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Social change in the social philosophy of John Dewey Desjardins, Pit Urban 1961

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SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY OP JOHN DEWEY by PIT URBAN DESJARDINS B.A., The University of B r i t i s h Columhia, 19J4.I A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Philosophy We accept th i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1961 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree th a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood tha t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Pit Urban Desjardins Department of Philosophy  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada. Date April 5, 1961  ABSTRACT This essay i s , in the main, a presentation of Dewey's social and p o l i t i c a l philosophy, with particular attention being given to his theory of the origin and nature of the state and to his recommendations for a programme of social recon-struction. As Dewey relies on the use of intelligence for conscious intervention within the social process and for the purposive control of social change, the f i r s t chapter of this essay is given to an exposition of Dewey's version of the pragmatic method, Instrumentalism. The major influences which operated to shape Dewey's methodological approach to philosophic problems are the following: (1) the rise of American industry: the divorce of production from hand-tool methods and the introduction of technology and mass manufacturing techniques; (2) the emergence of Pragmatism as a distinctive American philosophy; (3) the rising influence of the biological sciences; (ll) the contem-plative character of classic philosophy. These influences form the matrix out of which Dewey's general philosophic outlook emerged; an outlook in which thinking i s shifted from the contemplative to the practical, and which is ordered by the principle that thinking is instrumental to a control of the environment• Consistent with his methodology, Dewey places his theory of the emergence, existence and functioning of the state on an empirical base. Causal agency theories of the state are rejected; a theory of s o c i a l organization must sta r t with what i s observable, human behaviour. The hypos tat ized "'Individual" and "Society" are dissolved by a psychology of s o c i a l behaviourism which holds that the in d i v i d u a l i s an emergent from a group matrix and his behaviour as an i n d i v i d u a l Is explainable only by reference to the group. Dewey's s o c i a l theory begins, therefore, with the facts that human beings exist and act within some kind of s o c i a l grouping and that the consequences of acting within an association are perceived by the Individuals comprising i t . The perception of consequences i s the keystone of Dewey's theory. In Dewey's view the f a c t that consequences are perceived gives r i s e to the problem of co n t r o l l i n g c e r t a i n consequences, and to the co r r e l a t i v e problem of providing the apparatus for regulating actions to a t t a i n s p e c i f i e d and predetermined consequences. Dewey distinguishes two kinds of actions (or transactions, i n Dewey's terminology): those whose consequences are dire c t and confined to the group within which the actions take place are defined as private; but actions which have effects outside of the group and generate i n d i r e c t consequences are c l a s s i f i e d as p u b l i c . The need to control actions a f f e c t i n g the welfare of those not d i r e c t l y involved i n the transactions brings into existence a spec i a l s o c i a l group which Dewey c a l l s A Public. This s o c i a l e n t i t y takes on p o l i t i c a l form, I t becomes a p o l i t i c a l state, when o f f i c i a l s or representatives are appointed or elected and the organize the Public to care for the common intere s t generated i i i by the i n d i r e c t consequences of transactions. The formation of states i n a continuing, experimental process; as the conditions of s o c i a l l i f e change ao does the need for new forms of p o l i t i c a l organization. F i n a l l y , democracy, i n Dewey's theory, i s a form of government a r i s i n g out of a spec i f i e d practice In selecting o f f i c i a l s and regulating t h e i r conduct as o f f i c i a l s * Dewey's s o c i a l theory implies the d i r e c t i o n of society by ideas and by knowledge. It i s Dewey's general thesis, there-fore, that the method of experimental s o c i a l inquiry i s the most e f f e c t i v e means for a community organized as a p o l i t i c a l state to make s a t i s f a c t o r y adaptations to a changing material, i n t e l l e c t u a l and moral culture and, at the same time, allowing maximum freedom to the in d i v i d u a l for the development of h i s capacities and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . Recognizing that men are rule d by habit and that they c l i n g to long established b e l i e f s , Dewey saw the persistence of the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n as the means for carrying the experimental methodology into the arena of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s . But before i t could serve t h i s purpose, l i b e r a l i s m had to be reconstructed. In t h i s reconstruction Dewey saw no need to modify the ends of l i b e r a l i s m , but he points out that i f they are to play a guiding role i n contemporary l i f e l i b e r a l i s m must abandon i t s atomistic psychology and the cor r e l a t i v e doctrines of individualism and l a i s s e z - f a i r e and adopt the ideas and methods of an experimental s o c i a l philosophy. The immediate problematic s i t u a t i o n which prompted Dewey to advocate an experimental method of s o c i a l inquiry operating through a renascent l i b e r a l i s m was the lack of Integration In i v contemporary s o c i a l l i f e manifested by (1) the fragmentation of society into a m u l t i p l i c i t y of changing publics with d i f f e r i n g needs and demands, and (2) the apparent absence of a public c o n t r o l l i n g and d i r e c t i n g the apparatus of government* Dewey argues that the impact of science on society has been so traumatic that t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l methods are incapable of dealing with the problems which have been created. However, he does not specify what the a l t e r n a t i v e methods are, but only commits himself to i d e n t i f y i n g the conditions which must p r e v a i l i f the Great Community and a democratically organized Public are to emerge. These conditions are absolute freedom of s o c i a l inquiry and the widest possible d i s t r i b u t i o n of i t s conclusions. Given the foregoing conditions, the state w i l l become e f f e c t i v e l y the instrument of the Public. v CONTENTS CHAPTER Page I . THE THEORY OP KNOWLEDGE 1 I I . THE SOCIAL THEORY 36 I I I . SOCIAL CHANGE. 78 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 1 9 v i CHAPTER I THE THEORY OP KNOWLEDGE Dewey's theory of knowledge i s so fundamentally important to h i s whole philosophic accomplishment that we might safely say that i t constitutes both the foundation and the quintessence of h i s thinking. I t i s usually dangerous to characterize a segment of a philosopher's views by such a broad, descriptive generalization but, i n t h i s case, the ground f o r doing so appears to be s o l i d . One can surely say, then, that there would not be too many dissenting opinions i f i t were said that an understanding of Dewey's theory of knowledge, that i s , his Instrumentalism, i s the road to a clearer insight into h i s other philosophic d o c t r i n e s - - s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , moral, aesthetic, etc. Admitting the foregoing then, there i s no question that a des c r i p t i o n of the s i g n i f i c a n t elements of Instrumentalism i s a v i t a l and necessary prelude to an examination of Dewey's s o c i a l theory. As a matter of f a c t , upon further consideration, a discussion of Dewey's s o c i a l views apart from h i s theory of knowledge would be almost a meaningless endeavour; i t would be, i n Dewey's language, a detaching of knowledge from the knowing process; a separation of ends and means. For just as the emotional and the r a t i o n a l i n man are bound together, such that a separation means the ext i n c t i o n of the whole man, so for Dewey the knowing process and s o c i a l facts and hypotheses are part of 1 2 a continuum In which only an arbitrary and vitiating separation and abstraction is possible. Before undertaking to develop Dewey's theory of know-ledge, i t i s necessary for purposes of perspective to digress to a consideration of the distinctiveness of Dewey's point of view in the schema of traditional philosophy* The dominant theme which pervades and gives direction to Dewey's entire philosophic activity Is his wholehearted belief i n the process of experience as ends and as means. Moreover, to understand his attitude toward classic philosophy (particularly Greek philosophy) and i t s connection with the emergence of Pragmatism and Instrumental Ism, i t i s essential that one appreciate i n Dewey's outlook the depth and breadth of the influence of the foregoing theme. Dewey gave a new orientation to the role of philosophy; determined positively, on one side, by a moral and missionary concern over the future of mankind and negatively, on another side, by a reaction against traditional philosophy for i t s alleged failure to provide instrumentalities for the solution of the concrete problems of l i v i n g , and i t s direction of intellectual energies towards the transcendental rather than the human* This bivalent influence operated to shift Dewey's interest i n philosophy from the contemplative to the practical. Dewey visualized philosophy as a tool, an instrumentality for human ends, and the task  nto c l a r i f y men's ideas as to the social and moral strifes 1 of their own day,'1 1 Dewey, John, Reconstruction i n Philosophy, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1937 (Copyright 1920), p. 26. In giving a place of paramount importance to human ends i n the function of philosophy, we should not conclude that Dewey i s , ipso facto, making an evaluation of the importance of humanity on a cosmic scale that i s , making man the central f a c t of the universe. Gn the contrary, Dewey expressly denies any such implication: Humanity i s not, as was thought, the end fo r which a l l things were formed; i t Is but a s l i g h t and feeble thing, perhaps an episodic one, i n the vast stretch of the universe. But f o r man, man i s the center  of interest and the measure of importance.2 The crux of Dewey's attitude towards the accomplishments of t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy l i e s i n the foregoing quotation. Dewey charges that too much emphasis was placed upon and too much energy directed at understanding the world i n a contemplative way, i n discovering i n the f l u x of the universe an immutable r e a l i t y . Furthermore, the universe was contrasted either d i r e c t l y or by implication, to the insi g n i f i c a n c e of man. The r e s u l t , he asserts, was that the problems of mankind i t s e l f were side-3 tracked. To give philosophy an anthropocentric o r i e n t a t i o n w i l l be to many a repudiation of the t r a d i t i o n a l (and thereby real) scope of philosophy. In essence, t h i s i s what Dewey does; he wrenches philosophy from i t s long a p p l i c a t i o n to the c l a s s i c problems which emerged from Greek thought. In terms of 2 Dewey, John, The Public and Its Problems, Chicago, Gateway Books, I946, ( F i r s t published 1927 by Henry Holt and Company, New York), p. 176. 3 The thought developed i n t h i s paragraph i s expressed i n man of Dewey's works. Reconstruction i n Philosophy, p a r t i c u l a r l y Chapter 1, treats at length this idea. philosophy 1 s quest f o r the "good*, his motive f o r doing so stems from a morality which considers the "good" to be the welfare of humanity. When one considers h i s philosophy with mankind as the end and the motive, the obviousness of the outgrowth of a theory of knowledge i n which the whole stress i s l a i d upon technique, practice and doing, i s immediately apparent. Since, on t h i s view, the future of mankind i s the Pol a r i s of the philosopher and the transformed aim of philosophy i s the develop-ment of instrumentalities which w i l l e f f e c t i v e l y serve man i n the f u l f i l m e n t of hi s s p i r i t u a l and material aims, f o r Dewey t h i s i s a s u f f i c i e n t and compelling motive for philosophical inquiry, as he says: Philosophy which surrenders i t s somewhat barren monopoly of dealings with Ultimate and Absolute R e a l i t y w i l l f i n d a compen-sation i n enlightening the moral forces which move mankind and i n contributing to the aspirations of men to a t t a i n to a more ordered and i n t e l l i g e n t happiness.4 At t h i s point the question might have been r a i s e d by Dewey as to why philosophy has taken so long to acquire consciousness of the r o l e of a s s i s t i n g man with the p r a c t i c a l problems of l i f e * The answer l i e s , according to Dewey, at the source of the t r a d i t i o n of western philosophy--the Greek world of a n t i q u i t y . Now whether Dewey holds the early Greek thinkers responsible f o r the d i r e c t i o n of thought away from the p r a c t i c a l , or whether he believes that the turn given to inquiry was merely an inescapable phase of i n t e l l e c t u a l growth, Is not clea r . The f a c t remains, nevertheless, that he does place the I4. Dewey, Reconstruction i n Philosophy, pp.. 26-27. 5 onus f o r the present philosophical t r a d i t i o n on the Greeks; and, as a r e s u l t , there has grown up i n Dewey, probably unconsciously, a l a s t i n g and biasing antipathy towards Greek thought. Notwithstanding t h i s antagonism, Dewey does give a very p l a u s i b l e and natural explanation of the o r i g i n of the philosophic t r a d i t i o n which has been the source of i n s p i r a t i o n to philosophers to the present day.'' There Is to some degree extenuation (which I do not think Dewey would admit) f o r the successors of the Greeks i n t h e i r p e r s i s t i n g allegiance to Greek Ideas; the blinding luminescence of Greek thought exerted ineluctable influence over a l l who cared to behold and to understand. Leaving aside for the moment Dewey's thesis about the influence of Greek thought upon the course and goals of philosophical inquiry and considering how Immensely Greek ideas f i l l e d the philosophic void, one might reasonably ask the question "could the h i s t o r y of philosophy have been otherwise?" In early h i s t o r y the mainspring of inquiry, as Dewey says, was the quest f o r certainty, which quest, upon analysis, was not ultimately a search f o r knowledge at a l l ; the r e a l end was to a t t a i n some locus of emotional security. I t was, there-fore, an emotional need not i n t e l l e c t u a l inquisitlveness which provided the impetus to inquiry. But with the growth of knowledge the force of the o r i g i n a l motives waned; and the formal patterns of thought, established as a vehicle f o r these a f f e c t i v e elements, persisted into the present day as the hall-mark of worth f o r the thought of western c i v i l i z a t i o n . 5 Dewey, John, The Quest f o r Certainty, New York, MInlton, Balch & Company, 1929, Chapters 1 and 2. 6 Because of the ephemeral character of the phenomenal world certainty was i d e n t i f i e d with something Immutable, some intra n s l e n t realm of being. The r e a l world was a substratum of unvarying existence which could not be apprehended by senses adapted to the grossness of the material world. I t was a b r i l l i a n t and ingenious notion to project one's desire f o r cert a i n t y into an enduring archetype f o r a l l phenomenal existence. How easy i t must have been, knowing that antecedent to the world of inconsistencies and i r r e c o n c i l a b l e s that l a y before us, was a perfect realm of Being; and to overlook as v e n i a l the problems of men searching the sensuous world* Yet, th i s was, according to Dewey, the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c tenor of Greek philosophy. The d i v i s i o n of the world into the noumenal and the phenomenal, to use a Kantian d i s t i n c t i o n , i s the key point i n the consideration of the Greek theory of knowledge. On the one hand, the noumenal world i s the realm of Being which Is universal, f i x e d and immutable; on the other hand, the phenomenal world involves change and i n s t a b i l i t y * The f i r s t gives certainty; the second, p r o b a b i l i t y . Now the goal of Greek speculation was certainty, so i t was natural that s i g n i f i c a n t and genuine knowledge became r a t i o n a l cognition of the world of Real Being* Because of the f i x e d , permanent and universal character of the w o r l d - i n - i t s e l f a s e l f consistent r a t i o n a l i t y was imputed to i t s nature; hence, reason became the chief instrument of the knowing process. Since the realm of Being was immutable, change was a meaningless concept i n reference to i t ; and p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y , of which change i s an inherent quali t y , became completely 7 dissociated from the process and aims of knowing. The Holy G r a i l of the Greek philosophers was certainty; and the search f o r i t would only end when there existed a complete isomorphism between mind and the world of Being. With t h i s attainment the human s p i r i t could r e s t i n i t s bed of unchanging r e a l i t y . I t i s with the dictum that the "Quest for certainty ean be f u l f i l l e d .,6 In pure knowing alone" that the Greek theory of knowledge began i t s long career; and practice and doing as a method of knowing were relegated to the world of everyday a f f a i r s . The organization of Greek p o l i t i c a l l i f e on the basis of slavery i s , i n d i r e c t l y , evidence, according to Dewey, of the disparaging attitude which the Greek r u l i n g classes held towards p r a c t i c a l a c t i v i t y . Separation of mind and matter, the elevation of what was c a l l e d i d e a l and s p i r i t u a l to the very summit of Being and the degradation of every-thing c a l l e d material and worldly to the lowest po s i t i o n , developed i n philosophy as a r e f l e c t i o n of economic and p o l i t i c a l d i v i s i o n of classes.7 There was more than just passive acceptance of slavery as an inevitable phenomenon of s o c i a l growth on the part of Greek aristo c r a c y . Consciousness of the nature and character of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l structure i s betrayed by the many philosophical writings which give t a c i t , I f not downright, sanction to slavery as a necessary basis f o r s o c i a l organization. The d i v i s i o n of society Into classes c o r r e l a t i v e with the d i s t i n c t i o n 6 Dewey, The Quest for Certainty, p 9 8. 7 Dewey, John, Problems of Men, New York, Philosophical Library, 191+6, p. 11+.. 8 between purely cognitive and p r a c t i c a l knowledge i s only one of the overt, s i g n i f i c a n t manifestations of the " s p l i t between the i d e a l and the material'' which developed i n Greek l i f e and flowed through the whole of western culture* The i d e a l of pure r a t i o n a l i t y as the chief and defining c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of r e a l i t y has so permeated the f a b r i c of European c i v i l i z a t i o n that no modern man can escape contact with the notion that reason alone Is the omnipotent instrument f o r investigating the world's problems. Religion, law, p o l i t i c s , philosophy, i n f a c t , a l l departments of human a c t i v i t y have submitted, i n varying degrees, to the influences of Hellenism i n the recognition and the promotion of the disju n c t i o n between theory and p r a c t i c e . That t h i s dichotomy exists as a l i v i n g force i n contemporary l i f e i s indicated by the evidence of the greater s o c i a l esteem i n which thinkers and theoreticians, i n u n i v e r s i t i e s and i n pure research, are held as against those whose functions are l a r g e l y p r a c t i c a l . Dewey, i n many of h i s writings, has gone to considerable lengths to reveal the ramifications of the theory of knowledge set forth by the Greeks as the source of the manifold of d i f f i c u l t i e s confronting philosophy to-day; but h i s c r i t i c i s m s are not confined to Greek philosophy alone. He d i r e c t s a s i m i l a r attack, possibly with less insistence, at a l l theories which hold as the end of the knowing process something "antecedent to the mental act of observation and inquiry." He states: Some theories ascribe the ultimate t e s t of knowledge to impressions passively received, forced upon us whether we w i l l or no. Others ascribe the guarantee of knowledge to synthetic a c t i v i t y of the i n t e l l e c t . Idealistic theories hold that mind and the object known are ultimately one; r e a l i s t i c doctrines reduce knowledge to awareness of what exists independently, and so on* But they a l l make one common assumption. They a l l hold that the operation of inquiry excludes any element of practical activity that enters into ft the construction of the object known. With these remarks Dewey excludes from serious consideration practically a l l theories of knowledge which have oecupied the attention, and s t i l l are the chief concern, of professional philosophy* The grounds of exclusion are the same as those which denied the validity of Greek theories; the search for that which i s fixed and immutable* In a l l probability the core of. similarity that exists between these various theories i s due to the fact that none of them indicate, i n effect, an absolute schism with Greek tradition; but represent attempts on the part of schools of philosophy to circumvent the d i f f i c u l t i e s and weaknesses of more primitive views. Reconstructing the scene from which Dewey emerged one has no d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding the antagonism which he expresses, over and over again, towards the position and influence of traditional philosophy i n the enlightened circles of his time* The objection may be raised, however, that this antagonism has resulted i n some distortion and exaggeration of the views and doctrines of traditional philosophy. There i s no doubt that historians of philosophy could probably find ample evidence to support this contention. What justification, i f 8 Dewey, The Q,uest for Certainty, p. 22. any, i s there for Dewey's twisting and stretching of the facts of philosophic history? Tt i s not questionable that Dewey i s cognizant of the f a c t that he has d e l i b e r a t e l y presented the material of philosophy with a c e r t a i n bias and with a s p e c i f i c object i n mind. This i s made evident i n the following quotation which also answers the question i n the preceding paragraph: Common frankness requires that i t be stated that t h i s account of the o r i g i n of philosophies claiming to deal with absolute Being i n a systematic way has been given with malice prepense. I t seems to me that t h i s genetic method of approach i s a more e f f e c t i v e way of undermining th i s type of philosophic theorizing than any attempt at l o g i c a l r e f u t a t i o n could be.9 This reply, perhaps, leaves him open to a more serious charge of accepting the p r i n c i p l e that the end j u s t i f i e s the means. I f Dewey were a dogmatist and not a fervent proponent of free i n t e l l i g e n c e and discussion as the best of a l l possible methods fo r dealing with problems, h i s slanting of the facts to serve polemical ends would probably have been regarded with greater concern. In seeking j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r Dewey's apparent defection as a h i s t o r i a n of philosophy, consideration should be given i n r a t i o n a l i z i n g h i s attitude to the influence of his strong i n c l i n a t i o n f o r p r o s e l y t i z i n g . Dewey wanted to do more than merely present the experimental method of Inquiry as the most e f f e c t i v e use of i n t e l l i g e n c e ; he wanted people to use the method. This meant discarding something old and f a m i l i a r f o r 9 Dewey, Reconstruction i n Philosophy, 1920, p. 2ii.. 11 something new. Logical persuasion and the simple assertion of the s u p e r i o r i t y of the method are often not enough to e f f e c t the t r a n s i t i o n . In the preceding several pages an endeavour has been made to restate i n summary form the origins and some of the major concepts of t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy as t h i s matter appears afte r being organized and f i l t e r e d by the mind of Dewey. In r e c a p i t u l a t i n g Dewey's views a d e f i n i t e e f f o r t was made to preserve the o r i g i n a l tenor and s p i r i t of h i s own presentation because i n h i s organization and narration of the material of h i s t o r i c a l thought the temper of the man's mind i s revealed. Perhaps we should not be too concerned about the temper of a philosopher's mind, but s t i c k to facts and l o g i c i n an exposition and evaluation of his ideas. Should that be done i n the case of Dewey, an element e s s e n t i a l and important to the understanding of h i s philosophy and outlook would be absent. I t w i l l be l e f t to some p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y minded psychoanalyst to examine the evidence and explain the inner workings of Dewey's temper of mind; f o r purposes of t h i s essay we w i l l accept I t as a datum without ©nitology. The more r e a d i l y answerable question that can be asked Is what influences i n Dewey's environment, i n t e l l e c t u a l and physical, operated to develop t h i s unique temper of mind which produced a new philosophy. It i s obvious that no extensive treatment of the many influences which surrounded Dewey i n h i s l i f e t i m e can be given i n a short essay. The most that can be done i s to give a b r i e f i n d i c a t i o n of the character and importance of the formative 12 forces to which Dewey responded; to place him i n a context of s i g n i f i c a n t influences; to create a perspective. By doing so perhaps we can a t t a i n i n some measure the aim which Bertrand Russe l l sets out i n the Preface to h i s History of Western Philosophy: "to exhibit philosophy as an i n t e g r a l part of s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l l i f e . " That Dewey also would be sympathetic to t h i s aim does not seem questionable, f o r he states i n one place that "Philosophers are parts of history, caught i n i t s movement; creators perhaps i n some measure of i t s future, but ..10 also assuredly creatures of i t s past." Certainly, Dewey's own l i f e and work are a f u l f i l m e n t of t h i s r o l e ; he Is part of the growth of American c i v i l i z a t i o n , and i t i s p a r t l y i n terras of t h i s growth that he must be understood,, Since we are here p r i m a r i l y concerned with the develop-ment of Dewey's theory of knowledge, the ensuing paragraphs w i l l n e cessarily emphasize those influences which had greatest relevance to the f i n a l outcome. As the broadest and most pervasive influence was the American scene i t s e l f , i t seems appropriate to consider It f i r s t . Dewey'3 r i s e to a p o s i t i o n of philosophical influence i n America p a r a l l e l s the growth of I n d u s t r i a l power which took place around him at a enormous rate. No sensitive person, p a r t i c u l a r l y a philosopher, could be unimpressed by the nature and extent of the c i v i l i z a t i o n springing up i n the wake of the great p h y s i c a l developments occurring everywhere. But more 10 Dewey, John, Philosophy and C i v i l i z a t i o n , New York, Minton, Balcfa and Company, 1931* P« Important, no sensitive man could remain i n e r t i n the face