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Playing politics with national unity; or, The role of political leadership in secession on the Indian… Swaab, Selma 1973

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"PLAYING POLITICS WITH NATIONAL UNITY" or THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN SECESSION ON THE INDIAN SUBCONTINENT: THE PARTITION OF 1947 AND THE SECESSION OF 1971  by SELMA SWAAB B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1972  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS  in the Department of POLITICAL SCIENCE  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October, 1973  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r  an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e  and  study.  I f u r t h e r agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e copying o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  be granted by  the Head of my  Department or  I t i s understood t h a t copying or  publication  of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without written  permission.  Department of  ^oV.VccA Sc^e^ca- .  The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Vancouver 8, Canada  Date  QcVa^ear  y  }  \\~\3  Columbia  my  i  ABSTRACT  This  t h e s i s r e p r e s e n t s an attempt  of  secession through the r o l e of  of  India  i n 1947 a n d t h e s e c e s s i o n o f  i n 1971.  Although there  leadership,  as one f a c t o r  t h e most i m p o r t a n t ,  l e a d e r s h i p i n the  it  which by  i s assumed i n t h i s  i n many, i s one o f  the p o l i t y  political  is  whereby p o l i t i c a l  analysis  from where they can  is  affect  The s e c o n d h y p o t h e s i s i s i n the struggle  l e a d e r s seek to g a i n t h e i r  p e r s p e c t i v e on s e c e s s i o n ,  that for  primary  the body of  the  goal. thesis  c o n c e r n e d m a i n l y w i t h l e a d e r s h i p i n t e r a c t i o n and w i t h t h e b a r g a i n s  and n e g o t i a t i o n s between l e a d e r s w h i c h f o c u s and l i m i t of a c t i o n i n the s t r u g g l e f o r of  if  l e a d e r s i s t o o b t a i n and m a i n t a i n  power and a u t h o r i t y  which they seek to r u l e .  Given t h i s  political  goal.  t h e two m a j o r h y p o t h e s e s u n d e r l y i n g t h i s  s e c e s s i o n i s a means o r a l e a d e r s h i p s t r a t e g y authority  thesis that  v a r i a b l e s i n understanding the occurrence of  t h a t the primary g o a l of p o l i t i c a l p o s i t i o n s of  itself,  t h e more i m p o r t a n t ,  s e c e s s i o n a n d o f movements d i r e c t e d t o w a r d t h a t One o f  Partition  E a s t P a k i s t a n f r o m West P a k i s t a n  i s no s i n g l e f a c t o r ,  adequately explains secession,  not  political  t o e x p l a i n t h e phenomenon  alternative  into  authority.  It  is  courses of a c t i o n which u l t i m a t e l y  adopting secessionist-oriented p o l i c i e s .  their  course  t h i s narrowing  down  propels leaders  ii  TABLE OF CONTENTS  P a  INTRODUCTION  PART I:  g  1  The Partition of 1947  19  PART II: The Secession of 1971  58  BIBLIOGRAPHY  e  ..  ..  ..  . . . .  ..  92  INTRODUCTION  In August, 1947, Pakistan emerged as an independent, sovereign nation-state.  It consisted of the former Indian North West Frontier  Province (NWFP), Baluchistan, Sind Province, and part of the Punjab, in the North West;  and part of Bengal in the North East.  It was  designated  as the true "homeland" of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, where Muslims could pursue their religion without persecution, where they would be masters of their own affairs, and where they would be free from Hindu domination. Only twenty-four years after the creation of this nation, a second Islamic nation emerged in December, 1971 on the Indian subcontinent, declared its independence from West Pakistan, and called i t s e l f the sovereign state of Bangla Desh.  Paradoxically, this new nation-state owed i t s existence  to the military aid which i t received from Hindu India during the c i v i l war which broke out between the Bengalis of East Pakistan and the West Pakistanis in March, 1971. From the perspective of these events, and the Immense human suffering involved, one is forced to ask, "what was the purpose of i t a l l ? " How does one explain the origin of a "Pakistan" or of a "Bangla Desh"? It i s to these questions that this thesis is directed. The central argument to be presented in response to these questions is that the separatist movements leading to the Partition of India in 1947 and to the secession of  - 2 -  Bangla Desh from Pakistan in 1971, were the result of struggles for authority by p o l i t i c a l leaders. In the events leading up to Partition, the major contestants in the struggle for authority were the Muslims, represented by the Muslim League and led by Mohammed A l i Jinnah, and the Hindus, represented by the Congress under the leadership of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and his "successor" Jawaharlal Nehru.  The British, as the third party to the conflict, occupied the apex  of the power triangle.  Even though the British themselves were not directly  involved in the struggle for authority, since they were in the process of handing down authority, not gaining i t , they nevertheless contributed to the Hindu-Muslim struggle.  Their contribution was two-fold.  First of a l l ,  i t might be argued that the struggle for power between Hindus and Muslims was generated by the British policy of transferring more and more power to Indian hands in order to effect their goal of granting independence and self-government to India.  Secondly, in order to ensure that the transfer  of power might proceed f a i r l y , and do justice to both communal groups, British policy oscillated between concession of Hindu demands for a selfgoverning democracy and support for safeguards for Muslim interests. This vascillation, however, had the effect of producing mutual suspicion and distrust between the two r i v a l camps: collusion with the British.  each thought the other was in  This lack of trust inevitably resulted in the  preclusion of a situation in which both groups might share in the power which the British handed down:  - 3 -  ...when more and more p o l i t i c a l power was placed on the counter by the British after 1919,...Hindu and Muslim leaders appeared as r i v a l contenders to grab as much of i t as possible for their respective communities. Unfortunately, progressive realization of responsible government turned out to be progressive aggravation of the Hindu-Muslim conflict.1 As each group fought to improve i t s position vis-a-vis the other in bargaining with the British and with each other, as each group's demands escalated, and as each group's bargaining positions became more and more rigid, i t became clear that no constitutional scheme could ever resolve the struggle for authority between the Hindus and the Muslims and Partition was finally adopted as the only alternative to full-fledged c i v i l war. A similar p o l i t i c a l situation prevailed in Pakistan prior to the secession of Bangla Desh i n 1971.  Here i t was the military regime of  Ayub Khan, and later, Yahya Khan, which occupied the top of the power hierarchy.  Just as promises of self-government by the British led to  the Hindu-Muslim power struggle between Ghandi and Jinnah, so promises of a return to c i v i l i a n government by the military regime fostered the emergence of two opposing forces locked in battle in a new struggle for authority.  The two major contestants in the struggle were  Zulfiqar A l i Bhutto, leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP), supported mainly by West Pakistanis; and Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, leader of the Awami League, representing the Bengalis of East Pakistan.  - 4 -  Unlike the British, however, the West Pakistani military regime did not relinquish i t s authority willingly.  It was only after long years of  the combined pressure and anti-government agitation by the Bhutto and Rahman forces that Yahya f i n a l l y permitted a general election to be held in December, 1970.  Not long after the elections were held, i t became  apparent that Yahya's aim in holding the elections was not so much to step down from power in order to let an elected c i v i l i a n government take over, as i t was to stave off popular dissent to his regime for as long as possible.  In the post-election constitutional negotiations, i t  became clear that neither Yahya nor Bhutto were prepared to honour the election results which gave Rahman an overwhelming victory. The talks ended in a stalemate, the Bengalis embarked on a non-cooperation and c i v i l disobedience campaign, Rahman was imprisoned, and Yahya unleashed his army to suppress the unrest in East Pakistan.  C i v i l war resulted  and Bangla Desh emerged like a phoenix out of the ashes. In both of these two struggles for authority, the leaders seemed to be on a collision course:  their respective p o l i t i c a l goals  were mutually antagonistic and irreconcilable; for p o l i t i c a l predominance over his competitors.  each was struggling In their attempts to  out-manoevre one another, i n their actions and reactions, these leaders, whether knowingly or unwittingly, whether directly or indirectly, precipitated a chain reaction of events which culminated in the creation of Pakistan, and later, i n the emergence of Bangla Desh.  - 5 -  Given this perspective, given the focus on p o l i t i c a l leadership, the thesis w i l l analyze in each case, the ways in which the goals and perspectives of the leaders of each group narrowed and focussed the range of choices open to them in the struggle for authority in which they were involved.  In this analysis, emphasis w i l l be placed on the specific  bargains or negotiations between leaders.  In each case, an attempt w i l l  be made to pinpoint the individual leader's subjective perception of the date of his defeat in the power struggle, after which partition and secession became almost inevitable.  The concept of the individual leader's  subjective perception of the date of his defeat at the bargaining table is important because i t is this perception which determines the leader's choice of the secessionist option.  This marks the "turning point" in  the bargaining process. From a theoretical perspective, this analysis f a l l s most clearly in the category of the "rational behavior model" of leadership which assumes that, ...leadership decisions are based upon objectively manifest and logically consistent efforts to maximize specified gains and minimize losses by the choice of alternative courses of action.2 A related assumption which underlies the following analysis, is the rather Machiavellian notion that the primary goal of p o l i t i c a l leaders is to obtain and maintain positions of p o l i t i c a l power and authority 3  from where they can affect the polity which they seek to rule. short, the p o l i t i c a l leader's ultimate goal is to rule, and the  In  - 6 -  strategies which he employs w i l l be designed to attain this goal. Whether p o l i t i c a l leaders seek to attain this goal because of self-seeking motives or because of a more a l t r u i s t i c desire to redress the grievances of the group or groups which they come to represent and be identified with, i s of course a debatable point.  The important point to note here,  however, is that, albeit for different reasons, p o l i t i c a l leaders nevertheless seek the goal of rulership. The "self-seeking leader" w i l l pursue this goal because the attainment of power and authority w i l l 4 satisfy some inner psychological need.  The " a l t r u i s t i c leader" w i l l  pursue the same goal because i t is usually only from a position of power and authority that he can hope to effectively redress the grievances of his group. If one were to combine these two assumptions, one might hypothesize, with respect to the puzzle of secession, that i f a leader's attempts to rule in one p o l i t i c a l system are thwarted, and i f secession is a possibility,"' then the leader w i l l choose to promote this course of action in order to create a new p o l i t i c a l system in which he w i l l be able to rule.  Following this line of argument, the justification for using  the focus of p o l i t i c a l leadership in an explanation for secession is that secession can be seen simply as a means in the struggle for authority: the promotion of secession is a strategy by which the leader seeks the goal of rulership. Similarly, the justification for emphasizing the bargaining  process between leaders in the following analysis i s that as long as p o l i t i c a l bargains are s t i l l to be made between r i v a l leaders, the option of secession is not likely to be reverted to.  It should be noted  at this point that integration theorists have often suggested that the maintenance of bargaining politics may be one means of preventing p o l i t i c a l disintegration, and of staving off, indefinitely, the possibility of secession in plural societies.^  Hence, when a leader perceives  that no more i s to be gained by bargaining with his rivals (as i n the g  Indian case) or when there exists a "non-bargaining  situation" (as  in the case of Pakistan), then the leader i s likely to adopt the secessionist option. It does not follow, however, that secession w i l l necessarily occur or succeed once the secessionist option is adopted.  It might  happen, for instance, that secession is adopted as a bargaining counter rather than as a conscious option of last resort.  In this case, one  party may c a l l the bluff, and the secessionist leader must either proceed with secession or relinquish this option and thereby lose face, and possibly his p o l i t i c a l support.  Since no leader i s likely to commit  p o l i t i c a l suicide, however, the secessionist leader is l i k e l y to proceed with secession once his bluff has been called.  Given this fact of  p o l i t i c a l survival, the other party, i f and only i f i t i s truly committed to national unity, w i l l not respond to secessionist demands by calling the bluff, but rather by granting the separatists concessions short of p o l i t i c a l independence.  If secession represents a bargaining  - 8 -  counter, then those concessions may be acceptable to the secessionist leader;  i f , however, secession represents an option of last resort,  then no amount of concessions w i l l be able to stave off national disintegration. India and Pakistan represent two cases in which secession was adopted as a last resort, rather than as a bargaining counter.  In  the Indian case, once Jinnah's efforts to obtain the constitutional minority safeguards he sought for the Muslims within the framework of a United India had failed, Jinnah adopted secession as the only means he could see by which to protect Muslim p o l i t i c a l rights and interests. The 1940 Lahore Resolution made i t clear that the p o l i t i c a l survival of the Muslims was dependent upon the creation of Pakistan.  The adoption  of this resolution symbolized the adoption of secession as a last resort. Subsequently, no constitutional scheme was acceptable to Jinnah unless i t included the stipulations of the Lahore Resolution which provided for the creation of Pakistan and the granting of p o l i t i c a l independence to the Muslims.  Although in this limited sense, the Lahore Resolution  seemed to represent a bargaining counter, i t nevertheless had the effect of being an option of last resort, since i t was a bargaining counter in which the only acceptable concession was secession and p o l i t i c a l independence.  The Congress, which professed to be committed to the  goal of national unity, responded to the League's secessionist demands by granting concessions short of p o l i t i c a l independence, and hence  - 9 -  unacceptable to the League.  The British, who were committed primarily  to the goal of quitting India, and who represented the only group in the power triangle with the authority to decide and enforce national policy and to sanction constitutional schemes, finally granted independence to the Muslims, via constitutional means. In Pakistan, Rahman's Six Point Program, which was adopted by the Awami League as i t s p o l i t i c a l platform in 1966, served as the bargaining counter across which Rahman sought to negotiate a p o l i t i c a l settlement with Bhutto and Yahya in 1971.  It should be noted that f u l l  autonomy for the Bengalis within the framework of a united Pakistan, and not secession or p o l i t i c a l independence, was the basis upon which a constitution would be acceptable to Rahman.  It was only after  Bhutto and Yahya refused to honour the election results and failed to concede even these minimal demands for Bengali autonomy in the postelection constitutional negotiations, that the Awami League adopted secession as an option of last resort. To Yahya, who represented the nation's ruling group, the Bengali demands, for autonomy represented a threat not only to national unity, but more importantly, to his position of p o l i t i c a l authority. His response to the Bengalis was consequently one of military suppression rather than p o l i t i c a l accommodation.  Bhutto, who faced the prospect of becoming the leader  of the opposition in the central government, supported Yahya s military ?  actions because he perceived that his position of p o l i t i c a l power would be enhanced by the elimination of Rahman's forces either through  - 10 -  extermination or national disintegration. Bangla Desh was consequently born out of c i v i l war rather than out of constitutional means as was the case with Pakistan in 1947. Despite these differences, which were largely due to the locus of authority i n the two societies, i t i s clear that i n India and i n Pakistan, the future of national unity was to a large extent dependent on the outcome of the competition for p o l i t i c a l power and authority among the r i v a l p o l i t i c a l leaders.  