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Relinquishing Canada's nuclear roles Erickson, Darrin Jerroll 1990

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RELINQUISHING CANADA'S NUCLEAR ROLES By DARRIN JERROLL ERICKSON B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1989 A THESIS SUBMITTED  IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF  THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (POLITICAL SCIENCE)  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the r e q u i r e d  standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September 1990 © D a r r i n J e r r o l l E r i c k s o n , 1990  In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department  or  by  his or  her  representatives.  It  is understood  that  copying  or  publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission.  Department of The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada Date  DE-6 (2/88)  Oct, H , Wo  Abstract This  thesis  processes  intended  behind the  As s u c h , change  is  the in  to  enhance  r e l i n q u i s h i n g of  underlying factors  Canadian  defence  our  knowledge  Canada's  of  nuclear  the  roles.  which h e l p e d b r i n g about  policy  are  to  be  this  isolated  and  assessed. The  process  and complex,  of  the  1960s  climates, the  thesis  and  the  global  Canada's  i n v o l v i n g many a c t o r s  examined i n t h i s of  retiring  are  1970s.  strategic  l o o k e d upon i n the The  roles  and i n f l u e n c e s .  global  environment  community as  nuclear  and  was  The  factors  greater  domestic  context  political  and Canada's power  a whole d u r i n g  this  time  long  within  period,  are  considered. This which  one  nuclear on  study may  roles.  nuclear  has  revealed  several  draw c o n c e r n i n g  conclusions  r e l i n q u i s h i n g of  Canada's  F i r s t of a l l , the Trudeau government's  position  weapons  the  interesting  coincided  with  growing  opposition  n u c l e a r weapons w i t h i n t h e C a n a d i a n p u b l i c . F u r t h e r m o r e , evident  that  p u b l i c o p i n i o n on t h e  nuclear  issue  was  it  of  o r h e r p o s i t i o n on d e f e n c e retiring  Pierre  the  Trudeau  nuclear and  spending. Secondly,  weapon  some  of  systems his  was  close  led  the  is  closely  r e l a t e d t o an i n d i v i d u a l ' s p e r c e p t i o n o f t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s his  to  and  process  largely  associates,  by in  particular  Ivan  the  of  face  Head and Donald intense  abandoning the  nuclear  declining  position  growth of  detente.  of  a  rapidly  systems this  bureaucratic roles  in  MacDonald.  the  global  was  an  The  issue  shows  it  strategic  extremely of  that  was a l s o  also  in  as  Thordarson  therefore  merits  part  weapons  For t h i s because public.  very  thesis,  Regrettably,  also  were  as  the  result weapon  P e r h a p s most i m p o r t a n t l y ,  of  is  the  one  1971  which  defence has  been  Granatstein  roles  review. largely  i n the  past,  and B o t h w e l l ,  and  attention. telephone  little  for the time-being. surveys  as w e l l  our  to  which  o v e r l o o k e d by d e f e n c e and f o r e i g n p o l i c y a n a l y s t s such  Canada's  p a r t l y the  environemnt  in  Thirdly,  r e l i n q u i s h i n g Canada's nuclear  important  nuclear  resistance.  community and  w e r e q u i c k l y made o b s o l e t e .  thesis  done  was  was s t r o n g l y r e l a t e d t o  In a d d i t i o n ,  changing  This  written  i n t e r v i e w s h a d t o be material  is  conducted  available  to  the  t h e s e i n t e r v i e w s must r e m a i n c o n f i d e n t i a l Several books,  very helpful  i i i  articles  and p u b l i c o p i n i o n  in conducting this  analysis.  Contents Abstract List  of  /  i i  Tables  /  v  Acknowledgements  /  vi  Chapter  1:  Introduction  Chapter  2:  The  Chapter  3:  Implementation  Chapter  4:  Assessment  Chapter  5:  Notes  78  /  References  Trudeau Defence  of  of  Review /  the  1 13  Defence  Influences  /  Review  37  Domestic  Factors  /  37  External  Factors  /  61  Conclusions  /  and Background /  /  70  85  iv  /  28  L i s t of Tables 1.  P u b l i c A t t i t u d e s Towards Arming of / C a n a d i a n F o r c e s w i t h N u c l e a r Weapons  2.  P o s i t i o n on N u c l e a r Weapons  3.  4.  /  42  a.  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 2 who v o t e d f o r t h e L i b e r a l s i n the l a s t election  /  45  b.  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 2 who v o t e d f o r t h e / Conservatives i n the l a s t election  45  c.  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 2 who v o t e d f o r t h e / New D e m o c r a t s i n t h e l a s t election  45  a.  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 3 who v o t e d f o r t h e L i b e r a l s i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n .  /  46  b.  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 3 who v o t e d f o r t h e / Conservatives i n the l a s t election  46  5.  C o n f i d e n c e i n the U . S . and / P o s i t i o n on N u c l e a r Weapons  6.  P o s t i o n o n D e f e n c e S p e n d i n g / 51 a n d P o s i t i o n on N u c l e a r Weapons  v  49  42  Acknowledgement s I would l i k e t o thank t h e I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s at the U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia f o r p r o v i d i n g me w i t h f u n d s f r o m i t s M i l i t a r y and S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s g r a n t . T h e s e f u n d s were n e e d e d t o c o n d u c t t h e t e l e p h o n e i n t e r v i e w s which c o n s t i t u t e the m a j o r i t y of i n f o r m a t i o n used i n t h i s thesis. I am a l s o v e r y g r a t e f u l t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l s who t o o k the t i m e o u t o f t h e i r b u s y s c h e d u l e s t o speak w i t h me on t h i s topic. U n f o r t u n a t e l y , t h o s e p e o p l e must r e m a i n n a m e l e s s due to t h e c o n f i d e n t i a l i t y o f t h e i n t e r v i e w s . I am d e e p l y i n d e b t e d t o Don Munton and B r i a n J o b , w i t h o u t whose g u i d a n c e and e n c o u r a g e m e n t t h i s t h e s i s may n o t h a v e b e e n completed. I would a l s o l i k e t o thank Lorae C h a r l t e n f o r p r o v i d i n g me with assistance i n arranging the telephone interviews. F i n a l l y , I t h a n k my c l o s e f r i e n d s and f a m i l y b u t above a l l my p a r e n t s , J e r r y and P a t E r i c k s o n , f o r p r o v i d i n g me w i t h much n e e d e d e n c o u r a g e m e n t and s u p p o r t t h r o u g h o u t my u n i v e r s i t y endeavours.  vi  Chapter 1  Introduction  The NATO  and  preeminence  strategic effect  variety  of  acquiring  upon  weapons  history  and  so w i l l  briefly  to  provide  thesis  will  focus  relinquishing the the  period  this  in  is  well  be  these  Both domestic in  an  decision  effort  was  and  to  resulted the  in  Honest  and  have  a  For  a  Canada  John  and  Bomarc B  and  CF-101  acquisition  of  these  part  in this  background. on  American  policy.  documented  nuclear  the  of  chapter  roles,  this  behind  weapon s y s t e m s . was  only  Rather,  processes  1972  Canadian  the  Although  most c r i t i c a l  this  to  a n a l y s i s must  when t h e l a s t o f t h e weapon s y s t e m s  use. and to  external ascertain  t o abandon t h e  took place  -  the  The  nuclear  1968  of these  removed from  and  necessary  a l s o l o o k f o r w a r d t o 1983 was  with  dealt with later  between  retirement  1950s  influence  Canada.  a  in  defence  f o r use  narrowly  of  the  Canadian  i n Europe,  squadrons  forces  during  weapons  Starfighter  nuclear  nuclear  reasons,  nuclear  "Voodoo"  of  doctrine  powerful  CF-104  Background  nuclear  factors the  rationale  roles.  i n r e a c h i n g t h i s d e c i s i o n , and  1  will  The  be  analyzed  behind  processes  the which  i n dismantling  the  n u c l e a r weapon systems, extent  possible.  constrain  this  t h e r e f o r e be domestic  The  change  in  light  proved  have  background.  