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All you need is love - and an international organization : the role of the Inter-American Commission… Campbell, Kathryn 2007

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A l l You Need is Love - and an International Organization: The Role of the Inter-American Commission and Court on Human Rights Improving Conditions in Latin America by Kathryn Campbell A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (Political Science) THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA August 2007 © Kathryn Campbell, 2007 Abstract The Inter-American Commission for Human Rights and its partner Court have been major players in the improvement of human rights in Latin America. Since their creation, the two organizations have had a profound effect on the behaviour of states in the region, and have helped to bring the worst abuses of various regimes to the light of international scrutiny. Thanks to the support of the US, but avoiding the restrictions hegemon sponsorship tends to imply, the IACHR and Court have been given the means with which to pursue allegations of human rights violations and punish the offending states. The diffusion of international human rights norms through the channel of human rights law has given these two institutions the necessary framework in which they can operate, and their institutional independence has ensured that their actions have generally been successful and accepted by member states. This provides an important case study in the utility of international organizations, as the Commission and Court have proved that these organizations do indeed have the potential to affect state actions and policies. Table of Contents Abstract ii Table of Contents iii Acknowledgements iv Introduction 1 CHAPTER I Theoretical Framework 2 CHAPTER LT The OAS and Human Rights 6 CHAPTER III The Evolution of the IACHR 8 3.1 Case Study: The Dominican Republic 10 3.2 Case Study: Nicaragua 12 CHAPTER IY The Link to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights 14 4.1 Case Study: Honduras 16 CHAPTER V Explaining the Impact of the Commission and Court 18 5.1 The Role of the United States 18 5.2 The Role of Civil Society: Domestic and International 22 5.3 International Law and the Diffusion of Norms 25 CHAPTER VI Stumbling Blocks to the Commission and Court 27 Conclusion 31 Bibliography 34 Appendix A: IACHR Cases & Rulings Involving the United States 37 Appendix B: Contentious Cases Before the Court 38 Acknowledgements I am grateful for the patience and support of a number of my professors in completing this work. Dr. Richard Price has been a continuing source of inspiration, and has driven me to pursue the slippery question of norms and their impact. Dr. Brian Job and Dr. Philippe Le Billon convinced me of the importance of accurately explaining the world in which we find ourselves, providing a beacon of reality to guide my academic efforts. Dr. Katharina Coleman introduced the category of international organizations to me, allowing me to ground my ideas in a systematic way. Her guidance on this paper has been immensely helpful and much appreciated. Introduction The evolution of human rights norms and practices around the world has been a gradual, painful process. The last fifty years have seen the demise of numerous brutal authoritarian regimes, and their replacement with at least nominally democratic governments. The degree to which these fledgling democracies have upheld or improved human rights within their borders has varied wildly. Latin America offers a fascinating case study for the emergence of respect for human rights that is particularly interesting because it highlights the importance of international players, particularly inter-governmental organizations, in the diffusion of these norms. There has been a "transition from a culture of sovereign impunity to a culture of national and international accountability."1 Leading the way along this path to human dignity in Latin America has been the Inter-American Cornrnission of Human Rights and its partner, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. This paper argues that the Commission and Court are independent, effective institutions. As independent institutions, they are free of political manipulation by their member states and pursue their mandates in a neutral fashion. They are effective in this endeavor, as they have had a substantial impact on the improvement of human rights in the region. Following a study of the evolution of the two organizations, the argument continues onto a discussion of the overall successes and failures of the institutions. The theoretical reasons for institutional importance are addressed in three sections. First, the role of the US as a benefactor of the IACHR and regional hegemon are proven to be significant, but not omnipresent. The IACHR and Court have retained a high degree of institutional independence 1 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. International Development Research Center (US, 2001) p . l 4 1 and have not been degraded to tools of the hegemon. Second, the role of civil society in strengthening and responding to the Commission and Court is shown to be a factor in the continuation of the two institutions, although not in their initial rise to power. Third, the rise of human rights norms as embodied in international law gives greater meaning to the strength of the IACHR and Court. Finally, the failures and limitations of the two institutions are discussed in relation to opposition from member states, the OAS and inherent structural weaknesses. I. Theoretical Framework The IACHR and Court provide a particularly interesting case study for testing general theories on the utility of international institutions. The three main explanations for compliance with international institutions are systemic, interest-based, and normative. The rules and principles laid out and represented by international institutions are problematic, in that there remains a large degree of disagreement over why states would and do choose to comply. Ian Hurd clearly illustrates three basic reasons why an actor might obey rules: "(1) because the actor fears the punishment of rule enforcers, (2) because the actor sees the rule as in its own self-interest, and (3) because the actor feels the rule is legitimate and ought to be obeyed."" These three possible reasons behind compliance are derived from three very different views of the world and relationships between states. The first hypothesis for compliance with institutions comes from the realist school of thought, in particular the structural realists. According to this interpretation, the IACHR and Court are tools of the dominant states in the region or system, rather than notable actors in their own right. Thus, the structural realist argument would be that the IACHR and Court are merely following the lead of the US and do not in fact display any true institutional 2 Hurd 1999, p.379. 2 independence or legitimacy outside of US patronage.3 The case studies presented later on in this work will serve to contradict this view and prove that institutions can and do in fact act on their own initiative, often diverging from the interests of their founders and dominant members. Institutions can become principals, rather than remaining submissive agents to powerful states. As Barnett and Finnemore note, "Not only are international organizations independent actors with their own agendas, but they may embody multiple agendas and contain multiple sources of agency..."4 The IACHR and Court successfully gained a great degree of institutional independence, violating the Realist perception of the agent and principal. The second hypothesis stems from the finding that hegemonic power is an insufficient condition for institutional success and members' obedience. Following on Hurd's second reason for compliance, self-interest emerges as another explanation for state acquiescence to a rule. Moravcsik's liberal explanation of state interests illustrates the significance of domestic pressures on the development of state interest, and provides a firm basis for understanding the role of NGOs in molding state interests. "States (or other political institutions) represent some subset of domestic society, on the basis of whose interests state officials define state preferences and act purposively in world politics."5 International institutions may arise in response to domestic pressure on various governments, demanding better human rights. Keck and Sikkink discuss the role of transnational advocacy networks in lobbying various governments to improve their human rights records.6 This kind of activism can serve to alter the perceived self-interest of a state. In the interests of self-preservation and appeasing disruptive activists, a government may choose to improve its human rights record and submit 3 Krasner 1982 4 Barnetl and Finnemore 1999, p.704. 