- Library Home /
- Search Collections /
- Open Collections /
- Browse Collections /
- UBC Theses and Dissertations /
- Rational disagreement about social justice
Open Collections
UBC Theses and Dissertations
UBC Theses and Dissertations
Rational disagreement about social justice Preinsperger, Kurt
Abstract
Numerous conflicting theories about the just distribution of goods in society have emerged in response to John Rawls’ 1971 treatise A Theory of Justice. Given that informed persons continue to disagee strongly about the demands of social justice, progress may come from better understanding the underlying reasons for disagreement about justice among philosophically informed people of moral goodwill. In this dissertation I explore the idea, suggested by Larmore, Pogge, Ackerman and others, that some of the disagreement about justice among informed people of goodwill is “rational” disagreement. I identify, in the literature on social justice, recurrent conceptual, normative and empirical issues which we have reason to consider currently (or conceivably forever) irresolvable, at the first-order level of moral reasoning, by any information, arguments or methods accessible to us. But claims concerning the possibility of rational disagreement about justice only differ non-trivially from skepticism about justice if plausible limits can be set to the scope of this disagreement. To characterize such limits, I seek to establish the following two wide-reflective-equilibrium-based presumptions. (1) A consequentialist metaethical framework is our most credible approach to moral justification (where the form of consequentialism defended is constructivist, non-foundational, value-pluralistic, and includes distribution sensitivity among its ultimate values). (2) In moderately well-off, pluralistic societies, only those conceptions of justice fall within the scope of rational disagreement which propose broadly egalitarian-liberal, “directly responsive” principles (i.e. principles applicable to individual or group shares and not merely to basic social structure). Some likely candidates for the status of rational disagreements about social justice are discussed: the criteria definition and inclusion problems; various balancing problems related to attempts to increase the comprehensiveness of principles (the priority problem, the aggregation-distribution problem and commensuration problems); the domain demarcation problem; and problems of imprecision associated with justifying claims about justice within a consequentialist framework. An improved understanding of major sources of rational disagreement about social justice, as presented in this dissertation, helps define the normative weight of appeals to justice. This in turn clarifies the need to resolve many issues of social distribution otherwise than by relying on invocations of justice.
Item Metadata
Title |
Rational disagreement about social justice
|
Creator | |
Publisher |
University of British Columbia
|
Date Issued |
1992
|
Description |
Numerous conflicting theories about the just distribution of goods in society
have emerged in response to John Rawls’ 1971 treatise A Theory of Justice.
Given that informed persons continue to disagee strongly about the demands
of social justice, progress may come from better understanding the underlying
reasons for disagreement about justice among philosophically informed
people of moral goodwill.
In this dissertation I explore the idea, suggested by Larmore, Pogge, Ackerman
and others, that some of the disagreement about justice among informed
people of goodwill is “rational” disagreement. I identify, in the literature on
social justice, recurrent conceptual, normative and empirical issues which we
have reason to consider currently (or conceivably forever) irresolvable, at the
first-order level of moral reasoning, by any information, arguments or
methods accessible to us.
But claims concerning the possibility of rational disagreement about justice
only differ non-trivially from skepticism about justice if plausible limits can
be set to the scope of this disagreement. To characterize such limits, I seek to
establish the following two wide-reflective-equilibrium-based presumptions.
(1) A consequentialist metaethical framework is our most credible approach
to moral justification (where the form of consequentialism defended is
constructivist, non-foundational, value-pluralistic, and includes distribution sensitivity
among its ultimate values). (2) In moderately well-off, pluralistic
societies, only those conceptions of justice fall within the scope of rational
disagreement which propose broadly egalitarian-liberal, “directly responsive”
principles (i.e. principles applicable to individual or group shares and not
merely to basic social structure).
Some likely candidates for the status of rational disagreements about social
justice are discussed: the criteria definition and inclusion problems; various
balancing problems related to attempts to increase the comprehensiveness of
principles (the priority problem, the aggregation-distribution problem and
commensuration problems); the domain demarcation problem; and problems
of imprecision associated with justifying claims about justice within a
consequentialist framework.
An improved understanding of major sources of rational disagreement about
social justice, as presented in this dissertation, helps define the normative
weight of appeals to justice. This in turn clarifies the need to resolve many
issues of social distribution otherwise than by relying on invocations of
justice.
|
Extent |
5926957 bytes
|
Genre | |
Type | |
File Format |
application/pdf
|
Language |
eng
|
Date Available |
2008-12-18
|
Provider |
Vancouver : University of British Columbia Library
|
Rights |
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.
|
DOI |
10.14288/1.0086610
|
URI | |
Degree | |
Program | |
Affiliation | |
Degree Grantor |
University of British Columbia
|
Graduation Date |
1992-11
|
Campus | |
Scholarly Level |
Graduate
|
Aggregated Source Repository |
DSpace
|
Item Media
Item Citations and Data
Rights
For non-commercial purposes only, such as research, private study and education. Additional conditions apply, see Terms of Use https://open.library.ubc.ca/terms_of_use.