Where  to  acted to both  of  the  work,  the  confidential  and  sources cannot  review  to  look at the Prime  o f Mr  some  foreign  followed  by  itself. part  The by  chapter  policy  and  defence in  necessarily into  will  will  what  government's  be  what  processes  decision  to  policy The  the  t o conduct  to  were  be d i s c u s s e d  defence  be  been  1968.  Prime  review. a  discussed  examination of the defence  importance  review  the  use  and  the  and  has  disclosed.'  to the decision  thorough  prime  i n the  planned  defence  a  Of  producing  made  and  insights  be  insights  and  secondary  interviews  Trudeau  will  will  of  the  hoping t o a c c o m p l i s h from the  p r o c e s s e s l e a d i n g up  majority  source  foreign  Minister  Trudeau  provide  M i n i s t e r was  of  by  beliefs  order  The  will  ordered  personal in  2  of  and  place.  interview  most  Chapter  policy  valuable  However, so t h e  propel  a l t h o u g h some  revealed.  fullest  international  provided the  contain  possible  defence  they took  contained i n this  also  analyzed to the  Canadian  i n which  interviews  information  which  in  assessed  Telephone  a l s o be  forces  environments  sources  will  review next, review  c o n s i d e r who were  involved  relinquish  took in  Canada's  o f n u c l e a r weapons.  t h i r d chapter w i l l the will  Trudeau focus  b e c o n c e r n e d w i t h how  government more  on  were  individual  2  the  decisions  implemented. weapon  systems  This and  how  they  were  retirement discussed by  of  fourth  nuclear  quishing  of  discussed time  how  they  use.  The  timing  weapon systems  determine  in  will  which  the  whether  analyze may  nuclear  the  could  previous  have  from the  will  turn  now  of  will  the  also  any were  nuclear  As  context  be  affected  club.  will  the  relin-  the be  and  points  placed  at  and a n a l y z e d i n terms  of  Finally,  It  is  briefly  erupted  domestic  such,  conclusions  analyze  which  the  influenced  chapters  some  to  weapons  have  interacted.  offer  withdrawal  both  weapons.  i n t o a more g e n e r a l  then  nuclear  to  chapter  factors  this  from  considerations.  external  will  the  i n an e f f o r t  unique The  removed  under  about  to the  the  chapter  this  five  Canada's  end that  controversy government  of  we over John  Diefenbaker.  *  The  Canadian  setbacks the that  i n the  loss  of  the  Avro  increased Diefenbaker weapon  defence  late  the  *  1950s.  CF-105  industry  government  system  which  was  The most  Avro  be  costs  When  put  and  act  3  into  a  immediately could  beset  by  significant  Arrow.  Arrow c o u l d not  production  *  a  of these  was  to  was  concluded  p r o d u c t i o n due  small began  as  it  numerous  market,  to the  look  for  a  replacement  for  the  interceptor.  However, as Jon McLin s t a t e s ,  the l o g i c a l replacement would have been an American i n t e r c e p t o r ; b u t t h e r e was no agreement f o r an i n t e r c e p t o r ready a t hand, as was the Bomarc d e a l . More i m p o r t a n t l y , i t was h i g h l y p r e f e r a b l e p o l i t i c a l l y t o a c q u i r e from t h e U.S. a m i s s i l e - a p r o d u c t which Canadian industry d i d n o t produce r a t h e r t h a n an i n t e r c e p t o r , which would appear c o m p e t i t i v e w i t h t h e Arrow. 1  So  i t was  that  on  announced Canada's  September  intention  23,  to  1958,  Diefenbaker  a c q u i r e t h e Bomarc.  When  a l l c o n t r a c t s on t h e Arrow were c a n c e l l e d on F e b r u a r y 20, i t was  also  made  warheads  public that  t o be  eventually  effective.  a t N o r t h Bay,  As  will  later  Ontario, be  because  required  The Bomarc  2  t o c o n s i s t o f two  one  acceptable  t h e Bomarc  sites  B  of  nuclear  deployment  was  28 m i s s i l e s each,  t h e o t h e r a t La Macaza, Quebec.  seen,  this  the United The Bomarc  move  States  was  3  financially  was a c t u a l l y p a y i n g  for  the m i s s i l e s .  squadrons  were  operational  by  mid-March, 1962, even though warheads f o r them were not  yet a v a i l a b l e . The gap had  c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h e Arrow a l s o t h r e a t e n e d  i n North long  replacing.  American  been a r g u i n g When  a i r defence.  Military  t h a t t h e CF-lOOs  t h e government f e l t 4  t o leave a  and  that  F-86s  planners needed  enough t i m e had  elapsed  after  t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h e Arrow, they  what t h e U.S. a i r f o r c e c o u l d d i v e r t t o C a n a d i a n The  F-101  this  move  offered,  Voodoo and  at  was  the  only  subsequently  no c h a r g e ,  aircraft  sixty-six  looked t o airbases.  available for  of  them  were  t o t h e Canadian government.  This  i n i t i a l o f f e r was r e j e c t e d b e c a u s e t h e g o v e r n m e n t d i d n o t want to  appear as though i t  end,  however,  w i t h an o r d e r F-104s,  were  F-lOls  the  Genie  tional  $50 m i l l i o n  i n t h e U.S.  system  t h e Canadian  aircraft Soviet  of  the cost  conjunction  of  Pinetree providing  I t s h o u l d be m e n t i o n e d t h a t  4  a i r force  were  equipped  only  No e f f e c t i v e  with  conven-  was a v a i l a b l e f o r u s e on t h e C F - l O l s  a i r force  had been d e s i g n e d bomber  the  f o r $200 m i l l i o n w o r t h o f  nuclear a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e .  weapon  in  o f t a k i n g o v e r A m e r i c a n - manned  t o E u r o p e a n NATO a l l i e s .  the  In  "charity".  acquired  f r o m t h e US a i r f o r c e  s t a t i o n s and p a y i n g  when  accepting  t h e Voodoos  at a cost  F-104s  was  acquired  t h e i n t e r c e p t o r . The 5  f o r i n t e r c e p t i n g and d e s t r o y i n g  formations  and  a  conventional  warhead,  c o n s i d e r i n g i t s l o w e r y i e l d , was s i m p l y i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r t h i s task. Also  of  prime  importance t o Canadian defence  planners  d u r i n g t h e l a t e 1950s was t h e commitment t o E u r o p e a n d e f e n c e . One  of  "tactical  the greatest nuclear  ground-to-ground felt  i t could  perceived  weapons  missiles".  play  an  in 6  the  This  active 5  needs form  i n NATO of  was an a r e a  role  in  was f o r  short-range where  European  Canada  defence.  The  missile  tests was  originally  on t h e  an  missile  announcement  Honest  John  time  to  as  although  no d e c i s i o n  Canada's  should  possessed  that  Canadian influence acquire  was  CF-104s  some  Canadian  implied  the  taken  one,  The  was  but  result  made  nuclear  to  the  at  the  weapons.  into  service  s u p p l y them  the  in  in  a role  with  NATO.  fighters  the  nuclear  effective  were  not  The  no that  with  to  Most  8  nuclear  warheads  needed  of the  SACEUR  for  the  end  result  of  this  mention  weapon  6  those  one  agreement  be  was  given  made  role  systems  Diefenbaker  at  to the  necessarily  weapons.  for  to  understanding  would  these  forthcoming.  forces  best  on t h e  the  and  acquire  government's  i n Europe,  announcement  acquired,  Canada's  did  the  was  military  Furthermore,  in production  that  also  inferior  role.  was  However,  fact  that  fact  strike  Diefenbaker  for  both  weapons  role  division  for  Europe  performing similar roles.  particular strike  of  existed  countries  arming the  Despite  with  defence  with  troops  concessions  the  Lacrosse  acquire  introduced  been  crucial  industries.  of  to  mention  armed  A rationale  the  air  1960  were  air  equipped  this  was t h e  unsuccessful.  no  be  had yet  the  a  by a l l i e d  for  insisted  time  in  "Eurogroup"  CF-104  that  role  be  would  missiles  reasons.  not  29,  March  this  7  being  political  the  the  weapons."  as  on  it  1962,  seen  be  although  "By e a r l y  nuclear  for  proved to  system,  whether  chosen  9  had them  was  been to  be  unable  to  make  a  decision  on  whether  the  weapon  systems  a c q u i r e d w o u l d be armed w i t h n u c l e a r w a r h e a d s . missile in  crisis  the  the  did  .not  government's  warheads.  