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Desperate Times, Desperate Measures: German Oppression, Dutch Resistance, and the Tragedy at De Woeste.. Huyskamp, Ross 2011

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     Desprate Times, Deprate Measurs:  German Opprsion, Dutch Reitanc, and the Tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve   by Ruud Huyskamp   Submited in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the Honours Program in History University of British Columbia, Okanagan. 2011    Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Maurice Wilams, Department of History  Author’s Signature: ___________________________   Date: ___________________  Supervisor’s Signature: ___________________________   ate: ___________________  Honours Chair Sgnature: ___________________________   Date: ___________________  ii  © Ruud Huyskamp, 2011  iii  Abstract A case tudy of the atck on Hanns lbin Rauter and the subsequent reprisal tDe Woest Hoeve alows usto investigae the role ofthe Grmn occupirs nd the utch resitance, nd especialy the relation betwn tm after Operation Market Garden. The Dutch-Grman reltions slowy deteriorated over the cours ofthe occupation, reching a ritial ow in erly March 1945. By tha tim t Germans were dtermined to forestl defet nd clamped down on the increasingly hostil Dutch popultion. Manwhile, the Dutch resitanc suffered from various fctors tha inhibited its developmnt, but was simultneously ncouraged by Alied vitories and motivatd by extreme cold, lack of fuel, scarcity of food, and ever-increasing lvels ofGrmn represion to undertke incresingly bold nd daring misons. When tse two forces mt, he result were deadly nd revealing, giving a ore nuanced persctive ofthe sta ofafirs n t Ntherlnds fter Sptember 1944.   iv  Acknowledgements First and foremost, I would like to xtnd a special thank you to Dr. Maurice Wilams, without hom this project d not exist. It isdifiult o overstae my gratiude for his enthusiasm, inspiration, and great forts in his examinaton of my work nd providing me with advic on creating  beter project han I could have r iagined. Throughout the procs ofwriting Dr. Wilms offred ncouragement, advice, and mny great ides. I would have been lost wihout hi.  I would also ike to extnd a sincere thank you to Dr. James Hull for his advice in the early stage ofthe projct and for the commnts on the prospectus. is keen insghts nd kisuggestions sColloquium Chair were ofgreat sitance. I am furthermore indebted to many student colleagues athe University  British Columbi Okanagan for providing a fun nd stimulating nvironment in which to learn nd grow. In this rerd, I would especily ike to thank Rainder K. Saini for proofreding the final copy. Likeise, I d like to hank the librarians the University of British Columbia Okanagan ibrary for the innumerabl document deliveries and inter-library-loans this project required.  I ow afinal thank you to my frinds and fmily whose love, patienc, and encouragement has upported m throughout this project.         v   Contents  Abstrac ……………………………………………………………………………………… ii knowledgements ………………………………………………………...………………... iv Prefac: Aftr Markt Garden……....…………………………………………………………1 Chapter One: The Donauklub: German Oppresion……………………………………....…7 te Two: Sonderstelung: Dutch Rsitanc.…………………………………………...20 Chapter The: Convergenc: e Woeste Hoeve. .......…34 onclusion: Pasing Judgmnt: Dst in Retrospect.……………………..…….46 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………………………… 51 1 - Preface - After Market Garden  “They were lined up in order ofexcution. I was forced to walkby them thrtims and  notallowelookaway. Tr ushav been 117  118.” - Mrs. Ledder-Brouwer, ywitnes1 The story of Nazi occupied Holland has not received full atention, even though, compared to other West European democracies, the Ntherlands suffred tmndously.2 While France, Blgium, and the Netherlnds south of t Rhine were liberated beginning in the fal of1944, the Dutch north of t great rivers remained under Grman occupation until t spring  1945, suffering starvation, extnsi depredations, and heightened German violenc. By war’s end the Ntherlnds had suffred some 204,000 civiln deaths, rly tn tims any s Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, nd Norway ombined.3 Although the diary of Anne Frank is wel known, and any y have heard ofArnhem because oft il-fted Operation Market Garden, few relize what happened to t Dutch after the btl for Arnhem was lost.  In many respect he final months ofthe war ere t ost fascinatng, yet he most tragic episode ofthe German occupation  t Ntherlnds. This paper investigaes how t relationship betwn t Duth and the Germans, or more precisely betwn the Grman                                                  1 After the war Mrs. Ledder-Brouwer ecounted thashewas biking on the road between Arnhem and Apeldoorn when she came cross the ite of the reprisals. German oficers forcdhr to gt of her bikand walkbythe row ofxcuted prisoners, ot allowingher tolookaway. HenkBernds, Wost Hov:8 maart1945 (Kampen: Uitgeverij Kok Voorhoeve, 1995), 29-30. 2 Henri VanDer Zee, TheHunger Winter: Ocupid Holland 1944-5 (London: Jull Norman & Hobhouse, 1982), 15; David Stafford, Endgame, 1945: The issing Final Chapter of orld ar II (New York: Little, Brown & Company, 2007),258. Throughout this paper the names “Holland” “the Netherlands” wil be usd interchagebly. Althoug technialy incoret, given the fact tht “Holland”olycvers two ut f the twlve provinces, “Hoand” i what Eglis-speakers tradiionally call the country he Dutch mslve call “Nerla.” 3 These nubers exclue Jewish deaths. Belgium sufered rughly 10, civl de; Luxemor, 5259, Denmark, 1000; and Norway, approxiately 5000. Chris Bishop,S. Hell on the Western Front: The Waffen S. In Europe 1940-1945 (St. Paul: Amber Books, 2003), 104-105.  2 occupiers and the Dutch resitance changed after Operation Market Garden, and it especialy examines how changes in this reltionship fctd the lives ofthe general popul. In considering these iues, one specif event in March 1945, what  Dutch aled “D Woeste Hoeve,” stands out. An analysis ofthis piode, nd especialy the fators tha ld to i, alows for a beter xaminaton ofthe stae the German ocupational forces nd the Dutch resitnce in the lst six months of World Wr II.  In early 1945 the Netherlands suffered from amsive faine, the only one in history to occur in  modern, developed, nd litra country.4 The resitnce, which had not only grown desperate, but also ore determined than ever to defeat he Nazis, undertook dangerous misons to levit he fami and provide for the nerly 300,000 people hiding throughout the country.5 One such ison took place on t night ofMarch 6, 1945, when a sml resitance unit from the regiof Apeldoorn tmpted to capture met ruck ner De Woeste Hoeve,  smal halet bewen the cites ofArnhe nd Apeldoorn.6 Instad of finding food, hower, the group acidentaly taked a vehicle arrying the Nazi Chief Police in the Ntherlands, Hnns Albin Rauter, the second-highest rankiNational Socialst in the ountry. T sult left him badly injured, but alive.7 The underground fighters had no idea tha t car they shot up contained a high-profile S.S. Oficer. It was painful tsament to he ft hat even this late in the wr, the Dutch resitanc as til suffering from inherent disadvantages, such s  lck of internal unifiaton, the udacity of som mbers, and the absenc ofrelible miltary inteligenc.                                                  4 Zena Stein, et al, Famine and Human Development:The Dutch Hungerwinter of 1944-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 40. 5 Paul Arblaster, A Hstory of the Low Countries (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 228. 6 Berends, 11. 7 Louis De Jong, Het Konikrij der Nederlane ide Tweed Wereldorlg, vol. 10B, Het Latse Jar II: Eerste Helft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1981),418.  3 The Germans, of course, ordered severe prisal for the atck. De Woeste Hoeve provided tm with  lom pretxt to show the popultion tha t Grmans wre stil n control and tha any ct resitant to German gemony would be punished mercilsy.  Consequently, Rauter’s replemnt, Krl . Ebenhardt Schöngarth, ordered t idiate xecution of Todeskandidatn, the hostages held by the Nazis for just such an occsion.8 Across the Netherlands these hostages died: 59 were shot in Amsterda, 49 in Amesfoort, 38 in DeHag, nd notr 8 in Utrecht.9 The orst reprisal took plac on March 8 at he site ofthe tck itself. From nearby prisons t Nazis gathered 117 hostges, drove tm to he roadside, formd them into groups of20, nd directed t green uniformed Grman Order Police to shoot t down. Al 117 hostages were lft on the side ofthe road, lid out in the order of their execution. Every paser-by had to sop, alk up and down tha d three tims, and look only at he orpses.10 In al, the number of executions cme to an stounding 263, the highest number of hostages murdered in any singl episode in Nazi ocupid Holland.11 This tragedy t De Woeste Hoeve betwen March 6 nd 8, 1945, provides n ppropriate case tudy to understand betr the stae ofthe Dutch resitance the German occupiers, nd speily the reltion twen tm ftr arket Garden. It demonstras two things about the conditions in the Ntherlands in 1945. First, De Woeste Hoeve reinforces the notion tha German mlicousnes nd terror reached its peak in the final year of t war. Hostage xecutions ocurred on an lmost daily basi, generaly in public nd on stree corners to                                                  8 Berends, 17. 9 Ibid., 1-26.10., 30. 11 Werner Warmbrun, The Dutch under German Ocupation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 251.  The final numberof executions (263) is supported by Warmbrunn, 60; Berends, 25; Jørgen Hæstrup,European Resistance Movement, 1939-1945: A Complete History (Westport, CT: Meklr Publishng, 1981), 450; Wern Rigs, Life with he Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe 1939-1945 (Garden City, NY: Doleday & Company, 1982), 40. Waler B.Maas sted biger fiures for th kilng of htaes aftr the atpt oautr, about 40, of who 117 wer excuted at the site of th attempt. (Walr B.Maas, The Netherlands at ar:1940-1945 (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1970) 146.)  4 heighten the impact.12 Second, the event tragicaly exemplifes tha the Dutch resitance was still a reltively sal, ideologicaly dirse organiztion, which d not truly unifid into  single organiztion.13 Aordingly, the resitance sometims undertook misons tha undermined their own objectives by provoking the Grmans to retalite with harsh reprisal.  Although individual resitanc pockets did much to undeine the Grmn ar efort, the lck of aunified system ofcomnd, the absenc ofreliable miltary inteligenc, nd t audaity  som bers had disatrous consques in tha final yer of the war. For Hollnd, the cbination of these two ftors turned the year 1945 into the bloodiest period of World ar II.14 Although the German malice and violenc isuniformly acknowledged by historians, the treament oft Dutch resitnce ismuch ore controversil.  The historiography of Hollnd under Grman ocupation, and specialy the role ofthe resitance within tha framework, has developed round a myth of unified nd singl-minded organiztion.15 Part ofthe reason for this miconception nvolves eantics. The Dutch term verzet, which transltes as“resitnce,” gives the ipresitha the resitnce to  Nazis a unified; aftr l, people spoke ofDutch resitance. Throughout this projct he term “resitnc” wil beused in much the same way, but this did not mean the resitance spoken of was united movent. As thi paper wil rgue, the only thing ost resit groups had in comon was their oppositon to he Nazi regime, and they generaly had widely divergent religious, politcal, or social ides nd otivatons.                                                   12 Van Der Zee, 180. 13ick v Galen Last, “The Netherlands,” inResistance in Western Europe, ed. Bob Moore (New York; Berg Publisher, 2000), 207. 14 Stafford, 25. 