It should be noted, however, that there  is no single factor which, by i t s e l f , adequately explains secession. Although p o l i t i c a l leadership represents only one factor in many, i t may nevertheless be seen as one of the most important variables, i f not the most important, in understanding the occurrence of secession and of movements directed toward that goal.  Unfortunately, the role of  p o l i t i c a l leadership i n secession has received l i t t l e attention i n the literature concerned with integration and secession.  The emphasis  on p o l i t i c a l leadership in this thesis i s thus meant to supplement, rather than refute the validity of, other explanations of secession commonly found i n integration literature. Some of these other explanations of secession, as juxtaposed against that of p o l i t i c a l leadership, involve a concern with 9  institutional factors.  Federalism  and the structure of the party  system, ^ for instance, are usually recognized as a means through which 1  national unity may be maintained in plural societies. One of the  - 11 -  general hypothesis underlying the "institutional approach" to secession is that the greater the extent to which institutions cut across social cleavages, such as ethnic cleavages, the less i s the likelihood of secession.  With respect to the two cases under consideration, one might  speculate that i f the leaders in India and in Pakistan had agreed to adopt a highly decentralized federal system of government, then at least some degree of national unity might have been maintained. Unfortunately, the leaders of the Congress and the Punjabi-dominated West Pakistan elite put the task of "state-building" ahead of "nationbuilding" and sought to concentrate authority rather than disperse lt\^~ In India, this trend was most clearly illustrated by the refusal of the Congress party to form coalition ministries with the Muslim League after the 1937 elections. Many Indian nationalist leaders believed that the concentration of power i n the hands of the Congress party was a pre-requisite for gaining independence and self-government from the British.  The Congress leaders, therefore, sought support for their  nationalist movement from a l l sectors of Indian society, including the Muslim sector.  And, although the Congress leaders were willing  to accept a federal system of government for India, i t was to be a system in which one party, namely the Congress, was to predominate. The emergence and growth of the Muslim League as a r i v a l focus of authority for the Muslim segment of the Indian population seriously undermined the Congress' claim to represent a l l Indians.  The British,  - 12 -  furthermore, gave the Muslim League a certain degree of legitimacy when the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, invited Jinnah as well as Gandhi to participate i n the Simla conference of 1939 to discuss the implications 12 of India's involvement i n the War.  From this date onward, two  competing structures of authority, as represented by the Congress on the one hand, and the Muslim League on the other, temporarily coexisted in what has been referred to as a "dual power" or "dual authority" arrange13 ment.  During this period, from 1939 to 1947, the British came to  recognize the Muslim League as an equal heir, together with the Congress, to the power which they wanted to transfer to Indian hands.  But since  the Muslim League was supported solely by Muslims and had the effect of transforming the Congress into a largely Hindu organization, i t represented an organization based on lines coincident with the religious cleavages which split the Indian population into a Muslim segment on the one hand, and a Hindu segment on the other.  The British policy of  transferring power and authority to the Congress and the Muslim League, therefore, had the effect of splitting the Indian subcontinent into two segments, one of which was largely Hindu, namely India, and the other, largely Muslim, namely Pakistan. In retrospect, one might speculate that i f the Congress had been able to maintain i t s pre-1939 position of p o l i t i c a l supremacy and i f i t had been able to hang on to, and broaden i t s Muslim support in the face of the religions appeal of the Muslim League and had thus been able to undermine the growth of that organization, then the  - 13 -  British transfer of power to Indian hands might not have partitioned the Indian subcontinent.  Unfortunately, the breakdown of the unity  and decisiveness of the Congress leadership in the years following 1939, opened the way for the Muslim League and Pakistan. In Pakistan, after partition, the Muslim League suffered even greater setbacks i n i t s internal organization than the Congress in 1939.  Soon after i t s ascent to power, the Muslim League was  divided into three major factions:  the Dacca, or Nazimuddin, faction 14  the Fazlul Huq faction;  and the Suhrawardy faction.  This  factionalization prevented the Muslim League from asserting i t s p o l i t i c a l predominance over the other parties which soon emerged on the p o l i t i c a l scene.  The competition for power and authority among  these parties soon came to be organized along lines which coincided with the major ethnic and t e r r i t o r i a l cleavages i n the society. The adoption of the one-unit scheme by West Pakistan i n 1955 set the precedent for such competition.  Although Pakistan was comprised of five  different ethnic groups, the one-unit scheme and the geographical separation of the West and East Pakistani wings by 1000 miles of Indian territory, gave ethnic relations i n the country a bi-polar pattern.  The economic policies of the Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan  regimes, furthermore, had the effect of bringing economics into the same bi-polar focus.  In p o l i t i c s , the same pattern prevailed  when the Awami League emerged as a s t r i c t l y Bengali and East  - 14 -  Pakistani organization vis-a-vis the West Pakistani People's Party. The only way  in which national unity might have been maintained after  the 1970 elections was i f the Awami League had assumed power at the national level.  When Bhutto and Yahya prevented this from happening,  Bangla Desh prevailed. Besides institutional factors, class divisions may also act as important cross-cutting linkages. "* 1  Class divisions within ethnic  groups, for example, may inhibit the emergence of a strong ethnic identity and solidarity, and thereby weaken the appeal of a separatist ideology.  If one considers that most secessionist movements are  essentially middle class phenomena, i t becomes apparent that successful secession depends, in part, on the extent to which the secessionist leaders are able to gain the support of other classes for their cause. The hypothesis flowing from this concept is that the greater the extent of class-predicated p o l i t i c a l behavior among the potentially secessionist-oriented ethnic group, the less chance there w i l l be for successful secession. ^ 1  Both the Muslim League and the Awami League started off as organizations whose primary support came from the urban middle class, the students and intelligentsia, and the western educated e l i t e . In order to broaden i t s support to include the i l l i t e r a t e Muslim masses, the rural peasants, and the workers, the Muslim League adopted ethnocentric appeals which would transcend class boundaries.  By  - 15 -  issuing the warning that Islam was " i n danger", by branding a l l nonMuslim League members as "traitors", and by enlisting the aid of the ulama (the traditional Muslim religious leaders and scholars) the Muslim League was able to expand i t s support substantially i n the byelections following the 1937 elections. In 1940 these appeals were given a more concrete form in the Lahore Resolution.  After 1940, the  Muslim League's campaign was that in Pakistan lay the future glory of Islam and therefore a l l Muslims should support the demand for Pakistan."^ The 1945-46 election results testified to the great appeal which the idea Pakistan had for the Muslim population and to the success with which ethnocentric appeals as a leadership strategy could be used i n an attempt at "coalition-building" between classes. Whereas the Muslim League only won 4.6% of the total Muslim votes i n the 1937 election; 18 in 1945 i t polled about 75% of the Muslim votes. In Pakistan, the Awami League's campaign was based mainly on economic issues.  Rahman's Six Point Program and the idea of autonomy  gained considerable support among the Bengalis after 1966.  The Awami  League's economic program, however, was not solely responsible for the virtually unanimous support which the Awami League received  in the  1970 elections. The support which the party received during the elections may also be attributed to the Awami League's propaganda regarding the typhoon which h i t Bengal just prior to the elections, and the inadequacy with which the central government handled the  - 16 -  disastrous effects which the typhoon left in i t s wake. support may  Political  thus also be achieved by a "triggering device" such as  a cataclysmic event, or a natural disaster, or the outbreak of violence, which affects a large number of people and which forces them to take sides.  When such "triggering devices" are taken into account,  however, i t becomes almost impossible to predict whether secession w i l l or w i l l not be successful in any one case. Another factor which is certainly important in determining the likelihood of secession is the resources which the secessionist group i s able to command. The number of people who  lend their  p o l i t i c a l and/or financial support to the secessionist party i s one indicator of the secessionist group's strength.  Another factor is the  external assistance available to the secessionists.  If, for example,  India had not lent i t s military support to the Bengalis during c i v i l war,  the  then the overwhelming military strength of the West Pakistani  army would certainly have prevented the establishment of Bangla Desh. Thus the resources available to the central government, or to the group(s) trying to suppress secession represent another factor to be taken into account.  One might speculate, with regard to the Indian  case, that i f the instruments of force and authority had been in the hands of the Congress, which represented the Hindu majority,  instead  of under British control, then a Muslim secessionist attempt would surely have failed.  It is no wonder therefore, that the Congress'  - 17 -  leaders wanted to gain independence before the issue of Pakistan resolved.  was  It was only by insisting that the question of an independent  Muslim state should be resolved prior to independence, and by cultivating the goodwill of the British, that the Muslim League was able to establish Pakistan through constitutional, and relatively peaceful means. Various socio-economic factors may also be considered as important variables in explaining secession.  In multi-ethnic societies, an  ethnic group which is economically exploited and the members of which perceive themselves to be economically deprived as related to other groups in the society, i s likely to become secessionist-oriented. It is the awareness or perception rather than the fact of relative economic deprivation and also of the lack of opportunities for upward social mobility that propels the ethnic group, or at least a segment thereof, to demand that their grievances be redressed.  Whether or not  these grievances are to be resolved through secession or not,  depends  to a large extent on the response of the central government or the ruling group to the demands. The refusal of the ruling group to recognize demands for autonomy on the part of a distinct ethnic group, for example, may lead to the escalation of these demands to secession, as in the Pakistani case.  The response of the ruling group, provided  i t is suppressive rather than accommodative in nature, may also broaden and intensify the awareness of relative economic deprivation on the part of the members of the aggrieved ethnic group. 19 Communication factors  and the geographical  concentration  - 18 -  of the ethnic group may also affect this awareness and so influence the occurrence or non-occurrence of secession.  An ethnic group which i s  t e r r i t o r i a l l y concentrated, for instance, is more likely to act as a solidary  group than an ethnic group which is spread throughout the  country, because communication among the members of the ethnic group is likely to be better in a "self-contained" t e r r i t o r i a l unit.  It i s only  through communication that the members of the ethnic group w i l l perceive the commonality of their socio-economic interests and hence act upon i t . Without communication there w i l l be no protest and no secession. Where socio-economic interests are not commonly held by a majority of the members of an ethnic group, ethnic solidarity may achieved, at least temporarily, via ethnocentric appeals.  be  Unity based  on such appeals, however, tends to be less lasting than unity based on common socio-economic interests.  An example of this may be seen in  the factionalization of the Muslim League after 1947 and later, in the secession of East Pakistan from West Pakistan.  Apart from the leader-  ship factor, the emergence of Bangla Desh may also be attributed to the fact that the eastern and western wings of Pakistan were not geographically contiguous and that, consequently, the system of communication and the economic system were not integrated.  PART I THE PARTITION OF  1947  In retrospect, i t seems strange that the man who spearheaded the movement for a separate Muslim state, should, in the early years of his p o l i t i c a l career, have been called "the best ambassador of Hindu20 Muslim unity".  Yet, this was an accurate description of Jinnah's  p o l i t i c a l creed until 1928.  During this period, Jinnah's object was  to reach a Hindu-Muslim settlement on the basis of an acceptable constitutional compromise.  Later, during the 1930's and 1940's,  after Jinnah had decided that this approach had failed, he adopted a more rigid attitude and negotiated from a position of considerable strength and influence which was based on the p o l i t i c a l power and mass 21 support that he had mobilized under the banner of the Muslim League. Even though  the latter strategy dictated in the name of  p o l i t i c a l expediency, that Jinnah adopt a communal stance on a l l p o l i t i c a l issues, i t is doubtful whether Jinnah ever really believed the two-nation theory on which he put so much emphasis while championing the cause of the Muslims for a separate state. Later, when Jinnah, upon his election as the f i r s t President of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, made his f i r s t speech to that body, i t seemed that he never really lost his earlier belief that Muslims and Hindus could coexist harmoniously in one state:  ^  19  -  - 20 -  You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques or to any other place of worship in this state of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the fundamental principle that we are a l l citizens of one State. (...) Now, I think, we should keep that in front of us as our ideal, and you w i l l find that in course of time, Hindus w i l l cease to be Hindus and Muslims w i l l cease to be Muslims, not in the religious sense, because that i s personal faith of each individual, but in the p o l i t i c a l sense as citizens of the State."*  Having seemingly repudiated the two-nations theory, i t also became apparent that Jinnah's fight during the 1930's and 1940's was not so much with the Hindu community as such, as i t was against Gandhi and the Gandhi-oriented Congress party.  This argument i s supported  by Jinnah's p o l i t i c a l behavior prior to the advent of Gandhi and his non-violent non-cooperation movements on the Indian p o l i t i c a l scene. Prior to the advent of Gandhianism, the Muslim League and the Congress had not as yet emerged as r i v a l p o l i t i c a l organizations representing Muslim interests on the one hand, and Hindu interests on the other. The Congress at this time was the only p o l i t i c a l organization with anything approaching real nation-wide influence.  The  Congress was never as communally oriented, either in membership or in purpose, as was the Muslim League.  The Congress was created, in 1885,  for the purpose of representing Indian views and aspirations to the British.  It welcomed Muslims as well as Hindus to its membership  - 21 -  ranks.  Between the years of 1885 and 1896, the Congress had even  elected two Muslims as Presidents in order to boost the recruitment of 23 Muslims into the organization.  Despite the outbreak of intermittant  communal violence, the keynote as stressed by the Congress during this time was Hindu-Muslim cooperation against the common foe represented by the British. The emergence of the Muslim League i n 1906 marked the beginning of a change i n the Indian p o l i t i c a l climate.  The League was founded  for the manifest purpose of uplifting the socio-economic status of the Muslims and of protecting the p o l i t i c a l rights and interests of the Muslim minority vis-a-vis the Hindu majority.  The League was a communal  organization from the start and tended to have a membership which was exclusively Muslim.  Although the Muslim League was not adverse to  cooperating with the Congress in order to gain concessions from the British for independence and self-government, the establishment of a separate exclusively Muslim p o l i t i c a l organization, nevertheless, represented the f i r s t crack in the facade of Hindu-Muslim unity.  The  second, and f i n a l crack i n the united front came with Gandhi's attempts to cast Indian politics in terms understandable to Hindus. His attempts to broaden the Congress' base of support by using Hindu symbols and language and by launching massive non-violence noncooperation movements had the effect of alienating various Muslim elements in the Congress, elements which subsequently joined the ranks of the  - 22 -  Muslim League.  Gandhi had thus cast the communal dye which was to  color the Congress as a predominantly Hindu organization.  "Gandhi",  "Congress", and "Hindu" subsequently became synonymous terms as far as Jinnah, the League, and many Muslims were concerned. It is against this historical background, that Jinnah's i n i t i a l p o l i t i c a l actions are to be understood.  