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Decision and Judgment, pp. 16979-17076 & Dissenting opinion Conde, David W., 1906- 1946

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DISSECTING OPINION; cf tiie Soviet Member of the Iiiteriiatioiial Military Tribunal, Major General; Jurisprudence I.T. Kikitchenko on the Judgment concerning defendants; Schacht, von Papen, rrita»clie and Hess and the accused organizations:; Reichscabinet, General Staff, and OKW.; The TriLunal decided:; a) to acquit the defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Pa*oen and; Hans Fritzsche;; "b) to seirbence the defendant Rudolf Hess to life imprisonment;;; c) not to declare criminal the following organizations: the; Heichscabinet, General Staff and OKW.; In this res-oect I can not agree with the decision adopted "by the; Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the cas^ and is based; on incorrect conclusions.; 1 . T H E IMPOUNDED ACQ.UIT?AL OF DEFEi^AH? SCHACHT; The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht, confirms; the following facts:; a) Schacht established contact with G-oering in December 1930 and with; Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently established contact between; the leadership of tiie ITazi Party and the foremost representatives of the German; industrial and financial circles. This, in particular, is confirmed 、y the; testimony of Witness Severing (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23 May 1946;; also US-S15).; "b) In July 1932 Schacht demanded that Pa*oen resign his post as Reich; C:iancellor in favour of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by Pe-oen; 1;  s testimony; at the preliminary interrogation and by Schacht; 1; s own testimony in Court; Transcri"o, Afternoon Session, 2 May 1946.; c) In November 1932, Schacht collected signatures of G-erman indus-; trialists, urging them to come out for Hitler; 1;  s appointment as ! R e i c h Chancell; On KovemTDer 12,1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler:; "I have no doubt tiiat the way we are directing the course; of events can only lead to your anointment as Heich; Chancellor. We are trying to secure a large num"ber of; signatures among the industrial circles to ensure your; appointment to this post." (3 一 6, US—??3, PS-3901, US-837)•; d) In Petraary 1933 Schacnt organized the financing of the pre-election; campaign conducted "by tile Hazy Party, and demanded at the conference of; Hitler and G-oering with the industrialists, that the latter "orovide three; million marks (D-203). Schacht admitted in Court that he had pointed out; the necessity for -oroviding the Nazi leaders with'this sum CTranscrit),; Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946), while the Defendant Fank and the former mem-; ber of the management of "I.G-. Far"benindustrie" Schnitzler, who were; present at this conference, "both confirmed that it was Schacht who was; the Initiater of the financing of the pre — elect ion canroai^ri. (Trans cri'ot; 4 July 1946, and EC—439, US—618)•; e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his; public statements that he asked for the support in the elections of "botii; the Nazi Party and of Hitler. (US-615, Transcript, Afternoon Session,; 2 May 1946)•; On 2 August, 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler:; :; f; Uo matter where my activities lead me in the near future,; even if some day you see me imprisoned, in a fortress, you; can always depend on me as your loyal aide. " (EC-457, US — 619) •; Snh^n.ht ごorisごicnisly and delibfir^telv siip-oorted the Ifezi Party find.; Actively a jded in the seizure of -power in Germany "by the fascists, Even; prior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and immediately; after the seizure of Dower "by the Nazis, Scha.ch/fc led in -olannin^: and develo-; ping the G-erman Armaments, as follows:; a) On 17 March, 1933, Schacht was at)-oointed President of the Reichs"be.nk; (PS-5021,US—11), and as he himself stated in a speech before his Reichsbank; collea::^ues on 21 March 1938, the HeichsLank under his management was "none; other than a national socialist institution; 11;  (Transcri-ot, Afternoon Session,; 3 May 1946).; t) In August, 1934, Schacht was appointed Reich Minister of Economy; (PS-3021; ITS-ll).His Ministry "was given the task of carrying out the eco-; nomic pret)ara.tion for war." (EC—128, US—623) • A special decree granted; Q/>V.̂ V̂.4- T n "HI a ハ - N O R »う tV nf "Rpi R*. • Mi.Nう RT. OT "Rn.ONNMV. nnl I mi t.pH AI:tViftri t.v; in the field of economy / "Heiclisgesetzblatt" for 1934, Part 1 , p . 565/-; c/ Making use of these powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon the; execution of the "new program" developed *by him /"Reichs^esetz'blatt; 11; ^ 1934,; Part I, p. 826/, and, as Schacht I myself noted in his speech of 29; Kovemter, 1936, this organization -played a tremendous -part in the course; cf Germany; 1;  s rearmament ? E C - 6 1 1 , U -62/'.; d/ ? o r the purpose of the most effective execution of this "new; program'; 1;  Schacht used the property and means of those political enemies of; the Hazi Regime, who either oecame the victims of terror or were forced to; emigrate /Schacht; 1; s note to Hitler of 3 May 19S9, PS-116S,; Sciiacht used swindler; 1;  s tactics and coercion" in an effort to acquire; raw material and foreign currency for armaments" /Affidavit of Vice-; President of the Reichstank, Puhl SC—437, US^634/,; /e During the very first day of his association with xteich.s'banlc,; Schacht issued a series of decrees /27 October 1933, 23 March 1 9 3 4 , 1 9; rebruary 1955/, which, in the long run helped realize the "bro^d program of tbe; financing of armaments, developed by iiim, and with, trie aid of which, as he; testified, he;  ,r; had found the way to finance the rearmament program.; w; In his Speech, in Leipzig on 1 March, 1935, Schacht, while s m m i n g iro; his preceding economic and financial activities, announced "••••everything; tiiat I say and do has the ? u e h r e i ^ s full agreement and I shall not do or say; anything which is not at)-oroved ty the J\iehrer; ,?;  /USSH-427/.; Having become the PIeni; _; ootentiary General for War Economy, Schacht; Minified under himself the leadership of the c-ntire German economy and through; his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerite war machine was accomplished.; a/ The secret law of 31 May, 1935, which appointed Schacht the; Plenipotentiary General for War Sccnomy, states as follows; "The task of; the Plenipotentiary General fcr War Economy is to place ell the economic; rraources in the service cf warfare.; 11;  "The PI tent iary General for vv; r; ar; Economy within the frainework of iiis functions is givr-n the right to issue; legal orders, deviating from the existing laws.; 11 ,f; He is the responsible; head for financing wars through the He%ch Ministry and the Reichsbank,; /*DQ noCI TT̂  . OA /; "b/ Schacht financed German armaments through the MEPO system of; promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on a national scale that has; no precedent, and the success of which was dex>rndent ut)on thr realization of; the aggressive plans of the Hitlerites. It was "because of this that; Schacht set 1942 as the date when the MEFG notes were to mature, and. he; •pointed out in his speech of 29 i\fovem"bcr, 1938, the relation between "the; daring credit policy" of tiie Heichsbank end the aims of the Hitlerite foreign; policy. /HC-611, US-622/.; c/ Having made full use of his plenary powers, Schacht carefully; developca and. carried out a "broad program of economic jno"bilization which; allowed the rlitlerite leaders to wage war at any time considered most; favorable. In particular, from the report of Schacht; 1;  s deputy, Wohltat,; "the preparation for mobilization carried out ty the Picnipotentiary for; War E c o n o m y s h o w s that Sciaacht provided to the last detail for the; system of exploitation of the German economy in war timp, all the way from; the utilization of industrial entcrorises, of raw material resources and; manpower down to the distriTDution of 80,000,000 ration cards/SC-258,; US-625/. It is significant that this re-oort was drawn U"0 a month; after Hitler; 1;  s statement at the conference of 5 ITov^mlDer, 1937, at which; Hitler set forth this concrete plan of aggression /PS-386, US-25/.; Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937: "I; worked out the preparation for war in accordance with the principle that; the vlan of our war economy must "be "built in peace time in such a way that; there will "be no necessity for any reorganization in casp of war". Schacht; confirmed his statGineiit in Court/Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May, 1946/.; Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared G-erm^ny for war.; d/ The former hinister of War, Von Blom'berg testified tiiat: "Schacht; was fully cognizant of the plans for development and increase of the Oerman; Armed forces, since he was constantly informed...., of all the financing; necessary for the aeマelopment of the G-erman armed forces" /US-838/; On 31 August, 1936, Von 3lomT:erg informed Schacht that: "The; establishment of all th^ Air Force units must be conroleted by Ax>ril1,1937,; and therefore large ex-oenditures nust be entailed in 1936, •• "/PS—1301,US-123/; In the spring cf 1937, Schacht partici"oat©d. in the military eycercises; in Godesberg /EC-174/.; /e In his memorandum to Hitler 011 May 3 , 1 9 3 5 , entitled the "Financing; cf Rearmament; 1 1; , Schaciat wrote: speedy fulfillment of the program for; rearmament on a mass scale is the "basis cf German policy, and, therefore,; every tiling else must be subordinate to this task; the completion of this; task; the completion of this task, the achieve珥en七 of thi^ purpose must meet; no obstacles "Pb-llSS, US-37/; In his STDGech on 29 Hovei^'ber 1938, Schacht aiinounced that ReiciisTDank; 1;  s; •oolicy mado possi/ble for G-ermany to crcate an;  ,f; unsurpassed machine, and, in; turn, this war mackine made possible the realization of the aims of our; policyマ SC-611, US-623ハ; One must cycludc the supposition that Schacht was not informed as to; what ; p u r p o s e s these weapons were to serve since he could not but take into; consideration their unprocedonted scale and an olDvious w f e r e n c e for; offensive types of weapons, heavy tanks, "bombers, and so on. Besides, Schacht; knew perfectly well that not & single count ry intended to wa.^^ war on C; T;  or many; nor had it any reasons to do so.; a/ Schacht utilized the Military might growing under hiB direction to; back G-ermany; 1;  s territorial demands which grow in p^o-oortion to the increase; in armaments,; Schacht testified in court that;  ,r; at first he confined himself (in his; demands) to the colonies whiph had once "belonged to G-ermany.; 11;  /Transcript,; Morning Session, 3 May, 1946/.; in September, 1934, during talk witii the Jimerioan Ambassador Dodd,; Schacnt pointed cut that he;  l,; dcsired annexation; ,f;  if possible without war,; "but through war, if the US would stay cut of it". /EC-461, US—58/,; In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul ?\illcr- "Colonies are; essential to Germany, If it is possible, v^ shall acquire them through,; negotiations; if not, wo shall sriz^ them,"/ EC-450, US—62; G; /,; Schacht admitted in Court th这t military -or^esure "out uooji Czechoslovakia; was "in some measure the result and the fruit of his labor". /Transcript,; M o; r; n i n ^ Session, 3 May, 1946ハ; "b/ Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and state; property of the countries which "became victims of Hitlerite aggressions.; The minutes of tiie conference of the Military-Sconomic Staff on 11; March, 1936, in which Schacht participated, state that those present were; given Hitler; 1; s latest directives about the invasion of Austria. Further, the; minutes state stat: "After this, at the suggestion of Schacht, it was; docided that.... all the financial accounting will "be made in Reichsmarks; at the rate of exchange: 3 shillings for one Reichsmark'; 1; / BC-421,US-645f.; Schacht admitted in court that he personally was in charge of the seizure; of the CzcciioSlovak ilaticnal Bank after the occutiation of Czechoslovakia.; /Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May, 1946/.; c/ At the "be^innin茗 of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his s^naccs for; negotiations with the United States of -Ajnerica in regard to the discontinuance; of aid to Sngland. and. he informed &oering of his offer. PS-3700, US—780/.; d/ Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate Hitler; putlicly after the signing of armistice with Prarxco, although Schacht, better; than anyone else, understood tlie usurpatory nature of the armistice.; /German Documentary, US-635/.; e/ In his letter to Punk on 17 October, 1941, Schacht suggested a more; effective exploitation of occupied territory, In tkis case, too, Schacht; acted on his own initiative/. SC—504 US^830/.; Schacht also participated in the persecution of the Jews:; a/ 二e testified in court that fee ''continued the policy of the perse-; cution of the Jews as a matter of principle; 1; 、 /Transcript, Afternoon Session,; 2 May, 1946/ although, he stated, "to a certain e x t e n t i t was a matter of; conscience which, however,;  ,!; was not serious enough to trin^ atout & "break"; between him and the Hazis. (Same Transcri*ot; also US—616)•; t. In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Sciiacht sighed a series of; decrecs, in accordance with which the wo-orrty of the Jews in Germany was sub-; ject to plxmder with impunity. (US-832 and US—616)• Schacht confirmed in; Court the fact that he had signed a series of anti-Semitic decrees, (Trans-; cript, Afternoon Session, 2 May, 1945.); As to the reasons for Schacht;  f; s rrsimation from the t>ost of thfi Minister; and also from the post of the President of the Rpichs"ba.nk on 20 Novem'bpr,; 1939, and finally from the post of the Minister without Portfolio in January; 1943, th.e evidence submitted establishes the following:; A, The reason is not Schacht; 1;  s disagreement with the economic *ore—; para七ion for aggressive wars.; Three weeks "before leaving the Ministry of Sconomy and the post of Ploni; potent iary General f or War Sconomy Schacht wrote to Q-oering: "... I also; doi^t consider that my ovinioh can differ from yours on economic policy^ • .;  H; (3C-497, US-775).; In nis reply G-ocring states: .. You promised me y6ur support and; collaboration. .. You have repeated thisproniso many times, even after; differmces of opinion "began to ere p up between us/SG—493, US-643./; Schacht testified in Court that Soering and he "Differed in matters of; procedure" /Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May, 1946/.; In the prrliciinary examination G-oering testified that Schacht; 1;  s leaving; the Heichsoank "had no rolatio'n to the -oro^rani of rearaainent"/ US-548.; The vlce-presiierit of the Reichstank, Puhl, confirmed that Schacht; resignation from the Reichs"bank can "be e.TT)laincd "by "his desire to oxtricate; himself from a dangerous situation" which d^velo-oted as the result of Schacht; own crooked financial operations. /EC—534, US-646/; "b. The reason is not Schacht; l; s disapproval of mass terror conducted; ty the Hitlerites.; The witness for the Defense, G-esavius, testified that he constantly in-; formed Schacht of the criminal actions of the G-estapo, crcated by G-oering,; and that nevertheless, right up to the rnd of 1936, Schacht looked for; for "Gcering; 1;  s support; 11;  /Transcript Morning Session, 24 April’ 1945/•; In iiis letter to Von Blomberg on 24 pecemlDer, 1935, Schacht suggested; that Grcstagpo atroly "more cautious methods; 11;  since the open terror cf the; G-esta"oo "hinders the objectives of the armament; 11;  /Transcript, Afternoon; Session, 2 May, 1946/.; On 30 January, 1937, Schacht was awarded a golden Party i n s i ^ i a "by; Hitler. /SC-S93, US^643/. As stated in an official Orr-rman "oublica七ion", he; was able to "be of groated lielt) to the Party than if hp wcro ac.tnfin v n mpm'bpr; Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Crermans, the; incvi七ability of the failure of the Hitlerite regime, did Schacht establish; contact with the cpx)0siti0n circles, however, doing nothing to help depose; this regime. Therefore, it was not by ciiance that having found out these; connections of Schacht, iiitler still spared Schacht's life.; It is thus indisputable established that:; 1)Sciiacht; 1;  s actively assisted in the seizure of power "by the iMazis;; 2) Inuring a period of 12 years Schacht closely collaborated with Hitler; 3) Schacht provided the economic and. financial "basis for the creation; of the Hitlerite military machine;; 4) Schacht prewarcd Oermany; 1; s econcmy for the va贫in疼 of aggressive vers;; 5) Schacht partici-oated in tho persecution of Jews end in thr -oltirider; of territories occupied "by the Gfrmans.; Therefore, Schacht; 1;  s loading -cart in tho -or^-oaration and ^yecuticn of the; common criminal t)lan is -oroved.; Tho decision to acquit Schacht is in obvious contradiction vith tko; evidenct; in possession of the Tritunal; Iェ• The Unfounded Acquittal of Dof ndant Von Pa-ocn.; The vordict does not dispute the fact that von Papen Drcpared the way; for Hitler; 1;  s ap;ooirrfcment to the post of the Rrichskanzler and that he actively; helxj^d Hazis in their seizure of power.; In a speech of the 2nd of Noveia"ber 1333,マon Papen said the following; on the subjcct:; "Then and. there, on "becoming the Heicnskanzler (this was; in 1932) I spoke in fa^or of tile young and fighting move-; ment for freedom; just as on tiie 50th of January I was; chosen "by Pate to surrendor power into tiie hands of otir; Kanzler and Purhrer, so today I must tell the ひ p r m a n; people and all these who have maintained, their trust in; me: mere iful G-od tlcssed. Germany by granting her in these; days of deex> sorrow a Further lik^ this."; /PS-2375./; ^ ‘ It WAS von Pa-ocn who revoked 3runing,t s ordor dissolving the SS and; the SA; f;  thus allowing the Hazis to realize their proCT闩茈 of mess terror.; 3-631).; Again it was the defendant who, "by the amplication of "brute fore,, did; aw&y with the Social Domocrat Government of 3reun and Severing. (Soマprin客,s; On the 4th January, 1933, Pat)on had a conference, vith Hitler, Hess,; and Himmler. (D-632).; Papen participated in the t)urge of the state machir.cry of all -oersonel; considered unreliable from the Nazi point of view; on the 31 of March^ 1933; t; he 6ignod a dccree crratin^ s-Qf-cial political tri"bunals: he had also signed; an order granting amnesty to criminals whose crimes were committed in the; coursc of the "national revolution"; ho participated in drafting the text; of the order "insuring party and state unity; 11; ; and so on.; Subsequently Papen faitrJ'ully served the m t l c r regime.; During the Putsch of 1934, Pa-oen ordered his stLlpordinato 'Tscr-irschky; to ppnn^^r r̂, tトご Qnatapr), knowing full well what awaited him there.; Tsnirschky as is well known, was exccuted. (2-684).; wnile Papen helped to kepp the "bloody murder secret from public o-oinion.; (D-718). .; Defendant played a tremondous role in helping Nazis to take possession; of Austria.; Three weeks after the assassination of Dcllfuss, on the 26th of July,; 1934, Hitler told Papen that he was "being appointed minister to Vienna,; specially noting in a letter: ^You have "been and continue to "be in; possession of my full and unlimited trust. " (PS-2799).; In this connection it is impossible to ignore the testimony of the; American Ambassador Messerschmidt who quoted Papen as saying that;  11;  the seizure; of Austria is only the first step; Jt;  and that ho, von Papen is in Austria for; the purpose of;  ,l; furtiacr weakening the Austrian Government." (US—57).; Def.ondant was Hitler; 1; s chief advisor in effecting plans for the seizure; of Austria. It was he who proposed several tactical maneuvers, to quiet the; vigilance of world opinion on the one hand, end allow Germany to conclude her; war preparations, on the other.; This follows indist>uta"ble from Papon; 1;  s statement to the Austrian Minister; Ber^er-Waldeneck (PS-1760), from the Eeport of G-auleiter Rouner of 6 July,; 1939 (US-61), from Papen; 1;  s Report to Hitler of 26 A u w s t 1936, (PS-3246), from; Papen* s Report to Hitler of 1 Sept enter 1936 (US-67), and from a series of; otiier doctunents which had "been sutraittcd in evidence.; Papen played this game until the issuance of the order for alerting the; German Armed ^crces for moving into Austria (US-69). He participated in; arranging the conference fcetween Hitler and Schuschnigg of 12 PelDruary 1938; (US-69).; It was Papen who in a letter to m t l e r cmpiiatically roccmmendcd that; financial ail "bo given the i^azi organization in Austria known as the 'Treedom; Union; 1 1; , specifically for "its figiit against the Jewry 丨丨 ( P S - 2 8 3 0 ) .; Indisput&"ble apoears th.e fact of the Hazi seizure of Austria and of; Papen; 1;  s partic'ip^i; 0 1 1;  this act of aggression. After the occupation of; Austria, Hitler rewarded von P&pen with the golden i n s i ^ i a of the H; a; z i Party; /D-632ハ; iMeither is it possi"bln to ignore von Pa-oen; 1;  s role as agent t)rovoc&t^nr; The post of ambassador to Turkey was at thr- time of considerable icroor—; tance in helping tiie Nazis realize their aggressive plans.; The official Nazi "biographer wrote atout von Papcn as follows:; "Shortly (after the occupation of Austria) the Fuehrer had; need of von Papert' s services again and on 18 April, 1939, he,; therefore, appointed, him German Ambassador in Ankara; }r;  /D-632/.; It should el so be noted that for his Turkish activities, Hitler revardrcl; von Paper with the Knight; 1; s Cross for his "Military services". /D-632/.; Thus evidence submitted estalDlisiies "beyond doubt tiiat:; 1 . V o n Papen actively aided the ifazis in their seizure of; 2. Von Papen used "ooth his efforts and his connections to; stren^tiien the Hitlcrian tr-rroristic regime in G-ermany.; 3. Von Papen actively particinatod in the Hazi agression; Aust; r; ia culminating in its occu-oation.; 4. Von Papen feithfully served Hitler up to the vory and; Hazi plans of agression iDOth with his ability and his diiDloinatic skill.; It therefore follows that Defendant von Papen "beトrs considerable; respcnsitility for the crimes of the Hitlerite rrgime.; xor these reasons I cannot consent to the acquittal of Defendant von; Papen.; III. The Unfounded Acquittal of Dcfende.nt Fritzsciie.; The acquittal of Dcfend£.nt nans x-ritzsche follows from the reasoning tl* .; ? r i t z s c i i G , allegedly, had not reached in Termany the official position; making him resporxsitle for the criminal actions of the Hitler regime end that; his own personal activity in this respect cannot "be considered criminal.; The verdict characterizes him as a secondary figure carrying cut the directives; of G-oe"b"bels and Eibtentrop, and. of the Heich Press Director Dietrich.; Tiie verdict does not take into consideration or mention the fact that it; was Fritzsche wiio until 1942 was the director de fscto of tlie Heich t>ress and; that, acco; r; ding to himself, sntsequent to 1942 he "becsmo the ”Conunender-in-chir; of the G-erman radio. “ /Trmscri-ot, Morning Session, 23 January, 1946/; For the correct definition of the fol户 of Defonipnt H^ns Fritzsche it is; necessary, firstly, to keep clearly in mind the im-oortanc^ attached ty Hitler; and his closost associates (as Ooerin^, for exam*ole) to nrotja^^ndp in; power.; solidify and; 抂gainst; aiding the; the most important and essential factors in tiie success of conducting ail; g^r-pssive war.; The Germany of Hitler, propaganda was invariably a factor in preparing; and conducting acts of aggression and in training the German populace to; accept obediently the criminal enterprises of German fascism.; Tiie aims of these enterprises were served loy a huge and woll centralized; propaganda machinery. With, tiie help of the police controls and of a system of; censorship it was possible to do away altogether with the frerdom of -oress; and of speech.; The "basic method of the Nazi propagandistic activity lay in the false; presentation of facts. This is stated, q^itr frankly in Hitler; 1;  s "Mein KannDf; "With the help of a skilful and continuous aT)-olication of TDro-oagsnde it is; possiole to make the people conceive even of heaven as hell and also make; them consider heavenly the most miserly existence.; n;  /US—276, p. 302/.; The dissemination of provocative lies and the systematic deception of; public opinion were as necessary to tho Hitlerites for the realization of thei"; plans as were the production of armaments and the drafting of military t)lans.; Without propaganda, founded on the total eclipse of the freedom of press and; of speech, it would not have "been possible for G-erman ? a seism to realize its; aggressive intentions, to lay the groundwork ana then to put to practice the; war crimes and the crimes against humanity.; In the prop&ganda system of the Hitler State it was the daily press end; tho radio tnat were the most inroortant weapons.; In his court testimony, Dofendant G-oering named three factors as; essential in the successful conduct of modern war according to tho Nazi conccT)t,; n a m e l y , ( 1 ) t h e military o"Derations of the armed forces, (2) economic warfaro,; (3ジ propaganda, With reference to 七he latter ho seid:;  n; Prot)a/:and^ has trn—; meridoua value, particularly -oro^aganda. carricd by means of r^dio; G-ermany has learned this through cxt>rrionce "better than anyone olse; ,r; .; Transcript, pp. 5981-5382/; With such concepts in ascondanc'" it is imDOssitle to su"p"oose that the; supremcnt rulers of the Rcich would appoint to the post of the director of re die; propaganda who supervised radio activity of all tho troadcastin •: comt)anies; The point of view of the verdict contradicts "both, the evidc-nce sutmitted; and the actual state of affairs.; Beginning with 1942 and into 1945 ? r i t z s c h e wa.s not only Chief of the; Radio Department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda "but also "PleniTDOtrntiar:; for the Political Organization of Hadio in G-re^ter Crormany; n; . This circumst?nco; is fully proven by the sworn affidavit of ? r i t z s c h c himself. /PS-3469, US-721/; It; thus follows that not at all was Pritzsche merely "one of the twelve de-oart-; mental chiefs in the Ministry of Propagende" was acquired res-oonsi"bility for al; radio propaganda only towards the end of the wer, as the verdict asserts.; Fritzsche was the political director of the G-erman radio uv and into; 1945 i. e, up to the r.oment of G-orman def eat and capitulation. ? o r this reason; it is Fritzsche who tears responsibility for the false and provocative "broad-; casts of the G-crman radio during the yeers of the war.; As ciiief of the Press Section inside G-erniany it was also Fritzsche who; was responsi"ble for the activity of the German daily press consisting of 2300; ncwst>apers. It was Fritzsche who created. o.nd perfected the Information Soctior; winning from the Reicii Government for the purpose an increase in the subsidy; greoited the newspapers from 400,000 to 4,000,000 marks. Subsequently Fritzsche; participated energetically in the development of the propaganda cejnpaigns; preparatory to the acts of aggression against Czocho-Slovakia and Poland.; /Transcript, Morning Session, 23 January, 1946/. A similar active vrovag^nie.; campai^pi was conducted by the Defendant prior to the attach on Ta^slavia as; he himself admitted on oath in court /Transcript, Morning Session. 23 January,; 1946/.; 又_; Pritzschc was informed of the plan to attack the Soviet Union and was put; "; a; u courant" the military intentions at a confero^ice with Hoscn'berg.; /PS—1039, US—146, Rosen'bGrg; 1;  s Written Heport to Hitler on the Subject of; Preliminary Drafts on Eastern European Problems/.; ? r i t z s c h e headed the German press campaign falsifying reports of Grrmenyts; aggressive war against Prancr, Englend, Norway, the Sc、iet Union, the USA,; and the other states.; The assertion that ? r i t z s c h p was not informed, of the- wp.r crimes ? n d the; crimes ag-: inst humanity tlien "being peroetratei oy the Hitlerites in the; occupied regions docs not agree with the facts. Prom Fritzscho; 1; s trstimony; in court it is ouvious that already in May 1942, while in the Proでagr-nip; Section of the 6th A m y , he was awa.ro of xiitler; 1;  s decrce ordering cxocution; for all Soviet political workers f.nd Soviet intellectuals, the so-c?llcd; "Commissar Decree". It is also established that already at the "beginning of; hostilities Fritzsche w?.s fully aware of the fact that the % z i s were carry-; ing out their decision to do away with all Jews in Europe. For instance, when; commonting on Hitler; 1;  s statement that "among results of the war there will "be; the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe" /p. 248 of the transcript/.; Pritzscnc stated that: "As Fuohrer predicted, it will occur in the event of; war in Europe, the fate of tile European Jcivry turned oi:t to "be quite sad.; !t; /p.3231 of tile transcript;/. It is further estatlishod that the Defendant; systematically preached the anti-social theory of race h p t m d and character-; ized peoples inhabiting couritries victimized, by aggression as "su"bhumans"; /Transcri/ot, Morning Session, 26 April,1946, v.83; and of the afternoon; session, pp. 1-2/.; When the fate of ム a z i G-ormany bccajne clear, Fritzscho c^mo out with; encrgetic support of the Defendant Martin Bormann and of other frnp.tical; Hitler adherents who organized the undercover fascist association, the so-; called "Werewolf."; On the 7th cf April, 1945, for example, in his last radio address,; Fritzsche agiteted for all the civilien population of &orm&ny to take active; part in the activities of this terroristic '^azi undcrgroup organization.; He said: "Let no one "be surprised to find the civilian t)0T)nlati0n,; occupied p.nd even after occupation has taken place. We shall call this; phenomenon "Werewolf" sincr it will have arisen without any preliminary; planning and without a definite organization, out of the very instinct of; l i f e / U S S S ^ 4 9 6 /; In his radio addresses fritzsche welcomed the G-erm&n use of the new; terror weapons in conducting the war, specifically the use of the "Y; u; rockets. On receiving a plan for the introduction of factorial warfare he; immediately forwarded it to the OXW for accept?.nce. /USSR —484, Evidence; submitted during the Afternoon Session, 28 June, 1946/.; I consider Fritische; 1;  s ros-DCnsilDility fully proven. His activity had a; most basic relation to the prer>arstion and. thr conduct of aggressive warfare; as we丄丄 as to the other crimes of the Hitler regime.; IV. Concerning the sentence of the defendant Rudolf Hess. The Judsment; of the Tribunal correctly and adequately portrays the outstanding position; wnicii Rudolf Hess occupied in the leadership of th.e Nazi party and state.; He w?s indeed Hitler; 1; s closest personal confident and his authority was; exceedingly great: In this connection it is sufficient to quote Hitler; 1;  s; decree appointing Hess as hi a Deputy: "I here*by ap'oo int Hess as my deputy; and give him full power to moke decisions in my name on all questions of; Pe.rty Lc-edcrship (TranscriDt 7 Potruary 1946, afternoon.); But the authority of Hess wrs not only con^in^d to questions of Prrty; leadership.; The official NSDAP publication "Party Year Book for 1941", which was; aamitted as USA Erhil^it Ko. 255, PS—3163, states that:... "In addition to the; duties of Party lcadershi-o, the Deuuty of the Feuhrer has far-reaching -oowers; first:; in the field of the State. These are/participetion in national and St?tc; legisle.tion, including the preparation of ruehrer; 1;  s order. The Doputy of; the fuehrer in this way マと-liiとvfces the conception of the Party...; Approval of the Deputy of the Fuehrer of proposed appointments for official; and labor service lee-.ders. Three, securing the influence of the Party over; the self-government of the municipal units.;  n;  (Doc. USA-255, PS-3163); Hoss was an active supporter of nitler; 1;  s aggressive policy. The crimes; against peace committed by him arc der It with in sufficient iete.il in the; Judgment. The mission undertaken by Hess in flying to England should "be con-; sidered as thf ‘last of these crimes, as it was undertaken in the hope of; facilitating the realization of aggression ageinst the Soviet Union "by; temporarily restraining England, from fightiiifi:.; The failure of this mission led to Hess; 1; s isolation end he took no; direct p?.rt in the planning and commission of subsequent crimes of thP Hitler; regime. There cp.n "be no doubt, however, that HPSS did evrrythin^ ,)ossi"ble; for the preparetion of these crimes.; Hess, together with Himmler, occupied the rolo of creator of the SS; police organizations of Gnrman fascism which pft^rwrrds cemmittod the most; ruthless crimes t.geinst humanity. The dofend?.nt clearly pointed out the; "Special tejskB; 11;  wkicii f&cea the Sb formations on occupied territories.; order through the Party Chancellory which made aiding the conscription of; Party memters into tliese organizations "by ell means compulsory for Perty; o r ^ ns: He outlined the tasks set before tiie Waff en-S^ as follows:; "The'units of the Weffen-S^ composed of National Socialists are more; suitable than other armed, units for the specific tc.sks to be solved in the; occupied ilastern territories due to the intensive trebling in regard to question; of race ani nationality. (G3-267, 3245-PS); ‘ : 、 . ' . ‘ : : ハ; :; “ . . . ' , . : . • : i • . y ; • •; , :; ' . . . ル; As early as 1934 the. Def eniantJ initiated 荩 proposal tbat the so-called SP; under the H^ichsfueiirer SS (Security Service) be giren extraordinary powers; and thus become the leading force in Hazi Germany.; On the 9th of June 1934 Hess issued a decree in accordwicp with which; the "Security Senricr of the Rpichsfuohrer SS” was dpclared to be th? "sole; political Inevs and defrnse- service of the Pf>rt,y!?, (CtB-257).; Thus the Defendant playei p direct part in the creption and ccnsolid?tion; of the systen of special .police orgrns which wer^ "being prepared for the com-; mission of crimes on occupied territories.; We find Hess to have always teeii an. advocate of the man-hating "master; race" tlieory. In a speech, ne.de on the \6th January 1937 v:iiile speaking of the; education of the ftermau nation, Hess pointed outt リ T h u s , they are "being educated; to put Germans atove the subject日 of a foreign nation, rrgardless of tiieir; positions or their origin•零! ( & B 2 5 3 , 3l24wPS).; so-called.; Hess signed the/Law-for ti^e Protection of Blood and Honour; 1; * pn the 15th.; Sept^iber 1935 (USA 300,, 3179-PS), The body of tnis law states that "the; Fuehrer; 1;  s deputy is authorized to issuf all necessary decrees, and directives".; ‘ ' ; • ハ 广 - ' : :ぃ . . ': •ク . _ . u ニ ニ . 一 ぶ i;" ,;  ;;  { ‘ .i :メ.:.ぃ丨f..ン:マ'; for the practical, realization of the "Nurnterg decrees."; , レ 、 ぐ . . . に : . . . ’ 厶 4 ^ •;  r; . 、— . • - . . , . • •; On the 14tli of November 1535. issued an ordinate liiide-r.S^f ch; citizenship law in RaoorpLaRce with which tte Jows were. denied the rî hjfc t-o; .• .:..; :;  ... .ニ,, . • • • へ 二 人 一.-... •••.一:.. ‘ ... '•‘; votB â - el^o^i^ae -oî ' hold public office (OB 358; 1417-PS).; On the 20th of May 1938 a decree signed l?y Hess extended the H u m b e r t; laws to Austria (GB-259, 224-PS).; “ し . . '、, . * , : ご . こ . . ‘ . . い . . 、 、 : ‘ :; On October 1 2 , 1 9 3 9 Hess signed a decree creating the ? d m i n i s ^ r ^ t i o n of; Polish occupied territories (Reichs^esetzblatt H 210, 1939 p 2077). Article 2; of this decree gave the defpndent Frr.nk the power of dictpt; 0; ^.; There is sufficiently convicing evidence showing that this Defendant; did not limit himself to this generel directive which introduced, into the; occupied Polish territories a regime of unbridled, terror. As is shown in the; letter of the Reichsninister of Justice to the Chief of the Reichschancollory; dated A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 4 1 , Hess was the initiator in the formation of specie!; "penal laws" for Poles and Jews in occupied Eastern territories. The role of; this Defendant in the drawing up of these "lews" is characterized by the Ministo; of Justice in the following words'i; "In accordance with the opinion cf the Fuehrer; f B deputy I s t p v t ^ from; the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible to the infliction of; ordinary punishment, •• • Under these new kinds of -ounishment, -orisoners are to; "be lodged outside prisons in camps find are to "be forced to 4o ho?vy and; heaviest labour, • The irxtroduction of coroorel -ounishjnent vrfiick the Deputy; of the Fuehrer has "brought up for discussion has not been included in the; drrft. I can not e.gre.e to this type of punishment The procedure fcr en-; forcing prosecution has "been ^"brogated, for it seemei intolerf."ble that Poles; or Jews should be a"ble to instigate a public indictment. Poles and. Jews have; also been deprived o^ tke right to prosecute in their own names or join the; putlic prosecution in an action... .Jroa the very "beginning it was intended to; intensify special treetment in case of need: When this necessity "became; actual e. sup-olementary decree was issued to wiaich the raehrer; 1;  s deputy refers; to in his letter.... (KB 268 H^96).; Thus, there can be no douot that was together with the other major war; criminals is guilty of crimes a^pinst hamanity.; Taking into consideration that among x>olitic?l leaders of Hitlerite; Germany Hess was tnird in si^ificance end ulayed p decisive role in the crimes; of the i%zi regime, I consider the only justified sentence in his cpse c^in te-; death.; -IS—; V. Incorrect Judgment With. Regard to the R^ich Cabinet; The Prosecution has posed before the Tribunal the question of declaring; the Reich Cabinet a criminal organization. The verdict rejects the claim of; the Prosecution, unfoundedly refusing to declare Hitler Government criminal; orgrnization.; Wish such c, decision I cannot agree.; The Tribunal considers it proven that the Hitlerites have committed; innunieraole and monstrous crimes.; The Tribunal also considers it proven that those crimes, were as e rule; conmitted intentionally end on an Organized sc^le, according to previously-; prepared plans and directives /"Plan Bar"be.rossa ,;  !,; !Tight and Fo只”,"Bullet",; etc. /; The Tribunal has declared several of the Nazi mess organizations criminal; the organizations founded for the realization 穸nd "outting to "or?•でtice the; •plans of the Hitler G-overnnent.; In view of this it appears perticularly untenable and rationelly in-; correct to refuse to declare the Reich Cabinet, the directing org£:n of the; Strte with a direct and active role in the working out of the criminal enter-; prises, a criminal orgpnize.tion. Th^ members of this directing staff had; great power, e?.ch hef.d.ed an appropriate government agency, each participp.ted.; in preparing and realizing the Nazi program.; In confiraa.tion it is deemed proper to cite several facts:; 1 . I m m e d i a t e l y after the Kazi ascent to power 一 一 on the 24th of March,; 1933 —一 there was a law passed entitled "The law of Defense of the People and; the State" vrhereby the Hoich Cr"binet, besides the Reichstag, received the; right of issuing new legislature.; On the 26 of May 1933 the Reich G-ovcrnnient issued e decree ordering the; confiscation the property of all Comiminist or^nizations pnd on the 14th; of June, the saaい year, it also confiscat^I the -oro-oerty of the Social; Democrpt or^nizations. On tiie 1st of Dec-nter, 1933, the Rpich G-overnnent; issued the law "Ensuring Party and. State Unity".; Following through its program of liquidating denocratic institutions, in; 1934 the G-overnnent passed a law of the "Heconstruction of the Reich" whereby; "bodies. Heichstag thereby "became an institution without functional meaning.; /TranscriTot, Afternoon Session, Novein'oer 23,1945, pp. 23-25/.; By the law of 7 April 1933 and others, all Reich government employees,; including judges, ever noted for any anti-llazi tendencies or ever having be-; longed to loftist organizations, as well as all Jews, were to be removed from; tiie ^overxiiuent service &nd substituted ty Hazis. In accordance with the; "Basic Positions of tiie G-ernan Law on Gl-overniaent Employees" of the 26 of; January "the innor harmony of the official and the ITazi party is a; necessary presupposition of his eppo into ent to his post …g o v e r n m e n t employee; inust be the executors of the will of the National Socialist St?.te, directed "by; the KSLAP" /Defense Exhibit ilo. 28, p. 59/.; On the 1st of May, 1934, there was created the Ministry of Educetion; instructed to train students in the spirit of nilitarisn, of rr.cial hatred,; and in terms of reality thoroughly falsified "by Nazi ideology. /PS—2078/.; Free trade unions were abolished, their property confiscptei, end the; majority of the leaders jailed.; To suppress even & semtlence of resistance the G-overnnent created the; Gestapo and the concentration Ccinps. Without any trial or even a concrete; charge hundreds of thousands of persons were arrested e-.nd then done away with; merely on a suspicion of an aiiti-Nazi tendence.; There were issued the so-called Hurn'berg Laws against the Jews. Hess and; Frick, both neuters of the Reich G-overninent, implemented, these by additional; decrecs.; It was the activity of the 2eich Cabinet thet "brought an the w&r which; took uillions of hoiaan lives and caused inestimable ±am.ge in property and in; suffering "borne "by tho neny nations.; On the 4th of February 19S8; f;  Hitler organized the Secret Council of; Ministers defining its activity as follows:;  n; To aid. me "by advice on protl^ns; of foreign policies I an creating this secret council"/"Hl'ichs^es^tz'hlatt"; for 19S6, Part I, p.112, PS-2031/. The forei»m policy of the Hitler Govern-; ment was the policy of a^^ession. For this reason the members of the secret; council shculd "be held responsible for this policy. There were attempts in; court to represent the secret council as a fictitious organization, never; sufficient to、recall Roscnber它,s letter to Hitler where the former insistently; tried to "be appointed nonbor of the secret council of ministers —一 to; epprecipte fully the significance of the council.; Even -.lore irroortant "orecti; c; r.lly in conducting eg^ressive the; Roich Defense Council headed, by Croerin^. Tho following were nen'bers of the; Dofenso Council, as is well known: Hnss, Prick, Punk, Keitel, Raider,; Lanners /PS-2194 and. 2018/.; Goerin.^ charrcterizod the function of the Defense Council and its role in; wrr preparftions rs follows, during the court session of 23 June 1939: "The; Defense Council of the Reich was the decidinr^Hoich or^an on all questions; concern^n^ Toro-pgrgition for we.r". /PS-3787, US-7S2/»; At the sane tine G-opring eypha.sized the fact tiiat "the meetings of the; Defense Council always took placc for th.e purpose of making the nost intiortant; ifcisions". From the ninutes of these meetings, submitted as evidence ty the; Prosecution, it is quite clear tn^t the Council nade very inportant decisions; indeed. The minutes also show that other cabinet ministers sonetines took; part in the neetin^s of the Council for the Defense alongside the menders of; the Council when Wcr enterprises and war preparedness were discussed.; For exe.ni-ole, the following Cabinet ministers took part in the meeting of; 23 June 1939: of LaT^or, of Food and Apiculture, of Finance, of Conmnicetion; and a nurabcr of others, while the minutes of the meeting were sent to all the; members of the catinet. /US-782/.; The veriict of the Tribunal justly points out certpin t^culiarities of; the Hitler Governnent as the directing organ of the state, nanely: the; essence of regular ca"birxet ueetin^s^ the occasional issuance of laws "by tho; individual ministers having unusual independence of action, the tremondous -Der-; sona.1 "oower of Hitler hinself. These peculiarities do not refute "b^t on the; contre.rt further confirm the conclusion tlie/t the Hitler Government is not en; ordinary rank- of -1 he- file cabinet lout a criminal organization.; Certainly Hitler had an unusual r-ieesure of personal power "but this in no; way frees of responsibility the meal-ers of his cabinet who were his convinced,; followers and the actual executors of iiis -orogran until and when the day of; r e c; lconing arrived.; VI. Incorrect Jud,??nent With Ref^rd to the G-eneral Staff; and the OICゾ ,; The verdict incorrectly re.jpcts the accusation of criminal activity; directed a ^ i n s t the G-enpral Staff and the OKW.; The rejection of the accusation of criminal activity of the General Staff; end of t3ae OKW coivbrpdicts "both the actual situation end the evidence su"b-; ciitted in the course of the trial.; It has teen established "beyond doubt that the leadership corps of the; Armed Forces of Hezi G-ermany together with the S^-Party machine, represented; the most important agency in the preparing and r。