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Praxis as a sociological concept

University of British Columbia

On the assumption that "praxis" should and could be, but is not yet a meaningful working concept of sociology, the argument is directed to initiating the search for an appropriate meaning of praxis from amongst those meanings existing (implicitly or explicitly) in social/political theories. The question of the meaning(s) of praxis is approached on the basis of the argument that praxis is an all-encompassing concept; i.e., its meaning is inseparable from, and therefore encompassing of, an underlying theoretical structure. The argument implies, therefore, a correct strategy for finding an appropriate praxis for sociology: one which exposes the "constitutive assumptions"—the ontological, epistemological, and axiological components—within which the particular concept is couched. The argument, therefore, challenges the commonly held assumption (in sociology) that praxis is synonymous with Marxist critical/ humanist philosophy. Two normative concepts of praxis-—the alternatives to the scientific Marxist concept which the thesis argues for—are discussed (and "tested" in the substantive context of the social program, newSTART) and are evaluated as being inappropriate concepts to inform a praxis sociology. Arendt's normative concept, however, is deemed adequate as a philosophical concept and does serve as a plausible alternative to praxis as a scientific sociological concept. Habermas's concept of praxis is introduced because it provides a theoretically credible challenge to Arendt's concept and also offers a viable concept for sociology; but because it is (arguably) couched in a "normative theory of efficiency", it is located within a functionalist sociological paradigm, thus undermining the potential of praxis to express its emancipatory content in meaningful social action. The theoretical structure of a Marxist science is taken as the correct starting point for the formation of a praxis sociology because it is the only existing model that can challenge Arendt's philosophical praxis while retaining the potential to express the meaningfulness of praxis. However, because of the determinism inherent in this position, which results in a conflation of teleology with axiology, its potential to express the meaningful content of praxis as human agency is negated. This, however, is only a transient "failure" of Marxist science, and two further theoretical positions are outlined—in the work of Carchedi and Bhaskar—which promise to rectify the shortcomings of the scientific Marxist approach and establish a valid concept of praxis.

Text

2010-10-22

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http://hdl.handle.net/2429/29480

Sociology

University of British Columbia

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