5Moravcsik 1997, p.518. 6 Keck and Sikkink 1998 3 to an international institution for monitoring and review. However, the IACHR and Court were not founded in response to domestic agitation, but rather preceded the domestic human rights movement in Latin America by several decades. Significantly, the IACHR and Court provided an environment where domestic human rights advocacy was possible, as the institutions created a non-corrupt, neutral recourse for activists against various governments. Thus, the second hypothesis regarding self-interest as the primary motivation for compliance with these institutions is incomplete. Ian Hurd's third reason for actors obeying rules is perhaps the most complete answer to the question of institutional success. Legitimacy can be interpreted as the quality an actor gains when they are in accordance with a widely accepted norm. States seem to comply with institutional rules because they believe these rules to be legitimate; a secondary motivation for compliance is that states seek to appear as legitimate themselves by following these accepted rules. For the purposes of this argument, the legitimacy of the institution and its rules are of primary importance, although essentially inseparable from a state's quest for legitimacy, which is a significant motivating factor for compliance. Hurd's definition of legitimacy is the "normative belief by an actor that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed." However, this does not explain why an institution is considered legitimate in the first place. Institutions such as the IACHR and Court are the embodiment of certain norms like human rights. Institutions provide these norms with structure and formal rules for states to follow, so understanding the importance of norms is a key factor in comprehending the motivations behind state compliance and institutional power. 7 Hurd 1999, p.381. 4 First, the progression of norms can be understood thanks to Finnemore and Sikkink's outline of the lifecycle of a norm. The norm emerges, often thanks to a 'norm entrepreneur', then it reaches a tipping point where a critical mass of states have come to accept it. The norm then "cascades" throughout the international system, thanks to the desire of states for conformity and international legitimacy. Finally, the norm becomes so internalized that it achieves on a 'taken for granted' nature and is virtually indiscernible.8 In this progression, institutions act as "conveyor belts" for the spread of norms.9 International institutions provide socialization for states. Socialization remains a somewhat loose concept within international relations, but there is a consensus that at root, it is "a process of learning in which norms and ideals are transmitted from one party to another."10 Institutions improve socialization amongst their members, and therefore play a substantial role in providing a certain level of conformity in behaviour.11 Once all the actors are socialized to accept and follow a norm, it can reach the internalized stage and become a relatively permanent fixture of international relations. International institutions are the vessels for these rules and norms, and as such they become the legitimate authority behind an accepted norm. Norm breakers can be shamed and even rejected by institutions for their 'anti-social' behaviour, while compliant states are praised and held up as models of good behaviour. The exact implication of this shaming or praising is a source of great debate. However, the rate of compliance with norms seems to indicate that they are held in great esteem by a majority of states, the majority of the time. ~ Even when states fail to comply with an institution and the norm it represents, they do not generally do so with total impunity. 8 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 9 Barnett & Finnemore 1999, p.712. 1 0 Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, p.289. " Johnston 2001 l 2Chayes and Chayes 1993 5 Justifications and excuses are always made, indicating that the norm breaker is aware of its wrongdoing and realizes its behaviour is inappropriate. This is the main source of legitimacy for international institutions. With this legitimacy comes institutional power. It is not the same kind of power as that wielded by states; no institution existing today holds any military or economic capacity in its own right. The IACHR and the Court have the ability to influence state behaviour, to alter their actions and even their own interests because they are simply attempting to enforce norms already in existence and already accepted, at least nominally, by their member states. II. The OAS and Human Rights The Organization of American States was created in 1948 by twenty-one states of the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.13 The OAS was founded on principles of non-intervention, state sovereignty, and regional cooperation. Most importantly, the Latin American members sought to bind the US into a regional organization that would ensure its continued financial support and limit its political interference. For its part, the US welcomed the creation of an organization it hoped would take over some of its security responsibilities for the hemisphere, and act as an additional bastion against the threat of Communism.14 The structure of the OAS reflects these various concerns, as the most powerful body remains the General Assembly where every state has a seat and an equal vote. However, while the OAS was originally created to foster cooperation on economic and security issues, it evolved quickly into a far more complex creature. 1 3 Original OAS members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 1 4 Tulchin 1995 6 The rapid emergence of concerns for human rights in the region was a product of the spread of brutal authoritarian regimes, which continued unabated until the 1980s. Dictatorships arose in virtually every state of Latin America, and the region became synonymous with repression, corruption and abuse of power. This trend was characterized by such infamous leaders as Castro in Cuba, Stroessner in Paraguay, Pinochet in Chile, Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, and military juntas such as those in Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. The rampant human rights abuses were in clear violation of the OAS Charter, which clearly endorses the principles of the United Nations, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (signed shortly after the OAS Charter). Furthermore, Article 3 states that "social justice and social security are the bases of lasting peace" and proclaims respect for the "fundamental rights of the individual".15 The initial documents of the OAS show quite clearly that members saw human rights as "merely a diplomatic decoration".16 Despite the indifference with which individual states treated their populations, there was pressure to appear to be supporting principles of human rights. This pressure came from domestic sources as well as from Latin America's relationship with the US, and from a growing international movement towards greater recognition of human rights. The colonial legacy of Latin America created an environment initially open to authoritarian rule, but it also left a "cultural consensus which accepts, in theory, the place of human rights in the social order".17 This underlying expectation of domestic audiences for some kind of human rights protection prompted governments to at least pay lip service to the notion within the OAS if not in their own domestic institutions. The US was content to support non-democratic regimes so long as they prevented the rise of Communism in the region. 1 5 Organization of American States, "The Charter". Available at: 1 6 Dykmann 2004, p. 144. 