15ee fr example: Warmbrun, 185, 215, 254; Van Galen Last, 189-221; Diane L.Wolf, Beyond Anne Frank: Hidden Children and Post-war Familes in Holland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Ido de Haan, Na deOndergang: De Hernneng aan de Jodenvervolging in Nedrlan, 1945-1995 (Den Haag: Sdu Uitgevers, 1997); AntoniusA.Klumpr, Sociale Verdediging en Nederlands Verzet’40-’45: Ideëel Concpt Getoest aan Historiche Werkeljhed (Tilburg:Drukerj Giaoten, 1983) 5 The myth surrounding the resitance lso grew out ofthe fact hat in the post-1945 proces ofrebuilding, the moveent ws credited ith reakening Duth nationalism and creating a stronger sens ofnational unity.16 It was comfortito hink of solid, unified resitnce gainst he Nazi occupation. As hitorin Louis de Jong points out, it was only “natural tha t resitnce trated atntion. It furnished examples ofself-crifie nd courage under xtremly dangerous circumstnces and it was rtarming… to dwl on this materil.”17 Subsequently, the myth of abrave unified resitnce dovetailed wl ith he strong national consiousnes oft postwr period.18 As will be demonstrad, however, such a myth was incorret. The focus ofthis paper is thus twofold. First, De Woeste Hoeve, and by extnsion the conditions in the Netherlands tlarge, can tel usabout the sta ofthe occupatiand t German tiude towrds t Dutch ner the nd of the wr. In erly 1945, t Nzis began to reliz the inevitability of their demise asought to clamp down on whatever they could control. Retliton for anything percived s ontrary to he German r fort was imediatly nd severely punished. In this light, De Woeste Hoeve ws very much a part ofthe overal Grmn stragy. Second, investigaon of the tragedy confirms the ste ofthe Dutch resitance. Encouraged by the diminishing German positon, ations grew bolder and incresingly daring. The desperation brought on by the Hungry Winter (Hongerwinter) of1944 and 1945, moreover, ma valiant misons anecesity. Dspit heir ncreasd ctiviy, however, the Dutch resitnce ws unable to unify ftively, set up a relible systm ofcommand, or obtain urat miltary intligenc to aid n its operations, nd thus reained a partiulrly diletnt afir. Although the atempt to capture the meat ruck ws very                                                  16 Van Galen Last, 207. 17 Louis De Jong, “Preface:” in Werner Warmbun, The Dutch under German Ocupation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), v. 18t, 2.  6 commendable in ts inte, the fact hat iended in the atck on Rauter, and cused the death of 263 peopl athe hands oft Germans, remains tragi reminder tha the Dutch resitnce suffered from inherent disadvantges.   7 - Chapter One - The Donauklub:  Grman Oppresion  “We hope not to win the war. We hope to postpone defeat long enough to provoke a fatal split beween the Alis.”- Ernst Kaltnbrunner 19  The tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve was n obvious result ofthe deteriorating relations betwen t utch nd the Grmans.  To understand what ppened tha arly morning of March 8, 1945, we ned to examine the nature objectives ofthe Nzi occupation, and especily understand tha the Grman pproach had not remained staic throughout the five-year subjugation. Initily, t occupation was rked by reltive stbility, and for large sections ofthe population daily ife ontinued much the same sbefore.  When t wr began to urn against Germny, howver, things changed drasticly. The Nazis gre increasingly desperate o hang on to whater they ould, and with hat growing despair cme n iresed us ofviolnc. Then, hen t German Reich began to crumble in arnest, he Nazi distre set f acsade ofevents tha turned the year 1945 into the most lhal yer t etherlands xperinced during the war. In these days ofightened violenc, De Woeste Hoeve st out as one of its worst episode.  When t Germans invaded Holland on May 10, 1940, the Dutch were completly unprepared for wr. For them t invasirepresentd the first violation of sovereignty sinc                                                  19 David Stafford, Endgame, 1945: The Missing Fal Chpter of World War II (New York: Little Brown and Company, 207), 258.  Ernst Kaltenbrunner was a high-ranking Austrian S.S. Officer who replaced Reinhard Heydrich as thehief o the Scurity Police and the SecurityService (ChefderSicheritspolize und des SD) after his assassination in 1942. Kaltenbrunner the president of Interpol between 1943 and 1945, and as the highest-ranking S.S. Oficer to be tried at Nuremberg 1946. (Louis De Jong, Het KonikrijdrNeerlandi Tweede Wereldoorlog, vol. 5,Maart ’41 – Juli ’42: Tweede Helft (‘s-Gravenhg: Staatsuitgeverij, 1974), 1034.) 8 the Napoleonic Wars. After he Congres ofVienna the country had managed to say out ofevery Europen onflict for almost acentury and  half.20 Events uch s the Franco-Prussian War nd orld ar I went by nerly unnoticed, the Dutch, perhaps naively, thought tha the current wr ould pas them as wl. Aftr al, Hitler, in numerous public delarations, had promised to respect Holland’s indepence nd policy of neutrality.21 The Duth Prime Ministr, Hndrik Colijn, in fct, belived tha ven ithe ase a European wr, hich he regarded as very unlikely, the German Reich would respect Hollnd’s sovereignty.22 In reality, he German High Commnd had deid it must occupy the Netherlands in the event ofwr on t wstrn front.23 Hitler agreed violating both Duth and Belgin neutrality ould protect he industrial Ruhr Vly, nd gain base for the probable air-tck on England.24 Furtrmore, it ws the Führer’s opinion tha such a brech of neutrality was irrelevant, and tha no one ould question it afer the Third Reich had won the ar.25 The Grmns lso considered the Low Countris to be anatural extnsiof tir country. Ocupation, moreover, would give Germany control ofthe Mas, Wal, nd Rhine Rivers, al of whih carried uch of the overss trade ofthe Reich.26 A final consideration to invade ws the Duth olonial mpire, in particular the East Indies (present-day Indonesia). Capture ofthe empire would bring Nzi Germany dvantges in foreign trade and commerc.27                                                  20 It should be noted that the Netherlands did experience the Blgian Revolutin i 1830 and 1831, when the southern provinces seceded from the United Kingdom f the Netherlands tofrm the indpt Kidm f Belgium. (J.H.CBlom and Emiel Lamberts, History of tLow Countris, trans. James C. Kenedy (New York:Berghahn Books,1999), 301.)21 Max Dmaru, Hitlr, R u Prklamatio, 1932-1945 (Wauconda: Blochazy-Carducci Publishing, 1990), I:699, 1149; Whitney R.Haris,Tyranny on Trial:TheEvidence at Nuremberg (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1954), 139-140.22 Louis e Jong, Het Konikrj der Neerlnde ide Twede Werldorlg, vol. 1,Voorspel (‘s-Gravenhg: Stasuitgevrij, 196), 59, 649. 23 Werner Warmbru, The Dutch Under German Occupation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 6. 24 Ibid. 25 JeremyNoakes and Geofrey Pridham, Nazism, 1919-1945: Foreign Policy, War, and Racial Extermination (Exeter: University ofExetr Press, 1995), 765.26 Warmbrun, 25. 27 Gerhard Hirschfeld, Nazi Rule and Dutch Colabortin: The Netherlands uer Geman Occupation, 1940-1945 (New York: Berg Publishers, 1988), 33. 9 Aside from the miltary nd economic onsiderations to invade, there was lo the vague, but crucial, iologicl nd rail ncntive.28 Much like hefelt about the Norwegians nd the Danes, Hitler believed the Dutch were mbers oft Aryan mstr rac (Hrnvolk), t race destined to rul lser peopls. Acording to historian Werner armbrunn, the Führer was driven by a romantic-historical vision of aHoly Germnic Epire oft German Ntion, which s entily  reonstiut the old oly Roman pire with he ddition of some Sandinavian trritories.29 Consequently, Hitler sought to unite he Aryan Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, nd Flemings in a “Grmanic Empire” under Nazi ldership.30 Moreover, he wnted to integrat hes peoples to improve the raial compositon of the German nation.31 Thus, aftr the invasion, t Ntherlands had a Speil Stus (Sonderstlung) within the Nazi sphere, based on this racil deology.32 Importntly, tha foc meant relatively mild nd friendly occupation, t lest initaly, nd certainly far diferent from the wr of destruction launched in Poland and throughout Estern Europe.33 As aresult ofthis Sonderstelung, it initaly ppeared the occupation was to be an unexpectedly civilzed afir.34 Sinc many Dutchmen xpected something fr more onerous, they wre surprisd to find the eney soldiers polit and ourtous, ladione historian to cal this time the “honeymoon period.”35 Even the Belgins, who had experiencd  Germn ocupation ls than a generation before, were taken back by the “corretnes” ofthe                                                  28 Hirschfeld, 19. 29 Warmbrun, 2530erner Rings, Life with he Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe 1939-1945 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1982), 22; Ivo Schör, HetNationa-socialstsche Beeld van de Geschiedenider Nederlanden: Een Hstoriografische en Bibliografische Studie (Utrecht: Hes Publishers, 1978), 90.  31Adolf Hitler, Hitlers Tichgespräche i Führeauptqrtie, 1941-1942, ed. Gerhard Riter, trans. enry Picker (Bonn: Anthenäum-Verlag, 1951), 122, quoted in Werner armbrunn, The Dutch Under rman Ocupation, 1940-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 24. 32irschfeld,4. 33 The term usedis“war of destruction” (Vernichtungskrieg.) Pietr Lagou, “Belgium,” inResistance in Western Europe, ed. Bob Moore (New York; BergPblihers,20), 30. 34 Paul Arblaster, A History ofthe Low Countries (New York: Palgrave Macmilan, 2006), 222. 35 Warmrun, 1.  10 occupiers’ behaviour.36 For their part, the Germans rrived in the Netherlands hoping to find frinds, ven alies, and expected to occupy the country with as fw troops as they could.37 Consequently, the pproprit authorities aw to i tha troops nd police personnel remained s inconspicuous asposible.38 Additionaly, during this phae the Grmans basked in succesive victories in Westrn Europe, and Nzi leaders were confident tha ty would be abl to ontrol the Duth population without much dditional fort. They d good reason to fel sured. By t ime the Germns italed  civilan government in t Netherlnds, the Belgian rmy was about to collaps nd the French were lose to defat.39 The general feling, moreover, s tha the British would have dificulty xtricating ven  part oftir xpeditionary force from the continent, much les muster nough strength to repel aGerman invasion.40 Everything suggested tha onc the Grmans gained continental supremcy, it would be impossible to dislodge them. In t Netrlands, the German hegemony quickly took hold. Although the Nazis worked hard to creat nd preserve apolicy of friendship, there was no mistaking tha ty ere the masters. The Dutch governmnt had gone into xile in London, nd on My 18, a mre thre days ftr Holland surrendered, a civilan dministraion headed by an Austrin, rthur Seyss-Inquart, ws instled. Appointed personaly by Hitler s t High Commisoner of the Ocupied Ntherlands (Richskommisar für die bestzn niderländischen Gebit), acted as the supreme civiln authority.41 In his propagandistic naugural speh, Syss-Inquart claied tha hehad no inteion of imposing National Socialst ideology on Dutch society, and                                                  36 Bob Mre, “Comparing Resitance nd ResitanceMovements,” inResistance in Western Europe, 250. 37re, 30; Rings, 69. 38 Rings, 69. 39 Ibid., 47-48.40ins, 48. 41 Warmburnn, 27.  11 indeed, he hoped to win the Dutch to he benefits ofNazism in a friendly manner.42 He furtrmore claimed tha t Germans did not have iperilistc designs on the country, guaranteing the onarchy and the indepence ofthe Netherlands fter he Nazis had won the war.43 On June 6, Seyss-Inquart was joined by Hanns Albin Rauter who, apart from the Reichskommisar, becam the ost powerful officl in olland. utr, ho s alo n Austrian, had en reomended by Hinrich imler and personaly appointed by Hitler s Higher S.S. and Polic Lader in the Netherlands (Höher S.S. und Polizeführr und Gneral-Kommisar für das Siheritswen).44 H ws tal, tough-looking man of lite charm, which did lite to ndear him to he Dutch. 45 A fnatic nd radical Ntional Socialst with an overriding sns ofduty, Rauter was quite formal in his ontts with eyss-Inquart nd other colleagues.46 Unlike the Richskommisar, Rauter rarely eft his post, hich meant hewas on hand during the crise oft ocupation. For any Dutchmn Rauter bea t symbol ofthe Nazi terror, asocitd with al reprisl kilings tha took plc in the country.47 T nnouncmnts ofthose reprisl, plastered al over Dutch ites, bore his name and his signature.48 While peopl readily joked bout Seyss-Inquart, aling him “Six and  Quarter” (Zes en een Kwart), no jokes circulated a Rautr.49 To round out the occupation pparatus, three other officals, ech in harge ofdiferent government departments, joined Rauter and Syss-Inquart. The first, Hans Fischboek, a                                                  42 Arthur Seys-Inquart, Vier Jahre in de Niderlan: Gesamlte Rdn (Amsterdam: Volk und Reich Verlag, 1944), 9-10; Richard S. Fuegner, Dawn ofCourage: Dutch Rsitac toh Gema Occupio fHolad, 1940-1945 (Minneapolis, MN: Mori Studio, 2008), 64. 43 Wambn,27;J. Bolen and J.C. Van Der oes, Five Years of Occupation: The Resistance of the Dutch Against Hitler-terroism and Nazi-robbery (N.P: Printed on the Secret Press of D.A.V.I.D., 1945), 14.44 Hendricus J. Neumann, Arthur Seyss-Inquart (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1970), 139. 45 Warmbrun, 31. 46 Ibid., 31. 47 LouisDe Jog, Het Konikrij der Nederlane ide Tweed Wereldorlg, vol. 4,Mei ’40 – Mart ‘41: Eerst Hlft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1972),74. 48 Ibid. 49 12 former bank president from Vienna, asumed responsibilty for Finance and Economy.50 Fridrich Wimer, another Austrin, delt with Intrnal Afairs nd Justic.51 The third man, Fritz Shmidt, from stphalia, ws the only non-ustrin mong the op ivilan officls. He was Commisoner-General-ithout-portfolio, but was reponsible for Public Opinion and Dutch politcs.52 With so many Austrians, the Dutch referred to hem asthe Donauklub, fter the river Danube.53 The Germn High Command lso played up this Austrian-connetion, hoping to wken plasnt mories ofTyroles yodeling nd Viennes jovility.54 The nickname stuck.  