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The leading principles of philosophy of education Daniels, LeRoi B. 1963

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THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION by LeRoi B. Daniels B.A., The University of British Columbia, 1953  A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in the Department of Philosophy  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  The University of British Columbia July, 1963  ABSTRACT What are and what should be the leading principles of method of philosophy of education?  Traditionally, it  has been claimed that the leading principle consists of the deduction of statements about education from statements in "regular" philosophy.  It has further been claimed that  differing statements about education differ because they have been deduced from different positions in regular philosophy. These claims are analyzed by applying some tools of modern philosophical analysis to the works of four selected reputable philosophers of education who are assumed to "represent"1 three of the chief modern "schools" of philosophy of education. This analysis reveals that the traditional characterization of the leading principles of method is at best very misleading.  It reveals in fact that the leading prin-  ciples of the Idealists .and Realists are more accurately described as "pseudo-science" in which explanatory systems are devised by selecting statements about empirical facts or states-of-affairs and encrusting the system with terms which are metaphysical, synonymous and without empirical meaning. It further reveals that the writings of philosophers of education are also encrusted with ethical terms which have dominantly. emotive meanings.  The leading principles of the Instrumentalists are shown to be somewhat closer to those of the modern analytical philosophers and closer to the best of traditional regular philosophy. In conclusion, it is asserted that philosophy of education should in future have two leading principles2 1.  The academic exercise of analyzing the writings of traditional philosophers of education using the tools of philosophical analysis,  2,9 The application of some or all of the techniques of philosophical analysis to empirical theories about education, such as learning theories.  We accept this abstract as conforming to the required standard  .'•." .'... In presenting this.' thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advahced degree at the University of British Columbia? I agree that the Library shall make it freely available, for reference and study,  I further agree that per-  mission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives,,  It is understood that copying, or publi-  cation of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department The University of British Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada. ;; Date  TABLE OF. CONTENTS CHAPTER I  PAGE INTRODUCTION Leading Principles of Method  ..........  1  Methods of Philosophy  1  Strawson's Concept of Meaning  5  Outline of Succeeding Chapters  6  Preliminary Characterization of Leading Principle of Traditional Philosophy of Education  8  Preliminary Characterization of Dewey's Leading Principle of Method  9  Comment on Quality of Argumentation  II  ...  10  The Communication Function of Language ..  11  A Definition of Meaning  13  DEFINITIONS OF SOME KEY TERMS '  ...............  Some Implications of This Definition Dominant and Minor Meanings  ..  16  ...........  17  The Whole Meaning  19  A Definition of Communication  19  j. •• :  CHAPTER.  jv~  III  |: I I • i i s  v  PAGE  -THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF IDEALIST AND REALIST: PHILOSOPHERS OF EDUCATION Justification for Selecting Broudy, Ulich, H o m e and Dewey Broudy;  20  His Interpretation of the  Leading Principle of Philosophy of Education  21  i  Broudy:. The Four Levels of Inquiry  i  Broudy:  !  Levels  21  Theoretical and Philosophical 23  Why People Write Philosophy of Education . What is Explanation?  27 28  Broudy:  Analysis of "Education"  31  Broudy:  The Good Life  32  Broudy:  Correspondence Theory of Truth . .  314.  Broudy:  Meaningfulness  35  Broudy:  What is Reality?  36  Broudy:  Structure and Trend  Broudy:  Human Nature  38  Broudy:  The Self  38  Broudy:  The Three Tendencies of the Self.  ij.2  Broudy:  Summary of His Metaphysics  1|_7  .......  ............  .....  37  j."' j  / ORAPTER III  PAGE Broudy:  Summary of His Epistemology  ....  ij.8  i  The ..Function of the Realists' Systems  ...  i(.8  }••  The Leading Principle of the Realists  ...  ij.9  Ij  Ulichs  The Idealist System  i:  Ulich:  Summary of His Metaphysics  ......  5l  f.  Ulichs  Summary of His Epistemology  .....  $1  !  Broudy:  School and Society  i  Broudy:  Curriculum  !  I4.9  Ulich: and Homes  School and Society  Ulich  Curriculum  and Home:  52 5I4. ...  51j. 56  Doctrine of Externality of Relations  ....  57  Doctrine of Internal!ty of Relations  ....  57  Metaphysics Inferred from Empirical Observations Inductive Inference Characterized  58 58  •The Leading Principle of Idealists and Realists: Metaphysical System Merely Reflects Empirical Facts Chosen  59  Idealist and Realist Systems - Fallacious.  60  Metaphysical Utterances are Meaningless ..  60  Synonymity of Primitive Terms Used  60  PAGE  CHAPTER  III  Why Metaphysical Systems are Persuasive .  61  Classical and Modern Ethics Distinction  61  Philosophy of Education as a Type of Ethics  62  What Is the Meaning of Ethical Terms in Philosophy of Education? What Is Persuasion?  ...... ........  62  ....................  61j.  Realist and Idealist Use of Persuasion ..  65  Realist and Idealist Ethical Statements are Primarily Emotive  .  67  Emotive Use of Ethical Terms as Exemplified by Realist and Idealist Assertions on the Aims of Education  ...  68  A Brief Review of the Basis of the Analysis Made  IV  70  THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF METHOD OF JOHN DEWEY The Two Aspects of Dewey's Works  72  ^ome Sections of Dewey's Positive Account  72  Dewey's Naturalism  73  I I CHAPTER IV  PAGE Dewey's Instrumentallsm  73  The Pragmatic Criterion of Significance  .  71|.  Conoflection Between Knowledge and Ethics.  7[1.  Excitation of the Senses and Knowledge ..  78  Plato and Dewey Differ on Fallibllism  ..  79  ...  79  Some Aspects of Dewey's Critical Accounts  80  The Conceptual Background - S u r v i v a l ....  80  His Analyses are "Therapeutic"  80  Dewey's Epistemology in Contrast to that of Plato Showing Both Hold, to a  Dewey's Doctrine of Learning  Dewey's Type of Analysis Compared with that of the Ordinary Language Philosophers  ..........................  Dewey is Often Prescriptive  ............  Dewey Uses Social-Historical Analysis  ..  80 8l .81  Use of Ordinary Language  81  Dewey's Emphasis on Polar Terms  82  Dewey's "Tripartite" System  83  ............  Reinterpretation of Statements to Hypothetical Selective Examples of Dex^ey's Analyses ..  81j. 8£  CHAPTER  IV  PAGE  Logic, The Theory of Inquiry  ..  85  Dewey's Goncept of Education .  85  Dewey on Intellectual and Practical Studies  ........  87  So cial—Historical Analysis Prescriptive Reinterpretation  V  87 ..........  89  Reinterpretation as Hypotheticals .......  90  Dewey's Interpretation of Mind  91  SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION . The Basic Fault in Traditional Philosophy of Education  93  A Modern Viewpoint - Analysis Summary of Some Analytic Techniques  9i|. ....  95  Comment on the Traditional Method of Creating Learning Theories Education as a "Science"  ...............  96 97  The Analysis of Speculative Philosophies of Education  97  Some Evidence of the Need for Analysis of Learning Theories  BIBLIOGRAPHY  98  99  CHAPTER II  An important part of the investigations by Charles Peirce consisted of analyses of the "leading principles" of the methods used by various scientists and philosophers. As a result of these investigations he was able to state what he believed to be the logical form of scientific method. It is this writer's intention to outline some of the leading principles of method employed by analytic philosophers and by "educational philosophers" in order to compare the two and in order to attempt to apply some of the methods of the former group to the work of the latter group. In recent years discussions concerning the methods of philosophy have centered not so much around the question of what the methods of philosophers are or should be, but whether , in fact, there are or can be any method or methods peculiar to philosophy. Many sorts of answers have been given to this question. As far as those philosophers who can be classed as analysts are concerned, the one feature common to all of their answers to the question is that philosophy does and, to some extent, has in the past concerned itself with analysis of the complexities of language. T  hree of these modern views seem important to this  writers  .  1.  2  -  G. E. Moore apparently believed that the methods of  philosophy should be almost ad hoc analysis of lin•  '' ' . 'I-''."  guistic expressions.  2. Mr. Moore was engaged in philosophical analysis as it was known until the advent of "the later Wittgenstein".  It  consisted of exceedingly careful and detailed logical analysis of various expressions.  At least two views are  held regarding the aim of such analysis; a) The view expressed in an extreme form in.some of the writings of Russell and the "earlier" Wittgenstein whereby an attempt was made to translate key expressions into an ideal form of language which somehow corresponded in structure with the real world.  As  a result of Wittgenstein's own criticism of this approach, it is now, it appears, largely discreditedf b) That some expressions are confusing or misleading because of their structure and that they can be translated (or, in this sense, "analyzed") into equivalent modes of expression which, for certain rather limited purposes, have advantages the others lack.3 1  Strawson, P.P. - "Construction and Analysis" in G. Ryle and^others, The Revolution in Philosophy. Macmillan, 1957, 2  Wittgenstein, L. - Philosophical Investigations, Black5 well, 1958, p. x e . 3  Pole, D. - The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein,. University of London, The Athlone Press,1.958, p.  3.  Ludwig Wittgenstein developed and John Wisdom has carried on a very subtle form of analysis now known as "therapeutic a n a l y s i s " I n this method one attempts to resolve what appear;; to be paradoxes by showing how philosophers, and others, have extended the uses of certain linguistic expressions beyond convention. We will now attempt, briefly, to characterize the  method used by these two philosophers, but do so only with trepidation since analysis as performed by them Is probably best described as a "subtle art".  Its successful application  depends perhaps more on unique imaginative abilities formalized method,  on any  ^uch method Is to a large extent, by its  very nature, not describable. Five features are typical of the therapeutic approach: 1. Appeal to ordinary language as the place to seek a clarifying paradigm or to see how language is used. 2. Use of "language-games" - imaginary societies or situations of a relatively simple structure in which a language is used.  The purpose of these is to illustrate more  clearly how language i_s used in ordinary language.-' In ^ Ibid. Warnock, G.J. - "Analysis and Imagination" in Ryle and others, op. cit., p. 123. He characterizes it as explanatory and inventive "imaginative" analysis.  Wisdom, the language-games are supplanted by "types or „ 6  categories of discourse".  It appears to this writer that what Wisdom has done is to discover that ordinary language has within it certain sub-languages, not reducible one to the other, which are, in effect, actual "language-games".  Thus one might  call Wisdom's category of moral discourse "a real or existing language-game". 3. Use of metaphor to combat assumed but unrecognized metaphor or to illustrate a point.7 Ij... Like bloodhounds seeking the trail, Wittgenstein and Wisdom consider many uses of a. words like scientists they test it in many "crucial" situations until they can see how it is used. 5.  The conception that paradoxical philosophic statements appear to be so because we do not correctly construe the function they are actually performing within a language. A. J. Ayer proposes that the unique method of philoso-  phy consists In analysis of the meanings of linguistic expressions in an effort to discover the various functions performed by language. -:  6  As outlined in "The Problem of Knowledge"8 the  Pole, D. -  ci£., p. 121.  7  Wittgenstein, L., op. cit., p. 93® cited in A.j. Aver The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin, 1956, p. 60. 8  Ibid., pp. 7 & 8j 26-30j 3]+.  method he proposes has the following important features: 1.  Concern with language as it is used.  2. A n the evidence which bears upon philosophical problems is already available to philosophers. 3.  The use of deductive logic for developing the proofs desired.  l|.. The appeal to real or imaginary situations in which the linguistic expressions in question are applied to see if their application is acceptable. His conception that there are particular jobs to be done by any language and his study of a particular linguistic expression In the English (or .some other) language not so much to find out about that word as to discover the function it performs in order to understand the function. This same function is likely performed by a different symbol in other languages or, perhaps, there is no accepted symbol for performance of that function In another specified language. In all of these proposed methods one concept is obviously of great importance - the concept of meaning.  It  seems to this writer that analysts could make considerable use of a linguistic tool that has been proposed In a specific form by P. P. Strawson, i.e., his definition of the meaning of expressions which have a uniquely referring use as, "the  n 9 set of rules, habits, conventions for its use in referring". To make broader use of this tool we should state it in a more general form: "the meaning of a linguistic expression is the general rules for its use".  It will be our aim in the second  chapter to expound this notion in an effort to make explicit the expression "general rules" and, using this concept, to indicate a system of analysis which might be applied to a body of literature often called "philosophy of education". Because the word "philosophy" is used, one would expect this literature to have something in common with what might -be called "pure" philosophy.  Indeed, philosophers of educa-  tion have maintained that this common feature consists in the fact that they deduce their conclusions concerning education from this or that position taken from pure philosophy.  In  Peirce's terminology, they have held that the leading principle of their method consists of this form of deduction. One could make a very lengthy list of writers who have been said to have written "philosophy of education".  In most  cases, however, even a superficial examination reveals that they should be characterized as "sociologists of education" or "anthropologists of education" or given some similar title.  • 3  seen UUWJ.1"  U.OC3 .  Prom among the many possibilities, this writer intends to select four: Robert Ulich, Harry Broudy, Herman Home and John Dewey.  Justification for this selection is given in the  opening sections of Chapter III.  Suffice it to say here that  they adequately represent, in this writer's opinion, some of the major conflicting points-of-view current in the field of educational philosophy.  In Chapter III we have attempted to  specify the leading principles of method of Ulich, Home and Broudy and to apply some of the techniques of the modern philosophers to the works of these three. In Chapter IV we have specified the leading principle of method used by John Dewey and compared this with the techniques of some modern philosophical analysts. In our concluding chapter, Chapter V, we have attempted to answer a question x^hich can be stated in several ways, such as: 1. What have philosophy and philosophy of education in common? 2. Are there paradoxes in philosophy of education which can be dealt with by the methods of philosophical analysis? 3. How do the methods of philosophy of education need to be changed? ij.. In a comparative way, how can we characterize modern analytic philosophy and modern educational philosophy?  What we will endeavour to show Is that one will be less misled if one thinks about the relationship between pure philosophy and philosophy of education if one considers as follows:: 1.  