of the innumerable problems of adjustment, Individual, s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l , which the new era of industrialism brought with i t . True to h i s t o r i c a l form, however, the physical aspect of American c u l t u r a l growth was decades ahead of a cor r e l a t i v e development i n educational, s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l matters. Moreover, the philosophical attitude concomitant with the s p i r i t of the new technological, i n d u s t r i a l age had not yet emerged i n a form and with the strength necessary to give d i r e c t i o n to these ascendant forces, American philosophy was s t i l l l a r g e l y concerned with "puzzles of epistemology and the disputes between r e a l i s t and i d e a l i s t , between phenomenalist and absolu t i s t . " Even Dewey, on hi s own admission, was pr o f e s s i o n a l l y concerned with the problems of German Idealism. Broadly speaking, therefore, t h i s was the hiatus i n the American c u l t u r a l pattern that existed at the emergence of the philosophy of experimentalism. In the i n t e l l e c t u a l component of the r i s i n g culture we f i n d emerging under the leadership of C.S. Peirce a philosophic movement c a l l e d Pragmatism, a movement which some historians of philosophy have stated characterized and forms the i n t e l l e c t u a l 11 counterpart of an i n d u s t r i a l c i v i l i z a t i o n . This assessment, 11 Bertrand Russell i n his Essay, "Dewey's New Logic" written f o r the volume The Philosophy of John Dewey, New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1951> edited by Paul A. Schilpp, holds t h i s view with respect to Dewey's p a r t i c u l a r form of Pragmatism: "Dr. Dewey has an outlook which, where i t i s d i s t i n c t i v e , i s i n harmony with the age of industrializm and c o l l e c t i v e enterprise," p.,137. Dewey took strong exception to t h i s statement (p. 527) i n his r e b u t t a l essay "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder," appearing i n the same volume as Russell's essay. however, i s by no means a f i n a l judgement that has majority concurrence; i t i s s t i l l a contentious issue i n philosophical l i t e r a t u r e . Aside from i t s possible r e l a t i o n to American material culture, Pragmatism had a more c l e a r l y defined r o l e i n the f i e l d of philosophy. I t assigned a new object to philosophy: to give meaning to the universe i n terms of human l i f e ; not i n the s t a t i c r e l a t i o n of t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy and i t s ""spectator theory of knowledge" but i n r e l a t i o n of active control f o r d i s t i n c t l y human purposes. Pragmatism, as i t was o r i g i n a l l y enunciated by Peirce, underwent development and transformation i n the hands of P.C.S. S c h i l l e r , William James, and, of course, John Dewey, whose version with which we are p a r t i c u l a r l y concerned, represented, broadly speaking, an a l l i a n c e between P e i r c e 1 s views and the methodology of experimental science. In i t s p r i s t i n e form, however, Pragmatism meant simply "the rule of r e f e r r i n g a l l thinking, a l l r e f l e c t i v e consideration, to consequences, f o r f i n a l test and meaning." The signfleant word to note i s "consequences". Dewey has drawn attention to i t s importance i n i n t e r p r e t i n g the meaning of Pragmatism by i t a l i c i z i n g the printed form of the word i n the work from which the quotation was abstracted. F i n a l l y , the influence of biology, though not as apparent as the others, must be pointed out as an important factor i n the formation of Dewey's philosophy. I t should be noted that the chief conception of biology, that the world i s 12 Dewey, John, Essays i n Experimental Logic, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2nd ed., 191'B, p # 330. I 15 organically u n i f i e d , was probably coupled with the r e s i d u a l influence of Hegel's organic idealism. This union was most l i k e l y not a deliberate one, but the resultant notion of organic unity was fortuitous i n that i t provided the integrative element necessary to a functional theory of knowledge. As a r e s u l t of t h i s Influence Dewey saw man as an organism i n an i n t r i c a t e and complex environment, continually faced with a problem of modification and adjustment. It i s not too great an i n f e r e n t i a l leap, therefore, to conceive of ideas as instruments of response and adaptation and that t h e i r "truth** i s to be judged i n terms of t h e i r effectiveness. What has been said i n the preceding sentence i s e s s e n t i a l l y the meaning of Instrumen-talism; an organized, systematized means for man to deal e f f e c t i v e l y with h i s environment© / No great insight i s required to see i n Dewey's view, . that the concept of evolution and b i o l o g i c adaptation and the notion of a "complete and true Reality" cannot exi s t side by side within the same epistemologlcal framework. Evolution means growth and growth means that there are no fi x e d ends. The end of l i f e i s continuous transformation of oneself and one's surroundings. The End has now taken on a functional value: The end i s no longer a terminus or l i m i t to be reached. I t i s the active process of transforming the the existent s i t u a t i o n . Not perfection as a f i n a l good, but the ever-enclosing process of perfecting, maturing, r e f i n i n g i s the aim of l i v i n g . 1 3 13 Dewey, Reconstruction i n Philosophy, 1920, p. 177. 16 Many Implications can be drawn from the l i n e s just quoted but the s i g n i f i c a n t one i s the conception of the continuum of ends and means. In summary, then, the major influences determining the formation of Dewey's philosophy but p a r t i c u l a r l y his theory of Instrumentalism are (1) the r i s e of American industry: the divorce of American production from hand-tool methods and the introduction of technology and mass manufacturing techniques; (2) the emergence of Pragmatism as a d i s t i n c t i v e American philosophy; (3) the r i s i n g Influence of b i o l o g i c a l sciences; (Ij.) the influence which has not as yet been s p e c i f i c a l l y referred to In the foregoing pages but which must be mentioned: the s t a t i c condition of professional, academic philosophy which i s coupled with Dewey's reaction to the body of t r a d i t i o n a l academic philosophy. C r y s t a l l i z e d and u n i f i e d , these influences form the matrix out of which Dewey's philosophy emerged. At one time i n his career, Dewey must have been confronted with a personal, moral problem, which might have been stated thus: "Comparing the l i v i n g problems of a v i t a l age with the academic h i s t o r i c a l problems of professional philosophy, have I the choice of moving Into the seclusion of past h i s t o r y , or must I move out into the arena of present c o n f l i c t s ? What tools, what methods can I contribute to the r e s o l u t i o n of the c o n f l i c t i n g issues? Is the r e v i v a l of some dictum of past ages the answer?" Probably i t i s u n l i k e l y that that issue ever arose i n Dewey's mind i n such a precise and d e f i n i t e way. In any case, i t i s only i n retrospect that the existence of this moral issue can be so c l e a r l y defined, ^he answer, of course, to 17 these questions i s epitomized In the l i f e and work of Dewey. With th i s b r i e f survey of the background against which Dewey's philosophy must be examined we are now i n a p o s i t i o n to turn to a consideration of his theory of knowledge. Instrumentalism--the doctrine that ideas are instruments of response and adaptation, with t h e i r "truth" determined by t h e i r effectiveness i n promoting a s a t i s f a c t o r y adjustment,—is the name pf Dewey's d i s t i n c t i v e contribution to epistemology. In the succeeding paragraphs the main endeavour w i l l be directed at developing t h i s theory from the point of view of i t being an apparatus, a t o o l of inquiry. Therefore, the omission from examination of some of the technical issues of epistemological theory which Dewey's Instrumentalism r a i s e s i s not to be construed as an admision that the theory has successfully dealt with those issues, or that I t has rendered them meaningless, but only that the scope of this essay, t h i s chapter i n p a r t i c u l a r , does not permit a more thorough-going treatment. The most that can be achieved i s a presentation of the main elements of the theory so that i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to and significance i n s o c i a l theory w i l l be apparent. In formulating h i s theory of knowledge, Dewey was very much Impressed by and, as i t turns out, borrowed heavily from the methodology of physical science. What were the considerations, aside from the methodology i t s e l f , that predisposed Dewey to give such whole-hearted acceptance i n the formulation of h i s own theory to the s c i e n t i f i c method of inquiry? The answer to this question i s twofold: (1) the facts of the achievement of physical science; t h i s to Dewey was indisputable evidence of the e f f i c a c y of i t s methods, and (2) Dewey held that the raw material of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry i s change; the problems of science are determined by change. R e f l e c t i o n upon these two ideas w i l l reveal how pregnant they are with the main tenets of the instrumental theory. F i r s t l y , the achievements of science: are r e s u l t s of thinking i n a ce r t a i n s p e c i a l i z e d way, they are "consequences"; i f we reconsider f o r a moment, the i n t e r -p r etation given by Dewey as to the meaning of Pragmatism, that i s , "the rul e of r e f e r r i n g a l l thinking...to consequences for f i n a l t e s t and meaning", i t i s quite apparent how the l o g i c inhering i n the pragmatic p r i n c i p l e could validate the s c i e n t i f i c method of thinking. (Xn the a n a l y t i c observation contained i n the foregoing sentence, the c i r c u l a r and s e l f -regulating character of Instrumentalism i s hinted at. The methodology of Instrumentalism through i t s own r u l e of r e f e r -l k ence to consequences validates i t s own methodology). Secondly, change, the subject matter of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry according to Dewey, i s the source of human experience and human problems; t h i s stands i n contrast to the antecedent, immutable r e a l i t y outside the pale of experience about which t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy was concerned. I t i s i n the concept of change, generally speaking, that we discover the germ of the theory of Instrumentalism. There i s , perhaps, a Hegelian metaphysical element i n t h i s lij. In hi s Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, New York, Henry Holt and Company,"193^» Dewey raises t h i s question i n connection with the ro l e of l o g i c i n inquiry, p. 5. The question, he states, "can be adequately answered only i n the course of the entire discussion that follows." concept; a suggestion that change i s some kind of enduring substratum possessing the properties of i n f i n i t e v a r i a b i l i t y and ceaseless movement* Certainly, t h i s concept has p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r the creation pf an ordered metaphysic, and the h i s t o r y of philosophy provides precedent for i t . In the f i f t h century, B 0 C , Heraclitus held the view that only change i s r e a l ; a l l things and the universe as a whole are i n a constant, ceaseless f l u x . However, as f a r as Dewey i s concerned, i t i s ~ t o be assumed that he does not hold any b e l i e f i n a metaphysic of change, but regards change s o l e l y as a term characterizing the phenomenal world with which science deals; nothing more* How does t h i s changing world manifest i t s e l f so as to be amenable to s c i e n t i f i c inquiry, the question might be asked? Events are the tokens by which we experience the ceaseless v a r i a t i o n of our environment, and these events are the elemental " s t u f f " of inquiry* I t i s i n the need to give meaning to these events that t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy and empirical science diverge so widely* In the e a r l i e r parts of t h i s chapter, i t was shown that philosophy concerned i t s e l f with the problem of discovering and "knowing" a realm beyond experience; i n d i r e c t contradiction to t h i s aim we here assert that science i n dealing with the changing events of our experience does not t r y to get outside the monism of our experience* The meaning of an event within the schema of a t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c a l system Is determined by associating the event with some f i x e d term or terms of reference. In essence, 20 t h i s i s how s e c u r i t y o f knowledge i s a t t a i n e d . F o r Dewey, on t h e o t h e r h a n d , meaning i s r e l a t e d t o p o s s i b l e c o n s e q u e n c e s ; i t i s " t h e I m p u t a t i o n o f c e r t a i n consequences t o a n e v e n t ; i t i s a method o f a c t i o n ; a r u l e f o r u s i n g and i n t e r p r e t i n g 15 t h i n g s . " B u t , d e p e n d i n g o n t h e consequences t h a t c o n c e r n u s , t o any g i v e n event s e v e r a l meanings c a n be a s c r i b e d ; how do we e s t a b l i s h t h e v a l i d i t y o r i n v a l i d i t y o f t h e s e meanings w i t h o u t the b e n e f i t o f a f i x e d frame o f r e f e r e n c e ? F u r t h e r m o r e , where s e v e r a l e v e n t s a r e c l o s e l y r e l a t e d , how do we e v a l u a t e t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e ? The q u e s t i o n s o f the f o r e g o i n g p a r a g r a p h might be answered by c o n s i d e r i n g t h e n a t u r e o f o u r p e r c e p t i o n o f the e v e n t s . P s y c h o l o g i c a l l y r e g a r d e d , i s t h e r e a d i f f e r e n c e o f k i n d o r degree i n the s t a t e s o f awareness a r o u s e d b y our p e r c e p t i o n w h i c h w o u l d g i v e c o g n i t i v e v a l i d i t y t o one o f t h e meanings and e v e n t s ? T h i s i s the a p p r o a c h o f i n t r o s p e c t i v e p s y c h o l o g y ; t o d i s c o v e r meanings and knowledge i n s t a t e s o f m i n d . I t i s i n r e a c t i o n a g a i n s t the p r i n c i p l e t h a t c o g n i t i v e v a l i d i t y can be d e t e r m i n e d b y a n a l y s i s o f s e n s e - d a t a o r o f p e r c e p t i o n i t s e l f t h a t Dewey d e v e l o p s h i s t h e o r y o f the knowing p r o c e s s . The d e t e r m i n a t i o n o f the c o g n i t i v e v a l i d i t y o f one p e r c e p t i o n as a g a i n s t a n o t h e r , Dewey s t a t e s , i n c o n c l u d i n g a n a n a l y s i s i n w h i c h he u s e d a n example the p e r c e p -t i o n o f a h o r s e and a c e n t a u r , " i s n o t a n a f f a i r o f I n t r i n s i c d i f f e r e n c e i n t h e two p e r c e p t i o n s , w h i c h i n s p e c t i o n o f the two 15 R a t n e r , J o s e p h , e d . , I n t e l l i g e n c e i n the Modern W o r l d , J o h n Dewey's P h i l o s o p h y , New Y o r k J The Modern L i b r a r y , 1 9 3 9 , PP« Oi>7-6b7 f o r d i s c u s s i o n . 2 1 atates of awareness as such ean ever bring to l i g h t ; i t i s a causal matter, brought to l i g h t as we investigate the causal antecedents and consequents of the events having the meanings." We can draw the conclusion, then, that perception i s not knowledge; the meaning of an event which we perceive only becomes knowledge with the addition of something 17 e x t r i n s i c to what l i e s within the perceiving organism. A l l of what has been said i n the previous four paragraphs can be reduced to the following proposition which i s a conclusion from which we take the next step towards the development of the Instrumental theory: HHo knowledge i s ever merely immediate." In supporting this statement, Dewey recurs again to h i s i l l u s t r a t i o n involving the perception of a horse and a centaur. In view of the importance of his d i s t i n c t i o n between perceiving and knowing, and the causal-consequential conditions connected with the attainment of knowledge, the length of t h i s quotation may be excused: The proposition that the perception of a horse i s v a l i d and that a centaur i s f a n c i f u l or hallucinatory, does not denote that there are two modes of aware-ness, d i f f e r i n g i n t r i n s i c a l l y from each other. I t denotes something with respect to causation, namely that while both have t h e i r adequate antecedent conditions, the s p e c i f i c causal conditions are ascertained to be d i f f e r e n t In the two cases. Hence, i t denotes something with respect to consequences, namely, that action upon the respective meanings w i l l bring to l i g h t (to apparency or awareness) such d i f f e r e n t kinds of consequences that we should use 16 Ratner, Intelligence i n the Modern World, p. 926 17 Ibid., pp. 926-927. 22 the two meanings i n very d i f f e r e n t ways. Both acts and consequences l i e s outside the primary perceptions; both have to be d i l i g e n t l y sought for and tested. Since conditions i n the two cases are d i f f e r e n t , they operate d i f f e r e n t l y . That i s , they belong to d i f f e r e n t h i s t o r i e s , and the matter of the h i s t o r y to which a given thing belongs i s just the matter with which knowledge i s concerned.18 The analysis of the r e l a t i o n of perception and cognition i n t h e i r bearing upon the problem of a t t a i n i n g knowledge reveals the workings of Dewey's argument fo r the denial of the empiricists' claim that the foundation of knowledge i s i n the data of empirical p o s i t i o n with respect to the r e l a t i o n of 19 perception to knowledge, we are s t i l l l e f t with the r a t i o n -a l i s t s ' contention that c e r t a i n knowledge has an immutable basis i n l o g i c . 20 I t i s i n Logic: The Theory of Inquiry that Dewey examines the r a t i o n a l i s t point of view with respect to l o g i c . In the same work he also discusses the Interpretations of l o g i c offered by other philosophical schools as these l o g i c s form parts of t h e i r theories of knowledge. No attempt w i l l be made here to review the arguments and ideas presented In t h i s "work. 18 Ratner, Intelligence i n the Modern World, p. 927. My i t a l i c s . 19 Bertrand Russell states that perception i s r e l a t e d to empirical knowledge. I t i s i n developing t h i s r e l a t i o n that he and Dewey diverge. P. lliO i n The Philosophy of John  Dewey, Ed., Paul A. Schilpp, New York, Tudor Publishing Co., 1951. 20 Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, This volume cpntalns Dewey's f u l l y elaborated views on the r o l e of l o g i c i n the knowing process. In The Philosophy of John Dewey, edited by Paul A. Schilpp, Bertrand Russell's contribution to t h i s volume i s a c r i t i c a l essay devoted e n t i r e l y to an examination of the' views set f o r t h i n Logic: The Theory of Inquiry. 23 The s u b s t a n c e , however, o f Dewey 1 s c r i t i c i s m s o f r a t i o n a l i s t l o g i c I s t h a t l o g i c i s c o n s i d e r e d a p a r t f r o m t h e human a c t i v i t y o f i n q u i r y ; i t i s c o n s o n a n t w i t h t h e p o s t u l a t i o n o f a n immutable r e a l m o f b e i n g , w i t h t h e q u e s t f o r c e r t a i n t y . The p o i n t has a l r e a d y been made e a r l i e r i n t h i s e s s a y t h a t t h e l a t t e r a r e the o b j e c t s o f t r a d i t i o n a l p h i l o s o p h y w h i c h Dewey has made t h e t a r g e t s o f h i s c r i t i c i s m s . I n d e e d , as F e l i x Kaufmann has s t a t e d i n h i s e s s a y on Dewey, "He n e v e r t i r e s o f d r i v i n g home t h e p o i n t t h a t the quest f o r c e r t a i n t y f o r the immutable and i n d u b i t a b l e , Is i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the acknowledgement o f the 21 autonomy o f t h e s e l f - c o r r e c t i v e p r o c e s s o f s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y , " B u t i t i s t h e p o s i t i v e element o f h i s c r i t i c i s m s w h i c h m e r i t s o u r a t t e n t i o n ; l o g i c p l a y i n g a p a r t i n t h e a c t i v i t y o f i n q u i r y . I t I s the c a r d i n a l p o i n t o f Dewey's d o c t r i n e t h a t l o g i c c a n n o t be s e p a r a t e d f r o m s c i e n t i f i c m e t h o d o l o g y and the " f o r m s and c a u s e s o f l o g i c n e e d n o t and c a n n o t be j u s t i f i e d b y a p r i o r i 22 p r i n c i p l e s f i x e d a n t e c e d e n t l y t o i n q u i r y . " Dewey's l o g i c a l t h e o r y c a n n o t be more c l e a r l y s t a t e d t h a n i n t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t t a k e n from h i s L o g i c : The t h e o r y , i n summary f o r m , i s t h a t a l l l o g i c a l forms ( w i t h t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c p r o p e r t i e s ) a r i s e w i t h i n t h e o p e r a t i o n o f i n q u i r y and are c o n c e r n e d w i t h c o n t r o l o f I n q u i r y so t h a t i t may y i e l d w a r r a n t e d a s s e r t i o n s . T h i s c o n c e p t i o n i m p l i e s much more t h a n t h a t l o g i c a l forms a r e d i s c l o s e d o r come t o l i g h t when we r e f l e c t upon p r o c e s s e s o f I n q u i r y t h a t a r e i n u s e . Of c o u r s e i t means t h a t ; but i t a l s o means 21 H o o k , S i d n e y , e d . , J o h n Dewey: P h i l o s o p h e r o f S c i e n c e and F r e e d o m , New Y o r k , The D i a l P r e s s , 1950, p . 219. 22 I b i d . , p , 222. 21+ that the forma originate i n operations of inquiry. To employ a convenient expression, i t means that while inquiry into inquiry i s the causa cognoscendi of l o g i c a l forms, primary inquiry i s i t s e l f causa essendi of the forms which inquiry into inquiry discloses.2 3 The important conclusion to be drawn from Dewey's statement of his p o s i t i o n regarding l o g i c a l subject matter i s that the methods of inquiry are autonomous; they are se l f - r e g u l a t i n g and  s e l f - c r i t i c i z i n g ; 2 ^ they are not subject to external l o g i c a l  c r i t e r i a . What has been said about the relations of perception and cognition and the theory of l o g i c a l forms leads us to a consideration of inquiry as an empirical procedure. Much of what i s to follow i s contained, either e x p l i c i t l y or i m p l i c i t l y , i n the preceding paragraphs; but r e p e t i t i o n .and restatement may f i n d j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n making clearer Dewey's conception of inquiry as an operational device f o r the " i n s t i t u t i o n of conditions which remove the need for doubt." Attention has already been drawn i n t h i s essay to the point of view, held by Dewey, that t r a d i t i o n a l philosophy was not concerned with a f f a i r s of the mundane world; I t preferred to r detach I t s e l f as much as possible from the p r a c t i c a l concerns of men. ^he natural outcome of this detachment were epistemologies which emphasized the purely mental character of inquiry. There grew up, i n f a c t , a d i v i s i o n between theory and pr a c t i c e . I t 23 Dewey, Logic; The Theory of Inquiry, pp. 3 " i + . 2li See ray comment, p. 1$, Footnote l l i , on t h i s element of Dewey's theory. ' 25 Is i n t h i s d i v i s i o n that Dewey finds the f a i l u r e of epistemology; the f a i l u r e to perceive that inquiry involves overt action, involves experimentation either with e x i s t e n t i a l objects or with symbols. The process of inquiry f o r Dewey i s not merely a matter of I n t u i t i o n , of introspective examination of psychic states, but requires actual manipulation of the objects of knowledge. I t i s t h i s emphasis on manipulation, on the act of doing, that distinguishes Dewey's epistemology, and that provides him with h i s most potent weapon f o r attacking c l a s s i c philosophy. But l e t Dewey speak f o r himself: I f , accordingly, i t can be shown that the actual procedures by which the most authentic and dependable knowledge i s attained have completely surrendered the separation of knowing and doing; i f i t can be shown that overtly executed operations of i n t e r a c t i o n are r e q u i s i t e to obtain the knowledge c a l l e d s c i e n t i f i c , the chief f o r t r e s s of the c l a s s i c philosophic t r a d i t i o n crumbles into dust. With t h i s destruction disappears also the reason f o r which some objects, as f i x e d i n themselves, out of and above the course of human exper-iences and i t consequences, have been set i n opposition to the temporal and concrete world i n which we live.2 5 The somewhat oracular tone of these l i n e s reveal the conviction i n which Dewey holds b e l i e f i n action as the cornerstone of a theory of inquiry; one could go further and say holds b e l i e f i n inquiry as a method of action. I f inquiry i s a method of action, then "an inquiry" must be some kind of transformation of a s i t u a t i o n . The precise d e f i n i t i o n of inquiry given by Dewey i s as follows: 25 Dewey, The truest for Certainty, p. 79. 26 I n q u i r y i s the c o n t r o l l e d or d i r e c t e d t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of an indeterminate s i t u a t i o n i n t o one that i s so determinate i n i t s c o n s t i t u e n t d i s t i n c t i o n s and r e l a t i o n s as to convert the elements of the o r i g i n a l s i t u a t i o n i n t o a u n i f i e d whole.26 Most of Chapter VI of h i s L o g i c i s devoted to an ex p l a n a t i o n of the meaning of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n i n terms of the operations by means of which an indeterminate s i t u a t i o n i s transformed i n t o a determinate one. Rather than attempt t o summarize Dewey's thoughts, the goal of exegesis w i l l perhaps be more l i k e l y a t t a i n e d i f Dewey r e c a p i t u l a t e s h i s own argument and ideas and an a n a l y t i c a l commentary i s reserved t o the w r i t e r . Dewey's summary given on p. 117 of h i s L o g i c i s the f o l l o w i n g : The t r a n s i t i o n i s achieved by means of operations of two kinds which are i n f u n c t i o n a l correspondence w i t h each other. One k i n d of operations deals w i t h I d e a t i o n a l or conceptual s u b j e c t -matter. The subject-matter stands f o r p o s s i b l e ways and ends of r e s o l u t i o n . I t a n t i c i p a t e s a s o l u t i o n , and i s marked o f f from fancy because, o r, i n s o f a r as, i t becomes ope r a t i v e i n i n s t i g a t i o n and d i r e c t i o n of new observations y i e l d i n g new f a c t u a l m a t e r i a l . The other k i n d of operations i s made up of a c t i v i t i e s i n v o l v i n g the techniques and organ of / observation. Since these operations are e x i s t e n t i a l they modify the p r i o r e x i s t e n t i a l s i t u a t i o n , b r i n g i n t o h i g h r e l i e f c o n d i t i o n s p r e v i o u s l y obscure, and r e l a t e t o the background other aspects that were a t the outset conspicuous. The ground and c r i t e r i o n of the execution o f t h i s work of emphasis, s e l e c t i o n and arrangement i s t o d e l i m i t the problem i n such a way t h a t e x i s t e n t i a l m a t e r i a l may be provided w i t h which to t e s t the ideas t h a t represent p o s s i b l e modes o f s o l u t i o n . 26 Dewey, L o g i c : The Theory of I n q u i r y , pp. lOij - 1 0 5 . 