{"Affiliation":[{"label":"Affiliation","value":"Arts, Faculty of","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#departmentOrSchool","classmap":"vivo:EducationalProcess","property":"vivo:departmentOrSchool"},"iri":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#departmentOrSchool","explain":"VIVO-ISF Ontology V1.6 Property; The department or school name within institution; Not intended to be an institution name."},{"label":"Affiliation","value":"Anthropology and Sociology, Department of","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#departmentOrSchool","classmap":"vivo:EducationalProcess","property":"vivo:departmentOrSchool"},"iri":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#departmentOrSchool","explain":"VIVO-ISF Ontology V1.6 Property; The department or school name within institution; Not intended to be an institution name."}],"AggregatedSourceRepository":[{"label":"Aggregated Source Repository","value":"DSpace","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/dataProvider","classmap":"ore:Aggregation","property":"edm:dataProvider"},"iri":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/dataProvider","explain":"A Europeana Data Model Property; The name or identifier of the organization who contributes data indirectly to an aggregation service (e.g. Europeana)"}],"Campus":[{"label":"Campus","value":"UBCV","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeCampus","classmap":"oc:ThesisDescription","property":"oc:degreeCampus"},"iri":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeCampus","explain":"UBC Open Collections Metadata Components; Local Field; Identifies the name of the campus from which the graduate completed their degree."}],"Creator":[{"label":"Creator","value":"Letkemann, Peter Jacob","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/creator","classmap":"dpla:SourceResource","property":"dcterms:creator"},"iri":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/creator","explain":"A Dublin Core Terms Property; An entity primarily responsible for making the resource.; Examples of a Contributor include a person, an organization, or a service."}],"DateAvailable":[{"label":"Date Available","value":"2011-05-02T22:35:26Z","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/issued","classmap":"edm:WebResource","property":"dcterms:issued"},"iri":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/issued","explain":"A Dublin Core Terms Property; Date of formal issuance (e.g., publication) of the resource."}],"DateIssued":[{"label":"Date Issued","value":"1971","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/issued","classmap":"oc:SourceResource","property":"dcterms:issued"},"iri":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/issued","explain":"A Dublin Core Terms Property; Date of formal issuance (e.g., publication) of the resource."}],"Degree":[{"label":"Degree (Theses)","value":"Doctor of Philosophy - PhD","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#relatedDegree","classmap":"vivo:ThesisDegree","property":"vivo:relatedDegree"},"iri":"http:\/\/vivoweb.org\/ontology\/core#relatedDegree","explain":"VIVO-ISF Ontology V1.6 Property; The thesis degree; Extended Property specified by UBC, as per https:\/\/wiki.duraspace.org\/display\/VIVO\/Ontology+Editor%27s+Guide"}],"DegreeGrantor":[{"label":"Degree Grantor","value":"University of British Columbia","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeGrantor","classmap":"oc:ThesisDescription","property":"oc:degreeGrantor"},"iri":"https:\/\/open.library.ubc.ca\/terms#degreeGrantor","explain":"UBC Open Collections Metadata Components; Local Field; Indicates the institution where thesis was granted."}],"Description":[{"label":"Description","value":"This study, based upon interviews with forty-five experienced\r\nproperty offenders, is intended as an addition to the sparse sociological literature having as its focus the description and analysis of criminal behaviour. Detailed attention\r\nis given to the technical and organizational dimensions of property offences. In contrast to much of the available literature on crime, this study does not deal with motivational\r\nfactors but rather with questions as to how crime is committed. The behavioural dimensions of two crimes in particular,\r\nnamely safecracking and bank robbery, are described in detail. Although it has long been recognized that a criminal's\r\nskills are learned, attention to the details of crime makes it possible to document what it is a criminal learns and how such learning takes place. This study shows that some mechanical\r\nskills are learned by way of formal instruction from the more experienced, and how and why some skills are more easily taught and learned in prison than other skills. It is indicated that the method of learning criminal skills does not resemble the system of apprenticeship common in legitimate skilled trades; criminals tend to work with equals, whether experienced or inexperienced. The data also indicates that some of the criminal's skills consist of making relevant and explicit such common-sense knowledge as is routinely used in everyday life\u2014the systematic application of such knowledge being best illustrated in the instance of \"casing\" procedures. The ability to make profitable, albeit illegal, use of everyday\r\nknowledge suggests a continuity in the socialization of criminals and non-criminals which is not developed in other literature.\r\nAnalysis of various types of crime, such as burglary, safecracking and armed robbery, leads to the development of two analytic units: surreptitious and non-surreptitious crimes. The former category is characterized by the criminal's concern with avoiding the victim, and the need of mechanical skills. Non-surreptitious crimes, in contrast, involve victim confrontation--the requisite skills having to do with organization\r\nand victim-management. It is argued that these analytic units are more manageable than those typologies and classificatory schemes which are based upon purely legal and career distinctions. In addition, this distinction is based upon the behavioural dimensions of crime rather than the social and personal\r\ncharacteristics of criminals. In this way the sociology of crime is more fully brought under the rubric of the sociology of occupations and hence of social science in general","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/description","classmap":"dpla:SourceResource","property":"dcterms:description"},"iri":"http:\/\/purl.org\/dc\/terms\/description","explain":"A Dublin Core Terms Property; An account of the resource.; Description may include but is not limited to: an abstract, a table of contents, a graphical representation, or a free-text account of the resource."}],"DigitalResourceOriginalRecord":[{"label":"Digital Resource Original Record","value":"https:\/\/circle.library.ubc.ca\/rest\/handle\/2429\/34205?expand=metadata","attrs":{"lang":"en","ns":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/aggregatedCHO","classmap":"ore:Aggregation","property":"edm:aggregatedCHO"},"iri":"http:\/\/www.europeana.eu\/schemas\/edm\/aggregatedCHO","explain":"A Europeana Data Model Property; The identifier of the source object, e.g. the Mona Lisa itself. This could be a full linked open date URI or an internal identifier"}],"FullText":[{"label":"Full Text","value":"MODUS OPERANDI: CRIME AS WORK by . Peter J . Letkemann M.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1965 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA February, 1971 In present ing t h i s thes is in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements fo r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make it f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study. I fu r ther agree that permission for extensive copying o f th is thes is fo r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h is representa t i ves . It is understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s thes is f o r f i n a n c i a l gain sha l l not be allowed without my wr i t ten permiss ion . Department The Un ive rs i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada MODUS OPERANDI: CRIME AS WORK ABSTRACT This study, based upon interviews with f o r t y - f i v e ex-perienced property offenders, i s intended as an addition to the sparse s o c i o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e having as i t s focus the description and analysis of criminal behaviour. Detailed at-tention i s given to the technical and organizational dimensions of property offences. In contrast to much of the available l i t e r a t u r e on crime, t h i s study does not deal with motiva-t i o n a l factors but rather with questions as to how crime i s committed. The behavioural dimensions of two crimes i n par-t i c u l a r , namely safecracking and bank robbery, are described i n d e t a i l . Although i t has long been recognized that a c r i m i -nal's s k i l l s are learned, attention to the d e t a i l s of crime makes i t possible to document what i t i s a criminal learns and how such learning takes place. This study shows that some me-chanical s k i l l s are learned by way of formal i n s t r u c t i o n from the more experienced, and how and why some s k i l l s are more e a s i l y taught and learned i n prison than other s k i l l s . I t i s indicated that the method of learning criminal s k i l l s does not resemble the system of apprenticeship common in legitimate s k i l l e d trades; criminals tend to work with equals, whether experienced or inexperienced. The data also indicates that some of the criminal's s k i l l s consist of making relevant and e x p l i c i t such common-sense knowledge as i s routinely used i n everyday l i f e \u2014 t h e systematic application of such knowledge being best i l l u s t r a t e d i n the instance of \"casing\" procedures. The a b i l i t y to make p r o f i t a b l e , a l b e i t i l l e g a l , use of every-day knowledge suggests a continuity i n the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of criminals and non-criminals which i s not developed i n other l i t e r a t u r e . Analysis of various types of crime, such as burglary, safecracking and armed robbery, leads to the development of two analytic units: surreptitious and non-surreptitious crimes. The former category i s characterized by the criminal's concern with avoiding the victim, and the need of mechanical s k i l l s . Non-surreptitious crimes, i n contrast, involve v i c t i m confrontation--the r e q u i s i t e s k i l l s having to do with organiza-t i o n and victim-management. I t i s argued that these a n a l y t i c units are more manageable than those typologies and c l a s s i f i -catory schemes which are based upon purely l e g a l and career d i s t i n c t i o n s . In addition, t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s based upon the behavioural dimensions of crime rather than the s o c i a l and per-sonal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of criminals. In t h i s way the sociology of crime i s more f u l l y brought under the rubric of the socio-logy of occupations and hence of s o c i a l science i n general. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Chapter I Introduction 1 Chapter II  Methodological Notes A. INTRODUCTION 39 B. SELECTION OF SUBJECTS 46 C. THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER 60 1. The Establishment of Independence 63 2. Researcher as Mediator 65 D. THE INTERVIEW 67 1. Informal, Unstructured Association 67 2. The Interview i n the Prison Context 69 (a) The Interview Context 69 (b) Interview Procedure 75 (c) Interview Problems 83 (d) Tape Recording 95 Chapter III  Perspectives on C r i m i n a l i t y A. INTRODUCTION 98 B. LEGAL CRITERIA AND PENAL CLASSIFICATION 100 i i i Ch. I l l cont.: Page C. LAY AND CRIMINAL PERSPECTIVES IN CONTRAST 107 1. The Criminal as \"Professional\" 107 (a) Rounders and Squares 110 (b) The \"true\" criminal and the \"bum\" 111 (c) Professional and Experienced\/Amateur 117 (d) Alky, Dope fiend, and Normals 129 2. The Criminal as Prisoner 133 (a) How much time done, and where 136 (b) Prison subculture and \"doing your own time\" 137 3. The Criminal as S p e c i a l i s t 143 (a) \"Having a l i n e \" 144 (b) Variations within a l i n e 150 (c) Small f r y \/ b i g shot 153 D. RECOGNITION AND REPUTATION 154 1. On being \"known\" 155 2. How orie becomes \"known\" .159 3. The implications of \"being known\" 163 Chapter IV Surreptitious Crimes: The Technical Dimensions of Burglary, with Special Attention to Safecracking A. INTRODUCTION 167 B. MAKING THE \"IN\" 172 1. Unlocked Windows 174 i i i Ch. IV cont.; Page 2. Fo r c i b l e Opening 175 (a) \"Loiding the door\" 17.8 (b) Tampering with the lock 178 (c) Lock picking 179 3. Alarm Systems 183 C. ACCESS TO CASH 191 1. House Burglary 192 2. Hotel Prowling 197 3. Commercial Establishments 200 D. SAFECRACKING AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE 20 3 1. Inroduction 203 2. Basic Tools and Equipment 205 (a) Grease 205 (b) Soap 214 (c) Knockers and String 214 3. Techniques of Safecracking 218, (a) The Jam Shot 22 3 (b) Shooting for Space 2 32 (c) The Gut Shot 2 34 (d) Harnessed Safes 236 (e) Blowing a Vault 2 38 (f) Non-explosive Techniques 242 4. The Interpretation of Technique 248 E. BEHAVIOURAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 2 63 XV page Chapter V Non-Surreptitious Crimes (Victim Confrontation): The Technical Dimensions of Robbery,.With Special Attention to Bank Robbery A. INTRODUCTION 2 71 B. PRE-EVENT PLANNING 275 C. PROCEDURAL VARIATIONS 280 1. Example No. 1 281 2. Example No. 2 299 D. DIMENSIONS OF VICTIM-MANAGEMENT 308 1. Surprise and V u l n e r a b i l i t y 30 9 2. Establishing Authority and Managing Tension 311 Chapter VI  Learning Technical S k i l l s A. INTRODUCTION 325 B. THE DELINQUENT STYLE 327 C. THE PRISON AS SCHOOL 332 D. LEARNING AND EXPERIENCE 349 V Page Chapter VII \"Casing\"; Perceptual S k i l l s A. INTRODUCTION 363 B. AVENUES OF INFORMATION 366 1. Information v i a other Criminals 366 2. Information v i a legitimate sources 371 3. Personal Investigation 376 C. ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 383 1. Patterns of Monetary Fluctuations 384 2. Fraudulent Use of Legitimate Roles 392 D. ASSESSMENT OF RISK 400 1. P r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the Victim 401 (a) The Risk Factor, for example, the Corner Grocer < 401 (b) The Age Factor, for example, the Banker 404 (c) The Incongruity P r i n c i p l e 408 (d) Home Owners 411 2. Location--A Reinterpretation of Geography 414 (a) Alarm systems 415 (b) P o l i c e 417 (c) Noise 422 E. ASSESSMENT OF DIFFICULTY 424 F. GENERAL COMMENTS ON CASING 430 Page Chapter VIII  Concluding Comments ^ ^ BIBLIOGRAPHY 441 APPENDIX: A. Supplementary Notes on Data C o l l e c t i o n 447 B. Interview Guide 454 C. Insurance Ratings 455 D. Alarm Systems 456 *** ACKNOWLEDGMENTS To ray respondents, p a r t i c u l a r l y Bob and Lloyd, who shared t h e i r experiences with me; To my Advisory Committee, p a r t i c u l a r l y Prof. Adrian Marriage and Dr. Roy Turner, for help and valuable suggestions; To my wife, Katie, for typing, patience and much encouragement; To the Canadian Penitentiary Service for per-mission to interview; To the Canada Council for f i n a n c i a l support\u2014 Thank you. Chapter I Introduction This paper i s intended as an addition to that small, yet growing body of research which has as i t s focus the des-c r i p t i o n and analysis of criminal behaviour. P a r t i c u l a r em-phasis i s to be given to the technical and organizational dimensions of such behaviour. The value of such an emphasis derives p a r t l y from the tendency of researchers to bypass these dimensions i n favor of research on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the criminal and on the defining processes of o f f i c i a l agen-c i e s . Much has been inferred from the i l l e g i t i m a c y of crime, but l i t t l e from the inherent nature of the behaviour i t s e l f . Despite the magnitude of the l i t e r a t u r e , both s c i e n t i -f i c and j o u r n a l i s t i c , on the subject of crime, s o c i o l o g i s t s studying criminal behaviour have argued that very l i t t l e i s a c t u a l l y known about such behaviour. A look at the exi s t i n g l i t e r a t u r e , with i t s preponderance of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes and typologies would seem to substantiate t h i s . The intended u t i l i t y of such c l a s s i f i c a t o r y schemes has ranged from that of the applied and r e h a b i l i t a t i v e to high le v e l s of abstraction and theory b u i l d i n g . Some of these cl a s s i f i c a t i o n s , notably those which combine exis t i n g l e g a l cate-gories with administratively relevant c r i t e r i a , have found t h e i r way into various therapeutic and r e h a b i l i t a t i v e programs 2 The most obvious weakness of many of these schemes i s the absence of s p e c i f i c a t i o n of the a n a l y t i c a l units by which the various categories are seen to be meaningful units i n re-l a t i o n to each other.^ This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of those schemes which u t i l i z e l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s as a b a s i s . Prob-lems of v a r i a t i o n i n law enforcement practices have further minimized the u t i l i t y of such schemes for comparative purposes. The number of c l a s s i f i c a t o r y types continues to grow. Journal a r t i c l e s i n p a r t i c u l a r , appear to concentrate on the 2 description of a single \"type\" , though the rela t i o n s h i p of t h i s type to a larger c l a s s i f i c a t o r y system i s seldom spelled out. C l i n a r d and Quinney point out that the factors which con-s t i t u t e the basis for various schemes w i l l d i f f e r according to the purpose of the scheme: Clarence Shrag, \"A Preliminary Criminal Typology\", Paci- f i c S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 4 (Spring, 1961)> pp. 11-16. Shrag distinguishes between c l a s s i f i c a t i o n and typology i n terms of these c r i t e r i a ; for example, a typology contains such s p e c i f i -cation, a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n does not. 2 For example, the publications of J u l i a n Roebuck, whose \"types\" are based upon arrest records: J.B. Roebuck and M.L. Cadwallader, \"The Negro Armed Rob-ber as a Criminal Type: The Construction and Application of a Typology\", P a c i f i c S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 4 (Spring, 1961), pp. 21-26. J.B. Roebuck, \"The Negro Numbers Man as a Criminal Type: The Construction and Application of a Typology\", Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and P o l i c e Science, 54 (March, 1963), pp. 48-60. J.B. Roebuck, \"The Jack-of-all-Trades Offender\", Crime  and Delinquency, 8 (January, 1962), pp. 21-23. 3 Typologies w i l l d i f f e r markedly from one another according to the p a r t i c u l a r phenomena upon which they are based. For example, i f a typology i s based on criminals, the emphasis w i l l be on such matters as l i f e h i s t o r i e s of offenders, self-conceptions, attitudes and so-c i a l background factors. On the other hand, i f the objective i s a typology of criminal beha-viour, attention w i l l be focused on such mat-ters as the mode of operation, the overt crimi-nal act, the s i t u a t i o n i n which the offence occurs, opportunities to commit crime, subcul-t u r a l norms, relationships between offenders, and s t r u c t u r a l aspects of the larger society. A typology based on c r i m i n a l i t y would consist of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that relate to the condi-tions and processes by which persons and be-haviours become defined as criminal.1 C Una id. and Quinney*s summarization of typologies as based upon eithe r criminals, criminal behaviour or criminality, f a c i l i t a t e s the evaluative process. Extended discussion and evaluation of the various typologies i s provided by various 2 sources. Our own discussion w i l l be limited to those aspects r e l a t i n g d i r e c t l y to the material to be presented i n t h i s paper. Leading text books and journals dealing with crime and s o c i a l problems display a good deal of consensus as to what are M. C l i n a r d and R. Quinney, Criminal Behaviour Systems:  A Typology, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc. (1967), p. 13. 2 For such discussion see i n p a r t i c u l a r : D.C. Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker: The Treatment of Delinquents and  C riminals, Englewood C l i f f s , N. J .: Prentice H a l l Inc. (1965); M. C l i n a r d and R. Quinney, Criminal Behaviour Systems: A  Typology, Chapter 1. 4 taken to be the cen t r a l t h e o r e t i c a l issues i n criminology. In terms of C l i n a r d and Quinney*s d i s t i n c t i o n s , the emphasis has to do with the attr i b u t e s of the cr i m i n a l . This emphasis i n turn, i s characterized by a p a r t i c u l a r methodological perspec-t i v e , namely s t a t i s t i c a l analysis of quantitative data derived from o f f i c i a l records, and a reliance upon i n s t i t u t i o n a l popu-lat i o n s for purposes of interviews and questionnaires. The use of quantitative data has provided such research with a superficially respectable status, inasmuch as criminolo-g i s t s were r e l a t i v e l y early i n t h e i r use of what i s sometimes referred to as \"hard data\"\"'\". Many research reports begin with an opening q u a l i f y i n g statement acknowledging the problems of r e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y inherent i n the data to be used, but proceed, nevertheless, to draw conclusions and make predictions which the reader i s intended to take seriously. Ned Polsky states: Fortunately, most criminologists are not ma-gicians, and the t y p i c a l criminology text i s given rather early on to moaning and groaning about the fact that criminals and the things they do are not well represented by o f f i c i a l crime s t a t i s t i c s . (This fact i s then usually ignored i n the l a t e r chapters.) 2 Emile Durkheim, Suicide, A Study i n Sociology, translated by J.A. Spaulding and G. Simpson, N.Y.: Free Press of Glencoe (1951). Durkheim's Suicide must be recognized as an early example of o f f i c i a l data. I t has since been repeatedly c r i t i -cized i n terms of the r e l i a b i l i t y of the data. Ned Polsky, Hustlers, Beats and Others, Chicago; Aldine Publishing Company (1967), p. 120. 5 David Maurer, commenting on studies done by Hooton and Rorschach, says: However, i n order to keep our perspective, we should remember that these highly t e c h n i c a l approaches t e l l us a l i t t l e (a very l i t t l e ) about the criminal, a good deal about the i n -vestigator and h i s methods, and almost nothing about crime.-*-I t i s not the intention here, to evaluate the procedures c r i t i c i z e d by Maurer, p a r t i c u l a r l y since such evaluation would need to take into account an investigator's purpose at hand. However, the u t i l i z a t i o n of the categories which comprise of-f i c i a l data can be misleading i f the assumptions b u i l t into the categories are not recognized. The consequence of analysis based upon a s u p e r f i c i a l acceptance of data provided by o f f i c i a l agencies, i s i l l u s t r a -2 ted by the study on delinquency by Shaw and McKay . They found delinquency to be highly correlated with broken homes, 3 and implied a causal r e l a t i o n s h i p . A recent ethnographic David Maurer, Whiz Mob, New Haven, Conn: College and University Press (1964), p. 12. 2 CR. Shaw and H.D. McKay, Juvenile Delinquency i n Urban  Areas, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1942). 3 The work of L e s l i e Wilkins, both i n B r i t a i n and the Uni-ted States, and of several researchers i n Sweden, represents a more sophisticated quantitative analysis of o f f i c i a l s t a t i s -t i c a l data. c f . L. Wilkins, S o c i a l Deviance, London: Tavistock Publications (1959); L. Wilkins, Evaluation of Penal Measures, N.Y.: Random House (1969); and N. C h r i s t i e , ed., Aspects of  S o c i a l Control i n Welfare States, V o l . I I , Toronto: Methuen Publishing (1969) . 6 study, concerned with the processes of juvenile j u s t i c e , sug-gests rather that the c o r r e l a t i o n may be accounted for i n terms of occupational dimensions of p o l i c e work.\"*\" This i s to say that o f f i c i a l categories are a product, as i t were, of some s o c i a l arrangement, rather than simple statements of \"what i s \" . They are formed not only by the be-haviour which they presumably refer to, but also by the v a r i e -t i e s of constraints forming the context of t h e i r genesis. Only by c a r e f u l attention to t h i s context, does the meaning of the category become c l e a r . For example, David Sudnow, by carefully looking at the occupational demands of the Public Defender's o f f i c e , found that the o f f i c i a l category \" l o i t e r i n g about a public playground \" refers to behaviour more commonly known as 2 the sexual molestation of young children, by older men. Sudnow* s i s but one of several recent studies which have provided us with d e s c r i p t i v e accounts regarding the s o c i a l context within which laws are broken and enforced. I t i s ironi-c a l that, given the magnitude of the l i t e r a t u r e on the subject of crime, there should be so l i t t l e which takes as i t s task the s p e c i f i c a t i o n of what i t i s that i s being studied. Re-searchers have la r g e l y assumed that terms such as \"crime\" and \"burglary\" can be understood without documentation. \"'\"Aaron Cicourel, The S o c i a l Organization of Juvenile Jus- t i c e , N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons (1968). 2 David Sudnow, \"Normal Crimes: S o c i o l o g i c a l Features of the Penal Code:,,Social Problems, V o l . 12 (Winter, 1965), pp. 255-270. 7 Only recently have researchers taken the int e r p r e t a t i o n of o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s as a research problem i n i t s own right.\"*\" This p a r t i c u l a r approach appears to have great p o t e n t i a l , a l -though at t h i s stage i t i s t e l l i n g us much more about the bureaucratic processes and the c r i t e r i a that determine o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , than about the criminals whom the s t a t i s t i c s are in-tended to describe. In terms of C l i n a r d and Quinney's three d i s t i n c t i o n s (the criminal, criminal behaviour and crimi n a l i t y ) t h i s approach i s d i r e c t i n g attention to. the t h i r d , namely crimi-n a l i t y . As defined by them, typologies based' on c r i m i n a l i t y \"would consist of c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that relate to the conditions and processes by which persons and behaviours become defined as 2 criminal\" . Given t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , the range of perspectives alluded to would include environmental accounts for the causes 3 of crime , as well as l a b e l l i n g theory from the standpoint of 4 symbolic i n t e r a c t i o n . Emphasis upon c r i m i n a l i t y has the advantage of placing criminology squarely within the framework of t r a d i t i o n a l so-c i o l o g i c a l themes, i n p a r t i c u l a r those of s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n and s o c i a l structure. I t s disadvantage l i e s i n tie i m p l i c i t \"Hj .1. .Kitsuse and A.V. Cicourel, \"A Note on the Uses of O f f i c i a l S t a t i s t i c s \" , S o c i a l Problems, 11 ( F a l l , 1963) ,pp. 131-139. 2 C l i n a r d and Quinney, Criminal Behaviour Systems;A Typology. 3 A good example: Edwin Schur, Our Criminal Society, Engle-wood C l i f f s : P r entice-Hall Inc. (1969). 4 c f . E. Rubmgton and M.S. Weinberg, Deviance, the Inter- a c t i o n i s t Perspective, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co. (1968). 8 suggestion that o f f i c i a l l a b e l l i n g and public d e f i n i t i o n s con-s t i t u t e the important aspects, and that non-labelled criminal acts and criminals are of no s o c i o l o g i c a l interest.''\" This approach, s i m i l a r to that which uses only o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , tends to ignore a substantial, i f not the major part of that a c t i v i t y which, i f brought to o f f i c i a l attention, would be defined as c r i m i n a l . This omission, plus i t s focus upon the behaviour of 2 those responsible for law-making and law enforcement rather than upon the behaviour of criminals, suggests,that the l a b e l -l i n g perspective i s not designed to provide the needed data on, criminal behaviour. 3 The studies by Skolnik-and C i c o u r e l are examples of how the perspectives of law enforcement personnel, and the bureaucratic constraints within which they work, point to nume-rous otherwise unnoticed aspects of criminal behaviour. On the other hand, i t might be argued that any model of o f f i c i a l legal processes i s inadequate unless the perspective of the criminal i s also taken into account. -'\u2022This i s to be distinguished from an e a r l i e r controversy i n the f i e l d where some, l i k e Tappan, argued that the only r e a l criminals are those so found by a court of law; c f . P a u l W. Tappan, \"Who Is The Criminal?\", American S o c i o l o g i c a l  Review, 12 (February, 1947), pp. 96-102. 2 For examples of t h i s perspective i n research, c f . J . Skolnik, J u s t i c e Without T r i a l , N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (1966); and A. Cicourel, The S o c i a l Organization of Juvenile  J u s t i c e . 3 I b i d . 9 In h i s 1966 introduction to Shaw's The Jack-Roller, Howard Becker states: I f we take Stanley seriously, as h i s story must impel us to do, we might well raise a series of questions that have been r e l a t i v e l y l i t t l e studied\u2014questions about the people who deal with delinquents, the t a c t i c s they use, t h e i r suppositions about the world, and the constraints and pressures they are subject to. Such studies are only now beginning to be dene. Close study of The Jack-Roller might provide us with a wide range of questions to put as we begin to look at the dealings of policemen, judges and j a i l e r s with delinquents. 1 Contrary to the suggestion by Becker, current research on o f f i c i a l processes does not emanate from studies of crimi-nal behaviour. This i s hardly surprising, given the r e l a t i v e s c a r c i t y of studies such as The Jack-Roller, upon which one might draw. We have discussed above, two of three approaches to the study of crime as defined by C l i n a r d and Quinney. The f i r s t involved emphasis upon att r i b u t e s of the criminal, the second upon at t r i b u t e s of the l a b e l l i n g processes. I t has been ar-gued that both approaches t e l l us more about o f f i c i a l and re-search processes than about criminal behaviour. We turn now to the t h i r d approach, namely the study of criminal behaviour i t s e l f . .Where does one f i n d information dealing with such matters as the criminal's method of operation, the criminal career and l i f e - s t y l e , subcultural norms, and relationships between. criminals? Shaw, The Jack-Roller,, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1930), p. i i i . 10 Sutherland's The Professional Thief , David Maurer's 2 3 The Big Con , and Whiz Mob are the best known and most widely used descriptive studies dealing with the dimensions l i s t e d above, judging by the frequent reference to them i n the l i t e -rature. Their continued use, despite p u b l i c a t i o n dates of 1937, 1940 and 1955 respectively, i s i n d i c a t i v e not only of t h e i r academic value, but also of the r e l a t i v e absence of comparable, contemporary research. Except for Sutherland's study of professional t h e f t c i t e d above and Maurer's work on the con-fidence game, there has been l i t t l e empirical research on the various types of professional crime. The research that does exi s t includes Cameron's study of professional and non-profes-sional s h o p l i f t e r s i n a Chicago department store, Maurer's work on professional pickpockets, Roe-buck and Johnson's study of the 'short con' man, Polsky's observations on the pool hustler, and Lemert's study of the systematic check forger.^ Complaints regarding the s c a r c i t y of descriptive material on criminal behaviour are found i n many other criminology texts and related publications: Edwin Sutherland, The Professional Thief, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1937). 2 Davxd Maurer, The Big Con, Indxanapolxs: Bobbs-Merrill (1940). 3 Maurer, Whiz Mob. F i r s t published by the American D i a l e c t Society, G a i n e s v i l l e , F l o r i d a , i n 1955. 4 C l i n a r d and Quinney, Criminal Behaviour Systems; A  Typology, p. 429. 11 I t i s a l l very well to draw a f u l l e r quanti-t a t i v e picture of the numbers and kinds of c r i -minals and criminal acts. But we cannot use t h i s to dodge what i s the ultimate, q u a l i t a t i v e task, p a r t i c u l a r l y regarding career criminals whose importance to any t h e o r i s t of human beha-viour, not to mention the rest of society, i s so disproportionate to t h e i r numbers: providing well-rounded, contemporary, s o c i o l o g i c a l descrip-tions and analyses of criminal l i f e styles, sub-cultures, and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to larger s o c i a l processes and structures. This i s where c r i m i -nology f a l l s f l a t on i t s face....Criminologists can t e l l you about Sutherland's Chic Conwell, but they can't give you comparable data on pro-fessionals of today, s t i l l less the many other kinds of data on professionalism i n crime that Sutherland never got to at all.-'-More recently, Wolfgang and Fer r a c u t i , who su b t i t l e d t h e i r work \"Towards an Integrated Theory i n Criminology\", state: Unfortunately, there has thus far been i n -adequate attention and research time given to a f u l l d escription and analysis of criminal of-fence types.^ The l i s t of early descriptive studies can be only slightly expanded. Studies which, l i k e Sutherland's and Maurer's, have had an on-going influence, include W.I. Thomas's The Unadjusted 3 4 G i r l , Shaw's The Jack-Roller , Jerome H a l l ' s Theft, Law and \"'\"Polsky, Hustlers, Beats and Others, p. 122. 2 M.E. Wolfgang and F. Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence, London: Tavistock Publications (1967), p. 40. 3 W.I. Thomas, The Unadjusted G i r l , Boston: L i t t l e and Brown (192 3) . 4Shaw, The Jack-Roller. 12 1 2 Society , Donald Cressey's Other People's Money , Thrasher's 3 4 The Gang , and W-F. Whyte's Street Corner Society . U n t i l about 1965, s o c i o l o g i s t s theorizing about crime have had to r e l y almost exclusively upon these aforementioned early studies, for information of a descriptive and analytic s t y l e . The work of other writers and j o u r n a l i s t s who have dealt i n more popular style with the subject, and whose material has frequently been u t i l i z e d for purposes of supplementing systematic research, i s not to be ignored. Inclusion of such material greatly expands our i n i t i a l bibliography. .Some names, however, are more prominent than others and need s p e c i f i c 5 6 mention. The work of Damon Runyon and Dostoevsky cannot be 1 Jerome H a l l , Theft, Law and Society, Indianapolis: Bobbs-M e r r i l l (1952). 2 D.R. Cressey, Other People's Money: A Study of the So- c i a l Psychology of Embezzlement, Glencoe: The Free Press (1953). 3 F.M. Thrasher, The Gang: A Study of 1313 Gangs i n Chi- cago, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1927). \"Sj-F. Whyte, Street Corner Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1943). ^Damon Runyon, Runyon on Broadway, London: Constable and Co. Ltd. (1950) . ^F. Dostoevsky, Crime and Punishment, London: Dent (1963), o r i g i n a l l y published i n 1866. I t i s noteworthy that a chapter from Dostoevsky's The House of the Dead, London: William Heineman Ltd. (1862) i s reprinted i n a recent reader i n Crimi-nology by G. Sykes and T.E. Drabek, Law and the Lawless, Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd. (1969). 13 ignored. Brendan Behan's Borstal Boy , John Martin's My L i f e 2 3 i n Crime and Jean Evans' Three Men provide \"xnside\" subjec-t i v e accounts which are highly valuable to the analyst. The serious scholar, however, looking for detailed and well documented data on criminal behaviour, w i l l be disappoin-ted. In 1955, David Maurer, the l i n g u i s t s p e c i a l i z i n g i n criminal argot, commented: Ac t u a l l y we know l i t t l e about crime as a way of l i f e ; i n fact, we have more data on the be-haviour pattern of almost any obscure pr i m i t i v e t r i b e than we have on these problem areas within our own culture....At any rate, we need more l i g h t thrown into these areas, not so much to reform society as to understand i t . 4 Donald Gibbons has stated: H i s t o r i c a l l y , criminologists have not paid much attention to the detailed description of the beha-v i o u r a l forms taken by c r i m i n a l i s t i c deviance. Yet i t hardly needs to be pointed out that s a t i s f a c t o r y explanation of behaviour i s u n l i k e l y i n the absence of good information about the phenomena to be explained. The p r o l i f e r a t i o n of studies based on a generally u n c r i t i -c a l useage of o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s did not produce either the theory or the s o c i a l reforms sought a f t e r . More recently, and i n p a r t i c u l a r since 1965, the l i t e r a t u r e indicates a s h i f t i n the d i r e c t i o n of research. As indicated e a r l i e r , a serious look at the categories which constitute o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s has re-sulted i n several descriptive accounts having to do with the \"'\"Brendan Behan, Bor s t a l Boy, London: Hutchinson (1958) . 2 J.B. Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, N.Y.: Signet Books (1952). 3 Jean Evans, Three Men, N.Y.: Random House Inc. (1950). ^Maurer, Whiz Mob, p. 12. 5 Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker, p. 285. 14 processes of o f f i c i a l decision-making. In addition, contem-porary inte r e s t i n the style of Sutherland and Maurer i s e v i -2 dent. W. J . Einstadter , i n h i s study of the s o c i a l organiza-t i o n of armed robbery, examines h i s data with reference to Sutherland's work. He concludes that the contemporary st y l e of armed robbery bears l i t t l e resemblance to that depicted by Sutherland. Similar also to Sutherland's use of autobiography i s the account by Williamson, edited by R. Lincoln Keiser and 3 analysed by Paul Bohannan, both anthropologists. An e a r l i e r account by Parker and A l l e r t o n , despite i t s more popular style , constitutes a r i c h source of subjective perspective of the 4 cr i m i n a l . In 1965, Gibbons noted: A f a i r amount of information has begun to appear on another question regarding lower-class delinquents, namely, 'What do delinquents do? 1^ 6 Walter M i l l e r , an anthropologist, i s currently Sudnow, \"Normal C r i m e s : , pp. 255-270; Cicourel, The S o c i a l Organization of Juvenile J u s t i c e ; Skolnik, J u s t i c e Without T r i a l . 2 W.J. Einstadter, \"The S o c i a l Organization of Armed Robbery\", S o c i a l Problems, Vo l . 17, No. 1 (Summer, 1969), pp. 64-83, from h i s unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , \"Armed Robbery\u2014A Career Perspective\", University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley (1966). 3 H. Williamson, Hustler'., F. Lincoln Keiser, ed., N.Y.: Avon Books (1965) . In h i s concluding commentary, Bohannan states, \"Indeed, not since Sutherland's 'Professional T h i e f fo r t y years ago have we had so f u l l an account from the other side of the law.\" 4 Tony Parker and R. A l l e r t o n , The Courage of His Convictions, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd. (1962). 5 Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker, p. 285. 6W.B. M i l l e r , \"White Gangs\", Transaction, V o l . 6, No. 10 (September, 1968), pp. 11-26. 15 concluding a ten-year ethnographic study on delinquency i n C h i -cago, and R. Lincoln Keiser has recently published an ethnography on the s o c i a l structure and culture of the gang''\". Camp, i n h i s study of bank robbery, points out that h i s \"...main unit of analysis moves away from the actor (the bank 2 robber) to the action (the robbery) ...\" . Ward and Kassebaum, writing i n .1965, claim that t h e i r s i s \"the f i r s t comprehensive study of the s o c i a l structure of 3 4 a women's prison\" , and W.E. Mann , i n h i s recently published book on a Canadian Reformatory, i s correct when he states that h i s i s \"the f i r s t such study i n Canada\". Renewed in t e r e s t i n descriptive studies makes possible the r e v i s i o n of extant t h e o r e t i c a l models. Dubin points out that the early descriptive studies l i s t e d above served the same function i n t h e i r time: ^R. Lincoln Keiser, The Vice Lords, Warriors of the Streets, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehard and Winston (1969). 2 G.M. Camp, \"Nothing to Lose: A Study of Bank Robbery i n America\", unpublished doctoral d i s s e r t a t i o n , Yale University (1967), p. i i i . 3 D.A.Ward and G.G. Kassebaum, Women's Prison,.Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. (1965) . W^.E. Mann, Society Behind Bars, Toronto: S o c i a l Science Pub. (1967), p. 14. Studies of Canadian Correctional I n s t i t u -tions are l i m i t e d to G. Hjalmarson, Just C a l l Us Bandits, Toronto: Doubleday (1961)\u2014(Hjalmarson i s a Kingston Peniten-t i a r y inmate ); and some Government Commission Reports. I know of no Canadian study comparable to D.Clemmer, The Prison Com-munity, N.Y.: Holt,. Rinehart and Winston (1940), or G. Sykes, The Society of Captives, N.J.: Princeton University Press (1958). 16 One of the descriptive tasks of empirical research i s to delineate the observable states of a system. When t h i s i s done, i t i s l i k e l y that there w i l l be s i g n i f i c a n t feedback to the model from which the research was generated* In p a r t i c u l a r , the feedback may force modifica-t i o n of the st a r t i n g model by introducing states of the t h e o r e t i c a l systems that were not pre-vi o u s l y recognized. Several examples w i l l serve to i l l u s t r a t e t h i s point. Sutherland, i n h i s study White C o l l a r Crime, made i t cl e a r that criminal behaviour resulted i n states of the system l i n k i n g the i n d i v i d u a l with h i s s o c i a l m i l i e u that were not previously conceptualized by c r i m i n o l o g i s t s . Clinard's study The Black  Market as an extension of the analysis of white c o l l a r crime added further complexity to the states of the i n d i v i d u a l - s o c i a l systems that produce criminal behaviour. Subsequently, Yablonsky, s t i l l working i n the area of c r i m i -nal behaviour, analysed the delinquent gang as a near group and came to the conclusion that there was a state of relationship among members of a delinquent gang that was different from the states usually postulated by the students of delinquency. In t h i s example of the work of Sutherland, C l i n a r d and Yablonsky, each des-cribed system states that required r e v i s i o n of extant t h e o r e t i c a l models i n order to incorpo-rate the empirically determined system s t a t e s . x The early impetus towards descriptive sociology emanat-ing from the \"Chicago School\" has recently been augmented by a renewed i n t e r e s t i n the phenomenological and ethnographic stance as exhibited by s o c i o l o g i s t s at the University of C a l i -f o r n i a . The perspectives of Goffman and Garfinkel, for ex-ample, are shaping the research of t h e i r students, who appear to f i n d ready pub l i c a t i o n of t h e i r work. Such publications R\u201e Dubin, Theory Building, N.Y.: The Free Press (1969), pp. 162-163. 17 have not as yet p e r t a i n e d d i r e c t l y t o c r i m i n a l behaviour, 2 3 but s e v e r a l , n o t a b l y those of Wiseman and Cavan , provxde u s e f u l r e l a t e d data. The dearth of d e s c r i p t i v e material d e a l i n g s p e c i f i c a l l y w i t h c r i m i n a l behaviour may. be p a r t l y accounted f o r i n terms of the i n a c c e s s a b i l i t y of such data r e l a t i v e to the ease of o b t a i n i n g s t a t i s t i c a l data. By the f a c t of i t s i l l e g i t i m a c y , . . . . 4 p r a c t i t i o n e r s have an i n t e r e s t i n m a i n t a i n i n g secrecy . W r i -t e r s and j o u r n a l i s t s , even those who have found entrance i n t o c r i m i n a l \"subcultures\", f i n d i t necessary t o f i l l - i n or to e m b e l l i s h t h e i r otherwise incomplete accounts. In a d d i t i o n , and as I s h a l l document l a t e r , researchers i n t e r e s t e d i n com-municating d i r e c t l y w i t h confined c r i m i n a l s w i l l f i n d that those charged w i t h t h e i r custody discourage such contact and encourage i n s t e a d the use of e x i s t i n g , f i l e d data. As i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r > E i n s t a d t e r ' s d i s s e r t a t i o n on armed robbery i s as yet unpublished. 2 J.P. Wiseman, S t a t i o n s of the L o s t , Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: P r e n t i c e - H a l l (1970). 3 S h e r r i Cavan, L i q u o r License, Chicago: A l d i n e P u b l i s h i n g Co. (1966) . 4 Ned P o l s k y has argued t h a t the d i f f i c u l t y of doing r e -search on i l l e g i t i m a t e behaviour i s g r e a t l y exaggerated but agrees t h a t a r e a l consequence of the exaggeration i s t h a t researchers have p r e f e r r e d to do research on the \"law s i d e \" of crime. c f . Polsky, H u s t l e r s , Beats and Others, Chapter 3. 18 Researchers have also tended to study those types of crime most amenable to research. For example, studies on homi-cide far outnumber studies on armed robbery. Probably because of the seriousness of homi-cide and i t s high degree of s o c i a l v i s i b i l i t y (hence detection), t h i s offence has received more attention than most other types of criminal offence from a phenomenological perspective.1 At any rate, and for various reasons such as the above, s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s , l i k e the public, must r e l y heavily on jour-n a l i s t s and the mass media for information on criminal beha-viour. I t i s generally agreed that such presentations are probably incomplete, but the c r i t e r i a for evaluation are not e x p l i c i t l y stated. I t i s the intention, therefore, as stated e a r l i e r , to add to that growing body of research which has as i t s focus the d e s c r i p t i o n and analysis of criminal behaviour. An effort w i l l be made to get as close to such a c t i v i t y as possible, by way of extensive use of verbatim accounts by criminals. P a r t i c u l a r attention w i l l be focussed upon the techni-c a l and organizational dimensions of criminal behaviour. Most writers have given these dimensions secondary attention, f a -vouring instead to analyse values and a t t i t u d e s . I t i s note-worthy that those studies (such as Sutherland's and Maurer's) ^Wolfgang and Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence, p. 40 . 19 most frequently referred to i n research on crime, have placed heavy emphasis on technical dimensions. I t w i l l be argued here that the significance of behaviour can hardly be assessed unless the nature of that behaviour i s f i r s t known. Not only i n the sociology of crime, but i n other f i e l d s as well, we have often studied the implications of behaviour p r i o r to a study of the behaviour i t s e l f . Implications of industrializa-t i o n were studied at great length p r i o r to any detailed exami-nations of behaviour within an i n d u s t r i a l s e t t i n g . Worker d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n was i n f e r r e d p r i o r to recognition of v a r i a -tions within i n d u s t r i a l contexts. Only recently has there been reborn an i n t e r -est i n the core feature of the modern i n d u s t r i a l w orld\u2014the technologies upon which i t i s ground-ed. S o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s and management th e o r i s t s have been pre-occupied for several decades with 'human problems' and human rel a t i o n s i n work or-ganizations. A recent analysis could discover fewer than three dozen research studies i n Ameri-can, B r i t i s h , French and German l i t e r a t u r e empi-r i c a l l y dealing with s o c i a l aspects of the man-machine re l a t i o n s h i p . This paucity i s a harsh commentary on the neglect of technology during the current pre-occupation with the psyche of man i n industry. x Case studies of factory work have \"paid o f f \" t h e o r e t i -c a l l y . Sweeping generalizations have been replaced as a r e s u l t of a new appreciation of v a r i a t i o n s within the i n d u s t r i a l context. R. Dubin, et a l . , Leadership and Productivity, San Fran-c i s c o : Chandler Publishing Co. (1965), p. 10. The study re-ferred to by Dublin i s by M. Meissner, \"Behavioural Adaptations to I n d u s t r i a l Technology\", unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Un i v e r s i t y of Oregon, Department of Sociology (1963). 20 In p a r t i c u l a r , the importance of technical v a r i a t i o n s i s of recent\"*\" acknowledgement. I t i s reasonable to assume that criminal behaviour should be no less immune to the e f f e c t s of technological change than i s non-criminal behaviour. Nowhere, to my knowledge, have the ef f e c t s of technological change (for example, unemployment, worker re-training, specialization) been studied with reference to criminal behaviour. David Maurer recognizes that criminal techniques vary over time, but i n s i s t s on the continuity of underlying p r i n c i p l e s : I f we examine the multifarious rackets prac-t i c e d by the. legions of professional criminals i n the United States today, we are hard put to i t to discover a single new type of crime. Each has i t s prototype i n some culture going back to the beginning of recorded h i s t o r y . Every p r i n -c i p l e of thievery known today was chronicled by Petronius as he surveyed the Roman underworld; on our own times i s to be found recorded i n the great mass of picaresque l i t e r a t u r e which flood-ed Europe during the 16th and 17th centuries; these p r i n c i p l e s were already ancient and time-less, i t should be noted, by the time they were written down. Techniques change, but the p r i n -c i p l e s remain the same.2 Although Maurer himself has spelled out the p r i n c i p l e s of confidence games and demonstrated t h e i r a p p l i c a b i l i t y over time, no such p r i n c i p l e s are available for other types of crime. I t i s cl e a r from Maurer*s own studies, that such Though they were pointed to e a r l i e r by, for example, Marx and Veblen. 2 Maurer, Whiz Mob, p. 14. 21 p r i n c i p l e s cannot be developed without a detailed knowledge of technique. Such knowledge i s not available for most major crimes, except i n b i t s and pieces. As an example of the u t i l i t y of Maurer's p r i n c i p l e s i t i s necessary to quote from h i s own work again: As a b r i e f i l l u s t r a t i o n of how tenaciously Freudian or pseudo-Freudian explanations for crime influence contemporary thinking, I fi n d i n the 1954 publi c a t i o n of the Isaac Ray Lec-tures, delivered at Yale by Dr. Gregory Zilboorg, the following passage i n which he comments on a diary by Barrington, the famous 18th century t h i e f , who notes that pickpockets i n London l i k e to go to work on the crowd the moment the victims swing at a public hanging: 'If we re-c a l l the intimate relationships between the murder and suicide i n our psychic economy, we may understand a l i t t l e better the pickpockets who p l i e d t h e i r trade while within the sight of the strangled criminal swinging from the gallows. A f t e r a l l , they had v i c a r i o u s l y par-t i c i p a t e d i n the act of execution and also, therefore, had v i c a r i o u s l y paid for t h e i r past crimes. This automatically brought them into a state of combined vicar i o u s expiation and challenge against those righteous possessors of f u l l pockets which they proceeded to pick with a complete sense of doing what they wanted to do, no matter what. This was t h e i r revenge for t h e i r own vicari o u s execution.' Now Dr. Zilboorg i s an eminent p s y c h i a t r i s t and perhaps as w e l l q u a l i f i e d as any to write on the psy-chology of the criminal act. But i f he had even a rudimentary understanding of how pick-pockets l i v e and work, he would never have made the statement just quoted. He does not know that the timing of thef t from the person can be e a s i l y explained on the basis of a very sound mechanical p r i n c i p l e of misdirection which i s as old as organized thievery. 'You can't s t e a l a man's money as long as he has h i s mind on i t . ' Maurer, Whiz Mob, pp. 14-15; quoting Gregory Zilboorg, The Psychology of the Criminal Act and Punishment, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co. (1954), pp. 65-66. 22 The \"mechanical p r i n c i p l e of misdirection\" referred to by Maurer, above, places the criminal within the context of the sane and the r a t i o n a l , rather than the pathological and possibly b i z a r r e . The p r i n c i p l e of misdirection would seem to be an ex-tension and refinement of a p r i n c i p l e used by many non-criminals for legitimate purposes. More important, the simpler and there-fore preferred interpretation of the' act requires a thorough knowledge of criminal technique, or as Sudnow\"*\" might put i t , of the \"procedural basis\" of criminal behaviour. Attention to the t e c h n i c a l and organizational aspects of criminal behaviour places such research within the rubric of the sociology of work and occupations. For example, both criminals and nan-criminals need to develop c e r t a i n s k i l l s necessary for the suc-sess f u l completion of work tasks. Furthermore, the temporal dimensions of work place c e r t a i n r e s t r a i n t s upon non-work time. The implication of technology and of work-time have been studied i n considerable d e t a i l by s o c i o l o g i s t s of work and industry. What I am suggesting i s that the various dimensions of work would appear to be as applicable, for the purpose of study, to the i l l e g i t i m a t e as to the legitimate worker. I f not, i t may be that our concepts are unduly l i m i t e d . Ned Polsky applied the concepts, both of the sociology of work and the sociology of l e i s u r e , to h i s study on poolroom h u s t l e r s . Although the study i t s e l f i s a strong case for the continued application of t h i s approach, he has argued h i s po s i t i o n more e x p l i c i t l y . 'D. Sudnow, Passing On, Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice Hall (1967) . 23 Criminologists stand to lose l i t t l e and gain much i n the way of s o c i o l o g i c a l understanding i f , when studying people dedicated to an i l l e g a l oc-cupation, they w i l l overcome t h e i r fascination with the ' i l l e g a l ' part long enough to focus on the 'occupation' part. A f t e r a l l , any theory of i l l e g a l occupations can be but a s p e c i a l case, a l b e i t an important one, of general occupational theory. Criminologists, following the lead of the l a t e Edwin Sutherland, recognize that one h a l l -mark of the career c r i m i n a l \u2014 b e he engaged i n major crime or, l i k e the hustler most of the time, i n v i o l a t i n g generally unenforced criminal law\u2014 i s that the i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y i n question c o n s t i -tutes h i s regular job. Yet t h e i r researches seem thoroughly untenanted by what occupational s o c i o l o g i s t s have learned about how to look at someone else's regular j o b . \u00b1 The p o t e n t i a l analytic u t i l i t y of an occupational per-spective i n the study of crime may be demonstrated by the ex-amples given below. My own data on safecracking indicates that safecrackers open safes on a sporadic and i r r e g u l a r schedule. Only i n ex-ceptional circumstances would safecrackers attempt to \"go on a caper\" more often than once a week, despite the fact that p r o f i t a b l e opportunities are not seriously reduced by more frequent a c t i v i t y . T r a d i t i o n a l explanations for the sporadic a c t i v i t i e s of criminals have revolved about the need for c r i -minals to r e s t r a i n t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s p e r i o d i c a l l y in,order to 'cool' p o l i c e \"heat\", and about the assumption that criminal a c t i v i t y pays so well that i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s need only work Polsky, Hustlers, Beats and Others, p. 101. 24 p e r i o d i c a l l y . These explanations are not to be discounted, yet both raise additional questions. Why do safecrackers not avoid p o l i c e pressure by moving from c i t y to c i t y rather than by temporarily ceasing a c t i v i t y ? Why do safecrackers not ac-cumulate c a p i t a l by more frequent a c t i v i t y , as would be con-sistent with the Western free enterprise t r a d i t i o n ? An occupational perspective suggests an unusual approach, namely that we might be dealing here 1 with a case of .\" r e s t r i c t e d output\". S o c i o l o g i s t s of work have discovered that the re-s t r i c t i o n of output i s not necessarily due to external factors, but i s frequently one of the products of work-group pressure. C e r t a i n l y i t i s hard to think of occupations i n which there i s no group preoccupation with de-f i n i t i o n of proper l e v e l s of e f f o r t and product and of those l e v e l s which, since they may en-courage others i n the work drama to expect too much, are p o t e n t i a l l y dangerous for a l l who share the fate of l i v i n g by the given trade or c a l l i n g . 2 This perspective encourages us to look beyond obvious external r e s t r a i n t s (such as p o l i c e a c t i v i t y ) , to the implica-tions of being involved i n group criminal a c t i v i t y as over against operating as a \"loner\". ^Donald Roy, \"Quota R e s t r i c t i o n and Goldbricking i n a Machine Shop\", American Journal of Sociology, 57 (March, 1952), pp. 427-442. 2 . E.C. Hughes, \"The S o c i o l o g i c a l Study of Work: An E d i -t o r i a l Forward\", American Journal of Sociology, V o l . LVII, No. 5 (March,. 1952), p. 426. 25 As a second example of the u t i l i t y of occupational concepts, I s h a l l quote at some length from Polsky's study of poolroom hu s t l e r s : As to the possible gain for criminology i n the o r i e n t a t i o n I suggest, consider, for ex-ample, one t h e o r e t i c a l implication of what the h u s t l e r often does when he needs addi t i o n a l sources of income. I t suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y that many of the data criminologists refer to by rubrics such as 'the occasional criminal' or 'occasional crime' would be more sharply conceptualized and better understood under the heading 'crime as moonlighting'. This i s for two reasons. F i r s t , as soon as we think of crime i n t h i s way, i t becomes clear e r that much serious crime (for example, bank robbery) i s undertaken by people who are neither 'mentally i l l ' nor 'white-collar criminals' nor oriented to serious crime as a career (unlike the hust-ler) but who are employed i n and i d e n t i f y with p e r f e c t l y legitimate lower-class jobs, get way behind i n t h e i r b i l l s , and see temporary or 'one-shot' criminal a c t i v i t y as a way to get solvent without giving up t h e i r regular jobs. Second, a major precondition of moonlight-ing, according to Wilensky, i s the existence of 'occupations and industries on f l e x i b l e work schedules which provide opportunity for part-time help', and more recent analysis by labor economists confirm t h i s point: 'the i n -dustries i n which moonlighters found t h e i r se-cond jobs were t y p i c a l l y those providing op-p o r t u n i t i e s for part-time work'. Most crime f i t s these descriptions p e r f e c t l y . Indeed, ene of the most genuinely appealing things about crime to career criminals and part-timers alike \u2014though one would hardly gather t h i s from criminology t e x t s \u2014 i s that for most crimes the working hours are both short and f l e x i b l e . 1 Polsky, Hustlers, Beats and Others, p. 103. 26 A t h i r d and more recent example i n the sociology of deviant behaviour, are Skipper and McCaghy's studies of the occupational requirements of being a strip-teaser.\"*\" The high rate of lesbianism among pro s t i t u t e s and strip-teasers has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been explained i n psychological and psychoanalyti-c a l terms. Skipper and McCaghy, by looking at the occupational aspects of being a s t r i p teaser, are able to account for les-bian behaviour without recourse to psychopathology. Factors such as s p a t i a l mobility of the occupation, occupational image, worker v u l n e r a b i l i t y , and hours of work are u t i l i z e d to account for homosexual preference. This explanation i s also able to account for the lack of lesbian tendencies among those s t r i p -teasers whose work s i t u a t i o n does not involve t r a v e l . The a b i l i t y to account for contrary cases, as well as the law of parsimony, suggests that the occupational perspective i s the more powerful explanatory device. In addition, the occupational perspective provides a wider framework within which, to analyse the transmission of values and s k i l l s , as well as the process and context of learn-ing. Howard Becker has used t h i s framework i n h i s analysis, J.K. Skipper and C.H. McCaghy, \"Strip-teasers: The Anatomy and Career Contingencies of a Deviant Occupation\", S o c i a l Problems, V o l . 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1970), pp. 391-405; and J.K. Skipper and C.H. McCaghy, \"Lesbian Behaviour as an Adaptation to the Occupation of Stripping\", S o c i a l Problems, V o l . 17, No. 2 ( F a l l , 1969), pp. 262-270. 27 of both the subculture of jazz musicians and the learning of marijuana smoking.\"'\" James Bryan has documented the learning 2 process of p r o s t i t u t i o n i n terms of the concept of career. One looks i n vain, however, for a contemporary analysis of con-ventional crime from the perspective of the sociology of work and occupations. Sociology, and c e r t a i n l y the sociology of occupations has benefited greatly by the concommitant u t i l i z a t i o n of two methodological stances, namely attention to both behaviour and s o c i a l action. In addition to d e t a i l e d attention to the behavioural dimensions of crime, i t i s intended i n ftis paper as well, to take seriously the perspective of the criminal himself. This requires that the researcher avoid imposing an \"outside\" order upon the data. He must look for the categories which are meaningful to the p a r t i c i p a n t and seek to a r t i c u l a t e the analytic properties of these categories and t h e i r r e l a t i o n -ship one to another. He must look to the actor for answers to questions having to do with the meaning of an action and i t s motivations. The relationship between the subjective perspective of the actor and i t s behavioural dimensions poses p a r t i c u l a r me-thodological problems for anyone doing research on criminal \"Sl.S. Becker, Outsiders, N.Y.: The Free Press (1963). 2 J . Bryan, \"Apprenticeships i n P r o s t i t u t i o n \" , S o c i a l  Problems, V o l . 12, No. 3 (Winter, 1965), pp. 278-297. 28 behaviour. Since the behaviour he i s studying i s i l l e g i t i m a t e , there are various and obvious reasons why he i s dependent upon the actor for a description of the behaviour. This description may be supplemented by persons who become involved i n the be-haviour through circumstance (for example, robbery victims) or through occupation (for example, the p o l i c e ) . For d e t a i l s of the procedures and s k i l l s involved one must, however, r e l y heavily upon the actor's own account, the behaviour i n ques-t i o n not being amenable to observation without participation.\"^ A b r i e f review of two recent studies focussing on the perspective of the actor may help to c l a r i f y the objectives of t h i s research. John Irwin, i n h i s study The Felon, set as h i s objective the analysis of the career of a t y p i c a l felon. With t h i s i n mind, he singles out three concepts as ce n t r a l to h i s analy-2 s i s : \"perspective, i d e n t i t y and behaviour system\". In h i s opening chapter he says: The methodological implications w i l l be discussed i n the following chapter. I t might be noted here that such observa-t i o n a l problems are not confined to the study of criminal be-haviour. Skolnik, i n h i s study of p o l i c e behaviour, discovered that observation was impossible without considerable p a r t i c i -pation i n the behaviour to be observed. The methodological implications are similar; for example, the researcher i s both observer and actor. The p r a c t i c a l consequences are d i f f e r e n t ; namely, Skolnik did not become a criminal through p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as would the researcher-participant i n crime. 2 . John Irwin, The Felon, Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice H a l l (1970), p. 3. 29 Allow me to answer the major c r i t i c i s m which I anticipate w i l l be inspired by the general approach on p a r t i c u l a r aspects of t h i s study: namely that an analysis which focuses on the perspective of the actor, subcultural patterns, and shared meaning worlds remains at the l e v e l of the i d e a l - t y p i c a l , far above concrete be-haviour, and therefore misses most of the r e a l behaviour. To a great extent t h i s c r i t i c i s m i s true, but no more of t h i s approach than of most others. I t i s noteworthy that Irwin's study of the criminal career contains no discussion of what criminals a c t u a l l y do as c r i m i n a l s \u2014 i t i s assumed that terms such as theft, burg-l a r y and armed robbery, require no description as a work-phenonencn. I t may be that the perspectives which he provides i n consider-able d e t a i l remain \" f a r above concrete behaviour\", p a r t l y be-cause t h e i r relevance to the criminal's actual work i s seldom 2 made e x p l i c i t . In h i s study of bank robbery, Camp provides considerable d e t a i l having to do with the meaning of the robbery for the robber. In h i s opening chapter he recognizes the need to re-late such subjective perspectives to the behaviour i t s e l f . Ibid., p. 6. 2 My own data would suggest that the perspectives Irwin provides are not \"f a r above concrete behaviour\". My only c r i t i c i s m i s that t h i s evaluation cannot be made on the basis of the data he has provided. 30 Indeed, he states: ...the main unit of analysis moves away from the actor (the bank robber) to the action . (the robbery) and by focussing on the robbery as the primary unit of analysis, the relationships be-tween the bank robber, the bank, and the mecha-nisms of s o c i a l control are explored. Unfortunately, the research provides v i r t u a l l y no data having to do with the behavioural dimensions of the robbery i t s e l f . The section e n t i t l e d \"During the robbery\" deals only with the r e c i p r o c i t y of expectations as to bank robber and bank personnel, without t e l l i n g us what either do as a conse-quence of these expectations. Soc i o l o g i s t s of occupations have pointed out how the demand c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of various occupations shape, and are shaped by the perspective of the worker. Some of the occupa-t i o n a l demands of c e n t r a l importance to the worker are larg e l y 2 hidden from the view of the outsider. Detailed examination of such demands i s required i n order to make i n t e l l i g i b l e both 3 the perspective and behaviour of the worker. This i s not to \"''Camp, \"Nothing to Lose:...\", p. i i i . 2 An excellent example of such an occupation i s that of the apartment-house j a n i t o r . c f . Ray Gold, \"Janitors versus Tenants: A Status-Income Dilemma\", American Journal of Socio-logy, V o l . LVII, No. 5 (March, 1952), pp. 486-493. 3 Skolnik, for example, i n J u s t i c e Without T r i a l accounts f o n the often unorthodox behaviour of p o l i c e i n terms of the demands of a highly bureaucratized and unresponsive organiza-t i o n a l law enforcement structure. 31 suggest, however, that occupational demands are to be treated only as independent v a r i a b l e s \u2014 t h e y too may be subject to change i n response to the expectations and q u a l i f i c a t i o n s which the worker brings with him. I t w i l l be our objective i n t h i s paper to see whether considerations of t h i s kind help to make criminal behaviour more i n t e l l i g i b l e . There i s also reason to believe that the study of criminal behaviour may help to make non-criminal be-haviour more i n t e l l i g i b l e . Following from the work of theorists such as Simmel and Schutz i s a growing recognition that every-day taken-for-granted routines are legitimate subject matter for s o c i o l o g i c a l analysis, and that i t i s there, i n fact, where one looks for the foundations of s o c i a l structure. I t i s also recognized that the \"taken-for-granted\" i s least obvious to those most intimately acquainted with i t . . Like the \"civilian\"\"*\", the criminal operates on the basis of \"background expectancies\". The member of the society uses background ex-pectancies as a scheme of inter p r e t a t i o n . With t h e i r use actual appearances are for him recog-nizable and i n t e l l i g i b l e as the appearances-of-familiar-events. Demonstrably he i s at a loss to t e l l us s p e c i f i c a l l y of what the expectancies con s i s t . When we ask him about them he has l i t t l e or nothing to say. For these background expectancies to come into view one must either be a stranger to the ' l i f e The term \" c i v i l i a n \" , criminals (police excepted) samepurpose. used by criminals to refer to , w i l l be used throughout for non-that 32 as usual\" character of everyday scenes, or be-come estranged from them. As A l f r e d Schutz pointed out, a 'special motive' i s required to make them problematic. In the s o c i o l o g i s t ' s case t h i s 'special motive* consists i n the pro-grammatic task of treating a s o c i e t a l member* s p r a c t i c a l circumstances,which include from the member's point of view the morally necessary character of many of i t s background features, as matters of t h e o r e t i c a l interest.1 The nature of \"background expectancies\" makes possible the documentation of several perspectives. The researcher strange to the l i f e of crime may be sensitive to what the c r i -minal takes for granted. In turn, the criminal, who, i f not a stranger then at least one who has a \"spec i a l motive\" to make the background expectancies of the c i v i l i a n problematic, may provide new perspectives from which to view the larger l e g i t i -mate s o c i a l order. From a methodological point of view i t i s also sugges-ted, p a r t i c u l a r l y by Garfinkel, that such structure can only be uncovered by deliberate v i o l a t i o n of taken-for-granted ex-pectations. From t h i s , one might also i n f e r that a study of the deliberate v i o l a t i o n of o f f i c i a l expectations, such as i n crime, might t e l l us much about the taken-for-granted l e g i t i -mate structure. ^H. Garfinkel, Studies i n Ethnomethodology, Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice H a l l Inc. (1967), p. 37. 33 The operations that one would have to perform in order to multiply the senseless features of perceived environments; to produce and sustain bewilderment, consternation, and confusion; to produce the s o c i a l l y structured a f f e c t s of anxi-ety, shame, g u i l t , and indignation; and to pro-duce disorganized in t e r a c t i o n should t e l l us something about how the. structures of everyday a c t i v i t i e s are o r d i n a r i l y and routinely produced and maintained.1 I f t h i s . i s so, then a study of those non-experimentally induced behaviours which produce the same ef f e c t should also t e l l us much about the structures of everyday a c t i v i t i e s . Many s o c i a l acts, such as'locking doors, are designed to prevent shame and f r u s t r a t i o n . I t would appear, therefore, that a study of the criminal's perspective might uncover the taken-for-gwanted of everyday l i f e . As a part of the descriptive scope of t h i s paper, an e f f o r t w i l l be made to underline those aspects of criminal a c t i v i t y which provide new perspectives from which to view the larger s o c i a l order. For example, common va r i a t i o n s i n everyday arrangements may have special significance for the c r i m i n a l \u2014 a painter's s c a f f o l d beside a building i s not seen by the criminal as a sc a f f o l d only, but as a means of entry to the b u i l d i n g . Common, i n s i g n i f i c a n t problems take on new meanings--the absence of a parking spot i n front of the bank i s an inconvenience for the shopper, but i t i s of central oc-cupational concern to the urban bank robber. One may gain new 1 I b i d . , p. 38. 34 a p p r e c i a t i o n f o r the c u l t u r a l l i m i t a t i o n s of t h a t aspect of s o c i a l i z a t i o n i n v o l v e d i n the development of p e r c e p t u a l s k i l l s ; f o r example, the average customer does not see the alarm tape pasted around the store window, but the b u r g l a r sees t h i s even when he i s on a l e g i t i m a t e shopping t r i p . The unintended com-munication of r o u t i n e a c t i v i t i e s may be i l l u s t r a t e d by the f a c t t h a t , when a c a s h i e r goes back to the o f f i c e f o r change, the burglar knows there i s more money back there; the o r d i n a r y customer i s merely annoyed at having to w a i t . S h e r r i Cavan has noted t h a t : The taken-for-granted c h a r a c t e r of'the stand-ing behaviour p a t t e r n s of any s e t t i n g may a l s o become a matter of p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t to those who wish to e x p l o i t them, to use them i n a way t h a t i s n e i t h e r r o u t i n e , nor proper, but none-t h e l e s s p o s s i b l e . x I am suggesting t h a t , i n s o f a r as the t y p i c a l l y 'unques-ti o n e d background of t h i n g s taken-for-granted' i s a matter of p r a c t i c a l i n t e r e s t t o the c r i m i n a l , h i s observations may bring the taken-for-granted to the a t t e n t i o n of the c i v i l i a n . I n t h i s sense i t might be s a i d t h a t the c r i m i n a l takes on a r o l e very s i m i l a r t o t h a t of the s c i e n t i s t . Schutz puts i t t h i s way: What i s taken f o r granted i n the b i o g r a p h i -c a l s i t u a t i o n of d a i l y l i f e may become question-able f o r the s c i e n t i s t s , and v i c e versa; what avan, L i q u o r License, p. 6. 35 seems to be of highest relevance, on one l e v e l , may become e n t i r e l y i r r e l e v a n t on the other. x I have attempted, throughout t h i s opening chapter, to demonstrate the need for descriptive research having to do with the sociology of crime. I t has been necessary to provide a b r i e f summary of the substantive nature of related, published research and l i t e r a t u r e . By doing so I have t r i e d to indicate that the p r e v a i l i n g emphases have by-passed the analysis of criminal behaviour, in favor of the study of criminals and of o f f i c i a l processes. In addition to the problems generated by the inaccuracies and misinterpretations of o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s , an additional and important weakness of much available research must be men-tioned. Concern with p r e d i c t i o n and i t s p r a c t i c a l implications has seldom been based on c a r e f u l l y conceptualized t h e o r e t i c a l models. A c r i t i c i s m directed against much of the predicting done by h i s t o r i a n s i s applicable here. The reason why we interpret t h e i r statements as supported only by reference to trends i s that nothing of t h e o r e t i c a l i n t e r e s t turns upon the truth or f a l s i t y of the predictions, and t h i s i s t y p i c a l of n o n - s c i e n t i f i c predictions. A scien-t i s t uses predictions as a method of testing some of the statements from which h i s p r e d i c t i o n -statement i s deducible.... 2 A l f r e d Schutz, \"Common-Sense and S c i e n t i f i c Interpreta-t i o n of Human Action\", M. Natanson, ed.,.Philosophy of the S o c i a l Sciences, N.Y.: Random House (1963), p. 336. 2 R. Brown, Explanation i n S o c i a l Science, London: Rout-ledge and Kegan Paul (1963), p. 31. 36 Furthermore, a good deal of the l i t e r a t u r e having to do with crime has been i n terms of what the philosopher Robert Brown refers to as \"reporting\", as d i s t i n c t from describing.\"'' That i s , the reader i s informed as to various frequencies and events (for example, how many bank robberies were committed i n Montreal over a six-year period) without being provided with the c r i t e r i a by which such events might be recognized. I have argued that description, i f i t i s to have scien-t i f i c u t i l i t y , must provide the a n a l y t i c a l units necessary to the subsequent development of models and t h e o r e t i c a l schemes. I cannot emphasize too strongly that there i s a fundamental place for accurate description i n any science. Description, as I have already indicated i n the previous chapters, provides the input for developing units of a theory, i t s laws of interaction, the system states, and the boundaries of the model. Without adequate des-c r i p t i o n , we would not have models that connect with the world that man perceives and about which he theorizes.^ Throughout t h i s chapter i t has been claimed that our approach w i l l \"make more i n t e l l i g i b l e \" , \"account for\" and \"help us to understand\" the various phenomena to be discussed. Such claims make i t reasonable for the reader to expect answers to various \"why\" as well as \"how\" questions. For a f u l l e r discussion of the d i s t i n c t i o n , c f . Brown, Explanation i n S o c i a l Science, pp. 15-16. His use of the term \"reporting\" i s sim i l a r to the perjorative \"mere description\" as used by s o c i o l o g i s t s . 2 Dubin, Theory Building, p. 227. 37 Brown points out how, at each point i n an account, i t i s : ...possible and reasonable to i n t e r j e c t the question, 'why t h i s ? ' ....No account could give the answers to a l l such questions: t h e i r num-ber would be i n d e f i n i t e l y large since each ans-wer could produce a further question. But an account which s a t i s f i e d no such queries would be a monstrosity, since we should not know which events were responsible for the occurrence of other events.1 I t i s not claimed that the queries s a t i s f i e d by my re-search w i l l necessarily or obviously s a t i s f y various theo-r e t i c a l concerns. For example, the answer to the question, \"Why i s the timing of an urban bank robbery less predictable than a r u r a l one?\" appears to be, \"Because the urban bank robber cannot e a s i l y predict when a sa t i s f a c t o r y parking op-portunity w i l l occur\". Although t h i s response may explain the temporal i r r e g u l a r i t i e s of urban bank robberies, the t h e o r e t i -c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of the statement i s not obvious. I t w i l l be our intention throughout t h i s paper, to s p e l l out what appear to be patterned relationships between variables, even where the t h e o r e t i c a l significance of the relationship i s not obvious. The s p e c i f i c a t i o n of variables and analytic units i s only one step, yet an important one, i n the development of theory. Brown, Explanation i n S o c i a l Science, p. 23. 38 Description, other than that of attitudes and beha-viour, w i l l be limited to that having a d i r e c t bearing upon behaviour; for example, the description of bank architecture i s important to us only insofar as i t helps to account for the behaviour of persons involved i n a bank robbery. As Brown has said: In a work of s o c i a l science the descrip-tions of the appearance of things are simi-l a r l y j u s t i f i e d by the connection between appearances and s o c i a l behaviour. x Ibid., p. 24. Chapter II Methodological Notes A. INTRODUCTION I t i s obvious that no study i s possible unless the de-sired data i s av a i l a b l e . When the subject matter, however, deals with information which i s information i n part because o i t s secret nature, then the factors which make such informa-t i o n available to s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s are themselves s o c i o l o g i -c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g . What, for example, were the conditions which prompted Williamson to speak with such freedom into Reiser's tape recorder\"'\"? We are given glimpses into Maurer's 2 on-going i n t e r a c t i o n with members of whiz mobs , and of Shaw' 3 counselling relationship with Stephen, the Jack-Roller , yet these accounts lack the s e n s i t i v i t y towards methodological 4 matters found, for example, i n Dalton's Men Who Manage . I t i s not enough simply to indicate how i n i t i a l contacts were made\u2014we need also to know how the contacts were maintained and terminated, and how the s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n may have affee ted the data provided. \"W illiamson, Hustler'. 2 Maurer, Whiz Mob. -3.-Shaw, The Jack-Roller. 4 M e l v i l l e Dalton, Men Who Manage, N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons (1959). 39 40 In order to a s s i s t the reader i n h i s assessment of the data and interpretation to be presented, a b r i e f , yet detailed d e s c r i p t i o n of the research procedure and s i t u a t i o n follows. As Becker points out, the methods used i n q u a l i t a t i v e research are seldom made e x p l i c i t . Q u a l i t a t i v e analysis of f i e l d data are not new in s o c i a l science; indeed, many c l a s s i c s of s o c i a l research have been based on such ana-lyses. But the methods of a r r i v i n g at conclu-sions have not been systematized and such re-search has often been charged with being based on insight and i n t u i t i o n and thus not communi-cable or capable of r e p l i c a t i o n . ! In the F a l l of 1967, I was asked by the Canadian Com-mittee on Corrections, to study the implementation of Habitual Criminal L e g i s l a t i o n i n Canada and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n B r i t i s h Columbia. I welcomed the assignment for several reasons. F i r s t , i t would provide me with the o f f i c i a l sanction which I would need i n order to ask of law enforcement o f f i c i a l s the kinds of questions that other s o c i o l o g i s t s were now asking with 2 a good deal of t h e o r e t i c a l u t i l i t y . E s s e n t i a l l y these studies were e f f o r t s to document the implications of routine occupational demands. The Habitual Criminal l e g i s l a t i o n , i t seemed to me, would provide an ide a l case for the study of non-legal factors, such as organizational demands, which a f f e c t l e g a l decisions. ^H.S. Becker, Blanche Geer, Everett Hughes and Anselm L. Strauss, Boys i n White, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1961), p. 30. o I am thinking here of those studies which made detailed inquiry into the routine aspects of police work, lawyer's activities and court procedures (Skolnick, C i c o u r e l and Sudnow, for example) . 41 The H a b i t u a l C r i m i n a l study was completed w i t h i n three months; some t h i r t y persons i n v o l v e d i n l e g a l p r o f e s s i o n s and i n what i s known as \" c o r r e c t i o n s \" were interviewed. I was granted access t o two F e d e r a l penal i n s t i t u t i o n s and was a l s o i n v i t e d t o attend the weekly Thursday evening sessions of pa-r o l e d H a b i t u a l C r i m i n a l s who met i n t h i s way w i t h t h e i r P a r o l e O f f i c e r s . My attendance at these sessions c a r r i e d on w e l l be-yond the three-month p e r i o d , and i n t o the time of t h i s p a r t i -c u l a r study i t s e l f ; consequently, some f u r t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n i s necessary. The Thursday nig h t sessions were unstructured and h i g h l y i n f o r m a l . The meetings were h e l d i n an o f f i c e of the John Howard S o c i e t y B u i l d i n g and attending were those H a b i t u a l C r i m i n a l s on p a r o l e who were able and w i l l i n g to come. I t was c l e a r t h a t t h e i r coming was coloured w i t h a good dea l of am-b i v a l e n c e \u2014 a d e s i r e to s o c i a l i z e , sometimes s e r i o u s l y t o ask f o r advice, but l a r g e l y because i t was expected of them by t h e i r P a r o l e O f f i c e r s . The number of parolees v a r i e d from four t o seven, w i t h some turnover owing to the r e t u r n to p r i s o n of two and the r e l e a s e of two others, w i t h i n an eight month p e r i o d . The d e t a i l s of my i n t e r a c t i o n i n t h i s s e t t i n g w i l l be discussed below. I discussed my paper and i t s recommendations w i t h the Thursday nig h t group, p r i o r t o my submitting i t to Ottawa. I a l s o continued going t o the sessions, even though my o f f i c i a l reason f o r being there no longer a p p l i e d . 4 2 Gradually, over time, relationships developed into friendships. I was introduced to other parolees, one of whom became a frequent f i s h i n g companion. Relationships of mutual t r u s t developed\u2014I r e a l i z e d that I was being confided in, con-sulted and treated i n a way that parolees do not normally treat \"squares\".\"'\" I also realized that I was being given access to information otherwise unavailable. The Thesis research was beginning, as i t were, well be-fore i t s formal inception. Many hours were spent i n casual conversation while driving, eating, or other leisure time ac-t i v i t i e s . The evenings spent l i s t e n i n g to a group of \"cons\" exchanging anecdotes i n t h e i r own peculiar type of humor were p a r t i c u l a r l y d e l i g h t f u l . This i n i t i a l period of i n t e r a c t i o n might be viewed as one during which the researcher obtained a working knowledge of the language of the \"natives\". By language I do not re f e r so much to what i s regarded as the criminal argot--of t h i s I found sur-p r i s i n g l y l i t t l e ; strange words usually referred to tec h n i c a l aspects of criminal acts. Instead, I refer to p a r t i c u l a r meanings assigned to the conventional categories of the English language, often r e s u l t i n g in unconventional usage. In the sub-sequent chapter the various dimensions of these categories w i l l be made e x p l i c i t . xAt the time of f i n a l writing, Spring, 1971, association i s s t i l l being maintained with several subjects, v i a regular correspondence. One respondent has v i s i t e d our family f r e -quently and has read and commented on t h i s paper. I am being informed as to the welfare and whereabouts of about twelve s u b j e c t s - - a l l of t h i s on a purely s o c i a l basis. 43 I t i s d i f f i c u l t , i n retrospect, to place these associa-tions within the framework of what i s commonly known as a re-search design, since at t h i s point no research was intended.\"*\" My academic interest i n the association had to do with the re-lat i o n s h i p of what I was hearing, to the content of standard cr i m i n o l o g i c a l l i t e r a t u r e . The importance of t h i s i n i t i a l \" s o c i a l i z a t i o n \" period i s underscored by those methodologists who emphasize the socia aspect of the interview s i t u a t i o n . We s h a l l elaborate l a t e r , on Cicourel's concern with the establishment of \"systems of shared meanings\" . He states: The well-conceived interview,, complex as i t may be, must have i t s roots i n the categories of common-sense thinking, for without a knowledge of such roots the interviewer could not establish the necessary community for conducting h i s re-search. This means a recognition and understand-ing of how the respondent-interviewer i n t e r a c t i o n involves overlapping s o c i a l Worlds. According to Schutz, relevances necessary for the synchroniza-t i o n of meaning are pre-supposed. The respondents and interviewer 1s stock of knowledge at hand and t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n of the s i t u a t i o n w i l l determine t h e i r mutual reaction to the questions posed.^ There i s a sense i n which t h i s period corresponds with what Becker, et a l . have referred to as the \"unstructured tech niques\" used by them at the i n i t i a l stages of research. Such techniques are referred to as methods which would \"...allow us to discover phenomena whose existence we are unaware of at the beginning of the research; . our methods had to allow for the discovery of the .variables themselves as well as relationships between variables...techniques i n which the data-gathering techniques are not designed, for instance, to see which of two or more alte r n a t i v e answers to a question someone w i l l pick, but rather which questions he himself w i l l ask.\" Becker, et a l . , Boys i n White, p. 18. Aaron V. Cicourel, Method and Measurement i n Sociology, N.Y.: Free Press of Glencoe (1964), p. 79. 44 As I listened to the Habitual Criminals t a l k of the criminal l i f e - s t y l e , I became more convinced than ever of the truth of David Maurer's statement, quoted e a r l i e r : \"Actually we know l i t t l e about crime as a way of l i f e - . .\" I t seemed to me that my relat i o n s h i p with these men was now s u f f i c i e n t l y secure to aca-jrmodate research i n t e r e s t s . I could not r e l y on the criminals' vested interest i n the re-search for support as I had i n the Habitual Criminal research. However, I discussed my research interests with several parolee friends; they assured me of t h e i r cooperation and indicated that they would recommend others who would be h e l p f u l to me. In Chapter One I argued the need for descriptive re-search i n the sociology Of crime. In t h i s chapter I have i n d i -cated how a series of circumstances made i t possible for me to respond to t h i s need. Given the non-shareable nature of such information i t i s not strange that whatever c a r e f u l and des-c r i p t i v e accounts of crime we do have, are the resu l t of for -tuitous circumstances, rather than deliberate plan. David Maurer's l i n q u i s t i c i nterests provided us, as a by-product, with the best descriptive material on pick-pockets a v a i l a b l e . Re-lationships of tr u s t and confidence were developed well before a number of researchers (for example, Sutherland, Shaw and Keiser) i n i t i a t e d t h e i r actual research. I t should be empha-sized that such interpersonal relationships were not developed \"'\"Maurer, Whiz Mob, p. 12. 4 5 and maintained i n order to f a c i l i t a t e research. Instead, the research was an unintended consequence of already established r e l a t i o n s h i p s . More recently, W.E. Mann published an account of l i f e i n an Ontario prison. Again, i t was a combination of circum-stances which f a c i l i t a t e d h i s writing: I t was not u n t i l the writer had terminated h i s chaplaincy duties and by chance several ex-inmates came to reside i n h i s house, that the idea of conducting a s o c i o l o g i c a l study a c t u a l l y began to c r y s t a l l i z e . I t was the a v a i l a b i l i t y of these young men\u2014and t h e i r f r i e n d s \u2014 f o r leng-thy interviews and the p o s s i b i l i t y of securing others that made a useful s o c i o l o g i c a l study f e a s i b l e . With cooperation assured, the research problem was more s p e c i f i c a l l y formulated. This was subject to two factors: needs extant i n the l i t e r a t u r e on the sociology of crime, and secondly, the nature of the information I knew to be available to me. Data c o l l e c t i o n proceeded throughout the winter of 1967-1968, p r i m a r i l y v i a informal contact with parolees. In May, June and July, of 1968, interviews were conducted i n three Federal penal i n s t i t u t i o n s . A t o t a l of f o r t y - f i v e men were interviewed, some only once, others v i a repeated association over a period of one year. Twenty of these subjects agreed to have our interview(s) taped. \"hyiann, Society Behind Bars, p. 9. 46 In addition, I was able to draw upon the resources of persons involved i n corrections and custody, as well as persons who had a very d i r e c t i n t e r e s t i n crime: namely bank managers, store clerks and the manufacturers of safes. B. SELECTION\u2022OF SUBJECTS As was indicated e a r l i e r , the i n i t i a l subjects consis-ted of those parolees attending the group meetings. I t became obvious that some were better able to converse, or were more in c l i n e d towards communication than others. Whatever sel e c t i o n occurred here was not with research purposes i n mind, but i n terms of compatibility and friendship. Two persons i n p a r t i c u -l a r became close friends and contributed i n the role of the \"well-informed informants\" \\ not so much i n terms of t h e i r own tech n i c a l knowledge, but i n terms of t h e i r a b i l i t y to refer me to persons able to contribute to p a r t i c u l a r questions and inte-rests I had. As my research inter e s t developed, they introduced me to several persons they thought I should see, and these con-tacts i n turn led to others. During the course of casual conver-sation, or during a formal taped interview, someone might say, \"You should see , he knows more about that than I\", or \"You should see . He could t e l l you a l l the d e t a i l s on that job.\" K^.W. Back, \"The Well-informed Informant\", i n R.H. Adams and J . J . Preiss, . eds., Human1 Organization Research, Homewood, 111.: Dorsey (1960) . 47 I t was not possible to contact a l l of the persons re-commended to me; some of them were no longer i n the province, and often t h e i r s p e c i f i c whereabouts was unknown. I t i s of inte r e s t to note, however, that the names mentioned to me were usually of persons presently i n prison. My informants referred me to persons outside of prison only a f t e r having asssured themselves of the r e f e r r a l ' s cooperation. This appears to be part of the unwritten code of ethics of \"ex-cons\"\u2014they w i l l not embarrass or put i n jeopardy someone, l i k e themselves, whose concern i s with \"the management of d i s c r e d i t i n g informa-t i o n . I t should be mentioned as well, that my two most help-f u l informers were both employed, without t h e i r employers \"knowing\" about t h e i r criminal past, and one was c e r t a i n that he would lose h i s job, should h i s criminal record become known. Most of the formal interviews were conducted i n prison; t h i s for several reasons. F i r s t of a l l , my key informers had l i s t e d names of persons presently i n prison, whom they f e l t I must see; consequently, I made e f f o r t s to do my prison i n t e r -viewing as soon as possible. The nature of prison interviewing i s such that i t does not f a c i l i t a t e intermittent i n t e r v i e w s -administration wanted to knew when I would begin and end my period of interviewing. Whatever interviewing I wanted to do, therefore, should be done without interruption. Secondly, given the cautionary remarks of other i n t e r -viewers (to w h i c h l ' w i l l refer l a t e r ) , I was pleased with the r e s u l t s of my prisoner interviews. My r e f e r r a l s often suggested 48 further persons i n prison whom I should see i f at a l l possible; also, the data I was getting was good. My l i s t , o f interviewees grew to the extent that there was no time l e f t to pursue those persons suggested by the Parole Board. Then also, prison interviewing had a number of p r a c t i c a l advantages. Timewise, i t was much more e f f i c i e n t . My i n t e r -views outside the prison had indicated d i f f i c u l t i e s i n finding mutually convenient times for interviews--evenings \"wasted\" be-cause the interviewee received company and couldn't continue, and so on. In contrast to this, the prison interview was re-laxed, uninterrupted, and as many put i t : \"Time we have l o t s of\". Furthermore, out of prison interviews tended also to be c o s t l y . I f e l t obliged (and i t seemed to be expected of me) to provide some token of a p p r e c i a t i o n \u2014 a meal, drinks, or pay-ment in money in return for the interviewee's time. Inside the prisons I supplied only cigarettes and coffee (this being a l l I was allowed to o f f e r the prisoner). The problem of gaining entry p r i v i l e g e s to the Federal Prisons was f r u s t r a t i n g and time consuming; however, once I was granted entry I was given unexpected l a t i t u d e i n several important aspects, not the least of which was the freedom to select my subjects. This freedom was r e s t r i c t e d only at the Western Penitentiary, and only in so far as I might not see those persons presently i n s o l i t a r y confinement. 49 In each of the i n s t i t u t i o n s i t was necessary to describe the nature of my research to numerous enquirers. The s p e c i f i c i n t e r e s t of the enquirer varied i n terms of h i s p o s i t i o n within the i n s t i t u t i o n . Although I developed a f a i r l y standardized re-sponse, s e n s i t i v i t y to the enquirer's p a r t i c u l a r interest was important. One would not, for example, mention the possible applied u t i l i t y of my research when speaking with Custodial S t a f f . Some members of the Custodial S t a f f made very clear that they \"don't believe i n r e h a b i l i t a t i o n \" . Administrators needed to be assured that my research would not unduly upset organizational routine. Questions having to do with procedu-r a l d e t a i l s (how much time and space would I need) were com-bined with a concern as to whether I was \"studying prison l i f e ? \" Corrections Personnel (for example, s o c i a l workers and parole o f f i c e r s ) wanted to know as to the p o t e n t i a l applied u t i l i t y of my research. Such persons usually indicated a general disdain for t h e o r e t i c a l l y - o r i e n t e d research, yet interpreted any sug-gestions as to the p r a c t i c a l u t i l i t y of the research as an i m p l i c i t c r i t i c i s m of t h e i r own work. They were also concerned as to the possible adverse e f f e c t s of my interview on t h e i r c l i e n t s and on t h e i r relationships with t h e i r c l i e n t s . The selection of subjects was handled d i f f e r e n t l y i n each of the three i n s t i t u t i o n s , but at no time was my experi-ence l i k e that predicted by W.E. Mann: On the other hand, i f the investigation were conducted i n the open, and the s o c i o l o g i s t had the approval of the prison authorities, he would have to r e l y heavily on interviews with whatever sel e c t i o n of inmates was o f f i c i a l l y approved.1 \"Mann, Society Behind Bars, p. 7. 50 In each of the three prisons v i s i t e d , the subjects were selected v i a several routes. The f i r s t was the r e f e r r a l s to inmates by parolees. These were the f i r s t persons interviewed. The;practice of passing on the greetings from the parolee to the inmate generally i n i t i a t e d a successful interview, and usually led to inmate-inmate r e f e r r a l s as w e l l . Secondly, there were r e f e r r a l s to inmates by inmates, as mentioned above. These constituted a second-best source of information; that i s , I would decide on the basis of the referee's response, whether or not h i s r e f e r r a l s were l i k e l y to be good ones. I f the referee did not seem to grasp the ob-j e c t i v e s of my study, I f e l t i t un l i k e l y that h i s r e f e r r a l would be a useful one. There were also r e f e r r a l s by c o r r e c t i o n a l workers. My presence i n the prison interviewing rooms involved d a i l y con-tact with agency workers, such as Parole O f f i c e r s . Those who became f a m i l i a r with my research interests were h e l p f u l i n providing names. Then, l a s t of a l l , there was some selection v i a fi l e d ' data and consultation with C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Personnel. This pro-cedure varied frcm i n s t i t u t i o n to i n s t i t u t i o n , i n each case r e f l e c t i n g the organizational structure which was operative. I t should be noted that these i n s t i t u t i o n s are part of The Canadian Penitentiary Service; as such, they are under Federal rather than P r o v i n c i a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . My use of Federal prisons implies an i n i t i a l selection--namely persons whose sentences are of two or more year 1 s duration. This choice was deliberate, i n that my population was more l i k e l y to consist of r e c i d i v i s t s and persons with serious offences, rather than with what are known as petty offenders. 51 A f i r s t question directed to me by C l a s s i f i c a t i o n per-sonnel at each of the three i n s t i t u t i o n s had to do with the c r i t e r i a I would use for the selection of subjects. They were aware that some c r i t e r i a are more readi l y available than others, and i f the prospective researcher u t i l i z e d c r i t e r i a not to be found on the \" c l a s s i f i c a t i o n cards\"\"'\", but required instead a review of inmate f i l e s , the amount of work and time required would be m u l t i p l i e d . In explaining whom i t was I wanted to interview, the following c r i t e r i a were suggested, regardless of which i n s t i -t u t i o n I was at. The person to be interviewed should have con-siderable experience i n property offences; t h i s did not neces-s a r i l y mean someone with numerous convictions. Secondly, the interviewee should, i f possible, be an inmate known as having some spe c i a l s k i l l as a criminal (for example, safecracker, or bank robber). As the research proceeded I began to be more selec t i v e i n terms of s p e c i f i c s k i l l s . The above were e s s e n t i a l l y the only c r i t e r i a I sugges-ted. Despite appearing simple, these c r i t e r i a were not r e a d i l y understood, nor e a s i l y followed by persons in positions of au-t h o r i t y . The f i r s t c r i t e r i o n was too general to be useful to them. Most inmates are property offenders and except for the very young, custodians assume that, inmates are not f i r s t - t i m e \"'\"\"Classification cards\" are 5\" x 7\" cards containing basic data such as the l a s t offence, sentence, age, r e l i g i o n , time of release, plus a picture of the inmate. These cards are f i l e d a l p h a b e t i c a l l y i n a small portable f i l i n g drawer. 