When Jinnah joined the Congress  party in 1906, after having made a name for himself as a successful lawyer in Bombay, the Congress was the only party through which a budding politician could hope to gain any measure of success.  Similarly, Jinnah's  advocacy of Hindu-Muslim unity, for which the Congress had set a long precedent, represented a convenient avenue to power which he only abandoned later, with the emergence of Gandhi, for better strategies. Whether or not Jinnah's strategies represented his personal beliefs i s obviously a debatable point.  One can only speculate that Jinnah's  strategies were carefully planned to make the most of the p o l i t i c a l situations with which he was confronted and were adopted in order to advance and improve his and the Muslims' position of p o l i t i c a l power and authority vis-a-vis other r i v a l leaders and the Hindus.  Following  this line of argument, Jinnah's statement about freedom of worship i n Pakistan (see p. 20) does not really offer sufficient grounds for arguing that Jinnah never believed in the two-nation theory, but only that Jinnah believed i t was expedient to re-adopt the strategy of Hindu-Muslim unity in order to stave off sectarian conflict i n  - 23 -  Pakistan i n order that no opposition might emerge to challenge his own, or the Muslim League's predominance in the new p o l i t i c a l system. That Jinnah's actions, were motivated by his desire to constantly improve his and the Muslim League's position of power and authority w i l l become clearer as the history of Hindu-Muslim p o l i t i c a l  rivalry  in India unravels i t s e l f in the following pages. Jinnah's f i r s t p o l i t i c a l victory came three years after he had joined the Congress, when he was elected by the Bombay Muslims to the 24 Imperial Legislative Council  i n 1909.  Although the Muslim League  was founded i n 1906, Jinnah took l i t t l e interest in its i n i t i a l deliberations and in its attempts to secure a separate electorate and weightage for the Muslims. Jinnah and the Congress were opposed to separate representation for the Muslims, though they became reconciled to the idea which was viewed as a temporary arrangement and as a prelude to a final p o l i t i c a l compromise i n which i t would no longer be necessary.  It was with a  view to affecting such a compromise, that Jinnah stepped into the leadership of the Muslim League, upon the withdrawal of the Aga Khan, in 1913.  In the same year, the Muslim League defined its goal for  the f i r s t time as the achievement of a suitable form of self-government for India, thereby bringing i t s objectives in line with those of the Congress which were self-government and independence for India.  - 24 -  As a member of the Muslim League and the Congress and the Imperial Legislative Council, Jinnah was in an ideal position to harmonize the p o l i t i c a l activities of the Congress and the League with the aim of bringing about Hindu-Muslim cooperation and understanding. On a more cynical note, this "tripod" position enhanced Jinnah's p o l i t i c a l reputation immeasurably.  By joining the Muslim League,  Jinnah added Muslim support to his already growing popularity with the Congress Hindus.  By being a member of the Imperial Legislative Council,  he could bring pressure to bear on the British on behalf of the Congress and the League, thereby adding to his influence. It was on Jinnah's i n i t i a t i v e that the Congress and the League agreed to hold their annual sessions at the same time and place i n 1915 at Bombay.  It was decided at this session that the Congress in  concert with the League would formulate a scheme of self-government for India, to be presented at the next annual session at Lucknow.  So i t  was that the groundwork was laid for what became known as the Lucknow Pact of 1916.  25  In retrospect, the Lucknow Pact represents a turning point in the Indian struggle for independence;  i t represented the f i r s t and  the last time that Congress-League harmony was achieved:  - 25 -  The Pact was indicative of the realization on the part of both the League and the Congress that the problem of safeguarding the minority in a democratic framework and the question of Muslim representation in the legislative bodies of India had to be satisfactorily resolved. Consequently a scheme of communal representation and constitutional reform was drawn up by common consultation. 26 Unfortunately, this scheme (which included among other things, separate electorates for Muslims and weightage for Hindus and Muslims where they formed minorities) was almost totally discarded by the British when they introduced a device called "dyarchy".  This device was put forth  in the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 which later became the basis 27 of the Government of India Act of 1919.  In short, the British, by  not taking advantage of the temporary Hindu-Muslim unity of  1916,  forfeited one of the best opportunities they were ever likely to have to effect constitutional reforms acceptable to both of the leading Indian p o l i t i c a l parties. Although the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms accepted the principle of separate electorates, the reforms were otherwise disappointing to both the Congress and the League.  The consequent events which led  to the Amritsar Massacre on April 13, 1919, and the Khilafat Movement 28 of 1920,  again drove the Congress and the League in opposite  p o l i t i c a l directions, creating a gulf of differences which even Jinnah's conciliatory policies could not bridge.  - 26 -  A few months after the Government of India Act was instituted, the British government passed the Rowlatt Act in March, 1919.  The Act  empowered the government to authorize arrest without warrant and without trial.  Jinnah vehemently opposed i t , and as a token of his protest,  resigned from the Imperial Legislative Council.  In 1920, Jinnah also  resigned from the Congress, in which Gandhi was emerging as leader, because he disapproved of the Gandhian politics of mass agitation. Hence, Jinnah decided to throw in his lot with the Muslim League. Given the existing p o l i t i c a l situation he decided that his goal of Hindu-Muslim unity were most l i k e l y to be achieved by concentrating his  efforts solely within the League's organization.  In the Congress,  Gandhi's influence had begun to overshadow the moderate policies of Jinnah's conservative Congress cohorts, such as Dadabhai Naoroji and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, and Jinnah found that he could no longer make any p o l i t i c a l headway in an organization i n which the majority supported Gandhi's unconstitutional non-violent tactics.  In the  Imperial Legislative Council, Jinnah found himself helpless to do anything against the hard line which the British had adopted in response to Gandhi's unlawful demonstrations. Jinnah's position was also far from secure.  In the Muslim League In the face of the  religious fanaticism which had taken hold on the Muslim rank and f i l e under the combined leadership of the A l i brothers and Gandhi in the Khilafat movement, Jinnah's refusal to cooperate in the movement f e l l  - l i -  on deaf ears.  At this juncture, Gandhi was clearly the man of the hour.  Since his return to India in 1915, Gandhi had regularly attended the annual Congress sessions, yet he never took any noteworthy part in Congress politics until the Amritsar session in 1919.  In this session  of the Congress there was a clash between C. R. Das and Gandhi over the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.  Whereas Das favoured total rejection  of the reforms, Gandhi advocated caution, moderation, and active 29 cooperation with the government.  But after Gandhi had a l l i e d himself  with the Khilafat agitators, at their request, and was hence assured of a considerable Muslim following, there was a sudden change i n his attitude.  Now he advocated non-cooperation instead of active  cooperation with the government.  Gandhi, who had at f i r s t been feeling  his way around Congress politics, had obviously decided that the time 30 had come for him to play a leading role i n Indian p o l i t i c s .  On  the strength of his alliance with the Khilafat leaders, Gandhi launched his non-cooperation movement on August 1, 1920. Since the movement has been started on his own i n i t i a t i v e , Gandhi was anxious to obtain the support and approval of Congress. It was with the aim of considering Gandhi's program that the Congress and the League held a special session at Calcutta in September, 1920. Gandhi's scheme was supported overwhelmingly by both Hindus and Muslims with the exception of only a few dissenters on either side. Jinnah was among these.  - 28 -  Jinnah opposed Gandhi's resolution of non-cooperation and advised caution and restraint.  Although Jinnah wanted self-government and  independence for India as much as did Gandhi, he did not advocate obtaining these goals by unconstitutional means. Jinnah again registered his opposition at the annual session of the Congress at Nagpur i n December, 1920, which was the last Congress session in which he actively participated.  In response to a request by Gandhi to Jinnah to join the  forces of non-cooperation, Jinnah expressed his views as follows; I thank you for your kind suggestion offering me to take my share in the new l i f e that has opened up before the country. If by 'new l i f e ' you mean your methods and your programme, I am afraid I cannot accept them; for I am f u l l y convinced that i t must lead to disaster (...) your methods have already caused splits and division in almost every institution that you have approached hitherto, and the public l i f e of the country (...) and your extreme programme has for the moment struck the imagination mostly of the inexperienced youth and the ignorant and i l l i t e r a t e . A l l this means complete disorganization and chaos. What the ^ consequences of this may be, I shudder to contemplate. Jinnah and Gandhi were obviously not cut from the same p o l i t i c a l , ideological cloth.  Jinnah was a parliamentarian and a believer i n consti-  tutional methods, whereas Gandhi was an agitator and a believer in the power of mass movements.  Although their goals were similar, and they  both sought Hindu-Muslim unity and independence for a self-governing India, their methods were different and had the effect of intensifying the  p o l i t i c a l rivalry between the two.  Gandhi, whose mass agitation  tactics against the British had temporarily succeeded in welding together Congress and League support under his own banner had l e f t  - 29 -  Jinnah high and dry. Jinnah's opposition to Gandhi's scheme, however, had the effect of regaining his influence over the Muslim League of which Gandhi's tactics had temporarily robbed him. Despite his discontent with the prevailing p o l i t i c a l situation in the early 1920's, Jinnah did not relinquish his strategy of HinduMuslim unity.  Even though Jinnah must have.realized from as early as  1920 onward that the constitutional way in politics or the role of mediator i n a country in the throes of mass politics launched by 32 Gandhi was becoming increasingly ineffective,  he continued to work  for a Hindu-Muslim united front attained by constitutional methods. Hence, i n 1922, Jinnah convened an All-Parties Conference i n Bombay to urge moderation upon the British and the participants i n Gandhi's non-cooperation movement.  It was also suggested that i t would be  desirable to hold a Round Table Conference with a view to putting a stop to the protest activities initiated by Gandhi.  Again, i n 1924,  at the Muslim League session in Lahore, Jinnah stressed his objective as being the achievement of "... a complete settlement between the 33 Hindus and Muslims as was done i n 1916." He believed, furthermore that "... India w i l l get Dominion Responsible Government the day 34 the Hindus and the Muslims are united."  These statements were  clearly out of step with existing p o l i t i c a l situation in India.  The  Congress, under Gandhi's influence of Hindu symbolism and mass mobilization, had turned into a predominantly Hindu oriented communal organization in which Muslims were definitely out of place.  After  - 30 -  the failure of the Khilafat Movement, many Muslim leaders, such as the A l i brothers, were imprisoned or had lost their faith in the virtue of cooperating with the Congress.  The League i t s e l f was left divided,  disorganized, and weakened after Gandhi's campaign of non-cooperation. Under these circumstances, Hindu-Muslim unity was virtually out of the question. Another attempt to bring about Hindu-Muslim unity was made by Jinnah, however, when he decided to join the Congress in i t s decision not to cooperate with the Simon Commission of 1927.  Since the commission  did not include any Indian members, Congress refused to cooperate with i t , and instead, appointed a committee under Motilal Nehru to draft a constitution for India. The result was the Nehru Report of 1928, which represented the f i r s t Indian attempt at constitution-making.  Typically,  the report represented the Congress' newly found strength and virtually ignored the League's previous demands for separate electorates and weightage for the Muslims.  In short, i t was a Hindu constitutional scheme,  not an Indian one, in which Muslim minority rights and interests were ignored. Although Jinnah's faction of the League had decided to join the Congress i n i t s boycott of the Simon Commission, there was  another  faction, led by Sir Mahammad Shafi, which favoured cooperation with the British government. Whereas the League was weak and divided, the Congress had been strengthened considerably by Gandhi's politics of mass agitation,  - 31 -  and had adopted an increasingly militant and uncompromising stance toward Muslim demands for the protection of their p o l i t i c a l rights and interests.  Consequently, the Nehru Report not only denied separate  electorates and weightage to the Muslims, i t also denied the principle of provincial autonomy and favoured a unitary rather than a federal scheme of government.  This represented a total reversal of the  agreements reached at Lucknow in 1916. At the All-Parties Conference of December, 1928, at Calcutta, which was held ostensibly to discuss the Nehru Report, the League expressed its criticism of the report. Jinnah proposed three amendments to the scheme i n order to safeguard Muslim interests.  But the Congress refused  to listen to Jinnah and even questioned his right to speak for a l l Muslims.  The net result of the conference was that i t achieved nothing  but hard feelings.  No compromise was arrived at, and the r i f t between  Muslims and Hindus widened.  Disappointed at the results, Jinnah  35 described this juncture as "the parting of the ways." Jinnah's failure at the Calcutta conference was largely due to the split in the League.  The Congress, whose chief spokesmen were  Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru and M. R. Jayakar, took advantage of this intraLeague r i f t by questioning Jinnah's right to speak on behalf of a l l Muslims.  By pointing out that he only represented a small minority  of Muslims, Jinnah's position at the conference was severely undermined. After the conference, therefore, Jinnah attempted to unify the League  - 32 -  and thereby strengthen his own position as spokesman for the Muslim League vis-a-vis the Congr ess.  With this objective in mind, Jinnah  convened a meeting of the Muslim League in March, 1929, in Delhi. At the League meeting i n Delhi, the Nehru Report came up for discussion again.  Opinion on the report was diverse and in an  attempt to accommodate the various points of view on the matter and hence bring unity to the League, Jinnah proposed a scheme of fourteen 36 points  which was to be kept in mind whenever constitutional reforms  were being negotiated.  These fourteen points were to serve as the  central p o l i t i c a l platform and as the main bargaining counter of the League for the next ten years, until i t was replaced by the Lahore Resolution of 1940.  The Congress was not willing to concede even  these basic safeguards contained in Jinnah's scheme and hence another opportunity to reach an agreement with the League was lost.  The  Congress leaders again believed that the demand came from people "more famous than representative" and could be "ignored with impunity.' This time, however, the Congress was wrong to believe that the League was not united behind Jinnah on the issue of the Fourteen Points.  The  Congress' refusal to accept the demand had the effect of consolidating 38 the Muslim League unity which had been achieved at Delhi.  One is  led to believe, furthermore, that the Congress was not particularly anxious to arrive at an agreement with the League at this time and that their objective in refusing to cooperate with Jinnah was to  - 33 -  create a Congress-dominated India rather than a situation i n which 39 the Congress would have to share power with the League. Since the Nehru Report did not produce a workable constitutional scheme, the British government, on the recommendation of the Simon Report, decided to c a l l a Round Table Conference in London in order to iron out the constitutional d i f f i c u l t i e s .  In October, 1929, the British  announced that the government planned to grant Dominion Status to India as soon as an acceptable constitution was worked out, and that i t was for this purpose that the Round Table Conference had been organized. The conference took place in three sessions between 1930 and 1932, but failed to bring about any "rapprochement" between the leaders of the Congress and the League.  As a consequence of this impasse,  the British government decided to take matters in their own hands, and introduced a provisional scheme in the form of the Government of 40 India Act of 1935.  