t:lizing the i^azi ag^essive; end man-hating program. This was constantly and forccfully reiterated "by the; Hitlerites tiieコselves in their official "bulletins meant for the officer per-; sonnel of the arned forces. In the liazi Party Bulletin called "Politics and; the Officer in the III Reich" it is quite clearly stated that the Hazi regime; is founded on;  11;  two -oillars: the Party and the Armed, forces. Both are forms; of expression of the spjne t)iiilosophy of life",;  ,f; the tasks "before the Party and; the Arned forces ere in an organic relationship to each other and each ト e a r s; the seme resTDOnsitility... . "both these agencies Ae-oend on each other; 1;  s success; or failure" /PS-4060, US-928, p.4/; This organic interrolRtionshiiD "between the Ne.zi Party and the on the; one hend end the liazi Armed Forces on the other liana, was TDarticulerly e^id^nt; a^iong the upr,er circles of military hierarchy which the Indictment groups; togetlier under the concept of criminal organization ~ that is, a^iong the; neLi"bers of the General Staff and the OKW.; The very selection of members of the Supreme Command of the Army in Nazi; Germany was tasoa on the criteria of their loyalty to the regime and their; readiness not only tc pursue aggressive iniliteristic policies but also to ful-; fill such. Bpccial directives as related, to treatment meted out to prisoners-; of-war and to tiie civilian populations of occupied territories.; The leaders of the German Armed Forces were not merely officers who; reached certain levels of the military hierarchy. They represented, first of; a l l , a closely-knit group which was entrusted with the most secret -olans of; the Sazi leader shit). Evidence submitted to the Tribunal has fully confirmed,; the contention that; the military leaders of Germany justified this trust com—; Hitler; 1; s plans,; It is not accidental that at the head of the Air Fore广 stood the "Second; man; n;  of the 以 a z i Eeich, naiiiely Gocring; that the commander-in-chief of the; ITavy was Doenitz, subsequently desi; r; ^nated "by Hitler to "be the latter* s; successor; that the coninani of the Ground Forces was concentrated in the hands; of Keitel who signed the major part of the decrees concerning the exectition; of the t)risoners-of-war and of the civilians in occupied territories.; Thus the comparisons made witia the organization of the supreme commands; in Allied countries canixOt "be considered valid. In a democratic country, not; one self-respecting military じxpしrt> would a^ree to prepare plans for nase; reprisals and nercilcss killings of prisoners — of—war side "oy side with Dlans; of the puivly^ili七ary and stratc^c character.; Meanwhile it is precisely 6uch natters that occu-oied the supreme command; of the G-eneral Staff -nd of ttie; 0; ^;  i n;  Nazi G-grnany. T b , conmission then; of the heaviest crimes against peace, of the war crir.es, and of the crimes; against honanity is not denied "but is "oarticularly om-ohasiz^i in the ^r; r; dict; of the Tribunal. And yet the commission of these crimes has not brought the; logical conclusion.; The verdict states;; :,; Thcy have been a-dis^race^to .the-' honorable profession.of arias; Without their military ^uidancc tho aggressive anuitions of; Hitler and his follow Hazis would have been academic and sterile...”; jind subsequently:; "Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier; 1;  s oath of; ob edience to nilitery orders. When it suits their def; r; ilse they say; they had to o"bey; when confronted with Hitler; 1;  s "brutal crimes,; which arc shown to have "been within their general knowledge, they; say they discteyed. The truth, is they actively participated in all; these crincs, cr sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the conaission; of criiies on a scale larger and shocking than the world ever; had the misfortune to know. . T m s imist "be said.; 11; All these assertions in the veriiqt are- correct and arc "based on numerous; and reliable depositions. The only thing that remains incom-or^h.ensi"bl^ is the; reasoning which does not rocoj?iii2e as criminal that "hundred of h i ^ e r rank-; ing officers" who causod the world and their own country so much sorrow, tho; reasons backing the incision not to declare the organization criminal.; The verdict advances the following reasons for the decision, reasons; a); 1;  That the crimes were committed "by representatives of the General; Staff and of the OIIW as private individuals and not as members of a.; criminal conspiracy*; "b) That the General Staff and the OKW were merely weapons in the hands; of the conspirators and interpreters or executor© of the conspirators; 1;  will.; ifeiercus evidence disputes such conclusions.; 1.でhe leading representatives of the General Staff ani of the OKW,; ftlon^r with B small ciyale of the higher Hitlerite officials, were called; upon Ipy でれe const>irators to -Dartici-oate in tho develoiDinent and the realization; of the plans of ag2;rossion, not as TDassivo functionaries, Vat as active; participants in the const)iracy against vea.ee and humanity.; Without their adYice and active cooperation, Kitier could not havr solved; these Droblems.; In the majority of cases their croinion was decisive. It is iimDOSsi'ble to; iaagine how the ag^ossive plans of Hitler; 1;  s Germany could have teen realized; iiad it not "been f.or the full sup-oort given him "by tho leading staff mein"bers of; the armed forces.; least of all did Hitler conceal his criminal plans and motivations from; the leaders of the Supreme Command.; For instance, while preparing for the attack on Poland, as early as 29; May, 1939, at a conference with, the high military commanders of the new; Heich Chancellory, h.e stated:; 丨 T o r us the matter consists of the expansion of;  ^; Le"bensrauIn; ,;  to; the East,丨; ,; "Thus the question of scaring Poland cannot be considered, and,; instead, we have to consider the decision to attack Pa丄and at the; first opiDOrtunity. ” (L-79) •; ; D o nス " b e f o r e the seizure of Czochoslovakria, in a directive of 30 May, 1938,; Hitler, addressing the representatives of the Su-oremp Command, cynically stated:; "Prom the military and -oolitical x>oint of view, the most favorable; tine is a lightning attack on the "basis of some incident, "by which; Germany will have "been strongly provoked and which will ncrally; justify the military measures to at least Dart of the world ot)inion."; (PS-.368).; Prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia, in a directive dated 2? March, 1941,; addressing the representatives of the Eigii Command, Hitler wrote:; "Even if Yugoslavia declares its loyalty, it ms七"be considered, an enemy; and must, therefore, "be smashed as soon as possible.; 1 1;  /PS—1746/; While preparing for tiio invasion of USSR, Hitler invited the renresenta-; In the instructions to apply propaganda in the region "Barbarossa,“; issued "by the OKW in June, 1941, it is pointed out that:; M; Por the tine we should not have propaganda directed at the dismem"berxnent; of the Soviet Union丨、/PS-446/; As early as 13 May, 1941, OKW ordered the troops to use any terrorist; measures against the civilian populations of the temporarily occupied regions; of the Soviet Union.; 11; Hero a spccial sti"oailatioii read:;  n; To confirm only such sentences as are; in accordance with the political intentions of the LeadorshiT).; ,f;  /G-50/; 2. OKIv and the G-encral Staff issued the _most brutal and orders for; relentless meesures against the unarmod peaceful -Dornilatiorx and ^the _t)risonars; of war.; In the "decree of special liatility to punishment in the region;  l,; Barl:arossa; while preparing for thr: attack upon the Soviet Union, the OKW abolished "before-; hand the jurisdiction of the military courts, gr^.ntin^ the right of repressions; over the peaceful population to individual officers and soldiers.; It; is particularly stated there that:; "Crimes of hostile civilians are excluded from the jurisdiction of the; court martials. . . ", "Suspected elements must "be immediately delivered to the; officer. The latter will decide whether they should be shot..,..;  M; ,;  r,; it is; absolutely forbidden to hold sus-oects for the purpose of "bringing them to; t r i a l . " T h e r e slto also provisions for ^^st e^tr^me measures, and, in; particular, Uvleasures for mass violence', if circ^imstances do not -oermit the; ra.pid detection of the ^ i l t y .;  11; In the saae Docree of tlie OKW the pnaranteo of in*ounity was assured in; advance to the- military criminals from tho ser^icr -oersonnel of the Crornan Army.; It states there as follows:;  u; Th.e "brin^in^ of suits of actions, committed; officials of the A m y and "by the scrvice -oersonnel against h.ostiXc civilians is; not ouligatory even in cases where Bucii actions at tiie same time constitute; military crimes or offences;  n; In the course of the war the ^-igh Command consistently followed this; policy, increasing its terroristic^ctiris with regard to prisoners of war and; The OKW directive of 1ft S^tem'her, 1941, states:; "It is important to realize that a man lif> in the countries to which; this refers, moans nothing, and that intimidating action is vossillr only through; the aDplication of unusual "brutality" 98/.; Addressing the commanders of th.p army ^TOUTDS on 23 July, 1 9 4 1 , t h ^ OKW; siimDly "briefed then as follows: "It is not in the demand for additional security; detachments, but in the application of appropriate draconic measures that the; commanding officers must use to keep order in the regions und^r their juris-; diction" /PS-459/.; The OKW directivr- of 16 Deceml»er, 1941, states:; 11;  The troops... have the right and are o"bli^ed to a.nx)ly... any measures; whatsoever also against women and children if th.is contri"butes to success....; /USSR-16/.; Ancng the most 'brutal OKW directives concerning the treatment o?; -orisoners of war one oust consiaer the order entitled "Night and . The; reasons for resorting to ca*oital punisliment for prisoners of war were; offences, which accordint to international conventions, generally should; not carry any •ounishmeiit; for example, esca*oe from the camT).; The order states: ,; "Penalty for such offencos, consisting of loss of frendom and ^ven; a life sentence is a. sign of weakness. Only dr»?th sentence or measures; wiiich entail ignorance of the fate of the .^ilty "by local po-oulation will; achieve r e a l effectiveness. /L-90, US-224, Transcri-ot, Afternoon Session; 25 January, 1946/; In the course of the present trial agreat ieal of eviiencr of apple-; cation of this order has "been submitted. One of the exarat>le of this kind; of crime is the murder of 50 officer-pilots. The fact th&*t this crime was; inspired oy the High Comnand cannot "bo doubted.; OKW also issued an order for the destruction of the ^Commando; u;  units,; The original order was submitted to the Court /PS—498, US—501/ According; to this order, officers and soldiers of the "Commando; 11;  units had to "br shot,; except incases when they were to "be questioned, after which they were; shot in any ease.; This order was unsworvin^ly cerried out "by tho ccnnandin^ officers; of army units. In June 1944 Rundstudt, the commander-in-chiof of thn; G-erman troops in the West, reported the.t Hitler* s order in r^^ard to; "the treatment of the Conmando grouiDS of 七!^ an^ny is still "bnin^ ca-ri^d; out" /PS一531, US-550/; 3, The Hi^h Command, alon^c with tho SS and the Police, is guilty; of the most trutcl x>olicc actions in the occiroied regions.; The instructions relating to specie! regions, issued "by OJCW on 13 Marc; 1941 contemplated the necessity of synchronising the activities in occiroi; territories "between the army command and the Reichsfurhrer of the SS. As is; seen from the testimony of the chief of the 3d Dcpartmrnt of HSE-i and who; was concurrently chief of the Einsatzf;ruppe;  n; D; u; , Otto Ohlendorf, end of the; chief of the VI DciDartment of HSrLh.. Walter Schellenber/r. in accordance with; OKW instructions there was an a^roemont made l)etwepn the general staff and; the RSHA at out the organization of s-oecial "ot>erational ^rout)s; ,f;  of the; Security Police and SD - "einsatz^rupt^n", assigned to the atJ-oropriat^ army; detachments.; Crimes conmitted "by the einsatz^mppon on the territory of the ten—; porerily occupied regions aro co-antlcss. Tho einsr tz^rupiDen were acting; in close contact with the commanding officers of tho appropriate army; groups.; The following eycerpt from the report of Einsatz<2^rapr>o "A" is extremely; characteristic as evidence:; "...among our functions as the establishment of personal lisiaon with; the commanding officer "both at the front and in the rear. It must "be; pointed out that the relations with, the army were of the "best, in some eases; very close, almost hearty, as, for instance, the conunander of the tank ^rouv,; Colonel-Grneral Hoppncr" /L-160/.; 4. Tho roDrosentf-tivcs of the High Conniand acted in all theeschelons; of the army as mongers of & criminal firou-o.; In s-oite of the violation of international law ? n d of the crastoms of; war, the directives of thr- OKW and of the General Staff and the command of; individual a m y units "byt wore a*o-olied in life and were atisjnented "by pven; more brutal orders issued as implementation to these directives.; In this connection it is characteristic to note the directive; cf Ficldmarshal von Reichenau, Arny troop conmander, addressed to his; soldiers: "Tlie soldier in the eastern territories is not only a warrier; skilled in th.p art of w&rfare "but a earer of a merciless national idology."; And elsewhere, calling for the extermination of the Jews, Heichnau wrote:; "Thus the soldier must "be in full cognizance of the necessity for harsh end; .just revenue on those sub-humans / the Jews". (USA-556).; As another examole the order of Fieldaarshal von Manns te in addressed,; to iiis soldiers can 1:e referred to. On tile Las is of the "political aims; of the war; 11;  the Pieldmarshal cynically appealed to his soldiers to wage; the war in violation of the "recognizi d laws ofwarfare in Surot)e;  1;  (USA — 927).; Hitlerite Array corapriscd a highly dangerous criminal organization,; _ 聿 聿 傘 } i ( 本; I consider it my duty es e Judge to draw up my dissontiivニ: opinion; concerning those in'oortant questions in which I disa^r^o with the decision; adopted "by the moml^ers cf the Tribunal.; Soviet Member IMT; Major General Jurisp rudence; け 1946 I.I. iJikitchcrJco; ME. 3IDDLE:; :RI33?;FT 避; Ri"b*bentrop is indicted, under all four courrfcs. He joined the Nazi; Party in 1S32. E y 1933 he had teen made Foreign Policy Adviser to; Hitler, and in the same year the representative of the Nazi Party on; Foreign Policy, In 1934 he was arnoointei Delegate for Disarmament; questions, and in 1935 Minister Plenipotentiary at Large, a capacity; in which he negotiated the Anglo-German Naval Agreement in 1935 and; the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. On August 1 1 , 1 9 3 6 , he was ap-oointed.; Ambassador to England, 0n ?e"bruary 4 , 1 9 3 8 , he succeeded von Feurath; as Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs as t>art of the general reshuffle; which accompanied the dismissal of von Pritsch. and von 31om"berg»; Crimes against Peace; KiVoentrop v/as not present at the Hosz"back Conference hsld on; HovemlDer 5 , 1 9 3 7 , tut on J a m a r y 2 , 1 9 3 8 , while still Ambassador to; England, he sent a memorandum to Hitler indicating his opinion that; a change in the status quo in the East in the German sense could only; "be carried out iDy force and suggesting iie thods to prevent England ana; Prance from intervening in a Suropean x̂ rar fotiglrb to l:ring a"bout such a; change. When Ri"b"bentrop "became Foreign Minister Hitler told him that; Germany still had four problems to solve, Austria, Sudetenland, Merael; and Danzig, and mentioned the possibility of "some sort of a show-down"; or "military settlement" for their solirbioiu; On PelDrjaryl2; t;  1938, HilDlDentrop attended the conference between; Hitler and Schuschnigg at which Hitler, "by threats of invasion, foreed; Schuschnigg to grant a series of concessions designed to strengthen; 16979; 七he Nazis in Austria, including the appointment of Seyss-Inq.uart as; ^ m i s t e r of Security and Interior, with control over the Police.; ili"b"bentrop was in London when the occupation of Austria v/as actually; carried out add, on the iDaeis of information supplied him "by Gosring,; informed, the Britich GcOTrnment that G-ermany had not presented Ausir:^a; with an ultimatum, "but had inter^re^redT in Austria only to prevent civil; war. Gn March 1 3 , 1 9 3 8 , RiVoentrop signed the law incorporating Austria; into thet-German Reich.; RitTben七rop participated in the aggressive plans against Czecho-; slovakia. Beginning in March 1938, he was in close touch with the; Sudeten German Par and gave tliem instructions which had the effect; of keeping the Sudeten German question on a live issue which might serve; as an excuse for the attack- which Germany was planning against Czecho-; slovakia. In Angust 1938 he particit)ated in a conference for the pur-; xjose of obtaining Hungarian support in the event of a war with Czecho-; slovakia. After the Munich Pact he continued to "bring diplomatic "pres-; sure with the o"bjec'o of occupying the remainder of Czechoslovakia. He; was instrojneirbal in inducing the Slovaks to proclaim their independence.; He was present at the conference of March 14-15, 1939, at which Hitler,; "by threats of invasion, compelled President Eacha to consent to the; G-erinan occupation of Czechoslovakia^ After the German troops had; marched, in, Ri"b"bentrop signed the law esta"blishing a Protectorate over; Bohemia and Moravia,; HilDlDentroT) played a particularly significant role in the diplomatic; activity which led up to the attack on Poland. He participated in a; conference held on August 1 2 , 1 9 3 9 , for the iroirpose of obtaining Italian; sup-port if the attack should lead to a general Suro-oean War. RiVbentrop; 16980; discussed, the Oerman demands with respect to Danzig and the Polish; Corridor with the British Ambassador in the period fron August 25 to; August 3 0 , 1 9 3 9 , when he knew that the G-eraan "plans to attack Poland; had merely "been temporarily postponed in an attempt to induce the; British to abandon their guarantee to the Poles, The way in which he; carried out these discussions makes it clear that he did not enter; them in good faith in an attempt to reach a settlement of the diffi-; culties between Germany and Poland.; jcii'b'bentrop was advised in advance of the attack on Norway and; Denmark and. of the attack on the Low Countries, and prepared the; official foreign Office memoranda attempting to justify these aggres-; sive actions.; Ri o"bentrop attended the conference on January 20,1941,at which; Eitier and Mussolini discussed the proposed attack on Greece, and the; conference in January 1941, at which Eitlsr olDtained from Antonescu; permission for German troops to go through Humania for this attack. ®n; karch 2 5 , 1 9 4 1 , vrtaen Yugoslavia adhered to the Axis Tri-partite Pact,; RilDlDentrop had assiired Yugoslavia that Germany w u l d respect its; sovereignty and territorial integrity. On March 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 , he attended; the meeting, held after the coup d; !; etat in Yugoslavia* at which plane; were made to carry out Eitler; 1; 3 announced intention to destroy YugoslaviA.; RiVoentrop attended a conference in May 1941 with Eitler and An-; tonescu relating to Rumania participation in the attack on the TJ.S.S.R.; Ee also consulted with RosenTperg in the preliminary planning for the; political exploitation of Soviet territories and in July 1941, after; the oufbreak of war, urged Japan to attack the Soviet Union,; 16981; War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; Ri,otentrop participated in a meeting of Jtlhe 6 , 1 9 4 4; f;  at which; it was agreed to start a program under which Allied aviators carrying; out machine g*an attacks on the civilian porrolation should "be lynched.; In DecemlDer 1944 Ri"blDentrop was informed of the plans to murder one of; the French Q-enerals held as a prisoner of war and directed his sub-; ordinate to see that the details were worked, out in such a way as to; prevent its detection *by the protecting powers, RiTD^entrop is also; responsible for War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity "because of his; activities with respect to occupied countries and Axis satellites. The; top German official in "both Denmark and Vichy* France was a Foreign; Office representative, and Ritfbentrop is therefore responsible for the; fo; eneral economic and political policies put into effect in the occupa-; tion of those countries. He urgsd the Italians to adopt a ruthless; occupation policy in Yugoslavia and Greece.; He played an important part in Hitler; 1; s けfinal solution" of the; Jewish question. In September 1942 he ordered the Oerman diplomatic; representatives accredited to various Axis satellites to hasten the; deportation of Jews to the East; #;  In June 1942 the Gernan Am"bassador to; Vichy requested Laval to turn over 50,000 Jews for deportation to the; Bast. On February 2 5 , 1 9 4 3 , M ^ e n t r o p protested to Mussolini against; Italian slowness in deporting Jews from the Italian occupation zone of; France, On A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 4 S; f;  he toop part in a conference between Hitler; and Eorthy on the deportation of Jews from Hungary and informed Horthy; that the ^Jews must either "be exterminated or taken to concentration; camps.; 1; . A t the same conference Hi tier had likened the Jews to "tu'ber-; culosio bacilli; r t;  and said if they did not work they were to "be shot.; 16982; ElVbentrop^s defense to the charges made against him is that Hitler; made all the important decisions and that he was such a great admirer; and faithful follower of Eitler that he never questioned Hitler; 1;  s; repeated ascertions that he wanted peace or the truth of the reasons; that Eitler gave in explaining aggressive action. The Tribunal does; not consider this explanation to "be true. RiTD"bentrop participated in; all of the Fazi aggressions from the occupation of Austria to the; invasion of the Soviet Union. Although he was personally concerned; with the diplomatic rather than the military aspect of these actions,; his diplomatic efforts were so closely connected Trtth war that he could; not have remained unaware of the aggressive nature of Hitler; f; s actions.; In the administration of territories over which G-ernany acquired control; "by illegal invasion Ritbsntrop also assisted in carrying out criminal; policies particularly those involving the extermination of the Jews.; There is a"bundaivfc evidsnce, moreover, that RiVbentrop was in complete; sympathy with all the main tenets of the l!ation§l Socialist creed, and; that his collaboration with Hitler and ^ th other defendants in the; coimission of crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against himanity; was vhole- hearted. It was because E i t l e r ^ policy and plans coincided; with his own ideas that ElTDlDeiitrop served him so willingly to the end-; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Rit"bentrop is guilty on all four counts.; 16983; M . de TA3ESS:; . K Z I T S L; Ksitel is indicted, on all four counts. He was Chief of Staff to; the then Minister of War von 31onTDerg from 1935 to 4 February 1938; on; that day Hitler look cornnead of the armed forces, making Keitel Chief; of the High Command of the Armed Forces. Keitel did not have command; authority over the ン three Wehrmacht "branches,Aich enjoyed direct access; to the Supreme Comr.iander. OKW was in effect Hitler; 1;  s military staff.; Crimes against Peace; Keitel attended the Schuschnigg conference in Fetr-uary 1938 with; two other generals. Their presence, he admitted, was a "military; demons t rati o n " b u t since he had been apDointed OKW Chief just one week; "before he had not known why he had "been summoned, Hitler and Keibel then; continued to put pressure on Auotria wi*h false ronors, broadcasts; and troop manoeuvros. Keitel made the military and other arrangements; and Jodl; 1;  s diary noted;  ,?; the effect is qui ok and strong." When Schusch-; nigg called his plebiscite, Keitel that night "briefed Hitler and his; generals, and Hitler issued "Case Otto; r t;  which Keitel initialed.; Cn 21 April 1938 Hitler and Keitel considered making use of a pos-; si"bls "incident,; r t;  such as the assassination of the &ernan Minister at; Prague, to preface the attack on Czechoslovakia. Keitel signed nany; directives and memoranda on けFall G-rucn,; M;  including the directive of; 3© May containing Hitler; 3;  s statement: "It is ny nnaltera"ble decision; to smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future.; 1 1;  After; Munich, Keitel initialed Hitler; 1; s directive for the attack on Czechoslo-; vakia, and issued two; 16984; sup-olements. The second supplement said the at tack should appear to the; outside world as "merely an act of pacification and not a warlike under-; taking. The OZW Chief attending Hitler's negotiations with Hacha when; the latter surrendered.; Keitel" was present on 2S May 1939 Tvhen Hitler announced his decision; ,f; to attack Poland at the first suitable opTDortunity.;  M;  Already he had; signed the directive reoniring the Wehrnacht to submit its "Fall Weiss'; 1; timetable to OKW "by 1 Kay.; The invasion of IToaxway and L e m a r k he discussed on 12 December; 1939 with Hitler, Jodl and Raeder. 3 y directive of 27 January 1940; the Norway plans were placed under Keitel; ?;  s "direct and personal qui dance.; u; Hitler had said on 23 Kay 1939 he would ignore the neutrality of Belgiun; and the Netherlands, and. Keitel signed orders for these attakks on 15; October, 20 Kovsr/ber, and 28 November 1939. Orders postponing this; attack 17 times until spring 1940 all wore signed "by Keitel or Jodl.; Formal planning for attacking Greece and Yugoslavia had "begun in; ilovember 1940. On 18 March 1941 Keitel heard Hitler tell Eoeder caniple te; occupation of Greece was a prerequisite to settlement, and also heard Hitler; that shotild take place; decree on 27 March/ the destruction of Yugoslav!a/^4 th "urnierciful harsl>-; ness.; n; Keitel testified that he opposed the invasion of the Soviet Union; for military reasons, and. also "because it would constitute a violation; of the non — aggression Pact. Nevertheless he initialed;  n; Case 3ar"barossa,; signed ty Hitler on 18 December 1940, and attended the OZW discussion; with Hitler on 3 Petruary 1941. Keitel; !; s supplement of 13 March es-; tablished the relationship "between the military and political officers.; He issued his timetable for the invasion on 6 June 1941, and was; present at the; 16985; briefing of 14 June when the generals gave their final reports before; attack. He appointed Jodl and Warlimont as JKW representatives to; Rosenberg on matters concerning the Eastern Territories. On 16 June he; directed all army nnits to carry out the economic directives issued "by; &oering in the so-called "Green Folder,; r t;  for the exploitation of Rus-; sian territory, food and raw materials.; War Crimes and Crimes against Eimanit^; On 4 August 1942 Keitel issued a directive that paratroopers were; to "be tiirned. over to the S3, On 18 October Hitler issued the Comnaado; the landing in; Crder which was carried out in several instances. After/Fornandy, Keitel; reaffirmed the order, and later extended it to Allied missions fighting; with partisans. Hs admits he didn^t "believe the order was legal tut; claims he could not stop Hitler fron decreeing it.; When, on 8 September 1 9 4 1 , C Z W Issued its ruthless regulations; the treatnent of; for/Soviet PCT^Hs, Canaris wrote to Keitel that under international law; matter; the SD should have nothing to do with this/; #;  On this ! n e m o r a n d t u n in; Keitel; 1;  s handwriting, dated 23 Se^tenber and initialed "by hin, is the; s t a t e m e n t ;け T h e objections arise from the military concept of chivalrous; warfare. This is the destruction of an ideology. Therefore I atnDrove; and "back the measures," Keitel testified that he really agreed with; Canaris and argued vith Eitlcr, but lost. The OKW Chief directed; the military authorities to cooperate with the Einsatzsteh R o s e n t e r ^ in; looting cultureal property in occupied territories.; Lahousen testified that Keitel told him on 12 Septenber 1939, while; a"boaxd Hitler's headquarters train, that the Polish intelligentsia, nobility; and Jews were to iDe liquidated. On 20 October, Hitler told Keitel the; intelligentsia would "be prevented from forming a ruling class, the standard; 16986; of living would remain low, and Poland would be used; only for labor forces. Keitel does not remember the; Lahousen conversation, but admits there was such a; policy and that he had protested without effect to; Hitler about it.; On 16 September 194-1,Keitel ordered that attacks; on soldiers in the East should be met by putting to death; 50 to 100 Communists for one German soldier, with the; comment that human life was less than nothing in the East.; On 1 October he ordered military commanders always to have; German; hostages to execute when/soldiers were attacked. When; Terboven, the Reich Commissioner in Norway, wrote Hitler; that Keitel's suggestion that workmen's relatives be held; responsible for sabotage, could work only if firing squads; in the margin:; were authorized, Keitel wrote on this memorandum/ "Yes,; that is the best."; On 12 May 194-1,five weeks before the invasion of the; the the; Soviet Union,/OKW urged upon Hitler a directive of/OKH that; political commissars be liquidated by the Army. Keitel ad-; mitted the directive was passed on to field commanders.; And on 13 May Keitel signed an; ted of offenses against troops; and that prosecution of German; civilians was unnecessary。 On; order that civilians suspec-; should be shot without trial,; soldiers for offenses against; 27 July all copies of this; directive were ordered destroyed without affecting its; validity. Four days previously he had signed another; order that legal punishment was inadequate and troops should; use terrorism.; On 7 December 1941, as already discussed in this; opinion, the so-called "Nacht und Nebel" decree, over; Keitel's signature, provided that in occupied territories; civilians who had been accused of crimes of resistance; against the army of occupation would be tried only if a; death sentence was likely;; 1698?; otherwise they would "be handed to the Gestapo for trans-oortation to; Germany,; that; Keitel directed/ Russian POW; 1;  s be used in German war industry. On; 8 September 1942 he ordered French, Dutch and Belgian citizens to work; construction of the; on the/Atlantic Wall. He was present on 4 January 1944 vhen Hi tier; directed Snuckel to ottain four million new workers fron occupied terri-; tories.; In the face of these docunents Xei\;al does not deny his connection; with those acts. Rather, his defense relies on the fact that he is a; soldier, and on the doctrine of superior orders,; M;  prohibited "by Article; 8 of the Charter as a defense.; There is nothing in mitigation. Superior orders, even to a soldier,; cannot "be considered in mitigation v/here crimes as shocking and extensive; have teen committed consciously, ruthlessly and wi fchout military excuse; or justification.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds Keitel guilty on all four counts.; 16983; TEE PEESIIEOT: K A L T E F m W S R; Kalten'orunner is indicted under Counts One; t;  Three and. Fovr. Ee; joined the Austrian Hazi Party and the SS in 1932. In 1935 he became; leader of the SS in Austria^ After the Anschluss he was appointed; Austrian State Secretary for Security and when this position was aTDolished; in 1941 he was nade Higher SS and Police Leader. On Janrary 3 0 , 1 9 4 3 ,; he was appointed Chief of the Security Police and SD and Head of the; Reich Secirrity Head Office (RSHA), a position vihich had teen held "by; Eeydrich until hi6 assascination in 'June 1942, Ee held the rank of; Cbergnippenfuehrer in the SS.; Crinec against Peace; Aft leader of the SS in Austria Kalten"brunner was active in the; Uasi intrigue against the Schuschnigg Oovernnent. On the night of March; 1 1 , 1 9 3 8 , after Goering had ordered Austrian Fational Socialists to; seize control of the Austrian G o v e r m e n t , 500 Austrian SS men under; Kaltentrunner; 1; c connand surrounded the Federal Chancellery and a special; ietachneirb unier the coinnand of M s adjutant entered the Federal; Chancellery Seyss-Inquart waa negotiating with President Miklas.; But thare is no evidence connecting Zalten"brunner with plans to wage; aggressive war on any other front. Ihe Anschluss, although it was an; aggressive act, is not charged as an aggressive war, and the evidence; against KaltenlDrunner under Count On© does not, in the; Tribunal, show his direct participation in any plan to; opinion of the; wage such a var; #; 1 6 9 8 9; War Crimes and Crimes against Emanity_; When he "became Chief of the Security Police and 9D and Head of; the RSHA on January 3 0 , 1 9 4 3 , KaltenTDrnnnsr took charge of an organiza-; tion which included the main offices of the &estapo; f;  the SD and the; Crininal Police. A; s;  Chief of the RSKA, Kalten"brunrLsr had authority; to order protective custody to and release fron concentration camps.; Orders to this effect were normally sent over his signature. Zalten-; "brunner was aware of conditions in concentration canps« He had un"; doulDtedly visited Mauthausen and witnesses testified that he had seen; prisoners killed "by the various methods of execution, hanging, shooting; in the "back of Hhe neck and gas sing, as part of a demonstration. Zaloen-; "brunner himself ordered the execution of prisoners in those canps; and his office was used to transmit to the canps execution orders; which originated in KinTnler's office. At the end of the war Kalten-; "bronner participated in the arrangeraents for the evacuation of innat93; of concentration canps, and the liquidation of nany of then, to pre-; vent then fron "being liberated "by the Allied armies•; During the period in which Kalten"brunner 辦as Head of RSEA, it; was engaged in a widespread t>rogran of War Crimes and Crines against; Humanity. These crines included the nistreatment and murder of prisoners; of war, Eins&tz Kornnandos o-oerating under the control of the Gestapo; were engaged in the screening of Soviet prisoners of war. Jews, com-; nia sars, and others' who were thought to Td© ideologically hostile to; the Nazi system were reported to the RSSl, which had then transferred; to a concentration carcp and murdered. An RSEA order issued during; KaltenTDrunner; 1;  s regime established the "3ullet Decree,; n;  under which; certain escaped prisoners of war who were recaptured were taken to; Mauthausen; 169S0; and shot; t;  The order for the execution of connando troops was extended; "by the Gestapo to include parachutists while Jtaltentranner was Chief; of the ESHA.. A n order signed "by Kaltentrunner instructed the Police; not to interfere with attacks 011"bailed out Allied fliers. In De center; 1944 Kaltentrunner participated in the riurder of one of the French; Generals held as a prii?aiier of war; #; During the period in which Kaltentrnnner was Head of the HSEA.,; the Gestapo and SD in occupied territories continued the nurder and ill一; treatment of tlie pop-olation, using nethods which included torture and; confinement in concentration camps, usually under orders to which Zalten-; "brunner; 1;  s name was signed.; The Gestapo was responsible for enforcing a rigid la"bor discipline; on the slave laborers and Kalten*brunner established a series of la"bor; reformatory carips for this purpose, 1/hen the SS en*barked on a slave; la"bor program of its o^m, the G-estapo was used to obtain the needed; workers "by sending laborers to concentration cartos.; The HSEa played a leading part in the ^final solutioii" of the; Jew!eh question "by the extermination of the Jews. A ;s-oecial section; under the AMP IV of the RSEA. was established to supervise this pro gran.; Under its direction approxinately six nillion Jews were nurdered, of; which two million were killed *by E i ne a t z grup -oe n and other units of the; Security Police. Kalten"brunner had teen infornei of the activities; of these Einsatzgrapr>en when he was a Higher SS and Police Leader, and; they continued to function after he had "becone Chief of the RS^i.; fhe nurder of approximately four million Jews in concentration carips; has heretofore "been described. This part of the program was; 16991; also under the supervision of the RSHA. when Kalten"brunner was head of; that organization, and special missions of the RSHA. scoui^d. the; occupied territories and the various Axis satellites arranging for the; deportation of Jews to these extermination institutions. Kalten"briinner; was informed of these activities, A letter which he wrote on June 30,; 1944, described the shipment to Vienna of 12,000 Jews for that purpose,; and directed that all who could not work would have to "be kept in; readiness for;  11;  special action," which meant murder, Kalten"brunner; denied M s signature to this letter, as he did on a very large nun"ber; of orders on which his nane was stamped or typed, and, in a few in-; stances, written. It is inconceivable that in natters of such in-; portance his signature could have ap-oeared so many times without his; authority,; Kalt9n"brunner has clained that when he took office as Chief of; the Security Police and SD and as Head of the RSHA he did so pursuant to; an understanding with Eitler under which he was to confine his activities; to natters involving foreign intelligence, and not to assume overall; control over the activities of the RSHA. He claims that the criminal; program had "been started before his assumption of office; that he; seldom knew what was going on; and that when he was informed he did; what he could to stop them_ It is true that he showed a special interest; in matters involving foreign intelligence. But he exercised control; over the activities of t^e RSHA; was aware of the crimes it was connit-; ting, and was an active participant in many of then.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that ICaltenbrnnner is not guilty on. Count One.; Ee is guilty under Counts Three and Four.; 16992; liAJCR GZFZRAL FIKITCF^FICO:; Rosenberg is indicted on all four counts* Fe joined the Ifazi Party; in 1919, participated in the Munich Ritch of Fovenber 9 , 1 9 2 3 , and tried; to keep the illegal SFazi Party together while Eitler was in jail. Recog-; nized. as the Party*s ideologist, he developed, and spread Fazi doctrines; in the newspapers "Voelkischer 3eo"bachter" and S Monatshefte," which; he edited, and in the n"on"berous "books he wrote. His "book, "Myth of the; Twentieth*.Century,; n;  had a circulation of over a million copies.; In 1930, Rosen*berg was elected to the Reichstag and he "becane the; Party's representative for Foreign Affiairs. In April 1933 he was nade; Reichsleiter and head of the Office of Foreign Affairs of the HSDAP; (THE APA)• Hitler, in January 1934, appointed Rosenberg his Deputy for; the Supervision of the Entire Spiritual and Ideological Training of the; NSDAP, In January 1940, he was designated to set up the;  u; Eohe Schnle,書,; the Center of National Socialistic Ideological and Educational Research,; and he organized -the "Einsatzstat Rosen"berg" in connection with this; task. He was appointed Reich Minister for the Occupied Saster Terri-; tories on July 1 7 , 1 9 4 1 .; Crimes against Peace,; As head of the APA, Hosen"berg was in charge of an organization; agents were active in Fazi intrigue in all parts of the world. His own; reports, for example;  f;  claim that the APA was largely responsible for; Ro-onania*s joining the Axis. As head of the APA, he played am important; role in the preparation and planning of the attack on For way •; 16993; Rosenoerg, together with Raeder, was one of the originators of the; plan for attacking Forway. Rosenberg had becone interested in ITorway; as early as June 1939, when he conferred with Quisling. Quisling had; pointed out the importance of the Forwegian Coast in the event of a; conflict "between Germany and Great 3ritain, and statei his fears that; Great Britain might "be alDle to obtain Forwegian assistance? As a; result of this conference Rosenberg arranged for Quisling to; collalDorate closely vith the Kational Socialists and to receive; poiitical assistance "by the Fazis.; When the war troke out Quisling began to express fear of British; intervention in Forway. Roserfberg supported this view, and transmitted; to Raeder a plan to use Quisling for a coup in Forway. Rosenberg was; instrunental in arranging the conferences in December 1939 "between; Hitler and Quisling which led to the preparation of the attack on; Forway, and at \\ihich Hi tier pronised Quisling financial assistance^; After these conferences Eitler assigned to Rosenberg the political; exploitation of Norway. Two weeks after Forway was occurdei, Eitler; told Rosenberg that he had iDased his decision to attack Forway "on; Jjhe continuous warnings of Quisling as rex>orted to hin "by Reichsleiter; Rosenberg.; t !; Rosen"bei^ "bears a major responsi"blity for the fornul&tion and; execution of occupation policies in the Occupied Eastern Territories.; Ee was infonaei "by Hitler on April 2 , 1 9 4 1 , of the coming attack against; the Soviet Union, and he agreed to help in the capacity of a "Political; Advisor.; H;  On April 2 0 , 1 9 4 1 , he was appointed Commissioner for the Central; Control of Questions Connected with the East-European Region. In preparing; the plans for the occupation, he had imnerou^- conferences with Keitel, Raeder; Goering, Funk, Ei"b"bsntrop; f;  and other high Reich authorities. In April and; 16994; hay 1941 he prepared several drafts of instructions concerning the setting; up of the administration in the Occupied Eastern Territories. Cn June 20會; 1941, two days "before the attack on th© USSR, he made a speech to his; assistants aloout the pi^otlems and policies of occupation. Rosenberg at-; the course of; tended Hitler^s conference of July 16* 1941, in/which policies of adminis-; tration and occupation were discussed* On July 1 7 , 1 9 4 1; f;  Hitler appointed; Rosenberg Reich Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories, and publicly-; charged him with responsibility for civil adninisti-ation^; War Crimes and Criire s against Htunanit^; Rosenberg is reBponci"ble for a system of organized plunder of "both; pu"blic and private property throughout the invaded countries of Europe; #; Acting under Hitler; J; s orders of January 1940, to set up the "Hohe Schule."; he organized and directed the "Einsatzstab Rosenberg", which plundered; nuseums and libraries, confiscated art treasures and collections, and; pillaged private houses. His own reports show the extent of the conficsa“; tions. In "Action-M" (Moetel〉,instituted in DecerTber 1941 at Rosen"berg; f; s; suggestion, 69,619 Jewish homes were plundered in the West, 38,000 of them; in Peris alone; %;  and it took 26; f; 984 railroad cars to transport the confiscated; furnishings to Germany^ As of July 14; 4;  1944, more than 21,903 art objects,; including fanous paintings and nusenn pieces, had "been seized "by the; EinRatzste."b in the West,; With his appointment as Reich Minister for Occupied Eastern Terri-; tories on July 1 7 , 1 9 4 1 , Rosenberg "becpne the supreme authority for those; ateas* He helped .to formulate the policies of Gemanizp.tion, exploitation,; forced labor, extermination of Jews and opponents of Fazi rule;  f;  and he set; up the administration which carried them out‘ He took r>art in the confer-; ence of July 1 6 , 1 9 4 1 , in which Hitler stated that they were faced with the; 16695; task of;  u;  cut ting up the giant cake according to our needs, in order to "be; first, to dominate it, second, to administer it, and third, to; he; exploit it," and/indicated, that ruthless action was contempl-ted.; Rosenberg accepted his appointment on the following day.; Rosenberg had knowla dge of the "brutal treatment and terror to; which the Eastern peepte were su"bjected. Ee directed that the Eague; Rules of Land Warfare were not applicable in the Occupied Eastern; Territories, Ee had knowledge of and took an active part in stripping; the Eastern Territories of raw materials and foodstuffs, which were all; sent to Germany. He stated that feeding the German people was first; on the list of claims on the East, and that the Soviet people woiald; suffer thereby. His directives provided for the segregation of Jews,; ultimately in Ghettos. Eis subordinates engaged in nass killings of; Jews, and his civil administrators in the East considered that; cleansing the Eastern Occupied Territories of Jews as necessary. In; Rosenberg; December 1941, /made the suggestion to Hitler that in a case of; shooting 100 ho stages, Jews only "be used. Rosenberg had knowledge; of the deportation of laborers from the east, of the methods of; "recruiting" and the transportation horrors, and of the treatment; Eastern laborers received in the Reich. He gave his civil adminis-; trators quotas of laborers to "be sent to the Reich, had to "be; iuet "by whatever means necessary. Eis signature of approval appears; on the order of June 1 4 , 1 9 4 4 , for the;  , r; Eeu Aktionけ,the apprehension; of 40,000 to 50,000 youths; f;  aged. 10-14, for shipment to the Reich.; Upon occasion Rossn"berg objected to the excesses and atrocities; committed "by his subordinates, nota"bly*in the case of Koch, "bills these ‘; 16996; excesses continued and he stayed in office until the end.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Hosen"berge is guilty on all four counts.; 等; 16997; m . 