52 offenders, regardless of o f f i c i a l records of convictions. Beyond t h i s general conception, no further d i s t i n c t i o n s as to criminal h i s t o r y were generally known. I say generally, be-cause there were exceptions. Persons c l a s s i f i e d as Habitual Criminals and Dangerous Sexual Offenders (D.S.O.s) were known as such. Also, persons who had been leaders i n some sensa-t i o n a l crime were recognized as such. The second c r i t e r i o n was even more d i f f i c u l t . Prison employees simply do not think of inmates i n terms of \" s k i l l s ' . Inmates are frequently assessed in terms of I.Q.: \"He's a very bright boy\", or \"He's d u l l \" , but not i n terms of i l l e -gitimate s k i l l s . Ignorance of the inmates' p r i o r criminal s k i l l s was r e a d i l y admitted at both Western Penitentiary and V a l l e y Prison. At the Drug Rehab i l i t a t i o n Centre this was ad-mitted with some embarrassment, since a number of counsellors perceived of the incongruity of t r y i n g to counsel someone v i a group therapy without any knowledge of the member's pre-vious occupational s k i l l s . The \" s p e c i a l s k i l l \" c r i t e r i o n poses further problems, i n that few inmates are t r u l y specialized criminals, and fur-ther, the various s k i l l s required i n crime are not mutually exclusive categories. For example, the safecracker i s also an accomplished Breaking and Entering (\"B & E\") man. A hold-up man may occasionally do a bank, but not consider himself a bank robber. (The meaning of reputation and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n w i l l be dealt with i n more d e t a i l i n Chapter III.) 53 Since the c r i t e r i a I wished to use as a basis for se-l e c t i o n were not available v i a o f f i c i a l f i l e d data, i t was necessary for me to r e l y heavily upon u n o f f i c i a l and informal sources. I was aware, for example, that prison employees may be much more knowledgeable than the o f f i c i a l data would suggest. During the previous study I had found a C l a s s i f i c a t i o n O f f i c e r (C.O.) at Western Penitentiary\"*\" to be a person rather well acquainted with the u n o f f i c a l designations or reputations of inmates. He was a regular member of the Thursday evening Habitual Criminal sessions and was therefore also f a m i l i a r with my present research i n t e r e s t s . Together we thumbed through the c l a s s i f i c a t i o n cards and he quickly eliminated inmates on the basis of several c r i t e r i a . Younger offenders with only limited experience i n crime were eliminated. I t should be noted that such information cannot be inferred on the basis of one or even a few l i s t e d convictions, but i s more r e l i a b l y inferred from* the inmate's prison reputation, where the experi-enced criminals are distinguished from the inexperienced on the basis of u n o f f i c i a l information. Other persons eliminated were those whose offences were pri m a r i l y against the person. This included assault, rape and other sexual offences. The account which follows i s limited to a d e s c r i p t i o n of procedure at Western Penitentiary. For s i m i l a r l y d e t a i l e d accounts of procedure at the Drug Re h a b i l i t a t i o n Centre and at V a l l e y Prison, c f . Appendix A , pages 447-453. 54 Persons who were d e f i n e d by the C O . as \" d i s t u r b e d \" were a l s o e l i m i n a t e d . These i n c l u d e d persons who had j u s t had t h e i r p a r o l e a p p l i c a t i o n r e j e c t e d , or who had l o s t a c o u r t appeal, and the C O . f e l t t h a t t h i s would not be the r i g h t time t o t a l k t o them. While thumbing through the cards, he kept up a running commentary, r e l a t i v e t o the above: \"He's been t r a n s f e r r e d \" , \"He's doing e i g h t years but he's not your type\", \"He wouldn't t a l k t o you\", \"He might t a l k t o you\", \"You should see him\u2014he's got a long h i s t o r y \" , and so on. I i n d i c a t e d t h a t persons should not be excluded simply because they were l i k e l y t o be uncooperative, but t h a t I would take my chances. He agreed, but g e n e r a l l y commented t o the e f f e c t : \"He'd be good i f he\"11 t a l k - - y o u can t r y \" . I j o t t e d down the names of p r o s p e c t s as we went along and t r i e d t o i n c l u d e the C.O.'s comments. With a few ex c e p t i o n s I found those who had been p r e d i c t e d as un-c o o p e r a t i v e t o be among my b e s t informants.\"*\" \\ l y e xperience at V a l l e y P r i s o n was s i m i l a r . I gathered t h e r e t h a t the i n t e r v i e w e e s I s e l e c t e d were not those whom the inmates had expected I would s e l e c t . I t was suggested by one int e r v i e w e e t h a t the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , f o r p u b l i c i t y purposes, s e l e c t s \" c e r t a i n \" inmates ( r e f e r r e d t o as \"sugars\") whenever the Press, or T.V. wants t o i n t e r v i e w someone. \"We checked when we heard you were coming and i t was a l l r i g h t \u2014 t h e r e wasn't a s i n g l e sugar on the l i s t I\" s a i d the i n t e r v i e w e e . I asked him how they (the inmates) had checked the l i s t . He s t a t e d t h a t t h e r e were some o f f i c e r s (guards) who \" t a l k e d \" and whom they t r u s t e d \u2014 a p p a r e n t l y they got a review of my proceedings from these guards b e f o r e any a c t u a l i n t e r v i e w i n g was done. 55 The l i s t of names provided by the C.O. was supplemented by my e a r l i e r r e f e r r a l s , by r e f e r r a l s from inmates, and by r e f e r r a l s made by Parole O f f i c e r s whom I met i n the hallways of the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n Building, while i n the course of my work. Except for the lengthy l i s t provided by the C.O., I was able to see a l l my other r e f e r r a l s . I gave p r i o r i t y to these l a t t e r r e f e r r a l s , since they were based on a more s p e c i f i c knowledge of my research interests and a more intimate know-ledge of the r e f e r r a l himself. Following i n i t i a l consultation with the C.O., my contact with Administration was r e s t r i c t e d l a r g e l y to a junior f i l i n g c l e r k . Our method was as follows: I would write the name and number of the inmate on a s l i p of paper and hand t h i s to the f i l e c l e r k . He would then phone the appropriate prison area and request the prisoner to come down. Although senior ad-mini s t r a t i v e s t a f f , when present i n the larger adjoining office, could hear the number he requested, I was s a t i s f i e d that no censorship of any kind was operative at t h i s l e v e l . The persons interviewed do not necessarily constitute a representative sample of the larger prison population, or of criminals i n general. In fact, my selection of subjects suggests that my sample i s biased i n favor of the more s k i l l e d , experienced and successful criminal, yet at the same time does not include persons who, though engaged i n crime, have managed successfully to evade the law. 56 In terms of informal reputation (for example, the i l -legitimate a c t i v i t y , i f any, by which the subject i s \"known\" both to peers and persons i n law enforcement), my f o r t y - f i v e subjects may roughly be grouped as follows: Safecrackers - 10 Armed robbers - 5 Bank robbers - 5 Breaking and Entering - 10 House and Hotel Burglars - 3 Sh o p l i f t e r s - 2 Theft: various forms - 10 Total: 45 As was pointed out e a r l i e r , the interviewees were not i n i t i a l l y selected on the basis of s p e c i f i c s k i l l s , but i n terms of being \"experienced property offenders\". I t was d i f f i c u l t to know i n advance, how the research int e r e s t s outlined i n Chapter I could most adequately be ac-commodated. Owing to circumstance, the f i r s t f i v e persons s p e c i f i c a l l y interviewed for t h i s research were known as safe-crackers. The cooperation of these subjects, and t h e i r w i l l i n g -ness to provide extensive r e f e r r a l s , made the prospect of limiting my subjects to safecrackers only, highly a t t r a c t i v e . On the basis of initial interviews i t became apparent that by lijaiting my subjects to a single type, the analytic u t i l i t y of my research would be seriously undermined. I t became obvious that the cate-gory \"safecracker\", f o r example, cannot be understood without reference to numerous other categories to which the safecracker 57 a l s o belongs (\"rounder\", \"B & E man\", \" t h i e f \" ) . Furthermore, t e s t i n g the u t i l i t y of applying conventional o c c u p a t i o n a l con-cepts t o crime would c e r t a i n l y be more complete i f more than one type of crime were s t u d i e d . Indeed, t h e study of one type alone would be extremely d i f f i c u l t , since p r a c t i t i o n e r s are c o n s t a n t l y making comparisons between v a r i o u s types of crime. Safecrackers, f o r example, see the work and o c c u p a t i o n a l d i -mension of t h e i r trade as being q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from t h a t of \"going heavy\" (armed robbery) . I n a d d i t i o n , the study of more than one type f a c i l i t a t e d comparison\u2014a u s e f u l research s t r a t e -gy i n any case, and p a r t i c u l a r l y h e l p f u l f o r purposes of des-c r i p t i o n and a n a l y s i s . As the i n t e r v i e w s proceeded, the c r i t e r i a f o r s e l e c t i o n of f u r t h e r subjects became i n c r e a s i n g l y e x p l i c i t . x Various s k i l l c a t e g o r i e s became apparent and f u r t h e r s e l e c t i o n of sub-j e c t s was done, i n p a r t on the b a s i s of these s k i l l s . I n t h i s way i n f o r m a t i o n could be supplemented where necessary. Further, as the i n t e r v i e w s proceeded, t h e c a t e g o r i e s meaning-f u l to the a c t o r s became apparent. The c r i t e r i a as t o the adequacy of the data are complex. I t should be remembered that the research was not intended t o provide a f u l l and complete p i c t u r e of one or more types of crime. Rather than a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e p o r t r a i t of crime, i t i s ''\"Wiseman discusses s i m i l a r problems i n her study of a l c o -h o l i c s . \"In an e x p l o r a t o r y study of t h i s type, i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o know i n advance what the sample should be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f \" . Wiseman, S t a t i o n s of the Lost, p. 282. 58 intended as a demonstration of the relationship between the \"how\" of some types of crime (given various technical con-straints) , and the context of expectancies within which such acts are committed. This requires c a r e f u l and d e t a i l e d at-tention to the behavioural dimensions of crime and the meaning of the behaviour for the actor. Given these requirements, how i s the adequacy of the data assessed? As a rough guide during the period of data-gathering, Glaser's \"saturation technique\" was u t i l i z e d : The c r i t e r i o n for judging when to stop samp-l i n g the d i f f e r e n t groups pertinent to a category i s the category's t h e o r e t i c a l saturation. Satu-rati o n means that no addi t i o n a l data are being found whereby the s o c i o l o g i s t can develop proper-t i e s of the category. As he sees s i m i l a r instan-ces over and over again, the researcher becomes empirically confident that a category i s saturated.-'-This technique was p a r t i c u l a r l y applicable to the study of safecracking. The technology of safe construction l i m i t s the number of methods by which a safe can be opened, to a few. Although the procedures were discussed i n d e t a i l with ten \"known\" safecrackers, by the time I interviewed the l a s t three 2 I was receiving no s i g n i f i c a n t l y new information. Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Chicago, Aldine Pub. Co. (1967), p. 61. 2 Wiseman used e s s e n t i a l l y the same technique. \"When there i s no set number of interviews decided upon i n advance and no structure to the questions, how does one decide when to stop gathering data? In the case of t h i s study, interviewing con-cerning a c t i v i t i e s at a station and the two views of meaning of those a c t i v i t i e s continued u n t i l no new material was disco-vered for some time.\" Wiseman, Stations of the Lost, p. 282. 59 The application of the \"saturation technique\" was more d i f f i c u l t i n the case of armed robbery. Subjects indicated that numerous procedural v a r i a t i o n s are employed. The data, as presented, i s intended to display the range of variations employed. Although each additional subject was able to pro-vide a d d i t i o n a l information as to procedural variations, sub-jects agreed as to the basic problem of robbery, namely that of victim-management. I t i s t h i s problem which makes the con-cept of \"going heavy\" or \"armed robbery\" meaningful to the criminal, and which distinguishes i t from some other forms of crime. The data, therefore, must adequately represent the d i -mensions of victim-management as a central feature of armed robbery. The c r i t e r i a for the adequacy of q u a l i t a t i v e data are not available i n as e x p l i c i t a form as are those pertaining to quantitative analysis. I t does not follow, however, that the data i s therefore less adequate, but only that the evalu-ation of i t s adequacy i s less e a s i l y agreed upon. In dealing with the problems of inference and proof i n q u a l i t a t i v e re-search, Becker points to ce r t a i n s i m i l a r i t i e s between quanti-t a t i v e and q u a l i t a t i v e analysis: In assessing the evidence for such a conclu-sion the observer takes a clue from h i s s t a t i s t i -c a l colleagues. Instead of arguing that a con-clus i o n i s either t o t a l l y true or false, he decides i f possible, how l i k e l y i t i s that h i s conclusion about the frequency or d i s t r i b u t i o n of some pheno-menon i s an accurate q u a s i - s t a t i s t i c , just as the 60 s t a t i s t i c i a n decides, on the basis of the vary-ing values of a c o r r e l a t i o n c o e f f i c i e n t or a significance figure, that h i s conclusion i s more or less l i k e l y to be accurate. x Becker has suggested that q u a l i t a t i v e research would become more \" s c i e n t i f i c \" and less \" a r t i s t i c \" endeavours i f the data were presented i n \"natural h i s t o r y \" fashion. This would require \"...presenting the evidence as i t came to the atten-t i o n of the observer during the successive stages of h i s con-ceptualization of the problem\". He stresses that the reader be given 11 . . .greater access to the data and the procedures 2 on which conclusions are based\". Becker's advice accounts i n part for the format of t h i s paper. The natural h i s t o r y of the research i s presented i n considerable d e t a i l ; further, the reader i s given access to much of the data. Many quotations are included i n order to a s s i s t the reader in h i s assessment of the analysis. C. THE ROLE OF THE RESEARCHER The role of the prison researcher has been discussed at some length by W.E. Mann: ^ i . S . Becker, \"Problems of Inference and Proof i n P a r t i -cipant-Observation\", American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, V o l . 23,No. 6, (December, 1958), p. 656. 2 I b i d . , p. 660. 61 On the other hand, i f the investigation were conducted i n the open and the s o c i o l o g i s t had the approval of the prison authorities, he would have to r e l y heavily on the interviews with what-ever selection of inmates was o f f i c i a l l y approved. In carrying out such interviews, too, the resear-cher would have to present himself either as a psychologist, s o c i o l o g i s t or s o c i a l worker, any of which t i t l e s would automatically place him i n a status and role foreign to the s o c i a l system of the prison and to that from which the majority of prisoners come. Unless he had s p e c i a l g i f t s of achieving rapport with h i s subjects, he would l i k e l y become i d e n t i f i e d as belonging to an a l i e n , s o c i a l group and regarded as a friend of the hated administration, for example the 'captors'. In consequence, he would be the object of d i s t r u s t among a substantial number, i f not a majority of the inmates. These would l i k e l y stereotype him as a t o o l of the captors. Inmates less involved in the 'cold war1 of the prison might regard him suspiciously as an outsider c r i t i c a l l y observing inmates l i k e guinea pigs. Unless the investiga-tor could e f f e c t i v e l y break down such d i s t r u s t - -and to do t h i s would require unusual personal charisma, or a c o l d l y calculated campaign to win support by evincing sympathy for the prisoner's biases and problems, he would receive from cer-t a i n inmates very guarded, useless, exaggerated or f r i v o l o u s r e p l i e s , at best an uncertain mix-ture of fact and fancy. The task of separating t h i s 'chaff from the authentic and r e l i a b l e would tax the s k i l l of the investigator to the utmost\u2014and l i k e l y bring into focus at least some of h i s basic sympathies and personal and t h e o r e t i c a l biases.1 Mann points out several central issues. I have e a r l i e r i n d i -cated how my experience d i f f e r e d regarding the selection of subjects. hi ann, Society Behind Bars, p. 7. 62 With regard to \" t i t l e s (that) automatically place him i n a status and role foreign to the s o c i a l system of the p r i -son\" (from preceding quote), i t was to my advantage that I was not a \"head-shrinker\" Inmates implied that head-shrinkers used deception and could not be trusted. Furtha:, to be i n t e r -viewed by a psychologist raises doubts about one's sanity, a sanity about which inmates are p a r t i c u l a r l y sensitive, per-haps because the environment v i t i a t e s against i t . I frequently needed to explain the meaning of \"sociolo-g i s t \" , and mentioned that I was studying at the un i v e r s i t y . This seemed to help, as there was no antipathy towards the uni v e r s i t y . S o c i o l o g i s t s were not known to inmates, nor even confused with s o c i a l workers whom they see as parole of-f i c e r s . In addition, I was known to some as the guy that had done the \"Bitch Study\" (Habitual Criminal Study). This study had been discussed by those inmates \"doing the b i t c h \" (Habitual Criminals, some of whom had attended the Thursday night ses-sions as inmates, on a special pass), and was regarded favor-ably by them. My report, a copy of which I had given to a senior C l a s s i f i c a t i o n O f f i c e r at Western Penitentiary, had been used as study material i n a group session of inmates. This term i s used to apply to both psychologists and to p s y c h i a t r i s t s . 63 Mann i s quite correct when he states that inmates re-sent an \"outsider c r i t i c a l l y observing inmates l i k e guinea pigs\".''\" My acquaintance with \"outside\" parolees, and the nature of my research topic operated i n my favor. I mentioned to the inmates that I would ask them the same question I would ask of any working person (for example, I related i t to the sociology of occupations). Every e f f o r t was made to imply no moral d i s t i n c t i o n . Writers and cor r e c t i o n a l personnel f r e -quently remark on the prisoner's a b i l i t y to i d e n t i f y a \"phoney\"; from t h i s i t would appear that a \"non-moralistic\" stance would be d i f f i c u l t to put on simply for purposes of research. On a number of occasions I f e l t that the subject made deliberate ef-for t s to assess my own values. I t was personally more comfort-able, and I believe also more productive for purposes of research to be p e r f e c t l y honest on t h i s issue. I had no desire to de-fend or denigrate the p r e v a i l i n g l e g a l and s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n . I f e l t that my stance did not i d e n t i f y me as a s o c i a l worker or as a c i v i l servant, or with an overly sympathetic attitude (the motives of which might quickly become suspect). 1. The Establishment of Independence Mann refers to \" i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with 'captors', for ex-2 ample, Administration\" . I f inmates operated on a simple \"inmate-non-inmate\" dichotomy, then of course I would be a mem-ber of the a l i e n group; however, I found that t h i s was not the \"Mann, Society Behind Bars, p. 7. 2 I b i d . 64 case. The Public, or Society, i s viewed as being i n support of prison p o l i c y and i n that sense i s viewed also as being part of the \"enemy\". But inmates have room for exceptions--both i n public as well as the prison administration sphere. They are probably less prone to lump a l l prison o f f i c i a l s into one category than are reform oriented social workers and sociologists . I assumed that to be i d e n t i f i e d with Administration would not be favorable to my research. At the same time, co-operation and thus contact with them was necessary; consequently I made e f f o r t s to l i m i t my contacts to the \"right guys\" (accord-ing to the inmates) i n the administration. Here again, my p r i o r ongoing relationship with parolees proved invaluable. I learned through inference, and through blunt comments, who i n Administration w a s respected by inmates and who was despised. I obtained evaluations of the senior administrators both of the Western Penitentiary and the Drug Centre. Subsequently I made e f f o r t s to avoid being seen together with the \"wrong guys\", and where this' was not possible, I adopted a business-l i k e demeanor which would not imply friendship. At the same time, I made no e f f o r t to be seen together with the \"right guys\"; i n fact, I avoided contact with Administration as much as pos-s i b l e . (Within the prison setting t h i s did not define me as asocial.) A p o l i t e \"Good morning\", and a generally business-l i k e , no nonsense approach seemed to be appropriate and appreci-ated. Researchers may be viewed with suspicion and t h i s may account for some of the antagonism, but they are also viewed 65 as a nuisance and an interruption (for example, as a person who does not appreciate the routines and patterns that have become r i g i d l y entrenched i n the prison system).. I brought my own lunch and ate i t alone i n my i n t e r -viewing room. I t should be noted here that there are no areas of a prison which are sealed o f f to an inmate\u2014some inmates are used as j a n i t o r s , or clerks, and therefore have a very good knowledge of the sociometric patterns which are operative. To what extent such information f i l t e r s back to the larger inmate population i s d i f f i c u l t to say, but my impressions are that i t i s substantial. 2 . Researcher as a Mediator I t i s well known that prisoners' contact with the out-side, v i a l e t t e r or verbal communication, i s severely r e s t r i c -ted. I t i s also known that such communication i s often greatly desired, as the methods of obtaining i t would indicate. The interviewer i s one such possible source of contact with the outside world, without going through the o f f i c i a l and censori-ous channels. I t might be hypothesized that the greater the degree of t r u s t between interviewer and subject, the greater the tendency for the subject to request special favors of the interviewer. I received some, but not many such requests. From contact with agencies such as the National Parole Service and the John Howard Society, I was aware that any interference with, 66 or advice I might o f f e r regarding someone's c l i e n t , would be disapproved of unless s p e c i f i c a l l y requested by the agency worker. Agency workers did frequently ask me about inmates I had seen. Such questions implied that I was one of them (the agency), since c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y among parole o f f i c e r s does not apply intra-agency. To such questions, of course, I would give no substantive re p l i e s , although on a few occasions these questions did provide the opportunity for me to convey a mes-sage requested by the subject i n question. Only once did I de l i b e r a t e l y seek out a parole o f f i c e r i n order to convey a message. This was from an inmate who claimed he had unsuccess-f u l l y t r i e d to see the o f f i c e r for a year and asked whether perhaps I could contact him. I did, and the inmate had an i n -terview with h i s parole o f f i c e r on that same day. Whether or not t h i s favor was the cause I do not know, but t h i s inmate, who had been most h e l p f u l , gave me a r e f e r r a l to another inmate who also proved to be an excellent source. There was also a sense i n which I served as a l i n k be-tween the inmates i n the three i n s t i t u t i o n s . This was not i n the form of providing factual information, for the prison grape-vine operates between i n s t i t u t i o n s as well as within any one. Inmates know who has been released or paroled, and when; or who has been re-admitted, and for what. Such information ap-p l i e s only to persons who matter to them; they do not keep track of the \"young punks\". My contribution as a l i n k seemed 67 s u p e r f i c i a l l y minimal. When asked, \"How's o l d Bob d o i n 1 out at ?\" I needed t o be c a r e f u l i n my response, f o r I could not communicate th a t which was s a i d t o me i n confidence. I would perhaps r e f l e c t on d i s p o s i t i o n ; f o r example, \"Oh, he's q u i t e a g u y \u2014 a f t e r f i v e years he s t i l l has q u i t e a sense of humour\". I was never pressed f o r d e t a i l - - a b r i e f exchange l i k e the above would probably end w i t h , \" I f you see him again, say ' h i 1 f o r me, okay?\" I t i s understandable that persons i n confinement place greater value upon the exchange of gree t i n g s than persons who are not i n such circumstances. Whenever I could begin a new in t e r v i e w by conveying gr e e t i n g s from someone e l s e , I was a l -most c e r t a i n l y assured immediate rapport. D. THE INTERVIEW 1 . I nformal, Unstructured A s s o c i a t i o n I t would be misleading t o suggest t h a t any one s t y l e of i n t e r v e i w technique was employed, or even to suggest that a l l data were gathered by the i n t e r v i e w method. In a d d i t i o n to the i n t e r v i e w , s e v e r a l other methods were employed. F i r s t of a l l , I p a r t i c i p a t e d r e g u l a r l y i n the group session w i t h p a r o l e d H a b i t u a l C r i m i n a l s , every Thursday. As was mentioned e a r l i e r , the s e t t i n g here was h i g h l y i n f o r m a l , though the d i s c u s s i o n matter revolved around a few b a s i c themes, such as: the com-munication of news and gossip regarding persons i n p r i s o n , new 68 parolees, court decisions, parole decisions; the communica-t i o n of employment information\u2014job openings, relations with employers; and discussion and frequent argument between pa-rolees and parole o f f i c e r s regarding f i n a n c i a l a c t i v i t i e s and parole r e s t r i c t i o n s . The Thursday sessions frequently ended by the entire group d r i v i n g to the nearest bar, where the con-versation centered about the humorous aspects of crime and law enforcement. I did not make notes or use a tape recorder at these sessions--such an observer-researcher stance may have destroyed the informal and spontaneous style of the sessions. However, I frequently made notes following the sessions. Some of these notes pertained to the subject matter of my thesis, but most were clues as to how to proceed, whom to see,, and so on. As was indicated e a r l i e r as well, such data was to prove invalu-able in the subsequent research--in fact, i t i s doubtful that my studies would have materialized without t h i s . Through my s o c i a l contact with parolees and \"ex-cons\" I gleaned more information. Such contacts took the form of informal v i s i t s and fi s h i n g t r i p s , not motivated by research interests, but by friendships and similar recreational i n t e -rests. E n t i r e days were spent f i s h i n g , without a word being said regarding crime or prison; i t seemed appropriate to sepa-rate my research from such a c t i v i t i e s . For purposes of i n t e r -viewing I would make appointments with these persons for another time, t e l l i n g them that I intended to question them, 69 use a tape recorder and spend the evening s p e c i f i c a l l y on re-search business. Such interviews were conducted at my Uni-v e r s i t y o f f i c e , at the subject's home, or in the one instance, at the subject's place of work. 2. The Interview i n the Prison Context (a) The Interview Context: T h i r t y - s i x interviews were conducted i n prison, ranging i n length from one hour to f i v e hours. Interviews tended either to be very short (one hour) or quite long (from four to f i v e hours), and those which were longer than two hours were interrupted as least once by the fact of prison routine. To describe the prison interview i t i s necessary to describe the prison schedules. Prison routine varied from prison to prison and i t was necessary for the interview process to adapt to the ongoing patterns. I s h a l l describe i n d e t a i l the procedure i n the largest of these prisons, the Western Penitentiary. I arrived at the prison at, or shortly a f t e r nine o'clock i n the morning. Inmates were available for interviews at eight-t h i r t y , but i t was my impression that the records s t a f f did not wish to be rushed at that time of day\u2014consequently I wait-ed t i l l nine. Entry into the prison usually followed a pattern: a perfunctory look into my briefcase, a joke or two by the guards regarding my bag lunch, and my signing of the v i s i t o r ' s r e g i s t e r . Generally I would be delayed between gates while the 70 guards processed a truck or other vehicle through the gates. The Administration was unduly slow i n issuing me a permanent pass; consequently, for the f i r s t two weeks I would need to wait u n t i l a clerk came to the gate with the appropriately signed d a i l y pass. This procedure was p a r t i c u l a r l y f r u s t r a t -ing, not only for myself but for the clerks and gate guards. The problem of the clerks was to find someone available who was duly authorized to sign my pass. No reason was given, either to myself or to the frus-trated Records Clerk, for the delay in getting my permanent pass. There i s reason to believe that the series of hurdles which l i e i n the path of the p o t e n t i a l researcher serve a func-t i o n useful to the Administration. F i r s t , only the most per-sistent w i l l continue, and t h i s assures that only projects considered highly important to the researcher w i l l be carried out. Secondly, delays of several months make projects with dead-lines v i r t u a l l y impossible; t h i s eliminates students who want to do term papers or a course project. A t h i r d func-t i o n i s that the delays provide an 'education' for the resear-cher, regarding the l i n e of authority operative at the i n s t i -tution, both the formal and the informal. Below i s a quote taken from my notes made on Thursday, June 27, 1968: Western Penitentiary, Thursday, June 27, 1968. Due to a long weekend, the s t a f f meeting i s being held today. This means that interviews are not possible u n t i l 2:00 p.m. In addition to t h i s de-lay, I am further delayed by the fact that the 71 Records Clerk has forgotten to bring my Prison Pass to the front gate. I t i s 2:30 by the time I get to the o f f i c e and have put in the a p p l i -cation to see . By 3:45 has s t i l l not ar-rived, despite repeated phoning by the Records Clerk. The Clerk does not know how to account for t h i s ; he feels that the Supervisors don't make any e f f o r t to locate the inmate. I ask hew i t i s that Parole O f f i c e r s can see ten or twenty men i n one day. 'Oh', he says, 'For Parole the inmate i s probably bugging h i s supervisor to go for the interview 1.-'- Apparently, the speed with which an inmate can be located i s dependent both on the Supervisor and the inmate. I t i s not cle a r whether the inmate can refuse to come for the interview when c a l l e d for. I t i s clear, feem the Records Clerk, that the Supervisors can frustrate an interview and that there i s an on-going c o n f l i c t between Records and Supervisory s t a f f . The above i l l u s t r a t e s several points. F i r s t , the a f t e r -noon was unproductive\u2014there was no interview. Secondly, when I did get to see , he i n s i s t e d that t h i s was the f i r s t time he had been c a l l e d . Evidence that he was sincere was seen i n h i s willingness to help and in h i s readiness to come for a second session. I t did seem that Supervisory s t a f f may thwart the Records s t a f f i f i t wished, and the reason for t h i s became apparent. By c a l l i n g men to the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n O f f i c e , the work schedule, for which Supervisors are responsible, i s i n -terrupted (for example, worked as a baker and he indicated to me that there are c e r t a i n times when he can't leave h i s work). Usually Records s t a f f are aware of and t r y to accommodate the various work schedules, but f a i l u r e to do so results i n non-cooperation. A second reason may have to do with the status of There i s a more simple explanation, namely that Parole O f f i c e r s tended to c a l l up several inmates at once. This i n -volved waiting, on the part of some inmates, but was highly ef-ficient for the Parole O f f i c e r s . 72 the various departments i n the I n s t i t u t i o n . The C l a s s i f i c a -t i o n O f f i c e i s regarded as part of \"Corrections\" (for example, those persons i n r e h a b i l i t a t i v e programs), i n contrast to Cus-tody. From comments by custodial and c o r r e c t i o n a l s t a f f i t i s obvious that an on-going tension e x i s t s . Once I had gained entry to the prison my task was to find an empty interview room.x The rooms were very s i m i l a r to one another. I t r i e d to avoid the room next to the A s s i s -tant Deputy Warden's O f f i c e , since conversations could be overheard between them; and one other o f f i c e was \"out of bounds\" on those days when a Board Meeting was being held next door. The interview rooms were c o l o r l e s s and s t e r i l e i n ap-pearance. Furniture consisted of two chairs and a table, and the absence of window blinds tended to raise temperatures well 2 above the comfort l e v e l . The f i r s t communication I received from prison admini-s t r a t i o n stated that I could only occupy an interviewing room on one day per week, when agency personnel would not be using i t . The f i r s t day of my interviewing, however, personnel seemed surprised when I stated that I would \"be back next week\"\u2014 why not come back tomorrow? Thereafter I interviewed each day of the week. 2 At the V a l l e y Prxson I found the interview room so de-pressing that I asked permission to move in some upholstered furniture from the nearby lounge. I was given permission and was c a r e f u l to return the chairs at the end of the day. Upon a r r i v a l next day, the chairs had been replaced i n my o f f i c e by an inmate j a n i t o r . At the Drug Rehab i l i t a t i o n Center the rooms were well furnished, a t t r a c t i v e and comfortable. 73 A f t e r s e v e r a l d a y s o f e x p e r i m e n t i n g , t h e R e c o r d s C l e r k and I w o r k e d o u t an a g r e e a b l e p r o c e d u r e f o r c a l l i n g a n i n m a t e . My r e j e c t i o n o f e s t a b l i s h e d p r o c e d u r e s was due t o my own c o n -v i c t i o n t h a t i n m a t e s s h o u l d n o t b e k e p t w a i t i n g ; t h e r e f o r e I d i d n o t l e a v e a l i s t o f names w i t h t h e C l e r k ( o f w h i c h h e c o u l d h a v e c a l l e d up a s many a s p o s s i b l e a t h i s l e i s u r e ) . I n -s t e a d , I w a i t e d u n t i l t h e p r e v i o u s i n t e r v i e w was c o m p l e t e d b e f o r e c a l l i n g a new s u b j e c t . A t t h a t p o i n t I w o u l d h a n d t h e C l e r k a s l i p o f p a p e r w i t h t h e number and name o f t h e i n m a t e on i t . F o r t h e f i r s t week h e h a b i t u a l l y r e s p o n d e d w i t h \"The b o d y o r t h e f i l e ? \" \" ' ' My p r o c e d u r e n e c e s s i t a t e d h i s i m m e d i a t e p h o n i n g f o r t h e i n m a t e . U s u a l l y I w o u l d w a i t f o r h i s r e p l y , f o r e x a m p l e : \"He's o u t o n t h e y a r d s \u2014 s h o u l d I c a l l h i m up o r s h o u l d I c a l l a n o t h e r ? \" , o r \" H e ' l l b e r i g h t u p \" , b e f o r e r e -t u r n i n g t o my o f f i c e t o a w a i t t h e i n m a t e ' s a r r i v a l . The r e l a t i v e r o l e o f \"body\" a s a g a i n s t \" f i l e \" a s v i e w e d f r o m t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e R e c o r d s Department a nd b y C l a s s i f i -c a t i o n p e r s o n n e l i n g e n e r a l , i s o f i n t e r e s t . I n e a c h i n s t i -t u t i o n i t was i n c o n c e i v a b l e t o s u c h p e r s o n n e l t h a t a n y o n e w o u l d w a n t t o s e e t h e \"body\" a nd n o t t h e \" f i l e \" . Some, I f e l t , t o o k i t a s a p e r s o n a l a f f r o n t r e g a r d i n g t h e v a l u e o f t h e i r w r i t t e n w o r k . The c l a s s i c t h e o r y o f t h e i m p e r s o n a l c h a r a c t e r o f b u -r e a u c r a c i e s t a k e s on a c u r i o u s t w i s t h e r e . A l t h o u g h t h e \"body\" To w h i c h a P a r o l e O f f i c e r c o u l d r e s p o n d w i t h \" b o t h \" o r \" j u s t f i l e \" , e t c . 74 i s indeed viewed as a number (personnel refer to inmates by-number rather than by name), the f i l e i t s e l f i s personified. The comments of others constitute the prisoner. These com-ments of others are perceived of as a more accurate r e f l e c t i o n of the person than the person himself. In fact, ihe \"body\" i s perceived of as being a fa l s e image. \" I t \" may \"give you a l i n e \" , \"b.s. you\", \"give you a snow job\". In contrast, the f i l e i s trustworthy. I t contains absolute l e g a l i d e n t i t y , the finger-p r i n t s . In addition, i t provides us with tie body's character--an account of i t s values and thoughts by way of psychological tests, charts, and reports. The body's a b i l i t y also i s i n d i -cated by aptitudeand I.Q. t e s t s . The body's photograph, the only evidence towards which one i s i n c l i n e d to react in a more personal manner, i s tucked away in an envelope at the back of the f i l e . The length of time spent waiting for the inmate to ar-rive would vary from f i v e minutes to an hour, and might i n fact end with an apology by the Records Clerk, to the e f f e c t that said inmate could not be reached, and a question as to 2 whether I would want him to c a l l someone else. ''\"The numbers were a l l f i v e - f i g u r e numbers. The p r a c t i c a l reason for t h e i r routine use may be accounted for, at least i n part, i n terms of ease of f i l i n g . The numbers themselves, how-ever, do not communicate any information other than i d e n t i t y . The a b i l i t y to remember numbers also appears to be a c r i t e r i a of status and work experience\u2014an occupational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c which prison clerks share with parts-men i n machinery shops. 2 Since the length of the wait was unpredictable, I could not r e l y on i t i n order to make notes on the previous i n t e r -view. I f such note-making was required, I would do so before c a l l i n g up the next subject. 75 The inmates c a l l e d by the Records Clerk were not t o l d the reason they were asked to come and t h i s had both advanta-ges and disadvantages. P o s i t i v e l y , i t meant that persons un-w i l l i n g to p a r t i c i p a t e i n research could not refuse u n t i l I had a chance to explain the project to them. Negatively, those inmates who were waiting to hear from the Parole Board, or who had been waiting to see t h e i r Parole O f f i c e r , were disappoin-ted when they discovered that t h i s was not the reason for being c a l l e d . The paged inmate would come to the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n b u i l d -ing to await d i r e c t i o n . From here the Records Clerk brought him to my o f f i c e . The Clerk made no introduction; he simply ushered the inmate into the o f f i c e and closed the door. Then the interview began. (b) Interview Procedure: A l l interviews were conducted with only the interviewer and the respondent present. As was pointed out e a r l i e r , the physical arrangements and comforts of the interviewing rooms varied. I assumed that the arrange-ment of objects, the type of objects, and so forth, would be used by the subject as clues i n interpreting the new s i t u a t i o n . I therefore eliminated any objects that might arouse eit h e r suspicion or resentment; t h i s included removal of the tape recorder, the inmate f i l e s , and any large hard-bound books\"*\" \\)ne psychologist, who I knew was d i s l i k e d by inmates, took several large volumes on psychiatry and psychology with him, even when t r a v e l l i n g to another i n s t i t u t i o n for i n t e r -views. These would be stacked 11 impressively\" on h i s desk i n the otherwise barren room. 76 (the tape-recorder was l e f t i n my b r i e f c a s e ) . Then I put on display such objects that imply comfort and r e l a x a t i o n \u2014 a n open pack of tailor-made\"*\" cigarettes, a thermos of coffee, and so fo r t h . The opening of the interview did take on a pattern, yet with repeated s i g n i f i c a n t v a r i a t i o n s . A handshake did not a l -ways seem appropriate\u2014some inmates simply walked i n and sat down without saying a word. Others were outgoing, f r i e n d l y and t a l k a t i v e . The formal inception varied according to the i n i t i a l mood of the encounter. Where greetings were to be con-veyed, i t was done at t h i s time. In such cases rapport was 2 quxckly achieved and e a s i l y maintained. I began my explanation with a question: \"Do you know what I'm here for?\" This question for two reasons: I was i n -terested i n knowing how quickly and widely information of t h i s 3 kind t r a v e l l e d in a prison ; also, I needed some in d i c a t i o n from the subject as to the degree of explanation I should o f f e r . \"'\"Generally, prisoners are only allowed to \" r o l l your own\". Tailor-made cigarettes are considered a luxury by many, though some fin d them too mild r e l a t i v e to the home-made v a r i e t y . 2 Cannell and Kahn emphasize the importance of maintaining rapport: \"...rapport i s not something which i s 'plugged i n ' at the beginning of the interview i n order to get i t off to a good s t a r t . Rapport refers to the atmosphere or climate of the en-t i r e r elationship between respondent and interviewer.\" Charles F. Cannell and Robert L. Kahn, \"The C o l l e c t i o n of Data by int e r -viewing\", in L. Festinger and D. Katz, Research Methods i n Be- havioural Sciences, N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston (1953),p.356. 3 The r e s u l t : The news spread slowly i n the Western Peni-t e n t i a r y (500 inmates). At V a l l e y Prison, following the f i r s t interview, a l l subsequent subjects had at least some idea of what I was studying. At the Drug Centre, the d i f f e r e n t method used to introduce the project assured that a l l had at least a vague notion of the project. 77 I f the answer to my question was negative, I would say something l i k e , \"Well, f i r s t of a l l , I should say that I'm not a Parole O f f i c e r , or an agency worker of any kind. I have no connection of any sort with the P e n i t e n t i a r i e s Commission. I'm from the University here and am interested i n a number of things that only people l i k e yourself can help me with. I think you know that you are not required to help me--that t h i s w i l l be s t r i c t l y voluntary. I should add too, that there i s nothing i n t h i s for you.\"'\" I can't pay you and I can't o f f e r you Parole or anything of that sort. You can help me, but I can't help you. I want there to be no misunderstanding about that, okay? You're under no obli g a t i o n to stay, either now of a f t e r I've t o l d you what i t i s I want.\" This opening admission, with an emphasis on the volun-tary nature of the occasion, had several e f f e c t s . F i r s t of a l l , i t was honest and as such eliminated any pretence of my doing someting for the inmate, which my presence at the p r i -son might suggest. This statement was obviously disappoint-ing to some, p a r t i c u l a r l y those who were hoping to hear good news from the Parole Board. Secondly, I decided to leave the door open, as i t were, even before I began my explanation. In part t h i s was because of my personal dis t a s t e for the common salesman t a c t i c s , and that just as with any other person, the inmate as well should not be made to f e e l obliged to l i s t e n even to an i n i t i a l \" p i t c h \" . Inmates, as they often admit, have \"*\"This statement was not intended, nor was i t interpreted, as a denial of the p o t e n t i a l g r a t i f i c a t i o n which might be de-r i v e d from the communication process and the personal relatdorship. 78 l o t s of time, but to take t h i s and t h e i r a v a i l a b i l i t y for granted i s an affront to t h e i r self-respect. They seem only too aware of t h e i r \"captive quality\", and since i t i s the most obvious fact of t h e i r condition, i t i s also one which i t must remain t h e i r p r i v i l e g e to joke or to ta l k about. Most inmates were at least curious about what I wanted and asked me to \"go on\". Some already at t h i s point, offered to be of whatever help they could. My general impression was that those who requested the most detailed explanation of my research tend-ed to be the most informative subjects. At t h i s point I would launch into a description of my project. This would include an account of the factors that led to i t . F i r s t of a l l , I would mention the Habitual Crimi-nal project, which was of general interest to the inmate. Many were interested i n i t for personal reasons; for example they wondered i f they themselves might be e l i g i b l e for such proceed-ings. In that case I had an excellent opportunity to discuss t h e i r past convictions with them and to t e l l them whether or not they might i n fact be e l i g i b l e . By t h i s I do not wish to imply that I was the f i r s t person with whom they had discussed this--the inmates were acquainted with the l e g i s l a t i o n , though not always of i t s d e t a i l s . I was probably, for some of them, the f i r s t \"outside\" person with whom they had discussed i t . Without exception, inmates considered the l e g i s l a t i o n unjust and were anxious to support any e f f o r t towards i t s amendment. 79 Secondly, I would discuss with the convicts the theo-r e t i c a l reasons behind the research project. This involved a candid confession that, although academics had written a great deal about crime and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , l i t t l e was r e a l l y known about how the criminal went about h i s work, how he spent h i s money, organized h i s time, and so on. I stated that most studies tend to emphasize the \"Why?\", whereas I was interes-ted i n \"How?\" I indicated that I f e l t that the criminal had cert a i n s k i l l s which were often not recognized; perhaps these could be adapted for legitimate use. Frequently I used the example of the drug addict, by saying something l i k e , \"Take the drug a d d i c t \u2014 o f t e n thought of as a petty t h i e f , yet he manages to earn some f i f t y to sixty d o l l a r s per day, seven days a week. Most squares couldn't do that. How does the addict manage? Surely there are some s k i l l s involved.\" By asking \"How\", rather than \"Why\", I was giving recog-n i t i o n to the s k i l l s which they had developed. Placing t h e i r s k i l l s within the general rubric of work and occupations im-p l i e d continuity rather than d i s c o n t i n u i t y between themselve s and myself. More frequently the reservation expressed by the con-v i c t was of a modest nature. Most subjects f e l t they had l i t t l e to o f f e r by way of expertise on s k i l l s . In fact, the concept \" s k i l l s \" was not one they e a s i l y associated with i l l e g i t i m a t e a c t i v i t y . A number expressed surprise at the association. In 80 contrast to what my many \"advisors\" from custodial and correc-t i o n a l s t a f f had t o l d me, I met with a great deal more modesty than I did with the exaggeration of s k i l l s . Perhaps t h i s was owing to my i n i t i a l imputation of s k i l l . Perhaps also, i t was because I was expressly interested i n examining these \"often exaggerated\" s k i l l s , i n contrast to most interviewers who are b a s i c a l l y interested i n discovering d e f i c i e n c i e s of various sorts. Their defensive reaction was towards my expecting too much of them, rather, than too l i t t l e - - h e n c e modesty rather than exaggeration. Cannel and Kahn indicate that: ...two major types of motivation may be tapped, thereby ensuring continued cooperation by the res-pondent... One of the motives for communicating i s the desire to influence, in some manner, the per-son to whom the communication i s addressed. That i s , a person w i l l communicate i n a given s i t u a t i o n i f he believes that such communication w i l l bring about a change or e f f e c t an action which he con-siders desireable.... A second major type of moti-vation depends more d i r e c t l y upon the personal re-la t i o n s h i p between the interviewer and respondent. I t can be defined as follows: An i n d i v i d u a l i s motivated to communicate with another when he re-ceives g r a t i f i c a t i o n from the communication process and the personal r e l a t i o n s h i p . x In terms of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i t i s obvious that my d i s -cussion of Habitual Criminal l e g i s l a t i o n appealed to the f i r s t type of motivation. In terms of research strategy, however, i t provided the basis for the second type of motivation. I t i s l i k e l y that our discussion of the l e g i s l a t i o n gave at least Cannell and Kahn, \"The C o l l e c t i o n of Data by Interview-ing\", pp. 336-337. 81 some in d i c a t i o n to the subject as to whether our continued discussion might prove g r a t i f y i n g . My expressed interest i n the subject's generally unrecognized s k i l l s appealed to the desire for such g r a t i f i c a t i o n . Although the cooperation of the subject may have been i n i t i a l l y encouraged by Cannel and Kahn's f i r s t type of motivation'*\", i t was developed and main-tained on the basis of the second. The amount of explaining which was required varied from inmate to inmate. Much weight can be put upon the fact that my project was of the sort that could be thoroughly and openly discussed with the inmate; nothing needed to be hidden. I made no pretence about i t having any applied value towards re-h a b i l i t a t i o n \u2014 i n m a t e s are not impressed with the concept of r e h a b i l i t a t i o n to begin with. When I f e l t that the subject was s a t i s f i e d with the explanation, I again provided him with the choice of leaving or remaining to help me. Several ques-tions arose at t h i s point. \"Would any of t h i s get back to the Administration?\", \"Would my name be used?\", \"How do I know they won't read t h i s ? \" . Whether or not t h i s l a t t e r question was asked, I would say something l i k e t h i s : \"Look, I know no-thing about you except your l a s t conviction. I've not read your f i l e , and won't without your, permission. I'm going to have to take you at your word, and I guess y o u ' l l have to take me at mine. Actually, I don't think you need worry\u2014you need 'Ibid. 82 not t e l l me anything you'd worry about. You need not mention any names or places i f you don't want to.\" With the consent of the subject\"*\" I would proceed to get down to business. Taking notes I began with some p r e l i m i -nary questions, such as present conviction. \"How long have you been 'in'?\", \"When are you expecting to leave?\", and so f o r t h . The reply to the question about present conviction usually led to the question: \"Armed robbery\u2014was t h i s your f i r s t conviction for armed robbery?\". Usually the respondent f r e e l y provided a b r i e f autobiographical account; he would indicate to me some notions of i d e n t i t y regarding criminal re-putation. I f not, I would ask ^something l i k e , \"What are you known as--a bank robber, s h o p l i f t e r , or what?\" Responses varied\u2014some f e l t they had a d e f i n i t e occupa-t i o n a l image, others did not. At any rate, I would ask whether we could t a l k about any one job they had done. I preferred to begin t h i s way since i t provided me with the opportunity of i n -dicating the nature of my questioning. I preferred to leave further biographical d e t a i l s u n t i l rapport was more c l e a r l y established. The nature of my detailed questions i s probably best i l l u s t r a t e d by a look at the substantive section of this report. I had only one outright r e f u s a l to cooperate. This per-son, an e l d e r l y man, begged to be excused on the basis that he was too ashamed to t a l k of h i s past. He remained, however, to t a l k about the present and h i s future plans. 83 Most interviews terminated i n keeping with the temporal routine of the i n s t i t u t i o n . Morning interviews began at nine, and ended just before eleven; afternoon interviews began shortly a f t e r one, and ended at f i v e minutes to four. The average good interview lasted an entire day, with the inmate returning a f t e r lunch. Problems arose with \"poor\" i n t e r v i e w s \u2014 given my research objectives, for me to terminate the i n t e r -view before an hour would be an obvious sign that the subject was not \"producing\". At the same time, i t was considered too late to c a l l up another inmate less than an hour before five minutes to eleven; consequently, even poor interviews tended to l a s t u n t i l the natural termination at fi v e minutes to eleven. Very few interviews ended p r i o r to the natural breaking-of f points. In addition to the usual farewells, I asked each sub-ject whether, should I fi n d that I needed h i s further help, he would be w i l l i n g to see me again. A l l subjects indicated w i l l -ingness to do so. (c) Interview Problems: The form which the substantive part of the interview took i s best described as incorporating some but not a l l of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s associated with two techniques\u2014namely \"depth interviewing\" and the \"focussed i n t e r -view\" . The point of divergence from the standard depth i n t e r -view has to do with my own lack of interest i n motivational factors. The l i t e r a t u r e dealing with motivation as a focus 84 i n interviewing often f a i l s to specify what i s meant by \"moti-vation\" . The d i s t i n c t i o n made by Schutz may c l a r i f y the issue. He distinguishes between \"In order to\" motives and \"Genuine be-cause\" motives. The f i r s t refers to\"...the state of a f f a i r s , the end, which i s brought about by the action undertaken... from the point of view of the actor t h i s class of motives re-fers to the f u t u r e \" . x The second type: \"...refers from the point of view of the actor to h i s past experienceswhich have 2 determined him to act as he did\" . In terms of t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n my own interviews were cha-racterized by a deliberate avoidance of the \"because\" motives. This because respondents tended to equate interviews with prob-ings into \"because\" motives and as such seemed prepared to pro-vide what I suspect were rather standardized responses. In several interviews I was given the standardized response before I had a chance to indicate my i n t e r e s t s \u2014 I was interested i n behaviour and i n i t s meaning to the actor; consequently, \" i n order to\" motives were e n t i r e l y adequate. The depth of the interviews had to do more with atten-t i o n to d e t a i l rather than with subleties of motivation. Many questions were designed to encourage the respondent to \"back-track\" (for example, to return to an item previously discussed with the hope of having him provide additional material). Merton and Kendall point out two advantages of restating what has gone Schutz, \"Common-Sense and S c i e n t i f i c . . . . \" , p. 321. 2 I b i d . 85 on e a r l i e r i n the interview. Although they speak in terms of the respondent's feelings only, the same p r i n c i p l e s would seem to apply i n terms of objective d e t a i l . By so rephrasing emotionalized attitudes, the interviewer i m p l i c i t l y i n v i t e s progressive elabo-rations by the informant. And second, such re-formulations enhance rapport, since the interviewer thus makes i t clear that he f u l l y 'understands' and 'follows' h i s informant... The technique of backtracking must be combined with a good deal of s e n s i t i v i t y . My own experience suggests that when backtracking i s overdone, the informant begins to wonder whether the interviewer r e a l l y does \"understand\" or \"follow\". That i s , the rules of everyday conversation imply that re-statement i s a t a c i t acknowledgement that the l i s t e n e r i s having d i f f i c u l t y assimilating the material. This i s \"appropriate\" where the informant acknowledges the conceptually d i f f i c u l t nature of h i s information. When the technique i s used purely for purposes of e l i c i t i n g elaboration, t h i s everyday rule i s e a s i l y v i o l a t e d . Each subject was encouraged to relate the d e t a i l s of several \"capers' he had p a r t i c i p a t e d in, and to choose such capers which, when retold, could not possibly have le g a l repercussions for himself. In addition, each subject was encouraged R.K. Merton and P.L. Kendall, \"The Focussed Interview\", American Journal of Sociology, V o l . LI, No. 6 (May, 1946) . 2 Ibid., p. 556. 86 to select at least one caper that was successful, and one which was not successful. Their choices provided an indicat i o n of what the criminal considers to be success or f a i l u r e within h i s own occupation. The unsuccessful cases were also useful in bringing to my attention such aspects which had been overlooked when describing successful capers. The point of concentrating on instances where things do not work well i s that i t helps one d i s -cover how things work when they do work well, and these are discoveries that are more d i f f i c u l t to make i n situations of harmony because people are more l i k e l y to take them for granted and less l i k e l y to discuss them. In the sense tnat attention was focussed on \" p a r t i c u l a r concrete situations\", my interviews bore resemblance to the 2 \"focussed interview\" as characterized by Merton and Kendall. However, the \" . . .hypothetically s i g n i f i c a n t elements, patterns and t o t a l structure of the s i t u a t i o n . . . \" were not \"...previous-3 l y analysed by the investigator\". Although the broad areas of inquiry were i n i t i a l l y delimited as indicated i n the Intro-ductory Chapter of t h i s paper, s p e c i f i c hypotheses were not formulated. Merton and Kendall perceive of the function of the Becker, et a l . , Boys i n White, p. 21. 2 Merton and Kendall, \"The Focussed Inteiciew\" , pp. 541-557. 3 This raises the question of the changing nature of the interview situation, from the f i r s t interview through to the l a s t . By t h i s I refer to the ever increasing knowledgeability of the interviewer upon the interviews as they proceed, and \" not to the \"instrument fatigue\". 87 interview as a t e s t of the v a l i d i t y of previously established hypotheses, rather than as the source for the generation of hypotheses or, i n the terms of Glaser and Strauss, \"grounded theory\"\"'\". The most c r i t i c a l problems facing the interviewer have to do with r e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y . By \" r e l i a b i l i t y \" I refer to the consistency of the data and i t s amenability to r e p l i c a -t i o n . By v a l i d i t y I refer to the accuracy or truth-value of the data. Methodologists generally agree that v a l i d i t y and r e l i a -b i l i t y are seldom both maximized i n any one interview situation, p a r t i c u l a r l y where the interviewer wishes to probe at some depth. In such situations i t seems that some compromise must of necessity be accepted. The problem i s c l e a r . The more the i n t e r -viewer attempts to sustain a relationship with the subject which he f e e l s w i l l reveal v a l i d responses, the more he feels the interview i s 'successful'. The more standardized tne i n t e r -viewers are in t h e i r r e l ations with the subject, the more r e l i a b l e the data presumably become. Hyman, et a l . propose the usual solution: syste-matic controls b u i l t into the study design i n order to avoid having the interviewer assume the burden of handling the problems of r e l i a -b i l i t y and v a l i d i t y . This would be resolved by research designs which anticipate situations of 'deeper meaning 1, and ' d i f f i c u l t rapport 1.2 'Glaser and Strauss, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, 'Cicourel, Method and Measurement in Sociology, p. 77. 88 Hyman's (et al.) solution to the problem involves building systematic controls into the study design. Despite the generally unstructured nature of my interviews, some controls were b u i l t i n . F i r s t , the focus of the interview was concrete and specific\u2014\"How did you go about committing such and such a criminal act?\". Secondly, various dimensions of behaviour (for example, temporal, technical and s o c i a l organization) were systematically inquired about. An interview guide was developed i n terms of these dimensions and t h i s guide was re-ferred to near the end of each interview. I would point out to my respondent that, i n order to ensure my not forgetting anything, I would l i k e to go over my l i s t of items. These would then be read to the respondent. I f omissions were noted, we would pursue t h e i r correction. Frequently, although the topic had been dealt with e a r l i e r , i t s rephrasing as an item on the interview guide would e l i c i t additional comments by the respondent. C i c o u r e l considers the u t i l i z a t i o n of systematic con-t r o l s as inadequate, both for purposes of r e l i a b i l i t y and v a l i -d i t y . He points out that \"Each interview w i l l not exist again 2 ' for e l i c i t i n g the properties c a l l e d data\". He emphasizes the fact that the interview i s a s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n and that i t s success depends upon the adequacy of the system of meanings 1 I b i d . 2 Ibid., p. 81. 89 shared by the two p a r t i c i p a n t s . To the extent that t h i s sys-tem of shared meanings varies between any two persons, stan-dardization v i t i a t e s against r e l i a b i l i t y . In this sense then, \" r e l i a b i l i t y cannot be achieved by the same procedures for a l l subjects, but only for each subject taken separately\".\"'\" The answer, as C i c o u r e l sees i t , i s to make e x p l i c i t the system of shared meanings and to take them into account when interpre-ti n g the data. He c o r r e c t l y points out that our present know-ledge, both of systems of shared meanings and of the ways of studying them, i s inadequate, as also i s our knowledge of how t h i s factor may af f e c t the data. This problem i s p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t i n a study such as t h i s , which has as one of i t s f o c i the very systems of shared meanings which C i c o u r e l t a l k s about. In t h i s sense, the interview becomes both the method and the object of study. In part, Cicourel's caution i s taken into account by the so-c i a l i z a t i o n period which preceded the formal inception of t h i s research. E a r l i e r we referred to t h i s period as one i n which the researcher \"learned the language\" of h i s future interview-ees . As Wiseman points out, the problem of r e l i a b i l i t y i s c l o s e l y associated with that of v a l i d i t y . 1 I b i d . , p. 80. 90 The r e l i a b i l i t y problem i n t h i s study has some unique aspects: Does the data offered by the respondents i n the form of attitudes, descriptions, and observed interactions con-s t i t u t e commonly accepted phenomena i n t h i s world, or i s i t i d i o s y n c r a t i c and not repre-sentative because: (i) The persons i n t e r -viewed or observed are not t r u l y represen-t a t i v e of the s o c i a l actors i n t h i s behaviour system, or ( i i ) the person interviewed l i e s to the investigator or changes h i s behaviour in the presence of the observer, or i s a chro-nic complainer and a malcontent. x We have e a r l i e r discussed the problem of representative-ness. We turn now to questions of v a l i d i t y . The two most persistent c r i t i c i s m s directed towards prison research focus on the representativeness of the prison population of c r i m i -nals i n general, and on the v a l i d i t y of the material gathered. The l a t t e r consideration may stem i n part from p r e v a i l -ing myths of the prisoner as being without moral r e s t r a i n t and not to be trusted, plus the knowledge that the prisoner has, been involved i n a c t i v i t i e s which he has an i n t e r e s t i n keeping secret. Mann makes si m i l a r inferences, though he q u a l i -f i e s h i s comments as applying only to \"certain inmates\". Unless the investigator could e f f e c t i v e l y break down distrust--and to do t h i s would require unusual personal charisma, or a c o l d l y c a l c u l a -ted campaign to win support by evincing sympathy for the prisoner's biases and problems, he would receive from cert a i n inmates either very guarded useless, exaggerated or f r i v o l o u s r e p l i e s , at best an uncertain'mixture of fact and fancy Possibly, i f provided with a very cooperative prison administration and a status and role i n the i n s t i t u t i o n which placed him outside the pay \"'\"Wiseman, Stations of the Lost, pp. 281-282. 91 and j u r i s d i c t i o n of the authorities, the i n -vestigator might, over a period of time, break down \"most inmate suspicion and d i s t r u s t and secure r e l i a b l e interview material. Those acquainted with prisons would add a further fac-tor, namely that i n order to gain approval of custodians for possible parole, the prisoner may f i n d i t necessary to put on an act, or to pfey the role of someone he isn't, nor has been. Negatively, i t may take the form of exaggerated c r i t i c i s m and imputed mistreatment. Whatever i t s form, t h i s digression from \" r e a l i t y \" i s referred to by custodians as \"the con l i n e \" . The assumption seems to be that any prisoner could, i f he wanted to, take on t h i s r o l e . I t i s also assumed that any prisoner i s an expert i n determining when and when not to use the con l i n e . Parole o f f i c e r s ' casual conversation centers heavily on the clues by which they learn to separate fact from fancy. Prison administrators, c o r r e c t i o n a l o f f i c e r s , as well as the inmates themselves, continually warned me to beware of the \"snow job\". Several inmates said something to the e f f e c t that, \"I suppose a l o t of the guys are just giving you a l i n e ? \" My reaction to such a query was to appear g u l l i b l e , rather than to indicate mistrust. I f e l t i n no p o s i t i o n to engage i n the b a t t l e of wits which I so often saw operative i n Parole \\lann, Society Behind Bars, pp. 7-8. The same emphasis upon assuring the subject cf the interviewer's d i s a s s o c i a t i o n from administration i s to be found i n Daniel Glaser, The  Effectiveness of a Prison and Parole System, Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co. Inc. (1964). 92 Officer-Parolee i n t e r a c t i o n . I quite simply stated that I f e l t my respondents were being very h e l p f u l . I had indiated to a l l of them that although I could, I did not wish to read t h e i r o f f i c i a l f i l e s , and preferred to base my study on t h e i r statements. Several persons stated that i f an inmate t o l d me that he (the inmate) had stolen a thousand d o l l a r s , * I should reduce the figure to ten d o l l a r s . To these persons I rep l i e d that, on the contrary, most inmates appeared to be overly modest. In other words, I began on the premise of tr u s t and had strong reason' to believe that t h i s expectation was met. I suspect that there was some exaggeration i n the form of over-dramatization; i t i s probable that in the re-t e l l i n g of biographical events, some aspects now seem to be more s i g n i f i c a n t then they probably were at the time they hap-pened. This, of course, i s a problem not unique to prison interviewing. I r e c a l l only three examples of blatant d i s t o r t i o n . A look at these cases may indicate some of the c r i t e r i a used i n assessing v a l i d i t y . Case one was that of an el d e r l y t h i e f , now quite s e n i l e . His memory was poor and biographical d e t a i l s which he gave were inconsistent. As a man \"near h i s grave\", he had reconstructed h i s biography in terms of a few good deeds he had probably done. The significance of these deeds was now la r g e l y distorted, yet i n a pathetic and desperate sense, newly meaningful to him. 93 C a s e t w o : \u2022 coiLd b e d e s c r i b e d a s a t a l k e r . H e k n e w a l l a b o u t e v e r y t y p e o f c r i m e a n d a s s u m e d I d i d n ' t . H i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f s a f e - b l o w i n g i n d i c a t e d t h a t h e h a d h e a r d o f i t i n p r i s o n , b u t h a d n e v e r d o n e i t . I was a b l e t o d e t e c t t h i s s i m p l y b y t r y i n g t o r e c o n c i l e h i s d e s c r i p t i o n o f s a f e -b l o w i n g w i t h t h e a c c o u n t s g i v e n b y p e r s o n s I h a d come t o know w e l l , a n d w h o s e r e p u t a t i o n a s s a f e c r a c k e r s was a t t e s t e d b o t h b y p o l i c e a n d c o r r e c t i o n a l w o r k e r s . T h a t i s , my r e s e a r c h d e a l t i n p a r t a t l e a s t , w i t h o b j e c t i v e \" h a r d \" d a t a . T h e r e a r e o n l y some w a y s b y w h i c h a s a f e c a n b e o p e n e d , a n d w h e n t h i s i s k n o w n , o t h e r w a y s may b e d i s c o u n t e d . C a s e t h r e e : T h i s man was a \" C a d i l l a c E l d o r a d o \" t y p e \u2014 a t y p e I w a s t o l d t o e x p e c t m a n y o f . F r o m h i s a c c o u n t i t a p p e a r e d t h a t h e h a d i n d e e d b e e n a h i g h - r a n k i n g c r i m i n a l w i t h c o n n e c t i o n s . H i s v o c a b u l a r y was h e a v y a n d u n c o m f o r t a b l e o n h i s t o n g u e . F o r t h e a f t e r n o o n s e s s i o n h e b r o u g h t w i t h h i m a w r i t t e n r e p o r t i n d i c a t i n g , f r o m a p s y c h o a n a l y t i c p o i n t o f v i e w , t h a t c r i m i n a l s c o m m i t c r i m e i n o r d e r t o b e c a u g h t . H e c o u l d n o t s u p p l y d e t a i l s r e g a r d i n g h i s r e p o r t e d s o p h i s t i c a t e d c r i m e s , b u t s u p p l i e d e x t e n s i v e d e t a i l r e g a r d i n g h i s l e s s e r c r i m e s . I f e l t t h a t h e k n e w t h a t I d i d n o t b e l i e v e h i s C a d i l -l a c e m p h a s i s , a n d I a s k e d p e r m i s s i o n t o r e a d h i s f i l e . T h i s was p u t t i n g h i m o n t h e s p o t , i n a w a y , f o r h e c o u l d n o t r e f u s e w i t h o u t l o s i n g f a c e . He c o n s e n t e d ', a n d t h e f i l e d e s c r i b e d h i m a s a b u n g l i n g p e t t y t h i e f - - h i s l a s t s e n t e n c e was f o r s t e a l -i n g j u n k f r o m a j u n k d e a l e r . 94 These i l l u s t r a t i o n s point to the u t i l i t y of i n t e r n a l checks (for example, biographical consistency and attention to detail) and external checks (for example, the use of files\"*\") . Deutscher has emphasized the need for methods independent of each other: In a r e p l i c a t i o n , we have evidence only that the same methods obtain the same results when employed by d i f f e r e n t investigators. We have- evidence of v a l i d i t y only to the extent that the investigators employ methods that are independent of each other. 2 Several independent measures of data v a l i d i t y were em-ployed: 1. The f i l e s , despite limited u t i l i t y , may corroborate the story. 2. For several subjects, cross-checking with a partner's story was possible. My r e f e r r a l subjects frequently suggested that I \"ask B i l l \" about a ce r t a i n d e t a i l of which they themselves wee not c e r t a i n . One bank-robber, who t o l d me that he had been of the best, was l a t e r described, without my prompting, as a top-notch bank-robber, by a well-known safecracker. Although o f f i c i a l l y I do not need an inmate's consent to read h i s f i l e , I am personally ambivalent about the ethics of f i l e - r e a d i n g without the subject's consent. 2 . Irwin Deutscher, \"Looking Backward: Case Studies on the Progress of Methodology i n S o c i o l o g i c a l Research\", i n W.J. F i l s t e a d , ed., Qu a l i t a t i v e Methodology, Chicago: Markham Pub. Co. (1970), p. 214. 95 3 . Referrals made by Parole O f f i c e r s frequently included short introductions; for example, \"He's done a l o t of hold-ups\", or \"He's never done anything big, but he knows what he's doing\". 4. Casual conversation with c o r r e c t i o n a l s t a f f , and also overhearing comments .regarding c e r t a i n inmates. 5. Methods of opening safes and of dealing with burglar alarm systems were also discussed with safe manufacturers and with the Western Detection Service (Vancouver's largest alarm system). Their comments, on how to f o i l the c r i m i -nal, were i n harmony with what the criminals had t o l d me from t h e i r point of view. C l e a r l y , the perspectives were d i f f e r e n t , but the technological issues were si m i l a r . For example, a senior member of a safe company inquired of me, \"I suppose they (the criminals) t e l l you they can open safes just by turning the d i a l and fee l i n g for the rig h t combination?\". I rep l i e d that none had claimed such a b i l i t y . \"Well, i f they ever do, you know it's not t r u e \u2014 today's safes simply can't be opened that way!\". (d) Tape Recording: Each i n s t i t u t i o n granted, without h e s i t a t i o n , permission to use a tape-recorder. The recorder used was a small portable Cassette recorder which was e a s i l y c a r r i e d i n the briefcase.\"*\" Sony TC-100. 96 I made ce r t a i n that the tape-recorder was concealed within the briefcase u n t i l I had been given permission by the subject to use i t . Such permission was requested at what-ever time in the interview seemed to be appropriate. Such a time was in part manufactured\u2014I would write f u r i o u s l y with p e n c i l , asking the subject to wait occasionally. Then I would say, \"Do you mind i f I record this? I can't very well keep up with the writing.\" Of the persons whom I asked i n t h i s way, only two were reluctant and I responded by saying, \"Okay, we'll leave i t then.\" Most of the subjects had no reservation, though several of them needed to be assured that the tape would be used with d i s c r e t i o n . Of the fo r t y interviews, twenty were recorded. The other twenty included those two who did not give t h e i r consent, and those whom I did not ask. Where I f e l t that the subject was nervous, sometimes even of my writing down h i s comments, or unduly suspicious, I simply made notes and did not mention the recorder. I have no way of knowing whether my judgements were the best.\"'\" Where only written notes were made, they were extensive. A l l quotations i n the text are actual verbatim quotations. Although research pahts to the generally n e g l i g i b l e e f f e c t of tape-recording during interviews, the leg a l implications of the subject matter indicated the need for considerable caution, c f . R. Bucher, C.E. F r i t z and E.L. Quarantelli, \"Tape Recorded Interviews i n S o c i a l Research\", American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, Vol. 21, No. 3 (June, 1956), p. 359. 97 Where i t became quickly obvious that the subject was not l i k e l y to be too h e l p f u l , but would tend to ramble on about ir r e l e v a n t matters, the tape recorder was likewise not employed. The interviews which were recorded on cassettes were then re-recorded on a dictaphone tape-recorder. From here they were typed, word for word. Technical d i f f i c u l t i e s , coup-led with accoustical problems, resulted i n extensive trans-c r i b i n g d i f f i c u l t i e s . x I t was my impression that those persons who r e a d i l y agreed to the use of the recorder were not i n h i b i t e d by i t and several of them enjoyed hearing t h e i r own voices on the re-play. Also, the technical features of the recorder were ad-mired by many of the subjects, because most of them had not yet seen a cassette recorder. As a matter of p r a c t i c a l advice, i t would be well for the interviewer to have a l l equipment checked out by experts p r i o r to the research i t s e l f . Chapter III Perspectives on C r i m i n a l i t y A. INTRODUCTION In the preceding chapter I have indicated the procedure whereby persons possessing various criminal s k i l l s were selec-ted for purposes of interview. Before we begin our examination of the behavioural dimensions of these criminal s k i l l s , i t w i l l be h e l p f u l to locate these s k i l l s within the conceptual framework employed by criminals. I f we are able to i d e n t i f y the categories employed by criminals i n the organization of criminal a c t i v i t y , the a c t i v i t y i t s e l f w i l l become more i n t e l -l i g i b l e . When we can recognize the criminals' perspective we w i l l not so re a d i l y impose conventional and possibly misleading categories upon the behaviour under study. For example, to what extent do non\u2014criminals and criminals share common d e f i -n i t i o n s of such concepts as \"job\", \"trade\", \"career\", 'occupa-t i o n \" , \"work\", \"play\", \"professional\", \"amateur\"? Does the layman's use of the term \"criminal career\" show that he sees s i m i l a r i t i e s between i l l e g i t i m a t e and legitimate career patterns, or does the term simply imply persistence i n wrong\u2014doing? By comparing \"lay\" and criminal perspectives on crime we s h a l l question the v a l i d i t y of applying conventional occupational terminology to c r i m i n a l i t y . Furthermore, we w i l l need to d i f -f e rentiate between the moral and the technical dimensions of pr e v a i l i n g crime\u2014related conceptual categoies. 98 99 There are e s s e n t i a l l y three perspectives which need to be compared and contrasted for our purposes: that of the conventional c i t i z e n or layman, that of the criminal, and that of law enforcement and corrections personnel. Each of these perspectives may either confirm or c a l l into question the u t i l i t y of any other perspective. Although the layman may categorize some criminals as armed robbers, and further-more define them as dangerous, the prison o f f i c i a l may d i s r e -gard these dimensions and prefer to c l a s s i f y h i s population according to other c r i t e r i a , such as \"trouble-making\" p o t e n t i a l . The reconstruction of subjective perspectives i s metho-d o l o g i c a l l y precarious. The perspectives themselves are e a s i l y d i s t o r t e d v i a i n i t i a l data selection and the l a t e r im-p o s i t i o n of the researcher's own perspectives upon the data. For example, i f one wished to discover \"professionalism\" i n criminal behaviour, numerous examples could be found. P r i o r notions, such as professional-amateur d i s t i n c t i o n s , may be im-posed upon the data at the cost of missing more meaningful d i s t i n c t i o n s . The r e s u l t i n g model may be a conception of the criminal which i s held neither by criminals nor by those who work most c l o s e l y with them. This i s not to argue that the observer has no right to organize what he sees, into whatever categories he wishes t o , x XThe s c i e n t i f i c c r i t e r i o n being that of u t i l i t y , whether pre d i c t i v e and\/or explanatory. 100 provided of course, that he distinguishes between the order he imposes upon the data, and the order which constitutes the subjective perspective of h i s subjects. The problem i s a d i f -f i c u l t one for the ethnographer: Instead of dealing with documents and a r t i -facts, the ethnographer i s faced with the task of making i n t e l l i g i b l e h i s observations or h i s f i e l d notes. We have tended to think of the ethnographer as reconstructing the subjective standpoint of the people whose actions he ob-serves, but we can just as e a s i l y think of him as postulating that standpoint i n order to ex-p l a i n what he observes.1 The reader w i l l be provided with numerous quotations through which he w i l l be able to check on the researcher 1s ana-l y t i c a l procedures. Later chapters, i n which the objective and tangible d i -mensions of behaviour are discussed, provide further basis upon which to assess the subjective perspectives presented, and t h e i r relationship to behaviour patterns. B. LEGAL CRITERIA AND PENAL CLASSIFICATION The public regulation of deviance involves developing standardized procedures and categories by (and through) which the deviant may be e f f i c i e n t l y processed. The t r a n s i t i o n from the t r a d i t i o n a l c r i t e r i a of evaluation to the r a t i o n a l - l e g a l (in the Weberian sens^ i s never complete, of course. Decisions Leon J . Goldstein, \"The Phenomonological and The Natura-l i s t i c Approaches to the S o c i a l \" , M. Natanson, ed., Philosophy  of the S o c i a l Sciences, N.Y.: Random House (1963). 101 based upon extra-rlegal considerations continue to make the headlines i n d a i l y papers\"*\"; however, the immediate implica-tions of the bureaucratization of law enforcement have only recently been documented. The need for e f f i c i e n c y , r e s u l t i n g in the procedures known as \"the normalization of crimes\" and \"bargain-justice\" indicate that the layman can no longer impute conventional meaning to the long-standing l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n s . Some of the implications of t h i s phenomenon have a l -ready been alluded to in my e a r l i e r discussion of research procedure and problems. Although no policemen were systemati-c a l l y interviewed for the purposes of t h i s study, i t seems probable that my inte r e s t i n criminal technical s k i l l s (modus operandi, or \"M.O.\", as referred to by policemen), would have been of considerable i n t e r e s t to them. Policemen have a d i -rect i n t e r e s t i n criminal technique for reasons of crime pre-vention and interpretation; prison administrators, on the other hand, show l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n criminal technique. That i s , the considerations relevant to e f f i c i e n t l y running a p r i -son appear to have l i t t l e to do with the acquired criminal s k i l l s of the inmates. Neither custodians nor o f f i c i a l s re-fer to inmates in terms of criminal s k i l l s . Reference may This i s not to be confused with the more recent and wide-spread open questioning of the moral legitimacy of the laws being enforced, p a r t i c u l a r l y as they pertain to m i l i t a r y par-t i c i p a t i o n . C r i t i c i s m s directed towards the p o l i c e i n t h e i r implementation of laws concerning r a c i a l r e l a t i o n s are more pertinent to the point being made above. 102 be made to the inmate's l a t e s t offence, which culminated i n h i s confinement, but l i t t l e i nterest i s shown i n h i s previous i l l e g i t i m a t e behaviour. In part t h i s suggests that the o f f i -c i a l FPS record cannot be taken l i t e r a l l y - - t h a t i s , i t must be interpreted, as Sudnow has indicated, i f i t i s to t e l l the reader anything about the person i n question.\"'\" Such interpre-t a t i o n demands enquiry into the d e t a i l s of the t r i a l procedure a practice l e f t to the parole o f f i c e r s and psychologists whose inte r e s t i n the inmate extends beyond the period of h i s con-finement. This researcher's i n t e r e s t i n \"experienced property of-fenders\" was not e a s i l y understood by penal o f f i c i a l s . One reason would be that most inmates are property offenders; an informal operative code would appear to be that i f one i s not a DSO (Dangerous Sexual Offender) then one i s a Property Of-fender. O f f i c i a l s assume that inmates, except for the very young, are not f i r s t - t i m e offenders, regardless of t h e i r o f f i -2 c i a l record of convictions. They base t h e i r assumption on For example, persons known as safecrackers would not be convicted as such, since the Criminal Code does not use the term. They would most l i k e l y be charged with B & E, a charge they would share with numerous other inmates who are not safecrackers. 2 Thxs xs known as t h e i r FPS Record, or Finger P r i n t Seria Record\u2014the most o f f i c i a l t r a n s c r i p t of a person's criminal convictions, and includes a l l charges, court dispositions and time done by the person. 103 the general theory that a young, f i r s t - t i m e offender, unless h i s offence was p a r t i c u l a r l y serious, would be assigned to a p r o v i n c i a l j a i l . I t i s also assumed that the magistrate has already done some evaluative work r e l a t i v e to the c r i i i n a l h i s -tory. My subjects generally agreed that the number of crimes committed f a r exceeds the number of convictions l i s t e d on the FPS record. \"You only get caught for one out of twenty things you do\u2014sooner or l a t e r you p u l l a sloppy one.\" (#7) . Both the inmates and the penal o f f i c i a l s also pointed out that not a l l crimes l i s t e d on an FPS record need necessarily have been committed by the offender under whose name they were recorded. In other words, I found widespread recognition of \"bargain-j u s t i c e \" and learned that whenever someone had served several concurrent terms for s i m i l a r offences (for example, had pleaded g u i l t y to perhaps a dozen B & E's, and received two years for each, with sentences to run concurrently), the bargain-justice pattern was probably operative. For the penal o f f i c i a l to investigate the r e a l i t i e s of any inmate's criminal h i s t o r y would be both time consuming and unnecessary, given the present operating objectives of most prisons i n Canada. His knowledge of law enforcement pro-cedures provides him with the i n t e r p r e t i v e techniques that make a quick glance at an FPS record meaningful enough to ac-commodate administrative needs. Beyond that he r e l i e s on the 104 in-prison reports of the inmate's behaviour, and may ask for a more detailed h i s t o r y and assessment from persons whose duties are e s s e n t i a l l y non-custodial, for example, C l a s s i f i c a -tions and Treatment personnel. The treatment and temporary segregation of new \" f i s h \" (inmates just admitted) might also be regarded as a period where assessments r e l a t i v e to adminis-t r a t i v e considerations may be made. The prison o f f i c i a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those with custodial duties, are not p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n the types of con-v i c t i o n s l i s t e d on an inmate's record. x In the sense that they recognize the FPS record at best only as an i n d i c a t i o n of c r i m i n a l i t y , they exhibit considerably more sophis t i c a t i o n than many criminologists who have developed elaborate theories around the l i t e r a l acceptance and interpretation of these records. One subject, referred to me by a Parole Of f icer, with the introduction: \"He's only got one conviction but a l o t of experience\", suggested that i t i s persons with few convic-tions on t h e i r FPS records who have probably committed the most crimes. I replied, \"You see, I wish I could t e l l that, because I'd l i k e to meet more of your type, you know\u2014persons with very short records but a long h i s t o r y and much experience.\" X T h i s i s not to ignore c e r t a i n well p u b l i c i z e d exceptions, such as the \"baby-rapos\" who must be iso l a t e d from other i n -mates for t h e i r own protection. The form of t h i s protection, and to what extent i t also involves protection from custodial s t a f f has never, to my knowledge, been adequately documented. 105 To t h i s he answered: Well, over here they don't r e a l l y know, but t h e y ' l l think, 'Well, you didn't do just that one--you're not gonna k i d us. You see, t h i s one was knocked o f f or that one was knocked o f f and you got pinched for i t , so therefore i t must have been you.' And you might say, 'Well, could be', and you just >: l e t them draw t h e i r own conclusions. (#7) Whatever interest prison o f f i c i a l s have i n the criminal h i s -tory of the inmate might well be accounted for i n terms of the prison routine. O f f i c i a l s did di s t i n g u i s h between those who \"have a long record\" and those who don't. This d i s t i n c -tion, however, does not appear to arise out of concern for the inmate's personal biography; rather, i t appears to i n d i -cate that the person with a long record i s l i k e l y to be back. To t h i s must be added a second d i s t i n c t i o n made by prison o f f i c i a l s , namely between those inmates doing a \"long b i t \" or those doing a \"short b i t \" . By d e f i n i t i o n , a l l penitentiary inmates have been sentenced to two or more years. In terms of prison routine, however, i t appears to make a difference whether a man w i l l be there for eight or fouteen years, or whether he w i l l be with them for cnly two years. These conside-rations, i n part at least, are important for purposes of prison work assignments. P r i o r c r i m i n a l i t y and the type of crime committed are peripheral to factors such as those l i s t e d above, which d i r e c t l y a f f e c t the prison as an on-going i n s t i t u t i o n . I t i s i r o n i c a l , yet quite i n keeping with Goffman's notion of the t o t a l i n s t i t u t i o n , that the closer one looks at prison 106 routine, the less important n o n - i n s t i t u t i o n a l factors become. From the perspective of the prison o f f i c i a l , the criminal biography, the type of crime committed and the criminal s k i l l s acquired by the convict are only important insofar as they a f f e c t prison routine. A look at the organizational elements of prison routine may also help to account for the consistent emphasis, on the part of administration, upon psychological dimensions of i n -mates, who are frequently assessed i n terms of vague notions of I.Q.: \"He's pretty bright\", or \"He's d u l l \" . In terms of my research t h i s appeared to be related to how deceptive the inmate was expected to be i n h i s i n t e r a c t i o n with me. I t i s part of the administrative expectation that the inmate wants \"out\" as soon as i s l e g a l l y possible, and that the \"bright\" inmate w i l l recognize that getting a parole, for example, i n -volves putting on a good act, even when that act i s probably not i n d i c a t i v e of good motivation. The bright inmate may also recognize that the good act alone i s not enough and that h i s custodians detect s u p e r f i c i a l i t y and demand genuine change. Both may be aware of the game element, but t h i s very awareness i s favorably assessed by administration. For one thing, such a bright inmate i s abiding by the rules of the game: \"Do your own time, don't cause trouble and we'll see that you get out of here\". I t i s t h i s behavioural dimension which may, i n fact, be most c e n t r a l . In t h i s sense the administration may contrast the bright inmate with someone defined as \"disturbed\", 10 7 \"upset\", or (a frequently used phrase) \"not yet s e t t l e d down\". These c r i t e r i a would seem to show the concern with \"no trouble\", which i s t y p i c a l of Administration. I t i s also i n the interests of Administration to u t i -l i z e and exploit the i n t e l l i g e n c e and the leadership a b i l i t y of inmates for administrative and custodial purposes. Such a b i l i t i e s are more l i k e l y to be recognized i n terms of the inmate's reputation rather than i n terms of h i s s p e c i f i c c r i m i -nal s k i l l . The penitentiary o f f i c i a l s , they recognize t h i s . They recognize the class d i s t i n c t i o n s , and they operate accordingly. Now you take 1 a l l the key positions i n prison, they're given eit h e r to the i n t e l l i g e n t person I was t a l k i n g about--like the check-writer or somebody l i k e that, that gets o f f i n a storm\u2014or they're given to charactas. Now i f i t ' s handling other convicts, i f i t ' s down to where you're gonna t e l l another convict what to do and d i c t a t e hi s p o l i c i e s to him, they always get a charac-ter to do that....It's on your record. They know that I'm a character The penitentiary knows that there's characters and there's idLcts and there's rums. And your characters w i l l always be running the penitentiary. They can't h i r e enough guards. x C. LAY AND CRIMINAL PERSPECTIVES IN CONTRAST 1. The Criminal as \"Professional\" In conventional society i t i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y useful to i d e n t i f y a person as a non-criminal, or, for example, as a non-carpenter; for most purposes, more s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s Bruce Jackson, \"Who Goes to Prison\", Harper's, Vol. 217, No. 1 (January, 1966) , pp. 55-56. 108 necessary. The criminal and the carpenter, on the other hand, may f i n d such designations useful; for example, i t i d e n t i f i e s those who are not one of t h e i r s . I t i s , however, considered meaningful to the conventional c i t i z e n . t o have someone i d e n t i -f i e d to him as a \"criminal\" . Just as the criminal may require l i t t l e further description than \"non-criminal\" to describe those who are not of t h e i r \"trade\", so also the conventional c i t i z e n may f i n d the designation \"criminal\" as quite adequate for most purposes, i n describing anyone engaged i n i l l e g i t i m a t e a c t i v i t y . However, when the layman does subdivide \"criminal\" into more s p e c i f i c categories, he i s i n c l i n e d to use models based upon conventional experience, such as professional-amateur d i s t i n c t i o n s . In addition, he may d i f f e r e n t i a t e between types of criminals as being thieves, or murderers, and so on. Popular l i t e r a t u r e and the d a i l y press also use t h i s terminology. Our question here i s to determine to what extent such conceptions and c r i t e r i a are shared by the offenders, and to specify those sub-categories' of the category \"criminal\" which are used by the criminals themselves (and which may grossly d i f f e r from those imputed by the conventional society). The conventional world i t s e l f i s divided into numerous sub-categories of increasing s p e c i f i c a t i o n . Many of these categories have to do with occupation, and these i n turn re-f l e c t the major ingredients of status\u2014namely one's place 109 within the d i s t r i b u t i o n of power and -privilege. Like the non-criminal, the criminal requires further specification as well, when re f e r r i n g to persons within h i s own category. I t became obvious during the course of t h i s study, that although the term \"criminal\" i s seldom used by those who are o f f i c i a l l y designated as criminals, there i s a sense i n which they think of the term i n the same sense as the layman does; for example, that a criminal i s one who has been convicted by the courts, and that the term implies a moral dimension and c a r r i e s with i t subsequent stigmatization. Furthermore, i n terms of G a r f i n k e l 1 s concept of degradation ceremonies 1, i t implies a t o t a l i t y \u2014 f o r example, a t o t a l l y depraved person and therefore a reconstruction of biography. This i s not compatible with the offender's own self-image, or with h i s experience with other \"crinLnals\" . This may explain the lack of use of t h i s term by offenders. Although t h i s explanation i s i n part speculative, for I did not receive an a r t i c u l a t e statement from any of the criminals as to why the term i s so seldom used 2 by them , i t i s supported also by an analysis of other terms which are used frequently by offenders. XHarold Garfinkel, \"Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies\", The American Journal of Sociology, V o l . 61(March, 1956), pp. 420-424. 2 \u2022 \u2022 \u2022 Note: A review of my interview notes mdicats that the term \"criminal\" i s used more frequently near the end of my interviews. This suggests: '(i) that I imposed the term, or ( i i ) that the subject perceived a mutual understanding of the term and could use i t more comfortably. 110 (a) Rounders and Squares: The most common d i s t i n c t i o n made by the offender i s between the \"rounder\" and the \"square\" (or \" square-John') . \"Rounder\", however, has d i f f e r e n t connota-tions than \"criminal\". Simply to be l a b e l l e d \"criminal\" by the court does not confer rounder status. To be a rounder one must be known and recognized as one, by other rounders and by persons seriously committed to the i l l e g i t i m a t e l i f e s t y l e . In fact, inmates of prisons refer to some other inmates as \"squares\"\"'\". In contrast to lay perceptions, the rounder does not place any p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e in the single conviction or even the single j a i l sentence (he might refer to a person with a single conviction as a \"square\"). However, he neither assumes that the absence of a conviction necessarily implies the absence of i l l e g i t i m a t e a c t i v i t y . Some of the cynicism with which the criminal may view the legitimate order i s e v i -dent i n the following quotation: Well, I wouldn't suggest anyone sta r t out i n crime nowadays\u2014there 1 s nothing i n safes, nothing in banks; unless he was a r e a l good con a r t i s t , and then he'd probably be l e g i t , anyway 'cause that's what they are, aren't they? (#15) The court's designation i s not h i s designation. The c r i t e r i a which he uses to i d e n t i f y the \"true\" criminal or \"rounder\" are much more complex than the single court ceremony which s u f f i c e s for the layman. Criminals use the term \"square\" to refer to: (i) the conventional c i t i z e n , committed to the legitimate l i f e s t yle, and who i s stable and r e l i a b l e ; and ( i i ) the one-time offender otherwise committed to the legitimate l i f e s t y l e . I l l (b) The \"true\" criminal and the \"bum\": The d i s t i n c t i o n made by offenders regarding the rounder and other offenders i s i l l u s t r a t e d in the following comment by an inmate: (WE TALK ABOUT PRISON SOME MORE AND I ASK HIM ABOUT FRIENDSHIP PATTERNS, AND WHETHER HE MAKES A LOT OF FRIENDS THERE. HE SAYS:) No, I don't. A l o t of people do. I t ' s just the environment\u2014I wouldn't l e t myself be-come involved c l o s e l y l i k e that around here. One thing you w i l l f i n d about a l l the i n -mates h e r e \u2014 a l l the f i v e hundred h e r e \u2014 t h e true criminals i n here are closer to the square-Johns than the rest of us. WELL, WHOM WOULD YOU CALL A TRUE CRIMINAL? Well, someone who's dedicated h i s l i f e to crime. AND IN WHAT WAY WOULD YOU SAY THAT HE'S LIKE A SQUARE-JOHN? (HE ANSWERS WITH LAUGHTER.) Well, I \u2014 i n the sense that he's dedicated to hi s job. I think y o u ' l l find that they're more normal than the ones that just come i n here for one b i t and then are gone. (#35 THEN SUGGESTS THAT MOST OF THE IN-MATES HAVE MENTAL PROBLEMS, AND LAUGHINGLY\" SUGGESTS THAT 99% to 100% HAVE. THEN HE ADDS:) I would say that the true criminals are the more stable of the t o t a l population around here. (#35) #35 i s suggesting that according to some c r i t e r i a , such as dedication to a job, mental s t a b i l i t y , and r e l i a b i l i t y , the \"true\" criminal i s more l i k e a square-John than those who are not true criminals, for example the \"bum\" who does not have t h i s dedication and s t a b i l i t y : Now t h i s guy's case just came up to the courts r e c e n t l y \u2014 w e l l , he's been nothing but a bum a l l h i s l i f e , and an alcoholic, and he might\u2014might s t e a l the odd thing and get pinched. (#35) 112 That i s , he has added yet another category, so we now have: (i) the square-John; ( i i ) the true criminal, or rounder, who i s l i k e the square i n some ways; and ( i i i ) the \"not true\" criminal, or \"bum\", who i s not l i k e the square, or l i k e the rounder. The following i s an example of commitment, similar to that of the square-john. An experienced safecracker referred to bank robbers, swindlers and safecrackers as: \"...the higher class i n the underworld. We had a pride i n what we were doing.