c. / THE POLITICS OF WELFARE: CANADA'S ROAD TO INCOME SECURITY, 1914-1939 By JOSEPHINE M. SCHOFIELD M.A., The Univers i ty of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1971 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Department of P o l i t i c a l Science) We accept th is thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 1983 © Josephine M. Schof ie ld , 1983. In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by h i s or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or pu b l i c a t i o n of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of P o l i t i c a l Science The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date October 23, 1983 / "7Q ^ ABSTRACT The watershed in th is century's p o l i t i c s of welfare i s the transformation in income secur i ty away from char i table towards governmental support. But in the Canadian case i t s or ig ins s t i l l remain obscure. Although the sh i f t i s often pinpointed as occurring during and af ter World War I I , the decis ive bat t les over the propriety of a more act ive state role were fought between 1914 and 1939. The aims of th is study are to demonstrate the i r s ign i f icance in pioneering acceptance of the p r inc ip le of socia l co l l ec t i v i sm, and to shed l i gh t on the range of forces shaping the complex process of socia l policymaking. The case-study method i s used to invest igate the legacy of interwar welfare p o l i t i c s , v i z . , the development of emergency and statutory aid for se lect groups among the very poor. This technique has the advantage of capturing the h i s to r i ca l dimension of the policymaking process, and f i l l i n g the much-needed gaps in Canadian welfare research. Moreover, i t provides an opportunity to test proposit ions concerning socia l po l icy innovations and developments. The ex is t ing l i t e ra tu re iden t i f i es several factors as important: the nature of the economy, the cul tura l context, the structure of p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s , and four sets of part ic ipants - m i l i tan t workers, interest groups, po l i t i c i ans and bureaucrats. The analysis focuses upon the in teract ion between these determinants in shaping a l l the major interwar pol icy decisions in means-tested income maintenance. The evidence reveals that a myriad of forces shaped the or ig ins of the Canadian welfare s ta te , but t he i r inf luence var ied. Socio-economic change played a mediating role by creating the social problems requir ing reso lu t ion, and generating the revenues to finance innovations. The general framework of ideas and the ins t i t u t i ona l structure also exerted a mainly ind i rec t impact, with the former def ining the values and the l a t t e r guiding the behaviour of the par t i c ipants . In contrast , a l l the act ive p o l i t i c a l forces played the pivotal role of interpret ing the problems and deciding the timing and content of the po l icy dec is ions. Interest group power overshadowed working-class mi l i tancy as the ef fect ive societal spur, with farmers rather than businessmen qual i fy ing as the arch opponents of the c o l l e c t i v i s t cause. Inside government, e lec ted, not appointed, o f f i c i a l s dominated the socia l policymaking process. i i TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT i i LIST OF TABLES v LIST OF FIGURES v i i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS v i i i Chapter 1 INTRODUCTION 1 PART I THE ENVIRONMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT 25 2 THE CANADIAN BACKGROUND FOR WELFARE INNOVATIONS 26 45 50 83 111 141 PART III STATUTORY BENEFITS FOR THE DEPENDENT POOR 170 7 MOTHERS' PENSIONS, 1916-1937 174 8 OLD AGE PENSIONS, 1927 228 9 WAR VETERANS' ALLOWANCES, 1930 267 10 PENSIONS FOR THE BLIND, 1937 301 PART II EMERGENCY STATE AID FOR DESTITUTE EMPLOYABLES 3 FEDERAL POLICY OF INTERVENTION, 1919-1921 4 FEDERAL POLICY OF WITHDRAWAL, 1922-1930 5 RELIEF CAMPS FOR SINGLE, HOMELESS MEN, 1932 6 RELIEF LAND SETTLEMENT FOR SELECTED FAMILIES, 1932 i ' i i PART IV CONCLUSIONS 351 11 WELFARE POLITICS: THE CANADIAN CASE 352 FOOTNOTES 371 BIBLIOGRAPHY 430 APPENDICES 445 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 450 i v LIST OF TABLES 1. Population of Canada, by province, census dates 1901-31 28 2. Urban population as a percentage of total population, Canada and provinces, census years 1901-41 30 3. Federal expenditure on unemployment rel ief under orders-in-council, by category aided, 1919-21 70 4. Provincial expenditure on unemployment re l ie f , 1921-30 98 5. Estimates of occupational and age distribution of the unemployed 114 6. Numbers of single, homeless men aided by various federal-provincial projects during the 1932 winter 128 7. Numbers of single, homeless men assisted by rel ief commissions in the western provinces in December 1932 133 8. Numbers of single, homeless men housed in DND camps and Parks Branch camps, by province, and authorized or total expenditures for f iscal years 1932/33 - 1935/36 137 9. Immigration to Canada, 1901-40 143 10. Supporters of re l ief land settlement inside Parliament,1930-34 155 11. Opponents of re l ie f land settlement inside the House of Commons, 1930-34 159 12. Actual and estimated proportions of e l ig ib le applicants (including dependents) and federal contributions under the 1932 rel ief land settlement plan 165 13. Numbers of private and public institutions for the dependent poor in selected c i t i e s , 1900 172 14. Number and percentage of widows in total female population for Canada and the provinces, 1911 and 1921 175 15. Employment of women in Canada, 1891-1931 177 16. Prime movers in provincial campaigns, by ci ty 182 17. Provincial def ic i ts in Ontario and the western provinces, 1914-20 f iscal years 200 18. Amounts expended on mothers' allowances (or their equivalent), 1916-17 to 1938-39 (to the nearest dollar) 218 19. Provincial defici ts in the maritime provinces and Quebec, 1914-37 f iscal years 219 20. Population 70 years and over as percentage of total population, Canada and provinces, 1901-41 census years 229 21. Number of homes for aged poor and institutions for adult poor with number of inmates in parentheses, Canada and Provinces, 1900 231 22. Supporters of pensions inside the Canadian Parliament, 1907-14 240 23. Opponents of pensions inside the Canadian Parliament, 1907-14 243 24. Distribution of Progressive votes on Irvine's motion, 1925 253 25. Organizations joining the Dominion Veterans' Al l iance, 1922-25 275 26. Legion spokesmen and sympathizers in the House of Commons, 1926-29 280 27. Actual and estimated federal expenditure on war veterans' allowances, 1930/31 - 1938/39 f iscal years 294 28. Total blind population and numbers in non-productive and unspecified occupations, 1901-21 census years 302 29. Local clubs of the c iv i l ian blind in Canada, 1921-29 315 v-30. Disabled classes by totals and per 10,000 of the population, 1921-31 census years 321 31. Organizations endorsing memorials, 1933 and 1936 328 32. Supporters of Cotnam's resolution on pensions for the bl ind, 1936 332 33. Number of pensioners and federal contributions towards pensions for blind persons, 1937/38 - 1938/39 f iscal years 346 34. Measures of unemployment used by governments during the 1921-29 period 445 35. DBS estimates of the total numbers of wage-earners, of wage-earners in employment, and of wage-earners unemployed, and the percentage of unemployed in the years 1930-38 446 36. Proportion of unemployed wage-earners on direct re l ie f , 1932-36 446 37. Classif ication of dominion disbursements under rel ief legis lat ion, September 1930 to 31 March 1939 447 v i LIST OF FIGURES 1. Possible determinants of socia l pol icy decisions 23 2. Estimated numbers of employed and unemployed wage-earners in re la t ion to the tota l working populat ion, 1921-38 47 vi>i x ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I would l ike to record my sincere appreciation to a l l members of the thesis committee for their efforts. Keith Banting provided excellent supervision, combining inspirat ion, sustained interest and meticulous reading of the material; Alan Cairns offered encouragement as well as insights; and Dick Johnston made helpful comments on the draft. In addition, thanks are due to Ken Carty for fac i l i ta t ing the final stages of the project. In the course of doing archival research in Ontario, I was helped by numerous o f f i c ia l s , particularly John Smart of the Public Archives of Canada and Grace Worts of the Canadian National Institute for the Blind. I am also indebted to the SSHRC for providing the funds to conduct this study. Equally valuable moral support was offered over the years by several friends: Cynny Abrioux, Robbie Bagot, Helen and Rid Carver, Nora Hutchison, Laura Powers and Peter Robbins; and welcome secretarial assistance was ably provided by Maggie Paquet. The greatest debt, though, is owed to my husband John who bore the brunt of my preoccupation with welfare po l i t i cs , but tolerated i t with such equanimity. v i i i CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION As in other western democracies, Canada's watershed in the development of collective provision against loss of income was the replacement of the stigma of public charity with the principle that state aid is granted as a matter of right. This dramatic shift is often claimed as a pol i t ical achievement of the 1940-70 period when the cornerstones of the contemporary income security system were put into place. But, in fact, the interwar pol i t ics of welfare was more decisive in fac i l i ta t ing acceptance of the principle of social collectivism. Its legacy included various federal and provincial measures for the very poor that set significant precedents for granting state aid 'as of r ight, not chari ty. ' The purpose of this study is to elucidate the pol i t ical origins of these historic innovations in Canadian income security. The onset of the trend away from charitable support began effectively during World War I and gained momentum throughout the 1920s and 1930s. The emergence of welfare as a major pol i t ical issue during these years prompted the senior levels of government to take the i n i t i a l , hesitant steps on the road to income support, as of right. Although their intervention aided only a minority of the poor, i t represented the f i r s t , major assault upon the colonial poor re l ie f inheritance and i ts inherent stigma of public charity. While the ideological break with the past came in a series of small-scale innovations rather than in a single, legislat ive landmark l ike the American New Deal, in combination they established the principle of social collectivism. Once governments accepted that they had a duty to compensate the elderly, some 1 2 disabled groups, sole-support mothers and unemployed workers for the i r loss of income, the seed of extensive state intervention was sown and came to f r u i t i on during and af ter World War II when t ransfer benef i ts , as of r i gh t , were implemented for a l l c i t i z e n s . While representing a s ign i f i can t advance over the ex is t ing system of poor r e l i e f , the package of measures involved only a refinement, not a replacement, of the assistance technique of income support. Publ ic ass is tance , ! i r respect ive of whether i t i s granted to select or a l l categories of the des t i tu te , i s characterized by means-tested, non-contributory benefits financed ent i re ly by the s ta te . It i s given e i ther in cash or kind by a governmental authority only to ind iv iduals who are unable to provide fo r themselves the basic necessi t ies of l i f e . In contrast to publ ic ass is tance, other techniques of income support do not require lack of f inanc ia l resources as the c r i t e r i on of e l i g i b i l i t y . Instead, socia l insurance demands contr ibut ions as the main condit ion of cash benef i ts ; and non-contributory demogrants such as family allowances apply to everyone in a major group, regardless of need. Although the three techniques emerged during World War I to challenge the monopoly of the t rad i t iona l poor r e l i e f system, 2 categoric publ ic assistance soon gained the upper hand. During the 1920s and 1930s, a l l e f fec t ive federal and provincial intervention in the f i e l d of income maintenance depended on the means tes t . Despite i t s res t r i c ted coverage, t h i s development of publ ic aid represented a radical new departure. It approximated the establishment of a "soc ia l service s ta te , " characterized by the provision of services at minimum standards to the poor, that l a i d the foundations for the advent of the "welfare s ta te" in which services are provided at optimum standards for the whole populat ion.^ 3 In the t rans i t i on to the Canadian welfare state during the 1940s, socia l t insurance and demogrants replaced publ ic assistance as the dominant components of income support. Their ascendancy has tended to monopolize the attent ion of researchers because the i r methods and scope vary so widely from assistance as to suggest "dif ferences in k ind . " However: , . . [ t ]here i s no absolute di f ference between socia l welfare before the Second World War and af ter i t . No new pr inc ip les were i nvoked . . . , i f the state was wr i t ing with a wide pen i t was not on a blank page.4 A f a i l u re to appreciate t h i s element of cont inui ty among contemporary invest igators has resulted in the neglect of the role of publ ic assistance in pioneering acceptence of the p r inc ip le of socia l co l lec t i v i sm.5 Moreover, th i s technique s t i l l remains an important component of the ex is t ing income secur i ty system. Indeed, Canada seems to re ly more heavily on means-tested benefits than many other countr ies.6 The evolution of categoric publ ic assistance in Canada followed a s im i la r route to that of other western federat ions. It involved a t ransfer of the income-maintenance function from l o c a l , pr ivate and publ ic agencies to senior leve ls of government. But the Canadian case i s d i s t i nc t i ve because th is sh i f t was semi-involuntary. In contrast to Aus t ra l i a , the process of cen t ra l i za t ion was accompanied by "constant disavowals of respons ib i l i t y " at the highest leve ls and "continuous e f fo r ts " to force lower governments to undertake what was considered to be the i r duty to the people of t he i r area. 1 The sh i f t towards the centre was also only p a r t i a l , as provision of means-tested benefits has not become the exclusive prerogative of the federal government but remains shared with the provinces and, in cer ta in instances, with the mun ic ipa l i t i es . 4 The break-up of the poor r e l i e f system began during World War I. Up unt i l 1914 the r e l i e f of dest i tu t ion was handled in English Canada by munic ipa l i t ies and private c h a r i t i e s , and in Quebec by re l ig ious i ns t i t u t i ons . By the outbreak of the Second World War the i r ro le in re l iev ing the poor was no longer paramount. Dupre describes the transformation in the case of Ontario during the 1921-41 period as: . . . two decades of constant change in the welfare f i e l d , two decades at whose dawn local government shouldered the t r a d i -t iona l respons ib i l i t y of centuries of English pract ice and at whose close the scene was unrecognizable. What had begun as 'poor r e l i e f had become aid to unemployables and employables.8 A s im i la r process of d i f fe ren t ia t ion among the dest i tute occurred in the other provinces. Acting together, the senior leve ls of government provided emergency aid fo r unemployed workers in select winters of the 1920s and throughout the 1930s. Besides sponsoring jo in t schemes of d i rect r e l i e f and r e l i e f works in both decades, they par t ic ipated in a r e l i e f camps pol icy for s i ng le , homeless men and a land settlement scheme for selected fami l ies during the Great Depression. They also singled out some categories of the dependent poor for special treatment. Spurred by Manitoba's 1916 experiment, the provinces sponsored t he i r own statutory programs providing means-tested benefi ts for widows and other sole-support mothers. Ottawa took s im i l a r , independent action concerning prematurely sen i le veterans in 1930. J o i n t l y , the federal and provincial governments financed means-tested pensions for the aged in 1927 and the bl ind in 1937. Although these various i n i t i a t i v e s represented s ign i f i can t advances over t rad i t iona l methods of re l iev ing the poor, ex is t ing research i s sparse and 5 la rgely a p o l i t i c a l . Only the 1927 o ld age pensions i n i t i a t i v e and the development of unemployment r e l i e f provision have been subject to detai led ana lys i s , by Bryden (1974) and Struthers (1983) respect ive ly . Furthermore, despite the obvious p o l i t i c a l sal ience of the various i n i t i a t i v e s in determining who gets what, when and how outside the market p lace, l i t t l e attent ion has been paid to the range of forces shaping the i r o r i g ins . Instead, the t rad i t iona l focus of the l i t e ra tu re i s on the administrat ion of income maintenance measures re f lec t ing the authors' backgrounds in accountancy, law and socia l work.9 f r v e n i n contemporary welfare research p o l i t i c a l sc ien t i s t s are mainly conspicuous by the i r absence, leaving analysis of the semi-v i rg in t e r r i t o r y of pre-1939 i n i t i a t i v e s to the i r colleagues in h istory and socia l work. This study i s designed to remedy the neglect of Canadian welfare p o l i t i c s during the 1914-39 per iod. It involves the hi therto unexplored task of examining the circumstances under which the se lec t i ve , means-tested measures were developed and ident i fy ing the e f fec t ive p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the i r t iming and content. The case-study method i s selected as the appropriate technique of analysis because i t i l l u s t r a t e s the h i s to r i ca l character of the policy-making process and meets the pressing need for information on Canadian publ ic po l i cy , pinpointed by Bryden and Simeon. 1 0 Moreover, when case studies are f i rmly grounded in major theoret ical debates, they possess an explanatory potential lacking in descr ip t ive s tud ies. Although " theore t ica l " case studies s t i l l f a i l to meet the r i g id test of predict ive a b i l i t y , they are useful too ls fo r test ing and re f in ing proposi t ions, provided that cer ta in conditions are met. These prerequis i tes comprise a set of s im i la r cases, invest igat ion of policymaking through t ime, and a conceptual framework.^ The measures, 6 selected fo r ana lys i s , sa t i s f y the f i r s t c r i t e r i on because they are a l l dependent upon the means t e s t . Moreover, the bulk represent innovations that f a c i l i t a t e d acceptance of the pr inc ip le of socia l co l l ec t i v i sm. As these major po l icy decisions were taken on an ad hoc, unplanned basis between 1914 and 1939, the choice of subject involves invest igat ion of policymaking through t ime. The remaining prerequis i te requires more extended d iscuss ion , as a conceptual framework provides the means of st ructur ing the mass of data accumulated through use of the case study method. Conceptual Framework of the Study Social pol icy researchers have formulated a number of proposit ions that can be tested in the context of Canadian welfare p o l i t i c s during the 1914-39 per iod. As they are pr imar i ly interested in accounting for innovations, the bulk of t he i r hypotheses suggest possible spurs to governmental ac t ion ; but a few scholars recognize tha t , l i k e a l l other types of publ ic po l i cy , socia l pol icy also embraces governmental inac t ion , and they ident i fy constraints on i t s development. Their co l l ec t i ve research f indings suggest that socio-economic, cu l tu ra l and p o l i t i c a l determinants are important factors inf luencing how socia l po l i c ies are ra ised , debated and shaped. This t r i l ogy of fo rces , however, i s often not incorporated into individual analyses. Instead, the tendency in the l i t e ra tu re i s to concentrate upon establ ish ing the primacy of economics or cul ture or p o l i t i c s . In contrast , th i s study adopts a mu l t i -rather than a uni-dimensional approach, as a l l these factors ass is t us in understanding the complex process of socia l policymaking. Socio-economic determinants: The importance of socio-economic change i s stressed in two d i s t i nc t schools of l i t e r a t u r e : quant i tat ive analyses and h is to r i ca l s tudies. Systematic 7 research at the cross-nat ional level pinpoints economic growth as the key var iable related to the global development of social secur i ty . In l i ne with the f indings of s t a t i s t i c a l analyses by Cutright (1965) and Pryor (1968), a recent 64-nation study iden t i f i es economic growth and i t s demographic and bureaucratic outcomes as "the root cause of welfare state development."12 The sal ience of economic development, though, diminishes when the units of comparison sh i f t e i ther to nations at s imi la r leve ls of aff luence or , of more relevance for th is study, to regions within federat ions. American scholars , the pioneers of quant i tat ive analyses at the sub-national l e v e l , remain divided over the re la t i ve merits of economic development and p o l i t i c a l factors in accounting for d i f ferent leve ls of welfare expenditure between states.13 Although s l im , Canadian research of th i s type suggests that p o l i t i c a l var iables are more relevant. For example, Chandler i den t i f i es the threat of s o c i a l i s t opposition as the sa l ien t factor in explaining post-World War II var iat ions in welfare spending among p rov inces . ! 4 Regardless of the units of comparison, however, studies of th is type share a comnon major weakness, i . e . , an i n a b i l i t y to explain the soc ia l policy-making process. Posi t ing a re lat ionship of s t a t i s t i c a l s ign i f icance between, say, regional economic d i spa r i t i es and varying levels of welfare spending t e l l s us nothing about how socia l problems become p o l i t i c a l issues and are converted into programs. Less rigorous surveys of h i s to r i ca l evidence also provide a guide to the re lat ionship between socio-economic variables and social secur i ty development. After invest igat ing the cases of Germany, the U.S.A. and the U .S .S .R . , Rimlinger concluded tha t , i r respect ive of the nature of the socio-economic order, the need for a highly organized form of income protection increases as 8 society becomes industrialized and urbanized.15 His finding is corroborated by Heclo (1974) for the cases of Britain and Sweden, and in many single-nation studies of welfare-state development. Wallace claims that i t sparked a similar development in Canada by breaking down the self-sufficiency of the pioneer family and creating social problems requiring collective action.16 Moreover, one historical feature of the industrialization process, the Great Depression of the 1930s, is often singled out as playing a catalyst role in the development of North American income secur i ty .^ Although they attribute a primary role to the spur of socio-economic change, these researchers do not subscribe to a crude determinism. Instead, they suggest that i t plays only a faci l i tat ing and not a direct role in the development of income maintenance. Sustained economic growth provides governments with the means of financing state aid but does not guarantee action on their part. The other key variables of industrialization and urbanization have a similar, limited impact. The creation of a wage-earning class in c i t ies adds the new dimension of unemployment to the causes of poverty, yet does not, ipso facto, guarantee a collective response. The break-up of the extended family removes a mainstay of support for the aged and other groups among the dependent poor, but does not necessarily usher in public substitutes. However, by focusing their attention on the impact of industrial growth, and the emerging urban society, scholars have tended to conceive of the socio-economic context much too narrowly, neglecting the c r i t i ca l balance between old and new sectors of economies in transit ion. In particular, they tend to overlook the importance of the agricultural sector. Although they may note in passing that the structure and values of agrarian society mil i tate 9_'. against developments in income maintenance, they tend to t reat welfare p o l i t i c s as the exclusive battleground of capi ta l and labour, the key interest groups in the indust r ia l sector . But, in the Canadian case, rural-urban con f l i c t cannot be so eas i l y discounted, because the nation was in a process of t rans i t i on from an agrarian to an indust r ia l society when the issue of state aid for the dest i tu te came to the fo re . Indeed, the evidence of th is study indicates that organized farmers and the i r elected spokesmen were leading ac tors , rather than minor p layers, in the evolution of co l l ec t i v i sm. Furthermore, t he i r role as arch opponents was more consistent than that of businessmen. Cultural determinants: In addit ion to socio-economic fac to rs , cu l tura l var iables a lso shape the making of socia l po l i cy . A major theme in cross-national research i s that the l a t t e r are most sa l ient in explaining national dif ferences in income secur i ty coverage. For example, King (1973) i den t i f i es ideas concerning the role of the state as the key factors in explaining why the U.S. i s a wel fare-state '1 agger' compared with Canada and other European nat ions. While agreeing that national p o l i t i c a l goals and values account for var iat ions concerning the scope and level of benef i ts , Woodsworth suggests that the borrowing of ideas among nations also inf luences the way countries develop the i r socia l benefi t programs.^ Single-nat ion studies also stress the importance of cu l tura l determinants. Both Marshall (1965) and Romanyshyn (1971) ident i fy changes in concepts of c i t i zensh ip r ights as spurs to the development of co l lec t i v i sm in Br i ta in and the U.S . , respect ive ly . Herman pinpoints a s im i la r sh i f t of opinion in the Canadian case. Her content analysis of the debates of the federal Parliament between 1 8 7 5 and 1 9 6 0 i l l u s t r a t e s the l ink between the dr ive towards equal i ty in socia l r ights and developments in heal th, welfare and social secu r i t y ; and a less rigorous but broader review of secondary sources also traces the connection between changes in publ ic opinion and the advent of the Canadian welfare s t a t e . 1 9 A general consensus ex is ts that these broad s h i f t s , often tr iggered by national c r ises such as depressions or wars, made the idea of state intervention more acceptable. The precise impact of mass a t t i tudes , though, i s d i f f i c u l t to p inpoint , espec ia l l y in h i s to r i ca l analys is where evidence i s , of necessi ty , impressionist ic owing to the absence of publ ic opinion surveys. Compared with t he i r e lus ive qua l i ty in the society at la rge, cu l tura l factors in th i s type of research are more eas i l y i den t i f i ab le in the p o l i t i c a l process in the form of values and prejudices of decision-makers. Nonetheless, prevai l ing ideas about the causes of poverty and i t s treatment did inf luence the course of Canadian welfare p o l i t i c s during the 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 3 9 per iod. The general framework of ideas i s sketched in chapter 2 because i t provides an essent ial guide to what Canadians comprehended as socia l problems, considered as a l ternat ive approaches to resolving these problems, and accepted as the proper extent of governmental in te rven t ion .20 Like a l l major inf luences on publ ic po l i cy , cul tura l var iables act as constraints upon, as well as spurs t o , governmental ac t ion . Bryden suggests that the i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c "market ethos" of Canadian society not only delayed the introduction of mens-tested benefits for the aged unt i l 1 9 2 7 but also shaped the subsequent development of pensions po l i c y ; and Taylor indicates that i t had a s im i la r ef fect on the evolution of health insurance.21 But the 11 concept of "market ethos" i s an overly e l a s t i c one, embracing a l l values that m i l i t a te against co l l ec t i v i sm , and so i s imprecise about the spec i f i c be l ie fs that res is t developments in income maintenance. Brecher provides a firmer guide by s ing l ing out a conservative f i s c a l orthodoxy as a primary constraint during the interwar years.22 Besides confirming his f inding that i t m i l i ta ted against welfare spending at the federal l e v e l , the evidence from the case studies also establ ishes that i t was an equally powerful impediment to governmental action in the provinces. P o l i t i c a l determinants: Although socio-economic and cul tura l factors raise and define the problems to be resolved, on t he i r own they cannot account fo r t he i r conversion into socia l pol icy outcomes. Instead, p o l i t i c a l determinants provide the key to understanding the or ig ins and content of spec i f i c decisions concerning income maintenance. Bryden acknowledges the i r re la t i ve supremacy over the other types of var iab les . Even though he views Canadian pensions pol icy as a clash between underlying socio-economic and ideological fo rces, he points out that the con f l i c t between the two i s resolved in the p o l i t i c a l system and that p o l i t i c a l oo processes are themselves s ign i f i can t determinants of po l icy design. Inst i tu t ional factors and par t ic ipants are both cruc ia l because the i r in teract ion characterizes the decisionmaking process. Inst i tu t ional factors have a dual impact on the development of socia l po l i cy . According to Leman (1980), they set the rules of the game within which the d i f ferent players contend and also shape the terms of p o l i t i c a l debates. For example, in federal systems the re la t i ve d is t r ibu t ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers plays the cruc ia l ro le in def ining the p o l i t i c a l context(s) wi th in which issues J . 2 are raised and resolved. However, i t does not d i rec t l y af fect the substance of soc ia l po l icy dec is ions. Leman suggests that another i ns t i t u t i ona l va r iab le , "the h i s to r i c conf igurat ion of programs," inf luences both the cause and outcomes of p o l i t i c a l debates on issues of income maintenance. 2 4 The po l icy inheri tance and other relevant fac to rs , such as the competitiveness of the party system and the s ize and nature of bureaucracy, are described in chapter 2, with attent ion focusing here on the federal structure of government, "the ins t i t u t i ona l factor that has had the greatest impact on income secur i ty in Canada."25 The ex is t ing evidence i s ambiguous as to whether a federal structure of government f a c i l i t a t e s or i nh ib i t s developments in income maintenance. On the one hand, there are cases to support the contention that i t creates more opportunity fo r experimentation than a unitary system. For example, the Austral ian image of a "socia l laboratory" stems from state experiments in statutory assistance programs fo r the aged and inval ids undertaken in the early years of t h i s cen tu r y . 2 6 S im i l a r l y , the American states qual i fy as the pioneers of means-tested pensions fo r widows, the aged and the b l i nd . On the other hand, the record of the Canadian provinces lends support to the c e n t r a l i s t s ' case that regional governments are impediments to developments in income support. Theirs i s a record characterized more by inact ion than innovat ion, despite the contention of Trudeau that the seed of socia l reform i s planted more eas i ly in cer ta in regions than at the national l e v e l . 2 7 Apart from mothers' pensions, a l l other se lec t i ve , means-tested measures were sponsored by Ottawa. Why? 13 Recent research by Banting i den t i f i es two important constraints upon income secur i ty developments at the sub-national level in the interwar per iod: the imbalance between the provinces' l eg i s l a t i ve powers and the i r f i s c a l capab i l i t y , and the i r governments' preoccupation with economic development, manifest in a desire to avoid imposing res t r i c t ions upon the mobi l i ty of capi ta l and labour . 2 ^ As the provinces were unable and/or unwi l l ing to sponsor cost ly i n i t i a t i v e s , a system of federal subsidies developed to finance welfare innovations, including the bulk of means-tested benefits introduced during the 1914-39 per iod. Birch contends that the con f l i c t s a r i s ing over th is method of f inancing precluded the "successful operation" of condit ional grants and obstructed a l l attempts at "comprehensive socia l reform."29 In addit ion to confirming both these scholars ' proposi t ions, the evidence of th is study suggests that the f i s c a l conservatism of provincial po l i t i c i ans was the underlying motive behind the i r reluctance to sponsor independent i n i t i a t i v e s . Besides ins t i tu t iona l fac to rs , p o l i t i c a l ac tors , i . e . , act ive par t ic ipants in the socia l policymaking process, also shape developments in income maintenance. They play the cruc ia l role of def in ing the socia l problems and deciding the t iming and content of l e g i s l a t i o n . 3 0 However, considerable controversy ex is ts among students of socia l pol icy over whether forces located outside or ins ide government play the dominant ro le . Further disagreement ar ises over which are the relevant societal or governmental par t ic ipants . A review of the l i t e ra tu re results in the cu l l i ng of four interpretat ions that are not mutually exclusive but d i f f e r in emphasis and comprehensiveness concerning the e f fec t i ve p o l i t i c a l forces. Each interpretat ion depicts a d i f ferent set of actors as playing the primary ro le in shaping decisions concerning income maintenance. The f i r s t interpretation is the social control model of welfare po l i t ics . While the model incorporates various meanings of social control,31 i ts major variant postulates that in situations of intense social unrest, working-class militancy is the effective spur because i t forces welfare concessions from the state. Proponents of the social control model, however, are divided over i ts precise prerequisites. On the one hand, various scholars, including non-Marxists, claim that in situations of intense class conf l ic t , radicals in the labour movement are the effective societal actors because their act iv i t ies arouse fears of revolution among the ruling class. For example, Rhys argues that Bismarck pioneered social insurance in Germany "out of fear that the prevailing social order might be overthrown by revolutionary agitation of the working class;"32 a n c | Gilbert and Fraser identify a similar motive behind Bri t ish pol i t ic ians' decisions to sponsor income maintenance measures in 1911 and 1920, respectively.33 on the other hand, investigators of the recent U.S. urban c r i s i s suggest a different set of preconditions for state provision of welfare concessions. Piven and Cloward, for example, identify unemployed workers rather than labour radicals as the key actors. They contend that in times of depression c iv ic turmoil in the form of protests and riots by the jobless results in in i t iat ion or expansion of rel ief caseloads, and that once disorder lessens contraction occurs to reinforce restrict ive work norms. But they dismiss fear of revolution as a redundant motive and suggest instead that the threat of popular discontent motivates national poli t icians to offer concessions in order to win the allegiance of disaffected voting b l ocs . 3 4 The disagreement over the effective actors (labour radicals/mobilized unemployed) and the pol i t ic ians' motives (fear of revolution/electoral 15 calculations) is not the only imprecise feature of the model that this study seeks to rect i fy. As a perceptive c r i t i c points out, most theorists also tend to rely too heavily on assertion rather than empirical data, with the result that "motives, intents and purposes are often assumed from the effects of action, rather than el ic i ted through careful research."35 | ^ o r e fundamentally, however, they tend to overlook the cr i t i ca l fact that public assistance measures are "always devised" to reflect distinctions between those able to work and those deemed incapable. 3 6 Given this dichotomy, their tendency to treat a l l innovations as examples of overt repression is suspect because the physically f i t obviously pose more of a threat to the established order than, say, the unemployable bl ind. In order to test whether the salience of the social control model varies according to the category of recipient, this study examines in i t iat ives for destitute employables separately from the benefits extended to select categories of the dependent poor in Parts II and III, respectively. The findings indicate that this distinction is an important one in the Canadian case, for the only two innovations satisfying the prerequisites of the social control model involved able-bodied wage-earners. The second general interpretation emphasizes interest group power as the decisive force. In this pressure group model of welfare po l i t i cs , associations in the private sector attempt to promote their interests and values within the decision-making process, and i t is the confl icts and accommodations among these groups that shape income maintenance policy. Some proponents attribute a central role to economic interest groups, particularly capital and labour, in the social policymaking process. For example, Lowi argues that leaders of the peak economic associations JL.6 representing the "haves" and the "have nots" in conjunction with forces inside government are "the makers of the pr inc ip les of r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . " 3 7 His general contention i s supported by indiv idual case studies. Brown (1971) invest igated the or ig ins of the f i r s t B r i t i s h i n i t i a t i v e to aid unemployed workmen and found that the 1905 l eg i s l a t i on was shaped by a c lash between interests espousing the t rad i t iona l conservative ideology and the r i s i ng forces of co l lec t i v i sm represented by the' labour movement. Bryden (1974) a lso discovered that the or ig ina l Canadian i n i t i a t i v e in publ ic pensions was molded by a s im i la r c o n f l i c t involv ing establ ished business associat ions and the emerging trade unions. However, other invest igators cast doubt on the consistency of the roles of capi ta l and labour over time. Finkel (1979), for example, found that during the interwar period Canadian businessmen acted not only as i n f l uen t ia l opponents but a l so , on occasion, as equally e f fec t ive advocates of socia l reforms, a f inding that i s confirmed in th is study. A comparative study by Heclo (1974) indicates that organized labour in B r i t a in and Sweden also adopted divergent posit ions on the issue of income support. Canadian trade unions, as we shal l see, were consistent advocates l i k e the i r Swedish counterparts, even though the i r claim to be the champions of the cause of co l lec t i v i sm was only incontestable in the case of the old age pensions movement. The group model does not designate the socia l policy-making process as the exclusive battleground fo r economic in te res ts . Some researchers suggest that spokesmen of pr ivate char i t i es a lso play an in f luen t ia l ro le . Hall and her colleagues contend that B r i t i s h soc ia l service agencies have often acted as pressure groups, and Gi lber t a t t r ibutes a s im i la r creat ive role to U.S. voluntary agencies, descr ibing the char i ty organization soc ie t ies and the 17 settlement house movements as "the socia l progenitors of modern welfare po l icy . "38 However, in the Canadian case, establ ished char i t i es have apparently obstructed developments in income maintenance. Alb inski suggests that the values of the major re l ig ious ins t i tu t ions delayed the introduct ion of s tate-d i rected welfare programs pr ior to 1914.39 i n f a c t , the evidence of th is study indicates that the be l ie fs of Cathol ics and Protestants acted as constraints well beyond th i s watershed, even though the monopoly of denominational char i t i es was increasingly challenged by new, non-sectarian welfare agencies during and af ter the war which, fa r from opposing state in tervent ion, i n i t i a l l y welcomed i t . The case study on the mothers pensions movement reveals th is con f l i c t wi thin the char i ty establishment most c l ea r l y . Besides organized c h a r i t i e s , c l i en t groups, composed of actual or potential benef ic iar ies of income maintenance measures, are also important par t ic ipants in the socia l policymaking process. But, with the important exception of m i l i tan t action by unemployed workers, ex is t ing evidence i s scant on the inf luence exerted by moderate segments of the job less . It i s also scarce concerning the behaviour of the dependent poor, with studies by Baker (1963) and Bryden (1974) documenting that the Canadian bl ind took up t he i r own cause, whereas the e lder ly did not become act ive unt i l a f ter the introduction of means-tested benef i ts . Concerning sole-support mothers and disabled veterans, the other categories aided, the f indings of the relevant case studies reveal that they were spectators and part ic ipants in the p o l i t i c s of wel fare. The th i rd interpretat ion places greater stress on forces inside government. This "representative model" postulates that independent choices of po l i t i c i ans are the cruc ia l determinants of socia l po l i cy . It a t t r ibutes an 18 autonomous role to elected of f ic ia ls in contrast to the two preceding interpretations that imply that these actors resemble "automatons" merely acting in response to forces outside government. Public choice theorists claim that pol i t ic ians' decisions to establish new social programs are motivated primarily by electoral calculations. For example, Downs, in his pioneering analysis, contends that the "major force shaping a party's policies is competition with other parties for votes"; and the authors of a recent study on the Canadian decision-making process also assume that vote maximization is the "proximate objective" of polit icians.40 Outside of this group, there exist supporters of the less extreme notion that electoral calculations play a part in pol i t ic ians ' decisions to redistribute income. Bird, for example, postulates that these perceptions were more significant in the past when non-taxpaying voters f i rs t entered the Canadian electorate.41 Although electoral calculations were important factors influencing Canadian pol i t ic ians ' decisions to finance statutory means-tested benefits, the evidence suggests that expansion of welfare expenditure was not the only route open to these actors to enhance their chances of re-election. Their decisions to delay legislat ive action were, on more than one occasion, based upon calculations of what the public would stand for. Other proponents of the representative model suggest that the ideology of power-holders is also an important spur to developments in social security. Beer argues that a dist inctive system of pol i t ical ideas influenced the social policy decisions of Br i t ish poli t icians and guided the behaviour of their parties from 1918 onwards.4 2 His finding is duplicated in the Australian case by Mendelsohn, who concedes "that Labour has been the pacemaker, and that in 19 periods of Labour r u l e , socia l welfare l eg i s l a t i on was more l i k e l y to be pushed a h e a d . " 4 3 in contrast , the impact of changes in Canadian party government i s often dismissed as neg l ig ib le . Redekop, for example, asserts that the socia l po l i c ies of both Liberals and Conservatives during the 1930s "were shaped more by the times than those po l i c ies shaped the t imes"; and Saltsman contends that during the interwar period western protest movements, not establ ished pa r t i es , were the vehic le fo r ideas concerning socia l pol icy i n i t i a t i v e s . 4 4 In pa r t i cu la r , the national leadership of the emergent Labour group i s credited with a pioneering r o l e . 4 5 without denigrating J . S . Woodsworth's role as "the conscience of Parl iament," the p o l i t i c a l leaders of the two major national part ies also espoused humanitarian values. Lloyd claims that i t was a "natural impulse" for Prime Min is ter King and Liberal po l i t i c i ans elsewhere in the English-speaking world to sponsor innovations in income maintenance because they "were sorry for the poor and wanted to do something to h e l p . " ^ T h e Liberal Prime Min is te r , however, did not monopolize the socia l policymaking process in the 1914-39 per iod. Conservative administrations pioneered the major i n i t i a t i v e s in state a id fo r dest i tu te employables, and the i r decisions contained shades of the Tory value of co l l ec t i v i sm, as the case studies in Part II reveal . Recent research by Heidenheimer and his colleagues suggests that po l i t i c i ans have greater inf luence on reforms involv ing cash t ransfers to c i t i zens rather than over the use of publ ic services because they have less impact on the "v i ta l in te res ts" of serv ice suppl iers . According to these scholars, the evidence in the cases of several European nations and the U.S. i s so overwhelming as to suggest "a general ru le" "that part ies can e f fec t i ve ly 20 sponsor social insurance programs, provided that their leaders do not accept implici t ly assumptions that favour the status quo. 4 7 They also imply that the method of financing programmes is a key factor influencing a party's reform capabil i ty. Their suggestion is elaborated upon by Bird who proposes that reformist pol i t icians encounter more resistance from taxpayers in sponsoring in i t iat ives financed entirely by general revenues than measures based upon the contributory principle.48 The fourth interpretation views c i v i l servants as the primary pol i t ical actors. This "bureaucratic model" postulates that administrative leadership is the spur to social policy decisions. It assumes that of f ic ia ls possess separate interests and resources separate from those of private pressure groups and pol i t ic ians. Proponents of this viewpoint suggest that bureaucrats generate and champion issues as well as design particular schemes. For example, Roberts identif ies the inspectorate in various government departments as the creative force behind the development of social legislation in nineteenth century Br i ta in; and another Bri t ish scholar, MacDonagh, also argues that the impetus for the extension of the role of government in the area of emigrant protection came from professional administrators, not polit icians.49 After comparing the development of income maintenance policies in Britain and Sweden, Heclo concludes that bureaucrats were "the most consistently important of a l l pol i t ical factors." "In both expansionary and restr ict ive directions, administrative actors have been crucial in giving concrete substance to new policy in i t iat ives and in elaborating established approaches."^ In the Canadian case, existing research supports the notion of an act ivist c i v i l service. At the provincial level the strong leadership of 21 Ontar io 's Inspector of Asylums and Prisons i s iden t i f i ed as "the key" to the vigorous pace of socia l welfare development during the ear ly post-Confederation e ra ; and another Ontario c i v i l servant i s also designated as the precip i tant of the mothers' pensions i n i t i a t i v e . 5 * However, as the resources for th is study precluded a review of archival material in a l l of the then nine provinces, the precise role played by administrators in shaping developments in categoric publ ic assistance remains an open question, even though the avai lab le evidence suggests that i t was re la t i ve l y minor. At the federal level bureaucrats were apparently inact ive during the interwar per iod, or at least played no part in the development of publ ic pension pol icy analyzed by Bryden (1974). But they are credited with playing a creat ive role af ter World War I I . Armitage contends that since 1945 an e l i t e corps of senior o f f i c i a l s , aided by some of t he i r provincia l counterparts, provided "an enduring and consistent force for socia l welfare reform"; and his argument i s supported by the reco l lec t ions of a sel f-confessed "reformist bureaucrat" employed by the Department of Health and Welfare during the 1952-72 p e r i o d . 5 2 The f indings of the case s tudies, though, suggest that the role of t he i r prewar counterparts was much less c rea t ive , with senior administrators blocking welfare innovations more often than promoting them. Each of the four interpretat ions depicts a d i f ferent set of p o l i t i c a l actors, as dominant wi th in the socia l policymaking process: m i l i t an t workers, interest groups, party po l i t i c i ans and c i v i l servants. These part ic ipants are l i k e l y to be partners, rather than r i v a l s , in shaping spec i f i c i n i t i a t i v e s because socia l pol icy decisions are "too complex to be explained simply as the predicate of some maker."53 consequently, the analysis involves an examination 22 of the way the various p o l i t i c a l actors interact over time and an evaluation of the i r re la t ive inf luence in shaping the timing and content of the se lec t i ve , means-tested measures introduced during the 1914-39 per iod. In order to f a c i l i t a t e the task of assessing the precise form of t he i r in teract ion and the i r respective in f luence, the assumption i s made that the e f fec t ive p o l i t i c a l forces are l i k e l y to vary according to the d i f ferent type of socia l pol icy under invest iga t ion . Two types relevant for th is study are innovations that represent en t i re l y new departures for the state and developments, i . e . , expansions of programs that contain novel features.54 jh-j s re lat ionship i s tested mainly in Part I I I , where mothers' pensions and old age pensions are treated as innovat ions, and statutory benefits for veterans and the bl ind as developments of the l a t t e r . Within the same type, the e f fec t ive actors are l i k e l y to d i f f e r between the phase when the issue develops and provokes controversy and the phase when the pol icy decision i s made. The material i s organized around th i s simple d i s t i nc t i on in each of the case studies in the form of attaching the labels of advocates, opponents and prec ip i tants to the relevant par t ic ipants . Advocates and opponents depict the p o l i t i c a l forces urging or res is t ing expansion of state a c t i v i t y . Precip i tants represent the forces which push the issue of publ ic welfare higher up the government's l i s t of p r i o r i t i e s as well as shape the f ina l form and structure of the po l i cy . They, therefore, can be e i ther advocates or opponents in the e a r l i e r phase: As the preceding review ind ica tes , the forces shaping soc ia l po l icy decisions are complex, comprising socio-economic, cul tura l and p o l i t i c a l determinants. Sustained economic growth provides governments with the means of 23. f inancing innovations, and i t s concomitants, i ndus t r i a l i za t i on and urbanizat ion, create the socia l problems requir ing resolut ion in the p o l i t i c a l process. The general framework of ideas determines how these problems are to be defined and acted upon. Inst i tu t ional fac to rs , espec ia l ly the re la t i ve d is t r i bu t ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers in federal systems, shape the behaviour of the p o l i t i c a l actors. As socio-economic, cul tura l and ins t i t u t i ona l factors set the context within which the players in the p o l i t i c s of welfare par t ic ipate and exert a minimal d i rect impact upon the content of socia l p o l i c i e s , they are treated as environmental var iables in th is analysis (see f igure 1) . Four types of p o l i t i c a l ac tors , m i l i tan t workers and interest groups in the society at large plus party po l i t i c i ans and c i v i l servants ins ide government, are i den t i f i ed as the major shapers of dec is ions. The next task then, i s to determine the way in which they interacted with the broader environment to produce the f i r s t milestones along Canada's road to income secur i ty . Figure 1. Possible determinants of socia l pol icy decis ions: Environmental Factors P o l i t i c a l Actors Socio-economic set t ing M i l i t an t workers Cultural context Interest groups Inst i tu t ional framework Party po l i t i c i ans C i v i l servants The socia l pol icy environment out of which demands arose for special treatment of cer ta in types of paupers i s sketched in chapter 2. Detai led analyses of the i n i t i a t i v e s for dest i tute employables are then undertaken in chapters 3-6, and invest igat ion of benefits for the dependent poor follows in chapters 7-10. Chapter 11 presents a summary of the evidence on how the various determinants shaped the development of categoric publ ic assistance prov is ion. It also discusses broader questions raised by the analysis concerning their inter-relationship in the social policy-making process. The information for this study is collected from a wide range of sources, owing to the fact that Canadian welfare pol i t ics is a sorely neglected area of research. Among secondary works, biographies and memoirs of pol i t ic ians, social and pol i t ical histories of the period, as well as the recent, valuable crop of studies in feminist and labour history, are the major sources. Information in yearbooks of various sorts and newspaper cuttings is also used. The bulk of evidence, however, is drawn from published and unpublished government documents. The la t ter , housed in the Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa, comprise departmental f i les and private papers of pol i t ic ians, but not cabinet documents, as no formal records of Privy Council meetings were kept until 1940. PART I THE ENVIRONMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY DEVELOPMENT 25 CHAPTER 2 THE CANADIAN BACKGROUND FOR WELFARE INNOVATIONS Canada was a society in t rans i t ion between 1914 and 1939, the era when the innovations in publ ic assistance were introduced. The Canadian economy was being transformed from an agrarian to an indust r ia l one and the dominant, i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ethic was increasingly challenged by a new welfare ethos. The establ ished framework of p o l i t i c a l ins t i tu t ions was also al tered by the advent of competitive mass p o l i t i c s and the expansion of the publ ic sector , developments that were precip i tated by World War I. As the changing environment moulded part ly the behaviour and motives of the part ic ipants in the p o l i t i c s of wel fare, the spec i f i c socio-economic se t t i ng , the cul tura l context and the ins t i tu t iona l framework are out l ined below. Socio-economic Sett ing In Canada the socio-economic preconditions for developments in income maintenance began to be l a i d in the la te nineteenth century. Although industr ia l -urban growth was not an unfamil iar feature of the post-Confederation economy, i t accelerated af ter the 1890-96 depression. In contrast to B r i t a i n , where an indust r ia l revolut ion ushered in developments in income maintenance, Canada's i n i t i a l steps were sparked by changes in the agr icu l tura l sector . The developing wheat economy of the p ra i r i e provinces was the "dynamic element" of the country's economic growth during the 1896-21 per iod. The potential of the plains attracted capi ta l and labour in unprecedented amounts and the resul ts f i l t e r e d through the ent i re economy.1 Paradoxical ly , though, the wheat boom also fostered developments in secondary industry that hastened the decl ine of agr icu l ture as the dominant mode of production in the national economy. The soaring production and export of Canada's new staple during the Laurier years (1896-1911) at tracted increasing amounts of foreign capi ta l that funded the development of minerals and energy in northern regions of B r i t i s h Columbia, Ontario and Quebec. The wheat boom also financed great expansion of manufacturing, pa r t i cu la r l y in central Canada. 2 This growth was further stimulated by the needs of a wartime economy, so that by 1920, the time of the f i r s t federal survey of overal l production, manufacturing was already s l i g h t l y ahead of agr icu l tu re , contr ibut ing 43.7 percent compared with 41.3 percent to to ta l output . 3 This unparal leled economic development was accompanied by s ign i f i can t demographic changes. In contrast to the disappoint ing, slow growth in population during the 1871-1900 p e r i o d , 4 a rapid increase characterized the f i r s t three decades of th i s century, with i t s s i ze almost doubling from 5,371,315 in 1901 to 10,376,786 in 1931. While th is expansion in part ref lected trends common to other developing nat ions, such as increases in b i r th rates and l i f e expectancy, i t s major source was the in f lux of immigrants attracted by the developing wheat economy of the p r a i r i e s . Population growth in th i s new region was the most dramatic pr ior to 1921 (see table 1) . The settlement of the p ra i r i e west by outsiders al tered the soc ia l structure in a dramatic manner by sh i f t i ng the ex is t ing population balance between the two founding ethnic groups. At least one-third of the more than two m i l l i on new se t t le rs came from countr ies outside the Engl ish- and French-speaking worlds. As they were too numerous to be absorbed rapidly into any melting pot, they forged a new society with i t s own d i s t i n c t i ve blend of ethnic i d e n t i t i e s . Following i t s c rea t ion , sectional con f l i c t was added to the 28 l i s t of ex is t ing l i n g u i s t i c and re l ig ious cleavages.5 j n i s n e w d i v i s ion was manifest i n i t i a l l y in prewar disputes over eastern control of churches and trade unions, and af ter 1918 in con f l i c t s over the issue of state aid fo r the des t i tu te . Table 1. Population of Canada, by province, census dates 1901-31. 1901 1911 1921 1931 Canada 5,371,315 7,206,643 8,787,949 10,376,786 P .E . I . 103,259 93,728 88,615 88,038 Nova Scotia 459,574 492,338 523,837 512,846 New Bruns. 331,120 351,889 387,876 408,219 Quebec 1,648,898 2,005,776 2,360,510 2,874,662 Ontario 2,182,947 2,527,292 2,933,662 3,431,683 Manitoba 255,211 461,394 610,118 700,139 Sask. 91,279 492,432 757,510 921,785 Alberta 73,022 374,295 588,454 731,605 B.C. 178,657 392,480 524,582 694,263 Yukon 27,219 8,512 4,157 4,230 N.W.T. 20,129 6,507 8,143 9,316 SOURCE: M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, eds . , H is tor ica l S ta t i s t i c s of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), p. 14, ser ies A2-14. The rapid in f lux of newcomers also underlined the-need for a new approach towards poor r e l i e f by exacerbating socia l problems in urban centres. Although they were recruited as s e t t l e r s , substant ial numbers of immigrants remained in c i t i e s or d r i f ted in a f ter f a i l i n g on the land. In Winnipeg and Toronto they were often forced to l i v e in the most slum-ridden sect ions, where disease and crime were the predictable products of ignorance and poverty.6 Their presence in the ranks of the dest i tu te unemployed in Toronto prompted spokesmen of pr ivate char i t ies to complain publ ic ly in the 1890s about the "hordes of 'paupers and c r im ina ls ' from Great Br i ta in and Europe every year lured out to Canada by opt imis t ic and misleading representations of the prosperity of our 'lower c l a s s e s , ' only to swell t h i s already overwhelming t i de of misery from lack of winter work." 7 No provision for publ ic wel fare, however, was made in response to the pre-war deluge of s e t t l e r s . Instead, socia l work became largely the respons ib i l i t y of churches. While welcoming the new opportunit ies for socia l serv ice , Cathol ics and Protestants a l i ke were alarmed about the threat posed by immigration and urbanism to the rural values they had so painstakingly p cu l t i va ted . Besides western settlement, another demographic change occurring from the turn of the century onwards also l a i d the groundwork for innovations in income support. The a l te r ing balance between c i t y - and country-dweller was equally "s t r i k ing and more s ign i f i can t in i t s long-run e f fec ts . " - 3 The s tar t of the process of urbanization preceded the period of rapid economic growth. After the 1890-96 depression the sh i f t to c i t i e s and towns accelerated, because people's l i ve l ihoods depended increasingly on industry, natural resources and service occupations. The d iv id ing l i ne was reached in 1921, when the rural-urban balance was roughly equal , but B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario reached th is threshold pr ior to the war (see table 2). The advancing indust r ia l and urban growth had a profound ef fect on the character of Canada, creat ing a new and unfamil iar kind of soc ie ty . The most s ign i f i can t organizational change in the pr ivate sector was the emergence of broadly based, h ierarchical organizations of business and labour. 30 Table 2. Urban population as percentage of total population, Canada and provinces, census years 1901-41 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 Canada 34.9 41.8 47.4 52.5 55.7 Prince Edward Island 14.5 16.0 18.8 19.5 22.1 Nova Scotia 27.7 36.7 44.8 46.6 52.0 New Brunswick 23.1 26.7 35.2 35.4 38.7 Quebec 36.1 44.5 51.8 59.5 61.2 Ontario 40.3 49.5 58.8 63.1 67.5 Manitoba 24.9 39.3 41.5 45.2 45.7 Saskatchewan 6.1 16.1 16.8 20.3 21.3 Alberta 16.2 29.4 30.7 31.8 31.9 Br i t ish Columbia 46.4 50.9 50.9 62.3 64.0 SOURCE: Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Pol icy-Making in Canada (Montreal: McGi11-Queen's University Press, 1974), p. 26, table 1. The Canadian Manufacturers' Association was reorganized in 1900, nearly thir ty years after i ts founding, to centralize i ts trade af f i l ia tes and to cope with the growing variety of problems confronting the corporate sector; new national organizations of bankers, retail merchants and other entrepreneurs were also formed between 1890 and 1918. Labour also organized for the protection and benefit of industrial wage-earners and the growth of unions paralleled the expansion in commerce during the f i r s t decades of this century. In 1886 the Ontario-based Trades and Labour Congress of Canada was formed, and by 1918 i t represented the bulk of l o c a l s . 1 0 Furthermore, the early phase of industrial ization also prompted collective action among farmers. Various organizations devoted to defending agrarian interests were established in 31 Ontario and the p ra i r i e provinces during the f i r s t decades of th is century, a development which culminated in a " fu l l -b lown revo l t " in the 1921 federal e lect ion.11 Conf l i c ts between agr icu l tu re , capi ta l and labour over the issue of publ ic welfare emerged soon a f ter the onset of rapid growth and in tens i f i ed af ter World War I. The i ndus t r i a l i za t i on process also hastened developments in income maintenance by creat ing a new category of employable indigents a r i s ing from wage dependency. Industrial employment was much more uncertain than subsistence farming because sel f -support was dependent upon cash earned outside the family environment.12 So long as economic growth provided jobs in fac to r ies , mines and pulp m i l l s , the vu lnerab i l i t y of wage-earners was masked. However, with downturns in the economy, t he i r economic and socia l insecur i ty became exposed. Although unemployment and poverty were not novel problems, t he i r scope broadened considerably as a resul t of ongoing i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , and the i r e f fec ts prompted demands for state remedies. The growth of c i t i e s had equal ly important consequences because i t increased the dependency of the t rad i t iona l poor. As urban l i v i n g accommodation was less spacious than on the farm, the care of e lder ly or disabled re la t ives became more d i f f i c u l t for t he i r fami l i es , the t rad i t iona l mainstay of socia l secur i ty . As a resu l t , these groups became more susceptible to poverty, espec ia l ly when they lacked the resources to make even minimum savings and publ ic pensions were non-ex is ten t . 1 3 The ef fects of socio-economic change, therefore, were c lea r l y providing the stimulus for an era of innovative social po l i cy . 32 The Cultural Context Despite the changing nature of t he i r soc ie ty , the majority of Canadians took time to be persuaded that the challenge posed by the emergent indust r ia l society required new approaches to the causes of poverty and i t s treatment. Unt i l the 1930s, poverty was considered "by most people as the just reward of the improvident or l azy , as a re f lec t ion of a deplorable lack of character and of inherent defects which const i tuted a reproach to the owner."14 Besides these deeply held prejudices, a general at t i tude of complacency also mi l i ta ted against developments in income maintenance: It was part of the fo l k lo re of Canadian l i f e in the nineteenth and well in to the twentieth century that Canada was a land of opportunity for a l l who were w i l l i n g to work^ The social secur i ty measures which other indus t r ia l i zed nations were undertaking at th is time were, i t was claimed, not required in Canada. The amount of unavoidable poverty...was re la t i ve l y neg l ig ib le and could be handled by the ex is t ing phi lanthropic agencies.1^ These prevai l ing views ref lected in part t rad i t iona l re l ig ious b e l i e f s . The re l ig ious and socia l ideas shaping the Cathol ic Church's operation of char i tab le i ns t i t u t i ons and services in Quebec had the i r roots in the seventeenth century. Inspired by "a Chr is t ian s p i r i t of humanity and cha r i t y , " the French Canadian idea of socia l assistance also ref lected a popular preference for pr ivate enterpr ise based on the threefold foundation of the fami ly , mutual benefit society and church.16 This preference persisted well into the twentieth century and shaped reactions in the province to state i n i t i a t i v e s by ident i fy ing them as 'encroachments.' It was cu l t ivated by the Cathol ic hierarchy who were anxious to protect both t he i r theological p r inc ip les and ins t i t u t i ona l monopoly.I 7 The t rad i t iona l Protestant eth ic was equally host i le to developments in socia l secur i t y . It rooted poverty in improvidence and indiv idual moral 33-f a i l u r e , with the ' f a l l from God's grace' more marked in the cases of rogues and vagabonds than the aged, s ick and widows; and designated i t s r e l i e f as a proper sphere of the church not the state.18 Although i t was challenged by reform-minded c l e r i c s during the 1890-1921 per iod, a s izeable segment of the Protestant community continued to bel ieve that state a i d , even for the 'more deserving' poor, represented pauperism, v i z . , dependence on publ ic char i ty by people who should be independent. "It was not unt i l the indust r ia l revolution was in f u l l swing that they gradually came to rea l ize that the i r respons ib i l i t y fo r human welfare must lead them into a prophetic witness in the arenas of p o l i t i c s and economics. "^ The secular ideology of North American l ibera l i sm was also a powerful const ra in t , providing i n te l l ec tua l j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the lack of socia l secur i ty in the pre-1914 e ra , even though i t had not impeded the state playing an aggressive role in promoting economic development. Its i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c values and l a i s s e z - f a i r e philosophy stressed s e l f - r e l i a n c e , the duty incumbent upon fami l ies to care for t he i r own, and the threat to freedom inherent in the extension of government a c t i v i t i e s , espec ia l ly when these d i rec t l y affected the l i ves of indiv iduals and f a m i l i e s . 2 0 Like other ideologies, the strength of c l ass i ca l l ibera l i sm resided in the socio-economic background of i t s fo l lowers. Individualism had most appeal for upper- and middle-class Canadians who l i ved well above the poverty l i ne and were not affected by the re la t ive absence of publ ic welfare. These crusaders of indiv idual ism opposed the idea of state subsidies for the poor on the grounds that i t would s t i f l e the i r i n i t i a t i v e , rob them of t he i r sense of s e l f - r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , help to create paras i tes , destroy the moral f i b re of society and erode cherished values l i k e t h r i f t . 2 1 Their b e l i e f s , however, began to be challenged from the turn of the century onwards by other l i b e r a l s who "were slowly coming to rea l i ze that the s ta te , 34 whether i t helped the r i ch or not, could help the poor by schemes o f . . . s o c i a l i n su rance . " 2 2 From the 1880s onwards a small but in f luen t ia l minori ty of the urban middle c lass began to question the prevai l ing notion that poverty was due to indiv idual moral f a i l u r e and i t s amelioration essent ia l l y a matter for pr ivate philanthropy. Instead, these Canadians ident i f ied the source of deprivation in national economic and soc ie ta l shortcomings and argued that only s tate intervention could meet the growing socia l needs of the new, urban soc ie ty . Although they were hampered by a dearth of information on soc ia l i nd ica to rs , soc ia l l y conscious j ou rna l i s t s , individual reformers and groups of concerned c i t i zens advanced the cause of co l lec t i v i sm. Through the i r e f f o r t s , "the causes of poverty were redef ined, pre jud ic ia l at t i tudes towards the poor were chal lenged, and the groundwork was l a id for public act ion."23 The ensuing debate sparked by th is challenge was not pecul iar to Canada. In a l l indust r ia l soc ie t ies the ear ly years of the twentieth century were "years of ferment over the role of the state as promoter of socia l welfare and protector of indus t r ia l s t a b i l i t y under capi ta l ism."24 However, Wallace suggests that publ ic discussion was at i t s height in Canada in the 1870-1900 period and declined in in tens i ty thereaf ter , at least up unt i l the 1940s. Her analysis of Toronto-based newspapers and per iodicals indicates that as early as the 1880s there was a growing d i s inc l i na t i on to accept the l a i s s e z - f a i r e theory of government. Some commentators argued then that the state should intervene to prevent people from dying of hunger in the s t ree ts , whether or not t he i r dest i tu t ion was t he i r own f au l t . In the next decade doubts were increasingly expressed over the notion that the poor were the ch ief authors of t he i r own p l igh t . The author of an a r t i c l e in the Week (12 Apr i l 1895), wri t ten in the 35 midst of depression condi t ions, rejected the idea that the bulk of the able-bodied unemployed receiving aid from pr ivate char i t i es were lazy and work-shy on the grounds that hundreds of thousands of Canadians were u t te r ly unable to f ind employment even of the most menial k ind. Other jou rna l i s ts condemned the trend towards ins t i tu t iona l care for neglected chi ldren while no provision was being made to enable the aged and needy to l i v e without begging. Although the need for governmental act ion was not widely recognized, by the turn of the century there was, according to Wallace, "ample evidence that such a convict ion was f a i r l y widespread and was growing.. . . "25 The increasing strength of the challenge to the doctr ine of l a i s s e z - f a i r e indiv idual ism from 1900 onwards was manifest in the concerted ef for t made by concerned c i ty -dwel lers to remedy a wide range of social problems, including the incidence of poverty among indust r ia l workers and dependent groups. The d i v i s i ve issue of prohib i t ion was the spec i f i c t r i gger . It stimulated the development of "a generous reform impulse, which sought ways of ameliorating the i n j us t i ces , inequa l i t ies and suffer ings of a society undergoing rapid change."26 j n - j s "impulse" was mult i - faceted both in terms of issues and par t i c ipants . Concerning the p l ight of the des t i tu te , i t was expressed most keenly by indiv idual urban reformers and Protestant churchmen. The research work of S i r Herbert Ames, a wel l - to-do Montreal manufacturer, was a notable example of pioneering, indiv idual e f f o r t , ranking with the contr ibut ions made by the B r i t i sh invest iga tors , Booth and Rowntree. The resul ts of his house-to-house survey of a working-class d i s t r i c t , published in The Ci ty Below The H i l l in 1897, allowed him to challenge some of the 36 conventional at t i tudes towards poverty and i t s causes. Ames iden t i f i ed insu f f i c ien t employment as a chief cause and then demonstrated that saving for the proverbial rainy day was impossible, thus repudiating the standard argument that the ef fects of i r regu lar work could be met by the worker pract is ing t h r i f t while employed. His intensive invest igat ion of the circumstances of the poorest fami l ies a lso challenged the conventional wisdom by revealing that the 'undeserving' category formed a fa r smaller proportion than was generally imagined. Although Ames demonstrated that the problem of poverty was largely rooted in economic and socia l arrangements, his proposals for reform did not extend to extensive state in tervent ion. Other than advocating winter works programs for employables, the rest of his suggestions were dependent on private i n i t i a t i v e , including the care of the dependent poor unable to work . 2 7 Protestant churchmen also challenged prevai l ing ideas concerning the causes and treatment of poverty. From the 1890s onwards they were increasingly inf luenced by the socia l gospel that sought to apply the teachings of Christ to the economic and social problems of the day. While the new movement had both conservative and radical elements, the majority of social gospellers "took a middle road, favouring a broad programme of l i be ra l reform measures, leading ul t imately to the welfare state."28 y n e i r par t ic ipat ion in the crusade for prohib i t ion al tered i t s character by focusing attent ion on the socia l consequences of alcohol consumption. The 'demon rum' was not merely a matter of personal s i n . As a major cause of poverty and other social i l l s , i t could only be excised in a more general reform of soc ie ty . Although prohib i t ion was the i r major goa l , socia l gospellers also urged state intervention on other national 37 questions in order to give ef fect to Chr i s t ' s teachings.29 Their "broad program of social reform was unveiled at the f i r s t , national congress on socia l problems held in 1914; and i t recommended state pensions for widows with young chi ldren and comprehensive socia l insurance to protect Canadians against work i n ju ry , old age and unemployment. The proponents of these reforms displayed a knowledge of American and European developments and refuted conventional objections to providing an income to people in need.30 socia l reformers, however, faced a formidable task in persuading the majority of Canadians to endorse the new cause of co l l ec t i v i sm, as indiv idual ism remained the dominant socia l value well into the interwar years. Ins t i tu t iona l Framework The structure of Canadian p o l i t i c a l ins t i tu t ions also had a s ign i f i can t impact upon developments in income maintenance. Canada's or ig inal cons t i tu t ion , the B r i t i s h North America (BNA) Act of 1867, made only scant reference to the subject of publ ic aid and other welfare services fo r the poor, a neglect that has prompted considerable discussion.31 At the time of Confederation, Canada was pr imari ly a pioneer rural soc ie ty , and income secur i ty as we know i t , was regarded pr imar i ly as a matter for the extended fami ly , with re l ig ious char i t i es and local governments f i l l i n g in the gaps. "Not su rp r i s ing ly , such a minor function of government did not a t t ract much attent ion e i ther in the debates that preceded Confederation or the BNA Act i t s e l f . . . . " 3 2 The 1867 const i tut ion iden t i f i ed the provinces as the 'centres of grav i ty ' fo r i n i t i a t i v e s in income support, because i t al located them most of the powers concerning health and welfare. In sect ion 92 they were given exclusive authori ty to pass laws pertaining to the "establishment, 3 8 maintenance and management of hosp i ta ls , asylums, c h a r i t i e s , and eleemosynary i n s t i t u t i o n s . " 3 3 Their posi t ion of advantage was further strengthened by other exclusive powers concerning municipal i n s t i t u t i ons , the pr inc ipal agencies of publ ic r e l i e f at that t ime. Their j u r i sd i c t i on over matters pertaining to property and c i v i l r ights was also to have an important impact on the future development of the socia l insurance technique of income support. In contrast , the national government was assigned a very l imi ted r o l e , with i t s relevant enumerated powers confined to two types of i n s t i t u t i o n s , marine hospitals and pr isons, and select groups comprising a l i e n s , Indians and veterans. However, i t s possession of the residual power to make laws for the "peace, order and good government of Canada" and i t s power to raise money by "any mode or system of taxat ion" were potent levers for i n i t i a t i n g and funding developments in income support. But p r io r to 1914 j ud i c i a l in terpretat ion confirmed provincial dominance. Both the or ig ina l decisions of the Jud ic ia l Committee of the B r i t i s h Pr ivy Council and i t s subsequent interpretat ions in the ear ly decades of th i s century reaffirmed that advances in social secur i ty depended upon provincial not national ac t ion , and the federal government was quite content to accept provincial respons ib i l i t y for wel fare." Although they had free rein to i n i t i a t e and fund developments in income support, the provinces played a passive role pr ior to 1914. After delegating the function of re l iev ing the poor along with most of i t s costs to the munic ipa l i t ies and/or pr ivate c h a r i t i e s , they confined the i r own involvement to occasional a id in the form of small grants. Their i ne r t i a concerning public assistance contrasted sharply with t he i r aggressive role in developing health services and educational f a c i l i t i e s , and f u l f i l l e d in part the be l ie f of the framers of the BNA Act that development of income maintenance measures would 39_, occur at the local l e v e l , "where colonial t rad i t i on dictated they belonged."36 Moreover, the or ig ina l members of Confederation apparently had "no desire to challenge the dominant posi t ion of churches over welfare serv ices."37 Their reluctance to disturb the ex is t ing colonia l pattern of r e l i e f arrangements resulted in the development of a decentral ized and haphazard system that endured well into the twentieth century. The two maritime provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were the only ones to adopt a spec i f i c poor law based on Elizabethan pr inc ip les of local respons ib i l i t y and less e l i g i b i l i t y , which stated that the amount of assistance provided must be less than the earnings of the lowest-paid labourer. Under t he i r respective statutes of 1786 and 1763, munic ipa l i t ies were required to levy property taxes to re l ieve dest i tu t ion among the dependent poor. This system persisted intact af ter the i r entry into Confederation, with provincial involvement confined to the occasional grant to meet emergencies.38 In contrast , the English poor law model was not copied in Prince Edward Is land. In view of the i s l and ' s small s i ze and population and the re la t i ve absence of municipal government, the province administered poor r e l i e f both in the pre-and post-colonial per iod. y In Ontario the system of poor r e l i e f was s imi la r to that of New Brunswick and Nova Scot ia , even though the Legislature of Upper Canada had e x p l i c i t l y rejected the B r i t i s h Poor Law in 1792. By 1867 the province already had an establ ished system of municipal government experienced in administering ins t i t u t i ona l care and outdoor r e l i e f to the resident poor. These local author i t ies shared the function with pr ivate philanthropies run along denominational l i n e s , with Protestants dominant. A provincial inspectorate also existed at the time of Confederation, charged with the task of supervising 4 0. i ns t i t u t i ons such as asylums and pr isons, and i t s leadership played an important ro le in developing socia l welfare programs during the 1868-81 period.40 These i n i t i a t i v e s plus the province's passage of Canada's f i r s t soc ia l insurance scheme in 1914 made Ontario the 'pacemaker' among the provinc ia l governments pr ior to World War I. The Quebec system was d i s t i n c t i v e , with re l ig ious ins t i tu t ions organized along denominational l ines acting as the major r e l i e f agencies. However, i t was equally decentra l ized, with the parish or diocese comprising the local unit of administ rat ion. This structure was bequeathed from the seventeenth-century French pattern and remained unchanged af ter the province's entry into Confederation. As the dominant re l ig ious char i t y , the Cathol ic Church, stressed pr ivate i n i t i a t i v e in remedying socia l i l l s , the provincial government played a very marginal ro le unt i l the 1920s. Its intervention was confined for nearly three centuries to legal acknowledgement of pr ivate char i table ins t i tu t ions and soc ie t ies and to f inanc ia l encouragement by means of subsidies to organizations requesting them. Quebec munic ipa l i t ies were even more inac t ive . Although the i r charters gave them the power to aid indigents in t he i r own homes, th is ob l igat ion remained a moral one up un t i l 1921, when the prov inc ia l Publ ic Char i t ies Act required them to contr ibute towards the i r care.41 The entry of the western provinces in to Confederation did not a l t e r the establ ished pattern of r e l i e f arrangements. Instead, they followed colonia l t rad i t i on by delegating respons ib i l i t y for the poor to the i r m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 4 2 In those areas where local government was rudimentary or non-existent, the provinces paid the costs of i ns t i t u t i ona l and emergency poor r e l i e f , but provincia l involvement was only voluntary pr io r to World War 1. For example, the operation of B .C . ' s Dest i tu te , Poor and Sick Fund, created in 1880 for residents of unorganized areas, had no statutory basis and provincial grants to munic ipa l i t ies were equally ad h o c . ^ Despite the di f ferences in administ rat ion, the des t i tu te , whether they l i ved in Charlottetown or V i c t o r i a , received a s im i la r form of publ ic a i d . Unt i l World War I i t was provided only on an emergency basis by munic ipa l i t ies or by pr ivate char i t ies acting as t he i r agents, and was generally referred to as 'outdoor r e l i e f . ' Re l ie f was usually given in kind in the form of grocer ies , fuel orders and second-hand c lo th ing . Both i t s amount - meagre, subsistence-level handouts - and form - workhouse or work tes ts - were "conditioned by the famous (or infamous) English poor law pr inc ip le of less e l i g i b i l i t y . " 4 4 T n - j S minimal, residual and rudimentary form of publ ic assistance formed the springboard for a l l future developments in income maintenance. In th is sense, "poor r e l i e f was the seed from which came the root, branch and flower of socia l secur i t y . In addit ion to the structure of federalism and the colonial pol icy inher i tance, the character of other p o l i t i c a l ins t i tu t ions shaped the evolut ion of categoric publ ic ass is tance. Although representative assemblies and responsible cabinets were establ ished in the pre-Confederation e ra , Canada did not qual i fy as a fu l l - f l edged democracy pr ior to World War I since competitive party p o l i t i c s was not mass-based. The franchise was res t r i c ted to men who owned property unt i l 1888, when Manitoba and Ontario adopted manhood suffrage at the age of 21. Their example was copied by the other provinces, with Quebec holding out unt i l 1936. Nat ional ly , the pr inc ip le of universal suffrage for both men and women was establ ished in the 1920 Dominion Elect ions Act , but Indians and certain a l iens were excluded. Women did not gain the r ight to vote p rov inc ia l l y unt i l the war years, with Manitoba's i n i t i a t i v e prompting seven 42 other provinces to take s imi la r action during the 1916-22 per iod, leaving Quebec women disenfranchised un t i l 1940. Despite these var ia t ions , the creat ion of a mass franchise had a s ign i f i can t impact because i t ushered in the formative era for innovations in publ ic assistance. The absence of a mass electorate was not the only noticeable feature of the ins t i tu t iona l framework in the pre-1914 era. The federal bureaucracy hardly qua l i f i ed as 'modern. 1 A patronage system of appointment was the norm unt i l 1908, when a non-partisan commission was created to apply the p r inc ip le of se lect ion by mer i t , a goal that was applied generally throughout the service in 1918 . 4 6 In 1908 there were fewer than 10,000 employees and no spec ia l ized agency engaged in health and welfare a c t i v i t i e s . 4 7 Although the Department of Labour, founded in 1900, contained o f f i c i a l s interested in socia l problems, including a future Liberal Prime Min is te r , i t s small s ta f f and low posi t ion in the administrat ive hierarchy res t r ic ted i t s a c t i v i t i e s mainly to a po l ic ing funct ion. Indeed, Ottawa had to sponsor invest igat ions such as the 1887 Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital to compensate for i t s re la t i ve administrat ive impoverishment. With the possible exception of Ontario, t h i s charac ter is t i c also applied to the provincial cap i t a l s . World War I, however, had a dramatic impact on both the scope and s ize of the federal bureaucracy. It prompted the establishment of temporary regulatory agencies to meet the unprecedented emergency and, of more relevance for t h i s study, the creation of permanent departments for veterans' a f fa i r s in 1918 and publ ic health a year l a t e r . Ottawa's wartime intervention also recruited a new army of c i v i l servants, with the i r number almost doubling from 25,101 in 1914 to 47,133 in 1920, a peak that was not matched unt i l 1940.48 j h e i r ranks included a few of the bureaucrats who were to oversee the laying of the foundations of the Canadian welfare s ta te . 43 A Review This sketch of the environment indicates the presence of both spurs and constraints on innovations in income maintenance from 1914 onwards. The socio-economic preconditions for i n i t i a t i v e s in categoric public assistance existed on the eve of World War I. Canada had reached an unprecedented level of af f luence, with the expansion of secondary industry posing an increasing threat to the establ ished agr icu l tura l sector . It was a nation in "an emulsive stage of development part way between an agrarian and an indust r ia l economy...." 49 The spurt of economic growth from 1896 onwards provided the senior leve ls of government with the resources to finance co l l ec t i ve provision against loss of income. Two of i t s demographic e f fec ts , the rapid growth of the p ra i r i e west and of urban, indust r ia l areas, al tered the social structure by adding both sect ional and class con f l i c t s to the ex is t ing l i s t of cleavages, and creating the economic interest groups who would clash over the s ta te 's role in welfare. They also hastened innovations in income maintenance by exacerbating problems of urban poverty, creating a new category of employable indigents and enhancing the prospect of publ ic dependency for those unable to work. These innovations, in f ac t , date from World War I, when provincial programmes in workmen's compensation and mothers' pensions were launched in 1914 and 1916 respect ive ly . This very short time lag between the onset of unprecedented economic growth in the la te nineteenth century and provincial experiments in socia l insurance and categoric publ ic assistance provides strong evidence to refute the contention that Canada was a welfare state '1 agger' compared with other western nat ions. Even when a l a te r s tar t ing point i s used, namely, the federally-sponsored i n i t i a t i v e in old age pensions, her progress was " t y p i c a l , or even a l i t t l e e a r l y . " 5 0 However, entrenched ideas about the causes and treatment of poverty acted as powerful constraints upon advances in income secur i ty . They ref lected both tradional re l ig ious be l ie fs and the dominant secular ideology of North America, l a i s s e z - f a i r e l i be ra l i sm . Their hegemony, though, began to be challenged from the 1880s onwards. Individual reformers discovered that poverty was largely involuntary, and expressions of d i ssa t i s fac t ion with the minimal ro le of the state were voiced in the press and by Protestant socia l gospel lers. Although the growing band of urban socia l reformers appeared to be confused about t he i r lobbying ta rge ts , the d iv is ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers provided a c lear guide. Both the terms of the 1867 const i tu t ion and j ud i c i a l in terpretat ion c lea r l y iden t i f i ed the provincial governments as the 'centres of g rav i t y 1 for i n i t i a t i v e s . But, apart from Ontario, the other provinces were inact ive in the pre-1914 e ra , leaving the colonia l t rad i t ion of local poor r e l i e f v i r t u a l l y in tac t . While the federal system was to complicate Canada's response to the new social problems of an emerging urban soc ie ty , other aspects of i t s p o l i t i c a l evolution were to heighten i t s responsiveness. The d i s t i nc t i ve features of twentieth-century p o l i t i c s - mass democracy and a professional bureaucracy - were to generate important pressures for innovations in income support. As shown above, World War I provided the impetus for t he i r development, and i t ushered i n , among other th ings, special treatment for dest i tu te unemployed workers, a category previously deemed i n e l i g i b l e for publ ic ass is tance. PART II EMERGENCY STATE AID FOR DESTITUTE EMPLOYABLES 45 46 Introduction The development of emergency state aid occurred during a period when recession was more prevalent than prosperity. This trend was reflected in unemployment s ta t is t i cs , compiled from 1921 onwards (see appendix A). The 1913-15 depression represented a small blot on the record of industrial growth in the f i rs t decades of this century. It was short-lived as the outbreak of World War I fuelled an unprecedented demand for labour both in the agricultural and industrial sectors. The effects of wartime expansion lasted until the fa l l of 1920, when a softening of prices, especially for farm products, marked the onset of recession. From 1925 onwards- Canada shared in a major boom originating in the United States, with a l l the main economic indexes showing the same broad pattern of development. At the end of 1929 came a financial collapse that ushered in the Great Depression, during which production and employment reached their lowest levels ever in 1933, and only recovered slowly thereafter until the stimulus of war took hold.l One major consequence of these economic downturns was the creation of a new social category, destitute employables. The 1931 census provided the f i r s t accurate data on their demographic origins. It defined unemployed workers as wage-earners in stated occupations whose earnings were reduced by loss of time resulting from lay-offs and loss of jobs, thus distinguishing them from other segments of the gainfully occupied population such as farmers, employers, and others working on their own account. 2 However, only a minority of wage-earners were affected by unemployment even during the unprecedented economic decline of the 1930s (see figure 2). In his pathbreaking study, Marsh identif ied casual, seasonal, and industrial workers as the most vulnerable to unemployment because their work was chronically unstable and their incomes lower than other wage- or 47 Figure 2. Estimated numbers of employed and unemployed wage earners in re la t ion to the to ta l working populat ion, 1921-38, SOURCE: Leonard C. Marsh, Canadians In and Out of Work: A Survey of Economic Classes and t he i r Relat ion to the Labour Market (Toronto: Oxford Univers i ty Press, 1940), p. 263, f i g . 30. 48 sa lary-earners. "In total numbers, whether measured by l a y - o f f s , losses of jobs , or casual workers, the unski l led manual c lass car r ies by far the greatest burden." 3 Among unemployed wage-earners, only those completely devoid of any f inanc ia l resources were e l i g i b l e for emergency state aid during the interwar per iod. No f igures are avai lab le on the incidence of dest i tu t ion among the working population unt i l the mid-1930s. But invest igators suggest that i t s impact was even more unequal than that of unemployment, with the unsk i l led sector comprising the ent i re c l i en t group. Cassidy speculates that unt i l 1932, publ ic dependency was "a monopoly of . . . the lowest socia l and economic groups in the community." 4 Despite the l e v e l l i n g ef fects of mass unemployment, Marsh establ ished that i t remained nearly synonymous with the unski l led c lass as indigence was s t i l l the c r i t e r i on of e l i g i b i l i t y . 6 Throughout the 1914-30 period des t i tu te , unsk i l led workers received a id only on an emergency bas is , as unemployment was perceived to be mainly a winter problem. World War I marked a threshold in the development of emergency aid as i t spurred the involvement of both senior leve ls of government. Pr ior to 1914, the munic ipa l i t ies were the only publ ic author i t ies to provide occasional r e l i e f . During the 1913-15 depression the four western provinces contributed towards municipal r e l i e f costs for the f i r s t t i m e . 6 Although a s ign i f i can t departure from previous po l i cy , the i r independent e f for ts f e l l c lea r l y within t he i r j u r i s d i c t i o n . Ottawa's involvement, however, in subsequent jo in t i n i t i a t i v e s during the postwar depression posed a d i rect challenge to the ex is t ing d i v i s i on of powers. The federal pol icy of intervention between 1919 and 1921, and retreat during the rest of the decade i s analyzed in chapters 3 and 4. The Great Depression spurred Ottawa to renew i t s partnership with the t rad i t iona l r e l i e f - g i v i ng au thor i t i es . Despite the unprecedented scale of unemployment and poverty, r e l i e f provision during the 1930s cannot qual i fy as a socia l experiment. Instead, i t represented an extension of po l i c ies and pract ices developed in the preceding decade. The Conservative administrat ion of R.B. Bennett, though, did not re ly so le ly on past precedents in i t s attempt to solve the problem of depression. Apart from i t s abortive attempts to introduce unemployment insurance, i t sponsored two novel forms of emergency state a i d : r e l i e f camps for s ing le , homeless men and a land settlement scheme for selected f am i l i es . Although these measures aided only minor segments of the r e l i e f populat ion, they represent further opportunit ies to test proposit ions concerning welfare innovations. The p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the i r introduct ion are analyzed in chapters 5 and 6 respect ive ly . CHAPTER 3 FEDERAL POLICY OF INTERVENTION, 1919-1921 Between December 1919 and October 1921 Ottawa sponsored no less than four separate measures for des t i tu te , unemployed workers. The Unionist government extended a id f i r s t to veterans, f inancing the ent i re costs of t he i r r e l i e f during the 1920 winter. Although th i s was a unique expedient, i t set an important precedent for the extension of emergency aid to c i v i l i a n s . ! Following the onset of the postwar depression, the governing coa l i t i on then offered cash cont r ibut ions, i . e . , do les , towards municipal r e l i e f costs in the 1921 winter. This i n i t i a t i v e was s ign i f i can t as no previous federal administration had financed aid for able-bodied c i v i l i a n wage-earners. Moreover, i t establ ished Canada as the North American pioneer in unemployment r e l i e f . 2 Although p a r t i a l l y disabled veterans were e l i g i b l e for c i v i l i a n r e l i e f , Ottawa decided in January 1921 to assume on a temporary basis the ent i re costs of t he i r maintenance. Its commitment, in f ac t , turned out to be an ongoing one as these marginal members of the labour force received aid in successive winters of the interwar period. Unionist action concerning phys ica l ly f i t c i v i l i a n s was not confined to pioneering a doles po l i cy . In the f a l l of 1921 federal contr ibut ions were offered towards municipal r e l i e f works as well as d i rect r e l i e f . Their payment was contingent upon matching provincia l grants, a requirement imposed in future interwar schemes. Ind iv idua l ly , these various measures could be dismissed as merely ad hoc responses to postwar condi t ions. Taken together, however, they amounted to an unprecedented po l icy of federal intervention often involv ing forays into 50 51 t e r r i t o r y hi therto regarded as the exclusive te r ra in of the munic ipa l i t ies and provinces. The purpose of th is chapter i s to elucidate the p o l i t i c a l forces behind th is po l i cy . The chapter begins with an out l ine of the background, against which the various i n i t i a t i v e s were taken. It then iden t i f i es the various advocates, opponents and precipi tants of federal ac t ion . It concludes with a review of the f indings in order to highl ight the relevant factors shaping the pol icy of in tervent ion. Background In contrast to previous depressions, Ottawa ant ic ipated that abnormal unemployment would resul t from the sudden reconversion of war-time industr ies and the demobil ization of 500,000 s o l d i e r s . 