3IDJ3LE: 7 B M K; Iroxik is indicted under Counts One, Three and Four. Prank joined; the Kazi Party in 1927. He "became a mem*ber of the Reichstag in 1930,; the Bavarian State Minister of Justice in March 1933, and when this; position was incorporated into the Reich Goverinnsnt in 1934, Reich; kinister without Portfolio^ Ee was made a Reichsleiter of the Nazi; Party in charge of Legal Affaire in 1933, and in the same year Presidnnt; of the Academy of German Law. Prank was also given the honorary rank; of ©"bergruppenfushrer in the SA, In 1942 Frank "became involved In a; temporary dispute with Eimmler as to the type of legal system which; should "be in effect in G-ermany, During the same year he vas dismissed; as Reichsleiter of the Uazi Party and as President of the Academy of; German Law.; Crimes against Peace; Ihe evidence has not satisfied the Tribunal that Prank was suffi-; ciently connected with the common plan to wage aggressive war to allow; the Tribunal to convict him on Count One.; War Crimes and Crines against Humanity; Prank was appointed Chief Civil Administration Office for occupied; Polish territory and, on October 1 2 , 1 9 3 9 , was made Governor General of; the occupied Polish territory^ On October 3 , 1 9 3 9 , he described the; policy which he intended to put into effect "by stating; "Poland shall; "be treated like a colony; the Poles will "become the slaves of the Greater; German World Empire." The evidence esta"blishes that this occupation; policy was "based on the complete destruction of Poland as a national; 16998; entity, and a ruthless exploitation of its human and economic resources; for the German war effort. All opposition was crashed with the utmost; harshness. A reign of terror was instituted, "backed "by summary police; ち; courts which ordered such actions as the public shootings of groups of; twenty to two hundred Poles, and the widespread shootings of hostages^; The conceritration camp system was introduced in the 0-eneral Goverransnt; "by the establishment of the notorious Tretlinka and Maydanek camps,; •AS early as re"bruary 6 , 1 9 4 0 , Prank gave an indication of the extent of; this reign of terror Toy his cynical comment to a nevst>aper reporter on; von Ueurath; 1; s poster announcing the execution of the Czech students;; ff; If I wished to order that one should hang up posters aoout every seven; Poles shot, there would not *be enough forests in Poland vith which to; make the paper for these po sterc.; n;  Oil May 30; f;  1940, Frank told a police; conference that he was taking advantage of the offensive in the West; which diverted the attentioii of the world from Poland to liquidate; thousands of Poles who would "be likely to resist G-errnan domination of; Foland^ including "the leading representatives of the Polish intelligent-; sia.; ft;  Pursuant to these instructions the "brutal A^B. action was 'oegun; under which the Security Police and SD carried out these extsrrdnations; which were only partially subjected to the restraints of legal procedure,; On October 2 , 1 9 4 3 , Jrank issued a decree under ^ i c h any non.-0-ernans; hindering German construction in the General Governnent were to be tried; "by stumnary courts of the Security Policce and S2 and sentenced to death.; The economic demands made on; excess of the needs of the army of; proportion to the resources of the; the General Government vrere far in; occupation, and were out of all; cotmtry. The food raised in Poland; 16999; was shipped to Germany on such a wide scale that the rations of the; population of the occupied territories were reduced to the starvation; l e v e l , a n d epidemics were widespread. Some steps were taken to provide; for the feeding of the agricultural w r k e r s who were used to raise the; crops, "but the requirements of the rest of the population were disregarded; It is undoulDtedly true, as argued "by Counsel for the defense, that some; suffering in the General G-overnment was inevitable as a result of the; ravages of war and the economic confusion resulting therefrom. But the; suffering was increased "by a planned policy of economic exploitation.; Frank introduced the de-oortation of slave laborers to Germany in; the very early stages of his administration. On January 2 5 , 1 9 4 0 , he; indicated his intention of de-oorting one million laborers to Germany,; suggesting on May 1 0 , 1 9 4 0 , the use of police raids to meet this q^iiota.; On August 1 8 , 1 9 4 2 , Frank reported that he had already sut)plisd 800,000; workers for the Reich, and expected to "be able to supply 140,000 more; "before the end of the year.; The persecution of the Jews was imriediately "begun in the General; G-overnment. The area originally contained from 2,500,000 to 3,500,000; Jews. They were forced into ghettos, subjected to discriminatory laws,; deprived of the food necessary to avoid starvation, and finally,; systematically and "brutally exterminated^ On DecsnlDer 16,1941, Frank; told the Cabinet of the Governor G e n e r a l :; f l; W e must annihilate the Jev/s,; wherever we find their, and wherever itis possible, in order to naintain; there the structure of Reich as a whole.; n;  B y January 2 5 , 1 9 4 4 , Frank; estimated that there were only 100,000 Jews left.; 17000; At the beginning of his testimony, Prank stated that he had a; feeling of "terrible guiltけ for the atrocities committed in the occupied; territories. But his defense was largely devoted to an atter.pt to prove; thai; ne wasnot in fact responsible; that he ordered only the necessary; pacification measures; that the excesses were due to the activities of; the police which were not under his control; and that he never even; knew of the activities of the concentration It has also "been; argued that the starvation was due to the afternath of the war and; policies csrrisd out undertthe 'Fovr 了ear Plan; that the forced laoor; TDrograjn was under the direction of Sauckel;and that' the extermination; of the Jews was by the police and SS under direct orders from E i m l s r ,; It is undoubtedly true that most of the criminal -orogran charged; against ?rarfc were put into effect through the police, that Prank had; jurisdictional difficulties with Himmler over the control of the police,; and that Hitler resolved nanア of these dismites in favor of Einmler.; It therefore may well "be true that some of the crimes connitted in the; G-ensral Government were c o m i t t e d without the knowledge of Frank, and; even occasionally despite his opposition. It !nay also "be true that; some of tlie criminal policies -put into effect in the G»ensral Governnent; did not originate wi th Prank "but were carried out pursuant to orders; from Germany. But it is also true that Prank ^as a billing and knowing; participant in the use of terrorism in Poland; in the economic; exploitation of Poland in a way which led to the death "by starvation; of a large nurder of TDeo-ole and the deportation to Germany as slave; laborers of over a million Poles; and in a program involving the; nurder of at least three million Jews,; 17001; Conclusion; The Triounal finds that ? r a n k is not guilty on Count One "but; guilty under Counts Three and Pour»; 17002; M。 DE VABRES; FRICK; Frick is indicted on all four counts. Recognized as the; chief Nazi administrative specialist and. bureaucrat, he was; appointed Reichminister of the Interior in Hitler's first; cabinet. He retained this important position until August,; 194-3, when he was appointed Reich Protector of Bohemia and; M o r a v i a . In connection with his duties at the center of all; internal and domestic administration, he became the Prussian; Minister of the Interior, Reich Director of Elections, General; Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the R e i c h , and a; member of the Reich Defense Council, the Ministerial Council; for Defense of the R e i c h , and the "Three Man College; As the several countries incorporated into the Reich were over; r u n , he was placed at the head of the Central Offices for thei; incorporation.; Though Frick did not officially .join the Nazi Party until; 1 9 2 5 , he had previously allied himself with Hitler and the; National —Socialist cause during the Munich P u t s c h , while he; was an official in the Munich Police Department. Elected to; the Reichstag in 1 9 2 A , he became a Reichsleiter as leader of; the National Socialist faction in that body.; Crimes ajgainst Peace; An avid N a z i , Frick was largely responsible for bringing; the German Nation under the complete control of the NSDAP。; After Hitler became Reich Chancellor, the new Minister of the; Interior immediately began to incorporate local governments; under the sovereignty of the R e i c h . The numerous; 17003; laws he drafted, signed, and administered abolished all oppos-; ition parties and prepared the way for the Gestapo and their; concentration camps to extinguish all individual opposition.; He was largely responsible for the legislation which suppressed; the Trade Unions, the Church, the Jews. He performed this task; w i t h ruthless efficiency。; Before the date of the Austrian aggression Frick was; concerned only with domestic administration within the Reich.; The evidence does not show that he participated in any of the; conferences at which Hitler outlined his apgressive intentions.; Consequently the Tribunal takes the view that Frick was not; a member of the common plan or conspiracy to wape aggressive war; as defined in this Judgment.; Six months after the seizure of Austria, under the pro-; visions of the Reich Defense Law of September 4 , 1 9 3 8 , Frick; became General Plenipotentiary for the Administration of the; Reich. He was made responsible for war administration, except; the military and economic, in the event of H i t l e r; 1; s proclaim-; ing a state of defense. The Reich Ministries of Justice,; Education, Religion, and the Office of Spatial Planning were; made subordinate to him. Performing his allotted duties,; Frick devised an administrative organization in accordance; with wartime standards. According to his own statement, this; was actually put into operation after Germany decided to ad opt; a policy of war.; Frick signed the law of March 13,1938, which united; Austria with the Reich, and he was made responsible for its; accomplishment. In setting up German administration in; A u s t r i a , he issued decrees which introduced German law, the; Nurnberg Decrees, the Military Service Law, and he provided; 17004; for police security "by Eimmler.; Ee also signed the lavs incorporating into the Reich the Sudetsnlard; llemel; f;  Danzig, the Eastern territories (マest Prussia and Posen) and 3hipen; f; rialmedy, and More snot. He was placed in charge of the actual; incorporation, and. of the establishment of G e m a n administration over; these territories. He signed the law esta"blishing the Protectorate of; Bohemia and Moravia.; As the head of the Central Offices for Bohenia and Moravia, the; G-overnnent General, and Forway, he was charged ^; r; ith obtaining close; cooperation "between the Germany officials in these occuoied countries; and the suprene authorities of the Reich. He sur)t)lied German civil; servants for the admin-' strations in all occupied territories, advising; Hosen"berg as to their assignment in the Occuoied Eastern Territories.; He signed the laws apr>ointing TerlDoven Reich Conr.issioner to Forway*; and Seyss-Inquart to Holland.; War Or乂nes and Crimes against Hunanit]£; Always rabidly anti-Semitic, Frick drafted, signed, and administered; many laws designed to eliminate Jews from &ernan life and economy. His; work funded the "basis df the FurnlDerg Decrees, and he was active in; enforcing them. Responsible for prohibiting Jews fron follo^dng vaiious; professions, and for confiscating their property, he signed a final decree; in 1943, after the mass destruction of Jews in the Zast, which -placed; them;  , T; outside the law" and handed ttiem over to the G-esta-po. These laws; paved the way for the "final solutioiV* and were extended "by Prick to; the Incorporated Territories and to certain of the Occu-oied Territories.; 17005; while he was Reich Protector of Bohemia and Moravia, thousands of Jews; were transferred from the Terezin Ghetto In Czechoslovakia to Auschwitz,; where they were killed. He issued a decree -oroviding for special penal; laws against Jews and. Poles in the Government General.; The police officially fell under the jurisdiction of the Reichminister; of the Interior. But Frick actually exercised little control over Hiimnlsr; and police matters. However, he signed the law appointing Himmler Chief; of the Oeriバan Police, as well as the decrees sstatlishing Gestapo juris-; diction over concentration camps and regulating the execution of orders; for protective custody. Proin the many corrrolaints he received, and from; the testimony of witnesses, the Tribunal concludes that he knew of; atrocities con-it ted in these carps. With knowledge of Himmler; 1;  s; methods, Frick signed decrees authorizing him to takenecessary security; measures in certain on the Incorrjorated Territories. Tte t those; "security measures" turned out to "be has already "been dealt with,; •is the Supreme Reich Authority in Bohemia and Koravia, Frick "bears; general responsibility for the acts of OTOression in that territory after; 20 August 1943, such as terrorise of the •population, slave labor, and the; deportation of Jews to the concentration camps for extermination.; It is true that Prick*s duties as Reich Protector were considera'oly more; limited than those of his predecessor, and that he had no legislative; and limited personal executive author!ty in the protectorate. Never-; theless, Prick knew full well what the Fazi policies of occupation were; in Europe; f;  particularly with res-oect to Jews, at that time, and "by; accepting the office of Reich Protector he assumed responsibility for; carrying out those policies in Bohemia and ! " o r a v i a .; 17006; German citizenship in the occupied countries as well as in the; Heich came under his .jurisdiction while he was Minister of the Interior.; Saving created a racial register of persons of German extraction, Prick; categories; conferred G-errnan citizenship on certain / of citizens of foreign; countries. He is responsible for &ermanination in Austria, Sudetenland,; in the territories of; Menel, Danzig, Eastern Territories (West Prussia and Possn), and/the Eupen; Kalmedy, and Koresnot; #;  He forced on the citizens of these territories,; Q-ennarx law, German courts, German education, G-ernan police security,; and compulsory military service.; During the war nursing homes, hospitals, and asylums in which; euthanasia;  v; a s practiced as described elsewhere in this Judgment, came; under Frick; 1; s jurisdiction. He had knowledge that insane, sick.and aged; people, "useless eaters,; n;  were "being systematically rnrt to death.; Complaints of these murders reached hin, 'but he did nothing to stop; them, A report of the Czsclioslovak War Crimes C o m i s s i o n estimated that; 275,000 mentally deficient and aged people, for whose welfare he was; responsible, fell victim to it*; Conclusion; Tlie Tribunal finds that ? r i c k is not guilty on Count One.; He is guilty on Courts Two, Three and F o m; 17007; Gerr:on people to active persecution. Erch issue of "Der; Sturnier", which reaches a circulation of 600,000 in 1935,; was filled with such articles, often lewd cnc disgusting.; Streicher had charge of the Jewish boycott of A p r i l 1; 1933. He advocated the Nurnberg Decrees of 1935. He wns; responsible for the denolition on imgust 10,1938, of the; Synagogue in Nurnberg. And ;n Nnver.ber 10,1938, he; spoke publicly in support of the Jewish pogrom which was; trking place pt thst tine.; But it was not only in Germf.ny that this defendant; advocr-ted his doctrines. As early es 1938 he b e g m to; csll for the annihilation of the Jewish race. Twenty-; three different articles of "Der Sturrner" between 1938; pnd 194-1 were produced in evidence, in which externinetion; "root rnd branch" was preached. Typical of his teachings; v;as a leading article in September 1938 which termed the; Jew a g e m . end a pest, not a huiuan being, but "a parasite,; en ener.y, an evil-doer, a disserainator of uisesses who; must be destroyed in the interest cf mankind". Other; articles urged th?t only when world Jewry had been; annihilated would the Jewish problem hrve been solved, pnd; predicted thst fifty yerrs hece the Jev;ish grrves "will; procl?in th'-t this people of Eiur'erers pnd crir.inals has; after ell cet its deserved frte". Streicher, in February; 194®, published a letter from one of "der Sturr.er' s"; readers which compared Jews with swarnis of locunts which; must be exterminated completely. Such was the poison; Streicher injected into the Dinds of t h o u s m d s of Germcns; which caused then: to follow the National Socialist policy; of Jewish persecution and externdnation. Ji lending article; of "Der SturKier" in May 1939, shews cleerly his sini.; 17009; "A punitive expedition must come against the; Jews in Russia。 A punitive expedition which; will provide the same fate for them that every; murderer and criminal must expect. Death; sentence and execution. The Jews in Russia; must be killed. They must be exterminated; root and branch."; As tho war in the early stages proved successful in; acquiring more and more territory for the Reich, Streicher; even intensified his efforts to incite the Germans against; the -Jev/s. In the record are twenty-six articles from "Der; Sturmer", published between August 1941 and September; 1 9 4 4 , twelve by S t r e i c h e r; 1; s own hand, which demanded; annihilation and extermination in unequivocal terms.; He wrote and published on December 2 5 , 1 9 4 1 :; "If the danger of the reproduction of that; curso of God in the Jovdsh blood is to finally; come to an end, then there is only one way--; the extermination of that people whose father; is t.ho -devil."; And in February 1944 his own article stated:; "Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel,; a criminal. And he who repeats and wishes; to copy him deserves the same fate, annihila-; tion, death."; W i t h knowledge of the extermination of the Jews; in the Occupied Eastern Territory, this defendant continued; to write and publish his propaganda of death. Testifying; in this t r i a l , h e vehemently denied any knowledge of mass; exccutions of Jews. Eut the evidence makes it clear that; ho continually received current information on the pro-; gress of the "final solution". His press photographer; was sent to visit the ghettos of the East in the spring; of 1943, the time of tho destruction nf the Warsaw Ghetto.; The Jewish newspaper, "Israelitischcs Wochenblatt", which; Streicher received and read, carried in each issue accounts; of Jewish atrocities in the E a s t , and gave figures on the; number of Jews who had been deported and killed。 For; e x a m p l e , issues appearing in the summer and fall of 1942; reported the death of 72,729 Jews.; 17010; in W a r s a w , 1 7 , 5 4 2 in Lodz, 18,000 in 園 a t i a , 1 2 ヲ , 0 0 0 in; R u m a n i a , 14,000 in Latvia, 85,000 in Y u g o s l a v i a , 700,000; in all of Poland. In November 1943 Streicher quoted ver-; batim an article from the "Israelitisches Y/ochenblatt"; which stated that the Jews had virtually disappeared; from E u r o p e , and commented "This is not a Jewish lie."; In December 1942, referring to an article in the "London; Times’’ about the atrocities, aiming at extermination,; Streicher said that Hitler had given warning that the; second World War would lead to the destruction of Jewry.; In January 1943 he wrote and published an article which; said that • "itler•s prophecy was being fulfilled, that world; Jewry was being extirpated, and that it was wonderful to; know that Hitler was freeing the world of its Jewish; tormenters.; In the face of the evidence before the Tribunal it is; idle for Streicher to suggest that the solution of the; Jewish problem which he favored was strictly limited to; the classification of Jews as aliens, and the passing; of discriminatory legislation such as the N u m b e r s Laws,; supplemented if possible by international agreement on; the creation of a Jewish State somewhere in the world,; to which all Jews should emigrate.; Streicher's incitement to murder and extermination; at the time when Jews in the East were being killed under; the most horrible conditions clearly constitutes per-; secution on political and racial grounds in connection; with war crimes, as defined by the Charter, and con-; stitutes a crime against humanity.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Streicher is not guilty; on Count One, but that he is guilty on Count F o u r .; 17011; FUHC; Funk is indicted under all four counts. Punk, who had previously; teen a financial journalist, joined the Fazi "^arty in 1 9 3 1 , a n d shortly; thereafter Idecame one of Eitier; 1;  s personal economic advisers. On; Furfc; Jairoaiy 3 0 , 1 9 3 3 , / was nade Preas Chief in the Reicli Governmsrt,; and on March 1 1 , 1 9 3 3 , "became Under Secretary in the Ministry of; Propaganda and shortly thereafter a. leading figure in the vaious Fazi; organizations which were used to control the Dress, films, music and; Punk _; publishing houses. / took office as Kinister of Econonics and; Plenipotentiary General for War Sconony in early 1; Q; 3 8 a^d as President; of the Reichs'bank in January 1939. He succeeded Schacht in all' three; of these positions. Ee vas nade a ! n e n t e r of the Ministerial Council; for the Defense of the Reich on August 1939, ania merfber of the; Central Planning Board in September 1943.; Crimes against Peace; Punk "became active in theecononic field after the Fazi plane to; wage aggressive war had "oeen clearly defined. One of his representatives; attended a conference on October 1 4 , 1 9 3 8 , at which Goering announced a; gigantic increase in armaments and instructed the Ministry of Economics; to increase exports to o"btain the necessary exchange. On January 28,; 1939, one of Punk; 1;  s sulDordinates sent a n e n o r a n d m to the O K ^ on the; use of prisoners of war to nake ux> labor deficiencies which would arise; in case of ino"bilization. On May 3 0 , 1 9 3 9 , the Under Secretary of the; Ministry of Economics attended a meeting at which detailed plans were; nade for the financing of the war.; On August 2 5 , 1 9 3 9 , Funk w o t ^ a letter to Eitler expressing the; 17012; had "been; gratittuie that he / able to participate in such world shaking events;; that his plans for the "financing of the war," for the control of wage; and price conditions and for the strengthening of the Eeichs^ank had; "been couple ted; and that he had inconspicuously transferred into gold; all;foreign exchange resources availa"ble to Germany. On October 14,; Funk; 1939, after the war had "begun, / made a speech in which he stated that; the economic and financial departments of Germany working under the Four; Year Plan had been engaged i、n the secret econonic ^reparation for war; for over a year.; Funk partici*oated in the conomic planning which proceeded the attack; on the USSR. Eis deputy held daily conferences with Rosenberg on the; economic prolDlens which would arise in the occupation of Soviet territory.; Funk hinself participated in planning for the printing of ru"ble notes in; Germany prior to the attack to serve as occupation currency in the USSR.; After the attack he niade a speech in which he .described plans he had; nade for the economic exploitation of the "vast territories of the; Soviet Union; 1 1;  which were to "be used as a source of raw material for; Europe •; Funk was not one of the leading figures in originating the ila2i; plans for aggressive war, Eis activity in the econOnic sphere was; under the supervision of G-oering as Plenipotentiary General of the; Jour Year Plan. Es 4ii, however, participate in fehe economic preparation; for certain of the aggressive wars, notaoly those against Poland and the; Soviet Union, "but his guilt can "be adequately dealt with under Count Two; of the Indictment,; 17013; War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; In his capacity as Under Secretary in the Ministry of; Propaganda and Vice-Chairman of the Reichs Chamber of Culture,; Funk had participated in the early Nazi program of economic; discrimination against the Jews. On Novembor 12,1933, after; the pogroms of November, he attended a meeting held under the; chairmanship of Goering to discuss the solution of the Jewish; problem and proposed a decree providing for the banning of Jews; from all business activities, which Goering issued the same; day under the authority of the Four Year Plan. Funk has; testified that he was shocked at the outbreaks of November; 1 0 , but on November 1 5 , he made a speech describing these; outbreaks as a "violent explosion of the disgust of the; German people, because of a criminal Jewish attack against; the German people,’’ and saying that the elimination of the; Jews from economic life followed logically their elimination; from political life.; In 1942 Funk entered into an agreement with Him.mler under; which the Reichsbank was to receive certain g-^ld and jewels and; currency from the SS and instructed his subordinates, who were; to work out the details, not to ask too many questions. As a; result of this agreement the SS sent to the Reichsbank the; personal belongings taken from the victims who had been; exterminated in the concentration camps. The Reichsbank; kept the coins and bank notes and sent the jewels, watches; and personal belongings to Berlin Municipal Pawn Shops.; The gold from the eyeglasses, and gold teeth and fillings was; stored in the Reichsbank vaults. Funk has protested that he; did not know that the Reichsbank was receiving articles of th•s; Funk; kind. The Tribunal is of the opinion that/ either knew; what vms being received or was deliberately closing his eyes; to what was being done.; 17014; As Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank,; Funk participated in the economic exploitation of occupied; territories. He was President of the Continental Oil Company; which was charged with the exploitation of the oil resources; of occupied territories in the East. He was responsible for; the seizure of the gold reserves of the Czechoslovakia]! National; Bank and for the liquidation of the Yugoslavian National Bank.; F u n k; 1; s; On June 6,1942, / deputy sent a letter to the OKW request-; ing that funds from the French Occupation Cost Fund be made; available for black market purchases. Funk; 1; s knowledge of; German occupation policies is shown by his presence at the; meeting of August 8,1942, at which Goering addressed the; various German occupation chiefs, told them of the products; required from their territories, and added; "It makes no; difference to me in this connection if you say that your; people will starve.; 11; In the fall of 1943, Funk was a member of the Central; Planning Board which determined the total number of laborers; needed for German industry, and required Sauckel to produce; them, usually by deportation from occupied territories. Funk; did not appear to be particularly interested in this aspect; of the forced labor programme, and usually sent a deputy to; attend the meetings, often S3 General Ohlendorf, the former; Chief of the SD inside of Gerriany and the former Commander of; Einsatzgruppe D . But Funk was aware that the Boarバ of which he; was a member was demanding the importation of slave laborers,; and allocating them to the various industries under its control.; As President of the Reichsbank, Funk was also indirectly; involved in the utilization of concentration camp labor.; Under his direction; 17015; the Reichs'baiik: set up a revolving fund of 12,000,000 Reichsmarks to; the credit of the SS for the construction of factories to use; concentration canrp laborers.; In spite of the fact that he occupied important official positions; Junk was never a dominant figure in the various programs in which he; participated^ This is a nitigating fact of which the Tri"bunal takes; notice.; Conclusion; The Trilmnal finds that Fuuk is not guilty on Count One "but is; guilty* tinder Counts Two, Three and Pour.; TEE PHSSIDSilT: The Court will adjourn for 10 minutes.; 17016; M R . BIDDLEt SCHACHT; Schacht is indicted under Counts One and Two of the; Indictment. Schacht served as Commissioner of Currency-; arid President of the Reichsbank from 1923 to 1930; was; reappointed President of the bank on M a r c h 17,1933;; Minister of Economics in August 1934; and Plenipotentiary; General for War Economy in May 1935* He resigned from; these two positions in November 1937, and was appointed; Minister without Portfolio. He was reappointed as President; of the Reichsbank for a one-year term on March 16,193ヮ,; and for a four—year term on March 9 , 1 9 3 8 , but was dismissed; on January 2 0 , 1 9 3 9 . He vras dismissed as Minister without; P o r t f o l i o on January 2 2 , 1 9 4 3 .; Grimes against Peace; Schacht was an active supporter of the Nazi Party; before its accession to power on January 3 0 , 1 9 3 3, and; supported the appointment of Hitler to the post of Chancellor; After that date he played an important role in the vigorous; rearmament program which was adopted, using the facilities; of the Reichsbank to the fullest extent in the German rearm-; ament effort. The R e i c h s b a n k , in its traditional capacity; as financial agent for the C-ertnan Government floated long-; term Government l o a n s , the proceeds of which were used for; rearmament. He devised a system under which five year notes; known as M.E。F.0. b i l l s , guaranteed by the Reichsbank and; b a c k e d , in effect, by nothing more than its position as a; bank of issue, were used to obtain large sums for rearmament; fron the short-term money market. As Minister of Economics; and as Plenipotentiary General for War Econofey he was active; in organizing the; 17017; German economy for w a r . He made detailed plans for indus-; trial mobilization and the coordination of the Army with; industry in the event of w a r . He was particularly concerned; with shortages of raw materials and started a scheme of; stock-piling, and a system of exchange control designed to; prevent G e r m a n y ^ weak foreign exchange position from hinder-; ing the acquisition abroad of raw materials needed for rearm-; ament. On May 3 ? 1 9 3 5 ? he sent a memorandum to Hitler stating; that "the accomplishment of the armament program with speed; and in quantity is the problem of German politics, that; everything else therefore should be subordinated to セ h i s; purpose."; Schacht, by April 1936, began to lose his influence; as the central figure in the German rearmament effort when; Goering was appointed Coordinator for Raw Materials and; Foreign E x c h a n g e . Goering advocated a greatly expanded proerara; for the production of synthetic raw materials which was; opposed by Schacht on the ground that the resulting financial; strain might involve inflation. The influence of Schacht; suffered further when on October 1 6 , 1 9 3 6, Goerin? was; appointed Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan with the; task of putting "the entire economy in a state of readiness; for war within four y e a r s . Schacht had opposed the; announcement of this plan and the appointment of C-oering; to head it, and it is clear that H i t l e r; 1; s action represented; a decision that Schacht's economic policies were too conser-; vative for the drastic rearmament policy which Hitler wanted; to put into effect.; After Goering's appointment, Schacht and Goering promptly; became embroiled in a series of disputes. Although there was; an element of personal controversy running through these dis-; putes , Schacht disagreed; 17018; with Goering on certain "basic -oolicy issues. Schacht, on financial; grounds; t;  advocated a retrenchment in the rearmament programme, opposed; as uneconomical much of the proposed expansion of production facilities,; particularly for aynthetics, urged a drastic tightening on government; crdiit and a cautious policy In dealing with C-ernany; 1;  s foreign exchange; reserves. As a resiilt of this dispute and of a "bitter argument in; which Hitler accused Schacht of upsetting his plans "by his financial; methods, Schacht went on leave of absence from the Ministry of Economics; on September 5 , 1 9 3 7 , and resigned as Minister of Sconoinics and as; Plenipotentiary General for Wax Economy on November 16,1937*; As President of the Reichsbank, Schacht was still involved in; disputes. Throughout 1938, the Reichsbank continued to function as; the financial agent for the G e r m n Government in floating long-term; loans to finance armanents, 3ut on March 3 1 , 1 9 3 8 , Schacht discon-; tinued the practice of floating short-term notes guaranteed by the; Reichsbank for armament eroendit-ures. At the end of 1938, in an attempt; to regain control of fiscal policy through the Reichsbank, Schacht refused; an urgent request of the Reiclisminister of Finance for a special crddit; to pay the salaries of civil servants ^tiich were not covered "by existing; funds. On January 2 , 1 9 3 9 , Schacht held a conference with Hitler at; which he urged him to reduce expenditures for armaments• On January 7,; 1939, Schacht submit ted to Hitler a report signed "by the Directors of; the Eeichs"bank which urged a drastic curtailment of armament expenditures; and a "balanced "budget as the only method of preventing inflation. On; January 19, Eitler dismissed Schacht as President of the Reichs"barfc.; On January 22; f;  1943, Eitler dismissed Schacht as Heichs Minister without; 17019; Portfolio because of his whole attitude during the present fateful; fight of the German nation. “ On July 3 3 , 1 9 4 4 , Schacht was arrested "by; the Gestapo and confined in a concentration camp until the end of the yar.; It is cleax» that Schacht was a central figure in Germany; 1;  s rearmament; program, and the steps which he took, particularly in the early days of; the ITazi regime, were responsible for Fazi G-ermany; 1;  s rapid rise as a; military power. But rearmament of itself is not criminal under the; Charter. To "be a crime against *oeace under Article 6 of the Charter; it must "be sho^i that Schacht' carried out this rearmament as part of; ihe Nazi plans to wage aggressive wars.; Schacht has contended that he participated in the rearmament; program only "because he wanted to TDuilcl up a strong and independent; Germany which would carry out a foreign policy which wo "old command; respect on an equal "basis with other Europe an countries; that when; he discovered that the Nazis were rearming for aggressive purposes he; attempted to slovr down the speed of rearmament; and that after the; dismissal of von ^ritsch and von 31om"berg he partici"pated in plans; to get rid of Hitler, first l:y deposing him and later "by assassination.; Schacht, as early as 1936, "began to advocate a limitation of; J;  the; rearmament programme for financial reasons. Had the policies advocated; "by him "been put into effect, Germany would not have "been prepared for a; general European war* Insistence on his policies led to his eventual; dismissal from all positions of econonic significance in G-ernany.; On the other hand, Schacht, with his intimate knowledge of German; finance, was in a peculiarly good position to understani the true; significance of Eitler; 1; s frantic rearmament, and to realize that; the economic policy adopted was eonsi stent; 17020; only with war as its object.; Moreover Schacht continued to participate in German; economic life and even, in a minor way, in some of the early; Nazi aggressions. Prior to the occupation of Austria he set a; rate of exchange between the mark and the schilling. After; the occupation of Austria he arranged for the incorporation of; the Austrian National Bank into the Reichsbank and made a; violently pro-Nazi speech in which he stated that the Reichsbank; would always be Nazi as long as he was connected with it, praised; Hitler, defended the occupation of Austria, scoffed at obiec-; ti ons to the way it was carried out, and ended with "to our; Fuehrer a triple 'Sieg H e i l ' H e has not contended that this; speech did not represent his state of mind at the time. After; the occupation of the Sudetenland, he arranged for currency con-; version and for the incorporation into the Reichsbank of local; Czech banks of issue. On November 2 9 , 1 9 3 8 , he made a speech in; which he pointed with pride to his economic policy which had; created the high degree of German armament, and added that this; armament had made Germany's foreign policy possible.; Schacht was not involved in the planning of any of the; specific wars of aggression charged in Count Two. His participa-; tion in the occupation of Austria and the Sudetenland (neither of; which are charged as aggressive wars) was on s’.ch a limited basis; that it does not amount to participation in the common plan charge; in Count One. He was clearly not one of the inner circle around; Hitler which was most closely involved with this coramon plan.; He was regarded by this group with undisguised hostility. The; testimony of Speer shows that Schacht; 1; s arrest on July 2 3 , 1 9 4 4 ,; was based as much on Hitler's enmity towards Schacht growing out; of his attitude; 1 70 PI; "before the wax as it was on suspicion of his complicity in the "bom"b; plot- The case against Schacht therefore depends on the inference; 1rkat Schacht did in fact know of the Fazi aggressive plans.; On this all important question evidence has "been given for the; prosecution, and a consideral)le v o l m e of evidence for the defense.; The !TrilDuxial has considered the whole of this evidence with great; care, and comes to the conclusion that this necessary inference has; not "been established "beyond a reasonable dou"bt.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Schacht is not guilty on this Indictment,; and directs that he shall "be discharged "by the Marshal; f;  vhen the; Tribunal presently ad.journe.; 17022; M . de TA3BES: DOEFITZ; Doenitz is indicted on Counts One, Two and Three• In 1935 he took; command of the fir由t U-3oat flotilla commissioned since 1918, "became in; 1936 commander of the submarine arm, was made Vice—Admiral in 1940,; Admiral in 1942, and on January 3 0 , 1 9 A 3 Gomnan&er-in-Chief of the German; Navy. On 1 May 1945 he "became the Head of State, succeeding Hi tier •; Crimes Against Peace; Although Doenitz built and trained the German U-3oat arm, the evidence; cioes not show he was privy to the conspiracy to wage aggressive wars or; that he prepared and intiated such wars. Ee was a line officer perforning; strictly tactical duties, Ee was not present at the important conferences; ^hen plans for aggressive wars were announced, and there is no evidence he; was informed about the decisions reached, there. Doenitz di4, however,; wage aggressive war within the meaning of that word as used "by the Charter.; Su"biriarine warfare which "began innediately uvon the outbreak of war, was; fully coordinated with the other "branches of the Wehrmacht, It is clear; that his TJ-3oats, few in nim"ber at the time, were fiilly -ore-oared to wage; war.; It is true that until his ap-oointment in January 1943 as Coirmiander-in-; Chief he vas not an;  rt; Ol>erl:.sferhlshaker,; ft;  But this statement underestimates; the importance of Doenitz; 1;  -oosition. Ee was no nere Army or division; conmander. The TJ-3oat arm was the principal part of the German fleet and; Doenitz was its leader. The EighwSeas fleet made a few minor, if spectacular; raids during the early years of the war "but the real damage to the; 17023; enemy was dono almost exclusively "by his sulomarines as the millions of; tons of allied and neutral shipping sunk will testify. Doenitz was; solely in charge of this v&rfare. The Naval War C o m a n d reserved for; its- If only the decision as to the nunLer of suliaarines in each area.; Docnitz; In the invasion of Horway, for example,/ made recommendations in October; 1939 as to submarine "bases, which he claims were no morr than a staff study,; and in March 1940 he made out the o-oerational orders for thn supporting; U—Boats, as discussed elscwhero in this Judgment.; That his icroortance to the G-orman war effort was so re.^ardod is; oloquently proved "by Harder; 1;  s recomniGndation of Docnitz as his successor; and his appcintnent "by Hitler on 30 January 1943 as Commander — in— Chief of; the Havy. mtler too knew that su^me.rine warfare was the essential part; of Germany; f;  s naval warfare,; From January 1943, Doenitz was consulted almost continuously ty; Eitler. The evidonce was that they conferred on naval probiens about 120; times during the course of the war.; As late as April 1945 when he admits he knew the strugglo was hopeless,; Doenitz as its Commander-in-Chief ur.;ed the i^avy to continue its fight.; On 1 May 1945 he "became the ニeaci of State and as such ordered the; Wehrmacht to continue its war in the Sast, until capitulation on 1945.; Doenitz ex-olaincd that his reason for these orders was to insure 七 h a t the; G-erman civilian population might "be evacuated and the Army might make an; orderly retreat from tho E&st.; In the view of the T r i b u n a l , t h e evidence shows that Docnitz was; active in waging aggressive war.; 17024; War Crimes; Doenitx is charged with waging unrestricted sulDniarine m^ar-; fare contrary to the Naval Protocol of 1936, to virhich Germany; acceded, and whi ch reaffirmed the rules of siibmarine warfare; laid doY/n In tho London ITa val Agreement of 1950.; The ;prosecution has submitted that on 3 Septeniber 1938; tho German てJ一;3oa七 arm began to wage unrestricted submarine war-; fare upon all merchant; ships, whether enemy or neutral; >; cynically disregarding tho Protocol; and that a calculated; effort was made throughout the war to disguise this practice; "by making hypocritical roferonces to international law and; supposed violations by the Allies•; Doeniセz insists that at a3.1 times the Navy rcmoined ‘‘; within the confines of international law and of the Protocol•; He testified that when the war began, tho guide to submarine; v\rarfare was tho German Prize Ordinance takon almost literally; from the P r o t o c o l , t h a t ; p u r s u a n t to tho G e m a n view, he; ordered submarines to attack all merchant ships in convoy,; and all that refused to stop or used their radio upon sighting; a submarine. '-Then his reports indicated that British merchant; ships wore boing used to give information by m r c l o s s , wore; iDGing armed and wcre 81tacking sifomarj.ncs on sight, ho; ordered his sxabmarincs on 17 Octobor 1939 to attack all; onomy merchant ships without; on tho ground that;  r; resistance wc\,; c; 'to be e ^ ectod; #;  Orders already had been; issued, on 21 Scptomloer 1939 to attack all ships, including; neutrals, soiling at night without lirrti七s the Enslish; C h a n n e l s; On 24 November 1939, the Gorman Q ovornmcnt issued, a; warning to nciitrol shipping that, owins to tho frsquont; engGgcmcri七s taking placo in; 17025; tho Y/ntors oround tho British Islos and tho i^ronch Coast; between TJ-Eonts and Allied merchant ships which wore armed; r.rid licid instructions to use 七lioso arms as well as to ram U-; B o a t s , the aafoty of neutral ships In セ h o s e meters could no; longer be taken for granted. On tho first of January, 1940; f; 七ho Gorman XJ-Boat command, acting on tho instruct!oris of; Hitlor^ ordered Tj«Boats to attr.ck all Greek mcrchcri七 ships in; tho zone surrounding tho B r i t i s h Islos which was banned by; tho Unitod States to its ovm ships and also mvorchant ships; of gvgrv ric七ionnlity in tho limi七eci area of the Bristol; C h a n n e l . P ivc clays later a fur七ho:r ordor wos givon to TJ一Boats; to;  !,; makc iMnodiatcly unrGstrictod use of won pons 七 nil; ships; 1 1;  in an rrca of the Nor•七h S e a , tho limits of •vrtiich; wore dofincfi, Finally on tho 18th of J a n u n r y , 1 9 4 0 ,;  T; J-Boats; ^oro authorized to sink, withovi七 morning, r.ll ships thoso; waters near tho onomy coasts in which the use of mines enn; b e pr-Gtcndod; 1 5;  • E x c e p t i o n s w e r e t o b e m a d o i n t h o C しへ »j «J Ox; Uni七od States, Italian, Jappnoso end Soviet Shipc..; Shortly ciftor the outbronk of v/cr 七ho British Admiraltj^; In accorclGncc with its Handbook of エnstmi.ctions of 1938 to; the ifiorchont nr.vy; s;  arraod Its racrclaant vosscls, in many cases; convoyccl them with armed cscort, gr.vo orders to send position; rGpor七s upon sighting sufcmarinos, thus integrating mo:rchcm七; vessels into tho warning network of no.val intcll3.gonco. Qn; X Octolocr, 1939 , the Br i t i sh Acinairalty crmouncGd; B r i t i s h Tiicrchrri七 ships h-d been ordered to ram U-^oats i f; possible.; In the nc七ur、l circumstancoa of thia caso, tho Tribunal; is not p r o p e ro d to hold Doonitz guilty for his conduct of; submarine v/arfarc agrdnct Bri七iuh armed merchant ships•; Howcvor, tho proclcmrtion of operational zones mcl tho; sinking of ncntrr 1 morchr.nt vcanols whi ch on tor those; zones prosonts a different question. This; 17026; practico \ic s employod in the h of 1914-1918 by Germany cud.; c d o p t o d i n r c t n l i a t i o n b y G r c n t B r i t a i n . T h o W a c h i n g t o n c o n —; forotico of 1922, the London Nr.vaX Agroomcnt of 1930 rnd the; Protocol of 1936 were cntcrocl into v/ith f u l l kno^lcdgo thot; First W o r l d; c u c h z o n o s had. loocn e m p l o y o d I n t h o / l f c r . Y e t t h e P r o t o c o l; maclc no oxccption for operational zonos. The order of Doenitz; t o nlnlr n o u t r r l s h i p s w i t h o u t v/rrning vAion f o u n d w i t h i n; thcrofore; those zones vro.s tho o p i n i o n of セ h o Tribunal^ a; violation of the Protocols; エ七 Is olrjo asGcrtod that tho Gorman U-Eont r.Tm not; only fiid not crrry out tho warning r'jnd roccuc provisions of; tho Protocol that Doenitz dclibcrrtoly ordered the; killing of survivors of ship玎rockod vcrjscls, ”The七her enemy; or neutral. The prosecution hr.s Introducod much cvidonco; surroianding two orders of D o o n i t z , War Order N o . ! 