support  for  bring  about  position  on  Furthermore,  the  American  an  Canada's  lack  blockade  opposition parties  to  nuclear  Canadian  forces.  it  apparent  role  crisis  had  adequate out  for made  quite  defence c a p a b i l i t i e s .  immediate issue  h a r s h c r i t i c i s m and mounting p r e s s u r e confirm,  Even the  the  naval  at  Canada  of  from  accepting prompt  Cuba l e d  the  least  Cuban change  of  of  had  to  public  and  temporarily,  the  The  Cuban  that  missile  Canada  lacked  In a d d i t i o n , Jon McLin  points  that,  American displeasure at the events of October constituted one source of pressure. Another lay in the fact that the date by which Canada had committed i t s e l f t o have the f i r s t u n i t s of C F - 1 0 4 s q u a d r o n s o p e r a t i o n a l was May 1, 1963; since some s i x months were needed... for the construction of s t o r a g e f a c i l i t i e s and f o r t r a i n i n g , a d e c i s i o n was n e e d e d b y N o v e m b e r 1 . 1 0  "Thus,  by  Canada  had  weapons  time  of  invested  systems  weapons, In  the  addition,  about  that  and none  the  were  had been a  poll  Cuban 685  missile  million  intended made  dollars use  available."  p u b l i s h e d on 7  for  crisis  in  1962,  in  various  with  nuclear  1 1  December  27  indicated  that  54  per  forces  cent  should  November  have  CPRI endorsed  crisis,  this  stance.  It  the  a  connection  the  new  be  the  the  1963.  this,  into  During  forced on  Up u n t i l  acquire nuclear least  January his  weapons.  in 12,  In  Cuban  a  then  missile  Europe at  pro-nuclear was  commitment  that  weapons  Lester Pearson, was  the  now  a speech  in  8  farewell  General  Norstad  view that  NATO  if  it  Canada did  not  were  being  Only  nine  days  after  1 4  another  the  turn  for  the  reluctance  to  general  opposition.  of  acquiring  i n Toronto  he  support  However,  L i b e r a l Leader,  favour  delivered  a  grow  which  received  the  systems.  CF-104s  took  the  make  was i n t e r v i e w e d  Diefenbaker's  had of  to  time.  time,  on  SACEUR,  his  aware  continued to  interview,  situation  this  as  a  United States,  Norstad,  expressing  for  had  f a i l e d to  the  government  this  weapons  principle)  party  but  Lauris  into  its  Diefenbaker's  worse.  the  p u b l i c ' s view of  General  a  Canadians  a r m i n g o f C a n a d a ' s n u c l e a r weapon  nuclear  introduced  with  Diefenbaker  Kennedy,  year.  3,  that  implied  that  Diefenbaker  reneging  acquire  that  John  Canadian  pro-American position,  time  on t h e  reluctantly  would  (at  very  t o Ottawa upon h i s r e t i r e m e n t  on J a n u r a r y was  h a n d l i n g of  a  that  Combined  1 2  revealed  probable  between  view of the  Pressure  which  that  p o p u l a r i t y of  and i t s  visit  at  thought  weapons.  Kennedy's  seems  of  in  nuclear  indicated  which  1 3  Canadians  poll,  strongly  position  of  on  announced the  nuclear  stated,  As a C a n a d i a n , I am a s h a m e d i f we a c c e p t commitments and then r e f u s e t o d i s c h a r g e them... [The Conservative government] s h o u l d end at once its evasion of responsibility, by discharging the commitments i t has a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d for Canada. It can only do this by accepting nuclear warheads... [At t h e same time] the Government should re-examine at once the whole b a s i s of Canadian defence p o l i c y . In p a r t i c u l a r i t should discuss with the United States and with NATO a role for Canada in continental and collective defence which w o u l d be more realistic and effective for Canada t h a n the present one. 1 5  Pearson  further  "perhaps Government John  crisis  25  the  that]  as  in  the  when  to  reach  during  this  a  of  strike  "under  doubt"  strategic Douglas  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of t h i s that  little  that  for  the  Commons  on  easier  1 6  the  over  saying  House  Cuban  a  the  of  P r i m e M i n i s t e r saw t h e turning  "strategic  point changes  western  for  in  due  largely  political then  He was  9  of  felt going  Defence,  that to  this  be as  developments  Problems  1 7  place  cannot  described  recent  fields.  Minister  speech.  Diefenbaker  to  missile  therefore  that  he  is  East-West  [and  hardened decisions role  It  are t a k i n g  world...  reconnaissance  Harkness,  by  issue.  the  and  fire  nuclear  of  time  The  indication  debate  the  the  decision".  He s t a t e d t h a t  not  a  addressed  something  is  to  it  a  that  thinking  altered." being  making  apparent  relations. in  I'm  fuel  Diefenbaker  January quite  added  arose  gave  was a  accept  his clear  nuclear  weapons.  When  however, split  asked  to  Diefenbaker  in  views  Diefenbaker In  to  refused gave  grounds  govern  the  country.  to  issued  that  highly critical  The  of  statement  the  to  Diefenbaker's  Ottawa  feelings  Canadian  of  sentiment.  an  Mail  complained that  the  United  of  diplomacy  and  view  critical "he  is  of  the  of  the  1 9  it  Canadians  appealed also  for  analyzed  between  the p e s s i m i s t i c  and the  encouraging  one  an  to  of the  10  more stir  up  the  Globe and in  which  a neighbor's  to  to  anti-American  act  like  perhaps  lack  witless  the  action.  most He  was but  anti-Americanism". noting the  given  by  2 0  discrepancy  State Department's  which had been  was  show  into Canadian a f f a i r s ,  end  of  to  way  Department's  the document, nature  issue.  impression  to  1,  the  had  Canadian  did  and  but  30  one  hand  did  of  State  Washington  statement,  Pearson  State  the  designed  "we d i s a p p r o v e d  fools".  of  January  was  first  on F e b r u a r y  for  US  nuclear  to  nationalism  excuse  be  government  than  of American interference  also  Pearson  no  ability  of  saw t o  States handled the matter,  hysterical  tempered  it  the  editorial  obvious  the  evening  act,  of  the  speech,  give his  public  Canadian In  to  This  1 8  what  This  resentment  the  so.  Ambassador  situation.  embarass  of  interpretation,  doubt  on t h e  Canadian  Canadian  back  the  a  from  The  recalled  to  "unfounded" avoidance  response  dismay.  do  Diefenbaker's  Department  government's  this  to  again  answer  was  confirm  the  view, Prime  Minister.  Pearson  clarify  the  matter  then  appealed  to  but  Diefenbaker  the did  Government  not  to  address  the  question. Diefenbaker's was  its  death  position  on  political  blow  the  as  February  nuclear  Diefenbaker's, position  on  position  weapon  Douglas  4.  controversy  Defence.  A nuclear  Harkness had spent  career  obtain,  Diefenbaker's action.  It  2 1  against issue  reluctance was  which  Pearson as  States  in  1963, which  forces  system.  Although  in  Canada,  countries.  This  little  weapons,  to  from  role  no  for  longer  this  his Canada  he  doomed  next  day  tolerate  course  would  or  resignation  subsequent  pledged to  would  the  they could  first  his  contrary  of  either  would the  decide  avoid  the  Diefenbaker  with  a  vote  make  election  conclude the  with  of  weapons  were  deal  be was  were at  warheads  supplied  not  warheads  opposition  nuclear  used  by  the  without  concluded  time  to  the  to  the  in  1 964 .  stored  States  of 2 3  to  two-key  be  consent  as  United  available  United  i n August  delivered early  this  were  and,  the  i n Europe and N o r t h A m e r i c a under the  therefore,  the  that  Parliament.  Canadian 2 2  follow  was v i c t o r i o u s i n t h e  deal  could  the  what  much o f h i s m i n i s t e r i a l  Diefenbaker  collapsed  May 1 1 , a  that  This  he  to  nuclear  altogether.  no-confidence  early  clear  acquiring  government,  and  was  resigned  was s o m e t h i n g t h a t to  delivered  Realizing  Harkness  M i n i s t e r of  trying  was  and  of  both  1963,  and  There  acquisition  of  was the  warheads/ been  most  resolved for the  operational warheads Europe  with  were  nature  of  relieved that  time being.  