A STUDY OF THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE«S COMMUNES IN THE SINO-SOVIET DISPUTE by D. B. MAR SON B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1 9 6 2 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science We accent-^this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1964 ABSTRACT W i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e p e o p l e * s communes i n t h e P e o p l e * s R e p u b l i c o f C h i n a i n 1 9 5 8 , a f a r - r e a c h i n g i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e a r o s e b e t w e e n t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C h i n a . I n t h e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g t h e d e a t h o f S t a l i n , t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a d e m b a r k e d u p o n a d o m e s t i c p o l i c y w h i c h l a r g e l y i g n o r e d many o f t h e d i r e c t i v e s l a i d down b y t h e f a t h e r s o f C o m m u n i s m , a n d w h i c h o f t e n s u b o r d i n a t e d i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t o p r a g m a t i c e c o n o m i c c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . The p e o p l e ' s communes e m b o d i e d a n a t t e m p t b y t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n i s t s t o r e a l i z e a l l t h e p r e -r e q u i s i t e s t o Communism w h i c h t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a d f o r s a k e n i n t h e i r d r i v e t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h u s c o n s t i t u t e d a c h a l l e n g e t o t h e " r e v i s i o n i s t " p o l i c i e s o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . T h i s w a s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e i n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s p e c i f i c r e j e c t i o n o f communes b y t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s a f e w m o n t h s b e f o r e t h e C h i n e s e communes w e r e i n t r o d u c e d . M o r e o v e r , b e c a u s e " a n t i -p a r t y " g r o u p s e x i s t e d b o t h w i t h i n t h e C h i n e s e a n d S o v i e t p a r t i e s , a n d w e r e g i v e n i d e o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t b y t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y , t h e d i s p u t e o v e r t h e p r i n c i p l e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e communes w a s t u r n e d f r o m a t h e o r e t i c a l d i s p u t e i n t o a c o n c r e t e s t r u g g l e w i t h i n t h e s e p a r a t e p a r t i e s . B e s i d e s b e i n g a n i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e o v e r t h e c o r r e c t p o l i c i e s t o f o l l o w d u r i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o Commun ism, t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y a l s o r e l a t e d d i r e c t l y t o t h e more p r e d o m i -n a n t i s s u e s o f t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e . The m i l i t a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e communes p r o v i d e d one s u c h l i n k ; t h e d e t r i m e n t a l e f f e c t o f t h e communes on t h e w o r l d ' s i m a g e o f Communism p r o v i d e d a n o t h e r s u c h l i n k , a n d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f p r o - S o v i e t a n d p r o - C h i n e s e f a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e t w o p a r t i e s , p r o v i d e d t h e o t h e r l i n k ; t h e l a t t e r s i t u a t i o n w a s e s p e c i a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y s i n c e t h e C . P . S . U . 1 l s s u p p o r t f o r t h e a n t i - c o m m u n e f a c t i o n o f M a r s h a l l P e n g T e h - h u a i a n d C h a n g W e n - t i a n , w a s a t t h e same t i m e s u p p o r t f o r a f a c t i o n more i n s y m p a t h y w i t h t h e " r e v i s i o n i s t " f o r e i g n p o l i c y o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . I n a b r o a d e r p e r s p e c t i v e , t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y a l s o r a i s e d i m p o r t a n t i s s u e s c o n c e r n i n g i d e o l o g i c a l a u t h o r i t y , p a r t i c u l a r l y o v e r q u e s t i o n s o f d o m e s t i c p o l i c y d u r i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o C o m m u n i s m . S i n c e t h e C h i n e s e p a r t y r e m a i n s d e t e r m i n e d t o p r o c e e d w i t h t h e i r commune p r o g r a m a s s o o n a s e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w , a n d s i n c e t h e C . P . S . U . c o n t i n u e s t o make a more a n d more l i b e r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f C o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y , i t c a n b e e x p e c t e d t h a t t h e i s s u e s e m b o d i e d i n t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y w i l l c o n t i n u e t o be s t r o n g l y c o n t e n d e d b y t h e two p a r t i e s . M o r e o v e r , t h e f a c t t h a t t h e commune i s s u e i s r e l a t e d t o t h e more p r e d o m i n a n t i s s u e s o f t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e , s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e d e b a t e o v e r t h e communes w i l l c o n t i n u e a s l o n g a s d i f f e r e n c e s r e m a i n b e t w e e n t h e two g i a n t s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t w o r l d . In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e for reference and study, I further agree that per-mission for extensive copying of t h i s t h esis f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s representatives, I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i -c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of \ okc. The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8 , Canada TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE I. THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES: AN INTRODUCTION . . . 1 II . THE IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE DISPUTE: THE COMMON IDEOLOGY 8 Marx 8 The Concept of Communism 8 Engels Ik Lenin's Concept of Socialism and Communism. 19 Lenin i n the Post-Revolutionary Phase . . . 23 Stalin's Succession and His Path to Communism 37 III. THE DIALOGUE OF A DISPUTE: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COMMUNE CONTROVERSY $k The Early Experiments: Spring 1958 . . . » 6k The Reform of Soviet Agriculture 65 The Development of C o l l e c t i v e Farm Theory . 75 IV. THE UNVEILING OF THE COMMUNES: SIN0-SOVIET CONFRONTATION 86 The Chinese Party Congress 86 Khrushchev at the Bulgarian Party Congress. 89 Public Unveiling of the "People's Communes" 93 Confrontation over the Communes: July 1958 96 Commune Upsurge: August 1958 . . . . . . . 99 V. THE COMMUNE RESOLUTION AND. SOVIET REACTION. . 105 Communes i n the Chinese Press 113 The Soviet Response to the Communes . . . . 118 CHAPTER PAGE T h e P a r t - S u p p l y S y s t e m 122 C o n t i n u i n g S o v i e t R e a c t i o n 12*+ The B e g i n n i n g o f R e t r e a t 127 V I . THE C H I N E S E RETREAT 129 The L u s h a n R e s o l u t i o n 130 C o n t i n u i n g S o v i e t D i s p l e a s u r e 138 M i k o y a n i n t h e U . S 139 German P a r t y R e a c t i o n t o t h e Commune . . . . lM+ V I I . THE T W E N T Y - F I R S T CONGRESS AND THE AFTERMATH: TEMPORARY TRUCE lk6 C h o u E n - L a i * s C o n g r e s s S p e e c h 167 P a v e l Y u d i n on E c o n o m i c Q u e s t i o n s 173 C h i n e s e R e a c t i o n t o 21st C o n g r e s s 177 The P o s t - C o n g r e s s E c o n o m i c A i d A g r e e m e n t . . 179 Commune C o n s o l i d a t i o n a n d S o v i e t A c c e p t a n c e : S p r i n g 1959 185 V I I I . R I F T OVER THE COMMUNES I N THE C H I N E S E COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT (SUMMER 1959) 19^ The A n t i - C o m m u n e E l e m e n t w i t h i n t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y lyk E c o n o m i c D i s l o c a t i o n a n d M o u n t i n g U n r e s t w i t h i n t h e P a r t y 205 The P o s i t i o n o f t h e P . L . A 208 The I n t r a - P a r t y D e b a t e o v e r t h e Communes . . 216 The R e n e w a l o f S o v i e t C r i t i c i s m o f t h e Communes 223 The A u g u s t C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e M e e t i n g a t L u s h a n : P e n g T e h - h u a i ' s A t t a c k 225 CHAPTER PAGE Soviet Involvement with Peng Teh-huai . . . . 228 The Lushan Aftermath: The Debate over Soviet Experience . . . 231 IX. THE ANT I-RIGHT I ST CAMPAIGN AND THE OCTOBER CELEBRATIONS (FALL 1959) . . . . o 2^0 The Cult of Mao 2k2 Tenth Anniversary Speeches 2^5 X. THE NEW UPSURGE OF COMMUNES AND THE CONTINUING POLEMICS 253 The Tightening Up of the Rural Communes . . . 253 The Introduction of the Urban Communes . . , 257 Growing Sino-S viet Polemics: Winter and Spring 1959-1960 261 Lenin Anniversary Statements on the Transition to Communism 26k The Confrontation at Bucharest 272 XI. WITHDRAWAL OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNE SYSTEM 275 Further Retreats in Commune Policy . . . . . 278 The Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee . . 28 l XII. THE DEVELOPING DEBATE: I96O-62 286 The i960 Moscow Conference 286 The 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U.: The Soviet Path to Communism 29*+ The 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U 296 Post-Congress Polemics . . 305 Khrushchev1s Central Committee Report on Agriculture March 1962 307 XIII. OPEN DISPUTE (1963) 31*f I v CHAPTER PAGE X I V . THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE COMMUNES TO C H I N A AND THE C . P . C 324 D o m e s t i c C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 324 I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n 331 I d e o l o g i c a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s 333 X V . THE COMMUNE CONTROVERSY I N P E R S P E C T I V E . . . 3^9 I s s u e s R e l a t i n g t o S o c i a l i s t C o n s t r u c t i o n a n d t h e T r a n s i t i o n t o Communism 352 Q u e s t i o n s I n v o l v i n g I d e o l o g i c a l A u t h o r i t y . 38I Q u e s t i o n s R e l a t i n g t o t h e W i d e r D i s p u t e . . 385 C o n c l u s i o n 391 B I B L I O G R A P H Y 39I+ 4 CHAPTER I THE PEOPLE'S COMMUNES: AN INTRODUCTION O f f i c i a l l y introduced into China In August of 1958, the People's Commune superseded the c o l l e c t i v e farm as the basic unit i n the Chinese countryside. The communes were formed by bringing together about twenty-five c o l l e c t i v e farms, each containing about 200 f a m i l i e s , under one central administration; the c o l l e c t i v e becoming the sub-unit of the commune known as the production brigade. In nearly every case, the commune, with i t s population of about 20,000 corresponded almost exactly geographically to the township or Hsiang, the unit of l o c a l government; and the commune took over the function of l o c a l government. There are now about 24,000 of these r u r a l people's communes i n China. While becoming the basic governmental unit of Chinese society, the commune also became the basic economic and s o c i a l unit. The communes assumed control over the schools, industries, banks, and f a c t o r i e s within their confines, and became responsible for coordinating a l l economic production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . Two of the e n t i r e l y new features which were introduced along with the communes were the public dining h a l l s and the people's m i l i t i a , which introduced a militancy not experienced before i n Chinese l i f e and resulted i n peasant l i f e becoming t i g h t l y d i s c i p l i n e d and highly c o l l e c t i v i z e d . 2 In general, the whole l i f e process was organized along m i l i t a r y l i n e s , and came under the constant control of the Party apparatus. Another new feature was the introduction of a certain degree of "free supply" which was substituted f o r wages, with a resultant reduction i n material incentive and a move towards equal!tarianism i n d i s t r i b u t i o n of commodities. Intimately connected with these p o l i c i e s was the a b o l i t i o n of the peasants 1 small private p l o t s , and the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of nearly a l l of the remaining private property including livestock, implements and i n some cases, personal e f f e c t s . In the spring of i960 the country*s urban areas were also transformed into a network of communes, sometimes centered around an i n d u s t r i a l complex, and sometimes taking i n a certain area of a c i t y with a l l i t s diverse f a c t o r i e s and enterprises. In some cases, workers were forced to change their place of residence to somewhere closer to their place of work, but i n general the changeover to communes i n the c i t i e s involved more of an administrative change than a s o c i a l change. I n i t i a l l y i n the c i t i e s too, communal dining h a l l s were set up and commodities rationed out on a p a r t i a l supply basis. Nurseries and homes for the aged were also established i n the urban communes, as they had been i n their r u r a l counterparts. This resulted i n most women being freed from general household duties, allowing the State to augment the urban labour force by many mi l l i o n s . In actual size, the urban communes are considerably larger on the average than the r u r a l communes, having a membership of approximately 50,000 persons each. In some cases, then, the commune i n -cludes an entire town. China i s thus, now divided into basic units known as communes. These communes, the Communist Party declares, are the socio-economic units which -will carry the nation through the period of t r a n s i t i o n to communism, and which w i l l continue to form the basic units of society when pure communism i s reached. As China approaches nearer to communism, the communes, i t i s said, w i l l evolve both to a higher stage of property r e l a t i o n s and to a higher p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Ultimately, a l l c o l l e c t i v e property w i l l become property of the "whole people", and society w i l l be based on the p r i n c i p l e of "from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s ; to each according to h i s needs". The Chinese road to communism i s , then, through the People's Communes. A number of observers of the Chinese scene have made short studies of the Chinese communes themselves, and a few have made a somewhat limited analysis of their wider significance within the communist bloc. The most comprehen-sive study of the i n i t i a l introduction of the communes and of their effect on Chinese-Soviet re l a t i o n s was conducted by D. S. Zagoria i n a chapter of h i s book The Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t , written i n 1961. However, most of the r e l i a b l e [ k evidence concerning the role of the communes within the t o t a l dispute has appeared since Zagoria c o l l e c t e d h i s information, thus allowing a new and f u l l analysis to be made. E s p e c i a l l y lacking i n the previous short studies of the Chinese communes has been the question of their h i s t o r i c a l and id e o l o g i c a l significance within the framework of the communist ideology. For this reason, the present study includes a preliminary discussion of the i d e o l o g i c a l foundations of the Sino-Soviet dispute over the communes, and a h i s t o r i c a l survey of the relevant p o l i c i e s of Lenin and S t a l i n . Without this i d e o l o g i c a l - h i s t o r i c a l perspective, the r e a l significance of the Chinese communes cannot be f u l l y appreciated. There i s a strong tendency of writers to disregard purely i d e o l o g i c a l considerations when dealing with the rel a t i o n s between China and the Soviet Union, laying the causes of dispute s o l e l y to such things as d i f f e r i n g national interests and power p o l i t i c s . Such, I believe, i s not the case. Although i t may be tempered by these considerations, ideology s t i l l maintains an enormous influence on policy within the communist bloc; this being especially true i n the Chinese case. Despite this f a c t , the obvious ch a r a c t e r i s t i c of the commune dispute was that i t was carried on i n i d e o l o g i c a l language with constant reference to the common ideology of Marxist-Leninism. Thus, without an understanding of the id e o l o g i c a l foundations of the debate, 4 5 i t i s impossible to gauge how f a r each side was deviating, i f at a l l , from the teachings of the ideology of Marxist-Leninism, and how much thi s deviation was caused by non-i d e o l o g i c a l considerations such as national i n t e r e s t . From the evidence gathered i t w i l l be shown that the introduction of the communes resulted i n an i d e o l o g i c a l dispute between the leadership of the two parties over the correct interpretation of Marxist-Leninism In regard to the question of the proper road and the proper speed f o r the ad-vance of communism. The i n t e n s i t y of the dispute, and the importance attached to i t by both sides, w i l l be shown to be a direct r e s u l t of the existence of opposing factions within both parties; while the o r i g i n of the dispute w i l l be shown to be a re s u l t of Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l revisionism and conser-vatism. From the evidence presented, i t w i l l also be shown that the dispute over the communes widened into a dispute over the question of the i d e o l o g i c a l authority of the Soviet Union with regard to domestic construction and domestic p o l i c y i n other communist nations, and the binding nature of "Soviet experience" i n the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. The m i l i t a r y implications of the communes w i l l be shown to be one d i r e c t l i n k with the more predominant aspect of the Sino-Soviet dispute—the question of bloc foreign p o l i c y and of violent revolution. The economic and organiza-t i o n a l aspects of the communes w i l l be shown to have similar 6 relevance to the wider dispute, i n so fa r as they affect the image of communism i n the Western world. The significance of the communes i n terms of Chinese leadership of the under-developed nations w i l l also be elaborated upon, and their implications for the future i n the l i g h t of the Slno-Soviet r i f t , w i l l be suggested. The major sources used i n thi s study have been: the published works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and S t a l i n ; o f f i c i a l documents and speeches published by the Foreign Languages Publishing House i n the Soviet Union, and the Foreign Languages Press i n China; the translations of the Soviet press and Party journals as collected i n Soviet Press Transla-tions and Current Digest of the Soviet Press: the translations of the Chinese press and Party journals as collected i n the Peking Review, Current Background. Extracts from China Main-land Magazines. Survey of China Mainland Press, and Current Scene; the China Quarterly and Soviet Survey; The New York Times and numerous secondary sources included i n books and a r t i c l e s both on the communes as such, and on communist ideology. One of the greatest problems i n studying the relations between China and the Soviet Union from the source material available to the Western researcher has been the necessity of undertaking considerable interpolation and i n t e r -pretation because of the veil e d language used i n the communist 7 w o r l d . H o w e v e r , s i n c e 1 9 o 3 , t h e s p l i t b e t w e e n t h e two p a r t i e s h a s e v o l v e d t o t h e s t a g e o f o p e n p u b l i c a r g u m e n t , a n d t h u s t h e n e e d t o u n d e r t a k e " d e c o d i n g " o f t h e p o l e m i c s i s no l o n g e r p r e s e n t . M o r e o v e r , t h e f a c t s r e v e a l e d i n t h e p u b l i c e x c h a n g e s b e t w e e n t h e R u s s i a n s a n d C h i n e s e h a v e c a s t l i g h t on e v e n t s i n t h e p a s t w h i c h b e f o r e w e r e c o m p l e t e l y u n k n o w n , o r o n l y g u e s s e d a t , a n d a l l o w t h e s c h o l a r t o make a much more v a l i d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f p a s t a r t i c l e s a n d s p e e c h e s i n t h e S o v i e t a n d C h i n e s e p r e s s . I t i s w i t h t h i s " h i n d s i g h t " t h a t a n y n e c e s s a r y i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f d o c u m e n t s a n d a r t i c l e s o f t h e pre -1963 p e r i o d h a v e b e e n m a d e . The s t u d y i s o r g a n i z e d i n t o t h r e e m a i n s e c t i o n s . F i r s t , t h e i d e o l o g i c a l a n d h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e i s o u t l i n e d . T h e n a d e t a i l e d e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e commune d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e two p a r t i e s i s u n d e r t a k e n , b e g i n n i n g i n 1957 a n d c o n t i n u i n g t h r o u g h u n t i l t h e d a t e o f w r i t i n g . F i n a l l y , a n a n a l y s i s o f t h e c h i e f t r e n d s e m e r g i n g f r o m t h e d a t a a n d i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s p r e s e n t e d , a n d t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y i s c o n s i d e r e d i n t h e c o n t e x t o f t h e t o t a l d i s p u t e . CHAPTER I I THE I D E O L O G I C A L FOUNDATIONS OF THE D I S P U T E : THE COMMON IDEOLOGY F r o m a n i d e o l o g i c a l p o i n t of v i e w , t h e S i n o - S o v i e t r i f t o v e r t h e communes i s d i r e c t l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e b r o a d q u e s t i o n o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o c o m m u n i s m , i n t h e p o s t -r e v o l u t i o n a r y p e r i o d . T h e r e f o r e , i n o r d e r t o p u t t h e d i s p u t e i n t o i t s i d e o l o g i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o e x a m i n e t h e t h e o r e t i c a l f o u n d a t i o n s o f M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s m ( t h e common i d e o l o g y t o w h i c h b o t h d i s p u t a n t s c l a i m t o s u b s c r i b e ) w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e u l t i m a t e g o a l o f c o m m u n i s m , a n d w i t h r e g a r d t o t h e p r e s c r i b e d means o f r e a c h i n g t h i s g o a l . The w r i t i n g s o f M a r x , E n g e l s a n d L e n i n f o r m t h e m a i n c o m p o n e n t s o f t h e M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t i d e o l o g y , a n d w i l l be d e a l t w i t h i n t u r n . The w o r k s o f S t a l i n d e a l i n g w i t h t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o communism w i l l a l s o b e c o n s i d e r e d s i n c e b o t h t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y r e c o g n i z e t h a t S t a l i n ' s i d e o l o g i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n " e n r i c h e s a n d a u g m e n t s t h e s c i e n c e o f M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s m " . " 1 ' I . MARX N o w h e r e d o e s M a r x d i s c u s s i n d e t a i l t h e c o m m u n i s t Utopia t o w a r d s w h i c h h e c l a i m s t h e w o r l d i s i n e x o r a b l y ^ • P e o p l e ' s D a i l y . O c t o b e r 30, 1952; S o v i e t P r e s s T r a n s l a t i o n s . 1 Q 5 2 , p . i f 3 2 . 9 advancing. Neither does he lay down i n d e t a i l the exact construction of the immediate post-revolutionary society, which, under the dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t , i s the t r a n s i t i o n a l phase between capitalism and communism. His chief concern i n h i s writings i s to analyze h i s t o r y d i a l e c t i c a l l y , and to influence the p r o l e t a r i a t to become conscious of i t s h i s t o r i c a l mission to overthrow world capitalism through violent revolution. His discussions of the immediate t a s k s — t h e organization of the workers of the world, and the overthrow of exploitative capitalism as represented by the bourgeoisie—are exhaustive since these pertain to the p r a c t i c a l a f f a i r s of the moment; but generally only passing references are ever made i n h i s writings to the cha r a c t e r i s t i c s of the post-revolutionary phases. As a result of th i s f a c t , i t was l e f t to the id e o l o g i c a l h e i r s of Marx—Lenin, S t a l i n , Khruschev and Mao to f i l l i n the loose and general t h e o r e t i c a l framework. This lack of a detailed characterization by Karl Marx of the period of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, and of communism i t s e l f , has resulted, during the current century, i n considerable dispute among Marxists as to the "correct" course to follow now that a number of national revolutions have been successful. The commune controversy i s one manifestation of thi s dispute. The Concept of Communism In one of Marx's very early writings--his posthumously published Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, the father of 1 0 modern communism provides considerable insight into the nature of h i s thinking i n regard to the future communist Utopia. He also provides, i n t h i s work, an analysis of the human condition, which serves as a foundation for h i s concep-tion of the i d e a l society. In general terms, Marx saw the human condition as one of s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n , of domination by the material world, of human debasement through slavish acquisitiveness; and he saw c a p i t a l i s t society as the highest stage of t h i s a l i e n a t i o n — o f this dehumanization. The workers, he argued, were treated as l i t t l e more than animals or machines by the exploitative c a p i t a l i s t s and had reached the lowest depths to which mankind could sink. Soon, he claimed, they would r i s e up against their c a p i t a l i s t overlords, smash the socio-economic-political structure and free the whole of mankind from the bonds of materialism—creating i n the long run a new kind of society i n which s e l f - a l i e n a t i o n was transcended. The most comprehensive outline of future society made by Marx appears i n h i s Critique of the Gothe Program which was written i n I875. Here Marx c l e a r l y defined the two stages of the post-revolutionary stage and outlined the p r i n c i p l e s of production and d i s t r i b u t i o n operative i n each. Clearly separating the two d i s t i n c t stages and their c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , Marx declared that: 11 Between c a p i t a l i s t and communist society l i e s the period of revolutionary transformation of the one Into the other. There corresponds to th i s also a p o l i t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n period i n which the state can be nothing but the revolu-tionary dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t . 2 Marx pointed out that since the new society emerges from the old, i t must necessarily undergo a t r a n s i t i o n a l phase i n which a l l the vestiges of c a p i t a l i s t society are overcome. In the following passage, he outlined this intermediate stage: What we have to deal with here i s a communist society, not as i t developed on i t s own foundations, but, on the contrary, as i t emerges from c a p i t a l i s t society; which i s thus i n every respect, economically, morally and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , s t i l l stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb i t emerges. Accordingly, the i n d i v i d u a l producer receives back from society - after the deductions have been made - exactly what he gives to i t . What he has given to i t i s h i s i n d i v i d u a l quantum of labour.3 What t h i s means i n actual practice, then, i s equal shares of the t o t a l production for equal labour contributed: . . . the s o c i a l working day consists of the sum of the i n d i v i d u a l hours of work; the i n d i v i d u a l labour time of the i n d i v i d u a l producer i s the part of the s o c i a l labour day contributed by him, h i s share i n i t . He p K. Marx, Critique of the Gotha Program (Moscow, F.L.P.H., 19^7), p. 39. 3 I b i d . . p. 2k. 12 receives a c e r t i f i c a t e from society that he has furnished such and such an amount of labour (after deducting h i s labour f o r the common fund) and with this c e r t i f i c a t e he draws from the s o c i a l stock of means of con-sumption as much as costs the same amount of labour. The same amount of labour he has given to society In one form, he receives back i n another.^-In the f i r s t stage of communist society, then, equal labour begets equal right to the s o c i a l products of society as a whole. But equal right i n this sense i s s t i l l "bourgeois r i g h t " according to Marx. This i s because although an equal s t a n d a r d — l a b o u r — i s l a i d down, "the right of the producers i s proportional to the labour they supply."^ Thus "natural" i n e q u a l i t i e s come into play even here. No matter whether labour i s computed on a time basis or an in t e n s i t y basis, some men w i l l contribute greater amounts of labour because they are stronger or i n t e l l e c t u a l l y superior to others, and w i l l therefore "earn" more s o c i a l products than others. Moreover, some men have wives and families to support while some do not, and some have more children than others; therefore while two men may contribute equal labour and receive equal portions of commodity production, one w i l l be richer than the other—due merely to the circumstances he finds himself i n . Bourgeois r i g h t s , then, s t i l l remain. "But these defects are inev i t a b l e , i n the f i r s t phase of Ibid., p. 25* Loc. c i t . 13 c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y , " M a r x a r g u e d , " a s i t . . . h a s j u s t 6 e m e r g e d a f t e r p r o l o n g e d b i r t h p a n g s f r o m c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y . " I n t i m e , M a r x d e c l a r e d , t h e l a s t v e s t i g e s o f b o u r g e o i s s o c i e t y w i l l b e s w e p t a w a y b y t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , a n d a new a n d f i n a l s t a g e w i l l be u s h e r e d i n : I n a h i g h e r p h a s e o f c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y , a f t e r t h e e n s l a v i n g s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l s u n d e r d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r , a n d t h e r e w i t h a l s o t h e a n t i -t h e s i s b e t w e e n m e n t a l a n d p h y s i c a l l a b o u r h a s v a n i s h e d ; a f t e r l a b o u r h a s c e a s e d t o be a means o f l i f e a n d h a s become i t s e l f t h e p r i m a r y n e c e s s i t y o f l i f e ; a f t e r t h e p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s h a v e a l s o i n c r e a s e d w i t h t h e a l l - r o u n d d e v e l o p -ment o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , a n d a l l t h e s p r i n g s o f c o - o p e r a t i v e w e a l t h f l o w more a b u n d a n t l y — o n l y t h e n c a n t h e n a r r o w h o r i z o n o f b o u r g e o i s r i g h t be f u l l y l e f t b e h i n d a n d s o c i e t y i n s c r i b e o n i t s b a n n e r s ; f r o m e a c h a c c o r d i n g t o h i s a b i l i t y , t o e a c h a c c o r d i n g t o h i s n e e d s . 7 F r o m t h i s d e s c r i p t i o n , i t i s s e e n t h a t i n t h e h i g h e r s t a g e o f p r o d u c t i o n , t h e p r i n c i p l e s g u i d i n g b o t h p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n c h a n g e . W h e r e a s t h e amount o f l a b o u r f o r m e r l y d e t e r m i n e d t h e amount o f s o c i a l c o m m o d i t i e s d i s t r i b u t e d t o c i t i z e n s , now n e e d i s t h e g u i d i n g f a c t o r i n d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d a l l men p r o d u c e a c c o r d i n g t o t h e i r a b i l i t i e s . T h u s t h e d i r e c t l i n k b e t w e e n p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n i s s u p e r s e d e d . The p r e r e q u i s i t e s r e q u i r e d b e f o r e t h e new p r i n c i p l e o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d c o n s u m p t i o n i s i n t r o d u c e d a r e a l s o f o r t h r i g h t l y p o i n t e d o u t , a n d a d d , u p t o a f a i r l y i m p r e s s i v e l i s t — s u g g e s t i n g t h a t i n p r a c t i c e t h e l o w e r s t a g e o f communism w i l l r e m a i n i n I b i d . , p . 26. I b i d . , p . 27. Ik existence for some considerable length of time. The a n t i -thesis between town and country i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned i n the l i s t , but i t i s evident from other passages devoted to t h i s question that i t i s included as an i n t e g r a l part of the a b o l i t i o n of the d i v i s i o n of labour. Thus, Marx's Critique of the Gotha Program, within a few paragraphs, gives the most succinct general summary of the post-revolutionary phases to be found i n Marx's extensive writings. Here, however, he was more concerned with elucidating general p r i n c i p l e s and prerequisites, and was therefore not as s p e c i f i c i n d e t a i l as he was i n certain other scattered passages i n other works. I I . ENGELS Engel's most comprehensive treatment of post-revolutionary society i s to be found i n h i s Anti-Duhring. which lays out perhaps the most straight-forward exposition of Marxism produced by either men. P a r t i c u l a r l y valuable i n Anti-Duhring are Engels' discussions of the State i n future communist society, of the d i v i s i o n of labour, of commodity value and of the de-alienation of man. In r e l a t i o n to the future of the state as such, Engels expounded i n Anti-Duhring h i s famous p r i n c i p l e of the withering away of the state. He declared that: when a t l a s t i t b e c o m e s t h e r e a l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e w h o l e o f s o c i e t y i t r e n d e r s i t s e l f u n -n e c e s s a r y . . . . T h e f i r s t a c t b y v i r t u e o f w h i c h t h e s t a t e r e a l l y c o n s t i t u t e s I t s e l f t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e o f t h e w h o l e o f s o c i e t y - t h e t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e name o f s o c i e t y - t h i s i s a t t h e same t i m e , i t s l a s t i n d e p e n d e n t a c t a s a s t a t e . S t a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e i n s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s b e c o m e s , i n one d o m a i n a f t e r a n o t h e r , s u p e r f l u o u s , a n d t h e n d i e s o u t o f i t s e l f ; t h e g o v e r n m e n t o f p e r s o n s i s r e p l a c e d b y t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f t h i n g s , a n d b y t h e c o n d u c t o f p r o c e s s e s o f p r o d u c t i o n . The s t a t e i s n o t a b o l i s h e d . I t d i e s o u t . 8 T h u s , a s i n t h e p l a n s o f t h e P a r i s Commune ( d i s c u s s e d b y M a r x i n h i s The C i v i l War i n F r a n c e ) T t h e c e n t r a l a d m i n i s t r a -t i o n a p p a r a t u s e v e n t u a l l y c o n c e r n s i t s e l f o n l y w i t h e c o n o m i c c o - o r d i n a t i o n a n d p l a n n i n g , a n d r e l a t e d t a s k s . I n t h i s l a t t e r r e g a r d , E n g e l s n o t e d e a r l i e r t h a t " t h e s o c i a l a n a r c h y o f p r o d u c t i o n g i v e s p l a c e t o a s o c i a l r e g u l a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n u p o n a d e f i n i t e p l a n , a c c o r d i n g t o t h e n e e d s o f t h e c o m m u n i t y a n d o f e a c h i n d i v i d u a l . E c o n o m i c p r o d u c t i o n i s r e g u l a t e d b u t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s a s s u c h a r e n o t . The c o e r c i v e s t a t e g i v e s w a y t o a s y s t e m o f e c o n o m i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . N o w h e r e d o e s E n g e l s s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t e t h e p r o c e s s o f d y i n g o u t t o t h e h i g h e r a n d l o w e r s t a g e s o f c o m m u n i s m , a n d one c a n o n l y ^ F . E n g e l s , A n t i - D u h r i n g ( M o s c o w , F . L . P . H . , 195*0, p . 389. 9 I M d . , P. 387. 16 s u r m i s e t h a t t h e d y i n g o u t o f t h e s t a t e c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e a c t u a l a c h i e v e m e n t o f t h e h i g h e r s t a g e a n d i s a p r e c o n d i t i o n t o i t . I n t w o s e p a r a t e d i s c u s s i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e d e t e r m i n a -t i o n o f t h e " v a l u e " o f c o m m o d i t i e s i n c o m m u n i s m ' s l o w e r p h a s e , E n g e l s c l e a r e d up some o f M a r x ' s somewhat c o n f u s i n g e x p l a n a t i o n s . E n g e l s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t a c t u a l l a b o u r - t i m e w i l l be t h e d e t e r m i n i n g f a c t o r i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e amount o f s o c i a l p r o d u c t d u e t o e a c h i n d i v i d u a l . H e a l s o s t a t e d t h a t t h e " p r i c e " o f c o m m o d i t i e s w i l l be d e t e r m i n e d e x c l u s i v e l y a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a v e r a g e number o f l a b o u r - h o u r s e m b o d i e d t h e r e i n . T h u s i f one man m a k e s a s h o e i n f o u r h o u r s a n d a n o t h e r I n t w o h o u r s , t h e n b o t h s h o e s w i l l be v a l u e d a t t h r e e l a b o u r h o u r s , a n d t h i s w i l l b e t h e i r " c o s t " t o t h e l a b o u r e r . E n g e l s a l s o d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r i n f u t u r e s o c i e t y , a n d t h e r e l a t e d m a t t e r o f m a n ' s d e - a l i e n a t i o n . He l a u d e d b o t h F o u r i e r a n d Owen f o r t h e i r demand t h a t e a c h i n d i v i d u a l be g i v e n a s w i d e a p o s s i b l e v a r i a t i o n o f o c c u p a t i o n , i n o r d e r t o r e c o v e r f o r man t h e a t t r a c t i v e n e s s h e f o u n d i n l a b o u r b e f o r e t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r d e s p o i l e d i t . E n g e l s n o t e d t h a t t h e a r r i v a l o f t h e m a c h i n e a g e h a d e s t a b l i s h e d t h e c o n d i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e d i v i s i o n o f l a b o u r t o be m a i n t a i n e d i n d e p e n d e n t l y o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h e l a b o u r e r . Q u o t i n g M a r x , h e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t " s i n c e t h e m o t i o n o f t h e w h o l e s y s t e m d o e s n o t p r o c e e d f r o m t h e w o r k m a n b u t f r o m t h e m a c h i n e r y , a c h a n g e o f p e r s o n s c a n 17 take place at any time without an interruption of the 10 work . . . ." Thus, men can interchange occupations at will in the future society without jeopardizing the pro-ductivity of labour. Turning finally to the question of the development and de-alienation of man, Engels declared that in communist society: productive labour instead of being a means of subjugating men, will become a means of their emancipation, by offering each individual the opportunity to develop a l l his faculties, physical and mental, in a l l directions, and develop them to the f u l l - in which, therefore, productive labour will become a pleasure instead of a burden.11 Thus, man is to find true freedom within the classless society of communism; and creative, productive labour is to be a joy in itself, since through i t man will find a vehicle of self-expression. With the seizing of the means of production, Engels argued, the domination of man by his material world ceases. At the same time: The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then, for the fi r s t time man in a certain sense is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal ^Ibid.. p. 409, quoting from Capital. i : LIbid. , p. 408. 18 c o n d i t i o n s o f e x i s t e n c e i n t o r e a l l y human o n e s . The w h o l e s p h e r e o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s o f l i f e w h i c h e n v i r o n m a n , a n d h a v e h i t h e r t o r u l e s m a n , now c o m e s u n d e r t h e d o m i n a t i o n a n d c o n t r o l o f m a n , who f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e b e c o m e s t h e r e a l , c o n s c i o u s l o r d o f n a t u r e , b e c a u s e h e i s now become m a s t e r o f h i s own s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . 1 2 E n g e l s c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e p r o c l a m a t i o n t h a t f r o m h e n c e f o r t h man w i l l b e t h e m a s t e r o f h i s own d e s t i n y , a n d t h e m o u l d e r o f a t r u l y human e x i s t e n c e w i t h i n a c l a s s l e s s , c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y : O n l y f r o m t h a t t i m e w i l l man h i m s e l f , w i t h f u l l c o n s c i o u s n e s s make h i s own h i s t o r y . . . . I t i s t h e a s c e n t o f man f r o m t h e k i n g d o m o f n e c e s s i t y t o t h e k i n g d o m o f f r e e d o m . 1 3 T h u s , i n t h e s e f i n a l f e w p a s s a g e s E n g e l s r e t u r n s t o t h e o r i g i n a l theme l a i d down b y M a r x i n h i s 18M+ M a n u -s c r i p t s — t h e u l t i m a t e o v e r c o m i n g o f m a n ' s a l i e n a t i o n f r o m h i s m a t e r i a l e n v i r o n m e n t t h r o u g h c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h e f i n a l s e t t i n g f r e e o f h u m a n i t y s o t h a t i t may d e v e l o p a l l i t s human p o t e n t i a l t h r o u g h c r e a t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i t s n a t u r a l e n v i r o n m e n t . I n c o m m u n i s m , m a n ' s i n n e r n e e d s a r e l i b e r a t e d , a n d f u l f i l l e d . The c o m m u n i s t m a n , i n h a r m o n i o u s i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h n a t u r e a n d h i s f e l l o w m a n , r e a l i z e s h i s f u l l human p o t e n t i a l . ! I b i d . . p . 393-L o c . c i t . 19 I I I . L E N I N ' S CONCEPTION OF S O C I A L I S M AND COMMUNISM I n 1917 , i m m e d i a t e l y b e f o r e t h e B o l s h e v i k s s e i z e d p o w e r i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , L e n i n w r o t e h i s w e l l - k n o w n The S t a t e a n d R e v o l u t i o n i n w h i c h h e summed up t h e t e a c h i n g s o f M a r x o n t h e n a t u r e o f t h e d i c t a t o r s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t a n d t h e t w o p h a s e s o f p o s t - r e v o l u t i o n a r y s o c i e t y . I n t h e p r o c e s s , h e a l s o a d d e d h i s own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n t o a number o f i m p o r t a n t q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f s o c i a l i s m a n d c o m m u n i s m . L e n i n w e n t v e r y c a r e f u l l y o v e r M a r x ' s w r i t i n g s , a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y o v e r h i s C r i t i q u e o f t h e G o t h a P r o g r a m , q u o t i n g M a r x a t l e n g t h a n d a d d i n g n u m e r o u s c o m m e n t s . C o n c e r n i n g t h e l o w e r p h a s e o f communism o u t l i n e d b y M a r x , L e n i n u p h e l d t h e n e c e s s i t y o f d i s t r i b u t i n g c o m m o d i t i e s o n a n e q u a l b a s i s a c c o r d i n g t o w o r k p e r f o r m e d . H e s u g g e s t e d t h a t : I t i s u n a v o i d a b l e i n t h e f i r s t p h a s e o f c o m m u n i s m ; f o r i f we a r e n o t t o i n d u l g e i n u t o p i a n i s m , we m u s t n o t t h i n k t h a t h a v i n g o v e r t h r o w n c a p i t a l i s m p e o p l e w i l l a t o n c e l e a r n t o w o r k f o r s o c i e t y w i t h o u t a n y s t a n d a r d o f r i g h t : a n d i n d e e d t h e a b o l i t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s m d o e s n o t i m m e d i a t e l y c r e a t e t h e e c o n o m i c p r e m i s e s f o r s u c h a c h a n g e . And t h e r e i s a s y e t n o o t h e r s t a n d a r d t h a n t h a t o f ' b o u r g e o i s r i g h t ' . l ^ L e n i n r e i t e r a t e d t h e f a c t t h a t w h i l e b o u r g e o i s r i g h t s a r e r e t a i n e d t h e r e w i l l b e a c o n t i n u i n g n e e d f o r t h e s t a t e t o c o n t i n u e i n e x i s t e n c e . " F o r t h e c o m p l e t e w i t h e r i n g away o f t h e s t a t e c o m p l e t e communism i s n e c e s s a r y . " V . I . L e n i n , S e l e c t e d W o r k s , v o l . I I ( M o s c o w , F . L . P . H . 19^7), P . 205. 20 Lenin then passes on to a discussion of the 'complete communism1. He suggests that u n t i l this stage i s achieved " s o c i a l i s t s demand the s t r i c t e s t control by society and by the state of a measure of labour and the measure of consump-t i o n . " " ^ He declares that "the whole of society w i l l have become a single o f f i c e and a single factory, with 16* equality of labour and equality of pay." During this time, economic production w i l l increase immensely, thus laying the foundations for the t r a n s i t i o n to pure communism: "The economic basis for the complete withering away of the state i s such a high development of communism that the a n t i -17 thesis between mental and physical labour disappears." ' Thus, s o c i a l abundance i s reaffirmed as a precondition to communism. But Lenin makes no estimate of the period required to achieve t h i s abundance and the necessary other prerequisites to the higher stage of communism. He declares that: how ra p i d l y this development w i l l proceed, how soon i t w i l l reach the point of breaking away from the d i v i s i o n of labour, of removing the antithesis between mental and physical labour, of transforming labour into 'the prime necessity of l i f e * - we do not and cannot know.l8 Ror can one predict "the s p e c i f i c forms of the withering away" since there i s no basis upon which such a prediction ^ I b i d . , p. 207. "^Ibid. . p. 210 (*the emphasis i s mine). 1 7 I b i d . , p. 206. 18, Loc. c i t . 21 can be made. These questions are l e f t f or the future. Nevertheless, the general p r i n c i p l e s under which future society w i l l operate are known, as are the general pre-r e q u i s i t e s , one of which Is that "the necessity of observing the simple, fundamental rules of human intercourse w i l l become a habit. ""^ The other prerequisites outlined by Marx were reiterated and upheld by Lenin. Summation of Engels, Marx and Lenin We are now i n a position to sum up the th e o r e t i c a l foundations of Marxist-Leninism on the questions of socialism and communism, as things stood on the eve of the Soviet Revolution. A l l the ideology that has developed since then has been linked with experience rather than with theory pure and simple, and belongs i n another category. From the scattered references made by Marx, Engels and Lenin to the post-revolutionary t r a n s i t i o n to communism, the following general picture can be b u i l t up. F i r s t of a l l , post-revolutionary society i s seen as two d i s t i n c t s t a g e s — s o c i a l i s m and communism—differentiated c h i e f l y by the di f f e r e n t p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n operative i n each stage. In the f i r s t stage i t i s "equal pay for equal work" and i n the communist stage i t i s "from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s ; to each according to h i s needs." Ibid., p. 211. 22 The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the f i r s t stage are the followingJ the dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t nationalizes a l l the instruments of production and abolishes private property, including land; the p r i n c i p l e of equal pay for equal work i s introduced; inheritance rights are abolished; schools are opened to a l l children free of charge; a people's m i l i t i a replaces the standing army; cred i t and banking are nationalized; co-operative farming i s established i n the r u r a l areas; f a c t o r i e s are run democratically by the workers themselves; true democracy along the lin e s of the Paris Commune i s introduced; job mobility i s introduced; and central economic planning i s undertaken by the , s t a t e f . In order to establish the pre-requisites f o r the advance to the higher stage of communism, the s o c i a l i s t society works towards the following goals: the a b o l i t i o n of the differences between mental and manual labour (partly through occupation mobility); the a b o l i t i o n of the differences between town and country (through an integration of agriculture and industry, and through a decentralization of population); the achievement of material abundance; the establishment of proper s o c i a l conduct as ingrained habit; the establishment of labour as a human necessity and working according to a b i l i t y as a s o c i a l r u l e ; and f i n a l l y , the gradual withering away of the state. When these prerequisites have been f u l f i l l e d , society enters the higher stage of communism where the pr i n c i p l e "from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s ; 23 to each according to h i s needs", i s put into e f f e c t . As has already been pointed out, Marx, Engels and Lenin were not more s p e c i f i c than t h i s , because they claimed that any further d e t a i l s would only be speculative. Moreover, they suggested that detailed structure during the t r a n s i t i o n period might vary from country to country, depending on l o c a l conditions, and so s p e c i f i c forms and p o l i c i e s could not be l a i d down on a blanket basis. In other words, while the pr i n c i p l e s and the goals were universal, means of achieving them might d i f f e r somewhat from place to place. IV. LENIN IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY PHASE Following the victory of the October Revolution i n 1917, i t became necessary for Lenin as leader of h i s Party to begin to put into practice the teachings of Marxism. At the same time, Lenin continued to serve as the font of ideo l o g i c a l wisdom, further developing the ideas of Marx and Engels as he went along. Experience was c r y s t a l l i z e d into ideology. Almost immediately, nationalization of banking, finance, and industry was put into e f f e c t , and the means of production was step-by-step gathered into the hands of the state. As far as land was concerned, i n early 1918 the government promulgated a decree that a l l land was to be "the property of the whole people, to be used by those who 2k c u l t i v a t e i t . " While most of the land was to be divided up for use by a l l the peasants, large estates and "lands with highly developed forms of c u l t i v a t i o n " were to be 21 "cultivated exclusively by the state, or by the communities" and a l l the l i v e s t o c k and equipment thereon was retained for state use. These large estates were not to be divided up for peasant use, but were to be turned into model state farms. As far as the rest of the land was concerned, there was to be no r e s t r i c t i o n on the forms of land tenure--be i t i n d i v i d u a l , co-operative or communal. Once distr i b u t e d , the land could no longer be bought or sold, so that only by a co-operative pooling of land could large scale farming be carried out. Thus, although the land had been nationalized by decree, de facto 'ownership* remained with the i n d i v i d u a l peasants. But on February 1^ , 1919, a decree e n t i t l e d "The Regulations Concerning the S o c i a l i s t i c Agrarian Arrangement and the Measures fo r Organizing Agriculture on a S o c i a l i s t i c Basis," was issued, setting out Lenin's plan to gradually change over to c o l l e c t i v e farming. It proclaimed that: Ibid., p. 236. Ibid., p. 237-25 For the purpose of destroying a l l exploitation of man by man; of organizing r u r a l economy on the basis of Socialism and with the application of a l l improvements i n science and technique; of educating the t o i l i n g masses i n the s p i r i t of Socialism; of bringing about al l i a n c e between the p r o l e t a r i a t and the ' v i l l a g e poverty 1 i n their struggle against c a p i t a l , i t i s necessary to pass from the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c forms of land exploitation to c o l l e c t i v e forms. Large Soviet estates, r u r a l communes, group agriculture and a l l other forms of c o l l e c t i v e use of the land are the best forms for achieving t h i s object, and therefore a l l forms of i n d i v i d u a l use of the land should be regarded as merely temporary and doomed to destruction.22 Thus, i n declaring the need fo r "the introduction of c o l l e c -t i v e p r i n c i p l e s i n the use of land, rather than i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ones" the Soviet Government set out three s p e c i f i c forms of c o l l e c t i v e agriculture which were permissible: Soviet estates, r u r a l communes, and a g r i c u l t u r a l associations. The Soviet estates were roughly equivalent to the modern Soviet state farms. They were managed by the state i t s e l f , and the people working on the estates assumed the same status as urban proletarians, since they were paid wages for their work d i r e c t l y by the state. The Soviet estates thyis designed as models which embodied pure s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s . The r u r a l communes were a form of c o l l e c t i v e farm which were organized by the state, "and embodied a lower l e v e l Quoted i n C. Basvolsky, The Economics of Communism (New York, Macmillan, 1 9 2 1 ) , p. 7 2 . 26 of socialism than the Soviet estates, insofar as implements and equipment were c o l l e c t i v e l y , rather than state owned. Designed primarily for the " v i l l a g e poverty" who had recently returned from the c i t i e s to the countryside and had no land to c u l t i v a t e , these communes were aided i n the beginning by a huge b i l l i o n ruble loan fund on which they could draw. Everything i n the commune was owned c o l l e c t i v e l y , and members were '"permitted to keep cert a i n f i x e d amounts of the food products they produce as compensation for their t o i l . " ^ Everything else produced had to be delivered to the state, although everything above the commune's quota was paid for by the state. Any such p r o f i t s had by law to be "used f o r the improvement and extension of the communal estates." Generally, each commune was managed by a small elected council, and a l l the communes within a county or a province were organized into groups or loose federations. Thus, these r u r a l communes were highly equalitarian i n that a l l members received an equal share of their c o l l e c t i v e production Moreover, there was no private property as such, since the land was state owned, and a l l other property was communally owned. They were, therefore, of a r e l a t i v e l y advanced s o c i a l i s t character. The t h i r d form of c o l l e c t i v e agriculture established i n the r u r a l areas was the a g r i c u l t u r a l association i n which 27 t h e i n d i v i d u a l p e a s a n t v o l u n t a r i l y l o a n e d t h e a s s o c i a t i o n h i s l a n d a n d i m p l e m e n t s , p u t t i n g t h e m i n t o a common p o o l , b u t r e t a i n i n g de f a c t o o w n e r s h i p o v e r t h e m . D i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e c o l l e c t i v e p r o d u c t i o n was "made among members a c c o r d i n g t o n o r m s e x i s t i n g f o r t h e w h o l e c o u n t r y a t t h e t i m e o f t h e d i v i s i o n . " The r e m a i n d e r , i f a n y , w a s t u r n e d o v e r t o t h e s t a t e . B y J a n u a r y o f 1920 a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9$ o f t h e l a n d w a s i n t h e f o r m o f S o v i e t e s t a t e s , a n d r o u g h l y 2.5$ i n r u r a l communes a n d a g r i c u l t u r a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . T h u s , n e a r l y 90$ o f t h e l a n d r e m a i n e d i n t h e f o r m o f i n d i v i d u a l h o l d i n g s " l o a n e d " 25 t o t h e p e a s a n t s b y t h e s t a t e . y On D e c e m b e r k, 1919, L e n i n a d d r e s s e d t h e F i r s t C o n g r e s s o f A g r i c u l t u r a l Communes a n d A g r i c u l t u r a l A r t e l s , m a k i n g a number o f i m p o r t a n t s t a t e m e n t s c o n c e r n i n g t h e communes . H e o b s e r v e d t h a t " t h e name ' a g r i c u l t u r a l commune* i s a g r e a t o n e ; i t i s a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e c o n c e p t i o n o f c o m m u n i s m . " H o w e v e r , h e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t : . . . i t h a s f r e q u e n t l y h a p p e n e d t h a t t h e communes h a v e o n l y s u c c e e d e d i n p r o v o k i n g a n a t t i t u d e o f h o s t i l i t y , a n d t h e w o r d ' commune* h a s e v e n a t t i m e s become a c a l l t o f i g h t commun ism. A n d t h i s h a p p e n e d o n l y when s t u p i d a t t e m p t s w e r e made t o d r i v e t h e p e a s a n t s i n t o t h e communes b y f o r e e . The I b i d . , p. 82. 2 5 I b i d . , p. 83. 28 absurdity of this was so obvious that the Soviet government long ago forbade it.26 He urged a l l those attending the congress to see that a l l vestiges of coercion be stamped out. Lenin noted that "Communism is the highest state of the development of Socialism, when people work because they realize the necessity of working for the common good," and urged a l l commune members to give free labour and assistance to the surrounding peasantry—to labour in a communist "subbotnik" 27 spirit. ' During these first years following the revolution, nearly every organization that sprang up began to adopt the name "commune". In the summer of 1919, in a pamphlet entitled "A Great Beginning", Lenin criticised this practice, declaring that: every enterprise that is started by communists, or which they help to start, is very often at once declared to be a 'commune1, and very often i t is forgotten that this honourable title must be won by prolonged and persistent effort, must be won by practical achievement in genuine communist construction.28 He referred to the fact that the government had decided to change the name of "consumers1 communes" to a less extravagant ti t l e , and urged other organizations toi 26 Lenin, op. cit., p. 5^1 • Ibid. , p. 'Ibid. , p. 500. 27-28 29 F i r s t show that you are capable of working g r a t i s i n the inter e s t s of society, i n the interests of a l l the t o i l e r s , show that you are capable of "working i n a revolutionary s t y l e * , that you are capable of r a i s i n g the productivity of labour, of organizing i n an exemplary manner, and then put your hand out for the honorable t i t l e of 'commune'129 At the same time, he declared that not enough attention was being given to the kind of exemplary units he had described. These "young shoots of Communism" he exclaimed, "should be nursed with much more care." He referred e s p e c i a l l y to those s o c i a l i s t creations which freed women from being "a domestic slave". He declared that "the r e a l emancipation of women, r e a l Communism, w i l l only begin when a mass struggle . . . i s started against t h i s petty domestic economy, or rather when i t i s transformed on a mass scale into large-scale S o c i a l i s t economy".^ He urged communists to give a l l support possible to the establishment and maintenance of "public dining rooms, creches, kinder-gartens"—examples of "communist shoots" which free women from household drudgery. In a wider sphere he lauded the "communist shoots" of "exemplary production, exemplary communist subbotniks, exemplary care and conscientiousness i n procuring and d i s t r i b u t i n g every pod of grain, exemplary dining h a l l s . . . " and so on. " A l l these," he said, "are the young shoots of communism; and nursing these shoots yLoc. c i t . 3°lbid., p. 498. 30 should be our common and primary duty . . . with the support of the proletarian state, these young shoots of Communism w i l l not wither; they w i l l grow and blossom into complete 31 Communism."0 Really there are two types of so-called communist shoots, then. One type relates to the development of the s o c i a l l y conscious, s e l f l e s s communist man, and the other relates to organizational forms such as public dining h a l l s , which apparently w i l l be universal i n the higher stage of communism. Tempered mainly by actual experience i n constructing a s o c i a l i s t society, Lenin wrote a number of a r t i c l e s i n the period between 1917 and 1923, i n which he took a much more r e a l i s t i c view of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism than was evident i n some of h i s e a r l i e r writings. In 1918, for example, i n an Izvestia a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government", Lenin took to task those who take Engels at h i s word and want to "leap, from the kingdom of necessity into the kingdom of l i b e r t y . " These people, he said, have read a l l about socialism i n books, but "have never seriously understood i t , have never stopped to think that by 'leap* the teachers of socialism mean changes i n world history, and that leaps of this kind extended over periods of ten years or even more." 3 2 In the following year, faced with famine and a 3 1 I b i d . , p. *+99-3 2 I b i d . , p. 388. 31 f a l t e r i n g economy, Lenin observed that "we cannot establish a s o c i a l i s t system now--God grant that i t may be established i n our children's time, or perhaps i n our grandchildren's t i m e . " 3 3 Thus,Lenin was cautioning against any reckless leap into s o c i a l i s t forms before the time was r i p e , and was warning that the t r a n s i t i o n period might take several generations. In the same vein he wrote i n the Communist International i n the autumn of 1919 that: Socialism means the a b o l i t i o n of classes . . . . In order to abolish classes one must . . . abolish the difference between working man and peasant, one must make them a l l workers . . . . This task . . . can only be solved by the organiza-t i o n a l reconstruction of the whole economy, by a t r a n s i t i o n from i n d i v i d u a l , disunited petty commodity production to large scale s o c i a l enterprise. This t r a n s i t i o n must of necessity be extremely protracted.3*+ As Lenin accumulated more and more experience i n the actual administering of a state, he became more and more emphatic that a state can only evolve very slowly, and by small increments, towards the distant communist Utopia. He r e a l i z e d the necessity of making temporary compromises and of taking one step backward i n order to take two steps forward. In h i s book Left Wing Communism, written i n 1920 just before War Communism was abandoned and the l i b e r a l New 3 3 I b i d . , p. 5*+5-3 L f I b i d . , p. 532. Economic Policy introduced, Lenin quoted Engels 1 well known passage which c r i t i c i s e d the Blanquists for wanting to achieve communism overnight without entering into temporary compromises or going through intermediate way stations: Engels had r i d i c u l e d the Blanquists because "they imagine that merely because they want to skip the intermediate stations and compromises, that se t t l e s the matter . . . and once they come to the helm, 'Communism w i l l be introduced 1 th day after tomorrow."-5^ In 1921, Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy, admitting that "we made the mistake of deciding to change over d i r e c t l y to communist production and d i s t r i b u t i o n . " 3 ^ On October l*+th, 1921, Lenin wrote a most important a r t i c l e i n commemoration of the October Revolution's Fourth Anniversary. In thi s a r t i c l e , Lenin made two key points: f i r s t , that the t r a n s i t i o n to communism i s an unrelenting struggle which does not come to a hal t at any particular stage; and second, that intermediate stages are v i t a l l y necessary, and that i t i s a mistake to race through these stages without regard for objective factors. On the f i r s t point Lenin declared: 3 ^ I b i d . , p. 606. 3 6 L e n i n , Works, v o l . 33, P. *+0: speech to Second Congress of Committees for P o l i t i c a l Education; cited i n Abramovitch. The Soviet Revolution (New York International Press, 1962), p. 220. 33 We have consummated, the bourgeois-democratic revolution as nobody has done before. We are advancing towards the S o c i a l i s t revolution, consciously, deliberately and unswervingly, knowing that i t i s not separated from the bourgeois-democratic revolution by a Chinese wall, and knowing that ( i n the l a s t analysis) struggle alone w i l l determine how f a r we s h a l l advance, what portion of this immense, l o f t y task we s h a l l accomplish, and to what extent ->„ we s h a l l succeed i n consolidating our v i c t o r i e s . ^ ' On the l a t t e r point, Lenin admitted that immediately following the revolution, the Communists had been carried away by their own enthusiasm. He characterized the post-revolutionary euphoria i n the following way: Borne along on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm, rousing f i r s t the p o l i t i c a l enthusiasm and then the m i l i t a r y enthusiasm of the people, we reckoned that by d i r e c t l y relying on t h i s enthusiasm we would be able to accomplish economic tasks just as great as the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y tasks we had accomplished. We reckoned - or perhaps i t would be truer to say that we presumed without reckoning correctly - on being able to organize the state production and state d i s t r i b u t i o n of products along Communist lin e s i n a small peasant country by order of the proletarian state.38 But this enthusiasm merely led to a subjective evaluation of the p o s s i b i l i t i e s and caused the communists to make serious errors by pushing forward towards socialism too f a s t . Lenin, admitting h i s mistakes, noted that "experience has proved that we were wrong." Like the Blanquists who wanted to introduce communism p r a c t i c a l l y overnight, the Russian 3'Lenin, OP. c i t . . p. 7 k 7 . 3 8 I b i d . , p. 7 5 2 . communists had been overzealous i n their desire to reach socialism and communism as soon as possible. C r y s t a l l i z i n g experience into an i d e o l o g i c a l framework, Lenin drew the following conclusion: It transpires that a number of t r a n s i t i o n a l stages are necessary - state capitalism and Socialism - i n order to prepare by many years of e f f o r t f o r the t r a n s i t i o n to Communism. Not d i r e c t l y r e l y i n g on enthusiasm, but aided by enthusiasm engendered by the great revolution, and on the basis of personal i n t e r e s t , personal incentive, and business p r i n c i p l e s , we must f i r s t set to work i n this small-peasant country to b u i l d s o l i d l i t t l e gangways to Socialism by way of state capitalism. Otherwise, we s h a l l never get to Communism. That i s what experience, what the objective course of the development of the revolution has taught us.39 Sometime e a r l i e r , Lenin had taken preventive action against being l a b e l l e d a Blanquist by suggesting that the three months which transpired before the communists took measures i n the r u r a l areas allowed enough time for the Party to make the necessary " d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n of classes" and the necessary compromises. Had the Party gone ahead Immediately to so c i a l i z e the r u r a l areas, then "this would have been a Blanquist d i s t o r t i o n of Marxism, this would have been an attempt on the part of a minority to impose i t s w i l l on the majority, this would have been a theoretical absurdity . . . -^Loc. c i t . ^°Lenin, Works, v o l . 2 8 , p. 2 8 l ; quoted i n Abramo-v i t c h , op. c i t . , p. 2 2 0 . 35 Despite t h i s defense by Lenin, however, i t was clear from h i s own admissions that h i s War Communism p o l i c i e s were g u i l t y of Blanquist-like tendencies. Lenin touched on the question of s o c i a l i s t organiza-t i o n a l forms i n the r u r a l areas, i n an a r t i c l e written shortly before h i s death. In "On Co-operation", Lenin re-emphasized the need to introduce c o l l e c t i v e forms into Soviet society, and especially i n the r u r a l areas. He declared that, "If the whole peasantry were organized i n co-operatives. we would be standing fir m l y with both feet hi* on the s o i l of Socialism." But the prerequisite to the establishment of co-operatives on a universal basis through-out the country was, he said, "a complete c u l t u r a l revolution", which i n turn rested on the wiping out of i l l i t e r a c y and a k? greater development "of the material means of production." The basis of S o c i a l i s t r u r a l organization was to be, never-theless, the co-operative. He makes no mention of the appropriate organizational forms i n the higher stage of communism, however; but the commune and the state farm were s t i l l considered to be higher forms than the co-operatives, and superior i f they could be achieved. For Lenin, experience had shown that the communist Utopia was a long way off: ^ L e n i n , op. c i t . . p. 835 (*the emphasis i s mine), ko Loc. c i t . 36 The re-education of the small landholders, the reshaping of their entire psychology and habits w i l l take generations . . . . When I say i t w i l l take generations, I do not mean i t w i l l take centuries . . . but you understand very well that this must be reckoned . . . at least i n decades.*+3 While laying out guiding p r i n c i p l e s , Lenin had l i t t l e to say about the detailed form and structure of future communist society: Lenin, l i k e Marx, was more concerned with the immediate tasks at hand. For the very reason that pure communism was s t i l l a thing of the distant future, Lenin remained s t r i c t l y " s c i e n t i f i c " i n h i s descrip-tions of the ultimate Utopia, and refused to describe more than the general operative p r i n c i p l e s . Such things as the ultimate s o c i a l units of future communist society were l e f t for future generations to determine. Like Marx, Lenin was more deeply concerned i n his writings with matters immediately at hand than with i d l e theorizing about the detailed structure of future society. Moreover, whereas i n h i s e a r l i e r writings Lenin emphasized the necessity of maintaining the momentum of the revolution, i n the post-revolutionary period Lenin placed much more stress on the necessity for pragmatism and for a long prolonged struggle before communism could be realized. In the l i g h t of Soviet experience he warned against trying to ^ L e n i n , Works, v o l . 28, p. 281; quoted i n Abramo-v i t c h , OP. c i t . , p. 221. 37 leap forward towards communism, and emphasized the gradual nature of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. Since Lenin's attitude towards the post-revolutionary phase underwent important changes i n the l i g h t of actual experience, Lenin can s e l e c t i v e l y be quoted to support both " r a d i c a l " and "pragmatic" views on s o c i a l i s t construction within the communist world. This situation has important bearing on the current i d e o l o g i c a l dispute between the leaders of the Soviet and Chinese parties, since both are able to p a r t i a l l y j u s t i f y their positions by reference to Lenin. V. STALIN'S SUCCESSION, AND HIS PATH TO COMMUNISM Following Lenin's death i n 1923, St a l i n assumed the position of supreme interpreter of Marxist-Leninism, and Pope of the world communist movement. And i n his l i f e t i m e he consciously advanced the Soviet Union along the path of communism', sometimes at enormous human s a c r i f i c e . In January of 1926, S t a l i n discussed i n his work "Concerning Questions of Leninism", the question of "permanent revolution" i n a domestic situation, a question which involved the whole issue of the speed of tran s i t i o n to communism and the question of the various stages along the way. S t a l i n pointed out that Lenin himself was an advocate of permanent revolution insofar as i t applied to maintaining the momentum of revolutionary domestic change. S t a l i n suggested that: 38 I t should be born i n mind that the idea of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into the s o c i a l i s t revolution, propounded by Lenin as long ago as 1905, i s one of the forms of embodiment of Marx's theory of permanent r e v o l u t i o n . ^ He noted that Lenin had declared i n 1905 that, "we stand for uninterrupted revolution. We s h a l l not stop halfway . . ." J On another occasion shortly before his death, Lenin had reiterated this b e l i e f that the post-revolutionary phases occur i n uninterrupted succession, S t a l i n noted. On thi s occasion Lenin had said of the bourgeois and s o c i a l i s t revolutions: "the f i r s t grows over into the second. The second i n passing, solves the questions of the f i r s t . Struggle, and struggle alone, decides how far the second 1+6 succeeds i n outgrowing the f i r s t . " S t a l i n thus gave his support too, to the idea that the process of the evolution towards ultimate communism must never be halted, and must proceed by constant struggle. And indeed, Stalin's forced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of the peasantry i n the years following 1929 proved that he practiced what he preached. One b r i e f , but s i g n i f i c a n t , reference by S t a l i n to the actual ultimate s o c i a l units of future society, occurred J. S t a l i n , Works, v o l . 8 (Moscow F.L.P.H. 1951+), p. 20. 'Lenin, Selected Works, p. 1+1+2. Lenin, Works, v o l . 27, p. 26. 39 i n the same year as h i s "Concerning Questions of Leninism"— 1926. In a speech at the Party's Fifteenth Congress, replying to c r i t i c i s m s by Zinoviev, S t a l i n undertook a discussion of Engels' The Principles of Communism. One of the twelve measures l a i d down by Engels as the necessary program of the dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t was the following: Erection of great palaces on the national estates to serve as common homes for communes of c i t i z e n s which engage both i n industry and agriculture, and which combine the advantages of both urban and r u r a l l i f e , without the one-sidedness and disadvantages of either.^? In h i s comment on t h i s item, S t a l i n claimed that "this evidently refers to a large scale solution of the housing problem", and observed that the government was carrying out housing construction as f a s t as i t s resources would allow. But, of course, the significance of Engels' program went f a r beyond any mere solution to the housing question. It was concerned with the question of merging town and country, and with the ultimate s o c i a l units of communist society. In f a c t , Engels* description of the "great palaces" i s borrowed d i r e c t l y from Fourier's description of the future decentralized communistic society which Engels lauded i n h i s "On the Housing Question". Thus, i t would seem evident that at t h i s time S t a l i n was f a r too concerned with matters at hand to be too concerned about resolving the city-country antagonisms or about the future communal society. ho In 1928 S t a l i n put forward a new agrarian law to supersede the previous one passed i n 1922—not long before Lenin died. The new law i n effect made i t compulsory for a l l peasants to join c o l l e c t i v e s . Throughout 1929 enforced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n took place throughout the country, i n the face of widespread resistance and at a t e r r i b l e loss of human l i f e , e s p e c i a l l y of the kulak class. Although the coercive and often brutal t a c t i c s of the authorities succeeded i n forcing the large majority of peasants into co-operatives within a l i t t l e over a year, economic chaos was also a necessary r e s u l t : (The peasants) worked on the c o l l e c t i v e farms without any r e a l desire for achievement. Sowing and harvesting were carried out l a z i l y , c a r elessly and late i n the season; a g r i c u l t u r a l machinery was kept i n poor repair; the losses suffered i n animal husbandry, for lack of s k i l l e d and devoted personnel, were p a r t i c u l a r l y large . . . . The losses i n livestock were so extensive that i t took Russia more than a generation to recover . . . . The grain harvests, too, were disasterously poor . L 8 With the nation's economy threatened, S t a l i n issued an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "Dizzy with Success" i n which he c y n i c a l l y reprimanded cadres who got carried away with enthusiasm and practiced coercion to force the peasants into c o l l e c t i v e s . This was on March 2, 1930. On March 15, just two weeks l a t e r , the Party Central Committee issued an order relaxing somewhat the s t r i c t s o c i a l i z a t i o n of property. It "countermanded the Abramovitch, on. c i t . , p. 3 L 0 . hi s o c i a l i z a t i o n of dwellings, small livestock, poultry, and 1+9 dairy c a t t l e whose products were not intended f o r sale. ' The following summer, however, c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n was stepped up again and the remaining peasants gradually forced into c o l l e c t i v e s . On the heels of t h i s harsh c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n came a nationwide famine which brought death to millions i n 1932 and 1933-At the 17th Party Congress i n January 193 k , S t a l i n addressed a considerable part of h i s "Report on the Work of the Central Committee" to the theory and practice of ag r i -c u l t u r a l co-operation, discussing i n some d e t a i l the future of the c o l l e c t i v e s and the communes. This discussion represents by f a r the most important and detailed considera-tion of the co-operative question undertaken by St a l i n within h i s l i f e t i m e , and i s for this reason of particular i d e o l o g i c a l significance. In general, S t a l i n was str i k i n g out at the " L e f t i s t petty bourgeois chatter" within the party which favoured the abo l i t i o n of money, the introduction of direct commodity exchange, and the a g r i c u l t u r a l communes. Devoting the greater part of the discussion to the merits of artels ( c o l l e c t i v e s ) as opposed to communes, S t a l i n noted that the Party had been absolutely correct i n transforming the communes which remained from the period of War Communism, into artels during L f 9 I b i d . , p. 3 k l -k2 the 1929 c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n drive. He emphasized that under conditions prevailing i n the Soviet Union i n 193 L , the a r t e l was the most appropriate form of c o l l e c t i v e agriculture for the r u r a l areas, because i t combined public with private i n t e r e s t , and at the same time taught the peasants to appreciate c o l l e c t i v e l i f e . Contrasting this with the commune, S t a l i n pointed out that: Unlike the a r t e l , where only the means of production are s o c i a l i z e d , the communes, u n t i l recently, s o c i a l i z e d not only the means of production, but also the appurtenances of l i f e of every member of the commune; that i s to say, the members of a commune, unlike the members of an a r t e l , did not i n d i v i d u a l l y own poultry, ^ small l i v e s t o c k , a cow, grain or household land. 5 In other words, i n the commune a l l private ownership was abolished and everything was owned i n common—except the land, which was owned l e g a l l y by the state. In the a r t e l , private incentive was retained and a small amount of private ownership tolerated. S t a l i n noted that the higher degree of s o c i a l i z a t i o n i n the communes had resulted i n private interest being eclipsed by public interest " i n the pursuit of petty-bourgeois equalization". He suggested that the lack of i n d i v i d u a l ownership and i n i t i a t i v e i n the communes was responsible for their lack of popularity among the peasants, and argued that the few communes l e f t had had to permit ind i v i d u a l ownership of livestock, and ease up on their s t a l i n , Report to the 17th Congress (Moscow, F.L.P.H. 1951), P. 95. k3 p o l i c i e s of s t r i c t equalization, i n order to save themselves from complete collapse, and i n the process therefore becoming a r t e l s . "There i s , " he said, "nothing bad i n t h i s , because i t i s necessary i n the interests of the sound development of 51 the c o l l e c t i v e movement.xw However, St a l i n very c l e a r l y expressed the view that the commune was d e f i n i t e l y a higher s o c i a l i s t s o c i a l unit than the a r t e l , but that i t was premature to introduce i t at the present stage: This does not mean, of course, that the commune i s not needed at a l l , and that i t no longer represents a higher form of the collective-farm movement. No, the commune i s needed, and of course, i t i s a higher form of the c o l l e c t i v e -farm movement.52* But the future commune, he suggested could only arise "on the basis of a more developed technique and of an abundance of products . . . . The future communes w i l l arise out of developed and prosperous a r t e l s . " " 0 Because the communes were introduced before the material foundations had arisen, they had been compelled to introduce r i g i d equalitarianism, S t a l i n argued—and th i s eventually resulted In their f a i l u r e . Thus, the following conditions were necessary before artels could be transformed into communes: p. 96. ^ 2 I b i d (*the emphasis i s mine). 5 3 I b i d . , p. 97. The future a g r i c u l t u r a l commune w i l l arise when the f i e l d s and farms of the a r t e l are replete with grain, with c a t t l e , with poultry, with vegetables and a l l other produce; when the a r t e l s have mechanized laundries, modern dining rooms, mechanized bakeries etc. . . . the future commune w i l l arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of a more developed a r t e l , on the basis of an abundance of products.5 k The f i n a l , and perhaps most important prerequisite l a i d down by the Soviet leader was that the transition to communes must be voluntary and "must proceed gradually to the extent that a l l the c o l l e c t i v e farmers become convinced that such 55 a t r a n s i t i o n i s necessary. ^ It was on the question of equalization of income that S t a l i n most fervently opposed the War Communism communes. Perhaps the main reason for this fact was that S t a l i n was continuing the c a p i t a l i s t policy of providing some occupations with much higher salaries than others—something quite a l i e n to Marxist notions of equal wages for equal labour time. The equalization of income i n the communes was an attempt to implement the p r i n c i p l e of "from each according to his a b i l i t i e s ; to each according to h i s work" which was supposed to p r e v a i l i n the s o c i a l i s t stage. Thus, i t represented a challenge to Stalin's incentive p o l i c i e s , and a reminder of Marxist orthodoxy. 