1 5 4 , issued; in 1 9 3 9 , and tho so — c,rllこ’d;  il; Lnconir.; ?i;  order of 1942. The; dofcnco argues that theso ordorc nncl tho cvicicnco supporting; them do not show such n policy end introduced m u c h cvldcnco; to the contrrrjT". The Trxbnnal of tho opinion that tho; ovidoncc dooa not cstrblish マ/ith the ccrtainty required 七l'ir,七; Doenitz dclibcr^tcly ordered the killing of shipwrockod; c u r v i v o r c . T h o o r d e r s u o u n d o u b t e d l y cMiibiguovis, a n d; dorjervo t h e s t r o n g e s t; T h o v i d c n c c f u r t h e r s h o w s thr,t t h e r c s c u c p r o v i s i o n s; 飞7Gro not carricd out and thr.t the defendant ordered that they; should not "be carriod out. The crguraont of the defense is; that the socurity of the stabmnrinc i n , rn tho f i r e t rule of; the son ^ prrainount to rcccuo cncl that the development: of rir-; c m f t mr.de rcscv.z impossible . This mごy be co, but the; Protocol is explicit. If tho corrmr.ndor cannot rcscuc,, then; tin d o r i t s t e r m s h e c r ^ n o t s i n k p m c r c b a h t vgssc.1 n n d s h o u l d; r llov; it to }ic, rj z hnnnlocs before hi a poriGCopo. Those- orders,; then, prove- Doenitz is guilty of a v i o l a t i o n o± the Protocol.; 1 7 0 2 7; In vicw of all of the faats proved rnd in particulrr of; an orclcr of tho B r i t i s h Admiralty a n n o ^ c c d on the 8; according to which; Jfcy 1 9 4 0 / a l l vc3 .els should be sunk at night in tho; Skcigcrral:, and tho nnsv/cra セo intorrogn七orios by Adrairr.l; stating; Nimitz /that unrostrictod submarine ivrrfarc r/cis carriod on; in the Pac i f ic Ocoon by tho United States from the f i rot day; that nntion entered 七h e wnr, the aontcnco of Docnitz is riot; c-GSGSGcd on tho ground of his brcochos of the intornational; of rjubmarinc v;arfarc#; Docnitz was also chargcd with responsibility for Hitler; 1; tf; Conir.iancio Order of 18 Octobcr 1942; #;  Docnitz admitted ho; roccivoa and knew of the order when ho m s 71 ng Of f icer of; IT-Bor.ts, "but disclnimcd rvoaponsibility. Ho points out that; the order by its express torma oxcludcd men enptured in; novel v/r-rcfero, that the Nrvy hrcl no torritorir.l commmdc; on; Ir.nd, end thr.t subm^rinc cormnnndcrs would novor cncoimtor; commr.ndos •; In one instr.nco, when ho was Commr.ndcr-in-Chicf of the; Ncivy, in TS43, tho mombo:rrj of m rlliod motor torpedo boat; v/orc cr.pturcd by Gorman llr val Porccs • Thoy were intcrrogp tod; for intolligcncc purpoaorj on behalf of the local rdrairal,; m d then tiarnod over by liirj order to tho SD and shot, Docnitz; said thc/c if thoy *7oro cnpturccl "by tho No vy their cxocution; T; 7as a' violation of tho comrAOndo ordor, that tho oxocution; v/cs not announced in the Wchrmo.cht communique, rnd thot he; 〜マr.s never informed of the incident • Ho pointed out thr.t the; cdmirrl in question a not. in his chain of cornmnnd, but; ”でo subordinate to the crmy general in commnncl of the l^or^y; occuprtion# But Docnitz permitted tho order to rcmrin in; f u l l forco i了hen he bocr.mc cormc.ndor-in-chiof, rnd t o t h rt; extent ho is rccponsiblo,; Doon3.tz; In a c o n f o r c n c G o f 1 1 Dc. c o m b o r 1 9 4 4 / s o i d; け 1 2 , 0 0 0 conccntrr.tj.on ccmp prisonars v/ill be employed; in the shipyards as additional lr.bor#; ft At; 1 7 0 2 3; -V:; 、 い 、 、; Docnitz ‘; 七 h i s time / had no jurisdiction ovor ahipynrd construction ,; e n d c l r i m a thr.t t h i s w a s m o r o l y a s u g g e s t i o n c t t h o m e e t i n g; that thつ responsible offIcirln do gomothing nbout tho production; of s h i p s , t h a t h o t o o k n o s t e p s t o g e t t h o s o Y/orkcrs s i n c e i t; that ho; '•jo.8 not a ranttor for his jurisdiction rnd/dooo mo七 know; "r±iether they ovor wcro procurcd# He admits ho know of; conc. ntrr.tion cr.mps• A m a n i n h i s p o s i t i o n m u s t n c c o a G o r i l y; :::::::::::二̂; In ; 1 9 4 5 , 1 1 3 . t i e r roquost: d tho opinion of Jodl ond; Doonit z 〃hc 七lior tho Gone vr. Con vent ion ahonla be donounccdt; The notes of the meeting bctvmon the tv/o mil itary loaders; on 20 Fob run ry 1945 Gho^T the t Doenits expressed his view; that tho cli s ad vr. n t o gc a of such cn notion outweighed tho; r.dvcntagcG• Tho rjvxmory of Doon5.t2;1 attitude sho”n in the; notcc taken by m offic-r , included the follo v / ing scntcncc:; " I t i./ould bo "hotter to onrry out 七ho mccaurcs; concidorocl ncccascrjr v/ithout TOming, end rt; ご 1 1 ooct's to so vc free wi th tho outer ivorldttf; Tho proa c cut ion insi3t , ,d t:hr 七 u 七lie mcr.jiii.irosn referred 七 o; m:、.っnt tho Convention should not レ 、 d o n o u n c c c 5 . , but should bo; broken at vrjJ.l. The defonso oxplcnntion Is that liitlcr; "rrnntocl to break tho Convention for tv.o roaaons : to tごkc; nY/njr from Gc m a n troops tho protection of the Convontion,; thns pro von ting them from continiiin.^ to siirrondcr in large; ^roup3 to tho B r i t i s h and A^criccn ; and nlso to permit; ropricrlc pgainct A l l i e d prisoners of v; a r beer us o of A l l i e d; bomb5.ng Docnitz clr.ims that i/hr.t he racnct "by; Umcr.suirc i^; 1;  vrorc discipline ry mcnsuroG cgr in•つ t German troops; 七 h o t h i s; to prevent them from surronacring, r.ncl/hr.cT no rcforcnco; norcovor; t o n c r . o u r C 3 ngr.inst t h e A I I I g q ; / t h a t t h i s v:r.a m e r e l y; a a i^gost ion , rnd that in に n y event no; 1 7 0 2 9; や.; such ncrnuros ^oro cvor trkon, oithor against A l l i e s or; CTormans. The T r i o u n o l , h o w e v e r , cloos not bwlicvc this ox-; planrtion . The Geneva Convention xics not , hov/cvor, dcnouncccl; by G-oriiiPny. Tho rlcfcdgo hoc introduced 〔に:wへrnl ci:「'ficlnvi七s; to prove 七].:iご七 ^ r i t i s h nr.vc 1 pr5,soners of r<cr in cr.mps undor; D o c n i t z; 1;  juriGclict5.on v/oro t r o o t cl strictljr a c c o r d i n g t o 七 h o; Convention, rnc] the Tri"burial七nlブ:jj this fcict into considera-; tion , r o g r r d i n g it r.g n nut5.grting circviiictp.ncc#; circumstcu'〕c; C o n c l u s i o n; The Tr?Jjunr,l f inds Docmitz Is not on Count Ono; rnd is; of the 丄 n c l i c t m o n t , / g u i l t y on Counts Tv/o end Throo.; 1 7 0 3 0; THE PREblDSNT:; SAEDBR; Raeder is in(iictc^ on Counts One, Two and. Three. In 1928 he became; Chief of Naval Command and in 19o5 0ocrDefcjilsiia^cr dcr Kriegsmarine (OKM);; in 1939 Hitler made him Gross-Admiral, He was a. member of the Heich Defense; Council. On. 30 January 1943, Doenitz re-olaccd him at his own request, and. he; became Admiral Inspector of the Navy, a nominal title.; Crimes a ^ i n s t Poace; In the 15 years lie commanded it, Raeder built and directed tho G-ornan; Ha^y; he accepts full responsil:ility until rctironcnt in 1943. He admits the; N a; v; 7 violated the Vrrsailles Treaty, insisting it was "a matter of honor for; every man" to do so, and alleges that the vicltations were for the most part; minor, and &ernany "built less than her ellowe^le strength. These violations,; as well as these of the Anglo-Ggraan i^aval -agreement of 1935, have already "been; discussod. elsowhere in this Jud^merit.; * Raeder received the directive of 24 June 1937 from von Blom"berg requiring; special preparations for war against Austria. He was one of the five leaders; present at the hoszhach Conference of 5 NoveiaDQr 1937. He claims Hitler merely; wished by this conference to spur the Arny to fastor rearnaaent, insists he; Relieved the questions of Austria and Czechoslovakia would "oe settled "oeace—; fully, as they were, and points to the new naval treaty with England which had.; j; U; s t "been, signed. Ho received no orders to siDeed construction of U-Boats,; indicating tĥ•七 Hitler was not planning war.; Raeder received directives on "Jail G-ruen" and. the directives on;  T,; P?11; Weiss" beginning with that of 3 A-oril 1939; the latter diroctpd the; 17031; w; Nr. vy to support the Army "by intcrvontion from tho see 0 Eo; g a l s o o n o of t h e f017 c h i c f l o a d e r s p r e s e n t o t t h e r a a c t i n g; o f 2 3 !.Ic\y 1 0 3 9 . H e a t t e n d e d t h e O b c r s r l s b u r g b r i c f i n s of; 2 2 A u g u s t 1 9 3 9 .; T h e c o n e o p t i o n of t h e i n v a s i o n o f Norv/cy f i r ^ t e]?o〔.;c i n; t h o nine] of P r o d o r a n d n o t t h a t of K i t l o r . D e s p i t e H i t l e r ' s; d e s i r e , 0 3 s h e n n b y h i s cliroctivc of O c t o b o r 1 9 3 9 , t o k e e p; S c c n d i n c v i a n o u t r r l , t h e IT: v y cxcininocT 七 h o r c l v a n t o ^ o n of n n v a l; 0 '. S kJ t h e r e ra o r r l y an O c t o b o r . Ad:n?lrr:1 Ilrrls o r i ^ i n r - l l y; suc.gcctcd to Pacd, r tlie dcsirablvO c?sp;,cts of bnsca in !Tor-7°y.; A q u e s t i o n n a i r e , ciat•-d 3 O c t o b e r 1 9 3 9, ;1.iich c.)r]Fi:nt;3; on t h o d c G i r a b i l i t y of s u c h b n n ^ s , w:c circulて、•{;つd w i t h i n SICT; J#; On 1 0 O c t o b e r Rnoclcr t h o m a t t e r t; t; 1 t h II?.tier; hi;、7nr; Die r y cntrj f o r t h a t d a y zicjrj H i t l e r intend;. cL t o g i v e t h e; racttcr c o n s j . d c r a t i o n ^ A f o r i-iontliG I n t e r H i t l o r trl V o d 七 o; R a o d o r , Q u i c l i n g , K o i t o l r.nfi J ocll;GEF loogan i t a p l m n i n c ?、nd; t h o Ifcval  }r{c.r Staff work.;d rrith OK37 s t a f f o f f i c e r s . P r o d o r; r o c o i v o d K e i t e l;  f; s d i r c c t i v x f o r N o r ^ r y on 2 7 J r mv: r j 1 9 4 0 ^a d; t h e ^x; n; .bsoqucnt d i r o c t i v c of 1 M a r c h , a i g n o a b y H i t l; F n c d o r d e f e n d s hirj r a t i o n s • on t h e ^roxmd. it で、s r n o v c 1 0; f o r c n t r . l l t h e 七 i s h . It i s n o t n o c o s s r r y r g c i n 七 o d i s c u s s; t h o T r i o u n r l; t h i s flofonscづ vihich / hnvc- h e r e t o f o r e troritcd in s o n Coio.3.; concli.:ding that Gormrny !s invnrjion of 丄 〈 o m y D :nn^rk てr、3; a g ^ r ^ s G l v : \-7c.r; m;  I n - 3_ctt cr t o t h o K(つ v y . P a o d o r sciic,バ; ; i; Thc; o p c r r t i o n s of t h o N。vy I n t h e o c c u p a t i o n of Nor:.:でy て i l l f o r r l l; t i m o romcrj.in t h o g r c ^ t contribi.ition of t h e N c v y t o t h i s;  u; R a o d c r r c c c i v e d t h : ( ' i r c G t i v c o , inoXuclin^; t h e; postponomcnts, for the attr.ck in the In a moc七ing of; 1 8 M r r c h 1 9 4 1マ i t h、 H i t l e r h e v.rg3d t h e occnpr.セion of r l l; Q-rocco. H e c l a i m s t h i s -re. s o n l y c f t o r th:-- "3ritlsh hご d irnfiod; p.nd n i t l c r he.d orcl:rccl七he: rttr.ck, r n d p o i n t s; 1 7 0 3 2; out tho Kp. vy hnd no interest In Grccc':、 Ho rcco.tvod Hi t ier yo; Airoctivc on Yngoalr.vie.; Pr.odor c n c l c a v o r o d t o d i o s u a d o Ei七lor f r o m oml:)^rkinn; u p o n; tho invasion of tho USSR. In September 1240 ho urged on H it ler; n n r . g j r c s s i v o M c d i t c r v p . n c a n p o l i c y t. u し.o ̂ I t o r r s r t l v c t o a n; nttcck on Russia;  #;  On 14 KovcniD :r 1940 ho urged the, r^ainnt; Snglr.nd u cs our main enemy" rnd thrt subnrrinc nncl vrl r i r; f o r c c c o n s t r u c t on b o c o n t i n u e d . H o v o i c o d;  n; s c r i oris o b j e e 七 iorjG; c.^ainct tho Tiv.b S io n cornpoign before tho clof or t of Bn^lnnd ,; n.ccording to notos of the Q-ornnn lir val Wpr StaTf # Ko clri-an; his objections T/orc basc^d on the violr- tion of tho N on - A ggr o ^ s i on; Pr c t an v/c 1 1 r s a t r n t o g y; #;  B u t o n c c t h o o.cc j.rjion hr d b o ; n mrclc,; ho gave pcrnicsiori s i x dry3 be?ore tho in vaaion of the Sovi " t; tTnion to rttrck Russinn こ;iVbnr.rin.:.•つ in the 七 i c Sea within r; G p c c i f i : d v.^rninc r n d A c f c n d c t h i c r.ction b o c a u s c tlionio; Gub'nc.rincs vjcro wcnooping u on Ocrnicn 二 c t i v i t i n s ぃ; It ia olc^r frora t h i a v. "/idcnco t h r t P n c d c r prr七icip; o; 七つcl; in t h o p l a n n i n g cnic" v/cging o f a ^ ^ r c n a i v e r/c:r; 0; "rrr Crimea; Racdor Is chorgod -ith r/r. r c rime a on the h i ^ h rj on r; • The; m -ancmod British, pcaccn^ r l i n e r ,マn : 」 a u n k on 3; S e p t e m b e r 1 9 3 9 , '7hil:: caitvnrd oouncl t o A-ncricr;  #;  T h e へ : r n r n s; t•マ0 morithn lr t o r chnrgcc; 5; . thr t llr. C h u v c h i l l d-oliToc.r、七oly rr、rik; t h e;  u; Athcn3.r.; ? i;  t o c n c o u r r . ^ o A n c r i c c n h o s t i l i t y t o G c r m r : n y .; In fr.ot;  9;  i t x:?.3 s u n k "by 七he. G c r m r n TJ — I3o,t 3 0 , H.nccl ̂ r c 1c. ir^i; t h a n o n i n c T - p ^ r i o n c c d TJ一でパ“)r、t comianci :r rjrrik i t i n m i c t r k c f o r; r n d c r m o d n ^ r c l i m t oruiricr,七licit thirj n o t kr,own t i l t h o; IT-30 r e t u r n e d a c v o r r l v*co]rc a f t e r 七1.:ic Crc^nnn donir:! one. t h r t; Eitlv:!; 1;  tlion d i p o c t c c l t h o Kp vj r n d; 17033; Foreign OffIco to continue denying It. Freder .Icnlcd knov-; lodg、 or the propaganda cr raped cn , t t r . eking J‘ir« Cb.urchill#; Tho most r:orioles chrrgo against I?a: clor ic that he carried; out \\nro8trictod cubmr.rino r/rrfarc, inclv.din:?; sinking of; ご rnc d r c ha n 七 a hi p s , of no ut rr.Irj ̂  non-roac uo r? n cl nc c h i n c 一 gun n i n g; of survivors , contrary to the London Protocol of 1S36 # The; Tribunal mnlcoc tho cnmc f inding on Eacdci。 on . thia charge ra I t; did qu to Docnitz , v;hich he。already- boon onnouncod, up unti l; 30 Jvinurry 1943 '7b.cn Rr.cdcr rcturcd 9; the; Tho Co3;T '.nnclo Orclcr/of 18 Oct ob r 1042 ^vhich jxpr ^ a l y d id; not c.pnly to nr.v."; 1; 1 ^nrfrro, v/ac trnnsnittod by 七lie Knval >; r; /nr; Staff to tho lower n^vrl coriramd^rc v:ith t.ho direction It; tihoti.ld be distributed nrrlly by f lot i l i a 1へ,rdcrs nnd socti on; con:-cn dor 3 七 o 七 Iicii; 7;  suborclinr tea • Tiro cormrAidoo \roro pvit to; by 、 tho; dor.th by tli.:,Np.vy, c.nO.. not/七he S D , at Bordocivoz on/lO Docoribor; 1942. Tho com^ont of the Navr:! War Staff that thi.s v-cig; llin a cc or dan cc wi th the Puclircr J s a p : c i a l order, >rai ifj; n vcrth^losa gamothins nc\7 5.n intornrtional1ご…,ijincc tho; vrcro in uni forru " I?r.oclor acliuits he passcd the order; clown through 七]io chain of coranand, rnd ho uid not objoct to; H i t l e r .; The; Tv;o , nil a; Conclusion; Tr.ibun-n.l fincla thr-t Prcdor io guilty on Counts Ono,; Three•; 1 7 0 3 4; FX: !Rて .A L riKITCHENKO:; VOII SCIIIEACH; Von Schircch is ino.ictod under Counts On— rn cl Fo^r . He; joined the ITr.zi Pr.rty ond the SA In 1 9 2 5 . In 1929 he 乃.:.enno; tho Loader of tho .Nctionr.l Social ist Stud ;nt3 Union. In 1931; lie s ric,do RoicliG Youth Lccclor of tho zi Party v/ith control; o v e r a l l W a z l yotith o r g a n i s r t i o n n i n c l u d i n g t h e II5.tlcr J n ^ c n d .; In 1933 , after the Nazis had obtained control of the GovornKont; v o n S c h i r a c h v;an h c d c L ": a d o r of Y o u t h in t h e G-o rino n P r i c h ,; originclly に poaition v/itliin tho Hinirjtrjr of the Int-::r-5.or, 'out,; aftDr Docoriloor 1 , 1 9 3 6 , cn ox'fico itt the iレ.ich Cabinet .; In 1940 , von Schirncli resigned ra lr+'ru: of tho Hit ler J . v し * e n d; Leader of Youth in tho C'cmon ? c i c l i , but rotainoc^ his ponitioin; c s H^j.chslcitcr v;Ith control of Youth Educr. ti on. In 1.940; h e a p p o i n t e d G a i i l o i t c r of Vicnn〔.;, F c i c h a r'ov:.rnor of; Vi on nr.:, oncl Fcichs Dofcnao Cori^iicjaloncr for that territory .; Crimes A^cinat^Pcnco; A f t e r t h o N a z i a hr d c o m e t o po'".; T; cr v o n S c b i r c c b , uti^J.a—; ing both pliyoicnl violence cncl Q/ 'ficiol pressure, 'either (ニrovo; out of orxctoncc or took over n i l youth groups v/hich co:-ipotod; t;- t h t h e H i t l o r Ju^'ncl. A H i t l e r ^.ccr.o of D o c o r a b c r 1 , 1 9 3 6 ,; incor-porntca all Gcrmr.n you.th て,:Ithin the Hit lor JuToncl.; the time formo.l conscription T7as introd^c o. in 194-0, 97;t of; thoso e l i g i b l e ”;crc nlrcr.dy mcrubcrrj.; Von Schirach ug -d the Hitler nd to :ducatc Gomrn; Y o u t h t h o s p i r i t of Nctionr:l Socialicin; ; !;  nnd. j s u b j o c t o d thcra; t o o n i n t e n s i v e p r o g r a m of N a z i propr g n n d a . He. c s t n b l i s h c c . the-; H i t I c r J u g c n d c s a uo u r c c of rcplc.com:: n t s f o r t h e ITnzi P r r t y; f aviation a . I:n October 1938 he. ontcrcd; 1 7 0 3 5; in七o ごn r^rocricnt v i t h H i m l G r under マ h i c h ^icnlDcr^ of th.c; n i t lcr Jugcncl •;7ho net SS standards would "b、: considcrr-c.: rs the; primary aourcc of roplrccmonts for tho SS,; Von Schirc.cli c Iso iic;cd tho Tlitlcr J^g^-nc for pro-; inilitary 七 r ご . i n i n ^ ^ Spocial units , s e t up v;hosc pri- ^ r y; pv.rponc s training specialists for the various brnnchcc of; tlie G c r v i c , On August 1 1, 1 9 3 9 , ho on七cr cl into c.n  n^rco-; ":iont v/it3i ivcltol under v:hich tho E i t l e r Ju^cnc5.ごsrcod to; cc.rry out itsproliniinri-ry r.ct5-vitics under strndarrrj lair"; (lorn by th: :":ohr3-?.cclit enc tlio "/chrnncht rn;rocd to 七 rご i n; 30,000 Hitler Ju^cnd instruct org ( o ch yoar;  #;  The El七li。Ju^cnd; nlacccl particular enphrnis on 七ho n i l l t r r y spirit its •; t]- c inport'"nco of return of tho; colcnios, the nccccaity for L c b c n s r n m ご . t h e noblj バ ' c G t i n y; of G- yoivbh to d ie for Ilitier.; DcGpitc the ytrliL:c n rturo of tho octivitioc r.f t;••c; Hit ler Junciid, hovjov it docs not rppccr tint m Schir.-^ch; Y/rs 5.nvolvccl in tho -'cvclopncnt of IIしtl、r’s plnn for torritor-; S-nl oxpcn,sion by; of srjIV3 r , or thごセ::〕.ニ participctocl; in the pl^nniH5 or prcparo.t5.on of oivj of 七]':c v/rrc of c^^tol^IoT ) .; Crimc s A f^ i n rj t Ii:*u:ar. nitて; In July 1940 , von Schirr ch r:cg pppointod Gcv. I c l t o r of; V5.cnnr.• At the anno ti)'io he "roz cippoin七:x,. Bcichc ^ov .rnor; i or Vicnnr -nrl I?cichf5 Dcfcnno Corjmncii.on , or i^ innlly f or; KilitrrjT" D i str ict 17, incl^c^ing the of Vienna, Uppcr; Dp nub- °ncl Lower Dr.nul:c rf tcr ITovc^ib^r 17,194-2, for the; Gpai of Vienna r,lonc# Aa Hcichc DoT^nsc CD^inlsaioncr^ h、. hr.C; cohtrol of tli.; c iv i l ian vic.t ocononiy. A g P^.IcIig Governor jig; \7aa head of the nunicipnl r.T'-anistpr:tion of the oity of; Vicnnr;, rjxl, under the nupcrvirji on; 1 7 0 3 6; レ; of t h o M i n i a t o r of t h o I n 七 c r i o r , in c h a r g o of t h o rov^rnr'izntcl; i\Oxainlrjtrr.1on of t h e iic.ich i n V i e n n a .; V o n S c h i r a c h i s n o t c b r r gノ d -:'Ith thし co; v; iriisaion of W a r; C r i n c 3 i n V i c n n ^ , o n l y v:ith t h e coinnioG?.on of C r i n c s rgr5.ns七; IiTir-ir n i t y . AD hrrj c;lrccdy b e e n K e e n ^ ^ u g trie: o c o i z p i o d p u r —; 3*ar.r)t t o r. c o n p l n n of r . ^ r r o ^ s i o n . I t s o c c u p a t i o n 又 t h e r e -; f o r e , n "c^^inc コえ七]:liわ t h e jur isdiction of t h e Trilvanc 1,; ? t;  r:s; that t c m is used in A-: t iclo 6 (c ) of the Ch:. 丄 u レ Jxfj C. .L' 0 o lilt ,; li; :c:iurc; n; .cr, oxtcrv;iinr.tion, o n s l a v o n o n t ^ depot; 5; 七こtion r n d o t h e r; inhui :mc r.otn^ r.ncl T,pcrsc.cutiono on pつliticrj. 5 rncir.l or; religious grouncloIr in conn'-'Ct3.on with this occupation cons1七itut:; a Critic agoinct Evxic.nity v:odcr tlint A r t i c l e .; A s G ? u ] . o i t c r of V i o n n r , v o n S c h i r a c h c c n c u n c; 1; : r t h o; Sruclc^ 1 docrcc dr.tc d Apri l G , 1 9 4 2 , nakinr- the :1-c"ul,:̂ .t、,:rs; S n u c k o l; !; s p 1 c n i p •:»t c n t i r. r i o fj f o r nanpo; v; /.: r \7itb nx'c heritor t o; G u p c r v i c o tlie utill2;r.tion craC. tr>:;r.t:'n、)n七 r、:ご nr.npoorer \ rithin; their Gnus • Sn”.ckol fs clirocti pro vie .0. thot the C ore .;d; 1cborors ヮ o r e to be foci, nh-. ItorccI m d tv^ctod so rs to exploit; t h e m t o t h o h i广 h o s t p o s s i b l o d o g r ;c こ t the lov/ost I-'; 1;  J u し.J. o -し'•ン; cxpoinso.; v o n S c L i r a o h bocr.nc C-a 1110!tor of V i e n n a the flopor-; to, t i o n of t h o Jc-,7e hr.O. n l r o c d y •n.cn 如 , r n c " o n l y 6 0 , 0 0 0 o u t; of Vienna 's original 1 9 0 , 0 0 0 Jew! ronaincc1:. On Octol>:r 2,; 1 9 4 0 , he rttcndod a conforoncc c.t H i t l e r ' s o : f icc tc.ld; Pronk that he h-cl 5 0 , 0 0 0 Jcv;s in Vxcnm v;h5.ch the G tiorcl; G-ovoimnont v-oulO hrvc to tcko ov„r fron h in . On Dcc -nber 3 ,; 1 9 4 0 , von Sc "ii'r.ch rcccivcd r . l e t t e r from ctrt in^; that r ftor the roccipt of the rep rta nnこc by von Snhirach ,; Eitlci1 he? docidcd to doport the 6 0 , 0 0 0 J.:T7S a t i l l I'or.'.ninins; i n V i c n n ? to t h e G o n c i o l Govcrnin'-nt b c c a u G o of t h e hof.sing; s h o r t广 3 0 I N V i e n n a . The- d e p o r t r T I o n of t h e JOTTS f r o n Vionn。-; 1 7 0 3 7; then begun nn^. continuod V-X)til tho ..rrly f e l l of 1942 ,; On S:pセし:rfbor 1 5 , 1 9 4 2 , von 8 c1 irr ch nn do ?. :,pccch in " Tnl ch; h--;  r:; 'cf o n d o d h i a o.ction i n h':; 1;  v i n ^ d r i v o n;  : i; t . ns of t h o u s ^ n ^ c ;; u p o n t e n a of t l i o u G m d a of i n t o t h o ^ h o i to of t h o 3:*: s t; u; o s ^ G o n t r i b u t i n T; to E u r o p e a n c u l七 n r c .; u; " R H I L O t h o JGV/CJ VIZTO "hoiわ2 R E P O R T E D f R o n V I E N N A ROoortr;,; rdc'rca^ccl 10 him in hiIJ oごご:leiご1 crprcity, -JTOTO VOCCXV:,^ in; von S c - i r a c h; f;  s o f f i c o ±ron t h e o.CfIco of t h o C h i e f of t h o; S .curity Folic c me. SD which contrin c.飞 r clr. scrip tion of t ho; rct3„vl七ic:] of n s r t r u p p c n in e j e t t i n g J^WG.; reports woro intic:loci oy one of von Sciarccl:?ci; p:;incipr 1 oputiv r: # On June 3 0 , 1944 , von Schirr ch nf f ICC; rlso roccivocl r letter frori I^rItcnbrnnn^r ir.i'mつin h:.n th?.i; c. sb.ipr ri七 of 1 2 ^ 0 0 0 J e w s マ.t:s on i t a 7 t o V i o n n r .f or'; oし rjenセirl vrc;r ”!o r k n n C tlir.t r l l t h o 3 •• w h o i n c r p,;.lole ):«:'; •"; r; ork 二 0 1 1 I hr.vo to b o k o p t I n ror clinccir; i'or;  , r; a p o c i r 1 r cti o n •;  u; T h o Tri'Duncil f i n d s t h c t von S c h i r r ali^ - h i l o h o '‘!•. n o t; つ r i ^ i n r . セ c the policy 01こつ;pcrtii]ご fron Vi-nnii'y p d ticipatccl; I n t M a d e p o r tc tioij t o r h e h.、こ b c c D n c ^ r a i l c i t c r ox .; Ko knev:七 hrt tho bcG t t h : conl。 hop; for XJC a r. niccrr j lc; cxirjtoncc in the Ghottooa of THE EGNT• BtillotinG describing; t h o Jc-lrjh c ^ t c - r m i n r t i o n V Z T O i n ale o f f I c c #; ' n i l 〔 ^ u l e i t o r of V i c n n r , v o n S c M r a c h c o n t u n w 1 0; f u n c t i o n u o R o i c h l c i t c r f o r Y o u t h S c n c n t i o n c.nC. i n t h i s; cごp「ciセy he i n b o r n t h e ^ i t l r r Jvi^on^ participation; In tho plrn put into offset In tho f r l l of 19^4 un-lor r;hich; 5 0 , 0 0 0 yon.n'2 ncoplc bct":ccn 七h e " 3 s of 10 ご.)rユ 20 VJOTC; cvacuntcd into C o m a n y fron nrccs roc^pturc^ by tho Soviet; ? o r e c s rnc\ useこ a s r . p p r c n t i c c s i n G c r r r n IncLustry r.nc; 1;  n s; cjixili-rios in units OJ? the a m . cl 1 orccs# In tlic sir'rr: r; of 1 942 , von Schirach 七 . . l e g r r p h . r . d; 1 7 0 3 8; Bormann urging that a "bombing attached an English cultural town IDG; carried out in retaliation for the assassination of Heydrich which,; he claimed, had "been Dlanned "by the British.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that; :; >cn Schirach is not gailty on Count One; He is gailty under Courit Four.; 17039; ME. BIDDLS:; SAUCKSL; Sauckel is indicted, under all four counts, bjxuclcel joined the ifezi; Pf-rty in 1923, and "becanie Gauleiter of Thurin^ia in 1927. HG WPS B mom"bcr; of the Thuringian legislature from 1927 to 1933, was ap-oointed Heichs-; stattiialter for Thurin^ia in 1932, and Thurin^ian Minister of the Interior; and. HoRd of the Thurin^ian State Ministry in May 19S3, Hr "brcaniG p ncm"bcr; of tho Reichstag in 1933. He held tho formal r?nk of Opr/^ruTD-oonfuphrer; in L)oth the SA and tho SB.; Crimes ^a^ainst Peace; The cvidcnce has not satisfied the Tribunal tliat Ssuckcl was suf-; ficiontly connected with the common plan to wp^e aggressive war or sufficiently; involved in the planning or waging of th.6 ft^ Tcssivc- wars to ellow the; Tribunal to convict him on Counts One or Two.; War Crines and Grimes a^c-.inst Humanity; On March 2 1 , 1 5 4 2 , Hitler appointed Sauckel Plenipotentiary Oeneral; for the Utilization of Labor, with authority to put under uniform control; "the utilization of all available manpower, including tiiat of workers; recruited abroad and of prisoners of w r r; u; . Sauckol was instructed to; o-oerat^- within the fabric of the Four Xear Plan, and on March 2 7 , 1 9 4 2 ,; G-ocrin:^ issued a decree as Commissioner for the Pour Year Plan transferring; his manpower sections to Sauckel. On Seiptem; v; (5r 3 0 , 1 9 4 2 , Hitler g&^e.; Sauckel authority to aつ"ooint Connissioners in the various occnvied terri-; tories, and "to take all necessary ncasures, for th^ enforcement; 1 1;  of the; decree of March 2 1 , 1 9 4 2 .; Under the authority which h^ obtainod "by these decrees, Sauckol set nv; a program for the mobilization of the IP^OT resources to the Hcich.; 17040; One of the important parts of this mobilization was the systematic; exploitation, "by force, of the l&bor resources of the occupied territories.; Shortly after Sauckol had taken offi c; t;  he had the governing authorities in.; the various occupied territories issue d cror-s, establishing compulsory; labor srrvice in Germany. Under the authority of theso decrees Sauckol; !; s; Commissioners, "backcd up 、y tho polico authorities of the occut)io4 t^rri-; tcries, and sent to Germany the laborers which wore necosspry to; fill the quotas given then "by S a u c k e l . H o described so-cellod "voltuvbary"; •Janatcs; recruiting "by/"a whole "hatch of nale and female agents just as was done in; the olden tines for shanghaiin式”.That real volunt&ry rpcruitin尺 was the; exception rather than the rule is shown "by Sauckel; 1;  s statement on March 1,; 1944, that;  u; out of five million foreign workers who arrived in G-ernany not; even 200,000 canc voluntarily.;  n;  Althou^i he now claims that the statement; is not true, the circumstances under which it was made, as well as the; e v i d m c c presented "before the Tribunal leave no doult that it was; substantially accurate.; The manner in which the unfortunate slave laborers were collectea end; transport ei to G-errnany, and what happened to thou after they arrived, has; already loen described. Seuckel argues that he is not res-oonsi"ble for these; excesses in the administration of the "oro^rar“ He says that the total; number of workers to be oトtailed was sot by th>^ d^mejids from turn and; from industry; that obtaining tho workers was the resr)onsi^ility of the; occupation authorities, transx»ortinr: thora to Germany that of the G-prrnan rail-; ways, and taking care of thorn in G-rrr:any that of thp Ministries of L?^or and; Agriculturo, the G- m a n Lalr.or Front and the various industries involved. He; testifies that insofar as he heel any authority he ves constantly nrgin^; 17041; hu"1 ̂ nc 七 r c a tnont•; Tboro Is no eoubt , ho'vovcr,' that Sr uckr 1 h'^d OVCIT.11; respons ib i l i ty for tho slave Irb.^r progrn::, At the tine of; the events in question he li^ not f a i l to assort control; over 七he fir;lels rrhioh ho n c l r i n s 'were the solo rospnvsihil ity; of at hero • Eis rcguL tion3 provided thr t bio ConnlsGion-rsj; c h o u l “ h r vc m t h D r i t y for obtaining labor , end ho wo 3 constcntly; in the f 1 : 1C sup . rvialn^ tho a top^ v/hich "rci-て boinn: takon.; He r^r. a rv::^rc cf ruthless notho^s "bcin. ニ tnken to obtain; laborers , -nC. vigorously rjv.pportcO. then on the ground thr,七; セ hey were nocoscory to f i l l tho q.uotrr:.; S c . u c k c l r c ^ u l n t i o n c r Iso provideバ1 V. ri ho he.C. rr jpor}-; c l b l l i t y for transporting tho oarers to G-ornirriy, r l l c c ° t i n g; t]:on to cnployors rnd taking care of t h e n ,ごn d th~t tho otlior; ngoncioG involved In those proccssos >70ro subordinate 七つ hi^i.; He v.raG infomoci of the bncl conditions v/Mch cxiatod,エ七ご.:?os; not pppcnr thri: ho HCIVOCP b r u t a l i t y " •?o r it:。 crr.n G•つkc,; rfi odvocatc of nny pro gran sucli nロ Hin-tier ‘ g pirn for; c x t o m l n r tion thirou^l- v^ork. His attitude a thua o?;prcsrjcd; in r. rcgul.r tion 1; ム 1 1 t h e n c n nuc;t ]つし feel. ».i.i./X しし;1'、jCl C'.ci b370cii*fcoC'.; in such r v:ay as 七0 exploit:セhen to the hi^host; possible, extent at tho lov;crjt conc^ivnbl;. degree; of cxponciturc. 1 1; The cviccrico ^jhov;s 七 h a t Sruckcl wnc in chargo of p. pro^^cn; v/hich involved Coportation for slave Irbor of noro then; : , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 hunrn boinss 9 nciny oi' them un'"or terr ib le; conr:ationn of cruolty rn'::. cuj?fcring.; Conclucion; The Tribunrl f inds that SrMokcl is; Couiits One anc Tマo» 上丄w is guilty under; not guilty on; 0 orm ts Three nn; 17042; M; #;  こ c m s :; JODL; Joel is in lie ted on ell f our ccuntc. Pr on 1935 to lv :53; ho \ic s chi^f of the ^rt ionnl Defense Section in the lii^h C orirr nC.; Af tor a year in corjrrnc of troope, in ハ-agnn セ 1 9 3 9 he return; to bccono Chief of tho Oporrtions Sta f f of the High Corraorid; of tho a-r:nocl ? o r c c c , 七hon .Gh hic i .ncdirtc superior v/r.c; ぐ . :し丄 •ン“ nt ^ A t o l , he rcpo:rt;cci C±Toct\j to H it ler on opcrctional; 七 c r s . In tho strict n i l i t n r y ricnso, Jo:二 1 wos t h : r,cturl; planner of the v/r.r mcl rosponai^iv:. in Ir.rgo iふ、-•し'vj <.1.3. o for the; atrntogy ^ncl corKlncセ of oporationr?•; Jocil C.ofcnrls lii::isolf on t h e ^ r o u n ^ . hつ r/nn a riolcicr; to obcdioncc, r.nc. not c. p o l i t i c i a n ; . n(, that hlr; stnff rncl; plrnninr マつ:rk left hin no 11?-io for other nr ttcrs; #;  丄ユ、ニ 七hr.; J; c; T;hon ho ん1 or Ir4ti::lcd orders, rmorancr R.l::.X 1Jinごし,-; ficl rjo for SltloT cnC. often in the cibs. ncc of ^ o i t c l . Thoia^h; ho cloiir.G 十:hot ra a solclior he hr.cl t :. obey El七1じ2,, ho; that he of ton tr ied to obstruct cortnin rionsuro^j "by r^lay^; v;hich occr.r;ionclly prove:! sr.ccoGsfulし、s v-hen h,: resisted; Hitler; ?; 3 Ccnand that r‘ diroctiv^ bo issurO. to lynch clliccl; ^terror f l i c r 3 n »; Crinos c. inc t ^Fca cc; Entries in J o d l ! s clirry of 13 and 14 Pobrurry 1.95S; Ghoi? Kitlcr ins tract;ccl both hin r n ( l i t to kocp up; n i l i t o r y pressure R. 「•.こ i JD "t ^us trir bo gun r: t the SchuschniGS; confcronco c j Gimal-tinc n i l i t r r y noasurn^y r.ri:l that thz^c; c chic vol their purpose. -hon Hitler dccldccl "no セ to t ol--r^t; Sch-aschnigg yコ plcloicicitc, Joこ1 br j-a:;ht tn the ccnf r^noc; the c r a f t " , the crcistin.^ c 七 c.ff plan . rry fop 10; Mr-.rch shov/G H i t l e r t h e n o r d e r e d t h e n r c p a r n t j . o n of;  :i; C!r.こレ O t t o; u; ,; 17043; an(で th、: c i r o c t i v o -7c.s i n i t i r l o d "by J o d l . J o d l i s s u eこ c u p p l o -; n c n t r r y i n s t r u c t i o n s on 1 1 Ifcrch, i n i t i a l e d K i t l c r; f; 3 orclcr; f o r t h o I n v a s i o n on t h o GPIIC CLAtO#; I N plrnnin.7 t h e "L Lt.v Oj.1. on C Z . :C1IOG1Ovrkir;  9;  Jocll T7‘?G V O R Y; r.ctj. vc;  9;  n c c o r c l i n g t o t h e Schnunclt ^ o t os • H o initlalv-c; 1; .I t o n s; 1 7 , 2 4 , 3 6 c n a 3 7 i n t h e N o t o s * Jocll r ^ i i t s h r n-rcccl; •vith OKE thcit t h o;  J t; i n c 3 . d c n t七 o ; p r o v i d e G^. m a n i n t e r v e n t i o n; t occur r.t t h o lr. t c G t -oy 1 4 0 0 on X - 1 D r y , tlic C”j ID :;f o r e; t h e cittx.ck, Br.iC. iセ n n s 七 OCCUl^ 厂 • 七 ご . 1 t J. l!.ヴ o o し.; flyin.f; 5; ; v/cathcr• J o d l c o n f e r r e d v/ith t h e p r o p c g n n c l c -.rto; on;  u; i:*^iinont corraon t a o k c; 1 1;  cinch r,a Gornr.n v i o l a t i o n s o f; I n t c m p t i o n r 1 l a v ; , exploit.?、七ion o f セ!: n t h e onorry c:ic\; r e f u t a t i o n s b y t h e G - c m a n a , " t a c k;  ??;  J o e l c o n s i d o r; “ メ; Jl; pc、:r1::ic-j,lr:rl.y i n p o r t a n t; 1 1;  •; A f t c r M a n I c J i , J o c l l;  0; j; GC t; 1 1; C ^ c c h o s 1 ovakic; 1;  a s a po; v; ;cr is o u t ••• T h e gcniiTS; o f t h e F u e h r e r r.nc; 1; . Ills d G t c r r i i n a t i o n n o t t d ol'ran; QVv-n r.. "7 or I d '7ar ho v o age i n v/on t h o v i c t o r y w i t h o u t; t h e u/jg of f o r c c; #;  T h e b o p e rev;?ins t h r t t h o i n -; c r o f . u l n u s , t h e v/crk t h o d o u b t f u l p c o p l o he vc-; b e e n c o n v e r t e d nncl-;/ill r .人-1<-丄inし丄丄ししセTic-,y•‘‘; Shortly aftor the Sudeten occiTpotion^ Joe .1 v/ont to a; p o s t cornimpc"'. ancl C-iC n o t h ^ c o n o C h i e f of t h o O p c r r ti/vna S t a f f; in OlCf uri七il t h o e n d of A u s u a t , 1 9 3 9 .; J a c c u a s o c ! t h e Korv/ay in va s 1 on v:i 七];! H i 1 1 c r, K c i セ'、:1; I J.1 C. ~ C ’ • CL o r o わ 1 2 D c c o n b c r 1 9 3 9 J h i s ..irry i s r o p l c t c *"itli; l r t c e n t r i e s on h i s v i t i c s i n p r o p c . r i n ^ t h i n r t t ^ c k .; J ocll o p IrJ.riG h i s c o n n c n t thr. t H i t l e r xrc c s t i l l lookirr, f o r; t h a t; i c r n t / h o \ic\a writing: f o r r c l i r b l c ari;  ; i r; !:ccucc; u;  七3 ri:つvc; i n t e l l i g e n c e on t h e; n a “ n c c o G G n r j ^ n o v o; B r i t i s h p i r n s , r:o; r;  c c f c n C s t h o j.nvrsion; t o f ororjtrll t h e n * H i s t v - s t i n o n y sho-:s the.; 1 7 0 4 4; f r o n O c t o b e r 1 9 3 9 K i t l o r plnntu.'l t o 、七七 o c k t h e W o a t t h r o u g h; 3clこ.;iun, b u t v;qs d o i i b t f u l a b o u t i n v D - ' i n ^ HolXnnc? u n t i l t.ho; :ni.. r'.lc of N o v o n b c r . On 8 P :;"bnv.ry 1 9 4 0 , J o a l , h i e ;lopu.ty; "Jrrli-iont, rnc" J o s c h o n n o k , t h e .。ir f o r c e s p i ' n n r , "iGcunnccl; cnonご:tiicna?1 ves t h e "n rc i广.oa; n;  of r . t t r c k i n ^ N o r v n y , D o n n a r ] c; ancl Hollr.n^., 'out 'jucrantcoinf tho neutrality of Bolciun,; of tho 17 orders postponing the attr.ck in the て c o t for; vrr.ioun rcr.sons i n o l u c ' l n g '7or.thor c o n d i t i o n s, until. M r y 1 9 4 0 ,; vr,,rc signed by Jotll.; H o wo a ご c t i v c i n tlio p l n n n i n ^ a g a i n s t C r c o c c e n d; Y u g o s l r . vie,. T h e H i t l o r o r d e r of 1 1 Jn nu.° 194-1 t o i n t e r v e n e; in A l b m i a -ica initialed by Jodl. On 20 J' nv.ary, f -^ur; months before the o t t r c k , Hit].or tolC. c confcrcncc of Ccirar.n; rriC I t a l i a n s o n o m l s i n Joe; 1; ! p r c s c n c o thr.t Gor.-.te.n t r o o p; conccntrつセions in Rounpnin.ヮcro to bo unou n/ニain〔;t Cxr c c c ,; Jocll r̂o.s p r o s o n t on 1 3 M a r c h づ じ 幻 H i t i e r t o l C Raoclrr r l l; G r c o c c n u s t b e o c c u p i c O b e f o r e m y sot-tlcn: n t coii3.-f. b e; rcachoc; 1; .. On 27 March -cfh.zn Kitl'::r tolr" tho Gomごn Hi〔::]i; that; Corrrnc'/tlaG d e s t r u c t i o n of Y-a^osl.; 0; vin nhoiil^. b e ficconpli^hoc'l; v;  1 t h ''tinncrciful hnrsbneas'‘, nn(1 tin.: u c c i a i o n v;r.c trハ.ncn t o; b o n b B c l ^ r r c l o v;5.thout c.Icclr:ration uf vrr.r, J o d l trrs r l s o t];cro.; Jodl t e s t i f i e d thr .T III tier forrcvl a n r.ttnek b y KITS sir.; nn; r; " a o ttc.ck":d f i ro t . T h i s p r e p a r o t i o n ^ c ^ " n r.lnoat n; y e a r b e f o r e t h o i n vr, s i on ; J o d l t o l: "; r; - r l i n o n t r.s r. rly r.a; 2 9 J u l y 1 9 4 0 t o propr.ro t h e p l r n s s i n c c H i t l e r h a i 'ccic"ocl; to ntt ご clc; n m l Hitler lot or told ^ r l i r u n t ho brd •olrnnr:ベ1 to; a t t a c k 5.n A u g u s t 1 9 4 0 b u t p o s t p o n o c " it f o r n i l i t r . r y r - 3 - c o n s .; H; o i n i t i r l c c l H i t l c r ' c d i r o c t i v c of 1 2 N o v c i a b a r 1 9 4 0; according to -±\ich; / p r o p e r s . t i o n s vcrball;v o r ^ o r o d shoult'. b o o ^ n t i n n e d -nc' rl.^o; 5.ntitin.lcf- " C r a c B r . r b r r o s c c; ! {;  on 1 3 D c c c . n b c r . On 3; P o b r u c r y , 1941, Hitler, Jodl r.nC. K c - i t c l 3 c u s s c d; 17045; tho invrsion, m c l lie vie3 proaont 、)n 14 Juno ”3r.cn finr 1; reports on  uGr so ^crbc.roaac:; n;  \rcro nc.C.c9; War C rino s r.n o. Crir:;os a in s t ^vxic ni tエ; On 1 0 O c t o b e r 1 9 4 2 E i t i e r Iszm C. th: Connrnこつ Orc; n; .-;r r.nc; 1; .; lay t c r a g u p p i c n o n t a r y o x p l m ^ ti r>n to corr'irn "in-r o-fxicors; o n l y . Tliつ c o v o r i n c nor;.orrnCxvi vrnc 'aigiicこ b y ooc"; 1; .!. IjrrXy; •"-rrft,G of the order v;oro -ucicc "by ^oc.1; 1;  G G七riff, n i i h hio; lenovrlocl^c. J0^.1 t e s t i f i e d h o マruつ rjtrongl^; 7; * opporj on riorol; r.nこ1.'3ご1 srounO-; r; j, b u t coul'l n o七 i ? c f m : - t o pr.ss i t on.丄:•:) ±u; sicts he tried to;  i; ltir;cto its hnrchnr^c in prr.ctic "by not; infor-'iing Kitlcr rhen it て.•••ニ not carri::cl o u t H o j.nitir-led; t h o 0K'.; r;  ncnorcnC.vj'i of 2 5 Jiuic 1 9 4 4 r o r f f l n i i n o t h e O r ^ c r; a f t o r t h e N o r n c n ^y 1 m i n i n g s •; A p l ^ n t o c l i n i n n t o S o v i e t c r o u i G n c r G フごs i n the; c i r c c t i v o f o r;  ii; C。gc 3rrbrro:jc;a; I S; , T»\o dccirjion ^-hct^ . r tb; Gl.oulス.be Villccl w i t h o u t trir.l y了03 t o ト厂:ir;do b y r n o f r i o .; A d r a f t con七ciiriG J: d l; f;  c h r ^ n W r i t i n g tinこ’thic ; : j h o u l ^ l; b o Panelled r o t r . l i r t i o n , rri; n;  h o tcrjtifiつこ thirj v; r; rs h i s; r七tc::.ipt 七 0 g e t .ハ r o u n ' l 3.七《; T,Vhon In 1945 i l i t l o r c ons i uo r c c l (^ono>incin:? the? r on ova; Con vent i oi'],J of. I nr^ucd tho outrroighed tho; r d v r n t c : r c c . On 2 1 h o tolr: H i t l e r r,こhcrcnco to th:.; C o n v e n t i o n n o t I n t c r . f c r o t h tlic c^n'*uct of tli.、; giving as m つュccin.pl、〕 tb.o nf.nkino; of r. Ihi 七 i s h hocpitrl -jliip; r s r. rcprirjr.l e n c c r l l i n G ' 土 七 「 : H e srld Uo 厂 rj0; "bccucL'G i t vicci t h o o n l y nttitu-lc E i t l e r v-qtiI:! o o n s l "Lcr^ t h r t; n o r a l o r lcgr.1 p.r31^:10ntn hex. n o c;f.f.:.ct rir:""- crguc^i h o t h u a; preven 七 cぐ Hit lor f r o n clonouncin^ tho Con 7cri七 ioru; 17046; There is litt丄g evid.cn.c6 the.t Jod l was actively connGctod. with the; slave lal:or program, and he must have concentrated on his stratp^ic -olannin^; function. But in rds erpeech of 7 November 1943 to the Ofmlcitrrs ho spid; it was neccssa^y to act "with rpinorseless vi^or end. r广sorirfcion'; 1;  in; Dcnnark, Prance and the Low Countries to corvoel work on the Atlantic Wall,; By t e l o t ^ e of 28 October 1944, Jodl ordered the evacuation of all; the; persons in jJorthern Norway end./burning of their houses so they could not; help the Russians. J odl says he was agr-.inst this, tut Eitler ordered it; end.it was not'fully carried out. A docuncnt of the Norwegian Government; says such an evacuation did take place in Northern Norway and 30,000 houses; were damaged. On 7 October 1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would; not accept en offer of surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the; contrary he insisted, that they ue completely destroyed. He says this was; done "because the Cremans were afraid those cities would be uined by the; Russians as was Kiev. Ho surrender was ever offered.; His defense, in "brief, is the doctrinn of "su-oorior orders; 1 1; ,; prohibited 1-y Article 8 of the Charter as a drf^nse. There is nothing; in mitigation. Participation in such crimes as these has novor "been; required of any soldier and he cannot now shiold himself "behind a mythical; requirement of soldierly obodicnce at all costs as his excuse for; connission of these crimes.; Conclusion; The TriV.unal finds that Jodl is guilty on all four counts.; 17047; THE PRESIDENT: VCN PAPEN; Von Papen i s i n d i c t e d unde r C o u n t s One ;-,nd Two. He vja.; a p p o i n t e d; Ch r i c e l l o r o f t h e R e i c h on J une 1 , 1 9 3 2 , and 切 a s s u c c e e d e d b y v o n; S c h l e i c h e r on December 2, 1 9 3 2 . He ^as m,:de V i c e C h a n c e l l o r i n t h e; H i t l e r C a b i n e t on J a n u a r y 3C; y;  193?> r nd on November 1 3 , 1 9 3 3 , P l e n i -; p o t e n t i a r y f o r t h e S a a r . Cri J u l y 2 6 , 1 9 3 4 ? he iA;as a p p o i n t e d M i n i s t e r; t o V i e nna, and i/vas r c a l l e d o n F e b r u a r y 厶 , 1 9 3 8 . Cn ’ o r i l 2 9, 1 - 3 9 ,; he a p p o i n t e d ;lmb s s a d o r t o T u r k e y . Ke r e t u r n e d t o Germany ;hen; T u r k e y b r o k e o f f d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s v d t h Ge rm .ny i n :•.,】ist 1%ふ.; C r i m e s a g a i n s t P ea ce; Von P a p e n ivas a c t i v e i n 1932 and 1933 i n h e l p i n . H i t l e r t o f o r m; t h e C o a l i t i o n C a o i n e t and a i d e d i n h i s , p p o i n t m e n t a s C h a n c e l l o r on; J a n u a r y 30^ 1933 . As V i c e C h a n c e l l o r i n t h a t C a b i n e t he p a r t i c i p a t e d; i n t h e N a z i c o n s o l i d a t i o n o f c o n t r o l i n 1 933 . Or: June 16^ 1S34>; h o w e v e r , v o n Papen inade a s p e e c h a t I i a r b u r g w h i c h c o n t a i n e d a d e n u n c i a t i o n; o f t h e N a z i a t t e m p t s t o s u p p r e s s t h e f r e e p r e s s and t h e c h u r c h , o f t h e; e x i s t e n c e o f a r e i g n o f t e r r o r , and o f;  U; 15C% ho we re m i s t a k i n � -; " b r u t - l i t y f o r v i t a l i t y . n Cn June 3C 9 1 934 , i n t h e wave o f v i o l e n c e; w h i c h a c c o m p a n i e d t h e s o - c a l l e d Itoehm F^i^e, v o n Papen v;as t ^ k e n i n t o; c u s t o d y b y t h e S S, h i s o f f i c e f o r c e was r r e s t e d , and t-"o o f h i s; a s s o c i a t e s 5 i n c l u d i n g t h e man "who h:xd h e l p e d h i m ト’ork on t h e L: r b; s p e e c h , i^ere m u r d e r e d . V on Papen was r e l e a s e d on J u l y 3, 1 9 3 4 .; N o t h ^ i t h s t a n d i n r t h e mu rde r o f h i s a s s o c i a t e s ^ v o n P pen a c c e p t e d; t h e p o s i t i o n o f M i n i s t e r t o A u s t r i a c n J u l y 2 6,1 9 ?厶, t h e d. y a f t e r; Do丄丄fuss had b e e n a s s a s s i n a t e d . H i s a p p o i n t m e n t was nnounced i n a; 17048; l e t t e r f r o m i i t , l e r w h i c h i n s t r u c t e d h i m t o d i r e c t r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n; t h e tv,?o c o u n t r i e s 11 i n t o n o r m a l a n t i g r i e n d l : , c h a n n e l s ,, a n d a s s u r e d; h i r a of H i t l e r ? s " c o m p l e t e and. i i n l i m i t e c } c o n f i d e n c e . , f As I ' i n i s t e r t o; A u s t r i a , v o n P apen ivas a c t i v e i n t r y i n g t o s t r en: t h e n t h e n o s i t i o n c f; t h e N a s i P a r t y i n A u s t r i s f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f b r i n r i n g abo t ハ n s c h l u s s .; I n e a r l y 1 9 3 5 he a t t e n d e d a m e e t i n g i n B e r l i n t 扔h i ch t h e p o l i c y v!as; l u i d dovjn t o a v o i d e v e r y t h i n g w h i c h "would g i v e t h e appe r a n e e o f; Cerimn i n t e r v e n t i o n i n t h e i n t e r n r . l a f f a i r s o f • us t r i o . Y e t he a r r a n g e d; f o r 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 marks a mon th t o be t r a n s m i t t e d t o " t h e p e r s e c u t e d N a t i o n a l; S o c i a l i s t s u f f e r e r s i n A u s t r i a • ” On L a y 17^ 1S35 , he r e p o r t e d t o; H i t l e r t h e r e s u l t s o f a c o n f e r e n c e w i t h C a p t a i n L eopo l d^ t h e L e a d e r o f; t h e A u s t r i a n N a z i s , arid u r g e d H i t l e r t o make s t a t e m e n t r e c o g n i s i n g; t h e n a t i o n a l i n d e p e n d e n c e o f Aus t r - i a^ and p r e d i c t i n g t h a t t h e r e s u l t; m i r h t t o be h e l p t h e f o r m a t i o n o f a c o a l i t i o n b e t w e e n S c h u s c h n i g g 1 s; C h r i s t i a n S o c i a l i s t s f�nd t h e l u s t r i :.n N a z i s a i i n s t S t^ rhembe rg , On; J u l y 2 7, 1 9 3 5 , v o n Papen r e p c r t e 1 t o H i t l e r t h a t t h e u n i o n o f A : i s t r i a; and Germany c o u l d no t be b r c u ' h t a b o u t b y e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e b u t o n l y; b y t h e s t r e n g t h o f t h e N a t i o n a l S o c i a l i s t 1"ovement, He: ur , :ed thr-1 t h e; A u s t r i a n N a z i Part3r change i t s c h a r a c t e r as a c e n t r ' l i r e d R e i c h Cerrorn P r t y; and become a r a l l y i n g p o i n t f o r a l l N a t i o n a l Ge rmans .; V o n P a p e n was i n v o l v e d i n o c c a s i o n a l N a z i p o l i t i c a l d e m o n s t r a t i o n s; s u p p o r t e d N a z i p r o p a g a n d a a c t i v i t i e s and s u b m i t t e d d e t a i l e d r e p o r t : o n; t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e N a z i P a r t y , and r o u t i n e r e p o r t s r e l a t i n ; t o \ u s t r i n; m i l i t a r y d e f e n s e s . H i s M . u s t r i a n p o l i c y r e s u l t e d i n t h e a t r eemen t o f; J u l y 1 1, 1 9 3 6 , v j h i c h n o m i n a l l y r e s t o r e d r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n Germany and; A u s t r i a t o " n o r m a l and f r i e n d l y f o r m " , b u t ^ h i c h had a s e c r e t s u pp l emen t; p r o v i d i n g ; f o r ' in amnes t y f o r A u s t r i a n N a z i s , t h e l i f t i n g o f c e n s o r s h i p; 17C49; o n N a z i p a p e r s , t h e r e s u m p t i o n o f p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s by N a z i s a n d t h e; a p p o i n t m e n t o f men f r i e n d l y t o t h e N a z i s i n t h e 3 c h i s e n n i t r C . . b i n e t .; A f t e r t h e s i g n i n g o f t h i s a g r e e m e n t v e n Pape r : o f f e r e d t o r e s i g n b u t h i s; r e s i g n a t i o n was n o t a c c e p t e d . T h e r e a f t e r h e p r o c e e d e d t o b r i n乙 c し n t i n led; p r e s s u r e o n t h e A u s t r i a n G o v e r n i n o n t t o b r i n g N a z i s i n t o t h e S c h u s c h n i : g C a b i n e t; a n d t o g e t t l i e m i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i o n s i n t h e F a t h e r l a n d F r o n t , A u s t r i a Ts s i n g l e; l e g a l p a r t y . C n S e p t e m b e r 1936^ v o n P a p e n w r o t e h i t l e r ‘ a d v i s i n g h i m t h a t; a n t i - N a s i s i n t h e A u s t r i a n M i n i s t r y o f S e c u r i t y 列ere h o l d i n g up t h e i n f i l t r : t i o i; o f t h e N a s i s i n t o t h e A u s t r i a n G o v e r n m e n t r e co i nmended b r i n g i n r " s l o v v l y; i n t e n s i f i e d p r e s s u r e d i r e c t e d a t c h i n g i n ^ t h o r e g i m e " .; O n F e b r u a r y 1 9 3岔, v o n P a p e n was n o t i i ' i e d o f h i s r e c a l l a s M i n i s t e r t o; A u s t r i a , a t t h e same t i m e t h a t v o n ? r i t s c h , v o n B l o i n b e r r a nd v o n Ne r . t h i/i/ere; r e m o v e d f r o n t h e i r p o s i t i o n s • Ho i n f o r m e d H i t l e r t h a t he r e g r e t t e d h i s r e c a l l; b e c a u s e he h a d b e e n t r y i n g s i n c e N o v e m b e r 1 9 3 7 t o i n d u c e S e n s c h n i ^ g t o h o l d a; c o n f e r e n c e i - v i t h H i t l e r a r d S c h u s c h n i g g h a d i n d i c a t e d h i s i l l i n / n e s s t o d o s o .; A c t i n g u n d e r H i t l e r T c-: i n s t r u c t i o n s , v o n F .pen t h e n r e t u r n e d t o .'