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 Policy Briefing
Asia Briefing N°3 6
Kathmandu/Brussels, 24 February 2005
Internationa
Crisis Group
WORKING TO PREVENT
CONFLICT WORLDWIDE
Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
OVERVIEW
King Gyanendra's seizure of power and arrest of
democratic party leaders on 1 February 2005 will likely
aid the Maoist insurgency and intensify the civil war.1
But by bringing the crisis to a head he has created an
opportunity for diplomatic efforts to pull Nepal back from
the brink of collapse and develop an effective counter-
insurgency strategy. The key countries and organisations
involved in the country — India, the U.S., the UK and the
UN — need to work together to strengthen a collapsing
state and establish a plan to deal with the Maoist
insurgency.2 Acceptance of the coup and lack of action
would only increase the chances of a Maoist victory and
a descent into worse violence.
There is also an urgent human rights crisis in Nepal that
requires international action. The record on disappearances
and extra-judicial killings is one ofthe world's worst.
Hundreds of political figures and activists have been
detained, and protests have been violently suppressed.
An expanded campaign against the Maoists by the Royal
Nepalese Army (RNA) is likely to result in worsening
abuses while offering no realistic chance of defeating the
insurgency or reaching a negotiated solution. At the
same time, the government is vulnerable to external
pressure because it is heavily dependent on foreign aid.
The policy priorities should be:
□      re-establishment of constitutional rule, including
restoration of all suspended freedoms, release of all
1 For more details on the coup see Crisis Group Asia Report
N°91, Nepal's Royal Coup: Making a Bad Situation Worse,
9 February 2005.
2 This paper deals with immediate policy steps to strengthen
the state in order that it can develop a political, economic and
military strategy to defend itself against a violent insurgency
and recover the ground it has lost in the last several years. It
does not address in detail the longer-term issue of how to end
the Maoist threat, through military means or negotiations, or a
combination of those two approaches: this will be the subject
of future Crisis Group reporting. Detailed policy reports will
also shortly be published on three critical areas for reform -
the constitution, political parties and the security sector - and
on how best to respond to the current human rights crisis.
people arrested in the royal crackdown since 1
February 2005 and revocation of the state of
emergency;
□ expanded protection of human rights, including
through full and immediate access to all places
of detention for the National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) and the International
Committee ofthe Red Cross (ICRC);
□ a stronger legal framework to protect rights,
including through repeal of the Terrorism and
Destructive Activities Ordinance (TADO);
□ re-establishment of democratic institutions and
strengthening of the state's administrative and
governance capacity across the country; and
□ a broad-based political, security and socio-economic
strategy to address not only the insurgency but also
the underlying issues that have fuelled it.
To achieve these, donors should immediately implement
a range of measures to pressure the royal government.
Instead of vague threats, they should take the following
steps at once and only lift them when specific conditions
are met:
□ suspend all military assistance that is not essential
to maintaining the security status quo;
□ suspend all direct bilateral and multilateral
budgetary support to the government;
□ initiate a review of all current development
assistance and prepare plans for phased suspension
and withdrawal of these programs;
□ signal displeasure with the king's action by
diplomatic and protocol means (including
cancellation of visits and invitations); and
□ support a strong resolution on human rights at the
UN Commission on Human Rights in Geneva in
March 2005.
The best mechanism to coordinate this would be a
Contact Group bringing together the major powers and
institutions that have been active in developing a policy
towards Nepal's conflict. This group might in rum appoint
a special envoy to advance its agreed political response to
the coup and the insurgency. It will not be easy to achieve
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Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 2
all policy objectives but a demonstrably united
international front would demand attention in Kathmandu
and be able to send a strong message to all involved that
political institutions must be rebuilt if the state is to
survive the insurgency. Ifthe country's main political
forces cannot agree on a common agenda, they all stand
to lose.
The Contact Group and other donors should make clear
that they expect the measures demanded to be taken
immediately and to be sustained. The royal government
must be judged on its actions rather than its public
pronouncements. Ifthe initial round of pressure does not
achieve results, and the king is still unwilling to
relinquish absolute power, donors should consider:
□ suspending all military aid, including provision
of spare parts for vehicles and helicopters and
aviation fuel;
□ suspending all assistance (including development
assistance) apart from humanitarian aid;
□ introducing targeted sanctions including a freeze
of the assets of the royal family, senior officials,
military officers and their families, visa bans and
suspension ofthe RNA's lucrative involvement in
UN peacekeeping operations; and
□ encouraging the Security Council to investigate
and prosecute both government and Maoist
suspects who have escaped justice due to Nepal's
inadequate judicial procedures.
Should the king still drag his feet, it would be time to
consider more radical options, including international
expressions of support for a republic rather than
constitutional monarchy. Gyanendra may well have
tipped support within the country decisively toward a
republic already but he should be offered one last
chance to agree to policies that would allow the
Nepali state to respond effectively to the Maoist
challenge. If he continues on his present course, his
coup will mark a stage leading to intensified conflict
and possibly a Maoist victory.
II.     A COUP THAT CANNOT BRING
PEACE
A.    The King' s Plan
The king and his new ministers have argued that only a
strong, authoritarian government can deliver peace. The
newly appointed deputy premier, Tulsi Giri, argues that
Nepal is acting no differently than the U.S. after 11
September 2001: "Every country has a problem which it
is trying to solve", he said, "but then it's not justice that
you make comments on how Nepal is dealing with it".3
How the king might achieve a lasting resolution of the
conflict is unclear. He may envisage three scenarios but
none is likely to succeed:
□ Talks. The new Council of Ministers has called for
negotiations with the Maoists4 but there is no realistic
prospect. The insurgents' chairman, Prachanda, their
spokesman, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, and other
figures have reiterated that they will not deal with
the king.5 Even if they were to come to the table,
talks between forces representing the extremes of
the political spectrum would be unlikely to deliver
a stable long-term settlement. More probably, the
Maoists would only use them as a tactical diversion
and a means for weakening the monarchy further.
□ Military pressure. Even ifthe generals recognise
that a knock-out military victory is impossible, many
of them argue that a sustained offensive would
weaken the Maoists enough to force them into talks
without preconditions. But even the "bloody nose"
objective Indian advisers previously recommended
is unlikely to be delivered. The army has shown
little capacity to hurt the rebels, and military experts
have been unimpressed by its progress in adapting
to a counterinsurgency campaign. Since its
deployment in November 2001, the military
position has progressively weakened, and the RNA
is now burdened with extra responsibilities which
will distract it from frontline fighting. State security
forces, which now have to guard against unrest
from the political mainstream, will be even less
likely to win support and develop improved
intelligence capacity. Moreover, the royal coup
will likely prove a recruiting boon for the Maoists,
particularly from disaffected leftist party activists.
