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Not With a Bang but a Whimper: Nixonian Foreign Policy and the Changing Canadian American Relationship Schwarz, Robyn 2012

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       Not With a Bang but a Whimper:  Nixonian Foreign Policy and the Changing Canadian American Relationship    By  Robyn Schwarz    Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements of the History Honours Program in History University of British Columbia, Okanagan 2012   Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Doug Owram, DVC and Department of History Author’s Signature:   ___________________________            Date: _______________  Supervisor’s Signature:  ___________________________            Date: _______________  Honours Chair’s  Signature:  ___________________________            Date: _______________  ii © Robyn Schwarz 2012                         iii Abstract   An examination of Richard Nixon’s foreign policy and the way it contributed to changing the Canadian-American relationship from 1969-1974. Nixon’s administration redirected U.S. foreign policy, as outlined in the Nixon Doctrine, to address American interests under the influence of the Vietnam War. In doing so, the Nixon administration ignored issues linked to Canada such as trade and economics. Pierre Elliot Trudeau was also repositioning Canada’s international priorities during this period. The Nixon Economic Shock created a gap between the two countries. Canadians felt betrayed by the American decision to impose an import surcharge on their goods. Looking at documented meetings of the two leaders also reveals that both men did not cooperate well with one another. The Canadian-American relationship was permanently altered during this period because of a combination of these different factors.                  iv Acknowledgements  I would first like to extend a thank you to my supervisor, Dr. Doug Owram, without whom I could not have completed this project. He has been a great asset in my writing despite his busy schedule. I appreciate the interest he has taken in my work and his direction has been invaluable. I would also like to thank Dr. Ben Nilson for his last minute insights on the project, and for his guidance over the last three years. I want to thank my fiancé and roommate, Jeffrey Pimer, for whose support I am forever grateful. He took care of me for much of the research and writing, allowing me to focus on my work and not worry about the complications of life. Without his patience, I would have never completed this project. I would like to extend a special thank you to Dr. David Jefferess, who has been both a mentor and a friend during my time at UBC Okanagan.  I would like to acknowledge my peers and professors in the History department, who have helped me grow and inspired my interest in the subject. I would particularly thank Brian Stephenson for his suggestions, friendship, and assistance this year. I would also like to thank my family and friends for their support and encouragement. Finally, I would like to thank everyone in my life for putting up with my Richard Nixon obsession for the last four years, something I am sure has been a trial for some. But I hope that this obsession will also inspire you to look differently at a man that has become such a large part of my life and so dear to my heart.      v Contents  Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………….........…… iii Acknowledgements ……………………………………………………………………………... iv Preface: How to Live Next to the Elephant ...................………..…………………...……….1 – 9 Chapter One: Revitalizing International Relations through Nixonian Foreign Policy........10 – 20 Chapter Two: Trudeau and the Canadian War.………………………………….……...... 22 – 33 Chapter Three: A Shift in Partnership …………………………..……….…………...…. 34 – 43 Conclusion: The Changing of the Canadian-American Relationship …..……….………...44 – 50 Bibliography ……………………………………………………………...…………..........51 – 54                 1 Preface: How to Live Next to the Elephant  Richard Nixon has been a controversial figure in American history. One area, however, in which his administration has tended to be seen positively is in the area of foreign policy. This paper seeks to assess how Nixonian foreign policy affected Canadian-American relations. For while Canada was not the primary focus of the Nixon administration, the impact of the United States on Canada and the vast trade between the two nations, meant that the Canadian-American relationship is of importance in understanding this era. Richard Nixon’s foreign policy during his five years as President of the United States was transformational. His presidency redirected foreign relations at a time when the influence of the United States appeared to be declining in the wake of the Vietnam War. Between entering the White House in 1969 and the President’s resignation in 1974, Nixonian foreign policy began détente with the Soviet Union, brought an end to the Vietnam War, and opened up relations with China. Nixon, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and the rest of the President’s foreign policy team sought to improve the global image of the United States and realign the international balance of power.1 Nixon’s presidency clearly had a dramatic effect on international relations, but what about the effects of Nixonian foreign policy on the United States’ closest Cold War ally?  Canada was affected by this realignment of American interests, at a time when it too had a new Prime Minister. Canadian policy and Canadian-American relations are often dictated by the United States.2 The Canadian-American relationship during the Cold War has been explored, but primarily from a Canadian perspective in order to understand this dominance. American scholars have largely ignored the importance of the relationship of these two countries, and Canadian      1 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 158.      2 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada in the World, 1945-1984, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 41. 2 scholars in turn focus on highlighting Canada’s perspective and importance in this period of international affairs. Therefore, the changing Canadian-American relationship under the Nixon administration has remained largely unexplored. This paper will seek to understand the impact of Nixon’s foreign policy at a time when Canada was also repositioning itself as a middle power by creating a “just society” for the betterment of the world order.3  Before looking at the changing Canadian-American relationship during the Nixon era, it is important to understand that Canada has had two great alliances shape its history. The first, the Canadian relationship with Britain, reaches back to Canada’s colonial origins. Canada had been economically and politically dependant on Britain after 1867, and this relationship was strengthened by Canada’s involvement as an ally of the British Empire in the First and Second World Wars. While Canada had its own alliance with Britain within the confines of the British Empire, the relationship between these two countries was also a part of an interaction with the United States. John Bartlet Brebner describes the United States and Canada in the introduction to North Atlantic Triangle as “Siamese Twins who cannot separate and live.”4 Both countries have always been closely connected. Brebner argues that “the United States and Canada could not eliminate Great Britain from their courses of action, whether in the realm of ideas, like democracy, or of institutions, or of economic and political processes.”5 This assertion clearly addresses the Canadian-American relationship within the context of the British influence over both countries. However the “interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain” changed by the end of the Second World War.  British economic and military power had seriously weakened, as was indicated by Britain’s withdrawal from India and its other remaining colonies,      3 John English, Just Watch Me: The Life Of Pierre Elliott Trudeau Volume Two 1968-2000 (Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada, 2009), 20.      4 John Barlet Brebner, North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States, and Great Britain (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968), xxv.      5 Brebner, xxv. 3 while in contrast the United States was enjoying unmatched prosperity and power.6 Brebner’s thesis historically framed how we examine the Canadian-American relationship, but in the Cold War era of American dominance and Canadian independence it has lesser relevance. Understanding the Nixon era’s effect on Canadian-American relations must be framed within the constructs of the Canadian-American Cold War relationship. The United States was the undisputed Western leader in the Cold War alliance, and the military wartime alliance that the United States shared with Canada was subsequently maintained in the years leading up to the Vietnam War. Britain was still a part of the alliance, and all three countries worked together in 1949 to form the North Atlantic Pact. This pact subsequently became the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and can be seen as a North American military guarantee for Western Europe in case of Soviet aggression.7 Canada was moving away from British influence however, and had its own role in the alliance as it worked with the US to come up with a defense for Europe. NATO gave the Americans responsibility over strategic air operations, which in turn lead to the 1957 North American Air Defense Command (NORAD). NORAD “made explicit the symbiotic relationship of the Canadian and American air defence”8 through an integration of military command structure. The United States was also able to use Canada to create radar lines that would detect a Soviet attack. Canada economically assisted as much as it could to these projects, and the United States paid the rest.9 The Canadian-American alliance during the Cold War was grounded in military cooperation. Both countries participated in the Korean War under the United Nations. Canada moved closer to the United States as it assisted America in its conflict with communism.      6 Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion, 41.       7 John English and Norman Hillmer, “Canada’s American Alliance,” in Partners Nevertheless: Canadian- American Relations in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989), 36-37.      8 Ibid, 37.       9 Bothwell, 117.  4 Throughout the Cold War there was an underlying apprehension among Canadians over the Canadian-American relationship, despite the close ties between the two countries. There was always nervousness in Canada that blindly allying with its neighbour would not allow Canada to pursue its own national interests, and Canadians wanted to work with the United States as partners despite the difference in size and power. Mackenzie King had refused to sign a bilateral military alliance in 1946 as he objected to a union with the United States. 10 Lester Pearson clearly indicated that while Canada depended on the United States for protection, he wanted both countries to work together through NATO on equal terms.11 This was always an uneasy goal, balanced between the reality of American power and Canadian desire to preserve sovereignty. In the case of Vietnam, however, Canada clearly carved its own path, staying out of the war and even cautiously criticizing the United States. Thus, in 1965, Pearson publically called for a halt to bombing of North Vietnam at Temple University.12 Therefore, while both countries were able to work together before 1968 as Western allies, Canada maintained its ability to question American decisions despite not being able to provide the same level military support to the Western alliance as the great powers.   Canada and the United States had more than a military alliance during the Cold War because of the close connection between the economies of both countries. The free trade negotiations of 1947-1948 emphasize the economic ties that were present in North America at the end of the war. A custom’s union between the two countries was proposed after the war. This would have allowed Canadian goods to enter the United States duty free. The agreement was not reached however because Mackenzie King was reluctant to break away from having Britain as one of Canada’s primary trading partners. This incident is important though as it demonstrates      10 English and Hillmer, 35-36.      11 Ibid, 37.      12 Ibid, 39. 5 that ideas of free trade were a part of the political landscape in North American after WWII. The United States had a great deal of influence of Canadian manufacturing because of the size of its markets. In 1955, 60 percent of Canada’s exports and 73 percent of the country’s imports were with the United States. The United States was also the source of 76 percent of foreign capital investment in Canada.13 Clearly the Canadian economy was closely tied to the United States whether Canadians liked it or not. The apprehension Canada felt in relation to American influence is also evident in the Diefenbaker government’s failed attempt to redirect trade away from the United States.14 Despite this uneasiness, the creation of the Canadian-American auto- pact was a significant legislative decision in the 1960s that further integrated the economic activity of both countries. In 1965 both countries agreed that free trade in vehicles was in their joint interest, and agreement to this affect was signed in January. The Auto Pact eliminated duties on Canadian cars, trucks, buses, parts, and accessories for assembly in the United States. By 1967, trade in auto parts had become the largest part of the Canadian-American economic relationship, allowing Canadian cars to be sold in the United States.15 It was a crucial piece of legislation for Canada and made both countries look at other areas where free trade might be beneficial. It is clear that at the time that Trudeau and Nixon both came into office Canada depended on the United States for its economic success.  