available  E a r l y 1964  weapons  for  each  the  task  of  the  Trudeau  election,  we  and  of  the  issue  had  saw t h e  Bomarcs  1966  nuclear  by  these  Honest Bomarc  lost  weapon is  abandonment the  see  of  John  weapon  systems  until  in  system  was  intended Canada's review  to  that  retired, explain  nuclear  which  i n Canadian defence  following  chapter,  five  the  policy.  12  p o l i c y was l e f t  years  of  were  been  to  Trudeau's  removed  disbanded,  from  and  the  strike  role.  It  was  CF-101  Voodoo  with  its  replaced the  roles.  brought  entire defence.  defence  had  the  collective  the  (nuclear)  1983  reconsider  batteries  squadrons its  to  in  Within  however,  consider  shall  government.  had  paper  contribution  Canada's  the  nuclear  pledged to  reassessing  the  service, CF-104  had a l s o  Canada's as  change  just  nuclear  Pearson  However,  This  were  and N o r t h A m e r i c a .  Lester  not,  people  by  processes We  about  turn this  the  CF-18.  behind  the  first  to  significant  Chapter 2 The  Trudeau  The  Defence  processes  relinquish Prime  to  r i d Canada  Minister  progress  Norman  helped  Trudeau.  of  the  in  shaping  Department  regard.  with  Pearson  the  the  In  of  recommendations  Robertson  Report,  as  despite  f o r e i g n or defence p o l i c y  Pearson  looked  favourably  in  this  of the report,  defence  policy.  or had  been,  Mr  gained  that  no  a  policy. Mr  major  of  seemingly  the  altering  surprisingly, conservative  policy the  in  the  early  Robertson  positions  of  1970s  Report  officials  changes  left  status  the  2 4  quo  by  the alter with  option  open. the  in  time.  steps to  reflected in  The  comfortable  was  in  Pearson's  impressed  was  and  report  were needed a t t h a t  Pearson  make  request,  Canada's d e f e n c e commitments i s not c l e a r . However, t h e of  desire  officials  foreign  and s u b s e q u e n t l y t o o k no reason  election  actually  produced  maintenance  instance,  quality  The  the  to  G e o f f r e y Murray  known,  Canadian  the  Pearson's  of  f o r Canadian  i t s insistence  upon  at  Affairs),  i t became  by  d i d not  1967  assistance  External  decision  despite his stated  ( a l l t h r e e were,  outlining  acceptance  Pearson,  n u c l e a r weapons,  in this  Robertson  Geoffrey the  which  n u c l e a r weapons were s e t i n m o t i o n  of  any  Review  Not  rather  Departments  of  External  Affairs  which the Mr  and N a t i o n a l  report  offered  Canada's  brought with him to  thought  to  be  Canada's  it  was c l e a r  Furthermore,  the  that  Canada's  realities  of  about t r y i n g t o world  However,  nuclear  T r u d e a u c a m e t o p o w e r o n 20 A p r i l ,  Minister  feel  Defence.  that  discussing  place at  defence  Canadian  Bruce "as  Canada's  the  policy He  as  international  brief.  The new P r i m e  sense  of  what  he  community.  Mr. Trudeau d i d not  accurately  therefore  1968  point  [Trudeau]  in  set  f o r Canada i n this  he  position  reflected  promptly  role  emphasizes  April  respite  was  global  "realistic"  Thordarson  early  a strong  in  life.  roles 1968.  the time that  c r e a t e a more  affairs.  stating  past  office  the  the  by was  following  terms:  We b e g i n by r e m i n d i n g o u r s e l v e s that we' r e p e r h a p s more t h e l a r g e s t o f s m a l l powers than the smallest of the large powers. And t h i s i s a complete change, I think, from our m e n t a l i t y of 20 years ago... [ f o r ] now we h a v e t o r e a l i z e t h a t Europe has developed i t s e l f ; it is a great continent, it's strong, its c u r r e n c y i s s t r o n g . A n d C a n a d a , on t h e o t h e r h a n d , has f a l l e n o n t o a more modest r o l e , and i t s h o u l d r e a s s e s s i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y rather than t r y i n g to peace-keep e v e r y w h e r e , w h i c h , i n a s e n s e , means t h a t we' r e t r y i n g t o d e t e r m i n e i n t e r n a t i o n a l situations. " 2 5  It not  is  clear  from statements  comfortable  with  the  like  idea 14  this that  one, Canada  that was  Trudeau a  was  globally  committed weapons  major  in his  power.  As  v i e w were  Mr T r u d e a u ' s  we  shall  part  of  see,  this  personal beliefs  possessing  nuclear  misconception.  on s e v e r a l  issues  are  very  important to t h i s  study. Trudeau b e l i e v e d Canadians shounot  overly  about  concerned  nuclear  The P r i m e M i n i s t e r s t a t e d long-run nuclear from  the war.  the  for  a  very  to  Trudeau s t a t e d  rather  that  decent  of  farther  standard  understandable Canada's  decision  refusing on  to  to  of  regarding  the  the the  this  reason  will  the  come  in  strongly  from  who  it  is  favour  of  foreign  aid  by h a r s h l y c r i t i c i z i n g P e a r s o n weapons  i n the  1963  opposed to  and by  to for  subsequently  election, Canada's  are  search  mind  in  the  instead  their in  of  in  be  world  this  giving  and the factor  Trudeau's  may  have  toward the  in  he the  saw  Soviet  developing  Trudeau  possession  especially  2 7  lack  related Union.  was of  to  of  concern  the  Prime  He d i d n o t  feel  a n d was c l e a r l y  impressed  in  standard-  the  improving relations  United States. is  apparent  been  U n i o n was d a n g e r o u s  changes and  for  war  attitude  Soviet  of-living Union  office  was  that  would  behind With  2 6  the  nuclear  strongly  nuclear  Minister's  by  Also,  in  "it  general.  weapons.  Part  that  Trudeau  Canada  of  farther  living".  place  run for  r e c o r d as b e i n g  nuclear  of  acquire  peoples  and  why  developing countries. his  the  in  he d i d n o t b e l i e v e  threat  falling  increasing  that  superpower  overwhelming  two-thirds  steadily  war o r  be  As w i l l  important  be  Soviet between  the  seen  chapter  when  in  Soviet  considering  4, the  CF-104  strike  role  Trudeau policy from  also  Europe.  strongly  believed  Minister's  sources.  major  of,  post-war  For  this  criticisms  and had  of  dominated,  period".  Canadian  relates  global  roles  of  power and i n f l u e n c e .  Defence  serve  of  should  the  Finally,  Pierre  bureaucratic  Rather,  perpetuate  departments. there  was  away  with  a  the  the  entrenched  he  where  necessary. actions of  3 0  is  and to  for  as  and defence  r e v i e w was  the  the  notion for  Trudeau  national  that  a  state  believed,  2 9  not  of  their  Thordarson, of  respective  Trudeau  administration  "said to  resistance  to  change  This  sentiment  of  the  of  regarding External irrelevant"  diplomacy  were  surprising that  P r i m e M i n i s t e r was p o l i c y on May 2 9 , end the  one to  of  funds  and  "largely  intended to  and  interests  with obtaining  influence  Bruce  being  thus  in  establishments  methods  Trudeau took  foreign The  It  the  main  such  bureaucracies".  traditional  policy,  the  policy  appropriate  new t e c h n i q u e s  as  was  Prime  He b e l i e v e d t h a t  sluggishness  regarded  to  the  military  M i n i s t e r was p a r t i c u l a r l y a p p a r e n t which  it  than  both  power  for  of  foreign  were more c o n c e r n e d  According need  more  rather  distrusted  l o o k i n g out  they  that  defence  Canadians.  Trudeau  departments.  t y p i c a l l y not  Canada. to  interests  "one  closely  s h o u l d seek  its  interests,  NATO w a s  This  2 8  Canada's  reason,  Canada  were  that  s h o u l d be d e r i v e d f r o m n a t i o n a l  external  focus  in  do of  Prime Affairs  in  an  no  age  longer  of  the  order  a  first review  1968.  image  i n the  minds  of  Canadians to  that  formulate  affairs. about  It  an  defence. utmost  Canada c o u l d t r y a  more  was  end For  this  to  appropriate review  Canadian  Trudeau the  importance.  