Interview with Reuters quoted in "Dr. Giri stands against
int'l criticism", Kathmandu Post, 16 February 2005.
4 A senior minister of the newly formed cabinet has said that
the government would soon form a team to hold peace
negotiations with the Maoist insurgents. According to reports,
Minister for Culture, Tourism and Civil Aviation Buddhi Raj
Bajracharya said that the team would discuss the insurgents'
demands only after they agree to talks. "The Maoists have
repeatedly said that they would hold a dialogue with the King
only. Now, it's the best time for them to come for talks as the
present government is formed under the chairmanship of His
Majesty", reports quoted the Minister as saying. Nepalnews.com,
7 February 2005.
5 Prachanda's press statement of 12 February 2005 stated
unambiguously that "the possibility and rationality of
talks with Gyanendra Shahi has ended in the aftermath of
[his] murdering of achievements of [the 1990 democracy
movement]".
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Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 3
□ Maoist collapse. Ever since the Maoists' plenary
meeting in August 2004, Kathmandu government
and diplomatic circles have been buzzing with talk
of serious splits within their leadership. Many
analysts hope that such internal tensions will fatally
divide the movement. But similar speculation has
frequently proved groundless. The Maoists do have
differences over strategy but they remain disciplined
and united. Indeed, they encourage a "two-line
struggle" within the party as a way of developing
policy.6 As long as they feel they have momentum,
serious splits are not likely. Attempts to "decapitate"
the insurgency by arresting or killing key leaders
would at best entrench local warlords and groups
rather than produce a total collapse. Moreover, a
negotiated settlement — the goal of any realistic
strategy ~ would be far easier to reach with a
unified Maoist leadership than a series of regional
splinter movements.
There have been suggestions that the king's move is
popular in Nepal, but there is no evidence for such claims.
If the move were truly popular, it would not seem to
have been necessary for the king to impose draconian
restrictions on the media and communications, with many
ofthe most vocal critics jailed and others intimidated into
silence. The king marked Democracy Day on 19 February
2005 by having schoolchildren bused in to celebrate
while public transport was banned and phone lines cut to
prevent demonstrations by political parties.
The only two recent large scale, professional surveys of
Nepali popular opinion in the last year both indicate a
popular preference for a constitutional monarchy and
extremely limited support for an absolute monarchy. A
July 2004 nationwide poll found that 60 per cent of
respondents favour a democracy with a constitutional
monarchy, 17 per cent democracy without a monarchy;
9 percent a return to the Panchayat system, and only 2
per cent an absolute monarchy.7 Of 3,249 respondents to
a nationwide survey carried out in August and September
2004, 62 per cent said that "democracy is always
preferable to any other form of government" while only
10 per cent thought authoritarianism was acceptable.8
6 The "two-line struggle" is a term used by the Maoists to
refer to internal debates. Mao regarded it as an inevitable
aspect of revolutionary work to be encouraged.
7 Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc., "Faith in
Democracy Endures, In Spite of Disappointments: Report on
the Baseline Survey and Focus Groups", Washington, 16
August 2004, p. 6.
8 The study was coordinated by the Lokniti wing of Centre for
the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), New Delhi and
supported by International IDEA. A summary of its findings is
available on IDEA'S website, http://www.idea.int. Their
relevance in the post-coup context is discussed in detail by
B.    Stronger Maoists, Weaker State
The immediate political impact of the royal coup is
almost entirely negative in terms ofthe state response to
the Maoist challenge. While royalist claims that Nepal
needs a strong hand on the helm may sound reasonable
from a distance, the reality is that the king's actions have
dramatically destabilised the ship of state. An authoritarian
grip on the levers of power means little when the
government's writ barely extends beyond Kathmandu
and a few other urban areas.
The assault on democratic parties and institutions
strengthens the Maoists and increases the likelihood that
the mainstream parties will join the rebels in a loose
alliance against the king.9 However such an alliance is
structured, the fact that the Maoists are not only the best
organised and most determined political force in the
country but also armed and violent gives them excellent
chances to control it. They will seek to co-opt other
parties and use them to achieve their long-standing
goals. The chances that this could result in some form of
Maoist victory have been greatly increased.
The Maoists almost certainly believe that their
analysis of Nepali society and their strategy of
protracted war have been vindicated. They had long
hoped that their opponents would eventually be
reduced to a royalist rump with a limited support base
and they will interpret moves within mainstream
parties towards republicanism as evidence of growing
support. The first indications in the aftermath of the
coup suggest that the king's actions have pushed even
some hitherto staunch monarchists toward a
republican  position.10 While  the  king  would gain
Yogendra Yadav, "Nepalis want democracy, not monarchy",
The Hindu, 3 February 2005 (available at http://www.hindu.com/
2005/02/03/stories/2005020314261100.htm).
9 The Maoist press statement of 4 February called for "all the
pro-people political forces, civil society, intellectual community
and all the level and sphere of people" to form a united front
"to overthrow feudal autocracy". The Maoists added, "We
would also like to clarify to all those concerned that we are
utterly ready for necessary sacrifice and flexibility from our
side for this purpose".
10 Sujata Koirala, daughter of Congress leader Girija Prasad
Koirala and a senior party leader herself, says that the
monarchy has now lost the confidence of the people
("Escaped Daughter of Ex-Premier Says King Ruling by
Terror", Inter Press Service, 13 February 2005). Congress
Central Committee member Krishna Prasad Sitaula has
stated that his party is "even ready to join hands with the
Maoists to put an end to the monarchy" ("Nepali Congress
may join hands with Maoist rebels", Press Trust of India, 8
February 2005). Moderate voices may find it hard to make
themselves heard: due to the coup the Nepali Congress has
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Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 4
credit for any dramatic progress in the conflict, the
institution ofthe monarchy is no longer shielded from
political failure. What support, or tacit consent, it has
gained or held on to can be expected to evaporate
rapidly if there are serious economic, political or
security setbacks.
Far from reassuring the public at large, the RNA has yet
to ensure its own security in the face of Maoist attacks.
There are precious few indications that the battle for
hearts and minds has been joined at all, let alone won.