3 The Unionist government, therefore, took various steps to minimize these d is loca t ions . In February 1918 i t offered condit ional subsidies fo r the expansion of provincial labour exchanges that spurred the development of a nationwide system by 1919. It a lso created a temporary Department of So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment (DSCR) to handle re-employment and other problems of the disabled veteran. In January 1919 i t s a c t i v i t i e s were expanded to handle the job placement of the physica l ly f i t so ld ie r . The government also secured approval in the 1919 session for a scheme to encourage so ld iers to take up farming and for a package of special measures to provide work in the c i t i e s . However, in spi te of these various measures of fores ight , a minority of veterans faced a d i f f i c u l t task in securing re-entry into the workforce. The problem of unemployment among veterans did not become acute unt i l the f a l l of 1919. Although 70 percent of the 350,000 men s t i l l overseas were released between March and June of that y e a r , 4 the impact of th i s f lood of disbanded so ld iers was not f e l t immediately. Like t he i r 73,000 colleagues discharged in Canada, the newly returned so ld iers received war service gra tu i t ies to cushion the i r i n i t i a l re-adjustment to c i v i l i a n l i f e . Their period of independence, though, was shor t - l i ved as these cash grants were soon eroded by the s p i r a l l i n g cost of l i v i n g which rose over 13 percent in 1918. They were then faced with the prospect of f inding employment at a time when factory jobs were becoming scarcer and seasonal work was over for the year. Unemployment among veterans in the f a l l of 1919 was most acute in the c i t i e s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, and Nova Sco t ia , the areas at t rac t ing the greatest number of newly demobilized men. A DSCR o f f i c i a l estimated that two-thirds of the 30,328 unemployed ex-servicemen were concentrated in urban areas: his par t ia l breakdown of f igures i den t i f i ed 3,497 in Winnipeg, 5,750 in Toronto, Hamilton and Brantford, and 4,900 in Kingston.5 As they were not lega l l y residents of these c i t i e s , they were not e l i g i b l e for r e l i e f under the poor law inheri tance that s t i l l governed char i table ass i s tance . 6 Ottawa, however, had not ant ic ipated th is when i t decided to pay the fares of discharged so ld iers to any dest inat ion of t he i r choice. Its program of re-establishment contained no provision for emergency a i d . Moreover, the Canadian Pa t r i o t i c Fund, the major voluntary agency engaged in post-discharge r e l i e f work, was unable to tackle the problem of t he i r des t i tu t ion . Its revised charter of 1919 e x p l i c i t l y excluded the granting of assistance to fami l ies where unemployment was the only cause of dependency "so long as the ex-so ld ier was physica l ly f i t . " Rel ie f for the able-bodied veteran ran counter to the dominant e th ic guiding the agency's a c t i v i t i e s : "Se l f - re l i ance must be encouraged to the f u l l es t extent poss ib le , otherwise there i s a grave danger of 53 creat ing a c lass that w i l l always tend to relax personal e f fo r t and lean on public benevolence." 7 The problem of re l iev ing veterans was soon overshadowed by more widespread dest i tu t ion among c i v i l i a n wage-earners. In the f a l l of 1920 the b r ie f postwar boom faded and the economy began a steep s l i de towards depression.8 jhe primary cause of the 1920-25 depression was a severe decl ine in agr icu l tura l p r i ces , espec ia l ly of the pr inc ipa l crop - wheat - resu l t ing from a sharp drop in demand in Europe.^ This decl ine was accompanied by a less rapid f a l l in pr ices general ly. The depression affected p rac t i ca l l y every province, but i t s impact was especia l ly severe on the pra i r ies where both rural and urban areas were h i t hard.10 j n other provinces the slump i n i t i a l l y had a more se lec t ive impact a f fect ing the logging industry in B r i t i sh Columbia, and manufacturing in Ontario and Quebec. The slowdown in these industr ies coincided with the seasonal closure of camps and ports. Together they produced mounting unemployment in urban centres, pr imari ly among unsk i l l ed , casual labour. Although i t s precise extent across Canada was unknown, the Deputy Minister of Labour estimated that 200,000 were jobless in October 1920, compared with a normal seasonal total of 40,000-50,000 in the c i t i e s . 1 1 The abnormal condit ions in Quebec, Ontario and B r i t i s h Columbia imposed severe s t ra ins on the ex is t ing r e l i e f machinery. In Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, both pr ivate and publ ic agencies were overwhelmed by demands for emergency a id from the dest i tute unemployed.! 2 The re l ig ious char i t ies in Quebec were experiencing a severe f inancia l c r i s i s in 1920 because the demands placed upon them were not matched by an increase in pr ivate revenues. Their functions could not be transferred eas i ly to the public sector as Montreal and other municipal governments were facing bankruptcy. 1 3 C i t i es in English Canada 54 also faced f inanc ia l problems ar is ing from the i r dependence upon the property tax , because i t s revenue-raising a b i l i t y could not keep pace with demand.^ Their revenue const ra in ts , though, were not the only impediments. Faced with sp i r a l l i ng r e l i e f costs for t he i r own permanent res idents, c i v i c p o l i t i c i a n s were reluctant to f inance a id for t ransients and veterans because local ratepayers objected to any outlay from c i t y cof fers for the able-bodied unemployed. Property-owners voiced the i r opposit ion in Vancouver by ".. .grumbling about giving r e l i e f to men who, no doubt, wasted t he i r earnings in riotous l i v i n g " ; and Toronto ratepayers were equally perturbed about having to support " l oa fe rs . " - - 5 Ever mindful of the i r const i tuents ' wishes as they faced annual re -e lec t i on , spokesmen of these and other c i t i e s lobbied for provincial a i d . The revenues of the provincial governments, however, were also squeezed by the postwar depression. Taxation of income was the i r major source of funds at that t ime, as other forms such as the gasoline tax or income from l iquor control were i n s i g n i f i c a n t . 1 6 Besides lack of resources, there was another, more powerful constraint upon provincial in tervent ion. The prevalent f i s c a l orthodoxy iden t i f i ed retrenchment, not increased expenditures, as the appropriate course of act ion in times of recession. Consequently, the two provinces that took independent steps in the f a l l of 1920 to aid the unemployed refused to pay any contr ibut ion towards d i rect r e l i e f cos ts . Instead, the Liberal government of B r i t i s h Columbia offered to lend money to c i t i e s for the s tar t ing of r e l i e f works; and the new Farmer-Labour government of Ontario earmarked funds in November for road construction to meet the unemployment c r i s i s . 1 7 i n contrast , Ottawa was more receptive to demands for emergency a id for des t i tu te , unemployed workers. 55 The Agi tat ion for Federal Intervention, 1919-21 Despite i t s b rev i ty , the agi tat ion for federal intervent ion was complex, incorporating elements of both the social control and interest-group models of welfare p o l i t i c s . On the one hand, i t was l inked with the emergence of l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d dissent in the immediate postwar per iod. On the other hand, i t represented a more or less orthodox struggle between competing in teres ts representing a c l i en t group and the major sectors of the economy. While the boundary between the two interpretat ions i s blurred by the fact that veterans were the key societa l actors in both cases, i t i s possible to d is t ingu ish concurrent separate c lass and group pressures shaping Ottawa's in tervent ion. The onset of the agi tat ion coincided with an unprecedented surge of labour radica l ism. Although working-class radicals were seeking fundamental social and p o l i t i c a l change, rather than temporary p a l l i a t i v e s , t he i r a c t i v i t i e s alarmed the pub l ic , as well as both the c i v i l and m i l i t a ry au thor i t i es , and underlined the need for remedial act ion of some kind. Against th i s backdrop of widespread unrest, spokesmen of in terest groups clashed openly over the issue of state a id for unemployed workers. Representatives of mainly moderate veterans and unionists voiced separate demands for a national remedy for postwar unemployment with the former engaging in more intense lobbying. Spokesmen of capi ta l and farmers, on the other hand, were not convinced of the necessity of state-f inanced ventures to a l l ev ia te unemployment. Although they represented the major federal taxpayers, t he i r sporadic protests were disregarded because businessmen lacked a powerful bloc ins ide the Unionist cabinet to speak on the i r behalf and farmers represented only an embryonic p o l i t i c a l force during the ag i ta t ion , except in Ontar io, where they scored an upset v ic tory in 1919. 56 Inside government, cabinet po l i t i c i ans rather than bureaucrats qual i fy as the precipi tants of the federal pol icy of in tervent ion. They made the major decisions because the pol icy involved a new departure requir ing a government decision on p r i nc ip le . Their motives were mixed, re f lec t ing the simultaneous con f l i c t i ng external pressures, and included fear of revo lut ion, perceived legit imacy of veterans' c la ims, e lectora l and cost considerat ions. Advocates: The agi tat ion developed i n i t i a l l y outside the Canadian Parliament. It was di rected mainly at Ottawa rather than the provincial governments, because under the d iv i s ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers the former was assigned j u r i sd i c t i on over the category of veterans, as well as the residual power of peace, order and good government. It was conducted by two sets of societa l actors: labour radicals and orthodox interest groups representing ex-sold iers and trade un ion is ts . Their pleas were to a t t ract support from other segments of Canadian soc ie ty , and federal l eg i s l a t o r s . In 1919 working-class mi l i tancy in the form of union membership and s t r i ke a c t i v i t y reached a peak that was not equalled unt i l 1943.18 j n e ] e v e i 0 f l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d dissent in the immediate postwar years was also unprecedented. It represented the emergence of a new form of c lass con f l i c t at a time when the cl imate was receptive to demands fo r a new p o l i t i c a l and socia l order. "The growing strength of s o c i a l i s t ideas, the encouragement offered by the Russian revolut ion, resentment of the al leged power of the 'bosses' over part ies and governments, as well as of such par t i cu la r ev i l s as conscr ip t ion, unemployment and the high cost of l i v i n g , a l l gave an impetus to labour radical ism which exci ted hope in the breasts of many and ter ror in the hearts of others."19 57 The act ive part ic ipants in radical labour causes represented only a small minority of indust r ia l workers. They included not only c i v i l i a n s but also disaf fected veterans who were b i t t e r over the contrast between 'a land f i t for heroes to l i v e i n ' and the condit ions of i n f l a t i o n , poor housing and unemployment they encountered af ter demobi l izat ion. Although the i r a l l i ance was not formal ized, i t was manifest in a var iety of forms soon af ter the war. Some ex-so ld iers attended the labour churches in Winnipeg and other western c i t i e s that were under RCMP survei l lance because of t he i r "sedi t ious p reach ing . " 2 0 Others made common cause with more extreme elements of the labour movement. In March 1919 an anonymous "Manifesto of the Provisional Council of Soldier and Workers Deputies of Canada" was d is t r ibuted in Toronto urging the organization of secret counci ls along the soviet m o d e l . 2 1 In the same month, the spectre of a s im i la r a l l i ance was raised in Calgary, where delegates attending the founding convention of the One Big Union (OBU) passed a resolut ion ca l l i ng for the formation of jo in t counci ls of so ld iers and l a b o u r . 2 2 This new radical labour organization sought "fundamental and revolutionary change in society and the creat ion of a system of trade unions that would great ly increase the 23 economic and p o l i t i c a l power of the workers." The a c t i v i t i e s of revolutionary s o c i a l i s t s during the 1919 winter created widespread alarm that came close to dupl icat ing the state of national hyster ia reached in the American 'Red Scare . ' "Many of the fears . . . centred on the thousands of returned so ld iers demobilized af ter the a r m i s t i c e . " 2 4 Unlike c i v i l i a n s , these men were trained k i l l e r s and the i r potential for violence had already been demonstrated in sporadic attacks upon a l ien workmen in Winnipeg and Hali fax. 25 58 Tension mounted across Canada during the spring of 1919 as a resul t of veterans' par t i c ipa t ion in the Winnipeg General S t r i ke , "the explosive culmination of the [postwar] labour unrest."26 Although the s t r i ke was dominated by issues such as the r ight to co l l ec t i ve bargaining and a l i v i n g wage, i t was not simply a c i v i l i a n c lass struggle. It a lso involved "the c lus te r of problems associated with so ld ie r rehab i l i ta t ion . "27 In Winnipeg, unemployed veterans resented those who had stayed at home with jobs , made p ro f i t s on war contracts , or increased the i r land holdings.28 While estimates vary , a majority of the 16,000 ex-so ld iers in the c i t y were apparently behind the s t r i k e , many of whom had a labour background. 2^ From the onset of the s t r i ke (May 15), these veterans played an act ive part . Their par t ic ipat ion troubled the federal author i t ies as i t enhanced the p o s s i b i l i t y of violence on e i ther or both sides.30, i n response to the i r involvement and the perceived threat of Bolshevism, the contingent of 3,000 troops at the Winnipeg barracks was strengthened, detachments of the RNWMP force were moved into the c i t y , and machine guns were secret ly shipped i n . These steps, however, increased tensions and created an at t i tude of mi l i tancy among the returned-soldier s t r i k e r s . This was voiced in an a r t i c l e that appeared in the St r ike Bu l le t in of 6 June 1919: The absolute unscrupulousness of the employing c lass i s seen c lea r l y by the so ld ie r . He knows what machine guns mean in a mob and he has found out that he - the returned so ld ie r with the other s t r i ke rs - i s the mob, so once again he issues a warning and says once again quite p l a i n l y , i f you c a l l out the s o l d i e r s , you w i l l f ind that two can play that game.3i Although the ex-so ld ier s t r i ke rs did not resort to armed combat, they fought with ' L o y a l i s t ' veterans for control of the s t ree ts . They also precipi tated the only serious incidence of v io lence, 'Bloody Saturday,' when the i r s i l en t 59. protest against the arrest of s t r i ke leaders ended in the noise of machine guns f i red by the RNWMP. Their new-found radical ism did not d iss ipate in the aftermath of the s t r i k e . An Ex-So ld iers ' and S a i l o r s ' Labour Party was formed in Winnipeg in la te June. It was most act ive in i t s b i r thp lace, but had other branches in Saskatchewan, Alberta and B r i t i s h Columbia . 3 2 Its platform contained Progressive planks such as abol i t ion of t a r i f f s and d i rect l e g i s l a t i o n , but at the time the party was regarded as a front for the radical OBU because of i t s advocacy of extensive publ ic ownership.33 Besides labour rad ica l ism, orthodox group pressure also spurred federal in tervent ion. Organized veterans during the summer and early f a l l of 1919 exerted intense pressure upon Ottawa to remedy the i r grievances concerning i n f l a t i o n , prof i teer ing and unemployment, and the i r demand fo r addit ional war service gra tu i t ies was "the most pressing issue of the p o l i t i c s of re-establishment."34 Although th i s issue provided a focal point for t he i r general discontent, there was no united e f for t to secure further cash bonuses. Instead, the agi tat ion was conducted by a divided so ld ie rs ' movement marked by turbulent r i va l r y that ref lected the socia l unrest prevalent throughout the Dominion. The combined to ta l membership of the so ld ie rs ' movement represented a powerful force. At least 75 percent of the 500,000 men who returned from World War I enrol led in such organizations upon demobil ization.35 However, the movement was s p l i t between ten national associat ions formed before or soon a f ter the armist ice. Moreover, the internal structure of these organizations was also characterized by d i v i s i on re f lec t ing status dif ferences between the o f f i c e r s , who were drawn mainly from the middle and upper c lasses , and the 60 lower ranks composed of workers. The assumption of leadership roles by o f f i ce rs in the major associat ions in tens i f i ed the resentment f e l t by the mass membership since the end of the war. "It i s a matter of record that fol lowing the Armistice and pending demobi l izat ion, propaganda of an insid ious and persistent type, seeking to d iscred i t the o f f i c e r s , was prevalent among the 'other ranks. ' Among the plethora of returned-soldier organizat ions, the Great War Veterans' Associat ion (GWVA) was the la rges t , most act ive and most i n f l u e n t i a l . It was founded in Apr i l 1917 and experienced rapid growth in membership, so that by mid-1919 i t represented the majority of returned men.37 Like other major ex-servicemen's organizations outside Canada,38 the GWVA rejected the idea of independent p o l i t i c a l ac t ion , opting instead to be a non-partisan pressure group. The leadership also adopted moderate and const i tut ional goals, including commitments to respect law and order and to oppose Bolshevism, because i t was "anxious that i t s members be thought neither grasping nor radical in the i r approach to reconstruct ion."39 As a resul t of i t s moderation and s i z e , the GWVA soon acquired a posi t ion of pr iv i leged access in the decision-making process. Its representatives were appointed to serve on an advisory committee to the federal cabinet and most of t he i r suggestions to f a c i l i t a t e re-establishment were adopted . 4 0 The moderation of the GWVA executive was manifest in i t s stance on the g ra tu i t ies issue. Its o f f i ce rs refused to endorse the demand of t he i r Calgary branch for addit ional cash grants of between $1,000 and $2,000, and voiced the i r opposit ion in the Veteran (May 1919), arguing that the cost of the proposal, $1,000 m i l l i o n , was p roh ib i t i ve , a sentiment shared by the Finance Min is ter . Their reaction proved to be unpopular with segments of the mass membership. At the GWVA annual convention in June 1919, the 'Calgary Resolut ion' was the chief subject of debate. It was backed by a l l branches in Alberta and others across the country. Confronted with a divided convention, the executive has t i l y drew up a compromise resolut ion that was more moderate than the Calgary one because i t avoided mention of spec i f i c sums and recognized the f inancia l constraints facing the Unionist government. 4 1 When even th is request was rejected by the cabinet in the name of " r i g i d economy," 4 2 some rank-and-f i le GWVA members defected to a more radical a l te rna t i ve . They joined a new Returned So ld ie rs ' Gratui ty League founded at a mass meeting of 5,000 veterans in Toronto in September 1919 by John Harry Flynn, an ex-sergeant and a controversial f igure in the so ld ie rs ' movement. The men represented only a small minority of returned so ld ie r s , but they created "a good deal of turmoil for the time."43 Flynn 's new League attracted support from veterans in Ottawa, Montreal and Ha l i fax , as well as Toronto. Mass meetings were held in these c i t i e s and resolut ions were passed demanding immediate implementation of the 'Calgary Reso lu t ion ' . The League also received the backing of another radical group, the 16,000-strong Grand Army of Canada, founded by S . J . Brown of Toronto in 1918. Its l i s t of pr inc ip les included the declarat ion "that a serving class i s a disgrace to our c i v i l i z a t i o n ; " and i t s 1919 platform advocated not only Calgary-type bonuses but also extensive publ ic ownership.44 The tac t i cs adopted by Flynn to secure addit ional bonuses were unorthodox. His attacks upon the Unionist government and i t s " lackey," the GWVA, were so vigorous that they inspired unruly behaviour and minor disturbances. According to the Minister of So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment in 1920-21, Flynn's invect ive attracted attent ion because "he was a g l i b speaker of the demagogic type." The f u l l force of h is oratory became evident a f ter an emergency 62 parliamentary debate in September 1919 on the League's demand for Calgary-type bonuses. According to the min is te r , "Flynn had some of the unthinking men so excited in the support of his idea, that threats of physical violence and of burning homes poured in upon some of us by telegram, and one of the Members who appeared before his returned-soldier organization was manhandled."45 The Unionist government's decision to reject the League's demand for cash bonuses was overwhelmingly endorsed in the emergency debate. However, Flynn's b i t t e r agi tat ion was l i k e l y to continue unabated unless action of some kind was taken to dampen discontent among veterans and to aid the o f f i ce rs of the moderate associat ions stem the defections of t he i r members to the more extreme League. Recognizing t h i s , the cabinet agreed to the GWVA demand for an inquiry into the problems of veterans and appointed a House of Commons special committee on September 18th. Its broad terms of reference included making some provision fo r unemployed returned men. However, although i t s 21 members included eight ex-so ld iers and two fathers of veterans, they were un l ike ly to recommend a further cash bonus as the majority "supported a Government several times on record as opposed to i t . " 46 Despite th i s omen, the veterans' spokesmen used the hearings of the special conmittee to press the case for addit ional g ra tu i t i es . On October 1st the controversial Flynn, now head of a new United Veterans' League, threatened p o l i t i c a l action i f his 25,000 supporters' demand for Calgary-type bonuses was not met. "We w i l l d ic ta te to representatives of any party the i r platform, and i f they are not in accord with the views of th i s p o l i t i c a l power, then we w i l l use our franchise to prevent them gett ing into o f f ice . "47 Although the spokesmen of the three major moderate associat ions publ ic ly disassociated themselves from Flynn's t a c t i c s , they were not averse to issuing threats of 63. their own. A Calgary representative of the GWVA raised the spectre of "trouble" among their combined membership of 340,000 i f the committee rejected their own gratuity proposal in favour of other "half-hearted or cheese-paring" options: We have been si t t ing on a safety va lve. . . . I f , by any incomplete or insufficient measures which this Parliament may adopt, you unceremoniously throw us off that safety valve, our control is gone, and you may call upon us to assist you at a time when our control can no longer be of service to you....48 His warning, however, was not heeded. According to a senior minister, the cabinet discussed the issue on October 11th and concluded: "We are up against a 49 very grave situation but shall disappoint the gratuity grabbers." The cabinet's decision fai led to quell the agitation. The spl i t in the ranks of veterans showed no signs of healing during 1920, and Flynn s t i l l posed a challenge to the moderate associations.50 gut the Unionist government remained firm in i ts stance. Borden's successor, Meighen, told a mass meeting of veterans in Vancouver in the fa l l that he was "against any further cash bonuses [b]ut i f we can s t i l l further help the men to help themselves, we are ready to do it."51 Although sl im, the evidence suggests that the community at large was somewhat ambivalent towards Ottawa's stance on the gratuities question. Letters received by Prime Minister Borden from individuals in Toronto commended his firmness in resisting the "sel f ish" and "unreasonable" demands of Flynn.52 Among interest groups, only moderate trade unionists endorsed the 'Calgary Resolution.'53 However, the more general plea of veterans for special treatment attracted widespread sympathy, because the public perceived them as a cultural ly deserving group owing to their patriotic service. Some Protestant social gospellers even went so far as to ascribe a special moral claim to veterans' demands for remedy of their grievances.54 64 This dual reaction to the ex-soldiers' agitation was reflected inside the federal House. The Liberal opposition was the only party to endorse their demand for additional cash grants. It pledged to adopt them at i t s f i r s t convention in 1919 because "so easy an opportunity of winning the support of returned soldiers could not be resisted.. . ."55 i n contrast, Unionist backbenchers by and large supported their leadership's stance on gratuit ies, but were not averse to some other form of remedial action to alleviate hardship among ex-soldiers. Major D.L. Redmond, for example, urged the creation of federal public works on the grounds that unemployed veterans were s t i l l "wards of the state" until their re-absorption into the c iv i l ian labour market.^6 As well as organized veterans, trade unionists actively sought a national remedy for postwar unemployment. Although their ranks grew rapidly during the war, jumping from 143,000 in 1915 to 378,000 in 1919,57 t n e y were deeply divided along ethnic, ideological and sectional l ines. The Ontario-based Trades and Labour Congress (TLC) was the dominant national organization. It represented Canadian locals of American international unions, and i ts leaders were greatly influenced by the philosophy of their U.S. parent, Samuel Gompers, who rejected socialism and independent pol i t ical a c t i o n . ^ Their efforts to block the development of an autonomous Canadian movement prompted the growth of a separate, rival Catholic labour organization in Quebec. Their conservatism also precipitated another schism with western labour leaders that resulted in the founding of the radical OBU. In the immediate postwar period, these ' divisions seriously undermined the credibi l i ty of the TLC's claim to be the national voice of organized labour. The TLC pressed for implementation of a state-administered unemployment insurance fund in the immediate postwar period. It proposed that assessments be 65 levied on industry along similar lines to provincial workmen's compensation programs, and that Ottawa operate the scheme with the provinces contributing towards the cost of administration.59 A s ^-j-j a s including this proposal in i ts annual briefs to the cabinet, TLC spokesmen on various federal advisory bodies also advocated action. They signed the majority report of the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations in July 1919, recommending immediate investigation of unemployment insurance. Representatives of the TLC and railway brotherhoods on the Canadian Employment Service Council subsequently endorsed this recommendation. However, there is l i t t l e evidence to suggest that their demands were followed up by a concerted campaign to secure federal action until the 1922 session.60 Other sectors of Canadian society supported the claims of moderate unionists. The major Protestant churches and the GWVA passed resolutions at their respective postwar conventions endorsing the concept of contributory unemployment insurance. The federal Liberals also recognized i t s growing appeal. At their 1919 convention they pledged to implement a joint scheme of social insurance, once financial conditions permitted. Their new leader, W.L.M. King, who sponsored this resolution, had earl ier endorsed this technique of income support in his book Industry and Humanity, published in 1918. Individual members of the Unionist coalit ion also pressed the case for a statutory in i t ia t ive . Both Newton Rowel 1, the leading spokesman of the Liberal wing, and Senator Robertson, a senior Conservative, recognized that unemployment was an involuntary consequence of industr ial izat ion, and urged their colleagues to develop a contributory insurance scheme.61 Their advocacy was encouraged by a Justice Department ruling in April 1920, suggesting that Ottawa could sponsor a jo in t scheme under i t s residual power of peace, order and good government. 6 2 Thus, ins ide as well as outside government the cause of co l lec t i v i sm had growing appeal. Opponents: Businessmen and farmers, however, refrained from adding the i r voices to the r i s ing chorus of demands for federal in tervent ion. Premier Drury of Ontario, the head of the new Farmer-Labour c o a l i t i o n , also protested against the po l i c y , but his counterparts in other provinces remained s i l en t on the issue during the ag i ta t ion . Businessmen's opposition to federal intervention represented in part a ' taxpayers' r e v o l t . ' Besides levying a business pro f i ts tax from 1916 onwards, the Unionist government also introduced an income tax in 1917 that " f e l l most heav i l y , i f not exc lus ive ly , upon the professional and managerial c l a s s e s . . . those whose incomes had probably been most enhanced by war p r o s p e r i t y . " 6 3 These new taxpayers were h i t with addit ional tax increases on the i r personal incomes in 1918. They received no r e l i e f once peace came because of "the be l ie f of the Min is ter of Finance, S i r Thomas White, that 1919 was a 'war year ' and that heavy taxat ion was necessary to meet the costs of demobil ization and r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . . . . " 6 4 Confronted with further tax hikes on leve ls already perceived as onerous, indiv idual spokesmen of the Toronto business community such as S i r C l i f f o r d Si f ton ca l led for "a halt in reckless expenditure." 6 5 He was sharply c r i t i c a l of the shipbui lding contract signed by the Unionist government in December 1919 to re l ieve unemployment among veterans, denouncing i t as an "ut ter ly indefensible p roceed ing . " 6 6 Apart from the i r low tax to lerance, Canadian businessmen subscribed to the dominant ideology of l a i s s e z - f a i r e l i be ra l i sm. Unlike the i r American counterparts, they were not in favour of any permanent changes in government functions based on wartime precedents but wanted a return to prewar normalcy -with government aid only for economic development.67 | r v e n ind iv iduals who had played a key role in the war ef for t shared th i s preference. For example, Joseph F l a v e l l e , the successful Toronto f inanc ier who headed the Munitions Board was opposed to government intervention in labour matters. At the end of the war his views were characterized as those of "a reactionary f ree-enterpr iser , "68 a n c | n e opposed state remedies for unemployment because "they would rob the indiv idual of opportunit ies to do what he should do for himself."69 s im i la r views were expressed by two of the three employers' representatives on the 1919 Royal Commission on Industr ial Relat ions. Senator Smeaton White and F. Parzee, spokesman of the 'Montreal i n t e r e s t s , ' "submitted a thoroughly reactionary minori ty report, playing down unemployment...and condemning socia l insurance as a threat to the t h r i f t and i n i t i a t i v e of l a b o u r . " 7 0 The Canadian Manufacturers' Associat ion (CMA) supported these indiv idual protests . Its Committee on Industr ial Relations reported to delegates attending the 1921 CMA convention that unemployment insurance schemes in operation in Br i ta in and Europe had "conspicuously f a i l e d , " resul t ing in enormous government burdens and pauperization of insured workers. The manufacturers' opposit ion did not represent merely taxpayers' res is tance. It also ref lected a perception of unemployment as a temporary aberration rather than as an involuntary consequence of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n : "Generally speaking, except in periods of abnormal depression such as the las t 18 months, there i s work for a l l to do in a new country l i k e t h i s . " ^ 68 Although businessmen's opposition may well have influenced the Unionist government's decision not to take action concerning unemployment insurance, i t fai led to block in i t iat ives concerning unemployment re l ief . Their views were disregarded partly because the 'Montreal interests' lacked representation in the Borden and Meighen cabinets, the conscription election of 1917 having created a sol id Liberal Quebec for the f i rs t time since Confederation. Although spokesmen of Bay Street had more influence inside the cabinet, they were unable to dictate Unionist f iscal policy, i f the decision to levy an income tax is any guide. Farmers also rejected the idea that involuntary unemployment was a characteristic of the Canadian economy. They identified i ts cause in the dr i f t from farm to ci ty that accelerated during the war, and sought to return surplus labour 'back to the land.' Although this view was prevalent in the immediate postwar per iod , 7 2 a concerted protest against state maintenance of unemployed ci ty workers was not mounted until 1922. Agrarian opposition was muted before that because the Progressive movement represented then only an incipient revolt of farmers in the West and i ts in i t ia l reformist orientation obscured i ts individualist philosophy. In Ontario, however, organized farmers scored an upset victory in the 1919 provincial election. Drury, a prominent member of the United Farmers of Ontario, was chosen to head the new Farmer-Labour coal i t ion. His government's attitude towards unemployment and i ts rel ief clearly reflected the views of i ts agrarian not i ts industrial supporters. Ontario's Labour Minister told his federal counterpart that i t was doubtful "whether the Farmer branch...will look kindly upon emergency aid for unemployed ci ty workers, in view of their contention that labour is d i f f i cu l t or impossible to obtain for farm purposes and that men should leave the c i t ies and go to the farms."73 Spokesmen of rural Canada inside the federal House also voiced objections to the federal pol icy of in tervent ion. Nesbitt ( L i b . , Oxford), himself a farmer, objected to a ' do les ' po l i cy because i t fostered indolence among i t s rec ip ien ts ; and he also questioned the necessity for e i ther r e l i e f or unemployment insurance when work was avai lab le on the f a rms . 7 4 His sentiments were echoed during an emergency debate on unemployment by backbenchers representing rural r idings in Ontario and Quebec. 7 5 The new Progressive leader, Crerar, was also not convinced that unemployment was a serious problem, as the next chapter w i l l show. His par ty 's views carr ied l i t t l e weight, however, for "[w]ith the i r protect ion is t outlook, Conservatives were generally w i l l i n g to s a c r i f i c e the farm vote in the West for gains in the indust r ia l heartland of Ontario and Quebec." 7 6 Despite the i r industr ia l -urban e lectora l base, most members of the Unionist cabinet were opposed to f inancing cos t ly remedies fo r postwar unemployment. They were acutely conscious of the "extravagance" of the war years , and of the widespread c r i t i c i s m of t he i r d e f i c i t budgets and tax increases. They were par t i cu la r l y alarmed at the s ize of the national debt, estimated to be $2 b i l l i o n , and wanted to balance the budget and lower t a x e s . 7 7 From Apr i l 1919 onwards, Prime Minister Borden and his successor, Meighen, pursued a pol icy of " r i g i d economy and careful retrenchment" that e f fec t i ve ly ruled out action concerning g ra tu i t ies because the costs of th is one-shot funding exercise were estimated to f a l l between $400 m i l l i on and $1 b i l l i o n , depending upon the scope. 7 8 Their f i s c a l pol icy a lso mi l i ta ted against the assumption of an ongoing obl igat ion to a l l ev ia te unemployment, for the long-term costs of a j o i n t insurance scheme were unpredictable, even though Ottawa's i n i t i a l contr ibut ion was estimated to be only $2 m i l l i on per annum, so long as unemployment did not r i se above 6 percent. 7 9 7 P Prec ip i tan ts : The attempt to restore f i s c a l orthodoxy, however, did not prevent members of the Unionist cabinet from sanctioning the much cheaper option of emergency state a id for dest i tu te employables. On four separate occasions in the immediate postwar years, they approved the payment of cash grants for veterans and c i v i l i a n s (see table 3) . While cabinet ministers qual i fy as the chief arch i tects of the federal pol icy of in tervent ion, t he i r decisions concerning spec i f i c i n i t i a t i v e s were influenced by bureaucrats - both c i v i l and m i l i t a r y -as well as po l i t i c i ans representing the other leve ls of government. Table 3. Federal expenditure on unemployment r e l i e f under orders- in-counci l by category aided, 1919-21 Administration Order-in-Council Expenditure Category Aided Unionist NA* $4,146,625 Phys ica l ly f i t and p a r t i a l l y disabled veterans PC 43 (10/01/21) $1,510,164 P a r t i a l l y disabled veterans PC 139 (24/01/21) $ 595,486 C i v i l i ans PC3831 (07/10/21) $ 247,514 II SOURCES: Figures concerning emergency aid for veterans are from Reports of the Work of the DSCR, 1920, 1922, pp. 84, 46 respect ive ly . Data on c i v i l i a n s are from unsigned memo, attached to a l e t t e r from Deputy Minister to Thomas, 25 Apr i l 1923, Ottawa, Publ ic Archives of Canada, Department of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , Record Group 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9B. *Federal expenditure was authorized by the House of Commons Committee of Supply on 8 November 1919. Fear of revolution was real and shaped the or ig ina l dec is ion. From the s ta r t of the demobil ization process, the cabinet had been aware of the veterans' propensity for v iolence and "were in dread of what might happen...when the majority of returned sold iers would experience the i r f i r s t taste of unemployment throughout a Canadian winter."80 j n e Winnipeg General 7 1 Strike in the spring of 1919 provided a foretaste of what they dreaded. Although historians such as Masters (1973) and Bercuson (1978) have established that i ts aims were non-revolutionary, the pol i t ical leadership of the time had a different reaction. Prime Minister Borden, for example, regarded the confl ict as "a deliberate attempt to overthrow the existing organization of the government, and to supersede i t by crude, fantastic methods founded upon absurd conceptions of what had been accomplished in Russia."81 Both Meighen, then acting Minister of Justice, and Robertson, Minister of Labour, had witnessed first-hand the events in Winnipeg, and shared their leader's perception of the revolutionary potential of the s t r i k e . 8 2 With the military confrontation of 'Bloody Saturday' fresh in their minds, they could not overlook the prospect of further clashes during the f i rs t winter following mass demobilization. They sensed that the informal revolutionary soldier-worker alliance forged in c i t ies of Ontario and the west resembled the coalit ion of forces that had toppled the czar in Russia in 1917 and the democratic government of Hungary in 1919. "Canada in 1919 (so i ts leaders believed) was not far from revolut ion. 1 , 8 3 The cabinet's decision was probably influenced by a warning i t received in September 1919 from a Department of Labour of f ic ia l based in Winnipeg: The radical labour element and the extreme soc ia l is ts , together with the Soldiers' and Sai lors ' League, are endeavouring to get hold of the returned soldiers here in the West, especially in Winnipeg and in Alberta. They want the returned men who are trying to get the Government to give them a further bonus to link up with them, promising that i f they unite they wi l l form a party that wi l l be strong enough to force the Government to accede to their demands, or, fa i l ing th is , to form a Government of their own. The movement i s , in my mind, a very dangerous one, and should be counter-acted in some way. 8 4 72 A s im i la r theme was echoed by two Ottawa-based bureaucrats a month la te r in the i r testimony to the 1919 Special Committee on So ld ie rs ' Re-establishment, the body chosen by the cabinet to devise some remedy fo r unemployment. The d i rec tor of the c i v i l i a n Employment Service of Canada ant ic ipated "a normal seasonal unemployment" for the 1920 winter. But, he continued, "there i s a temperamental fee l ing that we have now about the unrest, and from our present point of view the unemployment of 10,000 men i s much more serious than the unemployment of 25,000 f i ve or s ix years ago." The o f f i c i a l in charge of job placement for the phys ica l ly f i t so ld ie r agreed, describing condit ions in Winnipeg as " rea l l y abnormal today, because we s t i l l have the aftermath of the s t r i k e , the country i s in what you might ca l l a nervous condit ion in the large centres, and i t i s hard to estimate how they are going to se t t l e down. " 8 5 Their testimony had an important impact. According to H.B. Morphy, a Conservative MP, the "discentered nervous condi t ion" of the country was an "ever-present image" in the minds of the conmittee members. He recal led how they: . . . s a t down d a i l y . . . t o consider where th is country would be, i f in the absence of some provision being made to take care of that unemployment, insur rec t ion , crime, disorder should break out in Canada. This does not necessari ly come•from the returned so ld ie r . No one thought of such a th ing , but we know that in the winter time there are periods when men are out of t he i r ordinary employment and into idleness when the very worst passions are engendered. 8 6 The committee members, however, received no concrete suggestions from the o f f i c i a l s concerning remedial action to a l l ev ia te unemployment. They were l e f t to devise a remedy and opted to of fer aid only to needy jobless veterans.87 Their recommendation was c lea r l y a response to a perceived c r i s i s , for they l a te r admitted the i r co l l ec t i ve i n a b i l i t y to ar r ive at any precise estimate of costs or to decide upon the method of administration pr ior to i t s submission to the cabinet.88 Besides being a major spur of veterans' r e l i e f during the 1920 winter , the fear of revolut ion also shaped Ottawa's subsequent decision to extend aid to des t i tu te , phys ica l ly f i t c i v i l i a n s . Throughout 1920, the General Staf f were alarmed at "the prospect of Bolshevist i nsu r rec t i on . . . . " 89 Federal po l i t i c i ans shared the i r apprehension. In August, the cabinet approved the publ icat ion of a pamphlet prepared by the Department of Labour. Senator Robertson informed the new Prime Min is ter Meighen that i t was designed to demonstrate the connection of the Soviet ambassador in the United States " . . .w i th the One Big Union, and other s o c i a l i s t i c movements in Canada, the idea being to bring home to the minds of the Canadian people the fact that the revolutionary s o c i a l i s t i c propaganda i s today being carr ied on in th is country at the d i rect suggestion of the representatives of the Soviet Government, and that evidence ex is ts of substantial f inanc ia l assistance to accomplish that purpose."90 Winnipeg was the stronghold of the various organizations iden t i f i ed as spreading " s o c i a l i s t i c propaganda," i . e . , the OBU, Ex-Sold iers ' and Ex -Sa i l o r s ' Labour Party and the Labour Church movement, a fact which served to reinforce i t s post -s t r ike reputation as a radical and unsafe community. But i t was not the only major, c i t y regarded as a trouble spot. Vancouver was branded as "a hotbed of Social ism" because of i t s h istory of labour rad ica l ism; and Toronto was regarded by the m i l i t a ry author i t ies as a focal point of revo lut ion, owing to labour unrest, unemployment and Soviet ac t i v i t i es .91 In the f a l l of 1920, the a c t i v i t i e s of revolutionary s o c i a l i s t s in these centres prompted both ind iv iduals and municipal spokesmen to lobby Ottawa fo r further a i d . A Toronto lawyer was perturbed about the formation of "Soviets" in 74; many c i t i e s , and perceived the i r explo i ta t ion of unemployment condit ions and accompanying d is t ress as a prelude to insur rec t ion . "I do not think they w i l l succeed," he wrote to the Prime Min is te r , "but I am quite certa in that unless adequate precautions are taken, they w i l l do great damage and cause much misery, and probably considerable loss of l i f e . " 9 2 Municipal po l i t i c i ans were also alarmed. "Telegrams poured in to Ottawa...from the nat ion's largest c i t i e s , warning of dangerous leve ls of unrest among returned so ld ie rs . "93 f h e Prime Minister informed a p o l i t i c a l confidant in early December that the "government i s being pressed very incessantly now. . .par t icu lar ly [by] V i c t o r i a , Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto to provide employment and r e l i e f on a vast sca le . Shortly af ter these representations were received, Meighen and his cabinet colleagues decided to grant c i v i l i a n emergency r e l i e f . As no records exist of t he i r de l ibera t ions , i t cannot be conclusively demonstrated that fear of revolut ion motivated t he i r dec is ion , but the ind i rect evidence strongly suggests that th is was the case. Even i f socia l s t a b i l i t y had prevai led in the immediate postwar years , federal po l i t i c i ans would have found i t d i f f i c u l t to res is t the demands of unemployed veterans, because they perceived the i r claims in a special l i g h t . They regarded th i s category as more deserving of state aid than the c i v i l i a n j ob l ess , as t he i r unemployment derived from war service rather than from personal f a i l u r e . Moreover, they believed that intervention was popular, for the community at large thought that veterans, because of services rendered and pr ivat ions suf fered, were en t i t l ed to special treatment. The decision to extend emergency r e l i e f to veterans during the 1920 winter ref lected these perceptions. Meighen, then Inter ior Min is te r , recounted to the House his own reaction to the intense lobbying of the c l i en t group: 7 5 [Unemployment, when suffered by men returning from a t e r r i f i c c o n f l i c t , d i f f e rs from other unemployment. The demand then must be met; publ ic opinion w i l l permit nothing but that i t be met to the f u l l power of the government. The pressure for these ends I can, of course, very eas i l y r e c a l l ; I was in the midst of i t . I ask, Hon. gentlemen, to keep in mind that pressure of that kind was a jus t pressure, and what i s more, i t i s an i r r e s i s t i b l e pressure. Another senior minister shared his sentiments, claiming that the "appl icat ion of needed r e l i e f to those actua l ly in need w i l l approve i t s e l f to the people of Canada, and to the majority of returned so ld ie rs . "96 prime Minister Meighen's subsequent decis ion to extend state a id to dest i tu te c i v i l i a n s was also influenced by the fact that th i s category included 'deserving' jobless veterans. During his western tour in the f a l l of 1920, he met spokesmen of the GWVA and other moderate associat ions in Vancouver and V i c t o r i a , and promised federal aid to ass is t the province and munic ipa l i t ies to re l ieve unemployment among the i r rank-and-f i le.97 The legit imacy and popular i ty of veterans' claims also led the government to assume the ent i re cost of re l iev ing p a r t i a l l y disabled ex-sold iers from 1921 onwards. Their commitment was not simply a response to representations from the Liberal Premier of B r i t i s h Columbia and a persuasive plea from the mayor of Winnipeg.98 Prime Minister Meighen also perceived that the publ ic at large were in favour of Ottawa aiding th is 'deserving' category, but not the i r phys ica l ly f i t comrades: I bel ieve that the s p i r i t of the Canadian people demands that we do not, in any sense whatever, abandon the care of the [disabled] returned men. I know i t i s in the i r i n te res ts , as well as in the in terests of the country, that the well and able man, who has no par t i cu la r d i s a b i l i t y , ceases to regard himself in a c lass apart. But as respects him...who i s in a more or less degree d i s a b l e d . . . i t i s the s p i r i t of th is country that we walk by his side from year to year.99 7 6 : Unionist cabinet ministers were also receptive to veterans' demands because soldiers and their dependents had been a key element in their 1917 victory.100 For a variety of reasons, retention of their votes was crucia l . As the coalit ion government was formed in the emergency of war, i t had no traditional constituency to fa l l back upon i f veterans defected en masse from Unionist ranks. The government had already lost sizeable segments of i t s 1917 support base. It had alienated i ts prairie supporters by breaking i ts election pledge not to conscript farmers' sons, and was perceived as anti-labour as a result of i ts handling of the Winnipeg str ike. Moreover, pol i t ical opponents of Unionism were actively competing for the votes of veterans. The reinvigorated Liberal opposition adopted a costly soldiers' policy at i ts 1919 convention;101 and the new farmers' movement pledged to implement various measures of re-establishment.102 c lear ly , the government was under considerable pressure to retain the loyalty of the troops. Electoral calculations also appear to have shaped the decisions of Unionist pol i t icians to extend emergency aid to destitute c iv i l ians during the fa l l and winter of 1921. Their introduction of universal manhood suffrage in 1920 created a sizeable new voting bloc of labourers and mechanics who numbered over 1,200,000.103 j n e Minister of Labour recognized their potential pol i t ical power, at least in Ontario where urban labour was concentrated. He suggested to Prime Minister Meighen that provincial participation should not be made mandatory in the federal 'doles' policy for the 1921 winter because of doubts over whether the Farmer branch of the Ontario government would agree to participate. He then pointed out that i f i t refused to co-operate, "the tact ical advantage to us wi l l be considerable."104 77 Unionist i n i t i a t i v e s concerning dest i tu te wage-earners were also shaped by the con f l i c t i ng strands of Conservative Party ideology. Senator Robertson was c lea r l y influenced by a commitment made by Prime Minister Borden in 1919 to t reat unemployed labour as "something more than a commodity." Over a decade l a t e r he pointed out to his new p o l i t i c a l ch ie f , R.B. Bennett, that Borden had played an important part in draf t ing part 13 of the Treaty of Versa i l les concerning the welfare of indust r ia l wage-earners and had then " . . .so lemnly s igned . . .a Treaty in which Canada was pledged to certa in pr inc ip les intended to promote the welfare of humanity as from that t ime." These " lo f ty p r inc ip les" were: that the country's resources and wealth should be avai lable to guarantee our people, as far as poss ib le , an opportunity to work, or f a i l i n g t h i s , with food and warmth unt i l employment opportunit ies were ava i lab le . Only by so doing we f u l f i l our pledge to regard men's r ights as superior to those of goods or go ld. 0 5 Besides being incorporated into the Unionist platform in the form of a vague endorsement of unemployment insurance, these d i lu ted pr inc ip les of the t reaty were implemented in the Unionist pol icy of unemployment r e l i e f . These new pr inc ip les of co l l ec t i v i sm , however, were tempered by t rad i t iona l be l ie fs concerning the nature of the budgetary process. Although the i r adherence was not r i g i d , Unionist po l i t i c i ans respected the canons of the prevalent conservative f i s c a l orthodoxy that ca l led for balanced budgets and minimal taxat ion . They were also aware that the i r f inancing of r e l i e f was regarded as 'wastefu l ' and 'unnecessary' by businessmen, the major federal taxpayers. Consequently, they were highly conscious of the costs of t he i r various i n i t i a t i v e s . 78 The decision to extend emergency aid to c i v i l i a n s during the 1921 winter provides the c learest example of t he i r cost ca lcu la t ions . This category, in f ac t , contained both pa r t i a l l y disabled and physical ly f i t veterans, because the cabinet had decided in the previous winter to fol low the B r i t i sh example, to t reat them as c i v i l i a n s and phase out special services for them. Prime Min is ter Meighen real ized that as veterans were no longer e l i g i b l e for special federal treatment, the i r presence in the ranks of the c i v i l i a n dest i tute could set a dangerous precedent. "Now that there are among the unemployed and always w i l l , of course, be a proportion of returned so ld ie r s , i t gives the local author i t ies a chance to load the whole thing on the Dominion." Meighen was reluctant to take over the r e l i e f function bas ica l l y because of the expense involved. He pointed out to a confidant that " . . .we further from the scene, have to put in organizations and necessari ly the cost is much greater, and the extent of imposition in cases of r e l i e f very much greater also."106 In order to avoid saddling Ottawa with burdensome r e l i e f cos ts , Meighen decided on a "c lever strategy" j us t i f y i ng federal a id by l ink ing the current depression to the extraordinary circumstance of war: There would always be unemployed veterans and cyc l i ca l depressions. There would only be one war-related unemployment c r i s i s . When i t passed, so too would Ottawa's respons ib i l i t y for d i rect r e l i e f . 1 ° 7 This rat ionale shaped a l l i n i t i a t i v e s for c i v i l i a n s in the immediate postwar per iod. It was designed with one aim in mind: to off load the costs of supporting jobless veterans upon the other leve ls of government.108 79 . A Review The federal po l icy of intervention during the 1919-21 period was s ign i f i can t because i t establ ished the precedent for Ottawa's subsequent incursions into the t e r r i t o r y of the t rad i t iona l r e l i e f - g i v i ng au thor i t ies . Moreover, i t became a model for the treatment of unemployment r e l i e f for the rest of the interwar years. The pol icy represented an improvised, unplanned response to events, a process of devising expedients as the need arose. It involved the system o f d o l e s , ' the option perceived to be the cheapest means of coping with pract ica l problems of unemployment, which e f fec t i ve ly ruled out adoption of the insurance p r i nc ip l e . This form of a id was both non-contributory and at subsistence l e v e l , but i t s payment established the pr inc ip le that the state had a duty to prevent the unemployed from starv ing. In a l l these respects, Ottawa's sponsorship of emergency aid was s t r i k i ng l y s imi la r to the postwar provision made by the B r i t i sh a u t h o r i t i e s . - 1 ^ A l l the environmental factors iden t i f i ed in chapter 1, shaped the agi ta t ion for federal in tervent ion. The d is locat ions caused by the t iming of mass demobil ization and def la t ion created condit ions of abnormal unemployment that stretched the resources of both pr ivate and publ ic agencies. The war had a s ign i f i can t impact in a l ter ing operative at t i tudes toward state involvement to re l ieve unemployment because i t created the new category of jobless veterans whose pl ight aroused widespread sympathy owing to the i r pa t r io t i c serv ice . The war a lso promoted a radical change in government spending patterns that paved the way fo r intervent ion. This ef fect confirms the proposit ion of Peacock 80 and Wiseman that national c r i ses remove, temporari ly, the ex is t ing "soc io-cu l tura l l i m i t s " on expend i t u re . 1 1 0 Ottawa's i n i t i a l sponsorship of emergency state aid was not challenged by the provinces, because i t had j u r i sd i c t i on over the category of veterans and i t made no attempt to evade respons ib i l i t y for the i r unemployment. However, i t s la te r e f for ts to o f f - load most of the costs of re l iev ing phys ica l ly f i t veterans were resisted by Ontar io, whose lone protests echoed in the s i lence of other provinces. The social control model of welfare p o l i t i c s is c lea r l y v i s i b l e in the working-class mi l i tancy , l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d dissent and p o l i t i c i a n s ' fears of revolut ion. Labour radicals were among the primary societal actors spurring ac t ion . They comprised a small band of c i v i l i a n revolutionary s o c i a l i s t s and disaf fected veterans drawn from the ranks of both employed and unemployed workers. Their informal a l l i ance proved to be a potent combination because the involvement of ex-servicemen t ra ined to k i l l enhanced the prospect of successful insurrect ion. Their j o in t par t ic ipat ion in radical labour causes in the c i t i e s of Ontario and the West, and in the Winnipeg General S t r i ke , plus the formation of a veterans' labour party, created widespread alarm both inside and outside the federal c a p i t a l . Cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s ' fears of revolut ion were shared by ind iv idua ls , municipal spokesmen, MPs and o f f i c i a l s in both the c i v i l and m i l i t a r y bureaucracies, who a l l advocated remedial act ion to avert the prospect of Bolshevis t - inspi red disorder. Social control p o l i t i c s , however, was not the only feature of the ag i ta t i on . The group model of welfare p o l i t i c s i s also relevant to understanding the federal pol icy of in tervent ion. Organized veterans were the most i n f l u e n t i a l , with the unorthodox tac t i cs of Flynn's small extremist fr inge proving to be more e f fec t ive in 1919 than the more moderate representations of • - 8 1 the major associations. However, their roles were reversed in the following year, with the latter succeeding in securing a pledge from Meighen to extend aid to c iv i l i ans . Economic interest groups were also active, and their spokesmen clashed along mainly occupational lines rather than sectional or urban-rural cleavages. Moderate trade unionists stood alone in pressing the case for a concerted remedy for involuntary unemployment. Arrayed against them were spokesmen of the two major sectors of the economy, who,despite their confl ict ing views over the ta r i f f during the period under review, shared similar perceptions concerning the cause of unemployment and i ts remedy that reflected the prevalent individual ist ic ethos shaping Canadian society. Businessmen actively opposed the federal policy, partly because they resented their new role as federal taxpayers, and partly because they subscribed to the dominant ideology of laissez-faire l iberalism. Organized farmers voiced protests as well through their spokesmen in the Ontario government and the federal House that reflected their resentment of the ascendancy of c i t i es . But, l ike businessmen, they lacked the pol i t ical influence to block intervention. Inside government, the representative rather than the bureaucratic model of welfare pol i t ics is confirmed by the case study. Federal pol i t icians dictated both the timing and content of the policy of intervention because unemployment rel ief was "a highly pol i t ical ma t te r . . . . " 1 1 1 Their decisions to act were taken in response to perceived crises as well as group pressures reflecting the dual nature of the agitation. The members of the Unionist coali t ion were not motivated solely by fear of revolution to sponsor emergency a id . They also perceived the claims of the patriotic group of veterans to be legitimate and popular. Moreover, they depended upon the ex-soldiers' vote for their future pol i t ical survival. The extension of rel ief to destitute c iv i l ians 82 also ref lected e lectora l ca lcu la t ions as well as a new Conservative Party commitment and f i sca l conservatism. Their Liberal successors were prompted by a s im i la r set of motives to expand federal involvement but, as the next chapter reveals , t he i r intervention turned out to be sho r t - l i ved . CHAPTER 4 FEDERAL POLICY OF WITHDRAWAL, 1922-1930 The change in government fol lowing the federal e lect ion of December 1921 was not immediately accompanied by the withdrawal of national funds for unemployment r e l i e f . Having inher i ted the depression that contributed in part to the Unionis ts ' downfal l , the Liberal v ic tors decided to continue the payment of emergency aid during the 1922 winter. They, in f a c t , expanded federal involvement by paying s l i g h t l y more generous subsidies to residents of munic ipa l i t ies and agreeing to share with the provinces the costs of a l l ev i a t i ng d is t ress among inhabitants of unorganized areas. The Liberal r e l i e f arrangements were designed mainly to redeem promises made during the campaign. Although agrarian issues dominated the 1921 e lec t i on , the concerns of urban labour were not t o t a l l y ignored. W.L.M. King, the new Prime Min is te r , had committed his party to improving the lo t of c i v i l i a n wage-earners in 1919, and had made soc ia l insurance a central plank in his own bid fo r power, espec ia l ly in urban Ontario. His cabinet colleagues had chosen instead to focus on the Unionist r e l i e f po l i cy . They had apparently condemned i t "voci ferously before the e l e c t i o n . . . , " and attacked i t s sponsors on the hustings across Canada for t he i r "parsimony."1 Their increased subs id ies, approved a month af ter gaining o f f i c e , rewarded both c i v i l i a n s and veterans for t he i r support at the p o l l s . They also probably represented subst i tutes for more cost ly promises to develop a jo in t scheme of socia l insurance and to pay addi t ional g ra tu i t i es . Although Liberal expenditure on c i v i l i a n r e l i e f outmatched that of the preceding admin is t ra t ion , 2 i t was a 'one-shot' funding 83 84 exercise leaving the Unionists to qual i fy as the major sponsors of the federal pol icy of in tervent ion. From the spring of 1922 onwards, the new Liberal administration sought to withdraw from f inancing emergency state aid for dest i tute employables. Although i t f a i l ed to o f f - load the r e l i e f costs of p a r t i a l l y disabled veterans, i t succeeded in sh i f t ing the burden of re l iev ing physical ly f i t c i v i l i a n s back to the t rad i t iona l au thor i t ies . Its pol icy of withdrawal was thwarted only once, in the 1926 winter, when extenuating parliamentary circumstances, a r i s ing out of the 1925 e l ec t i on , spurred a temporary reversa l . For the rest of Prime Min is ter King's th i rd term of o f f i c e , federal a id was conspicuous by i t s absence. However, despite i t s s ign i f icance in shedding l i gh t on the sources of opposit ion to publ ic welfare, Ottawa's retreat during the 1920s has received only cursory at tent ion. To remedy i t s neglect, th i s chapter seeks to pinpoint the e f fec t ive p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the federal pol icy of withdrawal. The chapter begins with an out l ine of the background against which Ottawa's or ig ina l decision to retreat was made. It then iden t i f i es the various actors res i s t i ng , supporting and sponsoring non-intervention. It concludes with a review of the f indings in order to highl ight the relevant factors shaping the pol icy of withdrawal. Background Improving economic condit ions were used to j u s t i f y Ottawa's i n i t i a l withdrawal from the f i e l d of c i v i l i a n r e l i e f . Beginning in the spring of 1922 unemployment s teadi ly decl ined, and by the end of August;, only 3.6 percent of trade unionists were unemployed, whereas in 1921 the comparable f igure was 8.7 percent. The chief s t a t i s t i c i a n in the Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s (DBS) reported that returns from employers in 1922 showed that "a decidedly buoyant 85 tendency was in evidence and that a l l provinces shared in the recovery with the Quebec-Ontario d i s t r i c t experiencing the most marked improvement."3 But the economic recovery did not l a s t . The revival petered out in la te 1923, and unemployment remained heavy in both 1924 and 1925. 4 A boom in the second hal f of the decade provided a more powerful rat ionale to sustain the federal pol icy of withdrawal. By the f a l l of 1926 economic recovery was under way in both the agr icu l tura l and indust r ia l sectors. In October, unemployment among trade unionists reached i t s lowest point , 2.6 percent, since 1920. The improvement in employment conditions persisted unt i l nearly the end of the decade. The boom, though, did not el iminate the problem of abnormal seasonal unemployment. According to DBS estimates, even in the peak prosperity years of 1927 and 1928, between 12 and 16 percent of the work force were i d l e in the ' o f f season.5 These to ta ls rose dramatical ly fol lowing the stock market crash of 1929, but even they did not spur a reversal during the f i r s t winter of the Great Depression. Although the cyc l i ca l and seasonal f luctuat ions during the 1920s prompted sporadic demands for federal a i d , the Liberal Prime Min is ter succeeded in res is t ing them on a l l occasions except two, 1922 and 1926. At the star t of his f i r s t term of o f f i ce he personally sought the approval of h is cabinet colleagues for the more generous r e l i e f subsidies offered during the 1922 w in te r . 6 He also agreed to convene a federa l -prov inc ia l conference on unemployment la te r in the year. When announcing th i s to the House, King ruled out the prospect of any radical challenge to the ex is t ing d i v i s ion of powers, but hinted that his government would adopt a more concerted approach. "I would l i k e to make i t perfect ly p la in that so far as the government i s concerned, we regard a l l these matters of unemployment and the l i k e as questions pr imar i ly of 86 concern to munic ipa l i t ies and provinces, but insofar as the national interest may be concerned, we are prepared to co-operate with the munic ipal i t ies and the provinces in seeking a s o l u t i o n . " 7 During the summer of 1922 the Minister of Labour l a i d the groundwork fo r the forthcoming conference with provinc ia l Premiers. In August he asked spokesmen of the major c i t i e s to submit t he i r views concerning winter r e l i e f arrangements. In response, B.C. munic ipa l i t ies held a meeting where they expressed unanimous condemnation of the doles po l i cy .8 At a conference in Calgary, delegates from a l l p ra i r i e c i t i e s and the governments of Alberta and Saskatchewan passed a resolut ion approving the adoption of a j o in t scheme of unemployment insurance, and unt i l i t s establishment, they urged the continuation of jo in t r e l i e f provision along "more adequate l i n e s " ; and o f f i c i a l s representing New Brunswick, Ontar io, Saskatchewan, Alberta and western c i t i e s met the Labour Minister in Ottawa to discuss winter employment prospects.9 The Dominion-Provincial Conference was held in Ottawa in ear ly September of 1922. It was the f i r s t occasion on which federal and provincial Premiers had met to discuss the unemployment problem. In attendance were representatives from a l l provinces except Prince Edward Is land. Although municipal spokesmen were not i n v i t e d , delegates from western c i t i e s invaded the proceedings to argue the case for a permanent sharing of r e l i e f cos ts , and were permitted to present the i r views. Prime Minister King's opening speech "recommended that in f ind ing a solut ion to the unemployment problem, the conference should, as far as poss ib le , encourage the t rad i t iona l Anglo-Saxon rel iance upon se l f -he lp in preference to governmental ac t i on . " It was l e f t to Murdock to spel l out the Liberal po l i cy . He announced that emergency aid would not be provided in the 87 coming winter as the unemployment s i tuat ion was "not serious enough" to warrant federal in tervent ion. The delegates accepted his explanation for withdrawal. They passed a resolut ion endorsing his assessment of both ex is t ing and winter unemployment condi t ions. Their reso lu t ion , however, contained contingency plans in case of abnormal seasonal unemployment, amounting to federal and provincial a id for municipal costs of d i rect r e l i e f and r e l i e f wo rks . 1 0 Confronted with r i s ing r e l i e f caseloads la te r in the year , the mayor of Winnipeg and the Premiers of both B r i t i s h Columbia and Manitoba lobbied Ottawa to implement the contingency plans formulated at the 1922 conference. The provincia l representations were considered by the federal cabinet i n December, but not approved. Subsequent pleas for aid were also turned down. Why? The Agi tat ion For Federal Withdrawal, 1922-30 At f i r s t s igh t , the socia l control model of welfare p o l i t i c s appears to have l imi ted relevance in the case of withdrawal because working-class mi l i tancy , l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d dissent and concomitant fears of revolut ion declined in scope and intensi ty soon af ter the new Liberal administrat ion came in to o f f i c e . However, the absence of these prerequisi tes does not negate en t i re l y the inf luence of social control p o l i t i c s , for Ottawa's retreat lends support to the proposit ion of Piven and Cloward (1971) that contraction of r e l i e f r o l l s occurs once c i v i l disorder lessens, in order to reinforce r e s t r i c t i v e work norms. Their hypothesis, though, i s not confirmed consistent ly at the federal level due to the 1926 temporary reversa l . Moreover, i t cannot account for the behaviour of prov inc ia l governments, as these author i t ies were much less successful than Ottawa in the i r attempts at withdrawal. In contrast to the shadowy presence of soc ia l con t ro l , group welfare p o l i t i c s i s c lea r l y v i s i b l e in the ag i ta t ion . The same conste l la t ion of 88 soc ia l forces that shaped the e a r l i e r in tervent ionis t pol icy were involved, but the balance between them shi f ted dec is i ve ly . Representatives of agr icul ture and cap i ta l maintained the i r steadfast opposition to expanded r e l i e f , and the i r p o l i t i c a l inf luence increased dramatical ly a f ter the 1921 e lec t i on . On the other hand, the involvement of organized labour was muted unt i l the l a t t e r stages, as the TLC and other moderate unionists concentrated the i r energies on securing unemployment insurance, rather than protest ing against withdrawal. Among c l i en t groups, unemployed workers replaced veterans as the leading protagonists, because the ex -so ld ie rs ' ag i ta t ion for gra tu i t ies subsided and the i r subsequent lobbying ef for ts focused more upon securing improvements in pensions l e g i s l a t i o n . Unlike the previous st ruggle, the t rad i t iona l r e l i e f - g i v i ng author i t ies par t ic ipated act ive ly in the agi tat ion for federal withdrawal. Their entry ref lected belated recognition of the fact that the i r interests were affected by Ottawa's br ie f involvement with r e l i e f - g i v i n g . Western c i t i e s , the major benef ic iar ies of the federal po l icy of in tervent ion, protested against withdrawal, whereas the majority of provincia l Premiers welcomed i t , because i t conformed to the i r f i sca l predisposi t ions. Among po l i t i c i ans ins ide the federal government, Prime Minister King played the pre-eminent role in deciding the timing and content of the po l i cy . As in the previous case study, the apparently l imi ted role of bureaucrats can be explained in part by the nature of the pol icy under inves t iga t ion . Decisions in the realm of emergency r e l i e f - g i v i n g , espec ia l ly those concerning inac t ion , are essen t ia l l y p o l i t i c a l , having minimal consequences for administrators. King's decisions to retreat ref lected d i s t i nc t ideological be l ie fs concerning the role of the s ta te , the nature of federal ism, and f i sca l po l i cy . Even though 8 9 L the ranks of c r i t i c s of his pol icy increased rapidly soon af ter the onset of the Great Depression, he remained impervious to demands for a reversa l , a posture that contributed to his defeat in the 1930 e lec t i on . Advocates:* Protests against Ottawa's pol icy of withdrawal were voiced more or less simultaneously outside and inside the Canadian Parliament. Unti l the end of the decade, spokesmen of the new c l i en t group of unemployed workers were the only soc ieta l actors to advocate a continuing federal ro le . Po l i t i c i ans representing western c i t i e s and provinces as well as a few opposition MPs also registered t he i r approval of withdrawal, but f a i l ed to secure any change in the pol icy during King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e . In contrast to the i r mi l i tancy in the immediate postwar years, unemployed workers resorted to more orthodox lobbying af ter 1922, when local organizations sprang up to secure work and to better t he i r condi t ions. By 1925 the Toronto-based National Council of the Unemployed had branches in most major c i t i e s . Evidence i s scant on i t s a c t i v i t i e s and the s ize of i t s membership, but i t s leadership was apparently rad i ca l . A.E.Smith, a spokesman fo r the "Toronto Unemployment Associat ion" submitted a memorial to the federal Labour Minister in early 1925, urging the adoption of a pos i t ive publ ic pol icy concerning unemployment and ident i fy ing the cause of t h i s "socia l disease" as "the possession of a pr ivate interest in the machinery of production on the part of a very small c lass who exercise i t wholly at the impulse of the i r own advantage or c a p r i c e . . . . " ! - - The 900 members of the Edmonton branch, the Unemployed *The term "advocates" refers throughout the thesis to proponents of expanded state a c t i v i t y in income maintenance rather than to supporters of the par t i cu la r pol icy under inves t iga t ion . 9.0. Workers of Canada, also sought some remedy for the i r p l igh t . In the winter of 1925 they issued a manifesto protesting against "the campaign of slander and misrepresentation" conducted by the press, with the support of "many of our publ ic and o f f i c i a l men," that played down the extent of unemployment and d is t ress so as not to deter prospective immigrants. They threatened to forward the relevant cutt ings "to our class-conscious brethren in the Old Countries from which we came," unless the i r demands for "sympathetic consideration of the problems of the unemployed workers" were heeded. 1 2 However, such protests received short sh r i f t in Ottawa. The federal cabinet dismissed the organized jobless as the ' loafer c l a s s . ' According to Murdock, t he i r membership comprised mainly "men who would not accept employment, no matter how p len t i fu l jobs were...some of whom, I th ink , to be as kindly as poss ib le , cannot work, cannot steady themselves down to accepting a job and working at that job as the i r 13 employer would l i k e to have them work." Elected spokesmen of c i t i e s also voiced opposition to the federal pol icy of withdrawal. They protested par t i cu la r l y against having to maintain dest i tu te immigrants brought in under Ottawa's 'open-door' po l icy for agr icu l tura l labour. Their case was presented i n i t i a l l y by the mayor of Winnipeg, who urged Ottawa during the 1923 winter to take over the ent i re maintenance of indigents with short residence and veterans, arguing that these r e l i e f appl icants were " c i t i zens of Canada at la rge . " At the federa l ly sponsored 1924 Conference on Winter Employment the mayors of Vancouver, Edmonton, Toronto and Ottawa, and other o f f i c i a l s representing indust r ia l centres across Canada }voiced objections to current immigration pol icy because i t aggravated the i r r e l i e f prob lems.^ Besides register ing t he i r protests d i rec t l y with cabinet min is ters , some c i t i e s a lso lobbied federal l eg i s la to rs for t he i r support during the 1925 a i winter. In response, J . S . Woodsworth (Lab. , Winnipeg) sponsored an emergency debate urging federal maintenance of unemployed, dest i tu te immigrants during the i r f i r s t two years of residence. When pressing the claims of h is own r id ing and of Calgary, he c i ted an ed i to r ia l from the Calgary press supporting Mayor Webster's refusal to grant aid to non-resident and non-taxpaying foreign famil i e s : Their real need i s apparent, but the executive of the c i t y are faced with the more serious problem of making Calgary the mecca fo r the unemployed of the ent i re province, i f the r e l i e f pol icy l a i d by the council i s not adhered to in the s t r i c t es t manner. The voluntary creation of a c lass which year ly subsists on publ ic char i ty i s a dangerous precedent for any c i t y . T .L . Church (Con., Toronto) suggested that the Ontario capi ta l had already fa l l en v ic t im to th i s trend by becoming "a dumping ground" for unemployed harvesters recrui ted from Br i t a in and recent a r r i va l s from the Old Country. "Toronto's reputation for not l e t t i ng any man go hungry appears to be a magnet to many of these men. . . . " He protested that the i r maintenance was "unfai r" to local residents who contributed over $100 m i l l i on to the federal t r e a s u r y . 1 6 Ottawa, however, res is ted c i t i e s ' claims concerning dest i tute immigrants, i n s i s t i n g that the i r support f e l l under provincia l j u r i s d i c t i o n , while most provinces denied t h i s , arguing that t he i r r e l i e f was a national problem. The development of th i s pract ice of buck-passing during the 1920s was to have d i re consequences in the next decade. Only Premier Bracken of Manitoba and Premier Ol iver of B.C. protested against Ottawa's i n i t i a l decision to withdraw. Denied federal a i d , they took independent steps to ass is t the munic ipa l i t ies during the 1923 winter, and the i r intervention was repeated on subsequent occasions during the rest of the decade. Their i n i t i a t i v e s , however, represented the standard response to d is t ress a r is ing from unemployment. They were reluctant to sponsor new methods 9.2 of maintaining unemployed workers because they feared that the i r provinces would become magnets for the unemployed across Canada. Premier Bracken voiced his apprehension to Prime Min is ter King in 1928. "If any c i t y or province s ingly adopted plans to solve seasonal unemployment, that c i t y or province would become the mecca to which unemployed in other c i t i e s and provinces would d r i f t ; for th is reason and many others which might be advanced, the assistance of the federal government i s respect fu l ly urged."17 A few federal MPs also opposed the pol icy of withdrawal during King's f i r s t administration (1922-1925). Among the depleted ranks of the Conservative opposition only Ladner (Vancouver) and Church (Toronto) championed the cause of unemployed workers.18 A more sustained attack upon federal inact ion came from the two-man Labour group comprising Woodsworth (Winnipeg) and Irvine (Calgary). Their e f for ts were supported by the ten radical Progressives who s p l i t over the i r par ty 's a l l i ance with the Liberals in the summer of 1924, and formed with Woodsworth and Irvine a 'Ginger Group* in the House. The Labour leader spearheaded the attack upon federal i nac t ion . Woodsworth challenged the prevai l ing ideas about the causes of unemployment and suggested that i t s remedy could no longer rest with the indiv idual worker and his fami ly . "There are admittedly sh i f t l ess ind iv idua ls , lazy ind iv idua ls , and drunken ind iv idua ls , but the great part of unemployment today is involuntary, and hence the state in some form cannot divest i t s e l f of cer ta in respons ib i l i t i es . "19 However, the pleas of Woodsworth and h is few supporters for federal a id towards re l ie f , pending implementation of a jo in t unemployment insurance scheme^ were ineffectual in a chamber where representatives of agrarian interests held the balance of power. 93 Opponents: Organized farmers and businessmen shared an antipathy to state maintenance of unemployed workers, and the i r spokesmen consti tuted powerful blocs in the federal House and cabinet during Prime Min is ter King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e . Most provincia l Premiers also favoured withdrawal, as they were reluctant to spend revenues on unemployment r e l i e f . The Liberal v ictory in the December 1921 e lec t ion was hardly overwhelming. In the House of Commons the new government had a minority of one on a s t r i c t l y party vote: the voters returned 117 L ibe ra l s , 65 Progressives, 50 Conservatives and 3 others. Its p o l i t i c a l survival in the House, therefore, depended upon the new farmers' par ty , which comprised the second largest b loc. Struthers contends that withdrawal from the f i e l d of unemployment r e l i e f was the pr ice King paid for the support of the Progressives. The farmers demanded withdrawal because state maintenance of the urban unemployed made i t d i f f i c u l t for them to h i re unsk i l led labour cheaply. As Canada's largest employers of unsk i l led labour, farmers, once organized as a p o l i t i c a l fo rce , had a powerful vo ice. "By e lect ing 65 Progressive MPs to o f f i ce they ensured.. . that federal unemployment r e l i e f pol icy would conform to the i r economic i n t e r e s t s . " 2 0 The farmers' opposition to the federal pol icy stemmed in part from the i r widespread concern about rural depopulation. For them, unemployment was not involuntary but a resul t of the maldistr ibut ion of labour between rural and urban Canada. T.A. C r e r a r , 2 1 the Progressive leader, for example, argued that " . . . t h i s Canada of ours provides opportunity enough fo r labour to those who were w i l l i n g to work . . . " , and his sentiments were shared by his suppor te rs . 2 2 The farmers' problems of h i r ing workers cheaply began with the rural exodus during the war and were exacerbated in the immediate postwar period by Ottawa's r e l i e f i n i t i a t i v e s . "Alarmed over rural depopulation and angry with the high pr ice and short supply of agr icu l tura l labour, Canadian farmers and the i r Progressive representatives vigorously opposed the previous federal f l i r t a t i o n with unemployment...relief which made i t easier for surplus labour to remain in the c i t i e s . " 2 3 Federal intervention also v io lated the Progressive demand for " s t r i c t economy in government." Crerar urged the Prime Minister to impress upon the publ ic the need for retrenchment and the necessity of balanced budgets by sound methods, not by f inancing new schemes of taxat ion but by reducing expenditures. Prime Min is ter King complied with Crerar 's demand for reduction in expenditure because i t was v i r t ua l l y the only concession avai lable to him during the 1922-24 per iod. His of fer of cabinet posts was resisted by the Progressive leader in December 1921 and the summer of 1922. Implementing the major demand of Progressives for t a r i f f reform would spark strong opposition in indus t r ia l Canada, and so reduction in expenditure was the pr ice of Progressive support. Consequently, in November 1922, he issued a c a l l to his colleagues to bear economy and reduction in expenditure in mind in preparing the i r estimates. Among the l imi ted items of publ ic expenditure sui table for cu ts , unemployment r e l i e f measures were ready targets as they were funded on an emergency rather than a permanent bas is . The Min is ter of Labour, therefore, reported back that his department had " . . . a substantial reduction in a l l charges which are not more or less of a f ixed n a t u r e . " 2 5 The 1923-24 departmental estimates, in f ac t , showed a reduction of $1,300,000 due to the lack of unemployment r e l i e f provision.26 other services concerning employment suffered a s im i la r fa te . Between 1922 and 1924 Ottawa cut i t s funding for the Employment Service almost by one-hal f , resu l t ing in the departure of i t s d i s i l l us ioned d i r e c t o r . 2 7 The cutbacks aroused l i t t l e protest in the House. The majority of Liberal MPs were from Quebec. Besides being "highly conservative in the i r soc ia l outlook,"28 m o s t members of th i s bloc regarded maintenance of the unemployed as a provincia l concern.29 Their s i lence indicated deafening approval of the federal pol icy of withdrawal. The t a c i t approval of the bulk of the Progressive caucus was even more s ign i f i can t in the short run because these representatives of agrarian in terests held the balance of power. Organized farmers, though, were not the only sectional economic in terests Prime Min is ter King had to placate during his f i r s t term of o f f i c e . Businessmen a lso demanded his a t tent ion. Concentrated in Ontario and Quebec, where industry and anc i l l a r y services were most developed, the i r geographical base and the i r f inanc ia l contr ibut ions during e lect ions ensured that the i r views would be heeded in Ottawa. Both ind iv idua l l y and c o l l e c t i v e l y , members of the business community were already on record as opposed to government intervention in labour matters and especia l ly to state support of unemployed workers.30 During King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e , the p o l i t i c a l cl imate was so favourably disposed towards the business community as to warrant the Liberal Party being described as " largely in the gr ip of eastern b u s i n e s s . " 3 1 The inf luence exerted by corporate interests over L iberal economic pol icy during the 1922-23 period has been wel 1-documented. 3 2 In contrast , l i t t l e i s known about the extent of t he i r inf luence over socia l po l i cy . In f ac t , the Liberal po l icy of withdrawal was also a concession to business in te res ts . Businessmen favoured retreat because federal maintenance of the unemployed imposed addit ional taxes upon industry and themselves. As the major federal taxpayers,33 t he i r complaints about "too much government" and "onerous taxat ion" carr ied considerable weight. Through the i r spokesmen in the Liberal cabinet they ensured that federal unemployment r e l i e f pol icy conformed to the i r economic in te res ts . Of a l l corporate in te res ts , Prime Minister King was most anxious to please the 'Montreal group' composed of powerful transport and f inanc ia l concerns such as the Canadian Pac i f i c Railway and the Bank of Montreal. Their support was cruc ia l because they had backed his campaign in Quebec in 1921. As his v ic tory depended mainly on Quebec votes, King's p o l i t i c a l survival required conc i l i a t i on of that province's economic e l i t e . In March 1924 he recorded in his diary his motives for wooing the 'Montreal group': . . . t o lose that group i s to consolidate the Conservative party, give i t new l i f e and f inanc ia l support. I do not want to lose Quebec support, much less incur act ive opposition of powerful f inanc ia l and mfrg i n te res ts , they are against us anyway at h e a r t . . . . 3 4 Conc i l ia t ion of the Montreal interests involved not only acquiescing in t he i r major demand for high t a r i f f s , but also heeding the i r views on the unemployment problem. The major spokesman of the Montreal in terests in the Cabinet was S i r Lomer Gouin, Min ister of Jus t i ce . His inf luence over federal economic pol icy was considerable unt i l his resignation in June 1924, and he had l i t t l e sympathy for the unemployed. While Premier of Quebec (1905-20) he had sponsored only one i n i t i a t i v e benef i t ing labour, the creat ion of provincial employment bureaus, opting instead to leave the operation of his province's system of i ns t i t u t i ona l char i ty in the hands of the Cathol ic church. W.S. F ie ld i ng , the Finance Min is te r , was also known to be sympathetic to the corporate point of view. His age and dist inguished p o l i t i c a l career as Premier of Nova Sco t ia , and as Minister of Finance in Laur ier 's Cabinet, ensured that his approach to f i s c a l po l icy was t rad i t iona l rather than innovative. He was more concerned with balancing the budget than with taking up new ideas in f i s ca l p o l i c y , 3 5 and under his stewardship, cuts in expenditure were the order of the day. In December 1 9 2 3 i l l n e s s forced Fie ld ing to r e t i r e . J .A . Robb, the new Finance Min is te r , continued to pursue orthodox f i s c a l pol icy even though F ie ld ing ' s e f for ts had succeeded in producing, by 1 9 2 4 , the f i r s t revenue surplus since 1 9 1 3 . He too had l i t t l e sympathy for the unemployed, because he subscribed to the Presbyterian credo that "work and t h r i f t are the only sure roads to success . " 3 6 H J s views on unemployment also ref lected the at t i tudes of both f inanciers and his rural Quebec const i tuents. In March 1 9 2 5 Robb rejected Woodsworth's pleas for federal maintenance of des t i tu te , new immigrants on the grounds tha t , according to bankers, the problems of unemployment were exaggerated. F i n a l l y , he i ns i s t ed , r e l i e f simply rewarded indolence. "If i t means anything at a l l i t means that we are of fer ing a premium to those who do not desire to work, and the men who are spoi led by doles in the Old Country would come here and expect the government to board them." Besides Gouin, F ie ld ing and Robb, other ministers such as Bel and, Graham, J . H . King and Low were a l l supporters of p r o t e c t i o n . 3 8 Eastern business i n te res ts , therefore, had a formidable bloc in the cabinet to speak on the i r behalf. Their spokesmen were in f luen t ia l in ensuring that the federal pol icy of withdrawal was sustained up to the end of King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e . Most provinc ia l Premiers a lso backed the federal po l icy of withdrawal because i t provided them with a convenient excuse to t ransfer the costs of emergency aid back to the mun ic ipa l i t ies . Like Ottawa, they began the i r retreat in the midst of the postwar depression, with only B r i t i s h Columbia and Manitoba res is t ing the t rend. Their subsequent record of non-intervention was only p a r t i a l l y successful because most of the Premiers were compelled to give sporadic contr ibutions af ter the winter of 1 9 2 3 (see table 4 ) . 9.8 Table 4. Provincia l expenditure on unemployment r e l i e f , 1921-1930 *li nter B.C. A l t a . Sask. Man. Ont. Que. N.B. N.S. 1921 $147312 $ 3199 $19526 $ 78952 $219845 $ 30188 $ -- $ 2785 1922 244515 83279 46304 151719 485292 45134 3222 1149 1923 42025 -- -- 63543 — — --1924 — -- -- 55104 — — --1925 14414 22713 -- 58609 103489 -- — 1926 8322 21839 — 16568 28335 — 6720 1927 — — -- 9640 ? -- — 1928 — 4710 — 11553 ? -- — 1929 -- 23187 — 10963 -- ~ — 1930 37000 60609 64282 30419 ? ? SOURCES: Figures re la t ing to B . C . , Sask., Ont. , N.B. and N.S. are tal from "Amounts expended by provinces as shown in publ ic accounts under the heading "Unemployment Re l i e f , " Publ ic Archives of Canada (PAC), W.L.M. King Papers, Manuscript Group 26, J4 , reel C2622, p. 52701. The Quebec f igures only represent subsidies matching the federal contr ibut ions to munic ipa l i t ies and so may be under-estimates. The Alberta f igures are from "Comparative Statement of Expenditures made by the Prov inc ia l Government of Alberta for R e l i e f , " PAC, Department of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , Record Group 27, v o l . 210, f i l e no. 617:24.2. The Manitoba f igures are c i ted in Labour Gazette, 1929, 1931, pp. 1342, 563, respect ive ly . The eastern provinces were instrumental in spurring Ottawa's i n i t i a l re t reat . Their half-hearted par t ic ipat ion in the federal po l icy of intervention did not escape the notice of the new Liberal administrat ion. In the summer of 1922 Murdock sent the Prime Minister a review of c i v i l i a n r e l i e f schemes. With regard to the Liberal venture during the past winter , he pointed out erroneously that none of the four eastern provinces had par t i c ipa ted . "This i s a point of s ign i f icance with respect to any proposit ion looking to any Dominion-wide measure to meet unemployment."^ Eastern reaction to federal i n i t i a t i v e s was voiced at the 1922 Dominion-Provincial Conference. The region's protests about federal a id to the unemployed in the western provinces were at t r ibuted by B .C . ' s Deputy Minister of Labour to the fact that the eastern provinces were o lder , more establ ished soc iet ies where pr ivate char i ty played a larger part than publ ic a g e n c i e s . 4 0 More - voluntary bodies, in f a c t , were ava i lab le to aid the unemployed in the East than the West and leve ls of unemployment were also lower in most older provinces during the 1922 win ter . 4 1 However, eastern opposition to federal intervention was also rooted elsewhere in the at t i tudes of i t s Premiers towards r e l i e f costs. Among the maritime provinces, Nova Scotia cer ta in ly approved of the federal pol icy of w i thd rawa l . 4 2 i t s Liberal Premier, Murray, had ac t ive ly opposed Ottawa's r e l i e f arrangements during the 1922 winter because he regarded them - potent ia l ly at least - as exacerbating his government's f inancia l problems of l imi ted revenues and recurring d e f i c i t s . 4 3 His Conservative successor, Armstrong, was equally ins is tent that unemployment f e l l into the sphere of p rov inc ia l , not federa l , j u r i s d i c t i o n . He to ld the 1924 Conference that "the province of Nova Scotia can se t t le i t s own unemployment prob lems." 4 4 Subsequent events, however, were to cast doubt on his c la im. Armstrong appeared impervious to demands for aid from unemployed coal miners and steel workers in Sydney and Glace Bay, and his eventual o f fer of provincial assistance came too la te to prevent bloodshed and the use of the m i l i t a ry in June 1925. Quebec also welcomed the federal withdrawal. Premier Taschereau had only grudgingly contributed towards r e l i e f of the unemployed in Montreal. At the time of the 1922 Domini on-Provincial Conference he was involved in a b i t t e r dispute with the Cathol ic hierarchy over the passage of h is Publ ic Char i t ies Act that provided provincial subsidies to pr ivate char i t ies and mun ic ipa l i t i es . 100 In add i t ion, he was apprehensive about the f inanc ia l consequences of his 1921 i n i t i a t i v e . "Taschereau feared a drain on the Provincia l Treasury which his government would be powerless to plug once grants became 'automatic' and costs r o s e . " 4 5 Thus, Ottawa's withdrawal provided his Liberal government with the opportunity to cu r ta i l i t s own involvement in an area of potent ia l ly s p i r a l l i n g expenditure and to hand re l i e f back to the t rad i t iona l agencies. Ontario had received the bulk of federal a i d , but the funds were not welcomed. Premier Drury never succeeded in reconci l ing his agrarian philosophy with the idea of state support for the urban unemployed, especia l ly when i t involved cash g r a n t s . 4 6 His government's representatives at the 1922 Dominion-Provincial conference complained that t r i p a r t i t e schemes "brought men into our c i t i e s from the country looking for r e l i e f rather than working for board wages or a l i t t l e better on the f a r m s . " 4 7 It was not surpr is ing , therefore, that provincial funds were withheld during the 1923 winter. The defeat of Drury's Farmer-Labour coa l i t i on at the po l l s in June 1923 d id not augur well for the province's dest i tu te residents. Ferguson, the new Conservative Premier, was "cautious about welfare programmes because he was imbued with the eth ic of his day, which regarded governmental economy as the greatest blessing any administrat ion could bestow on a p e o p l e . , . . " 4 8 Ferguson also believed in the primacy of local r espons ib i l i t y , maintaining that r e l i e f of poverty was inherently a matter for pr ivate char i ty or for municipal ac t ion , i f pr ivate action f a i l e d . 4 9 For example, i n October 1924 he rejected a request from the mayor of Toronto on the fol lowing grounds: "Having prof i ted by the labour of the workman, surely your municipal i ty has some d i rect respons ib i l i t y when i t i s found.. . the workman has no longer an opportunity of earning a l i ve l i hood fo r himself and his f a m i l y . " 5 0 However, pressure from organized labour and c i t i e s persuaded the Ontario cabinet to contribute towards costs of 1.0.1 municipal r e l i e f works and other forms of a i d , except cash do les, during the 1925 winter. Among the p ra i r i e provinces, the heads of the respective Liberal and Farmers' governments in Saskatchewan and Alberta also supported the federal pol icy of withdrawal. Both Premiers Dunning and Greenfield subscribed to the agrarian philosophy of t he i r constituents that stressed indiv idual ism and economy, and perceived unemployment as a consequence of rural depopulation. For example, Greenfield believed that there were "as good opportunit ies today for the man who wants to work as there were at the time he came."51 His optimism was put to the test in la te 1924, when an in f lux of immigrants into southern Alberta produced serious unemployment in urban centres. In response to pleas for aid from various mayors and spokesmen of organized labour, the head of the Farmers' government wired Ottawa asking for contr ibut ions. Faced with a denial of federal a i d , Greenfield authorized provincial funds towards municipal r e l i e f costs during the 1925 winter. The majority of provincial Premiers overwhelmingly endorsed the federal po l icy of withdrawal at the 1927 Dominion-Provincial Conference. For them, re l i e f " on any f ixed basis was simply an encouragement to unemployment.5 2 However, Ontario and Alberta could not avoid taking action of a sporadic type during the second hal f of the 1920s. These provincial i n i t i a t i v e s were l imi ted because the i r Premiers took ser iously the i r pledges of balanced budgets and economy in government. Like the i r colleagues in other provinces and the federal Prime Min is te r , they subscribed to an ideology of economic l i be ra l i sm that equated prosperity with reduction of publ ic expenditure. "In th is sense, the Fergusons, the Kings, and the i r kind had more in common with the nineteenth century than with the i r successors of a more indulgent a g e . " 3 0 102 Prec ip i tan ts : Among federal cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s , Prime Min is ter King qua l i f i es as the archi tect of withdrawal because he made the f ina l judgments concerning what was p o l i t i c a l l y f eas ib le . His summary of 'the sense' of Cabinet meetings was "unquestionably" government pol icy.54 j n addit ion to external pressures, his decisions to retreat were shaped by d i s t i nc t ideological b e l i e f s . King accepted the ex is t ing balance of forces in Canadian society that ref lected the power of corporate capi ta l and a focus on agrar ian, not labour, i ssues. Whitaker points out that King 's acceptance of the status quo in the 1920s was not merely a response of "a p o l i t i c a l automaton" to external pressures. "The very acceptance of the balance i t s e l f imparts an ideological colouring to King's range of c h o i c e s . . . . " King's decisions not to ac t , therefore, ref lected a personal ideology that was "c lose ly in harmony with the dominant forces of North American c a p i t a l i s m . " 5 5 King's posi t ion also ref lected a be l ie f in provincial r i gh ts , an aspect overlooked by social reformers during the 1920s, who tended to be cen t ra l i s t s and interpreted his pol icy as "masterful i n a c t i v i t y . " 5 6 During the 1922-25 period King consis tent ly maintained that unemployment r e l i e f was a p rov inc i a l , not a federa l , matter. In February 1925 he to ld an Ontario labour delegation requesting emergency a id that unemployment was a purely local concern in which Ottawa could not par t ic ipate without v io la t ing the BNA Act. He was then reported as saying to the delegates that " . . . i f they were a l l Indians they [ i . e . the government] would be responsible for the i r welfare and could adopt any measures to protect them and give r e l i e f , but seeing that they are a l l white c i t i zens and so ld iers of industry they must be l e f t to the tender mercies of the provincial and municipal governments." 