In  t o . be  a major  role  for  which  was  reliance  on  issue  of  power,  and  also  Canada  in  world  eventually  to  bring  nuclear  nuclear  weapons  weapons  was  of  for the  fact,  In 1963 Mr. Trudeau delivered a b l i s t e r i n g a t t a c k on L e s t e r P e a r s o n for h i s d e c i s i o n t o accept n u c l e a r weapons, a n d i n 1968 he t o l d a p r e s s conference that he still objected to the proliferation of nuclear arms on the grounds t h a t t h e danger of n u c l e a r war increased in direct proportion to the number of countries that had nuclear weapons on t h e i r soil. Similarly, the Prime Minister viewed NATO's nuclear strike capability as dangerously provocative, and something in which C a n a d a s h o u l d h a v e no p a r t [since the Soviets w o u l d be u n a b l e t o d i s t i n g u i s h between reconnaissance and strike flights] . 3 1  This  dislike  for  nuclear  weapons  r i d Canada of  its  nuclear  roles.  foreign  policy advisers,  dominant troop press.  one  i n the  reductions  the  defence  in  led  to  Trudeau's  According to  issue review,  of  Europe  received  in  defence  one o f  nuclear  despite  desire  more  Trudeau's  weapons  the  fact  coverage  to  was  the  that  the  by  the  3 2  The determine  first its  stage scope  the  and  direction. 17  review In  process  this  was  Trudeau  to was  instrumental. his  Bruce  [Trudeau's]  internal  place,  ly  outside  claim  decision,  and e x t e r n a l  first by  is  and i t  cant  in  change  the  entire  the  current  he It  this  is  the  issue  alliance  of  factors,  the  the  review  its that  three  evident  the  the  3 3  This  officials  desired  to  see  be  signifiwanted  as  near  from  with  NATO  was  and  progress  area  wanted  that  Consequently,  the  review  in  Trudeau Canadian  this.should  be  NATO  review  opportunity  Furthermore, NATO  of  to  perfect  its  the  opposed  impending the  review  an  as  and  took.  (including  set  18  world  given  annual  national,  alliance.  had to  was  The  Trudeau  and f e l t  government  new  overseas  NATO  policy  The  Canada  years.  and  future.  i n the  in  of  the  subsequently  review.  change.  NATO,  the  commitments  review  defence  in  of  Trudeau wanted  involvement  derived  such  role  that  approaching  Canadian  in light  place  military  defence  fast  Trudeau  reconsider  next  to  taken  which the  i n the  was  policy  provided  the  also  Canada's  wanted  in  this  the  marginal-  He t h e r e f o r e  reconsidered  had  Canada's  of  critics  realized  to  is  direction  priority  external  by  clearly  policy.  only  direction".  made  Trudeau  defence  its  of  a review i n  influenced  determined  paper.  was p r i m a r i l y  interpretation  to conduct  statements  believed  reducing  himself),  by  Canadian  in  defence  that  this  made  which  views,  p o l i c y were t o be  w i t h i n Canada.  the  on h i s  "it  scope of defence p o l i c y r e v i e w e d and a l l a s p e c t s  developments  The  based  was h i s  corroborated for  states that,  environments,  advice,  interviewed  highest  Thordarson  it  was  commitments also  at for  provided  the  government  review,  with  years.  defence  defence  policy  Department the  o p p o r t u n i t y would not  review  process  produced External  current  s h o u l d be against  of  The  this  and a d v e r s e l y  States.  Department  The  strongly desire, best, big  opposed to  capable  league".  3 6  in  a  arise  defence  again  for  of  [weapon]  These  of  and  statement  on  External  Canada's  affect  National  nuclear  o f f i c i a l put i t ,  systems,  proposals  for  what  he  expected  within the  their  would  the  even  more  because of " t o have  the were  looked outside more  a  the  in  rationale  be  on  United  and t o be p l a y e r s  and  was  primarily  was  roles  America  Affairs  with  Defence  the  suggested  stature  relations  by  North  weapon s y s t e m s  hurt  government  a  Minister  i m m e d i a t e l y r e j e c t e d b y M r T r u d e a u who t h e n bureaucracy  for  essentially  Europe  abandoning the  as one s e n i o r  most  which  nuclear  might  with  Prime  Department  NATO a l l i a n c e 3 5  the  Affairs  r e l i n q u i s h i n g the that  began  for  commitments  maintained.  grounds  motivation  3 4  The  the  necessary  because another  several  that  the  the  imaginitive  opinions. At  this  academics whose  Spencer.  were  time  solicited  Clarkson, 3 7  in  Mr  Trudeau  looked  f o r o p i n i o n s on C a n a d a ' s d e f e n c e  views  Stephen  point  These  cabinet  ministers  defence  matters.  David  were  Cox,  John  Jack  other  academics  in  early  1969  Unfortunately,  to  Holmes,  met  Canadian  p o l i c y . Among  Granatstein,  and  to  with  exchange  insufficient  those  James  Eayrs,  and  Robert  most  their  of  the  views  on  evidence  exists  at  this  time  to  the  nuclear  the  importance  and the  weapon  it  This  an  Committee  that  evidence  importantly'  1969.  on  that  the  defence  intention variety  arguments well  as  stage they  of  weapons,  debate. throughout  time the  the  Common's  and N a t i o n a l  Prime M i n i s t e r had assured  of  Committee  the  w o u l d be ."  It  3 9  Committee  government  the  its  was  Defence 3 8  the  House  considered  Very  was h o p e d  would  be  therefore  taken  into  when f o r m u l a t i n g C a n a d a ' s  expose as  the  scholars,  Committee's the  both  worthwhile  for  argued that  Europe.  The  end  to  also  academics  review  general  commitments  Committee  possible.  military officials  academics  4 0  to  views  f r o m many  discovered  foreign s t i l l  of  senior  retain  nuclear  new  posture.  The a  Also during this  Given  Prime M i n i s t e r  some  Affairs  part  e x a m i n a t i o n o f C a n a d a ' s NATO p o l i c y " .  the  by the  of  what  discussions.  continued  government...  findings  just  eyes of the  matter  External  the  before  consideration  wide  1968  by t h e  these  consultation  " u n d e r t o o k an e x t e n s i v e " I n November of  in  of  r e l i n q u i s h the  was t h e  of  picture  i n the  decision to  t h r e e months of  Standing  played  matter  doubtless  process  accurate  issue  of the  subsequent  however,  first  paint  To t h i s  Canadian  end and  was  a  tour be  that  Canada,  all  final  Europe  where  Canada  participation but  one  of  of  this  20  should  i n NATO  the  Canada ought t o w i t h d r a w i t s  result  investigation  as  The  While m i l i t a r y o f f i c i a l s  argued  as  heard  foreign,  of  that  to  they  and b u r e a u c r a t s .  opinion to  NATO.  members  was  Canadian  forces  was  and  a  from  report  which stated roles  that  i n Europe  Mechanized  "Canada s h o u l d continue until  Brigade  review of p o s s i b l e new  defence  period" .  the  equipment  became  policies  would  the  Parliamentary  review,  two o t h e r  Affairs  and N a t i o n a l Defence.  STAFFEUR  reports  (Special  interdepartmental Tremblay  study  The  1972,  available  cabinet  on  ministers to was  end of  by also  Bruce  Committee  The  and  for  was  first  by  the  a  the  and  prompt so  that  post-1972  conducting  which  was  28,  Thordarson  a secret  Europe) .  Soviet  document  as  made  the  4 2  This  Paul  was  a  available  to  The  review,  other  also  -  the  Defence  completed  The External-Defence Report reached c o n c l u s i o n s t h a t were a l m o s t i d e n t i c a l t o STAFFEUR'S recommendations about NATO: maintain Canada's existing forces, at l e a s t f o r t h e t i m e b e i n g . The t w o r e p o r t s d i f f e r e d i n f o r m , h o w e v e r . The E x t e r n a l Defence Report c o n s i s t e d mainly of l i t t l e more than a set of options, while STAFFEUR adopted a more prescriptive approach and made definite policy recommendations.  21  an  Belgium  produced  External  a n d was  was  and  and  February.  4 3  External  Ford  Union  they  1969 .  its  t h e s e became known  Robert  document  February  of  on  headed  final report  the  Air Division  s h o u l d be u n d e r t a k e n  Force  to  four-hundred-page  Report,  in  military  were b e i n g p r e p a r e d w i t h i n  Task  (ambassadors  respectively).  referred  be  its  present  4 1  While  as  for  obsolete  military roles  its  by  Both  of  Cabinet. took  these  "One  for  major  ministers Trudeau  been  going to  come  decision  had to  scheduled Sharp  the  [such  The  4 4  be  take  "was  of  made  soon.  place  in  determined  before that  April gathering".  Saturday  and  scheduled  to  At  this  adviser, Head  Together its  time  Ivan  Office they  secret  entitled  X  Trudeau  Head,  to  members to  status".  