Many troops are tied down guarding essential
infrastructure such as telecommunications installations,
power stations, government offices and major highways,
while others now have taken on extra duties such as
censoring the media, detaining political opponents and
becoming more involved in administrative affairs at the
central and district level. Faced with managing potential
civil unrest from both the centre and the hard left, it
could rapidly find itself overstretched. There is also a
long-term risk of the growing militarisation of society.
Once armies get a taste for power and control of
resources, they tend to be reluctant to relinquish them.
On 13 February 2005 (the ninth anniversary ofthe start
of their armed campaign) the Maoists launched a
program of indefinite blockades, which has further
challenged the state's capacity to respond. All indications
are that these have been largely successful. Little traffic
has used the main highways, even though the Maoists
have not attempted to enforce them by direct military
action.11 "It's remarkable that there's no panic yet in
Kathmandu", commented a western diplomat. "All the
information we have suggests that the blockade could
soon make life in the capital very difficult".12
The government's credibility and capacity, meanwhile,
is at an all time low. The post-coup regime has no
constitutional legitimacy and doubtful ability to implement
any program. The first meeting ofthe Council of Mnisters
announced a ludicrously overambitious 21-point plan,
including construction of an east-west railway, full
employment and educational scholarships for minorities.
It was not revealed how an impoverished country facing
a liquidity crisis would pay for this.13 Delivery of
indefinitely postponed its 11th General Convention which
had been scheduled to take place in early March.
11 Even the censored Nepali media has recognised the
seriousness of the blockades: "Even as the authorities have
assured of security and have even provided escorts to
vehicles coming to and leaving the capital, Kathmandu,
traffic along major highways remains very low since last few
days." ("Air ticket sales soar as blockades continue",
nepalnews.com, 23 February 2005)
12 Crisis Group interview, Kathmandu, 23 February 2005.
13 The Kathmandu Post has estimated that the government
government services depends on the geographical reach
ofthe state and a capable bureaucracy. But the withdrawal
of most local government from the countryside ~
already well underway before the coup — is now being
exacerbated by the army's intervention in civilian affairs,
a move more likely to damage morale among civil
servants than improve efficiency.14
C.    A Human Rights Crisis
For the civilians who are the primary victims of the
conflict, the coup is likely to herald further miseries as
the already dire human rights situation deteriorates
further. The passing reference to respect for rights made
by the king in his proclamation was ambivalent: "all the
organs of the state must remain alert in honouring and
upholding human rights. However, it will be unfair to
put the state and terrorists on equal footing". Signs of an
atmosphere of even greater impunity for the security
forces have appeared with regularity since the coup. For
example, the first attempts to lodge habeas corpus writs
were unsuccessful; soldiers prevented National Human
Rights Commissioner Kapil Shrestha from leaving the
Kathmandu valley; prominent rights activists such as
Krishna Pahari and Gauri Pradhan have been detained as
has been Professor Lok Raj Baral, a respected academic
and former ambassador to India; peaceful pamphleteers
and demonstrators have been picked up off the streets of
Kathmandu. The most reliable estimate is that 385
political leaders or activists and 35 human rights
defenders have been detained since 1 February.15
now needs to mobilise an extra 32.31 billion rupees
(approximately $450 million) if it is to meet its planned
expenditure of Rsl 15.29 billion rupees ($1.6 billion) for the
fiscal year 2004-2005 ("Will Nepal meet the resource gap?",
24 February 2005). Nepal's foreign currency reserves of $1.7
billion may not be sufficient to withstand a severe liquidity
crunch, especially if there is a further reduction in foreign
tourism and any disruption to vital remittance income
("Coping with coup", Sunday Express, 6 February 2005;
available at http://www.indianexpress.com/full_story.php?
content _id=64159).
14 "The security forces have stepped up monitoring of
government offices providing direct services to general public
since Monday. On the first day, the security team is reported to
have launched sudden inspection of Passport Department, Land
Revenue Department, Kathmandu District Administration
Office and Transport Management Office in the valley. Royal
Nepalese Army (RNA) spokesman Brigadier General Deepak
Gurung said that the army had to step up monitoring of the
government offices after commoners had lodged complaints
against these offices". "Security forces start monitoring govt,
offices", www.kantipuronline.com, 8 February 2005.
15 Asian Human Rights Commission, "UPDATE (Nepal):
Additional lists of arrested political leaders/activists and
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Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 5
The prospects for further bloodshed, as and when the
RNA can spare the units for offensive action, seem
great. Indications from within the military are that it is
annoyed at the failure of "C"-type cordons, is preparing
to shift to "0"-type encirclement and engagement, and
will launch operations on the principle of "full destroy".
These new tactics explicitly recognise that civilian
casualties are both likely and acceptable. Already reports
from Morang district suggest that a major "encounter"
between the army and Maoists has resulted in the deaths
of at least three schoolchildren. With no freedom for
investigation and reporting of such incidents the potential
for abuses and the sense of impunity are greatly increased.
III.   WHAT CAN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY DO?
A.    The Priorities
International policy on Nepal has failed. Quiet diplomacy
and support for the king have not worked. Since 2002,
the main players — India, the U.S., and the UK ~ have
been urging the king to work with the political parties to
develop a common political strategy toward the Maoists.
The EU has taken a similar stance. Peace-building efforts
such as the creation of a secretariat to advance a
negotiated settlement and the provision of technical
conflict management expertise have not been backed by
adequate political will. Instead, and despite repeated
warnings from all sides, the king has seized power, and
the situation has worsened significantly. Acceptance of
the present course would lead to further instability and
hasten a possible takeover by the Maoists.
The first international reaction to the coup was strong16
but there is a risk that as the days go by the situation may
appear to normalise, and accepting the new status quo
could become the line of least resistance. The king and
his advisers were certainly surprised by the extent of
negative reaction, not least Indian refusal to attend the
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) summit at which Gyanendra had hoped to
appear as Nepal's head of government.17 But they are
prepared to weather a brief storm of protest. Palace
officials brushed off the stern Indian statement on the
human rights defenders", 23 February 2005, available at
http://www.ahrchk.net/ua/mainfile.php/2005/959.
16 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Royal Coup, op. cit.
17 The decision of India's prime minister not to take part in the
SAARC meeting scheduled to be held in Dhaka, Bangladesh,
in effect resulted in its cancellation since the SAARC charter
provides that summits may only be held if the head of state or
government of each member state attends.
coup with the comment that "Nehru said exactly the same
things in 1960 [when King Mahendra dismissed an elected
government and seized power]. But he came round soon
enough". Palace emissaries have been making open
comparisons with General Pervez Musharraf s seizure of
power in Pakistan and subsequent rehabilitation by the
international community.18
The international community as a whole has little
enthusiasm for close involvement with Nepal's troubles.
