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British Columbia’s residency requirement on welfare: a rational choice case study Olmstead, Amy D. K.
Abstract
This paper examines British Columbia's residency requirement on social assistance implemented by the NDP government on December 1, 1995. The policy created a three-month waiting period for newcomers to the province before they could apply for social assistance. Because it violated ;the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP), the residency requirement put the BC government at risk of losing, through federal penalty, many millions of dollars more than the intended savings. To explain the BC government's decision-making, I use a rational choice nested games approach. I argue that the residency requirement policy produced two sets of interactions in two separate policy arenas. In the principal arena, the British Columbia Social Services Ministry negotiated with the federal Department of Human Resources Development (HRD). The negotiations centred on the possibility of federal concessions in- exchange for BC withdrawing the residency requirement. In the secondary arena, the federal Department of Finance was consulting with its provincial counterparts regarding the' long-term funding formula for the Canada Health and Social Transfer (CHST) set to replace CAP on April 1, 1996. Social Services interacted with the federal Department of Finance to influence the outcome of the funding decision. I propose that the BC government risked minimal resources in the primary arena to gain substantially higher payoffs from the CHST funding formula. The government linked these two arenas through a 'trade-off strategy that allowed them to apply the political pressure and communication generated by the residency requirement and negotiations with HRD to the Finance arena. This enabled them to. increase the possibility of a favourable payoff in that arena. I find that the rational, choice approach produces an explanation that reflected the government's actual decision-making more closely than other theoretical approaches.
Item Metadata
Title |
British Columbia’s residency requirement on welfare: a rational choice case study
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Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
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Date Issued |
1996
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Description |
This paper examines British Columbia's residency requirement
on social assistance implemented by the NDP government on December
1, 1995. The policy created a three-month waiting period for
newcomers to the province before they could apply for social
assistance. Because it violated ;the Canada Assistance Plan (CAP),
the residency requirement put the BC government at risk of losing,
through federal penalty, many millions of dollars more than the
intended savings. To explain the BC government's decision-making,
I use a rational choice nested games approach.
I argue that the residency requirement policy produced two
sets of interactions in two separate policy arenas. In the
principal arena, the British Columbia Social Services Ministry
negotiated with the federal Department of Human Resources
Development (HRD). The negotiations centred on the possibility of
federal concessions in- exchange for BC withdrawing the residency
requirement. In the secondary arena, the federal Department of
Finance was consulting with its provincial counterparts regarding
the' long-term funding formula for the Canada Health and Social
Transfer (CHST) set to replace CAP on April 1, 1996. Social
Services interacted with the federal Department of Finance to
influence the outcome of the funding decision.
I propose that the BC government risked minimal resources in
the primary arena to gain substantially higher payoffs from the
CHST funding formula. The government linked these two arenas
through a 'trade-off strategy that allowed them to apply the
political pressure and communication generated by the residency
requirement and negotiations with HRD to the Finance arena. This enabled them to. increase the possibility of a favourable payoff in
that arena. I find that the rational, choice approach produces an
explanation that reflected the government's actual decision-making
more closely than other theoretical approaches.
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Extent |
5395553 bytes
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Genre | |
Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
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Language |
eng
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Date Available |
2009-02-17
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Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
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Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
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DOI |
10.14288/1.0094699
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URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
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Graduation Date |
1996-11
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Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
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Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
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Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.