1 7 Schreiber and Schreiber 1968 7 However, blatant and publicized violations of human rights in client states made it much more 18 politically costly for the US to continue supporting the guilty regimes. It therefore was supportive of the OAS taking on a more active role in human rights promotion, at least in part to justify its own involvement in the various authoritarian regimes in the region. From a more international perspective, a body of norms was emerging in the post-WWII period that also made it politically costly for states to violate the rights of their own citizens. This spread of human rights norms resulted in an eventual "norms cascade" in the region.19 Lip service to the norm promoted by the US turned to genuine compliance in a gradual shift of acceptable state behaviour. The starting point for this shift was the creation by the OAS of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to promote and later (with the creation of the Inter-American Court on Human Rights) to protect human rights. III. Evolution of the IACHR In 1959, the Organization of American States created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR). The IACHR has been a major actor in promoting an improvement in the human rights records of its member states, and has thereby proven that international organizations can indeed change the behaviour of their members. The IACHR, and its partner in the judicial realm, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights" , have experienced a slow but steady rise in power and have become a profoundly influential team for the protection of human rights in the Western Hemisphere. The IACHR was initially founded in an environment of impunity for human rights violations, and with the assumption that it would remain a weak and voiceless organization. Most member states of the OAS supported the , 8 Tulchin 1995 1 9 Lutz and Sikkink 2000, p.638. 2 0 Hereafter referred to as 'the Court'. 8 establishment of the IACHR with its originally very limited Statute, in order to give the appearance of supporting human rights.21 As an institution, the IACHR was highly successful at overcoming its intentionally limited mandate and recreating itself as a truly functional, independent and neutral organization. The Commission's structure was a key aspect of its ability to remain neutral and thereby gain credibility amongst OAS members and their citizens. The IACHR is composed of seven individuals who are elected by the General Assembly of the OAS. These individuals are chosen from a slate of up to three nominees from each member state. Only one individual at a time can serve from any state and they are not representatives of their countries. Rather, they act independently and are chosen for their "high moral character and recognized competence in the field of human rights".22 These seven members are elected for a four-year term that may be renewed once. The method of election and the limited terms provide a constraint on the members' power while also insulating them somewhat from the OAS and their home governments. The panel of seven members meets once or twice a year at its headquarters in Washington D.C., and is responsible only for upholding the mandate of the IACHR. The Commission and its staff publish annual reports providing an overview of the human rights situation and the activities of the IACHR in the region. They also provide special country reports to cover situations of particular concern. These reports include recommendations to the relevant governments on how they may improve their human rights record, and are therefore a very valuable political tool both for the IACHR itself and for other interested parties. IACHR reports have been significant in creating the grounds for moral condemnation of a state by its 2 1 Dykmann 2004, p. 66 2 2 IACHR, "Composition of the IACHR". Available at: 9 neighbours and by the OAS, and have provided exposure and support for domestic efforts to improve human rights. 3.1 Case Study: the Dominican Republic The actual activities of the IACHR have evolved greatly from those originally mandated by its 1959 Statute, due largely to its first major deployment during the 1965 crisis in the Dominican Republic. Article 9 of the original Statute clearly outlines a promotional rather than a protective role for the IACHR in regards to human rights. The Commission was meant to put human rights on the agenda of governments, help governments improve their records, and conduct on-site investigations of abuses when invited by the host government. During its involvement in the Dominican Republic, the IACHR took a very broad interpretation of these rights and responsibilities and recreated itself as a protector of human rights rather than a passive political tool. Following the 1961 assassination of President Trujillo, the long-term dictator of the Dominican Republic, the country suffered several years of political instability and coups. In April 1965, this instability erupted into full civil war between political and military factions. Both the Constitutionalists and the Loyalists claimed to be the country's legitimate government, and as part of the effort to gain recognition and support both sides invited the IACHR to conduct on-site investigations. Both factions hoped to gain legitimacy from the IACHR's findings, while ultimately discrediting their opponent for having the more reprehensible behaviour.23 The initial motivations and assumptions behind the invitation to the IACHR proved to be over-optimistic, as the Commission set out to unearth significant human rights violations on the part of both sides in the conflict. "The Commission indicated its 2 3 Schreiber & Schreiber 1968, p.518 10 sincere concern for the state of human rights in the country and conducted its investigations with impartiality. Any hopes that politicians may have had of automatic approval by the Commission were frustrated."24 The IACHR began its investigations in June 1965, and continued its presence in the Dominican Republic until July 1966. This lengthy operation constituted the first major action undertaken by the IACHR, and not only served to demonstrate that it would not be used for political ends but also allowed the organization to increase its power. The seven members of the Commission rotated in and out of the Dominican Republic and conducted extensive investigations into allegations of human rights violations. Within the first two weeks of involvement in the country, flagrant abuses were discovered on both sides of the conflict. Disappearances, politically motivated executions, horrifying prison conditions, political prisoners, a complete lack of due process, and many other problems were revealed. As the IACHR reported on the violations and made recommendations to both parties in the conflict, prison conditions were improved and many political prisoners were released. The IACHR was directly involved in these processes in addition to helping persecuted individuals find asylum and attempting to locate missing persons. Although the IACHR was only authorized to observe and report, it argued successfully that it should receive individual complaints and request information on their accuracy from governments.2'' For its exceptional impartiality and its role in uncovering violations, the United Nations acknowledged the IACHR as the sole organization in charge of investigating human rights violations in the Dominican Republic.26 The experience of the Dominican crisis converted the IACHR into an active, authoritative body for the protection of human rights. Because the IACHR successfully 2 4 Schreiber & Schreiber 1968, p.519 25 Ibid 26 Ibid 11 assumed more duties and powers than its Statute allowed for, the OAS set out to amend its mandate to suit the new reality. In November 1965, the IACHR Statute was revised to encompass its de facto powers. In particular, the IACHR was given the authority to receive and investigate individual petitions against OAS member states. The IACHR could request information from the accused governments, and included these communications in its special country reports. When a government refused to provide adequate information concerning claims transmitted to it, the Commission's public reports, simply by summarizing claims received along with the information provided, created a highly damaging portrait of the government's concern for human rights.27 The IACHR was thus transformed into a considerably more influential organization than the one envisioned at its foundation. The IACHR's newfound power stems from its use of moral suasion to influence the behaviour of governments, and from its ability to draw attention to embarrassing and condemning discrepancies between state rhetoric and reality. This newfound power was demonstrated to great effect just over a decade later in Nicaragua. 