いs t r i a r id; a r r a n g e d t h e c o n f e r e n c e v i h i c h was h e l d :� . t B e r c h t e s g a d e n o n F e b r a r y 1 2 , 1; V o n P a p e n a c c o m p a n i e d S c h u s c h n i g g t o t h a t con fe rence;, a n d a t i t s c o n c l u s i o n; a d v i s e d S c h u s c h n i g g t o c o m p l y "w i th H i t l e r ! s d e m a n d s . On M a r c h 1 C , M t l e r; o r d e r e d v o n P a p e n t o r e t u r n t o B e r l i n . V o n I J , ’ pen "was i n t h e Ch: n c e l l e r y o n; M a r c h 1 1 ^ h e n t h e o c c u p a t i o n o f A u s t r i a w a s o r d e r e d , llo e v i d e n c e h a s b e e n; o f f e r e d sho -w i n r t h a t v o n P a p e n vjas i n f a v o r o f t h e d e c i s i o n t o o c c u p y A u s t r i a; b y f o r c e . a n d; 17C50; he has testified that he urged Hitler not to take this、 step.; After the annexation of Austria von Papen retired into private; life and there is no evidence that he took ary part i n politics. He; a c c e p t e d t h e p o s i t i o n o f Ambas sado r t o T u r k e y i n A p r i l 1939 b u t no; e v i d e n c e has b e e n o f f e r e d c o n c e r n i n g h i s a c t i v i t i e s i n t h a t p o s i t i o n; i m p l i c a t i n g h i m i n c r i m e s .; The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papon's primary purpose; as Minister to Austria v^as to undermine the Schuschnigg re; (; - ime and; strengthen tho Austrian Nasis for the purpose of brin^in; about; Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue; and bullying. But the Charter does not make criminal such offenses; against political mora lit", however b:.d these may be. Under the Charter; von Papen can be held guilty only if he ^as a party to the planning of; aggressive war. There is no shov^ing that he was a party to the plans; under v/hich the occupation of Austria was a step in the direction of; f u r t h e r a g g r e s s i v e a c t i o n , o r e v e n thu.t he p a r t i c i p a t e d i n p l a n s t o; occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not established; beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his activity,; and therefore the Tribunal cannot hold that he was : party to the; coramon plan charged in Court One or participated in the planning of; the aggressive wars charged under Count Two,; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that von Papen is not guilty under this Indict-; ment^ and directs that he shall be discharged b y the fershal, when the; Tribunal presently adjourns•; 17051; 1IAJCR GENERAL NIKITCHSNKO:; SEY3S- INQUART; S e y s s - I n q u a r t i s i n d i c t e d u n d e r a l l F o u r C o u n t s . S e y s s - I n q ] . a r t, a n; A u s t r i a n a t t o r n e y , was a p p o i n t e d S t a t e C o u n c i l l o r i n A u s t r i a i n May 1937; a s a r e s u l t o f German p r e s s u r e . He h ad b e e n a s s o c i a t e d -w i t h t h e A u s t r i a n; N a z i P a r t y s i n c e 1931^ b a t had o f t e n h ad d i f f i c u l t i e s w i t h t h a t P a r t y; a n d d i d n o t a c t u a l l y j o i n t h e N a ^ i P a r t y u n t i l M a r c h 1 3 , 1 9 3 3 . He iwas; a p p o i n t e d A u s t r i a n L i n i s t e r o f Sec a r i t y and I n t e r i o r w i t h c o n t r o l o v e r; t h e p o l i c e p u r s u a n t t o one o f t h e c o n d i t i o n s w h i c h H i t l e r had i m p o s e d o n; S c h u s c h n i g g i n t h e B e r c h t o s g a d e n c o n f e r e n c e o f F e b r u a r y 1 2 , 1 9 3 3 .; Activities in Austria; S e y s s - I n q u a r t p a r t i c i p a t e d i n t h e l a s t s t a g e s o f t h e N a z i i n t r i g u e; w h i c h p r e c e d e d t h e German o c c u p a t i o n o f A u s t r i a , a nd was made C h a n c e l l o r; o f A u s t r i a a s a r s u i t of Gorman t h r e a t s o f i n v a s i o n .; On Uaroh 1 2 , 1 9 3 ^, S e y s s - I n q u a r t met H i t l e r a t L i n z and made a s p e e c h; •welcoming the G; 0; rman forces and advocating tho reunion of Germany and; A u s t r i a # On M a r c h 1 3, he o b t a i n e d t h e p a s s a g e o f a l a w p r o v i d i n g t h a t; A u s t r i a s h o u l d become a p r o v i n c e o i � G e r m a n y and s u c c e e d e d M i k l a s a s; P r e s i d e n t o f A u s t r i a v/hen K i k l a s r o s i g n e d r a t h e r t h a n s i / n t h e l a w . G e y s s -; I n q u a r t 1 s t i t l e was c h a n g e d t o R e i c h s G o v e r n o r o f A u s t r i a on I�.'? r c h 1 5 ,; 1 9 3 8, a n d o n t h e same d a y he was f i v e n t h e t i t l e o f a G e n e r a l i n t h e S S .; He was made a H^ichs Canister without Portfolio on Ihy 1,l c 39 .; On M a r c h 1 1 , 1 9 3 9 ^ he v i s i t e d t h e S l o v a k i a n C a b i n e t i n B r a t i s l a v a; a nd i n d u c e d t h e m t o d e c l a r e t h e i r i n d e p e n d e n c e i n a way 训h i c h f i t t e d i n; c l o s e l y v^i th H i t l e r ' s o f f e n s i v e a g a i n s t t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f C z e c h o s l o v a k i a •; 17052; As Reichs Governor cf Austria, Seyss-Inquart instituted a program; of confiscating Jewish property. Ur ;er his regime Je^s were forced to; emigrate, were sent to concentration cpjnps and were subject to pogroms.; At the end of his regime he cooperated v;ith the Security Police and SD; in the deportation of Jeiws from Austria to the East •;  k; /hile he; Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Nazis were sent to concen-; tration camps by the Gestapo, mistreatod and often killed.; Criminal Activities in Poland and the Netherlands; I n S e p t e m b e r 1 9 3 9 , S e y s s - I n q u a r t -was a p p o i n t e d C h i e f o f C i v i l A d m i n i s -; t r a t i o n o f S o u t h P o l a n d . On O c t o b e r 1 2 , 1 9 3 9 , S e y s s - I n q u a r t w a s made; Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland under Frank.; On Llay 1 3 , 1 9 4 0 , Seyss-Inquart 切as appointed Reich Commissioner for; occupied Netherlands. In those positions he assumed responsibility for; governing territory which had been occupied by aggressive wars and the; administration of;  T; .vhich of vital importance in the aggressive war being; waged by Germr-ny.; As Deputy Governor Gc-neral of \.he General Government of Poland, Seyss-; Inquart vjas i supporter of the harsh occupation policies "which were put; in effect. In November 1939, while on an inspection tour through the; General Goverrmient, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland v,as to be so administered; as to exploit its economic resources for the benefit of Germany, Seyss-; Irquart also advocated the persecution of Jews and 聰 3 ini'ormed of the; beginning of the AB action v/hich involved the murder of many Polish; intellectuals; #; As Reichs Coninassioner for Occupied Netherlands, Seyss-Inq iart was; ruthless in applying terrorism to suppress all opposition to the German; 17053; occupation, a program v^hich he described as "annihilating" his opponents.; In collaboration with the local Higher SS and Police Leaders he m s; involved in the shooting of hostage for offenses against the occupation; authorities and sending to concentration camps all s spected opponents; of occupation policies including priests and educators, Many of the Dutch; police were forced to participate in these programs by threats of reprisal; against their families, Dutch courts were also forced to participate in; this program, but when they indicated their relact-inct to give sentences; of imprisonment because so many prisoners were in fact killed, a greater; emphasis was placed cn tho use of summary police courts.; Seyss-Inquart carried out the economic administration of the; Netherlands without regard for rulしs of the Hague Convention •which he; described as obsolete. Instead, a policy "was adopted for the inaximum; utilization of economic potential of the Netherlands, and executed v/ith; s^.ll regard for its effcct cn tho inhabitants. There was widespread; pillage of public and private property vjhich ivas fiven color of legality; by Scyss-Inquart; 1; s regulations, and assisted by manipulations of the; financial institutions of tho Metherl-inds under his control.; As Reichs Commissioner for the Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart immediately; began sending forced laborers to Germany. Up ntil 1%2, labor service in; Germany was theoretically voluntary, but was actually coerced by strong; economic and governmental pressure. In 丄 9 4 2 Seyss—エnquart formally; decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the services of the; Security Police and SD to prevent evasion of his order. During the; occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Netherlands to the; 17C5U; Reich as laborers and only a very small proportion \^ere actually volunteers; One of Seyss-Inquart; 1; s first steps as R; e; ich Commissioner of the; Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws iinposinc: economic; discriminations apainst the Jews. This was followed by decrees requiring; their rogistratioh^ decrees comnosin^ them to reside in Ghettos and to; v:e-.r the star of David, spor die rests and detention in concentration; camps, and finally, at the suggestion of Heydrich, the mass deportation; of almost 120,000 of Holland‘s 140,000 Jews to Auschwitz and the "final; so丄utioru; n;  Seyss-Inquart admits knowing that they were going to Auschwitz; but claims that he heard from people 切ho had been to Auschivitz that the; Je ivs v^ere c o m p a r a t i v e l y v ; e l l o f f t h e r e ^ and t h a t he t h o u g h t t h a t t h e y; were being held there for resettlement after the war. In light of the; evidence and on account of his official position it is impossible to; believe this claim,; Scyss-Inquart contends that he was not responsible for many of the; crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they were; either ordered from the Reich, committed by the Arrry, over v^hich he had; no control, or by the German Higher S3 and Police Loader, who, he claims,; reported directly to Himiiiler, It is true that some of the excesses were; the responsibility of the Army, and that the Higher SS and Police Leader,; although he was at the disposal of Seyss-Inquart, could always report; directly to Himmler. It is also true that in certain cases Seyss-; Inquart opposed the extreme measures used by these other agencies, as; when he v;as largely successful in preventing the Arniy from c rryin.^ out; a scorched earth policy, and urged the Higher SS nd Police Loaders to; reduce the number of hostages to be shot. But the f.,ct remains that; 17055; Soy〔:3—Inquci rt v/ac: c. knox^oc -nvoluntary pr.rticipcnt in; 'r,r じ r i r . c s 'マゾ?. Crinc.g c^c.inc:t Hunoni七y ":;Mc7i 7/oro oo'l'ilttocl; in th occupation "'f the Wot^iorlan^G.; C u c l u s i o n; The Tribunrl flndc tur t Sこ;ycis-IrK. uこ rt is ^ixllty; unr,-or Oownis T-:/つ,Three n n : Pour, Scycs-Inqtiart is no七; aiilty on Count One •; 17056; VR. BIDDU::; S K E R; S p e e r i s i n d i c t e d u n d e r a l l F o u r C o u n t s . S p e e r j o i n e d t h e N a z i; P a r t y i n 1 9 3 2 . I n 1934 he was made H i t l e r a r c h i t e c t and became a; c l o s e p e r s o n a l c o n f i d a n t . S h o r t l y t h e r e a f t e r he was made a Depa r tmen t; H o i d i n the; German l a b o r F r o n t and t h e o f f i c i a l i n Cha rge o f C a p i t a l; C o n s t r u c t i o n o n t h e s t a f f o f t h e D e p u t y t o t h e F u e h r e r , p o s i t i o n s i/vhich; he h e l d t h r o u g h 1 941 . On F e b r u a r y 1 5 , 1 % 2 , a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f F r i t z; Todt, Speer v.'as appointed Chief of the Organization Todt and Reich; M i n i s t e r f o r Armaments and M u n i t i o n s ( a f t e r S ep t embe r 2 , 1 % 3 , f o r; Armaments and W a r Production), The positions vj^re supplemented by his; appointments in March and April 1942 as General Plenipotentiary for; Armaments and as a member of the Central Planning Board, both within; t h e F o u r Y e a r P l a n . 3 p e e r was a member o f t h e R e i c h s t a g f r o m 1941; until the end of the w a r .; Crimes against Peace; The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer; 1;  s activities do not aniDunt; to initiating, planning, cr preparing wars of aggression, o r o f; conspiring to that end. He became the head of the armament industry; "well after all of the -wars had be on cornnonced and were under 对 a y . His; activities in charge of German Armament Production were in id of the; •war effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the; vjaging of v;arj but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that such; activities involve engaging in the common plan to wage aggressive war; as chargod under Count I or waging aggressive ^ar as charged under; Count II.; 17C57; War C r i m e s a nd C r i m e s a g a i n s t H u m a n i t y; Tho c v i d o n c c i n t r o d u c e d a g _ . l n s t S p e e r u n d e r C o u n t s T h r e e a nd F o u r; r e l a t e s e n t i r e l y t o h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e s l a v e l a b o r p r o g r a m .; S p o o r h i i . ' i s e l f h ad no d i r e c t a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r t h i s; p r o g r a m . A l t h o u g h he had a d v o c . t e d t h � a p p o i n t m e n t o f a G e n e r a l; P l c n i p o t o n t i r y f o r t h e U t i l i z a t i o n o f l a b o r b e c a u s e he vvanted one; c c n t r 1 a u t h o r i t y w i t h ivhom he c o u l d d e a l o n l a b o r u n t t e r s ^ he d i d; n o t o b t a i n a d m i n i s t r ” t i v o c o n t r o l o v e r S a u c k e l , S a u c k o l "was a p p o i n t e d; d i r c c t l y b y H i t l e r , u n d e r t h e d e c r e e o f i , l a r ch 2 1 , 1 9 4 2 ^ w h i c h p r o v i d e d; t h a t he s h o u l d b e d i r e c c l y r e s p o n s i b l e t o G o e r i n g , a s P l e n i p o t e n t i a r y; o f t h e F o u r Y e a r F l a n .; As R e i c h K i n i s t e r f o r A rmaments and I g n i t i o n s and G e n e r a l P l e n i -; p o t e n t i a r y f o r A rmament s u n d e r t h e F o u r Y e a r P l a n , 8 p e e r had e x t e n s i v e; a u t h o r i t y o v e r p r o d u c t i o n . H i s o r i g i n a l a u t h o r i t y "was o v e r c o n s t r u c t i o n; and p r o d u c t i o n o f arms f o r t h e OKH. T h i s "was p r o g r e s s i v e l y e x p a n d e d t o; i n c l u d e n a v a l a r m a m e n t s; >;  c i v i l i a n p r o d u c t i o n and f i m 丄 l y , o n A u g u s t 1,; 1944^ a i r a rmaments» As t h e d o m i n a n t member o f t h e C e n t r a l P l a n n i n g; B o c r d , i.'hich h ad sup reme a u t h o r i t y f o r t h e s c h e d u l i n g o f Ge rman p r o d u c t i o n; and t h e a l l o c a t i o n and d e v e l o p m e n t o f rrav m a t e r i a l s , S p e e r t o o k t h e; p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e B o a r d h ad a u t h o r i t y t o i n s t r u c t S a u c k e l t o p r o v i d e; l a b o r e r s f o r i n d u s t r i e s u n d e r i t s c o n t r o l ;:nd s u c c o s s d e d i n s u s t a i n i n g; t h i s p o s i t i o n o v e r t h e o b j e c t i o n o f S a u c k o l , The p r a c t i c e 旧as d e v e l o p e d; u n d e r 列h i c h S p e e r t r a n s m i t t e d t o S a u c k c l a n e s t i m a t e o f t h e t o t a l number; o f w o r k e r s n e e d e d , S a u c k e l o b t x i n o d t h e l a b o r ,md a l l o c a t e d i t t o t h e; v a r i o u s i n d u s t r i e s i n a c c o r d .nee w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s s u p p l i e d b y S p e e r .; S p e e r know "when he made h i s demands o n S. u c k e l t h a t t h e y "would be; 17058; s u p p l i e d b y f o r e i g n l a b o r e r s s e r v i n g u n d e r c o m p u l s i o n . He p a r t i c i p a t e d; i n c o n f e r e n c e s i n v o l v i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e s l a v e l a b o r p r o g r a m; f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f s a t i s f y i n g h i s d e m a n d s . He "was p r e s e n t a t a; c o n f e r e n c e h o l d d u r i n g A u g u s t 10 and A u g u s t 1 2 , 1 9 4 2 , w i t h H i t l e r a nd; S c u i c k c l a t w h i c h i t was a g r e e d t h a t S a u c k e l s h o u l d b r i n g l a b o r e r s b y; f o r c e f r o m o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r i e s w h e r e t h i s "was n e c e s s a r y t o s a t i s f y t h e; l a b o r n e e d s o f t h e i n d u s t r i e s u n d e r S p e e r ! s c o n t r o l , S p e e r a l s o a t t e n d e d; a c o n f e r e n c e i n H i t l e r h e a d q u a r t e r s o n J a n u a r y “,19kU} a t w h i c h t h e; d e c i s i o n 列as niado t h a t S a u c k u l s h o u l d o b t a i n n a t l e a s t 4 m i l l i o n neiw; •workers f r o m o c c u p i e d t o r r i t o r i G s n i n o r d e r t o s a t i s f y t h e demands f o r; l a b o r made b y S p c e r 5 a l t h o u g h S a u c k e l i n d i c a t e d t h a t he c o u l d do t h i s; only "with help from Pliiiiniler.; S a u c k o l c o n t i n u a l l y i n f c r i n e d S p e e r a n d h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t h a t; f o r e i g n l a b o r e r s v ;e re b e i n g o b t . i n e d b v f o r c e . A t . m e e t i n g o f M a r c h 1 ,; 1944^ S p e e r 1 s d e p u t y q u e s t i o n e d S r / a c k o l very c l o s e l y こ b o u t h i s f a i l u r e; t o l i v e up t o t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o s u p p l y f o u r m i l l i o n i - v c r ko r s f r o m; o c c u p i e d t e r r i t o r i e s . I n some e a s e s S p e e r d e i m n d e d l a b o r e r s f r o m; s p e c i f i c f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s . T h u s , :vb t h e c o n f e r e n c e Au: l i s t 10—丄2,1%2 }; Sauckcl VJCIS instructed to supply Speer ivith;  ,!; a further million Russian; laborers for the G-urmrn armament industry up to c.nd incl'idin^ October; 1 9 4 2 • u A t a m e e t i n g 01 t h e C e n t r i P l a n n i n g B o a r d o n A p r i l 2 2 , 1 % 3 S; Speer discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal; m i n e s , a nd f l a t l y v e t o e d t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h i s l a b o r d e f i c i t s h o u l d; be undo up by German l.bor; 9; S p e e r h a s a r g u e d t h a t he ^.dvocn tea t h u r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e; l a b o r p r o g r a m t o p l a c e a g r e a t e r e m p h a s i s o n u t i l i z a t i o n o f German; 17059; labour in war production in Gc.rrriany and cn the use of labour in occupied; countries in local production of consumer goods formerly produced in; Gornnny. Speer took steps in this direction by establishing the so-; callocl "blocked industries; n;  in the. occupied territories ^hich were used; tc produce goods to be shipped to Germany. Employees of these industries; were inimune from deportation to G; e; rmany as slave labourers and any; vjorkcr ivho had been ordered to go tc Germany could avoid deportation if; ho v;ent to work for a blocked industry. This system, although somewhat; l o s s inhumanし t h a n d e p o r t a t i o n t o Ge rmany , TOS s t i l l i l l e g a l . The s y s t e m; of blocked industries played only a small part in the overall slave; labour progr .nunc knowing the way in xvhich it was actually being; administcrod. In \n official sonsc, he vms its principal beneficiary; and he constantly urged its oxt^nsion.; Spccr vids \lso dircctly involved in tho utilization of forced; labour n.s Chief of tho CrgMiization Todt. The Organization Todt; functioned principally in tho occupicd areas on such projects as the; A t l a n t i c W a l l a n d t h し - c o n s t r u c t i o n o f m i l i t a r y h i g h w a y ^, and S p e e r h a s; adrnittod. that ho relied on compulsory service tc keep it adequately; staffed• Ho also uced concentration camp labour in tho industries under; h i s c o n t r o l . Ho o r i g i n a l l y a r r a n g e d t o t a p t h i s s o u r c e o f l a b o u r f o r; use in small out of tho factories; and later, fearful of Miinmlfcr; r; s; jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as feiv concent rat ion cimp; w o r k e r s a s p o s s i b l e •; Speer 例as also involved in the use of prisoners of V\iar in armament; industries but contonts that he only utilised Soviet prisoners of v/ar in; 17060; industries covcred by the Gcnev: Convention,; Spoer; T; s position 对こs such that he was not directly concerned with; the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program,; although ho v^as a-waro cf its existenet;. For example, at meetings of; t h e C u n t r r . l r i i n n i n g B o a r d he was j n f o r r a ed t h a t h i s demands f o r l a b o r; wore so Ir.rge as to necessitate violent methods in recruitings At a; meet ing of the Central Planning Board on October 1 % 2 , Speer voiced; his opinion that mar^r slave- laborers v;ho claimod to be sick were •; malingerers and stated: "There is nothing to bt s’、id ag:,inst SS and; Police taking drastic steps and putting thosり knovm as slackers into; concentration camps. “ Speor, hovjover, insisted th二t the slave; laborers be givon idequatu food and working conditions so that they; could v^ork cfficiontly\; In mitigation it must bし rccognizcd that Speer;  !; s eGt.^blishment; of blockcd industries did kuep kany laborers in their honius and that; in tho closing st;iges of the -war he vjas one of tho few men yhc had the; c our age to tc.ll Hitler that the weir was lost and to take steps to; prevent the senseless destruction of production facilities, both in; occupiod territories and in Germany^ He carried cat hi3 opposition; to Hitler's scorchod earth program in some cf tho Western countries; and in Gorncny by doliveratcly sabotaring it at considerable personal; risk.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Speer is not guilty on Counts Cne and Two,; but is guilty uncWr Counts Three and Four,; 17061; M . e.G V A B R E S I; VON KZ:UR;.TH; v.r Countrj. He; 〔::,:• rnr; n ニ::ib oacr. c o r; Jv.no 2 , 3.952,; Ii'G In tho von; Von N c u r c t h Iej irrlictscl un:?.or o i l P; i,-j こ professionalドiplへ.rint "•;ho s c r v 0. c a; to Britain fro^n 1930 to 1932 . On; he wr.c eppointoti MInictcr of Foroi^n Aff; Prp.;n c r b i r u t , n posi七iom -jhich h o hole"; 1; , u n d e r t h o c c b i n o t a; of von Schloiclior ond Hitlor . Von Ncurath rcsignc.1 rr:; Minister of Foreign Afj'aira on Pcbinrry 4 , 1 9 3 8 , m'レ:1.; riaclc F! cli Uiniatcr vrf.tliont Portfol io , Proaic.cnt of the; Socrot Ccblnot Council r.rr: a ncnbc.r o£ the Poich DcfcnGO; Council . On Ilarch 1 8 , 1 9 3 9 , lie 17ns appoi:at..v:''. Roich Pro-; toctor for '3ohcviic 「:n ご - H C T C v i r , r.n: acrvod in this cr prcit^; ujntil S c p t c n b c r 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 . H o hclc; 1; . t h o f o r . r l r e n k of; O b o r £ r u i p p c n f u o h r r i n t h e 3 S .; Cri: ict; a^cS.nst Pcrco; Ac ranis tcr of Foreign A f r r i r s , von Ncurc 七}ユ n^vls.: cl; K i t l o r I n c o n n e c t i o n r i t h t h n i t h c r n v c l f r a n tile D i c -; rru.an-.nt C o n f o r o n c o ゥr”,the L e a g u e of lietioris on Oct...)レ:.r 14,; 1933 j tLc Institiition of rcr r:n-iciit ; the pnesr.^o on; I . I r r c; 1; ! 1 6, 1 9 3 5 , of tlic l「,r f o r w r , 5 . 1 : i l l i t a r y sorvic-c;; cnC tho pcncr.gc -m Mry 2 1 , 1 9 3 5 , of tho accrct Ecich Dcfonsc; L c マ . H e "-'cc a k e y f i g u r e i n the n >g >tictiorj of t h e; He va 1 Accord on tcr G'ご-Into botuo に,n Gomr.ny "ncl ^nglanc1. on; Von Ncurc.th; J u n o 1 3 , 1 9 3 5 . / pln^'ccl nil inportr.nt p a r t i n Hi.tlor'3; ccciaion to rooccupy tr:-. i?hinolonこ on Iferch 7 , 1 9 5 5 ,; rnr:- pre die ted tlxt thz occupation coul'.". bo carriod thrc^gl::; r ith out ご ny reprisal u f r .:a the 上-' ,rcnch. On I'.fcy 1 8 , 1 9 3 6 ,; lie tolcl the •"•noriccn ^.nb"-ssnc'or to Prnncc 七 b n t it -rrs tlio; poloiy of tho Crcr::rn ^ovcrnnosnt to "'.0 notMn-T in foreign; r.ffnirs u n t i l;  ; i; tho Rhinol.r.n ぐ . h o c " b o on u i g c a t c ,r.ncl; that ce soon; 17062; ri ti tho f o r t f i c n t i o n c in the P . h l n o l r - n h r d b,.cn c o n s t r u c t c c l; ごn,, t h e c o u n t r i e s of c o n t r r 1 S u r o p c r o n l i z o c l 1>hr,七 F r a n c o; coulこ n o t e n t e r Cr-, m a n y '’七 r.a 1 1 , ^ a l l t h o a o c o u n t r i o n ."ill; to foci very こ 3 . : i r fし r o n t l y rb-nt their foreign policies; mc'. ;?. ne?; c o n c t o l l r . t j.on w i l l - ' G v c l o p; #;  ^; Von Ncnrrth took prrt in the Hoszbach crnforonco of; Nov^ribcr 5 , 1 9 3 7 . ^c has t^stj.fled that h二 v;ca 3 • GhockcCl; by Ilitlor statcrionts thc.t he her a heart attack . Shortly; thcr-after, he offer on to resign ^ n n : 1 : 1 s rcsi^nr tion v'r; rcccptccT on Pcbrurry 4 , 1 9 3 8 , nt tho tine thr.t von; ? r l t s c h ^nu von Blo^rocrg ^/cro . Yet -;ith km.:-; ledge of H it loi^s ncrcciGivo V)lrrnt: hr: retainou 。 ± or:'ir.l; relet I on aid p マ:1セli tho l^azi rcgi:ic an T'cichr: I.TiniG tor て i 七; v.t Port fo l io , Pre a i lent of th、、 Socrct C ぐ“bin t Council; r ncl r. runber of the I'c ich^j Dc fori so C u n c i l . r 上 .) t r; ok emerge; of tlic Foreign Office r.t tli:.txric o? the occupy 15. '.-n of; Aus七ric, assured tho B r i t i s h Anbrssご.,or thr:t c h^C. not; been ccus noy c Gcrnr n 飞ュ!^:!,广七un, riic" i n f ^ m ^ d the; C z :• c h o s 1 ovrlzir,ti K i n i r t e r ti~^t G c r n n n y irrtcrr:こ:ニ tc rbi^.o; by its orloltration convention •.了itl). Czochonlovnlrir # Vr-n; ^ o n r r t h pr r-ticipn t c こ i n t h e l.',s セ p h r G o of t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s; prcooc'.ins tho Ihniich Pr.ct biit contends 七ン.八01 ho し n t ン c; thcrjo .lacnnsions only to ^rgo i i t l c r :vc ry; off ->rt tn settle the issues "oj poncoful r-.ocna.; C r i n i n a l c t i v l t i o a I n Czoch3slovc; ,; ?cio; V o n F o u r r . t h vie.s appoint、.., P'-ichs P r o t o c t o r f o r Bohoriic.; rncl M o r a v i a on I f c r c l i 1 3 , 1 9 3 9 . Br/acr-ia rnr; 1; . ilorrvir r c r; occupicO. by -"ilitory f orcc . HE:- cho conscnt, obt nine:-"' , ,c; i t v:rs b y d u r c r c , c m n o t b- c:、nciiclcr-c.ぺ-r.s j u a t i f y i nこ ; t h o; o c c u . p r t i o n . H i t l e r ' s d c c r c o of M ^ r c h 1 5 , 1 9 3 C , catrlDlio].:!-; inビ th"; ^ r o t o c t o r a t e , atr.to-'"セtin.セ t h i s ncv; t e r r i t o r y chw.lcT; ''bclons hene•-•forth t o t h e t e r r i t o r y o f t h e G-ornan Hoicli; : i; ,; r:n r. au;"iption thrt tho; 17063; Kcpublic of Czechoslovakia no Ion ^cr ozistod . it " I s o; …•ニrit on tho theory thnt Bohorar Mjravin retained their; s o v c r c i ^ n t y ^"ubjoct only t o t h e intorcc;ta of G-crnrhy n c; oxprccscd "j-j the Protoctorp.ti;, Therefore oven i f the ::ン:てー; trine of subjtigatiori a h o u l b e consi^orod to be applic° : : .lc; to tcvj?±t orv occupicd by ng^ro/ii^ivc ction , the Trilranr.l; ぐ ocg not ^ c l i c vo thr. t this P r oclnnr t i o n anountod t o r.n; incorporr tion ^ M c h ,.7r.c siiffici to brin,3 the :". act rino; into off ,ct • The occupation of Bohemia へ ncl Morn vie :‘ぺて飞に七; thcr-cfore "be c o n s i d e r e d c. y.ili t n r y o c c i i p a t i o n covcroc- b y; t h e rvilsa jf w a r f a r e . A l t h o u g h CzccIios 1 o v r k i r m n o t a; pc.RTY t o t h e ^ h ^ u c C o n v e n t i o n of 1 9 0 7 ,七 h e PUICG of 1 ' n c; vjr.rfrrc in thi a Convention nro ^oclorc t ory of; cr.iatinr i n t c r n c t i o n r . l l,; r; -了 r:r)‘, h o n c o r-.rc r.pplic;; n; blo; #; 厶s Roichs Protcct r , von Ncnrr.th. i n ^ t i t u t c d m c('•:min-; istration in 3 -henin rncl lorご vin s i n i l n r 七o thrvb in afreet; in G o r " ^ c n y . T h e f r pros.;;, D.'.ノlitic.'、l p a r t i e s r n ^ urrO.o; u n i o H G r 、 X i. u .o -一--'. - • X X; opposition •'/ore outlavjcd, C .^ochon 1 vrki-n In ry て'.へ0n; vorkccl i n t o t h e c?セracirurつ of G o r n n n •; -r; "r p r o d u c t i o n , rriこ; e x p l o i t e d f o r t h e ir.n  r:c-T e f f o r t . N c z i rn七i-Sニ.:litic; p o l i c i o s m C 1p"7q TTorc ."Iso intr•こ”accc. J or/a r/crc br r r o d; fron leading positions in Govern: :cnt rvr):. tusincsG .; I n A u g u s t 1 9 3 9 , v o n J-'Oiirr.th 1,;;gucd r. p;r:)cl:〜、•七ion; v / a r n i n s a ̂ t. I n at c?ny n e t s of a r b o t o ^ c :n, stc:七:Uつ;T; ihrt t h e; r o s p o n s i b i l iセ y f o r e l l c o t s of s a b o t e g e i s r七 t r i b u t cl; no七 o n l y to ir)C.lvi; r; :icl p c r p o t r r . t o r n b u t t o t h e e n t i r e; C v cch pop-ulrtion. ” T7hon the フ r r or ok:- out on Scptc^?cr; 1§39, 8 , 0 0 0 p r o n i n c n t G z c c h o -rcro nrrcstc'•ニ b y t h e S c u r i t y; P o l i c c i n Bohcr..in mc". Mr-rrvir rnこ p u t i n t o p r o t c c t 5 . v c; cuot ody. Mr.ny of chis ^roup in cnnccntrr ti on corprj; r.s c. resul七 of iit\tror tn.cnt •; In October -nr. No verier 1939 , Czcohoal:^ vr ki^n stuclcritG; hoiこ c acricrj of . onG t ra11 one • LB r. r c a u l t , on Hi t ier f s; orc'crc:, c.ll nnivoraitic^ 1 706^-; レ; R;CRC GIOCJCCI, 1 9 0 0 N T U ^ M T i;^PRIC ; N C U , . 广 N こ TH- i]irr、1 r C.cvc; of t h e フ.て:ioriG七:!?r.tiつriコhot b y 3 c c a r l t y P o l i c y 「 n l S D; #;  V o n; N c u r r t h t ^ G t i f i^cl the t he n o t i n f m 广 へ f thir; r c t i o n; in r.C.vrncc, but i t v;rc ^nn uncrC by proclr; -/- tion ovc r hio; :nrセur•ハ ported :)n plr cr.rcn.o t ^ r t h ^ 上:rot:.:c b^rr.t.-ぞ; ,ich h e e l m — i n , h o w e v e r , no ”i七h•つlit hirj r-ath:->rity; 0; On -u^uat 3 1 , 1 9 4 - 0 , von th tr°ncr”lt"fcc〔"l セ ) t; r、Mcnor^n^un -hich he hr.f prcprred ccrl in^ -:1th th fntnrc.; of the Protcctorrtc , mC. r . , . , i t h hit) rppr^vr:!; proprrccl by Crrl Hernrn P r m k on tho srnc oulj jc. ct 0 Bnth; d e a l t —i七h t h e q u e s t i o n of 'rcr/^anizntion へ p r o p o c c f .; Virt 七lie nr.jori七y of セh e Gz chc niこ’lit be r.ssi^.il"1 tcこ; rnc ir l ly int.: tho Gcrnnn r r t i . n . 3つ七li n,.vocr、七:こ the; cll'rlnr tion of the Czcchoclovr,ki°n i n t : l l i 3 C D t G i n ハn〔,.; othcr ^roupa r了liich ni.—jht rc^int Gcrnrnizrtion , von; Naur a til's by expulsion , Pm .nk ' s by expulsion or HspccS-rl; trcr.tncnt. : ?; Von Kcurr.th hr a nrsiacd thr.t the r otunl oKf つ:rconcri t of; the rcprcGcivo nonaurcG vrnG cnrrioclつ"u七"by the Soci^ri tjr; Folic c mcl SD vfho v;crc under 七 he c on tr ol of hi a Str to; Sccrotnry, C”rl Hcrrmn F'r「nlr, v^ho n rppointcc*1 nt the; つ ご ‘ ) s t i o n of EI^t -.Icr r.tr:,,マ1:lo, na n Higher SS r.n n Pol?てcc; Lor ^or, rep -rtcd こ i r o c セ l y 七つ Hlnnlcr . Von Kcurr.th further; rrgwos thr-1 m t i - S c r u t i c n^nsurcs rncl thono rcsul七:Ln二 in; :crnonlc c^nloit^t ion were pv.t into offcct In the Protcc-; tornto as tho result ,、f policloc 'ニcci〔—:Gこ upon i n the rcich #; Hotrovor t h i s n n y b e , lie a c r v c d na the c h i S '^ornan o f f i c i a l; in the Protoctox^.to the c,dniniatration of this terri-; tory plrycd an inportr.nt r^lo in tho v;r,rs of ngcrossion ^rhich; G o m r n y v/r.s v/agimc i n t h o Sr.st, knov-In^ t h n t 7 r r Cri: v s; (。nd Crines r.gainst Eunnnity,.,cro being corr'^ttcd under his; cnthorit'-j.; 17065; von Hcurr. th; In "ilti^ntion i t .nuct bo rc?-:o:"ibcrccT thr;七 / CdC. inter; vonc with tho Socurity Policy r.n'ニ SD for the rclorso of; n.̂ .riy of the C2cchoclovnks v.Tha w e r e arrostocl on Scptcnbcr 1; 1 9 3 9 , r.nC. for the rclcr.ac of stvAcnto nrrcctof"'. lr tor in .; t h o f n l l . On S o p t o ? i b c r 2 3 , 1 0 4 1 , h e w n u s i r n o n o l b e f o r e; H i t l e r t o l d thr.t h o V;P.3 b o i n; ;; 3 n o t h a r s h e n o u g h r n d; that Hcydrich boing sen七 to tho Protocto:rr、七c 10 co-^or.t; t h e C z o c h o s l c vrkir.n r o G i G t a n c o g r o u p s • V o n N c u r r . t h ‘; but in vp.xn,; n t t c n p t c c l t o ClsQVir.C.o H i t l o r f r o n a o n d i n s H o y c ^ r i o h / r.nd; when ho v;ns not succcssfiTl offered to rcs5_3n# 'rLcn hi3; rocicn-tion v/ns not occoptc"'. he v:cnt on lenvo, on; Soptciibor 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 , m d rcfusocT to pct rs Protcctor p.ftor; 七hr七 CrセCi Els rosi3n.ntion f ^ l a l l j; A u g u s t 1 9 4 3 .; Conclusion; The Tribunrl f inds thrt von Ucixrr•.七:h; r.ll f o u r c o u n t c •; : c c o p t c d in; is gu i l ty under; 1 7 0 6 6; PRITZSCHS; Pritzschc is in^-ictod on Counts One, Thrco ‘-.nf. Pour. He; vi"s b e s t knovm r.s r. rrc'-io c o m c n t r . t o r , d i s c u s s i n g o n c e r. v;cok; tb.c. o v o n t s of 七 h o cln.y on h i s ov;n p r o g r - n , "Hr.n Fritzsclio; Speaks . " He bc^r.n brr.odcr.ctin3 in Scptcnbor 1932; in tho; sr.no yorr ho vrns nrdo the lior.cl of tho “ irolcsa News Sorvico,; r. P c i c h G o v c r n n o n t A g e n c y . V.lion on Mr.y 1 , 1 9 3 3 , t h i c r ^ c n c y; ne.n 5.ncorporrtod by the • 七 i o r r . l Soc3.rlists into their Fcicli; Ministry of Popular ^nli-htennent nd Propr.2<nn>., Fritzscho; boenne r. nonber of the Nr.zi P°.rty rnd v:cnt to that Ministry,; J-n D c c o n b c r 1 9 3 8 h e b c c r n o hcr.r,. of t h e H o n e P r e s s Division; of tho 1'Iinistryj in Octobcr 1942 he s pronotoc1. to the; of Ministerial Director After sorving: b r ie f ly on the Ens七crn; Front in r propr.^mO.". conp^ny, ho vir.a, in If"1 venber 1942 , vir do; hcacl of the clio Diviefcri of the Propp.ご,:ndln Ministry; P l o n i p o t o n t i r r y f o r t h o P o l i t i c a l O r f y " n i K; o; t i o n of t h e G r e a t e r; G c r n ? n R r d i o . ‘; C r i n e s p.^ainat Pcr.co; As hcrt1- of the Hono Press D i v i s i o n , F ritzaclic atipcr vlocd; tho Gcrnr.n press of 2 , 3 0 0 cV.ily ncv/spr.pors• In purrjurnco of; this ftmction ho hold dally press c o n f o r o n c c s to c n . c 3 . i v c r the; " ircctivcs of the Propa^nn^a M n i a t r y to tho so papers. He; nr.s, hov/cvcr, subordinnto to D ictr ich , the Roich Press C h i e f ,; vrho x:rs in turn 广 subordin-to of G-oobbols. It wrs Diotrich; v.'ho rccciveel the diroctivcs to the press of Goobbclc rncl; other Rcich Ministers,广tv, prcpcrcc1. then °s instrn.ctlons,; w h i c h h e t h e n h m d c " t o P r i七 s s c h c f o r 七 l i e p r c s 3 ,; F r o n tin;: t o t i n e , t h e " D a i l y Pp.rol'G of t h e R c i c h; Proas C h i e f " , ns those instructions were I n b c l o f . , c'.Ircctcd; the press to present to; 1 7 0 6 7; tho po r plo cortrin thcncs, rjiich ハ s tho lor r : rship pr inciple ,; t h o Jov; r; ish p r o b l c n , t h o p r o b l o n ' f livirr: s p r e e , or .)th ;r; st^.rKViirこ Nr: zi i 'cr s . ニ v i r o u s pr:.'pr.-rn lr c ^ n p r l ^ n •广ロ; crr-riod o u t b o T o r e :...。ch r,.. j or n e t :/£ r.こ,ニ:rossioru n i l o; Prxtzocho HE:、巴Oこ tho HOMO P r D i v i s i o n , H.—; insi:r”.c七O:; th:; press hoス:.,tho " ctionn or v/r.ra r、.ニrinst Dohonir ハrr:; U'、i”vl,, Pcl'-n'*5.., Yuごoslnvir, nnc tho Soviet Union sirrml'"n; bo ぃ广.1七 I?ri tzscho hnC no control f tho f-.jrnv.lc ti :>n; っ f those propn^^n''"^ p He u s no rely r con "v.lt to; 七].i•し prcna -f thり instructions YrndoC.. b in by D ietr ich . In; Fohrw^ t j 1SS9 …irニ bef or e tho ^baorptlon of ^ o h c u n " n aorr vi; for instrncc, he rcc^ivr:^ De i tr ich ' s or^cr to brin,'” セ " . t h e; ".t ten tion of the prens SI efforts for in lop^n^ ~ncc,; r.rA tbc rn七:1ー つ!て力:”'mic policies r.rr, politics of the c.:rln七inこ;; Pr; n; c"uc G ' - v c r n n c n t; #;  T h i o o r ^ o r 七 : : ) D i c t r i c h or± t h e; Poroi^n Offlcc .; TH:. RP.DI o ^ L ^ / I S I O N , OF * ••..ニ••し ->. P r i t s s c h o B C C P H G CL̂I O; h:;r (1 in !T;-voribor 1942 , '-r. c one of thw 七マ.ニIvc "".iT丄sions; of tb.o I H n i s t r y . Iri thし b c ^ i r i n l n ^ てムン i t r i c h; -n " o t h e r b/j”こ5 of " i v i G i o n n し:;::cri:、, i n f Inc.nco o v e r t h o; t o b e foil::rod "'>7 T ' m r u s tho c n u -f the; m,, ho^ovoj • Pritzrichc "beer::;-, tho s :1c ^utlioriirr thin; the. L l i n i n t r y f o r r^-^Io rc'fciマi七ica. In t h i s cハ.ppcity h e; omulハセ'.”.マissvu:.', V i l y rr M o "•でr> つ s; , :;  t o rll; P':5_cb. Propnこ“r)〔1r O.ff Ic ~ rj, r、ccoi。,.*lin〔, to the ,::. ncr "1; p .liticr.l policies of the N. %i r subject to tho; "'ircctlvos .:、f the ĉ: I :^- P -1 i t i c-̂  1 Di vi g ! on of the S'^r; Ov'fico, nn'1七ho pv,rc ^vipc-jrvisi n̂ of ^ooVocls •; ? r i t s s c l i c , つ t b .こ . r - 'マ f i c i ^ lご f the Propnr^n; r U n i s t r y , vjn;  s;  p r e s e n t っ七 G o o ^ b c l s;  1;  ''nily nt.^ff c , n f ore n o e s ,; •てI.iぅc t h o y Y:crc i n s t r u c t e d i n t h o ncvia 一n’. propa^rn^.a; policioG of tlヤン cicj# After 1943 フ r i 七 z s c l i c; 170SS; hinself occr.aion^lly hclC. these confcrcricosy but only nhen; Boobbcls nncl his State Sccrotnrios v;oro rbscnt . even; than his only function v/ns to trnnsriit the Q-ocbbolsf CLiroc-; tivoa relayed to h in by tclophon-•; T h i n i s t h o oviixinry of F r i t z s c h c; 1;  s p o s i t i o n s ^ncl; x n f l u c n c c in the Third Rcich# Novor こ i c l l i e nchiovo cuf -; f i c i c n t rjtr.ttirc to ご1 :七on- the pl^nnirio c o n f c r c n c c s v-hich; loci t o nご g r c s s i v c YJP.V; inclocc nec「、r^lins t o h i s or;n u n c o n -; t r a d i c t e d t c s t i n o n y h e n e v e r e v e n h r d r c o n v e r s ^ t o n "•マi七h; H i t l e r . F a r is there a n y shov/ing t h n t h o v/r-s in f o m c O , of; t h o c l c c i s i o n s tr.lcon a t t h o s e c o n f c r c n c c s . H i e a c t i v i t i e s; c。nrio七 bG sr-icl to bo those v/hich fr.ll v/ithin tho dofinltion; o f t h e c O N plr.n TO W厂ごG P ^ r o s s i V C WRr °s n l r o ^ D Y a c t; f o r t h i n t h i s J u d ^ n c n t .; Wr.r C r i n e s C r i n o s r、q_n:Lris七 Hunr.nit;^; The prosccvi七ion hr.s assortocl thn七 .^ritzscho inci七g(*1; o; ru,- c n c o u r r ^ c C . t h e c o ^ i i s s i o n of YJC.T c r i n o s , b y r . c l i b o r r t o l y; f nov;s to r: r oias o I n t h o Gcrn.^n p o o p l c t h o s o ^ s i o n s; w h i c h loci t h e n t o t h o c o n n i s s iつ n of a t r o c i t 3 . e s un^.or G -vn : s; T h r o c anc" i; ?; o u r . E i s posit5.on n n u o f f i c i a lぐ u t i o s norc n o t; s u f f i c i e n t l y i n p o r t r . n t , her.ァover, t ^ I n f e r t h " t h o tcv、lc p n r t; i n o r f o r n u l n t i nご propr."j^nc^.r. c r n p r i ^ n c; t; E x c o r p t s i n GVlu o n c c f r on liis tjpv j c c h c s shov/ 广 c f i n i t c; r n t i - S: n i t i s n on h i s pr.rt j; f;  H o b r o f ^ c ' マ t y for , . r i o , t h r t; tho \irr hc.C. be on cr.us し . こ b : r Jov/s a n d s〔 t h e i r fr tc; hr.cl; t\irriCL. o u t;  u; r.s vmplcr. srnt rs tho F u e h r e r prccHctc し•書 七; t h c ^ o s p c c c h c s n o t u r g e p c r u o c u t i o n ^r o x t c r M i n ^ o f; Jcv/s» There is no ovic'.onco th^t ho yrr.s nvrr.ro of their; cxtcminひ七ion In 七ho i^ant0 The cvx^.onoc nnroo'jor shows thnt; h e tv;icc 。 •!:七 o n p t c . r t o hr;vc p u b l i c a t i o n of t h o p n t i - S o n i t l o; “Dor S t u m o r " s u p p r e s s e s , t h o u g h n n a u c c o s c f u l l y •; 17069; In t h o s e br0n.clcr.nt3 P r i t z s c h o s o n c t i; v; i c s s p r e a d f a l s e; nov/s, but i t Y/rs not provoこ he r;ncv: it to bo f'-lso, Fnr; c x a n p l c , h e r c p o r t c C .七 h n t n o G c r n n n U — Br)ハ、t i/。a i n t h e v i c i n i t y; of t h o;  n; A t h o n i r .; n r; vhcn i t \7-广s svink. T h i s infor;-!?tion \7r\s; u n t r u e ; b u t ? r i t z s c h o , hrvinr^ r c c o i v o d I t "fron 七 h o Gcrnr.n; N ^ v y , hr.C. n o rco.son TO IOGIICVG it vr「s u n t r u c; #; I t r.ppcrrs t h a t P r i t s s c h o goncti:nos riaclc s t r o n g s t n t c -; n c n t c of r p r o p a g p .n d s t x c nr.turo i n h i s bronclcc.sts. B u t t h o; Tribian-l is not prcpnrod to hole!, thr.t they v/crc In t e n t o; i n c i t o t h e CJornnn p e o p l e t o cr、nnit a t r o c l t i c n on c o n c u c r c c l; p o o p l o s , mC h o c a n n o t b e h e If. t o ho v o b o o n c, p ハ r t i c i p n n t i n; the critics ch<°rgGcl# His rv/ra vr.thor to p.muso pnpulrr; s o n t i n c n t I n s u p p o r t of I-Iitlcr こ t h o G-crnnn v r r e f f o r t .; C -n e l u s i o n; T h e Tribnnし; 0; 1 f i n t h r . t F r i t s s c h o i s n o t g u i l t y v n C c r; t h i s i n ' " i c t n c n t , n n c l i r c c t s t h ^ t h e s h r l l b o c l i s c h r r ^ c d b y; t h e l.; T; nrshal v; r; : cn t h e T r i b u n e 1 p r e s e n t l y n ^ j ^ u m G .; 17070; BORir.lIW; B-rnrnn is in nictod on Countc One, lliroc, 。mこ; Ho joined tho Hrtionr.l Social ist P^rty In 1925 ,was r.; ?-ionber of tho Staff of the Suprc-'ic Corrmni of tho Sニ; fr JU 1 9 2 8 七o 1 9 3 0 , vrrs in c h n r c c of t h o ニ iこ P u n " o f t h e; P.^rty, nncT vrrs R c i c h s l c i t c r f r o n 1 9 3 3 t o 1 9 4 5; 4;  P r o n 1 9 3 3; 七 o 1 9 4 1 h e vjrs C h i e f of S t a f f i n t h e O f f i c e o f t h e F u e h r e r ' s; D e p u t y r.ftor t h o f l i g h t r-.f H e s s t o I - n s l r . n ^ bccr.no; Hor^ of セ h e Pnrty Ch^ncollory on 12 E r j 1 941 . On 12 April; 1943 ho bocr.nc SccrctHry to the .Fuehrer. Ho vr.s p r>liticrl; rn .̂. o r ^ m i z n t i o n n l hon.^ of the Volksstvxrn mcl r. Grcncml in; the SS#; C r i n c s こ ス r i n s t P o a c c; ' but then; B o m r n n , i n t h e b e s i n n i n c r. n i n o r Nn.zi,/stonclily r o s e t o; r p o s i t i o n o f pov;cr nn.1, pr.rt5.ciilrrly I n t h e c l o s i n g :,«r-; t; ,s,; of ^ v o r t i n f l u c n c c O V E R H i七 l o r . H o S R c t i VG i n tiio Pnrt:; r 1;  s; r i s o t o pov/cr r.riこ e v e n n o r c s o I n t h e c o n s o l i > t i . ; n of t h r t; pov.^or. H o ',-0V0"bcx: n u c h of h i s t i n o t o t h o p a r s c u t i o n o f; t h o c h u r c h o s nrrl of t h e JCVJS witliiri G c r n n n y ^; T h o ovic; n; .GncG d o c s n o t s3iovr thr,七 3 r n n n n k n g w of; 113.tier plr.ns t o p r o p r r c , i n i t i r t c o r —でこ:o;  n; s;;rGcs:Ivc; H o r . t t e n d e d n o n e o f t h e i n p o r t r . n t c o n f c r o n c c s マ ] i c n K i t l c r; r o v o n l c c; 1;  p i c c o b y p i c c c t h ^ s o p l a n s f o r n ^ r j r e s s i o n . N o r; c r n Imov.'lodse b o c o n c l u s i v e l y i n f e r r o d f r o n t h o p 'Siti ^ns; h o h o l ' \ エ t r/n s ハ n l y マ h e n h o b e e n n o Here"', of 七 h o P r r t y; C h m coll cry in 19<:-1, r r r , t o r in 1943 socrctnry to tho; ? ' n o h r c r v/hon h e r t t c n ^ o c l of H i t l e r c n f o r c n c c s ,; t h r t h i s p o s i t i o n s;  v c;  h i n t h o n o c o s s T y r c c c s s . U n "'.or; t h e viovj stntc':, clscivhcrG w h i c h t h e T r i b u n r l h r s 七广 k o n o f; t h e c; r; >nspirr.c7/ t o v:r re a.^.^rGssi ̂ o ,t广:r,セhere i s じぃ t s u f f i c i e n t; cviベ•っnco to br ine; 17071; Bornr.nn within the scopc of Count One.; War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; By doc roe of 29 May 1941, Bomio.nn took over the offices and powers; the; held by Hessj by/decree of 24 January 1942 these povjors were extended to; give him control over all lav^s and directives issued by Hitler. He was; thus responsible for laws and orders issued thereafter. On 1 December 1%2,; all Gr.us bccame R^ich Defense districts, and the Party Gauleiters respons-; ible to Bormann wore appointed Reich DefVnse Conunissioners# In effect,; this made them tho adirinistrators of the entire civilian war effort. This; was so not only in Gcrrmny, but also in these territories which were in-; corporated into the Reich from the absorbed and conquered territories.; Through this mechanism Bormann controlled the ruthless exploitations; of the subjected populaco* His order of 12 August 1942 placed all party; agcncies at the disposal of Himmler's program for forced resettlement ?.nd; denationalization of persons in the occupied countries• Three weeks after; the invasion of R u s s i、 he attended the conference of 16 July 1941 at; Hitler»s field quarters with Goering, Rosenberg and Keitelj Bormpjin's; report shems that there vie re discussed and developed detailed plans of; enslavement and annihilation of tho population of these territories. And; on 8 !,!ay 1942 ho conferred with Hitler nnd Rosenberg on the forced resettle-; ment of Dutch personnel in Latvia, the extermination program in Russia, and; the economic exploitation of the Er.stern Territories. He VJZS interested in; the confiscation of art and other properties in the Enst. His letter of; 11 January 1944 c;:llod for the ere-tion of a large-scale organiration to; withdraw commodities from the occupied territories for the bombed-out; 17072; デ、; G o me.n p o p u l n c o •; B o i r m n ras cxtrc^.ioly activc In tho pcrsccivbi、n of the; Jgy/s9 not only in Gcrnnny but r l s 」 i n the ^bsDrbod mcl con-; quered countries• He took p.nrt in th,, "iscurjsions v'hicli led; to the ronovrl of 6 0 , 0 0 0 Jorrs f m Vlonnr to Pol°nこ in coopor-; p.tion v/ith the SS the Gostrpo-. Ho siこ::nocl the ^.ccroc of; 31 LIry 1941 cxtcn^ins the Kurnbcrg Lr.wa to the annexed; Terr itor ies 0 In r.n order of 9 Octobor 1942 ho cloclprcl that; t h e p o r n r n o n t ollninr.tiON of JCTTS i n G r e a t e r G e r m n n t e r r i t o r y; o )ulcl. no 1 nccr bo s 'Ivocl by o^l^rr t ion , but only ハy nnpiyin^; "ruthless forco" In the spcciひ1 crr.ips in the E r s t , Ori1 July; 1943 he signoc; n; . r.n or-f irirncc v;Ithdrrvdnc Jews fron the pr ; tcctj. on; • of the Iriv; c w v t s PTJ • pl^ cin.;; then "anlor the o x c l u o i v c jiiria-; こ i c t i o n of Hinn]-cr Gostr.po•; B o m n n n v:ns p r o n i n o n t I n t h e vc 1广"bor p r o ^ r n n . T h o; Prrty Lccrlors supervised slrvc l^bor nnttcrs in the rcEpcctivc; G r n s , i n c l u ' - i n ^ c r i p l o y n c n t , c^n; r; ':LtIonc o f r/or]^ • nncl; h o u s i n r ;; #;  h i s c i r c u l r r :」f 5 I.t̂ y 1 9 4 3 t o t h e Lcr.^crn;'ip; Corps, d istr ibutor こ:-)”m to the lovol of Orts^ruppcn 1 . 1 bcrs,; ho issued Odrcctj-ons ror^ulrtine the 七 : 七 : ) f rorcirn; w o r k e r s , p o i n t i n g o u t t h e y r c r c s u b j c c t t o 3 S c on t r ol on; security problcns , m r orC.orcC. the provlourj 'listrcnt'-iont to; cor.30• A report: of 4 S c p t o n l o c r 1 9 4 2 rclr、七in^ t o t h o n s f o r; o f 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 forr.lo d o n e s t i c T/rrkcrs f r n t h e L ^ s t t o G o n ^ r n y; ^honocl t h o t c o n t r o l r;r.s t o b o oズぐ:rcisc'ニ b y S; r; u c k o l , H i n n l c r; mci Bornnnn. 