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Abstract

The thesis examines the formation and development of post-World War II international collaboration in the economic regulation of the commercial aspects (i.e., market entry; market shares and prices) of civil aviation. Specifically, it studies the formation and operation of one type of international regime: a cartel. The thesis seeks to answer two questions: why do states cooperate to support an international cartel? And why do states cease to support a cartel? The study proposes three reasons why states will support a cartel: (1) to promote consumer welfare and the growth of the industry; (2) to ensure the development and protection of their national carriers; and (3) in response to hegemonic activity. It then considers why states cease to participate in the cartel arrangements. This occurs: if states no longer believe that the cartel is promoting consumer welfare and industrial growth; if they conclude that their industry no longer benefits from cartel protection; or if the hegemon is unable or unwilling, or both, to support the regime. All three give valuable insights. Nevertheless, the author proposes that it is possible to establish a hierarchy of usefulness according to the depth and scope of understanding offered by each explanation. It is argued that hegemonic stability theory provides the most useful insights.