27 S y m b o l s , d e f i n i n g terms a n d p r o p o s i t i o n , a r e n e c e s s a r i l y r e q u i r e d i n o r d e r t o r e t a i n a n d c a r r y f o r w a r d b o t h i d e a t i o n a l and e x i s t e n t i a l s u b j e c t - m a t t e r s i n o r d e r t h e y may s e r v e t h e i r p r o p e r f u n c t i o n s i n t h e c o n t r o l o f i n q u i r y . T h i s q u o t a t i o n seems t o c o n t a i n a l l o f the e s s e n t i a l i d e a s r e l e v a n t t o the t h e o r y o f i n q u i r y w i t h t h e e x c e p t i o n o f one t o w h i c h r e f e r e n c e w i l l be made l a t e r . D i v e s t e d o f e l a b o r a t i o n s , what Dewey i s a p p a r e n t l y s t a t i n g i s t h a t t h e p r o c e s s o f i n q u i r i n g i n v o l v e s the i n t e r a c t i v e f u n c t i o n i n g o f t h e o p e r a t i o n s o f h y p o t h e s i z i n g , o b s e r v i n g and t e s t i n g . We d e v e l o p p l a n s o f a c t i o n ( h y p o t h e s e s ) as p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n s t o t h e p r o b l e m , w h i c h p l a n s s e r v e a t t h e same t i m e as t o o l s o r i n s t r u m e n t s f o r more d i r e c t e d and p e n e t r a t i n g o b s e r v a t i o n ; a n d by o b s e r v a t i o n we m o d i f y t h e s i t u a t i o n , d e l i n e a t e the s i g n i f i c a n t f a c t u a l m a t e r i a l t h e r e b y b r i n g i n g t h e p r o b l e m i n t o a f o c u s s u c h t h a t we a r e a b l e t o t e s t o u r h y p o t h e s e s . The consequence o f t h i s t e s t i n g i s t o i n d i c a t e t h o s e h y p o t h e s e s w h i c h s t a n d o u t as most l i k e l y s o l u t i o n s a n d , a l s o , t o r e v e a l new f a c t s w h i c h w i l l s e r v e t o m o d i f y e x i s t i n g h y p o t h e s e s and make p o s s i b l e the emergence o f e n t i r e l y new o n e s . And so t h e p r o c e s s o f h y p o t h e s i z i n g , o b s e r v i n g and t e s t i n g i s r e p e a t e d u n t i l a p o i n t o f e q u i l i b r i u m i s r e a c h e d , t h a t i s , a c u l m i n a t i o n o f t h e p r o c e s s i n an adequate and f u l l y v e r i f i e d h y p o t h e s i s . I n the a n a l y s i s o f I n q u i r y , the m e d i a t i n g r o l e o f s y m b o l i s m i n p e r f o r m i n g t h e o p e r a t i o n s s h o u l d n o t be o v e r l o o k e d ; t h e y a r e the t o o l s w h i c h make c o n t r o l l e d a n d d i r e c t e d i n q u i r y p o s s i b l e . Now t h a t we have a c l e a r e r c o n c e p t i o n o f the meaning o f i n q u i r y , i t i s p e r h a p s t h e a p p r o p r i a t e moment t o l o o k a t t h e 28 question towards which we have been d i r e c t i n g t h i s analysis: To what does the quest of t r a d i t i o n a l epistemologies, knowledge, have reference i n the f i e l d of t h i s process of inquiry? That the answer to t h i s question l i e s within the f i e l d of inquiry i t s e l f i s i m p l i c i t i n the theory, and when the implications of the theory are reinforced by Dewey's r e j e c t i o n of a l l theories that hold that knowledge can be acquired apart from i t s method of attainment, then i t i s obvious that knowledge "can only be a generalization of the properties discovered to belong to 27 conclusions which are outcomes of inquiry." But Dewey gives a d e f i n i t i o n of knowledge i n more formal and precise language; he states "that which s a t i s f a c t o r i l y terminates inquiry i s , by d e f i n i t i o n , knowledge; i t i s knowledge because i t i s the 28 "~ appropriate close of inquiry." By virtu e of the tautological character of t h i s d e f i n i t i o n , Dewey hopes to avoid any suggestion of,the hypostatizatlon of knowledge. No more i s to be implied by the use of the word than i s indicated by i t s function as an abstract term employed to designate the product of Inquiry. In order to free himself from the ambiguities and the h l i s t o r i c a l connotations connected with the words b e l i e f and knowledge, Dewey discards these terms whenever possible and ref e r s to the outcome of inquiry as that which "warrants assertion", or knowledge i s equivalent to that which has warranted a s s e r t a b l l i t y . Aside from the ambiguity of the word, 27 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 8. 28 Loc. c i t . 29 knowledge, Dewey has a much more significant reason for the choice of this special designation for the outcome of inquiry. "The use of a term that designates a potentiality rather than an actuality Involves recognition that a l l special inquiries are parts of an enterprise that is continually renewed, or is a 29 going concern." The interpretation to be given to that state-ment i s that no outcome of inquiry is ever f i n a l l y settled. The body of knowledge i s a continuum, a system of means and consequences. There i s no ultimate knowledge i n this continuum; a l l warranted assertions or beliefs, to use the expression popular with Dewey, are subject to and are means of further inquiry. This instrumental character of knowledge i s of particular significance i n science. In s c i e n t i f i c inquiry, the criterion of what is taken to be settled, or to be knowledge, is being s_o settled that i t available as a resource in further inquiry; not being settled i n such a way as not to be subject to revision in further Inquiry.30 The history of science could provide adequate documentation i n support of that assertion. Thus far, we have been considering Inquiry more or less i n the abstract, as a methodology amongst methodologies but removed from the arena of human activity. The ralson d'etre of inquiry cannot be determined, i t s meaning cannot be elucidated, u n t i l we restore the function of inquiry to the f i e l d of human purposes. In other words, only when we regard inquiry in a 29 Dewey, Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 9. 30 Ibid., pp. 8-9. 30 b i o l o g i c a l context do the r e s u l t s of Inquiry a t t a i n meaning and s i g n i f i c a n c e . The question now to consider i s what are the properties of human a c t i v i t y within which the s p e c i f i c character-i s t i c s of the theory are determined. In a t h e o r e t i c a l sense i t has been shown that the end of inquiry as a mode of action i s a solution to a problem, that i s , the transformation of an indeterminate s i t u a t i o n into a determinate one which has warranted a s s e r t a b i l i t y . But what i 3 the c o r r e l a t i v e function of inquiry within the media of human desires and purposes? To what end i s adaptation and adjustment d i r e c t e d ? — t h e attainment of a more sa t i s f a c t o r y s i t u a t i o n l The function of Inquiry then i s to mediate the transformation of a less s a t i s f a c t o r y s i t u a t i o n into one that i s more s a t i s f a c t o r y . In short, the fundamental assumption which i s made i s that human actions are p r i m a r i l y directed to a t t a i n i n g a state of greater s a t i s f a c t i o n . The r o l e of inquiry i s one of Intervention: a set of operations designed to provide the most e f f i c a c i o u s means for the attainment of human desiderata. With the theory of inquiry now relocated i n the perspective of the human s i t u a t i o n we can re-examine the theory outlined above and f i l l i n the missing element to which we alluded. The consummation of an act of Inquiry, we have stated, i s a determinate s i t u a t i o n having warranted a s s e r t i b i l i t y or, expressed i n terms of human aspirations, the elimination of an undesirable state of a f f a i r s . We have also asserted that the achievement of t h i s determinate s i t u a t i o n may be the consequence of repeated acts of Inquiry, each act inter-connected with the 31 preceding and succeeding acts by a chain of consequences. But, i n t h i s sequence of operations, i t i s not shown by what means we determine that the termination of the sequence w i l l r e s u l t i n a u n i f i e d , meaningful s i t u a t i o n . The answer, of course, cannot be found by an inspection of the mechanism of the theory of inquiry but we must look to purposes—human purposes. I t Is only i n terms of the s a t i s f a c t i o n of human needs, i n the r e s o l u t i o n of the doubt with which inquiry begins, that we f i n d the c r i t e r i a f o r determining whether the outcome of inquiry i s appropriate and f i t t i n g to the need. And, as needs change as a consequence of the transformation and development of material and i n t e l l e c t u a l culture, so do new d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n s and doubts arise demanding renewed Inquiry. Perhaps, now, we can appreciate more f u l l y the import of Dewey's observation about the place of man i n the universe, quoted at the outset of t h i s chapter (p. 3): "But f o r man, man i s the center of interest and the measure of importance." (I wonder i f Dewey recognized his debt to Protagoras). Up to t h i s point we have scrupulously avoided any reference to a concept having long and venerated standing i n the h i s t o r y of human speculation: Truth. This has been done p a r t l y i n deference to Dewey's r e j e c t i o n of the concept i n Its c l a s s i c meaning and p a r t l y because i t i s beyond the compass of th i s essay to give proper recognition to i t s place i n epistemologlcal theory. Nevertheless, because truth i s the concept around which many of the arguments against and c r i t i c i s m s of Instrumentalism revolve, a b r i e f discussion of 32 the r e l a t i o n of truth to Instrumentalism i s e s s e n t i a l to a survey of the theory. Prom one t r a d i t i o n a l viewpoint the search f o r truth generally presupposed the existence pf two independent states of being; the r e l a t i o n being u s u a l l y that of an immutable r e a l i t y over and against a knowing mind. The.function of .mind i s t h i s dualism i s to "mirror" r e a l i t y i n a thought process; the "image" being a set of propositions, l i n g u i s t i c or mathematical. These propositions are said to possess the property of "truth" when a one-to-one r e c i p r o c a l correspondence exists between them and the features of r e a l i t y of which they are tokens. This view allows one to ascertain the truth of i n d i v i d u a l propositions independently of each other, or of a whole set of propositions. The "whole truth", then, i s perhaps just a matter of the systematic accumulation of discrete elements u n t i l the pattern i s complete, as f o r example, a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n table, which 31 Russell says i s a perfect model of truth. The foregoing b r i e f discussion of the truth concept leaves much unsaid about the notion of truth but i t serves to point out a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of truth which accounts, i n part, f o r Dewey's renunciation of the concept. Truth when f i n a l l y attained i s absolute i n character. A proposition within a truth system i s either true or f a l s e ; i t either mirrors the r e a l i t y or i t does not. Moreover, a proposition, i f true, can stand and have v a l i d i t y independently of the methods of v e r i f i c a t i o n . On 31 Russell, Bertrand, A History of Western Philosophy, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1945» p. 020. 33 On the other hand, the instrumental theory regards a proposition as a t o o l , as a means; i t s "truth" resides or i s measured i n terms of i t s effectiveness as means and It owes i t s existence to the act of inquiry, to a set of operations. Further-more, i t s continued v a l i d i t y , meaning by that warranted assert-a b i l i t y , depends upon the consequences that ensue as i t I t s e l f 32 i s used as an instrument of inquiry. The d i s t i n c t i o n between Dewey's Instrumentalism and the generally accepted t r a d i t i o n a l view i s c l e a r l y drawn out by Bertrand R u s s e l l , who may be considered one of the most important contemporary protagonists of the t r a d i t i o n a l conception of t r u t h . Russell's analysis of Instrumentalism i s most f u l l y developed i n his c r i t i c a l essay "Dewey1s New Logic", but the ground of h i s divergence i s c l e a r l y and adequately expressed i n more succint form i n a passage of h i s History of Western Philosophy from which the following quotation Is taken: The main difference between Dr. Dewey and me i s that he judges a b e l i e f by i t s e f f e c t s , whereas I judge i t by i t s causes where a past occurrence i s concerned. I consider such a b e l i e f "true", or as nearly true as we can make i t , i f i t has a c e r t a i n kind of r e l a t i o n (sometimes very complicated) to i t s causes. Dr. Dewey holds that i t has "warranted a s s e r t a b i l l t y " — w h i c h he substitutes f o r " t r u t h " — i f i t has c e r t a i n kinds of e f f e c t s . This divergence 32 In his Logic: The Theory of Inquiry, p. 2>k$* i n a footnote Dewey accepts a d e f i n i t i o n of truth given by Peirce. I have refr a i n e d from reference to t h i s d e f i n i t i o n as i t would require more extensive treatment than i s possible i n t h i s b r i e f discussion of truth. Russell i n his essay "Dewey's New Logic" i n the volume edited by Paul A. Schilpp, The Philosophy of John  Dewey, pp. XI4.I4. f makes a careful analysis of Peirce's d e f i n i t i o n s . 3k i s connected with a difference of outlook on the world. The past cannot be affected by what we do, and therefore, i f truth i s determined by what has happened, i t i s independent of present or future v o l i t i o n s ; i t represents i n l o g i c a l form, the l i m i t a t i o n s on human power. But i f truth, or rather "warranted a s s e r t a b i l i t y " , depends on the future, then, i n so f a r as i t i s i n our power to a l t e r the future, i t i a i n our power to a l t e r what should be asserted. This enlarges the sense of human power and freedom.33 Russell states that the divergence between himself and Dewey i s connected with a difference of outlook on the world, but the question might well be asked as to what influence t h e i r respective t h e o r e t i c a l views have had i n forming t h e i r outlooks. In t h i s survey of the theory of knowledge which Dewey has contributed to philosophy the development contained i n t h i s chapter has of necessity been somewhat s u p e r f i c i a l with, perhaps, some of the ideas presented not f u l l y connected together. To compensate f o r some of the discursiveness of the writer and to provide an authoritative d e f i n i t i o n of Instrumen-talism the following quotation taken from one of Dewey1s e a r l i e r works seems to f i t the need: •••instrumentalism means a behavior1st theory of thinking and knowing. It means that knowing i s l i t e r a l l y something we do; that analysis i s ultimately physical and active; that meanings i n t h e i r l o g i c a l q u a l i t y are standpoints, attitudes, and methods of behaving toward f a c t s , and that active experimentation i s es s e n t i a l to v e r i f i c a t i o n . Put i n another way i t holds that thinking does not mean any trans-cendent states or acts suddenly introduced 33 Russell, A History of Western Philosophy, p, 826 35 into a previously natural scene, but that the operations of knowing are (or are a r t f u l l y derived from) natural responses of the organism, which constitute knowing i n vi r t u e of the s i t u a t i o n of doubt i n which they arise and i n vi r t u e of the uses of inquiry, reconstruction, and control to which they are put.3^ 3I4, Dewey, Essays i n Experimental Logic, pp. 331-332. CHAPTER I I THE SOdAL THEORY It i s not surprising that Dewey i n developing h i s s o c i a l theory should r e j e c t at the outset a l l s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l doctrines and psychological theories which purport to be the 35 cause, source and means of s o c i a l organization. Generally speaking, most such theories are rejected by Dewey because of t h e i r postulation, either i m p l i c i t l y or e x p l i c i t l y , of a society forming causal force l y i n g outside of the realm of what i s observable, and are therefore of the same order of inadmis-s i b i l i t y as many of the metaphysical doctrines he has repudiated. But with s p e c i f i c reference to t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l theories he sums up the main ground fo r h i s skepticism about their value i n explaining p o l i t i c a l facts with the statement that " s o c i a l 36 philosophy exhibits an immense gap between f a c t s and doctrines." To i l l u s t r a t e the extent of t h i s d i s j u n c t i o n there i s c i t e d the contrast between the agreement which i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y possible to obtain i n matters of observed phenomena as, f o r example, the behaviour of public o f f i c i a l s , and the complete disagreement about the "basis, nature, functions and j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the state. 35 Dewey, The Public and Xts Problems, pp. 3 - 1 2 . 36 Ibid., p. 3 . 37 Ibid., p. I i . 36 37 Tt must be acknowledged that Dewey's examination of - 38 the theories and doctrines which he catalogues i s rather cursory and s u p e r f i c i a l . But i t would be unjust to conclude that Dewey dismissed them afte r only casual consideration and f o r t r i v i a l reasons. The ground of his r e j e c t i o n i n each case 1$ fundamental: the theory i s not founded s o l e l y on the v e r i f i a b l e f a c t s of human behaviour. A f t e r a fashion Dewey's approach i n preparing f o r the exposition of hi s own views i s analogous to Descartes' p r i n c i p l e of doubting everything, with the difference that Dewey goes much further than mere doubting; he undermines and r e j e c t s . Perhaps h i s sweeping renunciations (and at times denunciations) are not quite acceptable to the scrupulous p o l i t i c a l t h e o r i s t , but they do focus attention upon the need to approach the subject matter without an already systematized bias which must of necessity predetermine the outcome of the inquiry. Dewey does not dismiss from further consideration a l l extant p o l i t i c a l theories. He recognizes that they have t h e i r place and that they are not without some importance, even though we do not f i n d i n them an adequate explanation f o r the o r i g i n of the forms of p o l i t i c a l behaviour. Since such theories have played and continue to play a s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n human a f f a i r s , they must be kept i n the forefront of one•s thinking when theorizing about p o l i t i c a l matters. These alternative theories have not usually emerged e n t i r e l y removed from the facts of 38 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, pp. 3-12. 38 human behaviour; they are often the r e s u l t of the "amplifications 39 of selected factors among those f a c t s . " But simply because such theories are only q u a s i - t r u t h f u l and the pure theory of p o l i t i c a l philosophers, they are not without effectiveness thereby. Much evidence can be found i n h i s t o r y and by observation of the contemporary p o l i t i c a l scene to v e r i f y the foregoing assertion. Less di f f u s e d proof resides i n the functioning of the human organism i t s e l f . Thinking and acting are aspects of the same structures and processes; an idea conceived i s usually associated with some plan of action. Hence, a p o l i t i c a l theory i s o r d i n a r i l y not without i t s protagonists. I t would be extremely i n t e r e s t i n g and informative to explore the multitude of side issues which Dewey touches upon i n the course of the development of his own spe c i a l theory. These c o l l a t e r a l digressions, which are frequent i n his work, often r a i s e points which could of themselves and apart from the main issue be the subject matter of a substantial work of research and reporting. However, as much as t h i s discursive method of attacking a problem may serve to reveal i t s connectedness with the whole body of b e l i e f s and ideas of which i t forms a part, i n the interests of economy and cogency the exposition of the p o l i t i c a l theory which follows hereon w i l l be l i m i t e d to an ex p l i c a t i o n of those of Dewey's ideas which are relevant and J+O necessary to a coherent development of his central doctrine, 39 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p, 6, ]±0 Several references have already been made to Dewey's book, The Public and It3 Problems. I would l i k e to point out-here that the e s s e n t i a l doctrines comprising Dewey's s o c i a l theory are 39 The essential problem i n Dewey's inquiry is the deter-mination of those conditions which are necessary and sufficient to account for ordered community l i f e and for the p o l i t i c a l forms through which the community expresses i t s e l f . The pre-conditions stipulated by Dewey for such inquiry are twofold: i t must be conducted within the canons of the scientific method and i t mu3t exclude a p r i o r i assumptions about the nature of the causes underlying the formation of states* Furthermore, the starting point of the inquiry must be restricted to what is observable, the behaviour of human beings, to the acts they perform either individually or in groups. In making the distinction between the acts performed by individuals and by groups Dewey cautions us not to Infer that there i s something fundamentally different between the behaviour of, an individual in his singularity and i n his group relation. Sp e c i f i c i a l l y , Dewey is asking us to deny the validit y of individualistic psychologies which, in their traditional formulations, assume the existence of a private consciousness in which the subject-matter of thought is purely private and not socially derived. Any interpretation which we do make of the distinctiveness of individual and group behaviour must be based solely on observation of behavioural differences. Moreover, we should note, according to Dewey, that the individuality of the behaviour of singular human beings remains completely within the are developed In this book, although the detailed elaboration of many of the doctrines is to be found in other works by Dewey. In.the preparation of Chapter II of this essay the writer has drawn heavily upon this book. p h y s i c a l , o r g a n i c s t r u c t u r e as i t c o n s t i t u t e s t h e l o c u s and s o u r c e o f b e h a v i o u r . But what about t h e i n n e r c o n t e n t o f c h o i c e , p u r p o s e , d e s i r e , e t c . , o f w h i c h b e h a v i o u r i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n ? I n what c o n t e x t do t h e y f i t ? I n a n e g a t i v e f a s h i o n what Dewey i s l e a d i n g up t o i s the a s s e r t i o n , as a t h e o r y o f human b e h a v i o u r , o f the p s y c h o l o g y o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r i s m , a l t h o u g h i n The P u b l i c  and I t s P r o b l e m s he does n o t employ t h i s s p e c i f i c l a b e l u n d e r w h i c h h i s views a r e a r r a n g e d . S i n c e t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l t h e o r y which Dewey espouses i s c r u c i a l t o the development o f h i s s o c i a l t h e o r y , some f u r t h e r e x a m i n a t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y (expounded i n h i s book Human N a t u r e and Conduct) w h i c h he assumes i s w a r r a n t e d . George H . Mead, a one t ime c o l l e a g u e o f Dewey a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o , o r i g i n a t e d some a s p e c t s o f and e l a b o r a t e d q u i t e e x t e n s i v e l y t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r i s m , and t h e r e i s no doubt t h a t Dewey was s t r o n g l y i n f l u e n c e d b y and took o v e r M e a d ' s s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y and made I t p a r t o f h i s own p h i l o s o p h y . I f we are p e r m i t t e d , t h e n , t o assume t h a t Dewey a c c e p t s M e a d ' s v iews i n t h e i r e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s , t h e f o l l o w i n g p a s s a g e s t a k e n f r o m Mead w i l l s e r v e to d e f i n e t h e p s y c h o l o g i c a l framework w i t h i n w h i c h Dewey's s o c i a l t h e o r y i s d e v e l o p e d : 111 I n The P u b l i c a n d I t s P r o b l e m s , C h a p t e r 1 , Dewey does n o t make c l e a r t h a t the s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g y i m p l i e d i n t h e o b s e r v a t i o n s about human b e h a v i o r i s a t h e o r y w h i c h he a c c e p t s , and t h a t some o f t h e s t a t e m e n t s w h i c h a p p e a r as f a c t s o f b e h a v i o r a r e i n r e a l i t y c o n c l u s i o n s f l o w i n g from t h e p s y c h o l o g y o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o r i s m . 112 S c h i l p p , P . A . , e d . , The P h i l o s o p h y o f J o h n Dewey, New Y o r k , T u d o r P u b l i s h i n g Company, R e v i s e d E d i t i o n , 1951 > p p . 2 6 - 2 7 . l £ S o c i a l psychology studies the a c t i v i t y or behaviour of the i n d i v i d u a l as i t l i e s within the s o c i a l process; the behaviour of an i n d i v i d u a l can be understood only i n terras of the behaviour of the whole s o c i a l group of which he i s a member, since h i s ind i v i d u a l acts are involved i n larger, s o c i a l acts which go beyond himself and which implicate the other members of that group. We are not, i n s o c i a l psychology, building up the behaviour of the s o c i a l group i n terms of the behaviour of the separate i n d i v i d u a l composing i t ; rather, we are st a r t i n g out with a given s o c i a l whole of complex group a c t i v i t y , into which we analyse (as elements) the behaviour of each of the separate individuals composing i t . We attempt, that i s , to explain the conduct of the i n d i v i d u a l i n terms of the organized conduct of the s o c i a l group, rather than to account f o r the organized conduct of the s o c i a l group i n terras of the conduct of the separate indiv i d u a l s belonging to i t . For s o c i a l psychology, the whole (society) i s p r i o r to the part ( i n d i v i d u a l ) , not the part to the whole, and the part Is explained i n terms of the whole, not the whole i n terms of the part or parts. The s o c i a l act Is not explained by building i t up out of stimulus plus response; i t must be taken as a dynamic whole—as something going on—no part of which can be considered or understood by I t s e l f — a complex organic process implied by each i n d i v i d u a l stimulus and response involved In i t . 1^ 3 Mead has been quoted at length f o r the reason, as we s h a l l see, that the roots of Dewey's views are i n the theory given i n t h i s kk excerpt. 1+.3 Mead, G.H. Mind, S e l f and Society, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 19q.°» PP* fo~7« I4J4. Gordon W. A l l p o r t i n hi s essay "Dewey's Individual and  S o c i a l Psychology" i n the volume The-Philosophy of John Dewey, edited by P.A. Schilpp, states that "What Dewey wants i s a psychology compatible with democracy-and he rejects any mental science having contrary Implications'*; furthermore, the ground of Dewey's repudiation i s not i n contradictory evidence but "frankly upon the basis of their i d e o l o g i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n s . " p. 2 8 3 . With Mead's succinct statement of the psychology of s o c i a l behaviourism as a context, we can return to our s t a r t i n g point of s o c i a l inquiry: the observable acts of i n d i v i d u a l s and groups. The characterizing feature of the concept of the act i s i t s necessary implication of a r e l a t i o n .between things. When we observe the act of an i n d i v i d u a l or of a group, or f o r that matter,.any object, there appears inherent i n the s i t u a t i o n the r e l a t i o n of "connection and combination." We note that Singular things act, but they act together....the action of everything i s along with the action of other things. If6 That things should act together i s not something adventitious to the action, but i s a "law" of everything known to e x i s t . There i s , perhaps, a strong i n c l i n a t i o n to ask how things come to be associated. Such a question, Dewey r e p l i e s , i s not an answerable one; i t i s of the same order of questions as those which demand to know why the universe i s the kind of universe i t Is. In other words, we must simply accept i t as a fact of nature that "conjoint, combined, associated a c t i o n i s a universal t r a i t of the behaviour of things." 