3-°uckcl by ^.ccroo of S Soptcribcr ciroctccl.the; ICrcislcltcrs to s u p e r v i s a the '"IctrilDuti n rn^. r n c i ニ m—icri七; of theso fonnlo Xrborcrs.; B o m a n n;  0; I s o 311cこ n s e r i e s つf e r r o r s t o the Pr.rty; Lc^C.crs dor.IIn2: v;ith t h e tiPGrtncrit o f p r i s n c r s uf vnr9; On 5 Wovcnbcr 1941 ho proMbltccT :cccri七 burials for 丄 ' n s s i r n; pris')ncrs of r/nr0 On 25 Novcnbcr 1943 ho; 17075; w; dircctcd Gaulレiters to report cases of lenient treatment of prisoners of; ^^-r. And on 13 September 1944 ho ordered liaison between the Kreisleiters; with the camp commandants in determining the use to be made of prisoners; of war for forced labour• On 29 January 1943 ho transmitted to his; leaders OKU instructions allowinp the use of firearms, and corporal; punishment on rocalcitrnnt prisoners of war, contrary to the Rules of; lAnd I'fcrf^rc, On 3〇 September 19ム厶 hし signed a decree taking from the; OKW jurisdiction ovor prisoners of ^ar and handing them over to Himnilor; and thし SS.; Borimnn is responsible for the lynching of Allied airmen. On 3〇; May 1944 ho prohibited any police action or criminal proceedings agairs t; persons who had taken part in the lynching of Allied Fliers. This was; accompanied by a Goobbols; f;  propaganda campaign inciting the German people; to take action of this nature and thし conference of 6 Juno 1944,"where; regulations for the application of lynching v^oro discussed.; Kis counsel, who has laboured under difficulties,別as unable to; refute this cvidcnce. In tho face of those documents which bear Bcrnnnn's; signature it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the defend-; ant present. Counsel has argued that Bornnnn is dead and that tho; Tribunal should not av .il itself o£ Article 12 of thし Charter 讽 h i c h; gives it thし right to tako procoedings in absentia. But the evidence; of death is not conclusive, and tho Tribunal, as previously stated,; determined to try him in absentia. If Bormann is not dead and is later; apprehended, the Control Council for Germany may, under Article 29 cf; the Charter, consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or reduce his; sentcncし,if deemed proper.; 17074; Conclusion; Th。 Tr*ibun:l finds that Bormr'.nn is not guilty on Count Onし,but; is r uilty on Countc Thr^u m d Four.; Tlf- PR^oIDI^NT: Bcforv. pronoancing s^nt^ncu on any of th duf^nd nts,; ニnd uhil^ :、ユ1 of the .nts pr.sont, th^ Tribunal t—kしs the; occ sion to :idvis^ th、iu th-.t nny . ;:plic tions for cl^m^ncy of thし Control; Council must b、.. lodged ソ i t h tho G; c; n^r 1 Secret ry of this Tribun .1 within; four d^.ys from tod i.y.; Thレ Tribun—ユ will nou adjourn .nd vdll sit r-.g An at "tしn minutes to; thrcu.; (A .r^coss m s t \kon until 145C hours.); 17C75; AFTE^ICCN 3』SICN; (The Tribunal r^convしn。d rrt 1450 hours.); THT" F.1E3ID3NT: In accordance 別ith Article 27 of thし Ch rt^r, the; Int^rn-\tion:il Kilix^ry Tribunal will nov; pronounce thレ s^nt^nc_s on the; d^fv.nd .nts convicted cn thiし indictment•; Dui^nd^nt Hcrir^nn 、:L丄ĥ lm Goering, on thし counts of thし.indictment on; .^hich you hav^ bししn convicted, thu エntし;rriation .1 L-ilit^ry Tribun .1 sしnt^ncos; you to dcr.th by hanging.; Defend m t Rudolf Hess, on thレ counts of thし indictment on which you have; be、ンn convictoa, the Tribuiir.1 sont^ncos you to imprisonment for lif^.; D^fend .nt Jo .chim von Ribbuntrop, on thし counts of the indictment on; which ycu h v.. b^on convicted, th、 Tribunal s^nt^nco you to do: th by hangirv •; D^f^nd°.nt;  rr; ilhしlm K、一itレ1,on the counts of thし indictment on which you hrrv^; boon convicted, tho Tribun 1 sontonc^s you to dじ.-、.th by h rising.; Duf ̂ nd :rr; :; -. Ernst K ltcnbrunnしr, on thし counts of thし indictment on which; you havu buon convictod^ th^ Tribun 1 s^iit^ncしs you to death by hrjri inr; 4; D^fend'.nt Alfred Rosenborg, on tho counts of thし indictm、nt on "which you; have bv.cn convicted, thし Tribunal 3レntしnc^s you to do th by hanging,; D^f^nd -.nt H'ins Fr .nk^ on tho counts of "th、 indictment on "whic,:,you h vし; b、;じn convicted, thし Trinun'1 sunt^nc^s you to do th by hcin- in;-̂; D^f^nd .nt V/ilh^lm Frick, on thし counts of thし indictment on which you ir.vc; been convicted, th、ノ Tribun-.l sont^nc^s you to do .th by h nging.; D^f^nd .nt Julius oiroichor, on thし count of thv. indictment on v^hich you; hr-Vw been convicted, the Trinunal s^ntuncos you to duevth by h ngin£;,; Dofv.nd -nt ./ lthcr Funk^, on tho counts of thu indictment on -which you; h-'ivc been convictod, thし Tribunal s、ノntしncしs you to imprisonment for lif^.; Dof^nd'Mit K".rl Docnitz, on th.ゾ counts oi' thし indictment on which you hr.Vo; been convicted, th^ Tribun 1 s^nt^nc^s you to ten yc rs imprisonment,; Defend nt "rich Rn^dcr^ on thし counts of thし indictm. nt on which you; hr.vc bりしn cenvictod, thし Tribunal 3 ntenc^s you to imprisonment for lifじ•; D^iVnd'-nt B ldur von Schir-ch, on th、ン counts of the indietm, nt on which; you hニvし bucn convicted^ thレ Tribun .1 sontoncos you to twenty yo rs imorison-; m nt. ,; Dしfしnd。.nt Fritz S uck-.l, on th.. counts of thし indictment on which you; 17076; h ,vc bv.on convicted, the Tribunal sentences you to do th by hanfdrif;  f; Defendant Alfred Jodl, on tho counts of thじ indictment on which you have; boon convictcd^ the Tribunal sentences you to docth by h .nging.; Defend' nt Arthur S^iss-Inquart, on the counts of th。 indietmont on which; you hrvし boon convictod, the Tribunal sentences you to der.th by hanging.; Dcfしnd。nt Albert Spour^ on the counts of tho indictment on which you h ;ve; boon convictしd, thし T r i b u n . n t c n cし s you to twenty yc rs; 1;  imprisonra、ノnt•; Defendant Konst'\nbin ven N^ur.^th, on the counts of thし.indictment on; •which you hav^ bcon convictod, thし Tribun 1 Sont,.nCwS you to fifteen y^-.rs;  1; imprisonment,; Th。 Tribun 1 s^ntonc^s tho Dしfしlid nt {./ rtin Borra nn, on th、 co m t s of; tho iiidictm^nt on vmich ho h -a b^cn convictod, to do th by h n; in .; I h; r;  vc '\n announcement to m k ん , T h し Soviet lumber of the エrrt、rnニtionニ 1; ?•.llit.-.ry Tribunal d^sirvs tc record his dissent from th^ decisions in thし; c.飞s、s of tho Dv-fv.nd m t s 3ch cht, von P p^ri, .nd Frit s c h し H e is of thし; opinion thこt thしy should h .v^ b^un convjctca nd not acq aittod•; He Iso das3v.rits from th、, docisicns in rしspしct to th^ Raichs C .binレt, tho; Gorier 1 St'\ff nd Hiどh Coiriin: nd, being of thし opinion thr.t thしy should havo bo^n; d e c l a r e d t o bし c r i m i n .1 o r g n i z a t i o n c .; He nlso dissents from th、., decision in thレ c is-, of th。 s, nt^ncu on tho; Defendant H^ss, 、,nd is of •匕hし opinion th:.t thし s^ntcncu should h ivc b^on; dc^th,ュnd not li.fし imprisonmont.; Thir> dissenting opinion will bo put into v/riting .nd annexed to the; judgment ‘.nd bu published soon zs possible.; (Th-. Tribunal "djo -rn. d.); 17077; DISSENTING OPINION; cf the Soviet Memter of the International Military Tribunal,Major G-eneral; Juris-orudence I.T. Nikitchenko on the Judgment concerning defendants; Schacht, von Papen, Prita^che and Hess and the accused organizations:; Reichscabinet, General Staff, and OKW; #; The Tribunal decided:; a) to acquit the defendants Hjalmar Schacht, Tranz von Pa*oen and; Hans Pritzsche;; "b) to sentence the defendant Rudolf Hess to life imt)risonment;; c) not to declare criminal the following organizations: th^; Heichscatinet, General Staff and OKW.; In this res-oect I can not agree with the decision adopted "by the; Tribunal as it does not correspond to the facts of the cas^ and is "based; on incorrect conclusions.; 1 . T H E UigQUITDED ACQUITTAL OF DSFSHDAH; SCHACHT; The evidence, submitted to the Tribunal in the case of Schacht, confirms; the following facts:; a) Schacht estatlishei contact with Goering in December 1930 and with; Hitler at the beginning of 1931. He subsequently established contact between; the leadership of the Nazi Party and the foremost representatives of the German; industrial and financial circles. This, in particular, is confirmed the; testimony of Witness Severing (Transcript, Afternoon Session, 23 May 1946;; also US-615).; "b) In July 1932 Schacht demanded that Pa*oen resign his post as Heich; Chancellor in favour of Hitler. This fact is confirmed by Pa-oen; 1;  s testimony; at the preliminary interrogation and "by Schacht; 1;  (3 own testimony in Court; Transcrit), Afternoon Session, 3 May 1946.; c) In November 1932, Schacht collected si ? n a t u r e s of G-erman indus-; trialists, urging them to come out for Hitler; 1;  s apT)oiri七merit as Reich Chancell; On Hovem"ber 1 2 , 1 9 3 2 , Schacht wrote to Hitler:; "I have no doubt that the way we are directing the course; of events can only lead to your at)でointment as Reich; Chancellor. We are trying to secure a large num"ber of; signatures among the industrial circles to ensure your; appointment to this post." (3 — 6, US—??3, PS—39〇1, US-837).; 4) In February 1933 Schacht organized the financing of the pre-election; campaign conducted "by tiie Hazy Party, and demanded at the conference of; Hitler and G-oering with the industrialists, that the latter provide three; million marks (D—203). Schacht admitted in Court that he had -oointed out; the necessity for -oroviding the Nazi leaders with-this sum CTranscrit),; Afternoon Session, 3 May 1346), while the Defendant Funk and the former mem-; "ber of the management of "I.G-. Fart en i ndus trie" Schnitzler, who were; present at this conference, "both confirmed that it was Schacht who was; the Initiater of the financing of the pre-election canroai^n. (Transcri-ot; 4 July 1946, and EC-439, US-618).; e) Utilizing his prestige, Schacht also repeatedly admitted in his; public statements that he asked for the support in the elections of "botli; the Nazi Party and of Hitler. (US-615, Transcript, Afternoon Session,; 2 May 1946).; On 2 August, 1932, Schacht wrote to Hitler:; "Ho matter where m/ activities lead me in the near future,; even if some day you see me imprisoned in a fortress, you; can always depend on me as your loyal aide.;  11;  (EC—45?, US — 619).; TJms,, Sohaoht oorisraonsly -and, deliberately sup'QOrted. the Kazi Pa.rty, and; fl^tively a jded in the seizure of ipower in G-ermany "by the Fascists, Even; iDrior to his appointment as Plenipotentiary for War Economy, and immediately; after the seizure of Dower "by the Nazis, Schacht led in -olannin^: and develo-; ping the G-erinan Armaments, as follows:; a) On 17 March, 1933, Schacht was a n o i n t e d President of the Heichstank; (PS — 5021, US—11),and as he himself stated in a s w e c h iDofore his Reichsbank; collearaies on 21 March 1938, the Heichstank under his management was "none; other than a national socialist institution" (Transcript, Afternoon Session,; 3 Ma.y 1946).; "b) In August, 1934, Schacht was appointed iieich Minister of Economy; (PS-3021; US-11)• His Ministry "was given the task of carrying out the eco-; nomic preparation for war.; M;  v-£0-128, US—623)• A special decree granted; Schacht in his capacity of Reicニ Minister of Economy, unlimited authority.; ふ; in the field of economy / "Reiciisgesetzblatt" for 1934, Part 1 , p . 565/•; c/ Making use of these powers in 1934 Schacht launched upon the; execution of the "new pro gram; n;  developed *by him / "Reichs^eset z*blat t; 1 1; ,1934,; Part I, t). 826/, and, as Schacht I myself noted in his speech of 29; November, 1938, this organization played a tremendous -oart in the course; of G-erman?-; f;  s rearmament ? E C - 6 X 1 , U -62/'.; d/ for the purpose of the most effective execution of this "new; p r o g r a m S c h a c h t used tho property and means of those political enemies of; the ilazi Regime, who cither became the victims of terror or were forced to; emigrate /Schacht; 1;  s note to Hitler of 3 May 1939, PS-1168, US-137/.; Schacht used swindler; 1;  s tactics and coercion; 11;  in an effort to acquire; raw material and foreign currency for a^rla^lents; ,,;  /iiffida^it of Vice-; President of the Reichsbank, Puhl EC-437, US—634/•; /e During the very first dey of his association with Heichs"bank,; Schacht issued a series of decrees /27 October 1933, 23 March. 1 9 3 4 , 1 9; February 1935/, which, in the long run helped realize the "bro^d program of the; financing of armaments, developed "by him, and with the aid of which, as he; testified, he;  ,r; had found the way to finance the rearmament program^*; In his tepecch. in Leit)zig on 1 March, 1935, Schacht, while stunming iro; his preceding economic and financial activities, announced ,.•everything; that I say and do has the 3\ifthrer; ?;  s full agreement and I shall not do or say; anything which, is not atroroved "by the Fuehrer; ,f;  /USSR-42?/.; Having "become the PIeni"ootc^ntiary General for War Economy, Schacht; unified under himself the leadership of the entire German economy and through; his efforts the establishment of the Hitlerito war machine was accomt>Xished.; a/ The socrot law cf 21 May, 1935, which appointed Schacht the; Plenipotentiary General for War Economy, states as fellows: "The task of; the Plenipotentiary Onneral fcr War Economy is to place all the economic; resources in the service of warfare.; ,f;  "The Plenipotentiary General for War; Economy within the framework of his functions is givc-n the right to issue; legal orders, deviating from the existing laws. " "He is the responsible; head, for financing wars through, the Keich Ministry and the Eeichsbank,; ,f; /PS-2261, US-24ハ; 、一 w; "b/ ochacht financed German armaments through the MEFO system of; promissory notes, which was a swindling venture on a national scale that has; no precedent, and the success of which was dexirndent ut)on thr realization of; the aggressive plans of the Hitlerites. It was "because of this that; Schacht set 1942 as the date when the MEFQ notes wore to mature, and he; •DOinted. out in his speech of 29 i!ovem"ber, 1938, tile relation between "the; daring credit policy" of the Heichstank and the aims.of the Hitlerite foreign; policy. /SC—611, US-622/.; c/ Having made full use of ニis plenary powers, Schacht carefully; developed and carried out a "broad program of economic mobilization which; allowed the rlitlerite leaders to wage war at any time considered most; favorable. In Particular, from the report of Schacht; 1; s deputy, Wohltat,; "the preparation for mobilization carried out "by tlie Plonit)otcntiary for; War Economy; 1; ' shows that Schacht provided to the last detail for the; system of exploitation of the G-crman economy in war time, all the way from; the utilization of industrial entoriorisps, of raw material rosources and; manpower down to the distribution of 80,000,000 ration cards/EC-258,; US-625/. It is significant that this report was drawn ut> a month; after Hitler; 1;  s statement at tho conference of 5 Ilovom'ber, 193?, at which; Hitler srt forth this concrete plan of aggression /PS-38S, US-25/.; Summarizing his past activity, Schacht wrote in January 1937: "I; worked out the -preparation for war in accordance with the principle that; the xjlan of our war economy innst "be "built in peace time in such a way that; there will "be no nrcossity for any reorganization in casp of war; 1 1; . Schacht; confirmed his statement in Court/Transcript, Afternoon Session, 2 May, 1946/.; Schacht consciously and deliberately prepared Germany for war.; d/ The former Minister of War, Von Blomberg testified that: "Schacht; was fully cognizant of t.he plans for development and increase of the German; Armed forces, since he was constantly informed...,. of all the financing; necessary for the development of the German armed, forces" /US-838/; On 31 August, 1936, Von 3lomberg informed Schacht that: "The; establishment of all th^ Air Force units must "be conroletei by Avvil1,1937,; and therefore large ex*oenditures must "be entailed in 1936, • •;  n; /PS—1301,US—123/; In the spring cf 1937, Schacht participated in the military excercises; in G-odes'berf, /EC-174/.; /e In his memorandum to Hitler on May 3 , 1 9 3 5 , entitled the "Financing; of Rearmament; 1 1; , Scliacht wrote: "A speedy fulfillment of the program for; rearmament on a mass scale is the "basis of Oerman policy, and, therefore,; everything else must "be subordinate to this task; the completion of this; task; the completion of this task, the achievejaent of tiii� purpose must meet; no obstacles 丨 H 1 6 8 , US-37/; In his st)Gech on 29 Ko venter 1938, Scliacht announced that ReichsTDank; 1;  s; policy madn possible for Crcrmany to crcate an "unsurpassed machine, and, in; turn, this war machine made possible tho realization of the aims of our; policy"/ 3C-611, US-622/,; One must Gyclude the stLjroositicm that Schacht was not informed as to; what purposes these weapons wero to serve since he could not "but take into; consideration their unpreceipnted scale and an o"bvions •or" ference for; offensive types of weapons, heavy tanks, "bombers, end. so on. Besides, Schacht; knew perfectly well that not a single country intended to wagp war on Germany; nor had it any reasons tc do so,; a/ Schacht utilized the Military might growing under his direction to; "back Germany's territorial demands which grow in pマo:oortion to the increase; in armaments.; Schacht testified in court that "at first he confined himself (in his; demands) to the colonies which had once belonged to Ocrmany.; u;  /Transcript,; Morning Session, 3 May, 1946ハ; Xn September, 1934, during iiis talk witfe the American M t a s s a d o r Dodd,; Schacht pointed cut that he "desired, annexation" if possible without war,; tut through war, if the US would stay cut of it". /EC-461, US—58/,; In 1935, Schacht announced to the American Consul duller: "Colonies are; essential to G-ermany, If it is possible, wo shall acquire them through,; negotiations; if not, wo shall srizr- them."/ EC-450, US-62°/.; Schacht admitted in Court thp.t military -orassure "out uoon Czechoslovakia; was "in some measure the result and the fruit of his labor"• /Transcript,; Mo; r; ning Session, 3 May, 1946/.; j 一; "b/ Schacht personally participated in the plunder of private and state; property of the countries which became victims of Hitlerite aggressions.; The minutes of the conference of tho Military —Sconomic Staff on 11; March, 1938, in which Schacht participated, state that those present were; given Hitler* s latest directives atout the invasion of Austria. Further, the; minutes state stat: "After this, at the suggestion of Schacht, it was; decided that.... all the financial accounting will be made in ^eichsmarks; at the rate of exchange: 2 shillings for one Reidismark"/ SC-421,US-645?.; Solvent admitted in court that he personally was in charge of the seizure; of the Czeciioslovak % t i c n a l Bank after tho occuioation of Czechoslovakia.; /Transcript, Morning Session, 3 May, 1946/.; c/ At the "beぢinning of 1940, Schacht offered Hitler his services for; negotiations with the United States of America in regard to the discontinuance; of aid to Sngl&nd. and he informed &oering of his offer. PS—3700, US—780/.; d/ Schacht considered it his duty to greet and congratulate Hitler; publicly after the signing of armistice with France, although Schacht, better; than anyone else, understood tlie usurpatory nature of the armistice.; /German Documentary, US-635/.; e/ In his letter to Funk on 17 October, 1941, Schacht suggested a more; effective exploitation of occupied, territory; #;  In this case, too, Schacht; acted on his own initiative/. EC-504 US^830/.; Schacht also participated in th.e persecution of the Jewst; a/ He testified in court that he ^continued the policy of the perse-; cution of tiie Jews as a matter of principle; 1; *. /Trp.npcript, Afternoon Session,; 2 May, 1946/ although, he stated, "to a certain e x t e n t i t was a matter of; conscience which, however, "was not serious enough to "orin^ at out & "break"; between him and the ilazis. (Same Transcrrot; also US^6X6),; TD. In his capacity of Minister of Economy, Sciiacht sighed a series of; decrees, in accordance with which the pro-oerty of the Jews in G-ormany was sub-; ject to plunder with impunity. (US-832 and US—616)• Schacht confirmed in; Court the fact that he had signed a series of anti-semitic decrees, (Trans-; cript, Afternoon Session, 2 May, 1945.); As to the reasons for Schacht; 1; s resignation from the post of the Minister; of Economy and the Plenipotentiary Oeneral for War Economy in November, 1937,; 一 6 -; and also from the post of the President of the Hpichs"bank on 20 Novem'brr,; 1939, and finally from the post of the Minister without Portfolio in January; 1943, the evidence submitted establishes tke following:; A. The reason is not Schacht; 1;  s disagreement with the. economic "ore—; paration for aggressive wars.; Three weeks "before lesTing the Ministry of Economy and the post of Pleni-; potentiary G-eneral f or War Economy Schacht wrote to Q-ooring: "... X also; don; 1; 1 consider that my opinioli can differ from yours on economic policy»•."; (EC-4S7, US-775).; In his reply G-ocring states: .. You promised me y6ur support and; collaboration. .. You have repeated thisproniso many times, even after; differences of opinion "began to ere p up between us/EC—493, US-642./; Schacht testified in Court that Ooering and ile "Differed in matters of; •; D r o; cedure; M;  /Tfanscript, Morning Session, 3 May, 1946/.; In the prrliminary examination G-oering testified that Schach•七; 1;  s leaving; the Hcichsl>ank: "had no rolatio'n to the -orô rajii of rearmament"/ US-648.; The vice-president of the Reichs"barik; f;  Puhl^ confirmed that Schacht; 1; 6; resignation from THE Reichs"bank can IDG (\v*olained "BY "his desire to extricate; himself from a dangerous situation" which d^velo-oted as the result of Schacht; 1; own crooked financial operations, /EG-534, TJS — 646/; "b. The reason is not Schacht; f; s disapproval of mass terror conduct(?i; "by the Hitlerites.; The witness for tiie Defense, G-esavius, testified that he constantly in-; formed Schacht of the criminal actions of the G-estapo, crcated by Goering,; and 七ile/b never七iieless, right up to the rnd. of 1936, Schacht looked for; for "Gcering; 1;  s support; 1; ' /Transcript Morning Session, 24 April, 1945/.; In his letter to Von 31omDerg on 24 December, 1935, Schacht suggested; that (rcstagpo atmly "more cautious methods" since the open terror of the; Gesta-oo "hinders the objectives of the armament; 11;  /Transcript, Afternoon; Session, 2 May, 1946/.; On 30 -January, 1937, Schacht wae awarded a golden Party inei^ia "by; Hitler. /3C-393, US-543/. As stated in an official Orc-rman •oublication", he; was able to "be of groated helt) to the Party than if he wore actually a member; 0マ the Party". /EC-460, US-617ハ; Only in 1943, having understood earlier than many other Germans, tho; irxcvitability of the failure of tho Hitlerite regime, did Schacht establish; contact with the opposition circles, however, doing nothing to help depose; this regime. Therefore, it was not by chance that having found out these; connections of Schacht, Hitler still spared Schacht; 1; s life.; It is thus indisputable established that:; 1)Sciiacht; 1;  s actively assisted in the seizure of power *by the Hazis;; 2) During a period of 12 years Schacht clcsely collaborated with Hitler; 3) Schacht provided the economic and financial "basis for the creation; of the Hitlerite military machine;; 4) Schacht prepared Germany; 1; s cconomy for the 祕a咨ing of ag^rossivp vers;; 5) Schacht partici-oated in thr persecution of Jews end in thr -olundor; of territories occuioied "by the frermans.; Therefore, Schacht; 1;  s loading: -cart in tho •or^nayation and execution of the; common criminal "Plan is -oroveA.; Tho decision to acquit Schacht is in o*bvio-as contradiction vith tho; evidence in possession of the Tribunal; エ エ . T h e Unfounded Acquittal of Dof nd&nt Von Pat>cn.; The verdict does not dispute the fact that von Papen prepared the way; for Hitler; 1; s appointment to the post of the Hoichskanzler and that he actively; hel-ood Nazis in their soizurc of power.; In a speech of the 2nd of Novem"ber 1933, von Papen said the following; on the suDjcct:; '^Tnen and there, on "becoming the Heicnskanzler (this was; in 1932) I spoke in faマor of the young and fighting move-; ment for freedom; just as on the 50th of January I was; chosen "by Fate to surrender power into the hands of our; Kanzler and so today I must tell the trprman; people and all these who have maintained their trust in; me: merciful Grod blessed Germany by granting her in these; days of dcex) sorrow a Further lik户 this.; 11; /PS-2375./; ん It was von Pa-pen who revoked Bruning; 1;  s order dissolving the SS and; the SA, thus allowing the Hazis to realize their program of mess terror.; D-631).; Again it was tho dofr-ndant who, by the at)T)lication of brute forc^; t;  did; away with the Social Democrat Crovernmont of 3raun and Severing. (Srマ户ring's; Testimony, T'rc nscript, Afternoon Session,14 June, 1946, r).11.); On the 4th January, 1933, Pa^on had a conference with Hitler, Eoss,; and Eiminler. (D-632).; Papen participated in the t)urge of the stato. machinery of all t)ersonel; considered unreliable from the Nazi point of view; on the 31 of March、1933; t; he si^nocl a docree creating s-Qfcial "political tribunals: he had also signed; an order grenting amnesty to criminals whose crimes were committed in the; coursr of the "national rovolution"; he participated in drafting the text; of the order "insuring party and state unity"; and so on.; Subsequently Papen faitr^ully served the Hitler regime.; During the Putsch of 1934, Pa^oen ordered his^ sulDordinatc Tscr.irschkx,; to tt, thn ^nfltapr), knowing full well what awaited him there.; Tsnirschky as is well known, was executed. (3-684).; while Papen helped tc kcpp the "bloody murder secret from tm*blic opinion.; (B-718). .; Defendant played a tremendous role in helping Nazis to take possession; of Austria.; Three weeks after the assassination of Dcllfuss, on the 26th of July,; 1934, Hitler told Papen that he was "being appointed minister to Vienna,; specially noting in a letter: "You have "been and continue to "be in; -oossession of my full and unlimited trust. ” (PS-2799).; In this connection it is impossible to ignore the testimony of the; American ^ntassador Messerschmidt who quoted Papen as saying that;  11;  the seizure; of Austria is only the first step; Jt;  and that he, von Papen is in Austria for; the purpose of "furtiior weakening the Austrian iiovernment.; 11;  (US-5?).; Defendant was Hitler* s chief advisor in effecting plans for the seizure; of Austria. It was he who proposed several tactical maneuvers, to quiet the; vigilance of world opinion on the one hand, and allow G-ermany to conclude her; war preparations, on the other.; This follows indlstmtable from Papen's statement 七0 the Austrian Minister; Berber-Waldeneck (PS-1760), from the Report of G-guleiter Reuner of 6 July,; 1939 (US-61),from Papen; 1;  s Report to Hitler of 26 AUOT^ 1936, (PS-2246), from; Papen; 1;  s Report to Hitler of 1 SeptemlDer 1936 (US-67), and from a series of; other documents which had "been submitted in evidence.; Papen played this game until the issuanco of the order for alerting the; German Armed Forces for moving into Austria (US — 69), xie participated in; arranging the conference between Hitler and Schuschnigg of 12 February 1938; (US-69).; It was Papen who in a letter to Hitler emphatically rocemmenied tliat; financial aid "be given the i^azi organization in Austria known as the 'Treedom; Union", specifically for "its fight against the Jewry;  1;  丨 ( P S - 2 8 3 0 ) .; エ n i i s p u t a l i l e apoears tlie fact of the Nazi seizure of Austria and of; Papen; 1;  s •participation in this act of aggression. After the occupation of; Austria, Hitler rewarded von Papen with the golden insignia of the Nazi Party; /D_632ハ; Heither is it possi"blo to ignore von Pa^en; 1;  s role as agent -orovocgit^r; when i n h i s c a p a c i t y o f d i p l o m a t h e was th^ German Amba s s ado r t o T u r k e y —一; whenever evaluation of his activity there is mad^.; ” 1 0 -; The post of ambassador to Turkey was at thr time of considerable imt>or-; tance in helping the Nazis realize their aggressive plans•; The official Nazi "biographer wrote about von Papen as follows:; "Shortly (after the occupation of Austria) Fuehrer had; need of von Papen; 1;  s services again and on 18 April, 1939, he,; therefore, appointed him German Ambassador in Ankara; , f;  /D-632/.; It should also be noted that for his Turkish activities, Hitler rev^rdrd; von Paper with the Knight; 1; s Gross for his "Military services". /D-632/.; Thus evidence sutmitted esta'olisiies "beyond doubt tiiat:; 1 . V o n Papen ©.ctively aided the Nazis in their seizure of power.; 2, Von Papen used "both his efforts and lais connections to solidify and; strcn^tiien the Hitlcrian terroristic regime in G-ermany.; 3. Von Papen actively particinatcd in the Hazi a g r e s s i o n against; Aust; r; ie. culminating in its occuiDation,; 4. Von Papen faithfully served Hitler up to the vory and aiding the; Nazi plans of aggression 'both with his ability and his diplomatic skill.; It therefore follows that Defendant von Papen *beトrs considerable; respcnsitility for the crimes of the Hitlerite regime.; I or these reasons I cannot consent to the acquittal of Defendant von; Papen.; Iエエ• Thf Unfounded Acquittal of Scfendant i'ritzsch.e.; The acquittal of Defendant Hans Pritzsche follows from the reasoning t?; ? r i t z s c l i e , allegedly, had not reached in Termany the official position; making him resporxsitle for the criminal actions of the Hitler regime and thst; his own personal activity in this respect cannot "be considered criminal.; The veraict characterizes him as a secondary figure carrying out the directives; of G-oe"b"bels and Ri"b"bentrop, and of the Heich Press Director Dietrich.; The veraict loos not take into consideration cr mention the fact thst it; was Fritzsche who until 1942 was the director de facto of the Hoich -oress and; that, accc; r; ding to himself, su"bsequent to 1942 he "became the ”Commpnder-in-chir; of the G-erman radio.;  M;  /Trenscri-ot, Morning Session, 23 January, 1946/; Tor the correct definition of the fole of Defend?nt & n s ? r i t z s c h o it is; necessary, firstly, to keep cleerly in mind, the im-oorteTiC^ attached by Hitler; and his closcst associates (as G-oering, for exacrole) to prot)a^ndp. in; general and to radio propaganda in particular. This was considered one of; ” 1 1 -; the most important and essential factors in the success of conducting an; a; ^r»ossive war.; The Germany of Hitler, propaganda was invariauly a factor in preparing; and conducting acts cf aggression and in training the G-erman populace to; accent obediently the criminal enterprises of German fascism.; The aims of these enterprises were served "by a huge and woll centralized; p r o p a g a n d a m a c h i n e r y . W i t h t h e h e l p o f tlae p o l i c e c o n t r o l s a nd o f a s y s t e m o f; censorship it was possible to do away altogether with the frerdom of *oress; and of speech.; The basic method of the Uazi propa^andistic activity lay in tho false; presentation of facts. This is stated quite frankly in Hitler; 1;  s "Mein Kamt)f; M; ;; "With, the help of a skilful and continuous aD'olication of で r cで a g e n d a it is; possible to make the people conceive even of heaven as hell and also make; them consider heavenly the most miserly existence.; M;  /US—276, p. 302/.; The dissemination of provocative lies and the systematic deception of; ;public opinion were as necessary to the Hitlerites for the realization of thei"; plans as were the production cf armaments and. the drafting cf military plans.; Without propaganda, founded on the total eclipse of the frondom of press and; of speech, it would not have "been possible for G-erman Fascism to realize its; aggressivo intentions, to lay the groundwork ano. then to put to practice the; war crimes and the crimes against humanity.; In the propaganda system of the nitler State it was the daily press end; tho radio tnat were the most im; _; oOrtant weapons.; In h i s court testimony, Ecfendant Goering named, three factors as; essential in the successful conduct of modern war according to the Nazi conccot,; nsjnely,(l)the military operations of the armed forc^s, (2) economic warfare,; ( 3 ) p r o p a g a n d a , W i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e l a t t e r ho s e i d : "Pro-oa^and? h a s t ro—; mendona v a l u e . t ) a r t i c u l a r l y -oro-Qaganda. c a r r i c d "by means o f r g d i Q; Germany has learned this through ext>rrionce "better than anyone olse". /Err^lish; Trenscri-ot, pp. 5981—5982/; With such concepts in ascondancr it is inroossible to sup-ooso that the; supremcnt rulers of the Heich. would appoint to the post of the director of radio; propaganda who supervised radio activity of all tho "broadcastin:-; comt)anies; andl d i r e c t e d t h e i r p r o p a g a n d i s t i c content一一a man t h e y c o n s i d e r e d a s e c o n d a r y; figure.; ” 12-; The point of view of the verdict contradicts "both the evidence submitted; and the actual state of affairs.; Beginning with 1942 and into 1945 Fritzsche was not only Chief of the; Radio Department of the Reich Ministry of Propaganda tut also "Pleni-ootentian; for the Political Organization of Hadio in G-re^tcr G-ormany". This circ"amst?nce; is fully proven by the sworn affidavit of ? r i t z s c h c himself. /PS—3469, US-721/; It thus follows that not at all was Fritzsche merely "one of the twelve de-oart-; mental chiefs in the Ministry of Propagenda" was acquired responsibility for al; radio prot)aganda only towards the end of the wer, as the verdict asserts.; Fritzsche was the political director of the G-erman radio v.v and into; 1945 i. e. up to the r.oment of G-orman def eat and capitulation. For this reason; it is Fritzsche who "bears responsibility for the false and provocative broad-; casts of the G-crman radio during the years of the war.; As chief of the Press Section inside Germany it was also Fritzsche who; was responsible for the activity of the German daily press consisting of 2300; news t ) ape r s . I t was F r i t z s c h e who c r e a t e d , and. p e r f e c t e d t h e I n f o r m a t i o n S o c t i o r; winning from the Heicii G-overnmcnt for the purpose an increase in the subsidy; granted the newspapers from 400,000 to 4,000,000 marks. Soi"bseq;a€)ntly Fritzsche; partici-oated energetically in the development of the propaganda campaigns; •pre-oaratory to the acts of aggression against Czccho-Slovakia and Poland.; /Transcript, Morning Session, 23 January, 1946/. A similar active -orot)aganda; campaign was conducted by the Defendant prior to the attach on Yugoslavia as; he himself admitted on oath in court /TranscriDt, Morning Session. 23 January,; 1946/.; Fritzschc was informed of the plan to attack tho Soviet Union and was put; "au c our ant" the military intentions at a conf ere-ice with Rosenberg.; /PS—1039, US-146, Rosen"bcrg; l;  s Written Eeport to Hitler on the Subject of; Preliminary Drafts on Eastern European Problems/.; ? r i t z s c h e headed the German press campaign falsifying reports of Gr-rmeny^s; aggressive war against Francr, England, llorway, the Soviet Union, the USA,; and the other statos.; The assortion that ^ritzschp was not informcd of the wp.r crimes pnd the; crimes against humanity then toing perpetrated "by the Hitlerites in the; occupied regions docs not agree with the facts. From FritzschP; 1; s testimony; in court it is obvious that already in May 1942, while in the Pro-oa^ndr..; Section of the 6th Army, he was awaro of Hitler; 1; s decroo ordering execution; for all Soviet political workers rnd. Soviet intGlloctuals, tlic so-c?llod; "Commissar DecrGO; M; . It is also established that already at the "beginning of; hostilities ?ritzsche w?.s fully ewe.re of tiae fact that the ^azis were carry-; ing out their decision to do ?.wey with all Jews in Europe. For instance, when; commonting on Hitler; 1;  s statement that "among results o? the war there will "be; the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe; n;  /p. 248 of the transcript/.; Pritzsciie stated that: "As Puoiirer predicted, it will occur in the event of; war in Europe, the fate of the European Jewry turned ov.t to "be quite sad."; /p. 3231 of the transcript/. It is further esteblisiied tliat the Defendant; systematically preached the anti — social theory of race lirtrod. p.nd character-; ized TDeoples inhabiting countries victimized "by agression as;  n; su"bhumans; 11; /Transcri-ot, Morning Session, 26 April, 1946, t>. 83; and of the afternoon; session, pp. 1-2/.; When the fate of 必 a z i Gormany bocamo clear, ? r i t z s c h o camo Out with; energetic support of the Dcfendent Martin Bormann and of other fme.tical; Hitler adherents who organized the undercover fascist association, the so-; called "Werewolf.;  11; On the 7th of April, 1945, for example, in his last rfidio address,; Iritzsche agitated for all the civili&n ;population of G-ermany to take active; part in the activities of this terroristic -^azi undcrgroup organization.; He said:;  M; Let no one "be surprised to find the civilian population,; wearing civilian clothers, still continuing the fight in the regions already; occupied pnd even after occupation has taken place. We shall call this; phenomenon "Werewolf" sincr it will have arisen without any preliminary; planning and without a definite organization, out of the very instinct of; life•丨; ,; /USSR-496/; In his radio addresses Fritzschc welcomed the German use of the new; terror weapons in conducting the war, specifically the use of the "Y; 11; rockets. On receiving a plan for the introduction of factorial warfare he; immediately forwarded it to the OKW for acceptance. /USSR — 484, Evidence; submitted during the Afternoon Session, 28 J u n e , 1 9 4 6 / .; I consider ? r i t g s c i i e ' s res'oonsi'bility fully proven. Kis .activity had a; most "basic relation to the TDrerarstion and thr conduct of aggressive warfare; as well as tc the other crimes of the Hitler regime.; IY. Concerning the sentence of the defendant Rudolf Hess, The Judgment; of the Tribunal correctly and adequately portrays the outstanding position; which. Rudolf Hess occupied in the leadership of the Nazi party and state.; He was indeed Hitler; 1; s closest person&l confident and his authority was; exceedingly great: In this coniiection it is sufficient to quote Hitler; !;  s; dccree appointing Hess as his Deputy: "I herety ap'ooint Hess as my deputy; and give him full power to make decisions in my name on all questions of; Party Loadcrship (Transcript 7 Po"brue.ry 1946, afternoon.); 3ut the autnerity of Hess wrs not only con^in^d to questions of Pprty; leadership.; The official NSDAP publication "Party Year Book for 1941", which was; admitted as USA Hxhibit No, 255, PS-3163, states that:... "In addition to the; duties of Party leadership, the Deputy of the Feuhrer has far-reechin^ *oowers; first:; in the field of the State. These are/participation in nationpl end; legislation, including the preparation of Fuehrer; 1; s order. The Deputy of; the Fuehrer in this way V:*-lidt.tes the conception of the Party...; Approval of the Deputy of the Fuehrer of proposed appointments for official; and labor service leaders. Three, securing the influence of the Party over; the self-government of the municipal units.;  n;  (Doc. USA-255, PS—3163); Hoss was an active supporter of xiitler; 1;  s aggressive policy. The crimes; against peace committed, "by him arc der It with in s-ufficient dete.il in the; Judgment. The mission undertaken "by Hess in flying to England should "be con-; sidered as thf •last of these crimes, as it was undertaken in the hope of; facilitating the realization of aggression ageinst the Soviet Union "by; temporarily restraining England from fighting.; The failure of this mission led to Hess; 1; s isGletion and he took no; direct p?.rt in the planning and commission of subsequent crimes of th^ Hitler; regime. There cp.n "be no doubt, however, that HPSS did everything *oossi"ble; for the preparation of these crimes.; Hess, together with Himmler, occupied the role of creator of the SS; police organizations of Gorman fascism which pft^rwrrds committed the most; ruthless crimes ^.geinst humanity. The dofendf.nt clearly pointed out the; "Special taJskB; 11;  which face a the Sb formations on occupied territories.; When the Waff en SS were "being formed xiess issued n special; order through the Party Cheinccllory which made aiding the conscription of; Pp.rty members t^ese organizations "by ell means compulsory for Party; or^f ns: He outlined, the tasks set before the Waff en-S'; 3;  ag follows:; uziiTiS oi tiis W^iren一Sゐ coxapQ^6u. Ne.tlojial socialists arc- nio^e; suitable than other armed units for the specific tどsks to be solved in the; occupied Eastern territories due to the intensive training in regard to question; of race and nationality, (G3-267, 3245-PS); As early as 1934 tiie.Defendant initiated a proposal tiaat the so-called SP; under the Heiciasfuehrer SS (gecuri^y Service) be gi^en extraordinary powers; and thus become the leading force in Nazi &ermany.; On thf 9th of Juae 1934 Bess issued a decree in accordance with which; the "Security Se^Tice of the Heichsfuohrer SSリ was declared to be tho "sole; political Inews and defense- service of the P^rty?. (GB—257) •; Thus tfee Defendant played P direct part in the creation and ccnsolidption; of the 日 y s t e n of spacial police organs which wer^ being prepared for the con>-; uiisBion of crimes on occupied territories.; We find ness to h^ve always "bee^ an— advocate of the man-hating "master; race" theory. In a speech nade on the \6th January 1937 v/iiile speaking of the; education of the ftermeuxnation, Hess pointed outt "Thus, they are "being educated.; to put Germans above the subjects of a foreign n&tion, rrgardless of their; positions or their o r i g i n . ( G B 253, 3i24-PS); t; so-called; Hess signed tiie/Law.for the Protection of Blood and Honour; M;  pn the 15th; • に ; . . . . •‘ •‘ : ,':' ‘ '•.':ユ.:“';'• ニ .... : • . i へ. -ij, •‘; S e p t ^ b e r 1935 (USA 30a, 3179-PS). The tody of this law states that "the; Fuehrer; 1;  s deputy is toitliqrizei ta—issv^ all necessary iMireea and directive^; t t; .; for the prr^ptieal realization of the;  11;  N u m b e r g decrees.; 11; .‘;  v;  ' - . : ぐ • U ; : : ニ ハ - - - 、 ユ : し , - 3 . •:'. •し r. — • ' , 、 : • ' 1 : " . - - . . . . . ノ .. • .;.;.; “ ..•や; ;; :'.; On the 14th of lHovembpr 1SK35, H^ss i s ^ e d an ©ytiina^e T i n i e r R ^ c h; citizenship law in aa^orAaRce with which the Jrws were denied, the ri^ht tf>; み . - . . ド 广 ’ ......- ‘ ‘; roiue a ^ eleoticme ̂  hold, public office (G-B 358; 1417-PS).; On the 20th of May 1938 & decree signed by Hess eytended the H u m b e r t; laws to Austria (G-B-259, 224-;PS).; On Octo"ber 1 2 , 1 9 3 9 hess signed a decree creating the pdminist^tion of; Polish occupied territories (Reichsgesetzblatt IT 210, 1939 p 2077). Article 2; of this decree gave the defindent Frr.nk the power of dictator.; There is sufficiently convicing evidence showing that this Defendant; did not limit himself to this gene-rel directive which introduced, into the; occupied Polish territories a. regime of un"bridled terror. As is shown in the; letter of the Reichsminister of Justice to the Chief of the Reichschancellory; dated A p r i l 1 7 , 1 9 4 1 , Hess was the initiator in the formation of special; "penal laws" for Poles and Jews in occupied Eastern territories. The role of; this Defendant in the drawing up of these "lews" is characterized by the Minister; of Justice in the following words-t; "In accordance with the opinion of the Fuehrer's deputy I stprtnd from; the point of view that the Pole is less susceptible to the infliction of; ordinary punishment.... Under those new kinds of -ounishment, "orisoners are to; "be lodged outside prisons in camps find are to "be forced to do hopvy and; heaviest l a b o u r ,… T h e introduction of coroorel iD-unishment which the Deputy; of the Fuehrer has "brought up for discussion has not "been included in the; drrft, I can not fr.grf;6 to Tixiis "type of punishjuGnt• . • • .!Tiio procedure for en-; forcing prosecution has "been ^ r o g a t e d , for it seemed intolerf.ble that Poles; or Jews should be able to instigate a public indictment. Poles and Jews have; also been deprived o^ the right to prosecute in their own names or join the; public prosecution in an action, ...