Philosophy of education is concerned with many topics which can be categorized in different ways but xfhich, for convenience, we shall categorize as follows (without any intention of claiming that these are mutually exclusive categories): i. Moral development ii. iii.  Curriculum School and Society  iv. Methodology v.  Aims of education.  It has been the traditional view that the comments'of philosophy of education on these topics have been logically deduced from some stand or other in pure philosophy.  This  is, it is asserted, the leading principle of philosophy of education. 2.  It will be less misleading to say that most traditional philosophy of education really has at least three leading principles which are and have been used interchangeably: A.  Use of ethical terms.  Application of either pre-  scriptive or, occasionally, descriptive ethics. B.  Deduction from various systems based upon metaphysical terms.  C.  Application of concepts developed In related disciplines, such as sociology and psychology.  Type A has been applied chiefly to the topic of moral development in children and to the relationships between school and society. Type B has been applied chiefly to the topics of aims and curriculum. Type G has been applied in all areas and has been a chief cause of confusion about what philosophy of education really is. It is our intention to try to show that Type A has in fact been used by outlining the type of ethical stand taken by the authors we are considering. With Type B we shall briefly expound their leading principle as it has been traditionally expounded and then, for the sake of comparison, expound it as a type of language use which we shall try to characterize. With Type 0 we shall simply mention, without exposition, from time to time, where this sort of leading principle has been used. John Dew-ey's writings exemplify a very different approach to philosophy of education which is, in certain respects, similar to that used by the modern philosophical analysts.  f .•  I  • - . 10 ' - •  One feature common to all philosophy of education makes analyses very difficult - namely, the arguments used  ,  !  are carried out with less care than is sometimes the case in pure philosophy.  This means that the arguments contain in-  consistencies and contradictions which make it difficult to interpret just what it was the author meant.  In such cases  we simply have to assume that he meant this or that in spite of the contradictory statements.  CHAPTER II  "Think of the tools in a tool-box: there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails, and screws. - The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects."1 The function of words xtfith which we shall deal is that of communication, although other functions will necessarily be referred to.  The words with which we shall deal are those  that are part of a language or languages. language will be outlined below.  What we mean by a  For the present we shall  refer to it in what Dr. Stroll calls "a narrower sense wherein conventional signs are opposed to natural signs".2 Every attempt at communication consists of at least one user of language and at least one interpreter of language. The essence of communication is the attempt by the user to pass one or more meanings to the interpreter.  Because the in-  terpreter and user have somewhat different life histories, because of the complexity of the conventions which users of language follow, and because of the variety of situations and ways in which any language can be used, the exchange of meaning in communication is extremely difficult to analyze.  Wittgenstein, L., op. cit., p. 6®. 2'•'•'••'"• > Stroll, A., The Emotive Theory of Ethics: 1951).; p. ij.0.  -  12  - '  We shall adopt the following terminology: 1.  3  denotes - words or sentences are used to denote or seem to be used to denote particular things, classes of things or statea-of-.affairs.  2.  designates - words or phrases are used to designate or seem to be used to designate a set of defining characteristics. One of the factors which makes communication difficult  to analyze is that, in every attempt at communication, we are likely to find at least two different sets of meanings: (1) a set of meanings indicated by the question, "What does he mean?" or, "What do you mean?", or a statement of the form, "By this I mean X".  All of these refer to what we shall call the  "user's meaning";  (2) a set of meanings indicated by, "I  take it you mean X", or, "I understand you to mean X".  These  refer more specifically to what we bhall call the "interpreter's meaning."  In this study we will be primarily concerned  with the interpreter's meaning, i.e., with the meanings which this writer extracts from the works of various writers.  This  distinction between user's and interpreter's meanings is of -3  These are adapted from Hospers, J. - An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Prentice-Hall, 1953, p. "pT"6£. ^ Hospers, J., bjo. cit., p. Ij.88 and Broudy, H.S. - Building AJ^hilp_sophy of Education, Prentice-Hall, 195^., p. 139 point out some of the problems which can arise as a result of the differences between user's and interpreter's meanings.  -  13  -  considerable importance in philosophy of education because writers of this sort of material have not been as careful in their use of terms as they might have been. When there is complete communication both of these sets of meanings will be the same.  Judging by the amount of lin-  guistic confusion in the world, this seldom, if ever happens. But whene ver there is successful communication the two meanings must be to some extent the same. "Communication" covers a host of different occurrences. Language is often used to express, evoke or "communicate" emotional states of the user to the interpreter.  For our pur-  poses we wish to attempt to analyze writings which at least appear to be attempts to pass information from user to interpreter. We choose this particular type of communication since  vre are dealing with the languages of philosophers and/or philosophers of education and believe that in general they are either attempting to communicate information or seem to be attempting to do s o /  We shall see, however, that at least  some of the statements are really commands or exhortations. We have used the word "meaning" without attempts at Ryle, G., The Concept of Mind, London, Hutchison Home Library, 19i)-9, as cited in Scheffler, I., ed., Philosophy and Education, Allyn and Bacon, 1958, p. 136, expounds this type of communication as didactic use of language. Traditionally, it has been called cognitive use of language.  clarification.  Vie shall now attempt to state our thesis  regarding meaning. With reference to expressions which have a uniquelyreferring use, Strawson distinguishes among an expression, a use of an expression, and an utterance of an expression.^ In the same section he writes, "... the meaning of an expression is ... the set of rules, habits, conventions for its use in referring." Wow, let us put this against a background of "types of meaning" as outlined by Hospers 7 .  He distinguishes the  following:; 1.  denotation *  2.  designation  3.  picture-meaning  ij..  emotive meaning.  ' •  Strawson is discussing words: (a) which can be used to denote a large number of things; (b) which are used to designate little if anything. He ignores picture-meaning and emotive-meaning. His thesis is that for a particular group of such words,  6  Strawson, P.P., "On Referring", Part II, pp. 27-33 in Flex*, A., ed., Essays in Conceptual Analysis, London. Macmillan, 1956";; ' 7  Ho spars, o£. cit., pp. 6^-71)..  -  15  -  which he terms expressions having "a uniquely referring use",® "the meaning of an expression (of this particular kind) is not the set of things or the single thing it may correctly be used to refer to: the meaning is the set of 9 rules, habits, conventions for its use in referring." Considering the types of meanings outlined by Hospers, we can adapt Strawson's statement as follows:: 1.  The denotative meaning of an expression is the set of rules, habits, conventions for its use in referring.  2.  The designative meaning of an expression is the set of rule s, habits, conventions which govern Its use with regard, to its synonyns and 'antonyms. This latter, perhaps, warrants some exposition.  It  seems to this writer that x*hen we say a term ^designates" a property x*hat we are saying is that another expression or term or set of terms is the equivalent or, less strongly the synonym Q 9  10  or antonym of the term under consideration.  .-• : ' '. — — • ; — Strawson, o£. cit., p. 27.  : • : ——————  -•  —_  ibid., p. 32.  • 1 0 Goodman, Nv, ."On Likeness of Meaning", p. 73, in LInsky,L Semantics^and the Philosophy of Language. University of Illinoi Press, 1 9 5 2 . K e l s o n Goodman proposes "we shall do better never to say that two predicates have the same meaning but rather that they have a greater or lesser degree, or1 one or another kind, or likeness of -meaning." Restated according to the views put forward here, this state rnent would become "we shall do better never to say that two words have the same meaning but rather that the rules for their use are to some extent the same and that they therefore may be said to have a greater or lesser degree, or one or another kind of likeness of meaning".  —  16  -  The "rules for the use" of such terms deal, roughly, with acceptable polarity and synonymity of the term.  If this  is so, several implications are important here: i. If we accept some form of the positivist or instrumentalist criterion of significance, such as Pei rce's,  then for a term to have acceptable em-  pirical use either it, or one of its synonyms, must meet the criterion. ii. For an explanatory system to have significance, its 12 primitive terms must meet the criterion. 3.  If the denotative meaning of a term can be expressed roughly as: "The term X is used In such a way that it seems to refer to an empirical object but, upon examination, it has been shown that no such object has or can exist" then it has empirical significance only if its synonymous terms do. The strength of Strawson's contention lies in three  propositions regarding meaning: 1.  That some terms do have cognitive meanings yet they are not used to denote things which now do, ever have, or likely ever will exist.  2.  That many such terms appear to have a unique designative use, but in fact are members of a class of terms all of 11  Peirce, C.S., "The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce", Vol. V, 1932, p. lj.02, as cited in Childs, J.L., American Pragmatism and Education, Henry Holt & Co., 1956,p. I4.7. 12 See pp. 28-31 of this thesis . for more detailed discussion of "explanatory system" and "primitive terms".  -  17  which have the same type of designatIve meaning, where "meaning" is interpreted as "rules for the use of". 1 ^ 3.  That by showing that terms are used as outlined in 1. and 2. we can satisfactorily answer the question, "What does X mean?" It is our contention that this interpretation of  meaning can be usefully applied to some other types of terms. What x-Je will be particularly concerned to show here is that there are terms which appear to have a unique denotative and designative meaning but which, in fact, are members of a class of terms all of which have the same denotative and designative use and, hence, are synonyms in the view put forward here.  Further, we shall endeavour to show that these terms  are often the primitive terms in the explanatory system proposed by philosophers of education. Hospers refers, when discussing the emotive theories of ethics, to the "primacy of emotive meaning of ethical terras".1^  By this he means "that it is the emotive meaning,  not the cognitive, which is the determinant for the use of ethical terms in particular sentences,1^ or again, "the 13 ^  Strawson, P.P., o£. cit., p. Hospers, J., op. cit., p. lj.82. Ibid., p. lj_8l  ,18 emotive and not the cognitive meaning of the ethical term is the determinant for its use".  36  By these expressions, Hospers is explaining that, even though some ethical terms may have cognitive meaning for the user, the user is nonetheless not attempting (consciously or otherwise) primarily to communicate this cognitive meaning but is endeavouring to express or evoke emotions. Now, if we consider this sort of situation in the light of our four-part division of.meanings, we can see that we could call the emotive meaning of such terms the dominant meaning (i.e. when the words are used according to convention) of such terms and the other meanings the "minor meanings" of the term. It is important to note also that to be able to say that an interpreter understands a word used by a user of language it must be said that he knows not only the denotation or designation of the word which is at the time involved but also must be said to know certain rules of the language which state "this word, X, is commonly used to denote and/or designate these other things and/or words which can be used to denote characteristics which are not now to be part of the situation.  Further, it seems to us that both emotive and pic-  ture meanings of a word can be expressed as rules of language. However, these are very likely far more personal and complex. 16  17  Ibid., p. ij.81.  •  . ' '  Ibid., p. 102.  :  19 Wordsj of course, have many uses and follow many conventions. If we know all the conventions according to which a word is used we will know the "whole" meaning of a word.  If we dis-  tinguish only one or some of the conventions we will have one or some "partial" meanings of a word, Thus, in terms of our definition of "meaning", we can now say successful communication is accomplished If both user and interpreter were at the time of the attempted communication aware of the same convention for the use of the conventional sign or signs involved.  As we have attempted to  indicate in Chapter I, it is the essence of modern philosophical analysis that sometimes in philosophical statements the conventions followed by the user are enigmatic or unconventional and are, therefore, confusing to the interpreter, who may even be the user himself.  In the next two chapters  we will endeavour to analyze the leading principles and key linguistic conventions followed by certain philosophers of education.  CHAPTER III We return now to the four philosophers of education mentioned in Chapter I and justification of our selection of these four as representatives of the area of philosophy of education®  It will readily be granted by most people in the  field of formal education that the major conflict in educational ideas of our time concerns a distinction that has been characterized in many ways, but often as the conflict between "traditional" and "progressive" education. It is our opinion, that in terms of practical, everyday educational terms there are three distinct programs proposed under these two headings.  These can be labelled  Realism,. In the sense of the statement often made by those responsible for paying for education, "Yes, we want the best for our children, but let's be 'realistic' about it";  Pan-  sophism, as exemplified by the current campaign of Mortimer Adler's "Syntopicon", and Progressivism, founded under the aegis and impetus of American Pragmatism.  Respectively,  these three are represented here by Broudy, Ulich and Horne, and Dewey. I have chosen these three for the following reasons: 1.  They are reputable academic authors.  2.  They are, I believe, representative of the field and the major disputes. 1  1  Except for those authors who "represent" established religious groups, whose theories I have not considered here.  -  21  -.  Let us deal first with Broudy. major work  In Chapter I of his  he decides that, in spite of obvious inconsisten-  cies and problems, philosophy of education must, if it is to be a worthwhile exercise, have as a major part of its method, some deductive apparatus which logically connects its educational conclusions with the major areas of regular p h i l o s o p h y . ^ He presents philosophy of education as a discipline followed to seek solutions to specific educational problems. In his discussion Broudy seems to imply that "seeking a solution to a problem" is essentially a matter of reaching agreement among disputing parties.^  This, of course, is very  close to an idea of Peirce's - that people seek, not truth, but belief, an idea which has, as we shall see, an important place in our analysis of the methods of certain philosophers of education, including Broudy.  Broudy points out that there  are many ways of reaching agreement.  He hutlines four such  methods and terms them "levels" to indicate that some are not as trustworthy as others.  