Most countries have long hoped that India, its most
influential neighbour, would play a more active role in
ensuring stability in its backyard. While the severity of
Nepal's situation has slowly dawned on the outside world,
and the precariousness of its state institutions are now a
matter of wider concern, it is all too likely that attention
will dwindle rapidly, and the policy drift that has
accompanied Nepal's slide towards state failure will
continue.
However, the goals of Nepal's friends and neighbours
are similar: they want a peaceful, stable, prosperous and
democratic Nepal, and they want to avert a violent
Maoist takeover. Immediate policy priorities, therefore,
are easy to identify:
□ re-establishment of constitutional rule: restoration
of all suspended freedoms, release of all those
arrested in the royal crackdown since 1 February
2005 and an end to the state of emergency;
□ expanded protection of human rights not only
through the signing and full implementation of
the NHRC's Human Rights Accord but also by
immediately providing full access to all places of
detention for the NHRC and the ICRC; and
□ development of a stronger legal framework to
protect rights through the repeal of the Terrorism
For example, they say the idea of cutting all phone
communications was borrowed from the Pakistani coup. There
are clear differences between the situations in the two countries,
however. The RNA and the Palace lack the institutional capacity
to run the state that the Pakistani military has built up over
many decades. International support for Musharraf has been in
exchange for his cooperation on terrorism and nuclear
proliferation and because of an exaggerated concern that the
Pakistan state is under threat from Islamic extremists. Nor is
Pakistan a good model for Nepal of economic, political or
security management. Tensions are rising across Pakistan; it
remains severely under-developed; reforms to areas such as
education have faltered; jihadism has not been effectively
tackled, and the military looks unlikely to leave power any
time soon. It is notable that General Musharraf also justified
his coup on the grounds of corruption and the ineffectual
nature of political parties. After several years of military rule,
Pakistan is no less corrupt. See Crisis Group's extensive
reporting on Pakistan at www.crisisgroup.org.
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Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 6
and Destructive Activities Ordinance (TADO),
signature ofthe Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions and full implementation of the
international instruments to which Nepal is already
a party.
B.    Pressure Points
These policies are most likely to succeed if preceded by
the judicious application of pressure on the royal
government. Certain effective actions have already been
taken. Most significantly, India has cut off military aid
and the UK has suspended delivery of a planned new
package of military assistance.19 India has also surprised
the palace with the force of its diplomatic reaction:
blocking the king from obtaining recognition at the
SAARC summit, postponing the Indian army chiefs
scheduled visit to Kathmandu, and strong public
statements. The coordinated recall of the Indian,
American and all EU ambassadors has also sent a
clear signal. The Danish government has suspended all
development aid. But international reaction should utilise
a wider range of pressure points. In each area there are
both measures that should be taken immediately and
stronger ones that can be held in reserve in case results
are not forthcoming.
1.       Non-military assistance
Nepal is heavily dependent on foreign aid. Most
development work is funded by outsiders. Essential
humanitarian assistance must be continued but much
development aid has been thrown into doubt by the
royal coup. Donors who work with and through the
government had already been concerned by its lack of
capacity to implement programs. Many experts on the
ground now expect the development environment will
make most programs unviable.
□     First round:
(i)    freeze of all direct budgetary support to the
government;
(ii) no new agreements with the international
financial institutions (IFIs);
(iii) no new bilateral or multilateral development
aid agreements;
(iv) review all other development assistance and
draw up plans for a phased suspension and
withdrawal.
□ Second round: suspend all development assistance
channelled through the government.
2.       Diplomatic action
Concerted diplomatic action can yield results but only if
it sets realistic benchmarks and applies pressure that will
be felt in Kathmandu. The international community has
not been taken seriously in the past: for example, the
Nepal government's commitment letter and the Chair's
statement at the 2004 UN Commission on Human
Rights did not lead to any improvements in the human
rights situation. Donors could easily assert much greater
authority if they made clear that Nepal will face intense
scrutiny in all possible international arenas and will be
judged on action and implementation not words.
□ First round:
(i) support a strong Item 9 resolution at the
Commission on Human Rights in Geneva;20
(ii) cancel pending official visits by Nepali
officials;
(iii) restrict attendance at government functions
and all non-essential meetings by Kathmandu-
based diplomats.
□ Second round:
(i)    reduce diplomatic ties;
(ii) in the case of lack of improvement in the
human rights situation, start preparing a
security council decision with respect to
investigation and prosecution of possible
war crimes;21
19 "India Freezes Arms Aid to Nepal", Statesman, 22 February
2005. "British Government Suspends Military Support to
Nepal", statement by Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, 22 February
2005. The package included night flying capability and
communications enhancements to Short Take Off and Landing
surveillance aircraft previously provided, 40 general purpose
Land Rovers and Explosive Ordnance Disposal equipment and
vehicles. Straw said the UK was "now considering with key
international partners what our longer term policy for providing
assistance to Nepal should be, including on assistance with a
humanitarian purpose". It appears that India's freeze is more
comprehensive than the UK's: Britain has not so far suspended
military training.
20 Item 9 refers to the agenda item of the Human Rights
Commission's annual meeting in Geneva under which
countries can raise concerns about "Human Rights in the
World". It provides a flexible opportunity for members of
the commission to raise emergency human rights situations.
21 UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour
raised the possibility of such investigations and prosecutions
during her visit to Nepal in January 2005, shortly before the
royal coup, Nepal is not a signatory to the Rome Statute
establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC) but the
Security Council could authorise that Court to exercise
jurisdiction similar to what is currently under discussion with
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Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 7
(iii) suspend participation of Nepali troops, police
officers, civil servants, etc. in UN peacekeeping
missions.
3.       Military assistance
The RNA is heavily dependent on foreign assistance for
both its operations and prestige and, therefore, should be
vulnerable to pressure to change both the king's policies
and the disastrous human rights environment that
has done so much to reduce the effectiveness ofthe
counterinsurgency. While Nepal ultimately requires
outside aid to maintain an effective military, the RNA
has enough weaponry, ammunition and equipment to
maintain its current level of activity against the Maoists
for at least the next few months. A suspension of
military assistance would not, therefore, create a military
emergency in the short-term but it would make the RNA
think hard about where its interests lie and probably
prevent the launching of an offensive that would result
in substantial civilian casualties while it was doing that
thinking.