^rom the very "beginning it was intended' to; intensify special treetment in case of need: When this necessity "became; actual e. supplementary decree was issued to which the fuehrer; 1;  s deputy refers; to in his l e U e r •… ( C r 3 268 R-96) •; Thus, there can "be no doubt tiifit was together with the other major war; criminals is guilty of crimes a ^ i n s t Immunity.; Taking into consideration that among iDolitic?l loaders of Hitlerite; Germany riess was third in si/^nificsnce and. vlsyei p decisive role in the crimes; of the i%zi regime, I consider the only justified sentence in his cpse c^n; death.; -18—; V. Incorrect Judgnont With Rcgrrd. to the R^ich Cabinet; The Prosecution has posed "before the Tribunal the question of declaring; the Reich Cabinet r; criminal organization. The verdict rr-jects the claim of; the Prosecution, unfoundedly refusing to declare Hitler Government criminal; org: nizatior:.; Wish such t, decision I cannot agree.; The Triounal considers it proven that the Hitlerites have committed; innumerable ajid. monstrous crimes.; The Tribunal also considers it ; p r o v e n that those crimes, were as e rule; conmitted intentionally end on an organized sc^le, according to previously-; prepared plans and directives /"Plan Bar"be.rossa , "Night pnd. Fo只","Bullet",; etc. /; Tho Tri"bu2ial has declared several of the Hazi mess orgeniz»tions criminal; the organizations founded for the realiz?ticn end w t t i n g to r>r?ctice the; plans of the Hitler Government•; In view of this it appears perticiilarly untenable and rationally in-; correct to refuse to declare the Reich Caoinet, the directing org£.n of the; Strtc with &. direct and active role in the working out of the criminal enter—; prises, a criminal organization. Th^ mem"bers of this directing staff had; great power, ee.ch headed an appropriate government agency, each participp.ted; in preparing and realizing the Nazi program.; In confiraa.tion it is deemed proper to cite several facts:; 1 . I m m e d i a t e l y after the Mazi ascent to power 一一 on the 24th of March,; 1933 •••一 there was a law passed entitled. "The law of Defense of the People and; the State" whereby the Reich Cr"binet, besides the Reichstag, received the; right of issuing new legislature.; On the 26 of May 1933 the Reich G-ovcrnnient issued a docree ordering the; confiscation the property of all GoninmniBt organizations pnd on the 14th; of June, the samo yep.r, it also confiscatol the nronerty of the Social; Democrat organizations. On the 1st of DeC'-nber, 1933, the Rpich G-overnnent; issued the law "Ensuring Party and State Unity".; Following through its program of liquids七ing denocratic institutions, in; 1934 the G-overnnent passed a law of the "Reconstruction of the Reich" whereby; dcmocretic elections were abolished, for both central and local representative; レ; "bodies. Reichstag thereby tecejne an institution without functional meaning.; /Transcript, Afternoon Session, November 2 2 , 1 9 4 5 , pp.23-25/.; By the law of 7 April 1933 and others, all Reich government employees,; including judges, ever noted for any anti-Nazi tendencies or ever having "be-; longed to loftist organizations, as well as all Jews, were to "be removed from; the .^overmuent service and substituted "by ilazis. In accordance with the; "Basic Positions of the Greruan Law on Grovemiaent Employees" of the 26 of; January 1 9 迻 " t h e inner harmony of the official and the Hazi party is a; necessary presupposition of his appointment to his post•“ government employee; m s t be the executors of the will of the National Socialist Stf.te, directed "by; the USDAP" /Defense Exhibit No. 38, p.59/.; On the 1st of May, 1934, there was created the Ministry of Education; instructed to train students in the spirit of nilitfiri3:n; f;  of rr.cial hatred,; and in terns of reality thoroughly falsified 'by Nazi ideology. /PS^2078/.; Free trade unions were abolished, their property confiscpted, end the; majority of the leaders jailed.; To suppress even a sernblence of resistance the G-overninent created the; Gestapo and the concentration cecips. Withgat any trial or even a concrete; charge hundreds of thousands of persons were arrested and then done away with; merely on a suspicion of an anti-Nazi tendence.; There were issued the so-called Hurn'berg Laws against the Jews. Hess and; Frick, both neuters of tiae Reich G-overmnent, implemented these "by additional; decrees.; It was the activity of the 3eich Cabinet that "brought an the W£.r which; took uillions of haiaan lives and caused inestimable denege in property and in; suffering "borne "by the neny nations.; On the 4th of February 1938, Hitler organized the Secret Council of; Ministers defining its activity as follows:;  n; To aid ne "by advice on protl^ms; of foreie^n policies I am creating this secret council" /".R孕ichsぢesptz*blatt; n; for 1938, Part I, p.112, PS-2031/. The foreign policy of the Hitler Govorn-; nent was the policy of egression. For this reason the inem*bers of the secret; council should "be held responsible for this policy. There were attempts in; court to represent the secret council as a fictitious organization, never; actually functioning. This however; f;  is an inadmissible position. It is; ” 20-; sufficient to recall RoscnlDcrg; 1;  s letter to Hitler where the former insistently; tried, to be appointed member of the secret council of ninisters 一一 to; epprecifte fully the si^nificpnce of the council.; Even norc in*oortant -Drpctic^lly in conducting ©gfressivo werf«r^ was the; Roick Defense Council headed by Oroerin^ Tho following were nem'bers of the; Defense Council, as is well known: Hoss, Prick, Funk, Keitel, R^rder,; L e x e r s /PS—2194 and. 2018/.; Q-oerin^ charrcterizri the function of the Defense Council and. its role in; wrr preparations rs follows, during the court session of 23 June 1939: "The; Defense Council of the Reich we.s the deciding Hoich or耍n on all questions; concerning x>rcx)e,re,tion for wer". /PS-3787, US-763/.; At the seane tine G-o^rin^ expha.sizod the fact that "the meetings of the; Defense Council always took place for the purpose of making the nost imoortRnt; decisions". Fron tho ninutes of these ctin^s, submitted as evidence by the; Prosecution, it is quite clear tiae.t the Council nade very important decisions; indeed. The minutes also show that other cabinet ninisters sonctines took; part in the meetings of the Council for the Defense alongside the members of; the Council when wcr enterprises and war pre-oaredness were discussed.; For exexrole, the following Cabinet ministers took part in the meeting of; 23 June 1939: of La、or’ of Food and Apiculture, of Finance, of Connunication; ana a nuraber of others, while the miimtes of th^ meeting were sent to all the; menters of the cabinet. /US-782/.; The veriict of the Trilmnal justly points out certain T^culiarities of; the Hitler &overnnent as the directing organ of the state, nanely: the; absence of regular Cc.'binet neetin^s, the occasional issuance of laws by tho; individual ninisters naving unusual independence of action, the tremondous per-; sonal "oower of Hitler hinself. These peculiarities do not refute "b^t on the; contre.rt further confirm the conclusion that the Hitler G-overnment is not en; ordinary rank- of -1 he- file cabinet "but a criminal organization.; Certainly Hitler had an unusual measure of personal power "but this in no; way frees of responsibility the meml-ers of his cabinet who were his convinced; followers and the actual executors of his progr&m until and when the day of; rer; .Jconing arrived.; I consider that there is every reason to declare the Eitler Government; e* crininal organization.; VI. Incorrect J u d ^ e n t With H e ^ r d to the General Staff; and the OKW; The verdict incorrectly rejects the accusation of criminal activity; directed against the G-enpral Staff and the OKW.; The rejection of the accusation of criminal activity of the General Staff; and of the OKW contr?dicts "both the actual situation end the evidence sub-; mitted in the course of the trial.; It has teen established "beyond dou"bt that the leadership corps of the; Armed Forces of Nazi Germany together with, the S^-Party machine, represented; the most imDortant agency in the preparing and rr-alizin^ the Nazi aggressive; and man-hating program. This was constantly and forcefully reiterated "by the; Hitlerites tjaeinselves in their official "bulletins me&nt for the officer per-; sonnel of the arned. forces. In the Hazi Party Bulletin called "Politics and; the Officer in the III Heich; 11;  it is quite clearly stated that the Hazi regime; is founded on;  11;  two -oillars: the Party and the Armed Forces. Both arc forms; of expression cf the same -ohilosophy of life; 1; 、;  11;  the tasks "before the Party and; the Armed Forces are in an organic relationslii;© to each other and e&ch ト e a r s; tiie seme resTDOnsitility.... "both these agencies denend on each other's succrss; or failure" /PS-4060, US-938, p.4/; This organic interrolBtionshiD between the Nazi Party and tho on the; one hend end the Hazi Armed forces on the other hand, was Particularly evident; BZionF the w o e r circles of military hierarchy which the Indictment grout)s; together under the concept of criininal organization 一一 that is, eunong the; m e t e r s of the General Staff and the OKW.; The very selection of members of the Supreme Command of the Army in Nazi; Germany was tased on the criteria of their loyalty to the regime and their; readiness not only tc pursue aggressive militeristic policies but also to ful-; fill such spccial directives as related, to treatment meted out to prisoners-; of—war and to the civilian populations of occupied territories.; Tho leaders of the German Armed joroes were not merely officers who; reached certain levels of the military hierarchy. They represented, first of; a l l , a closely-knit group which was entrusted, with the most secret t)lans of; the Hazi leadershi-o. Evidence submitted to the TrilDunal has fully confirmed; the contention that the military leaders of Germany .justified this trust com-; pletely and that they were the convinced followers and ardent executors of; -2S-; Hitler; 1; s plans,; It is not accidental that at the head of the Air Fore广 stood the "Second; man" of the Nazi Reich, namely Goering; that the comander-in-chief of the; Havy was Doenitz, subsequently designated by Hitler to be the latter; 1; s; successor; that the command of the Ground Forces was concentrated in the hands; of Keitel who signed the major part of the decrees concerning the execution; of the prisoners—of-war and of the civilians in occupied territories.; Thus the comparisons made with the organization of the stroreme commands; in Allied countries cannot "be considered valid. Ill a dcraocratic country, not; one self-respecting military would agree to prepare plans for mass; reprisals and nercilcss killings of prisoners-of-war side ty side with t)lans; o f t h e p u rレ l y ^ i l i七 a r y and s t r a t e g i c c h a r a c t e r .; Meanwhile it is precisely such natters that occu-oied the supreme command; of the G-eneral Staff ,-nd of Nazi G-grmany. Th(.,commission them; cf the heaviest crimes against peace, of the war crimes, and of the crines; against humanity is not denied T^ut is -oarticularly mvliB&iz^i in the; of the Tri'Dunal. And yet the commission of these crimes has not ^rou.^ht the; logical conclusion.; The verdict states;; u; Thcy have been a.4is; f; ^race^tc .the-'honorable profession.of arijis; Without their military dance the aggressive anuitions of; Hitler and his follow Hazis would have been academic and sterile.••“; jind subsequently:; "Many of these men have made a mockery of the soldier; 1;  s oath cf; ol"-edience to nilitary orders. When it suits their defense they say; they had tc o"bey; when confronted with Hitler; 1;  s brutal crime$,; which arc shown to have "been within their general knowledge, they; say they disobeyed. The truth, is they actively participated in all; these criracs, cr sat silent and acquiescent, witnessing the. commission; of crimes on a scale larger and iuoro shocking than the world ever; had the misfortune to know,. T m s must be said.;  u; All these assertions in tiie veraict are correct and arc based on nunierous; and reliable depositions. The only thing that remains incom-or^hensil^l^ is the; reasoning which does not rocognize as criminal that "hundred of higher rank-; ing officers" who caused the world and their own country so much sorrow, tho; reasons "backing the dncision. not to declare the organization criminal•; The verdict advances the following reasons for the decision, reasons; quite coirbraiictory to the facts:; ” 23-; a); 1;  That the crimes were cosmittcd. "by reiDresentatives of the General; Staff and of the OKW as private individuals and not as members cf a; »; criminal conspiracy*; "b) That the General Staff and the OKW were merely weapons in the hands; of the conspirators ana interpreters or executors cf the conspirators; 1;  will.; iTuirierous evidence disputes such conclusions.; 1.?he leading representatives of the General Staff and of the OKW,; 兑lone with e. small, circle of the higher Hitlerite officials, were called; upon 'by the cons-pirators to T)articit)ate in tho develo-oment and the realization; of the -plans of aggrossion; >;  not as passive functionaries, Vat as active; participants in the cons-oiracy against t)eace and hu:nanity,; Without their adrice and active cooperation, Hitler could, not havr solved; these TDro'olcms. ‘; In the majority of cases their otdnion was decisive. It is invoossi"ble to; imagine how the agj^rossive plans of Hitler; 1;  s Germany could have loeen realized; had it not teen f.or the full sup-oort ^iven him "by the leading staff menders of; the arned forces.; Least of all did Hitler conceal his criminal plans and motivations from; the leaders of the Supreme Command.; For instance, while preparing for the attack on Poland, as early as 29; May, 1939, at a conference with the high, military commanders of the new; Reich. Chancellory, he stated:; 'Tor us the matter consists of the expansion of '"LeToensraum; 1;  to; the East.丨; ,; 11;  Thus the question of scaring Poland cannot "be considered, and,; instead, we have to consider the decision to attack Poland at the; first 0px)0rtunity.; 11;  (L-79).; ion^ before the seizure of Czechoslovakia, in a directive of 30 May, 1938,; Hitler, addressing the representatives of the Sororeme Command, cynically stated:; "From the military and political x>oint of riew, the most favorable; time is a lightning attack on the "basis of some incident, "by which; Germany will have "been strongly provoked and which will morally; justify tiie military measures tc at least tiart of the world oiDinion.;  M; (PS-368).; Prior to the invasion of Yugoslavia, in a directive; dated 27 March, 1941,; addressing the representatives of the higii Command, Hitler wrote:; "Even if Yugoslavia declares its loyalty, it mast "be considered, an enemy; and must, therefore, "be smashed as soon as possible.; 11;  /PS-1746/; While preparing for the invasion of USbH, Hitler invited the representee; tives of the General Staff and the OKW to help him work out the rc-lated plans; and directives not at all as simply tile military experts.; In the instructions to apply propaganda in the region "Barbarossa,“; issued "by the OKW in June, 1941, it is pointed out that:; "For the time we should not have propaganda directed at the dismem"bGrment; of the Soviet Union". /PS-446/; As early as 13 May, 1941, OKW ordered the troops to use any terrorist; measures against the civilian populations of the temporarily occupied regions; of the Soviet Union.; n; Hero a spocial stit)ulation read:;  n; To confirm only such sentences as are; in accordance with tho political intentions of the L^adorshit).; ,f;  /G — 50/; 2. OKW and the G-encral Staff isstu、d_the most Jbrntal d^crr«s and orders ̂ for; relentless nee sure s against the unarmed "oeaceful -DOTjiilation and the prisoners; of war.; In the "decree of special liability to punishment in tho region "Barbarossa; while preparing for the attack upon the Soviet Union, the OKW abolished, "before—; hand the jurisdiction of the military courts, grant ing the right of repressions; over the peaceful "Dopulaticn to individual officers and soldiers.; It is particularly stated there that:; "Crimes of hostile civilians are excluded from the .jurisdiction of the; court martials. . . "Sus-oected elements must be immediately delivered to the; officer. The latter will docide whether they should be shot;  M; it is; absolutely forbidden to hold suspects for the purpose of "b-rin^in^ them to; trial.; u;  There ar^ also -orovisions for extreme measures, and, in; particular,;  1;  Measures for mass violence', if circumstances do not permit the; rapid detection of the ^ilty.; 1 1; In the same Decree of the OKW the m e T a n t e ^ of im"ounity was assured in; advance to the military criminals frojn the ser^ior -oersonnel of the Gormen Army.; It states there as follows: "The "bTin^in^ of suits of actions, committed by; officials of thr A m y and "by the scrvice -oersonnel hostile civilians is; not obligatory even in cases where 笮ucb actions at the sarae time constitute; military crimes or offences;  11; In the course of the war the High Command consistently followed this; •oolicy, increasing its terroristic ̂ ctiDS with regard to prisoners of war and; the peaceful populations of occupied, countries.; The OKW directive of 16 S^DteLVber, 1941, states:; "It is important to realize that a man lifp in the countries to which; this refers, mrans nothing* and that intimidating action is x>ossi>lr only through; the amplication of unusual "brutality" 98/.; Addressing the commanders of thp army ^roiros on 23 July, 1 9 4 1 , t h ^ OKW; simply briefed them as follows: "It is not in the demand for additional security; detaciiments, "but in the application of appropriate draconic measures that the; commanding officers must use to keep order in the regions und>°r their juris-; diction" /PS-459/.; The OKW directivr of 16 Decein"ber, 1941, states:; 11;  The tro<ros... have the right and are ol)li^ed to BX)X)ly... any measures; whatsoever also against women and children if this contri*butes to success....; /USSR-16/.; ” 27-; Aincn^ the iaost "brutal OKW directives concerning the treatment of; -orisoners of war one must consider the order entitled "Night and Po^; 1 1; . The; reasons for resorting to capital punisliment for prisoners of war were; offences, which accordint to international conventions, generally should; not carry any "ounishment; for exam"ole, esca*oe from the canvo.; The order states: .; "Penalty for such offences, consisting of loss of freedom and ^ven; a life sentence is a sign of weakness. Only sentence or measures; which entail ignorance of the fate of the r^ailty "by local po-oulation will; achieve r e a l effectiveness. /L-90, US-234, Transcript, Afternoon Session; 25 January, 1946/; In the course of the present trial agreat deal of evidence of apple-; cation of this order has;  n; oeen submit ted. One of 七 he exenx>l e of this kind; of crimr: is the murder of 50 officer-pilots. The fact that tliis crime was; inspired, "by the r.igh Command cannot "be douoted.; OKW also issued an order for the destruction of the "Commando; u;  units,; The original order was submitted to the Ccurt /PS—498, US—501/ According; to this order, officers and soldiers of the "Commando; 11;  units had to "be shot,; except incases when they were to "be questioned, after which, they were; shot in any ease.; This order was unsworvin-'^ly cerried out "by the ccmmandin^ officers; of army units. In June 1944 Hundstudt, the commander-in-chio^ of tho; German troops in the West, reported that Hitler; 1; s order in r^^ard to; "the treatment of the Commando groups of the en^my is still l^in^ ca-ri^d; out" /PS-531, US-550/; 3. The High Command, alon^ with tho SS and tho Police, is ^uilt^;; of the most "brute 1iDolicc actions in the occupied, regions,; The instructions relating to specie 1 regions, issued "by OKW on 13 Hare; 1941 contemplated the necessity of synchronising the activities In occiroip; t^rritories "between the army command and the Reichsfurhrer of the SS. As is; v; seen from the testimony of the chief of the 3d Departmrnt of HSEn and who; was concurrently chief of tho Einsatzgruppe "D", Otto Ohlcndorf, and of the; cnief of the VI Department of RbHis., Walter Schellen"berg, in accordance with; ” 126-; OKW instructions there was an a^roemcnt made "between the general staff and; the RSHA a"bout the organization of s-oocial "otierational;  ?; ^rotros" of the; Security Police and SD 一;  ,,; einsatz/5rup; ,; oen; n; , assigned to the a-o-oropriat^ army; detachments.; Crimes coniinitted "by the einsatz/^ruppen on tho territory of the ten—; porerily occupied regions aro countless. Tho einsr tz; ?; q;rup"oen were acting; in close contact with the commanding officers of tho awroiDriate army; croups.; The following excerpt from the report of Einsatzミruxroo "A" is extremely; characteristic as evidence:; "...among our functions as the estal'lishmcnt of personal lisiaon with; the commanding officer "both at the front and in the rear. It must "be; pointed out that the relations with the army were of the "best, in some eases; very close, almost hearty, as, for instance, the commander of the tank groun,; Colonel-Grneral Hoppncr'; 1;  /L-180/.; 4. Th."- roTpresentptivcs of the Hi^h Conniand acted in all theeschelons; of the army as nom^ers of a criminal ^rou-o.; In sTDite of the violation of international law rnd of the customs of; w a r; , the directives of the OKW and of the General Staff and the command of; individual army units "byt wore a l l i e d in life and wern aUOTcnted 'ny oven; more brutal orders issued, as irpolemcntation to these directives.; In this connection it is characteristic to note the directive; cf Fieldmarshal vcxi Reichenau, Army troop commander, addressed to his; soldiers: ''The soldier in the eastern territories is not only a warrier; skilled in tiip art of warfare "but a ' earor of a nerciless national idology."; And else-where, calling for the extermination of the Jews, Reichnau wrote:; "Thus the soldier must loe in full cognizance of the necessity for harsh and; .just revenge on tho BP sub-humans / the Jews". (USA-556).; As anotlier example the order of Fieldxriarshal von Mannstein addressed,; to iiis soldiers can l:c referred to. On the Las is of the "politice.l aims; of the war" the Jieldmarshal cynically appealed to his soldiers to wa^e; the war in violation of the "recognize d laws ofwarfare in -Surot)e; 11;  (USA-927).; Thus, in the course of the hearing of evidence it has "been -oroven; "beyond a l l d o u b t t h a t t h e G - e n e r s l S t a f f a n d t h e Su-or^mo Command o f t h e; ” 29-; Hitlerite Arrny comprised a highly dangerous criminal organization.; 幸 * 傘 傘 * 本; エ consider it my duty as e. Jud^e to draw up my dissenting opinion; concerning those imortant questions in which I disa^ron with, the decision; adonoted "by the moml^ers cf the Tribunal•; Soviet Member XMT; Major General Jurisp rudence; w 1946 I.T. Nikitchenko; One of the important parts of this mobilization was the systematic; 1944, that "out of five nil; even 200,000 canc volurxtari; (Dxploitation, "by force, of the labor rc sources of the occupiod territories.; Shortly after Sauckel had taken offi c, he liad the governing authorities in; the various occiroied territories issue d^crers, establishing connDulsory; le.loor srrvicc in G-ernany. Under the authority of thoso decrees Sauckcl; T;  s; Comnissioners, "beckcd up 、y the polico authorities of the occut)ied t^rri-; tcries, oT^aincd and sent to Germany the laborers which were necosspry to; fill the quotes ^iven then、; e; v S a u c k c l . H o 4oscri>o4 so-cpll^d "voluntary”; •Janatcs; r c c m i t i n g ty/ "a whole ^atch of male and fonalc agents .just as was done in; the olden tines for shan^r-aiins:". That real voluntary rocruitin^ was the; exception rpther than the rule is siiown "by Sauckel; 1;  s statement on March 1,; -lion foreiン;n workers who arrived in O-ernany not; Lly. " «rtltliouぬ he now claims that the statenciit; is not true, the circumstances \mder which it was naie, as well as the; eviicncc presented "before tlie Tribunal leave no doult that it was; subste.ntially accurate.; The manner in whick tke unfortunate slave laborers were collected e.nd; transported tc G-errnany, and what happened to the:- after they arrived, has; already "been descrilood. Seuckcl a r ^ e s that he is not resでonsi/ble for these; excesses in the adninistration of tho ^rof^ran. He says that the total; number of workers to "oc ontaiiipd was set tk^ d-mejids fron p.^icniltiim and; from industry; that obtaining the workers was tho responsibility of the; occii-nation sutiiorities, tre.nsx>ortirv: thon to G-ernany that of the G-prnan rail-; ways, and taking care of them in G-ermany that of thp Ministries of Ip.^or and; Agricuiturn, the G- rnan Lal^or Front and the various industries involved. He; testifies tiie.t insofar as ho had any authority he wps constantly urging; hu〜ハno t r c n t r a o n t .; T h o r e i s n o d o u b t , , ' tlici: Sr i.ick."1 h っこ even で 1 1; r c s p o n s i b : l 1 i t y f o r t h : sir.vc l^bprogr."'::-.丄'-t t h e t i n e of; t h e e v e n t s i n q u e s t i o n h e li^ n o t f a i l t o r.ssci—c; c o n t r o l; o v e r the firlcls rli-ich h o no; 1; マ c l r i n s '7crc 七:-ふ s o l o r-osponsi"b5.1 i t y; of o t h e r s . H i s r c g u l t i o n s provlcc'又 thr t h i g CorT-.asciiori-rs; G h o u l — hr vc r u t h n r i t y f o r obtaining; In'oor, m d lie \vr. s c on s t a r t l y; i n uhe f I : s u p - r v i s i n c t h o s t o p s vrhich ".vcrc てつoinr」 t a k o n .; h e vr. a rv;.?.rc o f r u t h l e s s m o t hoc. s "be in ご t n k e n t o obtoiti; lr. D o r c r s ,っ nこ v i g o r o u s I j r a u p p o r t c d t h e n on t h e g r o u n d t h n t; t h e y v/crc n c c o s s p r y t o f i l l t h e qo.otr.s.; S r u c k c l; 1;  a r c ^ u l r . t i o n c <° Is o provide;".1:トrt h o hec"; 1; . r r j p n n -; s i b i l i t y for t r a n s p o r t in: t h e o o r c r s t o G o m ^ r i y , r l l r c ^ tin'-; tンon t o o^.ployc^rs ncl tokinご’car-c of t h e n , r+か:; 1; .th~t t h o o t h e r; ngonei.03 i n v o l v e d i n t h o a c p r o c c s s o a rrorc suborcin〔て七c 七つ,ニ:じ:!華; H e;  r; 7r.a i n f o m o c i of t h e br.C. c o n d i t i o n s v/Mcli e x i s t e d . I t ご.OT.S; n o t rppcf:r thri: h o rulvocrt.:パ b r u t a l i t y f o r i t c or.n or; " r a rrt odvocr.tc of n n y p r o g r a n s u c h P.E; rt-Iirrtlcr ‘ c p i r n f or; cxtor'ninr t i o n tb-rou^b r o r k . H i s a t t i t u d e t h u u c y p r e s a c d; in rcguD-" t i on i; t h e n c n n u a t f e d , s h e l t e r e d r.nci trcatcc?.; i n s u c h r. Y:C.J C.E t o e x p l o i t t h e n t o t h e h i二 h o s t; poa,,iblt: e x t e n t _ n t t h o l o r c c t conc:〕ivr"ol.... d e g r e e; of o - p o n c i t u r c . .; 1 1; T h :vic:.cnc,.〕 shoて.-,3 t h a t Sruclicl vrr.es i n c h a r ^ o of こ pro^rcj:!; r/hich i n v o l v e ご : R e p o r t a t i o n f o r sir; vc I r b or of n o r o t h m; ";,000,000 huracn b o i n s s , nc.nj of t h e m un^.or t o r r i ' o l c; c o n d i t i o n s of c r u o l t y m d s u f f e r i n g .; C o n c l u s i o n; T h e T r i b u n a l f i n d s t h n t Sm^.okcl is n o t - n i l t y on; C o i m t D O n e an(5 T'7C. H e is 〔:uilty u n d e r C ovtnts T h r e e r.n '; F; r; >ur; M . こ c :; J O D L; Jo こ 1 la in l i c t c d on r l l f o u r c c u n t a . Fror: 1 9 3 5 t o 1 9 3 3; h o v7cs c h i o f of t h e ^r.tionr.1 D e f e n s e S e c t i o n i n t h e H i ^ h C orinrnO..; A f t e r c y e a r in c o m - n r; 1; . of -croopc, i n ^ugu-st 1 9 3 9 ho i-'ctr.rn ; d; t o b e c o n e Cliiof of t h o O p o r r t i o n s S t a f f of t h e Hiこ:h Cormnncl; of t h o x-r:nocl P o r c c s . “1七hou〔;:h h i s I'nccllr.to s u p e r i o r c; cn'lrnt ^ - i t c l ,とこ r e p o r t e d i i ^ c c t i y t o H i t l e r on o p e r a t i o n a l; r.ic.ttci-'s. In t h o c t r i c t n i l i t a r y rienso, Joc:l w r s th" r.ctiir.l; p l a n n e r of the vrrr cncl r e s p o n s i b l e in I n r ^ o n c c a n r c f o r t h e; Cjijx; 1; 'し、ノ̂ ĵ ‘- xjĉ  c o n d u c t of oporo.tlonr>•; J o d l c.".cfends lii::is jlf -n t h o ごi''outk’- hつ v.-r. n r. c, older ar*orn; to o b c d i o n c c , r.nc. n o t c. p o l i t i c i r n ; .. nご t h a t hir: str.ii' rncl; plrnnj-ng v:ork l o f t h i n n o ti?'io f o r otlior r r t t c r s , H、; rri^. t]:r.t; rlicn h e s i g n e d or i r & i c l c d o r d e r s , nr:noranc> m c . 1 . . t t o r a , ?io; C i d GO f o r ^ i t l o r CNC" o f t e n i n t h e c.bc:ncc of ^ v a t c l . Thoti^h; he- cl,?iir.c t h ^ t ra a s o l d i e r h e lire: t o b e y H i t l e r , h o sr.-Ci; t h a t h e o f t e n t r i e d to obatriict cc'rtr.in nonsioroa わ:厂; v/bich o c c r . c i o n r l l y prove:: s v . c c o s s f u l c z v; r; '.ion h.. r e s i s t . :。; H i t l e r ' s C o n e n d t h a t r; dir '-.ctiv^- b o issvi:d t o l y n c h ご.llicd; " t e r r o r f i l e r s " .; C r i n o s c^ciintit Foc.cc; E n t r i e s i n J o d l ' s clirry of 1 3 a n d 1 4 F o b m r r y 1 9 5 S; sho-7 H i t l e r i n c t r a c t c d o o t h Iij.n rnこ-K.it:;1 to u p; n i l i t r r y p r e s s u r e r.^rinot Axis t r i e b o g u n r.t tlio ScliviachnicG; c o n f c r o n c c a i n u l ^ t i n c n i l i t r r y n o r s u r n o , rn"T t h a t thr.ac; cchicvc.l t h e i r purpocic. -hya H i t l e r rlcclr.cc:;  : ,; not to to]. - .rrt; s c h u c c h n i s s p l c b i c c i t c , J o d l b r o u g h t to t h o c o n f "rr.ncc; t h e " o l d clraft", the; (ニこis七in.ニ c t a f f p l a n . d l r r y f o r 1 0; M r r c h s h o ^ c H i t l e r t h e n o r d e r e d t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of;  : i; C r a - O t t o " ,; anc" th-. c".iroctivo ~c.s initirlcc!. "by Joe; 1; .!. Jocll issueこ c a p p l o -; ご:ry i n s t r u c t i o n a on 11 J t r c h , r‘n亡 i n i t i . " . l K i t l o r ' 3 こ’rclcr; f o r t h e i n v a s i o n on t h e G。ric こct.〕*; In pl"nnin.7 t h e a t t a c k on C z.-:clioslovr.!rir, Jocll r.,ra 'nry; r.ctivc, nccorclinn- to t h e SclrnUTut K o t o s . 丄 io initial、.*:; 1; .I t o n s; 1 4 , 1 7 , 2 4 , 3 6 e n d 3 7 in t h o N o t e s . Joe; 1; .! r'lrilts hr r.-rccd; -7ith O K R thc.t t h o " i n c i d e n t " t o provide. G ^ r n a n i n t e r v e n t i o n; n n c t o c c u r r.t tlio lr.tcat loy 14-00 on X - l D r y , tlic Cc.j o r o; u^ic ci*b し し . • , <-.n' u«?. i d it rrast o c c u r r.t r. f i x e d ti:ic in 2; 0 0; - -; flyin:" v'co. t h c r . Jo rll c o n f e r r e d v/ith t h e propr.gr. n^.c c-:?p--rta; on;  !i; i:"i"iin' nt c o r m o n tc.aks" s u c h r.a Gcrnr.n -/j.olr.tions of; i n t c r n r t i o n r 1 l a t r , exploit.?.tion of th- n the cnor^y mc; 1; .; rofutr tions "by the Crcrnans, t '1:1 ch ! ,tack " JoTil c^nsiuor .d; “ J; ! l; pr.rtlculrrly i n p o r t a n t " .; 厶 i "セ c r Manic!::, Jocll-:-rotc :; nC r c c h o s l o v a k i o a s n p o u r is out . . . T h e g e n i n s; of the Pticlircr r.nc". h i s clctcrr.Tj.n.°tion n o t t d c h u n; o v ^ n r.. "7orl.'' '7ar hr v o age in v;on the v i c t o r y v;i t h o u t; t h o u;jc of 1 o r c c . The, b o p o rc/.•二ins thr.t the i n -; crof.ialnus,七lie r;ork rri''" t h。 . ニ : r u b t f u l p c o g l 0 he vo; b e e n c o n v e r t e d r.ncl "Till r :nairi t h a t “; S h o r t l y a f t o r t h e Sivlotcn o c c u p r . t i c n , Joこ1-./ont to c.; p o s t corTji.r.nc''. r.ncl ciこ noセ"bつcaric C h i e f of t h e O p c r r t i o n c Str.ff; in O K W u n t i l t h o cinc: of i . u s u a t , 1 9 3 9 .; J; o'?.l ( a c c u a a c d t h e K o r w a y I n v a s i o n i.ltli h i t l e r , K c i t; m c l rr -.dor oft 12 Dcconijcr 1 9 3 9 ; h i 3;  n; i r r j i s r:jpl'..tし....づ.tli; lr七c cntr5.cti on h i s ^.ctivitirs i n proper!n; t; -r t h i n rセ t ^ c k ,; J o d l o p In j.ns h i s c o r n c n t t h n t H i t l e r xrc a s t i l l f o r; . t h a t; a n "dxcutic; 1 1;  to rzovc 7.1cr.nt/hc 'jr.\-;ritin.3 f o r rc 15..-1010; i n t o l l i g c n o e on t h e B r i t i s h p i r n s , m; r;  c c f c ^ C s t h e i n v r s i o n; 'ra r n c c o s a n r y n a v e to f o r o c t r l l thcr- H i s t:-stinon••‘ shot.'s thc.t; f r o n O c t o b o r 1 9 3 9 H i t l o r p l a n n e d to a t t c c k 七lie;  v; foat t h r m g h .; biat t o s ioiVb七:ful o.fcout invo-'rlric- Holl.̂ ri':: u n t i l t h o; n i C l o of N o v ^ n b c r . On 8 P o o r n ^ r y 1 9 4 0 , liici :lopnty; W r r l i n o n t , cncT J o c c h o i m o k ,七 h e c i v f o r c e s p l r n n o r , (liciciTcnod; r-'ionc' tiicnsolves t h e " n o r of r.ttrckinG H o r v r . y , D o n n a r k; r.ncT HollrrK,., "but ; • j u c . r a n t c o i n r t h e n c u t r r l i七 y of B o l ^ i m - i .; Mr ny of tho 17 orders poGtponiri;3 tho attr.ck in the Uc•コセ for; vr r i o u n r e a s o n s incltiding ""/or t h o r c o n d i t i o n s , u n t i l M r y 1 9 4 0,; マし r c s l ^ n o u b y JoO.l;  9; H o wo a r c t i v c in t h e piご rm in 3 a g a i n s t C r c c c c mi,?-; Y u g o s l a v i a . T h o E i t l o r o r d e r of 1 1 J r n m r r y 1 9 4 1 to i n t c r v o n o; in A lbr.nlu rjc3 i n i t i r l c c by Joe•丄《 On 20 J'" niic1.ry, f m r; nontlis b e f o r e t h o r.ttrck, H i t l o r r, c o n f c r c n c c of G. r a n n; mc".. Ita3 i a n s o n o r a l s im Joi'l'r; prcacnc:; t h r t Gar:ir.n ^ r o o p; ccinccntrntj.ons i n R o u v r n i n . v c r c t o b o ticccl n,r;ninc;t G r c c o .; J o d l s prosont on 1 8 ifcrch ^ h^n H i t i e r tolc" ?? accTor r l l; Crvcocc ntis t b e oc c u p if'.;"'. b o f o r o r n y E.。ttlcn:、nt coul.f.1:.; r c c c h c d . On 2 7 M a r c h H i t l e r t o l d t h o Go m e n H i g h; t h a t; Con-irnc''/the clcstniction of Yu^osl."vio choul^. bo ncco;; …itli " u m c r c i f u l h?.rchnca£i; n; , r.ncl tin.: v c c i c i o n nr.g セ t o; b o n b Bclsrrclo r i t h o u t n .ilcclrr-'-tion リ f r;r.r, Jotll v:rc r l s o tljorc.; J o d l t o s t i f l c d t hr t H i t l e r f c r r r C . n n rttncl; b y P u s sir; nn; r; , s o " ttock.^cl fircst. T M s p r c p c . r o t i o n ,〕こ•こ“vn r.lno^t; year before the invr sion . J oai tol ^ ^ r l i n o n t r.s ? rly rs; 2 9 J u l y 1 9 4 0 t o p r o p r r c tli..: p i r n s s i n c c H i t l o r hc-1 Icciclocl; to attr.ck j nnu. H it ler lotcr t olcl 可ご r l i r u n t lie licid p l m n : t o; attr.ck I n A u ^ u o t 1 9 4 0 b u t p o s t pence- It f o r -.lilitr.ry; initirlcJ . H i t ler ' g diroctivc of 12 Kovc;iljar 1940; a c c o r d i n g t o vfaich; p r o p c r . - t i o n s vcrballj- orrlorod a h o u l C b o c o n t i n u e d - n d p I c o; intitialcc: " C r s c B r . r b r r o s s c " on 1 3 D c c o n b c r . On 3; P o b r u r r y , 1 9 4 1 , Ilitlcr, J o d l rnc: I^oitcl " i a c u s a ^ a; tlie I n vr z i o n , c n cl1 "!.、.ぃj し.i J p r o G c n t m i 1 4 J n n o rt.cn f i n d; reports on “Cmsc " v;oro nc.C.c; 9; 'la r C rinc s r. n こ Crir;o s r. qc,iriGt nunc ni ty; On 1 8 O c t o b e r 1 9 4 2 H i t l e r Iszm . C t h Cr/rornclつ Oiっこ:i,r.nc; 1; .; lr t::r a Gupplcr*'/:.ntr.ry oxpl。rr ti to corr-'-rn "in o.ff icors; only. Tho covcrinc nc-iorrnc^un vrr.z 'sigrK:こ by JoC.l; m;  Î r rlj; of the order ]T / J O C . 1 s t a f f , rfitli lain; l e n : : J o C L tostific. " lir' v:aa rjtr. ngl3r つppoこ..;こ on :丫、でご1; .,n こ l - . ^ r l 2 r oii.n-; 1;  ̂ , t?ut c o u l n o t rcf-as::: to pr. s s i t o n . E o i n; oicts he trieこ to • dti^c.tc its hnrchn?-c;a in prr.ctic b j rr)t; inf or: "ling K it lcr -"hen it -.”ニ not carr i : d out • Ho i n i t i o lod; tho 0KTr nG!':iorc ndui'i of 25 Jiuic 1944 r or f i l m i n g the Order; af tor the Nome, n l°nf"insc3.; A pl.,n t o clir-iinato S o v i e t c^oxiGnr-rG -'ca i n tlic:; C i r c c t i v o for " C r c c B r r b r r o s c c” • T h o dccirjion T/hct;-• r il:j; be 1cillcc1. v.Tithout trir.l "7na to "o-. n「でc by r n offic; A こreft; c o n t c i n c J - c.l'c h r r ^ . v r i t i n c G u s g c ^ t i n . s t h i c ;.;hot\l;l; bo ?-..?.ncUcd : 。 r o t c l i r i : I on, r-n " ho tcnt5.ri:;0.七 hi,つ 3 hi a; rttcrupt to Qct riroun'"1- i t .; '•Vbcri in 1945 丄-litlcr c onsi f:orccl cn.on oniic5.n'? tho r-cnova; C o n v e n t i o n , Jof.X orsuccl tlio ("iar.c'.vnntr.GOc .ratrrciゆc;こ t h o; rdvr.ntr.ee2. On 21 I^nbiunr^" tolr: H it ler r.c'hxrcnco to th..,; Convこnticm m i l : : not Interfere :t1 th the c.?nruct of th - -.rr,; giving r.a m oxcnplc tb.o ninking of r. Zii t i i h hospital ^liip; r.3 r. r c p r i s r l r.nc. c r l l i n ^ it 「'. :ilatclo.. lie 3「:iこ lie :〕.パ s o; tccur^c it VJC G tho only nttitu^.c Eitlor フoul..:- oonsi ".or, thot; norcl or I ccrl r.rgiraontn hc-c no offset cn;'" rrguじs ho thus; prevente-". E i t lor f r o n clcnouRcinc the Convention,; There is little evidence that Jodl was actively connected, with the; slave lalror program, and he must havo concentrated on his で l a n n i n疚; function. But in his speech of 7 No vender 1943 to the Setilriters hp s?id; it was necessary to act "with rpnorseless vi^or end. r',sol\rfcion'; T;  in; Denmark, France and. the Low Countries to conでel work 011 tke Atlantic Wall.; By of 28 Oc^-o'ber 1944, Joil ordered the evacuation of all; the; persons in Northern Norway end/turning of their houses so they could not; help the Russians. Joil says he was a^f-.inst this, tut Hitler ordered it; end.. it was not'fully carried out. a document of the Norwegian &overninent; says such an evacuation did take place in Northern Norway and 30,000 houses; were damaged. On 7 October 1941, Jodl signed an order that Hitler would; not accept en offer of surrender of Leningrad or Moscow, but on the; contrary he insisted tiiat they ue completely destroyed. He Bays this was; done "because the G-crnans were afraid those cities would be nined by the; Russians as was Kiev. Uo surrender was ever offered.; His defense, in "brief, is the cioctriiin of "ewoorlor orders",; prohibited ••y Article 8 of the Charter as a ir'f^nse. Ther^ is nothing; in mitigation. Participation in such crimcs as these has never "heen; required, cf any soldier and h^ cannot now shield himself "behind a mythical; requirement of soldierly obodicnce at all costs as his ^ c u s c for; commission of these crimes.; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Jodl is guilty on all four counts.; THE PRESIDENT: VCN PAPEN; Von Papen is indicted under Counts One i,nd Two. He Yja:' ppointed; Chancellor of the Reich on June 1932,and was succeeded by von; Schleicher on December 2,1932• He 对as m-de Vice Chancellor in the; Hitler Cabinet cn January 30,193?, rnd on November 13,1933, Pleni-; potentiary for the Saar, Cn July 2 6 , 1 9 3 4 , he was ppointed Hinister; to Vienna, and 〜ms r called on February 厶, 1 9 3 8 . Cn pril 29,l; r; '39; >; he vにs appointed Anib ssador to Tarkey. Ke returned to Germany :/hen; Turkey broke off diplomatic relations rath Germ.ny in ハ ’ 】 . i s t 1 % 4 .; Crimes against Peace; Von Papen was active in 1932 and 1933 in helpinし Hitler to form; "ohe CoaliLion C a o m e t and aided in his 〔 ppointnient cis Chancellor on; January 3C; 3;  1933. As Vice Chancellor in that Cabinet he participated; in the Nazi consolidation of control in 1933. On June 16,1934^,; however, von Papen made a speech at liarburg r;hich contained つ . d e n u n c i a t i o n; of the Nazi attempts to suppress the free press .-nd the church, of the; existence of a reign of terror, and of "15C茗 I; T;  .zis; 11;  ho ”'vere mistaking; "brut:、.lity for vitality." Cn Jane 3 C , 1 9 3 4 , in the ^ave of violence; which accompanied the so-called Itoehm F T/- e; 3;  von Papen v-;as t^ken into; custody by the S3, his office force was rrested. and t'jc of his; associates^ incliiding the man who h:;d helped him ^-crk on the ]:: rb、r;; speech,xvere murdered. Von Papen was released on July 3 . 1 9 3 4 .; Noth〜vithst.andin, the murder of his associates^ von P : pen accepted; the position of I'inister to Austria on July 2 6 , t h e d- j after; Dollfuss had been assassinated. His appointment was Trounced in a; letter from I:itler which instructed him to direct relations between; the two countries "into normal antigriendl:, channels; n;  and assured; him of Hi tie r; r;  s; n;  c omplet e and. iinlimitecj confidence.;  n;  As Minister to; Austria, von Papen 讥as active in trying to stren: then the nosition cf; the Nazi Party in Austria for the purpose of brinr ing abo t 八nschl,ュss.; I n e a r l y 1935 he a t t e n d e d a m e e t i n g i n B e r l i n t "which t h e p o l i c y was; laid dovjn to avoid everything which v;ould give the appe ranee of; German intervention in the internal affairs of -..ustrio. Yet he arranged; for 200^000 marks a month to be transmitted to;  n; the persecuted National; Socialist sufferers in Austria." On 17^ 1935, he reported to; Hitler the results of a conference with Captain Leopold, the Leader of; the Austrian Nazis, arid urged Hitler to irake statement recognising; the national independence of ハ u s t r i a; ?;  and predicting that the result; mirht to be help the formation of a coalition between Schuschnigg; Christian Socialists and the :us"tri:;.n Nazis a iinst Stcirherrierg. Cn; July 27,1935,von P.〕.pen repcrte.' to Hitler that the union of A istria; and Germany could not be brcu'iit about by external pressure but only; by the strength of the National Socialist Movement. Kc ur,:ed th?t the; Austrian Nazi Partj; r;  change its character as a centr- lired;  T?; .eich rernirn P rty; and become a rallying point for all National Germans.; Von Papen was involved in occasional Nazi political demonstrations; supported Nazi propaganda activities and submitted detailed reports on; the activities cf the Nazi rarty, and routine reports relatin; to "jisiri- n; military defenses. His •,ustrian policy resulted in the a,: reement of; July 11; 3;  1936, which nominally restored relations between Cevm.ny and; Austria tc "normal and friendly form", but -which had a secret supplement; providing for 'm amnesty for Austrian Nazis, the lifting of censorshio; on Nazi papers; y;  the resumption of political activities by Nazis and the; appointment of men friendly to the Nazis in the 3ch i^cnni; r; C ..hinet.; After the signing of this agreerient vcn Papen offered to resign but his; resignation i/vas not accepted. Thereafter he proceeded to brinこ ci ntin led; pressure on tho Austrian Government to bring Nazis into the Schuschnigg Cabinet; and to get them important positions in the Fatherland Front, Austria;  T; s single; legal party, Cn September i , 1 9 3ら von Papen wrote Hitler, advising him that; anti-Nasis in the Austrian Ministry of Security were holding up the infiltr; :; 、tioi; of the Nazis into the Austrian Government しn,! recoinmended bringing "slovvlj; intensified pressure directed at changing thじ regime".; On February 193^^ von Papen was notified of his recall as Minister; 1;  to; Austria, at the same time- that von;  ?; ri"csch, von Bloiuberr ュnd von Ne r. th v^ere; removed fron their positions• Ho informed Hitler that he regretted his recall; b e c a u s e he had b e e n t r y i n g s i n c e Eovejmber 1937 t c ind!..ice Sen s c h n i g g t o h o l d a; conference tvith Hitler and Schaschni^p; had indicated his ill in; ness to do so.; Acting under Hitler; T; c: instructions^ von F :.pen then returned to stria rid; arranged the conference vihich was held -.t Berchtesgaden on Febr ary 12,; Von Fapen accompanied Schuschnigg to that conference, and at its conclusion; advised Schuschnigg to comply xvith Hitler; 1;  s deniands. On liarch 1C,1933^ I:itlex-; ordered von Papen to return to Berlin, Von Prpen "was in the Ch; ncellery on; March 11"when the occupation of Austria 讽as ordered. No evidence has been; offered sho-wing that von Papen "was in favor of the decision to occupy Austria; by force^ and; he has testified that he urged Hitler not to take this、 step.; After the annexation of Austria von Papen retired into private; life and there is no evidence that he took any part in politics. He; accepted the position of Arpbassador to Turkey in April 1939 bat no; evidence has been offered concerning his activities in that position; implicating him in crimes.; The evidence leaves no doubt that von Papen; f; s primary purpose; as Minister to Austria was to undermine the Schuschnigg re,- ime and; strengthen tho Austrian Nazis for the purpose of brinp;in:ご.about; Anschluss. To carry through this plan he engaged in both intrigue; and bullying. But the Charter does not rrake criminal such offenses; against political mor.