The four levels are: I. Emotional  levels- In disagreements at this level, solutions are reached by arguments that are "either the results of unreflective impulse or rationalizations t h e r e o f I I .  Factual Level:-  2' t, Broudy, H. S., Building a Philosophy of Education.  3  » PP. 19 and 26.  i, 4. 4,u B r o u d y d o e s n o t specifically say that he means this, but the examples he uses and his explication of the method of philosophy of education certainly is this.  , . 5 ..  Ibid., p . 20.  -  -22 -  Here, disagreements are settled by collection of information. III. Theoretical Level's-  Disagreements are settled by pro-  posing a theory which seems to "make sense out of the facts IV. Philosophical Level:-  When the other three methods have  failed to produce agreement, disputants may seek to resolve their differences by. turning to philosophy.  In such cases we  may do either or both of: 1.  Applying various logical techniques of philosophy to our 7  problem. 2.  "Pick yourself a philosophy and see what kind of education you need to bring that kind of good life about."® This is to be accomplished by deducing the education practices from the philosophy's metaphysics, epistemology and/or axlology.^ Broudy recommends that a combination of these two meth-  ods be used and declares that his book "will be an exemplification of this approach...."10  ^ Ibid., p. 22.  7  These techniques are, of course, not solely those of philosophy. What Broudy seems to be getting at here is that the arguments be studied and analyzed with great care as is often done in philosophy,, 8  Q 10  Ifrld.;, p. 18. Ihid..,.. p. 21].. Ibid., p..20.  23 It is not entirely clear to this writer upon what basis Broudy distinguishes between the Theoretical Level and the Philosophical Level.  Insofar as his book is an exempli-,  fication of the Philosophical Level, we shall discover what he means by it as our analysis of his book proceeds.  For  now, let us study how he characterizes these methods in Chapter I of his book to try to see if he does indeed make a distinction between them. The following expressions are used by him in reference to the Theoretical Level: 1.  "guided by some theory" 11  2.  "a theory to make sense out of facts"  3.  13 "some...theory may be invoked to explain why"  [j..  "The argument becomes more profound and involved."1^  5.  "Where science offers an explanation - a tfosory that does  12  account for the facts adequately.. 6.  "Unfortunately, the sciences of the soul and of society are still immature.  7.  16  "it is our intellectual duty to exhaust the possibilities 11  Ibid., p. 22.  12 Ibid., • . • Ibid.  :.  Ibid. 15 Ibid., p. 23. 16 Ibid*  of science in the solution of problems before turning elsewhere.  It is all well and good to cry that we have  to go beyond science for the secret of the good life, but it is well to get to science before going beyond it." 17 The following summarize his references in outlining the Philosophical Level; 1.  "a level on which the issue is: What is really true,  -i Q  what Is really valuable, what Is really real?" 2.  "truths about the world, about man , or about goodness that are universal, eternal and valid for all men.in all  3.  circumstances?"19 "the ultimate in the possibilities of discussion."20  Ij.,  "there is no deeper level on which the disputants can PI take refuge. "  5.  "issues in metaphysics, epistemology, aesthetics and ethics  6.  "the most general aspects of all human thought and furnish the basis and validation of all human knowledge in any field." 23  17  Ibid.  18 • 19  Ibid., p. 214.0 Ibid.  20 TIbid. . •. , 21  Ibid.  22  •Ibid.  23  Ibid.  - • 25 7.  - ' '  "problems that can be settled by seeking out the facts, or which cease to be controversial in the light of reliable scientific theory are not, strictly speaking, problems in;the philosophy of education."2^"  8.  "to the depth of their philosophical roots. u2 ^  9.  "we have to resort to views about reality, about knowledge, about goodness, and about beauty, and what views we have about these may decide the side on which we throw our choice in ... practical issues."  ?A  ?  Because Broudy used terras such as "root" and "depth" in an obviously metaphorical way in these statements, and because he does not specify the meanings of such key terms as "basis" and "validation" it is not possible to be sure that we can correctly characterize his conception of the Philosophical Level so as to distinguish it from the Theoretical Level. However, it seems to us that it can be reasonably characterized as follows: 1.  There are carefully prepared and accredited theoretical systems which are generally said to be scientific systems.  2.  These theoretical systems concern themselves with hypotheses and experimental validation and their propounders believe that they will not always be considered to be "true" Ibid., p. 25.  25  • p Ibid. 26  Ibid.  -  26  -.  Rather, they expect them to be replaced by a more useful theory. 3.  They are not expected to be permanently accepted.  There are also theoretical systems which are called "philosophical systems".  These are more general than  scientific systems and are put forward as purveyors of eternal and universal truths. In seeking agreement on answers to problems, if we cannot convince others of the validity of our claims by appeal to accredited scientific theories, we then can appeal to an accredited philosophical theory. 5.  If agreement cannot be reached in this way, agreement cannot, by logical discussion, be reached.  6.  In either case, whether we seek agreement by the Theoretical or Philosophical Level, what we do is to try to show to those with whom we are In disagreement that our position "fits into" a true theoretical system and hence is "explained" by that system. 27 In this, point-of-view, Broudy carries on in a long tra-  dition of- philosophy of education. It is Interesting to note that in his outline of the Theoretical Level one of Broudy's examples illustrates a "therapeutic" approach. The disputants are shown by use of a psychological theory, how they came to have the arguments they hold to. By doing so*, it is hoped, they can-then see that their belief is not rationally based. Some philosophical analysts seek to deal with those who'seek universal truths in philosophy In an analagous way by showing disputants how their use (or misuse) of language has led them to hold to the arguments they do hold to.  27 Careful inspection of extant and apparently worthwhile writings on the subject leads us to the conclusion that philosophies of education have' usually been written for one or a combination of five purposes: 1.  To guide people to "salvation" in the usual Christian sense of the word®  2.  To- justify certain actions„  3. Because it is an interesting project. If.. To establish goals for a plan and thereby achieve consistency in action. 5.  To explain certain actions or proposed actions,, The first of these purposes is not relevant here.  This  writer believes that the second and third are of vital importance in inspiring philosophers of education to begin writing their works.  However, the fourth and fifth purposes  become the most important, for two reasons: a) A consistent and complete explanation is usually accepted as a justification for actions taken, possibly because a consistent explanation reveals that the actions themselves were consistent with some plan or goal'.  Thus the fourth  purpose "explains" the second. b) It is accepted practice among nearly all (intellectual) disciplines that one seek to establish a consistent and complete "system" of statements from which one can deduce desired true statements about things andstates-of-affairs. cess has various names, among which are: "seeking an  This pro'  .explanation for sucli-and-suoh" or, .and this is a very common way of expressing it, "building a philosophy of such-and-such" . W e have discussed at length what/Broudy1 s* distinction between the Theoretical and Philosophical Levels seems to be because it exemplifies the answer which would be given by most philosophers of education to the question,\ "Why have a philosophy of education.?"  In its brief form the answer would be:  "To have a system which will 'explain' the actions we propose. Let: us take, a brief digression to see what Is involved in seeking to prepare such an explanation. What, is explanation?  According to Hospers, "to explain  • '• ' • pQ -  an event Is simply to bring it under a law."  By "to bring  it under" Hospers does not necessarily mean to make It.de-dUcible,  He considers that_such a strict criterion as deduci-  bility is. a "purist" one although he personally favours its application. We shall consider this further from the'point of view of a purist, as outlined by Gopi.29 What are the properties of consistent and complete deductive systems?  As Gopi points out, it is impossible ex-  cept for. tautologus systems, to prove beyond doubt that any system is consistent and complete-. p D  •  .  :  -  . . . - • •  But certain tests ...  .  .  .  ._.„_,,-;-  Hospers, J., "What is Explanation?", p. 98, in Flew, A,, op. cit. ••' 29-'  , Gopi, I.M., Symbolic Logic, Macmillan, New York, '19j?lj.. '"•'' ' 3.0' .•'••„'-' Ibid., p. 178.  -  29  -.  are accepted as Indicating that a system is probably consistent and complete. 1.  Consistency is indicated w h e m  "it contains no formula such that both the formula and its negation are provable as theorems within it." 31  2.  one can "find an interpretation which makes all of its axioms true."  32  Assuming a system Is consistent the "notion of deductive completeness ... is used in various senses." 1.  Two ares  "in the least precise sense ... a deductive system Is complete if all the desired formulas can be proved within it.  Me may have an extra-systematic criterion for the  truth of propositions about the subject matter for which we set the deductive system up..  If we' have, then we may  call that system complete when all of its formulas which become true propositions on the intended interpretation are provable formulas or theorems of the system.1,33 2.  In another sense, a system can be said to be deductively complete when "every formula of the system is such that  31  Ibid.  32  Ibid.,;p. 179.  33  Ibid.  -  30  -  either It or Its negation is provable as a theorem."-^4" To- be most useful, deductive systems should also, according to Copi, have certain other properties: 1.  They should be "expressively complete" ....  We are here  discussing what can be said in the system, not what can be proved.  With respect to a given subject matter, a  formal deductive system is 'expressively complete' when it is possible to assign meanings to its undefined terms in such a way that every proposition about that subject matter can be expressed as a formula of the system,"3^ 2.  They should possess "rigor".  A system has rigor when  "no formula is asserted to be a theorem unless it is logically entailed by the a x i o m s . T o  achieve rigor,  it is recommended that devisers of systems follow certain basic practices:  Ibid., p. l80. - "Any formal deductive system will have a certain collection of special undefined or primitive terms. ... We may speak of the totality of undefined terms as the base of the system, and the formulas expressible in the system are all formulas constructed on that base. In general, the totality of formulas constructed on the base of a given system can be divided into three groups: first, all formulas which are provable as theorems within the system: second, all formulas whose negations are provable within the system; and third, all f ormulas such that, neither they nor their negations are provable within the system. For consistent systems the first and second groups are distinct, that is, have no formulas in common. Any system whose third group is empty, containing no formulas at all, is said to be deductively complete." 35 36  Ibid., p. 1?8. Ibid., p. 181.  a) Use "arbitrary rather than familiar symbols. b) Develop the system "formally", that is, syntactically rather than semantically.  c) Specify all axioms. d) Specify "what principles of inference are to be used."38 It is this xvriters opinion that most of those traditionally referred to as "philosophers of education" have been attempting to devise a deductive system which would have to some extent at least, the properties of completeness, consistency, rigor and expressive completeness.  It has been  their hope that with such a system they would be able to explain and justify certain educational procedures.  However,  it also seems to be a fact that the levels or degree of consistency and rigor reached by philosophy of education have been very low. As we stated before, Broudy approaches the task of trying to build a theoretical system by attempting to find ansvjers to various educational problems. The first problem he tackles is that of definition of the term "education".  His approach is analytic and is partly  prescriptive and partly descriptive.  37 Ibid., p. l8l. 38  Ibid., p. 182.  It embodies only a  -  32  -.  small portion of the therapeutic method.  We will not con-  sider it here. The second problem he deals with is that of aims for education.  He assumes we need aims to avoid haphazard opera-  tion and, implicitly, also assumes that haphazard operation is something to be avoided.^  He asserts that the variety of  and conflicts among aims propounded by various people arise from "the lack of unanimity as to what constitutes the good life."^0 1.  The implications of this statement are thatj  Various philosophers of education have arrived at different and conflicting decisions on what the aims of education ought to be.  2.  Their views on the aims of education have been deduced from different "regular" philosophies.  3.  These different regular philosophies have had different opinions concerning what constitutes the good life. Therefore, the deduced aims have been different* He then proceeds to an analysis of "The Concept of the  Good Life".  Because this term, "the good life", is one of  the key terms in his arguments, we shall analyze his uses of it in some detail. . This writer suspects that arguments, which are usually very brief, In favour of having aims gloss over many inconsistencies which are worthy of analysis, but he has not gone into it here. Broudy, Building a Philosophy of Education, pi 29.  -  33  -.  Broudy asserts that everyone, seeks the good life. is so, he argues, "for no one knowingly chooses evil."^1  This Let  us see what such a claim might entail. Broudy seems to want to say that "seeks the good life" is a defining characteristic of humanity when he describes a man who does not want to as "such a creature".^2  If such is  his intention then his declaration that everyone seeks the good life would be interpreted as follows: 1.  He does not mean that he has made an empirical study and discovered that everyone seeks the good life for himself and others.  2.  He does not mean that most people seek the good life for themselves and others.  3.  He. means, literally, that everyone seeks the good life, at least for himself.  kr . He means, in fact, that if he were to meet something which appeared in every respect to be human but which' avowed in Its speech and revealed in Its actions that it was not seeking the good life for itself - this thing could not be human.  In other words "seeks the good life"  is a defining characteristic of man. 5.  It is, in short, logically impossible for a human to seek evil' for himself.  ^  Ibid., p. 33.  hr2  Ibid., p. 51.  .  .  •  -  3k  -  Ob the other hand Broudy does not specifically say that it is a defining characteristic;of man.  In fact he. rather  vacillates on this point when he says of "the creature", "I would also wonder why I was . still calling him a man..1'^ ; In either case, the term "the good life" is used polar to "evil".  He also uses it, and with possibly the same sort  of entailment, polar to "uiihappiness".^  It is perhaps  logically impossible for a human knowingly to seek to make himselfunhappy.  Because of the apparent variety of aims pur-  sued by people, Broudy' s use of "good" and "happiness" in this way immediately makes one suspicious that he simply uses these terms as synonyms for "seeks something",,  In such a case his  claims would be true only because they were expressed in terms with such wide denotation and designation that anything whatever is good or brings happiness.,. This use of the terms is not Broudy's intention. He sets out to specify exactly what the good life consists of, what sort of life the term "good" denotes and what sor-t,-of-life will make any human happy. Broudy asserts belief in a form of correspondence theory of truth.^ •  Statements are true when they describe  Ibid.  