While economic and military forces were the basic structures of the Canadian-American alliance, it is nonetheless true that personality plays a role in international relationships. The personality of both countries’ leaders has had an influence on the Canadian-American      13 J.L. Grantstein, “Free Trade and Politics,” in Partners Nevertheless: Canadian-American Relations in the Twentieth Century, ed. Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1989), 84.       14 For an examination of how Diefenbaker attempted to redirect trade away from the United States in the wake of Canadian anti-Americanism, see: Bruce Murihead, “From Dreams to Reality: The Evolution of Anglo-Canadian Trade During the Diefenbaker Era, Journal of the Canadian Historical Association 9, no. 1 (1998): 243-266.      15  Grantstein, 88. 6 relationship. The Nixon-Trudeau relationship will be focused on later in this paper, but of equal importance as an example of how this alliance can be dictated by political personalities is the dichotomy of John F. Kennedy and John Diefenbaker. Diefenbaker was Prime Minister of Canada from 1957 to 1963, and John F. Kennedy was President of the United States for two of those years at the height of Cold War tensions. One incident that demonstrates the way that personality can dictate the relationship of these two countries can be viewed as the ‘Diefenbaker mistake.’ The Prime Minister bought Bomarc antiaircraft missiles as a replacement for the expensive Canadian developed Avro Arrow to help with Canada’s commitment to NORAD. The problem with these missiles was that they required nuclear warheads to be effective, and Canadians did not want to adopt nuclear weapons. Diefenbaker blamed the United States for this mistake, and Kennedy responded by showing his personal dislike for Diefenbaker through direct criticism of the Prime Minister’s decision. Further, Diefenbaker would also refuse to automatically support Kennedy during the Cuban Missile Crisis.  This disagreement became problematic when the United States began to question Canada’s commitment to their military alliance. In January of 1963, American General Lauris Norstad told the press that Canada was not keeping its promises. This comment to the media caused Diefenbaker’s credibility to crumble, and would eventually lead to the demise of the Diefenbaker government. This questioning of Canada keeping its commitments was commented on by opposition leader Lester Pearson, who announced that the Liberal Party would support nuclear weapons if elected. Diefenbaker was subsequently defeated in the 1963 election, and blamed the State Department and the American president for working to defeat him.16 Clearly Canadian-American relations during this period were affected by the personalities and general disdain of the leaders of these two countries. Diefenbaker’s defeat was not entirely manufactured by Kennedy’s relationship      16 Hilmer and English, 38-39. 7 with the Prime Minister, but Canadian politics were clearly affected by how these two interacted. Therefore it is crucial to understand the role of personality when looking at the Canadian- American alliance. With this background in mind, I will now turn to the election of Richard Nixon and Pierre Elliot Trudeau in 1968. Richard Nixon came to power in the United States at a time when American foreign policy was in turmoil. The United States was losing the Vietnam War, and American credibility worldwide was suffering as a result of this military fiasco. Nixon was also a comeback politician. He had lost to Kennedy in 1960, and his return to the Presidency can be viewed as an act of desperation by the American electorate. The Democrats were virtually unelectable because of their involvement in the Vietnam War and divisions within their own party, so Nixon, the ‘old Cold warrior,’ was a sort of last choice by the American public to deal with these problems. Pierre Elliot Trudeau, in contrast, captured the hearts and minds of the Canadian public in order to win the election. After Lester Pearson announced his retirement in December of 1967, “Trudeaumania” swept Canada as the country got caught up in Trudeau’s perceived youth and sexiness.17 Unlike Nixon, Trudeau was a relative newcomer to his country’s national politics, and therefore the direction he would take Canada’s foreign policy upon coming to office was relatively unknown. More on these elections and the dichotomy between these two leaders will come in later chapters. Nixon and Trudeau were very different leaders, with very different approaches to foreign policy, but more than just the relationship between these two politicians shaped and changed the Canadian-American alliance between 1969 and Nixon’s resignation in 1974.       17 Paul Litt, “Trudeaumania: Participatory Democracy in the Mass-Mediate Nation,” Canadian Historical Review 88, no. 1 (2008): 41. 8 This paper seeks to situate itself within the historiography of the Canadian-American relationship during the Cold War. Brebner’s North Atlantic Triangle examines the anglocentric dynamic of the alliance as it existed before the Second World War.18 This interpretation of Canada’s place in the North Atlantic does not encompass the dominance of the United States in the Cold War world. Richard Nixon’s outlook on the world and the United States’ position in international politics had changed drastically since Brebner’s study of the Canadian-American relationship. Robert Bothwell’s Alliance and Illusion provides a summary of Canadian foreign policy during this period, but it does not examine the Nixon-Trudeau dynamic in detail.19 Historical assessment of the period generally recognizes that there was some altercation in the Canadian-American relationship during the Nixon era. Lawrence Martin examines the relationship between the President and Prime Minister Trudeau, stating that Nixon and Trudeau “decided, in effect, that the countries could become more distant friends.” 20 Lawrence does not however situate his assessment of Nixon and Trudeau outside the confines of Canadian- American relations. This paper will in contrast look at Canada’s own position in international relations and how this fit into the foreign policy that the Nixon presidency was trying to create. The relationship between these two men and how their rapport affected Canadian-American relations is important, but it is only through an examination of their individual foreign policies that a full understanding of the period can be reached. Exploring both general foreign policy and the way that the Canadian-American relationship functioned during the Nixon administration will allow better understanding of whether or not Nixon’s foreign policy had a dramatic effect on Canada. By approaching this topic in this way, it is hoped that this paper will contribute to a       18 Tony McCulloch, “Revisiting the North Atlantic Triangle: The Brebner Thesis After 60 Years,” London Journal of Canadian Studies 20 (2004): 1-2.      19 See Robert Bothwell’s chapter “Parallel Lives: Nixon Meets Trudeau,” in Alliance and Illusion: Canada in the World, 1945-1984, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 312-331.      20 Lawrence Martin, The Presidents and The Prime Ministers (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 1982), 237. 9 deeper analysis of the relationship between these two neighbours, as well as a fuller understanding of how both countries addressed this critical period in Cold War history. This paper will begin with a summary of American foreign policy during Richard Nixon’s time in office, from his election in 1968 to his resignation on August 9, 1974. Nixon’s previous Cold War involvement will be briefly examined as well as his perspective on American foreign policy. Nixon’s view of the world, Canada, and how his presidency sought to implement its ‘grand design’ approach to foreign policy is a part of how the Canadian-American relationship changed during his time in office. Chapter Two will focus on Pierre Elliot Trudeau’s sudden rise to power in Canada, the Prime Minister’s world views, and Canada’s foreign policy from 1968 to 1974. It will explore how Trudeau was beginning to position Canada as a third world leader rather than simply a Western ally. Canada had its own foreign policy independent of American interests, and the issues that were of importance to Canada during this time period will be examined. After setting up this dichotomy, Chapter Three will present the way that the relationship functioned during this period, by examining the diplomatic relations of the two leaders and the economic changes that occurred during Nixon’s administration. Particularly it will look at the Nixon Economic Shock because of its significance for Canada and the way that this changed the trade relations between the two countries. It will also examine Trudeau and Nixon’s relationship in greater detail. Finally, the conclusion will demonstrate why the Nixon era changed the structural relationship between Canada and the United States. The two leaders had considerably different emphases in broad international policy and this affected bilateral issues as well. There was no singular event that changed the Canadian-American relationship during this period. It was a combination factors that contributed to a shift in the priorities of each country. The Canadian-American relationship was altered during the Nixon administration because both 10 countries did not focus on the importance of their alliance, and by the time that Trudeau left office in 1979, the diplomatic nature of this relationship was permanently changed.                                     11 Chapter One:  Revitalizing International Relations through Nixonian Foreign Policy  Canadian-American relations during the Nixon years cannot be separated from the general context both of Richard Nixon’s career and the major international issues which defined his time in office. First, it is important to see how Richard Nixon came to power and the circumstances at the beginning of his time in office in 1969. Nixon’s Presidency was shaped by his long political journey and remarkable comeback. The Nixon of the 1950s established himself as a “hard hitting, slashing campaigner” who would do anything to counter communism. He was known for his misleading tactics such as once wrongly portraying his opponent as a communist sympathizer. It was during his pre-Presidential years that Nixon was first called “Tricky Dick.” He emerged onto the national political scene during the 1949 Alger Hiss case, and his anti- communist stance earned him the vice presidential nomination alongside Dwight D. Eisenhower. After two terms as Vice President, Richard Nixon ran for the Presidency and was defeated by a narrow margin by John F. Kennedy in 1960. 21 He ran again in 1962, this time for the California governorship, and lost a second time. These defeats altered Nixon’s public persona, causing him step back from politics. He left the public eye and “permanently” retired. He was a fallen man, but five years later, a ‘new’ Nixon would be once again running for the office of the President in the wake of the Vietnam War. This new Nixon seemed calmer, more self-assured, thoughtful, compassionate, and was in a clear position to take power as the nation was unhappy with the Democrats decision to escalate the Vietnam conflict.22 Nixon had started his career as a Cold warrior, but his political defeats changed how he viewed American politics. America had      21 Michael A. Genovese, The Nixon Presidency: Power and Politics in Turbulent Times (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), 2-4.       22 Theodore H. White, The Making of the Presidency, 1968 (New York: Atheneum, 1969), 148.  12 changed since Nixon’s time as vice president, as the sixties had shown that the United States was not invincible. This old Cold warrior would eventually take charge of the country and revitalize American foreign policy in the wake of the Vietnam War.  Richard Nixon’s foreign policy was shaped in part by the President’s fear that American world power was on the decline. In his inauguration address, Nixon stated that it was America’s time to “lead the world at last out of the valley of turmoil and onto that high ground of peace that man has dreamed of since the dawn of civilization.”23 Nixon saw himself as a statesman of world peace and this anchored his approach to international relations.24 He also believed in personal diplomacy, and therefore became the most travelled of any American President. He was able to visit thirty one countries while in office, which demonstrates his desire to conduct international politics face-to-face with other world leaders.25 Nixon was greatly disturbed by the decline in American power that had perceivably occurred during his time out of politics. Coming into office, he had to address the fact that the United States could not continue the same foreign policy that it had been practicing since the start of the Cold War. Former President Lyndon Johnson had left him with the Vietnam War which was rightfully one of the Nixon administration’s main concerns. The United States was still one of two superpowers struggling for global domination when he took office, and therefore Nixonian foreign policy reflects the politics of the Cold War. However, the Nixon administration was forced to change the      23  Richard Nixon, "Inaugural Address," January 20, 1969, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=1941 (accessed December 14, 2011).      