^litho-wever b:.ci these may be. Under the Charter; von Papen can be held guilty only if he was a party to the planning of; aggressive war. There is no shoeing that he was a party to the plans; under "which the occupation of Austria was a step in the direction of; further aggressive action, or even thJ: he participated in plans to; occupy Austria by aggressive war if necessary. But it is not established; beyond a reasonable doubt that this was the purpose of his activity,; and therefore tho Tribunal cannot hold that he was a party to the; coinraon plan charged in Court One or participated in the planning of; the aggressive wars charged under Count Two,; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that von Papen is not guilty under this Indict-; ment, and directs that he shall be discharged by the Marshal, when the; Tribunal presently adjourns•; !.IAJCR GENERAL NIKITCHSNKO:; SEYSS-INQUART; Seyss-Inquart is indicted under all Four Counts. Seyss-Inq iart, an; Austrian attorney, was appointed State Councillor in Austria in May 1937; as a result of German pressure. He had been associated vdth the Austrian; Nazi Party since 1931^ but had often had difficulties with that Party; and did not actually join the Nasi Party until L'larch 13,1933. He "was; appointed Austrian Liinister of Sec urity and Interior with control over; the police pursuant to one of the conditions i/vhich Hitler had imposed on; Schuschnigg in the Berchtosgaden conference of February 1 2 , 1 9 3 3 .; Activities in Austria; Seyss-Inquart participated in the last stages of the Nazi intrigue; which preceded tho German occupation of Austria, and 训as made Chancellor; of Austria as a result of Gerran threats of invasion.; On I&rch 1 2 , 1 9 3 3 , Seyss-Inquart met Hitler at Linz and made a speech; •wulcoming the G; e; rman forces and advocating the reunion of Germany and; Austria• On March 13, he obtained the passage of a law providing that; Austria should become a province c± Germany and succeeded Iliklas as; President of Austria when Kiklas rc signed rather than sir n the Seyss -; Inquart's title "was changed to Reichs Governor of Austria on M'rch 15,; 1938, and on the same day he was fiven the title of a General in the SS.; He was made a Reichs Jdnister vリithout Portfolio on Ihy 1, l; c; 3 9 .; On March 1 1 , 1 9 3 9 , he visited the Slovakian Cabinet in Bratislava; and induced them to declare their independence in a way which fitted in; closely "with Hitler's offensive against the independence of Czechos丄ovaicia^; As Reichs Governor of Austria, Seyss-Inquart instituted a program; of confiscating Jewish property. Ur !er his regime Jews were forced to; emigrate, were sent to concentration camps and "were subject to pogroms.; At the end of his regime he cooperated v;ith the Security Police and SD; in the deportation of Jews from Austria to the East. ./hile he was; Governor of Austria, political opponents of the Na?:is were sent to concen-; tration camps by the Gestapo, mistreatod and often killed.; Crindnal Activities_in Poland and the Netherlands; In September 1 9 3 9 , Seyss-Inquart 讽as appointed Chief of Civil Adminis-; tr.ition of South Poland. On October 12,1939, Seyss-Inquart was made; Deputy Governor General of the General Government of Poland under Frank.; On Llay 18,1940, Soyss-Inquart "was appointed Reich Commissioner for; occupied Netherlands. In these positions he assumed responsibility for; governing territory which had been occupied by aggressive ^ars and the; adirdnistrntion of which 对as of vital importance in the aggressive 別ar being; ivaged by Germrny.; As Deputy Governor General of •リhe General Government of Poland, Seyss-; Inquart vjas i supporter of the harsh occupation policies 例hich were put; in effect. In November 1939^ while on an inspection tour through the; General Government, Seyss-Inquart stated that Poland ’v”as to be so administered; as to exploit its economic resources for the benefit of Germany• Seyss-; Ir.quart also advocated the persecution of Jews and wa3 iniorined of the; beginning: of the AB action which involved the murder of many Polish; intellectuals.; As Heichs Commissioner for Occupied Netherlands, Seyss-Inq iart was; ruthless in applying terrorism to suppress all opposition to the German; occupation, a program which he described as "annihilating" his opponents.; In collaboration with the local Kifher SS and Police Leaders he m s; involved in the shooting of hostage for offenses against the occupation; authorities and sending to concentration camps all s spected opponents; of occupation policies including priests and educators. Many of the Dutch; police vjerc forced to participate in these programs by threats of reprisal; against their families, Dutch courts were also forced to participate in; this program, but when thoy indicated their relactひ.nee to give sentences; of imprisonnient because so many prisoners were in fact killed, a greater; emphasis was placod cn tho use of summary police courts.; Seyss-Inquart carriod out the economic administration of the; Netherlands without regard for rul^s of the Hague Convention which he; described as obsolete. Instead, a policy was adopted for the inaximiuii; utilization of economic potential of the Netherlands, and executed with; smr\ll regard for its effcct on the inhabitants. There was widespread; pillage of public and private property vjhich was fiven color of legality; by Soyss-Inquart's regulations, and assisted by manipulations of the; financial institutions of tho Metherl-Jids under his control.; As Rcichs Commissioner for tho Netherlands, Seyss-Inquart inmediate]y; began sending forced laborers to Germany. Up >ntil 1 % 2 , labor service in; Gerniany ivas theoretically voluntary, but was actually coerced by strong; economic and governmental pressure. In 1942 Seyss-Inquart formally; decreed compulsory labor service, and utilized the services of the; Security Police and SD to prevent evasion of his order. During the; occupation over 500,000 people were sent from the Netherlands to the; Reich as laborers and only a very small proportion were actually volunteers; One of Seyss-Inquart»s first steps as R; e; ich Commissioner of the; Netherlands was to put into effect a series of laws iinposin::; economic; discriminations arainst the Jews. This 別as follovjed by decrees requiring; their registration^ decrees comoosinp them to reside in Ghettos and to; Yjear the star of David, sporndic rests and detention in concentration; camps, and finally, at the suggestion of Heydrich, the mass deportation; of aLnost 120,000 of Holland‘s 140,CCG Jews to Auschwitz and the "final; solution,; n;  Seyss-Inquart admits knowing that they were going to Auschvdt?; but claims that he heard from people "who had been to Auschwitz that the; Jews vjere comparatively vjell off tho re, and that he thought that they; were being held there for resettlement after the war. In light of the; evidence and on account of his official position it is impossible to; believe this claim.; Soyss-Inquart contends that he was not responsible for many of the; crimes committed in the occupation of the Netherlands because they were; either ordered from the Reich, committed by the Araiy, over vjhich he had; no control, or by the German Higher S3 and Police Leader, "who, he claims,; reported directly to KLmmler, It is true that some of the excesses were; the responsibility of the Army, and that the Higher SS and Police Leader,; although he was at the disposal of Seyss-Inquart, could always report; directly to Himmler, It is also true that in certain cases Seyss-; エnqucirt opposed the extreme measures used by these other agencies, as; when he was largely successful in preventing the Arijiy from c rrj^in^ out; a scorched earth policy, and urged the Higher 3S ;nd Police Loaders to; reduce the number of hostages to be shot. But the f.-.ct remains that; S r t vxr.n c knoTrin.ニ rnc1-voluntary participant In; Crir.cs Crir;cc ニ;:in,:;七 H t r m i t y -:;hich co?i-iittod; in ti?. occupation f the Notl-orlcaTls.; The- Tribunal f i n i : t:.r’t S yGG-In'.;ur;rt is utility; nncor Counts T'.TO, Throe r.n.:’- Pour. Scycs-INQIAR.RT is not; -ij.il ty oin Co\ant One; VR. BIDDLiTs; S K E R; Speer is indicted under all Four Counts. Speer joined the Nazi; P a r t y i n 1 9 3 2 , I n 1934 he was made H i t l e r ' s a r c h i t e c t and became a; close personal confidante Shortly thereafter he 船 s made a Department; Hoid in the German Labor Front and the official in Charge of Capital; Construction on the staff of the Deputy to the Fuehrer, positions i/vhich; he h e l d t h r o u g h 1 9 4 1 . On F e b r u a r y 1 5 , 1 % 2 , a f t e r t h e d e a t h o f F r i t z; Todt, Speer "was appointed Chief of the Organization Todt and Reich; Minister for Armainents and Munitions (after September 2, 1 % 3, f o r; Armaments and YJar Production) • The positions were supplemented by his; appointments in March and April 1942 as General Plenipotentiary for; ArnHments and as a member of the Central P l a m i n g Board, both "within; the Four Year Plan, Speer was a member of the Reichstag from 1941; until the end of the war,; CriiiBs against Peace; The Tribunal is of opinion that Speer; !; s activities do not amount; to initiating^ planning, cr preparing wars of aggression, or of; conspiring to that end. He became the head of the armament industry; "well after all of the wars had been commenced and were under Kay; #;  His; activities in charge of German Armament Production v̂ /ere in id of the; xvar effort in the same way that other productive enterprises aid in the; waging of war; but the Tribunal is not prepared to find that such; activities involve engaging in the common plan to 饥 a g e aggressive war; as chargod under Count I or waging aggressive -war as charged under; Count II.; War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity; Tho cvidoncc introduced ag-lnst Speer under Coants Three and Four; relates entirely to his particip'rbion in the slave labor program.; Speer hirosclf; 1;  had no direct adrninistrative responsibility for this; px-cgram. Although he had advoc .ted th。appointment of a Genera l; Plcnipotcnti ry for the Utilization of labor because he wanted one; centr-: .l authority with whom he could deal on labor matters^ he did; not obtain administrative control over Sauckel. Sauckel ^as appointed; dircctly by Hitler, under the decree of Uarch 21,1942^ "which provided; that he should be directly responsible to Goering, as Plenipotentiary; of the Four Year Flan.; As Reich Minister for Armaments and Munitions and General Pleni-; potentiary for Armaments under the Four Year Plan, 3peer had extensive; authority over production. His original authority was over construction; and production of arms for the OKH. This was progressively expanded to; include naval armaments, civilian production and finally, on August 1,; 1944^ air armaments» As the dominant meiriber of the Central Planning; Board, T.'hich had supremo authority for the scheduling of G^raian production; and the allocation and development of raiv materials, Speer took the; position that the Board had authority to instruct Sauckel to provide; laborers for industries under its control and succossded. in sustaining; this position over the objection of Sauckel, The practice was developed; under "which Speer transmitted to Sauckel an estimate of the total number; of workers needed, Sauckel obtained the labor ana allocated it to the; various industries in accord i_n.ee instructions supplied by Speer.; Speer knei'\; ^hen he made his demrids on 3...uckel that they would be; supplied by foreign laborers serving under compulsion. Ke participated; i n c o n f e r e n c e s i n v o l v i n g t h e e x t e n s i o n o f t h e s l a v e l a b o r p r o g r a m; for the purpose of satisfying his demands;  #;  He "was present at a; ccnferenco held during August 10 znd August 12,1%2,"with Hitler and; Sこ u c k c l a t T-vhich i t was a g r e e d t h a t S a u c k e l s h o u l d b r i n g l a b o r e r s b y; force from occupied territories where this "was necessary to satisfy the; ' l a b o r n e e d s o f t h e i n d u s t r i e s u n d e r S p e e r T s c o n t r o l , S p e e r a l s o a t t e n d e d; a conference in Hitler; 1;  s headquarters on January at which the; decision VKIS made that Sauckcl should obtain "at least 4 million new; •workers froru occupicd territories" in order to satisfy the demands for; labor made by Speer^ although Sauckol indicated that he could do this; only 別ith help from Kiiiinil^r.; Sauckol continually infcri.ned Speer and his representatives that; f o r e i g n l a b o r e r s v?ere b e i n g o b t i n . : d b y f o r c e . A t . m e e t i n g o f M a r c h 1 ,; 1%“, SDcer;  !; s deputy questioned Sauckol very closely r.bout his failure; to live up to the obligation to supply four rnillion workers from; occupied territories • In some eases Speor denr.nded 丄ご.Dorers from; specific foreign countries. Thus, rb the conference August 10-12, 1%2,; Sauckel vjas instructed to supply Speer vd_th further million Russian; l a b o r e r s f o r t h e Gし r a rn a r n n m e n t i n d u s t r y up t o a nd i n c l ' i d i n g O c t o b e r; 1 % 2 .; U;  At n meeting of the Ccntr 1 Planning Board on April 2 2 , 1 % 3 ,; Speer discussed plans to obtain Russian laborers for use in the coal; m i n e s , a n d f l a t l v v e t o e d t h e s u g g e s t i o n t h a t t h i s l a b o r d e f i c i t s h o u l d; be undo up by Gornnn l.xor,; Speer has argued that he ニdvocニted the reorganizax.ion of the; labor program to place a greater emphasis on utilization of German; labour in wxr production in Gcrrmny and on the use of labour in occupied; countries in locn.1 production of consumer goods formerly produced in; Gerrmnj. Speer took steps in this direction by establishing the so-; called. "blocked industries" in the. occupied territories vjhich were used; tc produce goods to be shipped to Geraiany^ Employees of these industries; T^erc iTiimuiie from deportation to Germany as slave labourers and any; Y;orkor v;ho had been ordered to go to Gerinany could avoid deportation if; ho went to work for a blocked industry• This system, although some"what; less inhuman。 than deportation to Germany, -was still illegal. The system; of blockc-d industries played only a s m l l part in the overall slave; labour progr :nmic knowing the way in ivhich it vms actually being; administcroci. In official sonsc., he vれ!,s its principal beneficiary; and he constantly urged its oxt^nsion,; Spccr was 飞Iso dircctly involved in the utilization of forced; labour as Chief of tho Organisation Todt. The Crg::inization Todt; functioned principally in tho occupied areas on such projects as the; Atlantic Wall and thじ construction of military highv^aj^s; 9;  and Speer has; adm j . t t od t h a t ho r e l i e d o n c o m p u l s o r y s e r v i c e t c k e e p i t a d e q u a t e l y; staffed• He also used concentration camp labour in the industries under; his control. Ho originally arr:-nged to tap this source cf labour for; use in small out of the iway factories; and later, fearful of Himmler's; jurisdictional ambitions, attempted to use as few concentration cimp; •workers as possible,; Spoer TOS also involved in the use of prisoners of v\iar in armament; industries but contonts that he- only utilized Soviet prisoners of ivar in; industries covcred by the Geneva Convention,; Speer; T; s position Kas such that he vjas not directly concerned 训ith; the cruelty in the administration of the slave labor program,; although ho was awaro cf its existence. For example, at meetings of; the C e n t r a l ? 1 inning Board he was j.nformed that his demands for labor; wore sc large as to necessitate violent methods in recruitings At a; meeting of the Gent m l Planning Board on October 3C> 1 % 2 , Speer voiced; his opinion that irr.ny slave laborers v;ho claimod to be sick were •; malingerers and stated: "There is nothing to be said against SS and; Police taking drastic steps and putting those known as slackers into; concentration camps. “ Speor^ however, insisted that the slave; laborers be givしn adequate food and working conditions so that they; could work efficiently•; In mitigation it must bし rccognizcd that Speer; !; s establishment; of blocked industries did k^ep iaany laborers in their honsjs and that; in thし closing stages of the m r he was one of tho few men "whe had the; courage to toll Hitler that the wnr was lost and to take steps to; prevent tho senseless destruction of production facilities, both in; occupiod territories and in G•しrmany. He carried out hi3 opposition; to Hitler's scorchcd earth program in some of tho Western countries; and in Germany by deliveratoly sabotaging it こt considerable personal; risk*; Conclusion; The Tribunal finds that Speer is not guilty on Counts Crie and Two,; but ia guilty under Counts Threじ、:ind Four,; M . e.G V A B R E S :; V O H Nニ:TJRニTH; V o n Ncn.rr.th I n "ictocl u n :/.or ご 1 1 レ . . u r G o u n t c . H e; irj " p r o f e s s i o n a l ''"i. p i rir. t "vho s c r v ご - c a ^MTJO scr.ror; t o B r i t a i n f r o n 1 9 3 0 t o 1 9 3 2 . 0; n;  J u n o 2 , 1 9 3 2 ,; h e w a s a p p o i n t o d Minicセ、:r of P o r o i r n Affr.irc i n t h o v o n; P r p j n c r b i i i ; t , n p o s i t i o n vrliich lie half, u n i c r tlio c r b i n o t c; of v o n S c h l n i c h c r e n d iiltlor. V o n N c u r n t h rcsi.cnc-l rz; M i n i s t e r of F o r e i g n Afj'r.iro on P o b r u r r y も,1938,ごn."; 1; .マrs; "laclc P i c h I.Iiniatc r -.Ti tiiovit P o r t f o l i o , P r o c i c o n t o r t h o; S o c r o t C c b l n o t C o u n c i l r.nニ a n c; r; i b c r of t h e P o i c h D e f e n c e; C-.v,ncil. On llarch 1 3 , 1 9 3 9 , lie appoint..vf. - o i c h P r o -; tcctoj? f o r '3oI"ic; v; iin r-.tiO.. , r.rr,. 3crvocl i n t h i c c r p r c i t y; u n t i l S c p t c n b c r 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 . H o hcl". t h e f o r n r l l-rnk of; O b o r c r u p p c n f - u c h r c r i n t h o S S .; Cri: i c c。ニ c i n s t P e r co; A s n i ' n i s t o r of F o r e i g n ニ f f r i r s , v o n N c u r c t h n v 丄 c!.. ci; liitlcr i n c o n n e c t i o n r i t h t h て了:!セ]-:iご:r.。\マ;:1 f r o n tlic. D i c -; rr:.ia;:v n t C o n f o r o n c c ?i'k"; 1;  t h e L e a g u e of N r t i o n s on Oct..)レ:.r 1 4 ,; 1 9 3 3; t h e i n s t i t u t i o n of rcrr-in-icnt; t h e pnesr.とてし on; Ilrrc'a 1 9 3 5 , o f t h e f o r u.nlv r s r 1: i i l i t o r y s o r v i c c ;; m d tho pcstjr.sc r-n Ivlny 2 1 , 1 9 3 5 , of tho see r e t Hoich Defense; Lr.v:. H e ^ c a a k e y f i ^ r c i n the. n o g >tlc.tion o f t h e; H e val;.ccorc; 1;  c n t c r c C i i n t o botvroon G;.、mnny 「 n d U n g l a n ^ on; V o n N c u r c th.; J u n 3 1 3 , 1 9 3 5 . / p l n y c d .?n i n p o r t m t p a r t iti S . t l ' s; c c c i a i o n セ o r o o c c u p y 11;-: rihinolancl on r c h 7 , 1 9 3 5 ,; -n-:. p r c d i c t c d tlict t h e o c c u p a t i o n cnal'". b o c a r r i c t l t^.rcugl:; て i t h c a i t c.nj roprisrJ.a f r ;.i t h e Frcnc:^. On 1 ? , 1 9 3 6 ,; ho t^lcl t h e " n c r i c c . n “nb。ssr....; -; '.c)r t o F r m c c thr.セ i t -tcs tlio; p o l c i y of t h e G e m ( J o v c r n n o n t t o ::1o noth5.ns i n x o r c i g n; affr.irs u n t i l;  ; i; t h o R h i n o l m ^ h a d boor) u i ^ c s t o d " , ancT; t h a t r e a o o n; a s t h o f o r t i f i c r 1 5 . o n e in the. P.hinolrn., h e d b、:.cn c o n s t r u c t c c l; V o n N c n r r t h t o o k; N o v o r i b c r 5 , 1 9 3 7 . H e; ご n , t h e c o u n t r i e s r>± c o n t r r l E u r o p e r o n l i z o c l thr.七 F r a n c o; coulこ n o t e n t e r Cr-. m a n y '七 v . l 1 1 , t h o s > c c a n t r i o n 一,ill; "bニCi:つ t o f vcrj C d i f i T o n t l y .'""b.'nt t h e i r f ̂ r c i ^ n p o l i c i o a; r ~ nこ n c "; c o n s t c l l r . t i o n i:ill."cvolop; #;  11; r: r t i n t h e K o s z ' o a c h c r n f o r o n c c of; , hc:s t r s t i f l e d t h a t hニ vro.s s o !Jh^ckcd; "oj E i t l e r statc-;icnts セ1飞こ he; r;  a h e a r t r.t t r e k . S h o r t l y; t h c r - ^ f t o r , h e O A f c r c n t o r e s i g n , nnこ L i s rcsiGrir ti.ブ.i vr o; r c c c p t o o . on Fc'orvrry 1938, r t t h o amz t i n e thr.t v o n; ^ r i t o c h ハn(; n; . v o n Blo^roorg マcro -?. UJ .1.1 U、J し'..• i c t ';/il t h k n; 1 ; c 1 ( t c H i t l o i ^ s ニ : : t c c j g x v o pirnじ h,: rctaincid - fいrncl; r c l r t i o n a ' d - p Titli tla^ K a z i rcri: :c a a;  T; 'cichc L'Inis t c r rn t h -; Mit P o r t f o l i o , P r e s i d e n t of th. S c c r c t C - b i n t C n u n o i l; r ncl r. of t h e ''cichs D c f o n s c C o u n c i l . た : , t o o k c ^ c r ^ c; of tlic ? o r c i g n O f f i c e r.t tL.- t又:-:.c of t h e o c c u p a t i o n nf; Aiistrie., naauroc". t h o Di i t i s h A n b c s s ^ ^ o r t h r t th±c bsC. n o t; b e e n e c u s zC. b y c G c r n r n u l t i ~ i r t i r . i , m f ' i n . f o r n o d t h e; C z c h o s 1 ovrkir.n Ilinirter t):nt G-crrr.ny intcr»"2c-il t o rbi'"o; l、y i t s a r b i t r a t i o n c .invention ".rith C7ochmn 1 ovn Id.r. V:、n; ^ o u r r t h pr rticipr.tc.,. i n t h e l'、ct plirao of t h e n c ^ o t i r t i o n s; p r c o c h i n 2 t h e Ihvnich F n c t oiit c o n t e n d s t h n t h e i-.nt;..rcc,.; t h G n o a u c u a s i o r i c o n l y to r.r^" h i t l o r t o n c k c ; v c r y; c f f ii't t:"> s e t t l e t h e i a s u o s "by p c c . c o f u l ' - o c n a .; Cririinc-.l.'ctivitlos i n C z c c - u s l o v r J c x r; V o n F o u r r . t h マr.s P:icl,s P r o t o c t o r f o r E n h c r i r; "ncl M o r a vie on H r r c h 1 3 , 1 9 3 9 . 3 o h c r d n m c; 1;  HDIT vir '.-cr; occrapicd b y n i l i t r r y fore::. Hrchc. 's c o n o c - n t , obtninc-'* a; i t \:rS "ay d u r c . r s , cr-nnot b.、c nciclcro^. c g juatiifyin:; t h e; o c c u p r t i o n . E i t l c r ' s d o c r c c of J ^ r c h 1 5 , 1 9 3 9 , o a t r b l i c b —; in.し’ th-: ^rotoctoi-c-tc, a t r.t ブ t h ^ t t h i s nc\7 t e r r i t o r y :h->v.l::; ' b e l o n g h e n e ^ f c r t h t o the tc--rit o r y o f t h e G-ornen Rcicli; : l; ,; K c p u b l i c of C z c c h o s l o v k i o n o I o n "'cr ニ〔,-• '"ut i t r l s o; ".r^nt on セ].:i.j t h e o r y the t Bohor^lr c. n ‘' M rrc.vir. r e t nine:, thr i r; s o v e r e i g n t y j o c t o n l y t:J t h e i n t o r r . d s of G-cr?:irhy ac; o x p r c c s o d "by t h e P r o t o c t o r r . t o . T h e r e f o r e o v e n i f t h e :.V、c一; t r i n e of subjtisation c h o u l l b e cj'nslC.orr^l t o b e a p p l i c . ^ o l o; tc tcr.vitor7 o c c u p i c d n g 3 r c o s i v c : c t i o n , t h e Trilj^nnl; '".occ n o t b e l i e v o thr.t t h i s Pt っ c l r n r t i . ' ) n a n o u n t c d t o r.n; i n c o r p o r r t i o n ^liich c s v X r i c i to b r i n 3 the : " . o c t r i n e; i n t o o f f ,ct; #;  T h e o c c u p a t i o n of B o h c n i a ^ncl llorrvir :‘vu\rj七; t h e r e f o r e b o c o n ^ i i c r . : . m i l i t a r y o c c u p a t i o n c u v c r o ^ b y; t h e r u l e s v;ai\farc. A l t h o u g h C z c c h o s l o v r k i r m n o t ci; p c r t y t o t h e Heこvie C o n - o n t i o n of 1 9 0 7 , the r u l c c of 1'nこ; •Tr.rfrrc : x p r c G G o d i n t h i s C o n v e n t i o n a r 0 c o c l c r r t o r ;: of; cxis七inこ i n t e r n e t j . o n r . l I rマ rjn, ]:; r; .orjco 。rc r . ^ p l i c n b l o .; 厶 s R o l c h s F r o t c c t r , von N c n r ? t h inrjtitutccl m; i s t r a t i o n in '3' •hov.iic, r nclレ..:)rご vip Gi-'illnr 七 0 thrvt in c f f c c t; in Gordon;;. T h e f r ,0 p r o n a , p.ノliticrl p a r t i e s rnr- trcO.c; u n i o n s \マ:1っ.つ r 'y lishoこ• 二 11〔;r ^rliich -Ai^ht :;crマ:..,rs; o p p o s i t i o n '7crc o u t l a w e d . Cz-och0G 1 nvrIcL”n in " u g t r y - r ^; r^orked i n t o t h e c;trticturo of C-on-ian r p r o ^ i i c t i o n , r; e x p l o i t e d f o r t h e G•.ニmen v-or e f f o r t . N r z i rnti-S:/:itic; p o l i c i o s " nO v/orc 0 Intr'-^.uccc. Jcr/a マcrc "orrrod; エ J.' j:..11 c •.,— p o s i t i o n s i n Govorir:ont r n t u s i n c s c .; In :-uguat 1 9 3 9 , v o n I-oiirr.tli i s s u e d c. procl.--i~.tion; v/arnin^ a.^r.Injt o n y n o t e r,f a r b o t o r c : n 1 n t c t i n ? t h广七 " t h o; r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f c r c.ll c.ctc o± sr.bot:-、3c; in r.ttri'j'at d; no七 o n l y to irn’.ivi,,uc、l p c r p c t i v . t o r s tait t., t h o e n t i r e; C-Tcch p o p u l a t i o n .; r; ' n . 2 3 n t h e \icr o r o k c o u t on S c p t c - ^ c r 1 ,; 1 9 3 9, 3 , 0 0 0 p r o n i n c n t G^cclia -;cro n r r c s t c; r;  b y t h : S c u r i t j; P o U . c c i n Bohcrir, mc:. M:-rrvir rn',. p u t i n t o p r o t c c t i v c; c u s t o d y . Mr.my of .'chis ^ r o u p 广i..ブ 1 i n c o n c c n t r r t i o n ccirpc; "a c. r e s u l t of -liiitrcrtMcnt.; X'N Oc T rihr r- nr; 7;  !̂ハび广,-,ト产竹 T C=IQ r ,…I -レ-J-- -> •; r.; T; crc cloacr.y 1 9 0 0 ntw":nt i”pric :.'n。こ,"nこ t h - u i n ”1“‘C.crc:; of the;  n; ."nr:nGtrr.tiori o h o t L y 3 c c u r i t y P o l i c y m T S D . V i n; Ucurr . th t ' s t i f I . - c 1 . t h r t he -vtg not 5.nf r:;へ;C t h i r ;广 c t i o n; i n o.C.\; r; r n c c , o u t i t v.t.2 -"nmine.、こ b y p r っ c l " : • … n - / c r 1'ic;; jri . ;nrt i i rr p o c t c c l ) n p l r OC.TC.D t ^ r /a ::\ONT t h o ょ r o t : . c い r r . t . - ,; • " M c h lac cl.-v、1.3, h - T ^ c v e r , ャa こ..nこ"ithoi^t l?d;j 「uthnri七:_「。; On 1131.1.01 3 1 , 1 9 4 0 , von ^ T u r - t h trrnsnittncl七..’1;广-卞-ダrc;; r. •r^n^vri - h i c l i he h-.r"1 prcp^.r-cd こ : : r . l i r r . " : i t h t h f t i t u r c; of t h e P r o t c c t n r r t c , m ^ r. no:v)rnn'"''TJ!; -; '". ”ith hiti "ppr^v".1; proprrcc". b y C r r l He rnr n ?r.ハ ftk nn t h e aulj je c t . B t h; d e a l t — i t h thr: q u e s t i o n of 'vc r'T.nizr.ti on -rrl propncirc"".; t'a."t 七he rr.jori七;7 of セhふ:.CZ' c.ha 二:iごlit Toe r.fJci-'-il'"toe; 1; ,; r n c i r l l y i n t o セh o Q-c.rnr.n rrti-.>n« つ:)七li r.^.vocat C. t]�y; c l i r ^ I n r t i o n of t h e C z c c h 0 1 o v r ] c i r i i n t l l i ^ c n t c i a ^.nd; o t h e r ^ r o u p a;  T; :; r; hich ni,ニ].it r c n i n t G c r r r n i z r t i o m , von; N o t i r a t l i ' s by e x p u l s i o n , F r a n k ' s by e x p u l s i o n o r ' ' 'cpccn. '1; t r c r . t : a c n t .; Von Hcurr. th hra r.r^ucd thr.t t h e r c t u r . l o K f o r c c n c n t r f; t h e r e p r e s s i v e nor .auros rrnc c n r r 1 oC. o u t b y t h e S c ; c n r i t y; P o l i c o r.ncl SD -rho x-cro vind( r 七 l ie c o n t r o l o f h i a S t r t o; S.-crotnr- ,- , C- r l H c m ° n Frrn1.--, v.̂ .10 .."".a rppointc':"1 n t t h e; っ ご ‘ . ) s t i o n of Hi-: -.Icr r.tr,'vlio, ns r. Hiごher SS r.nn Polr .cc; L c r •'",or, rep:-rtcO. C i r o c t l y 10 Hi1 T i l e r . V-n Hcurr. t h f u r t h zr; TQv,:,a thr . t r n t i - S c M . i t i c n^-rsurcc nncl t h o s e r c s - a l t i n j i n; . c r n o r i i c e x p l o i t a t i o n v;cro p u t i n t o o f f c c t i n t h e P r o t c . c -; t o r r . t o a3 t h o r e s u l t :� f ' p o l i c l o a :".ociclc(f. upon i n t h o r c i c h ,; Ho-.'^ovar t h i s riry b e , h e a c r v c d r,s the c h i -f ^crr;an jfficir.l; in tlic P r o t o c t o r r . t o w h e n the rclniniatrr.tion of t h i s t e r r i -; t o r y p l r y c d a n ir:portr.rit r'-lo in t h o r;rrs of r.g-rosaion -Thich; G o m r n y wrs t/r.^inr: i n tl io Z e s t , kno"'iri3 thr . t .^r Cri:- s; 「fid G r l n c s o G n i n s t ilunnnitiy ..,crc b c i n ^ corr-ltt;...a unxlcr h i s; r u t h o r i t y; v o n I'Icurr. t h; In ritijr.tion i t n u a t b o rc?-:o"iborccl thr.t / こ i n t e r; v e n e \7ith t h e S o c u r i t y P o l i c y rn"; 1; . S D f o r t h e r c l c r s c of; rr.ny of tho G z c c h o c l o v n k s '."ha w e r e arrostocl on S c p t c n b c r 1; 1 9 3 9 , r.nu f o r t h e rclcr.ac of stu'lonts p.rrcctcl I n t e r in ,; t h o fp.ll. On S c p t o n b c r 2 3 , 1 H 4 I , he wr.a sirnono.1 b e f o r e; H i t l e r f'.nこ t o l d thr.t h o wp.a b o i n G n o t hr.rsh e n o u g h m d; that HcycTrich x'rs b o i n ^ s e n t to t h o P r o t o c t o r r t c t o conbr.t; t h o Czochoolcvrlcir.n roaiatr.nco g r o u p s . V o n i'Tcurrth ‘; tait in vp.in,; n t t e n p t e d t o H i t l e r fr')r.i s o n l i n e Hoyc'.rich/ r n d; wlicn h o r;p.s n o t succcaafiil off o r e c; 1;  t o r e s i g n . '; r; Lon h i s; resignご.tion w a s n o t ncccptc:; 1; . h e w e n t on Icr.vo, on; S c p t c n b c r 2 7 , 1 9 4 1 , m d r e f u s e d t o r e t r s P r o t o c t o r n f t o r; t h r t ^.r.tc, E i 3 resign."; - u c u s t 1 9 4 3 .; T h e T r i b u n r l f i n d s; t i o n vvre f.:)r,••;ally n c c c p t o d i n; C o n c l u s i o n; •fclir七 Hcurr'.th ia ^ u i l t j u n d e r; r.ll f o u r c m n t c; P R I T Z S C H E; F r i t z s c h c is in; ; 1; -ictod on C o u n t s O n e , T h r e e rriC. P o u r . H e; x;rs b e s t knot/n r.s r. rr.c'.io c o m c n t r ,セ o r,こ i s c u s s i nじ o n c o r. \7cok; t h e e v e n t s of t h e c!.ny on h i s cr:m p r o r j r r n , "E-.n Fritzsclio; Spcc\ks." H e bc^p.n brr.odcr.ctiriG in S o p t crib o r 1 9 3 2 ; i n tlio; sp.no y c r r h o m n r d o t h e hor.cl of セlao '"irolcss N o w s S o r v i c c ,; r. P c i c h G o v c r n n c n t A g c n c y . F h o m on i'hy 1 , 1 9 3 3 , 七 h i s . " ご c n c y; r;r.s incorporr.tocl b y t h o t i o n - 1 S o c i a l i s t s i n t o t h o i r Fcicli; M i n i s t r y of P o p u l a r - ^ n l i - h t e n n e n t ’n; r; l Propr.^r.n'V., F r i t z s c h c; b c c r n c r. n e n b e r of t h e Kr.zi Pマrty v:cnt t o thr.t M i n i s t r y ,; In D c c crib c r 1 9 3 8 h e b o c r n o her,,, of t h e H o n e P r e s s D i v i s i o n; of t h e H i n i s t r y j i n O c t o b c r 1 9 4 2 h e -;:rs p r o n o t oこ t o t h e r ^ n k; of M i n i s t e r i a l D i r e c t o r A f t e r s o r v i n g b r i e f l y on the- E n s t e r n; F r o n t i n r. propr.c广ncl。. c o m p a n y , h o vir.s, i n N-^vonbcr 1 9 4 2 , r r d c; h e a d of the P.°clio D i v i a o n of t h e Propr.gr.nclr. M i n i s t r y ^rrl; P l o n i p o t o n t i r ' r y f o r t h e P o l i t i c a l Oiyjワni3; 0; セion of t h e G r e a t e r; G c r n n n R r d i o , '; C r i n c s r.^p.irmt Pcr.co; A s her.c; 1; .of t h e Iiono P r o s 3 D i v i s i o n , F r i t z s c h c s u p e r v i o o d; t h e C-crnp.n p r e s s of 2 , 3 0 0 cV.ily ncv/spr.porc. In p u r c i i m c c of; t h i s f r a c t i o n h e h e l d d a l l y p r e s s c o n f o r c n c c s t D d e l i v e r セ h e; c'lrcctivcs of t h o P r n p n p r r l n M i n i s t r y t o t h o s e p a p e r s . H e; s , h o r / c v c r , s u b o r d i n ^ t o t o D i c t r i c l i , t h o R c i c h P r e s s C h i e f ,; フ h o T^S in t u r n 广 sviborAin广to of GOOTDTOCIS. It; vw.s D i c t r i c h; • h o rcccivocT t h e d i r c c t i v c c t o t h e p r e s s of G c o b b c l c r n d; o t h e r R c i c h M i n i s t e r s , m C . p r opr. r e d t h e n r>s i n s t r u c t ! o n e ,; w h i c h h e t h e n h m c l oこ t o F r i t s a c h c f o r t h e p r e s s .; P r o n tinr t o t i n e , t hし " D r . i l y P r r o l ' s of tlic P c i c h; P r o a s C h i e f " , r.s t h o s e i n s t r u c t i o n s v;cro lr.bclocl,' (T.ircctcd; t h o p r e s s t o p r e s e n t t o; tho por plo cort^in thcncs, such , s the Ic.r p^'-j/ncipl-',; t h o Jcv;ish problc:.,, t h e pi-'/ol livirr: s p r e e , :.r .^th'.r; at^nC-o.rd Nr.zi i^.crs, “ vi : r.ius pr^pr.-rn.lr enpri .^n a; cr r-rî rl out be Tore '•‘ ch n". jor 广:ct :£ ひ,ニ::rossioru ^ >dlo; Pritzsclio j^R^C^ tho IIOMG Pr^sn D iv is ion , ' i n s t r " . c t o ' 1; th : • p r c s t }.ioT- t h e - c t i cna cr vir.rc, r.-^r i n s t Bc-hG-iir. "n ."; xhrr v i , 3?cl"n,’-, Y-u^oslcvir,,nご tho So"/ict Union sン onl',; b c ''i.-̂ lt r;itli. P r i t z s c h o hrこ n o c o n t r o l f t h o f o m r . l r t i )n; っ f t h o s e propr. p 'l.lclos. H e -rr s riorc ly r. con..vd セ to; tlic. prr-aa .f the i n sセ m e t 3 . o n s h^nclotl liin by D i e t r i c h . In; Fobr; ,; a" 1 9 3 9 '.n'1 b e f or.. th.c - ocsnrption つf "3obx"dr..广n.."; 1; :lor^ ,; f o r i n s tr n c c , h e rcc、.ivr, Doitricli'a or'" :..r t o ! o r i n " t ハ t h e; attention .)f the prens SI v̂1-::.::'s r,f.f'『rts for 5.n ',.o;o .n'"1. "ncc,; rrt'". the m t i - G w r r r . n i c p o l i c i o s rtr"; 1; . p o l i t i c s of t h e orristin^; Prncv.c G ' •vcrmcnt. This or ".or to Di:. trich ori ;in~ tr.: in the; Poroi^n Offlcc .; T h - S i v i s i o n, 、.-•丄J J. J.JL. Oil H t s s c h : boc.-riG t h e; h 3.n IT;-vor.ibbr 1942 , •;- c ono of セli、ン t1了..:.Ivc :i、.,isiハnc; of t h o Propa^rri'ln llinlntr^; 7 -; . Im tli:. " D ^ i t r i c h; 1; '?thev h/j?こfl >± "ivisf.on.iし::二or七し.•"‘ influ-..ncc ovoi" t h o; p-'15.cios t o b e f,つ:Ll:.:.rリこr.i'o. T-cT.r'ls tho ca:". .f tlic; Iio'vovcoj ^ r i t z a c h c bcc'--,. t h ^ a lo ^v/chorit'j セ h i n; th‘ H^nir ; t r y f o r rマ,iつ广c.fciマi七i.ニコ•In tiiis cnppcD.t;-、こ; f へn ” iasiic " • "^ilj rr ".io " ; r r j1';S" t :>'; Poich Proprこ“nこp. Officer」, r.ccor'n.i>n;-; to tho .:.:. vct-1; p lit5.cr.l polioios oT tlic IT.- r sitb j^.ct t:j t]io; rircctivos of the rn^io-P'rlitic.-l Division of tho F^T -t::̂; Orfic:-., r.nlセ:he p. nnpcrvlsi n of Ooc"i)bcls.; T r i t z a c h c , r*ith o t h e r .'.:.Tici。ls ?f t h o Propr.^-n-'c.; Ilinistry,巧。s pros.:.nセ。七 Coo^l^cls ' "r.ily c t " f f c- n f o r ^ n o c s .; .rc; t h o y v w r c inc七rac七し•こ I n tlio nc^Ta …n'’. propngrn^.a; policies of til。 Jlr;y. .".ftcr 1943 "•'ritzcclic; hii'isclf occasionally hcl'ニ the so confcrcricos, but only ^vhen; B o o b b o l a r.ncl h i s Str.tc Sccrotr . r ics v;orc r b s c n t . ニ n ^ o v e n; tlion hi a only function xrr.a to ti-nnsrilt the Bocbbols' uiroc-; tivos relayed to hin by tclcphon-•; This is the siii.rir.ry of Pritzachc 's positions r^nd; inflticncc in the Third Rcich. Never '"id lie nchicvo ouf -; f ic icnt strturc to r.ttoriel the planning confcrcnccs v:hich; loci t o a ^ g r c G s i v c nr.r; inclccnecつr'."iiriG t o h i s unc'.、n_; trr. dieted tcstinony he never even hrd r. con vers" tion —'ith; Hiセlcr. Nor is thsre any ohovdns tlmt ho v;ns inf omccl of; tlio clc-cisions tnlcon nt those confcrcricos. Iiic 广 c 七 i v i t i o s; c a n n o t b o sr.ic! t o b e t h o s e trhich fr 1 1 w i t h i n t h o rlofin5.tiuri; of the c。nn.)n plr.n to wr\jG 。こ•ごrossivc wr.1-。s n 1 reC.y set; forth in this Jud^ncnt.; Wr.r Crincs ancl Crincs a.^ninst Hu"ir. ni t-^; T h e p r o s o c u t i o n hr.s asoortocl t'hnt .'.; ,1; ritzschc incitocl; "nc". oncr.v.rn^cC the cn-^-iisaion of vrc.v crinoc, by ("".clibciTtcl^*; f ^ l s i f y i n s nov/s to r.rouse i n tho Gcrnr.n p e o p l e those p广f:sions; r/hich l e d tlion to tlic o a m i s s i on of a t r o c i t l c s un-.or G -v,tf' s; Throe anc1- Four. Els position Pnc'. o f f ic ial "utios v:crc not; suf f ic iently inportr.nt, hovovcr, t '、infer th"t he to^k pr.rt; In ori{vinntin^ or f'jrnulごtinこ proprマ".nこn ernprijne .; E.':corpts in cvidoncc f r o n )iis s p ^ c c h c s sho\7 d e f i n i t e; r n t i - S m i t i s n on h i s pr.rt, lie b r o n z e .; 0; ^ t , f o r cxrriplo, thr.t; 七 h o xir.r hru"! b e on c r u s c d b y Joi7s r.nd snic". t h e i r f r t c lir.cl; "tvirncu nut unplcnsmt rs tho Puchi-cr precUct:.':.,i!; the so spcochcs "iC. not ur^c poraccution :)r cxtorviin.0 of; Jews. There is no ovic'.onco thrt he rr.s ".t7r.r0 of th.:ir; c x t c r r ^ i n a t l o n i n t h o Er.st. T h o c^/i.-'oncc n n r o o v o r shoi^n thr.t; he t v d c c rttonptc;/. to hr.vo p u b l i c a t i o n of t h o p n t i - S o ? i i t ! c; “Dcr Stuiricr" supprcsccc:, tliou;ii tmauccosaful'ly.; In t h e s e bror.cTccsta P r i t z a c h c s;、n;:tines s p r e a d fr.lsc; nov/E, "but i t v;rs n o t p r o v o d h e kner/ i t t o b e f--lac, P; 1; に、r; cxr.nplc, he r o p o r t c C . thr.t no Gcrnrn U-P,.!ハ.t -jr.a in the vilcinity; of t h o " A t h o n i r . "フ h e n i t w r s s u n k . H i i s info^'irtioln vrr.s; u n t r u e ; b u t P r i t z s c h c , h-vinri rccciveel i t 'from t h e Gcrnr.n; N"v;-, lar.r'; 1; . n o r e a s o n t o b c l i o v o it YJC.s u n t r u e •; It r.ppori; 1; ;: thr.t P r i t z s c h c G o n c t i n o s nnclc s t r o n g str.tc-; n c n t s of r propc^nritlistic nr.tlire i n h i s brop.dcr.sts. 3 u t t h o; Tribtulr.l is n o t prcpr.rocl t o hole!, t h r t t h e y マ c r c intcnrlc:' t o; i n c i t c t h e S o m r . n p e o p l e t o c〜'init a t r a c i t i o n on coriqucrocl; p e o p l e s , m O h o c - n n o t b e heir", t o lievo bocri r. p°rt:".cipnrit in; t h e ! c a chr. rgccl. H i s <; n; in てfr u m t h c r t o p. r o u s e t>npul「r; sontincrit in c u p p o r t of H i t l e r n m : t h o G-cr-mn •:“-.r e f f o r t .; C;.nclu3iori; T h e Tr5.bunr 1 fin^.a thr.t P r i t s s c h o is n o t - u l l t y unこcr; t h i s in>-"ictr.iGnt, m c .lirccts t h - t h e siirll "be ^.ischrr^cC b y; t h e I'hrshclフ; 1;  cn t h e Tribi.mr 1 p r e s e n t l y r.c'j nurris.; BORI-'L'-IIN; B'-rnrnn is irTictod on C:•;nnts One, lliroc, -ncl P^ur .; EG joined tho Hrtionr.l Socialist P-rty In 1925,v;a£3 r.; n o n b e r of t h o S t n f f of t h e Suprc/.ic Co?—r.r;I of t h o Sニ; fron 1 9 2 8 to 1930 , xics in cliarQG of the ニid Pun^- of tho; Pf.rty, r.nd vrrs Roichalxitcr fron 1933 to 1945 . Pron 1S33; t o 1 9 4 1 lie \irs C h i e f of S t a f f i n fclic O f f i c o of t h e F u e h r e r ' s; Dopnty -nu, rf tcr the fli:.:ht Hoss to I'D^lrn^-, beer no; Her" of セ ho Pprt^r Ch-n col lory on 12 Hry 1941 . On 12 ム pi'il; 1 9 4 3 h o b o e r n e S o c p c t r v j t o t h e F u e h r e r . H e r:r. s p ' l i t i c r l; 厂n; r; , or3rnizr\ticinr.llioor; 1; , of t h e V o l k s s t u r n m c . r. Gcncr'nl i n; the SS .; Crincs r.-rinst Pco.cc; ' but then; B o r r m n , in the 'bc^innin:.; r. ninつr Nr.zi,/stc^rli 17/ rr>sc to; r. p o s i t i o n of pov;cr r nご - , p a r t i c i ^ l r r l y I n t h e clc.sinこ’ilr^rs,; of ^rort influcncc へ v c r H i t ler . IIo s r c t i v g i n tho Part--'s; riso to p->v;cr r.nO. oven n o r c s c In t h e c o l i ' n t i n of t h r t; penマcr. Ho ', .o v o t oこ rmch of his t5.no to the pars ..cution of; tho churchos R.NCL of T H E J CITS V ; itMn Gc-RN.r.nĵ; T h e ovir.Gnco c".ocs nr>t s h o t h r . t 3 m r n n k n e w ->f; ri3.tlor 's plr.ns to p r o p r r c , I n i t i r t c or _:,r.こ0 ^^rossivo マ r . r s «; Ho rtton^ccT none of the 5.nport?.nt confcronccs -.7h.cn Hitler; rcvo^loc"1. pic co by piccc 七lioso plnns f or nこ-/」res si つ n , I T or; c r n hnov.-lod^G b o c n c l u s i v o l y inforrot; 1; . f r o n t h o p.'sitx^tts; ho hcl,: , It '^nly i?hcn lio bccanc Hccr of tlio iVrty; C h r . n c c l l G r y in 19^-1, riT" I n t e r i n 194-3 sc-crctr.ry t o t h o; P u u h r c r t/hon he r.ttcn'lcd -\r.nj of H i t l e r; f; 3 c n f o r c n c c s ,; t h o t h i s p o s i t i o n s こつ v c liirt tlic n o c o s s r r y n c c c s s . ITn.'."̂—..r; tb.c vicv; stntcぐ elseフhere which t h e T r i b u n r l Iips t.^kon of; t h e c^nspirr.cy t o vj^r^c ひ ニ ^ r o s s i マ o r ,セ h e r e i s n o t sufj?ic5_Gnt; cvi^onco to bring; Bornr.nn vjithin the scopc of Count One.; War Crimes and Crimes against Huimnit^; B7 doc roe of 29 May 1941, Bormann took over the offices and powers; the; held by Hess; by/decrce of 24 J^nairy 1942 these powers were extended to; give hin control ever all laws and directives issued by Hitler. He was; thus responsible for laws and orders issued thereafter. On 1 Decomber 1942,; all Gcius bccanuG R^ich Defense districts, and the Party Gauleiters respons-; ible to Bormann wore appointed Reich DefVnse Commissioners• In effect,; this made them tho administrators of the entire civilian war effort. This; was so not only in Gorrmny, but also in these territories which were in-; corporated into the Reich from thu absorbed and conquered territories.; Through this mechanism Bormann controlled the ruthless exploitations; of the subjected, populace. His order of 12 August 1%2 placed all party; agencies at the disposal of Himmler; f; s program for forced resettlement nnd; d^nationalization of persons in the occupied countries• Three weeks after; the invasion of R u s s i a he attended the conference of 16 July 1 % 1 at; Hitler's field quarters with Goering, Rosenberg and Keitel; Bcrmnnn's; report shexws that there vjere discussed and developed detailed plans of; enslavement and annihilation of tho population of these territories. And; on 8 May 1942 he conferred with Hitler nnd Rosenberg on the forced resettle-; ment of Dutch personnel in I/vbviハ,the extermination program in Russia, and; the economic exploitation of the Er.stern Territories. He V J Z S interested in; the confiscation of art and other properties in the East. His letter of; U January 1944 c;illod for the creation of a large-scale organiration to; withdrOT commodities from the occupied territories for the bombed-out; C-ornon p o p u l a c c ,; Bnirrnn で c ス n c t i v c in tho pcT£K:.c’-rfci、ri of the; J O W E , not only in C-cr-inny but rls J in the -BSORBOCL MI 1 , c^n-; qucrccl. countries. lie took p.°rt in セ ^ . i s c u a s l o n s r'hich led; t o t h e r o n o v r l of 6 0 , 000 Jotts fr )n V i o n n r t o Fol。.n(:: in co o p e r -; a t i o n rrith t h e S S " n C t h e Gostr.po., H o siこ;nod t h e C.ccroc of; 3 1 LIry 194-1 cxtcri'Tins 七 h e ITurnbcrs Lrvrs to tlic °.nnc^cd E r n t ..rn; T e r r i t o r i e s。 In cm o r d e r of 9 O c t o b o r 1 9 4 2 h o cloclrrcl t h a t; t h e pcrnmont olininr.tion of J e n s i n G r e a t e r G e r m n n .territory; cハulこ n o l n c - r *oo s ilv^c; 1; .b" t i o n , b u t o n l y ^ y 广 . p p l y i n . 3; "ruthless forco" in the spccir.l c'�?-.ips in the Erst . On 1 July; 1943 he sicneこ r.n nrrinrncc r;ith'n.rrvdnc Jews fr the pp: taction; .of t h o l r w c o u r t s rn,. pi广cin.:: t h e n nnニor t h e o c c l u s i v e jurici-; '"•.icti on of Hirtnlcr Gostr.po.; Bomnnn v:ns pron::.nont in the sl^vc Irbor pro^rrn. Tho; P r r t y Lcr.clcrs supoi'vised s lr vc 1 - b o r ? n r t t c r s i n t h o r o s p c c t i vc; G-rtis, including criployncnt, crin'Titiorm of vrorh-, f GO'Tin • nncl; housing. his circulrr of 5 1043 to the Lcnc.1crn]~ip; Corps, r"istribute 1 c'.orrn to the lovel of Orts^r-appcnl-itcrc,; ho issued • ? I r c c t i o n s 1*し jul。セ:InG the trc tnent of i : - r c i ^ n; workers, pointing out they TtCPC subjcct to 3G control on; 3 c curi t;- pr .Colons, rn-" or こ crcc’ the pre vi ^ua ^istrcr.t-'-jont to; ccrso. ニ report of 4 Sept"-nber 1942 rein七inニ to tho transfer; of 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 f e r u l a clones t i c T/rrkcrs fr. r: t h e t o Gorrr n y; shor/crl thot control v:r.s t o be o;ccrcIsc:. b y S-uckol, Hinrilcr; rnこ Bnrnr.nn. Sruckol by こ c c r o c of S Soptoribcr '".Iroctocl the; Itrcislcitcrs to super visa the '".Intributi -n rrK’. rns5.^nncnt; of t h e s e fonr.l0 lrb:ircr3.; B o r n n n n;  n; I s 0 i- sua': n s e r i e s of o r d e r s t o t h e P r r t y; Lenders clorlin:; rdth tho trortnont f pris ncrs -y± ii-r.; On 5 Hovcnbcr 1941 ho p r o M b i t c c xccnt burials for ^ussirri; prisoners of wnr. On 25 ilovcribcr 1943 ho; dircctcd Go.ulciters to report cases of lenient treatment of prisoners of; n r . And on 13 Scptomber 1S44 ho ordered liaison between the Kreisleiters; with the camp comnpiidご-nts in determining the use to be rmde of prisoners; of war for forced labour. On 29 January 1943 ho transmitted to his; leaders CITJ instructions allowing: the use of firearms, and corporr.1; punishment cn rc calcitrant prisoners of war, contrary to tho Rules of; I^nd T'fcrf^rc, On 3〇 Scptomber 1%ム h^ signed a decree t .kin{; from the; OKW jurisdiction ovor prisoners of vjar and handing them over to Himmlor; and thし SS.; Borimnn is responsible for the lynching of Allied airmen. On 3〇; May 1944 ho prohibited any police cction or criminal proceedings agairs t; persons who had trikoa part in the lynching of Allied Fliers. This "was; accompanied by a Goobbels;  !;  propc.g;mda campaign inciting the German peopt; to take action cf this nature and thし conference of 6 Juno 1%U, where; regulations for the application of lynching "were discussod.; Kis counscl, who has laboured under difficulties,"was unable to; refute this ovidcnco. In tho faco of these documents which bear Borimnn^; signature it is difficult to see how he could do so even were the defend-; ant present. Courtsol has argued that Bormann is dead and that the; Tribunal should not rnr.il itself o£ Article 12 of thし-Charter ivhich; gives it th。 right to tako proceedings in absentia. But the evidence; of dc-ath is not conclusive, and the Tribunal, as previously stated,; dcteriTiincd to try him in absenti.ru If Bormann is not dead and is later; apprehended^ the Control Council for Germany may, under Article 2V cf; the Charter, consider any facts in mitigation, and alter or reduce his; sentence, if deomccl proper.; Conclusion; Th。Triburr.l finds that Bornr-.nn is not guilty on Count Onし,but; is し u i l t y on Counto Thr^u 2nd Four.; TPr FR^IDI^-T: B̂ . forv. pronoj.ncing s^nt^ncu on any of th defend nts; -nrl uhil^ wll of tho .nts zr^ pr^s^nt, thし Tribunal t^k^s the; occ sion to .vJvis^ th.rn th—t -ny .;?plic tions for cloik,ncy of thし Control; Council must b^-lodged フ i t h tho G; c; nしr.1 Secret ry of this Tribun .1 within; four ch.ys from tod; Thぃ Tribun ユ will now adjourn 、nd will sit .in at tしn minutes to; thrじし•; (A .recess v.'.̂s t \kcn until 145C hours.); AFTE^ICCN S ^ S I C N; (The Tribunal r^convしr^d rvt 1450 hours.); THr. r'RESIDENT: In accordance i/vith Article 27 of thし Ch .rt^r, the; Intv.rn'\tion:il Kilitiry Tribunal will nov/ pronounce thレ s^ntunc.s on the; d^f^nd .nts convicted on thi. indictment.; D^f^nd^iit Hしrnrnn Jilholm Go^ring, on th。counts of thし.indictment on; .which you hav^ buon convicted, thしエnt^rrintion .1Iviilit^ry Tribunal sunt^ncしs; you to dcr.th by hanging.; Defend:nt Rudolf Hess, on thレ counts of thし indictment on which you have; bc^n convicted, tho Triburir.1 s^nt,.ncos you to imprisonment for lifvj.; Dしf。nd .nt Jo .chim von Ribbしntrop, on thし counts of the indictment on; which yし u h マ一 be on convicted ̂  th . Tribunr:l s^nt^rico you to dしrth by hangin; r;  .; Dしfしnd°.nt;  rr; ilhしlm K、-it。l, on the counts of th、. indictment on which you hnv; b^on convicted, thし Tribun 1 sontonc^s you to dし:th by h n^ing.; Duf .̂ nd、.n\. Ernst K' ltoribr'innv.r, on th。 counts of thし indictment on ^Jhich; you b^en convictod, th^ Tribun 1 Swrit^ncca you to death by hr.n inr;  #; D^fond-.nt Alfred Rosenborg, on tho counts of thレ indictm、nt on "which you; hn.vc bv.cn convicted, thし Tribunal s^nt^ncvs you to do th by hanging•; D^f ̂ nd :nt H°.ns Fr .nk, on tho counts of th、 indictment on ^vhic; 1; , you. h vし; bv.;̂ n convicted, thレ Trinun'1 suntonc^s you to do th by han, in^.; D^i^nd .nt "/ilh^lm Frick, on thし counts of th^ indictment on;  T; jhich you h^.ve; been convicted, th、ン Tribun-;1 sしrrtしric、メs you to de:.th by h nging; #; D-f^nd .nt Julius oircich^r, on tho count of "thし indictment on v/hich you; been convicted, the Trinunal s^ntunccs you to d»jc.th by h ngin^,; Dofv.nd nt i lthor Funk^ on the counts o.f thし indictment on which you; hnv^ been convictcd, thレ Tribunal you to imprisonment for lifu.; Dof^nd".nt K".rl Do^nitz, on th。 counts oi' thし indictment on which you hr.Vv.; been convictcd, th。 Tribun 1 s^nt^nc^s you to ten yc rs imprisonment,; Defend nt "rich : ^ ^ - d c r , on th。 counts of th。 indictm, nt on v/hich you; hrwし bv^^n convicted, thし Tribunal 3 ntenc^s you to imprisonment for lifo.; D^fv-nd*.nt B ldur ven Schir- ch, on thし counts of the indictm、iit on which; you h°.vc bucri convicted^ thレ Tribun .1 sontcnccs you to tverity yo rs imorison-; m nt; #; h .vc b^cn convict、メd, tho Tribunal s^nt^ncos you to do th by han[in《•; Defendant Alfred Jodl, on tho coants of thu indictment on which you hr.vc; been convictcd; 3;  the Tribunal sentences you to dG':vbh by h .nging.; Defend' nt Arthur .3 し iss-Inquart, on tho counts of th。 indie tmont on "which; you boon convictod, the Tribunal s^ntonccs you to de.\th by hanging.; Dcfしnd'-nt Albert Spuur, on tho counts of the indictment on which you h .ve; convictcj, th、一 Tribunal ntoncc.s you to twenty yc rs; 1;  imprisonment.; Defendant Konst'、.ntin ven N u u n t h , on the counts of thu indictment on; ivhich you hrrvし boon convictod, thし Tribun 1 s。nt.メnĉ s you to fifteen y•し'-.; iraprisenmont •; Th。 Tribun 1 s ..ntonc^s thし D。f、,ndnt iJ'rtin Borrn rin, on ttb co m t s of; the indictment on v^hich ho h's b^on convictod, to de th by h n; in .; エ h'v。 -.n :nnouncumしnt to m n kし , T hし Soviet i:リmb。r of tho IrrUrnニtion'〜1; Vilitr\ry T r i b u m l dしsiivs to record his dissent from thv decisions in th。; c^sv.s of tho D^f-nd :nts 3ch cht, von P p^n, .nd Frit schし•• He is of thし; opinion thr.t thuy should h b しし n convjctca nd not acq i it tod.; Ho .lso disjしrrts from th- decisions in r^sp^ct to th。 Raichs C .binレt, tho; Gon^r 1 St'iff nd High Comin: nd, being of thし opinion thr.t th^y should have b(-un; declared, to bu crimin .1 org nizations•; He 二lso dissents from th.., decision in thレ c.しs。 of th、 s、nt。ncu on tho; Defendant KLss, \nd is of tho opinion thr.t thし sしntしncし should h ivc bじcn; dc^th, not li.fし imprisonment.; Thir, dissenting opinion will bo put into writing .nd annexed to the; judgment '.nd bo published '.s soon possible•; (Th... Tribunal -.djc =rn d.)

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