Although the League and the Congress both  expressed their reservations about the scheme, they both decided to contest the elections in 1937 which were provided for by the Act. Even though Jinnah was present at a l l the sessions of the conference, he took l i t t l e part in i t s deliberations and was more of an observer than a participant. follows:  He expressed his personal views as  - 34 -  I received the shock of my l i f e at the meetings of the Round Table Conference. In the face of danger, the Hindu sentiment, the Hindu mind, the Hindu attitude led me to the conclusion that there was no hope for unity. (...) The Mussalmans were like dwellers in No Man's Land: they were led either by the flunkeys of the British Government or the camp-followers of the Congress. Whenever attempts were made to organize the Muslims, toadies and flunkies on the one hand, and traitors in the Congress camp on the other, frustrated the efforts. I began to feel that neither could I help India, nor change the Hindu mentality, nor could I make the Mussalmans realize the precarious position. I f e l t so disappointed and so depressed that I decided to settle down in London. Not that ^ I did not love India, but I f e l t so utterly helpless. Gandhi's contribution to the conference can only be described short, forceful, and inflammatory.  Since he was imprisoned i n 1930 for  his protest activities, Gandhi only attended the last session of the Round Table Conference.  In this one session, he succeeded i n  alienating both the British and the Muslims by his refusal to discuss a communal scheme of representation and by stating that the current Hindu-Muslim conflict was due to the British presence in India.  He  demanded that India be granted independence at once, with or without a constitutional scheme acceptable to the Muslims. v'  His tactics at  the conference, however, disclosed his incompetence as a negotiator; he was subsequently never again called upon to represent the Congress point of view at future negotiations.  In December, 1934, Gandhi  formally announced his retirement from the Congress.  Even after his  - 35 -  resignation, however, Congress never took a major decision without consulting him. Meanwhile, two years after having settled in London, Jinnah was approached by Liaquat A l i Khan, a prominent Muslim League member from the Punjab, who begged him to return to India to lead the Muslims.  Although  Jinnah must have been tempted to make a last effort to build up the almost moribund Muslim League into an effective organization, Jinnah was slow to 42 make up his mind to accept the challenge.  After having visited India  several times during 1934-5 in an effort to gauge the p o l i t i c a l situation, Jinnah f i n a l l y decided to settle down in Bombay. His return signalled the beginning of a new era in Muslim p o l i t i c s .  ^  One might speculate that Jinnah's policies upon his return to India were influenced by three major p o l i t i c a l factors.  The f i r s t was that the  British insisted on some sort of agreement between the two major communities, the Hindus and the Muslims, before any measure of self-government was granted.  This requirement had prompted Jinnah's earlier attempts at  establishing Hindu-Muslim unity.  The second factor was that with the trans-  formation of the Congress party into a mass movement under the leadership of Gandhi in the 1920's, Jinnah's constant aim of attaining Hindu-Muslim unity no longer seemed an essential preliminary to independence.  With the  temporary removal of Gandhi and his mass agitation politics from the Congress after 1934, however, Jinnah must have f e l t that the goal of HinduMuslim unity was s t i l l applicable and attainable; this goal until after 1937.  he did not relinquish  Thirdly, since the Congress' mass movement  - 36 -  included Muslims as well as Hindus, although the Hindus were bound to predominate i n such a movement, the Congress' leaders f e l t that there was no need to come to any agreement with the League, especially since i t represented only a small faction of the total Indian Hindu population.  Thus in order for Jinnah to gain his goal of  Hindu-Muslim unity, he was required, by the Congress' attitude, to build up the Muslim League as a> strong organization representative of a l l Muslims.  In order to gain widespread Muslim support for the  Muslim League, Jinnah was compelled to compete in the struggle for p o l i t i c a l power and authority vis-a-vis the Congress.  Paradoxically,  these policies, which were i n i t i a l l y designed to promote Hindu-Muslim unity, had the long-run effect of dividing the two groups to such an extent that two independent nations were formed. Upon his return to India, Jinnah's i n i t i a l attitude towards the Congress and the British was conciliatory.  In his speech to the  Indian Legislative Council, to which he was elected in 1934, Jinnah 43 commented as follows on the Communal Award of 1932  which was  incorporated into the Government of India Act of 1935: ... speaking for myself personally, I am not satisfied with the Communal Award, and again, speaking as an individual, my self-respect w i l l never be satisfied until we produce our own scheme....But for the time being l e t i t stand... until a substitute i s agreed upon between the communities concerned....44  - 37 -  In an attempt to settle the communal question by mutual agreement, talks were held between Jinnah who had been elected permanent president of the League and Dr. Rajendra Prasad, who was then Congress President. Although their sincere efforts to reach an agreed solution were thwarted 45 by extremists in the League and the Congress,  Jinnah nevertheless hoped  that, ...the leaders of the Congress with their wider experience and very good training, would overcome that section (i.e. the extremist section of the Congress) and assure the Muslims that i t was not going to be a Hindu Government, but an Indian Government in which the Muslims w i l l not only have a fair and just treatment but also that they w i l l be treated as the equals of the Hindus."46 ^ Again, in another attempt to resolve the Muslim-Hindu disagreement over the Communal Award, Jinnah tried to initiate a personal discussion with Gandhi.  Gandhi, who was virtually the only individual  in Congress who could have brought pressure to bear on both extreme and 47 moderate wings of the Congress, evaded Jinnah's conciliatory overtures. Even though these past failures at reconciliation normally should have indicated that Jinnah adopt a strong anti-Congress stance during the 1936-7 election campaign, Jinnah's campaign speeches reflected a strange mixture of criticism of the Congress as well as appeals for cooperation and mutual accommodation between the two parties. The seeds of League hostility toward the Congress which were embodied in Jinnah's speeches were to come to f u l l fruitation only after the 1937 election and were played down in the campaign.  Jinnah's  " 38 ~  conciliatory attitude toward the Congress was justified as a vote-getting tactic by the p o l i t i c a l situation which existed prior to the election. In preparation for the 1937 election, both the Congress and the League formed . their own separate election organizations.  Although the  Muslim League contained Muslim members only, not a l l Muslims belonged to i t .  Similarly, not a l l Hindus belonged to the Congress; many  Hindus were Liberals or Independents and strongly opposed to the Gandhioriented Congress policies.  In this situation i t was only expedient for  Jinnah to declare that, Ours i s not a hostile movement. Ours i s a movement which carries the olive branch to every sister community. We are willing to cooperate, we are willing to coalesce with any group or groups, provided their ideals, their objects are approximately the same as ours.48 This policy was of course designed to get votes for the Muslim League and hence legitimize Jinnah's claim to speak on behalf of the Muslims of India.  On a more negative note, yet in keeping with this goal, Jinnah  had started to put forth his main point, which was that Congress should not challenge the position of the Muslim League as the only representative organization of the Muslims and that Congress should confine i t s e l f to representing Hindus: I warn my Hindu friends and the Congress to leave the Moslems alone. We have made i t clear and we mean i t that we are ready and willing to cooperate with any group or groups of progressive and independent character, provided that their  -39  -  programme and our programme are approximately the same. We are not going to be the camp followers of any party or organization. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru is reported to have said in Calcutta that there are only two parties in the country, namely the Government and the Congress, and the others must line up. I refuse to line up with the Congress. There i s a third party in this country and that is the Moslems. We are not going to be dictated to by anybody.49 Jinnah's seemingly contradictory strategy, which was  designed  to strengthen the position and support for the Muslim League, by building coalitions with other parties, by appealing to non-League Muslims, and by unifying League Muslims, was to pay off less favourably than was expected.  The Congress won an overwhelming victory*at the  polls, capturing 716 of the 1585 seats in the provincial assemblies. It also gained 26 out of the 482 Muslim seats. which was weakest in Muslim-majority  The Muslim League,  provinces and strongest in Hindu-  majority provinces, won 109 s e a t s . I n the Muslim-majority  provinces  of Punjab and Bengal, the majority of Muslim seats went to the Unionist Party led by Sir Sikander Hayat Khan and to the Krishak-Praja Party of Maulavi Fazlul Huq respectively."'  1  Although the Muslim League's 109 out of 482 Mulsim seats was not particularly supportive of i t s claim to speak on behalf of a l l Muslims, neither were the Congress' 26 out of 482 a sound base for i t s claim to speak on behalf of Muslims as well as Hindus.  From this  point onward, the League embarked on a program designed to systematically increase i t s support among Indian Muslims.  Its intense efforts were  to pay off handsomely in the next elections held in 1945.  - 40 -  The Congress, for its part, under Nehru's guidance, initiated a campaign of mass contact in which i t emphasized the politics of common economic interest as against that of communalism.  It was on  this note of anti-communalism that the Congress formed ministries in seven, later, eight, out of the eleven provinces, and refused to form coalition governments with the League in those provinces containing Muslim groups, unless the Muslim representatives became Congress members 52 and the League ceased to function as an independent group.  This  demand, i f agreed to, would have been tantamount to committing p o l i t i c a l suicide for the League and was hence totally unacceptable to Jinnah. The result was that the Muslim League refused to recognizefclheCongress Ministries. The Congress justified i t s rejection of the League demand for coalition on the grounds that " i t was contradictory to parliamentary practice;  coalitions were formed either in times of national crises 53  or when no party i n the legislature commanded a majority."  Whatever  the justification, the Congress probably also feared that by associating i t s e l f with the League i t would give the latter prestige and power which would prove harmful to the Congress' objectives and organization in the f u t u r e . N e h r u , for instance, f e l t that i f the Muslim League with its landlord support came into the cabinet, the Congress program for agrarian reform would be jeopardized. "*"*  Given the League's failure  to win the Muslim vote there seemed to be no reason for Nehru and  - 41 -  the Congress to take Jinnah's claims seriously, nor could there have seemed to them to be any good reason for cooperation with the League except on their own terms, nor any obstacle to an attempt by the 56 Congress to recruit the Muslim masses.  In retrospect, however, the  dispersal of power in some kind of power-sharing arrangement between the Congress and the League, instead of the concentration of power in Congress hands, might have brought the Hindus and Muslims closer together in the common task of governing India and hence might have had the effect of staving off the secessionist-oriented policy which the League formally adopted in 1940.  Instead, the Congress' behavior re-  emphasized that the League must build up its inherent strength i f i t was to be recognized as more than just an important communal organization. Consequently, the Muslim League's policies after the 1937 elections were carefully designed to broaden its support and build up i t s strength vis-a-vis the Congress. The Pakistan Resolution of 1940 as one such policy may also be seen, i n part, as a defensive mechanism against Hindu domination as represented by the Congress. Jinnah's experience of practical politics during the 1937 election campaign and afterwards seems to have had the effect of changing him from an "idealist" who believed i n the possibility of Hindu-Muslim unity, into a "realist" who saw no future for the Muslims i n India once the British had left." ^ 5  As a result of the post-election  developments, Jinnah's strategies were no longer conciliatory and no  - 42 -  longer aimed at achieving Hindu-Muslim unity.  Conciliatory policies  toward the Congress only had the effect of drawing potential Muslim support away from the League to the Congress. The by-election in which the Muslim League simply raised the cry of "religion in danger" was a pointer to the new strategy which unfolded i t s e l f at the Lucknow session 58 of the All-India Muslim League i n October 1937.  In his presidential  address to the Muslim League in this session, Jinnah declared that, Honourable settlement can only be achieved between equals, and unless the two parties learn to respect and fear each other, there is no solid ground for any settlement. Offers of peace by the weaker party always means confession of weakness, and an invitation to aggression. Appeals to patriotism, justice and fair-play and for goodwill f a l l f l a t . It does 4iot require p o l i t i c a l wisdom to realize that a l l safeguards and settlements would be a scrap of paper, unless they are backed by power.59 Armed with this newly adopted concept of power p o l i t i c s , and convinced that Hindustan was s t r i c t l y for the Hindus, Jinnah and the League launched a campaign to discredit the newly-established Congress ministries.  In the "Pirpur Report and the "Shareef Report" the  Muslim League brought forward charges of cruelty and tyranny against the Congress ministries.  When the Muslim League rejected British and  Congress' proposals for holding judicial inquiries into the League's allegations against the Congress ministries, i t became clear that the League's propaganda was not meant to convince either the British or the Congress of the validity of i t s accusations, but was meant  - 43 -  for "home consumption", for the Muslim community.  The purpose of the  propaganda was to i n s t i l l in the Muslim community the fear of Hindu domination and to broaden the League's support by capitalizing upon these fears and upon the religious sentiments of the Muslims.  Not only  was this an effective means to reach the Muslim masses, i t also had the effect of forcing such powerful non-Muslim League leaders as Fazlul Huq from Bengal and Sir Sikander Hyat Khan from the Punjab into supporting the League's policies.  It i s likely that both these  leaders lent their support to the League under the impulse of selfpreservation, since both were aware that the religious fervor which the League had aroused throughout India could cut the ground* from under their feet in Bengal and the Punjab.^  1  Neither, therefore, had  any objection to joining i n the League's tirade against the Congress i f in return they were l e f t alone i n their respective provinces. Consequently i t was agreed in the Lucknow session of the League in 1937, that both Fazlul Huq and Sir Sikander Hyat Khan would advise a l l the Muslim members in their respective coalition parties to join the Muslim League.  With this newly found strength the Muslim League was 62  able to win a l l the seven by-elections that were held after 1938. The idea of Pakistan further contributed to the Muslim League's strength.  At the annual session of the Sind Mulsim League  at Patna in 1938, Jinnah recommended that the League "...devise a scheme of constitution under which the Muslim majority provinces, Muslim  - 44 -  native states, and areas inhabited by the majority of the Muslims might 63 attain f u l l independence in a federat ion of their own".  This  "recommendation" was later formalized in the famous Pakistan Resolution by the Muslim League at i t s Lahore session in March, 1940.  In this  resolution, the League declared that, ...no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to the Muslims unless i t is designed on the following basic principle,viz., that geographically contiguous units are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted with such t e r r i t o r i a l adjustments as may be necessary that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North-western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute "Independent States" in which the constituent units shall b«j autonomous and sovereign.64 Prior to the Pakistan Resolution, however, another important occurrence influenced the future of Indian p o l i t i c s :  the British  government declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939.  By a  Viceregal Proclamation, India was also declared a belligerent country on the side of the A l l i e s .  Shortly after this proclamation, the  Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, invited Gandhi and Jinnah to attend a conference at Simla in order to discuss the implications of India's involvement in the war.  The Congress immediately expressed i t s dissatisfaction  at not having been consulted prior to the proclamation, and decided to withhold i t s support to the British war effort.  As a sign of i t s protest,  the various Congress ministries resigned in October, 1939.  The Muslim  League, which had decided to support the British, provided that the  - 45 -  demands of the Muslims were met, called upon the Muslims to observe December 22, 1939, as the "Day of Deliverance" from the Congress' "tyranny".  