\" (#4) The true criminal applies work considerations s t r i k i n g l y s i m i l a r to those of any \"straight\" employer: THEN YOU GOT $3,000. YOUR CUT\u2014. YOU SPLIT THAT, I SUPPOSE. AND THEN YOU DID ANOTHER ONE, RIGHT? Right. NOW, THAT SECOND ONE\u2014WAS DONE WITH THE SAME PERSON? No. NOW, WAS THAT WHEN YOUR BROTHER STARTED IN WITH YOU? Yeh. Then we s t a r t e d \u2014 t o work just with my brother. WHEN DID YOU DROP THAT OTHER FELLOW? Be-cause, he had money\u2014I don't r e c a l l - - . Oh yeh, I asked\u2014one night I phoned him and I wanted him to go near , Quebec\u2014there's a bank that s i t s way, about 35 miles from t h e r e \u2014 i t ' s c a l l e d , and I was sentenced--I got three years on that one. And I phoned t h i s guy, and he was drunk. And I said, 'You're not f i t to work tomorrow'. He wanted to come to work, you see. But I said, 'You're not f i t \u2014 y o u ' r e drunk.' So he started to give me some shi t over the phone and I said, 'Fuck you\" Right on the phone, you see. ' I ' l l see you l a t e r . ' (#28) I t may well be that the proverbial \"honor among thieves\" can best be described in terms of commitment. To abide by one's 113 word implies a desire to remain within the rounder status. Within an occupation where the worker has no trade union protec-tio n , and i n which new re c r u i t s appear to be i n good supply, compliance i s esse n t i a l to one's continued employment. At the same time, t h i s occupation i s only one among several a l -ternatives open to the worker. He can become a bum or a loner or perhaps even a square-John. \"Honor among thieves\" i s true by our very d e f i n i t i o n of the concept \" t h i e f \" : WHAT ABOUT THE TAKE\u2014HOW DO YOU SPLIT THAT UP? Oh, i t ' s always s p l i t right down the middle. IF THERE ARE THREE FELLOWS THEN IT'S A THIRD FOR EACH ONE? Oh yeh\u2014 a l w a y s \u2014 t h a t was pretty well a standard rule among pete-men in a l l times. You're never worried about your end. I mean, i f - - i f you have to get out in a hurry and one guy takes a l l the money out of the safe and you didn't immediately s p l i t i t three ways, you never worried about your t h i r d . You'd get your t h i r d right to the penny, you know, regardless of who done i t . Of course, i t didn't always work out t h i s way. Lots of guys that would short you out. But as a rule i t was always understood that everybody. . . . (#14) Another factor i n the rounder versus others d i s t i n c -t i o n involves commitment to i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . Note the am-bivalence i n t h i s comment: A criminal i s somebody who plans--a l o t of guys go and kick i n places. The majority of hypes began as c r i m i n a l s \u2014 a l o t of them are the best around. The hypes are the actual criminals. A l o t of people out t h e r e \u2014 g i r l s and stuff--say that I'm more of a square-John than a criminal. (#21) 114 Another facet of commitment to i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s i s suggested by the following comments. #42, a bank robber, stated that persons who are taught to rat inside prison w i l l never make i t on the outside. He f e l t that such persons re-veal an i n a b i l i t y to deal with pressures and succumb too e a s i l y . Thus, when faced with f i n a n c i a l hardship they w i l l also succumb and s t e a l . As for himself, he said, \"I wasn't going because I was desperate--I was going because I wanted money.\" That i s , the true criminal does not s t e a l against h i s w i l l (anymore than the true square-john goes to h i s work a-gainst h i s w i l l ) . The compulsory factor i n both cases was brought out when #42 l a t e r remarked, \"When I was down to a ce r t a i n l e v e l I would go out.\" That i s , money factors dictated the temporal routine, but the method of acquiring such money i s a matter of perceived choice, both for the true criminal and for the square-john.\"'' A bank robber suggested that the bulk of the prison popu-l a t i o n consists of the t h i r d category, namely people who are neither rounders nor squares: \"In t h i s place you've only got t h i r t y t h i e v e s \u2014 t h e rest are m i s f i t s , nuisances.\" (#41) Note: Criminals themselves di s t i n g u i s h between the v a r i -ous factors that cause crime. They are aware that persons en-gage' i n crime for d i f f e r e n t reasons. The main difference i n the analysis i s that they perceive of the true criminal as being more l i k e the square-john than the \"not-true crimi n a l \" . 115 Another respondent stated: Well, some thieves perhaps\u2014some people who know you, they might give you a l i t t l e respect, you know. They f e e l you know what you're doing, and you're out there trying, at l e a s t . You know, i t ' s more a matter of respect for yourself. You're not a bum, you know. There are too many people just s i t -t i n g around, you know\u2014would-be thieves, l i v i n g o f f some broad or something. That's not my l i n e at a l l . (#2) The \"true criminal\" category does not necessarily i n -clude even those whom the le g a l machinery has designated as \"Habitual Criminal\". In response to the question, \"Would you consider the habitual criminal to be a true criminal?\", #35 re p l i e d : Well, these habitual c r i m i n a l s \u2014 w e l l , you got to come down to the i n d i v i d u a l . I t ' s almost impossible to put people i n a class here, other than to say that they're convicts. (#35) Later on, during our conversation, he referred to a s p e c i f i c Habitual Criminal as a \"bum\". Again, t h i s i s saying that the o f f i c i a l designation \"Habitual Criminal\" does not confer rounder s t a t u s \u2014 t h e \"bum\" i s not a true criminal, nor does he have much i n common with what the criminal defines as a square-John. The category of the \"bum\" must be further distinguished from that of the \"young punk\"-\"older fellow\" d i s t i n c t i o n . The l a t t e r i s e s s e n t i a l l y an age-maturity d i s t i n c t i o n . The ack-nowledged criminal looks at most criminal a c t i v i t y on the part 116 of younger men as the work of young punks, unless i t i s ob-vious to the acknowledge criminal that these younger men \"mean business\" and \"know what they are doing\". A single un-usually successful caper on the part of these young punks may change t h e i r status. I f , however, the young punk continues i n unsystematic and sporadic criminal a c t i v i t y he w i l l become known as a bum. A \" s o l i d \" thoughtful younger offender would not be re-ferred to as a young punk. To be referred to as an \"older fellow\" implies both maturity and experience i n crime (for example, a semi-retired or r e t i r e d rounder). An older, but immature person might be c a l l e d a \"bum\", but not a punk. An armed robber said that \"young prisoners\" never asso-c i a t e with other young prisoners: Younger kids get an admiration for some of the big wheels and t r y to be l i k e them. Most guys who get into serious crime are l i k e that. (#30) He added: That's a f a l l a c y \u2014 t h i s teaching of crime. There i s nothing systematic. The majority of older guys with any self-respect or common sense\u2014they don't go around t e l l i n g anyone what they've done. I f they're t e l l i n g s t o r i e s , they are stories i n the f i r s t place. (#30) In contrast to \"those who get into serious crime\" he referred to those who are \"unsuccessful--they don't p u l l t h e i r weight either working, stealing or anything\". (#30) 117 This d e f i n i t i o n corresponds c l o s e l y to that of the \"bum\", and bears s t r i k i n g resemblance to Cloward and Ohlin's \"double failures\"\"'\". I t i s also s i m i l a r to the inmates' description of prison guards as being \"too lazy to work and too yellow to steal\". (c) p.rofessional and Experienced\/Amateur More s p e c i f i c attention must be paid at t h i s time to the concept of the \"professional criminal\" as used by both laymen and academics. The category \"professional criminal\" was seldom used by my subjects; even well-knOwn rounders did not refer to themselves as professionals. When I enquired about the concept they were unable to i d e n t i f y anyone as a professional. One must conclude therefore, that the concept of the \"professional criminal\" lacks objective reference in the community understudy, or that t h i s category i s synonymous with that of \"rounder\". Since no inquiry was made of laymen, on the issue, the meaning of the layman's category \"professional criminal\" cannot be ascertained with any f i n a l i t y . I t i s obvious that \"lay\" categories cannot include a l l facets of the technical d e f i n i -tions of \"professional\", as the term i s defined by academics. For example, Hughes states, \"Now the conventional and evaluative term \"profession\" carries as connotation the contention that R.A. Cloward and L.E. . Ohlin, Delinquency and Opportunity, N.Y.: The Free Press of Glencoe Inc. (1960). 118 there i s no c o n f l i c t of interest or perspective between pro-fessi o n a l and client\"\"'\". C l e a r l y t h i s d e f i n i t i o n cannot 2 r e a d i l y be applied to criminals'. In h i s study, Sutherland compares the Professional Thief with the d e f i n i t i o n of the learned professions and as defined 3 by Carr-Saunders and Wilson. The profession of t h e f t has most of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . I t has technical sM.ll, an exclusive group, immunity from punishment which almost amounts to a license from the state to s t e a l , a degree of monopoly growing out of t h e i r exclusive group relationship and \u2022of t h e i r recognition by the agents of the state. Each of these i s less formal than i n other professions. They do not have written constitutions for t h e i r groups or licenses which they may hang on t h e i r o f f i c e walls. They do have the informal equivalents of con-, s t i t u t i o n s and licenses. The one c h a r a c t e r i s t i c l i s t e d by Carr-Saunders and Wilson which they lack i s the e t h i c a l standards which minimize the pecuniary motive. When t h i s point was mentioned to t h i s professional t h i e f , he admitted that his profession did not have t h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c , but he added that the medical and l e g a l profes-sions would have very few members i f that were used as a c r i t e r i o n of membership.4 Hughes, \"The S o c i o l o g i c a l Study of Work: An E d i t o r i a l Forward\", p. 425. 2 With the exception, perhaps, of those criminals who work with the \"victim\" for t h e i r mutual benefit, for example, i n insurance frauds. I t i s not l i k e l y , however, that the layman has these persons i n mind when speaking of professional criminals. 3 Exapts from Sutherland's The Professional Thief are i n -cluded i n Howard Vollmer and Donald M i l l s , P r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n , Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-Hall (1966). 4 Sutherland, The Professional Thief, p. 216. 119 The layman probably includes several of the c r i t e r i a listed by Sutherland, when using the term \"professional criminal The model probably incorporates concepts such as s p e c i a l i z a t i o n s k i l l , wit, commitment to crime, membership in a criminal sub-c u l t u r e \u2014 t h e l a t t e r providing both opportunity for p r a c t i c e - and r e l a t i v e immunity from the law. Sutherland notes that the professional t h i e f : ...did not make a comparative study of pro-fessions as a method of reaching a conclusion that stealing may be a profession. Rather he assumed that i t was and applied the name 'pro-fession' i n accordance with tee t r a d i t i o n a l language of h i s group. The quotation below i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of such t r a d i -t i o n a l useage: Your r e a l characters are ones that go out and use the underworld as a means of l i v l i h o o d and go about i t i n a professionalway, i n a pro-fessional\" manner....1 think that a character i s somebody that makes h i s l i v i n g completely out-side the law but yet has some p r i n c i p l e about i t . 2 As indicated e a r l i e r , the category of \"rounder\" as em-ployed by my subjects, includes most of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The difference may well be one of degree rather than of kind. ^Ibid., p. 215. 120 Criminals themselves have an image of the professional c r i m i -nal as one who would be highly specialized i n a s p e c i f i c s k i l l related to i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y , l i m i t h i s a c t i v i t y to t h i s s k i l l , be materially successful, and move in i n f l u e n t i a l c i r c l e s . They believe that sueh; persons probably exist, but none were known to them. I t may be that the concept of the \"professional criminal\" i s an ideal-type concept rather than a description of a part of the r e a l world. Einstadter, i n h i s study of armed robbery, makes f r e -quent and d i r e c t comparisons with h i s data and that of Suther-land' s i n The Professional Thief. He discovered l i t t l e simi-l a r i t y between the behaviour of h i s subjects and the behaviour of Sutherland's professional thieves. From the foregoing comparison i t becomes obvious that the group of c a r e e r i s t robbers seems to bear only s l i g h t resemblance to the mob that Sutherland describes.1 Given Sutherland's data, one would be w i l l i n g to con-clude that the professional\/amateur d i s t i n c t i o n i s useful when d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between various categories of thieves. I t s u t i l i t y , however, may be questioned when applied across d i f f e r e n t criminal behaviour systems. To speak of professional thieves and professional armed robbers implies a s i m i l a r i t y which i s not supported by empirical data. In fact, Einstadter Einstadter, \"The S o c i a l Organization of Armed Robbery\", p. 70. ' 121 suggests that, given the differences between h i s subjects and Sutherland's, i t would be more descriptive to speak of h i s subjects as career robbers rather than professional robbers.\"*\" My own data suggests that some, but not a l l of the cha-r a c t e r i s t i c s associated with professionalism are incorporated in the category of \"rounder\". With reference to my subjects the category \"rounder\" i s d i r e c t l y related to the world as they know i t , whereas that of \"professional criminal\" i s con-ceptualized i n abstract form only. Since the term \"amateur\" i s frequently used by criminals i t may be useful at t h i s point to explore i t s dimensions. The \"amateur\/experienced\" d i s -t i n c t i o n made by criminals bears some resemblance to the ama-teur\/professional d i s t i n c t i o n which the layman makes. The amateur\/experienced d i s t i n c t i o n i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s k i l l d i s t i n c t i o n . A job i s said to have been done by \"someone who knew what he was doing\", rather than \"by a pro-fess i o n a l \" . Although he may not refer to himself as a pro-fessional, the experienced criminal does dis t i n g u i s h between the s k i l l e d and the inept criminal. Each type of crime has i t s own peculiar terminology for both the experienced and i n -experienced in that specialty.. For example, experienced bank 2 robbers refer derogatively to \"note pushers\" as persons who \"'\"Ibid., p. 71. 2 \"Note pusher\": someone who robs banks,(usually armed) by handing the t e l l e r a note demanding money. 122 don't know what they are doing, and do not acknowledge them as bank robbers. The experienced criminal does not want to be i d e n t i f i e d with the one-time blundering offender, or with the alchoholic or hype who has experience but not a b i l i t y . As was stated, a person commiting a crime i s evaluated as \"know-ing what he's doing\" or \"not knowing, what he*' s doing\" . The former e l i c i t s admiration, the second, contempt. The terminology of the public media does not di s t i n g u i s h between such a \"professional\" caper and an amateur attempt. This i s disturbing to criminals, since to be i d e n t i f i e d with \"armed robbers\" i n general, lowers the status of the s k i l l e d operator. IS IT TRUE THAT THE NUMBER OF BANK ROBBERIES HAS INCREASED? Well, the number of bank rob-beries i n the sense of goin' i n with a note has c e r t a i n l y increased, but an out and out armed robbery, when they say bank robberies they are including a l l of that, but when you take away a l l - - a l l those with a note, or who are drunk\u2014there was a drunk convicted yester-day, wasn't there? I DON'T KNOW. Yeh\u20142.5 reading I I mean, 2.5\u2014you're i n bad shape I Y e h\u2014 convicted him. He went i n with a note. Here's a\u2014 t h e r e ' s a bank robbery, I mean, you know, on the sheet. (#32) The above quotation shows the c r i t e r i a by which t h i s informant made h i s own d i s t i n c t i o n s . Anyone robbing a bank with a 2.5 reading had to be an amateur. He would not c l a s s i f y t h i s as a bank robbery. This was simply \"goin' i n with a note\". 123 There's two types of bank robbers; there's those note-droppers. We c a l l 'em wicket-men. I t ' s touch and go there. I f somebody says 'scat', you know, t h e y ' l l run and a l l they've got i s a note. Or i t might be kind of a nutty person--might shoot someone. We've got that type i n here too, but they're not considered i n t h i s . . . . HOW DO YOU KNOW WHETHER A GUYIAS JUST TRIED IT WITH A NOTE OR WHETHER HE JUMPED OVER THE COUNTER\u2014COULDN'T SOMEONE PRETEND THAT HE'D DONE IT THE BIG WAY? Well, i t ' s i n the papers. The newspapers come i n here, and a number of those people that are on b a i l and f i n a l l y get convicted and come i n here--so everybody\u2014every case comes i n here i s well known. Nobody can escape. I f he's a policeman, we know he's here, within a few minutes, because there i s also some o f f i c e r s that you know. They don't t e l l you outright, but t h e y ' l l speak to another o f f i c e r and you're l i s t e n i n ' . (#15) Public knowledge about himself may be one of the reasons why the amateur cannot apply p o t e n t i a l l y higher-status l e g a l d e f i n i t i o n s to himself. The accepted \"rounder\" w i l l not t r y to \"pass\" as someone he i s n ' t , because i t would jeopardize h i s rounder status (for example, he w i l l not consider himself a bank robber just because he has robbed one bank). In fact, he indicates true \"rounder\" status by being able to d i f f e r e n t i -ate between himself and a bank robber, and by not claiming an unwarranted status as a \"young punk\" would be l i k e l y to do. The quotation below i s from a respondent who had been continuously involved i n various property offences and was a recognized rounder p r i o r to setting up a legitimate business. When the business floundered he accepted the suggestion of h i s former criminal associates to rob a bank and thus a l l e v i a t e 124 h i s f i n a n c i a l d i s t r e s s . Neither he nor h i s friends had ever robbed a bank before; . . . i t was the biggest goof-up I've ever seen i n my l i f e . We a l l got drunk before we went on the caper, drinking i n my house. P i l e d i n -p i l e d the car up, one guy got shot i n the leg. I l o s t my shoe; o h \u2014 i t was ugly, r e a l ugly. We had l o t s of money\u2014twenty eight thousand dollars.. But I mean, b u t \u2014 i t was such a goofy thing, i t was crazy. I t was worse than the movies, when I think back on i t . I t was nuts. One guy dropped a c l i p out of the gun i n the bank, another guy dropped the money out\u2014coming out of the door, picking i t up, you know. Oh I I t (1 aughs) was t e r r i b l e . One guy forgot to drive the car\u2014went i n the wrong d i r e c t i o n . Oh boy, i t was more l i k e a Laurel and Hardy. No kidding! I t was t e r r i b l e . So then I was a big bank robber, a big-time o p e r a t o r \u2014 h e l l u v a guyi AND YOU GOT TWENTY YEARS? Yeh, and paddles with i t . (LATER HE ADDED:) I'm i n for bank rob-bery, but I'm not a bank robber. At least I'm a miserably poor o n e \u2014 i n fact, I'm a poor c r i m i -n a l . (#6) The amateur i s not to be confused with the \"young punk\". To be considered as an amateur rather than a \"young punk\" i n -volves the benefit of hindsight. The successful criminal may look upon h i s e a r l i e r bumbling a c t i v i t i e s as \"amateurish\". An accomplished burglar referred to h i s e a r l i e r a c t i v i t i e s i n t h i s ways That was a B & E on houses. That'd be i n Vancouver. I was just a k i d and I was look-ing for money. And I wasn't stealing anything; l i k e some guys would walk i n and take f u r n i -ture and everything. But I was just young and I didn't know much. I was just going out look-ing for the money, you know. (#39) This suggests that as a k i d he could s t e a l nothing else than money. He was not a \" t h i e f \" , in the sense that he had no 125 connections with \"fences\" whereby the theft of a r t i c l e s i s made viable'. He was r e s t r i c t e d i n what he could d o \u2014 s o much so that he did not q u a l i f y as being a \" t h i e f \" . I asked: COULD YOU MAKE A LIVING OFF THIS KIND OF THING? Well, I guess you could i f you were taking, l i k e radios and T.V.s and you had a way of getting r i d of them. Then I imagine you could, yeh. BUT JUST TAKING MONEY, COULD YOU MAKE A LIVING THAT WAY? No, as a kid\u2014maybe.... (#39) With regard to the \"experienced criminal\", one measure of experience, although recognized as a crude one, i s the mat-ter of prison experience: (WE TALKED AT SOME LENGTH REGARDING PRISON REFORM AND ALSO ABOUT #40 1s FUTURE. I ASKED WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIMSELF TO BE A TRULY SUCCESS-FUL CRIMINAL, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE WHO WOULD NOT GET CAUGHT. HE DECIDED, AFTER SOME DELIBERATION, THAT WITH HIS PRIOR EXPERI-ENCE IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE. HE WOULD NOT ENTER SAFE-CRACKING:) ...armed robberies are another matter. In B.C.'s foggy wea-ther they can be pretty safe propositions. (HOWEVER, #40 ADDED THAT HIS CRIMINAL RECORD WOULD ALWAYS BE AGAINST HIM, AND AS A RESULT HE COULD NOT POSSBLY GET AWAY WITH CRIME FOR A LONG TIME. HE NOTED THAT:) . . . i n acquiring the experience you usually acquire a record. (#40) This implies that a prison record may denote competence rather than f a i l u r e , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n those criminal trades where competance and experience are c l o s e l y related. Safe-crackers asserted that one cannot be good at safecracking un-less one engages i n i t frequently and frequency enhances the pr o b a b i l i t y of apprehension. 126 You keep s t e a l i n g \u2014 y o u gotta go to j a i l . You got to f a l l \u2014 o h yeh. You know you're going to go to j a i l i f you keep on s t e a l i n ' . You know that. I don't care who i t i s . Most of them'11 admit i t too. (#15) The attitude towards t h i s prison experience,\"however, i s characterized by ambivalence. On the one hand i t denotes experience; on the other hand i t i s an in d i c a t i o n of f a l l i b i l i -ty, i f not incompetence. #15, who has asserted the i n e v i t a -b i l i t y of prison, also adds: I don't t a l k much about crime i n here, 'cause i f you were that good you wouldn't'\" be here. (#15) A s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between the amateur and the experienced criminal has to do with orientation towards law enforcement. This has been recognized by both Sutherland\"*\" 2 and Maurer , although only i n part. Both Sutherland and Maurer suggest that the professional i s one who has developed s k i l l s and p o l i t i c a l power of the sort that minimize h i s chan-ces of being convicted. My own data suggests the importance of distinguishing between \"detection\" and \"convictions\". The amateur criminal's central concern i s to avoid detection; the experienced criminal i s concerned that he avoid conviction. Experienced criminals implied a general disregard for anonymity. They didn't p a r t i c u l a r l y mind i f the p o l i c e \"knew\" they had 'Sutherland, The Professional Thief. i Maurer, The Big Con. 127 pulled a p a r t i c u l a r caper. The important factor for the ex-perienced criminal was that \"they have nothing on me\". That i s , there must be no evidence which w i l l \"stand up\" i n court. They are aware that t h e i r p a r t i c u l a r methods of operation and t h e i r technical s k i l l s and patterns do away with t h e i r anony-mity, and that the po l i c e w i l l \"know\" who did i t . Although they w i l l t r y to avoid arousing police pressure (\"heat\") , t h e i r c e n t r al concern i s that \"the po l i c e have nothing on me\". Now, that's the funniest part. Now we became r e a l l y professional i n our type of work, because the way we were working, the po l i c e knew that we were working, but the way we worked, they couldn't possibly bring any charge against us. For example, I ' l l describe you very b r i e f l y a bank robbery that we done. (#28) The amateur speaks i n terms of \"nobody knows who did i t \" . C l i n a r d and Quinney, when summarizing the typology deve-loped by Reckless,\"*\" i n 1961 (ordinary crime, organized crime and professional crime) make the following statements: Professional criminals as the t h i r d type of career criminals, are highly s k i l l e d and are thus able to obtain considerable amounts of money without being detected. Because of organization and contact with other profes-sional criminals, these offenders are able to escape conviction. ^Walter C. Reckless, The Crime Problem, New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts (1961) . 2 Clxnard and Quinney, Criminal Behaviour Systems, p. 9. 128 Note t h e i r further d i s t i n c t i o n : Ordinary criminals lack organization to avoid arrest and conviction. Organized c r i -minals, on the other hand, through a high degree of organization are able, without being detected or convicted, to s p e c i a l i z e i n a c t i -v i t y which can be operated as a large-scale business. x Although the above indicates some awareness of the detection\/conviction d i s t i n c t i o n , the rationale for t h i s d i s -t i n c t i o n i s not c l e a r . We are t o l d that the professional c r i -minal i s not detected because of h i s s k i l l , the ordinary crdminal i s detected because he lacks organization and the organized criminal escapes detection because of h i s organization. My own data includes no one who would f i t the above \"professional criminal\" category. My \"experienced criminals\" were often highly s k i l l e d , l a r g e l y unconcerned with detection, and escaped conviction, not because of contacts but because they l e f t no \"evidence\" i n the l e g a l sense. The nature of both these s k i l l s and of \"evidence\" w i l l be discussed i n subsequent chapters. I am suggesting, however, that categories such as the above look suspiciously a r t i f i c i a l , as though superimposed upon the data, while perporting to describe \" r e a l i t y \" . The criminal's concept of the professional criminal i s s i m i l a r to h i s concept of \"rounder\". Both imply commitment to i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y ; however, to be a \"rounder\" includes p a r t i c i -pation i n the s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s of other rounders. I t implies 'Ibid. 129 the need for and receipt of s o c i a l acceptance by other roun-ders. The rounder shares with other rounders, not only a criminal trade, but a way of l i f e . In contrast, the concept of professional, as held by my subjects, i s one of a highly s k i l l e d person who engages i n crime but has l i t t l e or no s o c i a l contact with rounders. The professional i s viewed as one who treats crime s t r i c t l y as a business rather than as a l i f e s t y l e . A respondent, now f i f t y years old, who had been i n -volved i n crime \" a l l my l i f e \" , was asked: \"Would you c a l l yourself a professional criminal?\" He repl i e d : N o \u2014 I don't think so, because I'm not money-hungry. I'm not out to make a fortune, l i k e some people want to make that great big one and re-t i r e . No\u2014I'm not money-hungry, you know. I won't f i g h t over i t \u2014 l e t ' s say you're cutting a stake up, l i k e some guys they see an extra quar-t e r and they want to f i g h t over i t . I was never l i k e that. I was n e v e r \u2014 I don't think I could be c a l l e d a profe s s i o n a l . You know, that's my viewpoint\u2014from t h e i r viewpoint I am. You know, I hang around with the guys doin* the big time, and the guys that have done the big crimes and so on and so forth, but then, who else am I going to hang around with? I can't t a l k the same lang-uage as some of them people. (#15) (d) Alky, Dope fiend, and Normals: Certain designations such as being an \"alky\" (alcoholic) or a dope fiend (drug addict) have s p e c i f i c meaning within the criminal subcultures. Both of these terms imply i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y , usually theft, as a major l i f e s t y l e . These categories are also somewhat d i f f e r e n t from the rounder, bum and square-john d i s t i n c t i o n . Although 130 they share the dedication which rounders and squares have i n common, t h i s dedication i s directed towards a goal which i n turn imposes s t r i c t constraints on the t o t a l l i f e s t y l e . The r i g i d i t y of t h i s l i f e s t y l e can be shared and appreciated only by others similarly involved. For example, #31 has indicated that he usually l i v e s with female \" a l k i e s \" for \"companionship\". This r e l a t i o n s h i p i s tenuous: S h e ' l l l i v e with you i f you've got a drink, i f not, s h e ' l l move over to someone who has; maybe latershe*11 come back to you. ARE THEY PROSTITUTES? Oh no, d e f i n i t e l y n o t \u2014 t h e y don't take money. There are not many alky p r o s t i -tutes\u2014most such are on dope. But I have known some al c o h o l i c p r o s t i t u t e s \u2014 t h e y ' r e not r e a l l y p r o s t i t u t e s ; they'11 turn right around and spend t h e i r money with you i n a bar. (#31) Although regularly involved i n i l l e g a l behaviour, few alk i e s or dope fiends are accorded rounder status. An al c o h o l i c stated that: Other criminals wouldn't have a thing to do with me for p u l l i n g a caper.. (HE MENTIONED SEVERAL CAPERS THAT HE'D BEEN INVITED TO GO ON, BUT ADDED THAT THOSE WHO HAD ASKED HIM HAD NOT KNOWN HE WAS AN ALKY. HE HAD NOT PARTICIPATED BECAUSE HE HAS NEVER WANTED TO:) r e a l l y go into crime. In fact, I'm kinda g r a t e f u l that I'm an a l c o h o l i c 2 . (HIS REASON WAS AMBIGUOUS:) I used to be pretty r e l i g i o u s \u2014 I never enjoyed crime. (HE ADDED:)If I'd have gone into crime whole-heartedly, I'd not have h a l f the convic-t i o n s . I f I'd gone into stealing for stealing's sake, I'd have been, I think, f a i r l y successful. (#31) J T h i s curious d e f i n i t i o n of \"prostitute\" i s based upon how the p r o s t i t u t e spends, rather than earns her money. 2 I t may be useful to view alcoholism as a means whereby per-sons such as #31 maintain a measure of role-distance from the f u l l e r c riminal r o l e . That i s , by being an alcoholic one i s pre-vented and excused from becoming a big-time successful c r i m i n a l . 131 The a l c o h o l i c lacks several \"rounder\" c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . His alcoholism decreases h i s r e l i a b i l i t y as a partner. In addition, he lacks commitment--he i s not (as #31 put it) \"stealing for stealing's sake\". Several safecrackers mentioned that one of t h e i r ack-nowledged colleagues was, i n fact, also a dope-fiend, but t h i s was referred to as both remarkable and unusual. To become known as a drug-user or an alc o h o l i c may seriously a f f e c t the status of even well-known rounders. To what extent such status i s permanent and i r r e v e r s i b l e i s not known. #11 worked i n the cheque business for some time. He rela t e s : When they--the people, eventually learned that I was connected with drugs, that I was using, they gradually started to have nothing to do with me. WHY? Well, because i t draws heat to them. They f e e l they can't depend on you, and t h i s to me i s very understandable. You know, they f e e l that whenever they send you on anything, you've gotta have drugs along and t h i s adds to the r i s k . And i f you didn't have drugs, well--what would you do? You know, you\u2014would you finger the whole situation? You know, t h i s kind of t h i n g \u2014 t h i s i s understandable. They're i n business. I t ' s just bad business to have anything to do with hypes. (#11) The r a t i o n a l basis for avoiding hypes and al k i e s was re peatedly underscored by my respondents' comments. They genera l y agreed that hypes are u n r e l i a b l e \u2014 \" w i l l s e l l t h e i r soul for a cap\", and are therefore p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable to p o l i c e threats and to bribery. In contrast to the \"bum\", \"young 132 punk\" or \"rat\", the hype's u n r e l i a b i l i t y i s not so much a r e f l e c t i o n upon h i s \"character\" as upon the p a r t i c u l a r nature of h i s state; to be betrayed by a hype i s a r e f l e c t i o n also on one's own judgement, rather than on the hype. Whatever bitterness was expressed towards hypes was of t h i s sort. In other words, the hype i s a p e r f e c t l y predictable type for those who are well acquinted with the underworld\u2014he i s to be avoided but not to be feared or to be mistrusted. In contrast to al k i e s , hypes are widely recognized as being among the best of thieves. Their daring, nerve and highly developed s k i l l s are widely recognized. The criminal acts of the alky, on the other hand, are characterized by inept bungling. Despite a common exclusion from true rounder status, the hype and the alky do not s o c i a l i z e together. This i s explained i n terms of the diverse e f f e c t s of drugs and alcohol: HOW BIG A CIRCLE OF ASSOCIATES OR WHAT YOU WOULD CALL FRIENDS WOULD YOU MAINTAIN? Well, I know a l o t of p e o p l e \u2014 I haven't got too many friends. I'm b a s i c a l l y a loner anyway. I'd just as soon go my own way. A LOT OF PARTIES AND STUFF LIKE THAT? No, not r e a l l y . You know\u2014we may go to a club sometimes, or go to the movies, but most of the time we'd just as soon s i t at home and enjoy each other's company. Or we might go out to the f l a t s . You know\u2014the l a s t time when I was out, I was out pretty well for two years. You know\u2014it was pretty well the same\u2014we t r a v e l l e d around quite a b i t . When you're using you don't want to s i t around with a bunch of drunks. They get on your nerves. You know\u2014they're acting s i l l y , and everybody i s having a good time, and youre s i t t i n g there thinking, 'Oh, you fools 1 1 (#2) 133 Although the hype and alky are accorded lower status for reasons of t h e i r u n r e l i a b i l i t y , low status i s also ac-corded c e r t a i n other criminals, but for reasons of morality. For example: Rapists--no one w i l l associate with a rapo. Why rape when there's l o t s of g i r l s around? A t h i e f takes property--that can be replaced; but a rapist, well--the g i r l , you can't change that. (#41) Similar evaluations were made of petty thieves who used violence when robbing older and generally helpless victims. 2. The Criminal as Prisoner To the layman, the prison community consists of c r i -minals. Most laymen are aware that prisoners are a sample of a larger body of law-breakers, some of whom have not been convicted and sentenced to a prison term. The rounder also i s aware that some law-breakers never form a part of the prison community, but he makes the additional distinction, that of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between rounders and squares within prison, as was discussed e a r l i e r . Judging from the professional l i t e r a t u r e , one i s led to believe that incarcerated persons represent the inept, criminal washouts, and as such are not representative of c r i -minals i n general. I t i s also probable that the layman views prisoners as being 'less s u c c e s s f u l criminals. My own data indicates that such generalizations must be q u a l i f i e d by recognizing the v a r i e t i e s of crime and i t s technical dimensions, 134 The law of averages i s against you\u2014I don't care how good you are--you'll end up i n j a i l at some time. (#44) DID YOU EVER KNOW ANY SAFECRACKERS WHO NEVER DID ANY TIME? No\u2014I can't say I did. DO YOU THINK THERE WERE SUCH? That's a hard thing to say, you know\u2014if there were such, I wouldn't know about them because i f they never got caught, how would you know? But any of the ones I ever knew, they a l l done time at one time or another. (#14) I ask #14 what would characterize a \"best safecracker\". He begins by saying that i t ' s experience that matters: I used to go out two and three times a week and through that I gained a f a i r b i t of ex-perience, but I'd say\u2014-I don't know how anyone would say so and so's the b e s t \u2014 b u t I don't think there i s any such thing as bein' the best. There's some guys that are smarter than others, that's a l l \u2014 m o r e cagier and more e f f i -cient and\u2014an natu r a l l y the more safes you blow the more you know about i t , you see. And l i k e I say, t h i s was one thing I lacked, be-cause I did too much time to get the experience. DOING A LOT OF TIME\u2014IS THAT A SIGN OF NOT BEING AT THE TOP OF THE LADDER IN THE SAFE-CRACKING SKILLS? No, n o \u2014 I wouldn't say that. I would say that some of>the r e a l good safe-crackers did an awful l o t of time\u2014some of the best did a l o t of time. But I would think i t ' s just due to a person's own fa u l t , or maybe carelessness. I t ' s got to be that. Or maybe too much a c t i v i t y , which I think was my case. I used to go out a l o t more than I had to, and you know--real often. And used to say--the more times you go out the more chance you have of ge t t i n ' caught, you see. Some guys were\u2014the better guys\u2014were r e a l cagey. They only went on the ones they knew were good scores. That had money i n them. So they would get enough out of i t so they wouldn't have to go out again for quite a long time, see? And some of these guys stayed out of j a i l a l o t longer. (#14) 135 In the subsequent chapter I s h a l l argue that safecrack-ing expertise i s maintained only by frequent p r a c t i c e . The quotation just given shows that frequent practice also i n -creases the p r o b a b i l i t y of being apprehended. In other words, expertise and frequency of conviction may be d i r e c t l y , rather than inversely related. Statements as to the relationship between expertise and prison experience would need to take into account the d i s t i n c t i o n s between various crime-forms. Like the layman, the rounder makes a great deal of use of the formal prisoner status as a means of i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . I t seems that i t i s not s i g n i f i c a n t l y easier for him to i d e n t i -fy the non-sentenced law-breakers than i t i s for the layman, except insofar as he may i d e n t i f y one at\"work\" by recognizing the s k i l l s employed (for example, boosters). As w i l l be noted again l a t e r , the type of crime and s k i l l s involved determines (in part) the p r o b a b i l i t y of un-known persons engaging i n i t . The safecracker can hardly con-ceive of unknown safecrackers. Because i t i s a f a i r l y \" v i s i b l e \" and therefore \"public\" offence, he i s aware of most safe-crackings, and through h i s s o c i a l network, i s able to \"account\" for them as they occur. This i s to say that the criminal, i n contrast to the layman, possesses f a i r l y objective c r i t e r i a by which the unknown \"criminal\" population may be assessed both i n terms of members and types. 136 The prison sentence provides networks of s o c i a l re-lationships which the ex-convict may either nourish or discard. The rounder i s one who maintains such association and i s iden-t i f i e d by the subculture as a member. This involves continued support of rounder norms, more or less a p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i l l e g a l a c t i v i t i e s and i n rounder s o c i a l a c t i v i t i e s . In Vancouver, several hotels are referred to by criminals as \"rounder hotels\". The d i s t i n c t i o n between the rounder and others consists not only of interaction, but of the places of such i n t e r a c t i o n . (a) How much time done, and where; One of the factors by which a rounder may be i d e n t i f i e d i s the amount of time he has spent i n prison. To a rounder, t h i s factor i s indica-t i v e of the degree of criminal involvement. The amount of time may consist of a series of shorter \" b i t s \" , or a single \"long b i t \" , or \"big time\". The significance of the prison experience bears a s t r i k i n g resemblance to that of the college or u n i v e r s i t y ex-perience. Both provide formal c r i t e r i a for p o s i t i o n and status. Both provide networks of association. The nature of the academic association i s further s p e c i f i e d when the aca-demic s p e c i f i e s which inst\u00b1ution he attended. In a s i m i l a r way, the where of the prison experience i s also an important item of information. Prisons are known to rounders i n terms of the network of s o c i a l relationships which suxound them. 137 Thus, the P r a i r i e Penitentiary was known for years as a place where safecrackers might be found. To have done time there was to say that one was acquainted with c e r t a i n roun-ders. Inmates at the Western Penitentiary, who are doing time for armed robbery in the East, are ascribed high rounder status, since inmates \"know\" that i t i s the p o l i c y of the Pen i t e n t i a r i e s Commission to transfer Eastern bank robbers who have worked in gangs, to Western prisons when conicted. Further, the d i s t i n c t i o n between a j a i l and a peni-t e n t i a r y experience i s c r u c i a l . F u l l membership i n the rounder community involves a graduation from j a i l to penitentiary sentences. (b) Prison Subculture and \"Doing your own time\": Both academic and j o u r n a l i s t i c l i t e r a t u r e makes much of what i s referred to as \"inmate subculture\". The image of the \"crimi-nal as prisoner\", which i s communicated to the reader, tends to focus on matters of prisoner s t r a t i f i c a t i o n systems and on prisoner ideology. Although my own data does not relate d i r e c t l y to t h i s subject, several questions are suggested. The f i r s t question has to do with the transfer of status-models from outside to inside the prison. For example, the drug addict or \"hype\" i s generally accorded low status when outside of prison, both by other criminals and by the publ i c . My data suggests, however, that i t would be f a l l a c i o u s 138 to assume that the addict i s also accorded low status when i n prison. Hypes tend to occupy many of the more i n f l u e n t i a l and \"soft\" positions within the prison work structure. The fact that they get r e l a t i v e l y long sentences may account for t h i s , since the Administration prefers persons with long sentences for these \"better\" p o s i t i o n s . The analysis of inmate subculture has usually proceeded from a st r u c t u r a l - f u n c t i o n a l approach 1, s i m i l a r to that u t i l i z e d in the argument just presented. Fu n c t i o n a l i s t s argue that the inmate social structure i s developed with reference to the s p e c i f i c needs of the prison i t s e l f , rather than with regard to the larger external society of which the prison i s but a part. John Irwin refers to t h i s as \"the indigenous-origin theory of the convict s o c i a l 2 system\". Irwin, r e f e r r i n g to h i s e a r l i e r work with Donald 3 Cressey, questions t h i s theory. He argues that c e r t a i n types of crime involve values and behaviour patterns which are rea d i l y adapted to prison. Further, \"...a convict entering prison does not have h i s former i d e n t i t i e s r e l a t i v e to other 4 subcultures blotted out\" . He concludes that: For example, Sykes, The Society of Captives. 2 Irwin, The Felon, p. 63. 3 John Irwin and Donald Cressey, \"Thieves, Convicts, and the Inmate Culture\", S o c i a l Problems ( F a l l , 1962). 4 Irwin, The Felon, p. 64. 139 The system of roles, values and norms that exist in the adult prison are the re-sult of two converging subcultures--the t h i e f subculture and the convict subcul-ture, both of which emerge in other s o c i a l s e t t i n g s . x The following quotation i l l u s t r a t e s both the curious reversal of status which a convict may experience, as well the use of \"outside\" factors, for purposes of evaluating prison behaviour. I WAS WONDERING WHAT YOU WOULD BE KNOWN AS HERE IN THE PRISON. BEING BOTH A DRUG ADDICT AND\u2014OR DO YOU STILL REFER TO YOURSELF AS BE-ING A DRUG ADDICT? Well, I don't have much in common with hypes, other than that I use drugs. I don't hang around with the addicts too much either, you know. ARE YOU KNOWN IN THE PRISON THEN AS A\u2014AS AN ARMED ROBBER, OR AS A DRUG ADDICT? Probably more as an armed robber. I NOTICE THAT THE ARMED ROBBERS SEEM TO HAVE A HIGHER STATUS HERE THAN THE DRUG AD-DICTS . I don't know\u2014I don't think so. Really, so f a r as the so-called society i n here, I t h i n k \u2014 I think the drug addicts would be higher than the armed robbers, i n that they've a l l got good positions and jobs. I MEAN AMONG THE INMATES. Well, they're good scapegoats. Blame i t on them hypes. I t ' s t h e i r f a u l t we got t h i s - - i t ' s t h e i r f a u l t we l o s t that. Them guys are stealing a l l the su-gar out of the kitchen and giving i t away. This kind of s h i t . There's some pretty creepy armed robbers around here too. Now what\u2014so what\u2014you go to j a i l , you're i n j a i l now. It ' s too bad, and there's no use getting on your knees and prayin'. You know\u2014at least be a man about i t . 'Cause you're not fooling any-body. They're just lookin' at you and laughing at you. And the more you s n i v e l to these people the more they (something about i n s u l t s h e r e ) \u2014 'you wretch'.' You know\u2014at least be a man. You know, you were a man when you walked into there \"*Tbid. 140 with that gun, and now\u2014what happened? I guess maybe the time gets them too. You know, a few of them that I can think of that have done big time, and now they 1re here with a bunch more, and they think, 'Oh boyl' I guess i t ' s a way of 'getting out 1, though they know themselves that i t ain ' t going to get them out. (#2) The nature of the prison subculture, as well as i t s re l a t i o n s h i p with the \"outside\", may be p a r t l y c l a r i f i e d by examining the notion of \"doing your own time\". This expres-sion i s frequently used by inmates and has several implica-t i o n s . F i r s t of a l l , \"doing your own time\" i s an i n d i c a t i o n of adaptation to a t o t a l institution. That i s , the outside i s d e l i b e r a t e l y made i r r e l e v a n t . .A part of each interview included a discussion of how the inmate adapts to \"doing time\". Inmates agreed that the best way i s to forget about the out-side, though they did not a l l consider themselves equally successful i n achieving t h i s . Persons doing \"big time\" agreed that a l l outside s o c i a l t i e s must be severed. This does not imply permanence, but rather a moratorium. The inmate who \"does h i s own time\", \"doesn't care\" about p o l i t i c s , Vietnam, or anything outside. He probably knows about what i s going on, but he d e l i b e r a t e l y develops an attitude of no concern. When I asked, \"Why?\" I received a rather standard and highly r a t i o n a l reply: \"what difference would i t make\u2014I can't do anything about i t here.\" 141 What's the use? You're i n j a i l ; what the h e l l ' s the use of w r i t i n ' to somebody outside? I t don't do any good. The less contacts you have with the outside when you're inside, the easier your time i s . l Nor does there appear to be much room for idealism i n terms of changing the prison structure or of putting pressure on the Administration. Frequent references were made to \"the r i o t \" as an example of how open resistance to the Administra-t i o n results i n even greater r e s t r i c t i o n . The inmate who i s try i n g to arouse militancy among h i s fellow inmates i s viewed as one who has not yet learned to \"do h i s own time\". A second dimension of \"doing your own time\" involves inmate-inmate re l a t i o n s h i p s . I t i s generally acknowledged that being sentenced to the Penitentiary involves serious de-pri v a t i o n , and frequently s o c i a l tragedy for one sentenced to .the \"Pen.\". Inmates are aware that some of them are con-stantly i n danger of \"cracking up\" under the s t r a i n . I i n -quired as to the amount of inmate s o c i a l support given to those who couldn't bear up under the pressures: \"How do inmates help and support each other?\" I was surprised to f i n d strong agreement to the e f f e c t that such s o c i a l support i s large l y absent and i n fact, d e l i b e r a t e l y avoided: \"You've got to learn to do your own time\", or \"You can't cry on anyone's shoulder\". Martin, My L i f e in Crime, p. 135. 142 I f you're i n a dorm with forty guys--a guy gets a l e t t e r from home that someone died. Well, he's cr y i n ' on your shoulder and makin' you do the hard time; or maybe he goes berserk i n the night and stabs some guys. When I'm alone I can relax-*-, other-wise I'm very high-strung. (#9) Two reasons were given to account for t h i s apparent lack of compassion. Inmates f e e l that they have nothing to o f f e r \u2014 t h e y cannot change either the in t e r n a l (prison) or external (outside) problems which the inmate faces. In addi-tio n , one must avoid hoping for favorable changes i n one's condition, and avoid arousing what are l i k e l y to be fals e hopes, i n others. Secondly, each inmate i s probably bearing a l l the problems he i s personally capable of handling. \"I can't worry about h i s wife t o o i \" Despite i t s generally a-s o c i a l character, \"doing your own time\" does not preclude maintaining primary relationships; however, these are limited to two or three friends per inmate. For reasons such as these, inmates are not happy with the group emphasis incorporated into contemporary prison ar-chitecture by the r e h a b i l i t a t i v e school of thought. Being confined to a c e l l alone i s not viewed as e n t i r e l y undesirable,, except of course, for extended periods and i n extreme cases, such as s o l i t a r y confinement. 2 On the basis of my data I am unable to assess the per-vasiveness of these r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Clemmer concludes:\"... about for t y percent of prisoners are not i n any way intimately i n -tegrated i n groups i n which strong s o c i a l relationships exists\" He notes, however, that the dyads and t r i a d s that do exis t are characterized by strong primary r e l a t i o n s h i p s . Clemmer, The  Prison Community, pp. 129 and 136. 143 Although \"doing your own time\" may well be viewed as a functional adaptation to prison, I am suggesting that the implications of \"doing your own time\" m i l i t a t e against the f u l l development of what i s usually included i n the concept of \"sub-culture\" . In doing h i s own time the inmate i s able to meet the demands, of prison routine without relinquishing the norms and s t a t u s - d i s t i n c t i o n s meaningful to him outside the prison. This perspective incorporates boththe p o s i t i o n of the func-t i o n a l i s t s and of those, l i k e Irwin and Cressy\"*\",, who see the prison culture as an extension of the \"outside\" criminal values and behaviour systems. 3. The Criminal as S p e c i a l i s t We have indicated e a r l i e r that the d i s t i n c t i o n s set forth i n the Criminal Code (for example, theft, homicide, rape) are not p a r t i c u l a r l y useful to Administrators for purposes of managing a prison. Because prison Administrators often deal repeatedly with the same offender, yet with reference to d i s -s i m i l a r crininal acts, they do not translate the magistrate's \" g u i l t y of the f t \" into \" t h i e f \" . Tris \" t h i e f \" may e a r l i e r have been met under a \" g u i l t y of armed robbery\" or \"robber\" l a b e l . Since the layman does not keep record of the court reports he reads of i n the d a i l y paper, he i s i n c l i n e d to make simple translations, such as \" g u i l t y of theft\" equals \" t h i e f \" . Irwin and Cressey, \"Thieves, Convicts, and the Inmate Culture\". 144 He may also impute to the criminal subculture h i s own ex-perience i n a highly bureaucratic society (aspects such as high degree of d i v i s i o n of labor and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n ) . Such perspectives are supported by complicated defective stories and the conventional d e f i n i t i o n of the professional c r i m i n a l . I t w i l l be our purpose here, to evaluate the v a l i d i t y of these concepts when applied to the behaviour of criminals. Does the concept of specialization \" f i t \" our data describing such behaviour? This question w i l l be answered by r e f e r r i n g to the language and behaviour of the subjects under study. In legitimate society, persons are known i n terms of occupations. I f one teaches, one i s a teacher; i f one welds, a welder. The teacher who supplements h i s income by welding on weekends might acknowledge h i s a b i l i t y as a welder. He would, however, probably think of himself as a \"teacher\" even i f he had just finished h i s f i r s t week of teaching, following ten years of welding experience. That i s to say, for various reasons, some having to do with status, one a c t i v i t y i s taken to be more descriptive and useful than another. (a) \"Having a Line\": \"As i n the legitimate society, so also criminals may refer to themselves i n more s p e c i f i c occu-pational terms. The nearest criminal l i n g u i s t i c equivalent to s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s known as \"having a l i n e \" . One respondent, a f t e r r e f e r r i n g to himself as a shop-lifter, added: \"Everybody's got a l i n e \u2014 I got that l i n e \" , (#33). Another stated: 145 Such bugs are hard to b e a t \u2014 I would go get someone who could handle them. Locks are my_ specialty, others go for bugs, s t i l l others cans. (#13) One of the reasons for the development of a \" l i n e \" i s s i m i l a r to the reasons for s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i n the square world, for example, e f f i c i e n c y . As our more detailed discussion of technical s k i l l s w i l l indicate, the increasing technological complexity which the criminal faces demands s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true for those crimes involving surrep-t i t i o u s entry. Better alarm systems, more d i f f i c u l t locks, hinges and so on, require study and experience over time. Such experience and s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s , as i n the square world, a saleable q u a l i t y . On numerous occasions I've been approached just for that reason\u2014guys are having trouble g e t t i n an * i n ' . (#13) Another example: So we drove to that small town, and by the way, a l l the banks that I done was mostly out of the c i t y . And contrary to , he's a s p e c i a l i s t to work i n the c i t y , you know, at Montreal. And I'm the type of guy that works outside the c i t y . (#28) In a l a t e r chapter we w i l l discuss some of the factors which encourage or discourage s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , and the c r i t e r i a by which various \" l i n e s \" are evaluated as career p o s s i b i l i t i e s . At any rate, most of the subjects interviewed f e l t that they \"had a l i n e \" . This i s probably where the s i m i l a r i t y with \" s p e c i a l i z a t i o n \" ends. 146 To \"have a l i n e \" i s not a r e s t r i c t i v e factor i n any \" l e g a l \" or organized fashion. That i s , the criminal i s not troubled by trade union or professional l e g i s l a t i o n which r e s t r i c t s the behaviour of i t s members. He i s hampered i n some cases by technical and as s o c i a t i o n a l factors, as we s h a l l see l a t e r i n our discussion of the technical aspects of crime. His peers do not expect him to stay only i n h i s \" l i n e \" \u2014 t h e s h o p l i f t e r may do a B & E on occasion, and the bank robber, a burglary. One inmate whose \" l i n e \" was hotel-prowling, stated that there was probably no crime which he hadn't committed at one time or another. He pointed out that the bank JBDII i s the factor which determines what type of crime w i l l be en-gaged i n at any one time: I f you've got b i g money you can do a con job\u2014impress someone. I f you're broke, you've got to go on the boost. (#12) He acknowledged that there i s a temptation, following a big score, to \" l i v e o f f i t \" t i l l i t i s gone. However, the penalty for such behaviour i s that one must then go back on the boost. To remain o f f the boost i s i n part a matter of good money management. I t i s d i f f i c u l t i n the f i r s t place for an addict to gain enough c a p i t a l to stay o f f the boost, but an addict with money can l i v e much mae cheaply by buying h i s drugs i n larger quantity. (#12) 147 A v a r i a t i o n from one 1s l i n e may also be brought about by new opportunities, p a r t i c u l a r l y when one's regular \" l i n e \" does not appear to be viable at the time. #11 goes into a long discussion of hi s addict habit and how he conned a g i r l f riend into supporting him with money. He went to England, came back, and went into what he c a l l s a \"checks scam\", at t h i s point. I t i s noteworthy that he was sked by the big rounders to j o i n them i n a check scam. He explains that he knew a l l the big rounders owing to h i s previous association with the card games. He explains also that h i s reputation downtown was that he was very s o l i d . And since I didn't have anything going at the time, I decided to go i n on i t . So when I was approached on t h i s thing, I didn't have anything going at the time and they said, 'We want you to go to such and such a state'. T h ^ explained the whole scam to me and they said there had been a t r i a l run made on t h i s . (#11) The value of a new opportunity may be assessed, at least p a r t l y , i n terms of who i s advocating i t : YOU SAY YOU WERE NOT JUST CONFINED TO DOING SAFES? Oh no. Ac t u a l l y you'd do anything that you figure was a good score\u2014you f i g u r e d you could make i t , regardless of what i t was. A l l the time you get d i f f e r e n t guys comin' to you and saying--I got a good score!', 'I got t h i s . ' And some might be safes and some might not be, but you know these might come from guys that aren't pete men. But i f they've got a good name and you know they're a l r i g h t , you may go along with what they've got. (#14) 148 Sutherland's Professional Thief pointed out that: Con men change frequently from one con racket to another. I f need be, they can step out on the heel, boost, shake, tap and other rackets. x As Sutherland points out i n a footnote, t h i s f l e x i b i l i t y may only be true of the small-time confidence men. As another of h i s respondents puts i t : The r e a l l y b i g guns s t i c k to one racket consistently. The statement that con men ssp out on the boost i s absurd. This would be only the dregs of the profession. No self-respecting con man would think of doing so. 2 Some of the factors which tend towards s p e c i a l i z a t i o n have to do with the criminal's concept of r e l a t i v e safety: WOULD A PETE-MAN^ HAVE THE SKILLS TO DO, LET'S SAY, A BANK ROBBERY? Oh yeh, but few pete-men would go on a bank robbery\u2014you g o t \u2014 one reason being most of them d i s l i k e very much to use a gun. I f you're goin' on a bank robbery you got to go there with a gun and you've got to be prepared to use i t , because i f you don't you're crazy. Because y o u ' l l get your head blown o f f yourself i f you don't. You're usin' a gun which gets you more t i m e \u2014 you may end up shootin' somebody or g e t t i n ' shot yourself, whereas breaking and entering i s s u rreptitious e n t r y \u2014 s e e what I mean\u2014no-body' s supposed to see you, see? Sutherland, Professional Thief, p. 42. 2 I b i d . 3 The term \"pete-man\" refers to \"safecracker\". Although the two terms are sometimes used synonymously, i n i t s more precise meaning, \"pete-man\" refers only to those safecrackers who use explosives. 149 WHAT ABOUT B & E\u2014DO YOU NEED TO KNOW THAT, AND WOULD A PETE-MAN GO IN FOR B & E*S? Well, I mean, safecracking e n t a i l s B & E too. DO ALL SAFECRACKERS START AS B & E MEN? Oh yeh, a l l of them. (#14) I asked #14 whether a pete-man would do B & E's without looking for a safe: Well, yes. Depending on what i t was, you know. I f i t was worth your w h i l e \u2014 i f there's money i n i t , sure you would. (HE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, PICK UP STUFF THAT WAS. HARD TO TURN INTO CASH.) (#14) S t r i c t s p e c i a l i z a t i o n may be both impractical and im-possible: When you're s t e a l i n ' you don't just s t e a l with one f e l l a ' \u2014 y o u f i l l i n with any-body who finds out something. You begin to get the idea? Stealing for a l i v i n g i s n ' t just being a burglar or stick-up man. You've got to be able to look around and recognize opportunities and be able to take advantage of them regardless of what the conditions are. A l o t of people think once a stick-up man, always a stick-up man. Well, you can't run around s t i c k i n ' up people every day of the week l i k e a workin' man. Maybe something worth s t i c k i n g up only shows up every two or three months. In the meantime you're doing t h i s and that, changing around, doing p r a c t i -c a l l y anything to make a dol l a r . 1 Criminals recognize the danger of engaging i n types of crime with which they are not f a m i l i a r . Although they are l i k e l y to l i m i t t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s to styles with which they are fam i l i a r , the quotation below suggests that even t h i s precaution may be ignored: Sutherland, The Professional Thief, p. 80. 150 But Shorty wouldn't do stick-ups, so I went back to the old bunch. See, when you're stealing you can't just be a burg-l a r ; you've got to be a burglar, stickup man, twenty d i f f e r e n t -things. Burglary, i n the long run, i s safer. Y o u ' l l get away with a hundred burglaries where you! get away with f i v e s t i c k ups. But i f there's a place over here where there's a l o t of money and the only way to get i t i s to go i n and s t i c k him up, you're a h e l l of a t h i e f i f you don't s t i c k him up. x To engage i n crime for which one i s i n no way q u a l i f i e d i s both hazardous and d i s c r e d i t i n g . One respondent who re-ferred to himself as an 'alky and a t h i e f \" stated: I'm not a set criminal i n any of my ways\u2014I l i k e - - I found these cheques, I cashed them. (#31) By commiting a crime for which he was unqualified, #31 indicates that he cannot be considered a \"set c r i m i n a l \" . (b) Variations within a l i n e : One's l i n e does not neces-s a r i l y indicate status ranking. That i s , one can be a good or a poor B & E man. The criminals are neither r e s t r i c t e d nor protected by union or professional codes; there are no re-cognized standards which o f f i c i a l l y designate anyone as a B & E man. The standards which do exi s t are informal and have to do with the q u a l i t y of one's performance within a spe-c i f i c l i n e . Good and poor performance within a l i n e may or may not be accorded a more s p e c i f i c designation. The poor t h i e f i s a ''\u2022Ibid., p. 41. 2 I b i d . 151 \"petty t h i e f \" . The poor B & E man does \"kick- i n s \" . These c r i t e r i a , more so than one's \" l i n e \" , indicate status. The good t h i e f may occasionally engage i n petty theft, and some B & E's may turn out to be nothing more than k i c k - i n s . But i f the exceptions become the rule, one's status may change. An experienced burglar provided the following commentary: AND YOU WERE NOT ENGAGED IN PETTY THEFT? Oh, a l o t of thefts were pretty p e t t y \u2014 t h e y weren't intended to be that way. Don't misunderstand me\u2014I'm not try i n g to make out that I'm a high powered t h i e f or -anything. A l o t of the s t u f f I did, panned out to be ham sandwich s t u f f . Oh yeh\u2014I've done my share of petty-ass k i c k - i n s - - l i k e medical dental buildings and drug stores, just to get drugs, you know. And a l o t of times I've been broke. (#2) A shoplifter distinguishes between h i s own s k i l l s and the e f f o r t s of \"rubby-dubs\" ( a l c o h o l i c s ) : (ARTICLES VARY ACCORDING TO THEIR 'LIFTING' DIFFICULTY. I ASKED WHETHER HE WOULD BOTHER LIFTING CHEAP ARTICLES, SUCH AS SOCKS:) ARE CHEAP ARTICLES WORTH THE RISK OF DETECTION? (HE LAUGHS WHEN I MENTION SOCKS.) A l l these rub-by-dubs l i f t socks. Soieks i s n o t h i n g \u2014 l i k e a baloon. I take a few pair, but socks i s no-thing. (#3) By h i s gestures i t was clear that the balloon simile was to indicate that socks l i t e r a l l y \" l i f t \" up by themselves\u2014there i s no e f f o r t required. He indicated that to l i f t socks i s not r e a l l y shop-lifting\u201e; one picks up socks i f one needs some. I t i s a l i t t l e extra, about which no one thinks twice. 152 Another subject interviewed, stated as follows: (WE CONTINUE OUR DISCUSSION AND I MEN-TION A PARTICULARLY CHEAP BRAND OF TAPE RECORDER THAT HAD BEEN ADVERTISED IN THE WANT AD SECTION. #35 FEELS THAT THIS WAS PROBABLY A \"BLOCK-IN\"\u2014HE GOES ON TO EX-PLAIN:) Now t h i s i s something that a l o t of criminals f a l l back on. Let me give you an example. The place that puts these out i s Jewellers, i n Montreal, and they put out these watches, t r a n s i s t o r radios, e l e c t r i c shavers\u2014even t r a n s i s t o r T . V . ' s \u2014 s t u f f l i k e t h i s . Now these things aren't made to.work. They're very cheap. They're just put together with the very necessities--say a watch might work for fi v e minutes. A radio might work an hour, and a f t e r that i t ' s just going to f a l l a p a r t \u2014 i t ' s just the bare n e c e s s i t i e s . These are c a l l e d \"blocks\". .Like--you buy a watch that may be a dollar\u2014maybe three d o l l a r s . These tings look\u2014now these watches w i l l look l i k e two-hundred d o l l a r time-pieces. They got names l i k e \"Long-reen\". There's a few guys, that's a l l t h e y ' l l do. But most criminals f a l l back on t h i s , to pick' up cash when they need i t . (LATER ON HE SAYS THAT HE HIMSELF HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN THIS AND SAYS IT'S:) ...just l i k e giving them away--it's that good! (#35) A second v a r i a t i o n of the \" l i n e \" versus s p e c i a l i z a t i o n involves the nature of the career pattern commonly associated with s p e c i a l i z a t i o n . The criminal \" l i n e \" does not necessarily involve a progressive movement from the more general to the more s p e c i f i c . The \" l i n e \" i s simply i n d i c a t i v e of some con-sistency i n one's choice of i l l e g a l a c t i v i t y . A further d i s t i n c t i o n i s made i n terms of one's p o s i -t i o n within a given \" l i n e \" or speci a l t y . Wehave already indicated that persons may be ranked i n terms of standards of 153 performance. D i s t i n c t i o n s having to do with the scale of one's i l l e g a l operations, as well as d i s t i n c t i o n s e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r to employer-employee relationships are made. (c) Small fry\/big shot: In an interview I asked whether #16 considered himself as having been a good B & E man. He rep l i e d : I was just a small f r y . BUT YOU WERE GOOD AT IT, WERE YOU? Uh-huh\u2014not good enough, not good enough. Just a small t h i e f , not a big shot. HOW WOULD THEY DIFFER FROM YOU? Well, say t h i s person i s quiet--he's a quiet person, quiet type. Say, well, there's a quiet place tonight and he don't l i k e no noise. We'll send him over there, work over t h e r e \u2014 t h e r e ' s no disturbing. He knows how to go about i t and everything. Oh\u2014they have a c e r t a i n person l i k e that. (#16) What he i s saying i s that the \"big shots\" have men l i k e him-s e l f who work for them. To be a big shot may also indicate a high degree of manipulative and organizational s k i l l s . HOW DO YOU RATE THE INMATES HERE\u2014WHO'S AT THE TOP OF THE LADDER AND WHO IS DOWN EELOW? Oh\u2014they're a l l ranked i n d i f f e r e n t grades. WHO WOULD BE AT THE TOP? Uh\u2014the one that's the smartest. WHAT KINDS OF THINGS DO THE SMART GUYS GENERALLY DO? Oh, he s i t s back and l e t s the others do the work, see? (I COULD NOT GET HIM TO SPECIFY RANK IN TERMS OF CRXMINAL TYPE.) (#16) As i n the legitimate world, d i s t i n c t i o n s such as small f r y and big shot are r e l a t i v e d i s t i n c t i o n s . A t h i e f who ope-rated i n the shadow of the big rackets i n Chicago stated: 154 The money I spent was p e a n u t s \u2014 I ' l l say that i n about four years i n the 1920's I must have been i n on at least two hundred f i f t y thousand d o l l a r s worth of thieving. -Which i s n ' t bad for just a l i t t l e small-town boy. A t h i e f , not a big-time t h i e f . Just an ordinary t h i e f . x D. RECOGNITION AND REPUTATION The everyday legitimate world includes a v a r i e t y of public \"rites de passage\" by which the public r a t i f i e s the right of a ce r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l to assume a c e r t a i n r o l e . This may include the right to use ce r t a i n public symbols (such as the wedding ring) or i t may consist of a private document or license which can be produced i f necessary. On the other hand, some persons (for example, leaders) may be\u2022informally acknowledged without formal r a t i f i c a t i o n of that r o l e . A woman may also be known as a wife and mother, even though every-one knows that the relationship i s common-law. In either case the concept of reputation becomes applicable. By reputation i s meant the consensus of s o c i a l evaluation within a given group. These matters, complicated enough i n the legitimate society, are even more complex when applied to criminals. The criminal i s a part of at least three worlds or defining com-munities, each of whose s o c i a l evaluations he recognizes as important, and whose evaluations may d i f f e r r a d i c a l l y from each other. 'Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 94. 155 For most c i t i z e n s the courts provide a highly useful s i m p l i f i c a t i o n process. Certain o f f i c i a l s are assigned the task of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between the criminal and non-criminal (just as p s y c h i a t r i s t s do with reference to the mental health of persons). The r i t u a l associated with court processes adds the stamp of both legitimacy and v a l i d i t y , to the decisions made. The d i f f i c u l t i e s by way of s o c i a l acceptance, encoun-tered by the ex-convict, indicate the i r r e v e r s i b l e character of such a d e f i n i t i o n . This suggests that the lay person who defines as criminals those convicted by the courts i s u n l i k e l y to reverse t h i s d e f i n i t i o n ; re also-prefers to believe that per-sons not so convicted are not criminals. 1. On being \"known\"; As numerous studies indicate, policemen are not as r e a d i l y impressed by the decisions of the courts as are \"lay\" people. They \"know\" before such decisions are made, who i s g u i l t y or innocent, and are not l i k e l y to change t h e i r opinion as a re s u l t of the court decision.\"'\" The lay person may be content to d i s t i n g u i s h between a criminal and a non-criminal, but the p o l i c e are interested i n more s p e c i f i c subcategories. Some of these might corres-pond to those already discussed as relevant categories used by criminals themselves, but since policemen were not i n t e r -viewed, t h i s must be l e f t to speculation. I t does seem This i s documented i n Skolnick, J u s t i c e Without T r i a l . 156 reasonable to suppose that p o l i c e are interested i n imputing some degree of consistency and p r e d i c t a b i l i t y to the c r i m i -nals they encounter so that they can be more e a s i l y recog-nized as having done a p a r t i c u l a r \"job\" . This i s seen by the criminals: Once you are known as one who does B & E's the p o l i c e can pick you up and charge you with anything on the s l a t e . (#33) This suggests that establishing a \" l i n e \" i s useful to the p o l i c e , but involves a danger for the criminal i n terms of unwanted recognition. This avenue of recognition i s also useful to those business i n s t i t u t i o n s most vulnerable as victims of criminal a c t i v i t i e s , for i t i s i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t to be able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between legitimate and i l l e g i t i m a t e customers. For example, #33 doesn't seem very \"choosy\" as to where he would boost. When he mentions the Bay, I ask whether the clerks at the Bay would recognize him, since I heard they studied pictures of known s h o p l i f t e r s : I'm not known as a s h o p l i f t e r . The Bay knows the s h o p l i f t e r s . WHAT ARE YOU KNOWN AS? Just an ordinary drunken t h i e f , that's a l l . (#33) Because he i s not 'known\" as a sh o p l i f t e r , he w i l l not be sus-pected as one. The context of t h i s statement implies that the \"anything\" refers to any type of B & E, rather than any type of crime. 157 As we w i l l indicate below, one of the reasons for de-veloping a \" l i n e \" , or specialty, i s that of e f f i c i e n c y . To become known as a s p e c i a l i s t invokes the danger of po l i c e recognition and suspicion; on the other hand, we have noted that criminal s p e c i a l i z a t i o n i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y r e s t r i c t i v e . That i s , one may leave one's \" l i n e \" occasionally to do d i f -ferent jobs. None of my respondents indicated that such movement was consciously designed to f r u s t r a t e p o l i c e , though one may reasonably deduce that t h i s i s one of the consequen-1 ces. Within the criminal subculture i t s e l f , persons may become \"known\" as \"B & E man\", \"hold-up man\", as someone who \"does banks\", or as a \"pete man\". Such terms, however, were used much less frequently by my subjects than the categories discussed e a r l i e r (for example, \"rounder\"). That i s to say, one's \" l i n e \" i s important for u t i l i t a r i a n r e a s o n s \u2014 i f a d i f f i c u l t alarm system needs to be sprung, the criminal w i l l look up someone who i s \"good with bugs\". To have a \" l i n e \" indicates a c e r t a i n s t a b i l i t y as a criminal, but i s not nece s-s a r i l y a c r i t e r i o n for status. Studies of prison \"communities\" imply that the inmate's criminal \" l i n e \" determines h i s pos i t i o n i n the prison s t r a t i -f i c a t i o n system (I have e a r l i e r questioned t h i s assumption). I t would be useful to determine how r i g i d the p o l i c e -man' s \"typing\" proves to be. That i s , having typed someone as a B & E man, i s such a person ruled out as a potential booster? 15.8 This inference appears to ignore the basic differences be-tween the prison and the outside, and i n p a r t i c u l a r some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of t o t a l institutions. I t i s true that persons with c e r t a i n \" l i n e s \" tend to be rated higher i n prison cultures than persons with other or no \" l i n e s \" , but various intevening variables need to be pointed out. To have a \" l i n e \" , as we said, implies s t a b i l i t y , maturity, and i n the case of the true \"rounder\", a dedication to one's job, which i s c l o s e l y akin to the square-john. These are the same q u a l i t i e s required in the more important, or p o t e n t i a l l y more influ e n -t i a l prison work assignments. Also, to know a man's \" l i n e \" i s to know a l o t about him. For example, as one habi-t u a l criminal put i t : I f a man's been i n crime for forty yaars and has never hurt anyone, what better proof can you have that he never w i l l hurt anyone? What I am saying i s that as a c r i t e r i o n of status i t i s not as important to be known for any p a r t i c u l a r \" l i n e \" , as i t i s to be known as someone who \"has a l i n e \" . To be \"known\" implies recognition of rounder q u a l i t i e s ; i t does not seem to matter much what one's p a r t i c u l a r l i n e i s . One q u a l i f i c a -t i o n should be added\u2014the young kids, or punks, appear to pay more attention to t h i s factor (for example, the s p e c i f i c \" l i n e \" i t s e l f ) than do the older fellows. I t may be that they carry over to the criminal world, some of the square c r i -t e r i a for assigning status. They are not yet s o c i a l i z e d to the new value system. 159 Also important i s the matter of reputation. I f \"to be known\" i s more important than \"to be known as a pete man\", than also to be \"known as a good pete man\" i s more important than to \"be known as a pete man\". The l e v e l of performance within one's l i n e forms the basis for the criminal's repu-t a t i o n . My respondents appeared to assign equal status to the \"good B & E man\" and the \"good safecracker\". Expertise i s more admired than the form of i t s ap p l i c a t i o n . I know of two p a r t i c u l a r fellows that were very good safecrackers\u2014they were very good. I've worked with them and done time with them and everything else. But I know these two i n p a r t i c u l a r have gone in for hotel thefts, l i k e room-prowling, I guess you would c a l l i t . And i t r e a l l y pays o f f - - b i g money. (#14) The above quote i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the fact that criminals are referred to i n terms of t h e i r l i n e , and are fur-ther d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n terms of expertise. 2. How one becomes known As indicated e a r l i e r , there are some obvious reasons why i t i s hazardous to become \"known\"; i t was generally as-sumed that i f one i s \"known\" to one's peers, one i s also \"known' to the p o l i c e . A l l my respondents took for granted that there was a steady flow of information from the larger criminal culture to the p o l i c e agencies. Information which was not to get to the p o l i c e needed to be kept from t h i s culture as w e l l \u2014 a n d conversely, i t i s possible to communicate 160 with the p o l i c e v i a t h i s culture. An apartment burglar stated: Nobody i n t h i s area knew what I was doing--I wouldn't, as I said before, flas h around a r o l l , because I never hung around with anybody. You see, t h i s i s the trouble with most people i n here ( p r i s o n ) \u2014 t h e y a l l drink at the same place. So you walk into t h e r e \u2014 l e t ' s say i t ' s a bar or a pub or something. So you walk into there, and you s i t down and these people a l l s i t t i n g around, and you can t e l l who i s making out a l r i g h t and who i s n ' t . By who i s fla s h i n g the r o l l around and who i s buying the rounds, and st u f f l i k e t h i s . Well, I never hang around with the criminal element when I'm on the street and a l l . For instance, i f I h i r e a partner who goes on scores with me from time to time, then I wouldn't hang with him. (#35) The above person would not become known u n t i l he \"does time\". I f the t r i a l indicates a consistentency i n his hist o r y of crime, t h i s reputation w i l l be ascribed to him by other i n -mates. From then on he is\"known\". In the above case the in d i v i d u a l enjoyed s o c i a l prestige i n the square world, even though he confined h i s association la r g e l y to females. Criminals, p a r t i c u l a r l y those who are known, seek t h e i r s o c i a l rewards within the criminal element. As one known safecracker put i t , \"What's the point of scoring i f nobody knows about i t ? \" (#32) In his case, he tended to celebrate a good score by buying the drinks for everyone. Others are more subtle, but manage some s o c i a l recog-n i t i o n as well: 161 Well, a c t u a l l y that' s. kinda hard to answer because when you rob banks you don't a c t u a l l y \u2014 I don't come around t e l l i n g y o u \u2014 I don't t e l l the guy next door. I didn't t e l l that guy i n the underworld, I didn't t e l l t h i s guy. I didn't t e l l anybody, because i t was none of t h e i r busines. But l i t t l e by l i t t l e people around town know that 'this guy\u2014he don't . work\u2014man, he's doing' somethin'! I'm t e l l i n ' you, that guy's up to somethin'.' You don't a c t u a l l y graduate, because you don't t e l l any-body you're doing i t . You see, there's no glory i n i t . I can't p u l l o ff a job, l e t ' s say for twenty thousand d o l l a r s , and then go down to the underworld and say, 'boy, , I just knocked off one for twenty grand!' 'Is that right? Nice going!' I can't t e l l them that. And he can't t e l l me what he does. You see what I mean\u2014it's just supposition. You hear i t somewhere along the line,somewhere a-long the grapevine--they think, but they don't know, you see. (#7) Further: SO YOU CAN'T REALLY ENJOY YOUR STATUS? No, you can't. The only part you can enjoy i s when you pick up the paper and you read that such and such a gunman tore off such and such a bank. That's a l l you get out of i t , see?l But then again, i n a place l i k e t h i s here, you're right at the top. HOW DO ANY OF THE OTHER GUYS IN HERE KNOW THAT YOU EVER DID ANY BANKS BESIDES THE LAST ONE THAT YOU WERE CAUGHT ON? Oh, they don't know. But when you organize that l i k e that, they know darn well that you just haven't done one\u2014you've probably done several more before that. (#7) I t should not be assumed, however, that the. criminal's display before h i s peers i s e n t i r e l y a matter of seeking status, This suggests an unacknowledged consequence of newspaper reporting. For example, for some criminals i t provides the only source of s o c i a l recognition. 162 or that i t constitutes a weakness on the part of the c r i m i n a l . Instead, i t i s more useful to view i t as a \"demand character-i s t i c \" of the c r i m i n a l 1 s trade; a display in the sense that the term i s used by Turner 1, who points out that \"work i s not merely done, but oriented to as a display\" and that each occupational setting i s oriented i n part to \" p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t audiences\" who must be taken into account by the worker. For the criminal, one such s i g n i f i c a n t audience i s h i s peer gjoup of fellow criminals. He r e l i e s upon them for v i t a l information which determines the course of h i s d a i l y a c t i v i t i e s \u2014 w h i c h parts of the c i t y are \"hot\", which fence i s i n need of what at any one time, and so on. Since by h i s d e f i n i t i o n h i s actual work i s \"secret\" rather than \"public\", i t i s he who must communicate h i s successes and competence to others. (Also, by d e f i n i t i o n , f a i l u r e s are highly v i s i b l e , being made public v i a numerous agencies.) Communication of competance may well be necessary for him to find or be offered continued\"work\". Becoming known i s not e n t i r e l y a matter of choice. The p o l i c e have developed a system of clues which indicate to them the p r o b a b i l i t y of criminal involvement, as w i l l be i l l u s t r a t e d by the following account. When #35 was seventeen years of age he frequently t r a v e l l e d with a friend who delivered food Roy Turner, \"Occupational Routines: Some Demand Charac-t e r i s t i c s of P o l i c e Work\", Unpublished paper presented to the CSAA (June, 1969), pp. 6 and 7. 163 for a Chinese Restaurant. Tris involved late night, and early morning t r i p s . The p o l i c e stopped them one day and checked t h e i r car, then charged them with possession of house-breaking instruments?\u201e These instruments consisted of a \" t i r e iron\", \"pair of p l i e r s \" , \" scrsw driver\" . #36 claimed that they were ac t u a l l y innocent at the time, yet the p o l i c e were able to make the charge s t i c k . #35 was on parole at the time. He was not working, but l i v i n g o f f the sale of stolen jewellery, which he had stolen p r i o r to h i s l a s t conviction, and the p o l i c e were suspicious: In t h e i r eyes I was well-heeled at the time, so i n t h e i r eyes I was doing some-thing. (#35) 3. The Implications of Being Known I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that the clues used by po-licemen bear s t r i k i n g s i m i l a r i t y to those used by other criminals. I t has already been noted that the experienced criminal i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y worried about being \"known\", as such, to the p o l i c e . In contrast to the amateur, whose con-cern i s with concealment, the experienced criminal's concern i s with evidence. He i s s a t i s f i e d when the p o l i c e \"have nothing on me\". In t h i s sense also, the criminal who i s \"known\" poses quite a d i f f e r e n t problem to the p o l i c e than the criminal who i s not \"known\". For the l a t t e r i t i s a question of \"Who 16 4 did i t ? \" ; for the former the question i s , \"What have we got on him?\". Criminals are i n c l i n e d to tal k shop a l l the time. (FOR THIS REASON POLICE OFTEN FIND OUT WHAT'S GOING ON, AND INMATES IN PRISON ALSO KNOW WHAT IS GOING ON.) When a bank's been done, we know pretty soon who done i t . The police, they know h a l f the time who done i t , but they can't prove i t . (#36) To be accorded \"known criminal\" status r e s u l t s i n the r e d e f i n i t i o n of everyday events. Respondents frequently spoke of \"bum beefs\", \"phoney beefs\", \"bum raps\", and so on. Such beefs were defined as \"a t r a f f i c beef or something\". That i s , a phoney beef may be a legitimate charge, which i s , however, made for other than the stated reasons. Both the p o l i c e o f f i c e r and the criminal understand the act as being symbolic (whereas a square-john may regard a t r a f f i c charge as legitimate, rather than symbolic). To the criminal i t i s a \"sneaky way\" for the p o l i c e to appreherd someone, and such behaviour i s not considered e n t i r e l y Kosher by the c r i m i -nal, although he needs to play along with the game. A phoney beef i s to be distinguished from what i s re-ferred to as \"not getting a f a i r shake\". The l a t t e r i s per-ceived of as lack of jus t i c e , discriroination and a v i o l a t i o n of the rules of the game. Criminals have strong notions as to what constitutes a just sentence, and also what constitutes v a l i d evidence. Although I have l i t t l e evidence to th i s ef-fect, there i s reason to believe that to be known as a criminal 16 5 may, i n the courtroom, be b e n e f i c i a l to, rather than detrimen-t a l to the accused. That i s , i t i s known by both prosecutor and magistrate that the accused i s not ignorant of precedent, and has a f a i r l y accurate notion of what sentence the bench may reasonably impose. On the other hand, a criminal's reputation may effect a l e g a l r e - d e f i n i t i o n of h i s behaviour. The example below indicates how the act of B & E may be reinterpreted by the judge i n a way which would be consistent with the criminal's reputation; i n t h i s case as an act leading towards an i n -tended safecracking. The criminal i s aware that h i s reputa-t i o n places additional meaning upon h i s behaviour: WHAT HAPPENED AFTER THESE TWO YEARS OF SAFEBLOWING? Went to the Pen. Got caught and went to the Pen. HOW DID YOU GET CAUGHT? U h \u2014 l e t ' s s e e \u2014 i t was during--I was going i n to blow a safe and I ran into a burglar alarm, just before I started getting into burglar alarms. I ran into a burglar alarm, and na-t u r a l l y , before I got out of there, they were there and they pinched me and they charged me with B & E. This i s a l l they can charge me with, i n a spot l i k e t h i s , 'cause I've a l -ready got r i d of t h e \u2014 a s soon as I saw them coming I got r i d of the fuses one way\u2014I poured the n i t r o glycerine down the sink. They don't know what I had, or, you know--so they charge me with B & E and I got three years for that. As much as they s u s p e c t \u2014 l i k e I t o l d you, they've got to have evidence, d e f i n i t e e v i -dence. NOW, WHEN THE POLICE KNOW THAT YOU ARE OBVIOUSLY GOING TO BLOW A CAN, AS THEY WOULD HAVE IN THAT CASE\u2014DOES THE JUDGE ALSO KNOW THAT? O f f i c i a l l y he doesn't, but h e \u2014 t h e pro-secutor usually gets to him and talks to him. NOW, IN FACT THEN YOU ARE SENTENCED AS IF YOU WERE GOING TO BLOW A CAN? Oh yes, sure. I t is n ' t what you did, i t ' s what you know. Another 166 man could come along right behind you and get charged with B & E and get six months where I get three y e a r s \u2014 f o r the very fact that I was a known--that I was involved i n t h i s . WOULD YOU HAVE GOT MORE TIME IF THEY HAD FOUND ALL THE STUFF ON YOU? Oh yes, oh yes. You see, they've got an excuse now, to give you more time. You see, ce r t a i n sections of the code c a l l f o r \u2014 a h \u2014Breaking and Entering c a l l s for, I f o r g e t \u2014 s i x months to fi v e to ten years. FOURTEEN YEARS? Y e h \u2014 i t ' s four-teen now, but at that time i t was either six to f i v e years. Six months to f i v e years. Explosives, carrying explosives was considered a more serious crime i n t h e i r eyes, you know. (#29) Being known may also provide immunity from some types of p o l i c e informers. One of the intere s t i n g factors i n the career of a t h i e f i s the role of the fence, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the fence i s also a bootlegger. There i s evidence to suggest that bootleggers need p o l i c e \"protection\" i n order to operate--they also depend on the i l l e g i t i m a t e order for a mandate. With reference to. t h i s a respondent suggested that the bootlegger acts as an informer for the police , but informs only on those thieves who have no status i n the criminal sub-culture. (#18) Chapter IV Surreptitious Crimes: The Technical Dimensions of Burglary, with Special Attention to Safecracking A. INTRODUCTION My data suggests that the technical aspects of crime take on three major dimensions, namely: those s k i l l s which are b a s i c a l l y mechanical i n nature (tools, equipment, pro-cedures) , those s k i l l s which are b a s i c a l l y organizational in nature (involving group leadership and the planning and execution of the event), and those s k i l l s which are b a s i c a l l y s o c i a l i n nature (involving the management of victims and the control of tension). I am not including here those s o c i a l s k i l l s necessary for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the criminal group. The d i s t i n c t i o n between mechanical and s o c i a l s k i l l s permits a further c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of crime: surreptitious crime, which avoids d i r e c t confrontation with the vic t i m (as i n various forms of burglary), and non-surreptitious crime, where vic t i m confrontation i s anticipated and generally un-avoidable (as i n robbery) . Surreptitious crimes require a high degree of both or-ganizational and mechanical s k i l l s . Perceptual (social) s k i l l s are required only i n the sense that the criminal needs to make relevant interpretations of the meaning of s o c i a l l i f e i n general. 167 168 Non-surreptitious crimes, on the other hand, although they may include some organizational and mechanical s k i l l s as well, predominately require a high degree of s o c i a l s k i l l s , for example, the successful management of the v i c t i m . The d i s t i n c t i o n discussed above i s seldom made e x p l i -c i t by criminals, though the difference i s e a s i l y inferred by attention to the dominant concerns expressed by them. At times, however, i t i s made e x p l i c i t , as i n the example below: Well, you go into a tavern and you hear a l l kinds of conversation, from other ex-cons; your ears are always open and you hear these places\", and sometimes you make i t ahead of them. HAVE YOU EVER MET ANOTHER GANG ON THE JOB WHILE YOU WERE DOING THIS? Yes, I did. I got worked over too. But you got to take your medicine--you take your medicine and you don't say a word and then they f i n d out l a t e r , 'Well, t h i s guy i s okay--why did we do these things?' See? So they come around and they're more f r i e n d l y and say, 'Well, Joe there l i k e s a place where i t ' s quiet and we l i k e a place where i t ' s noisy. Do you want t h i s job? Go ahead, take i t - - i t ' s yours.' YOU SAID SOMETHING ABOUT WORKING WHERE IT'S NOISY AND WHERE IT'S QUIET? Well, there's a l o t of people l i k e noise--action. They want action. They go into a f irm-\"-they'11 probably go there i n the daytime and they go i n there and t h e y ' l l have a b a l l . They get a kick out of t h a t \u2014 t h e y do i t i n p u b l i c . I l i k e a place where i t ' s empty, there's no noise. There's nobody i n there, nobody to molest, or anything ike that. And take i t and leave quietly, and that's i t . (#16) With reference to the available l i t e r a t u r e on criminology i t should be pointed out, f i r s t of a l l that t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n i s not the same as the notion of \"Crimes Without V i c t i m s \" x . Edwin Schur, Crimes Without Victims, Englewood C l i f f s : P r e n tice-Hall Inc. (1965). 169 We are not here denying the fact of v i c t i m i z a t i o n ; the point at issue i s the presence of a victim at the scene of the crime. Further, the term \"victim\" must be given a wider i n -terpretation, since a man robbed of h i s wallet at gunpoint i s obviously a victim of a d i f f e r e n t order than i s a bank-t e l l e r . Secondly, the importance of s o c i a l s k i l l s has been 2 3 acknowledged e a r l i e r by both Maurer and Sutherland . I t i s widely recognized that some types of crime, notably confidence games, involve highly refined a b i l i t i e s to manipulate people, predict t h e i r reactions, and so on. My own data suggests that the role of such a b i l i t i e s i s somewhat underrated with respect to crimes such as robbery. Carrying a gun as a per-suasive device does not appear to minimize the need of manipu-l a t i v e s k i l l s \u2014 i n fact, i n order not to have to use the gun the robber i s dependent upon just such s k i l l s . For the purpose of demonstrating some of the d i f f e r e n -ces between crimes without vi c t i m confrontation and crimes with' victim confrontation, I w i l l , i n t h i s chapter on surrep-t i t i o u s crimes, use the crime of burglary ( s p e c i f i c a l l y This d i s t i n c t i o n i s also made by robbers, p r i m a r i l y i n terms of possible danger to themselves. 2 Maurer, Whiz Mob. 3 Sutherland, The Professional Thief. 17 0 safecracking)- In each case I w i l l indicate the re q u i s i t e necessary s k i l l s , be they mechanical, organizational or s o c i a l . The s k i l l s and procedures associated with s u r r e p t i -tious crimes revolve around the following three dimensions: F i r s t of a l l , with regard to the selection of a vi c t i m (casing), I refer to those considerations regarding the probable eco-nomic gain, the d i f f i c u l t y i n obtaining t h i s gain, and the r i s k of detection involved. Some discrimination, i n terms of personal ethics, regarding the vi c t i m may play a part. This aspect w i l l be dealt with under the chapter dealing with perceptual s k i l l s . Secondly, there i s the fact of gaining entry and of detection (\"making the i n \" ) . Gaining entry refers to entering the place where the desired property i s located and includes s k i l l s having to do with burglar alarm systems and avoiding fi n g e r p r i n t s , as well as the ph y s i a l evasion of such persons as the v i c t i m or h i s agent and the public or the p o l i c e . A t h i r d dimension relates to property a c q u i s i t i o n , which includes opening safes, tampering with furniture or i n any other way locating the desired property (as i n house burglary) . The considerations taken into account by the burglar when he f i r s t assesses a p o t e n t i a l job, such as probable economic gain o f f s e t t i n g the r i s k s involved, w i l l be dealt with i n a Jater chapter. 171 The following examples and discussions on burglary techniques (in no way presented as an exhaustive l i s t ) which are used once the decision to do a c e r t a i n job has been made, i l l u s t r a t e s what are considered to be the basic p r i n c i p l e s which govern the act of burglary. A burglar may be f a m i l i a r with few or many s p e c i f i c techniques, but to be successful he must understand the basic p r i n c i p l e s , and knowing these, he must be able to apply them i n s p e c i f i c ways to concrete s i t u a t i o n s . This a p p l i c a tion may c a l l for considerable i n -genuity and c r e a t i v i t y . You see i n that s t e a l i n ' , there's no par-t i c u l a r way to s t e a l , you have to figure out ways. Theirs no one way to stea l , there's a thousand ways. I may know f i f t y or a hundred ways and another guy knows f i f t y or a hundred I've never heard of. But you've got to f i -gure out some way that f i t s the circumstances and everything else that you're up against at the moment.1 Again: Through h i s (Shorty's) long experience he had a wonderful fund of d i f f e r e n t techniques that could be used i n burglary e s p e c i a l l y . He understood burglar alarms thoroughly. He knew p r a c t i c a l l y a l l the t r i c k s of the trade that weren'.t known by the average burglar. Buaglary i s a planned operation, and i t depends on stealth and the absence of the owners, \u2022whether they're storekeepers or home owners. The gene-r a l idea of burglary i s safety. To watch and wait and pick the right time. And to devise some easy method of getting i n and out. This old guy Shorty learned me more about burglary than anybody e l s e . 2 \"\"Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 126. 2 Ibid., pp. 62-63. 172 B. MAKING THE \"IN\" I have indicated e a r l i e r that a l l safecracking involves those s k i l l s necessary for a B & E. I t may be that the safecracker occasionally employs someone to handle the entry for him, but i t i s generally assumed that safecrackers are also able to do B & E ' s. In our conversations, safecrackers seldom mentioned the techniques of the entry, whereas persons who referred to themselves as \"B & E men\" would elaborate upon these techniques. A glance at prison records indicates the prominent l i s t i n g of the offence l e g a l l y known as \"Breaking and Enter-ing\" . I t may or may not accompany an ad d i t i o n a l charge of \"theft over f i f t y \" , or \"theft under f i f t y \" . I t may cover a drunken k i c k - i n or a sophisticated safecracking operation. The o f f i c i a l charge i t s e l f does not indicate or specify such major v a r i a t i o n s i n procedure. I t i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned with the degree of sop h i s t i c a t i o n used, but with the fact of f o r c i b l e entry with or without t h e f t . Procedural v a r i a t i o n s may be indicated i n the p o l i c e M.O. report, and may play a part i n sentencing considerations; however, none of t h i s i s indicated i n the o f f i c i a l F.P.S. record, even though some of i t may be i n f e r r e d from the type of sentence imposed. The o f f i c i a l charge may simply be recorded as \"B. & E.\". The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of a technical \"B & E\" i s therefore dependent upon the o f f i c i a l reports;, e i t h e r written or o r a l , 17 3 and upon the statement of the accused himself. Our own analysis i s based upon descriptions by and interpretations of those convicted of t h i s offence. I t i s quickly obvious that a burglar's method of entry i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from that of a robber's. In fact, some forms of robbery do not involve entry into a building at a l l (for example, an on the street stick-up). Other methods of entry, such as i n bank robbery, are accomplished with r e l a t i v e ease, since the doors are usually unlocked and frequently even l e f t open for the convenience of customers, and thus serve as the natural points of entry for the robber. Unlike the burglar, the robber i s much more concerned with getting out than with getting in, and h i s conception of out i s probably more l i k e \"getting out of t h i s general area\" than i t i s with getting out of the building i t s e l f . The burglar, on the other hand operates at a time when neitrer he nor legitimate customers are welcome, and meets with closed doors. He does not face h i s victim, but instead the mechanical devices which indicate that he i s not wanted, and possibly, though unintentionally, the r e l a t i v e importance of h i s being kept out. Just as the mechanical devices designed to thwart burg-l a r s vary i n complexity, the procedures of burglars also vary from the simple and crude to -the highly sophisticated and s k i l l e d . 17 4 The door, of course, i s o n l y one means of entry, and . w i l l be d i s c u s s e d l a t e r . Windows too, are f r e q u e n t l y used, and may be entered by t a k i n g advantage of a l r e a d y unlocked .windows, or f o r c i b l y opening windows. 