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Diggin, Steven

University of British Columbia

I develop an account of the nature of improvisation, as a distinctive form of temporally extended agency. In contrast to the standard view, which says that agents perform extended actions by means of planning them in advance, I argue that improvising involves planning one’s actions contemporaneously with their performance, or equivalently, planning these actions after one has already begun performing them. Improvisation is psychologically distinctive because it involves the adoption of backward-looking intentions, or retroplans, which represent the actions that an agent has already performed as to-have-been performed under new descriptions, in relation to how these actions constitute parts of the larger action into which they are subsequently improvisationally incorporated. Improvisation is metaphysically distinctive because it involves exercising a special kind of diachronic agential control over the temporally extended action that one is performing. By means of continuing to act, as guided by a holistic improvised plan with backward-looking components, one can genuinely incorporate one’s previously-performed actions into a larger temporal whole, and thereby retroactively determine that these actions were (intentionally) performed under new descriptions. This is possible because of the temporally emergent metaphysical nature of the action-types that are improvisable. Improvisation is normatively distinctive because it enables new possibilities for temporally extended action, such as flexibly responding to unpredictable information in the course of acting and the retainment of a distinctive kind of self-curiosity during action. The progressive temporal structure of improvisation also raises a number of distinctive deliberative constraints that can be fruitfully modelled in general terms. Finally, improvisation is existentially distinctive, in the sense that an agent’s entire life can be understood as one grand-scale improvisational performance, where they gain existential unity and responsibility for the entire shape and meaning of their life by means of the successful improvisation of a self-constituting project over the course of their existence. Applying the account of the nature of improvisation at the level of a whole human life enables us to improv(is)e on existing existentialist and narrativist treatments of meaningful unity in life, and also to give a novel, systematic account of a series of existential crises and challenges.

Text

2025-04-08

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

http://hdl.handle.net/2429/90602

Philosophy

University of British Columbia

UBCV

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/