10 I t should be noted that Dewey's emphasis on the basic, elemental si g n i f i c a n c e of the act i s another instance of his indebtedness to G.H. Mead. In Mind, Self and Society, p. 8 , Mead states that "The a c t . . . i s fundamental datum i n s o c i a l and i n d i v i d u a l psychology." J4.6 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 2 2 . lj.7 Ibid., pp. 2 2 - 2 3 , for Dewey's discussion of association p r i n c i p l e s I 1 8 I bid., po 3k-We are n o t , h o w e v e r , . c o n c e r n e d h e r e w i t h the meaning o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f a s s o c i a t i o n i n i t s g e n e r a l i z e d f o r m ; our I n t e r e s t i s t o l e a r n what s i g n i f i c a n c e i t has w i t h i n t h e f i e l d o f human a s s o c i a t i o n . What i s i t s r e l e v a n c e i n e x p l a i n i n g t h a t s p e c i a l m a n i f e s t a t i o n o f " a s s o c i a t e d a c t i o n " the human community? F u r t h e r m o r e , how does i t f i t i n t o a t h e o r y t o a c c o u n t f o r t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f and d i f f e r e n c e s i n communit ies? The b e h a v i o u r o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , as Mead has s t a t e d , c a n o n l y be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f the whole group o f w h i c h he i s a member. U n d e r l y i n g t h i s p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n c l u s i o n i s t h e p r i n c i p l e o f c o n j o i n t a c t i o n w h i c h , i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n t o the f i e l d o f human b e h a v i o u r , i m p l i e s t h a t t h e a c t o f any i n d i v i d u a l o f a group I n v a r i a b l y has c o n n e c t i o n s w i t h t h e o t h e r i n d i v i d u a l s o f t h e g r o u p . M o r e o v e r , s i n c e the human b e i n g i s s u b j e c t t o t h e i m p l i c a t i o n s o f an e x i s t e n c e i n a b i o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t , he can n e v e r emerge as an i n d i v i d u a l a p a r t from the d e t e r m i n i n g i n f l u e n c e o f t h e p r o c e s s o f i n t e r a c t i v e c o n d u c t . T h a t an a d u l t human b e i n g has s u r v i v e d from a h e l p l e s s s t a t e o f i n f a n c y i s s u f f i c i e n t e v i d e n c e o f h i s dependency on o t h e r s . When we o b s e r v e , t h e r e f o r e , the b e h a v i o u r o f i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h i n k i n g and s t r i v i n g i t must be c l e a r l y u n d e r s t o o d t h a t , w h i l e t h e t h i n k i n g and s t r i v i n g i s o c c u r r i n g - I n the i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r s i n g u l a r s t a t e , t h e o b j e c t s o f t h i n k i n g and s t r i v i n g a r e p r o v i d e d by the s o c i o -p s y c h o l o g i c a l c o n t e x t w i t h i n w h i c h t h e i n d i v i d u a l s are l i v i n g o r , i n Dewey's w o r d s , " t h e c o n t e n t o f t h e i r b e l i e f s a n d i n t e n t i o n s ij.9 R e f e r e n c e p p . iil-li.2 t h i s e s s a y . 5o i s a subject-matter provided by association." By generalizing the terms and enlarging the frame of reference of the foregoing analysis, the concept of the individual as the emergent from a group matrix could possibly be extended to explain the character and behaviour of sub-human species as well as inanimate objects. The question a r i s e s , then, as to what i t i s that d i f f e r e n t i a t e s the behaviour of human beings i n a group s i t u a t i o n from the behaviour of other kinds of organisms or objects i n the i r respective group r e l a t i o n s . There i s c e r t a i n l y evident i n any group selected f o r observation the phenomenon of action of individuals i n association with others or, to use Dewey's phrase, "conjoint action", and i t s effect upon the members of the group and upon the group i t s e l f . In the human association, however, there i s an additional factor present: perception; the in d i v i d u a l members of the group perceive consequences which ensue from t h e i r acting together. The unique c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human associative a c t i v i t y i s the perception by the members of groups of the consequences of conjoint behaviour. The perception of consequences creates a new perspective; i t stimulates awareness of the associative and r e f l e x i v e nature of human actions,and, as Dewey points out, this awareness i t s e l f has consequences i n the re - o r i e n t a t i o n of i n s i g h t . For notice of the effects of connected action forces men to r e f l e c t upon the connection i t s e l f ; i t makes i t an object of attention and i n t e r e s t . Each acts, i n so f a r as the connection i s known, i n 50 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 25 4 5 view of the connection. Individuals s t i l l do the thinking, designing and purposing, but what they think of i s the consequences of t h e i r behaviour upon that of others and that of others upon themselves . 5 1 No great amount of analysis i s demanded to reveal that the perception of the e f f e c t of one's behaviour upon others and of others upon oneself has a r e f l e x i v e element present i n i t . It i s t h i s r e f l e x i v e factor which leads to a reconsideration of the action i n i t i a t i n g the consequences, and then to awareness that action and consequence are part of a causal sequence subject to premeditation. The outcome of th i s discovery, of course, i s that e f f o r t Is made "to control action so as to secure some consequences - 5 2 and avoid others." With the entrance of the idea of control we have reached the stage d i v i d i n g the f a c t u a l and hypothetical parts of Dewey's p o l i t i c a l theory, but before moving more deeply into the area of hypothesis some further prefatory remarks about 'consequences' are required. Perhaps a b r i e f summary at t h i s point might serve to draw together what has been said already, and make our point of departure Into the more speculative areas of Dewey's theory somewhat more secure. The conjoint action of individuals (or of subgroups) within a group has consequences of some kind and degree f o r the whole group and perhaps f o r some individuals within the group. These consequences are perceived and by virtue of t h i s perception attention i s given to c o n t r o l l i n g the 5 1 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 2I4.. 5 2 I b i d . , p. 12 . 1+6 consequences by regulating or modifying the action to a t t a i n s p e c i f i e d and predetermined r e s u l t s . The c y c l i c causal sequence of action-consequence-perception-control i s i n Its e s s e n t i a l aspects an exemplification i n a human s o c i a l context of the procedure of the method of experimental Inquiry: concomitantly with the occurrence of A (conjoint action) there i s an event C (consequence); immediately, or p ossibly a f t e r a r e p e t i t i o n of the concomitant occurrence of A and C, we perceive a connection between A and C; thi s perception leads to a deliberate v a r i a t i o n of A i n order to ascertain i f and what v a r i a t i o n occurs i n C; f i n a l l y , A i s 53 varied to obtain a s p e c i f i e d and predetermined r e s u l t C. In th i s rather over-simplified description of the experimental procedure we have l i m i t e d the f i e l d of observation e n t i r e l y to the family of causal sequences r e s u l t i n g from the v a r i a t i o n of A; we have not been concerned that the C i , C2» C3, ... C^, r e s u l t i n g from A_i, A2, A3 ... A n may have effects extending beyond the l i m i t s of our f i e l d of observation. The consequences of human action could be l i m i t e d to the f i e l d of a c t i v i t y of the group or sub-group within which the action was i n i t i a t e d or, and t h i s i s the c r u c i a l point for Dewey's theory, the consequences could be projected beyond the group or sub-group into the f i e l d of a larger, encompassing group or into the f i e l d of another uninvolved sub-group. In other words, there i s a difference i n degree, extent or scope of 53 The writer acknowledges that t h i s i s a much over-simplified d e s c r i p t i o n of the experimental procedure. conjoint action i n that I t may have consequences not only within the group i n which the action originated but also within another group of which the former i s a sub-group or a separate and unrelated group. (In Dewey's statement that "consequences are of two kinds, those which a f f e c t the persons d i r e c t l y engaged i n a transaction, and those which a f f e c t others beyond those immediately concerned" one might conclude that there are two kinds' of action r e s u l t i n g i n two kinds of consequences. Dewey's statement i s not to be interpreted that way. In the event that the writer's comments also lead to such an lnter« pretation I wish to emphasize that there Is only a single action but i t s scope gives i t points of app l i c a t i o n i n two d i f f e r e n t 55 s o c i a l contexts with the r e s u l t i n g difference i n consequences. It i s important to have a clear understanding of t h i s point since i t i s the basis of Dewey's d i s t i n c t i o n between private and publ i c , which w i l l be dealt with more f u l l y l a t e r ) . I t i s these consequences which go beyond the group i n i t i a t i n g the action, the " i n d i r e c t consequences" as Dewey refers to them, that are the concern of a p o l i t i c a l theory. To d i s t i n g u i s h those actions which have consequences confined to those d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the action from those actions which have consequences extending beyond the immediate parti c i p a n t s Dewey employs the designations "private" and "public". The meaning of these two terms should be c a r e f u l l y 51+ Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 12. 55 Ibid., p. 15. This point i s made clearer i n Dewey's discussion of the basis of d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g public and private. 1+8 noted for they have acquired a spe c i a l denotation, as the development of the previous paragraphs indicates. But to eliminate any dis t o r t i o n s a r i s i n g from paraphrasing, Dewey's own d e f i n i t i o n s are submitted: When the consequences of an action are confined, or are thought to be confined, mainly to the persons d i r e c t l y engaged In i t , the transaction i s a private one. ...Yet I f It i s found that the consequences . . . a f f e c t the welfare of many others, the act acquires a public capacity....56 I t has already been stated that there Is not a discrete difference between private and public; the basis of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n i s o r b i t a l : "namely, that the l i n e between private and public i s to be drawn on the basis of the extent and scope of the acts 57 which are so important as to need control...." So f a r we have discussed acts and consequences i n t h e i r private and public meaning; we have pointed out the r o l e that perception plays i n leading to e f f o r t s to regulate consequences by c o n t r o l l i n g actions; f i n a l l y In the preceding sentence the notion of the necessity for eontrol has been introduced, but as yet no reference has been made to the means of at t a i n i n g control or, In the public sense, f o r whom the control i s necessary. Within the o r b i t of the private group actions are v o l u n t a r i l y i n i t i a t e d i n order to achieve consequences, i . e . , ends, desired by the group: thus the necessity f o r control Is determined by the intere s t of the group i n attaining the ends 56 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 12-13. 57 Ibid., p. 15. 49 which have been i n s t i t u t e d . Control, therefore, i n i t s private function i s e s s e n t i a l l y a kind of s e l f - r e g u l a t i o n : the d i r e c t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e a c t i o n into those channels which appear to be most l i k e l y to lead towards the sought a f t e r consequences. On the other hand, when these v o l u n t a r i l y i n i t i a t e d actions s p i l l over the boundaries of the orig i n a t i n g group into the or b i t of a larger more in c l u s i v e group, consequences may arise which perhaps are not i d e n t i f i e d as desirable by the l a t t e r group. I f we re f e r back to the d e f i n i t i o n distinguishing private and public i t w i l l be noted that since these consequences a f f e c t others not d i r e c t l y engaged i n the action, the conduct of the group i n questions takes on a public s i g n i f i c a n c e . The necessity f o r c o n t r o l l i n g the i n d i r e c t or unpremeditated consequences creates a new i n t e r e s t ; a concern on the part of a "public" i n c o n t r o l l i n g the occurrence of u n s o l i c i t e d and, perhaps, undesired consequences by regulating the actions and the conduct of groups whose private interests have effects i n i a public domain. Control i n the public sphere takes on a different, meaning; i t no longer has the p a r t i c u l a r I d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the attainment of ends but has more a regulative connotation; the concern i s now with l i m i t a t i o n , p r o h i b i t i o n and, i n some instances, promotion. The foregoing discussion of control as i t devolved down to a consideration of the control of consequences projected beyond the individuals and associations d i r e c t l y concerned ushered In the key concept i n the hypothetical phase of Dewey's s o c i a l theory: The Public. When our analysis of 5o the control of consequences reached the point where the regulation of i n d i r e c t consequences arose as a problem i t was l o g i c a l to anticipate that some s p e c i a l , overriding group would emerge as dominant amongst the m u l t i p l i c i t y of groups of which the com-munity i s comprised. The assumption should not be made, however, that the Public exists i n any metaphysically hypo-st a t i z e d sense, that i t i s created by some integrating p r i n c i p l e e x t r i n s i c to the community. Such an assumption would take the Public outside of the s o c i a l causal sequences and destroy the empirical basis f o r the nature and functions of the state as an instrument of the public action. No more should be imputed to the designation the Public than i s contained In t h i s d e f i n i t i o n : "The Public consists of a l l those who are affected by the Indirect consequences of transactions to such an extent that It i s deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared f o r . " Now, one further word of caution i s warranted: we must not i d e n t i f y the public with p o l i t i c a l organization. The public i s simply a special grouping of diverse s o c i a l elements created by a common intere s t and when i t comes into existence i t Is devoid of any p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . But when, and by what means, does a public become a r t i c u l a t e d by adding to i t s e l f the capacity f o r regulation and control? The amorphous state of the public Is given a p o l i t i c a l form when o f f i c i a l s or representatives are elected or, by other means, appointed, to care f o r the common Interest which has been generated. It i s through the agency of individuals who have 58 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 15. 51 subordinated t h e i r private interests f o r the public good.that the public becomes a p o l i t i c a l state. The state, then, using Dewey's d e f i n i t i o n , i s "the organization of the public effected through o f f i c i a l s for the protection of the interests shared by 59 i t s members." This d e f i n i t i o n i s obviously i n i m i c a l to a conception of the state i n any r i g i d form and to the elevation of the state to a p o s i t i o n of supreme importance i n the s o c i a l hierarchy. Since the formation of the state i s the end product of a process there i s no f i x e d c r i t e r i o n by which we can evaluate the "goodness" of a state. The only s i g n i f i c a n t point of r e f e r -ence which we have i s the public i n t e r e s t ; and the measure of the value of the state Is the degree i n which the o f f i c e r s of the state have cared for th i s public i n t e r e s t by v i r t u e of the degree of p o l i t i c a l organization the public has attained. In seeking the good state we must recognize the conclusion that there are no a p r i o r i rules for i t s formation; the rules that do come int o play are determined by the s p e c i f i c ends to be attained i n the protection and conservation of the public i n t e r e s t . 59 Dewey, John, The Public and Its Problems, p. 33 . It i s in t e r e s t i n g to compare Dewey's functional d e f i n i t i o n of the state with the descriptive d e f i n i t i o n s usually given i n books on p o l i t i c a l science. For example, "A state i s a portion of society l e g a l l y Independent of external control, which permanently occupies a d e f i n i t e t e r r i t o r y within which It main-tains adequate government." P. 23 of An Outline of P o l i t i c a l  Science, G.A. Jacobsen and M.H. Lipman, New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1937 • This d e f i n i t i o n emphasizes not the nature of the state but the place and conditions under which a state w i l l most l i k e l y be found. 52 60 In the d e f i n i t i o n of the state given i n a footnote i n t h i s essay, reference was made to "adequate government" as one of the c r i t e r i a of the state. The d e f i n i t i o n implies more than simply the f a c t that the presence of government i s a feature which serves to i d e n t i f y the existence of a state; the state "maintains adequate government." In other words, govern-ment i s constituted by and owes i t s existence to the state. This point of view i s i h d i s t i n c t contrast to the r o l e which Dewey assigns to government, and Dewey's d e f i n i t i o n of the state given on the preceding page c l e a r l y reveals the difference. We would approximate what Dewey holds to be the correct r e l a t i o n between state and government i f we changed the positions of the words "state" and "government" as they now appear i n the statement 'the state "maintains adequate government"'. This transposition of terms suggests the d e f i n i t i o n that the state i s the organization of the public effected by representative o f f i c i a l s endowed with special powers; hence, the government comprises those representative o f f i c i a l s with authority delegated to them by the pu b l i c . In the d e f i n i t i o n of the state given by Jacobsen and Lipman (quoted i n footnote 59» page 5D i t i s possible f o r the government to be corrupt and inadequate but with the sovereignty and i n t e g r i t y of the state remaining i n v i o l a t e ; the sanctity of the state i s preserved. But In Dewey's conception of the nature and r e l a t i o n of government and the state, the state i s no better or no worse than the government 60 Footnote 59 of th i s essay. 53 which constitutes i t . Amongst the other forms of association in which a shared interest i s created, the state stands apart and pre-eminent i n representing the common interest shared by a public. But like a l l forms of association the state acts through singular human beings—its officers—and is thereby subject to the weaknesses, prejudices and limitations of individuals who though charged with a public trust often turn the special powers granted them to private account or f a i l to serve the public interest because of incompetence or ignorance. Because the state, moreover, is created by human agencies i t does not ...imply any belief as to the propriety or reasonableness of any p o l i t i c a l act, measure or system. Observations of consequences are at least as subject to error and il l u s i o n as is perception of natural objects. Judgements about what to undertake so as to regulate them, and how to do i t , are as f a l l i b l e as other plans.6l There is no immanent intelligence to guide the state towards the fulfillment of i t s role; there are only varying degrees of human intelligence operating within a t r i a l and error process. "The 62 formation of states must be an experimental process." More-over, the experiment must constantly be retried. We cannot assume that once the formation of a state has been achieved we have attained the be-all and end-all of p o l i t i c a l l i f e . The conditions which generate a public.vary both with time and place. With the transformation of the physical conditions under 61 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 29-30. 62 Ibid., p. 3 3 . 54 which men l i v e , the new publics which emerge with the elapse of time and the changes In environment require new p o l i t i c a l forms to be custodians of their i n t e r e s t . The p o l i t i c a l problem, then, i f i t can be c a l l e d such, i s the rediscovery of the state, and the need for rediscovery i s constant and unrelenting; otherwise the old form hardens and c r y s t a l l i z e s , f orcing the new publics to f i n d a means of expression i n an old mold with the r e s u l t that the new publics remain "inchoate, unorganized'* because they cannot use inherited p o l i t i c a l « 6 3 agencies. We moved Into the more speculative and t h e o r e t i c a l area of Dewey1s s o c i a l theory when we became concerned over the control of the Indirect consequences of the actions of a group. The theory developed so f a r i s summarized by Dewey as follows: Those i n d i r e c t l y and seriously affected f o r good or f o r e v i l form a group d i s t i n c t i v e enough to require recognition and a name. The name selected i s The Public, This public i s organized and made e f f e c t i v e by means of representatives who as guardians of custom, as l e g i s l a t o r s , as executives, judges, etc., care f o r i t s especial interests by methods intended to regulate the conjoint actions of Individuals and groups. Then and i n so f a r , association adds to i t s e l f p o l i t i c a l 63 Later on i n t h i s chapter some points of contact and agree-ment of Dewey's s o c i a l theory with the Marxian viewpoint w i l l be indicated. It i s i n t e r e s t i n g , however, that there i s d i s t i n c t disagreement between Dewey and Marx as to what accounts for revolutions. Marx, of course, holding that revolution i s the culmination of an Irreconcilable and i n t o l e r a b l e class antagonism; whereas Dewey finds the basis i n the persistence of an obsolescent p o l i t i c a l form kept i n existence by the "power and l u s t " of public o f f i c e r s which a new public must break through, sometimes by v i o l e n t means, i n order to express i t s e l f and e f f e c t changes. See p. 31 The Public and Its Problems. 61+ Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 35« 5 5 organization, and something which may be government comes into being: the public i s a p o l i t i c a l state.6I4. Implicit i n what has been discussed i n the preceding paragraphs i s the doctrine of the p l u r a l i t y of s o c i a l forms; a doctrine which admits the existence of a m u l t i p l i c i t y of publics with the passage of time. However, we have been considering Dewey's theory as though there were only a s i n g l e , generalized Public, which might be symbolized by the l e t t e r P, but i t should be noted that Dewey's theory concerns a manifold of s p e c i f i c Publics, P i , P 2, P 3 , ... P n and the s p e c i f i c conditions under which they a r i s e . The meaning of Dewey's s o c i a l pluralism becomes apparent i f we examine semantically h i s use of the word 'society'. I t i s perhaps superfluous to mention that this word does not denote any kind of transcendent e n t i t y under which groups of human beings are subsumed. The s o c i a l psychology which Dewey accepts necessarily excludes such notions. What Dewey means by society can be c l e a r l y discerned i f we r e f l e c t upon the f a c t of the v a r i e t y of associations of which we, as singular human beings, are i n e x t r i c a b l y and i n e v i t a b l y a part. Society i s not something from which we can v o l u n t a r i l y stand apart; we are society, incarnate; we are associated, whether we choose to be or not, and our i n d i v i d u a l i t y i s the product of associating. In i t s broadest sense, therefore, society i s " i n d i v i d u a l s i n t h e i r 6lj. Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 3 5 » 56 65 connections with one another." Xn Dewey's description Society...is many associations not a single organization. Society means association; coming together i n j o i n t intercourse and action f o r the better r e a l i z a t i o n of any form of experience which i s augmented and confirmed by being shared. 66 In many contexts Dewey brings out the point that society i s not any single form of association, nor i s I t a name to cover an aggregate of associations held together by some p r i n c i p l e of integration; there i s no p a r t i c u l a r "thing" to which the word has reference. Society i s the name given to a universal kind of behavioural process as the l a t t e r part of the foregoing quotation suggests. To describe t h i s process i s one of the tasks of s o c i a l psychology; to make e x p l i c i t what i s involved i n the statement that "Society i s the process of associating In such ways that experiences, ideas, emotions, values are transmitted and made common. •" How does t h i s manifold of associations arise? They emerge i n response to the common in t e r e s t s , immense i n number, which bind people together. The interests may be i n music, f o s s i l s , r e l i g i o n , business, crime, etc.; the endless v a r i e t y of pursuits and a c t i v i t i e s i n which human beings engage themselves. 4s the conditions of l i f e change so do the interests evolve to produce something new and create new associations and, at the same time, the grounds fo r an old i n t e r e s t die out and the 66 Dewey, Reconstruction i n Philosophy, p. 205 . 67 I b i d . , p. 207. 57 association with i t . Society i s i n a constant state of f l u x with the m u l t i p l i c i t y and character of associations f l u c t u a t i n g with the events which determine the conditions of s o c i a l l i f e . The function, then, which i s represented by a vast number of overlapping groups each of which i s a s o c i a l molecule owing i t s existence to the magnetic force of i n t e r e s t , i s society* Most of what has been said about the causal origins of the association, the public, the state and other s o c i a l phenomena has been concerned with the consequences that flow from the conjoint a c t i v i t y of s o c i a l groupings. Our explanations, i n other words, have revolved around material, behaviouristic phenomena, the subject-matter of s o c i a l psychology. But these phenomena even though organized into v e r i f i a b l e generalizations are not of themselves sufficient to explain the vari a t i o n s , changes, differences occurring within the s o c i a l process. Moreover, to attempt to confine ourselves to the f i e l d of s o c i a l psychology can only lead to valueless c i r c u l a r explanations. We must get outside the frame of reference within which we have been working and look f o r those conditions which determine the character of associated a c t i v i t y and the s p e c i f i c nature of the consequences which ensue from t h i s a c t i v i t y . The answer to the problem which has just posed i s to be found i n our physical environment. For a n a l y t i c a l purposes we have assumed a discontinuity between associated a c t i v i t y and environment but, i n f a c t , there i s no such disjunction; i t exists only i n the symbolism used to represent these two states of a f f a i r s . There i s i n e v i t a b l y an i n t e r a c t i o n between the 58 a c t i v i t y of a group,and the environment of the group, which shapes the s o c i a l consequences of the group a c t i v i t y . For purposes of p o l i t i c a l theory, however, we are not concerned with environment i n i t s wide b i o l o g i c a l sense but with the more immediate environment of d a i l y , intimate contact and interactions. I t i s the proximate environment i n which, when changes occur i n the forms and d i r e c t i o n of behaviour, some causal connection between a s p e c i f i c environmental factor and the a l t e r e d behaviour can be perceived. Dewey refer s to this environment as a '"material culture" which he asserts i s of basic Importance i n determining variations i n p o l i t i c a l behaviour. He states h i s views on t h i s point In the following l i n e s : The consequences of conjoint behavior d i f f e r i n kind and i n range with changes i n "material culture", e s p e c i a l l y those involved In exchange of raw materials, f i n i s h e d products and above a l l i n technology, i n t o o l s , weapons and u t e n s i l s . These i n turn are immediately affected by invention i n means of t r a n s i t , transportation and inter-communlcation.... Roughly speaking, tools and implements deter-mine occupations, and occupations determine the consequences of associated a c t i v i t y . In determining consequences, they i n s t i t u t e publics with d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s , which exact d i f f e r e n t types of p o l i t i c a l behaviour to care for them.