1. Unlocked windows B u r g l a r s p o i n t e d out t o me t h a t although a home-owner w i l l seldom leave h i s door unlocked when he i s away, he tends t o pay l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n t o windows. As one b u r g l a r put i t , . \" M o s t houses have about twenty windows\u2014you can be p r e t t y sure t h a t at l e a s t one of them i s u n l o c k e d T h e danger, f o r the b u r g l a r , i s t h a t window e n t r y i s more c o n s p i c u -ous than door e n t r y . Other problems were a l s o mentioned, such as the g r e a t e r d i f f i c u l t y i n a v o i d i n g f i n g e r p r i n t s and the danger of l o s i n g one's t o o l s w h i l e making a p h y s i c a l l y d i f -f i c u l t e n t r y . F u r t h e r , although p r i o r c a s i n g may have i n d i -c a t e d t h a t t h e house i s vacant, b u r g l a r s p r e f e r t o e n t e r v i a a doorway because t h i s f a c i l i t a t e s a h a s t y e x i t , should the need a r i s e . I t i s a maxim of the house b u r g l a r , t h a t he permit no one t o come between h i m s e l f and the e x i t : WHAT KIND OF TOOLS DO YOU TAKE WITH YOU? U s u a l l y i n a house you don't need any a t a l l . I f anything, you'd c a r r y a good machinist's s c r e w d r i v e r . W e l l , a l s o you'd u s u a l l y c a r r y a pocket k n i f e ; t h a t ' s enough to handle any-t h i n g you might run a c r o s s . Because you take the average h o u s e \u2014 h a s how many windows? Say a minimum of e i g h t windows. So t h a t ' s e i g h t t o one. So you u s u a l l y f i n d one window t h a t ' s not f u l l y l o c k e d . One t h a t can be\" f o r c e d w i t h -out too much t r o u b l e and without\/any damage. 175 SUPPOSE IN FACT THE WINDOWS ARE ALL SOLI-DLY LOCKED? Well, then I would check the basement windows i f any. And I'd check the doors, and i f i t happened to be two stories I'd t r y to check the upstairs windows too. I might have to climb up a drain pipe or some-thing\u2014anything at a l l . WOULD YOU RESORT TO BREAKING THE GLASS? N o \u2014 n o \u2014 I ' d force a window, but I wouldn't break the glass. I might break the glass by accident, but most of the locks nowadays, y o u ' l l f i n d that they're quite flimsy. The aluminum type windows, they can be e a s i l y forced. You just need\u2014they have hardly any lock system on them at a l l . You just put a l i t t l e pressure on them and ihey'll open. I t ' s f a n t a s t i c \u2014 h o u s e s are r e a l l y so easy to get i n t o . I t ' s a l l easy. Every house, every-thing has a weak spot somewhere. Even i f the weak spot has to be b u i l t into i t , l i k e for instance, even for example, a s a f e \u2014 w e l l , the company have to put a weak spot into i t some-where. They can get into i t i f i t jams up or something. (#35) 2. F o r c i b l e Opening The simplest procedure regarding the f o r c i b l e opening of a window i s to take advantage of c l i m a t i c conditions. During hot weather, windows are often l e f t open, leaving only a wire screen which can be cut away with a small pen-k n i f e . However, the most common method, when the window i s closed, i s to jimmy the window by prying i t open, thereby eitha: breaking or bending the locking mechanism. For t h i s purpose the burglar w i l l use either an eighteen inch bar or a screwdriver. 1 The skylight i n the roof of many business establishments i s usually a most convenient place for the \"An eight inch screwdriver i s one of the greatest tools a B & E guy can have.\" (#33) 176 burglar to enter. Not only are skylights usually less d i f -f i c u l t to pry open, but they are also less l i k e l y to be \"bugged\". Another fa v o r i t e i s the bathroom window; t h i s because i t i s often the only unsealed window i n public b u i l d -ings. I was t o l d that such windows are of ten not f u l l y closed by attendants, and that when they are, the mechanisms are usually of i i f e r i o r q u a l i t y . Several burglars also mentioned that i t i s easy to tamper with the bathroom window while using the bathroom for apparently legitimate reasons during the normal business hours. This window can then be e a s i l y opened at night. The privacy of the bathroom may be used for both conventional and unconventional purposes. (This i l l u s -t rates a point to be made later\u2014namely that the criminal provides us with a new int e r p r e t a t i o n of geography, including the meaning of the various rooms i n houses and business places.) The method of taking a rock to break a window i n or near the door in order to then reach i n to open the door i s generally only successful where there i s no one i n the b u i l d -ing, where the noise of breaking glass does not a t t r a c t at-tention, and where no e l e c t r i c a l alarm systems are i n e f f e c t (and provided, of course, that the door can, i n fact, be opened by simply reaching in and doing so). This method may be used by s k i l l e d burglars where the above conditions are met. The noise of breaking glass can be avoided by f i r s t I l l s t i c k i n g adhesive tape on the glass to be broken. The win-dow can then be smashed without the glass f a l l i n g . Older burgirs stated that they used to cover the windows with s t i c k y fly-paper. A rock or iron bar i s also used to smash large plate glass windows on jobs where the act of theft i t s e l f can be done with great speed and where the getaway i s assured. One burglar r e c a l l e d how a window could be smashed and several t e l e v i s i o n sets loaded into a car i n just a matter of a few seconds, provided that one has paid attention to the factor of p o l i c e p a t r o l . Where access to the desired goods i s quick and the getaway assured, such crude methods of entry may be e n t i r e l y adequate. The \"ki c k - i n \" , a designation commonly used by thieves, has several variations, but generally refers to a simple, unsophisticated burglary attempt. I was t o l d that a good sharp kick at the spot just next to the door lat c h w i l l spring open most back doors of bothhouses and business estab-lishments. This i s i n keeping with my respondents' general contempt or disregard for standard locking procedures of homes. There are, of course, various other ways of dealing with doors than that of the simple \" k i c k - i n \" . Several methods may be used to v i o l a t e the normal functioning of the door i t -self.- During normal business hours a burglar may unobtrusively 178 inser t rubber hinge pins for the usual metal ones. These pins w i l l permit the door to function s a t i s f a c t o r i l y during normal, use, but w i l l \"give\" under pressure. Another method i s to remove screws, thereby weakening the hinge and latch structure so that i t would \"give\" under pressure. More common, however, i s the burglar's attempt to deal with the locking mechanism i t s e l f . Here several methods were frequently mentioned, such as \" l o i d i n g \" , tampering with the lock and lock-picking. (a) \"Loiding the door\": Loiding the door was a very common method some f i f t e e n years ago and e a r l i e r . I t i s used less today because a r e l a t i v e l y cheap mechanical change, available for household use, renders t h i s method i n e f f e c t i v e . The method i t s l e f consists of inse r t i n g a s t i f f , yet f l e x i b l e piece of p l a s t i c (or c e l l u l o i d ) , approximately two inches by four inches i n size, between the door frame and the door l a t c h . The f l e x i b l e p l a s t i c w i l l work i t s way between the latch and the door, thereby pushing the latch back and thus freeing the door. (b) Tampering with the lock: Tampering with the lock generally consists of removing a screw unobtrusively, while the door i s open during business hours. Many door locks con-s i s t of a c y l i n d r i c a l cone, held i n place by a single screw which can only be removed when the door i s open. The screw i s one of four or s ix other i d e n t i c a l screws on the edge of 179 the door. The t h i e f must know the location of that screw (usually the upper right hand one) and must remove i t during the day\u2014he w i l l do t h i s toy s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y removing i t while leaning against the door or while no one i s looking. The screw i s not l i k e l y to be missed, and when the burglar re-turns, usually at night, he simply turns out the entire cy-l i n d r i c a l mechanism of the door from the outside. (c) Lock-picking: Picking the lock requires the use of a set of picks. This may consist of three or more c a r e f u l l y f i l e d metal s t r i p s which can be inserted into the key-hole for purposes of opening the lock. , Making picks was referred to as a leisure-time a c t i v i t y f o r burglars much i n the same way as one speaks of w h i t t l i n g wood. Older burglars pointed out how they often had many hours (for example, while on trains) to while away, so during t h i s time they would be f i l i n g p i c ks. The metal used was spring s t e e l , the springs from wind-up clocks preferred. Since i t i s i l l e g a l to be found i n possession of a set of picks, burglars pointed out that they require several sets which they can hide i n d i f f e r e n t places, making i t unnecessary to transport the picks continually. Those whose a c t i v i t i e s i n -clude several c i t i e s pointed out that they would need to have a set or two i n each c i t y . These sets were \"planted\"; for example, the picks were o i l e d , wrapped i n leather, and l i t e r a l l y buried at a spot which was easy to remember but where they were 180 not l i k e l y to be disturbed. Should the burglar be unable to locate h i s set of picks, he would l i k e l y have to make up a set before going to work. Respondents indicated that picks never became an object of economic t r a n s a c t i o n \u2014 t h e y were not bought or sold, the inference being that they were too e a s i l y made to become a scarce commodity. There i s evidence to suggest that at least some status was associated with the a b i l i t y to use picks. When I asked one burglar to trace h i s involvement i n crime, he responded: \"I'd have to go back to the l o i d f i r s t \" . He had f i r s t heard about l o i d i n g doors while i n prison, and upon release he \"started to f o o l around with i t \" . He found that some doors simply would not open\u2014the latch would not go a l l the way back. This was the case at a place where he was sure of a p a r t i c u l a r l y good score. He contacted a \"pick-man\" he had heard of. \"I t o l d him I had a l i t t l e sting and would he come and look at i t \u2014 h e come up with a couple of picks and he sprung the door for me\u2014that was a l l I needed*\" (#13) #13 then proceeded to make his own set, t r y i n g h i s picks on locks he had taken o f f and taken home. They wouldn't work, so he went back to the \"pick-man\" and managed to get a set from him. Since that time he has made numerous sets of his own which did work w e l l . The various picks themselves are given names which con-s t i t u t e part of the argot of the burglar. I was t o l d that a 181 minimum of three picks i s required, but that some pick-men make several more, thus increasing the number and types of locks which can be opened. The three standard picks are: (1) (2) (3) Some burglars make use of several methods of gaining entry and the factors which determine which method to use are not only mechanical i n nature. A respondent who had done considerable h o t e l prowling, indicated the following. He said that i n the better hotels the locks cannot be loided, nor can they be e a s i l y picked without arousing suspicion. I f the burglar has money, he can get a master key made\u2014this i s done by f i r s t checking into the hotel as a legitimate customer. The burglar uses the lock from h i s own room, eithe r removing i t e n t i r e l y and substituting another, or removing a l l but one pin (leaving just enough to keep the lock working). He added, \"I can't make a master key, but for a pr i c e you can get someone who can*\" (#12) That i s , c e r t a i n persons are able and w i l l i n g , for a fee, to make a master key from the door lock i t s e l f . I f the burglar can not afford t h i s expense, but wishes to remain i n hotel work, he can \"run openers\". By t h i s i s meant working the cheaper hotels where the locks are easier. My respondent pointed to the door of the interview 18 2: o f f i c e : \"See that? That lock's easy to beat and l o t s of hotels have i t . You just put a v i s e g r i p or a monkey wrench on i t and i t ' l l come\u2014you just turn i t and open i t * \" (#12) House and hotel burglars are not faced with the prob-lem of alarm systems, nor with p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t lock-ing mechanisms. The actual entry for such a burglar i s less problematic than the assurance that no-one i s present within.\"*\" However, the weakness of security measures i n the average house does not compensate for the high p r o b a b i l i t y of the v i c t i m being home. The burglar who works commercial establishments faces more d i f f i c u l t entry, yet can be f a i r l y well assured that no one i s present inside. The burglar who wishes to enter a commercial estab-lishment may be interested i n cash, or goods, or both. I f he i s interested i n goods, he faces the problem of trans-portation and of converting the goods into cash. His technical problems, however, are l a r g e l y over . once a successful entry has been made. The burglar who goes for cash must be able to make a second \" i n \" ; for example, he must be able to get at the c a s h \u2014 a task much more problematic than that of get-t i n g at goods. He does not, however, face the problems of transportation or of being i n possession of stolen goods, and of course, h i s take i s \" l i q u i d \" i n economic terms. This, of course, i s not the case i n the \" l i v e prowl\". 18 3 Given these aspects, i t i s understandable why burglars tend to go either for cash, or for merchandise. I t i s tech-n i c a l l y d i f f i c u l t to come equipped, both to obtain cash and to transport merchandise. The combined operation i s danger-ously time-consuming; further, the cash burglar may see l i t t l e need to take merchandise. As one of them put i t , \"Why should I? I f I want something, I can come back next day and buy i t . \" The discussion i n t h i s chapter w i l l focus on the cash burglar, for several reasons. F i r s t of a l l , cash burdary i l l u s t r a t e s the divergent s k i l l s used i n what amounts to s i t u a -tions of double entry; secondly, i t f a c i l i t a t e s comparison with the armed robber who also i s interested i n cash only. This i s in.no way to underrate the s o c i o l o g i c a l significance of the in t e r a c t i o n between the merchandise burglar and the \"fence\", and between the fence and the purchaser of stolen goods. I t w i l l , however, be given a subordinate p o s i t i o n for purposes of t h i s paper. 3. \u2022Alarm Systems The commercial burglar i s faced, f i r s t of a l l , with making an \" i n \" 'into the building where the desired cash i s presumably kept. He may very well use any or a l l of the methods used by the house burglar. However, he i s frequently constrained by elec t r o n i c alarm systems, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n establishments such as banks, where large amounts of money are kept. 184 Burglars d i s t i n g u i s h between two types of alarms\u2014 the s i l e n t alarm or bug, and those which are not s i l e n t . The s i l e n t bug i s linked v i a telephone wires to a c e n t r a l detec-t i o n agency. When the bug i s set off, a l i g h t flashes on a panel at the agency itself. Each business establishment which u t i l i z e s the agency's services has i t s own l i g h t . The panel i s watched around the clock and the p o l i c e are immediately n o t i f i e d when a l i g h t flashes. Such agencies may o f f e r ad-d i t i o n a l services. V i a e l e c t r o n i c c i r c u i t r y they can t e l l , f or example, whether a given bank's vault i s open or closed. They may n o t i f y a bank reminding the manager that a vault has been l e f t open beyond the agreed upon closing time. Where such a c e n t r a l agency i s not i n operation, the s i l e n t alarm may be connected to the l o c a l p o l i c e station instead. In either case, aside from h i s own knowledge of alarm systems, the burglar i s given no i n d i c a t i o n by the s i l e n t alarm, whether or not i t has gone off.\"'\" In contrast, the non-silent bugs, .'when triggered, set o f f one or more loud gongs or b e l l s which may be located \"'\"The writer was able to v i s i t the largest and main Detec-t i o n Agency headquarters of the c i t y where a l l interviews were done. Access to the back room, where.the panel of l i g h t s i s constantly watched, was gained v i a the manager's password only. Two heavy locked doors separated the panel from the front of the building, where safes and security boxes were sold. The manager then proceeded to explain the operation of the alarm system, i t s mechanical dimensions, and how criminals attempt to \"beat\" i t . His explanation, as well as h i s description of crim i n a l techniques, was i n substantial agreement with that given by burglars themselves. 18 5 e i t h e r inside or outside the building, or both. .Depending on the noise l e v e l and b e l l location, the burglar may or may not attempt to silence the b e l l . Burglars, when r e c a l l -ing the loud alarms, indicate that the sound i t s e l f i s highly unnerving, and that the usual pattern i s to make a hasty e x i t . Alarm systems can be \"beat\" i n several ways. The simp-l e s t way i s to use a brace and b i t plus a keyhole saw, to open up a panel of the door. In this way entry through the door can be gained without opening i t . Burglars know that doors are bugged i n such a way that a small switch, located i n the door frame on the hinge side, i s closed when the door i s opened. (Similar to the switch for the dome-light i n a car, which i s closed when the door i s opened \u201e) I t i s an axiom for burglars i n a bugged building, not to open doors or to swing open low p a r t i t i o n s set up i n hallways. I was asked by one burglar to note f u n c t i o n a l l y useless swinging p a r t i t i o n s i n hallways; i t was h i s contention that they are allowed to swing f r e e l y only a f t e r hours, and that they are invariably bugged. The burglar walking down a hallway must go either over or under such a p a r t i t i o n . Where the construction of the door or p a r t i t i o n i s of poor quality, the button of the alarm can sometimes be kept i n a depressed state by the in s e r t i o n of a penknife blade. A bugged window i s e a s i l y i d e n t i f i e d by the s t r i p of alarm tape around i t s edges. None of my respondents suggested 186 any means whereby windows such as t h i s can be \"beat\". I t was, however, assumed that not a l l windows w i l l be bugged; consequently the burglar w i l l check basement windows or win-dows f a i r l y high o f f the ground, as well as s k y l i g h t s . My respondents agreed that skylights are frequently not bugged\u2014 a fact which burglars f i n d puzzling, since they prefer to work on the roof of a b u i l d i n g . The roof provides considerable privacy for t h e i r work\u2014also, i t was agreed, skylights tend not to be very securely fastened or constructed. An a l t e r n a t i v e i s to enter v i a the roof i t s e l f . This involves the use of a d r i l l and a saw. Cases related to me included only situations of f l a t roof construction. In addition to the p o s s i b i l i t y of avoiding the alarm, roof entry o f f e r s another advantage. Most alarms have t h e i r control box i n the space betweent\u00b1ie c e i l i n g and the roof. Access v i a the roof puts the burglar into a p o s i t i o n where he can, i f he i s t e c h n i c a l l y competent, jump the alarm or otherwise render i t obsolete. 1 From then on the burglar can proceed with r e l a t i v e freedom. (He must, of course, watch for the loud alarm which may be used i n addition to the s i l e n t . At t h i s point the Detection Agency disagreed with the burglars' claims. The Agency claimed that t h e i r alarms can-not be jumped\u2014this w i l l a l t e r the \"pulse-rate\" of the current flowing through i t and set o f f the alarm. Several burglars indicated the need to keep constant the length of wire through which the current flows, but added that t h i s can be done by jumping the alarm with a c o i l of wire roughly as long as the wire used i n the b u i l d i n g . This c a l l s for an accurate estima-t i o n of the wire used. 1 8 7 I t would probably be much more l o c a l i z e d , f o r example, placed near the cash r e g i s t e r , than are most s i l e n t systems.) An example of \"making the ' i n ' \" was given by one of my respondents: WHERE DID YOU LEARN THIS? P e n i t e n t i a r y . E v e r y t hing I l e a r n ' t was i n the p e n i t e n t i a r y I (LAUGHTER.) You know\u2014and other t h i n g s , l i k e , a c t u a l l y , I'm a q u a l i f i e d sheet metal man\u2014I never worked at i t , but the i n s t r u c t o r here w i l l t e l l you and the i n s t r u c t o r at the Pen. w i l l t e l l you, t h a t I know more about the sheet metal trade, more than they do\u2014because I went i n t o i t deeply. I got the b o o k s \u2014 I learned how t o use the acetylene t o r c h and everything e l s e . DID YOU DO THIS CONSCIOUSLY, WANTING TO USE IT FOR ILLEGAL PURPOSES? Oh yes'. L i k e I t o l d y o u \u2014 e v e r y t h i n g I t r i e d t o do was to b e t t e r myself i n the f i e l d of crime. YOU KNOW\u2014I CAN SEE WHERE THEY DON'T WANT SOMETHING LIKE LOCKSMITHING TAUGHT HERE. Oh yehi L o c k s \u2014 t h a t ' s another t h i n g we l e a r n ' t i n p r i s o n . Years ago we made them ourselves f o r the j a i l i t s e l f , or the p e n i t e n t i a r y . And we've got i t so t h a t \u2014 w e l l , l e t me g i v e you an i n s t a n c e . They c a l l me here a month a g o \u2014 t h e i n s t r u c t o r here i n charge of the switch box was away, and they broke the key o f f i n the l o c k up at the ' - - i t ' s one of these l o c k s l i k e t h a t (points t o the box on the w a l l ) . So, they run around here f o r about four hours t r y i n ' t o f i g u r e out how t o get i t out, and f i n a l l y the works' o f f i c e r s a i d , 'Well, l e t ' s get #29'.' So they came and got me and I took the l o c k o f f . Took the key out and handed i t to them and put i t . back i n . There was an aw-f u l scream about t h a t \u2014 t h e powers t h a t be, you know\u2014the b i g shots here s a i d i t shouldn't be done. But the l o c k s are simple, b a s i c . You can imagine w i t h a l l the l o c k s on the market, they're a l l b a s i c a l l y the same. -A l o c k i s a l o c k \u2014 t h a t ' s a l l there i s to i t . \"There's a d i f f e r e n c e i n the make and number of-tumblers and so on, but they a l l work on the same p r i n -c i p l e \u2014 j u s t l i k e I t o l d you s a f e s \u2014 e v e r y safe, 188 the p r i n c i p l e i s the same. The locking bars, the combination; I mean, i t doesn't matter i f they put f i v e d i f f e r e n t d i a l s on i t , i t ' s s t i l l b a s i c a l l y \u2014 i t ' s the same thing. SO YOU TOOK SHEET METAL WORK AND FOUND IT USEFUL. WHAT ABOUT OTHER TRADES TAUGHT HERE, LIKE CARPENTRY? Carpentry? You learn how a building i s b u i l t and l i k e and I \u2014 our favorite entry i s through the roof. And we found out through the years that roofs are not bugged, you see\u2014there's no alarms on roofs. So, usually we go up o n \u2014 u s u a l l y the roof i s wood and t a r paper and tar, so we go up on the roof, s t r i p the t a r paper o f f and d r i l l a hole through the roof and take a keyhole saw and cut a square\u2014now, we're i n the fal s e c e i l i n g . A l l buildings have fals e c e i l i n g s . And here....get as close to the o f f i c e as we could and we get up in there. Now--all your burglar alarms run around i n t h i s false c e i l -ing. Now, they may come down the windows and everything else, but they a l l run up where the\u2014where you can't see them\u2014up above i s where the alarm i s , on the outside of the b u i l d i n g . And we would cut the holes through the roof. We found t h i s the easiest method of entry, 'cause the door was always bugged. The win-dows are bugged, 'and we get up there and we find the alarm and we go to the alarm and we jump i t right across, l i k e . Usually, i f t h i s was the alarm here, you'd have wires comin' t h i s way and wires comin' t h i s w a y \u2014 i t ' s a continuous c i r c u i t \u2014 i t ' s either a closed c i r -c u i t , open as long as the juice i s on, you see? As soon as you break t h a t - - l i k e a window, then the alarm switch drops and i t sets the alarm o f f . So we go to where the alarm i s and jump wires from one wire to another\u2014now you've broken\u2014you've s t i l l got the c i r c u i t going around, but i t ' s going just around t h i s wire. Now you can go anywhere i n the building with-out being scared of tr i p p i n g o f f \u2014 o f t r i p p i n g of f t h i s , 'cause you've jumped i t . And usually you'd take a w i r e \u2014 a c o i l of wire, to give i t a distance to t r a v e l , and you'd tape i t \u2014 p u t one end around here, on the other wire coming into the b e l l . Now, even i f i t does drop, the b e l l won't go. Now, i f i t ' s a s i l e n t alarm, 189 you do exactly the same thing. You find the power supply\u2014you do the same thing. You just need to crawl on the roof and l e t i t run through the c o i l . DO YOU NEED A CERTAIN LENGTH OF WIRE? You don't a c t u a l l y need a ce r t a i n length of w i r e \u2014 t h e more you use the better i t i s . I t ' l l heat up i f you use too short a one. DOES THAT RUN ON 110 VOLTS? No, usually they're eit h e r on telephone voltage or bat-tery operated. SO YOU TAKE A COIL OF WIRE WITH YOU? Oh yeh. HOW DO YOU GET ON THE ROOF IN THE FIRST PLACE? Oh\u2014that depends. We'd look at the place. I f there was a telephone pole next to the place we'd go up the telephone pole, which i n the majority of a l l e y s there'd be. They would be running along the back, usually there would be. They have climbing things on them, and we would figure out two or three ways of getting on the roof--we wouldn't carry ladders or anything l i k e that, but we would carry a hook and rope. I f we figured the hook would catch on the roof we'd throw i t up and climb up that way. NOW THAT WOULD WORK ONLY ON LOW BUILDINGS? Y e h \u2014 u s u a l l y they're low buildings. WHAT ABOUT TALL BUILDINGS? A t a l l building? You would have to go through some method of get-t i n g onto that f l o o r \u2014 t h e f l o o r you want to get on. I f you couldn't get there from a-nother b u i l d i n g you'd have to go through the ground f l o o r . (#29) The fact that \"beating\" alarm systems separates the \"men from the boys\" was made very obvious by my respondents. Most burglars would r e c a l l t h e i r experiences and intersperse t h e i r comments with statements l i k e , \"...unless of course i t ' s bugged, then I wouldn't touch i t \" . Burglars unwilling to, or unable to cope with bugs must avoid them, thus confining t h e i r work to places other than major commercial buildings and establishments. I t i s in t e r e s t i n g also, to note that 190 burglars compare various l o c a l i t i e s i n terms of the proportion of business establishments that are \"bugged\". .My respondents agreed that Vancouver was more highly bugged than the west coast of the United States, and that the p r a i r i e province c i t i e s were also less formidable i n t h i s respect. 1 The respondents acknowledged that the introduction of alarm systems has affected the range of opportunity open to the burglar, and asserted that the increase i n bank robberies and hotel prowling i s due to the technological s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of alarm systems which prevent surreptitious crimes. I t might also be deduced, though t h i s was not suggested by any respon-dents, that burglars interested i n merchandise may have turned to s h o p l i f t i n g , i n order to avoid the hazards of alarm systems. Making the \" i n \" constitutes a challenge and accomp-lishment i n i t s e l f , aside from whether or not the caper i s economically successful. The psychoanalytic t r a d i t i o n which has interpreted breaking and entering as symbolic rape, i s an acknowledgement of the subjective importance attached to the act. I t does not, however, recognize the significance of either the s k i l l s or tension involved, and as such, n e i -ther the difference between the subjective meaning of an im-pulsive k i c k - i n or a complicated evasion of an alarm system. : \"4?his v a r i a t i o n i s supported by the fact that the opera-t i o n of such agencies i s l a r g e l y i n the hands of private enter-p r i s e . I t s cost to the consumer varies inversely with the number of subscribers, and d i r e c t l y with theirgeographical concentration. 191 WHAT WAS THE BIGGEST THRILL ON A NIGHT WHEN YOU WENT OUT TO BLOW A CAN? I don't think I e v e r \u2014 I was rather c l i n i c a l i n my approach to these things. I don't think I ever a c t u a l l y experienced any p a r t i c u l a r kick at any time, but i f thare would be any one moment of danger, as i t were, i t would be the actual making of an in\u2014because of, well, i n b u r g l a r y \u2014 w e l l , you c a n t \u2014 i t ' s \u2014 you l i k e l y have to make a f o r c i b l e entry, and the i n i s the a l l \u2014 important thing, and i f there i s any one moment of re a l ap-prehension and tension, you know\u2014a fe e l i n g of being keyed up, and aware of everything that's going on, i t would be at that time. Although for me, personally, I've never experienced i t to that degree that I've heard other people express. (#26) C. ACCESS TO CASH The burglar interested i n cash w i l l not find i t e a s i l y available, even a f t e r he has entered the b u i l d i n g . In commercial establishments he may fin d i t i n the expected places, such as safes, cash-registers, or i n d e l i b e r a t e l y unexpected places, such as one shoe box among several hundred others.\"*\" In r e s i d e n t i a l dwellings the burglar's task may be even more d i f f i c u l t , since the places where cash may be found are not as predictable. A home does not have a cash register, nor necessarily a safe. The burglar must therefore make quick interpretations as to the most probable l o c a t i o n of cash. The mental a c t i v i t y here i s r e a l l y a game of w i t s \u2014 of operating on the basis of rec i p r o c a l expectations. \"*\"Among numerous \"strange places\" related to me, one was that of the grocery store owner who kept h i s large b i l l s i n two halves of a hollow loaf of bread, held together by a plas-t i c bag and kept i n the freezer. The discovery was made a c c i -dentally, as the burglars added some needed groceries to t h e i r l o o t . 192 1. House Burglary The following i s an example of how a burglar finds the money i n houses: HOW ARE YOU DRESSED ON JOBS LIKE THIS? A p a i r of slacks and a dark coat. I used to wear a dark grey beach jacket, you know. One of these pullover things. I t had a hood on the back; you p u l l the hood up; that way you don't get so much fl a s h on the skin at night. And I wear a p a i r of hush puppies so that I'11 be very l i g h t on my feet. And gloves. (I ASK #35 WHETHER HE WOULD TRY TO OPEN A WINDOW WHICH WAS EXPOSED TO THE STREET, AND HE REPLIES THAT THIS DEPENDS ON THE LIGHTING.) I f there i s no street l i g h t i n g at the front i t doesn't matter. The im-portant thing i s that no one can see you. In the summer time especially, people are hanging around t h e i r windows and may look out. WELL,. LET'S SUPPOSE YOU'VE NOW GOTTEN IN THE WINDOW. YOU HAVE YOUR LITTLE FLASH-LIGHT, IT'S DARK. HOW DO YOU KEEP FROM CRASHING INTO FURNITURE AND STUMBLING INTO VASES AND THINGS LIKE THAT? ' The only prob-lem that I've had i n houses i s nerves. One of the worst experiences you can have i s to walk into a room and there's a mirror i n i t . . And you see a person i n the mirror out of the corner of your eye, moving. But other than that I have no trouble. OKAY. LET'S SAY THAT THE ROOM THAT YOU HAPPEN TO GET INTO IS THE KITCHEN. WHERE DO YOU GO FROM THERE? Well, the f i r s t place I would check would be a sort of den, which they use as an o f f i c e . And i f i t didn't have a den, i f you check that out, then you would move on to the master bedroom. And from the master bedroom, you'd move on to the l i v i n g room and that would be i t . NOW YOU SAID THAT THE FIRST THING YOU WOULD DO IS LOOK FOR A WAY OUT. Right. NOW WHAT DOES THAT MEAN IN TERMS OF HOW YOU MOVE AROUND? Well, t h i s i s before you get into the place. 193 WOULD YOU, AS SOON AS YOU ENTER A HOUSE, GO DOWN THE BACK STEPS AND OPEN THE BACK DOOR, SO THAT YOU COULD GET OUT? Well, that would depend on the circumstances. Depending on the type of houses. I f there was any type of arrangement to he made of that sort, then you'd make i t . But the main thing i s to fa-m i l i a r i z e yourself so that you know what to do. I f something happens so that i f i t hap-pens fas t i t w i l l c l i c k i n your mind right away, what you w i l l do, and you just go through with i t l i k e a machine, and you're out of there. . SO YOU GO TO THE DEN FIRST? WHAT PART OF THE DEN WOULD YOU LOOK AT? Well, i f he had a desk, and there was a hook there with the records for the house, that would be where he would keep his personal papers, b i l l s and s t u f f l i k e t h a t - - i f he would have any cash around, that would be the most l i k e l y place he would have i t . DO YOU MAKE A BIG MESS? DO YOU PULL DRAWERS OUT AND SPILL THINGS ALL OVER THE PLACE? No. I t r y to be as t i d y as possible . Because you always have i t i n the back of your mind that you don't want people to spot t h i s as soon as they walk into the house, especial-l y i f someone comes while you're\" i n there. You don't want to a l e r t them as soon as they come into the door\u2014uh\u2014maybe i t w i l l be an hour before they open that drawer and see that anything i s gone. (I THEN ASK HIM IF HE'S ONLY TAKEN TWENTY DOLLARS, IF THAT'S ALL THAT IS IN THE HOUSE, WHETHER HE WOULD TRY TO LEAVE THINGS SO THAT THE FAMILY MIGHT, IN FACT, NEVER KNOW THAT IT HAD BEEN STOLEN.) That's pretty w e l l impos-s i b l e . When you're looking for things, not to move things around. And that's going to a l e r t them. (HE THEN MAKES THIS INTERESTING COMMENT:) In my c e l l , where I l i v e , I've got maybe t h i r t y books, and I know where they are, and i f I come i n the c e l l , and even one of those books has been moved, I know i t ' s been moved and people are the same way, and i t would take too long i f you look through a place and then you put everything back exactly the way i t was. (ONE MIGHT NOTE THERE THAT HIS COMPARI-SON BETWEEN HIS OWN CELL ARRANGEMENT AND THAT OF THE FAMILY HOME MIGHT NOT BE A VALID COM-PARISON, BUT AT ANY RATE IT'S A COMPARISON HE MAKES.) 19.4 I ASK HIM WHAT HE DOES WITH ALL THE BOOKS AND LIBRARY WHICH ONE USUALLY FINDS IN A DEN. I WANT TO KNOW WHETHER HE WOULD LOOK FOR CASH IN BOOK SHELVES.) Very few people keep money inside of books. People l i k e to have some-thing which they f e e l i s secure. They would rather put i t i n a t i n box with a t i n y lock on i t . And i n a desk, than in a book up i n a shelf, because subconsciously, as long as i t ' s i n that l i t t l e box with the lock, w e l l \u2014 because nine out of ten times y o u ' l l have that l i t t l e t i n box. And i f you go through a drawer and you don't find a l i t t l e contain-er, why then you begin looking i n another place. Now, the f i r s t thing you think of when you're i n there i s , now, i f he's got money, where would he keep i t . So you look at every-thing else that looks interesting\u2014maybe a book case and you look i t over and you ques-t i o n . SUPPOSE YOU FIND FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IN THE DEN, WOULD YOU PROCEED TO LOOK FOR MORE IN THAT HOUSE? C e r t a i n l y . WHERE DO YOU LOOK? The Master Bedroom\u2014well, the f i r s t place you check are the jewelery boxes, and the jewelery boxes are usually kept right on the counter, or whatever\u2014you know. So you open them and you see i f there's anything of value there by way of diamonds or rubies or anything. Then you check the drawers\u2014noth-ing thorough--just a l i g h t going o v e r \u2014 j u s t the bottom of the drawers. You wouldn't bother with what's on top, because i f people put valuables i n a drawer they always dig right through to the bottom. WOULD YOU LOOK UNDERNEATH MATTRESSES? No, I would look i n c l o s e t s - - i n fact, a l o t of people, l i k e \u2014 i f they have a safe t h e y ' l l put i t in t h e i r c l o s e t s . T h e y ' l l put i t down--and they'11 have maybe a shoe stand on top of i t . Look i n the closet, look under the bed--I wouldn't bother looking under the mattresses, because you seldom find people that put something under there\u2014under the mattresses. AND YOU WOULDN'T GO BEYOND THE MASTER BED-ROOM? No. That's just about i t . YOU DON'T GO SNOOPING THROUGH THE REST OF THE HOUSE LOOKING FOR ANYTHING VALUABLE? Well, i t de-pends on what kind of a house i t i s . I f a person would have, say for instance, antiques, then I'd probably check a l l the rooms and see what he had. 19 5 (I ASK HIM IF HE WOULD THEN SIMPLY LEAVE THE PLACE AND GO BACK TO THE CAR. HE ADDS:) Well, i f I found something, say a good stamp c o l l e c t i o n , or something, then I would f i r s t look for a box or a suitcase to put i t i n . And then I'd leave the house with t h i s sbuff, with t h i s box, and I'd fin d a most conveni-ent spot near the house\u2014say two or three houses down, and I'd put i t behind the hedge or something. And then I'd get the car and drive back, because, as I say\u2014where I've parked the c a r \u2014 i t may be a f i v e or ten mi-nute walk to that place. And then I'd drive back with the car--jump out and grab i t , and then I'm gone. OKAY, LET'S SAY YOU'VE HAD A PRETTY GOOD SCORE IN THAT ONE HOUSE. WOULD YOU GO ON TO ANOTHER HOUSE THAT NIGHT, OR WOULD THAT BE ALL? N o \u2014 t h a t would\u2014that's enough. WHAT DETERMINES THE FREQUENCY OF HOUSE-BREAKING? Well, how much you get, I guess. DO YOU FIRST SPEND WHAT YOU HAVE, BEFORE YOU GO OUT AGAIN? OR DO YOU BUILD UP A BIT OF A SAVINGS ACCOUNT SOMEWHERE? No, n o \u2014 sometimes you would, sometimes you wouldn't. Once you reach a f i n a n c i a l l e v e l then you maintain i t . Lile, I would t r y to keep two or three hunded d o l l a r s i n my pocket. And l e t ' s say I got down to two hundred d o l l a r s , then I'd star t looking for something else. NOW LET'S SAY THAT YOU DID A HOUSE IN NORTH VANCOUVER IN A CERTAIN AREA AND THE PEOPLE FIND OUT ABOUT IT THE NEXT DAY. DOES THAT MEAN THAT THAT AREA IS NOT FOR YOU THE NEXT WHILE AND THAT YOU MUST GO SOMEWHERE ELSE FOR THE NEXT WHILE? No\u2014 t h a t p a r t i c u l a r place would be hot, but l e t ' s say there was two or three'places broken into i n the same area\u2014one t h i s week, one next week and one the next week\u2014let's say there, was some pat-tern i n i t , then I would draw suspicion or heat. NOW LET'S SAY THAT YOU\u2014DO YOU THEN TRY DELIBERATELY TO OPERATE IN SOME KIND OF A RANDOM PATTERN? I would go from one area of town to another. I t r y my utmost to use a di f f e r e n t pattern i n such a way that they would think i t was a d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l . (YET HE DOES EACH HOUSE IN THE SAME WAY.) 19 6. (#35 THEN SPECIFIES FOUR PLACES WHICH HE DID IN A SHORT SUCCESSION, COVERING A WIDE AREA OF THE CITY OF VANCOUVER AND ALSO IN-CLUDING BOTH SMALL BUSINESSES AND HOUSES. HE GOES ON TO SAY:) And I must have succeed-ed to some extent because they didn't think i t was the same person or people that was to blame for a l l these. You know, the p o l i c e forces i n the lower mainland here don't co-laborate with each other that. much. I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE COULD RELATE SOME SPECIFIC HAZARDS RELATED TO HOUSE BREAKING.) I can't r e a l l y see any hazards at a l l . Un-less maybe i t could be a dog that was i n the house. HOW WOULD YOU DEAL WITH THAT? Why, you'd keep him on one room and yourself i n another and t r y to get out of there. (I ASK HIM HOW HE DEALS WITH SERVANTS AND HE POINTS OUT THAT HE ONLY MET UP WITH ONE FAMILY IN THE RICHER SECTION OF VANCOUVER WHICH IN FACT HAD SERVANTS LIVING IN. HE MENTIONED THE SPECIFIC NAME OF THE FAMILY AND STATED THAT HE DISCOVERED THIS WHILE HE WAS CASING THE PLACE, AND CONSEQUENTLY HE NEVER DID BREAK INTO THAT PLACE.) I THEN ASK WHETHER HE WAS EVER SURPRISED BY THE OWNERS COMING IN BEFORE HE WAS FINISHED.) Oh\u2014I've had d i f f e r e n t times when people have come home, so I'm just gone, you know. (WE NOW REVIEW OUR CONVERSATION SO FAR, AND I ASK HIM WHY HE WOULD NEED A POCKET KNIFE.) Well, a pocket knife would be i n preference to a screwdriver. For example, take a desk drawer--in a pocket knife the blade i s wide. I t wouldn't leave a mark i f you jimmied i t . I t wouldn't leave a mark i f you forced the drawer down, so that the draw-er would come below the lock. Whereas a screw-driver, i t ' s not that wide--it's gonna leave a mark on the drawer. (I ASKED HIM WHETHER HE WOULD DISTINGUISH BETWEEN BREAKING INTO A SMALL BUSINESS OR INTO A HOUSE AND HE REPLIES THAT BASICALLY THERE WOULDN'T BE ANY DIFFERENCE.) You take the same things into consideration. (HE THEN POINTS OUT THAT THE IMPORTANT THING IN A BUSINESS IS TO CHECK IT A WEEK BEFORE ON THE SAME NIGHT TO FIND OUT WHAT THE WORK IS LIKE THERE AND WHETHER ANYBODY WORKS LATE ON THAT NIGHT.) (#35) 197 The burglar's concluding comments above indicate that he r e l i e s heavily on the routine of work situations when burg l a r i z i n g business establishments. From h i s e a r l i e r com-ments, i t i s obvious that when bur g l a r i z i n g private dwell-ings he also proceeds on the assumptions he has regarding routine family behaviour, and that he anticipates c e r t a i n uniformities, both in architecture and i n styles of handling valuables. He may be frustrated by unexpected v a r i a t i o n s i n either of these aspects, and leave empty-handed. 2. Hotel Prowling The burglar working the \"heel\" i n .hotels operates i n a s i t u a t i o n where several of the above problems are mini-mized. Like the house burglar, he must assess the p o s s i b i l i t y of anyone being home\u2014this may be done by knocking on the door, watching the rooms, or both. Once entry i s gained he w i l l f i n d a r c h i t e c t u r a l uniformity, with only a limited number of possible v a r i a t i o n s as to where valuables may be safely kept. However, contrary to people i n private dwell-ings (houses), who usually leave at least some of t h e i r money behind when they go out, people who leave t h e i r h o t e l room generally tend to take t h e i r money with them. Therefore, even though the hotel burglar may gain easy access to money-hiding places, he faces great l i k l i h o o d of no money being there. Both a r c h i t e c t u r a l uniformity and the assurance of some money i s to be had by the \" l i v e prowl\" i n hotels. In 198 contrast to the heel, the l i v e prowl involves th e f t i n a home or hotel room with the occupants p r e s e n t \u2014 t h e pre-ferred time being while the occupants are asleep. This pro-cedure has interesting dimensions which are best i l l u s t r a t e d i n the following account, quoting my interview notes on a discussion with a hotel prowler: (#12) The would-be hotel prowler should book i n v i a an a i r p o r t bus. I f he enters the hbtel with the other a i r p o r t bus passengers, his a b i l i t y to pay w i l l not be questioned: 'They think a i r customers have money'. Cab custo-mers may be a c r e d i t r i s k . He should check i n on a fal s e name and book a room away from the bottom f l o o r \u2014 p r e f e r a b l y i n the middle of the b u i l d i n g . This because people on lower l e v e l f l o o r s often use the stair s - - t h e r e f o r e they are able to ar r i v e on a f l o o r unannounced. People on higher lev e l s use the e l e v a t o r \u2014 t h e burglar can then watch the elevator signals on the f l o o r he i s working. He knows when the elevator i s a r r i v i n g and w i l l be c a r e f u l not to arouse suspicion during that time. (Note that the criminal 'uses' ordinary, every-day things ( l i k e elevator signals) i n a way -hot thought of by the 'square'.) The hotel prowler should book in during a convention week and get himself a convention badge\u2014they can usually be had for very l i t t l e money, or the burglar can make h i s own. When he goes to bed he should set h i s alarm instead of having the desk waken him. He should go to work at about four i n the morning and pre-ferably work with a woman partner. Both should be well-dressed; the man wearing the convention badge and the woman carrying a large purse: 'with only enough i n i t to make i t look l e g i t i -mate should there be trouble'. Just before leaving h i s room he takes a couple of shots of whiskey: 'so you have whis-key on your breath'. This i s done i n case the occupant wakens\u2014the burglar then pretends that he i s drunk and has entered the wrong room. He w i l l even i n s i s t , i f necessary, that the door was unlocked. #12 added tret he would be normally treated as a convention brother and c h e e r f u l l y helped on h i s way. 199 The burglar and his companion then pro-ceed to 'run the hotel down1. This means that the burglar begins on the rooms at the top f l o o r and works his way down. This i s a sa-fety p r e c a u t i o n \u2014 i f anyone's suspicion i s aroused, h i s pursuers w i l l be above him; not below, where they might prevent his escape. He may then follow one .of two patterns. I f the burglary i s taking place following a l a t e convention party, he may simply t r y the door and enter only those rooms which are unlocked. #12 claimed that following a late, heavy drinking party, a good number of doors w i l l not be locked by the occupant. On the other hand, the burglar may have a master key, and i f so, he w i l l f i r s t determine whe-ther or not the door i s locked; and i f i t i s he w i l l use h i s key. The layout of the room need not be stu-died beforehand: \"You get a room sim i l a r to the ones you want to rob\u2014you must know where the bed i s ; that's the most important f u r n i -ture. ' The burglar w i l l choose a door furthest from the s t a i r s and work his way down the h a l l , to the s t a i r s . Having opened the door, he assesses the s i t u a t i o n by the l i g h t from the hallway: 'If they leave a l i g h t on i n the bathroom i t ' s good for us\u2014we can see better'. #12 also noted that he prefers absolute s i -lence. The noise from heating units or fans i s not h e l p f u l * he i s not a f r a i d of making any noise himself, and silence permits him to assess the state of his victims. (Note that house burglars on l i v e prowls also pre-fe r quiet streets; noise prevents them from hearing the possible movements of t h e i r v i c -tims .) #12 noted that after conventions the man w i l l probably drape h i s pants over a chair, leav-ing h i s wallet i n i t , and drop into bed drunk: 'He i s probably juiced,.and the wallet i s i n his pants'. The burglar picks up the pants and takes them to the open door. I t i s there that he empties the pockets and passes the a r t i c l e s to h i s partner\u2014he does not pass the pants to his partner: 'She can't be seen with a p a i r of men's trousers, i n the hallway'. The woman 2 0 0 w i l l quickly thumb through the wallet, take out the cash and hand the wallet back to him. He puts i t back into the pants and replaces them. Having done t h i s , both of them move on to the next door. I f anyone i s around who may see them more than once and become sus-picious, they w i l l leave that f l o o r and move on to the next. (From interview with #12.) The \" l i v e prowl\" indicates a form of burglary which forms an i n t e r s t i t i a l category between those crimes where the victim i s avoided and those where he i s confronted. That i s , the l i v e prowl necessitates latent s k i l l s which must be immediately available, should vi c t i m confrontation occur. In t h i s sense, the l i v e prowl involves some of the s k i l l s of both surreptitious and of non-sirreptitious crime. 3. Commercial establishments The burglar who works commercial establishments faces quite d i f f e r e n t problems form those of the hotel burglar. He probably knows, p r i o r to the burglary, where the cash i s kept--he need not look for i t , ne need only obtain possession. Again, the d i f f i c u l t y of the task varies with the degree^ of technological s o p h i s t i c a t i o n . My respondents agreed that most older-type cash registers can be sprung by prying with a good screw d r i v e r . They also agreed that today not much money i s kept overnight i n such r e g i s t e r s . The d i f f i c u l t y of gaining access to cash inside a business establishment necessitates a number of sub-special-t i e s of burglary. The most common of these i s safecracking, which I w i l l discuss i n d e t a i l l a t e r . The use of s e l f - s e r v i n g 201' vending machines has, however, introduced another source of cash, more e a s i l y available to the burglar: We did the juke box, pin b a l l machines, and s t u f f l i k e that, and the money out of the cash r e g i s t e r \u2014 a n y t h i n g we could, we took i t . And these are about the easiest things to get into. Because the juke b o x \u2014 i t ' s only got one lock. That takes the panel out\u2014you can p u l l the panel out at the corner with the screw-driver and pop the lock, and on the side i t ' s got the change. The only thing hold-ing i t i s four head screws. And i t only takes a second to take those out and then you get the money. I t takes a minute to pop the shuffle board or something l i k e that. You put i n your screw-driver and you break the lock. You\u2014 on one we got eight hundred d o l l a r s out of three of these. So there's a l o t of change i n them. We done many i n each. (#10) The t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s here are minimal, yet require some \"know-how\", p a r t i c u l a r l y for purposes of e f f i c i e n c y and speed. The tools required, though few and uncomplicated, are of a special kind--not ones normally car r i e d by a burglar: I f you took a l l the tools you'd need, you'd need a ladder, you'd need a hook and a rope to climb down on some of them. You'd need crow bars. But mainly we work with a hammer, a screw-dri v e r and a l i t t l e pinch bar. And I take four screw-drivers, d i f f e r e n t sizes, 'cause each one you use i s d i f f e r e n t . DIFFERENT KINDS OF SCREW-DRIVERS? P h i l l i p s and\u2014mostly P h i l l i p s , and the small l i t t l e t h i n one, regular blade, that's what you need. Two P h i l l i p s and two regular screw-drivers, but one small one. WHAT'S THE SMALL ONE FOR? Well, i n case you get l i k e \u2014 i n some of these change boxes, you get small P h i l -l i p s , they won't f i t , 'cause they're r e a l l y small. So you have to use i t . I t ' s a spe c i a l P h i l l i p s , , a small one. 202 WHAT ABOUT ALLEN KEYS? No, I never used an A l l e n Key, just these main tools to open a window. .Mostly I t r y either coming from the inside out, so that they figure i t ' s somebody inside the j o i n t doing i t , or I come through a transfer--through a window. That's very r a r e l y you use wrenches. Like, sometimes you get windows that got bars. You have to take the bars out, and go through; then you replace them, so they don't know how you got i n . (#10) For the purpose of more detailed analyses we w i l l look at what i s probably the most complex type of burglary for cash, namely safecracking. This type of crime involves both entry to the b u i l d i n g and entry into the safe or vault where the cash i s kept. I t also i l l u s t r a t e s the continuing war of tech-n o l i g i c a l escalation, between the safecracker and the poten-t i a l v ictims. For the purpose of comparison with other forms of burglary, i t w i l l be shown that the mechanical s k i l l s neces-sary for safecracking are of paramount consideration. The avoidance of the victim, entry into the building and :so forth are secondary to the actual gaining of access to the cash. This does not mean that these are taken for granted, for they must be regarded c a r e f u l l y ; however, they are only a part of a larger and more d i f f i c u l t operation, namely the safe-opening i t s e l f . I t w i l l be assumed, i n the discussion to follow, that the i n i t i a l \" i n \" has already been made, i t being essentially subject to the same considerations as those i n our discussion on other forms of burglary. The considerations by which a safecracker assesses a p o t e n t i a l score willbe discussed in a later chapter. 20 3 D. .SAFECRACKING AS A SPECIFIC EXAMPLE 1. Introduction Our description of procedure w i l l require increasingly s p e c i f i c descriptions of safes and v a u l t s . I t may be ade-quate, at the outset, to note that safecracking includes the .opening of a v a r i e t y of safes.. Some safes c l o s e l y resemble fir e p r o o f cupboards or closets, others are massive bank v a u l t s . Safecrackers d i f f e r e n t i a t e between what might be c a l l e d strong-boxes (for example, light-gauge metal boxes that can be pried open) and the more heavily constructed safes. A strong-box and a safe are not d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between i n terms of s i z e . The small cylinder imbedded i n the concrete f l o o r (as i n many service stations) i s as much a \"safe\" to the safecracker as one weighing several tons. Safecrackers d i s -tinguish between \"easy cans\" (or \" t i n cans\") and more d i f f i c u l t ones, frequently by reference to the brand-name of the safe. To the u n i n i t i a t e d , the name Chubb may mean l i t t l e \u2014 t o a safe-cracker t h i s name, coupled with the adjective \"round\", i n d i -cates a very d i f f i c u l t safe to open. (The adjective \"round\" refers to the shape of the door\u2014round doors being considered more d i f f i c u l t to open than square or rectangular ones.) The designation \"safecracking\" i s a general term which includes both safe-blowing (by use of explosives) and other methods of safe-opening. To d i s t i n g u i s h between complex and crude methods, the derogatory term of safe-breaking may be 2 04 used. The designation of \"safecracker\" i s also a more gene-r a l term which includes both \"pete-men\" and other safecrackers. \"Pete-men\" i s a derivative of \"Peter-man\", or \"powder-man\", a term borrowed from the logging industry where i t refers to those workers who handle b l a s t i n g powders. .A safecracker who i s referred to as a \"pete-man\", therefore, would be one who i s known to use explosives i n opening safes. In the same way, the term \"safe-blowing\" i s more precise than \"safecracking\". He may, of course, also use other, non-explosive methods. The s p e c i f i c designation of \"pete-man\" i s not often used and i t i s generally assumed that a safecracker i s one who uses explosives for the purpose of opening safes. The discussion to follow w i l l focus almost exclusively on the mechanical aspects of safecracking. From an analysis of my interviews i t i s evident that the mechanical aspect of the actual opening of the safe i s of ce n t r a l importance to the safecracker; t h i s i s exclusively h i s s k i l l . He shares with other burglars the s k i l l s needed for making the \" i n \" , as well as those required for casing purposes. As for the l a t t e r , we s h a l l indicate i n a l a t e r chapter how casing, for purposes of safecracking, has s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t dimensions then when done for purposes of general burglary. Before describing the various techniques used, a d i s -cussion i n d i c a t i n g the source-and nature of basic tools and equipment i s i n order. 205 2. Basic Tools and Equipment The basic ingredient around which safe-blowing tech-niques revolve i s that of \"grease\", the criminal's term for nitroglycerine.\"'\" Ca) Grease: The older safecrackers refer back with some nostalgia to the days when grease was r e a d i l y available i n the form of dynamite s t i c k s . These sticks \"you could pick up any place\" (#32). The \"picking up\" consisted of the the f t of dynamite from construction s i t e s or land-clearing operations. Dynamite s t i c k s were apparently stored i n tem-porary sheds on l o c a t i o n . Safecrackers would drive out to these s i t e s at night, pry open the usually poorly constructed 2 doors, and take the dynamxte s t i c k s with them. These s t i c k s themselves were of no value for the purpose of safe-blowing, but the nitroglycerince the s t i c k s contained was, and needed to be separated from the bonding compound which kept i t i n s t i c k form. I was t o l d that t h i s could be done i n several ways: You could take the n i t r o g l y c e r i n e right out of that--by a process, putting i t i n a sack and then squeezing i t out of the. packing compound--can't remember the name of i t \u2014 s o r t of l i k e a moss\u2014say sawdust or something. You could get the n i t r o g l y c e r i n e right out of that. (#32) Another account: HOW WAS THAT DONE? Well, you used to be able to buy dynamite that didn't have a gelatine com-pound i n i t . The same as i t i s now,. You\u2014and \"'\"The connotation of the term i s o b v i o u s \u2014 n i t r o g l y c e r i n e , being p a r t l y composed of glycerine, i s i n fact an o i l y substance, \" 2 In addition, they would take the fuses and detonators ('knockers') discussed l a t e r . 206 you would just take i t i n a container of b o i l i n g water\u2014you'd take the casings off the dynamite and you'd put i t right i n, and the heat separated the sawdust, the body--i t wasn't a gelatine, but whatever i t was. That i s , whatever i t was that held i t to-gether. The heat would just dissolve that and greaas\u2014nitro i s heavier than water and, and i t would sink right-to the bottom. And you'd pour o f f the water, and there i t i s . x AND I UNDERSTAND THAT CAN'T BE DONE ANY-MORE. No, no\u2014they have a compound i n dy-n a m i t e \u2014 i t won't dissolve i n b o i l i n g water. I t won't dissolve from the n i t r o i t s e l f . WAS THAT DONE DELIBERATELY? Well, I suppose i t was p a r t i a l l y done deliberately, yeh. To stop i t \u2014 h e h . That was d e f i n i t e l y one of the factors, and i t also made the - - i t - - t h e r e may be a safety factor involved too. (#36) As the above quotation indicates, l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced which required a new bonding process for the manufacture of explosives. This process does not permit the separation of the n i t r o g l y c e r i n e from the bonding compound, at least not v i a any methods known to safecrackers. Safecrackers referred to t h i s new form of explosive as g e l i g n i t e and f o r c i t e . I t i s useful to them i n i t s s t i c k form only, and then only for purposes of blowing a vault c e i l i n g (a seldom-used procedure). Safecrackers disagree as to the motive for the change. Some are convinced the procedure was s p e c i f i c a l l y designed Of the two methods described above, the second was men-tioned much more frequently., I encountered a f a i r amount of uncertainty as to the actual process. Some suggested that the nit r o g l y c e r i n e was an o i l which floated on the water and was then skimmed o f f . I t was obvious that the process was an old one and that r e c o l l e c t i o n of d e t a i l was not always consistent. 207 to frustrate t h e i r own procedures; others f e e l i t was for reasons of general safety. But. the Mounted Polic e are the ones p r i -marily responsible, and the CIA or whoever was involved, you know. 'Cause everybody was taking the ni t r o g l y c e r i n e out of dynamite. \u2022WHEN DID THIS HAPPEN, THIS CHAN3E? When did the switch occur? Well, i t occurred while I was i n j a i l so there would be a kind of gap, - but I would say, '42-'45\u2014during that two-year period. I've heard d i f f e r e n t specula-tions on who ac t u a l l y made the f i r s t n i t r o -glycerine, you know, by the chemical process. (#32) A description of the chemical production of n i t r o g l y -cerine was provided by each of the safecrackers interviewed;:,. Each of the accounts were consistent i n p r i n c i p l e , though i t was obvious that some were able to provide dimensions that others could not. This was generally consistent with t h e i r claims as to expertise and experience. The basic procedure was presented c r y p t i c a l l y as f o l -lows : (MAKING THE GREASE:) l i k e you add s u l -phuric and n i t r i c acid and glycerine--that's a l l you need. And\u2014but the thing was to get them i n the right proportion. And we learn't t h i s right proportion and from then on you could go to any drugstore and buy--separate drugstores\u2014you could go to any drugstore. You wouldn't go and buy a l l three i n one drug-store\u2014you'd be asking for trouble. But go to one and buy the nitroglycerine, go to the next one and buy n i t r i c acid, go to the t h i r d one and buy sulphuric acid. And keep them i n a controlled temperature\u2014this i s the secret, keeping i t at a controlled temperature. (#32) 208 Important analytic issues are introduced here: the te c h n i c a l procedure regarding proportion of acids was learned, the l e -gitimate purchase of merchandise may arouse suspicion of motives i f done i n a c e r t a i n fashion, and c e r t a i n aspects of the procedure are more c r u c i a l than others. Learning how to make grease i s achieved v i a instruc-t i o n by others, through reading, or both: HOW DID YOU LEARN TO MAKE THE STUFF? Oh, I'd heard about i t \u2014 t h e thing that I a c t u a l l y studied was the Encyclopedia B r i t t a n i c a - -they've got a very good run-down on i t (laughs). Look i t up and y o u ' l l find about three pages ' on i t . (#32) The following indicates how both the old and new methods were learned: OKAY, NOW TO REVIEW. YOU'VE BEEN LIVING OFF BLOWING CANS FOR TWO YEARS. Uh huh. WHAT KIND OF RELATIONSHIP DO YOU HAVE WITH OTHER SAFECRACKERS? DID YOU MAKE YOUR OWN GREASE ALL THIS TIME? No, we started to le a r n \u2014 y o u pick these things up from other safe-blowers and so on and so forth and f i -n a l l y I found out an old safe-man\u2014he's dead now\u2014and he was going out to make some grease. So now\u2014and I t o l d him I'd help him. ' I ' l l get the powder and you take me out. I ' l l help you and you show me how to make i t . ' He agreed. And he went with me\u2014both of us went together, and, but l i k e you say, the grease\u2014we\u2014I learned how to b o i l p l a s t i c , dynamite, say\u2014how to get grease out of i t and then right a f t e r the war we learn't the chemical formula. HOW DID YOU LEARN THAT? I t was passed on and i t come out of some book. I don't know\u2014 a l o t of safe-blowers passed i t on down the l i n e , where you would buy these three ingredients and mix them together and you'd get grease. (#29) 20.9 Although i t i s legitimate to purchase the necessary ingredients, the motivation of such a purchase may be c a l l e d into question: YOU SAY YOU CAN BUY THE COMPONENTS PER-FECTLY LEGALLY? I used to pose as a school teacher. I would even get them to give me a receipt b i l l and\u2014so I could c o l l e c t from petty cash, you see. There was some degree of r e s t r i c t i o n s on buying t h i s \u2014 n o t l e g a l l y , but simply on account of the product i t i s , you see. They are dangerous acids, a c t u a l l y . DID YOU BUY BOTH THE NITRIC AND SULPHURIC ACID YOURSELF? Oh yes. I HEARD THAT SOME OF THEM HAVE ONE GUY BUY THE NITRIC AND THE OTHER THE SULPHURIC. That's been done too. Well, o r i g i n a l l y I would walk right i n and buy both i n the same place, but as i t be-came known a l i t t l e b i t that\u2014amongst the authorities, well I would buy one i n one place and the other i n another, and then, par-t i c u l a r l y when got caught with two of the components, and got convicted, then I would only buy one component at one time and take i t and plant i t and go back\u2014'I would never have two components at one time, i n possession. (#26) Another: I SEE. UH HUH. DO YOU HAVE ANY TROUBLE BUYING THE STUFF? Well, the one\u2014the tough one i s the n i t r i c acid, you know. Druggists w i l l h e s i t a t e \u2014 s u l p h u r i c s are comparably easy to get because there are so many v a l i d reasons to use i t , you know. But the n i t r i c i s d i f f i -c u l t at times. SO WOULD YOU BUY A LITTLE BIT AT A TIME, MAYBE? No\u2014the wholesales are f a i r l y good, they... (SECTION OF TAPE NOT CLEAR). SO YOU GO TO A WHOLESALE DRUGSTORE? Yeh\u2014warehouse d i s t r i c t . (#32) Later the same respondent adds: Say, i n c i d e n t a l l y , they put a new section i n the Criminal Code, l i k e before we could, l i k e you could have a l l the components and be safe, because they c e r t a i n l y wouldn't explode, but then they put a new section i n the Crimi-nal Code, I think i t \u2014 I think I was one of the f i r s t guys to be charged with that too. I got a stay of proceedings on i t \u2014 l i k e pos-session of components. (#32) 210 The following i s an example of how these three ingredi-ents are combined to make \"grease\": LET'S SEE, WHEN YOU MAKE THE STUFF, HOW MUCH WOULD YOU MAKE AT ONE TIME? Oh, on the average you\u2014when you buy, say nine pounds, that's the measurement even though i t ' s l i -quid, you buy nine pounds of sulphuric acid, s a y \u2014 i t comes i n a big glass Winchester, you know. And then you go to a d i f f e r e n t drug-store, d i f f e r e n t place, you know, for six pounds of n i t r i c \u2014 t h a t gives you that 3-2 rat i o , see what I mean? You got i t a l l pre-measured. YEH. -And then the g l y c e r i n e \u2014 the glycerine ration i s usually one: 3-2-1. But i t a c t u a l l y doesn't mean too much because the acid w i l l only take so much glycerine and you can see i t by watching how much i t w i l l absorb\u2014see what I mean? You just throw the rest of the glycerine away. The more time you take i n t h i s , the bet-t e r . Not only safer, but you come up with a better product. And the dangerous aspect i s where you add the g l y c e r i n e \u2014 t h a t ' s when, what's the chemical term? Fusion, you know; l i k e a c t u a l l y n i t r o g l y c e r i n e - - l i k e sulphuric acid i s used to extract the water element from glycerine and from n i t r i c acid. They make\u2014just l i k e the name implies--nitro-gly-cerine. The sulphuric acid i s a kind of a, l i k e a working agency, taking t h i s water out and combining the n i t r i c and... CATALYST? Catalyst, that's i t . That's r i g h t . The only b a f f l i n g part that's found r e a l d i f f i c u l t , when they make t h i s , you know, \" i n \" \u2014 s a y Duponts, for example\u2014recognized, manufacturer (LAUGHTER). This glycerine i s injected right into i t i n some t e r r i f i c a i r -pressure somehow\u2014'now you haven't got that kind of resource a v a i l a b l e . Now t h i s glycer-ine got to be added. Say you got a f i v e - g a l l o n crock and you have t h a t \u2014 y o u keep going around very s l o w \u2014 i f you ever dropped i t i n there, well, i t ' d be (LAUGHTER) d i s a s t r o u s \u2014 o h god, I'm t e l l i n g youi But you have to pour very thin, just the size of a needle, and you get t o \u2014 y o u got to keep moving, keep i t moving so, and you have a dairy thermometer, one of those 211 big brass ones. You nave that i n your l e f t hand and you keep s t i r r i n g so there's no gobs of glycerine\u2014you keep i t spread out so there's a very t h i n layer. And you t r y to keep that r a t i o , because l i k e , t h i s c a t a l y s t operation i s going on. You just keep adding at that rate. You do i t by guess, but you learn f a i r l y quick, 'cause you can see t h e \u2014 s a y there's a gob, for example, i t gets kind of a rust c o l o r \u2014 y o u break i t up with t h i s dairy thermometer, you know\u2014spread i t out. (#32) Another example: DID YOU BOTH MAKE GREASE? Well, took i t over, the majority of i t . 1 I learned how to do i t , working with him and helping him and so on. (HE SAYS SOMETHING ABOUT THE IM-PORTANCE OF HAVING GOOD GREASE\u2014IF YOU LET OTHERS MAKE IT, YOU NEVER KNOW HOW GOOD THE GREASE IS\u2014THAT* S WHY YOU MAKE IT YOURSELF.) There i s a way of testing g r e a s e \u2014 I don't know i f any of these other safe-blowers ever t o l d you or not; but a l l you do i s put a gob on the railway t r a c k \u2014 e v e r heard of t h i s before? NO. You get your b o t t l e of grease with you and you put a l i t t l e d r o p \u2014 u s u a l l y we take a matchstick or something and dip i t i n and put i t on the track and h i t i t with a hammer and i f i t goes it's good grease. I f i t won't go you might as wel l throw i t away and sta r t a l l over. WELL, WELL. That's a l l you need\u2014put i t down and just h i t i t with a hammer on the track and i t ' l l go o f f . I t sounds just l i k e a s h e l l going o f f . WHAT DID YOU DO WRONG IF YOU GOT POOR GREASE? Oh, there's l o t s of ways of makin' poor grease\u2014using the wrong ingredients, mixture. Also, not c o n t r o l l i n g the tempera-ture, l i k e . You make grease\u2014when you mix grease, we used to mix i t i n a bowl that we were going to mix i t in, and put i t i n ice, and we'd use a thermometer and you keep i t as close as you can to forty (degrees). Now i f you go over you get poor grease; i f you go under you get poor grease. And while you're mixing you watch t h i s terraometer and This was the t y p i c a l pattern\u2014one of the two partners i n a safecracking team would be responsible for the grease. 212 i f i t ' s getting too cold you take i t out of the ice f o r a few seconds and then put i t back again. And you can make a l l of i t i n a hotel room, which I've done a l o t . You can make i t anywhere. 1 (#29) There are apparently several features of making grease which make i t an unpleasant and hazardous process both. The process, I was t o l d , emits noxious fumes: Yeh\u2014oh boy, that's a h o r r i b l e experience makin' that. Primarily that's because of the t e r r i f i c headache you get\u2014you just f e e l l i k e someone's caught you with a four cornered sledge, you know. You got to get drunk i n order to (Laughs) ... (#32) In addition, he added: You've got to watch (temperatures) though when you make i t \u2014 i t won't go o f f \u2014 i t ' l l just go up i n flames and you got to watch. The heat'11 peel the skin right o f f your face. (#32) The problems involved i n purchasing the ingredients, the danger of being caught i n possession of components, the unpleasantness and danger of the procedure, plus the fact that one might s t i l l end up with poor grease, appear to have l i m i -ted the continuous production of ni t r o g l y c e r i n e to a small num-ber of safecrackers. A l l my respondents claimed to have been able to make i t and implied that a l l safecrackers could do so. Several acknowledge that they had made very l i t t l e , and a few stated that they had made much. A common place to make grease was on the edge of a ri v e r , with the container located i n shallow water. This kept the contents c o o l . The outdoor aspect also provided an element of safety, should the contents burst into flame. 213 WELL, YOU SAY YOU ALSO PLANTED NITRO AROUND THE PLACE AND YOU MADE GALLONS OF THE STUFF,.LITERALLY? Yes. .DID YOU SELL IT? No\u2014we used a l o t and gave a l o t away. That p a r t i c u l a r time--well, that was i n Vancouver, '43, '44 and '45\u2014a l o t of very active burglars then, l a t e r on again, i n the '50's, when I was h e r e \u2014 i t was the-same thing, and I think I supplied most of them. (#27) Another stated: NOW IF YOU SUPPLIED A MAN WITH NITRO FOR A BIG JOB,.DID YOU GET A SHARE OF THE TAKE, THEN, OR...? No, I've never'done, i t that way\u2014although that's been done. But i t ' s not a geneal p r a c t i c e . Here again, i t comes back to a rather unique and loose liaison among burglars. You know, i f you've got something and I need something, and I haven't got i t , there i s generally no question about needing i t , or getting something for nothing. WELL, WHAT DID YOU GET OUT OF THIS THEN? What, making the grease? YEH. Well, I needed i t myself, and i t ' s just as easy to make--you get the nine pound Winchester of sulphuric for about\u2014oh, I forget the pr i c e now\u2014around three d o l l a r s and a seven pound Winchester of n i t r i c f o r \u2014 i t was a l i t t l e more expensive\u2014 about four d o l l a r s and f i f t y . Those two a-mounts of acid would make\u2014well, I could make four, eight ounce b o t t l e s of glycerine. That would make thirty-two ounces of n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . I would buy four, eight ounce b o t t l e s of gly-cerine i n a drugstore and the chemical proce ss that takes p l a c e \u2014 I would get back four, eight ounce b o t t l e s of n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . This i s af-t e r . Through experience, you know. You get p r o f i c i e n t at i t . (#26) DOES EVERY PERSON WHO WANTS TO USE THIS HAVE TO GO AND BUY THIS ACID AND MAKE IT,.OR CAN HE BUY IT? He can buy i t \u2014 h e can buy i t . N i t r o -glycerine can be bought for up to a hundred', d o l l a r s an ounce, but the average is-\u2014say a per-centage of the caper, say f i v e percent or some-thing. (PAUSE) Or replace i t \u2014 t h e r e ' s a l o t of that\u2014-replace i t when you get the opportu-n i t y . (#32) 214 (b) Soap: A second ingredient for safe-blowing i s soap, l i t e r a l l y interpreted. The basic function of soap i s to pro-vide a funnel-like structure through which the grease can be poured into the door of a safe. Like the components of grease, soap can be purchased p e r f e c t l y l e g a l l y . Unlike grease components though, i t can be purchased without arousing sus-picion; therefore, without precaution. Not a l l soap i s equally good for the purpose of safe-blowing, and the desirable c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are not those generally advertized by soap companies. The soap must be malleaple, and i t s consistency of the sort which w i l l not permit the grease to drain through i t . The only soap men-tioned by name as meeting these requirements was the F e l s -Naptha brand, although plasticene was mentioned as an alterna-t i v e . The use of good soap i s important: ...now keep i n mind, because now, there's P Se G and there's a l l kinds of other soaps. Some of these can be r e a l l y unsatisfactory. You can have, you know, grease coming down the door of the safe, you know\u2014and things l i k e that. I t ' s pretty detrimental in blow-ing a s a f e \u2014 b e l i e v e me. Because i f i t deto-nates up there you get a h o r r i b l e report and nothing e f f e c t i v e . (#32) (c) Knockers and Strings The grease must be set off v i a a detonator (knocker) and the knocker i n turn v i a a fuse or a spark from an e l e c t r i c source. The e l e c t r i c a l method i s a more recent innovation, but a l l respondents indicated experience 215 with both types. P r i o r to the use of e l e c t r i c a l knockers the ordinary fuse was i n common use. Even a f t e r grease could no longer be obtained v i a dynamite sticks, safecrackers would s t i l l v i s i t construction'sites for the purpose of s t e a l -ing detonators and fuse: WHERE DO YOU GET FUSES AND DETONATORS FROM? Well, normally on these highway projects, and i n mines, you know. .Someone w i l l go o f f and knock o f f a r o l l of fuse, you know\u2014string and a case of detonators,.and then t h e y \u2014 l i k e I indicated b e f o r e \u2014 t h e safecracking f r a t e r n i t y i s p retty good that way, you know. They'd ask i f you need any\u2014I've done that, and I've got them o f f other fellows the same way. (#32) The fuse-type detonator consists of a small metal cap (about the size of a .22 c a l i b r e shell) with an open end. I t con-tains a small amount of fulmonite of mercury and may be set o f f by a fuse which i s placed inside the open end and crimped i n place. Although changes i n the production of explosives made safecracking more problematic, other technical changes have been to the safecracker's advantage. Mosz important here was the development of e l e c t r i c a l detonators to set o f f the grease. These permitted the safecracker much greater control in the timing of his shots. The e l e c t r i c a l detonator i s a l -ready closed on both ends and has two short wires protruding from i t . Longer pieces of wire are attached, the ends of which are then touched to an e l e c t r i c a l source. They have not, however, always been e a s i l y available, subject to 216 contingencies such as wartime. NOW, IN THESE TWO YEARS\u2014WERE YOU USING ELECTRICAL KNOCKERS YET? No. We didn't s t a r t using e l e c t r i c a l knockers t i l l a f t e r the war, and these things didn't become available, l i k e before the war they were\u2014 people had been using them for years, but they were not available to us and so on. .Fuses--you could get l o t s of fuses. YOu could r a i d any c i t y works and get fuse--any b l a s t i n g crew, highways department. You can go and get a l l the fuse you want. You just go there at night and st e a l i t . (#29) The following quotation indicates the functional ad-vantages of the e l e c t r i c a l method, but also points out that the type used (whether e l e c t r i c of fuse-type) may be d i c -tated not only by preference, but also according to t h e i r immediate a v a i l a b i l i t y . NOW, YOU SAID THESE WEUE TWO KINDS OE WAYS TO GET THOSE DETONATORS TO GO OFF. ONE WAS ELECTRICAL AND THE OTHER Yeh. Yeh, there's a fuse. WHEN DO YOU USE WHICH? Well, i t ' s a matter of preference. I l i k e t h e \u2014 w e l l , I shouldn't s a y \u2014 I preferred the e l e c t r i c because they're a l o t quicker. I dont mean the actual action that takes place--they would--they're much more functional i n the handling of them. You could time your movements so much better, whereas with the fuse, I don't know, i f y o u \u2014 well, we used to put them i n and crimp them, and make them f a i r l y short, see? Because i t burns so much feet per minute, see\u2014depending on the type of f u s e - - i t may be a fast-burning fuse. We'd shorten the length, but i t takes three or four matches; i t takes rather an i n -tense flame to st a r t the fuse. You have to Although some general observations of a s t a t i s t i c a l sort have been made regarding the relationship of war and crime rates, a det a i l e d examination of the relationship does not e x i s t to my knowledge. 217 take the end of i t and--and cut i t back, you know\u2014like a f l o w e r \u2014 t o get at the central core of powder--that's just a black powder. I t takes a rather intense flame to l i g h t i t . And t h i s takes more time, setting, than the e l e c t r i c a l knockers. A n d \u2014 i t ' s r e a l l y much more functional. But sometimes, out of neces-s i t y , i t depends on what you can either buy or s t e a l . A h \u2014 w e l l , rock quarries were a f a -v o r i t e target. They always have a shack or a . concrete, moveable building, where they store the s t u f f in, and sometimes they wouldn't have one type, you see. So i t would depend on what you could get. We had plants of the s t u f f a l l over the country\u2014as a matter of fact, I s t i l l got a l o t . , I made him, I think, l i t e r a l l y gallons of the stuff, and he had the worst memory of anybody I ever met i n my l i f e . (LAUGHTER) He'd always forget wrere he put i t . (#2 6) Forgetting the location of planted grease i s only one of the problems associated with the handling of the basic equipment for safecracking. Safecrackers agree that the transportation of detonators i s consideaably more dangerous than the transportation of grease. Only one of my respondents indicated that there was need to take any p a r t i c u l a r care when transporting grease: SO\u2014IS IT DANGEROUS TO TRANSPORT (GREASE)? Uh\u2014no, no. I t ' s not r e a l l y dangerous. What we did with i t \u2014 i t ' s l i k e i f I had a b o t t l e , a medicine bo t t l e , and i f i t was h a l f f u l l of grease I'd f i l l the other h a l f f u l l of water; now, grease won't mix with water. Now the water goes to the bottom and i t cushions i t \u2014 i t keeps i t from sloshing around. This i s when i t i s dangerous\u2014when i t sloshes around. So, i f you had a bo t t l e , say with three oun-ces and you use one ounce, you put another ounce of water i n i t . (#29) 218 The only precaution mentioned by the other respon-dents were those associated with i t s i l l e g i t i m a c y . For example, no more grease should be taken along than i s needed for the job, and i t was understood, of course, that grease i s not kept on one's p r e m i s e s \u2014 i t i s planted instead, which may include l i t e r a l l y burying i t , or hiding i t i n a secret place, usually out of doors. The transportation of the knockers, p a r t i c u l a r l y the e l e c t r i c a l type, i s viewed as more problematic. Safecrackers do not l i k e carrying them and agree that they would never carry more than one per pocket. Another technique, although not followed by a l l , i s to twist the two wires of the deto-nator together before putting them into the pocket. They believe that t h i s prevents s t a t i c e l e c t r i c i t y from setting off the knocker. 3. Techniques of Safecracking Before we proceed to a discussion of s p e c i f i c tech-niques, some general information regarding safes w i l l be u s e f u l . In addition to permissible v a r i a t i o n s or n i c e t i e s i n 2the-^.tech-niques* of safecracking there are\" those s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s demanded by differences i n the make of the safe i t s e l f . Know-ledge of these differences constitutes part of the s k i l l of the safecracker and I gathered from my respondents that the differences between makes and between new and older models c o n s t i t u t e a good part of the informal discussion among 219 safecrackers. I t i s on t h i s basis that expertise and ex-perience may be assessed. A check of my notes indicates that some thirteen d i f f e r e n t makes of safe were mentioned by various safecrackers. DO YOU WANT TO DISCUSS AT ALL HOW YOU IN FACT GO ABOUT UNLOADING A CAN? Yeh, sure. F i r s t of a l l , i t depends on the p a r t i c u l a r make. And, at that time tne most prevalent make was the J . J . Taylor. And also tne most convenient to blow, because of the structure of i t . Tne many other types, Garry, Ford, Winnipeg, H a l l , Marvin Hall\u2014oh', many of them. .And 1bey a l l \u2014 here again, through both experience plus talking to, you know, other pete-men, you discovered the p e c u l i a r i t i e s of each one. NOW, THOSE NAMES AGAIN? Garry\u2014there's ' both a red and a black G a r r y \u2014 t h e r e are two d i f f e r e n t types. FORD. Ford, uh-huh. F l e t -cher, N o r r i s . WINNIPEG? Winnipeg, H a l l . Did you get J . J . Taylor? Harrinton and Marvin-H a l l . HARRINTON? Harrington-Marvin-Hall\u2014 that's one name. OKAY, THOSE WERE THE MAIN KINDS THEN? They just come to my mind\u2014I could probably\u2014there's l i t e r a l l y \u2014 t h e r e ' s many more of them. IS THAT RIGHT? Oh yeh, yeh. AND SO YOU HAD AN IDEA OF EACH ONE OF THESE\u2014THE INTERNAL WORKINGS OF EACH ONE? Uh-huh. TALKING ABOUT IT? Uh-huh. Right. And, p l u s \u2014 a s I said before\u2014some l i m i -ted experience here i n Vancouver, before I went East. (#2 7) The various makes are evaluated roughly i n terms of; the r e l a t i v e ease with which they can be opened. Some may also have meaning i n terms of the s p e c i f i c technique required to open them, but generally the technique used i s determined by other factors. The safecracker's ratings thus bear similarity to insurance company ratings ( a n d may i n fact be determined by them) , and i t was hot unusual for 's'afecrackers to refer 220-to a make and add, \"I t ' s got a high rating too\", r e f e r r i n g to insurance r a t i n g s . 1 Well, various doors are d i f f e r e n t . Now, the Garry--remember, I mentioned the red and black Garry now, some of them are that thick, and t h e \u2014 w e l l , safes are b u i l t for two reasons. One of them i s burglar protection and the other i s f i r e protection. And i n or-der to combine the two i n those days, i t was a very d i f f i c u l t thing. So they got the maxi-mum burglar protection that they could get, but the emphasis was on f i r e protection , you know, for records, money, other valuables; and that door contained a f i r e clay, and so were the walls. That's the reasons for the varied thicknesses, depending on the actual purpose of the safe. .And, today for instance, the Mosler i s the toughest. The Chubb and the Mosler. They are b u i l t s p e c i f i c a l l y for burglar protection, and f i r e protection secon-dary. (#27) Owing to technological change the safecracker must keep himself updated as to h i s knowledge of safes. Twenty years ago i t was said that the three v a r i e t i e s of H a l l safes were the easiest to open; today the H a l l safe i s referred to as one of the most d i f f i c u l t . Despite differences, safecrackers, l i k e burglars generally agree that there are basic s i m i l a r i t i e s i n a l l lock-ing devices: For an example of safe-ratings and insurance costs, see Appendix C, p. 455. 2 \"Safes, as known today, were introduced towards the end of the 18th Century, but these early safes only offered pro-t e c t i o n against f i r e . \" From Too Latei issued by Chubb & Sons Safe Co..Ltd., Le i c e s t e r : Sceptre Litho Ltd., p. 11. 22i: ARE SAFES ALL THAT SIMILAR SO THAT IF YOU LOOKED AT ONE DOOR...? No, they're not a l l that s i m i l a r . They vary i n the degree, yet the theory i s the same. I t doesn't matter whether i t ' s a bank vault, or--or a safe door, the theory i s just about the same i n a l l . They keep coming up with new gimmicks to t r y and get anead of us, and we come up with gaffs to beat t h e i r gimmicks'. (LAUGHS.) (#29) The nature of escalation i n the b a t t l e between c r i m i -nals and property owners w i l l be discussed l a t e r i n t h i s chapter. Also, before discussing the various techniques of f o r c i b l y opening a safe (namely, \"safecracking\"), another point must be made, having to do with the non-forcible, yet i l l e g a l opening of a safe. ToLs procedure i s based upon various observations and assumptions regarding routine o f f i c e behaviour. One of these assumptions i s that safes are d i f f i c u l t and clumsy to open even for those who know the lock combination\u2014this i s based on the observation that safes are frequently l e f t un-locked or only p a r t i a l l y locked. The safecracker who has arrived prepared to blow the safe w i l l nevertheless f i r s t t r y tne handle to see i f i t i s i n fact, locked. One experienced safecracker r e c a l l e d h i s embarrassment when h i s novice look-out man turned the handle and opened the safe door while he was preparing to blow i t open. 222 I t i s assumed that for purposes of convenience o f f i c e personnel develop short-cut ways of opening and locking safes. I t i s u n l i k e l y that the door w i l l be l e f t e n t i r e l y unlocked, but to leave i t \"on the h i t c h \" ( p a r t i a l l y locked) during the day i s one such method, and i f l e f t i n t h i s state overnight i t becomes a convenience to burglars as w e l l . To see whether or not the door i s \"on the h i t c h \" the d i a l must be moved gently, one degree to the right, then one de-gree to the l e f t and so on, t r y i n g the handle each time. This i s repeated to number four, a f t e r which i t i s considered not to be on the h i t c h . I t i s also assumed that safe combinations are easy to forget, and that t h i s information i s therefore to be found i n a \"permanent, yet handy p l a c e \u2014 i n a desk drawer, on the back of a book or under a drawer\" (#4). Whether or not a safecracker looks for t h i s code i s dependent on h i s casing results, on factors such as l i g h t i n g , as well as on safety factors including the need for speed. Looking for the safe-code i s seldom done, whereas t r y i n g the handle to see i f the safe i s \"on the h i t c h \" i s standard procedure. In the discussion below, the various procedures employed in s i x basic safecracking techniques w i l l be described. These six techniques are considered basic techniques by safecrackers and include the non-explosive technique also (of which there are several v a r i e t i e s ) . Each of the f i v e which are \"explosive\" 223 techniques also permit s l i g h t v a r i a t i o n s i n procedure, or perhaps better said, i n sty l e ; however, the basic procedures are well known and understood by safecrackers. (a) The Jam Shot: Of a l l explosive techniques, the jam shot i s probably the most common. I t i s f e a s i b l e on most safes, including both those with round 1 and square doors, and does not require the safe to be moved or l a i d on i t s back, as i n the \"Gut Shot\". The following l i s t of equipment and procedures has been assembled from my notes made during the interviews with safecrackers: Tools and Equipment for the Jam Shot: ( A l l tools, including the grease, must be as-sembled p r i o r to going out on the job) 1. Soap, preworked 2 and wrapped i n wax paper; 2. Two ounces of ni t r o g l y c e r i n e (grease) i n graded medicine bottles\u2014may be cushioned by adding water to the bottles, (may take as much as four ounces); 3..A prefolded s t r i p of cellophane; 4..Heavy wooden matches; 5. Detonator, or \"knocker\" (not l i k e l y to carry more than two); 6. Five inches of fuse \" s t r i n g \" (several pieces) already crimped into the detonator, but not yet \" s p l i t \" ; 7. A razor blade; Round door safes, however, require two \"shots\": one done p r i o r to the jam shot (known as \"shooting for space\", discussed on page 231. 2 This pre-workmg involves about f i f t e e n minutes of hand-kneading, done at home p r i o r to the caper. 224 8. A 'fountain-pen 1 f l a s h l i g h t ; 9. A pe n c i l , i f other than a jam shot i s anticipated; 10. An 18 inch crowbar; 11. Gloves; and 12. Old clothes ( p a r t i c u l a r l y pants and shoes) that can be discarded. Standard Taylor Safe Procedure for the Jam Shot; Step No. 1 : \u2014 A l l equipment should be l a i d out on top of the safe. I f the safe i s too t a l l to make t h i s convenient, some other nearby place must be found. Step No. 2:\u2014The piece of folded cellophane, o r i g i n a l size about 4\" x 8\" i s now folded into an 8\" x \\\" s t r i p . The length of the s t r i p depends on the width of the door. For t h i s reason the safecracker should know the type and size of the safe p r i o r to going on the job. Eight inches, however, i s long enough for most safes. 225 Step No. 3:\u2014The pre-worked soap i s fashioned into a cup with a funnel-type shape, around the cellophane. The soap must be of such consistancy that i t does not permit the grease to drain through. I t must also be t i g h t f i t t i n g so that no grease i s allowed to dribble down the front of the door. Step No. 4:\u2014When the cup i s finished the cellophane i s c a r e f u l l y pulled out. This provides a channel for the flow of the grease. Care must be taken not to j a r the soap cup. Step No. 5:\u2014The knocker i s placed i n the cup and the fuse i s hung about 3% inches over the edge of the cup. This provides about 5 seconds of time. Matches must be handy. A razor blade i s then used to s p l i t the end of the fuse; t h i s cannot be done before-hand, since the material i n the center of the fuse may j a r loose and may not l i g h t properly. Step No. 6:\u2014The n i t r o i s poured into the cup and the \"art\" of safecracking comes i n at t h i s point. The operator must assess the rate at which the safe i s \"drinking\" (this i s also referred to as \"how fast the grease i s \" ) : And t h i s i s where the actual art of safe-blowing comes i n \u2014 r i g h t now\u2014is when you load t h i s can, you know\u2014this cup. You 'watch to see, l i k e \u2014 j u s t how fast t h i s grease. is--what you c a l l drinking. (#32) 226 A l i t t l e l a t e r the same respondent s t a t e s : There has to be a continued chain, i n e f f e c t , r i g h t t o the detonator. I f you haven't got i t timed r i g h t the grease i s e i t h e r gone, and then a l l you get i s a noise l i k e a .38 going o f f , and nothing e l s e . Or, i f you shoot too quick, you may have a t h i r d of an ounce o u t s i d e i n t h i s cup, and only i n e f f e c t 2\/3 of an ounce i n s i d e \u2014 t h a t * s going to hang your safe up. Now, t h a t ' s where the a c t u a l a r t i s \u2014 i n t i m i n g i t . NOW\u2014I HAVE A QUESTION HERE: HOW DO YOU KNOW BEFOREHAND HOW THICK THE DOOR OF THE SAFE IS GOING TO BE\u2014DOES THAT AFFECT THE LENGTH OF FUSE? Very much! SO YOU HAVE TO KNOW BEFORE YOU GO IN WHAT KIND OF SAFE YOU ARE MEETING UP WITH. True. HOW DO YOU KNOW? L i k e \u2014 t h e s e safe com-p a n i e s \u2014 t h e y have d i s p l a y s i n a l l the windows, you know. And as a general r u l e the s a f e c r a c k e r goes around and takes a look at them, j u s t t o see i f they got any-t h i n g new out. And the Ta y l o r , l i k e \u2014 i t u s u a l l y has f o r i t s s i z e \u2014 l i k e , they have u s u a l l y three steps, three steps But l i k e I t o l d you, I i n d i c a t e d i t depends on a great degree on how f a s t the safe i s d r i n k i n g . That's what you w a t c h \u2014 l i k e I t o l d you, t h a t ' s the key p a r t i n s a f e c r a c k i n g , i n watching t h a t . I f i t ' s d r i n k i n g t e r r i b l e slow, f o r example, i t may be a t h i c k door; you see what I mean? (#32) For example, a safe roughly twice the s i z e of the above one would take two ounces, and so on: And then i t ' s l a r g e l y \u2014 w e l l , you have to compute, l i k e \u2014 a c t u a l l y , i t takes experience to compute e x a c t l y how much n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . to use. I f you use too much, you can make a bomb out of a safe. (#32) I n the f o l l o w i n g example the safec r a c k e r has j u s t r e -c a l l e d an e a r l y experience where too much grease was used. 227 The result was that the door blew o f f and most of the money was burned. ; SO WHAT DID YOU DO THE NEXT DAY? Oh gawd, you're goin' back a long way. YOU THEN PRO-CEED TO BLOW CANS AFTER THIS? Yes. Yeh. We started looking around YOU GOT BETTER AND BETTER? We got better and better as we\u2014we learn't as we went along. DID YOU KNOW RIGHT AWAY WHAT HAD GONE WRONG ON THE FIRST SAFE? Well, we went back to a couple of safe-blowers we knew and we talked t h i s over with them and they explained to us exactly what we had done wrong. SO NEXT TIME YOU USE LESS GREASE? So we use less grease and less grease as we went along u n t i l we found that we could blow a safe and just have the door open instead of havin' i t f l y i n ' right o f f i t s hinges and ac-ross the h a l l . WHEN YOU BLOW A SAFE WITH THAT DEGREE OF PRE-CISION, IF MONEY IS IN A BAG WITH SILVER, DOES IT STILL SHRED THE BILLS? Not i f you don't use too big a charge. (#29) On the other hand, i f you use too l i t t l e you merely \"bulge\" the safe (for example, d i s t o r t the shape of the door). Safecrackers generally agree that a bulged safe i s almost impossible to open by any method. In addition to probably having to attempt a second shot, t o o l s may have to be used to force i t open completely. YOU'VE GOT TO USE JUST THE RIGHT AMOUNT? Just the r i g h t \u2014 y o u know, a d i f f e r e n t sized safe takes a l i t t leL -and then i t depends on Regarding the amount of grease to use, #32 stated: \"There's a general rule, l i k e \u2014 s a y your s t a n d a r d \u2014 l i k e a Taylor safe, for example. One of the best safes .in Canada. Now, say that a Taylor safe i s approximately oh\u20144^ feet high by 3% feet wide. Now that, right there, on a jam shot, w i l l take approximately one ounce. That's usually what you gauge from\u2014from a standard Taylor safe, you know.\" (#32) 22 8 your grease too. There's a l o t of things that enter into this\u2014who made the grease, uh--how good you know i t i s . Because i f you s h o o t \u2014 i f you attempt to blow a safe and you don't use enough grease you are i n a l o t of trouble. Because once you spring i t you can't get grease back i n i t \u2014 i t ' l l just blow out the c r a c k s \u2014 i t won't j a r the door open. IT WON'T? No. HOW COME? Be-cause there's too much of a gap. Suppose you get t h i s door h a l f way open, now you got a quarter of an inch soap i n there and I imagine the expansion, which i t does when i t b l o w s \u2014 i t expands. Uh\u2014the frame around the door expands and I imagine that--what I found out, anyway, i s i f I blow one and I get i t out the rest of the way, I can't blow i t the rest of the w a y \u2014 i s \u2014 y o u gotta use t o o l s . (#29) Step No. 7:\u2014The fuse must be l i t at a precise time also, because the knocker must go o f f just as the l a s t b i t of grease leaves the cup. I f the knocker goes o f f too soon ihere w i l l be too much grease l e f t i n the cup, and the door may be forced _iri rather than out. I f the knocker goes o f f too l a t e a l l the grease w i l l have drained away, and the knocker w i l l go o f f without the grease going o f f . In both cases there w i l l have been noise, time and material w i l l have been wasted, and the door w i l l s t i l l be unopened. Fur-thermore, a second shot i s always more problematic, since the The fuse cannot e a s i l y be l i t with ordinary paper safety-matches; apparently they do not produce enough heat. Wooden matches are used and usually i t takes several to l i g h t a fuse: I t ' s not--everybody thinks you just l i g h t these fuses l i k e f i r e c r a c k e r s - - i t ' s not that simple. You have to have heavy kitchen matches. You know, because l o t s of times the outer covering w i l l l i g h t and that's where a l o t of mi s f i r e s come i n . (#32) 229 amount of unexploded grease l e f t i n the can i s not known. The unexploded grease w i l l go o f f on the second shot; how-ever, often i t s d i r e c t i o n of force i s not towards opening the door. Instead i t goes inward and tends to \"burn the money\". . The noise of a well-time n i t r o explosion i s muffled because i t occurs inside the can; shooting too soon would cause\" much of the n i t r o to explode outside of the can, conse-quently causing a very loud noise. Step No. 8:--It i s important to move about twenty feet away while waiting for the detonation. In actual practice, such precautions may not be f e a s i b l e . In such cases the safecracker simply crouches behind some fur n i t u r e . Step No. 9 : \u2014 A f t e r the explosion the door i s pulled open\u2014often i t i s already swinging open.'*' A number of con-tingencies ar i s e when looking for the money\u2014it may be burnt, 2 or there may be a Keister . The c r i t e r i o n of a perfect jam-shot i s that a f t e r the detonation the door must swing open on i t s hingesi \"The hinges remain i n t a c t . A good safe-blowing i s with the safe doors swinging properly.\" (#32) The swinging door i s i n contrast to one that i s simply \"bulged\", or one that i s l i -t e r a l l y blown o f f i t s hinges. The former case makes the safe almost impossible to open. The l a t t e r nay shatter windows and draw attention to the scene. In addition, i t indicates that too much grease was used, increasing the l i k e l i h o o d of burnt .money. The swinging door d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the expert from the novice. 2 \"Keister\" i s the term used by safecrackers to refer to a small (usually round-doored) \"safe within a safe\". These small safes, designed for burglar protection, are frequently placed inside cheaper safes b a s i c a l l y designed for fire prctectkn. 230 S t e p No. 1 0 : \u2014 T h e t o o l s a r e l e f t b e h i n d a n d e x i t i s made f r o m t h e b u i l d i n g . S h o e s a nd p a n t s a r e removed and dumped i n t o a g a r b a g e b a r r e l . The c l o t h i n g i s d i s c a r d e d b e c a u s e b r i c k d u s t x f r o m t h e s a f e - e x p l o s i o n s c o n s t i t u t e s e v i d e n c e f o r t h e p r o s e c u t i o n . A common v a r i a t i o n o f t h e jam s h o t , p r e f e r r e d b y some s a f e c r a c k e r s , i s t h e one d e s c r i b e d b e l o w . I n a d d i t i o n i t i n d i c a t e s t h e p r o c e d u r e when u s i n g e l e c t r i c a l k n o c k e r s r a -t h e r t h a n t h e common f u s e : COULD WE GO THROUGH THE DETAILS OF HOW YOU I N FACT UNLOAD A CAN? I u s e d e i t h e r a p l a s t i c i n e s u b s t a n c e o r N a p t h a S o a p . Y o u k n e a d i t up u n t i l i t * s a r e s i l i e n t p i e c e , l i k e p u t t y , a n d s t a r t i n g a b o u t e i g h t i n c h e s f r o m t h i s c o r n e r y o u b u i l d a c u p , l i k e a s p o o n . I a l w a y s u s e d t o i n s e r t a l i t t l e p i e c e o f c a r d b o a r d i n t h e c r a c k o f t h e d o o r h e r e , and t h e n a d h e r e t h e c u p t o t h e d o o r . A n d t h e r e a s o n I p u t t h e l i t t l e p i e c e o f c a r d b o a r d i n i s s o i t w o u l d n ' t \u2014 s o i t w o u l d n ' t s e a l o f f t h e c r a c k i n t h e d o o r , a n d t h e n I w o u l d p u l l t h e p a p e r o u t and t a k e more p u t t y a n d s e a l up a l l t h i s down t o h e r e , p a s t t h a t o t h e r p o i n t a b o u t e i g h t i n c h e s f r o m t h e c o r n e r . T h e r e I w o u l d b u i l d a n o t h e r c u p \u2014 s a m e p r o c e -d u r e a s t h e t o p . Now, a J . J . T a y l o r i s a b o u t t h e h e i g h t o f t h i s d e s k . T h e y w e r e g e n e r a l l y f a i r l y s q u a r e , a T a y l o r , t h a t i s . A n d I w o u l d \u2014 I u s e d t o p u t my g r e a s e i n one o f t h o s e b o t t l e s - - y o u c o u l d b u y them a t t h e d r u g s t o r e . T h e y c o n t a i n one o u n c e o f l i q u i d . A n d w i t h t h i s t y p e o f c a n I w o u l d u s e s l i g h t l y \u2014 o h , s l i g h t l y more t h a n h a l f a n o u n c e \u2014 I w o u l d p o u r i t i n h e r e , i n t o t h i s c u p . Y o u c a n s e e t h e a c t i o n t h a t w o u l d F o l l o w i n g t h e e x p l o s i o n t h e a i r i s h e a v y w i t h \\a v e r y f i n e d u s t , r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e b r e a k - u p o f t h e f i r e - b r i c k s w h i c h l i n e a s a f e ( f o r f i r e p r o t e c t i o n ) . 