Broudy is not always consistent in his use of the "the good life". Sometimes it is polar to evil, sometimes to unhappiness and sometimes to both. ;Broudy, op. cit., pp. 75 and 128„  -  35  -.  things op states-of-affairs as they really are, false when they describe thera as they "seem to be".^6  We discover truth  by two processes: (1) Perception of secondary qualities: (2) Abstraction of primary qualities by reasoning on the basis of various types of perceptual evidence which seem to form a consistent pattern.^7 Broudy does not specifically discuss the term "meaning" in the cognitive sense but he does imply in his discussion of "cognition" that a meaningful term has these defining properties: a) Refers to an existent primary quality which we have abstracted. b) Refers to a secondary quality which may have its origins I. in a real primary quality, ii. In a person's mind.^ c) Refers to various combinations of perceived or abstracted qualities. Imaginary perceptions (i.e. - those which arise strictly from a person's mind), faulty abstraction^0 and/or faulty combination of qualities are the sources of error and false statements.  • v • ' ' •'.•-•• Ibid., p. IJ4.2.  "  •  •  Ibid,,, p, llj.0. ': ^  Ibid., p:. 134. Ibid.,, p. 135.  Although. Broudy at one point (p. 13^) seems to hold that faulty abstraction is impossible - when he says the mind abstracts Infallibly.  -  36  -.  When we; obtain true••3tateffients','-.we^ have : sta.teiaent;:sv. which in : some way correspond with reality.  Beality has two  aspects, which Broudy denotes by various polar terms: 1. When he discusses,knowledge: a) continuity and change b) matter and form^1 c) matter and structure d) field and distortions e) fixed and changing f) continuous and discontinuous g) actual and potential tio  h) determinate and indeterminate, 2,  When he discusses human nature: Self and the Other He adopts these sets of polar terras because of the word  "change".  The proper use of this term seems to necessitate  that there be something continuous to be changed and change, according to Broudy, we all accept as universal.  We must choo  between this polarity and the polarity of "annihilation and creation" which are "types of change that we do not find in nature and could not understand if we did":, ^ • ,  •  ••  •.:..  •  '  ~  "  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  . . . . . " • '  He seems to be very inconsistent in his use of this term. ( see pp. 132 and 133) •^2 Most of these polar terms are used on pp. 128-138 of Building a Philosophy of Education. • 53 Ibid,, p. 67. 5k Ibid., p. 131.  ' "  :  -  37  -.  With this as background, Broudy sets as hia avowed aim to show:. 1. Because there is a structure in everything in the universe, ) . -' -. • • • there must ba a structure in each human which permits and indeed necessitates that he conform to a certain way of 2.  life to lead the good life. This structure is the same in every human.  3.  Therefore, there Is one and only one good life - the good life. Broudy's reality also includes a teleological aspect:  things have a trend,"That toward which an entity is essentially tending, which will realize Its nature, is good for it. This", concept involves some difficulties which, It seems to thi s writer, Broudy overlooks: 1. Why use such words as "tend", and "trend"? to:  These are polar  a) fixed unavoidable direction - in this sense, "trend" Is used to allow for actions which do not carry out what "ought" to happen.'  . 2.  b) no change.-^ It is, of course, connected with the free will problem. By using terms like "trend" Broudy allows for obser-  vable exceptions. It seems to be the case that many, indeed 1 1 : : : FP 1 ~ 1 • • •: ~ ~ : ^ Ibid., p. 75, as cited by Broudy from Wild, J., "Tendency The Ontological Ground of Ethics", The; Journal of Philosophy, . XLIX:!!}.* July 3, 1952, p. 473. The term "essentially" has the same use.  38  -  most, people do not lead, the good life. •In--humans, the structure which we tend to follow Broudy calls "human nature",  When we actually act in accor-  dance with our structural tendency we lead the good life. Thus, in addition to being polar to "evil" and "unhappiness", "the good life" is also polar to "not following the demands of human nature".  Apparently, a being which does not strive  to follow this trend is not a human being. When discussing this structure with respect; to Individuals, Broudy uses the term "Self", capitalized.  Here is how  he characterizes the Self? "...each human being is a real individual with a style of existence peculiar to Selves. This style we can call its formal structure. This structure remains the same so long as the individual continues to live.. Thus he has a certain kind of body with certain kinds of organs that maintain life In certain ways. He also has certain ways of knowing, feeling, remembering and imagining. These may vary in different men, so that what we know, remember, imagine and feel changes from moment to moment,* But the structure does not change so long as the individual remains a man. ... It Is this structure that we can call the,substance or the substantial nature of man." "At any moment the Self is a core of what it has done and what It is striving to do. And in Its waking moments under normal conditions it is aware of: this unity of pattern, i.e., it is aware of itself." 58 Xtn ...  Broudy, o£. cit., p. 65. Ibid. ,. ,  •  -  39  "The Self, is not a hard bit of something. It is a pattern of activity,, and it is with this .pattern that we shall be concerned In the remainder: of;. this chapter. It is what we shall mean by human nature. It Is this pattern that gives each Self its enduring continuity." 59 , "At any moment .1, ... am the result of my total history. Everything.I have done, thought, sensed, remembered, felt,/ and imagined is registered in me. Not as they happened originally to be sure but as effects,of those happenings, ©ne answer to the /0 questions What am. I? is "You, are what .you have been.'" "Persons in grave stages of illness still live : when, consciousness is gone, and even physicians speak of a will to live that seems to have nothing to do with the patient's thoughts about the matter." "At any moment I, as an actual real individual, am the result of my total history. ... But at every moment throughout that whole history I was straining toward the next moment .... Apart from this ... we could hardly distinguish animate objects from Inanimate ones .... Thus at the level of human life where we can not only live toward the future, but also, be aware that we are doing so , the Self can be thought of as made up. of its envisioned possibilities. What am I really? Perhaps what really expresses me Is my hopes', and plans ... The Self is what the mind envisions:as my possibilities ... what I have undergone to date ... has been.arranged and preserved symbolically In the hopes and plans I have for the life I have not yet lived. This, transformation is what I have contributed and not merely taken from the'past. ... It is the Self as a symbol." 62 "Frustration of desire reveals the Self. At first It is regarded as evil. Later we recognize some desires as evil. Then we came to regard frustration py  Ibid.. . .  60  Ibid., p. 66.  9  Ibid. Ibid.  • '  1  -  Ij.0 »  of our premeditated choice as the evil. This is the frustration of our free will. Why so evil?. Because the Self, my plan for me, and frustration of my choices frustrates my plan, "Hence, the first right of man is: freedom, and to surrender this right is tantamount to ceasing to exist as a human: being, i.e., spiritual suicide. " "All of which leads us to conclude that freedom or selfdetermination is one of the natur al and e s sential goals of. the human being. To be good subjectively or objectively a life must give evidence of being fashioned from within by the person who.is living it. It must not be fashioned by desire solely, but by desires as. weighed and chosen by a thinking Self. part of whose, very being and essence are the.possibilities of becoming what it can e n v i s i o n . "...the existence of a Self that by its exertions gave notice to the world that here was a piece of reality to be reckoned with. "61+ "If we agree with,modern psychology, we shall say that structurally we inherit each of the generic powers of value realization in an amount or degree ranging from point above zero to an undetermined maximum. Among such generic powers we would certainly include the. power to become a Self, i.e., a unity of experience of which each moment Is referred to a psychological center - the Ego - and the power of symbol-making and symbol-using."65 "...the obvious components self and realization. As to the Self, we have already Indicated that it is a peculiar tension between What we are at any given moment and the possibilities that we envision for ourselves in subsequent moments. The Self is a striving to become a certain kind of person." "To realize one's self...Is to fulfill some of these possibilities, especially those determined in our reflective freedom. Nov; in general this makes sense. Ask an adult what his hopes .,. are there is no mystery about what self-realization Ibid., p. 67. 4- Ibid., p. 70.  61  Ibid.*, p. 80.  -  1+1  -  means to him." . •  "But suppose you look at a lad of nine ... What Self is he trying to realize? .... his burning ambition at the .moment is to.operate a space ship.... We would have to admit that probably this is his real Self at this stage of the .game."  ..  "But we shall not forget either that when reflective freedom begins to sort out these possibilities, the Self will , change the direction of its strivings.... but we have to educate the young man now. ... the concept seems ... fuzzy and useless."bb The Self is some sort of structure which has capacities, and a will.  Its existence explains memory, the continuity of  the individual, the connection between mental and physical orders of being, the unpredictability of human actions, and, as an aspect of the latter, freedom of the human will.  It  apparently also explains the fact that each individual appears to be unique, yet all are to some extent the same. In his various references to the Self, there are several instances where Broudy seems to be vague or inconsistent.  For  instance: 1. Does the Self: have a mind or Is it the mind? 2. Does he intend to use "Self" as he does "matter", to denote a principle of continuity?  This seems to be implied  . in the fact that the concept is to be used to explain memory and continuity of the,individual and in. his description of it as "a style ..." and "a pattern ..." and in other similar expressions. 66  Ibid., p. 81.  These entail that the Self  does not change.  On the other hand, Broudy sometimes  speaks of the Self as changing as, "hi3 real Self at this stage ,of the game." 3<  He argues sometimes, as if the Self is the one thing unique to a person but at other times as if It were what all peo- . pie have in. common - i.e. - human nature.  It-. By using words like "pattern*1 he often speaks of the Self as if it were something observable but inevitably comes back to terms like "power" and "will" which, apparently, denote some sort of unobservable something. It is this writer's opinion that these apparent contradictions can be resolved by an analysis, in terms of wordUse, of the arguments, and we intend to attempt such an analysis after completing an outline of Broudy's main concepts.. Broudy ties together his conception of the good life , and of the Self by outlining three tendencies which,are necessarily a part of all humans as a result of the structure of human, nature.  They ares  2.  Self-determination^7 Self-realization68  3.  Self-integration 69  1.  67  ;  . ..  :  . Ibid., p. 70. ; :  68  Ibid.,pp. 81, 82, 8i|., 86v .  69  Ibid., 86 - 90.  -  If-3 -  It is in his exposition of self-determination that Broudy gives his solution to the free will problem.  His  argument runs thusly: 1.  The Self includes three aspects - its past, its present, its plans for the future». •  2.  To destroy any one of these is to destroy part of the Self.  3. No Self can knowingly aim to destroy itself. It will, therefore, regard anything which tries to prevent it from considering plans for its future as trying to destroy it and consider that thing to be evil.'''0 5.  The determinists argue that everything Is "caused".  "There  is, they would argue, a psychological, physiological, and logical determinism that makes up our minds for us. 6. However, what they say is true only of the physical world. 72  There is "a fundamental duality between two orders of being". In the mental world, the world of meaning, a Self can combine , symbolically, events, of any type whatsoever. 7.  Thus, although we cannot have physical freedom, we must have freedom in the world of symbols»  This freedom is  freedom to consider possible plans for our Self. In short, Broudy defines freedom as "the possibility of possibility".73 70  Ibid., p. 69.  71  Ibid.3 p. 70.  Ibid., p. 72. 73 Ibid.:, p. 7ii-.  • ; " . -  8.  -  '  kh  -  This freedom to combine symbols "by whatever means - : science, fancy, wish or dream" he terms "natural freedom" and he further calls it a "natural right" of man However, he goes on to expound "good" or "real" free-  dom which he describes as "reflective" freedom and explains as follows: . . a);Natural freedom permits unlimited symbolic combinations. b); Certain combinations of our symbols will work because they are in accord with this structure (of the universe) and others will not for the 75 opposite reason." c) We discover the -combinations that "work" by reflective freedom. d) Natural freedom is simply a means of providing the widest range of possibilities of choice to be used in reflective freedom, - "the use ofrythe imagination in behalf of constructive activity". / Although he does not specifically say so, Broudy seems to believe that self-realization Is a moral duty.  His  argument in this respect can be summarized as follows: 1.  Observation of humans and other creatures leads us to conelude that environment alone cannot explain either the Mdi Ibid., p. ?5. 76  Ibid., p. 77. 77 Ibid., p. 81)..  ; •  ;  - 'kS  -  •:•  differences among human beings or the differences between humans and other creatures, 2. We are therefore forced to conclude that "we inherit... 78 generic powers of value realization"' Broudy uses several terms to denote this inherited something "capacity", "potentiality", "powers".  Such things  "cannot be. directly observed,- they are a.lways/inferred."79 3. We have a duty to strive for our own self-realization because anything else means that we seek self-destruction. !}.«, If we think about it,.. It will become apparent to us that our own self-realization Implies that we also seek the self-realization of all others. It seems: that here Broudy is considering some form of enlightened self-interest theory, but he does not expand It further. The third tendency of human nature and of . "Selfs" is that of self-integration which Broudy expounds as follows: 1.  Success of some sort makes humans happier.  2. Happiness can usually be taken as an Indication that we 80 are determining and realizing our Self in the best way. It Is, therefore, usually good to be happy. 3. We usually cannot be successful unless we are well organized as individuals. 78  7Q  Ibid-, P- 80.  - /Ibid., p. 82. Ibid., p. 86,  i|.. As individuals good organization necessitates some, consistent method of choosing among conflicting possibilities and some method of keeping us striving to reach long-term goals. To achieve good organization we should seek integration, which is something like organic unity, for the Self.  "If  there Is no wholeness to. the Self, then there is no way of deciding which desire is more compatible with It than any other. 6. But "A Self cannot be integrated because a Self Is already a principle of unification; it Is what unifies diverse experience with the flavour of 'mineness'. When we speak of integration we mean the unifying of, many selves within one personality, or "foSie unifying of actions or values so 82 that they blend rather than conflict." Examples of types of these many "selves" or '"clusters" which must be integrated within each of us are:  /  a) - our various roles, such as, father, worker, club member b) - new ideas coming to us must be fitted in with the old ideas. 7.  No matter what these clusters are or what our individual Self is like, these will be Integrated In some fashion. In some people the integrations are monstrous and "psychotic'! Rl 82  Ibid,, p. 87. Ibid., p. 86.  -  2+7 -  8.; Thus, what really concerns; us is not integration per se, but rather "good" integration as opposed to "bad" integration. 9.  