Military prestige is very much invested in contacts with
foreign militaries. Overseas service with UN peacekeeping
operations is a lucrative source of income for top military
officials and a point of pride. All future military assistance
should be conditioned on human rights improvements
and the army's non-interference in politics.
□     First round:
(i) freeze all military aid that is not essential to
maintaining the security status quo;22
respect to the situation in the Darfur area of Sudan. The U.S.,
which objects to the ICC, has opposed such a referral on
Darfur and supports the use of an ad hoc tribunal.
22 As noted above, India which is the RNA's most important
supplier, and the UK, which is third, after the U.S., have
already announced measures that appear to go at least this far.
Military aid has only had a limited impact on the state's capacity
to maintain security. More weapons have intensified the conflict
without improving security and much materiel has fallen into
Maoist hands. There may be practical difficulties in determining
what aid is essential and what is non-essential, but the
practical rule of thumb would be that RNA capacities should
not be increased. Thus while resupply of a certain level of
ammunition or other supplies could be justified, increases in
those supplies or new or improved systems would not be.
There might be legitimate differences about what assistance
should be allowed because it is already well into the pipeline.
Again, the bottom line should be whether the impact would
essentially be to allow the RNA to hold present lines or
whether it would be to encourage it to attempt offensive
action. Potential military donors should also consider that
unlimited supplies have only encouraged the RNA to engage in
unproductive,   ^discriminate  free-fire  fights.   Limiting  its
(ii)   provide no new military aid pending review;
(iii) suspend international contacts, army-to-army
ties, officer training courses, etc.;
(iv) review the RNA's current involvement in
UN peacekeeping options and have the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations
prepare plans for replacing currently
deployed forces.
□ Second round:
(i)    suspend all military assistance;
(ii) suspend all participation of RNA soldiers in
UN peacekeeping operations;
(iii) target sanctions (visa ban) on all senior
RNA officers and their families.
4.       The palace
By seizing power, the king has placed himself at the
centre of any diplomatic action. Polite demarches will
not resolve this problem. The king and those around him
are vulnerable to a number of forms of pressure, some of
which have already been exerted. Protocol restrictions
are an obvious starting point, although a flexible approach
needs to be maintained to allow some communication to
facilitate a solution. It is not known what assets the king
has outside the country but he has large business interests
including a hotel, a tea estate, and stakes in other
companies inside Nepal, which link him to members of
the Kathmandu elite who have encouraged him to seize
power. The Nepali elite is cosmopolitan and well-
connected to the outside world and therefore vulnerable
to smart sanctions.
□ First round:
(i) limits on international contacts, restrict
diplomatic attendance at royal or palace
functions, withdrawal of travel and social
invitations to royal family and close relatives;
(ii) investigate royal and other overseas assets,
including bank accounts, property and business
interests, and draw up plans for asset-freeze.
□ Second round:
(i) blacklisting of palace-owned or crony
businesses and their senior staff;
(ii) visa and travel ban for members ofthe royal
family and the royal government;
(iii) freeze royal assets overseas.
supplies as well would not only send an important signal but
might also improve RNA tactics.
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page <
C.      AN INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM
"The king just doesn't listen to us ~ what can we do?",
has become a standard refrain of ambassadors in
Kathmandu, who even before the coup were frustrated
at their inability to persuade the king to follow their
governments' advice.
A major hindrance to successful international pressure
has been the diversity of diplomatic voices. While the
major players — most notably India, the U.S. and UK —
have frequently cooperated and agreed on the basic line
that there is no obvious military solution to the conflict,
successive Nepali governments have proved adept at
shrugging off advice. The palace has calculated that
political indecision will allow its coup to succeed
regardless ofthe chorus of public disapproval. But hand-
wringing does not have to be the only response to this
dangerous situation. The key players should organise to
deliver their messages more effectively.
1. Forming a Contact Group
If the international community is to play an effective
role in helping rescue Nepal from its political crisis and
working towards the resolution of its long-running
conflict, it must speak with a strong single voice. For
this it needs a suitable mechanism. The best would be a
Contact Group that brings together at least New Delhi,
Washington, and London as well as the UN.
The group could appoint a senior envoy with stature,
experience and a mandate to devote considerable time to
serious talks in Kathmandu and other capitals.23 Even
without a special envoy, the group could formalise the
coordination of policy in a way that sends a clear
message to Kathmandu.
2. Members and their positions
Contact Groups have played a significant role in the
international response to other conflicts.24 But composition
and mandate raise certain questions. When major powers
are already coordinating their policies what advantages
would a formal grouping bring? Why should certain
nations and intergovernmental bodies be a part of it and
others not? What scope would the group and its envoy
have for diplomatic engagement and what weight would
it carry?
The primary aim of forming such a group for the Nepal
crisis would be to make the adoption of a common
policy explicit and to reaffirm to all players in the
country that they will gain no advantage by seeking to
play one power against another. The most difficult
immediate issue on which to reach agreement would be
the aid question, especially military aid. Ultimately
Contact Group members would also need to coordinate
their views on negotiations with the Maoists about
which they have at least nuanced differences.25 However
great their cooperation to date, diplomats have admitted
that their sustained efforts to use gentle persuasion have
ended in failure. A single group with a high-profile
envoy would stand a far greater chance of having its
messages heard and acted on.
The composition ofthe group would be crucial. It would
not be a group of equals but rather a loose alliance of
interested and influential parties, consisting of three
states and the UN. The positions and interests of its
members are outlined below.
India. India sees Nepal as part of its sphere of
influence and has a unique relationship with it under
the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship.26 India
asserts, with justification, that other nations may seek
to influence Nepal but none is equally exposed to the
effect of instability there. India is also the main
supplier of military assistance though, as noted, one
of its first reactions to the coup was to announce the
suspension of that assistance.
While Delhi has been deeply concerned by the royal
coup, it faces difficulties in taking policy steps since its
diplomats are well aware that any intervention runs the
risk of raising Nepal's nationalist hackles and leading to
unwanted side-effects. A Contact Group would afford it
key opportunities that are otherwise unattainable: (i) a
degree of external assistance to Nepal in the resolution
of its conflict without ceding decision-making powers to
any third party; (ii) the chance to shape international
policy without being branded a bullying big brother.
Moreover, a mature and cooperative role in such a
multilateral grouping could boost Delhi's claim to a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Such an envoy would not necessarily have to come from
one ofthe Contact Group member countries.