231 take place. The bottom part of the cup i s right at the very base of the crack i n the door. Consequently i t would funnel i t into the crack. I t would run down here. Now, the moment i t showed up i n the cup down be-low I would have\u2014uh\u2014now, depending, now there are two types: the e l e c t r i c and the f u s e \u2014 i f I'm using an e l e c t r i c detonator, I would have everything ready. Detonator generally laying right on top of the safe. I t has long wires to i t , connected to a f l a s h l i g h t battery; and put the detonator i n that. Put i t i n the cup and then f o l d the cup around the detonators\u2014that's right i n the crack there, and take the battery, touch the two ends there, and when you touch i t , boomI I t doesn't run out that way at a l l . NOW THAT'S A TAYLOR SAFE. DOES THAT PRO-CEDURE CHANGE FROM ONE SAFE TO ANOTHER? Uh, fundamentally, no. SO THE USUAL PROCEDURE IS TO POUR IT IN THE TOP AND IT COMES OUT THE BOTTOM? Yeh. .Now, the reason we do that, now some people would do i t i n the top, but what has happened on occasion\u2014you put the detonator i n the t o p \u2014 i t ' s possible for a gap, a break i n the grease to form, a break to form\u2014there'd be grease here and here, and the detonator w i l l go off without the n i t r o -glycerine going o f f . Whereas here, i t ' s im-possible for i t to happen, because the grease i s running to the detonator, and the wast that can happen i s that, i f there's grease here and here, maybe i t ' s a l l run away from there, but what would happen then i s that i t would p e e l \u2014 i t wouldn't be as perfect an opening, but i t w i l l open. AND IT WOULD OPEN ON THIS SIDE? THIS WOULD TEND TO PEEL BACK LIKE THAT FROM THE CORNER? The majority of times i t opens on the hinges. Sometimes you can, that i s , i f your experience According to my respondents, n i t r o g l y c e r i n e has c e r t a i n properties which make i t easy to see under these conditions. I was t o l d that i t w i l l \"gleam l i k e q u i c k s i l v e r \" under the ray of a pen-light. 2 3 2 i s good enough you can time the flow of the grease so you can set your fuse o f f before--before you see any grease coming down, so that just as the detonator goes o f f the grease has flowed down to i t . AT THE SAME TIME, ONCE YOU'VE LIT THAT FUSE YOU CAN'T STOP IT, CAN YOU? No, n o \u2014 well,yes, you can--you could r i p i t out and throw i t i n the corner. (#27) (b) Shooting for Space: The \"shooting for space\" tech-nique i s used on smaller, usually round-door safes which are often located inside larger safes, and on those doors which have small pressure bars which do not permit a jam shot. I t i s also used on the small c y l i n d r i c a l safes which are en-cased i n cement and found i n the f l o o r s of service stations and near the front of supermarkets. Where the door i s h o r i -zontal, as i n f l o o r safes, the safecracker may simply pour a small pool of grease on i t , near the center. This i s then detonated. That i s , on ho r i z o n t a l doors, i t i s not necessary to b u i l d a soap cup. For this reason a standard size o f f i c e safe with a round door may, i f possible, be tipped over on i t s back and worked on i n t h i s way. On v e r t i c a l round doors the soap cup i s b u i l t up right on the face of the door, i n the center, anddetonated as i n jam shot. The use of the e l e c t r i c a l knockers, plus the use of two soap cups rather than one, removes some of the need for \"the art of safecracking\" referred to i n the e a r l i e r method. I t was my impression also, p a r t i c u l a r l y from older respondents, that e l e c t r i c a l knockers have removed some of the \" c r a f t - l i k e \" q u a l i t i e s from the trade. At the same time, t h i s improvement i n safe-blowing techniques has not compensated for the techno-l o g i c a l improvements i n safe construction. 23 3 You're going to dish that door, no matter how well i t i s constructed, and i t ' s going to get a .severe enough j a r from t h i s shot to give you enough space to shoot. (#30) That i s , the \"space shot\" i s to dent or \"dish\" the door enough to permit a standard jam shot. Safecrackers generally agree ttetround doors o r d i n a r i l y f i t too snugly to permit an immediate jam shot. The disadvantage of having to shoot for space i s that of having to shoot twice. (The implications of t h i s are discussed later.) The use of the tube-type safe (often referred to as \"cannon-ball\") has been f r u s t r a t i n g for safecrackers accus-tomed to more conventional types. An older respondent stated: They're s t a r t i n g to use these tubes, i n the f l o o r , you know, i n the concrete. And, well, I was f a m i l i a r with these old brands. These can be blown, but i n the course of i t , I know, and I, I don't know--we blew up, I don't know how many\u2014how much money. Just shredded b i l l s , you know....through a rather h i t or miss, but well, I r e a l l y don't know too, I r e a l l y don't want to t a l k too much about these. In my day i t was d i f f e r e n t and I r e a l l y don't know too much about.... (#27) Martin, i n h i s book, states: Now, there's one or two makes of safes that i t don't pay the average guy to look at twice. A Diebold. And another one that i s on the same order--a cylinder safe, constructed so that you can't punch i t , can't s t r i p i t . The only way you can get into i t i s to blow i t , and to blow i t you're gonna have to take f i v e or six shots. I t ' s not p r a c t i c a l to f o o l with. 1 Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 85. 2 34 Another respondent who has done some safecracking stated: Cannon-balls, i n concrete, near the front windows\u2014you can't touch them, but I've seen 'em done, on a foggy n i g h t \u2014 w a i t for a good rainy night I t makes an awful l o t of noise and you might have to blow two or three times. (#15) (c) The Gut Shot: The gut shot i s sometimes referred to as \"Spindle Shot\". Tools and equipment for the gut shot include a sledge hammer, soap, a penc i l , two ounces of nitro g l y c e r i n e , an eye-dropper (may be part of the medicine b o t t l e which contains the grease), cotton-batten or a s t r i p of c loth, an 18 inch crowbar, knockers, fuse, a razor-blade, gloves, and old clothes that can be discarded. Procedure:\u2014The use of the gut shot i s limited be-cause i t requires that the safe be tipped over on i t s back. Once tipped, the equipment i s placed on top of i t , leaving room to knock o f f the d i a l : SO, THAT WAS THE GENERAL PROCEDURE THEN? Uh-huh. WELL, THAT'S ON WHAT YOU CALL A JAM SHOT? Now\u2014this here's your d i a l . Now you knock t h i s o f f . That's just one blow with the hammer, and you t i p the whole safe over on i t s back. Then you take an eye-dropper, and the n i t r o w i l l f o l -low the path down. S e e \u2014 i t ' s lying on i t s back, ac t u a l l y . NOW WHAT KIND OF A SHOT IS THIS CALLED? Gut shot. And the gravity w i l l p u l l the n i t r o and t h i s i s c a l l e d the gut box, for very obvious reasons. 'Cause t h e \u2014 i t contains the actual mechanism\u2014the tumblers. 235 Well, anyway--the grav i t y takes the grease down the spindle and i t can't go any further, and you just pour i t with the dropper. Well, the most that you would use i s a dropper and a h a l f . That's a l l . And then you just lay your detonator right across i t \u2014 o h , probably you b u i l d a l i t t l e bridge, you know. Just sort of to form a cup, and you just put the cap i n there, and boom* You l e t i t go--with an e l e c t r i c detonator, you see. AND WHAT DOES THAT DO TO THE MECHANISM ITSELF, INSIDE? W e l l \u2014 i t just destroys i t a l l . You see, the locking mechanism\u2014you know, the way i t works i s a series o f \u2014 w e l l , l e t me draw i t . You see, a series of tumblers and a locking bar comes over here d i r e c t l y , you see. There*d be three here and they go into holes i n these cams. See? WELL, HOW LONG WOULD IT TAKE YOU TO DO A TAYLOR, FROM THE TIME YOU START TILL IT'S OVER? Oh, about 4-5 minuts. DID YOU DO IT ALL BY YOURSELF, OR DID YOU HAVE SOMEONE WITH YOU? Oh g e n e r a l l y \u2014 g e n e r a l l y I had someone with me, but by my nature I generally done the work. . (#27) The single advantage of the gut shot as over against the jam shot i s that i t can be used where the door of the safe i s very snug, or has \" l i p s \" which do not permit the jam shot. . (Square-type doors are not e a s i l y \"dished\"). I t also has several disadvantages. F i r s t , the safe must be i n a po s i t i o n whaB i t can be tipped over, and secondly, knocking o f f the d i a l involves several sharp blows with a heavy hammer\u2014the noise of t h i s operation would not be ad-viseable i n most si t u a t i o n s . This shot i s also susceptible to m i s - f i r i n g ; as i n the jam shot, the safe may \"drink\" too quickly or too slowly. 236 (d) \"Harnessed\" Safes: The jam shot i n i t s e l f must be regarded as being designed for the least t e c h n i c a l l y so-p h i s t i c a t e d safes; i t implies that there i s s u f f i c i e n t space between the door and the door jamb (frame) for the grease to enter- The effectiveness of the jamshot prompted several mechanical improvements i n the manufacture of t h i s type of safe. One of these improvements provides a small trough or \" l i p \" on the steps of a safe door, to catch the grease near the outside edge of the door rather than have i t run i n farther. A more important and mechanically more complex change has been the introduction of pressure bars. Pressure bars consist of heavy chrome rods which are to be seen on the outside of the safe door. These bars are moved into t h e i r own sockets a f t e r the door has been closed and provide a wedge e f f e c t which pushes the safe door into i t s frame very t i g h t l y . Safecrackers refer to safes with pressure bars as \"harnessed\" safes: Now what that does i s drive i n two heavy chrome bars\u2014we c a l l i t 'harnessed'. That's the nickname we use. But i t ' s a c t u a l l y pres-sure bars. A l r i g h t , now we spin t h i s wheel, or sometimes i t ' s a big lever, to p u l l a t \u2014 that i n e f f e c t drives that door of the vault so t i g h t l y that a sheet of.' newspaper--and you can't lock i t . (#32) The net e f f e c t of the pressure bars i s to make the introduction of n i t r o g l y c e r i n e v i a the jam shot impossible. The pressure bars must be removed or loosened f i r s t , before the jam shot can be used. ThE i s done v i a an i n i t i a l shot 2 37 of grease, designed t o l e s s e n the e f f e c t o f the p r e s s u r e b a r s and make the jam shot p o s s i b l e . The procedure f o r t h i s i n i t i a l shot i s t o b u i l d a soap cup at the v i t a l spot of the harness . The l o c a t i o n of t h i s spot v a r i e s w i t h the s p e c i f i c mechanical design, but i t would be somewhere near the wheel or l e v e r which f o r c e s and h o l d s the b a r s i n p l a c e . The soap cup i s then f i l l e d w i t h grease and detonated i n the u s u a l manner. I f the shot i s s u c c e s s f u l i t w i l l be p o s s i b l e t o proceed w i t h the u s u a l jam shot. S a f e c r a c k e r s do not t h i n k o f mechanical improvements per se as c o n s t i t u t i n g a s e r i o u s t h r e a t t o what they can do w i t h n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . A c t u a l l y , you c o u l d beat any s t y l e o f v a u l t w i t h n i t r o g l y c e r i n e \u2014 I don't care about t h a t . However, the time element and t h e n o i s e element are the ones t h a t beat you. (#32) Safe manufacturers and s a f e c r a c k e r s both g e n e r a l l y agree t h a t any safe can be blown wi t h n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . The whole p o i n t of t e c h n i c a l improvements i s t o make the t a s k more time-consjming and more d i f f i c u l t , - r a t h e r than i m p o s s i b l e i n a mechanical sense. To t h e s a f e c r a c k e r the problem of p r e s -sure b a r s i s one of n o i s e . As was a l r e a d y s t a t e d , a sa f e w i t h p r e s s u r e bars r e q u i r e s a minimum of two shots o f grease. The f i r s t shot i s to loos e n the p r e s s u r e bars; the second i s t o open the door i t s e l f . T e c h n i c a l l y , the procedure i s v e r y s i m i l a r t o t h a t r e q u i r e d when \"shooting f o r space\". I t 238 i s the second shot which i s problematic, and that because of noise: Like, i t ' s amazing\u2014like, i t ' s a general understanding you can shoot one shot any place. Like, say you shoot one on G r a n v i l l e Street. The policemen might be on-the beat and hear that, but i t ' s a r e a l hard sound to locate. I t ' s almost impossible to t e l l , evenwhich side of the street i t ' s on. He knows there's a safe being blown somewhere, but where? You know what I mean? YEH. I t ' s when you st a r t having to shoot two or three t i m e s \u2014 t h i s happens, you know. But then you're i n trouble. (#32) Due to t h i s noise factor, the structure of a safe must be considered i n i t s geographical context, when assessing the safe's burglary p o t e n t i a l . A harnessed safe i n a quiet neigh-borhood i s safer (for the owner) than a harnessed safe next to a busy, noisy street. The noise factor plays a s i g n i f i -cant part i n the safecracker's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of geography, as we w i l l indicate i n a subsequent chapter on \"casing\". (e) Blowing a Vault: Although blowing a vault i s a con-siderably d i f f e r e n t operation from that of safe blowing, i t i s considered to be within the \"legitimate\" domain of the safecrackers. A vault may be defined, for our purposes, as a walk-in safe, such as are typically to be seen i n banks. Blowing vaults i s not a common experience f o r the safecracker, and i s becoming increasingly less so. Examples of t h i s ac-t i v i t y indicate that the practice was more common twenty years ago than i t i s today. . The reason for the decline appears to be the increasing technological s o p h i s t i c a t i o n of the vaults themselves. 239 As with safecracking, blowing a vault i s possible only a f t e r making an i n i t i a l l y successful \" i n \" , into the bu i l d i n g . This \" i n \" may either be very d i f f i c u l t , or f a c i l i -tated by the fact that the vault usually forms part of the c e i l i n g . Safecrackers agree that the weakest part of a vault i s i t s c e i l i n g ; i t i s also the part least l i k e l y to be protected by alarm systems. -Vault blowing i s greatly f a c i l i a t e d where access to the top of the vault can be made through the roof of the bu i l d i n g . The burglar can then work within the a t t i c sec-t i o n of the building, where he has a good deal of pr i v a c y . X Tools and Equipment fo r Blowing a Vault: 1. A star d r i l l or a portable e l e c t r i c jack-hammer (with the l a t t e r , also a blanket to muffle the sound); 2. A heavy hammer; 3. One of two explosives, g e l i g n i t e or f o r c i t e ; 4. E l e c t r i c a l knockers; 5. A knife for cutting up the sti c k s of explo-sives i n order to f i t them into t h e . d r i l l e d holes; 6. An 18\" crowbar; 7. Gloves; and 8. Old clothes that can be discarded. \"TMy respondents agreed that most vaults cannot be en-tered by way of the door, though i t has been done both v i a explosives and cutting torches. 240 Procedure: AND, LET'S SEE\u2014HOW WERE YOU GOING TO GET IT THROUGH THE TOP OF THE VAULT? Through the vault? I was going to d r i l l through and use dynamite--small shots of dynamite. OKAY. LET'S GET THE DETAILS OF THAT. WHAT KIND OF A DRILL WOULD YOU USE? Well, a star d r i l l \u2014 a basic star d r i l l . Or you can use a Black and Decker\u2014a small e l e c t r i c jack hammer\u2014 l i k e you use a small blanket. You work through a folded up b l a n k e t \u2014 t h a t muffles i t , you know. OH, SO YOU DON'T USE A DRILL, ACTUALLY? Not a d r i l l , n o \u2014 a star d r i l l . A star, l i k e \u2014 t h a t goes through with a quarter turn at a time. UH-HUH, YEH, I KNOW WHAT YOU MEAN. WHAT IS IT MADE OF, CONCRETE? Concrete, with reinfo r c i n g rods, l i k e there i s a kind of a mesh\u2014I think i n (PAUSE) ,\u20141934 they started building t h i s s t y l e with a mesh\u2014steel mesh with holes i n i t . AND YOU USE A BLACK AND DECKER PORTABLE? Jack-hammer, u h - h u h \u2014 e l e c t r i c . AND YOU'VE GOT TO MAKE A BIG ENOUGH HOLE FOR YOU TO GET THROUGH? Yeh\u2014but you d r i l l a series of small holes and then shoot\u2014you use small shots of g e l i g n i t e or f o r c i t e . (#32) The holes d r i l l e d form a c i r c l e about eighteen inches i n d i a -meter. The holes themselves are d r i l l e d at an angle so that the c i r c l e of concrete w i l l be forced down by the explosion. Once he has gained entry to the vault, the safecracker faces add i t i o n a l problems. He i s prepared to take valuables (for example, s e c u r i t i e s or even jewelery) i n addition to cash, but these may be kept i n safety boxes. x I was t o l d that a safecracker may come equipped to do a safecracking within the vault once having entered i t , but t h i s would be unusual, because such a procedure would require the dangerous second explosion. He does, however, come pre-pared with a heavy st e e l bar so that he can attempt to pry open the boxes. 24 1 Also, whatever cash the vault contains w i l l probably be locked i n smaller containers within the v a u l t . He may or may not know beforehand how secure these containers w i l l be; however, he does assume that most of these can be pried open with a s t e e l bar. His problem of gaining possession of the cash, once inside the vault, i s not unlike that faced by the safecracker a f t e r he has opened the door of a safe. He does not expect to see bundles of cash openly before him; instead, he may be faced with stacks of paper, ledgers and envelopes, usually placed i n compartments of varying sizess WHEN YOU'VE OPENED THE SAFE, DO YOU TAKE EVERYTHING OUT, OR DO YOU ONLY TAKE SOME OF THE ITEMS IN THE SAFE? Well, i f i t ' s a ques-t i o n of money-\u2014well, there's only generally several compartments. I always go for the small compartment f i r s t , because generally the money i s there. Sometimes they\"re lockedo Generally the money i s i n them, and I always take the ledger books out and so forth and fan them, because quite often people hide b i l l s of high denomination i n them. I got $1000 that way one night. Ten, hundred-dollar b i l l s i n an envelope, stuck inside a ledger<, DO YOU TAKE EVERYTHING, OR DO YOU LEAVE A LOT OF STUFF IN THE SAFE? No, we take, everything out. Generally. AND WHERE DO YOU SORT IT? Oh, right t h e r e \u2014 r i g h t there. (#27) In those cases where the safecracker feels secure and does not suspect a \"rumble\"'*', he w i l l sort the material on the spot. When speed i s important, however, he must select \"Rumble\" refers to p o l i c e intervention. To have a \"rank\" i s to know that something has happened during the caper which i s very l i k e l y to bring about p o l i c e intervention. 242 i n addition to the cash i t s e l f , those items which appear to have cash p o t e n t i a l . This requires some knowledge of busi-ness accounting procedures\u2014a knowledge gained v i a repeated experiences with the exploration of safe contents. (f) Non-explosive Techniques: The safecracker i s not limit e d to the use of explosives. Depending on noise factors, make of safe and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of equipment, he may or may not use explosives. Non-explosive methods take on three major forms: \"unbuttoning\" (or \"st r i p p i n g \" ) , \"punching a can\", and d r i l l i n g a safe. The technique of \"unbuttoning\" or \"st r i p p i n g\" a safe can only be used on cheaply constructed safes. I t consists of d r i v i n g a series of wedge-shaped c h i s e l s of ever increasing size into a spot between the door and the door jamb, or be-tween the safe wall and the s t r i p of angle iron riveted over each corner of the safe. When a hole has been created, large enough for the entry of a heavy s t e e l bar, the safecracker proceeds to pry loose the door covering, or i n the case of the corner angle iron, he pops the r i v e t s one by one. I f he i s working on the door he w i l l continue t h i s procedure u n t i l he can reach i n and manipulate the mechanism. I f he i s working on the corner of the safe, he w i l l remove a complete side panel u n t i l he can work at the weaker inside wall with an axe or other heavy, pointed object. 24 3 This procedure i s s i m i l a r to a v a r i e t y of t e c h n i c a l l y uncomplicated methods used on cheaply constructed safes. A safe may be upended and the bottom cut out with an ordinary axe. Acetyline cutting torches have also been used, but constitute d i f f i c u l t transportation problems. They are used with some frequency i n cases where the entire safe i s stolen by the bu^.ar, i n which case he has time to work on i t elsewhere at some l e i s u r e and with safety. Unbuttoning or stripping are no longer considered viable forms of safecracking^\". Safecrackers agree that poor qu a l i t y safes are s t i l l i n considerable use; however, they are not used for purposes of keeping what the safecracker would consider to be worthwhile amounts of money. A second non-explosive method i s \"punching a can\" . Next to the jam shot and the gut shot, t h i s i s probably the most popular method of safe-opening. I t s use i s confined to r e l a t i v e l y unsophisticated safes, but i t i s a f e a s i b l e method on most safes which are amenable to eithe r the jam or the gut shot. The tools and equipment required for punching a can are: a heavy hammer and a long, high-quality s t e e l punch with a narrow t i p . \"*\"Safe manufacturers caution against the use of older type safes that can be \"peeled\": \"In 1835 Charles Chubb patented the f i r s t burglar r e s i s t i n g safe and from t h i s time u n t i l the 1890's safes consisted of a rectangular box made from s t e e l plates riveted to an angle-iron frame....Unfortunately, to break into the majority of these safes i t i s simply a matter of finding the f i r s t r i v e t s and peeling o f f the back and sides\". From Too Late1,Chubb & Sons Lock and Safe Co. Ltd., p. 11. 244 Regarding the procedure used when punching a can, the safe should be tipped over on i t s back i f possible, before the work begins. X The d i a l i s knocked o f f with a few hard blows of the hammer and the safecracker then proceeds to knock the spindle down with punch and hammer. This i s not easy, but safecrackers i n s i s t that i t can be done even on good-quality safes. The spindle i s knocked down (or in) u n t i l one can hear the tumblers (which rotate on t h i s spindle) f a l l . At t h i s point the handle w i l l be t r i e d \u2014 i f the spindle has been punched i n fa r enough, the door can be opened simply by turn-ing the handle. This procedure o f f e r s several advantages, the most im-portant being the ease with which the equipment necessary for the job can be obtained. The equipment can either be bought for very l i t t l e money, or e a s i l y stolen. Several accounts were related i n d i c a t i n g that a natural \" f i r s t \" crime for newly released prisoners i s to \"punch a can\" i n a garage. By using the tools which are already i n the garage, no i n i t i a l cash outlay i s required, and the danger of stealing the equip-ment i s also avoided. Secondly, safecrackers t r e a t the noise of t h i s operation with r e l a t i v e disregard. I was t o l d that the noise of the hammer does not carry much beyond the b u i l d -ing, and i f i t does people are not e a s i l y aroused by the sound XThese steps are i d e n t i c a l to those used i n the gut shot, except i n the case of punching a can the safe does not neces-s a r i l y have to be tipped over, although i t i s advisable. 245 or rai.se of a hammer at night. Whether or not these assump-tions are correct i s beyond the scope of t h i s p a p e r \u2014 s a f e -crackers, however, operate on the assumption that'everyday* c i t i z e n s think of the sound of a hammer as a legitimate noise, i n contrast to that of an explosion. A t h i r d non-explosive method i s that of d r i l l i n g a safe. The invention of a small portable and highspeed e l e c t r i c d r i l l plus the widespread a v a i l a b i l i t y of e l e c t r i c i t y has opened up new p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the p o t e n t i a l safecracker. I f these had been read i l y available twenty years ago i t i s reasonable to suppose that the opening of many safes then i n use could have been f a c i l i t a t e d . The following tools and equipment are necessary for d r i l l i n g a safe: a high speed e l e c t r i c d r i l l (the size was not s p e c i f i e d ) , high q u a l i t y d r i l l b i t s of varying sizes up to , a small quantity of o i l with which to lub r i c a t e the d r i l l b i t , a paper template, a penlight, and extension cords. D r i l l i n g a safe has the advantage of being a less noisy operation than blowing i t would be; however, i t i s more time consuming, since the operation w i l l require a minimum of one hour of work, and i s p h y s i c a l l y very hard work: It ' s a l o t of hard work, d r i l l i n g . I t ' s a steady hour of pushing and pushing and you never know whether y o u ' l l make i t or not. (#15) 246 Various devices may be improvised to a s s i s t i n the ap p l i c a t i o n of pressure upon the d r i l l b i t . Chains, jacks and wooden frames with levers have been designed to apply greater pressure. The noise of the d r i l l i n g i t s e l f may be muffled by the use of a blanket, but t h i s has the disadvan-tage of heating up the d r i l l and making the operation even more awkward. The d r i l l i n g burglars generally need to make frequent stops: \"We stop to l i s t e n , see i f anything's going on, and to cool the d r i l l . \" (#15) Some of the cheaply constructed safes are opened v i a d r i l l i n g , but they are generally not considered worthwhile for, as i n the case of those which can be \"unbuttoned\", \"big\" money i s usually not kept i n them. In the case of these safes a hole i s d r i l l e d near the d i a l and the tumblers are manipu-lated v i a wire or finger. The more expensive or better b u i l t safes are more com-plex. Safecrackers agree that the q u a l i t y of the s t e e l used i n modern safe construction renders them impervious to d r i l l -ing, except i n what i s known as the \"soft spot\". They assert that a l l \"better\" safes have a \"soft spot\", or \"weak spot\". This spot consists of a hole i n the metal of the safe door; the location of t h i s spot cannot be v i s u a l l y ascertained. (Only one burglar, who was not known as a safecracker, claimed that the spot could be lcc ated by burning o f f the paint with a blow torch;; however, t h i s was not mentioned by safecrackers as being a p o s s i b l i t y . ) The reason for the soft spot i s to 247 enable safe-repair men to open the safe without damaging i t , should the mechanism f a i l to respond to normal opening pro-cedures. The secret of d r i l l i n g a safe, therefore, i s to d r i l l at the right spot. This cannot be done v i a t r i a l and error. I t was assumed by my respondents that the right spot can be located with the aid of \"inside\" information only. That i s , the burglar would need to be given t h i s information by some-one l e g i t i m a t e l y involved i n safe manufacturing or reparing. The location of the \"weak spot\" i s marked on a paper template, and t h i s template i s held up against the door ac-cording to the instructions given. Once t h i s soft spot i s located, the safecracker begins d r i l l i n g . Procedural d e t a i l s at t h i s point are somewhat scanty; i t should be' noted that none of .my respondents claimed ever to have opened a good safe v i a d r i l l i n g . A l l of them had heard of the procedure, and according to newspaper reports the practice i s current, though infrequent. Some suggested that the soft spot consists of a shaft made of soft metal, which supports part of the locking mechanism. By d r i l l i n g through i t , the shaft f a l l s and releases the mechanism. Others imply that one manipulates the mechanism v i a a wire through the d r i l l e d hole. I t was obvious that my respondents did not have first-hand information on the subject. 248 The safe blowers interviewed, however, expressed a good deal of admiration for those who had pulled of success-f u l \" d r i l l jobs\". Such persons were not recognized as part of the safecracking \" f r a t e r n i t y \" . A \" d r i l l job\" done suc-c e s s f u l l y and reported i n the newspaper at the time of i n t e r -viewing e l i c i t e d a good deal of comment. .One respondent stated that he f e l t honored at having been questioned by the p o l i c e about i t . \"I couldnt' have done that i f I'd t r i e d \" , he said. \"That was a b e a u t i f u l j o b i \" 4. The Xnterpretation of Technique: The various techniques by which safes may be opened have implications i n addition to the simply mechanical aspects. They play a part i n the d i v i s i o n of labor and status a l l o c a -t i o n , as well as i n l e g a l i d e n t i f i c a t i o n . Each of the techniques described above can be performed by one person; i t i s more common, however, for two persons to p a r t i c i p a t e . Safecrackers refer to other safecrackers i n terms of two-person groups or \"partners\". This r e l a t i o n -ship i s a f a i r l y permanent l i a i s o n between two people, and the partnership i s recognized by other safecrackers. Each partner comes to assume ce r t a i n r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s pertaining to safecracking. I f a t h i r d man i s needed, i t i s not l i k e l y that he w i l l be recruited from among other safecrackers, but 24 9 rather from among the general rounder population. He w i l l be used for purposes of \"lookout\" (called a \"point-man\"), rather than for the actual safecracking. The number of persons p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a safecracking i s an in d i c a t i o n of the perceived d i f f i c u l t y of the job. A safecracker working alone w i l l probably not be carrying a gun. He i s not expecting trouble; i f he were, he would not work alone and he would probably pack a gun. AND YOU WEAR GLOVES, I SUPPOSE? Oh yes, yes. DO YOU CARRY A GUN WHEN YOU ARE OUT ON THIS TYPE OF WORK? I have, yes, I have. ONLY WHEN YOU ARE BY YOURSELF, OR ALSO...? No, not when by myself, although I have blown cans by myself. No, I don't think I have when I've been by myself. But usually when I have there's been two or three of us. But then i t ' s because of the type of premises. DOES THAT MEAN THAT WHEN THERE ARE SEVERAL OF YOU THEN IT MEANS IT\u00abS A PRETTY DIFFICULT SITUATION? Yeh, yeh. And I know when I went back East I joined up with a mob t h a t \u2014 w e l l , that's the wrong word to use\u2014two or three people that were pretty high f l y i n g , and they took the Bank i n Ontario, where grease was used\u2014glycerine was used, you see. And I think we had about three guns with us that night, plus a base-ball bat, or soffeball bat. (#27) Safecrackers may sp e c i a l i z e i n c e r t a i n techniques of safecracking and each partner i n a group of two may f e e l par-t i c u l a r l y competent i n one s p e c i f i c technique. In such cases, the demands of the p a r t i c u l a r caper w i l l determine who does what. Usually, one of them does the actual safecracking, 250 while the other acts as \"point-man\". Both, however, w i l l be known as safecrackers. I WAS INTERESTED ALSO IN\u2014LET'S SAY YOU ARE THREE FELLOWS AND YOU'RE GOING TO BLOW A SAFE. HOW DO YOU DECIDE WHO DOES WHAT? Well, you t r y to go, of course, t h i s i s a \u2014 l o t s of safecrackers are egocentric and ego-t i s t i c a l , you know. Lots of guys w i l l , when you say, 'I went out l a s t night with so and so', t h e y ' l l say, 'well, what'd you go with him for, he don't know nothin, he could't do nothin, he don't know foil nothin', whereas you might know i n your own mind that the guy does know\u2014the one that's doin' a l l the yakkin' doesn't know\u2014it's somethin' you got to f i n d out for yourself and by others\u2014guys that have gone with him and they t a l k \u2014 e a c h one cuts up him and him and him, and you know how good you are, and you t e l l . So i f we decided, say three of us went out, and say we had never been out with each other before, say me and and somebody el s e . Say we'd never been out together before. I f we had been out with each other before, we would probably know which i s , which should do the w o r k \u2014 i f we hadn't been we'd just have to r e l y on what we'd heard from other guys and of course we'd say, 'Well\u2014how are you at t h i s kind of a shot? A spindle shot or a jam shot, or what do you think?' And he might say, 'I don't think i t should be done that way\u2014I think i t should be done t h i s way.' And you would just kind of t a l k about i t l i k e t h i s , and then somebody would have to concede and say, 'Well, you go ahead and do i t ' . I don't think there would ever be much of an argument t h e r e \u2014 t h e r e i s the odd time you get a couple of guys that are r e a l high on themselves and ttere may be a l i t t l e row about how you are going to do i t , but most guys would step aside and say, 'You do i t ' . Like, I know and I \u2014 i f we would have went out together, i n the old days, I know that would have said, 'Well, you go ahead, you do i t \u2014 y o u know more about i t \u2014 y o u do i t * . And I would probably say the same: 'No, n o \u2014 I think \u2014 I don't think I do\u2014you go ahead and do i t ' . And t h i s i s probably what would happen. We'd probably wind up tossin ' to see who does i t , or maybe we'd just both do i t together. 251 HOW MANY FELLOWS DOES IT TAKE TO BLOW A SAFE? Just o n e \u2014 a c t u a l l y \u2014 j u s t you y o u r s e l f . You r e a l l y don't need anyone e l s e . COULD YOU EVER GO BY YOURSELF? Oh y e h \u2014 I would. I've done i t l o t s of times. REALLY? Oh yeh\u2014I'm t a l k i n * about the o l d days, oh yeh. I t i s k i n d of a scarey d e a l you know, but t h i s adds up t o the .kick of i t too, you know. But there i s no reason why i t shouldn't be a one-de a l a f f a i r , because there i s no manual l a b o r i n v o l v e d , unless the safe's hung up somehow, jammed up and you would have t o use a crowbar to get i t open. But r e a l l y , the only reason you need two men i s tha t one has t o watch out, kinda be a look-out, l i k e \u2014 i f you're i n a b u i l d i n g , back i n the o f f i c e or something and you can't see out on the s t r e e t , and you don't know who's w a l k i n ' around out there--might be a cop around or anything when you're ready to set o f f the ex p l o s i o n , so one guy has to be\u2014make sure t h a t everything i s c l e a r when i t goes, you see. And th a t ' d be the main reason f o r having two g u y s - - i f you were somewhere where you weren't worried abart being heard or anything, you would e a s i l y do i t y o u r s e l f \u2014 b u t i t ' s l i k e everything e l s e , you l i k e company. (#14) I n a d d i t i o n t o the social i m p l i c a t i o n s of sa f e c r a c k i n g techniques, such as stat u s d e r i v e d from v a r i o u s s k i l l s , a knowledge of the mechanical aspects of sa f e c r a c k i n g provides a b a s i s f o r the a p p r e c i a t i o n of the.psychic rewards involv.ed: ...as a matter of f a c t , I enjoyed t h i s . T h i s i s the funny p a r t of i t \u2014 i t i s n ' t a c t u a l l y \u2014 w h e n y o u \u2014 I don't know how to descr i b e i t . Oh, i t ' s not an orgasm or nothing l i k e t h i s , but i t J_s ni c e , say when you can k n o c k \u2014 e i t h e r punch the door o f f or blow the door o f f a safe and reach i n -side and take out a handful of money. WHAT'S THE BIGGEST THRILL IN BLOWING A CAN? I imagine when that door swings open. AND WHAT ABOUT THAT DOOR OPENING\u2014IS IT LOOKING AND SEEING THE MONEY? Oh yes, you're disappointed, but then you're s a t i s f i e d too th a t you've got the door o f f \u2014 y o u ' v e done the job, you know. What you've accomplished to do\u2014you've done, and i f you've done i t w e l l (#29) During a s o c i a l occasion I had with several rounders, the group had spent some time discussing the pleasures of gambling at Las Vegas, when one member said to #24: \"what i s i t i n safe blowing that gives you the biggest kick?\" The idea here was to fin d i n safecracking the peak of ex-citement just as there i s apparently such a peak i n gambling. To t h i s he replied, I guess i t ' s when i t goes o f f \u2014 t h e big bang\u2014that's the most exciting part. Then when i t (the dust) clears, to see i f the door i s open. That's the p o i n t \u2014 d i d i t work? Does i t open properly? Did I put i n too much or too l i t t l e ? That's the big spot'. (#24) Someone inquired as to whether the excitement over the door opening was not r e a l l y a matter of c u r i o s i t y as to how much money might be i n the safe. To t h i s he strongly objected: \"NeverL The money i s secondary--you take what there i s . \" He spoke of t h i s as a n t i - c l i m a t i c . The statement below suggests that both the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a big score and the s a t i s f a c t i o n derived frcm suc-c e s s f u l l y opening the safe, both contribute to the excitement of the event. Now a f t e r I get inside, a l l my fear more or less i s gone. And you concentrate on the safe, and you can look at i t and\u2014of course you always know what kind of safe i t i s before you make your entrance and everything. You go in, you got your tools and everything, and you can e s t i -mate what's i n the safe. I f i t ' s a place that has d e l i v e r y trucks, you can figure $500 per 25 3 t r u c k f o r every t r u c k they got and t h e y ' l l have t h a t much i n the safe. I mean t h a t ' s the average f o r any k i n d of business whether i t be a beer t r u c k or a dry c l e a n i n g p l a c e . But s t i l l i n a l l , t h a t jewel might be the one. I t j u s t might be the guy that's beating the income tax, or i t might be the guy t h a t ' s booking a l l the b i g f o o t b a l l payoff or l a y -o f f or something. And there's no charge i n the world, man, l i k e when you see tha t smoke... For instance, i f you're punching i t and you hear t h a t p i n h i t the back of the safe: 'clinggg.' You know you're home f r e e . Or i f you're p e e l i n g i t you see that smoke come out\u2014whenever you pop t h a t door and see the smoke you know t h a t you've cracked the r i v e t s and i t ' s a l l yours. And when you see tha t safe door open, i t i s a charge. I t h i n k the most safes I ever made was s i x of them i n one n i g h t . But t h a t was four of them i n one b u i l d i n g \u2014 y o u j u s t go from safe t o safe. But man, i t never became l e s s . You know, i t ' s not l i k e screwing. The f i r s t time i t ' s p r e t -t y w i l d , then each time i t tapers o f f ; you get p a r t of the same d r i v e , you know, the same a c t i o n , but i t ' s not l i k e the f i r s t . A safe's not l i k e t h a t . Each time i t ' s more so because you f i g u r e the odds are more i n your favor of i t being the b i g score.1 Another safe c r a c k e r compared the s a t i s f a c t i o n of sa f e c r a c k i n g to t h a t of other manual s k i l l s : W e l l , r e f e r r i n g n o w \u2014 a c t u a l l y to myself. The a c t u a l mechaics of p a r t i c u l a r l y b u r g l a r y . I'm a carpenter now, and a r a t h e r good one. I worked out s i d e on tha t f o r s e v e r a l years. And I found t h a t the same aspect t h a t a t t r a c t e d me t o t h i s p a r t i c u l a r type of crime has a c t u a l l y been sublimated i n t o carpentry work. Now, t h i s i s an a c t u a l experience, that I've known d e f i -n i t e l y works w i t h i n myself. I get a c r e a t i v e enjoyment out of i t . N o w \u2014 t h i s i s d e s t r u c t i v e , a c t u a l l y , but s t i l l i t ' s f u n c t i o n a l , and now that I'm--the same c r e a t i v e enjoyment i s put i n t o carpentry work. There's something c r e a t i v e about t h a t . Jackson, \"Who Goes t o P r i s o n . . . . \" , p. 5 5 . 254, BY THE WAY\u2014WHAT IS THE GREATEST THRILL IN SAFECRACKING? IS IT THE GETTING OF THE MONEY? No, I don't think I did i t s t r i c t l y for the money. (LONG PAUSE). With me, personally, i t ' s been a \u2014 a lack\" .of motivation, I think. I \u2014uh, I tended to d r i f t into t h i s and (PAUSE) ...then got myself involved i n situations where I tended to rather react with a h e l l - o f -a-lot of h o s t i l i t y and expressed my h o s t i l i t y i n d i r e c t i n g my energies i n a criminal way. Fundamentally i t wasn't money. WHAT WAS THE BIGGEST THRILL ON A NIGHT WHEN YOU WENT OUT TO BLOW A CAN? I don't think I ever a c t u a l l y experienced any p a r t i c u l a r kick at any time, but i f there would be any one time of a moment of danger....it would be the actual making of an-\" i n \" . . . (#27) Another burglar with some experience i n safecracking commented: Maybe\u2014it may be just that i t ' s crime, but I can t e l l you, that I've had no greater t h r i l l than the f i r s t time that I opened a safe door. When I opened, you know\u2014-I went at i t \u2014 I didn't peel i t or nothing. I went at i t i n a s o p h i s t i -cated manner and i t was a t h r i l l . WHAT IS THE . THRILL\u2014IS IT THE FACT OF OPENING THE DOOR, OR IS IT THE FACT THAT THERE IS MONEY THERE? No, no--just opening the d o o r \u2014 I wasn't worried about the other at that time. (#2) I t i s c l e a r from the above that themechanical complexi-t i e s and related hazards of safecracking make for a sense of achievement for those who manage the operation success-f u l l y . The various techniques are thought of not only i n terms of economic gain but also i n terms of mechanical ex-pe r t i s e . A \"beautiful job\" i s not necessarily a comment i n -d i c a t i n g that a large amount of money was taken; more probably i t implies technical expertise. 255 In t h i s sense the safecracker resembles the c r a f t s -man whose reward i s more notably psychic than economic. In contrast, however, the dangers involved i n safecracking are h i g h \u2014 i t i s therefore not an a c t i v i t y one can indulge i n for these kinds of reasons only. The technique of safecracking used by p a r t i c u l a r safe-crackers i s seen by others i n terms of expertise and ack-nowledged by way of status a l l o c a t i o n . .It i s seen as having meaning not only for safecrackers and other rounders, but for law enforcement personel as w e l l . . Each of the d i f f e r e n t techniques described above i s subject to numerous minor vari a t i o n s , peculiar to the ope-rator. The degree of safety (from the explosion) desired varies among safecrackers. Those who prefer to be i n an adr-jacent room require longer wires for the e l e c t r i c a l detonators, and so on. Safecrackers believe that each safecracker de-velops h i s own particular style, and that the p o l i c e can i d e n t i f y the operator by interpreting the technique a f t e r the event. M.O. i s a big thing. M.O.?\u2014I'M NOT SURE... Would you c a l l i t 'modus operandi'? OH! And t h i s i s a b i g factor\u2014uh\u2014when you're learning how\u2014maybe somebody shows you how to blow a can and you can blow i t that way, and i t works. Well, you got a tendency to always follow the same procedure because i f i t worked fo r you once you figure i t w i l l work for you again, so you always J U S J \u2014 I might go i n and knock the d i a l o f f the safe and put on a l i t t l e cup and 256 blow i t through the spindle and I open i t t h i s way. might go i n and put soap i n the top crack and open the door up, but you pretty well always do t h i s the same way. Not only t h i s , but the way you get into the place\u2014how you break in\u2014some guys w i l l go in through a roof\u2014another guy w i l l f l i p a window and another guy has another way of geifcLn' in\u2014maybe right through the brick wall or something, and they do t h i s consis-t e n t l y \u2014 a n d the po l i c e can pretty well look at the job and say, 'Well, so and so made i t ' . They know--they know\u2014just by the way every-thing i s done.l WHY DON'T YOU CHANGE YOUR METHODS THEN? Ah\u2014because i f you go out f i s h i n ' and you put a big crazy kind of a spoon on and you throw i t i n and you get a r e a l big nice steelhead, y o u ' l l continue to go back and do i t again, because you figure y o u ' l l get another one. I f i t works for you once, you figure i t ' s that important. For instance, you figure, 'To h e l l with the l o t \u2014 I don't care whether they knew I blew i t or not, they're not going to get me with nothin' anyway', see? 2 So what \"do I care? So i f you figure you can open i t i n a ce r t a i n way, you w i l l , and of course\u2014oh, hundreds of times I've had them come to me the day a f t e r and say, 'Well, we know you got so and so\u2014we know you got i t ' , and you stand there laughin' and say, 'So what? What i f I did? What're you going to do about i t ? ' They can't do nothin', 'cause they haven't got nothing\u2014but sooner or later, they w i l l have something, you see? Maybe a fo o t p r i n t . (#14) A senior corrections o f f i c e r at the Drug R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Centre said, \"The po l i c e w i l l t e l l you that a l o t of these guys, l e t ' s say four or f i v e safes have been blown, the p o l i c e can look at the jobs and i t ' s just as i f they've l e f t t h e i r f i n g e r p r i n t s \u2014 t h e y know immediately who did i t just by how i t ' s done.\" 2 Some deliberate e f f o r t s are made to mislead the po l i c e , yet no one suggested changing basic techniques for t h i s pur-pose. E f f o r t s to mislead included smoking a d i f f e r e n t brand of cigarettes than normally smoked, while on a caper. 25 7 Despite the c a s u a l remarks above, regarding the p o l i c e \"know-in g \" , the same respondent s t a t e d : Now, once they know, say me and #32 blew a safe....now t h i s r e a l l y s i m p l i f i e s t h i n g s f o r them because they j u s t watch us and at the r i g h t time they n a i l us, maybe p i c k i n * up the t o o l s t h a t we used at the place or may-be i t ' s the money tha t we planted\u2014maybe we kept the b i l l s and planted the s i l v e r , or they catch us changin' a ten d o l l a r b i l l s i n t o hundreds or something, and some of them are marked, but the t h i n g i s - - t h e y know who d i d i t and they got a b i g edge i n r a i l i n ' us on somethin'\u2014now t h a t ' s the best I can f i g u r e . (#14) My respondents a l s o pointed out tha t some techniques are more standardized than others, and l e s s amenable t o v a r i -a t i o n s ( f o r example, the s p i n d l e s h o t ) . I n these cases the p h y s i c a l r e s u l t s would be q u i t e s i m i l a r no matter who ac-t u a l l y d i d the shot. Safecrackers assume, however, t h a t the p o l i c e look f o r a d d i t i o n a l c l u e s such as the type of an \" i n \" made, the type of place v i c t i m i z e d , and the l o c a t i o n of the job p l u s t h e i r own knowledge of what v a r i o u s rounders are \"up t o \" at any given time. I n a d d i t i o n , the safecrackers r e a d i l y admit t h a t i n terms of s e c u r i t y they make t h e i r b i g g e s t mistakes a f t e r the caper, by t e l l i n g others of t h e i r a c t i o n : ...and conversation, I t h i n k would be the bigg e s t f a c t o r \u2014 y e h , I t h i n k . Seems l i k e no-body i s able t o keep t h i s to h i m s e l f so you get i n a b i g crowd, a whole bunch of you, and you're yakkin\", and p r e t t y soon i t gets t o be common knowledge and a l l the safecrackers a l l over town know who d i d j u s t about every score, you see? And, w e l l , t h i s i s a l r i g h t i f you 258 was only t a l k i n ' amongst yourselves, but you get g i r l friends and wives and other guys that aren't safecrackers and pretty soon\u2014I think i t ' s just a matter of time before i t gets back to the p o l i c e . (#14) The following example i l l u s t r a t e s a number of points made i n the preceding discussion: p o l i c e procedure and the operation of \"bargain j u s t i c e \" , the role of the safecracker's \"modus operandi\", the development and recognition of h i s own s p e c i f i c method of operation, and several technical aspects of safecracking i t s e l f : SO, YOU HAD AN EXAMPLE THERE\u2014YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT... Well, what I was r e f e r r i n g to when I said I had another l i t t l e story that wouH point up perhaps how p r o f i c i e n t you become a f t e r a time. I was arrested i n , I think i t was in\u2014when was i t ? 1950. For an attempt on the Bank of ,', i n . I don't know whether you would r e c a l l that or not, or have heard anything of i t . NO. However, i n May\u2014I won't go into that story--that's another story--the fact was, I was arrested. I was waiting i n Okalla for t r i a l . While I was there I got out on b a i l , I was out on b a i l , I was rearrested, for blowing a safe t h i s time\u2014and t h i s makes a l i e of what I s a i d \u2014 i t ' s just occurred to me that I was arrested for blowing a safe, yes. In 1950. I had t o t a l l y forgotten i t , but i t ' s true. U h \u2014 w h i l e \u2014 t h e n I was taken back to prison and while I was there there was a sergeant i n the RCMP who h a d \u2014 h i s job was what they c a l l the \"safe and lock\" d e t a i l , and h i s area was t h i s entire Fraser Valley. And he came out to prison and questioned me, as a r e s u l t of t h i s safecracking that I had been arrested on, and\u2014during the conversation he reached into h i s pocket and he took a picture out and he said, 'Do you recognize t h i s pic-ture? And the picture was a picture of the safe which had been blown i n Vancouver\u2014the one I had been arrested for. And i n c i d e n t a l l y , I was cold on i t \u2014 n o way of getting out of i t . 259 I won't go into d e t a i l , but I r e a l i z e d that there was n o \u2014 I wasn't harming myself by saying, 'Yes, I recognize i t ' , the p i c -ture, which I d i d . 'Well', he said, 'you recognize i t and you admit that you were responsible for the condition of t h i s safe?' And I said, 'Well, we both know I am'. I said, 'And I'm going to j a i l , yes.' 'Fine', he said, 'What about these?' And he l a i d s i x more pictures down. And he said, 'What about the f i r s t ore?' And I said, 'I don't-\u2014I don't recognize i t ' . The second\u2014I didn't recognize that either, and so o n \u2014 I didn't recognize any of them. But i t turned out, to get back to your expression, the M.G used was of the kind that took the safe door\u2014the front plate of the safe door and curled i t up l i k e , s imilar to when you open a can of sardines with a key, you know. And the metal c u r l s around the key. .Well, t h i s plate on the safe had curled i n that same fa s h i o n \u2014 o n the safe that I was arrested. .And so too, were each of the sheets on the other six safes that had been taken here, there and everwhere through-out the v a l l e y here, you see. And he said, 'Incidentally, I have ano-ther sheet of pictures i n the o f f i c e , which I didn't bother to bring', he says, 'That are i d e n t i c a l with these s i x ' . 'Now', he says, 'What about i t , , do you cl e a r the books for i t , or what?' YEH? Naturally I denied\" a l l knowledge of these, because I had had no-thing to do with them. (LAUGHTER.) Tiis would indicate to you, or help you i n your idea of what occurs a f t e r you get going on these things, you know\u2014it's amazing, the number of safes that do amount up, you know, over a period of time. This was probably\u2014some of the pictures he had, had gone back a couple of years. IS THAT RIGHT? AND THE POLICE CAN TELL PRETTY WELL BY LOOKING AT THE JOB? Well, I think anyone can. I don't think i t ' s any exceptional feat, to look at a safe, and i f you see the door curled up from one corner to the other on this one, and you know\u2014it's l i k e that on six others, they're going to assume that the man who did i t i s the one that did the f i r s t one. YEH. 26 0 SO THERE'S NO VERY STANDARD METHOD THAT ALL OF YOU USE? Well, there are standard methods, but each\u2014I think each person de-velops h i s own p a r t i c u l a r methods which shew up d i f f e r e n t l y , of course. ON YOURS AND NOT ON SOMEBODY ELSE'S? Because of the distance from the corner that I shot the safe. OH. You see, the bottom plate of the d o o r \u2014 I used to come up only about 4-6 inches, and I under-stand that most people would go further than that. But I worked under the impression, and t h i s was my own theory, that I had evolved i n my mind, from reading and from conversations, t h a t \u2014 t h a t when that explosion, or explosive, rather, i s confined i n the inside of the safe, you know--it's l i k e a \u2014 i t w i l l take, l i k e when i t explodes i t w i l l take the l i n e of least resistance, and n a t u r a l l y i t follows that on the hinge side of the safe d o o r \u2014 t h i s i s the strongest s i d e \u2014 i t c e r t a i n l y i s not going to go there. I t would\u2014the weakest part would go f i r s t , which i s the opposite side to the hinge. So, i f t h i s i s true, then I would prefer to have my nitroglycerine ex-plode as close to the l e f t hand side of the door, and as close to the center of the door as possible. That i s , I don't want to deto-nate i t when i t ' s up at the top of the door, and I don't want to detonate i t when i t ' s on the bottom of the d o o r \u2014 I want to detonate i t when i t ' s running i n \u2014 j u s t running down the middle of the door, so the f u l l force of the explosion i s the weakest point. And, i t ' s technical, perhaps, but i n my mind i t was so. And i t was so. Because i t usually worked. But the r e s u l t of t h i s was that i n most cases the fact that the n i t r o g l y c e r i n e was running down the door, there would always be a cer-t a i n quantity of grease, as we c a l l i t , on the bottom left-hand corner of the door, and that would deliver a t e r r i f i c punch i n that area. And the r e s u l t of that t e r r i f i c punch was to take that metal and just P r r r r ! Twist i t r i g ht up, you see. MY GOODNESS I And the obvious res u l t was that each safe had that, that stamp on i t , so to speak. AND JUST BY VARYING THE PLACE OR EVEN THE AMOUNT THAT COULD CHANGE, EVEN THE SMALLEST ? Oh yes. The\u2014many people\u2014most safecrackers that I know, prefer to, what we c a l l shoot the top of the door, that i s , from the t o p \u2014 r i g h t 261 at the same place they pour the grease i n , you see. Pour the grease i n ; the knocker, you s e e , \u2014 l a y the knocker in, right in that same place they pour the >\u2014right i n that same area. P u l l the soap over i t , and l e t i t detonate from there. Whereas, I had the idea that I wanted the grease down the door to the bottom so that the f u l l length, and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the middle part of the door i s where I wanted most of the grease to be'. In the instant of explosion so the force was delivered to the weakest spot. You knew, and t h i s i s where... .OH, AND WHERE DID YOU\u2014DID YOU PUT YOUR...? So I wold wait u n t i l the grease came through to the bottom of the door. Then I knew that the remainder of the grease was i n the cup at the top, while s t i l l : running--I would lay the knocker at the bottom where i t already showed through\u2014see? You can see i t - - i t gleams l i k e q u i c k s i l v e r under a f l a s h l i g h t , you know. In the crack of the door, and as soon as I could see.that I wouTdlay the knoc-ker i n and close that up so that i t couldn't run out of the s a f e \u2014 i t was confined there. In the meantime, the rest of i t was running in, and by the time I had reached my safety point\u2014where I stood when I detonated the e l e c t r i c a l knocker, the remainder of the grease would be where I wanted i t - - i n the cen-te r of the door. But at the same time, there was always the factor of having grease at that bottom l e f t hand corner, because i t was there i n the beginning\u2014was running there a l l the time. I t was bui l d i n g up there, you see\u2014there would be a l i t t l e extra punch there, i n that area. So that was the \u2014 speak-ing o f \u2014 u s i n g your term, the M.O.\u2014this was a dead giveaway i n that respect. .AND WHY DID YOU NOT CHANGE THEN, IF YOU KNEW THAT THE POLICE WOULD RECOGNIZE THIS? Well, at that p o i n t \u2014 t h a t was i n 1 9 5 0 \u2014 i f you r e c a l l . I t o l d you that I had given i t up and that was the time that I had given i t up--I never touched a safe since then. (#4) Safecrackers f e l t ambivalent towards carelessness i n leaving f a i r l y obvious i d e n t i f y i n g clues. They regard the habit with a mixture of respect and apprehension. One 262 safecracker who generally wore a black hat with h i s i n i t i a l s on i t , would also wear i t on the j o b \u2014 a dangerous practice, since i t could e a s i l y be l o s t while making a hasty e x i t . .Another safecracker apparently had the habit of me-t i c u l o u s l y cleaning up af t e r he had blown a safe, even to the point of dusting the furni t u r e . Safecrackers asserted that h i s style was a dead giveaway to the p o l i c e . At the same time, he was known for h i s a b i l i t y not to leave such evidence as would be admissible i n court. The following quotation by an older safecracker i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of several of the themes discussed i n thi s chap-ter, as for example: inter e s t i n learning and teaching of criminal s k i l l s being d i r e c t l y related to the v i a b i l i t y of crime as an economic a c t i v i t y ; decline i n the number of pra c t i t i o n e r s a f f e c t i n g the number of persons who w i l l have the opportunity to learn ( p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the case of the safecracker) , and technological change d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g the criminal career. APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY SAFECRACKERS DO YOU THINK THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN WHEN YOU GOT OUT OF JAIL? The P r a i r i e Pen.? At that time\u2014you ..-mean just right i n Western City? -YEH. Oh, I'd say about t h i r t y , maybe f o r t y . . . . . 1 can remember back i n the f o r t i e s when there would be four or f i v e (safecrackings) a n i g h t \u2014 s a f e s goin' every night, you know. That, with the average say, two or three or four or f i v e thousand d o l l a r s apiece, and that was goin* every night I don't know whether they've come to the conclusion that i t doesn't pay o f f . They get too much time or too l i t t l e money, or what i t is . Or, they make the safes a l o t more d i f f i c u l t to get into. Safe blowing 263 i s something that started out during the de-pression years, back i n the pcairies. When they started going for the wheat e l e v a t o r s \u2014 a l l the wheat elevators had a safe, and were always good for four or f i v e thousand d o l l a r s , you know. And t h i s i s quite a common thing a l l the w a y \u2014 r e a l old timers used to come down there to blow safes\u2014and these were i n the days when you used to have to take your n i t r o g l y -c e r i n out of dynamite\u2014boil i t i n a pot, you know, s t r a i n i t . However, that changed and i n the 1940*s we started makin' our own. You see, out of a c i d \u2014 t h e hey day of the safe blowin' era was i n the 1930*s and then through the '40's and then i t started to dwindle o f f i n the f i f -t i e s most of the safes that are bein' cracked now are 'made' by guys that studied them pretty well, and they don't blow them--they d r i l l 'em. Maybe they worked where the safes are made or something, and they know how they're made, and they know where to d r i l l them, you see you wouldn't know where to d r i l l , but i t ' s l i k e everything else, eh? Guys g e t t i n ' more s c i e n t i f i c at i t , g e t t i n ' more thorough and\u2014and these are about the only ones\u2014the guys who've been workin' at safes, who can get i n there.... (#14) E. BEHAVIOURAL IMPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLGICAL CHANGE The relationship of changing technology to the s o c i a l structure has been of central in t e r e s t to s o c i o l o g i s t s . Recent research has tended to center around the e f f e c t of technological change upon developing nations. An older and ongoing theme of special i n t e r e s t to those i n the s o c i a l problems f i e l d has been the e f f e c t of changing technology upon employment. Related to t h i s , yet of more specialized focus i s the interest of I n d u s t r i a l S o c i o l o g i s t s regarding the ef f e c t of technology upon worker behaviour and organi-zation . 264 Much academic as well as public and governmental con-cern has addressed i t s e l f to the problems facing those who are being displaced by technology. Special l e g i s l a t i o n i s sought, and some of i t has been enacted, providing protec-t i o n for the workers whose s k i l l s become obsolescent due to technological change. In addition to economic assistance schemes we hear of massive r e - t r a i n i n g programs with sugges-tions that the average worker w i l l need to be re-trained p e r i o d i c a l l y throughout h i s working l i f e . I t i s understandable that no such sympathy has been extended to the criminal who finds himself displaced by tech-n o l o g i c a l advances. Such an attitude i s no doubt p a r t l y owing to the assumption that the criminal's loss i s the public's gain. However, i f one can judge by the lack of at-tention given the subject by academics, \"technology\" and \"criminal\" are concepts not readi l y associated with each other by legitimate society. \"Criminal\", i t appears, i s f i r s t of a l l a moral category, and i s seldom viewed i n occu-pational terms. Since we know so l i t t l e about the mechanical and s o c i a l s k i l l s involved i n the criminal's routine a c t i v i t y , we are i n no p o s i t i o n to appreciate the effects of changes i n these areas. To say that the criminal too i s affected by technologi-c a l change could hardly be c a l l e d a discovery. I t i s more int e r e s t i n g to ask how the criminal responds to such change. 265 Such a question might reveal some int e r e s t i n g comparisons and contrasts between the ef f e c t s of technology on s o c i a l l y approved a c t i v i t y versus s o c i a l l y disapproved a c t i v i t y . The criminal i s not granted public aid when faced with unemploy-ment.''\" I f he wishes to r e t r a i n himself for other types of crime, he must do so on h i s own, and furthermore, must do so i n the face of obstacles d e l i b e r a t e l y put i n h i s way. Although speeches by labor leaders sometimes imply that management i s using technology as a p o l i t i c a l weapon against organized labor, i t i s generally agreed that techno-l o g i c a l advances are accepted for the purposes of p r o f i t . A l -though the economic factor encourages management to buy a better safe or i n s t a l l a more complex alarm system, management w i l l also be quite free to e x p l i c i t l y state the desire that by doing so i t hopes to put more criminals out of business. That i s , although i n both cases technological advance i s for reasons of p r o f i t , i n the case of the criminal (as i n con-t r a s t with that of legitimate labor) the s o c i a l consequences of such acceptance can be openly j u s t i f i e d . The student of t h i s \"cold war\" w i l l f i n d neither side engaging i n pretense; the stated purpose of technological change on the part of management and the development of technological s o p h i s t i c a t i o n on the part of the criminal are both part of an understood on-going war of escalation. \"'\"Unless, of course, we think of prison as a subsidized r e t r a i n i n g program. Prison programs are designated to re-t r a i n for legitimate occupations, but as.we have shown, may also be used for i l l e g i t i m a t e ends. 266 The e f f e c t of technological change on criminal beha-viour i s p a r t i c u l a r l y well exemplified i n the case of safecracking. I t can only be understood with the t e c h n i c a l features of the safecracking process c l e a r l y i n mind. A number of important technological changes have d r a s t i c a l l y a ltered both the safecracker 1s technique and h i s s o c i a l patterns. .Although the early (1930-1945) safecracking communi-ty thought of i t s e l f as constituting a s o c i a l group i n Vancouver even at that time, the cohesive factor had to do with the communication of information regarding p o l i c e ac-t i v i t y , and of \"scores\" which only another safecracker could properly appreciate. The safecrackers were not held to-gether by economic factors,; nor was there any p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r -dependence based upon the sharing of s k i l l s or equipment. The technical change >from dynamite to other forms of explosives\"'\" (such as g e l i g n i t e and fo r c i t e ) , i n i t i a t e d by the government i n approximately 1945, made the derivation of n i t r o g l y c e r i n e impossible v i a the previous simple methods of b o i l i n g the dynamite s t i c k s , t o extract the n i t r o g l y c e r i n e . Other explosives, such as f o r c i t e and g e l i g n i t e are s t i l l popularly referred to as dynamite. Such explosives do contain nitroglycerine, but the bonding substance i s such as to prevent the separation' of the n i t r o from i t . Such explosives can be used i n s t i c k form only, and t h i s i s not useful to the safecracker except i n Hasting vault c e i l i n g s . 267 Being cut o f f from a simple and ready source of n i t r o -glycerine posed a serious problem for the safecracker. He faced several a l t e r n a t i v e s . One: he could revert to other forms of crime; two: he could r e s t r i c t himself to safes that could be punched, d r i l l e d or otherwise manually opened; or three: he could f i n d new sources of n i t r o . There i s no way of knowing how many took the f i r s t a l t ernative as a permanent step, though there are indications that at least some took i t as a temporary measure. The second a l t e r n a t i v e was not economically v i a b l e . The t h i r d a l ternative was more d i f f i c u l t and confined to a few. I t i s a matter of dispute among safecrackers as to who deserves c r e d i t for being the f i r s t to make \"grease\" v i a mixing chemical ingredients C s u l p n u r i c acid, n i t r i c acid and glycerine); none personally claimed the d i s t i n c t i o n . The new method of obtaining grease i s considerably more demanding than the former, i n a number of ways. The ingredients need to be bought without arousing suspicion and cannot be e a s i l y stolen. The necessary tools and a place to make grease need to be arranged for before-hand. The operation i t s e l f i s dangerous and the mixture may go up i n flames. To make i t economical they need to make considerably more than they can quickly use; hence the problem of storage. Added to t h i s i s the fact that grease cannot be made on the spur of the moment\u2014one may not be able to take advantage of a good and temporary \" i n \" which has just been spotted i f t h i s entire process needs to be done f i r s t . 2 6 8 I t i s not surprising, therefore, that given these circumstances, plus a demand for nitroglycerine, some ar-rangement for the supply of ready-made grease would a r i s e . I t became obvious to safecrackers that grease made by the above methods varied i n q u a l i t y \u2014 t h e r e ;was good grease and poor grease. Consequently, a loose form of s p e c i a l i z a t i o n set i n on a f a i r l y large scale. There i s no i n d i c a t i o n that anyone made his l i v i n g exclusively on making and s e l l i n g grease, but several persons became known as ones who were l i k e l y to have a supply and who would be w i l l i n g to s e l l i t , or i n many instances, give i t away with the understanding t h a t i t would be replaced at a l a t e r date. This new form of economic cooperation between safe-crackers strongly reinforced the already existing s o c i a l bonds. The majority of the safecrackers were now dependent on each other for the source of t h e i r l i v l i h o o d . Such de-pendence, furthermore, was not an impersonal buyer-seller r e l a t i o n s h i p . Making grease was a l e g a l l y precarious busi-ness and the producer could safely s e l l or give only to proven customers. Some safecrackers depended on t h e i r own resources and remained r e l a t i v e l y independent, but these were, exceptions. New, p o t e n t i a l safecrackers could enter the f i e l d only by winning the confidence of those i n control of grease. Safe-crackers remark on the great amount of borrowing, buying and other i n t e r a c t i o n that revolved around \"grease\". 2 69 I t may well be that the unintended consequence of making ni t r o g l y c e r i n e more d i f f i c u l t to obtain has been to strengthen the criminal community. I t provided the leaders with the a b i l i t y to screen new \" r e c r u i t s \" and neces-sitat e d the development of a stronger sub-culture based on mutual aid and group l o y a l t y . Some techn i c a l changes have been i n the safecracker's favor. The development of e l e c t r i c a l detonators was of r e a l advantage, for i t permitted the safecracker much greater control i n the timing of h i s shots. The safecracker has also been able to take advantage of better q u a l i t y tools and of more advanced means of communication. He may even f e e l that i n some respects he i s ahead of h i s opposition: I took up radio--this a l l t i e s i n with the way we work. As the p o l i c e progress, we progress. I f you don't, you're dead. Like, when they got two-way radios i n t h e i r cars, we got two-way; we used walkie-talkies before* the C i t y P o l i c e d i d . (#29) However, the discussion on safecracking techniques has indicated how changes i n safe design have made safecracking increasingly more d i f f i c u l t . Changes i n safe design have been p a r a l l e l e d by changes i n building architecture and i n the location of safes. Modern design no longer relegates the safe to a back o f f i c e . They are now to be found i n f u l l view, often f l o o d - l i t at night, near large plate glass win-dows at the front of the stores. A l l of these changes have tended to frustrate the safecracker. 270 Informants agreed that the two changes that have been most injurious to burglary and safecracking have been the development of a c r e d i t economy, and the invention of night depositories. The c r e d i t economy has resulted i n fewer cash trans-actions; safecrackers complained that there just i s n ' t much cash i n safes anymore. Related to t h i s i s the night d e p o s i t o r y \u2014 i t i s now a simple matter for the businessman to deposit h i s day's take i n the bank a f t e r hours, rather than putting i t i n h i s safes THE QUESTION THEN IS, WHY NOT OPEN THE NIGHT DEPOSITORY? CAN'T YOU GET INTO THOSE BOXES? Oh, they've dropped now; they were h i t quite a b i t too (LAUGHTER) e a r l i e r , but they've made them v i r t u a l l y impregnable.... they're i n a bad spot to blow, and a modern bank today i s b u i l t with an amazing amount of glass\u2014you're not only going to be seen, you're going to be harmed 'cause that glass i s going to go\u2014I've given them quite a b i t of thought. (#32) The development of night depositories has coincided with complex burglar alarm systems, the most elaborate of which are to be found i n banks. My informants agreed that these t e c h n i c a l developments have l e f t only the most s k i l l e d criminals operating i n t h i s f i e l d . Alarm systems and the c r e d i t card systems have discouraged the burglary of major business establishments; for example, banks are seldom burg-l a r i z e d today. For t h i s reason, said my informants, the burglary of business establishments has given way to armed robbery. We turn now to an analysis of armed robbery. Chapter V Non-Surreptitious Crimes (Victim Confrontation) : The Technical Dimensions of Robbery, with Special Attention to Bank Robbery A. INTRODUCTION As was mentioned i n Chapter II , the information re-ceived from the f o r t y - f i v e subjects interviewed for t h i s study included comments on a wide v a r i e t y of criminal beha-viour. Without wishing to provide yet another typology of crimes, i t appears to be most useful for the purpose of t h i s paper to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between those crimes which are com-mitted s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y and those which involve d i r e c t confron-t a t i o n with the v i c t i m . The one involves the taking of pro-perty without the owner's consent or knowledge, the other involves the demand for property and i t s being \"given\" to the t h i e f by the v i c t i m . Roughly speaking, t h i s follows the le g a l d i s t i n c t i o n between burglary and robbery. The primary difference s o c i o l o g i c a l l y , i s that one involves d i r e c t i n -ter a c t i o n between t h i e f and victim, while the other does not. I t follows, therefore, that the s k i l l s associated with robbery must include those which are necessary for the management and manipulation of people. This i s not to minimize the im-portance of mechanical and te c h n i c a l s k i l l s , but to indicate that victim-confrontation adds an additional dimension to the s k i l l s necessary for success i n non-surreptitious crime. 271 2 7.2 Maurer has well documented the s o c i a l s k i l l s necessary to 2 the confidence man. Sutherland, i n The Professional Thief , indicates the importance of these s k i l l s , which are employed by those thieves who pride themselves i n non-violent t h e f t . He points out that i n terms of status, professional thieves d i s t i n g u i s h between those criminals whose work depends p r i -marily on manual dexterity as over against those whose work 3 depends on \"wit, 'front' and t a l k i n g a b i l i t y \" s ...burglars, robbers, kidnappers, and others who engage i n the 'heavy rackets' are generally not regarded as professional thieves, for they depend primarily on manual dexterity, or force. A few criminals i n the 'heavy rack-ets' use t h e i r 'wits, front and t a l k i n g a b i l i t y , and these are regarded by the professional thieves as belonging to the profession.^ The inference, as I see i t , i s that v i o l e n t crimes, for example those involving the threat or use of violence by way of weapons are thought to require l i t t l e or no a b i l i t y to manipulate people . Since the mechanical s k i l l s , aside from the a b i l i t y to use a gun, appear also to be minimal, the rob-ber i s thought to share neither the s o c i a l s k i l l s of the con a r t i s t , nor the technical s k i l l s of the burglar. As such h i s trade i s viewed by many as crude, unsophisticated, and generally of low status. One receives t h i s kind of a picture Maurer, Whiz Mob. 2 Sutherland, The Professional Thief, p. 198. 3 I b i d . 4 I b i d . 273 from reading Williamson's Hustler , wherein i t appears that a l l a slum k i d needs to do when he needs money i s to pick up a gun and do a stick-up. Williamson, l i k e my own subjects, tends to gloss over whatever subtleties are involved, since he was not asked by the interviewer (R..Keiser) to make them e x p l i c i t . I t i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of workers, whether i n l e -gitimate or i l l e g i t i m a t e trades, to take for granted, and as therefore u n i v e r s a l l y known and understood, those aspects of t h e i r work which are most c e n t r a l . My subjects recognized that some \" l i n e s \" demand greater a b i l i t y i n conning the public (for example, con a r t i s t s ) and that some l i n e s involve no contact -with the public at a l l . Among the l a t t e r , however, are some l i n e s , such as burglar alarm experts who, although not i n face to face contact with the public, speak of t h e i r work i n terms of t h e i r a b i l i t y to outsmart the p u b l i c . The same i s true of safecrackers who v i o l a t e the ultimate symbols of f i n a n c i a l security. There-fore, although the manual aspect of the above l i n e s varies (the safecracker doing much more purely physical labor), each 2 involves an i n t e l l e c t u a l rather than a physical conquest. ^Williamson, Hustler'. 2 There are exceptions to t h i s , and examples of snobbish-ness can be documented. For example, #35, who was a burglar, r e c a l l e d h is d i f f i c u l t y i n opening h i s f i r s t safe. I inquired as to why he had not sought advice from an experienced safe-cracker. \"I wasn't that much interested i n it', he said. \"Actually, I just rate a safecracker, even the best, only as a laborer, 1 1 (#35) 274\" In t h i s chapter on non-surreptitious crime, i t i s our purpose to analyse the descriptive accounts as given by armed robbers, with a view to discovering the assumptions upon which the robber proceeds and the s k i l l s which are u t i -l i z e d i n the action. Just as safecracking was used to i l l u s t r a t e various dimensions of burglary, so group bank robbery w i l l be used here to i l l u s t r a t e facets of robbery. This choice i s p a r t l y a r b i t r a r y , for s i m i l a r basic patterns can be seen i n gene-r a l armed robbery as w e l l . To focus' on bank robbery, however, provides a useful contrast with our previous discussion on safecracking, both forms being often used to extract money from banks. Since i t was frequently suggested to me by my subjects, that the increasing d i f f i c u l t y of b u r g l a r i z i n g a bank i s the cause for the r i s e i n bank robberies, the choice provides a basis for testing these assumptions and the v a r i -ous factors that are operative here. As i s indicated under \"Procedural Variations\" l a t e r , bank robbery may take various forms. In terms of organiza-ti o n , robbery may involve a highly organized group of persons who operate as a work team; on the other hand, i t may be a loose, temporary l i a i s o n between several persons, or i n fact, i t may take the form of a lone gunman doing a stick-up. The victims also may vary, from banking i n s t i t u t i o n s to the corner grocer or a lone pedestrian. 275 A good deal of attention has been focussed by the public on tne one-person, toy-gun bank hold-ups, some of which appear to have been quite successful. My respondents gene-r a l l y agreed that such practices are engaged i n by persons who are i n desperate f i n a n c i a l need, involve l i t t l e planning, and are b a s i c a l l y impulsive i n character. .Success i s a t t r i -buted to luck rather than to expertise. Without wishing to minimize the need for inquiry into the s o c i o l o g i c a l dimensions of such behaiour, i t i s apparent that we w i l l need to look at more systematic forms of robbery i n our quest for subjective perspectives of experienced criminals. Our choice of group bank robbery provides opportunity for a look both at the i n t e r a c t i o n between the group and the bank employees, and at the s o c i o l o g i c a l processes within the group i t s e l f . The process of group formation, of the te s t i n g of l o y a l t i e s and the a l l o c a t i o n of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be dealt witn l a t e r under the more general topic of the teaching and learning of criminal s k i l l s . In t h i s chapter we w i l l look at the act of group robbery i t s e l f \u2014 i n t h i s way the technical, organizational and s o c i a l s k i l l s involved may be documented and described before we ask the question as to how they are learned and transmitted. B. PRE-EVENT PLANNING Some planning i s involved i n the process of group for-mation. I f the group i s a loose, temporary l i a i s o n , i n i t i a t e d by a transient robber, the choice of partners w i l l be made at 27 6 least p a r t l y on the basis of the s k i l l s required for a par-t i c u l a r job. I f the group i s a c o a l i t i o n of some duration, various r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s w i l l be understood and f u l f i l l e d by members p r i o r to the event i t s e l f . (In each case, how-ever, a group bank robbery demands that c e r t a i n preparations be attended to just p r i o r to the event.) In the case of highly organized c r i e , such responsi-b i l i t i e s may include the consideration and accommodation of other groups of criminals: We were nine i n our gang, i n that gang. \u2022We were nine guys, you know. We would be operating i n c e r t a i n d i s t r i c t s ; for ex-ample, I had the northern d i s t r i c t , and they had the southern d i s t r i c t , south of Eastern C i t y and north of Eastern C i t y . Anyone which was o f f north of Eastern C i t y , they would phone me and say, 'Well, , when are you working?' 'Well', I would say, 'maybe two weeks from now'. And they'd say, 'Well, okay, we'll synchronize on the same day. We'll work south only f i v e mi-nutes l a t e r than you, and the p o l i c e w i l l rush to one place and then they'11 have to disperse and widespread t h e i r force l i k e that and we have a better ways of going through the roadblock.* (#28) Organization and concentration within a r e s t r i c t e d geographical area make other on-going arrangements possible: THE ONLY TOOLS YOU BASICALLY NEED THEN ARE MASKS AND GUNS? Oh no. D e f i n i t e l y you need more than that. Now t h i s i s where or-ganization i s the big thing. You see, w e l l \u2014 f i r s t of a l l you've g o t \u2014 w e l l , I was shot. Well, I'm shot, see? Now just supposing I'd have got away, where am I going to go? St. Paul's Hospital? Am I gonna go to St. Mary's Hospital? General Hospital? Oh no\u2014I've gotta have a doctor. You've gotta, so 277 therefore you've gotta nave a doctor. You've gotta take care of a l l these things. You just don't\u2014you've gotta have, i n case you go to j a i l , you've gotta have a lawyer. You've gotta have a l l these things taken care of long before you go into planning a bank job. Well, where would I have gone i f I'd have got shot? Well, I couldn't have stayed i n a ho-t e l room, bleeding l i k e a sieve. Right away, i f I'd have got out, I'd have just phoned my doctor so and so, and said, 'I'm here, get up here right awayi' You see, you've gotta pay them of f , you see. There's l o t s of them i n Western C i t y . Same also i f I'd have got .caught, I would have needed a lawyer right away, quick. Things l i k e that. You've got to take care of. a l l these things. WHAT ABOUT BAIL MONEY? Oh, I had that a l l taken care of. B a i l money was taken care of. (#7) I t may be for reasons such as these that organized c r i -minals tend to operate within s p e c i f i c areas, despite the fact that such operation draws \"heat\" upon them. The tran-sient criminals enjoy anonymity, yet must choose partners from among r e l a t i v e strangers, and s a c r i f i c e the insurance provided by arrangements with doctors, lawyers and bondsmen. Legal, medical and f i n a n c i a l arrangements may or may not form a part of an indiv i d u a l ' s pre-robbery preparation. However, c e r t a i n t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s are more basic, and needed by a l l ; for example, the a b i l i t y to handle fire-arms: (I THEN ASKED #7 TO TRY TO REVIEW FOR ME AGAIN SOME OF THE THINGS THAT MUST BE LEARNED IN ORDER TO ROB A BANK SUCCESSFULLY. I ASKED HIM ABOUT LEARNING TO SHOOT A GUN.) Well, you have to know something about firearms, that's for sure. WHERE DO YOU PICK UP THAT KIND OF KNOWLEDGE? Oh, I just went down to the bush and practiced. 278 WHAT ABOUT STEALING CARS? Stealing cars? I know very l i t t l e about stealing cars. YOU ALWAYS HAVE SOMEONE ELSE DO IT? Always some-one e l s e . 1 NOW\u2014THEN SOMEONE ELSE WOULD KNOW THAT YOU WERE ABOUT TO DO A BANK, IS THAT RIGHT? No s i r \u2014 t h e information only goes to three people, and that's the ones that are involved. WHAT WOULD THIS OTHER GUY WHO STEALS A CAR THINK YOU MIGHT WANT TO DO WITH IT? Well, usually you pick the type of guy who won't ask any questions\u2014who couldn't care l e s s . You give him a hundred bucks. He couldn't care l e s s . He doesn't care i f you want i t for a hunting t r i p or a f i s h i n g t r i p . He doesn't care. Usually he knows after, be-cause i t says i n the papers, a description on, say a '56 Merc or grey two-tone. Well, n a t u r a l l y he can draw hi s OMI ideas. ARE YOU EVER BOTHERED BY BLACKMAIL FROM GUYS LIKE THAT? No, never. They know bet-t e r . WHAT IS THE RATE OF BLACKMAIL REGARDING SUCH THINGS IN THE CRIMINAL WORLD? I think i t ' s very low. (#7) ^\u2022ater, #7 stated: You never s t e a l your own c a r \u2014 y o u have somebody do i t for you, and pay them o f f . There's no use incriminating,yourself i n a car theft, when you're gonna p u l l a bank job. Therefore, i t ' s worth to you to give some fellow a hundred d o l l a r s to get you a car. What's a hundred d o l l a r s of the bank's money? Nothing (#7) Stealing a car, or having i t stolen may be problematic; rented cars are more e a s i l y traced. A member of a highly organized group stated: We met tne p o l i c e right away\u2014they were coming in--they didn't look at us. They went for tne bank f i r s t , n a t u r a l l y . We got through the road block, but the car that we used that t i m e \u2014 I didn't have time to st e a l a car, and you know\u2014I had neither the time nor the opportunity to s t e a l a car that I wanted, so I rented one. (#28) 2 79 As w i l l be indicated i n Chapter VII, the bank w i l l nave been cased before-hand by the one who i n i t i a t e d the robbery. He may or may not have consulted with a partner (prior to the casing) as to the f e a s i b i l i t y of the job. In cases of transient, two or three-man groups, casing may be done by a l l members of the group as. they drive l e i s u r e l y down the st r e e t s . In a l l cases of bank robbery related to me, no member of the group was e n t i r e l y \"cold\" (for example, had not as much as seen the bank to be done). The general procedure i s for the one who initiated the job to case the place, decide on a suitable time, and then take h i s partners with him on a dry run the day p r i o r to the hold-up. OKAY. LET'S SAY IT'S THE DAY BEFORE\u2014THE DAY BEFORE YOU WANT TO DO THIS. WHAT DO YOU HAVE TO DO THE DAY BEFORE? Well, we usually get our car the night before, and we\u2014well, we n a t u r a l l y check over our weapons. We go through the dry run so to speak, you know. The best exit out. DO YOU DO THAT WITH YOUR OWN CAR? Oh yes. DO YOU MAKE ANY DRAWINGS AT THAT STAGE? No. BUT YOU'RE ALL TOGETHER AT THIS TIME, RIGHT? Right. DO YOU SPEND THE NIGHT TOGETHER? We have at times, yeh. But not a l l the time, not a l l the time. We--usually i f we're gonna meet i n the morning we just sort of casually saunter into a coffee shop, just l i k e the working s t i f f , you know. . Saunter i n and have a cup of coffee. And before you know i t there's three of us there and we have our coffee and then we saunter out. AND YOUR CAR IS READY TO GO? Yeh, that's r i g h t \u2014 i t ' s a l l been taken care of. WHEN DID YOU GET THE CAR? The night before. AND IT'S A STOLEN CAR? That *s r i g h t . .SUPPOSE THE COPS ARE LOOKING FOR THAT CAR BY THAT TIME? That's very unlikely, because we have the plates and that a l l doctored up. 2 8,0 AT WHAT POINT DO YOU DECIDE WHO DOES WHAT? Well, i t ' s p retty well understood; l i k e you always have one who makes the suggestion, 'Let's rob a bank'. So naturally, i f you're going to rob a bank, you make the suggestion, you're the one who's going to lay the ground work for i t . So ti e y \u2014 w e l l , they just more or less accept you as the leader. (#7) C. PROCEDURAL VARIATIONS When speaking of v a r i a t i o n s i n the actual procedures of bank robbery, those differences which make every robbery unique w i l l not be dealt with. I t i s such d e t a i l that the Professional Thief has i n mind when he says: Each of these rackets has many va r i a t i o n s i n the s p e c i f i c d e t a i l s of procedure. A mob may beat fo r t y men i n a day on the same spot on the' same racket. Although the p r i n c i p l e ^ i s the same, there are forty minor v a r i a t i o n s . In our discussion here, those procedural v a r i a t i o n s which are necessitated by s o c i a l , geographical or other stan-dard factors w i l l be emphasized. Differences based upon in-d i v i d u a l preferences w i l l take second place to these which are more s t r u c t u r a l i n character. Our procedure here w i l l be to present first-hand accounts, recorded verbatim, of various robberies which provide the basis for comparison and contrast. The f i r s t .example i s that of a small-town bank robbery, i t s most d i s t i n c t i v e feature being Sutherland, The Professional Thief, p. 43. 2.8.1 that i t i s r u r a l . This factor distinguishes i t from an urban robbery, i n the terms of speed required, parking op-po r t u n i t i e s available, and r i s k of p o l i c e intervention. Example No. 1: (#28) The way we do i n the p r o v i n c i a l f i e l d when I h i t that town, we usually h i t them that have somewhere i n the neighborhood of 5,000 popula-t i o n . They have generally one p o l i c e that po-l i c e the whole town, you know. So we're not a f r a i d of t h i s guy\u2014he's nothing. We drive the car, and two of us would be behind the seat and with the door open, the hoods on, the guns ready. The dr i v e r would sta r t to slow down when he comes to the bank and c a l l 3, 2, 1. And then we open the door and we run as fast as we can. Into that bank. Because whoever comes in f i r s t , he's got ten d o l l a r s more than the rest of us got, you know. I t ' s just t o \u2014 y e h , just to gire us an urge, you know.-*- IS THAT RIGHT? MY GOODNESS I Yeh. And the f i r s t guy that enters the Pank goes over the counter. The second guy which follows him, which i s very fast, goes for the manager's o f f i c e . The t h i r d guy stays by the door.2 And the d r i v e r The ten-dollars, of course, has meaning well beyond i t s econimic' x* value. 2 The work posxtions are determined by the c e n t r a l concern of the operation, namely speed. A l l persons must be capable of performing equally well i n d i f f e r e n t positions; however, the door-man has the most dangerous p o s i t i o n and one requiring the greatest degree and v a r i e t y of s k i l l s . The fact that i n t h i s group, the doorman would be the f i r s t to enter and tem-p o r a r i l y take up a d i f f e r e n t p o s i t i o n i s unusual. I t may be accounted for by the fact that a l l members of t h i s group are highly experienced. The more common pattern, I was to l d , i s better expressed by #7: I usually go i n l a s t . I f I'm the leader I go i n l a s t . Now t h i s i s my own\u2014some guys may do i t d i f f e r e n t l y . But I go i n l a s t and I come out l a s t . (#7) 282 comes i n last.\"'' The role of the d r i v e r varies with the rural-urban factor. In an urban bank robbery the d r i v e r would l i k e l y remain i n the car, with the car already moving as the part-ners return and jump ins i d e . He w i l l t r y to look inconspic-uous, perhaps have a newspaper i n h i s hand. He i s responsible to watch for opposition, either c i v i l i a n or p o l i c e . In addi-t i o n to having dr i v i n g a b i l i t y he must be absolutely r e l i a b l e . He i s expected to remain on the scene should p o l i c e a r r i v e . His opportunity to leave the scene i n r e l a t i v e safety i s i n stark contrast to the s i t u a t i o n of h i s partners, should he decide to do so. Whether or not the d r i v e r remains i n the car also appears to be related both to the r e l i a b i l i t y of the d r i v e r and the degree of pressure he may be exposed to i n any s p e c i f i c caper: In the old days they used to leave the d r i v e r of a bank car outside, and most times they'd come out and the car would be goneI How you take the d r i v e r with you and he's the f i r s t one out. DO YOU THINK THAT IS WHY THEY TAKE THE DRIVER WITH THEM? D e f i n i t e l y , no other reason. (#15) Another respondent: YOU LEAVE THE MOTOR RUNNING? Yes. WITH NO-ONE IN THE CAR? That's the way I would do i t . .Sure, because i f something happens and t h i s guy panics and takes o f f with the car\u2014which has happened, but not to me. (#36) The d r i v e r may or may not leave the engine running. #45 indicated that to leave the motor running would draw suspicion. When I asked about the r i s k of the car not s t a r t i n g immediately when needed, he pointed out that t h i s i s unlikely, and that i t i s one of those r i s k s they have to take. In other words, the elimination of some r i s k s would create even greater ones. 283 NOW WHAT DOES HE DO WITH THE CAR? The c a r \u2014 the doors are open, and i t stays l i k e that. Now I look at the people i n the s t r e e t \u2014 I watch them so that nobody w i l l come near the car. IS IT PARKED WHERE ALL THE OTHER CARS ARE? No, no parking\u2014we don't care about parking, whether or not. .We drive right i n front of the bank where the door i s the closest to i t , even i f i t ' s on the sidewalk, and there's a thing that goes on the sidewalk. And i f there's one there we go right on the sidewalk. Period! Because we figure that as soon as we open the door of the car, we assume that the alarm i s going o f f right there. And we act accordingly. So we are tense right there, you know. We are f u l l of tension. And once the action starts, you got no tension any more. x You know, you're so busy watching; looking there, watching there\u2014'On the f l o o r there!' Watching that car pass by, you know. 'Get the fuck out of there!' And things l i k e that, you know. You're not a f r a i d anymore. But I'm a f r a i d before I go into the bank though. The moment I s i t on that back seat or I'm driv i n g that car coming to the bank, I'm looking a l l over the place and I'm f u l l of tension. I'm ready to bunch up. I f somebody would say, 'booi' behind The lack of tension while on the job i s i n contrast to the anxiety of the employees--an anxiety induced and delibe-r a t e l y aggravated by the . robbers.. I t must also be viewed as a necessary s k i l l \u2014 t h e s i t u a t i o n demands quick r a t i o n a l de-cis i o n s , where mistakes may well mean death. 284 me, you know, 1 1d go right through that r o o f i 1 WHAT ABOUT THE DRIVER\u2014IS HE WEARING A HOOD? Everything. WELL, AREN'T YOU BEING NOTICED THEN, BY PEOPLE ON THE STREET? I t ' s funny. I t ' s funny how people\u2014I've noticed that. I t ' s been noted t o o \u2014 t h a t most o f - . - I ' l l t e l l you more than t h a t \u2014 on three banks we walked into the bank, we got out, and the people were walking by, and they Tn contrast: NOW SOME OF THE GUYS HAVE BEEN SAYING THAT THEY'RE PRETTY NERVOUS AT THIS STAGE. WAS THAT YOHR EXPERIENCE? No, n o \u2014 I never got nervous. To me i t was just l i k e going to work, just a business. Just l i k e getting up and hav-ing a shave and having coffee and going to work. WHAT ABOUT BEFOREHAND? YOU KNOW, SOME OF THE GUYS HAVE BEEN SAYING THEY NEEDED A SHOT OF WHIS-KEY BEFOREHAND. I never d i d . I f e l t i f I needed li q u o r or dope, I shouldn't be going i n the f i r s t place. I didn't need any crutch to support me. (#7) Another bank robber noted that i t i s e s s e n t i a l for the doorman to have a gun. He f e l t that the other two accomplices do not necessarily need to be armed, and that he would only have them carry guns i f they had the experience to use them with d i s c r e t i o n . The man with experience c a r r i e s the gun, he saids The reason he c a r r i e s the gun i s that he won't p u l l the t r i g g e r right away. Everybody i s nervous; i f a guy i s too nervous you don't give him a g u n \u2014 i t ' s too dangerous. (#39) He emphasized the nervous tension which precedes a holdup: You f e e l the need of a shot of liquo r before going o u t \u2014 t h i s i s a hazard. Some guys take too much and don't know what they are doing. (#39) Getting the money i s the easiest job for the least experienced or nervous person. (#41) This i s the most purely manual aspect of bank robbery aside from d r i v i n g . 2 8 5 t h o u g h t i t was H a l l o w e ' e n o r s o m e t h i n g p h o n e y . T h e y d i d n ' t know i t was s o m e t h i n g r e a l h a p p e n -i n g . 2 Y o u k n o w , t h e y r e a l i z e w h e n p e o p l e s t a r t t o s c r e a m , ' H o l d u p , b a n d i t ! ' , and t h i n g s l i k e t h a t . T h e t h e y s a y , ' O h my g o d \u2014 h o w c l o s e I was t o t h a t g u y ! ' Y o u k n o w . S O , Y O U ' R E NOT GOING TO B E BOTHERED ABOUT A PARK S P O T ? Oh n o , n o t i n a p r o v i n c i a l . I n M o n t r e a l y o u w o u l d h a v e t o . Y o u k n o w , b e c a u s e t h e n t h e p o l i c e a r e p a t r o l l i n g t h e s t r e e t a l l t h e t i m e . Y e h . Y o u g o t t o p a r k a t t h e p r o p e r p l a c e o r o t h e r w i s e y o u a r e g o i n g t o h a v e opposition T h i s i l l u s t r a t e s how t h e p u b l i c i s a c c u s t o m e d t o some d e v i a t i o n f r o m t h e n o r m a l i n s o c i e t y , a n d how t h e r o b b e r c a n t a k e a d v a n t a g e o f t h i s f a c t i n h i s i l l e g i t i m a t e a c t i v i t y . 2 T h e f o l l o w i n g r o b b e r h a s a d i f f e r e n t c o n c e p t i o n o f how p a s s e r s - b y a r e l i k e l y t o r e a c t a n d s o h i s p r o c e d u r e s a l s o d i f f e r a c c o r d i n g l y : OKAY T H E N . Y O U COME TO T H E DOOR. Y O U O P E N I T , Y O U L E T T H E O T H E R GUY I N . T H E M I N U T E H E ' S I N H E P U L L S H I S MASK DOWN, I S T H A T I T ? N o , u s u a l l y r i g h t i n t h e c a r . Y o u s ^ y o u r c a r d o o r i s n e v e r a c t u a l l y s h u t . Y o u s e e , l i k e - -I ' l l b e l a y i n g r i g h t down i n t h e b a k . Y o u c a n ' t s e e me, a n d t h e man i n t h e f r o n t s e a t , h e ' l l b e l a y i n g down i n t h e f r o n t . S o a c t u a l l y a l l y o u ' r e g o i n g t o s e e d r i v i n g u p i s j u s t o n e m a n . S o t h e m i n u t e h e d r i v e s u p t o t h e b a n k h e t e l l s y o u , ' O k a y ! ' S o y o u j u s t k i c k t h e d o o r o p e n w i t h y o u r f o o t . S o a s t h e d o o r o p e n s y o u r e a c h u p l i k e t h i s a n d p u l l y o u r m a s k d o w n , s o a s t h e d o o r o p e n s y o u r m a s k i s o n . S:o y o u b a r g e r i g h t i n a n d h i t t h e d o o r . W E L L , S U P P O S E Y O U RUN I N T O A F A I R NUMBER OF P E D E S T R I A N S ? W e l l , y o u r l o o k o u t man t e l l s y o u . I f h e t h i n k s t h e r e ' s s o m e t h i n g g o i n g o n h e t e l l s y o u t o h a n g t o u g h f o r a s e c o n d . T i l l t h e p e r s o n p a s s e s ; o r i f i t d o e s n ' t l o o k r i g h t , h e ' l l d r i v e r i g h t t h r o u g h . B u t y o u c a n ' t d r i v e u p w i t h t h r e e p e o p l e i n t h e c a r , b e c a u s e a u t o m a t i c a l l y y o u ' r e u n d e r s u s p i c i o n . S o y o u k e e p r i g h t down l o w a n d y o u h o l d t h e d o o r w i t h y o u r h a n d . M o r e o r l e s s a j a r , a n d y o u just g i v e i t a k i c k w i t h y o u r f o o t a n d o f f y o u g o , a n d t h e n y o u j u s t w a l k r i g h t i n . ' C a u s e y o u ' r e n e v e r t o o f a r f r o m t h e d o o r , b e c a u s e y o u d r i v e r i g h t u p i n f r o n t o f t h e d o o r . (#7) 286 right there and then. WELL, WELL. NOW, LET'S STAY WITH,THE SEQUENCE HERE. YOU GENERALLY TRAVEL IN TWO CARS? Two cars, yes. Two stolen cars. Like, my car and my part-ner' s car. Two guys per car, you see, and the stolen car, we drive them two days before. They're parked there and they're there, and we drive back with our own car. Because these are the cars that we're going to go through the roadblock with, and the two sto-len cars, they are going to be dumped out or sometimes we reverse the tank and we set f i r e to i t or sometimes we don't even bother with that. This i s an example of how the very routine aspects of everyday l i f e are pertinent considerations for the bank robber While interviewing an urban bank robber I had l i t t l e success i n having him respond to the-question, \"What time of day i s the best time to h i t a bank?\" He f i n a l l y responded by saying, \"Well, you can't t e l l , you see\u2014you-may not be able to f i n d a parking spot.\" He noted that sometimes robbers are obliged to cruise around the block repeatedly before a suitable park-ing spot m a t e r i a l i z e s . The urban bank robber cannot double-park, nor can he park some distance from the bank. The prob-lem of parking, which may be only.an annoyance to the shopper, i s a v i t a l consideration to the bank robbers. Furthermore, since parking space apparently a f f e c t s one's business, banks, in order to draw customers by providing parking space, also draw unwanted \"customers\". The urban parking consideration makes further planning d i f f i c u l t . Knowledge of p o l i c e p a t r o l must by synchronized with the unknown parking factor and parking opportunities vary within the urban s e t t i n g . One robber pointed out that parking i s seldom a problem at a suburban centre. In those instances where parking v i o l a t i o n s are anticipated, the robber follows what he considers to be \"normal\" parking violations, for exampl v i o l a t i o n s which w i l l not a t t r a c t attention. Just as persons i n o f f i c e s of law enforcement construct concepts of the \"norma or \" t y p i c a l \" crime, so i t i s assumed by the robber that the layman distinguishes between routine parking v i o l a t i o n s and a t y p i c a l ones: SUPPOSE YOU CAN'T FIND A PARKING SPOT? Oh, we double-park. You see, i n these small towns, e s p e c i a l l y country towns, you see, we're d r i v i n g a pick-up truck; i f people see a truck double-parked, motor running, they think i t ' s a farmer who's gone into the bank for a minute\u2014so i t takes away a l l suspicion. We make sure i t ' s an old truck, but with a f a i r l y good motor i n i t . (#8} 287 WELL, LET'S SEE NOW. YOU'RE TWO MEN TO THE CAR WHEN YOU DRIVE INTO THE TOWN HERE. And you know\u2014suppose the bank i s here and the street i s here, and there's a., connecting street here. Now we stop the f i r s t car here. We got hoods on. But as you stop here the two guys goes out and I.'m right i n front. ' They just jump i n and we keep going. And then we come back and.if everything goes good, everything goes good here we don't worry about that car\u2014we leave i t there. We just keep going. Because t h i s car i s com-p l e t e l y useless to us anymore. This car i s just put there i n case of emergency, I SEE. Diagram; One stolen car l e f t here. (To be used only i f other car f a i l s , ) Bank Personal cars l e f t here Z X AND YOU SAY THAT THERE'S NO SET ORDER AS TO WHO GETS IN THE BANK FIRST? No. The one ' who runs fastest i s the one who goes i n . I stay at the door, but suppose now I run faster than,my p a r t n e r \u2014 I go i n . The f i r s t thing I d o \u2014 I ' l l jump over the counter 1, you know. I give the order 'On the f loor'.' , and then everybody goes on the f l o o r , and I ' l l smash somebody\u2014the one who i s closest to me. I'm going to have to smash him i n the face. 