3.2 Case Study: Nicaragua The single most compelling case demonstrating the ability of the Commission to alter behaviour is that of Nicaragua in 1979. The Somoza dynasty ruled Nicaragua for a combined thirty-three years, and carried out innumerable atrocities against the population, including disappearances, politically motivated executions, unjust imprisonment and torture. In the early 1960s, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) was founded in opposition to the regime. The FSLN conducted a long-term insurgency that was opposed by the United States for its communist leanings. The US supported Somoza despite the regime's human rights 2 7 Schreiber & Schreiber 1968, p.51 I. 12 record, as it felt far more threatened by the prospect of a communist government in Latin 28 America than it did by an oppressive dictatorship. In 1978, the IACHR initiated its first special country report on Nicaragua. The report was harshly critical of the Somoza regime, citing complaints in relation to disappearances, executions, imprisonment without due process, a lack of freedom of speech, and the government's violent repression of striking workers.29 The IACHR showed some sympathy for the state of emergency in Nicaragua at the time, but called on the government to respond to the report's recommendations and improve its human rights record. No response was received from Somoza, and the report was passed on to the OAS. At that time, the OAS was attempting to formulate a plan for dealing with the increasingly unstable situation in Nicaragua. The US had presented a proposal whereby a government of national reconciliation would be established and supported by an inter-American peacekeeping force. The Latin American states were fearful that this proposal would give justification for a direct intervention in Nicaragua by the US; significantly, most states felt that this type of intervention would not be successful in forcing Somoza to relinquish power. Instead, the IACHR report played a key role in the decision of the OAS. "On the basis of the Commission's critical report, they essentially called on the people of Nicaragua to 30 replace the Somoza government and establish a representative democracy through elections."" The IACHR report in conjunction with statements by the OAS, encouraged the FSLN to move against the Somoza regime as it could be confident of international support under the banner of human rights. In July 1979, the FSLN took over from Somoza with the full support of the 2 8 Shaw 2003 2 9 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua. IACHR (1978). Available at: 3 0 Shaw 2003, p.79. 13 Nicaraguan population. This use of the IACHR report as a political weapon against a vicious and unpopular regime was unprecedented. It demonstrates the influence the norm of human rights may have on international politics. Perhaps most significantly, the report was used to defy the proposal by the US and therefore proves the IACHR's independence from its main financial contributor. IV. The Link to the Inter-American Court on Human Rights The 1969 American Convention on Human Rights created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and further expanded the role of the IACHR. Once the Convention came into force in 1978, the Court was legally established and began to work in conjunction with the IACHR. The two organizations are separate but inextricably linked, as the Court may only hear cases that are forwarded to it from the Commission. The establishment of a formal judiciary to uphold human rights was extremely significant as it offered an enforcement mechanism to complement the recommendations of the IACHR. The IACHR receives its cases either by direct petition from individuals, or in the course of its on-site investigations in specific states. The Commission then sets out to investigate the facts of the case, including requesting pertinent information from the relevant government. The IACHR has a variety of options for action, depending on the results of the investigation. The case can be dismissed if it is found to be inaccurate or if the Commission fails to follow its own procedures of confidentiality and neutrality. The Commission can make recommendations to the government that may be included in an annual or special country report. Alternatively, a Special Rapporteur may be created to study the relevant issues and provide the governments of the 14 region with advice on how to improve their institutions and governance to better protect human rights. Finally, the IACHR can forward unresolved cases to the Court for review or trial. The Court is composed of seven judges elected by the states that have ratified the American Convention. They may serve a single six-year term, and like the members of the IACHR they serve as individuals and not representatives of their home governments. The judges hold regular sessions twice a year at the Court in San Jose, Costa Rica, although they may also hold special sessions to deal with any pressing issues that may arise between regular sessions. By ratifying the American Convention and accepting the Court's jurisdiction, member states acknowledge the Court's authority to enforce compliance with its decisions. To date, twenty-five OAS states have ratified the Convention' , while twenty-one have submitted themselves to the Court's automatic jurisdiction.32 The Court can make both contentious and advisory rulings. Contentious jurisdiction applies only to states that have ratified the American Convention, and only states and the IACHR have legal standing in these cases. The IACHR or a state may forward a contentious case to the Court, which will pass judgment on responsibility, order provisional measures to be taken and/or award damages to the victims of human rights abuses. Advisory power gives the Court jurisdiction over all OAS member states and organizations. The Court can render opinions on institutions or treaties in regards to the protection of human rights, and judge the compatibility of domestic laws with international law. Advisory opinions are recommendations, not mandatory orders by the Court. However, in the history of the Court it has been extremely rare that a government has refused to act on an 3 1 Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Granada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela have all ratified the Convention, although Trinidad & Tobago renounced it in 1998. 3 2 Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Suriname, Uruguay and Venezuela have all accepted the Court's jurisdiction. 15 advisory opinion."' The general norm of compliance with the Court's advisory opinions can be understood in the same way as the influence of the IACHR. By publicly denouncing flaws, omissions or violations within a state's human rights policy, both organizations have successfully shamed those states into reforming their policies in order to protect human rights. Beginning in 1986, the Court has seen a steady increase in the number of both contentious and advisory cases brought before it. It has issued 162 judgments, ordered 71 provisional measures and offered 19 advisory opinions as of 2006. The chart in Appendix B, illustrates the steady accumulation of contentious cases. The Court's decisions have provided an important reference point for domestic courts, and as such have been very influential in raising the standard of human rights in the region, as well as highlighting the responsibility of domestic judiciaries to uphold the law.34 4.1 Case Study: Honduras The processing and responses to cases involving the widespread disappearances in Honduras offer substantial evidence of the success and authority of the Court. Between 1980 and 1992, approximately 179 people 'disappeared' in Honduras. The practice of state-sponsored disappearances was used most extensively as a method of repression by the government of Argentina from 1973 to 1983. During this time period, 9,000 people were reported disappeared, presumably kidnapped and subsequently murdered in a widespread campaign of terror carried out by the government against its citizens."" As Argentina had not ratified the American Convention during this time period, the thousands of cases brought to the IACHR during its on-site investigation could not be brought to the Court. However, when 3 3 Frost 1992 3 4 Grossman 2000 3 5 Lutz & Sikkink 2000 16 Honduras carried out a similar, although far more limited campaign of disappearances, it was subject to the Court's jurisdiction. Manfredo Velasquez Rodriguez disappeared in Honduras on September 12, 1981. His family brought his case to the IACHR who forwarded it on to the Court along with four other cases in 1986. After two years of deliberation, the Court ruled that the government had indeed carried out systematic disappearances of individuals like Velasquez. Most importantly, the Court ruled that Honduras must award compensation for its actions to the victims' families.36 This case was significant as it was the first time the Court ruled against a state and ordered the payment of compensation by the guilty government. Honduras was humiliated, and its "image was very much damaged internationally by the cases".37 Immediately following the Court's decision, disappearances in Honduras virtually ceased, with only two cases in 1989 and only one thereafter. It has been argued that this was a result of the regional peace process involving Nicaragua, or due to the end of the Cold War, or thanks to the increasing stability in Honduras itself. However, as Lutz and Sikkink illustrate, It is important to note.. .that the decline in disappearances in Honduras in 1988 preceded rather than followed many of the other developments. Thus the authoritative decision of a prestigious regional court must be seen as having contributed 18 to a decline in the practice of disappearances.' The case of disappearances in Honduras and the numerous other contentious cases adjudicated by the Court, serve to demonstrate its increasing use by the IACHR for enforcing the protection of human rights in Latin America. The increasing number of contentious cases overseen by the Court should not be interpreted as an indication of a worsening in the human rights of the region. Rather, the increased use of the Court's procedures has prompted a 3 6 Abi-Mershed 1994 3 7 Frost 1992, p. 192. 