There was nothing pleasnt bout the occupation, however, and the “honeymoon” was over ithin  fe months. Vry few Dutchmen sympathizd with  Ntional Socialst cuse, and Seyss-Inquart had no succes atrating others through friendly persuasion. Himlr, who had countd on 600,000 young Dutchmen for his S.S., was furious and claied tha “Jeish apitlist nfluences” had corrupted the utch.55 The relity s, of ours, t the Dutch had become acustomd to he realits ofocupation and had grown more vocal in opposing it. This ld to increased friction betwen the two side. In 1941 the tension ce to  head with the outbreak of the Fbruary Strike in Amsterda. This diruption was general demonstraion against he nti-Jewish measure launched by the Nazis.56 Although put down after only one day, t strike arked the brekdown of t Germn concilation tmpt, nd the acknowledgement that t Dutch would not convert to National Socils voluntarily.57                                                  50 Warmbrun, 33; Neumann, 138. 51 Neuman, 138. 52 De Jog, Mei’40– Mart ‘41: Eerste Helft, 86-89. 53 F. Parkinsn, Conqueing the Past: Austrian Nazism Today &Yesterday (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1989), 334. 54 Ibid. 55 Henri A. Van Der Zee, The Hunger Winter: Ocupied Holland 1944-5 (New York: Oxford University Pres, 1975), 10. 56 Louis De Jong, Het Konikrij der Nedrlan id Tweed Wereldolg,vol.4,Me’40 – Mat ‘4:Tweede Hlft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1972),800. 57 Warmbru, 12. 13 After he February Strike the strife betwen the German dministraion and the general populac larly intnsifed. 58 T Dutch had to adapt to he new physicl realites of ocupation: food shortages, tric rationing, and compulsory labour registraion.59 Moreover, the German police began to ke Todeskandidaten, hostages witng execution in the event ofsabotge.60 The plight grew orse becaus ofthe ntry of the Sovit Uniand t Unitd Stes into t war in June and Dmr 1941 respectively.61 Tir entry, coupled with a worsning miltry situaion n North Africa prompted further harsh masure with ncresingly oppresive legislation, random arrest, rbitrary imprisonments, nd tcks on personal liberty.62 Further, Hitler’s conomic mobilizaton for total wr in al Nzi-ocupied trritories in the spring of 1943, ld to he introductiof forced lbour nd internmnt offormr Dutch servicmen.63 During this period rationed goods began to disapper as wl.64 The combination of thes fators did much to upset he Dutch, and it cme lr tha the Germans had failed to win tm over. Because the Nazis realized they ould no longer win t Dutch to heir cus, it becae ls iportnt to indoctrinat tm, or to treat them gently.65 Conditions, however, did not radicaly worsen until after he Normandy landings ofJune 6, 1944. The Alid Expeditionary Force dvancd cross nortrn France nd Belgium with lightening speed and s the anticpation of apossible Dutch liberation ran high, German apprehension ran ven higher. 66  The Nazis now began to prepare for the Alied ncursion tha ty knew as coming. Geographicaly, the Netherlands, with s river systm esntialy                                                  58 Ibid. 59 Dick van Galen Last, “The Netherlands,” inResistance in Western Europe, 196. 60 Warmbrun, 11. 61 Ibid., 12. 62 Van Galen Last, 19. 63 Rings, 69-70. 64 Warmbrun, 13.65 Ibid.  66 LouisDe Jog, Het Konikrij der Nederlane ide Tweed Wereldorlg, vol. 10A, Het Latse Jar: Eest Hlft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1980),172.  14 separating north and south, was perfectly positoned as defensive German line.67 Seyss-Inquart was convinced tha the Alid advance could be stld, perhaps n turned around, in the Netherlnds.68 Rautr too, ws certin tha Holland was el situaed for  prolonged defns. 69 Tir dreams ofan iminent Alied defet re stimultd by the forts ofJoseph Goebbels, who set up  specil unit spreading misnformation nd tantlizng half-truths to hungry Alid and neutral journalist.70 Usithis network, the Nis pread deceptive inteligence with he hopes ofinducing the Alies to believe tha azi Germny could holout for som tim. T tmes wre alys t sam: “ipregnable positons, masive supplies carefully hidden ibomb proof cves, underground factoris, and, of course, lit units oftroops to man the whole bastion.”71 If the Alies believed this, o the Nazis fntasized, the Aericns nd t British might sek a negotiatd peac, which ould in turn provoke split with he Soviets.72 In the final days ofthe wr, the Germns no longer fought for victory, but merely to postpone defeat long enough to provoke a sparation amongst the Alies.  The hopes of split betwen the Anglo-erican forces and t Sovits meant heightened German determinaton to hold on to what s til under their control. The Dutch, manwhil, wre ncouraged by the rapid advance ofthe Alies and expeted liberation very soon. As ifto support the notion, on Septmber 5, 1944, cam big news: the first roops had supposedly crossed t Belgian-Dutch border.73 The ood in the Netrlands was one ofeuphoria. Prim Ministr of the uth government-inexil, Pietr S. Grbrandy nnounced in a broadcst from London: “Now tha the Alid armis have crossed the Dutch border in their                                                  67 Ibid., 175. 68 De Jong, HetLatse Jar: Eest Helft, 175. 69 Ibid., 182. 70 Staffrd, 25. 71 Rodney Kennedy-Milnot, The Fortress that Never Was: The Myth of Hitler’s Bavarian Stronghold (New York: Holt, Rinehard, and Winston, 1964), 25.72 Staffrd, 25. 73 De Jong, HetLatse Jar: Eest Helft, 175.  15 irresitble advance, I wish to give awrm elcom to our Alies on our native soil…. The hour of liberation has come.”74 The relity as lightly difrent, hower. London, alwys about twenty-four hours behind t facts, had brazenly broadcast hat roops had crossed into Dutch trritory and lirated the ity of Breda.75 It was ihful thinking. In reality he Alid troops were stil 60 kilomtrs awy from Dutch soil, nd the liberation of the first Dutch ity, Mastricht, had to wait until Septmber 14.76 Nevertheles, peopl in the Netherlands were ecstatic after he radio announcemnt.77 Soon storis began to circulate: Dordrecht had supposdly fln nd t roops wre n route to Rotterdam.78 Believing this,  resitance group took posseion of aschool in Rottrdam, only to fac rrest and xecution by the Grmans, who re stil frmly in ontrol.79 When no Alied troops rrived by nightfal,  sens ofrelity returned. Radio Oranje, realizng t imns istake ithad mde, nnouncd tha ithad “no further offical reports bout the advance in the Netherlands.”80 Most ofthe Dutch population lso knew beter by then; phone cls to Breda had ben sufficent to show tha the town ws til n Grman hands, as were Dordrecht and Rotterdam.81 That Tuesday, Septmber 6, subsequently becme known s Md Tuesday (oll Dinsdag).82 To the Germans, Dolle Dinsdag was a clear dmonstraion of the Dutch hostily towards them. They now began to act on the sumption tha they occupid nemy territory nd tha                                                  74 From May 1940 onwards, the Dutch had a daily fiften-miute broadcst onthe faciltes ofthe B.C., known asRadio Oranje. It provided the population with news untainted by the Nzi propagd machin. Van Der Zee, 18.  75 Ibid., 19; De Jog, Het Ltse Jar: Est Helft, 172. 76 Van Galen Last, 203; Warmbrun, 14.77 Pieter Lagrou, The Legacy ofNazi Ocupation: Patriotic Memory and National Recovery in Western Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Pres,2000),59-60. 78 Van Der Zee, 21. 79 Ibid.; De Jong, HetLats Jar: Eest Helft, 227-228. 80er Zee, 2. 81 Ibid., 22. 82 The termDole Dinsdag was firt used onSeptmber 15, 944, in the ati-German gazine De Gil. It was nevertheless possible, however, that e nam hrgemongthral ulationbfore that; “it is almost toperfct termtodenote the gnral feling ofthat dy.” DeJong,HetLts Jr: Este Helft, 175.   16 they faced  hostile population wilng to give aid to he enemy wherever possible.83 Rather than drafting Dutch mn of iltry age for the lbour batalions, t Nazis began drafting tm out offear they ight asit he Alied forces.84 T hysteri oftha day lso convinced any Grmns nd Dutch ollborators to ransport their womn and children to Germany.85 Syss-Inquart had alredy set he example. On Septmber 3, hehad sent his wif to Slzburg.86 Dolle Dinsdag clerly srved as wake-up cal for the Nazis, nd they realized tha the situaion for many ofthem had become unsfe.87 For mebers oft Dutch ollborationist party, the National Socialist Movement (Nationaal Socialistische Beweging, or N.S.B.), the situaon was much worse. From the beginning of the occupation the general populac had been more resentful and violent towards t N.S.B.ers than towards the Germns theslve.88  Consquently, many collborators were ager to get out oft country and  mas exodus followed. Over 60,000 people fld the country in a moveent the landestine pres ockingly dubbed the new Drive to the East (Drang Nach Osten).89   It as not until now, wn German defat smd alost inevitable, tha Westrn Europe, and the Netherlnds in particular, began to suffer the worst excs ofthe Nazi regim. After D-Day, Hitlr decreed tha ltrils ofresitanc fighters in Europe should stop, sthee turned them into heroes and martyrs.90 Instead, they should be summarily executed. To implnt this new rule in t Netherlnds, Krl G. Ebenhardt Schöngarth ws hosn and ade head of the Security Srvic (Sicritsdienst, or S.D.).91 rth, a stern charater, who inssted on                                                  83 Warmbrun, 14. 84 Ibid. 85 Van Der Zee, 22. 86 Ibid., 23. 87e Jong, Het Latse Jar: Eest Helft 1,185-186. 88 Ibid., 180-181.89 Arblaster, 23. 90 Van der Zee, 18191 The Sicherheitsdienst was the secret police and intelligence arm of the S.S. It was often seen as a sister organization of the Gestapo. Ibid.   17 punctuality, alowed no one to speak gainst his decisons.92 He was, however, les involved in the decisons ofhis ubordinates han some ofhis presors nd lowd a gretr degree ofindividual discretion among his underlings. This meant tha in some regions ofthe country he toleratd a reign of terror.93 One colleague cld Schöngarth “a raging drunk” and n “impossible human being” who “ursd onstntly.”94 This wa the Schöngarth who took over Rautr’s job aftr the atack at De Woeste Hoeve.  Hitler’s directive bout resitanc fightrs began a new era ofbrutality. For example, in June 1944, a locl resitance group briefly managed to ke over the vilge ofTull, Franc, kiling nd badly mutiltng the Grman garrison housed there.95 Wn t Germans regained the own later he sae day, ty found 64 dead.96 The next morning, the reprisl begun as lmales in tn wre gathered together. Ninety-ni Frenchmen wre publicly hanged from balconis, indow griles, and lmpposts along the main stres ofthe own ithe hope t the hangings would detr further tcks.97 More would have died hat S.S. not run out ofrope. Instead, they rounded up 149 ivilans nd deported them to Grmany for slave lbour. One-hundred-ndone did not return.98 Menwhil, in Italy, Field Mrshal Abert Keslring gave orders tha vilages from which shot wre fid t Grmn srvicemn should b burned down and the “culprits and ringleaders” publicly hanged.99 T terror reached t Netherlands on October 24, when 29 civilans were publicly executd in Amsterda in retaliton for the murder of an S.D. Ofier.100 Pdestrians nd                                                  92 De Jong, Het Latse Jar: Eest Helft, 68. 93 Ibid.; Va Der Z, 181.94 Adlf Emile Cohen, Een Onbekende tijdgenoot: de laatste Befehlshaber der Sicherheitspolizei and des SD in Nederland (Amsterdam: Rijksinstuut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1955), 171.95 H.R. Kedward, In Search of the Maquis: Rural Resistance in Southern France, 1942-1944 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 173. 96 Ibid. 97 Rings, 41. 98 Kedard, 174. 99ins, 4. 100 Louis De Jong, Het Konikrij der Nederlane ide Tweed Wereldorlg, vol. 10B, Het Latse Jar: Eerst Helft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1981),370.  18 others who pased by were held at gunpoint and forced to witnes the brutalites.101 At his trial Rauter claimd tha hehad known nothing bout this reprisal, nd tha hehad protestd to Hitlr bout the execution of hostages in uch a fshion.102 This w acrucial point, given tha Rauter had apparently not wnted ny retliton for the 1941 February Strikes either, and d supposdly sked for no reprisal to be carried for t atck on his lif atDe Woest Hoeve. 