°8 Expressed i n fewer words, what Dewey i s stating Is that economic conditions have a large influence i n determining p o l i t i c a l behaviour. 68 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 1+4*45• Compare Dewey's statement with that of the Marxist George Plekhanov: "The organization of any given society i s determined by the state of Its productive forces, As this state changes, the s o c i a l organization i s bound sooner or l a t e r to change too." p. 32, The  M a t e r i a l i s t Conception of History, New York, International Publishers, 191+.0. There are quite a number of ideas expressed i n Plekhanov's essay which would f i t into Dewey's s o c i a l theory. 59 In a l a t e r work Dewey broadens the concept of culture i n i t s bearing upon p o l i t i c a l i n s t i t u t i o n s to include factors which could be subsumed under the categories i n t e l l e c t u a l and , 69 moral. He raises the question whether any one of the factors i s dominant i n determining the patterns of s o c i a l behaviour at the various l e v e l s of grouping. The answer which he appears to accept i s that provided by anthropology: Whatever are the native constituents of human nature, the culture of a period and group i s the determining influence i n t h e i r arrangement; i t i s that which determines the patterns of behaviour that mark out the a c t i v i t i e s of any group, family, clan, people, sect, f a c t i o n , class. 7 0 Dewey has not e n t i r e l y relinquished h i s hold upon the p r i n c i p l e of economic determination as he e a r l i e r expressed i n the quotation given i n the preceding paragraphs but i t i s no longer the greatest single determinant as the following sentence indicates: "Proof i s decisive that economic factors are an i n t r i n s i c part of the culture that determines the actual turn taken by p o l i t i c a l measures and r u l e s , no matter what verbal „ 7 1 b e l i e f s are held." That Dewey derived many ideas from the same source as Karl Marx and probably much from Marx himself i s not a matter for dispute. Moreover, both Dewey and Marx once obtained i n s p i r a t i o n from the same master, Hegel. Whether this a s s o c i a t i 69 Dewey, John, Freedom and Culture, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1 9 3 9 . See Chapters 1 and 2 . 79 I b i d . , p. 18 7 1 I b i d . , p. 8 . 6 0 accounta for a similarity of outlook on many points is d i f f i c u l t to say with any conclusiveness. Bertand Russell goes much deeper i n pointing out the relationship between the ideas of Marx and Dewey. Russell states that a doctrine of Marx's, later embodied in the theory of dialectical materialism, is "allowing for a certain difference of phraseology...essentially 72 indistinguishable from instrumentalism." It i s surprising that Dewey did not comment on this comparison i n the essay he wrote replying to the essayists. The point which Interests us here, however, i s not whether Dewey and Marx used an economic interpretation of society to explain p o l i t i c a l behaviour and the events of history but whether future events and future p o l i t i c a l action are subject to human control through the use of intelligence. Unlike Marx whose views have underlying them amf' inev i t a b i l i t y principle Dewey asserts the primacy of i n t e l -ligence acting through the methodology of science as the basis for the determination of the future course of human events. It would be an interesting problem i n comparative analysis to show systematically the points of agreement and disagreement i n the social and p o l i t i c a l theories of Dewey and Marx. But such i s not the task of this essay. We can go no farther here than to make one or two generalizations which, 72 Schilpp, P.A., ed. The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. II4.3. The similarity which Russell alleges exists does not seem to serve a purpose in Russell's analysis of Dewey's instrumentalism as he does not draw any conclusions except the one about similarity. There i s , of course, the implied conclusion that since the two men were at one time Hegelians their theories are similar because the same dialectical element i s present i n them. 61 though they are without documented substantiation, have gained through the passage of time a status of acceptability. There^ are many things i n the Marxist analysis of social and economic history with which Dewey agrees and has used In the foundation of his own views; the example of the bearing of economic facts i n the formation of p o l i t i c a l institutions has already been cited. Nevertheless, although there may be substantial agreement on certain facts there Is a wide divergence between Dewey and Marx on the interpretation of and the conclusions drawn from these facts. The disagreement at the theoretical level is undoubtedly a reflection of a more fundamental disagreement i n logic and metaphysics. But since we are interested i n differences between Dewey and the Marxists i n so far as the difference sheds light on the social theory which Dewey asserts, a comparison of a basic concept in their respective p o l i t i c a l theories w i l l Illustrate the radical dissimilarity of conclusion. As the origin of the state claims the attention of both Dewey and the Marxists, we probably cannot go far wrong i n choosing this point of mutual concern to reveal the contrasting distinction In views. Dewey's conception of the state has already been given i n this essay but for the sake of this comparison we repeat i t : "The state is the organization of the public effected through o f f i c i a l s for the protection of the interests shared by its 73 members." By contrast the definition given by Lenin, one of 73 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 33* 6 2 the moat influential disciples of Marx, is submitted: "The state is the product and the manifestation of the irre c o n c i l a b i l i t y of 7ii. class antagonism." These two statements speak for themselves; no comment w i l l be added. In the last few paragraphs we moved from a consideration of Dewey's social pluralism to an exploration of the grounds for the difference in social groupings, particularly publics, which led us to a brief examination of the relation between Marxian and Deweyian views. Now the Marxists assert that the state has a class function; i t serves the interest of the dominant economic 75 group i n society. Dewey, on the other hand, contends that there is nothing i n his hypothesis of the state which determines a p r i o r i that i t must serve a partisan social interest. Further-more, there is nothing in the doctrine of plural forms (and nothing should be implied from i t ) that there are "inherent limits to state action"; that the "state is limited to settling 76 conflicts among other groups." Dewey asserts that i t should be clearly recognized that Our hypothesis is neutral as to any general, sweeping implications as to how far state activity may extend. It does not indicate any particular polity of public action.... Just as publics and states vary"with conditions of time and place, so do"the concrete functions which should be carried on by states....Their scope is something 7i+ Lenin, V.I., State and Revolution, New York, International Publishers, 1935* p. b. 75 Ibid., p. 9 . 76 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 73. 63 t o be c r i t i c a l l y a n d e x p e r i m e n t a l l y d e t e r m i n e d . 7 7 H a v i n g d e v e l o p e d a t h e o r y o f the s t a t e Dewey does n o t l e a v e t h e t h e o r y t o f i n d v e r i f i c a t i o n and s u p p o r t i n I t s own l o g i c a l c o n s i s t e n c y . F o l l o w i n g t h e method o f s c i e n t i f i c p r o c e d u r e he u n d e r t a k e s t o t e s t h i s h y p o t h e s i s b y s t u d y i n g a c t u a l s t a t e s t o d e t e r m i n e whether t h e r e i s f a c t u a l e v i d e n c e t o show t h a t s t a t e s p e r f o r m t h e f u n c t i o n o f c a r i n g f o r c o n -s e q u e n c e s . The c o n c l u s i o n w h i c h Dewey r e a c h e s i s t h a t s t a t e s do e x h i b i t t r a i t s w h i c h can be t a k e n as s i g n s o r " m a r k s " i n d i c a t i n g t h a t t h e s t a t e i s o p e r a t i n g i n some degree i n c o n f o r m i t y w i t h 78 the h y p o t h e s i s . The f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c w h i c h c a n be u s e d t o e s t a b l i s h the e x i s t e n c e o f a s t a t e i s t e m p o r a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a l -i z a t i o n . T h e r e a r e many forms o f s o c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s , h i s t o r i c a l and c o n t e m p o r a r y , w h i c h a r e d e s c r i b e d as s t a t e s , l a r g e l y b e c a u s e o f the p r e s e n c e o f t h e c o n v e n t i o n a l a p p a r a t u s o f s t a t e a c t i v i t y . A p r i m e example i s the t h e o c r a t i c s t a t e w h i c h f l o u r i s h e d w i d e l y i n the e a r l i e r p e r i o d s o f o r i e n t a l h i s t o r y b u t t o d a y e x i s t s o n l y i n i s o l a t e d and remote p l a c e s . The g o v e r n i n g body d e r i v e d i t s a u t h o r i t y n o t f r o m a p u b l i c b u t f r o m a t h e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e c o u p l e d p e r h a p s w i t h an u n c o m p r i s i n g and u n r e a s o n i n g b e l i e f i n f i l i a l p i e t y , a n c e s t o r w o r s h i p , o r i n t h e d i v i n i t y o f a l e a d e r . I t i s o b v i o u s , t h e n , t h a t w i t h i n 77 Dewey, The P u b l i c and I t s P r o b l e m s , p p . 73-71+. 78 These t r a i t s a r e d e s c r i b e d i n c o n s i d e r a b l e d e t a i l i n The  P u b l i c and I t s P r o b l e m s , C h a p t e r I I . such a s o c i a l organization there i s no concern f o r consequences; there i s rule but not control and regulation. At the other extreme from a monolithic theocracy we f i n d s o c i a l groupings of a size which do not require a formal apparatus to regulate the spread of consequences. A s o c i a l group exists but i t i s a face-to-face group i n which the consequences are spread and are appreciated almost as quickly as within a family u n i t . Such a society might be found on one of the South P a c i f i c Islands. The importance of geography, of physical environment, has already been suggested i n e a r l i e r remarks about the significance of environment i n determining the differences i n and m u l t i p l i c i t y of publics and states. The ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s of a geographic area and the range, kind and unity of the interests of the s o c i a l groupings occupying the area c e r t a i n l y have some c o r r e l a t i o n . The Interests of a people deriving t h e i r existence from the farms of a plains country w i l l d i f f e r considerably from those of a people l i v i n g i n a rugged, barren mountain country. Moreover, the presence of oceans, great r i v e r s , and high mountains tends to h a l t s o c i a l intercourse and thereby prevent the spread of consequences. Although Canada Is by vi r t u e of rapi d communication and transportation a state within the meaning of Dewey's d e f i n i t i o n , i t exhibits i n i t s physiography the d i v i s i o n of a land area into d i s t i n c t sections. For example, B r i t i s h Columbia i s bounded n a t u r a l l y by the P a c i f i c Ocean and the Rocky Mountains with the forests as the 79 Transportation and communication bring into play other c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which are of equal Importance as t r a i t s of a state. 65 p r e d o m i n a t i n g economic f e a t u r e o f the i n t e r v e n i n g a r e a . E a s t o f t h e R o c k i e s and West o f t h e L a u r e n t i a n S h i e l d t h e r e i s a g r e a t p l a i n s a r e a w i t h i t s p a r t i c u l a r economic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . T h i s a n a l y s i s c o u l d be c a r r i e d f u r t h e r b u t enough has b e e n s a i d t o i l l u s t r a t e Dewey's p o i n t t h a t "Whatever Is a b a r r i e r t o t h e s p r e a d o f t h e consequences o f a s s o c i a t e d b e h a v i o u r by t h a t v e r y 80 f a c t o p e r a t e s t o s e t up p o l i t i c a l b o u n d a r i e s . " I n summary, t h e n , when we u s e the t r a i t o f t e m p o r a l and g e o g r a p h i c a l l o c a l i z a t i o n we must do so w i t h d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , r e c o g n i z i n g t h a t t h e r e i s no h a r d and f a s t l i n e d e c i d i n g p o l i t i c a l a n d n o n - p o l i t i c a l a s s o c i a t i o n s . We must m a i n t a i n i n o u r s e a r c h the e x p e r i m e n t a l a t t i t u d e and r e a l i z e t h e r e f r o m t h a t T h e r e a r e a s s o c i a t i o n s w h i c h a r e t o o narrow and r e s t r i c t e d i n scope to g i v e r i s e t o a p u b l i c , j u s t as t h e r e are a s s o c i a t i o n s too i s o l a t e d f r o m one a n o t h e r t o f a l l w i t h i n t h e same p u b l i c . 8 l a n d , f u r t h e r m o r e , t h a t Somewhere between a s s o c i a t i o n s t h a t a r e n a r r o w , c l o s e and i n t i m a t e and t h o s e w h i c h a r e so remote as t o have o n l y i n f r e q u e n t and c a s u a l c o n t a c t l i e s , t h e n , the p r o v i n c e o f a s t a t e . 8 2 The s e c o n d t r a i t i s f o u n d i n the f a c t t h a t t h e q u a n t i t a t i v e scope o f r e s u l t s o f c o n j o i n t b e h a v i o u r g e n e r a t e s a p u b l i c w i t h a n e e d f o r o r g a n i z a t i o n . When t h e b e h a v i o u r o f i n d i v i d u a l s and groups r e s u l t i n consequences t h a t become so SO.Dewey, The P u b l i c a n d I t s P r o b l e m s , p. I4.3. 8 1 I b i d . , p. 3 9 . 8 2 I b i d . , p. J4.3. 66 widespread that no p r e d i c t i o n can be made as to who or what number w i l l l i k e l y be affected then a public intervenes. I f we take the foregoing statement together with the observation ~ that "No one can take into account a l l the consequences of the acts he performs", there w i l l of necessity a r i s e a system of "dikes and channels" to confine actions within l i m i t s presented 83 by p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . Such a system has a twofold aim: on the one hand, i t enables an i n d i v i d u a l to plan h i s conduct and actions with due regard f o r what the outcome may be i n the l i v e s of others; on the other hand, as the actions of individuals are governed by r u l e s , the public i s i n a p o s i t i o n to foresee, within c e r t a i n l i m i t s , consequences. Where a l e g a l system exists within a state and i t i s possible to interpret the operation of the statutes and regulations i n terms of the control of con-sequences, then we have further evidence to confirm Dewey's theory of the state. Dewey makes the point clear that r e g u l a t i o n i n the form of law arises i n response to the need to control private actions which have public consequences. Laws, moreover, are not to be viewed as commands, because to accept the command theory l o g i c a l l y leads to adoption of a theory of the state i n terms of an antecedent causation. Obedience to law i s obtained not through deference to the authority of superior force but through recognition of the need fo r c o n t r o l l i n g consequences. Rules of law are i n f a c t the i n s t i t u t i o n of conditions under 83 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 5 2 . 6 7 which persons make their arrangements with one another. They are the structures which canalize action... The law, in other words, is not an active force, It is a guide to behaviour. The third t r a i t of a public organized as a state, Dewey states, i s that " i t is concerned with modes of behaviour which 85 are old and hence well established, engrained." It is a familiar thought that society usually regards the production of new ideas and inventions as a private matter; an activity to be carried on by and through individuals or special groups organized for such a purpose. For various reasons— the persistence and hold of old habits, fear, inertia, lack of organization—the state has not taken unto i t s e l f the respon-s i b i l i t y for the development and spreading of new ideas. This work is s t i l l considered to be the peculiar preserve of persons and groups whose private ends generate individual i n i t i a t i v e . It should not be assumed, however, that this function is beyond the capacity of the state; in the long term perspective i t Is not, but at the present level of organization, cultural attain-ment and collective intellectual development the community does not welcome as a blessing new ideas; they are unsettling to established, accepted modes of behaviour and are demanding in insistence upon re-adjustment and the adoption of new patterns of response. Perhaps the exceptions to this generalization are 81i Dewey, The Public and It3 Problems, p. 85 Ibid., p. 58. 68 t e c h n i c a l and technological ideas. They are not regarded with the same hesitancy and suspicion because usually they do not d i r e c t l y touch upon established s o c i a l forms and b e l i e f s , although i n d i r e c t l y technical ideas, as they a l t e r the means of production and open up new avenues i n the u t i l i z a t i o n of the materials of our environment, modify, sometimes d r a s t i c a l l y and without prevision, the established s o c i a l forms and modes of behaviour* When an idea, an instrumentality, a mode of behaviour becomes part of the f a b r i c of custom and habit such that i t s presence i s esse n t i a l to and a prerequisite of the carrying on of private endeavour " i t tends to come within the scope of the state." That the state should assume t h i s charge, i f we consider fo r a moment Dewey's hypothesis, i s a natural course of events; f o r the absence of an established mode of behaviour would have public consequences. For example, highways and communication systems are a public concern. The loss of freedom to use them at w i l l would have severe and widespread consequences; for "means of t r a n s i t and communication a f f e c t not only those who u t i l i z e them but a l l who are dependent i n any way upon what Is 86 transported, whether as producers or consumers*" It would not be necessary to do any intensive searching to f i n d other examples of instrumentalities which have come under public control and regulation. Dewey's proposition, then, that the public i s concerned with established modes of behaviour i s well supported by evidence* 86 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 60 . 69 The fourth and f i n a l t r a i t which Dewey finds character-izes the state i s the concern of the public over those indivi d u a l s i n society who have not the capacity to fend f o r themselves on an equal basis with other members of the group and with those conditions which i f not regulated have irreparable consequences. P r a c t i c a l l y any public action which could be c l a s s i f i e d as coming under the heading of health and welfare would be i l l u s t r a t i v e of t h i s t r a i t . But s p e c i f i c examples involving deficiency of capacity or i n q u a l i t y of status are the insane, the helpless and, i n a d i f f e r e n t sense, children. Recognizing t h e i r dependency the public enacts measures which protects and secures t h e i r welfare. In the case of children the state has introduced l e g i s l a t i o n to regulate the hours of labour of children; to ensure that steps are taken towards provision f o r their education because neglect i n childhood can only be made up l a t e r on with great d i f f i c u l t y , i f at a l l . This review of the t r a i t s which characterize the state cannot be concluded without pointing out that Dewey does not hold that these t r a i t s are c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which a state ought to have nor are they to be considered a pr e d i c t i o n of the forms which state action might take i n the future. These t r a i t s are simply "the marks by which p u b l i c action as d i s t i n c t from 87 private i s characterized." Having considered the evidence which Dewey adduces i n support of h i s theory of the state we have now attained the stage 87 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 6I1. 70 i n t h i s exposition where i t i s germane to bring i n for examination i n terms of the s o c i a l theory developed the concepts of representative government and democracy. The meaning of these two concepts flows naturally, almost as i f by preordination, from the theory. In f a c t , one could almost point to the theory i t s e l f and state "that i s the meaning of democracy" but, i n Dewey's philosophy, not quite a l l the meaning. There i s some-thing yet to be added,, Democracy i s more than j u s t v t h e best means which men have yet devised to regulate l i v i n g together. It i s a way of l i f e b u i l t upon the b e l i e f that no man or l i m i t e d set of men i s 88 wise enough or good enough to rule others without their consent. Too much stress cannot be l a i d upon the statement that "democracy i s not merely a p o l i t i c a l philosophy"; for Dewey democracy i s f a r more than just an organized set of p o l i t i c a l ideas. I t i s unfortunate that the eloquence i s lacking here to convey, at lea s t i n some measure, the overwhelming import of the idea of democracy, i n the determination not only of Dewey1s s o c i a l views but of h i s whole philosophy. Perhaps i t i s enough to say that Dewey's mission i n l i f e was mankind, and that he found i n the idea of the democratic p o l i t i c a l state the most e f f i c a c i o u s instrument f o r the r e a l i z a t i o n of mankind's hopes and aspirations. I t has already been remarked i n the beginning of t h i s essay that one of the dominant motivations i n Dewey's philosophy 88 Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 58. 71 was his desire to reorient inquiry, s c i e n t i f i c and philosophic, i n the d i r e c t i o n of mankind. There was no doubt i n Dewey's mind that i f the instrumentalles of inquiry were turned towards the problems of men great strides would be taken i n the res o l u t i o n of the c o n f l i c t s of human l i f e . As one would expect, this conviction about men's a b i l i t i e s to give i n t e l l i g e n t d i r e c t i o n to t h e i r l i v e s l i e s at the bottom of his b e l i e f i n democracy. The foundation of democracy i s f a i t h i n the capacities of human nature; f a i t h i n human i n t e l l i g e n c e and i n the power of pooled and cooperative experience. It i s not b e l i e f that these things are complete but that, i f given a show, they w i l l grow and be able to generate progressively the knowledge and wisdom needed to guide c o l l e c t i v e action.89 It would be an enormous task to colle ct and catalogue the multitude of ideas about democracy which Dewey has uttered i n a the course of his l i f e ; but i f such/jobn were undertaken and a summation made the r e s u l t would probably resemble the above quoted statement. Dewey had no fear of what many re f e r to as the "masses". They are the " s t u f f " out of which democracy must emerge and they are the ultimate referent i n determining whether the needs which p o l i t i c a l democracy undertakes to care f o r are being met. The individuals of the submerged mass may not be very wise. But there i s one thing they are wiser about than anybody 89 Dewey, Problems of Men, p. 5 9 . 7 2 else can be, and that is where the shoe pinches, the troubles they suffer from.90 To return to the point which initiated this discussion of democracy the question must be answered, then, as to how the concepts of representative and democratic government emerge from Dewey's theory. In order to answer this question we must refer to the distinction between private and public. When an individual acts consequences follow which are usually limited to a sphere affecting none accept those directly concerned with the action, but in some cases the action may go beyond the group, and then i t becomes of public significance. A- public then emerges and appoints offices to regulate these consequences. The point to be made here in respect to these officers is that they represent a public; the public acts through them, and they are granted special powers to guard the public interest. We never find A Public acting but only singular persons who act in a public capacity. Now every individual when he votes to r a t i f y legislation or appoint an o f f i c i a l Is acting in a capacity of representative of the public interest. Undoubtedly, the common man expresses his opinion i n the public interest much less frequently than, say, a member of Parliament or a police officer, but this uttered opinion, nonetheless, makes him a representative of the public. In these singular individuals, whether voter or o f f i c i a l , we find the confluence of the private and public streams of interest. "In other words, every officer of the 90 Loc. c i t . 73 public, whether he represents i t as a voter or as a stated 91 o f f i c i a l , has a dual capacity." It is in the resolution of the conflicts arising out of the duality of purpose that representative government finds i t s meaning. No individual can submerge his private capacity. ...The best which most men attain to is the domination of the public weal of their other desires. What Is meant by "representative" 1 government is that the public i s definitely organized with the intent to secure this dominance. The dual capacity of every officer of the public leads to conflict i n individuals between their genuinely p o l i t i c a l aims and acts and those which they possess in their non*»political roles. When the public adopts special measures to see to i t that the conflict is minimized and that the representative function overrides th£ private one, p o l i t i c a l institutions are termed representative.92 Representation, however, i n modern p o l i t i c a l l i f e is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the existence of p o l i t i c a l democracy. In the space of a few paragraphs the necessary conditions w i l l be indicated but more w i l l be omitted in pointing out the characteristics of p o l i t i c a l democracy than w i l l be told. The story lying behind the democratic processes as we see and experience them today is a dramatic account in epic proportions. Unquestionably, one cannot appreciate the f u l l significance of the achievements i n the management of human affairs without being acquainted with the genesis of these accomplishments. Dewey has stated that "To discuss democratic 91 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 76. 