5 7 His stance was reinforced by a 103 j u d i c i a l decis ion of the B r i t i sh Privy Council in 1925 that circumscribed the r ights of the federal government in labour matters. King's concept of federalism was mingled with his f i s ca l conservatism. According to Jack P i c k e r s g i l l , a loyal member of his s ta f f , King's "proper" const i tu t ional view towards unemployment and i t s r e l i e f was based on the premise that federal treasury funds were expendable only i f contr ibut ions to other leve ls of government were not involved.58 p.e was opposed in pr inc ip le to a l l forms of condit ional subsidies because they v io lated a basic canon of f i s c a l orthodoxy: economy.59 withdrawal of federal contr ibut ions fo r r e l i e f , therefore, was one means of arrest ing the s l i de towards 'extravagance and waste' inherent in a method of f inancing where revenue col lected by one government was spent by others. The resul ts of the 1925 e lect ion suggested that King's f i s c a l p r i o r i t i e s were not popular with a l l segments of the e lec tora te . The Liberals were reduced to the posi t ion of runner-up, securing only 101 seats , 69 of which were in Quebec, and 35.8 percent of the popular vote. King and four of his cabinet colleagues were defeated in Ontario. They had campaigned on the i r record of "sound" finance and promised more of the same, but a f ter four years in o f f i ce the government had "no conspicuous achievement of which to boast."60 Moreover, Liberal f i s c a l pol icy had not succeeded in ending the postwar depression, a f a i l i n g that was iden t i f i ed by Liberal candidates as contr ibut ing to the i r poor showing in Ontario.61 According to his Conservative opponent, Murdock, the Labour M in is te r , was defeated in Toronto because Liberal f i s c a l pol icy was i den t i f i ed as producing the condit ions of unemployment in High Park and extensive d is t ress and hardship.62 104 As his major r i va l s f a i l ed to win a major i ty , securing only 117 seats , King did not re l inquish the reins of power. His p o l i t i c a l survival depended on the 24 Progressives and the two Labour MPs, and the l a t t e r exploited the i r sudden r i se to prominence to f u l l advantage, prec ip i ta t ing the temporary reversal in the pol icy of withdrawal during the 1926 winter , as well as the more s ign i f i can t concession of o ld age pensions, as chapter 8 documents. By improvising measures intending to sa t i s f y Progressive and Labour demands, the government withstood fo r f i ve months of the 1926 session "a sustained onslaught" by the Conservatives.63 i t .was ul t imately brought down by the customs scandal and, fo l lowing Meighen's abortive attempt to govern, Parliament was d isso lved. Having secured re-e lect ion and a working major i ty, Prime Minister King basked for the rest of the decade in the novelty of economic prosperi ty and p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y . These two condit ions provided him with a convenient rat ionale to ref ra in from repeating the 1926 lapse in o f f i c i a l po l i cy . Economic recovery, however, turned out to be a f l ee t ing phenomenon. The ef fects of the stock market crash in October 1929 combined with p ra i r i e drought produced abnormal unemployment. Accompanying the onset of the Great Depression, there were renewed demands fo r federal in tervent ion. The agi ta t ion developed in western Canada. Following a ser ies of conferences in Regina (October 1929) and Winnipeg (December 1929, January 1930), spokesmen of organized labour, c i t i e s and provinces made jo in t pleas for federal a id towards r e l i e f and a national conference on unemployment.64 jh e y presented t he i r case d i rec t l y to the Liberal Prime Minister in la te February of 1930.65 A s im i la r set of forces in Ontario also made separate representations. These various demands for renewed federal involvement in unemployment r e l i e f were not the only p leas: 105 The Dominion was also bombarded with appeals of a s im i la r nature.. . from various church, f r a te rna l , labour and trade organizat ions. At the same time national action to stem the mounting t ide of unemployment was ca l led for in resolut ions adopted by many soc ie t ies and associat ions, in newspaper e d i t o r i a l s , and in addresses by leaders of publ ic opinion. Besides th is popular ag i ta t ion , the question of unemployment was discussed by the federal House on several occasions during the spring of 1930, with c r i t i c i s m of o f f i c i a l pol icy voiced from a l l sides.66 Despite th is r i s ing chorus of demands for federal ac t ion , the Liberal Prime Min is ter refused, at f i r s t , to admit that there was an unemployment problem. "Then the furthest he would go was to announce that i f by any chance there was a problem i t wasn't serious enough to warrant intervention by the Dominion." 6 7 An ed i to r ia l in a labour publ icat ion suggested that e lectoral ca lcu la t ions shaped King's decision not to act : It i s not d i f f i c u l t to understand the Government's viewpoint. The in terests of the Canadian people are subservient to the interests of the Liberal party, and in view of the l i ke l ihood of an e lect ion th i s year, the Government i s making a val iant e f for t to soft-pedal the s i t ua t i on . Let the unemployed t ighten the i r belts and suffer in s i l ence ; le t them keep of f the s t ree ts , and avoid regis ter ing at the employment bureaus. . . . King was also reluctant to intervene because he f e l t that the claims of provinc ia l Premiers represented " p o l i t i c s not publ ic wel fare. " He regarded i t as more than a coincidence that a l l requests for a id came from e i ther Conservative or Farmers' administrations and not from the two Liberal Premiers of Quebec and Prince Edward Is land. His reaction to provincial demands became c r ys ta l - c l ea r during the debate on the motion of A. Heaps (Lab., Winnipeg) urging the Liberal government to take immediate action to ass is t the provinces and mun ic ipa l i t i es . Baited by a question from Woodsworth, King tossed his customary caution to the wind: 106. With respect to giving monies out of the federal treasury to any Tory government in th is country for these alleged unemployment purposes, with these governments si tuated as they are today, with po l i c ies d iametr ica l ly opposed to those of th is government, I would not give them a f ive-cent piece. His ' f i ve -cen t ' speech was probably the "most cost ly mistake" of his whole p o l i t i c a l career. "King was soon in the midst of the e lec t i on , l i s ten ing to those awful, i r re t r ievab le words played back to him frcm a l l quarters and from every manner of mankind."69 The issue of unemployment played a prominent part in the 1930 campaign. Conservatives denounced the Liberal government for i t s f a i l u re to undertake measures of r e l i e f and Liberals re ta l ia ted with accounts of the prosperity which had favoured the land during the i r years of o f f i c e . 7 0 Bennett, the opposition leader, promised in c i t i e s across Canada that a Conservative v ic tory would be followed immediately by remedial ac t ion . His aggressive approach contrasted sharply with the defensive posture of the chief archi tect of the federal pol icy of withdrawal, and Bennett won a c lear major i ty. Upon assuming o f f i c e , he kept his promise by c a l l i n g a special session in September 1930 to deal with the problems of the job less . The stage was therefore set for another a c t i v i s t era in emergency state aid for dest i tute employables. A Review Of a l l the po l i c ies examined here, the federal pol icy of withdrawal reveals most c lear ly the major sources of opposition to publ ic welfare during the 1914 to 1939 per iod. The h o s t i l i t y of in terests representing the dominant sectors of the economy and the f i s c a l conservatism of provincial and federal po l i t i c i ans proved to be a potent combination in blocking governmental act ion concerning state i n i t i a t i v e s fo r dest i tu te employables. Pr ior to assessing t he i r respective ro les , the impact of environmental factors i s assessed. The socio-economic set t ing exerted less impact upon the agi tat ion for withdrawal than on the preceding struggle. Although the postwar depression persisted unt i l 1925, i t did not prevent Ottawa's re t reat , presumably because widespread labour unrest subsided soon af ter the L iberals came to power. Moreover, the general prosperity in the rest of the decade did not spur a reversa l , even though i t provided the revenue for a jo in t i n i t i a t i v e by f i l l i n g the federal treasury and provincial coffers in a l l regions except the maritimes. Unlike the socio-economic environment, the cul tura l context d i r ec t l y shaped the ag i ta t i on , but in a less posi t ive way than previously, fo r the prevai l ing cl imate of opinion acted as a constraint upon governmental ac t ion . The decl ine in sympathy at both the mass and e l i t e leve ls for the p l ight of the dest i tu te jobless resulted from the absorption of the cu l tu ra l l y deserving group of veterans into the c i v i l i a n labour force. The remaining environmental va r iab le , the ins t i tu t iona l framework, exerted much more inf luence upon the federal pol icy of withdrawal than i t had on intervent ion. Ottawa was able to take advantage of the d iv i s ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers to of f - load the costs of re l iev ing phys ica l ly f i t c i v i l i a n s upon the t rad i t iona l au thor i t i es , and the 1922 Dominion-Provincial Conference provided an ideal forum to announce i t s in tent ion. Furthermore, the dual targets of pressure bu i l t into the federal structure fostered the development of the pract ice of buck-passing between the senior levels of government. As discussed above, social control p o l i t i c s had some relevance in the case study f o r , even though working-class mi l i tancy and fears of revolut ion were absent, Ottawa's retreat can be seen as a means of re inforcing r es t r i c t i ve work norms. But i t was overshadowed by group p o l i t i c s , with agr icu l ture and capi ta l qual i fy ing as the dominant societa l ac tors . The evidence suggests that 108 far from acting together to secure withdrawal, circumstances combined to enhance their respective pol i t ical influence after the 1921 election. Progressive MPs representing organized farmers in the West and Ontario held the balance of power in the fourteenth Parliament, outnumbering the few opponents of withdrawal. Eastern business interests had influential spokesmen inside the Liberal cabinet, including the two Finance Ministers. Thus, withdrawal was the price Prime Minister King paid for Progressive support and the concession made to accommodate corporate capi ta l , especially the 'Montreal group.' Arrayed against these powerful forces was the newly organized cl ient group of urban unemployed workers, but their isolated demands for a reversal of o f f ic ia l policy were discounted by the pol i t ical e l i te as representing only the claims of ' loafers. ' As decisions concerning emergency aid can be reversed more easily than for statutory benefits, a more concerted protest was mounted against Ottawa's withdrawal at the onset of the Great Depression, but i t was equally ineffective. Among pol i t ic ians, opinion was more divided over the desirabi l i ty of the federal policy of withdrawal. Elected spokesmen of western and other c i t ies urged Ottawa to take over the maintenance of destitute immigrants, but their demands were merely deflected to the provinces. Most provincial Premiers, however, were equally reluctant to spend their taxpayers' money on re l ie f because they took seriously their pledges of economy. Their f iscal conservatism was a more significant constraint than their agrarian or business ethics. These opponents of action also probably shared the concern of their colleagues in Bri t ish Columbia and Manitoba, who protested against Ottawa's retreat, but were not themselves prepared to take independent, concerted action in case their provinces became isolated 'meccas' for destitute employables across 10.9 Canada. Both of these underlying motives, f i s c a l conservatism and concern about the mobi l i ty of capi ta l and labour, are pinpointed by Brecher (1957) and Banting (1982) as important constraints upon ac t ion . Inside the federal c a p i t a l , Prime Minister King qua l i f i es as the arch i tect of the po l i cy . He decided to withdraw because he subscribed to the same c l ass i ca l l i be ra l values as the dominant classes and respected provincia l autonomy, and the canons of f i s c a l orthodoxy. A l l these motives confirm the proposi t ion, advanced by Heidenheimer e t . a l . (1975), that a leader 's imp l i c i t acceptance of assumptions that favour the status quo acts as a major constraint on a party 's reform capab i l i t y . Among them, King's f i s ca l conservatism was the major constraint upon intervent ion. As his top p r i o r i t y during the 1920s was 'economy,' he recoi led with horror at of fer ing condit ional subsidies to 'spendthr i f t ' provinces, except when his very p o l i t i c a l survival was at stake, as in the 1926 session. His orthodox f i sca l po l i cy , however, was instrumental in contr ibut ing to his downfall and paving the way fo r renewed federal involvement in r e l i e f t e r r i t o r y , as the next chapter reveals . Before examining Conservative-sponsored innovations in emergency a i d , the p o l i c i e s , analyzed to date, are compared. The cases of intervention and withdrawal reveal in terest ing dif ferences and s i m i l a r i t i e s in the behaviour of advocates, opponents and prec ip i tan ts . Social control p o l i t i c s was much more sa l ien t in the agi tat ion for expansion of state ac t i v i t y than contract ion. Moreover, even in the case of in tervent ion, labour radicals were not the dominant societa l actors, as they shared the stage with interest groups representing trade unions and veterans. Compared with the l imi ted relevance of socia l con t ro l , in terest group power was decis ive in both ag i ta t ions. A s t r i k i ng feature of group p o l i t i c s was the consistency displayed by agrarian 110. and corporate interests over time to the issue of state a i d . Farmers and businessmen were the major soc ieta l opponents throughout, whereas organized labour and c l i en t groups vac i l l a ted in the i r support for federal involvement. Inside government, cabinet po l i t i c i ans played the pre-eminent role in deciding the t iming and content of the p o l i c i e s . CHAPTER 5 RELIEF CAMPS FOR SINGLE, HOMELESS MEN, 1932 In the f a l l of 1930 the federal author i t ies appeared to be adopting a bolder approach to the problem of dependency among wage-earners. The new Conservative government had won in Ju ly "the f i r s t modern federal e lect ion in which the issue of unemployment proved d e c i s i v e . " 1 Its leader, Bennett, then took swift act ion to redeem his pledges to provide "work and wages" and "to b last h i s way in to the world 's markets." In September he summoned a special session of the new Parliament to approve a $20 m i l l i on grant for public works -ten times more than Ottawa spent on c i v i l i a n r e l i e f during the 1920s - and a s t i f f across-the-board t a r i f f increase. But neither i n i t i a t i v e succeeded in stemming the t ide of severe and prolonged depression. Between 1930 and 1933 the scale of unemployment and poverty reached unprecedented l eve l s .2 /\ s a resu l t , the p o l i t i c a l sa l ience of r e l i e f a lso increased dramat ical ly . By 1932 i t had become, according to two prominent businessmen of the t ime, "one of the most vexed questions of publ ic welfare.""^ Ottawa's response, however, to the problem of unparal leled poverty cannot qua l i fy as a novel experiment in state a i d . Instead, as Struthers (1977) f i r s t emphasized, i t represented an extension of po l i c ies and pract ices developed in the previous decade. It involved the resumption of payment of condit ional subsidies to the t rad i t iona l r e l i e f - g i v i ng au thor i t i es , not a brand new pattern of i n te rven t i on . 4 Moreover, both the Conservative administrat ion (1930-35) and i t s L ibera l successor (1935-40) adopted the ' t r i e d and t rue ' methods of doles and r e l i e f works, spending unprecedented funds on these orthodox projects (see appendix,A, tab le 37). They also revived the past pract ice of granting a id only 111 112 on an emergency bas is . Their po l i c ies were formulated from year to year with each of the ten successive r e l i e f acts stressing that federal intervention was a temporary incursion into provincial j u r i sd i c t i on to meet circumstances of "extreme and unusual g rav i t y . " This strategy was designed with a fami l i a r object ive in mind: to avoid the permanent burden of s p i r a l l i n g r e l i e f costs.5 The inher i ted method of policymaking, though, was f l e x i b l e enough to afford opportunit ies for experimentation. Real iz ing th is ear ly in i t s term of o f f i c e , the Conservative government decided to sponsor a novel form of aiding t rans ien ts , a category of wage-earners not previously s ingled out fo r special treatment. Re l ie f camps to provide work and maintenance for s ing le , homeless men were operated by the federal Departments of National Defence and the Inter ior between 1932 and 1937. Their establishment was unprecedented, representing the f i r s t occasion that Ottawa bore the f u l l costs of ass is t ing a segment of the c i v i l i a n unemployed. It also marked the culmination of federal involvement with s ing le , homeless men, superseding an arrangement made in the summer of 1931 in which the Conservative government agreed to share the costs of maintaining these men in camps with the western provinces and Ontario. This trend of increasing par t ic ipat ion by Ottawa, however, i s neglected in ex is t ing studies of Canadian r e l i e f camps. 6 The purpose of th is chapter i s to elucidate the p o l i t i c a l forces behind the evolution of camp r e l i e f for s i ng l e , homeless men. Background The impact of the Great Depression was most severe during the f i r s t three years of the Conservative government's term of o f f i c e . According to DBS estimates the jobless rate among wage-earners rose from 12.8 percent in 1930 to a record level of 26.5 percent in 1933. The incidence of unemployment, though, 1 1 3 was not shared equally by a l l regions, part ly because economic conditions in the p ra i r i e provinces, espec ia l ly Saskatchewan, were exacerbated by the persistence of severe drought. Consequently, although wage-earners in communities over 5,000 were d is t r ibu ted 23.1 percent in the West and 76.9 percent in the East, 1931 census data revealed that the proportions unemployed were 31.1 percent and 68.9 percent, respec t i ve l y . 7 The ranks of des t i tu te , unemployed workers in western c i t i e s included s ing le , homeless men who emerged as a d i s t i nc t group among r e l i e f appl icants during the 1930s. The majority had been previously employed as t ransient workers, a mobile segment of the labour force that played a c ruc ia l role in the development of Canada's natural resources. These workers followed seeding, harvest ing, homesteading, lumber camps, sawmil ls, mines, and the c i t y or town boarding-house in the ' o f f season, in a regular cyc le . But when the depression s t ruck, t he i r mobi l i ty became a l i a b i l i t y because i t deprived them of residency, an essent ial qua l i f i ca t i on for e i ther municipal or provincial r e l i e f . Even unemployed, s ingle men with establ ished community t i e s found themselves in the ranks of the homeless, as they were often denied work or shel ter allowances. From 1929 onwards they joined the ranks of dest i tu te t ransients ' r i d ing the rods' from coast to coast in search of food and s h e l t e r . 8 There are no precise f igures of the s ize of th is group. O f f i c i a l estimates made in the 1930s ranged from a minimum of 20,000 to a maximum of 70,000.9 But t h i s range is probably conservative, since a re l i ab le independent invest igator estimated the number of dest i tu te t ransients to be at least 100,000 in 1932 . 1 0 More re l i ab le data are avai lable on the i r occupations and age groups (see table 5) . 114 Table 5. Estimates of occupational and age d is t r ibu t ion of the unemployed Occupational Dis t r ibut ion Married Men Single Men Unski l led labour 40-45 % 40-42 % Agr icul tura l workers 5-6 28-50 Railway men 7-10 6-7 Bui lding and construction 12-15 6-7 Of f ice and c l e r i c a l 3-4 3 Other (shop ass is tan ts , salesmen, e t c . ) 25-30 15-20 Age Dis t r ibu t ion 19-25 years ~ 20 25-40 years 50 50 40-50 years 20-25 12-15 SOURCE: "Confident ial Report re Unemployment and Rel ie f in Western Canada," n.d. [Summer, 1932], Universi ty of New Brunswick, R.B. Bennett Papers, Manuscript Group 26K, reel 381, pp. 478087-88. Desti tute t ransients were concentrated in western Canada mainly as a resul t of the completion of many capi ta l construction pro jects. The mechanization of western agr icu l tu re , however, res t r ic ted t he i r chances of f inding a l ternat ive employment. The rapid spread in the use of the combine dramatical ly cur ta i led the demand for harvest workers,!-- and shortened the working time of those who were employed in harvest ing. Furthermore, the disappearance of free homesteading land close to areas of settlement meant that these men were no longer able to support themselves during the ' o f f season. While these developments were occurr ing, agr icu l tura l immigrants continued to be recrui ted from abroad. According to the federal Labour Min is te r , out of the 115 221,566 immigrants who entered Canada between February and July of 1930, 99,367 were males aged 18 years and over.-- 2 Their entry into a shrinking labour market contributed further to the problem of group transiency in the West. Although a l l c i t i e s and most towns of western Canada attracted unemployed t rans ien ts , Winnipeg and Vancouver were the magnets. As the only large centre of population within a 1,000-mile stretch of t e r r i t o r y , Winnipeg offered a refuge for seasonal workers la id off in the winter months. As 'the gateway' to the western provinces, i t a lso attracted a constant t r a f f i c of labourers seeking work in the harvest f i e lds or in the developing northern h inter land. If no work was ava i lab le , the population from the rural areas flocked in to Greater Winnipeg, and "the westward movement stopped there."- - 3 Vancouver was also a 'mecca' for t rans ients . Besides being "the logging headquarters" every winter, i t s mild cl imate attracted seasonal workers from elsewhere. During the depression Vancouver became a haven for unemployed transients from a l l over Canada who went where "the weather f i t t ed the i r c l o thes . . . . " 14 The in f lux of s i ng le , homeless men into these and other c i t i e s of western Canada posed special problems fo r r e l i e f o f f i c i a l s . Hard-pressed to meet the demands of t he i r own unemployed res idents, some munic ipal i t ies refused to aid them. Others, espec ia l ly the larger centres, provided the occasional meal and a bed and then to ld the d r i f t e r to "move on": Subjected to constant movement, jungle l i v i n g , and disappointment af ter disappointment, the s ing le , homeless, unemployed man soon became a t rans ien t , a tramp, a hobo, or perhaps a t h i e f . He was the grey f igure begging on the s t ree t , sleeping in the doorway, standing on the corner, pr ick ing your conscience or offending your s e n s i b i l i t i e s . Slowly Canadians became aware of the problem.* 5 Once aware, they demanded swift act ion to remedy the problem of group t ransiency. 116 The Agi tat ion for Federal Re l ie f Camps, 1930-32 Of a l l the campaigns for i n i t i a t i v e s in the f i e l d of unemployment r e l i e f during the interwar per iod, the agi tat ion for r e l i e f camps for s ing le , homeless men of fers the most graphic i l l u s t r a t i o n of the socia l control model. V i r tua l l y a l l the advocates perceived th is group as potent ia l ly v io lent and susceptible to revolutionary propaganda. They e x p l i c i t l y demanded federal action in order to quell the prospect of Communist-inspired disorder. Although some commentators question both the accuracy and s incer i t y of these perceptions, the evidence overwhelmingly suggests that po l i t i c i ans and the publ ic regarded the threat posed by dest i tute t ransients as a serious one. Unlike the previous struggles, the dominant economic in terests were not v i s i b l e opponents of camp r e l i e f for dest i tute t rans ients . Instead, during the agi ta t ion most spokesmen of capi ta l concentrated the i r energies upon pressing Prime Min is ter Bennett to drop his cost ly publ ic works program, arguing that i t was endangering the nat ion's credi t and v io la t ing canons of f i s c a l orthodoxy.I 7 A few businessmen, in f ac t , lobbied Ottawa to estab l ish camps because they feared revolut ion and regarded th is form of r e l i e f as economical. Organized farmers a lso refrained from voicing objections as survival became a more pressing p r i o r i t y , espec ia l ly in the West, where most became dest i tute as a resul t of depression and drought. The void in opponents' ranks created by the s i lence of agrarian and corporate in terests was f i l l e d by previous supporters of publ ic welfare i n i t i a t i v e s , v i z . , unemployed and employed wage-earners. The Communist-led unemployed, representing the bulk of the nat ion 's organized job less , were the major opponents of the pr inc ip le of camp r e l i e f work. More moderate elements of the Canadian labour movement, outside and ins ide Parliament, voiced qua l i f i ed 117 protests against m i l i t a ry administration of camps. Prime Minister Bennett was a lso re luc tant , at f i r s t , to involve the army, and his opposit ion was s i g n i f i c a n t , as he purportedly ran a one-man show during his term of o f f i c e . But he la te r reversed his stance af ter the 1932 winter demonstrated the f a i l u re of a jo in t camps po l i cy . Advocates: The agi ta t ion for federal camps to house dest i tute t ransients was conducted by two sets of p o l i t i c a l forces. Alarmed by the a c t i v i t i e s of labour r ad i ca l s , municipal and provincial po l i t i c i ans in Ontario and the West exerted intense pressure upon Ottawa to es tab l ish camps. Individuals and groups, representing mainly non-economic interests across Canada echoed the i r p leas. The various advocates' demands attracted l i t t l e attention in the federal House, but ind iv idual Conservative backbenchers and ministers were act ive behind the scenes pressing the case for ac t ion. The campaign coincided with a resurgence of l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d dissent that was more intense and much wider in scope than the postwar unrest. Among the various s o c i a l i s t groups involved in the process of mobi l iz ing workers, the Communist Party of Canada (CPC) was the most successful in the f i r s t years of the depression. After i t s founding in 1921 i t remained a moribund organization for the rest of that decade, with only 1,900 members in November 1 9 2 9 . ^ It grew rapidly thereafter because the unprecedented scale of unemployment and poverty created a f e r t i l e breeding ground for radical doctr ines among disaf fected wage-earners and some hard-pressed farmers. At the peak of i t s strength in 1931, the CPC was outlawed and i t s leaders ar rested, but i t s various fronts were s t i l l legal and remained ac t i ve . 118 Among CPC a f f i l i a t e s , the Workers' Unity League, created in 1929 by Tom McEwen, was the par ty 's "most e f fec t ive a r m . " 1 9 Its f i r s t major task was to forge a national mass movement out of the hundreds of local groups of unemployed workers which sprang up soon a f te r the depression struck. To th i s end, i t created the National Unemployed Workers' Associat ion (NUWA) in the spring of 1931 to press for non-contributory unemployment insurance and to unite "the struggles of every section of the working-class" in the f ight for the overthrow of capi ta l ism.20 The NUWA leadership played an act ive part in organizing the various marches, parades and minor r io ts - often involv ing clashes with the po l ice - that took place in many c i t i e s of Ontario and elsewhere. Thus, across Canada "many municipal and provincial governments and much of the press shared Bennett's view that protest groups and mass meetings of the unemployed were, by d e f i n i t i o n , revolutionary in intent."21 Po l i t i c i ans representing western c i t i e s and the provinces of B r i t i s h Columbia, A lber ta , Manitoba and Ontario were par t i cu la r l y alarmed about t rans ien ts ' suscep t i b i l i t y to the propaganda of Communist ag i ta tors . From 1931 onwards they waged an aggressive campaign to persuade Ottawa to estab l ish r e l i e f camps for them. Besides i n d i v i d u a l , writ ten representat ions, they lobbied Senator Robertson, the federal Min ister of Labour, d i r ec t l y during his v i s i t to western Canada in the summer of 1931. His fac t - f ind ing tour began on the coast, and so the demands of B.C. municipal and provincial po l i t i c i ans were received f i r s t . During the 1931 winter the in f lux of s ingle men from a l l parts of Canada in to Vancouver imposed severe s t ra ins on the local r e l i e f machinery. Their maintenance was resented by c i v i c o f f i c i a l s because i t had to be financed par t ly by the i r ratepayers. Vancouver aldermen, however, were not prepared to 119_ bui ld the i r own camps to house dest i tu te t rans ien ts , and they lobbied both senior leve ls of government to do so. According to the chairman of the c i t y ' s r e l i e f committee, " [ throughout the winter we have been constantly urging upon the Provincia l Government the adv i sab i l i t y of establ ish ing work camps at a distance from the c i t i e s . . . . " 2 2 Frustrated by the lack of provincia l response, Mayor Taylor went to Ottawa in Apr i l 1931 to press for the provision of camps in each province, and he repeated th is demand for national action when c i v i c po l i t i c i ans met Senator Robertson in V ic to r ia in mid-June. The Conservative Premier of B.C. reinforced the pressure on Robertson. Condit ions, he i n s i s t e d , were "grave": . . . e s p e c i a l l y in the c i t y of Vancouver, where huge crowds of unemployed men were having parades, marching to various points and holding meetings. There were several clashes between the pol ice and the unemployed and a d i s t i n c t l y communistic s p i r i t was e v i d e n t . 2 3 Premier Tolmie's suggested remedy, jo in t funding of r e l i e f camp work on the Trans-Canada Highway, was designed to re l ieve married as well as s ingle men. Indeed, as he was not prepared to pay the costs of transport ing the unemployed from urban centres to these camps, residents of the unorganized areas of the province would have benefited the most from road camp work. The B.C. Premier, however, presented his proposal as a remedy fo r the transient "menace" in Vancouver, warning the Minister that " . . . t he unemployment s i tuat ion i s becoming da i l y more acute, and with communistic ag i ta t i on , i t i s a much more serious question than when i t was discussed some time a g o . . . . " 2 4 Civ ic po l i t i c i ans in Alberta also pressed the case for federal action on Senator Robertson. They too favoured road-construction projects in order to remove "the transient non-resident menace" from the large c i t i e s , 25 a n c j t he i r demands were subsequently endorsed by a l l mun ic ipa l i t i es , both urban and r u r a l , in the province. A resolut ion passed by the Union of Alberta Munic ipa l i t ies 120 contended that the care of unemployed transients was the sole duty of the senior leve ls of government and suggested that th i s group be placed in camps and employed on useful publ ic works.26 premier Brownlee, the head of the United Farmers government, was prepared to par t ic ipate with Ottawa in special r e l i e f works to absorb transients but not to act independently. He suggested construct ion of the Banff-Jasper highway in the national parks as a sui table project for re l iev ing "a large number" of t rans ients . "In any event, we think in the in terests of maintenance of socia l standards and to get away from Communistic inf luences these men should be moved out of c i t i e s . " 2 7 Among the remaining p ra i r i e provinces, only Manitoba faced a serious t ransient problem. Although Winnipeg was subject to recurrent seasonal unemployment, the c i t y was unprepared for the constant in f lux of t ransients requir ing r e l i e f from 1929 onwards. In the f i r s t winter of the depression o f f i c i a l s attempted to res t r i c t a id to resident s ing le men, of fer ing d i rect r e l i e f in return for a work test in day camps.28 However, t he i r e f for ts to deny food and shel ter to outsiders were shor t - l i ved because c i t i zens complained about the extensive panhandling that developed. By the spring of 1931, 5,000 s ing le unemployed men were being fed at the c i v i c soup k i t c h e n , 2 9 comprising one-third of the estimated total of unemployed in Winnipeg. The prospect of reducing the i r numbers was remote because very few farmers were h i r ing labour and other industr ies were affected by the slump. Once again, tension was heightened by the threat of continued Communist-inspired d i s o r d e r . 3 0 Both municipal and provincial po l i t i c i ans pressed for federal action in the summer of 1 9 3 1 . 3 1 Two Winnipeg aldermen presented the case for a nat iona l , uniform pol icy to Robertson on June 26th, describing the dest i tu t ion of both resident and transient s ingle men as "p i t i ab le in the extreme," and making i t c lear "that Winnipeg cannot act alone in the matter of giv ing r e l i e f to t r ans i en t s . . . . " 32 Qne counc i l lo r spel led out the reason: "If we were to attempt to feed these men at th is time without s im i la r provision being made in a l l other parts of Canada, our c i t y would be overwhelmed by the migration of hungry men from East to West who would f lock here for food."33 Following t he i r meeting with Robertson, provincial o f f i c i a l s in Manitoba submitted spec i f i c proposals for r e l i e f camp work in the national parks in order to remove several thousand s ingle men from the urban centres.34 while the i r demands were being considered in the federal c a p i t a l , unrest in tens i f ied across Canada, resul t ing in the arrest of "bo lshev is t i c " agi tators in Manitoba's capi ta l and elsewhere. These disturbances prompted the mayor of Winnipeg to wire Ottawa suggesting that " . . . t he greatest remedy for countering communistic propaganda i s to provide work now and the most su i table job would be the immediate s tar t ing of Trans-Canada Highway east and west, where many thousands could be handled under semi-mi l i tary organization and c o n d i t i o n s . " 3 5 Ci t i es and towns in Ontario also joined the growing chorus. The Conservative provincial administration had decided not to contribute towards e i ther d i rec t r e l i e f or local works during the summer of 1931, and munic ipa l i t ies in northern Ontario were hard-pressed to re l ieve t he i r own unemployed res idents, l e t alone aid incoming t rans ients . The Clerk of Cochrane, a town of 3,000, wired Ottawa asking for the immediate removal of 1,000 starv ing and homeless men "who intimate disturbances w i l l a r ise i f action not taken."36 Aldermen of Port Arthur and Fort Wi l l iam, along with local business and labour organizat ions, made s im i la r pleas to the federal and provincial c a p i t a l s . 3 7 These indiv idual appeals were buttressed by a jo in t demand. In ear ly Ju ly a delegation representing 50 munic ipa l i t ies throughout Ontario asked Premier Henry to urge Ottawa to estab l ish centres for the care of unemployed t ransients.38 i n response, the Conservative Premier endorsed the idea of a 122 j o i n t federa l -prov inc ia l i n i t i a t i v e to form "labour bat ta l ions" of unemployed s ing le men to bui ld l i nks in the Trans-Canada Highway and other roads in northern Ontario.39 F in layson, the minister in charge of r e l i e f administration in th i s area, urged the Prime Minister to sanction th is suggestion as " . . .we very much fear [an] outbreak in northern towns."40 He la te r made a personal plea to the federal Minister of Railways for action to avert Communist-inspired d isorder: The s i tuat ion in some parts of Northern Ontario i s becoming desperate and I am afra id we may have an outbreak at a few of the places where i t i s pa r t i cu la r l y bad and where there i s a red element. This i s par t i cu la r l y true on the head of the Lakes, Sault Sainte Marie and Sudbury. Our pol ice reports from these l o c a l i t i e s are very bad and the s i t u a t i o n . . . i s gett ing very d i f f i c u l t and I am rea l ly a f ra id from a c i v i l standpoint.41 Elected o f f i c i a l s i n Ontario and the West were not the only advocates of federal action concerning t rans ients . Individuals and various interest groups a lso lobbied Ottawa. They were even more e x p l i c i t in demanding m i l i t a ry involvement in r e l i e f camp work. The fol lowing sample of t he i r views is i l l u s t r a t i v e not exhaustive, as the Prime Min is te r ' s Off ice was "inundated by people sending us good, bad and ind i f ferent schemes....42 /\ Montreal resident urged Ottawa to enrol s ing le , homeless men as aux i l i a r i es of the Department of National Defence in order to prevent loot ing of food stores.43 The Chief Constable of Vancouver suggested the creation of "Internment Camps" at the borders of Alberta and B.C. " . . . i n order to re l ieve the s i tuat ion which i s d i s t i n c t l y ser ious."44 C.W. Frederick, who owned several newspapers in northern A lber ta , sent Prime Min is ter Bennett an a r t i c l e suggesting that Canada fo l low the example of France and Germany and mobil ize her s i ng le , unemployed men in an " indust r ia l army" under m i l i t a ry administrat ion in order to " r i d . . . ou rse l ves once and for a l l of the bolshevist element with which the 123. ranks of our unemployed are so thoroughly spr inkled."45 Groups representing churches, businessmen and veterans concurred. Anglicans in the Kootenay diocese pet i t ioned both the B.C. government and Ottawa to estab l ish "moveable camps" under the auspices of the Employment Service to provide r e l i e f work and then to enforce r i g i d l y the vagrancy laws.46 English-speaking Cathol ics in Montreal advocated housing the foreign-born in work camps. 4 7 The Calgary Board of Trade sent a resolut ion to Ottawa suggesting that a l l homeless men be housed in r e l i e f camps run along d i sc ip l i na ry l ines .48 Veterans belonging to the Edmonton branch of the Crusaders of the B r i t i s h Empire demanded mi l i ta ry -con t ro l led camps to undercut the threat posed by " . . . those whose aim i s sed i t i on , revolut ion and disregard for law and order."49 Federal l eg is la to rs also demanded special treatment for s ing le , homeless men. Behind the scenes a few Conservative MPs pressed the case for federal ac t ion . A.U.G. Bury (Edmonton) suggested special projects for t r a n s i e n t s , 5 0 while two Ontario Conservatives made separate representations fo r the establishment of m i l i ta ry -con t ro l led r e l i e f work camps. V.C. Porteous (Grey North) advocated th is remedy to counteract ex is t ing condit ions "which border on r e v o l u t i o n , " 5 1 and Brigadier-General Ross (Kingston) argued that housing s ingle homeless men in the armouries of c i t i e s would have "the most soothing effect on the r e d s . . . . " 5 2 Members of the Conservative cabinet also favoured the establishment of m i l i t a ry -con t ro l led r e l i e f camps. The Min is ter of Railways advocated th is remedy in order to reduce unrest. "My own great fear i s that we may hesi tate too long and have serious r io ts verging on revolution in which l i f e may be taken which would be, to my mind, a t e r r i b l e catastrophe as hungry men can hardly be blamed fo r refusing to starve q u i e t l y . " 5 3 The Minister of Labour shared his concern. Senator Robertson, " s t i l l fr ightened by the memories 124 of the Winnipeg General S t r i ke , . . . [was] convinced that these men were potential revolut ionar ies and that many of them were already communists."54 He was c lear ly disturbed by the condit ions he found in western Canada, perceiving the s i tuat ion in Manitoba to be the most threatening: "Undoubtedly the s i tuat ion in the Ci ty of Winnipeg is more acute than at any other point , due not only to the large number of men unemployed, but also because of the fact that so large a proportion of them are of a l ien or ig in and communist sympathies, thereby making the c i t y a p r o l i f i c breeding ground for communistic doctr ines. This i s evident because of the recurring disturbances, some four of which have happened within the past month." Robertson was also fearful that s im i la r outbreaks would occur in northern Ontar io, where the bulk of the unemployed were also foreign-born. In order to minimize the threat of Communist-inspired disorder in Ontario and Manitoba as well as Alberta and B r i t i s h Columbia, he suggested that Ottawa should cooperate with these governments in extensive road-works on the Trans-Canada Highway to remove transient and resident s ingle men from c i t i e s . He advocated that these men "be put at work promptly under supervision equivalent to semi-mi l i tary con t ro l ; with employment ava i l ab le , with ample food and reasonable shelter tended, id le unemployed men should be prepared to accept same or fo r fe i t t he i r r ight to State assistance."55 Opponents: Robertson's remedy fo r the transient "menace," however, was not condoned by a l l segments of Canadian soc iety . Although the scale of opposition was muted compared with the barrage of c r i t i c i s m that developed af ter the Department of National Defence camps were estab l ished, protests against both the pr inc ip le and method of administration of camp r e l i e f were voiced by radical and moderate segments of the divided labour movement. Inside government, Prime Minister Bennett was also reluctant to sanction federal ly-operated r e l i e f camps. Following i t s founding in 1931, the Communist-sponsored NUWA grew rapidly because neither establ ished unions nor labour part ies showed much interest in organizing the nat ion's job less . Although independent estimates of i t s strength are not ava i l ab le , i t s Secretary claimed a mass membership of 300,000 by the f a l l of 1933.56 j n e NUWA leadership was bas ica l l y opposed to the idea of housing transients in r e l i e f camps, as i t sought a permanent national remedy fo r unemployment rather than innovations in emergency state a id . Its i n i t i a l s t rategy, however, was not to condemn the camps outright but to demand that Ottawa meet an extensive set of condit ions concerning hours of work, wages, l i v i n g condit ions and method of administrat ion ( c i v i l , not m i l i t a ry ) pr ior to sanctioning th is form of r e l i e f for the i r members.57 Local a f f i l i a t e s of the NUWA were more openly h o s t i l e . The B.C. Premier recal led that in the summer of 1931 in Vancouver: . . . t he unemployed, espec ia l ly the Communists, were using the expression 'pr ison camps.1 They were en l i s t i ng public sympathy when they stated that the government were preparing camps not f i t to l i v e in.58 They also lodged a formal protest with Ottawa. In September a mass meeting organized by the Burnaby branch of the NUWA approved a resolut ion protesting against "the inauguration of a system of Slave Camps" as i t represented "a curtailment of l i be r t y and a lowering of the standard of l i v i ng . "59 Among employed workers, members of non-international unions also opposed the establishment of camps. The leadership of the National Labour Council of Toronto, an offshoot of the All-Canadian Congress of Labour, and delegates attending the 1931 convention of the Calgary-based Mine Workers Union of Canada condemned "the system of forced labour" that coerced s ing le , unemployed men to accept camp r e l i e f work or else face s t a r v a t i o n . 6 0 In contrast , members of internat ional unions' a f f i l i a t e d to the Canadian TLC were more cautious in 126 t he i r c r i t i c i s m . They were not opposed i n i t i a l l y to the pr inc ip le of work camps.61 However, they did not sanction m i l i t a ry involvement in th is form of r e l i e f . For example, the Calgary Trades and Labour Council impressed upon the Prime Minister the necessity for c i v i l administrat ion of work camps for the s ing le unemployed, i f th is procedure was carr ied out.62 Members of western Labour part ies adopted a s im i la r stance to moderate un ion is ts . At t he i r conference in Ju ly 1931 they approved a resolut ion condoning only c i v i l i a n administrat ion of camps for s ingle men and protest ing strongly against proposals "to m i l i t a r i z e or dragoon our unemployed or to explo i t t he i r misfortune by semi-forced labour on a mere r e l i e f b a s i s . " 6 3 Inside Parliament no overt opposition to the p r inc ip le of r e l i e f camps for s i ng le , homeless men was voiced pr ior to the i r establishment. Among the few MPs concerned about the pl ight of t ransients in the 1931 session,64 o n i y Woodsworth brought up the subject. Like other western labour representat ives, he was not opposed to camp work per se. In f ac t , he la te r urged the creation of a "peace army" to provide board and wages for the unemployed in return for undertaking "construct ive works" in the North.65 However, Woodsworth did condemn press demands for "detention camps" under m i l i t a ry con t ro l , contending that the i r establishment in peacetime represented a "dangerous precedent" and unfair treatment of the- unemployed. He warned the Conservative government that m i l i t a r y camps might develop into "schools of bolshevism" and even provide " . . . t he means by which capi ta l ism i t s e l f w i l l be done to death."66 The Prime Min is ter was also opposed to placing r e l i e f camps under army administrat ion because he was not prepared to s t i r up publ ic animosity, espec ia l l y in Quebec: The legal d i f f i c u l t i e s could be overcome by the exercise of the authority of the Government in a manner that would create 127 such fee l ing throughout the country as would not warrant the e f f o r t . In some parts of Canada the fee l ing in connection with the use of the word 'conscr ip t ion ' i s very strong.67 He la te r to ld a Conservative MP that any i n i t i a t i v e l i k e l y to provoke a backlash in Quebec would provide powerful ammunition to his " p o l i t i c a l enemies."68 Bennett's re fusa l , however, to sanction m i l i t a ry r e l i e f camps did not obviate the necessity for act ion during the 1932 winter. His cabinet decided on a two-pronged strategy to deal with the problem of s ing le , homeless men: deportation of a l ien agi tators and special r e l i e f arrangements including camp work. In ear ly July of 1931 the cabinet ordered the RCMP to round up Communists throughout Canada, espec ia l ly known agi tators in the West, for deportat ion. Later in the month i t sought approval from Parliament for special powers under the 1931 Rel ie f Act to maintain peace, order and good government throughout the Dominion. The Prime Minister j u s t i f i e d the inser t ion of th i s clause on the grounds " . . . t ha t r io ts might not be poss ib le , that unfed men might not congregate in corners to be inspired with the thought that the i r lo t was such that they should prefer Russia to Canada."69 The Conservative government also decided to select s ing le , homeless men for special treatment. Under the 1930 Re l ie f Act d i rec t r e l i e f costs had been s p l i t three ways for a l l categories of the unemployed but while in Edmonton in June 1931, the federal Min ister of Labour had agreed to share with the western provinces the costs of maintaining transients on d i rect r e l i e f up to a maximum of 40 cents a day. The Cabinet decided to continue th i s new cost-sharing arrangement during the forthcoming winter. It a lso endorsed his suggestion tha t , where poss ib le , dest i tu te s ingle men would be employed on highway and other works projects located away from c i t i e s , but i t shied away from sanctioning the use of the army. The Prime Minister announced to the House that 128 these special projects would be undertaken in B r i t i s h Columbia, A lber ta , Manitoba and Ontario. Although de ta i l s of th is jo in t r e l i e f camps pol icy varied between the respective provinces, there were common features governing the treatment of s i ng l e , homeless men. Only token cash allowances not wages were paid so as to make camp r e l i e f work less a t t rac t ive than pr ivate employment.7* Organization and administrat ion of the camps was l e f t to the provinces as Ottawa wanted to avoid the creation of any cos t l y , permanent machinery . 7 2 A jo in t r e l i e f camps pol icy was not the only i n i t i a t i v e taken in 1931 to a id s i ng l e , homeless men. Under the arrangements made with Manitoba and Saskatchewan, Ottawa also agreed to share the costs of placing these men on farms during the winter. However, neither of these i n i t i a t i v e s achieved the i r common objective of removing dest i tute t ransients from urban centres during the 1932 winter. The bulk of them, in f ac t , remained in the c i t i e s of western Canada and Ontario receiving d i rect r e l i e f , as table 6 i l l u s t r a t e s : Table 6: Numbers of s i ng le , homeless men aided by various federa l -provincial projects during the 1932 winter Province Direct Rel ie f Road Camps National Farm in C i t i es Park Camps Placement B.C. 20,238 11,421 Alberta 8,081 - 1,003 Saskatchewan 5,000* - 188 7,937 Manitoba 7,541* - 1,300 1,602 Ontario 56,000* 14,000 SOURCES: The B.C. f igures are c i ted in "Report of Select Committee of the Leg is la t i ve Assembly on Unemployment," 11 Apr i l 1932, Universi ty of New Brunswick, R.B. Bennett Papers, Manuscript Group 26K, reel 393, p. 492170; the data re la t ing to the p ra i r i e provinces are taken mainly from Canada, Dept. of Labour, Report of Dominion Commissioner of Unemployment Re l ie f for the f i s c a l Year Ending 31 March 1935, p. 38; and the Ontario f igures are c i ted in H.M. Cassidy, Unemployment and Re l ie f in Ontario 1929-1932: A Survey and Report (Toronto: J .M. Dent & Sons, 1932), pp. 108, 113. *These to ta ls include s i ng le , unemployed residents as well as t rans ients . 129_ Prec ip i tan ts : As the jo in t r e l i e f camps pol icy fa i l ed to remove the transient "menace" from urban centres during the 1932 winter , p o l i t i c a l pressures soon surfaced for wholesale federal ac t ion . Elected o f f i c i a l s in the West stepped up t he i r campaign to persuade Ottawa to assume the f u l l costs of re l iev ing s i ng le , homeless men, and they received support from expert sources close to the government. At the Dominion-Provincial Conference in Apr i l 1932 the or ig ina l par t ic ipants in the jo in t r e l i e f camps pol icy were successful in securing i t s continuation during the summer. Elected o f f i c i a l s in the West then in tens i f ied t he i r e f for ts to secure wholesale federal involvement. A meeting of western mayors passed a resolut ion asking Ottawa to re l ieve c i t i e s of any cost for the care of s ing le men lacking bona f ide residence. 7 3 This was followed up by a j o in t plea from municipal and provincia l p o l i t i c i a n s . At an unemployment conference in ear ly August they approved a memorial point ing out that var ia t ions in t he i r methods of administering r e l i e f were contr ibut ing to "unrest and ag i ta t ion" and encouraging "the constant movement to and f ro of the unemployed, par t i cu la r l y s ingle men and women, that i s proving disastrous to our national welfare and publ ic morals." As a remedy, they suggested tha t , fo l lowing a national reg is t ra t ion of a l l s ingle men and a ban on railway t r a v e l , dest i tu te t ransients "be concentrated in c a m p s . . . . " 7 4 This remedy was a lso advocated by Charlotte Whitton, the Executive Director of the Canadian Council on Chi ld and Family Welfare. Besides being "the most i n f l uen t i a l Canadian socia l worker of her e r a , " she was a supporter of the Conservative government. Outraged by the " f lagrant patronage," ine f f i c iency and waste in public welfare agencies, she suggested to the Prime 1 3 0 Minis ter that her profession could ass is t Ottawa to bring r e l i e f costs under con t ro l . Her of fer was i r r e s i s t i b l e , as i t came at a time when Bennett was "gravely worried that the ballooning cost of r e l i e f might bankrupt the country." In May she was hired to invest igate conditions in western Canada, and her report was the only detai led study on unemployment r e l i e f Bennett ever commissioned. 7 5 Whitton's invest igat ion was guided by two major const ra in ts , one imp l i c i t and the other e x p l i c i t . Its recommendations would have to be consistent with the sh i f t in general pol icy away from r e l i e f works towards d i rect r e l i e f agreed upon at the 1932 Dominion-Provincial Conference. They would a lso retain provinc ia l control of r e l i e f projects because "the federal power desires to avoid as fa r as possible any assumption of d i rect administrat ive r espons ib i l i t y . " Despite t h i s , however, both guidel ines were broken in the case of s ing le , homeless men as Whitton recorrmended that Ottawa take over the i r care and provide r e l i e f camp work. The special problems posed by group t ransiency, she argued, could only be handled by Ottawa as western c i t i e s and provinces lacked the means of cont ro l l ing a "huge," mobile, f loa t ing population. In contrast to fami l ies and s ingle women receiving r e l i e f , the "s ingle man, unattached with his labour to s e l l , and the s p i r i t of adventure beckoning him, sets out upon the road, and nothing less than a common pol icy of nation-wide control can exercise any rest ra in t upon him."76 Central ized control was necessary as the piecemeal treatment of dest i tu te t ransients was "threatening to create a real menace to our socia l system." It was destroying the se l f - respect of thousands of young men and possibly creat ing a permanent "hobo" c l a s s . It was also spurring co l l ec t i ve act ion by local groups of t rans ien ts . "The movement i s organizing i t s e l f , comparing treatment 131 in d i f ferent centres, demanding conferences with public bodies, putt ing forward demands for service and standards and generally becoming a grave menace to law, order, property and secur i ty in the Dominion." As i t s potential membership was estimated to be at least 100,000, Whitton urged Ottawa to "organize the movement before i t gets further out of hand." She also stressed that a federal i n i t i a t i v e would be less cost ly than the ex is t ing patchwork of po l i c ies for t rans ien ts . "Because of i t s suscep t i b i l i t y to large-scale treatment, and the work p o s s i b i l i t i e s of those ass is ted , properly organized, the provision of r e l i e f and shel ter to homeless men should enable handling at a lower cost than any other c lass of r e l i e f ; as a matter of f a c t , however, the cost has been scandalously h i g h . . . i n some of the p rov inces . " 7 7 Whitton then singled out the lax and extravagant administrat ion of r e l i e f camps in B.C. for special c r i t i c i sm.7 8 To curb the t ransient "menace" and to reduce cos ts , Whitton recommended that Ottawa establ ish semi-mi l i tary camps for physical ly f i t t ransients aged 25 years and over. She suggested that the Department of Labour and an experienced m i l i t a ry administrator operate these "concentration camps" in areas where construct ive works could be undertaken. However, her proposal did not involve wholesale federal f inancing but jo in t sharing of costs with the provinces.79 The cabinet received Whitton's conf ident ia l report sometime in September 1932 and the Prime Minister described i t as "of great value."80 with the events of a recent demonstration in Ottawa fresh in t he i r minds, they were receptive to her suggestions concerning s i ng le , homeless men because the winter was fast approaching and the threat of renewed disorder loomed large. As the t ransient problem was most acute in western Canada, the cabinet i n i t i a l l y formulated plans exc lus ive ly for th i s region. Its members accepted in a 132 modified form the major thrust of Whitton's recommendations concerning the need for centra l ized con t ro l , but stopped short of u t i l i z i n g the m i l i t a ry in i t s r e l i e f camps po l i cy . To fo res ta l l the increased movement of t ransients once the harvest ended, they announced a ban on r id ing f re ight t ra ins a f ter September 30th. Moreover, they decided " . . . t o take necessary steps to insure that a l l s i ng le , homeless men in urban centres be sent to camps...[and] be given no r e l i e f by c i t i e s . " 8 1 The object was to remove a l l t ransients from urban centres as "[a]ny s ign i f i can t number remaining perpetuated the s i t ua t i on , and continued the potential threat to socia l order."82 Another s ign i f i can t departure occurred in the method of f inancing camp r e l i e f . Instead of sharing cos ts , Ottawa decided to pay the f u l l costs of maintenance for s i ng l e , homeless men up to a monthly maximum of $12 per man. The Cabinet 's decision to take th is unprecedented step ran counter to Whitton's proposal of j o in t f inancing. It was motivated by a desire to achieve "the utmost economy and e f f i c iency . "83 Direct funding would allow Ottawa to exert s t r i c t e r controls over expenditure than the cost-sharing formula used previously. However, th i s new arrangement did not apply in the case of camps operated by the federal Parks Branch in Manitoba and Saskatchewan. Here the method of jo in t f inancing was continued during the 1932-33 f a l l and winter.84 As these provinces re l ied on Parks Branch camps to house t rans ien ts , Ottawa's decis ion to take over maintenance of s ing le , homeless men in provincial camps smacked of an attempt to remedy the "impossible s i tua t ion" in B r i t i sh Columbia. Despite th i s expansion, cabinet ministers refused to take over the organization and administrat ion of camp r e l i e f presumably because they were fear fu l of being saddled with the continued maintenance of t rans ients . Instead, they ins is ted that the western provinces supply the i r camps and equipment free 133 of charge and pay administrat ive cos ts . However, they were not prepared to l e t these provinces estab l ish t he i r own administrat ive machinery. They proposed that "pub l i c -sp i r i t ed men," chosen by the federal cabinet , serve on honorary, provincial commissions to manage camp re l i e f . 85 In ear ly October, Dr. J.W. Black, Director of Colonizat ion for the Canadian National Railway, was chosen by the Minister of Labour to implement the comprehensive plan for the care of s i ng le , homeless men. His v i s i t to B r i t i s h Columbia, the f i r s t province contacted, produced a modif icat ion in Ottawa's or ig ina l plan to house a l l t ransients from c i t i e s in camps. In response to a request from members of the newly appointed commission, Black agreed to allow wel1-organized r e l i e f organizations to continue feeding single men in urban centres.86 This change in the or ig inal plan also applied in the p ra i r i e provinces (see table 7) . Besides camp and d i rect r e l i e f , Ottawa agreed to pay the f u l l costs of monthly payments to t ransients placed on farms. Table 7. Numbers of s ing le , homeless men assisted by r e l i e f commissions in the western provinces in December 1932 Project B.C. Alberta Saskatchewan Manitoba Rel ie f camps 5,180 363 1,869 362 Urban r e l i e f 9,690 6,146 32 4,112 Farm placement - - 2,192 1,228 SOURCE: "General Memos re Unemployment Re l i e f , 1930-44," pp. 8-11, Public Archives of Canada, Department of Labour F i l e s , Record Group 27, v o l . 614, f i l e no. 28-3. Wholesale federal involvement, however, could not be confined to western Canada. News of the federal plan provoked a reaction from the other regions. According to the Minister of Labour, "Ontar io, the provinces of Quebec and the Maritimes made representations concerning s im i la r men within t he i r boundar ies."8 7 As the Bennett administrat ion was already vulnerable to charges that i t s general unemployment r e l i e f pol icy discriminated against central and 134 eastern Canada, these demands were d i f f i c u l t to r e s i s t . But the cabinet faced problems in implementing quickly a uniform r e l i e f camps po l i cy . As only Ontario had an ex is t ing system of camps, federal machinery would have to be u t i l i z e d . Yet, since most of the 18 national parks were concentrated in the West, Ottawa could not use the Department of the Inter ior to provide r e l i e f camp work for eastern t rans ients . Other federal agencies catering to c i v i l i a n s lacked the resources to organize and operate camps in time fo r the forthcoming winter. This l e f t the Department of National Defence (DND). Although the cabinet had previously resisted the idea of using the army, i t s members could not reject the log ic behind th i s department running the camps, - "here was convenient machinery ready to be adopted, while to have any other department would be a lengthy job and c o s t l y . " 8 8 The persuasive powers of the Chief of the General Staf f also contributed to Ottawa's choice of the DND. Major-General McNaughton had already submitted an unsol ic i ted plan to house unemployed transients in army camps. His remedy was "a natural one" for a professional s o l d i e r . 8 9 But i t was not a novel idea, and so the DND camps hardly qual i fy as "his b r a i n c h i l d . " 9 0 Nonetheless, McNaughton's close re lat ionship with the Prime Minister plus his reputation and known a b i l i t y placed him in a s t rategic pos i t ion . "There was probably no one in government serv ice who could have lent greater author i ty , p res t ige , or dedication to the unemployment r e l i e f p r o p o s a l . " 9 ! McNaughton had formulated h is scheme af ter seeing f i rs thand the bread-l ines across Canada while on a tour of inspection in August 1932, and he presented i t "pr imar i ly as an a l ternat ive to the use of force in the suppression of disorders in the larger c e n t r e s . . . . " 9 2 His i n i t i a l e f for ts to persuade the Minister of Labour of i t s merits had been unsuccessful. Consequently, when he attended the opening of the 1932 session on October 6 th , "McNaughton was surprised when the Prime Min is te r . . . leaned Over to him and whispered that 'the Cabinet was very much interested in his scheme and asked him i f he could have a deta i led proposal in the Prime M in i s te r ' s o f f i ce by 9:30 a.m. the next day. ' "93 Pressure from provinces in central and eastern Canada had been the spur to th i s renewal of interest in the general 's p lan. Without i t the cabinet would have remained reluctant to sponsor anything resembling conscr ip t ion, espec ia l ly in Quebec. McNaughton's suggested projects (repair of c i tade ls at Quebec City and Ha l i f ax , and completion of the Trans-Canada Airway)94 W O u l d provide jobs for t ransients outside the western provinces and so sa t i s fy demands for equal treatment. The low cost of m i l i ta ry camp r e l i e f also appealed to the cabinet: $1.00 per day per man, including 20 cents for personal spending. The l a t t e r amount was chosen to make the cost of the scheme appear low enough to be accepted by taxpayers "who desired f ruga l i t y in everything."95 The McNaughton plan received formal approval the next day. Its rapid implementation was almost without precedent, even in national emergencies.9 6 Thus, federal camp r e l i e f for s ing le , homeless men during the 1933 winter encompassed two separate plans in the East and the West. Although these plans were administered by d i f ferent agencies: the DND and "p rov inc ia l " cormiissions, both involved wholesale federal intervention to re l ieve th i s category of the dest i tu te unemployed. Designed as a temporary expedient, the dual r e l i e f camp system was soon ra t iona l ized by General McNaughton, who exerted an "almost mesmeric influence on the members of Bennett's government."97 in August 1933 the DND took over administrat ion of r e l i e f camps from the four "p rov inc ia l " commissions in the West. But i t s poor c i v i l i a n r e l a t i o n , the Department of the In te r io r , prevented a m i l i t a ry monopoly developing, because i t assumed the f u l l costs of maintenance and operation of the camps in the national parks. In 13.6 tandem, these two federal departments ran r e l i e f camps fo r physical ly f i t t ransients during the 1933-36 period (see tab le 8) . Their procedures fo r admitting and releasing inmates were ident ica l in that men were free to enter or leave the camps at any t ime. They also offered a s im i la r form of r e l i e f , subsistence and 20 cents per day in return for work, even though conditions in the camps were not i d e n t i c a l . 9 8 However, according to the Commissioner of the National Parks, there was a fundamental psychological di f ference in the atmosphere between the two sets of camps ar is ing from the c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a ry methods of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . " Ottawa's r e l i e f camps po l i cy , however, f a i l ed to achieve i t s goal of removing most t ransients from Canadian c i t i e s . Moreover, i t "did not re l ieve government concern for the threat posed to socia l s t a b i l i t y by the s i ng le , unemployed men, instead i t focused concern on the camps themselves."100 Discontent and unrest was concentrated in the DND camps and proved to be the i r death-knell .101 Their closure in 1936 was unlamented as Ottawa's "pioneering soc ia l experiment" represented "a pa te rna l i s t i c approach to the problem of suf fer ing proposed and implemented as a measure to protect the establ ished order, [and]...shaped and operated in a cl imate of fear and f ruga l i ty . "102 The irony was that a more palatable model of federal camp r e l i e f was t r i ed out in the national parks, but both po l i t i c i ans and scholars , captivated by the personal i ty of a forceful general , f a i l ed to appreciate i t s presence. 137 Table 8. Numbers of s ing le , homeless men housed in DND camps and Parks Branch camps, by province, and authorized or tota l expenditures fo r f i s ca l years 1932/33 - 1935/36 Number, by DND Camps Parks Branch Camps province(a) 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36 1932/33 1933/34 1934/35 1935/36 B.C. 125 6,726 6,172 5,405 -- 346 ? ? A l t a . -- 1,099 1,713 1,912 1,098 2,788 ? ? Sask. — 1,083 1,419 1,509 188 1,204 ? 200+ Man. 94 447 1,123 1,187 1,355 1,802 936+ ? Ont. 400 5,444 5,657 5,338 -- — -- --Que. 325 2,215 2,479 2,706 -- -- -- --N.B. 135 548 981 1,028 -- — — --N.S. 314 139 435 456 -- -- -- — )tal No. 1,393 17,702 19,979 19,541 2,591 6,140 4,725 1,012 Auth 'd. Exp. ( in 000s) $ 496 8,875 9,846 9,384 Total Exp. (b) ( in 000s) $ 866 1,115 1,411 2,219 SOURCES: "Final Report on the Unemployment Rel ie f Scheme for the Care of Single Homeless Men Administered by the DND, 1932-36," v o l . 1, app. 12 (re number) and pp. 53-54 (re amounts), Publ ic Archives of Canada, DND F i l e s , Record Group 24, v o l . 157: Rel ie f Act , 1932; and Canada, Department of the In te r io r , Annual Reports for F isca l Years Ending 1932/33 - 1935/36. ( a ) In the case of DND camps, f igures refer to numbers housed in December of each f i s c a l year. ( b )0ttawa's contr ibut ion in the 1932/33 f i s ca l year was matched by the par t i c ipa t ing provinces. 138 A Review The environmental factors iden t i f i ed in chapter 1 exerted a varying impact upon the agi ta t ion for camp r e l i e f . The Great Depression d i rec t l y shaped i t by creat ing a new d i s t i nc t category of des t i tu te , unemployed workers, v i z . , s i ng le , homeless men. Although i t i s often credited with also a l te r ing mass at t i tudes towards the p l ight of the j ob less , th is sh i f t in opinion was not v i s i b l e in the case of t rans ien ts , who were regarded as the least deserving of a l l r e l i e f rec ip ients owing to the i r lack of communal and family t i e s . Besides the cu l tura l context, the ins t i tu t iona l framework also acted as a const ra in t , delaying the timing of concerted governmental ac t ion. Despite the increased scale of unemployment and dependency, the jo in t r e l i e f camps pol icy formulated by Ottawa and the provinces represented the same type of ad hoc improvised response to c r i s i s used in the previous decade. The subsequent expansion of federal involvement occurred within the ex is t ing d i v i s ion of powers, mainly because Ottawa wished to avoid ongoing, cost ly commitments for the maintenance of dest i tu te t rans ients . Once again, the federal structure provided a rat ionale for cost-conscious national po l i t i c i ans to l i m i t the extent of state in tervent ion. Of a l l innovations for dest i tute employables, the r e l i e f camps pol icy provides the c learest example of the social control model of welfare p o l i t i c s . Unlike the case of unemployment r e l i e f where labour radical ism vied with semi-orthodox in terest group a c t i v i t y , the agi ta t ion consisted almost exc lus ive ly of l e f t i s t - i n s p i r e d dissent and concomitant fears of revolut ion. The dominance of these prerequisi tes represents an almost c l ass i c version of the model preferred mainly by Marxist scholars. An in terest ing feature of the case study i s that largely unorganized bands of s i ng le , homeless men roaming the country, not the Communist-sponsored national movement of the unemployed, were iden t i f i ed as the e f fec t ive working-class m i l i t an t s . V i r tua l l y a l l the advocates perceived t he i r l i f e - s t y l e , propensity for violence and suscep t ib i l i t y to revolutionary propaganda as posing the greatest threat to establ ished order, and demanded act ion to prevent outbreaks of Communist-inspired disorder. Fear of revo lut ion, however, was not the only spur to federal involvement in camp r e l i e f . F iscal conservatism also exercised a powerful inf luence. It accounted both for the reluctance of elected o f f i c i a l s in local and regional governments to sponsor t he i r own cos t l y , independent i n i t i a t i v e s , and for Ottawa's unprecedented decision to take over the ent i re care of t rans ients . Municipal and provincial po l i t i c i ans in Ontario and western Canada qual i fy as the major advocates in the ag i ta t ion . Unlike previous struggles where they were divided over the d e s i r a b i l i t y of federal in tervent ion, they agreed on the necessity for a nationwide system of camps to house s ing le , homeless men. Their intense lobbying ef for ts overshadowed the sporadic pleas of ind iv iduals and various in terest groups, including c a p i t a l . The small band of opponents contained unfamil iar faces in the guise of mobi l ized, unemployed workers and moderate labour unions and par t ies . Their co l l ec t i ve views represented voices from the emerging industr ia l society^, but were discounted by po l i t i c i ans who regarded them as representing the "Red element." Inside government, the representative rather than the bureaucratic model of welfare p o l i t i c s i s again confirmed in the case study - a f inding that i s hardly surp r i s ing , given the sal ience of the p o l i t i c s of r e l i e f in the ear ly years of the depression. Like his predecessors, Prime Minister Bennett 140 qua l i f i es as the main archi tect of the camps po l i cy . His i n i t i a l opposition to the idea of using the m i l i t a ry e f fec t i ve ly delayed wholesale federal action fo r a year. In making th is dec is ion, he, in e f fec t , d ictated both the timing and content of the jo in t i n i t i a t i v e during the 1932 winter. Although his leadership was reputed to be d i c t a t o r i a l , Bennett's subsequent change of mind was not arr ived at independently. Instead, his decision was influenced by concerted pressure from western elected o f f i c i a l s and uncoordinated protests from provincial po l i t i c i ans in central and eastern Canada, as well as by the advice of prominent ind iv iduals ins ide the governing party and the m i l i t a ry bureaucracy. It was dictated mainly by cost considerat ions, a recurring motive in the development of emergency state a id . The overt presence of social control p o l i t i c s i s a s t r i k ing feature of the cases analyzed to date. Although the r e l i e f camps pol icy provides the clearest example, the or ig ina l innovation in r e l i e f also represented in part a welfare concession extracted from cost-conscious national po l i t i c i ans who feared revolut ion. Group p o l i t i c s , though, also shaped the pol icy of intervention and dominated the subsequent agi ta t ion for withdrawal. While a s imi la r conste l la t ion of group forces part ic ipated to varying degrees in a l l the s t ruggles, t he i r roles as advocates and opponents varied over t ime, with the notable exception of farmers. Their disputes were resolved in a l l cases by cabinet po l i t i c i ans with Prime Ministers Meighen, King and Bennett playing the dominant ro le in deciding the t iming and content of the p o l i c i e s . The i n a c t i v i t y of bureaucrats in the process, however, was more apparent than r e a l , as the next chapter reveals. CHAPTER 6 RELIEF LAND SETTLEMENT FOR SELECTED FAMILIES, 1932 Besides s i ng le , homeless men, the Bennett administrat ion singled out for special treatment another category of dest i tute employables: c i t y fami l ies with agr icu l tura l backgrounds. In Apr i l 1932 the Minister of Labour announced that Ottawa would par t ic ipate with the provinces and munic ipa l i t ies in a r e l i e f land settlement plan for these fami l i es . Essen t i a l l y , t h i s plan involved cap i t a l i z i ng d i rect r e l i e f expenditures to enable c i t y fami l ies to return to the land and engage in subsistence farming. While representing a minor departure in r e l i e f po l i cy , i t s adoption represented the f i r s t instance of publ ic ly -subs id ized land settlement of se t t le rs without c a p i t a l . A lso , the long-forgotten struggle preceding i t s introduction involved a pattern of urban-rural c o n f l i c t , not v i s i b l e before in the p o l i t i c s of r e l i e f . 1 The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to pinpoint the p o l i t i c a l forces behind the implementation of th is novel measure of unemployment r e l i e f . Background In contrast to socia l welfare po l i cy , land settlement was defined by the framers of the 1867 const i tu t ion as an area of jo in t concern. Section 95 of the BNA Act made immigration and agr icu l ture shared j u r i sd i c t i ons of the federal government and the provinces. For the f i r s t s ix ty years of Confederation these two subjects were inext r icab ly l inked as immigrants, not Canadian residents, were recrui ted for settlement on pub l i c l y - and privately-owned land. Although both senior leve ls of government could take i n i t i a t i v e s in the area of immigration and co lon iza t ion , Ontario was the only province pr ior to 141 the F i r s t World War to display any interest in promoting land settlement by immigrants. The federal government played the dominant role as immigration was central to the nat ion-bui ld ing process, and to develop the West, i t retained control of the lands and other natural resources of the two new p ra i r i e provinces unt i l 1930. As the major beneficiary of federal land grants, the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway played the key role i n western settlement. Its aggressive promotion of immigration and colonizat ion in the f i r s t decades of th i s century had considerable economic benef i ts . Apart from the pro f i t i t could make by se t t l i ng land, the railway company stood to benefit enormously from the increase in t r a f f i c which settlement brought. Thus, the aim of i t s colonizat ion work was to induce immigrants to se t t le on lands adjacent to the i r l i n e s . 2 The F i r s t World War represented a watershed in the evolution of Canadian immigration pol icy as i t marked the end of the rap id , substantial in f lux of newcomers. Immigration in 1913 reached a peak that was not matched subsequently (see table 9 ) . The flow f e l l to a t r i c k l e during the war years and, fol lowing a b r ie f revival once peace came, slackened again because of the postwar recession. While the increase in western settlement during the 1920s resembled "the Laurier era of rapid advance," i t never matched the prewar sca le . The supply of p ra i r i e farms was diminishing and mechanization was reducing employment opportuni t ies. Moreover, the development of the new northern f ron t ie r in western and central Canada was not conducive to large-scale settlement because access was res t r ic ted and i t s resource base comprised base metals and pulpwood rather than farmland. "[T]he old Canada of farms and f ron t ie r settlement was passing away." 3 World War I had also produced a more in tervent ion is t phase in federal co lonizat ion po l i cy . In 1917 Ottawa entered the f i e l d of land settlement for 143_ Table 9. Immigration to Canada, 1901-40 1901 55,747 1911 331,288 1921 91,728 1931 27,530 1902 89,102 1912 375,756 1922 64,224 1932 20,591 1903 138,660 1913 400,870 1923 133,729 1933 14,382 1904 131,252 1914 150,484 1924 124,165 1934 12,476 1905 141,465 1915 36,665 1925 84,907 1935 11,277 1906 211,653 1916 55,914 1926 135,982 1936 11,643 1907 272,409 1917 72,910 1927 158,556 1937 15,101 1908 143,326 1918 41,845 1928 166,783 1938 17,244 1909 173,694 1919 107,698 1929 164,993 1939 16,994 1910 286,839 1920 138,824 1930 104,807 1940 11,324 SOURCE: Freda Hawkins , Canada and Immigration: Publ ic Pol icy and Public Concern (Montreal: McGill-Queens Univers i ty Press, 1972), app. 1, table B. the f i r s t time by f inancing a scheme for Canadian veterans. In the postwar period i t joined with the B r i t i s h and provincia l governments in various plans designed to induce B r i t i s h immigration. These included the Empire Land Settlement Scheme launched in 1922 and the 3,000 B r i t i s h Families Scheme begun two years l a t e r , as well as agreements with spec i f i c provinces concerning fami l ies and boy s e t t l e r s . 4 Under these various plans, immigrants with l imited capi ta l received assisted passage and government loans to f a c i l i t a t e the i r settlement. This expansion of the federal role was ref lected inside the bureaucracy. In 1917 a Soldier Settlement Board was establ ished in the Department of Immigration and Colonizat ion to supervise the placement of returned men. A c i v i l i a n Land Settlement Branch was set up in 1924 to ensure that new se t t le rs would be directed to locat ions where they would have the best opportunity of success and be safeguarded from e x p l o i t a t i o n . 6 144 Despite these developments, the railways remained the major colonizat ion agencies. In 1925 the Liberal government gave the Canadian P a c i f i c Railway and i t s new r i v a l , the publicly-owned Canadian National Railway, more or less exclusive authori ty to bring in and se t t le immigrants from eastern Europe in agr icu l tura l employment in the West. 6 Although the majority of newcomers entering Canada under the railway agreements of 1925-27 and 1927-30 were s ingle men, fami l ies with l i t t l e or no capi ta l were also set t led upon privately-owned vacant farms on the p r a i r i e s . In 1925 the colonizat ion departments of both railway companies set up new subsidiary organizations in Winnipeg to oversee the i r settlement. Their work was to set an important precedent when the issue of aiding dest i tute Canadian fami l ies came to the fore. Demands for domestic colonizat ion began to surface in the la te 1920s. Organized labour was the f i r s t advocate of a pol icy of " in tens ive , internal co lon izat ion" instead of " ind iscr iminate, outside immigration." In an interview with the Vancouver Province in 1927, the TLC president suggested that instead of combing the c i t i e s of Europe for agr icu l tura l workers, the proper method was to s tar t at home and get the unemployed farmers' sons current ly in Canadian c i t i e s back on the l a n d . 7 Simi lar views were voiced by the o f f i c i a l in charge of immigration work for the Anglican Council of Social Service and by organized farmers in Saskatchewan. 8 However, none of these suggestions e x p l i c i t l y embraced the concept of land settlement as a r e l i e f measure. The impetus behind the idea was the 'back to the land movement.1 F l ight from the c i t i e s was a standard response to downturns in the economy but i t s scale was great ly i n tens i f i ed in the Great Depression. From 1929 onwards refugees from urban unemployment and drought joined the trek to f ront iers in the North and West. Confronted with th i s spectacle, cer ta in provinces and Ottawa were quick to rea l i ze i t s potential as a remedy fo r unemployment. I n i t i a l l y , they were only prepared to ass is t unemployed fami l ies with capi ta l to return to the land. Their independent e f f o r t s , however, paved the way fo r the b i r th of a j o in t agreement in 1932 to d iver t d i rect r e l i e f expenditure towards settlement of dest i tu te fami l ies with farm backgrounds. The Agi tat ion For Re l ie f Land Settlement, 1930-32 A s t r i k i ng feature of the agi tat ion for r e l i e f land settlement i s the minimal presence of socia l control p o l i t i c s . Although i t took place against the same backdrop of developing unrest as the preceding st ruggle, most advocates were not motivated by fear of revolut ion. They viewed dest i tu te urban fami l ies as a po tent ia l l y s t a b i l i z i n g rather than d isrupt ive force because of the i r previous exposure to the agrarian ethic of se l f - he lp . Certain advocates, in f ac t , urged the i r removal from indust r ia l centres in order to shore up the defences of rural Canada against the challenge of increasing urbanizat ion. Despite i t s b rev i ty , the agi tat ion was complex, incorporat ing elements of both the group and bureaucratic models of welfare p o l i t i c s . Outside the Canadian Parl iament, i t took the form of an urban-rural con f l i c t involving businessmen and farmers, a d iv is ion not manifest in previous st ruggles, where the dominant economic interests had been on the same s ide . Municipal and provincial po l i t i c i ans also divided along urban-rural l ines over the issue of r e l i e f land settlement. Inside the federal government, bureaucrats played a creat ive role in spurring the federally-sponsored i n i t i a t i v e . Their par t i c ipa t ion represented the f i r s t occasion on which o f f i c i a l s had par t ic ipated ac t ive ly i n the p o l i t i c s of r e l i e f . These bureaucratic actors , however, did not act independently. They had close t i es with o f f i c i a l s representing the two major ra i lways, and together the colonizat ion interests 14.6 pressed the case for ac t ion . Their a l l i ance i l l u s t r a ted a re lat ionship of dependency between the state and pr ivate interests not normally v i s i b l e in the soc ia l pol icy arena. The const i tu t ional framework shaped the agi ta t ion for r e l i e f land settlement. As j u r i sd i c t i on over land settlement pol icy was shared, separate but concurrent campaigns were waged in the provincial and federal capi ta ls to secure e i ther independent or jo in t ac t ion , with the l a t t e r being urged more often because at the time the senior leve ls of government were col laborat ing on the issue of r e l i e f . Although there was some over lap, espec ia l ly in the ranks of opponents, the par t ic ipants were d i s t i nc t enough to warrant separate treatment. Consequently, the various advocates and opponents are ident i f ied according to whether the i r major target was the provincial or federal level of government. Prov inc ia l Struggles At the provincial level the idea of r e l i e f land settlement had a l imited appeal. It at t racted minimal attent ion in Ontario and Nova Sco t ia , even though the former had implemented a scheme for the unemployed with capi ta l in 1930, and the l a t t e r sponsored a loan scheme for jobless miners without capi ta l in 1932. It was apparently a dormant issue in New Brunswick and B r i t i s h Columbia unt i l the inauguration of the federal p lan. In contrast , r e l i e f land settlement became a sa l ien t p o l i t i c a l issue in the three p ra i r i e provinces and Quebec. Although the agi tat ion took d i f ferent forms within the i r boundaries, common themes are d i sce rn ib le . Advocates representing various urban interests were almost always p i t ted against mainly agrarian opponents; and a l l provincial governments were reluctant to take independent ac t i on , even Quebec and Saskatchewan which had sponsored i n i t i a t i v e s for the unemployed with c a p i t a l . 147 Advocates: The business community and professional c lass in Winnipeg were the major advocates in Manitoba. According to a local MP, J . P . Seimens, a prominent businessman and farmer, was "the ins t iga tor " of the campaign, which he advanced in an a r t i c l e wri t ten in 1931 mainly on grounds of cost : It seems absurd. . . to spend by labour $1,100,000 for a d i tch that can be made by steam shovel for $150,000. This saving of $950,000 would place 1,000 fami l i es , representing 5,000 people at l eas t , on the land. This i s what our governments must do and quit borrowing money and spending i t to feed the people on a system which we could not afford in prosperous t imes . 9 His views were shared by members of the establ ished professions. Senator Forke i den t i f i ed the "most enthusiast ic advocates" of r e l i e f land settlement in Winnipeg as min is te rs , doctors and lawyers, "men without agr icu l tura l experience."10 Among these proponents, a Reverend Kerr ac t ive ly sought to secure a jo in t i n i t i a t i v e . Impressed by the moderation shown by "large bodies" of unemployed workers in pressing the i r case for municipal and provincial a id to help them return to the land, he became the i r self-appointed lobbyist with the author i t ies in Ottawa. Acting in his capacity as president of the Canadian Club in Winnipeg, he arranged for a deputation to meet the federal Labour Min is ter during his v i s i t to that c i t y in the f a l l . Kerr then pressed the i r case upon the Minister of Immigration: "These men have absolutely refrained from l ink ing up with the Communists of our c i t y , have remained patient in the face of every discouragement, and are asking for the most moderate assis tance, and i f we are discouraged by the author i t ies i t w i l l have a damaging effect upon the i r mora le . "H Re l ie f land settlement was also advocated by c i v i c p o l i t i c i a n s , as family a id was the largest item of r e l i e f expenditure. Aware that s p i r a l l i n g costs were unpopular with the i r taxpayers, they sought to induce fami l ies with farm 148 backgrounds to return to the land. Montreal aldermen and ratepayers belonging to the na t iona l i s t Societe St . Jean Baptiste stressed in the i r representations that r e l i e f land settlement would be a cheaper option than c i v i c r e l i e f ; 12 a n ( j t he i r sentiments were echoed by the mayors of the f i ve c i t i e s in A lber ta , who made a united plea for a jo in t i n i t i a t i v e "thereby saving a l l governments a considerable sum of money." 1 3 Municipal po l i t i c i ans in Saskatoon and Moose Jaw were more impatient than the i r colleagues elsewhere. During the 1932 winter they sent a l imi ted number of fami l ies to northern areas af ter t he i r appeals for federa l -prov inc ia l aid had been turned down. In the case of Saskatoon, th is i n i t i a t i v e was taken to discourage unemployed workers from rely ing on c i v i c ins t i tu t ions to supply jobs . According to the mayor, his council decided "that those who agree to take up land w i l l be given a greater portion of r e l i e f work provided we are empowered to hold back a portion of the i r earnings for the purpose of enabling them to get on a homestead." In contrast , dissenters would receive only "the barest s u b s i s t e n c e . " 1 4 C i t i es in Saskatchewan also continued to press for a j o in t i n i t i a t i v e . Counci l lors from Saskatoon, Regina and Moose Jaw met during the 1932 winter and formulated a r e l i e f land settlement plan that was subsequently endorsed by the provincial government. Acting upon the i r behalf, a Saskatoon MP, F.R. MacMil lan, asked the federal government to par t ic ipate in t he i r scheme to relocate 2,000 fami l ies by matching the i r c o n t r i b u t i o n s . ^ Opponents: The advocates' p leas, however, were resisted by rural po l i t i c i ans on the p ra i r ies and in Quebec, who objected to the idea of becoming dumping grounds fo r the urban unemployed; and in Quebec the Cathol ic Church was also opposed to state involvement i n domestic co lon iza t ion . These various opponents had powerful a l l i e s in the guise of cost-conscious provincial Premiers. Counci l lors in western rural munic ipa l i t ies ac t ive ly opposed resettlement proposals because they feared that relocated fami l ies would become publ ic charges f o r , unl ike other s e t t l e r s , dest i tu te unemployed workers had no capital to t ide them over.16 In Manitoba, rural d i s t r i c t s c i rcu la ted a resolut ion in the spring of 1932 opposing any ef for t on the part of the c i t y of Winnipeg to se t t l e i t s r e l i e f fami l ies on farms in the i r a reas . I 7 In Saskatchewan the United Farmers of Canada, the organization in charge of r e l i e f d is t r ibu t ion in the northern ha l f of the province, voiced the "only constant source of c r i t i c i s m " about resettlement. As well as representing potential welfare cases, the in f lux of se t t l e r fami l ies - even those with capi ta l - represented added competition at a time when farm prices were at an a l l - t ime low. Protests of farmers l i v i n g in the Kenvi l le d i s t r i c t of Saskatchewan were "purely economic" in that more production would lower grain pr ices further and so reduce the i r already depressed standard of l i v i n g . I 8 Agrarian h o s t i l i t y was not confined to the p ra i r i e provinces. Farmers in Quebec were apparently unenthusiastic about the provincial colonizat ion scheme for the unemployed with capi ta l j for s im i la r reasons.19 In the case of Quebec, another powerful opponent was the Cathol ic Church. According to a senior c l e r i c , Monsignor Courchesne, government intervention in co lonizat ion matters should only be "except ional , " leaving the tasks of se lect ion and maintenance of se t t l e rs to "family i n i t i a t i v e , i n te l l i gen t cooperation and organized c h a r i t y . " 2 0 The Cathol ic Church had been the major co lon izat ion agency in Quebec since the 1880s, when the f i r s t government-sponsored repatr iat ion scheme was i ns t i t u ted . It was determined to prevent d i rect intervention by "patronage-hungry" provincia l po l i t i c ians .21 Consequently, fol lowing the inauguration of the colonizat ion plan for the '150, unemployed with c a p i t a l , i t took steps to guard i t s monopoly by creat ing a colonizat ion company in 1931 to further the movement of the unemployed back to the land.22 The Liberal Premier of Quebec heeded the negative reaction of the Cathol ic hierarchy and farmers. Although he was an enthusiast ic supporter of subsidized colonizat ion for the unemployed with cap i ta l ,23 Taschereau was well aware of the r isks involved in a larger state ro le . With an e lect ion imminent in the summer of 1931, he could not afford to al ienate rural voters, the mainstay of Liberal support. He was also conscious of the fact that any venture in subsidized colonizat ion ran a high r isk of f a i l u r e . Although his government's request for federal a id toward settlement of the unemployed with capi ta l was turned down, his ministers went out of the i r way to create the i l l u s i o n that Ottawa was par t ic ipat ing.24 The p o l i t i c a l response on the p ra i r ies was s im i l a r . Dr. Anderson, the head of the Saskatchewan Cooperative government had won power in part on a pledge to promote domestic co lonizat ion.25 But he, too, shied away from the idea of rese t t l i ng fami l ies on urban r e l i e f . Instead, he was i n i t i a l l y only prepared to sponsor a loan scheme for unemployed young men with farming experience and l im i ted capi ta l to move from the dustbowl and c i t i e s on newly-acquired Crown lands. As his numerous appeals for federal contr ibut ions were ignored,26 he went ahead on his own during the 1931 winter. Faced with the subsequent i re of northern farmers, his government delayed endorsing c i t i e s ' demands for a j o in t i n i t i a t i v e unt i l the l a t t e r stages of the ag i ta t ion . Premier Bracken of Manitoba was also re luctant . His Farmers' government was due to go to the po l ls in 1932 and was conscious of the at t i tude of rural voters toward r e l i e f land settlement. Its members were also pledged to continue a po l icy of economy and so wanted to avoid cost ly drains on the publ ic 151 purse. State-aided settlement enterpr ises, therefore, were to be avoided as they "have been fa i lu res to a considerable extent and have involved the loss of large sums of money."27 premier Brownlee of Alberta also resisted the idea, even though his government was lobbied by an aggressive group of disabled ex-servicemen, based in Edmonton.28 A s n e a d o f a Farmers' administrat ion in a period when agr icu l tura l prices were at an a l l - t ime low, he was not prepared to antagonize his rural constituents by sanctioning resettlement of urban dwel lers. Even a f te r Alberta became a part ic ipant in the r e l i e f land settlement p lan , Premier Brownlee remained unenthusiast ic. He to ld part ic ipants at the 1933 Dominion-Provincial Conference that he was " less sanguine" about the prospects of the 'back to the farm movement' than other Premiers because i t was d i f f i c u l t to ass is t new se t t le rs when pioneers in the Peace River region were experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s . 