Broudy implies that these two can usually be distinguished by application of some "greater happiness" principle,  10.  Self integration can be reached by acquiring and using four types, of. knowledge; i. "accurate appraisal of our abilities and strivings" ii. a knowledge of what society expects iii. a knowledge of the "successes and failures.of "man-: - ' • •. kind" ... iv. "to know the ways of the physical world"®^ Now let us.summarize Broudy's system as developed thus  fart A.  Metaphysics: 1. All things including people, have a structure. 2. This structure gives them tendencies to act in certain ways. 3. The structure also gives them certain powers. I}.. Action in accordance with the tendencies and to use the powers bring pleasure; those contrary bring pain. 5. These tendencies and powers determine the pattern of each Self. 6. All Selfs, because of the defining structure of human nature, seek self-determination, self-realization and 82  Ibid., p. 86.  self-integration. 7. The structure, tendencies and powers of humans are Impossible to observe.  They are inferred from .the. observ-  / able activities which form the pattern of the Self. B.  • Qk Splstemology; 1. Cognitive knowledge Is either; a) direct knowledge of secondary qualities, or b) inferred knowledge of the structure of somethings 2. True statements are true because they correspond with the structure. It is the contention of this writer that the episte-  mological and metaphysical system proposed by Broudy as summarized above is repeated with only minor variations by a large group of philosophers of education commonly termed'"Realists". The general function of such systems was explicitly recognized by Peirce - to help people to achieve the satisfactory state termed "belief" and Implicitly recognized by Broudy, as we have seen, in his exposition of the levels of discussion. The leading principle of the method of seeking belief used by most philosophers of education can be described as "metaphysical".  It may have its psychological origins in what QB  Ulich terms man's 'feetaphysical yearning".  Its general pat-  tern can be summarized as follows: ^ We will,consider Axiology in a later section. Ulich, R., The Human Career, Harper and Brothers, 1955, p. 191. • '  ij-9 1.  Construct  a m o r e or less  system from•which  logically  statements  coherent. e x p l a n a t o r y  about e d u c a t i o n can h e  de-  duced. 2.  Use  as p r i m i t i v e  terms i n the  s u c h as " s t r u c t u r e " and w h i c h are  system metaphysical  terms  "power" w h i c h denote: " t h i n g s "  unobservable.  T h e r e is a n o t h e r group of e d u c a t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h e r s are u s u a l l y called p r i n c i p l e a s the  " i d e a l i s t s " w h o f o l l o w the same  e x a m p l e s of this l a t t e r  shall not deal w i t h his system i n detail b u t  .  type»  simply  We  outline  here:  U l i c h a s s e r t s that  .matter, mind  and  there are  three l e v e l s of  ' his references  to and c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n s  are m e t a p h o r i c a l .  reality:  "a t h i r d , or u n i v e r s a l , o r d e r b e h i n d  p h y s i c a l aiid m e n t a l o r d e r o f t h i n g s " . ^  1.  leading  realists.  U l i c h ' s w o r k s are  it b r i e f l y  who  For  the  The great m a j o r i t y of the third  of  order  example:  . . . d e e p e r f o r m of  ,.87 life"  2.  ^  1  .the f l o w e r m a y b e c o m e t r a n s p a r e n t , as It w e r e , and i n the p i e c e of n a t u r e w h i c h he then sees he m a y a d m i r e the u n i m a g i n a b l e g r a n d e u r of the self. manifesting cosmos.""0  3 . " . . . t h e sense of t r a n s c e n d e n c e w h i c h d r i v e s h i m f r o m • o b j e c t to object toward e v e r - d i s t a n t r e g i o n s , comes "•"•'..• to rest i n the assurance that t h e r e w o r t e an e m b r a c i n g t r u t h and u n i t y b e h i n d all_the little t r u t h s and e r r o r s of the h u m a n m i n d . " " ° ' - • ' .• ' . . 86  :  Ibid.,: p .  100.  8 7  I b i d . , p . 221)., See also p . 98.  8 8  I b i d . , p . 2 1 1 . See  8 9  I b i d . , p', 2 1 0 . See also p p . 99,  :  .  also p . 78, • 100.  •  I).,.  50  - .  Yet S h a k e s p e a r e , and the Apostles:, w e r e I n the translations. s ° there m u s t b e s o m e t h i n g u n i v e r s a l w i t h i n and b e h i n d h u m a n l a n g u a g e s , a self-, r e p e a l i n g spirit i n the v a r i e t y of t o n g u e s . " 9 0  5. "...in the embrace of the unseen"^ 6. ,  ..the t i e s b y w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l m i n d , as t h r o u g h an u m b i l i c a l Q c o r d , is c o n n e c t e d w i t h  the creative ground"'2  I n o t h e r p l a c e s , the f o l l o w i n g w o r d s p h o r i c a l l y to d e s c r i b e elevating  this third o r d e r :  (p. 73); m a s k  (p. 72);  However, U l i c h does characterize p e a r to b e m e t a p h o r i c a l . T h e , t h i r d order active.  These  are used  ,  and l e v e l  It is  2.  It is c r e a t i v e .  are o u t l i n e d  of b e i n g h a s  91k  5. , 6.  It is  immanent.  It is  ineffable.96  It is m e t a - e m p i r i c a l , h e n c e • 98 It is t e l e o l o g i c a l .  .  9 0  Ibid.,, p .  9 1  Ibid., p. 53.  9 2  I b i d . , p . Ij-7.  9 3  Ibid., p.  77.  72.  I b i d . , p . If-TI b i d . , p . I)..  ' * 96 •  Ibid., p .  201.  9 7  Ibid.,, p . llj-0.  9 6  Ibid., pp. 189,  201.  unknovxable. 9 7  ap-  below:  these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s :  95 3.  (p.910.  it i n t e r m s w h i c h do not  93  1.  meta-  /  ;  v - 51  -  7. .Among the products of this third, order are "selfs" which are unique because of the creative force of the self These characteristics have been re-summarized below to make them-more easily comparable with the summary of Broudy's ideas on.pp. 47.and 1+8 of this thesis: A.. Metaphysics 1" All things including people, have behind them a third . order of being, 2. This third order gives them tendencies to act in certain ways. 3« It also gives them certain powers. If., We can get glimpses of the third order by self-transcendence and enjoy "the elevated feeling of conscious participation in the spiritual order of the world."100 5, The self is an expression of the third order, 6. The third order is unobservable but can be "known" through intuition and/or -the functional coherence of - .  101  data. • B«  Eplstemology 1. Cognitive knowledge is of three levels: a) the level of natural reaction. 99JIbld,j p. 75. 100  EbM., p. 78.  101  Ibid.3 p. 138.  :  ,  b) the level of system. ..  ^ e level of meaning.  In this latter level one,  discovers "the' abiding ground behind his self and the world". 2. True statements are true because they correspond with the third order^  3  If* as Broudy has stated, philosophers of education cannot agree on what is to be done in education then the ultimate source of the difference or differences' is to be found In their philosophical beliefs, which must, therefore, differ.  If  Broudy and Ulich differ in educational matters they must differ in philosophical matters. ters.  They do differ in educational mat-  Let us see some ways in which they differ in educational  matters and trace these from their, different philosophical * statements; to .further elucidate the leading principle used by both and to give a clear indication of the significance of any differences. In defining the school's role within society, Broudy gives us a good example of the leading principle.  Indeed, his  discussion of the school's role shows the leading principle more clearly than any other part of his book.  He baldly  states that he makes two assumptions upon which to construct, 102 • Ibid., p. 99... 103 Ibid., p. 106.  Ms  System and that, these two assumptions are true because  they correspond with the inferred structure of what there is. The assumptions are: : 1.  That "social institutions develop in response to some need of the group".  2.  That "the principle of the division of labour applies or ••' io5 could apply to social institutions".  This latter statement and the extension which Broudy makes from it is a declaration of the truth of the doctrine of externality of relations. His argument can be summarized as follows: 1.  There; is an unobservable structure underlying everything.  2.  This structure gives everything tendencies and powers.  3.  Actions in accordance with the tendencies and to develop the powers bring pleasure.  In society, pleasure Is harmony.  I).. In a society organized in accordance with the structure, harmony is achieved by developing institutions which carry -i out a specific task in response to a need which arises 107 from the tendency of the underlying structure. This  ,» '•  •  • vi08'  is the "'natural' order of society .  • •  A society thus organized will permit each Self to, carry out Broudy, .Building a Philosophy of Education, p. 9lf.0 Ibid., p.-95. 106  Ibid.» p. 93.  107  Ibid., P. 16.  108  Ibid., p. 95.  .  / its "drive to self-perfection"109 without conflicting ' w i t h society's harmony®110 6.  The "special primary function of the school is to develop "the h a b i t s of a c q u i r i n g , U s i n g ,  and e n j o y i n g  knowledge  in the pursuit of the good life ...."111 7.  Other institutions such as the church, the family and the •.• . . . ,• -112 , government, have their own primary functions to perform/  8„  Broudy's entire exposition of the school's role is imbued with the notion that we "ought" to organize our society in the way he explains.  This, of course, Is an ethical  statement. We will consider it as such later. Broudy's approach has led almost directly to curriculum. The function of the schools is.to be the development of noetic skills among the students. other aspects of each Self.  Other institutions are to develop If all Institutions are properly  organized it will lead to each man's self-perfection. " • tJlich does not go into as much detail regarding school, society and curriculum as does Broudy, However, the extension of his views into these areas can be clearly seen in statements -  109 110 111  "l i p  Ibid., p. 93. Ibid.» pp. lj-7: and Ibid., p. 103.  The term "primary" has the same function here as "tendency" in another section— to denote occurrences which are not but ought, if the theory is correct, to be universally evident^  - ' 55' - •: by H. H. Horns. 113'' , - H o m e uses language with even greater metaphor ical gusto than does Ulich but their metaphysical systems are virtually the s a m e . O n e  quotation from H o m e will  indicate how closely his system parallels what we have seen of Ulich'st "All things and persons embody and manifest the  ll5 power and quality of spirit according to their capacity". By combining the ideas of Ulich and H o m e we can get /a fairly clear idea of the typical Idealist's proposals for curriculum and school and society: 1.  There is an unobservable Third Order underlying everything. All parts are governed by Internality of relations.  2.  This order gives everything tendencies and powers* .  3. Man has an "inner urge to feel himself In harmony with what he considers to be the productive and uniting forces.116 not only in his society, but in the creation as a whole"., ft. He can satisfy this urge and fulfill his powers by coming to consciously know this Third Order. H o m e , H. H..» "An Idealistic PhIlosophyw in Henry, N.B. (ed.) The Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part I - Philosophies^of Education, University of Chicago Press, [Henceforth cited as "NSSE, 19U-2". ) One difference: Horne's "underlying unity" is unchanging; Ulich's appears to be constantly creating. H o m e , NSSE, 19ft2, p. 176*. • 116  Ulich, The. Human Career, .p. 15?.  -  5.  56  -  This can be done by "self-transcendence".  6., Self-transcendence can be achieved by one, or both of , two methods: a) by acquiring universal knowledge; •' -i-i A b) by intuition. 7.  These two techniques are not the task solely of the school, nor does the particular type of school organization much 119 matter. What is more Important is having "teachers who can sense the presence of the eternal in the temporal".120 117  ' -  Ibid., p. 232  118  The basis of these statements Is the doctrine of in, ternality of relations. It implies two factors relevant here: 1.  To have complet  e knowledge of anything.one must have complete knowledge of everything. : . 2. Knowledge of anything is partial, knowledge ,of everything. The first of these factors presents educational idealists with a serious problem because it seems to Imply, considering the apparent limitations of humans, that we can never master the curriculum we ought to master. There are several different solutions given by idealists to this problem: a) Home simply asserts that it will take an infinity for man to satisfy his urge. (p. 158) b) Gomenius asserted that we must in fact acquire universal knowledge. c) Most put forward "some form of "short-cut" theory, such as: : i. Some rare people, mystics, have special powers to see the Third Order directly and can then pass on the knowledge to the rest of us(Ulich ppl I[.6-5l).ii. By "intuition" or religious experience we can in fact acquire direct knowledge of the Third Order. v (Horne, p. 162) 119 Horne., NSSB, 1942, pp.: 173, 174. 120 _ . Ibid,, p. 163.  -  57  - .  Both of these schools of philosophy of education, as we have seen, appear: to propose systems which purportedly "explain" these educational statements.  Both systems also  appear to be theoretical empirical systems prepared to "explain" certain facts and/or states-of-affairs which have been observed. The doctrine of externality of relations leads the realist to,two educational statements: 1.  There is an unobservable structure underlying everything. .  2.  The doctrine of externality of relations provides a true description of this structure,  3. Because it is a true description, the various Institutions have specific, unique functions.  Therefore:  a) The school is an Institution and has a specific unique function, b) Because it has this function the curriculum is restri ted to within certain bounds.  The: doctrine of internallty of relations leads the idealist to two different statements about the same educational areas: 1.  There Is an unobservable Third Order underlying everything  2.  The doctrine of Internallty of relations provides a true description of this Third Order.  3.  Because It Is, a true description, the functions of the various Institutions cannot be separated.  Therefore:  •  - 58  - ...  a) The school as an institution has no specific function ,  different from other institutions,,  b) The curriculum cannot be restricted within'certain bounds but must include all knowledge. Now this exposition of their theories has shown them as if their educational ideas were deduced from their philosophical ideas. happened.  In fact, however, exactly the opposite has  As we have seen, both theorists admit that their  basic metaphysical enti'tles are inferred from true statements about empirical observations.  There are two types of infer-  ence, inductive and deductive. If Broudy, Ulich and Home have been using deductive inference then by definition what they have to say about the "Third Order" or "structure" adds no empirical knowledge to what the empirical statements themselves declare.  As we have  said earlier, it appears to be their intention to say some- thing empirically significant which, goes beyond the facts observed.  In other words, their inferences are inductive.  Peirce has analyzed Inductive Inference as follows: B ;  ; If A, then B„  Therefore, probably A.• 1.21 •  121  Peirce, C.S., The Collected Papers of C. S. Peirce. as cited in Gallie, W. B'., • Peirce and Pragmatism. Penguin, 1952 p.. .98.,  If B is some tiling likes "Bach of us has his own: unique character" or "My death will have ho effect on the life of a tree growing in Brooklyn", then A may perhaps be statements which declare the truth of the doctrine of externality of relations, such as those used by Broudy. If, on the other hand, B is something like; "One cannot separate a doughnut from the hole" or "In this painting, the colour of the rose is affected by the colours of the rest of the painting", then A may perhaps be statements which de--' clare the truth of the doctrine of internal!ty of relations, such as those Used by Ulich and Home., If one is impressed by both of these types of observable facts, then one's system may, as does Broudy's, reflect both emphases/ and terms like "self" and  tt  human nature" will  be used vaguely and contradictorily within the system, as we have seen they are In Broudy's system. In any case, It appears to be the contention of these three men that their statements about the "Third Order" are Empirically significant.  