7 Loc. c i t ^ L o c . c i t h5 Answering "those who think that i n declaring the a r t e l to be the fundamental form of the collective-farm movement the Party has d r i f t e d away from Socialism," S t a l i n skirted the v i t a l question of labour wage equality by charging that "equalization i n the sphere of requirements and i n d i v i d u a l l i f e i s a piece of reactionary petty-bourgeois absurdity worthy of a primitive sect of a s c e t i c s . ^ Thus he changed the question from one based on r e l a t i v e remuneration for work, to one of human needs—which Marx, Engels and Lenin a l l recognized as unequal. As has been noted previously, a l l three men had accepted the necessity of "equal pay for equal work" i n the f i r s t stage, despite their r e a l i z a t i o n that human needs d i f f e r e d . Only i f those who did more work were not recompensed more, could "equalitarianism" be f a i r l y charged. But i t was clear, despite h i s ideo l o g i c a l arguments, that S t a l i n opposed "equalitarianism" for the very p r a c t i c a l reason that i t dampened i n i t i a t i v e and slowed production: There can be no doubt that the confusion i n the minds of certain Party members concerning Marxian Socialism and their infatuation with the equali-tarian tendencies of the a g r i c u l t u r a l communes, are as l i k e as two peas to the petty-bourgeoise views of our L e f t i s t blockheads, who at one time id e a l i z e d the a g r i c u l t u r a l communes to such an extent that they even t r i e d to set up communes i n f a c t o r i e s , where s k i l l e d and unskilled workers, each working at h i s trade, had to pool their ^ 6 I b i d . , p. 98. K6 wages i n a common fund, which was then shared out equally. You know what harm these infan-t i l e equalitarian exercises of our , l e f t t blockheads caused our industry.57 Although, as S t a l i n says, this wage equalization may have impeded production, nevertheless i t was i d e o l o g i c a l l y sound, since Engels had s p e c i f i c a l l y emphasized i n Anti-Duhring that i n S o c i a l i s t society s k i l l e d workers would get no more than unskilled (since society absorbs the cost of the training which gives them the added s k i l l ) . Despite h i s extensive discussion of the commune question, S t a l i n made no reference to the future of the state farm, nor to the unit, i f any, that might supersede the future communes. Therefore, although the commune was d e f i n i t e l y designated to succeed the a r t e l , neither form (including the state farm) was o f f i c i a l l y designated as the ultimate goal of the c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n process. Thus, while answering many questions, the 17th Congress s t i l l l e f t some important ones unanswered. The next Party Congress, which did not convene u n t i l 1939, was also a s i g n i f i c a n t one i n terms of the development of the communist ideology on questions of the advance to communism. In h i s report to this 18th Congress, S t a l i n distinguished two d e f i n i t e stages In the Soviet advance thus f a r . ^ 7 I b i d . , p. 102. L7 The f i r s t phase was the period from the October Revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes;. . . . The second phase was the period from the elimination of the c a p i t a l i s t elements i n town and country to the complete v i c t o r y of the s o c i a l i s t economic system and the adoption of the new constitution.5 8 Implicit i n t h i s analysis was the claim that the Soviet Union had achieved socialism; and was now setting i t s sights on communism: As you see, we have now an e n t i r e l y new s o c i a l i s t state . . . . But development cannot stop there. We are moving ahead towards Communism.59 Thus, Soviet society had b a s i c a l l y arrived at the s o c i a l i s t stage, and i t s duty now was to prepare for the t r a n s i t i o n to the higher stage. The l a s t major work written by S t a l i n was h i s Economic Problems of Socialism i n the U.S.S.R. which was published i n 1952, shortly before h i s death. In this work he took as h i s main thesis the problems of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, and l a i d down three major prerequisites to be achieved before Soviet society could go over to communism. The f i r s t prerequisite outlined by S t a l i n was to ensure "a continuous expansion of a l l s o c i a l production" i n order to create the necessary foundation of material abundance. Secondly, he deemed i t necessary: 5®J. S t a l i n , Report to the 18th Congress (Moscow F.L.P.H., 195D, p. 8^+7 ^ 9 I b i d . , p. 93. kQ by means of gradual tr a n s i t i o n s c a r r i e d out to the advantage of the c o l l e c t i v e farms, and, hence of a l l society, to raise collective-farm property to the l e v e l of public property, and also by means of gradual t r a n s i t i o n s , to replace commodity c i r c u l a t i o n by a system of products exchange, under which the central government, or some other socio-economic center might control the whole product of s o c i a l production i n the interests of s o c i e t y . ° 0 On the question of the c o l l e c t i v e farms, S t a l i n emphasized that at the present and i n the near future, they would continue to be the correct units of Soviet agriculture. "But," he added, i t would be unpardonable blindness not to see at the same time that these factors ( c o l l e c t i v e property and commodity c i r c u l a t i o n ) are already beginning to hamper the powerful development of our productive forces, since they create obstacles to the f u l l extension of government planning.61 He concluded that: In order to raise c o l l e c t i v e farm property to the l e v e l of public property, the surplus collective-farm output must be excluded from the system of commodity c i r c u l a t i o n and i n -cluded i n the system of products exchange between state industry and the c o l l e c t i v e farms.62 No mention at a l l was made by S t a l i n about the introduction of communes. Communism could be attained, i f accomplishment of the t h i r d task was r e a l i z e d : 5 0 J . S t a l i n , Economic Problems of Socialism i n the U.S.S.R. (New York, International Publishers, 1952), p. 51. 6 l I b i d . , p. 52. 6 2 I b i d . , p. 69. 1+9 to ensure such a c u l t u r a l advancement of society as w i l l secure for a l l members of society, the all-round development of the i r physical and mental a b i l i t i e s , so that members of society may be i n a position to receive an education s u f f i c i e n t to enable them to be active agents of s o c i a l development, and i n a position to f r e e l y choose their occupations, and not be tied a l l their l i v e s , owing to the existence of the d i v i s i o n of labour, to some one occupation.°3 In concrete terms, i n order to achieve t h i s end, S t a l i n prescribed the eventual shortening of the working day to f i v e hours and compulsory polytechnic training i n several occupations for a l l . Thus, he was advocating positive p r a c t i c a l steps which would achieve the condition of occupa-t i o n a l mobility advocated by Engels and Marx as a necessity f o r creative human development. Closely associated with the question of occupational mobility and the d i v i s i o n of labour, are the questions of the antithesis between town and country, and between mental and manual labour. S t a l i n 1 s claim was that the actual antithesis between these elements had a l l but disappeared, since a l l c i t i z e n s — p e a s a n t , i n d u s t r i a l worker, manager and la b o u r e r — were working i n harmony towards a common goal. Only " d i s t i n c t i o n s " now remained. S t a l i n r e c a l l e d that Engels had predicted that with the a b o l i t i o n of the antithesis between town and country "the great towns w i l l perish", but discounted Engels* statement. On the contrary, he argued, great towns Ibid., p. 53. 50 w i l l arise i n the countryside and "this w i l l f a c i l i t a t e the c u l t u r a l progress of the nation and w i l l tend to even up 6k conditions of l i f e i n town and country. As to the remaining " d i s t i n c t i o n s " between town and country and mental and manual labour, S t a l i n maintained that some d i s t i n c t i o n s would never disappear: "Some d i s t i n c t i o n s , even i f i n e s s e n t i a l , w i l l c e r t a i n l y remain, owing to the difference between the conditions of work i n industry and i n agriculture," and because "the conditions of labour of the 65 managerial s t a f f s and those of the workers are not i d e n t i c a l . " The most serious remaining " d i s t i n c t i o n " i n the former case was the difference between state ownership i n the towns and the remaining c o l l e c t i v e ownership i n the farms of the r u r a l areas. "It therefore cannot be denied," S t a l i n stated, "that the disappearance of th i s essential d i s t i n c t i o n between agriculture and industry must be a matter of paramount importance to us." But Stalin's solution was not "simply to nationalize collective-farm property, to proclaim i t public property." He declared that "conversion into state property i s not the only, or even the best form of n a t i o n a l i -t y zation, but the most natural i n i t i a l form of n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n . ^ ' In the future when most of the states are s o c i a l i s t , the state 6¥; rIbid. . p. 23 66 6 5 I b i d . , p. 25-Ibid.. p. 2k. 6 7 l b i d . , p. 65. 51 as such w i l l die away, he argues, and "the h e i r of public property w i l l then not be the state, which w i l l have died away, but society i t s e l f , i n the shape of a cent r a l , directing economic body."^ However, S t a l i n did oppose the plan put forward by some economists to s e l l the state-owned "basic implements of production" controlled by the Machine Tractor Stations, to the c o l l e c t i v e s . He claimed that t h i s would be a step backward from communism, rather than a step towards i t , since the state property would be transformed into l e s s -s o c i a l i s t i c c o l l e c t i v e property: Can i t be said that such a status would f a c i l i t a t e the elevation of collective-farm property to the l e v e l of public property, so that i t would expedite the t r a n s i t i o n of our society from socialism to communism? Would i t not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property, and would not bring us any nearer communism, but, on the contrary, remove us farther from it?69 Hence, i t would appear that S t a l i n s t i l l intended to s o c i a l i z e the lesser tools and implements owned i n d i v i d u a l l y within the co l l e c t i v e s , and to ultimately nationalize the c o l l e c t i v e l y owned, implements, machinery and animals as well. This would involve going through the commune stage, but the Soviet leader made no e x p l i c i t reference to future s o c i a l units. It i s not en t i r e l y clear whether Stalin's plan to take control hoc, c i t . 6 9 I b i d . . p. 68. over a l l collective-farm commodity exchange was meant to obviate the need to adopt higher s o c i a l units i n the future, but t h i s cannot rule out as a p o s s i b i l i t y . It i s with the long i d e o l o g i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l background outlined, that the Sino-Soviet differences over the Chinese People's Communes arose. As can r e a d i l y be seen, the communes of China necessarily involved very extensive i d e o l o g i c a l implications for the entire communist movement since they were concerned with the correct road to communism, and with the discovery of the fastest method of achieving the prerequisites to communism. Moreover, the introduction of the communes i n China cannot be viewed i n i s o l a t i o n , but only as a continuation of a long h i s t o r i c a l debate within the communist movement—and with special significance for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which had experienced several decades of dispute over the future of c o l l e c t i v e s and communes, and which was s t i l l i n progress when the communes were introduced. Even before the introduction of the communes, the Chinese had become a party to the controversies over t r a n s i -t i o n a l measures, occurring i n the Soviet Union. Thus, with the publication of Stalin's Economic Problems of Socialism, the Chinese placed themselves i n l i n e with Stal i n i n the controversy by supporting his basic theses. People's Daily noted that the a r t i c l e : 53 throws much l i g h t on the basic problems i n the economics of socialism and points the way to the t r a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism. In this work, Comrade S t a l i n systematizes the experience gained i n the construction of socialism i n the U.S.S.R. and i n the world revolutionary movement and he enriches and aug-ments the science of Marxism-Leninism.70 The People's Daily further noted that S t a l i n was pointing the way for the whole communist movement, not just the Soviet Union: It Is beyond doubt that Comrade Stalin's theore t i c a l contribution to a l l these questions i s of extremely important significance, not only for the economic construction of the U.S.S.R., but also for the economic construction of China and the other countries of the people's democracies.71 Thus It was inevitable that with the f a l l of S t a l i n , and the reversal of some of h i s a g r i c u l t u r a l and collective-farm p o l i c i e s , the Chinese, as supporters of Stalin's i d e o l o g i c a l pronouncements should come into c o n f l i c t with the new CPSU leadership over domestic issues. As an independent entity, China remained a proponent of S t a l i n i s t orthodoxy, out of the control of the CPSU leaders and a thorn i n their sides. 7°Ppnnle's Daily. October 3 0 , 1952; Soviet Press Translations. 1952, p. H-32. 7 1 L o c . c i t . CHAPTER III THE DIALOGUE OF A DISPUTE: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE COMMUNE CONTROVERSY On August 29, 1958 an enlarged session of the Chinese Communist Party's Politburo passed a resolution supporting the establishment of "Peoples Communes" throughout the r u r a l areas of the nation, and providing a theoret i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the introduction of this new s o c i a l unit of Chinese society. U n t i l the resolution was o f f i c i a l l y published on September 10, no comment of any kind had appeared i n the Soviet press regarding the communes, despite the fact that some provinces were already completely "eommune-ized" by the end of August when the party resolution was passed, and despite the f a c t that the communes had been i n i t i a t e d i n some areas as f a r back as A p r i l , and had been extensively publicized i n the Chinese press. This apparently purposeful p o l i c y of the Soviet party hierarchy to ignore the commune movement i n i t s early stages i s i n i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t and suggests (the p o s s i b i l i t y ) that the C.P.S.U. was privately seeking to dissuade the Chinese leaders from continuing their experiments. Certain discussions concerning the future of eo-operative farms i n the Soviet Union did take place i n the spring and summer of 1958 at the same time that communes were beginning to be set up i n various parts of the People's 55 Republic, but these discussions were apparently aimed at quelling opposition to Premier Khrushchev's plan to dissolve the Machine and Tractor Stations and s e l l their assets to the c o l l e c t i v e s . Whether these discussions have d i r e c t , or only i n d i r e c t , bearing on the Chinese communes depends lar g e l y on whether the Soviet leaders had advance knowledge of Mao's intention to depart from the path of the Soviet Union i n a g r i c u l t u r a l development. In this regard, i t i s also important to establish the date of the Chinese Communist Party's switch i n po l i c y i n regard to the development of the co-operatives. By 1957, agriculture i n China had gone through the succeeding stages of Land Redistribution, Mutual Aid Teams, Lower Stage Co-operatives, and Higher Stage Co-operatives, thus bringing i t i n eight years to the approximate stage of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n achieved i n the Soviet Union i n 1933, and more or les s retained ever since. Following a similar move i n the Soviet Union, some Chinese co-operatives amalgamated i n 1957 into larger units of over 1,000 families each. However, i n general, the co-operatives for the most part retained a membership of approximately 100 to 300 families, and taking i n a single v i l l a g e . Moreover, as late as June 1957 Mao Tse-tung suggested that i t would take f i v e years or more to "consolidate the co-operatives and end these arguments 56 about their not having any superior qualities."" 1' Furthermore, on September Ik, three months l a t e r , the Central Committee passed a resolution stating that: Experiences i n d i f f e r e n t l o c a l i t i e s during the past few years have proved that large c o l l e c t i v e s and large teams are generally not adaptable to the present production conditions . . . a l l those that are too big and not well managed should be divided into smaller units i n accordance with the wishes of the members. Henceforth, a c o l l e c t i v e should generally be the size of a v i l l a g e with over a thousand households . . . . After the size of the c o l l e c t i v e s and production teams has been decided upon, i t should be p u b l i c l y announced that t h i s organization w i l l remain unchanged i n the next ten years.2 Yet s i x months l a t e r Mao himself helped i n i t i a t e the f i r s t communes i n the province of Honan. The testimony of the Honan party secretary i n an a r t i c l e published i n Red Flag on September 16, 1958 casts some l i g h t on the events preceding the establishment of the f i r s t communes: When co-operation of the advanced type was achieved i n Honan i n 1956, there were a l -together 26,211 co-ops, each having an average membership of 358 households, and 808 co-ops embracing over one thousand XMao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradic-tions Among the People (Peking, Foreign Languages Press, I960), p. 35. ^People's Handbook for 1958 (Peking, 1958); cited i n Choh-Ming L i , "Economic Development," China Quarterly, no. 1, January-March I960, p. ^3. 57 families each. With the i n i t i a l overhaul i n the Spring of 1957, the co-ops i n the whole province became consolidated i n the main and many large co-ops fared comparatively well. Closing their eyes to this s i t u a t i o n and yie l d i n g to the demand of a small number of well-to-do middle peasants, a few r i g h t i s t opportunists within the Honan pr o v i n c i a l Communist Party committee, however, indiscriminately t r i e d to compel a l l the large co-ops to s p l i t up.3 As a r e s u l t , the number of co-ops i n Honan increased to 5*+,000 each averaging 180 households with the smallest containing less than 3 0 . 3 A The dismantling of the large c o l l e c t i v e s was of course i n l i n e with the Party's September 2h d i r e c t i v e . It must be presumed that Pan Fu-sheng's error then, was i n forcing even highly successful large c o l l e c t i v e s to reduce their size, and i n succumbing to pressure from the peasantry to relax c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . The resu l t of his error, according to the Honan Daily (July k, 1958) was that "land-lords, r i c h peasants, counter-revolutionaries, bad elements, and well-to-do middle peasants accustomed to c a p i t a l i s t ways of thinking applauded and agitated for withdrawal from their c o l l e c t i v e s saying 'big co-operatives w i l l turn into small % o t e : In 1957 during the Anti-Rightist campaign, Pan Fu-sheng alternate member of the Central Committee and f i r s t secretary of the Honan prov i n c i a l committee, was 'exposed and removed from o f f i c e for 'right opportunist mistakes*. 3 AWu Chih-pu, "From A.P.C.s to People's Communes," Red Flag, no. 8, September 16, 1958; People's Communes i n China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 26-*+7. 58 co-operatives 1, then into mutual aid teams and back into i n d i v i d u a l farms. The lesson that the Party was to draw from this was that as soon as p o l i t i c a l pressure was released, the peasants would spontaneously reverse the course of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . The choice was either to push forward, or be driven back. Wu Chih-pu, the new Honan pr o v i n c i a l secretary, suggests the course decided upon: "As i t was, spontaneous merger of a g r i c u l t u r a l co-ops began i n Honan as early as the spring of 1958, so that by the time of the wheat harvest the existing co-ops were amalgamated into 30,000 or more."' In actual f a c t , the merger was f a r from 'spontaneous*. In r e a l i t y , Mao Tse-tung had announced this policy of combining the co-ops into larger units at a conference of members of the Central Committee and regional party representatives at Chengtu i n March. At the same time the Central Committee also i n i t i a t e d i t s policy of i n d u s t r i a l decentralization which was to play a v i t a l r ole i n the establishment of the communes. ^Honan Daily. July k , 1958; Current Background, no. 515, August 29, 1958, p. 26. ^Wu-Chih-pu, OP. c i t . , p. 3 k» ^People's Daily, e d i t o r i a l , August 29, 1959; re-printed as Appendix to Report on Adjusting the Ma.lor Targets of the 1959 Economic Plan (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), PP. 31- k 67 59 Commenting on the situ a t i o n i n Honan, Wu Chih-pu revealed that: Some of the large co-ops took another stride forward l a s t spring. They developed i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l production simultaneously, merged the farming, handicraft, supply and marketing, and credit co-ops into one, set up thei r own secondary schools, trained large numbers of leading personnel and a c t i v i s t s who are both s o c i a l i s t minded and professionally competent, and gained adequate experience i n the management of large scale production. This was i n essence the people's commune i n the bud, displaying a s t i l l greater superiority over the small co-ops.7 In mid-winter, Mao Tse-tung himself had made a tour of the southern provinces. During t h i s tour Mao inspected the s i t e s of the tremendous i r r i g a t i o n and flood control projects, being b u i l t by the mass peasant army of over 100 m i l l i o n throughout the r u r a l areas i n the winter months. This successful campaign by the Party to mobilize the nation's greatest resource--manpower--no doubt convinced Mao that a new form of s o c i a l organization must be created i n China to exploit f u l l y the labour potential of the 500 m i l l i o n Chinese peasants. Following t h i s tour a Supreme State Conference was held i n February, presumably to discuss the new surge forward in the countryside. The only clue to the proceedings of this conference appeared i n an oblique reference i n the People's Daily on June 11, 1958. In the a r t i c l e i n question i t i s stated that: Wu Chih-pu, OP. c i t . , p. 33* 6o At a Supreme State Conference i n February this year, Chairman Mao mentioned a c r i t i c i s m made by a f r i e n d against the Communist party, saying that the Communist Party 'loves grandeur and achievement, wants quick results and p r o f i t , b e l i t t l e s the past, and believes b l i n d l y i n the future*. Chairman Mao replying to the c r i t i c i s m said the Communist Party was just l i k e t h a t — that i t loved the grandeur of Socialism, wanted quick r e s u l t s i n Socialism, b e l i t t l e d the past, and believed b l i n d l y i n the future.8 From th i s reference i t i s evident that the subject under consideration at the conference was s o c i a l i s t construction, and the speed and forms thereof. It i s d i f f i c u l t to ascertain whether these remarks by Chairman Mao referred to c r i t i c i s m s made by persons within the country or without. There i s a d i s t i n c t p o s s i b i l i t y that the 'friend* referred to by Mao was Khrushchev, or some other high Soviet o f f i c i a l at the November 1957 conference of communist parties i n Moscow, just three months e a r l i e r . It i s known from subsequent disclosures by both sides that a considerable amount of mutual c r i t i c i s m and disagreement took place between Mao and Khrushchev at this meeting i n November when the international l i n e of the communist movement was hammered out, and i t i s also thought that the question of Soviet trade credits and Soviet aid to China were also discussed i n private talks between the representatives of the two countries. Thus, i t i s d i s t i n c t l y possible that the remarks and c r i t i c i s m s to which Mao refers were made during these negotiations. This i s especially so ^Quoted i n D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet Conflict (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 89. 61 In the l i g h t of the fact that no new loans were forthcoming from the negotiations. From 1956 onward the receipt of loans from the USSR have been n e g l i g i b l e . In fact they have been systematically outweighed by heavy repay-ments. This state of a f f a i r s i s r e f l e c t e d i n the growing Chinese export surplus i n Sino-Soviet trade obviously connected with the servicing of old debts; by 1957 exports to the USSR were half as large again as imports.9 It has been argued by many that the Soviet Union was i n no position to advance loans and aid to China at t h i s time since the Russians were deeply committed to aid programs In Europe, sparked by the uprisings i n Poland and Hungary the year before. But whatever the reason, the Soviet Union f a i l e d to provide the Chinese with the economic boost they needed, especially i n view of the poor harvest, leaving the Chinese no choice but to u t i l i z e the resources of manpower i n order to raise themselves by their own bootstraps, and to organize their society along the l i n e s most suited to dir e c t and control peasant labour i n the r u r a l areas. At the time of the Moscow Conference, the Central Committee had already issued the September 2k d i r e c t i v e several weeks before, to mobilize the vast peasant armies for the massive winter campaign to b u i l d dams, canals, reservoirs, and i r r i g a t i o n ditches throughout the country-side; thus, there i s also A. Zauberman, "The Economic Aspect," The Chinese Communes (New York, Institute of P a c i f i c Relations, i960) , P . 65. 62 the p o s s i b i l i t y that this p o l i c y of mass mobilization reminiscent of the S t a l i n era i n the Soviet Union, came under f i r e i n discussions with the Soviet leaders. It i s important to establish whether Khrushchev was the author of the remarks to Mao, since this would establish the ori g i n of the dispute over a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c y i n China, and the correct road of building socialism i n communist countries. It would also add a new significance to a r t i c l e s and pronouncements i n the press of both countries i n the early months of 1958. At the second session of the Eighth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party i n May 1958 f o r instance, Liu Snao-chi included i n h i s report on behalf of the Central Committee the following statement: Referring to the mass mobilization of r u r a l labour over the winter months, Liu stated: During t h i s great movement i n which hundreds of m i l l i o n s of people were mobilized, i t i s inevitable that there should be some defects i n our work even while great successes are being scored and that as we advance we should meet with some d i f f i c u l t i e s . . . . Some people c r i t i c i z e us for 'craving greatness and success', for seeking 'quick success and instant benefits'. What they say about us i s r i g h t ! And shouldn't we crave greatness f o r our 600 m i l l i o n people and the success of socialism? Should we rather crave smallness and court f a i l u r e , reject success and benefits, and rest content with lagging behind and doing nothing?10 Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee," Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking F.L.P., 1958), p. h$. 63 Clearly, this i s a reference to the same statement which Mao revealed at the State Conference i n February. From Liu's choice of words i t would appear that the reply i s directed at persons outside of China, and i t s r e p e t i t i o n by Liu makes i t clear that t h i s c r i t i c i s m came from a person of high enough stature to outrightly challenge Chinese poli c y . Obviously no non-Party person within China would have the prestige and power to warrant such serious consideration by both Mao and Liu; the importance attached to th i s c r i t i c i s m of Party p o l i c y can best be explained by the fa c t that i t came from the l i p s of an important Soviet leader, and by the fact that i t gave ammunition and support to the right wing elements i n the Chinese communist party who Liu revealed were i n opposition to the general l i n e of "building socialism by exerting our utmost e f f o r t s and pressing ahead consistently to achieve greater, f a s t e r , better and more economical re s u l t s , " put forward i n September 1957' I f indeed the originator of the c r i t i c i s m of the general l i n e was N. S. Khrushchev, i n h i s November talks with Mao, then the Soviet Party no doubt kept close watch on the domestic developments i n China i n succeeding months, and consciously studied the events which led to the emergence of the communes i n People's China. Moreover, i t would appear certain that the Chinese were keeping closely informed of domestic developments i n the Soviet Union, also, since 6h Khrushchev was s i m i l a r l y contemplating important reforms i n Soviet agriculture. The Earlv Experiments: Soring 1958 As has been noted previously, the Chinese Party's Central Committee met i n Chengtu i n March of 1958 and issued a d i r e c t i v e reversing the September Ik d i r e c t i v e of the previous F a l l , and ordering a gradual amalgamation of the co-operatives into large scale co-operatives. This i n i t s e l f was not necessarily a departure from Soviet policy,since the same process had been i n i t i a t e d i n the Soviet Union after Stalin's death, and was s t i l l continuing. During A p r i l Mao himself spent some time i n Honan and Hopeh presumably i n i t i a t i n g and overseeing the experiment i n combining the two p o l i c i e s of decentralization and large c o l l e c t i v e s into a concrete form: The Communist Party committees at various levels i n the province undertook to set up on a t r i a l basis some large co-operatives of several thousand households each, among them the 9,369-household Weihsing (Sputnik) Co-op i n Chayashan, Suiping county, formed (on A p r i l 20) out of 27 smaller co-ops . . . . In the course of the merger of the small co-ops, energetic e f f o r t s were made to build industry, organize community canteens, nurseries, kindergartens, homes for the aged, and other welfare services; plots of land reserved f o r private use were turned over to the co-op and s o c i a l i s t co-operation was developed on a vast scale. „In the c i t i e s too, an increasing number of f a c t o r i e s were b u i l t and more community services and welfare f a c i l i t i e s i n i t i a t e d . This was, i n essence, already the start of the movement for people's communes . . . . Only after Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave h i s directive regarding the people's communes did they (the people) begin to see things c l e a r l y , r e a l i z e the meaning of thi s new form of organization that had appeared i n the vast r u r a l and urban areas, and f e e l more confident and determined to take this path.11 The Reform of Soviet Agriculture At approximately the same time that selected Chinese Party leaders were meeting i n Chengtu to i n i t i a t e the p o l i c i e s that would r e s u l t i n the formation of the communes, a nationwide discussion was taking place i n the Soviet Union over the proposal by the CPSU to reorganize the state-owned Machine Tractor Stations and s e l l their tractors and machinery to the c o l l e c t i v e farms. This proposal arose out of Khrushchev's policy of giving the peasants more incentives i n order to encourage increased production. In Marxist eyes, such a pol i c y , based on expediency rather than Ideology i s retrogressive, and a number of Soviet economists and party members said as much during the debates on the proposal. To many, the s e l l i n g of state property ( i . e . property of the whole people) to the c o l l e c t i v e farms was a step away from the Communist goal, since according to Marxist theory, the avowed aim i s to gradually transform a l l the means of production into state property: property of the whole people. In fa c t , i n 1952, S t a l i n had rejected similar proposals as retrogressive for this very reason. "Wu Chih-pu, op. c i t . , p. 3*+. 66 In the debate over the reorganization of the M.T.S., both Khrushchev and leading Party theoreticians took up the whole question of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism and attempted to provide th e o r e t i c a l j u s t i f i c a t i o n , within the framework of Marxist-Leninism, for the Party policy. In doing so, they adopted positions on a number of important theoret i c a l questions which were to form the center of the commune controversy i n the succeeding months. Some of the comment had bearing on the exact subject of communes, which meant that the CPSU took an i d e o l o g i c a l position on the communes immediately p r i o r to the time that the f i r s t one was o f f i c i a l l y established i n Honan. (It should be noted, however, that the new unit i n China was not o f f i c i a l l y termed 12 a "commune" u n t i l June of 1958. ) Thus, the Chinese set up their communes f u l l y knowing that the Russians had just adopted a public position concerning their appropriateness at the current stage of the road to communism. It i s not equally discernible from available evidence, whether the CPSU was f u l l y aware at this particular moment of the Chinese experiments or intents. I f the Soviet leaders were indeed f u l l y informed of the Chinese intent, then the a r t i c l e s i n the Soviet press and journals take on added significance. In either case, the reorganization of the M.T.S. proved to be 1 2"Long Live the People's Communes," People's Daily. August 29,,1959; reprinted i n Report on Adjusting the Major Targets of the 1959 Economic Plan (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), P. hi. 67 the occasion for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to make i t s views known concerning c o l l e c t i v e s , communes and the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. In h i s speech on March 27 to the Supreme Soviet, Khrushchev discussed i n d e t a i l the question of the t r a n s i -tion to communism, from both a theoretical and from a p r a c t i c a l point of view. From the outset, he stressed the importance of increasing production and emphasized that h i s l i b e r a l a g r i c u l t u r a l p o l i c i e s designed to achieve t h i s end had been opposed by the more dogmatic element within the Party, (which had been led by Molotov, Shepilov, Malenkov, Kaganovitch and Bulganin, who were ousted from the politburo i n the summer of 1957). Khrushchev pointed out that: In organizing the nationwide struggle for a sharp advance i n agriculture, the Communist Party i s guided by the programmatic p r i n c i p l e s of Marxist-Leninism concerning the enormous importance of a g r i c u l t u r a l production and of creating an abundance of food, without which the t r a n s i t i o n to communism i s inconceivable. The Party delivered a shattering blow to the conservatives and dogmatists divorced from l i f e who r e s i s t e d the Party's Leninist l i n e and opposed implementation of such major measures as developing the v i r g i n and i d l e lands, increasing livestock productivity and consistently applying the p r i n c i p l e of the material stake of the farmers i n the develop-ment of the communal economy.13 1 3N. S. Khrushchev, "On Further Developing the Collective Farm System and Reorganizing the M.T.S.," Pravda, March 28, 1958; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . X, no. 13, p. 6. 68 Turning to the c o l l e c t i v e farms as such, Khrushchev propounded the view that they had not yet reached their f u l l p otential as an organizational form, and that with h i s proposed reorganization of the Machine Tractor Stations, their productiveness would be vastly increased. Thus, he made the declaration that: An increase i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production depends on further strengthening the c o l l e c t i v e farms, improving the organization of their work and reinforcing their material and technical base . . . . Amalgamation of the c o l l e c t i v e farms was an important step i n the development of the c o l l e c t i v e farm system. This measure opened up favourable opportunities for more r a t i o n a l use of equipment and manpower resources and for advancing the c o l l e c t i v e farm economy. But because of serious shortcomings i n the manage-ment of agriculture, this measure alone could not assure a r a d i c a l turning point i n the development of c o l l e c t i v e farm production . . . Now . . . i t i s time to think about making r a d i c a l changes i n the provision of technical and production services to the c o l l e c t i v e farms.ih B a s i c a l l y then, Khrushchev's main theses i n these passages were that (a) the most important task i s to create material abundance, which i s the primary prerequisite for the achievement of communism i n a s o c i a l i s t nation; (b) material abundance can be most quickly achieved by the use of material incentives and through mechanization; (c) further c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n into bigger units has limited p r a c t i c a l value and (d) ideology must take second place to increased production i f communism i s to be reached i n the shortest time. Ibid., p. 8. The Soviet premier then went on to discuss the problems i n Marxist-Leninist theory raised by the proposed pol i c y , and s p e c i f i c a l l y the question of the di f f e r e n t forms of s o c i a l i s t ownership. It should be remembered that i n reorganizing the M.T.S., Khrushchev was reversing the policy e x p l i c i t l y l a i d down i n 1952 by S t a l i n himself. Thus, Khrushchev was forced to come to grips with, and refute, the ideological arguments presented by S t a l i n for the retention of the Machine Tractor Stations i n the hands of the state. S t a l i n f s most formidable argument had been that the s e l l i n g of state machinery to the c o l l e c t i v e farms would constitute a backward step, since c o l l e c t i v e property was a lower form of s o c i a l i s t property than property belonging to the whole people. Khrushchev was thus forced to defend h i s M.T.S. p o l i c i e s against those who upheld the ide o l o g i c a l v a l i d i t y of Stalin's stand, made only a few years before i n 1952. Khrushchev outlined their arguments i n the following passage: Some comrades, primarily among the economists, held that with the reorganization of the M.T.S. a vagueness would arise i n certain theoretical questions, i n particular the question of two forms of ownership. Proceeding from the premise that the tr a n s i t i o n to communism requires the comprehensive strengthening of public ownership and r a i s i n g c o l l e c t i v e farm co-operative property to the l e v e l of public property, they expressed the fear that the planned reorganization of the M.T.S. would contradict Marxist-Leninist theory and that the sale of machinery to the c o l l e c t i v e farms might weaken public ownership. The question was also raised as to which form of s o c i a l i s t agriculture better corresponds to the tasks of building communism, c o l l e c t i v e or state farming? Since the state farm i s based on public ownership, should not the c o l l e c t i v e farms be converted to the state farm form of economy?l5 Ibid., p. 11. This argument concerning the gradual t r a n s i t i o n towards ownership of the whole people i s a key one, i d e o l o g i c a l l y , and proved to be one of the central issues i n the Sino-Soviet dispute over the communes. Khrushchev's position on t h i s question i s thus an important factor being taken into account. He assumed the position that the importance of transforming c o l l e c t i v e property into public property should not be over-stressed. While conceding that Lenin had declared public property to be the highest form of property, he suggested that Lenin had "never counterposed public property and co-operative property." Instead, "he stressed that both forms of property are s o c i a l i s t , and both serve the interests of the people and the common aim—the building of communist society." Thus, he concluded that there was no need to view c o l l e c t i v e and state property as antagonistic, and that c o l l e c t i v e property would gradually evolve towards public property anyway i n the natural course of events: Of course, there are de f i n i t e differences between c o l l e c t i v e farm co-operative property and public property, but these are merely the diff e r e n t forms of development of one and the same thing, namely, the s o c i a l i s t mode of production. The only difference i s that public property has a higher and c o l l e c t i v e farm property a lower degree of s o c i a l i z a t i o n . This means that i t i s a matter of gradually r a i s i n g the l e v e l of s o c i a l i z a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e farm property and thus r a i s i n g i t to the l e v e l of public property. How i s this to be done? Only by further developing both public, state property and co-operative, collective-farm property. The measures planned for further developing the c o l l e c t i v e farm system and reorganizing the M.T.S. w i l l assure the expansion 71 of c o l l e c t i v e farm property and i t s closest approximation to public property.16 •In other words, Khrushchev de-emphasized the difference between c o l l e c t i v e and state ownership, and placed the task of raising production over the theoret i c a l requirement of moving towards state ownership. And despite h i s fancy Marxist-Leninist footwork, h i s main point remained i m p l i c i t — that a movement towards state ownership of agriculture, or retention of state-owned M.T.S. wouldn't rais e production. In short, pragmatism must take precedence over ideology. It i s interesting to note i n t h i s regard, a comment made by Liu Shao-chi a month la t e r at the Chinese Party Congress i n which he took the opposite view, saying that "some people say that id e o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l work can produce neither grain nor coal nor iron. This i s l i k e f a i l i n g to see the wood for the trees." These two statements of position form an important point of departure i n the Sino-Soviet dispute, one stressing material incentive, the other ideology, i n the struggle to raise production. Continuing his argument, Khrushchev goes on: One wonders how i t can be assumed that the development of c o l l e c t i v e farm ownership contradicts the interests of building socialism, that this ownership can be used against our state, against the working Loc. c i t 7 2 class. Only those people can think this who lag hopelessly behind l i f e . 1 7 * It i s interesting to note that Khrushchev refers i n this paragraph to the building of socialism rather than the building of communism, which i s the stage i n which the Soviet Union i s purported to be. This may be a clue to the fac t that Khrushchev was also dir e c t i n g h i s remarks to the Chinese, who l i k e the other members of the communist bloc, are considered to be s t i l l i n the stage of building socialism. The s e l l i n g of state equipment to the c o l l e c t i v e farms w i l l r e s u l t i n an increase i n production of foodstuffs, the Soviet leader continues: Does this contradict the tasks of building a communist society? No, . . . f o r i t speeds the progress of our country towards communism. The i n d i v i s i b l e funds of the c o l l e c t i v e farms w i l l increase, the l e v e l of s o c i a l i z a t i o n of co l l e c t i v e farm production w i l l be higher and i n t e r - c o l l e c t i v e farm t i e s w i l l grow, this w i l l be a major condition for the further development of c o l l e c t i v e farm property and w i l l help i t grow into public property.1° Developing th i s point i n another part of h i s address he suggested that: . . . the c o l l e c t i v e farms are uniting their e f f o r t s to solve problems that f a l l outside the framework of ind i v i d u a l farms and are building i n s t a l l a t i o n s that are e s e n t i a l l y of Ibid., p. ih (*the emphasis i s mine) Loc. c i t . 73 a p u b l i c n a t u r e . H e r e i t i s n o t d i f f i c u l t t o s e e e l e m e n t s o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f c o l l e c t i v e - , Q f a r m c o - o p e r a t i v e p r o p e r t y i n t o p u b l i c p r o p e r t y . y F r o m a p u r e l y M a r x i s t p o i n t o f v i e w , t h i s a n a l y s i s i s h a r d l y c o n v i n c i n g : t h e p r o p e r t y t h a t K h r u s h c h e v c i t e s i s s t i l l c o l l e c t i v e p r o p e r t y owned b y , a t t h e m o s t , a f e w t h o u s a n d f a m i l i e s , a n d b y no means p u b l i c p r o p e r t y . The d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n r i c h c o l l e c t i v e s a n d p o o r c o l l e c t i v e s o n a n a t i o n w i d e s c a l e s t i l l p e r s i s t s . A t no p o i n t d o e s K h r u s h c h e v s u g g e s t t h a t a p a r t y - i n i t i a t e d , f o r m a l p r o g r a m w o u l d b e i n i t i a t e d t o t r a n s f o r m c o l l e c t i v e o w n e r s h i p i n t o s t a t e o w n e r s h i p i n t h e f o r e s e e a b l e f u t u r e . R a t h e r , h e s u g g e s t e d t h a t a s a s o c i a l u n i t , t h e c o l l e c t i v e s w o u l d b e r e t a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o c o m m u n i s m . A t no p o i n t d i d h e e v e n m e n t i o n t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f e v o l v i n g t o t h e commune u n i t s t h a t w e r e e x p e r i m e n t e d w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n i n t h e p e r i o d o f War Communism, i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n . M o r e o v e r , h e d e n i e d t h e n e c e s s i t y t o g r a d u a l l y s w i t c h o v e r t o t h e s t a t e f a r m s y s t e m w h i c h e m b o d i e s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f o w n e r -s h i p b y t h e w h o l e p e o p l e . A n s w e r i n g t h o s e who w e r e m a i n t a i n i n g t h a t s t a t e f a r m s w e r e more a p p r o p r i a t e t h a n c o l l e c t i v e f a r m s d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f c o m m u n i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n , t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r a g a i n d e - e m p h a s i z e d t h e d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e two a n d d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e r e w a s no v i t a l n e c e s s i t y t o c h a n g e t h e r e l a t i o n s I b i d . , p . 1 2 7k of production from a c o l l e c t i v e to a state form. He argued that u n t i l the c o l l e c t i v e s had outlived their usefulness, they would be retained, and that t h i s usefulness was l i k e l y to continue into the i n d e f i n i t e future: Naturally i t i s impossible mechanically to equate the state farms and the c o l l e c t i v e farms. The state farms are state enterprises with a higher l e v e l of s o c i a l i z a t i o n and organization of production . . . . But does this mean that one form should change into another? This question could only arise under conditions where one of these forms had ex-hausted i t s p o s s i b i l i t i e s f or further development and f o r increasing production. But can i t be said that the c o l l e c t i v e farms have exhausted their p o s s i b i l i t i e s ? The experience of s o c i a l i s t production shows that both the c o l l e c t i v e farms and the state farms have inexhaustible (emphasis added) reserves f o r advancing production.20 The l a s t sentence of Khrushchev's argument i s especially s i g n i f i c a n t since i t suggests that the status quo as regards the organizational forms of socialism w i l l remain right through the period of building communism. I t i s important to note i n this regard that the Soviet leader emphasises the fact that the c o l l e c t i v e s i n their present form have v i r t u a l l y unlimited potential i n terms of production development. According to Marxist theory, the production r e l a t i o n s , or organization forms of the process of production, can only change when they have outlived t h e i r usefulness; that i s to say, when the superstructure r e s t r i c t s the further expansion of the productive forces. In other words, changes i n the Ibid., p. Ik. 75 organization of the productive forces can only occur when objective conditions demand i t ; a new economic super-structure cannot be a r b i t r a r i l y imposed. Whether or not the c o l l e c t i v e s had r e a l l y outlived their usefulness, was to become one of the key arguments i n the dispute over the introduction of the communes i n China. In t h i s speech by Khrushchev, the Soviet view was f i r m l y established: the c o l l e c t i v e s would serve for many years to come. Later, the Chinese were to argue d i f f e r e n t l y . The Development of C o l l e c t i v e Farm Theory In the following weeks a r t i c l e s by leading economists and theoreticians appeared i n Soviet newspapers, magazines and journals, further expanding the case put forward by Khrushchev at the session of the Supreme Soviet. The a r t i c l e s by comrades Leontyev, Glotov and Strumilin were of particular importance. In these a r t i c l e s , not only were Khrushchev*s p o l i c i e s given further i d e o l o g i c a l support, but also e x p l i c i t references were made to communes as a form of s o c i a l i s t organization. Thus, the Soviet attitude towards the Introduction of communes into s o c i a l i s t society was s p e c i f i c a l l y spelled out less than a month before the f i r s t experimental communes were organized by Mao Tse-tung i n Honan on A p r i l 2 0 . Leontyev*s a r t i c l e which appeared i n the A p r i l 7 edition of Pravda, the party newspaper, was e n t i t l e d "For 76 a Mighty Upsurge of the S o c i a l i s t Economy" and dealt mainly with the methods by which the c o l l e c t i v e farm economy would gradually evolve into a form more clo s e l y akin to that of the state farm, while at the same time praising the party's p o l i c i e s i n agriculture as being i d e o l o g i c a l l y correct. Can one imagine more v i v i d and so to speak, more tangible proof of the strength and v i t a l i t y of the Marxist-Leninist p r i n c i p l e s of building a s o c i a l i s t economy, p r i n c i p l e s cr e a t i v e l y applied by the Party at the present stage of the advance towards communism? . . . . In improving the methods of guiding economic construction the Communist Party i s resolutely casting aside dogmatic concepts that hamper the successful advance to communism.21 Of course, one of these basic so-called "dogmatic concepts" to which the writer was r e f e r r i n g was the thesis put forward by S t a l i n i n h i s work Ecpnomic Problems of Socialism i n the U.S.S.R., that c o l l e c t i v e farm property was already beginning to "retard the powerful development of our productive forces", and would do so increasingly as time wore on. This, of course, was the thesis p u b l i c l y proclaimed by the Chinese Communists l a t e r , i n defence of their introduction of the communes. Leontyev further developed Soviet theory regarding the development of the c o l l e c t i v e farms, and their role i n the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, arguing that: L. Leontyev, "For Mighty Upsurge of S o c i a l i s t Economy," Pravda, A p r i l . 7 , 1958; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . X, no. 15, p. 31. 77 L i f e has shown that the r a i s i n g of c o l l e c t i v e farm property to the l e v e l of property belonging to the whole people proceeds through the develop-ment, growth and increase of both state and co-operative property; moreover, th i s takes place through expansion of the sphere of commo-di t y c i r c u l a t i o n as a r e s u l t of greater marketed production by the c o l l e c t i v e farms, on the one hand, and the free sale of machinery to the c o l l e c t i v e farms on the other. It i s no longer possible to deny that the bringing of the two forms of s o c i a l i s t property closer together i s not being accompanied by a contrac-tion of the sphere of value relations but an expansion of t h i s sphere . . . . The advance of the s o c i a l i s t economy to communism i s connected with ever f u l l e r and wider use of the law of value and the value categories based on i t - prices, money, et c . 2 2 In short, by taking one step backward i d e o l o g i c a l l y , the Soviet Union would move two steps forward i n the long-term evolution to communism. The road to communism did not l i e through a structural revolution i n Soviet society, but through increased production, whence st r u c t u r a l changes would gradually and naturally evolve. It i s noteworthy that not only Stalin*s teachings on c o l l e c t i v e versus state property i s negated, but also his teaching concerning the connected matter of commodity c i r c u l a t i o n . S t a l i n had stressed i n h i s Economic Problems of Socialism that i n the future commodity c i r c u l a t i o n would gradually decrease and be replaced by direct barter and exchange. Leontyev 1s a r t i c l e argues for exactly the opposite— the increase i n commodity c i r c u l a t i o n and greater use of the Loc. c i t 78 law of value. Thus, the new Soviet l i n e embodied an almost complete reversal of the S t a l i n i s t position, and far-reaching compromises i n ideology i n order to stimulate productiveness. From a dogmatic Marxist point of view, these p o l i c i e s were ideo l o g i c a l heresy. The second of the two a r t i c l e s defining Soviet policy concerning the appropriate a g r i c u l t u r a l units i n the period of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism appeared i n the March 25 edition of the Lit e r a r y Gazette and dealt more s p e c i f i c a l l y with the commune as an alternative to the c o l l e c t i v e . The author, Academician S. Strumilin, a leading Soviet economist, makes hi s main points i n the following passage: To t h i s day we do not regard the c o l l e c t i v e farm as the highest rung of s o c i a l i s t c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . I t was assumed that the co l l e c t i v e farm was a stage i n the t r a n s i t i o n to the a g r i c u l t u r a l commune - i . e . the stage immediately preceding the commune. However, since the communist p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n presupposes inexhaustible sources of abundance, i t would be sheer absurdity to begin applying this p r i n c i p l e with the c o l l e c t i v e farm country-side, i . e . the most backward sector of the s o c i a l i s t economy. Therefore transformation of the a r t e l into a commune has been, of course, precluded i n practice for an en t i r e l y i n d e f i n i t e period. The idea that the present-day c o l l e c t i v e farm should i n time turn into an independent producer-and-consumer commune seems to me fundamentally untenable.23 JS. Strumilin, "On the Right Track," Literary Gazette, March 25, p. 2;, Current Digest of the Soviet Press v o l . X, no. 15, p. 25. 79 He also rejected the p o s s i b i l i t y of transforming the c o l l e c t i v e s into state farms, and advocated instead a gradual evolution of the c o l l e c t i v e farms i n their present d i r e c t i o n , towards a form more similar to state farms, but not the same: It would be wrong to orient ourselves towards turning the c o l l e c t i v e farms into state farms. But to d i r e c t the development of the c o l l e c t i v e farm system towards possibly coming closer to more progressive forms of the Soviet economy, towards bringing the c o l l e c t i v e farms closer to the state farms i n the organization of labour, seems the most natural path of the c o l l e c t i v e farms 1 further development. 24-Here, the Soviet view was l a i d squarely on the l i n e , completely repudiating the idea that the commune could be introduced u n t i l abundance had been achieved, and rejecting the idea that such a form would be introduced i n the foreseeable future, even i n the Soviet Union—the most economically advanced nation i n the communist bloc. Moreover, the strength of the Soviet conviction i s c l e a r l y and e x p l i c i t l y revealed by the strong language used; the introduction of communes was completely out of the question. Moreover, the future development of the c o l l e c t i v e s was c l e a r l y l a i d out--they would come gradually closer to the state farm form, that i s to say nearer to ownership by the whole people, but would certainly not change over into communes. Ibid., p. 26. 80 The t h i r d a r t i c l e i n the series on the future of a g r i c u l t u r a l development, was probably the most s i g n i f i c a n t . It was written by I. Glotov, and appeared i n the o f f i c i a l journal of the Central Committee, Kommunist. the A p r i l edition. After dealing with Stalin's thesis that the sale of the M.T.S. assets to the c o l l e c t i v e farms would be a retro-gressive step and would only remove the Soviet Union farther from communism, Glotov turned h i s attention to the whole question of the future of the c o l l e c t i v e farms: W i l l c o l l e c t i v e farm property go through the stage of state property belonging to the whole people, or i s this stage not necessary f o r i t ? On the road to communism w i l l the c o l l e c t i v e farms i n their present form of a g r i c u l t u r a l a r t e l s grow over into communes, or i s the pro-cess of r a i s i n g c o l l e c t i v e farm property to the l e v e l of property belonging to the whole people, of communist property, not connected with a stage of the a r t e l ' s growing over into a commune? Such questions arise among many comrades. It must be said that the correct answer to these questions can be given only by l i f e i t s e l f , by the p r a c t i c a l experience of millions of Soviet men and women building communism i n i t s f u l l concreteness and a l l i t s d e t a i l s . They have never said that they would adhere once and for a l l to (any) set form methods and ways i n accomplishing the tasks of communist construction.25 This passage sets up the stage for the 'negation' of the communes as a useful form i n the task of communist I. Glotov, "Reorganization of the M.T.S. and Co l l e c -t i v e Farm Property," Kommunist. no. 5, A p r i l 1958, pp. 38-54: Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . 10, no. 15, p. 22. 81 construction, and t i e s i n with Strumilin fs careful assertion that " i t was assumed (previously) that the c o l l e c t i v e farm was a stage i n the t r a n s i t i o n to the a g r i c u l t u r a l commune," implying that the assumption has now been proven f a l s e , i n the l i g h t of Soviet experience. Of course, the nature of Glotov's assertion concerning the finding of the correct i d e o l o g i c a l road only through experience i s most useful as a tool for the Soviets since i t means that they are not t i e d to unbending ideology. However, at the same time, i t does mean that the Soviet Union a r b i t r a r i l y sets i d e o l o g i c a l standards for the rest of the S o c i a l i s t countries as i t progresses ahead of the others along the communist road. And this of course, i s one of the chief sources of the f r i c t i o n i n the dispute over the communes: Soviet 'experience 1 takes precedence over the id e o l o g i c a l 'assumptions' to which the Chinese subscribe. Having cleared the way i d e o l o g i c a l l y for the need to be guided by 'experience' ( i . e . expediency) i n the process of evolving to communism, Glotov banishes the commune from id e o l o g i c a l orthodoxy: Does t h i s mean that the c o l l e c t i v e farms w i l l come to communism i n the form of a g r i c u l t u r a l a r t e l s or w i l l they grow over into communes, enterprises also based on group property, but which apply the p r i n c i p l e 'From each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s , to each according to h i s needs'? Evidently such a commune i s unlikely under socialism for the economic conditions at this stage d i f f e r from the economic conditions under communism precisely i n that they are not ripe as yet for the application of the communist p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n . And under 82 communism a commune, as a c o l l e c t i v e of owners of group property, i s obviously senseless. The commune proved to be unviable at the dawn of the c o l l e c t i v e farm system. It i s also un-suitable during the period of t r a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism.26 In this short statement, Glotov rejected the commune outright, even as a unit of future communist society, thus throwing the commune concept on the Russian's i d e o l o g i c a l scrapheap. I t should be noted, too, that Glotov's i d e o l o g i c a l assertions are of such a nature as to be directed at the communist movement as a whole and not merely the Soviet Union. Here, he i s not just prescribing for the Soviet Union, but i s making id e o l o g i c a l pronouncements of a general nature, applicable to the communist movement as a whole. Since the a r t i c l e appeared i n the Central Committee's theoretical journal, i t can be safely concluded that this pronouncement concerning communes and future development of the c o l l e c t i v e farm system represented the formulation of the new party l i n e i n the aftermath of the M.T.S. debates. It i s interesting to note that although Glotov mentioned the f a c t the "commune proved to be unviable at the dawn of the c o l l e c t i v e farm system," he d i d not quote Stalin's 193*+ repudiation of the communes i n support of this case against the commune. There are two reasons f o r this anomalous situation. The f i r s t i s that the party had just finished rejecting Stalin's arguments against the transfer Ibid., p. 25. 83 of the M.T.S. equipment to the c o l l e c t i v e s , and was hardly i n a.position to use him as an id e o l o g i c a l authority In the f i e l d of agriculture. The second reason i s that while S t a l i n rejected the commune idea i n 193 k > he by no means ruled i t out i n the future. In f a c t , he f u l l y supported the notion that the c o l l e c t i v e s would evolve into communes when the time was ripe ; and h i s suggestions i n the years immediately before his death that the c o l l e c t i v e s were beginning to hamper forces of production, seemed to indicate that he thought the communes might not be fa r off. And since Glotov*s purpose was to rule out the communes altogether i d e o l o g i c a l l y , to quote S t a l i n , was to court disaster. Commenting on the prematurity and the apparent f a i l u r e of the a g r i c u l t u r a l commune, St a l i n had suggested three reasons for i t s lack of success: a shortage of products, a too-low l e v e l of technology, and an egalitarianism forced on the communes by scarci t y . The present a g r i c u l t u r a l commune arose on the basis of an underdeveloped technology and a shortage of products. This r e a l l y explains why i t practiced egalitarianism and showed l i t t l e concern for the in d i v i d u a l , everyday interest of i t s members—as a r e s u l t of which i t i s now being compelled to assume the status of the a r t e l , i n which the in d i v i d u a l and the public interest of the c o l l e c t i v e farmers are nationally combined . . . . Practice has shown that the communes would cer t a i n l y have been doomed had they not abandoned egalitarianism. 27 J. S t a l i n , Report to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U. (TO (Moscow, F.L.P.H. , 195D, p. 98. 8k This l a s t statement was to be a foreshadowing of events i n People's China more than twenty-five years l a t e r . Moreover, i t was this assertion, along with the formulated prerequisites for the implementation of the commune outlined by S t a l i n , that prevented the Chinese too from mobilizing Stalin's works i n support of their commune program. This explains why S t a l i n was never referred to for support by either side i n the controversy over the communes. Outlining the s p e c i f i c conditions under which the commune as a s o c i a l unit could arise i n S o c i a l i s t society, S t a l i n had asserted i n h i s 17th Congress speech, that: The future commune w i l l arise on the basis of a more developed technology and of a more developed a r t e l , on the basis of an abundance of products. When w i l l that be? Not soon of course. But i t w i l l be. I t would be criminal to accelerate a r t i f i c i a l l y the process of t r a n s i t i o n from the a r t e l to the future commune. That would only confuse the whole issue and would f a c i l i t a t e the work of our enemies. The t r a n s i -tion from the a r t e l to the future commune must proceed gradually, to the extent that a l l the c o l l e c t i v e farmers become convinced that such a t r a n s i t i o n i s necessary.28 Clearly, the Chinese communists could not hope to claim i n 1958 that they had f u l f i l l e d Stalin's conditions. Even with the bumper harvest of that year, China s t i l l remained i n the same conditions of poverty that characterized the Soviet Union at the time the a g r i c u l t u r a l communes were disbanded there. Thus, by introducing the communes into the Ibid., p. 97. 85 Chinese s o c i a l system, the Chinese found themselves i n the position of f l y i n g i n the face of, not only the contemporary Soviet leaders, but also of Joseph S t a l i n , the man who seemingly claimed so much of Mao's id e o l o g i c a l allegiance and respect. Nevertheless, the Chinese communists, apparently oblivious to these considerations, I n i t i a t e d the f i r s t experimental communes i n mid-April i n Honan, with a view to advancing the revolution i n China to yet another stage. CHAPTER IV THE UNVEILING OF THE COMMUNES: SINO-SOVIET CONFRONTATION The Chinese Party Congress The most important event i n the month following the establishment of the f i r s t experimental communes i n Honan was the meeting of the 8th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party which had l a s t met i n October 195°. At the 1956 session, representatives of f r a t e r n a l parties from nearly every country i n the world were i n v i t e d to attend the proceedings, and were even i n v i t e d to address the Congress. It was here for instance that Anastas Mikoyan made an important speech regarding Soviet aid to China and a number of other aspects of Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . But, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , at the 1958 Congress no outside observers were i n v i t e d to attend the sessions and to record the deliberations. Even i n the Soviet Union, the only reports of the Congress were those issued by the New China News Agency. Evidently, not even the Soviet Union had been in v i t e d to be represented at the Congress" closed sessions. C l e a r l y t h i s curtain of secrecy which was drawn over the proceedings of the Congress was not without purpose, and strongly suggested that the communes were among the things discussed behind closed doors. It i s interesting i n this regard that although Mao Tse-tung addressed the Congress, his speech was not published along with those of Liu Shao-chi and Tan Chen-lin. 87 It would appear l i k e l y that Mao dealt at some length with the communes i n his address, since the experiment had been underway fo r several weeks, and Mao had only just returned from h i s month i n various provinces overseeing t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n . It i s interesting to note that nowhere i n the report of the Central Committee to the Congress was there any direct mention of the communes (indeed i t should be remembered that the name 'commune' was not applied by the Central Committee u n t i l a month l a t e r ) . Nor was there any indication i n the speech by Tan Chen-lin on the National Program For A g r i c u l t u r a l Development, that a revolutionary new movement was underway i n certain r u r a l areas. A number of important i d e o l o g i c a l and domestic policy points were made i n these speeches, however, and a number of oblique references made, which i n the l i g h t of subsequent events, can be seen as pertaining to the impending introduction of the communes on a nationwide scale. Moreover, the i d e o l o g i c a l foundation was l a i d for substantiating the Party's new policy of leaping forward i n economic construction and for the coming f u l l - f l e d g e d dispute over the communes. Perhaps the most important p r i n c i p l e l a i d down at the Congress was the p r i n c i p l e of "uninterrupted revolution", which l a i d the i d e o l o g i c a l foundation for both the economic leap forward, and more d i r e c t l y , the people's commune. Liu Shao-chi expressed the concept i n these words: 88 Marx, Engels and Lenin often pointed out that the watchword of the working class should be "uninterrupted r e v o l u t i o n 1 . In putting forward new revolutionary tasks i n good times, so that there i s no halfway h a l t i n the revolutionary advance of the people, the revolutionary fervour of the masses w i l l not subside with interruptions of the revolution, and Party and state func-tionaries w i l l not rest content with the successes won and grow arrogant or apathetic, the Central Committee of the Communist Party and Comrade Mao Tse-tung have always guided the Chinese revolution by thi s Marxist-Leninist theory of uninterrupted r e v o l u t i o n . ! This was the f i r s t time that Mao Tse-tung*s theory of 1uninterrupted r e v o l u t i o n 1 had been p u b l i c l y expressed, indicating that i t was meant to set the theoreti c a l founda-tion for the r a d i c a l p o l icy changes that were being introduced. In the following months, the theory was to form the theoretical core of the Chinese dialogue with their Soviet comrades. In actual f a c t , although Liu claimed the pr i n c i p l e to have been advanced by the fathers of communism, lat e r i t was claimed to be a "creative addition to Marxist-Leninism". It i s true that Marx, Engels and Lenin advocated uninterrupted revolution but not exactly i n the sense that Mao was seeking to use i t . They had used the concept to apply to the period of revolution i n a country before the working class (the communist party) seized power, and to the period of t r a n s i t i o n from bourgeois revolution to s o c i a l i s t L i u Shao-chi, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee," Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Peking, F.L.P., 1 9 5 8 ) , P. 3 9 . 89 r e v o l u t i o n , w h i l e Mao was e x t e n d i n g t h i s c o n c e p t t o i n c l u d e t h e a d v a n c e of s o c i e t y f r o m s o c i a l i s m t o t h e c o m m u n i s t Utopia. I t i s l i k e l y n o c o i n c i d e n c e t h a t Mao h a d f o r m u l a t e d t h i s p r i n c i p l e i n t h e m o n t h s f o l l o w i n g h i s v i s i t t o t h e S o v i e t U n i o n f o r t h e M o s c o w c o n f e r e n c e . I t w o u l d seem c l e a r f r o m l a t e r C h i n e s e c h a r g e s o f R u s s i a n " c o n v e r s a t i s m " t h a t Mao h a d b e e n i m p r e s s e d b y t h e i n c r e a s i n g " b o u r g e o i s i z a t i o n " o f l i f e i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n d u r i n g h i s v i s i t t h e r e a n d h a d become c o n v i n c e d t h a t t h e " m o d e r n r e v i s i o n i s t s " w e r e b r i n g i n g t h e S o v i e t r e v o l u t i o n t o a h a l t i n t h e d o m e s t i c a r e n a ; t h a t t h e a d v a n c e t o w a r d s communism i n a n o n - m a t e r i a l s e n s e w a s n o n - e x i s t e n t . The m e s s a g e b e h i n d M a o ' s new p r i n c i p l e was c l e a r : t h e P a r t y mus t move t h e n a t i o n i n t o t h e n e x t s t a g e o f c o m m u n i s t d e v e l o p m e n t . H i n t i n g t h a t b i g c h a n g e s w e r e due i n t h e m a k e - u p o f C h i n e s e s o c i e t y , L i u S h a o - c h i d e c l a r e d : The f a c t i s t h a t t h e g r o w t h o f t h e s o c i a l p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s c a l l s f o r a s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n a n d t h e s p i r i t u a l e m a n c i p a t i o n o f t h e p e o p l e ; t h e v i c t o r y o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n a n d e m a n c i p a t i o n i n t u r n s p u r s a l e a p f o r w a r d i n t h e s o c i a l p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s ; a n d t h i s i n t u r n i m p e l s a p r o g r e s s i v e c h a n g e i n t h e s o c i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d a n a d v a n c e i n m a n ' s i d e o l o g y . I n t h e i r c e a s e l e s s s t r u g g l e t o t r a n s -f o r m n a t u r e , t h e p e o p l e a r e c o n t i n u o u s l y t r a n s f o r m i n g s o c i e t y a n d t h e m s e l v e s . 2 2 I b i d . , p . 32. 90 Since a so-called leap forward in production had already occurred over the winter and spring months, the Chinese leaders were already in an ideologically consistent position to argue for a change in production relations. Calling for a revolutionary upsurge in building socialism, Liu noted that already Chinese society was in revolutionary ferment: In city and countryside people vie with each other to join in a l l kinds of voluntary labour. In building Irrigation works the peasants in many places have thrown aside the age-old narrow-minded idea of only looking after their native places . . . . Many enter-prises, organizations, schools, army units and individuals have taken the initiative in co-ordinating their activities with those of others so as to promote the progress of a l l concerned. Al l this i s , as Lenin said, the actual beginning of communism, the beginning of a change which is of world historic significance!3 As a corollary to the 'permanent revolution* formula, Liu put forward the party's general line for socialist construction: of achieving "greater, faster, better and more economical results," which had been passed by the Central Committee the previous September. The communes were later said to have resulted from this ordered speed up in the tempo of construction since new organizational forms were needed to make better use of rural labour. Thus, Liu's arguments supporting the increase in" tempo can also be seen as arguments supporting the necessity of introducing the communes. He asserts that: Ibid., p. 2 8 . 91 Some people do not recognize the importance of increasing the speed of construction . . . . Some say that speeding up construction makes people f e e l 'tense', and so i t ' s better to slow down the tempo. But are things not going to get tense i f the speed of construction i s slowed down? Surely one should be able to see that a r e a l l y t e r r i b l y tense sit u a t i o n would exist i f more than 600 m i l l i o n people had to l i v e i n poverty and c u l t u r a l backward-ness for a prolonged period, had to exert their utmost ef f o r t s just to eke out a bare l i v i n g , and were unable to r e s i s t natural calamities e f f e c t i v e l y , unable to put a quick stop to possible foreign aggression and ut t e r l y unable to master their own fate.*+ Quite c l e a r l y , h i s argument i s that i f substantial progress i s not made by the regime i n a f a i r l y short time, peasant unrest might possibly become widespread and threaten i t s existence. The experience of 1957, e s p e c i a l l y during the Hundred Flowers period, had shown the party quite c l e a r l y and unmistakenly that a l o t of resentment and unrest lay beneath the surface of the society which would spring to the fore as soon as conditions were rig h t . During the f i r s t f i v e year plan, a g r i c u l t u r a l production had increased by less than % per year, hardly keeping ahead of population growth—in order to j u s t i f y the peasants' s a c r i f i c e s i n terms of increased work and regimentation, the party would have to step up production and produce more r e s u l t s . The alternative, implied L i u Shao-chi, was to r i s k peasant up-r i s i n g s such as those of a minor nature, which occurred i n some areas i n 1957* Ibid., p. kh. The t h i r d major proposal made by Li u was that Industry should be decentralized and placed under l o c a l control i n order to increase l o c a l i n i t i a t i v e and increase output. This move was an important one i n the move towards the communes, since one of the outstanding features of the communes was to be that they combined both industry and agriculture, and became the basic administrative as well as the basic s o c i a l and economic units of Chinese society. Thus, the Party Congress, which met for nearly three weeks, while not p u b l i c l y Issuing any statement concerning the commune experiment, did lay the theoreti c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l foundation f o r their introduction, and provided the opening challenge to the Soviet policy of gradualism and conservatism i n agriculture and ideology. On June 1, an a r t i c l e appeared i n Red Flag under the authorship of Mao Tse-tung, and called "Introducing a Co-operative". Here Mao made h i s famous assertion that: Apart from their other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , China's 600 m i l l i o n people are: f i r s t of a l l poor and second "blank". This seems l i k e a bad thing, but i n fact i t ' s a good thing. Poor people want change, want to do things, want revolution. A clean sheet of paper has nothing on i t , so that the newest and most beautiful words can be written and the newest and most beautiful pictures painted on i t . 5 e. yMao Tse-tung, "Introducing a Co-operative," Red Flag. no. 1, 1958; Peking Review, no. 15, 1958, p. 6. 93 Moreover, he went on, "throughout the country the communist s p i r i t i s surging forward." However, no e x p l i c i t reference to the experiments i n Honan was made, even though In re t r o -spect i t can be seen that Mao obviously had the communes i n mind when he made these remarks. Khrushchev at the Bulgarian Party Congress A few days l a t e r , at the Bulgarian party congress, i t was the Soviet leader's turn to state h i s views. His opening remarks were c l e a r l y intended for the Chinese, suggesting that they should co-operate i n the Soviet plan for economic integration of the bloc. (A conference of bloc members had met a few weeks previously and was scheduled to discuss this matter again within another few weeks.) Soviet distress over the Chinese determination to build an independent economy was evident, and i t i s clear that part of the dismay over the Chinese leap forward and the communes stemmed from the fact that these moves were related to the Chinese drive fo r economic independence. In h i s speech, Khrushchev told his audience that: It goes without saying that each s o c i a l i s t country decides independently on i t s forms of co-operation with the other s o c i a l i s t countries. There i s not and cannot be any pressure whatsoever i n this respect.° How-ever, could the r i c h opportunities of the s o c i a l i s t countries be exploited to the f u l l i f each country acted i n i s o l a t i o n This statement would suggest that pressure had indeed been applied on the Chinese—perhaps i n the form of withholding economic assistance. 9 k stewed i n i t s own juice as the saying goes? If the s o c i a l i s t countries were to act at cross purposes, could a r e l i a b l e defence of the gains of socialism be assured under present international conditions? Of course not . . . . Only the s o l i d a r i t y of the s o c i a l i s t countries and the strengthening of all-round co-operation and f r a t e r n a l a id can assure a general increase i n the s o c i a l i s t economy and the advancing of the formerly underdeveloped countries to the l e v e l of the advanced.7 The attempt by the Soviet Union to coerce and persuade the Chinese to enter the Soviet economic orbit had met with no success at the May COMECON meeting i n Moscow, and this should be borne i n mind as a contributing factor to the subsequent commune controversy. In the same speech Khrushchev also made a number of apparently favourable references to the creative ideology of the Chinese party. In a h i s t o r i c a l perspective, these can now be seen as a kind of left-handed compliment, stressing the correctness of the p o l i c i e s the Chinese had followed i n c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n , and leaving implied the suggestion that to make a r a d i c a l policy switch would be wrong. Thus Khrushchev asserted that: The Chinese Communist Party and the other f r a t e r n a l parties of the people's demo-cracies have , . . found unique forms for applying the Leninist cooperative plan i n practice (referring to mutual aid teams 'N. S. Khrushchev, "Speech at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party," Pravda, June *+, 1958, pp. 1-3; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . 10, no. 22, p. 8. 95 and other innovations), China has masterfully combined the general truth of Marxist-Leninism with the concrete practice of revolution and s o c i a l i s t construction i n i t s country.