24 I recognize that there are many negative perspectives on the Nixon administration and Nixonian foreign policy, which has also been viewed as neo-colonial or less successful than I construct it. I have always taken the perspective that Nixon’s foreign policy was reactionary, but well thought out in a way that primarily looked after American interests. For other perspectives on his foreign policy see: William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy during the Nixon Presidency, New York: Hill and Wang, 1998; David Greenburg, “Nixon as Statesman: The Failed Campaign,” in Nixon in the world: American Foreign Relations, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 45-66; Tad Szulc, The Illusion of Peace: Foreign Policy in the Nixon Years, New York: Viking Press, 1978; and for Nixon’s foreign policy in relation to Watergate, see: Chalmers M. Roberts, “Foreign Policy Under a Paralyzed Presidency,” Foreign Affairs 52, no. 4 (1974): 675-689.      25 Stephen W Stathis, “Nixon, Watergate, and American Foreign Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 13, no. 1 (1983): 130. 13 framework of the Cold War in order to reflect the lessons that the United States had learned in Vietnam War era. Nixon’s presidency therefore began in a time of crisis and transition. Nixon’s Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, also played a large role in shaping Nixon’s “grand design” approach to foreign affairs. Both men believed they could impose order and stability on the world if the White House controlled policy by “appearing conciliatory but acting tough.” 26 This was the approach that the Nixon administration took in foreign affairs, reflected in the fact that Nixon was the first president to recognize the Soviet Union as an equal power to the United States. During his six years as president three areas of Nixon’s foreign policy demonstrate what his administration was generally trying to achieve: détente with the Soviet Union, opening up relations with China, and trying to reconcile American involvement in the Vietnam War. Richard Nixon implemented this foreign policy in order to create a new multipolar balance of power that would advance American interests.27 The Nixon administration introduced the “Nixon Doctrine” at the beginning of Nixon’s first term in office. The Doctrine showed that the presidency was looking at America’s past mistakes and wanted to move forward. Nixon presented the Nixon Doctrine on July 23, 1969 in Guam, and later outlined three principles that demonstrated his desire to push foreign policy in a new direction. First, Nixon wanted the United States to honour all of its treaty commitments.28 This was important as American could not simply ignore its commitment in Vietnam and its alliances, as this would dramatically affect the international community.29 Nixon also stated that the United States would “shield” its allies if nuclear power threatened their security. Finally, Nixon outlined that the United States would provide economic and military aid in accordance with its alliances,      26 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 150.      27 Hoff, 158.      28 Richard Nixon, “‘President Nixon's Speech on "Vietnamization,’ November 3, 1969” Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Richard Nixon, 1969, 903.      29 J. L. S. Girling, “The Guam Doctrine,” International Affairs 48, no. 1 (1970):  48. 14 assuming that the allied nation would be defended by its own soldiers.30 This last principle demonstrates a shift from previous American policy, as in the past the United States had provided both personnel and weapons as aid.31 Nixon did not see this new policy as a way of getting America out of Asia, but rather “one that provided the only sound basis for America staying in and continuing to play a responsible role helping the non-communist nations and neutrals as well as [America’s] Asian allies to defend their independence.”32 Americans would no longer intervene with military strength as they had mistakenly done in Vietnam.  The Vietnam War was clearly one of Nixon’s primary concerns coming into office, and although he did not succeed in properly implementing his policy of “Vietnamization,” he did his best to withdraw American troops and bring about an end to the war. The Nixon Doctrine also provided the basis for future American foreign policy in Asia. In presenting its allies with military and economic assistance provided they assumed the responsibility of their own defence, Nixon’s administration was moving away from the policy of Americanization that had be implemented by Johnson in the 1960s. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was to take over fighting themselves through a number of different phases. This policy ultimately failed because the success of Vietnamization was in the hands of the South Vietnamese. The ARVN was poorly trained, undisciplined, and reluctant to leave the security of their compounds when it came to actually engaging the North Vietnamese Army in combat.33 Nixon was forced to expand into Cambodia in order to protect South Vietnam from being surrounded by communists.34 The Nixon administration’s goal was to pass the fighting from American soldiers to ARVN troops,      30 Nixon, “President Nixon's Speech on "Vietnamization,"” 904.      31 James E Dougherty, American foreign policy: FDR to Reagan (London: Harper & Row, 1986), 241.      32 Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 395.      33 Robert K. Brigham, ARVN: Life and Death in the South Vietnamese Army, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006), 110.       34 James H. Willbanks, Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost its War, (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 76-78. 15 but the United States still had to support any offensive through air power and strategic planning. They knew that a total military victory was no longer possible when Vietnamization was implemented.35 However, Nixon’s policy did allow an American exit strategy. He succeeded in withdrawing American troops, and by January 1973, American forces in Vietnam were cut from a high of 543,000 to 24,000.36  Therefore, the Nixonian policy of Vietnamization was a political tool that allowed Nixon to deal with rising discontent in the United States even though the war was lost. Nixonian Vietnam policies demonstrate the administration’s ability to make the best of a difficult situation. Nixon also negotiated the Paris Peace Accords of 1973 which were intended to end the Vietnam conflict through ceasefire and withdrawal.37 The United States was already in Vietnam, and therefore would not have been able to easily withdraw without international consequences, but Nixon was being pressured domestically to end the war. Vietnamization allowed the Nixon administration to withdraw American troops while continuing to aid the South Vietnamese.  The Nixon Doctrine had broader applications outside the Vietnam conflict and would provide an outline for the conduct of Nixonian foreign policy. It was based on a balance of power concept rather than one of American dominance, which allowed the Nixon administration to treat the Soviet Union as an equal partner in power. The document was at its heart a recognition of the limits of U.S. power as demonstrated in Vietnam. Nixon himself had made a comeback in American politics, and his foreign policy attempted to change the framework of the Cold War in the wake of a perceived American decline. The Vietnam War had destroyed      35 Ibid, 290.      36Michael H Hunt, Crises in American Foreign Policy, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996), 310-11.       37 For a history of the events around the Vietnam peace talks and the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, see: Walter Scott Dillard, Sixty Days to Peace: Implementing the Paris Peace Accords, Vietnam 1973 (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 1982), http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?seq=21&id=mdp.39015013506285&page=root&view= image&size=100&orient=0 (accessed March 13, 2012).  16 Johnson’s time in office and made the Democrats unelectable. Nixon recognized that he was elected because of this mistake, and he did not want the issue to sink him. Instead of exercising American power through military interventions, Nixonian foreign policy sought to use diplomatic means to protect American interests. The goal of U.S. dominance still remained, but Nixon’s administration recognized that the rhetoric of American international relations needed to change. Nixon supported this new approach in a conversation on foreign policy on July 1, 1970 when he stated that “the Nixon Doctrine…provides that the United States rather than sending men will send arms when we consider it in our interest to do so.”38 Nixon’s policy was to be a statesman of world peace as well as an advocate of American interests. Although the document was primarily aimed at ending American involvement in the Vietnam conflict, it became the blueprint for avoiding conflict and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nixon’s rhetoric of peace was also a recognition that the United States could no longer afford war of any kind, as Vietnam had politically, economically, and domestically humiliated the Americans. Therefore, Nixon’s administration had to find another route that would allow them to continue to shape the world order in America’s image. Nixon chose to do this through personal diplomacy and cooperation, as cooperating with ideological opponents would allow the United States to dictate the world balance of power. Nixon clearly recognized that the America that exerted its military strength on other parts of the world was no longer benefiting the United States, and that there needed to be a shift in American international relations. Richard Nixon’s role as a statesman of world peace in order to advance American interests can be seen in the nuclear reductions talks with the Soviet Union. Nixonian foreign policy practiced a policy of détente with the USSR, which eased tensions between the two      38 Richard Nixon, “A Conversation with the President about Foreign Policy,” July 1, 1970, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2567&st=doctrine&st1=#axzz1p4Ccex2u. 17 superpowers. One of the main ways that Nixon did this was through the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). This series of negotiations began on November 17, 1969 when Nixon sent a delegation to Helsinki, Finland, but the talks were quickly halted because the two sides differed on the proper scope of an agreement.39 The Soviets only wanted the agreement to limit defensive Anti-Ballistic Missile systems (ABMs), whereas the United States hoped it would also place limits on Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) and Multiple Interdependently- targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRV). A second talk took place at Vienna in 1970, but no firm resolution was reached between the two powers. Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador to the United States Anatoly Dobrynin then agreed to divide the issues of defensive weapons and offensive weapons in May 1971.40 The two sides eventually agreed to meet at the Moscow Summit in 1972. The summit was the culmination of four years of the Nixon administration insisting on linkage between the two powers.41 Nixon had insisted on peace with the Soviet peoples and the control of nuclear armaments represents this change in U.S. policy.42 The treaties that Nixon and Brezhnev signed included one that limited the deployment of AMBs to two for each country, and another that froze the number of ICBMs at the level of those then in production or deployed.43 SALT I did not stop the nuclear arms race, but it recognized that unregulated weapons competition between the two superpowers could not continue to go on. It essentially stopped further missile build-up, and even though it did not limit MIRVs, it was still a step in the right direction by the Nixon administration. Nixon was the first American president to follow through with strategic arms limitations. These agreements were closely tied to Détente and therefore      39 Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, 523.       40 Hoff, 190.      41 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1202.      42 Richard Nixon, “Toast of the President and Nikolai V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., at a Dinner in Moscow,” May 22, 1972, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3428&st=&st1=#axzz1swMyhajN.      43 Hoff, 202. 18 demonstrate the Nixon administration’s willingness to collaborate with the Soviet Union rather than trying to outplay them.   Richard Nixon’s other, and best known, major achievement in terms of his administration’s détente policy was improved American relations with China. The United States had broken ties with China when Mao took power in 1949. The Nixon administration reversed long-standing American policy and took steps to establish relations with this major Asian power. Nixon approached China in a quiet and deliberate way. The Chinese were in conflict with the USSR along the Sino-Soviet border, where the Soviets had millions of troops armed with nuclear weapons. This ‘split’ led the Chinese to seek other diplomatic partners, and Nixon’s administration stepped in to help them.44 He first began by taking small steps, referring to them as the “People’s Republic of China,” and easing travel and trade regulations. Kissinger was then sent secretly to China in July 1971 to begin negotiations for a closer partnership with the United States and lay the groundwork for Nixon’s own visit the following year.45 In opening up to China, Nixon stated the United States must recognize the two countries shared their differences, but that these differences must be addressed without becoming “enemies in war.”46 He landed in Beijing on February 21, 1972 and met with Mao Tse Tung the first afternoon. The men discussed the new American-Chinese relationship which would include increased trade and economic ties.47 The following days were filled with negotiations and sightseeing, which was all documented for American television. The visit became a momentous occasion as China was being shown to the world, and Nixon’s willingness to work with ideologically different powers      44 Peter Rodman, “Nixon’s Opening to China,” in Triumphs and Tragedies of the Modern Presidency: seventy-six case studies in Presidential Leadership, ed. David Abshire (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 2001), 196.      