3 8 Lutz & Sikkink 2000, p.651 17 positive step towards raising the standard of human rights. Domestic actors in brutally repressive regimes were not only unable to safely bring cases to local courts without fear of reprisal, but also lacked functional judiciaries within their own states. With the creation of a regional, neutral Court, free from corruption in Latin America, individuals were given the opportunity to actively pursue justice and an improvement in the conditions of their countries. V. Explaining the Impact of the Commission and Court The IACHR and the Court have worked together to improve the human rights situations in member states. This process has met with varying levels of success and encountered severe obstacles throughout the history of the two organizations. Although some of these developments have been concrete and fairly obvious, others have been more in the normative realm and therefore are inherently difficult to measure though certainly no less valuable. The achievements of the IACHR and the Court are mainly due to the support of the United States, the parallel developments in civil society and domestic standards in the region, and the spread of international human rights norms. The shortcomings of the two organizations can be traced to their opposition by member states, their institutional flaws, and their relationship with the OAS as a whole. 5.1 The Role of the United States Significant support from the United States for the IACHR stems from the crisis in the Dominican Republic - the same crisis that expanded the IACHR's mandate and influence. The US had sent troops to the DR just four days after the military coup led by the Constitutionalists plunged the country into armed conflict. Marines were initially deployed to protect US and 18 other foreign nationals, although they soon established a neutral zone and became very clearly anti-Constitutionalist. The US declared that the Constitutionalists were communists and therefore a threat to the stability of the region. After much debate within the OAS by the majority of Latin American states who were in opposition to the unilateral intervention by the US, the nature of the intervention was changed to become the Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF). The IAPF was essentially under the control of the US, and consisted almost entirely of US troops. It was possible for the US to push through the vote on the peacekeeping force in the OAS, due to a great deal of division between other members on how they wanted to respond to the Dominican crisis." The strong presence of the US in the Dominican Republic was extremely significant for the IACHR mission, as it allowed for a relative level of security in many areas. This helped the IACHR to operate safely and effectively within the country, and helps to explain why the mission was not launched until June 1965, almost two months after the crisis erupted. Furthermore, the US presence helped to urge cooperation with the Commission from both sides in the conflict, and provided transportation and other logistical support for the investigations. Cooperation between the IACHR and the IAPF was solidified during the criminal investigation of the El Haras estate, where several corpses of political prisoners were found. The IAPF guarded the site from outside interference while the IACHR oversaw the investigation of the bodies by US forensic experts.40 The IACHR clearly would have had a great deal more difficulty operating in the Dominican crisis without assistance from the US; for its part, the US had a great deal to gain from the involvement of the IACHR. The massive intervention by the US "heavily engaged US policy and prestige in Dominican events, and as a result American 3 9 Shaw 2003 4 0 Schreiber & Schreiber 1968 19 statesmen found it important to avoid creating the impression that armed force was being used to support a regime lacking respect for human rights."41 Prior to the crisis in the Dominican Republic, the US had presented a positive attitude towards the creation of the IACHR, but had not thrown much weight behind the organization. Indeed, the US was one of the loudest opponents to the inclusion in the IACHR Statute of the power to review individual petitions. The US argued that including this power would "constitute 'protection' of human rights which could only be established through a binding international convention."42 By the time the OAS General Assembly convened in November 1965 to review the IACHR's mandate, the US was the leading proponent of including this key power in the new Statute. From this point onwards, the US continued to support the IACHR and later the Court. Beginning in the 1970s under President Carter, the US began supplying the vast majority of the IACHR's budget directly to the Commission rather than routing it through the OAS. The substantial budget increases of the IACHR during the 1970s gave the organization's reputation a significant boost. The financial support for the IACHR is evidence of the US belief that the Commission was significantly more effective than the OAS as a whole, and that it was "a cheaper and more politically useful instrument to implement its human rights policy."43 The support for the IACHR tended to rise and fall with each US Administration's overall concern for human rights. Carter oversaw a massive increase in the IACHR budget, while Reagan withheld significant funding from the OAS as well as the IACHR. However, despite the vagaries of US support, the hegemon consistently demonstrated its interest in the issue and was a key factor in the overall success of the organization. 4 1 Schreiber & Schreiber 1968, p.520. 42 Ibid, p.525. 4 3 Dykmann 2004, p.71. 20 However, financial dependence has not made the IACHR a tool of the USA. The case of Cuba is one example where the IACHR has suffered some criticism for being a puppet of US policy, as it played a major role in condemning the human rights practices of Castro's government, which was a position clearly in alignment with the US. The IACHR's first special country report was based on information from exiled Cubans in Florida, and it was followed by seven other reports on Cuba, more than on any other state. The IACHR's treatment of Cuba in its special country reports was questionable, as Cuba had been expelled from the OAS in 1962 and was therefore no longer covered by the IACHR's mandate for investigations. However, Cuba remained a 'passive member' of the OAS despite being excluded from actual participation in the organization. The IACHR argued that this was sufficient standing to put Cuba under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, while other OAS member states were divided on whether the IACHR should be investigating Cuba, they universally condemned the state's human rights practices.44 Contrary to the claim that the IACHR's interest in Cuba was primarily due to US pressure, the concern of every other OAS member in the Cuban situation shows that the IACHR was acting on behalf of the organization as a whole, not just its main benefactor. Perhaps the most significant indicator of the institutional independence of the IACHR, however, is the record of cases and results issued by the Commission. Beginning in 1977, a steady string of allegations of abuse by the US were brought to the Commission by individuals.45 These cases fell into a wide range of categories such as inappropriate uses of capital punishment on juvenile offenders or mentally incompetent persons, Native American 4 4 Dykmann 2004 4 5 See Appendix A , 21 land claims, indiscriminate harm caused by military operations in Grenada and Panama, police brutality, racism within the justice system, illegal deportations of Haitians and Cubans, and abortion.46 In every case, the US followed the proceedings very carefully, submitting evidence in its defense and arguing to the bitter end for its innocence. Several cases were rejected as inadmissible on either procedural grounds or more often on the grounds that domestic channels had not yet been exhausted before going to the IACHR. However, of the