Yet in neither case does the: addition  of their primitive metaphysical terms add anything to the empirical statements they are endeavouring to explain.  This can:  be s e e n by the fact that all of the primitive terms of the idealist could replace those of the realist, and vice-versa, and neither system would be materially changed. " s t r u c t u r e could replace "Third Order".  For instance,  In fact, because  60  -  these terms are interchangeable, the two systems really differ in no way from one another except in the facts or states-ofaffairs which are•selected by their proponents to support the theories. Their theories are, in fact., rather lengthy examples of one type of the logical fallacy known as "begging the question", "The fallacy of assuming what is to be proved ... by using as a premise ... a proposition that could not bfe established except 122  by assuming the truth of the conclusion".  A radical empiricist such as A.yer would claim that a statement like "There is a Third Order" is "a metaphysical utterance which cannot be either true or false.n because it ' „ 123 is without "any literal significance". By our definition of meaning all of their primitive terras are synonymous and probably equivalent.  They are used to en-  able people to reach belief, achieve agreement and put an end to argumentation.  They have the same denotative and desig-  native uses: 1. They denote something.which Is by definition unobservable and which if expressed as ,''nothing" would be less misleading. 2.. Their designative uses permit deduction.of either pansophist or restricted curricula. 122  :.  Black, Mrf, Critical Thinking (Second Edition), Prentice-Hall, 1952, p. iJ-3Y. ^-23 Ayer, A.J.,^Language, Truth and Logic, Dover Publications 19l)i> edition, p. lib.  ;.  61  -.  How is it that these systems enable .some men to reach  belief?  Black:states that men can arrive at basic beliefs  in three ways giving rise to three types of basic beliefs,. "arising from - testimony, experience, or self-evidence".12^ Certainly all three of these have played a part in convincing Broudy and Ulich but we believe that, there is a further re a- . SOn why men reach belief and it is illustrated by their acceptance of these theories.  The persuasiveness of their theories  lies in the wide scope of true statements which can be deduced from them. them.  Indeed, practically.anything can be deduced from  Any action whatsoever can be deduced from "tendency",;  "power", and other primitive terms used by either author. The error is of course in assuming that this quality indicates that the theories are: therefore very good theories, whereas in fact they have such wide application simply because they add nothing significant to the facts they supposedly explain. Now let us turn to our final category of discussion about these two "theories" - the category of axiology.  We  shall consider only ethics. A very lap,ge section of regular philosophy has been concerned with ethics.  In modern times many students of  ethics have become Involved in "modern" ethics as opposed to "classical" ethics.  Modern ethical theories deal primarily  with, ethical terms, mainly with what, if any, meaning these terms have.  To a large extent it has been accepted that  Black, oj). cit., p.;266.  :  -  62  '  ethical terms are easily re cognizable and. a list of the key common ones is easily made: such terms as "ought", "good", ^evil", and so on.  Now this writer believes that it is not  too much to say that philosophy of education has been primarily a form of ethical philosophy.  Me have deliberately avoided  becoming involved in this aspect of the study in the hope that the leading principles of philosophers of education would thereby be more easily seen.  But it is not much of an exag-  geration to say that wherever we have presented the philosopher of education as saying "this is the way things are or can be in education", we would have been more accurate had we quoted him as saying, "this is the way things ought to be".  It is our intention to attempt to approach this Section of philosophy of education in a "modern" way, i.e., to attempt to analyze the ethical language embodied.in typical philosophies of education. If, as our thesis proposeSj the meaning of an expression Is the rules for Its use, what is/are the meaning(s) of the ethical terms in philosophy of education?  It would per-/  haps he most interesting to answer this question with reference to ethical terms or theories which either are unique to philoQ sophy of education or which permeate it.  Me have therefore  chosen one theory which permeates a large portion of philosophy of education, that an increase in knowledge is good.  -  63 —  •.•..  This theory has taken many special forms in the philosophy of education, but in all cases concerns itself with^four more specific,questions; 1. Qualities of knowledge. 2.  The relationship between knowledge and morals.  3-  Quantities of knowledge.• .  J+. Capacity for knowledge. Thus we have philosophers of education setting up hierarchies of types ;of knowledge, discussing whether one can be immoral if he "really knows" certain concepts, asserting that to Increase knowledge'is good and asserting that to develop capacity for knowledge Is good. This latter notion has its roots in a more general idea which can be roughly stated as, "It is good to develop and use capacity".  In this general form the idea can be criticized In  several ways, such as: 1.  It regards "capacity" too narrowly and thereby leads to contradictions.  For example, the same "capacity" to do  delicate hand work might be developed into the talents of a jeweller or into those of a pickpocket and may therefore when developed be either good or bad., 2.  It does not appear to be a logical contradiction to say, "X ought not to develop his capacities".  3.  Evidence of the truth of the two criticisms cited is that whenever the general Idea is put forward It is then  -  61k.*  modified in an effort, to;;enable, it to distinguish be-. tween "good" and,"bad" development. Finally.,^ the term "capacity", and others used in its place,, are criticized as being metaphysical in the same manner as we have criticized Broudy's and Ulich's uses of their primitive terms. Modern philosophical analysts have revealed a Considerable variety of uses to which ethical terms are put, such ass grading, commanding, describing andemoting. /  It is our opinion that the ethical terms in philosophy of education are usually used In a varied range somewhere along a continuum from prescription to persuasion, • In the main they are used to persuade rather than command, except for philosophy of education as practised by religious devotees. Persuasion can be of, many varieties.  In brief, It con-  sists of getting somebody to (I) believe and/or (2) do something.  It usually consists of one or a combination of the  following methods: 1.  A promise and threat.  2. . Some sort of evidence., 3,.... An explanatory hypothesis, k.  A testimonial.  ,  5'. An appeal to emotions.  -  65 -  The promise-threat part,of persuasion takes the form of a hypothetical statement like:  If you do X then you will  experience pleasure - or - If you do not do X you will experience pain or at least miss a certain pleasure,. Broudj> it is expressed ass  "If you develop your noetic powers,  •you will be happier than you:could any other way". and Horne it is:  With  With Ulich  "If you connect yourself consciously with .  the Third Order you will no longer be lonely/" Such promises are accompanied by statements offering empirical evidence, often of the form: "X is happy" or "X Is not lonely".  The realists, from Aristotle, offer as evidence  that those who do study are happiest. as empirical evidence.  This could be evaluated  We know of no study to evaluate It but  it seems at best to be some form of wishful thinking. The idealists usually do not offer evidence.  Rather,  they skip to the explanatory part, perhaps, although this is not stated, because it is almost implicit In their theory, . "'125 that no mere mortal could be what they seek. In any case, the next step, from a logical point of view,, in persuasion Is to offer an explanation of the prof erred evidence,  This explanation takes the form of a theory,  in this c a s e the theories we have outlined, 12  Because it. takes an infinite time to accomplish their aims.  66  -  There are certain features which theories 'must' have to be acceptable, at least acceptable by those who are "experts": 1.  It must connect the facts for explanation.  2.  It must give us an indication of what evidence is relevant to support the theory. With either of the'explanatory theories proposed by.  these men it appears to be true thats. 1. Any occurrence or activity can be "explained" by reference 'to the Third Order.  For example? "Why did you brutally  murder that child?" ~  "Because I had within me a structure which leads me to do so."  2.  If we take their "unobservable entity" notion seriously, there is no evidence whatever available, even in theory, which might be used to prove or disprove their respective theories.  In effect, as we have already seen with  respect to other statements, their theories or explanations add nothing whatsoever to the original promises. Another commonly-used type of persuasion is the testimonial.  Testimonials start with empirical statements of the  form "I believe X'1 and lead to ethical statements like: . you ought, to believe X".  The persuasiveness of the  argument rests on: 1.. The reputation of the person putting the argument forward. 2. The facts and explanatory theory which supports his belief.  -  67  - .  Most of the key arguments of Ulich, Home and Broudy include a testimonial argument which can be stated either as: "I believe that the doctrine of Internal!ty/externallty is true of all things, at least of education." ".*. you ought to believe this also." Finally, in a logical sense, persuaders appeal to the emotions of those they are trying to persuade.  In this  writer's opinion, whenever these authors use ethical terms such as "We ought to develop the powers of the students" they are attempting to persuade us by evoking favourable emotions on our part.: That they would do so is ahaaost inevitable because: 1»  Their promises are hypothetlcals whose logical persuasive power depends upon.the evidence and explanation;offered to show that the.likelihood of their consequent being true Is high.  2.  The evidence they can offer is, at best, conflicting.  3.  Their theories contain fallacious reasoning, explain nothing or everything and in either case are almost the poorest quality theories possible.  i).. Their testimonial arguments rest ultimately on the evidence and explanations they offer. They are left then with nothing but emotive persuasion. This Is i n e v i t a b l e w h e n e v e r  any theory is proposed  in  s  :. "  j: V  ... -  68  .  : '  /.Which the primitive symbols are metaphysical ahd the theory  v  is unselective as to supporting evidence.  To paraphrase Ayeri  "What,is hot so generally recognized is that there can be no.way of proving that the existence of the Third Order is, even probable. ; :T  .  If the existence of such a '  Third Order were probable, then the proposition that it existed would be an empirical hypothesis.  And ih that  case it would be possible to deduce from it, and other • : . . ; e m p i r i c a l hypotheses, certain experiential propositions which were not deducible from those other hypotheses alone. But in fact this Is not possible."126 Let us apply this analysis to a specific example, 'their statements about alms for education. - •  A statement of aims is obviously an ethical statement.  It Is prescriptive and is usually stated in terms accepted as ethical terms. ;  The stated aims of the Realists and Idealists differ. The Realists, like Broudy, declare that the develop• ment of noetic skills ought to be: the prime aim for education. This is so, they sayj because the underlying structure makes  •  a society ih which the schools have this as'an aim more har> /"v '  monious than societies organized differently.  The Idealists,  Ayer, A.J., Language, Truth and. Logic, p. 115>.  _  69  _  by virtue of their acceptance the internality doctrine can hardly exclude anything as an aim-.. Their statements of alms are either: lv  .  Couched in "permissive" language - as exemplified by Home t who says, "We might put good health at the bottom -127  •6 0 "O  This type of idealist aim usually ends up as  a lengthy list of aims covering practically every value possible, such as Home's, "health, character, social justice, .skill, art, love, knowledge, philosophy and T , n.128 religion 2. Keyed to the primitive terms of their system, such as 129 Home's "likeness to the spiritual order of the universe". Of course, these statements exemplify the logical .fallacy pointed out In Hume's famous "is Is not ought" declaration.o -One cannot logically deduce any ethical state-' ment from a statement of fact because It is never contradictory to say that what Is ought not to be. Therefore, since the ethical statements they wish to put forward cannot be deduced from their systems and since the ethical terms in their statements appear to have no denotative meaning and no de.signative meaning which can logically connect them with empirical statements, the ethical ^ 127  Home, HSSE, 1942, ,p. 186.  128  Ibid., p. 182.  129  I b i d . p . 185.  terms::arid, statements must be -performing some other , function or functions, .We believe, as we have stated, that they serve as a means to try to settle disputes by persuasion '""'•..: which consists of promises, evidence,.:explanation, testimonials and; emotive appeals.  The; ethical terms, for reasons  explained previously, can serve one or both of the latter purposes.  Thus, ethical statements used by. these writers  serve either: 1.  As statements about the beliefs of their authors, or  2.  As emotive statements. The former have cognitive meaning theoretically test-  able by some study of the state of mind of the authors. The latter are, as far as the ethical terms in them are concerned, devoid of cognitive meaning.  Their cognitive  meaning consists of any remaining in them when the ethical terms are removed® This entire analysis of the leading principles of Realists and Idealists rests on the notion that they are in fact'attempting to construct systems wMch can produce true statements about, matters of fact. With Broudy we have' shown that he does not distinguish between science and philosophy  •  other than with'the notion of generality and, hence, permanency, of t r u t h s deducible. With the Idealists, the evidence that they are attempting to produce empirical systems is not so clear.. The reasons for this lack of clarity are probably:.  -  ?1 -  1. They are more blatantly metaphysical.  They pride them-  selves In It. 2. They resort more often to a "higher" method of achieving knowledge - I.e. - intuition of some form. 3. They appeal to man's "metaphysical yearning" as evidence for their approach. Now one cannot argue logically against this approach because the approach is to reach belief by using terms in such a way that one cannot argue about them.  CHAPTER III  Iii this chapter we shall consider the leading principles of method of John Dewey. We shall see that In the dominant aspect of his work Dewey's leading principle. !s very different from that which we have outlined in Chapter III and which has been followed by most philosophers of education.  The methods we have outlined could well be called  "pseudo-science".  Dewey's methods are similar in signifi-  cant respects to those of the modern analytic philosophers and to those of the "great" philosophers of the past. We have no hesitation in calling his work "philosophy". As Dewey clearly recognized and stated, his works have two distinct , sections: 1. A negative, critical account of the ideas of some others In some of his works this was the major section. 2.  A positive account of the instrumentalist view. Let us deal with the latter part first in very brief  form, more to serve as background for discussion of the negative account than to offer a thorough statement of his . point of view. At the heart of Dewey's doctrines are two concepts: ln  Naturalism - this has been aptly described as follows: "His philosophy is an emergent naturalism with a place for the emergent facts of life and mind." 1  1  Ghilds, op. cit., p. 5l - quoting Professor Savery.  -  73  -.  In over-simplified, form, M s naturalism entails that all fields of thought and endeavour must be considered as equally a: part of nature.  