45 David Greenberg, Nixon’s Shadow: The History of an Image (New York: W.W. Norton, 2003), 275.      46 Richard Nixon, “Remarks on Departure From the White House for a State Visit to the People's Republic of China,” February 17, 1972, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 3746&st=&st1=#ixzz1swQa9LUr.      47 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy during the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill   and Wang, 1998), 304.  19 made this possible.48 This meeting is considered Nixon’s greatest diplomatic achievement as President because it opened American relations with China that had previously not existed. It was regarded by some as the “week that changed the world” because of its importance as a foreign policy act.49 This event plays directly into Nixon and Kissinger’s attempt to create a balance of power in foreign relations and therefore was one of his greatest achievements in international relations.  Richard Nixon’s détente policy also allowed the United States to successfully intervene in two Arab-Israeli conflicts in the Middle East during his presidency. Nixon’s administration wanted to develop an “even handed” policy in the region that favoured neither the Israelis nor the Arabs, while recognizing that the Soviet Union wanted to enhance its influence among Arab states. He had inherited the aftermath of the Six Day War in which Israel launched an attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967. It was in 1970 that Nixon first intervened to negotiate a cease fire between the Arabs and the Israelis with the assistance of Soviet cooperation. Nixon wanted to open up U.S.-Soviet consultation on the Arab-Israeli conflict, and this took shape in what would eventually be called the Rogers Plan.50 The Soviet Union was deeply involved in the region supplying arms and other assistance to states like Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.51 The United States therefore sought to bring the USSR into creating a peace settlement for the region in March of 1969 to keep the agreement fair to both combatants, but the Soviets showed no interest in deescalating tensions and the Rogers Plan failed52 Americans were primarily concerned that Soviets would step up activity in the region, and soon after they received a letter from Premier      48 Ibid.       49 Bundy, 306.      50 Richard Nixon, “Remarks to Reporters Announcing Acceptance by Middle East Nations of United States Cease-Fire Proposal,” July 31, 2070, The American Presidency Project,  http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=2604&st=israel&st1=#ixzz1swSKQXS9.      51 Dougherty, 241.      52 Ibid. 20 Kosygin saying that the USSR would aid Arab nations if Israel continued its attacks.53 In response to what Kissinger viewed as their first threat from the Soviet Union, Nixon and Kissinger decided to resupply Israel and attempt to stop Soviet power in the region, which would become an overriding U.S. policy in the Middle East.54 The Nixon policy towards the Middle East during the first year of his presidency demonstrates the importance of the Nixon Doctrine in keeping the U.S. out of proxy wars. While opening talks with the Soviet Union was difficult, the conflict did not escalate, and Egypt and Israel agreed to a momentary ceasefire. The conflict previously might have turned into a greater proxy war with the Soviet Union, and instead benefited from Nixon’s détente policy.  Nixon’s balance of power was further tested during the Yom Kippur War of 1973. Egypt and Syria began this new stage of the Arab-Israeli conflict by attacking Israeli forces, and it was imperative to both the United States and the USSR that neither be drawn into the conflict.55 Nixon made the choice of allowing Israel access to American supplies, such as ammunition, and this was clearly in line with the Nixon Doctrine. The European members of NATO however were afraid to get involved because the Arabs could use their oil monopoly to impose embargos on Europe, so they would not allow American planes headed for Israel to fly over their territory.56 NATO was right in predicting an oil crisis caused by American aid. As the first C-5s arrived in Israel during the day, Israeli spirits improved, and by October 18th Israeli forces were making dramatic gains.57 This began the Oil Crisis of 1973, as the Gulf oil states announced as 70 percent increase in the posted price of oil to $5.11 a barrel. After October 19th, when Nixon      53 Genovese, 153.      54 Genovese, 152.      55 Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: partners in power, (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 521.      56 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy during the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 436.      57 Ibid, 437. 21 requested $2.2 billion to finance emergency military aid to Israel, the Arab oil countries reacted by imposing a complete embargo on shipments to the United States.58 This was short lived however as a ceasefire was negotiated on October 28th, and there was no clear victor in the conflict which was the result Nixon had wanted. The Soviet Union had been in favour of the ceasefire, and Kissinger had gone to Moscow to help negotiate the settlement with Brezhnev without Israeli or Arab input.59 It is clear that both powers were able to work together for mutual gain, despite Richard Nixon being caught up in the Watergate scandal. The conflicted ended with no direct Soviet-American conflict and an agreement for Egypt to hold direct talks with Israel. Nixon’s successes in the Middle East clearly demonstrate that negotiating with the Soviet Union could be beneficial for both powers in exerting their influences and avoiding conflict. Nixonian foreign policy was not simply an approach that would allow the United States to maintain control over its sphere of influence. By working with the Soviet Union, the Nixon administration could also shape affairs outside the European theatre to further align with American interests. Nixon’s achievements in China, Vietnam, in relation to the Soviet Union, and in the Middle East are important in understanding the Canadian-American relationship because they demonstrate the Nixon administration’s priorities in foreign policy.  The foreign policy plan that Nixon and Kissinger were trying to enact for the United States was one of détente and a positioning of the United States as a leader in great power politics. The United States would no longer fight the Cold War through expensive proxy wars and military interventions. Nixon was a realist who felt he could redirect American foreign policy in wake of the Vietnam embarrassment.60 He understood that there needed to be a change in the conduct of American foreign policy, but was optimistic that his policies could maintain U.S. influence. While Nixon      58 Ibid, 438.      59 Dallek, 533.      60 Stathis, 133.  22 was clearly the first President to treat the Soviet Union as an equal partner through open negotiations, he did this with the notion that working with other powers like the USSR and China would allow the United States to manipulate global politics in their favor. Ideology was not important to Nixon; he was willing to work with anyone, as long as it advanced his administration’s vision of American foreign relations. The Nixon administration’s focus was clearly great power politics and it was in this arena that Nixon was able to have his greatest achievements as President. But this ignored the interests of lesser powers like Canada, and would have an effect on Canadian-American relations.                  23 Chapter Two:  Trudeau and the Canadian Way  When Richard Nixon was elected in 1968 and began to try to redirect American foreign policy, there was also a sense that change would come to Canada. The Pearson years were coming to an end as the Prime Minister announced that he would be retiring just before Christmas in 1967, when polls showed that Robert Stanfield would defeat the Liberals should the government fail.61 The man that would replace Pearson after the Canadian nation became infatuated with his looks and young image was Pierre Elliot Trudeau. Trudeau would remain in power for the next ten years, and for better or worst had a dramatic effect on Canada both at home and abroad. While Trudeau’s importance in shaping Canadian history cannot be questioned, his foreign policy was conducted in the shadow of the United States. Though he is often famously misquoted, Trudeau once told Americans that “Living next to you is in some ways like sleeping with an elephant: no matter how friendly and even tempered the beast, one is affected by every twitch and grunt.”62 Trudeau faced limits in what he could do with Canadian foreign policy. The elephant anthology symbolizes the fact that Canada could not ignore the United States. Trudeau thus charted a course that was both mindful of the U.S. but also pushed against restraints in order to fit his own sense of what mattered. This chapter will focus on the contrast between Trudeau and Nixon, and the way that Trudeau shaped Canadian foreign policy through his own understanding of the world.  Pierre Trudeau’s character directly contrasted with Richard Nixon’s when he came into the presidency. Trudeau was an internationalist and intellectual, spending his youth travelling the      61 John English, Just Watch Me: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, (Toronto: A.A. Knopf, 2009), 6.      62 J.L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 51.  24 world and being a part of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution. Born into a wealthy French-English family in Montreal, Trudeau’s adulthood began with graduate world at Harvard, Paris, and then in London.63 He co-founded the political journal Cité Libre in 1950 which allowed him to create a dialogue on international affairs in the context of shaping Quebec nationalism, eventually becoming one of the leading voices against Quebec separatism. From the beginning the journal tested limits, drawing disapproval from Catholic leaders in Quebec for its harsh criticism.64 Trudeau had come to Ottawa in 1949 to begin working as an economic political advisor, but by 1951 had decided to leave civil service for travel.65 He visited China in 1960 with friend Jacques Hébert, and wrote about their travels in the book Two Innocents in Red China. Before entering politics, Trudeau clearly spent his time learning about the world.66 He was anti-Quebec separatism, but still pro-Quebec, as he believed his time was better spent in Montreal than in Ottawa. Significantly, Trudeau was in no way a cold warrior. If anything his travels and cool, rationalist intellectualism led him to doubt the black and white rhetoric of the Cold War. Both his mildly left of centre ideology and his doubts about the Cold War contrasted with Nixon. Nixon’s early career had been very much tied to anti-communist attitudes in the United States. Trudeau had the experience of being a citizen of the world when he became Prime Minister. Unlike Nixon, who was realistically approaching a country that was seemingly on the international decline, Trudeau’s experiences abroad made him an idealist who wanted to use Canadian international relations for the betterment of the world.       63 John English, Citizen of the World: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau, (Toronto: A.A. Knopf, 2006), 1.      64 For more information on Trudeau’s involvement with the Cité Libre, its conception, and his conversations with the Catholic Church, see Citizen of the World: The Life of Pierre Elliot Trudeau by John English, pages 237– 251.      65 Ibid, 233.       66 The period between 1944 and 1965 was twenty years of learning and travelling for Trudeau, in which he developed his political thought. See: Max Memni and Monique Memni, Trudeau Transformed: The Shaping of a Statesman, 1944-1965. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 2011. 25 It was this background that contributed Prime Minister Trudeau’s rise to power in 1967 but it was also a question of personality. What has been termed ‘Trudeaumania,’ lasted only a few months during the Liberal leadership and federal election campaigns in the winter and spring of 1968, but had a dramatic impact on the Canadian political landscape. Paul Litt explains that Trudeaumania “introduced to centre stage the major figure in modern Canadian political history, entrenched a particular vision of national unity, and imprinted the baby-boom generation as it came of age.”67 Trudeau’s rise to power therefore was significant for Canada as it linked together both the political and the cultural. Canada’s Centennial was celebrated in 1967, and while the country was optimistic about its future, the 1960s had been a frustrating decade in national politics. Both Diefenbaker and Pearson were World War I veterans, and had not appealed to the needs of the Canadian youth. There was also the pressing issue of Quebec separatism, and so in choosing a new leader the Liberals wanted someone who was both Quebecois and could charm the younger voters. Much like when John F. Kennedy wooed America in the early 1960s, Trudeau would fill this role as he was viewed by the Canadian public as more than a politician. He became an instant celebrity, and this transformation seemed to happen overnight. He had a trendy image that allowed the media to focus on his youth, fashion sense, and sex appeal.68 From February 16, 1968 when Trudeau announced his candidacy for Liberal leadership, to the day he was sworn in as Prime Minister on April 20th, the country was swept up in Trudeau’s charisma while he toured the country. Trudeau did not however win the majority of the votes in the June 25th federal election. The Liberals did go on to gain a majority, but they had done so with just over 45 percent of the popular vote. This was just 5 percent more than the Liberals had won in the 1965 election, proving that Trudeau’s popularity could not win over the entire country, but it      67 Paul Litt, “Trudeaumania: Participatory Democracy in the Mass-Mediated Nation,” The Canadian Historical Review 89 no. 1(2008), 28.       