° Yet he took pains to stress very c l e a r l y that "the experience of your (Bulgarian) party confirms once again that whatever the national features, there i s no other way to e n l i s t the broad peasant masses i n socialism except by the tested Leninist cooperative plan." Here he e x p l i c i t l y countered the Chinese argument that the communes were a product of national p e c u l i a r i t i e s . His statement i s such as to reassert the essence of Glotov's a r t i c l e — t h a t the path to communism charted by the CPSU i n the l i g h t of Soviet experience did not just apply to the Soviet Union, but had the force of Marxist dogma, binding on a l l . Doubtless these words by the Soviet leader were i n the nature of a warning to the Chinese not to proceed with their experiments, but to remain true to the "Leninist cooperative plan", and were designed to show Soviet d i s -pleasure at the developments i n China i n recent months, without e x p l i c i t l y and openly referring to the commune experi-ments. However, before the month was over the Chinese Party's P o l i t i b u r o had committed i t s e l f even deeper, Ideologically, to a departure from the Soviet l i n e . It was hoc.cit 96 i n June that the decision was made to adopt the name "people's communes" for Mao's r u r a l creations. The significance of t h i s move cannot be overestimated, since to apply the word 'commune' s i g n i f i e d a deliberate move on the part of the Chinese to challenge the Soviet Union i d e o l o g i c a l l y . The communes could just as well have been called "Higher Stage C o l l e c t i v e s " by the Chinese, and much of the c o n f l i c t would have been averted. But the naming of these new units as communes s i g n i f i e d (a) that the Chinese did not adhere to the CPSU's re v i s i o n of Marxist theory to exclude the commune as the f i n a l stage of the a g r i c u l t u r a l revolution, nor i t s formula revising the notion of the nature of the t r a n s i t i o n of s o c i a l i s t society to communism, and (b) that the Chinese were claiming to be moving one step ahead of the Soviet Union on the road to the communist Utopia. In short i t s i g n i f i e d a d i r e c t challenge to Soviet ideological leadership and to the U.S.S.R.'s position as the leading s o c i a l i s t state. The decision had c l e a r l y been made to d i r e c t l y oppose the l i n e set down by the CPSU only two months before; and to assert i d e o l o g i c a l independence. Public Unveiling of the 'People's Communes' On July 1, an a r t i c l e by Politburo member Chen Po-ta i n Red Flag f i n a l l y revealed p u b l i c l y the term 'people's commune*, applying i t to describe the Hsukuang No. 1 Co-operative i n Hupeh (where Mao had also spent a good deal of time i n Ap r i l ) which had been publicized previously i n Red 97 Flag as a new type of cooperative. According to Chen, th i s new people's commune was an example of what Mao was talking about when he said that the "poor and blank" Chinese people were "painting the newest and most beautiful pictures" on a clean sheet of paper. Exhalting this brand new Chinese c r e a t i o n — t h e people's commune--Chen Po-ta declared that i t would enable the Chinese to r e a l i z e a l l the prerequisites to communism i n record time: Can i t be said that what th i s cooperative i s doing i s actually an indicati o n that our country can develop the productive forces of societyat a rate unknown i n history, can quickly eliminate the d i s t i n c t i o n between industry and agriculture, and the d i s t i n c t i o n between mental and manual labour, thereby to open a road on which our country can smoothly pass over from socialism to communism'? I think i t can be said.9 Referring to the prerequisites to, and prin c i p l e s of, communist society l a i d down by Engels, theoretician Chen Po-ta openly proclaimed that the new people's commune, such as the one under discussion, " i s concretely and gradually re a l i z i n g such an i d e a l of the founders of s c i e n t i f i c communism." Two weeks la t e r i n the same Party journal, the Red Flag editor, Chen Po-ta discussed the communes i n greater d e t a i l , and attributed them d i r e c t l y to the creative mind of Mao Tse-tung. He suggested that this new creation of the ^Chen Po-ta, "New Society, New People," Red Flag. July 1, 1958; Current Background, no. 517, p. 98 Chinese leader was completely consistent with Marxist-Leninism since Marx and Engels had only set out the p r i n c i p l e s to be followed and had not set down "a prescription for each nation." Moreover, he noted that Lenin had remarked that Eastern countries had conditions which d i f f e r e d greatly from those i n Europe, and that therefore d i f f e r e n t forms could be expected. Here, of course, i s a clear i n d i c a t i o n that the Chinese leaders were very much aware that the commune was a deviation from the Soviet path, and were already defending their deviation on the grounds that d i f f e r e n t conditions demanded di f f e r e n t solutions. In the course of the a r t i c l e , Chen also eulogized Mao as an outstanding theoretician of Marxist-Leninism, thus i n f l a t i n g Mao's stature as a source of do c t r i n a l interpretation, and at the same time giving the communes added id e o l o g i c a l orthodoxy. Chen noted that: Comrade Mao Tse-tung said that we should steadily and systematically organize industry, agriculture, commerce, education, and soldiers (people's armed forces) into a big commune, thereby to form the basic units of society . . . . This conception of the commune i s a conclusion drawn by Comrade Mao Tse-tung from r e a l i s t i c l i f e . 1 0 According to Chen, Mao's concept of the commune was that industry, agriculture and commerce would provide the material l i f e of the members; culture and education would be deployed to s a t i s f y their s p i r i t u a l requirements and the armed forces Chen Po-ta, "Under the Banner of Comrade Mao Tse-tung," Red Flag, no. k. July 1 6 , 1958; Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press, no. I38. 99 would protect the members u n t i l such time as "exploitation of man by man i n the world" i s eliminated. Confrontation Over the Communes: July 1958 Thus, with both sides having taken stands over the communes, the stage was set for a confrontation between Khrushchev and Mao—and the chance soon came. At the end of July, Khrushchev made an unexpected, secret t r i p to Peking, ostensibly to discuss the Middle East c r i s i s with Mao, and to have consultations over the building tension of the Formosa S t r a i t s . The communique issued after the meeting contained no reference to anything but foreign policy, but subsequent disclosures by the Soviet party have confirmed that the Chinese commune policy came under f i r e and was o f f i c i a l l y and personally discouraged by Khrushchev. In i t s l e t t e r of September 2 1 , 1963 to the Chinese government, the Soviet government revealed the nature of Khrushchev's misgivings concerning the communes: Precisely because the interests of the Chinese people are dear to us, we were upset by the turn which became apparent i n the development of the Chinese national economy i n 1 9 5 8 , when the leaders of the People's Republic of China proclaimed their l i n e of the "Three Red Banners", announced the "Great Leap", and began setting up the People's Communes. Our party saw that this was a road of dangerous experiments, a road of disregard for economic laws, and for the experience "of other s o c i a l i s t States . . . . We could not f a i l to f e e l alarmed when, with every step they took, the leaders of the People's Republic of China began to pour abuse on the Leninist p r i n c i p l e 100 of material Incentive, abandoned the p r i n c i p l e of remunerating labour, and went over to ,, eg a l i t a r i a n d i s t r i b u t i o n i n People's Communes. Thus the communes were regarded, even i n their experimental stage, as being "dangerous experiments", involving a negation of material incentive and an undue emphasis on egalitarianism. It w i l l be remembered that i t was exactly for these l a t t e r "heresies" that S t a l i n abandoned and v i l i f i e d the premature Soviet communes of the 1920's. The Soviet party also emphasized that the Chinese communes represented a blatant disregard for t h i s Soviet experience with communes, and stressed that the Chinese communes were a deviation from the cooperative plan l a i d down by Lenin. Recalling Khrushchev's 1958 confrontation with Mao on the commune question, the 1963 Soviet l e t t e r summed up the conversation as follows: We regarded i t as our duty to t e l l the Chinese leaders i n a comradely way as early as 1958 about our doubts concerning such 'innovations'. This was said personally by Nikita Khrushchev to Mao Tse-tung i n the summer of 1958. The head of the Soviet government pointed out that many things which the Chinese comrades regarded as the very l a t e s t i n Marxist-Leninism, as a method of speeding up the building of communism, had already been t r i e d out i n practice by our own people during the f i r s t years of the revolu-tion. In our day, we learned that such a form of organizing peasant production did not j u s t i f y i t s e l f f o r many reasons. Our party accomplished Soviet Government, A Reply to Peking (London, Soviet Booklets, 1963), p. 12. 1 0 1 t h e t a s k o f t h e s o c i a l i s t t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a g r i c u l t u r e on t h e b a s i s o f L e n i n ' s c o o p e r a -t i v e p l a n . 1 2 One o f t h e i m p o r t a n t t h i n g s t o be b o r n e i n m i n d c o n c e r n i n g t h i s a d m o n i t i o n b y K h r u s h c h e v , a n d h i s c h a r g e s a g a i n s t t h e communes , i s t h a t M a r s h a l P e n g T e h - h u a i w a s a member o f t h e C h i n e s e d e l e g a t i o n a t t h e s e t a l k s , and so w a s w i t n e s s t o K h r u s h c h e v ' s d i s p l a y o f d i s p l e a s u r e . M a r s h a l P e n g l a t e r became i n t i m a t e l y i n v o l v e d i n I n t e r n a l p a r t y o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e communes. A t t h e t i m e , h o w e v e r : The C h i n e s e l e a d e r s t u r n e d a d e a f e a r t o o u r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s a n d d i d n o t t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f o u r p a r t y a n d s t a t e . M o r e -o v e r , p e o p l e i n C h i n a b e g a n t o c a l l us c o n s e r -v a t i v e s , b e l i e v i n g t h a t t h e " g r e a t l e a p " a n d t h e P e o p l e ' s Communes w o u l d p e r m i t t h e P e o p l e ' s R e p u b l i c t o s k i p a w h o l e s t a g e i n t h e b u i l d i n g o f a new s o c i e t y a n d go o v e r t o communism s t r a i g h t a w a y . 13 Thus t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p r e j e c t e d K h r u s h c h e v ' s w a r n i n g s and d e c i d e d t o p r o c e e d f u l l s p e e d a h e a d w i t h t h e i r r a d i c a l new commune p o l i c i e s , come w h a t may . M o r e o v e r , t h e c h a r g e a g a i n s t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n o f ' c o n s e r v a t i s m * o p e n e d up a new p h a s e i n t h e d i s p u t e i n w h i c h R u s s i a n d o m e s t i c p o l i c i e s w e r e o p e n l y q u e s t i o n e d a s t o r e v o l u t i o n a r y c o n t e n t . Commune U p s u r g e : A u g u s t 1958 I m m e d i a t e l y a f t e r h i s m e e t i n g w i t h K h r u s h c h e v — t h e v e r y n e x t d a y i n f a c t — M a o T s e - t u n g s e t o u t on a t o u r o f I b i d . , p . 1 3 . L o c . c i t . 102 Hopei, Honan and Shantung to inspect the communes established i n those provinces. I t i s almost certain that the purpose of this t r i p was to check up on the progress of the communes before the order was given to give the commune program o f f i c i a l public party support. During this tour, the Communist leader, defying the warnings of Khrushchev and the Soviet party, gave instructions to l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and cadres to proceed f u l l speed ahead with the communes through-out the r u r a l area: On h i s inspection tour to Hopei, Honan and Shantung early i n August this year, Comrade Mao Tse-tung gave further instructions on the organization of the People's Communes, saying 'It i s better to run people's communes. Their advantages l i e i n that they can merge industry, agriculture, trade, culture and education, and m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s into one entity and make i t easier for leadership.' This was a s t i l l greater enlightenment and i n s p i r a t i o n to the Honan people. An upsurge i n forming people's communes thus spread throughout the province.Ik In the Soviet Union, during Mao's tour of the countryside, a r t i c l e s dealing with Chinese agriculture stressed that the harvest successes were due to the Chinese following Lenin's cooperative plan and the experience of the Soviet Union, and ignored completely the s t i l l - u n o f f i c i a l commune movement. On August 5» for instance, while Mao was i n Hopei, Wu Chih-pu, "From A.P.C.'s to People's Communes", Red Flap., no. 8, September 16, 1958; People's Communes i n China. (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 3 K . 103 an a r t i c l e appeared i n V pomoshch* politischeskomu soobrazovaniuy. a CPSU Central Committee journal, lauding the Chinese successes i n the construction of socialism and Chinese c r e a t i v i t y i n applying the general tenets of Marxist-Leninism to the concrete conditions i n China. However, the a r t i c l e also stressed that the best C.P.C. cadres had explained to the peasantry "the experience of c o l l e c t i v i z a -tion and the successes of the kolkhoz regime i n the U. S. S.R.. And of course the Soviet experience included f a i l u r e of the commune. It i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of these a r t i c l e s i n Soviet publications that the "correctness" of the cooperative path rather than the incorrectness of the commune path i s stressed, thus c r i t i c i s i n g by implication rather than by s p e c i f i c reference. On August 18, Pravda published an e d i t o r i a l ( s i g n i f i c a n t l y , i . e . rather than a news report) concerning the successes of the Chinese harvest, noting that "this year, China w i l l surpass the U.S.A. i n gross output of wheat by at least two m i l l i o n tons, and this i s not a l i m i t . In their recent meetings with Chairman Mao, the Chinese peasants spoke with enthusiasm about the great p o s s i b i l i t i e s inherent i n the cooperative system. Here the Soviets make i t very p l a i n that Khrushchev's assertion that the cooperatives i n the Soviet Union had unlimited production potential, also applied very d e f i n i t e l y to China. Before, i t had been implied; •^Cited l n D > 5 . zagoria, The Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 95. Loc. c i t . (*the emphasis i s added). 10k now i t was e x p l i c i t . Thus, while the Chinese were claiming that the co-ops were hampering production and made a new form of r u r a l unit necessary, the CPSU was claiming just the opposite. It i s indeed s i g n i f i c a n t , and also i r o n i c , that the e d i t o r i a l i n Pravda was stressing the peasant support for the cooperative plan by reference to peasant reaction to Mao*s v i s i t s with them on h i s commune tour. There i s thus an implication i n the e d i t o r i a l , that not only i s Mao contravening Marxist theory with h i s commune experi-ments, but also the opinions of the "masses". And one of the fundamental arguments of Mao i n support of the communes was that they were the "creation of the masses", and were i n s t i t u t e d at their demand. The e d i t o r i a l was thus a two-pronged blow. Despite Soviet reaction, however, Mao made the decision to extend the experimental communes throughout the whole nation and make them the basic unit of Chinese society. i CHAPTER V THE COMMUNE RESOLUTION AND SOVIET REACTION In the l a t t e r part of August, the Chinese Party's Politburo met to give formal approval to the extension of the communes to the entire nation. The decision was embodied i n the h i s t o r i c August 29th Resolution "On The Establishment of People's Communes i n the Rural Areas", published on September 10. This resolution s i g n i f i e d the beginning of the formal i d e o l o g i c a l claims for the communes, and probably was the most s i g n i f i c a n t departure point i n the whole commune controversy. The resolution has two main elements: one describing the process and particulars of setting up communes throughout the country, and the other intermingled, providing the ideolo g i c a l rationale and claims for the communes. As fa r as the commune dispute i s concerned, the l a t t e r i s , of course, by far the most important. Providing the arguments to show that the communes were not a r b i t r a r i l y introduced but arose out of existing objective conditions that made the previous co-ops obsolete (and therefore f u l f i l l i n g the condition imposed by Marxist h i s t o r i c a l materialism), the resolution stated that: the people's communes are the l o g i c a l r e s u l t of the march of events . . . . "The basis for the leap forward i n China's a g r i c u l t u r a l production, and the ever-rising p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the 500 m i l l i o n peasants. An unprecedented ad-vance has been made i n ag r i c u l t u r a l c a p i t a l 106 construction since the advocates of the c a p i t a l i s t road were fundamentally defeated economically, p o l i t i c a l l y , i d e o l o g i c a l l y ( i . e . 1957 a n t i - r i g h t i s t campaign). This has created a new basis f o r p r a c t i c a l l y eliminating flood and drought, and for ensuring the comparatively stable advance of a g r i c u l t u r a l production . . . . Capital construc-tion i n agriculture and the struggle f o r bumper harvests involve large-scale co-operation which cuts across the boundaries between co-operatives, townships and counties. The people have taken to organizing themselves along m i l i t a r y l i n e s , working with militancy, leading c o l l e c t i v e l i f e , and this has raised the p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the 500 m i l l i o n peasants s t i l l further . . . . What a l l these things i l l u s t r a t e i s that the a g r i c u l t u r a l co-operative with scores of families or several hundred families can-no longer meet the needs of the changing situation. In the present circumstances the establishment of people's communes . . . i s the fundamental p o l i c y to guide the peasants to accelerate s o c i a l i s t construction, complete the building of socialism ahead of time and carry out the gradual t r a n s i t i o n to communism. These, then, were the basic arguments presented by the Chinese to show that objective conditions demanded the introduction of the communes. "In such circumstances, the people's communes were born just as 'an I r r i g a t i o n canal forms as the water comes' or 'a melon drops from i t s stalk when i t o ripens'." This was, of course, one of the central points at issue i n the commune dispute; the Russians claiming (as did ^"Resolution on The Establishment of People's Communes In The Rural Areas," People's Communes i n China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 1, Lin Tieh (1st Secretary of Hope! Provincial Committee), "The People's Commune Movement i n Hopei," Red Flag, no. 9, October 1, 1958; Ibid. , p. 1+9. 107 a faction of the C.P.C.) that the communes were introduced prematurely, before the objective conditions were r i p e , and therefore that the communes had been 'imposed* from the top, contrary to the dictates of Marxist-Leninism and h i s t o r i c a l materialism. The commune resolution also defined the nature of the new s o c i a l unit and showed where i t d i f f e r e d from the co-ops. Quoting Chairman Mao, Wu Chih-pu l a t e r stated that the commune i s distinguished by two chief c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s : i t s bigger si z e , and i t s more s o c i a l i s t i c nature. By 'bigger si z e * , i t was explained, two things were meant: one, that the communes were physically larger by at least ten times than the cooperatives, and were "much more powerful i n terms of manpower, land, f i n a n c i a l resources, and material strength." 3 Secondly, "bigger si z e " meant that the communes had a much wider range of a c t i v i t i e s than the co-op: "It i s no longer an organization dealing with agriculture alone, but a s o c i a l unit that has as i t s task the ov e r a l l develop-ment of agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry, side occupations and fis h e r y , and that integrates industry, agriculture, trade, culture and education, and mi l i t a r y a f f a i r s into a single whole." The commune also took over the role of l o c a l government, thus making i t "at once a k basic s o c i a l unit and a basic organ of state power." Chih-pu, "From A.P.C.*s to People's Communes," Red Flag, no. 8, September 16, 1958; Ibid., p. 35. **Ibid. , p. 36. 108 By "more s o c i a l i s t nature" was meant that the commune was "the best form or organization for effecting the t r a n s i -tion from c o l l e c t i v e ownership to ownership by the whole people, and that i t contains the budding of communism." In the spring, Soviet theoreticians had indicated that the road to communism included a gradual evolution of the c o l l e c t i v e s towards a form similar to the state farm. However, the commune resolution indicated that t h i s was not to occur i n China since the communes with their wide scope of a c t i v i t y were fundamentally d i f f e r e n t to the state farms. Thus, the politburo indicated that: a l l the big merged cooperatives w i l l be called, people's communes. There i s no need to change them into state farms, for i t i s not proper for farms to embrace industry, agriculture, exchange, culture and education and m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s at the same time.5 It should be remembered that the CPSU had also ruled out the state farm as the ultimate unit, but for dif f e r e n t reasons. In ef f e c t , the Russians had committed themselves to the cooperative as the most suitable unit i n s o c i a l i s t society, and i n the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, while the Chinese rejected i t , and substituted the commune i n i t s place. The Chinese claimed that although the commune i n i t s i n i t i a l form was s t i l l based on c o l l e c t i v e ownership, i t '"Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes i n Rural Areas," Ibid., p. 6. 109 •would soon evolve to the higher state-ownership by the whole people: In f a c t , c o l l e c t i v e ownership i n the people*s communes already contains some elements of ownership by the people as a whole. These elements w i l l grow constantly i n the course of the continuous development of the people's communes and w i l l gradually replace c o l l e c t i v e ownership.6 This assertion i s r e a l l y , of course, not too di f f e r e n t from those made by the Soviet theoreticians some months e a r l i e r i n regard to the evolution of the c o l l e c t i v e s to th i s higher form of ownership, and therefore, by i t s e l f , didn't represent a challenge to Soviet leadership. However, the resolution also contained a time-table for the changeover to ownership by the whole people, which the Soviets had not fixed. Thus, while the CPSU had assigned the changeover to some in d e f i n i t e future, the Chinese were claiming that the process would be completed within a few years: "The t r a n s i -tion from c o l l e c t i v e ownership to ownership by the whole people i s a process, the completion of which may take less time—three or four y e a r s — i n some places and l o n g e r — f i v e 6a or six years or even longer--elsewhere." This declaration did signify a dire c t challenge to the CPSU since i t meant that the Chinese were attempting to achieve a higher form of s o c i a l i s t ownership (the Russians had conceded this i n the spring) throughout society before the Russians. In short, 6Jj2id. , p. 7. 6a T . . Loc. c i t . 110 the Chinese were attempting to leap ahead of the Soviet comrades i n this aspect of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. The Chinese made i t e x p l i c i t , however, that even when ownership by the whole people had been achieved, the communes "are s t i l l s o c i a l i s t i n character, where the pr i n c i p l e , !from each according to hi s a b i l i t i e s , to each according to his work 1 p r e v a i l s . " However, the Chinese leaders also suggested that "where conditions permit, a s h i f t to the wage system may be made." This l a s t point indicated not the introduction of "each according to hi s needs", but rather an in-between stage i n which a monthly wage was guaranteed despite how many days were worked. This pr i n c i p l e had also been i n s t i t u t e d i n certain areas of the Soviet Union i n certain wealthy c o l l e c t i v e s , and thus was not e n t i r e l y i n the nature of an innovation, although the Soviet party had never issued an o f f i c i a l d i r e c t i v e or policy regarding t h i s '"higher" stage of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Insofar as the Chinese had made i t o f f i c i a l p o l i cy to encourage this system of d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t did tend to place the Chinese (on paper at least) ahead of the Soviet Union i n this regard. But at no time i n the commune resolution did the party advocate the introduction of the communist p r i n c i p l e "to each according to his needs", or even suggest the system of "part supply" which was introduced l a t e r . At the end of the h i s t o r i c commune d i r e c t i v e , the Central Committee made abundantly clear the l i m i t s of i t s I l l i d e o l o g i c a l claims, reasserting unmistakably that: At the present stage our task i s to b u i l d socialism. The primary purpose of establishing people's communes i s to accelerate the speed of s o c i a l i s t construction, and the purpose of building socialism i s to prepare a c t i v e l y f o r the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. It seems that the attainment of communism i n China i s no longer a remote future event. We should a c t i v e l y use the form of the people's communes to explore the p r a c t i c a l road of t r a n s i t i o n to Communism.7 It i s only i n the l a s t two sentences that a challenge to the Soviet Union's leadership could be inferred. Since the U.S.S.R. i s conceded to be building communism, i t i s clear that the Chinese are r e i t e r a t i n g their previous stand, that the Soviet Union i s the farthest along the road to communism, and i s i n fa c t a whole stage ahead. At the same time, how-ever, there i s an implication i n the l a s t two sentences that the Chinese are rapidly catching up. It was almost exactly one year e a r l i e r that Khrushchev had asserted i n a speech that communism was no longer remote i n the Soviet Union, so the Chinese were, by their own calculations, only one jump behind. But the r e a l innovation i n the Chinese claims was that the commune could be used as a p r a c t i c a l experiment to 'explore* the road to communism. But c e r t a i n l y , the Chinese had not claimed to have leaped ahead into the stage of 'building communism*. Indeed, the commune resolution s p e c i f i c a l l y set out the prerequisites 7 I b i d . , p. 8 . 112 that would have to be achieved before the communist d i s t r i b u -t i o n p r i n c i p l e could be introduced and communism achieved: After a number of years, as the s o c i a l product increases greatly, the communist consciousness and morality of the entire people are raised to a much higher degree, and universal educa-tion i s i n s t i t u t e d and developed, the difference between workers and peasants, town and country and mental and manual labour . . . w i l l gradually vanish and the function of the state w i l l be limited to protecting the country from external aggression but w i l l play no role i n t e r n a l l y . At that time Chinese society w i l l enter the era of communism where the p r i n c i p l e of from each according to h i s a b i l i t y and to each according to h i s needs w i l l be practiced.8 The essence of the Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l challenge was fourfold, then. F i r s t , the Chinese were rejecting the binding force of Soviet 'experience 1 which had supposedly proven the communes to be unworkable. Secondly, they were claiming to be a second source of id e o l o g i c a l wisdom, insofar as the people's commune was an almost e n t i r e l y new idea, d i f f e r i n g substantially from the abandoned a g r i c u l t u r a l communes i n the Soviet Union. Thirdly, they were s t r i v i n g to bring about ownership by the whole people, as opposed to c o l l e c t i v e ownership, before this was completed i n the Soviet Union. Fourthly, they were setting themselves on a par with the Soviet Union by asserting that communism was no longer something remote i n China; and while conceding the Soviet lead, they were claiming i n essence to be moving Ibid., p. 7. 113 faster towards communism, with the p o s s i b i l i t y of reaching that f i n a l stage even before the U.S.S.R. It was implied that their innovation, the commune, would provide a revolutionary shortcut to the communist goal. Later, of course, i n subsequent months, these claims were expanded by various party leaders, but these were the chief challenges involved i n the text of the commune resolution i t s e l f . Communes i n the Chinese Press Within the next few days, important a r t i c l e s appeared i n both Red Flag and People's Daily, amplifying the content of the resolution. Moreover, a number of further i d e o l o g i c a l claims were advanced or implied. The communes were e x p l i c i t l y t i e d to Mao's theory of uninterrupted revolution, for instance i£ a Red Flag e d i t o r i a l on September 1. There, i t was asserted that the communes had been introduced so smoothly not only because the forces of production had outgrown their cooperative superstructure, but also because: the Chinese people have grasped the guiding ideology of the Communist Party's Central Committee, and Comrade Mao Tse-tung*s teachings on uninterrupted revolution. The working people want no pause i n the course of the revolution and they see that the more rapidly the revolution advances, the more benefits they w i l l derive.9 Furthermore, i t was recommended that the communes organize along military l i n e s , and introduce a m i l i t a r y style i n their ^"Greet the Upsurge i n Forming People's Communes," Red Flag,,, ,No. 7 , September 1 , 1958; Ibid., p. 1 3 . Ilk 'battle* to raise production. The ideol o g i c a l foundation for this policy was found i n the Communist Manifesto where Marx advocated the "establishment of i n d u s t r i a l armies, especially for agriculture". The p r a c t i c a l foundation was found i n the fac t that "the swift expansion of agriculture demands that they should greatly strengthen their (the peasants 1) organization, act more quickly and with greater d i s c i p l i n e and e f f i c i e n c y , so that l i k e factory workers and army men they can be deployed with greater freedom and on a 10 larger scale." As a rather ominous additional comment on the para-military technique to be employed i n the communes, i t was noted that "although the organization of a g r i c u l t u r a l labour along m i l i t a r y l i n e s at present i s f o r waging battles against nature and not human enemies, i t i s nonetheless not d i f f i c u l t to transform one kind of struggle into another." The communes, as a s o c i a l unit, were themselves further substantiated, i d e o l o g i c a l l y , by claiming for them the approval of the fathers of communism, (although s p e c i f i c references to document this claim were not put forward). Thus: " i t w i l l become the basic s o c i a l unit i n the future communist society as thinkers—from many outstanding Utopian s o c i a l i s t s to Marx, Engels and Lenin—had predicted on many 12 occasions." Moreover, i t was further asserted that the 1 0 I b i d . , p. Ik. 11 Loc. c i t . 12 "Hold High the Red Flag of the People's Communes and Continue to March On," People's Daily. September 3 , 1958; Ibid., p. 2 0 . 115 party had discovered the s p e c i f i c road to communism: "Co-op, advanced co-op, people's commune, advanced people's commune (e n t i r e l y communist i n character)." And that while the Chinese revolution was s t i l l i n the stage of building socialism, that some aspects of the communes such as the free supply of grain were "the budding sprouts of communism." Furthermore, while i t was reasserted that i t would be a mistake to think that the revolution was not s t i l l i n the stage of building socialism, and a mistake to attempt to move too quickly or prematurely to the communist d i s t r i b u t i o n system, i t was also made abundantly clear that the t r a n s i t i o n to communism was not f a r off. While the August resolution suggested that after ownership of the whole people had been achieved ( i n three to six years or longer), i t would s t i l l take "a number of years" to establish the prerequisites f o r communism, the a r t i c l e i n People's Daily reduced this l a t t e r period to "a few years", thus implying communism to be even more imminent i n China. From this l a t t e r forecast, one could conclude that there was a p o s s i b i l i t y of achieving communism within ten years i n China. At the same time as these r a d i c a l i d e o l o g i c a l assertions were being made, other statements i n the same a r t i c l e s provided amplifications of some of the p r a c t i c a l ^"Greet the Upsurge i n Forming the People's Communes, Red Flag, no. 7 , September 1 , 1958; Ibid., p. 12 . 116 reasons why the communes had been Introduced, indicating that, (as i n the Soviet Union's case) the changeover from old forms to new was apparently motivated p a r t l y by p r a c t i c a l considerations. Thus, i n the following passage, there i s no reference at a l l to id e o l o g i c a l considerations—only to the p r a c t i c a l consideration of rai s i n g the nation's standard of l i v i n g . Thus, To achieve high speed advance i n agriculture, enable the countryside to assume a new aspect at an early date, and improve the peasants* l i v i n g standards as quickly as possible, as facts show i t i s necessary to carry out large scale c a p i t a l construction that w i l l fundamentally change natural conditions; to apply new farming techniques; to develop forestry, animal husbandry, side occupations and f i s h e r i e s side by side with agriculture; to bui l d industries that w i l l serve agriculture and the needs of the peasants as well as big industries; gradually carry out mechaniza-tion and e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n ; to improve transport, communications and housing conditions i n r u r a l areas; and set up educational, health and cu l t u r a l establishments—to do a l l t h i s i s beyond the power of an a g r i c u l t u r a l producer's co-operative consisting of a few dozens or hundreds of households.lh One of the p r a c t i c a l reasons also mentioned, was the one attributed to Mao, that the decentralization provided by the communes would "make i t easier for leadership." It i s presumed that this means the communes would relieve the burdens on the party leaders whose task i s to direct a nation of over 650 m i l l i o n people, and place more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for economic development i n the hands of l o c a l authorities. How-ever, another meaning might also be implied: that the People's Daily, op. c i t . 117 commune system would make i t easier for the leadership (and the party) to control and indoctrinate the peasantry and workers. The system of communal l i v i n g offered by the communes i s p a r t i c u l a r l y well suited to p o l i t i c a l and economic control by a minority of party cadres, and to constant surveillance and i n d o c t r i n a t i o n — i n other words, t o t a l i t a r i a n " t o t a l " control. That this aspect of the communes was one of the more p r a c t i c a l advantages of the new s o c i a l unit i n the eyes of the Chinese leaders i s not to be denied. This i s especially apparent i n the l i g h t of the events of the preceding two years which had included numerous student s t r i k e s , the discovery of secret peasant organizations advocating the overthrow of the regime, and widespread c r i t i c i s m of the party and popular unrest during 15 the "Hundred Flowers" period. J It was clear i n the l i g h t of these events that the peasants i n particular were i n need of s t r i c t party supervision and i d e o l o g i c a l attention, and that permanent tight control could only be achieved through some kind of s o c i a l unit l i k e the commune. In communist terminology, the commune was the i d e a l s o c i a l unit to raise the " p o l i t i c a l consciousness" of the peasantry and lead i t to communism. Although the argument was never used by the Chinese, Marx could have been mobilized to support the commionization of the peasantry. In h i s Eighteenth 15 -'Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradic-tions Among the People (Peking, F.L.P., I960), p. 59* 1 1 8 Brumaire of Louis Napoleon. Marx noted that the reason the French peasants did not play a revolutionary role i n French his t o r y despite their wretched conditions and exploitation, was that they farmed small i n d i v i d u a l plots and. never came into contact with each other, thus never being able to develop an awareness that millions of others were i n the same condition—never, therefore, developing a class consciousness, the prerequisite to playing a part i n the process of his t o r y . Applying t h i s to the Chinese situation, one can see that the bringing together of the peasants into very large units would (with the party's assistance) heighten their class consciousness, just as the bringing together of workers into f a c t o r i e s during the i n d u s t r i a l revolution had served to raise the p o l i t i c a l consciousness of the working class. The Soviet Response to the Communes The public claims of the Chinese concerning their people's communes did not go unanswered by the Soviet Union. Within a week the Soviet leaders announced the convocation of the party's 2 1 s t Congress to be held a year early, i n February 1959. It i s evident from the timing, and the theme of the Congress (the building of communism), that the Chinese challenge was serious enough to warrant an ide o l o g i c a l answer from the podium of the most important of a l l party meetings—the Congress. Within days, the i n i t i a l Soviet reaction to the Chinese ideological challenge became apparent— 119 i t was to take a positive approach, reviving Khrushchev's statement of a year e a r l i e r that communism was on the horizon i n the Soviet Union. In a Kommunist e d i t o r i a l on September 9 , f o r instance, i t was proclaimed that: It i s necessary to evaluate the significance of the forthcoming 2 1 s t Congress of the CPSU. Our country i s i n the process of a great upsurge. The higher phase of communism i s already not a remote aim; the completion of the construction of socialism and the r e a l i z a t i o n of the gradual t r a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism i s the basic contant of the contemporary stage of development of Soviet society. 1 ° At the same time, a r t i c l e s which made any mention of the communes at a l l (which now of course could hardly be completely ignored) often referred to them as "higher type cooperatives", rather than "people's communes" thus indicating very c l e a r l y the ideol o g i c a l challenge inherent i n the choice of the name "commune". One important a r t i c l e of th i s type appeared i n Problems of Economics on October 1 6 , and was ent i t l e d "Great China Builds Socialism". The a r t i c l e made i t clear that the prerequisite for a rapid advance to communism was a high l e v e l of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and this was exactly what China did not have. It also pointed out that i n formerly underdeveloped countries l i k e China, i t was not enough to i n s t i t u t e purely s o c i a l i s t production r e l a t i o n s : "a certain l e v e l of development of prbduction forces i s also Quoted i n D.S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t , (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), p. 110. 120 needed." In short, " i t follows from this that the ( s o c i a l i s t ) t r a n s i t i o n period has not been completed i n the C.P.R." It i s noteworthy, however, that the a r t i c l e stated that the "higher type cooperatives" were the best form i n China, for 17 the speeding up of s o c i a l i s t construction. ' It i s true, of course, that the Russians could hardly launch a head-on attack on the communes without i n v i t i n g a major break with the Chinese party, and that some concessions to the more p r a c t i c a l Chinese assertions could be made while undermining the more far-reaching i d e o l o g i c a l claims. It i s perhaps even more s i g n i f i c a n t , however, that no Soviet leader even mentioned the communes p u b l i c l y , or expressed an opinion of them. Thus, while the press could hardly ignore them completely, the leadership most ce r t a i n l y could show i t s strong disapproval through an obvious and prolonged silence. This silence was to l a s t for over three years. Perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t a r t i c l e to appear i n Soviet journals during this period was one i n Problems of Philosophy by T. A. Stepanyan, a leading Soviet philosopher and authority on the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. In this a r t i c l e Stepanyan put forward an e n t i r e l y new concept i n Marxist theory—that di f f e r e n t groups of s o c i a l i s t countries would enter communism at different times, and that the European s o c i a l i s t countries would be the f i r s t to enter the communist Loc. c i t . 1 o state. Thus, People's China was relegated to a secondary-position v i s - a - v i s the other bloc members, and would have to undergo the t r a n s i t i o n to communism at a much l a t e r date, along with the otherAsian s o c i a l i s t countries. I t i s clear, of course, that this new assertion by Stepanyan was pa r t l y Soviet reaction to the ref u s a l of communist China i n May to agree to submit to Soviet pressures to enter into economic integration with the rest of the bloc. However, i t was also an implied threat that i f the Chinese didn't come to heel i d e o l o g i c a l l y , the Soviet Union would refuse to aid i n China's bid to catch up i n d u s t r i a l l y to the more advanced nations. When the Chinese did back down somewhat i n the following months, the Russians withdrew th i s 'law' l a i d down by Stepanyan and replaced i t with the p r i n c i p l e that a l l the s o c i a l i s t countries would enter communism simultaneously. And, of course, i n order for this to occur, the advanced s o c i a l i s t countries would have to undertake large programs of aid to enable their underdeveloped a l l i e s to catch up economically. A more obvious, purposeful downgrading of the Chinese occurred just a few days l a t e r upon the proclamation of the slogans for the anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution. Previously China had been accorded a special position i n the slogans, indicating a more advanced state ItQg-4. c i t a 1 2 2 than the other people's democracies. Now, she was downgraded to the position of the others. Thus, while being d i f f e r e n -t i a t e d before as a 'builder of socialism* (as opposed to 'building s o c i a l i s m 1 ) , i n the new slogans China was now said 19 to be 'building socialism* l i k e the rest of the s a t e l l i t e s . 7 This was a clear indication that the Russians were attempting to soft-pedal Chinese importance, especially as a bloc leader i n ideology and s o c i a l i s t construction. The Part-Supply System i n the Communes In the meantime the Chinese were continuing to press forward with their claims for the communes. On October 1, an e d i t o r i a l i n People*s Daily claimed that Mao Tse-tung had asserted on the basis of the 1958 leap forward that within from one to three years there would be an abundance of food and clothing i n China. Moreover, emphasis began to be put on the communist nature of the supply system of distribution being i n s t i t u t e d i n the communes, and i n mid-October the party put forward the policy of "part wages, part supply" for the r u r a l communes. This policy was put forward after an intra-party debate conducted among other places on the pages of People's Daily during the f i r s t three weeks of October. Some party leaders had attacked the wage system as bourgeois i n nature, echoing what Lenin had said i n "State 1 9 I b i d . , p. 111. 2 0 A c o l l e c t i o n of these a r t i c l e s appears i n Current Background, no. 537* 123 and Revolution", and urging the implementation of the free supply system. In essence this demand was a demand to move from socialism to communism i n terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, since Lenin had asserted that the two systems of d i s t r i b u t i o n — t o each according to h i s work (wage system) and to each according to h i s needs (supply system) were the chief c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the s o c i a l i s t and communist stages respectively. Other participants i n the debate urged that the wage system was the only appropriate one f o r the s o c i a l i s t stage i n which China found i t s e l f . The party came down i n the middle of these two schools—the Utopians and the conservatives—and formulated the part-wage, part-supply system. Insofar as the system was part-supply, i t was from a Marxist point of view also p a r t l y communist, and thus advanced beyond the Soviet system based almost solely on wages, and on "bourgeois" incentive. It i s clear, however, that from the Soviet point of view, these so-called buds of communism contained i n the communes were r e a l l y a r t i f i c i a l buds, since they were not i n f a c t based on the p r i n c i p l e "according to need", but on mere egalitarianism. It was obvious to a l l that there was not enough food i n China, despite the bumper harvest, to supply the needs of 650 m i l l i o n people. There i s a great difference between giving everyone a "free" bowl of r i c e , and l e t t i n g everyone eat h i s f i l l . This i s the difference between egalitarianism as practiced i n the premature Soviet communes, and communism as envisioned by Marx. 21 Zagoria, op. c i t . , p. 111. 12k Continuing Soviet Reaction One of the most s i g n i f i c a n t occurrences of this period was the r e c a l l to Moscow of the Soviet Ambassador, Pavel Yudin, i n late October. He remained i n Moscow for about two weeks, returning to Peking an the f i r s t week of November. Upon h i s return, Yudin made two speeches i n Peking which completely ignored the communes and stressed instead the necessity of building up a vast technological and economic base before any s o c i a l i s t country could consider the tr a n s i t i o n to 21 communism. It i s clear from the turn of events following Yudin*s return from Moscow that the Ambassador had important talks with the Chinese leaders about t h i s time, bringing back from Moscow a message and instructions concerning the communes and Chinese economic progress. It i s reasonable to assume, i n the l i g h t of subsequent events, that the Soviet Union brought economic pressure to bear on the Chinese i n order to bring about an ide o l o g i c a l retreat. I t i s interesting to note that the Chinese had had their economic dependence on the Soviet Union underlined only a few months e a r l i e r when they had to appeal to the Russians for an emergency supply of trucks and other equipment to cope with the enormous harvest, and other aspects of the great leap forward: In connection with the great upswing i n economic development i n 1958, requirements . . . for some types of machinery, equipment and raw materials increased s i g n i f i c a n t l y . Even after the signing of the annual protocol on trade i n 1958, we approached the Soviet Union to request supple-mentary commodity deliveries . . . Soviet 125 organizations s a t i s f i e d a l l our requests and delivered on schedule a large volume of equipment, raw materials and vehicles.22 The magnitude of this emergency request can be gauged from the fact that 20,000 trucks and t r a i l e r s alone were delivered 23 under this supplementary agreement i n August. J It i s quite probable that, i n the l i g h t of Stepanyan 1s a r t i c l e , the Soviet leaders instructed Yudin to inform Peking that unless their i d e o l o g i c a l claims were c l a r i f i e d and reduced i n regard to the communes, the Soviet Union would withdraw i t s economic support i n China's i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n program and leave the Chinese to "stew i n t h e i r own ju i c e " , (as Khrushchev had indicated i n June at the Bulgarian Congress). In the Soviet Union, the party continued i t s response to the Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l offensive. Thus, i n November two mass movements hailed as " c e l l s of the future communist society" were unveiled, with the effect of showing that, not to be outdone, the Russians also had "the buds of communism" within their society. These two mass movements were known as the "Brigades of Communist Labour", and the "People's M i l i t i a " . The former was a mass movement of workers designed to increase labour productivity, and to develop a "communist" 22 Statement by the Chinese Commercial Counselor i n Moscow, quoted i n 0. Hoeffding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations i n Recent Years," Unity and Contradiction (New York, Praeger, 1962), p. 209. 2 3Hoeffding, loc. c i t . 126 attitude towards work, while the l a t t e r was a movement designed to take over the functions of pol i c i n g the nation i n preparation for communism, when the public order would be maintained not by the state, but by the "people". In the same month, Khrushchev put forward his Thesis on the Seven Year Plan i n preparation f o r the 21st Congress. Included i n this preliminary draft was the following important passage, quite obviously meant for Chinese eyes: Vladimir I l y i c h Lenin has taught that without material incentives It i s impossible to lead tens and tens of millions of people to communism. The founders of Marxist-Leninism underlined the importance of the p r i n c i p l e of material interest of a l l t o i l e r s i n the growth of communal production for the creation of an abundance of products which would ensure the tr a n s i t i o n to communism; and, i n their time they c r i t i c i z e d the attitude of equalization i n distribution.2 5 At the same time Khrushchev l a i d down the basic program for the t r a n s i t i o n towards communism through a huge increase i n material abundance i n the Soviet Union, as opposed to r a d i c a l changes i n the superstructure or organization of Soviet society. 2 LH. Ritvo, "Totalitarianism Without Coercion?" Problems of Communism, November-December, i960, p. 19. 25 'N. S. Khrushchev, "Thesis on the Seven Year Plan," Pravda, November l k , 1958; Current Digest of the Soviet Preps, v o l . X, no. k 6 , p. 3. 127 The Beginnings of Retreat During November the Chinese Communist party began a widespread check up on the communes.2^ It was clear from the r a p i d i t y with which they were set up that many problems necessarily arose i n the communes during t h i s period. And since the commune resolution had l e f t the s p e c i f i c form of each commune i n the hands of the l o c a l cadres, i t was almost inevitable that some overzealous cadres would force the peasants into the communes against their w i l l , and that some cadres would become carried away by the successes of the leap forward and attempt to set up premature "utopian" communes. From l a t e r reports, i t i s now evident that many communes i n s t i t u t e d a free supply system i n the flood tide of i d e o l o g i c a l enthusiasm, and that t h i s led to a quick depletion of a l l the commune's grain reserves and to a great shortage of consumer commodities. It was i n this kind of economic and ide o l o g i c a l ferment that the Central Committee began to take steps to bring the commune movement under tighter control, and began to make a considered i d e o l o g i c a l retreat. Between November 2 and November 10, Mao Tse-tung called a meeting i n Chengchow of central and l o c a l party leaders to check up on the nationwide situation i n regard to L i Fu-chun, Raise High the Red Flag (Peking, F.L.P., I 9 6 0 ) , p. 2 . the communes.z* Chu Teh who was not at this session and apparently unaware of i t s development, made a speech at the Soviet Ambassador's reception on the evening of November 1 i n which he asserted that the Chinese people "have the confidence to accomplish s o c i a l i s t construction i n a very short h i s t o r i c a l period and, further, to pass 28 on to communism." Apparently after Mao had returned from Chengchow and reported to the politburo, and probably after Mao had received Yudin, and heard f i r s t hand the Soviet attitude, a d i s t i n c t policy change was ordered. Thus, only two weeks after h i s November 7 speech, Chu Teh told a conference of young party a c t i v i s t s that i t was mistaken to start "behaving l i k e Utopians." He stressed that China required i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n and the "highest world levels i n science and culture" before the t r a n s i t i o n to communism could be considered. He added that "our achievements so f a r are s t i l l f ar behind what i s needed to complete the building of 29 socialism." 7 He also refrained from discussing the role of the communes i n the t r a n s i t i o n to communism and remained s i l e n t on the question of the previously-lauded free supply system. '"Communique," 6th Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 3-28 Survey of the Chinese Mainland Press, no. l 8 9 k , November Ik, 1958, p. 3 k . 2 9Quoted i n Zagoria, op. c i t . . p. 12 k . CHAPTER VI THE CHINESE RETREAT On November 21, only eleven days after the end of the Chengchow meeting, Mao convened another meeting i n Wuchang, this time made up of central o f f i c i a l s and the party secretaries of the provinces, municipalities and i autonomous regions. This meeting dealt i n length with the reappraisal of the communes and prepared the way f o r the Plenary Session of the Central Committee held i n the same c i t y immediately following ( i n f a c t , the next day) the close of the deliberations. It was decided at this meeting to undertake a massive checkup of the communes i n the following winter months, according to a set of c r i t e r i a set down by the party leaders and promulgated the following week by the Plenary Session of the Central Committee. This Central Committee Session which ran from November 28 u n t i l December 20 was one of the most important events of the whole commune controversy, producing one of the three major docu-ments which have served to set party policy i n regard to the p r a c t i c a l and ide o l o g i c a l aspect of the communes (the other two being the o r i g i n a l resolution and the 1959 Eushan Communique, Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 3. 130 r e s o l u t i o n ) . T h i s d o c u m e n t , e n t i t l e d " R e s o l u t i o n On Some Q u e s t i o n s C o n c e r n i n g t h e P e o p l e ' s C o m m u n e s " , " e l a b o r a t e d a s e r i e s o f q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e p e o p l e ' s communes f r o m p t h e s t a n d p o i n t o f t h e o r y a n d p o l i c y " a n d f u n d a m e n t a l l y r e v i s e d t h e m o r e e x t r e m e i d e o l o g i c a l c l a i m s c o n t a i n e d i n t h e A u g u s t r e s o l u t i o n . A t t h e same t i m e t h e b a s i c " c o r r e c t -n e s s " o f t h e p e o p l e ' s commune p o l i c y w a s r e a f f i r m e d , a n d i t s f u n d a m e n t a l i d e o l o g i c a l b a s i s r e i t e r a t e d . The L u s h a n R e s o l u t i o n I n d e f e n d i n g t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e communes t h e r e s o l u t i o n a s s e r t e d t h a t " t h e e m e r g e n c e o f t h e p e o p l e ' s communes i s n o t f o r t u i t o u s ; i t i s t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e e c o n o m i c a n d p o l i t i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t o f o u r c o u n t r y , t h e o u t c o m e o f t h e s o c i a l i s t r e c t i f i c a t i o n c a m p a i g n c o n d u c t e d b y o u r p a r t y , o f t h e p a r t y ' s g e n e r a l l i n e f o r s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d t h e g r e a t l e a p f o r w a r d o f s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n i n 1958." 3 B e s i d e s i t s p r a c t i c a l b e n e f i t s , t h e r e s o l u t i o n a d d e d , " t h e commune h a s s h o w n t h e c o r r e c t r o a d o f t h e g r a d u a l t r a n s i t i o n t o communism a n d h a s p r o v e n t o be t h e c o r r e c t v e h i c l e f o r t h e r e a l i z a t i o n o f t h e p r e r e q u i s i t e s f o r c o m m u n i s m . " " A l l t h i s , " s u g g e s t s t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , " p r o v e s t h e c o r r e c t n e s s a n d h i s t o r i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e o f t h e 2 I b i d . , p . 1. -> " R e s o l u t i o n o n Some Q u e s t i o n s C o n c e r n i n g t h e P e o p l e ' s C o m m u n e s " , I b i d . . p . 12. 131 (August) Resolution on the Establishment of People's Communes i n the Rural Areas To underline their basic f a i t h i n the commune the Chinese leaders confirmed the fact that "urban people's communes . . . w i l l also become instruments for the transformation of old c i t i e s and the construction of new s o c i a l i s t c i t i e s " ^ i n the not too distant future. In short, the general commune policy-was restated and reaffirmed: Marxist-Leninist theory and the i n i t i a l experience of the people's communes in. our country enable us to foresee now that the people's communes w i l l quicken the tempo of our s o c i a l i s t construction and constitute the best form for r e a l i z i n g , i n our country the following two tr a n s i t i o n s . F i r s t l y , the tra n s i t i o n from c o l l e c t i v e ownership to ownership of the whole people i n the country-side; and secondly, the t r a n s i t i o n from s o c i a l i s t to communist society, the people's commune w i l l remain the basic unit of our so c i a l structure.© It i s si g n i f i c a n t to note, that while claiming the mantle of Marxist-Leninist theory for the communes, the Chinese expressly insert the q u a l i f i c a t i o n that they are the best form "in our country", thus disclaiming to be necessarily setting a "correct" model for the rest of the bloc. The soft pedalling of previous claims and insinuations giving the appearance of challenging Soviet leadership within the bloc or of challenging the Soviet lead i n the tr a n s i t i o n to commun-ism, was characteristic of the entire resolution. Ibid., p. Ih. ^Loc. c i t . 6 I b i d . , p. 17. 132 On the key question of the speed of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, the resolution repudiated previous suggestions that communism was imminent i n China, and asserted that the country would be engaged i n s o c i a l i s t construction for many years to come: This whole process w i l l take f i f t e e n , twenty or more years to complete, counting from now . . . . During this process, the elements of communism are bound to increase gradually and these w i l l lay the foundation of material and s p i r i t u a l conditions for the t r a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism.7 Thus, the challenge i n an i d e o l o g i c a l sense to the Russian leadership i n the drive towards communism was unmistakeably withdrawn, since the Soviet Union had completed the stage of s o c i a l i s t construction i n 1939 and had been ( t h e o r e t i c a l l y , at least) evolving from s o c i a l i s t to communist conditions for nearly twenty years. Thus the Russians were conceded to be far ahead of China on the road to communism. A similar retreat occurred i n regard to the claims put forward previously that the t r a n s i t i o n to the ownership of the whole people i n the r u r a l areas would be accomplished within a very few years. Now i t was asserted that: Col l e c t i v e ownership s t i l l plays a positive role today i n developing production i n the r u r a l people's communes. How soon the t r a n s i t i o n from c o l l e c t i v e ownership to ownership by the whole Ibid., p. 18 . 133 people w i l l be effected, w i l l be determined by objective factors - the l e v e l of development of production and the l e v e l of people's p o l i t i c a l understanding - and not by mere wishful thinking that i t can be done any time we want. Thus t h i s t r a n s i t i o n w i l l be r e a l i z e d , by stages and by groups, on a national scale only after a considerable time.° Furthermore, i t was made pe r f e c t l y clear that "the change from s o c i a l i s t c o l l e c t i v e ownership to s o c i a l i s t ownership by the whole people i s not the same thing as going over from socialism to communism."^ At the same time, the resolution voiced a warning that the existing c o l l e c t i v e ownership could not be kept in t a c t i n d e f i n i t e l y since this would jeopardize the p o s s i b i l i t y of evolving to the higher stage; thus federation of communes on a county l e v e l was advocated as an immediate step to keep the revolutionary process on the move. It i s interesting to r e c a l l i n this regard that this p o l i c y was s t r i k i n g l y similar to the proposals by Soviet theoreticians i n the previous spring, who had suggested that the road to eventual "ownership of the whole people" lay through federation of existing r u r a l units. Another ide o l o g i c a l retreat lay i n the resolution's modification of Mao's theory of "permanent revolution". While s t i l l maintaining the implied c r i t i c i s m that the Soviet Ibid., p. 21. i Loc. c i t . 1 3 k Union had brought i t s revolutionary evolution to a stand-s t i l l , the Chinese leaders repudiated the notion that the Chinese or anyone else could skip stages on the road to communism, or somehow leap forward to that f i n a l stage before f u l f i l l i n g the Marxist prerequisites. Thus, the resolution held that: We must not mark time at the s o c i a l i s t stage, nor should we drop into the Utopian dream of skipping the s o c i a l i s t stage and jumping over to the communist stage. We are advocates of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the development of the revolution by stages; we hold that dif f e r e n t stages of development r e f l e c t qualitative changes and that these stages, ^ 0 d i f f e r e n t i n quality, should not be confused. In essence, t h i s l a t t e r modification was one which made i t d i f f i c u l t to j u s t i f y the introduction of "shoots of communism" i n the s o c i a l i s t stage, and can be thus seen as a de f i n i t e i d e o l o g i c a l concession to the Soviet point of view, more or less forced on the party by Soviet pressure. At the same time there were also strong domestic reasons to oppose utopianism: We should not groundlessly make declarations that the people's communes w i l l 'realize ownership by the whole people immediately* of even *enter communism immediately*, and so on. To do such things i s not only an expression of rashness, i t w i l l greatly lower the standards of communism i n the minds of the people, d i s t o r t the great i d e a l of communism and vulgarize i t , strengthen the petty bourgeois Ibid., p. 2k. 135 trend towards egalitarianism and adversely af f e c t the development of s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n .H The phrasing of t h i s statement i s most reminiscent of Stalin's declaration on the communes at the 17th Congress and provides a strong i n d i c a t i o n that the Chinese had made a very conscious swing toward conceding that Soviet warnings and Soviet experience should have been more closely heeded. Another id e o l o g i c a l point conceded to the Russians i n the text of the resolution was that an enormous abundance of s o c i a l products was essential before communism could be achieved. It w i l l be remembered i n this regard that the Russians had made this point one of their key arguments i n their reaction to the Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l challenge during the autumn months. Now the Chinese p u b l i c l y agreed that without "an enormous abundance of s o c i a l products . . . i t i s of course impossible to talk about entering a higher stage of development i n human society--communism." More importantly, i t was soberly suggested that "our comrades must bear i n mind that the present l e v e l of development of the productive forces i n our country i s , after a l l , s t i l l very low." The significance of this point should not be under-estimated, since i t was at the very crux of Khrushchev's domestic p o l i c i e s . The most important of a l l goals as far as Khrushchev was concerned was increasing productivity and the Loc. c i t . 136 point which the Chinese were agreeing to had supplied the i d e o l o g i c a l foundation for the M.T.S. reorganization i n the spring, and which supplied the rationale for Khrushchev's emphasis on incentives and other expedient, u n s o c i a l i s t i c devices. In a similar vein, the resolution rejected the premature introduction of the communist system of d i s t r i b u t i o n and defended the system based on the p r i n c i p l e of each according to h i s work. Bowing to the Soviet point of view the Chinese agreed that: any negation of the p r i n c i p l e to each according to h i s work w i l l tend to dampen the enthusiasm of the people and i s therefore disadvantageous to the development of production and the increase of s o c i a l products, and hence to speeding the r e a l i z a -tion of communism . . . . Any premature attempt to negate the p r i n c i p l e of 'to each according to h i s work' and replace i t with the p r i n c i p l e of 'to each according to h i s needs', that i s , any attempt to enter communism by overreaching our-selves when conditions are not mature - i s un-doubtedly a Utopian concept that cannot possibly succeed.12 Moreover, i n the l i g h t of this admission, an attempt was made to stress the s o c i a l i s t nature of the part-wage part-supply system i n s t i t u t e d i n the communes and to deemphasize the role of free supply i n the communes. Thus i t was suggested that i n future wages should gradually increase as a proportion of t o t a l income, and that the free supply portion of income Ibid., p. 2 3 . 137 should, be reduced. Nevertheless, the free supply system was s t i l l defended as embodying the f i r s t shoots of communism, and was to be maintained as an a u x i l i a r y to the wage system: The introduction of a d i s t r i b u t i o n system which combines the wage system and. the free supply system i n the part of the commune's income a l l o t t e d to i t s members fo r consump-tion i s a form of s o c i a l i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n created by China's people's communes, and at the present time i t represents what the broad mass of the members earnestly demand . . . . This d i s t r i b u t i o n system includes the f i r s t shoots of communism but i n essence i t i s s t i l l s o c i a l i s t - based on the p r i n c i p l e of 'from each according to h i s a b i l i t y , to each according to his work'.13 Apparently i n reply to charges of 'egalitarianism', the resolution went on to point out that the "free supply system does not seek to make the l i f e of the people uniform." In summation, then, i t can be said that the December resolution upheld the commune as the correct and necessary soc i a l unit for China, while withdrawing most of the i d e o l o g i -c a l claims which had suggested that China was rapidly advancing towards communism or that China had jumped ahead of the Soviet Union. At the same time, certain i d e o l o g i c a l challenges remained. For example, the Chinese s t i l l defended the p r i n c i p l e of uninterrupted revolution with i t s implied c r i t i c i s m of those who "mark time at the s o c i a l i s t stage". Ibid., p. 31* 138 And i n sticking to their advance from c o l l e c t i v e s to communes, the Chinese were s t i l l f l y i n g i n the face of Soviet p o l i c y which had rejected the orthodox Marxist notion that communes were the ultimate unit of s o c i a l i s t and communist society. This s t i l l amounted to a concrete challenge of the Soviet revisionism i n this regard. Moreover, i n reaffirming the supply system as "budding communism" the Chinese could s t i l l claim to be nearer to communism than the " s t a t i c " Soviet Union i n certain limited respects. And f i n a l l y , by r e l a t i n g the communes to needs a r i s i n g out of the special conditions existing i n China, the Chinese were s t i l l able to offer their road as the most appropriate for the under-developed nations, thus offering i d e o l o g i c a l leadership to these areas. In short, the whole commune p o l i c y as a s t r i k i n g divergence from the Soviet road and as a policy more i n l i n e with orthodox Marxist theory, established Peking as an alternative source of l e a d e r s h i p — i d e o l o g i c a l , and p r a c t i c a l — w i t h i n the communist world. Continuing Soviet Displeasure On December 1 i n Moscow, Khrushchev made mention of the communes i n a private interview with Senator Hubert Humphrey while the Chinese Central Committee was i n session. According to Humphrey's report, Khrushchev: was openly derisive, however, of the Chinese experiment with communes. This i s an 'old fashioned 1, 'reactionary* idea which the Soviet Union had t r i e d unsuccessfully right 139 after the 1917 revolution and had long since been abandoned. The communes, he went on, are based on the theory 'from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s , to each according to h i s needs. '1^ The Soviet leader stressed that the communes repudiated i n c e n t i v e s — a policy Khrushchev claimed was absurd. He tol d Humphrey that i t was impossible to achieve increased production without an incentive system for the workers. Mikovan i n the United States A few weeks l a t e r , Mikoyan spoke i n similar terms i n Los Angeles to a U.C.L.A. seminar group. This was on January 13, some time after the December 10 resolution had been published by the Chinese. Discussing the communes, i n answer to a press question, Mikoyan asserted that the Chinese had now rea l i z e d the necessity of maintaining the incentive system i f the communes were to function as effective economic units. According to the New York Times report, Mikoyan said that: the Russians set up such communes i n 1918 and 1919 but soon discovered that without a developed economy they would not work. He said i t was not possible to i n s t i t u t e the communist p r i n c i p l e 'from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s , to each according to h i s needs 1 u n t i l a very productive economy had been developed, a situation he admitted l a y s t i l l i n the distant future. 15 'New York Times. February 7, 1959. New York Times. January 13, 1959, P« 1. It i s clear from Mikoyan*s remarks that from the Soviet point of view, the Chinese had d e f i n i t e l y attempted to introduce prematurely the communist system of d i s t r i b u t i o n and work i n the o r i g i n a l communes. His remark concerning the December 10 decision to r e t a i n incentives points up Soviet recognition that the p r i n c i p l e of 'to each according to h i s work' had been at least p a r t i a l l y r e i n s t i t u t e d by the Chinese. No doubt, however, the party-supply system of d i s t r i b u t i o n was s t i l l a matter of Soviet concern. Mikoyan went on to reinforce 'his previous comments by asserting that " i n a poor economy such as that of the Soviet Union immediately after the revolution, the pure commune would not work." He said that Marx, Lenin and other communist philosophers had recognized that material incentives would be needed before pure communism was attained."*"^ In reply to a question asking how long i t would be before communism would be attained, "Mikoyan smiled and said ' i t w i l l take some time, 17 and i t w i l l be a gradual process*." ' It i s interesting to note Mikoyan*s choice of words here. His statement that the "pure commune" would not work leaves open the p o s s i b i l i t y that the revised Chinese commune might, i f i t s t i l l embodied the incentive system. On the other hand, hi s words concerning the necessary gradualness of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism i s a clear indictment of the Chinese attempts to leap forward towards communism during the autumn months. ^ L o c . c i t . 1 7 L o c . c i t . According to the New York Times correspondent, "Mr. Mikoyan stressed that there was no difference between the Soviet Union and China on the commune issue. However, his remarks implied that there was a difference i n thinking since the Chinese were fa r from reaching an economy of abundance. ""^ Two weeks l a t e r , on January 2h, Mikoyan was once again questioned on matters r e l a t i n g to Sino-Soviet r e l a t i o n s . At the National Press Club he was asked whether Mao Tse-tung was now the leading theoretician of the communist world: Mr. Mikoyan hesitated a moment before replying. Then he said very quickly 'Mao i s as good a theoretician as he always was.' Listeners noted that Mr. Mikoyan spoke brusquely and immediately seated himself as i f he wished to dismiss the enquiry as quickly as possible. The tone of h i s reply, p a r t i c u l a r l y as expressed i n Russian, verged on rudeness.19 Obviously this was a p a r t i c u l a r l y sore point with Mikoyan as with the other top Soviet leaders, and h i s reply makes i t clear that Mao's id e o l o g i c a l i n i t i a t i v e s were deeply resented i n Moscow. It i s also clear from these remarks that Mao's theorizing had assumed the proportions of a major challenge to the position of the CPSU as leading and only interpreter of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The resentment against Mao as a theorist can r e a l l y only be explained i n the l i g h t of the fact that Mao's interpretations were not just of a Loc. c i t . 'New York Times. January 25, 1959, p. k. domestic character but were of bloc-wide significance, offering alternative i d e o l o g i c a l leadership to that of the Soviet Union. Moreover this leadership was of such a nature as to even extend into the Soviet Party, and to provide a r a l l y i n g point for such "anti-party" groups as the so-called S t a l i n i s t wing of the CPSU. Indeed, since Mao's Interpreta-tions of Marxist-Leninism were much more orthodox than those of Khrushchev, they were p a r t i c u l a r l y dangerous to the Soviet leader since i t was exactly this "dogmatism" that Khrushchev was struggling against. For instance, there had been by Khrushchev's own admission, considerable intra-party opposi-tion to h i s reorganization of the M.T.S. i n early 1958, and this opposition had come from the more "dogmatic" elements i n the party. This opposition had been silenced, but only a few months l a t e r Mao Tse-tung came forth to support the same id e o l o g i c a l position, and he was not silenced so e a s i l y . In his M.T.S. speech, Khrushchev had said: The Party delivered a shattering blow to the conservatives and dogmatists divorced from l i f e who resisted the Party's Leninist l i n e and opposed implementation of such major measures as . . . applying the p r i n c i p l e of the material stake of the c o l l e c t i v e farmers i n the development of the communal economy.20 Khrushchev's i n t e r n a l opposition was bolstered immensely by the appearance within the bloc of a powerful independent voice 20 N. S. Khrushchev, "On Further Developing the Collective Farm System and Reorganizing the M.T.S.," Pravda. March 28, 1959; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . X, no. 11, p. 6. 1 L3 supporting their point of view. Although Molotov, Kagano-v i t c h , Shepilov, and Malenkov were a l l demoted to minor posts and denounced, i t i s almost certain that these former presidium members had a large following within the party which was receptive to just the kind of external support which Mao provided (and continues to provide) i n the i d e o l o g i -c a l sphere. This situation i s doubtless the cause of considerable concern to the Soviet leaders, and w i l l remain so as long as Mao continues to follow c l o s e l y i n the foot-steps of S t a l i n . Although the two party leaders had f i r s t crossed ide o l o g i c a l swords i n Moscow i n November 1957 over the issues 21 of war and peace, and of co-existence, i t was Mao's public pronouncements over the communes i n 1958 which constituted the f i r s t public concrete challenge to Moscow's monopoly i n ideological matters, and offered an alternative source of ideological leadership to rank and f i l e communists of S t a l i n i s t and orthodox Marxist persuasion i n communist parties every-where- -including the Soviet Union. It i s i n this l i g h t then, that Mikoyan's remarks about Mao to the National Press Club take on their significance, and i n this l i g h t that they should be interpreted. As the New York Times observer cor r e c t l y pointed out:, Soviet Government. A Reply to Peking (London, Soviet Booklets, 1963), p. 18. There was no praise f o r Mr. Mao's present theoretical c a p a b i l i t i e s , and an avoidance of any commitment by Mr. Mikoyan as to what Mr. Mao's past theore t i c a l a b i l i t i e s had been. It was thought the p o s s i b i l i t y existed that Mr. Mikoyan*s choice of curt, non-commltal language r e f l e c t e d serious differences between Moscow and Peking of a t h e o r e t i c a l nature, s p e c i f i c a l l y on the question of the Chinese communes.22 Mikoyan's tone indicated that despite the December resolution's p a r t i a l i d e o l o g i c a l r e t r e a t , considerable differences of opinion remained between the Soviet and Chinese leaders, and feelings were s t i l l high. And this was on the eve of the Soviet Party's 21st Congress, and only three days before Khrushchev's major address. German Party Reaction to the Communes In t h i s same period just before the 21st Congress a very s i g n i f i c a n t a r t i c l e appeared i n Unity, the theore t i c a l journal of the East German Communist Party. The a r t i c l e dealt with the theory and practice of the communes i n China, and was written by Paul Wandel, East Germany's Ambassador to Peking. The theme of the a r t i c l e was that while the communes might be suitable for China, they were not the appropriate form to be used i n building a s o c i a l i s t society elsewhere i n the bloc. According to the New York Times summary of the a r t i c l e , "Herr Wandel said the communes could be understood New York Times. January 25, 1959, p. L . ii+5 only i n terms of the s p e c i f i c conditions found i n China. Developments i n China arise from conditions much di f f e r e n t 23 from those i n other countries, Herr Wandel said." J Thus, the communes were explained away as arising solely from unique objective conditions i n China. The communes and Mao's theorizing was deliberately rejected as a possible alternative road for the other bloc countries. This statement by Wandel, therefore, suggests great significance of the communes as an id e o l o g i c a l challenge to Russian leadership over the bloc's t r a n s i t i o n to communism. At the same time Wandel's a r t i c l e seemed to indicate an acceptance of the commune system i n i t s revised form, and an attitude of non-interference as long as the Chinese did not seek to prescribe for the rest of the bloc as well as for themselves. The tone set by the German Ambassador i n this a r t i c l e proved to be a harbinger of the i d e o l o g i c a l position adopted by the Russian leaders at the 21st Congress a few weeks l a t e r . 23 New York Times. January iH, 1 9 5 9 , p. 3 . CHAPTER VII THE TWENTY-FIRST CONGRESS AND THE AFTERMATH: TEMPORARY TRUCE As has been pointed out, the timing of the decision to c a l l the 21st Congress was a strong i n d i c a t i o n that Khrushchev intended to use thi s forum as a vehicle to mount his i d e o l o g i c a l reply to the Chinese challenge and to win back the i d e o l o g i c a l i n i t i a t i v e . Although the Congress was formally c a l l e d to discuss the new Seven Year Plan, i t was, i n r e a l i t y , a Congress convened i n order to lay down the ide o l o g i c a l l i n e on the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, just as the 22nd Congress was c a l l e d two years l a t e r to lay down the l i n e of the international communist movement on revolution and peaceful co-existence. The CPSU Congress was an i d e a l vehicle for this since, unlike the Chinese party congress eight months e a r l i e r , there were delegations from seventy parties i n attendance i n Moscow, headed by such important bloc personalities as Chou E n - l a i , and the European s a t e l l i t e leaders. The most important single event of the Congress was Khrushchev 1s lengthy speech, i n which he devoted a whole section to the "New State i n Communist Construction and Some Problems of Marxist-Leninist Theory". This was to become the most authoritative statement of the Soviet ide o l o g i c a l position on the question of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism throughout the Ik7 d i s p u t e o v e r t h e communes , a n d r e m a i n s t h e b a s i c d o c u m e n t d e f i n i n g S o v i e t p o l i c y a n d i d e o l o g y on t h i s m a t t e r e v e n t o d a y . K h r u s h c h e v b e g a n b y d i s c u s s i n g " t h e t w o p h a s e s o f c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y a n d t h e l a w s g o v e r n i n g t h e g r o w i n g o f s o c i a l i s m i n t o c o m m u n i s m . " H e e m p h a s i z e d t h a t M a r x , E n g e l s a n d L e n i n h a d a l l m a i n t a i n e d t h a t f o l l o w i n g t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y o v e r t h r o w o f c a p i t a l i s t s o c i e t y , t h e new o r d e r w o u l d p a s s t h r o u g h t w o d i s t i n c t s t a g e s : a l o w e r p h a s e ( s o c i a l i s t ) a n d a h i g h e r p h a s e ( c o m m u n i s m ) . M o r e o v e r , h e a s s e r t e d t h a t t h i s p a r t i c u l a r s e g m e n t o f M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t t h e o r y h a d b e e n s u b -s t a n t i a t e d b y t h e h i s t o r i c a l e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , w h i c h h a d c o m p l e t e d t h e b u i l d i n g o f t h e f i r s t p h a s e some y e a r s ago a n d h a d now e n t e r e d " a new p e r i o d i n w h i c h s o c i a l i s m g r o w s i n t o c o m m u n i s m . " 1 R e p l y i n g on t h e t w i n s o u r c e s o f M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s t t h e o r y a n d S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e , K h r u s h c h e v w e n t o n t o f o r m u l a t e t h r e e b a s i c p r o p o s i t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e n a t u r e o f t h i s t w o -p h a s e t r a n s i t i o n t o p u r e c o m m u n i s m . F i r s t o f a l l , h e a s s e r t e d , " t h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m t h e s o c i a l i s t t o t h e h i g h e r s t a g e i s a l a w - g o v e r n e d h i s t o r i c a l p r o c e s s t h a t c a n n o t be v i o l a t e d o r b y p a s s e d a t w i l l ; . . . s o c i e t y c a n n o t l e a p s t r a i g h t f r o m c a p i t a l i s m t o communism w i t h o u t g o i n g t h r o u g h t h e s o c i a l i s t N . S . K h r u s h c h e v , C o n t r o l F i g u r e s f o r t h e E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e U . S . S . R . f o r 1 9 5 9 - 1 9 6 5 : R e p o r t D e l i v e r e d a t 2 1 s t E x t r a o r d i n a r y C o n g r e s s o f t h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , J a n u a r y 2 7 , 1959 ( M o s c o w , F o r e i g n L a n g u a g e s P u b l i s h i n g H o u s e , 1959), p. l l k . l»+8 stage." 2 This, of course, was a clear i d e o l o g i c a l thrust at the Chinese who had o r i g i n a l l y intimated that the communes were a shortcut to communism. The charge that the Chinese were attempting to "skip over" a stage was one of the most serious l e v e l l e d at the Chinese during the more heated moments of the dispute over the communes and was one of the most deeply resented. In expanding the proposition that i t i s impossible to skip over h i s t o r i c a l stages, Khrushchev denounced "e g a l i t a r i a n communism" and the premature i n t r o -duction of d i s t r i b u t i o n according to needs. Apparently referr i n g to the Chinese, he remarked that: Some comrades might, of course, suggest that we accelerate the introduction of the p r i n -cip l e s of communism. But to pass prematurely to d i s t r i b u t i o n according to needs . . . would only impair the work of building communism . . . . This 'egalitarian communism* would only eat up our stockpiles, make extended reproduction impossible and block successful expansion of the economy. We must advance step bv step creating the material and s p i r i t u a l requisites for a methodical t r a n s i t i o n to communism.3 In this passage the Soviet leader not only p u l l s the i d e o l o g i -c a l rug from beneath Chinese f l i r t a t i o n with egalitarianism, but also answers c r i t i c i s m s implied by the Chinese i n the autumn that the Russians were holding back the advance to communism. 