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A critical analysis of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of action

University of British Columbia

This thesis is a critical examination of three influential and interrelated aspects of Donald Davidson’s philosophy of action.. The first issue that is considered is Davidson’s account of the logical form of action—sentences. After assessing the argument in support of Davidson’s account, and suggesting certain amendments to it, I show how this modified version of Davidson’s account can be extended to provide for more complicated types of action—sentences. The second issue that is considered is Davidson’s views concerning the individuation of actions; in particular, I examine Davidson’s theory concerning the ontological implications of those sentences that assert that an agent did something by means of doing something else. The conclusion that I seek to establish in this case is essentially negative—that Davidson’s theory is false. The third issue that is considered is Davidson’s theory concerning the logical implications of those sentences that assert that an agent did something as a means of doing something else, which is also commonly known as the causal theory of action. Here I argue against Davidson’s view by providing an alternative, and more satisfying response to the theoretical challenge that generates the causal theory. Subsequent to this I attempt to explain what motivates Davidson’s commitment to the causal theory.

Thesis/Dissertation

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2009-04-24

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http://hdl.handle.net/2429/7545

Philosophy

University of British Columbia

UBCV

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