68 Ibid, 34-35. 26 could win the Liberals power in Parliament.69 Trudeau’s rise in 1968 to Prime Minister of Canada does demonstrate the strength of his popularity through the enthusiasm of his supporters. Trudeau refreshed the Canadian political scene because he was viewed so differently from Diefenbaker and Pearson.   Richard Nixon’s rise to power clearly contrasts with Trudeau’s election in 1968. Richard Nixon came to power in 1969 because there was no better option on the American political scene. Robert Kennedy had announced his candidacy for Democratic nomination, but was assassinated in Los Angeles on June 5th. Lyndon B. Johnson was not going to stand for the Presidency again and a bitterly contested nomination process demonstrated that the Democrats could not escape the growing doubt about the Vietnam War. On the Republican side Nixon came back from electoral defeat and relative obscurity to win both the nomination and then the Presidency in 1968.70 Nixon’s image was one of an ‘old Cold warrior,’ a man who had been at his prime during the outset of the Cold War during the McCarthy era. While he had won the Republican nomination with relative ease, this was because he did not face any adequate opposition. He won the election because of a ‘divided Democratic party.’ Trudeau’s victory reinvigorated Canadian politics, whereas Nixon’s election represented a country that was tired of division and war. Interestingly enough, the images that these two men portrayed during the elections were completely opposite. Trudeau’s image stemming from his youth, charisma, and sex appeal, and Nixon’s coming from his experience. Youth was an attribute that was specifically ascribed to Trudeau by the media and the Liberal campaign machine, which actually gave his birth date as    1921 rather than 1919.71 At forty-eight, Trudeau was not that much      69 Ibid, 45.      70 Paul F. Boller, Presidential Campaigns: from George Washington to George W. Bush, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 321.       71 Litt, 40.  27 younger than Nixon. Yet each man was portrayed and viewed by the public in an entirely different way. This contrast would be reflected in the way that Trudeau shaped Canadian foreign policy through an internationalist lens.  Pierre Trudeau repositioned Canada’s role as a ‘middle power’ in international relations by paying particular attention to the global south. Trudeau began his career in politics as a member of the New Democrats, and so while he denied his radicalism at a press conference the day after he became Liberal party leader, Trudeau was going to bring a left of center vision to his foreign policy. Jeremy Kinsman states that “Trudeau was an interventionist in favour of a better deal for poorer countries and people, and he was a great promoter of détente.”72 Trudeau felt Canada needed a new foreign policy to gain influence in the Third World, but he would have to be mindful of the United States if he wanted to reposition Canada internationally.73 In his first major foreign policy speech in May 1968, Trudeau criticized past Canadian occupation with Asiatic or European affairs, and stressed that the Third World was crucial to Canada. He explained that Canadians must “never forget that [they] are beneficiaries as well as benefactors” of foreign aid.74 During Trudeau’s time in office, foreign aid became one of the focuses of Canada’s foreign policy, and Canada’s aid budget expanded as its defense budget contracted.75 Multilateralism was not a new concept in Canadian foreign policy, but Trudeau’s emphasis on foreign aid redirected Canada’s focus away from international institutions to directly assisting the Third World.76 Of particular importance was growing Canadian aid to francophone Africa, which reflected growing Quebecois demand for reform of Canada’s foreign aid system to better 72 Jeremy Kinsman “Who is my Neighbour? Trudeau and Foreign Policy,” London Journal of Canadian Studies 18 (2002): 104.      73 Granatstein and Bothwell, 39.       74 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 298.       75 Granatstein and Bothwell, 266.  76 Tom Keating, Canada and World Order: The Multilaterialist Tradition In Canadian Foreign Policy (Don Mills, Ont: Oxford University Press, 2002), 1-4. 28 assisted French-speaking areas of the world. Trudeau saw this shift as instrumental to holding the country together amidst Quebec separatism as it would counter protests that Canadian policy was dominated by Anglophones.77 Trudeau however was unable to meet all of his Third World objectives, and Western aid did not transform the global south. Trudeau’s government had proposed an international aid standard of 0.7 percent of GNP, but this was not reached in Canada by the end of his time in office.78 Another facet of Canadian relations that demonstrates Trudeau’s desire to refocus Canada’s foreign policy was engaging in close relations with Latin America. Trudeau toured South America in January 1976, and stopped off in Havana on the way home.79 Although Cuban intervention into Angola was underway, Trudeau chose to go and speak with Castro about the country’s African venture.80 Trudeau showed the world that Canada was going to pursue a foreign policy of its own. He pushed the limits of American influence within the constraints of having the United States as Canada’s most important ally. Focusing on aid and going to Cuba demonstrates the intellectual input that defined Trudeau’s leadership in foreign policy.81 He understood the limits of his ability to act as a citizen of the world under American influence, but he also wanted to show that he was thinking internationally in constructing Canada’s foreign policy. The way that Nixon and Trudeau approached foreign policy greatly contrasted. Trudeau’s focus was on redirecting Canadian foreign policy. The Cuba visit was Trudeau’s way of demonstrating to Latin Americans that the Canadian view of the world was different from that of the United States. Both men had outlined their foreign policies early in their terms in office, but      77 Bothwell, 299.       78 Ibid, 310.       79 For a summary of Trudeau’s visit to Havana in 1976, and an analysis of his friendship with Fidel Castro, see: Robert Wright, Three Nights in Havana, Toronto: HarperCollins, 2007.       80 Granatstein and Bothwell, 274-275.      81 Harald Von Riekhoff, “The Impact of Prime Minister Trudeau on Foreign Policy,” in Canadian Foreign Policy, ed. J.L. Granatstein (Toronto: Copp Clark Pitman, 1993), 298. 29 the messages of these manifestos were fundamentally different. The Nixon Doctrine may have been a break from American Cold War policy in that it would keep the United States from getting into other armed conflicts like the Vietnam War. Nixon’s view of the world involved making America great again in this changing international environment, but he was still a man of great power politics. Nixon did not care about the Third World because he did not believe that it had much to offer the United States.  Nixon clearly thought American, and believed that advancing American world interests hinged on working with the Soviet Union and shaping international relations to suit America’s needs through diplomacy. Trudeau can be seen as taking an opposing view with Canadian foreign policy. He was not trying to oppose the United States as America was still Canada’s closest ally, but he was not going to bend over backwards to work towards the interests of the United States. Trudeau believed that Canadian foreign policy was not “sufficiently attuned to changed international circumstances” and therefore sought to realign Canada to better address what he saw as a changing international order.82 Canada would take on more of a flexible position in international relations. It could align itself with American interests while pursuing a policy of its own. This can be seen as a reflection of Trudeau’s experiences during the Cold War. Trudeau began to pursue a ‘middle power’ position in relation to the Third World in which Canada would play a leading role in international aid. Trudeau’s interest in Third World development reflects his ethical commitment to social justice, something that Nixon’s foreign policy did not share.83 Trudeau and Nixon had fundamentally different approaches to international relations because they had very different views of what would be in the best interest of their countries.       82 Ibid, 288.       83 Ibid, 294. 30 Pierre Trudeau took steps to visit and recognize communist China outside of the American-Canadian relationship, further demonstrating his desire to think beyond traditional Cold War ideas of containment. The Korean War had initially kept Canada from recognizing China’s communist regime, and the United States had been so against the Chinese in the 1950s and 60s that Canada had chosen not to press the issue. There was American pressure for Canada not to recognize China, and as the 1960s wore on the United States was blamed for being irrationally anti-communist in its refusal to acknowledge Chinese authority.84 Trudeau shared this view, and while he had concluded that Soviet Communism was dangerous, he did not approve of the anti-communism expressed by the American right. Trudeau ridiculed China’s exclusion from international organizations and non-recognition by Western democracies.85 Two Innocents in China was republished in English shortly after he became Prime Minister, demonstrating his desire to make Canadian’s rethink its foreign policy.86 Canada’s reconciliation with China therefore began before Nixon had taken steps to visit China and ultimately repair the Chinese-American relationship. This agreement would be difficult for Canada to reach because it also wanted to continue recognizing the Nationalist government on Taiwan. No other country had been able to do this, but Secretary of External affairs Mitchell Sharp believed that Canada could succeed. There were questions around whether or not this recognition would irritate the United States, but Canada began to take steps towards reaching an agreement with China. On February 6, 1969 Canada initially approached China, which did not draw an immediate response, but soon after on February 19th a meeting between the two countries was arranged.87 Canada was      84 Bothwell, 308.       85 English, 58.      86 Granastein and Bothwell, 178.      87 Granastein and Bothwell, 181-184.  31 able to reach an agreement to recognize China at the end of these negotiations in October 1970.88 Soon after the announcement embassies were opened in Beijing and Ottawa, and Trudeau visited China in 1973. There was no direct connection between Canada’s recognition of China and the United States’ decision to do the same in 1972, but Canada had clearly taken this diplomatic step on its own terms. Trudeau’s achievement has been overshadowed by Nixon’s visit in 1972, but Canada had made its own way in changing international affairs.   Canada also had a distinct position within the NATO alliance and its own relationship with the Soviet Union. Trudeau believed that Canadian foreign policy had to serve Canadian national interests, rather than just those outlined by its Western alliance, and this is reflected in the way that he would begin approaching NATO. Coming into office, Trudeau wanted to review whether or not Canada’s military commitment in Europe was still appropriate to the situation in Europe at the time. Therefore, Trudeau’s personal opinion on the alliance was well known; He did not see Canadian involvement in NATO as a requirement, and believed that Canada should reduce its commitment to the alliance.89 The compromise that ended up taking shape was that rather than leaving NATO, Canada reduced its troops in Europe and focused on the defense of North America. The viewpoint that Canada should play a lesser role in the alliance, like Canada’s recognition of China, emphasizes Trudeau’s attempts to create a foreign policy that was uniquely Canadian. It also demonstrates the limits of Trudeau’s independence. He could not pull out of NATO because there were pressures from the Europeans and the U.S. to stay in the alliance. On one hand, Trudeau’s foreign policy explored a radical departure from Cold War alliances, showing his independence, but on the other, he had to compromise on this shift.  Canada was still under the influence of the United States, and as this paper explores the      88 Bothwell, 309.      89 Robert Bothwell, Canada and the United States: The Politics of Partnership (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 100. 32 Canadian-American relationship it will be clear that Trudeau understood the limits of what Canadian foreign policy could accomplish. Trudeau had wanted to improve Canadian relations with the USSR as well, but the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 got their relationship off to a bad start. Trudeau’s government condemned the Soviets for violating the human right to freedom and national independence. There was little Canada could do about Soviet aggression however, and soon after USSR foreign minister Andrei Gromyko visited Ottawa. Trudeau firmly believed that he could get along with the Soviets despite their differences. As a result of this Canada and the Soviets signed an agreement on Cooperation in the Industrial Application of Science and Technology in January 1971, and in May 1971 Trudeau visited the USSR himself. Trudeau had extensive talks with both Brezhnev and Premier Alexei Kosygin, and the three discussed trade and economic cooperation, as well as signing the ‘Protocol on Consultations.’ 