24 Two current prominent Contact Groups deal with the
Middle East (the Quartet) and Kosovo. Others have operated
during and after the war in Bosnia and during the Liberia
Crisis. Contact Groups are informal, ad hoc groupings that do
not require a UN Security Council mandate and can set their
own modus operandi.
25 See Crisis Group Report, Nepal's Royal Coup, op. cit.
26 For a text ofthe treaty see: http://www.insof.org/treaty/280
41960_Sino-Nepalese_Treaty.htm. It provides for an open
border, gives citizens the right to work in the other country,
and establishes India's right to veto Nepali arms deals with
third countries.
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 9
India has been reluctant to consider third party mediation
between the political forces in Kathmandu and the
Maoists, saying this would legitimise the insurgents.
But it may be somewhat more amenable to an
international role in settling the political dispute in
Kathmandu that the king's coup has sharpened.27
U.S. Washington has been a staunch supporter of
successive Nepali governments' efforts to tackle the
Maoist insurgency and has given the RNA significant
military aid. Although criticised as a hawkish backer of
a tough security response to the insurgency, the U.S. has
long recognised, at least in its rhetoric, that a military
solution is impossible. Recent legislation that predates
the coup tied its military assistance to better observance
of human rights by both the RNA and the government,28
and its response to the king's action has been one of
dismay. Its calls for immediate restoration of constitutional
freedoms and democratic institutions would be amplified
by a united Contact Group.
U.S. reluctance to cut off aid may be driven by a fear that
this would only embolden the Maoists but senior officials
are aware that military pressure has failed to yield results
so far and there is little chance of that changing in the
near future. U.S. officials say there is no lethal military
equipment in the pipeline for delivery before May or
June,29 which gives them a window in which to
coordinate policy on this issue with the Indians and
British. This is important because Delhi would likely
react strongly should Washington move into a vacuum
and reduce significantly the RNA's dependence on it for
most of its needs.
Crisis Group interview with Indian official. New Delhi.
January 2005.
28 Section 590 (C) of the omnibus appropriations act passed in
December 2004 (P.L. 108-447) provides that: "(2) Funds
appropriated under the heading 'Foreign Mlitary Financing
Program' may be made available for assistance for Nepal if the
Secretary of State reports to the Committees on Appropriations
that the Government of Nepal: (A) has determined the number
of and is making substantial progress in complying with habeas
corpus orders issued by the Supreme Court of Nepal, including
all outstanding orders; (B) is cooperating with the National
Human Rights Commission of Nepal to identify and resolve all
security related cases involving individuals in government
custody; (C) is granting the National Human Rights
Commission of Nepal unimpeded access to all places of
detention; and (D) is taking effective steps to end torture by
security forces and to prosecute members of such forces who
are responsible for gross violations of human rights. (3) The
Secretary of State may waive the requirements of paragraph (2)
if he determines and reports to the Committees on
Appropriations that to do so is in the national security interests
ofthe United States".
29 Crisis Group interview, Washington, February 2005.
UK. London's diplomatic ties with Nepal date back to
the expansion of the British East India Company in the
eighteenth century and have remained close because of
the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers and a large aid
program. Although the European Union has started to
take a more active political interest in Nepal ~ as shown
by the visit of a high-level troika in mid-December 2004
— the UK has been much more willing to play a leading
role in the international response, especially since it
organised an international conference on the conflict in
Nepal in 2002. The UK also has good links to Delhi and
Washington. The UK has provided some limited military
assistance including helicopters but it announced on 22
February 2005 that it is suspending planned delivery of a
package of further non-lethal equipment worth £1.34
million.30
The UN. The UN is widely respected in Nepal, which is
proud of its reputation as an active member state and
contributor of peace-keeping forces, but the world
body's large in-country presence has traditionally been
heavily development oriented, with the United Nations
Development Program (UNDP) as the lead agency.
Secretary General Kofi Annan has on several occasions
expressed concern about the conflict and offered his
good offices in any peace process. The Department of
Political Affairs has been monitoring the situation and
has built good relations with key political players. High-
profile visits by special rapporteurs and the High
Commissioner for Human Rights have focused domestic
and international attention on urgent problems. But the
UN has held back from a more proactive political role in
searching for a resolution and has been wary of declaring
a humanitarian crisis prematurely. A Contact Group
would allow it to contribute expertise in areas such as
human rights, humanitarian affairs and conflict resolution.
Other nations. A number of other countries also could
play important roles, albeit not within the Contact Group
itself. While China is generally not keen to comment
directly on Nepal's internal politics, it could use UN
participation in the Contact Groups as a channel to
exercise indirect influence. The EU and many of its
member states, Japan, Canada Norway, Switzerland and
Australia are donors and could form a valuable bloc to
help the Contact Group maintain momentum. Other
members of the South Asian Association for Regional
Cooperation would be indirectly represented by the
UN and should be pleased to see India engaging in
multilateral diplomacy.
1 See footnote 19 above.
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 10
D.    A Reform Plan and Vision of the
Future
Nepal is a failing state in no shape to reverse a violent
insurgency on its own. The international community needs
to help the country reverse the setbacks ofthe last nine
years and put it in a position to negotiate a viable long-
term settlement. Rebuilding the state cannot be a matter
of resorting to the status quo ante that allowed Nepal to
get into this position. There needs to be a forceful and
far-sighted agenda for change. Some elements of such
an agenda are political steps that could be achieved with
little financial cost and would require few state resources.
Others will have to be more long term and require, at
minimum, a re-direction of international assistance. Some
reforms will need to co-opt ideas from the Maoists: this
should not been seen as granting concessions to a rebel
group but as a sensible way to deal with the deep
problems of Nepali society that the insurgency feeds off.
The immediate policy changes demanded of the royal
government, such as the restoration of civil liberties and
freeing of political prisoners arrested since the coup,
must be only the prelude for a wider program of reform.
The re-establishment of democratic institutions should
be the basis for strengthening the state and restoring the
population's faith in it. Elected representatives at all
levels are the only means of making administration and
governance responsive to people's needs and presenting
a political challenge to the Maoists.
The next government must then develop a broad-based
political, security and socio-economic strategy to address
the insurgency and the underlying issues that have fuelled
it. The political challenge will be to sell to Nepal's people
a vision of the future that inspires confidence and
support. Making this vision reality will require political
leadership of a calibre far above that exhibited by recent
governments. In the absence of inspirational and capable
statesmen and women, Nepal's friends in the international
community will have to shoulder much of the
responsibility for acting as guardians to a sustained
reform process.