2 9 The Federal Campaign Accompanying the various provincial s t ruggles, there was a more concerted campaign for r e l i e f land settlement waged inside the federal c a p i t a l . It resembled a bureaucratic model of welfare p o l i t i c s rather than a group one, with o f f i c i a l s involved in colonizat ion work championing the cause. There were also some supporters of the 'back to the land movement' ins ide the Canadian Parliament. But t he i r pleas were resisted by a c lus ter of opponents s im i la r to those operating at the provincial l e v e l : spokesmen of agr icu l ture in the federal House, and cabinet po l i t i c i ans who knew that previous state ventures had been cost ly and embarrassing f a i l u r e s . Advocates: Unlike a l l previous agi tat ions for i n i t i a t i v e s in emergency state a i d , the federal campaign for r e l i e f land settlement or iginated inside rather than 15.2 outside government. O f f i c i a l s employed by the chief colonizat ion agencies in Canada, the Department of Immigration and Colonizat ion (DIC), the Canadian National Railway (CNR) and the Canadian Pac i f i c Railway (CPR), were the major advocates at the federal l e v e l . Within the space of a year a f ter the depression st ruck, t he i r a c t i v i t i e s were d ras t i ca l l y cu r ta i l ed . The outgoing Liberal administrat ion discontinued the immigration scheme for B r i t i sh fami l ies and ass is ted passage for B r i t i s h adult immigrants, administered by DIC, as well as o n the railways agreement, thus cutt ing of f the supply of European s e t t l e r s . The new Conservative Min is ter of Immigration, Gordon, went even further in imposing res t r i c t ions on the flow of immigrants. Par t ly as a gesture of compensation, he suggested to the railways that they jo in with his department in a new pol icy of domestic colonizat ion of the urban unemployed with cap i ta l .31 Personnel of agencies which lose the i r or ig ina l functions quickly search fo r new ones, and the national colonizat ion interests were no exception to th is general ru le . From the f a l l of 1930 onwards, they devoted t he i r energies to placing both s ingle men and fami l ies with capital and farm backgrounds from c i t i e s in agr icu l tura l employment. In contrast to the provincial schemes, no f inanc ia l a id in the form of ind i rec t subsidies or loans was of fered. Instead, o f f i c i a l s in the Land Settlement Branch of DIC and the railway colonizat ion departments merely proffered advice and supervis ion. I n i t i a l l y , they worked independently. However, fol lowing discussions in the spring of 1931 they decided to es tab l ish a central committee to d i rect a new, coordinated ef for t and to acquaint t he i r own f i e l d representatives and provincial o f f i c i a l s with de ta i l s of t he i r scheme through a ser ies of conferences.32 The f i r s t conference was held in Winnipeg. At th i s gathering two Manitoba o f f i c i a l s broached the subject of broadening the federal scheme to include 15 3_ dest i tu te unemployed breadwinners. This suggestion was approved by Dr. W.J. Black, Director of Colonization of the CNR and his counterpart in the CPR, J .N.K. Macal ister.33 Their endorsement part ly ref lected economic motives. Both railway companies had a strong vested interest in promoting land settlement f o r , according to the i r presidents, each household was worth on average $746 per year in t r a f f i c earnings.34 Black of the CNR explained that r e l i e f land settlement "would create actual and potential f re ight revenues for Canada's transportat ion system."35 As freight t r a f f i c generated 70 percent of the income of both ra i lways, addit ional settlement was essent ia l during the depression years to compensate for the drop in the i r earnings that had resulted from the d ras t i c decl ine in purchasing power of ex is t ing se t t l e rs on the p r a i r i e s . An added imperative to increasing the t r a f f i c was the need to se t t l e surplus l ines bu i l t in the 1920s. Colonization o f f i c i a l s in the railway companies and in DIC were also spurred on by more mundane fears of redundancy. Depression and rest r ic ted immigration made the i r jobs highly vulnerable unless some a l ternat ive supply of se t t l e rs could be found. According to Gordon, the Immigration Min is te r , his scheme for the unemployed with capi ta l was ins t i tu ted " . . . r a t h e r than see the colonizat ion establishments of the railways and of the Department d i sso l ved . . . . " 36 C.A. Van Scroy, a CPR o f f i c i a l , rea l ized that th is scheme offered a defence against the question: "What is there to do for our par t icu lar departments?" As the Chief Commissioner of Colonization i n DIC "appropriately said - 'This i s a chal lenge. ' "37 In la te August of 1931 the colonizat ion o f f i c i a l s met to pool t he i r experiences and to prepare a memorandum for the Min is ter . They suggested two new plans: farm placement of 5,000-10,000 s ingle men and settlement of selected 154 fami l ies on farms. Although both plans were recommended as an "antidote to the forces of unrest," these o f f i c i a l s regarded s ingle men, not f am i l i es , as posing the greater threat . But they also advocated th i s remedy as the least expensive way of re l iev ing s ingle men,38 and i t s re la t i ve cheapness probably influenced Prime Min is ter Bennett to reverse his or ig ina l stance and endorse farm placement for t ransients in Manitoba and Saskatchewan during the winter of 1932.39 p r o m -jts small beginnings, th is scheme gradually expanded and became the motif of Liberal r e l i e f pol icy for t ransients in 1936 . ^ Concerning f am i l i es , the o f f i c i a l s suggested that the $360 per year required to maintain these people on urban r e l i e f be diverted instead towards re-estab l ish ing them on the land. They stressed that funds would be spent under supervision and that fami l ies would be subject to a r i g i d select ion procedure by experienced colonizat ion o f f i c i a l s . The l a t t e r would also choose sui table farms requir ing no outlay on the part of governments. The spokesmen of the national colonizat ion interests concluded by describing r e l i e f land settlement as "a measure of sound business in the interests of the individual family and the State."41 The merits of r e l i e f land settlement were also recognized inside the federal Parliament. Although only a few MPs and one lone Senator qual i fy as champions of the cause, the idea was endorsed by leg is la to rs from a l l part ies with the notable exception of the UFA (see table 10). In contrast to advocates outside Ottawa, supporters inside the House and Senate were not, by and la rge , spokesmen of urban Canada. Instead they represented mainly mixed or rural r i d ings . However, most proponents were not d i rec t l y employed in agr icul ture and so they could afford to extol the vir tues of rural l i f e . Their ideal ized view of l i f e on the farm was apparently shared by many c i t i z e n s , but i t was carr ied 15.5. Table 10. Supporters* of r e l i e f land settlement ins ide Parl iament, 1930-34 A f f i l i a t i o n Prov. Riding Type of Occupation Constituency House: Trois Bourgeois Con. Que. Rivieres Mixed Bar r i s te r Hackett II ll Stanstead Rural •I Kennedy n Man. Wi nni peg Urban n MacMi11 an II Sask. Saskatoon Mixed Merchant Bouchard L ib . Que. Kamouraska Rural Farmer Boulanger II •I Bellechasse Bar r is ter Bradette Lib-Lab Ont. Timiskaming Mixed Farmer Dubois L ib . Que. Nicolet Rural Farmer Fournier II II Hull Mixed Bar r is te r Gershaw II A l t a . Medicine Hat Physician Heenan Lib-Lab Ont. Kenora Rural Rlwy.Engr. Howden L ib . Man. St. Boniface Mixed Physician Hurtubise II Ont. Ni p issing ll Marcil II Que. Bonaventure Rural Journal is t Munn B.C. N. Vancouver Mixed Lumberman Pouli ot H Que. Temi scouata Rural Barr is ter Power •I Quebec Urban II Reid II B.C. New Westminster " Rancher Veniot N.B. Gl oucester Rural Ins. agent Bourassa Ind. Que. Labelle II Pub l i c i s t Woodsworth Lab. Man. Winnipeg Urban Soc. Worker Senate: Area Buchanan L ib . A l t a . Lethbridge News Publ . Forke Lib-Pro Man. Brandon Farmer Lacasse L ib . Ont. Essex Physician Po i r i e r Con. N.B. Acadie Barr is ter SOURCES: The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1932, passim; and Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Chief Electoral O f f i ce r , 17th General E lec t i on , 1930. *Supporters comprise leg is la to rs who spoke in favour of resettlement of fami l ies on c i v i c r e l i e f . 156 to extremes by French Canadians as " [ f ]or them, there were no shadings of grey AO between the moral i ty of the country and the depravity of the c i t y . " It was not su rp r i s ing , therefore, that the or ig ina l champions of r e l i e f land settlement inside the House represented Quebec. During the 1931 session two Liberal backbenchers, L. Dubois and O.L. Boulanger, pressed the case for federal involvement. They both represented se t t l e r r idings and were convinced that without state subsidies the ef for ts of new co lon is ts were doomed to f a i l u r e . They a lso espoused the ideology of agrarianism, defined by Brunet as "a re jec t ion , based on a s ta t i c view of soc ie ty , of the contemporary indust r ia l age."43 During the interwar period proponents of th i s ideology were reacting to the s t ra ins of Quebec's indust r ia l revolution that was "transforming the old rural world of New France into a region of crowded c i t i e s and f a c t o r i e s . " 4 4 Dubois ( L i b . , Nicolet) was an archetypal proponent of the ideology of agrarianism. A se l f - s t y l ed spokesman of the " t i l l e r s of the s o i l , " he depicted the farmer as "the Unknown Sold ier who guides the plough." In his advocacy of a jo in t r e l i e f land settlement i n i t i a t i v e , he eulogized the vir tues of a rural environment claiming that "the land breeds moral i ty" and was "the most favourable environment for the development of c i v i c v i r tues that are the warp and woof of strong races."45 H i s colleague Boulanger ( L i b . , Bel lechasse), voiced s im i la r sentiments. He compared agr icu l ture to the "roots of the t ree , " whereas industry and trade were merely the respective "braches" and "leaves."46 An act ive supporter of state-aided domestic colonizat ion since the la te 1920s, he introduced a resolut ion urging the reinstatement of reduced railway fares for co lon is ts to estab l ish a better equi l ibr ium between the rural and urban populat ion, reduce federal r e l i e f expenditure and aid national development.47 In the Senate the cause was also championed by a French-Canadian spokesman from 1 5 7 northern Ontar io, Dr. A. Lacasse, who was convinced that the re l ig ious ideals and patr iot ism of the ear ly se t t le rs s t i l l ran in "the veins of young Canada today . . . . "48 j 0 develop these q u a l i t i e s , he urged that some means be found "of enabling the unemployed in our c i t i e s to move from the cold and dry pavements where carrots and turnips cannot be grown, to the so i l that gave a l i v i n g to the i r a n c e s t o r s . " 4 9 These demands for federal action e l i c i t e d a sympathetic response from W.A. Gordon, the Minister of Immigration and Colonizat ion, who also represented a se t t l e r r id ing in northern Ontario. Among members of the Conservative government, he was the only act ive proponent of state-aided land settlement, earning him the press label of "the great co lon izer ."50 u p o n assuming o f f i ce he inaugurated a po l icy of domestic colonizat ion for the unemployed with c a p i t a l . In addit ion to compensating the national colonizat ion interests for immigration r e s t r i c t i o n s , the scheme ref lected Gordon's own views on the " ind iscr iminate" immigration po l i c ies pract ised by his predecessors. He suggested to MPs that these po l i c ies were promoted simply in order to provide revenues to pay for unnecessary railway expansion. He opposed them because immigrants had not been absorbed into agr icu l ture but had sought jobs in industry thus creat ing " . . . ou r present disproportionate c i t y populat ion." In order to remedy th i s "excessive urbanizat ion," Gordon decided that any federal expenditure on colonizat ion during his tenure as Minister "should be devoted to replacing on the land our own people who had departed from the farms and found themselves without jobs in the c i t i e s . " 5 1 For Gordon, settlement for the unemployed also offered a correct ive to the trend towards socia l co l l ec t i v i sm. The land offered "the best prospect" fo r the independence and maintenance of the urban unemployed,52 and agr icul ture was the foundation of national economic 158 prosper i ty . When announcing the r e l i e f land settlement plan he rejected the slogan "go back to the farm" as a misnomer, suggesting instead "go forward on the farm." Canada's su r v i va l , a f ter a l l , depended largely upon "the products of the f i r s t s ix inches of her s o i l . " 6 3 Opponents: Gordon, however, faced a d i f f i c u l t task in converting others to the cause of r e l i e f land settlement. Spokesmen of agrarian in terests from the major opposit ion part ies and hal f of the Labour group voiced the i r disapproval in the House of Commons (see table 11). Their protests f e l l on sympathetic ears as Prime Minister Bennett and most of his cabinet were reluctant to endorse any form of state-aided land settlement. MPs from both Liberal and UFA ranks acted as spokesmen for t he i r agrarian const i tuents. A Saskatchewan Liberal argued that r e l i e f land settlement would exacerbate the ex is t ing depression in agr icul ture in western Canada, as "the farmer w i l l have addit ional competition and have his prices lowered s t i l l fu r ther . " The UFA leader voiced s im i la r sentiments, contending that any expenditure promoting further settlement was unwarranted " . . . u n t i l the people now on the land are in a posi t ion to make a p ro f i t from the i r operat ion." A colleague dismissed the concept of r e l i e f land settlement as "absurd" and " i l l thought out" on the grounds that modern s c i e n t i f i c agr icu l ture had made farming an expensive venture and had displaced the t rad i t iona l model of the s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t homestead. He also voiced doubts about the qual i ty of r e l i e f s e t t l e r s , suggesting that the average unemployed man - even from a farm background - was temperamentally unsuited for f a rm ing . 5 4 Labour MPs were divided over the issue. H. Mi tchel l (Hamilton) questioned the soundness of a pol icy that used the land as "the scrap heap of indust ry ; " Table 11. Opponents* of r e l i e f land settlement ins ide the House of Commons, 1930-34 A f f i l i a t i o n Prov. Riding Type of Constituency Occupation B l a i r Donnelly Fafard Sanderson Stewart Brown Campbell Coote Gardiner Garland Luchkovick Speakman Macphail Maclnnis Mi tchel l L ib . Pro. UFA UFO Lab. Ont. Sask. Que. Ont. Al-ta Man. Sask. A l t a . Ont. B.C. Ont. Wellington Willow Bunch L ' I s le t S. Perth W. Edmonton Li sga r Mackenzie Macleod Acadia Bow River Vegrevil le Red Deer S.E.Grey S. Vancouver Hamilton Rural Mi xed Rural Urban Physician Physician and Farmer Surveyor Flax grower Farmer Farmer & Clergyman Farmer Teacher Farmer Teacher Mot'orman E lec t r i ca l operator SOURCES: The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1932, passim; and Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Chief Electoral O f f i ce r , 17th General E lec t i on , 1930. *0pponents comprise MPs who voiced disapproval of the idea of reset t l ing c i v i c r e l i e f cases. 160 and his col league, A. Maclnnis (Vancouver), developed th i s argument in a more ideological ve in : Such a movement...tends towards the creation of a peasantry in Canada, a peasantry which w i l l eke out a precarious l i v i n g from the land when there i s nothing to be done in the c i t y . That peasantry w i l l form a labour reserve to be ca l led upon at a time when working condit ions in the c i t i e s improve. Such a condit ion w i l l be dangerous to the people affected and dangerous to workers in the c i t i e s . 5 6 Woodsworth, the Labour leader, however, found himself on the opposite s ide . While doubting the effectiveness of r e l i e f land settlement as a remedy fo r urban unemployment, he was to urge federal involvement in the Manitoba p lan. Doubts existed within the Conservative Party as w e l l . A Quebec backbencher, wrote to the Prime Minister urging him not to par t ic ipate in the Quebec colonizat ion scheme fo r the unemployed with c a p i t a l . "I hold that th is movement w i l l be a complete d isas te r , for the unemployed themselves and the country as w e l l ; . . . f rom a party standpoint par t ic ipa t ing to [ s i c ] i t only means s u i c i d e . " 5 7 Most of the cabinet shared his sentiments. On numerous occasions in 1931 they resisted Gordon's pleas to promote land settlement as a r e l i e f measure. In October Gordon reminded Bennett that : . . . a s ear ly as Apr i l l a s t , I brought a rather modest scheme before Council having in view the return to the land of a l imi ted number of fami l i es . . .and I a lso suggested...some contr ibut ion towards a scheme of colonizat ion in [Saskatchewan], Council de f i n i t e l y decided against the idea. Si nee-then I have brought i t up a number of times with the same r e s u l t . 5 8 The Conservative government's opposition ref lected painful memories. The i l l - f a t e d Sold ier Settlement Scheme, i n i t i a t e d by the Unionis ts , had l e f t Ottawa with a legacy of abandoned farms and unpaid debts. The B r i t i s h Families Scheme, sponsored by the L ibe ra ls , was also unsuccessful. Less than hal f of the or ig ina l loans had been recovered by the end of the 1930-31 f i s c a l year , and over a quarter of the fami l ies had withdrawn a l t oge the r . 5 9 161 The fear that 'h is tory would repeat i t s e l f lay behind the cabinet 's refusal to endorse proposals submitted from the provinces. The Minister of Labour rejected one Manitoba plan because i t "suggested that some $800 per family be advanced to se t t le them on farms whether the se t t le rs had capi ta l or not, or whether they had farm experience or n o t . . . . " 6 0 Even Gordon, the lone advocate in the Cabinet, shied away from endorsing another Manitoban proposal which involved administrat ion by his own department, thus placing the onus for the success or f a i l u re of the scheme d i rec t l y upon Ot tawa. 6 1 Another drawback of both schemes was that they involved loans which the cabinet opposed: . . . ou r ventures into that f i e l d have not been crowned with the success that was hoped for . It i s , I am a f r a i d , only too true that i f you s tar t a person out on a farm loaded with any debt at a l l , in a large number of cases that w i l l spel l his ultimate d i sas te r . 6 2 In an era when a l l governments subscribed to a conservative f i sca l orthodoxy, previous cost ly fa i l u res represented blots on the i r records of sound administrations and provided powerful ammunition for the i r p o l i t i c a l opponents. As the Conservative government was already vulnerable in 1931 to charges of extravagance because of s p i r a l l i n g r e l i e f cos ts , i t s members were very reluctant to finance further drains on the treasury in the guise of land settlement schemes for the unemployed. Their resistance in tens i f ied fol lowing B r i t a i n ' s decision to go of f the gold standard in the f a l l . To minimize i t s impact, Bennett appointed a small cabinet committee to consider every expenditure made on unemployment r e l i e f . He stressed that "[t]o maintain our c r e d i t , we must pract ice the most r i g i d economy and not needlessly spend a s ing le cent."63 Prec ip i tan ts : Although the prospects of a federal i n i t i a t i v e concerning r e l i e f land settlement looked bleak in la te 1931, developments during the 1932 winter 162 precip i ta ted ac t ion. The status of the lone advocate in the cabinet increased. Pressure from the p ra i r i e provinces and a concerted lobby by Manitoba MPs prompted the Conservative government to endorse a jo in t plan in Apr i l 1932. In February 1932 Gordon assumed a more s t rategic pos i t i on , taking over as act ing Min is ter of Labour upon Robertson's resignat ion. This new post included the chairmanship of a cabinet subcommittee that vetted unemployment r e l i e f proposals submitted by the provinces and, more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , recommended new federal ventures. Moreover, the 1931 Rel ie f Act was due to expire at the end of the f i s c a l year. The t ime, therefore, was ripe to consider new proposals. Gordon had ea r l i e r consulted the national colonizat ion in terests about broadening the i r e f for ts to include the dest i tute unemployed. Their interest in th i s category of se t t le rs in tens i f ied in the 1932 winter as there were ominous signs that the pool of unemployed with capi ta l was drying up. In the preceding f a l l the colonizat ion agencies had temporarily discontinued the i r advert is ing campaign because of the poor response. Some other out let was needed to prevent the demise of t he i r o rgan i za t i ons . 6 4 This new out let would, of p o l i t i c a l necessi ty , have to be found inside Canada, given the Min is te r ' s views on outside immigration, which had been further reinforced by the negative publ ic reaction resul t ing from his decision in early March to permit the Ontario government to bring in 500 B r i t i s h boys. This concession was apparently made in order to rescue immigration soc ie t ies in Ontar io . 6 5 Towards the end of the f i s c a l year , senior co lonizat ion o f f i c i a l s formulated a proposal. They took pains to point out that i t was not a colonizat ion scheme but essent ia l l y an unemployment r e l i e f measure based on the p r inc ip le of helping people to help themselves, and that i t would not involve any addit ional expenditure. Their proposal sa t i s f i ed t he i r own vested in terests 16.3 i n job s u r v i v a l , because the suggested method of administrat ion was by provincial co lonizat ion departments augmented by assistance from railway o f f i c i a l s in the select ion of fami l ies and inspection of lands. Its authors advocated t r i p a r t i t e par t ic ipat ion in the consol idat ion of r e l i e f expenditures for land settlement in order to conform to ex is t ing federal po l i cy , and suggested a non-recoverable grant of $200 to cover subsistence for two years with the balance of $400 to be advanced by way of loans from the three levels of government. 6 6 Faced with mounting pressure from urban in te res ts , the p ra i r i e provinces also took advantage of the renewal of r e l i e f arrangements to press for a jo in t i n i t i a t i v e . They apparently made "strong representations" for r e l i e f expenditure towards land se t t lement , 6 7 and support from the other provincia l Premiers was forthcoming at the Dominion-Provincial Conference in Apr i l 1932.68 Although debate and passage of the 1932 Rel ie f Act was scheduled for la te A p r i l , the various methods of federa l -prov inc ia l cooperation were often not agreed upon unt i l winter approached. In the case of the land settlement p lan, however, the timing of i t s announcement was spurred in part by further lobbying from Manitoba, applied th is time to local MPs. In response, Woodsworth (Lab., Winnipeg) took up his province's cause and urged immediate a c t i o n . 6 9 Gordon's i n i t i a l response was not encouraging and implied that the cabinet had vetoed his la test proposal presumably because i t involved loans. However, l a te r in the debate on the DIC's estimates he admitted that Woodsworth's suggestion to d iver t ex is t ing federal expenditure from di rect r e l i e f to land settlement had "a good deal of merit" and that Ottawa's par t ic ipat ion was a d i s t i nc t p o s s i b i l i t y . 7 0 The task of devising a sui table scheme f e l l upon a three-man committee comprising two DIC o f f i c i a l s and the Dominion Commissioner of Unemployment 164 Rel ie f from the Department of Labour. In two respects - t r i p a r t i t e par t ic ipat ion and method of administrat ion - t he i r plan was s im i la r to that recommended by the colonizat ion in te res ts . However, they proposed a di f ferent method of f inanc ing, involv ing non-recoverable expenditure rather than a grant-loan combination. They pointed out that the federal contr ibut ion of $200 would f ree Ottawa from any further r e l i e f payments to recip ients for two years. Both the s ize of the federal share and the aggregate amount recommended were larger than the "minister o r i g i na l l y had in mind," but the o f f i c i a l s ins is ted that the to ta l sum must be able to meet minimum requirements of fami l ies across Canada. "Otherwise the r e l i e f proposal w i l l be open to c r i t i c i s m or even to r i d i cu le . "71 The o f f i c i a l s ' plan won swift approval. On Apr i l 28th, t he i r M in is te r , Gordon, formally announced that Ottawa would par t ic ipa te with the other governments in re-estab l ish ing the urban unemployed on the land.72 A l l provinces except New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island implemented the p lan, but t he i r level of par t ic ipat ion did not match the expectations of federal o f f i c i a l s (see tab le 12). Despite i t s l imi ted appeal, further agreements were negotiated in 1934 with a l l the or ig ina l part ic ipants except B r i t i s h Columbia, and in 1936 with four provinces: A lber ta , Manitoba, Quebec and Nova Scot ia . The plan lapsed during the Second World War as the improvement in economic condit ions reversed the d r i f t back to the land. Out of the tota l intake (10,802), 7,485 fami l ies were s t i l l registered as se t t l e rs in 1942.73 Although the scheme offered them more hope than the miserable condit ions of urban r e l i e f , i t was a "stop-gap," not a remedy, representing "more a confession of despair than a bold new departure in r e l i e f pol icy."74 165 Table 12. Actual and estimated proportions of e l i g i b l e applicants ( including dependents) and federal contr ibut ions under the 1932 r e l i e f land settlement plan Province % of El i g i b l e Appl icants Federal Contributions Actual Estimated* Actual Estimated' B.C. 0.04 12 $ 6,604.33 $ 171,420 Alberta 0.24 12 47,789.66 171,420 Sask. 0.26 14 37,189.42 200,000 Manitoba 0.30 12 56,363.49 171,420 Ontario 0.05 15 20,564.60 214,285 Quebec 0.17 15 88,235.17 214,285 N.B. - 8 - 114,280 Nova Scotia 0.37 9 4,900.00 128,565 P . E . I . - 3 - 42,855 100 $261,646.67 $1,428,520 SOURCES: Information concerning actual proportions and contr ibut ions i s taken from Report of the Dominion Commissioner of Unemployment Re l ie f for the F isca l Year Ending 31 March 1934, p.9. The o f f i c i a l estimates are contained in Memo: Hon. W.A. Gordon. Rel ie f Settlement Scheme, 26 Apr i l 1932, p.3, Public Archives of Canada, Department of Labour, General Services F i l es of F.M. Hereford, Record Group 27, v o l . 3193, f i l e no. 146. *Federal bureaucrats used estimates prepared by o f f i c i a l s in Saskatchewan, the only province to submit a de f in i te proposal. 166 A Review Al l the various environmental factors iden t i f i ed in chapter 1 d i r ec t l y shaped the agi tat ion for r e l i e f land settlement. The combined impact of depression and drought created the d r i f t back to the land that sparked the i n i t i a l in terest of the senior leve ls of government in resettlement as a remedy for unemployment. The prevalent se l f -he lp ethic also fostered acceptance of the then novel idea of subsid iz ing resident fami l ies without c a p i t a l . Its inf luence was i den t i f i ab le in the p o l i t i c a l process, with federal l eg is la to rs and bureaucrats qua l i fy ing as i t s most fervent subscr ibers. The ins t i tu t iona l framework too exerted a considerable in f luence. As j u r i sd i c t i on over land settlement was shared, the part ic ipants lobbied both targets for governmental ac t ion . Their preference for a jo in t rather than an independent i n i t i a t i v e was reinforced by the pract ice of federa l -prov inc ia l co l laborat ion on r e l i e f matters that developed in the early years of the Great Depression. Together, the formal d i v i s ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers and the convention governing r e l i e f arrangements exerted a much more d i rect impact upon the timing and content of the plan than on the r e l i e f camps po l i cy . However, in the case of the former, national po l i t i c i ans were not e x p l i c i t l y motivated by fear of revolution to sponsor the i n i t i a t i v e , and so could afford the luxury of time to secure provincia l consent before taking ac t ion. Urban-rural con f l i c t dominated the agi tat ion for state aid to ass is t c i t y fami l ies to return to the land. This clash of interests and values occurred at a time when the ascendancy of urban society could no longer be ser iously challenged. Moreover, i t marked the f i r s t occasion on which businessmen and farmers were on opposing s ides , and th is sh i f t in the posi t ion of capi ta l i s consistent with the f indings of Finkel (1979) concerning other issues of socia l 16.7 reform during the 1930s. In the ensuing bat t le the forces from urban Canada c lear l y won out over the i r country cousins. This variant of group p o l i t i c s was most v i s i b l e in the provincial s t ruggles. Taxpayers and elected o f f i c i a l s in c i t i e s of Quebec and the p ra i r i e provinces perceived dest i tute fami l ies with farm backgrounds as cost ly drains on the publ ic purse. However, the i r attempts to t ransfer the costs of t he i r maintenance to rural munic ipa l i t ies were resisted by hard-pressed farmers concerned about the threat of added economic competition as well as the potent ial increase in r e l i e f expenditure. In Quebec the Cathol ic Church, a stout defender of rural values, also resisted government intervention in domestic co lon iza t ion , fearing that i t would become an instrument of patronage. These various opponents had powerful a l l i e s in the guise of provinc ia l Premiers whose decisions not to act were motivated by electoral pressures and the i r ever-present f i s c a l conservatism. The federal campaign resembled the bureaucratic model of welfare p o l i t i c s more than the group one. Unlike socia l wel fare, colonizat ion had occupied a prominent place on Ottawa's p o l i t i c a l agenda since the ear ly years of Confederation, with the resul t that a re la t i ve l y sophist icated administrat ive apparatus was f i rmly in place when the issue of domestic land settlement came to the fore. The national colonizat ion interests qual i fy as the major advocates at the federal l e v e l , and t he i r involvement was spurred pr imar i ly by s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Once aware that c i t y fami l ies represented potential f re ight users and a pool of c l i en ts to keep the i r jobs i n tac t , they pressed the case upon the i r sympathetic min is ter . In contrast , the few federal l eg is la to rs from central Canada who championed the cause inside Parliament were motivated by the ideology of agrarianism, perceiving the c l i en t group as potential purveyors of 168 the t rad i t iona l cu l tura l heritage that was threatened by the advance of c i t i e s . Their b e l i e f s , however, were not shared by e i ther spokesmen of western farmers or the majority of the Labour group. The presence of these t rad i t iona l foes in the ranks of opponents i s noteworthy, for t he i r in terests were usual ly c o n f l i c t i n g . However, in the case of r e l i e f land sett lement, they shared a common h o s t i l i t y to a category of the unemployed that represented a potential threat to the interests of the i r respective memberships. Federal cabinet po l i t i c i ans once again played a dec is ive ro le in shaping the t iming and content of the po l i cy . Their f i s c a l conservatism i n i t i a l l y imposed a powerful constraint upon governmental action and ref lected painful memories associated with previous, cost ly ventures in state-aided land settlement. But, in the end, resettlement was sold as the cheapest means of re l iev ing se lec t , dest i tu te fami l ies in the short term with the added advantage of of fer ing the prospect of permanent se l f -suppor t . Among the prec ip i tan ts , Gordon, the Minister of Immigration, played the pre-eminent role in the sudden r i se to prominence of the issue. Once armed with the support of the provinces, he was wel l -p laced in his new capacity as acting Minister of Labour to define the requirements of an acceptable proposal, leaving the de ta i l s to his sympathetic o f f i c i a l s in the DIC. Unlike previous innovations for dest i tute employables, bureaucrats played an apparently more act ive role in formulating the land settlement proposal. Apart from re f lec t ing the d i f ferent nature of the source mater ia l , t he i r involvement i l l u s t r a ted the expansion of Ottawa's role in r e l i e f - g i v i n g . From being a unique expedient in 1919, state aid for the unemployed had become by 1932 the most sa l ient issue of interwar welfare p o l i t i c s . This development was shaped by a myriad of forces. The timing of mass demobil ization of World War I veterans and the postwar slump prompted the emergence of the issue into the p o l i t i c a l arena; and the Great Depression pushed i t to the top of the agenda. Confronted with these downturns, supporters of the new cause of socia l co l lec t i v i sm began to mount an increasingly e f fec t ive challenge against the hegemony of indiv idual ism and i t s i n f l uen t ia l champions. Their disputes were dec is ive ly shaped by the ins t i tu t iona l framework, because the dual targets of inf luence inherent in the federal structure provided a l ternat ive lobbying targets and, more s i g n i f i c a n t l y , a rat ionale for cost-conscious po l i t i c i ans to def lect demands for a id . Opposing forces outside and ins ide government d ictated the s ta te ' s response to the problem of unemployment-related dependency. Both labour radicals and interest groups were e f fec t ive societa l actors but the i r inf luence varied over time. Social control p o l i t i c s vied with interest group power in the case of Ottawa's or ig ina l intervention and dominated the agi tat ion for r e l i e f camps. In contrast , groups representing the major sectors of the economy and c l i en ts clashed over the issue of state a id in a l l four p o l i c i e s , with the struggle for withdrawal revealing the i r inf luence most c l e a r l y . They were divided along various l i n e s , but occupational and urban-rural cleavages were the most sa l i en t . Inside government, cabinet po l i t i c i ans overshadowed bureaucrats in the social policymaking process. Their decisions were shaped by a mixture of motives, with f i s c a l conservatism qual i fy ing as the ever-present one. It was equally powerful in shaping statutory benefits for the dependent poor, as the next sect ion of th i s study reveals. PART III STATUTORY BENEFITS FOR THE DEPENDENT POOR 170 171 Introduction Unlike dest i tu te employables, the dependent poor were perceived as incapable of se l f -suppor t , and so as a 'more deserving' category. Their composition was heterogeneous, covering those "who were too young, o l d , c r ipp led , s ick or stupid to look af ter themselves.. . ."-- These members of the community required assistance in times of prosperity as well as in times of depression, pr imar i ly fo r reasons other than involuntary unemployment. Their dependency derived from age- or d i sab i l i t y - r e l a t ed incapacity and was aggravated by death, drunkenness, i l l n e s s , imprisonment or i r regu lar earnings of the i r r e l a t i ves , the mainstay of the i r income support.^ Denominational, pr ivate char i t ies played the major role in re l iev ing the dependent poor up unt i l World War I. Although the i r work included the v i s i t i n g of c l i en t s in t he i r own homes, they displayed a marked preference for i ns t i t u t i ona l care. The Cathol ic Church had a "venerable t r a d i t i o n " of organized char i ty dating back to the settlement of New France so that by 1900 i t had a network of orphanages and various homes for the adult poor establ ished in Quebec and elsewhere (see table 13). In response to the increase in poverty and other ' soc ia l e v i l s ' a r is ing from rapid urban growth, the major Protestant denominations a lso created special i ns t i t u t i ons of rescue that mul t ip l ied in the early years of th i s century . 3 Canadian women, representing mainly the middle c l a s s , played the pre-eminent role in developing the plethora of voluntary organizations for the r e l i e f of d i s t r ess . By the turn of the century they operated e i ther wholly or par t ly a l l the various char i tab le ins t i t u t i ons and s o c i e t i e s . 4 Rel igious communities of nuns in conjunction with organized lay women ran the numerous Cathol ic benevolent i n s t i t u t i ons . The presence of women was equally noticeable in Protestant c h a r i t i e s , with orders of deaconesses performing socia l work in Table 13. Number of pr ivate and public ins t i tu t ions for the dependent poor in selected c i t i e s , 1900* Ha l i fax : Cathol ic Protestant Non-sectarian Municipal S t . John: Cathol ic Protestant Non-sectarian Municipal Montreal: Cathol ic Protestant Non-sectarian Municipal Toronto: Cathol ic Protestant Non-sectarian Municipal Winnipeg: Cathol ic Protestant Non-sectarian Municipal Vancouver:Catholic Protestant Non-sectarian Municipal Desti tute Children 2 1 7 5 1 1 4 1 Desti tute Women 1 1 3 2 1 2 3 Aged and Infirm Poor 1 1 Adult Poor Total 4 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 16 10 3 0 4 9 2 1 1 4 0 0 0 1 0 0 Total 28 16 16 65 SOURCE: This table i s based upon or ig ina l material l i s t e d in Madame Thibaudeau, "Char i t ies and Reform," in Women of Canada: Their L i f e and Work, a handbook compiled by the National Council of Women of Canada for d is t r ibu t ion at the Par is International Exh ib i t i on , 1900; repr int e d . , 1975, pp. 324-92, passim. *Medical and penal ins t i tu t ions are not included because indigency was not a formal c r i t e r i on for entry. 173 slum areas and rural-based national missionary soc ie t ies along with local " l ad i es ' a ids" ra is ing the bulk of funds. 5 Urban female volunteers a lso monopolized both the interdenominational Protestant organizations and the non-sectarian socia l service agencies that pro l i fe ra ted af ter the 1880s. Concerning the l a t t e r , the National Council of Women of Canada spearheaded the organization of associated char i t ies in major c i t i e s ; and i t s local a f f i l i a t e s created the bulk of c i v i c day-care f a c i l i t i e s for dependent ch i ld ren , as well as sponsoring other phi lanthropic endeavours fo r aged and in f i rm women.6 Compared with the voluntary char i ty establishment, the publ ic welfare sector was re la t i ve l y underdeveloped pr ior to 1914. The t rad i t iona l r e l i e f - g i v i ng author i t ies opted to subsidize the maintenance of dest i tu te inmates in private ins t i tu t ions rather than develop the i r own f a c i l i t i e s , except in the maritimes, where they operated the various almshouses themselves.7 Publ ic aid for the poor in t he i r own homes was also l imi ted because of the prevalent be l ie f that i t should be the " las t resort" a f te r pr ivate philanthropy had f a i l e d . World War I marked the onset of the process of s ing l ing out select categories of the dependent poor for specia l ized r e l i e f . In 1916 Manitoba pioneered the payment of statutory benefi ts for sole-support mothers, an i n i t i a t i v e that was eventually copied by the other provinces. Acting together, the senior leve ls of government financed the payment of means-tested pensions for the e lder ly from 1927 onwards. In 1930 Ottawa, on i t s own i n i t i a t i v e , made s im i l a r provis ion fo r prematurely sen i le veterans, a new category of the dependent poor. It subsequently joined with the provinces in 1937 in f inancing means-tested benef i ts for the unemployable b l i nd . As a l l these welfare innovations represented milestones along Canada's road to comprehensive income secur i t y , the p o l i t i c s surrounding the i r introduction are analyzed in chapters 7-10, respect ive ly . CHAPTER 7 MOTHERS' PENSIONS,! 1916-1937 The provinces sponsored the f i r s t statutory innovations in categoric publ ic assistance. Manitoba pioneered the payment of pensions for needy mothers with dependent chi ldren and i t s example was soon copied by Saskatchewan in 1917, Alberta in 1919, and B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario in 1920. The movement then los t i t s impetus and the remaining provinces did not implement schemes unt i l the fol lowing decades, with Nova Scotia cap i tu la t ing in 1930, Quebec in 1937, New Brunswick in 1944 and Prince Edward Island in 1949. Besides marking the f i r s t major break with the colonial t rad i t ion of poor r e l i e f , the or ig ina l mothers' pensions plans "were the true precursor and even progenitor of present-day socia l assistance p rograms. . . . " 2 Despite the i r precedent-setting inf luence, the provincia l innovations have received l imi ted treatment. Recent studies by Guest (1980), Hepworth (1980) and Strong-Boag (1979) have a l l dealt with indiv idual provinces: B r i t i s h Columbia, Saskatchewan and Manitoba respect ive ly . In the absence of comparative research, the precise ident i t y of the part ic ipants in the provinces pioneering the payment of mothers' pensions remains somewhat ambiguous. Moreover, the question of why the '1 aggers' res isted has received l i t t l e a t tent ion, a surpr is ing oversight in view of i t s impl icat ions concerning the general issue of provincia l inact ion in welfare state development. Consequently, the purposes of t h i s chapter are to elucidate the e f fec t ive p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the introduct ion of mothers' pensions in the f i ve provinces west of Quebec, and to suggest reasons for the delay of implementation of s im i la r l eg i s l a t i on by eastern Canada. 175 Background Widows comprised the largest group of sole-support mothers, representing around 5 percent of the female population during the period when the issue of mothers' pensions was f i r s t under act ive considerat ion. Their re la t i ve d i s t r i bu t ion varied by region, with the maritime provinces and Ontario having higher averages than other provinces. Although these proportions did not increase dramatical ly as a resul t of World War I, an upward trend in a l l provinces i s detectable in the 1921 census, as the fol lowing table reveals . s Table 14. Number and percentage of widows in total female populat ion, for Canada and the provinces, 1911 and 1921, 1911 1921 Total Number Percent Total Number Percent Canada* 3,384,648 179,656 5.3 4,258,538 236,522 5.5 P .E . I . 46,659 3,279 7.0 43,728 3,358 7.7 N.S. 241,319 16,440 6.8 257,365 18,752 7.3 N.B. 172,022 10,380 6.0 190,525 11,676 6.1 Quebec 992,961 46,764 4.7 1,181,171 57,809 4.9 Ontario 1,226,020 78,654 6.4 1,451,772 99,259 6.8 Manitoba 208,440 7,541 3.6 289,551 12,349 4.3 Sask. 200,702 5,556 2.8 343,810 10,567 3.1 A l t a . 150,503 4,498 3.0 264,246 9,607 3.6 B.C. 140,861 6,178 4.4 231,173 12,846 5.6 SOURCE: Census of Canada, 1921, vo l . 11 , p.117, table 23. *Figures for Canada include Yukon and N.W.T. 176 Widows were widely regarded as the most deserving category of sole-support mothers because the i r dest i tu t ion was due to misfortune rather than perceived moral f a i l u r e . Nonetheless, special recognition of t he i r p l ight was slow to develop. At the time of Confederation, widows in the c i t i e s of English Canada faced a precarious existence as there were few 'harbours of refuge' for themselves or the i r ch i l d ren , in contrast to the spec ia l ized ins t i tu t iona l provision offered by re l ig ious orders in Quebec. Often they were forced to rely on the earnings of the i r ch i ld ren , as Victor ian society frowned upon the notion of married women working outside the home. If the i r chi ldren were too young to peddle wares or take in sewing, the options facing poverty-str icken mothers were bleak. Their maintenance depended upon sporadic assistance from re la t i ves , f r iends or pr ivate c h a r i t i e s , supplemented by occasional handouts from municipal co f fe rs . In the absence of such supports, they had l i t t l e choice but to seek employment as charwomen and leave the i r chi ldren unsupervised or in unlicensed baby farms. In the i r struggle to surv ive, some women were forced to desert the i r f am i l i es , or worse, resort to i n fan t i c ide . An "alarming increase" in ch i l d desertion and in fan t i c ide during the 1870s prompted the establishment of ins t i tu t ions l i k e the Protestant Infants' Home of Toronto.3 s im i la r f a c i l i t i e s were developed by pr ivate philanthropy in c i t i e s of other provinces. Shelters also sprang up in towns serving agr icu l tura l communities across Canada to cater to widows and orphans l e f t dest i tu te as a resul t of periodic epidemics. 4 The spread of orphanages, however, began to be questioned towards the end of the century by ". . .more advanced social thinkers and those in the new profession of socia l work [who] condemned such large aggregations of chi ldren as in jur ious to youth and harmful, i n the long run, to the community." 5 Dissa t is fac t ion with ins t i t u t i ona l care was not confined to middle-class reformers. In order to avoid the break-up of the i r f am i l i es , sole-support mothers increasingly sought employment outside the home, a trend copied by women general ly (see tab le 15). Their entry into the unsk i l led labour market was f a c i l i t a t e d by the growth of factor ies in central Canada and the increasing demand for domestic workers in the West. However, neither earnings in 'sweatshops' nor rates for day labour were su f f i c ien t for independent support. In some cases older chi ldren were forced to work to keep the family a f l o a t . 6 Explo i ta t ion of ch i l d labour was not the only problem facing working mothers. With the rapid growth of c i t i e s ear ly in the century, the sight of t he i r ' l a tch key' chi ldren running wi ld in the s t ree ts , begging and appearing in increasing numbers before the cour ts , led to juveni le protection l e g i s l a t i o n . Infants of working mothers were also iden t i f i ed as at r isk by "publ ic s p i r i t e d , " female volunteers. However, despite the i r work for nurser ies, the l a t t e r "never lost sight of the preferable a l te rna t ive : fu l l - t ime motherhood." 7 Table 15. Employment of women in Canada, 1891-1931 Total No. of Females Total No. & Percentage of Year Aged 10 Years & Over Females Gainfu l ly Employed Number Percent 1891 1,770,877 195,990 11 1901 1,981,790 237,949 12 1911 2,548,743 364,821 14 1921 3,209,998 490,150 15 1931 3,906,522 665,991* 17 SOURCE: Labour Gazette, 1936, p. 1125, table I I I . *A breakdown by occupation for 1931 reveals that 220,000 (33%) were employed in domestic and personal serv ice , 118,000 (18%) in the professions, 116,500 (17%) as c l e r i c a l workers and 85,000 (13%) in manufacturing. 178 A be l i e f in the v i r tues of maternal care was also the central tenet of the burgeoning ch i l d welfare movement in the United States. It dominated discussions at the 1909 White House Conference on the Care of Dependent Chi ldren, prompting delegates to endorse the idea of publ ic aid for needy, 'deserving' mothers. This remedy was soon adopted. In 1911 I l l i n o i s passed the f i r s t state-wide Mothers' Pensions Act and by 1913 s im i la r l eg i s l a t i on was on the statute books of 17 other s tates.8 The rapid success of the U.S. mothers' pensions movement outpaced developments within the Empire because, apart from New Zealand's pre-war widows' pension, Aust ra l ia was the only other dominion to react to the p o l i t i c s of motherhood by paying maternity allowances from 1912. Besides these precedents, the Canadian mothers' pensions movement was also boosted by a pre-war domestic i n i t i a t i v e . The passage of the Ontario Workmen's Compensation Act in 1914 represented the f i r s t step towards acknowledging that cer ta in categories of female-headed fami l ies were deserving of special assistance outside the prevai l ing system of poor r e l i e f . The provision of statutory cash benefi ts to widows and chi ldren of workers k i l l e d in indust r ia l accidents and dependents of men with temporary or permanent d i s a b i l i t y set an important precedent. It " . . . se rved to strengthen the case for pensions to a l l mothers who were deprived of the f inancia l means of caring for the i r c h i l d r e n . " 9 The F i r s t World War also hastened publ ic acceptance of the idea of state aid for father less fam i l i es . Federal pensions for dependents of so ld iers k i l l e d or disabled on act ive serv ice underlined the need fo r state a id fo r c i v i l i a n widows or wives of incapacitated men. Ottawa's sponsorship of the payment of pr ivately-funded cash allowances to dependents of en l is ted men also demonstrated the benefi ts of regular support for des t i t u te , father less 13 9L-f am i l i es , increased volunteers' awareness of t he i r problems while at the same time i t exposed the l im i ta t ions of t he i r "pa te rna l i s t i c " approach.10 Another ef fect of the c o n f l i c t was renewed interest in ch i ld welfare, that prompted, among other th ings, the onset of a concerted campaign to secure province-wide mothers' pensions. The Mothers' Pensions Movement Of a l l the campaigns for statutory benef i ts , the mothers' pensions movement was the most prolonged, spanning over three decades. It was also the only struggle waged mainly at the provincial rather than the federal l e v e l . As the movement was complex, analysis i s broken down into two stages, covering the successful campaigns waged in the provinces west of Quebec and the protracted struggles in eastern Canada. Successful Prov inc ia l Campaigns, 1910-20 In contrast to the or ig ina l struggle for aid for dest i tu te employables, the provincia l campaigns for mothers' pensions contain l i t t l e evidence of the socia l control model, even though in A lber ta , B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario they were conducted against the same backdrop of postwar unrest. Instead, they resembled a group model of welfare p o l i t i c s , with spokesmen of various in terests d iv id ing along occupat ional, secu lar - re l ig ious and urban-rural l i n e s . Among economic interest groups, organized labour stood alone in endorsing the then novel idea of state aid for des t i tu te , father less fam i l i es , whereas businessmen and organized farmers were passive opponents. A s im i la r d i v i s ion of opinion was v i s i b l e within the social service establishment, a c lus te r of in terests which was not v i s i b l e in the struggles for emergency a i d , presumably because services for dest i tu te employables were re la t i ve l y embryonic pr ior to 18.0. World War I. Female volunteers and employees of non-sectarian agencies in both the pr ivate and publ ic sectors favoured state in tervent ion, whereas the i r counterparts in the major denominational char i t ies resisted i t . U The cleavage between volunteers a lso ref lected a con f l i c t between c i t y and countryside. Among forces ins ide government, cabinet po l i t i c i ans rather than bureaucrats once again played the pre-eminent role in deciding the timing and content of the various schemes. Despite the i r varying party l abe l s , provincial Premiers shared a common h o s t i l i t y to funding pensions for needy mothers unt i l overwhelming e lectora l pressures precipi tated l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . But the or ig ina l statutes s t i l l bore the same stamp of f i s ca l conservatism that marked the innovations for dest i tute employables. Advocates: The demands fo r state a id fo r dest i tu te mothers sprang from an urban-based, loose coa l i t i on of trade un ion is ts , female volunteers, indiv idual socia l workers and municipal p o l i t i c i a n s , and the i r cause attracted the support of a few reformist po l i t i c i ans inside the provincial l eg i s l a tu res . The Canadian TLC, representing the major and moderate arm of organized labour, was the f i r s t national in terest group to endorse the concept of mothers' pensions. From 1912 onwards delegates to i t s annual conventions approved resolut ions urging governments to pay working mothers to remain at home. Their motives, though, were not purely humanitarian. As with the i r e f fo r ts to el iminate the "scourge" of ch i l d and female labour, trade unionists were motivated in part by fears of low-wage competit ion. They were also unwi l l ing to unionize female workers "whose primary funct ions, they bel ieved, ought to have been in the home."12 181 Confusion over the target of pressure, however, characterized the un ion is ts ' ear ly advocacy and undermined t he i r spokesmen's claims to be the champions of the mothers' pensions movements.--3 i n i t i a l representations were made by the Saskatchewan and Ontario TLC executives to t he i r respective provincial governments in 1913 and repeated by the former in the fol lowing year. After the outbreak of World War I unionists selected Ottawa as t he i r target because the issue of mothers' pensions became entwined with the campaign to secure federal o ld age pens ions . 1 4 Consequently, they played only a subsidiary ro le in the concurrent campaigns to secure province-wide mothers' pensions. Notable women of the day act ive in soc ia l - se rv i ce volunteer work and/or the suffrage movement in Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, Vancouver and Toronto qual i fy as the real champions of the cause. Like other socia l reformers of the per iod, t he i r energies were not concentrated on securing a s ingle reform but d iss ipated among a wide var iety of causes. They a l l held executive posit ions in a var iety of non-sectarian women's organizations re f lec t ing the i r overlapping in terests in the ch i ld -we l fa re , p roh ib i t i on , suffrage, public health and urban reform movements. A biographical analysis reveals that the prime movers in the provinc ia l campaigns were mainly drawn from White Anglo-Saxon Protestant ranks, with a majority born in Ontario and the remainder e i ther American or B r i t i s h immigrants (see table 16, columns 1-2). They represented the urban middle c l a s s , as a l l but one or two were wives of businessmen and professionals. They also belonged to the ' l e i s u r e c l ass ' among organized women, because only a few had worked e i ther before or af ter marriage. The dominance of housewives in the mothers' pensions movement contrasted with the professional ly dominated suffrage e l i t e but was not unusual at a time when the idea of a married woman working outside the home was s t i l l frowned upon . 1 5 182 Table 16. Prime movers in provincial campaigns, by c i t y . Bir thplace Religion Paid Occupation Husband's Occ. No. of Pre/Post Marriage Children (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) Winnipeg: Deacon Ontario Cong. ? — C i v i l engr. 4 Dick " Baptist Teacher — Lumber merch. 6 Regina: Peverett " Anglican ? ~ Realtor 4 Stapleford ? Methodist ? - - Methodist c o l l . pr inc ipa l ? Calgary: Kerby Ontario Methodist ? - - " " 2 Riley " Anglican ? - - Stockbroker 3 Vancouver: Clark U.S. ? Teacher Union Pr inter 4 Agent Macken ? Theos. ? - - ? ? Toronto: Hamilton G.B. Anglican ? - - Surveyor 0 Huestis Ontario Methodist ~ ~ Re l i g . Publ . 4 Table 16 continued. 183 Table 16. Prime movers in provincial campaigns, continued Volunteer Work Suffrage Movement Party Publ ic o f f i ce Ex. Off ice Member Ex. Office/Supporter (6) (7) (8) (9) Deacon LCW*, NCWC*, X L ib . Man. MAB* Missionary S o c , Mothers' Assn. Dick Mothers' Assn . , IODE, C iv i c League L ib . Playg'd Assn . , CPF* PEL* Peverett LCW X Con.? Stapleford LCW, X Lib Wm.Educ'l. Club Kerby Ri ley Clark Macken LCW LCW, PCW* Rotary Club WCTU LCW, PTA Worn.Rate-payers Hamilton NCWC, YWCA LCW Huestis LCW, NCWC, CNIB CPHA*, Big S i s - Red Cross t e r s , Hm. Econ. YWCA Assn. ,Wm.Hosp., Wm.Erner.Corps, Wm.Emer.Leag. X X PRVL*, WSL*, WSRCC*, NEL* NEL, WSRCC, WVWVI* EFL*, OEFA*, OWCA*, US*, UVL* UVL ? Fern. Lab. Fern. Fern. Fern. Can. Food Bd. Van. MAB* Tor. C . C . , 1920-Ont. RC re feeble-minded SOURCES: Canadian Men and Women of the Time, 1912; National Reference Book, 1940; and Who's Who and Why in Western Canada, 1913. *The unfamil iar acronyms stand fo r Local Council of Women, National Council of Women Canadian Pa t r i o t i c Fund, Provincial Council of Women, Canadian Publ ic Health Association P o l i t i c a l Equal i ty League, Proportional Representation Voting League, Women's Suffrage League Women's Suffrage Referendum Campaign Committee, New Era League, Women Voters of Ward VI , Equa Franchise League, Ontario Equal Franchise Associat ion, Ontario Women Ci t i zens Association United Su f f rag is ts , United Voters League, Mothers' Allowances Board. 184 The champions of the cause of mothers' pensions subscribed to the dominant ideology of maternal feminism. Like the i r counterparts in the prohib i t ion and suffrage movements, they viewed female suffrage as "an enabling tool of pet socia l reforms" rather than as an equal r ights measure, and so represented "a conservative brand of women's socia l act iv ism."16 Although protect ive l eg i s l a t i on for women and chi ldren was the i r common goa l , they disagreed over the issue of par t isanship, with the majority favouring t i es with establ ished par t ies , while a minority advocated the formation of independent a l l iances of women voters, as table 16, column 8 reveals. The motives underlying the voluteers ' advocacy of mothers' pensions were mixed, re f lec t ing both humanitarian and c lass concerns. Phi lanthropic notions of women's work and mothering prompted them to s tar t day nurseries for working-class ch i ld ren . Their contact with the hardships experienced by sole-support mothers led them to endorse pensions as a remedy. The advocacy of middle-class volunteers a lso ref lected a concern for order and a more d i sc ip l i ned soc ie ty . This was v i s i b l e in the i r arguments, s t ressing the contr ibut ion made by "su i tab le" family l i f e to socia l s t a b i l i t y and the i r appeals based on socia l e f f i c i ency , i . e . , the costs of maternal care were cheaper than upkeep in publ ic ly-subsid ized i n s t i t u t i o n s . ! 7 L i l y Deacon and Harr iet Dick of Winnipeg spearheaded the campaign to secure province-wide pensions in Manitoba. They founded the Mothers' Association in 1909 " . . . t o bui ld a more 'enlightened motherhood' and to see to the welfare of chi ldren - with a program aimed at preventing juveni le delinquency."18 Although i t s act ive membership was smal l , numbering around twenty, they set up supervised playgrounds and establ ished a day nursery where "they saw mothers simply wearing the i r l i ves out in the struggle to keep the 185 family together."19 Acting upon D ick 's suggestion, the Mothers' Associat ion began an experiment in 1910 to demonstrate that maternal care for dependent chi ldren was cheaper than maintenance in publ ic ly-subsid ized i ns t i t u t i ons . During the 1910-16 period a to ta l of f i ve widows with 16 chi ldren were supported by allowances paid by the assoc ia t ion. Faced with decl in ing donations during the 1915 winter , Dick decided to organize a delegation to press the case for provincial act ion during the current session. She secured the support of other 'progressive ' forces in the c i t y , including the Local Council of Women and the Associated Cha r i t i e s , arranged favourable press pub l i c i t y that appeared under the b y - l i n e , "Mothers Pensions Prove An Economic Gain To State, " and c i ted the Pennsylvanian scheme as well as the local experiment.20 Urban, middle-class volunteers in Saskatchewan also took up the cause of mothers pensions. They belonged to the Local Council of Women (LCW) of Regina, a federation of local clubs founded in 1895 that had 39 a f f i l i a t e s representing 1,000 members by 1917.21 Although they operated a rescue home for unmarried mothers and a shel ter for deprived in fan ts , the i r involvement was not prompted by exposure to the problems faced by s ingle working mothers in caring for the i r ch i ld ren . Instead, i t was tr iggered by a request from the local mayor, whose u l t e r i o r motive was probably to fo res ta l l increased r e l i e f expenditure, as he had recently been elected on a pol icy of economy and " less extravagance."22 in response, the LCW investigated the subject, reviewed developments in Manitoba and approached the Min is ter of Mun ic ipa l i t i es , who was sympathetic but suggested l e g i s l a t i v e action should be delayed unt i l a f ter the war.23 The agi tat ion for province-wide mothers' pensions in Alberta had s im i la r roots. It was championed by the LCW of Calgary, a federation founded in la te 1912 that grew rap id ly , a t t rac t ing 54 a f f i l i a t e s with 3,000 members in just over one year.24 un t i l the f a l l of 1915 these volunteers devoted the i r time 186 and energy to the campaign to secure a provincial f ranchise, i n i t i a t ed by organized farm women. Once promises concerning women's suffrage and the related goal of prohib i t ion were extracted, t he i r executive focused the i r attention upon securing mothers' pensions: "Prompted by the idea that the chi ldren being the s ta te 's biggest asset , the women are of the opinion that a better step could not be t a k e n . " 2 5 An ideal vehic le for concerted action by LCWs in c i t i e s and towns throughout Alberta was provided by the formation of a provincial laws committee in 1916 to secure reforms for women and ch i ld ren. However, the Calgary group had d i f f i c u l t y convincing the i r colleagues that mothers' pensions was a top p r i o r i t y . 2 6 Under the committee's const i tu t ion a majority of a f f i l i a t e s of each LCW had to endorse the package of reforms pr ior to submission to the l eg i s l a tu re . As approval was slow in coming in Calgary,27 two impatient and in f l uen t ia l members of the Edmonton LCW, Emily Murphy and Mrs. C. Gainor, approached Premier Si f ton in the f a l l of 1916 and secured promises concerning a dower law and equal parental r igh ts . Their pre-emptive s t r i ke e f fec t i ve ly ruled out l eg i s l a t i ve action concerning pensions in the 1917 session and did not meet with the approval of Calgary vo lun tee rs . 2 8 The prime movers in the Calgary LCW were also caught of f guard by the Liberal Premier's decision to ca l l a surpr ise e lect ion in June 1917. They made no ef for t to cap i t a l i ze on the opportunity presented by the f i r s t exercise of the provincial women's franchise as they were divided over the question of women's role in p o l i t i c s . Other femin is ts , however, par t ic ipated ac t ive ly i n the campaign on behalf of the government that had granted prohib i t ion and suffrage. They included N e l l i e McClung of Edmonton, the nat ional ly known suf f raget te , who was "a -great platform at t ract ion for the L i b e r a l s . " 2 9 Although she was on record as favouring mothers' pensions,30 n e r address in 187 Calgary avoided mention of spec i f i c subjects. Instead, she successfu l ly urged the new women voters "to exercise love, char i ty and k ind-th inking" and vote for Sif ton.31 In contrast to the p ra i r i e campaigns, the champions of the B.C. ag i t a t i on , Susie Clark and Mrs. J . K . Macken were prominent suffragettes as well as social service volunteers.32 They founded the New Era League (NEL) in Vancouver fol lowing the passage of the suffrage and prohib i t ion referenda in the 1916 provincia l e lec t i on . Although the i r c lass background and the i r re l ig ious and p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s did not f i t the standard mold of the prime mover,33 they espoused the dominant ideology of maternal feminism. According to Clark, the aim of the new League was to promote female p o l i t i c a l par t ic ipa t ion in order "to gain jus t i ce through leg i s la t i on . "34 Although a l l women voters in the c i t y were e l i g i b l e to j o i n , i t s act ive membership reached only 40.35 Macken suggested the cause of mothers' pensions to NEL members in the 1917 winter , a f ter reviewing developments in Aus t ra l i a , New Zealand, Denmark, the American states and Manitoba.36 The League executive then secured the support of the LCW, an organization that had already investigated the subject and pet i t ioned Ottawa,37 and lobbied both the municipal and provincia l governments. Their overtures to Vancouver aldermen secured backing only for a p rov inc ia l l y funded pi an,38 and t he i r reception in the provinc ia l cap i ta l was also discouraging. Clark of the NEL headed the contingent of mothers' pensions supporters from Vancouver and V i c t o r i a , who represented various womens' organizat ions, c h a r i t i e s , loca l churches, organized labour and c i v i c o f f i c i a l s . The various speakers pressed upon the Premier the immediate necessity of l e g i s l a t i v e action to provide fo r widows and deserted women "forced through poverty to leave the i r homes and earn a l i ve l ihood for t he i r l i t t l e f l o c k . " 3 9 188 Undeterred by the i r f a i l u re to secure l eg i s la t i on in the 1918 sess ion , the NEL decided to broaden i t s base by securing the support of other urban 'progressive' forces representing prominent Liberal women, ch i l d welfare workers, veterans and c i v i c o f f i c i a l s , as well as of members of the rural Women's Ins t i tu tes . Consequently, a more impressive delegat ion, headed again by Clark, presented the case fo r a provincial-municipal pensions scheme to the cabinet short ly before the 1919 session.40 In common with the B.C. campaign, both female volunteers and prominent suffragettes were act ive in the agi tat ion to secure mothers' pensions in Ontario. Their ro les , however, were reversed with the volunteers taking the lead. Florence Huest is , President of the Toronto LCW, spearheaded the Ontario campaign. Her i n i t i a l e f for ts were concentrated on securing the backing of the National Council of Women of Canada (NCWC), the major non-sectarian volunteer organization and leading voice of maternal feminism during the war years. At i t s 1913 annual meeting her suggestion that provinces should fol low the example of Aus t ra l i a , New Zealand, I l l i n o i s and Missouri was approved,41 but not unanimously, as suffragettes l i k e Dr. El izabeth Shortt of Ottawa and Carr ie Derick of Montreal were "worried about the deb i l i t a t i ng ef fects of such 'handou ts , ' . . . . "42 jo appease these c r i t i c s , a committee which included Huestis and Shortt was appointed to invest igate the subject. Their favourable report was endorsed by the rank and f i l e in October 1915. However, t he i r recommendation concerning provincia l campaigns was undermined by the decision of the national leadership to d i rect the i r own lobbying at Ottawa during the war y e a r s . 4 3 Huestis was also act ive at the local l e v e l . After discovering that many women with infants in Toronto were forced to work to avoid s tarvat ion, she 18 9_ decided to create a pensions fund along the l ines of s im i la r experiments in other c i t i e s , presumably Chicago and Winnipeg. In March 1914, she headed a deputation of female volunteers and needy mothers which succeeded in persuading the c i v i c socia l service commission to sanction the exper iment . 4 4 After a lapse of four years , the LCW, in cooperation with the socia l service commission and church and labour organizat ions, establ ished a committee to press the Ontario government to introduce mothers' allowance l e g i s l a t i o n . 4 5 Prominent suffragettes also part ic ipated in the Ontario ag i ta t ion . Under the leadership of t he i r founder, Constance Hamilton, the United Suf f ragis ts of Toronto, an organization of f i ve local soc ie t ies founded in the f a l l of 1914, took up the c a u s e . 4 6 Their i n i t i a l e f f o r t s , however, were sho r t - l i ved , and fol lowing the disbanding of the United Suf f rag is ts , i t s a f f i l i a t e s reverted to the i r or ig ina l miss ion, the securing of the vote. Once th is was achieved in the 1917 sess ion, the leaders of the suffrage movement showed renewed interest in the issue of mothers' pensions. Harriet Prenter, the President of the newly formed P o l i t i c a l Education League described i t as a l e g i s l a t i v e p r i o r i t y " for pa t r i o t i c reasons"; and her col league, Mrs. Campbell Maclver, echoed her sentiments claiming that mothers' pensions " . . .would be better for the so ld ie rs ' wives than the present system." 47 Social workers employed by non-sectarian voluntary agencies and publ ic bodies also sanctioned the idea of state aid for needy mothers. Like female volunteers, they were drawn mainly from the urban middle c l a s s . They also represented conservative forces of socia l service act iv ism, regarding mothers' pensions as a cheaper method than ins t i tu t iona l care as well as a means of preventing the d is in tegrat ion of bourgeois family l i f e , "the best guarantor of soc ia l o r d e r . " 4 8 The bulk of sympathizers within the service professions 1.9LQ espoused the secular notion that social work represented the appl icat ion of s c i e n t i f i c methods to the problem of poverty, and the remainder were Protestant socia l gospel lers who regarded social work as a d iv ine vocat ion. Both types endorsed the concept of mothers' pensions at the f i r s t national socia l service congress held in March, 1914. However, t he i r stamp of approval was d i lu ted by the fact that the subject was not included in the l i s t of demands presented to Borden's cabinet at the end of the congress.49 Social workers in both the pr ivate and public sectors also part ic ipated in provinc ia l campaigns. At the inaugural meeting of the Ontario Associat ion of Chi ldren 's Aid Societ ies in 1912, employees of these new non-sectarian agencies, along with volunteers of both sexes, passed a resolut ion urging the payment of widows' al lowances; and at the 1918 convention of the newly formed B.C. Chi ld Welfare Assoc ia t ion, a s im i la r combination of professionals and volunteers d id l i k e w i s e . 5 0 Employees of c i v i c organized c h a r i t i e s , the forerunners of family casework agencies, were equally sympathetic, regarding the provision of pensions as an essent ial step in modernizing the whole process of r e l i e f assistance in the Dominion.51 j .H .T . Fa lk , the secretary of the Associated Char i t ies of Winnipeg, readi ly agreed to par t ic ipate in the experiment of the Mothers' Associat ion by supplying coal to the recip ients and to jo in the 1915 delegat ion. Woodsworth, the then fu l l - t ime secretary of the Canadian Welfare League, was another act ive supporter of the Manitoba movement, and the Edmonton Board of Public Welfare supported e f for ts in Alberta.52 The leadership of the Neighbourhood Workers' Associat ion of Toronto, a pioneer family casework agency, also par t ic ipa ted. Its founder and f i r s t president, Rev. Peter Bryce, was a prominent Methodist social gospel ler who believed that government intervention represented "the coordinated action of good c i t i zens in which the strong support the weak."53 19.1 Members of the new profession of social work in the publ ic sector were equally ac t i ve . They included the well-known feminist Rose Henderson, a provincia l probation o f f i ce r employed in the Montreal Juveni le Court. She was an e f fec t ive speaker, impressing the chairman of the federal House of Commons (Special) Committee on Old Age Pensions in 1913 with her plea for state aid for needy mothers as well as the dest i tu te aged.54 A prominent Ontario female reformer, Dr. Helen MacMurchy, also endorsed the cause. While serving as provincia l inspector fo r the feeble-minded, she was asked by the Whitney Government to invest igate the subject of infant mortal i ty in 1910, and her recommendations included a province-wide mothers' pensions plan.55 Another Ontario o f f i c i a l , J . J . Kelso, Superintendent of Dependent and Neglected Children from 1893, qua l i f i es as the or ig ina l Canadian advocate of mothers' pensions because his involvement dates from the mid-1890s. His annual reports of 1895 and 1896 suggested mothers' pensions and, as a resul t of his long-time advocacy, Kelso was asked in 1918 to chair the special committee created by the Toronto LCW to press for provincial ac t ion . He served in th i s capacity for a few weeks, wr i t ing a r t i c l e s for the press in which he c r i t i c i z e d the Hearst government for i t s tardiness in introducing mothers' pensions l e g i s l a t i o n . His publ ic c r i t i c i s m , however, prompted his p o l i t i c a l superior to ban Kelso 's further par t ic ipat ion in the Ontario campaign.56 A.M. McDonald, A lber ta 's second Superintendent of Neglected Chi ldren, was also a vocal proponent of mothers' pensions. He was disturbed about the increasing number of indigent chi ldren becoming wards of his department, bel iev ing that the i r removal from the i r fami l ies "was not r ight to do i f the mothers' sole crime i s poverty." He brought th i s trend to the attent ion of the 1917 convention of Alberta Women's Ins t i tu tes , urging the farm women to campaign for a sat is fac tory solut ion.57 1.9.2 Municipal p o l i t i c i a n s in Toronto and western c i t i e s a lso endorsed province-wide mothers' pensions as a means of reducing c i v i c r e l i e f expenditure. Reluctant to provide regular support even for resident widows, they balked at maintaining increasing numbers of dest i tute women who f locked into the c i t i e s in search of employment or r e l i e f during the f i r s t decades of th i s century. Their pol icy towards both resident widows and newcomers was blunt ly described by Regina's Rel ie f Inspector as "[t]o get r id of them; that i s the only method."58 The Social Service Commission of Toronto, the advisory body to the c i t y council on r e l i e f matters, cooperated with the prime movers in t he i r experiment and subsequent lobbying a c t i v i t i e s , because they perceived mothers' pensions to be a cheaper option than the ex is t ing system of municipal ly-subsidized ins t i t u t i ona l c a r e . 5 9 Elected o f f i c i a l s in Winnipeg too supported the e f for ts of female volunteers, because they real ized that a system of province-wide pensions would reduce the in f lux of cases of dependency from the rural d i s t r i c t s . Their spokesmen on the 1915 delegat ion, Hunt, the c i t y ' s s o l i c i t o r , was already invest igat ing ex is t ing schemes in Aus t r a l i a , New Zealand and cer ta in American s t a t e s . 6 0 Elsewhere in the West, the economy-minded mayor of Regina provided the i n i t i a l impetus to the Saskatchewan ag i ta t i on ; c i v i c o f f i c i a l s on the west coast openly supported the cause; and aldermen of A lber ta 's major c i t i e s eventually endorsed the movement.6 1 A few po l i t i c i ans ins ide the provincial leg is la tures also promoted the cause of mothers' pensions. They were drawn almost exc lus ive ly from the ranks of L ibe ra ls . As t he i r part ies represented the o f f i c i a l Opposition in the immediate pre-war period in a l l provinces except A lber ta , the i r experience in the p o l i t i c a l wilderness probably heightened the i r sens i t i v i t y to the growing demand for reform among the e lectorate. Their advocacy also ref lected the 19.3 inf luence of new ideas in the i r party 's ideology, with one proponent claiming that "the old l i be ra l struggle was for freedom, the new was for the proper appl icat ion of that freedom."62 N.W. Rowell, leader of the Ontario Liberal opposition between 1911 and 1917, and an act ive Methodist layman, was one of the f i r s t to grasp the electoral s ign i f icance of the issue of social reform. In h i s 1911 address to the electors he ranked "the promotion of the s o c i a l , moral , and indust r ia l welfare of the people" as a higher p r i o r i t y than material development. 6 3 Mothers' pensions were subsequently incorporated into his par ty 's platform in the f a l l of 1916.64 in Manitoba only Edward Brown, the Liberal leader in 1906 and unsuccessful candidate in the 1910 and 1914 provincia l e lec t i ons , openly associated himself with the prime movers by agreeing to j o in the 1915 delegat ion. However, h is successor, T.C. Nor r is , had a l l i e d the Liberal opposit ion with the general cause of socia l reform since 1910 in order to cap i t a l i ze on the discontent of a number of groups d i ssa t i s f i ed with the Roblin government. Liberal pledges concerning d i rect l e g i s l a t i o n , equal suf f rage, prohib i t ion and "progressive" l eg i s l a t i on fo r wage-earners attracted the support of organized farmers, Protestant c l e r i c s , Orangemen and feminists in the 1914 e lect ion.65 Although the Norris L iberals made s ign i f i can t gains, they f a i l ed to unseat the Conservative government, suggesting "that in a head-to-head confrontation with ' the forces of react ion ' reform ideas did not enjoy the support of a c lear majority of the electorate."66 In contrast to Manitoba, the resul ts of the f i r s t e lectoral contest in B.C. between a s im i l a r reformist Liberal coa l i t i on and a t rad i t iona l Conservative administrat ion augured well for the progressive cause. The v ic tors of the 1916 e lect ion included John W. DeB. F a r r i s , a Vancouver lawyer who 1 .9 .4 became Attorney-General and the new Minister of Labour in May 1917. He was a "prominent Bapt is t" and an adherent of the new school of lawmaking that viewed the law as "a tool of soc ia l jus t i ce . "67 He was fami l ia r with the concerns of female reformers as his wife Evelyn was a leading feminist . Farr is was also aware of the p o l i t i c a l benefits of protect ive l e g i s l a t i o n . According to the Conservative opposit ion leader, by 1918 the Attorney-General had "establ ished a record fo r chasing af ter women...not in the properly accepted or offensive sense of the term, but more as a means of catering to the vote of the f a i r s e x . . . . " 6 8 Mary El len Smith was another in f luen t ia l a l l y of the prime movers in the B.C. Legis la ture. She won a by-elect ion in Vancouver in January 1918, as an Independent on a platform of women's and ch i ld ren 's r i gh ts , cap i t a l i z i ng on the ant i -par ty sentiment of new female voters. Her "brand new s t y l e " of e lect ion program included pensions for widowed and dependent mothers, "and the women, now wel l-versed in the mult i far ious business of canvassing, e lect ioneer ing and platform speaking, supported i t v igorously."69 Individual reformist Liberals were also v i s i b l e on the government benches of the Alberta Leg is la ture . Wil l iam Davidson, the publisher of the independent Morning Albertan, won a Calgary seat in the 1917 e lec t i on , the f i r s t occasion on which women voted. His wife was an act ive volunteer and on record as favouring province-wide mothers' pensions, and he was perceived to be sympathetic to welfare l e g i s l a t i o n . Besides his general sympathy with the underpr iv i leged, Davidson's subsequent advocacy of mothers' pensions also ref lected cost considerations manifest in his claims that t he i r provision was "a stra ight case of business" and "the most economical way" of caring for dependent chi ldren.70 Although the re la t i ve cheapness of pensions was a recurring theme advanced by the broadly-based, loose ly-kn i t coa l i t i on of urban 193. reformers promoting the cause, not a l l segments of Canadian society accepted the argument that state a id would reduce costs . Opponents: Spokesmen of cap i ta l and agr icu l ture were not convinced. As major taxpayers, they were unsympathetic to any new ventures financed out of general revenues. Moreover, female re la t ives of organized farmers were also opposed to publ icly-funded pensions, and these tac i turn opponents in Canadian society had powerful a l l i e s in the guise of provincial Premiers. Apart from the par t ic ipat ion of a lone board of trade in a 1920 delegat ion, the Ontario business community refrained from endorsing the mothers' pensions movement. Instead of register ing i t s disapproval in the provincial c a p i t a l , i t s wealthier members voiced iso lated protests. In the course of recounting the i r experiences during the inf luenza epidemic, socia l service volunteers in Toronto countered businessmen's object ions. They "declared that the i r work had been to them a revelat ion of how the poor help the poor...and would have made salutary reading for people wto dogmatized on the shi f t lessness of the poor from the centre of a luxurious home." The secretary of the local Neighbourhood Workers' Associat ion a lso referred to protests voiced against publ ic pensions by a "reactionary group which feared the growing up of a pa te rna l i s t i c s ta te . " 7 - -Winnipeg businessmen voiced s im i la r anonymous sentiments. A female j ou r na l i s t , sympathetic to the cause of mothers' pensions, suggested that there were " . . .peop le who fear increased taxation as a resul t of such l e g i s l a t i o n " ; and she la te r rebuffed another argument of wealthy opponents to the ef fect that hardship experienced by chi ldren of poorer fami l ies was a pos i t ive factor in charac ter -bu i ld ing . 7 2 Fears were also expressed among the Winnipeg middle c lass that mothers receiving state aid "w i l l lose the i r sense of independence 19_6 and become, perhaps too f r ivo lous on the i r $25 per month, and take to going to picture shows, forgett ing the serious business of l i f e . " 7 3 Unlike businessmen in Manitoba and Ontar io, representatives of B.C. capi ta l applied overt pressure upon the new Liberal government to balance i t s books, a move that e f fec t i ve ly blocked l eg i s l a t i ve action concerning mothers' pensions pr ior to 1920. Premier Ol iver recal led that , in response to demands from the large banking ins t i tu t ions for government expenditure to conform to i t s revenue, taxat ion had been increased in 1917. "Mining companies had [then] come to the government with the threat of c los ing t he i r operations i f addit ional imposts were persisted i n . . . . " 7 4 Organized farmers, the other dominant economic i n t e res t s , were also passive opponents of mothers' pensions. Alarmed about the trend towards rural de-populat ion, they reacted defensive ly , dismissing socia l welfare measures as "un jus t i f iab ly extravagant and l i k e l y to benefit the urban at the expense of the rural population."75 Although the p ra i r i e farm organizations had ac t ive ly supported the cause of women's suf f rage, they refrained from endorsing mothers' pensions during the war. The United Farmers of Ontario was equally s i l en t on the issue, and the reaction of the i r mouthpiece, the Farmers Sun, to the 1919 reform package of i t s Liberal r i va l s suggested that the costs of mothers' pensions and other soc ia l welfare proposals were of paramount concern. "The platform adopted by Mr. Dewart's convention contains a complete statement of the S o c i a l i s t i c program, the enactment of which would ruin the country and reduce the farmers to a d is t ress which they have not yet experienced."76 Newly organized farm women in a l l provinces except B.C. were a lso reluctant to sanction the idea of state aid for needy mothers. Even though they shared a common desire for voting power with c i t y femin is ts , they were divided by economic i n te res ts , with the former representing a group of primary 19J producers and the l a t t e r an entrepreneurial and professional e l i t e . As a resu l t , they had d i f ferent l eg i s l a t i ve p r i o r i t i e s , re f lec t ing "the incompat ib i l i ty of agrarian and urban middle class v a l u e s . " 7 7 Although the a l l i ance forged between the United Farm Women of Alberta and urban volunteers persisted af ter the suffrage campaign, the presence of i t s president, Irene Parlby, on the prov inc ia l LCW committee was only token because she represented a mere 924 farm women compared with the 8,000 strong Women's I n s t i t u t e s . 7 8 The Ins t i tu tes , representing the voice of more conservative rural elements, res isted an iso la ted plea from the province's senior ch i l d welfare o f f i c i a l at t he i r 1917 convention (see page 178). The women's aux i l i a ry of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers also championed the provincial suffrage movement. Its founder, Vio let McNaughton, was cer ta in ly concerned about the explo i ta t ion of women forced by economic circumstances into the labour market.79 But during her tenure as president the issue of mothers' pensions was not brought before the rank-and-f i le membership. Its absence from convention agendas probably ref lected the same'concerns which surfaced at a Saskatoon LCW meeting, where objections were raised concerning the costs of a system of paid invest igators and fears voiced that pensions might encourage propagation of undesirables as well as desertion and divorce.80 The more s i zab le , government-sponsored Homemakers' Clubs a lso avoided discussion of the issue at t he i r war-time conventions. In contrast to Alberta and Saskatchewan, the women's suffrage movements in Manitoba and Ontario were directed by urban middle-class feminists rather than by farm and small-town women. As the d iv is ions between c i t y and countryside were sharp in these provinces, contact between the two sets of female reformers was minimal, with the prime movers in the mothers' pensions campaigns confining the i r prose ly t iz ing ef for ts within urban boundaries. 19.8 Rural women also comprised the bulk of the membership of the Protestant missionary s o c i e t i e s , the f i r s t national agencies of female volunteers to develop in Canada. Representing the most s izab le women's organizat ion, with an estimated membership of 200,000 in 1916, the i r endorsement of the concept of mothers' pensions would have added considerable weight to the movement. However, perceiving the i r sole purpose to be home and foreign missionary work, the various Protestant soc ie t ies "consistent ly refused to express an opinion on publ ic or socia l q u e s t i o n s . " 8 1 Male-dominated o f f i c i a l Protestant bodies such as the provincial and national conferences of Methodists and Presbyterians were equally reluctant to sanction the idea of state a id for needy mothers despite the ascendancy of the socia l gospel during the war. Even the interdemoninational socia l service counci ls of reform-minded c l e r i c s withheld t he i r approval during the early stages of the provincia l campaigns. The general secretary of the Ontario Social Service Counci l , Rev. Gi lber t Agar, pinpointed the underlying reason fo r the i r ret icence when presenting the case for l eg i s l a t i ve action to Premier Hearst in 1919. '"Even i f adequate cash provision i s made by the Government, we shal l need the church in the work,' he concluded, evidently fearing that the pension might be opposed by those who considered that private char i ty might be ch i l l ed i f the State inter fered."82 Administrators of Cathol ic char i t i es outside Quebec were also passive opponents. Their disapproval probably ref lected fears of the o f f i c i a l church hierarchy that state involvement would supplant the i r work and become another instrument of patronage. It was manifest in the non-response of Cathol ic re l ig ious orders operating orphanages in Manitoba to a request for information concerning the proportion of chi ldren of widows. 8 3 The various interests opposed to publ ic ly- f inanced pensions for sole-support mothers had supporters inside government. Despite the i r d i f ferent 19.9-party l abe l s , the Premiers of Ontario and the four western provinces shared a contnon reluctance to sanction pensions that ref lected i deo log i ca l , e lectora l and cost considerat ions. Both Hearst and Rob l in , the heads of Conservative governments in Ontario and Manitoba respect ive ly , were implacable foes of suffragettes and other reformers. Prepared only to sanction state intervention fo r economic development purposes, neither were bel ievers in "the awakening ideas of governmental respons ib i l i t y for the correct ion or amelioration of socia l i n e q u i t i e s . " 8 4 Of the two, Premier Roblin was the more outspoken c r i t i c of co l l ec t i v i sm, perceiving the demand for mothers' pensions as a l ien to the Canadian p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . A "[h]ard-headed businessman," he "regarded the reform s p i r i t as a fad inspired by subversive American republican p r i n c i p l e s . " 8 5 The Liberal Premiers of Saskatchewan and Alberta were also reluctant to endorse mothers' pensions, even though they were receptive to demands for prohib i t ion and suffrage. They could safely ignore the pleas fo r province-wide pensions as these emanated from the c i t i e s rather than the countryside, t he i r major support base. Their apathy a lso ref lected cost considerations as both t he i r administrations were confronting war-time d e f i c i t s (see table 17). B r i t i s h Columbia Liberal po l i t i c i ans were equally unprepared to sponsor a provincial i n i t i a t i v e during the i r tenure of o f f i c e . Brewster, the f i r s t head of the reformist administ rat ion, confronted serious f inancia l problems upon gaining power in 1916, as revenues were inadequate to meet the heavy expenditure on roads and other cap i ta l - in tens ive pro jec ts . His successor, O l i ve r , inher i ted not only the problem of meagre revenue flow but also the backlash a r i s ing from the remedy of increased taxat ion. He ruled out l e g i s l a t i v e action in the 1918 session on the grounds that "the administrat ion 200 could not go any faster than the people who paid the taxes would allow i t to t r a v e l . " 8 6 Table 17. Provincial de f i c i t s in Ontario and the western provinces, 1914-20 f i s ca l years B r i t i s h Fiscal year Ontario Manitoba Saskatchewan Alberta Columbia 1914 $ 697,927 $ 126,496 $ 146,319 $5,283,653 1915 553,641 $ 343,713 570,442 3,968,171 1916 249,973 457,692 737,199 3,791,811 1917 567,369 492,398 2,624,956 1918 584,714 643,046 140,424 1919 772,409 1920 732,245 SOURCE: Calculated from f igures showing ordinary revenues and expenditures in the relevant f i s c a l years in Canada Year Book, 1931, pp. 861-3, tab le 24. Prec ip i tan ts : Even though the circumstances resul t ing in l e g i s l a t i v e action varied in each of the f i ve provinces, there were common underlying themes prec ip i ta t ing the payment of mothers' pensions. In a l l cases the granting of equal suffrage during the war pushed the issue of protect ive l e g i s l a t i o n higher up the p o l i t i c a l agenda because women represented s izable blocs of new voters. In th is respect, province-wide mothers' pensions represented " p o l i t i c a l concessions to women's i n t e res t s . " However, p o l i t i c i a n s ' e lectora l ca lcu lat ions were also tempered by cost considerat ions, with the resul t that the or ig ina l schemes f e l l far short of the prime movers' expectations. While representing symbolic recognit ion of the fami ly 's ro le in rearing ch i ld ren , t he i r "concessions" res t r i c ted the extent of f inanc ia l l i a b i l i t y and only provided support for 'deserving' conventional family u n i t s . 8 7 As Premier Roblin of Manitoba, "the 'bete no i re ' of western re fo rmers , " 8 8 had won re-e lect ion in 1914, the prospect of a wartime i n i t i a t i v e concerning 201 mothers pensions was remote. His government, however, was sho r t - l i ved , resigning a f ter the parliament bui ldings scandal brought the 1915 session to a stormy ending. Norr is , the leader of the Liberal opposi t ion, was asked to take over the reins of power. In the summer, he sought a mandate to implement prohib i t ion and suffrage and other pledges made in 1914, and was elected on a reform t i cke t with feminist s u p p o r t . . . . " 8 9 No promises concerning pensions were made during the campaign. But the champions of the cause had ac t ive ly campaigned on behalf of the L ibe ra l s , and had an in f luen t ia l a l l y , Edward Brown, the new provincia l Treasurer. However, the unprecedented package of reforms, announced in the throne speech opening the new Parliament, contained no mention of f inanc ia l aid for needy mothers. This omission probably ref lected reluctance on the government's part to fund a cost ly new program when a d e f i c i t of $500,000 was already ant ic ipated, a r i s ing from implementation of e lect ion pledges. Moreover, Premier Nor r is ' support base included the powerful Manitoba Grain Growers, " . . . a n d . a l l farm governments are essent ia l l y conservative in the i r approach . " 9 0 Winnipeg socia l workers played an in f luen t ia l ro le in prec ip i ta t ing l e g i s l a t i v e act ion during the 1916 session. Shortly af ter the Liberals had taken o f f i ce in May 1915, the 40-member Social Service Workers Club appointed a committee to invest igate the subject of mothers' pensions. It was chaired by G.B. Clarke, an employee of the Associated Char i t i es , and included two known advocates, Falk and Dick, as well as a representative of the c i t y ' s M in is te r ia l Assoc ia t ion. They examined relevant l eg i s la t i on in Denmark and the American s ta tes , adopting wholesale the pr inc ip les governing the administrat ion of mothers' pensions in New York. They also compiled s t a t i s t i c s on the extent of widowhood in Manitoba. Despite the surpr is ing f inding that the proportion of ch i ldren of widows in orphanages represented only 5 percent of inmates, they 202 concluded that state aid was s t i l l the "most economical way" of caring fo r father less chi ldren because in the long term i t would reduce the number of adult dependents in provincia l ins t i tu t ions.91 The committee's report was completed in the same month as the opening of the 1916 sess ion. According to the Manitoba Free Press (29 January 1916), i t was " in r e a l i t y , the substance of the b i l l on 'Widows' P e n s i o n s ' . . . . " Copies were sent to a l l the MPPs pr ior to pub l ica t ion. The report-cum-bi 11 was then presented formally two days af ter the passage of the women's suffrage b i l l by a delegation headed by Dick and comprising representatives of the Mothers' Associat ion and the LCW, with Woodsworth act ing as the soc ia l workers' spokesman. Outright re ject ion of t he i r demand was r isky as the new government gained o f f i ce at a time when, in the Premier's words, " . . . a great wave of publ ic opinion [was] passing over the U.S. and Canada demanding that po l i t i c i ans keep the i r promises."92 As Liberal pledges included implementation of an i n i t i a t i v e mechanism, the cabinet could hardly afford to ignore the i r supporters' demands for mothers' pensions. But the three ministers who met the deputation were not prepared to commit themselves to l e g i s l a t i v e action without some ind icat ion of the costs of the proposal. The authors of the report responded quickly and suggested $30,000 as the provincial contr ibut ion for the f i r s t year , to be matched by a s im i la r grant from the m u n i c i p a l i t i e s . 9 3 The Liberal government, however, reduced the i r share by one-hal f , presumably because of i t s concern over the forecasted d e f i c i t . In mid-February of 1916 the provincial Treasurer asked the leg is la tu re to approve an item of $15,000 to cover the provincia l contr ibut ion toward mothers' pensions, and when replying to a lone d issenter , he stressed the reductions in provincia l subsidies to orphanages that would resul t from the proposed measure. The passage of the l eg i s l a t i on was swi f t . The b i l l was introduced on February 28th 20.3L by Premier Nor r i s , given unanimous approval at the second reading stage two days la ter ,94 and royal assent on March 16th. The l eg i s l a t i on was c lea r l y viewed as an experiment because no provision was made for f ixed funding. However, with i t s passage "Manitoba...was to pioneer the concept of the socia l serv ice state in Canada."95 The 1916 Mothers' Allowance Act was l i t t l e more than a skeleton, re f lec t ing i t s experimental character and hasty passage. Its res t r i c ted scope c lea r l y ref lected the inf luence of the advocates. Their report on "State sa la r ies for mothers" recommended that only widows and wives of men in insane asylums should be e l i g i b l e , presumably because the i r poverty was involuntary. Famil ies of phys ica l ly disabled men were excluded, as were other categories of sole-support mothers considered 'unworthy' because the i r dest i tu t ion was of a voluntary and 'blameworthy' character.96 y n e advocates' suggestions concerning character, c i t i zensh ip and residency requirements, and the chosen method of administrat ion were also adopted. But provincial po l i t i c i ans determined the s ize and the method of ra is ing provincial and municipal contr ibut ions (see appendix B) . In a province where agrarian interests predominated, the l i ke l ihood of Saskatchewan taking an early cue from i t s eastern neighbour and implementing mothers' pensions l eg i s l a t i on was remote. However, i t s new Liberal Premier, W.M. Mart in, in the f a l l of 1916, inher i ted an administration with less than a year to run. He displayed an ear ly awareness of the fact that 284,000 women, representing around 40 percent of the tota l populat ion, would vote for the f i r s t time in the forthcoming e lec t i on . In his inaugural address in November Martin stated that "the women of the province w i l l now y i e l d an ever- increasing inf luence for good in the making of a l l our laws, but more par t i cu la r l y w i l l they inf luence laws that af fect the home and family."97 204 Although prohib i t ion and other measures designed to appeal to the new women voters were implemented during the 1917 sess ion, mothers' pensions were not considered. Female delegates, including volunteers from the Regina LCW, took steps to rec t i f y th i s omission at the provincia l Liberal convention in March. In response to the i r lobbying, the party incorporated into i t s platform an e x p l i c i t pledge to inaugurate a pensions scheme for al_l_ des t i tu te , father less fam i l i es . Not to be outdone, the Conservative opposit ion revised the i r January manifesto to include mothers' pens ions . 9 8 During the e lect ion campaign in June 1917, the governing Liberal party c lea r l y had the advantage over i t s major r i v a l , as i t had granted equal franchise and temperance l e g i s l a t i o n . But "the Woman vote was an unknown element which refused to take s i d e s . . . . " 9 9 Both part ies made special e f for ts to win i t . Liberal platform speakers, for example, at meetings in Regina c i ted mothers' pensions as an example of the "progressiveness" of the government. 1 0 0 Their sentiments were endorsed at the p o l l s , with women voting " in large numbers...for the government, and for c l e a n n e s s . " 1 0 1 The throne speech opening the new Parliament promised l eg i s l a t i on to estab l ish a pension system for deserving and indigent mothers. This measure was ant ic ipated by the press as a redemption of the e lect ion pledge. On November 27th the Attorney-General introduced a resolut ion providing pensions only for widows with ch i ld ren . He pointed out that the measure was "a beginning" and acknowledged that i t was "not per fec t . " In the ensuing discussion the only c r i t i c of the narrow scope of the scheme was a farmer and ret i red clergyman, M.L. Lei tch (L ib , M o r s e ) . 1 0 2 The Liberal government's decision to finance a id only fo r widows ref lected cost considerat ions. Its members took ser iously the i r pledges of sound administrat ion and economy made to t he i r mainly agrarian supporters, and so were disturbed about the sizeable d e f i c i t appearing at the 205 end of the 1916 f i s c a l year. In order to reduce i t , Premier Martin decided to retain d i rect taxat ion as a method of ra is ing revenue. Although i t was o r i g i na l l y introduced in the f i r s t session of 1917 on the pretext of ra is ing funds for the Canadian Pa t r i o t i c Fund, he made the provincial levy permanent in the second session of 1917. The passage of the l eg i s l a t i on was non-controversia l , and went unreported in the press. Like the other wartime precedent, Saskatchewan's 1917 Mothers' Pension Act was dist inguished by i t s brev i ty . However, in contrast to Manitoba, i t s terms ref lected the stamp of cost-conscious po l i t i c i ans rather than external p o l i t i c a l fo rces. In addit ion to providing benefi ts to impoverished widows only, the scale of the pension and the methods of f inancing and administration were so niggardly that Saskatchewan qua l i f i ed for the dubious d i s t i nc t i on of having the most r es t r i c t i ve scheme among the provinces pioneering the payment of mothers pensions (see appendix B). In contrast to Saskatchewan, the Liberal government of Alberta survived i t s f i r s t encounter with the newly enfranchised women without having to make cost ly pledges concerning mothers' pensions. The new Premier, Charles Stewart, was a farmer who was dependent upon agrarian interests for his p o l i t i c a l s u r v i v a l , a re lat ionship that did not augur well for the urban-based mothers' pensions campaign. The new Premier's rural support base included the Women's Inst i tutes which, according to the president of the r iva l UFWA, comprised merely "another p o l i t i c a l machine, bought and paid for by the Government." 