'On the f l o o r , i n the corner.' 2 Now, by that time, by the time I say that, my three other part-ners are i n . The one i s already going into the o f f i c e and 'I backstep right to the door, Even the most important p o s i t i o n i s temporarily l e f t vacant i n the inter e s t of speed. I t i s most important that the t e l l e r s are moved away from t h e i r counters just as quickly as possible. 2 When r e c a l l i n g another robbery, #28 elaborated further on the psychology of t h i s i n i t i a l violence. See discussion p.3 288 and then I take my p o s i t i o n . And now I watch the car outside. I watch the employees. I f someone gets up, or something l i k e that. And I watch the people which are on thxs side of the counter a l s o . 1 NOW, IF YOUR BANK IS BUILT LIKE THIS 2, LIKE MANY OF THEM ARE, WITH THE DOOR HERE, AND THE BANKING COUNTER,, AND THIS IS THE MANAGER'S OF-FICE\u2014YOU'VE GOT TO JUMP OVER THAT COUNTER. THERE'S A DOOR HERE AND A DOOR THERE. IF YOU MUST JUMP OVER THIS WAY, HOW DO YOU MANAGE THIS FELLOW IN THE FRONT? I don't worry about him. I f I'm the one that comes i n the bank f i r s t , I don't worry.about him. I just jump in the corner herre, on top here, and the door w i l l l i k e l y be closed anyway, eh? And there w i l l probably be someone having an interview with t h i s manager. I don't bother with him. Because the manager a l s o \u2014 t h e y know about that. They s t i l l freeze i n t h e i r o f f i c e , just think-ing, 'Is that a joke, or something?', you know. And t h e \u2014 b y the time he s t a r t s to react, l i k e i t takes only maybe three seconds, the whole sequence there. I give a y e l l , ' A l l on the f l o o r ! ' and then by the time I give my y e l l people look at me\u2014they are kind of undecided and I ' l l smash the f i r s t guy and back I go, because my partner i s on t h i s side of the coun-te r and one i s busting the door open and 'Out you gpi', and there you are, you know. And I'm back at the door h e r e \u2014 I take my p o s i t i o n . OKAY, YOU'RE BACK HERE. NOW, TWO FELLOWS, HO, THREE ? Three. We usually work four. Now, one guy goes i n here\u2014he : gets everything The robber i s continuously assessing the probable mean-ing of h i s victims' movements. 1, 2 Diagram of bank as sketched by #28: Manager's O f f i c e Main Entrance 289 i n there. One w i l l go to the t o i l e t , or wherever the washroom or the employees wash-room\u2014sometimes they are downstairs, you know. He goes down there and he cleans everything out there, and the t h i r d one WHAT DOES HE CLEAN OUT THERE? Well, he gathers a l l the people\u2014there may be\u2014he bursts\u2014sometimes he got guys with t h e i r pants half-way down\u2014 grabs the guy, 'Up you go!' Yeh, no choice. You can't say, 'Well, have your crap and please come up', you know. ' MY GOODNESS\u2014WHY DON'T YOU JUST HAVE HIM STAY THERE AND JUST BE SURE NONE OF THEM LEAVE? Oh well, we can't because you see, t h i s guy here, by the time he stays down there a l l the time, suppose actions s t a r t here at the door\u2014somebody starts popping shot i n through that window\u2014I want to --I want t h i s guy to be up there pretty fast, you know. And he leaves that guy down there, you know-how do I know that he hasn't got a gun concealed i n there somewhere down there? H e ' l l bring them up and; push them a l l up i n one corner. Now we know that a l l the people are i n one cor n e r \u2014 t h e y cannot be of any harm to us. I f there happened to be a po-l i c e o f f i c e r i n the bunch, I'm watching that guy there a l l the time. I f a guy goes and makes a move there, he got h i s hands on h i s head you know. And i f he makes a move I got time to react to him, and I say, 'What are you doing there?' And i f I got a suspicion i t may be a p o l i c e o f f i c e r I. may just knock him off, you know\u2014give him a good blow i n the head and knock him cold, or things l i k e that. But you cannot have dispersion i n the bank. I f the guy i s down near here, and suddenly action occur, and t h i s guy wants to know what's going on, and so you have to leave t h i s guy here and run ups t a i r s . NOW, BANKS ARE MOSTLY BUILT THE SAME WAY, I GUESS. Right. BUT SOMETIMES THEY ARE A LITTLE DIFFERENT. DO YOU, BEFORE YOU COME THERE THKT DAY, GO THROUGH THAT BANK AND SEE WHERE THE WASHROOM IS, AND WHERE THIS IS \u00a3ND WHERE THAT IS? No. Sometime we do that but very often not, because I don't want to be i d e n t i f i e d af-t e r . OH, I SEE. But sometime we know\u2014you see, the p r o v i n c i a l banks i n '_ \u2022, for example. They b u i l d i n a c e r t a i n manner. A National Bank maybe i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t manner, but 290 i t ' s so close that a f t e r you have done maybe two or three banks i t comes automatic .--just two or three. I t ' s r e f l e x action. You get i n and you see that the manager's o f f i c e - -you don't have to worry, i s t h e \u2014 i s t h i s the assistant, yes i t i s \u2014 i t ' s the manager's of-f i c e . You burst the door open and see what's there and push them out. Period. And you see a door connecting downstairs, well, right away, you s a y \u2014 t h i s i s a bank that I'm sure that must be the t o i l e t i n there, you know. And away out one goes, you know. DO YOU EVER SMASH INTO THE WOMEN'S SEC-TION? Oh yeh, of course. You have to get everybody o u t \u2014 I mean there's n o \u2014 i t ' s an emergency action. You know, we don't have time to look and say, 'Well, I'm sorry madam', or anything. .We don't have the urge or sexual urge or anything l i k e that, you know. I t ' s 'Out you go! And f a s t i ' And probably the wo-men, when they r e a l i z e that, they are so ex-ci t e d that\u2014'Out you go!' and she goes. She doesn't even r e a l i z e h e r s e l f that she's i n a pecul i a r p o s i t i o n . NO, I'M SURE I WOULDN'T EITHER. That's r i g h t . But then, by the time the shock, you know\u2014she goes into a state of shock--well, we're gone. OKAY NOW, ONE GUY IS CLEANING OUT THE BATH-ROOMS,. ONE GUY IS IN THE MANAGER'S OFFICE, ONE \u2014YOU'RE AT THE DOOR, AND ONE FELLOW IS SCOOP-ING UP THE MONEY. Scooping\u2014well, f i r s t you make sure that a l l the people are i n the corner. Take a fast look into the vault, and then he scoops the cash. Then, by that time the two other guys w i l l enter the vault with the manager, and we have\u2014we t r y to have the f i r s t safe opened. There's always a big safe--there's four t e l l e r s i n that bank. The a s s o c i a t i o n \u2014 insurance association, w i l l not cover more than f i v e thousand d o l l a r s , for example, i n t e l l e r ' s , where they c a l l 'risky area', right? So now they have the f i r s t door in the safe and there's four small other safes. You know, a case l i k e that. Now you c a l l ' f i r s t t e l l e r ' . F i r s t t e l l e r comes i n and opens her safe. Now, any-thing i n excess of her money she puts i n that safe u n t i l four o'clock and then she counts i t . Now you scoop that money in, and you open 291 them four safes. We never have time go go for the treasury , which i s another s a f e \u2014 that s i t s way at the\u2014most of the time at the end of the v a u l t 3 . And t h i s big safe i s what they c a l l the treasury. A l l the money, r o l l i n g money, you know, of the bank i s there. So we get them four as fast as we can. NOW, THOSE FOUR HAVE TO BE OPENED BY THE TELLERS? Yeh\u2014we c a l l them ' f i r s t t e l l e r , se-cond t e l l e r , t h i r d and f o u r t h 1 . SO, THEY'VE GOT TO COME AND OPEN THESE? Yes. Well, we get the manager to c a l l them. You know, we grab the manager by the head, and you know, 'Come on, move'.1 ' C a l l the f i r s t t e l l e r , you cocksuckerl' And he c a l l s them in, Mrs. so and so, and we're ready to go. And they are a l l pretty excited and they don't l i k e the pressure of sharp commands l i k e that, and d i r t y language\u2014we use very often too, you know. To upset them as much as possible we can. Don't l e t them think\u2014we don't want them to think, you know. Get them as nervous as p o s s i b l e \u2014 i n a h y s t e r i a s i t u a t i o n , where they are just ready to collapse, you know.^ DOESN'T THAT PRODUCE THE DANGER OF SOMEONE IN FACT GETTING HYSTERICAL? Yeh, i t did on me once. A woman\u2014she was maybe for t y f i v e or f i f t y or s o \u2014 a n e l d e r l y woman. She had a sat-c h e l \u2014 i s that a satchel\u2014how do you c a l l a wo-men's...? PURSE? Purse. And when she g o t \u2014 when she went into the corner f i r s t and then xNote the robber's above average knowledge of banking procedures. 2 Although the r u r a l bank robber has not the time to get a l l the money kept i n the bank, he does attempt access to considerably more than h i s urban ccmterpart. Urban robbers who spend less than two minutes i n a bank, w i l l not ask for any of the money i n the vault, but must be content with t i l l money. (That i s , unless they are programmed for special monies, such as safety deposit monies, to be discussed l a t e r 3 Uniform architecture, undoubtedly an economic conside-ration for banks, i s of advantage to the bank robber as well 4 Some robbers attempt to d i s p e l fear, others induce i t . (See discussion on page 312 of t h i s paper.) 292 she backtracked and she said, 'I want to get out of here, I want to get out of here'. ' And now, I saw her right away\u2014she's h y s t e r i c a l . I got a machine gun x and the f i r s t thing that I always do on a job l i k e t h i s , never l e t the person be able to touch my weapon, because that's where accidents mostly occur. I f I got a gun I'm pointing at you, you grab my gun and the tr i g g e r blows and I k i l l you and I have no intention. I keep the damn thing away from me, you know. And I put myself i n a p o s i t i o n i f the guy comes\u2014I could s t i l l cover myself, or b l a s t him i f he's dangerous. I f he's i n a state of hyst e r i a I pushed away, okay. This lady\u2014she went for the door there; I just backed away and I held my machine gun l i k e t h i s , and I said, 'Go.' you know. And she\u2014that's what she wanted\u2014I knew t h a t \u2014 s h e wanted to get out of there, you know. And when she went by me I was j u s t \u2014 o n e of my ha n d s \u2014 f l a p ! Right on the side of h e r \u2014 s h e f e l l r i g ht on the f l o o r and she cooled down. She started to cry, and she said, 'Don't shoot; mister'.' I said, 'Sure, I won't shoot y o u \u2014 just go back into the corner'. And she went on the fl o o r , you know\u2014going back into the corner. Well, I didn't have no other opposi-t i o n from that. But that's where they say i t i s dangerous sometime with a person l i k e that. I f I had had no experience, for example\u2014if I would have been i n a po s i t i o n of my f i r s t bank robbery, I would have probably shot her right there and then, because I would have been i n a state of shock myself. You see, I would have said, 'Well, she cannot go out, I cannot permit her to go out!' You know, and I'm a f r a i d she comes close to me, and I would shoot her. But today I wouldn't do that. I SEE. WOULD YOU SAY THAT THE MORE EXPERI-ENCED BANK ROBBERS ARE LESS DANGEROUS? They're less dangerous\u2014the less dangerous they become. IS THAT RIGHT? I mean\u2014providing that i t ' s not a p o l i c e opposition. You know, I mean\u2014to a c i v i l i a n i n a bank they' re not harmful-<-there i s no danger i n t h a t \u2014 t h e r e ' s no danger attached to that providing that there's no weapon being shown. But as soon as somebody should p u l l a Again, there i s a lack of consensus as to which weapons are best. One was firm i n h i s b e l i e f that a shotgun i s best \"because you can cover everyone i n a bank with a shotgun\". (#41) 29,3: weapon somewhere, and when that is--you know, a b u l l e t may go astray and k i l l somebody. But normally speaking, i t ' s less dangerous having to do with professional criminals i n banks l i k e that than having to do with what we c a l l the amateur. OKAY. HOW LONG DOES THE WHOLE OPERATION TAKE? HOW LONG ARE YOU IN THE BANK? I t would never exoes-d more than four to seven minutes, at the most. I don't know--depending on t h e \u2014 on howwa, how much time i s devoted into having the safe opened inside the vault, you know.x AND ALL THAT TIME YOUR CAR IS SITTING OUT HERE. Oh yes. AND YOU ARE STANDING HERE, WATCHING IT. .Yeh. IS THE MOTOR RUNNING? Oh yeh. Everything i s running\u2014the car door open. SUPPOSING SOMEBODY WANTS TO GET IN THERE? I shoot. YOU SHOOT AT THEM? Oh yeh. I would just open the door and say, 'Out, or I shootl\" I would s a y \u2014 i f a guy comes into my car and Regarding time-duration and factors which determine time, four to. seven -minutes are usual i n r u r a l robbery. This \u2022 i s based upon the length of time i t would take for the l o c a l policeman to augment h i s force. Another factor, not mentioned by robbers, i s that only i n places where customer t r a f f i c i s l i g h t , could a l l incoming customers be accommodated .for t h i s length of time. A busy urban bank might well become crowded in t h i s length .of time: NOW THIS ALWAYS AMAZES ME. HOW DO YOU KEEP THESE GIRLS AT THE COUNTER FROM PRESSING THESE ALARM BUTTONS? Well, sometimes you can't t e l l , sometimes i t s very d i f f i c u l t . This i s why you can spend only such a short time in the bank. 'Cause i n these cages, i f there's a high counter you cannot see t h e i r hands when you f i r s t walk i n . I f they happen to spot you f i r s t , they've only got to move t h e i r hand a matter of inches and they can press a s i l e n t alarm, or somebody could be standing at the counter and he just needs to move h i s foot a few inches and he could press a s i l e n t alarm. This i s why you're i n the bank only maybe at the most 35-40 seconds, 'cause you've got to be out of there\u2014you can't stand no three or four minutes i n the bank. By that time the p o l i c e are there and the whole place i s surrounded. So you can't count on them not pressing the s i l e n t alarm\u2014you've got to go fast and take no chances. (#7: urban bank robber) The technology demands speed: \"HOW DOES THE GUY WHO'S COLLEC-TING THE MONEY KNOW WHEN THE TIME IS UP?' \"I usually h o l l e r . I t e l l him, ' t h i r t y seconds, l e t ' s go!' You can count o f f 30 or 40 seconds pretty accurately.\" (#7) 294 sees the door i s open and I assume right away that t h i s guy\u2014he's a p o l i c e o f f i c e r or some-th i n g \u2014 h e has no business there. And I would shoot, probably very close to him, i n order for him to duck, and that would be the f i r s t thing I'd do. Then I would' bust the door open and go aft e r t h i s guy. You see, so he won't have time to react there. In case he's armed. You see, i f he's a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , f o r j example, that's the best way to catch them. You shoot f i r s t , close to them, and duck down. Now he i s i n a state of shock for maybe 2 or 3 sec-onds. By the time he got h i s gun, and he doesn't know now\u2014he's ducked down--he doesn't know where you are. I'm out of that d o o r \u2014 I'm running. And I got into that\u2014behind that car, you know. One way I shoot him and then the other way I gethim cold turkey by the way back. And i f he's got a gun, I ' l l probably shoot, because I don't want to take a chance for him to turn around you know, and shoot at me. SUPPOSING A CUSTOMER WANTS TO COME INTO THE BANK WHILE YOU ARE IN THERE? Oh yeh\u2014he comes i n . He goes with the r e s t . SO YOU LET THEM ALL IN? Oh yes. He goes with the r e s t . 1 I t i s important to bank robbers that customers come a l l the way into the bank: WHAT DO YOU DO WITH CUSTOMERS WHO COME IN WHILE YOU'RE IN THERE? Oh, I make them l i e right down, l i e right down. Actually, not too many come i n . You see, you're i n there only about 30 seconds. So i f somebody does come, why you l e t them i n and you're there and you say, 'Down*.* and they j u s t \u2014 u s u a l l y just get right down\u2014they just drop right down\u2014they don't even look. SUPPOSE I'M COMING IN AND I HAVE THE DOOR HALFWAY OPEN AND SEE WHAT'S GOING ON, AND THEN I DECIDE NOT TO ENTER\u2014WHAT WOULD YOU DO WITH A GUY LIKE THAT? Nothing. YOU MEAN YOU'D LET HIM GO? Well, the minute I sta r t chasing him I'm taking my eyes o f f the people and I'm leav-ing my partner unguarded. So usually when some-thing l i k e that happens, whether we're finished or whether there's other banks, we come right out. You know, u s u a l l y \u2014 a c t u a l l y they never a c t u a l l y see you i n there. I'm usually behind a p a r t i t i o n or something l i k e that. (#7) (He then goes on to repeat some of the d e t a i l already mentioned, but adds that they leave at a t e r r i f i c rate of speed. This i s i n contrast to some of the other reports I've had.) 29 5, SUPPOSE THE MANAGER DOESN'T COOPERATE? Ah, he w i l l cooperate, because there's two ways of having a manager very e a s i l y to cooperate. F i r s t of a l l t h i s guy's i n a state of shock. You have hoods on you head, you have a heavy weapon in your hand and you see two or three guys there, swearing language\u2014he knows we're vulgar--he knows\u2014we made him know that we are br u t a l , sub-human bastards, you know. We project that im-age to him, you know. And usually they are i n a stcte of shock, but i f i t ' s a very cold custo-mer we would say, 'Well, -listen, you open the door or we shoot the f i r s t one I ' And one of my partners would grab t h e \u2014 a woman-.by her hair, you know, and she would scream every time, cause i t ' s sorrowful, you know, and then the man he would say, 'Well, these damn fucking subhuman bastards, he's going to k i l l her1, you know, and t h i s , you walk two or three times l i k e that and usually h e ' l l go a l l the way. OKAY. YOUR SEVEN MINUTES ARE UP. NOW YOU'RE GOING TO LEAVE THIS PLACE, RIGHT? Right. WHO GETS OUT FIRST? I do. YOU GO OUT FIRST? That's the bloody part of i t . I got to go f i r s t . I run. You see, I open the door\u2014the door i s usually kept open at a l l times anyway, because i n them banks you open the door l i k e t h i s , and you put the thing l i k e t h i s , and I would take a run--I run\u2014the car i s never far-tier away than, for example, twice the width of that room here, and not even that; to get into the car I'd jump in, you see, i n the back seat. And the d r i v e r comes second^, and the t h i r d and fourth. And we go. WHY DO YOU SAY THAT YOU DON'T LIKE TO LEAVE FIRST? Because I'm a f r a i d a l l the time that one of them second world war heroes, or one of them square Johns maybe have a r i f l e at the other side of that house there i n the street or something, and he's waiting for the f i r s t bastard to get out, and give him a potshot, you know. So that's why I'm always l e a r y \u2014 l o , how do you say that? LEARY? L e a r y \u2014 I look to them window and I haven't too much time to devote there m y s e l f \u2014 I got to get out fast, you know, and i t ' s very hard to look inside a As indicated e a r l i e r , some urban bank robbers prefer that the d r i v e r remain i n the car and act as a look-out man. He w i l l also have the car already moving as the robbers catch i t 'on the f l y ' . 296 window\u2014you just have to take a chance. So that's why I t r i e d to make i t as fast as I can. (LAUGHTER.) HAVE.YOU EVER BEEN SHOT AT, WHILE YOU WERE GOING OUT? No, but my partner has\u2014he l o s t h i s thumb l i k e that, and he t o l d me the story the same night, you know--he scared the s h i t out of me. LOOK AT THAT.. SO YOU SAY WHILE YOU'RE DOING THAT YOU'RE NOT SCARED? No\u2014before and a f t e r . DO YOU NEED A BIT OF GOOD STRONG WHIS-KEY BEFORE? No\u2014the guy who would\u2014no. The only thing I do\u2014there's a \u2014 I t e l l you another thing I do\u2014there's a \u2014 t o me\u2014I drink a glass of porter with two eggs at six o'clock i n the morning. And I don't drink anything else t i l l the job i s over. Another of my partner, he eats six hot dog, two hamburger and 2 cup of cof f e e \u2014 t h a t ' s h i s breakfast before the holcV-up. Another guy don't drink fuck a l l \u2014 h e takes a glass of water. And you know, there's nothing. IT JUST DEPENDS WITH DIFFERENT PEOPLE? Yeh, that's for sure. But none of us would be tolerated i f he had alcohol into him, or goofball o r \u2014 t h e p o l i c e they are quite fast to say that the guys were goo,fed up, you know. Goofballs and things l i k e that\u2014some of them are, but not any of the gang that I was working with. Because i t ' s very dangerous. Because a guy now i s overly too much\u2014overly confident\u2014he's overly confident to the point that he i s a danger to myself more than he i s a danger to society. DO YOU CARRY ANY IDENTIFICATION ON YOU WHILE YOU'RE DOING A BANK? We're stripped. JUST THE ARMY UNIFORM,? Just those things. Coveralls, you know\u2014there's nothing, no other i d e n t i f i c a -t i o n whatsoever. OKAY. YOU LEAVE THE BANK. YOU GET IN THE CAR. AND YOU LEAVE THAT ONE CAR WHERE IT IS. YOU COME DOWN THE ROAD, YOU MOVE IN HERE. Right. That's right, we move there. We move there because our two cars i s there. There's grass there, usually a soft earth there. Now, we get out and we s t r i p near the hole there that we have i n the earth there, while one guy w i l l stand guard somewhere i n case somebody has f o l -lowed, but that's v e r y \u2014 i t never.happens. And we s t a r t to dismantle machine, guns. We put 297 them there and we keep one gun for the guy who i s going to drive the stolen c a r \u2014 h e drives the stolen car. One good car in front, one good car behind, the stole car i n between. And that's that. So, once we come there, he jumps i n the c a r \u2014 h e downs the car here. Now he gets i n \u2014 h e dresses, you know, because the guy got h i s c l o t h i n g - - ! got h i s clothing--his clothing stays with me\u2014I got h i s clothing i n my car. Now, he comes bare naked there\u2014don't forget, he's a l l bare naked there i n that stolen car. The only thing, he has a p l a s t i c cover. YOU ARE DRESSED? Oh y e h \u2014 i n my own c a r \u2014 I won't go near that stolen car. You se e \u2014 s o he gets out of the car here and comes bare., naked i n that car of mine and then we star t to drive o f f . And then we don't care i f the p o l i c e arrest us or even i f we're just two miles away from there. WHERE DOES THE MONEY STAY? In that hole, everything stays i n that hole. AND THE POLICE WON'T FIND IT THERE? Well, they never find i t . How can they f i n d i t ? You know, t h e y \u2014 somebody would have to t e l l them i t ' s there. You know, or t h e y \u2014 I can't possibly see how they can prove i t . SEE, THIS IS THE ROAD NOW. Right. NOW, YOURE DRIVING IN YOUR LEGITIMATE CAR. Right. Cars. NOW, WHERE WOULD IT BE SET? ABOUT OVER HERE SOMEWHERE? Well, i t a l l depends now. You got to be c a r e f u l . Suppose there i s a con-necting road h e r e \u2014 a connecting road\u2014one here and t h i s i s the main\u2014the road that comes up here. This i s t h e \u2014 l e t ' s say the main highway right over h e r e \u2014 t h e y ' l l make the road block here, because t h i s i s a possible connection road, so they make the road block here, espe-c i a l l y i n here\u2014anywhere\u2014anywhere at a l l . NOW, THAT FISHING THING YOU TALKED ABOUT\u2014 THE LAKE WOULD BE SOMEWHERE IN HERE, I SUPPOSE. Yeh, suppose there's no lake t h e r e \u2014 w e ' l l look for a creek, or a\u2014any god-damn t h i n g \u2014 a small thing, just to say that we have an excuse for a law, you know, for a point of law. You know, i f w e \u2014 i f our lawyer says, 'What were you doing i n that region?' 'Well, we were f i s h i n g i n that region. You know, we f e l t l i k e going for an outdoor going, you know\u2014going i n a f i e I d . f o r a\u2014having a \u2014 e n j o y ' ourself.' We had a case of beer i n the car\u2014we had f i s h i n g rods and things l i k e that, n a t u r e \u2014 a compass, you know, 298 a compass and things l i k e that, to go into the bush. So they\u2014we got something to j u s t i f y our being in that region, for the lawyer. In case i t goes to court. That's the main thing. And then we go through the roadblock. NOW, I WOULD IMAGINE THESE FELLOWS AT THE ROAD BLOCK WOULD FAIRLY SOON KNOW WHOM TO LOOK FOR. Yes, they do, but then, what can they do? What can they do? The po l i c e of-f i c e r s , you know him, l e t ' s say you recognize me\u2014well, I say, 'How are you doing?' 'Weill How are you doing I You bastard1 You just been there, eh?' 'Well, gee, I don't know anything\u2014I just come from the creek there.' 'Is that a fact? Let's search the fuckin' car f i r s t , right?' 'Okay, I ' l l help y o u \u2014 I'11 help you search my c a r \u2014 y o u want me to s t r i p right h e r e \u2014 I ' l l s t r i p with pleasure.' You know, the more they search me the better you give me a beef i n case I go to court. Because my lawyer w i l l question you, and as soon as you say that you've searched t h i s person so thoroughly that you couldnt barely pass a d o l l a r b i l l there, then home-free I am. AND HE CAN'T ARREST YOU, IF HE HASN'T ANY_ THING ON YOU? Well, he could possibly say, 'Well, okay, I ' l l bring you i n for, say what--24 hours.' Well, I don't care about that. I ' l l go 24 hours anytime f o r f i v e thousand d o l l a r s \u2014 y o u know that part. WHAT WOULD YOUR NORMAL TAKE BE IN A BANK LIKE THAT\u2014A SMALL PLACE? Yeh\u2014they never have reached more than twenty or twenty-five thousand at the most. That's the very most. .SO THAT GIVES YOU FOR FOUR PEOPLE...? That\u2022s about f i v e thousand each. Well, usually we average about three thousand each. THREE THOUSAND EACH. OKAY. NOW, HOW SOON DO YOU COME BACK FOR THE MONEY IN THE BUSH? We usually come back somewhere between four and seven days. So, because they're smart, them guys t o o \u2014 t h e y know we plant the money. I mean, theywatch us. They know my address, they got them ghost\u2014how do you say that, them.... (#28) 29 9 2. Example No. 2: (#2) OKAY. HOW MUCH TIME PRECEDED THE EVENT IN TERMS OF PLANNING? Uh\u2014about two weeks. That i s , I started looking at i t two weeks af t e r I got out on b a i l . OKAY, AND WHAT DID YOU LOOK FOR AT THE RIVER HOTEL? Well, I had i t i n mind\u2014I knew they cashed cheques in the j o i n t . I t was more for speculation; I just went down on a Friday morning to see how they\u2014where they got that money from to cash the cheque. So I seen how they did i t and I started checking into i t . JUST SORT OF STOOD AROUND WATCHING? Oh n o \u2014 I not ex-a c t l y stood around. They have a parking l o t out i n front, and I had an idea--there's a bank right beside i t and a--I was pretty sure the money come from the bank, and I had gone--I went in a few times so that I could recognize the manager and the accountant. AND YOU SAW THEM TRANSFER IT TO CASH? Yes. SO\u2014WHAT DAY OF THE WEEK DID YOU DECIDE WAS THE BEST DAY? FRIDAY? Yeh\u2014well, n o \u2014 I went on a Thursday. I watched them Friday. I knew they cashed an awful l o t of cheques on Thursdays and Fridays. NOW, YOU WERE OUT ON BAIL\u2014YOU DECIDED TO GO OUT ON A THURSDAY, AND I WANT TO KNOW WHY A THURSDAY. Well, I had, l i k e I'd been going down every night to get an idea just who was doing what i n the j o i n t . Like at f i r s t I was thinking of maybe just grabbing the cheque\u2014-cashing book\u2014but being there were so many people around there i t would be pretty hard even early i n the morning. And while I was there on a Thursday I noticed that there was an awful l o t of people cashing cheques. So I checked and I pretty well counted i n my mind how many were cashing on Fridays, and I f i -gured there was more cash on Thursdays than on Fridays. So, you see, there's quite a few m i l l s around there, so I sat down and bought some beers for a couple of guys who work i n m i l l s , and just i n conversation you know-kind o f \u2014 t h e conversation got around to work-ing i n these m i l l s and that, and I mentioned that I knew a guy who worked at the m i l l and-who\u2014and the guy owed me some money and I asked them when\u2014when does t h i s group get paid. 'I'd l i k e to c o l l e c t \u2014 I ' d l i k e to catch 300 him on the day he gets paid.' So they t o l d me. So I f i g u r e d , w e l l , a l o t of these guys cash t h e i r cheques here and more do on Thursdays than on F r i d a y s , so sure enough I went down the n e x t \u2014 f o l l o w i n g week on Thursday, and sure enough\u2014and they come around l i k e a couple of t r a i n e d r a t s . So I s a i d , 'The money's ther e , a l r i g h t . I ' l l get i t here.' ALRIGHT. SO YOU DECIDED ON THURSDAY. WERE YOU ALL ALONE ON THIS CAPER? Oh yes. DID YOUR WIFE KNOW ABOUT THIS? Oh n o \u2014 n o . She was shocked. She knew i t was me a f t e r \u2014 a f t e r she heard i t on the r a d i o . 1 NOW THIS WAS YOUR FIRST REAL BANK ROBBERY, IS THAT RIGHT? W e l l , i t ' s the f i r s t one I've been c o n v i c t e d of, yes. OKAY, SO AGAIN, PRIOR TO GOING IN THE IE , WHAT TIME OF DAY WERE YOU GOING TO DO THIS? W e l l , they go i n t o the bank at 1 0 : 1 5 \u2014 a p p r o x i -mately 10:15 t o get a l l the money out. SO THAT'S WHEN YOU WERE GOING TO GO? Yeh. NOW TELL ME EXACTLY\u2014YOU TOOK A CAR OUT THERE I SUPPOSE. W e l l , . I had a \u2014 w e l l , i t was a h e l l of a t h i n g f o r one g u y - - i t was a l o t of work f o r one. See, I t r i e d t o get them th r e e d i f f e r e n t times, and e v e r y t h i n g - - e v e r y -time something happened. F o r one reason, or another, I cou l d n ' t do i t . I \u2014 w e l l , you know, t h e r e ' s a p a r k i n g l o t up above. I don't know i f you're f a m i l i a r or not w i t h the R i v e r H o t e l at a l l . There's a p a r k i n g l o t , l i k e , on the r o o f . U h \u2014 i t ' s hard t o e x p l a i n . They come out o f the bank and they go about t e n f e e t t h i s way beyond Mary D r i v e , and you know the alc o v e r i g h t b e s i d e the bank there--you know the Bowling A l l e y - - w e l l , t h e r e 1 3 a s t a i r w e l l t h e r e l e a d i n g up to the r o o f . So I \u2014 w e l l , the L a t e r i n the i n t e r v i e w I questioned #2 as t o how h i s w i f e \"knew\" t h a t i t was him from a d e s c r i p t i o n of the holdup on the r a d i o . He p o i n t e d out t h a t she knew he was t r y i n g t o make a l o t of money f a s t \u2014 s h e knew h i s work h a b i t s and h i s style. 2 In c o n t r a s t t o l a y p e r s p e c t i v e s , c r i m i n a l s r e c o g n i z e the q u a n t i t y of work i n v o l v e d as a s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r when as-s e s s i n g a caper. The amount of work r e q u i r e d may l e a d them t o abandon the caper, or t o r e c r u i t h e l p . I n a d d i t i o n t o a good d e a l of pre-event p l a n n i n g , a caper may r e q u i r e c o n s i d e r a b l e t r a v e l , odd hours and p o s s i b l y hours of hard p h y s i c a l work. I t may be t h a t the n e g l e c t of the p h y s i c a l dimensions of crime has l e d t o the p o p u l a r c o n c e p t i o n of the c r i m i n a l as being l a z y and i n t e r e s t e d o n l y i n \"easy money\". Respondents f r e q u e n t l y made r e f e r e n c e t o p h y s i c a l exhaustion when d e s c r i b i n g a caper. 301 f i r s t time I went I stole a car, and took i t down there and parked i t around midnight\u2014up above, right b e s i d e \u2014 r i g h t near where you come up the\u2014above onto the r o o f \u2014 t h e r e ' s sort of a protective area there. I parked i t there so i t would be right handy for me. So no one would s t e a l my parking space. And besides, I'm the world's worst car t h i e f . REALLY? Oh yes \u2014 s c a r e d to death. Scared to death of a stolen car. Scared to death. WELL, WHAT DID YOU DO\u2014DID YOU CHANGE THE PLATES RIGHT AWAY? No, no. I made sure the car wouldn't be reported stolen before...HOW DID YOU DO THAT? Well, I \u2014 I have a profession-a l secret, but i t ' s w e l l \u2014 I guess i t ' s pretty well known anyway. Well, we used to go up to the h o s p i t a l \u2014 t h e c i t y h o s p i t a l , and we'd watch the midnight s h i f t come o f f \u2014 t h e nurses. Now, these broads, they get off, say around midnight. And they go home, and the chances are they're not going to need t h e i r car u n t i l maybe about 11 or 12 o'clock the next day. So the car i s n ' t reported stolen. They're often the f i r s t to hear about itwhen the po-l i c e come down and t e l l them. 1 MY\u2014THAT'S VERY INTERESTING. THAT INVOLVES WORK AND PLANNING. Y e h \u2014 e s p e c i a l l y when you got to keep stealing them\u2014when the thing didn't come o f f . I couldn't leave the car there. When they sta r t finding stolen cars around there they're just l i a b l e to get curious; 'Well, look at t h a t \u2014 e v e r y week there's a stolen car up there.' So I had to take i t away.^ Here i s another example of how the criminal makes r e l e -vant interpretations of occupational routine. The p r o b a b i l i t y of a car being needed and consequently missed by i t s owner i s not constant, but varies with occupational demands. The layman i s reminded of t h i s on those occasions when h i s car breaks down, yet i t i s not a normally relevant consideration. From the c r i -minal's point of view i t i s p e r f e c t l y l o g i c a l to s t e a l a car that w i l l not be quickly m i s s e d \u2014 i n t h i s case from someone whose work s h i f t i s temporally opposite to h i s own. The layman does not normally think of shift-work i n terms of car usage. 2 He i s a f r a i d that the p o l i c e would c o r r e c t l y interpret the repeated presence 9 f the stolen car as having to do with an i n -tended crime. He i s assuming that the various intended proce-dural steps can be pieced together by the p o l i c e i f they are given t h i s f i r s t clue. That i s , the finding of a stolen car i s not interpreted by the p o l i c e as a completed event\u2014they must decide whether the stolen car symbolizes a completed joy-ride or an intended crime. 302 OKAY\u2014SO YOU'RE ON THE ROOF NOW, WITH THAT CAR. OKAY. AND THESE GUYS ARE COMING THROUGH THE. BANK- WAS THAT WHERE YOU WERE GOING TO STOP THEM? Y e h \u2014 r i g h t i n the alcove. Like I s a y \u2014 I was down there on three d i f f e r e n t oc-c a s i o n s \u2014 the f i r s t time I should have had them too. I t was my own f a u l t for being a l i t t l e too c a r e f u l . I l e f t the car there at midnight. I caught a bus and went home. I got of f down-town, took a cab home. I got up i n the morn-in g \u2014 t o o k my car down. Like, I had already\u2014 I knew where I was going. I had already set up ahead of time which streets I was going to use, to get away and change cars. I drove out about 9 o'clock i n the morning, and parked my car, where I wanted to on the other side of Man, and then I walked about six blocks to where the River Hotel--well, I checked on the c a r \u2014 I made sure the car was up there--I jumped i n and started i t up\u2014warmed i t up and I put on--I had a p a i r of coveralls and a hard h a t , x and a p a i r of sun glasses and gloves. I put i t on and s t a l l e d \u2014 I waited t i l l about 10 a f t e r 10. And I went downstairs and there's a win-dow there, you can look\u2014you can kind of see them in there, fooling around, so I waited. And they came o u t \u2014 t h e y walked right by me and I stepped back--there was a barber shop there. So I waited for them\u2014I waited for them to come by. And there was nobody around. At least I didn't see anybody. S o \u2014 j u s t past the s t a i r w e l l \u2014 j u s t walking up the r o o f \u2014 s o , I was eight feet behind them--I come out with t h i s gun. Three kids and t h e i r old lady\u2014their mother came running around the c o r n e r \u2014 t h e i r mother i s chasing the kids. Now\u2014I don't want something l i k e t h i s going on. Now these people w i l l see kids running\u2014the bank's r i g h t t h e r e \u2014 a l l they have to do i s run i n and they'll h i t the alarm, and I just didn't want to have a rank right away. So I worked the gun back. And they turned around, they kept\u2014you know\u2014 these kids were making a l o t of noise, so I As indicated e a r l i e r , t h i s h o t e l i s located i n an i n d u s t r i a l area and therefore such a t t i r e would be least conspicuous here. 303 turned around and looked at the same time. So they went about t h e i r business and I went back\u2014took the c a r \u2014 r u n i t down, oh, about eight blocks away from where my car was. You know, there's no p r i n t s or anything on i t . So I r o l l e d up these coveralls and hard hat and went back to my car and went home. Just burning, just fuming'. So, next week, the same thing. I go down in another car. Park i t there at midnight. Go home. Come back' the same time. .Start the car up\u2014works f i n e . Now t h i s time I didn't go down to check. I knew they'd be i n the bank. I'm waiting for t h e m \u2014 i t was 10:15, 10:20\u2014well, two guys come around the corner, packin' a bri e f c a s e . Now, the briefcase I recognized, but I don't recognize the two guys.^ i t looks l i k e the same b r i e f case but I don't recognize the two men. Now, as i t turned out, from what I understand, the mana-g e r \u2014 t h e accountant was sick and the manager was catering to some dinner or something. Now I don't want to rob these guys i n case I rob the wrong guys. I don't want to rob a couple of insurance men for t h e i r b r i e f case or something. That way I'd blow the score a l l to h e l l . -Away they g o \u2014 I ' d \u2014 I l e t them go. Back, checked the c a r \u2014 g o t r i d of i t . So f i n a l l y the t h i r d time I went back. THIS TIME THE MEN, CAME? Oh yes. AND YOU RECOGNIZED THE MEN AND THE BRIEF CASE? Oh yes, yes. Well, what happened was\u2014I'm wait-ing for them. Somebody came down the s t a i r s , By di v e r t i n g h i s attention to the children, he directed attention away from himself. In contrast to the group bank robber, the lone robber i s e a s i l y frustrated by the public, a highly unpredictable factor. The lone gunman i s e s s e n t i a l l y both a burglar and a robber. He wishes to remain unnoticed by a l l but the victim--hence he i s subject to the problems faced by both those involved i n surreptitious as well as non-surre p t i t i o u s crimes. 2 . . The robber i s relying not only on temporal routine, but on continuity of personnel i n various ro l e s . 304 some de l i v e r y man. He walked by me\u2014some wo-man came and walked down\u2014she took a look at me and kept going. And just before these people come out some guy and h i s old lady pulled across d i r e c t l y right across from the alcove . They parked the car and the guy got out and went into the bank. Now, h i s wife's s i t t i n g there with her k i d . Now, I know she's going to get a good look at t h i s , and I'm kind of hoping I can shield i t with my body. Now\u2014 they come out and walk around the corner. I l e t them g e t \u2014 o h \u2014 j u s t about even with the stairway going up, and I walk up behind them and I t o l d them, 'Hold i t . ' I've got the gun now\u2014I've kind of got i t i n front of me so the woman behind me can't see. She's maybe 35-40 feet away. Now I know what's going to hap p e n \u2014 i f there's any trouble she's going to run out and run to the bank\u2014that's what she did. And she wouldn't have kicked up either i f t h i s guy hadn't given me just a l i t t l e b i t of a t u s s l e . The guy carrying the br i e f - c a s e . He was a l i t t l e ahead, and the manager\u2014he's kind of a b i g guy\u2014a s i l v e r - h a i r e d guy\u2014he kind of stopped and turned around and I t o l d him, 'Hold i t i ' I c a n \u2014 I can see now, what's h i s name, , I can read h i s mind\u2014he's going to head for that door. 1 And I know he ain' t going to get to that door. So I just walked up and I grabbed , put the gun to h i s ear, and I t o l d him, 'Look, you take another step and your partner gets i t i ' And he stops and looks at me, and I just pushed up the s t a i r s and I stepped ahead and I grabbed , pulled him back also and grabbed the bag. And I said, 'Get up those s t a i r s ! * Now, t h i s i s when the woman behind me kicked up. I could hear the car door close. Now I know now that there's a rank. So I walked them up the s t a i r s , t o l d them to put t h e i r hands on the r a i l , and I had two pai r s of handcuffs. I t i s obviously much too simple to suggest that persons who handle other people's money have \"nothing to lose\" by losing i t . In fact, Camp goes even further to suggest that both robber and victim consider they have \"nothing to lose\" i n a bank rob-bery. Camp's respondents a l l indicated that they were i n despe-rate f i n a n c i a l p l i g h t and had \"nothing to lose\" by robbing a bank. Either Camp's respondents represent quite a d i f f e r e n t type of bank robber from my own, or else they were giving the interviewer ( a j a i l warden as well as graduate student) a \"sad t a l e \" . Camp, \"Nothing to Lose\". 30 5 So I went around and handcuffed the other guy. And I went up the s t a i r s , got i n the car and drove away. And I got to about, well, straight a c r o s s \u2014 I got to the side parking l o t , on , there's a side street you can cut across\u2014no trouble at a l l . There's no t r a f f i c at a l l so to speak of. So I went across a couple of side streets, across , towhere I had my own car parked. So I stopped on ihis side of , got out. So while I was d r i v i n g I took off t h i s hat and the sun glasses, put on my own sunglasses, took the coveralls o f f , and l e f t i t . I just took the gun and the gloves with me and the bag. Walked across main, got into my own car and drove home. SO, WHAT HAPPENED\u2014HOW'D YOU GET CAUGHT ON THIS ONE? Well, to begin with I was awful hot. And I'm pretty well known to the p o l i c e for the single robbery. They've been t r y i n g to get me for a long time on these. The one I had gone on just a f t e r I got out on b a i l and they were firml y convinced i t was me. S o \u2014 i f I could give them a half-assed account of my time and they couldn't i d e n t i f y me...well, apparently they said that these people could i d e n t i f y me. I don't know how they did i t , but they did i t . WELL, ALL RIGHT. IS THERE NO PROTECTION AGAINST FALSE IDENTIFICATION? Oh yeh. I f I had honestly thought i n my own mind that these people would l e t the b u l l s get to them and t a l k them into saying, 'Yeh, that's the guy'. You know, no doubt I f i t t e d the general description of what they saw, and they couldn't see very much, believe me. My hat was down\u2014I couldn't see very much, believe me, myself. Glasses, c o l l a r up, buttoned right around to here. They couldn't r e a l l y see that much of me, and there wasn't that many words spoken. I t was a very fast robbery. Now, they t r i e d to say i n court that i t was f i v e minutes. Now, you can't t e l l me that from the time t h i s broad jumped out of the car and started running, 'cause as soon as she went i n there they phoned the p o l i c e . Now I know for a fact that i t ' s only going to take three minutes at the most for the p o l i c e to get t h e r e \u2014 a t the very most\u2014maybe less i n that p a r t i c u l a r area. I f I'd have known t h i s was going to happen I'd have shot them both. I thought about i t too, you know. 306 OH, THE. MEN\u2014THEY IDENTIFIED YOU? Yeh, yeh. In my own mind I t o l d myself going up these s t a i r s \u2014 y o u know, when I had them hand-cuffed, i f anybody came down these s t a i r s , I wasn't going to hesitate to take them no mat-te r who i t was, 'cause I didn't even t e l l i m y old lady--nobody knew--just me. And I wasn't worried about somebody afterwards, for a re-ward sayin', 'Well, y e s \u2014 i t was so and so'. WELL, WHAT DID YOU DO WITH THE MONEY IN THE FIRST PLACE? Well, I took my car down-town to an underground parking l o t . And I took the money out of the b r i e f case. There was 500 d o l l a r s i n s i l v e r \u2014 I planted that. This fr i e n d of mine manages an apartment block. Now, he didn't know nothing about i t , but I knew a spot where I could dump the s t u f f and they had an incinerator going and there were some checks and some papers of some sort, and I dumped that into the i n -cinerator. And I just took the money and drove home. See, the po l i c e didn't know where I was staying at that time--I'd been dodging quite a b i t . AND HOW SOON DID THEY KNOCK AT YOUR DOOR? Well, they didn't. What happened was, a week went by. Now, I appeared i n court for a re-mand on t h i s stinking junk beef and t h i s other robbery. No sweat\u2014not a word said to me. I could see I was getting the f i s h -e y e \u2014 t h a t was a l l . So I thought, well, that's f i n e \u2014 g o t to go through one more remand and then I'm gone. So i n the meantime I'm--I'm just paying off, you know\u2014my partner's law-yer. Because I can't get him out on b a i l , because he's on parole. Now, he knew\u2014he had a pretty f a i r idea who i t was who grabbed t h i s . But you know\u2014he didn't say nothing. I had taken pretty good care of him i n p r i -son, sending him junk and money\u2014anything he wanted he got. So I figured, well, they might think, but I don't think they're going to bother me. Because i f they p u l l me i n for investigation and they can't make i t stick, they know I'm not going to hang around. They're going to know I'm going to jump right away. 307; I'm p r e t t y s u r e i n my own m i n d , t h a t t h e y k n o w t h a t I'm g o i n g t o j u m p . W h i c h t h e y d i d k n o w . T h e y a s s u m e d t h a t I w o u l d n ' t h a n g a r o u n d . T h e y f i g u r e d t h e y k n e w I h a d q u i t e a h i t o f money.-'- S o I g o t a n o t h e r r e m a n d \u2014 n o s w e a t \u2014 I l e f t . T h e n e x t r e m a n d I a p p e a r e d f o r t h i s s t i n k i n 1 r e m a n d . T h e y p u t t h e s n a t c h o n me i n t h e c o u r t r o o m . B o y , t h e r e w a s n o m o r e s u r p r i s e d g u y i n t h e w o r l d t h a n me. T h e l i n e u p s t u n k - - e v e r y t h i n g s t u n k ; . B u t t h a t ' s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e , y o u k n o w . T h e r e ' s n o s e t r u l e s . S o y o u c a n ' t r e a l l y s a y ; ' W e l l , o h \u2014 t h a t ' s n o t f a i r ' . S t i l l m a k e s y o u f e e l , y o u k n o w \u2014 y o u g e t h e a t e d u p , l i k e , e v e n i f y o u ' r e g u i l t y . 2 I O F T E N WONDERED HOW Y O U F E E L ABOUT T H A T K I N D O F T H I N G . YOU KNOW, WHEN A GUY KNOWS HE ' S DONE I T , DOES I T M A T T E R HOW H E ' S FOUND O U T ? W e l l , i t m a t t e r s t h a t y o u ' r e f o u n d o u t , p e r i o d . WOULD YOU HAVE F E L T B E T T E R I F YOU HAD A C -T U A L L Y L E F T SOME MORE P O S I T I V E I D E N T I F I C A T I O N B E H I N D ? Oh, I ' d h a v e f e l t w o r s e . T h e n I ' d r e a l l y h a v e k i c k e d m y s e l f , b e c a u s e I k n o w b e t -t e r . Y o u know, w h e n y o u d o s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h a t , y o u g o t n o r e c o u r s e t o a n y t h i n g e l s e . AND T I E GUN B E E F S WERE I N C L U D E D I N T H E ARMED ROBBERY? O n t h e f i r s t o n e . T h e y f o u n d t h e s e g u n s i n my b a c k y a r d w h e r e t h e . . . . (#2) #2 a s s u m e s t h a t t h e p o l i c e w a n t a c o n v i c t i o n r a t h e r t h a n h a v e h i m l e a v e t o w n . T h e y k n o w h e w i l l l e a v e , s h o u l d t h e y l a y a c h a r g e w h i c h d o e s n o t r e s u l t i n a c o n v i c t i o n . T h e y t h e r e f o r e w a i t u n t i l s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e i s g a t h e r e d s o t h a t t h e t r i a l w i l l b e c o n c l u s i v e . 2 #2 i s r e c o g n i z i n g t h e l e g i t i m a c y o f b o t h t h e f o r m a l r u l e s ( w h i c h a r e n o t b e i n g f o l l o w e d ) a n d t h e i n f o r m a l o p e r a t -i n g c o d e o f l e g a l p e r s o n n e l ( \" t h e r e ' s n o s e t r u l e s \" ) . A c -c o r d i n g t o t h e l a t t e r , h i s c o n v i c t i o n w a s f a i r . 308 D. DIMENSIONS OF VICTIM-MANAGEMENT I n a d d i t i o n to both being i l l e g a l , together w i t h the i m p l i c a t i o n s thereof, s u r r e p t i t i o u s and n o n - s u r r e p t i t i o u s crimes can be seen as having a number of features i n common. Both r e q u i r e a working r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h other c r i m i n a l s ; f o r example, as p a r t n e r s , or as purchasers of s t o l e n goods. I n terms of s k i l l s r e q u ired f o r s p e c i f i c crimes, the data i n d i c a t e s a s i g n i f i c a n t d i s t i n c t i o n between those crimes i n v o l v i n g the avoidance of the v i c t i m , and thos e i n v o l v i n g v i c t i m c o n f r o n t a t i o n . (These types are not d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n terms of avoidance-techniques, since both the robber as w e l l as the b u r g l a r must avoid the p o l i c e ) . I n terms of s k i l l s r e quired, the s u r r e p t i t i o u s crimes tend t o revolve about mechanical competences, w h i l e crimes i n v o l v i n g v i c t i m confrontation revolve about the matter of victim-management. The term \"management\" i s chosen t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e t h i s pro-cess from what might be termed v i c t i m - m a n i p u l a t i o n , as i n confidence games. Our focus upon victim-management i s not intended t o obscure other d i f f e r e n c e s , nor t o suggest t h a t c r i m i n a l s Under some c o n d i t i o n s v i c t i m - m a n i p u l a t i o n develops i n t o a s i t u a t i o n of victim-management, as i n Goffman's \"Cooling  the Mark Out\". High-pressure salesmen p o i n t out that i n i t i a l m a nipulation f r e q u e n t l y b r i n g s about a high degree of s t r e s s and a n x i e t y i n the p o t e n t i a l customer. At t h i s p o i n t the salesman must manage the v i c t i m i n ways which resemble the procedures of the robbers. E r v i n g Goffman, \"On C o o l i n g the Mark Out\", P s y c h i a t r y , V o l . 15, No. 4 (November, 1952). 309 d e v e l o p m e c h a n i c a l o r s o c i a l s k i l l s t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e o t h e r ; we h a v e e a r l i e r p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h i e v e s may engage i n b o t h t y p e s o f c r i m e s . The f o c u s a r i s e s , i n s t e a d , f r o m t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s made b y t h e c r i m i n a l s t h e m s e l v e s , a n d f r o m i n h e r e n t d i f f e r e n c e s i n t h e n a t u r e o f m e c h a n i c a l v e r s u s s o c i a l s k i l l s . 1. S u r p r i s e a n d V u l n e r a b i l i t y A d e e p l y r o o t e d f e a r on t h e p a r t o f b a n k r o b b e r s i s t h a t t h e i r a c t i o n may b e a n t i c i p a t e d a n d t h a t t h e p o l i c e w i l l b e w a i t i n g f o r them when t h e y a r r i v e . The e v a s i o n o f p o l i c e , h o w e v e r , i s a p r o b l e m o f a d i f f e r e n t o r d e r f r o m t h a t o f s u r p r i s i n g t h e v i c t i m . C r i m i n a l s do n o t s p e a k o f s u r p r i s i n g t h e p o l i c e , b u t t h e y do s p e a k o f c a t c h i n g t h e v i c t i m o f f g u a r d o r \"by s u r p r i s e \" . F o r t h e b u r g l a r t h e e l e -ment o f s u r p r i s e i s n e c e s s a r y b o t h f o r r e a s o n s o f d e t e c t i o n a n d f o r e c o n o m i c s u c c e s s ; f o r e x a m p l e , the v i c t i m h a s made no s p e c i a l p r e p a r a t i o n s , t o s a f e - g u a r d h i s money i n a n t i c i -p a t i o n o f t h e b u r g l a r ' s c o m i n g . F o r t h e r o b b e r , s u r p r i s e i s u s e f u l f o r p u r p o s e s o f i n c r e a s i n g t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f t h e v i c t i m , and r e l a t i v e l y t o e n h a n c e h i s own p o s i t i o n . The b a n k r o b b e r r e l i e s on t h e e l e m e n t o f s u r p r i s e t o b r i n g a b o u t m o m e n t a r y m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l p a r a l y s i s on t h e p a r t o f b a n k e m p l o y e e s : The d o o r w o u l d f l y r i g h t o p e n a nd t h e p e o p l e i n s i d e , t h e y f r e e z e ! (#28) 310 Such p a r a l y s i s i s of c r u c i a l importance to the bank robber. I t allows him quickly to take up h i s p o s i t i o n i n the building; further, he hopes to be able to back a l l cashiers away from t h e i r counter before they have had a chance to regain enough composure to push an alarm button\"'\". Criminals believe that the s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to surprise and the consequent v u l n e r a b i l i t y varies with the time of day and the day of week. A bank robber i n s i s t e d that mornings are the best time: OKAY. NOW WHAT TIME OF DAY? Always i n the morning. Catch: them by surprise. They've s t i l l got sleep i n their eyes and sort of hung over i f they drink. Catch- them' by surprise, about ten o'clock. (#7) A bank robber who preferred Monday mornings, said: On Monday everybody's asleep; not asleep, but not going anywhere. People are d u l l . On Monday people are not on the street i n the morning--people are either asleep or at work. (#41) The criminal i s also aware that h i s surprised victim i s not i n a p o s i t i o n to react e f f i c i e n t l y , even i f he should t r y to do so. A burglar commented: Once, i n f i f t y times, you'd run into trouble; and you had them at a disadvantag could run. You were a l l s e t \u2014 t h e y weren't \"*\"See Appendix D page 456 for a diagram of a t y p i c a l bank alarm system. 2 Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 64. 311' A burglar involved i n the \" l i v e prowl\" stated: WERE YOU PREPARED IN ANY SENSE IN THE EVENT OF BEING CAUGHT? Well, you don't think of that. 'Course I always made sure, l i k e you say, that there were ways out. 'Cause I never thought of being cornered by anyone there, be-cause most people when they wake up, they're stunned anyhow; they're not that wide awake, so you're wide awake, you know you're going to get out of the place. (#21) In addition, the v i c t i m i s not equipped with the s k i l l s required to reverse h i s p o s i t i o n of weakness, even i f he should recover from h i s surprise: But i n the long run, your chances of. ever using a gun on a professional t h i e f are very small\u2014you're better o f f without a g u n \u2014 y o u ' l l probably get your head shot o f f because he's doing something he does every day and you're doing something you've never done before.1 2. Establishing Authority and Managing Tension The i n i t i a l moment of surprise and shock i s the f i r s t step i n establishing a robber-victim r e l a t i o n s h i p . During this time the entire group may be herded into one corner of the bank, or ordered to l i e prostrate on the f l o o r . In either case, the posture and physical location of the v i c -tims are such as to enhance the robber's control over them. We were knocking o f f safes and they were pretty good scores; the amount of money we were taking didn't necessitate our running around every night or every week even\u2014we could pick our spots. We were on a h a l f a x I b i d . , p. 69. 312 dozen d i f f e r e n t stick-ups. Large restaurants, drug stores, places l i k e that. We'd wait t i l l we thought the time was appropriate, but i f i t wasn't we'd go i n anyway; i t didn't make much difference how many people there were i n there. That's where I r e a l l y went in for i t , there; I found out what I could do and what I couldn't do. Now, on a stick-up where there's a group of people, you've got to get them to do one thing, whether i t ' s look at the l i g h t or keep quiet. You can't just run in and h o l l e r , 'Stick 'em up!,', and shoot 'em, 'cause there's no p r o f i t i n that. The thing i s to get 'em to do one thing, i f i t ' s just to be quiet. By the time they do one thing for you, they've c o l l e c t e d t h e i r senses and they know they're i n the middle of a stick-up and they're not gonna make any trouble. I f you gotta shoot somebody you gotta run\u2014you don't get any money.x Once having established the po s i t i o n of control, some robbers encourage the return of r a t i o n a l thought to the v i c -tim, while others prefer to extend the state of shock u n t i l the robbery i s completed. In either case, the p a r t i c u l a r s t y l e which i s adopted seems to be a matter of personal preference rather than a choice based upon features of the s p e c i f i c robbery i t s e l f . Through experience, robbers adopt a style'which they f i n d e f f e c t i v e i n managing the vi c t i m . As was mentioned, sone seem to achieve victim management v i a continuing the state of shock i n the victim, while others make e f f o r t s to restore a measure of normality to the scene. ...the door would f l y right open and the people inside, they freeze. You know, when there's a big smash around everyone they freeze on the spot and look around, whether i t ' s a joke or not. And you see them guys with hoods on t h e i r heads and the gun, you 1 I b i d . , pp. 49-50. 313 know. And then there's one command\u2014'Hit the ground'.', you know\u2014'Hit the d i r t . ' \u2014 I don't know how to say t h a t \u2014 ' H i t the floor\u2014bunch of dogs.', you know. That's the way we say that: 'Fuckin' dog, h i t the floor, or we k i l l each and everyone of you.', you know. So they are froze t h e r e \u2014 t h e i r reaction i s one of very ex-treme fear and they drop on the f l o o r and some-time we select the strongest person\u2014the mana-ger e s p e c i a l l y or another t e l l e r which is very b i g \u2014 a s i x footer, or something l i k e that, you know. And we won't -say a word, we just walk up to him and smash him right across the face, you know, and we get him down. And once he's down the people, the g i r l s especially, they look at him and they say, 'My god\u2014big Mike, he's been smashed down l i k e t h a t \u2014 I ' d better lay down too, and stay guiet.' You know\u2014it's sort of l i k e psychology, to obey us immediately, every-body w i l l follow the leader. The manager i s the leader, and I see you go down\u2014jesus Christ, I'm going to follow you\u2014I'm going down too, you know'. (#28) Another bank robber, i n contrast to the above, i s anxious to avoid hy s t e r i a : That's how I used to operate. I'd stand right there and the manager and the whole works at bay. I might have them lay down on the floor, 'cause you couldn't just have them standing there with t h e i r hands up, because i t ' s too noticeable. You just walk in, and anyone you think i s going to panic, well you just t a l k r e a l quiet to them and you say, 'Don't panic and every-thing w i l l be a l l right; just take i t easy and t h e r e ' l l be no trouble, see?' DID YOU USE TO FIRE ANY SHOTS INTO THE CEIL-ING OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT? No\u2014I used to t a l k very s o f t l y - - I ' d t a l k very s o f t l y , very quietly, and I'd never raise my voice. I always figure that i f you h o l l e r and show panic, i t would make the people panicky. I f you just walk i n quietly, just l i k e you're transacting ordinary business, i t kinda reassures the people that you know ex-ac t l y what you're doing, and that you mean them no harm. But i f you go i n there hustling and bustling and f i r i n g and shooting, you're going to have people sta r t to scream, and everything else. And i t ' s pretty hard to hold back people screaming no matter what pressure they're under. 314 BUT ISN'T THERE THE PROBLEM THAT IF YOU SPEAK SOFTLY THERE MAY BE SOMEONE AT THE BACK AT AN ADDING MACHINE...? Oh'well, they automatically know. You don't speak that s o f t l y . You know, when we walk in we say, 'This i s a hold-up' and they automatically hear you. But then a f t e r that you just sort of--no worry, no rush. I t ' s just a matter of r o u t i n e \u2014 l o a d up the money, and your shopping bags and go out. Oh, we mate sure that everybody hears you, that's for sure. We don't just walk i n there and say, 'Well, t h i s i s a hold-up, hand over the money'. We give a good bellow when we walk i n . x WHAT KIND OF PROBLEMS HAVE YOU HAD WITH CUSTOMERS? I only had one. There was a lady i n there and she had a l i t t l e baby, maybe three years old, and I walked i n and I had the gun on the manager at the time and I said, 'This i s a hold-up'.', and the l i t t l e baby^-yeh, I guess about three years old, well, she star-ted to scream and kick and the old lady said to me, 'Mr. Gunman, I can't hold\/my baby', and I remember saying to her, 'Lady, you better hold her.' Anyway, she shook her o f f the f l o o r and grabbed her, and that's the only time. I t wasn't the woman, i t was when the baby started screaming. I guess she saw the mask and i t must r e a l l y have seared her. I guess the k i d had a premonition or something, that something was going on. That was the only time. I never had no trouble at a l l . They done ex-ac t l y what they were t o l d . I don't know whether they knew that they had better, but I had no problem whatsoever\u2014nothing. (#7) This i s sim i l a r to the approach used by the robber des-cribed i n \"The Heist...\" by DeBaum. On page 74 he states: So far as may be, the mob are calm and p o l i t e on the job. 'Cowboying' or the wild brandishing of p i s t o l s and shouting of orders i n a l l d i r e c -tions i s frowned upon; fear has made more heroes than courage ever has. DeBaum pays de t a i l e d attention to some aspects of vi c t i m -management i n armed bank robbery. His description of bank rob-bery i s e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r to that provided by my subjects. Everett DeBaum, \"The Heist: The Theory and Practice of Armed Robbery'.', Harper's, Vol. 200 (February, 1950), pp. 69-77. 315 Bank robbers emphasize self-confidence as the key toward successful bank robbery. They d i r e c t l y relate s e l f -confidence to the a b i l i t y to control people who are under stress. The manner i n which t h i s confidence i s communicated i s secondary, but i t i s considered e s s e n t i a l that i t be com-municated . .#45 stressed the importance of making i t c l e a r to those i n the bank that h i s group \"meant business\"''\": They can t e l l by the sound of your voice, by what you say and how you go about things, whether or not you mean business. I f you're shakey, they'11 know.2 (#45) The role of \"voice\" i n establishing authority and i n managing tension i s seen as c r i t i c a l by bank robbers, and as important by other armed robbers as we l l . The methods used, therefore, are v i s u a l (such as masked men) , auditory (vocal commands) and phys i c a l . SO WHAT WOULD YOU SAY ARE THE DANGERS IN THIS KIND OF AN OPERATION? Uh\u2014well, panic on the part of the store owner. WHAT FORMS CAN THAT TAKE? Uh\u2014I've experienced a man l i t e r a l l y freezing--couldn't speak. He just pointed to show where the money was. SO THAT DIDN'T CAUSE YOU MUCH TROUBLE? No, no. But on occasion I've had women scream. WHAT DO YOU DO IN THAT CASE? Well, on a couple of occasions I've just belted them on the side This raises the question of why bank personnel f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to accept the r e a l i t y of a robbery. 2 #45 was described to me by other criminals as \"very good i n banks\", and as having a \"very good voice f o r banks\". 31 . 6 of the head w i t h the p i s t o l . KNOCK THEM OUT OR WHAT? No. SO THAT'S ONE WAY OF DEALING WITH WOMEN WHO SCREAM? Or slap them i n the face w i t h the f i s t . The man I worked w i t h was w e l l over s i x f e e t and a very powerful b u i l t man w i t h a deep resonant v o i c e , and I saw him j u s t w i t h a loud v o i c e , and w i t h the tone of h i s v o i c e , he would b r i n g people out of a shock s t a t e . IS THE MANNER IN WHICH YOU SPEAK VERY IM-PORTANT? Very much s o \u2014 y e h \u2014 y o u have to be p o s i t i v e at a l l times. DID YOU EVER HAVE ANY TROUBLE, LET'S SAY, WITH A WOMAN WHO WOULDN'T COOPERATE? I d i d n ' t , no. (#27) Another example, regarding the use of language: Now, her mother and b r o t h e r they were at the back of the bank, you know, of the house, and they heard t h a t , because, you know, my t a l k i n g during a bank hold-up i s very d i f -f e r e n t from the t a l k i n g we have n o w \u2014 i t ' s f u l l of t e n s i o n and very commanding, you know. I n order to impress the people as much as we p o s s i b l y can. (#28) What bank robbers seem to be d e s c r i b i n g has c e r t a i n s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h what Max Weber has defined as \"charisma\". Robbers r e f e r t o these q u a l i t i e s as inherent, r a t h e r than as techniques t h a t might be learned. C e r t a i n q u a l i t i e s , such as v o i c e and\"physical b u i l d are of t h i s order. I t i s more d i f f i c u l t , however, to d e l i n e a t e the v a r i o u s dimensions of what robbers r e f e r t o as confidence. Some cl u e s have been provided; i n crime as w e l l as i n other b e h a v i o u r a l spheres, success breeds success: AND YOU WERE PRETTY SURE THAT YOU COULD KEEP THIS UP WITHOUT TROUBLE? Oh yes, d e f i -n i t e l y \u2014 m o s t of the guys th a t I've met, and I've met a tremendous amount of c r i m i n a l s , 317 you know, that were involved i n a bank robbery and we f e e l very confident? as a matter of fact, anyone who does two banks and he succeeds going a l l through and he has no p o l i c e suspi-cion on him he becomes over confident, you know. You say, 'Well now I'm a master criminal and I know how to do i t . They didn't catch me, they're not aware that I'm working on i t , and everything goes s m o o t h l y \u2014 i t w i l l work forever l i k e that.' You know, you get confident l i k e that. \/(#28) #28 i s pointing out that confidence can be dangerous, encourag-ing f a l s e notions of immunity from danger. Yet i t appears to be p r e c i s e l y t h i s confidence which f a c i l i t a t e s successful robbery. There i s a sense i n which the robber cannot afford to consider possible or even probable consequences of h i s action, l e s t such considerations deprive him of the confidence needed to complete the task successfully. Regarding prison as a deterrent, #40 stated that p r i -son ought to be a deterrent from a r a t i o n a l point of view. Objectively he feels the r i s k and cost of crime f a r outweigh the possible gains. Yet, he added, p r i o r to committing a crime the costs and r i s k s of a crime cannot be considered. I f the p o t e n t i a l criminal would stop at that stage, to con-sider the costs, he could never be successful i n the crim i n a l act i t s e l f . .Consequently, at that stage, i t i s r a t i o n a l not to consider undesirable consequences, since by considering them you w i l l bring them upon yourself a l l the more surely. 318 Experienced bank robbers consider that t h e i r work i s made more d i f f i c u l t , and the victim's s i t u a t i o n more danger-ous, by the tendency of the mass media to depict bank robberies as phoney, fake, \"toy gun s t u f f \" . Robbers f e e l they are now constrained f i r s t of a l l to convince t h e i r victims that the event i s \"not a joke\". This may require m o E b r u t a l action on t h e i r part than they would otherwise need to use. They need to convince any p o t e n t i a l \"heroes\" among t h e i r victims that they cannot be subdued, T.V. dramas to the contrary. The establishment of authority i s no doubt enhanced by the display and use of weapons. The discussion above i s intended to indicate, however, that the gun i s only one of various persuasive devices used by robbers. This i s not to deny that the use of other resources i s possible only because he has a gun. However, much of the robber's a c t i v i t y during a robbery i s necessitated only because he does not want to use h i s gun. He i s therefore r i g h t l y dismayed at the con-descension of those who f a i l to appreciate that h i s tech-niques revolve around the non-use, rather than the use of guns Such condescension i s obvious i n the statement of a con man who was serving a sentence for armed robbery: He had great pride i n h i s previous achieve-ments as a con man but said that anyone could s t i c k a gun i n a sucker's b e l l y and get some money and that anyone who did t h i s and landed i n prison for i t should f e e l ashamed.1 Sutherland, Professional Thief, p. 42. 319 I f guns are ca r r i e d for purposes of intimidation only, then why not use phoney guns? The answers were unani-mous: It's too dangerous\u2014you've got nothing to protect yourself with. (#39) Such protection may be needed because of p o t e n t i a l heroes among t h e i r victims or the p o l i c e . Robbers have only contempt for the hero-type, whose action i s considered en-t i r e l y i r r a t i o n a l and extremely dangerous. The robber's attitude towards him i s well described by Martin as \"...some ignorant poor guy f i g h t i n ' for h i s boss's dough\".''\" Whenever the robber meets serious resistance, he can-not \"win\" . He i s almost c e r t a i n l y going to \"win\" i n any shooting duel, given h i s experience and advantageous p o s i t i o n . Such \"winning\", however, has serious l e g a l implications. Also, the s c u f f l e w i l l l i k e l y disrupt the orderly r e t r i e v a l of money, forcing him to leave empty-handed. The bank rob-ber does not want trouble; he wants money. Well, t h i s i s where the public makes an awfully t r a g i c mistake. I t ' s a t r a g i c mistake and I think maybe there would be a l o t less people getting shot i n hold-ups i f people were just t o l d that the money i s t h e r e \u2014 g i v e i t to the man and leave i t to the p o l i c e . And you've seen i n the paper time and time again where people have been shot chasing them down the 'Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 37. 32 0 street. Mind you, they may catch the odd one, but they've only got to shoot one man and i t ' s t r a g i c , you know what I mean. And a c t u a l l y I don't want to shoot anybody, but i f i t ' s me or you, you're going f i r s t , I ' l l tell you that right now. (#7) Experienced criminals may demand that less experienced partners be unarmed, or armed with less e f f e c t i v e weapons. An experienced burglar who worked with two less experienced partrecs i n s i s t e d that they carry knives rather than guns: You think twice with a k n i f e . A person going with a gun i f he has to use i t , h e ' l l use i t right away, whereas a person with a knife, i f he can dodge i t , he w i l l . Say, for instance, i f you saw a guy i n the place, i n -stead of panicking and blowing the guy's head right o f f , with a knife you can move back into the shadows, and you don't panic, you just relax. -With a gun you're l i k e l y to shoot the guy, with a kni f e you gotta stab him which means you come i n close contact with him to stab him. (#10) Although the robber w i l l hesitate to use h i s gun on a c i v i l i a n , he w i l l not hesitate when confronted by p o l i c e while on a caper. Robbers assume that p o l i c e w i l l not h e s i -tate e i t h e r . Confrontation Joy p o l i c e while robbing a bank i s seen as resu l t i n g i n e v i t a b l y i n a \"shoot-out\". The same i s true i n case of pursuit by p o l i c e . \"Why not put up your hands and surrender when cornered?\" I asked. That seemed incomprehensible: \"They'd mow you down* they can just say we res i s t e d arrest.\" (#39) Bank robbers do not anticipate resistance from a single patrolman but are prepared for i t should i t occur. 32 1 Such resistance would be interpreted as a stupid \"hero act\", si m i l a r to that of a c i v i l i a n : Have you ever heard of a smart detective getting shot? No, the only ones you eve r hear of.getting shot are some dumb patrolmen. What do you think so and so (a detective) would do i f he pulled up alongside a car and a guy raised a chopper? (Sub-machine gun) You think he'd be a hero? No\u2014he's got brains. He'd get away from there as fast as he could. But he'd eventually find out who that was. Where a dumb patrolman hasn't got enough sense to do t h a t . 1 P o l i c e are expected to arri v e i n a group, or more l i k e l y , to be waiting i n the bank. The experienced robber, however, does not expect to be apprehended while at work. I f he i s to have \"trouble\" he expects it upon a r r i v a l at the bank, or a f t e r he has l e f t . To meet i t upon a r r i v a l i n -dicates an information leak, considered by robbers as t h e i r most serious uncontrollable contingency. The successful management of victims during a robbery demands the continuous and correct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the victim's behaviour. As such i t i s important that the robber understands c o r r e c t l y the non-verbal communication which i s going on; a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t task, since the degree of tension encourages abnormal behaviour. Robbers pointed out numerous examples of bizarre behaviour on the part of the victims. The most common form observed i n banks took the form of bank customers o f f e r i n g t h e i r own valuables to the robbers, Ibid, p. 100. 32.2 presumably to enhance t h e i r own chances of s u r v i v a l . On the other hand, some customers w i l l go to great lengths to hide t h e i r own wallets, rings and jewellery. Such actions must be interpreted as a threatening move. When t h i s occurs the robber may issue a warning, or shoot. One respondent, an experienced robber, pointed out that h i s being i n prison now was a r e s u l t of an error he had made i n t h i s regard: The guy wouldn't stop moving\u2014I didn't know what he was doing so I l e t him have i t . Later I found out he was just t r y i n g to hide something under a rug. The robber i s aware that h i s interpretations are sub-ject to error; they constitute part of the set of contin-gencies which constitute the r i s k of robbery. WHAT ARE SOME OF THE DANGERS, SOME OF THE HAZARDS AT THAT POINT? Oh well, you can always have people i n there, maybe someone attacking the man who's taking the money. You know, youte , busy picking up money, and he's relying on me to cover everybody. There's always the danger of some guy maybe taking a f l y i n g tackle, or there's the danger that the p o l i c e may p u l l up for a routine check. There's the danger of some passer-by seeing what's going on, and screaming and h o l l e r i n g . And there's always the danger that when you're coming out of the bank someone might be standing i n the doorway, and jump you coming out of the doorway. Or there's the danger of someone p u l l i n g up and \".. blocking your car when you want to p u l l o u t \u2014 things l i k e that, you know. Or ram your car; that's why your man out there i n the car i s not only out there as a driver, he's also watching for you when you're coming out, i n case you don't get some guy standing out there with wild ideas. I f that's the case he steps out of the car and bangs h i s revolver and t e l l s him to lay down or something. 3 2 3 NOW THESE ARE THINGS WITH WHICH YOU CAN'T DEAL BEFOREHAND. THESE ARE EMERGENCIES? Right. Aha. SO THESE ARE THE RISKS? That's r i g h t . You don't know, you might happen to walk in and the manager might happen to have h i s hand out under here, you don't know. He may have h i s hand down there and you figure he's looking for some paper and yet he might just p u l l out a gun and star t to f i r e . That's l i k e I say, these old fellows are pretty r e l i a b l e , but then again, you know--he might have done time in Vietnam--he may have done time i n Korea, and he may figure he's a good shot and he may just reach down and shoot you right dead on the spot. I t ' s not un l i k e l y - -i t ' s l i k e l y that i t could happen. I t ' s never happened to me, but I always used to guard a-gainst i t , you know. ( # 7 ) In contrast to group bank robbery, where a l l persons pre-sent constitute \"victims\", i t i s feasible in some situations for the robber to r e s t r i c t h i s interaction to one person only, in such a way that a l l other persons present are unaware of the robbery. This technique i s feasi b l e in single line-up situations, such as liqu o r stores and theatre booths with only one cash-register, or with cash registers on opposite sides of the room. Usual bank structure, consisting of several p a r a l l e l single-file line-ups of customers are not amenable to t h i s technique.\"'' The robber employing t h i s method takes h i s place in the line-up, posing as a regular customer. Upon reaching the ca-shier, he holds h i s gun in front of him and i n a quiet voice demands money. I f there i s no opposition he may leave with the money, unnoticed by other customers. I f there i s opposition he is in a pos i t i o n of grave danger. He cannot hope to control both the waiting customers and h i s intended victims. For t h i s The technique has been used i n banks by the use of news-papers or briefcases with which to shield the gun from the view of persons in adjoining lineups. 324 reason the method i s employed by single robbers only i n such situations where the robber can \"run\" with safety i f neces-sary. Such situations are generally out-of-doors, and crowded, such as in carnivals, out-door markets, outdoor theatre booths and so on. The technique i s considered to be more successful and safe when used by two robbers. In t h i s s i t u a t i o n both enter the store, one joins the line-up, the other browses around near the back walls, in a po s i t i o n from which he has a com-manding view of the entire room. He plays no obvious part i n the robbery unless h i s partner has trouble. His partner i n -dicates trouble by f i r i n g a warning shot: A f t e r the shot everyone i s alerted. Every-body stops cold. There are a few moments of silence. (#22) #22 then points out that the timing of the second robber's i n -volvement i s c r u c i a l . He must p u l l h i s gun and shout to every-one to stay where they are. He must do t h i s a f t e r the impact of the warning shot has \"sunk i n \" , but before the people sta r t m i l l i n g around and get noisy. The robber i n the lineup, af t e r having been given the money, goes to the car and starts i t . He then stands beside the car with h i s gun, waiting for h i s partner. In t h i s way both are protected by the other while making the e x i t . During the period of the hold-up, considera-tions s i m i l a r to those operative i n a bank robbery are i n ef f e c t . Chapter VI Learning Technical S k i l l s A . INTRODUCTION Our discussion of criminal s k i l l s suggests that such s k i l l s consist e s s e n t i a l l y of two types. There are those which appear to be extensions of the legitimate order--for example, s k i l l s available to a l l members of society. Such s k i l l s include the a b i l i t y to detect a house where the owners are not home, or to pose as a customer when one r e a l l y i s only \"scouting\" (for the lay person t h i s could mean price-shopping, for the criminal, \"casing\"). These s k i l l s are systematized, sharpened and refined by the criminal who thinks of them as relevant to h i s own interests.\"*\" In addition, some criminals possess some s k i l l s which are not e a s i l y available to the average c i t i z e n . Indeed, access to such s k i l l s i s also d i f f e r e n t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d among Various s o c i a l arrangements which are appropriate and com-mom to everyday l i f e are e s s e n t i a l l y s i m i l a r to those appropriate to criminal behaviour. For example, my wife, a fri e n d and I were standing on a downtown street corner. My wife wished to shop at a large department store while the two of us were going to have lunch at a nearby cafe. We agreed to meet my wife at the department store at 1:30. We were about to go our separate ways when my friend said, \"But where (in the store) are we going to meet?\" To t h i s I replied, \"Oh, we always meet at the Skywalk when we meet at that place\". He laughed, Oh, that's a l l ar-ranged\u2014gee, t h i s i s l i k e planning a caper'.\" My friend was an experienced c r i m i n a l . He i s pointing out that our legitimate routine planning bore s t r i k i n g resemblance to that involved i n crime, i n t h i s case more s p e c i f i c a l l y , the prearranged \"meet\" where criminals gather af t e r disbanding, following a caper. 325 326 those criminals who seriously desire them. Such s k i l l s i n -clude the mechanical procedures necessary for safe-opening, or the organizational know-how necessary for successful bank robbery. This d i s t i n c t i o n i s alluded to by a professional t h i e f when he speaks of the \"fundamentals\" as over against s p e c i f i c techniques: Lot of those things I've s i t down and f i g -ured out myself, they may not have been o r i -g i n a l , probably somebody been doing them since the beginning of time, but nobody ever t o l d me about them, I figured them out myself. I don't mean that I'm the only one ever thought of any-thing l i k e i t . There's a l o t of things that are new today that twenty-five years ago were old rackets. Outside some of the oldtimers, the new generation's never heard of them. They can be used a l l over again. That i s , the fun-damentals can be used. Maybe the application i s a l i t t l e b i t d i f f e r e n t . But the fundamen-t a l s can be used\u2014they are the same. Today you can apply engineering p r i n c i p l e s to prac-t i c a l l y any type of a building, and i f you've \" got the time and the finances, there's p r a c t i -c a l l y very few places that can't be taken i f there's something i n i t that's worthwhile tak-ing. I t depends on those three t h i n g \u2014 t i m e , finances, and the question of whether i t ' s worth i t . The thing i s , i f you're stealing for a l i v -ing, there are no set rules, things are never the same, circumstances a l t e r everything, you have to be able to s h i f t t h i s way and that i n a hurry.1 This d i s t i n c t i o n i s also made in part by Sutherland when he speaks of \"larceny sense\" as d i s t i n c t from \"techniques of t h e f t \" : \"Slartin, My L i f e in Crime, p. 128. 327 During t h i s probationary period the neophyte i s assimilating the general standards of morali-ty, propriety, etiquette, and rights which cha-rac t e r i z e the profession, and he i s acquiring \"larceny sense\". He i s learning the general me-thods of disposing of stolen goods ,and of f i x i n g cases. He i s building up a personal acquaint-ance with other thieves, and with lawyers, po-licemen, court o f f i c i a l s , and f i x e r s . This more general knowledge i s seldom transmitted to the neophyte as formal verbal instructions but i s assimilated by him without being recognized as instruction.1 As implied above, \"larceny sense\" and the actual tech-niques are not only d i f f e r e n t i n substance, but are also ac-quired d i f f e r e n t l y : the former i s \"assimilated\" gradually, rather than learned through i n s t r u c t i o n or experience as i s the l a t t e r . As I s h a l l indicate i n the subsequent chapter, a good deal of what Sutherland terms \"larceny sense\" has * i t s basis i n common-sense interpretations of the s o c i a l struc-ture. The systematizing of these common-sense assumptions, so as to make them relevant for non-legitimate purposes, seems to begin during teen-age delinquency. . A l l of the subjects i n -terviewed had begun t h e i r criminal behaviour during adolescence. This i s not to suggest that delinquency causes l a t e r crime, but simply to suggest that a person does not enter crime as an adult, a f t e r a period of legitimate l i f e - s t y l e \u2014 e a r l y d e l i n -quency does seem to be a prerequisite for the adult criminal career. Sutherland, The Professional Thief, p. 214. 328 Cloward, i n response to Merton's Theory of Anomie, has indicated that access to the i l l e g i t i m a t e ( l i k e the legitimate) i s not evenly distributed.\"'\" I t may be that early delinquency constitutes one of these conditions . .Early delinquency provides a basic education i n r u d i -mentary s k i l l s appropriate to the i l l e g i t i m a t e l i f e s t y l e . I t may well be that at the time when the young person i s b u s i l y engaged i n learning the difference between the appropriate and inappropriate, matters of etiquette and the role expecta-tions operative i n the legitimate s o c i a l structure, he i s able to see most e a s i l y how such arrangements may be manipulated for very d i f f e r e n t ends. Ea r l y delinquency may also be viewed as an experiment or t r i a l . One's taste, as well as one's a b i l i t y for the c r i -minal l i f e s tyle can be assessed, both by oneself and by peers. I t makes the reformatory experience p o s s i b l e \u2014 a n experience that opens the door to association with criminals and serves e f f e c t i v e l y to sever the t i e s with the legitimate order. The nature of non-technical s k i l l s (or \"larceny sense\") and the form of t h e i r a c q u i s i t i o n w i l l be discussed i n the subsequent chapter. In t h i s chapter discussion w i l l be l i m i -ted to the a c q u i s i t i o n of more technical and mechanical s k i l l s . Richard Cloward, \" I l l e g i t i m a t e Means, Anomie, and Deviant Behaviour\", American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, V o l . 24. (April , 1959), pp. 164-176. B. THE DELINQUENT STYLE Experienced criminals relate t h e i r early delinquent be-haviour with a good deal of humour. Their r e c o l l e c t i o n s of such a c t i v i t i e s dwell on the,aspect of adventure\u2014the humour-ous element having to do with what now appears to them to have been a preponderance of daring over a b i l i t y . Technical s k i l l s were described as simple applications of everyday knowledge. A safecracker, now aged f i f t y , r e c a l l e d the f i r s t safe he had opened: I h a d \u2014 l i k e we h i t a safe i n the meantime, you know. When we were just kids; we got the safe open, i t was a very cheap safe. .We got i t open and we had\u2014we had a pretty f a i r bank r o l l for kids, you know. About two hundred d o l l a r s apiece when we s p l i t i t up\u2014about two hundred. Why that was just\u2014-that was\u2014I just turned f i f t e e n about a week before. We took i t (the safe) i n one of these s t o r e s \u2014 a small gaieral store, and i t was a cheap safe. HOW DID YOU MANAGE TO OPEN IT? Well, we used two or three screw drivers, that's how bad the safe was\u2014we kept stepping over, you know, t i l l we got i t open. STEPPING OVER\u2014 WHAT'S THAT? Well, we started on the corner, you know. And then we drove another one in, you know, and kept stepping t i l l we got i t open. (#32) The absence of technical sophistication i s evident i n the following example of teen-age house burglary: LET'S LOOK IN FACT AT HOW YOU'D GOTTEN AROUND. HOW DID YOU CHOOSE A HOUSE TO ENTER? Well, that's what I s a y \u2014 l i k e for a time I'd walk around. Like l e t ' s say i n the d i s t r i c t . They b u i l t that new d i s t r i c t there. I'd walk around and I'd see a house with a l l the l i g h t s out. Well, I'd go 330 up and knock at the door. I f nobody answered then I'd know right away. Then i f somebody did answer, well I'd just say, 'Does so and so l i v e here?' and most people would say, 'Well, no, I don't know that person'. The majority of times when I did knock I new nobody was home anyway, because the l i g h t s were a l l out. SO WHAT DID YOU DO IF NO-ONE WAS HOME? Well, I'd go i n through the back door;, just make a hole through the window and open the door. JUST BREAK THE WINDOW. Yeh, with a rock. DID YOU HAVE TO CARRY ANY TOOLS WITH. YOU? No. WHAT TIME OF DAY WOULD YOU DO THIS KIND OF STUFF? Oh, usually i n the winter between seven and nine. Six, seven, nine\u2014around there. OKAY. LET'S SAY YOU'VE KNOCKED ON THE DOOR, NO-ONE ANSWERS. YOU GO AROUND THE BACK. YOU BREAK THE WINDOW, OPEN THE DOOR. YOU WALK IN AND IT'S DARK. DO YOU HAVE A LIGHT WITH YOU, OR HOW DO YOU OPERATE? Well, sometimes I used to carry a f l a s h l i g h t . Sometimes I used to turn the l i g h t on i n the house. I'd go i n the bedroom, turn the l i g h t on, walk around, and turn i t back o f f . You see, I wasn't there that long- I was just looking for the money and i f I didn't f i n d i t I'd leave.... NOW, DURING THIS TIME, WERE YOU ALSO HOLD-ING DOWN A JOB OF SOME SORT? Yeh. I was work-ing at d i f f e r e n t j o b s \u2014 f o r a month, maybe three months. Then I'd get f i r e d or I'd q u i t . So then I'd be broke again and then I'd go back to stealing again, 'cause I couldn't get a job right away. (#21) Ea r l y B & E's are referred to as \"kick-ins\", for example, the application of physical force to doors and windows, instead \u2022of using more sophisticated methods such as picking locks or l o i d i n g . Such tech n i c a l . \" s k i l l s \" were not learned i n any formal sense, though they may have been prompted by s o c i a l pressure: And these guys were kicking j o i n t s i n and everything; l i k e , from school, and we were get-ti n g razzed about being s i s s i e s so we acted, or 331 reacted, I guess, and we got to be pretty tough eggs ourselves during the next, w e l l \u2014 i n my case, the next fo r t y years, or t h i r t y - f i v e . (#32) Another example, quoting my.notes taken during an interview with #14: #14 went to a f a i r i n Regina one summer and ran into one of the guys he had met at Moosimin. He had another friend with him, a former boxer or something: 'They were quite the characters'. The three of them spent the week i n Regina, just t a l k -ing and fooling around, . and one of them came back to Moose Jaw with him. While having coffee i n a cafe h i s friend spotted a safe on the other side of the counter and said, 'Did you ever open a safe?' #14 answered, 'No.' 'Well, we can open t h i s one.' Apparently #14 had been somewhat reluctant, but that night they came back and 'We hammered i t open'. They were caught at t h i s and sentenced to the P r a i -r i e Penitentiary. As Sutherland has said, the neophyte's learning consists i n part of an understanding of what one can reasonably expect p o l i c e to do i n s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s . The delinquent experience provides opportunity for the observation of p o l i c e behaviour and forms the basis for future reaction to the p o l i c e : Anyway, I go up and they (the police) say, .,. 'Your partner's given us h i s version of your story, now t e l l us what you know.' Well, I didn't go for t h i s , because being brought up i n the slums and that, I was suspicious of anything they said, without even knowing t h i s tack that they used\u2014 t h i s ploy that they use. I was just naturally, I wouldn't believe anything they said anyway. Be-cause i t was a conditioned thing i n me from that environment. That they were bad and you didn't believe anything they said. (#11) The delinquent experience i s also associated with the Reformatory experience, which seems to be a f i r s t formal step 332 in the d i r e c t i o n of the criminal career. In terms of l a b e l l i n g theory i t serves to segregate the delinquent from h i s non-delinquent peers. On the basis of my respondent's comments, i t seems also that Reformatory conversation centers around crime, perhaps even more d i r e c t l y than i n j a i l s and p e n i t e n t i a r i e s . The f o l -lowing i s quoted from my f i e l d notes taken during an interview with #11: #11 goes into a long discussion on card t r i c k s . He mentions that he worked i n a fac-tory for three years and did part-time s t e a l -ing on the side. He started using drugs and was arrested for i l l e g a l possession of narco-t i c s and sentenced to six months i n a reforma-tory, and i n there he f e l t h i s criminal edu-cation began: 'And I went to a reformatory, and \"in there I would say my criminal education began, p a r t i a l l y , fhat i s ' . I t i s in t e r e s t i n g that although #11 had been consistently engaged i n delinquency and crime, and was recognized i n the factory as one asso-ciated with the criminal element, he states that i t was i n the reformatory where he got 'educated': 'In the shop that I was working at, that i s i n the reformatory, I got ta l k i n g to one guy about laying notes. And he showed me a couple of ways of laying notes, and explained to me how luc r a t i v e i t could be. And various other ways of B & E, heel man....' (#11) C. THE PRISON AS SCHOOL C r i t i c s of prisons as a means toward the r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of criminals frequently base part of t h e i r c r i t i c i s m on the assertion that prisons serve as schools of crime. I have ear-l i e r indicated that inmates think of such .-learning p r i m a r i l y 333 i n terms of \"contacts\" or associations which f a c i l i t a t e crime upon release. They generally agree that the techniques of crime are not systematically taught or learned i n prison, but that a good deal of such information i s communicated i n f o r -mally. As such, the teaching and learning process i s c l o s e l y related to patterns of association within prison. Criminals themselves disagree as to the educational value of the prison experience: Well, you learn from other c o n v i c t s \u2014 y o u go to j a i l for t h i r t y days\u2014you're green\u2014never been i n j a i l i n your l i f e . You get educated i n crime. The older fellows w i l l put a l l kinds of ideas in. your head that you never had i n your l i f e . (#16) #30 disagreed with the above: That's a f a l l a c y \u2014 t h i s teaching of crime. There i s nothing systematic\u2014the majority of older guys with any self-respect or ccmmon sense\u2014they don't go around t e l l i n g anyone what they've done. I f they're t e l l i n g s t o r i e s , they are stories i n the f i r s t place. (#30) In an anonymous l e t t e r to the editor, a person awaiting t r i a l states: ...our j a i l s are turning out more criminal minds than they are taking i n . During my own confinement, I've already learned how to mix ni t r o g l y c e r i n e and how to 'peel' a safe, and I've been given some t i p s on the kind of weaponry to be used during an armed robbery\u2014and I haven't even been sentenced y e t . x L e t t e r to the Editor, Playboy, V o l . 16, No. 8 (August, 1969), p. 48. 334 #27 has just stated that i n 1943 he had spent six years i n a penitentiary, and that p r i o r to t h i s term he had committed a wide v a r i e t y of offences. In r e f e r r i n g to the penitentiary sentence he says: Well, i n c i d e n t a l l y , that's where my education i n determining my f u t u r e \u2014 I think y o u ' l l agree that up t i l l now I was rather aimless 1, which I was, you know. But actually, I had grown pretty b i t t e r i n there--I done a l o t of time i n the hole. I must have done t h i r t e e n months in a stretch i n the damper. And got my ass paddled--when I came out I was determined to get hold of a bank r o l l . My f i r s t experience was with the m i l i t a r y . This was i n wartime, 1943. In the f a l l . By t h i s time--by the time I was r e l a t i v e l y b r o k e \u2014 I had maybe a hundred d o l l a r s . And I had no contacts because I had been away too long. And I had to go to work. But before I could g e t \u2014 g o t to work, I had to get clearance from the army. And I got my c a l l - u p notice, and was rejected for medical p s y c h i a t r i c reason. (LAUGHS AT THIS.) I got cleared with the army and\u2014and I worked i n the shipyards as a rigger u n t i l I could get back on my feet. Now here's where the narcotics begins. (#27) The above quotation indicates that despite having com-mitted a wide v a r i e t y of offences #27 considered himself as having been \"aimless\". This corresponds well with our pre-vious d e f i n i t i o n of the \"bum\" . The six year penitentiary stretch resulted i n what we might c a l l \"career c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n \" . He was b i t t e r and was determined to be less aimless regarding crime. This determination was hampered by the fact that, having By t h i s he seems to mean that he had not as yet established any s k i l l \u2014 i d e n t i t y , as of that time. This despite the fact that he had committed a whole v a r i e t y of crimes. 335 been i n prison for so long, he had l o s t h i s previous contacts with other offenders. Both for reasons of finance and of as-sociation, he worked legi t i m a t e l y u n t i l .