No outsiders should dictate the form of Nepal's political
institutions, and it is not the case that only one model
will work. Nevertheless, certain areas will clearly have
to be reformed. The sections below indicate some ofthe
challenges.
1.       Constitutional reforms
The 1990 Constitution has created neither a functioning
constitutional monarchy nor an effective democracy. A
document is needed that removes certain ambiguities
about royal power, particularly those centred around
Article 127, which the king has exploited in the past
several years to remove prime ministers and justify the
current coup.31 At the moment the most effective
mechanism of constitutional reform would be an
agreement among all mainstream parties to reconstitute
parliament with a limited mandate to change the
constitution to ensure:
□ limited royal powers that do not include the right
to oust governments;
□ civilian control over the military;
□ the constitutional primacy of parliament (around
which there is currently ambiguity); and
□ greater flexibility to deal with caste and ethnic
inequalities.
These changes would do much to undermine the Maoist
agenda. The door should be left open for further
constitutional change as needed; indeed the parliament
might also lay out a timetable for further discussion and
revisions over a five or ten- year period.
2.       Political Party Reforms
Nepal's political parties have done much to damage
support for democracy. Internal reforms are needed
urgently if they are to reclaim any of their lost
legitimacy. The establishment of a royal commission on
corruption provides cover for the king's undermining of
democratic leaders but it is the failure of successive
governments to control corruption that has made the
stick with which they are now being beaten. Carrying
out reforms while their very existence is under threat
will not be easy but parties will need to:
□ hold free and fair leadership elections (where
security will allow) so that members can choose
their leaders and possibly bring up a new generation;
□ deliver on public commitments to tackle corruption
and cooperate fully with any legitimate judicial
investigations;
Article 127 of the Constitution states: "Power to Remove
Difficulties: If any difficulty arises in connection with the
implementation of this Constitution, His Majesty may issue
necessary orders to remove such difficulty and such orders
shall be laid before parliament". The language is imprecise but
it is clear that the king has never laid any order before
parliament. Rule without elections clearly goes against the
spirit and language of the Constitution that states: "We are
convinced that the source of sovereign authority of the
independent and sovereign Nepal is inherent in the people, and
therefore, we have from time to time, made known our desire
to conduct the government of the country in consonance with
the popular will".
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 11
□ develop, with international assistance, mechanisms
to allow greater transparency on party financing,
the assets of party leaders and internal promotions;
and
□ develop mechanisms to make themselves more
representative ofthe wider population, including
encouraging greater leadership roles for lower
castes (dalits), ethnic minority members and
women.
3. Undercutting the Maoist Agenda
It is worth remembering that many of the Maoists'
original 40 demands have been accepted by almost all
politicians as reasonable.32 If action had been taken
earlier to address them ~ not least the issues of
economic, regional, caste and ethnic disparity which
have helped the rebel cause attract recruits ~ the
insurgency would have been unlikely to gain as much
ground as it has. The next government should:
□ develop, in consultation with all parties and civil
society, an economic blueprint for Nepal,
including not only domestic issues such as land
reform but measures to regulate and benefit from
the growing remittance economy;
□ take firm measures to outlaw discrimination on
the grounds of caste, ethnicity, gender, regional or
linguistic origin, and the like and to develop a
cohesive sense of national belonging based on
inclusion in political and administrative processes,
education and employment, and economic
development; and
□ reform the judicial system so that people feel they
have access to even-handed justice and are no
longer tempted to abandon the courts in favour of
the Maoists' "people's courts".
4. Effective Security and Human Rights
The RNA has no likelihood of stemming the insurgency
as long as people feel trapped between two violent
forces. Until it recognises that human rights protection is
a central aspect of any counter-insurgency strategy, it
stands no chance of reversing the Maoist gains. Its lack
of local support and its failure to develop effective
intelligence about the Maoists can be linked to its abuses
of human rights. It is not enough to point to Maoist
violence as a justification for more abuses by the RNA.
Priorities include:
□ signing and implementing the Human Rights
Accord,33 thus bringing pressure on the Maoists
to do the same;
□ enabling the National Human Rights Commission
to carry out its mandate in full and encouraging it
to accept as much UN assistance as necessary to
boost domestic capacity; and
□ addressing the urgent need for phased security
sector reform: apart from the question of civilian
control, the military needs to be further
professionalised (with, for example, promotion
on the basis of ability rather than family ties) and
to hand over responsibility for law and order to a
strengthened civilian police force that can win
the trust of local communities.
If reforms such as these are embarked upon promptly
Nepal stands a good chance of facing up to the challenges
of the Maoist insurgency and avoiding becoming a
"failed state". An approach that recognises and addresses
weaknesses in state structures and governance is much
more likely to defeat the Maoists politically and build a
sustainable future.
IV.    CONCLUSION
Although King Gyanendra has said he will be bring
peace to Nepal, this is unlikely to happen unless his
coup is reversed. The Nepali state should be dealing
with the insurgency through combined political and
security strategies that could bring the Maoists to the
table and forge a lasting peace. This will not happen
with a military strategy alone. The first steps taken by
Nepal and the international community should focus on
the political situation in Kathmandu rather than the
conflict with the Maoists. Only when a strategy can be
agreed on and implemented by all democratic political
forces in Kathmandu will talks with the Maoists be
possible that stand any chance of success.
This is not the time to adopt a "wait and see" strategy.
The 100 days for the king to prove himself being
talked of by the U.S. ~ which, as noted above, does
not have to take decisions on its next round of
military aid until May 2005 ~ is too long. Every
indication is that the situation will deteriorate day by
day, and the Maoists will be the prime beneficiaries.
The international community has had more than two
For the list of Maoist demands see: http://www.insof.org/
pohtics/130299_40demands_Maoist.htm.
33 The Human Rights Accord was proposed by the National
Human Rights Commission in May 2003. Its aim was to get
both the government and the insurgents to abide by human
rights standards and agree to a monitoring process.
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005 Page 12
years to conduct a policy toward the king that has
essentially been laissez-faire. Since October 2002 it
has been waiting for him to deliver results.
But for all the tough rhetoric, the king has presided over
a decline in the state's reach and capacity even more
precipitous than that managed by several ineffective
democratic governments. Waiting longer for the situation
to develop will only hasten the growth of a dangerous
power vacuum in Kathmandu. If Nepal's friends wish
to salvage the prospects of a stable, democratic and
prosperous country, the time to act is now.