A Study  of  a  to  produce  role]  skeptical which not  and  announced  "the  full  weekend and  cabinet  meeting  Trudeau on  3  on  the  known as  the  drafting y  defence  Board  and  of  Non-Group'  special Policy',  report  they  was 4 6  policy policy.  the  this "to  on  April".  a  in  Mr.  NATO b e  own f o r e i g n  Treasury  was  Canadian  upon h i s  assist  22  10  a  on  March,  report  of  clearly  April  decisions  30  called  Defence  weapons  Nevertheless,  new C a n a d i a n p o l i c y  The  they  policy  were  on  special  the  4 7  the  nuclear  defence  documents.  by  that  already-  Furthermore,  4 5  of  became  was  existing  along  any  and  the  hand  A NATO m i n i s t e r i a l m e e t i n g  at  29  announce  in  commitments  course  Sunday,  recruited  Council  its  both  that  all  that  and m i l i t a r y  determine  proof  of  CF-104's  Washington  in  to  of  the  these  membership  was  as  for  out  of the  changes  searching  from e i t h e r  to  criticism  detailed  demanded."  had  rejected  effectiveness  NATO c o n t i n g e n t offering  were  Cabinet  granted the  Canada's without  reports  Privy paper.  underline produced,  p r o j e c t e d 'armed f o r c e s of 50,000 after ten years, forces to be limited to d o m e s t i c d u t i e s , e x c e p t f o r 1800 Canada based s o l d i e r s a s s i g n e d to NATO's A l l i e d Command E u r o p e M o b i l e F o r c e . T h e n u c l e a r s t r i k e r o l e of the a i r f o r c e ' s CF-104s i n Europe, weapons that Head cautioned, might be p e r c e i v e d by the Soviets as intended for first strike, would be a b a n d o n e d a l o n g w i t h t h e NATO B r i g a d e ' s Honest John s u r f a c e - t o - s u r f a c e missiles with their nuclear warheads." 4 8  Furthermore, paper,  unlike  External  those  Affairs,  ministers, the  Granatstein  fact  closely,  that  reflected  the  is  point  or  if  The N o n - G r o u p R e p o r t  he  its  cabinet  existence  prior  discussion  to  o n 29  the  March.  D i s c u s s i o n s on t h e n u c l e a r Trudeau c a b i n e t . that seem  the  division  that  difficult  Granatstein within  Thordarson to  is  assess the  over  the  NATO  issue,  long  i n coming i n d i c a t e s  issue  the  correct  in  of  the  fact it 23  so  Prime its that  Leo C a d i e u x ,  knew  being  so  to  secret  were next  was  that  views  of  available  for  held within  the  5 0  Cabinet  the  Due  4 9  simply accepted  was k e p t  paper  and  new g r o u p  and B o t h w e l l r e c e n t l y  extent  but  the  whether  a p p a r e n t l y not even the M i n i s t e r of Defence, of  "the  Defence  Trudeau's  determine  report  in  that  Minister Trudeau".  paralleled to  out  officials  t h i n k i n g of  Prime  report  influenced this  by  the  difficult  recommendations.  Bothwell  prepared  and e s p e c i a l l y  it  Minister  and  have  substantial. saying division  that  the  It  that, within  decision  was c o n s i d e r a b l e " .  5 1  shown would  "it  is  cabinet was  so  Opinion  within  the  issue.  Cabinet  While  ministers,  of  some  such  Minister's  was  as  Despite  relinquish  Canada's  However,  the  Honest  the  Starfighter  the  defence  that  the  White  fighter  The  Bomarcs  as  the  supported  cabinet  the  Prime  a significant were  Cabinet, was  the  reached  number  in  strong  decision on  20  September  the  role  was  to  be  May. 19  phased  that  release  of  it  had been  decided  would  be  retired,  CF-101  be  removed  i n May  through  normal  would stay  was r e p l a c e d b y a n e w e r  to  from  and by  1971,  missile  5 2  out  the  Genie nuclear  to  with  aircraft.  use  as  soon  as  met  in  5 4  Brussels  on  informed  its  preliminary not  the  25  nuclear-strike  is  nuclear  made p u b l i c u n t i l  in  w e l l - were  Meanwhile,  It  within  -  w o u l d be d i s m a n t l e d i m m e d i a t e l y ,  Paper  the  of  w a s n o t made u n t i l  Voodoos  until  NATO  Cadieux,  weapons  A l t h o u g h not  5 3  Leo  split  nuclear  and t h a t  the  as  the  majority)  weapons,  nuclear-strike  CF-101  attrition,  possible.  the  on  MacDonald,  on n u c l e a r  John m i s s i l e s  1972 .  a  Donald  announcement  the  split  not  m i n i s t e r s ' such  opposition.  January  (if  position  other  widely  NATO  May,  1969.  allies role  Defence  of in  It  Planning  was  at  common  meeting,  although  intention  Europe.  There  negative  response.  admitted  that  knowledge the "In  Canada's  this  its  d i s c u s s i o n or n e g o t i a t i o n as  to  announcement the  House a  proposals  Committee time  to  had  that  discontinue not  been  p r i o r to the  what  took  by C a d i e u x few days  had not  Canada  at  clearly  well  long  decision.  place  later  been  any  the  5 5  this  drew  a  Mr C a d i e u x received,  but  claimed  failure  that  to  time  its  to  this  blunt  in  time  been other  their  to  concerned  prescribed  Canada  agreed  relatively ministers  criticisms  of  as  Canada's  procedures to  more  NATO a t  this  restrained, h a v i n g been  this  of  consult  The o p p o s i t i o n f r o m w i t h i n  have the  objection  exactly  NATO a l l i e s .  seems  defence  At  5 6  Cadieux r e c a l l s and  principal  conform  consultation." with  the  change  although very  in  harsh  Canadian  policy.  At a l a t e r meeting of the f u l l cabinet, t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r , as a l w a y s concerned t o f r e e Canada from n u c l e a r commitments, told Cadieux that if NATO ministers wanted Canada t o c o n t i n u e the nuclearstrike role of the CF-104 squadrons, that p r o p o s a l would have t o r e t u r n to cabinet for decision. 5 7  From  this  point  onward,  continued regarding the CF-104.  This  role  was  consultation  nuclear  of  particular  h a v e t o be t a k e n o v e r by a n o t h e r to the a l l i a n c e ' s opposed  to  reflection NATO  allies.  expression was  going  of to  might  certainly  regret,  but  forego  in  that  especially  concern  the  perhaps  there end  role."  ministers that  because its  it  of  the  would  importance  The t e r m " d i s c u s s i o n " ,  what a c t u a l l y t o o k p l a c e "Almost  NATO  c o u n t r y due t o  military strategy.  "consultation", of  roles,  with  5 8  be  between would  a  more  acceptance With  accurate  Canada and have  been that  the  as  its some  Canada  Canadian  government's objections to  alter  position  having  b e i n g made b y t h e  the  decision  Although  the  to  already  been  NATO m i n i s t e r s  r e l i n q u i s h the  United  States  was  decided,  were  insufficient  nuclear-strike  involved in  with  Canada's the  weapons part  U.S. does  the  States  would  Bomarc  were  weapons  to  The  an  European  useful  have  been  accurate to  that  forceful.  other  stage  cabinet  extensive.  of  may b e  from  the  the  American  response  was  not  that  the  practice  and  It  McNamara h a d more  than  stated  target  over  event.  how t h e  United  providing  nuclear  5 9  r e v i e w was  to  have  a White Paper.  the  This  decisions  process  by D o n a l d MacDonald and h i s  was  chosen  A l l t h e p r o p o s a l s w h i c h h a d been p r o d u c e d up u n t i l  t i m e had been April  1969  r e j e c t e d f o r one r e a s o n  statements  made  of e v e r y t h i n g that  statements  in  Canadian  sovereignty  priority  and  nuclear  nothing  weapons.  by  or another.  Trudeau  revealed  was  to  at  all  be was  that  given said  that  the the at  The d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o c e s s  this  In f a c t ,  constituted  had been d e c i d e d at  fact •only  in  appears  into  1969  This  nuclear  news.  the  drafted  and Genie  the  i n any  in  consultation  of  little  states  concern  assessment  Robert  for  defence,  Bomarc  growing American concerns  i n December  aides.  