1 0 3 Representatives of these "conservative" women's s o c i e t i e s , however, precip i tated an important development at t he i r 1918 convention. In response to a resolut ion submitted by the newly formed Calgary Ins t i tu te , they "hear t i l y " endorsed the pet i t ion to be presented by the prime movers in the forthcoming sess ion. They were then given deta i l s of the Manitoba scheme by Ne l l i e McClung, 206 a guest speaker, who urged the farm women to write the i r provincia l l eg is la to rs on the s u b j e c t . 1 0 4 The endorsement of the in f luen t ia l Inst i tu tes proved to be an e f fec t ive spur. It assured urban maternal feminists of a more sympathetic hearing than they had received in the past. In response to the i r pe t i t ion for a mothers' pensions ac t , submitted in the 1918 sess ion, Premier Stewart promised a sum of $20,000 that year to aid fami l ies in the chief c i t i e s of the province, and a b i l l at the next session to provide for mothers' pensions and the means of f inancing them. 1 0 5 The Premier's response was influenced mainly by the ex is t ing state of provincial f inances. The budget had been presented the day before he met the delegat ion, and contained a proposal to impose d i rect taxation upon mun ic ipa l i t i es , ostensibly to raise the province's share of the Canadian Pa t r i o t i c Fund. However, the main purpose was to reduce the estimated d e f i c i t stemming from uncollected municipal taxes and increased expenditures. In the f a l l of 1918 the promised funds for needy mothers were made ava i lab le on the understanding that each c i t y would match the provincial contr ibut ion of $ 5 , 0 0 0 . 1 0 6 Fearful that the Premier might forget his promise-to introduce l e g i s l a t i o n , the Calgary LCW organized a special meeting between the Premier and female socia l serv ice volunteers, trade un ion is ts , c i v i c representatives and local Calgary MLAs. The concept of mothers' pensions was widely endorsed, and suggestions concerning the terms of the scheme were of fered. Several speakers urged the Premier not to incorporate the stigma of char i ty in the l eg i s la t i on by leaving administration of funds to voluntary agencies which gave r e l i e f in kind only, once applicants qua l i f i ed as 'deserving' cases. They included a labour spokesman who argued that " . . . t he pensioning of mothers was in no sense char i ty but the i r jus t r i gh t . " Premier Stewart, however, was very reluctant to endorse cash grants: 207: . . . I t i s a l l r ight to say turn over the cheque to the mother and le t her do her own managing, but you a l l know as well as I do that there are some mothers who can make $70 go farther than others w i l l s t re tch $150. There i s no socia l l eg i s l a t i on that w i l l teach a mother how to manage. We rea l i ze th is and that i s exactly the stumbling-block in our way. Nonetheless, he assured the meeting that the government was going to take l e g i s l a t i v e a c t i o n . 1 0 7 In the month preceding the opening of the 1919 session the movement for mothers' pensions gained increased support. The Alberta Federation of Labour passed a resolut ion endorsing the idea.108 More crucia l was the approval of delegates attending the convention of the United Farmers of A lber ta . Its spokesmen presented the i r l e g i s l a t i v e request to the cabinet on January 28th. and a further conference was held on February 15th. Their demand for mothers' pensions e f fec t i ve l y ruled out further procrast inat ion as Stewart's government was "ent i re ly dependent on farmers for powe r . " 1 0 9 On February 18, 1919, the long-awaited l eg i s l a t i on was introduced in the House. It s t ipulated that allowances would be paid only to widows and wives with husbands in insane asylums. These benefits were to be financed j o i n t l y by the province and munic ipa l i t ies and l imi ted to $3.00 per week per c h i l d . The terms of the resolut ion produced protests outside the Leg is la ture . The mayors of Calgary, Edmonton, Lethbridge and Medicine Hat registered the i r disapproval of the cost-sharing formula by sending a jo in t telegram of protest to the Premier. "Whilst the i n i t i a l amount may not be heavy, i t en ta i l s a precedent which i s undesirable where the c i t i e s are concerned." The Calgary LCW organized a special meeting to voice the i r discontent with the cost-sharing formula and other prov is ions, including the narrow scope of the ac t .HO Debate on the second reading of the mothers' allowance b i l l occurred on February 27, 1919. The two female leg is la to rs elected in 1917, Louise McKinney, 208 -a Non-Partisan League member, and Roberta McAdams, a So ld ie rs ' representat ive, attacked the narrow scope of the b i l l . The l a t t e r also described the maximum of $3.00 per week per ch i l d as "absurd" in view of the high cost of l i v i n g , and the terms of the appl icat ion as "so modifying and humi l iat ing" as to deter the very women who should receive assistance from app ly ing .HI These c r i t i c i sms had some impact on the Liberal government. In early March the Premier met groups of c i t i zens from Calgary, representing the LCW and local un ion is ts , and from Edmonton, representing the Board of Publ ic Welfare, the Anglican Union Associat ion and women volunteers. Stewart informed them that his government had decided to reword the b i l l , "el iminat ing as far as possible the ta in t of cha r i t y , " and to remove the meagre maximum of $3.00. But he f l a t l y refused to broaden i t s scope.H2 His reluctance ref lected cost considerat ions, as the publ ic accounts revealed a cash d e f i c i t of $643,000 at the end of the 1918-19 f i s c a l year. The Premier's adamance, however, was not accepted pass ive ly . During the committee stage A .F . Ewing (Con., Edmonton) introduced an amendment broadening the scope to include wives of prisoners and physical ly incapacitated men. His plea for equal treatment of a l l needy chi ldren was echoed by other MLAs, inc luding the Conservative opposition leader, George Hoadley, who suggested that the extra money could be found somewhere. "We have da l l i ed with the subject too long and advise that they now take time by the forelock rather than go s lowly, as the Premier adv ised. " This provoked an outburst from Stewart, who declared that "the Government refused to be stampeded into going any further than the Act s ta ted . " The vote on Ewing's amendment was subsequently los t by a small major i ty. A suggestion that the province could assume a larger share than 50 percent of the payments, i f the system of d i rect taxation inaugurated in 1918 was reta ined, was also rejected.113 The provincial contr ibut ion of 209. $50,000 was subsequently approved and the Mothers' Allowance Act received royal assent on Apr i l 17th. Despite the controversy over the content of the scheme, the po l i t i c i ans c lea r l y won the margin of v i c to ry . They made the crucia l decisions concerning the scope and the method of f inanc ing, whereas advocates ins ide and outside Parliament influenced only more minor provisions re la t ing to residency, the scale of allowances and the method of administrat ion. The progress of the B r i t i s h Columbia agi tat ion for province-wide pensions stemmed less from in tens i f ied lobbying than from a combination of circumstances that developed in the f a l l of 1919. In la te September the provincial Conservative convention adopted a resolut ion approving the p r inc ip le of mothers' pensions.U4 As an e lect ion was imminent, act ion was required from the Liberal government to undercut the reformist appeal of i t s major r i v a l . Around the same t ime, demands in tens i f i ed for the appointment of a commission to study socia l problems. The pressure emanated from the Returned So ld ie rs ' Party i n the Leg is la tu re , but there was also "a broad publ ic sentiment" in favour of such an inqu i ry , pa r t i cu la r l y with regard to health i n s u r a n c e . ^ 5 Individual members of O l i ve r ' s cabinet were swayed by these pressures. W. Sloan, Minister of Mines, and a key o f f i c i a l in the B.C. Liberal Assoc ia t ion, wrote to the Prov inc ia l Secretary expressing the hope that a commission would be appointed "as soon as possib le" to inquire into pensions for widows, state health insurance and expansion of the Workmen's Compensation A c t . H 6 In response, the Provincial Secretary consulted E.S.H. Winn, chairman of the Workmen's Compensation Board, who suggested a three-member commission to invest igate health insurance, mothers' pensions, maternity benef i t s , publ ic health nursing and possibly old age pensions.117 Pr io r to the f ina l dec is ion , Ottawa was consulted for c l a r i f i c a t i o n concerning the appropriate level of j u r i s d i c t i o n . The federal Minister of 210 Labour agreed with B .C . ' s Attorney-General that mothers' pensions and minimum wage l eg i s l a t i on f e l l under provincia l j u r i s d i c t i o n . ^ 8 A "soc ia l welfare" commission was subsequently appointed on November 19th to invest igate mothers' pensions, health insurance and maternity benef i ts . Winn was named chairman and the other members were: C e c i l i a Spofford, a V ic to r ia volunteer, prominent in the prohib i t ion and suffrage movements; T.B. Green, a New Westminster physician chosen to represent doctors, employers and veterans; and D. MacCallum, past president of the B.C. Labour Federation and an o f f i c i a l in the new provincial Department of Labour. They were instructed to complete the i r invest igat ion into mothers' pensions "as early as possib le" in order that l e g i s l a t i v e action could be taken during the 1920 sess ion. Their report was completed in the fol lowing March. It reviewed developments in the American s ta tes , the p ra i r i e provinces and Ontar io, as well as presenting the reasons for ac t ion. The commissi oners pointed out that at the publ ic hearings held throughout the province "widespread demand fo r the immediate c r y s t a l l i z i n g of mothers' pensions l e g i s l a t i o n " had been evident. State aid for indigent mothers had been endorsed by 77 women's groups, 24 f raternal soc ie t i es , 34 labour organizat ions, 10 ministers of the gospel , 13 doctors and 50 ind iv idua ls , including employers, mayors and school t r us tees .H9 As women comprised a s izab le bloc of new voters, representing around 40 percent of the e lec tora te , the Liberal government had l i t t l e choice but to accept the recommendations of the report and enact such a popular piece of l e g i s l a t i o n . Deta i ls of the mothers' pension b i l l were announced by the Provincia l Secretary. The l eg i s l a t i on was based on the suggestions of the commissioners but contained one s ign i f i can t novel feature. The cabinet rejected t he i r recommendation that the scheme should be financed j o i n t l y with the mun ic ipa l i t i es , and opted instead to assume the f u l l costs of the plan. Their 211 re ject ion was not a reaction to apparent pressure from the mun ic ipa l i t i es . Presumably, the increased expense of th i s method of f inancing was traded of f against the e lectora l advantages of a purely provincia l scheme. In the subsequent campaign the i n i t i a t i o n of mothers' pensions was the basis of appeals made by the Premier and Attorney-General Farr is for the votes of veterans, women and workers. The b i l l was introduced in the House by the Prov inc ia l Secretary on Apr i l 7th. The Liberal Government then inv i ted a deputation of " l ad ies " from Vancouver and other c i t i e s to attend the debate on the second reading. On Apr i l 9th the inv i ted guests heard the i r representat ive, Mary El len Smith ( Ind. , Vancouver), describe the occasion as a "red l e t t e r day" in the history of the women's movement in B . C . , because they " . . .would now rea l ize the i r dream in placing motherhood where i t belonged." The sentiments expressed by the lone woman of the Assembly were endorsed by the leaders of the Covservative and So ld ie rs ' par t ies and many others. The only c r i t i c was J.W. Weart ( L i b . , Vancouver), who favoured a federal rather than a provincial scheme, and argued that the b i l l did not go far enough because i t excluded old age pensions. When c los ing the debate, Premier Ol iver l i ved up to his reputation for honesty by point ing out that the members should rea l i ze that "someone would have to pay the costs."121 The committee stage was a formal i ty and the b i l l received royal assent at the close of the 1920 session. Unlike the p ra i r i e l e g i s l a t i o n , the B r i t i sh Columbia Mothers' Pension Act was based upon the recommendations of a government commission. By and large, i t s members' suggestions concerning scope, c i t i zensh ip and residency requirements, scale of allowances and method of administrat ion were accepted by the government. However, the imprint of po l i t i c i ans was not neg l i g ib le , as they 212; determined the cruc ia l method of f inanc ing, a choice that dist inguished B.C. from the other ' leaders ' (see appendix B) . In contrast to i t s western counterparts, the Ontario labour movement was a cata lys t in pushing the issue of mothers' pensions higher up the provincial agenda. After a lapse of nearly s ix years , the Ontario TLC executive saw f i t to include a request for widows of c i v i l i a n s and sa i lo rs in i t s 1919 l e g i s l a t i v e program. Their inc lus ion was, in part , a response to the decision taken by the national congress in September 1918 to switch the target of pressure from Ottawa to the provinces. It was also prompted by a desire to remove working mothers from factory jobs at a time of abnormal unemployment in the province, a motive admitted by J .T . Gunn af ter presenting labour 's demand for mothers' pensions to the provinc ia l cabinet . The Premier then met a small delegation representing the forces act ive in the Toronto committee pressing fo r province-wide pensions. In response to pleas for state aid from representatives of female volunteers, soc ia l gospel lers and trade un ion is ts , he agreed to consider the matter c a r e f u l l y . ! - 2 2 In February 1919 Premier Hearst duly honoured his promise to organized labour by appointing Dr. W.T. Riddel 1, the province's f i r s t Deputy Min is ter of Labour, to study the subject of mothers' pensions and prepare a report on the operation of schemes elsewhere, as well as estimates of costs . Hearings of the one-man commission were held in Toronto, Ottawa, Kingston and Hamilton. In a l l , 93 witnesses, including femin is ts , c l e r i c s , doctors, socia l workers, volunteers and unionists were heard. They endorsed the general p r inc ip le of publ ic aid for dependent mothers and urged immediate l eg i s l a t i ve ac t ion . They a lso emphasized the "necessity of divorcing the proposed ass is tance. . . f rom any ta in t of c h a r i t y . " I 2 3 213.. Electoral pressures, however, played havoc with the response of the government. It was ant ic ipated by the press that Dr. R idde l l ' s report would be completed in time fo r implementation of his recommendations during the 1919 session, but an inter im report was not published unt i l well a f ter the end of the session. The Conservative government had decided to postpone enactment of a scheme unt i l the f ina l session of the fourteenth Parliament jus t before the next e lec t i on . This would be the f i r s t occasion for the nearly 1,500,000 women of Ontario to exercise the i r r ight to vote, and mothers' pensions would be a powerful drawing-card. The Hearst government was also anxious to cu l t i va te indust r ia l workers in order to undercut the appeal of the new Labour c o a l i t i o n . State aid fo r needy mothers would a lso be popular with churchmen who represented s izab le congregations. The co l l ec t i ve support of these urban forces act ive in the pensions movement would represent a formidable challenge to the ascendant United Farmers of Ontario (UFO). But the Premier's strategy changed. In the f a l l of 1919 Hearst ca l led a 'snap' e lec t ion on the same day as the prohibi t ion referendum. A major factor in his decision to hold the two together was the women's vote. "Inasmuch as they were the backbone of the temperance movement, could he not, therefore, reasonably expect most women to support him in the next elect ion?"124 When announcing the date of the e lec t i on , Premier Hearst promised a pension fund for sole-support mothers.125 The Liberal opposition was already on record as pledging to implement mothers' pensions, and the new Independent Labour Party manifesto also included pensions for mothers with dependent chi ldren as well as for the aged.126 in contrast , the UFO platform contained no mention of soc ia l welfare measures except a pledge to provide equal educational oppor tun i t ies.12 7 214 The upset v ic tory scored by the UFO, therefore, introduced an element of uncertainty concerning the ear ly enactment of a mothers' pension scheme. Their agrarian philosophy was "fundamentally antagonist ic" to such programs,128 a n ( j t he i r f i r s t p r i o r i t y was "to cut out a l l expenditures that are not absolutely essent ia l . "129 on the other hand, the i r new leader, E.C. Drury, was opposed to 'group government' and was a Methodist lay preacher of socia l gospel persuasion. Moreover, the survival of his administration depended upon the support of the eleven Labour members, so pol icy concessions were necessary, as well as cabinet posi t ions for the i r representat ives, M i l l s and Ro l l o . Early in 1920 a deputation presented the case for mothers' pensions to the new Premier on behalf of a l l denominations, most social serv ice agencies, phi lanthropic and education soc ie t ies in the province, as well as the TLC and the GWVA. 130 But the f ina l spur to l eg i s l a t i ve act ion came from the Labour group in the Legis la ture. At a caucus meeting the eleven MPPs decided to press for implementation of mothers' pensions as well as two other reforms in the forthcoming session. Shortly a f ter the caucus meeting the cabinet agreed to t he i r demands. On February 19 R o l l o , Min ister of Labour, announced at Elora that the three measures would be put through at the coming sess ion. The timing of the announcement was s i gn i f i can t , as Rollo was accompanying Attorney-General Raney in his bid to secure endorsement there as a member of the government.131 On the same day as the Elora announcement the report of Dr. Riddel 1 was publ ished. It was "a comprehensive document" reviewing s im i la r l eg i s l a t i on in Denmark, New Zealand, 39 U.S. s ta tes , Alaska, Hawaii and the p ra i r i e provinces, and containing s t a t i s t i c s on the extent of widowhood in Ontario.132 Its author recommended a three-year development of assistance for over 3,000 dependent 215 mothers at an estimated cost of $895,533, to be shared j o i n t l y by the province and the mun ic ipa l i t i es . A Globe ed i to r ia l (21 February 1920) endorsed the plan and stressed the need for urgent action to meet " . . . a n obl igat ion that the Province should no longer evade." The release of Dr. Riddel 11 s report , however, was not followed by swift l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . Although a mothers' pension scheme was promised in the throne speech of March 1920, i t was not unt i l May that l eg i s l a t i on was introduced in the House. Apparently the Labour members encountered considerable resistance from the i r farmer colleagues over i t s passage. George Hal crow, the i r house leader, complained pub l ic ly that " i t had been l i k e pu l l ing teeth to get the government to place the Mothers' Allowance Act and minimum wage l eg i s l a t i on for women on the books."133 Eventual ly, on May 10th, Rol lo introduced a b i l l to provide for payment of allowances in cer ta in cases to mothers of dependent ch i ld ren . The subsequent debate on the b i l l was br ief .134 A few Liberal MPPs attempted to persuade the government to include fami l ies of men sent to j a i l , deserted wives and unmarried mothers. But the i r amendments were opposed by government min is ters , mainly out of a "desire to keep down the costs of the scheme," and voted down.135 y n e b i l l was passed without major changes and came into ef fect in Ju ly 1920. In common with B r i t i s h Columbia, a government-sponsored invest igat ion had preceded the passage of the 1920 Ontario Mothers' Allowance Act. Consequently, the l eg i s l a t i on incorporated the suggestions made by Dr. Riddel 1 concerning scope, c i t i zensh ip and residency requirements, methods of f inancing and administrat ion. However, his recommendations met f inancia l constraints decided upon by po l i t i c i ans and so the i r inf luence was not neg l i g i b le . 216 Protracted Struggles, 1920-37 By the summer of 1920 Ontario westward comprised a so l i d block of t e r r i t o r y where mothers' pensions schemes were operat ive. Its eastern neighbours, however, resisted implementation of s im i la r plans for years. Nova Scotia was the f i r s t to capi tu late in 1930. New Brunswick enacted leg is la t ion in the same year, but made no payments un t i l 1944. Quebec eventually conceded in 1937. Prince Edward Island was the last stronghold to f a l l , but i t s la te entry in 1949 probably ref lected i t s persistent rural character rather than outr ight res is tance. What, then, explains the tardiness of the other maritime provinces and Quebec in sanctioning the payment of statutory benefits for sole-support mothers? The question of why the ' laggers ' resisted has received l imi ted a t tent ion. Anne Perry, a pioneer western femin is t , i den t i f i es the re la t ive lack of inf luence of eastern women voters as the major reason for the delay. She contends that maritime women fa i l ed to take advantage of the franchise they acquired in 1918 in Nova Scotia and 1919 in New Brunswick, whereas Quebec women lacked a provincial suffrage unt i l 1940, so the i r inf luence was dismissed as "ut ter ly neg l ig ib le " by p o l i t i c i a n s . 1 3 6 A socia l h i s to r i an , Strong-Boag, a t t r ibutes the tardiness of the eastern provinces to two other fac tors . "Their delay ref lected the greater weight of progressive sentiment in the more western provinces and the more sophist icated welfare t rad i t i on which had already grown up by 1 9 1 4 . " 1 3 7 The remote prospect of a federal scheme also accounts for the loss of momentum of the movement to secure province-wide mothers' pensions af ter World War I. Despite the c lear lead given by the western provinces and Ontar io, some advocates continued to favour a federal scheme over the patchwork nature of provincial prov is ion. Moore, the TLC president, regarded the issue of state aid for father less fami l ies as "a national question" and regretted that the d iv i s ion of powers had resulted in provincia l i n i t i a t i ves .138 y\js organizat ion, however, concentrated i t s energies in the interwar period upon lobbying the '1 aggers' to take l eg i s l a t i ve action rather than pressing Ottawa. In cont rast , Canadian Methodists and Presbyterians advocated implementation of federal l eg i s l a t i on during the immediate postwar years.139 Their expectations were raised by the incorporation of mothers' pensions into the reformist platform of the federal L ibera ls in 1919, and kept a l i ve during the 1920s as the subject became entwined with the agi tat ion to secure a nation-wide system of old age pensions. Apart from the ambiguity surrounding the target of interwar pressure, another, more powerful obstacle hindered the eastern progress of the mothers' pensions movement: the s p i r a l l i n g costs of the programs in t e r r i t o ry west of Quebec. Expenditures on mothers' pensions exceeded estimates and increased throughout successive years of the 1920s (see tab le 18). Moreover, i f the Saskatchewan example i s any guide, they consumed a larger proportion of provincia l funds during th is decade than general r e l i e f . ^ 0 Cost considerations were of more pressing concern in the maritime provinces than in Quebec, as they had higher proportions of widows. During the 1920s successive governments in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were plagued with inadequate revenues and recurring d e f i c i t s (see table 19). Their top p r i o r i t y was to secure a better deal from Confederation and th is was not achieved unt i l 1927, when the Duncan report proposed an increase in unconditional subsidies to the maritime provinces. Its recommendation was accepted by Prime Minister King, and increased federal funds were forthcoming before the end of the decade. 2 1 g ; Table 18. Amounts expended on mothers' allowances (or their equivalent), 1916-17 to 1938-39 (to the nearest dollar) 1916-17 Manitoba 63,964 Sask. Alberta British Columbia Ontario Nova Scotia Quebec 1917-18 81,285 1918-19 7,810 9,938 1919-20 36,955 16,111 1920-21 437,237 103,210 207,144 118,489 774,667 1921-22 329,259 158,300 252,243 331,366 1,382,138 1922-23 426,148 194,480 242,686 413,948 1,612,701 1923-24 406,020 219,480 257,412 454,041 1,715,155 1924-25 295,527 252,775 283,439 507,493 1,790,680 1925-26 415,206 301,280 314,298 553,872 1,886,095 1926-27 413,924 322,066 340,000 598,020 2,017,614 1927-28 470,445 355,610 364,604 612,645 2,205,877 1928-29 543,507 521,880 374,377 719,967 2,324,388 1929-30 485,060 467,575 396,755 759,698 2,478,205 1930-31 465,739 544,250 466,536 816,272 2,582,221 333,346 1931-32 483,618 479,607 842,977 2,698,789 348,172 1932-33 403,915 439,139 779,640 2,806,239 358,158 1933-34 407,993 439,983 621,502 3,030,415 356,074 1934-35 440,580 462,393 589,622 1,390,621 413,997 1935-36 444,874 474,120 507,502 616,555 3,946,816 363,981 1936-37 445,550 484,068 613,564 682,588 4,582,525 400,066 1937-38 433,384 495,988 748,272 4,851,641 426,448 1938-39 427,782 498,048 620,299 790,101 5,000,041 424,615 2,064,733 SOURCE: These figures are taken mainly from Veronica Strong-Boag, '"Wages for Housework': Mothers' Allowances and the Beginnings of Social Security in Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (Spring 1979):29, table 1. 219. Table 19. Provincial deficits in the maritime provinces and Quebec, 1914-37 fiscal years. Fiscal Year P.E.I. N.S. N.B. Quebec 1914 $ 213,435 1915 $ 39,615 120,370 1916 1917 225,389 $594,090 1918 241,163 41,153 1919 153,494 413,517 1920 115,832 1921 91,306 539,607 1922 790 1923 235,743 168,540 1924 118,142 110,236 1925 5,262 1,502,060 556,239 1926 582,468 1927 33,679 49,070 1928 609,448 103,686 1929 530,200 1930 218,921 843,735 1931 303,621 89,990 780,506 1932 71,375 163,104 402,690 $ 594,708 1933 129,213 1,618,884 79,069 6,840,908 1934 271,147 1,292,332 624,060 5,594,473 1935 376,297 807,601 703,117 4,939,235 1936 24,654 424,969 1,923,176 1937 120,774 SOURCE: Calculated from figures showing ordinary values and expenditures in the relevant fiscal years in Canada Year Book, 1931, 1941, pp. 861-3, table 24 and pp. 784-5, table 46, respectively. 220 Throughout the 1920s the impoverished state of provincial finances was the major reason for the delay in implementation of mothers' pensions in Nova Sco t ia . It prevented the Liberal government enacting the recommendations of a 1921 report of the Royal Commission on Mothers' Allowances before i t s defeat at the po l ls in 1925. It remained the main obstacle for the new Conservative administrat ion of Premier Rhodes unt i l near the end of the decade. Once increased funds from federal coffers began to flow into the province, there were renewed demands for implementation of mothers' pensions. In 1929 par t ic ipants at a publ ic meeting organized by the Hal i fax Chi ldren's Aid Society ca l led for l e g i s l a t i v e ac t i on ; and the i r demand was subsequently endorsed by the Provincia l Director of Chi ld Welfare.141 However, i t was e lectora l considerations that tipped the sca les . The Conservative government had been returned to o f f i ce in 1928 with a small majority of three seats, and in January 1930 i t contested a " c r u c i a l " by-elect ion a r is ing from the death of a cabinet min is ter . At the onset of the campaign Premier Rhodes promised to introduce allowances for needy mothers and other reforms, namely minimum wages fo r women and old age pensions. His three-point pledge was the main theme of the subsequent elect ioneering and contributed to the v ic tory of the government candidate. The Conservative Premier then redeemed his pledges concerning mothers' allowances and minimum wages during the 1930 session.142 Simi lar circumstances beset the advocates of province-wide mothers' pensions in New Brunswick. The f inancia l problems facing the Liberal government in the f i r s t half of the 1920s e f fec t i ve ly precluded implementation of the recommendations of a commission that reported in 1925. As in Nova Sco t ia , Liberal ru le ended in 1925 with v ic tory fo r the Conservatives. Like i t s predecessor, the new administrat ion turned down labour demands for mothers' 221 pensions and other reforms on the plea that the province was f i nanc ia l l y unable to meet the reques t s . I 4 3 Ant ic ipat ing an increased federal subsidy, the New Brunswick Federation of Labour renewed i t s e f for ts from 1927 onwards to secure provincial a id for sole-support mothers and par t ic ipat ion in Ottawa's scheme for the dest i tute aged. In 1929 i t s requests for an invest igat ion into old age pensions was acceded to by the government. Once the inquiry began, labour spokesmen persuaded Premier Baxter to broaden i t s scope to include mothers pensions. The commissioners reported favourably on the mothers' pensions proposal,144 a n c j e lectoral pressures once again prompted enactment of a scheme. Premier Baxter 's f i r s t term of o f f i ce was due to expire af ter the 1930 sess ion , so l eg i s la t i on was passed concerning mothers' allowances, old age pensions, minimum wages for women and ch i ld protect ion. Although the 1930 Mothers' Allowance Act was not proclaimed unt i l 1943 because of p o l i t i c i a n s ' fears about increasing the tax burden, i t and the other statutes "served to get the government through the e lect ion."145 In contrast to the marit imes, f inancia l constraints were not the primary factors delaying the enactment of mothers pensions l eg i s l a t i on in Quebec as that province enjoyed re la t ive prosperity up unt i l the ear ly 1930s. Instead, the opposit ion of the Roman Cathol ic clergy to state intervention in socia l welfare imposed a powerful curb on ac t ion. They resisted i t part ly because they perceived i t as a consequence of i n d u s t r i a l i z a t i o n , a process they deplored because of i t s secu lar iz ing influence.146 j h e clergy a lso feared that state a id for needy mothers would supplant t he i r own char i table work. Their fears were heightened by the passage of the 1921 Publ ic Char i t ies Act , which establ ished a cost-sharing formula for the care of indigents within char i table 222 i n s t i t u t i ons . This l eg i s la t i on provoked a "v io lent " reaction from the Cathol ic Church because the clergy feared that i t "would create another instrument of patronage for the state."147 Despite t h i s , the new Liberal Premier, Taschereau, was not impervious to demands for assistance for needy mothers. In 1922 he authorized l imi ted funding in response to a request from a delegation representing the Family Welfare Associat ion of Montreal, a Protestant voluntary organizat ion, for an annual appropriation of $200,000 fo r f i ve years to support needy sole-support mothers.148 However, his response f e l l far short of a provincial scheme, and fur ther demands from volunteers and trade unionists were res i s ted , part ly because of Taschereau 1s concern about the s p i r a l l i n g costs of his 1921 i n i t i a t i v e . Towards the end of the 1920s the Premier faced mounting pressures to enact mothers pensions from opposition members and from organized labour. In response, h is government commissioned a survey by Charlotte Whitton on ch i l d and family wel fare, and her 1931 report recommended adoption of mothers' pensions. It a lso appointed a commission in September 1930 to invest igate soc ia l insurance and i t s second report came out in favour of publicly-funded pensions for needy mothers. These semi -o f f i c ia l endorsements provided ammunition for reform-minded l e g i s l a t o r s , and the proposals were incorporated in to Conservative pol icy by the party 's new leader, Duplessis , "who was nothing but an astute p o l i t i c i a n . . . . " Depression condi t ions, however, made i t d i f f i c u l t for Taschereau to s i lence c r i t i c s of his "inadequate socia l po l icy" by l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . His government survived the 1935 e l e c t i o n , but the new coa l i t i on of reformist Conservatives and Liberals made an impressive showing. Following the stormy session of 1936, Taschereau resigned and dissolved the new Parliament. The Union Nationale won an easy v ictory in the subsequent e lec t i on . The new Premier, Duplessis, ca l led a special session to deal with "urgent" l e g i s l a t i o n , and mothers' allowances were enacted in the 1937 s e s s i o n . ^ 9 A Review The socio-economic set t ing exerted a re la t i ve l y l imi ted impact upon the long struggle to achieve payment of province-wide mothers' pensions across Canada. The wartime boom coincided with the onset of concerted campaigns in the western provinces and Ontar io, but i t only generated surplus revenues in central Canada. In the two new p ra i r i e provinces the emergency of war acted as more of a cata lys t by exposing the inadequacies of ex is t ing revenues, and prompting t he i r leaders to impose an income tax , an ef fect pinpointed by Peacock and Wiseman (1967). With the reversion to conservative f i sca l orthodoxy once peace came, the depressions of the 1920s and 1930s made i t d i f f i c u l t for the maritime '1 aggers' to fol low the ' l eade rs . ' Prevai l ing cul tura l at t i tudes towards the dependent poor a lso shaped the mothers' pensions movement. Among sole-support mothers, widows with dependent chi ldren were perceived to be the most 'deserving' because the i r poverty was c lea r l y involuntary, with fami l ies of inmates of mental hospitals ranking second in the hierarchy. War r e l i e f work heightened awareness of t he i r p l ight and underlined the importance of ch i l d welfare general ly. Foreign precedents, espec ia l l y the American state experiments, also acted as a stimulus to the successful provincial campaigns. Their inf luence was much more pronounced than in the previous case s tudies, presumably because statutory benefi ts rather than emergency aid were under invest iga t ion . It confirms the proposit ion of Woodsworth (1977) that the flow of ideas across national boundaries inf luences the timing and content of social benefit programs. However, the negative effect of d i f fus ion i s also evident in the case study. Awareness of the s p i r a l l i n g 224 costs of ex is t ing domestic programs acted as a powerful deterrent for eastern provinc ia l Premiers. Resides delaying the development of Canada-wide mothers' pensions, i t was also to curb the introduction of further welfare innovations at the provincial level in the remainder of the interwar per iod, as Wi l lard anticipated.150 The federal structure of government inf luenced both the successful provincial campaigns and the protracted struggles. The prov inc ia l governments were selected as the major targets because of t he i r j u r i s d i c t i o n over soc ia l welfare and the example set by the American s ta tes , but the wartime lobbying of Ottawa by national organizations of organized labour and women volunteers indicated an element of uncertainty concerning the appropriate level of sponsorship of a perceived new technique of income support. Provincia l po l i t i c i ans made no apparent attempts to def lect demands to the federal government except in the case of B r i t i s h Columbia. However, despite t he i r sponsorship of statutory benefits for needy mothers during the 1916-20 per iod, the dual targets of inf luence bu i l t into the federal structure served to fragment the subsequent ef for ts of advocates to secure uni formity. Concerning societa l ac tors , the case study represents another variant of group p o l i t i c s , with the var io is interests d iv id ing along urban-rura l , secu lar - re l ig ious and occupational l i n e s . The successful provinc ia l campaigns were offshoots of the broader chi ld-saving and suffrage movements that developed in Canadian c i t i e s in the f i r s t decades of th i s century. As trade unionists numbered among the advocates, they cannot qua l i fy as class-based ag i ta t ions , but the bulk of proponents represented the Anglophone middle c lass and espoused bourgeois values that stressed order, s t a b i l i t y and the potential savings accruing from maternal care. 225 Female volunteers in Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary and Vancouver were the prime movers. Their promotion or support of the suffrage cause was based on the rea l iza t ion that 'enl ightened 1 l eg is la t ion for women and chi ldren could only be secured through voting power. Among these maternal femin is ts , the supporters of t rad i t iona l part ies were much more successful than independents in further ing the cause of province-wide mothers' pensions. Their e f for ts were supported by employees of non-sectarian welfare agencies in both the private and publ ic sectors . The co l l ec t i ve par t ic ipat ion of both volunteers and professionals represented a novel form of pressure group a c t i v i t y in th is study and challenges the contention of Guest (1980) that the Canadian voluntary char i ty establishment opposed the development of state aid for needy mothers. In f ac t , only representatives of denominational char i t i es res isted i t . Among Protestants, female volunteers in the rural-based national missionary soc ie t ies were more consistent opponents than male c l e r i c s in the o f f i c i a l church bodies. The Cathol ic clergy refrained from sanctioning the idea, perceiving state aid to be a possible instrument of patronage, and a threat to i t s own char i table work and to the rural values i t espoused. Businessmen and farmers were also mainly passive opponents, with the i r sporadic protests drowned out by the wartime s p i r i t of reform. Other fami l ia r group actors representing c l i e n t s , however, were not part ic ipants in the movement. Besides the common constraints imposed by condit ions of poverty upon co l l ec t i ve ac t ion , needy sole-support mothers faced special problems in promoting t he i r own cause. Female p o l i t i c a l par t i c ipa t ion was then a very novel idea, and more establ ished in terest groups l i k e organized labour and women volunteers showed l i t t l e interest in organizing them. Inside government the pre-eminent role of p o l i t i c i a n s was once again confirmed, even though some reform-minded provincial bureaucrats played an 226 advocacy role in the early stages of the successful campaigns. I n i t i a l l y , the Premiers of the f i ve provinces west of Quebec resisted the pleas voiced by group ac tors , economy-minded c i v i c po l i t i c ians and a few reformist Liberal l e g i s l a t o r s . Despite t he i r varying party l abe l s , they shared a common h o s t i l i t y to the idea of f inancing pensions that ref lected ideological b e l i e f s , e lectoral ca lcu lat ions and f i s c a l conservatism. However, once aware of the electoral sal ience of the p o l i t i c s of motherhood, they were prepared to take l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion. Their motives confirm the hypothesis of Bird (1970) that the entry of s izab le blocks of non-taxpaying voters into the electorate induced Canadian po l i t i c i ans to expand welfare spending. Their "concessions" to new female voters, though, were tempered by the same f i s ca l conservatism that had branded innovations in emergency state a i d . Electoral pressures were equally e f fec t ive in spurring the reluctant po l i t i c i ans in eastern Canada to enact mothers' pensions schemes. By 1937 a l l provincial governments, except Prince Edward Is land, had made commitments to pay statutory benef i ts . Unlike the or ig ina l innovation in emergency state a i d , the pioneering venture in statutory benef i ts was not shaped by soc ia l control p o l i t i c s . Instead, both the successful campaigns and protracted struggles for province-wide mothers' pensions were dominated by in teres t group c o n f l i c t s . While the conste l la t ion of forces included fami l ia r part ic ipants representing the major sectors of the economy, i t also incorporated the Canadian char i ty establishment, a pressure group previously inact ive in the p o l i t i c s of wel fare. Cabinet po l i t i c i ans once more dominated the socia l policymaking process. Their decisions concerning the timing of the schemes were notivated pr imar i ly by e lectora l ca lcu la t ions , motives which were much less apparent in the i r decisions to sponsor i n i t i a t i v e s fo r dest i tute employables. Their ever-present 227 f i s c a l conservatism, though, shaped the content of the pensions plans. Moreover, i t was a key factor in explaining why subsequent programs for the dependent poor lacked the purely provincial l a b e l , as the next chapters reveal . CHAPTER 8 OLD AGE PENSIONS, 1927 In 1927 the Canadian Parliament passed l eg i s l a t i on providing for a federa l -prov inc ia l scheme of means-tested old age pensions. The statute represented a landmark in the development of publ ic assistance because i t marked "the dominion government's f i r s t major entry into the f i e l d . . . o n other than an emergency b a s i s . " ! It was also s ign i f i can t because i t establ ished a precedent for future provision in the interwar period for unemployable veterans and the c i v i l i a n b l ind . Unlike the statutory innovations for these disabled groups, the introduction of means-tested old age pensipns has already been invest igated. Bryden, in his pioneering study, views the or ig ins and evolution of Canadian publ ic pensions pol icy as essent ia l l y a product of a con f l i c t between the emerging "environmental want" and the dominant "market e thos . " 2 Reaction to his novel in terpre ta t ion, however, has been mixed, with some c r i t i c s confused over whether the con f l i c t represents a clash of values or of interest groups, and others' perturbed by the vagueness of h is key concepts.3 Bryden's h is to r i ca l analysis of the forces shaping Ottawa's 1927 i n i t i a t i v e can also be questioned on the grounds of incompleteness. It focuses mainly on the advocates of federal ac t ion , ident i fy ing organized labour and a few MPs as the major champions of the cause. Consequently, i t neglects non-labour pressures directed at Ottawa; opponents outside the corporate sector res is t ing federal ac t i on ; and both advocates and opponents operating at the provincial l e v e l . The purpose of t h i s chapter i s to rec t i f y these omissions by e lucidat ing the range of p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the introduction of Canada's f i r s t publ ic pensions plan for the aged. 228 229. Background In Canada, as elsewhere, the aging of the population was an important demographic change, accounting for the emergence of the issue of publ ic pensions from the turn of the century onwards. From 1871 onwards the proportion of older age groups in the to ta l population increased in a l l census years except 1911 and 1921, when substantial immigration of young adult males temporarily halted the trend. During the agi tat ion for old age pensions the i r re la t i ve d is t r ibu t ion varied by region, with the maritime provinces and Ontario consistent ly having a higher ra t io of adults aged 70 years and over than the national average, whereas Quebec's ra t io was just under and the western provinces' well below i t (see table 20). These regional var iat ions ref lected d i f ferent patterns of migration in eastern and western Canada, as well as varying b i r th rates between provinces.4 Table 20. Population 70 years and over as percentage of to ta l populat ion, Canada and provinces, 1901-41 census years. 1901 1911 1921 1931 1941 Canada 3.1 2.8 2.8 3.3 4.0 Prince Edward Island 4.3 5.3 6.0 6.5 6.3 Nova Scotia 4.2 4.7 4.7 5.1 5.2 New Brunswick 3.5 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.4 Quebec 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.9 3.1 Ontario 3.4 3.5 3.5 4.1 4.9 Manitoba 1.3 1.4 1.7 2.6 3.6 Saskatchewan 1.5 0.9 1.2 1.9 2.9 Alberta 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.9 1.9 B r i t i s h Columbia 1.3 1.2 1.8 3.0 4.7 SOURCE: Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-making in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens Universi ty Press, 1974), p. 32, tab le 6. 230 The growth of industry and the sh i f t of population to urban areas from the la te 1890s onwards also increased the problem of dependency among the e lde r l y . Their emergence was accompanied by a decl ine in the importance of occupations, such as farming and small business, that enabled ind iv iduals to remain sel f -support ing beyond the age of 65. The twin processes of i ndus t r i a l i za t i on and urbanization also undermined the v i a b i l i t y of the extended fami ly , a major source of protection for the dependent aged. As the medical health o f f i ce r for Toronto pointed out in 1924, "[h]igh rents, overcrowding in houses, make i t d i f f i c u l t for the poor to provide for the i r aged parents."6 Although no precise data on the extent of poverty among the older age groups was avai lab le unt i l the 1950s, a memorandum published by the federal House of Commons Special Committee on Old Age Pensions in 1913 provides some guide. It concluded that i f the proportions in Canada were the same as in other, unspecif ied countr ies, the number of persons e l i g i b l e for means-tested pensions would be between 100,000 and 150,000.6 j n - j s estimate represented between 50 and 75 percent of a l l adults aged 70 and over, or 30 to 45 percent of the 65 plus age group in 1911. 7 Unsk i l l ed , seasonal workers and the i r wives const i tuted the bulk of t h i s group. Their low and intermit tent earnings precluded saving for t he i r retirement, and so they were e f fec t i ve ly excluded from par t ic ipat ion in the pr ivate plans offered by insurance companies, fraternal soc ie t ies and trade unions, or the low-cost federal old age annuity scheme introduced in 1908. The other ava i lab le options were bleak and carr ied the stigma of pauperism. Outdoor r e l i e f was provided by private char i t ies and mun ic ipa l i t i es , but usual ly only on an emergency basis because the appl icant 's poverty was widely perceived to re f lec t indiv idual f a i l u re rather than socio-economic causes. Indoor r e l i e f was also ava i lab le in both private and publ ic ins t i tu t ions for the dest i tute e lde r l y . Provision of ins t i tu t iona l care, however, was patchy at the turn of the century, with f a c i l i t i e s concentrated in central and eastern Canada (see table 21). It was also inadequate, for even in Ontario, with i t s re la t i ve l y comprehensive network of i n s t i t u t i ons , demand for shel ter outstripped supply, forcing aged indigents to seek shelter in p r i s o n s . 8 Table 21. Number of homes for aged poor and ins t i tu t ions for adult poor with number of inmates in parentheses, Canada and provinces, 1900 Aged Poor Homes Adult Poor Ins t i t u t i ons 8 Men Women Both Sexes Total Canada 9(815) 14(273) 32(2052) 55(3140)° 719 (47,195) P .E . I . 13 ( 992) N.S. 2( 38) 2( 38) 78 ( 2,561) N.B. 1( ID 1( 109) 2( 120) 37 ( 1,307) Quebec 5( 94) 19(1534) 24(1628) 321 (26,355) Ontario 8(761) 4( 57) 12( 409) 24(1227) 207 (12,850) Manitoba 1( 19) 1( 19) 14 ( 677) N.W.T. 27 ( 539) B.C. 1 1 2( 108) 24 ( 1,714) SOURCES: Figures on homes are compiled mainly from Women of Canada: Their L i f e and Work, a handbook compiled by the National Council of Women of Canada for d is t r ibu t ion at the Paris International Exh ib i t i on , 1900; reprint e d . , 1975, ch . 11. Data on ins t i tu t ions are taken frcm Census of Canada, 1901, v o l . IV, pp. 357-60, table 18. 3This category includes specia l ized homes for aged poor and other types of paupers, as well as asylums, hosp i ta ls , in f i rmar ies , convents, monasteries, mission houses, houses of industry, refuge and providence, and pr isons. b Th is total i s an underestimate because the l i s t i n g of inmates i s incomplete in the NCWC survey and represents only 2 percent of the 70+ age group. 232 The t rad i t iona l methods of re l iev ing dest i tu t ion began to be questioned from 1890 onwards. The ensuing public discussion on other options ref lected the inf luence of developments outside Canada. I n i t i a l in terest was sparked by a posi t ive reference in the 1889 report of the Royal Commission on the Relations of Labour and Capital to the French scheme of annuit ies for e lder ly workmen and the i r f am i l i es . Passing attention was also paid in the Toronto press to other European innovations, such as the German 1889 old age insurance scheme and the Danish 1891 non-contributory p lan. More sustained in te res t , however, was shown in developments within the Empire, namely the adoption of means-tested old age pensions in New Zealand in 1898, New South Wales and V ic tor ia in 1901, and Br i ta in in 1908. It was translated into concrete demands for s im i la r provision within Canada in the f i r s t decade of th is century . 9 The Old Age Pensions Movement Like the mothers pensions ag i ta t ion , the movement to secure old age pensions was dominated by group rather than socia l control p o l i t i c s . Its par t i c ipan ts , however, divided over the issue of state aid along mainly occupational l i n e s , with secu lar - re l ig ious and urban-rural cleavages being much less c lear-cut than in the previous case study. Trade unionists rather than maternal feminists championed the cause, and the i r choice of Ottawa as the i n i t i a l target set the pattern for subsequent lobbying by other par t i c ipants . They had a more d i rect vested in terest in retirement schemes for aging indust r ia l workers than in income maintenance measures for working mothers, whom they perceived as marginal members of the labour force. The e lder ly themselves were not par t i c ipants in the movement as the i r age-related dependency combined with the i r lack of resources impeded organizat ion. Instead, labour 's cause was supported mainly by non-economic in terest groups 2 33 representing Protestant cler ics and veterans. It was opposed by familiar opponents of welfare innovations, agriculture and capi ta l . Besides competing interests, their struggle represented a clash of values concerning the respective merits of annuities and social insurance vis-a-vis state-financed, means-tested benefits. The old age pensions movement was more protracted than the successful campaigns for province-wide mothers' pensions and spanned over a quarter of a century. It was a slower process, partly because the agitation was promoted by representatives of the emergent working class rather than middle class reformers, and more signi f icant ly, because their major demand required unprecedented government expenditure, a development resisted by powerful opponents. Consequently, analysis is broken down into two stages covering the pre-war agitation and the concerted campaign waged between 1914 and 1927. The Pre-War Agitation, 1905-14 In the decade preceding World War I demands for and against state aid for the aged were voiced both outside and inside Parliament, and were directed mainly at Ottawa rather than the provincial governments. The divisions among the original participants affected the campaign in the following ways. On the one hand, the advocates' isolated demands for old age pensions helped to remove the concept from ".. . the category of an unthinkable thought."1° On the other hand, the opponents' defence of traditional welfare methods and values impeded the progress of the pre-war agitation by providing poli t icians with a rationale for inaction. Trade unionists qualify as the pioneers of the old age pensions movement. The Canadian TLC, the major voice of organized labour representing international business unionism, and the smaller, nationalist Canadian 234 Federation of Labour were the only national interest groups to endorse the cause in the pre-war per iod. They campaigned pers is tent ly for the adoption of a federal scheme for dest i tute aged workers from 1905 onwards. Concurrent with the i r uncoordinated ag i ta t ion , organized miners in Nova Scotia lobbied for a provinc ia l i n i t i a t i v e and succeeded in securing l eg i s l a t i ve action in 1908, but the contributory plan was never implemented. Organized labour 's pioneering e f fo r ts ref lected not only vested in te res t , but also an a l t r u i s t i c concern for the pl ight of the aged poor general ly . "As working class organ iza t ions , . . . t rade unions were pecul iar ly sens i t ive to the changing wants of the emerging urban-industr ial s o c i e t y . 1 , 1 1 Pr io r to the F i r s t World War, however, unionists represented only an embryonic p o l i t i c a l force. The majority of indust r ia l workers remained unorganized, even though the proportion belonging to unions increased from 6.5 percent to 28 percent in the f i r s t decade of th is c e n t u r y . 1 2 In the i r e f for ts to increase the i r membership, Canadian unions faced numerous obstacles ar is ing from the mobi l i ty of labour, i t s heterogeneous nature and the act ive resistance of employers.13 Moreover, the lack of unity among the minority of workers who were organized undermined the i r effect iveness in the pre-war per iod. "In the face of divis ions,. . .governments could move at t he i r own chosen speed in introducing l eg i s l a t i on to improve working conditions and to remove the danger of serious con f l i c t in a society rapid ly moving in to an indus t r ia l i zed s t a t e . " 1 4 Organized workers were much too feeble to force the pensions issue on t he i r own, against "the resistance of the market ethos and the economic in terests j u s t i f i e d by i t . " These barr iers were manifest in overt pressure appl ied by mine owners to block implementation of the Nova Scotia scheme. 1 5 Other spokesmen of capi ta l remained s i l e n t , even though t he i r f i s c a l conservatism and h o s t i l i t y to unions would suggest resistance to the concept of non-contributory old age pensions. They were passive rather than act ive opponents because the i r interests were not challenged d i rec t l y by any pre-war l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e . Ottawa's intervention was l imi ted to sponsorship of an old age annuities scheme based on voluntary contr ibut ions, a plan that posed no threat to pr ivate insurance companies because few were involved in the sale of annuit ies for old age.16 Another reason for the passive stance of corporate in terests was the minimal level of public discussion on the pensions issue which re f lec ted , according to a Labour MP, " . . . the opposit ion of a very strong element which i s al l-powerful with the p r e s s . " ! 7 Organized farmers, the other dominant economic in terest group, were a lso passive opponents. In the pre-war period they vigorously defended agrarian values of rugged indiv idual ism and se l f - r e l i ance in response to challenges posed by indust r ia l growth and rural de-populat ion. Farmers in Ontario and Quebec - where the f l i gh t from the farm was most pronounced - were the most vocal opponents of the emerging urban-industr ial society and resisted labour demands for minimum wages and the eight-hour day. Their spokesmen, however, who appeared before the federal House of Commons Special Committee on Old Age Pensions in 1913, were divided over the d e s i r a b i l i t y of pensions for the aged. According to a committee member, the consensus of opinion among Ontario farmers was that an old age pensions scheme was "a very desirable th ing , " whereas representatives of Quebec farmers were opposed to such a plan for themselves but recognized the need for i t in large indust r ia l c e n t r e s . ! 8 Despite th is mixed react ion, federal po l i t i c i ans perceived rural in terests to be opponents. W.T. White, the Finance Minister in Borden's cabinet , rejected the 1913 236 : committee's recommendations on the fol lowing grounds: "We a l l know that the people in the c i t i e s approve a system of old age pensions, but we want to hear from the farmers."19 The d iv i s ion of opinion among economic interest groups was also ref lected in other sectors of the community. Within the Canadian char i ty establishment only indiv idual socia l workers ac t ive ly supported the idea of state aid for the aged poor. In common with the mothers' pensions movement, they represented professionals in both the public and pr ivate welfare sectors. The witnesses who presented the case for publ ic pensions before the 1913 committee included two provincia l bureaucrats act ive in the struggle for mothers' pensions, J . J . Kelso and Rose Henderson, as well as the Chief Inspector of Industr ial Establishments and Publ ic Buildings in Quebec, the o f f i ce r in charge of Associated Char i t ies and the Chi ldren 's Aid Society in Ottawa, and the secretary of a private home for the aged near Winnipeg. Despite the i r diverse occupations, they stressed common themes concerning the inadequacy of wages, the i n a b i l i t y of the private sector to cope with the extent of poverty among the aged, and the stigma attached to ins t i t u t i ona l care.20 In contrast to the re la t i ve unanimity of opinion among sa lar ied welfare workers, middle-class female volunteers were divided over the d e s i r a b i l i t y of old age pensions. Supporters on the NCWC executive included Agnes Machar of Kingston, an author and a "benevolent conservative" with an interest in labour problems who championed the cause of the aged poor both in her novels and in her volunteer work. However, her pleas for state a id at tracted l i t t l e a t tent ion, because the NCWC Standing Committee on the Care of the Aged Poor was "never very act ive."21 At the local l e v e l , organized women displayed varying degrees of in terest in the pensions issue. Representatives of a Montreal women's club were apparently the only volunteers to endorse the idea of a federal scheme for the aged deserving poor in the prewar period.22 Their preference, however, was not shared by members of the Kingston branch of the Protestant King's Daughters, an a f f i l i a t e of the LCW, who lobbied for a federal old age annuit ies scheme, 2 3 or by other volunteers in Toronto and Calgary, who confined the i r e f for ts to improving the t rad i t iona l methods of re l iev ing the aged poor.24 Churchgoers were equally divided over the d e s i r a b i l i t y of publ ic pensions in the prewar per iod. Support was concentrated in the Protestant denominations, since the Cathol ic hierarchy opposed state intervention part ly on ideological grounds and part ly out of fears that welfare could be used as an instrument of patronage, as chapter 7 revealed. However, even among Protestants, proponents of publ ic pensions were drawn from the minority ranks of reform-minded c l e r i c s . I n i t i a l l y , t he i r lobbying was conducted by ind iv iduals such as the Rev. R.W. D ick ie , a Presbyterian pastor, who sponsored a resolut ion at a public meeting in Montreal requesting federal l eg i s la t i on "granting under wise condit ions old age pensions to the deserving poor . . . . "25 In March 1914 more widespread endorsement was forthcoming. Delegates to the f i r s t national social service congress, representing a l l wings of the socia l gospel movement and the major denominations, approved a resolut ion requesting Ottawa to i n i t i a t e a system of o ld age insurance. However, the i r stamp of approval was d i lu ted by the fact that th is demand, l i k e mothers' pensions, was not included in the l i s t of l e g i s l a t i v e requests subsequently presented to the federal cabinet. Among the o f f i c i a l Protestant bodies, only the Methodist conference gave formal - a lbe i t vague - endorsement to the idea of state a id in the pre-war period. Delegates attending i t s 1914 annual convention passed a resolut ion urging sui table provis ion for workers i f incapacitated by old age, in jury or s ickness. 238 Spokesmen of the other denominations, however, shied away from giv ing the i r o f f i c i a l blessing f o r , despite the ascendancy of the social gospel , " [p]ubl ic char i ty was s t i l l looked upon with d is t rus t in the Protestant ethic of i n d i v i d u a l i s m . " 2 6 In te l lec tua ls a lso disagreed over the issue. Sympathizers included W.A. Sherwood, a well-known Toronto a r t i s t and community a c t i v i s t , who, in an address to the local Progressive Club, urged Canadians to fol low New Zealand's example and adopt a federal scheme in order to stop the exodus of people from the Maritimes and to retain white labourers in B.C.27 j n e Toronto in te l lec tua l community, however, included a vehement opponent, Goldwin Smith, the noted h is tor ian and act ive volunteer. He was "a perennial l a i s s e z - f a i r e l i b e r a l " who used the medium of his journal the Week to attack the concept, contending that publ ic pensions fo r the aged poor would place a premium on laz iness and would tax the "industr ious and t h r i f t y " for the benefit of the " less d e s e r v i n g . " 2 8 P o l i t i c a l economists in Ontario also disagreed over the merits of pensions. James Cappon, a facu l ty member at Queen's, was sympathetic to the idea, and his views were shared by Professor Mavor at the Univers i ty of Toronto, but opposed by his Queen's col league, Adam S h o r t t . 2 9 Inside the Canadian Parliament there was a s im i la r controversy over the d e s i r a b i l i t y of publ ic pensions. A few individual MPs championed the cause of the aged poor and attracted some support. But opponents of state aid were equally numerous and voca l , and the i r views proved to be more in f luen t ia l in the prewar per iod. They succeeded in confining l e g i s l a t i v e act ion to the passage of the 1908 Annuities Act , a measure designed to solve the problem of o ld age dependency by encouraging se l f -he lp andjthrift among indust r ia l workers. 2 39.-A small group of MPs comprising three Conservatives (Porter , P r ing le , Burnham) and three Liberals (Macdonald, Kyte, Car ro l l ) were the "leading protagonists of publ ic pensions" ins ide Pariiament.30 These proponents were a l l backbenchers who acted as ind iv idua ls , not as party spokesmen, because old age pensions were not endorsed by e i ther major federal party unt i l af ter the F i r s t World War. Their a c t i v i t i e s included sponsorship of resolut ions urging federal provision for the aged and deserving poor in the sessions of 1906-7 and 1914; and securing the appointment of special committees to invest igate the subject in the sessions of 1907-8 and 1911-13. Although no decis ive action resulted from the i r e f f o r t s , they succeeded in drawing the attent ion of successive governments to the need for publ ic pensions. In order to ascertain why certa in federal l eg is la to rs supported the cause of the aged poor, a biographical analysis of MPs and senators who sponsored resolut ions and spoke in favour of pensions during the pre-war period was undertaken. It reveals that the average age of proponents in the House of Commons was 43 years (see table 22). This was s l i gh t l y lower than that of the opponents in the House (48 yea rs ) , and much lower than that of hos t i le senators (66 years) . The supporters' re la t ive youth could account for the i r endorsement of state intervention in social welfare. W.F. Nickle (Con., Kingston), one of the younger advocates, presented the case for government involvement to promote equal i ty of opportunity. "We have got beyond the days of mere indiv idual ism and have come to the days of so-ca l led socia l i sm. . .which gives every man a chance, which says that the man who i s down shal l not necessari ly be kept down a l l his l i f e for want of a f a i r opportunity."32 But tab le 22 also reveals that the supporters of publ ic pensions in the House of Commons represented mainly urban r id ings located, with one exception, in central and eastern Canada. On i t s own, representation of urban-industr ial in terests cannot Table 22. Supporters! of pensions inside the Canadian Parl iament, 1907-14 Party Prov. House of Commons: R id ing 2 Age (1907) Occupation Di rector-ships Public Off ice Mun/Prov Burnham Con Ont Urban 47 Lawyer MacDonnel1 II II 46 H Nickle ll II n 38 X X X Porter II II II 48 X X Pr ingle ll II Rural 52 II X Carro l l Lib N.S. Urban 30 •I X Emmerson ll N.B. •I 54 II X X Graham ll Ont 48 Publisher X X Johnstone ll N.S. ll 40 II X Kyte ll II Rural 43 Lawyer X Logan ll II Urban 38 X MacDonald ll II Rural 42 II X X Smith ll B.C. Urban 49 Union agent X Bourassa Ind/Lib Que Rural 39 Journal is t X X Ve rv i l l e Lab ll Urban Ave: 43 43 Union agent Senate: Ferguson Con PEI Urban 68 Farmer SOURCE: The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1907-14, passim. Supporters comprise sponsors of resolutions and speakers who argued in favour of publ ic pensions. ^Ridings are c l a s s i f i e d as urban i f they contain c i t i e s and/or towns of over 7,000. This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s adopted from House of Commons, Returns of the Thirteenth General Elect ion (Ottawa: King's P r i n te r , 1917). 241 account for t he i r involvement as other MPs with s imi la r consti tuencies were e i ther in the camp of opponents or apathetic to the cause. According to a Liberal advocate, W.F. C a r r o l l , what set the supporters apart was the fact that old age pensions was "a l i v e l y and burning question" in the i r r idings that stretched from the coal-mining regions of eastern Nova Scotia through the indust r ia l centres of Ontario and Quebec, to the mining community of Nanaimo, B.C.32 The sal ience of the issue in these areas prompted f i ve other supporters (Pr ing le , Smith, V e r v i l l e , Macdonald and Emmerson) to respond to labour representations.33 Information contained in table 22 shows as well that a majority of the supporters had served as ei ther appointed or elected municipal o f f i c i a l s . Their experience in local administration exposed them to the operation of poor r e l i e f machinery and i t s inadequacies. Again, according to N i ck le , "[ t ]here is not one of us who has taken any act ive part in the char i table work of our c i t i e s who has not been moved by the many cases of men and women who have been indust r ious, t h r i f t y and hard-working through a long period of l i f e but who are by necessity forced on t he i r chi ldren fo r support or e lse into our almshouses or houses of industry in the i r old age."34 D. Ferguson, the lone advocate in the Senate, was also keenly aware of the stigma attached to ex is t ing prov is ion, presumably as a result of his experience as a commissioner of the provincia l poorhouse in Prince Edward Is land. But he was the only proponent to suggest that the absence of proper provision for the aged at a time when rapid accumulation of wealth was exacerbating d i spa r i t i es between r ich and poor could be used by extremists to destroy the p o l i t i c a l equi l ibr ium.35 The arguments advanced by the supporters of publ ic pensions did not go unchallenged in the pre-war sessions of Parliament. Certain MPs and Senators 242 spoke fo r c i b l y against state aid for the dest i tute aged (see table 23). An analysis of t he i r speeches and backgrounds suggests that the vocal opponents, drawn from both the back and front benches, can be divided into two groups. The f i r s t group consisted of ' h a r d - l i n e r s , ' i . e . , ind iv iduals who saw no need for any form of o ld age pension. Its membership comprised four Conservatives (Algui re, Cur r ie , Foster, White) and two L ibera ls (Clark and Senator McMullen). The other group of vocal opponents accepted the need for a state-sponsored annuity scheme based on the p r inc ip le of voluntary contr ibut ions but were opposed to pub l ic ly f inanced, non-contributory pensions, bel iev ing that they would destroy "habits of t h r i f t " and contribute to pauperism. Its membership was predominantly Liberal (F ie ld ing , Laur ier , Lemieux, Pardee, Rob i ta i l l e and Senators Cartwright, Cloren, Ross, Sul l ivan) but included some Conservatives (Fowler, Lefurgey, Maclean). The higher average age of senators (66 years ) , mentioned above, suggests that as members of a generation reared in a pioneer society where agrarian values predominated, they subscribed to the c lass i ca l l i be ra l tenet of l imi ted government. Senator Ross, for example, referred approvingly to the maxim prevalent when he entered public l i f e that government should not be p a t e r n a l . 3 6 Table 23 also reveals that the opponents were drawn mainly from central Canada and represented both urban and rural r id ings . It i s s ign i f i can t that three of the backbenchers representing agrarian in terests were in the camp of ' ha rd - l i ne rs ' (Clark, A lgu i re , Cur r ie ) . Their viewpoint was voiced c lea r l y by M. Clark ( L i b . , Red Deer), who was a rancher and a se l f - s t y l ed i n d i v i d u a l i s t . "What I feel on the general p r inc ip le i s that i f you go i nde f i n i t e l y along the l ines of helping men to do what they should do fo r themselves you w i l l i nev i tab ly , in the end, undermine the v i r i l i t y and strength of your p e o p l e . " 3 7 Table 23. Opponents* of pensions inside the Canadian Parl iament, 1907-14 Party Prov. Riding Age Occupation Director- Publ ic (1907) ships Off ice Mun/Pro/Fed House of Commons: Alguire Con Que Rural 72 Doctor X Curr ie ll II ti 39 Mftr . X Foster , G.E. II II Urban 60 Academic X X Fowler ll N.B. Rural 48 Lawyer X X Lefurgey II PEI 36 •I X Maclean ll Ont Urban 53 Journal i s t White II Rural 41 Financier X X Clark Lib Al ta •I 46 Fa rmer F ie ld ing II N.S. 59 Publisher X Laurier " Que Urban 66 Lawyer X Lemieux II II Rural 41 II X Nesbitt Ont Urban 48 General agent Pardee ll II 40 Lawyer X X Rob i t a i l l e Ind/Lib Que Rural 24 Businessman ?nate: Ave. 48 Sul l ivan Con Ont Urban 69 Doctor X Cartwright Lib ll H 72 Financier X X Cloren ll Que ll 52 Lawyer X McMul1 en ll Ont ll 74 Merchant X X Ross ll n ll 66 Teacher X X Ave. 66 SOURCE: The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1907-14, passim. *0pponents comprise leg is la to rs who spoke against publicly-funded pensions. Other opponents were not simply mouthpieces of business in te res ts . As table 23 shows, only a few had di rect l i nks with the corporate world. Indeed, by i t s e l f , the holding of d i rectorships i s not a re l i ab le ind icator of opposition to public pensions as f i ve supporters were also on corporate boards. However, three opponents (Foster, Senators Ross and McMullen) were di rectors of insurance companies. G.E. Foster was the only one to act as a spokesman of insurance interests by regis ter ing his disapproval of federal involvement in the sale of old age a n n u i t i e s . 3 8 In contrast to the supporters, the ranks of opponents included s i x past and present Finance Ministers (Foster, White, Fie ld ing and Senators Cartwright, Cloran, Ross) who had contro l led the purse-str ings of e i ther provincial coffers or the federal t reasury. This suggests that the i r opposition to publ ic pensions ref lected f i s c a l conservatism. Both Foster and Senator Cartwright had inaugurated regimes of economy while serving as federal Finance Ministers in the late nineteenth century. Their f i s c a l conservatism was shared by F ie ld ing , Laur ie r 's Finance Min is te r , and White, his Conservative successor, who both regarded the costs of publ ic pensions as the major obstacle to l e g i s l a t i v e act ion.39 They were successful in l im i t ing l eg i s l a t i ve action to an old age annuit ies plan. This scheme, however, was not an e f fec t ive subst i tute for publ ic pensions and so the agi tat ion continued af ter 1914. The Concerted Campaign, 1914-27 The outbreak of war in August 1914 temporarily halted the agi tat ion for o ld age pensions. But i t s overal l impact added momentum to the campaign by contr ibut ing to "the further dec l ine" of the l a i s s e z - f a i r e philosophy of government.40 Although the war made the idea of state aid for the dest i tute aged more acceptable, i t only modified the dominant ideological framework of 2.45 c l a s s i c a l l i be ra l i sm. Individualism was s t i l l v i s i b l e because the concept of o ld age insurance, incorporating the values of se l f -he lp and t h r i f t , gained currency rather than the idea of non-contributory old age pensions.41 In the immediate postwar period there was an increase in demands for l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . Outside Parl iament, the ef for ts of organized labour were endorsed by the major Protestant churches and newly organized veterans. Their pleas were mainly directed at Ottawa, and e l i c i t e d responses from the major federal part ies because an e lect ion was imminent. The v ic tory of a number of sympathizers in 1921 ensured that the case for l eg i s l a t i ve action would be pressed inside the federal House. They faced an uphi l l ba t t l e , though, as the new Liberal minority government was dependent upon western Progressive support and receptive to the views of eastern businessmen. Moreover, nei ther Ottawa nor the provinces were prepared to sponsor cost ly i n i t i a t i v e s un t i l e lectora l pressures precipi tated federal ac t ion . Advocates: During the 1914-27 per iod, organized labour continued to be the major pressure group outside Parliament pressing for l eg i s l a t i ve act ion concerning old age pensions. Its campaign was aided by internat ional and domestic developments. The Labour Convention of the Treaty of Versa i l l es stressed the need fo r ameliorative programs such as old age pensions. Inside Canada semi -o f f i c ia l bodies in 1919 also endorsed early ac t ion . In June a federal Royal Commission on Industr ial Relat ions, af ter invest igat ing the causes of postwar labour unrest, recommended immediate inquiry by expert boards into state insurance against o ld age and unemployment. In September, a follow-up National Industr ial Conference repeated the demand for an ear ly invest igat ion by the c i v i l serv ice . Spurred by these developments, persistent demands for federal act ion were voiced by national labour organizations and iso lated 246 requests were made by provincia l associat ions such as the Nova Scotia miners' 1923 deputation. The Canadian TLC spearheaded labour 's agi tat ion during World War I and afterwards. As the question of j u r i sd i c t i on was not set t led un t i l 1925, i t sought to take advantage of the federal structure of government by lobbying both targets.42 In September 1920 delegates at the TLC convention passed a resolut ion urging enactment of old age pension laws in the various provinces. In response, t he i r executives in Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia included pensions for the needy aged in the i r l eg i s l a t i ve programs, and requests for inqu i r ies into the subject were made by unionists in Alberta and Man i toba. 4 3 Frustrated by the lack of response at the provincial l e v e l , the TLC concentrated on securing federal l eg i s l a t i ve action from 1924 onwards. Its demand fo r a un ive rsa l , non-contributory scheme for the 65-plus age group, however, was not endorsed by other moderate unionists representing the railway brotherhoods and miners in Nova Scot ia , who respect ively favoured aid only for the aged, deserving poor and a contr ibutory plan.44 Even i f these d iv is ions had not developed, unionists were s t i l l not powerful enough by themselves to secure decis ive ac t ion . Despite the spectacular growth in the proportion of wage-earners who were organized from 28 to 64 percent between 1910 and 1919 , 4 5 they s t i l l represented a minority voting b loc. Moreover, t he i r own ef for ts to broaden the base of the old age pensions movement had l imi ted s u c c e s s . 4 6 Besides standard lobbying, organized labour a lso endorsed part isan p o l i t i c a l act ion to secure o ld age pensions and other demands. In 1917 the Canadian Independent Labour Party (ILP) was created upon the suggestion of the TLC and with i t s b less ing. It f a i l ed to develop into a national party, but i t s a f f i l i a t e s in Manitoba and Ontario included old age pensions in the i r platforms 247 of 1917 and 1919, respect ive ly . At the federal level the electoral success of the ILP was l imi ted to securing 2 seats in both the 1921 and 1925 e lec t ions . In contrast , the performance of i t s provincial a f f i l i a t e s was more noteworthy. Labour spokesmen were elected in a l l provinces except Prince Edward Island in the immediate post-war per iod, and in Ontario they comprised the jun ior partner in a Farmer-Labour coa l i t i on government. The e lect ion of these federal and prov inc ia l labour candidates aided the campaign because i t occurred at "a c r i t i c a l period in the development of publ ic opinion on the pension issue. The two ILP representatives in the Ontario cabinet made an e x p l i c i t attempt to secure ac t ion . They sponsored a 1921 resolut ion suggesting that a federal conference be held to consider old age pensions and other labour matters, and that i f i t decided that any of the questions were provincial in scope, the provinc ia l Labour Department should invest igate and report to the House with a view to enacting l e g i s l a t i o n . A Labour MLA in B r i t i sh Columbia also sponsored a resolut ion in December 1925, urging the adoption of a "sound" plan of old age pensions fo r Canada.^ 8 Organized labour, however, was no longer alone. The major Protestant churches also joined the old age pension movement. Their formal endorsement was a d i rect resul t of the impact of war which precipi tated a challenge to the tenets of Protestant indiv idual ism and produced a marked sh i f t in the posi t ion of churches towards questions of socia l reform. The socia l service department of the Methodist Church was the f i r s t agency to shed i t s conservatism. In 1917 i t s committee on indust r ia l re lat ions stressed the need for socia l insurance, and a year la te r i t recommended an a l l - i n c l u s i v e system covering contingencies l i k e old age. Although th i s recommendation was not accepted wholesale by the 1918 General Conference of the Methodist Church, the proposal that the nation should provide old age insurance was included in i t s socia l dec larat ion. This 248 stamp of approval was s ign i f i can t as the number of Methodists at the end of the war to ta l led one mi l l ion .49 The Presbyterian Church, the largest Protestant denomination with over one m i l l i on members, also endorsed old age insurance. In 1920 delegates to i t s General Assembly passed a resolut ion "warmly commending movements now afoot in many of our indus t r ies , " including those seeking to secure the s ta te 's cooperation in providing pensions for old age.50 The endorsement of federal action was not confined to indiv idual churches. In 1918 the Social Service Council of Canada, "the reforming arm of Protestant ism," commenced publ icat ion of Social Welfare, and i t s f i r s t issues elaborated i t s pr inc ip les and programs, including socia l insurance against old age.51 The Alberta branch of the council was the f i r s t to take up the cause, and soon a f ter delegates to i t s national conference approved a resolut ion urging enactment of federal l eg is la t ion .52 The for thr ight demands of Protestants for o ld age insurance were not re i terated af ter 1921 because the inf luence of the socia l gospel waned. Nonetheless, t he i r formal endorsement in the immediate postwar period added momentum to the campaign. It establ ished old age pensions as a sa l ien t p o l i t i c a l issue by removing i t from the confines of a labour-sponsored ag i ta t ion . The views of s izeable congregations endowed the movement with legit imacy by " . . . p r i c k i n g the conscience of the middle c lass and s t i f fen ing the backs of p o l i t i c a l leaders."53 Newly organized veterans also endorsed the cause. In 1919 the GWVA passed a resolut ion urging enactment of o ld age insurance.54 AS the most powerful returned men's organizat ion, representing the majority of veterans, i t s opinions carr ied weight ins ide government c i r c l e s , as chapter 3 revealed. The r i s ing chorus of demands for o ld age pensions l eg i s l a t i on did not go unnoticed by the t rad i t iona l p o l i t i c a l par t ies . As Ottawa, not the provinces, 24.9-1 was the major target , more interest in the subject was shown by the federal pa r t ies , with only the governing Liberals in B r i t i sh Columbia including old age pensions in the i r postwar platforms.55 The federal L iberal Party was the f i r s t major national party to recognize the electoral appeal.of old age insurance, by inc luding the subject in i t s 1919 platform.56 This pledge sprang from a pol icy review i n i t i a t ed by Laurier during his wartime years in opposi t ion. In July 1916 a subcommittee on socia l welfare chaired by Joseph Atkinson proposed early action on old age pensions and the eventual establishment of a comprehensive soc ia l insurance program. These recommendations were swi f t l y endorsed by Lau r i e r .5 7 However, af ter the war, the suggestion that p r i o r i t y be given to o ld age insurance was not incorporated into o f f i c i a l party po l i c y . In August 1919 delegates to the Liberal leadership convention approved without debate a resolut ion endorsing only the development of a federa l -prov inc ia l scheme of soc ia l insurance. This resolut ion was drafted by a committee headed by King, the new Liberal leader, who was equivocal about the ef fects of income secur i ty upon the se l f -he lp eth ic.58 Despite the lack of a f irm commitment to take ear ly action concerning o ld age insurance, i t s passage was s i gn i f i can t . "For the f i r s t t ime, a national party found i t expedient to appeal for publ ic support on a program of socia l reform."59 The governing Unionist coa l i t i on was also responsive to changing publ ic opinion with regard to old age pensions. At least one prominent Liberal member, Rowel 1, was sympathetic and attempted to include pensions in postwar programs of reconstruction.60 His b id , however, was unsuccessful. The 1920 Unionist manifesto contained only a vague endorsement of social insurance in i t s pledge to enact laws to carry into ef fect the ideas and pr inc ip les in the peace t rea ty . Although the Unionists stopped short of e x p l i c i t approval of old age pensions, they took steps to rec t i f y the i r f a i l u re to act upon the suggestion 25 0 of the 1919 National Industr ial Conference that the subject should be invest igated by the c i v i l se rv ice . "After a lapse of eighteen months and with the time for a federal e lect ion drawing nigh, i t was announced in the 1921 Speech from the Throne that the Labour Department was invest igat ing 'systems of unemployment insurance and old age pensions." '61 The Unionist invest igat ion and vague pledge, however, were not enough to overcome i t s ant i - labour reputation and to win votes from indust r ia l workers in the 1921 e lec t i on . In contrast , the Liberal pledge concerning socia l insurance was a central plank in King's own campaign in Ontario and probably attracted the votes of urban labour and other sympathizers. Other prominent Liberals in t he i r speeches throughout Canada apparently "proclaimed themselves the champions of old age p e n s i o n s . . . . " 6 2 The e lec t ion of a Liberal government - a lbe i t a minority one - in 1921 augured well for the progress of the old age pensions movement. In contrast to the moribund years from 1914 to 1921,63 a concerted ef for t was made to secure l e g i s l a t i v e act ion from 1922 onwards. Inside the federal Parliament the agi ta t ion was conducted by a small nucleus of MPs representing a l l part ies except the Progressives. The advocates comprised two Conservatives (Church, Stevens), two L ibera ls (Fontaine, Mar te l l ) , the two Labour spokesmen ( I rv ine, Woodsworth) and the Independent ( N e i l l ) . They represented urban-industr ial r id ings in a l l provinces except Saskatchewan, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Is land. Their involvement was spurred by s im i la r motives to those prompting t he i r pre-war counterparts: ideological be l ie fs and labour representat ions; but three advocates also acted as spokesmen for the province of B r i t i s h Columbia, a spur not v i s i b l e in the pre-war Pariiaments.64 Despite the i r l imi ted numbers, the advocates were f i n a l l y able in 1923 to secure a commitment from the government, which agreed to have a committee go 251 into the matter the fol lowing year.65 j h e work of the 1924 Commons special committee turned out to be cruc ia l because for "the f i r s t time an attempt was made to work out a concrete p lan . . . . "66 Three advocates (Fontaine, I rv ine, N i e l l ) served on th i s committee, and endorsed the f ina l report recommending the establishment of a non-contributory scheme for the dest i tu te aged of 70 years and over, to be financed j o i n t l y by the federal and provincial governments. A year l a t e r , however, the advocates disagreed openly over the question of j u r i sd i c t i on and the means of f inancing means-tested old age pensions. This s p l i t developed as a result of the lukewarm reaction of the provinces to the notion of cost -shar ing. Their lack of enthusiasm prompted the re-appointment of the special committee in the 1925 sess ion. Its members then sought a ru l ing from the Department of Jus t i ce , that according to A.W. N e i l l , confirmed the i r o r ig ina l convict ions that unlike old age insurance, f inanc ia l a id towards non-contributory old age pensions was within the competence of the federal Parliament.67 Although the 1925 committee again recommended a jo in t non-contributory p lan, two members disagreed. W. I rv ine, the spokesman for the two-man Labour group, rejected the proposal as "un rea l i s t i c " and moved that the report be referred back with instruct ions to consider a purely federal scheme. His motion was supported by T.L. Church (Con., Toronto),68 D U t opposed by Ne i l l (Ind.) on the grounds that a federal scheme would be too c o s t l y . 6 9 This d iv i s ion of opinion among parliamentary advocates was s i gn i f i can t , re f lec t ing a cleavage between "cost-conscious" and "welfare-conscious" a c t o r s . 7 0 i t i s doubtfu l , though, whether the i r disagreement s ta l l ed l e g i s l a t i v e action in the 1925 session, as there i s l i t t l e evidence that the Liberal government was ser iously contemplating federal l eg i s la t i on at that t ime. It made no ef for t to arrange a conference with the provinces pr ior to the 1925 e lec t ion and avoided the issue in i t s own campaign. Its reluctance to take 252 l e g i s l a t i v e action stemmed in part from i t s dependence upon the support of the Progressives, who represented "the disenchanted votes of Canadian f a rme rs . " 7 1 Opponents: During the 1914-27 period organized farmers were, by and la rge , opposed to l e g i s l a t i v e action concerning old age pensions, and the i r p o l i t i c a l inf luence increased dramatical ly a f ter the war. Besides securing 65 seats in the federal Parliament in 1921, they also captured the provincial governments of Ontar io, Alberta and Manitoba in the immediate postwar per iod. Elsewhere, rural in terests wielded considerable inf luence. In Saskatchewan successive Liberal governments were, in r e a l i t y , farmers' governments because of t he i r close dependency upon the Grain Growers, and in the remaining provinces agrarian spokesmen were wel1-represented in the l eg i s la tu res . Overt support for l eg i s l a t i ve action was confined to farmers' organizations in Alberta and Saskatchewan, which, in associat ion with the s o c i a l i s t Non-Partisan League, included in t he i r 1917 platforms a plank advocating national compulsory social insurance covering old age and other d i s a b i l i t i e s . 7 2 in the postwar per iod, however, only branches of the United Farmers of Alberta remained sympathetic to labour demands. 7 3 In contrast , Ontario farmers were openly hos t i le to publ ic pensions of any k ind. In the 1920 session Premier Drury introduced a b i l l to give pensions to employees of the prov inc ia l government. However, "the UFO clubs took such strong ground against i t that many of the farmer members declared that they would vote against i t or any l i k e measure, even i f i t was brought up by the i r p a r t y . " 7 4 Their vehement reaction e f fec t i ve ly blocked any further provincial i n i t i a t i v e s in the f i e l d of pensions by the Farmer-Labour government (1919-23). The UFO rank and f i l e membership was also strongly against federal old age pensions l e g i s l a t i o n . Its 2 5 3 , 1 ' mouthpiece, the Farmers' Sun, urged reject ion of the 1927 b i l l , contending " . . . t ha t the country i s now so overburdened with debt and taxes that i t cannot support a new levy."75 The majority of the farmers' representatives in the federal Parliament were equally hos t i l e . In the vote on I rv ine 's 1925 motion to secure a purely federal scheme, the Progressive caucus s p l i t along the fol lowing l i n e s , with the majority opposing: Table 24. Dis t r ibut ion of Progressive votes on I rv ine 's motion, 1925 UFA SGGA UFM UFO OTHERS TOTAL Yeas: 6 2 4 1 0 13 Nays: 0 13 8 10 2 33 Absent: 5 0 0 13 1 19 Tota l : 11 15 12 24 3 65 SOURCE: Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1925, p. 4433. The ranks of opponents from Manitoba included Crerar , the Progressive leader unt i l November 1922, who regarded old age pensions as unnecessary extravagance,76 a n c | h is successor, R. Forke, shared his view that " r i g i d economy in government" was essential at a l l times.77 Besides farmers, businessmen also became vocal opponents of o ld age pensions l eg i s l a t i on af ter the war. Two of the three employers' representatives on the 1919 Royal Commission on Industr ial Relations*, Senator Smeaton White, owner of the Montreal Gazette, and F. Pauze, a Montreal lumber merchant, wrote a minori ty report condemning socia l insurance. Their major objection to contr ibutory old age pensions concerned the i r ef fect on the worker's product iv i ty . They argued that establishment of a national scheme "might ser iously affect the ambition of the worker when he had the f u l l enjoyment of his physical and mental capaci ty."78 2 54 Organized manufacturers in Ontario also resisted the idea. They lodged a protest with Premier Drury in Apr i l 1920 concerning the proposed increase in workmen's compensation benefits on the grounds that i t would encourage "mal ingering," adding that the i r contr ibut ions should not be used to finance e i ther old age or unemployment insurance . 7 9 Besides taxpayers' res is tance, a concern about the mobi l i ty of capi ta l lay behind the manufacturers' opposi t ion. This was manifest in the at t i tude of delegates representing the Alberta CMA branch, who to ld Premier Greenfield i n 1925 that the "associat ion was not opposed to an old age pension, but considered i t a matter for cooperation between a l l provinces and the federal government." 8 0 Unlike i t s provincial a f f i l i a t e s , the CMA apparently lodged no formal objections with Ottawa pr ior to the passage of the 1927 ac t . However, i t s leadership was openly c r i t i c a l . In his president ia l address to the 1925 CMA convention, Colonel Hatch, a Hamilton manufacturer, dismissed measures such as old age pensions as "of l i t t l e use i f industry can scarcely pay operating expenses" and complained about the potential tax burden. His views on federal f i s c a l pol icy were prevalent in other sectors of the business community. E.W. Beatty, President of the Canadian Pac i f i c Railway, the largest federal taxpayer, complained to his shareholders about "serious taxation burdens" and stressed the need for more r i g id economy in publ ic expenditures i f prosperity was to return; and s imi la r sentiments were voiced by prominent bankers and members of boards of t r a d e . 8 1 During King's f i r s t term of o f f i ce (1922-25) the views of corporate capi ta l were voiced by in f luen t ia l members of the federal Cabinet, as chapter 4 documented. Consequently, business interests were in a powerful posi t ion to curb l e g i s l a t i v e action on old age pensions. The prevai l ing f i s ca l at t i tudes of both federal and provincia l po l i t i c i ans were another constra int . They have been ably summarized as devotion to the concept of the balanced budget in order to keep publ ic debt down to a minimum. 8 2 The f i sca l conservatism of provincial po l i t i c i ans explains why the i r governments took no independent action during and a f ter the war. It a lso accounts for B r i t i sh Columbia's act ive campaigning for a purely federal scheme between 1921 and 1924 - a preference la te r endorsed by a l l other provinces, except Quebec, when confronted with the prospect of f inancing a jo in t p l a n . 8 3 Provincia l po l i t i c i ans were reluctant to develop the i r own schemes or par t ic ipate in a cooperative venture because old age pensions would involve heavy addit ional expenditure that would require a substantial increase in taxa t ion . As sources of provincial tax revenues before and af ter the war (corporation taxes, succession dut ies , property taxes) were more regressive than federal tax revenues (income taxes) , t he i r sponsorship of new programs would have "more depressing e f fec ts" on private spending than corresponding action on the part of the federal government.8^ Provinc ia l po l i t i c i ans were also hesitant to pursue a pol icy of f i s ca l expansion to finance old age pensions because they feared i t s e lectoral consequences. They were well aware that even tax lev ies to solve orthodox f i s c a l problems such as recurring de f i c i t s were unpopular. The defeat of Liberal governments in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in 1925, a f ter long periods in power, was at tr ibuted d i rec t l y to a taxpayers' revolt against f i s c a l mismanagement.85 Although po l i t i c i ans in other provinces in English Canada were not confronted with such serious f inanc ia l problems, they were fearful of the voters ' reaction to tax increases. Consequently, throughout the 1920s they competed to "outdo the other in the advocacy of tax r e d u c t i o n . . . . " 8 6 Of a l l the provinces, Quebec had the most buoyant t reasury. Despite i t s surplus of funds, however, i t s government was the most reluctant to endorse old age 256 pensions l e g i s l a t i o n . In 1926, Premier Taschereau wrote personally to Prime Minister King opposing par t ic ipat ion in a jo in t plan on the ground that i t " . . .would leave us with a huge de f i c i t . " 87 In the f i ve provinces west of Quebec the s p i r a l l i n g costs of mothers' pensions acted as a further deterrent to other independent i n i t i a t i v e s with the technique of categoric publ ic assistance. Senator McMeans of Winnipeg referred d i rec t l y to Manitoba's experience with mothers' pensions in the course of questioning the r e l i a b i l i t y of estimates concerning the costs of o ld age pensions. He pointed out that the i n i t i a l sum of $52,000, voted by the province, had escalated to $750,000 by 1925, forcing a reduction in the next year ' s appropriation to $450,000, "which i s no small sum for a province with a small population where we have much d i f f i c u l t y in f i nanc ing . . . . "88 The deterrent ef fect of mothers' pensions 'experiments' a lso probably accounts for the non-part ic ipat ion of munic ipa l i t ies in the old age pensions movement, espec ia l ly in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and A lber ta , the provinces adopting a jo in t method of f inancing. In contrast to the i r aggressive advocacy of state aid fo r the dest i tute unemployed, and the i r support of the cause of mothers' pensions, elected spokesmen of c i t i e s in Ontario and the West were s i l en t on the issue of state aid for the aged.89 The f i s c a l conservatism of federal po l i t i c i ans also mi l i ta ted against l e g i s l a t i v e action during the 1914-25 per iod. Even though the imposition of a federal income tax in wartime provided Ottawa with the means to finance old age pensions, i t s s ign i f icance was not appreciated in the national c a p i t a l . In the postwar period the emphasis of f i s c a l po l icy was on retrenchment and economy. "In those pre-Keynesian days, the federal government, faced with heavy debt charges incurred by the war as well as a hi therto unprecedented b i l l for 257 veterans' pensions and allowances, was reluctant to commit i t s e l f to any new expensive programs. 1 , 9 0 From 1918 onwards national po l i t i c i ans were preoccupied with f i sca l problems stemming from wartime mobi l i za t ion . Meighen suggested that the burden of debt in 1921 prevented his government from making " fa lse promises" concerning old age pens ions . 9 1 His r i va l King was also disturbed by the f i s c a l s i t ua t i on . In 1921, when leader of the opposi t ion, he expressed doubts about the wi l l ingness of the people to accept the expenditure required for a pension program in view of the high taxes and public debt resul t ing from the w a r . 9 2 Once Prime Min is te r , he adopted orthodox remedies: reduction of cont ro l lab le publ ic expenditures in order to hal t the emerging pattern of annual d e f i c i t s , and diversion of revenues to reduce the s i ze of the debt. New social pol icy i n i t i a t i v e s , therefore, were precluded unt i l the federal budget was balanced and the debt burden lessened. In 1923 King informed a labour delegation from Nova Scot ia that old age pensions " . . .would have to wait unt i l the country's f inanc ia l posi t ion had improved." 9 3 A year l a t e r Heenan, Min is ter of Labour, made i t c lear that f i s c a l problems, not doubts about j u r i s d i c t i o n , remained the major constraints upon federal l e g i s l a t i v e action during the 1922-25 pe r i od . 