92 Ibid., pp. 76-77. government at large apart from i t s h i s t o r i c background i s to miss i t s point and to throw away a l l means f o r an i n t e l l i g e n t 93 c r i t i c i s m of i t . " With t h i s observation there can be no quarrel. But the task that has been set i s not to examine the hi s t o r y of p o l i t i c a l democracy nor the operation of democratic governments as they appear i n the contemporary scene; the problem Is to construct an abstraction--the unfleshed skeleton of the s o c i a l process—Dewey 1s conception of the inner mechanism of the democratic state, and with this abstraction before us perhaps we can see what s o c i a l inquiry, as Dewey v i s u a l i z e s i t , means i n e f f e c t i n g controlled and directed s o c i a l changes. Although i t i s not the intention to give any account i n t h i s essay of the h i s t o r i c a l origins of democracy, a c i t a t i o n of two passages from Dewey's writings may serve to suggest the character of the evolutionary struggle and the d i r e c t i o n of the s h i f t i n p o l i t i c a l control which occurred i n t h i s h i s t o r y . There was a great number of p o l i t i c a l , economic, moral and r e l i g i o u s Influences operating during the period when p o l i t i c a l democracy was being shaped and ' " p o l i t i c a l democracy has emerged as a kind of net consequence ?of a vast multitude of responsive adjustments to a vast number of sit u a t i o n s , no two of which ,9k were a l i k e , but which tended to converge to a common outcome." 93 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 8 3 . Dewey gives an account of the origins of democracy i n several places. A succinct survey i s given i n Chapter I I I of The Public and Its problems, pp« 83^103. In his book Liberalism and S o c i a l Action, Dewey traces back the origins of the L i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n ; i n doing so he reveals many of the important influences which contributed to growth and evolution of democracy. 9I4. Ibid., p. 81+. 75 I t need not be stated that the convergence to a common outcome was not the r e s u l t of acts of conscious d i r e c t i o n on the part of _ some prescient group; nor the product of an idea immanent i n the process I t s e l f . To what democracy owes i t s origins we w i l l not presume even to suggest but i t seems clear that the develop-ment was without a u n i f i e d plan or a single i n s p i r a t i o n . Considering the growth and emergence of democracy i n the more s p e c i f i c context of the control of human a f f a i r s Dewey says that "the development of p o l i t i c a l democracy came about through s u b s t i t u t i o n of the method of mutual consultation and voluntary agreement for the method of subordination of the many to the 95 few enforced from above.'* The public eventually attained through a long struggle recognition of i t s e l f and also the I n s t i t u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l machinery which, i n theory at l e a s t , was set up to care for i t s i n t e r e s t s . However, the public capacity of those governing (th i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y true of the early periods of p o l i t i c a l democracy) was frequently bent i n the d i r e c t i o n of serving private Interests; was used, as Dewey says, " f o r the deliberate 96 advancement of dynastic i n t e r e s t s . " In short, there was i n existence the machinery of p o l i t i c a l democracy but i t s mechanism was neither sharp enough nor broad enough to constrain the ru l e r s to recognize t h e i r p u b lic capacity and to exercise the power delegated to them i n the public i n t e r e s t . The question to which t h i s s i t u a t i o n gives r i s e (and i t i s a recurring one; 95 Dewey, The Problems, of Men, p. 58 . 96 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 77. 76 never f i n a l l y answerable) i s : "Since o f f i c e r s of the public have a dual raake-up and capacity, what conditions and what technique are necessary i n order that insight, l o y a l t y and energy may be e n l i s t e d on the side of the public and p o l i t i c a l 97 r o l e ? " ' When we add to the theory of representative government the method of inquiry into the means of selecting and defining the r i g h t s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of public o f f i c i a l s such that i n the discharge of t h e i r o f f i c e maximum recognition i s given to the public i n t e r e s t we designate a s i g n i f i c a n t meaning amongst the many meanings given to democracy. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t f o r i t concerns the method of e f f e c t i v e s o c i a l control of consequences by the pu b l i c . We are concerned with democracy, then, i n i t s meaning as a p o l i t i c a l form, as . . . i t denotes a mode of government, a sp e c i f i e d practice i n selecting o f f i c i a l s and regulating t h e i r conduct as o f f i c i a l s . This i s not the most i n s p i r i n g of the di f f e r e n t meanings of democracy; i t i s comparatively s p e c i a l i n character. But i t contains about a l l that i s relevant to p o l i t i c a l democracy. 98 That Dewey should choose an uninspiring meaning (but not unimportant one) i s i t s e l f s i g n i f i c a n t . In many places and i n many ways Dewey utters exhortations to have f a i t h i n the democratic i d e a l but at the same time he points out that ideals cannot stand by themselves; there must be means f o r t h e i r a t t a i n -ment. 97 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 82 . 98 Loc. c i t . 77 The exposition of the theory i s now concluded. The task of the succeeding chapter w i l l be to outline some of the problems facing p o l i t i c a l democracy today but more p a r t i c u l a r l y to discuss the means and methods, as they are exemplified i n a program of s o c i a l inquiry, f o r the e f f e c t i v e and s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s o l u t i o n of the s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l problems facing mankind, now and i n the future. CHAPTER I X I SOCIAL CHANGE The p r e c e d i n g c h a p t e r was l a r g e l y d e v o t e d t o a n e x p o s i t i o n o f Dewey's s o c i a l t h e o r y and i t c u l m i n a t e d i n a d i s c u s s i o n a n d d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e meaning o f p o l i t i c a l d e m o c r a c y . I n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e t h e o r y t h e emphasis c e n t e r e d upon r e v e a l i n g Dewey's f u n d a m e n t a l i d e a t h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l f o rms u n d e r w h i c h s o c i e t i e s o r g a n i z e t h e m s e l v e s and r e g u l a t e t h e a c t i v i t i e s o f t h e i r members a r e d e v i c e s , a l b e i t i n many i n s t a n c e s v e r y complex d e v i c e s , i n v e n t e d b y men t o s e r v e human p u r p o s e s and a r e h o t t r a n s c e n d e n t a l i n s t r u m e n t s s t a n d i n g a p a r t f r o m t h e s o c i e t i e s w h i c h t h e y s e r v e . I t ; was a l s o shown t h a t Dewey does n o t p r e s e n t h i s t h e o r y a s dogma t o be a c c e p t e d on f a i t h i n a d e v i n e a u t h o r i t y , b u t he a s s e r t s h i s t h e o r y as one open t o e m p i r i c a l v a l i d a t i o n . B u t , above a l l , what emerged f i n a l l y f r o m t h e e x a m i n a t i o n o f Dewey's s o c i a l t h e o r y was h i s o v e r r i d i n g c o n v i c t i o n t h a t o f t h e many fo r m s o f p o l i t i c a l o r g a n i z a t i o n w h i c h h a v e emerged i n t h e c o u r s e o f human h i s t o r y , p o l i t i c a l d e m o c r a c y p r o v i d e s t h e g r e a t e s t s c o p e f o r t h e c o n t i n u o u s d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p e r f e c t i n g o f t h e s o c i a l mechanisms w h i c h c a n g i v e m e a n i n g f u l r e a l i z a t i o n t o t h e t r i u m v i r a t e o f v a l u e s : l i b e r t y , e q u a l i t y , f r a t e r n i t y . A g a i n s t t h e b a c k g r o u n d o f Dewey's s o c i a l t h e o r y we now t u r n our a t t e n t i o n t o t h a t a r e a i n h i s s o c i a l t h i n k i n g w h i c h p r o b a b l y i n i t s b r o a d e s t a s p e c t was t h e m a i n c e n t r e o f i n t e r e s t 78 79 and chief motivating force i n Dewey's manifold endeavours as philosopher, educator, p o l i t i c a l writer, etc., namely, s o c i a l change. Someone has characterized Dewey as the Philosopher of Change; i f we consider only his outlook i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l philosophy tfta$ designation, i n the opinion of the writer, i s p a r t i c u l a r l y opposite. Dewey saw society as a vast complex organism continuously adapting i t s e l f to new environments and circumstances, and the s o c i a l philosopher's task that of providing the i n t e l l e c t u a l framework within which the techniques of adaptation and control could be developed. Although Dewey's chief concern was to set out a method-ology of s o c i a l change (at least the the o r e t i c a l framework of such a methodology) he f i r s t found i t necessary to formulate a s o c i a l theory (and i t s c o r r e l a t i v e s o c i a l psychology) which recognized as fundamental data the p l a s t i c i t y of human nature and the i n f i n i t e v a r i a b i l i t y of the forms of human association. In the context of p o l i t i c a l philosophies Dewey invented a theory which i s c l e a r l y democratic i n i t s orientation. With respect to the s o c i a l psychology underlying the theory, A l l p o r t has commented that Dewey has rejected other s o c i a l psychologies 99 simply because they seemed undemocratic. As Dewey was by i n c l i n a t i o n a reformer, he was undoubtedly at times impatient with theorizing i n the sense of building precise t h e o r e t i c a l structures or models to represent the i n t e r r e l a t i o n s of observed phenomena. There i s too much of the spectator r o l e i n that kind 99 Schilpp, P.A., ed., The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 2 8 3 . 80 of activity. However, there is no question that Dewey f u l l y accepted the logical necessity of providing an adequate theory of human social behaviour as a foundation upon which to super-impose a theory of change out of which could grow the techniques for modifying and controlling social relations and objectives. Whether Dewey's social theory is able completely to encompass the entire realm of social and p o l i t i c a l phenomena is s t i l l an open question beyond the task of this essay to judge. Certainly, however, his theory is consistent with his general philosophical outlook and i t provides a base for launching an inquiry into social method. It is the task of this chapter to try to show how Dewey has extrude.d from his social theory a basis for social change, a method for the attainment of social and p o l i t i c a l ends. However, before we undertake to outline Dewey's contribution to a philosophy of social change, i t would serve to illuminate the road we are to travel (in places obscure and winding) and to examine brie f l y some of the influences which motivated Dewey and which also operated i n fashioning his views. Foremost amongst these influences is Dewey's idealism: a profound belief i n the pre-eminent value of human dignity. Ultimate values have no role in Dewey's philosophical world except, perhaps, one; when Dewey repudiated Hegel i t surely can be said that he substituted the ultimate worth of man for the Hegelian Absolute. At the same time, however, Dewey was a thoroughly practical man; he was keenly aware that human aspirations have a precarious v i a b i l i t y short of the means of embodying them i n the l i v e s of men. "Ideals and standards formed without regard to the means by which they are to be achieved and incarnated i n f l e s h are bound to be t h i n and 100 wavering." But Dewey was not an i d o l a t o r ; i f he ever worshipped or contemplated his ideals i t was only to gain i n s p i r a t i o n f o r continuing his e f f o r t s of providing instrumen-t a l i t i e s f o r the f u l f i l l m e n t of man's hopes. Dewey held a f a i t h i n man's worth, but i t was a f a i t h buttressed by a secure b e l i e f i n the capacity of man's in t e l l i g e n c e to meet a l l the challenges of existence provided that i n t e l l i g e n c e i s given the proper vehicle through which to operate. The achievements i n the physical sciences l e f t no doubt i n Dewey's mind that the proper vehicle was the method of experimental science. I t became, therefore, Dewey's mission as a s o c i a l philosopher to introduce the experimental methodology into the i n v e s t i g a t i o n and d i r e c t i o n of s o c i a l matters i n place of the discussion of s o c i a l a f f a i r s i n terms of conceptualist g e n e r a l i t i e s and hypostatizations. Perhaps we are a n t i c i p a t i n g to some extent the conclusion of Dewey's programme f o r s o c i a l action, but i n Dewey's writings the ubiquitousness of the Idea of i n t e l l i g e n c e acting through the experimental method leaves l i t t l e doubt as to what that conclusion w i l l be. However, even though the p r i n c i p l e i s apparent, i t s t i l l must be shown how Dewey sees experimental i n t e l l i g e n c e operating i n the s o c i a l f i e l d , and i t s r e l a t i o n to the t r a d i t i o n a l methods of at t a i n i n g 100 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. lip.. 82 s o c i a l goals. In the preceding paragraph we have discussed the most c l e a r l y defined influence streaming through Dewey's s o c i a l philosophy, and i n the f u l l perspective of a l l Dewey's work possibly the most important one. There i s , however, a second major stream of i n f l u e n c e — l i b e r a l i s m — f e d by a number of tri b u t a r y streams from which Dewey drew the ideals of p o l i t i c a l freedom and the forms and language of the democratic p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n . In Dewey's philosophy the two streams converge to provide r e c i p r o c a l support for each others contributions to the formation of that philosophy, both streams being committed to the end of providing maximum opportunity f o r i n d i v i d u a l growth and development. On the one hand, Dewey i d e n t i f i e d the experimental method with the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n to gain acceptance f o r this r a d i c a l new way of thinking i n s o c i a l matters; on the other hand, i n the p o l i t i c a l arena Dewey preached a "renascent l i b e r a l i s m " , a l i b e r a l i s m r e v i t a l i z e d by the substitution of i n t e l l i g e n c e and change for the i n t e l l e c t u a l abstractions of p o l i t i c a l and economic man. To inspect clo s e l y the elements of the philosophy of l i b e r a l i s m which became part of or served to shape Dewey's s o c i a l theory, p a r t i c u l a r l y that part of h i s theory r e l a t i n g to s o c i a l change, would be a d i f f i c u l t task, since i n no single work of Dewey's are these elements systematically i d e n t i f i e d . Dewey was a p r o l i f i c writer of a r t i c l e s i n s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l 83 101 philosophy, both polemical and expository. Many of h i s pos i t i v e ideas for a theory of s o c i a l change have emerged from c r i t i c a l analyses of s p e c i f i c , contemporary s o c i a l problems. The more general influence of the t r a d i t i o n of l i b e r a l i s m ( i n which Dewey was steeped) i n Dewey's thinking w i l l be considered further i n the l a t t e r part of this chapter. As one would na t u r a l l y expect, Dewey's ideas f o r a theory of s o c i a l change d i d not-arise out of a s o c i a l vacuum. The impetus f o r their emergence was a f e l t need, a demand f o r the means of resolving urgent contemporary s o c i a l issues. We cannot ignore, therefore, the determining influence i n the formation of the conclusions of Dewey's s o c i a l thinking of the r o l e which he played as observer and c r i t i c of and, on many occasions, spokesman f o r American c i v i l i z a t i o n and culture. Even though we may not want to go as f a r as to agree with Bertrand Russell's assertion that the distinctiveness of Dewey's outlook i s due to i t s "harmony with the age of in d u s t r i a l i s m and c o l l e c t i v e enterprise", i t must be admitted nevertheless that many of the problems which concerned Dewey (and the solutions 102 which he offered to them) are peculiar to his era. As a matter of f a c t , considering that Dewey was a professional philosopher whose concern should allegedly have been with matters of universal s i g n i f i c a n c e , he dealt with a su r p r i s i n g l y large 101 See John Dewey's two volumes of Essays Characters and Events, Edited by Joseph Ratner, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 1929. 102 Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey, p. 137. number of issues having only parochial and t r a n s i t o r y importance: state education, American p o l i t i c a l administration, technology and industry, etc. Because of Dewey's active interest and p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n "backyard' a f f a i r s we must assume that his t h e o r e t i c a l investigations were to some extent circumscribed by the character of the immediate and pressing issues which confronted and challenged him. Furthermore, i t i s a thesis of t h i s essay, f o r which s p e c i f i c evidence i s not c i t e d , that Dewey's s o c i a l theory, but p a r t i c u l a r l y some aspects of the theory shortly to be discussed, have emerged from and r e f l e c t the growth of.the American democratic society. This i s not meant to imply that Dewey's s o c i a l theory, and the problems of p a r t i c u l a r concern to him, are not without importance or significance when examined i n the f u l l perspective of s o c i a l philosophy, or that they do not have any permanent residual value In the h i s t o r y of s o c i a l thinking. The implication that i s intended i s that Dewey's s o c i a l philosophy i s clothed with the forms and experience of i t s American o r i g i n s . One of the essential tenets of Dewey's theory i s the view that the unresolved issues challenging modern s o c i a l theory have arisen as a consequence of the impact of science on society. (The manifestations of t h i s impact are most obvious i n America, i n terms of both i n t e n s i t y and extent). In a r e l a t i v e l y short span of time, say the period from the beginning of the i n d u s t r i a l revolution to the present day, the machine technology created by the appli c a t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c methods and discoveries has transformed the physical conditions of l i f e and, concomitantly, 85 has altered the habits and interests of men. But, Dewey observes, the effects of science and technology were la r g e l y external i n character; they exerted no deep-going influence as a "transforming influence of men's thoughts and purposes". The r e s u l t i s a contradiction '"between outer and inner operation" i n 1 0 3 the l i v e s of men. This lack of integration i n man's behavioural and psychic l i f e was a matter of deep concern f o r Dewey, f o r i n i t he saw a serious obstacle to finding means f o r the resolution of the s o c i a l problems generated by the invasion of science but p a r t i c u l a r l y means which would be i n harmony with the new age of science. Not only i s there disunity In the inner and outer aspects of man's l i f e there are also, Dewey states, two sets of unconnected ideals acting on men today. The f i r s t are those t r a d i t i o n a l ideals which have persisted and are retained from our c u l t u r a l past, with t h e i r glamour and prestige perpetuated and kept a l i v e i n l i t e r a t u r e and r e l i g i o n and by i n s t i t u t i o n s which have survived from an age gone by. And r i v a l l i n g the f i r s t i s a second, more recent, set: the ideals of a machine age—the desires, purposes and aims created by technology. In the struggle for survival the newer ideals have the advantage i n possessing instrumentalities to serve them, but the ideals of the past " s t i l l engage thought and command l o y a l t y . W h i l e 103 Dewey, John, Philosophy and C i v i l i z a t i o n , New York, Minton, Balch & Company, 1931* P. 318. 10!L Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. li+2. 86 the inconsonance between man's conduct and his desires stood as an obstacle to the discovery of means, the divisiveness of the inner c o n f l i c t stood as an obstacle to the attainment of consensus as to goals. Moving from the microcosm of i n d i v i d u a l man to the macrocosm of modern society we observe the s o c i a l manifestations of the acts of a personality divided and i n c o n f l i c t within i t s e l f . And i t follows as a c o r o l l a r y of s o c i a l behaviourism that the structure of the s o c i a l organism must take on the schizoid c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the human elements comprising i t . Hence, Dewey sees r e f l e c t e d i n the s o c i a l matrix the same lack of integration with respect to both ends and means. But the s p e c i f i c s o c i a l facts which r a i s e so i n s i s t e n t l y i n Dewey's thinking the question of method are (1) the fragmentation of society into a m u l t i p l i c i t y of changing publics with d i f f e r i n g needs and demands, and (2) the apparent absence of a public c o n t r o l l i n g and d i r e c t i n g the apparatus of government. Analogously to the lack of accord between outer and inner operation i n the l i v e s of i n d i v i d u a l men, the state seems to be functioning autonomously or at l e a s t only i n the interests of s p e c i a l groups, but not as the instrument of a public encompassing the interests of a l l sectors of society. Before we turn our attention to a closer consideration of the problems of a t t a i n i n g s o c i a l unity, i t might be h e l p f u l to r e c a l l to mind.the s o c i a l theory which forms the d o c t r i n a l context within which Dewey sees the problems. The empirical base upon which the theory rests i s the observable f a c t of 87 human b e i n g s l i v i n g and a c t i n g i n a s s o c i a t i o n . T h e s e a g g r e g a t i o n s o f human b e i n g s a c h i e v e t h e s t a t u s o f s o c i e t i e s , i t w i l l be r e c a l l e d , when i n d i v i d u a l s and g r o u p s c o n s c i o u s l y s e e k t o s h a r e t h e i r e x p e r i e n c e s , i d e a s and v a l u e s . F i n a l l y , s o c i e t i e s t a k e on p o l i t i c a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s when i t becomes n e c e s s a r y t o c o n t r o l t h e i n d i r e c t c o n s e q u e n c e s o f i n d i v i d u a l and g r o u p i n t e r p l a y . A t t h i s s t a g e a new s o c i a l e n t i t y emerges, A P u b l i c , w i t h a d i s t i n c t l y p o l i t i c a l r o l e i n s o c i a l a f f a i r s . The c o n c e p t o f A P u b l i c i s a u n i q u e l y Deweyian n o t i o n a n d t h e k e y t o u n d e r s t a n d i n g h i s v i e w s about t h e n a t u r e a n d f u n c t i o n s o f t h e s t a t e . A v e r y l u c i d e x p l i c a t i o n o f t h e c o n c e p t i s g i v e n i n a s i n g l e p a r a g r a p h b y G o r d o n W. A l l p o r t i n h i s e s s a y Dewey's I n d i v i d u a l and S o c i a l P s y c h o l o g y . A p u b l i c , i n s t e a d o f b e i n g a m y s t i c a l e n t i t y o r t h e e x p r e s s i o n o f s o c i a l i n s t i n c t , i s n o t h i n g b u t t h e b y -p r o d u c t o f s o c i a l a c t i v i t y b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s . So l o n g as A and B have d i r e c t p r i v a t e t r a n s a c t i o n s no p u b l i c i s i n v o l v e d . But l e t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s o f t h e i r t r a n s a c t i o n s e x t e n d b e y o n d t h e i r own l i v e s , a f f e c t i n g t h e l i v e s and w e l f a r e o f o t h e r s , and a p u b l i c , b a s e d on common i n t e r e s t , s p r i n g s i n t o b e i n g . I n i t s e l f s u c h a p u b l i c i s u n o r g a n i z e d and f o r m l e s s , c o m p r i s e d m e r e l y o f common segments o f c e r t a i n i n d i v i d u a l s ' i n t e r e s t s . One p u b l i c i s c r e a t e d b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f m o t o r c a r s , a n o t h e r b y t h e e x i s t e n c e o f s c h o o l s , a n o t h e r b y t h e p r a c t i c e o f t a x a t i o n . As soo n as o f f i c i a l s a r e e l e c t e d , o r i n some o t h e r way r e c o g n i z e d , t h e f o r m l e s s p u b l i c becomes o r g a n i z e d . The o f f i c i a l s t h e m s e l v e s , o f c o u r s e , a r e s i n g l e b e i n g s , b u t t h e y e x e r c i s e s p e c i a l powers d e s i g n e d t o p r o t e c t t h e common i n t e r e s t s o f t h e members. A com-p r e h e n s i v e p u b l i c a r t i c u l a t e d and o p e r a t i n g t h r o u g h o f f i c e r s who a r e e x p e c t e d t o 88 subordinate t h e i r private interests f o r the good of a l l , i s a State.105 In terms of the theory just set out how does Dewey explain h i s assertion that today there does not ex i s t a public representing the d i v e r s i f i e d interests of the many s o c i a l groups which comprise present day society? The explanation i n part Is to be found by moving back i n time and applying the theory to a society antedating the advent of modern technology. In the early period of American democracy the physical conditions of community l i f e and the aims and purposes of the community did not stand apart from each other; the inner and outer aspects of l i f e were r e l a t i v e l y well integrated. Furthermore, the community was a face-to-face community, which made, the spread of consequences d i r e c t and ra p i d . Under these circumstances the problem did not ar i s e as to the existence or the whereabouts of the p u b l i c ; i t came forward well-defined, organizing i t s e l f , as one would expect, using forms and methods of p o l i t i c a l action consistent with character of the face-to-face community. I t i s upon this scene of community l i f e that science intrudes, with the revolutionary force of technology following behind. Some of the e f f e c t s of t h i s i n t r u s i o n have already been suggested, but the p a r t i c u l a r r e s u l t which accounts to some extent f o r the "e c l i p s e of the public" was the disappearance of the homogeneity and intimacy which t y p i f i e d the community a c t i v i t y . The disi n t e g r a t i n g e f f e c t of science did not extend, however, to the 105 Schilpp, The Philosophy of John Dewey, pp. 285-6. Section VII, S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Psychology, of A l l p o r t ' s Essay i s a clear and succinct statement from a psychological viewpoint of the p r i n c i p a l ideas i n Dewey's s o c i a l theory. 89 Institutions, p o l i t i c a l forms and methods, purposes and ideals; they survived to " f i x the channels" and set the goals for the new non-political influences of industrialism. But out of this development a contradiction arose. The industrial revolution created a new society and a unified state, but the public disappeared. How is i t that society has apparently attained integration and yet there seems to be no public regulating the affairs of society and determining the conduct of public o f f i c i a l s ? In answer to the former part of this question Dewey states that Our modern state-unity is due to the consequences of technology employed so as to f a c i l i t a t e the rapid and easy . circulation of opinions and information, and so as to generate constant and intricate interaction far beyond the limits of face-to-face communities....The elimination of distance, at the base of which are physical agencies, has called into being the new form of p o l i t i c a l association.106 In other word3, state unity i s due to factors extraneous to the theory that the public through appointed o f f i c i a l s organizes i t s e l f into a p o l i t i c a l state. If impersonal, mechanical forces have operated to produce a unified state, the question of where the public i s , whose function these forces have usurped, becomes even more pressing. It cannot be that there are no consequences to c a l l a public into existence. To make such an assumption leads only to absurdity In explaining their non-existence. The fact stands 106 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 111+-5. 