total  of  respond  final  made b y  seem t o  evidence  was  to  r e l i n q u i s h i n g the  not  particularly  begun  on  result  available  there  commitment  role.  discussions  r e g a r d i n g Canada's n u c l e a r - s t r i k e r o l e and d i d express about  the  time.  the  the 6 0  sum These  protection highest  this  time  had been  of  defence about h u n g up  between  April  bureaucratic time  frame,  Paper  1969  and  in-fighting. eighteen  s t i l l  December  rejected  had not  been  produced,  resistance  within  DND  to  statement.  In  bureaucratic What t h e outstanding  resistance drafters issues  into a "package" done  by  issues not  during  this  the  announced,  the  the  period.  several  cabinet,  the package  had o f t e n  direction  and p l a c i n g them  met  subject  with of  draft  any d e b a t e  for Canadian defence  or  National  The  Defence  there  matter  was  d i d was t o months  1969 of  take  and work  said,  within  the them  This  as  was  well  6 2  kind  of  presented  and E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s  to for  the  a to  individual This  matter the  d e t e r m i n e d and  on n u c l e a r weapon  now p a s s e d  as  but which had  some  success.  p o l i c y had been  27  was  w i t h i n P a r l i a m e n t and so  t h e move away f r o m C a n a d a ' s r e l i a n c e begun.  White  6 1  was f i n a l l y  no  this  amount  g a i n e d a p p r o v a l where the little  to  April  tremendous  Prime M i n i s t e r had  f r a m e w o r k . When t h e  was n o t t h e  was  a  in  White Paper  past  The  l a r g e l y because  ideas was  the  by c a b i n e t .  which had been a l r e a d y d e c i d e d i n c a b i n e t  been  parts  largely  d e a l f o r the government to c o n s i d e r .  t a k i n g what  conceptual the  the  there  of  of  due  O f t w e n t y p r o p o s a l s made d u r i n g  had been  effect,  1970  systems  Departments  implementation.  of  Chapter  3  Implementation  of the Defence  Review  The i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f t h e g o v e r n m e n t ' s d e c i s i o n t o the  European nuclear  announcement in  NATO.  the  very  in  nuclear  schedule  had been  weapon.systems  systems  "unique" were t o  These (CDS) rid  factors  the  would  devised  for  the  timing vary  of  for In  the each  any  capability  removal  Chief  limited of  at  authority  these  as  with  nuclear  policy  in  weapon  systems. "those  reasonably  r a p i d a pace  the  preparedness  seem  to  have  influenced  weapons  Staff  decision  in the  the  a  were  CDS f e l t  Europe". timing  to  to  [decisions] as  it  their  According  of C a n a d a ' s n u c l e a r weapons i n c l u d e t h e  28  to  Defense  implementing the  adviser,  force  of  the  nuclear  nuclear  the  of  the  due  gave  a  Basically,  system, the  left  in cabinet,  removal of  event,  19  government's  d e c i s i o n w a s made  characteristics  which  retirement  the  mid-1970s.  foreign  consistent  chapter,  and  out  September  any n u c l e a r  early  Canada  carried  the  removed i n the  some  Trudeau  after  from Europe and Canada.  characteristics. be  forego  previous  When t h e  was u n d e r s t o o d t h a t weapon  the  soon  o f C a n a d a ' s N o r t h A m e r i c a n n u c l e a r r o l e s was  White Paper.  rough  began  Canada would  As noted  renouncement to  that  roles  abandon  was  6 3  The  of  the  procurement  process  involved in  those being these  new  removed. weapon  developed before extent  defence of  the  the  removal  of  weapon  naturally  systems  which  d i d have some  of  for  required  for  have  removed.  procedures  are  on t h e  to  be  To  some  involved  characteristic  an e f f e c t  these  system  also  c o u l d be  organizational  systems,  structures,  would  older  the  weapon  replacement  The t r a i n i n g a n d f a c i l i t i e s  systems  therefore,  replacing  finding a  of  eventual  in  most  timing  systems.  CF-104 S t a r f i g h t e r  The highest this  CF-104  on Mr T r u d e a u ' s  nuclear  degree of the  nuclear-strike  weapon s y s t e m  list".  and  strike  consequently  role  had  retire earlier  a  until  bit  of  1975.  insisted  that  life  it  its  was  perhaps  relinquishing  in the  strike  very  important a  certain  In a d d i t i o n , the it,  as  Trudeau role  of  it  was  fact,  to  NATO of  Starfighter not  adviser the  In  amount  CF-104  s u b j e c t to m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n at moments of h i g h t e n s i o n by S o v i e t d e f e n d e r s . They were o p e r a t i n g f r o m s o f t t a r g e t s and so t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n or c a t e g o r i z a t i o n by the Soviets, i t was f e l t , c o u l d o n l y be as first-strike weapons, and t h a t was i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h Canada's view then and 29  greatest  effectiveness.  commanded  left  However, the  Europe  Ironically,  was  r e s p e c t w i t h i n t h e NATO a l l i a n c e . s t i l l  in  i n many w a y s r e q u i r e d t h e  j u s t i f i c a t i o n because of  Starfighter's  strategy  "hit  role  due  to  mentioned was  now t h a t i t s h o u l d n o t weapon s t a t e .  be  a  first-strike  6 4  This  view,  nuclear that  and h i s  CF-104  strike  Paper  completely of  that  actual  on  out  The  6 5  role  conventional  officials  the  that  way h a v e  of  a nearby  1972,  was  been  CF-104's  move  be  of  Canadian to  the  role.  The  explanations 6 7  for  ,  that  withdrawal  from  combination  of  In  line  squadrons  the  was  NATO , 68  with  and n o n - n u c l e a r  was  not  move t o it  both  were  this  rationale  the  Lahr are required  or  perhaps  case.  because that  and  it  a  6 6  among  might  that  in  the  lack  reinforced Interviews  The it  the  relinquishing  was  role.  that  with  Lahr  coincidental  U . S . m i l i t a r y b a s e t o L a h r may h a v e  shown t h a t  beneficial  to  end  process  speculation  forces  be  and  by t h e  aircraft.  some  1971  by t h e  decision for  the  r e l i n q u i s h i n g of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r nuclear clearly  would  dispensed  for of  role  the  to  meant  The  d i d occur  accounted  found  matter  related  strike  between  Union,  doomed.  the  and t h i s  is  opposition  Soviet  was  that  properly  a  the  Europe  delay role  general  of  stated  by  the  in  weapon .system it  the  role  could  Furthermore,  of  perception  brief  w i t h d r a w a l of the  Trudeau's  defence  phased  year.  whereby  some  with  weapons  the  White  combined  only  was of  the have  possible  financially the  was  French  due  to  a  factors. this  restricted strike  decision, to  flights  the  conducting  CF-104 only  Starfighter reconnaissance  i n E u r o p e . T h i s change 30  over  was  completed  by  January  1972,  when  the  Canadian  squadrons  i n Europe took over a counter-attack  of  American or  either  squadrons the  in  "Combat  carried  were  system.  The  assigned  Group".  Subsequently,  removed  and  were  replaced  which the  then one  Canada  relinquished  this  former role  result  were  was  h a v i n g gone  now r e f e r r e d nuclear  a  by  to  bombs  conventional  to  as  they weapon  had  been NATO  senior  military officer,  once  it  longer  no  SACEUR  was  in  The  on  the  "The door slammed once you  From the m i l i t a r y ' s  7 0  demoralizing.  ashamed at  by  Starfighter  other  concerning the CF-104s.  got out of the n u c l e a r game".  the  i n support  The  6 9  were  role  Canadian Starfighters  reassigned  According to  the  forces.  conventionalrole  forces.  discussions  German  their  targets  to  West  Starfighter  Canadian  perspective  forces  f r o m b e i n g on t h e  in  "sharp  Europe  edge"  to  Leonard  as  stating that  a l t h o u g h no n u c l e a r weapons were u n d e r c o n t r o l  of  the  Group,  nothing. Granatstein  Combat  tactical American of  weapons, or  this,  other  "the  spurious."  This  7 1  weapons,  Bothwell  it  provided  of  only  NATO f o r c e s . " nuclear  argument  is  the  and  nuclear  General  to  W.C.  access  they  They t h e n  somewhat  fired  claim that was  are  "access to"  a  by  because  By  not  nuclear  overlooking make  such  completely  misleading.  phrase  One m u s t  to  were  virginity...  Bothwell  issue.  