9 ^ Prec ip i tan ts : The prospects of the old age pensions movement looked bleak at the c lose of the fourteenth Parliament. Pr ior to the 1925 e lec t ion Ottawa made no ef for t to persuade the provinces to endorse the cooperative plan recommended by the 1924 special committee. In the i r bid for re-e lect ion the L ibera ls avoided references to t he i r 1919 pledge concerning socia l insurance. Their lack of act ion was not attacked by the Conservative opposi t ion, even though the main issue of the campaign was the record of the government. In local campaigns the issue of old age pensions appears to have been sa l ient only in the B r i t i sh 258 Columbia i n t e r i o r and the federal t e r r i t o ry of the Yukon.95 However, the re-e lect ion of another Liberal minority government in 1925 turned out to be cruc ia l for the future progress of the pensions movement. Prime Minister King was dependent upon the support of minor part ies for h is own p o l i t i c a l survival and so was susceptible to the i r demands for concessions. These extenuating parliamentary circumstances ".. .brought the pension issue to the top of the agenda."96 Woodsworth and Heaps, the two Labour MPs, were "the prec ip i tants" of l e g i s l a t i v e act ion in the 1926 sess ion. Real iz ing that they had a unique opportunity to inf luence policy-making, they decided to take advantage of "the pecul iar combination of circumstances" to secure two "very urgent measures": old age pensions and unemployment r e l i e f . On the opening day of the session they sent a jo in t l e t t e r to King, Meighen and Forke, asking them to explain the i r pa r t i es ' posi t ion on these i s s u e s . 9 7 The Conservative and Liberal leaders ' reactions to these Labour demands revealed that "the pa t r i c ian" was no match for the former arb i t ra tor .98 In contrast to Meighen's lukewarm response, King was conc i l i a to ry . He to ld an intermediary act ing for the Labour group that " i f the United Farmers would support an old age pensions measure, he would undertake to bring i t down to the House. "99 Once an assurance was received from the Whip of the eight-man UFA group, King decided to en l i s t the support of the Labour MPs in persuading his cabinet colleagues that old age pensions was the necessary pr ice of staying in power: I had the members of the Cabinet meet Woodsworth & Heaps, & discuss old age pension legstn . tho some members of the Cabinet, LaPointe in conversat'n and Robb by memo from Finlayson opposed attempting anything, when they were confronted in d iscuss ion, a l l agreed on a b i l l which would apply to the Dominion as a whole, l e t t i ng each province come under, on a 50-50 b a s i s , for a non-contributory scheme appl icable to persons over 70 years of a g e . . . . It was agreed to have a b i l l immediately drafted.100 Although p o l i t i c a l survival was the dominant motive underlying cabinet approval, i t i s doubtful whether the 'coup' staged by the Labour MPs would have been successful i f i t had not coincided with an improvement in federal f inances. However, even with a more buoyant treasury than many of the provinces, the Liberal government was not prepared to fund a purely federal scheme. Dr. King, the sponsor of the 1926 b i l l , stated that i f no province opted to enter the cooperative p lan, Ottawa would not assume the f u l l costs of old age pensions.101 The 1926 Old Age Pension B i l l was based upon the recommendations of the 1924 special committee. During the l i v e l y debate in the House dif ferences of opinion surfaced among the o f f i c i a l opposition over i t s d e s i r a b i l i t y . Although eight Conservatives voiced support for the measure, ten of the i r colleagues registered protests. Their ranks included a few ' ha rd - l i ne rs ' who opposed the p r inc ip le of non-contributory pensions because, according to R.B. Bennett, i t „ would discourage economy and t h r i f t as well as breed a "dole mental i ty." The majority of Conservative opponents, though, adopted a d i f ferent tack and argued that the i n i t i a t i v e represented an unwelcome int rus ion into provincial j u r i sd i c t i on and would be unworkable without the i r consent. For example, Meighen, the opposition leader, observed wryly a f ter reviewing the lack lust re response of provincia l Premiers, "that there i s not much sunshine to be got out of these cucumbers.. . ." Despite Conservative reservat ions, the b i l l was passed unanimously by the House.102 The Conservative-dominated Senate, however, turned out to be a more effect ive'sounding-board for provincial ism than the lower chamber. Its members rejected the b i l l at the second reading stage af ter objections were voiced by two renegade Liberals and twelve Conservatives, who represented mainly the maritimes and Ontar io. These vocal opponents viewed the plan as imposing an 26.0. unnecessary, cost ly burden upon the i r provinces and as const i tu t ing a dangerous precedent with unpredictable f inanc ia l c o n s e q u e n c e s . T h e i r re ject ion of the old age pension b i l l and another event in the turbulent session of 1926, the Governor-General's refusal to grant King a d i sso lu t i on , provided the Liberal minori ty government with an " i r r e s i s t i b l e basis on which to appeal to the e lec tora te . The issue of o ld age pensions was prominent in the 1926 e lec t i on . In his own campaign King l inked the subject with the need for Senate reform. In Calgary he promised to re-introduce the 1926 b i l l unt i l i t was forced past the Conservative opposit ion in the Senate.105 Liberal strategy also involved branding a l l Conservatives as opponents of old age pensions, even though the b i l l had secured unanimous approval in the House of Commons. According to the temporary leader of the opposi t ion, "[d]uring the course of the e lect ion las t f a l l , I think I am safe in saying that in every quarter of Canada, Conservative candidates in the various r idings were charged with opposition to the Old Age Pension B i l l " ; and other Conservative MPs confirmed his charge.106 Refutation of Liberal accusations, however, put Conservative candidates on the defensive during the campaign, and the i r formal posi t ion of cooperation with the provinces pr ior to l eg i s l a t i ve action was not understood. Despite the p o l i t i c a l sal ience of o ld age pensions in the 1926 campaign, i t was probably not the decis ive factor behind the Liberal v i c to ry . "Many of the po l i t i c i ans themselves, however, at t r ibuted major s ign i f icance to the pensions issue,"107 a n ( j th is assessment undercut subsequent opposi t ion. For example, Heenan, the new Minister of Labour, when introducing the 1927 Old Age Pensions B i l l , argued that " . . . t he re can be no question that the pr inc ip le adopted in th i s B i l l was endorsed by the people of Canada"; and in the ensuing debate backbenchers representing a l l part ies and a l l regions also stressed the electora l sal ience of the issue.108 Members of the Senate were also prompted by the e lec tora te 's endorsement to reverse t he i r 1927 posit ion and vote for the b i l l . Perceived electoral support was also the spur to provincial par t ic ipat ion in the federal scheme. Premier Ol iver of B r i t i s h Columbia was the f i r s t to recognize the popular appeal of the pensions issue and to pass enabling l eg i s l a t i on in 1927. His example was soon followed by the Premiers of the four western provinces and Ontario. In Quebec and the marit imes, however, par t ic ipa t ion was delayed un t i l the 1930s, when overwhelming e lectora l pressures forced the i r reluctant Premiers to enter the p l a n . 1 0 9 Although the timing of the implementation of the 1927 Old Age Pensions Act was dependent upon the provinces, i t s content was dictated by p o l i t i c a l forces ins ide the Canadian Parliament. The major features of the or ig ina l plan were devised by members of the 1924 Special Committee. Working within the confines of a j o in t means-tested i n i t i a t i v e suggested by the Liberal government, the views of "cost-conscious" advocates such as Ne i l l (Ind.) prevai led over the preferences of I rv ine, Labour's spokesman, with regard to the minimum age requirement and the scale of pension, but they agreed on the c i t i zensh ip and residency qua l i f i ca t i ons . However, the committee chairman, presumably acting upon instruct ions from the cabinet, suggested the methods of f inancing and adminis t rat ion.HO Although these MPs were apparently the major formulators of the scheme, the i r choices may have been guided by the advice of bureaucrats in the Department of Labour. Despite the attempts of a few Conservative and Labour backbenchers to secure a lower age requirement and an increase in the federal contr ibution,111 there were no s ign i f i can t changes made in the course of the passage of the 1927 B i l l . In a l l important respects, the or ig ina l Old Age 26-2 Pension Act was ident ica l to the 1924 plan formulated by economy-minded parliamentary advocates and cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s . A Review The movement to secure old age pensions was shaped by the socio-economic se t t i ng , as industr ia l -urban growth was exacerbating the problem of dependency among the aged poor. It also took place in a period marked by a recurring cycle of boom and slump. Of these f luc tua t ions , the economic prosperity in the second ha l f of the 1920s was the most s ign i f i can t because i t provided the f inanc ia l resources for a l l governments, except those in the marit imes, to contemplate ser ious ly taking l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . However, in and of i t s e l f i t was no guarantee of ac t ion , for a jo in t statutory i n i t i a t i v e concerning unemployment was not acted upon during the same period. The cul tura l context also exerted some inf luence. Sympathy for the p l ight of the aged dependent poor was confined to the loosely-def ined 'deserving' category, presumably comprising those whose dest i tu t ion was not due pr imari ly to criminal behaviour or drunkenness. During the prewar period i t was not t ranslated into concrete mass demands for state-f inanced pensions. Instead, the be l ie f was prevalent that remedies should incorporate the dominant se l f -he lp eth ic in the form of e i ther annuit ies or contributory benef i ts , whereas demands for means-tested pensions represented only the proverbial 'straws in the wind. ' However, the increased state intervention to cope with the emergency of war hastened the erosion of th is eth ic and made the l a t t e r concept more acceptable, even though the insurance pr inc ip le also- gained currency. Like the successful mothers' pensions campaign, the inf luence of foreign precedents was also detectable in the i n i t i a l stage of the old age pensions movement, with the 263.. innovations within the B r i t i s h Empire sparking more interest than European developments. The inf luence of the federal structure of government varied according to the stage of the movement. Organized labour 's choice of Ottawa as the i n i t i a l target of pressure was decis ive in the sense that i t influenced the behaviour of other advocates, and the i r co l l ec t i ve lobbying hastened the introduction of Canada-wide pensions. The TLC's postwar decision to conduct concurrent lobbying in the provinc ia l cap i ta ls may have been influenced by the adoption of province-wide mothers' pensions. During the concerted campaign Ottawa engaged in minimal buck-passing, but made i t p la in that i t was only prepared to act with the provinces, not independently. Its stance was not simply a delaying t a c t i c , subsequently reinforced by the Just ice Department ru l i ng . It a lso ref lected a reluctance to finance the f u l l costs of such a major i n i t i a t i v e , a sentiment shared by a l l provinces, espec ia l ly those already f inancing pensions fo r needy mothers. Prime Min is ter King, however, made only token attempts to secure provincia l consent during his f i r s t term of o f f i c e . The ensuing stalemate was only resolved when extenuating parliamentary circumstances ar is ing out of the 1925 e lect ion prompted him to sponsor an abortive scheme that was subsequently r a t i f i e d in the 1927 session. As the or ig ina l Old Age Pension Act depended upon provincial par t ic ipat ion for e f fec t ive implementation, federalism exerted "a sizeable inf luence" - a lbe i t a delaying one - upon i t s t iming, even though i t afforded the provinces " l i t t l e inf luence" over the choice of the des ign .U2 In l i ne with the f indings of Bryden (1974), the case study confirms a group model of welfare p o l i t i c s . However, i t bui lds on his interpretat ion by emphasizing that the 1927 i n i t i a t i v e was a product of a con f l i c t between competing economic in terests which espoused d i f ferent sets of values 2.6.4 representing an emerging welfare ethos and the dominant "market ethos." This stress on a clash of values avoids the confusion of reviewers l i k e Baum (1975) and Simeon (1975) over his key concepts, a r i s ing from his tendency to t reat "environmental want" as more of a structural var iable than a cul tura l one. In f ac t , both concepts had roots in d i s t i nc t p o l i t i c a l ideologies of reform l ibera l i sm or democratic social ism on the one hand, and c lass ica l l ibera l ism on the other. Moreover, the ensuing struggle was not fought exc lus ive ly along occupational l i n e s . Organized labour, the vanguard of the emerging industr ia l -urban soc ie ty , spearheaded the agi tat ion during i t s two stages, but other groups in Canadian society also espoused the cause of social co l lec t i v ism - a lbe i t with less tenac i ty . In the prewar period members of the new profession of socia l work, and reform-minded Protestant c l e r i c s also advocated adoption of publ ic pensions and af ter World War I the major Protestant denominations and the most i n f l uen t ia l veterans' associat ion formally endorsed the concept. Their support broadened the movement beyond i t s working-class base and enhanced the legit imacy of the issue in the eyes of p o l i t i c i a n s , especia l ly the federal L ibe ra ls . Arrayed against these various advocates were the dominant economic in te res ts . Although spokesmen of capi ta l and agr icul ture were the most fervent subscribers to the "market ethos," they did not possess a monopoly of th i s c lus te r of values. Urban, middle-class female volunteers, the champions of the mothers' pensions movement, most Cathol ics and Protestants, and a few prominent academics also espoused the dominant se l f -he lp ethic pr ior to the war. But as a resul t of t he i r increased p o l i t i c a l inf luence a f ter 1921, organized businessmen and farmers qual i fy as the most e f fec t ive opponents. A s im i la r c lash of values was v i s i b l e ins ide Parliament. The or ig ina l proponents of the new welfare ethos were drawn from the ranks of a l l par t ies , except the Progressives, and represented mainly urban r id ings . They were spurred by a var iety of motives: party ideology re f lec t ing generational va lues, labour and provinc ia l representations, and local community work to champion the cause of the aged poor. They were more e f fec t ive in the postwar per iod, securing the appointment of the 1924 Special Committee that devised the or ig ina l plan. Their involvement in the process of formulat ion, though, provoked a d iv i s ion between "cost-conscious" and "welfare-conscious" parliamentary advocates. However, not a l l federal l eg is la to rs were convinced of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of state-f inanced old age pensions. The or ig ina l defenders of the t rad i t iona l "market ethos" comprised opponents of any form of publ ic pension, and more moderate adversaries who favoured the contributory pr inc ip le over state-f inanced benef i ts . Co l l ec t i ve l y , they were older and represented more rural r idings than the advocates ins ide Parliament. Their protests ref lected be l ie fs in l imi ted government and f i s ca l conservatism and were successful in l im i t i ng l e g i s l a t i v e action to an old age annuit ies plan. After the war parliamentary opponents appeared in the guise of defenders of prov inc ia l i n te res ts , as the 1926 debate in the House and Senate demonstrated. This development contrasts sharply with Splane's descr ipt ion of the post-1945 Parliament as "no t . . . a sounding-board for the assert ion of provincial ism in soc ia l w e l f a r e . " 1 1 3 Concerning forces ins ide government, the case study resembles a representative rather than a bureaucratic model of welfare p o l i t i c s . The decisions of cabinet po l i t i c i ans at both levels of government were motivated pr imar i ly by e lectora l ca lcu la t ions . I n i t i a l l y , they were reluctant to sanction l e g i s l a t i v e action because of fears of the e lectora l consequences of tax lev ies to finance old age pensions. Their fears of a taxpayers' revolt rather than 26.6. doubts about j u r i sd i c t i on were the major obstacles to governmental action in the f i r s t ha l f of the 1920s. Prime Min is ter King's subsequent change of heart only occurred because his very p o l i t i c a l survival was at stake. After conceding old age pensions in return for the support of Labour and UFA MPs and witnessing i t s reject ion by the Senate, he then real ized the electoral potential of the issue. Following the 1926 e lec t i on , p o l i t i c i a n s ' perceptions of popular support provided an incentive at both levels to take l eg i s l a t i ve action to ass is t the aged poor. A s t r i k i ng feature of the two movements for statutory benef i ts , analyzed to date, i s the v i r tua l absence of social control p o l i t i c s . Instead, in both cases, in terest group power was decis ive in spurring the introduction of means-tested pensions for sole-support mothers and the dependent e lde r l y . A s im i la r conste l la t ion of forces par t ic ipated in both movements comprising economic interest groups and c h a r i t i e s . Their disputes were resolved once again by cost-conscious cabinet po l i t i c i ans facing e lectora l pressures. This mixture of motives was equally powerful in shaping Ottawa's decision to pay benefits to some disabled veterans, as the next chapter reveals. CHAPTER 9 WAR VETERANS' ALLOWANCES, 1930 In 1930 the Canadian Parliament passed l eg i s l a t i on providing for the payment of federal allowances to non-pensionable veterans who, because of premature s e n i l i t y or other handicaps, were unemployable and in distressed circumstances. Ottawa's sponsorship of th i s "discret ionary form of socia l secur i ty" represented a new method of compensating World War I veterans for war-related in jury because, unl ike the d i s a b i l i t y pension, i t took into account earning capacity.1 It was also a novel experiment within the B r i t i s h Empire, spurring Austra l ia and New Zealand to of fer s imi la r aid subsequently. Despite i t s pioneering s ign i f i cance , however, Ottawa's 1930 i n i t i a t i v e has been v i r t u a l l y ignored by students of socia l po l i cy . To remedy th is neglect, th i s chapter aims to pinpoint the e f fec t i ve p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the introduct ion of the l e g i s l a t i o n . Background The c l i en t group of dest i tute unemployable veterans emerged from the ranks of the 450,000 men who were discharged as physica l ly f i t . Their handicaps developed af ter t he i r return to c i v i l i a n l i f e and f e l l outside the range of physical and mental causes of war-related unemployability recognized at the time by the medical profession. They were mainly psychologica l , resul t ing from the traumas of trench warfare, and included premature s e n i l i t y , shell-shock and other, "abnormal" nervous diseases. C o l l e c t i v e l y , men with these d i s a b i l i t i e s were labe l led as 'broken down,' 'burnt out' or 'prematurely aged' cases. Although no precise data ex is ts on the i r numbers, o f f i c i a l s in the Department of So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment (DSCR) estimated that the bulk of the 6,000 267 26.8 unemployed veterans who received r e l i e f fo r periods of ten weeks or longer during the 1920 winter were "men who have lost the i r g r i p . " 2 Assuming that 5,000 f e l l in to th i s category at the onset of the decade, th i s f igure was l i k e l y to increase over time because the aging process exacerbated the mental t o l l exacted by war service for veterans on the borderl ine between job f i tness and incapaci ty. By region, they were concentrated in the provinces bearing the brunt of the "returned so ld ier problem," v i z . , Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba and B r i t i s h Columbia. Unlike the i r 50,000 comrades severely or p a r t i a l l y disabled during the war, 'burnt out' veterans were i n e l i g i b l e for federal d i s a b i l i t y pensions or special services such as sheltered employment. Instead, the i r dest i tu t ion was re l ieved by spec ia l ized voluntary organizations in the immediate postwar per iod. The Canadian Pa t r i o t i c Fund (CPF) was the major r e l i e f - g i v i ng agency fo r ex-sold iers not provided fo r by federal regulat ions. Its postwar charter defined the fol lowing as e l i g i b l e for regular monthly assistance: cases of chronic or extended i l l n e s s of the breadwinner, including insan i ty , not e l i g i b l e for pension and not due to post-discharge intemperance or improper conduct, rendering him wholly or p a r t i a l l y incapable of supporting his fami ly . Although the charter s t ipulated that only the i r dependents were e l i g i b l e for maintenance, th is regulation was not watert ight, as CPF volunteers were given discret ionary authori ty to ass is t disabled veterans d i rec t l y under certain circumstances. However, another regulat ion precluding the granting of assistance to men without dependents, whether pensioned or not, was applied r i g i d l y and imposed considerable hardship on the s ingle incapacitated veteran, as a l ternat ive sources of a id were few and sporadic.3 Only one other fund existed fo r the handicapped ex -so ld ie r . The Disablement Fund was a pr ivate t rust created by James Carruthers of Montreal 269 during the war for the express purpose of looking af ter cases of severe d i s a b i l i t y which did not f a l l techn ica l ly under federal regulat ions. But, the scope of i t s work was l imi ted by i t s t rus tee, the Assistant Deputy Minister of the DSCR, to making small loans to pensioners and others in need of assistance known to the Department. According to the Minister of So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment, $15,000 was the sum tota l of money loaned up un t i l 1925. 4 Other sources of pr ivate aid for the single disabled veteran were equally l im i t ed . Voluntary agencies serving ex -so ld ie rs , such as the Red Cross, lacked the resources to provide regular support. The ex -so ld ie rs ' own organizat ions, such as the adjustment bureau of the GWVA, were only able to extend emergency assistance to needy comrades in d i s t ress . Although the i r funds were on occasion supplemented by pro f i ts from the federal ly-administered Canteen Fund, 5 t he i r resources were inadequate to meet the demands for a i d . Public provision for non-pensionable disabled veterans was a lso in termi t tent . They were e l i g i b l e for federal unemployment r e l i e f for returned so ld iers during the 1920 winter, but as they were non-pensioners, they did not qua l i fy for federal aid for pa r t i a l l y disabled veterans in subsequent winters (see chapter 3, page 75.) Instead, t he i r dest i tu t ion was rel ieved by munic ipa l i t ies or provincial returned so ld ie rs ' commissions, which only granted occasional emergency r e l i e f . Their demotion into the ranks of the c i v i l i a n needy, however, was not un iversal ly condoned and prompted demands for special treatment of 'burnt out' cases soon af ter the war. The Agi tat ion for War Veterans Allowances, 1920-30 In sharp contrast to the or ig inal struggle for emergency state aid where phys ica l ly f i t veterans were perceived as a threat to the establ ished order, the agi ta t ion to secure allowances for disabled ex-so ld iers contains l i t t l e 23.0.. evidence of soc ia l control p o l i t i c s , a f inding that h ighl ights the importance of the d is t inc t ion between the employable and the incapacitated poor. Instead, l i k e the preceding movements for statutory benef i ts , the agi tat ion approximates a group model of welfare p o l i t i c s . But, there are s ign i f i can t d i f ferences. The key societa l advocates were spokesmen of organized veterans rather than social service ac t i v i s t s or trade un ion is ts . They represented associat ions of both able-bodied and disabled men, with the former championing the cause of the 'burnt out' veteran. Even though the various d i s a b i l i t y organizations were not formed pr imar i ly to defend the in terests of the c l i e n t group, t he i r par t ic ipat ion remains noteworthy, marking the f i r s t time potential benef ic iar ies of statutory benefits engaged in pressure group a c t i v i t y . Unlike the other movements, the advocates' a c t i v i t i e s aroused l i t t l e opposition in Canadian society because veterans were widely perceived to have special claims as a resul t of the i r pa t r io t i c serv ice. Even organized businessmen and farmers, the major opponents of publ ic welfare for the c i v i l i a n needy, numbered among the supporters of the cause. As the publ ic generally was sympathetic, the advocates concentrated the i r energies for most of the agi ta t ion upon lobbying forces inside government. They selected Ottawa as the target because i t was assigned j u r i sd i c t i on over the category of veterans, but they faced an uphi l l bat t le in persuading the national decision-makers that they, rather than the provinces, should finance special benefits for the c l i en t group. The agi tat ion to secure war veterans' allowances was shorter than the movements to secure mothers' pensions and old age pensions. Yet, despite i t s re la t i ve brev i ty , i t evolved through two d i s t i nc t stages requir ing separate analyses, covering the i n i t i a l struggle to secure recognition of the pl ight of 'burnt out ' cases in the f i r s t ha l f of the decade and the concerted campaign to secure l eg i s l a t i ve action waged between 1926 and 1930. 2 71 The I n i t i a l Struggle, 1920-25 As the issue of special treatment for 'burnt out ' cases was l inked with the p o l i t i c s of veterans' r e l i e f during the 1920-25 depression, certain advocates engaged in d i rect lobbying of the federal cabinet , the agency that decided upon the d is t r ibu t ion of emergency a id . They comprised a local group of unemployed veterans and r e l i e f o f f i c i a l s in Toronto and Vancouver, the two c i t i e s with the highest concentrations of disabled e x - s o l d i e r s . 6 In the summer of 1922 a group of unemployed veterans in Toronto, the "so ld ie r c i t y , " marched to Ottawa to demand that the employment and r e l i e f sect ion of the DSCR aid a l l ex-members of the Canadian Expeditionary Force, regardless of the i r physical condi t ion. On June 5th representatives of the 247 hikers met the Prime Minister and members of his cabinet. Their leader, F. R i l e y , demanded immediate action to a l l ev i a te the "rampant" d is t ress in Toronto. In rep ly , King requested the names and regimental numbers of indiv idual cases of hardship. R i l e y , however, refused to supply th i s information, dismissing the Prime Min is te r ' s method as inadequate. He contended that Ottawa had a duty to a l l ev ia te th is d is t ress because war experience had produced physical d i s a b i l i t y among 95 percent of his group, whose members were " a l l f i r s t - l i n e frenchmen." Ri ley ended his submission with a warning of even greater pressure in the event of no concrete action being taken: [T]his l i t t l e army. . . is only the precursor of a greater army that i s coming. This i s only a caut ion, not a threat . I am not a Red, nor a Bolshev is t , nor a Sinn Feiner. In response to th is "caut ion, " Prime Min is ter King offered only the standard promise to consider the veterans' representat ions. 7 However, fol lowing the departure of " R i l e y ' s Army" from Ottawa, the cabinet decided to grant emergency r e l i e f to the permanently disabled veteran. The timing of the Toronto h ikers ' march coincided with a decision of the CPF to 272 concentrate on ex is t ing cases requir ing continuous assistance and to stop granting emergency r e l i e f , because i t s funds were dec l in ing . This cutback was prevented by Ottawa's intervent ion. The Cabinet decided to grant $900,000 to the Fund to enable i t to carry on i t s emergency r e l i e f work for at least another winter. During the 1923 winter the CPF expended $700,000. In Apr i l i t s o f f i c i a l s requested permission to use up the outstanding balance for the fur ther r e l i e f of des t i tu te , permanently disabled veterans not on t he i r caseload at the end of Ju ly 1922, when the l i s t of benef ic iar ies en t i t led to continuous assistance had been c losed. The federal government agreed to the i r request and the CPF was able to ass is t "some extremely hard cases" for another winter, with the f i na l grants being paid in May 1924.8 During the 1923 winter a delegation from a r e l i e f agency serving ex-so ld iers in Toronto attempted to secure addit ional federal a id for t he i r disabled unemployed c l i e n t s . It was headed by an ex -o f f i ce r , Rev. T.C. Brown, and included representatives of churches, veterans, manufacturers, the C i ty of Toronto, the Ontario So ld ie rs ' Aid Commission and an o f f i c i a l from the local branch of the DSCR. Brown informed the Prime Minister that these various organizations had united to coordinate r e l i e f a c t i v i t i e s among unemployed veterans, including 'burnt out' cases. He requested a federal contr ibut ion of 50 percent towards the i r maintenance, claiming that the "worthy ex-serviceman should be regarded as a special ward of the coun t ry . . . . " In his reply , Prime Min is ter King pointed out that requests for federal r e l i e f must come from the p r o v i n c i a l , not the local au tho r i t i es , and that Ottawa's pol icy could not be s e l e c t i v e . "You ask us for what seems l i k e a small amount, but we cannot do for Toronto what we are not prepared to do for other pi aces."9 273 The representations from the Toronto delegat ion, though, were successful in e l i c i t i n g a l imi ted federal response. In early February of 1923 the cabinet approved an order- in-counci l authoriz ing payment of one-third of the expenditure made by spec ia l ized agencies to ex-so ld iers "suffer ing from d i s a b i l i t i e s which, although not a t t r ibutable to war serv ice , and therefore not pensionable, place the men concerned in most cases under a handicap in competing in the general labour market . . . . "10 Federal contr ibut ions were subsequently paid to organizations ass is t ing such cases in Montreal, Toronto and Wallaceberg, but withheld from Winnipeg because i t lacked the requis i te organizational structure combining c i v i c o f f i c i a l s and vo l un tee rs . ^ By the f a l l of 1924 Ottawa's reluctance to take over the r e l i e f of 'burnt out ' cases was exhausting the patience of o f f i c i a l s in B r i t i sh Columbia, who were confronted with a steady in f lux of disabled ex-sold iers at a time when employment condit ions were depressed. Their f rust rat ions surfaced at the annual meeting of the advisory council of the Employment Service of Canada (ESC). J . D. McNiven, B .C . ' s Deputy Minister of Labour, explained the i r source: Now you know what occurs with a body of men out of work - cannot get work - they are d i s s a t i s f i e d , discontented, and they are going to embarrass the government that i s c losest to i t . . . . We know that from experience i t i s not a question of money at a l l , i t i s a question of who is going to get embarrassed.... His plea for federal action was supported by J.W. Ward, the Canadian Council of Agr icul ture representative on the ESC, who argued that there was no more deserving applicant than the disabled so ld ie r , and nobody "who begrudges what i t w i l l c o s t . . . . " 1 2 The federal Min is ter of Labour, however, refused to give McNiven a guarantee that Ottawa would make provision for unemployable veterans. He was well aware of h is cabinet col leagues' h o s t i l i t y towards r e l i e f expenditures of any type, as chapter 4 documented. Moreover, the recent 274 precedent of funding emergency a id fo r unemployed pensioners with minor d i s a b i l i t i e s acted as a deterrent to further expansion of a federal role in veterans' r e l i e f because of the p o l i t i c a l repercussions involved in withdrawing. Ottawa's refusal to a id 'burnt out ' cases a lso probably ref lected doubts over whether the i r d i s a b i l i t i e s were genuine. Accompanying the struggle to secure special r e l i e f , there was sporadic lobbying of federal l eg i s l a to rs during the 1920-25 per iod. Demands fo r l e g i s l a t i v e action were voiced by the CPF and veterans' assoc ia t ions. But t he i r uncoordinated pleas received only token attention from the Liberal government, because i t was determined to avoid new cost ly obl igat ions for a category of veterans i t perceived as 'undeserving. ' W.F. N ick le , the honorary secretary of the CPF, brought up the problem of premature s e n i l i t y among veterans during the hearings of the 1921 Special House of Commons Special Committee on Pensions, Insurance and Re-establishment. He c i ted cases of men in the 40-50 age group who went overseas, returned apparently sound, but were unable to se t t l e back into t he i r pre-war occupations, adding that "the country must consider doing something for these m e n . . . . T h e committee members, however, only made passing reference to these cases in the i r f ina l repo r t . * 4 Organized veterans also took up the cause of 'broken down' cases. Although they were divided into 14 separate national organizations during the f i r s t hal f of the decade, the GWVA and the other major assoc ia t ions, representing both able-bodied and disabled veterans, attempted to achieve a measure of unity in the i r l e g i s l a t i v e lobbying. They formed a Dominion Veterans' A l l iance in 1922, pr imar i ly in order to seek improvements in federal re-establishment po l i cy . Its combined membership represented the bulk of veterans s t i l l enrol led in organizations (see table 25). But th is attempt at coordination fa i led because of internal d iv i s ions among the partners over the appropriate strategy. The conservative GWVA favoured a non-partisan approach, while the more radical Grand Army of United Veterans advocated the draf t ing of a " s o l d i e r s ' plat form," including the r ight of r e c a l l . "[W]hen the wishes of the veteran seemed at such cross-purposes.. .one can readi ly see why the Government was confused, why the publ ic did not know just what the veteran wanted, and why the veteran himself was not sure what was happening and why . " 1 5 Table 25. Organizations jo in ing the Dominion Veterans' A l l i a n c e , 1922-25 GWVA Army & Navy Vets Imperial Vets Grand Army Canadian Legion Date of formation 1917 1919 1920 1921 Amputations Ass'n 1919 Headquarters Ottawa Winnipeg Toronto 1919 200,000 40,000 50,000 Number of members 1922 1925 170,000 150,000 60,000 80,000 1,500 T.B. Vets Ass'n 1921 4,000 600 600 3,000 5,000 SOURCE: 1919 membership f igures are c i ted in Minutes of Evidence, Special Committee on So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment, House of Commons Journals, 1919, app. no. 1, p. 747; 1922 f igures are taken from Canadian Annual Review, 1922, pp. 873, 877; and 1925 f igures are c i ted by Manion, House of Commons Debates, 1925, p. 1502. 2 76 The new Al l iance drew attention to 'burnt-out ' cases during hearings of the 1922 House of Commons Special Committee on Pensions, So ld ie rs ' Insurance and Re-establishment. Its spokesmen stressed that in the community at large "the general impression is that they have been rendered unemployable because of war serv ice."16 j n response to the A l l i ance ' s demand for federal ac t ion , the committee members recommended that ex is t ing sheltered employment f a c i l i t i e s be made accessib le to both e lder ly and prematurely aged veterans on the grounds that the provision of work was more desirable than "enforced i d l e n e s s . " ! 7 But as the vetcraf t shops operated by the DSCR and the Red Cross were already f u l l , these cases were denied entry. The A l l iance also brought the p l ight of 'burnt out' veterans to the attent ion of the 1924 Royal Commission on Pensions and Re-establishment. In response to the i r advocacy, the commissioners proposed that Ottawa establ ish special homes to house the indigent, prematurely aged veteran. They pointed out that the i r suggestion was hardly novel as such ins t i tu t ions had been operated successfu l ly for many years in England and e lsewhere . 1 8 Their recommendation, however, was rejected by the Liberal government, and extra help was confined to pensioned veterans without dependents. 1 9 The exclusion of t he i r non-pensioned counterparts condemned them to continued dependence upon pr ivate and public char i t y ,o r the s t ree ts , for the i r existence. Handicapped veterans also made an iso lated attempt to secure l eg i s l a t i ve act ion during Prime Min is ter King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e . A majority of the various national d i sab i l i t y -o r ien ted organizations decided not to par t ic ipate in the A l l i a n c e , including the Vancouver-based Federated Disabled Veterans of Canada, a coa l i t i on formed in 1921.20 This federation took the i n i t i a t i v e to l i nk the cause of 'burnt out' veterans with the c i v i l i a n old age pensions movement. In the summer preceding the 1925 e lec t ion the Disabled Veterans, with 27.7 "a voting power of 6,000," approached S . F . Tolmie, then Conservative MP fo r V i c t o r i a . Their demands included a pension for dest i tute veterans in the 50-plus age group, who en l is ted in middle age and who were broken down in health as a resul t of the i r war serv ice . In response to the i r request for o f f i c i a l party approval of the i r demands, Tolmie wrote to his leader seeking a commitment.21 But neither the o f f i c i a l opposition nor the governing Liberals took up the cause of veterans during the subsequent campaign. Instead, they focused upon the more pressing issues of t a r i f f po l i c y , t ransportat ion, immigration and Senate reform, upon which the electorate returned a "hung jury" verd ic t . The Liberal government's persistent refusal during i t s f i r s t term of o f f i ce to recognize the claims of veterans suffer ing from premature s e n i l i t y ref lected mainly cost considerat ions. D i s a b i l i t y pensions were the cos t l i es t item of re-establishment, with $336,810,000 expended up to the end of the 1923-24 f i s c a l year, so containment of the scheme, not expansion, was the order of the day. By refusing to accept that the handicaps of 'burnt out' veterans were related to war serv ice , the cabinet were able to l i t e r a l l y pass the buck for t he i r maintenance to the t rad i t iona l re l iev ing au thor i t i es . The Concerted Campaign, 1926-30 The campaign to secure l e g i s l a t i v e act ion for 'burnt out ' cases i n tens i f i ed during the second hal f of the decade mainly because of the un i f i ca t ion of the ex -so ld ie rs ' movement. Following the creation of the Legion in November 1925, organized veterans engaged in concerted lobbying to secure federal provision for t he i r non-pensionable disabled comrades, and the i r e f fo r ts attracted support from Conservative MPs. These advocates, though, faced 278 an uphi l l bat t le since some members of the governing Liberal Party and senior administrators were not convinced of the merits of the claims of non-pensioners. Advocates: In November 1925 the sizeable GWVA merged with f i ve smaller groups, the Grand Army of United Veterans, Imperial Veterans, the ex is t ing Legion, TB Veterans and Disabled Veterans, to form the Canadian Legion of the B r i t i sh Empire Service League. Although the 60,000-strong Army and Navy Veterans and the majority of the d i sab i l i t y -o r ien ted organizations decided not to j o i n , the new Legion could claim to represent majority opinion among the 225,000 discharged men s t i l l enrol led in assoc ia t ions, as i t s combined membership t o ta l l ed 160,000.22 This development represented a s ign i f i can t advance over the previous fragmentation; and the new Legion soon became "a powerful voice that could not be s t i f l e d or ignored."23 Local branches of the new unity movement in B r i t i s h Columbia pressed the claims of the prematurely aged veterans during the turbulent 1926 parliamentary sess ion , when the p o l i t i c a l survival of the minority Liberal government was at stake. Their separate representations i l l u s t r a t e d the teething problems involved in the process of merger. On March 17th the V i c to r i a branch of the Legion forwarded a resolut ion to the federal cabinet suggesting that i t s i n i t i a t i v e for the c i v i l i a n e lder ly should allow certa in preferences in age, residence and allowable income for unemployable veterans; and on the fol lowing day members of the V ic to r ia GWVA passed a s im i la r resolut ion. Their demands were subsequently voiced in the federal House by B.C. Conservative backbenchers,24 D U t were resisted by the Liberal government.25 The Legion's subsequent e f for ts to secure l e g i s l a t i v e action were waged in concert with the i r spokesmen inside the House of Commons. These MPs a l l made 27 9.. d i rec t references to Legion demands in the course of the advocacy, and were members of- the Conservative opposition fol lowing the 1926 e lect ion (see table 26). Only two had d i rect l inks with organized veterans: J . A . C lark , a GWVA founder, and L . J . Ladner, an honorary GWVA member. Their involvement ref lected a mixture of motives. Clark and R . J . Manion were ex-o f f icers who f e l t the same sense of obl igat ion for the welfare of the i r comrades as had existed on the front l i n e s . The remainder represented consti tuencies with re la t i ve l y high proportions of veterans. Besides Legion spokesmen, there were other supporters of the veterans' cause inside the House who avoided mention of spec i f i c group representations. These MPs were drawn from a l l pa r t ies , except the two-man Labour group, and a l l regions, with the noticeable exception of Quebec. As table 26 revea ls , most sympathizers were not ex -so ld ie rs . Their involvement was presumably motivated by humanitarianism, because they a l l shared the popular perception that veterans were a cu l tu ra l l y deserving group. While agreeing that something had to be done fo r unemployable non-pensioners, the advocates in the House were divided over the questions of e l i g i b i l i t y and j u r i s d i c t i o n . Their di f ferences of opinion surfaced during the debate on the 1927 old age pensions b i l l . Captain R . J . Manion and Brigadier-General Clark sponsored an amendment incorporating the Legion's suggestion to lower the age requirement for shell-shock cases to 65 from the s t ipu la ted age of 70. Other Conservatives, however, questioned i t s s u i t a b i l i t y . Dr. P. McGibbon suggested subst i tu t ing unemployability for the lower age requirement; and another physic ian, J.W. Edwards, rejected the proposed jo in t method of f inancing arguing that Ottawa should assume the f u l l costs of maintenance for men handicapped as a result of war service.26 Following the government's re ject ion of the amendment, the proponents agreed to press for inc lus ion of 'burnt-out ' cases under the federal war 280.. Table 26. Legion spokesmen and sympathizers in the House of Commons, 1926-29 Party Prov. Occupation M i l i t a ry Career Cabinet Posts Rank Unit Medals Prov. Fed. Spokesmen: Clark Con B.C. Lawyer Gen. Infy. CMG.DSO Esl ing n II Publisher Ladner II II Lawyer McQuarrie II H II Manion II Ont Doctor Capt. Medic. MC Pr ice N.B. Dentist Sympathizers: Arthurs II Ont Merchant L t -Co l . In fy . Bennett II Alta Lawyer Edwards II Ont Doctor ? Medic. Kennedy II Man Lawyer Major Infy. MC McGi bbon Ont Doctor Capt. Ryckman II II Lawyer Adshead Lib-Lab. Alta Farmer M i l l a r L ib-Pro. Sask II Ross, A .E . L ib . Ont Doctor Gen. CB.CG.CMG Ross, J . A . II Sask Farmer Sanderson ll Ont •I Capt. ? Vallance ll Sask II Young, A.M. ll n Doctor Evans Pro. •I Farmer Irvine UFA Alta Journal is t Volunteer M i l i t i a Speakman H Farmer Macphail UFO Ont Teacher SOURCE: J .K . Johnson, e d . , The Canadian Directory of Parl iament, 1867-1967 (Ottawa: Publ ic Archives of Canada, 1968), passim. 281 d i s a b i l i t y pensions plan. In reply to a question from O.B. Pr ice (Con., Westmoreland), 2 7 the Minister of So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment made i t c lear that the Liberal cabinet had no intent ion of amending the Pension Act to include those whose d i s a b i l i t i e s were not related to war s e r v i c e . 2 8 His announcement sparked a stormy protest from the Dominion Command of the Legion which sent a l e t t e r to a l l MPs asking that they remain in session long enough to consider the i r l eg i s l a t i ve proposals. Branch members across Canada joined in the protest and made the i r wishes known to the i r local MPs. "Publ ic indignation was aroused, newspapers attacked the Government's stand, and f i n a l l y events came to a head during a 6-hour debate in the House . " 2 9 Although the purpose of the debate was to discuss changes in the composition of the pensions appeal board, i t was dominated by discussion of cases of hardship among non-pensioners. Speakers from a l l pa r t i es , except the Labour group, urged the government not to forget " . . . t he claims of men who came back mained for l i f e . " They included two prominent members of the medical profess ion, Manion and McGibbon, who stressed the novelty of these veterans' handicaps, espec ia l ly t he i r mental and nervous disorders that defied diagnosis beyond comparing the patient to "a battery which was discharged." The new. Min is ter of Defence,however, was not convinced that these d i s a b i l i t i e s were "incurred through se rv i ce . " His cabinet col league, Dr. J . King, was equally s c e p t i c a l , promising only to consolidate the Pension Act next year af ter an invest igat ion.30 In response to a reminder from Bennett, the new leader of the Conservative oppositional Prime Minister King appointed a special committee ear ly in the 1928 session to consider new leg i s l a t i on and amendments to ex is t ing laws. The chairman was Major C . J . Power, who had served overseas with the 14th Royal Montreal Bat ta l ion and, a f ter being twice wounded, was inval ided out in 1918. 282 Eight of the other 15 committee members had served overseas during World War I, and the i r ranks included three known proponents, Clark, McGibbon and Sanderson. Among the remainder, only Adshead and Speakman were on record as sympathizers. Representatives of various veterans' associat ions presented the case for special provision for 'broken-down' cases. Although they agreed on the necessity for l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion , they presented con f l i c t i ng remedies and so los t an opportunity to present a united f ront . W.S. Dobbs and J . F . Marsh of the Canadian Pensioners' Association (CPA) to ld the committee members that out of 1,100 appl icants to the Toronto o f f i ce of the Canadian Employment Serv ice, 238 were 'burnt-out ' veterans not in receipt of pensions, and that many had been employed since the war unt i l t he i r sudden breakdowns. For these sufferers of war neurosis, Marsh proposed that "an allowance be made, instead of arranging i t in the r e l i e f department."32 %ut th is remedy was not incorporated into the CPA's wri t ten br ie f that recommended instead the creat ion of a federal rehab i l i ta t ion board in Toronto and other larger centres to deal exc lus ively with cases referred by the Employment Service.33 A CPA spokesman at the hearings urged the committee to sanction i t s establishment, as i t would go a long way to help those men who have no confidence in themselves, and who have reached that stage as described by some wr i ter not long ago, 'To dig I am not able and to beg I am ashamed. ' " 3 4 But the major associat ions of able-bodied veterans disagreed over the merits of the board proposal. The Army and Navy Veterans favoured making provis ion for cases of premature s e n i l i t y by amendment of the c i v i l i a n Old Age Pension Act.35 in contrast , Legion o f f i c i a l s endorsed the idea of a federal board in the i r submission. Furthermore, they suggested that for the ut ter ly disabled with dependents, one of i t s functions would be to determine "...some form of allowances without having recourse to char i ty . "36 283 The members of the 1928 special committee, however, rejected the idea of an allowance to remedy the pl ight of 'broken down' dest i tu te veterans. In the i r f i na l report they pleaded lack of time and resources for the i r f a i l u re to define any pol icy to deal with "the most serious problem which has.ar isen in connection with our ex -so ld ie rs . " To meet pressing cases of need, they recormiended a number of temporary expedients, such as expansion of vetcraft shops. At the same time the committee members stressed the need for an immediate invest igat ion in order to frame a pol icy tha t , they were convinced, "must eventually be adopted by the Department."37 Opponents: The rat ionale used by the 1928 committee members to j u s t i f y the i r f a i l u re to recommend a concrete remedy masked internal d iv is ions of opinion concerning the d e s i r a b i l i t y of aiding 'burnt-out' cases. The reluctance of a few Liberal backbenchers was also shared by senior administrators and cost-conscious members of the Liberal cabinet. Not a l l the ex -o f f i ce r members of the 1928 special committee were sympathetic to the idea of special federal treatment for 'burnt-out ' cases. Their opposition ref lected the be l ie f prevalent among senior members of the p o l i t i c a l e l i t e that the war-disabled so ld iers earned the i r r ight to a pension, whereas other categories received aid merely as a gratui ty or as a g i f t . 38 For example, S i r Eugene Fiset ( L i b . , Rimouski), a Boer War veteran and ex-Deputy Min is ter of M i l i t i a and Defence, objected to a Legion suggestion that non-pensioned, s ing le men should receive free ins t i tu t iona l care in special so l d i e r s ' homes while t he i r counterparts receiving pensions for minor d i s a b i l i t i e s should contribute towards the i r costs of maintenance. He c lear l y perceived the former as less 'deserving' than the i r war-disabled comrades. Another Liberal committee member, Captain Thorson, a World War I veteran and 284 former Dean of Manitoba Law School, shared his perception. He opposed the idea of the 'broken down' non-pensioner with dependents receiving a federal allowance on the grounds that such aid would be "tantamount to pensioning h i m . " 3 9 C i v i l i a n Liberal MPs on the 1928 special committee were also opposed. They were scept ical of the claim made by CPA spokesmen that cases of premature s e n i l i t y f e l l under federal j u r i sd i c t i on because the i r condit ion was traceable to war serv ice . M. McLean (Melfort) suggested instead that the i r neuroses could be due to " indust r ia l s t r a i n ; " and he la te r objected to the idea that non-pensionable unemployables with dependents who never saw overseas service on account of t he i r age could qual i fy for special treatment, arguing that the i r maintenance was "purely a provincial r espons ib i l i t y . " A colleague from Manitoba, E.A. McPherson, also doubted whether the handicaps of e lder ly veterans were war-related, when arguing that "there w i l l be a l o t of cases where the moral l i a b i l i t y of the Dominion, I th ink , i s very f a r - f e t c h e d . " 4 0 The reservations voiced by Liberal backbenchers were shared by senior bureaucrats in the DSCR. Although the l a t t e r were not averse to making further provision for unemployable pensioners receiving federal r e l i e f , they balked at the idea of statutory benefits for 'burnt out' cases. Their resistance ref lected a desire to protect the special status of t he i r war-disabled c l i en ts from contamination by a group with questionable handicaps, as well as cost considerat ions. The i n i t i a l invest igat ion of the issue by the bureaucracy was prompted by the decision of the federal cabinet to include the question of employment of war-disabled pensioners on the agenda of the 1927 Dominion-Provincial Conference. 4 1 E. Flexman, Director of Administration in the DSCR, was assigned the task of inqu i ry , and his recommendations were forwarded to the Deputy 285 Minis ter of Labour on October 31st. He pointed out that the unemployment s i tua t ion among disabled pensioners was "a great deal better" than for c i v i l i a n s . In February 1927 the respective proportions were 4.4 percent and 6.5 percent, with the bulk of unemployed pensioners concentrated in c i t i e s of Ontar io, Quebec and B r i t i s h Columbia. But Flexman estimated that at least 75 percent of pensioners on the DSCR r e l i e f r o l l s were "p rac t i ca l l y unemployable" owing to t he i r age, and most only received pensions fo r d i s a b i l i t i e s rated below 50 percent. He presented two options to deal with these cases: continuation of federal r e l i e f or creation of new machinery to t ra in 'burnt out ' cases, and came down in favour of the former on grounds of cost . "The amount expended at the present time on r e l i e f i s not la rge, and whi ls t i t i s probably not the most sa t i s fac to ry , i s probably the least expensive way of taking care of the s i t ua t i on . " Flexman then proposed changes in the method of re l iev ing unemployable pensioners. He suggested that e i ther the i r pensions should be augmented to current r e l i e f rates or that Ottawa should t ransfer these cases to the i r munic ipa l i t ies and contr ibute 50 percent towards t he i r r e l i e f . If the l a t t e r a l ternat ive was chosen, he advocated s im i la r aid for non-pensioned 'burnt out ' cases in order to ensure uniform treatment of indigent ex-servicemen and to sa t i s f y cormiunity expectations. "There i s a fee l ing among the publ ic generally that the condit ion among these men i s due in large measure to the stress of act ive serv ice , and that the Federal Government should assume respons ib i l i t y for the i r c a r e . " 4 2 For Flexman, the advantages of the proposed federal-municipal method of f inancing were twofold: r e l i e f administrat ion would be s imp l i f ied and Ottawa's costs would be no higher than the present system. He, however, ant ic ipated objections to his proposal , v i z . , di f ferences in treatment accorded to pensioners by various mun ic ipa l i t i es , and the "strong p o s s i b i l i t y " that the 28.6. local author i t ies would refuse to assume respons ib i l i t y for pensioners. If these obstacles proved insurmountable, Flecksman suggested that Ottawa reimburse the province or munic ipal i ty current ly maintaining unemployable non-pensioners 50 percent of the costs of caring for these permanent cha rges . 4 3 His suggestions, however, were not acted upon, probably because of protests voiced by provincia l Premiers at the 1927 Conference, which are discussed below. The next invest igat ion by senior bureaucrats was undertaken at the time of the hearings of the 1928 Special Committee. An eight-man committee was establ ished in the new Department of Pensions and National Health (DPNH) under the chairmanship of E.H. Scammell, the Assistant Deputy M in is te r , to prepare the Department's posi t ion on the question of care and treatment of problem cases. At t he i r March 23rd meeting the chairman discussed at some length the question of extending r e l i e f to the bona f ide non-pensioner because he was often " in even more desperate circumstances than the pensioner, and remedial measures were urgently required." The other par t i c ipan ts , however, were unable to resolve the question of j u r i s d i c t i o n , even though they agreed "that action along those l ines i s rea l l y necessary at the present t ime." The subject was discussed again on Apr i l 5th. The only outsider on the committee, R.A. Rigg, Superintendent of the c i v i l i a n ESC, explained very f u l l y the att i tudes of Ottawa and the provinces towards unemployment r e l i e f , c i t i n g Premier Ferguson's recent re ject ion of a request for a id from the township of York as evidence that r e l i e f was purely a municipal respons ib i l i t y . "It was f i n a l l y agreed that t h i s Committee could not see i t s way c lear to recommend expansion of the scope of r e l i e f to include non-pensioners."44 The bureaucrats' p o l i t i c a l superiors were equally reluctant to sanction the idea of special federal treatment for 'burnt, out' cases. Although the 287 federal treasury reaped the benefits of general economic prosperity during the second hal f of the decade, the Liberal government was not prepared to undertake new, cost ly ob l igat ions. When reject ing MPs' pleas for extension of the Pension Act to cover cases of premature s e n i l i t y in 1927, the Minister of So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment blunt ly to ld the House that the cabinet was not prepared to entertain any proposal that " . . .would enta i l a very large addit ion to our pension b i l l . " 4 5 The Liberal cabinet 's desire to cut costs was manifest in i t s abort ive attempt to persuade the provincia l Premiers to contr ibute towards the maintenance of unemployable pensioners. They placed the subject of "unemployment insurance for handicapped veterans" on the agenda of the 1927 Dominion-Provincial Conference. But only B .C . ' s Attorney-General showed "any in terest in th i s item.46 Spokesmen of the other provinces were opposed to discussing r e l i e f matters with Ottawa at that t ime, espec ia l ly when they involved new, cost ly commitments, as chapter 4 documented. The f i s c a l conservatism of provincial p o l i t i c i a n s , therefore, e f fec t i ve ly ruled out the prospect of a j o in t remedy fo r the problem of 'burnt out' cases. Prec ip i tan ts : Although the prospects of a federal i n i t i a t i v e appeared remote on the eve of the Great Depression, a renewed agi tat ion by the champions of the cause, combined with electoral pressures, pushed the issue of federal a id for 'burnt out ' cases higher up the p o l i t i c a l agenda, where the recommendations of sympathetic bureaucrats smoothed the way fo r l eg i s l a t i ve act ion. The opposition of the Liberal government did not deter the major advocates from continuing to press the case for l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . At the i r 1928 convention Legion delegates instructed t he i r Dominion Command to continue i t s study of in jus t ices and to pay par t icu lar attent ion to the needs of prematurely 288 aged men. In the fol lowing year they endorsed the i r execut ive's suggestion to lobby for ins t i tu t iona l care for non-pensionable-single men and for the payment of " l i v i n g " allowances to non-pensionable veterans with dependents who sustained d i s a b i l i t y or in jury in a theatre of war. Their promotion of the cause of the non-pensioner was not motivated so le ly by humanitarianism. It also ref lected vested in te res t , because Legion o f f i c i a l s perceived the presence of unemployables in the labour market as deterr ing prospective employers from h i r ing returned men. According to Colonel LaFleche, i t s 1930 President, a l e g i s l a t i v e i n i t i a t i v e "would remove from the labour market - and I want to be char i tab le here - what I term the lower s t r a t a , so far as capacity for work i s concerned."47 The Legion's renewed agi tat ion attracted the support of elected o f f i c i a l s of western c i t i e s and provinces. At the i r conference on unemployment held in Winnipeg in January 1930, they discussed the p l ight of amputees and 'burnt out ' ex-servicemen, and passed a resolut ion urging Ottawa to provide ins t i tu t iona l care fo r unmarried men and to pay a " l i v i n g " allowance for married men with dependents. A l l the delegates regarded these categories of veterans as "deserving the sympathetic considerat ion" of the federal author i t ies and employers.48 The subsequent development of the campaign, however, owed less to the e f fo r ts of interest groups than to e lectora l pressures. After the close of the 1929 session rumours of a federal e lect ion were widespread, and both the Prime Min is ter and the leader of the opposition went on speaking tours across the country. Although the state of the economy was the major issue, King did not ignore veterans' concerns. During his western tour i n the f a l l of 1929 he made d i rec t appeals for ex -so ld ie rs ' votes. While in Vancouver in mid-November he repeated his 1922 pledge of generous treatment for veterans and the i r 2 8 S L dependents. His theme was echoed by J . Ralston, the Defence Min is te r , in his address to delegates attending the Legion convention in la te November. Their r e t i r i ng President, General S i r Arthur Cur r ie , also made an "eloquent plea" for sympathetic understanding of the veterans' pos i t i on : "Our aim must be to see that no man who went to the service of his country must be permitted by that country to suffer want because of war d i s a b i l i t y . " 4 9 Currie was a towering f igure in the ex -so ld ie rs ' movement, having been Commander of the Canadian Corps during the war, and so his message received widespread pub l i c i t y . One week la te r the Prime Minister repl ied to Curr ie at a publ ic meeting in London, Ontario. King repeated h is 1922 pledge and promised a review of pension l e g i s l a t i o n . His response was motivated pr imar i ly by e lectora l considerat ions, but there was another spur to federal ac t ion . The onset of the depression "...emphasized the need of remedial measures."50 A review of the Pension Act was already underway. In the f a l l of 1929 Dr. J . King, the Minister of Pensions and National Heal th, had appointed a three-man committee to review ex is t ing provision for unemployable pensioners, and to invest igate the f e a s i b i l i t y of implementing his own preference for maintenance of th is category by a statutory allowance s imi la r to the c i v i l i a n old age pension precedent rather than by expansion of the Pension Act.51 i t was chaired by Major A.M. Wright, the chief administrat ive assistant in the Department, and the other members were Major F.S. Burke, a doctor employed in i t s Medical Services D iv i s ion , and W.S. Woods, a member of the So ld iers ' Settlement Board, who was summoned to Ottawa to serve on the committee. These o f f i c i a l s had a l l served overseas and the i r exposure to the pressure of trench warfare made them sympathetic to the p l ight of a l l 'burnt out' cases with f ron t - l i ne serv ice. After extensive consultat ion with ch ie f l y Legion spokesmen, they concluded that the indigent, prematurely aged veteran, p a r t i a l l y or wholly 29J0L non-pensionable, should be rel ieved by a statutory "economic allowance" s im i la r in form to the c i v i l i a n old age p e n s i o n . 5 2 The DPNH o f f i c i a l s ' choice of means-tested benefits for re l iev ing unemployable veterans was dictated pr imar i ly by cost considerat ions, rather than by a desire to achieve uniformity of treatment with the c i v i l i a n e lder ly . They opted for the payment of statutory benefits over extension of federal unemployment r e l i e f on the grounds that the costs of r e l i e f "would be as great and probably greater" because " d r i f t e r s , " i . e . , seasonally unemployed veterans, as well as unemployables would apply for aid.53 Their choice was also a cheaper option than the Legion's 1929 proposal to provide specia l ized i ns t i t u t i ona l care for non-pensioned, s ingle men, because the la t te r would involve heavy capi ta l expenditure. Moreover, the proposed monthly allowance of $20 represented a less cost ly means of re l iev ing both the 200 s i ng le , wholly unemployable pensioners current ly maintained in veterans' hospitals at a per diem cost of $3 and the problem cases on the DPNH r e l i e f r o l l s , because the o f f i c i a l s ant ic ipated, erroneously, that the removal of the l a t t e r would obviate the need for federal r e l i e f machinery.54 jhe imposition of a means test was also a method of cont ro l l ing s p i r a l l i n g future cos ts , f o r , according to Major Burke, the departmental committee members were struck by the "astonishing" revelat ion that a l l f ron t - l i ne ex -so ld ie rs , t o t a l l i n g 280,000 in 1930, would become unemployable as a resul t of the aging process.55 The Liberal cabinet readi ly accepted the i r bureaucrats' recommendations presumably because i t combined both manageable costs and electoral payoffs. But they were not prepared to endorse the proposed minimum age l im i t of 60, and a l tered i t to 65 in order to save an estimated $700,000 per annum. They l e f t i n t ac t , though, the o f f i c i a l s ' suggestion that younger, permanently unemployable cases should also be e l i g i b l e for federal a id because of the 29J. electora l payoff involved. According to the Deputy Minister of Pensions, these were "the type of men that the public generally believe were injured by the i r m i l i t a r y serv ice . They say, 'I knew th is young man before he went to war; he has come back now and i s a wreck. "'56 Early in the 1930 session the Prime Min is ter announced that the veterans' b i l l would be referred to a special committee s imi la r in composition to the 1928 inqu i ry , and suggested to the House that the question of war veterans' allowances "should be kept altogether out of party p o l i t i c s . " 5 7 On March 4th the Min is ter of Pensions introduced the reso lu t ion, echoing his leader 's plea fo r non-partisanship and enthusing that : "In making provision for the non-pensionable man, Canada w i l l be a pioneer."58 It was d i f f i c u l t , however, for the Conservative opposition to endorse the concept of war veterans' allowances in a s p i r i t of non-part isanship, because i t s members disapproved of the proposed remedy. Much of the debate on the resolut ion was dominated by Conservative protests over the pr inc ip le of means-tested allowances, because they regarded unemployable war veterans as deserving better provision than a mere "old age do le . " Dr. McGibbon led the at tack, arguing that provision for unemployables should be made v ia changes in pension l eg i s la t i on rather than a separate scheme of allowances, because the l a t t e r deprived ex-servicemen of the i r r igh ts . Other veterans' sympathizers in the House, such as J . Arthurs and Ross, also opposed discriminatory treatment. Their leader, Bennett, argued fo rc ib l y as well that the veteran should not have to meet the c r i t e r i on of "pauperism" imposed upon the c i v i l i a n applicant for an old age pension. In the case of "men who have offered the i r l i ves for the s ta te . . .ou r duty is to see that the s a c r i f i c e of these men i s not in vain."59 Bennett's speech prompted the Prime Minister to remind his p o l i t i c a l opponents not "to make party capi ta l out of th i s quest ion." He j u s t i f i e d his 29.2 government's choice of a separate measure for 'burnt out' cases over amending the Pension Act on the fol lowing ground: "Right ly or wrongly, there has grown up a cer ta in prejudice against the Pension Board." He then rejected Bennett's charge that the measure would pauperize veterans, as i t was based on old age pension l e g i s l a t i o n . He drew a d i s t i nc t i on between "pauperism" and "honourable penury," and contended that neither o ld age pensions nor war veterans' allowances were "acts of char i ty" on the part of government, but r ights of needy c i t i z e n s . 6 0 But the Conservatives continued the i r attack. In the second reading stage the vast majority of the 14 speakers from the opposition benches favoured provision through amendment to pension l eg i s l a t i on over the proposed system of a l lowances. 6 * The method of administrat ion was also attacked during the passage of the b i l l . Members of the Conservative opposition registered a loud protest against administrat ion by the DPNH, because they trusted neither i t s o f f i c i a l s nor i t s Minister to make impart ial dec is ions. C lark , a Legion spokesman, argued that "[s]uch a procedure would ca l l for favouri t ism."62 His plea for administration by an independent body was supported by his leader and other backbenchers. But Dr. King rejected the i r demands, arguing that his o f f i c i a l s were more competent to decide on the e l i g i b i l i t y of unemployables and that veterans favoured administration by his department over administration by the Pension Board.63 The proposed method of administ rat ion, however, was not un iversal ly approved by in f luen t ia l spokesmen of ex -so ld ie rs . During the committee stage General Cur r ie , Grand President of the Legion, opposed i t on the grounds that o f f i c i a l s would be subject to the orders of the min is ter , "and we know that ministers have no rest from those who want something." He suggested instead the appointment of a Legion representative and other honorary members in order to save the Minister and his successors "a great deal of embarrassment." McGibbon, a sympathizer of the veterans' cause, was also opposed to leaving determination of the e l i g i b i l i t y of cases under the age of 60 in the hands of a departmental committee. "I think no p o l i t i c a l committee should have that power, and i t i s absolutely a p o l i t i c a l comnittee when i t i s under the control of a min is ter , no matter what party i s in power." He suggested administrat ion by an independent board and his suggestion was endorsed subsequently in an in camera discussion.64 This change was re luctant ly accepted by Dr. King. Another term of the reso lu t ion , concerning the minimum age requirement, was also al tered by the 1930 committee members charged with the task of amendment. In his testimony Major Burke implied that he and his colleagues in the DPNH who drafted the or ig ina l b i l l were unhappy with the i r p o l i t i c a l super iors ' decision to increase the minimum age requirement from 60 to 65. He suggested that , as the immediate costs of aiding the older age group were "not in excess," a lower age requirement was s t i l l f eas ib l e , amounting to $2,000,000, an estimate that turned out to be on the high side (see table 27). His plea was accepted by the comnittee chairman, who decided to "amend the b i l l r ight now to 6 0 . " 6 5 The o f f i c i a l s ' suggestion, though, regarding residency was rejected. Their recommendation of a minimum of f i ve years continuous residence in Canada, to conform with the requirement for c i v i l i a n old age pensioners, was reduced i n i t i a l l y by cabinet po l i t i c i ans to three years because, according to Major Wright, t he i r choice was considered "un fa i r . " During the committee stage Arthurs, a Conservative veterans' sympathizer, suggested that no residency requirement should be imposed upon Canadian c i t i z e n s , because i t discriminated against men forced to leave Canada to earn a l i ve l i hood . Other members, as well as the committee chairman, Major Power, disagreed, favouring some safeguard 2.9_4 along the l ines of s ix months or one year. They were supported by LaFleche, the President of the Legion, and his plea for a reduction voiced la te r in the hearings spurred the Special Committee to accept one year af ter an in camera discussion of the s u b j e c t . 6 6 Table 27. Actual and estimated federal expenditure on war veterans' al lowances, 1930/31 - 1938/39 f i sca l years Total No. Expenditure Actual Estimated 9 Actual Estimated 3 1930/1 2,219 12,705 $ 318,029 $2,134,560 1931/2 3,825 15,013 1,039,551 2,522,400 1932/3 4,867 1,338,708 1933/4 5,837 1,646,314 1934/5 7,186 24,070 2,017,075 4,043,760 1935/6 8,820 2,530,396 1936/7 11,306 3,178,616b 1937/8 13,244 3,898,769 1938/9 20,010 5,308,098b SOURCES: Figures re la t ing to actual numbers and expenditures are taken from Canada, Reports of the Work of the Department of Pensions and National Heal th, 1930/31-1938/39, passim. Estimated f igures are c i ted in appendix no. 7, of the Special Committee on Pensions and Returned So ld ie rs ' Problems, House of Commons Journals , 1930, app. 1, p. 298. Es t ima tes were based on the assumption that 40 percent of veterans aged 60 and over would require a i d . •^ Amendments to the or ig ina l act in 1936 and 1938 increased the scope of the scheme and hence i t s cost . 2 95 The o f f i c i a l s ' recommendations to incorporate financial e l i g ib i l i t y requirements identical to those relating to the c iv i l ian elderly were also altered during the b i l l ' s passage. Their suggestion to disqualify veterans who disposed of their property in the five years preceding their application was cr i t ic ized for i ts harshness by two Conservatives. After pointing out that such disposal could occur in order to provide for dependents, these MPs attacked the drafter of the clause for suggesting that "the veterans were perpetuating a fraud upon the people of this country." 6 7 Their charges stung of f ic ia ls in the DPNH, who explained during the committee stage that the clause was never intended "to affect the case of a man who was right up against i t . " 6 8 An amendment to allow exclusion only i f fraud was suspected was accepted subsequently by the committee members. Another recommendation of the o f f i c ia l s , l imit ing deductions from casual earnings or gif ts to $120, was also rejected. The committee chairman accepted the argument of McGibbon, the chief opponent, that veterans would not keep track of their earnings and so the costs of checking would be "excessive." 6 9 The various amendments made by the special committee were approved unanimously at the third reading stage on May 1, 1930. The b i l l passed smoothly throughly the Senate and received royal assent at the close of the session. Although the legislation did not become operative until after the election, credit for i ts passage was claimed by the Liberal government during the campaign. 7 0 The 1930 War Veterans' Allowance Act was not drafted hasti ly. It was "probably the most carefully prepared statute" pertaining to ex-soldiers enacted by the Canadian Parliament. 7! Moreover, i ts drafting reflected a pattern of interaction between groups and bureaucrats, more common in modern policymaking. The involvement of Legion of f ic ia ls in the process of policy 2 9 A formulation contrasts with the non-part ic ipat ion of t he i r Austral ian counterparts, who were "never" involved in the draf t ing stage, at least p r io r to 1966.72 Legion spokesmen, in conjunction with DPNH o f f i c i a l s , determined the scope of the scheme, with the former securing inc lus ion of non-pensionable veterans with f ron t - l i ne service and the l a t t e r incorporating pensioners with par t ia l d i s a b i l i t i e s . Bureaucrats also chose the minimum age requirement, but t he i r wishes only prevai led when they persuaded backbenchers serving on the 1930 Special Committee to overturn the decis ion of cabinet min is ters . However, the wishes of both appointed and elected o f f i c i a l s concerning the residency requirement were disregarded by veterans' sympathizers on the committee. DPNH o f f i c i a l s , presumably acting upon instruct ions from the cabinet , devised the scale of benef i ts , income l im i ts and the method of f inanc ing, but once again backbenchers were instrumental in securing changes concerning property ownership and casual earnings. Al l these provisions re lat ing to f inance, except the method of ra is ing revenue, ref lected the precedent of old age pensions l e g i s l a t i o n (see appendix B) . The method of administrat ion represented a major concession, extracted by Legion spokesmen and the i r a l l i e s on opposition benches from a reluctant min is ter . A Review The socio-economic set t ing had a l imi ted impact on the agi tat ion to secure statutory allowances for non-pensioned, unemployable veterans. The 1920-25 depression created abnormal unemployment that gave r i se to the i n i t i a l s t ruggle. But i t was not used by decision-makers as a rat ionale for delaying ac t i on , because they received only sporadic, uncoordinated demands in the f i r s t ha l f of the decade. Like the old age pensions movement, the subsequent prosperi ty provided the Liberal government with a means of f inancing allowances, but i t offered no guarantee that action would, in fac t , take place. 2.9J7. The cul tura l context exerted a more d i rect inf luence than the economic environment. Widespread publ ic sympathy for veterans' claims persisted a f ter demobi l izat ion, a trend that ran counter to the Austral ian experience.73 i t s presence part ly accounts for the re la t i ve brevity of the ag i ta t ion , because, spared the necessity of converting others outside Parliament to the i r cause, the advocates could focus the i r attention upon convincing reluctant cabinet po l i t i c i ans and the i r senior advisors that 'burnt out' cases were worthy of special treatment. The att i tudes of the opponents ins ide government shed l i gh t on the d is t inc t ions made at the time between di f ferent categories among the cu l t u ra l l y deserving group of veterans. They perceived the ex-so ld ier with major d i s a b i l i t i e s as the most deserving because he had earned his r ight to a state-f inanced pension, whereas a id for his non-pensioned comrade, espec ia l ly i f his d i s a b i l i t y was psychological rather than phys ica l , carr ied the same stigma of char i ty attached to publ ic provision for the c i v i l i a n needy. Unlike the preceding movements for statutory benef i ts , foreign precedents were rarely mentioned in the course of the veterans' ag i ta t i on . Instead, Canada qua l i f i ed as a ' leader ' i n making provision for des t i tu te , prematurely aged World War I veterans. The ins t i tu t iona l framework also had a more d i rect impact than one might an t i c ipa te . Although the or ig ina l Canadian const i tu t ion assigned Ottawa j u r i s d i c t i o n over the category of veterans, i t attempted to avoid taking over the care and maintenance of ex-sold iers suffer ing from premature sen i l i t y and other nervous diseases. As chapter 3 documented, i t s 1920 decis ion to fol low the B r i t i s h example and treat a l l , except those with major d i s a b i l i t i e s , as c i v i l i a n s was motivated pr imar i ly by cost considerat ions. Faced with an increasing pensions b i l l during King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e , the Liberal government s t i f fened i t s resolve to res is t demands for expansion. The 29.8 t rad i t i ona l r e l i e f - g i v i ng au thor i t i es , however, were equally determined to avoid being saddled with the continued support of unemployable ex-so ld ie rs . The ensuing stalemate stemmed from the blurr ing of the d is t inc t ion between veteran and c i v i l i a n , a merger that was not ant ic ipated by the framers of the or ig ina l d i v i s ion of l eg i s l a t i ve powers. It also confirms the proposit ion of Birch (1955) that con f l i c t s over the method of f inancing delayed the introduction of soc ia l welfare l e g i s l a t i o n . Concerning societal ac tors , the case study represents essent ia l l y another var iant of group p o l i t i c s , even though socia l control p o l i t i c s was v i s i b l e in the i n i t i a l struggle when the issue of veterans' r e l i e f involved both phys ica l ly f i t and disabled men. However, the threat of disorder soon disappeared, to be replaced by more orthodox pressure applied by organized veterans. Following the un i f i ca t ion of t he i r major associat ions in la te 1925, they began a concerted campaign to secure federal provision for t he i r non-pensionable, disabled comrades. Although the new Legion represented mainly able-bodied veterans, the i r e f for ts were supported by the various d i sab i l i t y -o r i en ted organizations representing segments of the c l ien t group. The act ive cooperation of the l a t t e r represented a novel form of pa r t i c i pa t i on , contrast ing sharply with the apathy of the c i v i l i a n e lder ly and sole-support mothers. The Legion's cause was ac t ive ly promoted inside the federal House by a small group of MPs, drawn exc lus ive ly from the Conservative opposi t ion, who acted as i t s spokesmen. Other sympathetic MPs, representing a l l part ies except the Labour group, also endorsed the veterans' cause, but the i r dif ferences of opinion over the appropriate level of j u r i sd i c t i on provided ammunition for a cost-conscious Liberal government to res i s t demands for inc lus ion of 'burnt out ' cases under the c i v i l i a n old age pensions scheme. The subsequent e f for ts of Legion spokesmen inside and outside the House to secure inc lus ion of such 2 gr-eases v ia expansion of the Pension Act a lso fa l tered on the issue of j u r i s d i c t i o n . Inside government, both bureaucrats and po l i t i c i ans par t ic ipa ted, a combination of forces not as v i s i b l e in the preceding movements for statutory benef i ts . In common with the agi ta t ion for r e l i e f land settlement, the act ive par t ic ipa t ion of bureaucrats in the concerted campaign part ly re f lec ts the type of source material used. In both cases i t was also a d i rect result of the i r experience in administering schemes for segments of the population who shared some common charac ter is t i cs with the potential benef ic iar ies of the pol icy under inves t iga t ion . Unlike DIC bureaucrats, though, o f f i c i a l s in the DSCR, far from playing a creat ive ro le , i n i t i a l l y opposed demands for special treatment of 'burnt out ' cases. Their divergent posi t ions on the issue of welfare innovations confirmed the f indings of Heclo (1974) concerning the ambivalent roles played by c i v i l servants in Br i ta in and Sweden in income maintenance developments. The advice offered by senior bureaucrats in the DSCR and i t s successor, the DPNH, reinforced cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s ' reluctance to assume new, cost ly ob l iga t ions. As in the preceding movements, the cabinet 's subsequent decision to take act ion was motivated pr imari ly by e lectora l ca lcu la t ions . With an e lect ion due in 1930, the Legion's 1929 demand for some statutory remedy for 'burnt out ' cases became p o l i t i c a l l y sa l ien t because both po l i t i c i ans and bureaucrats perceived widespread popular support for them. In response, Prime Min is ter King promised a review of war pensions l eg i s la t i on and, acting upon the instruct ions of t he i r p o l i t i c a l super ior , the sympathetic o f f i c i a l s assigned to th is task recommended payment of statutory allowances for unemployable veterans in d is t ressed circumstances. Their recommendation was accepted by the Liberal government because i t provided an inexpensive means of redeeming past pledges 3:O:Q. of generous treatment for Canada's war-disabled. Even though the Conservative opposit ion expressed d issa t i s fac t ion with the choice of the assistance technique of income support, they endorsed the l e g i s l a t i o n , thus revealing the i r own sens i t i v i t y to e lectoral pressures. But they succeeded in securing important amendments during the b i l l ' s passage, at the expense mainly of bureaucrats. Unlike a l l previous st ruggles, the agi ta t ion to secure allowances for dest i tu te casual t ies of World War I was not marked by a clash between economic i n te res ts , an omission ind icat ing the extent of publ ic support that existed for the claims of disabled veterans. Nonetheless, i t i l l u s t r a t e d once more the dec is ive inf luence of pressure groups in interwar welfare p o l i t i c s . Veterans' promotion of the cause of the i r handicapped comrades was, in f ac t , more successful than the i r previous intense lobbying on behalf of f i t ex -so ld ie rs , as the Legion not only stimulated serious consideration of the issue but a lso shaped the content of the statutory i n i t i a t i v e . Cost-conscious cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s , though, retained control over the choice of design as well as the t iming of i t s in t roduct ion, as in a l l previous cases. Their remedy for 'burnt-out ' veterans ref lected the inf luence of the 1927 pensions i n i t i a t i v e for the c i v i l i a n e l de r l y , a precedent that also marked the remaining interwar innovation in publ ic assistance, as the next chapter reveals. CHAPTER 10 PENSIONS FOR THE BLIND, 1937 In 1937 the federal government amended the 1927 Old Age Pension Act to provide pensions for the unemployable bl ind aged 40 and over, a category of the dependent poor not previously singled out fo r special treatment. At f i r s t glance, th i s l eg i s l a t i ve i n i t i a t i v e appears to be merely a minor offshoot of the or ig ina l plan involving a reduction in i t s minimum age requirement for a smal l , select segment of the c i v i l i a n disabled population. This impression i s a lso bolstered by the fact that from the outset the cause of pensions for the needy b l ind was inext r icab ly l inked with the old age pensions movement. However, there are cruc ia l di f ferences between the two campaigns that are overlooked in ex is t ing studies.1 Apart from the unique configuration of circumstances surrounding any pol icy departure, the major advocates outside Parliament represented p o l i t i c a l forces d i s t i nc t from the part ic ipants in the struggle for old age pensions. This d i f ference, as well as the linkages between the two movements, are i l l u s t r a t e d in the course of analyzing the p o l i t i c a l forces shaping the 1937 i n i t i a t i v e . Background It was only a f ter World War I that the issue of state aid for the dest i tu te b l ind became sa l ient in Canada. Pr ior to 1918 the options facing th is category were res t r ic ted mainly to ins t i t u t i ona l care or vagrancy. The proportion of the dependent poor among the to ta l b l ind population i s not known, as census data from 1901 onwards recorded only numbers in non-productive or unspecif ied occupations and gave no information as to the i r means of support (see table 28). However, impressionis t ic evidence suggests that i t was very 3 01 3.02 high. In the 1880s an estimated two-thirds of the bl ind in Nova Scotia e i ther resided in poorhouses or begged for a l i v i n g . 2 Their s i tuat ion was probably not atypical because the b l ind were generally shunned by Vic tor ian society owing to the fact that syph i l i s was a primary cause of blindness in the nineteenth century.3 Besides the taboo of venereal d isease, ind iv iduals bl ind from b i r th or ear ly childhood suffered an addit ional handicap. They were treated as mental de fec t i ves , wholly incapable of doing anything, and kept "out of s ight" by the i r f a m i l i e s . 4 Table 28. Total b l ind population and numbers in non-productive and unspecified occupations, 1901-21 census years 1901 1911 1921 Total Non-Prod. Unsp. Total Non-Prod. Unsp. Total Non-Prod. Unsp. Canadaa 3279 590 644 3238 364 1258 4072 3033b 66 P .E . I . 67 8 10 58 1 13 73 55 -N.S. 485 151 53 332 15 163 514 370 -N.B. 283 29 52 232 12 53 242 179 2 Quebec 1063 264 94 1117 172 499 1160 936 31 Ont. 1035 131 242 1077 142 331 1468 1051 32 Man. 104 5 47 123 10 44 166 123 1 Sask. 114 2 62 78 5 32 137 98 -A l t a . 71 5 33 96 75 -B.C. 115 _ 96 138 2 78 208 145 SOURCES: Census of Canada, 1901, Vo l . IV, pp. 46-55; i b i d . , 1911, Vo l . I I , pp. 626-37; and i b i d . , 1921, Vo l . I I , pp. 755-56. a Figures for Canada include the t e r r i t o r i e s . bThis sharp increase probably re f lec ts the decl ine in the number of b l ind persons employed in agr icul ture e i ther on a wage basis or in return for board. 30.3 The absence of special welfare programs fo r the needy adult b l ind in Canada contrasted sharply with developments in the United States. Start ing with Indiana in 1840, state leg is la tures enacted publ ic assistance schemes to aid b l ind persons who could not work, so that by the end of the century the p r inc ip le of special welfare programs fo r the b l ind financed by publ ic funds was f i rmly es tab l i shed . 5 Among countries in the B r i t i s h Empire, however, only Aus t ra l ia implemented a pensions scheme for the b l ind pr ior to 1920. Although these i n i t i a t i v e s were not copied in Canada, the welfare of b l ind ch i ldren was not ignored. By 1918 res ident ia l schools provided academic and vocational education in a l l provinces. The Nazareth Inst i tute (1861) in Montreal educated the young French-speaking bl ind from Quebec and elsewhere. In English Canada the Hal i fax School for the Bl ind (1871) served chi ldren in the three maritime provinces and the colony of Newfoundland; and the Ontario School for the Bl ind (1872) took pupi ls from the p ra i r i e provinces. In B r i t i sh Columbia no schooling was avai lable unt i l 1917, when Mrs. C E . Burke started a small school in Vancouver that was la te r taken over by the provincial government. 6 Graduates of these i n s t i t u t i o n s , however,, had few opportunit ies to become se l f -suppor t ing . They faced considerable prejudice in securing employment in the open labour market because the i r blindness was associated by the general publ ic with "weakness of mind and complete physical incompetence." 7 Moreover, they were deprived of a l ternat ive ou t le t s , since pr ior to 1908 there were no f a c i l i t i e s of fer ing sheltered employment for the bl ind to work at trades learned in school , such as basket- and broom-making. In most cases the i r only recourse was to work at home and to supplement the i r i r regu lar earnings with l im i ted municipal r e l i e f . Individuals who became bl ind as adul ts , though, had even fewer options as there were no occupational t ra in ing programs to 304 rehab i l i ta te them. They were often reduced to being "poor mendicants, dependent upon the char i ty of s t rangers . " 8 To remedy the i r p l i gh t , the bl ind themselves began to establ ish local organizations to provide employment, t ra in ing and recreat ion. This development was tr iggered in part by the i r small numbers and scattered d i s t r i bu t i on , demographic t r a i t s that accounted for the or ig inal publ ic indi f ference to the i r needs. It was also fostered by the spread of industry, because the simple tasks of an assembly l i ne provided openings for groups not previously considered as sources of labour, and the increase in mechanization underlined the need for spec ia l ized t ra in ing to enable the bl ind to operate machinery. Sel f-help was related as well to the growth of c i t i e s , because the i r concentration in urban areas and the a v a i l a b i l i t y of f inanc ia l resources made organization feas ib le . Moreover, the impersonal social re lat ions of urban l i f e and the decl ine of the extended family eroded both the t rad i t iona l ethic and methods of caring for s ight less dependents, prompting them to develop the i r own f a c i l i t i e s . 9 In 1908 the Montreal Association for the Bl ind was founded by Ph i l i p E. Layton, a bl ind Englishman who qua l i f i ed as an organist before emigrating to Canada, where he became a successful manufacturer of musical instruments.* 0 Its goal was to ameliorate the conditions of the English-speaking bl ind in Quebec, and i t s f a c i l i t i e s included workshops, a res ident ia l school and a small hostel for the e lde r l y . Its founder was also instrumental in opening a broom factory in Ottawa which was taken over in 1914, when a local associat ion was establ ished to provide employment and t ra in ing for the adult b l i nd . The only other se l f -he lp groups establ ished pr ior to World War I were the Associated Bl ind of Toronto (1890), the Vancouver-based Western Associat ion of the Bl ind (1914) and two organizations in Hal i fax formed by graduates of the local schoo l , the Home Teaching Society (1893) and the Maritime Associat ion (1914). 305 If t h i s local network was embryonic compared with both Br i ta in and the U . S . , H nationwide voluntary provision qua l i f i es as v i r t ua l l y dormant. The Canadian Free Library for the Bl ind was the only national organization serving b l ind adults un t i l 1918. Its establishment in 1906 by Rev. E.B.F. Robinson of Markham, Ontario, was made possible by the granting of free postage on b r a i l l e l i t e ra tu re .12 After his death his wife moved the small l i b ra ry to Toronto. In 1913 she was succeeded by Dr. S.C. Swi f t , a b l ind graduate of McGill who was f luent in several languages. He and the l i b r a r y ' s president, Dr. C R . Dickson, a physician who lost his sight as a result of X-ray experiments in 1917, played a c ruc ia l role in furthering the cause of the adult b l i nd . The F i r s t World War aided the ef for ts of Dickson and Swift because the return of the f i r s t blinded veterans focused national attention and sympathy on the newly b l ind and the problems of the i r r ehab i l i t a t i on . The tota l lack of af ter-care and t ra in ing f a c i l i t i e s in Canada contrasted sharply with B r i t i sh provision and provoked press comment.13 To remedy t h i s s i t ua t i on , Swift advised federal o f f i c i a l s to send the war-blinded s t i l l in Europe to St . Dunstan's Hostel in London, England, an i ns t i t u t i on founded by S i r Arthur Pearson to implement his new concept of rehab i l i ta t ion stressing se l f help and independence.14 upon the i r return to Canada, i t s graduates became the most vocal proponents of better treatment for a group, whose dependency had previously been regarded as i l l eg i t ima te . They comprised a unique group among the s igh t l ess : they were young, they were war heroes, and they were bound by the serv ice s p i r i t of togetherness. Although they were only "a select few,"15 t he i r demands for regular work and sheltered employment attracted the pub l i c i t y previously denied the i nv i s i b l e mass of c i v i l i a n bl ind scattered across Canada. Besides the pleas of blinded veterans, the national appeal for funds to provide 306 care and t ra in ing for the 43 c i v i l i a n s blinded in the Hal i fax explosion of December 1917 also contributed to greater publ ic awareness.^ World War I a lso spurred the development of organized work for the adult bl ind at the national l e v e l . In the f a l l of 1916 Dickson and Swift asked two blinded veterans to jo in the l i b ra ry board to help with the expansion of i t s serv ices. Faced with a f inancia l c r i s i s and the prospect of ev i c t i on , they also approached members of the Toronto Women's Musical Associat ion to raise funds fo r a new bu i ld ing . Following the i r move in January 1917, they changed the i r name to the Canadian National L ibrary for the B l i nd . This newly-formed group was asked by the federal government to take on the t ra in ing of the war-blinded in return for funding. Its board members also drafted a const i tut ion for a new, comprehensive service organization for b l ind c i v i l i a n s , and the i r appl icat ion fo r a charter was approved in March 1918. "Thus the Canadian National Inst i tu te for the Blind took shape, a unique mixture of so l d i e r s , c i v i l i a n s , sighted and b l ind - a cooperating body of s t a f f , volunteers and government."! 7 Among the seven charter members of the Canadian National Inst i tute for the B l ind (CNIB), Captain E.A. Baker played the pre-eminent ro le in i t s development. "A born leader," he formulated and implemented a national program for the bl ind that earned worldwide respect.18 Baker was brought up on a farm near Kingston and graduated in engineering from Queen's Univers i ty . He was the f i r s t Canadian o f f i ce r to be blinded in m i l i t a ry action in the war. He was also one of the f i r s t Canadian graduates of St . Dunstan's Hostel in England, an experience that made Baker a l i f e l ong admirer of i t s founder, Pearson. Upon his return to Ontario, Baker secured employment as a typ is t and joined the l i b ra ry board. In July 1918 he was asked to take charge of the t ra in ing and af ter-care of the war-bl inded. Two years la te r he turned his attent ion to the cause of the c i v i l i a n b l i nd . In September 1920 Baker joined the s ta f f of the CNIB as General 3.0.7 Secretary, a post he held unt i l 1931, when he became Managing Di rec tor . Acting in his former capaci ty , he pioneered the movement to secure pensions for the b l i nd . The Pensions fo r the Bl ind Movement Like the other statutory i n i t i a t i v e s for the dependent poor, the case study of pensions for the bl ind resembles a group model of welfare p o l i t i c s . But i t i s d i s t i nc t i ve because i t represents the f i r s t occasion on which a c i v i l i a n c l i en t group championed the i r own cause. The key role played by the organized bl ind contrasts sharply with the minimal par t ic ipa t ion of the e lder ly and sole-support mothers in the preceding movements. It remains noteworthy even when measured against the major involvement of organized veterans, because the s ight less lacked not only the numbers but also the special status accorded to veterans' c la ims. The in f luen t ia l role played by the organized bl ind re f lec ts the t rad i t i on of se l f -he lp that or iginated in the prewar per iod. As they represented a t iny voting bloc compared with the other categories selected for special treatment in the interwar per iod, the i r effect iveness as an in terest group depended upon securing popular backing for the i r demands for special treatment, as well as developing contacts inside government. Provided that they could persuade decision-makers that t he i r claims were s p e c i a l , the i r small numbers could be used to the i r own advantage, because the costs of aiding the b l ind were less than for other segments of the c i v i l i a n disabled population. Although the movement to secure pensions for the bl ind was not as prolonged as the old age pensions campaign, i t was described by one observer as "the most d i f f i c u l t and time-consuming e f for t to obtain l e g i s l a t i v e enactment."19 Consequently, analysis i s broken down into two stages, covering the i n i t i a l struggle during the 1920s and the concerted campaign waged between 1930 and 1937. 