2 I b i d . , p. 115. -JLoc. c i t . 1 L9 The second of Khrushchev*s three propositions proved to be s t r i k i n g l y similar to Mao's revised theory of "unin-terrupted revolution" which had appeared i n the December 10 resolution. He conceded that "notwithstanding a l l the differences between the communist and s o c i a l i s t stages, there i s no wall separating these two stages of s o c i a l development.'^ Thus, while Mao had e a r l i e r made the concession that there were two d i s t i n c t stages and that the two stages "should not be confused", the Soviet leader now bowed to the Chinese view that "no Great Wall exists or can be allowed to exist between the democratic revolution and the s o c i a l i s t revolu-t i o n , and between socialism and communism." It i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that this meeting of minds on such an important point developed without private consultation between the two parties, especially i n view of Khrushchev's state of mind on December 1 i n h i s interview with Humphrey. It i s almost certain that discussions took place between the Soviet leaders and Chou E n - l a i on a number of i d e o l o g i c a l and economic issues, immediately preceding the Congress. This point of view i s substantiated by the f a c t that Khrushchev did not p u b l i c l y "deny" Humphrey's account of Khrushchev's remarks u n t i l his speech at the Congress on January 27 (the American Senator's report had been published weeks e a r l i e r ) . The Senator himself commented on the significance of the delayed Loc. c i t i5o attack i n a speech delivered i n the Senate following Khrush-chev's speech, suggesting that the Chinese had asked for a public denial of his remarks.^ (It i s also noteworthy that the Soviet Premier at no time actually denied making the remarks attributed to him, but merely announced how 'unthinkable* i t would be for any con f i d e n t i a l exchange to 6 have taken place.) In f a c t , the whole tone of the speech by Khrushchev, suggested that a considerable degree of co n c i l i a t i o n had occurred behind the scenes before the Congress opened. And, of course, this meeting of minds had been f a c i l i t a t e d greatly by the general Chinese id e o l o g i c a l retreat of December 10, which had opened up the way to some kind of i d e o l o g i c a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . Khrushchev's t h i r d main theoretical proposition embodied a further defense of the Soviet Union against charges of "conservatism", and was designed to counter suggestions that Soviet preoccupation with increasing the nation's material abundance meant a slowing down of the revolutionary advance to communism. Thus, the Soviet leader stated that the "gradual t r a n s i t i o n to communism should not be understood as a decelerated movement. On the contrary, i t i s a period of rapid development . . . ." Defending his p o l i c i e s of stressing %ew York Times. February 7, 1959. ^Khrushchev, on. c i t . , p. 187. 151 b e t t e r management a n d m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o - c o m m u n i s m , K h r u s h c h e v s t r o n g l y e m p h a s i z e d t h a t t h e c o r r e c t r o a d l a y n o t i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a n g e s ( l i k e t h e communes) b u t i n i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n . I n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n , h e p r o c l a i m e d , w a s t h e e s s e n t i a l f a c t o r i n s p e e d i n g t h e a d v a n c e t o commun ism: T h i s o b j e c t i v e p r o c e s s o f s o c i a l i s m g r o w i n g i n t o communism c a n be a c c e l e r a t e d on t h e b a s i s o f t h e h i g h l e v e l o f m a t e r i a l p r o d u c -t i o n a t t a i n e d i n t h e p e r i o d o f s o c i a l i s m . T h e r e m u s t be n o undue h a s t e , no h u r r i e d i n t r o d u c t i o n o f m e a s u r e s t h a t h a v e n o t y e t m a t u r e d . T h i s w o u l d l e a d t o d i s t o r t i o n s a n d w o u l d d i s c r e d i t o u r c a u s e . 7 H e r e i s a c l e a r r e f e r e n c e t o t h e communes , r e i t e r a t i n g o n c e more t h e S o v i e t v i e w t h a t t h i s f o r m o f s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s i n t r o d u c e d p r e m a t u r e l y I n C h i n a , b e f o r e o b j e c t i v e c o n d i t i o n s w e r e r i p e , a n d s u g g e s t i n g t h a t c o m m u n e - i z a t i o n h a d h u r t t h e b l o c ' s i m a g e . A t t h e same t i m e , i t w a s a l s o a d e f e n s e o f t h e S o v i e t p o l i c y o f r e t a i n i n g t h e c o l l e c t i v e s a s t h e b a s i c a g r i c u l t u r a l u n i t , e c h o i n g t h e a r g u m e n t s o f t h e p r e v i o u s s p r i n g , t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e s d i d n o t n e e d t o be s u p e r s e d e d b y some o t h e r f o r m , b e c a u s e t h e y s t i l l r e t a i n e d i n e x h a u s t i b l e p o t e n t i a l f o r i n c r e a s e d p r o d u c t i o n . W h i l e c o u n s e l l i n g a g a i n s t undue h a s t e , K h r u s h c h e v a l s o a s s e r t e d t h a t , " o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , we m u s t n o t s t o p l o n g a t w h a t we I b i d . , p . 116. 152 g have already achieved; that would lead to stagnation." But he made i t clear that his idea of moving ahead towards communism was to increase production, and that the fundamental practical task today is to build UP the material and technical base of communist society, secure a further powerful expansion of the socialist production forces . . . . In laying emphasis in the coming period, on the building of the material and technical base of communism, we proceed in every respect from Marxist-Leninism and the experience of the Soviet Union and a l l the socialist countries.9 By putting i t this way, Ihruschev was making i t clear that this was a pronouncement which was universally binding on a l l socialist countries. After collectivization, production was the most important task of a l l the socialist regimes, and other issues must be subordinated to i t . It is interesting to note the difference in emphasis in the other prerequisites to communism between the Chinese and Soviet parties. Whereas to the Russians, increased production was the matter of greatest Importance, the Chinese emphasized much more the organization and "spiritual" aspects in the struggle to prepare the foundations of communism. And this proved to be one of the most contentious areas of the dispute over the correct road to communism. To the Chinese, increased produc-tion was just one of several prerequisites. They had stressed that the communes would have as one of their tasks the Loc. cit. Ibid., p. 119. 153 elimination of the differences between town and country, which Marx and Lenin had proclaimed was a necessity for the achievement of communism. Moreover, the Chinese were much more concerned to raise the "ideological consciousness" of the masses i n order to prepare them to look upon work as a labour of love, and to work "according to their a b i l i t i e s " as incentives and coercion were gradually removed, and communism came closer. To the Chinese, the communes were an instrument to achieve a l l these prerequisites, not just the material ones: the communist consciousness and morality of the entire people w i l l be elevated to a much higher degree; universal education w i l l be achieved and the l e v e l raised; the differences between worker and peasant, be-tween town and country, between mental and manual labour . . . and the remnants of unequal bourgeois rights which are the r e f l e c t i o n of these differences w i l l gradually vanish . . . .10 These differences would not magically disappear, any more than production could somehow magically increase—they were differences which the party would have to a c t i v e l y reduce and eliminate through a prolonged nationwide e f f o r t . The commune, by combining industry and agriculture sought to erase the differences gradually between town and country. But what, the Chinese might ask, were the Russians doing about these problems? The Soviet party had rejected the commune and had made no move to integrate industry and agriculture; on 1 0From the December 10th Commune Resolution. i 5 k the contrary, i t had announced that the c o l l e c t i v e s , as b a s i c a l l y a g r i c u l t u r a l units, would remain i n d e f i n i t e l y i n Soviet society. It was here that the Russians l e f t them-selves open to Chinese charges of conservatism, and of ha l t i n g the revolutionary advance towards communism. Material abundance alone could not open the door to the communist society. But i n Khrushchev's 21st Congress speech, he in f e r r e d that by concentrating the party's e f f o r t s on increasing production, that somehow the other prerequisites to communism would naturally follow on. Thus, he claimed that: as s o c i a l i s t production i s extended on a new material and technical base, and as education i s more clos e l y linked with productive labour, the essential d i s t i n c t i o n s between mental and physical labour w i l l gradually disappear. The all-round development of our people w i l l trans-form labour into man's prime want. This w i l l be f a c i l i t a t e d by the forthcoming reduction i n working hours and further improvement of working conditions. When every branch of industry i s automated and man becomes the master of the machine, he w i l l have to devote less time and energy to producing things he needs. Labour, which at times i s s t i l l arduous and t i r i n g , w i l l become a source of joy and pleasure f o r a harmoniously developed healthy person.11 L i t t l e mention was made of id e o l o g i c a l considerations or of how this " a l l round development" was going to take place. Somehow, increased production would naturally solve the important problems and "contradictions" which stood i n the Khrushchev, op. c i t . , p. 119. 155 way of Marx's Utopia. There i s l i t t l e i n d i c a t i o n of a p r a c t i c a l party program p a r a l l e l i n g production development which would seek to raise the i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness of the people to prepare the way for the introduction of the communist p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n . As the Chinese were well aware from their i n i t i a l experience with the communes, when communist "morality" and "consciousness" are not developed to an adequate l e v e l , the population merely takes according to needs, but doesn't replenish according to t h e i r a b i l i t y to produce. In other words, they give as l i t t l e as they can and take a l l that they can get. To establish i n people the appropriate communist conscience to enable the state to introduce the communist system of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s an immense task requiring a fundamental change of human nature throughout the population. Yet, the Chinese who were constantly struggling, through mass campaigns and thought reform programs, to raise the id e o l o g i c a l consciousness of their workers and peasants, were doing f a r more i n this regard than their Russian comrades who claimed to be much closer to the attainment of pure communism. From the Chinese point of view, i t looked very much as though Khrushchev was l i t t l e concerned with r e a l l y working to achieve the non-economic prerequisites of communism, and i t appeared that h i s overriding concern was to raise the standard of l i v i n g of h i s people and to give them a b e t t e r — n o t necessarily a communist—life. While paying l i p service to the requirements l a i d down by Marx 156 and to the goal of eventually entering communism, i n actual practice, the Soviet leader was even s a c r i f i c i n g ideology, when expedient, to increase the flow of production. In short, i t looked very much as though Khrushchev had compromised the revolutionary advance of h i s nation towards communism, and had l o s t sight of the ultimate goal. In many ways the Soviet Union had evolved more towards bourgeois society than towards communist society since the death of S t a l i n . In defending the maintenance of the p r i n c i p l e of di s t r i b u t i n g according to work during the period of building communism, the Soviet leader appealed to the fac t that e a r l i e r Soviet history had shown the premature introduction of the communist system of d i s t r i b u t i o n to be disastrous. Thus, he concluded, u n t i l communism was achieved, society must stringently control both labour and consumption. Using this h i s t o r i c a l argument as a springboard to launch a th i n l y v e i l e d lecture aimed at h i s Chinese guests, Khrushchev b i t i n g l y proclaimed: This country passed through a period of 'war communism1 when, as a temporary measure, we were obliged to abandon the p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n according to work and adopt 'di s t r i b u t i o n according to mouths*. This was not due to abundance, but to an acute shortage of food and consumers* goods . . . . That method of d i s t r i b u t i o n , however, could not be regarded as normal. Its defects came to the surface immediately the country attacked the job of economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n and development. Lenin f o r t h r i g h t l y stated that without a material incentive giving every worker an interest i n the results of his work, there 157 could be no question of ra i s i n g the country's productive capacity or of building a s o c i a l i s t economy, and leading millions forward to communism.12 Forcing the lesson home, he added: the s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i o n according to work i s based on the understanding that i n the s o c i a l i s t stage, e g a l i t a r i a n d i s t r i b u t i o n i s impossible . . . . We cannot disregard the fact that l e v e l l i n g would lead to an unjust method of d i s t r i b u t i o n : the bad worker and the good would receive an equal share which would be to the advantage of the slackers . . . . Levelling would mean not tr a n s i t i o n to communism, but the di s c r e d i t i n g of communism.13 Not once does Khrushchev mention the communes by name—either the former Soviet ones or the current ones i n China—but these remarks are a clear indictment of the Chinese passion for " l e v e l l i n g " v i a the communes, and serve as a stern warning against further attempts at egalitarianism, which only serve to d i s c r e d i t the whole communist cause. The fact that the Soviet party leader did not mention the communes by name especially during h i s discussion of the period of war communism, i s a strong i n d i c a t i o n that he was loath to publ i c l y raise the commune issue, since he would then have had either to d i r e c t l y attack the Chinese "innovations" or to defend the Soviet policy of rejecting the commune as a useful s o c i a l unit i n the tr a n s i t i o n to communism. This Ibid., p. 121. Ibid.. p. 123. 158 avoidance of a d i r e c t confrontation of the Russian and Chinese paths to communism was strong evidence that a considerable area of dispute s t i l l remained despite the p a r t i a l i d e o l o g i c a l retreat by the Chinese i n December. While being careful not to raise the s p e c i f i c issue of the communes, Khrushchev did re i t e r a t e that the road to communism i n the Soviet Union would involve the "growing together" of the two forms of ownership—collective and state—and completely ignored the commune as having any future role to play i n the process. Moreover, he strongly emphasized that during the current stage, cooperative property would continue to be developed, despite the fact that some were urging that the process of merging be carried out immediately. "Property forms," he charged, "cannot be changed at w i l l . They develop i n accordance with economic laws and depend on the nature and l e v e l of the productive forces. The c o l l e c t i v e system f u l l y accords with the present l e v e l and development Ik requirement of the productive forces i n agriculture." He pointed out that agriculture had lagged behind i n l a t t e r years only because poor use was being made of c o l l e c t i v e s * p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , not because they were obsolete. The new upsurge i n agriculture, he concluded: i s conclusive proof that the collective-farm form of production r e l a t i o n s , f ar from having used up i t s p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , serves—and w i l l Ibid. , p. I2h 159 continue to do so for a long time to come— to enhance the productive forces i n agriculture. 15 Embodied i n these declarations i s the implication that the Chinese property forms had been "changed at w i l l " , contrary to objective conditions and the l e v e l of the productive forces. I f the Soviet Union at her stage of production s t i l l found the c o l l e c t i v e s to be the appropriate form of production relations for many years to come, then how could the Chinese j u s t i f y their p o licy of discarding the c o l l e c t i v e s ? Khrush-chev's remarks thus had more than just simple domestic implications. Discussing the significance of the eventual growing together of c o l l e c t i v e and public property forms, the Soviet leader alluded b r i e f l y to the Important question of obliterating the differences between town and country—a question to which the Chinese accorded great importance. He emphatically stated that: the merger of collective-farm-cooperative property with state property into an i n t e g r a l public property i s not a simple organiza-t i o n a l and economic measure, but i s the solution of the cardinal problem of bridging the essential d i s t i n c t i o n between town and country.1° Moreover, he added, "the party's subsequent aim (after the Seven Year Program) w i l l be to convert the collective-farm v i l l a g e s into modern urban-type communities supplied with a l l 15 16: Ibid., p. 125. Ibid., p. 126. 160 the l a t e s t municipal and c u l t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s . " 1 ' 7 This, then, was Khrushchev's alternative to the challenge i n i t i a t e d by the Chinese, who had given the commune the role of removing the differences between town and country. The Chinese had forced the Soviet leader into somehow re t r i e v i n g the i n i t i a t i v e on these i d e o l o g i c a l questions which had l a i n dormant i n the Soviet Union for years. He could not remain s i l e n t on these issues now that the Chinese had i n i t i a t e d a program designed to solve them, and he could not accept the Chinese solution, since communes had already been repudiated i n the Soviet Union. Thus he was forced to develop a theory based upon the already-announced plan to eventually merge state and c o l l e c t i v e property. The re s u l t was the "agro-c i t y " concept. But again, t h i s was something relegated to the future and subordinated to the task of increasing production. But i n theory, at le a s t , Khrushchev was able to formulate a plausible alternative to the Chinese plan; A g r i c u l t u r a l e l e c t r i f i c a t i o n , mechanization and automation w i l l lead to the pooling, to a kind of merger, of c o l l e c t i v e farm produc-ti o n f a c i l i t i e s with state, or public f a c i l i t i e s . A g r i c u l t u r a l labour w i l l gradually become a variety of i n d u s t r i a l labour.I" Perhaps the most st r i k i n g aspect of these words i s their lack of c l a r i t y , authority, and explicitness. One 1 7 L o c . c i t . . l 8 I b i d . , p. 125 . l 6 l paragraph i s a l l that Khrushchev devotes to this v i t a l Marxist question of the "contradiction" between town and country, and h i s words lack certainty and conviction; indeed, his discussion of the whole point i s vague. And, of course, the whole process was dependent on greater achievements i n technology and production, and apparently occurred "naturally" with l i t t l e party p a r t i c i p a t i o n . Certainly Khrushchev was far from being e x p l i c i t , and h i s words gave the impression that this theory of the eventual merging of town and country was more an i d e o l o g i c a l gambit than a purposeful guide to action. And by postponing the merging process u n t i l a future date, he l e f t the impression that he was l i t t l e concerned with these n i c e t i e s of Marxist theory. Moreover, while plausible, his conception of how to solve the differences between worker and farmer i s flimsy when compared to the Chinese program. In Principles of Communism, Engels had said " . . . contradiction between town and country w i l l disappear. Those performing a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l labour w i l l be the same persons instead of two di f f e r e n t classes." But Khrushchev made no statement which would indicate a policy of decentralizing industry, and of establishing basic s o c i a l units which would include both industry and agriculture. He suggests, rather, that somehow through mechanization and automation, jobs i n agriculture w i l l become more and more l i k e those i n industry. On the other hand, the Chinese had proposed and introduced a s o c i a l unit 162 -which integrated industry and agriculture; and with their program of backyard furnaces had actually accomplished, temporarily, the task of combining a g r i c u l t u r a l and i n d u s t r i a l labour i n the same i n d i v i d u a l . Thus, there was s t i l l a considerable difference between Chinese and Soviet roads to communism; and despite h i s formulation of a s p e c i f i c theory outlining the future achievement of Soviet society along Marxist l i n e s , Khrushchev's approach was s t i l l one which could give concern to doctrinaire Marxist-Leninists l i k e the Chinese. The 21st Congress speech by Khrushchev, and Chinese reaction to i t , had a l l the indications of a major rapproche-ment despite the fact that the commune issue was s t i l l f a r from being completely resolved. It has been mentioned before that one probable factor i n the i d e o l o g i c a l retreat conducted by the Chinese i n December was Soviet economic pressure. From the concluding portion of Khrushchev's speech, i t would also appear that economic inducement was also a factor i n helping to smooth over Sino-Soviet differences. Indeed, i t i s no accident that Khrushchev reversed the p o l i c y voiced by Strumilin i n the autumn, to the effect that the U.S.S.R. and the European s a t e l l i t e s would go over to communism i n a bloc, leaving China and her entourage to enter communism at a much la t e r stage. The Implied threat i n Strumilin*s statement was that i f the Chinese did not care to follow Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l leadership, then they would be l e f t to 163 "stew i n their own juice" economically. Now, at the 2 1 s t Congress, Khrushchev repudiated this p o l i cy and pledged Soviet help to bring the formerly backward s o c i a l i s t states up to the Soviet l e v e l : The economic law operating under socialism i s balanced proportional development, with the r e s u l t that countries economically backward i n the past are rapidly able to make up for l o s t time and raise their economic and c u l t u r a l levels by drawing on the experience, cooperation and mutual assistance of other s o c i a l i s t countries. In t h i s way the economic and c u l t u r a l progress of a l l the s o c i a l i s t countries i s evened out.19 On the s p e c i f i c question of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, he described as "highly improbable" the situation of one country achieving communism before the others and leaving them " t r a i l i n g behind somewhere i n the early stages of s o c i a l i s t construction." Instead he asserted that: from a theoretical standpoint, i t would appear more correct to assume that by successfully employing the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s inherent i n socialism, the s o c i a l i s t countries w i l l more or less simultaneously pass to the higher phase of communist society.2 0 The fact that an extensive aid agreement was announced immediately following the Congress s i g n i f i e d that the factor of Soviet economic assistance was one of the important ones i n achieving the temporary i d e o l o g i c a l truce. However, i t should be noted that Khrushchev had referred i n Ibid., p. 1 3 L . 'ibid. , p. 1 3 3 . 161* his remarks to "successfully employing p o t e n t i a l i t i e s i n -herent i n socialism" as the ultimate precondition to the "simultaneous t r a n s i t i o n " thesis. To Khrushchev t h i s meant f u l l economic integration of the bloc, i f we are to judge from h i s previous statements on t h i s subject. It should be remembered i n this regard that the Chinese had declined i n May of 1958 at a Moscow meeting of C.E.M.A. to f u l l y i n t e -grate their economy with that of the European communist states, and had steadfastly refused to submit to Soviet economic domination. Immediately after t h i s meeting (which was deemed important enough to be attended by the bloc leaders themselves) Khrushchev made his b i t t e r remarks about economic isolationism, asking "could the r i c h opportunities of the s o c i a l i s t countries be exploited i f each country acted i n i s o l a t i o n , stewed i n i t s own juice as the saying 21 goes?" He had noted then that "only . . . the strengthening of all-round cooperation and mutual aid assure a general i n -crease i n the s o c i a l i s t economy and the advancing of the 22 formerly underdeveloped countries to the l e v e l of the advanced." 21 N. S. Khrushchev, "Speech at the Seventh Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party," Pravda. June k, 1958; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. X, no. 22, p. 8. 22 Loc. c i t . ; i n a similar vein at the 21st Congress Khrushchev reaffirmed h i s view that "International d i v i s i o n of labour p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s highest f o r m s — s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and cooperation—are to play a big part i n the economic development of the s o c i a l i s t camp . . . . By i t s e l f no country could develop at the rapid pace at which i t develops within the system of s o c i a l i s t countries." 165 T h u s , - w h i l e t h e F e b r u a r y 1959 a i d a g r e e m e n t h e l p e d t o s m o o t h o v e r r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n C h i n a a n d t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , K h r u s h c h e v w a s s t i l l h o l d i n g o u t f o r C h i n e s e e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n ; a n d t h i s w a s t o be t h e s o u r c e o f c o n t i n u i n g c o n f l i c t . A t t h e e n d o f h i s l e n g t h y d i s c u s s i o n o f " . . . Some P r o b l e m s o f M a r x L s t - L e n i n i s t T h e o r y " i n h i s b o o k - l e n g t h s p e e c h , K h r u s h c h e v r e f e r r e d , s i g n i f i c a n t l y , t o " Y u g o s l a v . . . i n v e n t i o n s a b o u t t h e a l l e g e d d i f f e r e n c e s b e t w e e n t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d C h i n a . " The S o v i e t l e a d e r p u b l i c l y d e n i e d t h a t d i f f e r e n c e s e x i s t e d , w h i l e a d m i t t i n g t h a t t h e C h i n e s e w e r e f o l l o w i n g a d i f f e r e n t p a t h o f d e v e l o p -m e n t . " T h e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y o f C h i n a , " h e s a i d , " i s e m p l o y i n g many o r i g i n a l f o r m s o f s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n . B u t we h a v e 23 no d i s a g r e e m e n t s w i t h i t , n o r c a n t h e r e be a n y d i s a g r e e m e n t . " J F o l l o w i n g t h e C h i n e s e a r g u m e n t h e s t a t e d t h a t " i n C h i n a t h e r e a r e s p e c i f i c f e a t u r e s i n h i s t o r i c a l d e v e l o p m e n t , s i z e o f p o p u l a t i o n , l e v e l o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . I t w o u l d be a m i s t a k e t o i g n o r e t h e s e s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s a n d t o c o p y w h a t i s g o o d f o r one c o u n t r y b u t u n s u i t a b l e f o r a n o t h e r . " Then h e made a m o s t i m p o r t a n t a d m i s s i o n ( s h e d d i n g l i g h t on h i s p r e v i o u s r e m a r k t h a t t h e r e c o u l d be n o d i s a g r e e m e n t ) , s a y i n g t h a t , " T h e q u e s t i o n o f m e t h o d s a n d p r a c t i c e i n s o c i a l i s t ^ K h r u s h c h e v , R e p o r t t o t h e 2 1 s t C o n g r e s s , O P . c i t . , P . 135. 2 k I b i d . , p . 136. 166 construction i s a domestic a f f a i r of each country." y Of course, i d e o l o g i c a l claims are another matter, but Khrushchev here rei t e r a t e s the l i n e formulated i n 1957 at the Moscow meeting of f r a t e r n a l parties, which gave each party the right to take i t s own road to socialism within the bounds of Marxist-Leninism. This raises the Interesting point once more, that had the Chinese not introduced their r a d i c a l i d e o l o g i c a l claims for the communes, the Soviet party would not have reacted nearly so strongly to the Chinese experiment. Of course, i t s t i l l remains a matter of subjective i n t e r -pretation as to when a nation has overstepped the bounds of Marxist-Leninism under the guise of adapting i t to l o c a l conditions. As Khrushchev had pointed out, "every country has i t s own s p e c i f i c features of s o c i a l i s t development. But that does not mean that we can go forward to socialism by some other road, one that l i e s to the side of the general ? 6 path indicated by Marxist-Leninism." In this manner, he was able to uphold the Chinese deviation from Soviet experience, while condemning the road taken by Marshal Tito i n Yugoslavia. At the same time, the door was l e f t open f o r c r i t i c i s m of the Chinese i f the future situation warranted i t ; and pa r t i c u l a r l y i f ideological deviation was renewed to a dangerous degree. Loc. c i t . Ibid., p. 135. 167 In summary then, i t can be said that Khrushchev's speech was i n essence c o n c i l i a t o r y , matching the tone taken by the Chinese i n the December 10 resolution, and providing the theoretical and p r a c t i c a l bridge necessary to bring the Chinese and Soviet positions to common ground. From the Chinese point of view, i t could be said that they had succeeded i n prodding the Soviet leader to lay down a program for the achievement of communism and to speed up the lethargic revolutionary progress of the Soviet Union, as well as winning Soviet recognition of the right to build socialism i n their own way. At the same time, however, by h i s refusal to s p e c i f i c a l l y mention the commune and by his references to Soviet experience with e g a l i t a r i a n experi-ments, Khrushchev made i t clear that he s t i l l did not approve of the Chinese "innovations". Moreover, he f o r t h r i g h t l y stated that r a d i c a l i d e o l o g i c a l claims such as those which had been made i n China during the autumn, could not and would not be tolerated. Chou En-lai's Congress Speech As has been noted previously, the Chinese Communist Party sent Chou E n - l a i to head the Chinese delegation to the 21st Congress. Chou's speech to the Congress was delivered on January 28, the day after Khrushchev's marathon address, and was by contrast, r e l a t i v e l y b r i e f . Although i t touched on a wide range of subjects, the Chinese premier's speech stressed two major themes: the significance of the Seven Year Plan, and the successes of China's leap forward and the communes. In discussing the Seven Year Plan, i t was p a r t i -c u l a r l y noticeable that Chou gave equal emphasis to the " s p i r i t u a l " aspects of building a communist society, despite the fact that the Seven Year Plan was almost e n t i r e l y based upon the material aspects. Thus, while noting the planned increases i n production and standards of l i v i n g , he also stressed the f a c t that: The Seven Year Plan also lays i t down that the Soviet Union w i l l further enhance the communist consciousness of the broad masses of the people, w i l l further develop public education on the p r i n c i p l e of lin k i n g education with the r e a l i t i e s of l i f e , and raise the new communist man who w i l l con-scientiously observe the norms of s o c i a l l i f e , i s well versed i n science and well p n developed both physically and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y . ' Herein, one can f i n d once more signs of the differences i n approach between the Chinese and Soviet parties—between emphasis on material and emphasis on s p i r i t u a l prerequisites to communism. Despite this remaining difference i n emphasis, however, Chou praised the new program of the CPSU for the transition to communism and gave i t f u l l Chinese support. "It can be c l e a r l y seen that the p r a c t i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s plan w i l l be of great h i s t o r i c a l significance. It w i l l show the world the way of t r a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism 'Chou E n - l a i , "Speech to the 21st Congress," Peking Review. No. 5, 1959, p. 6. 169 28 and thus further enrich the treasury of Marxist-Leninism." Of course, the actual r e a l i z a t i o n of the plan was something of which the Chinese might be j u s t l y s c e p t i c a l i n the l i g h t of the directions of Soviet society since the death of S t a l i n ; and by stating their approval i n this way they were able to withhold f i n a l judgement u n t i l the Russians had shown their sincere resolve to build the s p i r i t u a l foundations of communism among the Soviet people. Turning to a consideration of Chinese e f f o r t s i n the advance towards communism, Chou asserted that the Chinese people were t r a v e l l i n g the same broad highway as the Soviet Union and the other s o c i a l i s t countries--"the road of the October revolution". Through the use of this device Chou was able to proclaim fundamental unity within the communist bloc. Of course, "the road of the October revolution" was by no means synonymous with the Soviet road to communism. It merely referred to the general p r i n c i p l e s of proletarian revolution, communist dictatorship, proletarian-peasant a l l i a n c e , s o c i a l i z a t i o n of the national economy, and planned development, which were common to a l l states within the bloc, and which formed the basis of i d e o l o g i c a l orthodoxy, as l a i d out at the Moscow meeting of f r a t e r n a l parties i n November 1957. However, by stating that Chinese s o c i a l i s t Loc. c j t 170 construction conformed to these p r i n c i p l e s of Marxist-Leninism, the Chinese leader was c l e a r l y reasserting that the Chinese deviation from the Soviet road was a "permissible" one—as Khrushchev had conceded i n h i s speech the day before. Turning to s p e c i f i c s , Chou openly discussed the communes and the great leap forward, thus breaking the deliberate silence on these phenomena which had so f a r prevailed at the Congress. Accordingly, Chou told the delegates that The leap forward i n s o c i a l i s t construction, especially i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production, made the vast mass of the peasants f e e l that the former a g r i c u l t u r a l producers 1 cooperatives could no longer meet the needs of the develop-ment of the productive forces. The peasant masses i n many places made spontaneous experiments to transform and improve the ag r i c u l t u r a l producers 1 cooperatives, amalgamate small cooperatives into large ones, expand the scope of their productive a c t i v i -t i e s , combine their e f f o r t s and i n i t i a t e c o l l e c t i v e welfare i n s t i t u t i o n s and so on."29 While attempting to maintain the necessary myth that the communes were the spontaneous creation of the masses, Chou admitted that the party had at least had some role i n their formation, adding that "actively supported and guided by the Chinese Communist Party and Comrade Mao-Tse-tung, the Chinese people have created the organization form of large-scale people's communes . . . . I , 3 ° At the same time, Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t 171 however, he made no mention of the o r i g i n a l commune resolution of August 28 which had l a i d the basis for the Sino-Soviet id e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t which had followed, and which had resulted i n the country-wide movement to organize communes. Instead, he centered h i s remarks on the more moderate December 10 Resolution, pointing out that: The Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China gave a very high appraisal of the peoples' communes, considering them the best form for developing socialism under Chinese conditions, the best form for the Chinese r u r a l areas to make the t r a n s i t i o n from c o l l e c t i v e ownership to owner-ship by the whole people, and the best form for China to make the t r a n s i t i o n from s o c i a l i s t to communism i n the future.31 Thus, Chou defended the communes as the most appropriate road towards communism i n China, but made i t clear that this road was not the only road and that i t did not necessarily apply to other s o c i a l i s t countries where condi-tions were d i f f e r e n t . It would appear from Khrushchev's speech that he had accepted t h i s formula as a basis f o r an i d e o l o g i c a l t r u c e — t h a t the communes were merely a phenomenon born out of l o c a l Chinese conditions and were i n no sense a challenge to the v a l i d i t y of the Soviet road i n national construction. But while the Soviet leader may have accepted this ideologi-ca l compromise with the Chinese, the seeds of c o n f l i c t s t i l l Loc. c i t 172 remained. No amount of disclaiming could erase the fac t that the communes stood as an alternative to the Soviet road of building socialism and communism, and neither could i t erase the fact that i f the communes were the optimum unit for progress under Chinese conditions, then they were also the best form for the other underdeveloped members of the bloc—Korea, Viet Niem and Mongolia, and for underdeveloped nations throughout the world. It did not matter whether the Chinese proclaimed this or n o t - - i t s t i l l remained true, and thus a challenge to Soviet leadership i n the sphere of ideology. Moreover, the communes s t i l l remained a monument to orthodox Marxist-Leninism and a r a d i c a l contrast to the conservative p o l i c i e s of the Soviet Union. As long as the communes remained i n existence and were upheld by the Chinese Party, the challenge to Soviet domestic p o l i c y remained, and the status of Peking as an alternative source of doctrinal guidance grew even stronger. Thus, the p r a c t i c a l effects remained, and were c l e a r l y evident even to the Western observer. Delegations from bloc countries toured China to view the revolutionary upsurge i n the countryside. Several delegations commented on the p o s s i b i l i t y of adapting Chinese forms to their own economy, and the whole bloc witnessed a surge towards greater c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . In Korea a system similar to the communes was adopted and i n some European communist countries amalgama-tion of cooperatives took place. Even the leader of a Polish 173 party delegation had lauded the communes and suggested that ^2 h i s own country might learn from them.J Chou En-lai's speech, then, by no means completely removed the causes of f r i c t i o n between the two parties, although i t did establish some semblance of id e o l o g i c a l unity on the question of the communes and the separate roads to communism. And Chou's support of the Seven Year Plan marked the temporary h a l t of Chinese charges of Soviet conservatism. Pavel Yudin on Economic Questions Pavel Yudin, Soviet Ambassador to Peking was c a l l e d upon by the party to develop the theme of Khrushchev's speech s p e c i f i c a l l y i n r e l a t i o n to "the part of this report dealing with questions of ideology and Marxism." 3 3 It i s by no means accidental that Yudin should be chosen f o r this task; indeed, i t i s an unmistakable sign that Khrushchev's remarks had been meant expressly for the Chinese and that Yudin was the best man to bring t h i s point home. It i s i n this l i g h t , then, that his remarks take on their considerable significance. J Z. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Con-f l i c t (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, I 9 6 0 ) , p. 2 8 5 . 3 3Pravda« February 1959, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XI, no. 1 7 , p. 1 9 . 17 L "It can be said without any exaggeration," he t o l d his audience, "that the thesis regarding the t r a n s i t i o n to the second stage of communism constitutes a new chapter i n the theory of s c i e n t i f i c communism. I would l i k e to note above a l l that Leninist p r i n c i p l e s are s t r i c t l y observed here: there i s not one io t a of utopianism i n defining the conditions and roads of t r a n s i t i o n to communism."~) It i s Important to note that Yudin mentioned "Leninist" p r i n c i p l e s rather than "Marxist-Leninist" as Is usually the case. It w i l l be remembered that two of the chief arguments of the Soviet leaders rested e x p l i c i t l y on Leninist t e n e t s — t h e "Leninist cooperative plan", and the Leninist "incentive" system. Yudin did not e x p l i c i t l y charge the Chinese with not observing Leninist p r i n c i p l e s , however, although the implication i s there. Instead, he directed h i s f i r e at unnamed figures on the Soviet domestic scene, charging that "some s c i e n t i f i c personnel want to move into communism at a faster pace without taking into account actual c o n d i t i o n s . n J g / It i s l i k e l y that the views of these " s c i e n t i f i c personnel" can be traced d i r e c t l y to the s p i r i t of revolutionary enthusiasm engendered by the establishment of the communes in China. In any event, i t can be seen how the sudden Chinese leap towards communism necessarily -nourished and encouraged Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t . 175 the more r a d i c a l groups within the Soviet party and brought pressure to bear on the Soviet leaders to speed up the process of evolution towards communism. On the question of Khrushchev's new thesis regarding the simultaneous t r a n s i t i o n of the whole bloc to communism, Yudin made i t doubly clear that the precondition to large-scale Soviet aid was Chinese economic integration with C.E.M.A.—the Soviet counterpart of the European common market. Khrushchev's thesis, Yudin suggested, " i s the f i r s t formulation of the new thesis that the law of planned and proportional development applies not only to in d i v i d u a l s o c i a l i s t countries but also the economy of the s o c i a l i s t camp as a whole." In other words, Khrushchev had extended the p r i n c i p l e , embodied i n the "road of the October Revolu-tion " concept, concerning the planned development of national economies so that i t applies to the whole bloc. He has thus u n i l a t e r a l l y l a i d down a new law which i s binding on the whole communist world, and has the force of dogma: "This i s a new pronouncement i n the theory of s c i e n t i f i c communism. It expresses the profound truth of Leninism that the world s o c i a l i s t camp constitutes a single economic system."-^ In the face of this bold move by the Soviet leader, the Chinese were placed i n the position of their agreeing to greater economic integration, or f l y i n g i n the face of 3^Loc f c i t . 176 Khrushchev's authority as leader of the bloc. Of course, i t i s possible that the Chinese had already undertaken to participate more f u l l y i n the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance i n talks before the Congress, and th i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s not to be ruled o u t . 3 7 However, both Khrushchev and Yudin were s t i l l arguing the case against economic i s o l a -tionism i n their speeches; and th i s would not have been necessary had firm agreement already been reached. Aiming h i s remarks ostensibly at the Yugoslavs, Yudin had pointed out that "with the emergence of the world system of socialism i t i s no longer possible to bu i l d socialism i n one country i n i s o l a t i o n from others." 3^ His words had a fa m i l i a r r i n g — they were almost exactly the same as those used by Khrushchev i n his remarks i n June 1958 following the meeting of C.E.M.A. when the Chinese declined to go further towards economic integration than increased trading. With the promulgation of Khruschev's new thesis and with Soviet aid as the incen-t i v e , Yudin now foresaw that "the economic plans of these 3 7 0 n December 19, 1958, People's Daily declared that, "the international d i v i s i o n of labour and coordination of long term economic planning among the s o c i a l i s t countries ensures the most r a t i o n a l u t i l i z a t i o n of their natural and economic resources, accelerates the growth of each country and promotes the rapid economic development of the whole s o c i a l i s t camp (Peking Review Ho. hk, 1958, p. 19). The a r t i c l e lauded the C.E.M.A. for i t s role i n "the assistance given by the more developed countries to the r e l a t i v e l y underdeveloped ones." Yudin, op. c i t . , p. 20. 177 (bloc) countries w i l l be more and more coordinated, and the more highly developed countries w i l l help the less developed countries i n order to march i n a united front towards communism at an increasingly faster pace."~ > / Striking was the fact that, l i k e Khrushchev, Yudin at no time made any sp e c i f i c reference to the communes or to the leap forward, even though he went to considerable lengths praising the Chinese f o r their achievements: again, indication that the communes were s t i l l a source of consider-able f r i c t i o n despite the temporary Ideological truce. Chinese Reaction to the 21st Congress O f f i c i a l reaction to the 21st Congress i n Chinese news media was enthusiastic and laudatory. Red Flag, for instance, on February 16 upheld a l l the important theses proposed by Khrushchev at the Congress. At the same time, subtle differences i n emphasis gave evidence of certain underlying i d e o l o g i c a l differences. Thus, while the Red Flag e d i t o r i a l made mention of the Soviet leaders "creative proposition" concerning the simultaneous t r a n s i t i o n to communism of the entire bloc, and hailed the p r i n c i p l e of the backward nations rapidly catching up with the aid of the advanced nations, i t made absolutely no mention of closer economic tie s or possible economic integration. Khrushchev, on the other hand, had emphasized that "international d i v i s i o n Loc. c i t 178 of labour, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n i t s highest f o r m s — s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and co-operation—are to play a big part i n the development of the s o c i a l i s t camp. Thus, i t appeared that the Chinese were s t i l l holding back from merging their economy with the C.E.M.A. countries, and were s t i l l reluctant to submit to Soviet economic domination. Moreover, differences were also s t i l l apparent over the question of the forms of s o c i a l i s t society and of the evolution of s o c i a l units. While other Soviet pronouncements met with praise and support, the question of the Soviet co-operatives 1 future evolution was dealt with i n a noticeably non-commital way: The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has mapped out a plan f o r developing and bringing closer together the two forms of Soviet s o c i a l i s t ownership - c o l l e c t i v e farm ownership, and ownership of the whole people. It held that the merging of the two forms of ownership i s the solution to the profoundly s i g n i f i c a n t question of overcoming the essential differences between the r u r a l and urban areas.*+l Of course, from the Chinese point of view, the commune was the solution to this problem. The People's Daily i n e d i t o r i a l s on February 5 and February 8 also showed a generally positive response to the proceedings of the Soviet Congress. It maintained that "the current Congress w i l l not only accelerate the building of communism i n the Soviet Union, but also contribute to the development of the international communist movement and the hO Khrushchev, loc. c i t . hi Red Flag. February 16, 1959; Peking Review. No. 8, 1959. strengthening of the world's peace forces. It i s a great inspiration to a l l those who are fighting for peace and hp socialism." In a similar vein, the People's Daily editors proclaimed: Forty and more years ago, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union led the people in blazing the t r a i l for mankind to socialism. Today, by putting forward the Seven Year Plan, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has again raised up before mankind a bridge leading to communism. *+3 It i s noteworthy that while praising the Soviet Union for putting forward a program for the advance to communism, the Chinese did not concede that this was the only road, or even the best road. In China at least, the communes s t i l l remained the key to the transition to communism. The Post-Congress Economic Aid Agreement Immediately after the close of the 21st Congress, i t was announced that the Soviet Union had agreed to extend i t s technical aid to China, and to help build several score major industrial complexes. The announcement, coming when i t did on the heels of the ideological truce, suggested the possibility of a significant t i e - i n with the commune dispute. It has been stated previously that one of the apparent factors in the ideological truce signified by the L-p ^People's Daily. February 5, 1959; Peking Review, No. 6, 1959. -^ Loc. c i t . 180 21st Congress was the promise by Moscow of more aid to China i n her massive program of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n . As has also been suggested, one of the important considerations i n the adoption of the p o l i c y of mobilizing the untapped resource of Chinese labour power was the fact that the Soviet Union was unable to provide the Chinese economy with the necessary amounts of i n d u s t r i a l c a p i t a l . It w i l l be remembered that i n the spring of 1957 a number of a r t i c l e s appeared i n the Chinese press suggesting that the country must r e l y mainly on i t s own resources and should not count on aid from f r a t e r n a l countries. These a r t i c l e s appeared shortly after Chou En-lai's return from Europe and Moscow, and tend to support the contention of a number of scholars that Khrushchev had informed Chou that due to the heavy Soviet economic commitments ar i s i n g out of the increase i n aid to European communist countries (and resulting from the Polish and Hungarian uprisings), the Soviet Union would not be able to provide any large-scale economic aid. Professor Brzezinski *s analysis of the Soviet predicament during t h i s period shows cl e a r l y why the Chinese requests for assistance could not be f u l f i l l e d without serious disruption of the Soviets* own domestic economy: The p o l i t i c a l events of 1956 had a sharp impact on Soviet economic relations with East Europe. U n t i l then the area had been a source of appreciable economic advantage to the USSR, with an estimated annual Soviet extract of at least one b i l l i o n United States d o l l a r s . The Soviet 181 admission that past economic p o l i c i e s of the area, l a r g e l y Soviet imposed, had courted disaster, the need to bolster the East German regime, to promote the recuperation of Radar*s Hungary, and to stave off a calamitous nation-wide r e p e t i t i o n of Poznan i n Poland, a l l forced the USSR to extend credit to these regimes. As a r e s u l t Poland, Hungary, and East Germany b r i e f l y became economic l i a b i l i t i e s . L J + In 1956 alone, the Soviet Union had extended credits of 370 b i l l i o n rubles to Bulgaria, 1.2 b i l l i o n rubles to East Germany, 200 m i l l i o n gold rubles to Hungary, 1.1 b i l l i o n gold rubles to Poland, and 270 m i l l i o n rubles to Rumania. More-over, she had cancelled 2.3 b i l l i o n rubles i n Polish debts. "According to the most thorough study available, the sum t o t a l of Soviet credit granted to the European Communist-ruled states i n 1956-57 was $1.3 b i l l i o n . To t h i s ought to be added $1.8 b i l l i o n i n Soviet credit cancellations, or, $3*1 b i l l i o n . " ^ This huge sum, which was required to promote economic and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y i n the bloc following the crises of 1956 was an even greater burden on the Soviet economy, due to the f a c t that the USSR was no longer receiving i t s $1 b i l l i o n subsidy from the s a t e l l i t e economies (and p a r t i c u l a r l y East Germany). It was i n the l i g h t of this situation that the Soviet Union cancelled i n February 1957, some $250 m i l l i o n i n credits which i t had granted Yugoslavia i n the preceding year. This l a t t e r act 1+k Brzezinski, O P . c i t . , p. 283. ^ I b i d . , p. 28k. 182 may also have been motivated p a r t l y by p o l i t i c a l considera-tions since Khrushchev could hardly j u s t i f y granting credits to " r e v i s i o n i s t s " and not to h i s Chinese a l l i e s . It should be noted, too, that as f a r as the Chinese economy was concerned, 1956 and 1957 were especially c r i t i c a l years, since the Chinese had begun to pay back the $1.7 b i l l i o n rubles i n economic credits extended by the Soviet Union i n 1950 and 195 k : It seems well established, however, that the t o t a l of these obligations i s f a r i n excess of the acknowledged Soviet 'economic loans 1 to China . . . . Soviet writers have repeat-edly quoted the Chinese statement that the t o t a l 'Soviet c r e d i t s ' to China since the founding of the People's Republic and pre-sumably through 1957, have amounted to 5*29 b i l l i o n yuan . . . . Converted at what has been reported to be the o f f i c i a l rate of two rubles to the yuan, t o t a l debts to the Soviet Union thus may amount to some 10.6 b i l l i o n rubles. Even i f an annual export surplus of 1 b i l l i o n rubles - as that of 1958 - were en t i r e l y applied to debt repayment, some k0% of Chinese exports to the USSR, also at the 1958 rate, would remain committed to repay-ment for nearly a decade. k6 No doubt the Chinese could well ask themselves (and perhaps the Soviets) how the Soviet Union could cancel 2.3 b i l l i o n rubles of the trade debts of Poland, a country which had risen against Soviet leadership, and not do the same for a friend who had stood steadfastly beside her. Nevertheless, 0. Hoeffding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations," Unity and Contradiction (New York, Praeger, 1962), p. 303. 183 the f a c t remained that the Chinese economy v i t a l l y required either an external or an i n t e r n a l stimulus of considerable proportions to meet payments on increased debt while providing fo r the needs of 650- m i l l i o n people and increasing i n d u s t r i a l i -zation. Since the Soviet Union was i n no position to supply t h i s stimulus, i t had to be found i n t e r n a l l y — i n the mobilization of 500 m i l l i o n peasants, and i n the p o l i c i e s of the great leap forward and the people's communes. Presum-ably i t was recognition of a possible causal relationship between lack of economic assistance and the establishment of the people's communes that led the Soviet Union to offer China extensive economic assistance i n August 1958 and again i n February 1959* The l a t t e r agreement, as has been noted, takes on particular significance i n that i t came on the heels of the Chinese reassessment of the commune policy, and of Sino-Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l c o n c i l i a t i o n at the 21st Congress. Together, the two related aid agreements provided for Soviet assistance i n the construction of 78 major i n d u s t r i a l enter-prises over an eight-year period. "The t o t a l value of the equipment to be supplied and the designing and other kinds of technical assistance to be provided by the Soviet Union for 1+7 these enterprises i s about 5,000 m i l l i o n rubles." ' According to the agreement, this sum was to be paid back i n goods according to already established trade agreements. Peking Review. No. 7, 1959, p. 12. 181* F r o m t h e C h i n e s e r e a c t i o n t o t h e s e a g r e e m e n t s i t i s c l e a r how d e p e n d e n t C h i n a * s i n d u s t r i a l d e v e l o p m e n t w a s on t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . I n a n e d i t o r i a l i n P e o p l e ' s D a i l y on F e b r u a r y 1*+, j u s t a f e w d a y s a f t e r t h e a g r e e m e n t h a d b e e n c o n c l u d e d i t was s t a t e d t h a t " a c c o r d i n g t o t h e a g r e e m e n t s s i g n e d d u r i n g C h i n a * s F i r s t F i v e Y e a r P l a n , t h e S o v i e t U n i o n u n d e r t o o k t o h e l p C h i n a b u i l d 211 h u g e p r o j e c t s . I n A u g u s t 1958, t h e two c o u n t r i e s s i g n e d a n o t h e r a g r e e m e n t o n S o v i e t a i d t o b u i l d o r e x p a n d U-7 C h i n e s e i n d u s t r i a l e n t e r -p r i s e s . A l l o f t h e s e e n t e r p r i s e s f o r m t h e s p i n e o f C h i n a * s kft c o n s t r u c t i o n . " R e f e r r i n g t o t h e new a g r e e m e n t f o r t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e 78 new e n t e r p r i s e s , t h e e d i t o r i a l a d d s , " w i t h t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e s e e n t e r p r i s e s , t h e b a c k b o n e o f C h i n a ' s m o d e r n i n d u s t r i e s w i l l b e f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n e d a n d C h i n a w i l l g a i n t i m e a n d a c c e l e r a t e t h e f u l f i l l m e n t o f t h e k q g r e a t t a s k o f d e v e l o p i n g i t s n a t i o n a l e c o n o m y , " 7 M o r e o v e r , t h e e d i t o r s o f t h e P e o p l e ' s D a i l y made i t a b u n d a n t l y c l e a r how much t h i s S o v i e t a s s i s t a n c e w a s a p p r e c i a t e d , p a r t i c u l a r l y a t a t i m e when t h e S o v i e t U n i o n w a s p u s h i n g a h e a d a s r a p i d l y a s p o s s i b l e i n h e r own e c o n o m i c c o n s t r u c t i o n : The S o v i e t U n i o n h a s u n d e r t a k e n t h e e x t e n s i o n o f a i d t o o u r c o u n t r y a t a t i m e when i t h a s b e e n a h e a v y t a s k t o f u l f i l l i t s own d o m e s t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . . The S i n o - S o v i e t L o c . c i t . L Q C , c i t . 185 a g r e e m e n t on t h e e x p a n s i o n o f e c o n o m i c c o - o p e r a t i o n f o r c e f u l l y d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n c o n s i d e r s t h e p r o m o t i o n o f t h e e c o n o m i c d e v e l o p m e n t o f a l l t h e b r o t h e r c o u n t r i e s a s i t s own c a u s e , t h a t i t w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e x e r t i t s u n t i r i n g e f f o r t s t o b r i n g a b o u t a common e c o n o m i c u p s u r g e i n a l l t h e c o u n t r i e s o f t h e s o c i a l i s t c a m p . The C h i n e s e p e o p l e e x p r e s s t h e i r h e a r t f e l t t h a n k s f o r t h e g r e a t a n d s e l f l e s s a i d g i v e n t o us b y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . 5 0 T h i s p e r i o d i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g t h e 21st C o n g r e s s a n d t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e S i n o - S o v l e t a i d a g r e e m e n t c a n be v i e w e d i n r e t r o s p e c t a s a mere l u l l i n t h e i d e o l o g i c a l s t o r m a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f t h e communes i n C h i n a , b u t i t c e r t a i n l y w a s a p e r i o d when i d e o l o g i c a l d i f f e r e n c e s seemed t o h a v e b e e n o v e r c o m e , a n d i n t e r - p a r t y s o l i d a r i t y a g a i n f i r m l y c e m e n t e d . As h a s b e e n p o i n t e d o u t , t h e h e a l i n g o f t h e i d e o l o g i c a l b r e e c h w a s e s s e n t i a l l y o n l y s u p e r f i c i a l and t e m p o r a r y , a n d w a s s u b j e c t t o r e o p e n i n g on a w i d e r a n g e o f i s s u e s , a s l o n g a s t h e communes r e m a i n e d . And t o d i s s o l v e t h e communes w o u l d mean t h e l o s s o f f a c e a n d p e r h a p s t h e l o s s o f l e a d e r s h i p b y t h e l e a d i n g p e r s o n a l i t i e s i n t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y , t h u s , s u c h a p o l i c y r e m a i n e d u n t h i n k a b l e . Commune C o n s o l i d a t i o n a n d S o v i e t A c c e p t a n c e s ; S o r i n g 1 9 5 9 The c h i e f c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h e C h i n e s e d o m e s t i c s c e n e i n t h e s p r i n g o f 1959 w e r e t h e s h o r t a g e o f f o o d , a n d t h e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e communes . Due t o t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n L o c . c i t 186 of the free supply system i n the i n i t i a l stages of the communes, and because consumption was geared to f a u l t y and exaggerated food production figures, the spring brought with i t a countrywide shortage of food. No doubt, exaggerated production figures also meant that the huge shipments of grain and other a g r i c u l t u r a l products sent to the Soviet Union i n 1958 and early 1959 were calculated on the f a u l t y assumption that adequate food reserves remained i n the country, when i n f a c t , they did not.^ The resulting situation i s summed up by a young "poor peasant" refugee from a commune i n Kwantung who was interviewed i n the spring of I960 upon h i s a r r i v a l i n Hong Kong: Q. Did things improve when the communes started? A. No. It was worse than the advanced co-operatives. It was not too bad during the f i r s t two months. We had three meals of r i c e a day and we could eat our f i l l . But l a t e r we were only given f i v e taels of r i c e mixed with sweet potatoes and bananas. F i n a l l y the r ation was cut to three taels of 3?ic Q • • • • Q. Did anyone complain about this kind of food? 5 2 A. Yes, everyone was complaining openly. ^ x I n h i s A p r i l 1959 Report to the National People's Congress, Chou E n - l a i noted that "Some people suspect that the tension i n the supply of certain commodities was due to excessive export," but claimed that exports were "only" 17.8% higher than i n 1957. urrent Scene: Reports from Communist China (Kowloon, P.O. Box 5217, 196l) , p. 108. 187 D u r i n g t h i s same p e r i o d t h e p l a n s f o r c h e c k i n g up on t h e communes a n d " c o n s o l i d a t i n g " t h e m , a s l a i d o u t i n t h e D e c e m b e r 10 R e s o l u t i o n , w a s c a r r i e d o u t . I n a c t u a l f a c t , t h e s o - c a l l e d " c o n s o l i d a t i o n " p r o v e d t o be a m a j o r r e t r e a t b a c k t o w a r d s t h e s i t u a t i o n e x i s t i n g i n 1957 b e f o r e t h e g r e a t l e a p . F o r e x a m p l e , many o f t h e communa l mess h a l l s w e r e d i s b a n d e d a n d p r i v a t e p l o t s r e t u r n e d t o t h e p e a s a n t r y i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e i n c e n t i v e , a n d s t i m u l a t e t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f m u c h - n e e d e d f o o d . F a r - r e a c h i n g r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e communes was c a r r i e d o u t , r e t u r n i n g much more i n i t i a t i v e a n d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o t h e p r o d u c t i o n t e a m a n d t h e p r o d u c t i o n b r i g a d e ( c o r r e s p o n d i n g r o u g h l y t o t h e l o w e r a n d h i g h e r s t a g e c o o p e r a t i v e s r e s p e c t i v e l y ) . ^ 3 I n l a t e F e b r u a r y a n d e a r l y M a r c h , a n e n l a r g e d m e e t i n g o f t h e P o l i t i c a l B u r e a u was h e l d i n C h e n g c h o w f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f i s s u i n g " d e t a i l e d i n s t r u c t i o n s f o r t h e c h e c k - u p i n t h e p e o p l e ' s c o m m u n e s ' " a n d f o r a r e c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f t h e w h o l e commune p r o g r a m . T h i s w a s f o l l o w e d b y a m e e t i n g o f t h e e n t i r e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e , a f t e r w h i c h t o p - l e v e l p a r t y men moved i n t o t h e r u r a l a r e a s t o p e r s o n a l l y s u p e r v i s e t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e ' s r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s . T h u s , a c c o r d i n g t o a r e p o r t i n t h e M a r c h 10 i s s u e o f t h e P e k i n g R e v i e w : 5 ^ J D L i F u - c h u n , " R a i s e H i g h t h e R e d F l a g . . . " ( P e k i n g , F . L . P . , i960), p . 3. J C h o u E n - l a i , R e p o r t on A d j u s t i n g t h e Ma . io r T a r g e t s o f t h e 1 9 5 9 E c o n o m i c P l a n ( P e k i n g , F . L . P . , 1959), p . 36. 188 for some time large numbers of government and Communist Party cadres have been moving to the people's communes for a s p e l l of work i n the countryside . . . . The l a t e s t of the top province leaders to have gone to the communes are the f i r s t secretaries of the Provincial Communist Party Committee of Shantung, Yunnan, Kwangtung, and Chinghai respectively. A few months l a t e r i n the Report of the Central Committee's Eighth Plenary Session, i t was revealed what changes these top party cadres had been supervising throughout the spring. It was revealed that, "during the check-up the p r i n c i p l e s of management and business accounting at d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s , of 'to each according to h i s work' and more income for those tt who do more work have been implemented. n y y But the changes went far beyond t h i s . It was decided by the Central Committee that: a three-level type of ownership of the means of production (would) be implemented i n the communes. Ownership at the production brigade l e v e l constitutes the basic one. Ownership at the commune l e v e l constitutes another part . . . . A small part of the ownership should also be invested i n the production team.56 Through these measures i t was hoped to overcome "the tendencies to over-centralization, to egalitarianism and extravagance . . . . " 5 7 These far-reaching measures went •^Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Peking, F.L.P., 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 1 0 . ^ L o c . c i t . 57-, Loc. c i t . 189 beyond anything envisioned i n the December Resolution and indicated a d e f i n i t e retreat towards the c o l l e c t i v e farm system. In e f f e c t , what remained was mostly a "paper commune" which consisted e s s e n t i a l l y of a loose federation of ag r i c u l t u r a l producers' co-operatives. At the commune l e v e l of ownership only the state enterprises such as banks and small f a c t o r i e s , which had been absorbed into the communes remained. The communes* power was limited to extracting from the production brigades such money as was necessary to build up the communes* c a p i t a l accumulation funds, and to providing the apparatus of administration. In operation, these new "paper communes" di f f e r e d l i t t l e from the amalgama-ted co-ops that sprang up i n the spring of 1958. But by retaining the skeleton outline of the o r i g i n a l communes, the party was able to achieve two t h i n g s — i t was able to defend i t s e l f against charges that the communes had been a f a i l u r e and had been abandoned, (and against any possible loss of face), and at the same time was able to leave the door open for a future attempt to scale the heights of communism through the communes. The fact that "ideological consciousness" had not been at a s u f f i c i e n t l y high l e v e l among the peasantry, meant that production had been slowed rather than spurred by the introduction of the communes. In order to overcome the economic dislocation caused by the great leap and the people's communes, i t became necessary for the party to revert to the 190 policy of encouraging i n d i v i d u a l i n i t i a t i v e and hard work through personal incentive. This was made clear by Premier Chou E n - l a i i n his A p r i l l8th report to the National People 1s Congress, wherein he noted that: Consolidation of the people's communes i s the prerequisite of the smooth growth of a g r i c u l t u r a l production . . . . We are confident that when a l l the work of checking-up and organization i s well done the people's communes w i l l bring the rank and f i l e i n i t i a -t i v e into f u l l e r play and further develop their energies. This w i l l be a further guarantee f o r f u l f i l l i n g the tasks of in-,-g creasing a g r i c u l t u r a l production i n 1959. Nevertheless, i t was clear from Chou's speech i n A p r i l which followed on the heels of the 7th Plenary Session of the Central Committee, that while a retreat had been ordered i n regard to the communes, Mao Tse-tung was s t i l l determined to retain them as the basic unit of society i n China, and to achieve "pure" communes as soon as i t was objectively f e a s i b l e . Reiterating the party's f a i t h i n the correctness of the communes, Chou said that; the people's commune . . . w i l l have v i t a l significance for the development of our country's s o c i a l economy. In the conditions obtaining i n our country, i t i s not only the best form f o r promoting the continued develop-ment of the productive forces and quickening the tempo of s o c i a l i s t construction, but i t i s the best form for effecting the future t r a n s i -tion of our entire countryside from s o c i a l i s t 58 Chou E n - l a i , Report on the Work of the Government, (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), p. 31. c o l l e c t i v e ownership to ownership by the whole people, and the t r a n s i t i o n from s o c i a l i s t to communist society.59 Chou also spoke most warmly of the achievements of the Soviet Union, and indicated that the c o n c i l i a t o r y s p i r i t of the 21st Congress s t i l l prevailed. Referring s p e c i f i c a l l y to the Seven Year Plan and the Soviet advance towards communism, Chou emphasized that "this plan s i g n i f i e s that the Soviet Union has entered an important h i s t o r i c a l p eriod—the period of extensive building of communist society—and i s announcing to mankind that communist society with i t s i n f i n i t e splendour i s not f a r o f f . " ^ From these remarks i t can be c l e a r l y seen that the two nations* i d e o l o g i c a l r e c o n c i l i a t i o n over the question of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism was s t i l l holding firm as late as mid-April. Moreover, from the Chinese Premier's remarks, i t seemed as though the Chinese were i n a receptive state of mind towards the Khrushchev plan to increase economic t i e s and economic co-operation between the two nations—although i t i s not s p e c i f i c a l l y clear whether this included a receptiveness towards economic integration as such* Chou exclaimed: We are deeply aware from our own experience, that mutual support and cooperation from the s o c i a l i s t countries i s an important condition for their smooth development. In the future we w i l l continue to strengthen actively our Ibid., p. 6. 'ibid. ? p. 57. 1 9 2 cooperation with the Soviet Union and other f r a t e r n a l countries i n the p o l i t i c a l , economic, technical, c u l t u r a l and other f i e l d s and continue to deepen the education • , of our people i n proletarian internationalism. The course of events l a t e r proved that integration was s t i l l regarded very dubiously by the Chinese, and a strong fear remained that i t would r e s u l t i n Soviet economic, p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l domination. Following the rapprochement on the commune question at the 21st Congress, the Soviet press relaxed i t s policy of ignoring the communes and published a number of a r t i c l e s which generally repeated Chinese assertions that under Chinese conditions they had a number of p r a c t i c a l (as opposed to ideological) advantages. In A p r i l , f o r instance, a journal spe c i a l i z i n g i n the Orient carried an a r t i c l e i n which i t was said that the communes allowed a "much larger and more r a t i o n a l use of labour power," and that "already the f i r s t months of practice show that this form i n the conditions of China contains many p o s s i b i l i t i e s f or stepping up the tempo of production i n the Chinese countryside." And as late as June, Kommunist mentioned the communes i n a favour-able l i g h t . ^ 3 But the commune truce was soon to break. 6 l I b i d . , p. 58. 62 D. S. Zagoria, The Sino-Soviet C o n f l i c t (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962), p. k21:citing "Problemy vostokavedinya" no. 2, 1959, p. 7. 6 3 l b i d . , p. 13I+. 193 While i d e o l o g i c a l differences had been temporarily bridged, the basis for a further rupture over the communes at a l a t e r date s t i l l remained. Should Chinese revolution claims be renewed or should the Soviet Union f a i l — i n Chinese e y e s — t o carry the revolution forward fas t enough at home or abroad; or should either party be troubled by disruptive factions receiving i d e o l o g i c a l support from the leadership of the other f r a t e r n a l party. CHAPTER VIII RIFT OVER THE COMMUNES IN THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY AND SOVIET INVOLVEMENT: SUMMER 1959 The Ant1-Commune Element Within the Chinese Communist Party Mention has been made of the fact that a f a c t i o n of the Chinese Communist Party had opposed the p o l i c y of "The Three Red Banners" (greater, faster and better and more economical r e s u l t s ; the leap forward; and the people's communes), and had consistently advocated a more balanced, r a t i o n a l economic development similar to that undertaken i n the Five Year Plan. In other words, they wanted to follow the general path of development taken by the Soviet Union i n s o c i a l i s t construction. The existence of this group proved to be of exceptional significance i n the Sino-Soviet dispute over the communes since i t meant that pronouncements on the commune question by the Soviet Party could be seized upon by the Soviet Road faction for support i n the intra-party struggle (just as Mao's prouncements provided support to S t a l i n i s t s within the C.P.S.U,). Of course, while the communes and the leap forward p o l i c i e s remained successful, the conservative faction within the party had l i t t l e chance of posing a serious threat to the " r a d i c a l " f a c t i o n . How-ever, as soon as the p o l i c i e s began to appear to have been a f a i l u r e , the r a d i c a l f a c t i o n was no longer safe from renewed attack within party organs such as the Central Committee. 195 I t was i n t h e C . P . S . U . ' s i n t e r e s t t o l e n d o u t s i d e s u p p o r t t o t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n f o r a t l e a s t t w o r e a s o n s . F i r s t l y , b e c a u s e w h i l e t h e communes r e m a i n e d , t h e y p r o v i d e d a n e m b a r r a s s i n g c o n t r a s t t o S o v i e t c o n s e r v a t i s m a n d r e v i s i o n i s m , a n d p r o v i d e d a n a l t e r n a t i v e m o d e l t o t h a t o f S o v i e t s o c i a l i s t d e v e l o p m e n t . A n d s e c o n d l y , b e c a u s e t h e c o n s e r v a t i v e f a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e C . P . C . , i f i t g a i n e d c o n t r o l o f t h e p a r t y , w o u l d be more r e c e p t i v e t o S o v i e t r e v i s i o n s o f M a r x i s t t h e o r y o n t h e q u e s t i o n s o f p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , p e a c e f u l t r a n s i t i o n , a n d t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f w a r . 1 F r o m a v e r y c a r e f u l s t u d y o f c o m m u n i s t C h i n e s e d o c u m e n t s a n d o f t h e C h i n e s e p r e s s , i t c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e a n t i - " T h r e e B a n n e r s " f a c t i o n w a s c o m p o s e d o f f o u r m a i n e l e m e n t s : e c o n o m i c p l a n n e r s , f o r e i g n a f f a i r s s t a f f , m i l i t a r y men a n d p r o v i n c i a l p a r t y l e a d e r s . I t h a s b e e n s u r m i s e d b y a n u m b e r o f o b s e r v e r s o f t h e C h i n e s e s c e n e t h a t t h e i n t r a - p a r t y d i s p u t e w a s , a n d i s , b e t w e e n f a c t i o n s l e d b y Mao T s e - t u n g on t h e one h a n d a n d L i u S h a o - c h i o n t h e o t h e r , o r b y L i u S h a o - c h i o n t h e o n e h a n d a n d C h o u E n - l a i o n t h e o t h e r . The l a t t e r t h e o r y i s b y f a r t h e m o s t p r e v a l e n t , a n d h a s f o u n d among i t s s u p p o r t e r s s u c h p e o p l e a s Z a g o r i a , M c F a r q u a r a n d p c e r t a i n N a t i o n a l i s t C h i n e s e s c h o l a r s . The f a c t s p r o v i d e T h i s f a c t i s d o c u m e n t e d l a t e r i n t h e c h a p t e r . M . K a l b , D r a g o n i n t h e K r e m l i n (New Y o r k : B u t t o n & C o . , 1961), p . 208. 196 l i t t l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n for this l a t t e r view, however, and s t i l l l ess for the former theory. In actual fact i t would appear that the opponents of the leap forward and the communes were led by Chen Yun, Peng Teh-huai and Wang Chen-tien; a l l three being members of the P o l i t b u r o — t h e former being one of the seven members of the Politburo's standing committee, Peng Teh-huai being the former Minister of National Defence, and Wang being former Ambassador to Moscow. It may be true that Chou E n - l a i was somewhat less enthusiastic about these p o l i c i e s than Mao, Liu, Ten Haiao-ping and Lin Piao, but the evidence shows that he was d e f i n i t e l y not i n the opposition camp. The evidence tends to indicate that opposition to the "Three Red Banners" p o l i c i e s was not confined to merely a few members of the Central Committee. On the contrary, i t would appear that the moderate f a c t i o n was a r e l a t i v e l y large group, and that Mao Tse-tung*s association with the l e f t wing fa c t i o n was the deciding factor i n giving this group control over party policy. This can be seen very c l e a r l y i n the events surrounding the introduction of the Twelve Year Plan i n 1956, which shed considerable l i g h t on the intra-party struggle over economic policy. In the f a l l of 1955, following the Central Committee's October 11th d i r e c t i v e to speed up formation of the advanced producers' cooperatives, an upsurge of s o c i a l i z a t i o n f a r exceeding that envisioned i n the directive took place i n r u r a l 197 China. Flushed with t h i s success, Mao wrote i n the preface to the book S o c i a l i s t Upsurge i n China's Countryside on December 22, 1955 that "the problem f a c i n g the e n t i r e party and a l l the people of the country i s no longer one of combatting r i g h t i s t c o n s e r v a t i s t ideas about the speed of s o c i a l i s t transformation of a g r i c u l t u r e . 1 , 3 Instead, he asserted, i t was one of combatting r i g h t i s t c o n s e r v a t i s t ideas i n the matter of production. He s a i d : The problem today i s that r i g h t i s t conserva-tism i s s t i l l causing trouble i n many f i e l d s and preventing the work i n these f i e l d s from keeping pace with the development of the ob-j e c t i v e s i t u a t i o n . The present problem i s that many people consider impossible things which could be done i f they exerted themselves.^-According to L i u Shao-chi "comrade Mao Tse-tung subsequently summed up the ideas i n t h i s preface i n the slogan of b u i l d i n g s o c i a l i s m by achieving 'greater, f a s t e r , b e t t e r and more economical r e s u l t s ' . " ^ Thus, i t was Mao himself who was the author of the new party general l i n e which was eventually adopted i n September 1957* The immediate r e s u l t of Mao's new r a d i c a l outlook on the speed of n a t i o n a l c o n s t r u c t i o n was h i s % a o Tse-tung, Preface to " S o c i a l i s t Upsurge i n China's Countryside," r e p r i n t e d i n Bowie and Fairbank, Communist China 1955-1959 (Cambridge, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1962), p. 117. k Loc. c i t . •'Liu Shao-chi, "Report on the Work of the C e n t r a l Committee," Second Session of the Eighth N a t i o n a l Congress Qf the Communist Party of China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 36. 198 formulation of a r a d i c a l "Draft National Program for Agri-c u l t u r a l Development, 1956-1967" which was adopted by the Politburo on January 26, 1956. As Liu later pointed out, i t was: a program f o r developing s o c i a l i s t agriculture by achieving "greater, f a s t e r , better and more economical r e s u l t s 1 . Not only did i t set great goals for r u r a l work throughout the country, but i t gave a correct orientation f o r development of the entire work of s o c i a l i s t construction.6 In the preface to the new Draft Program, Mao suggested that the proposed program should be studied through-out the party, "as well as by a l l departments concerned" (which indicates that Mao had drawn up the plan without consulting them) with a view to obtaining a wide range of views on i t . "These views" he suggested, "should be collected before A p r i l 1, 1956, so that the program can be submitted f o r discussion and adoption by the seventh plenary session (enlarged) of the seventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China which w i l l be held sometime after that date." 7 Clearly, Mao expected to get approval f o r h i s plan from the Central Committee; but, i n f a c t , that approval was not forthcoming, as w i l l be shown. Mao further elaborated the general theme of the Draft Program at an enlarged meeting Loc. c i t . 7Mao Tse-tung, "Preface to the Draft Program"; re-printed i n Bowie and Fairbank, op. c i t . , p. 119. 199 of the Politburo i n A p r i l , i n a report e n t i t l e d "Ten Sets of Relationships". According to Mao's deputy, Liu Shao-chi, "The general idea of the report was to mobilize a l l positive factors and available forces for building China into a modern, prosperous and mighty s o c i a l i s t state within the o shortest possible time." However, Mao's plans apparently met with s t i f f opposition from the more moderate elements of the Central Committee, since h i s Twelve Year Plan f a i l e d to gain approval at the Committee's session i n September of 1956. This f a c t alone i s enough to make i t clear that the moderate f a c t i o n was large enough and i n f l u e n t i a l enough to f o r e s t a l l the proposed change i n the party l i n e . At the Party Congress i n September, shortly after the Central Committee's meeting, there was no mention of the Twelve Year Plan i n the major reports. Instead, there occurred the introduction of the Second Five Year Plan, which was based on the same moderate economic philosophy as the F i r s t . The only a l l u s i o n to Mao's program for leaping ahead i n agriculture occurred i n an unfavourable context: Chou En-lai made mention of i t i n connection with an economic disruption at the beginning of the year: following the publication of the Draft National Program for A g r i c u l t u r a l Development (1956-1967) . . . i n the construction work of some depart-ments and l o c a l i t i e s there' appeared a tendency Liu Shao-chi, op. c i t . , p. 37. 