103For the later incdent Rauter limd tha Schöngarth had cted on instructions from Himlr.104 Si uter made thes taents athis trial, their truth is debatable. Moreover, at he tie ofthe October 24 reprisl in Amstrda lof Schöngarth’s ctions stil requid uthorization by Rauter, which made his clai of innocenc highly unlikely.105 Whetr or not Rautr ever fild  complint with Hitler remains questionable, but even if had, it was unlikely tha the Führer ould have done anything bout it. The shooting of hostages, hich s justifed as n xtrem form ofself-deens, was long standing, having been uthorized as erly s Spteber 16, 1941.106 The cre sted tha “in general, the xecution of fity o  hundred Communist” was to be regarded as “proper reparation for t death  one German servican.” Furthermore, the manner of their execution should “enhance the terrent fct.”107 Although t decree had originaly been designed for the Eastrn Front, which aording to he Nazi worldvi was populated with biologicaly inferior peopls, after July 1944 it was applied to al occupied trritoris on Hitlr’s personal orders.  Acordingly, Grman reprisal grew more atrocious and more frequent after July 1944. In ugust, in the own of Wormerver, five citzens wre chosen t random nd xecutd after                                                   101 Ibid. 102 Ibid, 371. 103 Van Der Zee, 183. 104 Ibid. 105e Jong, Het Latse Jar: Eest Helft, 371-372. 106 Rins, 40.107 Ibid., 4  19 policeman ws kiled.108 In Rotterdam, several days later, four men wre executed aftr local resitnc unit fred 48 prisoners from apolic stion.109 On the night ofSptmber 30, 1944, a German miltary vehicle was tcked near Putten, wounding al pasengers and kiling one.110 Gneral Christiansn, the Supreme Comnder of the Wehrmcht in the Netherlnds, was furious and demnded tha t ntire vilage pay for t crim.111 Although no one was kiled directly, 87 homes wre burned, women nd children were taken prisoner, and the entire mal population as transported to he concntration amp of Nuengame.112 Of t 600 mn deported, 552 perished.113 The tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve took place sveral months later, when t Nazis were on t brink of deft nd Alid victory ws lost rtain. As the public exeutions ofthe civilans in Amsterda athe incdent in Putten have shown, De Woest Hoeve was not an berration nd w very much in lne with Grman ctions lswhere. It moreover reinforced the notitha German ggresion and terror rehed its peak just before the nd of the war. With  establishmnt ofheightened Grman ggresion, one ofthe wo elmnts entil for De oest Hoeve was in plac. The second fctor, the Dutch resitanc, grew and volved alongside the Germn ggresion. Dangerously, the resitrs often cted on insufficent or inacurate information, did not profesionalize astir mebership increasd, nd undertook increasingly hazrdous misons. This combination had dire consquees in Mrch 1945.                                                   108 Fuegner, 182. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid., 43. 111 Genral Friedich Cristiaan Christianse was the Suprem Coander ofthe Whrmact in the Ntherlands (Wehrmactbefhlsaber in de Nidelande), wichmade imthe militaryconterpart toys-Inquart. He held the post from1940 until the final German surrender in 1945. Althoug Christane was ot sfatic sRautr, or as intellectual as Sys-Inquart, he was nevertheless an ardent Nazi. hen he heard about Puten heallegedly sid: “Das ganze Nestuss angesteckt werden und die ganze Bande an die Wand gestellt!” (“That whole nest [Putten] must be burned out and the hole gang put against the wall”.) Louis De Jong, Mei ’40 – Mart ‘41: Eerst Hef, 10-101; quote in De Jog,HeLaatst Jaar:Eerste Hlft, 51. 112 Olivier Wieviorka and JacekTebinka, Resisters: From Everyday Life to Counter-State in Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europ, ed. Robert Gildea, Oliver Wiviorka,ndAnet Waring, (New York: Berg Publishers, 2006), 195. 113 Walter B. Maass, The Netherlands atWar:1940-1945 (London, New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), 177.  20 - Chapter Two - Sonderstelung:  Dutch Ritance  “As everybody knows, the Dutch are the most insolent and obstrepeous peopl in t entire Wst…” - Josph Goebbels114 Isac Newton’s third law ofmotion, for every action there isan equal and opposite rection, had special pplicton to he relationship betwen t Dutch nd the Grmns during the ocupation of the Netherlands. While itws obvious tha the uth resitance mrged as reaction to  Grman occupation, it also changed as t German occupational polices evolved. In other words, the Duth resitnce pasd through  sri ofstge. Initialy, it was ry mild and pasive, often aking the form ofsymbolic resitance. As time pased, however, it bece incresingly violnt nd udacious. Yet ahe sme ti, the resitanc never unifid, and despit its best eforts, it leaders oftn ctd on insufficnt or inacurate information, which had disatrous consquencs in March 1945. Of equal danger, in the fa ofdesperation brought on by the Hongerwinter of1944 nd 1945, the resitance grew more ilng to undertake hazardous misons. When this increased desperation nd growing audacity combined with heightened German aggresion, it had lthal consequences for the Dutch.  The inital Dutch reation to he occupation was paive, due in large part to  surprise of t invasion for which t Netrlands s both materily nd psychologicaly                                                  114 Joseph Goebbels, The Goebbels Diaries: 1942 – 1943trans. Louis P. Lochner (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1948), 121.  21 unprepared.115 On May 10, 1940, the Germans simultaneously invaded the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg without adeclration of wr. The Wehrmacht forced t Dutch to  humilting cesfire n les than five days.116 Just o days before tha nd, Quen Wilhemina of Orange fld to London aftr her army chief told her  could not guarante r safety.117 While the Queen’s sudden departure tfirst surprised, hocked, and demoralizd the Dutch, fortunatly s oon became symbol of fredom and the representation of national sovereignty and unity.118 Aordingly the Queen becme t focal point for Dutch people from al wlks oflife. As hitorian Dr. Louis deJong obsrved, she becme “the living symbol ofthe nation’s wil to survive.”119 The inital period ofthe occupation was consequently marked by acts ofresitance tha focused on t Queen and  reawkened nationalis.120 Populr forms ofymbolic oppositon wre the aring of pins mde ofcoins bearing the picture ofthe Queen, growing flowers in the national colours, nd naing newborn babies ftr living mebers ofthe royal family.121 Many people also tuned into Radio Oranje, a daily 15 inute broadcast from t Dutch government-inxil on the faciltes ofthe B.B.C.122 Queen Wilhemina’s “spirited” speehes on this rvic were usualy  highlight for many Dutch. She regularly lunched verbal atcks German nd Dutch Nazis. A joke circulted hat he young princes Beatrix nd Irene were not lowd to listen to heir grandmother’s specs becaus ofthe foul lnguage she occasionaly used.123 Tling anti-Nazi stories and rrying nd distributing pictures oft royal fmily were oreover                                                  115 Dick van Galen Last, “The Netherlands,” inResistance in Western Europe, ed. Bob Moore (New York; Berg Publisher, 2000), 191. 116 Paul Arblaster, A History ofhe Low Countries (New York: Palgrave Macmilan,2006), 221.117 Henri V Der Zee,  unger Winter: Occupied Holland 1944-5 (London: Jull Norman & Hobhouse, 1982), 90; Arblaster, 221. 118 Gerhard Hirschfeld, NaziRule and Dutch Collaboration: The Netherlands under Geman Occupation, 1940-1945 (New York: Berg Publishers, 1988), 16. 119 Louis de Jong,“The Dutch Resistance Movements and the Alies," 1940-1945 inProceedings of the Second International Conference on the Histry fResitace Movments – Milan, 26-29 arch 1961 (Oxford: Pergamon, 1964), 10.  120 Rell Miller, TheResistance(Morristow, NJ: Time-Life Books Inc., 1979), 25. 121 Louis de Jong and Joseph W.F. Stopelman, The on Rampant: TheStoryofHolland’s Resistance to he Nazis (New York: Querido, 1943), 336. 122 Van Der Zee, 21. 123 Ibid., 97.  22 everyday expresions of popular disent. Patriotic itzens greetd mebers of the Dutch collaborationist party, the Nationaal Socialsithe Bweging (N.S.B.) by singing “On the orner of the stree” (Op den hoek van de Straat), which describes how the N.S.B. had betrayed their country.124 The Dutch greeting “halo” as transformed into an cronym to mean “Hng al traiors” (Hang Ale Landvraders Op).125 Acts ofymbolic and pasive resitance remained a significant part ofHolland’s struggle against he Nazis for the duration of the wr. The ore overt ts resitnce wre more dificult o organie, asty requid larger groups and m planning. When resita units did emrge, they usualy grew from personal friendships.126 Often loclity, religious beliefs, politcal persuasion, or social cs united hes groups. Some wre highly conservative and reationary, fighting for the idels ofCrown and Country, hil others, like the communist, w their chance to impose anew, diferent, improved post-war society.127 Tse groups, in turn, did not usualy combi into larger units, which ade the Dutch resitanc command control hierarchy pliated, decentralized, and ompartmentd.128 An excption to his wa the partnership betwn the Calvinist Reistnce Council (Raad van Vrzt, or R.v.Z.), nd several much saler Communist reistance units.129 Their union was very succesful, given their vastly diferent ideologies. This w, howver, an excption, s the only thing most organizations shared was the common goal of defeating the Nzis.130                                                  124 J.J. Bolen and J.C. Van Der Does, Five Years ofOccupation: The Resistance of the Dutch Against Hitler-teroism and Nazi-robbery (N.P: Printed on the Secret Prss of D.AV.I., 1945), 17. 125 Ibid. 126 Arblaster, 228. 127 Ibid. 128 StewartW. Bentley, Orange Blod, Silver Wings: The Untold Stry ofthe Dutch Resistance During Market-Garden (Bloomington, IN: Authouse,207), 6.129 Ring, 214. 130 Jeroen Dewlf, Spirit ofResistance: Dutch clandestine literature during the Nazi occupation (Rochester, NY: Camden House, 201), 75.  23 The creation of larger groups and the possibilty for active resitance was lo constrained by Hollnd’s geography nd demography.131 In 1940, the Netherlnds ompased only 32,529 square kilometrs in are, aking it saler than Vancouver Island.132 Furthermore, thanks to an exclnt transport system, the Germn garrison of three infntry divisions and several regiments of the Order Polic (Ordnungs Poliz) could move anywhere in the country within a fw hours.133 Furthermore, the country had no ountains nd very lite forest o provide shelter for partisan oveents.134 Only in a few ooded riverside ares wre sitance groups abl to hide Germn prisoners ofwar.135 Then, because ofHollnd’s population density, only very smal underground groups could sembl in ny one place.136 In 1940, the population of the Netherlands was roughly 9.25 ilon and, t nerly 710 persons per square kilometr, t country boasted he highest recorded popultion density n the world.137 In the west, i as twice as high as lwre. Although the west constiuted only about afith of t otal nd surf ofthe Netherlnds, it acounted for almost half the totl popultion  the country.138 For these reasons Holland ws il-uitd for full-scle atacks or partisan wrfare.139 It should be noted tha the sam geographial nd demographical onstraints plagued Belgium and Denmark. T Netrlnds, however, lso had the disdvantge oftopography. During the wr, the country was in many respect ut off rom t rest ofthe world.140 Unlike Norway, enmark, or France, it did not share alnd border with a neutral country, and the                                                  131 Jørgen Hæstrup, Europe Ablaze: an Analysis ofthe History of European Resistance Movements 1939-45 (Odense: Odense University Press, 1978), 101. 132 The province of Flevoland was created in 1986 by reclaiming the Flevoplder, part of the IJselmeer, and has since added almost 1,500 square kilometers. (Mark T.Hoker, The History ofolland [London: Greenwood Press, 1999], 6.)133 Van Galen Last, 190 134 Ibid.; Richard S. Fuegner, Dawn ofCourage: Dutch Resitance tohe German Occupation fHoland, 1940-1945 (Minneapolis, MN: Mori Studio, 2008), 3-4. 135 Werner Rings, Lifewith he Enemy: Collaboration and Resistanc in Hitlr’s Europe 1939-1945 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1982), 179. 136 Ibid. 137 Zena Stein, et al., Famine and Human Development: The Dutch ungerwinter of 1944-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 39. 138 Ibid. 139 Rings, 179. 140 Ibid., 213; Fuegnr, 4.   24 Germans closely guarded its North Sea venue to England.141 While over 50,000 Norwegians mde their sape to Sweden or Britin nd over 30,000 Frenchmn fld to Spain, ls than  thousand Dutchmen succd in making the dangerous sea crossing to England or crosed occupied trritory to Switzerland.142 T country’s location, moreover, was on the diret rout betwn Alied airfelds in Britin nd the industril hertlnd of Germny. This meant tha the dense concntrations ofanti-rcraft artilery tre hindered the dropping of scret gents or supplis to resitance groups.143 For som then, resitanc remained an isolated afair.144 In light ofthes geographic, topographic, nd deographic onstraints, the Dutch fel back on other means resitance, such as t ofespionage, sabotge, clandestine printing, and strikes.  