The Congress in i t s turn responded by threatening the  British with another Gandhi-inspired c i v i l disobedience movement unless complete independence was granted to India. This action on the part of the Congress, had the result of biasing the British in favour of Jinnah and the Muslim League:  unequivocal assurance was given to the League  that i t s viewpoint would always be respected. In retrospect, 1939 represented a turning point in the balance of power between the Muslim League and the Congress.  By i t s decision 4  to relinquish i t s ministerial posts, the Congress had sacrificed the gains of the previous twenty years and had surrendered i t s position of authority for l i t t l e apparent gain, and at the same time had opened to i t s opponents, especially to Jinnah and the Muslim League, a route previously blocked to the center power and authority, namely the 65  Indian government.  The Congress' decision to withhold i t s support  to the war effort also had the effect of tipping the scales i n favor of the League which cultivated the goodwill of the British.  The  British, furthermore, had bestowed a certain amount of prestige upon Jinnah and the Muslim League by inviting Jinnah along with Gandhi to attend the Simla conference, and by promising the Muslim League that its viewpoint would always be respected in future constitutional negotiations.  The British, therefore, were bound by their promise  - 46 -  to accept the prerequisites which Jinnah had layed down as the bases upon which negotiations were to be built. was  The f i r s t prerequisite  that the Muslim League was to be recognized as the sole authoritative  organization of the Muslims;  the second was that any constitutional  scheme acceptable to the League was to incorporate the idea of Pakistan as set out i n the Pakistan Resolution. The i n t i t i a l attitudes of Gandhi and Nehru to the Pakistan Resolution further undermined the Congress' position vis-a-vis the League and strengthened the League's demand for Pakistan.  In response  to the Lahore Resolution Gandhi wrote in April 1940 that, 4  Unless the rest of India wishes to engage i n internal fratricide, the others w i l l have to submit to the Muslim dictation, i f the Muslims w i l l resort to i t . I know of no non-violent method of compelling the obedience of...(the) Muslims to the w i l l of the rest of India, however powerful a majority the rest may represent. The Muslims must have the same right of self-determination that the rest of India has. We are at present a joint family. Any member may claim a division.66 Nehru's response i n the same period was equally "docile": ... i f people wanted such things as suggested by the Muslim League at Lahore then....They and people like...(me) could not l i v e together in India...(I) would be prepared to face a l l the consequences of i t , but... (I) would not be prepared to l i v e with such people.67 These rather agreeable attitudes on the part of two prominent Congress leaders had the effect of giving credibility to the Pakistan  - 47 -  Resolution and severely reducing the Congress' power of manoevre vis-a-vis the League.  Later, however, i n 1942, the Congress proceeded  to declare that, ...any proposal to disintegrate India by giving liberty to any component state or t e r r i t o r i a l unit to secede from the Indian Union of federation w i l l be detrimental to the best interests of the people of the different states and provinces, and the country as a whole, and the Congress therefore cannot agree to any such proposal.68 This hard-line did not improve the Congress' negotiating position v i s a-vis the League since i t seemed to rule out some loose kind of federation which was the most obvious and practicable alternative to 69 Pakistan and therefore the most promising line of negotiation. Since this main avenue of negotiation was closed, since the Congress could not bring force or any threat of force to bear upon the League, and since the majority of Muslims could not be persuaded to the Congress point of view, the Congress leaders found, i n the end, that the only course that was l e f t open to them was not so much to oppose partition as to try to limit as far as possible the area which was to be accepted as the state of Pakistan.^ In 1942,  events took a new turn.  In March of that year,  Sir Stafford Cripps declared, on behalf of the British government, that independence the war.  was to be granted to India upon the termination of  After the failure of the Cripps Mission to secure the  - 48 -  acceptance by both the Congress and the League of a constitutional scheme, however, Congress initiated i t s famous "Quit India" movement under Gandhi's leadership.  Almost as soon as the movement had  started, Gandhi, Nehru, and several other high-ranking Congressmen were imprisoned by the British.  The Congress' decision to i n i t i a t e  this movement of anti-British rebellion before a l l other possible paths had been explored i s usually considered as a major tactical blunder on the part of the Congress' leadership.^  With most of i t s  leaders i n prison, the Congress was temporarily immobilized with the result that Jinnah and the Muslim League were given an ideal opportunity to consolidate and broaden their support without Congress' interference. While the Congress was temporarily immobilized, Jinnah continued his advocacy of a separate homeland for the Muslims. The idea of Pakistan, which was o f f i c i a l l y coined at the League's Lahore session i n 1940, had a tremendous appeal for many Muslims.  As a  result, the League's membership increased from 1,330 i n 1927 to 72 112,078 i n 1941, and reached several million by 1944.  The success  which the Muslim League achieved i n the 1945 elections due to i t s increased support was not gained easily.  It i s note worthy that  several prominent provincial Muslim leaders i n i t i a l l y opposed the Pakistan Resolution and the idea of partition:  -49 -  Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, premier of the Punjab and Sir Ghulam Husain Hidayatullah, the premier of Sind, rejected the idea of partition of India outright. Khan Abdul Qaiyum, who was later to be a lieutenant of Jinnah, declared that 'the Frontier Province w i l l resist (partition of India) with i t s blood'. Syed Habibul Rahman, a leader of the Krishak Praja party said the proposal was not only absurd, chimerical and visionary but 'will forever remain a castle in the a i r . . . the Indians, both Hindus and Muslims, l i v e in a common Motherland, use the offshoots of a common language and literature, and are proud of the noble heritage of a common Hindu and Muslim culture, developed through centuries of residence in a common land. There i s no one among Hindus and Muslims who w i l l be prepared to sacrifice a l l this in order to accept what is demanded by Mr. Jinnah'.73 Fazlul Huq the premier of Bengal also became one of the "dissenters" when he had differences with Jinnah and the League over the issue of his joining the National Defense Council.  Although he agreed  to resign from this Council, he protested against the Muslim League's interference i n Bengal p o l i t i c s .  Later, towards the end of 1941,  Huq joined the new Progressive Coalition Party and refused to join the Muslim League in the Legislative Assembly.  Huq was subsequently  expelled from the Muslim League but he retaliated by forming a new Ministry with the support of Hindu groups in the Assembly which lasted until the end of March 1943.  In April 1943, Khwaja Nazimuddin, who  was a staunch supporter of Jinnah, and leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, was invited by the Governor to form a Ministry.  In 1946, Suhrawardy formed a  Muslim League Ministry in Bengal after the elections.  -50  -  Jinnah and the Muslim League also met with d i f f i c u l t i e s in the Punjab, which was the "cornerstone" of Pakistan.  Sir Sikander Hyat  Khan who was one of Jinnah's strongest opponents died in 1942, and Jinnah tried to win over the Punjab to the Muslim League fold by negotiating with Khizr Hyat Khan who succeeded Sikander Hyat Khan as Chief Minister. in 1944.  The negotiations failed and suffered a f i n a l breakdown  Although the League captured 79 out of 86 Muslim seats in 74  the 1945-6 provincial elections in the Punjab,  i t could not form a  Ministry because the Sikhs and Hindus would not cooperate with i t . Subsequently Khizr Hyat formed a Ministry with the cooperation of the Congress and the Sikhs.  In March 1947, however, he had to resign  because the League's c i v i l disobedience campaign against his Ministry paralyzed the administration. In Sind and in the North West Frontier Province, i t was also not until 1946 that the League had f i n a l l y secured a firm stronghold in these provinces.  It is thus apparent that Jinnah's campaign to  weld the Muslim community into a nation met with s t i f f opposition and that i t was not until 1946 that he received substantial help from the p o l i t i c a l leaders in the Muslim majority areas.  In retrospect, i t  seems likely that this provincialism would have impeded the establishment of Pakistan had i t not been for Jinnah's leadership.  Furthermore,  had i t not been for the breach between the Congress and the British which developed during the war and Jinnah's s k i l l in making p o l i t i c a l  - 51 -  capital out of i t , the Muslim League would not have been able to consolidate i t s support in the Muslim majority provinces i n the years between 1943 and 1946.  The consolidation of the League's support was  further aided by the support of the ulama which Jinnah shrewdly enlisted during the 1945 election campaign.  By enlisting the support of these  religious leaders, Jinnah was able to gain the support of the Muslim masses over the heads of the provincial leaders thereby cutting the ground from under these leaders' feet and forcing them to join the ranks of the Muslim League. Meanwhile,in the face of the increasing support for the Muslim League and i t s goal of an independent Pakistan, C. Rajagopalachari, a top-ranking member of the Congress, proposed, i n 1942, that the Congress should acknowledge the League's claim for separation.  Although  this move met with l i t t l e response i n i t i a l l y , i t became the basis of the Gandhi-Jinnah talks i n 1944. Upon his release from prison in May, 1944, Gandhi took the i n i t i a t i v e and suggested to Jinnah that they might meet in order to discuss Rajagopalachari's proposal.  Jinnah accepted the invitation  and the two leaders met on September 9, 1944, for a discussion which lasted eighteen days.  Although Gandhi was prepared to accept the idea  that those provinces with a Muslim majority create an independent state of Pakistan, he stipulated that the method by which this was to be achieved should involve the holding of a plebiscite i n those provinces after India had gained i t s independence from Britain.  Pakistan was  -52  -  thus to be created by mutual agreement and settlement between the Congress and the League once the two parties, in unison, had ousted the British. Jinnah rejected Gandhi's proposal because i t was contrary to the Pakistan Resolution and demanded that Pakistan be created prior to independence.  Jinnah was shrewd enough to realize that his chances  of negotiating with the British for the establishment of Pakistan were much more likely to be successful than with the Congress.  Gandhi, for  his part, also realized that in the absence of the British, there was no force in India strong enough to resist Congress ascendancy. With the British gone, there would be no reason to give in to the League's demands.  This line of reasoning had prompted Gandhi's earlier "Quit  India" movement as well as his position in his talks with Jinnah. After the Gandhi-Jinnah talks had resulted in a stalemate over the method by which Pakistan was to be achieved, another attempt was made to reach agreement on a constitutional scheme. Lord Wavell, the new Viceroy, convened a conference in Simla on June 25, 1945, with the objective of exploring the possibility of restructuring the Viceroy's Executive Council as an interim government.  The Council  was to be restructured to give parity of representation to Muslim and caste Hindus.  Although this was a very generous provision for  a minority, Jinnah demanded, furthermore, that only the League should have the right to nominate Muslims to the Council, and that Congress  - 53 -  nominations should consist only of Hindus.  Congress would not concede  this demand, and the negotiations, therefore, broke down. Although neither the Gandhi-Jinnah talks, nor the Simla Conference produced any concrete agreement between the Congress and the League, both are generally recognized as having been great p o l i t i c a l triumphs for Jinnah.  Through the talks with Gandhi, Jinnah achieved  two of his main objectives: f i r s t , he made i t clear that he was the most impostant Muslim leader in India and on equal footing with Gandhi, and second, that any settlement between the Congress and the League could only be based on the issue of Pakistan.^  At the Simla  Conference, furthermore, Jinnah stressed that only the Muslim League was the true representative of the Muslims and that non-League Muslim leaders were not likely to make much p o l i t i c a l headway by remaining outside the League.^  This was designed to put pressure on the leaders  of r i v a l Muslim p o l i t i c a l organizations in the Muslim majority provinces to merge their organizations with the Muslim League.  With the  prospect of an independent Pakistan and with the consolidation of the Muslim League's support in the Muslim majority provinces after  1943,  these leaders were finally forced to cooperate with the League i f they were to avoid losing their p o l i t i c a l support.  The extent of this  cooperation and of the success with which the ulama were able to mobilize the support of the Muslim masses beind the League can be seen clearly in the 1945 election results.  In the provincial assemblies,  - 54 "  the League won 428 out of 492 Muslim seats;  in the central assembly  i t won every seat reserved for the Muslims.^ Jinnah had finally received the support he needed to legitimize his claim that he was the only leader, and the Muslim League the only organization, representing a l l Indian Muslims.  Jinnah could finally  put forth his demand for Pakistan with the authority that was backed up by the power that lies in numbers.  In the following years, Jinnah  did everything in his power to ensure the establishment of Pakistan. He refused to concede any constitutional scheme which did not grant  ^  the Muslims a state of their own. After the 1945 elections, the British made yet another attempt to set up an interim government so that power could be transferred from British into Indian hands.  A Cabinet Mission was appointed and  arrived i n India on March 24, 1946.  Although the Cabinet Mission Plan  did not create an independent Pakistan, i t did guarantee f u l l autonomy to the Muslim Majority provinces within the framework of Indian unity. The Muslim League accepted the plan because i n i t was contained at least the idea of Pakistan by virtue of the plan's three-tiered scheme for grouping the provinces.  The three groups were to be comprised  of: (a) Hindu majority provinces; (b) Muslim majority provinces; and (c) Bengal (a Muslim majority province) and Assam (a Hindu majority province).  Provisions were made, furthermore, for the withdrawal of  any province from i t s group after the f i r s t general e l e c t i o n . ^  - 55 -  An interim government was to be set up on the basis of parity. Although the Congress rejected the idea of equal representation, i t accepted the rest of the plan i n principle and agreed to participate in the constituent assembly of the interim government. In the election of the constituent assembly i n July 1946, the League won 73 seats, a l l but five of those reserved for Muslims, 79  and the Congress captured 205. the Congress presidency.  Meanwhile Nehru had taken over  While the finalization of the Cabinet Mission  Plan was s t i l l to be achieved, Nehru issued a statement regarding the provisions of the plan: We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided for the moment to go to the Constituent Assembly.80 He declared i n effect, that the Constituent Assembly would be a sovereign body, unfettered by any agreements, which could change the Cabinet Mission Plan i f i t so wished.  Jinnah i n return interpre-  ted this rather indiscreet statement as a rejection of the plan by Congress, and resolved that the only way in which Pakistan could now be achieved was through direct action.  Consequently, August 1 6 ,  1946, was celebrated as Direct Action Day, and a chain reaction of fierce communal conflicts and killings followed. In the face of this mounting communal violence, Congress withdrew i t s earlier reservations about the Cabinet Mission Plan  -56-  and accepted i t entirely.  Consequently, on September 2, 1946, a  Congress-dominated interim government was formed under the leadership of Nehru. After protesting the Congress take-over, the League also decided to join the government and Liaquat A l i Khan was placed in charge of finance.  In this position the League was given an ideal opportunity  to disrupt the Congress hold on the administration;  a deadlock resulted.  With the government divided against i t s e l f and incapacitated, India was on the verge of c i v i l war.  It was at this juncture that the  British government declared on February 20, 1947, that i t intended to withdraw from India by June 1948.  Mountbatten was appointed to effect  the transfer of power. With only a very short time to formulate a scheme for the transfer of power, intense negotiations ensued upon Mountbatten's arrival in India.  Acutely aware of the past failures of  constitutional, schemes which were to apply to a united India, Mountbatten proposed on June 3, 1947, a scheme involving the Partition of India. The Congress,  which was now firmly under the leadership of Nehru and  Sardar Patel, was anxious to obtain independence and self-government. In order to obtain these goals, Congress accepted the partition plan even though i t had to sacrifice i t s ideal of a united India.  The Muslim  League, for i t s part, also accepted the scheme in a now or never effort to obtain an independent Pakistan.  The Pakistan envisioned in  Mountbatten's plan was, however, a "truncated" Pakistan as compared to the Muslim nation envisioned in the Pakistan Resolution of 1940.  - 57 -  Thus the Muslim League also had to make a compromise and had to forfeit its claim to the non-Muslim areas in the Punjab, Bengal and Assam. Having thus achieved the necessary agreement, Mountbatten's plan was formalized in the Indian Independent Act of 1947;  the British  withdrew from India ahead of schedule on August 15, 1947;  and Pakistan  was established as an independent nation-state with Jinnah at the helm of i t s government.  PART II  THE SECESSION OF  1971  After independence was granted to Pakistan in 1947, the new nation got off to a turbulent p o l i t i c a l start.  1948 marked the year  of Jinnah's death, and the country was l e f t without a strong head of state and with a leadership which was divided rather than united. crucial  The  disagreement among the leaders during the f i r s t ten years of  democratic c i v i l i a n government in Pakistan was about the organization and the purpose of the Pakistan state.  The role of Islam in the state,  the system of electoral procedures, the nature of the executive branch of government, and the federal structure were the four great conflictgenerating issues of the period.  These conflicts led to rapid changes  in Cabinets, transient party loyalties, and lack of party discipline in the legislatures.  Since no agreement or consensus was  forthcoming,  constitutional issues were prevented from being resolved. The constitutional conflict was intensified by the growing regionalism of the Bengalis.  In 1948-9, the Bengali complaint had been  mainly one of neglect, accompanied by a demand that the central 81 government do more for East Pakistan economically.  This feeling of  neglect found i t s expression in the 1952 language issue. - 58 -  In  1954,  - 59 -  after much rioting and bloodshed over the recognition of the Bengali language and over Bengali opposition to the imposition of Urdu, both Bengali and Urdu were o f f i c i a l l y adopted as "lingua franca" of Pakistan. By 1955, however, the Bengali complaint of neglect had escalated 82 to become a complaint of exploitation.  Bengali demands for greater  autonomy, however, were not conceded to by the dominant force in government, the Punjabis, and the 1956 constitution adopted a highly centralized form of government since this was thought to be a requisite for maintaining national unity.  The constitution, furthermore,  reflected the West Pakistani, especially Punjabi, fear of a Bengali dominated legislature, by incorporating the 1955 "one unit" scheme in its text.  This scheme was designed to consolidate the four provinces  in West Pakistan into one p o l i t i c a l unit so that parity of representation with the Bengalis could be achieved in the national assembly.  Although  the one unit scheme served to protect the p o l i t i c a l and the economic interests of the Punjabis, who had by this time emerged the most powerful group in Pakistan, by offsetting the numerical preponderance of the Bengalis, the scheme was not received favourably by the other groups in West Pakistan.  The Sindhis, Pathans, and Baluchis believed  that the scheme would undermine their influence in the nation's central government, and thus protested the measure. The 1956 constitution thus proved to be unworkable. With the government virtually incapacitated and with the country in the  -60 _  grip of an economic depression, Ayub Khan took over the reins of government in 1958, and issued in an era of military dictatorial rule. Even though l i t t l e was done to redress Bengali grievances by Pakistan's c i v i l government, the military regimes of Ayub Khan and Yahya Khan were to be even less responsive to Bengali demands for autonomy. Deprived of constitutional expression, which had acted as a "safety valve" for Bengali autonomist sentiments, the Bengalis turned to direct action and agitation. The military take-over by Ayub Khan in 1958 was aimed at resolving the "regime dissensus" which followed the 1956 constitution. The two military regimes of Ayub Khan and, to a lesser extent, Yahya Khan, had the effect of insuring that the constitutional issues which had plagued the c i v i l i a n government for the past ten years, would not be resolved and that Bengali interests would be subordinated to those of the West Pakistan ruling oligarchy.  This oligarchy, which was composed of  bureaucrats, the twenty-nine big industrial houses, big landlords, and military generals, also constituted Ayub's, and later, Yahya's, major 83 p o l i t i c a l support.  In order to safeguard their own positions of power,  Ayub's and Yahya's policies naturally favoured the interests of their supporters, that i s , the West Pakistani elite's business interests. Since this group's wealth and power depended largely upon the economic exploitation of East Pakistan, they, and the regime, favoured the economic and p o l i t i c a l subjugation of East Pakistan.  Even when Ayub tried to  _ 61 _  i  popularize and legitimize his regime by forming a constitution in 1962, and by holding elections in 1965, the essential power structure remained the same. And even though the Bengalis were given an opportunity to participate in the government through these measures, i t was  only "token"  84  participation which they received. P o l i t i c a l l y , the aim of Ayub's military rule, as expressed in the Basic Democracies Scheme, was  to reduce p o l i t i c a l participation and  involvement around constitutional issues, and to compartmentalize the dissent around these issues at relatively low levels of the p o l i t i c a l system and hence to strengthen the administrative structure of the government.  The long-run result of this policy for the Bengalis, was  to shift the focus from national politics to regional p o l i t i c s . regionalization of politics had the effect of intensifying and  This populari-  zing Bengali demands for autonomy. With regard to the economic policies of the regime, Ayub 85  pursued a policy of "functional inequality" Pakistan.  with respect to East  The main beneficiaries of this policy was  the West Pakistan,  86  Punjabi-dominated e l i t e .  The policy had the effect of reducing East  Pakistan to colonial status in relation to West Pakistan, and of 87  increasing the social and economic disparity between the two wings. Given this state of affairs, i t is no wonder that Bengalis emerged as the main opposition to the Ayub regime. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who  the In 1966,  had emerged as the undisputed leader of the  - 62 -  Awami League by 1964, proposed a Six Point Program to remedy the situation.  The program which was subsequently adopted by the Awami League  as i t s p o l i t i c a l platform, contained the following points: 1)  The constitution should provide for a Federation of Pakistan in i t s true sense on the basis of the Lahore Resolution and the parliamentary form of government with supremacy of a Legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult franchise.  2)  The Federal Government should deal with only two subjects, Defense and Foreign Affairs, and a l l other residuary subjects shall be vested i n the federating states.  3)  Two separate but freely convertible currencies for the two wings should be introduced; or i f this i s not feasible, there should be one currency for the whole country, but effective constitutional provisions should be introduced to stop the flight of capital from East to West Pakistan. Furthermore, a separate Banking Reserve should be established and separate f i s c a l and monetary policy be adopted for East Pakistan.  4)  The power of taxation and revenue collection shall be vested i n the federating units and the federal center w i l l have no such power. The federation w i l l be entitled to a share i n the state taxes to meet i t s expenditures.  5)  There should be two separate accounts for the foreign exchange earnings of the two wings; the foreign exchange requirements of the federal government should be met by the two wings equally or i n a ratio to be fixed; indigenous products should move free of duty between the two wings and the constitution should empower the units to establish trade links with foreign countries.  6)  East Pakistan should have a separate milita or para-military force.88  - 63 -  To Ayub, Mujib's autonomy scheme meant nothing but trouble. According to him, i t contained the seeds of national disintegration which would lead to c i v i l war.  Besides that, Mujib's Six Point Program  sought to strip the central government of a l l but i t s defense and foreign affairs functions.  It was also apparent to Ayub, that Mujib's  persistent opposition to the regime and his relentless demands for autonomy had gained a considerable number of adherents to his cause. In 1967, Ayub ordered Mujib's arrest, and embarked on a campaign to discredit Mujib by implicating him in a conspiracy to bring about the secession of East Pakistan with Indian aid.  The "Agartala Conspiracy  Case", as i t was called, was a p o l i t i c a l blunder and only served to 89 reinforce Mujib's power, credibility and popularity. In the meanwhile, opposition to the Ayub regime had also made its appearance in West Pakistan, under the leadership of Zulfiqar A l i Bhutto.  Bhutto, who had served in Ayub's government as Foreign  Minister since 1963, had been dismissed from the administration in 1966 for his public denunciations of Ayub's policies in the 1965 IndoPakistan War over Kashmir and the subsequent Tashkent Treaty.  These  public criticisms of the regime made headlines in the news and made 90 Bhutto a popular, public figure.  These issues coupled with rising  unemployment, a rapid increase in the cost of living, frequent arrests of p o l i t i c a l leaders, and ruthless restrictions on c i v i l liberties 91 created great resentment against the Ayub regime among the people.  - 64 -  Taking advantage of this public sentiment, and of the anti-Ayub riots and demonstrations which had been initiated by the students in 1965-66, Bhutto joined in the opposition and created the Pakistan's People's Party (PPP) i n 1967 to consolidate, broaden and coordinate his newlyfound support.  Since the PPP was an amalgam of different forces,  Bhutto kept his party's platform relatively vague.  His party's "Islam,  Socialism, and Democracy" slogans were designed to mean a l l things to a l l people who wanted a return to c i v i l i a n government. Shortly after the establishment of the PPP, Bhutto was imprisoned for his protest activities, and Ayub reimposed Martial Law on Pakistan.  This, however, only served to aggravate the situation and  after intense anti-Ayub demonstrations in both wings of the country during 1968-69, Ayub announced, on February 8, 1969, that he was willing to meet his p o l i t i c a l opponents i n order to discuss and resolve Pakistan's p o l i t i c a l and constitutional problems.  The consequent Round Table  Conference (RTC) of leaders was scheduled to convene in February and March of 1969 at Rawalpindi. On February 19, when the talks were to begin, i t became known that Bhutto and Mujib had declined to join the conference.  Bhutto,  who had been released from prison earlier, and taken to his home in Larkana where he was placed under house arrest, decided to boycott the meetings.  Since Ayub was obviously in the retreat and had lost his  credibility, Bhutto propably perceived that i t would be a mistake to  - 65 -  come to any p o l i t i c a l agreement with him; Ayub should, instead, resign 92 forthwith. Mujib, who was s t i l l in prison at the time, refused to attend the conference unless he could do so as a free man, that i s , unless Ayub withdrew the Agartala Conspiracy charges.  Under great pressure  from the other leaders invited to attend the RTC, Ayub withdrew the charges and released a l l the accused charged i n the case.  Having  brought Ayub to his knees, Mujib finally agreed to attend the conference, and the f i r s t session was held on February 26. As the conference got underway, however, i t soon became clear that a settlement was not forthcoming.  The leaders were deadlocked on  the familiar issues of parity, joint or separate electorates, and provincial autonomy.  Agreement was made even more d i f f i c u l t by Mujib's  insistence that any settlement or constitutional scheme was to incorporate his Six Point Program i n f u l l .  He insisted furthermore, that  West Pakistan's one unit be broken up into i t s former provinces, and that representation i n the National Assembly be based on population rather than parity.  It became clear at this point that Mujib's goals  included not only more autonomy but also a dominant position at the 93  center for the Bengalis. Ayub stated that the dissolution of a one unit West Pakistan and f u l l regional autonomy for East Pakistan were not acceptable since they threatened national unity and challenged the position of the  - 66 -  military and the Punjabi oligarchy in West Pakistan.  As a result of  this stalemate, the only agreements which were produced by the conference were that Pakistan should return to a parliamentary system of government, that elections should be held by universal adult 95  franchise, and that Ayub Khan should resign.  Ayub succumbed to the  latter demand, and Yahya Khan was o f f i c i a l l y proclaimed Chief Martial Law Administrator of Pakistan on March 25, 1969. The professed aim of the Yahya regime was to return the country to c i v i l i a n rule.  In order to effect the transfer of power,  Yahya announced, on November 28, 1969, that elections would be held in October 1970 to elect members of the national and provincial assemblies.  In addition to this, Yahya announced two major concessions  to the Bengalis which had previously been denied by Ayub at the RTC, namely, the dissolution of West Pakistan as one unit and proportional representation in the national assembly rather than parity, thus giving the Bengalis a 55% majority in the assembly.^ Despite these seemingly well-intentioned provisions, there is reason to believe that Yahya had no intention of simply fading out of the picture even after the elections.  In the Legal Framework Order  (LFO) which was proclaimed in March, 1970, Yahya specified that the constitution which was to be framed by the elected national assembly was to be validated by the President before the assembly could become the national governing body.  The Assembly, furthermore, was given  - 67 -  only 120 days in which to produce a constitution.  If this were not  done, or i f the constitution proved to be unacceptable to Yahya, then the assembly would automatically be dissolved, fresh elections would 97 be called, and the whole process would start again. It was through these two mechanisms that Yahya hoped to play a key role i n the post-election negotiations.  Despite the restrictions  contained i n the LFO, the p o l i t i c a l parties which were to contest the elections accepted i t , and the general elections were f i n a l l y held on December 7, 1970, after two months delay. Mujib's Awami League won an overwhelming victory at the polls, capturing 160 out of the 300 seats i n the national assembly.  Bhutto's  Pakistan People's Party emerged as the second largest party i n the Assembly with 81 seats.  In the provincial assembly election the same  pattern was repeated, the Awami League won 288 out of the 300 seats in the East Pakistan provincial assembly;  the People's Party won a  majority i n the Punjab assembly winning 113 out of 180 seats, and was 98 the largest party in the Sind assembly with 28 out of the 60 seats. As the post-election constitutional negotiations got under way in January 1971, i t soon became clear that neither Bhutto nor Yahya was willing to accept a government in which Mujib's Awami League would predominate.  Earlier, on December 20, Bhutto had issued  a statement in Lahore declaring that no constitution could be framed,  nor any central government be run, without his party's cooperation. He said that the PPP was not prepared to occupy the opposition benches 99 in the national assembly.  On December 24, Bhutto made another  statement saying that his party was "the sole representative of the people of West Pakistan, like the Awami League in East Pakistan, and 100 therefore i t could not be deprived of sharing power in the government." When Bhutto visited Mujib in Dacca during January 1971, Mujib rejected Bhutto's demand for power-sharing and reiterated his demand that the constitution be based on his Six Point Program.  Mujib suggested  furthermore that the national assembly should meet as soon as possible in order to frame a constitution.  On his return to West Pakistan,  Bhutto made his position on the Six Point Program known: He stated that he could accept the f i r s t and the sixth points of the six, those pertaining to a federal system of government and local m i l i t i a s . On the meat of the program, those points defining provincial powers, Bhutto hedged and said he would have to consult with his party colleagues. ...Bhutto... avoided firm rejection of the Awami League program but gave every indication that that was exactly what he meant."101 On February 13, Yahya announced that the national assembly would be convened on March 3.  On February 15, Bhutto announced that  he and his party would boycott the assembly.  His decision, however,  had l i t t l e effect on the other minority parties in West Pakistan, who saw their participation in the national assembly as the only means by which they could protect their interests.  On February 28, in  - 69 -  order to increase pressure on both Yahya and Mujib, Bhutto requested that Yahya either postpone the national assembly session or withdraw 102 the 120 day time limit imposed on the assembly.  Bhutto, furthermore,  threatened to launch a mass movement of protest in West Pakistan i f the assembly met without his party. In response to Bhutto's demands, on March 1, Yahya announced that the national assembly session scheduled for March 3 would be postponed to a later date.  