For instance,: "the problem  of how man is able to come to know things or events is precisely as empirical as is the problem of how the or„ ganism .is-able to feed on external materials and Through a process of,digestion transform them Into human energy. Mind, is as continuous with the materials within which it originates and operates as is the stomach with the :  2  materials that it ingests."  Likewise, it entails "the Integration of moral and 3  scientific beliefs...." The key term under the heading "Naturalism" in Dewey's, theories is "experience". 2.  Instrumentallsm - it is perhaps not too misleading to summarize this as what Dewey claims Is the most successful method"available to be used In dealing with experience. - For our purposes Dewey's instrumentallsm has four, main but overlapping sections: a) A doctrine of meaning. b) An epistemological theory. c) An explanation of learning. d) A Principle of falllbilism.^" 2 Ibid., p» 57. 3 Ibid., p. 55® ^ Ibid.,, p. ij.8.  -  Ik  -  Me will expand on each of these to some extent* Dewey's doctrine of meaning is, of course, taken from Peirce and antedates a similar one of the logical positivists. : Peirce's famous formulation of it is: Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object. I only desire to point out how impossible it is that we should have an idea in our minds which,relates to anything but conceived sensible effects of things. Our idea of anything ij3 our idea of Its sensible effects; and if we fancy that we have any other we deceive ourselves, and mistake a mere sensation accompanying the thought for a part of the thought itself. Thus, we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every real distinction of thought, no matter how subtile it may be; and there is no - distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice. 5 One of the important implications of this formulation Is that meaningful statements about anything become hypotheticals and all things are describable in a dispositional way.  6  His epist etiological theory can be described In many ways*  5  We shall describe It in such a way as to attempt to  ..".''" Ibid.., p. I}-?.  ^ Ryle, G., as cited in Scheffler , I.., Philosophy and Educa-tion., p. lOlj.'., says, nlf we wished to unpack all that is conveyed in describing an animal as gregarious, we should similarly have to produce an infinite series of different hypothetical statements.'1  state it accurately yet emphasize the points which will he of use to us later in expounding Dewey's critical accounts» ,We shall do so hy comparing his theory with parts of Plato's theory, Plato and Dewey seem to be seriously at odds, epistemologlcally-speaking, yet, using the pragmatic criterion-of meaning., both amount to the same thing and both give the,, same answer to a key philosophical question:  "Is there any con-  nection between epistemology and ethics?" This problem and answers to it have taken many different guises in the philosophical discussions of the past, such as: 1.  "Is is not ought" - (Hume)  2.  "The Will of All versus the: Will. of the Majority"' (Rousseau)  3»  "Can one who knows the right do wrong?" - (Plato) The crux of this problem can be stated in two ways:  1. Whether or not ethics is logically a subdivision of epistemology.  We have seen that it is not, •  2, Whether knowledge can effect behaviour in. moral situations. Plato explicitly outlined several levels of knowledge, only the highest of which could be described as "real" knowledge. 7  The highest level was knowledge of the unchanging Plato, The Republic, Scribner1s, 1928,.p. 271.  -  76 - .  "ideals:" or "ideas" which were patterns from which all existent items Or qualities took the characteristics which made them what they were. Many interpretations of Plato's ideas are possible, which range from: 1, He meant, literally, that there is an underworld (other-, world) In which these ideals have a sort of existence and objects In the realm of sense-literally partake of the qualities of the ideal. 2. His explanation was a metaphorical way of stating that if two things are, for example, chairs, they must be In some way similar. The former extreme is unacceptable from this writer's point-of-view either as an explanation of facts or as an 8 interpretation of Plato. If the latter view is closer to the truth, then a modern interpretation of his theories could be: 1-i" He realized that there are various qualities of knowledge. 2. He sought criteria to distinguish among the various types. 3. Among the criteria he proposed to use to separate one level from another were: a) certainty. b) effect on the knower, particularly where mOral 8  The former because It is not verifiable! the latter because the order of Plato 1s works seems to refute such a simple explanation.  •  77 ~  knowledge is ..concerned. The latter is really part of Plato's theory of ethics and of his psychology. It is part of his ethics because "it states, in effect, that there is a connection between the realm of knowledge and of.ethics.  It is; psychological because it declares that  knowledge can effect behaviour, . But it is also a definition of knowledge.  In effect  it state s that unless something that putatively is moral knowledge affects one's behaviour it cannot, for that person at least, be said to be knowledge. Dewey also specifies that there are different types of knowledge, at least a two-level set: 1.  Verbal knowledge. . '•• 9 2. Direct knowledge.  :  In order to be "really known" something must be experienced directly.  The less directly it is experienced the  lower Is our level: of knowledge of it-. If we have direct knowledge of it,; it will effect our behaviour.  In fact, as  with Plato, an effect on behaviour is one of the defining characteristics of knowledge In the field of ethics as well Q  Dewey, J., Democracy and Education, Macmillan, New York, 1916, p.. I{12„ .  -  78  -.  as any other. Dewey clearly realized this similarity between his epistemology and Plato's8  He says:  "This (Plato's) doctrine Is commonly attacked on the ground that nothing is more common than for a man to know the good and yet do the bad; not knowledge, but habituation, or practice, and motive are what is required. . The Issue turns, however, upon what is meant by knowledge.; Aristotle's objection ignored the gist of Plato's teaching to the effect that man could not attain a theoretical insight into the good except as he had passed through years of practical habituation and strenuous discipline." 11 Both, therefore, answer that there is a connection between knowledge and ethics. But according to Dewey, even Within the area of knowledge by direct experience there are levels of quality. The lowest is pure excitation of the sens© organs, the highest is that which Is consciously carried out under the stringent conditions of scientific inquiry. second key feature of his epistemology.  This is the  The best knowledge  available is that obtainable by application of the scientific method.  The reasons why this Is so are that it is self-  corrective and public. There is again a moral aspect implied in this 10  Ibid.  11 xx Ibid.  •  -  79  section of his epistemology.  -  Life, must renew itself "by.  adaptation to and'.'of Itsenvironment,  Organisms are con-  stantly threatened by problems they must solve to survive. Anything which prevents this prevents life, Dewey seems to imply that xirhatever does this is bad and whatever aids the continuation of life -is .'good* ./Since the scientific method is the best guarantor of continued survival^ its use: is good® The key difference between Plato's and Dewey's epistemological doctrines is their attitude toward 'fallib.il-;' ism,  Plato held that uncertain knowledge is not knowledge ,  but opinion, Dewey held that certain knowledge Is un^rormative because of its certainty,  The most useful knowledge is  hypothetical and uncertain in character, . Implied in the other features of Dewey's epistemology Is a doctrine.of learning. Learning is the acquiring of meanings,, At one end of a scale of quality is the learning of verbal meanings.  At the other and higher In quality is .  the acquiring of the meanings about the non-verbal environ-. ment.  Events have meanings also, as, "Those clouds mean rain.  This type of meaning is acquired by an.understanding;of "connections" among related events. As Dewey says, the "subject matter of learning is identical with all the objects, ideas, and principles which, enter as resources or obstacles into  '  -  '  8  0  -  the continuous intentional, pursuit of a course of action".12 It is against this background of struggle to survive by the use of various methods that Dewey Interprets the theories with which he deals critically. '.Let us. now proceed to this aspect of his works. Probably as a result of his study of the theories of evolution the immanent consideration of Dewey is survival. In the struggle to survive and grow organisms use various instruments, Man, "the most complex organism., has at his disposal certain intellectual instruments.  The best of these  is the scientific method. As he considers each author's ideas he'endeavours to re-interpret what they have said in such a.way as to show that insofar as the; ideas being discussed are meaningful they fit as instruments into the pattern of method used by man to survive.  '  What we intend to try to shxm is that the critical sections of Dewey's works are a unique type of analysis which although quite different In many respects, deserves the title "therapeutic" as much as philosophers now usually so characterized. To.begin with let us compare Dewey's.type of analysis with that of the Ordinary Language analysts. 12  Ibid., p.; 162  -  81  -  The Ordinary Language analysts usually avoid using a prescriptive approach.  They do not say "You ought to  use words this way or that way." What they are concerned to do is to use ordinary language as a paradigm to show that whereas certain expressions appear to be used one way, they are really used in another way. illustrates this time and again. hand, is often prescriptive.  Ryl^s.classic  Dewey, on the other  He tries to show that cer-  tain terms "ought" to be used this way or that way because they are in that way best used as instruments in applying the scientific method to this or that area of endeavour. The Ordinary Language analysts usually endeavour to show that the reason some terms are misleading is because their apparent logical status is different than their real logical status. Dewey does this also but often he will endeavour to trace the reason for this error back into some social and/or historical condition.  In other  words, he attributes some errors of use to social conditions.  This, of course, is a very Marxian approach.  The Ordinary Language analysts use ordinary language as a guide and corrector. Dewey does this also but not very often.  -  82  -  Both Dewey and the Ordinary Language analysts frequently analyze sets of polar terras. This is virtually unavoidable, of course, since so many expressions in a language have antonyms. With Dewey it is almost an exclusive concern.  In the main, he deals with dichotomies.  His approach, is to eliminate or greatly alter these dichotomies.  There appear to be three reasons for this:  1. His doctrine that social environment affects basic beliefs combined with the historical fact that there have been very few democracies or near-democracies leads him to the belief that many dichotomies were bound to arise as a result of the ruler-ruled social dichotomy. 2i The entire doctrine of experience, based as it is on an acceptance of an organism-environment dichotomy, nevertheless Is an effort to "play down" the dichotomous aspects of this and emphasize: i. What goes on in experience - i.e. - when the organism is affected and ,or affects its environment. ii. What goes on In learning - i.e. - when the organism is aware of these actions and reactions. Thus Dewey's doctrines are replete with what might be termed "centripatel" terms - terms like "experience" "connections", "environment", and "obstacles", which  -  83  -  are used to denote these occurrences of "contact" between organism and environment.  These terms are  the key primitive terms of his theory. On the assumption that philosophy is an activity concerned with the analysis of the uses of language, one could interpret Dewey's leading principle as follows: a) Whereas the Idealists and Realists have used two se% of terms which produce a dichotomous system, Dewey uses three sets of terms and produces a tripartite system. b) He has a set of terms to denote the organism and another set to denote the environment. c) He has a third set of terms to denote contact between the organism and the environment and to denote contact among organisms. d) His positive account of Instrumentallsm is an effort to set up the terminology for this tripartite system and to analyze and prescribe the logical implications among the centripatel terms of his system. e) His negative account consists of analysis of dichotomous systems by sociological-historical inference and by a comparison of the instrumental value of the terms of the dichotomous systems with  -  8ft -  parallel centripatel terras of his tripartite system. 3.  The doctrine of naturalism in combination with his analyses is in effect an attempt to convince others that for historical-social reasons we have almost universally used dichotomouB language to describe the occurrences of contact between organism and environment and that as a result of this we have made for ourselves such philosophical and educational problems as that of "How can matter affect mind£" The doctrine of naturalism by itself is simply a statement of belief.  There appears to be no more  reason for saying that the mind's operations ought to be accepted as being as unmysterious as the operations of the stomach than for saying that the mind's operations are much different and indeed mysterious. But when Dewey traces, as he purports to do, the historical-social roots of the mind-matter dichotomy to the ruler-slave society of the Greeks, and particularly to Plato's and Aristotle's acceptance of this dichotomy, then one begins to accept that the problem may indeed be one of language-usage. Another feature of Dewey's analysis Is that, in many cases, he endeavours to reinterpret statements to the logical status of hypotheticals.  This, of course, was a  key interpretation used by Ryle in his -classic analysis of the terras used to describe mind.  It Is not surprising  that Dewey should endeavour to do this since the realm V of science uses hypotheticals as its chief foundation. We will now outline selective examples of Dewey's type of analysis not to recapitulate his entire series of arguments but simply to give evidence to support our description of his critical method: His major work Logic, The Theory of Inquiry13 Is an example of his general approach.  In It he:condemns the cus-  tomary use of the term "logic" as being primarily concerned with deductive argumentation and endeavours to show that logic ought to include the whole realm of method used by man to deal with his environmento1^" Hi s concept of education also illustrates his general method.  It involves a metaphorical comparison but neverthe-  less is very enlightening.  Briefly, his concept Is this:  An organism survives and grows by adapting to its environment and by using various instruments to affect - its environment.  For man the chief instrument is his  : intellect. Using it he can learn and.use reason. As Dewey, J., Logic, The Theory of Inquiry,, Holt, lew York. : : 1938,./:'. : ..-•. ; .'.•".'••;..',' ;  ^'Ibid., pi :3»  86  -  Aristotle made contemplation the defining characteristic of man Dewey makes a relatively high level of learning the defining characteristic of man and the key feature of human life. Without it one is not really a completely free human.  But men die.  Comparable with  the organism is society which also has its life and which can survive and grow only by using various instruments. man.  Education is to society what learning is to a  Just as a man throughout life can increase his  learning so society through education can increase its 15  learning and enable it to survive and grow.  Edu-  cation is therefore the instrument for increasing knowledge. To illustrate his methods as they vxere applied specifically to education, we shall consider some sections from Democracy and Education. As we have seen, philosophers of education have been very much concerned with ethics.  In every case, to the best  of this writer's knowledge, they have said "We ought to do this or that in education".  Dewey also does this in the  positive sections of his xrorks.  Such statements Invariably  spring from certain aims which the philosopher of education believes we ought to try to reach. Democracy and Education Dewey, J., Democracy and Education, p. 11.  •  "  8  7  -  is primarily devoted to;the analysis of different aims which have traditionally been put forward as worthwhile.  In almost  every case these aims are stated in polar terms. We "shall start with Chapter XX, "Intellectual and Practical Studies".  In the works of philosophers of education  these words have not been used as are such terms as "Communism" and "Capitalism" or "integration" and "segregation" where one group puts forward one as good and another the other.  In  most cases, the two types of studies have been put forward almost simultaneously as.worthwhile.  In other words the aim  has been to divide studies into two sections. of a divisive aim which bothers Dewey.  It is the use  Throughout the chapter  and in other chapters he refers to polar terms which denote the same split. In the first step in his analysis Dewey holds that the origin of the division is to be found in ancient Greece where, for social reasons, "they were led to a flat opposition of reason and experience" with reason considered to be the high17 est form.  The former became identified with the citizens,  the latter with the artisans or slaves. 16  Consequently, two  Other examples are: livelihood and leisure; theory arid practice;, knowledge and;; activity; culture and utility; education and training. 17 Dewey, 0£. cit., p. 322. .  -  88  -  types of education were conceived, the intellectual for the rulers, the practical for the ruled„  There was held to be a  natural and logical distinction between the two which prevented thera from being carried on simultaneously by one person.  In the early stages of the scientific re.Volution the  polarity was changed to "experience and ijeason" with sensation— alistic experience considered to be the higher form. "Experience ... became a name for something intellectual and cognitive. In modern times we have been swept along by the successes of the scientific method but have been unable to eradicate the old dogmas.  As a result, most of our philoso-  phy of education wants both intellectual and practical development and seeks to accomplish this in an inefficient and confusing way.  "In the inherited situation, there is a cur-  ious intermingling, in even the same study, of concession to usefulness and a survival of traits once exclusively attributed to preparation for leisure.  The 'utility' element is  found in the motives assigned for the study, the 'liberal' element in methods of teaching. " Thus Dewey is asserting that in setting forth aims for education we are partly captives of the historical use of 18  Ibid., p. 312. 19  Ibid.. p. 301.  terras used to describe aims for education, We can free ourselves by putting the aims under consideration within the framework of scientific method.  An organism, particu-  larly a human one, in endeavouring to solve problems facing it uses intellectual instruments.  These do not consist, as  the Greeks would have us believe, In contemplation, nor as the sensationalists would have it, in reception, but rather in contemplation, reception and experimenting.  Thus, the  intellectual and the practical are not logically separate. The fact is "that 'intellectual' studies instead of being opposed to active pursuits represent an intellectualizing 20 of practical pursuits." Dewey is prescriptive in his analysis.  The "behaviour of surrounding things and persons  carries to a successful issue the active tendencies of the individual, so that in the end what the individual undergoes are consequences which he has himself tried to produce. In just the degree in which connections are established... his acts and the things about him acquire meaning. ... purposive education ... should present such an environment that this interaction will effect acquisition of those meanings which are so important that they become, in turn, instruments of further learnings."21 There "is no such thing 2 0  Ibld  21  ~  »»  P. 32L).  Ibid.... p. 320.  90  -  as genuine knowledge and fruitful understanding except as the offspring of doing."22 Thus Dewey carries out the second step in a typical analysis, the prescriptive reinterpretation within the framework of the scientific method. The third major aspect of his analysis, the reinterpretation of statements as hypotheticals, can best be seen in an earlier chapter on a closely related topic - Chapter VIII - Aims In Education.  If we consider aims, declares  Dewey, within a scientific framework, what part do they play? They are hypotheses whose functions are to "have a basis upon which to observe, to select, and to order objects and 23  our own capacities."  As in scientific study we should ccn -  sider as many aims as possible - "the more numerous the recognized possibilities of the situation ... the more meaning does the chosen activity possess, and the more flexibly controllable is it."2^" In the struggle to survive, hypotheses to guide activity arise when problems are faced. they arise under similar circumstances.  In science  As study and experi-  mentation proceed the hypotheses will need to be altered. Thus aims as a type of hypothesis, must take into account 22  Ibid., p. 321.  23  Ibid.y p. 120.  2k  Loc. cit.  -  91  -  present circumstances and must be flexible.  The aim must  25  also "represent a freeing of activities"  Apparently what  Dewey is saying here is that a hypothetical statement has two parts, antecedent and consequent.  The antecedent states  an activity to be performed, the consequent is an end which is usually used to define an aim but the activity described in the antecedent is at least as important and tends to be forgotten. However, Dewey does not stop with the translation of aims into hypothetical.  Indeed, he declares that all ideas  are hypotheses and that mind, usually conceived of as a mysterious entity, is a dispositional term which is best stated in a hypothetical form something like "If one refers present conditions to future results and future consequences to present conditions, then one has a mind." This interpretation is certainly strongly supported by Ryle's famous analysis of mind. In addition to the leading principle outlined in this chapter Dewey does use methods which would be best termed "Psychology of education" or "sociology of education", but in the main he is concerned with the interpretation of 25  26  ~~  Ibid., p. 123  ~  pp. 318 and 120.  :  -  92  -  significant terms in the way explained here. As such his methods can be termed "philosophical".  I  CHAPTER V  We shall now state In a general way what leading principles of method philosophers of education must follow if their work is to be useful and to have some continuity with regular philosophy. First, let us state what they ought not to do. They ought not to carry on the traditional leading principle exemplified by Broudy, Ulich and Home.  The basic mistake,  if one can call it that, which philosophers of education have made can be described In either of two wayss 1.  They have misunderstood the method of; philosophy and have considered it, in error, to be a sort of superscience.  2.  They are proposing that philosophy of education be a special type of empirical study in which its theories "explain" empirical facts and states-of-affairs by the use of metaphysical terms. This writer believes that most realists, like Broudy,  have done the former, while most idealists are attempting the latter.  In either case it leads to the same sort of  approachj they use the same leading principle.  In both case  the fault is the same. They propose empirical theories, yet by definition, deny empirical tests of their key statements. For this reason this writer considers them both to be in error in calling what they are doing "philosophy".  It  -  9k  -  would be more aptly called "pseudo-science".  What they  seek are theories which are very broad, which deal with universals.  They believe, deliberately or in error, that  this is what philosophers in the past have been doing and ought to continue to do. The "modern" approaches as exemplified by Ayer, Ryle, Wisdom, etc., have been to agree and disagree with this notion.  They agree with the idea of seeking generality! they  disagree that it is done by talking metaphysics.  To them the  world of universals rests right under our noses - in the words we use - and we find the generality sought by philosophers of the past and still continue in the tradition of careful definition and analysis by seeking the solution to or elimination of philosophical problems by a study of the way we use and misuse our language.  It is this type of approach which ought  to be attempted as philosophy of education. Ayer has put it wells "For our part we are concerned to emphasize not so much the unity of science as the unity of philosophy with science. With regard to the relationship of philosophy and the empirical seiences, we have remarked that philosophy does not in any way compete with the sciences. It does not make any speculative assertions which could conflict with the speculative assertions of science, nor does it profess to venture into fields which lie beyond the scope of scientific investigation. Only the metaphysician does that, and produces nonsense as a result. And we have also pointed out that it is impossible merely by philosophizing to determine the validity of a coherent system of scientific propositions. For the question whether such a system is valid is always a question  95 of empirical fact; anda therefore, the propositions of philosophy, since they are purely linguistic propositions, can have no bearing upon it. Thus the philosopher is not, qua philosopher, in a position to assess the value of any scientific theory; his function is simply to elucidate the theory by defining the symbols which occur in it." We will not attempt to characterize in detail what "defining the symbols" will involve. Even the professional philosophers hesitate to do that.  In this thesis we have  attempted to show some of the types of techniques which could be Involved: 1. Application of a definition of meaning. 2.  Clarification of the logical status of certain expressions.  3.  Application of logical techniques for testing validity. Other techniques and features have been outlined or  referred to z 1. Use of ordinary language as a paradigm. •2. Use of language games. 3. Adoption of higher standards of rigor. In addition, we have seen Dewey's application of two seemingly successful techniques: 1.  The therapeutic-like historical-sociological analysis of the origins of usage.  2.  The reinterpretation of key terms within a context different from the usual. 1  Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic, p. l5l  • -  96  -  • •  If philosophy of education is to adopt methods like these It will need to have something to apply them to.  There  are two areas for this2 1.  The analysis of philosophies of education written in the past, as we have done to some extent in this thesis.  2.  The analysis of empirical theories about education,, Assuming that the former is sufficiently clear, let  us look briefly at the latter. Until this century the practice of education was governed almost entirely by methods devised a priori. . Peirce describes Lavoisier's leading principle as'"to dream that some long and complicated chemical process would have a certain effect, to put it into practice with dull patience, after its inevitable failure, to dream that with some modification it would have another result, and to end by publishing the last 2 dream as a fact ...." The method by which theories of teaching methods have been concocted was no better. ately tested.  Seldom was a method deliber-  This is still largely true today. But with  the rise of modern psychology a change began to take place. Education also, in a few places, began to change from a 2  Peirce, C.S., in Tomas, V. (ed), Essays in the Philosophy of Science, Liberal Arts Press, Hew York, 1957i 1 p. 5. ' '•• 7 ' ;7  -  97  -  "speculative science" to an "empirical science". The seeds of this change can be seen at least as far back as Rousseau's Smile but the beginning of the truly modern phase, at least in America, can perhaps be marked at Thorndike's famous statement that anything that exists exists in some amount and can therefore be measured. In any case, it is certainly true that education as a "science" is less than seventy-five years old. Many people doubt that it can ever be an "exact" science as say, physics, is now. Whether it can be so or not is really Irrelevant at the present time. What is relevant is an improvement in the.type of knowledge we can have about education, particularly about teaching and learning.  SUch knowledge can be  acquired by the application of some form or forms of the scientific method.  As such it will involve the preparation  of theories as hypotheses to be tested.  It is the analysis  of such theories which" can profitably occupy the energies and the intellectual tools of philosophers of education. The analysis of the speculative philosophies of education written in the past might then become preparatory academic exercises for the real business of philosophy of education., We will close with some indication of the need for analysis of empirical hypotheses about education, specifically in the area of learning theory:  lo  98  -  The possibility that theorists should consider "the cognitive, functionalist, and stimulus-response 'systems' simply as alternative modes of description, each offering •3  advantages on some occasions and for some purposes,," 2<>  The possibility that, even within one or other theory of learning, some distinctions "are, in part at least, matters of linguistic preference ... "J"1"  3«  The advantages which could accrue from devising "a common terminology" and "common conceptual structure" for learning theories about animals, humans in laboratory situations and humans in school situations. It is our opinion that analyses of such problem areas  can be well done with analytic tools developed by modern philosophers and that such analyses ought to be the function of philosophy of education.  3  Estes, W.K., "Learning", in Harris, C. W., (ed.) Encyclopedia of Educational Research, (Third Edition), Macmillan, New York, I960, p. 753. ~ Ibid., p. 758. 5  Ibid., p. 767.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Ayer, A. J. Language, Truth and Loglc. Dover.Publishers, 1952.  New York:  Ayer, A. J. The Problem of Knowledge. Penguin, 195&..  Edinburgh:  Black, M. Critical Thinking. Prentice-Hall, 1952.  New York:  Broudy, H. 8. New York:  Building a Philosophy of Education. Prentice-Hall, 195i)-.  Childs, J. L. New York:  American^Pragmatism and Education. Holt, 1956.  Copi: I. M.  Symbolic Logic.  New York:  Macmillan, 1'  Crosser, P. K. The Nihilism of John Dewey. Philosophical Library, 1955. jDetoey, John.  New York:  The Child and the Curriculum ) The School and the Society ) University of Chicago Press, 1956.  Dewey, John. Democracy and Education. MacMillan Co., 1916. Dewey, John.  Ph1 _„„ n , 8  '  New York:  Interest and Effort in Education.  Boston, New York etc.l  Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1913  Dewey, John. Logic, the Theory of Inquiry. H. Holt and Co., 1938.  New York  Dewey; John. Reconstruction in Philosophy. H. Holt and Co., 1920.  New York  Flew, A. (ed). Essays in Conceptual Analysis. St. Martin's Press, 1956.  New York'  Gallie, ¥. B. Peirce and Pragmatism. Penguin, 1952.  Harmonsdworth:  -  Harris, C. W. New York:  100  -  Encyclopedia of Educational Research. Macmillan, 19507" • ~~ ~~  Henry, N. B0 Philo'sophies of Education. (Part I of the Forty-First Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education). Chicago: University of Chicago & Press, 1942. Hospers, J. London:  An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1956.  Lillie, W. London:  An Introduction to Ethics (Third Edition). Methueh, 1955. ~~  Linsky, L. Urbana:  Semantics and the Philosophy of Language. University of Illinois Press, 1952.  Plato,  The Republic.  New York, etc.:  Scribners,  Pole, D. The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein. Athlone Press, 19^57" ™ Reiss, S. The Universe of Meaning. Philosophical Library, 1953.  1958.  London:  New York:  Ryle, G. and others. The Revolution in Philosophy. London: Macmillan^ 1957. Scheffler, I. Philosophy and Education. Allyn and Bacon^ 19f>oI ' '  Boston:  Spencer, Herbert. Essays on Education (1861). Everyman's, 1911. Tornas, V. (ed.) of Science.  London:  Charles S. Peirce: Essays in the Philosophy New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1957.  Ulich, R. The Human Career;" A Philosophy of Self-transcendence . New York: Harper, 1955 ! ~ Wittgenstein, L. B. Blackwell,  Philospphlcal Investigations. 1953.  Oxford:  


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