Historin Jørgen Hæstrup cled the strike the “most charateristi feture” ofthe Dutch resitance.145 Indeed, strikes were usd very efctively to onvey the hostily  t populae, the first one coming n lat June, a mre sn wks after he Dutch surrender. Not surprisingly, t first srike ralied round  eber of the Royal Hous. On June 29, the birthday of Prince Bernhard, who as in xile in London, people alcross the country flew t national fag, in violation of Germn ban.146 Moreover,  stopped work and took to he strees to ing the national nthem, likewise prohibited, and many arked the day by crrying carnations in one oftheir buttonholes.147 The carnation was the Prince’s fvorite flower, and subsequently the day was remebered as Cation Dy (Anjerdag). Aftr njerdag the situaion in the Ntherlands remained relatively quiet. It was the calm before the storm, however, as much bigger strike broke out in February of 1941. In oppositon                                                  141 Van Galen Last, 190. 142 Rings, 213. 143t, 1.   Only ate inthewarwee suplies more asily fown in.Importanly, the Stn gus ed inthe attempt on Rauter were of British origins and had been parachuted in by Alied Forces. (GedenvFrjtag DrbKüzl,Resistance,Reprisals, Reactions in  Surviving Hler and Musolin: Dail Lif Occupd Ero, ed. Robert Gildea, OliverWieviorka, ad Atte Warring [New York: Berg Publishers, 2006], 190.) 144 Van Galen Last, 190.145 Jørgen Hæstrup, European Resistance Movements, 1939-1945: A Complete History (Westport, CT: Meckler Publishing, 1981), 10 146 Rings, 157. 147 Ibid.; Miller, 2.  25 to he pasage ofanti-Semitic laws, people initaly took to he strees in Amsterda, which had become t picentr of politcal turbulnc nd nervous tension.148 The unrest quickly spread to other its, and the February Strike (Februari Staking), as itwas ubsequently aled, becme one of the few popular uprising undertaken by non-Jeish citzns gainst nti-Jwish polices.149 In t Ntherlnds, where bout half the population was Calvinist, brought up on a stri knowledge of t Bible, anti-Semits was regarded not merely as inhuman, but sacrilegious.150 Nverthels, the wlkout as put down after only a day nd mny strikers rrestd, but not executed. After Fbruary 1941, the Dutch did not gain resit he anti-Semitic polices ofthe Third Reih n mas, nd of t 140,000 Jews ho lived in t Netrlnds in 1940, only some 35,000 survived the Nazi racial polics.151 Whil the Fbruary Strike neitr slowed nor stopped Nazi polices, it was clear indication tha t Dutch had grown hostil to he Grman presenc, nd tha the “honeymoon” ws over.152 Two fators help explain this. First, by this tim the Dutch d begun to recover from the initl shock of invasion nd had realized the realites ofocupation. Second, the Duth had grown hostile to he German uthoritis, pecily t person  Arthur yss-Inquart. The Reichskommisar hatd  royal fmily and never had much appreciaton for the Dutch eitr.153 Dspit his inital concilatory speech, he de no secret ofthe ft hat had om to he Netherlands to exploit ifor the Third Reih.154 Consquently, t Dutch took an intens dislike to this Austrin and, by extension, to he German occupational forces.                                                  148 Hæstrup, 102; Arblaster, 27. 149 Lois De Jong, He Konikijder Neerlande ie Twede Werldorlg, vol. 4,Mei ’40 – Mart ‘41: Tweede Helft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1972),800. 150 Michael R.D. Ft, Resistance: an Analysis of European Resistance to Nazism 1940-1945 (London: Eyre Methuen, 1976), 260. 151 Ibid. 152 Werner Warmbrun, The Dutch under German Ocupation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 12. 153 Van Der Zee, 98. 154 Ibid.  26  After Fbruary 1941 the Dutch resitance grew increasingly more violent, focusing its aggresion the collaborators first, and on the Grmns theselve second.  Although the strikes ofJune 1940 nd February 1941 might have gin t impresion of agret Dutch solidarity, this wa not the cas. The reality was t numerous, often tiny, underground organizations had sprung up to work gainst he Nzis.155 The Dutch Resitance was,  one historin cled it, a “very smal nd ideologicaly diverse” moveent.156 Although mny Dutch agreed on their oppositon to he Nzis, they disgred on ost other points. A good indiation of this diversity came in t clandestine pres. The Dutch had one oft liveest underground publicatons in al ofocupied Europe.157 As hitorian Miel Foot explained, “Printing was one ofHollnd’s lrgest light industries; there were thousands ofsml prese and skiled compositors, plenty of paper, and plnty of subjcts o write bout.”158 Eventualy over a thousand clandestine wsrs ppeared, supplemntd by numerous broadsheets nd pamphlets.159 The most el known were the Calvinist Trouw, the communist De Waarid, the royalist JMaintiendrai, and the to progresive papers, Het Parool, and Vrij Nederland.160 Like the resitanc itslf, tse newspapers were ideologicaly varied nd often only had the defeat oft Nzis n common, hich ensured tha atempts tunificaton mongst newspapers in 1940 nd in 1943 largely faild.161 Although the number of publicatons wthus commendable, the variety ws n indictor hat he resitance lcked unity, ted sparately, and reained ideologicaly diverse.  Since there were so many diferent subgroups, the possibilty of aunified resitance proved dificult. This a not the only shortcoming, however. Holland’s flt errain did not lnd itslf to                                                  155 Arblaster, 227. 156 Van Galen Last, 20. 157 Harry Stone, Writing in the Shadow: Resistance Publications in Ocupied Europe (London: Frank Cass, 1996), 45. 158 Fot, 261. 159 Ibid.; Rings, 169. 160 Ft, 2, 1. 161 Stone, 84-85.  27 partisan wrfare so esntial to he succes in France, Yugoslavi, Norway nd Greec.162 Nevertheless, earlier in June 1940, th Orde Dienst (O.D) had ben crted, lrgely b mmbrs of the Dutch Army, stil frustraed with Holland’s embarrasingly quick defat in 1940.163 It, and t few other miltary partisan moveents like t, howver, failed beause the population density and open plains ofHollnd did not lnd themsel to miltnt gueril warfre.164 The O.D’s moveent ws furthermore restriced by t any rivers and cnals tha traversed t country, aning its fighters had to us the roads, railroads, nd bridges, which ere asily patrolled by the Germans.165 Moreover, roadblocks and chekpoints, plus shortage ofgasoline and tires hindered the O.D. and made it easy for the Germans to limt their movement.166 T German bility o subdue t O.D. ws further lped by the so-cald England Gme (Englandspil). This had arisen iNovember 1941 n t Germn Miltry Inteligence (Abwehr), arrested a number of Dutch agents working for the governmnt-inexil in London. During the subsquent ierrogations the Abwehr gained aces to radio links with ondon, and as result, communications betwen London, the O.D., nd other resitance groups were compromised and nipultd by the Germans for an extnded period of tim. Using Englandspil, the Nzis diverted quipmnt, wpons nd money which ould have equipped 10,000 resiters. Furtr, it brought death o more than 450 resistance fighters (vrztsrijdes). Although Englandspiel finaly ended in lte 1943 when a Dutch agent managed to escape the bwehr, the Dutch resitanc had suffred a devasting blow from which it never fully recovered.167                                                  162 Will Irwin, Abundance of Valor: Resistance, Survivaland Liberation, 1944-1945 (New York: Ballatine Boks, 201), 69. 163 Van Galen Last, 194; Bentley, 4..164 Rings, 214. 165 Irw, 69166 Ibid. 167 Carlos C. Jurado and Paul Hanno, Resistance Warfare: Resistance and Collaboration n Western Europe, 1940-1945 (London: Osprey Publishing, 1985), 14.  28 Although the end of Englandspiel aowed the resitance to rebuild and tempt to unite, i was not successful. Among its larg branches, such as the Resistance Council (Raad van Verzet, R.v.Z.), the National Action Groups (L.K.P., Landelijke Knokploegen), and the Relief Organization for Those in Hiding (L.O., Landelijke Ondergronds) widely diverging objctives, priorities, nd politcal nd religious alinces til xistd. Aside from these larger groups, there wre many saler units, equaly divided iologicaly, which operatd indepently at local level. The discovery of Englandspiel in 1943 not only further divided these units, one group blaming t other for pil, but also cused individual pockets o mobiliz and step up tcks on German instaltions and personnel in revenge.168 The L.K.P., which had roughly 550 mebers in 1943, was primarily responsible for this increased aggresion, kiling over forty Dutch ollaborators in eight-month period imditly following the terminaton of Englandspiel.169 Thes asinatons, or “liquidations” asthe underground cald them, focused on mbers oft N.S.B. rather than the Germans themselve.170 N.S.B. offils, and even their wives ere shot in their homes. Tse wre not, howr, arbitrary acts politcl murder. Since they raisd trong moral qualms for many particnts, ech tk ws arefully discusd with a minister of religion or authorized resitnce laders.171 No atcks ere pproved ithout thorough xaminatof very concivabl thicl, moral, polital, nd psychological objection.172 Stil, any prominent ollaborators, including senior ice officers and Gestpo informrs met heir deth in 1943. General Hendrik Seyffradt, a sponsor  the Ntherlnds Volunter Lgion, but not ameber of                                                  168 Rings, 70. 169 Ibid., 197; Irwin, 68. 170 Warmbrun, 26171 Rings, 1. 172 Ibid.  29 the N.S.B., was the first o die when  as hot athis home on February 5, 1943.173 Shortly treafter Richard Reydon, t recently ppointed Scretary-Gneral ofthe Department ofPropaganda and Arts in the Ntherlands, was hot in the spi nd died  his injuris oon after.174 In quick succesion, t police hifs in Nijmegen and Utrecht wre xecuted in broad daylight.175 In addition to he asinatons, the Dutch-German reltions were further damaged by another strike, which ocurred in April 1943.  Lt in th month Hitlr declared economic mobilizaton for total r in al Nzi occupied trritories.176 When t Supreme Comander of the Wehracht in the etherlnds isued his proclamtion ordering Dutch army veterans to report for transfer to  Reich, strikes began.177 The disruptions, whih extnded into May, became one ofthe strongest demonstraions ofpopular resitance. Significantly, Rauter ws on duty s in Fbruary 1941.178 Imediatly people wre rrestd, lthough no one as ummarily executed in retaliton.179 Rautr supposedly antd no “unnecesary” blood.180 Although the Grmans wre stil omewhat civil towrds the Dutch, the strikes ilustraed the growing brekdown of relations betn the ocupier and t ocupied.181 In the ftermth of tse trikes, the number of asinatons increased. Encouraged by the increasd fort, sympatheic polie units now took their weapons underground and joined                                                  173 Warmbrun, 206; Walter B. Maass, The Netherlands at War: 1940-1945 (London, New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1970), 140. The Netherlands Volunteer Legion (Vrijwiligerslegion Nederland) was set up by Seyffardt, a former Chief of the General Staff of the Dutch Army, in July 1941 to let Dutch Nazi sympathizers fight under Dutch officers and their own flag. The assurances of autonomy were empty promises, and the Legion was qickly dissolved and its units integrated in the Waffen S. (Warmbu, 91; Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 1940-45, Rotterdam. July 10, 1941, .)174 Maass, 140; Warmbrunn, 207; F.A. De Graaff, Op Levn Dood: Krniek van Oorlog enBzeting, 40-1945  (Rotterdam: W.L.&J. Brusse, 1946), 178. 175 Ring, 197.176 Ibid., 6-70 177 Warmbrun, 113; Richard S. Fuegnr, Dawn ofCourage: Dutch Resitance tohe German Occupation fHoland, 1940-1945 (Minneapolis, MN: Mori Studio, 208), 1. 178 Rauter was always on hand drin th great crises of the occupatio, ulike Seys-Inquart who was always absent. Louis De Jong, Hans A.Rauter – Persn en Daen, in Nederland in Oorlogstijd, 1946-1950, vol. IV(Amsterdam: Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, 1949),3.179 Louis De Jog, Het Koikrije derlane deTwede Werldorlg, vol. 6,Juli ’42 – Mei ‘43: Tweede Helft (‘s-Gravehg: Statsuigeverij, 1975),777-778. 180 Ibid., 778.181 Warmbrun, 113.  