cases deemed admissible, the vast majority resulted in rulings against the US. The Commission has accused the US of violating a multitude of Articles from the 1948 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, including the right to life and liberty, equality before the law, impartiality in the law, the protection of children, freedom from cruel and unusual punishment, and the right to asylum and security. Furthermore, the IACHR has made numerous recommendations to the US that it review its laws and procedures to avoid future violations, as well as adequately compensate either the victims or the next of kin in most of the cases. Although the results of these recommendations have rarely been followed, and the US continues to protest their application, it is a significant fact that the IACHR has not shied away from pursuing cases against the hegemon. More generally, the fact that the US continues to protest against the IACHR, demonstrates not only institutional independence and legitimacy, but also the strength of the human rights norm. 5.2 The Role of Civil Society: Domestic and International The support for the IACHR from the US was mirrored by support from domestic players in the region as well as international NGOs. The gradual progression towards at least 4 6 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Published Reports". Avai lable at: www.cidh.oas/org/casos.cng.htm 22 nominal democracy allowed citizens more of a voice, if not to speak out against their governments directly, then at least to speak to the IACHR about abuses. International NGOs like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch led the way in facilitating the exchange of information on human rights abuses. They were followed by domestic groups such as the Abuelas de la Plaza de Mayo in Argentina, who represent victims of the thousands of individuals who 'disappeared' during the Dirty War of the 1970s, have played a valuable role in providing information and publicity to the human rights violations of governments. As Moravcsik points out, domestic actors and influences can have a significant impact on state interests, suggesting that the rise of civil society in the region caused a change in state attitudes and perceptions of national interest.47 The growth of grassroots movements pushing for improved human rights, or justice for past offenses, emerged in conjunction with the rise of the IACHR. Whether the IACHR created a more tolerant environment in which these local groups could emerge, or whether they simply pushed through the blanket of oppression in the region unilaterally, is very difficult to measure. However, it does appear that the increase in democracy as encouraged by the OAS, and the parallel improvement in human rights thanks to pressure from the IACHR, have certainly been potent factors in enabling domestic organizations to grow. Therefore, domestic human rights movements have been empowered by the IACHR and have in turn provided support, evidence and petitions to the Commission for review. The symbiotic relationship between domestic groups and the IACHR is an important one, as legitimacy and information have flowed both ways. The presence of domestic organizations pushing for improvements in human rights was an important, yet insufficient factor in the regional shift towards compliance Moravcsik 1997 23 with human rights norms and the IACHR. A further shift in behaviour and perceptions of human rights was necessary before the IACHR could become truly effective. International NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have been extremely supportive of the IACHR and have provided a great deal of information during its investigations of various states. Both NGOs maintain a presence throughout Latin America, have a wide web of contacts, and have the experience of decades of observing human rights abuses around the world. Amnesty International in particular has been a key player in drawing the IACHR's attention to specific individual cases, and has assisted with the forwarding of these cases into the Commission's system.48 These two NGOs are examples of effective transnational advocacy networks, as described by Keck and Sikkink. They had a profound impact on the increasing strength of human rights norms within Latin America. In general, this was achieved in stages of impact following Keck and Sikkink's model where "increased attention, followed by changes in discursive positions, make governments more vulnerable to the claims that networks raise."49 The power of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch can be traced directly to the rhetoric and treaty signing of the same states they critique. The states have in effect condemned themselves, and are merely being held accountable for breaking their own acknowledged human rights norms. Again, the IACHR plays a valuable role in institutionalizing these norms, which gives them a more concrete and inescapable air where "the effort is not to make governments change their position but to hold them to their word."50 It also provides a more legitimate course of action for those alleging human rights abuses against a state than do NGOs, as the IACHR and Court were created and supported by sovereign states. 4 8 Dykmann 2004 4 9 Keck & Sikkink 1998, p.26. 50 Ibid, p.26. 24 The success of the IACHR has been achieved at least in part from the tireless efforts of NGOs to expose violations and gather information that they pass on to the Commission. The IACHR can generally achieve greater success as it bridges the gap between human rights abuses against individuals and the status of independent states. This makes the IACHR a more powerful entity than NGOs. In addition, the IACHR not only created an environment of greater tolerance in which these organizations could operate, it also represented a greater underlying normative shift within the region. The self-interest of states, as created and altered by civil society, undoubtedly contributes towards their compliance with the IACHR. However, it is an incomplete explanation for the strength of the Commission. Self-interest would potentially lead states towards making certain improvements in human rights, but it cannot explain the submission of states to the IACHR, their following its recommendations, and the surrender of a certain degree of sovereign immunity. 5.3 International Law and the Diffusion of Norms The third and most successful hypothesis regarding the institutional strength of the IACHR builds on the previous two ideas, yet adds an essential normative factor. The spread of international human rights norms can be observed in the increasing body of international and regional human rights law that has emerged over the last twenty years. This growing body of law has been of great use to the IACHR and the Court, as it provides a framework in which the two organizations can operate. The existence of relatively firm definitions on torture, the right to life, disappearances, freedom of speech and other human rights issues is invaluable for the Court in particular to retain credibility and support for its judgments. The Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture and the Inter-American Convention on Forced 25 Disappearances, are the two main regional agreements, both of which entered into force in the mid-1990s. Both Conventions reaffirm the more general American Convention on Human Rights, and provide specific laws in relation to the crimes of torture and disappearance that had become so widespread in Latin America in the 1970s and '80s. International law also became more inclusive, with the signing of the 1949 Geneva Convention and 1977 Protocols regarding the treatment of prisoners of war, civilians in war, refugees and other victims of armed conflict, and the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. The issue of ratification is an important one, since 11 of 35 states in the region have yet to ratify even the American Convention, let alone the more specific regional agreements on torture or disappearances. The United States has signed but not ratified the American Convention, largely due to disagreements over capital punishment. Other states have yet to even sign the Convention, including Canada and the majority of Caribbean states.51 However, the norms in the documents still affect even non-ratifying states. States that refuse to ratify the Convention remain outside the Court's jurisdiction, but they may still be investigated by the IACHR and subject to intense criticism on their human rights records. Significantly, even states that have not ratified international agreements on human rights still tend to follow many of the principles involved. The existence of these laws provides the IACHR and the Court with the necessary justification and credibility