90 indisputably that there are consequences, But the machine age has so enormously expanded, mu l t i p l i e d , i n t e n s i f i e d and complicated the scope of the i n d i r e c t consequences, have formed such immense and consolidated unions i n action, on an impersonal rather than a community basis, that the resultant public cannot i d e n t i f y and distinguish i t s e l f . And this discovery is-obviously an antecedent condition of any e f f e c t i v e organization on i t s part. Such i s our thesis regarding the eclipse which the public idea and int e r e s t have undergone. There are too many publics and too much of public concern f o r our e x i s t i n g resources to cope with.107 The problem, then, i s not one of absence of consequences of public concern, but of inadequacy of methods and apparatus f o r the perception of the m u l t i p l i c i t y and scope of the consequences i n such a way that a widespread and Integrated public i s brought into being. But what about the apparatus of government? It exists and operates. Whom do the o f f i c i a l s of government represent? There are some economic determinists who charge that government has no representative function to act on behalf of a public, 108 but Is ruled by and i s an instrument of Ibig business'; On the other hand, there are those i n the business world who believe that 'big business' has brought about the economic conditions that assure our standard of l i v i n g and our prosperity and they claim, therefore, that p u b l i c p o l i c y should be determined by the agencies creating the material conditions of s o c i a l and 107 Dewey, The Public.and I t s Problems, p. 126. 108 The Marxists hold t h i s view. 91 109 p o l i t i c a l l i f e , namely, business i n s t i t u t i o n s . Dewey cites these two extreme views as examples of the confused state of s o c i a l thinking that stands as an obstacle to the public's search f o r the means to i d e n t i f y i t s e l f . Whether or not the charge that b i g business controls, or perhaps f i l l s the weaker p o s i t i o n of being the dominant influence upon, the operation of government i s capable of being supported by facts i s an important issue, but the allegations themselves are s i g n i f i c a n t ; they are symptomatic of the confusion and uncertainty which Dewey contends r e s u l t s from the i n d e f i n i t e state of the public's i d e n t i t y . In r a i s i n g the issue about whether the government i s functioning i n i t s capacity as an Instrument of the public Dewey touches upon the central theme of this essay: the basis of s o e i a l change. Habitually society has looked upon the apparatus of government—the l e g i s l a t u r e , the j u d i c i a r y , the administrative o f f i c i a l s — a s the chief means by which changes i n the basis of p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l l i f e are to be effected. I t i s l o g i c a l , therefore, that Dewey should f i r s t consider the r o l e of government and look f o r facts to support the view that It i s the instrument of s o c i a l change. He finds, however, that though we can observe the l e g i s l a t i v e and j u d i c i a l processes i n 109 See The Managerial Revolution by James Burnham, published by the John Day Company, New York, \9l\l. Burnham discusses the role of business managers i n contemporary s o c i a l l i f e . Another book by David E. L i l i e n t h a l Big Business: A New Era, Harper, 1953> makes - put a case f o r Big Business as the dominant i n s t i t u t i o n shaping conditions of s o c i a l l i f e . 92 operation, and o f f i c i a l s discharging t h e i r assigned duties, we cannot f i n d a connection which leads us to a public moving and guiding t h i s a c t i v i t y . I f a public exists i t i s s i l e n t since the government appears to be r u l i n g autpnomously or, i f we admit the contention on the previous paragraph, i t i s directed by a p a r t i c u l a r group for private purposes. Dewey extends h i s examination of p o l i t i c a l machinery to include the operation of the American two party system at which he points a condemnatory f i n g e r . Parties have become nothing more than extensive and consolidated "factions" so strongly entrenched that they i n h i b i t the emergence of any other parties but, more important, they make thinking about other means of carrying on government a f f a i r s seem treasonable. Even voting, according to Dewey, does not represent r e a l freedom of choice f o r : Instead of Individuals who i n the privacy of t h e i r consciousness make choices which are c a r r i e d into effect by personal v o l i t i o n , there are c i t i z e n s who have the blessed opportunity to vote f o r a t i c k e t of men mostly unknown to them, and which i s made up for them by an under-cover machine i n a caucus whose operations constitute a kind of p o l i t i c a l predestination.110 It Is d i f f i c u l t to believe that.this rather cy n i c a l and pessimistic observation originated from Dewey who usually main-tains an o p t i m i s t i c outlook even when uttering the severest s t r i c t u r e s . In t h i s instance his cynicism goes deep. He charges that because of the uncertainty and obscurity of the 110 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 119-120. 93 p u b l i c there i a a void created between the public and the govern-ment which i a f i l l e d by "bosses with t h e i r p o l i t i c a l machines.'* Who p u l l s the strings which move the bosses and generates power to run the machines i s a matter of surmise rather than of record, save f o r the occasional overt s c a n d a l . I l l r It hardly need be said that big business i s alleged to be the power behind the machine. The foregoing analysis of Dewey's attitude toward American party p o l i t i c s was made not so much f o r i t s bearing upon a theory and method of s o c i a l Inquiry, although i t has i t s implications there too, but more to reveal the skepticism with which Dewey regards t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l methods. Perhaps skepticism i s too weak a word, fo r Dewey not only expressed doubt about the e f f i c a c y of the accepted methods of p o l i t i c a l management of s o c i a l matters, he held these methods to be completely inadequate to the task. Not even the few general p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s could any longer be used i n the determination of p u b lic action. "The s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n has been so changed by the factors of an i n d u s t r i a l age that t r a d i t i o n a l general 112 p r i n c i p l e s have l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l meaning." Further inquiry Into Dewey's views about methods currently used i n p o l i t i c a l l i f e today would only add more evidence to support his conviction about the obsoleteness of these methods. Summarizing, then, what we have learned so far about Dewey's views: (1) the machine technology a r i s i n g out of the 111 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 120. 112 Ibid . , p. 133. s c i e n t i f i c method of thinking had a revolutionary e f f e c t upon the structure and organization of society. (2) the t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l apparatus was not adapted to the new conditions of s o c i a l l i f e , (3) the major consequence of (2) i s the absence of means f o r the public to organize i t s e l f and provide instruments fo r the expression of i t s Interests. I t i s not necessary to undertake a far-reaching search to f i n d evidence to support the f i r s t of these observations. A d i r e c t inspection of contemporary s o c i a l l i f e w i l l furnish ample data. As to Dewey's second observation, the fact that we have achieved no general agreement about the nature, functions and r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of government at le a s t t e s t i f i e s to the uncertainty about the effectiveness and adequacy of our inherited p o l i t i c a l equipment. F i n a l l y , with the t h i r d observation we have the crux of Dewey's plea for the reconstruction of our methods of s o c i a l inquiry and p o l i t i c a l expression. I t has already been noted that the ineffectiveness of the public i s a modern phenomenon rel a t e d both to the i n e l a s t i c i t y of old p o l i t i c a l methods and to the fragmentation of society i n t o a d i v e r s i t y of groups.. Certainly these are d i f f i c u l t i e s standing i n the way of the public asserting i t s e l f , but surely not a l l that can be said about the public's f a i l u r e to emerge as the dominant s o c i a l force. I f consequences are present i n s o c i a l l i f e — a n assumption d i f f i c u l t to doubt; f o r even i f the consequences are not susceptible to empirical investigation, they are assuredly f e l t and suffered by those whom they affect—why has a public not emerged to care f o r these 95 consequences? The answer to this question i s c r u c i a l to Dewey's whole argument and he "answers i t as follows: The r a m i f i c a t i o n of the Issues before the public i s so wide and i n t r i c a t e , the technical matters involved are so specialized, the de t a i l s are. so many and so s h i f t i n g , that the public cannot f o r any length of time i d e n t i f y and hold i t s e l f . I t i s not that there i s no public, no large body of persons having a common Interest i n the consequences of s o c i a l transactions. There i s too much public, a public too diff u s e d and scattered and too i n t r i c a t e i n composition. And there are too many publics, for conjoint actions which have i n d i r e c t , serious and enduring consequences are multitudinous beyond comparison, and each of them crosses the others and generates i t s own group of persons e s p e c i a l l y affected with l i t t l e to hold these d i f f e r e n t publics together i n an integrated w h o l e . 1 1 3 If Dewey's statement contains the material of the problem to be dealt with by p o l i t i c a l methods orig i n a t i n g i n a pre-tech-nological era, the f a i l u r e of the methods i s understandable though perhaps today, not excusable. I f the impact of science can produce such multifarious and complex Issues i n society, i t i s reasonable and l o g i c a l to ask the question whether the methods of science and i t s s p e c i a l i s t s and technicians can be enl i s t e d to manage and administer the a f f a i r s of society. In recent years the question of the r o l e of the expert i n public a f f a i r s has been frequently raised i n discussions. Dewey contends that there are a great many matters with which the government i s concerned which can "only be adequately handled by tec h n i c a l s p e c i a l i s t s . Moreover, there i s i n his opinion great need to extend and broaden the use of s c i e n t i f i c methods 1 1 3 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 1 3 7 . 96 and the employment of experts i n the operation of government; f o r many of the issues requiring government decision and action can only be s e t t l e d by inquiry Into facts by persons competent to make such inquiry. "What has counting heads, decision by majority and the whole apparatus of t r a d i t i o n a l government to do with such t h i n g s ? " 1 1 ^ But though Dewey strongly advocates the use and points out the i n d i s p e n s a b i l i t y of experts i n p o l i t i c a l management and administration, that i s as f a r as he goes. Dewey holds no b r i e f for the creation of an i n t e l l e c t u a l aristocracy, a class of experts, which would eventually become removed from the common in t e r e s t and "become ,115 a class with private Interests and private knowledge." Regardless of how s p e c i a l i z e d government becomes and how much the.principle that the ultimate referent of p o l i t i c a l decision and the determination of needs i s the populace. Dewey i s emphatic In his denunciation of government by experts which becomes divorced from public c o n t r o l . . No government by experts i n which the masses do not have the chance to inform the experts as to t h e i r needs can be anything but an oligarchy managed i n the interests of the few The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses.116 We must conclude, then, that Dewey regards the experts as e s s e n t i a l to the e f f i c i e n t operation of the s o c i a l system, but l l l j . Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 125. 115 Ibid., p. 207. - 116 I b i d . , p. 208. The r o l e of the expert i n public a f f a i r s i s discussed by Dewey at some length i n The Public and I t s Problems, pp..123-125 and pp. 203-208. 97 insofar as they play a part i n the formation of p o l i c y t h e i r r o l e must be l i m i t e d to mediating the public's finding and expressing i t s e l f . So f a r our review of Dewey's inquiry into the apparatus of government, the functioning of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , and the status of experts has shown that Dewey does not see i n the instruments of the existing p o l i t i c a l organization the answer to the problem of the eclipsed public. Certainly, there has been a reve l a t i o n of some of the obstacles standing i n the way of the "public a r t i c u l a t i n g and expressing i t s e l f " but the question of the means by which the public's "inchoate and amorphous estate be organized into e f f e c t i v e p o l i t i c a l action relevant to present 117 s o c i a l needs and opportunities", remains open. To f i n d an answer Dewey abandons, as we s h a l l see, the conventional avenues of inquiry and restructures the question he seeks to answer. To t h i s point Dewey has been d i r e c t i n g his attention to the question of whether e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l methods are capable, possibly after some modification and adaptation, of organizing the public for s o c i a l action. This l i n e of inquiry, as i t has already been stated, produced negative r e s u l t s . At t h i s stage Dewey r a d i c a l l y reframes his question as follows: "What are the conditions under which i t i s possible for the Great Society to approach more closely and v i t a l l y the status of a Great Community, and thus take form i n genuinely democratic societies and state? What are the conditions under which we may 117 Dewey, The Public and-Its Problems, p. 125. reasonably picture the Public emerging from i t s eclipse?" The focus of inquiry i s s h i f t e d from the present to the future, from empirical ground to i n t e l l e c t u a l ground. Dewey makes i t clear, however, that he w i l l do no more than i d e n t i f y the conditions that must p r e v a i l i f the goal of an a r t i c u l a t e democracy i s to be r e a l i z e d . There w i l l be no attempt to state how the required conditions might come i n t o existence, nor to prophesy that they w i l l occur. The object of the analysis w i l l be to show that unless ascertained s p e c i f -ications are r e a l i z e d , the Community cannot be organized as a democratically e f f e c t i v e Public.119 Dewey d i d not e n t i r e l y abandon t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l methods as a vehicle of 3 o c i a l action. But he was extremely pessimistic, as we have seen, about the p o l i t i c a l future of man i f the ex i s t i n g apparatus did not undergo r a d i c a l modification; and whenever and wherever possible he endeavoured to improve the performance c a p a b i l i t i e s of the available p o l i t i c a l machinery. This i s Dewey, the p o l i t i c a l reformer, at work i n the world of p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t i e s . Before turning our attention to a consideration of the answer Dewey offers to the questions quoted i n the preceding paragraph i t i s e s s e n t i a l , i f the answer i s to appear i n the f u l l perspective of his s o c i a l thought, that we f i r s t look at Dewey's recommendations and proposals for the reconstruction of the t r a d i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l thinking with which he i d e n t i f i e d himself. 1 1 8 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. lf ? 7 . 1 1 9 Loc. c i t . 99 In spite of the f a c t that Dewey was a severe c r i t i c of the continued use of anachronistic p o l i t i c a l methods, he d i d not dissociate himself from the p o l i t i c a l t r a d i t i o n from which they sprung. On the contrary, he recognized the persistence of t h i s t r a d i t i o n as a force which could be used to r e d i r e c t s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l thought into more f r u i t f u l channels of a c t i v i t y . Dewey espoused and i d e n t i f i e d himself with the t r a d i t i o n of Liberalism; not because of the programmes and theories which make up the past of the l i b e r a l t r a d i t i o n , a great deal of which Dewey regards as obsolete or without adequate supporting psychological and s o c i o l o g i c a l data, but because of the. end to which the l i b e r a l philosophy was directed. Liberalism i s committed to an end that i s at once enduring and f l e x i b l e : the l i b e r a t i o n of individuals so that r e a l i z a t i o n of t h e i r capacities may be the law of t h e i r l i f e . It i s committed to the use of freed i n t e l l i g e n c e as the method of d i r e c t i n g change.120 Although early l i b e r a l i s m asserted the primacy of in t e l l i g e n c e as the means f o r the attainment of the ends of li b e r a l i s m , i t did so within the framework of the psychology of individualism, of a theory of mind which held that the laws of human nature are the source of s o c i a l laws, and that men i n association have no properties other than those which ultimately have th e i r o r i g i n i n i n d i v i d u a l beings. E x i s t i n g c o r r e l a t i v e l y with and deriving support from th i s atomistic psychology was an economic doctrine which saw i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t as the 120 Dewey, John, Liberalism and Social Action, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935* p. 5b. 100 motivating force In economic l i f e . S e l f - i n t e r e s t , i f permitted to operate untrammelled i n the normal competitive environment, assures society of the e f f i c i e n t production of i t s needed goods and services. That this doctrine has survived to the present day need not be mentioned; the protagonists of "free enterprise" and "rugged individualism" continue to draw strength from the doctrine. I t i s the persistence of the view that i n t e l l i g e n c e i s an i n d i v i d u a l possession into the era of a machine technology that has created, according to Dewey, one of the main obstacles to organized s o c i a l planning. Today, "the i s o l a t e d i n d i v i d u a l 121 i s well-nigh helpless". We now l i v e i n an age when only cooperative i n t e l l i g e n c e operating through corporate organ-izations can create the material conditions of l i f e to which we have become accustomed. The problem that Dewey sees facing l i b e r a l i s m i n the present age i s how to overcome the i n s t i t u t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , generated by the philosophy of individualism, which stand i n the way of bringing into being a new s o c i a l o rientation and an organization d i r e c t i n g the resources of modern technology towards designated s o c i a l ends. Dewey charges that a r e v i t a l i z e d l i b e r a l i s m , a renascent l i b e r a l i s m as he refers to i t , has the task of producing an attitude of mind r e f l e c t i n g the s c i e n t i f i c age i n which we l i v e . "The c r i s i s i n democracy demands substitution of the i n t e l l i g e n c e that i s exemplified i n s c i e n t i f i c procedure for the kind of 121 Dewey, Liberalism and Soc i a l Action, p. 61. 101 122 i n t e l l i g e n c e that i s now accepted." To achieve the goal of making i n t e l l i g e n c e a s o c i a l asset to be used i n the d i r e c t i o n of s o c i a l changes, l i b e r a l i s m must become r a d i c a l ; and by l*radical" Dewey means "perception of the necessity of thorough-going changes i n the set-up of i n s t i t u t i o n s and corresponding a c t i v i t y to bring the changes to 123 pass." Dewey i s f u l l y aware that to many, radicalism implies the use of force to ef f e c t changes; the l i b e r a l , however, i s "committed to the organization of i n t e l l i g e n t action as the 12k chief method". In.his comments on the means used to maintain the existence of the present economic system Dewey shares i n a considerable degree the Marxist viewpoint (but not i t s ideology) that force underlies the operation of the system. He makes the observation that e x i s t i n g economic i n s t i t u t i o n s place force i n the hands of those who wish to perpetuate the i n s t i t u t i o n s . And those who regard force as the dynamic and cohesive element i n our s o c i a l system have no need to advocate i t s use. Force, rather than i n t e l l i g e n c e , i s b u i l t into the procedures of the ex i s t i n g s o c i a l system, r e g u l a r l y as coercion, i n times of c r i s i s as overt violence. The l e g a l system, conspicuously i n Its penal aspect, more subtly i n c i v i l p ractice, rests upon ; coercion.125 To ensure that we are not i n d i f f e r e n t to what he Is saying Dewey constantly repeats and emphasizes the point that the 122 Dewey, Liberalism and S o c i a l Action, pp. 72-3. 123 Ibid., p. 62. 12k Ibid. , p. 63. 125 Loc. c i t . 102 present method of s o c i a l control has force at i t s base. However, his purpose i s not to arouse us to meet :force with force, as the Marxists would exhort us to do, but to make us f u l l y aware that unless "the fact i s acknowledged . . . the meaning of dependence.upon i n t e l l i g e n c e as the alternative method of 126 s o c i a l d i r e c t i o n w i l l not be grasped." Unquestionably Dewey was not a Marxist, nor d i d he subscribe to any other variety of s o c i a l or economic determinism; but h i s analysis of the operation of the c a p i t a l i s t system, i f taken out of context, would make i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with the Marxist p o s i t i o n d i f f i c u l t to deny. In the passage quoted below, i n which he continues his description of the r o l e of force i n our s o c i a l system, the s p i r i t s of Marx and Engels must have lent a hand when he wrote i t . This i s not a c r i t i c i s m of Dewey, however; the v a l i d i t y or i n v a l i d i t y of his views must be deter-mined on grounds other than i d e n t i f i c a t i o n with a conventionally unacceptable dogma. But what we need to r e a l i z e i s that physical force i s used, at least In the form of coercion, i n the very set-up of our society. That the competitive system which was thought of by early l i b e r a l s as the means by which the latent a b i l i t i e s of individuals were to be evoked and directed into s o c i a l l y useful channels, i s now i n fact a state of scarcely disguised b a t t l e hardly needs to be dwelt upon. That the control of the means of production by the few i n l e g a l possession operates as a standing agency of coercion of the many, may need emphasis i n statement, but i s surely evident to one who i s w i l l i n g to observe and honestly report the ex i s t i n g 126 Dewey, Liberalism and Soc i a l Action, p. 6ii. 103 scene. I t Is f o o l i s h to regard the p o l i t i c a l state as the only agency now endowed with coercive power. I t s exercise of this power i s pale i n con-tr a s t with that exercised by concentrated and organized property interests. 1 2 7 The statements i n the foregoing quotation b r i s t l e with implications. However, most of them can be subsumed under two p r i n c i p a l ideas: (1) Force i s omnipresent i n the s o c i a l system, with the power of economic interests r i v a l l i n g i n magnitude and influence that of the state. (2) Organized i n t e l l i g e n c e has only a subservient place, i f i t has a place at a l l , as a method of s o c i a l action, and i t faces the formidable obstacle of a s o c i a l structure b u i l t on the power p r i n c i p l e . Although Dewey's description of the operation of the economic system has many of the overtones of the Marxian doctrine of the class struggle, the s i m i l a r i t y i n f a c t i s a s u p e r f i c i a l one; at the i d e o l o g i c a l l e v e l Dewey and Marx diverge widely. Dewey does not deny that groups are continually struggling f o r a more favoured p o s i t i o n and that, at times, r a d i c a l s h i f t s i n control are accompanied by violence. He parts company with Marx, however, when Marx i n s i s t s that r a d i c a l s o c i a l change and violence are necessary correlates. It i s i n this issue that we can see the fundamental disagreement between Marx and Dewey. The meaningful question for Dewey i s not how force w i l l be employed to achieve a r e s o l u t i o n of the class struggle, choice of method i s foregone i n framing t h i s question, but whether i n t e l l i g e n c e W i l l supplant force as the means of s o c i a l change. 127 Dewey, Liberalism and S o c i a l Action, pp.63-61+. l O l i The question i s whether force or in t e l l i g e n c e i s to be the method upon which we consistently r e l y and to whose promotion we devote our energies. Insistence that the use of violent force i s inevitable l i m i t s the use of available i n t e l l i g e n c e , for wherever the inevitable reigns i n t e l l i g e n c e cannot be used. Commitment to i n e v i t -a b i l i t y i s always the f r u i t of dogma; in t e l l i g e n c e does not pretend to know save as the r e s u l t of experimentation. the opposite of preconceived dogma.128 Not only does Dewey repudiate the class struggle theory and the view that the use of viol e n t force i n in e v i t a b l e , he denies also that there exists an e n t i t y c a l l e d a " c l a s s " . The idea of a class , according to Dewey, i s a product of an a b s o l u t i s t i c 129 l o g i c and has no basis i n f a c t . I t i s not one of the objects of t h i s essay to make a complete comparison of the p o l i t i c a l philosophies of Dewey and Marx. The b r i e f analysis of a sa l i e n t area of s i m i l a r i t y i n views was made pr i m a r i l y to show Dewey's unqualified commitment to the p r i n c i p l e of experimental i n t e l l i g e n c e i n s o c i a l matters, and secondarily to reveal the completely a n t i t h e t i c a l substrata of the two men's outlooks. In spite of the many apparent s i m i l a r i t i e s i n t h e i r observations of s o c i a l matters i t would 128 Dewey, Liberalism and So c i a l Action, p. 78. 129 In a short essay e n t i t l e d John Dewey and Karl Marx by J. Cork i n the volume of essays John Dewey: Philosopher of  Science and Freedom, New York, D i a l Press, 1950, ed. by Sidney Hook, there i s a summary of the major points of s i m i l a r i t y between the views of Marx and Dewey; nine are l i s t e d ; see pp. 338-3I1I. The points of disagreement are also discussed In this essay. In Dewey's book Freedom and Culture, New York, G-.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935* many of his c r i t i c i s m s of Marxism are recorded; see chapter four, T o t a l i t a r i a n Economics and Democracy, pp. 7li to 102. 