Kathmandu/Brussels. 24 February 2005
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 13
APPENDIX A
MAP OF NEPAL
Boundary representation is
not necessarily authoritative.
Zones
1 MahakaFi
8 Gandaki
2Seti
9 Narayani
3 Karnali
10 Bagmati
4 Bheri
11Janakpur
5Rapfi
12 Sagarmattia
6 Dhawalagir!
13KosT
7 Lumbini
14 Mechi
)Nawca      \   J
Base 301532 (B007S01MO
Courtesy of The General Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 14
APPENDIX B
ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an
independent, non-profit, multinational organisation, with
over 100 staff members on five continents, working
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to
prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group's approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing
practical recommendations targeted at key international
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch,
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct
regular update on the state of play in all the most
significant situations of conflict or potential conflict
around the world.
Crisis Group's reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and printed copy to officials in
foreign ministries and international organisations and
made available simultaneously on the website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with
governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate
support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board — which includes prominent
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business
and the media — is directly involved in helping to bring
the reports and recommendations to the attention of
senior policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is
co-chaired by Leslie H. Gelb, former President of the
Council on Foreign Relations, and Lord Patten of Barnes,
former European Commissioner for External Relations.
President and Chief Executive since January 2000 is
former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans.
Crisis Group's international headquarters are in Brussels,
with advocacy offices in Washington DC, New York,
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working in over 50 crisis-affected countries and
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish
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Affairs, New Zealand Agency for International
Development, Republic of China (Taiwan) Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Swiss Federal Department
of Foreign Affairs, Turkish Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, United Kingdom Department for International
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Foundation and private sector donors include Atlantic
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February 2005
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org
 Nepal: Responding to the Royal Coup
Crisis Group Asia Briefing N°36, 24 February 2005
Page 15
APPENDIX C
CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Co-Chairs
Leslie H. Gelb
President Emeritus of Council on Foreign
Relations, U.S.
Lord Patten of Barnes
Former European Commissioner for External
Relations, UK
President & CEO
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia
Executive Committee
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and
Ambassador to Turkey
Emma Bonino
Member of European Parliament; former
European Commissioner
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to
the UK; former Secretary General ofthe ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui*
Secretary-General, International Chamber of
Commerce
Yoichi Funabashi
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist,
The Asahi Shimbun, Japan
William Shawcross
Journalist and author, UK
Stephen Solarz*
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
William O. Taylor
Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S.
*Vice-Chair
Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah
II and to King Hussein; former Jordan
Permanent Representative to UN
Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director ofthe
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Ersin Arioglu
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman
Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi Group
Diego Arria
Former Ambassador of Venezuela to the UN
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the
President
Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group,
Hong Kong
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe
Pat Cox
Former President of European Parliament
Ruth Dreifuss
Former President, Switzerland
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Stanley Fischer
Vice Chairman, Citigroup Inc.; former First
Deputy Managing Director of International
Monetary Fund
Bronislaw Geremek
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
I.K.Gujral
Former Prime Minister of India
Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former
U.S. Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Wallen
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign
Affairs Minister, Sweden
James C.F. Huang
Deputy Secretary General to the President,
Taiwan
Swanee Hunt
Founder and Chair of Women Waging Peace;
former U.S. Ambassador to Austria
Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial,
Summary or Arbitrary Executions; former
Chair Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Senior Advisor, Modern Africa Fund
Managers; former Liberian Minister of
Finance and Director of UNDP Regional
Bureau for Africa
Shiv Vikram Khemka
Founder and Executive Director (Russia) of
SUN Group, India
James V. Kimsey
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America
Online, Inc. (AOL)
Bethuel Kiplagat
Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Kenya
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister, Netherlands
Trifun Kostovski
Member of Parliament, Macedonia; founder
ofKometal Trade Gmbh
Elliott F. Kulick
Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S.
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Todung Mulya Lubis
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia
Barbara McDougall
Former Secretary of 'State for External Affairs,
Canada
Ayo Obe
Chair of Steering Committee of World
Movement for Democracy, Nigeria
Christine Ockrent
Journalist and author, France
Friedbert Pfiiiger
Foreign Policy Spokesman ofthe CDU/CSU
Parliamentary Group in the German
Bundestag
Victor M Pinchuk
Member of Parliament, Ukraine; founder of
Interpipe Scientific and Industrial Production
Group
Surin Pitsuwan
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
Itamar Rabinovich
President of Tel Aviv University; former
Israeli Ambassador to the U.S. and Chief
Negotiator with Syria
Fidel V. Ramos
Former President ofthe Philippines
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
Former Secretary General of NATO; former
Defence Secretary, UK
Mohamed Sahnoun
Special Adviser to the United Nations
Secretary-General on Africa
Ghassan Salame
Former Minister Lebanon, Professor of
International Relations, Paris
Salim A. Salim
Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former
Secretary General ofthe Organisation of
African Unity
Douglas Schoen
Founding Partner ofPenn, Schoen & Berland
Associates, U.S.
Par Stenback
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Grigory Yavlinsky
Chairman ofYabloko Party and its Duma
faction, Russia
Uta Zapf
Chairperson ofthe German Bundestag
Subcommittee on Disarmament, Arms Control
and Non-proliferation
Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale
Center for the Study of Globalization
 Internationa
Crisis Group
WORKING TO PREVENT
CONFLICT WORLDWIDE
International Headquarters
149 Avenue Louise, 1050 Brussels, Belgium • Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 • Fax: +32 2 502 50 38
E-mail: brussels(@,crisisgroup.org
New York Office
420 Lexington Avenue, Suite 2640, New York 10170 • Tel: +1 212 813 0820 • Fax: +1 212 813 0825
E-mail: newvork@crisisgroup.org
Washington Office
1629 K Street, Suite 450, Washington DC 20006 • Tel: +1 202 785 1601 • Fax: +1 202 785 1630
E-mail: washington(@crisisgroup.org
London Office
Cambridge House - Fifth Floor, 100 Cambridge Grove, London W6 OLE • Tel: +44 20 7031 0230 • Fax: +44 20 7031 0231
E-mail: londougicrisisgroup.org
Moscow Office
Nizhniy Kislovsky Pereulok 3-46 - Moscow 125009 Russia • Tel/Fax: +7 095 290 4256
E-mail: moscow(@,crisisgroup.org
Regional & Local Field Offices
Crisis Group also operates from some 20 different locations in Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Latin America:
See: www.crisisgroup.org for details.
www.cnsisgroup.org