30 resitance moveents.182 Members ofthe N.S.B remained the primary trgets, a their betrayal of Quen nd country was n as oraly worse than t Germn invasion or occupation. In the eastrn provinces frmers ith known N.S.B sympathis wre targeted and their farms burned.183 In June 1943, Folkert E. Posthuma,  former Minister of Wr mber of the Politcal Secretarit ofStae ofthe N.S.B., ws sinatd.184 Altogether over forty N.S.B.ers were shot betwn February 1 nd Septmber 15, 1943.185 Stil, asinaton atempts on German miltary personnel, specialy high-ranking officers, remined reltively fw until the Alid invasion of Normandy in June 1944, after whih they began to increase.186 The D-ay lndings gave atremendous oral boost o resitance forts throughout Europe, and t Netherlands ws no xcption. Peopl across the continent wr overjoyed, as itfinaly semd Axis deft s atrue possibilty. The lndings moreover led to another tempt to unit he resitance fort in the Netherlands.187 With he approach of Alid rmis, Dutch forces became ore ctive, and t wil to unite more universl. With directions from London, the O.D., L.K.P., and R.v.Z. came together in the Netherlands Forces of the Interior (Nederlandse Binnenlandse Stijdkrachten, B.S.).188 With Prince Bernhard as its Commander, the B.S. was etblished to improve coordination within the resitance.189 Members ofthe various organiztions re declared soldiers ofthe Forces oft Interior, nd ca subject o Prince Bernhard’s orders nd thos ofhis ubordinats.190 The resitance organiztions tha wre combined into the B.S., however, were acustomed to operating in a decntralied manner and were unable to coordinat heir activis eftively, which as ential fthe B.S. ws to                                                  182 Rings, 178. 183 Warmbrun, 207. 184 Ibid.  185.186 Ibid 187 Jurado, 14. 188 Irwin, 68189 Van Galen Last, 203; Warmbrun, 215. 190 Warmbru, 14.  31 work.191 But itdid not realy mater. The formation came too late o be truly effective.192 Paramiltary ctivies incresd omwhat, but there ws til no genuine unifid miltary resitnce in the Ntherlands.193 T lack of internal integration was troubling because the Normandy landings coincided with o developmnts tha ld mny verztsrijdes to bandon moral concerns bout the use of violenc and step up aggresive resitance.194 First, he Alied invasion coincided with increasd Grmn aggresion nd viole, which t resitanc deliberately ountered ith numerous cts ofpolitcl asinaton and sbotage.195 Most resit groups and clandestine papers sanctioned the exeution of Dutch ollborators and German officals ike sneesary acts ofwr.196 Whil som expresed regret hat he situaion had ome to his, most openly pproved the liquidation of traiors and the enemy.197 T second dvelopmnt was the onset ofthe Hongerwinter aftr Septmber 1944. T faine onditions in the country ld many verztsrijdes to undertke dangerous and sometims foolish mis to aquire the barest necsite for survival.    The Hongerwinter occurred after he failure ofthe Alied nterpris atArnhem, which doomed hopes for a spedy liberation of t entire Dutch trritory.198 Consquently, the southern provincs ofZelnd, Noord Brabant and Limburg were liberated by the Alies, while t northern provincs remained under Germn control, sntialy diving t Ntrlands into a liberated south and n occupied north. In support ofOperation Market Garden, the Dutch governmnt-inexil had ordered Dutch railroad workers to go strike, nd thirty thousand                                                  191 Stewart, 6. 192 Rings, 219193 Van Galen Last, 190; Irwin, 68. 194 Warmbrun, 27. 195 Rings, 19. 196, 20. 197 Ibid., 208. 198 Fuegner, 17.  32 people had subsequently obliged. The Germans, fuming about the work stoppage, used it as pretxt to obstruct he delivery of food nd fuel to Hollnd’s estrn provinces.199 Due to is high population density,  Netherlands depended heavily on imports, epecialy in the west. The blocka ws diastrous sinc itws in addition to erlir German sure, which had cut food rations, introduced rlier curfe hours, nd limtd utilts bad on coal, etriity, and gas.200 The embargo both xpanded thes retricions and included a wholsal ban on goods trafic, which ultiately caused t Hongerwinter, limng the lives of15,000.201 In the big ites, the struggl for ood nd fuel becam the dominant preoccupation of everyone.202 In Fbruary 1945, for example, the situaion ws o desperate hat people in Amstrda received only 340 caloris per day.203 Although the Ses offred to snd humanitrian id to alvit the famine, the Germans had no inteion of alowing anyone to help the Dutch.204  T quest for ood now becam paraount for everyone so tha much of the resitance efort subsently became humnitrin-orientd. Dtrmined to aid their felow countrymn, many vrztsrijdes turned from sabotge to acquiring food. Forgery of food oupons and ration crds became necesary part ofthis efort. Theft was another option. Although this w by far the ost dangerous pproach, it was oftn quite succesful. Resitance fighters, often dresed in German miltary uniforms, raided food fics or atked vehicls rrying ration cards or food coupons. In one case, a resistance unit managed to burn a hole in an iron safe large enough for one adult o entr and steal th 40,000 ration cards locked insde.205 Desperation led to increasingly hazrdous braznly dangerous ations sthe Dutch resitanc took greatr risks to acquire ration cards.                                                   199 Van Galen Last, 203. 200 Warmbrun, 16. 201 Rings, 70. 202, 1. 203 G.J. Kruijer, Sociale Desorganisatie: Amsterdam tijdens de Hongerwinter (Meppel: J.A. Bloom, 1951), 179.  204 Van Der Zee, 43. 205 Bolen and Van Der Does, 36.  33 It was gainst his backdrop of despair tha the atck on Rauter took place. Betwen 1940 and 1945, the resitance thus grew progresively more violent. Additionaly, by Mrch 1945 the resitnce was uffring from intens despair caused by the Hongerwinter, while itas til plagued by geographical, topographical, nd demographical onstraints. Thes obstructions inhibited increased profesionalizton. Even though the verztsrijdes tmselve were not to blam for thes didvantages, it made the more prone to make istake. Acordingly, it was a combination of incresed Dutch resitnce without an companying profesionalizaton, nd heightened German ggresion tha resultd in the bloodshed in 1945. Consquently, the tack on Rautr ws not n tack the man hiself, or t office herepresentd, but simply n atempt to steal a met truck to alevit hunger.    34 - Chapter Three - Convergence: De Woest Hoev  “It doesn’t matter where you get the people. This i an order of the highest authoriy – it cannot be alted.”- Hans Kolitz206 In March 1945 the conditions in Holland were horrifying. The German Wehrmacht was determined to sop or turn around the Alied dvanc in the Netrlands, nd et any form ofhostily, resitance, or non-collboration with quick, harsh, nd violent reprisl. Betwen Septmber 1944 nd May 1945, roughly 1,000 Duthmen fel victim to Grman executions.207  Extre cold, lack of fuel, scrcity of food, forced population oveents, Alid bombing, and ever-incresing levels  German represion furthermore ncouraged the resitnce to undertake misons tha d rlir been considered too bold or too daring. Tse wre the preconditi for one ofthe worst pisode ofNazi cruelty in the Netherlands: the tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve on March 8. However, given tha the atck and subsquent reprisal were the result ofboth heightened Grman ggresion and incresed Dutch resitance, it sdificult to se D Woeste Hoeve mrely as a symbol of Germn trror. By March 1945 the efcts ofSeyss-Inquart’s mbargo had developed into a full-edged famine. The problems wre ompounded in Apeldoorn where, in the wake ofthe batl for Arnhe, any citzns from tha region had fled.208 To lp tse refugees nd otrs, a locl resitance unit reeived a tip n the late ftrnoon of March 6. It reveald  planned transfer of                                                  206 Henk Berends, Woest Hoev: 8maart 1945 (Kampen: Kok Voorhoeve, 1995), 17. 207 Dick van Galen Last, “The Netherlands,”inResistance in Western Europe, ed. Bob Moore (New York; Berg Publisher, 2000), 206. 208erens, 11.  35 3,000 kilograms ofeat from aslughterhouse in Epe, a sml city north of Apeldoorn.209 Here was golden opportunity o help lviat he faine conditions. Even if ople had somthing to et, heir diet consisted mainly of pottoes nd vegetables, and lcked protin and ft.210 Hnc, t local sbotage director ordered a resitance unit ld by Gert osens to sel the meat.211 The mison did not sem particularly perilous since simlar ones had succeded in the past.212 Acording to he tip he t ws to be picked up by  Grmn truck and transported to the Reih early in t morning of March 7. The first plan ws to use Germn truck the resitanc had stolen arlier and pick up t meat before the rel vehicl arrived.213 Itcould tke plce under the cover of darknes, ade sir ince stric polie ontrol ws not hat ihad ben arlir since t Nazis need l resourcs in their atmpt to postpone defeat.214 Acquiring the necsary papers ws not aproblem since t resitnce had becom specily adept atforging Germn documents.215  The plan thecald for a distribution of most ofthe meat among various section chiefs who would allocate it a their dcretion. Another part of the meat would be randomly dropped on stree corners in Apeldoorn, whih as in great need becus of the numerous refugees.216 Before t mison, Grt osns’ group secured and planned the esntials. Wehrmacht uniforms were acquired and the people to arry out the mison slctd. Gosens personaly chose Hnk de Werd, Krel Pruis, Wim Kok, nd two Austrians, Sepp Köttinger and Hermann Kämpfr, both well-trained and reliable desrters from the Wfn- who had joined the                                                  209 Louis De Jong, Het Konikrij der NeerlandeieTwede Werldorlg, vol. 10B, Het Latse Jar I:Eerste Helft (‘s-Gravenhg: Statsuigeverij, 1981),418. 210 Henri Vaner Zee, TheHunger Wintr: Ocupid Holland 1944-5 (London: Jull Norman & Hobhouse, 1982), 18. 211 Berends, 11. 212 Ibid. 213 De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 419; Berends, 11. 214 Werner Warmbrunn, TheDutch under German Ocupation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), 234. 215 Ibid., 235. 216 Berends, 11 36 Landelijke Ondergrondse.217 Köttinger and Kämpfer’s ability o speak fluent German had been of tremndous value in arlir misons, sinc their Austrin cent had rousd no suspicion aong felow countrymen ioccupied Holland. Transportation, howver, turned out to be amjor problm. The truck they intnded to use was not drivable, and the otr availble vehicles wre too sal. Trefore the group decid to highjack  Grmn vehicle, kil nd bury the re, and use tha truck to pick up the meat.218 Although this wa signifiantly more dangerous than the original plan, Gert osens had succsfully completd such operations in the past.219 T proposed loction for capture was quikly hosen. A desrtd strech of road running betwen Apeldoorn and Arnhem, just past n inn namd aftr he nearby hamlet De Woeste Hoeve, as idel for this operation. Although the stree ws t ost direct rout betwn the wo cites, it was not paved and ws primarily usd for supplying the Wehrmacht. Many trucks usd the road daily, and cpturing one in the cover of darknes hould not bea problem.220 At approximately 9:30 in the evening the men lft Apeldoorn by bicycle, and traveled south towrds rnhe. Most wre armd with Stn guns, while Gosns rrid his own Walther PK. After about 5 minutes Gean officer stopped them at roadblock. Köttinger spoke with the officer and, becaus of his flunt Grman, the group psed without prblem. To se ifthey could pas for  Grmn patrol, they stopped  truck in Bekbergen. Using their pocket lights, they flagged down a truck and sked the driver for his licens and registraion. The Dutch driver noticed nothing unusual, showed his papers and soon ontinued on his way. Confident, the group arrid on south towards D Woeste Hoeve.221                                                  217 Berends, 11-12. 218 De Jong, HetLatse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 419. 219s, 12. 220e J, tts r I:rst lft, 4. 221 Berends, 1.  37 They arrived at heir destinaon around 10:30. Since the moon was in ts lat quarter and would not rise until fter midnight, the night sky was pitch blak. To hundred metrs past D Woeste Hoeve Inn the group dropped tir bikes in the dith nd prepared their wapons.222 Aftr 10 minutes ty ard  heavy vehicle approaching, which they sumed s truck.223 They got into positon, two in t dith on h side ofthe road and two on the stree. Gert Gosens and Sepp Köttinger ere the two men ho were to sop the truck so t otrs could ambush them from the side.224 Köttinger turned on his flahlight and the approahing ar slowed down. At  same ti, in the vehicle, Rauter ordered his driver not to sop but drive straight through the blockade. 225 T drir, who as not one ofRauter’s regular drirs, instead hithe brakes hard and the BMW came to  rough stop in front Köttinger nd Gosens. 226 Acording to Rauter’s post-war ount, one ofthe men jumped on the car’s hood and pointed the gun straight at the driver.227 Then someone fro th car yelled:  “What is going on, man, don’t you know who e are?” (Was istden los, Mensh, wisen Si denn nicht wer wi sind?). Gosens and Köttinger re cught by surprise; they had xpectd a hevy truck with a crew ho ould obey their every ommand.228 Instad wt d ome to  halt in front ofthem as a luxury car – a BMW convertible crrying Germn officers.  