200 to do everything at once and do i t everywhere, taking no account of actual conditions and running recklessly ahead . . . . Some depart-ments and l o c a l i t i e s , impatient for success, attempted to accomplish within three to f i v e years, or even one to two years tasks that required seven or twelve years to complete. These tendencies were a l l discovered and corrected by the Central Committee i n good time.9 It appeared from Chou's report that the moderates had been powerful enough to r e t a i n control over the party l i n e , i n the face of the disruptions caused by the "leap forward i n 1956". There were clear indications i n Chen Yun's address that he himself was firmly i n economic moderates 1 camp. He urged the reintroduction of the free market at the v i l l a g e l e v e l , complaining that "there i s no competition whatsoever, and . . . the r e s u l t i s a drop i n the output of the ( a g r i -c u l t u r a l ) commodities." He further argued that i n general, "measures taken by state economic departments i n the l a s t few years, to r e s t r i c t c a p i t a l i s t industry and commerce have now 10 become unnecessary." Going even further, he urged that the party allow cooperative members to "have a b i t more land 9Chou E n - l a i , "Report on the Proposals for the Second Five Year Plan," Eighth National Congress of the C.P.C. Vol. I (Documents) (Peking, F.L.P., 1956), p. 27*+. 10 Chen Yun, "Speech to the Eighth Congress," Eighth National Congress of the Communist Party of China; Speeches, IoJU_JI (Peking, F.L.P., 1956), p. 161. 201 for their private use, so that they can plant crops f o r fodder to raise pigs and increase the production of subsidiary occupations," and suggested that "the state of a f f a i r s where everything i s indiscriminately managed by the cooperative 11 must be altered." It was evident from these remarks that Chen Yun was poles apart from the thinking of Mao Tse-tung and the other economic rad i c a l s within the Politburo and the Central Committee. After the r a d i c a l group had succeeded i n winning over the Central Committee to i t s point of view a year l a t e r ( i n September of 1957), Liu Shao-chi revealed the nature of the intra-party struggle between the two groups, by admitting that: There were individual defects i n our work during the leap forward i n 1956 . . . . However some comrades at the time magnified these defects and underestimated the great achievements attained, and hence regarded the leap forward of 1956 as a 'reckless advance 1. In a f l u r r y of opposition to this so-called 'reckless advance', some people even had misgivings about the p r i n c i p l e of 'achieving greater, f a s t e r , better and more economical r e s u l t s ' , and the h o-articles Pro-grams fo r Ag r i c u l t u r a l Development.12 It was further revealed that "the struggle between the two methods i n dealing with this question (of economic advance) was not f u l l y decided u n t i l the launching of the r e c t i f i c a t i o n i : L I b i d . , p. 168. 1 2 L i u Shao-chi, op, cit.« p. 38. 202 campaign and the a n t i - r i g h t i s t struggle."' 1" 3 At the September 1957 meeting of the Central Committee the r a d i c a l l i n e was endorsed and the eighteen-month-old Program for Ag r i c u l t u r a l Development revived. Apparently, a number of those who had opposed Mao's leap forward p o l i c i e s switched camps i n 1957. (It i s possible, though by no means sure, that Chou E n - l a i was one of these.) According to Liu's statements i n the spring of 1958: Many of the comrades who expressed misgivings about the p r i n c i p l e of building socialism by achieving 'greater, f a s t e r , better and more economical r e s u l t s ' have learned a lesson from a l l t h i s . But some of them have not learned anything. They say: 'We'll se t t l e accounts with you after the autumn harvest*. Well l e t them wait to s e t t l e accounts. They w i l l lose out i n the end.lH-These "comrades", to speak this way i n party deliberations, must have had considerable prestige and support; otherwise they would not have dared to be so outspoken. Moreover, the fact that these members of the moderate faction were not more thoroughly denounced, indicated that their strength was considerable. The f a c t that they postponed further confronta tion with the r a d i c a l group u n t i l after the autumn harvest wa also important since i t indicated an implied challenge of "produce results or else". The group of moderates remained ready to challenge the leadership as soon as signs of 13IM,d., p. 3 L -l L f rIbid., p. 39. 203 economic d i s l o c a t i o n appeared. During the party's r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign many party o f f i c i a l s , including a number of p r o v i n c i a l governors and high party o f f i c i a l s i n the provinces were purged, and i n the spring of 1958 numerous government o f f i c i a l s were dismissed from o f f i c e . Included i n those d i r e c t l y linked with " r i g h t i s t a c t i v i t i e s " were four members of the Central Committee, including Pan Pu-sheng, the f i r s t secretary of the Honan p r o v i n c i a l committee of the party. J At least two more alternate members of the Central Committee l o s t their government jobs i n the February reorganization of the 1 6 ministries: Wang Hao-shu, and Liu Lan-po. This brings to at least s i x , the number of Central Committee members who were openly affected by the r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign. A l l six retained their positions i n the Central Committee, despite losing their other posts and thus " l i v e d " to f i g h t another day against the r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s espoused by Mao Tse-tung. Besides this group there was also the "tide watching group" and the "post harvest reckoning group" within the Central Committee. I t i s not apparent whether the m i l i t a r y element i n the Central Committee which was l a t e r to challenge the commune program, was involved with these two groups, or whether they made up a separate group. ^Summary of the Eighth Congress, Second Session; Second Session of the Eighth National Congress (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 13. 16 Keesing's Contemporary Archives; Week of March 8-15, p. 16062, 1958. 20k It i s the existence of an anti-great leap f a c t i o n within the Central Committee that explains a peculiar aspect of the introduction of the communes. As has been pointed out, opposition was apparently much stronger within the Central Committee than within the smaller Politburo; and this apparently explains why the o r i g i n a l commune resolution (August 28, 1959) was passed by an enlarged session of the Politburo rather than the Central Committee. It may well be, moreover, that t h i s bypassing of the Central Committee on such an immensely important issue as the communes led to a considerable exacerbation of the i n t r a -party controversy. Although the Central Committee had 17 endorsed the formation of larger c o l l e c t i v e s i n May, ' i t was only i n December that the Central Committee was convened to consider the commune question, and this was after they had been i n existence for over three months. It may well be that Mao bypassed the Central Committee purposely i n seeking to obtain party support for h i s brainchild, the commune. Opposition from the moderate group within the Central Committee might well have been strong enough to postpone the r a d i c a l new soc i a l unit's introduction, just as the Twelve Year Plan had been postponed. As i t was, by the time the Central 1 7"Long Live the People's Communes," Red Flag, August 29, 1959; Appendix to, Chou En-lai's Report on Ad-justing the Major Economic Targets of the 1959 Economic Plan (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), P- H-0. 205 Committee was convened to consider the commune question, Mao himself had already reached a more moderate position i n regard to the o r i g i n a l claims which had been made on behalf of the new s o c i a l unit. It should be noted that the position of the moderates within the party necessarily depended on the success of the "Three Red Banners": i f the r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s were successful then the moderates had l i t t l e grounds for opposition, but i f these same p o l i c i e s f a i l e d then the position of the moderates would be greatly strengthened. As i t turned out, with the bumper harvest and general leap forward of 1958 (attributed by the radicals to their p o licy of the "Three Red Banners") the moderates* position within the party was considerably weakened. However, as time wore on and successes turned sour, the moderates were able to argue increasingly f o r c e f u l l y for a repudiation of r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s and f o r return to co-ordinated economic development of the Soviet type. Economic Dislocation and Mounting Unrest Within the Party It was clear by February of 1959 that severe d i s -location of the economy had been caused by the great leap forward and the people's communes. The Central Committee had ordered the "consolidation" of the communes; food was already i n short supply, grain remained unharvested i n the f i e l d s ; iron from the backyard furnaces was proving too poor to use; and overestimations of production figures were 206 beginning to come to l i g h t . This deteriorating s i t u a t i o n began to put the radicals on the defensive. In an a r t i c l e i n Red Flag on February 16, Tan Chen-lin, (a Vice Premier, Politburo member, and one of the most outspoken supporters of the r a d i c a l party l i n e i n general and the communes i n part i c u l a r ) revealed the nature of the unrest within the party, and i d e n t i f i e d several opposition factions. He said: There are s t i l l some people who even as they doubted the great leap forward l a s t year, are adopting a doubtful attitude towards the big leap forward this year . . . they are e a s i l y affected by rumours spread by the 'tide watching* group and the 'post-harvest reckon-ing* group . . . . If we do not solve the ideo l o g i c a l problems of these comrades, the big leap forward this year w i l l be severely affected.lo In short, i t appeared that with conditions deteriorating the moderates were beginning to win back the waverers to their camp. Revealing the nature of the charges launched by the moderates, Tan Chen-lin noted that: As to the 'tide watching 1 group and the 'account reckoning* group . . . . They say 'we have a wheat harvest but no fl o u r f o r food. Grain production has increased and yet we have sweet potatoes. The big leap forward i s unreliable.* They attempt to create chaos . . . . The 'tide watching* group also attempts to make use of the fac t that the estimated outputs were excessively high i n some areas i n order to reject the achievement of the big leap forward.19 ^ e d Flag, February 16, 1959; Extracts From China Mainland Magazines. No. 165, p. 29. 19 yLoc. c i t . 207 In the succeeding issue of Red F l a g ? Chen Yun wrote a lengthy a r t i c l e ostensibly discussing "Some Problems Concerning Capital Construction Operations", i n his role as Director of the State Capital Construction Commission. However, much of the a r t i c l e was given over to c r i t i c i z i n g reckless advance and i t s attendant economic dis l o c a t i o n . He argued f o r c i b l y that production figures were not everything— on the contrary, increases i n production meant very l i t t l e unless the products were of s u f f i c i e n t quality to be usable. "We must, he said, "oppose the deviation of laying stress only on speed, to the neglect of quality . . . . Because work w i l l have to be done over again i f the quality i s poor, 2 this w i l l lead to a waste of manpower, material, and money." At the beginning of A p r i l , the Central Committee met i n i t s Seventh Plenary Session to r a t i f y the decisions of the Politburo concerning the retreat to the three-levels-of-ownership system i n the communes (taken at Chengchow i n March) and to consider the production targets for 1959. The targets set were based on the 1958 statistics, which had s t i l l not been proven f a l s e at this late date. As a r e s u l t , completely u n r e a l i s t i c targets were set for the 1959 leap forward. 20 L i Fu-chun, Raise High the Red Flag of the General Line (Peking, F.L.P., i 9 6 0 ) , p. 3. 21 Chen Yun, "Some Immediate Problems Concerning Capital Construction," Red Flag. March 1, 1958; Extracts from China Mainland Magazines. No. 1 6 6 , p. 1. 208 As late as A p r i l 18, Chou E n - l a i delivered a report to the National People's Congress which was based on the i n f l a t e d 1958 figures. Sometime between this date and the Central Committee meeting i n August, when the revised figures were made known p u b l i c l y , the huge errors were discovered by the party. The release of these revised figures gave a tremendous impetus to the arguments of the moderates since i t was now shown that the great leap was mostly only a leap forward on paper. Whereas Chou had claimed i n A p r i l that the production of food crops and cotton had more than doubled i n 1958, the revised figures showed that OO the increases had been only 35$ and 28$ respectively. More-over, most of the steel produced i n the r u r a l areas and included i n the production figures, had proven useless. In this situation the r a d i c a l group's position was undermined and threatened, and. the moderate elements began to press home their attack. Floods and droughts also threatened huge areas of the country, and the revolt i n Tibet continued to t i e down a large section of the People's Liberation Army. The Position of the P.L.A. The People's Liberation Army i t s e l f played an immensely important role i n the intra-party struggle over the "Three Red Banners" p o l i c i e s , and some of i t s leaders took a leading role i n opposing the communes and the leap forward. Chou E n - l a i , Report on Adjusting the Major Economic Targets (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), p. 19. 209 U l t i m a t e l y Peng T e h - h u a i a n d H u a n g K o - c h e n g w e r e d i s m i s s e d f r o m t h e i r p o s i t i o n s o f M i n i s t e r o f D e f e n c e a n d C h i e f o f G e n e r a l S t a f f r e s p e c t i v e l y , a n d l a t e r t h e i r c o l l e a g u e T a n C h e n g , D i r e c t o r G e n e r a l o f t h e P o l i t i c a l D e p a r t m e n t o f t h e A rmed F o r c e s , r e c e i v e d t h e same f a t e . The f a c t t h a t t h e d i s m i s s a l s o f P e n g a n d H u a n g t o o k p l a c e on S e p t e m b e r 1 7 , 1959, i m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w e d t h e s t o r m y c r i s i s w i t h i n t h e p a r t y o v e r t h e communes a t t h e A u g u s t C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e s e s s i o n , c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e s e t w o men ( t h e f o r m e r a member o f t h e P o l i t b u r o , a n d t h e l a t t e r a f u l l member o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e ) w e r e d e e p l y i n v o l v e d i n t h e o p p o s i t i o n t o M a o ' s communes . T h i s w a s f u r t h e r s u b s t a n t i a t e d b y L i n P i a o , P e n g T e h - h u a i ' s s u c c e s s o r , a n d a member o f t h e P o l i t b u r o ' s S t a n d i n g C o m m i t t e e , who w r o t e i n P e o p l e ' s D a i l y on S e p t e m b e r 27 u r g i n g t h e Army t o " M a r c h A h e a d u n d e r t h e R e d F l a g o f t h e G e n e r a l L i n e a n d Mao T s e - t u n g * s M i l i t a r y T h i n k i n g " . I n t h i s a r t i c l e h e e x p o s e d t h e q u e s t i o n s o v e r w h i c h t h e r e a p p a r e n t l y h a d b e e n d i s a g r e e m e n t w i t h P e n g a n d H u a n g : I s i t s t i l l i m p o r t a n t f o r p o l i t i c s t o be i n command a t t h i s s t a g e o f t h e m o d e r n i z a t i o n o f t h e Army? C o n c r e t e l y s p e a k i n g , w h a t p l a c e h a s p o l i t i c a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l w o r k ? What a t t i t u d e s h o u l d members o f t h e a r m e d f o r c e s a d o p t t o w a r d s t h e c o u n t r y ' s e c o n o m i c c o n s t r u c -t i o n a n d t h e mass m o v e m e n t s ? What i s t h e c o r r e c t w a y t o h a n d l e i n t r a - a r m y r e l a t i o n s a n d t o s t r e n g t h e n s t i l l f u r t h e r t h e P a r t y ' s l e a d e r -s h i p o f t h e army?2 3 23 J L i n P i a o , " M a r c h A h e a d U n d e r t h e R e d F l a g a n d Mao T s e - t u n g * s M i l i t a r y T h i n k i n g , " P e o p l e ' s D a i l y . S e p t e m b e r 27, 1959; B o w i e a n d F a r b a n k , O P . c i t . , p . 579. 210 It was the t h i r d question which held the greatest significance i n the actual intra-party struggle—and i t was clear from Lin Piao*s discussion of this question that Peng and Huang had l i n e d up i n opposition to the mass movements—including the communes: What should our attitude be to this mighty mass movement? Should we plunge i n and support the masses with a l l our hearts? Or should we stand outside the movement and pick f a u l t with the masses here and there, or even stand i n opposi-tion to the movement and against the masses?2k The l a t t e r was apparently the course taken by "some comrades". There were a number of s p e c i f i c issues connected with the communes and the leap forward on which Peng Teh-huai disagreed with the party l i n e , and which can be i d e n t i f i e d from the text of Lin Piao's a r t i c l e . The f i r s t was the question of the army*s p a r t i c i p a t i o n In production: Some years ago there were comrades who regarded i t as an extra burden for the army to p a r t i c i -pate i n mass movements and a s s i s t the people i n production. They held that only d r i l l i n g and lectures constituted training while p a r t i c i p a -tion i n p r a c t i c a l s o c i a l i s t struggle was not training but an obstruction to training which would bring more loss than gain. Such a view-point i s utterly wrong.25 In 1958 the P. L. A. had been ordered by the party to p a r t i -cipate extensively i n the great leap forward and had contributed over 60,000,000 working days to i n d u s t r i a l and a g r i c u l t u r a l production. This included those soldiers on active duty at Ibid., p. 581. Ibid., p. 583. 211 26 t h e " F u k i e n f r o n t " . I t i s n o t s u r p r i s i n g , t h e n , t h a t P e n g and. H u a n g a s p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r s s h o u l d o b j e c t t o t h i s p o l i c y , s i n c e f r o m t h e i r p o i n t o f v i e w i t w o u l d n e c e s s a r i l y i m p a i r t h e a r m y t r a i n i n g p r o g r a m , m o r a l e , a n d c o m b a t r e a d i n e s s . M o r e o v e r , t h e communes h a d two f u r t h e r d e l e t e r i o u s e f f e c t s upon t h e a r m y . F i r s t o f a l l , t h e m o b i l i z a t i o n o f t h e p e a s a n t s i n t o l a b o u r a r m i e s a n d i n t o communes ( w h i c h t h r e a t e n e d t o d i s r u p t t r a d i t i o n a l f a m i l y l i f e ) , n e c e s s a r i l y h a d a n e g a t i v e r e a c t i o n w i t h i n t h e a r m y , w h i c h i s c o m p o s e d a l m o s t e n t i r e l y o f y o u n g p e a s a n t s . As L i n P i a o a d m i t t e d : s i n c e t h e o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y o f t h e o f f i c e r s a n d men o f o u r a rmy come f r o m t h e p e a s a n t r y , u n a v o i d a b l y some c o m r a d e s s o m e t i m e s c o n s i d e r q u e s t i o n s f r o m t h e t e m p o r a r y , p a r t i a l i n t e r e s t s o f s m a l l s c a l e p r o d u c e r s a n d do n o t c l e a r l y u n d e r -s t a n d c e r t a i n q u e s t i o n s o f s o c i a l i s t c h a n g e . 2 7 I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e communes a n d t h e g r e a t l e a p f o r w a r d l e d t o c o n s i d e r a b l e u n r e s t a n d l o s s o f m o r a l e w i t h i n t h e a r m y ; a s i t u a t i o n w h i c h m u s t h a v e b e e n a s o u r c e o f c o n s i d e r a b l e a l a r m t o P e n g T e h - h u a i a n d o t h e r a rmy pQ l e a d e r s . S e c o n d l y , t h e r e was t h e f a c t t h a t t h e communes 2 L i H s u - k u , " P . L . A . on t h e I n d u s t r i a l F r o n t , " C u r r e n t E v e n t s . N o . 3 , F e b r u a r y 6 , 1959; E x t r a c t s f r o m C h i n a M a i n l a n d M a g a z i n e s . N o . 167 , p . 15 . 2 7 B o w i e a n d F a i r b a n k , o p . c i t . . p . 580. oft U n d e r t h e s e c o n d i t i o n s o f u n r e s t w i t h i n t h e P . L . A . , o f f i c e r s l i k e P e n g T e h - h u a i m i g h t w e l l h a v e f e a r e d t h e 212 e m b o d i e d a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i c y o f d e f e n s e w h i c h n e g a t e d t h e r o l e o f t h e m o d e r n m e c h a n i z e d a r m y . F r o m t h e v e r y i n c e p t i o n o f t h e communes , a n i n t e g r a l p a r t o f t h e p l a n h a d b e e n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e " p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a " w h i c h was n o t d i r e c t l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o t h e a r m y . A s L i n P i a o p o i n t e d o u t : i n t h e e v e n t o f a w a r o f a g g r e s s i o n l a u n c h e d b y i m p e r i a l i s m a g a i n s t o u r c o u n t r y , t h e p e o p l e ' s communes . . . a r e t h e m i g h t y p r o p f o r t h e t a s k o f t u r n i n g t h e w h o l e p o p u l a t i o n i n t o f i g h t i n g men , o f s u p p o r t i n g t h e f r o n t , o f d e f e n d i n g t h e c o u n t r y a n d o v e r w h e l m i n g t h e a g g r e s s o r s . 2 9 T h i s c o n c e p t o f r e l y i n g on t h e " m a s s e s " a s o p p o s e d t o a r m e d m i g h t a n d a d v a n c e d m i l i t a r y t e c h n o l o g y i s , o f c o u r s e , one o f Mao T s e - t u n g ' s m o s t f a m o u s p r i n c i p l e s . B u t t o t h e m o d e r n p r o f e s s i o n a l s o l d i e r i n t h i s * e r a o f m o d e r n w a r f a r e , s u c h a n a p p r o a c h i s s e r i o u s l y o u t o f d a t e . S u c h , i t w o u l d s e e m , was t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f Peng T e h - h u a i a n d h i s f o l l o w e r s : Some c o m r a d e s t a k e t h e v i e w t h a t m o d e r n w a r -f a r e d i f f e r s f r o m w a r f a r e i n t h e p a s t . . . . T h e y s a y t h a t m o d e r n w a r f a r e i s a w a r o f t e c h n i q u e , o f s t e e l a n d m a c h i n e r y , a n d t h a t i n t h e f a c t o f t h e s e t h i n g s , m a n ' s r o l e h a s t o be r e l e g a t e d t o a s e c o n d a r y p l a c e . 3 0 p o s s i b i l i t y of a Kronstadt type of r e b e l l i o n within the ranks. The experience of the Soviet Union was well known i n this regard. 2 9Bowie and Fairbank, op..cit., p. 582. Ibid., p. 5835 It i s important to note that this m i l i t a r y view held by Peng Teh-huai i s also the view held by the CPSU. In the course of the Sino-Soviet dispute, Khrushchev was accused of r i d i c u l i n g Mao's stress on man over machine and of saying that "an organized m i l i t i a i s not an 213 In Taiwan, for instance, the U. S. forces were armed with t a c t i c a l nuclear weapons, and the Chinese army could have no hope of successfully assaulting Formosa unless they were s i m i l a r l y equipped. It was apparently with this i n mind that Peng Teh-huai met with Marshal Malinovsky i n Moscow i n November 1957* As a result of that meeting a secret agreement (revealed by the Chinese i n the 19°3 polemics) on "new technology for national defence" was signed by the two nations. This agreement provided for the Soviet Union to supply China with technical aid i n manufacturing i t s own atomic weapons. How-ever, i n July 1958 Khrushchev and Malinovsky flew secretly to Peking and put forward "unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet m i l i t a r y c o n t r o l . " 3 1 In view of subsequent revelations, i t would appear that the USSR decided to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to West Germany by suggesting to the Chinese that they accept Soviet army but cannon fodder." At the Bucharest Conference i n i960, Khrushchev said, "Let the Chinese comrades take no offence. Of course you have a great experience i n war but mostly i n g u e r r i l l a war . . . . The imperialist strategists now regard divisions as cannon fodder. What now counts with them i s who has hydrogen bombs and combat planes and how many. (A Reply to Peking, London, Soviet Booklets, 1963), p. 19. 31 J "Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," Red Flag. September 6, 1963; Peking Review. No. 37, September 13, 1963, p. 12. 21k n u c l e a r w e a p o n s u n d e r S o v i e t c o n t r o l , much l i k e t h e j o i n t c o n t r o l s y s t e m w i t h i n NATO. " T h e s e u n r e a s o n a b l e demands op w e r e r i g h t l y a n d f i r m l y r e j e c t e d b y t h e C h i n e s e g o v e r n m e n t , , u a n d Mao T s e - t u n g a p p a r e n t l y d e c i d e d t o r e l y more on t h e " m a s s e s " i n n a t i o n a l d e f e n c e . I n t h e l i g h t o f t h e s u b s e q u e n t s p l i t b e t w e e n P e n g T e h - h u a i a n d t h e s u p p o r t e r s o f M a o , i t i s l i k e l y t h a t P e n g w a s i n f a v o u r o f a c c e p t i n g t h e S o v i e t p r o p o s a l , a n d o p p o s e d Mao on t h i s p o i n t . To h a v e t o p r e p a r e f o r a t o m i c c o n f l i c t b y s e t t i n g up a r i f l e - a r m e d " p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a " u n d e r t h e c o n t r o l o f t h e d e c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f t h e communes , m u s t h a v e b e e n d i s t a s t e f u l t o a n y p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y m a n , t o s a y n o t h i n g o f t h e man p e r s o n a l l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r m a i n t a i n i n g t h e c o u n t r y ' s d e f e n c e s . T h u s i t c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e commune p o l i c y h a d a d i r e c t b e a r i n g on t h e p a r t y ' s a p p r o a c h t o n a t i o n a l d e f e n c e a n d i t w a s p a r t l y f o r t h i s r e a s o n , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t M a r s h a l P e n g s t o o d i n o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e new s o c i a l u n i t . The d i s m i s s a l o f t h e C h i e f o f S t a f f , G e n e r a l Su Y u i n O c t o b e r o f 1958 a l s o w a s a p p a r e n t l y f o r h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e communes , t h e u s e o f t h e Armed F o r c e s i n d o m e s t i c c o n s t r u c -t i o n , a n d t o t h e n o n - n u c l e a r s t r a t e g y o f Mao T s e - t u n g i n r e f u s i n g t o a c c e p t A - w e a p o n s u n d e r S o v i e t c o n t r o l . A r t i c l e s a p p e a r i n g i n t h e C h i n e s e p r e s s i n t h e l a t e summer i n d i c a t e d t h a t r e s i s t a n c e t o M a o ' s p o l i c i e s was w i d e s p r e a d w i t h i n t h e L o c . c i t . 215 P.L.A. 3 3 Accusations were made that certain m i l i t a r y men l a i d too great a stress on atomic weapons and modern m i l i t a r y techniques, and underestimated the importance of economic work to national defence; similar charges to those made by Lin Piao a year l a t e r . Su Yu's dismissal immediately after the introduction of the communes, and only a month after the "Generals to the ranks" program was begun, gave a very de f i n i t e i n d i c a t i o n that he supported the professional elements within the P.L.A. And being a member of the Central Committee, he added yet another voice to the group of dissidents within that body. Around the time when opposition to the "Three Red Banners" was mounting within the party, "the Soviet govern-ment u n i l a t e r a l l y tore up the agreement on new technology for national defence and refused to provide China with a sample of an atomic bomb and technical data concerning i t s ok manufacture." 0 This was i n June 1959. The Chinese saw this as an attempt to "curry favour with the U. S. i m p e r i a l i s t , " 3 ^ as part of a Soviet bid to reach a detente with the West, and thereby carry Khrushchev's " r e v i s i o n i s t " p o l i c y of permanent peaceful coexistence into treaty form. This occurrence marked 33 -'-'Discussed i n A. Hsueh, "Communist China and Nuclear Weapons," China Quarterly, No. 2, i960. 3k J "Origin and Development of Differences . . .," OP. c i t . , p. 12. 35 -^Loc. c i t . the f i r s t open manifestation of the Sino-Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l r i f t over the question of peaceful co-existence and bloc foreign policy, and opened, the way for a resumption of the commune controversy between the two parties. Formerly, the commune question had been a dispute i n i t s own ri g h t ; now i t was re-opened by the Russians i n an attempt to undermine the Chinese i d e o l o g i c a l authority as a whole, and to bring the r a d i c a l element within the Chinese party into disrepute: for the authors of the commune p o l i c y were concurrently the authors of the revolution-oriented foreign p o l i c y adopted by the party i n 1957. The Intra-Party Debate Over Communes Starting i n May and continuing through June and July, a r t i c l e s appeared sporadically i n Chinese newspapers and magazines which revealed a growing opposition to Mao Tse-tung's r a d i c a l domestic p o l i c i e s . In an a r t i c l e i n China Youth on May 16, f o r example, Chang Ch ,ien-chung indicated that opposition to extremist p o l i c i e s existed within the Communist Youth League. Discussing the question "What Begets Absolute Egalitarianism," Chang asserted that "absolute egalitarianism i s a r a d i c a l and subjective desire of the petty bourgeois, and Is a fantasy estranged from r e a l i t y and never realizable."- 1 (This statement was surprisingly •^Chang Chien-chung, "What Begets Absolute E g a l i t a -rianism," China Youth, no. 10, May 16, 1959; Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, no. 178, p. 6, 217 similar to l a t e r charges made within the party that the communes were nothing but "petty bourgeois fanaticism.") Since "egalitarianism" was one of the charges l e v e l l e d by the Soviet Union against the commune program, this a r t i c l e by Chang took on more than just academic significance, and assumed p o l i t i c a l and ide o l o g i c a l importance, especially i n the l i g h t of mounting intra-party c o n f l i c t . The next day another a r t i c l e appeared i n Economic Research, written by the Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission and e n t i t l e d "On the Question of Proportion, P r i o r i t y , and Rate of Growth i n the National Economy". In his discussion of this central question of party policy, Yang Ying-chieh raised an issue which was of immense importance i n the party controversy over the communes and i t s related phenomenon. This was the question of "Soviet experience". His own view was that "we should make a good study of the history of construction i n brother countries, thus to take them as an important reference f o r our c o n s t r u c t i o n . 1 , 3 7 On the s p e c i f i c topic under discussion i n the a r t i c l e , he argued that: i f the authorities for economic planning t r y to ignore a d e f i n i t e proportional r e l a t i o n , but demand high speed development only, the outcome would be contrary to what has been J'Yang Ying-chieh, "On the Question of Proportion, P r i o r i t y and Rate of Growth i n the National Economy," Economic Research, May 17, 1959; Extracts from China Main-land Magazines ? No. 178, p. 21. 218 expected. Economic maladjustment would emerge, thus forcing down the rate of economic growth.38 Several a r t i c l e s by Hsu Hsin-hsueh appeared during this same period i n Red Flag. Referring most favourably to Chen Yuri's a r t i c l e the previous March, which had attacked "the deviation of laying stress only on speed," Hsu put himself squarely i n Chen's camp, attacking "some comrades" who did not understand that since mechanization was lacking i t was "improper to s h i f t an excessive amount of manpower from the a g r i c u l t u r a l front to the i n d u s t r i a l f r o n t . " He made i t known that despite the r a d i c a l s ' claim that the country's manpower was i t s greatest resource, " r u r a l areas have experienced manpower shortages instead of manpower affluence." Moreover, reasserting Chen Yun's thesis i n stronger language, he argued that "some comrades . . . have been entertaining an incorrect opinion—the b e l i e f that the solution of the question of quantity automatically solves the question of economic results—without r e a l i z i n g that on quality depends the extent of economic r e s u l t s . " 3 9 But the most s i g n i f i c a n t a r t i c l e of t h i s period of growing opposition, leading up to the Central Committee meeting i n August, was an a r t i c l e by Tao Chu the 1st Secretary 3 8 L o c . c i t . •39 -"Hsu Hsin-hsueh, "Learn a S t i l l Better Way to Calculate Economic Results," Red Flag, No. 13. July 1, 1959; Extracts from China Mainland Magazines, no. 180, p. 2 k . 219 of the Kwantung Provincial Committee and member of the Central Committee. The a r t i c l e was reprinted i n People's Daily on June 18, after appearing i n Kwantung*s Shane Yu. but only after heavy censoring of the o r i g i n a l version. Even i n the censored version, Tao Chu's charges rang out loud, i f not altogether c l e a r : "by showing some respect for objective p o s s i b i l i t y . . . we can prevent ' l e f t i s t 1 ho adventurism." In the censored sections of the o r i g i n a l version, Mao himself was brought under t h i n l y v e i l e d attack, as were his commune p o l i c i e s and the party's general l i n e . Apparently making hi s remarks i n the l i g h t of the recently discovered errors i n production s t a t i s t i c s , Tao argued that: Our knowledge of the objective things goes through a process and always reaches per-f e c t i o n gradually from imperfection. That i s why we say that a man i s great not be-cause he i s 'consistently correct' (which i s impossible), but because he i s able to size up the situation and make decisions at the opportune moment and to discover problems and change hi s measures i n the li g h t of the objective situation. If he finds that objective r e a l i t y does not corres-pond to h i s knowledge, he should change hi s o r i g i n a l measures and throw away h i s o r i g i n a l formula.^1 Tao Chu, "The General Line and Methods of Work," People's Daily, June . 1 8 , 1959; Survey of the China Mainland Press, No. 2 0 5 1 , p. 3 . Loc. c i t 220 Not content with this sharp c r i t i c i s m of Mao, and t h i s apparent demand to discard the "Three Red Banners", which constituted Mao*s " o r i g i n a l formula", Tao Chu went so f a r as to warn Mao to change his p o l i c i e s or face being over-thrown: Fa i l u r e to supplement or change the established measures i n the process of practice and along with the demand of the objective s i t u a t i o n means r i g i d i t y of mind. He who does things this way w i l l i n e v i t a b l y f a l l . The Kwantung leader also indicated that he himself was among the school which asserted that "ideological work and p o l i t i c a l work can produce neither grain nor coal nor i r o n " (Liu Shao-chi*s report to 2nd Session of 8 t h Party Congress, May 1958) and which had received the c r i t i c i s m of the radicals throughout the struggle to implement the r a d i c a l party l i n e . Thus, Tao asserted that " i t w i l l not do to confine ourselves to p o l i t i c a l work while their (the workers) material l i f e i s not bettered at a l l . " 0 In other words, he was opposing the r a d i c a l s * policy of substituting ideological incentive for material incentive, asserting that this policy had f a i l e d (as Khrushchev had predicted). On the question of the communes, Tao Chu challenged Mao*s public assertions that they were the product of the Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t . 221 w i l l of the masses, and i n d i c a t e d that i n f a c t they were supported only by a very few: I f the things we do f a i l to set the masses i n motion and win support from only a small s e c t i o n of the masses, then our p r a c t i c e i s d e f i n i t e l y not a c o r r e c t p r a c t i c e , even ^ though the masses may pay l i p s e r v i c e to i t . A l l these censored p o r t i o n s of Tao Chu's a r t i c l e i n d i c a t e d an important challenge to the leadership of Mao and the other r a d i c a l s w i t h i n the P o l i t b u r o , and were no doubt instrumental i n convincing the Soviet leaders that they should break the commune truce and provide the moderate elements with outside support and with i d e o l o g i c a l ammunition. Two weeks a f t e r Tao's abridged a r t i c l e appeared i n People's D a i l y , another a r t i c l e appeared i n i t s columns, which shed more l i g h t on the inner party struggle c a r r i e d on by the moderate m i n o r i t y against Mao Tse-tung. In an a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d "How to Come From the Masses and Go Back to the Masses", the author Hsiao Pao c r i t i c i s e d leaders who are " s u b j e c t i v e " , who don't l i s t e n to the mino r i t y o p i n i o n , and who forc e t h e i r opinion on others without allowing proper debate. In obvious reference to Mao, he asserted that "he should never t h i n k that other people agree with h i s advocacy and method . . . i t i s impossible that they agree to any question without c o n s u l t a t i o n . " y As has been LU. Loc. c i t . he "Hsiao Pao, "How to Come from the Masses and Go Back to the Masses," People's D a i l y . June 29, 1959; S.C.M.P. No. 2053, 1959. 222 mentioned, i t was l a t e r admitted by Lu Ting-yi and others that the communes were the creation of Mao himself. More-over, the entire general l i n e was of Mao's invention, as apparently was the decision to move the communes from an experimental basis to a country-wide universal basis. In short, during the whole period from 1957 onwards Mao and the Politburo presented the Central Committee time after time with a " f a i t accompli" for Its approval. Thus, Hsiao Pao was i n ef f e c t c r i t i c i s i n g Mao for the same type of errors committed by S t a l i n during the period of the "cult of personality" and denounced by Khrushchev at the 2 0 t h Congress of the CPSU. In essence i t was a charge of negating inner party democracy. Relating this s p e c i f i c a l l y to party p o l i c y , Hsiao maintained that by ignoring the "different opinion of the minority, we are able to a r b i t r a r i l y affirm our immature or even wrong ideas and experiences, following our own opinions stubbornly, f a i l to discover and correct mistakes i n time, and commit s t i l l bigger mistakes." It was clear that the "minority" was c a l l i n g for an admission by Mao that h i s commune p o l i c i e s had been incorrect, had brought economic s t a n d s t i l l rather than achieving a leap ahead. The "minority" was also c a l l i n g for an abandonment of the communes and the other two "Red Banners" of the ra d i c a l general l i n e . i+6 Loc. c i t . 223 The Renewal of Soviet C r i t i c i s m of the Communes It was i n the l i g h t of the growing unrest within the Chinese party, and the growing need for the CPSU to mute the r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s of Mao Tse-tung that the Soviet Premier reopened the commune dispute on July 18, 1959. At thi s time, the Chinese party was i n a ferment, p a r t l y precipitated by the new sobering s t a t i s t i c s on the great leap forward, and p a r t l y by the break with the Soviet Union over the atomic weapons issue. As Chou E n - l a i pointed out i n August, "some people, taking a bourgeois stand, greatly underestimate the great achievements of the great leap f o r -ward and of the people's communes . . . . This kind of k7 thinking and sentiment has grown i n the l a s t two months." 1 Thus, i t was a most opportune time for the Soviet leader to step i n and throw h i s weight behind those within the Chinese party who opposed the r a d i c a l l i n e , both domestic and exter-nal. This was especially so, since a c r u c i a l meeting of the Central Committee was planned for the beginning of August i n Lushan. U n t i l this moment Khrushchev had never spoken pu b l i c l y of communes. Now, at a meeting of peasants i n Poznan, Poland, the Soviet leader launched a deliberate public attack against them. Speaking of the Soviet Union's own experience, Khrushchev made i t known that: Chou E n - l a i , op. c i t . , p. 26 22k The reorganization of i n d i v i d u a l farming into c o l l e c t i v e agriculture i s , of course, a complex process. We have met quite a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s along this road. Soon after the c i v i l war we began setting up not a g r i -c u l t u r a l artels but communes. There were people who reasoned 1 since we are f i g h t i n g for communism, l e t us set up communes.1 Apparently many people at that time had a poor understanding of what communism i s and how i t should be b u i l t . k 8 Pressing home his point, the Soviet leader continued h i s assault on the communes: We organized communes, although material as well as p o l i t i c a l conditions - I have i n mind the consciousness of the peasant masses - were lacking at the time. The result was that every-one wanted to l i v e well and yet work as l i t t l e as possible for the common cause. 'Work when you f e e l l i k e i t , receive according to need,* as they say. Nothing came of these communes. The Party adopted the path pointed out by V.I. Lenin. It began organizing the peasants into cooperatives, into a g r i c u l t u r a l a r t e l s , where people l i v e c o l l e c t i v e l y and receive according to their w o r k . k 9 That this deliberate reopening of the commune issue was a conscious attempt to provide support f o r the " r i g h t i s t opportunists" and moderates within the Chinese party, seemed clear. As the Chinese were to point out much l a t e r : any f r a t e r n a l Party which rejects the erroneous l i n e and program of the CPSU and perseveres i n the fundamental theories of Marxist-Leninism k& N. S. Khrushchev, "The Cooperative Way i s the Surest Way for the Peasant," Pravda. July 21, 1959; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XI, no. 29, p. 11. yLoc. c i t . 225 . . . Is looked upon as an enemy by the leaders of the CPSU, who oppose, attack and Injure i t , and try to subvert i t s leadership by every possible means.50 From this moment on, the Soviet press reinforced the party decision by reverting to their p o l i c y , established i n 1958, of ignoring the Chinese communes, even i n feature a r t i c l e s on Chinese agriculture and Chinese r u r a l areas. The August Central Committee Meeting at Lushan: Peng Teh-huai *s Attack The Central Committee met i n i t s Eighth Plenary Session i n Lushan from August 2 to August 16. In attendance were "75 members, and 7h alternate members of the Central Committee."^1 (It may be s i g n i f i c a n t that of a t o t a l member-ship of 190, only 14-9 were i n attendance at this c r u c i a l meeting. It may be that some waverers declined attendance i n this c r u c i a l meeting, i n order not to have to make a firm stand i n the ideol o g i c a l and power struggle.) The Plenary Session re-examined the sky-high 1959 production targets i n the l i g h t of the huge overestimations of the 1958 "leap", and reset the targets at a much lower l e v e l , and c a l l e d for an extensive campaign to "increase production and practise economy." And i n the f i n a l outcome the session: __ "On the Origin and Development of Differences . . . , " O P . c i t . , p. 17. 51 Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Documents) (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), p. 1. 226 raised s t i l l higher the glorious banners of the general l i n e , the big leap forward and the people's communes, enjoined the Party committees at a l l levels to resolutely c r i t i c i z e and over-come the right opportunist ideas of some cadres, and c a l l e d upon the entire Party to s t r i v e to f u l f i l l and o v e r f u l f i l l the leap forward plan of t h i s year. 52 In short, the party leadership weathered the storm and over-came the opposition to their r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s within the Central Committee. According to the communique, the r i g h t i s t opportunists continued as a great danger to the continuing leap forward. They "overemphasize the seriousness of certain defects which, owing to lack of experience, occurred i n the two movements" (the leap forward and the communes) and which have been quickly overcome. They slander as 'petty bourgeois fanaticism' the great leap forward and the people's commune 5 3 movements . . . ."-'-) The l a t t e r charge was one taken from Lenin's Left Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder i n which Lenin had castigated bourgeois s o c i a l i s t s who indulged i n utopianism and were without a coherent program, but leaped In every di r e c t i o n at once. The actual Resolution of the Lushan Meeting made but b r i e f reference to the r i g h t i s t s , but indicated that they were receiving support from outside the country: "Enemy elements h o s t i l e to the s o c i a l i s t cause of our country, both within our country and without 5 2 J Chou E n - l a i , op. c i t . , p. 50. ^ E i g h t h Plenary Session, op. c i t . , p. 6. have seized the opportunity to slander us i n an attempt to 5 L influence ce r t a i n unstable elements within our ranks.'" The actual public documents forthcoming from the Central Committee meeting shed l i t t l e l i g h t on the actual nature of the intra-party dispute. But the a r t i c l e s and statements which appeared immediately following the Lushan meeting exposed the exact d e t a i l s of the debate, and of the r e l a t i o n of the dispute to the Sino-Soviet r i f t . In a la t e r overview of the events surrounding the Lushan meeting, Politburo r a d i c a l L i Fu-chun r e c a l l e d that the commune movement had: evoked the enmity of the . . . modern re-v i s i o n i s t s (a euphonism for the CPSU). The right opportunists inside the Party, carried on f a c t i o n a l a c t i v i t i e s to oppose the correct leadership of the Central Committee and Mao Tse-tung. They dubbed the vigorous mass movements 'petty bourgeois fanaticism* and the leap forward ' l e f t adventurism*. They claimed that the people's communes were *founded too early* and were *in a mess 1, that the making of i r o n and steel i n a big way had resulted i n 'more loss than gain*; panic stricken and nonplussed i n the face of certain l o c a l and temporary imbalances which could hardly be avoided i n the big leap forward, they labelled such imbalances 'disproportions* i n the national economy as a whole.55 An e d i t o r i a l i n People's Daily on August 2 9 , e n t i t l e d "Long Live the People's Communes" provided further insight Ibid., p. 18. L i Fu-chun, op. c i t . , p. 3 228 into the charges of the "right opportunists". They "babble that 'the people's commune lacks objective material basis," exclaimed the e d i t o r i a l . "They say ' i t i s not a natural product of objective r e a l i t y but the f r u i t of the wishful thinking of a few men who have cookeditupout of thi n a i r . ' They say 'the people's communes were set up too soon and . 56 too fa s t and are i n a mess.*"^ Soviet Involvement with Peng-Teh-huai In recent years, much important evidence has come to l i g h t concerning the actual nature of the assault by Peng Teh-huai and others on the commune p o l i c i e s and on Mao Tse-tung himself. Most of thi s evidence has been gathered by David Charles i n interviews with communist Chinese refugees, and reported i n the China Quarterly. According to Charles' information, the following picture of events can now be drawn: We can now assert with confidence that Peng was the leader of an 'anti-party* group within the Politburo which made i t s challenge at the Lushan plenum, where Peng read a memorandum attacking the whole policy of the Party; that Peng's attack had been made with the knowledge of the Russians, for he, with-out the knowledge of the Politburo, had written a l e t t e r to the Soviet party c r i t i c i z i n g the great leap forward and the communes for which Moscow had already revealed i t s distaste; that h i s p r i n c i p l e associate was Chang Wen-ti e n , and that at Lushan or e a r l i e r he had p "Long Live the People's Communes," People's Daily. August 2 9 , 1959; Appendix to Eighth Plenary Session. op. c i t . , p. 2 3 . 229 enlisted the support of the veteran and highly respected Lin Po-chu; that Khrushchev refused to apologize for this intervention i n Chinese domestic a f f a i r s . 5 7 Thus, at least three members of the Politburo were implicated i n the attack on the communes; Peng Teh-huai, Chang Wen-ti e n , and Lin Po-chu. The fac t that Chen Yun disappeared from public view at this time also suggests that he too was i n some way involved with the cr i t i c i s m s l e v e l l e d during the Lushan meeting. The most important aspect of the anti-commune group was i t s connections with the Soviet Union. Peng Teh-huai, of course, was implicated by the l e t t e r which, i t was discovered, he had written to the Soviet party apparently seeking support against Mao Tse-tung. Chang Wen-tien, who had been the f i r s t Chinese communist ambassador to Moscow, also had close Soviet t i e s , as did Wang Chia-hsiang, h i s 58 successor,' who was dismissed along with Chang as Vice Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s following the Lushan Plenum. In retrospect, the renewal of commune c r i t i c i s m by Khrushchev at his speech i n Poland i n July, c l e a r l y was Intended, as has been suggested, to provide i d e o l o g i c a l support to the "a n t i -party" group headed by Peng and Chang. 57D. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal Peng Teh-huai," China Quarterly, October-December 1 9 6 l , p. 6k. 58D. W. Klei n , "Peking's Evolving Ministry of Foreign A f f a i r s , " The China Quarterly. October-December i960, P. 28. The second immensely important fact about this anti-commune, anti-Mao fa c t i o n was that i t also saw eye to eye with the Russians on the v i t a l questions of external bloc p o l i c i e s . According to Charles* Information: In March I 9 6 0 the Chinese resurrected Chang Wen-tien from the obscurity i n which he had l i v e d since his dismissal after Lushan, had him denounced as a r i g h t opportunist who had propagated the erroneous view that . . . peaceful coexistence i n accordance with the Five Principles and Bandung should be the basis of China*s foreign policy. Chang was said to have opposed the party's l i n e which was that peaceful coexistence was a means to an end and not an end i n i t s e l f , and that China should broaden the front i n the f i g h t against the enemy, United States* imperialism, by act i v e l y mobilizing the forces i n neutral countries which were h o s t i l e to the imperialists. 5 9 In the f a l l of 1 9 5 9 , Khrushchev was openly seeking a detente with the West; and East-West relations improved r a d i c a l l y with the meetings at Camp David between Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Thus, the Sino-Soviet dispute was increasingly becoming concerned with matters of foreign policy, and has continued so u n t i l the present day. The fact that the group within the Chinese party lined up with the Soviet Union both on the question of the communes, and on the question of peaceful coexistence explains the fact that the commune d i s -pute was renewed over and over by the Russians i n la t e r years, even when the communes had largely been abandoned. However, D. Charles, op. c i t . ? p. 75 231 this i s not necessarily to say that the commune issue was not s t i l l a genuine one i n i t s own r i g h t : i t was the inordinate emphasis on this dispute which suggested i t s connection with the larger dispute over world revolution. The Lushan Aftermath: The Debate Over Soviet Experience Chou E n - l a i i n his report to the National People's Congress made references to the charges made by the Peng Teh-huai group at the Lushan Plenum. But more important, he also i d e n t i f i e d another group who also opposed the communes. Apart from the " r i g h t i s t s " he said, "there are some people who pay l i p service to socialism but f i n d f a u l t with this and that i n the people's commune movement, which has the active support of hundreds of millions of people, and main-tain that the people's communes have been set up prematurely and have gone wrong. We would ask: Aren't you afr a i d of being thrown over the borderline of the bourgeois r i g h t i s t s ? ' The interesting thing about Chou's statement i s that the "some people" referred to by him were making almost exactly the same c r i t i c i s m s as the denounced right opportunists. This would indicate that these people were powerful enough within the party to be able to make this kind of charge, and survive—people l i k e Chen Yun and Lin Po-chu. Even so, Chou's statements were obviously a l i t t l e - v e i l e d warning that these moderates were courting disaster by challenging Chou E n - l a i , op. c i t . , p. 11 the communes and Mao's other r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s i n this way. To be labelled as right opportunists would mean probable expulsion for the moderates led by Chen Yun. It was not u n t i l September 1 that any mention was made of the fac t that the inner party struggle over the communes had involved the wider ideological question of "Soviet experience". S i g n i f i c a n t l y , nothing ever appeared i n the national press or the party's national theoretical journals concerning this v i t a l question which had rocked the party. Only i n two pr o v i n c i a l party newspapers, the Yunnan Daily and the Szechuan Daily, did reports of the c o n f l i c t over i d e o l o g i c a l authority appear. It i s si g n i f i c a n t that both p r o v i n c i a l party secretaries are members of the Central Committee, and therefore were reporting from first-hand experience. L i Cheng-chuan, 1st Secretary of the Szechuan Provincial Committee, i s also a member of the allpowerful Politburo, and i s the highest ranking pr o v i n c i a l leader within the party's inner core. These two editorials then were highly authoritative, and were of the highest s i g n i f i -cance. They c l e a r l y defined the detail s of the dispute over the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Soviet experience to the commune question, and firmly l a i d down Mao Tse-tung's position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union i n the dispute over ideological authority. According to the Yunnan Daily e d i t o r i a l which was the f i r s t of the two to appear, factions within the party had 233 used the ide o l o g i c a l authority of Soviet experience to demand a return to the c o l l e c t i v e s . It was said that "some people maliciously assert: 'we must take a leaf from the experience of the Soviet Union which launched communes during the early post-revolutionary period but subsequently 6 i introduced c o l l e c t i v e farms.'" Of course, this i s exactly what Khrushchev had said lust two weeks before the Lushan meeting of the Central Committee, and indicated that Khrushchev's remarks had not gone unheeded within the a n t i -Mao fa c t i o n of the party, but had been used to support their cause. In reply to this appeal to Soviet experience the e d i t o r i a l noted that, "considering the diff e r e n t conditions i n our country and the Soviet Union, the unmodified trans-plant of Soviet ideas and i n s t i t u t i o n s into our country i s unwise and incorrect." Moreover: the communes launched i n the Soviet Union during the early post-revolutionary period were communes of a communist stature . . . . The communes i n our country . . . are di f f e r e n t i n nature from those communist communes launched i n the Soviet Union . . . . 6 2 Contrasting conditions i n the two countries when each launched the communes, the Yunnan Daily noted that the Chinese party Yunnan Daily. September 1, 1959; Current Scene Reports on Communist China (Hong Kong, P. 0. Box 5217, 196l) . p. 8. ^ 2Loc. c i t . 23 k had t o t a l control over the countryside, whereas Soviet control was very loose i n the period of war communism: "This draws another l i n e of d i s t i n c t i o n between the conditions i n our country and those obtaining i n the Soviet Union. As concrete conditions are d i f f e r e n t , d i f f e r e n t lines of approach should be admitted." 6 3 The e d i t o r i a l then c l e a r l y lays down the a l t e r n a t i v e s — to follow Soviet experience or to follow Mao Tse-tung. Who i s to be followed i n matters of ide o l o g i c a l interpretation: Khrushchev or Mao? Arguing that the party must follow Mao, the Yunnan paper stated that: If we followed the Soviet Union as dogmatic Marxists, we would not have launched the people's communes. But learning from the Soviet Union i n the correct s p i r i t of Marxist-Leninism and the Mao Tse-tung ideology, we could launch the people's communes . . . . Those who outwardly claim to be learning from Soviet experiences but actually desire to crack down on the people's communes have f o r -gotten such a great Marxist-Leninist p r i n c i p l e . The people's communes are a creative endeavour of our people—a product of the creative blending of the universal truth of Marxist-Leninism with the r e a l i t i e s of China by the great leader Chairman Mao. 6M-Although hidden i n the ide o l o g i c a l jargon of "creatively applying" Marxist-Leninism to "the concrete conditions i n China," i t i s clear that "creative application" i n effect 6 3 L o c . c i t . 6k Loc. c i t . 235 means id e o l o g i c a l autonomy, and freedom from any binding effect of Soviet practice or experience i n s o c i a l i s t construction. Thus the communes, and one's attitude towards them, were central to the whole issue of i d e o l o g i c a l authority within the Chinese party, and within the Soviet bloc. Two months l a t e r , Lu Ting-yi was to c r y s t a l l i z e the entire commune issue with the remark that the choice for 65 a l l party members was "to obey chairman Mao or not." y The Yunnan Daily also went on to answer the c r i t i -cisms l e v e l l e d at the communes by those who held "Soviet experience" above the "creative applications" of Mao Tse-tung. It suggested that: those who dub the commune movement as a 'pre-mature-born c h i l d * must either harbour the idea of sabotage or embrace the a n t i - s o c i a l i s t notions of r i c h peasants and the bourgeois . . . . I t i s sheer nonsense to claim that the commune movement i s an 'attempt to leap to communism i n one step.'66 It should be remembered that Khrushchev had also "insinuated that China's s o c i a l i s t construction was 'skipping over a 67 stage*" ' and therefore, that these answers to comrades within the party were at the same time answers to the CPSU i n the intra-party dispute over the same questions. ^ C i t e d i n Bowie and Fairbank, on. c i t . , p. 36. 66 Yunnan Daily, loc. c i t . 67 'Origin and Development of Differences," op. c i t . , p. 12. 236 Khrushchev had noted at the 2 1 s t Congress that "property forms cannot be changed at w i l l . They develop i n accordance with economic laws and depend on the nature and l e v e l of the productive forces." He had further asserted that even with the high a g r i c u l t u r a l productivity within the Soviet Union, that the c o l l e c t i v e farm was s t i l l the appropriate production unit. Taking t h i s same argument, 1,some people" within the Chinese party had charged that "as the current productivity l e v e l i n the r u r a l areas i s s t i l l very low, i t 68 i s too early to launch the people's communes." In reply, the Yunnan e d i t o r i a l conceded that, "True, i t i s an objective economic law that production relations should be adapted to productivity," but on the other hand suggested that: There are different views of productivity. Some see only the machine factor i n produc-t i v i t y and overlook the human factor . . . . In discussing productivity one must take into consideration not only the role of machines but also the role of man . . . and the pattern of labour organization. Is the contention tenable that any change i n pro-duction relations must wait for the emergence of new tools, or i t constitutes a detachment from r e a l i t y ? If so, socialism would have been held off i n such technologically r e l a t i v e l y backward countries as Russia and China.69 In the opinion of those opposed to the communes "the people's commune movement should not be launched u n t i l mechanization Yunnan Daily, loc. c i t 'Loc. c i t . 237 has materialized." But according to those i n control of party p o l i c y , mechanization i s only one facet of "concrete conditions" r e l a t i n g to production. They claimed that " i n t e n s i f i e d s o c i a l i s t and communist indoctrination over a long period of time" had l a i d the objective conditions for the introduction of the communes. Here again we f i n d the enormous emphasis on "ideological consciousness" which was one of the major ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the "Mao Tse-tung ideology" and the related characteristic of negating the importance of material factors. This was one of the major sources of difference between Mao and Khrushchev i n their separate approaches to the problems of s o c i a l i s t construction and the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, and proved central to their ideological dispute. Khrushchev emphasized material; Mao emphasized man. The Szechuan Daily carried a p a r a l l e l e d i t o r i a l only two weeks l a t e r . Carrying the question of "Soviet experience" versus "the Mao Tse-tung ideology" even further, the pro-v i n c i a l party organ declared that "we cannot permit r i g h t i s t opportunist ideology to use the h i s t o r i c a l experience of the Soviet Union to shield i t s e l f . 1 , 7 0 It revealed to the rank and f i l e that: Szechuan Daily, September 22, 1959; Current Scene Reports In Communist China, op. c i t . , p. 7. 238 r i g h t i s t opportunists have attempted to negate the people's communes on the grounds of the h i s t o r i c a l experience of the Soviet Union and the absence of communalization i n other s o c i a l i s t countries. They assert that since the Soviet communalization e f f o r t was a f a i l u r e we should not countenance such an undertaking, and that absence of communaliza-tion i n other countries should deter us from making the attempt.71 The Szechuan Daily counters this argument i n a similar way to i t s brother paper i n Yunnan, suggesting that the Soviet communes were introduced before conditions were ripe, while the Chinese communes grew out of different and more advanced objective conditions. The Soviet communes, i t suggested, were introduced before "the well-to-do peasant class was obliterated" and while the " s o c i a l i s t consciousness of the peasants was at a low l e v e l " , and this was the reason they f a i l e d . In China on the other hand, the landlord class had been obliterated, and the peasants had gone through a process of gradual c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n which prepared them for the t r a n s i t i o n to the commune system. Moreover, i t was argued that China as a nation d i f f e r e d vastly from the Soviet Union, and therefore Soviet experience didn't necessarily apply anyway. In this l a t t e r regard, Lenin was introduced as an ideol o g i c a l authority to substantiate the Chinese deviance from the Soviet road. The e d i t o r i a l notes that: Loc. c i t 239 The Party Central Committee and Chairman Mao, coordinating the universal practices of our revolution, have creatively discovered a b r i l l i a n t and concrete organization pattern compatible to our development - the people's communes. Lenin predicted about our revolu-tion long ago: 'The revolutions i n those densely populated and s o c i a l l y complicated countries w i l l be marked by many peculiar features*. Are not the people's communes one of the major 'peculiar features' of our revolution ? 7 2 Here we see the germ of the idea which was to develop as time went on—that the Chinese party was setting not only i t s own precedents and establishing i t s own road to socialism, but was i n fact setting down the "orthodox" road for a l l those "densely populated and s o c i a l l y complicated countries" of Asia, South America and A f r i c a . Whereas the Soviet Union might be the vanguard of the i n d u s t r i a l i z e d nations, China was the f i r s t nation to blaze the path towards communism among the underdeveloped countries and could therefore claim leadership, i d e o l o g i c a l l y , over these l a t t e r nations. By denying the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Soviet experience to China on the basis that conditions were different i n China, and that China belonged to a different class of nation, the Chinese party was able to proclaim i d e o l o g i c a l independence i n matters of domestic importance while retaining the right to assume ideological authority over the methods of s o c i a l i s t and communist tra n s i t i o n i n the non-White world. Loc. c i t CHAPTER IX THE ANTI-RIGHTIST CAMPAIGN AND THE OCTOBER CELEBRATIONS (FALL 1959) Following the Eighth Plenary Session of the Central Committee a floo d of a r t i c l e s appeared i n party organs, exposing the c r i t i c i s m s made by the "right opportunists". This carried through u n t i l December, but only a few top party o f f i c i a l s were exposed, demoted or dismissed during this autumn a n t i - r i g h t i s t campaign. Many of the " r i g h t i s t s " i n high positions had been weeded out i n 1957 and 1958; and over a period of years Mao had placed men l o y a l to himself in many key party positions much as Khrushchev has done i n the Soviet Union. From 1955 to 1958, for instance, eleven provincial party secretaries were removed and trusted l i e u t -enants of the party chairman put i n their p l a c e . 1 Thus, during the commune c r i s i s Mao was able to r e l y on most of these men to stand firm, even though they were sometimes surrounded by moderates on the provincial committees. This situation where the key party men enforced the r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s of the party leader, and overrode the wishes of the moderate majority naturally led to considerable s t r a i n within the party apparatus. In ef f e c t , a hard core of party radicals was r e s i s t i n g a great spontaneous pressure f o r more l i b e r a l M. Kalb, Dragon i n the Kremlin (New York: Dutton & Co., 1961), p. 205. 2kl p o l i c i e s from the lower leve l s of the party and from the masses. (During this time even the so-called "middle peasants" who had been the a l l y of the party since the revolution were suddenly brought under f i r e for opposition to the communes and the leap forward--for conservatism.) The fact that this opposition was strong at the lower leve l s was l i k e l y an important factor i n the Soviet decision to speak out on the question of Soviet experience with communes. A r t i c l e s during t h i s post-Lushan period frequently spoke of "hostile elements at home and abroad"^ which were having a detrimental e f f e c t on "unstable elements" within the party. If Mao himself had not been standing fir m l y at the head of the radicals and bringing h i s enormous prestige to bear, the moderate elements may well have won the day with Soviet ideological support. As i t was the radicals retained control of party machinery and party policy through th e i r control of key party positions. Opposition to party authority being usurped by r a d i c a l p r o v i n c i a l 1st secretaries quite naturally came from within the p r o v i n c i a l committees. As Liu Lan-tao (Alternate Secretary of the Central Committee) revealed on September 28: Tsinghai Daily. November 26, 1959; Current Scene Reports on Communist China (Kowloon, P.O. Box 5217, 1961), P. 39. ^People's Daily. August 27, 1959j Appendix to Eighth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee (Documents), (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), p. 25. 2h2 The r i g h t i s t opportunists know nothing about the harmonization between the c o l l e c t i v e leadership and the role of an i n d i v i d u a l (the harmony of a CCP Committee and i t s f i r s t secretary.) They are opposed to the practice of placing the f i r s t secretary i n command, regarding i t as 'dictator-ship 1 and 'undemocratic 1. In r e a l i t y they only aim at bringing down the 'dictatorship* of the party i n order to establish their own d i c t a t o r -ship. 1* Liu rejects the idea that the practice of putting the 1 s t Secretary i n command i s a "move away from c o l l e c t i v e leader-ship." The Cult of Mao In these autumn months there was a tremendous upswing too i n emphasis i n party organs on the ideology of Mao Tse-tung. The c u l t of Mao was extensively cultivated and Mao was extolled as the greatest l i v i n g Marxist-Leninist theoretician. In a p a r t i c u l a r l y idolatrous passage, Liu Lan-tao raised Mao almost to the heights of a God: In the absence of the guidance of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and h i s thinking, our revolution w i l l f a i l and our construction w i l l meet handicaps. In the course of long revolutionary struggles, our Party and the people of the whole country have discovered Mao Tse-tung as their own great leader . . . . Comrade Mao Tse-tung i s the most outstanding exponent on the heroic p r o l e t a r i a t of our country, the most d i s t i n -guished representative of our superior traditions i n the entire history of our great nation, a Liu Lan-tao, "The C.C.P. i s the Supreme Commander of the Chinese People i n Building Socialism," People's D a i l y ? September 2 8 , 1959; R. R. Bowie and J. K. Fairbank, Communist China 1955-1959 (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 2 ) , P. 575. 2k3 beacon on our road to Communism, and the most outstanding contemporary r e v o l u t i o n i s t , states-man, and theoretician of Marxist-Leninism. He has creatively enriched the treasures of Marxist-Leninism on a series of important According to Liu Lan-tao, Mao was even more than t h i s : The six hundred m i l l i o n people of our country have placed i n him their hopes fo r their own happiness and future and consider him the i n -carnation of Communism and truth and the symbol of i n v i n c i b i l i t y . The influence, wisdom, and experience of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and the system of thought created by him by combining Marxist-Leninism with the actual practices of Chinese revolution are the most valuable treasures of our Party and people. The warm affec t i o n for the party leader i s i n f u l l con-formity with our ardent love f o r our Party, class, people and great Motherland.6 This overwhelming adulation heaped upon Mao at t h i s time was not just accidental. There were both domestic and international reasons motivating this massive buildup of Mao's image. Domestically the radicals needed to culti v a t e the cult of Mao i n order to counteract the influence of the moderates and "bourgeois r i g h t i s t s " . By c u l t i v a t i n g a mystic f a i t h i n Mao the radicals were also c u l t i v a t i n g mass support for the r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s which they and Mao espoused. At the same time they were also shoring up Mao's position as party leader, which had been challenged during the " r i g h t i s t opportunist" attacks. In the domestic sphere the dispute Ibid., p. 576. Loc. c i t . 2kk over "Soviet experience" had been i n effect a c o n f l i c t over who was the source of id e o l o g i c a l authority for the Chinese party: Khrushchev or Mao; and. Mao's position had been challenged. Relating to thi s situation was the question of Mao's id e o l o g i c a l stature within the Soviet bloc. Ever since Mao had d i f f e r e d with Khrushchev over the question of communist foreign policy i n Moscow i n November 1957} the question of ideol o g i c a l authority within the bloc had become increasingly contested between the two leaders. With the Soviet Union undermining Mao's ide o l o g i c a l stature by subtle c r i t i c i s m of hi s domestic commune p o l i c i e s , i t became increasingly important for the Chinese leadership to cu l t i v a t e Mao's image as an id e o l o g i c a l leader within the communist commonwealth. This, then, was to be the second reason motivating the sudden upsurge i n the "cult of Mao" i n the l a t t e r half of 1959- The claim by Liu Lan-tao that Mao was the greatest contemporary Marxist-Leninist theoretician was cl e a r l y aimed at vaulting Mao over Khrushchev into the position of ide o l o g i c a l Pope of the communist world. And although the dispute over revolution and peaceful coexistence gradually replaced the commune issue i n 1959, as the leading i d e o l o g i c a l point of contention between Moscow and Peking, i t i s si g n i f i c a n t to note that, from the Chinese point of view, domestic ideological issues s t i l l were of foremost significance i n the relations between the two parties, 2k$ at the time of the Chinese 1 0 t h Anniversary celebrations i n October of 1 9 5 9 . Since the party was s t i l l i n the midst of an i n t e r n a l ideological dispute over the communes and the policy of leaping forward, naturally the question of Soviet opposition to these p o l i c i e s remained extremely s i g n i f i c a n t . On the other hand, the Soviet Union was more concerned with the international issues i n dispute with the Chinese and f o r them the communes had become a secondary issue, having renewed significance i n the l i g h t of the more general question of i d e o l o g i c a l authority within the bloc. Tenth Anniversary Speeches This situation i s c l e a r l y reflected i n the speeches made by Soviet and Chinese leaders, and the a r t i c l e s appearing i n the communist press on the occasion of the 1 0 t h anniversary celebrations. The Soviet leader, who had only just returned from h i s v i s i t to the United States (which the Chinese had viewed with alarm) and his Camp David meetings with Eisen-hower, flew immediately to Peking to attend the anniversary celebrations. His speeches i n Peking were s i g n i f i c a n t i n terms of Chinese domestic p o l i c y only insofar as they were completely devoid of the laudatory remarks about domestic construction and s o c i a l i s t transformation which are customary on such occasions. In his main address at the state banquet, Khrushchev deliberately drew attention to the fact that h i s speech ignored the communes, the leap forward and Chinese 2 k 6 domestic p o l i c i e s . At one point he suggested that h i s reason for not discussing these customary topics was that i t was just a "short speech" and la t e r on made the excuse that " i t i s not fo r me, a guest, to come to China . . . and 7 talk of your successes."' He concentrated instead on i n t e r -national issues and bloc foreign p o l i c y , which to the Soviet Union had now superseded the communes and other domestic issues i n importance. Thus while he expressed his continuing displeasure of Mao Tse-tung*s domestic p o l i c i e s through a pol i c y of deliberate silence, he openly (though subtly) c r i t i c i s e d the Chinese policy of confrontation with the West. According to o f f i c i a l Chinese r e c o l l e c t i o n , By innuendo he openly maligned China as warlike and g u i l t y of Tadventurism*, and so on and so fort h . Back from the Camp David talks, he went so f a r as to s e l l China the U. S. plot of 'two Chinas" and, at the state banquet celebrating the Tenth Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China, he read China a lecture against 'testing by force the s t a b i l i t y of the c a p i t a l i s t system'.o On the other hand, the major address by the Chinese leadership to a Soviet audience on the occasion of the 10th Anniversary, dealt almost exclusively with questions of ideology concerned with domestic construction and the communes. Teng Hsiao-ping, 7 'N. S. Khrushchev, "Speech at the State Banquet," Peking Review. No. kO, 1959, P- 7-Q "Origin of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," Red Flag. September 6 , 1963; Peking Review, No. 3 7 , 1 9 o 3 , p. 1 2 . 2k7 Chinese Party Secretary, and member of the Politburo's Standing Committee was appointed to the task of writing an a r t i c l e for Pravda i n honour of the Chinese National Day, and of thus presenting Mao Tse-tung's position to the rank and f i l e of the Soviet party. The most noteworthy aspect of the a r t i c l e was that i t was almost e n t i r e l y devoted to a defense of the communes, mass movements and the r a d i c a l general l i n e of the Chinese party. Moreover, i t contained a strong c r i t i c i s m of the r i g h t i s t opportunists within the party and a refutation of their charges. The explanation f o r this type of a r t i c l e being directed at a Soviet audience was that the C.P.C.'s domestic p o l i c i e s and i n t e r n a l disputes were of bloc-wide significance, and that the Soviet party had made similar charges to those which Teng Hsiao-ping took time to refute. In f a c t , the nature of Teng's a r t i c l e was evidence i n i t s e l f of the scope and nature of the inter-party commune dispute. In essence, i t can be looked upon as a reply by the C.P.C. to the c r i t i c i s m s , open and implied, made by the Russians i n regard to the communes and related domestic p o l i c i e s . And i t must be remembered, too, that Teng's assertions about the correctness of the mass movements and the communes had important ide o l o g i c a l and p o l i t i c a l s i g n i f i -cance within the Soviet party and the Soviet nation, since both Russian and Chinese parties claimed to espouse the i d e n t i c a l guiding ideology: a defense of Chinese r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s amounts i n effect to a c r i t i c i s m of Soviet conserva-tive p o l i c i e s . 2h8 Thus, Teng Hsiao-ping f l a t l y asserted that: The strength of the proletarian dictatorship l i e s i n the fact that i t makes the broad mass of labouring people the r e a l masters of the country and i s b u i l t on the i n i t i a t i v e of hundreds of millions of people. Hence i t i s obviously an erroneous view to ignore the i n i t i a t i v e of the masses, to maintain that i t i s no longer necessary to organize mass move-ments since everything can be done by relying on the state apparatus.9 Where, one might ask, are the mass movements i n the Soviet Union? Doesn't the Soviet Union r e l y overwhelmingly on the "state apparatus" of which Teng speaks? Although ostensibly replying to c r i t i c s within h i s own country, his statements are concerned with the general question of s o c i a l i s t construc-t i o n and therefore are of general significance for a l l s o c i a l i s t countries, including the Soviet Union. In the same vein Teng continued, " in our own ranks some people cannot see the s o c i a l i s t i n i t i a t i v e of the masses and therefore entertain doubts about mass movements. They always think that the masses are not conscious enough 10 and that mass movements are unreliable." This, of course, was the point of view of the Soviet leaders who disputed that 'Teng Hsiao-ping, "The Great Unity of the Chinese People, and the Great Unity of the Peoples of the World," Pravda, October 1 , 1959; Bowie and Fairbank, op. c i t . , p. 5 9 7 . Ibid.. p. 5 9 8 . 2^9 the commune movement was a creation of the masses. To them and to the Chinese "right opportunists", the communes and other mass movements were a creation of Mao's s o c i a l i s t i n i t i a t i v e and not by any means the peasants 1. Teng, however, argued that these mass movements also served to rapidly raise the peasants' " s o c i a l i s t consciousness" and therefore prepare the way f o r the introduction of higher forms of socialism. Here again, Teng's words have s i g n i f i -cance for the Soviet Union, since one of the tasks l a i d down at the 21st Congress was the r a i s i n g of the Soviet c i t i z e n s ' i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness and communist m o r a l i t y — a pre-requisite to the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. In discussing " s o c i a l i s t consciousness" as an important factor i n economic construction, Teng Hsiao-ping touches on that area of Sino-Soviet i d e o l o g i c a l differences having to do with material versus ideological incentives. The Chinese 1st Secretary argued that "those who deny the role of mass movements i n construction, view p o l i t i c a l work 11 and economic work as absolute opposites . . . ." In t h i s regard, only a few months before i n a speech at a Central Committee plenary session c a l l e d to discuss improvements i n industry, Khrushchev made the following remarks: One comrade here sent me a note saying: Comrade Khruschev, a l l the speakers talk about industry and industry and no one says anything about Party work. My dear comrade, ^ l i i i d . , p. 599. 250 i f at the factory where you conduct Party work a defective a r t i c l e i s produced while you are giving a lecture on the establishment of communism i n our country ( s t i r i n the h a l l ) , wouldn't i t be more useful i f you organized the people f o r s c i e n t i f i c , better quality work? This i s p r e c i s e l y what Party work i s , when everyone knows h i s trade, produces good parts and assembles good machines.12 The Soviet Premier thus took a similar attitude to those "right opportunists" i n the Chinese party who denied that p o l i t i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l work could produce either grain or s t e e l . The i d e o l o g i c a l gulf between the Chinese and Soviet leaders on this question i s obvious. Turning h i s attention s p e c i f i c a l l y to a defense of the Chinese communes, Teng Hsiao-ping substantiated this deviation from Soviet practice on the basis that i t was born out of conditions peculiar to China. He claimed that: When hundreds of millions of people start to move under the Party's leadership they . . . break down the out-moded rules and regulations, go by the logic of l i f e i t s e l f and discover various kinds of appropriate new forms for our cause. It i s no accident that the broad masses of the Chinese peasants have created a form of , s o c i a l organization, that i s , people's communes. J He asserted that the former a g r i c u l t u r a l producers* co-operatives became outmoded by the big leap forward and had Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XI, no. 27, p. 7. 1 3Ieng Hsiao-ping, oo. c i t . . p. 599. 