90 This agreement called for regular meetings between the USSR and Canada to discuss bilateral issues for the interest of both power. Canadian priorities in international relations were tied to Canadian interests instead of working within the needs of the Western alliance, and Trudeau was able to implement Canada’s own vision of détente with the Soviets. The contentious nature of the Vietnam War was also experienced uniquely from a Canadian perspective. Canada had been involved in Indochina since the collapse of French power during World War Two. Canada was involved in the International Commission of Control and Supervision (ICC) to negotiate a ceasefire between the French and the Vietnamese in 1954.91 Before the conflict accelerated again in 1963, the Canadians supported American involvement in      90 Granatstein and Bothwell, 191-194.       91 Robert Bothwell has written an article on Canada’s involvement in Vietnam before the conflict became an American war, specifically focusing on Canada’s role in the International Control Commission titled “The Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam,” International Journal 56, no.1 (2000): 89-114. 33 South Vietnam through its involvement in the ICC. Therefore, Canada’s involvement in the conflict was not simply through internal protest to the Vietnam War. Vietnam shaped the American election of 1968 and was Nixon’s primary concern coming into office. As Canada and the United States were clearly close allies, this would continue to affect Canada, but not the same way as the United as it was not as heavily invested in the conflict. But this conflict and the international relations surrounding it did also have an effect on Trudeau’s foreign policy. It was the Vietnam War that led Canadian politicians to agree that Canada could not bring its foreign policy completely in line with the United States. This viewpoint was a dramatic turn from the ideological foreign policy that Canada had been generally pursuing throughout the Cold War.92 Canada could be viewed as an alternative society to the United States, and Trudeau represented and exploited this idea. Canadian public opinion around the war increasingly favoured a Canadian foreign policy separate from the United States as Nixon increased the aerial bombings in the conflict. Canadians saw Americans as indulging in terror attacks in Asia, and this spurred on anti-American sentiment. There were uprisings in Canada that by the late 1960s to oppose the war, and unsurprisingly Parliament openly condemned the bombings in 1973. In doing so it reflected the position arrived at by most Western allies.93 The United States would ask Canada to help cement the eventual peace terms, by once again joining International Commission of Control and Supervision. Some 290 Canadians went to Saigon as members of the ICCS, but Canada entered into these negotiations with its own interests in mind. The membership was only on a trial basis, and the Canadian ICCS team eventually left Vietnam before a true agreement could be settled.94 Canada reversed its policy from the 1950s and abandoned commission      92 Granatstein and Bothwell, 40-42.      93 Bothwell, 317.       94 Granatstein and Bothwell, 50-60. 34 diplomacy in South East Asia.95 This decision demonstrates that Canada did not want to assist the United States in making peace in the region. Trudeau’s foreign policy reflects this and politicians in Ottawa no longer favoured as strong an alliance with U.S. foreign policy. Canadian foreign policy deliberately sought to distinguish itself from the increasingly unpopular approach taken by the United States during Nixon’s time in office. Trudeau was not willing to simply fall in line with American foreign policy and the needs of the United States.  Domestic policy was always his primary focus, but he also had an intellectual vision for Canadian international relations. This is particularly evident through his commitment to foreign aid, Canada’s recognition of China, and the way that the Prime Minister was able to open up Canadian relations with the Soviet Union. Trudeau’s foreign policy was not purposefully oppositional to the United States. It cannot be seen that he searched for ways to anger the Americas, or made decisions solely based on what the United States was not doing. Instead, Trudeau recognized that Canada had to have a foreign policy of its own that was uniquely Canadian in origin and execution. Trudeau was a new Prime Minister for Canada, and his foreign policy reflects the fact that he was of the same generation as Diefenbaker and Pearson. During his opening years in office, Trudeau introduced a “new intellectual framework” to Canadian foreign policy.96 However, this new direction in international relations for Canada would cause some problems for the Canadian-American relationship, as both leaders pursued fundamentally different foreign policies that did not take into account the needs of their closest ally.          95 Robert Bothwell, “Further Shore: Canada and Vietnam,” International Journal 56, no.1 (2000): 114.      96 Kinsman, 106.  35 Chapter Three:  A Shift in Partnership  Having outlined the differences in the way that the Nixon and Trudeau administrations conducted foreign policy, this chapter will look specifically at the Canadian-American relationship during the Nixon administration, from 1968 to 1974. The issue of trade and the economy during this period was central to the gradual shift away from close economic and military alliance between the two countries that had been created out of both a natural inclination towards cooperation and the dominance of American power in North America. The United States had certain priorities during this period, as outlined in chapter one. Close relations with Canada did not fit into the Nixonian vision of repositioning American international relations in the wake of the Vietnam War. The relationship between Nixon and Trudeau would also affect how this relationship functioned. Nixon and Trudeau first met in 1969 when the Prime Minister came to Washington. Their initial meeting was cordial, further meetings became more complex as the Nixon administration made decisions that affected Canada. The implementation of the office of the United States Trade Representative in the 1960s would change the administrative relations between the two countries. The most dramatic influence on the Canadian-American relationship however would occur in 1971 when Nixon’s administration took the world off the gold standard by moving away from the Bretton Woods agreements. Canada saw this decision as an end to the special relations between the two countries. All of these issues together shaped how the Canadian-American relationship functioned during the Nixon administration, and demonstrate why there was a change in this relationship.  Trudeau was the first foreign leader to visit newly-elected President Richard Nixon in 1969. It was on this visit that Trudeau made his famous remark, likening the United States to a 36 sleeping elephant. Trudeau was welcomed by Nixon in a toast at the White House on March 24th. The President lauded the Canadian-American relationship, stating how fortunate the two countries were to “have such good friends and neighbors along the longest boundary in the world.” 97 While Nixon’s remarks were clearly situated in the nature of diplomatic hospitality, they reflect the relationship that they two countries had enjoyed during the Cold War. They did not necessarily always agree, but the United States was still Canada’s “best friend and ally” in 1969.98 Both men showed a great deal of warmth towards one another. The visit was conducted as a series of meetings between the Prime Minister and the President. They spoke about the future of NATO, arms control measurements, Canadian oil developments, and Canada’s plans for a domestic communications satellite, among other things.99 Nixon stated at the conclusion of Trudeau’s visit that in the years to come the “relationship [between the two countries would] be a close one,” and Trudeau agreed that the visit had been a success.100 Whether or not this diplomacy reflected the actual feelings of either leader is unimportant. At the time both men took office, the relationship between Canada and the United States appeared to be unchanging, and the rhetoric of both leaders reveals their outward commitment to maintaining this partnership.    Relations between Canada and the United States during this era were in part dictated by the powerful Secretary of state Henry Kissinger. Like Nixon, Kissinger was a realist when it came to shaping American foreign policy. He sought to focus on the big problems that the      97 Richard Nixon, “Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada,” March 24, 1969, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1971&st=Canada&st1=#axzz1o6d1KVJA (accessed February 28, 2012).      98 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, “Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada,” March 24, 1969, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1971&st=Canada&st1=#axzz1o6d1KVJA (accessed February 28, 2012).      99Joint news briefing by Press Secretary Ronald L. Ziegler and Romeo LeBlanc, Press Secretary to the Prime Minister, printed in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (vol. 5 no. 13), 467.      100 Ibid, 466-467. 37 United States had been facing in international politics, such as nuclear arms control and Vietnam. In most of these areas, Canada had little desire or ability to contribute.101 Kissinger’s attitude towards Canada can be seen in his reflections on Canada as an ally. Kissinger later stated in his memoir the White House Years that “Canada’s relations [within the Western alliance] have always had a special character. Unlike European countries, it was not directly threatened; unlike the United States, it could not be decisive in the common defense; the Canadian defense contribution would be marginal compared with that of the major European powers or the United States. Canada’s ties, therefore, had above all a strong symbolic character.”102 Kissinger did not believe that Canada played a significant role in Cold War international politics like the United States or Europe. During a visit from the Canadian ambassador, Kissinger is said to have once joked: “I hope you haven’t come to talk to be about the sex life of a salmon.”103 This statement epitomized how the Secretary of State viewed the Canadian-American relationship. Maintaining relations with Canada was a burden for him, which did not fit into the Nixonian commitment to great power politics. Kissinger believed that American economic relations were a secondary consideration to the role of the Secretary of State in constructing U.S. foreign policy. Kissinger was also disinterested in the economic relations of the U.S., stating in his memoirs that economics “had not been a central field of study for [him].”104 Canada’s ties with the United States were primarily economic, and therefore Kissinger clearly gave low priority to the Canadian relationship.105 Kissinger clearly did not value relations with Canada in the same way that he attributed importance to other Nixonian foreign policies. This attitude resulted in      101 Robert Bothwell, “Canada-United States Relations: Options for the 1970s,” International Journal 58, no.1 (2002): 67.      102 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years, (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 383.      103 Robert Bothwell, “Thanks for the Fish: Nixon, Kissinger, and Canada,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations, 1969-1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 309.      104 Kissinger, 950.      105 Bothwell, “Thanks for the Fish: Nixon, Kissinger, and Canada,” 310. 38 Canadian concerns being passed off to other members of the Nixon administration. Kissinger would delegate routine Canadian matters to his assistant on the National Security Council, Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who would in turn pass the Canadian ambassador off to his assistant, Denis Clift.106 This kept the Canadian ambassador from talking directly to Kissinger and made Canadian-American relations seem like small matters. More importantly, it meant Canada had limited access to the key decision maker in American foreign policy. Kissinger’s role specifically reflects the priorities of the Nixon administration and the way that it has an influence over the Canadian-American relationship.  The implementation of the office of the United States Trade Representative contributed to a change in the way that Canadian-American relations were conducted. The new cabinet position was first established under the Kennedy administration as part of the US Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (TEA). The TEA was passed in order increase trade for the United States, thereby stimulating the domestic economy and strengthening the ties between nations. It specifically reformed the way that trade negotiations by establishing the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, a cabinet position that would address the trading relations of the United States.107 This new office began to alter the diplomatic structure Canadian-American relations. In 1963, Kennedy dispatched the new Special Trade Representative Christian Herter to meet with Canadian Minister of Trade and Commerce Mitchell Sharp. The two men would negotiate the changes to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade that the United States favoured, rather than these negotiations being brought through the Secretary of State.108  The Auto Pact to remove tariffs on automotive parts between the two countries was also negotiated in part under the      106 Bothwell, “Thanks for the Fish: Nixon, Kissinger, and Canada,” 316.      