to carry out their tasks. These laws demonstrate the spread of a general international concern for human rights. Laws provide the two organizations with the legal and political tools necessary to condemn violations and arouse international attention and potential action. Most importantly, as these human rights norms go through the process of the 5 1 Cosgrove 2000 26 'norm cascade' and become internalized by states, the legitimacy of the IACHR and Court is increased. They are representing and defending an increasingly valued norm, which confers a great deal of power. Hegemonic pressure and self-interest are undoubtedly important elements of their institutional success, but without the rise of human rights norms the IACHR and Court would be lonely voices in the wilderness without any ability to influence state behaviour. VI. Stumbling Blocks to the Commission and Court Despite its successes, the IACHR and Court have been subject to certain failures, though these have illustrated areas requiring reform rather than insurmountable problems. Opposition from OAS member states, institutional weakness, and refusal to cooperate with the OAS have all caused problems for the Commission and Court. The IACHR and the Court avoid many of the dangers of manipulation due to their balanced composition. The principles of equality and fairness are enshrined in both organizations' procedures that prevent two individuals from the same state holding office at the same time, and enforce term limits. The history of members of the two organizations does not indicate domination by citizens of any one state, and suggests the organizations have remained unbiased by their own members.52 However, the states that have been subject to the IACHR's special country reports definitely fall into a certain level in the hierarchy of Latin America. Cuba, the rogue state that is no longer an active member of the OAS and has poor relations with most states in the region, has been the topic of seven special country reports. Other countries that have received a great deal of attention are Haiti, Honduras, and Nicaragua. These states are all minor players within the OAS and the international community. They do 5 2 Inter-American Court of Human Rights, "Composition". Available at: 2 7 suffer from atrocious human rights abuses, but are by no means the only states guilty of such crimes. Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil have all had significant periods of rampant human rights violations, yet each are the topic of only one special country report by the IACHR. It is an unlikely coincidence that these are also the most powerful and influential of Latin America's states. The issue of compliance is a very important one for both the IACHR and the Court. The IACHR depends on invitations from governments in order to conduct on-site investigations of human rights abuse. Without these invitations, the Commission may still conduct an investigation into allegations as well as publish a special country report, but it is highly restricted in its access to evidence from victims and other local actors. The IACHR's findings remain in the form of recommendations that a state may or may not choose to follow. Compliance is even more of an issue for the Court, as states must first have accepted its jurisdiction, and then must adhere to its judgments. As discussed earlier in the paper, the issue of ratification of the American Convention and the ensuing Court jurisdiction remains contentious. The rejection of the Court by Peru in the late 1990s (ruled to be inadmissible), and the withdrawal of Trinidad and Tobago indicate a severe weakness for the Court. The ability of states to reject the Court's jurisdiction is extremely damaging to the credibility and control of the Court. The failure of major states such as the US and even Canada to ratify the Convention is a dangerous example to other OAS members. In reality, the US and Canada have better human rights records on the ground, but many have argued that in Latin America putting on a show of compliance is the most important factor in achieving change. "Rhetoric and doctrine play a bigger role in inter-American relations than in most other international 28 associations. They are essential - if by themselves insufficient - to the mobilization of any constructive human effort."53 Finally, the IACHR and the Court have suffered from some inter-organizational rivalry. Initially, this took the shape of suspicion towards the Court by the IACHR. The Commission had been operating in isolation for twenty years before the Court came into existence. This situation caused some issues of cooperation between the two organizations as they established functional procedures and a better working relationship. The evolution of their relationship can be seen in the number of cases that were forwarded to the Court by the IACHR at its inception in comparison to later on in its life.54 A more important source of conflict has been the ongoing tension between the IACHR and the OAS. Technically, the IACHR is part of the General Secretariat of the OAS and therefore receives its funding from the OAS budget. In reality, the IACHR is an independent entity that has received a great deal of funding directly from the US. The US provides two-thirds of the OAS budget, and an even greater proportion to the IACHR. During the budget cuts under President Reagan, the US slashed its funding to the OAS, forcing the organization to lay off a huge number of staff and restrict many of its ongoing projects. The IACHR was also affected by these cuts, but managed to retain most of its staff and continue its operations at a reasonable level.55 Jealousy over finances, independence and relative success can help to explain the failure of the OAS to support the IACHR and the Court at certain key junctures. Drcir 1968, p.482. See Appendix B. Dykmann 2004 29 The Velasquez case (and the four others submitted at the same time) of the disappearances in Honduras illustrates an important shortcoming of the Court in particular. As discussed, the Court successfully presided over the case and ruled that the Honduras government compensate the families of the victims. Honduras had ratified the Convention and accepted the jurisdiction of the Court prior to the case being forwarded by the IACHR, and was therefore undoubtedly legally obligated to accede to the Court's ruling.56 The Court rendered its decision in 1988, but to date Honduras has still failed to provide compensation to the families. The failure of the OAS to support the decision of the Court by condemning Honduras' obstinacy has been a major problem for the enforcement of Court decisions. The lesson of impunity in the case of Honduras has provided a dangerous precedent and shown the Court does indeed lack proper enforcement mechanisms for its decisions. "Because compliance with recommendations and rulings still depends primarily on the goodwill of the state involved, there is little action that the Commission or the Court can take against blatant regressions."57 The Court has charged Honduras interest for failing to pay the full amount due the victims' families; since Honduras has been unwilling to pay the initial amount, it is extremely unlikely that the state would pay any attention to the interest owed. By remaining silent on the issue of enforcing the Court's decisions, the OAS has not only undermined the Court but also demonstrated its own institutional weakness of indecision. Grossman's comment about the Commission applies equally to the Court: "the success... and its effectiveness is not the result of the OAS' efficiency but happened in spite of the organization's inefficiency."' Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993. Available at: Grossman 2003, p. 18. Dykmann 2004, p. 142. 30 Conclusion The Organization of American States has presided over an inspiring and impressive improvement in the human rights records of its members. These improvements have occurred thanks in part to the IACHR and the Court, with the support of the US, NGOs and international law. The example of the IACHR in particular is an inspiring one. It demonstrates the ability of an international organization to change the behaviour of member states. It has largely remained immune to political pressures, has freely criticized state practices throughout the region, and has not been reduced to acting in the interests of dominant states. In general, member states have taken recommendations by the Commission and rulings by the Court seriously, and taken steps to implement change in their human rights records. The precise importance of the role the IACHR has played in comparison to that of local and international NGOs, international law and US pressure is inherently difficult to deduce. Determining whether the drive for improved human rights came from domestic actors or from external pressure requires unwinding the tangles of history and circumstance. However, based on the perspective of a timeline, the IACHR was the first organization to emerge and formally call for an improvement in Latin America's human rights. It began its special country reports and investigations even before the US began to show any significant interest in human rights, and before NGOs had achieved any success in the region. The IACHR undoubtedly paved the way for future campaigns, and has continued to strive for better human rights alongside other actors. Throughout its history, the IACHR has acted as "an authentic conscience of the region"59, and met with more success than any other such regional organization. The IACHR is the oldest inter-governmental institution for human rights outside of the United Nations. It 5 9 Dykmann 2004, p.427. 