In taking this decision, Yahya faced a d i f f i c u l t  choice: Had he permitted the session to open as scheduled, Bhutto would surely have seized the opportunity to organize demonstrations against the regime, and these almost as surely would have become violent. In turn Yahya would be required to use the police and Army against a leader whose party had won a major p o l i t i c a l victory in the principal recruiting grounds of these forces... Another or a concurrent alternative for Bhutto might be to c a l l the West Pakistani members of the Assembly into a rump session creating a serious threat to the unity of the country and placing Yahya in an equally uncomfortable position. Even i f Bhutto or others in his party had not chosen to act Yahya undoubtedly would sooner or later have been faced with an Awami League constitution, possibly passed with the assistance of the Wali Khan group of the National Awami Party and other smaller West Pakistan parties. This constitution would perforce violate the Legal Framework Order: Yahya could amend the order and validate the document, incurring the wrath of Bhutto but additionally risking support from his military associates who were willing to return to democracy only under the Order's provisions. Alternatively, Yahya could refuse to authenticate the act, taking upon himself the onus of frustrating democracy, seeing Bhutto probably finding some means to translate this to his advantage in the West, and facing potentially  - 70 "  widespread and serious anti-regime rioting in the East. Yahya chose to minimize his problems with Bhutto and with the military and to take his chances that the reaction in the East to the postponement would be containable.103 As a result of Yahya's postponement decision, widespread protest 104 demonstrations broke out in East Pakistan.  At this point, Mujib  decided to launch a non violent non cooperation movement in order to force Yahya s regime to negotiate with him. 1  As a result of this  movement, a "de facto" transfer of power had taken place within East Pakistan.  Within a week of Yahya's decision to postpone the convening  of the assembly, the administration of East Pakistan was almost entirely in the hands of Mujib's  supporters.1^5  During these demonstrations against Yahya's declaration, the agitators, including workers, students, and professionals, demanded independence and raised the slogan for Bangla Desh for the f i r s t time. Mujib, who was thereby placed under great pressure to declare the independence of East Pakistan, stated that a majority does not secede from a minority, and launched the non-violent non-cooperation movement in order to coerce Yahya to resume the negotiations and thereby stave off violent military suppression which he perceived would follow a declaration of independence.  As the non cooperation movement got under-  way, however, i t became increasingly d i f f i c u l t to keep i t non-violent and under Mujib's control.  Mujib was thus confronted with a situation  in which the leader must follow the lead in order to retain his position  -71of authority.  He either had to adopt the idea of independence and  so keep in the "driver's seat" of the Awami League or retain the notion of autonomy and so keep the channels open for a settlement with Yahya. When the non cooperation movement led to various violent incidents and thus provoked the military crackdown on March 25, the decision was taken out of Mujib's hands and independence prevailed over autonomy. It i s noteworthy that Tajuddin Ahmed, who had been a lifelong Awami Leaguer and occupied the position of General Secretary in the League's organization and was considered second in command to Mujib, was reported to have turned hawkish in early March 1971 when he joined the ranks of the secessionist-oriented s t u d e n t s . L a t e r during the c i v i l 107 war he became Prime Minister of the Bangla Desh government i n exile. Despite the pressure which the secessionists must have exerted upon Mujib, i t is certainly to Mujib's credit that he was able to keep these elements under control for as long as he did. He was undoubtedly aided in this task when several other non-Awami League leaders gave their support to Mujib.  Two of the most important leaders who threw their  weight behind Mujib were Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani, a one time leader of the Awami League who led a l e f t i s t exit i n the f i f t i e s to head a faction of the National Awami Party, and Ataur Rahman Khan, a former Awami League chief minister who with a small group of associates 108 broke away in 1970 to form the National Progressive League. Faced with the situation in East Pakistan, Yahya again met with Mujib on March 15 to work out a p o l i t i c a l  settlement of the c r i s i s .  _ 72 _  Mujib put forth four demands, which included the withdrawal of Martial Law, the transfer of power to the elected representatives, the with109 drawal of troops, and an inquiry into the army firing on March 2 and 3. Mujib also stipulated that the general strike in East Pakistan would continue and that the "de facto" transfer of power i n Bengal would remain while he negotiated  a "de jure" transfer of power with Yahya and  Bhutto. Yahya conceded the four demands, and a draft proclamation containing the outlines of an interim arrangement for the transfer of power to the elected representatives was drawn up.  The proposal  provided for the immediate cessation of martial law and the transfer of power to the majority party i n each of the five provinces, without such a transfer of power i n the center, where Yahya would stay on as President during the interim phase.  It also provided for the  division of the national assembly into two committees, one for each wing, to draft separate reports on the basis of which the constitution would be framed.  Autonomy was granted to East Pakistan on the basis  of Mujib's Six Point Program, while the amount of autonomy for the other four provinces was l e f t to mutual agreement. Even though the provision for the separate transfer of power to the provinces and the center was designed essentially to accommodate Bhutto, who was obsessed with the fear that Mujib would enter into collusion with the smaller West Pakistani parties and so neutralize the influence of his party, Bhutto nevertheless rejected the proposed  - 73 -  scheme. When Bhutto met with Yahya and Mujib  on March 22 in Dacca,  he put forth several o b j e c t i o n s . F i r s t of a l l , he said that after the removal of martial law the proposed proclamation would have no legal sanction, no way to ensure that a l l provisions were carrried out, and no way to stop a Bengali declaration of independence i f one should be made.  Secondly, Bhutto also wished to include i n the  proclamation a provision that any constitution must be approved by a majority of the members of the National Assembly from each wing rather than by a simple majority.  Thirdly, he objected to the provisions  concerning the two committees and the different amounts of autonomy for the two wings, and suggested as an alternative that a joint session of a national assembly be called f i r s t , or that he be given more time to negotiate directly with Mujib. Mujib rejected Bhutto's alternative suggestions, and Tajuddin Ahmad said that as far as the Awami League was concerned, there was no need for further meeting but simply the implementation 112 of the Yahya-Mujib agreement.  By this time i t was evident that  Bhutto was not willing to concede anything to Mujib.  His tactics  throughout the negotiations were designed to buy time in the hope that Yahya's army would step in and thus end the talks.  His stalling  techniques only served to increase the growing animosity between Yahya and Mujib which made agreement between them virtually impossible. When Yahya and Mujib finally did arrive at an agreement, i t was Bhutto who rejected i t .  After the meeting on March 22, Yahya was  - 74 -  thus faced with the acceptance by Mujib, and rejection by Bhutto and probably some of the military of the plan to transfer power.  113  Faced with this situation, Yahya decided on March 25, to launch a military campaign against East Pakistan, even though the negotiations had not suffered a formal breakdown. As subsequent events were to show, this decision was a tactical blunder of major proportions. Mujib was imprisoned and c i v i l war broke out.  On March 26, the  independence of Bangla Desh was formally declared on behalf of the Awami League and i t s leader, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman.  A  CONCLUSION  In conclusion, i t should be noted that both of the preceding power struggles resulting in secession, followed a remarkably similar pattern. The i n i t i a l phase in this pattern is characterized by cooperation. In Indian politics this phase of cooperation between the League and the Congress lasted up until the 1937 elections.  Although this  cooperation was strongest just prior to and during the 1920s (when Jinnah was hailed as the ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity, when the Lucknow Pact was negotiated, and when Hindus and Muslims joined hands in the Khilafat movement under Gandhi's leadership) and began to deteriorate in 1927-8 (when Jinnah's credibility as the leader representing a l l Indian Muslims was questioned by the Congress), the final break came after the 1937 elections.  It was not until this time that  Jinnah ended his conciliatory policies and went to "war" against the Congress in the name of Muslim separatism.  During this period of  cooperation, the British served mainly to unite the Hindus and Muslims against a common foe. self-government  Even though the British had been promising  since 1919, this promise was not given concrete shape  until 1935, and i t was not until after this time that the real HinduMuslim power struggle began. Similarly, in Pakistani politics, Ayub Khan's military regime served as the common target against which the West Pakistani and - 75 -  - 76 -  Bengali opposition forces were united.  Again, this cooperation was  broken down due to Yahya Khan's promise to return the country to representative government, and to hold elections in 1970.  After the  elections, any cooperation which had existed between Bhutto's People's Party and Mujib's Awami League had vanished. The second phase i n the pattern represents a "parting of the ways" and i s usually initiated by elections. In this phase, competition replaces cooperation, and minorities feel the need to find friends who w i l l protect them against the p o l i t i c a l dominance of majorities. In Indian politics, the 1937 and the 1945-6 elections had the effect of hardening the lines between the Congress and the League and hence undermining the sense of cooperation and mutuality necessary for constructive bargaining.  The League's election strategy, which empha-  sized the "vote for your own kind" politics, virtually precluded any inter-party reciprocity.  The British, during this phase, came to be  viewed as both friend and foe.  The League, being i n the minority,  especially realized the danger of alienating the British.  Hence the  League aligned i t s e l f with the British (as may be seen i n the League's pledge of support to the British war effort during 1939-45) in the hope of gaining constitutional concessions which would protect Muslim interests vis-a-vis the Hindu majority. In Pakistan, a slightly different situation prevailed. When i t became clear that the Awami League, the majority, would dominate  - 77 -  the government after the elections, Bhutto, who represented the minority, aligned himself with the Yahya regime, which represented the dominant force in Pakistan, and pursued a policy designed to frustrate Mujib's effort to come to an agreement with Yahya.  In this case i t  was the majority and not the minority which wished to separate. In India, the Hindu national elite sought to take over the reigns of power from the alien authority of the British.  The Muslim  minority "counterelite" contested such a transfer of power and f i n a l l y opted for secession once i t became clear that the tyranny of the majority would prevail.  In Pakistan, two "counterelites" sought to  take over power from the indigenous, arbitrary and exclusive authority of the Yahya regime.  When the majority Bengali counterelite  threatened to predominate, the minority West Pakistani counterelite led by Bhutto aligned i t s e l f with the national elite represented by v u »s regime. .114 Yahya In the third phase, i t i s typical for negotiations to break down and for direct action to be resorted to.  Because of the  hardening effect of the elections, negotiations tend to get bogged down easily.  The subjects of the negotiations, which are usually  symbolic of the minority's fear of p o l i t i c a l domination, involve such issues as ethnic group representation in the governmental administrative structure, recognition of language rights for ethnic minorities, and constitutional safeguards for these minority interests. These  - 78 issues represent virtually insoluble problems.  As Donald Horowitz  points out, In s t r i c t l y proportional terms, the problem (of access to positions and promotions in government) is intractable. Since the groups rarely approach parity in both numbers and educational attainment, there i s bound to be a dissatisfied segment, no matter what the proportions in the government service are. A group may feel deprived because i t i s underrepresented either by numerical c r i t e r i a or by merit c r i t e r i a , and occasionally by both.!!-* Hence the nature of the issues also contribute to the breakdown of negotiations. Another factor which militates against the bargaining process is the resort to violence.  Direct action usually takes over from  bargaining when there has been a threat to end or thwart the domination of a group entrenched in power, and when this provocation, usually from the aspiring, less legitimate group, has been met with violence from the entrenched, more legitimate g r o u p . T h i s was clearly the pattern in Pakistan, where Mujib's election victory and his uncompromising stance on proportional representation and Bengali autonomy in the post-election constitutional negotiations, were perceived as threats to their dominant position by the pro-Yahya Punjabi oligarchy in West Pakistan and were eventually met with a violent military response. In India, the situation was somewhat different. Here, i t was Jinnah who broke off negotiations to resort to direct action in 1946, after Nehru's indiscriminate rejection of the Cabinet Mission Plan.  - 79 -  This rejection was perceived by Jinnah as threatening to preclude the possibility of establishing Pakistan through constitutional means, and violence was subsequently resorted to. This resort to direct action, however, contributed l i t t l e to the establishment of Pakistan, and Jinnah returned to more constitutional methods to obtain his goal. It was largely due to the British presence that i t was possible for Pakistan to be created constitutionally without c i v i l war.  The British  had nothing to lose by the Partition of India, since they had already lost the whole subcontinent.  Jinnah, on the other hand, had everything  to gain by the establishment of a separate Muslim state. Jinnah would rule supreme; leader.  In Pakistan,  i n India, he would be a mere minority  The Congress also gained through the Partition by obtaining  p o l i t i c a l supremacy in an independent and self-governing India. Returning to Pakistan, i t was Yahya who had everything to lose by the secession of East Pakistan. gain a lot.  Bhutto on the other hand stood to  Once Mujib and his Bengali majority were eliminated  from Pakistani politics, the People's Party would become the dominant force In Pakistan and Bhutto would emerge as the head of state. For Mujib, i t probably made l i t t l e difference whether Pakistan remained united on the basis of his Six Points, or whether an independent Bangla Desh was established. leader.  In either case he would emerge as the supreme  When Yahya rejected Mujib's Six Points, probably upon Bhutto's  coaxing, Mujib was l e f t only with the option of Bangla Desh.  In order  to keep the country united, Yahya initiated his military campaign against the Bengali separatists.  FOOTNOTES  1.  Khalid B. Sayeed. Pakistan: The Formative Phase, 1857-1948. 2nd. ed., London, Oxford University Press, 1968, p. 7.  2.  Lewis J. Edinger, "Political Science and P o l i t i c a l Biography: Reflections on the Study of Leadership", Part I, Journal of Politics, Vol. 26. #2, May 1964, p. 434. For a similar approach to the study of leadership, see F.G. Bailey, Strategems and Spoils, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969, especially p. 36-84.  3.  Howard Wriggins, The Ruler's Imperative. Press, 1969, p. v i i .  4.  Lasswell's hypothesis i s that "... the power seeker ... pursues power as a means of compensating against deprivation. Power i s expected to overcome low estimates of the self, by changing either the traits of the self or the environment i n which i t functions." i n Harold D. Lasswell, Power and Personality. New York, Compass Book Edition of the Viking Press, 1962, p. 39.  5.  Secession can usually only be a viable alternative i f the leader's support i s concentrated t e r r i t o r i a l l y . For instance, the t e r r i t o r i a l i t y of ethnicity and of a leader's ethnic group support, i s a crucial factor i n determining the likelihood of secession. In the Pakistan case, we are confronted with a clear-cut situation i n which the aggrieved ethnic group, the Bengalis, i s concentrated i n a specific territory, namely East Pakistan. The factor of t e r r i t o r i a l concentration makes for a much different situation than one where the aggrieved group and the leader's support i s spread throughout the country, such as the Blacks i n the United States or the Chinese i n Malaya. In the former case, secession becomes a plausible option for the leader and for the resolution of the group's grievances, whereas i n the latter case, the resolution may involve revolution. In this limited sense, revolution may be seen as the non-territorial counterpart of secession. In India, however, the situation was not as clear-cut as i n Pakistan. Although the majority of Muslims were concentrated i n the provinces in the North-west and North-east of the Indian subcontinent, the idea of t e r r i t o r i a l i t y was formed i n the very process of seeking p o l i t i c a l independence for the Muslims. Since not a l l Muslims were concentrated in one specific territory, many Muslims had to migrate to the Muslimmajority provinces which were to compose the new nation of Pakistan. Many other Muslims, however, were left behind i n India. - 80 -  New York, Columbia University  - 81 -  6.  