\"I could get back on my feet\". At that point he had developed connections with a drug t r a f f i c k e r who wished to use #27's s k i l l s as a burglar. From here on h i s criminal a c t i v i t i e s as well as h i s associations took on a routine pattern. He was known by some twelve of the persons I interviewed, and was c l e a r l y considered a \"rounder\". I t i s within the prison setting that the process of selection between teacher and student takes place. In a num-ber of ways i t i s an i d e a l setting, p a r t i c u l a r l y for testing l o y a l t i e s without undue r i s k to the older experienced c r i m i n a l . I t i s , of course, not a good setting i n terms of p r a c t i c a l ap-p l i c a t i o n of what has been learned. Those who w i l l be \"taught\" are c a r e f u l l y selected by the \"teacher\". A question put to each subject was: \"To whom would you teach your s k i l l s ? \" The f i r s t requirement was: \"He must be s o l i d \" . S o l i d i t y i s readily tested i n prison. Inmates are repeatedly subjected to situations where loyalties are at stake. The s o l i d guy w i l l not squeal, w i l l take a bum rap rather than incriminate others, and makes i t c l e a r that h i s allegiance i s to the inmate culture rather than to the administration. Older, experienced criminals express a good deal of d i s -dain for the common young punk, despite the fact that they w i l l 336 describe t h e i r own juvenile actions i n s i m i l a r terms: Now\u2014I wouldn't hurt you and I wouldn't hurt anybody. I don't believe i n t h i s , you know. I t ' s the same here around t h i s i n s t i t u t i o n \u2014 m o s t of the old-time thieves are fine, but some of these younger guys w i l l twist each other, be-cause t h i s i s what they learned. I don't blame them, but we were brought up i n a \u2014 a school of crime where you didn't rob another t h i e f ; you didn't hurt an i n d i v i d u a l and you had c e r t a i n codes that you l i v e d by\u2014you didn't finger any-body even i f you got a bum beef\u2014you didn't i n -form on anybody\u2014you rode i t , you know. Nowa-days i t seems that the f i r s t guy to h o l l e r gets o f f and the rest of the guys go to r j a i l , but l i k e I s a y \u2014 I do blame them i n a way, i n the other way I don't because t h i s i s the way they were t a u g h t \u2014 t h i s i s the way kids are brought up nowadays. (#29) In addition, the p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t must show a good deal of i n i t i a t i v e and desire to learn. #32 was sentenced to f i v e years at the P r a i r i e Penitentiary. He was under twenty-one and therefore assigned to the young convicts section. The following i s from an interview with t h i s safecracker\u2014note the tremendous e f f o r t made to advance h i s career: NOW THESE YOUNG CONVICTS WERE IN THE SAME BUILDING? No, they were i n the same building, but they were i n two separate t i e r s . They were is o l a t e d . I remember it,'you had a \"y\" i n front of i t and you couldn't t a l k to any of the adult convicts. You were kept s t r i c t l y sepa-rate. You ate at your own tables and china wear and s t u f f l i k e that. Quite an unusual set-up. IT WOUTD BE, YESSIR. B a s i c a l l y , they had a point, but there was a pretty tough crew of kids i n there those days,you know. You knuw--nobody had got out of there t i l l he's finished h i s sentence or u n t i l he turned twenty-one, but I made my mind up that I was going to get out of there. There was what you c a l l a segre-gation shop, a shoe shop, and we'd always watch 337 them going by-\u2014the shoe shop was where a l l the tough convicts were\u2014and they were a l l safe-crackers. And some of the best safecrackers i n a l l of Canada were i n that shoe shop. IT WAS CALLED SEGREGATION SHOP? That's r i g h t . They d i d n ' t \u2014 t h e y weren't allowed to t a l k to any of the r e s t \u2014 t h e y got separate ex-ercise, everything. They were the other ex-treme from us. They couldn't t a l k to the rest of the criminals. I SEE. They went to t h e i r exercise alone, had t h e i r own shop, and they had a gun cage right i n the shop\u2014a man with a r i f l e right i n the shop. So I \u2014 i t took me, l e t ' s s e e \u2014 i t took me about th i r t e e n months to get into that shoe shop. Now, as I say, no one had ever got out of there t i l l they'd finished t h e i r j o l t or got to be twenty-one. I was i n that shoe shop when I was eighteen because I had made up my mind I was going to be i n there. YOU MOVED FROM THE YOUNGER CONVICTS? I did about eight months i n the hole, and l o s t f i v e months i n remission i n doing i t , because the warden was just as determined as me, that I was going to stay i n there. So I f i n a l l y won any-way--! got into the shoe shop. NOW, IN OTHER WORDS, YOU MADE ENOUGH TROUBLE FOR THEM SO THEY FINALLY GAVE YOU.... Anything, that's r i g h t . I got into a l i t t l e minor, you know\u2014did a l i t t l e hole time during these two and a h a l f years, but nothing l i k e previous. AND YOU WERE IN THE SHOE SHOP FOR TWO AND A HALF YEARS. Uh huh. And I learned safecracking from A to Z i n here, i n theory, i n that shoe shop. There were approximately\u2014oh, I'd say f i f t e e n good safecrackers. Now, don't get the idea that they volunteered t h i s information, you know. YEH\u2014I WAS JUST GOING TO ASK.ABOUT THAT. Oh no, no\u2014they didn't. They a l l watched, i n ef f e c t , six months, to see just what type I was, and I had t o \u2014 y o u know\u2014how determined and how s o l i d I was. And they f i n a l l y got to l i k e me and I learned from there on. BY SOLID, AND SO ON--WHAT DOES THAT MEAN? That means,, you know\u2014-I wasn't running to the Instructor or anything l i k e that, you know. I was a great con. Those days everything was black and white too, you know. I mean there was no i n between--you--those days you oust talked to cons. You didn't t a l k to guards i f you were 338 an inmate. I SEE. Now, l i k e today i t ' s e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t i n t h i s way. Anytime you t a l k to a guard, t h i s only means he's t e l l i n g you to do something. Now t h i s shoe shop, l i k e I said, i t had a gun-cage right at the end, and i t had an in s t r u c t o r and i t had a d i s c i p l i n a r y guard who did nothing but p a t r o l . Round and round\u2014on h i s entire eight-hour s h i f t . Now, you weren't supposed to leave your bench. SO HOW COULD YOU GET THIS INSTRUCTION WITH ALL THIS? During exercise period you could walk around--in those days exercise consisted of hand-b a l l , horse-shoes and running. SO YOU ACTUALLY GOT YOUR INSTRUCTION DURING EXERCISE PERIOD. Right. Then there was two smoke periods too, you know\u2014like when we had a\u2014you could only smoke during a ten-minute i n t e r v a l i n the morn-ing and then ten minutes i n the afternoon, and then you could leave your bench, you know. (#32) I t i s also required of the p o t e n t i a l r e c r u i t that he possess what i s best described as \"common sense\". There i s no room i n s k i l l e d crime for the emotionally immature or the im-pulsive unthinking person. . #24, a safecracker, stated that at present the following s k i l l s were being \"taught\" at the Western Penitentiary: safe-cracking, check-forging, B & E, robbing a bank, boosting and possibly pimping; i n some sense he f e l t that how to become a con-man was also being taught, but of t h i s he was not sure. I asked him how he would decide to whom to teach the s k i l l s . He r e p l i e d that he would never t a l k to a stranger about t h i s \u2014 he would have to know the fellow inmate for some time f i r s t . He said that the major requirement necessary to be a p o t e n t i a l p u p i l i s that the p u p i l be a \"responsible type\". This means that he would have to be at least twenty-five years old, probatory 339 about t h i r t y . I asked what was meant by \"responsible\". #24 found t h i s hard to verbalize: \"Not someone reckless, not a young punk, you know\u2014a stable character\". When I ques-tioned him s t i l l further he said: Well, I'd want to be sure that he'd be re-sponsible about i t , you know, not stash the n i t r o where kids could get at i t , keep i t out of reach\u2014not be careless. Also, some guys put too much grease in, just to blow the whole thing to pieces. Well, that's no good, you got to take care not to put too much in, not too l i t t l e . Some guys just make a big mess, that's not re-sponsible . WOULD YOU TEACH A RESPONSIBLE GUY ALL YOU KNEW? Yeh, probably, but he'd have to be the right guy. .It used to be harder you know, when I learned i t was tough to get anybody to say anything; they didn't want competition. I picked most of the s t u f f up on the s l y - - j u s t by keeping my ears open. Some guys are d i f f e r e n t too, you know\u2014like , he won't t a l k to nobody. Just keeps to himself. (#24) #24 also said that he would not teach these s k i l l s to anyone who was not mechanically minded: I've t r i e d the a r t i s t i c type, but they can't do i t good. Take , that's h i s tr o u b l e \u2014 h e ' s not mechanical, that's why he's not too good. (#24) Another example, quoted from my f i e l d notes taken during an i n -terview with #40: #40 fe e l s he learned the theory of safe-opening beginning at the age of seventeen, during h i s f i r s t penitentiary sentence. He stated that he made a point of seeking out people whom he had heard about through conver-sation; he would then show an inter e s t i n be-coming friends with these persons. Much of t h i s theory was communicated i n informal ways; 340 for example, the newspaper would report a safecracking job. #40 would refer the a r t i c l e to a safecracker during group conversation and say, 'I wonder how he done that?' The safecracker might explain how the act was possible\u2014#40 would 'milk' him for as much in-formation as possible. #40 noted that any specialized criminal i s very reluctant to communicate t h i s special knowledge\u2014they are very suspicious: 'It's the only thing he r e a l l y has*. I t i s t h i s s p e c i a l knowledge that has made them a suc-cess and they don't want to part with i t . Before a safecracker w i l l t a l k to someone he must be convinced of the person's ' s o l i -d a r i t y . I asked #40 what was meant by that term and he stated the c r i t e r i a i n t h i s or-der: he must not be an informer, he must be i n t e l l i g e n t enough to be able to use t h i s knowledge, and the safecracker must f e e l that perhaps he might be able to use t h i s person to h i s own advantage l a t e r on\u2014perhaps as a partner. These c r i t e r i a , said #40, mean that you must become a friend of the safecracker be-fore he w i l l t e l l you anything. This f r i e n d -ship, however, i s not so much of a sentimental nature, but i s based upon the s o l i d a r i t y re-ferred to above: 'The safecracker would pro-bably watch you for a couple of months\u2014-'they won't t r y to impress the mediocre type of i n -d i v i d u a l 1 . At the same time, the safecracker desires prestige from persons whom he respects. The following quotation indicates that subjective fac-tors also play a part, i n t h i s case combined with opportu-n i t y : HOW DID YOU GET TO TEACH YOU HOW TO BOOST? Well, he took a l i k i n g to me. I r e a l l y don't know\u2014it's just that one day he was stuck without a partner; he asked me to come along and I came along and he thought I had done a l -right, so from then on i t was, as a matter of fact, h i s partner went to j a i l , and I just con-tinued on with him. (#20) 341 The opportunity to learn a s p e c i f i c criminal trade may also be limited because of p r a c t i t i o n e r s i n t h i s f i e l d being unavailable to serve as teachers: THERE IS VERY LITTLE IN THE PAPERS ABOUT.. This i s why I say that safe-blowin' was, was the old school, l i k e . I wouldn't even con-sider myself as one of the old timers\u2014much older fellows than me that go into t h i s . And I'm like\u2014maybe at the t a i l end of the old t i m e r s \u2014 t h e y got too old and finished with t h i s and i t sort of died out, you see. Any of the guys that are coming out of j a i l now, like--we wouldn't go back into i t ; i f we were going to go back in, we'd go into some-thing else, because\u2014we've\u2014in t h i s day and age, I think, we've found out that i t doesn't pay off--too much time f o r too l i t t l e money and we'd probably do something else. UH HUH. And because of t h i s I don't think there's too many new one's turning out\u2014you know. Like kids, because who've they got to learn i t from? RIGHT. (#14) The process of selection suggests that inmates are not equally involved i n the teaching-learning process, except i n so f a r as information i s picked up inadvertently. . #21 and h i s partner spent six hours t r y i n g to open a round safe embedded i n concrete. I t was t h e i r f i r s t attempt and they were unsuccessful. I asked for more d e t a i l on h i s robbery and #21 r e p l i e d that they had learned l a t e r that the way to do them , i s to d r i l l t h i r t y or forty holes into the ce-ment and then h i t i t with the sledgehammer. But what they needed for that was a good d r i l l , and as #21 put i t : We didn't have one of them ( d r i l l ) ; i f we had we'd have been out of there i n three or four hours. We didn't have one\u2014we didn't r e a l i z e i t u n t i l a f t e r and we thought about 342 i t \u2014 w h a t kind of tools we'd need i f we ever did one l i k e that again. SO YOU HADN'T LEARNED IN THE PENITENTIARY WHAT KIND OF TOOLS TO TAKE WITH YOU? FOR A SAFE LIKE THAT? No\u2014that's one thing we dont do i n there, even with a l l the b i t s I've done. I don't go s i t t i n g around ta l k i n g about crime, I never have. I may hear somebody, but I won't go down and s i t down and ask, 'Well, how do you do t h i s , or hew do you do that?' I ' l l just keep to m y s e l f \u2014 I don't bother ask-ing about that. DO SOME OF THE INMATES HERE TALK ABOUT THAT QUITE A BIT? Some, yeh. Some do. I t ' s mostly the kids though. And some of the older guys do, but not a l l of them. Some of them do. (#21) The example below indicates some of the c r i t e r i a by which membership i n group discussions i s made possible, as well as the nature of technical s k i l l s necessary for bank robbery: WELL, GOING BACK AGAIN TO SOME OF THESE EARLIER BANKS\u2014YOU HAD BEEN THINKING ABOUT THIS BANK BUSINESS THEN FOR SOME TIME, AND DID YOU DO YOUR OWN\u2014YOU SELECTED THE BANK THAT TIME? Yeh, at that time I selected the bank. NOW, DID YOU SPEND A LOT OF TIME\u2014THAT IS, YOU WERE NOT AN EXPERIENCED CRIMINAL AT THAT TIME. No. HOW DID YOU KNOW WHAT WAS A GOOD BANK? Because of the time I spent i n (name of a pris o n ) . I would look around, and we're s i t t i n g there, two guys that were i n for bank robbery. They would say, well, he would be ta l k i n g to h i s partner, for ex-ample, and I would be s i t t i n g there, and maybe I'd know him, you know\u2014sort of and things l i k e that, so he would c a l l me over close to them, and he would say, 'Well, jesus Christ, you remember when we done that job, what mistake we done. We just should never have gone through parking road, you know. We should have known better, or we should have known that there would be a road block there. 343 We should have known i t . ' And things l i k e that. So you know, well t h i s guy. should have known that, okay. Now maybe I learn by the misfortune of others, you know. Through these guys now. And, so eventually, i n (name of prison) especially, when you s t a r t to t a l k with guys they eventually, you mix\u2014now i n a penitentiary too, you have a hold-up group\u2014 the hold-up men w i l l clique together, the sex offenders w i l l clique together, the check-men w i l l clique together, and within a group they ask me what type of crime I committed, and I t o l d them that I had t r i e d to make a bank, and was not successful, and we're in\u2014I'm i n that group. Now I maybe select a friend i n that group. One that I communicate with best and I w i l l be walking back and forth for hours with him, t a l k i n g about possible ways of doing banks, you see. And how we could outsmart the people, howwa could react to c e r t a i n c i r -cumstances during a bank hold-up, and things l i k e that. And i f people t r y to get out of a bank, l i k e a guy wants to come to you, and where to put your gun, and how to behave, you know. During a bank hold-up to make i t suc-c e s s f u l . SOME OF THESE THINGS YOU WOULD DISCUSS RIGHT IN PRISON? Oh yes, d e f i n i t e l y . I SEE. SO IN A SENSE YOU HAD A LOT OF THEORY. Oh yes. Now a l l the theory I required during the time I was in prison. On the outside I would think, and i t was just a matter of refreshing my memory for one evening, for example, with one guy, and we're ready to put i t into action, our theory. YEH. Or to a new bank, or whatever we had i n mind. (#28) The criminal may also, v i a more formal methods, seek out information which he thinks i s relevant to h i s work. Some of t h i s may occur i n prison as well as outside of prison: WHERE DID YOU LEARN TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE DIFFERENT TYPES OF ALARM SYSTEMS? Well, I just looked at them\u2014I guess I heard d i f f e r e n t t a l k about alarms when I was i n j a i l . TALK OF ALARMS IN JAIL? DID YOU IN ANY SYSTEMATIC WAY STUDY ABOUT ALARMS ANYWHERE? Well, when I was i n the C o r r e c t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e (LAUGH) I took an e l e c t r i c a l course for awhile (LAUGHTER). 344 DID YOU TAKE THAT COURSE WITH THIS KIND OF THING IN MIND? No, no\u2014but I got to think-ing about i t . And the books were there, and I started looking through them, to give me an idea of how they worked. WOULD YOU SAY THAT THERE'S A FAIR AMOUNT OF INSTRUCTION GOING BACK AND FORTH IN THE PRISON SETUP? OF THIS SORT? Well, nothing r e a l l y important, be-cause i f a guy's got a good thing, you know, you just don't l i k e to give i t to anybody, you know. I SEE. WHAT ABOUT LOCKS? SOME ARE DIFFICULT AND SOME ARE NOT, APPARENTLY. WHERE DID YOU LEARN TO DISCRIMINATE BETWEEN LOCKS? I took a lock-smithing course. YOU DID, REALLY? Yeh. Yeh, I took h a l f of i t - - I wanted to l e a r n \u2014 I was having a l i t t l e trouble afterwards with i t \u2014 the RCMP found out I was taking i t \u2014 t h e y walked in on me one day and I was cutting a key and t h e y \u2014 I was taking a\u2014by the I n s t i t u t e of America\u2014they had a correspondence course, so I sent away for that. I took about h a l f of the course. WHEN YOU WERE IN PRISON OR OUT? Oh no, when I was out. OUT\u2014THEY DON'T TEACH IT HERE, I GUESS? No. I SEE. AND THAT TOLD YOU ENOUGH TO BE ABLE TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN SOMETHING YOU CAN DO EASILY AND SOMETHING YOU CAN'T? Yeh--most locks though, they're not too hard to take. ALL RIGHT. AND SAFES\u2014WHAT ABOUT THOSE? Mostly from experience. The square door safes, they're a l l pretty easy to open, and\u2014we heard t a l k about the one type of round door safe and another there and i t ' s just a matter, you know. Well, maybe we hear that so and so got a round door. Well, i f you know the guy well enough, and maybe you've stolen with him, you go up to him and ask, 'Well, how did you get that?' And i f you know him well, and he thinks that you're going to make use of i t , h e ' l l t e l l you. WOULD THAT BE IN PRISON OR OUT? Both. BOTH\u2014I SEE. (#2) The concluding paragraph above indicates the on-going nature of the learning process, both p r i o r to, during and following the prison experience. The following example indicates 345 how an already knowledgeable criminal enhanced h i s knowledge during the prison experience: (#27 WENT TO OTTAWA TO BLOW A SAFE WITH DRUGS IN IT.) YOU WENT TO THIS DRUG COMPANY, RIGHT? Yeh. AND YOU BLEW THE CAN. Yeh. HOW DID YOU\u2014WHERE DID YOU PICK THAT UP? HOW DID YOU KNOW HOW TO BLOW A CAN? Well, u h \u2014 t h i s was i n c i d e n t a l l y the f i r s t time I had blown one\u2014I\u2014we used explosives, but\u2014uh, from, you know, tal k i n g , my knowledge previous to going into the pen, of punching cans and cans i n general, and ta l k i n g to the various, you know, experts i n the f i e l d , and then, i n the pen i t s e l f , and that's where I learned how to make nitroglycerine, by the way. IN THE PEN? Yeh, in the pen. UH HUH. NOW, HAD YOU ACTUALLY PUNCHED QUITE A FEW CANS BEFORE THIS? Not quite a few\u2014possibly h a l f a dozen. FINE. NOW, IF YOU LEARNED HOW TO MAKE NITRO AT THE PEN...Well, t h e o r e t i c a l l y , at least...HOW DID YOU MAKE OUT THE FIRST TIME YOU ACTUALL TRIED IT? (LAUGHTER) ... funnyI (#2 7 STATED THAT HE HAD TROUBLE WITH HIS FIRST ATTEMPT TO MAKE GREASE BUT THAT THE SE-COND ATTEMPT WAS A COMPLETE SUCCESS. THEN FOR ONE YEAR HE WORKED LEGITIMATELY IN THE SHIP-YARDS . DURING THIS TIME HE MADE NITRO AND SOLD IT TO OTHERS AND WENT ON A FEW SCORES HIMSELF. AFTER THIS HE LEFT FOR OTTAWA WHERE HE BLEW HIS FIRST CAN, AS DESCRIBED ABOVE.) Prison experience provides the time and formal oppor-tun i t y to enhance one's criminal s k i l l s because the various exigencies of time and money which l a r g e l y d i c t a t e h i s pre-prison behaviour are not operative within prison: HOW DID YOU FIRST LEARN TO OPEN A LOCKED DOOR? Well, I don't know, l i k e when I f i r s t started i t was just more or l e s s \u2014 I don't know. I'd hear something mentioned, but once I got in j a i l , I learned to do things a l i t t l e bet-t e r . That's about a l l you hear i n j a i l , how to do t h i s , and watch for that, and how to get 346 a car and change plates and everything. I f you're going to become any kind of profession-a l at a l l , you'd have to do some time\u2014maybe some guy has run into some guy that's done time and he hooked up with him, but otherwise i t ' s impossible. REALLY? YOU COULDN'T JUST LEARN ON YOUR OWN? Well, maybe you c o u l d \u2014 I ' d say you couldn't, myself. {#36) Respondents agreed that the adequacy of prison learning for purposes of actual practice varies with the type of crime. A bank robber pointed out that safe-cracking can be learned more f u l l y i n prison than bank robbery\"; t h i s because safe-cracking i s more mechanical, whereas bank robbery depends more on p r a c t i c e . At the same time, he added, only experience w i l l t e l l a safecracker just how much grease to use on any p a r t i c u l a r safe. None of my respondents suggested any degree of s p e c i a l -i z a t i o n p r i o r to the f i r s t prison s e n t e n c e \u2014 i t was during prison that the i l l e g i t i m a t e career took on form and structure. This for three reasons; f i r s t , the haphazard and impulsive character of delinquency can no longer be afforded. As the teenager becomes an adult, he needs to make greater e f f o r t s to avoid s t i f f e r penalties. Also, through experimentation the offender has some basis to assess al t e r n a t i v e modes of crime. An assessment of h i s own a b i l i t i e s , q u a l i f i e d by h i s Respondents provided several example where ex-prisoners* f i r s t jobs (safe-jobs), based e n t i r e l y upon prison \"theory\", were completely successful. 347 prison companions, i s one factor to consider. Last of a l l , he r e a l i z e s that not a l l criminal modes are viable alterna-t i v e s . Some s k i l l s must be learned from the experienced and cannot be picked up through t r i a l and error, and the experi-enced may not wish to comnuricate these s k i l l s to him (or perhaps the cost of such i n s t r u c t i o n i s p r o h i b i t i v e , i n terms of work expectations, for example). On the other hand, the prison experience opens up new p o s s i b i l i t i e s not known about or considered before: OKAY. NOW LET'S GO ON TO THE NEXT B & E, WHICH YOU GOT IN 161. WHAT KIND OF A\"B & E\" WAS THAT? That was night prowling. NIGHT PROWLING? Yeh. I t ' s l i k e B & E, but i t ' s at night, when people are home. AH. SO ON THAT FIRST COUNT, HOWEVER, YOU HADN'T BEEN DOING THAT? No. SO NOW YOU STARTED ENTERING HOUSES WHEN PEOPLE WERE AT HOME? WHY DID YOU CHANGE TO THAT KIND OF A TACTIC? Well, I thought I'd get more money. You see, when people go to bed they either leave t h e i r wallet i n t h e i r pocket or t h e i r purse laying around. SO IT WAS A MATTER OF MONEY? Aha. WHY DID YOU NOT START OUT THAT WAY IN THE BEGIN-NING? 'Cause I never thought of i t then. I t wasn't u n t i l I come i n here that I heard d i f -ferent guys t a l k i n g about i t . So I thought, well...DID YOU LEARN ANY OF THE SKILLS HERE IN PRISON? Well no, there's no s k i l l r e a l l y ; i t ' s just from hearing over and over.the guys tal k i n g about i t . You know, prowling apart-ments and that, so I t r i e d i t on a house. L#21) The prison experience expands the range of the c r i m i -n a l l y p o s s i b l e \u2014 f o r example, i t seems to have the e f f e c t of expanding the alternatives known to the cri m i n a l . This may 348 resu l t i n the criminal choosing a s p e c i f i c criminal trade more compatible with h i s own a b i l i t i e s . In Leavenworth you got some of the highest class criminals-- I ' l l say, i n the world; from the roughest type to the smoothest type. So you've watched them, you've found out how they've come ahead, and you star t to use your own head a l i t t l e b i t . You find out what you're capable of and what you're not. You begin to see a l i t t l e more c l e a r l y , you get a better perspective of things. You know you can do certain things and get away with i t ; other things are out of your sphere. You have time to see t h a t . l The realism to which Martin refers appears to be i n sharp contrast to the d i s t o r t i o n of thought and judgement which many of my respondents at t r i b u t e to prison: So I did the f i v e years, the whole b i t and when I got out things were r e a l strange. I don't know, r e a l l y strange. I didn't trust her anymore. I didn't f e e l right about her. I figured she was\u2014you get a re a l d i s t o r t e d mind i n there\u2014boy, you r e a l l y do. I didn't r e a l i z e t h i s , t i l l f i n a l l y I was t a l k i n ' to a couple of guys, old timers, and they were t e l l i n ' me t h i s , and I didn't believe them. (#6) I t i s of course probable that the prison experience may a f f e c t i n d i v i d u a l inmates d i f f e r e n t l y , leaving some with delusions of grandeur and others with sober judgement. I t may however, be possible to accommodate both the \"realism\" and \" d i s t o r t i o n \" i n terms of what might be referred to as a form of consciousness consisting of making problematic that a r t i n , My L i f e i n Crime, p. 140. 349 which would normally be taken f o r granted. More w i l l be said of t h i s i n the subsequent chapter. D. LEARNING AND EXPERIENCE Factors s i m i l a r to those involved i n the formation of a student-teacher relationship inside prison may also ope-rate outside of prison: NOW AFTER YOU GOT TO GET GOOD AT THIS, HOW DID YOU SELECT GUYS TO GET TO HELP YOU, OR WHOM WOULD YOU TRAIN AND WHOM WOULD YOU NOT TRAIN? Well, you don't r e a l l y t r a i n anybody, or you just go with your partner, you s e e \u2014 or you go with any other one of your friends that wants you to go with him. Or i f you got a score, maybe your partner don't l i k e i t so you go with another g u y \u2014 l i k e I said, safecrackers t h e n \u2014 w e l l , you kind of under-stand each other\u2014you knew that each one knew as much as you did....But as far as goin* and t r a i n i n ' somebody\u2014no. But some younger f e l -low might come along who doesn't know any-thing about i t and you might take a l i k i n ' to him and he might take a l i k i n ' to you, and he might hang around you, and bug you into seen how it;s--how you do i t , and so you, f i n a l l y you might take him along with you, and t e l l him what you know, and show him\u2014and you wouldn't select anyone--I mean the person would have to come up and ask you and have to be a good friend of yours. (#14) He may also be a r e l a t i v e : And so I asked my brother, and my brother was not an expert at stealing bank and things l i k e that--he had no experience. But he was very i n -terested, because I had money, you see. And he wanted to know how I got my money and I t o l d him, natu r a l l y . And he said, 'You must l e t me go with you', and things l i k e that . So I decided that night, I'm going to bring him along, because I knew that there wouldn't be too much opposition 350 on that job, you know, so I did that. We done the job good\u2014we got through our getaway by the back door. (#28) The above quotations provide support for Sutherland* s asser-t i o n below: Any man who h i t s the big time i n crime, somewhere or other along the road, became as-sociated with a big timer who picked him up and educated him. Then i f he had the guts and secondly, the a b i l i t y , he gradually i s turned into a professional big time racketeer. But no one ever crashed the big rackets with-out education i n t h i s line.-'-I t may well be that Sutherland's respondent repre-sents a quite d i f f e r e n t type of criminal from most of my own, for my data suggests that a formal partnership tute-lage relationship (as the three above examples suggest) was the exception rather than the ru l e . An e a r l i e r quotation suggests an e s s e n t i a l equality between safecracker part-ners (\"...safecrackers t h e n \u2014 w e l l , you kind of understood each other\u2014you knew that each one knew as much as you did\".) An armed robber stated: CAN YOU TELL ME HOW YOU GOT STARTED ON THIS\u2014GROCERY AND DRUG STORES? Well, I met a man a l i t t l e older than myself i n a f l o p -house\u2014that was run by the c i t y . This was i n the depression days and who instigated i t , I wouldn't have the f a i n t e s t idea. I was the one that o r i g i n a l l y got a gun from a t h i r d man, and I had to pay a rather exorbi-tant amount for i t at that time; and we ^Sutherland,, The Professional Thief, p. 23. 351 started stealing cars, s t i c k i n g up groceries, drugstores and were eventually caught on a jewaLlery store. YOU AND THIS OLDER MAN? Well, when I say o l d e r \u2014 h e was a matter of maybe four or f i v e years older. NOW, HAD HE HAD EXPERIENCE IN THIS KIND OF THING? No\u2014 he had none. SO YOU BOTH STARTED OUT, AS IT WERE, OREEN. Yeh. (#27) The respondents interviewed suggested that on-the-job t r a i n i n g , as i n the style of apprenticeship, i s an unusual pattern. More common i s a gradual progression, beginning with awkward juvenile efforts, refined by the prison experi-ence and followed by t r i a l and error combined with informal, intermittent advice from the more experienced. None of my respondents who were known as safecrakers had been given on-the-job i n s t r u c t i o n by an experienced safe-cracker prl'vor> to having attempted some safecracking on t h e i r own. A burglar with some limi t e d experience i n safecracking commented that he had been fortunate enough to go \"on a few jobs with pete-men\"; one of these pete-men was a j a i l contact. His very f i r s t safe-breaking attempt was done alone and was a f a i l u r e . He had been given a t i p for ten per-cent and had t r i e d to punch the safe, but f a i l e d a f t e r an hour 1s work. #40 had been fortunate i n that the pete-man he went out with took the time to show him how to do i t . x He noted A safecracker commented that safecrackers as a group have the reputation of being \"close-mouthed\" about their s k i l l s . (#4) 352 that some pete-men would use the young guys for lookouts only, and would not convey the t e c h n i q u e s \u2014 i n fact, they might take pains to conceal them. #40 stated that not many safecrackers are good teachers. With a good teacher #40 f e l t that the student need only, watch a safe-blowing once before being able to do i t himself. Making the grease i s another m a t t e r \u2014 i t would take more experience. . When early attempts at safecracking take the form of group e f f o r t s , such a group usually consists of equally i n -experienced persons, as was suggested previously. The f o l -lowing respondent referred to such attempts as safe-breaking rather than safecracking! ...before when we started going, we were pretty c r u d e \u2014 f o u r or f i v e of us at a time. (#35) Such e f f o r t s are characterized by u t i l i z i n g the simp-lest mechanical technique possible. Because these simple techniques are applicable only to c e r t a i n types of safes i t i s important that the would-be safecracker be able to iden-t i f y these \"easy cans\". Such information i s assimilated v i a association with the more experienced criminals, both inside prison and outside. The d i s t i n c t i o n between a \"round-door can\" and other \"cans\" appears to be common knowledge among young, p o t e n t i a l safecrackers, and i s not derived from actual experience. 353 A common technique for the beginner i s to peel the safe. Having thus torn o f f the front of the door, the mechanism i s then manipulated i n t r i a l and error manner u n t i l the bars move from the sockets. The manipulation i s not based on any general knowledge of how such mechanisms operate. Serious study l a t e r i n the criminal career, of the mecha-nisms, seems 1 to indicate what might be termed a \"career choice\". The study of the mechanism may take several forms, such as studying safes at one's home, seeking advice from the more experienced, or both. 1 A safecracker who mentioned that he and h i s partner had taken home a safe door to study was asked: \"Did you take the door with you on the f i r s t job?\" No\u2014not on the f i r s t job, we didn't take i t . We didn't take the door with us t i l l about eight or nine\u2014what they c a l l scores; a f t e r t h i s \u2014 t h a t we had been on. And we decided we didn't know enough, so we took a door\u2014took i t to * s place, took i t down . to the basement and we dismantled i t \u2014 j u s t to f i n d out what the door was made of and how i t was made and how the locking bars worked and so on and so fo r t h . (#29) As was referred to e a r l i e r , the experienced criminal w i l l aid or advise only those i n whom he has reason to have complete confidence. The following.account i s a part of my f i e l d notes \u2022 taken during an interview with a safecracker (#4): The practice of v i s i t i n g the .show..rooms of safe-compan-ies i s not done by the beginner. Experienced- safecrackers u t i l i z e , these f a c i l i t i e s i n order to keep .up with innovations, but i t does not seem to be a place where basic p r i n c i p l e s are learned. 354 P r i o r to doing h i s f i r s t 'can', #4 bugged an older safecracker i n prison ' . . . u n t i l he f i n a l l y divulged how to do i t ' . This instruc-t i o n , he added, was 1...not l i k e a teacher-student, i t was just a matter of discussion during work 1. When he l e f t the prison he went back to h i s regular partner and described to him what he had learned about safes. His partner said t h i s was ri d i c u l o u s , but #4 persuaded him to come along: 'I followed the instructions to the l e t t e r . I t opened\u2014we were both over-come with i t a l l \u2014 t h e ease of i t a l i i ' This f i r s t job had been a punch j o b \u2014 t e c h -n i c a l l y the simplest. Following t h i s #4 and h i s partner '...opened many doors by t r i a l and e r r o r . 1 He would study the door a f t e r opening, i f possible: 'The l i s t of safes we knew how to open grew'. This went on for four years; they had not as yet used explo-sives, nor had they ever been caught punch-ing safes. They became increasingly eager to t r y explosives since they found so many safes which couldn't be opened i n any other way. During t h i s time #4 was associating with other safecrackers; he stated that he was known as a safecracker and was putting on that he knew a l l about i t . He eventually enquired of another safecracker,whether he could bor-row some grease. 'I wouldn't admit that I knew nothing about \u2022it,'' He obtained the grease and then d e l i b e r a t e l y chose a partner who knew nothing about grease, but who thought that #4 knew what he was doing. #4 had also d e l i b e r a t e l y chosen a small safe\u2014one that could be removed from the b u i l d i n g (he was a f r a i d of blowing the building down.) and they blew i t i n Stanley Park. However, they had trouble and so the next day he discussed h i s problem with some more experienced safe-crackers. He found that he had used too long a fuse and was advised to use e l e c t r i c -a l knockers. This he did with success. S p e c i f i c advice from the experienced i s not ava i l a b l e to a l l who request i t , however: 355 NOW, LET'S TAKE YOU BACK FOR A MINUTE. ALARM SYSTEMS; AS FAR AS I KNOW THERE ARE CERTAIN TYPES, BUT ONCE YOU KNOW THE DIF-FERENT TYPES THEY ARE ALL VIRTUALLY THE SAME. Yes. WITHIN THE TYPE. NOW THAT'S A STRAIGHT TECHNICAL MATTER\u2014ANY ELECTRICIAN CAN LEARN IT. SUPPOSE YOU KNEW ABOUT TYPE \"B\", WOULD YOU NOT COMMUNICATE THAT TO SOMEBODY ELSE? Well, i f i t was somebody I'd worked with--now suppose somebody would come up to me and ask me--somebody I knew: 'Now I've got t h i s , I know a pretty f a i r spot I could get into but i t ' s an Acme Alarm System, i n the j o i n t . ' Well, I'd t e l l him, 'Well yeh\u2014what about i t ? ' And he'd say, 'Well, i s i t supervised?\" And I'd say, 'No, i t ' s not'. He'd say,' 'They haven't got a supervised system\u2014the e l e c t r i c eyes?' 'Well, they--maybe yes, no\u2014sometimes they do, sometimes they don't'. I'd explain and maybe i f i t i s worthwhile the guy might t e l l me, 'Well, look\u2014how about coming a-long?* Now i f I didn't l i k e i t , i f i t didn't look l i k e i t might work very well, I'd t e l l the guy, 'Well, I ' l l shut i f off, i f I can, and then you give me twenty-five percent. I SEE. AND THEN THE GUY WOULD DO THE REST HIMSELF? Yeh. SO, THAT KIND OF STUFF YOU WOULD ONLY TELL TO SOMEONE TO WHOM YOU HAD SOME REASON TO TALK ABOUT I T \u2014 YOU WOULDN'T COMMUNICATE THIS WHOLESALE? No. (#2) The following exerpt from a tape-recorded interview with #4 i s an example of a f i r s t attempt at safecracking. I t i l l u s t r a t e s the nature, extent and source of i n i t i a l basic information. A contrast of t h i s experience with the methods described i n Chapter IV e a r l i e r , w i l l indicate the te c h n i c a l blunders made. (The l a t t e r part of t h i s example introduces us to the next consideration, that of the development of perceptual s k i l l s , which w i l l be discussed i n the chapter to follow.) 3 5 6 NOW, WHAT ELSE DID YOU\u2014WERE YOU DOING BY THE AGE OF TWENTY-ONE? Armed r o b b e r i e s \u2014 I t r i e d the armed robberies for awhile, but I d i s l i k e i t . WE'LL TAKE ARMED ROBBERIES UP SPECIFICALLY LATER. WHAT HAPPENED AT AGE TWENTY-ONE? That's the f i r s t year I went to the penitentiary. HOW LONG WERE YOU IN? Two years. WHAT DID YOU DO WHEN YOU CAME OUT? I went back to stea l i n * again. WHAT KIND OF THEFT? A h \u2014 t h i s was during the war, and I was just s t a r t i n g on safes then. WHY HAD YOU NOT DONE SAFES BEFORE? Well, I didn't know too much about them. AND HOW COME YOU KNEW SOMETHING ABOUT THEM NOW? Well, and I got together and (LAUGHS) made a study of i t . HAD YOU KNOWN BEFORE THIS? I \u2014 I knew when I was seven. YOU AND DID A STUDY OF SAFES? Right. WHILE IN THE PEN.? While we were i n the Pen we studied as much as we could about metals. WELL, HOW DID YOU STUDY? ARE THERE BOOKS ON THE SUBJECT? There are books on safes showing the\u2014ah\u2014makeup and how to b u i l d a safe and so on, and then, when we got out we started blowin' doors o f f and saving the doors. SAVING THE DOORS? Taking the doors with us. WHAT ABOUT BOOKS? On the general makeup, not on the s p e c i f i c s \u2014 j u s t on the general makeup of safes\u2014how they're b u i l t and... DOES THE PEN. LIBRARY HAVE SUCH BOOKS? Uh, they came i n through trade magazines. I DIDN'T EXPECT THE PEN. WOULD HAVE BOOKS LIKE THAT. ANY OTHER SOURCE OF INFORMATION? Uh, just t a l k i n g to other safe-blowers, discuss-ing the fine arts (LAUGHS) and science of blowing a safe and how to feed a l i n e and knock the d i a l o f f and so fo r t h . WHY DID YOU TURN TO SAFES? Uh\u2014because there's money i n safecracking. The returns are greater, you know. There i s more money i n a safe than there would be i n a store, or in stealing something and r e - s e l l i n g i t \u2014 s u c h as goods and so on. You've got to handle i t too much, where a safe you just blow the door and you've got the money and that i s i t , that i s the end of the l i n e \u2014 y o u have the money and away you go. 357 SO YOU AND GOT OUT PRETTY WELL AT THE SAME TIME? 1945, I think. HOW SOON AFTER YOU GOT OUT DID YOU IN FACT BLOW A SAFE? Oh, I think i t was the next nightL I believe i t w a s \u2014 i t was within two or three days anyway, see\u2014we had to have some money just coming out of j a i l \u2014 i n those days they only gave you a ten d o l l a r b i l l when you l e f t j a i l and that wa s i t . TELL ME IN AS MUCH DETAIL AS POSSIBLE ABOUT THE FIRST SAFE YOU BLEW. The f i r s t one we blew... (LAUGHS) - .. We made a mess of that I DES-CRIBE IT ANYWAY\u2014HOW DID YOU- MAKE A MESS? Well, I ' l l have to t e l l you t h i s \u2014 w e went and got the grease, you know what grease is? YEH. We got the grease o f f a fellow we know had i t . HOW DID YOU GET TO KNOW HIM? Uh\u2014we got to know him i n the p e n i t e n t i a r y \u2014 h e was a safe-blower\u2014he got out before we d i d . We went and got the grease. DID HE HAVE IT WITH HIM? No\u2014he had to get if, for us. He had h i s own supply\u2014he used to make h i s own grease, and as a matter of fact, we bought i t o f f him--we had to pay for i t . ....we got the s t u f f . We went down to t h i s building; by the way, i t was a market. I don't think you want to know what market. NO, NOT AT ALL. I t was a market and we broke i n -to t h i s place, and we'd been t o l d a l l about, you know, what we'd learn*t and what we'd been t o l d about how to do i t , so we had a bar of soap WHERE DID YOU GET THAT? We bought the bar of s o a p \u2014 j u s t ordinary laundry soap. You'd take i t i n your hands and work i t t i l l i t was more or less l i k e putty when you got i t s o f t . And\u2014we'd been t o l d how to f i l l up the crack a l l around the door except for an inch or an inch and a h a l f at the bottom. So we did\u2014we went ahead and put the soap a l l around the door and up on the top we made a l i t t l e cup when we l e f t t h i s opening\u2014kind of s o \u2014 and we got this, and we got t h i s grease running inside. We weren't sure exactly how much, you know. We'd been t o l d by d i f f e r e n t people exactly how muchi 'Now, you use so much.' Anotter guy t o l d us to use h a l f an ounce, ano-' ther guy t o l d us to use an ounce. So we f i -gured, 'Oh h e l l , we'll make i t good'.' So we used two ounces. So we poured i t into the 358 cup and l e t i t run down into the safe\u2014now I forgot to t e l l you--on the bottom we used to leave a c r a c k \u2014 o n the bottom\u2014open. And oh t h i s cup on top, a f t e r we'd poured here, we'd put a cup and a fuse i n there, on top of the safe. I'd tape i t there or just leave i t s i t i n the cup, and when we saw the g r e a s e ^ t h i s i s the way i t was explained to us. When you saw the grease s t a r t i n g to come out at the bottom, plug that and l i g h t the fuse and get the h e l l out of the way. So we did\u2014now the strange thing about safe-blowing i s that (PAUSE)...we used far too much grease, and i f money i s i n the t i n box or just s i t t i n g on the shelf by i t s e l f i t ' s fine and dandy. .But i f i t ' s i n a bag and there's s i l v e r i n i t , the shock, when t h i s n i t r o goes off, w i l l send t h i s s i l v e r f l y i n g around l i k e \u2014 i n there l i k e a grinding wheel and a l l the b i l l s get chopped to h e l l . And t h i s i s exactly what we did--we chopped a l l the b i l l s up. When I opened the bag (LAUGHS) and got a look at i t \u2014 t h e s i l v e r , some of i t was a l l banged, you know\u2014out of shape from t h i s shock and a l l the b i l l s were cut to ribbons. (LAUGHTER) Now, t h i s i s the f i r s t one we ever blew\u2014 we blew the door right o f f \u2014 r i g h t across the room. Y e h \u2014 r i g h t o f f the hinges. (LAUGHS) Right across the room!. And t h i s \u2014 y o u know, losing the money\u2014uh\u2014some of i t was s t i l l \u2014 could be cashed; some of the b i l l s were i n a condition, but the majority of Lt was no goodi The s i l v e r was fine and dandy. And t h i s was.our f i r s t experience--we got a few d o l l a r s out of i t . ONE OTHER QUESTION\u2014HOW DID YOU KNOW WHICH PLACE TO HIT? Well, at these t i m e s \u2014 a t t h i s time we used to go around and look, and study places and figure out which one was the more l i k e l y one to h i t without a burglar alarm. We didn't know anything about burglar alarms i n those days and...YET YOU ONLY HAD ONE DAY TO DO THIS. Uh\u2014what, to go around? YES. The f i r s t day we were o u t \u2014 w e l l , we just\u2014we just happened to see t h i s place and we said, 'Well, l o o k \u2014 t h e r e ' s money, cash money in here.*.' I t was a market and people are coming i n and they're spending money, so there must be money 359 The following i s an example of amateur work i n a bank robbery, where an emergency was not handled i n a professional manner: Well, you know, the more time we have the better i t i s . So we going to t i e the people up and we t i e d the g i r l f i r s t , and then the mother started to say t h a t \u2014 y o u know\u2014she went into a s p e l l , you know. Started to a c t \u2014 how do you say that, 'spasm1? SPASM. Yeh. And the g i r l said, 'My mother i s having a heart attack.' So I said, 'Oh jesus c h r i s t , I don't want to have a murder on my hand, you knew'. So I said, ' T e l l you what', I said., 'I'm tying you now\u2014I wont t i e her, and as soon as she's up s h e ' l l be able, you and her, and that brother of yours there, to go to the next house to c a l l a doctor or something. And I said, 'Stay put for at least two minutes, before we get out.' So we got out, and t h i s old woman, as soon as we were in through the counter, she ran out, you know. And she took the license number with the plate reversed\u2014she was very quick mind-ed, you know! Now\u2014and I was not aware of that. (LAUGHTER) Now, we're about five-hundred yards away on the road, and my brother looked through h i s rear-view mirror and he said, 'This b i t c h i s there now\u2014she's on the road.' And I said, 'How i n the fuck she's on the road\u2014she's having a heart attack!' My bro-ther he says, 'The phoney b i t c h ! ' I said, 'Come on, keep going, keep going\u2014there's no time to stop here and st a r t shooting or things l i k e that!' So we went out anyway. I knew that when I was arrested that she's the one that took the license number i n re-verse. So now I go and get the car back to Montreal, you know\u2014it took us maybe four or f i v e hours to go back to Montreal. We shoved the car back i n the garage, and we paid the rent and everything and now I'm home, having a b e e r \u2014 i t ' s late at night. And suddenly, 'Open up,., #28!' So I opened up and that's the p o l i c e . And a hold-up squad. So I said, 'What's the matter?' So they said, 'Well, y o u ' l l knowvhen you come down to the o f f i c e . We want to t a l k to you. 1 360 My brother was there, so we both went to the o f f i c e . And then he said, 'How come you didn't attach that woman?' I said, 'Which woman?' 'Well', he said, 'Anyway, you got a hold-up charge, and you're going to court two days from now'. 'She took the license plate and everything and the car's been i d e n t i -f i e d as yours at the time', so on and so f o r t h . 'And you're the i d e n t i f i e d , because they iden-t i f y you by your eyes and everything' and things l i k e that. But then I promised myself then, a f t e r I was found g u i l t y , the next time, heart attack or no heart attack, they going to stay there and they going to be t i e d up. And that was--you see I learned an experience the hard way there. And a f t e r that I was very rude because I always remembered that. You know, i t cost me three years of my l i f e , because I was a good Samaritan for a few seconds. So, no more of that'. (#28) My respondents generally agreed that experience i s the most important factor i n learning t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s , as my notes taken during an interview with #45 indicate: The focus of my questioning was d e t a i l s of the act of bank robbery, but the information was hard to get. #45 treated questions of de-t a i l with the disregard which any worker would display toward the 'everyone knows i t ' d e t a i l s of h i s work. Bank robbery involves some planning which #45 generally referred to as '...the way anyone would do i t ' , and made much of 'You learn by practice, by experience. I don't care how smart anyone i s , you can't do a job right t i l l you've had some p r a c t i c e ' . This emphasis on practice, however, was somewhat inconsistent with the emphasis on 'anyone can do i t ' , and he had trouble specifying what i t i s one learns by p r a c t i c e . Most criminals learned from t h e i r mistakes and bungling: ...and each one, l i k e I say--you take i n each aspect of the thing. Where i t ' s s i t u a -ted, how you're gonna do i t . L i k e \u2014 t h e y 361 wanted to do one and I said, 'No'. 'Cause the t r a i l e r , t h i s guy l i v e d i n the t r a i l e r right behind i t and we t r i e d the window and, i t squeaked, and t h i s only about between me and t h i s wall, and the window of the t r a i l e r so I says 'No'. But they went and did i t anyways, and they got away with i t , f o r t u -nately. But I had to cruise tack and forth and t h i s guy kept following me back and for t h . So I l e f t , come back about f i f t e e n minutes l a t e r , and they come out and they jumped i n . They h i t a s l o t machine\u2014this was one of those states that have them. I t was a challenge to them, but i t was kind of crazy I think. But you make mistakes; you learn each one you do. Like I know once I \u2014 , we went to do i t \u2014 w e had to come down through the t r a n s i t , and to get up to the t r a n s i t I had to climb up the pole to get on to the roof. And we were three-quarters up the pole when a guy comes out of the store. I didn't know he was i n there, and he's s i t t i n g i n h i s car and we're hanging on to the pole, three quarters of the way up. So f i n a l l y he leaves, and we l e f t \u2014 w e didn't bother with the place, but i t ' s \u2014 y o u have to take these -things; each one i s d i f f e r e n t . (#10) However, i t does not necessarily follow that just because a person acquires a l o t of experience he is\"goo<3'. Some never learn from t h e i r bungling, as exemplified by the a l c o h o l i c burglar quoted below (an un s k i l l e d but not inexperienced e f f o r t ) . That i s , some persons have l o t s of experience but are not thereby enhancing t h e i r s k i l l s . The following example i s quoted from my interview notes, taken during a conversation with #9: #9 had spent the evening drinking i n a bar, and arrived back at the ho t e l about 4:00 a.m. He didn't f e e l l i k e staying there by himself (his g i r l f r i e n d had gone hone fo r the night), so he went out again. He had not been discussing crime with h i s friends at the bar and had no intention of stealing when he l e f t the h o t e l . 'I wasn't even broke\u2014very peculiar. 1 362 While walking past a school he saw a sign: ' C a f e t e r i a 1 . I t was part of the school: 'I figured there would be cash 'cause people have to pay for i t \" . He t r i e d to open the door but couldn't. 'I looked around for a window, couldn't come upon any, looked for something to open the door with, couldn't come upon anything. Then I found a rock, threw i t through the window closest to the l a t c h . I reached i n and opened the door.'. . .#9 did not check to see i f the window was bugged: 'I wouldn't know what a bug i s to t e l l you the t r u t h * . He did not attempt to muffle the sound of breaking glass. He was able to fi n d the t i l l s , but since he was unprepared for the darkness, he could not fin d a butcher knife or meat cleaver with which to pry open the t i l l drawer. He t r i e d to use the small pen-knife he had with him, but t h i s also f a i l e d . By breaking the window he had set o f f a s i l e n t alarm\u2014the p o l i c e arrived while he was t r y -ing to open the t i l l s . Chapter V I I \"Casing\": P e r c e p t u a l S k i l l s A. INTRODUCTION In a d d i t i o n t o the required t e c h n i c a l s k i l l s discussed i n the previous chapter, the c r i m i n a l must possess a v a r i e t y of p e r c e p t u a l s k i l l s p e r t i n e n t t o h i s t r a d e . Some of these, p a r t i c u l a r l y those having to do w i t h the evasion of law en-forcement personnel, are f a i r l y s i m i l a r , both f o r those who work s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y and those whose crimes i n c l u d e c o n f r o n t a -t i o n w i t h the v i c t i m . The s k i l l s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h evading the law appear t o be of two s o r t s : the pe r c e p t u a l s k i l l s by which the c r i m i n a l i s able t o p r e d i c t the behaviour of p o l i c e , and the s o c i a l s k i l l s by which he i s able t o communicate or conceal h i s illegitimate s t a t u s as the s i t u a t i o n demands. The s k i l l s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h assessing a p o t e n t i a l l y good (or undesirable) caper i n v o l v e s e v e r a l dimensions having t o do w i t h probable economic r e t u r n , as w e l l as w i t h the ease of ob t a i n i n g the money or goods and the r e l a t i v e r i s k i n v o l v e d . These dimensions are very c l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o the a c t u a l tech-nology of the type of crime intended. These p e r c e p t u a l s k i l l s are t h e o r e t i c a l l y i n t e r e s t i n g . A s o c i a l . s t r u c t u r e depends i n p a r t on communication, on con-sensus as t o the meaning of symbols and on s u b t l e c l u e s and 363 364 so f o r t h . These symbols, necessary for the routine function-ing of a society, are designed for well-meaning persons (or square Johns) who w i l l interpret them as intended; however, these same cues also provide information to those who wish to use them for purposes not intended. Knowing t h i s , the legitimate order i s constrained to devise cues to mislead the malevolent, yet not confuse the benevolent. The criminal must be able to recognize opportuni-t i e s within a context which i s d e l i b e r a t e l y constructed to conceal such opportunities. To do so he must be able to d i s -tinguish between those symbols intended for himself and those intended for others. Depending on the type of crime intended, t h i s requires varying degrees of sophi s t i c a t i o n i n int e r p r e t i n g the square, routine everyday world. The crime i t s e l f i s per-petrated, as i t were, on square s o i l , i n the context of the legitimate world. The criminal must take on the role of the \"other\" i n order to take advantage of the c i v i l i a n . Although i t i s apparent that such roie-taking i s necessary for the suc-c e s s f u l confidence game, i t s importance i n other types of crime i s not recognized i n related academic l i t e r a t u r e . The surreptitious criminal's more obvious perceptual s k i l l s have to do with those cues that t e l l him something about the l o c a t i o n and a v a i l a b i l i t y of money. For example, no degree of tec h n i c a l sophistication w i l l s u f f i c e i f the techni-cian repeatedly opens safes which are v i r t u a l l y empty. The 365 a b i l i t y to predict the probable contents of a safe requires some knowledge of how businessmen routinely handle money. .Although experienced criminals may be r e l a t i v e l y un-conscious of. the \"casing\"''\"processes i n which they are engaged, the dimensions of what seems to be i n t u i t i v e can be documen-ted: Your professional burglars depend on i n f o r -mation. Any time you read about a darn good burglary, they didn't just happen to be walk-ing along the street and say, 'Here's a good-looking house, l e t ' s go i n there'. They depend upon information from s t r i c t l y legitimate f e l l a s . I know. Look how we used to use the junk men, the coal men. There's just one angle. You never heard of a place being burglarized that didn't have servants or outside people coming i n . I f nobody sees anything, there's nobody going to come around looking for anything. A burglar i s out to make money. He* s not going to take a chance on just running into something. He wants to know i n advance that there's some-thing worth going after.2 The o r i g i n of the term \"casing\", and a d e f i n i t i o n , i s provided by Everett DeBaum. He says: Professionals agree that casing i s far and away the most important part of laying out a h e i s t (robbery). This word, which l i k e many others of the underworld o r i g i n i s coming into popular use, i s from the argot of faro, once as popular a bet-t i n g game as craps i s today. I t o r i g i n a l l y referred to a record of the cards played as kept on an abacus-l i k e contraption c a l l e d a 'case'. As used i n the underworld, the word means gathering information from observation'. Everett DeBaum, \"The Heist: The Theory and Practice of Armed Robbery\", p. 70. 2 . . Martxn, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 68. 366 B. AVENUES OF INFORMATION The knowledge pertinent to the criminal's hade may be gained v i a several avenues. One such source may be other criminals, some of whom, i n fact, make the task of dispensing such information t h e i r business. I t may come v i a legitimate sources\u2014from ordinary workers or even from the criminal's own legitimate work experiences. I t may also come v i a d i r e c t personal investigation by the c r i m i n a l . 1. Information v i a other criminals The association among criminals i s not purely s o c i a l . As i n the legitimate order, where associations between bus i -nessmen, laborers and so on consist of various dimensions, both s o c i a l and those which are s p e c i f i c a l l y work related, so also considerable information relevant to criminal a c t i v i t y i s passed along informally as criminals meet i n places known as \"rounder hotels\" and so on. Information i s also passed along, both inadvertently and i n t e n t i o n a l l y , i n prison s i t u a -t i o n s . Some inmates apparently leave prison with sketches (maps) prepared for them by other inmates, regarding a poten-t i a l l y good score. The flow of information takes on more formal stature i n those cases where i t i s exchanged on an economic basis. Such arrangements may vary from a single t i p - o f f to a more permanent arrangement between the criminal and h i s \"finger-man\" . The f i n a n c i a l arrangement too may vary from a percentage 367 of the possible take, to a set fee for the advice. Known rounders could \"draw heat\" i f they do the casing themselves. Using a fingerman i s e s s e n t i a l l y a d i v i s i o n of labor and of risk; also, a fingerman i s important to nomadic criminals who haven't time to pick up information v i a l o c a l gossip. (A t r a v e l l i n g bank robber (#39) indicated that he r e l i e d heavily on t i p - o f f s from l o c a l persons.) Although i t i s obvious that the finger-man himself would need to be adept at casing, relying on finger-men i s no r e f l e c t i o n on the casing a b i l i t i e s of the t h i e f \u2014 i t i s simply acknowledging the fact that some persons, l i k e barten-ders, have easy access to more information than others. Furthermore, for purposes of h i s own safety the t h i e f must be able to assess the merit of-the fingerman's advice. Many novice criminals make t h e i r mistake by following poor t i p - o f f s , and there i s apparently no shortage of persons who are w i l l i n g to give poor advice to younger.\"punks\" for a p e r c e n t a g e \u2014 i f the caper i s successful, the finger-man gains; i f not, he has l o s t nothing. The recipient of such information or t i p - o f f s from finger-men, however, has much to lose i f the information i s i n -accurate\u2014he may be exposing himself to unnecessary and unknown r i s k s . .For t h i s reason, the use of such information i s fe a s i b l e only for those with the necessary s k i l l s for i t s evaluation. 368 The following quotation indicates some of the c r i t e r i a by which such information i s evaluated: Well, i f i t was a straight t i p - o f f , i f some-body said, 'Well, I know a spot', and i t wasn't having anything to do with himself usually I'd be pretty leary, and unless I know the personl, I'd say,.'Well, what\u2014why should I waste my time by going out there looking at i t ' . But i f the guy comes and t e l l s me, you know, 'I know i t ' s there, i t ' s t h i s \u2014 t h i s type of safe, t h i s type of alarm system i f any', you know\u2014'the money i s there on cer t a i n days' 2, well then I would go and see and i f i t was a thing where maybe i t was a straight t i p - o f f , maybe for ten percent or something, he wouldn't be coming along. But i f somebody would come to me and say, 'Look, I know a spot, but I can't get i t , so do you want to come along with me?' Yeh\u2014then I would take him. WERE YOU EVER TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF WHEN YOU WERE STILL INEXPERIENCED? No, I \u2014 i n one respect I kind of got an advantage\u2014I had pretty well grown up with thieves and rounders. Well, be-cause my old man's a rounder, see? ....My old man had a li q u o r store on Street for years and y e a r s \u2014 I l i v e d right i n the bootlegging j o i n t . (#2) In those cases where the relationship between the finger-man and the crinlnal i s impersonal (for example, they may be re-l a t i v e strangers), the criminal w i l l take an added precaution: The reputation of the source i s one of the c r i t e r i a . Later #2 adds that he would be suspicious \"...unless i t ' s some-body that I know knows what he's ta l k i n g about. Has a reason to know what's there\". That i s , the information i s evaluated i n terms of how \"reasonable\" i t is--the connection between the source and the information must be cr e d i b l e . In response to the question, \"How do you dis t i n g u i s h between those who know and those who don't?\" he said, \"Well, a guy says to you, 'I know a spot--the Building Supply J o i n t * . Well, now I know there's money i n the Building Supply J o i n t . . . . I f i t sounds feasible I might examine i t . 2 The s p e c i f i c i t y of the information i s another c r i t e r i o n . 369 You always t e l l the guy you won't take i t \u2014 so they don't know when. He may have t o l d i t to several. You wait u n t i l a f t e r doing i t so he won't finger me. These guys go around look-ing for t h e i r end. (#15) In other words, criminals f e e l that i f a person to whom they are strangers w i l l give them a t i p - o f f , i t . i s possible that he gave t h i s same t i p - o f f to others as w e l l . The c r i m i -nal w i l l routinely \"decline\" the off e r , thereby protecting himself from suspicion should the caper i n fact be \"pulled o f f \" by someone else before he gets to i t . However, should he decide to do the job, he must then communicate t h i s to the per-son who tipped him of f , immediately following the c a p e r \u2014 i t i s assumed that h i s advisor would eventually discover who did i t , and that he must be paid. The following i s an example of a safecracker having a formal arrangement with a finger-man: Uh\u2014but I was goin' to t e l l you something else too. We're getting a l i t t l e ahead here. T h e \u2014 a f t e r t h i s \u2014 o h , about 1940, la t e f o r t i e s , we got i n touch with a couple of finger-men. .What they c a l l finger-men. One, , was one of them, and h e \u2014 I guess you know, was found on the golf course with h i s head blown o f f , i n Vancouver a few years back. was a beer-parlor waiter and he used to move from town to town. But h i s pastime was to--he made money fi n g e r i n ' jobs for safeblowers. The phone would ring and i t would be from Penticton, or Vernon, or someplace where he was workin' i n a beer p a r l o r . When he had a score l i n e d up, and for a quarter of what we used to make; the deal was that he would get one quarter of what was i n the s a f e \u2014 h e would phone us and t e l l us about t h i s place and when the money was goin' to be the r e \u2014 h e worked for two or three months 370 i n the beer parlor i n the town and he'd l i n e up two or three places i n the town for us, and we'd go out and blow them and come back to Vancouver. (#29) Enforcement of the economic arrangements between crimi-nals i s not, of course, subject to c i v i l law, but rather to informal norms--this has been the subject of many popular novels dealing with crime, p a r t i c u l a r l y that of the Mafia. My own respondents had l i t t l e to say on the subject. Some v a r i a -tions of a \"straight forward deal\" were taken for granted. For example, i t i s assumed that the finger-man i s paid, not only according to how much the score i s , but whether or not the caper was i n the order of d i f f i c u l t y and r i s k predicted. A burglar r e c a l l e d how information he received v i a a finger-man had been only p a r t i a l l y correct. He had not paid the finger-man the agreed upon $200.00. I asked how the finger-man had reacted to t h i s : (#11 GOES ON HERE TO TALK ABOUT HIS PROBA-TIONARY PERIOD, AND I INTERRUPT TO ASK HOW THE MIDDLE-MAN REACTED TO THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT GET HIS TWO HUNDRED DOLLARS:) Oh y e h \u2014 I l e f t that out. I'm glad you asked that. .While I was i n j a i l charged with t h i s thing, he was phon-ing my friend\u2014my g i r l friend and harassing people that I know, for t h i s thing. Threatening to k i l l me and so on and so for t h . And a l l kinds of threats about what he was going to do, 'cause he wasn't getting h i s money. 'Cause i t was never mentioned i n the paper how much money was there, and so he thought there was that amount. So when I got out, as i t happened, he had got arres-ted for something else. So I know when I got out,he wasn't around. 371 WHAT WOULD HAVE BEEN THE EXPECTED PROCEDURE ON YOUR PART HERE? WOULD IT HAVE BEEN THAT AS SOON AS YOU GOT THE MONEY, TO GO TO HIM AND TELL HIM? Y e h \u2014 r i g h t . Yeh, that's what's gene-r a l l y done i f things pan out. But the thing i s , you see--I was hot, because a l l the information he had given me was rotten. You see, the money wasn't even where i t was supposed to be, and so there's why I didn't contact him. You see, there was two doors to go through, so much of the i n -formation was incorrect. So I didn't f e e l that he had held up h i s end. So I didn't contact him or phone him or anything. (#11) The above example i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of several addition-a l points: although i n theory the arrangement was for a fixed price, i t was i n fact regarded as being proportionate to the estimated take. Since the take was less, the payment was con-sidered too high. (Another latent function of the newspaper i s noted h e r e \u2014 t h a t of informing a finger-man as to how much money was ac t u a l l y taken.) 2. Information v i a legitimate sources The routine features of various occupations such as armoured truck driver, merchant, salesman, are of cen t r a l im-portance to the c r i m i n a l . The ordinary c i t i z e n has only tan-g e n t i a l i n t e r e s t i n , for example, how the businessman handles h i s money. When the c i t i z e n discusses t h i s as part of con-versational small-talk, the criminal pays special attention: Like on t h i s (place that s e l l s c a r s ) \u2014 I got tipped o f f on t h i s and so on and i t was by a g i r l that worked there\u2014she didn't even know i t when she was t e l l i n g me. She just happened\u2014 she didn't a c t u a l l y know. She just happened to mention ; i n conversation that t h i s company had been down and bought so many trucks and they paid cash for them. And t h i s i s a l l I had to hear. (#29) 372 Information which the t h i e f finds relevant to h i s \"work\" may constitute a part of conventional conversational r i t u a l s ; for example, the housewife who meets the delivery boy at the door i s expected to o f f e r an explanation (as i n the example given below) for not having the payment i n her hands, even though i t would be odd for her to come prepared i n t h i s way. Such convention may be u t i l i z e d by d e l i b e r a t e l y e l i c i t i n g the information, or by taking advantage of those persons whose l e -gitimate work role constitutes part of the convention: Sometimes the housewife h e r s e l f p r a c t i c a l l y t e l l s you. She's always t e l l i n g what she's got. For instance, the d e l i v e r y boy comes i n with a C.O.D. Maybe she's ironing. 'Oh, wait a minute, I have to run into the bedroom to get my money'. So that boy knows that she keeps money i n her bedroom. Now, that boy--he works for a l i v i n g , but,\u2014he's a d e l i v e r y boy, he's honest; but where does he play? He plays around the poolroom. What.does he t a l k about? The only thing he can t a l k about i s h i s work. He don't know anything else. The chances are that he's gonna pass that information on to some character i n there that's making a l i v i n g s t e a l -ing. That's one way.1 #15 notes that a f a i r l y common method of getting infor-mation i s to become f r i e n d l y with the cleaning personnel:...\"buy them a beer....\". They're on the verge of starvation anyway. Give them a l i n e by saying that you have a small business of your own and might consider having i t cleaned. Before long t h e y ' l l ask you to see what kind of work they're doing and they take you along and you look around. (#15) #15 noted that such persons are not aware that they are aiding a c r i m i n a l . a r t i n , My L i f e i n Crime, p. 67. 373 The information may also arise out of legitimate work experience: Now, here's where the narcotics begins. While i n P.A. I made a friendship or., attach-ment with a guy from up east, and during the course of our conversation he used to come up with a l l sorts of wild schemes..And one of h i s schemes\u2014anyway\u2014he knew the Drug Company, which i s \u2014 w h i c h i s the outlet for , a c t u a l l y \u2014 a wholesaler. And during the wartime the prices for nar-c o t i c s were extremely high. Twenty d o l l a r s a grain. So--he had gotten out ahead of me. But when I got on my f e e t \u2014 w h i l e I was work-i n g \u2014 I wrote him and t o l d him where I was at and to check up on t h i s same spot--see i f i t was the place for what was s t i l l there. And the answer was i n the a f f i r m i t i v e . So I met a broad that had a l i t t l e money and she bank-r o l l e d me, and I went back east. (I ASK A QUESTION AT THIS POINT ABOUT HOW HE GOT TO KNOW THE FELLOW AND HE SAID:) Well, I met him at the Pen. He was from Ottawa--that was h i s home. Now, i n the course of one  of the jobs he had held as a de l i v e r y boy, he had worked for t h i s company, on Saturdays and weekends, doing d e l i v e r i e s , and the rea-son that was important to him\u2014he knew that the drugs were out there, and the pri c e of them out here. And he knew that t h i s could be converted into a l o t of money. (#27) Criminals recognize that some legitimate occupations provide greater opportunity to engage i n crime than others. Several respondents pointed out that the occupation most con-ducive to s h o p l i f t i n g , for example, i s \"carny work\" (that i s , working for a c a r n i v a l or circus), p a r t i c u l a r l y on the mid-way. Sho p l i f t e r s must be free to s h o p l i f t during normal business hours and one respondent (#3) l i s t e d the advantages of carny work to f a c i l i t a t e t h i s , i n the following order:\"*\" xThe notes to follow were taken during the interview with 63.. The sections i n quotes are d i r e c t quotes; the rest are a s i c a l l y the respondents words. 374 (1) Midway work i s night w o r k \u2014 t h i s leaves one free to s h o p - l i f t during business hours. 'A person on a regular eight to f i v e can hardly s h o p l i f t . ' (2) Since the carny moves from town to town, the s h o p l i f t e r '...never becomes known as a person to look out f o r ' . (3) The mid-way worker has a ready market for hot goods among h i s fellow workers, since 'Such workers are not highly paid and welcome hot goods'. (4) Garny work involves a l o t of t r i c k e r y and the mid-way worker learns a l o t about people that i s useful for thievery. One disadvantage or hazard for the s h o p l i f t e r who moves from town to town i s that he cannot recognize other thieves; therefore he may end up working close to a known t h i e f and 'draw heat to h i m s e l f . The mass media are a \"legitimate\" source of information for the criminal as well as for the layman. The criminal's \"system of relevances\" by which media content i s selected and interpreted i s considerably d i f f e r e n t , however. When the finger-man predicts a much larger amount i n a p o t e n t i a l score than i s a c t u a l l y realized, and i s to be paid on a percentage basis, the criminal (as the fingeanan i n our example on page 371) may r e l y on the newspaper to corroborate claims to a lower absolute payment: (#11 WAS TIPPED OFF ON A *B & E1 FOR A PER-CENTAGE. HE FOUND THE JOB MORE DIFFICULT AND THE TAKE MUCH LESS THAN ANTICIPATED. AS A RE-SULT HE REFUSED TO PAY THE MIDDLE-MAN. THE LATTER RAISED A FUSS\u2014HE THOUGHT #11 HAD ACTU-ALLY RECEIVED THE PREDICTED AMOUNT:) The papers never mentioned how much money was there'. (#11) 375 Criminals agree that the i n i t i a l reported estimates of loss v i a th e f t are exaggerated: Of a l l the smaller places I ever h i t , they always put the amount up by a couple a hundred d o l l a r s , you know. They pay a pretty high i n -surance so when they get a chance they l i k e to even things up a l i t t l e b i t . HOW WOULD YOU KNOW THIS? Well, these are ones I was caught on, and i t comes out at the t r i a l . (#36) On the other hand, the criminal may r e l y on the newspaper to provide an assessment of what he already has stolen. This may be useful i n those instances where the score mu=t be h a s t i l y planted and l e f t for some time p r i o r to counting i t , or when the the f t consists of a r t i c l e s or s e c u r i t i e s whose value i s not known to the c r i m i n a l . Martin, i n r e c a l l i n g h i s early years i n crime notes that, following a thef t of jewellery or furs, he would read the newspaper account to provide him with an estimate of value. At the same time, Martin points out, reliance on newspaper reports leaves the inexperienced c r i m i -nal vulnerable at the hands of the fences or other buyers: At that time I didn't know the value of the s t u f f myself unless I read about i t i n the pap-ers a f t e r I stole i t . So they took advantage of me.l Other persons who stand to benefit from crime i n some way may take a keen inter e s t i n crime reports. The following account shows how a less-than-trusting g i r l - f r i e n d assumes that her boy-friend has pulled a caper and therefore has money which he i s withholding from her: Martin, . My L j f e in Crime, p. 70. 376 (TWO GROUPS OF SAFECRACKERS ARE INTERESTED IN THE SAME SCORE AT THE SAME TIME. THEY BE-COME AWARE OF THIS JUST AS THEY LEAVE AFTER HAVING DONE THE JOB, BY NOTICING ANOTHER CAR WITH SEVERAL MEN PULL UP TO THE SAME SPOT:) So we had an idea that there was two of us interested i n the same thing. Well, next day t h i s other guy got pinched for i t , so\u2014he a c t u a l l y done time here. .Well, what happened was the soap had broken i n h i s pocket, and he had hung t h i s coat up i n h i s room and the g i r l he was with\u2014anyway\u2014she opened up to the b u l l s that he went out to do t h i s actual job. Well, as i t happened, he didn't, but she didn't know that. She heard i t on the news also, and she figured that he did i t , and he wouldn't give her no money because he never had any. Well, she didn't c a l l the p o l i c e , by the way. They knew he was a known safecracker and they went to h i s place, and she opened up on him. Well, anyway, I come here l a t e r on my bank beef and he's here and I t o l d him there's no-thing I could have done anyway\u2014if I'da' gone to court and t o l d them i t was me they pro-bably wouldn't have believed i t , 'cause I would have to take the Canada Evidence Act and they r a r e l y believe you. (#15) 3. Personal Investigation The personal i n v e s t i g a t i o n done by criminals may con-s i s t of casual looking, or s p e c i f i c search, or both: CAN YOU DESCRIBE SORT OF A TYPICALLY SMALL GROCERY HOLD-UP FOR ME? Well, just i n the nor-mal course of l i v i n g i n the c i t y \u2014 w e would spend our days walking around or on the street-car or so forth, and keeping our eyes open for v a r i o u s \u2014 for various locations that looked as though they would be the least protected, and have the e a s i -est access to and to get away from, and there wasn't r e a l l y too much deliberate planning, i n the sense that occurred p r i o r t o \u2014 t h a t i s , as a matter of fact, sometimes i t would simply be im-pulsive\u2014we would just s t e a l a car and then go looking for one. (#27) Respondents agreed that perception increases with experi-ence, yet the degree of consciousness employed while casing 377 diminishes. The experienced safecracker seems to come upon h i s \"victims\" by accident; he seldom can account for the fac-tors that led up to h i s discovery. That i t , he has developed a \" s i x t h sense\", as i t were, which i s operative at a l l times. He does not de l i b e r a t e l y look for a score\u2014he just \"spots\" them. The author remembers eating dinner i n a restaurant with a long-time safecracker. In the middle of our conversa-t i o n he remarked, \"This would be a good spot to h i t \" . I asked why and he commented as to the volume of trade, stating that there must be a l o t of money by the end of the day. He l i k e d the location but added that there would be a l o t more he would need to know, were he to think seriously about i t . That i s , he l i k e d what he could see, but would need to know what was done with the money, about p o l i c e routes, and so on. A good deal of casing \"happens\" while the safecracker i s going about legitimate i n t e r e s t s . One i s more l i k e l y to encounter relevant information i n some places than i n others: DURING THOSE TWO OR THREE YEARS\u2014LET'S SAY YOU WERE GOING OUT ONCEE5\/ERY TWO WEEKS. HOW MUCH OF THAT TIME WAS SPENT IN CASING? Uh\u2014 usually we would, l i k e I say, when we knew that we were getting low on money, we would s t a r t looking around. Now we may have been tipped o f f \u2014 w e may have been t o l d innocently and we may have run into i t . I've run into scores where I'd walk i n and I*d be i n there on a per-f e c t l y legitimate reason, and I'd see what was going on and you're\u2014the average person doesn't look f o r \u2014 h e might see a bi g bag of money and think nothing of i t or not know what i t i s . 378 SO IT'S NOT A CONSCIOUS MATTER OF GETTING UP IN THE MORNING AND SAYING, 'WELL, TODAY WE'LL GO CASING'? N o \u2014 a l l along you have been looking i n the back of your mind for something. (#29) S e n s i t i v i t y to various symbols or a c t i v i t i e s d i r e c t l y r e l a t i v e to one's occupation has been noted with reference to legitimate occupations, such as j a n i t o r s and car manufactur-ers. Such s e n s i t i v i t y takes on the form of habit. A safe-cracker had just l i s t e d some of the essentials of casing: looking over the place, seeing where the safe was, what type of safe i t was, whether i t had been repaired, what the volume of business was, and so f o r t h . He then added: I s t i l l have the habit--automatically my eyes go around the room, see i f there i s a safe there. I see i t and note what kind i t i s \u2014 I have t o drag my eyes o f f i t . (#4) Owing to the danger involved i n deliberate casing, such a c t i v i t i e s must be disguised i n keeping with the legitimate routine. During one interview #2 mentioned that he had been tipped o f f to a good p o t e n t i a l score i n a c i t y , dne hundred miles distant-, and had driven out to look i t over: BY CAR? Yes. With my c a r \u2014 a U-drive, or somebody else's. We'd go up there and...NOW, WOULD YOU BE FOLLOWED, ON A TRIP LIKE THAT? Well, I'd pretty well make sure that I wasn't followed. AND HOW DO YOU DO THAT? HOW DO YOU MAKE SURE? I'd drive around. You can t e l l when you're being followed. YOU CAN? Oh yes. You should be able to, anyway. OKAY, TELL ME HOW YOU KNOW THAT YOU'RE BEING FOLLOWED? Well, you go up the freeway, you stop somewhere, see what happens. S i t i n a beer-parlor for awhile. Watch the approaches, drive around. Then, well, 379 you know\u2014it's just a natural thing. You don't even think about i t \u2014 y o u just know i n your own mind--you make sure, you know that nobody knows what you're doing, you know. (#2) Although the experienced safecracker i s always \"looking\", various factors, p a r t i c u l a r l y with reference to h i s f i n a n c i a l p o s i t i o n , may necessitate some deliberate casing. For example, he cannot always afford to wait t i l l something \"shows up\" or \"comes along\". Nor i s i t always possible to assess a poten-t i a l caper l e i s u r e l y . When the safecracker needs money quickly he may d e l i b e r a t e l y need to find a spot, dispense with c a r e f u l planning and proceed quickly and at high r i s k . For t h i s rea-son, as well as others x, crimes committed shortly a f t e r re-lease from prison, when the ex-convict i s out of money, are the most r i s k y : This i s what we found was the hardest p a r t \u2014 stepping out of j a i l with no money and you have to go for t h i s f i r s t one you f i n d . You can't s i t back and study i t and f i n d out hew you get i n . So you've got to make a f i r s t night's stand on i t , where otherwise we'd s i t back and\u2014through the years we got so that, oh\u2014we'd spend any-where to a week sometimes, f i g u r i n ' out a place. Finding out what the alarms are, and the easiest method of getting i n . (#29) Casing frequently involves taking on the role of the con-ventional customer: Ofher reasons include. the fact that the ex-prisoner i s probably on parole, and i s known to the p o l i c e as one just released and i n need of money. 380 I f you don't get a sketch you go i n there on your own accord and you know approximately where the money would b e \u2014 o r you go i n i n the daytime and you go there and you change some money. Sometimes they put the money i n a dif-> ferent place\u2014-in that case one may rent a room across the street and use binoculars and watch the store. .Say around f i v e o'clock you watch. Then you know\u2014that's when you don't get no t i p - o f f s . You got to do everything on your own. (#16) Another respondent comments: But i n the meantime we done about eighty B & E's a l l across the United States and part of Canada. And each one was different. Some of them were so comical i t was pathetic. I f i t wasn't the idea of getting the money, i t would have been more l i k e a comedy show. Like i n one, one i n the western States, there was me, my partner and my brother, and i t was so pathetic. We went into t h i s place to have a few beers,and I looked i t over and I l i k e d i t . And I said, 'Well B & E t h i s j o i n t tonight.' (#10) An experienced safecracker stated: WELL, LET'S TAKE THAT BROADWAY BANK CASE\u2014 HOW DID YOU FIRST THINK OF IT AS A POSSIBI-LITY? Well, I'd looked for a bank i n a kind of not too f a r \u2014 I l i k e the main street, l i k e Avenue. I couldn't see no bank there because t h e i r vaults were l i k e the type I t o l d you about. They're a l l harnessed u p \u2014 b i g massive ones\u2014they're very d i f f i c u l t and they're i n a d i f f i c u l t l o c a t i o n . .WHY DID YOU WANT THEM ON A MAIN STREET? Well, on a main street a noise can go unno-tic e d , l i k e . You hear a noise i n some quiet d i s t r i c t , l i k e \u2014 t h a t ' s r e a l bad. HOW DID YOU KNOW THAT THE BANKS ON WERE HARNESSED UP? By walking outside and looking. YOU DON'T HAVE TO GO INSIDE? Some of them you can see from the sidewalk, others you step i n and you walk over--pretend you write out a check. You tear i t up and walk out, you know. SO YOU WENT DOWN BROADWAY\u2014WERE YOU WALKING? No\u2014I was d r i v i n g \u2014 I drove u n t i l I spotted t h i s j o i n t . (#32) 381 The preceding comments i l l u s t r a t e several points; namely: the suggestion that a bank which must be ruled out for purposes of th e f t i s , i n a manner of speaking, not a bank. \"I couldn't see no bank there because t h e i r vaults were l i k e the type....\". (From the safecracker's point of view these were not i n s t i t u t i o n s where he could do business.) Further, #32 has noted the type of vault, the location of the vault and street noise. . #32 prefers noisy streets but the noise i s not ade-quate to muffle the two explosions required by a harnessed vault. Further, banks on a busy main street usually occupy the s t r e e t - l e v e l f l o o r , with several more fl o o r s above them; hence, a roof \" i n \" i s ruled out. Most of t h i s can be observed simply by walking by, and a l l of the information i s available to him i f , i n addition, he b r i e f l y enters the bank posing as a legitimate customer. The process of casing varies i n scope\u2014from casing a single j o i n t , to investigating and evaluating larger areas. The criminal's mentality consists i n part of a complicated rating system which includes , countries, states, provinces, c i t i e s , suburbs, down to s p e c i f i c companies and businesses. England i s believed to be an easy place for safecrackers be-cause i t i s thought that they s t i l l use old-fashioned key-hole type safes. The United States and Canada, being l a r g e l y ser-viced by the same safe companies, vary i n terms of alarm 382 systems rather than st y l e of safe. I t i s thought that o f a l l west coast c i t i e s , Vancouver i s the most highly bugged. Cer-t a i n towns are not good for any type of crime because of few roads and mountainous t e r r a i n : \"you can't get out\",. The towns and c i t i e s may also be rated according to size, the evaluation varying according to the type of crime being considered. Small c i t i e s of 50,000 to 100,000 population are considered good temporary spots for s h o p l i f t i n g , but are not good i n terms of being a permanent s h o p l i f t i n g l o c a l e : Small towns good for a run pass-through\u2014 people ask i f you work there. . (#3) That i s , i n small towns people inquire about one's\/work habi t s . Burglars appreciate the absence of security systems i n smaller towns, and bank robbers the absence of strong p o l i c e contingents. .After spending some time i n Vancouver, \"looking around\", a burglar decided to stay i n Vancouver. He had \"looked the place over from Tswassen to North Vancouver\" and noticed that a large number of business places were bugged. He also ob-served that \"there was not much in s a f e s \u2014 s o many safecrackers had gone over them so often.\" I asked whether he f e l t that safecracking was s t i l l practiced i n Vancouver, and to what extent, and he r e p l i e d that there was c l e a r l y less safecracking now than there had been about f i f t e e n years ago. At that time, 383 he said, there must have been as many safes blows i n Vancouver as there are bank robberies i n Montreal. However, he knew that i t was s t i l l being done: The good ones (safes) that are l e f t are i n the I n t e r i o r and i n the North Western United States. (#35) He stated that he knew several men who operate out of Western C i t y , but who do a l l t h e i r jobs outside of Western C i t y . He also noted that there were very few American safecrackers. I asked why and he said, \"I don't r e a l l y know\u2014it seems they would rather pick up a gun\". (#35) The preceding discussion indicates that the criminal, l i k e the t o u r i s t or the p o t e n t i a l new resident, makes evalua-tions on the basis of c r i t e r i a relevant to h i s i n t e r e s t s . Many of these c r i t e r i a consist of factors of more general concern; for example, noise, t r a f f i c flow, and the lack of privacy i n small towns. These factors are of i n t e r e s t to the p o t e n t i a l new resident as well as to the criminal, and s e n s i t i v i t y to these constitutes part of the general s o c i a l i z a t i o n process. Some factors, on the other hand, are of l i t t l e or no relevance to the non-criminal; for example, the presence or absence of security systems, the location of safes, and so f o r t h . C. ASSESSMENT OF ECONOMIC POTENTIAL A f i r s t and primary casing consideration i s the proba-b i l i t y of economic gain. Given the high r i s k involved, i t i s 384 i n the interest of the t h i e f to assure that t h i s p r o b a b i l i t y i s as near to c e r t a i n as possible. .A safecracker .commented: LET'S BEGIN WITH THE MATTER OF \"CASING\". Well, the aspect there i s n a t u r a l l y \u2014 i s there any money i n the place. There's no point i n casing a place that hasn't got any money\u2014you just n a t u r a l l y eliminate the small grocer, 'cause i t ' s not worthwhile. You take corpo-r a t i o n s \u2014 w e l l , i t ' s \u2014 l e t me name some of the places I've done to give you an i d e a \u2014 l i k e an O i l Company, you know, . And (Dime Store), and Treasury Branches, (soft-drink factory), and big o u t f i t s l i k e that. (#32) 1. Patterns of Monetary Fluctuations Some places are already eliminated p r i o r to what the safecracker perceives of as \" c a s i n g \" \u2014 t h i s would include most private homes and grocery stores. The category of e l i g i b l e victims i s limited to places where there i s an i n i t i a l proba-b i l i t y of money. .Although i t i s known that banks contain money, the safecracker or professional bank robber i s aware that the amount varies, and that at some times the amount would not be worth the r i s k . Knowledge of the monetary fluctuations i n banks and businesses i s e s s e n t i a l to the successful burglar or robber and i s one of the c r i t e r i a by which the p r o f e s s i o n a l \/ amateur d i s t i n c t i o n may be made. The following assumptions regarding the routine i n bank-ing which determines a r u r a l bank robber's timing of a robbery were stated: OKAY, NOW HAVING TO DO WITH TIME. .WAS THERE ANY SPECIAL DAY OF THE WEEK WHERE YOU PREFERRED TO DO IT? I l i k e to do i t Thursday, and Monday morning. THURSDAY AND MONDAY MORNING? Right. 385 WHY THURSDAY? Friday they p a y \u2014 F r i d a y i s a b i g pay day. And usually the banks\u2014they re-ceive the difference of the amount of money that they want to compensate f o r t h e i r big day on Friday. And Monday i s \u2014 t h e day that they accumu-lated a l l the money from the big going around on Friday business into Monday, and i t ' s s t i l l i n the safe, which we h i t at ten o'clock i n the morning. AT TEN O'CLOCK IN THE MORNING? Right. THAT'S THE TIME TO DO IT, EH? The i d e a l time would be p r i o r to the bank opening, which i t ' s done\u2014not too frequently, but sometimes i t ' s done, you know. I f we know when they open the vault, then we got a better chance to get i n and do i t . Let's say f i f t e e n before ten. Because then we don't have to deal\u2014we have to deal only with the employees\u2014we don't have to deal with the public, to include them. (#28) Similar observations to those above are made regarding the routine of department stores and businesses, as indicated below: NOW, YOU SAY YOU CHOOSE THE BIG PLACES BECAUSE THEY'VE GOT MONEY? Primarily, yeh. You\u2014well, a person has to make sure that i t hasn't been picked up by an armoured car, you know. WELL, HOW DO YOU DO THAT? Well, you gotta take turns staking the place out. There's two guys\u2014well, one guy w i l l either s i t i n a car or l o i t e r , on a corner and make sure there's no pick-up, like\u2014Dominion Stores, f o r example, and Army and Navy. They're picked up twice a day\u2014twice a day the armoured car w i l l pick u p \u2014 w e l l , maybe\u2014like Army and Navy i s s t r i c t l y cash s a l e \u2014 t h e y ' l l pick up maybe f i f t y thousand to s i x t y thousand d o l l a r s right there around one o'clock. And then around f i v e t h e y ' l l make another seventy to eighty thousand d o l l a r pick up. AROUND FIVE O'CLOCK? Yeh\u2014-just before cl o s i n g time. SO YOU FELLOWS KNOW THESE SCHEDULES? Oh yeh\u2014and then the key aspect i s the \" i n \" , you know. And i n c i d e n t a l l y , when I say pick up, I'm im-plying that there i s no night depositories. They developed immensely during the l a s t , oh, 15 yars. Before that they were unheard of. WELL, HOW DO THEY HURT YOU? Well, they make an audit of t h e i r 386 money and just drop i t i n the bank, see? The night depositories--you have to watch that that doesn't happen. I f that, happens, the money's gone--it's i n the bank now. You see what I mean? (#32) Frequently, economic p o t e n t i a l must be assessed v i a more i n d i r e c t indices. The commercial context of a bank i s important: I f a bank i s near f a c t o r i e s , you can be sure i t w i l l carry a l o t of cash on paydays, which as a rule are on Friday. 1 (#39) Given a suitable commercial context, the t h i e f may wish to assess more s p e c i f i c a l l y the economic pot e n t i a l , p a r t i c u l a r l y with reference to i t s temporal f l u c t u a t i o n s . The following example, which was also used i n Chapter V, i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of the above: NOW, THAT WAS ONE OF THOSE COMMITTED IN A FEW MONTHS? Yeh. OKAY. HOW MUCH TIME PRECEDED THE EVENT IN TERMS OF PLANNING? Uh\u2014about two weeks. That i s , I started looking at i t two weeks a f t e r I got out on b a i l . OKAY, AND WHAT DID YOU LOOK FOR AT THE HOTEL? Well, I had i t i n mind\u2014I knew One respondent disagreed, stating that although i n theory pay-day near a factory complex i s a good s i t u a t i o n for a bank robbery, he has been fooled frequently. He i n s i s t e d that there were no c r i t e r i a by which the economic p o t e n t i a l of a bank can be assessed at any one time, except information from the \" i n -side\". .As a general \"rule, however, he stated: OKAY. I THINK WE'VE PRETTY WELL COVERED WHAT CONSTITUTES A GOOD BANK. NOW LET'S GO ON. WHAT ABOUT THE DAY OF THE WEEK? WHAT IS AN APPROPRI-ATE TIME? Well, I used to l i k e Monday\u2014Monday or Tuesday, I forget now. Right a f t e r t h e \u2014 I forget now whether i t was Monday. I t was a holiday. I used to go right a f t e r the week-end. I t WAS very seldom I took a job i n the middle of the week. (#7) 387 they cashed cheques i n the j o i n t . I t was more for s p e c u l a t i o n \u2014 I just went down on a Friday morning to see how they\u2014where they got the money from to cash the cheques. So I seen how they did i t and I started checking into i t . YOU JUST SORT OF STOOD AROUND WATCHING? Oh no, I not exactly stood around. They have a parking l o t out i n front, and I had an id e a \u2014 t h e r e ' s a bank right beside i t and I was pretty sure the money come from the bank, and I had gone\u2014I went i n a few times so that I could recognize the manager and the accountant. AND YOU SAW THEM TRANSFER IT TO CASH? Yeh. SO, WHAT DAY OF THE WEEK DID YOU DECIDE WAS THE BEST DAY? FRIDAY? Yeh, well, n o \u2014 I went on a Thursday. I watched them Friday. I knew they cashed an awful l o t of cheques on Thursdays and Fridays. YOU WERE OUT ON BAIL\u2014YOU DECIDED TO GO OUT ON A THURSDAY, AND I WOULD LIKE TO KNOW, WHY A THURSDAY? Well, I h a d \u2014 l i k e I'd been going down every night to get an idea just who was doing what i n the j o i n t . Like, at f i r s t I was think-ing of maybe just grabbing the cheque cashing book, but being there were so many people around there i t would be pretty hard even early i n the morning; and while I was there on a Thursday, I noticed that there was an awful l o t of people cashing cheques. So I checked and I pretty well counted i t out i n my mind how many were cashing them on Thursdays and how many were cashing on Fridays. So you see, there's quite a few m i l l s around here, so I sat down and bought some beers for a couple of guys who work i n m i l l s , and just i n conversation, you know\u2014kind o f \u2014 t h e conversation got around to working i n these m i l l s and that, and I mentioned that I knew a guy who worked at the m i l l and who could\u2014-and the guy owed me some money and I asked them when\u2014when does.this group get paid. I'd l i k e to c o l l e c t . I'd l i k e to catch him on a day he gets paid. So they t o l d me. So I figured, well, a l o t of these guys cash t h e i r cheques here and more do on Thursdays than on Fridays, so sure enough I went down the n e x t \u2014 the following week on Thursday, and sure enough, and they came around l i k e a couple of trained rats. So I said, the money's there a l l r i g h t \u2014 1 1 1 1 get i t here. (#2) 388 Some intere s t i n g contrasts can be made between safe-crackers and bank robbers regarding t h e i r selection for a h i t . For example, the safecracker who wants to do a bank-job assumes the presence of money at a l l times.-'- He must p r i -marily consider the technical a v a i l a b i l i t y , such as the a r c h i -tecture of a b u i l d i n g regarding an \" i n \" , the make of the safe, and so f o r t h . The bank robber, on the other hand, must consider the immediate a v a i l a b i l i t y of money. This varies from time to time, consequently a d i f f e r e n t set of considerations comes i n -to operation here. The following outline was presented by #41; (quoting my interview notes): The time\u2014on a Monday i f possible. On a F r i -day people withdraw, for the weekend: 'Only got $2,600 on a Friday from three cashiers'. Business deposits on Monday\u2014each cashier w i l l have no more than.$5, 000\u2014some under the box, some above. Businesses need change for the weekend; they don't want to deposit t i l l Monday. On Saturday banks are closed. Businesses may make a night d e p o s i t \u2014 i f so, that deposit w i l l also be counted on Mon-day morning. Regarding night deposits-, by 11:30 on Monday she (the cashier) may have $15, 000 out of safety-box counting. Safes have time locks for the main door. The house burglar also discriminates i n h i s choice of v i c t i m . He would choose houses i n the \"good areas\" or \"richer areas\". I t i s not necessary to check on the economic status xThe safecracker interested i n a safe other than one i n a bank, however, w i l l not assume the presence of money at a l l times, but must assess the economic p o t e n t i a l . 389 of the owner\u2014an appraisal of the home and i t s location i s quite adequate.\"*\" Several reasons were given for the choice of expensive homes: such homeowners are thought to leave more cash and valuables i n t h e i r homes; many have summer cottages at lakes and are gone on week-ends. One burglar estimated that one out of f i v e such houses i s empty on a week-end. Martin has noted that persons who leave t h e i r homes on week-ends are not l i k e l y to take much cash with them, and cer-t a i n l y not valuables: Or Sunday morning, that was always a good time for burglary. People go to church. In the summer a good time was between twelve-thirty and one i n the afternoon, or t h r e e - t h i r t y and four. Here's me down at the beach minding my own business, looking very respectable, so who do I see coming down there with your whole fami-ly , nice big C a d i l l a c ? Now, you don't take your wallet down with you to the beach, your wife don't take her jewellery. So I see you with your wife and a l l your kids, I take down that license number of your C a d i l l a c . I've got ways of finding out where that's registered to. I shoot right over to a drug store and I c a l l up your house. I know you're on the beach but you may have a servant or something, though chances are i f you went to the beach you gave the ser-vant the day o f f . I get no answer on the t e l e -phone, I know you're going to be down to the beach for at least an hour. So how much trouble i s i t going to be to. me to p u l l up i n back of the house, with a l l that nice green foliage and a l l , kick i n the basement door and go upstairs? I t ' s only going to take me f i f t e e n minutes to walk out with everything i n that house you've got that's worthwhile. 2 The t h i e f finds the \"windshield-survey technique\" quite adequate for h i s purposes, as also do s o c i a l s c i e n t i s t s for many of t h e i r purposes. 2 . . . Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 64. 390 Such an observation i s an extension of common-sense knowledge. I t i s well known, given existing business routine, that persons away for the week-end are not shopping. I t i s also known that many people go to the beach* on week-ends, and that they don't normally wear jewellery to beaches. The imp-l i c a t i o n s of t h i s , namely that such persons w i l l not be carrying much cash and that t h e i r jewellery i s at home in the absence of the owner, are not relevant to the c i v i l i a n . I t may be assumed that thieves prefer cash to less l i q u i d forms of currency. Some thieves w i l l not take cheques at a l l , others only with h e s i t a t i o n . For t h i s reason i t i s important that the criminal be able t o assess the cash poten-t i a l versus other currency p o t e n t i a l of the \"victim\" under consideration. Thieves assume that supermarkets, post o f f i c e s , utility-payment wickets and municipal o f f i c e s (\"where taxes and dog tags are paid\" (#35)), w i l l have high cash p o t e n t i a l . How-ever, some less obvious sources of cash were mentioned, i n d i -cating again how a knowledge of economic practices may be of benefit. With reference to heavy-equipment repair shops #35 ex-plained that many of the heavy-equipment construction firms do not give t h e i r true income to the Income Tax Department; conse-quently, they cannot present a l l t h e i r repair b i l l s either, since i t would not look good i f t h e i r expenses were higher than t h e i r income. As a r e s u l t they may . pay a l o t of t h e i r expense b i l l s i n cash. The following example indicates how public f a c i l i t i e s such as services for paying u t i l i t i e s , i n drug stores, have other meaning for burglarss Well, I would go\u2014probably i n the\u2014maybe around three or four o'clock. OKAY. In the afternoon. And I'd see what kind of busi-ness they've got. Take a look at the safe. The alarm system, location and, oh\u2014maybe they've got a B.C. Hydro or B.C. Telephone b i l l i n g service, you know\u2014where they pay t h e i r phone and l i g h t b i l l s . I f i t ' s the right time of the month, well, I'd look at i t and then just pass u n t i l the right time of the month. When the b i l l s were ccming i n \u2014 t h i s sort of thing. Maybe they have a delivery service... (#2) The safecracker i s never c e r t a i n when a good score may show up. As has been mentioned e a r l i e r , he i s , as a matter of habit, continually casing, though he w i l l do t h i s less con-sciously when he i s \" i n money\". Through continual association with other safecrackers he i s also informed as to the p o s s i b i -l i t i e s that e x i s t . He i s aware that the a v a i l a b i l i t y of money i s not randomly d i s t r i b u t e d over any given period of time. Seasonal fluctuations i n business, patterns of armoured truck pick-ups, p o l i c e b e a t s \u2014 a l l of these a f f e c t the a v a i l a b i l i t y of money and are la r g e l y predictable. In addition there i s , as i t were, a steady source of money--that i s , there are numerous business establishments that can be counted on to have money throughout the year. Given a knowledge of these var i a t i o n s , the safecracker can assess the p r o b a b i l i t y of a good caper at any s p e c i f i c 392 time. This p r o b a b i l i t y i s generally not as high as he would prefer; consequently, he keeps looking for breaks, unusual opportunities, or a change for the better i n the daify routine. The jewellery store he has long wanted to \"do\" i s now being remodelled\u2014how, he asks, does t h i s a f f e c t h i s chances? I f i n h i s favor, the temporary nature of the opportunity d i c -tates that he does not delay. Respondents noted an i n t e r e s t i n g point here, namely that the t h i e f , l i k e the legitimate entre-preneur, must learn to r e s t r a i n h i s greed. A good opportunity ought not necessarily be taken advantage o f \u2014 i f the t h i e f does not need the money'at the time he may be better o f f not doing i t . The more experienced implied that over-zealousness had been the downfall of many amateurs. 