251 t o be d i s c a r d e d . A n d m a k i n g i t v e r y c l e a r t h a t t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h a d n o i n t e n t i o n o f b o w i n g t o p r e s s u r e f r o m t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d f r o m f a c t i o n s w i t h i n t h e C h i n e s e p a r t y , T e n g a d a m a n t l y d e c l a r e d t h a t " s u c h a l a r g e - s c a l e mass movement w h i c h c o n f o r m s t o h i s t o r i c a l l a w s c a n n o t p o s s i b l y r i s e a l l o f a s u d d e n u n d e r t h e o r d e r s o f a f e w p e o p l e , n o r w i l l i t i k v a n i s h i n t h e f a c e o f o p p o s i t i o n b y a f e w . " H e a d m i t t e d t h a t t h e " r i g h t o p p o r t u n i s t s " h a d c h a r g e d t h a t t h e p e o p l e ' s communes a r e " m o v i n g b a c k w a r d s " a n d t h a t t h e o n l y way o u t i s t o d i s s o l v e t h e m , b u t h e i n d i c a t e d t h a t t h e p a r t y l e a d e r -s h i p w e r e d e t e r m i n e d t o h o l d f i r m on t h e commune i s s u e a n d r e t a i n t h e m i n d e f i n i t e l y . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , h e h a d a f e w w o r d s o f i m p o r t a n c e t o s a y a b o u t t h e s i g n i f i c a n c e o f C h i n e s e d o m e s t i c p o l i c i e s t o o t h e r n a t i o n s . F i r s t , h e r e f e r r e d t o t h e commune movement i n t h e C h i n e s e c o u n t r y s i d e a s " h i s t o r i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t " . T h e n h e w e n t on t o s a y t h a t : U n d e r t h e l e a d e r s h i p o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t , t h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e h a v e c a r r i e d t h e a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t a n d a n t i - f e u d a l d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n t o t h e e n d a n d , t h r o u g h t h e s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n a n d c o n -s t r u c t i o n , a r e r a p i d l y g e t t i n g r i d o f p o v e r t y a n d b a c k w a r d n e s s , p r o v i d i n g a n e x a m p l e o f m o v i n g f r o m t h e d e m o c r a t i c r e v o l u t i o n t o t h e s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n a c o l o n i a l a n d s e m i - c o l o n i a l c o u n t r y , a n d o f t h e t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f a b a c k w a r d a g r i c u l t u r a l c o u n t r y i n t o a n a d v a n c e d i n d u s t r i a l c o u n t r y . 1 5 L o c . c i t . I b i d . , p . 600. 252 Thus, Teng Hsiao-ping was reviving the claims made immediately after the revolution by Liu Shao-chi; that China was a model for a l l the underdeveloped countries. In essence, this was a clear warning that China was seeking id e o l o g i c a l leadership over the underdeveloped world. And coupled with the remark i n the Yunnan Daily of September 1 that Russia had been a "technologically r e l a t i v e l y backward" country l i k e China, i t had even wider significance f o r the ide o l o g i c a l position of the Soviet Union v i s - a - v i s the communist world. Taken as a whole then, this important a r t i c l e by the Chinese 1st Secretary revealed that Soviet opposition to Mao Tse-tung*s r a d i c a l domestic p o l i c i e s s t i l l played a v i t a l role i n Chinese thinking, and s t i l l remained an important item i n the growing r i f t between the two parties. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Teng used h i s Pravda a r t i c l e to place before the Soviet party rank and f i l e these domestic issues connected with the communes and the CPC int e r n a l dispute, rather than to defend the deviant Chinese position on communist international policy. I t indicated that the question of Chinese deviation from Soviet experience was s t i l l a very r e a l issue within the bloc. CHAPTER X THE NEW UPSURGE OF COMMUNES AND THE CONTINUING POLEMICS The Tightening Up of the Rural Communes Throughout this entire l a t t e r h a l f of 1959? and concurrent with the C.P.C.'s campaign to oppose r i g h t i s t conservatism, a tightening up of the communes took place throughout the r u r a l areas. This was another concrete manifestation indicating that the moderates and r i g h t i s t opportunists had been overcome quite f i r m l y at the Lushan meeting, despite their strong attempt to reverse party p o l i c y . (However, the opposition was apparently strong enough that the Politburo neglected to convene the Central Committee f o r over eighteen months—the next plenary session did not occur u n t i l January 1961). The most sig n i f i c a n t occurrence i n the tightening up campaign was the decision to take a firmer stand on the question of communal mess h a l l s . O r i g i n a l l y , i n the f i r s t f l u s h of enthusiasm, the mess h a l l s where peasants were forced to eat their meagre meals had become almost universal, and were the foundation of the "communist shoot" of the free supply system. The mess h a l l was also an extremely v i t a l part of the communes i n other ways, too, since i t was envisioned by the party as the center for c o l l e c -tive l i f e , where the peasants could be eas i l y indoctrinated and controlled. It was also supposed to prepare the way for the style of communal l i v i n g which would exist i n the future 25h communist society. But from the peasants 1 point of view these mess h a l l s were an unparalleled encroachment on t r a d i t i o n a l family l i f e and appeared to be aimed at the breakdown of the family system. This i s one of the important reasons why the communes received such a considerable degree of peasant resistance and sabotage. Connected, too, with the mess h a l l system was the whole question of increasing t o t a l i t a r i a n control, which from the Soviet point of view was something S t a l i n i s t and undesirable. This " t o t a l control" manifest i n the mess h a l l system was the very thing the Soviets were moving away from i n their period of de-Staliniza-tion, and was thus completely a l i e n to the current trend of Soviet ideology. Integrally associated with the mess h a l l system was the question of the peasants* private plots of land. In the i n i t i a l formation of the communes these had been confiscated, since a l l food was to be controlled through the mess h a l l system; and vegetables grown on these plots were expropriated for use by the communal kitchens. In A p r i l 1959, i n the face of an extremely tight food situation and the need to stimulate food production, private plots were returned to the peasantry for their own use. At the time, red cards were issued as t i t l e deeds, and carried the notation: "This private land belongs to you and your family permanently, and crops grown on i t s h a l l be disposed of by you only. 1 About the same •^Southern Daily, December 23, I960; Current Scene Reports on Communist China (Kowloon, P.O. Box 5217, 1961), p. 2 9 k . t i m e , t h e p a r t y p u t t h e m e s s h a l l s y s t e m o n a v o l u n t a r y b a s i s T h u s , o n J u n e 25, T e n g T z u - h u i , D i r e c t o r o f t h e p a r t y ' s R u r a l W o r k D e p a r t m e n t , d e c l a r e d t h a t , "We m u s t a l l o w t h e m a s s e s t o d e c i d e f o r t h e m s e l v e s w h e t h e r t o j o i n c o m m u n i t y m e s s h a l l s o r n o t . T h o s e who d o n o t w a n t t o t a k e p a r t i n t h e m m u s t b e a l l o w e d t o w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e m a n d t o t a k e f o o d p home t o be c o o k e d b y t h e m s e l v e s . " B u t f o l l o w i n g t h e L u s h a n m e e t i n g t h e m e s s h a l l p r o g r a m b e g a n t o r e c e i v e n e w i m p e t u s . B e t w e e n A p r i l a n d S e p t e m b e r many m e s s h a l l s h a d b e e n c o m p l e t e l y a b a n d o n e d b e c a u s e t h e s e n t i m e n t a g a i n s t t h e m h a d b e e n s o s t r o n g 3 b u t i n t h e l a t e a u t u m n t h e p a r t y b e g a n t o t a k e a s t r o n g e r s t a n d on t h e i s s u e . On S e p t e m b e r 22 t h e P e o p l e ' s D a i l y r e p o r t e d t h a t " a s t r u g g l e c e n t e r e d a r o u n d c o m m u n i t y m e s s h a l l s i s b e i n g w a g e d " i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s b e t w e e n t h e p a r t y a n d t h e p e a s a n t s , a n d c o n c l u d e d t h a t i n t h e l o n g r u n t h e p a r t y w o u l d k w i n o u t . T h e n , i n D e c e m b e r t h e p a r t y b e g a n o n c e more t o c o n f i s c a t e t h e p e a s a n t s * p r i v a t e p l o t s a n d t u r n t h e m o v e r t o t h e m e s s h a l l s . T h r o u g h o u t t h e w i n t e r a n d c a m p a i g n g a i n e d momentum, a n d b y M a r c h t h e m e s s h a l l s w e r e b a c k i n b u s i n e s s T e n g T z u - h u i , " S t r i v e t o R u n t h e C o m m u n i t y M e s s H a l l s W e l l a n d F o l l o w t h e P r i n c i p l e o f V o l u n t a r i n e s s , " New C h i n a H a l f M o n t h l y . N o . 12, 1959; E x t r a c t s f r o m C h i n a M a i n -l a n d M a g a z i n e s T N o . 179, A u g u s t 5, 1958, p . 1. ^ P e o p l e ' s D a i l y . S e p t e m b e r 22, 1959; C u r r e n t S c e n e , O P * c i t . , p . 1. k L o c . c i t . 256 on a universal basis. In Yunnan, for instance, i t was reported that by March "over 97$ of the commune members i n the province and their f a m i l i e s , are eating i n the mess h a l l s . " And a few days l a t e r i t was reported i n People"s Dally that i n Honan " a l l the r u r a l population without exception eat In the mess h a l l s which are permanent establish-ments."' The re-establishment of the communes1 mess h a l l s must be viewed within the context of the economic s i t u a t i o n at this time. It had been revealed by the People's Daily on September 22, 1959, that the reason why many of the mess h a l l s had been closed i n the spring and why the p r i n c i p l e of voluntariness had been introduced was that peasant resistance and opposition from r i g h t i s t opportunists within the party had forced the party to relax i t s policy temporarily. This, of course, was i n A p r i l before i t was known that the produc-tion figures for the 1958 harvest had been grossly exaggerated. At the Lushan meeting i n August the errors became known, and the c r i t i c a l food situation became obvious to a l l . Therefore, the plenum urged the country to "increase production and practise economy." It was immediately after this that the People's Daily began to e x t o l l the virtues of the mess h a l l 'People's Daily, March 26, I960; Current Scene. op. c i t . , p. 81. 6Loc. c i t . 7People's Dallv. March 30, i960; loc. c i t . 257 system i n regard to conserving grain. In i t s September 22 e d i t o r i a l i t made special note of the fact that: According to s t a t i s t i c s gathered from some 7000 community mess h a l l s i n Honan province, 780,000 c a t t i e s of food grain (390 metric tons) was saved i n the recent three months . . . mess h a l l s use 30% less f u e l . . . and the expenditure f o r replenishing kitchen o utensils can be reduced by about 60% each year. Thus the re-establishment of the commune mess h a l l s was born out of economic ne c e s s i t y — t h e need to conserve and ration grain. The Introduction of the Urban Communes At th i s same time, and born partly out of the same reasons, mess h a l l s began to be set up i n the urban areas, and the whole program of urban communes was rejuvenated and populatized. In the o r i g i n a l commune upsurge i n 1958 a number of experimental urban communes were established i n -cluding the model Yangch'uan People's Commune i n Shansi province, and the Chengchow People's communes i n Honan.^ In the general commune retreat which occurred at the end of 1958, i t was decided not to introduce urban communes on a universal basis f o r the time being. The December 10 Central Committee resolution directed, for various reasons: Current Scene, on. c i t . , p. 2. % . J. Lethbridge, China's Urban Communes (Hong Kong, Dragonfly Books, I96I), p. 5. 258 we should continue to make experiments and generally should not be i n a hurry to set up people's communes on a large scale i n the c i t i e s . . . . People's communes should be established on a large scale i n the c i t i e s only after r i c h experience has been gained and when the sceptics and doubters have been convinced.10 Throughout 1959 l i t t l e or no mention was made of the urban communes, although experiments i n various areas con-tinued, and mess h a l l s were set up on a large scale i n a number of the larger c i t i e s including Peking, Shanghai and Tientsin. The January 1 s t i 9 6 0 issue of Red Flag provided the f i r s t r e a l indications that the urban communes were to be universalized. The party journal reported a "high t i d e " i n the establishment of so-called "street industries". It noted that: the development of industries operated by the street inhabitants . . . enables the state to guide the economic l i f e of the people according to s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s and to make proper arrangements for the inhabitants i n the matter of d i s t r i b u t i o n and consumption.il Giving away the fact that the tight control of consumption i n the face of shortages was the key motivation behind the communalization of urban l i f e , Red Flag added that: "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the People's Communes," Sixth Plenary Session of'the Eighth Central Committee (Documents) (Peking, F.L.P.. 1Q58), p. Red Flag, January 1, I960; Current Scene, op. c i t . , p. 8k. 259 i n view of the fac t that the increase i n con-sumption frequently exceeds the increase i n production, the successful carrying out of planned d i s t r i b u t i o n exchange and consumption i s of great significance . . . . When the market i s temporarily short of certain commodities, the r a t i o n a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of these commodities can be effected through the street service organizations . . . the rate of consumption should be cut whenever commodities are i n short supply.12 Ideological and p o l i t i c a l control was also mentioned as an important motivation behind the renewed urban commune movement. Red Flag noted that: Production, l i v i n g and thinking are i n d i v i s i b l y related to each other. The economic a c t i v i t y of the people and their p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y frequently influence each other . . . . We must gradually, resolutely and unremittingly enforce communist d i s c i p l i n e and carry communist labour into effect. 1 3 On March 3 0 , L i Fu-chun, Chairman of the State Planning Commission (and a Politburo " r a d i c a l " ) , made the f i r s t public announcement confirming that the a c t i v i t y i n the urban areas was part of a determined program to introduce urban communes, as such on a universal basis. He told the National People's Congress that: A l l the c i t i e s are now setting up People's Communes energetically running neighbourhood industry, suburban farming, public welfare services and community dining rooms, exten-s i v e l y organizing the c i t y dwellers and Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t 260 emancipating millions of housewives from household chores so that they can take part i n s o c i a l labour.In-And a few days l a t e r , Minister of Commerce Yao I - l i n t o l d the same People's Congress that there were two main reasons for establishing urban communes—to make use of the labour potential and to control consumption. (In the words of the Central Committee, to "increase production and practise economy.") Accordingly, Yao declared that " i n order to exploit the labour potential of the c i t i e s . . . i t i s necessary to further organize the urban people's economic l i f e . " And referring to the public mess h a l l s , he explained that "these . . . enable us to conserve large amounts of food, f u e l , water, e l e c t r i c i t y and labour." 1^ By A p r i l , i t was reported i n People's Daily that over 20 m i l l i o n urban dwellers had been organized into communes. According to a l a t e r report i n the China Youth, there were by the end of July some 1,06*+ urban communes i n 16 existence with a t o t a l membership of 55«5 m i l l i o n . In t o t a l perspective, the urban communes and the tightening up of the r u r a l communes can be viewed as an attempt to solve China's domestic problems and to advance further Ik Cited i n Lethbridge, 0 0 . d i t . , p. 2 . 15 'Current Scene, on. c i t . , p. 8 5 . ^People's Daily. September 1, i 9 6 0 ; c i t e d i n Lethbridge, O P . c i t . . p. 2 3 . 261 towards communism through the use of the r a d i c a l economic and s o c i a l p o l i c i e s developed by Mao Tse-tung. The f i r s t h a l f of 1959 had seen a widespread retreat from these p o l i c i e s , but with the onset of winter millions of peasants were once again mobilized f o r construction and i r r i g a t i o n projects, private land was confiscated once more, and the commune-izaiion of the nation extended to the urban areas. This renewed e f f o r t to implement "mass movements" within China only served to heighten Soviet opposition to Mao Tse-tung and to his r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s . The introduction of the urban communes was especially s i g n i f i c a n t i n this regard since i t served a f i n a l notice to Soviets and Chinese alike that Mao had no intention of eventually disbanding the communes; on the contrary, h i s intention was to carry them as f a s t as possible to their l o g i c a l conclusion—pure communism. In a sense, too, the urban communes were also a new ideological challenge to the Kremlin leaders, since the Soviet had taken hardly any steps at a l l to c o l l e c t i v i z e urban l i f e as they had r u r a l l i f e . It raised f o r the Soviet Union the thorny ide o l o g i c a l question of how the CPSU intended to prepare the way f o r future communal l i f e within Soviet c i t i e s . Growing Sino-Soviet Polemics; Winter and Spring 1959-60 On December 1, 1959 Khrushchev delivered a speech to the Hungarian Party Congress i n Budapest which contained 262 t h i n l y cloaked c r i t i c i s m s of Mao's domestic p o l i c i e s . Khrushchev made a c r i t i c a l appraisal of the S t a l i n i s t regime •which had controlled Hungary before the 1956 revolution, and suggested that "other communist and workers' parties cannot 17 but heed "the mistakes of the Rakoski era" ' ( i . e . of Stalinism). Of course, China was at this time the only bloc country which s t i l l prominently displayed Stalin's p o r t r a i t and which s t i l l held him i n high public esteem. A l l the other bloc countries, excepting perhaps Albania had l i b e r a -l i z e d considerably since the denunciations of S t a l i n at the 20th Congress of the CPSU; China had become even more t o t a l i t a r i a n than e v e r — t h i s t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m being exemplified by the commune system. Obviously referring to the Chinese leader, and echoing some of the charges of the "right opportunists" within the C.P.S., Khrushchev verbally attacked "armchair leaders" who are i n the habit of "disregarding objective conditions" and of ru l i n g by "decree" and who "order 1 Pi the masses about." Using almost the exact words of the r i g h t - i n c l i n e d Tao Chu, Khrushchev declared that "one must have the courage to openly admit one's mistakes and to correct them i n time." He also echoed Tao Chu's assertion that no s o c i a l i s t leader was f a u l t l e s s and immune to mistake; no 17 'N. S. Khrushchev, "Speech to the Hungarian Party Congress," Pravda, December 2, 19595 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XI, no. 50, p. 3. 18 Loc. c i t . one could be "consistently correct" as had so often been claimed on behalf of Mao Tse-tung. In another passage c l e a r l y directed at the Chinese leader, Khrushchev declared: If we become conceited, i f we commit mistakes i n our leadership, i f we di s t o r t the teachings of Marxist-Leninism on the building of socialism and communism, these mistakes can be exploited by the enemies of communism as was done i n 195°.^-9 Here we should r e c a l l that Khrushchev had warned against " l e v e l l i n g " at the 21s t Congress asserting that i t would lead to "the dis c r e d i t i n g of communism." And, too, i n actual practice, the introduction of the t o t a l i t a r i a n communes i n China had done much to tarnish the aura of humanism which communism was attempting to project to the West i n the aftermath of Stalinism. Khrushchev's words als suggested a warning to Mao that his r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s i n domestic construction might well lead to peasant unrest and revolt, as had the S t a l i n i s t p o l i c i e s i n Hungary. Continuing, Khrushchev argued that: We must be masters of Marxist-Leninism. We must not f a l l too f a r behind or go too far ahead. We must, f i g u r a t i v e l y speaking, synchronize our watches. If the leadership of this or that country becomes conceited, this can only play into the hands of the enemy.- In thi s case, the s o c i a l i s t countries themselves, the leadership i t s e l f , w i l l help the enemy to fi g h t socialism, f i g h t communism and this cannot be allowed.20 Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t This f r o n t a l assault on Mao's domestic p o l i c i e s was the most frank yet, and i t l e f t no doubt that the r i f t between the two leaders and the two parties was becoming increasingly serious. At this time, of course, the s p l i t over bloc foreign p o l i c y was rapidly worsening relations between the Russians and Chinese, and thi s along with the resurgence of Mao's r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s provided the spark f o r Khrushchev's unprecedented outburst. The next important outbreak of polemics s p e c i f i c a l l y r e l a t i n g to the communes and Chinese domestic construction occurred i n A p r i l of I 9 6 0 , on the 90th anniversary of the bir t h of Lenin. The Chinese, p a r t i c u l a r l y , made this r e l a -tive inauspicious occasion the excuse for publishing an extremely thorough and widespread refutation of a l l Soviet charges and of a l l Soviet revisionisms. In f a c t , l a t e r i n the dispute, the Soviet Union accused the Chinese of making the intra-party c o n f l i c t public knowledge through the publica^ tion of the "Long Live Leninism" a r t i c l e s at th i s time, and even suggested that their publication marked the r e a l ?1 beginning of the Sino-Soviet s p l i t . Lenin Anniversary Statements on the Transition to Communism For the most part, the three a r t i c l e s i n question dealt with the questions of "peaceful coexistence", 2 1 Open Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. (July Ik, 1 9 6 3 ) , Peking Review. No. 3 0 , 1 9 5 9 , p. 3 0 . 265 revolution, imperialism and other facets of bloc foreign p o l i c y which were under dispute. This indicated that the differences between the parties had now d e f i n i t e l y shifted ground, and that the commune dispute, although s t i l l un-resolved, had taken second place. Nonetheless, the "Long Live Leninism" a r t i c l e s s t i l l devoted considerable space to a defense of Chinese domestic p o l i c i e s and to a refutation of charges made against the prime unit of Chinese s o c i e t y — t h e commune. Whereas Khrushchev had intimated that the Chinese "d i s t o r t the teachings of Marxist-Leninism on the building of socialism and communism," the People's Daily r e p l i e d that: Lenin held that l i f e i n s o c i a l i s t society i s a genuinely mass movement . . . i n which the great majority of or even the entire population takes part. He held that such vigorous crea-tive power of the masses i s the basic factor i n s o c i a l i s t society . . . .22 The a r t i c l e maintained that they were advancing economically at a high speed precisely because they had as Lenin said, extensively mobilized millions upon millions of people to take part i n the construction of the country, and because they had formulated the r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s of the general l i n e which included "the consolidation and development of our r u r a l people's communes and the present establishment of ."Forward Along the Path of the Great Lenin," (People's Daily. A p r i l 22, I 9 6 0 ) , Lone Live Leninism (Peking, F.L.P., I960), p. 6 0 . 266 urban people's communes on an extensive scale." And re-i t e r a t i n g that the communes were " i n accordance with the common laws of s o c i a l i s t construction", and were "precisely the product of integrating the universal truths of Leninism with the concrete r e a l i t y of China", the e d i t o r i a l further noted that Lenin had predicted that the revolutions i n the Oriental countries would "display even greater p e c u l i a r i t i e s than the Russian revolution." In conclusion the e d i t o r i a l addressed those "who say that our general l i n e , the big leap forward and the people's communes are products of 'petty bourgeois fanaticism', f a i l i n g to see that they are precisely products of the revolutionary s p i r i t of Marxist-Leninism." It urged these "foreign and Chinese P h i l i s t i n e s " to wait for ten years and witness the vindication of these p o l i c i e s . And quoting Lenin, the a r t i c l e charges that the people "have completely f a i l e d to understand what i s decisive i n Marxism, namely, i t s revolutionary d i a l e c t i c s . 1 , 2 3 The t h i r d a r t i c l e i n the "Long Live Leninism" series was written by Lu Ting-yi as an address to the Central Committee on the Lenin anniversary. Laying much more emphasis on the defence of domestic p o l i c i e s than the other two, Lu's a r t i c l e sets out a detailed summary of the Chinese position and offers implied c r i t i c i s m of Soviet conservatism. Lu noted that: 2 3 I b i d . , p. 63. 267 Our Party's general l i n e has not only been attacked by the imperialists and modern r e v i s i o n i s t s , but has also been slandered by some p h i l i s t i n e s as "petty bourgeois fanaticism*. But facts remain f a c t s . Our general l i n e for s o c i a l i s t construction i s a Marxist-Leninist general l i n e . 2M-Moreover, he noted that "as communists we must i n accordance with the Marxist-Leninist doctrines of uninterrupted revolution and the development of the revolution by stages, a c t i v e l y create conditions for the r e a l i z a t i o n of communism 25 as we carry on s o c i a l i s t construction," ' and he suggested that through the communes and the other r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s formulated by Mao these conditions could be created, and that "the speeding up of s o c i a l i s t construction w i l l i n e v i t -ably promote the r e a l i z a t i o n of communism." Para l l e l i n g t h i s defence of Mao's commune p o l i c i e s was a t h i n l y - v e i l e d c r i t i c i s m of Soviet bourgeoisization and of the r e l a t i v e l y conservative p o l i c i e s implemented by Premier Khrushchev. Lu Ting-yi held that: There i s a kind of theory which holds that there exists i n human society only contradictions be-tween ourselves and the enemy but no contradictions among the people;26 that i n s o c i a l i s t society, between the relations of production and the economic base there i s only the aspect of mutual Lu Ting-yi, "Under Lenin's Revolutionary Banner," Lone Live Leninism, p. ,95. 2 ^ I b i d . , p. 96. ?6 This theory was l a t e r f u l l y developed by Khrushchev at the 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. 268 conformity and no aspect of contradiction; that i n construction we need only to r e l y on technique and not on the masses; that there i s no need to develop the s o c i a l i s t system but only to consolidate i t and even i f i t i s to be developed, to go forward to communism, s t i l l there i s no need to undergo a struggle and to pass through a quali t a t i v e leap; and thus the process of uninterrupted revolution goes up to this point and no further. This, i n terms of philosophic thought i s a metaphysical viewpoint, and not a d i a l e c t i c a l m aterialist viewpoint.27 This passage i s a clear indictment of the conservative Soviet attitude towards the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. The so-called "qualitative leap" i s , of course, the change i n the relations of production from c o l l e c t i v e s to communes, as o r i g i n a l l y envisioned by Lenin and S t a l i n , and as implemented by the Chinese. Also c l e a r l y apparent i s the Chinese c r i t i c i s m of Khrushchev f o r relying on "technique"—that i s to say, on mechanization and automation—rather than on the masses which i s the Chinese alternative. And f i n a l l y , there i s the charge that the Soviets have brought the revolutionary transition process to a h a l t — t h a t only the standard of l i v i n g i s continuing to r i s e , while ide o l o g i c a l consciousness and the relations of production remain stagnant. On the same day as Lu Ting-yi*s speech, Presidium member Otto Kuusinen spoke i n Moscow on a p a r a l l e l topic. Although he dedicated a good part of his speech to proving Lu Ting-yi, op. c i t . , p. 9k 269 that Soviet foreign p o l i c y was t r u l y L e n i n i s t i c , he led off his speech with a discussion of "the Leninist Path to Communism". He made very few new points i n regard to the dispute over Chinese domestic p o l i c y , but he did reassert that: F i d e l i t y to Leninism requires that our party be responsible to the working class, to the Soviet people as a whole, and to the international communist movement. Our party, after a l l , thanks to i t s wealth of experience, i s setting the example of successful accomplishment of the supremely complex tasks of s o c i a l i s t and commun-i s t construction.28 Thus Kuusinen makes clear that Soviet experience and the Soviet example i n s o c i a l i s t construction provides a model for the entire communist movement, and has significance f o r a l l parties everywhere. But the main attack on Chinese p o l i c i e s by the CPSU did not come on the Lenin anniversary, but rather "On the kOth Anniversary of the Publication of V.I. Lenin's Book 'Left-Wing Communism: An Infant i l e Disorder,'" some two months l a t e r . The a r t i c l e , which appeared i n Pravda on June 1 2 , was written by well-known theoretician, Matkovsky, and contained a blunt attack on Chinese practices i n domestic construction. 0 . Kuusinen, "Translation of Lenin's Ideas into Reality," Pravda, A p r i l 2 3 , I9605 Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XII, No. 2 k , p. k. Matkovsky emphasized that s o c i a l i s t construction i n a l l bloc countries i s governed by general laws, and that "Consignment of these general laws to oblivion or under-evaluation of them leads to erroneous conclusions and .,29 serious mistakes,," y Moreover, he emphasized that Lenin taught communist parties "to be fearless i n baring and correcting mistakes committed." Taken together, i t i s obvious from the context that Matkovsky was accusing the Chinese of breaching the general laws of s o c i a l i s t construc-tion under the guise of "creative application" of these laws. He was also suggesting to the Chinese that they admit their mistakes and reverse their r a d i c a l non-Soviet domestic p o l i c i e s . The Soviet theoretician then went on to point out that the "left-wing" communists who Lenin attacked i n his book, had forgotten a basic truth about Marxism: Vladimir I l y i c h c i ted the views of F. Engels, who i n h i s day had c r i t i c i z e d the Blanquists for wanting to skip over a l l the way-stations and move straight to communism, disregarding the course of h i s t o r i c a l development and fancying that ' i f power turns up i n their hands, communism w i l l be i n s t i t u t e d the day after tomorrow.* Engels described as c h i l d i s h naivete the Blanquist attempts to represent ?Q their own impatience as a theoretical argument.-5 7N. Matkovsky, "The Ideological Weapon of Communism," Pravda, June 12, I 9 6 0 ; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XII, no. 2k, p. k. 30 Loc. c i t . 271 In contrast to those "Blanqulsts" who want to skip h i s t o r i c a l stages, the CPSU at i t s 21s t Congress " l a i d down a sound f u l l -scale program fo r the t r a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism," claimed Matkovsky. He said that Khrushchev characterized "the consistent regularity of the process by which socialism grows into communism" at the 2 1 s t Congress, quoting Khrushchev to the effect that one "must not be i n a rush to introduce that which i s not r i p e . This would lead to distortions and 31 compromise our cause."-' Matkovsky was e s p e c i a l l y c r i t i c a l of the Chinese subjectivism, and lambasted them for introducing the communes prematurely when objective conditions were not ready. He declared that: The course of s o c i a l development i s objective. The contentions of present day " l e f t i s t s " within the international communist movement that, having power i n one's hands, one may forthwith introduce communism by bypassing certain h i s t o r i c a l stages i n i t s development are erroneous and incorrect.3 2 Moreover, he denied that the Chinese " l e f t i s t s " had any basis i n Marxist-Leninism for their p o l i c i e s of introducing r u r a l and urban communes at this stage of development. The contentions of the " l e f t i s t s " , he asserted, contradict Leninism: Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t . 272 Lenin taught that to try i n practice to anticipate the future re s u l t of a f u l l y -developed, f u l l y consolidated and formed, f u l l - s c a l e and fully-matured, communism i s l i k e teaching higher mathematics to a four-year-old.33 Thus Mao's commune p o l i c i e s were thoroughly attacked, denounced and condemned as inconsistent with Leninism—the same Leninism whose purity the Chinese " l e f t i s t s " claimed to be safeguarding against the "revisionism" of the Soviet Union. And the same a r t i c l e struck out at the " l e f t - s e c -t a r i a n " deviation of the Chinese who: mistakenly regard the policy of working for the peaceful coexistence of countries with d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l systems, of struggling to put an end to the arms race and to strengthen peace and friendship among peoples, and of talks between the leaders of the s o c i a l i s t and c a p i t a l i s t countries as some kind of departure from Marxist-Leninism.3 1 * The Confrontation at Bucharest It was clear from the intensity of the polemics between the two parties, and especially those on the question of foreign policy, that some kind of concrete manifestation of the dispute between the two states must soon appear. The Rumanian Party Congress held i n Bucharest from June 2h to June 26 proved to be the forum wherein the Soviet Union attacked the Chinese 'deviations 1 i n the presence of party leaders from the entire bloc. The CPSU offered to the bloc Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t . 273 the opportunity to use the Congress for discussions on i n t e r -national policy. At Bucharest, Khrushchev "unleashed a surprise assault on the Chinese Communist Party, turning the spearhead of struggle against us and not against U. S. 35 i m p e r i a l i s m . H e p u b l i c l y issued a "Letter of Information", dated June 2 1 , from the CPSU Central Committee to the Chinese Central Committee, which "groundlessly slandered and attacked the C.P.C. a l l along the l i n e . " 3 ^ Moreover, i n h i s speech: he wantonly v i l i f i e d the Chinese Communist Party as "madmen*, 'wanting to unleash war*, 'picking up the banner of the imperialist monopoly c a p i t a l i s t s ' , being 'purely n a t i o n a l i s t i c * on the Sino-Indian boundary question, and employing 'Trotskyite ways* against the C.P.S.U. For their part, the Chinese r e p l i e d that they would "never submit to erroneous views which run counter to Marxist-Leninism," and disputed Khrushchev's right to interpret ideology, and set bloc p o l i c y . 3 7 And according to information gathered by David Charles Khrushchev defended the right of the Soviet party to have confidential consultations with dissidents within the Chinese, or any other party, thus refusing to make any apology for the C.P.S.U.*s dealings with Peng Teh-huai, and for helping him 35 J > " O r i g i n and Development . . .," on. c i t . , p. 1 3 . 3^Loc. c i t . 37 -"Loc. c i t . 27k to oppose Mao's commune p o l i c i e s i n the summer of 1 9 5 9 . 3 8 It was evident from these proceedings at the Bucharest meeting that open breaks i n relations between Russia and China were not f a r off. The withdrawal of Soviet technicians was just such an event, occurring only weeks after the Bulgarian Party Congress. Loc. c i t CHAPTER X I WITHDRAWAL OF T E C H N I C A L E X P E R T S AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMUNE SYSTEM F o l l o w i n g t h e o p e n c l a s h o f i d e o l o g i c a l p o s i t i o n s a t t h e B u c h a r e s t m e e t i n g , " t h e S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t s u d d e n l y a n d u n i l a t e r a l l y d e c i d e d t o r e c a l l a l l t h e S o v i e t e x p e r t s i n C h i n a w i t h i n one m o n t h , t h e r e b y t e a r i n g up h u n d r e d s o f a g r e e m e n t s a n d c o n t r a c t s . " 1 The S o v i e t U n i o n c l a i m e d t h a t i t s e x p e r t s h a d b e e n " p l a c e d b y t h e C h i n e s e a u t h o r i t i e s i n c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h r u l e d o u t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f d o i n g n o r m a l 2 w o r k a n d w h i c h w e r e h u m i l i a t i n g t o t h e i r human d i g n i t y , " a n d t h a t t h e r e f o r e t h e S o v i e t U n i o n h a d no c h o i c e b u t t o r e -c a l l i t s 1300 e x p e r t s . T h i s a c t i o n h a s a n i m p o r t a n t b e a r i n g on t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e C h i n e s e d o m e s t i c p o l i c i e s f o r a number o f r e a s o n s . I n t h e f i r s t p l a c e , I t h a d b e e n a d m i t t e d b y t h e C h i n e s e on n u m e r o u s o c c a s i o n s t h a t S o v i e t t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e h a d b e e n t h e c o r n e r s t o n e o f t h e i r r a p i d i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n p r o g r a m , a n d e s p e c i a l l y d u r i n g t h e F i r s t F i v e Y e a r P l a n . On t h e o c c a s i o n o f t h e s i g n i n g o f t h e new 1959 t e c h n i c a l a i d a g r e e m e n t , P e o p l e ' s D a i l y h a d r e f e r r e d t o S o v i e t - b u i l t e n t e r -p r i s e s a s " t h e s p i n e o f C h i n a ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n . " The m o d e r a t e s "'""The O r i g i n a n d D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e D i f f e r e n c e s B e -t w e e n t h e L e a d e r s o f t h e C . P . S . U . a n d O u r s e l v e s , " R e d F l a g , S e p t e m b e r 6, 1963; P e k i n g R e v i e w , n o . 37, 19&3, p T l H . A R e o l v t o P e k i n g ( S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t S t a t e o f S e p t -ember 1, I963), ( L o n d o n , S o v i e t B o o k l e t s , 1963), p . 13. 276 w i t h i n t h e p a r t y l a i d c o n s i d e r a b l e s t r e s s on t h i s t e c h n i c a l h e l p a n d r e a l i z e d t h a t i d e o l o g i c a l d e v i a t i o n s f r o m t h e S o v i e t l i n e n e c e s s a r i l y e n d a n g e r e d t h i s a s s i s t a n c e . W r i t i n g i n M a r c h o f I960 b e f o r e t h e t e c h n i c a l e x p e r t s w e r e w i t h d r a w n , m o d e r a t e K w a n t u n g P a r t y l e a d e r Tao C h u w r o t e a n a r t i c l e i n w h i c h h e s t r e s s e d t h a t t h e w a y t o s p e e d C h i n a ' s c o n s t r u c t i o n w a s t o i n c r e a s e t h i s a i d f r o m t h e S o v i e t U n i o n . He a r g u e d t h a t : B e c a u s e o f t h i s , o u r b a s i c i n t e r e s t l i e s i n s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e s o l i d a r i t y o f t h e s o c i a l i s t camp h e a d e d b y t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a n d t h e i n t e r -n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y o f t h e p r o l e t a r i a t . We m u s t make o u r u t t e r a n c e s a n d a c t i o n s b e n e f i c i a l t o i n t e r n a t i o n a l s o l i d a r i t y . . . . T h i s i s t h e o n l y w a y t o i n s u r e t h e s m o o t h p r o g r e s s o f o u r c o n s t r u c t i o n . 3 I n s h o r t , h e w a s a r g u i n g t h a t i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n a n d i n c r e a s e t h e b a d l y n e e d e d e c o n o m i c s u p p o r t o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , t h e C h i n e s e p a r t y s h o u l d a c c o m m o d a t e i t s e l f t o t h e C . P . S . U . l i n e . The w i t h d r a w a l o f S o v i e t s u p p o r t i n J u l y meant t h a t t h e m o d e r a t e s c o u l d n o l o n g e r u s e t h i s a r g u m e n t t o u r g e a c h a n g e i n t h e p a r t y p o l i c i e s , a l t h o u g h t h e y c o u l d now a r g u e t h a t t h e r a d i c a l s h a d u n d e r m i n e d t h e c o u n t r y ' s w h o l e p r o g r a m o f e c o n o m i c c o n s t r u c t i o n t h r o u g h t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l h a r d h e a d e d -n e s s , b o t h d o m e s t i c a l l y a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r a d i c a l p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p c o u l d , a n d d i d now u s e t h e S o v i e t U n i o n a s a s c a p e g o a t f o r t h e • ^ S o u t h e r n D a i l y , May 13, i960; S u r v e y o f t h e C h i n a M a i n l a n d Press, n o . 2277. 277 f a i l u r e of their r a d i c a l economic p o l i c i e s . As the Russians l a t e r argued, the attempts of the Chinese leaders to j u s t i f y d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the development of the Chinese economy by reference to the r e c a l l of Soviet s p e c i a l i s t s i s absolutely a r t i f i c i a l , a l l the more so since not a single Soviet s p e c i a l i s t i s known to have worked i n Chinese agriculture . . » . And i t was d e f i n i t e l y agriculture where the Chinese were experiencing the greatest economic calamities. In f a c t , the very timing of the Soviet withdrawal of technicians and advisers lends considerable weight to the p o s s i b i l i t y that i t was timed to coincide with the poor results of the summer harvest i n China. Despite claims i n 1959 that food production had increased about 10%, I t was l a t e r admitted that "farm production declined i n 1 9 5 9 . A s a r e s u l t of this decline, due partly to widespread flooding and drought, there occurred the acute food shortage which lasted throughout the winter and spring, and caused the party to undertake severe rationing and to resurrect the communal dining h a l l s . The i 9 6 0 harvest was also subjected to severe natural calamities, and as a r e s u l t farm production " f e l l even further i n i 9 6 0 . " Reports of mediocre harvests began to appear i n the Chinese press around the second week i n July, and only one day after the Soviet Union had declared k A Renlv to Peking, l o c . c i t . 5 yFang Chung, "All-Round Improvement i n China's Economy," Peking Review No. 3k, 1963, p. 8. hoc, c i t . 278 Its intention to withdraw i t s technicians the party issued a dir e c t i v e c a l l i n g on the whole country to plant and grow vegetables immediately "to prevent possible famine." 7 On June 20, the People's Daily declared that "production of autumn vegetables i n large quantities w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y safeguard certain areas from possible famine i f stricken by drought or f l o o d . " Despite the bleak outlook i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production and the p o s s i b i l i t y of famine, the party took no immediate steps to relax the commune system and to revert to the incentive system advocated by the moderates throughout the abortive leap forward. It was not u n t i l the party had v e r i f i e d that the autumn harvest was too poor to measurably a l l e v i a t e the c r i t i c a l food shortage that i t took concrete steps to introduce more incentive into the a g r i c u l t u r a l system. Further Retreats i n Commune Policy A r t i c l e s appearing i n Red Flag and People's Daily i n August and September indicated that debates over the communes and the general l i n e were once more taking place within the party. A r t i c l e s by r a d i c a l Tan Chen-lin and Agr i c u l t u r a l Minister Liao Lu-yen set out the different points of view. Tan suggested that the a g r i c u l t u r a l problem could be overcome ^Current Scene Reports on Communist China (Kowloon, P. 0. Box 5217, 19^1), p. 190. 8Loc. c i t . 279 through maintaining emphasis on industrialization and on producing agricultural machinery to mechanize farming,9 while Liao argued that emphasis must be switched from industry to agriculture. "Without the development of agri-culture," he said, " i t is impossible to develop Industry." Moreover, he urged the party to divert far more labour "to strengthen the agricultural front and reinforce the manpower engaged in field work."10 Contrary to what Tan had said, the Agriculture Minister argued that: Since agricultural production in our country is at present s t i l l done mainly by manual labour, the key to bringing about a continuous leap forward in agricultural production is to see to i t that agricultural production, and fir s t of a l l grain production, gets the man-power i t needs.11 It was the formation of the rural communes, he noted, which had drawn off too much labour to engage in non-agricultural activities and he urged that commune members be taken away from their rural factories and put back in the fields. In November the outcome of the debate was decided and the party decided on an overall retreat and liberalization in the rural communes: 9"On the Technical Transformation of China's Agri-culture," People's Daily. August 26, I 9 6 0 ; Current Scene. op. cit., p. 213. 1 0Liao Lu-yen, The Whole Party and the Whole People Go For Agriculture in a Big Way, Red Flag. No. 17, I960 (Peking, F.L.P., i 9 6 0 ) , p . 15. ^Loc. cit. 280 Faced with the p o s s i b i l i t y of widespread famine, Mao and h i s comrades could equivocate no longer. Swift and sweeping action (embodied i n a 12-point d i r e c t i v e issued by the party i n November) was taken i n November to conserve food and con-serve energy expended by the population. Trade policy was reversed: food exports were d r a s t i -c a l l y c u r t a i l e d , and arrangements were made to import between f i v e and six m i l l i o n tons of grain from Western countries during the coming year.12 As far as the communes were concerned, a further retreat towards the c o l l e c t i v e s and the lower co-operatives was made. More ownership and more r e s p o n s i b i l i t y and. i n i t i a t i v e was given to the production brigade and production teams. In some heavily populated provinces, ownership was put on a f o u r - l e v e l system which included the 20-household Work Team unit, which was formerly the Mutual Aid team. According to the December 21 issue of People's Daily: In the future the commune may make proposals . . . however, a commune should by no means r i g i d l y assign crop acreage, carelessly raise production targets and mechanically stipulate technical measures . . . much less go so far as to transfer carelessly the manpower and means ,^ of production away from the production brigade. ^ Moreover, the production brigade was to have complete control over the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i t s own harvests, i t being directed that " a l l income of a production brigade should be distributed 12 P. P. Jones and T. T. Poleman, Communes and the A g r i c u l t u r a l C r i s i s i n China (Stanford, Food Research I n s t i -tute, 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 1 5 . 13 -^People's Daily. December 1 , I 9 6 0 ; Current Scene. QP. c i t . , p. 2 8 4 . 281 within the brigade concerned." Formerly, a commune-wide " l e v e l l i n g " of income had taken place. Moreover, despite the fa c t that the mess h a l l s were to be retained (under the control of the production team) private plots were once again di s t r i b u t e d to the peasants, together with "the odd pieces of land around their houses." Throughout the following months the huge construc-tion projects of the previous winters were discontinued. The peasants either worked i n the f i e l d s i n the t r a d i t i o n a l manner, engaged i n private side-line a c t i v i t i e s , or did nothing. "Over much of China," wrote the Minister of Agri-culture i n mid-winter, "many peasants are conserving their strength as they H i d e over the famine.t"'1'^ As private plots and spare time occupations produced food and consumer goods, the v i l l a g e market economy was permitted to reopen, thus f i n a l l y returning to what Chen Yun had advocated at the Congress i n 1956. It was a hard won victory. The Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee On January 1 L , 1961 the Central Committee was con-vened i n plenary session to give " s o c i a l i s t l e g a l i t y 1 to what had already been done by the Politburo. It had not met for Loc. c i t . 1 5 'Jones and Poleman, l o c . c i t . 282 over eighteen months—its l a s t meeting being the 1959 Lushan meeting where the radicals overcame moderate and " r i g h t i s t opportunist" opposition and reaffirmed the consolidated communes and the general l i n e . Although con-firming the retreat by the party back down the path of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n and returning more ownership to the lower l e v e l s , the Central Committee also repledged i t s f a i t h i n Mao Tse-tung*s general p o l i c i e s , declaring that: The great achievements of our country during the past three years show that the party's general l i n e for s o c i a l i s t construction, the big leap forward and the people's communes suit the r e a l i t i e s of China.16 The communes were defended as having allowed the Chinese to mobilize the peasants during the severe floods and drought, and thus avert the kind of famine and disasters which had resulted from these phenomena i n previous decades. The Central Committee's communique also made note that "among party and government functionaries, more than 90% work f a i t h f u l l y and conscientiously for the people." It was admitted that the remaining 10% opposed the party p o l i c i e s But for the time i t was pointed out that this 10% included " l e f t i s t s " as well as " r i g h t i s t s " . The l e f t i s t s , I t was said: Communique of the 9th Plenum, Current Scene. P P . c i t . , p. 2 9 9 . 2 8 3 are inadequate i n their ideological consciousness. They lack the fundamental understanding of the fundamental p o l i c i e s of the Party and the govern-ment; they lack s u f f i c i e n t understanding of the d i s t i n c t i o n between socialism and communism, of the d i s t i n c t i o n between s o c i a l i s t ownership by the c o l l e c t i v e and s o c i a l i s t ownership of the people as a whole, of the three l e v e l ownership of the people's communes with the production brigade as the basic l e v e l , and of the s o c i a l i s t society's p r i n c i p l e s of exchange of equal values, of 'each according to his work* and of more i n -come for those who work more.17 The communique c a l l e d f o r a r e c t i f i c a t i o n campaign to r i d the party of this kind of l e f t i s t thinking, and indicated that a good deal of the work had already been done. This exposure of a l e f t i s t deviation within the party was the surest sign that Mao had undertaken an extensive retreat from his o r i g i n a l r a d i c a l p o l i c i e s . Except for the public dining h a l l s , about a l l that remained of the o r i g i n a l communes was an administra-tive structure. The actual organization and ownership systems i n the r u r a l areas, as of 1961, had returned almost completely to the pre-commune stage of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n . However, despite the long series of ideological and organiza-t i o n a l retreats, Mao had not given up his f a i t h i n the future of the commune and the party s t i l l espoused i n theory the r a d i c a l general l i n e . The long-range aims and the ideological commitment s t i l l remained. In the spring of 1961, the Central Committee issued an authoritative 60-article "Draft Regulations for Work i n Loc. c i t 284 the People's Communes" which s p e c i f i c a l l y set out the party's retreat i n the r u r a l areas, and even went so far i n decentra-l i z a t i o n as to delegate a number of r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s for actual farm production to "squads" of about ten men each. Material incentives were also heavily emphasized. 1^ But this was not the end. The 196l harvest was as bad as, i f not worse than the year before; "for the second consecutive year a decline was recorded i n the early summer harvest of wheat and other fall-sown g r a i n s . " 1 ^ As a r e s u l t , the party dropped the compulsory mess h a l l system and terminated the other l a s t hold out from the commune system, the free supply system. Moreover, ownership i n the three-level system of c o l l e c t i v i t y was switched downwards more towards the production team—the former lower cooperative made up of about eighty f a m i l i e s . Currently, therefore, the organization of the r u r a l areas i n China s t i l l consists of administrative commune units, but the actual unit of production and consumption i s the production team. In November of 1 9 6 3 , Agriculture Minister Liao Lu-yen described the organization of China's r u r a l areas as follows: People's Daily. August 29, 1961; Survey of the China Mainland Press T No. 2574. 1 9 yJones and Poleman, op. c i t . , p. 17. 285 There are now more than 7 k , 0 0 0 people's communes i n China . . . . Generally speaking, land, draught animals, farm tools and other means of production are a l l owned and managed by the production teams, and income i s distributed i n a u n i f i e d way with production teams as the basic unit . . . . People's communes also allow their members to c u l t i v a t e a certain amount of garden plot , raise pigs and poultry, and follow other domestic sideline occupations as a supple-ment to the c o l l e c t i v e economy.20 The Minister also added that: During the entire h i s t o r i c a l period of socialism they w i l l continue to implement the p r i n c i p l e of 'to each according to h i s work, and more income to those who work more* . . . . They are the basic s o c i a l organization for the entire h i s t o r i c a l period of socialism and for the future period of communism.21 This i s the present state of the Chinese commune system--a f a r cry organizationally from what was envisioned i n 1 9 5 8 . But the underlying ideology has s t i l l not been revised. The communes are a permanent part of the Mao Tse-tung ideology, and s t i l l remain the vehicle by which China plans to evolve along the road to communism. ^ Liao Lu-yen, " C o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of Agriculture i n China," Peking Review No. M+, 1 9 6 3 , p. 9 . 21 CHAPTER XII THE DEVELOPING DEBATE: i 9 6 0 - 1962 The I960 Moscow Conference In order to consider the extensive ideological r i f t s between China and the Soviet Union, the eighty-two Communist and Workers Parties met in Moscow in November of i 9 6 0 . Although most of the debate was concerned with the bloc's strategy against the capitalist world and related questions, there was also consideration given to the "correct" forms of the transition to socialism in bloc countries. Although the Chinese succeeded in modifying to a considerable degree the Russian ideological outlook on the question of revolu-tionary strategy and of peaceful coexistence , the Soviet position on domestic construction came through unscathed. As a result, the declaration which emerged from the conference asserted that "Lenin's cooperative plan" was the correct plan to implement in both the developed and the underdeveloped nations. In other words, i t had universal application. Of course, i t could be said from the Chinese point of view that they, too, had followed Lenin's cooperative plan but had x"Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leaders of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves," Ren Flag, September 6 , 19635 Peking Review, no. 3 7 , . 1 9 6 3 , p. 15 . p Statement of the Meeting of Representatives of Communist and Workers Parties, Moscow, i 9 6 0 , World Marxist Review, vol. I l l , no. 1 2 , December I 9 6 0 , p. 8. 2 8 7 p r o g r e s s e d b e y o n d t h a t s t a g e n o w , a n d w e r e p a s s i n g o n t o t h e h i g h e r s t a g e w h i c h h a d l o n g b e e n e n v i s i o n e d b y t h e f a t h e r s o f M a r x i s m — t h e commune. T h u s , i n a s e n s e , t h e w o r d i n g o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n i s s u c h a s t o l e a v e t h e C h i n e s e a n e s c a p e a n d t h e r e f o r e c a n b e s e e n o n l y a s a h o l l o w v i c t o r y f o r t h e C . P . S . U . On t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o c o m m u n i s m , t h e w o r d i n g o f t h e d e c l a r a t i o n i n d i c a t e s a d e f i n i t e S o v i e t t o u c h . I t s t r e s s e s t h a t a s t r o n g m a t e r i a l b a s e i s t h e c a r d i n a l p r e r e q u i s i t e t o c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h a t t h i s m a t e r i a l a b u n d a n c e c o u l d b e s t b e a c h i e v e d t h r o u g h " s t r i c t o b s e r v a n c e o f t h e L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e o f p r o v i d i n g m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s , " a n d t h r o u g h m e c h a n i z a t i o n a n d s t a t e p l a n n i n g . 3 T h u s t h e d e c l a r a t i o n n o t e s t h a t : T o p r o v i d e a m a t e r i a l b a s i s f o r t h e t r a n s i t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s t o c o m m u n i s m , i t i s i n d i s p e n s i b l e t o a c h i e v e a h i g h l e v e l o f p r o -d u c t i o n . . . w i t h o u t w h i c h i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o p r o v i d e t h e a b u n d a n c e o f c o n s u m e r g o o d s r e q u i r e d o f a c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y . On t h i s b a s i s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y t o d e v e l o p c o m m u n i s t s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , v i g o u r o u s l y p r o m o t e t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e p e o p l e a n d e d u c a t e t h e members o f t h e n e w , c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y . H-One v i c t o r y w h i c h t h e C h i n e s e w o n o n a r e l a t e d t o p i c h a d t o do w i t h e c o n o m i c i n t e g r a t i o n a n d C h i n e s e e c o n o m i c i s o l a t i o n i s m . W i t h t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f S o v i e t t e c h n i c i a n s f r o m C h i n a , t h e C h i n e s e h a d e m b a r k e d o n a p o l i c y o f c u t t i n g b a c k t r a d e a n d r e l y i n g o n t h e i r own r e s o u r c e s , a n d h a d moved 3 I b i d . , p . 9. L L o c . c i t . 288 even nearer towards economic independence from the bloc. When thi s question came up at the Moscow meeting the Soviet Union's "wrong thesis about opposing the policy of 'going i t alone' on the part of the s o c i a l i s t countries, which i n effect meant opposing the policy of relying mainly on themselves i n construction, was r e j e c t e d . u y H o w e v e r , the declaration did c a l l f or the "continuous improvement of the international system of the d i v i s i o n of labour through the coordination of national economic plans, s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and cooperation i n production . . . . w h i c h was a restatement of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of achieving Chinese economic integra-tion with the rest of the bloc. The thesis put forward by Khrushchev concerning the "more or less simultaneous t r a n s i -tion of a l l peoples of the s o c i a l i s t system to communism" was also stated as o f f i c i a l bloc policy, while linked to the idea of greater bloc economic integration. At the same time as the fr a t e r n a l parties were meeting i n Moscow, a noteworthy a r t i c l e appeared i n the World Marxist Review, which set forth i n very strong terms the Soviet position of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, and especially the overriding importance of increasing production. E n t i t l e d "The Main Link i n the Transition to Communism," and written by A. Sobolov, the a r t i c l e was very c l e a r l y directed to refuting the position held by the Chinese, and to discrediting their attempt to leap toward communism. ^"Origin and Development of Differences,"loc. c i t . ^Statement, loc. c i t . 289 Striking back at those who "claim that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union i s s u p e r f i c i a l i n i t s treatment of theo r e t i c a l questions, that i t adopts a narrow u t i l i t a r i a n attitude," Sobolov declared that: In the view of these 'defenders 1 of theory, s o c i a l science i s developed by abstract juggling with d i a l e c t i c a l concepts and quotations, armchair ruminations and the thinking up of abstract conceptions. Such "theory" has nothing viable about i t ; i t i s dogmatic and cannot be a weapon i n the struggle for communism.7 He went on to suggest that the development of Marxist-Leninism by the C.P.S.U. had proceeded i n recent years on the basis of generalizing the experience of communist construction, and thus was based on l i f e i t s e l f . Thus, the Soviet Union had enriched and developed Marxist-Leninism and provided the world with "a teaching s c i e n t i f i c a l l y substantiated and v e r i f i e d i n practice, on the laws of the tr a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism, on the organizational forms of communist s o c i e t y . " 8 Implicit i n this statement was the suggestion that the Soviet path was the correct one for the whole of mankind, and that the communes were not the proper organizational forms for communist society. A. Sobolov, "The Main Link i n the Transition to Communism," World Marxist Review, Vol. I l l , No. 11, November I 9 6 0 , p. 2. Ibid., p. 3 290 Sobolov argued that the " t r a n s i t i o n to communism does not c a l l f o r the destruction of s o c i a l i s t r e l a t i o n s , laws and p r i n c i p l e s " but rather a "development" and "consummation" of them. This was i n d i r e c t contrast to the Chinese view that the t r a n s i t i o n to communism demanded a q u a l i t i a t i v e change, not just quantitative, and was merely a substantiation of Khrushchev's decision to r e t a i n the c o l l e c t i v e s , to r e t a i n material incentives, and to increase commodity exchange. Turning to the Chinese position on the r e l a t i v e speed of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism, Sobolov declared that the t r a n s i t i o n must be gradual. While suggesting the p o s s i b i l i t y of speeding up the process through correct p o l i c i e s , he be-rates the Chinese attempts to leap forward too quickly, noting that: Experience has shown, however, that incomplete stages cannot be skipped; i t i s harmful and even dangerous to carry out measures that have not matured, and for which the way has not been paved by the march of time. In the f i n a l analysis this slows down the tempo of s o c i a l i s t development.9 As opposed to the frenzied leap forward undertaken by the Chinese the author indicated that the correct method of evolving toward communist society was through "harmonious and planned" economic construction, such as that undertaken by the Soviet Union i n i t s Seven Year Plan. Loc. c i t . 2 9 1 The main theme of the a r t i c l e was that the establish-ment of a vast material and technical base was the overriding prerequisite to communism, and that somehow a l l the other prerequisites would naturally evolve from the material base. Defending the Soviet Union's preoccupation with r a i s i n g production and standards of l i v i n g , Sobolov declared that: The C.P.S.U. has advanced and substantiated the proposition that the main l i n k i n communist construction, the decisive prerequisite for the tr a n s i t i o n from socialism to communism i s the creation of a powerful material and technical base. A l l other questions—big or small, those having a close bearing on the material base or those r e l a t i v e l y independent of i t — w i l l be settled either i n the process of laying the material foundation or on the basis of it.10 Giving this proposition the binding force of dogma ( i n Soviet eyes), i t was asserted that the above proposition "flows l o g i c a l l y from the laws governing economic development and the Marxist-Leninist concept of the essence of socialism, and i s therefore the only correct and genuinely s c i e n t i f i c 11 conclusion." Such a conclusion was d i r e c t l y contrary, however, to the Chinese view which held that organization changes and ideological consciousness were v i t a l to the r e a l i z a t i o n of communism, and that the party had to struggle for the non-material prerequisites just as hard as for the material base. 1 0 I b i d . , p. k. 11 Loc. c i t . The Chinese party also held that certain communist measures could be implemented on a r e l a t i v e l y undeveloped economic base, and had attempted to implement this idea with the communes. Sobolov called this type of program, one of the "vulgar concepts of communism"; "concepts which the CP.S.U. has had to combat and which i t i s s t i l l combatting. 1 1 He termed the commune-type program an: egalitarian-ascetic view according to which the main l i n k to the tra n s i t i o n to communism i s d i s t r i b u t i o n , the introduction without delay of communist principles i n this sphere, irrespective of the l e v e l of production. Those who hold this view reduce the communist id e a l to egalitarian distribution.12 Thus, as opposed to the Russians who emphasized that an abundant material foundation was the prerequisite to the introduction of certain communist pr i n c i p l e s , the Chinese had attempted through the free supply system to introduce p a r t i a l communist d i s t r i b u t i o n of products which were r e l a -t i v e l y abundant. At the time the a r t i c l e was written, the part -supply system s t i l l remained i n effect, and thus remained as a challenge to the C.P.S.U. ideology. As the author pointed out, " i n one form or another egalitarian senti-ments are now and again s t i l l encountered among people i n the 13 Soviet Union." Thus, i t can be seen quite c l e a r l y that the communes were not a dead issue by any means i n the Soviet Loc. c i t . Loc. c i t . 293 Union, and that their continued existence i n China constituted a continuing challenge to C.P.S.U. domestic poli c y . In a further attempt to refute the s p e c i f i c idea of the communes, Sobolov appealed to the experience with communes i n the early post-revolutionary period. His argument i s contained i n the following passage: Egalitarian-consumer views—the Idea of the 'ki t t y * were f a i r l y widespread i n the Soviet Union during the early days of Soviet construc-tion. Communes were set up i n both the country-side and i n the towns. Each member of the commune, irrespective of whether he was a s k i l l e d worker or apprentice, put a l l h i s wages into the * k i t t y * and each received the same share. These views r e f l e c t e d a narrow consumer outlook at a time when the productive forces were i n s u f f i c i e n t l y developed and there were not enough consumer products to go around; they minimized the role of material incentive i n the matter of improving s k i l l s and r a i s i n g labour productivity. The introduction of these pr i n c i p l e s of d i s t r i b u t i o n was an attempt to by-pass stages of development and this always gives r i s e to negative phenomena.I** Herein, one can discover nearly a l l the Soviet objections to the Chinese communes: they were set up prematurely, they practised egalitarianism, they dampened incentive for self-improvement, they dampened incentive to produce more and were a vain attempt to skip over necessary stages and w i l l ultimately end i n f a i l u r e because they violated objective laws. Loc. c i t . 29 k Sobolov also developed the Soviet conception of solving the difference between mental and manual labour, disparaging the Chinese idea of having s k i l l e d people do manual labour on the grounds that i t would lower produc-t i v i t y , and asserting that the answer lay i n automation which would make a l l labour the same, and through greater education for a l l . The vast difference between the Soviet and Chinese views concerning this v i t a l prerequisite to communism i s obvious. It i s noteworthy, too, that the measures taken i n China to begin the o b l i t e r a t i o n of differences between mental and manual labour (leaders and of f i c e workers and students going to the f i e l d s to do manual labour) was c r i t i c i z e d i n China on similar grounds to those proposed by Sobolov: that these people were needed by the country i n their proper places, not i n the f i e l d s . With the appearance of Sobolov*s a r t i c l e , i t was evident that there was s t i l l much more f i r e l e f t i n the commune issue than a perusal of the i960 Declaration might indicate. The 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. confirmed t h i s , and further developed the Soviet ideology on the question of the correct path to communism. The 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U.: The Soviet Path to Communism Immediately before the 1961 Congress of the C.P.S.U. the Chinese domestic situation was at a p a r t i c u l a r l y low ebb, with the t h i r d successive bad harvest being recorded and with the communes modified to such an extent as to exist p r a c t i c a l l y i n name only. At this point there was very l i t t l e for the Chinese to hold up to the world as a challenge to Soviet domestic p o l i c y and to the Soviet c o l l e c t i v e s ; especially since the Chinese had recently reverted for a l l intents and purposes to the c o l l e c t i v e stage. No r a d i c a l i d e o l o g i c a l claims about the communes were any longer f o r t h -coming from the Chinese, and with the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the Draft Program of the C.P.S.U. which dwelt almost exclusively on the p r a c t i c a l plan to evolve within twenty years to communism i n the Soviet Union, the Chinese had very l i t t l e basis to c r i t i c i s e the Russians for being conservative and fo r not advancing to the next state. Thus, i n L i u Shao-chi 1 s speech on the f o r t i e t h anniversary of the party*s founding, delivered on June 30, there was v i r t u a l l y nothing r a d i c a l said concerning the communes. He even suggested that Soviet experience had been drawn upon i n drawing up "the general l i n e f o r China's 15 s o c i a l i s t construction." J As f a r as the communes were concerned, he merely said that " i n our countryside there have emerged the people's communes formed by a g r i c u l t u r a l co-operatives joining together." Here was a master — -'Liu Shao-chi, Address at the Meeting i n Celebration of the hpth Anniversary of the Founding of the C.P.C. (Peking, F.L.P., 1961), p. 8. 1 /• Loc. c i t . 296 understatement; not an element of the r a d i c a l claims which heralded the introduction of the communes. But he did defend the commune policy as correct, and at the same time urged the party members to follow through the directives to l i b e r a l i z e the communes and, "place the people's communes, with ownership by production brigades as their basis, on a sound footing and consolidate them, and bring into f u l l play the superiority of the people's commune system i n promoting a g r i c u l t u r a l production." 1' 7 And to the party cadres he suggested that they study, along with the writings of Mao on domestic construction "the experience i n s o c i a l i s t construction of the Soviet Union and other f r a t e r n a l countries." S i g n i f i c a n t l y , he added none of the riders that usually went with such advice. The 22nd Congress of the C.P.S.U. The 22nd Congress of the CPSU was c a l l e d to formulate a new party program for the t r a n s i t i o n period to communism. As a r e s u l t i t dealt with a number of the points at issue between the Chinese and Russian parties, and elaborated on many of the problems of achieving the prerequisites to communism, which had been discussed by Khrushchev i n a pre-liminary way at the 21st Congress. The speeches by the Soviet leader at the Congress and the text of the program adopted by Ibid., p. 11 297 i t contained l i t t l e of the t h i n l y - v e i l e d anti-Chinese passages which had characterized the proceedings of the preceding Congress i n 1959. The f a c t the Chinese remained i d e o l o g i c a l l y committed to the communes as the best form for the t r a n s i t i o n to communism meant, however, that they s t i l l posed a certain i d e o l o g i c a l threat to the Soviet Union. Thus there are a number of passages i n Khrushchev's report to the Congress and i n the new C.P.S.U. program which have important bearing on the Chinese deviation from the Soviet road, as well as some passages which expand on Khrushchev's previous i d e o l o g i -c a l arguments with the Chinese over the communes. On the question of the road to socialism and the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of Soviet experience and "general laws" as opposed to "creative application" of these laws, for instance, the adopted C.P.S.U. program makes a number of observations. Emphasizing the Soviet view that general laws and Soviet experience are the main thing i n a l l countries, while "national p e c u l i a r i t i e s " can j u s t i f y only minor deviations, the program notes that; As a r e s u l t of the devoted labour of the Soviet people and the theoretical and p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i -t i e s of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, there exists i n the world a s o c i a l i s t society that i s as a r e a l i t y and a science i n s o c i a l i s t construction that has been tested i n practice. The highroad to socialism has been paved.18 18 , M £r,Qgram of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. (Moscow, P.L.P.H., 1961), p. 2 0 . ' Moreover, the program adds that: 298 It has been borne out i n practice and recognized by a l l Marxist-Leninist parties that the pro-cesses of s o c i a l i s t revolution and construction are founded on a number of basic objective laws applicable to a l l countries entering on the s o c i a l i s t path,19 So-called "national p e c u l i a r i t i e s " emphasized by the Chinese to support their deviations are not even mentioned. On the important point of the clos e l y related point of the general i d e o l o g i c a l relevance of the planned Soviet road to communism, both Khrushchev and the program make f a r -reaching claims. Thus, Khrushchev claims that: The draft program marks a new stage i n the development of the revolutionary theory of Marx, Engels and Lenin. The program f u r -nishes e x p l i c i t answers to a l l the basic questions of theory and practice of the struggle f o r communism, and to the key 2 0 questions of present day world development. In short, Khrushchev reiterates the Soviet claim that since the C.P.S.U. i s the f i r s t party to experience the building of communism i t alone has the authority to interpret and develop Marxist theory on the question of the evolution from socialism to communism. The program adopted by the Congress i s only s l i g h t l y less sweeping i n i t s statements on this question. It notes that: X 7 I b i d . , p. 21. 0 0 " N. S. Khrushchev, Report on the Program of the C.P.S.U. (London, Soviet Booklets, November, I 9 6 D , p. 18. 299 In building communism, the people of the Soviet Union are breaking new roads for mankind, testing their correctness by their own experience . . . and selecting the best forms and methods fo r communist construction.2 1 However, the program i t s e l f does recognize the p o s s i b i l i t y of certain adaptations to l o c a l conditions, and therefore i s s l i g h t l y more f l e x i b l e than Khrushchev's statements. It declares that; Since the s o c i a l forces . . . i n the Soviet Union and i n the other s o c i a l i s t countries are of one type, there w i l l be common basic objective laws fo r communist construction i n the U.S.S.R. and i n those countries, with due allowance made for the h i s t o r i c a l and national p e c u l i a r i t i e s of each country.22 On the question of the premature introduction of communism, the program i s also somewhat more accommodating than Khrushchev's speech, i n that -while condemning i t , i t bows i n the d i r e c t i o n of the Chinese thesis that i t i s "wrong to h a l t at an achieved l e v e l and thus check progress." S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t asserts that: The C.P.S.U., being a party of s c i e n t i f i c communism, proposes and f u l f i l l s the tasks of communist construction i n step with the preparation and maturing of the material and s p i r i t u a l prerequisites, considering that i t would be wrong to jump over the necessary stages of development . . . . 2 3 Khrushchev's language i s much stronger on t h i s question, arguing that: Program, on. c i t . , p. 1 2 0 . Loc. c i t . 'Ibid., p. 6 1 . 300 It would be a f a t a l error to proclaim the introduction of communism before a l l the necessary conditions for i t have matured. If we were to announce that we were i n t r o -ducing communism at a time when the bowl was s t i l l f a r from f u l l , we would be unable to take from i t according to needs. In that case we would merely d i s c r e d i t the ideas of communism, disrupt the i n i t i a t i v e of the working people and slow down the ad-vance to communism.2k "Communism," he added, " i s a higher and more perfect stage of s o c i a l l i f e and can develop only after socialism has been f u l l y consolidated." The Chinese, of course, had attempted to introduce communist forms and "shoots" before socialism had been f u l l y consolidated i n their country. Khrushchev also developed at the 22nd Congress h i s plans for the future evolution of the c o l l e c t i v e s and the state farms, which the Soviets had counterposed to the commune as the correct form for the tr a n s i t i o n to communism. In the only clear reference to the commune form as such, he made the forthright declaration that "Communist society i s not an association of self-contained independent economic organisms." No, he said: "Communist society, more than any other, w i l l need unified economic planning, the organized d i s t r i b u t i o n of labour and regulation of working time." J The general idea behind the communes, of course, was that they should become the basic economic and s o c i a l units of a decentralized 2k Khrushchev, oo. c i t . , p. 2 2 . 2 ^ I b i d . , p. 2 0 . 301 communistic society e In f a c t , much of the economic upheaval of the 195° period i n China had been attributed by the Chinese themselves to this over decentralization of which Khrushchev spoke. In the Soviet view, the s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t commune system was completely u n r e a l i s t i c as a socio-economic structure for future communist society. Speaking of the plans for the future development of the kolkhoz and the state farm, Khrushchev reit e r a t e d h i s plan to bring the two forms gradually together. He acknow-ledged that: The property of the whole people i s the basis of l i f e for the entire population, the c o l l e c -tive farm peasantry included. At the same time, the features characteristic of the property of the whole people arise and take root i n co-operative-collective farm property. L i f e i t s e l f i s steadily bringing the national and co-operative forms of pro-perty closer together, with the ultimate perspective of the emergence of a single Communist property and a single Communist pri n c i p l e of distribution.26 As before, he does not e x p l i c i t l y say that c o l l e c t i v e property w i l l evolve into property of the whole people, which i s the clear publicized aim of the Chinese party 0 Moreover, he does not make i t at a l l clear what "communist property" i s . Of course, there i s a sharp difference i n the property situations i n China and the Soviet Union. In Russia a l l the land i s i n theory nationalized already, and the Ibid*, p. 55. c o l l e c t i v e s merely occupy the land. Thus, i n a sense, the Soviet Union i s on r e l a t i v e l y safe ground i d e o l o g i c a l l y . Tackling the problem of equalizing the incomes of the r u r a l p r o l e t a r i a t , the Soviet party program announced that i n the future poor kolkhozes would be brought up to the l e v e l of the most advanced, and i n the long run the state would "effect a t r a n s i t i o n to a guaranteed monthly income." And on the question of the i n d i v i d u a l private plots remaining i n the r u r a l areas, the program somewhat unconvincingly suggests that when c o l l e c t i v e production has been raised, these plots w i l l become unnecessary and the peasants " w i l l 27 give i t up on their own accord." ' The whole theoretical problem of the elimination of the differences between town and country was also dealt with i n the program. The Chinese answer to this problem had been expressed during the introduction of the people fs communes; the Soviet plan was considerable d i f f e r e n t . The future development of Soviet society was to proceed i n the following manner: As the kolkhozes and state farms develop their production ti e s with each other and with l o c a l i n d u s t r i a l enterprises w i l l grow stronger . . . Agrarian-industrial associations w i l l gradually emerge . . . i n which . . • .agriculture w i l l combine organically with the i n d u s t r i a l pro-cessing of i t s produce . . . . The kolkhozes Program, O P . c i t . , p. 77 303 w i l l . . . turn into highly developed mechanized farms . . . . Gradually, the kolkhoz v i l l a g e s w i l l grow into amalgamated urban communities with modern housing f a c i l i t i e s , public amenities and services, and c u l t u r a l and medical i n s t i t u -tions. The r u r a l population w i l l ultimately draw l e v e l with the urban population i n c u l t u r a l and l i v i n g conditions. Elimination of socio-economic and c u l t u r a l d i s t i n c t i o n s between town and country and of differences i n their l i v i n g conditions w i l l be one of the greatest gains of communist construction.2o In short, Khrushchev*s plan was to solve the contradictions between town and country by developing so-called "agro-cities", mainly through the process of increased mechanization and a r i s i n g standard of l i v i n g . The other related problem—that of the contradiction between mental and manual labour was also going to be solved "naturally" through the introduction of mechanization and automation: ultimately everyone would be working with machines. Perhaps the f i n a l important point emphasized at the 22nd Congress which would have a bearing on Chinese domestic p o l i c i e s was that of incentives. The position of the Chinese radicals was, and i s , that the raising of, i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness can stimulate production. The Russians, on the other hand (and the C.P.C. moderates) discount this theory and emphasize the v i t a l need for material incentives. In Khrushchev's words, " i t i s the proper combination of material labour incentives and increasing d i s t r i b u t i o n through public Ibid., p. 78 30>f funds that w i l l lead to the f u l f i l l m e n t of the pri n c i p l e s 29 Of communist equality." J This remained a point of some disagreement between the two f r a t e r n a l parties. It must be noted, however, that the program did make mention of the need to develop "moral Incentive" as well. In Chou En-lai's short speech to the Congress, he made the normal r i t u a l i s t i c commendation of the successes of the C.P.S.U., then reiterated China's determination to maintain the p o l i c i e s so severely c r i t i c i z e d by the Soviet party, declaring that: The Chinese people under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, and holding high the three red banners--the banners of the general l i n e , the great leap forward, and the people's communes—are struggling to turn China into a s o c i a l i s t country with modern industry, modern agriculture and modern science and culture.30 In private conversations Chou "also frankly c r i t i c i z e d the errors of the leadership of the C.P.S.U." However, according to Chinese accounts "Khrushchev f l a t l y turned down our cri t i c i s m s and advice and even expressed undisguised support for-anti-party elements i n the Chinese Communist p a r t y . " 3 1 2 9Khrushchev, op. c i t . , p. 21. 