308 I n i t i a l Struggle, 1921-29 Both the onset and subsequent development of the i n i t i a l struggle were influenced by developments within the B r i t i s h Empire, namely the passage of the B r i t i sh Bl ind Persons Act in 1920, that granted the c i v i l i a n bl ind an old age pension at the age of 50, and a 1924 i n i t i a t i v e in New Zealand that paid s im i la r benefits to unemployables at the age of 21. Soon af ter the passage of the former, the CNIB voiced demands fo r s im i la r provision within Canada. Div is ions within the b l ind community, however, delayed the progress of the movement. In the second hal f of the decade representatives of a new, r i va l national organization of the b l i nd , and of local clubs in c i t i e s of eastern and western Canada, a lso joined in the cause. The resul t was uncoordinated a c t i v i t i e s , competing demands and leadership r i v a l r y , which provided decision-makers with a rat ionale for inac t ion . Internal d iv is ions also hindered the i r e f for ts to overcome popular prejudice, an obstacle exacerbated by the i r small s ize and scattered d i s t r i bu t i on . Inside the federal Parliament a small group of backbenchers pressed the claims of the needy b l i n d , but the Liberal government resisted the idea of funding pensions, perceiving them to represent a cos t l y , dangerous precedent. The CNIB spearheaded the i n i t i a l struggle outside Parl iament. As i t was a service organization for the b l i n d , i t s inf luence did not depend pr imar i ly upon e f fec t i ve representation of t he i r c l i e n t s ' i n te res ts . Instead, i t s status derived from i t s contacts with i n f l u e n t i a l , sighted Canadians, including some of the "most prominent businessmen of Canada," who recognized the merits of t reat ing blindness "on l ines s im i la r to those which had made of these men competent, se l f - respect ing and prosperous members of the community."20 The Ins t i tu te 's f i r s t president was Lewis M. Wood, a prominent Toronto f inancier .21 3.Q9-" His prest ige among the c i t y ' s f inancia l establishment enabled the CNIB to tap the fund-rais ing potential of Toronto's exc lus ive 400 Club and middle-class women's groups. Outside of Ontario the other provincia l d iv is ions also re l ied on pr ivate philanthropy for hal f of the i r funds, with the remainder coming from government grants. Their patrons included "many of the more prominent people in the publ ic and socia l l i f e of th i s c o u n t r y . . . . " 2 2 The CNIB's f i r s t attempt to secure pensions for the bl ind was made in the f a l l of 1921. After securing information about the new B r i t i s h scheme, i t s general secretary discussed the issue with the Deputy Min is ter of Education for Ontario, but nothing concrete resulted from the i r meeting.23 At that time Baker did not regard state aid as a top p r i o r i t y because he was convinced tha t , with appropriate t r a i n i n g , the majority of b l ind c i t i zens could become se l f -suppor t ing. But in the next two years the workshops of the Inst i tu te became crowded with ind iv iduals over 50 years of age who were unemployable even in condit ions of sheltered employment. As a resu l t , Baker became convinced that provincia l provision was necessary. Otherwise the Inst i tute would soon have to use the bulk of i t s fund to support "the unemployable people to the exclusion and detriment of young, i ndus t r i a l l y capable, and ambitious bl ind ind iv iduals deserving opportunity."24 Although Baker was aware that pensions for the c i v i l i a n bl ind f e l l under prov inc ia l j u r i s d i c t i o n , he selected Ottawa, not the provinces, as the major target of CNIB representations. Part ly because of his l imi ted success in pressing the case for pensions for the bl ind in Ontario,25 he became convinced that provincial par t ic ipat ion without "the stimulus of Federal i n i t i a t i v e w i l l be d i f f i c u l t to secure and require expensive educational propaganda throughout."26 Baker a lso concluded that f ede ra l l y - i n i t i a t ed l e g i s l a t i o n , once adopted, would avoid the lack of uniformity character iz ing the U.S. scheme of 31.0 statewide prov is ion. The CNIB rejected as well the American pract ice of separate statutes for the needy b l i nd . Instead, i t opted to fol low the B r i t i sh precedent, i . e . , payment of pensions under an old age pension act for the bl ind at 50 not 70 years of age. Baker was convinced that the bl ind stood more chance of receiving state aid i f t h e i r cause was associated with sighted unemployables than i f special treatment was sought. He was also opposed to s ingl ing out the unemployable bl ind as i t would make them a conspicuous class of dependents.27 The CNIB campaign to secure nationwide provision commenced in 1923. I n i t i a l l y i t was a low-key a f f a i r consist ing of "mild suggestions" made to federal cabinet ministers in the course of meetings held to discuss grant app l ica t ions . It was only af ter the surpr ise introduction of the 1926 o ld age pensions b i l l that requests were made for special meetings with elected and appointed o f f i c i a l s to discuss inc lus ion of the bl ind under th is leg is la t ion .28 Although the Ins t i tu te 's campaign in the 1920s focused mainly on cu l t i va t ing contacts in Ottawa, i t made a half-hearted attempt to broaden the base of the movement. In 1926 i t s National Council formally endorsed cooperation with other groups seeking publ ic pensions.29 But there i s no evidence of any d i rect approaches made by the CNIB to organized labour, the champions of the cause of the dest i tute e lde r l y . Instead, unsuccessful e f for ts were made to en l i s t the support of welfare organizat ions, espec ia l ly those representing "the aged or disabled sighted in order that the movement might be removed from the realm of c lass l e g i s l a t i o n . . . . " 3 0 Following the passage of the 1927 Old Age Pension Act , the Ins t i tu te 's interest in securing inc lus ion of b l ind unemployables waned during the rest of the decade. Other p r i o r i t i e s occupied the centre stage. In the late 1920s new serv ice centres were bu i l t in Hal i fax and Vancouver, and a program of indus t r ia l placement s tar ted. Besides these d ivers ions, Baker was reluctant to 311 press the case for pensions unt i l the CNIB was a v iab le organization throughout Canada.31 During the 1920s, however, his e f for ts to estab l ish a Quebec d i v i s ion were pers is tent ly thwarted by Ph i l i p Layton, the President of the Montreal Associat ion for the Bl ind (see page 304). Personal tensions between them developed soon af ter the war as Layton was resentful of the new Ins t i tu te 's monopoly of work with the war-blinded and the rapid ascendancy of Baker, "the young whipper-snapper," as the major spokesman of the bl ind inside government c i r c l e s . 3 2 His bi t terness par t ly motivated his decision to es tab l ish an a l te rna t i ve , para l le l structure to the CNIB. The Canadian Federation of the Bl ind (CFB) was founded by Layton in Montreal in June 1926 as a national union. It was essen t ia l l y "a f r a te rna l , p ro tec t ive , reformist assoc iat ion" with three ob ject ives: " . . . t o unite the b l ind in a brotherhood, to promote in every lawful way the i r socia l and economic wel fare, [and] to urge upon a l l munic ipal , provincial and federal governments the necessity of state a id."33 y n e CFB was modelled on the National League of the Bl ind in England, the precip i tant of the 1920 scheme. For Layton, the pensions movement was doomed to f a i l u re unless the Canadian bl ind were organized on a fraternal basis fol lowing the B r i t i s h example.34 But there was a s ign i f i can t di f ference between the Canadian and B r i t i s h unions. Layton favoured state aid only for the unemployable bl ind and was not opposed in p r inc ip le to the voluntary sector providing other serv ices . In contrast , the Engl ish League was founded in 1899 to press for complete state f a c i l i t i e s for the b l i n d , as i t s founders opposed voluntarism because of i t s complacency.35 Membership in the new fraternal organization was not confined to the b l ind alone. By December 1931 the CFB claimed 1,000 members throughout Canada.36 Although the Federation lacked the prominent contacts of the CNIB, i t s patrons were not without inf luence. Its f i r s t Honorary President (1926-27) was Mayor 3.12 Beaubien of Outremont. His successor, Lord Atholstan, was a Montreal tycoon who owned several newspapers, including the Star , a Conservative d a i l y . Besides being known for his philanthropy, he "aspired to play a dominating role in p o l i t i c s from behind the scenes, as a puppet-maker manipulating the po l i t i c i ans . "37 CFB a c t i v i t i e s to secure pensions were financed by dues, $1 for those who could afford to pay, and by the Layton fami ly 's own funds. The Federation never received federal funding, but as i t s headquarters were based in the o f f i ces of i t s parent, CFB services were paid for by the Montreal Assoc ia t ion , an agency that secured a federal grant from 1927 onwards, as well as provincial subs id ies. P r io r to establ ish ing the CFB, Layton had sought to cooperate with the CNIB in securing pensions for the bl ind.38 As his approaches e l i c i t e d l i t t l e in terest in jo in t ac t ion , he went ahead and c i rcu la ted pet i t ions among bl ind c i t i zens of Montreal and Ottawa, requesting that needy unemployables aged 40 or over be e l i g i b l e under old age pensions leg is la t ion .39 Following the Liberal government's refusal to include the bl ind in i t s 1926 old age pension b i l l , Layton decided to press fo r a separate statute in the next session. This switch was apparently a response to the advice of MPs. Separate l eg i s l a t i on was also favoured by cer ta in segments of the b l ind community. Real iz ing that the CNIB was on record as favouring provision for the bl ind v i a . expansion of old age pension l e g i s l a t i o n , Layton inv i ted Inst i tu te o f f i c i a l s in Apr i l to attend a conference in June to "thoroughly thrash th i s matter out ," but the l a t t e r refused to attend, part ly out of pique at receiving a last-minute inv i ta t ion.40 The CFB founding convention at t racted 30 delegates, a majority from the Montreal c lub. Representatives of the Ottawa Welfare Club, Ontario Associat ion fo r the B l i nd , Winnipeg Lux-in-Tenebris Club and the Western Association fo r the B l ind also attended and decided to a f f i l i a t e . 4 1 The conference adopted a 3.13, pet i t ion requesting a purely federal scheme granting pensions of $40 a month fo r a l l b l ind c i t i zens in the 40-plus age group. To present t h i s document, Layton decided to emulate the ef for ts of b l ind unionists in B r i t a i n , where a march of 250 members of the National League of the Bl ind from Manchester to London had resulted in the passage of the 1920 s ta tu te . On June 22, 1926, the conference delegates t rave l led to Ottawa and marched up Parliament H i l l , where they were joined by the local b l i nd . This group of 100 presented the pet i t ion to the Prime Min is ter . Although they fa i l ed to secure immediate l eg i s l a t i ve ac t i on , Layton was pleased with the i r performance. "The ef fects of th i s demonstration were far - reaching, bringing the Cause of the Bl ind most f o r c i b l y , not only before the MPs, but also before the publ ic at large as f u l l accounts were published in the newspapers a l l over the Dominion, and much sympathy was expressed."42 gut King's response to the b l ind marchers' demand was ambiguous and la te r became a subject of controversy. Although he avoided giving any f irm pledge, he apparently assured them "that he would do a l l in his power to put through the desired l eg i s la t i on . "43 This vague commitment was misinterpreted by Layton as a de f in i te promise to take l e g i s l a t i v e action in the next sess ion, and became a local issue in Montreal in the 1926 federal e lect ion campaign, as l a te r discussion w i l l show.44 Unlike the CNIB, the CFB agi tat ion did not lapse af ter the passage of old age pensions l e g i s l a t i o n . Its leaders presented the i r or ig ina l pet i t ion to the federal cabinet annually a f ter 1927, and lobbied indiv idual ministers towards the end of King's t h i rd term of o f f i ce .45 They were also act ive outside government c i r c l e s . Layton's address to the Ottawa Lions Club in January 1930 resul ted in 27 other branches engaged in char i tab le work fo r the b l ind subsequently endorsing the concept of pensions for the b l i nd , and his overtures to the executive of the Canadian TLC also e l i c i t e d a sympathetic response.46 3JL4 However, the CFB President was unable to devote a l l his attent ion to securing h is major goal because the Federation's branches outside Montreal faced competition for members from an expanding CNIB. The struggle during the 1920s was not confined to the two national organizat ions. Local clubs of the bl ind also took up the cause. Despite the i r numbers (see table 29), the organized b l ind of Quebec and Ontario were re l a t i ve l y i nac t i ve , re ly ing on the Montreal-based CFB and the Toronto-based CNIB to lobby on the i r b e h a l f . 4 7 In contrast , local clubs in the maritimes were "ac t ive ly supporting the movement for old age pensions," and the i r e f for ts presumably prompted the New Brunswick Federation of Labour to urge the provinc ia l government in 1927 to provide support for the non- ins t i tu t iona l ized b l i n d . 4 8 Their act ive par t ic ipat ion was duplicated out on the west coast by the Vancouver-based Western Association of the B l i nd . Pr io r to becoming a CFB a f f i l i a t e , i t sought to en l i s t the support of B.C. MPs for a measure granting pensions to a l l b l ind adu l ts , and i t also c i rcu la ted a pet i t ion among s ight less c i t i zens of the p rov i nce . 4 9 Its campaign, however, was overshadowed by the e f for ts of the organized bl ind in Manitoba. The Lux-in-Tenebris Club for the Bl ind (LTCB) in Winnipeg was the most act ive local organization in the ent i re pensions movement. It was formed in 1923 upon the i n i t i a t i v e of the CNIB, and by 1925 i t s membership included nearly a l l the 166 b l ind adults in Manitoba.50 Unlike other a f f i l i a t e s , i t s members took independent steps to secure pensions and in September 1925 the LTCB embarked upon an extensive campaign. A pet i t ion among the bl ind of Manitoba, requesting a federal scheme for dest i tute unemployables, secured 144 s ignatures, and a mass meeting of the b l ind was held in Winnipeg in January 1926 to endorse i t . The meeting was attended by two local Labour MLAs, W. Ivens 3:i5. Table 29. Local clubs of the c i v i l i a n bl ind in Canada, 1921-29 City Hal i fax Montreal Quebec Toronto* Ottawa Brantford Winnipeg Vancouver CFB A f f i l i a t e s Montreal A s s ' n , 1908-Ass 'n . Canadienne-Francaise, 1928-Comrades Club, 1921-Ontario A s s ' n , 1917-Welfare Club, ? Western A s s ' n . , 1912-CNIB A f f i l i a t e s Maritime A s s ' n , 1914-Home Teaching S o c , 1893 Quebec A s s ' n , 1927-Excels ior Club, 1923?-Ottawa A s s ' n . , 1914 Ontario School Alumni, 1917-Lux-in-Tenebris Club, 1923-SOURCE: This table i s compiled from scattered references in mainly unpublished mater ia l . *The Associated Bl ind of Toronto (1890) i s not included, as i t s a f f i l i a t i o n i s unknown. and J . Queen, who suggested that the c lub 's pensions committee be enlarged to include prominent sighted members of the audience and that a second pet i t ion be c i rcu la ted among c i t i zens at large "to give the b l ind weight in the i r e f for ts . "51 They succeeded in securing 23,000 signatures to a pe t i t ion requesting a federal scheme for unemployables aged 50 and over.52 The LTCB a lso en l is ted the support of provincia l l e g i s l a t o r s . From 1926 onwards Ivens (Lab. , Winnipeg), i t s spokesman in the Manitoba Leg is la ture , persuaded his colleagues to send annual memorials to Ottawa requesting pensions fo r the b l i n d . According to i t s V ice-Pres ident , the LTCB also secured a commitment from Premier Bracken that he would "write to the Premiers of Saskatchewan and Alberta t e l l i n g them what the Manitoba movement has done in regards to pensions 3.1.6.. so that when we write...they will...understand better what we are asking them to d o . " 5 3 Manitoba's example, however, was not followed by the other prairie provinces in the 1920s. Their indifference stemmed partly from the fact that organized work for the blind was not well developed in either Saskatchewan or Alberta. Until the early 1930s CNIB act iv i t ies were coordinated in these provinces by the Winnipeg-based central western division and the Vancouver-based western div is ion, respectively. This organizational vacuum was not f i l l ed by the CFB as i ts branches in Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton and Calgary were not established until after 1929. Progress in Alberta was also impeded by the pol i t ical controversy in the 1927 and 1928 sessions arising out of the Premier's refusal to adopt the federal old age pensions plan until better financial terms were extracted from Ottawa.54 Despite the various petitions and marches, the divisions of opinion among the organized blind delayed their progress in the 1920s. Not a l l members were in favour of state aid. A small and "very tolerant" segment believed that "pensions wi l l foster indolence and dampen the in i t ia t ive of many employable blind people."55 These 'hard-liners' included the CNIB's chief placement off icer in Montreal, who was quoted in the local press as contending that "pensions were not just i f iable."56 While the majority of the organized blind agreed on the principle of public pensions, they disagreed on the extent of state aid. These differences were ideological, reflecting conflicting notions of the role of voluntarism in blind welfare. The CNIB regarded pensions as a last resort for unemployables, whereas the CFB's Winnipeg branch and i ts a f f i l i a te in Vancouver favoured pensions for a l l blind adults, subject to a simple means test. Such confl icting demands created "confusion both among the blind and their sighted fr iends... ,"57 a n cj provided governments with a valid 317 excuse fo r delay. The Superintendent of the Ontario School for the Bl ind recal led that his contacts with MPs and Ontario MLAs brought home to him "how the tendency of cer ta in organizations of the bl ind to c r i t i c i z e each other has reacted ser iously to the i r d isadvantage. " 5 8 Although the con f l i c t between the CFB and the CNIB centred on deta i l s of pensions po l icy such as age l im i t s and the scale of benef i ts , i t was exacerbated by the personal r i va l r y at the national leadership level between Layton and Baker, who dist rusted each other 's motives. From 1926 onwards Layton used the press as a medium to attack the c r e d i b i l i t y of the CNIB, c r i t i c i z i n g i t s pensions pol icy as "st ingy" and implying that b l ind workers were exploi ted in i t s workshops. 5 9 Although Baker shied away from answering these charges pub l i c l y , he was not averse to refut ing them inside p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s . 6 0 The 'sharp-shooting' t ac t i c s used by both sides discredi ted the cause outside and inside government, and prevented jo in t e f for ts to resolve divided opinion among the organized b l ind . Besides d isun i ty , the persistence of the old prejudice towards blindness among the public at large was another obstacle. The b l ind were s t i l l perceived as t o t a l l y disabled members of the community rather than an emergent p o l i t i c a l force with special needs. The general secretary of the CNIB recal led that in "the ear ly days of our work, the general publ ic was inc l ined to p i ty the b l ind and regard them as helpless and a f f l i c ted . "61 The Ins t i tu te ' s own a c t i v i t i e s , though, helped to perpetuate th i s popular stereotype. As la te as 1940 i t remained "a rather conservative organizat ion" ass i s t i ng the b l ind on a char i tab le bas is . Its d iv is iona l boards were composed of in f luen t ia l and wealthy people who shunned pub l i c i t y for the i r philanthropy. "Consequently, the Inst i tu te was not too well known by the general publ ic . "62 in contrast , the CFB and LTCB were more conscious of the value of pub l i c i t y . But the i r e f for ts 3.18 to f am i l i a r i ze the publ ic with the cause of the b l ind received only in termi t tent , local coverage. Their fa i l u re to focus attention on the pl ight of needy unemployables stemmed in part from the d is t r ibu t ion of the bl ind populat ion. As a small group scattered over an immense t e r r i t o r y , t he i r problems were not obtrusive enough in any one area to make "a great impression" on the publ ic conscience. Thus, the b l ind "suf fered, l i k e a losing hand at br idge, from too general a d is t r ibu t ion . "63 Nonetheless, the major advocates succeeded in persuading a few federal l eg i s l a to rs that the i r claims were spec ia l . Inside the federal House the cause of the needy bl ind was championed by a small group of backbenchers representing a l l part ies except again the Progressives. Among these MPs only Raymond, a Liberal backbencher, had formal l inks with the organized b l i n d ; the remainder responded to the i r representations because of e lectora l pressures, party commitments or personal empathy. As the issue was intertwined with the old age pensions movement in the 1920s, the i r a c t i v i t i e s focused on securing inc lus ion of the bl ind at an e a r l i e r age under the 1926 and 1927 i n i t i a t i v e s . Although they f a i l ed in t he i r miss ion, they brought the cause of the bl ind to the attent ion of the House and l a id the groundwork for the future development of the campaign. W.G. Raymond ( L i b . , Brantford) took the i n i t i a l steps. Despite the fact that he was a sufferer of defect ive eyesight and a graduate of the Ontario School for the B l i nd , he did not par t ic ipate upon his own i n i t i a t i v e . Instead, representations from the CNIB were the spur to his involvement. Baker discussed the subject informally with Raymond in 1923, and a year la te r sent him deta i l s of a comprehensive l e g i s l a t i v e program including old age allowances for the needy unemployable bl ind in the 50-plus age group. At the time of these i n i t i a l contacts Raymond had no o f f i c i a l l inks with the Ins t i tu te , but in June 1924, he 3.1 SL was elected to i t s National Counci l . The timing of th is appointment was opportune as Raymond was then chairman of the 1924 Special Committee invest igat ing old age pensions. He agreed to present the Ins t i tu te ' s case for inc lus ion of bl ind unemployables before th is committee and was opt imis t ic "that a provision w i l l be made s imi la r to that in force in the old country."64 His optimism, however, turned out to be shor t - l i ved as no special treatment for the b l ind was recommended in the f ina l report of the 1924 committee. His defeat in the 1925 federal e lect ion possibly hurt the cause of the b l i nd , as Raymond had b u i l t up during his short parliamentary career (1921-25) a reputation as "a b r i l l i a n t and eloquent speaker" whose oratory at tracted a large attendance of MPs and v i s i t o r s . 6 5 T.L . Church (Con., Toronto) was the only other MP contacted formally by the CNIB in the 1920s. Besides being a f r iend of Baker's fa ther - in - law, he was also personally impressed by the Ins t i tu te 's work with blinded veterans,66 and he readi ly agreed to voice the claims of the c i v i l i a n b l ind when asked by Baker in June 1924.67 C H . Cahan (Con., Montreal) was the only CFB spokesman in the House. He was an odd choice of spokesman for bl ind unionists because, apart from being a wealthy corporate lawyer, he was ambivalent towards voicing only the claims of the b l i n d , as he believed that other categories of disabled were equally deserving.68 However, e lectora l pressures prompted him to support the inc lus ion of the b l ind in the 1927 old age pensions b i l l . According to Cahan, h is Liberal opponent gained votes in the 1926 federal e lect ion as a result of " . . . c e r t a i n promises made by the P.M. of th is country to a delegat ion, part ly from my consti tuency, to the ef fect that a l l those who suffer from blindness would th is year receive by federal measure r e l i e f on the scale suggested in th i s b i l l for old age pensions."69 320 Three representatives of the c i t y of Winnipeg were a l l spokesmen for the LTCB. Unlike the Conservative sympathizer, W.W. Kennedy, the involvement of Heaps and Woodsworth was prompted by party po l i cy . The Manitoba ILP was committed " lock , stock and bar re l " to the cause of the b l i nd , and enl is ted the support of i t s two federal members for the LCTB. 70 Woodsworth presented the pet i t ions signed by the bl ind and sighted c i t i zens of Manitoba to the House on Apr i l 13, 1926, and upon his request the plea from the bl ind was read by the Speaker on the fol lowing day . 7 * He also sought unsuccessful ly to introduce an amendment to include the b l ind under the 1926 o ld age pensions b i l l . 7 2 W.K. Esl ing (Con., Kootenay) was the only advocate in the House who was not c lea r l y labe l led as a spokesman of the organized b l i nd . Although he had been lobbied by the Vancouver-based Western Assoc ia t ion, he made no mention of group representations throughout his par t ic ipat ion in the movement, which began in 1927. His involvement presumably stemmed from personal empathy, because he was forced to re t i r e from act ive newspaper work in 1915 owing to f a i l i n g eyesight and la te r lost his a b i l i t y to r e a d . 7 3 The advocates' pleas for pensions for the b l i nd , however, were challenged in the 1920s. Their opponents were few in number, at least in pub l ic . Only two backbenchers and two members of the Liberal government spoke against inc lusion of the s ight less under old age pensions l e g i s l a t i o n . Their opposition ref lected fears about the costs of the precedent. If the pr inc ip le of state aid for the needy b l ind was admitted, i t would be d i f f i c u l t to res is t the claims of other equal ly deserving disabled groups in the community. Thus, although the bl ind comprised a smaller group among the various classes of the inf i rm (see table 30) , the costs of implementation of t he i r demands for publ ic ly financed pensions could not be considered in i so la t ion from the general category of phys ica l ly and mentally d isabled. 3 2 1 Table 30. Disabled classes by to ta ls and per 10,000 of the populat ion, 1921-31 census years Bl ind Deaf and Dumb Insane & Feeble-minded Total Per 10,000 Total Per 10,000 Total Per 10,000 1921 4,396 5.0 5,334 6.1 21,496 24.5 1931 7,347 7.0 6,767 6.5 31,686* 31.0 SOURCES: Census of Canada, 1921, Vo l . I I , p. 747; and i b i d . , 1931, Vo l . I, pp. 337-38, Vo l . IX, p. 113. *This f igure represents i ns t i t u t i ona l i zed cases only. Out of the t o t a l , 2,201 were "dependent," i . e . , receiving a id from publ ic funds, and 12,734 were "marginal ," i . e . , l i v i n g on da i ly earnings but accumulating l i t t l e or nothing. Census of Canada, 1931, Vo l . IX, p. 195. Ne i l l ( Ind. , Comox-Alberni), was a par t i cu la r l y vehement opponent. He argued fo rc ib ly against the inclusion of the bl ind and cr ipp les in the 1927 b i l l on the grounds that other aspects of d i s a b i l i t y would "tend to becloud the i ssue , [and] increase enormously the expense . . . . " His views were shared by a Liberal backbencher who favoured a " l imi ted s tar t in socia l l eg i s l a t i on " because costs had to be manageable in order not to prejudice future schemes. 7 4 The Liberal government also resisted demands to consider the claims of the b l i nd . Dr. King, the sponsor of the 1926 old age pension b i l l , was adamant about the i r exc lus ion, claiming that the i r maintenance was a purely municipal concern. The Prime Minister agreed, arguing that " i f we burden i t unduly by adding to old age other features, we may have d i f f i c u l t y in gett ing the general support we would l i k e to have for th is l e g i s l a t i o n . " 7 5 Despite i t s publ ic denials of the claims of the b l i n d , the cabinet did contemplate taking act ion during King's th i rd term of o f f i c e . Heenan, the Min is ter of Labour, admitted la te r to the House that the costs of including the b l ind in the old age pensions scheme had been invest igated and upon "casual 322 survey, we found that i t would cost about a m i l l i on and a hal f d o l l a r s . . . . " 7 6 The federal share, of course, would have amounted to only $750,000 at that t ime, but i t s payment would open the floodgates to other categories of unemployables, both c i v i l i a n and m i l i t a r y . The sp i ra l ef fect of pensions for the b l i nd , therefore, was a powerful constraint on l eg i s l a t i ve ac t ion. The Concerted Campaign, 1930-37 During the 1930-37 period representatives of the organized bl ind continued to be the major advocates outside Parliament. Their agi tat ion gained momentum in sp i te of the severe depression, because the i r newly-coordinated ef for ts allowed them to mount a concerted attack upon both leve ls of government and to a t t rac t increased public support. The advocates' p leas , however, f e l l on deaf ears during the f i r s t hal f of the Depression decade, as the majority of provincia l Premiers and the federal cabinet had more important f i s c a l p r i o r i t i e s dictated by the conservative orthodoxy of the day. This impasse was resolved in 1935 when electoral pressures- once again proved to be the catalyst of l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . Advocates: The i n i t i a l e f for ts to secure unity among the organized bl ind were made at the p rov inc i a l , not the nat iona l , l e v e l . In January 1930 the LTCB joined forces with the Winnipeg branches of the CFB and CNIB and representatives of sighted c i t i zens to form a 12-member United Bl ind Pensions Committee of Manitoba (UBPCM). The i n i t i a l demand of the committee members was for a jo in t scheme of pensions for the needy b l ind aged 21 and over.77 i t was modified l a t e r , in response to worsening economic condi t ions, to a milder request for old age pensions for the bl ind at an e a r l i e r age and in a "more l i b e r a l " amount, resu l t ing in a protest resignation of the CFB delegates from the new committee.78 323 The ef for ts of the UBPCM to broaden the base of the movement succeeded in en l i s t i ng the support of trade unionists in p ra i r i e c i t i e s , female volunteers belonging to the Imperial Order of the Daughters of the Empire and the NCWC, spokesmen of western munic ipa l i t ies and representatives of western labour p a r t i e s . 7 9 But the committee's overtures to l eg is la to rs made l i t t l e progress ins ide Manitoba. Their lobbying succeeded in adding one new rec ru i t , Bancroft (L ib -Prog . , S e l k i r k ) , to the ranks of local spokesmen in the federal House. Inside the Manitoba leg is la tu re Ivens, a long-time sympathizer, ensured that UBPCM pet i t ions were endorsed by his fel low MLAs.80 Memorials were sent to Ottawa in the 1930 and 1931 sessions. Like the i r predecessors, however, they contained no f irm statement of intent to take l eg i s l a t i ve ac t ion. Outside Manitoba the UBPCM helped to secure the support of the other p r a i r i e Premiers. Alberta formally endorsed the cause in a 1932 memorial that was s im i la r to the UBPCM's modified demand. In Saskatchewan the ef for ts of the Manitoba bl ind prompted representatives of the CNIB advisory board to urge the new Conservative Premier in November 1930 to support t he i r demand for pensions for the b l ind in the 50-plus age group v ia old age pensions leg is la t ion .81 in response, Premier Anderson forwarded the i r pe t i t ion to the federal Prime Min is te r . But another resolut ion sponsored by two Liberal MLAs, endorsing the con f l i c t i ng CFB demand, was also forwarded to Ot tawa. 8 2 The UBPCM also lobbied successful ly fo r a jo in t invest igat ion into the welfare of the b l ind population in the provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.83 /\ r 0 y a ] commission, headed by Olin B u r r i t t , pr inc ipal of the Pennsylvania Inst i tu t ion for the Instruction of the B l i nd , was appointed in August 1930 and reported in March 1931. It recommended, among other th ings, that both provinces enact pensions l eg i s l a t i on s im i la r to r e l i e f laws in states 32 A such as New York, where aid was given to a l l necessitous bl ind.84 Presumably because the Manitoba government was neither able nor w i l l i n g to finance a purely provincia l i n i t i a t i v e , a follow-up inquiry into the Burr i t t report was undertaken. It recommended the creation of yet another committee, comprising representatives of the provincia l government, mun ic ipa l i t i es , organized char i t y , the CFB and CNIB, to make suggestions in the next session. Although members of th is Special Committee on the Bl ind considered implementation of a purely provincia l pensions scheme, they came out strongly in favour of a federal p lan , describing i t s adoption as "the outstanding and most needful provision that could be made for the b l ind. "85 Their report urged Manitoba l eg i s l a to rs to reaff i rm the i r support fo r federal pa r t i c i pa t i on . This suggestion was acted upon and a memorial was sent to Ottawa in Apr i l 1932. S imi lar action was taken by the Saskatchewan Legis lature in i t s 1932 sess ion, suggesting that the Anderson government a lso balked at the idea of a purely provinc ia l scheme suggested by Bu r r i t t . Outside the p ra i r i e provinces, however, the UBPCM fa i l ed to stimulate in teres t p r io r to 1933. Its campaign was not copied in B r i t i s h Columbia, where con f l i c t i ng demands of the CFB and CNIB were met with a studied s i l ence . Attempts by the Manitoba bl ind to persuade the CNIB to form a s imi la r comnittee in Ontario to secure the support of federal and provincia l l eg i s la to rs were ignored. Instead, the Inst i tu te sought unsuccessful ly to cu l t i va te contacts ins ide the Ontario government. Its disdain for pub l i c i t y prompted the UBPCM to seek the support of Ontario sympathizers "outside the Inst i tu te . "86 Quebec and the maritime provinces were s t i l l holding out against implementation of old age pensions and so remained impervious to demands for inc lus ion of the bl ind.87 Attempts to achieve a united front at the national level were made a f ter the f u t i l i t y of continued independent lobbying was demonstrated in the ear ly days of the new Conservative administrat ion. Although Bennett's 1930 e lect ion pledge to provide dominion-wide old age pensions provided another opportunity to secure a federal i n i t i a t i v e , only the CFB recognized i t s po ten t ia l . Pr io r to the 1931 session i t s leadership made d i rect representations to the Prime Min is ter urging him to sponsor a ,spec ia l b i l l granting pensions to a l l bl ind people at the age of 40 and to younger, needy unemployables; and CFB branches and a f f i l i a t e s succeeded in securing the support of elected o f f i c i a l s in Montreal, Toronto, Calgary and other, smaller c i t i e s in Ontario and Saskatchewan, as well as of sympathetic male unionists and female ac t i v i s t s in the labour movement.88 Their e f f o r t s , however, f a i l ed to secure statutory benefi ts for the bl ind at the same time as the 1931 o ld age pensions amendment, which increased the federal share of costs from 50 to 75 percent. Prime Min is ter Bennett rejected CFB requests, arguing that unt i l the provinces " indicate a determination to discharge an obl igat ion which const i tu t iona l ly i s t h e i r s , action w i l l have to wait."89 The severe depression provided another impetus to unity because i t exposed the l im i ta t ions of voluntarism. The increase in demands for r e l i e f and sheltered employment strained CNIB finances to breaking point and forced the Inst i tu te to apply for a special federal grant of $50,000.90 The resources of the CFB's parent, the Montreal Associat ion, were also stretched because sales from i t s workshop declined by $3,000 in one year.91 This decl ine was not so le ly a t t r ibutab le to general condit ions of depression. Following the establishment of the CNIB's Quebec d iv i s ion in Ju ly 1930, i t had duplicated the assoc ia t ion 's work and engaged in pr ice-cut t ing of brooms. According to Baker, these a c t i v i t i e s were the "real motives" behind the readiness of the CFB to cooperate with the I n s t i t u t e . 9 2 3 . 2 . 6 In the summer of 1931 the f i r s t attempt to secure united action was made. At t he i r i n i t i a l meeting representatives of the CFB and CNIB agreed to press fo r a separate federal statute providing "adequate" pensions for the needy b l ind aged 40 and over, as well as younger unemployables.93 These t a l k s , however, s ta l l ed on the issue of the extent of j o in t action as the CNIB wanted cooperation on a l l matters of general service work for the b l i nd , whereas the CFB sought agreement on pensions only.94 j 0 resolve th is impasse, a national l i a i s o n committee was formed. Part ic ipants at i t s f i r s t meeting in July made l i t t l e progress. After a protracted delay, a second meeting was held in December, but i t was unable to resolve the impasse, and the negotiations were broken of f . There was l i t t l e contact between the two national organizations for the next year and a ha l f . Soon af ter the breakdown of t a l k s , Layton met the Prime Minister and, as a resu l t , reversed his posi t ion on the type of statute. He informed Baker "that Mr. Bennett and he thought i t would be preferable to seek an amendment to the Old Age Pensions Act and that the Government would entertain the idea af ter the majority of provinces.. .had indicated a desire for pensions for the b l ind."95 In Apr i l 1932 the CFB executive endorsed Layton's reversal of pos i t ion . However, the Federation's rank and f i l e were less char i tab le and ousted Layton from the presidency at t he i r convention in May. His successor, A .B. Howe, headed the Winnipeg and Manitoba branch. He represented a group which favoured pensions for a l l needy bl ind adults and f e l t strongly that " d i s a b i l i t y caused by old age or other i n f i rm i t i es should not be coupled with or used as an argument to secure pensions for people who are b l ind and dest i tu te."96 p 0 r the rest of the year Layton campaigned throughout the CFB and succeeded in recapturing the presidency at the Regina convention in the spring of 1933. Layton regained control of the CFB at a time when the depression was reaching i t s peak. The s i tuat ion among bl ind residents of Montreal was becoming c r i t i c a l . 9 7 The resources of voluntary agencies were stretched to the l im i t because of a blanket 10 percent cut in federal grants i n i t i a ted in the 1932-33 f i s c a l year. Spurred by the urgent necessity for government ac t ion , Layton requested a meeting with Wood, the CNIB President. They met in Toronto in early July 1933 and agreed to set up a committee to draft a statement on pensions pol icy for r a t i f i c a t i o n by the i r a f f i l i a t e s . The CNIB representatives ins is ted that the document to be sent to the senior leve ls of government should indicate agreement among the b l ind on the general p r inc ip le of publ ic pensions rather than focus on the character of l eg i s l a t i on or spec i f i c terms. Their r i va l s accepted the force of th is argument because they were equally aware that representations from various organizations of and for the bl ind were being discounted by governments on the grounds of lack of agreement.98 The united memorial was endorsed by 40 organizations of and for the bl ind (see table 31), representing an estimated one- f i f th of the tota l b l ind population.99 / \n a f f i l i a t e s of the CFB signed the document, but i t s Winnipeg and Manitoba branches deleted references coupling blindness with age and other i n f i r m i t i e s . Among CNIB a f f i l i a t e s , only the Ottawa Associat ion for the Bl ind refused to endorse the document for reasons of c o n s c i e n c e . 1 0 0 The 1933 memorial was sent to the federal government on October 28th, but remained unacklowl edged af ter the lapse of a month. The CFB-ONIB c o a l i t i o n , therefore, set in motion the second stage of t he i r campaign. They had agreed to send a small delegation to meet the Prime Minister in December, a time when estimates were being prepared. The new Secretary of the CFB suggested that as b l ind spokesmen would have "better appeal ," i t s membership should be confined to Layton and Baker, with himself and Myers act ing as guides.101 The leaders 328 Table 31. Organizations endorsing memorials, 1933 and 1936 CFB Branches St . John Hal i fax Montreal Quebec Ci ty Toronto Ottawa Hami1 ton Windsor+ Winnipeg Regina Saskatoon Edmonton Calgary* Vancouver A f f i l i a t e s Montreal Assoc. " School L'Aide aux Aveugles French Canadian Assoc. Societe Amicale* Comrades Club Ontario Assoc. CNIB D iv i s ions , e tc . A f f i l i a t e s Maritime Div. Quebec Div. Hal i fax School Nazareth Inst i tute Quebec Assoc. Ontario Div. Excels ior Club Alumni Assoc. , Ont Sch for B l i nd* London Assoc. Star of Hope Club* Unity Club* Fort Wil l iam Advisory Board* Port Arthur Advisory Board* Central Western Div. UBPCM Manitoba League Women's A u x i l . * Sask. Board Prov. Com.+ White Stick Club Women's Aux.* North A l t a . Com. Reliance Club South A l t a . Com. Jn t . Pens. Com.* Western Div. B.C. School Ni l Desperandum Club Women's A u x i l . * SOURCES: CNIB copy of "Pensions for the Bl ind of Canada, A United Memorial, October 1933"; and "Bl ind Persons Allowances Memorial, 1936," PAC, Dept. of National Health and Welfare F i l e s , Record Group 29, v o l . 159-A, f i l e no. 159-A: 209-1-3. *1936 addit ions +1936 omissions 3„2.9_ of the CFB-CNIB coa l i t i on met Bennett on December 12th. Layton described the "bondage of poverty" facing the bl ind and dealt with the general need for pensions. He pointed out that many b l ind people were denied r e l i e f on the grounds that they were unemployables. Bennett, however, challenged th i s content ion, c i t i n g as proof the s i tuat ion in Winnipeg.102 Baker then discussed the memorial and presented s t a t i s t i c s . In response, the Prime Minister t r ied to pass the buck fo r l eg i s l a t i ve action to the provinces, while accepting that t he i r involvement would require a federal st imulus. He discounted the resolut ions from the three p ra i r i e provinces on the grounds that none had passed enabling l e g i s l a t i o n . He then referred to the d i f f i c u l t f inancia l posi t ion the four western provinces were facing and the "extraordinary" federal expenditures on unemployment r e l i e f . While suggesting that the f inanc ia l s i tua t ion was "the factor to be overcome," Bennett promised to bring the matter up in cabinet the next d a y . 1 0 3 The advocates' hopes were boosted further by an announcement in the Montreal Gazette (26 December 1933) indicat ing that the pensions issue would be discussed at the forthcoming federa l -prov inc ia l conference in Ottawa. Although time was short , they redoubled the i r lobbying e f for ts v i s - a - v i s the provincial governments, contacting a l l Premiers before the i r a r r i va l in Ottawa. The CFB-CNIB coa l i t i on eagerly awaited the outcome of the f i r s t formal discussion of pensions for the bl ind by the two senior leve ls of government. However, a rumour c i rcu la ted on the eve of the 1934 Dominion-Provincial Conference that the subject had not been included on the agenda. During the f i r s t two days there was no mention of pensions for the b l i nd . Consequently, coa l i t i on spokesmen were dispatched to Ottawa on January 16th. They made "strenuous e f f o r t s " to have the matter discussed. Premier Taschereau to ld them that the question would not be raised due to pressure of other matters. His view was confirmed by several other sources. Eventually they reached the Prime 330 M in i s te r ' s pr ivate secretary and the matter was presented to Bennett, who agreed to discuss the question that d a y . 1 0 4 The Conference part ic ipants decided that while f inanc ia l conditions d id not warrant the granting of pensions on a generous sca le , "some action w i l l be taken. . .a t an ear ly date."105 j n addit ion to th is vague commitment, the impromptu discussion revealed growing provincial support. At the end of the conference, Ontario's Attorney-General announced that his government was "ready at any moment to implement any move Ottawa might make with regard to further a id for b l ind pensioners."106 y n e p ra i r i e provinces were already on record as supporting a j o in t venture. The past reactions of the Premiers of Quebec, Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island were not unfavourable. Although the new Liberal government of B r i t i s h Columbia had not made any publ ic pronouncements in support of pensions for the b l i n d , i t s Provincia l Secretary at least was sympathetic.!© 7 Only Premier T i l ley of New Brunswick was against the movement because of the f inanc ia l condit ions of his and other provinces.108 Besides evidence of increasing support among provincia l Premiers, the national pensions coa l i t i on received another boost in 1934. In the f a l l CNIB representatives were encouraged by rumours of work in progress on a new, "quite r a d i c a l , " federal scheme of socia l l e g i s l a t i o n , and so contacted o f f i c i a l s in "the r ight quarters."109 Their representat ions, however, were unsuccessful in securing inc lus ion of the needy bl ind under Bennett's 'New Deal' because the Prime Minister was opposed to the p r inc ip le of non-contributory pensions. Despite th is setback, the major advocates were encouraged by developments in the federal House. Dr. I.D. Cotnam (Con., N. Renfrew) had informed them in February 1934 of his intent ion to sponsor a resolut ion seeking inclusion of the needy b l ind v ia amendment of the old Age Pension Act. When notice of his 331 resolut ion appeared on the order paper for the 1935 sess ion , the CFB responded sw i f t l y . In la te January i t instructed i t s branches to wire the Prime Minister and local MPs urging the i r support of the Cotnam reso lu t ion , and to contact the local press in a bid to launch a national newspaper campaign in support of the pensions. Its executive was convinced that pub l ic i t y was the appropriate t a c t i c , because several sources in both leve ls of government indicated "that the Government i s at present vote hunting to quite an extent and that numerous communications to those in power w i l l tend to bring out the importance of the quest ion." Baker of the CNIB, however, shied away from asking his d iv is ions to take s im i la r ac t i on , opting "to reserve our representations unt i l they are needed to give the necessary f ina l push."HO On January 30, 1935, Cotnam sponsored the f i r s t formal debate on the subject . He urged the federal government to expand the old age pension scheme to cover the needy b l ind aged 40 years and over. After reviewing the evolution of b l ind welfare in other countr ies, he outl ined the posi t ion of the bl ind in Canada. He concluded with an urgent appeal for ac t ion , arguing that the time has come when "as a Chr is t ian nation we should give th is deserving class of our c i t i zens the benefit of state ass is tance. " Cotnam's resolut ion aroused no overt opposi t ion. It was supported by 17 MPs representing a l l part ies and every province except New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island (see tab le 32). In response to the i r p leas, Gordon, the Min is ter of Labour, suggested that the resolut ion be referred to the Standing Committee on Industr ial and International Re la t i ons .H I The CFB and CNIB made separate contacts with the 35 committee members. Only nine were known supporters of the cause.H2 This small group, however, contained an in f l uen t ia l spokesman in F.W. Turnbull (Con., Regina), the chairman of the standing committee. He suggested to CNIB o f f i c i a l s that the 332 Table 32. B l a i r Johnstone Macmillan Robinson Stanley Turnbull White Casgrain Chevrier Euler Gershaw Marcil Rinfret Stewart Heaps Mclnnis Irvine Supporters of Cotnam's Party Riding Con. Wellington Cape Breton Saskatoon Essex Calgary Regina Montreal L ib . Lab. UFA Ottawa Waterloo Medicine Hat Montreal Edmonton Winnipeg Vancouver Calgary resolut ion on pensions for the b l i n d , 1935 Interest Group Connections Unspecified contacts with b l ind Rep'ns from unnamed delegation Rep'ns from Jo in t Committee of Alberta Spokesman of Montreal Ass'n and Nazareth Inst i tute Rep'ns from unnamed delegations Contact w/bl ind when member of A l ta gov't Long-time advocate CFB spokesman SOURCE: Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1935, pp. 341-42, 347-50. presentation of br ie fs should be made by a small de legat ion; and Cotnam too advised them, st ressing "the necessity of a l l organizations appearing as one" and avoiding any statement about cost that might embarrass the Conservative adminis t rat ion, "espec ia l l y references to the Government being able to f ind money for other p r o j e c t s . " I 1 3 The CFB executive was in favour of par t ic ipat ing 333 in a j o in t delegat ion, but i t s Secretary also arranged with Turnbull for CFB delegates to meet separately with his committee af ter t he i r annual convention in Montreal. Although th is arrangement threatened the re lat ionship of "close cooperation" with the Ins t i tu te , a united front was maintained before the committee. H 4 A delegation representing the CFB, CNIB and the UBPCM appeared before the standing committee on February 21st. While out l in ing the pressing need for pensions, Layton played on the members' fears of b l indness: "You gentlemen only have to shut your eyes and think you are never going to open them again to get some idea of the posi t ion of one who goes b l i nd . You see, his vocation i s gone . . . . " He also appealed to the i r desire for re-e lect ion by st ressing the popular i ty of the cause among the publ ic at la rge. Baker, the next witness, pointed out that the unemployable bl ind were "a de f in i te problem" and required aid because they were mainly "vict ims of circumstances." Jessie MacLennan, the UBPCM representat ive, reviewed the extensive a c t i v i t i e s of the Manitoba bl ind to secure state aid and c i ted the precedents of pensions for mothers and the e lder ly to support her case .HS in response, the acting chairman suggested the appointment of a small subcommittee to examine the various writ ten submissions from the organized b l i nd . Pr ior to draft ing a report , the Standing Committee met 15 CFB d e l e g a t e s . i l 6 After hearing the i r case for pensions, R.S. White, a Conservative committee member, assured "the bl ind people that we are with them heart and sou l . Our problem now.. . is to iron out these l i t t l e things that are in the way." One stumbling-block was the type of s ta tu te , because the federal o ld age pensions plan was not yet implemented in New Brunswick and Quebec. Esl ing (Con.), a long-time sympathizer, favoured a separate statute to overcome th i s problem. The chairman agreed, but pointed out that a special act was 33.4 outside the terms of reference of the Cotnam reso lu t ion. His posi t ion was supported by Macphail (UFO) and Woodsworth ( L a b . ) . 1 1 7 In ear ly Apr i l Turnbull reported the Standing Committee's decision to the House. While regrett ing that the Cotnam resolut ion would only apply to the b l ind in seven out of the nine provinces, he recommended i t s approval. Upon hearing t h i s , Cotnam rejected his or ig ina l motion as t o t a l l y inadequate because i t would exclude an estimated 166 in New Brunswick and 720 in Quebec. He moved, therefore, that the report be referred back to the committee for amendment, so as to permit the House to pass a special s ta tu te , appl icable to a l l provinces and providing pensions for the needy b l ind aged 40 years and over, on the same basis as the Old Age Pension A c t . 1 1 8 This development was a setback for the movement as the report was referred back short ly before the House was due to adjourn for Easter. The committee chairman was c lea r l y worried about the "danger that nothing w i l l be done th i s sess ion ; " and the CNIB's managing d i rec tor was also concerned about the reaction of the b l i n d , espec ia l ly in his home province of Ontario, because i f pensions were not granted that sess ion, "we stand to be c r i t i c i z e d by them since they have been depending so largely on us to make representations on t he i r b e h a l f . " 1 ^ Consequently, he instructed a l l d iv is ions to arrange meetings with the b l ind to explain the reasons for the delay, and to send resolut ions to MPs, sighted organizations and the press to drum up support for the adoption of pensions in the 1935 session. The CFB also sent s im i la r orders to i t s branches. During the recess (Apr i l 17 to May 20) special meetings of the b l ind and sighted sympathizers were held in every major c i t y throughout Canada.120 The organized b l i nd ' s demand for l e g i s l a t i v e action was endorsed by "a p rac t i ca l l y unanimous press across C a n a d a . " 1 2 1 Special e f for ts were then made 335 to broaden the base of the movement, espec ia l ly by advocates in Manitoba and Ontar io, the two provinces where contingent l eg i s l a t i on had recently been passed. Expressions of support poured into the Prime Min is te r ' s o f f i ce from Lions Clubs in Ontario and elsewhere; organized workers, including members of over 20 loca ls of Ontario internat ional unions; female volunteers representing both rural and urban organizations in Ontario and Saskatchewan; and elected o f f i c i a l s of the c i t i e s of St. John and Verdun.122 Both the Canadian TLC and the All-Canadian Congress also formally endorsed the movement in 1 9 3 5 . 1 2 3 Following the recess the members of the Standing Committee decided that the i r or ig ina l report should be re-submitted to the House because there was not enough time l e f t in the session to study the many factors involved in a special ac t . They formulated, though, a special proposal to cover the b l ind of New Brunswick and Quebec unt i l such time as the old age pensions plan was adopted there. Turnbull reported the i r decision to the House on June 13, 1935. His report was not accepted, but l e f t in abeyance while the government formulated i t s response, a delay that boded i l l for any statutory i n i t i a t i v e under the Bennett administrat ion. Opponents: The persistence of acute depression during the 1930-35 period rendered l e g i s l a t i v e action concerning pensions for the bl ind a remote prospect. Indeed, a CNIB spokesman went so far as to ident i fy "the adverse f inancia l outlook" from 1929 onwards as "the only th ing" preventing Ottawa from enacting pensions leg is la t ion .124 jhe devastating impact of the depression upon public f inance, in f a c t , gave powerful reinforcement to the f i s c a l at t i tudes of certa in prov inc ia l Premiers and federal cabinet min is ters . Among the provinces par t ic ipat ing in the federa l ly sponsored old age pensions p lan, only Prince Edward Is land, Nova Scotia and Ontario were able to f inance addit ional expenditures, because the four western provinces were largely dependent upon Ottawa's largesse in the f i r s t ha l f of the 1930s. However, despite the i r varying balance sheets, a l l the part ic ipants expressed support for the cause of the needy b l i nd . Only Ontario and Manitoba, though, passed enabling l eg i s l a t i on pr ior to 1935. B r i t i s h Columbia demonstrated a wi l l ingness to par t ic ipate in a federal i n i t i a t i v e by making provision under a new Special Powers Act , but i t s Liberal government was not prepared to enact contingent l eg i s l a t i on in 1935 because " i t s chief concern" was apparently a balanced budget.125 This goal was presumably a p r i o r i t y of the other provincia l supporters of the cause who avoided making a l e g i s l a t i v e commitment. The two Premiers res is t ing implementation of old age pensions also opposed benefi ts for the b l i nd . According to the CFB leadership, Premier Taschereau of Quebec was "prejudiced against the p r inc ip le of pensions."126 i n f ac t , so extreme was his resistance to the idea of income secur i ty that i t has been described as a "study in p o l i t i c a l se l f -dest ruct ion."127 T i l l e y , the Conservative Premier of New Brunswick, was another 'ha rd - l i ne r ' on the issue. While en route to the 1934 Dominion-Provincial Conference he to ld the Laytons that he was opposed because " . . . such l eg i s l a t i on would open the way for a l l other handicapped classes to seek state aid and under present condi t ions, governments could not stand such expense." Premier T i l l e y rei terated his views at the in camera discussion of the issue at the conference. When challenged by Weir, B . C . ' s Provinc ia l Secretary, T i l l e y remained adamant, and Weir thought that i f he continued to press the matter, "a dog f ight might ensue."128 E.N. Rhodes, the federal Minister of Finance, also regarded the sp i ra l e f fec t of pensions for the bl ind as the major deterrent. On the eve of the 1934 Conference he informed the Prime Minister that , besides the question of cos t , " i t would be well to bear in mind that the moment pensions for the bl ind are estab l ished, there w i l l be an immediate demand on the part of the deaf and dumb and those responsible for the care of the indigent feeb le -m inded . " 1 2 9 His views were shared by two other col leagues. Shortly before the House of Commons reconvened in May 1935 the cabinet discussed the subject. A report in the Toronto Star (23 Apr i l 1935) indicated that there was increasing support for the notion that "a dangerous and cost ly precedent" was being se t : "Why pensions for the bl ind more than for the tubercular , the vict ims of cancer? was the reply of three cabinet members when asked about the government's in tent ion, and they implied that nothing w i l l be done. . .a f ter Parliament reconvenes." Besides Rhodes, the other two opponents were iden t i f i ed by CNIB o f f i c i a l s as Maclaren, Min is ter of Pensions and National Heal th, and Cahan, the Secretary of S t a t e . 1 3 0 Prime Min is ter Bennett was an even more powerful opponent. He was reluctant to finance pensions for the b l ind because corporate in te res ts , the major federal taxpayers, were res is t ing the idea of f inancing even emergency state a i d . He turned down a request to include the b l ind in the 1931 old age pension amendment on the grounds that "these things cost money," and then admitted he was haunted constantly by the question of how the money was to be r a i s e d . 1 3 1 As the depression worsened his preoccupation with ra is ing funds i n t e n s i f i e d . Bennett apparently to ld Layton in December 1933 that the CNIB estimate of $500,000 required to fund the federal share of a jo in t scheme would be d i f f i c u l t to f ind under present condit ions owing to the "heavy burden" taxpayers were already facing for national serv ices , unemployment r e l i e f and so ld i e r s ' p e n s i o n s . 1 3 2 Bennett was also opposed to the concept of publ ic ly- f inanced pensions on ideologica l grounds, favouring the contributory p r inc ip le based on compulsory t h r i f t . During the debate on the 1937 b i l l to provide pensions for the bl ind he made his posi t ion c lear : 338 I am sa t i s f i ed that i f the state i s to carry on the socia l serv ices. . .w i thout contr ibut ion on the part of those who w i l l receive the benef i ts , we might as well make up our minds that the future of the country i s the past. . . .We cannot give everything, expect the taxpayers to undertake the whole prov is ion , and administer s u c c e s s f u l l y . 1 3 3 He omitted to mention that when in power he had toyed with the idea of replacing the ex is t ing system of means-tested old age pensions with a t r i p a r t i t e contr ibutory scheme of annuit ies as part of his 'New Deal ' package . 1 3 4 This i n i t i a t i v e complied with manufacturers' demands to do away with "unsound" and "deserving poor" types of s c h e m e s . ^ Bennett's contr ibutory p lan , however, never reached the f loo r of the House, presumably because i t f e l l outside the realm of pract ica l welfare p o l i t i c s . Bennett, though, succeeded in blocking the introduct ion of state-f inanced benefi ts for the b l i nd . In his absence, the cabinet discussed on June 21, 1935, the report of the House standing committee favouring coverage by amendment of the Old Age Pension Act , with a special proviso to cover the bl ind of New Brunswick and Quebec. Six days la te r Bennett announced that no l e g i s l a t i v e act ion would be taken in that s e s s i o n . 1 3 6 instead, his government decided to pay a special grant of $50,000 to the CNIB, a request made o r i g i na l l y i n 1932. This decision not only s ta l l ed the progress of the movement, but also strained the developing tensions between the two partners in the national pensions coa l i t i on to breaking point. Although the Inst i tu te was innocent of the charge of accepting a special grant in l i eu of pensions for the b l i n d , the damage was done in the eyes of the CFB. The c los ing days of the 1935 session marked a resurgence of the 'sharp-shooting' tac t i cs that had heralded the opening of the seventeenth Par l iament . 1 3 7 3.3.9L Prec ip i tan ts : Although the future of the movement looked bleak in the summer of 1935, i t s prospects soon brightened, as an e lect ion was imminent. During the campaign pensions for the bl ind emerged as a v i s i b l e , national issue for the f i r s t t ime. The CFB can claim credi t for i t s appearance, an a c t i v i t y that was not condoned by the other champions of the c a u s e . 1 3 8 Its President contacted the four parliamentary party leaders and received favourable repl ies from a l l but Bennett, and Layton also asked the Federation's branches and a f f i l i a t e s to lobby as many candidates as possible and to secure wri t ten pledges of s u p p o r t . 1 3 9 Its Manitoba branch was, presumably, the anonymous source which asked King to state his views on the subject during the las t speech of his campaign made in Winnipeg. The Liberal leader 's response was heard by a l i v e audience of 4,400 and radio l i s teners throughout the country. He stated that "[n]o one was more sympathetic than himself , for h is own father had suffered from bl indness." Leg is la t ive ac t ion , however, was dependent upon implementation of Liberal po l i c ies because then "there would be money in the Treasury to ef fect such re fo rms. " 1 4 0 The resul ts of the 1935 federal e lect ion boded well for the future progress. The L ibera ls won a resounding major i ty. Besides King's pledge, both Robb and Heenan, ministers in the previous Liberal administ rat ion, had apparently made "promises" to the CFB that l e g i s l a t i v e action would be forthcoming once the o ld age pensions plan became operative in a few p r o v i n c e s . 1 4 1 Their immediate implementation, however, was unl ike ly as the new Prime Minister inher i ted the problems of mass unemployment and wanted to avoid "any precipi tous moves, not wishing to al ienate his Quebec supporters by e i ther t inker ing with the const i tu t ion or launching condit ional-grant schemes . " 1 4 2 Once the L ibera ls made the cruc ia l decision to ac t , a l l the minor part ies could 314.0. be counted upon to support i t . An outs ider , the Social Credit movement, had outstr ipped the other reformist groups at the p o l l s . One of i t s federal representat ives, J . C . Landeryon, assured the organized bl ind in Alberta that a l l h is colleagues were in favour of granting pensions; " in f ac t , we bel ieve adequate pensions should be given to a l l the b l ind i r respect ive of age."143 Electoral pressures also precipi tated the entry of New Brunswick and Quebec into the federal old age pensions plan. Their par t ic ipat ion removed a major obstacle to cooperative ac t ion , even though i t would cost the federal treasury an addit ional $8 m i l l i on and so might cause some delay in the adoption of pensions for the bl ind.144 In June 1935 Premier T i l l e y and his Conservative administrat ion were defeated at the po l l s in New Brunswick. His Liberal successor, Dysart, had promised to implement old age pensions during the campaign. He kept his pledge and proclaimed the 1930 provinc ia l act short ly a f ter the e lec t i on . In the Quebec e lect ion of November 1935 Premier Taschereau managed to survive a powerful challenge from the newly-formed Union Nationale. He had promised to implement the federal old age pensions plan in the next sess ion , and the 1936 throne speech included th is reform.145 These developments encouraged the two partners in the national pensions coa l i t i on to patch up the i r dif ferences and re-uni te . They succeeded in placing the subject of pensions on the agenda of the 1935 Dominion-Provincial Conference. Prospects of increased provincial support were enhanced by the fact that the new Premier of New Brunswick was "a very close f r iend of the family" of the Superintendent of the CNIB's Quebec d i v i s i o n ; and another new face, Premier Aberhart of Alberta was also apparently "very favourably i n c l i ned . " Premier Bracken of Manitoba broached the subject at the conference and discussion was referred to the Committee on Unemployment Rel ie f and Social Serv ices. Its chairman, the Labour Min is te r , reported that " . . . no dissenting 341 opinion was expressed and, in f ac t , there was general sympathy with the pr inc ip le of pensions for the bl ind."146 Besides bringing the issue before provincia l Premiers, the CFB-CNIB coa l i t i on a lso decided to focus the attention of the federal government upon i t s request for l eg i s l a t i ve action in the 1936 sess ion. Upon the suggestion of the CNIB, they forwarded a new memorial to the Prime Minister pr ior to the opening of the new Parliament. This 1936 memorial contained a l l s ignatories of the 1933 document except two, and ten new organizations (see tab le 31, p. 328). In response, King referred the advocates to the Minister of Finance, who was responsible for pensions po l i cy . Although he was impressed with the CNIB's presentation of the case, C A . Dunning was not keen on the idea of taking immediate l e g i s l a t i v e ac t ion . He gave Inst i tute o f f i c i a l s the impression that he would l i k e to see i t done but was worried about balancing the budget during the next f i s c a l year.147 Dunning held orthodox views on finance and was not prepared to sanction any type of social reform "without regard to how i t i s to be paid f o r . " ! 4 8 Despite th i s omen, "another rung of the pensions ladder" was climbed during the 1936 session because the Liberal government accepted the pr inc ip le of a federal scheme, and so the "need for further argument as to cons t i tu t iona l i t y or merit was de f i n i t e l y disposed of."149 Dr. Donnelly ( L i b . , Willow Bunch, Sask.) introduced a resolut ion concerning pensions for the needy b l i n d , and presented the case for extension of the provisions of the Old Age Pension Act to include the needy b l ind aged 40 years and over. His resolut ion was endorsed by a l l the 22 speakers in the debate, who represented every party and included several spokesmen of the organized bl ind.150 Nonetheless, the government's reaction was not favourable. Dunning informed the House that 3.42 although his colleagues were sympathetic, the "p rac t i ca l i t y " of l e g i s l a t i v e action at that session was "very doubtful."151 CNIB o f f i c i a l s , though, were not t o t a l l y disheartened, rea l i z ing that other pre-e lect ion pledges prompted the Liberal government to res is t demands for new expenditure for " . . . a section of the population concerning whose patience they had ample proof."152 One consolation for the i r long-suffer ing c l i en t s was the entry of Canadian mayors into the ranks of supporters in March 1936.153 Around the same time the old age pension b i l l was introduced in the Quebec National Assembly. Concerted e f for ts were then made by the CFB and CNIB to secure inc lus ion of the needy bl ind under th is l e g i s l a t i o n . They succeeded in persuading the b i l l ' s sponsor, Bouchard, to add a clause to th is e f fec t , and both organizations received copies of the proposed amendment.154 However, the t ac t i c s of the Union Nationale (UN) opposition during May and June brought the regular business of the Assembly to a s t a n d s t i l l . Faced with th is deadlock, Premier Taschereau decided to apply fo r a d isso lu t ion once certa in private b i l l s were approved. M. Duplessis, the UN leader, also succeeded in securing the passage of the old age pension b i l l in the c los ing stages of the session. Its rapid enactment l e f t the advocates confused about the fate of the pensions for the b l ind clause.155 Their confusion, however, was only temporary as the Liberal government, in a last-gasp bid to retain power, began payment of means-tested pensions for the e lder ly but not for the b l i nd . The UN v ic tory at the po l l s in August 1936 had more than passing interest fo r the coa l i t i on partners because i t s successful candidates included Gi lber t Layton, the CFB Secretary, who was appointed Minister Without Por t fo l io in Duplessis ' new cabinet. He publ ic ly announced that one of his f i r s t p r i o r i t i e s when the leg is la tu re convened would be to introduce a b i l l providing for pensions for the bl ind in Quebec.156 But he f a i l ed to secure passage of enabling l eg i s l a t i on during the special session ca l led by the new Premier to 3_43_ deal with urgent l e g i s l a t i o n , including amendments to Taschereau's Old Age Pension Act. Frustrated by th is omission, the CFB began to lobby provincial Premiers for t he i r support of discussion of benefits for the bl ind at the forthcoming Dominion-Provincial Conference. Although CNIB o f f i c i a l s were caught o f f guard by news of CFB lobbying, they managed to contact a l l Premiers at the conference, who "agreed to support the ear ly enactment of the necessary l e g i s l a t i o n should the opportunity a r i s e . " The subject cropped up in the discussion on old age pensions. The president of the CFB reported that his son had prec ip i ta ted the b r ie f debate and "not one dissent ing voice" had been raised.157 Dunning, the federal Finance Min is te r , played a pivotal role in the f ina l stages. Having come close to achieving his object ive of "sound f inance" in his f i r s t budget, he was not averse to funding new modest proposals in subsequent f i s ca l years. As he made plain at a lunch in la te March of 1936 with R. Myers and H. Turner of the CNIB, " i t was not a question of wait ing unt i l the budget had been balanced."158 In the f a l l of 1936 he asked the CNIB to submit up-to-date s t a t i s t i c s and the CFB to send a b r i e f . After these separate submissions had been supplemented with information from the DBS, the Deputy Min is ter of Finance, W.C. C lark , instructed his o f f i c i a l s to prepare an estimate of the costs of Ottawa's par t ic ipat ion in a jo in t scheme providing pensions for the needy b l ind between 40 and 69 who met the same c i t i zensh ip and residency requirements as sighted old age pensioners.159 It became c lear at a meeting between Dunning and Myers of the CNIB in ear ly December that the sudden r i se to prominence of pensions for the bl ind on the government's agenda stemmed from the fact that they were the least cost ly item of new proposals. The Finance Minister pointed out that besides the ag i ta t ion for pensions for the b l i nd , there was "recent considerable pressure" .344 from an organization representing old age pensioners in Bri t ish Columbia for an increase in rates and agitation from "another quarter," i . e . , organized labour, to lower the age of e l i g i b i l i t y for old age pensions. "Of these three, Mr. Dunning expressed the opinion that pensions for the blind most appealed to him."172 Their relative cheapness ($500,000) versus the estimated cost of paying old age pensions at the age of 65 ($38.5 mil l ion) was a sufficient imperative for legislat ive action.160 The throne speech opening the 1937 session contained the long-awaited announcement. During the drafting stage the government's choice of format was questioned by the chairmen of the War Veterans Allowances Commission and the Pensions Commission. According to the Deputy Minister of Finance, these bureaucrats preferred a separate statute over amendment via old age pensions legislat ion because "[t]hey fear opening up the latter Act wi l l lead to pressure for a lot of other amendments." Clark, however, informed the Minister that he had "an iron-clad defence on this point...as you can point out that amendments require the consent of a l l provinces...."1^2 Clark and the Sol ic i tor to the Treasury, in conjunction with Baker and Myers of the CNIB, were the major authors of the scheme. Working within the l imits of the old age pensions precedent set by the Minister, they applied the final touches. Baker was instrumental in enshrining the preferences of the coalit ion partners for the Bri t ish definition of blindness and a minimum age of 40, but fai led to alter the Minister's decision not to include younger unemployables. Both coalit ion partners also persuaded Finance of f ic ia ls to grant the blind a higher earnings l imit than sighted recipients of old age pensions or war veterans allowances (see appendix B). However, their demand for double the permissible earnings ($250) was pared down by the Deputy Minister. Acting purely on their own in i t ia t i ve , CNIB o f f ic ia ls managed to secure 345 inc lus ion of a clause granting bl ind couples who married af ter the passage of the l e g i s l a t i o n the equivalent of one pension only. They were "strong be l ievers" in penal iz ing such unions because of the hardships imposed upon ch i l d ren , but were not keen on the Minister pub l i c iz ing the i r views in the H o u s e . 1 6 3 Baker and Myers of the CNIB also precip i tated the timing of the passage of the b i l l , pressing for i t s enactment pr ior to the imminent recess so that a l l the provinces could act upon the federal i n i t i a t i v e while the i r leg is la tures were s t i l l in session. Although Clark doubted that th i s was feasible,164 h is p o l i t i c a l superior thought otherwise. On March 16th, Dunning i n i t i a ted the second reading of the b i l l to amend the Old Age Pension Act to include the needy bl ind aged 40 and over. The debate was dominated by charges of part isan administrat ion of old age pensions in B r i t i s h Columbia and Ontario. In the discussion on the amendment CCF MPs were c r i t i c a l of cer ta in terms of the l e g i s l a t i v e proposal, with Heaps arguing for an increase in the earnings allowance, and his B r i t i sh Columbia col leagues, Maclnnis and Taylor , attacking the "unfairness" of the "unnatural, inhuman" clause penal iz ing the bl ind who married a f ter the scheme became operative.165 Debate, however, was not prolonged and the b i l l was passed swi f t l y by the House. On March 18th, i t was approved by the Senate with only one amendment, c l a r i f y i ng the earnings l im i t for married couples. Except fo r A lber ta , a l l other provinces passed enabling l eg i s l a t i on making pensions for the b l ind payable from the f a l l of 1937 onwards (see table 33). Their swi f t entry into the federal pensions plan for the b l ind contrasted sharply with the i r delay in endorsing the old age pensions scheme. It was spurred in part by lobbying from the CNIB. But the CFB and the UBPCM also 3.4.6 deserve cred i t for the i r persistent e f for ts to bring the cause of the bl ind to the attent ion of provincial l e g i s l a t o r s . The eventual success of a l l the major advocates demonstrated c lear l y the truism that unity i s strength. Table 33. Number of pensioners and federal contr ibut ions towards pensions for bl ind persons, 1937/38 - 1938/39 f i s c a l years No. of Pensioners Federal Contributions 31.3.38 31.3.39 1937/38 1938/39 Al berta -- 146 $ — $19,290 B r i t i s h Columbia 76 232 3,025 37,324 Manitoba 98 206 6,412 33,507 New Brunswick 114 510 8,994 86,517 Nova Scotia 171 493 11,985 74,418 Ontario 683 1154 38,535 199,163 Prince Edward Island 41 104 660 10,518 Quebec 710 1453 57,028 263,452 Saskatchewan 53 214 1,778 36,167 To ta l : 1946 4512 $128,418 $760,354 SOURCE: Dept. of Finance, Report on the Administration of Old Age Pensions in Canada fo r F isca l Year Ended 31 March 1939, p. 15, table 4. A Review The socio-economic set t ing shaped the movement to secure pensions for the b l i nd . Industr ial urban growth had a s im i la r impact for the bl ind as i t had for the aged poor by exacerbating the i r dependency. However, for the bl ind i t also prompted the growth of se l f -he lp organizations in the prewar per iod, a development not copied by other c i v i l i a n c l i en t groups unt i l af ter the introduct ion of means-tested benef i ts . While the lack of success of the i n i t i a l 3.47 struggle owed less to economic conditions than to the advocates' own fa i l u re to convince decision-makers that the issue of state a id was a pressing one, the economy exerted much more inf luence upon the i r concerted campaign. The Great Depression delayed i t s progress because the adverse f inanc ia l outlook combined with p o l i t i c i a n s ' preoccupation with the r e l i e f of dest i tu t ion ar is ing from mass unemployment mi l i ta ted against welfare innovations. The onset of economic recovery mid-way through the 1930s provided Ottawa and provincial governments in central Canada with the means of f inancing statutory benef i ts , but offered no guarantee of l eg i s l a t i ve ac t ion . Preva i l ing cul tura l at t i tudes also exerted a c r i t i c a l impact upon the movement. Among the various categories of the dependent poor, the c l i en t group of b l ind adults was unique because the i r a f f l i c t i o n was ta inted by the taboo of venereal disease as well as being associated with mental def ic iency. Popular pre judice, therefore, was a major obstacle during the i n i t i a l struggle. Like the other pensions movements, the influence of foreign precedents was v i s i b l e in the ear ly stages, with the B r i t i sh scheme chosen over the U.S. experience as the example to fo l low. However, the domestic precedent of old age pensions soon became dominant, shaping the advocates' i n i t i a l choice of target as well as the character of l e g i s l a t i o n . As the 1927 jo in t i n i t i a t i v e for the c i v i l i a n e lder ly was sponsored by Ottawa, CNIB o f f i c i a l s , the pioneers of the cause, conducted the i r i n i t i a l lobbying in the federal c a p i t a l . But the i r example was not followed ei ther by t he i r a f f i l i a t e , the LTCB in Winnipeg, or by t he i r r i v a l s , the CFB, who both showed greater appreciation of the f l e x i b i l i t y afforded by the federal structure of government. The advocates' subsequent coordinated lobbying of both senior leve ls of government eventually bore f r u i t because neither Ottawa nor the provinces were prepared to finance independent i n i t i a t i v e s , opting instead 348 to consider only inc lus ion of the b l ind v ia expansion of the old age pensions p lan. But federa l -prov inc ia l con f l i c t s a r is ing over i t s implementation delayed the introduct ion of pensions for the b l i nd . Consequently, in l i ne with the f indings of Birch (1955), the method of j o in t f inancing influenced not only the content but also the t iming of the scheme. Concerning societa l actors, the case study represents another variant of group p o l i t i c s , with the organized bl ind qual i fy ing as the champions of the movement. Their sponsorship and development of the agi tat ion contrasts sharply with the minimal ro le played by other c i v i l i a n c l i en t groups, and even outmatches the par t ic ipat ion of disabled veterans. Their promotion of t he i r own cause stems mainly from the fact that the i r small and scattered potential membership represented only a weak voting bloc compared wi th , say, the e lde r l y , and so the i r effect iveness as a pressure group depended upon other resources such as a un i f ied organizat ion, a coordinated strategy and access to decision-makers. I n i t i a l l y the internal con f l i c t s between the CFB and the CNIB over the role of the state in b l ind welfare and appropriate tac t i cs ser iously undermined the i r e f f o r t s , because disuni ty provided po l i t i c i ans with the rat ionale for inact ion and impeded the process of converting others to the i r cause. Their ag i ta t ion only gained momentum once the i r e f for ts became coordinated, allowing the partners in the national pensions coa l i t i on and the UBPCM to mount a concerted attack upon both leve ls of government and to broaden the base of the movement. Outside Parliament they concentrated the i r p rose ly t iz ing ef for ts within urban boundaries and managed to secure the act ive support of trade un ion is ts , middle-class volunteers and c i v i c p o l i t i c i a n s . Inside the federal Parliament, the i r cause was championed by a few sympathetic. MPs. During the 1920s the i r spokesmen were motivated by electoral pressures, 3 49-party commitments or personal empathy to respond to interest group pressure. In subsequent Parl iaments, advocates advanced the cause upon the i r own i n i t i a t i v e and succeeded in bringing the subject to the attent ion of other l e g i s l a t o r s . Inside government, po l i t i c i ans rather than bureaucrats played the dominant ro le in contrast to the i r more equal par t ic ipat ion in the preceding agi tat ion for war veterans' allowances. The p o l i t i c i a n s ' i n i t i a l opposition ref lected t he i r ever-present f i s c a l conservatism. Although provincial Premiers displayed varying degrees of interest in the issue, they were united in the i r common determination not to sponsor new, cost ly independent i n i t i a t i v e s for the needy b l i nd . King and Bennett, when in power, were equally determined to res is t demands fo r act ion unt i l unanimous provincia l consent was forthcoming. Underlying t he i r resistance were fears that pensions would set a cost ly dangerous precedent. They did not perceive the claims of the bl ind to be more deserving than those of other categories of the c i v i l i a n d isabled. This sp i ra l e f f ec t , combined probably with the re la t i ve ins ign i f i cance of b l ind voters, were the major impediments to governmental ac t ion. However, in the end the i r small numbers helped them because decision-makers rea l ized that aid for the bl ind was the cheapest means of sa t is fy ing demands for socia l reform. Electoral pressures once again played a cata lyst ro le . Prime Minister King's pledge, extracted by the CFB during the 1935 campaign, and the promises of provincial Premiers in New Brunswick and Quebec to implement the federal old age pensions p lan , pushed the issue higher up the p o l i t i c a l agenda/ A sympathetic Finance Min is ter holding o f f i ce during a period of economic recovery f i n a l l y launched the federal i n i t i a t i v e . After assessing the re la t ive costs of a id for the b l ind v i s - a - v i s changes to the old age pensions p lan, Dunning y ie lded to the advocates' demands. He sketched the broad out l ines of 35 0 the scheme, with his o f f i c i a l s and representatives of the organized bl ind applying the f in i sh ing touches. Although a l l four statutory innovations for the dependent poor were products of group p o l i t i c s , the campaigns preceding the i r introduction were far from being i d e n t i c a l . Instead, comparison of the cases reveals an interest ing var ia t ion in pressure group ac t i v i t y related to the two types of social pol icy dist inguished in chapter 1: innovations and developments. Economic interests par t ic ipated in the mothers' and old age pensions movements when the con f l i c t s over the pr inc ip le of state-f inanced benef i ts , as of r i gh t , were urged. In cont rast , c l i en t groups v i r t u a l l y single-handedly championed the claims of disabled veterans and the c i v i l i a n bl ind for benefits s im i la r to those granted to the e lde r l y . A l l four s t ruggles, however, contained one common, s t r i k i ng feature: the v i r tua l absence of social control p o l i t i c s . The threat of disorder made only a f lee t ing appearance in the i n i t i a l struggle for war veterans' allowances when, s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the cause of disabled non-pensioners was l inked with the issue of r e l i e f for able-bodied veterans. Relat ive to societa l ac tors , cabinet po l i t i c i ans played a remarkably consistent ro le . They dominated the socia l policymaking process in a l l cases, in l i ne with the i r pre-eminence in the development of emergency a i d . While f i s c a l conservatism was ever-present, e lectora l pressures replaced fears of revolut ion as the e f fec t ive spur to governmental ac t ion . On the other hand, bureaucrats played a minor and usual ly negative role in developing the statutory legacy of interwar welfare p o l i t i c s . PART IV CONCLUSIONS 351 CHAPTER 11 WELFARE POLITICS: THE CANADIAN CASE As the foregoing analysis reveals , the interwar struggles over the issue of publ ic welfare were c r i t i c a l in foster ing acceptance of the pr inc ip le that state aid to compensate for loss of income i s granted as a matter of r igh t . Their s ign i f i cance , though, in pioneering the development of the welfare state i s not generally recognized by students of Canadian socia l po l i cy . After evaluating the current state of the l i t e ra tu re in 1979, Jones admits that he i s s t i l l in the dark about precisely when the elements of a social welfare system were establ ished during the f i r s t four decades of th i s century, and i s scept ical that i t s achievement "was a step-by-step process with no apparent se tbacks . " 1 This study sheds l i gh t on both matters by suggesting that the pattern of categoric public ass is tance, developed during the 1916-37 per iod, l a i d the foundations and that i t s construction was shaped not only by promoters of the cause of co l lec t i v i sm but also by forces of ind iv idual ism. It was the ser ies of smal l -scale measures rather than any one s ingle i n i t i a t i v e that paved the way fo r the introduction of comprehensive income secur i t y . The development of emergency state aid for dest i tu te employables a f ter 1918 heralded the onset of federal involvement in the f i e l d of public welfare that had "tremendous future s i g n i f i c a n c e . . . . " 2 Pr ior to World War I I , however, the payment of statutory benefi ts for select categories of the dependent poor s ign i f i ed more c lear l y that state aid was being granted 'as of r i gh t , not cha r i t y . ' Rubinow, a pioneer authori ty on the social insurance technique, recognized that innovations such as mothers pensions represented forms of spec ia l ized r e l i e f , "[b]ut as an admission of publ ic prov is ion, of i t s 352 353 preference to private charity, these Acts mark a very important step forward...."3 A variety of forces shaped the evolution of the Canadian pattern of categoric public assistance. All types of determinants, identified in chapter 1, exerted an impact, but their influence was not of equal importance in shaping the origins of the welfare state, as the following summary reveals. The evidence, accumulated from the study of comparable cases, confirms that socio-economic change played an indirect, mediating role. The effects of the ongoing shift from an agrarian to an industrial society included developments in income maintenance, but as Heclo and Rimlinger stress, initiatives of this type are not automatic by-products.4 Rapid industrialization and urbanization created the new category of destitute employables and exacerbated the vulnerability of the dependent poor. However, on their own, these processes do not explain why the Canadian state decided to take action. In fact, its intervention may well reflect more the absence of an entrenched system of denominational charity in western Canada, than any industrial-urban imperative. In similar fashion, the increased revenues accruing from the sporadic periods of economic prosperity during the interwar years afforded no guarantee that governments would use their newly acquired surpluses to finance welfare innovations. Although rapid economic growth had similar demographic consequences in Canada as elsewhere, the Canadian case is distinctive because i t was triggered more by a boom in the agricultural sector than by technological change in industry. The wheat boom in the first two decades of this century had far-reaching consequences for developments in income maintenance because i t altered the group pattern of society by creating, among other things, a new power structure of organized farmers in western Canada. These sectional i n te res ts , together with the i r rural counterparts in other provinces, vied with business and labour organizations for a posi t ion of dominance throughout the interwar per iod. But the impl icat ions of t h i s con f l i c t are overlooked by Canadian scholars engaged in social pol icy research, who tend to confine the i r analyses to struggles waged within the boundaries of the r i s ing industr ia l -urban sector . For example, both Bryden and Guest discount the reaction of farmers in the i r analyses of forces res is t ing interwar developments in income maintenance. 5 Authors of comparative and other s ingle-nat ion studies of socia l pol icy innovations also tend to relegate the rural sector to the proverbial scrap heap of h istory and in so doing they overlook a potent ia l ly formidable source of opposition to the cause of c o l l e c t i v i s m . 6 Compared with socio-economic fac to rs , cu l tura l determinants had a more d i rec t impact upon shaping the timing and content of the various means-tested measures. World War I and the Great Depression accelerated rather than created the sh i f t s in mass at t i tudes towards the causes of poverty and the role of the state in ameliorating d i s t r ess . The reform s p i r i t , developing in the f i r s t decades of th i s century, in tens i f i ed during the war years part ly as a result of the expansion of government involvement into community a f f a i r s . The return of veterans, though, was more of a cata lyst for developments in publ ic wel fare, because the i r claims for special treatment overcame conventional objections to income support, as the case studies on Ottawa's or ig ina l r e l i e f po l i cy , war veterans' allowances and pensions for the b l ind revea l . Their re-establishment a lso temporarily removed the ex is t ing soc io-cu l tura l l im i t s on revenues, an ef fect pinpointed by Peacock and Wiseman (1967), by allowing both the federal government and new p ra i r i e provinces to introduce income taxes, a means of f inancing innovations. Of the two major slumps during the interwar years, the Great Depression i s often ident i f ied as the peace time t r igger for sh i f t s in .35.5. mass opinion because the unprecedented leve ls of unemployment and corresponding dependency increased awareness that the i r causes resided in the socio-economic structure and made the idea of publ ic welfare more acceptable. However, in the case of publ ic assistance prov is ion, i t s impact was minimized by the fact that the bulk of innovations were in place before mass dependency reached c r i s i s proport ions. Despite the fact that Canadians became more receptive to the idea of state involvement, the persistence of t rad i t iona l at t i tudes towards the causes of poverty and i t s treatment well into the 1930s was an important const ra in t . Among churchgoers an in f luen t ia l minority of Protestants continued to view indigence as a sign of indiv idual moral f a i l u re rather than being involuntary, and to prefer pr ivate over publ ic c h a r i t y ; 7 and the Cathol ic clergy never became reconci led to the idea of state intervention during the interwar years, as the i r reaction to r e l i e f land settlement and old age pensions i l l u s t r a t e s . The crusaders of ind iv idual ism, the dominant secular social value, were equally hos t i le to the idea of state-f inanced a i d , perceiving i t as a device for encouraging pauperism and a threat to cherished values, espec ia l ly t h r i f t . Their sentiments coalesced in the shape of a taxpayers' resistance. Although the existence of widespread popular prejudice against taxation i s widely recognized as an obstacle in the case of Quebec, 8 i t s importance as a constraint in English Canada i s not appreciated by a l l social h i s t o r i a n s . 9 Its presence confirms the hypothesis of Bird (1970) that measures involv ing wholesale state f inancing are l i k e l y to provoke resistance from taxpayers. The prevai l ing i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c ethos contained subt le , perceived d i s t i nc t i ons concerning the worthiness of the various categories of both the new and old poor. Among dest i tute employables, World War I veterans i n i t i a l l y avoided the stigma of pauperism owing to the i r pa t r io t i c serv ice , but once they 356 became absorbed into the c i v i l i a n labour force they became vict ims of the same prejudice that branded the able-bodied as work-shy and ' l o a f e r s . ' Even within the category of phy ica l ly f i t c i v i l i a n s , d is t inc t ions on the 'deserving' spectrum were made between married residents with dependents and unmarried unemployed men, with non-resident s ingle men qual i fy ing for the dubious status of ' leas t deserv ing. ' Although the p l ight of the t rad i t iona l dependent poor e l i c i t e d more sympathy, only those categories where poverty was c lear l y due to misfortune, such as widows with dependent chi ldren and wives of inmates of mental hosp i ta ls , qua l i f i ed for the 'deserving' l a b e l . Below them on the hierarchy were the industr ious e lde r l y , with the unemployable b l ind t r a i l i n g fa r behind owing to the perceived causes of t he i r a f f l i c t i o n . S imi lar d is t inc t ions were made even among the new dependent group, with physical ly handicapped veterans outranking the i r 'burnt-out ' comrades suffer ing from new, psychological d isorders. The Canadian cu l tura l context though, was not immune to outside in f luences. Foreign precedents exerted more impact upon the development of statutory benefi ts than upon emergency a i d , a f inding confirming the proposit ion of Woodsworth (1977) that the internat ional d i f fus ion of ideas shapes the content of socia l benefit programs. Although developments in a var iety of countries were fol lowed, the American and B r i t i s h experiences at t racted most attent ion with the l a t t e r acting as more of a role model than the neighbouring federat ion, except in the case of the mothers' pensions movement. The flow of ideas, however, d id not only cross national boundaries. Domestic precedents a lso exerted both a pos i t ive and negative inf luence. Ottawa's f i r s t major statutory i n i t i a t i v e acted as an important precedent for the extension of means-tested benefits to prematurely sen i le veterans and the 357 unemployable b l i nd . In contrast , the pioneering provincial mothers' pensions schemes acted as constraints once the movement los t momentum, by not only deterr ing eastern Premiers from sponsoring s imi la r p lans, but also blocking fu ture, purely provincial welfare innovations. Like cu l tura l fac to rs , the ins t i tu t iona l framework dec is ive ly shaped the interwar p o l i t i c s of Canadian welfare by acting as a f i l t e r for the issues and channell ing the behaviour of the p o l i t i c a l actors. In contrast to the f indings of Leman concerning the p o l i t i c s of Canadian welfare reform during the 1970s, the evidence from th is study suggests that the structure of p o l i t i c a l i ns t i t u t i ons fostered " induct ive" rather than "deductive" policymaking in the sense that new ideas had to f ight t he i r way to the top rather than being imposed from above. This di f ference in s ty le i s revealed most c lea r l y in the pre-parl iamentary phase. In the interwar period the statutory innovations were products of vigorous con f l i c t s and bargaining among interest groups and cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s , whereas in the 1970s reform proposals were formulated in high- level negotiations between competing bureaucrats and federal and provinc ia l author i t ies.10 Two features of the interwar s t ructure, the novelty of competi t ive, mass-based party p o l i t i c s and the s impler , grassroots-type administ rat ion, encouraged c loser contact between pr ivate c i t i zens and p o l i t i c a l e l i t e s . Moreover, the special ba r r i e r s , imposed by the contemporary framework of federa l -prov inc ia l p o l i t i c s , to par t ic ipat ion by societa l actors were only beginning to be erected between the wars. Consequently, federal and prov inc ia l cabinet po l i t i c i ans were more exposed to external p o l i t i c a l pressures than t he i r postwar successors and were deprived of the re la t i ve luxury of se t t l i ng the i r disputes in the iso lated conclaves of executive federal ism. 358 The formal d iv i s ion of l e g i s l a t i v e powers l a i d the groundwork for the ent i re development of the pattern of categoric publ ic assistance. S p e c i f i c a l l y , provinc ia l l e g i s l a t i v e authori ty and federal j u r i sd i c t i on over veterans, combined with Ottawa's residual and spending powers, were the relevant terms. The 1867 const i tu t ion and a ser ies of j ud i c i a l decisions iden t i f i ed the provincial governments as the 'centres of g rav i t y ' for welfare innovations, but i t was Ottawa's assigned j u r i sd i c t i on over veterans and i t s power to make laws fo r "peace, order and good government" that prompted the or ig ina l pol icy of intervent ion to aid dest i tute employables. Ottawa's control over the major sources of taxat ion paved the way for i t s d i rec t involvement in statutory schemes for c i v i l i a n s through the mechanism of cost -shar ing. The dual targets of inf luence inherent in the federal structure of government served to fragment the ef for ts of advocates rather than to f a c i l i t a t e the introduction of welfare innovations. For example, during the f i r s t phase of the mothers' pensions movement the decisions of nat ional ly-organized women volunteers and trade unionists to lobby in the federal capi ta l retarded the progress of the cause; and in the ear ly struggle fo r o ld age pensions, organized labour was beset by s im i l a r uncertainty concerning the choice of target . Their confusion confirms the observation made by Simeon that demands of c i t i zens do not necessar i ly respect const i tut ional l i nes of a u t h o r i t y , H and was understandable given the fact that the idea of state intervention in the f i e l d of publ ic welfare was then very novel . More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , the presence of an a l ternat ive target provided the senior leve ls of government with the opportunity to develop the pract ice of buck-passing to a f ine art during the interwar years. This "form of s ta tecraf t " d id not develop simply because "the makers of the Consti tut ion fa i l ed to ant ic ipate that socia l reforms would require some special arrangements for 35 9-cooperative working."12 instead, i t s root cause lay in the mutual unwill ingness of the senior leve ls of government to finance on t he i r own the" development of the welfare s ta te . This calculus rather than the of ten-c i ted imbalance between the i r l e g i s l a t i v e powers and f inanc ia l capacity was the major factor condit ioning the i r con f l i c t s - at least unt i l the Depression decade. Despite the i r const i tu t ional power and surplus revenues, the provinces pers is tent ly refused in the 1920s to sponsor any new measures for the c i v i l i a n jobless outside the ordinary r e l i e f system, and the i r reluctance ref lected concerns about the mobi l i ty of capi ta l and labour, as Banting (1982) and Birch (1955) foresaw. Although Ottawa adopted a more posi t ive approach to unemployment and dependency, i t s choice of the cost-sharing formula and stress on the emergency character of a id indicated i t s determination to avoid being saddled with the ent i re cost of maintaining dest i tute wage-earners, a vow broken only in the case of t rans ien ts . The pract ice of col laborat ion a lso marked the major i n i t i a t i v e in statutory benef i ts . As old age pensions involved unprecedented and inde f in i te expenditures, the idea of a purely federal plan was never ser iously entertained. Instead, condit ional grants were offered as inducements to the provinces, which voiced the i r resentment by delaying implementation of Ottawa's cost ly plan for over a decade. Their reaction was conditioned by the i r own f inanc ia l experience with mothers' pensions, experiments that e f fec t i ve ly blocked the development of the welfare state as a purely provincial enterpr ise. Unlike the federal s t ructure, the colonia l pol icy inheritance exerted a very d i rect impact on the substance of the measures. The emergency character and re la t i ve low cost of poor r e l i e f , the only form of publ ic a id avai lable at the onset of the a c t i v i s t e ra , acted as a consistent frame of reference for policymakers. These features became the hallmarks of state aid for dest i tute employables in the interwar period. The pol icy inheri tance was equally v i s i b l e in the statutory schemes adopted, which represented spec ia l ized forms of public assis tance. But as Leman points out, the content of new proposals also shapes the terms of p o l i t i c a l deba te . 