There ws not much tie to hink, and in a split-ond Gosens opened fire.229 His hot went through the indshild of the cr hit he person in the pasnger seat. Lter it was discovered tha this man ws Rauter, who said tha felt “ shot asif truck by  sharp                                                  222 De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 420.223 Geraldien von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, “Resiance, Reprisal, Reactions” in  Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe, ed. Robert Gildea, Olivr Wieviorka, and Anette Warring (New York: Berg Publishers, 2006), 191.  224 Berends, 12. 225 Nederlane Binnenlandsche Strijdkrachten, Ik Draag U Op: Systeem en Werk der Nederlandsche Binnenlandsche Strijdkrachten, getoest aan de lotgevallen van locale eenheden (Apeldoorn en omgevin.) (Apeldoorn: Uitgave ten Bate van het fonds nabestaanden ondergronsche strijders, 1946), 8. (Hereafter cited as Ik Draag U Op.) 226 Ibid.227., 9 228 Berends, 12-13. 229 De Jong, HetLatse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 420. Others clim htiwas Rauter who opend fire first. (Von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 191.)  38 knife.”230 The otr men jumped out ofthe ditch and opened fire, piercing the car with 234 bullts.231 Rauter’s orderly, Oberleutnant Exner, who s itng in the backset, s riddled with lts and did instantly.232 The driver also died ithin minutes. Rautr, howver, who as truck first but subsequently onlby eight more bullts, urvived the ordeal. He remained consious and cording to his later acount considered continuing t fight ftr he resiters had stopped shooting.233 His gun jmed, however. 234 When silenc returned, Rautr heard sombody say, “He isdead” (Hij sdood).235 Seconds latr, with he group stil nspecting the damge,  truck pproached and pased the BM before resuming its route to Aldoorn.236 Wn the k had pased, t group, which had quickly hidden, came out for a closer inspection of t damage they had done. Since their flashlights had stopped working, they wr unable to se whom ty d shot, and becaus there was bsolute silnce ty asumed the thre mn re dead. When t group herd anotr cpproach, they decid to lve while ty could. They did not return to Apeldoorn; tha was too risky. Instead ty went to a cmpground named Coldenhove, to he southeast ofthe city, here ty spent the night in  log abin.237 Gosns and his group stil had no ide whom ty had shot. It as not until 3:30 the next morning tha the BMW was dicovered by a pasing Germn miltry convoy.238 Upon stopping, the soldiers ard Rauter mke afint noise. They rushed to he nearby De Woeste Hoeve Inn, woke its owners, and dended to us tir                                                  230 De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 420.231 Van der Zee, 183.232 Exer’s full name is a mystery. In all sources he is referred to simply by his tile: Oberlutnat Exner. 233 Ik Draag Up Op, 9. 234 Ibid. 235 De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 420. 236 Berends, 13.237 Ibid. 238 Berends, 13. Some sources claim that itwas actually a truck from the International Red Cross who discovered the body. However, this source also claims that there were four German officers in the BMW and that there were only 4 perpetrators. (Van Der Zee, 183.)  39 telphone.239 Stil nobody knew ho the critialy injured man ws. Within minutes an ambulance lft he miltary hospital in Apeldoorn. When it rrived, it found to corpss, the driver nd Exner, nd Rauter, who s everely weakened due to masive blood loss and nearly frozen due to he night cold. H had to bullts hrough his left lung, another through his jw, thre more through his right nd, one through his chet, which mised vitl organs, and one in his upper right thigh.240 Later hat morning, the Sicrheitsdenst began its nvestigaon. Two men from Velp were first on the scene, soon joined by Oscar Gerbig, commandant of the Apeldoorn detachment.241 T offials found many epty shel ofBritish-ke, nd concluded tha the tk must have been plnned nd xecutd by t resitance. The hypothesi was not farfetched since Gosns and his group had used Stn guns, which re ofBritish mke nd, s t Grmans knew, frequently dropped into occupid Holland by the Alies.242 At noon Gerbig returned to his office n Apeldoorn, where learned tha Rauter’s injuris wre serious and he would be incapaitd for at lest 6 months. Consequently, Gerbig contatd Heinrich Himler, who ppointed Zwoll S.S. Brigadier Gneral Eberhard Schöngarth to fil Rautr’s positon. 243 Schöngarth, a siniter person with a violent past, held t post until the end of the war.244 He had arrived in the Ntherlands in June 1944, wn  replaced Erich Naumnn as the Commnder of t S.IP.O nd t S.D. (Befhlshaber de Siheritspolize und der                                                  239 Berends, 13. 240 De Jong, HetLatse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 420-421. 241s, 15. 242 Ibid.; Werner Rings, Lif with he Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe 1939-1945 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1982), 197. 243 Berends, 16.244 Ibid. Schöngarth, who attended the 1941 Wannsee Conference to discus the final solution to the Jewish problem, was a fierce anti-Semite and staunch National Socialist. He had also worked in Poland where he had been responsible for the deaths of many Jews and Communists. (Gerad Fleming, Hitler an the Final Souti [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], 93.)   40 Sicheritsdenst).245  As close ollagues, Rauter and Schöngarth had gotten along well; in fat, Rautr onc remarked that he admired Schöngarth’s “dediation” to the job.246   The first sk Schöngarth undertook was to visit hi collegue in t hospital. When  arrived Rauter told him hewas bsolutely crtin somebody had planned nd executed this atck with he inteion of kiling him.247 He further claimd t the resitanc had known bout his trip becaus ithad alegedly tapped his phone.248 Rauter’s belief ws reinforced by the fact hat hehad herd the resitrs sy, “He isdead.”249utr, moreover, belived the number of asilnts to be around six, and recognizd Gert osens when Schöngarth showed him pictures of several suspects.250 After an tck on a high-profile Grman officer, it was only a mter of time before reprisal would begin. During his viit, however, Rautr limed he sked Schöngarth not to crry out ny reprisal. Ifso, itwas likey tha uter’s recognition of defeat had something to do with his request. Nevertheles, imediatly ftr his viit, Shöngarth reportd to Himler tha Rauter’s life had ben sad, despit being hit by several bullets. Himler, in turn, wired Seyss-Inquart t he would be grateful “if you would do anything tha can ontribute to [Rautr’s] recovery” and cusaly ordered the execution of tlest 500 people. Syss-Inquart thought it excesive, but did nothing to stop it.251                                                  245 De Jong, De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerste Helft, 66. Erich Naumann had replaced Wilhelm arster in 1943. Naumann had served as commander of Einsatzgruppen B in Poland, where h engaged in the wholesale shooting of Jews and Communists. At Nuremberg, Naumann was found guilty for over 17,256 deaths. In his position as Commander of the SIPO and SD n the Neterlands heintroduce anitesifd police troand sepd uthe number of reprisal murdrs. (Adolf EmileCohn,Een nbekende ijdgenoot:de laatste Befehlshaber der Sicherheispolizei a des SD in Nederland [Amsterdm: Rijksinstuut vor Orlogsdocumentatie, 195], -11.) 246 Warmbru, 41. 247 Berends, 15. 248 Ibid. 249 This statement, according to Rauter, implied that they knew whom they had killed. Since we now kn the attack on Rauter was unintentional and accidental, i is more likely that was said was,“Die s dood,” which losely translt “this e isda.” (De Jog, Het Latse JarII: Eerste Helft, 421.) 250 Berends, 15. 251 Van Der Zee, 183.  41 Despit Rauter’s aleged wishe, but in lne with Himler’s request, Schöngarth ordered Oscar Grbig to mke list ofprisoners in Apeldoorn and surrounding muniipalties who ere suitble ndidates for execution.252 Gerbig, in turn, gave his iediat subordinat, Hans Kolitz, he sam instructions.253 Kolitz hen contated Wily Lages, the S.D. Commandant in Amsterda nd ordered him to deliver 75 prisoners.254 Since s wa only able to deliver 53 Todeskandidaten fro Amsterda he found another 6 in Utrcht, bring thotl t 59.255 On the morning of March 8 al 59 prisoners were xecutd at Fort deBilt. Johannes Munt, the S.D. Comandant in The Hgue received an order for 80 prisoners. There were only 27 prisoners in Den Hg proper, but unt, r resourceful, red 49 prisrs to be identifed in the prison in Amsfoort.256 M personaly slctd another 11 prisoners and dded tm to his 27 prisoners. This brought his total to 38. Adding t 49 in Amesfoort, Munt ordered the executions of 87 men that evening.257 The greats reprisal, however, took place the scene ofthe ambush. Schöngarth personaly ordered prisoners from Asen, Zwoll, Almo, Colschate, Doetinchem, and Aldoorn to be brought to De Woest Hoeve. t around 6:30am on March 8, 1945, 117 prisoners were cuffed using parachut rope and loaded into trucks. A convoy of seven trucks left, ld by Grbig on his motorcycle. The first ruck carried scurity guards whos job it was to scure the road and stop al trafic one kilometr in h diretion of the reprisal ite. The trucks arrived t De Woeste Hoeve and parked about 200 metrs awy from t Inn, t xact site where t atck ocurred. A fire-squad of  50 Grmn soldiers f the Weapon                                                  252 Berends, 17. 253 Ibid. 254 De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 42. 255 Ibid. 256 Berends, 17. 257 De Jong, HetLatse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 42.  42 School ofthe Order Police (Waffenschule der Odnungspolize) in Amesfoort awited hem.258 The ficers had been told what hey wre to do and were asked if they r redy nd ilng to ake responsibilty for it. Wn one officer refusd to  part in what hecaled “man slughter,” he was imediatly arrested. Sveral days later Schöngarth personaly shot hi.259 Oberstleutnant Krl ilhem Fricke was in charge ofthe actual executions. Every five minutes agroup of twenty prisoners as brought to he site. Osr Grbig then read the reason for the xecution to ach group of prisoners. “At his xact location, an tck on  Wehrmcht offical ws arried out yesterday. As areprisal mesure, several hundred peopl wil beshot. You re part ofthis group.” Martin Slgter,  Dutch ollaborator, translated hat Gerbig said. Slagter latr dmited tha fter he had translatd he nnouncemnts, he d to sand behind a nerby shed becaus hedid not want to se the drama unfold. Grbig too, later dmited, tha hehad a hard time particting in the reprisal. After, the victims were lid out in a long line betwen the road and the bicycle path. t round 10a t road as opened to he public. Every cyclist hat pased t sit was forced to sop and walk past he li three tims. Mrs. Ledder-Brouwer rembers tha she s biking long the road tha morning when German officrs forcd her to get off r bike and walk by t row ofexecuted prisoners. “Ty re lined up in order of execution,” she recounted ftr he war, “I as forcd to walk by them three tims and was not alowed to look away. There must have been 117 or 118.”260 The totl number of retalitons ws triking. The reprisal Hns Kolitz had ordered throughout t country, 59 in Amsterda, 38 in DeHag, nd 49 in Amesfoort, with he 117 kiled at he sene ofthe abush, brought the totl number to an stounding 263, t highest number of ny singl episode in occupied Holland. The corpses wre loaded into three trucks                                                  258 Berends, 18, 27-28. 259 De Jong, HetLatseJar I:Eerst Helft, 424. 260 Berends, 28-30.  43 and driven to a nerby cemtry. Normaly, identifcation of the victims took place before they were loaded into the trucks, but tie constraints did not alow it. Insted, the vitims were burid in the same squence asthey had lain long the road t De Woest Hoeve; fortunatly, this made itpossibl to identify t victims lter. Although rumours about what d happened began to circulate soon after he incdent, nobody knew exactly what d occurred. The only source ofinformtion ws postr put up around the city by Grman uthorities. It taed tha in reprisal for atck a ‘German cr,’ several hundred terrorist nd saboturs d ben summrily exeuted.261 Sinc the vitims wr not identifd, many of the fmiles did not find out what had happened until after t liberation in May 1945.  Given the tragic outom ofthe atck on Rauter, the Dutch surprisingly paid minial attention to it. The first mention of De Woste Hov appeared in Het Parool on March 17, but the article focused on the reprisal rather than the atck tha provoked them. The paper began by reognizing t Germn eforts during t first few years ofoccupation to appese the Dutch populace, but then wrot tha these forts re ndered futile by the recent “string of unspeakabl violnc.” Germans re now kiling men by the dozn, grabbing them out prisons, nd summarily xecuting them without any form oftrial. As the piec asertd, whoever had the isfortune ofbeiarrested by the Germans would be eitr ded or dying ithin a couple ofdays. The article wnt on to not tha Rauter’s fat, s far s the resitance ws oncrned, had alredy ben stablished. He was ar criminal who ould be hangd after he ar. For this reon, it said, none oft lrge resitnce units had any inteion of crrying out Rauter’s sntenc any earlier.  