31 represents the region's early acknowledgement of the political importance of human rights, and is a symbol of the desire of authoritarian regimes to gain international legitimacy by manipulating their human rights image. Significantly, the IACHR continuously undermined this search for legitimacy by revealing human rights violations by the most oppressive regimes in the region. Every state in the region has been subject to some level of criticism over the last fifty years, and has been forced to either explain their human rights record or pay the political cost of ignoring a well-respected organization. Even the United States has been directly criticized by the IACHR. The Commission has heard complaints by Latin Americans and by First Nations of discrimination and racism within the US. Most recently, the issue of the treatment of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay has caused the IACHR to voice strong criticisms against the US. The progression towards an overall improvement in human rights within the Western Hemisphere has been shadowed by the shift towards democracy. Although many of the states in Latin America remain only nominally democratic, holding elections but failing to offer more substantial rights to their citizens, acceptance of democracy as the norm has continued to advance. The OAS explicitly adopted democracy as the ideal for its members, and has instituted such measures as Resolution 1080 that allows the organization to suspend a member in reaction to the overthrow of a democratically elected government.60 The spread of democracy in the region has created an atmosphere far more conducive and responsive to the work of the IACHR. New democratic governments are significantly more concerned with international opinion than were the autocratic regimes of the past. Upon returning to democratic governance, the Argentinean and Uruguayan governments immediately signed the 6 0 Spehar 2001 32 American Convention. Argentina also invited the IACHR to investigate the disappearances of the Dirty War, which the previous authoritarian government had refused to allow. Without the emergence of democracy in the region, the IACHR would have been very hard pressed to achieve any real success in the realm of human rights. The IACHR and the Court provide an essential tool to a region that has yet to consolidate its democratic regimes or to provide significant domestic protection for human rights. The organizations operate in tandem to provide the citizens of states that have weak, corrupt and dysfunctional judiciaries with the opportunity for justice. The petitions brought to the IACHR arrive because they have not or cannot be dealt with at a domestic level. Therefore, the IACHR and Court are filling the essential role of investigating and ruling on cases that would never otherwise be heard. The mass atrocities that have occurred in the region, and the severe violations of human rights that continue today have resulted from systems where the perpetrators have been able to operate with impunity. Law enforcement and judicial systems in most states are inadequate to provide closure, truth or justice for the victims. The IACHR and the Court offer this hope to individuals in the region, and have been successful in fulfilling this obligation. The Cormriission and the Court together provide an essential base for reconciliation and peace in Latin America. 33 Bibliography Abi-Mershed, Elizabeth, "Thirty-five Years Defending Human Rights". Americas, vol.16, issue 6 (Nov/Dec 1994) American Convention on Human Rights (1969). Available at: Barnett, Michael and Martha Finnemore, "The Politics, Power and Pathologies of International Organizations". International Organization, vol.53, no.4 (Autumn 1999) Chayes, Abram and Antonia Handler Chayes, "On Compliance". International Organization, vol.47, no.2 (Spring 1993) Cosgrove, Michael, "Protecting the Protectors: Preventing the Decline of the Inter-American System for the Protection of Human Rights". Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, vol.32, issue 1 (Winter 2000) Dreir, John C, "New Wine and Old Bottles: The Changing Inter-American System". International Organization, vol.22, no.2 (Spring 1968) Dykmann, Klaas, Philanthropic Endeavors or the Exploitation of an Ideal? The Human Rights Policy of the Organization of American States in Latin America. Iberoamericana (Madrid, 2004) Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political Change". International Organization: International Organization at Fifty: Exploration and Contestation in the Study of World Politics, vol. 52, no.4 (Autumn 1998) Frost, Lynda, "The Evolution of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections of Present and Former Judges". Human Rights Quarterly, 14 (1992) Grossman, Claudio, "Moving Toward Improved Human Rights Enforcement in the Americas". Human Rights: Journal of the Section of Individual Rights and Responsibilities, vol.27, issue 3 (Summer 2000) Human Rights Watch, World Report 1993. Available at: Hurd, Ian, "Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics". International Organization, vol.53, no.2 (Spring 1999) Ikenberry, G. John and Charles Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power". International Organization, vol.44, no.3 (Summer 1990) Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Composition of the IACHR". Available at: 34 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Published Reports". Available at: www.cidh.oas/org/casos.eng.htm Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Nicaragua. IACHR (1978). Available at: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, "Composition". Available at: Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2006, p.78. Available at: International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect. Internationa] Development Research Center (US, 2001) Johnston, Alastair Iain, "Treating International Institutions as Social Environments". International Studies Quarterly, vol.45, no.4 (Dec.2001) Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics. Cornell University Press (Ithaca, 1998) Keohane, Robert, After Hegemony. Princeton University Press (Princeton, 1984) Krasner, Stephen, "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables". International Organization, vol.36, no.2 (1982). Lutz, Ellen and Sikkink, Kathryn, "International Human Rights Law and Practice in Latin America". International Organization, vol.54, no.3 "Legalization and World Politics" (Summer 2000) Moravcsik, Andrew, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Relations". International Organization vol.51 no.4 (Autumn 1997) Organization of American States, "The Charter". Available at: Schreiber, Anna and Schreiber, Philippe, "The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the Dominican Crisis". International Organization, vol.22, no.2 (Spring 1968) Shaw, Carolyn, "Limits to Hegemonic Influence in the Organization of American States", Latin American Politics and Society, vol. 45, no. 3 (Autumn 2003) Spehar, Elizabeth, "The Role of the Organization of American States in Conflict Prevention". International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, no.8 (2001) 35 Tulchin, Joseph, "The United States and Latin American in the World Today" in The Consolidation of Democracy in Latin America by Joseph Tulchin and Bernice Romero (eds.). Woodrow Wilson Center (US, 1995) 36 Appendix A IACHR Cases & Rulings Involving the United States 10 61 8 6 4 2 0 1 1 \ ^ ( 1 K • In Favour • Against • Incomplete • Inadmissible 1977-2002 Data from the Inter-Amcrican Commission on Human Rights, "Published Reports". Available at: www.cidh.oas/org/casos.eng.htm 37 Appendix B Contentious Cases Before the Court1 " Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Annual Report 2006, p.78. Available at: 


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