107 Michael Hart, A Trading Nation: Canadian Trade Policy from Colonialism to Globalization, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2002), 226-227.      108 Ibid, 247.  39 Special Trade Representative’s office in 1965, but the way in which this trade representative could alter the conduct of Canadian-American relations only became fully apparent under Nixon.109 The Secretary of State would no longer be central in the conduct of trading negotiations. Kissinger could instead focus on peace, security, détente, Vietnam, China, and the Middle East, rather than matters that specifically affected the Canadian-American relationship. This would keep Canada’s needs on the periphery of the Nixon’s administrations priorities, as the men implementing the majority of the United States’ foreign policy during the period did not have to place an emphasis on Canadian trade.  The issue that would create the most tension between Canada and the United States during the Nixon administration was the Nixon Economic Shock and the ending of the Bretton Woods agreements. The Bretton Woods agreements had been designed in 1944 to facilitate the approach towards free trade and full employment at the end of the Second World War. 110 It was designed, among others, by Harry Dexter White, an assistant to the Secretary of Treasury at the time, and was created to supply specific rules and norms regarding both exchange rates and the supply of international liquidity. The United States was to maintain the stability of its exchange rate through the purchasing of gold, with the U.S. dollar being the key currency in the international system of maintaining fixed exchange rates.111 Under the Bretton Woods system, the dollar was extensively used in international monetary and trading systems, and the United States became the single most influential actor in word trade and finance.112 There were however problems with the system for the Americans, as foreign banks could convert their dollars into      109 For more about the Canadian-US Auto Pact see Kenneth P. Thomas, “Capital Mobility and Trade Policy: The Case of the Canadian-US Auto Pact,” Review of the International Political Economy 4 no. 1, (1997): 127-153.      110 Robert Leeson, Ideology and the International Economy: The Decline and Fall of Bretton Woods, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 16.      111 Joanne S. Gowa, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 34-37.       112 Ibid, 41.  40 gold in order to build up their own gold reserves. U.S. deficits soared to $3.7 billion in 1967, and spending on the Vietnam War had accelerated inflation. The American deficit grew in the 1960s and the United States was no longer the economic superpower it had been when the system was established.113 It was under these conditions that Nixon removed the conversion of the U.S. dollar into gold from the international system.  The ending of the gold standard was a decision that the Nixon administration made in order to bring the American focus back on national autonomy. Nixon had not dealt well with the inflation problem in his first months in office, and by 1971 his administration was looking for a solution to the inflation problem.114 The decision to end the Bretton Woods style of economics that had shaped international trade and finance since the Second World War was a drastic change to U.S. economic policy that was not foreseen by the rest of the world. Nixon announced his administration’s New Economic Policy on August 15, 1971, at the close of a secret Camp David meeting with sixteen economic advisers. This policy also became known as the Nixon Economic Shock because of the unilateralism of the decision, as it violated the principle of cooperation represented by Bretton Woods and a host of other post-war agreements. Nixon’s economic policy imposed a ninety-day wage and price freeze, a ten percent import surcharge, and ended the convertibility between U.S. dollars and gold.115 Nixon stated that the policy would target “unemployment, inflation, and international speculation.”116 The United States desired to enhance its control over its domestic economy, and this new economic policy would focus      113 For a summary of how Nixon’s administration addressed inflation problems before 1971, see Joanne S. Gowa, Closing the Gold Window: Domestic Politics and the End of Bretton Woods, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 42-59.       114 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 138-140.      115Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw, The Commanding Heights: The Battle Between the Government and the Marketplace that is Remaking the Modern World, (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1998), 60-64.      116 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: ‘The Challenge of Peace,’” August 15, 1971, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php? pid=3115&st=&st1=#axzz1omaxO35E (accessed March 1, 2012).  41 American economic needs.117 As Nixon stated in his address to the nation on the economic policy, his administration wanted to “invest in [the] Nation’s future” rather than allowing other countries to take advantage of the gold standard.118 Essentially, Nixon’s administration implemented a domestic policy that sacrificed an international set of rules in order to uphold U.S. freedom of action.  Canadian policy makers saw the Nixon economic measures as a blow to the Canadian- American relationship. Canada was the largest trading partner of the United States, representing about seventy percent of Canadian foreign trade.119 It is obvious then that Canada would be largely affected by Nixon’s New Economic Policy as the two countries’ economies were so intertwined. Economic difficulties had also been a topic of conversation in Canada. The Canadian government had not taken any measures to directly address this aside from asking Canadians to bear the economic hardship. As a result Trudeau was re-elected with a minority in 1972 because of his economic record.120 Canadians were concerned by the New Economic Policy for two related reasons. First, it signaled an American move towards protectionism by imposing an import surcharge that was viewed as a traumatic experience Canadian trade.121 Canada was also concerned because it was not exempted from the policy in spite of agreements like the auto-pact. The Nixon move therefore had both an immediate impact on Canadian trade and, equally unnerving, was a signal that the future was unpredictable. Canada viewed the New Economic Policy as an ending of the special relations between the two countries. There was uneasiness among Canadian policy makers over the issue and many felt that the United States      117 Gowa, 13.       118 Richard Nixon, “Address to the Nation Outlining a New Economic Policy: “The Challenge of Peace,” August 15, 1971.      119 Robert Dunn, “Canada and its Economic Discontents,” Foreign Affairs 52, no.1 (1973): 120.       120 Hart, 275.      121 J.L Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worst: Canada and the United States to the 1990s (Toronto: Thompson /Nelson, 1991), 247.  42 had acted in a way that they might have expected from France or the United Kingdom.122 Canada believed it should be exempt from the Nixon measures. As a response, Canada asserted its right to control its own destiny and protect itself from external forces. In 1972, Mitchell Sharp wrote about three options for the future conduct of Canadian-U.S. relations in a paper that became known as the “Third Option.” Sharp stated that Canada could maintain its present relationship with the United States, or Canada could “move deliberately toward closer integration with the United States.” The third option which Sharp favoured was for Canada to “pursue a comprehensive, long-term strategy to develop and strengthen the Canadian economy and other aspects of its national life.”123 Between 1972 and 1976, the Canadian government showed strong support for the CBC and the Canada Council. It also established the Foreign Investment Review Agency in order to examine concerns about foreign presence in the Canadian economy. This scrutiny did not change Canada’s trading partners. The ‘third option’ became a domestic policy option that strengthened the Canadian economy and created a host of agencies such as Petrocan which would curb American influence on the Canadian economy.124 Canadians saw the New Economic Policy as a direct challenge to their relationship with the United States, and in turn sought to strengthen their own independent identity.  The change in this dynamic can be seen as reflected in the way that Richard Nixon and Pierre Trudeau interacted after 1971. Nixon would visit Canada in 1972 and the meeting would have a very different tone than the visit Trudeau had paid to the United States in 1969. In an address to Parliament on April 14, 1972, Nixon stated that while the two countries were natural partners, each must have autonomous policies. He said that his administration’s policy towards Canada reflected the new approach the United States was taking in all foreign relations. Nixon      122 Dunn, 122.       123 Mitchell Sharp, Which Reminds Me: A Memoir (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 184.       124 Kisman, 110-111.43 asserted that “no self-respecting nation can or should accept the proposition that it should always be economically dependent upon any other nation.”125 The Nixon Economic Shock had clearly altered the discourse between the two countries. For Nixon, the meeting was a stop off on the way to yet another more important great power meeting. Nixon had just come from a visit to the People’s Republic of China and would be going on to speak with the Soviet Union. So while Canada had concerns about Nixonian foreign policy, Canadians were unimportant in comparison. Trudeau for his part had visited Nixon in Washington several months earlier to address concerns over the NEP, but tapes of that meeting only reveal further resentment between the two men. Nixon can be heard calling Trudeau a “pompous egghead” at the end of the meeting.126 Their personal dislike of each other aside, clearly there had been a change in the way that Canada and the United States were going to conduct relations since the cordial initial visit in 1969.  The Canadian-American relationship was therefore neglected under the Richard Nixon administration. While relations appeared normal when Trudeau visited the White House in 1969, this would slowly change as the Nixon administration outlined its foreign policy. Kissinger did not have an interest in economic policy, and therefore did not value Canada as an important ally. The implementation of the office of the Special Representative of Trade Negotiations would further allow Nixonian foreign policy makers to redirect anything to do with Canada to a subordinate. The issue that solidified this change was the implementation of Nixon’s New Economic Policy in 1971, which created an import surcharge and ended the Bretton Woods      125 Richard Nixon, “Address to a Joint Meeting of the Canadian Parliament,” April 14, 1972, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3377&st=Canada&st1=#ixzz1ospAYNU7 (accessed March 1, 2012).      126The White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives at  College Park, MD. 630-18, 4:01 to 6:10, December 6, 1971. http://nixontapes.org/chron2.html (accessed March 1, 2012). 44 economic system of converting dollars into gold.  This decision shocked Canadian policy makers and can be viewed as the course of action that made Canada move further away from its ally. While there was no evident change for American policy makers that Canada was moving in a different direction, both countries were at a cross roads that forced a change in international policy. The U.S. was facing inflation and hostility as a result of the Vietnam War, and Canada’s change was reactionary to the United States. The way this relationship functioned during the Nixon administration would lead to a permanent shift in Canadian policy.                  45 Conclusion: The Changing of a Special Relationship    Having examined the way that the Canadian-American relationship functioned during the Nixon years, I want to assert that the relationship between these two countries did begin to function differently and had changed by the time that Nixon left office. It was the ending of a special relationship that these countries had enjoyed before the end of the sixties.  No single event can define this shift. It was a gradual process, brought on by Vietnam War tensions, economic pressures, and assisted by the leaders of these two countries who could have not been more different. In conclusion, this chapter will look at the factors that caused the changing Canadian-American relationship between 1969 and 1974. While the change was not necessarily acknowledged by either country at the time, it is evident that Canada and the United States would no longer have the same relations that they had during the earlier years of the Cold War.   