For a similar argument see Andrew S. Janos, "Authority and Violence: The P o l i t i c a l Framework of Internal War" in Harry Eckstein (ed.) Internal War, New York, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. (Janos argues that internal war can be seen as a means in the struggle for authority, see p. 130).  7.  For a more detailed exposition of this argument, see Donald Rothchild, "Ethnicity and Conflict Resolution" in Robert J. Jackson and Michael B. Stein (eds.), Issues in Comparative Politics, New York, St. Martin's Press, 1971, p. 181-193.  8.  Donald Rothchild defines a "non-negotiating situation" or a "nonbargaining situation" as one in which "dissensus often prevails and reciprocity among collectives is s t r i c t l y limited in scope. Such a situation obviously i s present where violence i s resorted to and at least one of the parties to the dispute refuses to engage in a genuine process of give-and-take". "In addition to the refusal to negotiage ... the forcible domination of one sector by another, (and) various situational transformations such as extermination, assimilation, and exodus also work against the achievement of interethnic bargaining." See Ibid, p. 186-187.  9.  See K.C. Wheare, Federal Government. University Press, 1964.  4th ed., New York, Oxford  10.  See William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation and Significance. Boston, L i t t l e , Brown and Co., 1964.  11.  Rounaq Jahan states that "While state-building requires the creation and concentration of authority and an emphasis on the role of government in the social process ... , nation-building, especially in states with several subnational groups, often calls for dispersal of power and an emphasis on responsiveness in the p o l i t i c a l process ... The prime necessity of the state's survival as an independent international entity often pushes the governing elite to concentrate on state-building at the cost of nation-building. By overemphasizing the need for the concentration of authority, the maintenance of law and order, economic development, and the establishment of an efficient administrative apparatus, the ruling elite in the new states often under-estimates the need to nourish and strengthen the p o l i t i c a l process. Most new governments find i t d i f f i c u l t to share power and enter into  - 82 -  a p o l i t i c a l dialogue with the subnational groups i n order to develop a national ideology, and above a l l to tolerate an acceptable level of instability in the system. In the absence of adequate policies for nation-building, however, the cohesion of the state becomes tenuous." Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration. New York, Columbia University Press, 1972, p. 3-4. 12.  Philips and Wainwright interpret this event as follows: "On the outbreak of war in September 1939 Jinnah received some evidence that he had achieved a certain measure of success in his policy of building up the Muslim League, for he was one of the leaders to be consulted by the viceroy on the day following the declaration of war. As he later said (in his presidential address to the All-Indian Muslim League at i t s Lahore session i n March, 1940) ' ... up to the time of the declaration of war the Viceroy never thought of me but of Gandhi and Gandhi alone ... I wondered within myself why I was so suddenly promoted ... ' and he concluded that the reason was that the Muslim League had now become a power to be reckoned with. As Jinnah realized, this was a sharp blow to the Congress claim to speak on behalf of a l l India, and the British recognition that he was the leader of an important party increased Jinnah's stature, and that of the League, among Muslims. From now on the League's demands, particularly the demand for Pakistan after 1940, were taken into consideration by the British government whenever new proposals were put forward." See introduction in C.H. Philips & M.D. Wainwright (eds.) The Partition of India: Policies and Perspectives, 1935-1947, London, George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1970, p. 36.  13.  See Andrew C. Janos, "Authority and Violence: The P o l i t i c a l Framework of Internal War" in Eckstein (ed.), 0p_. Cit., p. 136.  14.  Jahan, 0p_. Cit., p. 39.  15.  See Ralph Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1959.  - 83 -  This hypothesis has been put forth by Graham White, Jack Millar and Wallace Gague, " P o l i t i c a l Integration i n Quebec During the 1960's". Canadian Ethnic Studies, Vol. 3, #2, Dec. 1971. Sayeed, 0p_. Cit. , p. 211. See Ibid., p. 177-178. See Karl W. Deutsch, "Communication Theory and P o l i t i c a l Integration in Philip E. Jacob and James V. Toscano (eds.) The Integration of P o l i t i c a l Communities, New York, J«B. Lippincott Co., 1964, p. 46-74. See also, Karl W. Deutsch, et. a l . (eds.) P o l i t i c a l Community and the North Atlantic Area, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 36-37; p. 50-53; p. 149-151; p. 169-170. This was a phrase used by Congressman Gakhale in a tribute to Jinnah "He (Jinnah) has true stuff in him and that freedom from a l l sectarian prejudice which w i l l make him the best ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity." quoted i n M.H. Saiyid.Mohammad A l i Jinnah: A P o l i t i c a l Study. Lahore, Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1953, p. 75. Khalid B. Sayeed, "The Personality of Jinnah and His P o l i t i c a l Strategy", in Philips and Wainwright (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 277. Mohammad Assembly Mohammad 1947-48. Karachi,  A l i Jinnah, "Presidential Address to the Constituent of Pakistan on 11 August, 1947", quoted in Quaid-i-Azam, A l i Jinnah, Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan, Pakistan Publications, 1962, p. 9.  G. Allana, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah: The Story of a Nation. Ferozsons Ltd., 1967, p. 50;  Karachi,  The Imperial Legislative Council was created by the Morley-Minto Reforms which operationalized the concept of separate electorates and weightage for the Muslims in elected bodies. Besides these reforms, the Viceroy's Executive Council, which consisted of  - 84 Six members and the Commander-in-Chief who assisted the Viceroy in the administration of the country, was enlarged into what was called the Imperial Legislative Council. This new Council provided for sixty members, against the previous six, of which thirty-five were to be nominated and twenty-five elected. This was the f i r s t time that the British government provided for the election of Indians to participate actively and effectively in the administration of their own country. These reforms which were formulated in 1909, were to be incorporated in the Indian Councils Act of 1919. For further information, see G. Allana (ed.) Pakistan Movement: Historic Documents, Karachi, Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968, p. 24. 25.  For a f u l l description of the Congress-League Scheme of Reforms adopted at Lucknow, see Ibid., p. 25-48.  26.  D. P. Singhal, Pakistan. 1972, p. 50.  27.  The India Act of 1919 implemented the Montagu-Chelmsford Report of 1918 which recommended the establishment of a partially responsible government in India. An all-Indian parliament of two houses was established, although the Viceroy reserved the right to issue emergency laws without reference to the Chambers, and the legislature s t i l l had no power to remove the executive. In the provinces, however, the Act made some concessions to the principle of responsible government by instituting a dyarchy (i.e. rule by two bodies); "reserved subjects" remained the prerogative of the permanent o f f i c i a l s , but "transferred subjects" were handed over to the responsibility of the elected Legislative Councils. The Act was an experiment and subject to review after ten years; i t was, in fact, criticized in the Simon Report of 1930 and virtually superseded in 1935.  28.  The Khilafat Movement represented the Indian Muslims' response to the British policy in Turkey after the First World War. In response to the proposed dismemberment of Turkey after the war, the Indian Muslims, who had been encouraged previously to look up to the Caliph in Turkey as their spiritual head, opted for Turkey against Britain. Muslim leaders formed themselves into a Khilafat conference in 1919. Under the leadership of the A l l brothers (Muhammad A l l and Shaukat A l i ) , the Muslims were urged to cooperate with the Congress which, under Ghandi's leadership, had commenced an anti-British campaign.  Englewood C l i f f s , Prentice-Hall Inc.,  - 85 -  A joint conference was organized at Delhi in November, 1919, to discuss the measures to be taken, and Gandhi was elected as the president of the Conference. The movement subsequently got underway in August, 1920. 29.  S.K. Majumdar. Jinnah and Gandhi. 1968, p. 96.  Calcutta, Firma Mukhopadhyay,  30.  Ibid., p. 68.  31.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Saiyid, 0p_. Cit., p. 186-187.  32.  Sayeed i n Philips  33.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Majumdar, 0p_. C i t . , p. 107.  34.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n S.M.J. Zafar, Founders of Pakistan. Lahore, Publishers United Ltd., 1968, p. 205.  35.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Hector Bolitho, Jinnah: of Pakistan. London, John Murray, 1954, p. 95.  36.  For an elaboration of the Fourteen Points Scheme, see M.R. Afzal and S.M. Ikram (eds.), Selected Speeches of the Quaid-i-Azam, Mohammad A l i Jinnah. Lahore, University of the Punjab, 1966, p. 302-305.  37.  See Majumdar, 0p_. C i t . , p. 115.  38.  Ibid., p. 115-116.  39.  See Sayeed, 0p_. Cit., p. 70-75.  & Wainwright (eds.), 0p_. Cit. , p. 282.  Creator  - 86 ~  40.  The India Act of 1935 was based on the decisions of the Round Table Conference and the "White Paper" of 1933. The Act proposed the transformation of the Indian Empire into a federation which would include native states as well as the provinces of British India. The federal administration was to be a dyarchy with responsible government for certain selected subjects but with the Viceroy retaining rights on others. The Act gave greater authority to the provincial assemblies, allowing eleven of them f u l l responsible government within their areas. The section of the Act dealing with provincial government came into force on 1 April, 1937, but divisions among the various Indian communities prevented the initiation of a federal government before the outbreak of World War II, and, with the decision to give India dominion status after the war, the federal section of the 1935 Act remained a dead letter.  41.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Bolitho, 0p_. Cit. , p. 100.  42.  See introduction in Philips and Wainwright (eds.), 0p_. Cit., p. 34.  43.  The Communal Award of 1932 reaffirmed the traditional policy of separate electorates and weightage to minorities, and i t was heavily t i l t e d i n favour of minorities.  44.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted in Majumdar, 0p_. Cit., p. 156.  45.  See Ibid.. p. 157, and Saiyid, 0p_. Cit., p. 323-328.  46.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Saiyid, 0p_. Cit., p. 327-328.  47.  Majumdar, 0p_. Cit., p. 159.  48.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Sachin Sen, The Birth of Pakistan. Calcutta, General Printers and Publishers Ltd., 1955, p. 107.  49.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted i n Sayeed, 0p_. Cit., p. 83.  - 87 -  50.  For the election results see, Singhal, Op. Cit., p. 57-58.  51.  Majumdar, Op. Cit., p. 162.  52.  Zafar, Op. Cit., p. 215-216.  53.  Singhal, Op. Cit., p. 59.  54.  Loc. Cit. Singhal also points out that, "The Congress failed to understand the real nature of i t s electoral success. If the League did not win the majority of Muslim votes, neither did the Congress. In order to compete for the neutral Muslim votes and the support of the vast number of Muslims who were not yet enfranchised, the Congress had to redesign i t s strategy. It insisted, however, that the much talked about communal problem did not really exist, and that by continuing to emphasize the p o l i t i c a l and economic issues, i t would be able to reach the Muslim masses effectively and to draw out their anti-imperialist s p i r i t " . See Ibid. , p. 59-60.  55.  B. R. Nanda, "Nehru, The Indian National Congress and the Partition of India, 1935-1947" i n Philips & Wainwright (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 155.  56.  See introduction i n Ibid., p. 35.  57.  Loc. C i t .  58.  Nanda i n Ibid., p. 158.  59.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted by Sayeed in Ibid. , p. 282.  60.  Nanda, i n Ibid.,  61.  Loc. C i t .  62.  Sayeed, Op. Cit., p. 214.  63.  Mohammad A l i Jinnah, quoted in Zafar, Op. Cit., p.218.  p. 162.  _ 88 -  64.  Syed SharifuddinPirzada, The Pakistan Resolution and the Historic Lahore Session. Karachi, Pakistan Publications, 1968, p. 14.  65.  See introduction in Philips & Wainwright (eds.) Op. Cit. , p. 25.  66.  Mohanda Karamchand Gandhi quoted in the introduction in Ibid., p. 26.  67.  Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted i n the introduction in Loc. C i t .  68.  Loc. Cit.  69.  Loc. Cit.  70.  Loc. C i t .  71.  Ibid., p. 25.  72.  Singhal, Op. Cit., p. 64-65. Singhal also states that "By 1944 in Bengal alone the League's membership was reported to be over 5 million; and in Sind 25 per cent of the adult male Muslim population had joined the League. Between 1938 and 1942 the Muslim League won 46 out of the 56 Muslim seats in by-elections." Of course this increase can not be attributed solely to the appeal which the idea of a separate Muslim state had on the Muslims. The League's policies which i t adopted to increase its support after the 1937 elections and the refusal of the Congress to form coalition ministries with the League also undoubtedly contributed to the League's growing strength.  73.  Nanda in Philips & Wainwright (eds.) Op. C i t . , p. 167.  74.  Sayeed, Op. Cit., p. 217.  75.  Sayeed in Philips & Wainwright (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 288.  _ 89-  76.  Loc. Cit.  77.  For the election results see Singhal, Op. Cit., p. 71.  78.  For further details about the Cabinet Mission Plan, see Ibid., p. 72.  79.  Ibid., p. 73.  80.  Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, quoted in Majumdar, Op. Cit., p. 227.  81.  Jahan, Op. Cit., p. 148.  82.  Loc. C i t .  83.  S. R. Chowdhury The Genesis of Bangladesh, New York, Asia Publishing House, 1972, p. 17-19.  84.  Jahan, Op. C i t . , p. 160.  85.  Angus Maddison. Class Structure and Economic Growth. London, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1971, p. 136.  86.  This i s adequately illustrated  87.  Loc. C i t .  88.  Quoted in M. Rashiduzzaman, "The Awami League in the P o l i t i c a l Development of Pakistan", Asian Survey, Vol. X, #7, July 1970, p. 583.  89.  N. C. Sahni, P o l i t i c a l Struggle in Pakistan, Jullundur City, New Academic Publishing Co., 1969, p. 48-49 and p. 60-62.  90.  Ibid. , p. 27-28; 46-48; 119-144.  in Chowdhury, Op. C i t . , p. 6-21.  - 90 -  91.  Ibid., p. 123-124.  92.  It became clear after Ayub's decision to resign that the West Pakistani protest movement which had fallen under Bhutto's leadership was directed against Ayub's system and was intended to oust Ayub from power. Once this aim was accomplished, the protest in West Pakistan subsided. In East Pakistan, however, Ayub's resignation was looked upon as only the f i r s t step toward the achievement of Bengali autonomist objectives. Given this divergence of objectives, attending the Round Table Conference was more conducive to obtaining Rahman's aims than Bhutto's. See Jahan, Op. Cit., p. 174.  93.  Loc. Cit.  94.  Ibid. , p. 186.  95.  Herbert Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis. London, Oxford University Press, 1972, p. 266-268.  96.  Janah, Op. Cit., p. 187.  97.  Ibid., p. 187-188.  98.  For the election results, see Ibid., p. 190.  99.  P. Srivastava. The Discovery of Bangla Desh. New Delhi, Sanjay Publications, 1972, p. 83.  100.  Zulfiqar A l i Bhutto, quoted in Ibid., p. 84.  101.  "David Dunbar" (pseud.) "Pakistan: The Failure of Negotiations" Asian Survey, Vol. XII #5, May 1972, p. 450.  102.  Jahan, Op. Cit. , p. 194.  103. " "David Dunbar", Op. Cit.,  p >  452^53.  -  91-  104.  Srivistava, Op. Cit., p. 96-97;  and Singhal, Op. Cit., p. 195.  105.  Jahan, Op. Cit., p. 195.  106.  "David Dunbar", Op. Cit., p. 454.  107.  M. Rashiduzzaman, "Leadership, Organization, Strategies and Tactics of the Bangla Desh Movement". Asian Survey, Vol. XII #3, March 1972, p. 186-187.  108.  "David Dunbar", Op. Cit., p. 455.  109.  Rehman Sobhan "Negotiating for Bangla Desh", South Asian Review, Vol. 4, #4, July 1971, p. 321-322.  110.  See "David Dunbar", for the following, Op. Cit., p. 458-459.  111.  Jahan, Op. Cit., p. 195-196.  112.  "David Dunbar", Op. Cit., p. 459.  113.  Ibid., p. 460.  114.  For a discussion of those different authority types and the kinds of rebellion they are likely to foster, see William Kornhauser, "Rebellion and P o l i t i c a l Development" in Eckstein (ed.) Op. Cit., p. 173.  115.  Donald Horowitz, "Multiracial Politics in the New States" in Jackson & Stein (eds.) Op. Cit., p. 173.  116.  Ibid., p. 178-179.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Afzal, M.F. & S.M. Ikram (eds.) Selected Speeches and Statements of the Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad A l i Jinnah. Lahore, Research Society of Pakistan, University of the Punjab, 1966. Ake, Claude, A Theory of P o l i t i c a l Integration, Homewood, The Dorsey Press, 1967. A l i , Chaudhri Muhammad, The Emergence of Pakistan, New York, Columbia University Press, 1967. Allana, G. Quaid-e-Azam, Jinnah: The Story of a Nation. Ferozsons Ltd. , 1967.  Lahore,  Allana, G. (ed.), Pakistan Movement Historic Documents. Karachi, Paradise Subscription Agency, 1968.  2nd ed.,  Bailey, F.G. , Strategems and Spoils, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1969. 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