Het Parool concluded tha the tck on Rauter must have been thoroughly planned and the perpetraors must have known of Rauter’s travels.  Itfurther claimed tha none ofthe sml                                                  261 Berends, 30-32.  44 rogue resitance units were sponsible sinc they had neither t means nor the wil to carry out such an attack.262 Ten days later, on March 27, Het Parool went even further, writing that it was likey Rauter’s atckers were themselve German nd tha even the Nazis thought so too. Semingly, the paper denid Dutch involnt to highlight the ilgitimcy of the subsequent reprisal. It noted tha Rauter’s ar had not swerved or hit soething, but had om to a stop voluntrily. This indicatd hat he cr as topped by a Grman patrol, for the car would not have stopped for ny other reason. Tn, had the perpetraors not been Grmn, t ensuing conversation would have reled this to Rauter and t other pasngers. The paper moreover asertd tha the lack of an investigaon following t atck was n indication tha the Nazis themslve believed the perpetraors were Grman.263  Whereas t Dutch reaction to he tck ws to focus on the reprisal rather than the ambush on Rauter, the Germns, uncharateristialy, chose to give the tragedy as lite publicty as possibl.264 Rautr was never publicly identifd as one oft victims ofthe atk, likey because the Germn uthorities did not want to dvertise the vulnerability  tir highest offils. It ws furtore mbarrasing tha the entire Grman police forc in the Netherlands could not guarante the safety of its leader.  T lck of German tntion paid to he tck was reflection of both the desperation and lck of resourcs twr’s end.  There was lo  general unwilngnes to monstrae the vulnerability  the Nazi’s highest officls. he Dutch, on the otr hand, only ever addresd the unjust naure oft reprisal nd went asfr s denying any involvement in the tck atl. Ty asertd alternatively tha the perpetraors must have been Grman. T inital Dutch                                                  262 “Ons Atword op het Bloedbad: Fellere Actie,Meer Verzet,” Het Parol, March 17, 945, http:/w.hetilegaleparool.nl/archief/1945/450317-1.php (accessed January 7, 20.)263 “Wie Pleegde de Aanslag op Rauter – de SD schijnt geen belang te hebben bij opeldering van deze vraag,” Het Parol, March 27, 1945, http:/.hetil .nl/archief/450327-1.php (accessed January 7, 2011.) 264 Von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 192  45 reaction perfectly demonstraed tha the resitance was re ofthe blunder it had made nd the unnesary aths ithad unwilngly provoked. In this light, t historian Louis Jong condemned the ctions ofthe resitance tDe Woeste Hoeve, caling it n irresponsible act ofresitance undertaken with  intion of geting a Grmn truck, but leading instd to he shooting of 263 people.265 Indeed, the resultimurder of Dutch itzns was tragic and appaling, yet should the resitanc have stopped its raids out fear for reprisal? Given the circumstances, the actions ofthe resitance wre both justifd nd commendable. That being said, whatver its motivat, t Dutch resitance had a role in provoking the reprisal, which mkes it dificult to se D Woeste Hoeve s stricly n exampl of German terror.266                                                   265 De Jong, Het Latse Jar I:Eerst Helft, 426.266 V Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 192. 46 - Conclusion -Passing Judgment: De Woete Hoeve in Rtrospect  “Let’s talk of graves, of worms and epitaphs;  Mak dust our paper, and with rainy eyes writ sorrow on the bosom of thearth.” - Wilam Shakespeare 267Richard I, Act I, Scen IThe tragedy at De Woste Hoeve serve as microcos ofthe stae ofafirs n Nazi occupied Hollnd ftr Operation Market Grden. It deonstraes tha two distinc fctors were at ply. First, De oeste Hoeve reinforces the notion tha Grman viciousnes and violnc reched its peak just before the final defat. Second, the atck on Rauter demonstraes the desperation of the Dutch resitance in the f of strvation. For the Ntherlands t combinati tse fators mnt t year 1945 became the bloodiest period oft war, tragialy exemplifd by De Woeste Hoeve. The vast jority of t 204,000 Dutch iviln csualtis did betwen Sptmber 1944 and May 1945. Of course, the Germans must acept the responsibilty for this. The dubious grounds ofthe atk on Rauter, however, nd the subsequent reprisal chalenge t notion tha they ber full responsibilty. Instad, what his paper has argued is t the tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve, and by extnsion some ofthe suffering betwen Sptember 1944 nd My 1945, was also unwitngly aresult ofactions on the part of the Dutch resitance.  T larger historiographical problem, of course, is tha ofresponsibilty. Who was responsible for the bloodshed in Holland in 1945? More specifaly, who should be held                                                  267 Isaac Reid, ed. The Works of William Shakespearein Ne Volumes, vol. 4 (Boston: Moroe and Francis, 1810), 46.  47 acountable for the tragedy at De Woeste Hoeve? Traditionaly, the Germans have d to shoulder the major responsibilty. Inded, without the German invasion, t Ntherlnds would never ha suffered the horrific onditions in hich t country found itself ater Sptember 1944. Moreover, t German unwilngnes to aept iminent defat in rly 1945, but instead proclaim fight to he last mn, cusd inse suffering nd death. Historians uniformly recognize tha t Germns perpetuaed violnc to he very nd. The reprisl tDe Woeste Hoeve reinforc this notion, and demonstra tha Nazi retalitons were often out ofproportion to the deed.  However, what rol did the Dutch resitance play? Was itnot complict in the tragedy? The ilgitimacy of the reprisal isbeyond doubt, but mybe the men who arried out the asult rehed for tir guns too soon. The atck on Rauter ay have been voided if t resitnce had beter intligence and more urate knowldge ofthe movent ofsenior Nazi officals. The resitanc, or t lst he clandestine pres, clearly recognized the dubious nature  the tck on Rauter, as itwent to gret lengths to rgue tha the atck ame from the Germans rather than the Dutch. It moreover denid tha the resitnce had ordered ny such tck.268 Tt mistake were ade tDe Woeste Hoeve isclear. It isunfair, however, to claim tha the resitnce should have gin up al tmpts atraids for er of reprisal.  As Gert Gosens said n 1946 when  came forwrd nd clied responsibilty for the ction, the act had ben meningful given t onditions.269 Neverthels, De Woeste Hoeve remains tragi reinder tha the Dutch resitance shared sponsibilty for the tragedies tha befel the Netherlands fter Sptember 1944. The lack of aunified system ofcomand, the absnc ofrelibl miltry intligenc, and t questionabl ction of s vrzetsrijdes did much to                                                  268 “Wie Plgde Aanslag opRauter – de SD schijnt geen belang te hebben bij opheldering van deze vraag,” Het Parol, March 27, 1945, http:/w.hetilegaleparool.nl/rchief/1945/450327-1.php (accessed January 7, 201.) 269 Geralin vo Frijt Drb Künzl, “Resitance, Reprisal, Reactions” in  Surviving Hitler and Mussolini: Daily Life in Occupied Europe, ed. Robert Gldea,OlverWiviorka,and Anete Warring (NewYork: Berg Publishers, 2006), 192.  48 aggravate he Germans, cusing them to ake conditions in 1945 worse than they mahave been without misguided Duth provoction. D Woeste Hoeve thus fundamentaly chalenged the popular perception of the Dutch resitance san fcti and unifid group . During t post-wr reconstructia myth surrounding the resitnce developed.  The smal, ideologicaly diverse organiztion wsproclaimed as one movent tha embodied national resurretion.270 This alowd the Dutch to hide behind the legend t “w re alin the resitance.”271  Indeed, the historian Louis deJong observed: “Resitance ppears tobe subject full ofromanc.”272 Itwas only “natural tha the resitanc tractd tntion. It furnished xamples elf-scrifie nd courage under extremely dangerous circumstances and it was hertwarming… to dwl on this materil.”273 This view, hoever, is not ntirely corret. While in countries uch s Franc and Belgium vetran resitrs wre the main protagonist ofcommoration, vrzetsrijdes were not particularly visible in t post-r reebrances. 274 This again goes back to he lack of unity within the resitanc. Those who fought the Grmans in Hollnd did not fel t urge to asocite ogetr nd clim their lgacy as peers. Moreover, those local groups tha atemptd to presrve their legay after  war ere boycottd for politcal resons. In the era ofpost-war reconstruction, t country neded n ideal of united resitnce, which ould be undermined by individual veterans’ leagues claimng their own particular mrits. 275 This limited atntion paid to  eforts ofthe resitnce has profoundly influenced how the Dutch remeber the war, the occupation, and tir oppositon to he Nazis. Grman trror                                                  270 Peter Romijn, The Synthesis of the Politcal Order and the Resistance Movemnt in the Netrlands in 1945, in The End of the War in Europe 1945, ed. Gil Bennett (London: HMS, 1996), 146.271 Diane L. Wlf, Beyond Anne Frank: Hidden Children Post-War Familis nHoland (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007), 105. 272 Louise Jong, The Netherlands and Nazi Germany (Boston: Harvard Uiversity Press, 190), 29. 273 Louis De Jong, “Preface,” in Werner Warmbun, The Dutch under German Occupation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), v. 274Pietr Lagrou,Legacy ofNaziOcupation:Patriotic Memory and National Recoveryin Westrn Europe, 1945-1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 68. 275 Ibid.   49 was, nd stil s,usualy acknowledged by pointing to incdents uch as Putten, while D Woeste Hoeve isgeneraly overlooked. The role ofthe resitance, furthermore, is not asstrongly clbrated in the Netherlands slwre, such s Polnd aFrance. In the Netherlands, rather than streing t role ofthe resitance, non-collaboration with he nemy is oftn remebered with pleasure. The Dutch re proud to lim tha atis ight the ebership for the N.S.B. s l than 4% of the otal population.276 In this light, the Dutch remr tir everyday oppositon to he Nazis with pride nd satifction, but tend to disregard the actions ofsome more aggresive resitance. It isn interesting ontrast with France, whih in post-1945 discourse has frequently overemphasized its reitance to he Nazis to compensate for its collaborationist regime in Vichy.  Tragicly, de-emphasizng the forts ofthe resitance resulted in the fact hat De Woeste Hoeve has never received t atention it deserve. A cross wa rected on the sit ofthe reprisal es tn two months ftr liberation, the insription, reding, “Hre 8-345 the Germn invaders brutaly urdered 117 sons oft Fatherlnd.” It clearly pointed to  victims, yet heir reltives plyed no part in the commeoration.277 Prt ofthe xplanation for the inital ck of involment in commeoration lies in the difernt backgrounds mong those xeuted. The ajority of the peopl shot tha day were sitanc fighters, but they cae from alwlks oflife, had widely divergent politcal nd religious persuasions, and hailed from towns nd vilages throughout the country.278 Only  few lived in the neighbourhood of the site of the asult nd the reprisal. T people shot re agroup of men randomly gathered, sharing only t fct hat y were Grman prisoners the tie the asult. Consequently, neither                                                  276 Jacob Zwaan, and Aukje Zondergeld-Hamer, DeZwarte Kameraden:  Geïlustred Geschiednis va deNSB (Amsterdam: Van Holkema & Warenorf, 1984), 56.  That average was slightly higher in the major cities, where it as around 7.2%. (Detlf Mülbrg, The Social basis of Europefascist movmts, [New York: Croom Helm, 1987], 228.)277 Von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 192. It should be noted that a ceremony is now held every year on March 8 to remember those who died at De Woeste Hoeve. 278 Hek Berends, Woest Hoev: 8maart 1945 (Kampen: Kok Voorhoeve, 1995), 17-26.  50 family nor the local municipalty cultivaed the meory of De Woeste Hoeve.279 The otr part of the explanation fuses on the realizton tha t atck and subsquent reprisal were not black versus white; Dutch and Germns like d been involved. Acordingly, both side have since lrgely forgottn the lmity of De Woest Hoe. The final tragedy then, i this ry lack of remebrance, regret, or sha on either t part of t Germans or t Dutch.                                                  279 Von Frijtag Drabbe Künzel, 192.  51 Bibliography  Published Primary Sources  Goebbels, Josph. The Goebbels Diares: 1942-1943. Translated by Louis P. Lochner. Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Company, 1948.   Hitler, Adolf. Hitler’s Tichgespräche imFührerhauptquartier, 1941-1942, editd by Gerhard Riter. Translated by Henry Pcker. 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