The Nixon administration’s primary focus was implementing a "grand design" approach to foreign policy that would reshape the international order. The core of this foreign policy was advancing American interests through relations with great powers in the international system. As discussed in chapter one, the Nixon Doctrine was designed to keep the United States out of military entanglements, but it also provided a blueprint for moving forward with American foreign policy in the wake of the Vietnam embarrassment. Nixon and Kissinger wanted the United States to be the dominant superpower that it had been since the end of the Second World War, but also recognized that in order for this to continue they would have adapt to changing circumstances. Working with the Soviet Union for strategic arms limitations was not an acknowledgment that both powers were equals, but rather a recognition by the Nixon administration that the hard anti-communist stance that the U.S. had been taking would no longer be entirely beneficial. Nixon’s “Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign 46 Policy” in 1971 outlined the “new American-Soviet Relationship” that he was trying to build, characterized by the SALT talks, European cooperation, and assistance in the area of Middle Eastern conflict.127 This cooperation would benefit both the United States and the Soviet Union, and by working with the communists rather than against them, Nixon believed he could ensure that the United States remained the dominate power. The Nixon administration was the only one in U.S. history to give an annual report on foreign policy to congress, demonstrating the President’s commitment to implementing this new kind of foreign relations. Foreign policy and great power politics clearly defined the Nixon administration. Nixon and Kissinger did not see Canada as an important ally in implementing their new foreign policy, and therefore neglected to foster relations with Canada. Kissinger in particular was not interested in trade and economics, and Canada therefore did not fit into the foreign policy that Kissinger trying to construct. While Canada was involved in NATO and other international endeavours such as peacekeeping activities, it was a middle power. In Kissinger’s mind, having a strong economic relationship with the U.S. was not going to advance America’s position in the international system. Canada was primarily an economic partner to the United States; all other international involvement was secondary in importance to Kissinger. On the other side of the border, Canada had distanced itself militarily from the United States because of the Vietnam War. Canada’s position in the NATO alliance had become much more symbolic when Trudeau’s government reduced the Canadian military involvement in April 1969.128 Canada was simply the United States’ most important trading partner. Historian Robert Bothwell explains that “Canada did not figure on Kissinger’s list of countries or issue that merited      127 Richard Nixon, “Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy,” February 25, 1971, The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=3324&st=United+States+ Foreign+Policy&st1=#axzz1pG7brRuo (accessed March 1, 2012).      128 Bruce Thordarson, Trudeau and Foreign Policy: A Study in Decision-Making (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1972), 121-163.  47 automatic presidential consideration.”129 Therefore, the relationship was neglected during the six years that Nixon was in office. Issues of Canadian importance were passed off to subordinates, so that Nixon and Kissinger could better focus on issues that they felt were important. Even on issues where Canada could have been a valued partner, such as opening relations with China, the Nixon administration chose to conduct foreign policy its own way. Nixon could have used the Chinese embassy in Ottawa as a tool to assist with creating a favourable climate for American- Chinese relations.130 Even though Canada had recognized China a year earlier, the Nixon administration chose to address the Chinese alone in 1971. Nixonian foreign policy dictated that the President only work with powers that were deemed important enough in international affairs.   The Nixon administration implemented policies that would reassert American superiority in the world, but these same policies also neglected Canada as an ally. Nixon’s foreign policy as President was marked by decisions that would help the U.S. advance its global position. However, in only concentrating on policies that would help the United States re-stabilize its position as a superpower, the Nixon administration did not make decisions that would benefit Canada and its other allies. For instance, the United States did not consult with NATO during the SALT I negotiations with the Soviet Union.131 This caused some resentment towards Nixon among the NATO allies, as the Europeans were concerned that the two superpowers would negotiate over their heads on other matters that affected them profoundly.132 This can also be seen in the way that the ending of the Bretton Woods agreements came about. This was a decision that the United States primarily for its own domestic interests. The Nixon administration      129 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver: UBC  Press, 2007), 315.      130 J.L. Granatstein, and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 186.      131 Joan Hoff, Nixon Reconsidered (New York: Basic Books, 1994), 185.       132 William Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy during the Nixon Presidency (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998), 415.  48 took the world off the gold standard and imposed an import tariff in order to address the massive debt that had been building up around the Vietnam War. Canada was not exempt from this tariff despite the existence of the U.S. - Canadian Auto Pact which was supposed to give Canada economic privileges. This decision would dramatically change the world economic system. Despite being the U.S.’s largest trading partner, Canada was not consulted with before the Nixon New Economic Plan was put into place. Nixonian foreign policy was focused on making America great again. The Nixon administration did not care if it damaged its relationship with its most important economic ally if the policy was best for the United States. This decision making can be seen in all of Nixon’s foreign policies, which is why there is a general disregard for the effects of American policies on Canada during this period.  Canada was also taking steps that affected the relationship. Pierre Trudeau’s re- positioning of Canada as a middle power did not strengthen Canadian-American relations. In chapter two, I demonstrated that Trudeau understood the limits of what he was able to accomplish in the U.S. sphere of influence, but was still looking to reinvigorate Canadian foreign policy and Canada’s role in the world. Trudeau had once commented that “Seventy percent of Canada’s foreign policy is predetermined by the Canadian-U.S. relationship” and that Canada’s goal should be to “maximize freedom of movement with regard to the remaining thirty percent.”133 Trudeau was in power from 1968 to 1979, and then again from 1980 to 1984. If it was solely Nixon’s foreign policy that neglected the Canadian-American relationship, those ties would have been repaired when Nixon was forced to leave office his in scandal. Trudeau’s influence in moving Canada away from the United States in examining the changing Canadian- American relationship, therefore, cannot be underestimated. Trudeau’s interest in foreign policy      133 John Herd Thompson and Stephen J. Randall, Canada and the United States: Ambivalent Allies, (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2002), 249.  49 is reflected in the release of Foreign Policy for Canadians in 1970.134 While the document was vague in nature, its publication shows the Prime Minister’s desire to reform Canada’s foreign policy. Trudeau used the freedom that he was allowed in Canadian foreign policy to make Canada into a Third World leader. He attempted to expand Canadian foreign aid, and created personal connections with China, the Soviet Union, and Cuba. Trudeau felt less engaged in the future of the Western alliance, and more interested in Canada’s role in the rest of the world.135 All of these aims moved Canada away from the United States, and towards having its own independent political identity in the international system. Trudeau’s influence on the Canadian- American relationship, while not hostile, was clear: Canada no longer needed the United States to have an influential foreign policy and Trudeau was going to do what he wanted whether or not the American’s agreed.   Finally, it is clear in looking at the relationship between the two countries that Richard Nixon did not like Pierre Elliot Trudeau. While this is a minor aspect of how the relations between the two countries were conducted, neither man would go out of his way to work with the other. There is no evidence that Trudeau disliked Nixon, but he saw Nixon as “a complex man, full of self-doubts.”136 Kissinger commented that “it cannot be said that Nixon and Trudeau were ideally suited for each other.”137 In his memoirs, Trudeau includes this statement, which reflects the fundamental differences between these two men that were highlighted in chapters two and three.138 Upon their first meeting at the White House in 1969, Nixon stated in a toast to Trudeau that “when I [Nixon] think that the Prime Minister entered politics in 1965 and within 4      134 Canada Department of External Affairs, Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1970),  5.      135 Robert Bothwell, Alliance and Illusion: Canada and the World, 1945-1984 (Vancouver: UBC  Press: 2007), 317. 136 J.L Granastein and Norman Hillmer, For Better or For Worst: Canada and the United States to  the 1990s, (Toronto: Thompson /Nelson, 1991), 224.      137 Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 383.       138 Pierre Elliot Trudeau, Memoirs (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993), 167.50 years became the head of government, believe me, for one for whom it took 22 long years to get here, we have, sir, for you the greatest respect for that political leadership which you have provided.”139 This statement subtly reveals the resentment that Nixon felt towards Trudeau and his privilege. Nixon always viewed himself as a political outsider, someone who had had to work his way up to everything that he had achieved.140 Perhaps he resented Trudeau’s charisma and popularity in Canada. More likely Nixon disliked the Prime Minister because he represented the academic elite that Nixon felt he had been excluded from his entire life.141 The strained relations between the two men can be heard on several of Nixon’s White House tapes. On the same tape in which Nixon refers to Trudeau as a “pompous egghead,” he also calls the Prime Minister an “asshole” and a “clever son of a bitch.”142 While it has been said that relations between the two men were better than these statements reflect, this kind of tension was clearly a part of the way that they interacted.143 Therefore, it is not a stretch to assert that these kinds of relations would have put a strain on the Canadian-American relationship.  Canada and the United States continue to have close economic and cultural ties, but politically the Canadian identity would change during the Nixon administration.  Canada was less committed to following American international policy, and focused more on its own international aims and leadership. The Nixon Economic Policy in particular finalized this change, but as these outlined above demonstrate there was no singular event that changed the      139 Richard Nixon, “Toasts of the President and Prime Minister Trudeau of Canada, March 24, 1969,” The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=1971&st=Canada &st1=#axzz1o6d1KVJA (accessed March 1, 2012).      140 Richard Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1978), 7-8.      141 For a look at Nixon’s rise to politics and his distain towards the Republican elite see: Michael A. Genovese, “The Making of Richard Nixon, in The Nixon presidency: power and politics in turbulent times, London: Greenwood Press, 1990.      142 The White House Tapes, Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, National Archives at  College Park, MD. 630-18, 4:01 to 6:10, December 6, 1971. http://nixontapes.org/chron2.html (accessed March 1, 2012).      143 Robert Bothwell states in Alliance and Illusion on page 331 that Pierre Trudeau’s relations with Nixon were not as good as he thought, but better than most Canadians believed. 51 Canadian-American relationship. This shift diminished the relations of two allies who had been so close for so long. While future leaders of the two countries might try to bring the countries closer together, the Nixon era marks a decline in the Canadian-American relationship. At the end of the Nixon era, nothing was set to bring this bond back together. The changes in U.S. trade policy, though momentary, and the problems of the Vietnam War had resulted in surging Anti- Americanism in Canada. Canadians rejected much of what the U.S. stood for, stating that they would be outraged if Canada were to join the United States. The U.S. embassy in Ottawa became alarmed when this sentiment began to emanate from the government.144 Pierre Elliot Trudeau personified this change in the Canadian public and his foreign policy reflects this shift. It was one that would continue to change the way that Canada conducted its international relations. The United States was on a decline, and Canada would come out more favourably in world affairs during this period. In reality, Richard Nixon accomplished so much more in his presidency in terms of foreign policy than Trudeau was ever able to as Prime Minister. Six years allowed the Nixon administration time to dramatically reorientation American foreign policy, in a way that protected American interests within the shifting system of global power. Trudeau’s rhetoric was more inspiring and more humanitarian in nature, but ultimately was unable to live up to the promise that it provided. While Trudeau was one of Canada's longest serving Prime Ministers, it was the six years that he served with President Nixon that were some of the most dramatic, forever changing the way that the Canadian-American relationship has functioned.        144 Bruce Muirhead, Dancing Around the Elephant: Creating a Prosperous Canada in an Era of American Dominance, 1957-1973 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 108-109.52 Bibliography Primary Sources:  Canada Department of External Affairs. Foreign Policy for Canadians. Ottawa: Queen’s Printer,  1970.  Joint news briefing by Press Secretary Ronald L. 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