3°Chou E n - l a i , "Speech to the 22nd Congress," Pravda, October 20, 1 9 6 I ; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XIII, no. !+9, p. 1 1 . 3 1 " O r i g i n and Development of Differences," O P . c i t . . p. 17. 305 These anti-party elements", of course, were Chang Wen-tien and Peng Teh-huai who had been routed at Lushan i n their attempt to reverse the commune policy, along with the other two "red banners". Even at this time, Khrushchev was apparently hoping for the overthrow of Mao Tse-tung from within the Chinese party, and obviously had not repented or apologized for h i s associations with Peng Teh-huai*s attack i n 1959. Post-Congress, Polemics Hot long after the 22nd Congress, Academician P. Fedoseyev, a member of the Central Committee, wrote an important a r t i c l e i n Pravda which indicated that there was s t i l l considerable controversy within the Soviet party concerning the correct road to communism, and which provided evidence for the f a c t that the Chinese communes s t i l l figured i n the debate. He noted that there was an element within the party which believed "that the simplest thing would be to turn a l l the c o l l e c t i v e farms into state farms as rapidly as possible, thus arriving immediately at a single form of property. 1 , 3 2 Such a plan, of course, i s one much more clos e l y aligned to the dictates of Marxist-Leninism than Khrushchev's plan to r e t a i n the c o l l e c t i v e s , since i t involves the up-grading of c o l l e c t i v e property to property of the whole P. Fedoseyev. "Way to a Classless Communist Society," Pravda, December 1, 1961, Current Digest of the Soviet Press. v o l . XIII, no. 48 , p. 12. 306 people—a step which the Chinese hoped to achieve through the communes. The existence of this group within the C.P.S.U. made the Chinese communes a continuing factor to reckon with: Everyone remembers that at the height of c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n certain hotheads from among both t h e o r e t i c a l and p r a c t i c a l workers attempted to force the setting up of 'communes* with l e v e l l e d d i s t r i b u t i o n i n order to accelerate the t r a n s i t i o n of the countryside to communism. If the Party had not rebuffed these Utopian exercises, we would have disrupted the implementation of the Leninist co-operation plan and would have destroyed i t s basic p r i n c i p l e : material incentives combined with personal public int e r e s t s . This was a matter of the fate of s o c i a l i s t construction i n the countryside and the Party settled i t i n a Leninist manner.33 The basic p r i n c i p l e behind both the commune plan put into effect by the Chinese and the state farm plan put forward by dissidents within the C.P.S.U. was that an organizational change was necessary i n order to f u l f i l l the prerequisites to communism: a qualitative change i n the relations of production. However, from the Soviet point of view, "the problem of merging the two forms of property i s not an organizational and technical one but a large s o c i a l problem that must be solved on the basis of highly developed productive forces." Therefore, the C.P.S.U.'s plan was to maintain the status quo i n production relations by "developing and perfecting both forms of s o c i a l i s t production: the state farms and co l l e c t i v e farms . . . ," J To the Chinese and to the dogmatic Loc. c i t . hoc, c i t . elements within the Soviet party, such a plan necessarily amounted to hal t i n g the revolutionary advance i n production r e l a t i o n s , and to the advance towards true communism. Khrushchev's Central Committee Report on Agriculture, March 1962 The next major development i n the continuing polemics over the communes and the tr a n s i t i o n to communism occurred i n the following spring, with Khrushchev's report to the Central Committee on the "Present Stage of Communist Construction". In the l i g h t of l a t e r reports of a renewed attempt by Chinese party moderates to attack Mao's p o l i c i e s at the National People's Congress i n May, Khrushchev's report takes on added significance since i t involved a comprehensive repudia-t i o n of the p o l i c i e s espoused by Mao Tse-tung and embodied i n the communes. It further indicates that Chinese charges of conservatism were continuing to sting the C.P.S.U.*s ideolo g i c a l s e n s i t i v i t y . As Khrushchev pointed out: The opponents of s c i e n t i f i c communism, standing on i d e a l i s t positions, have always t r i e d to r i d i c u l e and dis c r e d i t the sober and r e a l i s t i c approach of Marxist-Leninists to the people's v i t a l needs, to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of their material requirements. Our opponents have t r i e d and are trying to represent the concern of Communists for the people's welfare i n a vulgar and extremely distorted form.35 35 N. S. Khrushchev, "The Present Stage of Communist Construction and the Party's Tasks i n Improving the Management of Agriculture," Pravda, March 6 , 1962; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XIV, no. 8, 1 9 6 2 , p.3 . 308 Answering the question apparently posed by the Chinese com-rades—"Do we not b e l i t t l e the role of communist consciousness and i d e o l o g i c a l conviction when we present communism as a cup of abundance . . . .?"—Khrushchev r e p l i e d by castigating the egalitarianism and the emphasis on ide o l o g i c a l consciousness which characterized the Chinese position. He berated the pri n c i p l e s embodied i n the people's communes as a l i e n to Marxist-Leninism and r i d i c u l e d Chinese e f f o r t s to advance prematurely to communism: The preaching of equality i n the s p i r i t of the f i r s t C h ristian communities, with their low standards of l i v i n g , their asceticism, i s a l i e n to s c i e n t i f i c communism. Communism cannot be conceived as a table with empty plates at which s i t 'highly conscious' and ' f u l l y equal' people. To c a l l this 'communism* i s l i k e i n v i t i n g people to eat milk with an awl ( s t i r i n the h a l l ) . This would lead to a caricature of communism.36 Defending the Russian emphasis on satis f y i n g human needs, Khrushchev quoted Lenin to the effect that the goal of communism i s the "well-being and free rounded development" of the human ind i v i d u a l . "To forget t h i s , " he declared, "means to depart from a material presentation of the question, to f a i l to understand the objective laws of the development of society, to s l i p into s u b j e c t i v i s t , i d e a l i s t positions."^7 Supporting his arguments with texts from Lenin's works, Khrushchev defended the party's program for achieving 3^Loc. c i t . 3 7 I b l d . , p. 4 o 309 communism as s t r i c t l y Leninist, and argued that "Our party acted i n a s t r i c t Leninist way when i n the new party program i t defined as i t s chief economic task the building of the material and technical base of communism." He suggested, with obvious reference to the Chinese, that "not to follow this path means to abandon the task of eliminating poverty." Moreover, he declared that " i t i s incorrect to portray the movement towards communism only as a path requiring constant s a c r i f i c e s and deprivations," which was the course the Chinese leaders were following. On the question of material incentives, on which there was major disagreement with the Chinese, Khrushchev answered h i s Chinese c r i t i c s by charging that " i t would be r a d i c a l l y incorrect to see i n this p r i n c i p l e a certain 'concession 1 to 'bourgeois ideology'" and emphasizing the "exceptional importance of the Leninist p r i n c i p l e of material incentive for the cause of communist construction." Tackling the Chinese b e l i e f that "moral" incentives are perhaps even more important than material incentives, the Soviet leader argued that: It i s equally incorrect to counterpose material incentive to moral ones, and material interest to ideological-educational work. V.I, Lenin teaches that i t i s possible to build socialism and bring tens of millions ©f people to communism not on enthusiasm d i r e c t l y , but with the help of the enthusiasm born of a great revolution, on personal interests, on personal incentive, on cost accounting,38 Ibid., p. 5 . 310 Khrushchev declared that to depart from Lenin's emphasis on material incentive, and substitute "the revolutionary-enthusiasm of the masses" can only " i n f l i c t serious harm on the cause of socialism." Moreover, i n the period of building communism, the same p r i n c i p l e was said to apply, and "any counterposing of them (material and moral incentives) can only harm the cause of communist c o n s t r u c t i o n . 1 , 3 9 Stripped of i t s semantic n i c e t i e s , Khrushchev's statements reveal the same kind of position as that taken on the t r a n s i t i o n to a higher form of property r e l a t i o n s — i t w i l l be remembered that Khrushchev also had said that i t was wrong to "counter-pose" c o l l e c t i v e and public property. Thus, i n f a c t , Khrushchev was denying the need to change over gradually to "moral incentives" and the "communist style of work" which the more orthodox Chinese leaders viewed as an absolute necessity to the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. In essence, Khrushchev's "ideological position", i f one can c a l l i t that, was that with material abundance, "there takes place and w i l l take place the moulding of the man with high communist aware-ness and morality," i n a natural process which obviates the need for the kind of mass movements to r a i s e i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness which the Chinese advocate. Khrushchev based his position on the statement by Marx and Engels that, "It i s not consciousness that determines l i f e , but l i f e which determines consciousness." In other words, the society w i l l mould the man, not the party. 39 Loc. c i t . 311 In h i s speech to the Central Committee session, the Soviet leader also revealed one of the Important reasons f o r h i s intense displeasure with the Chinese communes and related domestic p o l i c i e s — a reason which was bound up c l o s e l y with h i s " r e v i s i o n i s t 1 1 theories of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful t r a n s i t i o n of the non-communist world from capitalism to socialism. If the transformation was to be carried out by peaceful means, then i t was not enough for a small minority to be convinced of the advantages of communism; instead communism must have a popular appeal. Thus, i t s image abroad i s v i t a l : i t must not only achieve excellent economic r e s u l t s , but must also give the appearance of an attractive society to l i v e i n — n o t just a t o t a l i t a r i a n slave camp. In th i s l i g h t , the communes and their attendant t o t a l i t a r i a n aspects, along with the subsequent economic f a i l u r e s , were highly detrimental to the prestige of the communist bloc, and of communism, i n the c a p i t a l i s t world. Khrushchev thus presented his argument i n the following manner: The force of example of socialism and communism acquires special importance also because i n our epoch hundreds of millions of people i n the countries of Asia, A f r i c a and Latin America have entered the arena of independent development . . . . Socialism by concrete examples, i s showing the people who have won national inde-pendence the advantage of a planned s o c i a l i s t economy—an economy of progress and prosperity . . . . It i s obvious i n this way that every s o c i a l i s t country that i s achieving r e a l successes i n economic development, i n r a i s i n g the standard of l i v i n g w i l l make i t s international contribution to the triumph of the ideas of Marxist-Leninism and thereby speed the victory of communism on a world wide scale. L0 312 This, of course, was the whole basis of Khrushchev's philosophy: i f the Soviet Union could outstrip the West i n material abundance and show i t s economic superiority i n competition with the West, then the c a p i t a l i s t nations would be inevitably won over to communism: Today i t i s not only revolutionary appeals to class consciousness, but above a l l the example of the fast-growing material l i v i n g standard of the broad popular masses of the s o c i a l i s t countries that i s exerting an ever-greater influence on the working people of the c a p i t a l i s t countries • . . .41 The premature attempt to negate material incentives and to introduce communes i n China could only hurt the communist bloc's image i n the West—as i n fact i t did. In the eyes of most Westerners, the communes were equivalent to slave labour camps, and the f a i l u r e of the economy i n the succeeding three years was interpreted as a f a i l u r e of the communist system, just as have the Russian a g r i c u l t u r a l f a i l u r e s i n recent years. Thus Khrushchev's point was well founded. Khrushchev continued h i s barrage against the Chinese throughout 1 9 6 2 , sometimes even i n interviews to Western newsmen such as Gardner Cowes of Look Magazine. Khrushchev to l d Cowes: If Communism i s proclaimed where there i s , say, one pair of pants per ten persons, and these pants are divided equally into ten parts, we s h a l l a l l be going without pants. We reject such pantless communism."+2 Loc. c i t . 42 New York Times. A p r i l 2 0 , 1 9 6 2 , p. 1 0 . 3 1 3 Moreover, he proclaimed, i n obvious reference to Mao*s determination to r e t a i n the communes come what may: " I t sometimes happens that someone adopts a wrong decision and then displays obstinacy and refuses to correct this wrong." J S i g n i f i c a n t l y , t h i s argument was almost exactly the one which appeared i n People's Daily i n the pre-Lushan c r i t i c i s m s of Mao and the communes: according to some reports, a new attempt to reverse Mao's domestic p o l i c i e s occurred not long after Khrushchev's interview with Cowes. Later i n the year, the dismissal of Huang Ko-cheng and Tan Cheng from their positions i n the party secretariat indicated another struggle had indeed taken place within the party hierarchy. Both men were connected with the army, and of course, Huang had been one of those implicated i n Peng Teh-huai's 1959 attack on the communes. Their replacement by three members of the r a d i c a l element within the P o l i t b u r o — L u Ting-yi, Lo J u i -ching, and Kang Sheng, indicated a further v i c t o r y against " r i g h t i s t " elements. However, at the same time, Chen Yun returned to the limelight i n 19&2, r e f l e c t i n g the fact that h i s more moderate economic p o l i c i e s had gained ascendancy despite the retention, i n theory, of the "three red banners". Whether or not the Soviet Union was again d i r e c t l y involved i n the dismissals of Huang and Tan i s not known, although the p o s s i b i l i t y should not be ruled out. Loc. c i t CHAPTER XIII OPEN DISPUTE ( 1963) After the almost complete return to the c o l l e c t i v e system i n 1 9 6 1 , the next year's harvest showed some improve-ment and the 1963 harvest was better s t i l l . But the b i t t e r s a c r i f i c e s to keep the country from starvation, including the r a d i c a l cut back i n i n d u s t r i a l output, caused an even greater enmity to build up against the Soviet Union: As China grappled with her temporary economic d i f f i c u l t i e s , the modern r e v i s i o n i s t s . . . rejoiced over China's d i f f i c u l t i e s and took advantage of them to launch a frenzied campaign of slander against China. They went on from this to . . . a c t i v i t i e s designed to aggravate China's d i f f i c u l t i e s and weaken and i s o l a t e her.2 As the res u l t of her s e l f - r e l i a n c e which brought her through the bad years, the Chinese b u i l t up an even stronger dogmatic be l i e f i n their communes and general l i n e . Thus the People's Daily New Year's e d i t o r i a l at the beginning of I 9 6 3 had the following to say about the commune system: The facts of the past few years also show even more c l e a r l y the tremendous superiority of the people's commune system. If we had not r e l i e d on the c o l l e c t i v e economy of the people's communes our a g r i c u l t u r a l production could not have improved so rapidly and the l i v e l i h o o d of Fang Chung, " A l l Round Improvement i n China's Economy," Peking Revjew, no. 3 L , 1 9 6 3 , p. 8 . 2Loc. cjt« 315 the several hundred m i l l i o n people i n the countryside, as well as the whole people, could not have remained so stable i n the face of several consecutive years of such extraordinary natural disasters as have rarely occurred i n the past century.3 The e d i t o r i a l drew the conclusion from these statements that the communes have proved their worth: This has again proved conclusively that the d i r e c t i o n taken by the people*s communes i s absolutely correct and that the series of p o l i c i e s and measures adopted by the Party concerning the r u r a l people's communes have been perfected. Whatever the slanders and d i s t o r t i o n by our enemies at home and abroad, the Chinese people w i l l continue . . . to hold high . . . the people's commune . . , .4 Moreover, the People's Daily suggested that the modern r e v i s i o n i s t s who had hoped China would be "crushed under the weight of hardships", were now "glum" i n the face of the bettering conditions i n China. It would be re c a l l e d here that the Soviet Union apparently was not adverse to hoping that economic deterioration might force a changeover i n the Chinese leadership; at the 22nd Congress " i n h i s conversation with the delegation of the C.P.C., Khrushchev • . . even expressed undisguised support for anti-party elements within the Chinese Communist party. 3 , 1 On to New V i c t o r i e s , " People's Dally, January 1, 1963; Peking Review, no. 1, 1963, p. 7. L Loc. c i t . •"'The Origin and Development of Differences Between the Leaders of the C.P.S.U, and Ourselves," Red Flag, September 6, 1963; Peking Review, no. 37, 1963, P. 17. 316 A few months l a t e r , at the June Plenary session of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U., Khrushchev f i r e d another polemical broadside at the Chinese commune p o l i c i e s , and defended Soviet domestic p o l i c y against Chinese charges. Thus, he asserted that the t r a n s i t i o n to communism: demands enormous ef f o r t s and the s e l f l e s s labour of the people. Some people think that t h i s can be done r e l a t i v e l y e a s i l y and rapidly. One cannot play at Communism: the development of society has i t s laws, and one must know them and take them into account. He who thinks he can ignore the laws of • development w i l l be punished by l i f e i t s e l f . Khrushchev maligned the Chinese by innuendo, stating that i t i s f o l l y to attempt to achieve the work of twenty years within f i v e . He called an approach which attempts to do this "subjective" and completely opposite to the "objective s c i e n t i f i c " approach taken to domestic construction i n the U.S.S.R. He b i t i n g l y pointed out that " i f you conceive a desire to obtain more than i s possible, you may even lose what you have . . . . If you take on too much, you w i l l overtax your strength, w i l l r o l l backwards, and l i f e w i l l cast you aside."' At this point, of course, Khrushchev would have l i k e d nothing better than for l i f e to cast aside Mao Tse-tung—or better s t i l l , f o r the Chinese party to cast him aside. — N. S. Khrushchev. "Speech to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee," Pravda, June 29, 1 9 6 3 ; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . XV, no. 2 5 , p. 3 . 7Loc. c i t . Referring to the great achievements won by the Soviet Union i n i t s attempt to f u l f i l l i t s economic develop-ment program, Khrushchev exclaimed himself to be "delighted" with his country's success. Apparently, however, the Chinese party had no h e s i t a t i o n i n pointing out certain Soviet economic c r i s e s — p a r t i c u l a r l y i n a g r i c u l t u r e — f o r Khrushchev demanded of his audience; "How could a person who backs our o common cause say that this joy i s a varnishing of r e a l i t y ? " Thus, i t appeared that the Chinese were using the same economic arguments as Khrushchev to support their i d e o l o g i c a l position on domestic construction: the proof of the pudding i s i n the eating. A p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t statement i n the resolu-tion passed by the Central Committee Plenum added f u e l to the flames i n the debate over the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. It noted that: The chief result of the party's a c t i v i t i e s i s that during the years of Soviet rule, socialism has triumphed f u l l y and completely i n our country, the man of communist ideals and high moral p r i n c i p l e s has been reared.9 Thus, the C.P.S.U. was claiming to have already achieved one of the great goals of communist s o c i e t y — t h e man of communist i d e a l s — w h i l e to the Chinese, Soviet man was becoming more and more l i k e bourgeois man every day. And the Soviets were ^Loc. c i t . Q I&id., p. 6. 318 claiming to have achieved this important goal without the aid of communes or mass campaigns or the c o l l e c t i v e l i v i n g which the Chinese believe to be an absolute necessity. Thus the debate continued to be renewed by ever more extravagant Soviet claims as to their successes i n building communism. During 1963, as i s well known, the Sino-Soviet dispute became public knowledge, and a number of the l e t t e r s between the two Central Committees were made public through the Chinese and Soviet press. Although these l e t t e r s dealt almost exclusively with the main point at i s s u e — t h e bloc's policy vis-a-vis the non-communist world—there was some peripheral debate bearing on the commune issue and related topics. The March 30 l e t t e r of the C.P.S.U. for example, touched on the question of deviations i n domestic construction; i t declared to the C.P.C. that: We do not close our eyes to the fact that different construction and the international communist movement, may occur between s o c i a l i s t countries . . . . This i s possible, for the countries making up the world s o c i a l i s t system are at different stages i n the construction of a new society . . . . One should not exclude the p o s s i b i l i t y , either, that differences may result from different approaches to the solution of some questions of Marxist-Leninism i n i n d i v i -dual f r a t e r n a l parties. To exaggerate the role of national, specific features may lead to a departure from Marxist-Leninism. To ignore national features may lead to a breaking away from l i f e and from the masses, and do harm to the cause of socialism. 1 ° "The Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to the Central Committee of the C.P.C," Peking Review, no. 25 319 Thus i t can be seen that the question of reconciling d i f f e r -ences i n domestic policy had s t i l l not been solved. As the C.P.S.U. pointed out, " A l l t h i s necessitates constant e f f o r t s to f i n d ways and means to se t t l e the differences a r i s i n g • . • with the least damage to our common cause." The problem of ide o l o g i c a l authority thus remained a key point i n the dispute between the two parties; and i n p r a c t i c a l terms, they s t i l l had not resolved the controversy over the variant path to communism. In their reply on June 14-, the Chinese came to grips with the problem of permissible deviation i n domestic construction, and the question of the binding force of Soviet experience. They rei t e r a t e d their stand that parties must: independently work out and apply p o l i c i e s and tac t i c s suited to the conditions of one's own country. Errors of dogmatism w i l l be committed i f one f a i l s to do so, i f one mechanically copies the p o l i c i e s and ta c t i c s of another communist party, submits b l i n d l y to the w i l l of others, or accepts without analysis the programs and resolutions of another communist party as one's own line.11 V i l i f y i n g the Soviet position, the l e t t e r charges that: some people . . . describe as 'universal Marxist-Leninist truths* their own pre-scriptions which are based on nothing but "Letter of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. June 14-, 1963," Peking Review, no. 25, I 9 6 3 , p. 20. 320 subjective conjecture and are divorced from r e a l i t y and the masses and they force others -.^ to accept these prescriptions unconditionally. Other c r i t i c i s m s within the June 14- l e t t e r attacked the 22nd Congress theses concerning the ending of the dictatorship of the pr o l e t a r i a t i n Russia and declaring the country a state of the "whole people". The Chinese brought up the question of those "antagonistic" elements within Soviet society, such as the bourgeois "hangers on", "swindlers", "speculators" and so on. Moreover, they noted that "the difference between ownership by the whole people and c o l l e c t i v e ownership exists i n a l l s o c i a l i s t countries without exception, and that there i s ind i v i d u a l ownership t o o , " 1 3 and that therefore there are di f f e r e n t categories of labourers i n the U.S.S.R., and also differences between workers and peasants. A l l this means that the dictatorship of the p r o l e t a r i a t i s s t i l l required. And despite the fact that the Soviet Union's plan was to reach communism within eighteen years of 1963, the Chinese l e t t e r declared that " a l l s o c i a l i s t countries are s t i l l f a r , f a r removed from the higher stage of communism. On July Ik, some four weeks l a t e r , the C.P.S.U. published an open l e t t e r to i t s members outlining the dispute with the Chinese party. In this l e t t e r , i t was made clear 12 Loc. c i t . 1 3 I i i d . , P. 17. that their respective interpretations of the correct road to communism was an Important issue under dispute. It noted that: - Soviet people f i n d i t strange and outrageous that the Chinese comrades are trying to smear the C.P,S.U. program, this grandiose plan of creating a communist society. Alluding to the fact that our party proclaims for i t s task the struggle for a better l i f e f or the people, the C.P.C. leaders hint at some kind of 'bourgeoisization* and degenera-tion of the Soviet society. To follow their l i n e of thinking i t comes out that i f a person walks i n bast sandals, eats watery soup out of a common bow l — t h i s i s communism, and i f a working man l i v e s well and wants to l i v e even better tomorrow—this i s nearly tantamount to the restoration of capitalism; And they want to present t h i s philosophy to us as the la t e s t revelation i n Marxist-Leninism.14 Thus, the Chinese had revived their e a r l i e r charges which had appeared during the commune euphoris—that the Soviet Union had become conservatized and was degenerating i n terms of communist pri n c i p l e s and communist goals. And the Russians quickly snapped back with countercharges of egalitarianism i n China and a naive approach to communism. The Open Letter added that: We are convinced that not only the Soviet people but also the peoples of other countries of socialism are capable of great labour ex-p l o i t s — i t i s only necessary that a correct Ik "Open l e t t e r of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. to a l l i t s party organizations at a l l levels and to a l l i t s party members" (Pravda. July lk, 1 9 6 3 ) , Peking Review, no. 3 0 , 1 9 6 3 , p. 3 8 . 322 guidance of the working class and the peasantry be ensured*, i t i s necessary that the people implementing this guidance would reason r e a l i s t i -c a l l y and make decisions that would . . . channel the strength and energy of the working people along the correct way,15 In other words, the C.P.S.U. considered Chinese domestic p o l i c i e s to be completely u n r e a l i s t i c and to have been disastrous i n terms of accomplishing any great labour exploits. A l l the Chinese had to do was to follow the Soviet path, and a l l would be well. F i n a l l y , on October 1, the Chinese National Day, Red Flag issued an e d i t o r i a l which revealed an important factor motivating the Soviet attacks on the communes and on Chinese domestic p o l i c y , and which to the Chinese explained Soviet actions since 1959: The modern r e v i s i o n i s t s attack China 1s s o c i a l i s t construction for the sole reason that the Chinese Communist Party has adhered to Marxist-Leninism, exposed their policy of capitulationism to the U.S. imperialism, torn away their Marxist-Leninist cloak, and so made i t a l l the more d i f f i c u l t f or them to push forward their r e v i s i o n -i s t l i n e . l 6 Nevertheless, i t can be said without fear of contradiction that t h i s i s not the whole story. Differences over the correct s o c i a l forms and over i d e o l o g i c a l l y orthodox p o l i c i e s i n the domestic evolution towards the communist goal s t i l l i nevitably lead to c o n f l i c t , and w i l l as long as ideo l o g i c a l authority i s 15 16' Ibid., p. 39. Peking Review, no. kO, 1963, p. 15. not c l e a r l y delineated within the bloc, and as long as the domestic p o l i c i e s of one party have repercussions within the ranks of another. CHAPTER XIV THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE COMMUNES TO CHINA AND THE C.P.C. In order to appreciate why the communes were i n t r o -duced into China, and why despite strong pressures from the Russians and Chinese party moderates, the communes were not disbanded, i t i s necessary to examine some of the reasons why this s o c i a l form commended i t s e l f to the Chinese leader-ship. In general, three basic groups of factors were involved: domestic, in t e r n a t i o n a l , and i d e o l o g i c a l . Domestic Considerations A number of domestic considerations appear to have carried considerable weight i n the Chinese decision to introduce, and to steadfastly maintain, the communes. As has been noted e a r l i e r , at the time of the decision to establish communes throughout the whole of r u r a l China, reference was made i n o f f i c i a l party documents to both ideological and p r a c t i c a l advantages inherent i n this new so c i a l unit. Indeed, i t i s readi l y apparent from a study of the domestic situation i n China immediately preceding the introduction of the communes that the p r a c t i c a l advantages of the communes must have been an important consideration i n the decision to depart from the Soviet road: advantages of both a p o l i t i c a l and an economic nature. 325 When looking for the p r a c t i c a l foundations of the Sino-Soviet dispute, one of the very important facts to take into consideration i s the fact that the two countries are at v a s t ly d i f f e r e n t stages of economic and p o l i t i c a l develop-ment. Because this i s so, i t i s clear that economic and p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s that may be appropriate for one, w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y not be e n t i r e l y appropriate f o r the o t h e r — just as modern Soviet domestic p o l i c y would not have been appropriate i n the Soviet Union forth years ago. After nearly f i f t y years i n power, the Soviet party i s now i n a position where i t i s so s o l i d l y established that i t can afford to relax i t s grip and begin to introduce f a r more freedom for the Soviet people. The Chinese, on the other hand, are s t i l l waging a continuing struggle against anta-gonistic elements within their society, and have yet to f u l l y conclude the c i v i l war. Thus, there i s a need fo r much s t r i c t e r p o l i t i c a l control i n China at the present time than i n the Soviet Union: one could almost say that there i s s t i l l a need for S t a l i n i s t p o l i c i e s within China. From an economic point of view, the difference i n the degree of development between China and the Soviet Union i s also very great. In terms of per capita output, China i s s t i l l some f i f t y years behind the Soviet Union, and s t i l l teeters on the subsistence l e v e l i n terms of a g r i c u l t u r a l production. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has been building i t s economy at a rapid pace for over f o r t y years, and i s now i n a position to cut down on the personal s a c r i -f i c e asked of i t s people i n order to build the country into a great power. Now the Soviet Government can afford not to drive the Russian people so hard, and the l a t t e r are able to enjoy some of the f r u i t s of their own labour now that the i n d u s t r i a l base i s b u i l t . Thus, p o l i c i e s that may have been necessary for the Soviet Union during the period of War Communism were discarded long ago; but i n China these p o l i c i e s of s t r i c t economic control may s t i l l be required. One can expect, therefore, that the Chinese may f i n d useful, and sometimes necessary, p o l i c i e s — b o t h p o l i t i c a l and economic—which the Russians dispensed with as obsolete, many years ago. The added important factor regarding these p o l i c i e s i s that many of them are regarded i n the Soviet Union as undesirable, since they are associated with the oppressive S t a l i n era. With this background, i t can be seen that i t i s almost inevitable that the Chinese communists should imple-ment p o l i c i e s of a more r a d i c a l and t o t a l i t a r i a n nature than those obtained i n the Soviet Union. The introduction of the communes bears out thi s analysis. At the Party Congress i n May of 1958 (while the communes were s t i l l i n the experimental stage) Liu Shao-chi made a series of statements which indicated some of the reasons motivating the adoption of ra d i c a l economic and p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s . He pointed out that: 327 Surely one should be able to see that a r e a l l y t e r r i b l y tense si t u a t i o n would exist i f more than 600 m i l l i o n people had to l i v e i n poverty and c u l t u r a l backwardness for a prolonged period, had to exert their utmost ef f o r t s just to eke out a bare l i v i n g and were unable to r e s i s t natural calamities e f f e c t i v e l y , unable to put a quick stop to possible foreign aggression and u t t e r l y unable to master their own f a t e . l Thus, Liu concluded, a p o l i c y of "speeding up construction to the utmost" i s an absolute necessity f o r China. From these remarks i t i s clear that Mao and Liu r e a l i z e d that i f l i v i n g standards were not raised at a f a i r l y rapid pace and i f economic s t a b i l i t y were not attained i n short order, that peasant unrest might ea s i l y topple the regime—especially with Chiang Kai-shek and the United States waiting offshore to turn unrest into counter-revolution. In 1958 China was s t i l l at a low l e v e l of production and a bad harvest or severe natural calamities could cripple the economy and provide conditions for mass re v o l t . Moreover, considering the regimentation imposed by the communist regime, the only way the communists could retain the peasants* sympathetic support was to provide economic progress commensurate with the s a c r i f i c e s demanded. During the F i r s t Five Year Plan, a g r i c u l t u r a l output rose by only about 25$. Moreover, a population increase of x L i u Shao-chi, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee," Second Session of the Eighth National Congress of the C.P.C. (Documents) (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. H4 . 2Chou E n - l a i , Report on the Work of the Government. A p r i l 18, 1959 (Peking, F.L.P., 1959), p. 3. 328 about 12% during t h i s period cancelled out much of the i n -creased production, leaving very l i t t l e tangible improvement i n the food si t u a t i o n for the peasant. At such a slow rate of per capita increase, i t would be generations before abundance would be achieved. And without that abundance, communism would remain only a dream. At the same time, beginning i n 1 9 5 6 , China had to begin repaying the Soviet Union for the credits extended during the f i r s t part of the Five Year Plan, 3 which meant that large amounts of a g r i -c u l t u r a l produce had to be exported from the country. Thus, there were three main factors motivating a r a d i c a l increase i n a g r i c u l t u r a l production: peasant unrest, population increase, and the need to repay the Soviet Union for aid received. And since i n the long run, the speed of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n was d i r e c t l y linked with the increase i n a g r i c u l t u r a l output, t h i s , too, was a factor. On the opposite side of the coin, r u r a l China was burdened with massive unemployment, since the peasants were mostly i d l e during the winter months. By 1957 "men working i n higher cooperatives were s t i l l only working the equivalent of 161 days a year," or less than h a l f of the t o t a l days of a year. Here was a vast reservoir of labour power waiting to be tapped. The communes, because of their larger size were able to finance and organize large-scale construction projects which mobilized 0. Hoeffding, "Sino-Soviet Economic Relations i n Recent Years," Unity and Contradiction (New York, Praeger, 1 9 6 2 ) , p. 3 0 2 . LF..Greene, China (New York, Ballantine, 1 9 6 l ) , p. 127 . 329 many thousands of men during the winter months. And the m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e involved i n the communes, allowed the party cadres to deploy the labour force i n useful talks throughout the working day. Moreover, by i n s t i t u t i n g communal dining h a l l s , creches and kindergartens, the communes succeeded i n releasing millions of women for productive labour i n the f i e l d s and i n construction. Thus, the communes were an answer to the pressing domestic problems of increasing output and mobilizing labour. For the Chinese, therefore, deviation from the Soviet road had d e f i n i t e economic advantages. As f a r as p o l i t i c a l advantages are concerned, the communes? chief usefulness was i n enabling the party to maintain a much tighter control over the peasantry. In 1957, Mao Tse-tung revealed that: In 1956, small numbers of workers and students i n certain places went on s t r i k e . The immediate cause of these disturbances was the f a i l u r e to s a t i s f y certain of their demands f o r material benefits . . . . In the same year, members of a small number of a g r i c u l t u r a l cooperatives also created disturbances and the main causes were also bureaucracy on the part of the leadership^ and lack of educational work among the masses. 3 Later i n the year, Mao discovered that a widespread discontent lay just under the surface of Chinese society and had to c a l l a hasty halt to h i s policy of l e t t i n g a "hundred flowers" vMao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People (Peking, F.L.P., i 9 6 0 ) , p. 59. 330 bloom and contend. Even subversive secret societies had been discovered during the Hundred Flowers period. One answer to the potential danger of a l l this discontent was to tighten up p o l i t i c a l control and id e o l o g i c a l "education", and this i s exactly what the communes were able to accomplish. By i n s t i t u t i n g t o t a l control of the l i v e s of the peasants, the party was able to prevent the formation of clandestine organized opposition as well as to undertake constant indoctrina-t i o n i n the communal dining h a l l s . With such tight p o l i t i c a l control, and constant propaganda, the chances of planned opposition occurring—even i n periods of economic d i f f i c u l t y — were greatly lessened. The party's increased control over the peasants 1 minds also f a c i l i t a t e d e f f o r t s to persuade the commune members to work harder, and to generally increase their communist consciousness and selflessness. Thus, i n the l i g h t both of the need to increase a g r i c u l t u r a l production and the need to exert greater p o l i t i c a l control over the b a s i c a l l y conservative peasantry, the communes provided considerable advantages. Moreover, these advantages were borne out p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the face of the natural calamities i n 1959, I960 and 1961, when the peasants were mobilized by the millions to protect crops against floods and drought. Not only did the communes prove useful i n minimizing the effects of natural calamities, but they also allowed the party to maintain generally firm control over the nation i n p o l i t i c a l l y - c r i t i c a l times. International Considerations Besides having economic and p o l i t i c a l significance, the communes also have considerable m i l i t a r y significance. In Moscow i n 1957 Mao Tse-tung made the following statements i n regard to nuclear warfare: If we f i g h t , atomic and hydrogen weapons w i l l be used. Personally I think that i n the whole world there w i l l be such suffering that h a l f of humanity and perhaps more than h a l f w i l l perish . . . . In China construction has not yet begun i n earnest. If the imperialists im-pose a war on us, we s h a l l be prepared to terminate the construction: l e t us f i r s t have a t r i a l of strength and then return to construction.6 Only a few days e a r l i e r the Russians and the Chinese had concluded an agreement on "New Technology for National Defence" which included the passing along of nuclear "know how" to Chinese s c i e n t i s t s ' — t h u s China would soon have nuclear c a p a b i l i t y and would be ready f o r any " t r i a l of strength" that might come, including one with the Americans i n Formosa. On the assumption that China would probably become involved i n a nuclear war with the Western "imperialists" sometime i n the future, and believing i n the i n e v i t a b i l i t y 6U.S.S.R. Government, A Reply to Peking: Soviet Government Statement of September 2 1 , 1963 (London, Soviet Booklets, 1 9 6 3 ) , P. 2 1 . 7"The Origin and Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the C.P.S.U. and Ourselves," Red Flag, September 6 , 1 9 6 3 ; Peking Review, no. 3 7 , 1 9 6 3 , p. 12, 332 of such a c o n f l i c t , i t i s only natural that certain defensive measures should be taken. While i t i s not clear whether the communes were i n part a dire c t response to the threat of nuclear war, i t i s ce r t a i n l y true that the communes were of considerable strategic significance. In the f i r s t instance, the communes involved the formation of a people's m i l i t i a with the slogan "every man a sol d i e r " , and i n the second instance they involved a decentralization of government and the economy. These two factors combined to put China In an extremely good position to face and absorb a nuclear attack. As L i Fu-chun pointed out, the decentralization of industry involved i n the commune program had the re s u l t of "ensuring Q s t i l l better the security of our national defence." As f o r the people's m i l i t i a , i t could be of immense value In c i v i l defence work, and i n maintaining order. With each commune existing as in d i v i d u a l economic and governmental units, on a highly organized and d i s c i p l i n e d basis, China was as well prepared for atomic attack as she was for b a t t l i n g natural disasters. Whether or not defence reasons actually played any large part In the decision to introduce communes, It i s quite possible that i n Soviet eyes the communes were intimately connected with Mao's views on foreign policy, and his b e l i e f i n the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war. L i Fu-chun, Raise High the Red Flag of the General Line and Continue to March Forward (Peking, F.L.P., i 9 6 0 ) , 3 3 3 Ideological Considerations As d i s c i p l e s of the Marxist ideology, the Chinese communists have as their goal the creation of a communist society i n their own country and i n the world. Since the vic t o r y of their revolution i n 1948, they have been a c t i v e l y working towards those ends gradually implementing p o l i c i e s that w i l l bring them nearer to the f i n a l goal. During the period before the communes were introduced, the Chinese Communist Party nationalized a l l industry, and stage by stage introduced c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n of the land on a s o c i a l i s t basis. The land i t s e l f was not nationalized as i t had been i n the Soviet Union; instead, i t was f i r s t d istributed to the peasants to gain their favour, and then gradually c o l l e c t i v i z e d . Some Machine Tractor Stations were also established, as were a number of state farms, both being state-owned. Thus, i n order to complete the building of the s o c i a l i s t stage, a l l c o l l e c t i v e property had to be raised to the l e v e l of state property, and the vestiges of private property eliminated. As far as the d i s t r i b u t i o n of commodities are concerned, the Chinese claimed to have already organized their society on the prin c i p l e of "each according to his work."^ Once the building of a s o c i a l i s t society had been completed i t would be necessary to begin the t r a n s i t i o n to yIt should be noted that i n the l i g h t of Leninist theory this claim i s somewhat dubious, since a wide range of incomes s t i l l prevailed i n China, as did a seven-level wage scale. communism, which would involve the establishment of the major prerequisites: material abundance, a b o l i t i o n of the differences between town and country, the integration of mental and manual labour, universal education, and the rais i n g of the ideol o g i c a l consciousness of the people. For a l l these problems which had to be overcome i n the future, the commune was the answer. Moreover, the commune was not something pulled out of thin a i r — i t had long been discussed as the l i k e l y unit of future communist society, by the founders of the ideology:, as was pointed out i n the opening chapters. As People's Daily noted i n the f a l l of 1958: . . . the people*s commune i s the most appropriate organizational form i n China for accelerating s o c i a l i s t construction and the tra n s i t i o n to communism. It w i l l become the basic s o c i a l unit i n the future communist society as thinkers—from many outstanding Utopian s o c i a l i s t s to Marx, Engels and L e n i n — had predicted on many occasions,10 Of course, the s t r i k i n g thing about t h i s particular statement i s that S t a l i n i s not included i n the l i s t of commune supporters. As has been pointed out already, this can be attributed to the fact that S t a l i n severely c r i t i c i z e d the premature introduction of communes and l a i d down very s t r i c t conditions under which they would ar i s e : those "Hold High the Red Flag of the People's Communes and Continue to March On," People's Daily. September 3 , 1958: People's Communes i n China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 20. 335 conditions did not exist i n China, Instead, the Chinese were putting forward the commune as a means of achieving those preconditions more quickly. The new theory put forward by the Chinese was that the communes would go through two d i s t i n c t stages: the people's commune would carry the domestic revolution forward to the completion of the s o c i a l i s t stage, and the "advanced people's commune" (e n t i r e l y communist i n character) would 11 take over when the stage of pure communism was reached. The purpose of the f i r s t stage—the people's communes—was to establish the prerequisites for the advance to communism, including the achievement of a much higher l e v e l of production: With the leap i n production, the products of society w i l l grow abundantly. And following the advance of the technical and c u l t u r a l revolutions, the people's communes w i l l grow and become units combining c i t i e s with the countryside. Differences between town and country, between worker and peasant, and be-tween mental and physical labour w i l l gradually disappear. The communist awakening of the people, the new high morality, consciousness i n the observation of d i s c i p l i n e w i l l increase and strengthen. When that time comes, the people's commune can pass from the s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e of 'from each according to his a b i l i t y to each according to his work* to the communist pr i n c i p l e of 'from each according to his a b i l i t y , to each according to his needs. '12 Lin Tieh (1st Secretary of the Hope! Provincial Committee). "The People's Commune Movement i n Hopei," Red Flag, no, 9 i 1958;. People's Communes i n China (Peking, F.L.P., 1958), p. 5o. Ibid., p. 55. 336 Thus, the people's communes were designed especially to meet the dictates of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the question of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. In the f i r s t place, they were designed to release the nation's productive forces by changing production r e l a t i o n s . By amalgamating the c o l l e c t i v e s into larger units, more r a t i o n a l use of resources and labour could be achieved, and production Increased. The faster production was raised, the sooner communism would be achieved. The interconnection between increased output and the changeover to communist principles was p a r t i c u l a r l y stressed when the communes were introduced. S p e c i f i c a l l y , i t was stated that where communes had a high rate of production, d i s t r i b u t i o n of commodities could be put on a semi-communist basis. The o r i g i n a l commune resolu-tion declared that "the system of d i s t r i b u t i o n should be determined according to s p e c i f i c conditions, Where conditions permit, the s h i f t to a wage system may be made."13 The free supply system which was termed a "bud of communism" was also determined by the prevailing l e v e l of production: By semi-supply i s meant that grain i s supplied gratis to members according to the standard stipulated by the state, or, a step further, that members can eat i n the communist canteen free of charge . . . . The adoption of the combined system of grain or meals supply and wage payment marks the beginning of the gradual "Resolution of the Central Committee of the C.P.C. on the Establishment of People's Communes i n the Rural Areas," People's Communes i n China (Peking, F.L.P., 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 8 . t r a n s i t i o n to the stage of 'from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s to each according to h i s needs, 1 I t ensures that everyone i n the commune can equ a l l y eat h i s or her f i l l . l 1 * Where the s t a t e determined the quantity of food to be con-sumed, t h i s was s t i l l s o c i a l i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n of food; but where production was high enough to allow everyone to eat h i s f i l l "according to h i s needs," t h i s was communist d i s t r i b u t i o n . In the same passage i t was s p e c i f i c a l l y pointed out that because of the low l e v e l of production and communist consciousness s t i l l p r e v a i l i n g , the wage system (with bonuses given to hard workers) must be r e t a i n e d . That i s to say, u n t i l production was g r e a t l y increased along with i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness, d i s t r i b u t i o n of food must s t i l l take place p a r t l y according to labour performed. As produc-t i o n increased, so could the proportion of commodities and s e r v i c e s d i s t r i b u t e d f r e e . Thus, the Chinese communists were i d e o l o g i c a l l y c o n s i s t e n t i n t h i s phase of the commune movement, and they were c l e a r l y motivated by i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . In other regards, too, the communes were c l e a r l y designed to f u l f i l l the d i c t a t e s of the ideology espoused by China's leaders. I t has been pointed out, f o r i n s t a n c e , that one of the c h i e f p r e r e q u i s i t e s to communism l a i d down by Marx, Engels and Lenin, i s the a b o l i t i o n of the d i s t i n c -t i o n s between town and country, peasant and worker, and Ik L i n Tieh, op. c i t . , p. 55« 338 b e t w e e n d i f f e r e n t t y p e s o f l a b o u r ; a p a r t i c u l a r l y d i f f i c u l t p r o b l e m f a c e d b y a n y s o c i e t y m o v i n g t o w a r d s communism i s h o w t o f i n d a s o l u t i o n t o t h e s e p r e r e q u i s i t e s . The communes e m b o d i e d t h e C h i n e s e s o l u t i o n . B y d e c e n t r a l i z i n g i n d u s t r y a n d i n t e g r a t i n g t o w n a n d c o u n t r y w i t h i n one u n i t , a g r a d u a l " u r b a n i z a t i o n " o f t h e r u r a l a r e a s was t o t a k e p l a c e a n d t h e p r o b l e m o v e r c o m e . An i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t o f t h e communes w a s t h e f o r m a t i o n o f c o u n t l e s s s m a l l l o c a l f a c t o r i e s w i t h l i t t l e c a p i t a l i n v e s t m e n t , a n d o f t e n m a k e - s h i f t i n t e r m s o f e q u i p -m e n t . T h e r e was a m a s s i v e c a m p a i g n a t t h e same t i m e t o i n t r o d u c e t h e p e a s a n t r y t o m a c h i n e r y i n o r d e r t o r e m o v e i t s m y s t i q u e , a n d t o i n d u c e t h e m t o s e t up t h e i r own c r u d e m a c h i n e s a n d i n t r o d u c e p r i m i t i v e m e c h a n i z a t i o n i n t o t h e i r w o r k . One p a r t o f t h i s c a m p a i g n was t h e p a r t y ' s b a c k y a r d f u r n a c e p r o g r a m w h i c h was t a k e n up a l m o s t f a n a t i c a l l y b y p e o p l e a n d c a d r e s e v e r y w h e r e . A l t h o u g h i n t h e l o n g r u n , much o f t h e i r o n p r o d u c e d b y t h e b a c k y a r d f u r n a c e s w a s o f l o w q u a l i t y a n d q u i t e o f t e n o f l i t t l e u s e , t h e w h o l e p r o g r a m d i d b r e a k down t h e m e n t a l b a r r i e r w h i c h h a d k e p t t h e p e a s a n t s i n awe o f i n d u s t r i a l w o n d e r s . M o r e o v e r , w i t h t h e p e a s a n t s w o r k i n g a t t h e b l a s t f u r n a c e s i n t h e i r s p a r e t i m e ( a n d o f t e n when t h e y s h o u l d h a v e b e e n i n t h e f i e l d s h a r v e s t i n g t h e c r o p s ) t h e y became b o t h p e a s a n t s a n d w o r k e r s , t h u s t e m p o r a r i l y o b l i t e r a t i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o . The same r e s u l t was a c h i e v e d b y i m p l e m e n t i n g M a r x ' s d i r e c t i v e c o n c e r n i n g t h e " e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f i n d u s t r i a l a r m i e s , e s p e c i a l l y f o r 339 agriculture," 1-^ and mobilizing millions of peasants to do construction work during the winter months. On the question of the resolving of d i s t i n c t i o n s between mental and manual labour, the communes also were to play a v i t a l r o l e : Apart from economic a c t i v i t i e s the people's commune undertakes culture and education (running primary, secondary and technical schools, carrying out s c i e n t i f i c research, etc.) so as to make i t s members people with high educational l e v e l and gradually eliminate the difference between mental and manual labour. 16 The communes were to create, through their educational systems, highly educated all-round individuals who would be trained f o r mental as well as manual labour, and 'could transfer from one to the other with ease, just as Engels 1 architect could leave his drawing board at a given moment and assume the duties of a porter. As propaganda chief, Lu Ting-yi pointed out: our educational work must not go i n the dire c t i o n of divorcing mental and manual labour but i n the direc t i o n of combining mental with manual labour and education with productive labour.17 He suggested that the new upsurge i n education taking place i n the communes was working towards creating the " a l l round individuals" who would be needed i n future society: "^Communist Manifesto. 16 "How to Run a People's Commune," People's Daily, September 4 , 1958; People's Communes i n China, op. c i t . . p. 81. l 7 L u Ting-yu, "Education Must be Combined with Productive Labour," Red Flag, no. 7, 1958; Peking Reyiew, no. 28, 1958. In the future when communist society i s f u l l y consolidated, developed and mature, men w i l l he trained i n many kinds of work and w i l l be able to undertake many professions while sp e c i a l i z i n g i n selected f i e l d s . This i s what we aim at. We must march to this goal. In our country's present conditions we can t r a i n people to do many kinds of work, but cannot yet t r a i n 'people to be capable of undertaking any profession. '18 With the upsurge of the communes, directives were issued f o r functionaries and o f f i c i a l s to spend time among the masses i n manual labour. P r a c t i c a l l y the entire Politburo spent several days working on the Ming Tombs reservoir project outside of Peking, and even army o f f i c e r s were made to serve i n the ranks for a short period of time. At the same time, those most intimately concerned with mental a c t i v i t y — students and teachers—were encouraged to take part i n manual labour on large projects and to integrate the schools and universities with industry with a view to combining learning with production. On the other hand, workers and peasants were encouraged to become l i t e r a t e , and to attend school i n the evening hours. Shortly after the communes were established, i t was reported that: Besides colleges and un i v e r s i t i e s , the communes have established 1,!+ m i l l i o n schools which had enrolled 81.M+ m i l l i o n students up to mid-October. 19 1 8 Loc. c i t . 1 9Peking Review, no. K 0 , 1958, p. 16. 3 k l From an ide o l o g i c a l point of view, a l l these p o l i c i e s associated with the communes were directed towards the gradual elimination of the d i s t i n c t i o n between mental and manual labour, and p a r t i c u l a r l y through having everyone engage i n them both. This was the basis of Marx's teaching on t h i s point: occupational mobility was the key to the solution, rather than necessarily making a l l labour of one particular type. The other major id e o l o g i c a l prerequisites to communism, as l a i d down by Marxism-Leninism, i s the heighten-ing of communist consciousness and s o c i a l morality. If the state i s to gradually wither away, then an inbred morality must be cultivated so that when coercive forces are withdrawn from society, man w i l l continue to work according to h i s a b i l i t i e s , and w i l l conduct himself i n a s o c i a l l y responsible manner. At the time of the i n i t i a l formation of the communes, this prerequisite was duly recognized, and was said to have \ been taken into f u l l account i n the formation of the communes. Thus i n a New China News Agency release from Honan during the i n i t i a l upsurge, i t was stated that, among i t s other major attributes: the people's communes are help f u l to the wiping out of the old ideology and habits of the bourgeoisie, the heightening of the people's s o c i a l i s t and communist consciousness and the establishment of communist ethics.20 New China News Agency Release, September 1, 1958; Current Background, No. 517, p. 16. 3 L2 On the one hand there was the physical aspect of c o l l e c t i v e l i v i n g , embodied i n the "five togethers": eating together, sleeping together, l i v i n g together, working together, and studying together. This was to prepare people for the kind of c o l l e c t i v e l i f e pattern of future communism. On the other hand, there was the educational-indoctrinational aspect of the communes, which subjected the peasants to an increased barrage of Marxist-Leninism and the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, thus r a i s i n g their i d e o l o g i c a l consciousness to a higher l e v e l . An outstanding feature of the communes, i n this regard, was that they encouraged voluntary labour of the "subbotnik" type, which Lenin had hailed as communist i n nature. In fact, one of the chief factors c a l l e d upon to j u s t i f y the introduction of the people's communes i n the f i r s t place was that the whole nation was ri d i n g a wave of subbotnikism. As Liu Shao-chi pointed out i n hi s Party Congress report: In the c i t y and the countryside, people vie with each other i n joining a l l kinds of voluntary labour . . . . A l l t h i s i s , as Lenin said, 'the actual beginning of communism, the beginning of ?, a change which i s of world h i s t o r i c significance.' The upsurge of voluntary labour associated with the communes and the backyard furnace campaign were considered further developments of the communist consciousness on the part of the masses. Reports of commune members engaging i n dawn to Liu Shao-chi, on. c i t . , p. 28 3k3 dusk labour without thought of remuneration were p a r t i c u l a r l y widespread during the euphoric stage immediately following the introduction of the communes. In November, Red Flag published a comprehensive a r t i c l e dealing with the "Communist Working S p i r i t " which had reportedly gripped the land. According to the author: Marxist-Leninism holds that communist labour i s voluntary labour, without set quotas, done without expectation of remuneration . . . . Voluntary labour has now become a large-scale mass movement i n our country . . • the communist s p i r i t i s growing vigorously throughout the country and labour without quotas i s becoming the general practice of our society . . . . Today, the application of the princ i p l e 'from each according to h i s a b i l i t i e s ' , and bringing the communist working s p i r i t into play i s the decisive factor i n preparing conditions for the t r a n s i t i o n to communism.22 Thus, i n a l l phases of the communes and the leap forward, the dictates, of the communist ideology, were f u l l y taken into account, and p o l i c i e s were c l e a r l y very c l o s e l y connected with ideology, being f u l l y consistent with the attainment of the recognized prerequisites to communism. In a summation of the obstacles to be overcome before the t r a n s i t i o n to communism could take place i n China, the Red Flag a r t i c l e just c i t e d , l i s t e d a l l the major preconditions which the party's p o l i c i e s were designed to attain i n succeeding years: Wang l i , "The Communist Working S p i r i t , " Red Flag, November 16, 1958; Peking Review, no. 38, 1958, p. 6 . 3kk In the course of some years, the 'three great conditions" w i l l gradually and at length he brought into being. These are: a great abundance of s o c i a l products; a great r a i s i n g of the communist consciousness and communist moral character of the whole people; populariza-tion and elevation of education among the whole people. Moreover, the three big differences that are inherited from bourgeois society must be gradually and at l a s t completely eliminated. They are the difference between c i t y and country-side, between workers and peasants, and between mental and physical labour.23 Clearly, the Marxist-Leninist ideology was not merely ex post facto as f a r as the communes were concerned. The character-i s t i c s of the communes and the p o l i c i e s attendant to them were quite c e r t a i n l y determined by the ideology espoused by Mao Tse-tung. Certainly, other factors, such as those out-lined i n the early part of the chapter, also played a role i n motivating the Chinese leader to conceive the s o c i a l unit known as the commune, but ideology appears to have played by far the most important r o l e . The only puzzling aspect of the communes, from an ideolo g i c a l point of view i s the people's m i l i t i a . If Mao's purpose i n establishing the people's communes had been to achieve tighter control over the peasantry, he would hardly have trained them i n armed combat and given them weapons and ammunition. In actual f a c t , when conditions became very bad economically i n i960 and 1 9 6 1 , the people's m i l i t i a i n Honan and nearby provinces did r i s e up against the party. According to People"s Liberation Army documents i n the hands of the United States" government: Ibid., p. 7 . 345 S e r i o u s d i s t u r b a n c e s o f t h e p e a c e w e r e r e p o r t e d i n s i x o f t h e s e v e n d i s t r i c t s i n H o n a n , P r o v i n c i a l c i v i l i a n m i l i t i a m e n w e r e s a i d t o h a v e l e d t h e p r o t e s t s , k i l l i n g c o m m u n i s t p a r t y m e m b e r s , w r e c k i n g c o m m u n i c a t i o n s l i n e s , a n d s t o p p i n g m i l i t a r y c o n v o y s , 2 4 To p u t a rms i n t h e h a n d s o f t h e p e a s a n t s was a c a l c u l a t e d r i s k t h e n on M a o r s b e h a l f ; a n d we c a n d i s c o u n t t h e t h e o r y t h a t t h e communes w e r e m o t i v a t e d b y a d e s i r e t o h o l d down p e a s a n t r e v o l t s . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e r e m u s t h a v e b e e n i m p o r t a n t c o n s i d e r a t i o n s f o r Mao t o h a v e t a k e n t h e r i s k i n v o l v e d i n f o r m i n g a p e a s a n t m i l i t i a . T h e s e c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , i t w o u l d a p p e a r , w e r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y i d e o l o g i c a l i n n a t u r e . One o f t h e i d e o l o g i c a l l y - d e r i v e d c o n s i d e r a t i o n s h a s a l r e a d y b e e n s u g g e s t e d i n t h e d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n t h e f o r m a t i o n o f t h e communes . T h i s r e l a t e s t o Mao T s e - t u n g * s o r t h o d o x L e n i n i s t p o s i t i o n on t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f w a r s b e g u n b y c a p i t a l i s t n a t i o n s , a n d t h e b e l i e f t h a t t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s w i l l n o t s t e p down f r o m t h e s t a g e o f h i s t o r y w i t h o u t a v i o l e n t s t r u g g l e . I f Mao r e a l l y b e l i e v e s i n t h e i n e v i t a b i l i t y o f a U . S . - s p o n s o r e d a t t a c k on t h e m a i n l a n d s o m e t i m e i n t h e f u t u r e , t h e n h i s p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a a s s u m e s b o t h i d e o l o g i c a l a n d m i l i t a r y s i g n i f i c a n c e . C l e a r l y , i f Mao s i n c e r e l y h o l d s t o t h i s f a t a l i s t i c v i e w o f L e n i n ' s , 2 ^ ^ N e w Y o r k T i m e s , A u g u s t 5, 1963, p . 1. 2 5 . . t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i c y o f f i n a n c e . . . i n e v i t a b l y e n g e n d e r s new i m p e r i a l i s t w a r s . . . . I t i s i m -p o s s i b l e t o e s c a p e i m p e r i a l i s t w a r a n d i m p e r i a l i s t w o r l d . . . w h i c h i n e v i t a b l y e n g e n d e r s i m p e r i a l i s t w a r — i t i s i m p o s s i b l e 3^6 then the domestic risks involved in the formation of a people's m i l i t i a , would be far outweighed by military considerations: especially i f one has a mystical faith in the peasant-worker "masses", and i f one i s also steeped in the tradition of guerrilla warfare. An even more clear-cut ideological consideration can be discovered to explain the communes* mi l i t i a . As has been demonstrated in the formation of the communes, policies were formulated with careful reference to dictates of Marxist-Leninism. On numerous occasions, passages from Lenin*s The State and Revolution were quoted at length in the Chinese press and party theoretical journals, in explana-tion of the various aspects of the communes. A perusal of this work by Lenin sheds considerable light on the ideological roots of Mao's people's m i l i t i a . Speaking of the transition to communism, Lenin asserts, in a passage oft* quoted by the Chinese during the commune polemics: By what stages, by what practical measures humanity w i l l proceed to this higher aim— we do not and cannot know. But i t i s important to realize how i n f i n i t e l y mendacious i s the ordinary bourgeois conception of socialism as something l i f e l e s s , petrified, fixed once for a l l ; whereas only under socialism w i l l a rapid, genuine, really mass forward movement embracing f i r s t the majority and then the whole of the population, commence in a l l spheres of social and personal life.2o to escape that inferno, except by Bolshevik struggle and Bol-shevik revolution." (Lenin, Selected Works« vol. I I (Moscow, F.L.P.H. , 1 9 k 7 ) , P. 5 7 0 . * Lenin, on. c i t . , p. 2 0 9 . 3 k7 I t i s n o t e w o r t h y t h a t i n t h e s u c c e e d i n g p a r a g r a p h t o t h e one j u s t q u o t e d , L e n i n made s p e c i f i c m e n t i o n o f i n t r o d u c i n g a t y p e o f p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a i n t o s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y . I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t Mao i s f a m i l i a r w i t h t h i s p a r t i c u l a r p a s s a g e , w h i c h a s s e r t s t h a t a f t e r t h e p r o l e t a r i a t h a s o v e r t h r o w n t h e b o u r g e o i s , i t i s t o : w i p e o f f t h e f a c e o f t h e e a r t h t h e b o u r g e o i s , e v e n t h e R e p u b l i c a n b o u r g e o i s s t a t e m a c h i n e , t h e s t a n d i n g a r m y , t h e p o l i c y a n d b u r e a u c r a c y a n d t o s u b s t i t u t e f o r t h e m a more d e m o c r a t i c s t a t e m a c h i n e b u t a s t a t e m a c h i n e n e v e r t h e l e s s , i n t h e s h a p e o f t h e a r m e d m a s s o f w o r k e r s who a r e b e i n g g r a n s f o r m e d i n t o a u n i v e r s a l p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a . 2 7 T h u s , a c c o r d i n g t o L e n i n i s m , Mao w a s f o l l o w i n g t h e d i c t a t e s o f t h e c o m m u n i s t i d e o l o g y i n e s t a b l i s h i n g a p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a i n C h i n a . I n t h e C i v i l War i n F r a n c e , K a r l M a r x a l s o makes m e n t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l m i l i t i a i n r e g a r d t o t h e p l a n s o f t h e P a r i s Commune. I n h i s p r a i s e - f i l l e d a n a l y s i s o f t h e m e a s u r e s i n s t i t u t e d a n d p l a n n e d b y t h e c o m m u n e , M a r x n o t e d t h a t : t h e commune was t o be t h e p o l i t i c a l f o r m o f e v e n t h e s m a l l e s t c o u n t r y h a m l e t , a n d t h a t i n t h e r u r a l d i s t r i c t s t h e s t a n d i n g a r m y was t o be r e p l a c e d b y a n a t i o n a l m i l i t i a a n d w i t h a n e x t r e m e l y s h o r t t e r m o f s e r v i c e . 2 8 T h u s , t h e m i l i t i a i d e a was n o t s o m e t h i n g p u l l e d o u t o f t h i n a i r b y Mao T s e - t u n g . I t was s o m e t h i n g c l e a r l y p r e s c r i b e d 27 ' L o c . c i t . 28 M a r x a n d E n g e l s , S e l e c t e d W o r k s , v o l . I ( M o s c o w , F . L . P . H . , 1 9 5 8 ) , p . 5 2 0 . ' 3 L 8 by both Lenin and Marx for the t r a n s i t i o n a l phase. Therefore, i n establishing the people 1s m i l i t i a i n the people's communes, Mao was being quite consistent with the prescriptions of the communist ideology. Thus, whether one views the people's m i l i t i a as motivated by Mao's orthodox ide o l o g i c a l views on the i n e v i t a b i l -i t y of war during the epoch of imperialism, or as res u l t i n g from the direc t prescriptions of Lenin and Marx, i t i s evident that this particular aspect of the people's communes, l i k e the other aspects, may be viewed as consistent with the communist ideology, and i d e o l o g i c a l l y derived. It i s apparent, then, that of a l l the motivating factors, i d e o l o g i c a l ones were the most important i n the introduction and formation of the commune system; and that once i n s t i t u t e d the significance of the communes to the 29 Chinese leaders was primarily i d e o l o g i c a l . ' ^ 7 I t i s sig n i f i c a n t i n this regard that those members of the Politburo who supported Mao's communes wholeheartedly were those with the highest "ideological consciousness": those who are the most capable Marxist-Leninist theoreticians. These include Liu Shao-chi, Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen, Chen Po-ta (editor of Red Flag), Kang Sheng, Tan Chen-lin, Ko Ching-shih, Lu Ting-I (head of the party's Propaganda Department), and L i Fu-chun, among others. In every case, when writing on the subject of the people's communes, the Politburo members exhibited an extensive knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory, and documented their statements with references to statements by Marx, Engels and Lenin. It i s noteworthy that Teng Hsiao-ping, Peng Chen and Kang Sheng were the three members of the Politburo chosen to represent the party i n the ideol o g i c a l discussions with the Russians i n Moscow i n 1 9 6 3 , which gives an indication of their c a p a b i l i t i e s as theoreticians. CHAPTER XV THE COMMUNE CONTROVERSY IN PERSPECTIVE The controversy over the communes can be seen i n perspective as involving three separate sets of issues. The f i r s t involves questions concerning the speed, the methods and the forms, of the tr a n s i t i o n towards communism. The second set involves questions which relate to the wider issues now dominating the Sino-Soviet dispute: the question of how c a p i t a l i s t states are to arrive at socialism. The th i r d set of issues involves questions of ide o l o g i c a l authority, and the relations between communist states. The greater part of the dialogue over the communes, and the p r i n c i p l e s which they involved, was concerned with arguments over the tr a n s i t i o n to communism, and the correct way to accomplish t h i s t r a n s i t i o n . It has been suggested e a r l i e r that there would appear to be a causal l i n k between the conservativization of Soviet domestic policy during 1957 and 1958 and the decision taken by Mao Tse-tung to introduce the communes into China, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the l i g h t of Mao's v i s i t to the Soviet Union i n November of 1957, and h i s sudden reversal of collective-farm p o l i c y i n the early spring of 1958. The other factors involved appear to have been c h i e f l y related to the r e a l i z a t i o n that the communist revolution must either move ahead, or be dragged back by the force of "spontaneous capitalism" which had reversed the tide 350 o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n i n t h e c o u n t r y s i d e b e t w e e n 195& a n d 1957; a n d t h e d e s i r e t o t a k e f u l l a d v a n t a g e o f t h e h i g h t i d e o f e n t h u s i a s m e n g e n d e r e d d u r i n g t h e 1957-1958 w i n t e r i n o r d e r t o make t h i s move a h e a d t o t h e n e x t s t a g e o f s o c i a l i z a t i o n . F a c t o r s s u c h a s t h e a b u n d a n t h a r v e s t o f 1958 w e r e a l s o e v i d e n t i n t h e t i m i n g o f t h e commune d e c i s i o n . B u t c h i e f l y i t w a s t h e r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t t h e a f f l u e n c e o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ( a n d t h e l o n g a w k w a r d p e r i o d s i n c e a n y q u a l i t a t i v e c h a n g e i n p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s h a d t a k e n p l a c e ) , h a d r e n d e r e d r e v o l u t i o n a r y a d v a n c e t o w a r d s communism a l m o s t i m p o s s i b l e , e v e n i f d e s i r e d b y t h e C . P . S . U . l e a d e r s . T h i s i s w h y , i n M a o ' s h i s t o r i c P r e f a c e t o " I n t r o d u c i n g a C o o p e r a t i v e " w r i t t e n i n e a r l y 1958, h e d e s c r i b e d t h e f a c t t h a t t h e C h i n e s e w e r e " p o o r " a n d " b l a n k " , a s a good t h i n g r a t h e r t h a n a b a d t h i n g : p o o r p e o p l e , h e s a i d , w a n t c h a n g e . And t h i s i s w h y , i n L i u S h a o - c h i 1 s w o r d s , t h e p a r t y w a s " p u t t i n g f o r w a r d r e v o l u t i o n a r y t a s k s i n good t i m e , s o t h a t t h e r e i s no h a l f w a y h a l t i n t h e r e v o l u t i o n a r y a d v a n c e o f t h e p e o p l e , " a n d s o t h a t t h e " r e v o l u t i o n a r y f e r v o u r o f t h e m a s s e s w i l l n o t s u b s i d e w i t h i n t e r r u p t i o n s o f t h e r e v o l u t i o n . " T h u s , b e c a u s e t h e C . P . S . U . h a d a d o p t e d a " r e v i s i o n i s t " l i n e i n d o m e s t i c p o l i c y i n 1957 ( f o l l o w i n g t h e o v e r t h r o w o f t h e " a n t i - p a r t y " g r o u p who h a d o p p o s e d t h e s e new p o l i c i e s ) , a n d b e c a u s e t h e i n t r o d u c -t i o n o f t h e communes was m o t i v a t e d p a r t l y b y a r e a c t i o n t o t h e c o n s e r v a t i v i z a t i o n o f S o v i e t s o c i e t y , a n i d e o l o g i c a l d i s p u t e o v e r t h e c o r r e c t way t o a c h i e v e communism was a n a l m o s t i n e v i t a b l e r e s u l t o f t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e communes i n C h i n a . 351 A p a r t i c u l a r l y important point i n the Soviet re-organization of the Machine Tractor Stations, i n the ending of compulsory d e l i v e r i e s , i n the decision to reject the commune as an appropriate unit for future society, and i n the decision to give more material incentive to Soviet c i t i z e n s , was that a l l these pragmatic reforms were made i n the name of Marxist-Leninism, and with reference s p e c i f i c a l l y to achieving communism i n the shortest possible time. In substantiating the pragmatic domestic reforms designed to stimulate production, Khrushchev inevitably had to Interpret Marxist-Leninism i n h i s own "creative" way and had to assume some positions which were h e r e t i c a l to dogmatic followers of Marxist-Leninism, such as the Chinese. It was because Khrushchev addressed himself i n his reforms to substantiating h i s positions on the basis of the ideology common to both the Russians and the Chinese that there arose a r e a l basis for dispute. The fact that Khrushchev had to "creatively interpret" the common ideology i n order to support h i s p o l i c i e s , and that he also claimed to be laying down new postulates of general significance on the basis of the Soviet Union being the vanguard of the communist movement, also provided the groundwork for a dispute with the more id e o l o g i c a l l y orthodox Chinese. There were many specific questions involved i n the long debate which has gone on between the two parties since 1958j over the transition to communism. These have been 352 exposed i n the evidence presented i n the previous chapters, but have yet to be gathered together i n a comprehensive whole, with the two sides to each question counterposed. Therefore, the sp e c i f i c areas of dispute and the opposing arguments supporting the Chinese and Soviet points of view w i l l be taken into consideration and examined i n some d e t a i l . Issues Relating to S o c i a l i s t Construction and the Transition to Communism One of the chief, and most frequent charges, made by the Russians was that the Chinese had introduced higher production r e l a t i o n s prematurely, before objective conditions were ripe. This had been one of the chief arguments used by St a l i n i n h i s c r i t i c a l appraisal of the communes introduced i n the Soviet Union after the revolution. S t a l i n himself had l a i d down stringent conditions under which communes would be introduced i n the future, and among these was that of material abundance. According to the Soviet view, because objective conditions were not ri p e , the communes were imposed by party leaders, rather than being the spontaneous desire of the masses. It w i l l be recalled that Teng Hsiao-ping, i n his 10th Anniversary a r t i c l e s p e c i f i c a l l y rebutted this argument, asserting that i t was f a l l a c i o u s to say that the communes were the creation of a few< men, and had been imposed on the peasants against their w i l l . I t was said on many occasions by the Chinese that the introduction of the communes was not "fortuitous", and that " i t was i n circumstances of a 353 g r e a t d e v e l o p m e n t o f r u r a l e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y a n d a g r e a t h e i g h t e n i n g o f t h e p e a s a n t * s p o l i t i c a l u n d e r s t a n d i n g t h a t i t h e r u r a l p e o p l e ' s communes e m e r g e d . " A t t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g o f t h e o r i g i n a l commune r e s o l u t i o n , i t was e x p r e s s l y n o t e d t h a t t h e e c o n o m i c l e a p f o r w a r d a n d t h e r i s i n g i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e p e a s a n t f o r m e d t h e b a s i s f o r t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e communes . Of c o u r s e , one o f t h e i m p o r t a n t i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e C h i n e s e s t a n d t h a t t h e communes w e r e t o t a l l y i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e l e v e l o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e s h a d become o b s o l e t e i n t h e f a c t o f r a p i d l y e x p a n d i n g p r o d u c t i o n f o r c e s , w a s t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e s i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n d i d n o t c o r r e s p o n d t o t h e l e v e l o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s , and t h a t a d v a n c e t o h i g h e r p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s was r e q u i r e d . T h i s i m p l i c a t i o n i s mos t i m p o r t a n t s i n c e S t a l i n h a d s a i d i n 1952 t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e s y s t e m was a l r e a d y b e g i n n i n g t o h a m p e r t h e p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s , a n d t h a t c h a n g e s i n p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s mus t come s o o n . I t was one o f K h r u s h c h e v ' s s p e c i f i c r e v i s i o n s o f S t a l i n i s t t h e o r y , t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e s w e r e h a m p e r e d o n l y b y b a d m a n a g e m e n t , i m p r o p e r p r i c e s y s t e m , a n d l a c k o f i n c e n -t i v e , a n d t h a t t h e y h a d n o t b y a n y means e x h a u s t e d t h e i r p o t e n t i a l p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y . I n f a c t o n l y a f e w months b e f o r e t h e communes w e r e o f f i c i a l l y i n t r o d u c e d , K h r u s h c h e v h a d d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e c o l l e c t i v e s h a d " i n e x h a u s t i b l e r e s e r v e s " L o n g L i v e t h e P e o p l e ' s C o m m u n e s , " P e o p l e ' s D a i l y , A u g u s t 29, 1959; A p p e n d i x t o C h o u E n - l a i , R e p o r t on A d j u s t i n g t h e Ma . io r T a r g e t s o f t h e 1 9 5 9 E c o n o m i c P l a n ( P e k i n g , F . L . P . , 1959), P . •+!. 