1 3 While a number of options were discussed and discarded, the then novel idea of cash payments was incorporated into the or ig ina l federal i n i t i a t i v e s for dest i tute employables and a l l the statutory programs, a s ign i f i can t development in foster ing the trend towards granting state aid as 'o f r i gh t , not cha r i t y . ' Another i ns t i t u t i ona l var iab le , the advent of competi t ive, mass-based p o l i t i c s was an important t r igger for developments in income maintenance, pa r t i cu la r l y of the statutory k ind. The decisions of the leaders of the t rad i t i ona l major part ies to finance mothers' pensions and old age pensions were c l ea r l y designed to at t ract the s izeable new voting blocs of women and urban labourers, which mainly represented nontaxpayers. But counteracting the trend towards expansion of welfare spending during the 1920s was the entry into party p o l i t i c s of organized farmers, to be discussed below. Although the Great Depression created another period of p o l i t i c a l uncertainty, the emergence of new, western protest movements in the 1935 federal e lect ion had minimal consequences for the po l i c ies examined here, because i t developed af ter the bulk of innovations were in place. Besides the introduction of universal suf f rage, World War I a lso prompted a rapid increase in the s ize of the federal bureaucracy. The expansion of the publ ic sector during the war years involved, among other things,, the establishment of separate departments for veterans and health that were merged in 1928. The evidence of th i s study, however, suggests that the creation of these new structures did not at t ract a core of reform-minded bureaucrats comparable to the personnel entering the public service af ter World War I I . 361 Moreover, a c t i v i s t c i v i l servants in the older Department of Labour departed in 1924 as a resul t of the regime of economy introduced during Prime Minister King's f i r s t term of o f f i c e . The wartime expansion of a c t i v i t i e s of government, though, had a greater impact upon the p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y of interest groups. It acted as an incent ive in the case of organized labour and c l i en t groups whose e f fo r ts were directed towards ever- increasing government in tervent ion, whereas i t provoked a backlash among the dominant economic in terests that was to reverberate throughout the interwar years. Like the environmental fac to rs , the act ive part ic ipants in the p o l i t i c s of Canadian welfare exerted varying degrees of in f luence. But, as ant ic ipated, t he i r co l l ec t i ve contr ibut ion was far greater for they performed the cruc ia l tasks of def in ing the socia l problems and deciding the timing and content of the income-support measures. Concerning societal ac tors , m i l i t an t workers were overshadowed by in terest groups. Out of the eight case s tud ies, only two s a t i s f i e d the prerequisi tes of the socia l control model, and even then the or ig inal po l icy of federal intervention was blurred by intense group pressure. Both involved i n i t i a t i v e s for dest i tute employables, a f ind ing that confirms that the d i s t i nc t i on made by Rein (1971) concerning the employabi 1 i t y of the c l i e n t group i s , indeed, c r i t i c a l in the development of income support. This benchmark, though, i s often overlooked by proponents of the socia l control model who tend to ident i fy working-class mi l i tancy rather than in terest group pressure as the e f fec t ive spur fo r a l l welfare innovations. Far from confirming t he i r sweeping genera l iza t ion, t h i s study indicates that the l i t e r a r y competition between socia l control and group p o l i t i c s i s a non-contest, as the welfare state i s a product of both. The evidence from the case studies on Ottawa's i n i t i a l sponsorship of emergency a id and i t s r e l i e f camps pol icy indicates that in s i tuat ions of 362 widespread discontent the agi tat ion of working-class mi l i tan ts was an ef fect ive spur to extract ing concessions from the decision makers. But, the i r f indings also suggest that th is category of actors i s imprecise, even though i t encompasses two types of "objects" of control i den t i f i ed in the social po l icy l i t e r a t u r e , v i z . , rad ica ls in the organized labour movement and mobil ized unemployed workers. Instead, the e f fec t ive ac tors , i . e . , those perceived to pose the greatest threat to establ ished order, possessed special charac te r is t i cs that set them apart from other segments of the working c l a s s . In the context of postwar unrest, newly returned veterans were perceived as the most dangerous because they were trained k i l l e r s ; and in the midst of the Great Depression s i ng le , homeless men were singled out because of t he i r l i f e s t y l e , propensity fo r violence and suscep t ib i l i t y to revolutionary propaganda. In sharp contrast , other groups including 'burnt-out' veterans and fami l ies with male and female breadwinners posed no such threat to the socia l order. The evidence sheds l i g h t as well on the ident i ty of the powerholders by establ ish ing that the reaction of cabinet po l i t i c i ans to the perceived threat of revolut ion was the cruc ia l st imulus. Concerning the i r motives, fear of revolut ion overshadowed electora l ca lcu la t ions , thus confirming the proposit ions of most social control theor is ts over those of Piven and Cloward (1971). Relat ive to the l imi ted influence of socia l control p o l i t i c s , in terest group power was a much more decis ive fo rce , dominating a l l the agi tat ions except the struggle for r e l i e f camps. Among economic interest groups, only organized labour, pa r t i cu la r l y i t s moderate arm, played a consistent advocacy ro le . However, i t s championship of the cause of old age pensions stands out as a s ingular achievement in the interwar p o l i t i c s of Canadian wel fare, an accomplishment that has formed the basis of the exaggerated claim that the 363 Canadian labour movement pioneered the welfare state. With regard to the other movements for statutory benefits, trade unionists qualify as supporters rather than effective advocates. They played an equally secondary role in developing emergency aid for destitute employables, because unskilled labour was not perceived as part of their potential membership and their lobbying efforts focused upon securing insurance against unemployment. Among the dominant economic interests, organized farmers qualify as the arch opponents of the cause of collectivism. Disturbed about rural depopulation from the turn of the century onwards, and their own declining pol i t ical influence vis-a-vis urban-dwellers, their decision to move beyond orthodox pressure group act iv i ty into the area of party pol i t ics had significant consequences. Their capture of provincial governments in Ontario and the prairie provinces in the immediate postwar period and their displacement of the Conservatives as the second largest group in the federal House after the 1921 election gave them privileged positions in the governmental decision making process to block developments in emergency state aid during the 1920s, and to delay the introduction of public pensions for the elderly. Their new-found pol i t ical influence was enhanced by their concentration in the developing agricultural frontier which counteracted the challenge posed by the emerging industrial sector. Even when western settlement and the growth of wheat exports came to an abrupt end at the end of the decade, farmers' control of the governments of the prair ie provinces ensured that their individual ist ic and conservative f iscal values had effective representation in the pol i t ical system. But the Canadian Progressive movement is not generally depicted as representing a reactionary force. On the contrary, i ts t ies with the general reform movement are often stressed* 4 and Progressives are usually credited with advancing the developoment of mass democracy by promoting the cause of women's 364 suffrage and other electoral reforms designed to enhance the inf luence of the ordinary voter. The implementation of these reforms, though, required minimal publ ic expenditure in contrast to developments in income maintenance that threatened the i r pocketbooks as well as the i r i n d i v i d u a l i s t i c values. The farmers' h o s t i l i t y to state-f inanced i n i t i a t i v e s in income support were shared by Canadian businessmen. The l a t t e r voiced the i r opposition by sponsoring taxpayers' revol ts against federal and provincial 'extravagance' as well as v ia the i r spokesmen in the federal cabinet. Cap i ta l , however, was not as consistent a veto group as agr icu l tu re , as the case study on r e l i e f land settlement reveals . Although th i s example of t he i r advocacy ro le i s not invest igated by Finkel (1979), i t reinforces his own f inding concerning the i r behaviour in the 1930s when they pressed for the adoption of unemployment insurance and other reforms. In th i s respect, the conduct of Canadian corporate in terests conforms to that of t he i r Austral ian counterparts in the period immediately p r io r to World War I.15 Unlike economic in terest groups, Canadian char i t i es during the interwar period were not prominent group actors . Their representatives entered the p o l i t i c a l arena in only one instance, the mothers' pensions movement, to promote the cause of t he i r c l i e n t s . This case study reveals that the rapid industr ia l -urban growth during the f i r s t two decades of th i s century created a d i v i s i on between the new, non-sectarian agencies and the estab l ished, denominational c h a r i t i e s , a cleavage overlooked by previous invest igators of the mothers' pensions movement. While pub l i c -sp i r i t ed female volunteers and employees of both pr ivate and publ ic welfare agencies worked in tandem to secure the adoption of province-wide pensions, they did not display the same degree of concern for other categories of the dependent poor. Their minimal par t i c ipa t ion in subsequent movements can be explained part ly by the fact that 365 once the goal of equal suffrage was achieved, most maternal feminists were absorbed into the t rad i t iona l par t ies . In s im i la r fashion, once the status of socia l workers increased, t he i r conservatism came to the fore. For example, Charlotte Whitton, Canada's most well-known socia l worker of the t ime, was a "highly cost-conscious" advocate, as shown in her report to Prime Minister Bennett that precipi tated wholesale federal sponsorship of r e l i e f camps. Relat ive to c h a r i t i e s , select c l i en t groups played a more creat ive role in promoting developments in income maintenance. As shown above, mi l i tan t unemployed workers were e f fec t ive in extract ing two welfare concessions. By cont ras t , moderate segments of the c i v i l i a n jobless were less successfu l , as the case of Ottawa's withdrawal reveals. But t h i s conclusion needs to be tempered by the fact that the i r a c t i v i t i e s remain largely unrecorded. Among the various categories of the dependent poor, c l i en t groups representing veterans and b l ind adults successfu l ly promoted the i r own causes for statutory a i d , with sole-support mothers and the e lder ly qua l i fy ing as spectators. The non-part ic ipat ion of the l a t t e r two groups can be explained part ly by the fact that they both represented more s izeable segments of the populat ion, so that once mass enfranchisement was introduced they were perceived by policymakers to be s ign i f i can t voting blocs which could be attracted by the issue of publ ic pensions. Furthermore, the par t ic ipat ion of both needy mothers and dest i tute aged was inh ib i ted by cul tura l constraints re la t ing to the i r gender and advanced age, respect ive ly . Veterans qua l i f i ed as the more successful c l i en t group because, unl ike the c i v i l i a n b l i nd , they succeeded in promoting two innovations in categoric publ ic ass is tance. The intense pressure exerted by the new ex-so ld ie rs ' movement in the immediate postwar period was as e f fec t ive in t r igger ing federal involvement with dest i tu te employables as the mi l i tancy of t he i r d isaf fected comrades. Their subsequent demands for the extension of the old age pensions scheme to cover 'burnt out ' cases were even more e f fec t i ve because, in addit ion to sponsoring the i r cause, the new Legion shaped the content of the po l i cy , as the case study on war veterans' allowances reveals. Like the i r Austral ian and B r i t i s h counterparts,16 the Canadian veterans' effect iveness as a pressure group derived from the prest ige, not the s i z e , of t he i r membership. Their pa t r i o t i c connections combined with the i r moderation and non-partisanship ensured general sympathy among both the publ ic and federal l e g i s l a t o r s . The re la t i ve lack of h o s t i l i t y and a c lea r l y i den t i f i ab le federal target allowed the leaders of the GWVA, who had d i rect access to the cabinet , and i t s successor, the Legion, to concentrate t he i r energies upon lobbying forces inside government, where the only real source of opposition ex is ted . Unlike veterans, b l ind c i v i l i a n s lacked both s ize and s ta tus. They were forced to concentrate t he i r i n i t i a l energies upon converting others outside Parliament to the i r cause, a process prolonged mainly by the i r own internal d i v i s i o n s . As chapter 10 reveals , the internal con f l i c t s between the CFB and CNIB were exacerbated by the r i va l r y between the i r leaders, a c lash which i l l u s t r a t e s the role played by personal i ty in p o l i t i c s . More than any other set of group actors , the b l i nd ' s effect iveness as a pressure group depended upon un i ty , and once th i s was achieved the i r campaign gained momentum. But the eventual success of t he i r concerted campaign was dependent upon persuading the decision-makers that the i r claims were d i s t i nc t from other, larger categories of the c i v i l i a n disabled population. In addit ion to c l i en t groups, urban municipal po l i t i c i ans also benefited d i r ec t l y from interwar developments in income maintenance. Their act ive support of the e f fo r ts of societa l advocates in most campaigns was motivated by a mixture of cost and electoral considerat ions. C iv i c po l i t i c i ans were eager to .16.7 of f load the i r r e l i e f costs upon the senior leve ls of government in order to sa t i s fy the desires of t he i r ratepaying const i tuents. Their object ive during the interwar years was "to give as l i t t l e as possible and encourage even l e s s . " ! 7 As the case study on r e l i e f land settlement ind ica tes , i t s achievement, on occasion, depended upon using organized areas in rural Canada as the dumping grounds for cases of dependency. A small band of federal and provincial l eg is la to rs also promoted the cause of co l lec t i v i sm during the interwar years. Their par t ic ipa t ion at the prov inc ia l level was most v i s i b l e in the case study on the mothers' pensions movement, with reform-minded l i b e r a l s pressing the case for province-wide pensions and labour representatives prec ip i ta t ing the entry of Ontario. Inside the Canadian Parliament, MPs drawn from a l l pa r t i es , with the notable exception of the Progressives, pressed the case fo r governmental ac t ion . Their involvement was prompted by a var iety of motives, including electoral and in terest group pressures, humanitarianism and party commitments. Concerning the l a t t e r , the t i ny Labour group was the f i r s t to incorporate state-f inanced income maintenance into i t s party po l i c y , with the L ibera ls and Conservatives fol lowing i t s example in 1919 and 1927^ respect ive ly . The par t ic ipat ion of cer ta in backbenchers, however, ref lected the influence of p o l i t i c a l ideology before socia l insurance became the o f f i c i a l po l icy of t he i r par t ies . For example, W.F. C a r r o l l , G.W. Kyte and E.M. Macdonald, the Liberal champions of o ld age pensions in the prewar per iod, voiced ideas of the new reform l i be ra l i sm , a f inding challenging Bryden's speculation that the i r advocacy was not ideo log ica l l y motivated.18 A lso , T.L. Church's advocacy of publ ic pensions ref lected the Tory value of co l l ec t i v i sm, a motive overlooked by Neatby, who describes Church as "not an orthodox Conservative" but "an independent in f ac t , i f not name."19 36.8 Inside government, cabinet po l i t i c i ans overshadowed bureaucrats as the key players in the p o l i t i c s of welfare. Despite t he i r d i f ferent party labels and const i tuenc ies, provincial and federal cabinet po l i t i c i ans shared the same conservative f i s ca l at t i tudes that acted as powerful constraints on Canadian welfare state development. As the case studies in Parts II and III document, cost considerations shaped the bulk of the i r decisions to res is t demands for ac t ion . Furthermore, on at least three occasions - r e l i e f camps po l i cy , r e l i e f land settlement and mothers' pensions - t he i r decisions to sponsor innovations were motivated by a desire to achieve economy, a motive not commonly iden t i f i ed as spurring welfare spending. While Brecher (1957) recognizes that the conservative f i s c a l orthodoxy of the interwar years was a powerful impedimentjto national innovations in publ ic wel fare, i t s equally powerful role in blocking regional experiments has not been stressed in the secondary l i t e r a t u r e . Yet, on the basis of the evidence of th is study, one might go so far as to argue that the system of condit ional grants- in-a id evolved by Ottawa to coerce the provinces into action concerning the job less , the aged and the bl ind was only necessary, because provincial Premiers f e l t bound by pledges of economy to res i s t demands for expansion of r e l i e f beyond the minimum required to curb unrest and prevent s tarvat ion. As the bulk of the developments were sponsored by Ottawa, members of the federal cabinet played the pre-eminent role in shaping them. Among these ac tors , successive Prime Ministers were the most i n f l uen t ia l decisionmakers, a f ind ing confirmed by Redekop (1978) in his study of a la ter period of Canadian socia l pol icy-making. Besides fear of revo lut ion, the i r decisions to take act ion also ref lected electoral ca lcu lat ions and ideological b e l i e f s . Of the two, the former were much more i n f l u e n t i a l , as the case studies on old age 3£9_ pensions, war veterans' allowances and pensions for the bl ind reveal . In th is respect, the evidence lends support to the contention of Trebilcock (1982) and other publ ic choice theor is ts that vote maximization i s "the proximate object ive" of p o l i t i c i a n s . However, t he i r f a i l u re to appreciate that on occasion fear of revo lut ion, ideological or ientat ion and cost considerations also shaped decisions to intervene reduces the effect iveness of t he i r decision making models. Compared with cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s , c i v i l servants played a re la t i ve l y minor ro le in the interwar p o l i t i c s of Canadian welfare. The evidence i s not conc lus ive, because the l im i t s of the study precluded review of provincial archival mater ia l . Nonetheless, i t does suggest that federal bureaucrats refrained from playing a creat ive ro le , except in the case of r e l i e f land settlement. Their i nac t i v i t y concerning statutory developments can be explained in part by the fact that senior administrators shared the same f i s c a l predisposi t ions and perceptions concerning c l i en t groups as the i r p o l i t i c a l super iors. Leman suggests that the parliamentary system also mi l i ta tes against bureaucratic act iv ism by encouraging deference among Canadian c i v i l servants.20 These o f f i c i a l s were more act ive in the draf t ing stage, shaping the content of the two plans extending old age pensions, a f ind ing suggesting that bureaucratic involvement i s more pronounced in socia l pol icy developments than innovations. Although long-forgotten, the struggles waged by the various p o l i t i c a l actors during the 1916-37 period remain s i gn i f i can t . They resulted in the construct ion of the f i r s t milestones along Canada's road to comprehensive income secur i ty . The establishment of these landmarks was a product of sporadic working-class mi l i tancy ; competing pressures from economic interest groups, c h a r i t i e s , se lect c l i en t groups and c i v i c p o l i t i c i a n s ; the ef for ts of a few 37-0., reform-minded l e g i s l a t o r s ; and cabinet p o l i t i c i a n s ' fear of revo lut ion, e lectora l ca l cu la t i ons , f i s ca l conservatism and ideological b e l i e f s . During t he i r various con f l i c t s these Canadians were influenced by the t r a i l s blazed by other s o c i e t i e s , espec ia l ly the B r i t i s h , the f i r s t indus t r ia l i zed people. But t he i r choices were also conditioned by indigenous socio-economic, cu l tura l and ins t i t u t i ona l features that shed l i gh t on the p o l i t i c s of the welfare s ta te . FOOTNOTES Chapter 1 *This term i s selected over the contemporary nomenclature of ' soc ia l ass is tance' and i t s co l loqu ia l equivalent 'wel fare' because i t s usage was standard in the period under review and i t stresses state involvement. For a discussion of the evolut ion of th is technique in the Canadian context, see Canadian Welfare Counc i l , Publ ic Welfare D i v i s i o n , Publ ic Assistance in Canada, Ottawa, 1952. ^Social insurance and categoric publ ic assistance appeared at the provincia l level in the respective guises of workmen's compensation (1914-) and mothers' pensions (1916-)- An embryonic form of demogrants was v i s i b l e in the federal scheme of war d i s a b i l i t y pensions launched in 1916. 3 J . R . Hay, The Origins of the Liberal Welfare Reforms, 1906-1914 (London: Macmil lan, 1975), p. 12. 4 G . P . Glazebrook, L i fe in Ontario: A Social History (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 282. 5 For example, Finkel contends that the debate over unemployment insurance and other economic reforms during the 1930s l a i d "[t]he groundwork for the Canadian t rans i t ion to the welfare s t a t e . . . . " (Alv in F i n k e l , Business and Social Reform in the Th i r t i es [Toronto: James Lorimer & Co . , 1979J, p. Y7J Mclnnis, an invest igator of family allowances, i den t i f i es the take-off point for developments in income secur i ty even la te r as dating from 1943 onwards. (Simon Mclnnis, "Canadian Social Po l icy Studies: A C lass i f i ca to ry Exerc ise , " paper prepared for the 49th annual meeting of the Canadian P o l i t i c a l Science Assoc ia t ion , Freder ic ton, N.B., June 1977, pp. 6, 31, n.3.) The f i r s t Deputy Minister of the federal Department of Health and Welfare also suggests that the "great" income-maintenance programs introduced during the 1940s and 1950s represented a "brand new" pat tern. (George F. Davidson, "Social Welfare in Canada, 1930-1955," in Social Welfare and the Preservation of Human Values, ed. Wil l iam G. Dixon [Vancouver: J .M. Dent & Sons, 1957J, pp. 28-29.) ^Comparative expenditure f igures for 1972 show that publ ic assistance comprised 19.6% of to ta l income maintenance expenditure in Canada, the highest proportion of the 16 nations surveyed. Figures c i ted in Kei th A. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Kingston: McGil 1-Queen's Universi ty Press, 1982), p. 35, tab le 14. 7Ronald Mendelsohn, Social Securi ty in the B r i t i s h Commonwealth: Great B r i t a i n , Canada, AustraliaT New Zealand (London: Athlone Press , 1954), p. 72. 8 j . Stefan Dupre, Intergovernmental Finance in Ontar io: A Prov inc ia l -Local Perspective (Toronto: Queen's P r i n te r , 1968), p. 18. 371 372 %ee Hugh H. Wolfenden, The Real Meaning of Social Insurance: Its Present Status and Tendencies (Toronto: Macmillan, 1932); Jacob L. Cohen, Mothers' Allowance Legis la t ion in Canada: A Leg is la t ive Review and Analysis with a proposed "Standard Act" (Toronto: Macmillan, 1927); and Margaret K. Strong, Publ ic Welfare Administration in Canada (Chicago: Universi ty of Chicago Press, 1930), respect ive ly . 1 0 See Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-making in Canada (Montreal: McGi 11-Queen's Universi ty Press, 1974), p. 6; and Richard Simeon, "Studying Publ ic P o l i c y , " Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science, 9 (December 1976):549. Uphoebe Hall et a l . , Change, Choice and Conf l i c t in Social Po l icy (London: Heinemann, 1975), p. 17^ 1 2 Haro ld L. Wilensky, The Welfare State and Equal i ty : Structural and Ideological Roots of Publ ic Expenditure (Berkeley: Universi ty of Ca l i fo rn ia Press, 1975), p. 47. 13Their ongoing debate and research f indings are ably summarized in Thomas R. Dye and V i rg in ia Grey, eds . , The Determinants of Publ ic Pol icy (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Conway, 1980), Pt . I. ^W.M. Chandler, "Canadian Social ism and Pol icy Impact," Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science 10 (December 1977):771-3, 776. 1 5 Gaston V. Rimlinger, Welfare Po l icy and Indust r ia l i za t ion in Europe, America and Russia (Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1971), p. 334. 1 6 M . El izabeth Wallace, "The Origin of the Social Welfare State in Canada, 1867-1900," Canadian Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science 16 (August 1950):384. i7Concerning i t s impact in Canada, see Davidson, "Social Welfare," p. 20; Mendelsohn, Social Secur i ty , p. 68; and Jack McLeod, "Post Cap i ta l i s t Society , " in Agenda 1970: Proposals for a Creative P o l i t i c s , ed. Trevor Lloyd and J . McLeod (Toronto: Univers i ty of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 49. Re the U .S .A . , see Charles E. G i l be r t , "Welfare Po l i c y , " in Po l i c ies and Policymaking, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), p. 122. 18David E. Woodsworth, Social Securi ty and National Po l i c y : Sweden, Yugoslavia, Japan (Montreal: McGi11-Queen1s Univers i ty Press, 1977), p. 7. 19See Kathleen Herman, "The Emerging Welfare State: Changing Perspectives in Canadian Welfare Po l i c i es and Programmes," in Social Space: Canadian Perspect ives, ed. D.I. Davies and K. Herman (Toronto: New Press, 1971); and M. El izabeth Wallace, "The Changing Canadian State: A study of the Changing Conception of the State as revealed in Canadian Social Leg i s l a t i on , 1867-1948" (Ph.D. d i sse r ta t i on , Universi ty of Columbia, 1950). 20see Ronald Manzer, "Social Pol icy and P o l i t i c a l Paradigms," Canadian Publ ic Administration 24 (Winter 1981):641. 2 1 See Bryden, Old Age Pensions, p. 1; and Malcolm Taylor , Health Insurance and Canadian Publ ic Po l icy (Montreal: McGil 1-Queen's Universi ty Press, 19/8), p. 419. 22irving Brecher, Monetary and F isca l Thought and Pol icy in Canada, 1919-1939 (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1957), p. 62. 23Bryden, Old Age Pensions, p. 3 ^Chr is topher Leman, The Collapse of Welfare Reform: P o l i t i c a l I ns t i t u t i ons , Pol icy and the Poor in Canada and the United States (Cambridge: Massachusetts Inst i tu te of Technology Press, 1980), p. 173. 25Banting, Welfare State, p. 172. 2 6 J i l l Roe, e d . , Social Po l icy in Aus t ra l i a : Some Perspect ives, 1901-1975 (n.p. : Cassel l Aus t ra l ia L t d . , 1976), p. 4. 2 7 P . E . Trudeau, "The Pract ice and Theory of Federal ism," in Social Purpose for Canada,ed. Michael Ol iver (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 373-74. 28Banting, Welfare State, p. 174. OQ A.H. B i r c h , Federalism, Finance and Social Legis la t ion in Canada, Aus t ra l ia and the United States (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 239. 3 0 V i c t o r George and Paul Wi ld ing, Ideology and Social Welfare (London: Routledge & Kegan Pau l , 1976), p. 2. OI J i F o r a discussion of the various meanings of the concept of con t ro l , see Joan Higgins, "Socia l Control Theories of Social P o l i c y , " Journal of Social Po l icy 9 (January 1980):14-20. 32cited in V ic tor George, Social Securi ty and Society (London: Routledge & Kegan Pau l , 1973), p. 18. 33see Bentley S. G i l be r t , The Evolution of National Insurance in Great B r i t a i n : The Origins of the Welfare State (London: Joseph, 1966), p. 448; and Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the B r i t i s h Welfare State; A History of Social Po l icy Since the Industr ial Revolution (London: Macmillan student ed i t i on , imy, p. 224. 3 4 Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Publ ic Welfare (New York: Random House, 19/1), pp. 3 , 38-41. 3 5 H i g g i n s , "Socia l Control Theor ies," p. 20. 36Martin Rein, Social Po l i cy : Issues of Choice and Change (New York: Random House, 1970), p. 312. 3,74 3 7 T . J . Lowi, "American Business, Publ ic P o l i c y , Case Studies and P o l i t i c a l Theory," World P o l i t i c s 16 (July 1964):714. 3 8 S e e Hall et a l . , Change, Choice and C o n f l i c t , p. 92; and G i l b e r t , "Welfare Po l i c y , " p. 38. 3 9 Henry S. A l b i n s k i , Canadian and Austral ian P o l i t i c s in Comparative Perspective (New York: Oxford Universi ty Press, 19/3), p. 13. 4 0Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 102; and M.J. Trebilcock et a l . , The Choice of Governing Instrument, a study prepared fo r the Economic Council of Canada (Ottawa: Min is ter of Supply and Serv ices, 1982), p. 11. ^ R i c h a r d M. B i r d , The Growth of Government Spending in Canada, Canadian Tax Papers, no. 51 (Toronto: Canadian Tax Foundation, 1970), p. 126. 4? ^Samuel H. Beer, Modern B r i t i s h P o l i t i c s : A Study of Part ies and Pressure Groups (London: Faber & Faber, 19b9), p. 38y. 4 3 Ronald Mendelsohn, The Condition of the People! Social Welfare in Australia,1900-1975 (Sydney: George Al len & Unwin, 1979), p. 39. 4 4 John H. Redekop, "Soc ia l Po l i c y : The Role of the Governing Par ty , " and Max Saltsman, "Party P o l i t i c s and Social Po l i cy : The Party i n Opposit ion," in Canadian Social P o l i c y , ed. Shankar A. Yelaja (Waterloo, Ont.: Wilfred Laurier Universi ty Press, 1978), pp. 245, 263, respect ive ly . 4 5 S e e Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in P o l i t i c s : A Biography of J . S . Woodsworth (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1959), p. 220. 4 6 Trevor L l o y d , , " Introduct ion: Our Ideological Trad i t ion" in Lloyd and McLeod, Agenda 1970, p. 6. 4 7 Arno ld J . Heidenheimer et a l . , Comparative Publ ic P o l i c y ; The P o l i t i c s of Social Choice in Europe and America (New York: St. Mart in 's Press, 1975), pp. 273-74. 48Bi rd , Growth of Government Spending, p. 165. 4 9 Dav id Roberts, V ic tor ian Origins; of the B r i t i s h Welfare State (New Haven: Yale Universi ty Press, I960), p. 72; and Ul iver MacDonagh, A PafFJern of Government Growth 1800-1860: The Passenger Acts and Their Enforcement (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1961), p. 327. 5 0Hugh Heclo, Modern Social P o l i t i c s in B r i t a in and Sweden: From Re l ie f to Income Maintenance (New Haven: Yale Universi ty Press, 19/4), p. 304. 5 1 S e e Richard B. Splane, Social Welfare in Ontar io, 1791-1893: A Study of Publ ic Welfare Administration (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1965), p. 50; and Peter N. O l i ve r , GTTIoward Ferguson: Ontario Tory (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 54, respect ive ly . 3 J 7 5 ^Andrew Armitage, Social Welfare in Canada: Ideals and Rea l i t i es (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 19/6), p. 68; and Richard l i . Splane, "Social Policymaking in the Government of Canada: Ref lect ions of a Reformist Bureaucrat," in Ye la ja , Canadian Social Po l i cy , pp. 209-26. 5 3 H e c l o , Modern Social P o l i t i c s , p. 9. 54Hal l , Change, Choice and Con f l i c t , p. 19. Chapter 2 lRobert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, Canadian Century Ser ies , no. 14 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart L td , 1974; paperback e d . , 1978) p. 2. 2 I b i d . , pp. 83-86. 3Figures c i ted in Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Policy-making in Canada (Montreal: McGi 11-Queen1s Universi ty Press, 1974), p. 27. ^Between 1871 and 1901, the overal l growth had been less than 50% increasing from 3,700,000 to 5,400,000. Kathleen Herman, "The Emerging Welfare State: Changing Perspectives in Canadian Welfare Po l i c ies and Programs," in Social Space: Canadian Perspect ives, ed. D.I. Davies and K. Herman (Toronto: New Press, 19/1), p. 133. 5Brown and Cook, Canada 1867-1921, pp. 1-2. 6 l b i d . , p. 71. 7 M . El izabeth Wallace, "The Changing Canadian State: A Study of the Changing Conception of the State as revealed in Canadian Social Leg is la t ion , 1867-1948" (Ph.D. d i sse r t a t i on , Universi ty of Columbia, 1950), p. 64. 8john W. Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era* The F i r s t Century of Confederation, (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), p. 93. 9Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, p. 2. l^This sect ion of the paragraph i s based upon information in Stewart Crysdale, The Industr ia l Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada: A Survey of Changing Power Structures and Chr is t ian Social Ethics (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1961), pp. 9-1U. n Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, p. 2. 12Bryden, Old Age Pensions, pp. 10-11. 1 3 I b i d . , pp. 27-29. 376 Wallace, "Changing Canadian Sta te , " p. 54. 15n ennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: Universi ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1980), p. 4. ISprovince of Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Consti tut ional Problems (Quebec: Queen's P r in te r , 1956), v o l . 3 , bk. 1, p. 65. 17B .L. Vigod, "Ideology and Inst i tut ions in Quebec: The Publ ic Char i t ies Controversy, 1921-1926," Social History 11 (May 1978): 181. 18Attitudes of Protestant churches towards socia l reform in the 1870-1900 period are described in Wallace, "Changing Canadian State , " pp. 92-96. l^Crysdale, Industr ial Struggle, p. 16. ^ G u e s t , Emergence of Social Secur i ty , p. 4. 21Shankar A. Ye la ja , "What i s Social Pol icy? Its Assumptions, Def in i t ions and Uses," in Canadian Social Po l i c y , ed. S.A. Yelaja (Waterloo, Ont.: Wil fred Laurier Universi ty Press, 19/8), p. 8. 2 2 Trevor L loyd, " Introduct ion: Our Ideological T rad i t ion , " in Agenda 1970: Proposals for a Creative P o l i t i c s , ed. T. Lloyd and J . McLeod" (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1968), p. 5. 2 3 Gues t , Emergence of Social Secur i ty , p. 4. 24jin Roe, e d . , Social Pol icy in Aus t ra l i a : Some Perspect ives, 1901-1975 (n.p. : Cassel l Aus t ra l ia L t d . , 1976), pp. 3-4. 2 5 Wal lace , "Changing Canadian State , " pp. 60, 82, 89. 26Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, p. 25. 2 7Guest, Emergence of Social Secur i ty , pp. 27-29. Ames1 research i s also analyzed i n Terry Copp, The Anatomy of Poverty: The Condition of the Working Class in Montreal, 1897-1929 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974), chap. 1. 28Guest, Emergence of Social Secur i ty , p.32. 2 9Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, pp. 24-25. 30Guest, Emergence of Social Secur i ty , p. 33. 3 1 S e e i b i d . , pp. 1-2; and Richard B. Splane, Social Welfare in Ontar io, 1791-1893: A Study of Publ ic Welfare Administration (Toronto! Universi ty of loronto Press, 1965), pp. 41-42. 32Keith G. Banting, The Welfare State and Canadian Federalism (Kingston: McGi11-Queen's Univers i ty Press, 1982), p. 47. 3.77 3 3Splane suggests that this phraseology reflected the "o f f i c ia l l y expressed preference" of Upper Canada for institutional programs, and speculates that i f the authonrhad been from the Maritime Provinces, "one might have found some reference to responsibility for the poor...described in terms of persons in need...[not] inst i tut ions." Splane, Social Welfare in Ontario, pp. 41-42. 3 4 Guest, Emergence of Social Security, p. 7. 35Banting, Welfare State, p. 48. Guest, Emergence of Social Security, pp. 13-14. He suggests that the municipalities were to develop as the principal agencies. However, another scholar cites John A. Macdonald's hope that 'a time would come when private charity would relieve the governments of their existing commitments for public wel fare. . . . 1 Herman, "Emerging Welfare State," p. 133. 37|_loyd, "Introduction," p. 44. 38For details of the rel ief system in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia see James M. Whalen, "Social Welfare in New Brunswick, 1784-1900," Acadiensis, 2 (Autumn 1972):54-64;. and Stan Fitzner, The Development of Social Welfare in Nova Scotia (Halifax: Dept. of Public Welfare, 1967), passim. 3 9 Guest, Emergence of Social Security, p. 12. 40splane, Social Welfare in Ontario, p. 68. 4 1Province of Quebec, Report of the Royal Commission, pp. 65-71. See also Serge Mongeau, Evolution de L Assistance au Quebec (Montreal: Editions du Jour, 1967), passim; and Vigod, "Ideology and Institutions in Quebec," pp. 168-69. 42Guest, Emergence of Social Security, p. 14. For a discussion of the f i r s t efforts to develop a public welfare system in the c i t ies of Winnipeg, Edmonton and Vancouver, see John Taylor, "The Urban West, Public Welfare and a Theory of Urban Development," in Cities in the West, National Museum of Man, Mercury Series, History Division paper, no. 10, ed. A.R. McCormack and Ian Macpherson (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), pp. 293-305. 43See "A Historic Review of the Social Services of the Government of Bri t ish Columbia," Province of B.C., Annual Report of the Social Welfare Branch of the Department of Health and Welfare For the Year Ended 31 March 1948, pp. 8-9. 44Guest, Emergence of Social Security, p. 36. 4 5Ronald Mendelsohn, Social Security in the Bri t ish Commonwealth: Br i ta in, Canada, Austral ia, New Zealand (London: Athlone, 19b4), p. ». 4 6 R . MacGregor Dawson and W.F. Dawson, Democratic Government in Canada, 4th ed. revised by W.F. Dawson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 77. 378 4 7Herman, "Emerging Welfare State , " p. 137. 48Figures c i ted in M.C. Urquhart and K.A.H. Buckley, e d s . , H is tor ica l S t a t i s t i c s of Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1965), p. 621, ser ies W177-213. 49crysdale, Industr ial Struggle, p. 3. ^ B a n t i n g , Welfare State, p. 32. Kudrle and Marmor also ident i fy means-tested old age pensions as the " f i r s t social program." Robert T. Kudrle and Theodore R. Marmor, "The Development of Welfare States in North America," in The Development of Welfare States in Europe and America, ed. Peter Flora and Arnold J . Heidenheimer (New Brunswick, N . J . : Transaction Books, 1981), pp. 82-83, 108. Part 2 iLeonard C. Marsh, Canadians In and Out of Work: A Survey of Economic Classes and the i r Relat ion to the Labour Market (Toronto: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1940), pp. & / - S 8 . ^Census of Canada, 1931, v o l . VI , p. x i . 3 Marsh, Canadians In and Out of Work, p. 308. 4 H.M. Cassidy, Unemployment and Rel ie f in Ontario 1929-1932: A Survey and Report (Toronto: J .M. Uent & Sons, p. b l . 5 Marsh, Canadians In and Out of Work, p. 351. SConcerning r e l i e f expenditures made by the B r i t i s h Columbia and Alberta governments during the 1915 winter , see Canadian Annual Review, 1915, pp. 714, 700 respect ive ly . Re provinc ia l expenditure in Saskatchewan during the 1914 winter , see Province of Saskatchewan, Report of the Committee on Provi nci al-Muni c i pa1 Re!at i ons (Regina: King's P r in te r , 1951), p. 162. Premier Bracken referred to Manitoba's pioneering wartime i n i t i a t i v e in a press release. See Winnipeg Evening Tribune, 28 January 1930. Chapter 3 lStruthers a lso stresses the importance of th is i n i t i a t i v e in t r igger ing federal involvement with the c i v i l i a n job less . See James Struthers, 'No Fault of Their Own': Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941 (Toronto: Univers i ty of Tronto Press, 1983), pp. 22-29. 2james Struthers, "Prelude to Depression: The Federal Government and Unemployment, 1918-29," Canadian H is tor ica l Review 58 (September 1977):283. 379 3 I b i d . , p. 278. ^Robert England, Discharged: A Commentary on C i v i l Re-establishment of Veterans in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1943), p. 20. 5Minutes of Evidence, Special Committee on So ld ie rs ' C i v i l Re-establishment, Canada, House of Commons (HC) Journals, 2nd s e s s . , 1919, app. No. 1, p. 331. ^Struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 283. 7 "CPF Regulat ions," 28 July 1919, p. 1, Ottawa, Publ ic Archives of Canada (PAC), Department of Veterans' A f fa i r s F i l e s , Record Group (RG) 38, v o l . 154: Pa t r i o t i c Funds for Assistance of Veterans, v o l . 1 (May-July 1919). 8 St ru the rs , "Prelude to Depression," p. 282. ^Robert E. A n k l i , The Canadian Depression of 1920-21, Department of Economics discussion papers noT 74-11 (Guelph, Ont.: Univers i ty of Guelph, 1974), p. 4. 10p o r example, in A lbe r ta , the pr ices of agr icu l tu ra l commodities f e l l by 42% while prices of other goods and services purchased by farmers in Western Canada f e l l by only 15%. Er ic J . Hanson, Local Government in Alberta (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1956), p. 34. ^Memo. to M in is te r , 30 December 1921, PAC, Department of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9A. 1 2 See B.L. Vigod, "Ideology and Ins t i tu t ions , May in Quebec: The Publ ic Char i t ies Controversy, 1921-26," Social History 11 (May 1978):167; Paul A. Bator, " 'The Struggle to Raise the Lower C lasses ' : Publ ic Health Reform and the Problem of Poverty i n Toronto, 1920 to 1921," Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (Spring 1979):47; and Province of B .C . , Annual Report of the Department of Labour for the Year Ending 31 December 1920, p. 6. 1 3 V i g o d , "Ideology and Ins t i tu t ions , " p. 168. l^Donald C. Rowat, Your Local Government (Toronto: MacMil lan, 1955), p. 121. 15See Canadian Forum, Apr i l 1920, p. 200; and Bator, "Struggle to Raise the Lower C lasses , " p. 43, respect ive ly . 16j.A. Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincia l Governments in Canada (Cambridge: Harvard Universi ty Press, 1937), p. 240, n.2. l 7 See Province of B.C. Annual Report of the Department of Labour for the year ending 31 December 1921, p. 5; and Canadian Annual Review (CAR), 1920, p. 54, respect ive ly . 380 1 8Struthers, No Fault of Their Own, p. 22. For details of postwar industrial unrest, see Stuart M. Jamieson, Task Force on Labour Relations, study no.. 22 (Ottawa: Privy Council Off ice, l % o % "~ l9Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen: The Door of Opportunity (Toronto: Clarke Irwin & Company, 1960), p. 213. 20see Richard Allen The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972), p. 159. 21Ibid., p. 108 "Norman Penner, ed. , Winnipeg 1919: The Str ikers' Own History of the Winnipeg General Strike (Winnipeg: James Lewis & bamuel, iy/3), p. -iu. 2 3David Bercjison, Fools and Wise Men: The Rise and Fall of the One Big Union (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 19/8), p. ZbZ. 2 4 I b i d . , p. 90. 25For details of these disorders, see Penner, Winnipeg 1919, p. 20; and CAR 1919, p. 705, respectively. 26Graham, Arthur Meighen, p. 229. P7 Allen Social Passion, p. 105, no. l . 28Beatrice Magder, The Winnipeg General Strike: Management-Labour Relations, Canadian Issues Series (Toronto: Maclean-Hunter, 1969), p. 72. 29D.C. Masters, The Winnipeg General Strike (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973), p. 62. 30ibid., p. 62 3 1 Ci ted in Penner, Winnipeg 1919, p. 95. 32information is sketchy on i ts prairie branches. Concerning B.C., see Margaret A. Ormsby, Bri t ish Columbia: A History (Toronto: Macmillan, 1958), p. 407. 3 3CAR, 1919, pp. 329, 491. 34james Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), p. 49. 35My own estimate based on 1919 membership figures of key veterans' associations: the Great War Veterans Association (250,000), the Imperial Veterans of Canada (50,000), and the Army and Navy Veterans (40,000). 36C1 i f ford H. Bowering, Service: The Story of the Canadian Legion, 1925-1960 (Ottawa: Canadian Legion, 1960), p. 4. 381 3 7 0 n 31 July 1919 the GWVA had 250,000 members and 525 branches; a year previously the respective f igures were 16,000 and 125. Cited in CAR, 1919, p. 619. 38The Austral ian Returned Servicemen's League and i t s counterparts in B r i t a i n , New Zealand and the United States a l l opted for non-part isanship. See G.L. Kr is t ianson, The P o l i t i c s of Patr io t ism: The Pressure Group A c t i v i t i e s of the Returned Servicemen's League (Canberra: Aust ra l ia National Un ivers i ty , 1966), pp. 6 and 247, n.9. 3 9 E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 44. 40Bowering, Serv ice, p. 6. 4 1 C A R , 1919, p. 619. 42Borden, HC Debates, 2nd s e s s . , 1919. p. 243. 4 3 C A R , 1919, p. 620. 4 4 I b i d . , p. 619. 4 5 R . J . Manion, L i fe i s an Adventure (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1936), pp. 259-60. 4 6 E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 55. 4?Minutes of Evidence, HC Journals , 2nd s e s s . , 1919, pp. 410-11. 4 8 I b i d . , p. 984. 4 9Diary of S i r George Foster , 11 October 1919, PAC, Foster Papers, Copies of Diary 1919, Manuscript Group (MG) 27, ser ies II 07, v o l . 8. 50see Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, pp. 57-58. 5 1Quoted in CAR, 1920, p. 416. 52see Meredith to Borden, 13 September 1919; and Caswell to Borden, 15 September 1919, PAC, R.L. Borden Papers, MG 26H, v o l . 3 , f i l e 0c 556(A), pp. 60689-90. 5 3 S e e CAR, 1919, p. 489. 5 4See A l l e n , Social Passion, p. 4. 5 5 E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 52. 56HC Debates, 2nd s e s s . , 1919, p. 332. 382 5 7 Robert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, Canadian Centenary Ser ies , no. 14 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974; paperback e d . , 1978), p. 309. 58Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour In P o l i t i c s (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1968; paperback e d . , 1972), p. 58. 59Labour Gazette, 1921, p. 50. 6 0 S e e Good, HC Debates, 1922, p. 3526. ^Concerning Rowell 's e f f o r t s , see Margaret Prang, N.W. Rowel!: Ontario Nat ional is t (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 274, 307, 385. For Robertson's views, see Robertson to Meighen, 26 May 1921, PAC, A. Meighen Papers, MG 261, v o l . 32, f i l e no. 114, p. 18610. 62struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 281. 6 3Brown and Cook, Canada 1896-1921, p. 233. 64w.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1950), p. 68. 65sifton to Dafoe, Ju ly 1919, c i ted in Ramsay Cook, The Dafoe-Sifton Correspondence, 1919-1927 (Winnipeg: Manitoba Record Society Publ ica t ions, 1966), p. 1. 6 6 John W. Dafoe, C l i f f o r d Sif ton in Relation to his Times (Toronto: Macmillan, 1931), p. 483. 6 7 Michael B l i s s , "A Canadian Businessman and War: The Case of Joseph F l a v e l l e , " in War and Society in North America, ed. J . L . Granatstein and R.D. Cuff (Toronto: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1971), p. 34. 6 8 i b i d . , p. 22. 6 9 P r a n g , N.W. Rowel!, p. 309. 70Al len, Social Passion, p. 134. 7 l a b o u r Gazette, 1921, pp. 845-46. 72see Struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 285, n.24. 7 3 Robertson to Meighen, 13 December 1920, PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9.1 v o l . 3. 7 4 HC Debates, 1921, p. 61. 75See Bryce, Sutherland and Robb, i b i d . , pp. 1363, 1370. 7 6 S t r u t h e r s , "Prelude to Depression," pp. 284-85. 383 7 7 R . M . Dawson, Wil l iam Lyon Mackenzie King: A P o l i t i c a l Biography (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1958), p. 278. 7 8 S e e Final Report of Special Committee, HC Journals, 2nd sess. 1919, pp. 48, 56. 7 9 S t r u t h e r s , "Prelude to Depression," p. 282. SOEayrs, In Defence of Canada, pp. 48-49. 8 1 C i t e d in Henry Borden, e d . , Robert Lai rd Borden: His Memoirs (Toronto: Macmillan, 1938), p. 972. 8 2 Concerning Meighen's react ion, see John Eng l i sh , Arthur Meighen, The Canadians Series (Don M i l l s , Ont.: Fitzhenry & Whiteside, 1977), p. 25. 8 3 E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 68. 84Memo. from Major Anthes, n .d . , PAC, Borden Papers, MG 26H, v o l . 112, f i l e no. Oc 559(A), p. 61012. 8 5 B r y c e Stewart, Major Anthes, Minutes of Evidence, HC Journals, 2nd s e s s . , 1919, pp. 319, 331. 86HC Debates, 2nd s e s s . , 1919, p. 1863. 8 7 F i n a l Report, HC Journals , 2nd s e s s . , 1919, p. 58. 8 8 S e e Arthurs and Calder, HC Debates, 2nd s e s s . , 1919, pp. 1859, 1962 respect ive ly . 8 9 E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 63. 9 0 Robertson to Meighen, 23 July 1920, PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 168, f i l e no. 613.04:1. 9 1 S e e Round Table, September 1919, p. 793, and Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, p. 63, respect ive ly . 9 2 C l a r k to Meighen, 20 November 1920, PAC, Meighen Papers, MG 261, v o l . 32, f i l e no. 114, p. 18497. 9 3 S t r u t h e r s , "Prelude to Depression," p. 283. 94Meighen to Jennings, 4 December 1920, PAC, Meighen Papers, MG 261, v o l . 43, f i l e no. 166, p. 24935. 95HC Debates, 1923, p. 3828. 9 6 D i a r y of S i r George Foster, 8 December 1919, PAC, Foster Papers, Copies of Diary 1919, MG 27 Series II D7, v o l . 8. 384 9 ?Meighen to Robertson, 7 November 1920, PAC, Meighen Papers, MG 261, v o l . 32, f i l e no. 114, p. 18490. 9 8 S e e i b i d . , f i l e no. 221, pp. 29710, 297113; and i b i d . , v o l . 54, f i l e no. 225, pp. 30112-17, 30133-34. 9 9 HC Debates, 1921, p. 4364. lOOAll members of the service were given the vote under the M i l i t a r y Voters Act of 1917 and the i r female re la t ives enfranchised under the War-time Elect ions Act. "Of t he i r 153 seats , no one can say prec ise ly how many the Unionists won because of the War-time Elect ions Act, but cer ta in ly they owed 14 to the M i l i t a r y Voters A c t . . . . " J . Murray Beck, Pendulum of Power: Canada's Federal Elect ions (Scarborough, Ont.: P ren t i ce -Ha l l , 1968), p. 145. 101See Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, p. 52. 10 2Will iam I rv ine, The Farmers in P o l i t i c s (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1920), p. 220. 1°3CAR, 1919, p. 382. 104RObertson to Meighen, 13 December 1920, PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9.1, v o l . 3. 105Memo. for Hon. Mr. Bennett, n .d . , R.B. Bennett Papers, MG 26K, Universi ty of New Brunswick reel 393, p. 493279. 106Meighen to Jennings, 4 December 1920, Meighen Papers, MG 261, v o l . 43, f i l e no. 166, p. 24935. 10?Struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 284. l ° 8 St ru the rs , No Fault of Their Own, p. 30. 109see Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the B r i t i s h Welfare State (London: Macmillan student ed i t i on , 1973), pp. 170-1. HOAlan T. Peacock and Jack Wiseman, The Growth of Publ ic Expenditure in the United Kingdom (London: George Al len & Unwin, 1967), p. xxx iv . H lKun io Hidaka, "The Administration of Unemployment Assistance" (M.A. t hes i s , Queen's Un ivers i ty , 1945), p. 164. Chapter 4 Manion, House of Commons (HC) Debates, 1922, p. 1074; and Meighen, HC Debates, 1925, p. 480. 385 2The L ibera ls spent $1,181,381 in the 1921-22 f i s c a l year , compared with the i r predecessors' $843,000. Figures c i ted in unsigned memo., n.d. [25 Apr i l 1923], Ottawa, Publ ic Archives of Canada (PAC), Department of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , Record Group (RG) 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9B. 3 R . H . Coats, "Employment in Canada during 1922," PAC, Arthur Meighen Papers, Manuscript Group (MG) 261, v o l . 37, f i l e no. 178, p. 82228. ^Struthers points out tha t , contrary to conventional h i s to r i ca l wisdom, the postwar depression did not end in 1923 but extended to 1925. He c i tes as evidence estimates of unemployment done by a DBS s t a t i s t i c i a n showing that unemployment rose from a low of 3% in Ju ly 1923 to 16.5% by December of the same year ; and that i t never f e l l below 8% unt i l September 1925. Struthers, "Prelude to Depression: The Federal Government and Unemployment, 1918-1929," Canadian H is tor ica l Review 58 (September 1977):277. 5Cited in i b i d . , p. 277, n.2. 6 See Pr ivy Council Order 191, 25 January 1922. ?HC Debates, 1922, p. 1074. ^Province of B . C . , Annual Report of the Dept. of Labour fo r the Year Ending 31 December 1922, p"T~l% 9 F o r de ta i l s of conferences in Calgary and Ottawa, see Labour Gazette, 1922, p. 982; and Canadian Annual Review (CAR), 1922, p. 296, respect ive ly . 1 0 Labour Gazette, 1922, p. 979. l l C i t e d by Church, HC Debates, 1925, p. 1449. 1 2 C i t e d by Woodsworth, i b i d . , p. 1413. 1 3 l b i d . , p. 1438. 1 4 T h i s paragraph i s based on Woodsworth's speech, i b i d . , pp. 1411-13. 15 lb id . , pp. 1412-13. 1 6 I b i d . , pp. 1451-52. 17Bracken to King, 24 January 1928, PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , Record Group (RG) 27, v o l . 209, f i l e no. 617:9.1, v o l . 4. 18See HC Debates, 1925, pp. 1431-36, 1448-52, respect ive ly . 1 9 I b i d . , p. 1415. 20struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 292. 386 ^Crerar hailed from Manitoba and was President of the United Grain Growers. In 1917 he was appointed Minister of Agriculture by Borden. In June 1919 he resigned over the decision of his colleagues not to reduce the tar i f f and subsequently led the parliamentary group of western farmers. The lat ter declared themselves as representatives of the Progressives in February 1920, one month after the formation of the national party. 2 2See Crerar, HC Debates, 1921, p. 263; McBride and Morrison, HC Debates, 1924, p. 3540; and Woods, HC Debates, 1925, p. 1436. 2 3Struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 285. 24Bruce Ferguson, The Right Hon. W.S. Fielding: Mr. Minister of Finance (Windsor, N.S.: Lancelot Press, 1971), p. 247. 25Murdock to King, 28 November 1922, PAC, W.L.M. King Papers, MG 26, J l , vol . 79. 26"Statement showing expenditure for Employment Service and unemployment re l ie f , 1920/21-1923/24, "PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacelle F i les , RG 27, vol . 208, f i l e no. 617:9B. 2 ?Struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 287. 28Kenneth Bryden, Old Age Pensions and Pol icy-Making in Canada (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1974), p. 66. 29see Denis, HC Debates, 1925, pp. 1452-53. 30see chapter 3, pp. 66-67. 3lRichard Al len, The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-1928 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1971), p. 200. 32see R. MacGregor Dawson, William Lyon Mackenzie King: A Pol i t ical Biography (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1958), pp. 353, 359, 388; Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen: And Fortune Fled (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin '& Co., 1963), p. 259; and Louis A. Wood, A History "of Farmers' Movements in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), p. 359. 3 3 0ver 50% of federal income tax collected in the 1926-27 f iscal year was paid by corporations. Of this sum ($29 mi l l ion), over 80% was collected from head offices in Toronto ($14 mill ion) and Montreal ($9 mill ion) of railways, banks, and insurance companies. "Copy of Speech of Mr. Robb at Dominion-Provincial Conference, 9 November 1927," PAC, King Papers, MG 26, J4, reel C2622, p. 52667. 3 4 Ci ted in H. Bla i r Neatby, William Lyon Mackenzie King,1924-1932: The Lonely Heights (Toronto: University ot loronto Press, 1963), p. 14. 3 5Ferguson, W.S. Fielding, p. 251. 36Neatby, W.L.M. King, p. 245. 387 3 7 HC Debates, 1925, p. 1431. 38support fo r protect ion does not automatical ly connote opposit ion to federal expenditure on unemployment r e l i e f . Bel and, for example, a member of the Gouin bloc of protect ion is t L ibe ra l s , was not insens i t ive to the problems of urban labour in times of depression. He admitted at the 1922 Dominion-Provincial Conference that he was not "an out and out advocate of the doles system but I resent any man reproaching public bod ies . . . f o r having resorted to measures of d i rec t r e l i e f of unemployment during the las t two years . " Quoted in Labour Gazette, 1922, p. 979. 39Murdock to K ing, 18 Ju ly 1922, PAC, King Papers, MG26, J l , v o l . 79, p. 66510. ^ B r i t i s h Columbia, 1922 Report of Dept. of Labour, p. 6. 4 1 S e e Labour Gazette, 1926, p. 125. 42prince Edward Island was not a part ic ipant in any federal scheme as unemployment was not a problem in the smal l , rural province. There i s no evidence of New Brunswick's reaction to the federal po l icy of withdrawal, but i t s par t ic ipat ion had been minimal and the lack of response of i t s Liberal Premier (Veniot) to federal overtures suggests d isapproval . 4 3 S e e PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9.1, v o l . 1. ^Proceed ings , National Conference Regarding Winter Employment in Canada, Ottawa, 3-4 September 1924 (Ottawa: King's P r in te r , 1924), p.. 58. Vigod, "Ideology and Ins t i tu t ions in Quebec: The Publ ic Char i t ies Controversy, 1921-1926," Social History 11 (May 1978):179. 4 6 F o r Drury's reaction to the federal doles po l i cy , see PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 208, f i l e no. 617:9.1, v o l . 3. 4 7Quoted in Struthers, "Prelude to Depression," p. 288. 48p e ter O l i ve r , G. Howard Ferguson: Ontario Tory, Ontario H is to r ica l Studies Series (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 129. 49Bryden, Old Age Pensions, p. 83. 5 0 Toronto Globe, 28 October 1924. 5lQuoted by Robb, HC Debates, 1925, p. 1431. 5 2 P r g c i s of Discussions, Dominion-Provincial Conference, Ottawa, 3-10 November 1927 (Ottawa: King's P r i n te r , 1928), p. 32. 53o i iver , Ferguson, p. 150. 54Bruce Hutchison, The Incredible Canadian: A Candid Por t ra i t of Mackenzie King: His Work, His Times and His Nation (Toronto: Longmans Green, 1952), pp. 75^76: 388 5 5 Regina ld Whitaker, " P o l i t i c a l Thought and P o l i t i c a l Action in Mackenzie King," Journal of Canadian Studies 13 (Winter 1978-79):58. 5 6Canadian Forum, March 1925, p.164. 57Toronto Dai ly S ta r , 3 March 1925. ^ i n t e r v i ew with author, V i c t o r i a , B .C . , 25 March 1978. 59see J .A . Maxwell, Federal Subsidies to the Provincia l Governments in Canada (Cambridge: Harvard Univers i ty Press, 1937), p. 203. 60Neatby, W.L.M. King, p. 53. 6 1 S e e C i rcu la r l e t t e r to a l l candidates, 18 November 1925, PAC, King Papers, MG 26, J4 , reel C2623, p. 54198. 6 2 Anderson, HC Debates, 1926, p. 1211. 63Roger Graham, Arthur Meighen, booklet no.16 (Ottawa: Canadian H is to r ica l Assoc ia t ion, 1965), p. 11. 64see PAC, Dept. of Labour, Lacel le F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 210, f i l e no. 617:24. 65see ibid., file no. 617:24.2. 6 6 H . M . Cassidy, Unemployment and Re l ie f in Ontar io, 1929-32: A Survey and Report (Toronto: J .M. Dent & Sons, 1932), pp. 53-4. 6 7 Ra lph A l l e n , Ordeal by F i r e : Canada, 1910-1945 (Toronto: Doubleday, 1961), p. 300. Canadian Railway Employees Monthly, January 1930, p. 2. 69Al len, Ordeal by F i r e , pp. 300-3. 7°Cassidy, Unemployment and Re l ie f in Ontar io, p. 55. Chapter 5 Barnes Struthers, 'No Fault of Their Own': Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State, 1914-1941 (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1983), p.44. ^Figures i l l u s t r a t i n g the magnitude of unemployment and dependency are c i ted in appendix A, tables 35-36. 3 W.F. Nickle and E.D. MacPhee c i ted in H.M. Cassidy, Unemployment and Re l ie f in Ontar io, 1929-1932: A Survey and Report (Toronto: J .M. bent & Sons, 1932), p.7. 389. 4The importance of past precedents i s overlooked by Neatby who describes the 1930 Re l ie f Act as "a major development" and "a radical measure because up to that time no federal government had accepted respons ib i l i t y for supporting the unemployed." H.B. Neatby, The P o l i t i c s of Chaos: Canada in the Th i r t ies (Toronto: Macmillan, 1972), p.56. 5For a discussion of the con f l i c t s a r i s i ng out of Ottawa's r e l i e f arrangements, see Struthers, No Fault of Their Own, chaps. 2-3. 6These works concentrate on the or ig ins of the Department of National Defence camps. See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: From the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1964); John Swettenham, McNaughton 1887-1939 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968); G.M. Lefresne, '"The Royal Twenty Centers ' : The Department of National Defence and Federal Unemployment Re l i e f , 1932-1936" (B.A. t h e s i s , Royal M i l i t a r y College of Canada, Kingston, Ont., 1962); and Thomas W. Tanner, "Microcosms of Misfortune: Canada's Unemployment Rel ie f Camps Administered by the Department of National Defence, 1932-1936" (M.A. t h e s i s , Universi ty of Western Ontario, 1965). Only the l a t t e r recognizes that the idea of federal r e l i e f camps "was not without pract ical precedent . . . " Tanner, "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 24. 7 Ci ted in "Conf ident ial Report Re Unemployment and Re l ie f in Western Canada," n.d. [Summer, 1932], R.B. Bennett Papers, Manuscript Group (MG) 26K, Universi ty of New Brunswick (UNB) reel 381, p. 478072. ^Unemployed, s ing le women were a lso denied c i v i c r e l i e f "but i n . . . t h e prevai l ing social cl imate women were far less l i k e l y to be r id ing the r o d s . . . " M. Horn, e d . , The Di r ty T h i r t i e s : Canadians in the Great Depression (Canada: Copp Clark , 1972), p. 132, n . l . 9See "Report on Transiency," September 14, 1936, p. 2, Publ ic Archives of Canada (PAC), Department of Labour, National Employment Commission F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 3353, f i l e no. 15; and Lefresne, " 'Royal Twenty Centers ' , " p. 10, respect ive ly . ^ "Con f i den t i a l Report," UNB reel 381, p. 478111. H l n western Canada in 1922 there were 2 combines d isplac ing approximately 28 farm labourers. By 1929, 7,255 combines were in use d isp lac ing around 101,000 workers. I b i d . , p. 478084. 12Gordon to Provincia l Premiers, 14 February 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 200, pp. 241109-10. 13"Confidential Report," UNB reel 381, p. 478134. 14james H. Gray, The Winter Years: The Depression on the Pra i r i es (Toronto: Macmillan, 1966), p. 146. i 5 Tanner , "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 13. 390 1 6 F o r example, Broadfoot contends that "Communism never was any threat -although for theat r ica l and p o l i t i c a l reasons the government sometimes treated i t so . " Barry Broadfoot, Ten Lost Years, 1929-1939: Memories of Canadians who Survived the Depression (Toronto: Doubleday, 1973), p. 361. * 7 See James Struthers, "Two Depressions: Bennett, Trudeau and the Unemployed," Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (Spring 1979):72. 1 8 0 s c a r Bryan, Tim Buck: A Conscience for Canada (Toronto: Progress Books, 1975), p. 126. 1 9 Ralph A l l e n , Ordeal By F i r e : Canada, 1910-1945 (Toronto: Doubleday, 1961), p. 335. ^Unemployed Worker, Ottawa, 19 June 1931. 2lKenneth McNaught, "The 1930s," in The Canadians, 1867-1967, ed. J .M.S . Careless and R. Craig Brown (Toronto: Macmillan, 1967), p. 248. Concerning urban protests in Ontario and western Canada, see H.M. Cassidy, Unemployment and Rel ie f in Ontar io, p. 256; and Gray, Winter Years, pp. 70, T7#w7 : 2 2 Ather ton to Taylor , 30 Apr i l 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 381, p. 477066. 2 3 Tolmie to B.C. Conservative MPs and Senators, 2 February 1932, i b i d . , p. 477940. 2 4 Tolmie to Robertson, 19 June 1931, i b i d . , p. 477013. 25"Report of the Minister of Labour in connection with Western Enquiry on Unemployment," 1 July 1931, i b i d . , p. 477204. 2 6 S e e Fraser to Bennett, 6 Ju ly 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 391, p. 4904467. 2 7Brownlee to Bennett, 15 Ju ly 1931, i b i d . , UN9 reel 381, p. 477147. 2 8 F o r de ta i l s of these camps, see "Confidential Report," i b i d . , pp. 478152, 478155. 2 9 G r a y , Winter Years, p. 21. 30For de ta i l s of disturbances in Winnipeg, see Senate Debates, special s e s s . , 1930, p. 59; and HC Debates, 1931, pp. 71, 1981. 31Prior to the v i s i t of the federal Labour M in is te r , an unemployment conference was convened by Premier Bracken on June 17th and the 200 delegates decided to pressure Ottawa to take over the ent i re care of t rans ients . See Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 381, p. 477240. 391 32"A Statement concerning Unemployment in the C i ty of Winnipeg, for presentation to the Hon. Senator G.D. Robertson during his v i s i t to Winnipeg," n . d . , i b i d . , p. 476955. 33"A [separate] Statement concerning Unemployment in the City of Winnipeg for presentation to the Hon. Senator G.D. Robertson during his v i s i t in Winnipeg," n .d . , i b i d . , pp. 476971-72. 3 4 " A Suggested Pol icy fo r the Rel ie f of Unemployment in Manitoba," n .d . , i b i d . , p. 477242. 3 5Webb to Robertson, 9 Ju ly 1931, i b i d . , p. 477107. 36MacVity to Bennett, 25 June 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 387, pp. 485016-17. 37see Milne to Bennett, 15 June 1931, i b i d . , p. 484978. 38cassidy, Unemployment and R e l i e f , pp. 63-64. 39see i b i d . , pp. 69, 105. 4 0 F in layson to Bennett, 1 June 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 387, p. 484959. 4 1 F in layson to Manion, 17 June 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 394, p. 493575. 4 2 Maclean to St . C l a i r , 23 June, 1932, i b i d . , UNB reel 393, p. 492228. 4 3Timmis to Bennett, 23 August 1930, i b i d . , UNB reel 385, p. 482048. 4 4Bingham to Bennett, 4 September 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 392, p. 491930. 4 5 C h a s . W. Freder ick, "Why Not Mobil ize Our Rel ie f Work Into Constructive E f fo r t , " n .d . , i b i d . , UNB reel 391, p. 490399. 4 6 "Reso1ut ion adopted by the Synod of the Diocese of Kootenay," Vernon, B . C . , 28 May 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 392, pp. 491746-47. 4 7 S e e Federation of Cathol ic Char i t i es , Montreal to Bennett, 6 July 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 385, p. 482294. 4 8 Ca lga ry Board of Trade to Bennett, 3 July 1931, i b i d . , UNB eeel 391, pp. 490437-38. 4 9 "Preamble , " n .d . , i b i d . , p. 490392. 50"MPs Submissions Unemployment Re l ie f (Constituencies) under 1931 Ac t , " n .d . , i b i d . , UNB reel 381, p. 477355. 51Porteous to Bennett, 8 Ju ly 1931, i b i d . , p. 493318. 5 2 Ross to Bennett, 30 June 1931, i b i d . , p. 493314. 392 5 3Manion to Bennett, 1 Ju ly 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 381, p. 477098. 54Neatby, P o l i t i c s of Chaos, p. 34. 5 5 "Repor t of the Minister of Labour," Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 381, pp. 477210-12. 5 6 See Sula to Bennett, 5 September 1933, i b i d . , UNB reel 322, p. 402377. 57see "Secret Report of Meeting," 12 September 1931; "Copy of Demands to be presented to Minister of Labour and Ottawa Ci ty Council on 15 September 1931"; and Commissioner to Ward, 6 October 1931, PAC, Department of Labour F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 614, Closed F i l e RCMP Reports 1931. 5 8 Tolmie to B.C. Conservative MPs and Senators, 2 February 1932, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 381, p. 477942. 59"Resolut ion", 6 September 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 392, p. 491931. 6 0 S e e Hyslop to Bennett, 6 October 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 391, p. 490596; and McPherson to Bennett, 3 August 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 387, p. 485155. ^ E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 128. ^ S e c r e t a r y , Calgary TLC to Bennett, 17 July 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 391, p. 490488. 63Manitoba Free Press, 18 Ju ly 1931. 6 4 Apar t from Woodsworth, th is small group comprised the other 2 Labour MPs (Heaps, Maclnnis) , 2 Liberals from northern Ontario (Heenan, Bradette), the UFA leader (Garland), and a Quebec Independent (Bourassa). 65canada, House of Commons (HC) Debates, 1932, p. 1999. 6 6 HC Debates, 1931, pp. 4293-94. 67Bennett to Freder ick, 19 August 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 391, p. 490491. 68see Bennett to Sauve, 14 October 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 385, p. 482575. 6 9 HC Debates, 1931, p. 4471. 7 0 l b i d . , p. 4280. 7 1 T h i s suggestion was made by the B.C. and Alberta governments. See "Report of the Min is ter of Labour," Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 381, p. 477205. 393 ? 2 I n the case of camps operated by the Parks Branch of the Department of the In te r io r , these tasks were undertaken by federal o f f i c i a l s , but the se lect ion of t ransients was done in conjunction with the provincial Employment Service. See Robertson to Murphy, 10 October 1931, PAC, National Parks Branch F i l e s , RG 84, v o l . 42, f i l e no. J121-3 p t . 3. 73"Report of Unemployment Conference of Western Mayors," Winnipeg, 6 July 1932, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 382, p. 478635. 74"Memorial," 4 August 1932, i b i d . , pp. 478718-19. 7 5 S t r u t h e r s , No Fault of Their Own, pp. 75-77. 76carbon Copy of "Conf ident ial Report re Unemployment and Rel ie f in Western Canada," Summer 1932, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 382, pp. 478850, 478863. This copy contains material not avai lable in the main report and so i s t reated as a separate reference. 77"Confidential Report," i b i d . , UNB reel 381, pp. 478110-11. 7 8 S e e i b i d . , p. 478126; and UNB reel 382, p. 478291. 79See i b i d . , UNB reel 381, pp. 478111-13. 8 0 P r i v y Council Order 2161, 30 September 1932. 8lBlack to Tolmie, 21 October 1932, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 382, p. 479030. 82Tanner, "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 71. ^Stevens to Hereford, 23 October 1932, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 382, p. 479037. 8 4 S e e Murphy to Clubb, 23 September 1932; and Clubb's rep ly , 27 September 1932, PAC, National Parks Branch F i l e s , RG 84, v o l . 149, f i l e no. B60-23 (vo l . I I ) . 85See Bennett to Stevens, 13 October 1932; and Stevens to Hereford, 23 October 1932, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 382, pp. 479010, 479037. 86Black to Tolmie, 21 October 1932, i b i d . , p. 479031. As the commission chairman, Major Fordham, had operated a home for unemployed veterans in Vancouver since 1930, he obviously had a vested interest in th is arrangement. 8 7 Gordon, HC Debates, 1934, p. 1736. 88Swettenham, McNaughton, p. 278. 8 9 I b i d . , p. 274. 39.4 ^ E a y r s , In Defence of Canada, p. 136. Lefresne also contends that the m i l i t a r y r e l i e f camp scheme was "o r ig ina l l y conceived by General McNaughton..." Lefresne, '"The Royal Twenty Centers ' , " p. 199. 9lTanner, "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 29. 9 2 C i ted in Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, p. 130. 9 3 i b i d . , p. 125. 9 4Although a DND o f f i c i a l (Major Turner) vetted the s u i t a b i l i t y of these projects for unsk i l led labour, he did not exercise any inf luence over t he i r se lec t i on . See Lefresne, '"The Royal Twenty Centers ' , " pp. 12-15. 95Tanner, "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 130. 9 6 I b i d . , p. 26. 97Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, p. 145. n o Examples of var iat ions in r e l i e f provision include free tobacco, and a holiday on Saturday afternoon in the DND camps, workmen's compensation coverage and better qual i ty food in the Parks Branch camps. Although t r i v i a l on the sur face, these dif ferences became sources of con f l i c t between the respective o f f i c i a l s with DND personnel usual ly emerging as v i c to r s . See Wardle to Hark in, 15 November 1933; Memo, to Harkin, 30 November 1933; and Memo, to Rowatt, 16 February, 1934; PAC, National Parks Branch F i l e s , RG 84, v o l . 149, f i l e no. B60-23 (vo l . I I ) . 99, I I ) . Memo, to Gibson, 7 January 1935, i b i d . , v o l . 412 f i l e no. GR 60 (vo l . ^ T a n n e r , "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 100. lOlSee i b i d . , pp. 73-78, 100; Ronald Liversedge, Recol lect ions of the On To Ottawa Trek ed. V. Hoar (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1973), passim; and "Final Report on the Unemployment Rel ie f Scheme for the Care of S ing le , Homeless Men administered by the DND, 1932-36," pp. 24-26 and app. 22, PAC, Department of National Devence F i l e s , RG 24, v o l . 157 Rel ie f Act , 1932. 1 0 2 Tanne r , "Microcosms of Misfortune," p. 127. Chapter 6 Canadian soc ia l h is tor ians have paid scant attent ion to th i s c o n f l i c t . Struthers, fo r example, in h is b r ie f analysis of the forces shaping th i s stop-gap measure, makes no mention of agrarian reaction to the issue of land settlement. See James Struthers, 'No Fault of Their Own': Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare State (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press , 1983), pp. 68-69. 3 95 2David C. Corbett, Canada's Immigration Po l i cy : A Cr i t ique (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1957), pp. 12-13. 3 J . M . S . Careless, Canada: A Story of Challenge, 3rd ed. (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974), pp. 4 Spec ia l schemes for land settlement of B r i t i s h fami l ies were negotiated in 1927 with New Brunswick and Nova Scot ia . Other plans concerning B r i t i sh boys were operative in Alberta from 1924 onwards and New Brunswick, Nova Sco t ia , Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan from 1928. Canadian Annual Review (CAR), 1924-25, p. 186. 6Corbett, Canada's Immigration Po l i c y , p. 14. 7 Ci ted in CAR, 1926-27, p. 189. 8See Minutes of Evidence and Productions of the Select Standing Committee on Agr icu l ture and Colon izat ion, House of Commons (HC) Journals , 1928, app. 8 , pp. 365, 822. 9 Ci ted by Howden, HC Debates, 1932-33, p. 1507. IQSenate Debates, 1932, p. 226. ^ K e r r to Gordon, 8 October 1931, R.B. Bennett Papers, Manuscript Group (MG) 26K, Universi ty of New Brunswick (UNB) reel 200, p. 241238. 1 2 See i b i d . , UNB reel 200, pp. 264695, 264698, and 264852-53. 13"statement sent to Premier Brownlee by the Mayors of Calgary, Lethbridge, Medicine Hat, Edmonton and Drumheller," 15 March 1932, i b i d . , UNB reel 392, p. 490722. 1 4 H a i r to Bennett, 17 August 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 391, p. 490518. 15HC Debates, 1932, pp. 1664, 2452. 16w.A. Mackintosh, Economic Problems of the P ra i r i e Provinces, Canadian Frontiers of Settlement Series (Toronto: Macmillan, 1935), p. 209. 1 7 See Memo, to Jones, 6 Apr i l 1932, Public Archives of Canada (PAC), Department of Immigration F i l e s , Record Group (RG) 27, v o l . 370, f i l e no. 499212, pt. 2, reel no. C-10, 270. 18T.J.D. Powel l , "Northern Resettlement, 1929-1935," Saskatchewan History 30 (Autumn 1977):94-5. 19Their views were voiced by a Quebec Liberal MP. See Dubois, HC Debates, 1931, p. 569. 39.6 ^ C i t e d in Copy of Quebec Colonizat ion Scheme, t rans. 30 October 1934, p. 15, PAC, Department of Labour, National Employment Commission F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 3388, f i l e no. 2. 2lRalph Heintzman, "The P o l i t i c a l Culture of Quebec, 1840-1960," Canadian Journal of P o l i t i c a l Science 16 (March 1983):42. 22[,abour Gazette, 1932, p. 53. 2 3 According to Senator Lacasse, the scheme was s t i l l in i t s early stages when Taschereau became convinced that "a back-to-the-1and movement i s the only remedy." Senate Debates, 1932, p. 224. 24see Copy of The Montreal Gazette, 18 September 1931; and Gobeil to Bennett, 26 October 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 385, p. 482507-8, 482608, respect ive ly . 2 5 F o r deta i ls of the,campaign, see John H. Archer, Saskatchewan: A Hi story (Saskatoon, Sask.: Western Producer P ra i r i e Books, 198U), pp. 209-10; and Evelyn Eager, Saskatchewan Government: P o l i t i c s and Pragmatism (Saskatoon: Western Producer P ra i r i e Books, 1980), pp. 52-53. 2 6 See Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 200, pp. 241113-15, 241129. 27Manitoba Free Press, 19 September 1931. 2 8 See "[Presentation of ] The Unemployed Ex-Servicemen's Assoc ia t ion, " Edmonton, Ju ly 27 1931, Bennett Papers, UNB reel 391, p. 490469; and "RCMP Secret Report Re: Unemployment S i tua t ion , " Edmonton, June 10 1932, i b i d . , UNB reel 382, pp. 478683-84. 29"[Evidence of ] Dominion-Provincial Conference," Ottawa, 17-19 January 1933, i b i d . , UNB reel 277, p. 347280. 3 0 S e e CAR, 1929-30, pp. 180-1. 3lFor de ta i l s of th i s po l i cy , see Labour Gazette, 1932, p. 965. 3 2 F o r de ta i l s of t he i r meetings, see Memo, for F i l e : History and Organizat ion, 4 August 1931; and Memo, by Director of P u b l i c i t y , 29 May 1931, PAC, Department of Immigration F i l e s , RG 76, v o l . 370, f i l e no. 499212, pt. 1, Reel No. C-10, 270. •^"Verbatim Report of Federal-Rai lways-Provincial Conference on Co lon iza t ion , " Winnipeg, 8 June 1931, pp. 13-16, i b i d . 3 4 Beat ty and Thornton to Gordon, 1 October 1930, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 200, p. 241019. 35Memorandum of Proceedings of a Meeting of the M in is te r ' s Advisory Committee on Rel ie f Settlement, 26 March 1936, p. 1, PAC, Department of Labour, National Employment Commission F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 3373, f i l e no. 3. 36HC Debates, 1932, p. 2284. 37»Verbatim Report of Federal-Rai lways-Provincial Conference on Co lon iza t ion , " Toronto, 19 June 1931, p. 7, PAC, Department of Immigration F i l e s , RG 76, v o l . 370, f i l e no. 499212, pt. 1, reel no. C-10, 270. 38Memo. Re: Unemployment, 28 August 1931, pp. 1-2, i b i d . 39see Bennett to Gordon, 21 September 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 200, p. 241073. 4°See PAC, Department of Labour, National Employment Commission F i l e s , RG 27, v o l . 3353, f i l e nos. 6, 15. 41Memo. Re: Unemployment, 28 August 1931, pp. 2-3, PAC, Department of Immigration F i l e s , RG 76, v o l . 370, f i l e no. 499212, p t . 1, reel no. C-10, 270. 4 2 H . B l a i r Neatby, P o l i t i c s of Chaos: Canada in the Th i r t ies (Toronto: Macmil lan, 1972), p. 107. 4 3c i t ed in K.A. MacKirdy et a l . , Changing Perspectives in Canadian His tory , revised ed. (Don M i l l s , Ont.: J .M. Dent & Sons, 1971), p. 279. 4 4 C a r e l e s s , Canada, pp. 362-63. 45see HC Debates, 1931, 1932, pp. 565, 1236-37, respect ive ly . 4 6 HC Debates, 1932, p. 1439. 47HC Debates, 1931, pp. 871-72. 4 8 Senate Debates, 1932, p. 41. 4 9 i b i d . , p. 224. 5 0 HC Debates, 1932, p. 2286. 5lHC Debates, 1932-33, p. 3202. 5 2 " [Evi t lence of ] Dominion-Provincial Conference," Ottawa, 17-19 January 1933, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 277, p. 347286. 398 5 3 HC Debates, 1932, p. 2457. 5 4 S e e Donnelly, Gardiner, Garland, HC Debates, 1932-33, 1931, 1932, pp. 2695, 872-3, 2275, respect ive ly . 55HC Debates, 1932-33, p. 2643. 5 6 I b i d . , p. 2657. 57Gobeil to Bennett, 26 October 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 385, p. 482608. 58Gordon to Bennett, 14 October 1931, i b i d . , UNB r e e l 200, p. 241237. 5 9 CAR, 1930-31, p. 572. 60RObertson to Gordon, 5 November 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 381, p. 477697. SlSee Gordon to Bennett, 14 October 1931, i b i d . , UNB reel 200, p. 241237. 6 2 Gordon, HC Debates, 1932, p. 2272. 63Bennett to Hanson, 22 October 1931, Bennett Papers, MG 26K, UNB reel 394, p. 493597. ^Between 1930-31 and 1931-32 the number of f u l l - t ime employees in DIC declined from 883 to 766 and immigration service expenditure was cut from $2,199,142 to $1,681,153. Figures c i ted in Freda Hawkins, Canada and Immigration: Publ ic Pol icy and Publ ic Concern (Montreal: McGi 11-Queen's Press, 19/2), p. 81. 6 5 S e e Lacasse, Senate Debates, 1932, p. 223. 66Memo. [ to ] Hon. Mr. Gordon [Re] Unemployment Rel ie f Land Settlement, 29 March 1932, pp. 1-4, PAC, Department of Immigration F i l e s , RG 76, v o l . 382, f i l e no. 534709, reel no . , C-10, 278. 6 7 S e e Memo.: Hon. W.A. Gordon. Re Rel ie f Settlement Scheme, 26 Apr i l 1932, p. 2, PAC, Department of Labour, General Services F i l es of F.M. Hereford, RG 27, v o l . 3193, f i l e no. 146. 68see Gordon, HC Debates, 1932, p. 510. 6 9 I b i d . , p. 2267. 39 9 7 0 I b i d . , p. 2282. 7lMemo. and E n c : Hon. W.A. Gordon Re Rel ie f Settlement Scheme, 26 Apr i l 1932, pp. 1-2, PAC, Department of Labour, General Services F i l es of F.M. Hereford, RG 27, v o l . 3193, f i l e no. 146. ^ S e e HC Debates, 1932, pp. 2453-54. 73Report of the Department of Labour for the F isca l Year Ended 31 March 1942, p. 36, table 2. 74struthers, No Fault of Their Own, p. 69. Part III iMich ie l Horn, e d . , The Dir ty Th i r t i e s : Canadians in the Great Depression (Canada: Copp Clark , 1972), p. 254. 2 H.M. Cassidy, Unemployment and Re l ie f in Ontario 1929-1932: A Survey and Report (Toronto: J .M. Dent & Sons, 1932), pp. 164-65. 3john Webster Grant, The Church in the Canadian Era: The F i r s t Century of Confederation (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1972), pp. 98-99. 4 G . J u l i a Drummond, " Introduct ion," in Women of Canada: Their L i f e and. Work, a handbook compiled by the National Council of Women of Canada for d is t r ibu t ion at the Paris International Exh ib i t ion , 1900; repr int e d . , 1975, p. 4. 5Grant, Church in the Canadian Era, pp. 57-58. 6See The Countess of Aberdeen, "The National Council of Women of Canada: What i t Means and What It Does," in Women of Canada, pp. 240-54. ^Provincial grants towards char i table ins t i tu t ions other than hospitals ranged from $63,500 in New Brunswick, $44,676 in Quebec to $13,543 in B r i t i sh Columbia. Figures c i ted in Madame Thibaudeau, "Char i t ies and Reform," i b i d . , pp. 318-22. Chapter 7 400 iThe term "pensions" i s chosen over "allowances" as the former const i tuted the or ig inal demand of proponents of state a id . In the i r usage, pensions did not connote benefi ts for l i f e but remuneration for services rendered by sole-support mothers to the state in bringing up the i r ch i ld ren . They also s i gn i f i ed cash grants, a method of payment designed to foster a s p i r i t of independence and to avoid the ta in t of char i ty associated with r e l i e f in k ind. 2 P h i l i p H. Hepworth, "Family Pol icy in Canada: The Case of Mothers' Allowances," Social Po l icy and Administration Newsletter 4 (June 1980):44. 3See i t s 1892 annual report c i ted in Michael S. Cross, e d . , The Workingman in the Nineteenth Century (Toronto: Oxford Universi ty Press, 1974), p. 208. 4R .B . Splane, "The Evolution and Appl icat ion in Canada of Rights Relating to Motherhood and Chi ldhood," Labour Gazette, 1958, p. 1236. ^Veronica Strong-Boag, '"Wages fo r Housework': Mothers' Allowances and the Beginnings of Social Securi ty in Canada," Journal of Canadian Studies 14 (Spring 1979):24. ^Concerning the problem of ch i l d labour in Ontario and Manitoba, see Evidence, Report of the Royal Commission on the Relat ion of Labour and Capital in Canada, v o l . 2 (Ottawa: Queen's P r in te r , 1889), pp. 161, 202, 629, 730; and 1908-9 annual report of A l l People's Miss ion, Winnipeg, c i ted in Alan A r t i b i s e , e d . , Gateway Ci ty Documents on the Ci ty of Winnipeg 1873-1913, n.p. : Manitoba Record Society Publ icat ions in associat ion with Universi ty of Manitoba Press, 1979) p. 194, respect ive ly . A/eronica Strong-Boag, The Parliament of Women: The National Council of Women of Canada, 1893-1939, Mercury Ser ies , History Div is ion paper no. 18 (Ottawa: National Museum of Man, 1976), p. 251. 8 F o r de ta i l s of these developments, see Els inore Haul t a i n , "Mothers' Allowances in North America," International Labour Review, 1927, pp. 649-50; and George P. Mangold, Problems of Ch i ld Welfare, 3rd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1936), pp. 510-11. %plane, "Evo lu t ion , " p. 1238. lORobert Craig Brown and Ramsay Cook, Canada 1896-1921: A Nation Transformed, The Canadian Centenary Ser ies , rib~. 14 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1974; paperback e d . , 1978), p. 223. ^ T h i s clash is overlooked by Guest and Hepworth, who assume that the Canadian char i tab le sector followed i t s American counterpart in opposing the development of publ ic a id for sole-support mothers. See Dennis Guest, The Emergence of Social Security in Canada (Vancouver: Universi ty of B r i t i s h Columbia Press, 1980), pp. 51-52; and Hepworth, "Family P o l i c y , " p. 35. 12|_inda Kealey, " Introduct ion," in A Not Unreasonable Claim: Women and Reform in Canada, 1880s-1920s, ed. L. Kealey ( loronto: Women's LducationaI Press, 1979), p. 3. 4.0.1 1 3 S e e , fo r example, the boast made by Tom Moore, TLC president, in the Preface of J . L . Cohen, Mothers' Allowance Legis la t ion in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1927), p. 6. ^Concerning provincial representat ions, see Labour Gazette, 1912-13, pp. 358, 881; and i b i d . , 1913-14, p. 650. With regard to federal p leas, see i b i d . , 1914-15, pp. 475, 883; 1915-16, pp. 405, 458; and 1917, p. 1671. 1 5 Caro l Bacchi , "Divided Al leg iances: The Response of Farm and Labour Women to Suffrage," in A Not Unreasonable Claim, pp. 91-92. 16Wayne Roberts, ' "Rocking the Cradle for the World ' : The New Woman and Maternal Feminism, Toronto, 1877-1914," i b i d . , p. 20. 1 7 N e i l Sutherland, Children in English-Canadian Society: Framing the Twentieth-Century Consensus" (Toronto: Universi ty 67 Toronto Press, 1976; paperback e d . , 1978), p. 237. 18Linda McDowell, "Harr iet Dick—A Lady Ahead of Her Time?" Manitoba Pageant 20 (1975):11. 19Manitoba Free Press, 3 February 1915. 2 0 T h i s paragraph is based upon information in i b i d . , 26 February; 6 March, 1915. 2 1 Regina Leader, 17 October 1917. 22see i b i d . , 4 , 7 December 1915. 23The Regina volunteers' i n i t i a l e f for ts are documented in i b i d . , 6 December 1916; 9, 10 January 1917. 2 4 Calgary Herald, 24 January 1914. 2 5 i b i d . , 20 November 1915. 2 6 For de ta i l s of t he i r i n i t i a l meetings see i b i d . , 16 March; 14 June 1916. 27For de ta i l s of protests voiced by the local Consumers' league and other women's groups, see Calgary Herald, 20 January 1917. 28see i b i d . , 30 November 1916. 2 9 L . G . Thomas, The Liberal Party in Alberta (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1959), p. III. 3 0 S e e Ne l l i e L. McClung, "What Wil l They Do With I t?" Maclean's Magazine, Ju ly 1916, pp. 36-38. 3 C a l g a r y Herald, 3 June 1917. 4 0 2 J 4j .C. feminist h is tor ians ident i fy the leadership of the Universi ty Women's Club of Vancouver as the or ig ina l sponsors of the cause. However, t he i r research contains no evidence of d i rec t lobbying for province-wide pensions pr ior to 1917. See Tami Adilman, "Evelyn Farr is and the Universi ty Women's C lub, " in In Her Own Right: Selected Essays on Women's History in B . C . , ed. Barbara Latham and Cathy Kess (V i c to r i a , B .C . : Camosun Col lege, 1980), pp. 156, 160; and Susan Wade, "Helena Gutteridge: Votes for Women and Trade Unions," i b i d . , p. 197. 3 3 S e e pp.182-83, table 16, c o l s . 2-4, 8. 3 4Vancouver Sun, 4 February 1919. 3 5 I b i d . , 16 May 1917. ^Vancouver Province, 21 March 1917. 3 7 S e e Labour Gazette, 1913-14, 1914-15, 1915-16, pp. 683, 1183, 286, respect ive ly . op See Vancouver Province, 16 January 1918. 3 9 V i c t o r i a Times, 21 March 1918. ^Vancouver Sun, 15 January 1919. 4lToronto Globe, 8 May 1913. rong-Boag, Parliament of Women, p. 252. 43see i b i d . , pp. 297, 434. 4 4 Guest interprets the str ingent conditions l a i d down by the Commission as a sign of imp l i c i t opposit ion that contributed to the dropping of the demonstration project "a few months af ter i t s incept ion. " Guest, Emergence of Social Secur i ty , pp. 51-52. However, the experiment operated throughout the 1914-17 period during which the LCW paid allowances to s i x mothers with 22 ch i ld ren . See Toronto Council of Women, Nothing New Under the Sun: A History of the Toronto Council of Women (Toronto: Local Council of Women, 1978), p. 38. 45Andrew Jones and Leonard Rutman, In the Chi ldren 's A id : J . J . Kelso and Chi ld Welfare in Ontario (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1981), p. 154. 46Toronto Globe, 18 September 1914. 4 7 Regina Leader, 17 March 1917. 4 8strong-Boag, '"Wages for Housework'," p. 25. 4 y Richa rd A l l e n , The Social Passion: Rel igion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-1928 (Toronto: Universi ty of Toronto Press, 1971), pp. 20 and 30, n. 59. 4 0.3 5 0 S e e Jones and Rutman, Chi ldren 's A i d , p. 143; and Sutherland, Chi 1dren in English-Canadian Society, p. 229, respect ive ly . ^Strong-Boag, '"Wages for Housework'," p. 25. Their American counterparts, however, vigorously opposed the development of state aid to needy mothers because of a ser ies of "disastrous experiences" with part isan public o f f i c i a l s . See Mangold, Problems of Chi ld Welfare, p. 511. 5 2 Accord ing to A. Maude R i l e y , i t adopted "a s imi la r stand on 'The Rights of Motherhood' and the serv ice that the mothers render to the s t a t e . " Quoted in Calgary Herald , 5 May 1917. 53Toronto Globe, 10 December 1918. 5 4 S e e Burnham, House of Commons Debates, 1914, p. 1341. 55see Suzann Buckley, "Ladies or Midwives? Efforts to Reduce Infant and Maternal Mor ta l i t y , " in A Not Unreasonable Cla im, p. 140; and Sunderland, Children in English-Canadian Society , pp. 62-617 5 6 Jones and Rutman, Chi ldren 's A i d , pp. 152-54. 57see Calgary Herald, 24 January 1919; 16 March 1917, respect ive ly . 5 8 Reg i na Leader, 7 November 1912. 59see Toronto Globe, 19 December 1916. 6 0 S e e Manitoba Free Press, 26 February 1915. 6 1 S e e pp. 185, 187 and 207 of the tex t , respect ive ly . 6 2 W. Davidson quoted in Calgary Herald, 4 June 1917. 63canadian Annual Review (CAR), 1911, pp. 462-64. 6 4 S e e Toronto Globe, 18 October 1916. 65Lionel Orl ikow, "The Reform Movement i n Manitoba, 1910-1915," in H is to r ica l Essays on the P r a i r i e Provinces, ed. Donald Swainson (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1970), p. 224. 6 6 John H. Thompson, The Harvests of War: The P ra i r i e West, 1914-1918 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1978), p. 96. 6 7 E l s i e M. MacG i l l , My Mother The Judge: A Biography of Judge Helen Gregory MacGill (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1955), p. 159. 6 8Quoted in Diane Crossley, "The B.C. Liberal Party and Women's Reforms, 1916-1928," in Her Own Right , p. 236. 404 6 9 M a c G i l l , My Mother, p. 159. 70This section of the paragraph i s based on information in Calgary Herald, 2 March 1916, 4 June 1917; and 20 December 1918. 7lToronto Globe, 10 December 1918; 5 January 1920, respect ive ly . 7 2 S e e a r t i c l es by Al ison Craig in Manitoba Free Press, 6 March 1915; 12 February 1916. 7 3 McClung, "What Wil l They Do?," p. 37. 74yjctor ia Times, 15 January 1919. 7 5 M . El izabeth Wallace, "The Changing Canadian State: A Study of the Changing Conception of the State as revealed in Canadian Social Leg is la t ion , 1867-1948" (Ph.D. t h e s i s , Universi ty of Columbia, 1950), p. 128. 76cited in CAR, 1919, p. 657. 7 7 B a c c h i , "Divided A l leg iances, " p. 104. 78CAR, 1918, pp. 726, 727. 7 9 June Menzies, "Votes fo r Saskatchewan's Women," in P o l i t i c s in Saskatchewan, ed. Norman Ward and Duff Spafford (Don M i l l s , Ont.: Longmans, 1968), p. 82. 80Regina Leader, 18 October 1917. 8 1 Marjor ie MacMurchy, The Woman - Bless Her: Not as Amiable a Book as i t Sounds (Toronto: S.B. Gundy, 1916), pp. 14-15. 8 2 Toronto Globe, 4 January 1919. 83See Manitoba Free Press, 29 January 1916. 84james A. Jackson, The Centennial History of Manitoba (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1970), p. 165. 8 5 0 r l i k o w , "Reform Movement," p. 216. 86Vancouver Sun, 22 March 1918. 8 7 Hepworth, "Family P o l i c y , " pp. 33, 48. 88Thompson, Harvests of War, p. 96. 8 9 Strong-Boag, '"Wages for Housework'," p. 26. 90jackson, Centennial History, p. 193. 405 9 1 T h i s paragraph is based on information in Manitoba Free Press, 31 May 1915 and 29 January 1916. 9 2Quoted in Orl ikow, "Reform Movement," p. 224. 9 3see Manitoba Free Press, 31 January; 12 February 1916. 9 4 T h i s section of the paragraph is based upon i b i d . , 16, 29 February; 2 March 1916. 9 5 J a c k s o n , Centennial H is tory , p. 189. 96see Calgary Herald, 16 January 1919. 9 7 C i t e d by Mrs. Haight, Regina Leader, 15 February 1917. 98see i b i d . , 30 March; 28 Apr i l 1917, respect ive ly . 9 9 CAR, 1917, p. 793. lOOSee Regina Leader, 8 , 26 June 1917. 1 0 1 I b i d . , 3 July 1917. 102 lb id . , 28 November 1917. 1 0 3 C i t e d in Bacchi , "Divided A l leg iances, " p. 104. lO^Calgary Herald, 9 March 1918. 1 0 5 I b i d . , 22 March 1918. 106vancouver Province, 24 October 1918. 1 0 7 C a l g a r y Herald, 20 December 1918. 108 ib id . , 9 January 1919. 1 0 9 C A R , 1919, p. 752. HOsee Calgary Herald, 22, 25 February 1919, respect ive ly . m I b i d . , 28 February 1915. H 2 l b i d . , 7 March 1919. 1 1 3 T h i s section of the paragraph is based on material in i b i d . , 12, 13 March 1919. 1 1 4 C A R , 1919, p. 792. H5D.L . Matters, "A Report on Health Insurance:1919," B.C. Studies 21 (Spring 1974):28. 1 1 6 S l o a n to Maclean, 30 September 1919, Provincial Archives of B r i t i s h Columbia (PABC), Box 27, Commission on Health Insurance, 1919. 1 1 7 Winn to Maclean, 25 October 1919, i b i d . 118cited in Maclean to Winn, 18 November 1919, i b i d . 1 1 9 "Mothers Pensions Report," 1920, p. 16, PABC, Sessional Papers, 1920, v o l . 2. 1 2 0 S e e Martin Robin, The Rush for Spo i l s : The Company Province 1871-1933 (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 19/2), pp. 182-83. 1 2 1 Vancouver Sun, 10 Apr i l 1920. 122information concerning these delegations i s taken from Toronto Globe, 17 December 1918; 4 January 1919. 123 ib id . , 20 February 1920. 1 2 4 B r i a n D. Tennyson, " S i r Wil l iam Hearst and the Ontario Temperance Act , " Ontario History 55 (December 1963):243. 1 2 5 Toron to Globe, 24 September 1919. 126see CAR, 1919, p. 658. 1 2 7 I b i d . , p. 40. l 2 8Peter O l i ve r , G. Howard Ferguson: Ontario Tory (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 94. 129CAR, 1919, p. 399. 1 3 0 Toronto Globe, 8 January 1920. 13lThis paragraph i s based on material in i b i d . , 9 , 21 February 1920. 1 3 2 H a u l t a i n , "Mothers' Allowances," p. 651. l 3 3 Quoted in O l i ve r , Ferguson, p. 94. 1 3 4 S e e Toronto Globe, 19 May 1920. l 35jones and Rutman, Chi ldren 's A i d , p. 155. 1 3 6 Anne A. Perry, "Is Women's Suffrage a F i z z l e ? " Maclean's Magazine, February 1928, p. 63. 1 3 7 St rong-Boag, '"Wages For Housework'," p. 26. Incited in Cohen, Mothers' Allowance Leg is la t i on , p. 6. 4.0J. l 3 9 See Al len, Social Passion, p. 73; and Stewart Crysdale, The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1961), p. 82. 14°See Province of Saskatchewan, Report of Committee on Provincial-Municipal Relations (Regina: King's Printer, 1951), pp. 36-37. 1 4 1 See Labour Gazette, 1929, 1930, pp. 367, 485, respectively. 142|