2. Fraudulent Use of Legitimate Roles The safecracker cannot assume worthwhile economic po-t e n t i a l i n every safe at a l l times, but he may assess t h i s po-t e n t i a l by i n d i r e c t factors such as the amount of cash business done plus the distance from the business to a bank. He w i l l also check on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of night depositories. In addi-ti o n , he may make a detailed study of the s i t u a t i o n , frequently u t i l i z i n g the role of the legitimate c i t i z e n to do so: And during my fishing t r i p s up there I ' l l run across c e r t a i n frings that I'm lookin' for, l i k e t h i s store here. I usually f i n d that they don't bank t h e i r money\u2014usually I ' l l f i n d out from some-body that been through the town, some other heeler or somebody l i k e t h i s and they'11 t e l l m e\u2014just i n a matter of conversation. T h e y ' l l say, 'my, gawd, I saw a nice store'. And you s i t down and drink a 393 beer or some-thin', and h e ' l l t e l l you about the Sweet Sixteen S t o r e \u2014 b y the w a y \u2014 i t ' s a legitimate store (LAUGHS). So I went up there to the Sweet S i x t e e n \u2014 I went f i s h i n g and when I come back I decided to look at the Sweet Sixteen. HOW DID YOU LOOK AT IT? I'd go inside, see? I'd have my g i r l with me or something. And I'd usually hand them a hundred d o l l a r b i l l for something I buy. They usually don't carry t h i s kind of money i n the t i l l \u2014 t h e y don't l i k e to, anyway. And they have to go to the o f f i c e . Now that's a l l I need to know. I f I see them go i n the o f f i c e I know the money must be there and the safe i s there. I'd say, I'd say i t ' s away of doin' things, the way they work. Like, when I go, I ' l l carry three or four hundred-dollar b i l l s i n my pocket, just for t h i s reason. Just to find o u t \u2014 i f they can cash i t i n the t i l l , f ine and dandy\u2014then I've got to fin d out some other way. OH, I SEE. THEY ARE GOING BACK FOR CHANGE. Yeh. They're going back to get, change. They go into an o f f i c e so that's where the money i s . Now, i f I get serious about the place I ' l l park across the street at closing time and I ' l l watch them...I'll see where they go. I f they go home, f i n e . Next night I ' l l s i t there and watch them. T i l l I find out when they deposit. Like, we sat out there and waited at the Sweet Sixteen store to find out when they do deposit t h e i r money. I t was a Monday morning. So we went i n Sunday night and blew the safe! You know, i t ' s more of less unconscious\u2014just l i k e a businessman. Like a salesman looking for customers and he gets t i p p e d \u2014 t h i s store i s opening and so on and so forth, and l i k e I say, i t ' s a separate way of l i f e altogether from legitimate p e o p l e \u2014 i t i s i l l e g a l , but i t gets to be a way of l i f e so that you uncon-s c i o u s l y \u2014 e v e n when I'm not.... (#29) The above example displays the t h i e f s knowledge of several conventions. He i s aware that men do not o r d i n a r i l y enter.Sweet Sixteen shops without a female partner and so he 3 9 4 does not go i n by himself, since t h i s might create suspicion ( i f not at the moment, then c e r t a i n l y as a post factum con-sideration) . The legitimate, single male customer might f e e l uncomfortable as well, and l i k e the t h i e f he does not wish to draw attention to himself, but for d i f f e r e n t reasons. Further-more, the t h i e f treats as important what the legitimate cus-tomer ignores or considers a nuisance. Going back for change i s common procedure--most customers t r y to avoid such delay by t r y i n g to accommodate the cashier's need. The t h i e f delibe-r a t e l y invokes what others t r y to avoid, and interprets the action not simply as \"going for change\" but also as \" t e l l i n g me where the safe i s \" . Very few of your country or small-town stores have safes\u2014they've been made so often that they've found out they're not safe. So the r e s u l t i s they usually hide t h e i r money. We had two tools, that's a l l wa had. We had an extension brace and b i t , and a spring l e a f that was ground down to a razor edge on one end. Those were the only things we had i n the automobile. Which couldn't be considered burg-l a r y t o o l s . We'd.pull into a small town, and as soon as the man opened up h i s store i n the morning one of us'd go i n and make a purchase, Cigars or cigarettes or something l i k e that. We'd present the man with a ten or twenty do l -l a r b i l l . Being the f i r s t customer i n the store he hadn't had a chance to get h i s money out or anything i n h i s cash r e g i s t e r . So na-t u r a l l y , he hadda go over to h i s hiding place to get h i s money. We apparently paid no at-tention to him; we_'.d look put the window with one eye and keep the other eye on him. And saw exactly where he had h i s money hid over-night i n the ri c e bag. A f t e r he closed that night one of us'd stand i n front of the store facing the street, the other'd make a hole i n the front door with the extension brace and b i t , reach i n and un-lock the front door, walk i n and close the door. 1 Martin, My L i f e in Crime, p. 117. 395 One respondent who had done many small-store hold-ups early in h i s career would give a cashier two d o l l a r s for a pack-age of cigarettes, thereby obliging her to open the cash-re g i s t e r f o r change: I know a l o t of guys who couldn't get the cash r e g i s t e r open. This way I just put the gun on her right then. (#36) The following example displays how the burglar correct-l y perceives that i t i s considered appropriate for a female customer to use the washroom i n a drugstore, but not for a male. V i o l a t i o n of t h i s informal, unwritten code of etiquette would bring suspicion upon him. The popular notion of c r i m i -nals as ignorant of s o c i a l conventions i s negated by such examples of criminal s e n s i t i v i t y to very subtle s o c i a l expec-tations: NOW, HOW DO YOU KNOW IN A DRUGSTORE, FOR EXAMPLE, WHERE THE SAFE IS? Well, generally speakin', i t ' s i n the back or \u00b1f i t ' s a round door safe i t might be near a front window; they might have i t i n sight, you know, so the po l i c e can watch i t , when they drive by. I SEE. I would fi n d i t anyway. YOU WOULD FIND IT? Oh yeh. HOW CAN YOU DO THAT WITHOUT MAKING YOUR-SELF CONSPICUOUS? Well, there's always people poking around j o i n t s , you know. I f i t was i n - -perhaps i n the back, where o r d i n a r i l y I couMnt go, I would maybe put on my old lady and s a y \u2014 probably want to use t h e i r washroom or some-thing. They could give me a reader^ what i t looked l i k e . And I'd pretty well be able to t e l l from what i t looked l i k e what i t was. I SEE, UH HUH. Something l i k e that would very seldom happen, you know\u2014usually you can spot them. (#2) The expression \"taking a reader\" i s used by criminals to indicate that they are de l i b e r a t e l y casing. 396 Casing may involve a c t i v i t y which a c t u a l l y includes \"setting up\" a place to be \" h i t \" . The example below shows how the desired goods are picked out and placed i n such a way that t h e i r pick-up during the burglary i s most e f f i c i e n t . The procedure may also provide the burglar with considerable pleasure: And he does, but they don't r e a l i z e that some people w i l l beat him. Like we needed t i r e s one time, so we went i n and bought a generator i n t h i s junk yard. He overcharged us, but we didn't say anything. But we picked out four t i r e s and we come back that night and beat him for them. He thought he was beating us, but he l o s t four new t i r e s , so he didn't beat nobody. When I go into a place, say l i k e a junk dealer or something l i k e t h i s , now I say to my boys, 'Know what you need', you know. 'Go look for i t and put i t aside and remember where you put i t , while I keep the guy busy'. I ' l l be t a l k i n g to him and we'll be dealing, and my partners are getting everything set. So I know he's tr y i n g to beat me, and I'm laughing at him inside, 'cause I'm r e a l l y beating him. But he don't know that I'm gonna beat him, and he's laughing up h i s sleeve 'cause he's get-tin g a l i t t l e more . So I l e t him bicker a l i t t l e more, maybe a few bucks more, and then I come back and then I beat him. But i t ' s more l i k e a game, where he says, l i k e I say to you, 'Let's play cards'. And I know I'm stacking the deck, and you're restacking the deck, and are gonna beat me. And i t ' s just a game as to who i s gonna beat who the most. And you r e a l l y get a big kick out of t h i s . There's a challenge to gain, but you can run into trouble. (#10) The t h e f t of coin-operated vending machines may involve considerable s e n s i t i v i t y to the habits of those who use them: 397 NOW IN THESE RESTAURANTS THAT HAVE THESE LITTLE JUKE BOX PANELS ON THE SIDE OF THE TABLE, HOW MUCH IS IN ONE OF THOSE? Oh, on a good take you get maybe t h i r t y - f i v e , f o r t y d o l l a r s . I t a l l depends how much i t ' s played. You see, because they have a trough i n the bot t o m \u2014 i t ' s about this long, and that high, and about that wide, and quarters... i t a l l depends what you play, you see. Some people play quarters, and that's a l l they t a k e \u2014 t h e most i s quarters. And we know, we've h i t some that have only nickles and dimes i n i t , and some that have mostly quarters. You see, i t a l l depends on how much i t ' s played. And where the ki d s \u2014 s o y o u can usually t e l l . Like when you go i n a place you see a bunch of kids i n there. They may have four booths i n the back and i n the front for older people, so you know mainly where to go\u2014 t h e one's that the kids have been playing, and that's where you can f i n d you get your main take, i f you can't get nothing else. 'Cause I know when I go play a juke box, l i k e at home, I used to spend f i v e or six d o l l a r s and a l l I can get out of there too, and that's what you look f o r \u2014 l i t t l e things l i k e , just l i k e kids. Well, i f you go into restaurants and see how much the juke box i s getting played that night, how much i s going across. Like i n a l o t o f the western states you have l i t t l e t i c k e t s , l i k e punch t i c k e t s , you know. And you pay for these and you watch where the guy throws the money. (#10) This t h i e f assumes that one observation of the seating preferences of \"kids\" i n a restaurant i s s u f f i c i e n t for pre-d i c t i n g a pattern. Where such observation i s not possible, he assumes that preference for seating away from the front window varies inversely with age. Teenagers' consistent de-s i r e for privacy provides him with a useful predictor. This seating preference of cafe patrons by age i s a matter of no concern to the normal customer, but i s of relevance to the t h i e f . 398 As a further check on h i s assessment the vending machine t h i e f pays attention to the sound of a coin dropped into the s l o t : Yeh\u2014you see, i f i t f a l l s , the bag stands about t h i s high and about t h i s wide, and then when i t f a l l s , i f i t f a l l s a long distance, i t ' s got a \u2014 w e l l , a type of a sound l i k e ping-ing sound, but when i t ' s f u l l , or almost f u l l i t d r o p s \u2014 i t ' s got l i k e a f l a t sound. You know, and you can t e l l . I t takes a while to learn, but you can t e l l . And then you know i f you want t o h i t t h i s place. (#10) There i s l i t t l e reason for the legitimate customer to interpret the various sounds made by the dropped coin, aside from the sound in d i c a t i n g that the machine i s performing nor-mally. The t h i e f , however, finds significance of another sort. In some ways sim i l a r to those of the student of occupa-tions, the t h i e f takes an intere s t i n the work roles of persons whom he would v i c t i m i z e . This may be for purposes of avoid-ing the victim, for managing and predicting h i s behaviour when confronted, or for predicting how he w i l l secure h i s valu-ables. An addict-thief (#2) made the following observation about the habits of druggists:, (quoting my interview notes): (1) Since i t i s required by law, druggists w i l l lock up t h e i r supply of drugs i n a cupboard for the night. However, 'Nine out of ten drug-g i s t s leave the key i n the lock'. Why? Because drugs are cheap to them and easy to replace. Secondly, they know that i f a t h i e f wants drugs and enters the store at night, he w i l l get the drugs anyway and w i l l do a l o t of property damage to get them, i f necessary. (2) Drug stores near medical buildings w i l l carry a larger supply of drugs than w i l l other drug stores. 399 (3) Druggists seldom keep t h e i r drugs i n a safe. The reason\u2014they know that i f an addict cannot fi n d drugs i n the cupboard, he w i l l open or take the safe. The l a t t e r may involve the loss of money and papers; the druggists would rather part with drugs. (4) With the exception of cigarettes, drug-stores have l i t t l e merchandise that can e a s i l y be turned into cash. (5) The addict-th i e f must know a b i t about pharmaceutical terms i n order to rob a drug-store. 'Any kind of morphine w i l l be t a k e n \u2014 Demerol and Methodone keeps you from getting sick when you're wired'. (#12) An i n t e r e s t i n g feature of h i s comments i s that the t h i e f de-pends on h i s knowledge of the druggist's knowledge of the t y p i c a l ways of the t h i e f . In terms of game theory, the s i t u a t i o n becomes, i n Schelling's terms: ...a behaviour s i t u a t i o n i n which each player* s best choice of action depends on the action he expects the other to take, which he knows depends, i n turn, on the other's expec-tations of h i s own. This interdependence of expectations i s p r e c i s e l y what distinguishes a game of strategy from a game of chance or a game of s k i l l . 1 The appreciation of legitimate work roles which enables the criminal to u t i l i z e them to h i s advantage i n the pursuit of money also makes possible h i s a b i l i t y to \"pass\" as a 'le-gitimate\" for purposes of avoiding detection: I'd just leave town for a l i t t l e while. I'd go down to Reno,.San Francisco, Chicago, and blow i t there for three weeks or a month. Then I'd come back here again and put on the old Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of C o n f l i c t , Cambridge: Howard University Press,(1963), p. 86. 400 guraboots and green s h i r t , pack a l i t t l e b i t of beer and root i t o f f around the beer par-l o r s and pool h a l l s . You see, draw steam o f f a l l the time. I used to go over to the beer parlor and I'd say, 'What's the chance of holding o f f payment t i l l pay day?' So I'd run up a b i l l here and there, at the pool h a l l , maybe three, four d o l l a r s . Well, the f i r s t place the p o l i c e are gonna go i s the beer parlor, the pool h a l l , and t h e y ' l l ask, 'Is t h i s guy hanging around here at a l l ? Yeh? Well, has he any money?' 'No, no, he's got a case of beer here he hasn't paid o f f i n two weeks'. 'Well, that can't be the guy we're af t e r then.' (#7) D. ASSESSMENT OF RISK In addition to having assessed the probable economic gain to be had on a p o t e n t i a l caper, the criminal who i s \"casing\" must weigh the r e l a t i v e degree of r i s k as well as the tec h n i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s involved. Although i t i s probably correct to say that the assessment of economic value usually precedes the assessment of ri s k , tie order of considerations may not always take t h i s sequence. A safecracker may, while on legitimate business, spot a p a r t i c u l a r l y \"easy\" safe. He may then assess the probable economic value of the safe's contents. Whether the value i s high or low, i f the r i s k s are low, he may \"make\" the safe. (On the other hand, if both are high, then he may also attempt the job.) We are assuming, of course, that other factors (such as h i s need f o r money) are held constant i n t h i s suggested equation. Generally speaking, the perception of r i s k varies with whether one works s u r r e p t i t i o u s l y , or openly as i n robbery. 401 The su r r e p t i t i o u s t h i e f perceives of r i s k as being the r e l a -t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y of avoiding the v i c t i m and the p o l i c e . The robber, on the other hand, intends to confront h i s v i c t i m \u2014 h i s r i s k s center around the p r o b a b i l i t y of successfully managing h i s v i c t i m while s t i l l avoiding the p o l i c e . The degree of r i s k involved varies with the type of crime, but i n addition, d i f f e r e n t crimes are more dangerous at d i f f e r e n t stages. The safecracker's point of danger re-volves around the actual safe-blowing. Once t h i s i s done, he leaves with the c a s h \u2014 a r e l a t i v e l y \"safe\" l o o t . The burglar out for merchandise faces high danger when making h i s exit and again when disposing of the goods; the house-burglar must be c a r e f u l during the entry, and the bank robber faces h i s greatest danger at the point of departure from the bank. 1. P r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the Victim The assessment of r i s k i n victim-confrontation type crimes tends to focus on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the v i c t i m and on the p r e d i c t i o n of p o l i c e behaviour. -Criminals associate the r i s k factor with the r e l a t i v e importance of the money to the victim, rather than with the absolute amount of money under consideration. (a) The Risk Factor; for example, the Corner Grocer; The reasons for avoiding the corner grocer are complex\"'\": \"*\"0ne reason may be the question of status i n v o l v e d \u2014 t h e safecracker, for example, cannot use h i s s k i l l s as a safecracker at the corner grocer's. He knows, from personal juvenile ex-perience, that corner grocery stores are \"done\" by \"kids\". 402 YOU WOULDN'T LEAVE OUT THE CORNER GROCER BECAUSE YOU FELT SORRY FOR HIM? Well, no. That might be i n the background\u2014part of i t ; but the primary thing i s that i t ' s not worth-while. These corner grocers, they get h i t a l o t by armed robbery, but i t ' s not a question of armed robbery. These are kids; they're not drug addicts or anything l i k e that....a l o t of corner stores are dangerous\u2014I would not want to t r y to run-in one of them. (#32) As #32 has suggested i n the above example, there are economic reasons for avoiding the corner grocery\u2014the generally low-p r o f i t y i e l d i s not worth the r i s k . Hold-up of the corner grocer i s seen as being extremely dangerous as w e l l \u2014 t h e grocer cannot afford to lose even one day's take and so he may be desperate and dangerous: In a store, i f you take two hundred d o l l a r s , you take away a man's l i f e savings\u2014he's going to f i g h t \u2014 h e i s dangerous. Not i n a bank. I t ' s not because i t ' s h i s l i f e s a v i n g s \u2014 t h a t didn't bother me at that time. (#41) Martin states: You see, when I was a l i t t l e younger, I didn't shy away from i t exactly, but i f I could avoid i t I never did l i k e to be i n a p o s i t i o n where I had to r e a l l y shoot anybody. I always figured i f you do your job properly why you can always intimidate people. Of course there's some cases you get into where you get cornered or where intimidation don't work and then you have to shoot. But I t r i e d to avoid any s i t u a t i o n l i k e that, that's why I usually stuck to burglary when I was a kid, and i f we did have a. stick-up any place, we t r i e d to s t i c k up people that were halfway i n t e l l i g e n t . You take a man that's uneducated and has got a business, he thinks that's the l a s t money there i s i n the world, i n h i s cash r e g i s t e r . He don't stop to think there's always another day he can make more money. You have to shoot a guy l i k e that. I t ' s your small shops. You never heard of anybody i n a b i g business 403 establishment getting shot. None of your o f f i -c i a l s . Some dumb employee that hasn't got any sense. I f you s t i c k up a wealthy man, he's not gonna argue with you\u2014he's insured, the chances are about f i f t y - f i f t y you might get caught and h e ' l l get h i s s t u f f back. He's not gonna... 1 Although safecrackers admitted that they cannot have too many scruples i n the business, they also confessed to some discrimination i n favor of the \"ordinary working s t i f f \" . Unless the information was volunteered, or was given inadver-t e n t l y within the context of other topics, I asked each subject the question, \"Does i t make any difference to you whom you you rob?\" Safecrackers agreed that they draw the l i n e between \"ind i v i d u a l s \" and business. They wouldn't think of robbing an \" i n d i v i d u a l \" . This does not exclude single ownership busi-nesses, since they are probably insured anyway. A business i s not personified and so the safecracker w i l l probably not look into i t s ownershipi DO YOU GIVE ANY CONSIDERATION\u2014THAT IS, DO YOU DISTINGUISH IN TERMS OF WHO OWNS THE BUSI-NESS\u2014LIKE, SUPPOSE A SWEET SIXTEEN WAS OWNED BY A CRIPPLED OLD LADY? No\u2014I wouldn't. I wouldn't bother. Usually i t ' s a legitimate business. I don't l i k e robbing i n d i v i d u a l s . Like, I wouldn't no more rob you i f you were a drunk and you had a hundred d o l l a r s i n your pocket. I ' l l no more rob you than the man who\u2014 as a matter of fact, I'd take you home, which I've done more than once. 'Cause I don't be-lie v e i n t h i s \u2014 I don't l i k e hurting the i n d i -v i dual, l i k e . But a business, yes. AND IT MAKES NO DIFFERENCE IF THIS BUSINESS IS OWNED BY A POOR FAMILY OR A MILLIONAIRE? No. YOU DON'T LOOK INTO THIS? No, I don't pry into that too deep\u2014usually i t ' s a g u y \u2014 I \"^Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 119. 404 know one guy I've been i t c h i n ' to rob for y e a r s \u2014 I can't do i t now\u2014it's (prominent p o l i t i c i a n ) . I got tipped o f f \u2014 t h e same guy that got k i l l e d tipped me o f f here, on 's store. He owns one\u2014two hardwares. A guy tipped me o f f that the money on Saturday night i s brought from one store to the other and on Monday i t ' s deposited. I was always going to h i t i t but somehow never got around to i t . . (LAUGHS) . AN UNFULFILLED AMBITION? (LAUGHTER) . Yeh. But as far as d i s t i n c t i o n l i k e \u2014 t h e Sweet Sixteen Stores, and General Motors and s t u f f l i k e t h a t \u2014 t h i s was usually what we done. 'Cause a small person hasn't got money. .You can't\u2014you can't hurt Sweet S i x t e e n \u2014 i t ' s a big organization, and the same with General Motors and o u t f i t s l i k e that, or the Post O f f i c e . Now t h i s i s a good t h i n g \u2014 e s p e c i a l l y drug stores with a post o f f i c e \u2014 b e c a u s e you know there's cash money\u2014now there's not much sense going into a place i f you're going to get c h e c k s \u2014 I don't cash c h e c k s \u2014 I draw the l i n e . I don't handle a check at a l l (LAUGHS). To me i t * s \u2014 w e l l , they can i d e n t i f y i t l a t e r on. SO YOU WOULD RATHER TAKE ON GM THAN THE CORNER GROCERY? Just because of the money. You can't have any scruple, you know-\u2014you can have to a c e r t a i n extent, but you can't have too many. (#29) (b) The Age Factor; for example, the Banker: The vi c t i m poses a danger i n terms of the current conceptions of bravery-, even though i t i s not h i s personal money being taken. Bank robbers are a f r a i d of younger male employees\u2014potential \"World War II heroes\", and prefer older bank managers: \"With grey hair...the younger ones may give you a f i g h t \" . (#39). Bank robbers expect to be most successful when dealing with highly experienced bank managers and depend heavily on the ra-t i o n a l i t y of the manager to make t h e i r robbery successful. In 405 terms of bank robbery, they perceive of r a t i o n a l i t y i n terms of the victim's complete compliance. The quotation below i l l u s t r a t e s the points made above: the quiet confidence of the bank manager i s apparently reas-suring to both customer and robber. AND WHAT ABOUT THE STAFF? WOULD YOU SAY THAT A STAFF OF ABOUT SIX TO EIGHT\u2014IS THAT A LARGE NUMBER? That's a f a i r s t a f f , a f a i r s t a f f . There are some that have more, some have thirteen, maybe f i f t e e n i n there, but I always kept i t down to about six or eight. Usually they have three tellers, and probably they have a few g i r l s on these l i t t l e adding machines and what not, you know. DO YOU LOOK OVER THE STAFF ITSELF? FOR EXAMPLE, DO YOU EVALUATE THE MANAGER? Oh, d e f i n i t e l y , d e f i -n i t e l y . The manager plays a key rol e . WHAT DO YOU LOOK FOR IN A MANAGER? Well, usually i f the manager i s sort of--well, i f he's a middle aged, he's usually pretty calm. They don't have a tendency to rush you. They'd be well versed, that i s \u2014 i f they're held up, just do as you're t o l d and nobody w i l l get hurt. Sometimes you get these young managers i n t h e i r late twenties or early t h i r -t i e s . And he figures, 'Well, maybe I'm a judo expert and maybe I can catch t h i s guy'. You never know. But the older they are, they seem to be more stable, more r e l i a b l e . They're not too anxious to f i n i s h up on the f l a t , you know what I mean. They're quite r e l i a b l e , you see. They're middle aged and they figure they've got a family, and af t e r a l l , a l l the money i s insured, so why should he step out, you know what I mean. That's what we have a law for . I'M OFTEN AMAZED AT SOME OF THE THINGS THESE MANAGERS DO. Very f o o l i s h , very f o o l i s h . I was extremely fortunate i n that no one has ever followed me, but i f they had done so, I would n e v e r \u2014 I would have shot. I would never s t o p \u2014 I would have shot. (#8) 406 In addition to the r i s k which the manager poses, the robber must assess the r i s k s involved i n managing other per-sons, l i k e bank customers, who one may assume are inexperienced and frightened p a r t i c i p a n t s . Bank robbers agreed that they would prefer to deal with as few customers as possible, though t h i s depends on the method used. Those who operate on p r i n -c i p l e s of mob psychology would \"just as soon handle twenty as ten\" (#45) . There i s apparently a minimum number of both employees and customers a f t e r which management becomes more d i f f i c u l t . More important than numbers, however, i s the fact that larger banks (with more customers present) tend to have more money available and t h i s factor tends to over-ride the customer-management considerations. The robber d i f f e r e n t i a t e s between victims i n terms.of how l i k e l y they are to r e s i s t t h e f t . Such a d i s t i n c t i o n i s p a r t l y made i n terms of whether the property belongs to the victim, or has been entrusted to him by others. Although he expects greater resistance from the property owner, he i s also prepared for resistance by the property manager, despite f e e l -ing that the l a t t e r * s resistance i s i r r a t i o n a l . Thieves f i n d i t hard to understand why anyone would f i g h t for money which i s not h i s own and which i s insured. Further, given t h e i r own readiness to use violence, they conceive of resistance on the part of the vi c t i m as nothing less than\u2022\"stupid\". 407 The following quotation suggests that a v i c t i m who i s both wealthy and older i s the least l i k e l y to r e s i s t : In fact, one of the men t o l d the women, 'don't make any noise now, don't bother them'. You see, about nine times outa ten, older people w i l l do t h a t \u2014 t h e y got more sense..And your wealthy people w i l l never give you any trouble. The only people t h a t ' l l give you any trouble i s some ignorant poor guy f i g h t i n ' f o r h i s boss's dough. 1 The thieves' objectives are f a c i l i t a t e d by two factors associated with the age of the vic t i m . Criminals f e e l that the older and probably wealthier person can more e a s i l y afford to cooperate with the criminal's demands. No respondent re-ferred to older persons as weak i n the sense of being less able to r e s i s t t h e i r demands. Although the t h i e f may prefer to rob older and perhaps wealthier victims, i f during the burglary he should discover that h i s vi c t i m cannot afford to be robbed the t h i e f may i n fact lose status, both among peers and po l i c e , should he ex-h i b i t constraint i n h i s burglary. A burglar was asked whether he would show any consideration should he fi n d that h i s vi c t i m could not, i n fact, afford to be robbed: No consideration at a l l \u2014 a s long as i t ' s cash. As long as there's cash handy. And you don't just take ten or twenty d o l l a r s , you take the whole flock, because they say, 'Well, i f you only take ten or twenty d o l l a r s , you're a sucker. Why didn't you take i t a l l ? ' See? The p o l i c e even. They\u2014police w i l l say ^Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 37. 408 that, l i k e 'What a sucker\u2014he missed f i v e hun-dred dollars\u2014how the h e l l ' d you miss f i v e hundred d o l l a r s ? ' See? 'If he took, say fo r t y to f i f t y d o l l a r s , why didn't he take the others?* That's what they're going to say. But i f you can't find i t , how the h e l l you goin' to take i t ? S ee\u2014that's the whole trouble. A smart c r o o k \u2014 a smart crook h e ' l l look into these things, and say, 'Well, he's got some stashed here, some stashed there, some stashed on the f l o o r \u2014 y o u look a l l over, and you clean him, and then when they come to investigate, the p o l i c e say, 'Well, there was a smart aleck, eh? He took everything\u2014he knew the layout'. You got to work that layout out. (#16) (c) The Incongruity P r i n c i p l e ; The armed robber r e l i e s h eavily on the routine of business arrangements as the basis for the predictions he must make. Like legitimate customers he expects to see c e r t a i n persons doing c e r t a i n things i n expected places and at expected times. However, unlike the legitimate customer who may make appointments to ensure the pr o b a b i l i t y of seeing whom he w i l l at the time he wishes, the criminal may need to re l y on routine only, and t h i s may lead to errors with serious consequences: DO YOU CHECK AT ALL WHERE THE MANAGER MIGHT BE AT THE TIME OF THE HOLD-UP? Aha, p o s i t i v e l y . That's why I was kind of shook up t h i s l a s t time. We went several times and he was always i n h i s o f f i c e , at that time, and the very morning we drew up he was standing by the counter, and he was the one that pressed the s i l e n t alarm. (#7) Relying on routine and on established patterns and work styles permits the criminal to operate i n terms of what Sacks has defined as \"the incongruity p r i n c i p l e \" . He notes that p o l i c e : 409 ...learn to treat t h e i r beat as a t e r r i t o r y of normal appearances. The learned normal ap-pearances are to constitute background expec-tancies, i n terms of which the beat i s observed during p a r t i c u l a r p a t r o l s . Given these expec-tancies the patrolman must so s e n s i t i z e himself as to be arousable by whatsoever s l i g h t v a r i a -tions appear which seem to be warrantable bases for making of the explanation of presented ap-pearances a matter of investigation. Not only i s i t expected that the whereabouts of a mana-ger i s predictable, but that the work st y l e of bank employees i s constrained by ce r t a i n predictable patterns of propriety. #41 stated that he had once entered a bank with the purpose of robbing i t andhad noticed a man standing behind the bank counter with h i s foot on a chair and h i s arms folded. He knew that t h i s man was a policemen, so he l e f t the bank with-out robbing i t . #41 went on to explain that a bank manager may s i t on a table with h i s feet hanging down, or else he may s i t on a chair and have h i s feet on a desk, but that \"he w i l l never stand with one foot on a chair!\" The incongruity p r i n c i p l e also permits the criminal to pass as a \"normal\" even while i n the act of committing the crime. He i s aware that persons within bureaucratic structures know that \"lay people\" are generally confused with any s p e c i f i c system and i t s r u l e s \u2014 t h e criminal c a p i t a l i z e s on t h i s t o l e -rance for error adopted by those \" i n the know\": Harvey Sacks, \"Methods i n Use for the Production of a Soc i a l Order\", p. 7. (Unpublished paper, no date given). 410 And I started out on the heel, and the l i v e prowl. Now these are two d i f f e r e n t things. The heel, well--the best way to explain i t to you i s that I used to go out at nine o'clock i n the morning. I always dressed i n a su i t to look l i k e a business man and I used to always carry a briefcase, which you know, looks very respectable. You know, i t ' s a key to p r a c t i -c a l l y any place. So what would I d o \u2014 I would h i t c e r t a i n o f f i c e buildings around the noon hour, and you know I generally had sort of l i k e a paper route mapped out i n my mind. You know these o f f i c e b u i l d i n g s \u2014 I would h i t big o f f i c e buildings. So I would walk down these hallways i n these big o f f i c e buildings, and at noon hour quite often the receptionist, s h e ' l l go out for lunch and s h e ' l l leave the petty cash box there. And I would just proceed along these hallways i n these buildings and go into an o f f i c e and i f there was nobody there I would go behind the counter and i f possible go over the counter, and i f there was cash trace I would take i t , and go on to the next o f f i c e . And i f someone walked i n at the time, well generally I would look at the roster of names, you know\u2014 i n these big business buildings they have these signs with names, 'Mr. so and so', and generally I would t r y to remember at least one name for each f l o o r . And i f someone did come i n , I would say, 'Well, pardon me, could you t e l l me where Mr. so and so i s ? ' And I done t h i s , and t h i s was f a i r l y l u c r a t i v e , because I was just handling cash. I don't l i k e merchandise. And I was also working the l i v e prowl. Which was at night, i n h o t e l s . (#11) The surreptitious criminal gives scant attention to the elements of i n t e r a c t i o n between himself and the victim, ex-cept i n terms of how to avoid such i n t e r a c t i o n . Here again, he r e l i e s heavily on the p r e d i c t a b i l i t y of the v i c t i m . I t i s assumed that an employee's presence at h i s place of work i s based on business routine rather than spontaneity. #35 pointed out that i f one was intending to burglarize a business at night, one should check the business p r e c i s e l y a week 411 p r i o r to the time of the intended caper, \"to see i f anyone works late on that day\". Not only i s i t assumed that such business demands which require someone to work late, w i l l be repeated, but that they w i l l be repeated on a regular weekly schedule. (d) Home owners: The house burglar's casing e f f o r t s are designed to avoid the v i c t i m . I f he i s on the sneak rather than the l i v e prowl, he w i l l look for signs in d i c a t i n g the absence of the owner, How does the burglar perceive the absence of the owner, p a r t i c u l a r l y when the owner has developed techniques d e l i b e r a t e l y designed to confuse the burglar? #35 developed a pattern which he followed f a i r l y con-s i s t e n t l y . He would drive around i n a r e s i d e n t i a l area at about eight o'clock on a Friday evening and note which houses looked empty. (He did not keep written notes, but r e l i e d on h i s memory.) He would t r y to f i n d about four or f i v e of these houses and would return to the area again at eleven o'clock or shortly thereafter, to see which of these houses was s t i l l empty. He would then return the next evening, on Saturday, at eight o'clock: \"Just a f t e r i t started to get dark\". He f e l t that persons do not arouse suspicion at t h i s hour, where-as they might at eleven or twelve at night. I t was at t h i s time, just a f t e r darkness set in, that #35 entered one of the houses he had looked at the night before. He reasoned that if persons had been away the night before at eight and had not 412 returned for the night, they would not be back at eight o'clock on a Saturday night ei t h e r . However, they might return l a t e r that night. How did #35 know whether the occupants of a house were away? Although he did not do t h i s often, he sometimes phoned, to see i f someone answered. He was reasonably c e r t a i n that no one was home i f the windows were closed i n the summer time,if milk b o t t l e s were standing unmoved from one day to the next, and i f papers accumulated on the front steps. Furthermore, an outside l i g h t l e f t on during the day or a h a l l l i g h t burning at two i n the morning were also interpreted as no one being home. These l a t t e r factors are of spe c i a l i n t e r e s t since they are obviously intended (by the homeowner) to indicate the con-t r a r y . The signs intended to mislead the criminal serve i n -stead to inform him.\"'\" Although the time of a home-owner's return i s d i f f i -c u l t to predict with great precision, burglars consider the form of t h e i r a r r i v a l highly predictable. They do not expect members of the household to return i n d i v i d u a l l y , but rather as a family, and furthermore, i n a car. (This of course i n keeping with the selected time of the burglary, discussed e a r l i e r ) . Should a member of the household a r r i v e home alone ^None of my respondents suggested that home-owners might take the strategy one step f u r t h e r \u2014 f o r example, not leave t h e i r l i g h t s on during the day when absent, on the assumption that the criminal would also assume that they would. Criminals assume that the r e c i p r o c i t y of expectations takes the form of \"What would I make of t h i s i f I were him?\" instead of \"What would., I do i f I were him wondering what I would do i f he were I wonder-ing what I would do i f I were she...\". Adapted from Schellmg, The Strategy of C o n f l i c t , p. 54. 413 and walking, the burglar i s not p a r t i c u l a r l y alarmed since he i s confident that i n such a case he can make h i s escape e a s i l y . The a r r i v a l of the entire family i s announced to the criminal i n the following way: COULDN'T YOU USE SOMEONE TO KEEP A LOOKOUT IN CASE THE OWNERS ARE COMING HOME OR SOMETHING? No\u2014here I am working with t h i s l i t t l e f l a s h -l i g h t . Everything i s s i l e n t . I'm making no noise. I can e a s i l y hear a car come up the street or up the driveway. And then there's the f l a s h of t h e i r headlights, and so on. There's always enough warning. The f i r s t thing you do when you case a jo i n t , before you go i n , you think of how you're gonna get out. I f something happens or someone comes. (#35) In terms of r i s k assessment, one notes an i n t e r * s t i t i a l . category of crime located t h e o r e t i c a l l y between surreptitious and non-surreptitious crime. This i s the category which i n -volves criminal-victim confrontation p r i o r to the act i t s e l f , or situations where the criminal must be prepared to meet the vi c t i m during the act, even though he has done h i s best to avoid him. AND WHAT KIND OF EMERGENCIES ARE YOU PRE-PARED FOR? SUPPOSE SOMEONE WAKES UP? Well, I always used to go f i r s t to the back door and the front door and unlock them\" and open them. I f anybody got up, I'd run. Just take right o f f . I wouldn't s t i c k around. WERE YOU PREPARED IN ANY SENSE IN THE EVENT OF BEING CAUGHT? Well, you don't think of that. 'Course I always made sure, l i k e you say, that there were ways out. 'Cause I never thought of being cornered by anyone there, because most people, when they wake up, they're stunned anyhow, the^re not that wide awake, so you're wide awake you know. You're going to get out of the place.1 (#21) \u2022'-This bears resemblance to the bank robber's inducement of near hys t e r i a i n order to create an imbalance i n the degree of r a t i o n a l i t y the robber and the victims are respectively capable 414 The burglar on the l i v e prowl perceives of opposition as coming from the inside rather than from the outside. Con-sequently, h i s attention i s focussed on the vi c t i m rather than on the outside persons, such as p o l i c e . There i s consequently no need for a \"point man\" \u2014 l i v e prowls are t y p i c a l l y one-man operations. Certain types of crime such as \" l i v e \" h o t e l prowling have such a high p r o b a b i l i t y of victim-confronation that i t i s imperative for the criminal to be prepared to meet the con-tingency. He may do t h i s by arming himself with a weapon, i n which case he faces problems s i m i l a r to the robber. On the other hand, he may be prepared to give a reasonable account of h i s presence and a c t i v i t i e s , as i n the case of the h o t e l prowler, who takes a shot of whisky just before h i s work so that he can convince p o t e n t i a l l y threatening victims that he i s drunk and not responsible for h i s actions. The problem i s somewhat modified for the safecracker by the fact that, having made a good \" i n \" , he can proceed . with h i s work without necessarily hurrying. He can afford to wait for the scene to c l e a r . Safecrackers speak of having a cigarette while they wait, or while they deliberate over a p a r t i c u l a r t e c h n i c a l problem. 2. Location\u2014A Reinterpretation of Geography As indicated e a r l i e r , the criminal has c e r t a i n concep-tions of what constitutes a good spot, meaning a p o t e n t i a l l y good opportunity for i l l e g a l gain. In t h i s section we s h a l l 415 i n d i c a t e more s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e p r e c i s e c r i t e r i a b y w h i c h t h e c r i m i n a l e v a l u a t e s t h e , l o c a t i o n f o r a c r i m e . T h r e e f a c t o r s i n p a r t i c u l a r a p p e a r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e c r i m e - p o t e n t i a l o f a c e r t a i n l o c a t i o n : t h e p r e s e n c e o r a b s e n c e o f s e c u r i t y s y s t e m s , t h e p o l i c e r o u t i n e , a n d t h e d e g r e e o f n o i s e . The w e i g h t o f e a c h o f t h e s e f a c t o r s v a r i e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e t y p e o f c r i m e i n t e n d e d . C r i m i n a l s a g r e e t h a t c i t i e s v a r y i n t e r m s o f t h e u s e an d e f f i c i e n c y o f s e c u r i t y s y s t e m s . C i t i e s a r e i n f a c t com-p a r e d o n t h i s b a s i s . F u r t h e r , s e c u r i t y s y s t e m s t e n d t o b e c o n c e n t r a t e d i n c e r t a i n p a r t s o f c i t i e s o n l y - - t h e downtown, h i g h - d e n s i t y a r e a s o f l a r g e r c i t i e s a r e a l m o s t c e r t a i n t o b e p r o t e c t e d i n t h i s way. (a) . A l a r m S y s t e m s : When c a s i n g f o r a l a r m s y s t e m s , t h e b u r g l a r may do a c a r e f u l ( t h o u g h o u t w a r d l y c a s u a l ) i n v e s t i g a -t i o n o f t h e b u i l d i n g i n q u e s t i o n , o r he may o p e r a t e i n t e r m s o f h i s own p r e - j u d g e d a s s e s s m e n t s o f t h e a r e a . He may assume a t t h e o u t s e t t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g i s b u g g e d , o r n o t b u g g e d , s i m p l y o n t h e b a s i s o f l o c a t i o n : HOW LONG BEFORE YOU ACTUALLY ARE GOING TO DO THE JOB YOU START PLANNING? Once y o u g e t t h e c a s i n g d one, a \u2014 l i k e , t h e r e ' s v a r i o u s t y p e s o f \u2022 i n s ' \u2014 y o u m i g h t n e e d a b r a c e a n d b i t , a n d s o f o r t h . L i k e i n V a n c o u v e r , i t ' s a v e r y p o o r p o l i c y t o o p e n a d o o r , y o u know. I n o t h e r p l a -c e s y o u c o u l d jimmy t h e d o o r w i t h o u t w o r r y i n g a b o u t i t , b u t i n V a n c o u v e r , w e l l \u2014 y o u j u s t d o n ' t j i mmy. T h a t ' s a l l t h e r e ' s t o i t . Y o u e i t h e r c u t t h r o u g h i t o r go t h r o u g h t h e w a l l a l o n g -s i d e o f i t . T he o d d s a r e t h a t i t ' s b u g g e d . (#29) 416 Burglars point out that i t i s not always possible to ascertain the presence or absence of an alarm system; however, they do assume that some areas are not bugged. This assumption i s not as risk y as i t may appear because these areas are some distance from heavily p a t r o l l e d d i s t r i c t s and consequently p o l i c e routine can be ascertained previously. The burglar also assumes that smaller towns and v i l l a g e s do not have s i l e n t alarm systems. Here again, the p o l i c e routine factor i s paramount. The safecracker in p a r t i c u l a r i s concerned about alarm systems. This i s because h i s best p o t e n t i a l scores are usually downtown, and furthermore, he cannot hope to have completed h i s task before the p o l i c e arr i v e , should the alarm have gone of f upon entry. This i s i n contrast to the urban bank robber, who assumes that the alarm has gone o f f upon entry, but who expects that even then he can leave p r i o r to p o l i c e a r r i v a l . The house burglar, i n contrast, assumes the absence of alarm systems\"*\" and i s able to go about h i s work with some l e i s u r e . a r t i n makes the in t e r e s t i n g suggestion that neighbor i n t e r a c t i o n can serve as an \"alarm system\" and that t h i s varies i n terms of s o c i a l c l a s s : The only place you can do that i s your wealthy communities. Your wealthy people don't h o l l e r over the back porch and say, 'Hello, Mrs. Smith, w i l l you keep your eye on the house while I'm gone?' Your wealthy people don't h o l l e r over back fences. Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, pp. 64-65. 417 (b) P o l i c e : A knowledge of p o l i c e routine i s of impor-tance for some types of crime and not for others. The hot e l prowler does not need to pay any attention to p o l i c e routine and the house burglar need pay scant attention only. In such crimes where i t _is important, the actual casing of p o l i c e rou-tine appears to range from methodical pre-investigation, to simply watching for p o l i c e while on the caper and avoid being seen by them. Accounts of casing procedures varied. One safecracker r e c a l l e d how he and h i s partner would s i t atop a t a l l b uilding near a Safeway store they intended to make. A f t e r several days of watching the p o l i c e routine from the building, they were ready to proceed. More common, however, i s a less systematic method\u2014one which thieves found d i f f i c u l t to a r t i c u l a t e i n any more d e t a i l than to say: \"You watch for the police , see whenever they make t h e i r rounds\". This watching for the p o l i c e consists of a complex series of v i s u a l clues not r e a d i l y observed by the layman. As such the clues resemble those by which policemen d i s t i n g u i s h a suspect from a regular c i t i z e n . The experienced criminal can spot a p o l i c e car whe-ther i t i s o f f i c i a l l y i d e n t i f i e d as one or not. Burglars who enter business establishments must be a l e r t to p o l i c e routine. They must not be seen making the entry, or be noticed while they are i n the premises. Unless the \" i n \" i s d i f f i c u l t and time-consuming burg-l a r s do not consider evading the p o l i c e as problematic at t h i s 418 point. They may simply park on a nearby street u n t i l they see the p a t r o l car, or patrolman pass by. I f the entry i s made by picking the lock the burglar w i l l need to know whether (and how) to close i t a f t e r he i s in s i d e . For t h i s reason he needs to know what the p a r t i c u l a r habits of patrolmen a r e \u2014 do they simply drive by, do they walk by and t r y the door, or do they use f l a s h l i g h t s to look into the windows? Such de-t a i l s form a part of the general knowledge of burglars who remain within one city, and need not be ascertained for each p a r t i c u l a r caper. When i n strange t e r r i t o r y , however ( p a r t i -c u l a r l y i n small towns), he w i l l want to acquaint himself with these d e t a i l s beforehand. No, I'd p r o b a b l y \u2014 i f there was a spot to hang around I'd probably hang around and see how they--the harness b u l l s around there would check the place out. Whether they knock doors or whether they get out of t h e i r car or...OH, I SEE. HOW DO YOU DO THAT? Well, t r y and p a r k \u2014 w e l l , i n sight of i t . Maybe i n a h o t e l parking l o t , or\u2014some spot that's a l i t t l e inconspicuous, much as you can. You get an idea i f they got a regular routine. (#2) A nomadic burglar needs to operate on c e r t a i n general assumptions regarding p o l i c e routine. He does not have the time or the contacts to c a r e f u l l y assess p o l i c e behaviour i n the various towns he passes through. The following quotation i l l u s t r a t e s such general assumptions: And each time you do something, you have to take i n each aspect, l i k e when you've been i n a place. There's always a chance that somebody may come along. A cop or something l i k e t h i s . So you have to be c a r e f u l . You have to know 419 what you're doing, and how you're doing i t . That's why a l o t of guys pick t h e i r spots i n the c i t i e s and st u f f l i k e t h i s . Not me. I do my spots along the highway, along the out-s k i r t s of town; very r a r e l y do I go i n town. Because on the outs k i r t s of town there's less chance of a cop coming along, less chance of some square-john walking along the street. There's less chance of somebody being inside for some late business. I h i t restaurants, bars, places l i k e t h i s that got p i n b a l l ma-chines, shuffle boards, juke boxes. You know, i f you don't get anything out of the t i l l or out of the safe i f i t ' s locked, you can always f a l l back on t h i s , and y o u ' l l f i n d that there's less r i s k of getting caught. Because i f the highway p a t r o l goes by, he just looks. He just looks at the b u i l d i n g . He's\u2014he don't even stop. He goes by. You're inside the building, you've got i t made, and no matter where you go or what you do, each job i s d i f -ferent. But I t r y and stay with the same kind of places, l i k e restaurants and s t u f f l i k e t h i s , because there* s always money. (#10) Another respondent stated: Oh, I'm not a f r a i d of much going wrong i n something l i k e t h i s because very r a r e l y any-thing w i l l go wrong. You may run into a cop maybe by chance; l i k e , you may be coming around and tlere's always a chance of someone passing by, but l i k e I say, I t r y to do the places along the highway and on the edge of town, when possible. I t ' s very rarely I go i n the town, because that way I bypass a l l these hazards. Because when the cop goes out to the edge of town, he don't stay out there\u2014he goes back i n . And you very ra r e l y find people walking around the edge of \u2022town. (#39) The safecracker, i n p a r t i c u l a r , needs to be cognizant of p o l i c e routine. He cannot afford to set o f f an explosion just as the patrolman goes by. The chief function of the safecracker's partner, the \"point-man\", i s to indicate when 420 the coast i s c l e a r for an explosion. The use of a point-man, however, i s also dependent upon location: (#15 POINTS OUT THAT USING A POINT-MAN CAN BE HAZARDOUS:) I t ' s not only the p o l i c e you've got to worry about but the population as w e l l . There might be a neighbor and he sees the point-man standing i n an awkward p o s i t i o n . I'd say you have to worry more about the population than the p o l i c e i f you've got i t cased r i g h t . (#15) While d r i v i n g down a busy Vancouver street on a rainy night with a safecracker, he remarked to me, \"You better p u l l over or slow down--you're drawing heat\". I did not under-stand. He explained that I had been c l o s e l y following an unmarked p o l i c e car for several blocks. I asked how he could t e l l and he pointed out c e r t a i n features of the license plate (\"All Vancouver p o l i c e cars have that.\"), then noted the seat-ing arrangement of the occupants: \"They are taking a suspect into the station\", he said. He noted also, that whenever one sees t h i s seating arrangement, and that the person behind the d r i v e r i s dressed d i f f e r e n t l y from the other two (who are s i m i l a r l y dressed) you can be pretty c e r t a i n that i t i s a po-l i c e car. To check on h i s observations I pulled up alongside the car and saw the p o l i c e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n on the shoulder of the o f f i c e r . The safecracker apologized for not being able to be more s p e c i f i c about-the po l i c e c a r \u2014 t h e r e was a time, he said, when he could have t o l d me which p o l i c e squad was represented just by looking at t h e i r license plates. 421 Casing for p o l i c e routine i s also a major factor i n the bank robber's preparation. He f u l l y expects to be f o l -lowed or stopped by the pol i c e and i t i s important to him that he be able to predict the time of pursuit and the loca-t i o n of road-blocks so that he may either avoid the p o l i c e or be prepared for the confrontation: So we drove to that place, and the bank was ni c e l y situated, whereby we had four roads where we could get away\u2014four roads, and the po-l i c e would l i k e l y come to two roads, because by t h e i r p a t r o l l i n g , you know\u2014they p a t r o l c e r t a i n areas. And I've watched t h e i r way of p a t r o l l i n g that area, a c e r t a i n a l l e y , and I knew that at a c e r t a i n hour they would be i n that area, and the two immediately available roads connecting to that bank would be situated i n the way, I felt--you know. So I decided that our getaway would be i n the d i r e c t i o n of opposite them, and which we done\u2014and we went through success-f u l l y . (#28) A good bank must have a good \"out\", implying that the robbers w i l l be able to leave the bank and go i n a number of d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n s . Although i t i s u n l i k e l y that they w i l l a l t e r t h e i r prearranged getaway route, the alte r n a t i v e possible routes are intended to mislead the police , or to disperse them. I was t o l d that some bank robbers inform one another as to when and where they plan to work. By synchronizing t h e i r ef-forts each group gains the advantage of pol i c e d i s p e r s a l . I f the bank i s located i n an urban area i t should also be located next to a moderately busy street. Congestion of t r a f f i c would delay the robbers and sparse t r a f f i c makes i t d i f f i c u l t for the robbers to melt into the t r a f f i c . Since 422 they w i l l be changing cars within a few blocks they are not much concerned over car i d e n t i f i c a t i o n \u2014 i t was my impression that they prefer l i g h t t r a f f i c to t r a f f i c congestion. Further, the good bank i s not near a p o l i c e s t a t i o n . The distance the p o l i c e must t r a v e l to the bank indicates the amount of time within which the robbery must be completed. This time period may be assessed by putting i n a fals e alarm from the intended bank location and then timing the a r r i v a l of the p o l i c e . Because of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c contingencies of the urban bank robbery (such as parking) , bank robbers do not case the nature of p o l i c e p a t r o l p r i o r to the event. I t i s apparently not uncommon for them to turn i n a fa l s e alarm, ind i c a t i n g a burglary i n a bank other than the one they i n -tend to rob, just p r i o r to the robbery. In t h i s way the po l i c e force i s both dispersed and delayed. (c) Noise: For some types of crime, location i s i n t e r -preted i n terms of noise. This factor i s i r r e l e v a n t to the bank robber; however, i t i s important to the safecracker, p a r t i c u l a r l y i f he i s intending to detonate twice. In the example below #32 indicates that he has been looking for a bank on a main street. The one which he finds, has a harnessed safe which w i l l require two shots: WHY DID YOU WANT THEM ON A MAIN STREET? Well, on a main street a noise can go unnoticed. Like, you hear a noise i n some quiet d i s t r i c t , l i k e \u2014 that's r e a l bad WERE YOU WALKING? No, I was dr i v i n g . I drove u n t i l I spotted t h i s j o i n t . 423 AND WHAT ELSE? I t was i n a location where noise wouldn't be too dangerous. The vault was considerably back--the o f f i c e wasn't on the front street e i t h e r \u2014 y o u know what I mean. I t was l i k e an inner o f f i c e \u2014 h a l f w a y along from the back. And the f r o n t \u2014 j u s t i d e a l . And there was a nice \" i n \" \u2014 t h e sky-l i g h t \" i n \" . (#32) In the above example the location of an intended crime was related to the noise l e v e l . The noise of t r a f f i c , a bother to most persons, i s seen as an advantage by the safecracker. The safecracker 1s concern i s i n d i r e c t contrast to that of the house burglar. The l a t t e r prefers t o t a l s i l e n c e . I f he i s on the \" l i v e prowl\" he wants to be able to hear the occupants i n order to assess t h e i r state of sleep, or a n t i c i -pate any movements. I f he i s not on the l i v e prowl, he wants to be able to hear anyone coming near the house, or i n fact entering i t : WHAT ABOUT TRAFFIC? Oh no, no t r a f f i c . You wanna get on o f f streets. I wasn't around where there was a l o t of cars. I f a car did come, I would just walk, or duck down u n t i l the car got by. I f i t had been a p o l i c e car they'd have never known I was there. I WAS WONDERING ABOUT THE NOISE. WOULDN'T THE NOISE HELP YOU? Oh no. That's the worst part. You don't want no noise. 'Cause I wanna hear everything, so i f somebody wakes up you're going to hear i t . I f there was a l o t of noise they'd get up and you'd never know, probably. (#21) T\" ' -However,noise may be a desired factor for some types of burglary (in addition to safecracking). Persons involved i n ki c k - i n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n small towns where bteinesses are not 424 bugged, prefer noise, either from t r a f f i c or weather, so that t h e i r own noisy operation w i l l be less noticeable: As for time, a night of ra i n and thunder i s best. (HE WOULD AVOID A MOON-LIT NIGHT). Wind, rai n and thunder obscure noise and people are l i k e l y to stay home. (#44) The l i t e r a l k i c k i n g - i n of a door i s not heard above the noise of wind and r a i n . I was also t o l d that on a stormy night one can break window panes without fear of being heard. The rela t i o n s h i p of cl i m a t i c factors to the f a c i l i t a t i o n of crime may be di r e c t , as i n the muffling of noise, or i t may be i n d i r e c t . By i n d i r e c t relationships I refer to various s o c i a l conventions related to c l i m a t i c conditions, which are seen by the criminal as being conducive to c e r t a i n types of crime. An armed robber (#41) noted that one can run down a back a l l e y at any time without being conspicuous, but that one cannot run down a main street or sidewalk except on a rainy day. For t h i s reason he preferred to do h i s robberies on a rainy day. Another armed robber noted that for bank robbery: A stormy day i s good, 'cause there's not too many people on the street...and you can wear a raincoat and\u2014to carry a shotgun. (#36) E. ASSESSMENT OF DIFFICULTY The assessment of the mechanical and\/or procedural d i f -f i c u l t y of a c t u a l l y \"making\" a safe or a bank forms part of the considerations of r i s k . The mechanical requirements of a 425 p a r t i c u l a r task may well necessitate exceeding the period of time during which the t h i e f estimates that he can work with-out undue r i s k . As was shown e a r l i e r , most of the required casing can be done \" l e g a l l y \" without arousing suspicion. The criminal may pose as a legitimate customer, or he may simply make the necessary observations while he i s walking by. Sometimes the assessment of technical d i f f i c u l t y i s more problematic and re-quires c l o s e r examination. In such cases the criminal may make an i l l e g a l entry simply to assess the situation, and i f h i s assessment i s favorable he w i l l return again, to complete the score. Well, t h i s one here\u2014we'd gone out and looked at i t the previous night. The front door, i n c i d e n t a l l y , was a 1 l o i d 1 door. We just opened her up with a s t r i p of c e l l u l o i d , you know. Well, we loided i t and went i n and looked at t h i s v a u l t . Had a discussion and looked i t over\u2014we a l l were clean\u2014we had no tool s or anything at a l l . . 1Loided' i s l i k e from c e l l u l o i d , you just say ' l o i d ' , you know. Well, we sat and discussed t h i s - -right i n front of the safe\u2014we sat down on the f l o o r right i n front of the vault door for about f i f t e e n minutes, figuring out the best--you know\u2014and looking at i t , and then we went back to the c i t y . (#32) Inside casing, however, i s to be avoided whenever pos-s i b l e , since i t involves two i l l e g a l entries with a l l of the concomittant r i s k s . The safecracker's usual pattern i s to come prepared according to the best information he has been able to gather previously; should he f i n d the s i t u a t i o n too 426 d i f f i c u l t he w i l l simply leave. He may indeed be f o i l e d even i n situations where h i s casing has been quite thorough\u2014this i s the case with safes that have been repaired, a f t e r p r i o r damage. I t i s apparently a p a r t i c u l a r disappointment to safecrackers to meet with a type of safe which they have previously opened and come equipped to open i n a s i m i l a r manner, only to find that they are faced with a repaired model. Such repaired models are much more d i f f i c u l t to open. The experi-enced safecrackers w i l l recognize such a safe by the l a b e l , \"Robertson Safe Company\" on the bottom right hand corner, but the l a b e l i s not v i s i b l e except from close up. The d i f f i c u l t y of \"making\"' a safe i s p a r t l y dependent oh i t s location i n the b u i l d i n g . Older businesses are l i k e l y to have the safe hidden near the rear of the building, probably i n an o f f i c e . Although these safes may be d i f f i c u l t to locate, and even when the presence of the safe i s assured i t s make cannot be determined except by observation l i k e l y to arouse suspicion, safecrackers prefer t h i s location to the modern method of placing the safe next to the front plate-glass win-dows with a l i g h t focussed on i t . The safe located near the front i s e a s i l y found, and i t s make can be determined without entering the building, but i t i s - more d i f f i c u l t for two reasons. Mechanically, the small c y l i n d r i c a l concrete-encased safes are very d i f f i c u l t to open and usually require two shots of grease. Secondly, an explosion 427 near the window w i l l shatter i t . The noise, plus the high v i s i b i l i t y of the operation make t h i s type of safe r e l a t i v e l y secure from safecrackers.^ Location of the building as well as i t s general a r c h i -tecture are both important factors: AND THEN\u2014OKAY, LET'S SEE\u2014YOU FOUND ONE ON BROADWAY. NOW WHAT FEATURES OF THAT PAR-TICULAR BANK WERE GOOD FEATURES? Well, the thing that struck me right away was the vault was right underneath an upstairs o f f i c e where I could go right through the f l o o r of the of-f i c e into the v a u l t . The weakest part of the vault structure i s generally i n the r o o f \u2014 t h e c e i l i n g , as a general r u l e \u2014 t h a t ' s the weakest part. I SEE\u2014YOU MEAN YOU WOULDN'T HAVE TO OPEN THE DOOR THEN? No\u2014go right through t h e \u2014 coming through t h i s o f f i c e r ight into the v a u l t . OH, I SEE. SO THAT WAS A GOOD FEA-TURE. Uh huh. (#32) Mechanical and a r c h i t e c t u r a l factors are less c e n t r a l to bank robbers than to safecrackers, when casing. Bank robbers r e l y heavily on the a r c h i t e c t u r a l uniformity of banks. Banks are frequently located on street corners and t h i s i s appreci-ated for get-away purposes. Glass doorspermit the robber-doorman to see who i s coming i n , wheras, as was noted by a robber, the persons coming i n have more d i f f i c u l t y seeing through the glass because of l i g h t r e f l e c t i o n . The present A young burglar admitted to spending six hours t r y i n g (via explosive techniques) to open such a safe i n a r e l a t i v e l y secluded suburban area. He l e f t the task unfinished just be-for the store's employees arrived i n the morning. This i l l u s -trates both the d i f f i c u l t y of making such a safe, plus the fact that t h i s burglar had underestimated the time required for the procedure. 4 2 8 trend towards low counters, possibly motivated by the bank o f f i c i a l s ' desire for a more personal and less p r i s o n - l i k e atmosphere, i s looked upon favorably by bank robbers: WHAT ABOUT THE HEIGHT OF THE COUNTER? IS THIS A FACTOR? Well, sometimes you see, you might have to jump the counter. Well, i f you get some of these r e a l high counters, w e l l \u2014 they're tough to get over. Well, you lose a few seconds by getting over the counters, and some of these banks, l i k e , they have these gates l i k e , w i t h \u2014 w e l l , you can't reach over and open them because the catch i s too f a r down, so therefore you've got to jump over t h i s coun-ter, you see. The lower the counter, the better I l i k e i t . You just hop over the\u2014and hop back, and also you can see just exactly what the man i s doing with h i s hands at a l l times. (#7) Just as a r c h i t e c t u r a l uniformity i s assumed, so the presence of mechanical alarm systems i s assumed. The use of hidden T e l e v i s i o n cameras and other devices (the presence of which are advertised v i a warning stickers) are not a deter-rent to the experienced bank robber because he w i l l be \"covered\" anyway (for example, wearing a mask), and so he cares l i t t l e whether he i s \"seen\" only by the personnel on the scene or by addit i o n a l persons v i a T.V. Since the presence of alarm systems i s taken for granted they are not \"cased\" as itw^re, or the object of sp e c i a l attention. The robber assumes that they are i n working order and that they have gone o f f the mo-ment he enters the bank. Although these purely mechanical factors remain con-stant, other factors may a f f e c t the d i f f i c u l t y of doing a 429 bank, some of which may be assessed beforehand. The d i s p o s i -t i o n of the manager i s i n f e r r e d v i a h i s apparent age. Those robbers who p r e f e r t o d e a l w i t h as few employees as p o s s i b l e may make d a i l y o b s e r v a t i o n s as t o the most opportune time. No a t t e n t i o n i s p a i d t o the number of customers i n a bank, except i n s o f a r as t h i s i n d i c a t e s the p r o b a b l e number who may wish t o e n t e r the bank d u r i n g the robbery. Persons w i s h i n g t o e n t e r at t h i s time are much more of a r i s k t o the robber than those a l r e a d y i n s i d e . The danger l i e s i n the customer no-t i n g t h a t something i s wrong b e f o r e he, or she has e n t i r e l y e n t e r e d . Such a customer cannot be prevented from l e a v i n g at t h a t p o i n t , and becomes the f i r s t . \" a l a r m \" . When t h i s happens the doorman w i l l c a l l h i s men out immediately. The bank robber's assessment of the a n t i c i p a t e d d i f f i -c u l t y i n doing a bank has t o do p r i m a r i l y w i t h the management of h i s \" v i c t i m s \" . The b u r g l a r ' s c o n s i d e r a t i o n s are of a more mechanical nature. I t might a l s o be added t h a t a f u r t h e r con-t r a s t c o n s i s t s of the f a c t t h a t the b u r g l a r ' s c a s i n g concerns the \" i n \" or entry, w h i l e the robber i s more concerned w i t h the p l a n n i n g of h i s e x i t . S i n c e the \" i n \" i s of c e n t r a l importance t o the b u r g l a r , and o f t e n t e c h n i c a l l y the most d i f f i c u l t aspect of h i s work, the a v a i l a b i l i t y o f an easy \" i n \" may d i c t a t e h i s work r o u t i n e . O c c a s i o n a l l y , the f a v o r a b l e aspects of an \" i n \" are temporary and s u b j e c t t o change. They may demand quick a c t i o n , thus 430 by-passing c a r e f u l planning: AND WHAT ABOUT\u2014DID YOU EVER PICK A PLACE SORT OF ON IMPULSE? Oh yeh. WITHOUT ANY PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION? YOU JUST SPOT AN \"IN\" AND GO IN? Yeh\u2014but i t ' s a r a r i t y at that. I mean, Giere'd be some basis for i t . Maybe at some p r i o r conversation i n a group; l i k e I said, safecrackers a r e \u2014 t h e y discuss \u2022things with each other and they might say, or I might say, 'I saw something'. Like that one time i n Calgary--a guy was t e l l i n g me about a score while s i t t i n g i n a beer p a r l o r . He was working as a mechanic at that time. He'd spotted t h i s , and we done i t that night. He had the information they were doing some remodelling at the back. They had these scaffolds, right up. He said i t ' d be i d e a l , which i t was. (#32) In the above example the \" i n \" was temporary\u2014removal of the scaffolds would have made the job impossible. A rou-ti n e feature of construction, for example, the erection of scaffolds, i s seen by the criminal as an opportunity for crime. In contrast, the bank robber i s not l i k e l y to come upon sudden good \"ins\"; the doors are, as i t were, open for him. As was mentioned before, h i s concern i s with making a quick e x i t . As a means toward assessing the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the exit, i t i s usual for bank robbers to make at least one dry run. They may also compare the r e l a t i v e merits of al t e r n a t i v e routes. F. GENERAL COMMENTS ON CASING The following i l l u s t r a t e s the use of some everyday ar-rangements for i l l e g a l purposes: 431 (I THEN ASK #35 HOW HE WAS ABLE TO GET RID OF THE GOODS WHICH HE STOLE, AND HE REPLIES:) Well, l e t ' s put i t t h i s way. I had no trouble getting r i d of i t . There's d i f f e r e n t ways. Let me give you an example now. I f you've got things that people l i k e , for instance now, a good portable typewriter, the best place to s e l l that would be to just walk into a laundro-mat and you type up a l i t t l e thing, saying 'portable typewriter for s a l e 1 , and you put down your telephone number. There are people i n there washing t h e i r clothes and t h e y \u2014 w e l l , they give you a phone. Now these people look up at that board and they see a l l the s t u f f that's there. Half of that i s stolen goods. (I QUESTION THIS AND HE SAYS:) Oh sure i t i s , sure. That's just an opinion now, but I would say, when I think of how I used i t \u2014 l i k e I \u2014 I put ads i n the paper too, things l i k e that. Criminals agreed on general c r i t e r i a : We had a l i t t l e b i t of trouble now and then, l i t t l e b i t of shooting. .We'd maybe both find out about a liquor plant i n somebody's house about the same time. Well, a good time to make a house i s a good time. I know about i t and you know about it? you might be waiting for a rainy night or a holiday, but the f i r s t good night for me i s the f i r s t good night for you.l Despite the general agreement among criminals as to the necessity and fundamentals of casing, i t should not be assumed that these requirements are routinely met. Various factors v i t i a t e against the u t i l i z a t i o n of adequate casing procedures. Where I made the mistake though i s I was never out long enough so I could plan a good one (bank robbery), l i k e where I could get a ^Martin, My L i f e i n Crime, p. 39. 432 couple a hundred thousand, and then just stop, but you don't just step out of prison and get that kind of money\u2014you need six months or a year's planning. (#36) One should not assume that a l l casing i s done systemati-a l l y . The following i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n of several themes entioned e a r l i e r : I n cidentally, the l a s t time I was out on a bad rumble i n Edmonton, right on the corner of Street and \u2014 r i g h t i n the heart of the c i t y . I met t h i s other safecracker. I was going down to a party that night and I went to the liquor store to buy a b o t t l e and I run into these two guys who were just from Vancouver. I asked, . 'What are you guys doin' i n town?'* 'Nothing, just lookin*. So I knew they was lookin' for something and I said, 'What's the date?' 'May the f i r s t ' . I says, 'Incidentally, a g i r l was t e l l i n g me about a caper on Street and ; i t ' s suppose to be good on the f i r s t and the sixteenth of the month.' They say, 'Well, l e t ' s take a look at i t . ' I said, 'Well, I've already looked at i t and I can see the ' i n ' from the back'. Well, t h i s guy, I think he was drunk, he was a heavy drinker, I know that, but he doesn't show i t . He said, 'No, no', and then he went and looked at the place and says, 'Ah, there's a b e a u t i f u l ' i n ' . ' (LAUGHS.) I t wasn't. Well, i t was some sort of investment company, Corpora-tio n , and i t ' s upstairs. Now he evidently was going to make h i s ' i n ' through these l i t t l e win-dows underneath the b i g show windows i n the shop, a hat shop. He said, 'Here's the 'in 1'.', and he pushed h i s foot right through the glass! I said, 'Oh gee'.' You see, we're only f i f t y feet from the main in t e r s e c t i o n i n Edmonton. Cars passing and everything\u2014god! I said, 'Come off i t i * I thought he was t r y i n ' to set me up--why else would he do i t ? And the other guy i s kind of co o l i n ' me o f f . I said, 'I t o l d you the 'in's' from the back, come on!' So we go on the look--we're not makin' the place yet. I mean, i t ' s s t i l l only six o ' c l o c k \u2014 a l o t of people are walkin' around at t h i s time. I t r i e d to act l i k e I'm drunk (LAUGHS)\u2014I was stunned. I figure I'd take them 433 around to the a l l e y \u2014 t h e y had\u2014they had grease and everything a l l ready, you know. Brought i t with them. So we make the place\u2014we made the can and we come out with the money. (#32) As a general rule (and i n summary of what has been d i s -cussed i n t h i s chapter on casing), one might suggest that thieves whose crimes involve avoiding the vic t i m are con-cerned f i r s t of a l l with those s k i l l s involving entry to the victim's possessions. These s k i l l s tend to be largely mechani-c a l i n nature, and are shared by safecrackers and other crimi-nals involved i n surreptitious crime. In contrast, thieves intending to confront t h e i r victims are concerned with mana-ging the v i c t i m and with t h e i r subsequent escape from the vic t i m and h i s agents. These s k i l l s tend to be la r g e l y s o c i a l and organizational i n nature and are shared by bank robbers and other criminals involved i n non-surreptitious crimes. Chapter VIII Concluding Comments In each of the preceding chapters the implications of the data and analysis have been spelled out, and that with reference to the general objectives set forth i n the opening chapter. In t h i s concluding commentary I s h a l l b r i e f l y re-i t e r a t e what I take to be the most important t h e o r e t i c a l implications of t h i s study. I have t r i e d to demonstrate that the app l i c a t i o n of an occupational perspective has the u t i l i t y of helping us to conceptualize criminal behaviour more sharply and accurately. Detailed attention to criminal behaviour enabled us to evalu-ate the u t i l i t y of applying to the criminal such concepts as \"professional\", \"amateur\", \"apprentice\", \" s p e c i a l i s t \" , \" s k i l l e d worker\", and so on. Pa r t i c u l a r emphasis was placed on the technical aspects of criminal behaviour. This required close examination of the s k i l l s required for the successful completion of various crimes. Various implications of technological change were docu-mented. The increasing mechanical sophistication of safes and burglar alarms, as well as new forms of architecture, have indeed rendered some forms of crime impractical for the c r i m i -na l . Some unintended consequences of the above technological 434 435 changes were also pointed out: by making burglary more d i f -f i c u l t , the criminal now feels increasingly compelled to obtain h i s money v i a robbery--a procedure much more dangerous, not only to the criminal but to the public as w e l l . Analysis of the core aspects of various forms of crime led to the development of the d i s t i n c t i o n between s u r r e p t i -tious and non-surreptitious crimes. Surreptitious crimes are characterized by the need for mechanical s k i l l s and a concern with victim-avoidance. Non-surreptitious crimes require or-ganizational s k i l l s combined with a concern on the part of the criminal regarding victim-management. Throughout the research we have emphasized both beha-viour and s o c i a l action. The importance of the categories employed by criminals resides i n the ways i n which these cate-gories may help to explain the behaviour of those who define the world i n that p a r t i c u l a r fashion. I t was noted that c r i m i -nals themselves make the surreptitious versus non-surreptitious d i s t i n c t i o n when using terminology such as \"going heavy\" or \"not going heavy\". For criminals t h i s i s a more important operating d i s t i n c t i o n than^the host of l e g a l categories for which persons are o f f i c i a l l y t r i e d . From an analytic stand-point t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n enables us to subsume numerous l e g a l categories. Furthermore, i t draws attention to the core features of these c r i m e s \u2014 i n other words, the c r i t e r i a for a l -location to one or another of the categories have to do with the c e n t r a l rather than with the fringe c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which 436 the behaviours have i n common. However obvious the d i s t i n c t i o n may seem i t should be noted that i t i s not made i n t h i s way i n the relevant academic l i t e r a t u r e . I t i s i m p l i c i t i n some typ-ologies of criminals; f o r example, Gibbons includes an emphasis on \"offense behaviour\", recognizing the \"Professional 'heavy* Criminal\" as a d i s t i n c t type.\"*\" I t should be noted that the sur-reptitious\/non-surreptitious d i s t i n c t i o n i s not intended to supplant such other d i s t i n c t i o n s , the u t i l i t y of such d i s t i n c -tions being dependent on the researcher*s objectives. J u l i a n Roebuck, i n h i s development of criminal career types concludes that the Negro armed robber i s s i g n i f i c a n t l y d i f f e r e n t from a l l other criminals, both i n terms of background and personality. Since the \"Negro armed robber\" would be only one among various other categories to be subsumed under non-surreptitious crimes, i t i s possible that criminals, l i k e c r i m i -nal behaviour, might also be u s e f u l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d i n terms of the surreptitious\/non-surreptitious d i s t i n c t i o n . My own data would not be adequate for testing t h i s hypothesis, though i t i s indicated that the non-surreptitious criminal must em-ploy various s o c i a l s k i l l s not demanded of the surreptitious criminal. Attention to the d e t a i l s of criminal behaviour has en-abled us to expand the sparse l i t e r a t u r e dealing with the learn-ing of crime. I t has long been recognized that the criminal's s k i l l s are learned, but few researchers have attempted to document what i t i s that the criminal learns. We have shown Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker, p. 102. 437 that some mechanical s k i l l s are learned v i a formal i n s t r u c t i o n from the more experienced and have indicated how and why i t i s that some s k i l l s are more e a s i l y taught and learned i n prison than other s k i l l s . We also showed that the method of learn-ing criminal s k i l l s does not resemble the system of appren-t i c e s h i p common i n legitimate s k i l l e d trades; criminals usually work with equals, whether experienced or inexperienced Our data also showed that some learning consists of making relevant such common-sense knowledge as i s routinely used i n everyday l i f e - - t h e systematic application of t h i s knowledge i s best i l l u s t r a t e d i n terms of \"casing\" procedures. The a b i l i t y to make p r o f i t a b l e , a l b e i t i l l e g a l , use of every-day knowledge suggests a continuity i n the s o c i a l i z a t i o n of criminals and non-criminals which i s not developed i n the l i t e sratufe on crime. Success i n crime, no less than success i n legitimate enterprise requires that the p r a c t i t i o n e r be a good student of s o c i a l patterns and arrangements. Since so much of the research on crime i s either expli-c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y reform-oriented, a comment on the potentia applied u t i l i t y of t h i s study i s i n order. Much contemporary research, p a r t i c u l a r l y that having to do with the construction of typologies based on c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of criminals, proceeds on the assumption that knowledge of the criminal's background and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the control of criminal behaviour. This approach need not be disparaged i n order to 438 make a case for alternate approaches. An occupational per-spective would seem to have obvious p o t e n t i a l applied u t i l i t y . To view crime as work demands that we look at i t i n terms of i t s v i a b i l i t y as an occupation: s k i l l s required, t r a i n i n g op-portu n i t i e s , e f f e c t s of technological change, f i n a n c i a l re-turns, and costs and r i s k s involved. I t may well be that the public would be more successful i n the control of crime i f i t knowledgeably manipulated the work dimensions of crime rather than the p r a c t i t i o n e r . The p o t e n t i a l contribution of t h i s study to the develop-ment of theory r e l a t i v e to criminal behaviour i s best under-stood when the state of contemporary t h e o r e t i c a l development in the f i e l d i s f i r s t delineated. A review of the theories which are evaluated i n Wolfgang and F e r r a c u t i ^ indicates that theories used i n the e f f o r t to account for criminal behaviour range from broad general theories of human behaviour (for example, Merton's Anomie) to s p e c i f i c hypotheses (such as the frustration-aggression hypothesis) applicable to c e r t a i n types of crime only. This v a r i a t i o n i n t h e o r e t i c a l perspectives may be p a r t i a l l y accounted for i n terms of the behaviour under study. J u l i a n Roebuck states: olfgang and Ferr a c u t i , The Subculture of Violence. 439 Any general theory of c r i m i n a l behaviour, given the cu r r e n t d e f i n i t i o n s of crime t h a t i n -clude such d i f f e r e n t kinds of a c t i v i t y as drug a d d i c t i o n , murder, embezzlement, rape and t r e a -son, can h a r d l y escape the n e c e s s i t y of being a general theory of human be h a v i o u r . x Roebuck suggests t h a t the c r i m i n o l o g i s t : ...work f i r s t on middle-range t h e o r i e s de-signed t o e x p l a i n as f u l l y as p o s s i b l e the o r i g i n s , development, and dynamics of s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r i e s of such behaviour. Instead of s t r i v -ing f o r the general theory at t h i s time the i n -v e s t i g a t o r might w e l l t u r n t o the development and t e s t i n g of a number of s p e c i a l t h e o r i e s . The s p e c i a l t h e o r i e s could then serve i n the construc-t i o n of even more general theory. I f t h i s s t r a -tegy f o r criminological research i s accepted, the f i r s t step to be taken i s the c o n s t r u c t i o n of a workable typology which would provide the means f o r i s o l a t i n g the s p e c i f i c c a t e g o r i e s of c r i m i n a l behaviour t o be explained by the s p e c i a l t h e o r i e s . Although Roebuck's s t r a t e g y appears sound, c r i m i n o l o g i s t s have had d i f f i c u l t y moving from the development of t y p o l o g i e s t o the development of s p e c i a l t h e o r i e s . Roebuck's attempt to con s t r u c t a workable typology has r e s u l t e d i n s e v e r a l types, such as \"The Negro Armed Robber\", \"The Jack of A l l Trades Offender\", and \"The Negro D r i n k e r and A s s a u l t e r \" . The s p e c i -f i c i t y of these c a t e g o r i e s suggests t h a t the completed typology would c o n s i s t of more types, and cover as wide a range of a c t i v i t y as do the e x i s t i n g l e g a l c l a s s i f i c a t i o n s . Roebuck, \"The Negro Armed Robber as a C r i m i n a l Type: The C o n s t r u c t i o n and A p p l i c a t i o n of a Typology\", i n C l i n a r d and Quinney, C r i m i n a l Behaviour Systems, p. 3 7 5 . 2 I b i d -440 Typologies based on l e g a l d i s t i n c t i o n s and designed to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between criminals and between various criminal careers (as i n Roebuck's) draw attention to the many possible variations, but generally f a i l to draw these together into manageable analytic u n i t s . What I have suggested i n t h i s paper i s that the analytic d i s t i n c t i o n s be made i n terms of the be-havioural dimensions of crime rather than i n terms of i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r s . 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Weinberg, Deviance, the I n t e r a c t i o n i s t  Perspective, N.Y.: The Macmillan Co. (1968). Runyon, Damon, Runyon on Broadway, London: Constable and Co. Ltd. (1950). Sacks, Harvey, \"Methods i n Use for the Production of a S o c i a l Order\", unpublished paper. 445 Schelling, Thomas C , The Strategy of C o n f l i c t , Cambridge: Harvard University Press (1963) . Schrag, Clarence, \"A Preliminary Criminal Typology\", P a c i f i c  S o c i o l o g i c a l Review, 4 (Spring, 1961). Schur, Edwin, Crimes Without Victims, Englewood C l i f f s : P r entice-Hall Inc. (1965). Schur, Edwin, Our Criminal Society, Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-H a l l Inc. (1969) . Schutz, A l f r e d , \"Common-Sense and S c i e n t i f i c Interpretation of Human Action\", M.Natanson, ed., Philosophy of the  S o c i a l Sciences, N.Y.: Random House (1963). Shaw, C l i f f o r d , The Jack-Roller, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press (1930). Shaw, C l i f f o r d , and H.D. MaKay, Juvenile Delinquency In Urban  Areas, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1942) . Skipper, J.K. and C.H. McCaghy, \"Lesbian Behaviour as an Adap-t a t i o n to the Occupation of Stripping\", S o c i a l Problems, Vo l . 17, No. 2 ( F a l l , 1969) . Skipper, J.K. and C.H. McCaghy, \"Strip-teasers: The Anatomy and Career Contingencies of a Deviant, Occupation\", S o c i a l Problems, V o l . 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1970) . Skolnik, J . , J u s t i c e Without T r i a l , N.Y.: John Wiley and Sons Inc. (1966) . Sudnow, David, \"Normal Crimes: S o c i o l o g i c a l Features of the Penal Code\", S o c i a l Problems, V o l . 12 (Winter, 1965). . Sudnow, David, Passing On, Englewood C l i f f s : P rentice-Hall (1967) . Sutherland, Edwin, The Professional Thief, Chicago: The Uni-v e r s i t y of Chicago Press (1937) . Sykes, G., The Society of Captives,. N.J.: Princeton University Press (1958) . Sykes, G. and T.E. Drabeck, Law and the Lawless, Toronto: Random House of Canada Ltd. (1969). Tappan, Paul W., \"Who Is the Criminal?\", American S o c i o l o g i c a l  Review, 12 (February, 1947). Thomas, W.I., The Unadjusted G i r l , Boston: L i t t l e and Brown (1923) . 446 Thrasher, F.M., The Gang: A Study of 1313 Gangs i n Chicago, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1927)\u2022 Turner, Roy, \"Occupational Routines: Some Demand Character-i s t i c s of Police\", unpublished paper presented to the CSAA (June, 1969) . Vollmer, Howard, and Donald M i l l s , P r o f e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n, Englewood C l i f f s : Prentice-Hall (1966) . Ward, D.A. and Kassebaum, G.G.,.Women's Prison, Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co. (1965). Whyte, W.F., Street Corner Society, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (1943). Wilkins, L., S o c i a l Deviance, London: Tavistock Publishing Co. (1959). Wilkins, L., Evaluation of Penal Measures, N.Y.: Random House (1969). Williamson, Henry, Hustler'., F..Lincoln Keiser, ed., N.Y.: Avon Books (1965). Wiseman, J.P., Stations of the Lost, Englewood C l i f f s , N.J.: Prentice-Hall (1970). Wolfgang, M.E., and F. Ferracuti, The Subculture of Violence, London: Tavistock Publications (1967). Appendix A SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES ON DATA COLLECTION Data C o l l e c t i o n at the Drug R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Centre: The Drug R e h a b i l i t a t i o n Centre i s a new medium security institution of modern architecture; i t hardly resembles the t r a d i t i o n a l prison. Relative to the other prisons, the emphasis on therapy and r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i s s u b s t a n t i a l \u2014 t o be admitted the inmate must be c l a s s i f i e d as an addict. .At the time of my interview-ing, the population consisted of 170 men and 40 female addicts. My selection here began with a quick look through the I n s t i t u t i o n cards. These indicate age, r e l i g i o n , height, weight, picture of inmate, l a s t conviction, type and length of sentence. On the basis of age, conviction and type of sentence I checked o f f those who appeared to be l i k e l y candi-dates, for example, were l i k e l y to be experienced property offenders. I met with the Senior Counsellor, the Senior Cor-rections O f f i c e r and with the Records Clerk. The Senior Counsellor said that he would explain my project to the other counsellors and would request t h e i r co-operation. I would then contact the counsellors i n d i v i d u a l l y . (Note: I rejected the idea that I t a l k to those inmates who volunteered i n response to a general appeal.) The C.O. 7 advised me of the administrative structure of the prison, and the Records Clerk, an ex-R.C.M.P. man who showed keen inter e s t i n the project, suggested several names and made general comments regarding these names. 447 448 I found the i n d i v i d u a l Counsellors f r i e n d l y and co-operative as well; several were graduate students i n psycho-logy and knew what research was about. I discussed my project with them i n d i v i d u a l l y . Most of them had trouble i n i d e n t i -fying the inmates by any past i l l e g i t i m a t e career. The gene-r a l f e e l i n g among counsellors was that most inmates were also small time, u n s k i l l e d thieves, and so forth, but that the only important thing was that they were addicts, and so t h e i r past offences did not seem to be of any regard. However, a l i s t of some sixteen names was compiled. The counsellors were asked to consult the suggested inmates and request cooperation for an interview. They would b r i e f l y describe the project and then report the inmates' re-action. Although the responses were a l l affirmative, the interview procedure was less than e f f i c i e n t . I was asked by Administration not to in t e r f e r e with the inmate's compulsory group therapy program. .Also, considerable time was wasted between interviews. I had learned that inmates hated to be kept wait-ing i n l i n e f o r t h e i r turn to see me, p a r t i c u l a r l y since i n most i n s t i t u t i o n s (Valley prison excepted) waiting space i s unconrfortable, i n public view, and the inmate w i l l probably be required to give account of h i s presence there, to a v a r i e t y of s t a f f personnel as they pass by. Therefore the next inmate was never c a l l e d up before the interview with the f i r s t was completed, and t h i s of course meant some waste of time. A t o t a l of nine persons were interviewed at the Drug Rehabilita-t i o n Centre. 4 4 9 Data C o l l e c t i o n at the Va l l e y Prison: Valley Prison i s a me-dium security i n s t i t u t i o n , located seventy-five miles east of Vancouver. I t was o r i g i n a l l y b u i l t for the Sons of Freedom Doukhobors, but at present only eight \"Douks\" ae l e f t at the Camp. The declining Doukhobor population has been replaced by older, long-term convicts. (Many of these have been sent here from Eastern Canada.) Administrations and inmates i n other i n s t i t u t i o n s frequently r e f e r to the V a l l e y Prison as an \"old folks' home\". S t a t i s t i c a l l y there i s basis for t h i s observation, since the median age of the prison population i s fif t y - t w o . Both the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n O f f i c e r and the Keeper at Val l e y Prison deplored t h i s stereotype of the I n s t i t u t i o n . The inmates f e e l they are being sent here to die, or to rot away, they said. The attitude that t h i s i s the f i n a l resting place i s not conducive to r e h a b i l i t a t i o n , they said. The Prison i s subject to widespread depression; turnover of popu-l a t i o n i s small, parolees are few. Administratively, t h i s Prison i s under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Warden of the Drug Rehabilitation Centre. Permission to do research at V a l l e y Prison was granted f i r s t of a l l by Ottawa, and then by the Warden of the Drug Centre, following a telephone c a l l by the Warden to the Superintendent at Va l l e y Prison. My v i s i t to V a l l e y Prison was preceded by a l e t t e r to that I n s t i t u t i o n by the Warden (this letter was shown to me at Val l e y P r i s o n ) . The l e t t e r i t s e l f was b r i e f , stating that I was also aware as to the matters of c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y and that 450 a l l meals would cost me f i f t y cents. This l a t t e r clause provoked some humor among the administrative o f f i c e r s at Val l e y Prison. I phoned Val l e y Prison a day before d r i v i n g out there and was i n every respect very c o r d i a l l y received. I was even given lunch at the Prison's expense, though t h i s on the f i r s t day only; The C l a s s i f i c a t i o n O f f i c e r and I discussed my research with the selection of interviewees i n mind. No treatment program i s i n operation at V a l l e y Prison, and the s t a f f makes no pretense that there i s . The person working most c l o s e l y with the inmates (aside from the guards) i s the C l a s s i f i c a t i o n O f f i c e r . His knowledge of the criminal background of the inmates was exceedingly scanty--if fact, he was unable to suggest anyone to me as having a record of property offences. I had previously, while at the Drug Centre, looked through an inmate f i l e of V a l l e y Prison, and from t h i s f i l e , which l i s t e d only the l a s t offence, I had selected about one dozen names. We decided to go to the f i l e s and look at the FPS 1 records of these men. As the C.O. pulled the f i l e s , I h a s t i l y checked t h i s record. Candidates were chosen simply on the '''This refers to the F i n g e r - P r i n t - S e r i a l Records whichis the o f f i c i a l and complete l i s t of the person's convictions and sentences. I t i s issued by the RCMP at Ottawa. 451 basis of a few more specialized offences such as armed robbery. Fourteen persons were selected i n t h i s manner and the C.O. suggested that a l l fourteen be c a l l e d up to the o f f i c e so that I could present my research interests and f i n d out which of them would be w i l l i n g to see me. I suggested another ap-proach: since I could not return for the actual interviews for at least a week, I suggested that during t h i s period the C.O. could contact the fourteen i n d i v i d u a l l y and ask them whether they would wish to see me. (This method had worked well at the Drug Centre). Upon returning a week l a t e r , the C.O. related h i s ex-perience i n contacting the men. He had c a l l e d them up as a group and presented my research i n t e r e s t s . He did not relate the d e t a i l s of h i s presentation, but emphasized that he had made i t c l e a r that t h e i r cooperation, and my research, would i n no way a f f e c t t h e i r Parole chances. Seven of the fourteen we had selected had agreed to see me. The other seven, said the C.O., were the sort who had no desire to cooperate with the Administration i n any way, and he didn't f e e l that the p a r t i c u l a r nature of my research had anything to do with their r e f u s a l . I was s a t i s f i e d , from my continued contact with the CO., that he was e n t i r e l y sympathetic with my research, and that he had presented the project i n a favorable way. At the same time, he shared the general administrative concern for peace i n the 452 i n s t i t u t i o n . He was worried at the possible e f f e c t s of the interview experience, stating that many of the inmates were older, nervous and on t r a n q u i l i z e r s . He pointed out that the inmates were not used to interviews, or to contact with outside p e r s o n s \u2014 i n contrast to the Drug Centre and i t s em-phasis on group therapy and so on. I t seems c l e a r then that the C.O. would not have \"pushed\" Cooperation very hard, p a r t i c u l a r l y since he had no p r i o r ex-perience with the i n s t i t u t i o n a l a f t e r - e f f e c t s of my i n t e r -viewing. He noted that the e f f e c t of presenting the issue to the men had been very \"upsetting\" to some of them and sug-gested that, should I wish to interview any more inmates, we could possibly work out another method of introducing the pro-je c t to the inmates. I agreed. I was given an o f f i c e , on the door of which was printed \"parole o f f i c e r \" . This association was not desired, but I had l i t t l e choice. The o f f i c e was very sparsely and \"coldly\" furnished. When asked i f there was anything I needed, I sug-gested that we move i n some of the soft chairs from the ad-joining lounge. This we did, and I arranged the furniture i n a more relaxing manner (for example, removing the austere desk), thus encouraging a more personal, less o f f i c i a l s e t t i n g . The procedure was as follows: I would present the name and number of the prospective interviewee to the o f f i c e r at the Guard Room. The guard would then get the inmate for me 453 and bring him right to my o f f i c e door. The reaction of the guards was i n t e r e s t i n g . Usually a comment of some sort was made when I handed over the slip of paper with name and number, such as \"Oh boy, he's a beaut'.\", \"Now you r e a l l y got something!.\", and so fo r t h . On several occasions the guard simply gave me an all-knowing smile. The comments did not seem to provide me with any basis for d i s -tinguishing between the persons I saw. I suspect they were intended to t e l l me that he, the guard, was well acquainted with a person about whom I knew nothing. Seven inmates were interviewed and i t was agreed that more interviews might be set up a f t e r that, should I desire them. My relations with the Administration were c o r d i a l , though I made an e f f o r t to remain somewhat is o l a t e d from them. For example, I did not eat i n the O f f i c e r s ' Mess, but brought my own lunch and ate i n my o f f i c e . I was a f r a i d that frequent, open association with Administrative S t a f f would not help my association with the inmates themselves. Appendix B INTERVIEW GUIDE Biographical Notes: - Prison experience\u2014how long i n prison and why. Review of prison experience\u2014the \"meaning\" of prison. - Experience i n crime\u2014what i s h i s \" l i n e \" i f any. Why and how i t became h i s \" l i n e \" . - Legitimate occupational e x p e r i e n c e \u2014 r e l a t i o n s h i p of l e -gitimate trade to \" l i n e \" . S p e c i f i c Examples: - The successful caper\u2014the d e f i n i t i o n of success. - What does i t mean when things go right? What might have gone wrong? How does he prevent things from going wrong? - The unsuccessful caper. Detailed Review of Examples: - Pre-event planning and preparation: - Casing: How did he know there was money? How are r i s k s assessed? How i s \"casing\" done? -\"What did you do the day before the caper...?\" - D e t a i l s of Caper: How was i t done? - Tool, equipment\u2014how obtained, used, transported. - D e t a i l s of the procedure used, s k i l l s involved. - D i v i s i o n of labor questions: Who does what? Who takes i n i t i a t i v e ? - Authority r e l a t i o n s between criminals... Learning Technical S k i l l s : - How were the s k i l l s learned? Where? When? - To whom would you teach these s k i l l s ? - Technical change: problems\u2014need for retraining? Consideration Regarding the Victim  Consideration Regarding the P o l i c e Review of Career Dimensions: - Temporal dimensions. - Relation of legitimate and i l l i g i t i m a t e work sequences. 454 APPENDIX C WHAT IS THE It is the Underwriters' Laboratories of Canada independent certifica-tion of burglary resistance. A money safe is awarded this label only if it complies with the Under' writers' rigid standards of design, construction and installation. These standards produce a quality safe suitable for use by the majority of Canadian businesses requiring cash protection. C H U B B - M O S L E R \u2022 - \u2022 T A Y L O R B R A M P T O N . ONTARIO CLASS OR BUIGLAIY BETTER PROTECTION LOWERIHSURANCECOSTS... Money can be insured in a DR safe at a much lower premium rat: because insurance companies know that the risk of successful burglar} is greatly reduced. The DR label attached to the money safe certifies to the insurer tha the unit meets the Underwriters' Laboratories of Canada standan of burglary resistance. IHSURANCE CHART \" l \" n e c n a r t illustrates the latest classifications of safes relating to th insuring of money. The dollar figures are for comparative purpose and do not necessarily represent actual rates. Your insurance agen should be consulted for complete information. L \u2022\u2022i\u00bbr nitfift am 1 Record Safe \u2014 designed to protect vital business records from destruction by fire. MONEY SHOULD NEVER BE KEPT IN THIS TYPE OF SAFE. \" f f W f f ^ 1 \" ' * \" * 1 ' If the cost of insuring S5,000. dollars in a Class 1 type of safe per year is \u00bb260( Round door money safe 1 \" steel body 1 y2\" steel door. To insure the same amount in a class 2 unit would cost per year $6000 Money Safe bearing New Under-writers' Laboratories of Canada DR Label. Money Safe bearing Underwriters' Laboratories TR-30 or X-60 Label. To insure the same amount in a class 3 DR unit would cost per year To insure the same amount in a class 4 type of money safe. $4000 $20 oo Money Safe bearing Underwriters' Laboratories TR-60 or TX-60 Label. Class 4 and 5 safes designed for the protection of larger sums of money. To insure the same amount in a class 5 type of money safe would cost per year > \u201e 455 $1500 APPENDIX D MARK 111 VAULT AND HOLD-UP ALARM SYSTEM\u2014TYPI CAL LAYOUT CODE \u00a9 H o l d - u p Buttons \u00a9 The rma l S e r D o o r Con tac ts a A u d i o Detec tors _ % \" Condu i t ANY OF THE FOLLOWING CAN BE TIED INTO THE MARK III SYSTEM: PREMISES PROTECTION This c a n b e p r o v i d e d fo r a l l a c c es s i b l e o p e n i n g s a n d w i n d o w s o r c a n b e l im i ted to spec i f i c ins ide a r e a s th rough the use o f u l t rasonic o r i n f r a - r e d d e v i c e s . NIGHT DEPOSITORY Con tac t swi tches c a n b e p l a c e d b e h i n d the ou ts ide f a s c i a to s i g n a l a t tempts to r e m o v e f a s c i a f r om w a l l . D e p o s i t o r y s a f e d o o r c a n b e fu l l y g u a r d e d to more p r o m p t l y i nd i ca te a n a t t ack . VAULT VENTILATORS A ven t i l a t o r c a n b e p r o t e c t e d a g a i n s t r e m o v a l f rom vau l t w a l l a n d poss ib i l i t y o f unit b e i n g left \" o p e n \" du r ing n ight t ime. HOLD-UP DETERRENT CAMERAS These c a m e r a s c a n b e s t r a t e g i c a l l y p l a c e d to p h o t o g r a p h cr i t i ca l a r e a s o f the b a n k i n g h a l l . C a m e r a s o p e r a t e a u t o m a t i c a l l y w h e n h o l d - u p a l a r m system is t r i g g e r e d . 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