105 be d i f f i c u l t t o s a y c o n c l u s i v e l y where Dewey and Marx a r e i n g e n u i n e a g r e e m e n t . P o s s i b l y t h e r e i s a m e e t i n g o f t h e minds i n t h e c o n v i c t i o n h e l d by b o t h men t h a t t h e p r e s e n t s o c i a l o r d e r and t h e ends t o w h i c h i t i s d i r e c t e d a r e e v i l . B e f o r e we d i g r e s s e d t o c o n s i d e r t h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e v i e w s o f Dewey and Marx we h a d s t a r t e d o u t t o e x p l o r e t h e s t r e a m o f t h e l i b e r a l p h i l o s o p h y t o a s s e s s i t s i n f l u e n c e u pon t h e f o r m a t i o n o f Dewey's s o c i a l t h e o r y . T h i s e x p l o r a t i o n h a s n o t b e e n c o m p l e t e d so we r e t u r n t o i t . I n a c o m p a r a t i v e l y s h o r t work, L i b e r a l i s m and S o c i a l  A c t i o n , Dewey h a s p r o v i d e d a s e a r c h i n g a n a l y s i s o f t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f l a i s s e z - f a i r e i n d i v i d u a l i s m ; an a n a l y s i s g r o w i n g t o w a r d s t h e l a t t e r p a r t o f t h e work i n t o a n o u t l i n e o f a programme f o r t h e r e i n c a r n a t i o n o f t h e s p i r i t a n d v a l u e s o f t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l i s m i n t o t h e body o f i d e a s e x p r e s s i n g t h e need s o f t h e p r e s e n t a ge. Dewey c h e r i s h e s t h e g o a l s o f t r a d i t i o n a l l i b e r a l i s m b u t he s e e s i n t h e u n d e r l y i n g p h i l o s o p h y t h e r e a c t i o n a r y a u t h o r i t y o f a d o c t r i n e b u i l t u p o n m e a n i n g l e s s p s y c h o l o g i c a l and e c o n o m i c a b s t r a c t i o n s ; a p h i l o s o p h y b o r n i n an age a n t e d a t i n g t h e i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n and f o r m i n g t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s and h a b i t s o f m i n d t h r o u g h w h i c h t h e f o r c e s o f t h e new m a c h i n e t e c h n o l o g y a r e now c o n s t r a i n e d t o p a s s . The c h a r g e , however, a g a i n s t t h i s e a r l y l i b e r a l i s m i s b y no means m e r e l y one o f r e t r o g r e s s i v e n e s s and i d e o l o g i c a l , r i g i d i t y . 'Dewey i s a l s o d i s t u r b e d b y t h e f a r - r e a c h i n g c o n s e q u e n c e s r e s u l t i n g f r o m t h e c o n t i n u e d a s s e r t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p l e t h a t b e n e f i c i a l ' s o c i a l change c a n o n l y be b r o u g h t a b o u t b y t h e u n r e s t r i c t e d and s o c i a l l y u n d i r e c t e d a c t i v i t y o f p r i v a t e e c o n o m i c e n t e r p r i s e . 106 T h i s d o c t r i n e , Dewey c l a i m s , i s noW o b s o l e t e . I t h a d a n a p p a r e n t v a l i d i t y d u r i n g t h e e r a o f t h e emergence o f c a p i t a l i s m , when s c a r c i t y was t h e r u l e and i n s e c u r i t y m o t i v a t e d men t o p r o d u c e . The i n d u s t r i a l r e v o l u t i o n u s h e r e d i n a n age o f p o t e n t i a l p l e n t y , however n o t a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f t h e i n s t i t u t i o n s a n d a r r a n g e m e n t s d e v e l o p e d i n t h e f o r m e r p e r i o d . The s t a t e o f s c a r c i t y i s a r t i f i c i a l l y m a i n t a i n e d a l o n g w i t h t h e f e a r s b r e d b y i n s e c u r i t y . I t i s Dewey's c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e d o c t r i n e o f i n d i v i d u a l i s m i s k e p t a l i v e t o p r o v i d e i d e o l o g i c a l s u p p o r t t o t h e b e n e f i c i a r i e s o f t h e e x i s t i n g e c o n o m i c s y s t e m . I n s p i t e o f t h e e v i l s w h i c h t h e p e r s i s t e n c e o f t h e b e l i e f s o f e a r l y l i b e r a l i s m h a v e wrought i n c o n t e m p o r a r y l i f e Dewey has n o t g i v e n up hope f o r i t s r e g e n e r a t i o n . He i s c o n -v i n c e d t h a t a r e n a s c e n t l i b e r a l i s m i s p o s s i b l e i f t h e rem n a n t s o f l a i s s e z - f a i r e d o c t r i n e s a r e d i s c a r d e d and a p o s i t i v e e f f o r t i s made t o a d o p t t h e methods and i d e a s o f e x p e r i m e n t a l s o c i a l p h i l o s o p h y . T h i s new a p p r o a c h i n s o c i a l t h i n k i n g i n c l u d e d , Dewey wants us t o u n d e r s t a n d , a c c e p t a n c e o f s o c i a l i z e d i n t e l l i g e n c e as means a l o n g w i t h t h e r e c o g n i i t o n o f t h e n e e d f o r c o m p r e h e n s i v e s o c i a l p l a n n i n g . I t has a l r e a d y b e e n n o t e d t h a t s u c h a programme o f r e f o r m o f l i b e r a l i s m c a n n o t be i n t r o d u c e d w i t h o u t d e e p l y d i s t u r b i n g l o n g s t a n d i n g b e l i e f s . B u t Dewey i s c o n f i d e n t t h a t i f s u c h a s w e e p i n g r e v i s i o n o f l i b e r a l d o c t r i n e c a n be e f f e c t e d t h e n l i b e r a l i s m w i l l become an i m p o r t a n t means t o r e d i r e c t t h i n k i n g t o w a r d s t h e r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t " t h e u l t i m a t e p l a c e o f eco n o m i c o r g a n i z a t i o n i n human l i f e i s t o a s s u r e t h e s e c u r e b a s i s f o r an o r d e r e d e x p r e s s i o n o f i n d i v i d u a l c a p a c i t y and f o r t h e 107 ,13< s a t i s f a c t i o n of the needs of man i n non-economic dire c t i o n s . " Xn view of the importance which Dewey attaches to the poten t i a l influence of a reconstructed l i b e r a l i s m we must conclude that i t i s one of the key factors i n h i s proposals f o r a programme of s o c i a l action. An e s s e n t i a l precondition f o r the emergence of Dewey's Great Community i s the elimination of s c a r c i t y i n the material needs of human beings. Adequate food, clothing and shelter available as a s o c i a l r i g h t i s prerequisite to emancipation from the fears bred by p r i v a t i o n and uncertainty. More than s o c i a l idealism supports the foregoing p r e s c r i p t i o n ; the p r i n -c i p l e i s now accepted i n modern psychology that a necessary condition for emotional security i s physical security. I t follows, therefore, that a secure physical and mental environ-ment must subsist i f free Inquiry i s to play a s i g n i f i c a n t role i n human a f f a i r s , and i f human beings are f r e e l y and c r e a t i v e l y to employ t h e i r i n t e l l i g e n c e for purposes beyond and outside of their i n d i v i d u a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . To at t a i n these conditions necessary f o r the "release of human energy f o r the pursuit of higher values ": Dewey makes i t one of the p r i n c i p a l objectives of a renascent l i b e r a l i s m the s o c i a l i z i n g of the forces of p r o d u c t i o n . 1 3 1 Liberalism was a major source of influence, as i t was indicated i n one of the opening paragraphs of t h i s chapter, i n 130 Dewey, Liberalism and S o c i a l Action, p. 88. 131 I b i d . , pp. 88 to 9 0 . 108 the development of Dewey'3 programme for s o c i a l action; i t provided the goals of and the connection with the democratic t r a d i t i o n . But i t performs another c r u c i a l l y important function: i t l i n k s science and p o l i t i c s . As we s h a l l see l a t e r , Dewey's ultimate goal was the introduction i n t o the current of s o c i a l thinking of the basic concepts of s c i e n t i f i c methodology to create the I n t e l l e c t u a l environment within which the s p e c i f i c tools of p o l i t i c a l action could be developed to replace those now i n use. As an interim measure Dewey did a s s i s t i n the repair and reinforcement of the exi s t i n g equipment, but i n the f u l l r e a l i z a t i o n of the fact that i t s eventful replacement would become i n the course of time imperatively necessary. When the circumstances are propitious l i b e r a l i s m w i l l be the vehicle, Dewey hopes, which w i l l carry the concepts of experimental science into the world of p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c s . To see the r e l a t i o n between Dewey's s o c i a l theory and hi s proposals f o r the t h e o r e t i c a l framework of a method of s o c i a l inquiry, we must examine some of the meanings which attach to his concept of the community, including h i s expanded concept, the Great Community. Its widest and deepest meaning can be i d e n t i f i e d with the idea of democracy f o r which Dewey gives the following d e f i n i t i o n : From the standpoint of the i n d i v i d u a l , i t consists i n having a responsible share according to capacity i n forming and d i r e c t i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of the groups to which one belongs and i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g according to need i n the values which the groups sustain. From the standpoint, of the groups, i t demands l i b e r a t i o n of the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of members of I 1 0 9 a group i n harmony with the interests and goods which are common.132 This d e f i n i t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t from the point of view of Dewey's psychological theory which holds that the i n d i v i d u a l as a psychological e n t i t y has no meaning apart from the s o c i a l matrix from which i t emerged, and that the character and quality of both the i n d i v i d u a l and the group are determined by the t o t a l i t y of the conditions of i n t e r a c t i o n . I t i s also s i g n i f i c a n t as a statement of the goals of Dewey's s o c i a l thinking; goals which are never f i x e d but always on the horizon. That i s not to say that they continually recede l i k e the v i s i o n of the i d e a l i s t , but that they are part of the continuum of ends-means, and as such at each new l e v e l i n s o c i a l evolution the ends attained become means for the r e a l i z a t i o n of the newly emerged ends. Dewey has chosen, therefore, a d e f i n i t i o n of the democratic community the central theme of which i s the core of his s o c i a l philosophy: the r e a l i z a t i o n of the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the i n d i v i d u a l human being i n harmony with the deepening of h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n community l i f e . It i s a d e f i n i t i o n , moreover, which i s consistent with hi s psychological b e l i e f s and his general metaphysical outlook. However, Dewey offers a somewhat narrower d e f i n i t i o n of h i s concept of the community; one which i s more c l o s e l y r e l a t e d i n form and content to the structure and elements of his s o c i a l theory. The idea or i d e a l of a community presents, however, actual phases of associated l i f e 1 3 2 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. l i i 7 . 1 1 0 as they are freed from r e s t r i c t i v e and disturbing elements, and are contemplated as having attained t h e i r l i m i t of develop-ment. Wherever there i s conjoint a c t i v i t y whose consequences are appreciated as good by a l l singular persons who take part i n i t , and where the r e a l i z a t i o n of the good i s such as to e f f e c t an energetic desire and e f f o r t to sustain i t i n being just because i t i s a good shared by a l l , there i s i n so f a r a community. The clear consciousness of a coraraunal l i f e , i n a l l i t s implications, constitutes the idea of democracy.133 I f we consider'only the l o g i c of the foregoing statements, there i s no doubt about their s t r u c t u r a l s i m i l a r i t y to Dewey's theory of the origins of the public and the state. With respect to the content i t s e l f , the f a m i l i a r elements of conjoint a c t i v i t y and consequences are present, but instead of a public emerging a community appears. What i s the explanation f o r this difference i n outcome? The answer l i e s , we believe, i n a q u a l i t a t i v e difference i n the nature of the conjoint a c t i v i t y which, of course, produces a corresponding difference i n the character of the consequences. In the p o l i t i c a l version of the theory which we studied e a r l i e r , a public emerged because the consequences were of a kind which had to controlled; i n the present ' e t h i c a l ' version the consequences are appreciated or valued, and the desire to sustain them brings a community into being. Whether a public and a community emerges appears to depend, therefore, upon the nature of the consequences; the need to regulate them creates a public, and the desire to promote and sustain them, a community. 1 3 3 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, pp. l i+ 8 - 9 . I l l It should be noted that the perception and appreciation of some consequences as goods to be shared and the wish to pursue and sustain them introduces moral considerations into the theory. In Dewey's view the distinctiveness of community l i f e i s that i t i s moral, "that i s emotionally, i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , consciously sustained. n^~^ The disclosure of the moral factor as the touchstone for the existence of a community necessitates that we take another look at the question of whether the experimental method has the universal a p p l i c a b i l i t y as an instrument f o r s o c i a l Inquiry which Dewey claims for i t . There appears to be no th e o r e t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y standing i n the way of applying It to the p o l i t i c a l phase of Dewey's theory: the associated a c t i v i t y of human beings, the consequences of this a c t i v i t y and, f i n a l l y , the effects of the consequences both within the group from which they originated and beyond the group ( i f they go beyond) to persons not d i r e c t l y involved are a l l observable phenomena f a l l i n g within the scope of empirical methods of inquiry. However, i f the consequences take the form of values, the case i s arguable whether the experimental method applies. Admittedly, r human purposing to promote some consequences and i n h i b i t others i s a kind of behaviour, but a subtle kind, concerned with aims, desires, p o l i c i e s , e t c . — w i t h ends or goods to be achieved. Generally speaking, the a c t i v i t y of valuing, of determining which ends we ought to pursue, has been held to be a subject 13)i Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. l£l 112 matter not susceptible to observation. I t i s claimed, moreover, that the existence of ends or values cannot be d i r e c t l y established, and i f at a l l , then only on the basis of circum-s t a n t i a l evidence. By now i t should be quite apparent that Dewey would r e j e c t any hypothesis that puts the determination of values outside of human experience; this included almost a l l metaphysical and theological doctrines, psychologies of the introspective type, and any other view which a p r i o r i places the control of the formation of human ends outside of human agencies. The reasons which Dewey gives for h i s denial of the v a l i d i t y of such hypotheses are d e a r l y consistent with h i s epistemology; ends or purposes are part of the continuum of ends-means, and ends, i n the sense of something desired, serve to determine the kind of behaviour and means required to a t t a i n the ends. In Dewey's words, "Ends-in-view are appraised or valued as good or bad on the ground of t h e i r s e r v i c e a b i l i t y i n the d i r e c t i o n of behaviour dealing with states of a f f a i r s found to 135 be objectionable because of some lack of c o n f l i c t i n them." In view of the ro l e which Dewey assigns to ends, i t i s obvious that they can be neither f i n a l nor absolute. A discussion of Dewey's valuation theory i s not a l o g i c a l l y e s s e n t i a l part of t h i s essay. Nevertheless, h i s views on t h i s subject are not. without some r e l a t i o n to his s o c i a l 136 theory. The proposition i n Dewey's valuation theory which 135 Dewey, John, Theory of Valuation, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 191+6, Volume II , Number l+, International Encyclopedia of Un i f i e d Science, p. 58. 136 Ibid., pp. 57-66. 113 bears d i r e c t l y upon a method of s o c i a l inquiry i s the following: Valuations exist i s f a c t and are capable of empirical observation so that propositions about them are empirically verifiable. 1 3 7 This statement i s Dewey's answer to our doubts about whether the experimental method i s subject to some l i m i t a t i o n s i n i t s a p p l i c a t i o n to the whole f i e l d of s o c i a l phenomena. Clearly, Dewey holds that nothing Is excluded; not only do the physical and organic conditions of human association come within the j u r i s d i c t i o n of s c i e n t i f i c procedure but so do the moral or value f a c t o r s . Hence, there i s no the o r e t i c a l b a r r i e r to the development of a method of s o c i a l inquiry to encompass the whole spectrum of conditions which account for community l i f e . Although Dewey claims that valuations are capable of being investigated s c i e n t i f i c a l l y , by empirical methods, he does point out that we are only at the f r o n t i e r s i n t h i s f i e l d of inquiry, both with respect to the extent of knowledge about valuations and to the methods for obtaining i t . The p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n the way of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry into valuations are great, so great that they are r e a d i l y mistaken for inherent t h e o r e t i c a l obstacles. Moreover, such knowledge as does exi s t about valuations i s f a r from organized, to say nothing about i t s being adequate.138 Leaving aside the v a l i d i t y of Dewey's claim that valuations are capable of empirical investigation, the undeveloped state of valuation theory may be a s i g n i f i c a n t part of the explanation 137 Dewey, Theory of Valuation, p. 5 8 . 138 Loc. c i t . 11 If. f o r the f a i l u r e of the Great Community to emerge. Individuals are faced today with the in c r e d i b l y d i f f i c u l t task of selec t i n g the important 'goods' from amongst the plethora of 'goods! which the age of technology has spawned. Left to his own devices the i n d i v i d u a l makes his decisions i n response to pressure or persuasion and occasionally from need, but r a r e l y as the r e s u l t of car e f u l , conscientious deliberation. It i s reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the i n a b i l i t y to reach agreement on the choice of the 'goods' which ought a c t i v e l y to be pursued and cul t i v a t e d by the group may be due to lack of ef f e c t i v e methods of valuation. Prom the discussion of the concept of the community i t i s clear that there i s no uncertainty i n Dewey's thinking about the nature of the goal to a t t a i n . I f there i s to be any hope for the emergence of the Great Community and the Public f i n d i n g and expressing i t s e l f , new conditions of s o c i a l l i f e must be generated. There i s also no uncertainty about the choice of methodology; we have just noted Dewey's view that the methods of s c i e n t i f i c inquiry are powerful enough to reach even into the t r a d i t i o n a l l y esoteric region of value formation. But what l i e s between the goal and the methodology? What i s the nature of the s p e c i f i c means which w i l l bring the methodology of exper-imental science into an appropriate working r e l a t i o n with society and i t s problems? In answer to the foregoing questions Dewey provides only general proposals, some of them we have already 139 discussed. 139 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 157. We have already noted (see page 9b" t h i s essay) that Dewey r e s t r i c t s his study to th e o r e t i c a l considerations only. 115 Dewey's remaining proposals f o r the re o r i e n t a t i o n of our approach to s o c i a l problems are cl o s e l y connected with the view that communication i s the v i t a l p r i n c i p l e underlying the organization of community l i f e . I t i s only through the sharing of meanings and values by means of symbols and language that a group of individuals coalesces into a community. To learn to be human Is to develop through the give-and-take of communication an ef f e c t i v e sense of being an i n d i v i d u a l l y d i s t i n c t i v e member of a community; one who understands and appreciates i t s b e l i e f s , desires and methods, and who contributes to a further conversion of organic powers into human resources and values.ll+O In the l o c a l face-to-face community communication Is rapid and e f f e c t i v e . Knowledge about matters a f f e c t i n g i n one way or another the welfare of the members of the community or the community i t s e l f i s available d i r e c t l y and quickly, without the mediation of experts to c o l l e c t , arrange and interpret the fa c t s , and of propagandists to disseminate the res u l t s to serve predetermined p o l i t i c a l ends. Today, however, the face-to-face community has almost disappeared; science has revolutionized the conditions of l i f e which were once f e r t i l e for the growth and sur v i v a l of the l o c a l communities. The hope, therefore, that Dewey sees f o r the existence of the Great Community l i e s i n the creation on a broad scale of a basis of communication which approaches i n intimacy and effectiveness that of the face-to-face community. lliO Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, p. 151+. See also pp. 152-157. 116 Now, we come to the conditions that must be f u l f i l l e d i f a democratically organized public i s to emerge and for which communication i s the indispensable prerequisite: freedom of s o c i a l inquiry and freedom of d i s t r i b u t i o n of the r e s u l t s . With respect to the f i r s t condition Dewey adds the following s p e c i f i c a t i o n s : (1) Methods of inquiry must be developed to trace interactions through to consequences. (2) Inquiry must be systematic and continuous. (3) Inquiry must be s p e c i f i c and contemporary. On the other hand, methods of inquiry cannot be developed without complete freedom of expression. I f there i s to be a public, there must be f u l l p u b l i c i t y of a l l consequences of inquiry which concern i t . This means not only widespread dissemination of the results of inquiry, but also that the res u l t s be put into terms and language comprehensible to the layman. F i n a l l y , with respect to the s o c i a l sciences, Dewey outlines the conditions which must be met before they can serve as e f f e c t i v e instruments of s o c i a l inquiry. F i r s t , that those concepts, general p r i n c i p l e s , theories and d i a l e c t i c a l developments which are indispensable to any systematic knowledge be shaped : and tested as tools of inquiry. Secondly, that p o l i c i e s and proposals for s o c i a l action be treated as working hypotheses, not as programs to be r i g i d l y adhered to and executed. They w i l l be experimental i n the sense that they w i l l be entertained subject to constant and well-equipped observation of the consequences they e n t a i l when acted upon, and subject to ready and f l e x i b l e r e v i s i o n i n the l i g h t of observed consequences .lip. l l j l Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 202-3 1 1 7 The o r i g i n of th i s methodological s p e c i f i c a t i o n should be obvious; i t i s the legitimate issue from the marriage of instrumentalism and s o c i a l theory. We cannot close our examination of Dewey's views on s o c i a l change without making some comment on whether they bear the imprint of the doctrine of instrumentalism. Dewey himself i n s i s t s that they do, and he has gone to great pains i n many of his writings on s o c i a l philosophy to contrast the empirical, instrumentalist approach to s o c i a l problems with the approaches born of " a b s o l u t i s t i c " philosophies, approaches which, i n Dewey's opinion, presume to resolve s o c i a l Issues by manipulating l o g i c a l abstractions from s o c i a l phenomena such as "the i n d i v i d u a l " , "society", etc. He has asserted, moreover, that the l o g i c and conceptions employed i n these l a t t e r approaches have not only been i n e f f e c t i v e , but they have also stood as obstacles to the ll\2 development of more f r u i t f u l methods of s o c i a l inquiry. In rebutting Dewey i t might well be asked whether he likewise has f a l l e n into the trap of absolutism i n respect to his chief p o l i t i c a l conception, the state. The answer i s c l e a r l y negative; for amongst the many c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which Dewey's state might possess, i t s dominant one, the capacity f o r change and adaptation, exists there by design. "Just as publics and states vary with conditions of time and place, so do the concrete functions which should be carried on by states....Their scope i s something to be l i | 2 Dewey, The Public and Its Problems, See pp. 191 to 2 0 3 for Dewey's discussion of this t o p i c . 118. 11+.3 c r i t i c a l l y and experimentally determined." I f there are any doubts about the methodological r o l e which Dewey assigns to the state, the foregoing statements should d i s p e l them. The state i s the instrument of the pu b l i c . II4.3 Dewey, The Public and I t s Problems, p. 7l\. 119 BIBLIOGRAPHY 1. Works b y J o h n Dewey (a) I n S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l P h i l o s o p h y F r eedom a n d C u l t u r e . New Y o r k , G.P. Putnam's Sond, 1939. I n d i v i d u a l i s m O l d a n d New. New Y o r k , M i n t o n , B a l c h & Company, 1930. L i b e r a l i s m and S o c i a l A c t i o n . New Y o r k , G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1935. The P u b l i c and I t s P r o b l e m s . C h i c a g o , Gateway Books; 19I+6 ( F i r s t p u b l i s h e d 1927). (b) I n O t h e r F i e l d s o f P h i l o s o p h y E s s a y s i n E x p e r i m e n t a l L o g i c . New Y o r k , D o v e r P u b l i c a t i o n s , I n c . , 1953. L o g i c : The T h e o r y o f I n q u i r y . New Y o r k , H e n r y H o l t a n d Company, 193b". P h i l o s o p h y and C i v i l i z a t i o n . New Y o r k , M i n t o n , B a l c h & Company, 1931. P r o b l e m s o f Men. New Y o r k , P h i l o s o p h i c a l L i b r a r y , ~~ 19$6". The Q u e s t f o r C e r t a i n t y . New Y o r k , M i n t o n , B a l c h & Company, 1929. R e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n P h i l o s o p h y . New Y o r k , H e n r y H o l t and Company, 1920. T h e o r y o f V a l u a t i o n . C h i c a g o , The U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i c a g o P r e s s , 19ljJD, Volume I I , Number I4., I n t e r n a t i o n a l E n c y c l o p e d i a o f U n i f i e d S c i e n c e . 120 (c) Under the d i r e c t i o n of an Editor Intelligence i n the Modern World; John Dewey's  Philosophy* Edited and with an Introduction by Joseph Ratner, New York, The Modern Library, 1939. 2. Works about John Dewey Geiger, George R. John Dewey i n Perspective. New York, Oxford University Press, 1958. Hook, Sidney, ed. John Dewey; Philosopher of  Science Freedom. New York, The Di a l Press, l930l Schilpp, P.A., ed. The Philosophy of John Dewey. New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1951. The Philosopher of the Common Man. Essays i n Honor of John Dewey to Celebrate His E i g h t i e t h Birthday, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, I9I4.O. 3. Other Works Consulted Jacob sen, G.A. and Lipman, M.H. An Outline of P o l i t i c a l Science. New York, Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1937. Lenin, V . I . State and Revolution. New York, International Publishers, 1935. - Mead, George H. Mind, Self and Society. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1914-0. Edited and with an Introduction by Charles W. Morris. Plekhanov, George. The M a t e r i a l i s t Conception of History. New York, International Publishers, 19li0. Russell, Bertrand. A History of Western Philosophy. New York, Simon and Schuster, 19^5* 

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