35 L 2 for advancing production." This, then, was one of the points most hotly contended i n the commune dispute: the Russians charging the Chinese with introducing higher production relations prematurely, high handedly and without an objective basis; and the Chinese defending the communes as "an inevitable product of h i s t o r i c a l development" brought on by the objective basis of the big leap forward, and implying that the c o l l e c t i v e system i n the Soviet Union was long overdue for an advance to higher production r e l a t i o n s . A related aspect of the introduction of the communes was the Chinese claim that "change i n old relations of production can f a c i l i t a t e the growth of productive force,"-' and that therefore, i f the communes were introduced, a higher rate of production would be unleashed. The Soviet Union countered t h i s argument with the declaration that the premature introduction of new production relations could only lead to a slowing of the process of production, rather than speeding i t up. In attempting to pass over to communist production relations prematurely, the Chinese, i t was said, were committing "Blanquist" errors. Believing that the state can accelerate the introduction of measures not yet matured, CN. S. Khrushchev, "On Further Developing the Coll e c -t i v e Farm System and Reorganizing the M.T.S.," Pravda. March 28, 1958; Current Digest of the Soviet Press, v o l . X, no. 13, p. Ik. 3Tan Chen-lin, "Factors that Bring Farm Production to a High Tide." Study, no. 6, March 1 8 , 1958; ECMM, no. 131, June 9, 1958, p. 33. 355 j u s t b e c a u s e i t h a s t h e p o w e r t o b r i n g t h e m i n t o f o r c e , i s a " l e f t i s t " d e v i a t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o t h e C . P . S . U . T h e communes w e r e a n e x a m p l e o f j u s t s u c h a d e v i a t i o n , c o m m i t t e d b y t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p . A n o t h e r a s p e c t o f t h e communes w h i c h f o r m e d t h e b a s i s o f a p a r t i c u l a r l y s t r o n g c l a s h o f o p i n i o n s , a n d w h i c h was h o t l y c o n t e n d e d , w a s t h e m e t h o d o f c o m m o d i t y d i s t r i b u -t i o n . F r o m t h e v e r y b e g i n n i n g o f t h e commune d i s p u t e , one o f t h e c h i e f S o v i e t c h a r g e s w a s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e c o m m u n e s , l i k e t h e e a r l y communes i n R u s s i a , p r a c t i c e d a n " e g a l i t a r i a n -i s m " w h i c h w a s d e c i d e d l y a l i e n t o M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s m a n d w h i c h w a s a b s o l u t e l y i m p e r m i s s i b l e . A g a i n i t i s n o t e w o r t h y t h a t S t a l i n h a d p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c i s e d t h e e a r l y S o v i e t communes f o r t h i s d e v i a t i o n , c a l l i n g " p e t t y - b o u r g e o i s e q u a l i z a t i o n " k t h e " w e a k e s t s i d e o f t h e c o m m u n e . " T h r o u g h o u t t h e commune d i s p u t e , K h r u s h c h e v h a s r e p e a t e d l y s t r e s s e d t h e v i e w t h a t t h e C h i n e s e c o n c e p t o f communism r e v o l v e d a r o u n d t h e n a t i o n o f e g a l i t a r i a n i s m , a n d t h a t t h e communes w e r e o f a n " e g a l i -t a r i a n - a s c e t i c " n a t u r e . The r e f e r e n c e i s t o t h e " f r e e s u p p l y " s y s t e m i n s t i t u t e d i n t h e c o m m u n e s , b y w h i c h " g r a i n i s s u p p l i e d g r a t i s t o members a c c o r d i n g t o t h e s t a n d a r d s t i p u l a t e d b y t h e s t a t e . " ^ T h u s , t h e " f r e e s u p p l y " s y s t e m r e s u l t e d i n e v e r y o n e r e c e i v i n g e q u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n o f c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t i t e m s , _ J . S t a l i n , R e p o r t t o t h e S e v e n t e e n t h C o n g r e s s o f t h e C . P . S . U . ( M o s c o w , F . L . P . H . , 1951), p. 95. ^ L i n T i e h , " T h e P e o p l e ' s Commune M o v e m e n t i n H o p e i " ( R e d F l a g , n o . 9, O c t o b e r 1, 1959)? P e o p l e ' s Communes i n C h i n a ( P e k i n g , F . L . P . , 1958;, p . 5*+. 356 rather than according to hi s work, or according to his need. In the community mess h a l l s , f or Instance, everyone got the same meal i n a similar quantity, just as i n the old ega l i t a r i a n communes i n the U.S.S.R. Among other things, the Soviet party charged that this egalitarian d i s t r i b u t i o n negated the s o c i a l i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n p r i n c i p l e of "each according to hi s work" and substituted the petty bourgeois p r i n c i p l e of "d i s t r i b u t i o n according to mouths." The Chinese never r e a l l y successfully countered these arguments concerning the egal i t a r i a n measures practiced i n the communes, and inherent i n the free supply system, although they did assert that equal d i s t r i b u t i o n i n the supply sector of d i s t r i b u t i o n was only a halfway house on the way to d i s t r i b u t i o n according to needs~-a t r a n s i t i o n phase. They argued that the wage sector of d i s t r i b u t i o n was s t i l l governed by the pr i n c i p l e of "each according to h i s work", and that therefore, on the whole, the dictates of Marxist p r i n c i p l e were met. However, while declaring the wage-supply system to be i n essence a form of " s o c i a l i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n " , they continued to maintain that the free supply system embodied "the f i r s t shoots of communism", and that i t "contains the f i r s t shoots of the communist pr i n c i p l e of 'to each according to hi s needs'."^ It was argued that the C.P.C. Central Committee, "Resolution on Some Questions Concerning the Rural People's Communes," Sixth Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee (Documents), (Peking, F . L . P . , 1958), p. 21. 357 f r e e m e a l s y s t e m i n v o l v e d d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o n e e d , s i n c e a l l t h e members o f a f a m i l y w e r e e n t i t l e d t o e a t i n t h e d i n i n g h a l l : t h i s meant t h a t a l a r g e f a m i l y r e c e i v e d more f o o d t h a n a s m a l l o n e , e v e n t h o u g h b o t h h a d one wage e a r n e r . Of c o u r s e , t h e S o v i e t o b j e c t i o n was t h a t s i n c e t h e s t a t e s e t t h e s t a n d a r d o f " n e e d " , m a k i n g e v e r y o n e " e a t w a t e r y s o u p o u t o f a common b o w l " , s o t o s p e a k , t h i s was a m o c k e r y o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o n e e d . R e l a t e d t o t h e c o n f l i c t o v e r t h e " e g a l i t a r i a n " a s p e c t s o f t h e communes , was t h e a r g u m e n t o v e r t h e C h i n e s e c l a i m t h a t t h e y w e r e i n t r o d u c i n g c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e s d u r i n g t h e s o c i a l i s t p e r i o d . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e C h i n e s e p o i n t o f v i e w , t h e f r e e s u p p l y s y s t e m was a b u d o f communism o f t h e k i n d w h i c h L e n i n h a d d i s c u s s e d i n h i s e s s a y , " A G r e a t B e g i n n i n g " . T a k i n g L e n i n a s t h e i r a u t h o r i t y , t h e C h i n e s e a s s e r t e d t h a t b u d s o f communism c o u l d a n d w o u l d a r i s e i n s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y ; a n d a s L e n i n s a i d , t h e y " w i l l n o t w i t h e r , t h e y w i l l g r o w a n d b l o s s o m i n t o c o m p l e t e c o m m u n i s m . " I n e s s e n c e , t h e i r a r g u m e n t was t h a t c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e s — a n d i n t h i s c a s e , c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e s o f d i s t r i b u t i o n — " c a n be 7 g r a d u a l l y r e a l i z e d , " ' s t a r t i n g a t a r e l a t i v e l y l o w l e v e l o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s . T h e y r e j e c t e d t h e i d e a " t h a t o n l y a f t e r t h e c o m p l e t e r e a l i z a t i o n o f " a u t o m a t i o n * and " a t o m i z a t i o n ' H s u L i - c h u n , " H a v e We A l r e a d y R e a c h e d t h e S t a g e o f Communism?" R e d F l a g , November 16, 1958; ECMM. n o . 156, 1958. 358 a n d o t h e r s u c h c o n d i t i o n s w i l l i t s t h o r o u g h e n f o r c e m e n t be 8 a n n o u n c e d some d a y . " The p a r t - w a g e , p a r t - s u p p l y s y s t e m w a s s e e n a s a m e t h o d w h e r e b y c o m m u n i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o n e e d s w o u l d b e g r a d u a l l y i n c r e a s e d a s p r o d u c t i o n g r a d u a l l y r o s e , w i t h t h e wage s e c t o r b a s e d on d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w o r k , g r a d u a l l y t a i l i n g o f f . T h i s p r o c e s s w a s s e e n a s b e i n g h a s t e n e d b y t h e h e i g h t e n i n g o f t h e p o l i t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e commune m e m b e r s . I n S o v i e t e y e s , t h e p r e m a t u r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n was a n h e r e t i c a l a t t e m p t t o l e a p i n t o communism b e f o r e c o n d i t i o n s w e r e r i p e a n d t o " f o r t h w i t h i n s t i t u t e c o m m u n i s m , b y - p a s s i n g c e r t a i n h i s t o r i c a l s t a g e s o f d e v e l o p m e n t . " ^ A s f a r a s t h e C . P . S . U . w a s c o n -c e r n e d , t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s h i p h e l d t o a p o s i t i o n " a c c o r d i n g t o w h i c h t h e m a i n l i n k i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o communism i s d i s t r i b u t i o n , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n w i t h o u t d e l a y o f c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e s i n t h i s s p h e r e , i r r e s p e c t i v e o f t h e l e v e l o f p r o d u c t i o n . " 1 0 B u t , a s t h e S o v i e t p a r t y p o i n t e d o u t , t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f e o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e s o f d i s t r i b u t i o n i n t h e p e r i o d o f s o c i a l i s m , c a n " o n l y i m p a i r t h e w o r k o f b u i l d i n g L o c f c i t . % . M a t k o v s k y , " T h e I d e o l o g i c a l Weapon o f C o m m u n i s m , " P r a v d a . J u n e 1 2 , I960; C u r r e n t D i g e s t o f t h e S o v i e t P r e s s , v o l . X I I , n o . 2H-, p . 4. 1 o A . S o b o l e v , " T h e M a i n L i n k i n t h e T r a n s i t i o n t o C o m m u n i s m , " W o r l d M a r x i s t R e v i e w , v o l . 3, n o . 1 1 , N o v e m b e r I 9 6 0 , p . k. 359 c o m m u n i s m . " 1 ' 1 ' N e c e s s a r i l y , t h e R u s s i a n s a r g u e d , t h e p r e m a t u r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o n e e d , a t a t i m e when m a t e r i a l a b u n d a n c e h a s n o t b e e n a c h i e v e d , c a n o n l y r e s u l t i n e g a l i t a r i a n d i s t r i b u t i o n , " w o u l d e a t up o u r s t o c k -p i l e s , make e x t e n d e d r e p r o d u c t i o n I m p o s s i b l e , a n d b l o c k t h e 12 s u c c e s s f u l e x p a n s i o n o f t h e e c o n o m y . " R e l y i n g on L e n i n a s a n a u t h o r i t y , t h e C . P . S . U . a s s e r t e d t h a t a q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e e x i s t e d b e t w e e n t h e t w o d i s t i n c t s t a g e s o f s o c i a l i s m a n d c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h a t t h i s q u a l i t a t i v e d i f f e r e n c e w a s e m b o d i e d i n t h e t w o d i s t i n c t p r i n c i p l e s g o v e r n i n g d i s t r i b u t i o n . T h r o u g h o u t t h e s o c i a l i s t p e r i o d , i t w a s a r g u e d , t h e p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n m u s t be * t o e a c h a c c o r d i n g t o h i s w o r k * , a n d t h a t a n y a t t e m p t t o p a s s o v e r t o t h e c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n w a s a n a b o r t i v e a t t e m p t t o s k i p t h e s o c i a l i s t s t a g e — a s t a g e w h i c h t h e C h i n e s e h a d o n l y e m b a r k e d u p o n i n 1956, h a v i n g c o n s u m m a t e d t h e b o u r g e o i s - d e m o c r a t i c p h a s e . On a more p r a c t i c a l p l a n e , t h e S o v i e t c h a r g e t h a t t h e p r e m a t u r e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f d i s t r i -b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o n e e d s w o u l d l e a d t o a d e p l e t i o n o f r e s e r v e s w a s f u l l y s u b s t a n t i a t e d b y C h i n e s e e x p e r i e n c e , a s r e c o r d e d i n a n e a r l i e r c h a p t e r . I n t h e i n i t i a l u p s u r g e o f commune e n t h u s i a s m , t h e commune members a t e t h r e e g o o d m e a l s a d a y , a n d v e r y q u i c k l y d e p l e t e d t h e s t o r e s o f g r a i n c r e a t e d b y t h e e x c e l l e n t 1958 h a r v e s t . W i t h i n a f e w m o n t h s a s e v e r e TT N . S . K h r u s h c h e v , C o n t r o l F i g u r e s f o r t h e E c o n o m i c D e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e U . S . S . R . . 1959-1965 ( M o s c o w , F . L . P . H . , 1959), p. 115. 1 2 L o c . c i t . 360 s h o r t a g e s e t i n , a n d s t r i c t r a t i o n i n g h a d t o be e n f o r c e d . The i d e o l o g i c a l a n d p r a c t i c a l a r g u m e n t s o f t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s w e r e t h u s e x t r e m e l y f o r c e f u l . On t h e o t h e r h a n d , t h e C h i n e s e a r g u m e n t t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e n o " G r e a t W a l l " b e t w e e n s o c i a l i s m a n d c o m m u n i s m , a n d t h a t c o m m u n i s t f o r m s a n d p r i n c i p l e s m u s t be i n t r o d u c e d a s s o o n a s c o n d i t i o n s a l l o w , h a d i m p o r t a n t s i g n i f i c a n c e f o r t h e C . P . S . U . l e a d e r s h i p , s i n c e i t a m o u n t e d t o a c r i t i c i s m o f t h e s l o w S o v i e t a d v a n c e t o w a r d s commun ism. The q u e s t i o n o f why t h e C . P . S . U . h a d n o t b e g u n t o i n t r o d u c e a more c o m m u n i s t i c s y s t e m o f d i s t r i b u t i o n now t h a t i t h a d e m b a r k e d on t h e p h a s e o f " c o m m u n i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n " was one o f c u r r e n t d e b a t e w i t h i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ; a n d t h e C h i n e s e a r g u m e n t s c o u l d do n o t h i n g b u t s t r e n g t h e n t h e p o s i t i o n o f t h o s e who q u e s t i o n e d K h r u s h c h e v * s a p p a r e n t r e l u c t a n c e t o i n t r o d u c e q u a l i t a t i v e c h a n g e . A s K h r u s h c h e v n o t e d a t t h e 2 1 s t C o n g r e s s : I n a r t i c l e s a n d l e c t u r e s , some s c i e n t i f i c w o r k e r s a l l e g e t h a t d i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w o r k s i g n i f i e s a p p l i c a t i o n o f b o u r g e o i s l a w t o a s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y . T h e y a s k w h e t h e r t h e t i m e h a s n o t come t o s h i f t f r o m t h i s p r i n c i p l e t o e q u i t a b l e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l p r o d u c t among a l l w o r k i n g members o f s o c i e t y . We c a n n o t a g r e e t o t h a t . 1 3 T h u s , i t c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e C h i n e s e move t o i n t r o d u c e a s y s t e m o f d i s t r i b u t i o n w h i c h i n v o l v e d e l e m e n t s o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n , a n d u p o n a m a t e r i a l b a s e much l e s s L o c . c i t 361 a d v a n c e d t h a n t h a t e x i s t i n g i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , g a v e d i r e c t i d e o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t t o t h o s e e l e m e n t s i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n who w e r e c h a l l e n g i n g K h r u s h c h e v ' s c o n s e r v a t i s m . The C h i n e s e s p e c i f i c a l l y r a i s e d t h e q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r t h e new l e a d e r s o f t h e C . P . S . U . h a d b r o u g h t t h e S o v i e t r e v o l u t i o n t o a h a l t a t t h e s o c i a l i s t s t a g e , a n d h a d b e g u n t o s u b s t i t u t e l i b e r a l i s m f o r M a r x i s t - L e n i n i s m . K h r u s h c h e v ' s a r g u m e n t w a s t h a t t h e c o m m u n i s t p r i n c i p l e s o f d i s t r i b u t i o n c o u l d b e n o t i n t r o d u c e d u n t i l s u c h t i m e a s a b s o l u t e m a t e r i a l a b u n d a n c e h a d b e e n a c h i e v e d . H i s c o n t e n t i o n w a s t h a t : T h e m a i n c o n d i t i o n e n s u r i n g a n a b u n d a n c e o f m a t e r i a l a n d s p i r i t u a l b e n e f i t s f o r t h e p e o p l e , w i t h o u t w h i c h i t i s i m p o s s i b l e t o c h a n g e o v e r f r o m s o c i a l i s t t o c o m m u n i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n , i s t h e e r e a t i o n o f t h e m a t e r i a l a n d t e c h n i c a l b a s e o f communism.1 4 T h u s t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e " t o e a c h a c c o r d i n g t o h i s n e e d s " h a s b e e n p o s t p o n e d i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n f o r a n i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d . I t s h o u l d be r e c a l l e d t h a t t h e C h i n e s e s p e c i f i c a l l y r e p u d i a t e d t h e v i e w o f t h o s e who s t r e s s " a u t o m a t i o n " a n d " a t o m i z a t i o n " a s p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o i m p l e m e n t i n g c o m m u n i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n p r i n c i p l e s , a n d t h u s f i r m l y r e j e c t e d t h e S o v i e t p o s i t i o n . N. S . K h r u s h c h e v , " T h e P r e s e n t S t a g e o f C o m m u n i s t C o n s t r u c t i o n : P r a v d a . M a r c h . 6 , 1962; C u r r e n t D i g e s t o f t h e S o v i e t P r e s s , v o l . X I V , n o . 8, p . k. 362 F u n d a m e n t a l l y t h e C h i n e s e a t t i t u d e i s t h a t t h e s o c i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e o f d i s t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d g r a d u a l l y be s u p e r s e d e d a s p r o d u c t i o n o f c e r t a i n c o m m o d i t i e s a c h i e v e s a r e a s o n a b l e l e v e l , a n d n o t i n t r o d u c e d a l l a t o n c e i n t h e d i s t a n t f u t u r e w h e n a u t o m a t i o n a n d a b u n d a n c e h a v e b e e n a c h i e v e d . M o r e o v e r , t h e y a s s e r t t h a t t h e b u d s o f c o m m u n i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n s h o u l d b e e n c o u r a g e d t o d e v e l o p e v e n i n s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y : t h i s , t h e y s a y , w a s L e n i n ' s p o s i t i o n i n r e g a r d t o t h e b u d s o f c o m m u n i s m . The S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i s d i a m e t r i c a l l y o p p o s e d t o t h i s , a n d c r i t i c i s e s t h e C h i n e s e f o r i m p l e m e n t i n g c o m m u n i s t d i s t r i b u t i o n p r e m a t u r e l y , i n t h e p e r i o d o f s o c i a l i s m . A c c o r d i n g t o K h r u s h c h e v a n d t h e C . P . S . U . , a n y n e g a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e " t o e a c h a c c o r d i n g t o h i s w o r k " — e v e n i n t h e p e r i o d o f c o m m u n i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n — w i l l j e o p a r d i z e l a b o u r p r o d u c t i v i t y , u s e up r e s e r v e s , a n d s l o w down t h e c r e a t i o n o f t h e m a t e r i a l a n d t e c h n i c a l b a s e n e e d e d f o r t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o p u r e c o m m u n i s m . A c l o s e l y r e l a t e d p o i n t o f d i s p u t e b e t w e e n t h e t w o p a r t i e s , a g a i n a r i s i n g o u t o f t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e p e o p l e ' s communes w a s t h e q u e s t i o n o f m a t e r i a l a n d m o r a l i n c e n t i v e s . I n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r i t w a s d e m o n s t r a t e d h o w t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y l a i d s p e c i a l e m p h a s i s o n t h e r o l e o f t h e " c o m m u n i s t s t y l e o f w o r k " i n t h e communes , a n d u p o n v o l u n t a r y l a b o u r a n d m o r a l i n c e n t i v e s r a t h e r t h a n m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s . T h e y s t r e s s e d t h a t w h i l e m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s w e r e n e c e s s a r y d u r i n g t h e p e r i o d o f s o c i a l i s m , t h e y s h o u l d be g r a d u a l l y p h a s e d o u t , a n d t h a t t h e I d e o l o g i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s o f t h e p e a s a n t s a n d w o r k e r s s h o u l d be r a i s e d b y a mass c a m p a i g n o r g a n i z e d b y t h e p a r t y . T h e i r m o t t o w a s t h a t " i d e o l o g i c a l a n d p o l i t i c a l w o r k c a n p r o d u c e i r o n a n d c o a l a n d g r a i n . " T o t h e r a d i c a l e l e m e n t s o f t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r -s h i p , m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e i s s o m e t h i n g " b o u r g e o i s " , s o m e t h i n g d e c i d e d l y i n f e r i o r t o m o r a l " c o m m u n i s t " i n c e n t i v e , a n d s o m e t h i n g t o be d i s c a r d e d a t t h e e a r l i e s t p o s s i b l e moment . I n t h i s l i g h t , t h e f r e e s u p p l y s y s t e m i n t r o d u c e d i n t o t h e communes w a s a move away f r o m m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e , r e n d e r e d p o s s i b l e t h r o u g h t h e u p s u r g e i n i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s among t h e p e a s a n t r y . T h i s n e g a t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e b y t h e C h i n e s e w a s o f t h e m o s t b i t t e r l y c o n t e s t e d a s p e c t s o f t h e C h i n e s e communes , a n d one w h i c h c o n t i n u e s t o r e c e i v e s p e c i a l a t t e n t i o n f r o m t h e l e a d e r o f t h e C . P . S . U . I t s h o u l d be n o t e d t h a t t h e c h i e f r e a s o n f o r t h i s i s t h a t t h e d o m i n a n t a s p e c t o f K h r u s h c h e v * s a g r i c u l t u r a l r e f o r m s i s h i s s t r e s s on i n c r e a s e d i n c e n t i v e s . M a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s h a v e f o r m e d t h e f o u n d a t i o n o f K h r u s h c h e v ' s p r o g r a m t o i n c r e a s e p r o d u c t i o n i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n ; t h u s , t h i s q u e s t i o n i s o f v i t a l i n t e r e s t t o t h e C . P . S . U . K h r u s h c h e v ' s a r g u m e n t a g a i n s t t h e C h i n e s e s t r e s s on i d e o l o g i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d m o r a l i n c e n t i v e s was c h i e f l y t h a t t h e " w e a k e n i n g o f i n c e n t i v e s ( i s ) i n e p t a n d w r o n g . H e 15 N . S . K h r u s h c h e v , " F o r New V i c t o r i e s f o r t h e W o r l d C o m m u n i s t M o v e m e n t , " W o r l d M a r x i s t R e v i e w , v o l . k, n o . 1 , J a n u a r y 1 9 6 1 , p . 9. ' ' 364 a r g u e d t h a t a n y n e g a t i o n o f t h e " L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e o f m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e " w o u l d l e a d t o a s l o w i n g o f t h e p a c e o f p r o d u c t i o n , a n d a l e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e t i m e t a k e n t o a c h i e v e c o m m u n i s t a b u n d a n c e : N e g l e c t o f t h e m a t e r i a l n e e d s o f t h e w o r k i n g p e o p l e a n d p u t t i n g e m p h a s i s c h i e f l y o n e n t h u s i a s m a n d p o l i t i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , on s o c i a l a n d m o r a l f o r m s o f e n c o u r a g e m e n t a n d r e w a r d , ( a r e ) d e t r i -m e n t a l t o t h e g r o w t h o f p r o d u c t i o n a n d r a i s i n g t h e s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g . 1 ° K h r u s h c h e v , i n c o u n t e r i n g t h e C h i n e s e a r g u m e n t t h a t m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s w e r e a l o w e r f o r m o f i n c e n t i v e t h a n m o r a l a n d i d e o l o g i c a l o n e s , s t r e s s e d t h a t i t i s " i n c o r r e c t t o c o u n t e r p o s e m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s t o m o r a l o n e s , a n d m a t e r i a l i n t e r e s t t o i d e o l o g i c a l - e d u c a t i o n a l w o r k . " 3 " 7 He c o n c l u d e d t h a t " a n y c o u n t e r p o s i n g o f t h e m c a n o n l y h a r m t h e c a u s e o f c o m m u n i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n . " M o r e o v e r , h e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t L e n i n h a d s p e c i f i c a l l y n o t e d t h a t t h e b u i l d i n g o f s o c i a l i s m a n d communism c a n be a c h i e v e d " n o t o n e n t h u s i a s m d i r e c t l y b u t w i t h t h e h e l p o f e n t h u s i a s m b o r n o f a g r e a t r e v o l u t i o n , o n p e r s o n a l i n t e r e s t , on p e r s o n a l i n c e n t i v e , on c o s t •j o a c c o u n t i n g . " I n s h o r t , t h e " e n t h u s i a s m o f t h e m a s s e s " s t r e s s e d s o much b y t h e C h i n e s e , m u s t r e s t o n t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e . 1 /: L o c . c i t . 1 7 N . S . K h r u s h c h e v , " T h e P r e s e n t S t a g e o f C o m m u n i s t C o n s t r u c t i o n , " p p . c i t . , p . ? • 1 o L o c . c i t . 365 On t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e e g a l i t a r i a n d i s t r i b u t i o n i m p l e m e n t e d i n t h e communes , t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r e m p h a s i z e d t h a t s u c h m e a s u r e s w e r e c o n t r a r y t o t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e . " D i s t r i b u t i o n a c c o r d i n g t o w o r k , " h e a r g u e d , " e n s u r e s a m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e , a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e r e s u l t s o f p r o d u c t i o n , " a n d " s t i m u l a t e s p r o d u c t i v i t y , h i g h e r s k i l l a n d 19 t e c h n i c a l p r o g r e s s . " 7 I f one n e g l e c t e d t o e n c o u r a g e g r e a t e r e f f o r t t h r o u g h m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s , t h e r e w o u l d be a s l a c k e n -i n g o f l a b o u r e n t h u s i a s m , K h r u s c h e v d e c l a r e d , a n d t h e a d v a n c e t o communism w o u l d come t o a h a l t : L e n i n f o r t h r i g h t l y s t a t e d t h a t w i t h o u t a m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e g i v i n g e v e r y w o r k e r a n i n t e r e s t i n t h e r e s u l t s o f h i s w o r k , t h e r e c o u l d be no q u e s t i o n o f r a i s i n g t h e c o u n t r y ' s p r o d u c t i v e c a p a c i t y o r o f b u i l d i n g a s o c i a l i s t economy a n d l e a d i n g t h e m i l l i o n s t o w a r d s communism. 2 0 W i t h t h e e c o n o m i c s e t b a c k s w h i c h p l a g u e d t h e C h i n e s e economy i n t h e t h r e e y e a r s f o l l o w i n g t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e communes , t h e l e a d e r s o f t h e C . P . S . U . c l a i m e d t h e i r w a r n i n g s t o h a v e come t r u e . T h e y a s s e r t e d t h a t C h i n a ' s e c o n o m i c p r o b l e m s w e r e a r e s u l t o f t h e v i o l a t i o n s o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e , a n d o t h e r " o b j e c t i v e l a w s " : t h e r e a l r e a s o n f o r t h e d i r e s t a t e o f t h e C h i n e s e economy l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t L e n i n i s t p r i n c i p l e s o f m a n a g i n g t h e s o c i a l i s t economy w e r e f l a g r a n t l y M. S . K h r u s h c h e v , C o n t r o l F i g u r e s , OP. c i t . , p . 123. ' i b i d . , p. 121. 366 v i o l a t e d t h e r e a n d g r a v e m i s t a k e s w e r e made £ o r 2 l w h i c h t h e C h i n e s e p e o p l e a r e now h a v i n g t o p a y . S i m i l a r l y , i t c o u l d be p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e g r a d u a l r e v i v a l o f t h e C h i n e s e e c o n o m y s i n c e 1 9 6 2 c o i n c i d e s w i t h t h e r e i n s t a t e m e n t o f m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s a n d w i t h t h e v i r t u a l a b a n d o n m e n t o f t h e communes . I n r e p l y i n g t o S o v i e t c h a r g e s o f n e g a t i n g m a t e r i a l i n c e n t i v e s a n d b e i n g o v e r l y c o n c e r n e d w i t h i d e o l o g i c a l c o n -s c i o u s n e s s , t h e C h i n e s e h a v e c r i t i c i z e d t h e C . P . S . U . f o r t o o g r e a t a c o n c e r n w i t h e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e m a t e r i a l p r e r e q u i s i t e s t o c o m m u n i s m , a n d o f n e g l e c t i n g " s p i r i t u a l " a s p e c t s s u c h a s m o r a l i n c e n t i v e s a n d c o m m u n i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s , w h i c h a r e e q u a l l y n e c e s s a r y t o c o m m u n i s m . R e c o g n i z i n g t h i s s e r i o u s c h a r g e , C h a i r m a n K h r u s h c h e v p o s e d t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e S l n o - S o v i e t commune p o l e m i c s : Do we n o t b e l i t t l e t h e r o l e o f c o m m u n i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s a n d i d e o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n when we p r e s e n t communism a s a c u p o f a b u n d a n c e t o w h i c h a l l h a v e a c c e s s a n d f r o m w h i c h t h e y w i l l a l l be a b l e t o s a t i s f y f u l l y t h e i r m a t e r i a l a n d s p i r i t u a l r e q u i r e m e n t s ? 2 2 H i s a n s w e r w a s t h a t "Communism c a n n o t be c o n c e i v e d a s a t a b l e w i t h e m p t y p l a t e s a t w h i c h s i t ' h i g h l y c o n s c i o u s 1 a n d ' f u l l y e q u a l ' p e o p l e . " 2 3 I n s h o r t , h i s a r g u m e n t i s t h a t f a c t o r s S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t S t a t e m e n t o f S e p t e m b e r 21, 1 9 6 3 ( L o n d o n , S o v i e t B o o k l e t s , 1963), p . 13. M. S . K h r u s h c h e v , " T h e P r e s e n t S t a g e o f C o m m u n i s t C o n s t r u c t i o n , " O P . c i t . , p . 3-2 3 L o c . c i t . 367 of the mind such as "communist consciousness" are secondary to material f a c t o r s , and that i t i s perfectly permissible to s a c r i f i c e these secondary factors for the sake of achieving material abundance: since material abundance i s the chief prerequisite, then nothing should stand In the way of achieving this abundance i n the shortest possible time. In the course of events, he suggests, these other factors w i l l take care of themselves, and w i l l be f u l f i l l e d on the basis of the achieved material abundance. Another charge made by the C.P.S.U. against the communes i n the course of the polemics was that they overly stressed the public interest at the expense of i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t . Accordingly the spokesman for the C.P.S.U. counterposed "the Leninist cooperation plan" to communes and argued that the communes undermined the basic p r i n c i p l e of Lenin's plan: material incentives combined with personal and public i n t e r e s t . By personal i n t e r e s t , or as S t a l i n put i t , "the i n d i v i d u a l everyday interests of the c o l l e c t i v e farmers," was meant such things as private ownership of poultry, small livestock, a cow, grain, or household land. In the Soviet c o l l e c t i v e farms, small private plots were s t i l l thriving at the time of the introduction of communes i n China and the "appurtenances of l i f e " were s t i l l retained i n private owner-ship by the peasants: thus a certain degree of i n d i v i d u a l interest was maintained. 368 In the communes of China, on the other hand, private interest was almost e n t i r e l y subordinated to public i n t e r e s t . Private plots were turned over to the commune, and their produce made available to the communal mess h a l l s ; l i v e -stock belonging to the peasants and privately owned poultry was generally c o l l e c t i v i z e d ; private f r u i t trees were expropriated for public use; and even houses, stoves and utensils were c o l l e c t i v i z e d i n some communes. The s o c i a l i z a -tion of items such as household goods not c l a s s i f i a b l e as means of production was, i n the Soviet view, a l i e n to Marxism. The eclipsing of individual interest i n the s o c i a l i s t phase, i n terms of small private holdings, was i n the Soviet view, a v i o l a t i o n of Lenin's cooperative plan. In the Soviet view, private holdings should not be a r b i t r a r i l y s o c i a l i z e d and confiscated by the commune or the state; these private holdings w i l l be given up by the peasants "of t h e i r own oh accord", at such a time as c o l l e c t i v e farming can produce the necessary abundance, to make supplementary farming unnecessary. The whole emphasis of the Soviet leaders was upon voluntariness and the bankruptcy of a p o l i c y of coercion. Indeed, Lenin had stressed on numerous occasions the need to persuade rather than coerce the peasantry, saying that "coercion would ruin our whole cause" and asserting that: ^Program of the C.P.S.U. (Moscow, F.L.P.H., 1 9 6 1 ) , p. 77. P r o l o n g e d e d u c a t i o n a l w o r k i s w h a t i s r e q u i r e d . We h a v e t o g i v e t o t h e p e a s a n t , who n o t o n l y i n o u r c o u n t r y , b u t a l l o v e r t h e w o r l d , i s a p r a c t i c a l man a n d a r e a l i s t , c o n c r e t e e x a m p l e s t o p r o v e t h a t t h e commune i s t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e t h i n g . 2 5 K h r u s h c h e v * s a r g u m e n t w a s t h a t b y f o r c e o r e x a m p l e o v e r a l o n g p e r i o d o f t i m e , c o l l e c t i v e p r o d u c t i o n w o u l d p r o v e i t s s u p e r i o r i t y b y s a t i s f y i n g t h e n e e d s o f t h e p e o p l e f u l l y , a n d w o u l d r e n d e r p r i v a t e p r o d u c t i o n o b s o l e t e . I n t h e C h i n e s e v i e w t h i s p o l i c y w a s t a n t a m o u n t t o r e t a i n i n g s m a l l s c a l e c a p i t a l i s m i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s , a n d a m o u n t e d t o a r e f u s a l t o c o n s u m m a t e t h e s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n , s i n c e t h e c h i e f t a s k o f t h e s o c i a l i s t p e r i o d i s t o s o c i a l i z e a l l t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n . A s one C . P . C . l e a d e r p o i n t e d o u t : . . . t h e p e o p l e ' s commune movement c l e a r l y f o r e s h a d o w e d t h e i m m i n e n t a n d f i n a l e x t i n c t i o n o f c a p i t a l i s t economy a n d i n d i v i d u a l e c o n o m y i n o u r c o u n t r y . T h i s e v o k e d t h e e m n i t y o f r e a c t i o n a r i e s b o t h a t home a n d a b r o a d a n d o f t h e m o d e r n r e v i s i o n i s t s . 2 6 The c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n o f t h e r e m n a n t s o f p r i v a t e p r o p e r t y b y t h e communes w a s a n e x c e p t i o n a l l y i m p o r t a n t a s p e c t i n t e r m s o f i t s i d e o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t s i m p o r t a n c e w a s t w o f o l d . F i r s t , i t d r e w s h a r p a t t e n t i o n t o t h e f a c t t h a t t h e S o v i e t U n i o n c o n t i n u e d t o a l l o w p r i v a t e " v . I . L e n i n , S e l e c t e d W o r k s V o l u m e I I ( M o s c o w , F . L . P . H . , 1 9 k 7 ) , p . 4 6 2 . ?6 L i F u - c h u n , " R a i s e H i g h t h e R e d F l a g o f t h e G e n e r a l L i n e a n d C o n t i n u e t o M a r c h F o r w a r d " ( P e k i n g , F . L . P . , i 9 6 0 ) , P . 3. 370 o w n e r s h i p o f t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t i t c l a i m e d t o h a v e a c h i e v e d s o c i a l i s m a n d t o h a v e p r o g r e s s e d t o t h e s t a g e o f b u i l d i n g c o m m u n i s m . B y s t r e s s i n g t h e M a r x i s t p r i n c i p l e t h a t a l l p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p o f t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n m u s t be a b o l i s h e d , t h e C h i n e s e p a r t y o p e n l y e x p o s e d t h e o b v i o u s l a g o f t h e p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s o f S o v i e t s o c i e t y a n d c a s t s e r i o u s d o u b t on t h e i d e o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n o f t h e S o v i e t l e a d e r s . S e c o n d l y , b y a b o l i s h i n g t h e l a s t r e m n a n t s o f i n d i v i d u a l o w n e r s h i p , t h e C h i n e s e C o m m u n i s t P a r t y w a s c l e a r l y p l a c i n g p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s a t a more a d v a n c e d s t a g e t h a n t h o s e e x i s t i n g i n t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , a n d t h e r e f o r e p r o v i d i n g a d i r e c t c h a l l e n g e t o t h e S o v i e t l e a d i n t h e a d v a n c e t o w a r d s c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y — i f n o t i n s t a n d a r d s o f l i v i n g , t h e n i n m a t u r i t y o f p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s . I n s h o r t , t h r o u g h t h e communes , t h e C h i n e s e w e r e t h e f i r s t n a t i o n t o a c h i e v e t h e a b s o l u t e a b o l i t i o n o f t h e r e m n a n t s o f c a p i t a l i s m a n d o f p r i v a t e o w n e r s h i p . I n t e r m s o f M a r x i s t i d e o l o g y , t h i s g a v e t h e m a c l a i m t o be i n t h e l e a d , i n a c t u a l t e r m s , i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o commun ism. C l o s e l y r e l a t e d t o t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e a b o l i t i o n o f t h e p r i v a t e s e c t o r o f t h e e c o n o m y , was t h e q u e s t i o n o f t h e e v o l u t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e p r o p e r t y i n t o p r o p e r t y o f t h e w h o l e p e o p l e . T h i s a g a i n w a s a m a t t e r o f t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o h i g h e r f o r m s o f s o c i a l i s t p r o d u c t i o n r e l a t i o n s . I n t h e s p r i n g o f 1958, s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e communes i n China, Chairman Khrushchev had conceded that "public property i s the highest form of property." This i s how-Lenin understood i t . 2 7 Moreover, Khrushchev s p e c i f i c a l l y declared that "public property has a higher, and c o l l e c t i v e pQ property a lower, degree of s o c i a l i z a t i o n . " However, Khrushchev's reorganization of the Machine Tractor Stations, and the sale of state machinery to the c o l l e c t i v e s , involved a transfer of a section of the means of production from a higher l e v e l to a lower l e v e l — t o the co l l e c t i v e l e v e l . Thus, not only were the s o c i a l i s t property forms not ad-vancing to a higher stage i n the Soviet Union, but they were taking steps backward. It was i n this context that the communes were i n t r o -duced i n China. In themselves, they embodied a higher form of property and production relations since the co l l e c t i v e unit had expanded greatly u n t i l i t encompassed a whole township. Moreover, some communes federated on a county scale which was an even greater advance towards the re a l i z a t i o n of the i d e a l of public property. But more importantly, the or i g i n a l commune resolution stressed that China would achieve "ownership of the whole people" universally within just a few years, and characterized the communes as already having N. S. Khrushchev, "On Further Developing the Collective Farm System," O P . c i t . , p. 1 1 . pQ hoc, c i t . 372 "some e l e m e n t s o f o w n e r s h i p o f t h e p e o p l e a s a w h o l e . " T h e s e l a t t e r e l e m e n t s I n c l u d e d s u c h t h i n g s a s s t a g e b a n k s a n d f a c t o r i e s w h i c h w e r e p l a c e d u n d e r t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e commune. M o r e o v e r , e v e n a t t h e t i m e o f t h e i n i t i a l f o r m a t i o n o f t h e communes o n a u n i v e r s a l b a s i s i n t h e r u r a l a r e a s , i t w a s d e c l a r e d t h a t a l r e a d y " o w n e r s h i p o f t h e means o f p r o d u c t i o n b y t h e w h o l e p e o p l e h a s b e e n i n s t i t u t e d b y a f e w p e o p l e ' s communes on t h e b a s i s o f t h e f u l l a g r e e m e n t o f t h e i r m e m b e r s . " A s f o r t h e r e s t o f t h e communes , i t w a s d e c l a r e d t h a t : The t r a n s i t i o n f r o m c o l l e c t i v e o w n e r s h i p t o o w n e r s h i p b y t h e p e o p l e a s a w h o l e i s a p r o c e s s , t h e c o m p l e t i o n o f w h i c h may t a k e l e s s t i m e — t h r e e t o f o u r y e a r s — i n some p l a c e s a n d l o n g e r — f i v e t o s i x y e a r s o r e v e n l o n g e r — i n o t h e r s . 2 9 The S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n t h e p o l i c y c l a s h o v e r c o l l e c -t i v e a n d p u b l i c p r o p e r t y , w a s t h a t t h e C h i n e s e w e r e a t t e m p t i n g t o a d v a n c e p r e m a t u r e l y t o w a r d s p r o p e r t y o f t h e w h o l e p e o p l e . A n s w e r i n g t h e c h a l l e n g e t o S o v i e t p o l i c y i m p l i e d i n t h e C h i n e s e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o a c h i e v e t h e e x t e r m i n a t i o n o f c o l l e c t i v e p r o p e r t y w i t h i n a v e r y f e w y e a r s , C h a i r m a n K h r u s h c h e v c h a r g e d t h a t : P r o p e r t y f o r m s c a n n o t be c h a n g e d a t w i l l . T h e y d e v e l o p i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h e c o n o m i c l a w s a n d d e p e n d on t h e n a t u r e a n d l e v e l o f t h e p r o d u c t i v e ^ " R e s o l u t i o n o f t h e C e n t r a l C o m m i t t e e o f t h e C . P . C . on t h e E s t a b l i s h m e n t o f P e o p l e ' s Communes i n t h e R u r a l A r e a s , " P e o p l e ' s Communes i n C h i n a ( P e k i n g , F . L . P . , 1 9 5 8 ) , p . 7. 373 forces. The c o l l e c t i v e farm system f u l l y accords with the present l e v e l and development require-ments of the productive forces i n agriculture.3 0 In the Soviet view, elements of ownership of the whole people would gradually increase i n the c o l l e c t i v e farm system as a natural course of events, gradually bringing "closer together the c o l l e c t i v e farm and public forms of s o c i a l i s t property." According to the leadership of the C.P.S.U.: . . . The features characteristic of the property of the whole people arise and take root i n co-operative-collective farm property. L i f e i t s e l f i s bringing the national and co-operative forms of property closer together, with the ultimate perspective of the emergence of a single communist property . . . .31 Thus, the C.P.S.U. rejected the stand of the Chinese party that an extensive program must be undertaken to reorganize r u r a l society i n order to make the t r a n s i t i o n to property of the whole people. According to the arguments put forward by Khrushchev, th i s was not an overly important matter since "Lenin never counterposed public property and co-operative property" and looked on both as s o c i a l i s t forms of property. Khrushchev thus denied the "contradiction" between the two forms of property, and charged the Chinese with attempting to change property relations before the appropriate l e v e l of 30 N. S. Khrushchev, Control Figures, O P . c i t . , p. 12*+. 3 1N. S. Khrushchev, On the Communist Program (Moscow, F.L.P.H., 1961), p. 77. 37 k p r o d u c t i v e f o r c e s h a d a r i s e n . T h i s was t h e c r u x o f h i s p o s i t i o n i n c r i t i c i s m s o f t h i s a s p e c t o f t h e p e o p l e 1 s communes . I t w a s shown i n t h e p r e v i o u s c h a p t e r t h a t t h e communes w e r e s p e c i f i c a l l y d e s i g n e d w i t h t h e i d e a i n m i n d o f o v e r c o m i n g t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n m e n t a l a n d m a n u a l l a b o u r , b e t w e e n w o r k e r a n d p e a s a n t a n d b e t w e e n t o w n a n d c o u n t r y . T h e s e w e r e p r o b l e m s w h i c h h a d v i r t u a l l y b e e n i g n o r e d b y t h e C . P . S . U . b e f o r e t h e communes w e r e i n t r o d u c e d , d e s p i t e t h e f a c t t h a t M a r x a n d L e n i n h a d made t h e o v e r c o m i n g o f t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o a c h i e v i n g c o m m u n i s m . W i t h t h e C h i n e s e l a y i n g s o much e m p h a s i s on t h e r o l e o f t h e communes i n o v e r c o m i n g t h e s e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s i n s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y , i t became n e c e s s a r y f o r t h e S o v i e t U n i o n e i t h e r t o a c c e p t t h e C h i n e s e s o l u t i o n t o t h e s e p r o b l e m s , o r t o r e j e c t t h e commune a n d s e t up a r e a l i s t i c a l t e r n a t i v e p o l i c y . T h e C . P . S . U . c h o s e t h e l a t t e r c o u r s e . I t a r g u e d t h a t a m a s s i v e r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f s o c i e t y s u c h a s t h a t u n d e r t a k e n i n t h e communes w a s w r o n g a n d u n -n e c e s s a r y . S i n c e t h e " m a i n l i n k " i n t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o communism a n d t h e c h i e f p r e r e q u i s i t e w a s m a t e r i a l a b u n d a n c e ( i n t h e S o v i e t v i e w ) t h e r e f o r e t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e t h r e e " c o n t r a d i c t i o n s " m u s t be b a s e d on t h e p r o c e s s o f " l a y i n g t h e m a t e r i a l f o u n d a t i o n , o r o n t h e b a s i s o f i t . " I n o t h e r w o r d s , t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n m e n t a l a n d m a n u a l l a b o u r , 375 w o r k e r a n d p e a s a n t , t o w n a n d c o u n t r y , c o u l d o n l y p r o p e r l y b e e r a s e d o n t h e b a s i s o f a v e r y h i g h p r o d u c t i v i t y a n d a n a d v a n c e d t e c h n o l o g y . T h u s , i n t h e S o v i e t v i e w , t w o c o n d i -t i o n s a r e n e c e s s a r y b e f o r e t h e d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n m e n t a l a n d m a n u a l l a b o u r c a n b e o v e r c o m e : F i r s t , t h e s c i e n t i f i c a n d t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u -t i o n a n d a b o v e a l l , c o m p r e h e n s i v e a u t o m a t i o n o f p r o d u c t i o n , a s a r e s u l t o f w h i c h l a b o u r i t s e l f i s t r a n s f o r m e d . M a n u a l l a b o u r w i l l be made e a s y a n d t h e m o n o t o n y o f some k i n d s o f m e n t a l w o r k e l i m i n a t e d . S e c o n d , t h e c a r r y i n g t h r o u g h o f a new s t a g e i n t h e c u l t u r a l r e v o l u t i o n , a s a r e s u l t o f w h i c h p e o p l e * s c o n s c i o u s n e s s w i l l be d e e p e n e d a n d a l l w i l l b e i n a p o s i t i o n t o a c q u i r e a h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n . T h u s , t e c h n o l o g y w i l l p r o v i d e t h e s o l u t i o n t o t h e c o n t r a d i c -t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e t w o t y p e s o f l a b o u r . I n c r i t i c i s i n g t h e C h i n e s e p o s i t i o n w h i c h s t r e s s e s t h e n e e d f o r t h e same i n d i v i d u a l t o d o b o t h m e n t a l a n d m a n u a l w o r k , t h e C . P . S . U . s p o k e s m e n h a v e a r g u e d t h a t " i f s c i e n t i s t s , a r t i s t s , q u a l i f i e d e n g i n e e r s , a n d d e s i g n e r s a r e made t o do m a n u a l w o r k t h i s w i l l n o t g e t r i d o f t h e d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n t h e t w o t y p e s o f l a b o u r . " 3 3 M o r e o v e r , I t h a s b e e n s u g g e s t e d t h a t " u s i n g h i g h l y q u a l i f i e d p e o p l e f o r l o w - e f f i c i e n c y w o r k r u n s c o u n t e r t o t h e n e e d s o f t h e economy a n d i s o f no b e n e f i t t o s o c i e t y , f o r i t w i l l r e c e i v e f e w e r m a t e r i a l a n d c u l t u r a l v a l u e s . " T h i s v i e w , o f c o u r s e , i s d i r e c t l y c o n t r a r y 3 2 A . S o b o l e v , o n . c i t . , p . 8. 3 3 L o c . c i t . 376 to the view of the Chinese leaders who see job mobility as the solution to the problem; i t i s also contrary to the dir e c t i v e s l a i d down by Engels and Marx who did not advocate making a l l work of one type, but advocated the free moving of individuals between a wide variety of jobs, both manual and mental. Thus, the Soviet party's position i s ideologi-c a l l y vulnerable i n the l i g h t of communist theory and i s a r e l a t i v e l y weak response to the challenge of the communes. As f a r as overcoming the differences between worker and peasant i s concerned, the Chinese program within the commune system was to have the peasants engage i n i n d u s t r i a l a c t i v i t y i n the backyard furnace program, to have the peasants work on i r r i g a t i o n and construction projects, to decentralize industry and encourage native f a c t o r i e s , and to have workers engage i n small-scale agriculture. Again, the Soviet party denied that such a r a d i c a l program was necessary and emphasized that the correct solution to overcoming the differences between worker and peasant would be found i n mechanization and automation whereas the Chinese leaders stressed the need of reorganizing society and the need for mass movements to overcome the d i s t i n c t i o n between worker and peasant. The C.P.S.U, denied this need and charged that such an unnecessary program could only upset the economy and cause i n e f f i c i e n c y and retard production. The t h i r d d i s t i n c t i o n which i t i s intended that the communes overcome i s the d i s t i n c t i o n between town and country. 377 By taking i n both urban and r u r a l areas, both Industry and agriculture, both town and country, and merging them into one s o c i a l unit, the Chinese expect to develop the future unit of communist society. The Chinese argue that purely a g r i c u l t u r a l units such as c o l l e c t i v e farms and state farms merely perpetuate the differences between town and country and that a new s o c i a l form—the commune— i s required. The Soviets, of course, reject t h i s argument and deny that i t i s necessary to reorganize society into communes i n order to erase the differences between town and country. In the view of the C.P.S.U., the aim of communists should be "to convert the c o l l e c t i v e farm v i l l a g e s into modern urban-type communities supplied with a l l the lat e s t municipal and c u l t u r a l f a c i l i t i e s , " - ' and deny the need for any kind of decentralization of the c i t i e s . According to Chairman Khrushchev: the merger of collective-farm-co-operative property with state property into an i n t e g r a l public property i s . . . the solution to the cardinal problem of bridging the essential difference between town and country.35 The question of family l i f e i n the communes of China was one of the chief aspects seized upon i n the Western world as deserving comment and c r i t i c i s m . The reaction of the 3*%. S. Khrushchev, Control Figures, on. c i t . , p. 126 3^Loc. c i t . 378 C.P.S.U. was not greatly d i f f e r e n t , and during the commune polemics, the Soviet Union made i t known that any negation of family l i f e was to be deplored, and that the p o l i c y of replacing family l i f e with c o l l e c t i v e l i f e was not at a l l consistent with the ideology of Marxist-Leninism. As Khrushchev pointed out i n h i s speech to the 22nd Congress: People who would say that the significance of the family drops during the transition to communism, and that i t disappears e n t i r e l y with time, are absolutely wrong. In f a c t , the family w i l l grow stronger under communism. Family relationships w i l l be completely disen-cumbered of material considerations and w i l l become very pure and lasting.3 o In other words, the Chinese p o l i c y of negating family l i f e and of undermining the family unit could not be j u s t i f i e d , and was a p a r t i c u l a r l y undesirable aspect of the communes. The Chinese countered with the argument that their intention was only to destroy bourgeois family relations and feudal aspects of the family and not necessarily the family as such. Nevertheless, the C.P.S.U. maintained a c r i t i c a l attitude towards the communes* negative p o l i c y towards the t r a d i t i o n a l l y c l o s e l y knit Chinese family system. Related to the fate of the family i n the communes, i s the wider question of personal freedom. As has been pointed out i n previous chapters, one of the most str i k i n g aspects of the communes was the accent on tight m i l i t a r y - l i k e N. S. Khrushchev, On the Communist Program, pp. c i t . , 379 d i s c i p l i n e and on t o t a l control of the members* existence; i n other words, i t s t o t a l i t a r i a n aspect. It has been pointed out that, whereas the Soviet Union was proceeding on a course of gradual l i b e r a l i z a t i o n and was introducing more and more freedom i n place of the total i t a r i a n i s m of the S t a l i n era, the Chinese were moving i n exactly the opposite d i r e c t i o n through the communes. Such a p o l i c y could hardly avoid coming i n for Soviet c r i t i c i s m . Thus, the C.P.S.U. declared that "the tran s i t i o n to communism means the f u l l e s t extension of personal freedom and the rights of Soviet c i t i z e n s , " 3 ' 7 rather than a narrowing of them as occurred i n the communes. On numerous occasions, Mao was accused by the Russians of wanting to employ p o l i c i e s and t a c t i c s characteristic of the "cult of personality" period i n the Soviet Union. Thus, the totalitarianism of the communes was another important point of dispute between the two parties. In the Soviet Union there existed "dogmatic" elements within the party who espoused i d e o l o g i c a l views similar i f not i d e n t i c a l to those of Mao Tse-tung. Thus, the C.P.C.*s introduction of the communes, which embodied many principles of Marxist-Leninism either ignored or revised by Khrushchev, gave these orthodox elements a r a l l y i n g point and a voice of i d e o l o g i c a l authority which eould not be silenced. The Program of the C.P.S.U.. on. c i t . , p. 9 6 . 3 8 0 f a c t that the anti-party group of Molotov, Kaganovitch and Malenkov had opposed Khrushchev's " r e v i s i o n i s t " domestic p o l i c i e s , and had only just been overcome when the communes were introduced made the Chinese display of dogmatic orthodoxy es p e c i a l l y inopportune. It should be noted that p a r t i c u l a r l y important was the fa c t that i n both China and the Soviet Union dissident elements were allowed to remain i n the party without being liquidated. In Russia, for instance, as a reaction to the oppression of the S t a l i n era, even "anti-party" elements l i k e that headed by Molotov were not immediately expelled from the party, and thus were i n a position to take advantage of the ide o l o g i c a l support offered by a strong f r a t e r n a l party. In China, the same sort of situation exists on the strength of Mao Tse-tung*s p o l i c y of "treating the disease to save the patient" and of looking at intra-party disputes as "contradictions among the people" which must not be solved by force. Thus, the threat of the communes, and the principles they represented, i s very r e a l to the leadership of the C.P.S.U. which has embarked upon what the more dogmatic Marxists consider to be a l i b e r a l , r e v i s i o n i s t approach to the question of achieving communism. And to the Chinese leaders, Soviet support of the "anti-party" group—consciously or otherwise—is an important factor to be reckoned with, 381 which explains i n part why the C.P.C. has attacked Soviet domestic p o l i c i e s . For both parties the existence of "anti-party" elements has been one of the key factors i n the commune controversy. Questions Involving Ideological Authority Besides the questions concerning the correct path to communism, the commune controversy raised a number of important questions regarding i d e o l o g i c a l authority i n matters of domestic construction. Two aspects, p a r t i c u l a r l y entered into the dispute: the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of "Soviet experience", and the permissible deviation from the Soviet model under the guise of "national p e c u l i a r i t i e s " . The question of Soviet experience played an important part i n the Soviet c r i t i c i s m s of the communes, and i n the attempts of the Peng Teh-huai f a c t i o n to have the communes abandoned. The C.P.S.U. charged that the Chinese "did not take into account the experience of our party and s t a t e " 3 ^ i n regard to communes; and the Peng Teh-huai group "attempted to negate the people's communes on the grounds of the h i s t o r i -c a l experience of the Soviet Union and the absence of communalization i n other s o c i a l i s t countries." 3^ The Chinese ^ S o v i e t Government Letter, O P . c i t . , p. 13. -^Szechuan Daily. September 22, 1959; Current Scene Reports on Communist China (October 1959-April 1961) (Hong Kong, P.O. Box 5217, Kowloon, 196l) , p. y. 3 8 2 r e p l y t o t h e c h a r g e o f n o t t a k i n g S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e i n t o a c c o u n t , was t w o f o l d . F i r s t t h e y a s s e r t e d t h a t "we s h o u l d c o n s i s t e n t l y k e e p on s t u d y i n g t h e e x p e r i e n c e s o f t h e S o v i e t U n i o n , b u t we a r e o p p o s e d t o t h e u n a n a l y z e d a n d d o g m a t i c ho s t u d y a n d a c c e p t a n c e o f S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e . " T h i s meant t h a t i n t h e f i n a l a n a l y s i s i t w a s t h e C h i n e s e p a r t y who w o u l d make t h e d e c i s i o n a s t o w h e t h e r S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e w a s a p p l i c a b l e , n o t t h e C . P . S . U . S e c o n d l y , t h e C h i n e s e t o o k p a i n s t o p o i n t o u t t h a t t h e C h i n e s e a n d S o v i e t communes w e r e d i f f e r e n t i n n a t u r e a n d w e r e i n t r o d u c e d u n d e r d i f f e r e n t c o n d i t i o n s , a n d f o r t h i s r e a s o n S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e w a s n o t a p p l i c a b l e . The C . P . C . a r g u e d t h a t w h i l e t h e S o v i e t communes w e r e c o m m u n i s t i n n a t u r e a n d p u r e l y a g r i c u l t u r a l , t h e C h i n e s e communes w e r e s o c i a l i s t i n n a t u r e a n d w e r e c o n c e r n e d w i t h a s p e c t s o f s o c i e t y a n d t h e economy o t h e r t h a n j u s t a g r i c u l t u r e . On t h e m a t t e r o f d i f f e r i n g c o n d i t i o n s , i t w a s p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e S o v i e t communes w e r e l a u n c h e d b e f o r e t h e s o c i a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n i n t o t h e r u r a l a r e a s h a d b e e n c o n s u m m a t e d a n d w h e n s o c i a l i s t c o n s c i o u s n e s s was a t a l o w l e v e l . I n C h i n a , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d , I d e o l o g i c a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s w a s h i g h , c o l l e c t i v i z a t i o n h a d b e e n a l r e a d y a c h i e v e d , a n d t h e p a r t y w a s i n f i r m c o n t r o l o f t h e p e a s a n t r y . T h e s e d i f f e r e n c e s , i t w a s c l a i m e d , w e r e s o l i d r e a s o n s f o r n o t s t r i c t l y a b i d i n g b y S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e a n d f o r g o i n g a h e a d w i t h t h e communes . I t c a n t h u s be s e e n t h a t " S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e " c a r r i e s e n o u g h i d e o l o g i c a l L o c . c i t w e i g h t t o be u s e d b y d i s s i d e n t C h i n e s e f a c t i o n s a n d t o be r e s p e c t e d a n d " c r e a t i v e l y " a p p l i e d b y t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s . H o w e v e r , i n t h e l o n g r u n , i t i s t h e p a r t y l e a d e r s h i p who d e c i d e s w h e t h e r S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e i s a p p l i c a b l e u n d e r C h i n e s e c o n d i t i o n s a n d t h u s w h e t h e r S o v i e t e x p e r i e n c e c a r r i e s a n y I d e o l o g i c a l a u t h o r i t y . T h i s i s t h e l e s s o n o f t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y . T h e o t h e r g e n e r a l q u e s t i o n i n v o l v i n g i d e o l o g i c a l a u t h o r i t y r e v o l v e s a r o u n d t h e q u e s t i o n o f h o w f a r " g e n e r a l l a w s " c a n be s t r e t c h e d i n a p a r t y ' s " c r e a t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n " o f t h e m t o m e e t " n a t i o n a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s " . I n t h e M o s c o w D e c l a r a t i o n o f f r a t e r n a l p a r t i e s i n 1957, a n d a g a i n i n t h e S t a t e m e n t o f t h e i960 m e e t i n g , i t w a s e m p h a s i z e d t h a t w h i l e g e n e r a l l a w s o f s o c i a l i s t c o n s t r u c t i o n m u s t be c r e a t i v e l y a p p l i e d ( " M e c h a n i c a l c o p y i n g o f t h e p o l i c i e s a n d t a c t i c s o f t h e c o m m u n i s t p a r t i e s o f o t h e r c o u n t r i e s . . . i s b o u n d t o h a r m t h e c a u s e o f s o c i a l i s m " ) , ^ 1 e x a g g e r a t i o n o f t h e r o l e o f t h e s e p e c u l i a r i t i e s , a n d d e p a r t u r e u n d e r t h e p r e t e x t o f n a t i o n a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s , f r o m t h e u n i v e r s a l M a r x i s t -L e n i n i s t t r u t h r e g a r d i n g s o c i a l i s m . . . c o n s t r u c t i o n w i l l i n e v i t a b l y h a r m t h e s o c i a l i s t cause . k 2 " D e c l a r a t i o n o f t h e C o n f e r e n c e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i v e s o f C o m m u n i s t a n d W o r k e r s ' P a r t i e s , " P r a v d a , N o v e m b e r 22, 1957; C u r r e n t D i g e s t o f t h e S o v i e t P r e s s , v o l . I X , n o . k 7 , p . 5» k p L o c . c i t . 384 Nowhere does i t state i n the Declaration or the Statement, who i s to decide when a party has overstepped the bounds; this leaves the question of Ideological authority open. Since t h i s i s the case, although the C.P.S.U. expressed the view at the 21st Congress that "the question of methods and practice i n s o c i a l i s t construction i s the domestic a f f a i r of each country," -> the C.P.S.U. has repeatedly implied during the commune polemics that the C.P.C. has implemented domestic p o l i c i e s , including communes, which cannot be substantiated on the grounds of national p e c u l i a r i t i e s , and which have overstepped the bounds j u s t i f i a b l e under the "creative application" of the general laws of s o c i a l i s t construction. In practice, the C.P.C. has repeatedly used the argument that the communes, although deviating from the Soviet path, can be explained on the basis of national p e c u l i a r i t i e s . In perspective, i t can be seen that the commune controversy has raised many questions concerning i d e o l o g i c a l authority, and concerning who has the power to be the i n t e r -preter of Marxist-Leninism i n matters rel a t i n g to the t r a n s i t i o n to communism. Most of these questions remain unsolved, and separate parties go their own way i n questions of interpretation. As i t stands, the two largest p a r t i e s — 'N. S. Khrushchev, Control Figures, op. c i t . , p. 136 385 the C.P.S.U. and the C.P.C. stand as opposing sources of doctrin a l interpretation on questions of the t r a n s i t i o n to communism and other parties look either to one or the other fo r i d e o l o g i c a l leadership. This has the effect of s p l i t t i n g the camp even further into two ideol o g i c a l factions. Questions Relating to the Wider Dispute The t h i r d set of important issues raised by the communes are issues r e l a t i n g to other areas of the Sino-Soviet dispute, and notably to the dispute over revolution and peaceful coexistence. According to Chairman Khrushchev's " r e v i s i o n i s t " point of view, the communist bloc should not r i s k war for the sake of advancing the communist revolution i n the c a p i t a l i s t countries. On the other hand, he advocates i n the place of revolution, peaceful coexistence and peaceful competition with the West. His argument i s that by showing the innate superiority of the s o c i a l i s t system, the c a p i t a l i s t countries can be won over to the communist cause by peaceful means. This side of Khrushchev's stand should be strongly emphasized, since i t has an important bearing on h i s attitude towards the Chinese communes. It should be r e a l i z e d that i f one rules out revolution as a means to achieve communism i n the c a p i t a l i s t world, the only effe c t i v e weapon l e f t to the dedicated communist i s the force of example: this i s the point of view assumed by the Soviet leader. 386 I n t h i s l i g h t i t c a n be s e e n w h a t e x c e p t i o n a l i m p o r t a n c e a t t a c h e s t o t h e s p e e d w i t h w h i c h s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t i e s a d v a n c e w i t h r e s p e c t t o c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , a n d t o t h e p o p u l a r i m a g e o f t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s among w o r k e r s i n c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . T h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e o f t h e U . S . S . R . w h i c h s t a n d s a s a m o d e l t o t h e a d v a n c e d c a p i t a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , a n d o f C h i n a w h i c h s t a n d s a s a s o c i a l i s t m o d e l t o t h e u n d e r d e v e l o p e d n a t i o n s o f t h e w o r l d . T h u s i t i s no w o n d e r t h a t t h e C . P . S . U . c r i t i c i z e d t h e C h i n e s e f o r i n t r o d u c i n g s u c h a d a m a g i n g p o l i c y a s t h e commune p r o g r a m . N o t o n l y d i d t h e communes e v o k e a n Image o f t o t a l i t a r i a n i s m i n t h e c a p i t a l i s t w o r l d , b u t t h e y a l s o ( s o t h e S o v i e t c h a r g e ) w e r e r e s p o n s i b l e f o r d i s l o c a t i n g t h e C h i n e s e economy a n d f o r c r i p p l i n g p r o d u c t i o n f o r s e v e r a l y e a r s , t h u s d o i n g i r r e p a r a b l e damage t o t h e w h o l e s o c i a l i s t c a u s e . A s t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e h a s d e v e l o p e d , t h e C . P . S . U . h a s p u t more a n d more s t r e s s o n t h e n e e d f o r t h e c o m m u n i s t c o u n t r i e s t o make t h e i r s o c i e t i e s a t t r a c t i v e m o d e l s w h i c h w i l l a p p e a l t o p r o l e t a r i a n s i n t h e n o n - c o m m u n i s t w o r l d . The f o l l o w i n g s t a t e m e n t shows j u s t h o w f a r t h e C . P . S . U . h a s gone i n s u b s t i t u t i n g t h e p o l i c y o f " t h e f o r c e o f e x a m p l e " f o r r e v o l u t i o n : To wage a s t r u g g l e w i t h i m p e r i a l i s m i n d e e d s , t o s a f e g u a r d p e a c e a n d t o h e l p i n e v e r y p o s s i b l e w a y t o a d v a n c e t h e w o r l d l i b e r a t i o n movement means f o r t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s , a b o v e a l l — 387 t o d e v e l o p s o c i a l i s t s o c i e t y s u c c e s s f u l l y , i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e s t e a d i l y a d v a n c i n g t h e economy.hk The n e e d t o d i s p l a y a s t e a d i l y a d v a n c i n g e c o n o m y , o f c o u r s e , i s e s s e n t i a l t o a v i c t o r y f o r t h e S o v i e t b l o c i n p e a c e f u l c o m p e t i t i o n w i t h t h e W e s t . D i s r u p t i o n s s u c h a s t h o s e w h i c h f o l l o w e d on t h e h e e l s o f t h e communes i n C h i n a c a n do t h e b l o c i r r e p a r a b l e h a r m . The o t h e r f a c e t — t h a t o f m a k i n g b l o c c o u n t r i e s a s a p p e a l i n g a s p o s s i b l e i n t h e i r w a y o f l i f e — i s a l s o c l e a r l y s e t o u t i n S o v i e t s t a t e m e n t s : The p r o t o t y p e o f t h e f u t u r e o f a l l m a n k i n d i s b e i n g c r e a t e d i n t h e s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r i e s . A n d t h e p e o p l e s o f o u r c o u n t r i e s a r e c a l l e d u p o n b y a l l t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s t o make t h i s p r o t o t y p e e v e n more a t t r a c t i v e , s o t h a t e v e r y w o r k i n g p e r s o n who l o o k s i n t o t h e w a y o f l i f e i n a n y s o c i a l i s t c o u n t r y c a n s a y : t H e r e i s my s p l e n d i d t o m o r r o w w h i c h i s w o r t h w o r k i n g f o r u n s t i n t i n g l y . 1 5 A g a i n , t h e i m p l i c a t i o n f o r t h e C h i n e s e i s c l e a r . The t o t a l i t a r i a n commune s y s t e m , b a s e d u p o n m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e , i s h a r d l y a n y o n e ' s i d e a o f a " s p l e n d i d t o m o r r o w " . T h u s , i t c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e communes h a d i d e o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e f a r b e y o n d m e r e l y q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e c o r r e c t r o a d t o commun ism. The f a c t t h a t t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r s s t i l l i n t e n d t o p u s h a h e a d w i t h t h e communes when e c o n o m i c c o n d i t i o n s i m p r o v e , i n d i c a t e s t h a t d i s a g r e e m e n t o v e r t h e m a t t e r o f m a k i n g C h i n e s e s o c i e t y " a t t r a c t i v e " f o r t h e s a k e " L e t U s S t r e n g t h e n t h e U n i t y o f t h e S o c i a l i s t M o v e m e n t , " Px§vda, J a n u a r y 7, 1963; C u r r e n t D i g e s t o f t h e S o v i e t P r e s s , v o l . X V , n o . 2. k ^ L o c . c i t . 388 of the non-violent victory of communism i n the c a p i t a l i s t world w i l l become increasingly intense i n the years ahead. Another facet of the communes which appears to have a bearing on the dispute over war and peaceful coexistence, i s their m i l i t a r y significance. Two specific features of the communes have important implications i n this regard: the people's m i l i t i a and economic decentralization. Both these factors have been pointed out by the Chinese party as important to national defence In the event of an attack by Chiang Kai-shek and/or the imperialists. From the Soviet viewpoint, i t i s l i k e l y that the military significance of the communes was surely realized and interpreted as a move by Mao Tse-tung to prepare the nation for a war against the i m p e r i a l i s t s — e s p e c i a l l y i n the l i g h t of his statement at the 1957 Moscow conference that: In China construction has not got underway i n earnest. If the imperialists impose war on us, we s h a l l be prepared to terminate construction; l e t us f i r s t have a t r i a l of strength and then return to construction.*+6 With the signing of the "Agreement of New Technology for National Defence" i n the f a l l of 1957, which made provision for giving the Chinese the information required to manufacture atomic weapons, the people*s communes must have taken on ominous significance to the C.P.S.U. There i s a di s t i n c t Quoted by Soviet Government i n , Soviet Government Statement (September 2 1 , 1963), op. c i t . , p. 2. 389 p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t t h e m i l i t a r y i m p l i c a t i o n s o f t h e communes w e r e i n s t r u m e n t a l i n c o n v i n c i n g t h e R u s s i a n s t o r e n e g e o n t h e A g r e e m e n t a n d r e f u s e t o s u p p l y C h i n a w i t h s a m p l e s o f a t o m i c w e a p o n s . The p e o p l e * s m i l i t i a w a s a l s o a n a s p e c t o f t h e communes w h i c h w a s s t r o n g l y c r i t i c i z e d b y t h e R u s s i a n s i n t h e c o u r s e o f t h e c o n t r o v e r s y . A c c o r d i n g t o t h e C h i n e s e , K h r u s h c h e v d e c l a r e d a t t h e i 9 6 0 B u c h a r e s t m e e t i n g t h a t " a n 1+7 o r g a n i z e d m i l i t i a i s n o t a n a r m y b u t c a n n o n f o d d e r . " ' I n m a k i n g t h i s s t a t e m e n t , K h r u s h c h e v w a s a r g u i n g t h a t i n m o d e r n w a r f a r e i t i s a t o m i c w e a p o n s a n d c o m b a t p l a n e s w h i c h d e t e r m i n e m i l i t a r y s t r e n g t h , n o t manpower a s t h e C h i n e s e h a v e s u g g e s t e d . T h u s , t h e c l a s h o v e r t h e p e o p l e ' s m i l i t i a i n v o l v e s t h e w i d e r q u e s t i o n o f h o w one d e t e r m i n e s o n e ' s own s t r e n g t h a n d t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e i m p e r i a l i s t s w h e t h e r i n d e e d t h e W e s t i s a p a p e r t i g e r , a n d w h a t t h e r e s u l t o f a n o p e n c o n f l i c t w i t h i m p e r i a l i s m w o u l d b e . P e r h a p s one o f t h e m o s t s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t o r s , l i n k i n g t h e commune c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h t h e d i s p u t e d i s s u e s o f w a r , r e v o l u t i o n , a n d p e a c e f u l c o m p e t i t i o n w h i c h now d o m i n a t e t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e , i s t h a t o f t h e " a n t i - p a r t y " f a c t i o n s . I t h a s b e e n shown t h a t t h e a n t i - c o m m u n e f a c t i o n i n t h e C . P . C . was l e d b y men who h e l d s i m i l a r " r e v i s i o n i s t " v i e w s on i n t e r n a t i o n a l q u e s t i o n s t o t h o s e o f t h e C . P . S . U . l e a d e r s h i p . L o c . c i t 390 T h i s s i t u a t i o n w a s i m m e n s e l y i m p o r t a n t s i n c e i t meant t h a t b y s u p p o r t i n g t h e " a n t i - p a r t y " g r o u p ' s a t t e m p t s t o s e i z e t h e l e a d e r s h i p o v e r t h e commune i s s u e , t h e C . P . S . U . a l s o h a d t h e c h a n c e t o v a u l t i n t o p o w e r t h o s e members o f t h e C h i n e s e p a r t y s y m p a t h e t i c t o t h e S o v i e t p o l i c y o f p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e a n d p e a c e f u l c o m p e t i t i o n . T h i s may p a r t l y e x p l a i n why t h e commune i s s u e h a s c o n t i n u e d t o be f a n n e d i n t o f l a m e b y t h e C . P . S . U . , d e s p i t e t h e c o n s i d e r a b l e i d e o l o g i c a l r e t r e a t u n d e r t a k e n on t h i s i s s u e b y t h e C h i n e s e l e a d e r . B y t h e same t o k e n , " d o g m a t i c " e l e m e n t s i n t h e C . P . S . U . o p p o s e ( a s d o t h e C h i n e s e ) K h r u s h c h e v ' s r e v i s i o n i s t p o l i c i e s , o n b o t h t h e d o m e s t i c a n d i n t e r n a t i o n a l s c e n e . I n t h e c a s e o f t h e a n t i - p a r t y M o l o t o v , M a l e n k o v , K a g a n o v i t c h g r o u p , i t h a s b e e n r e v e a l e d b y t h e C . P . S . U . t h a t t h i s g r o u p " w a g e d a s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t t h e L e n i n i s t l i n e o f t h e p a r t y , a g a i n s t t h e p o l i t i c a l c o u r s e a d o p t e d b y t h e 20th C o n g r e s s a n d a g a i n s t t h e p a r t y ' s u r g e n t a n d v i t a l l y n e e d e d m e a s u r e s i n d o m e s t i c a n d f o r e i g n p o l i c y , a n d s l i p p e d o n t o a p o l i c y o f s c h i s m a t i c a c t i v i t y . " T h u s , s u p p o r t g i v e n b y t h e C h i n e s e t o M o l o t o v a n d h i s s y m p a t h i z e r s o n i d e o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g d o m e s t i c c o n s t r u c t i o n , a l s o p r o v e d t o be s u p p o r t t o t h e g r o u p w h i c h s t a n d s o p p o s e d t o p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e . T h i s g i v e s t h e C h i n e s e r e p l i e s t o S o v i e t c r i t i c i s m o f t h e communes much w i d e r i d e o l o g i c a l s i g n i f i c a n c e t h a n w o u l d a p p e a r on t h e s u r f a c e . k 8 0 . K u u s i n e n , "The C h a r t e r o f U n i t y o f t h e W o r l d C o m m u n i s t M o v e m e n t , " P r a v d a . N o v e m b e r 22, 1958; C u r r e n t Digest o f t h e S o v i e t P r e s s , v o l . X , n o . k 7 , p . 4o. C o n c l u s i o n I n p e r s p e c t i v e i t can be s e e n t h a t t h e commune d i s p u t e i n v o l v e d a w h o l e r a n g e o f i d e o l o g i c a l i s s u e s , a n d w a s n o t c o n f i n e d o n l y t o q u e s t i o n s i n v o l v i n g t h e t r a n s i t i o n t o commun ism. A l s o i n c l u d e d i n t h e d i s p u t e w e r e i s s u e s o f i d e o l o g i c a l a u t h o r i t y , and i s s u e s r e l a t i n g t o the v i t a l l y i m p o r t a n t d i s p u t e o v e r w a r , p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , r e v o l u t i o n a n d p e a c e f u l c o m p e t i t i o n . M o r e o v e r , t h e e x i s t e n c e o f " a n t i -p a r t y " g r o u p s w i t h i n b o t h p a r t i e s was i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t a k i n g t h e d i s p u t e f r o m a m e r e l y t h e o r e t i c a l p l a n e t o a p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , a n d i n i n c r e a s i n g t h e debate ' s s i g n i f i c a n c e . I t c a n be s e e n t h a t t h e commune d e b a t e i s f a r f r o m o v e r , b o t h because t h e C h i n e s e a r e d e t e r m i n e d t o p u s h a h e a d w i t h t h e communes a s c o n d i t i o n s p e r m i t , a n d because o f t h e c o m m u n e s 1 r e l a t i o n t o t h e w i d e r a s p e c t s o f t h e S i n o - S o v i e t d i s p u t e s u c h a s w a r , p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , r e v o l u t i o n a n d p e a c e f u l c o m p e t i t i o n . I n d e e d , i t c a n be e x p e c t e d t h a t i n 1965 when t h e C . P . C . p l a n s t o r e n e w t h e commune p r o g r a m , t h e i s s u e s i n v o l v e d i n t h e commune d i s p u t e w i l l a g a i n e r u p t w i t h i n c r e a s e d , v i g o r . M o r e o v e r , a s t h e C . P . S . U . c o n t i n u e s t o d e p a r t " c r e a t i v e l y " more and more f r o m t h e o r t h o d o x M a r x i s t c o n c e p t o f f u t u r e c o m m u n i s t s o c i e t y , P e k i n g w i l l i n c r e a s i n g l y become t h e c e n t e r o f " b o o k i s h - d o g m a t i c communism" w h o s e v i s i o n i s s t i l l o f t h e Utopia o f E n g e l s a n d M a r x , a n d w h o s e f o l l o w e r s c o n s i d e r t h e m s e l v e s t o be " d e f e n d e r s o f t h e f a i t h " . Should the commune system prove i n the long run to be capable of advancing economic growth at exceptionally high speed, then the id e o l o g i c a l strength of the Chinese position would be remarkably strengthened. Given also the p o s s i b i l i t y of a prolonged slump i n Soviet economic growth, the people's commune may become a much greater threat to the leadership of the C.P.S.U. and their "creative" p o l i c i e f o r Khrushchev's p o l i c i e s have been substantiated c h i e f l y on the grounds of economic pragmatism and the promise of greater abundance. If the Chinese model should prove over longer period of time to create faster economic growth than the Soviet system, then the ground would v i r t u a l l y be cut from under the C.P.S.U. l e a d e r s — j u s t as the Soviet leaders hope that their own rate of economic advance w i l l undermine the appeal of the c a p i t a l i s t system i n the West. At the very l e a s t , i n a situation where the commune system produced good r e s u l t s — r e s u l t s superior to those i n the Soviet Union, then the Chinese model would become i n -creasingly a t t r a c t i v e to the underdeveloped nations of Asia A f r i c a and Latin America despite the fac t that i t embodied certain t o t a l i t a r i a n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . In the communist world, a vindication of the commune system over a number of years could only strengthen the ideol o g i c a l position of the "dogmatic" section of the world communist movement vi s - a - v i : the r e v i s i o n i s t sector, and could have important effects on the balance of power, both within individual parties, and within the communist system as a whole. 393 In the debate over the communes, the Soviet Union has won only a tentative v i c t o r y — i t s i d e o l o g i c a l position over the communes apparently being supported, and i t s predictions borne out, by China*s economic f a i l u r e s i n the three years following the introduction of the communes. However, to the degree that the Chinese economic setbacks were indeed the resu l t of natural calamities and the with-drawal of Soviet technicians rather than as the r e s u l t of factors inherent i n the commune system, the Chinese people's communes may yet prove iKhrushchev and the C.P.S.U. to be wrong. Thus, the dispute over the commune system and the ide o l o g i c a l issues—both i n t e r n a l and international—which i t represents, i s by no means concluded. The Soviet Union has won a temporary victory; but the Chinese have yet to admit defeat. With i t s v i t a l connections to the Sino-Soviet dispute as a whole and with i t s immensely important independent ide o l o g i c a l significance, the controversy over the people's communes and the principles which they represent, should continue as an important issue within the communist movement for many years to eome. SELECTED B I B L I O G R A P H Y A b r a m o v i t c h , R a p h a e l , R , The S o v i e t R e v o l u t i o n 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 4 9 . New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l U n i v e r s i t i e s P r e s s , 1962. B o t t o m o r e , T . B . ( t r a n s l a t o r ) . K a r l M a r x E a r l v W r i t i n g s . L o n d o n , W a t t s & C o . , 1963. B o w i e . R . R . a n d J . K . P a i r b a n k . 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