have  that  i s t h e y mean b y t h e  Granatstein  importance  cite  "continued  country's  s t a t i n g what i t  between  and  the  distinction  a c t u a l l y h a v i n g c o n t r o l o v e r n u c l e a r weapons and b e i n g  part  of  an a l l i a n c e  weapons.  General  the  latter.  In  his  opinion  that  any  actual  claimed.  which professes  Leonard's  fact, it  access  a  to  comment  retired  was  the  very  possible  was  more  senior  weapons  that as  of  likely  at  expressed  Canada  General  such  aimed  CAF o f f i c e r  unlikely  nuclear  use  s t i l l  had  Leonard  had  7 2  Honest John  Also  stationed  to-surface as  the  Canadian as  1972  the  had  Honest  Johns  already and  that  the  disbanded.  the  Europe.  was  Lance  7 4  so  and  contention  obsolete  made t o was  John  by t h e missiles  the  as  the  John  were  Honest  The  were  it  the  the  not  states.  a 7 6  for  NATO  Honest  The  were  1973-74 Johns  the  in  Honest  C h i e f of major  to  already  was b y  of  the  able  had in  s t i l l  missile  was  battery  the early  one  replacement  Johns  being  By as  Paper  not  time  Lance  removal  no d i f f i c u l t i e s f o r  32  the  oldest  In f a c t ,  immediate  E u r o p e a n NATO  reason  by  7 3  White  replacing  they  the  the  a  artillery  mid-1970s.  the  fact  surface-  These were  disband them.  Defence.  remaining  accordingly with  of  1970,  Honest A l l  in  selected  by  Consequently,  7 5  already  system  been  Johns proved to pose Staff,  Honest  CF-104s,  US D e p a r t m e n t  removed from use that  the  were t h e  had been  missile  system  been  John  decision  by  announce  i n NATO a s  Honest  this  fielded  Europe,  m i s s i l e s were t o be r e m o v e d q u i c k l y .  b i g an i s s u e  that  in  Defence area  Honest  of  Johns  were  simply  removed from the  Canadian a r t i l l e r y  batteries.  Bomarc  The  nuclear  slightly clearly point  different defensive  defence  air-to-air useful  matter. weapon  with  a  missile  defensive  d i d not present gave  systems  which  strong 7 8  highly  the  the  The B o m a r c s  against  Soviet  successfully threat  for  were  Bomarc  offered  only  The In  carried  formations.  role  of  the  Soviet  tested.  7 9  they  and the  by  US  supported aside  the  from  justifying the  Secretary  fact  being the  that  missile  attack  It  went  then  claim  of that  used  the as  removal of "the since  on t o  Bomarcs they say  Bomarcs  Bomarcs,  have  cannot  that  of  and  Bomarcs  become  point  only  had been 1960s.  once  of  during the  bomber  8 0  A  statement further  l i t t l e  value  maneuvers.  White Paper  highly  the  been  d e p l o y e d was  In  cited  vulnerable  be d i s p e r s e d l i k e  "moreover,  being defence  McNamara,  were  which strike  "impending"  Robert  targets  the  As a r e s u l t  p e r c e i v e d as  the  CF-lOls  Defence  be  CF-104's  had  n o t s e e n as h a v i n g m a t e r i a l i z e d d u r i n g t h e made  only  range,  missiles  a  Genie  misinterpretation  were w i d e l y  Furthermore,  7 7  were  the  would  CF-lOls  r e l i n q u i s h i n g the  the  Canada  addition,  Intended for a short  bombers,  which  CF-lOls  Voodoo  themselves  ineffective.  and  bomber  the  for  Bomarcs  range.  problem of  grounds  in  The  limited  nature,  stationed  systems.  i n attacking Soviet  their  role.  weapon  to  aircraft."  Canadian  Bomarcs  are  sited to  the  preponderance  force  is  located  military stated North  defend the of  U.S.  in  the  rationale  that  the  Bay,  for  of N o r t h America  mid-west".  of  After  the  at  the  strategic  8 1  decision,  squadrons  (all  "shortly",  part  land-based  the  Bomarc  Ontario  dismantled  Eastern  a l t h o u g h no  retaliatory  providing  White Paper  La Macaza,  Bomarc  whereas  specific  finally  Quebec  missiles) date  this  and  at  to  be  were was  given.  CF-101 Voodoo  The  CF-101  Voodoo  G e n i e m i s s i l e was n o t because of i t s missile  used  and  its  accompanying  phased out  of  use  until  operational characteristics. by  the a i r c r a f t ' s  the  CF-101  had to  be  nuclear-tipped the  early  To b e g i n w i t h ,  nuclear-tipped  f i r e c o n t r o l s y s t e m was r e l a t i v e l y  interceptors  Since the that  the  CF-101  decision the  replaced missle,  were was  had been  aircraft by the  a  "gatling  gun" i n the  with  the  Genie  been  illogical.  weapon e f f e c t i v e  to  any  hope  of  required  being  its  Genie  made  time  the  defence  at  the  retain  its  front  armament  Without  h a d n o t h i n g more  of  the  than  of  the  aircraft.  keeping  the  aircraft  would  not  r e t o o l the  have CF-101  34  been  it  was  air-to-air  To h a v e  cost  review  amounted  would  if  missile,  until  Genie what  8 2  effective.  without  aircraft.  while "It  have  because  ineffective  would  new  CF-101  to  the  inaccurate.  The h i g h e r y i e l d o f a n u c l e a r w e a p o n was t h e r e f o r e the  1980s  to  a  done  away  simply  have  effective  with a different  type  or of  air  defence  these  system".  8 3  The  White  Paper  had  put  the  issue  in  terms,  In a i r combat there is at present no a l t e r n a t i v e to equipping the C F - l O l s with n u c l e a r warheads h e l d i n Canada by the U . S . under e x i s t i n g s t o r a g e and c u s t o d y arrangements. The CF-lOls have a conventional air-to-air c a p a b i l i t y and a r e o p e r a t e d i n t h i s mode f o r peacetime interception and identification. However, to play an e f f e c t i v e r o l e i n the defence of North America against the threat of massive nuclear attack, they require nuclear-tipped air-to-air weapons. 8 4  In  any  to  event,  old  age.  politicians with  their  1983  when  October, The  replaced, is  not  could to  However, of  Trudeau era,  aircraft  The  first  1982  CF-lOls  were  before the  be  the  Genie  the  being were  retire  that their  i n use  replaced not  by  the  cabinet  nuclear i n the  weapons, early  use  late  the  as  CF-18  until  25  8 5  the  in  to  be  However,  it  the  Voodoos  interceptor  1980s. which  White Paper's 35  in  aircraft  or C F - 5 s .  expected  many  some t i m e  which decided that  resistance  p r i o r to the  first  due  of  as  delivered  the  1975  remained  missiles,  remaining CF-104s  bureaucratic  review process  nevertheless,  in  surprise  fighters  nuclear  were  CF-18s  to  to  and c o n t i n u e d t o be d e l i v e r e d u n t i l  retain  The  the  scheduled  perhaps  the  likely  s t i l l  V o o d o o was  accompanying  "Hornet".  1988.  the  existed  during  the  r e l e a s e was n o t  felt  during  the  explanation been to  implementation phase. for  this  d e c i d e d and i t ensure  rocking"  that would  conclusion discern  of  was  review.  central  the  changes  probably  which factors  may h a v e b e e n  by  was u p t o  the  the  that  not  Perhaps the this  have  The  place. been  next  i n f l u e n c e d the to  the  point  C h i e f of  took  most  8 6  the  the  issues  Defence  Excessive  tolerated  chapter  reasonable  will  review process  had Staff "boat  after attempt  the to  and which  r e v i e w and i t s i m p l e m e n t a t i o n .  36  Chapter 4 Assessment of Influences  This  chapter  influenced  the  which  Following those the  this  abandon  which  have  namely  from w i t h i n be  out  an  of  community  Canada  assessment  Canada's  in  Canada's  may  o f i n f l u e n c e w i l l be c o n s i d e r e d f i r s t ,  arose  global  factors  roles.  will  to  the  nuclear  emanated  which  assess  decision  Domestic sources those  will  and  of  its  population.  external  factors,  alliance  commitments,  and  other  general,  from  from  outside  sources.  I. Domestic F a c t o r s  Several considered factor  to  Minister  factors in  be  the  will  Trudeau and h i s  factor  to  Data  from  the  considered.  1961,  context  discussed  next  Canadian  arising  The  be  1988  Institute  1962,  1963  the  be  will  advisers be  that  until  Opinion  will 37  Canada  be  will  review.  personal  be  The  first  of  Prime  beliefs  and c o l l e a g u e s . of  the  Public Opinion  Public  and 1966,  within  defence  the  1960's  CUPS of  of  closest  analyzed  early  from  public present  Survey,  (CIPO)  utilized.  The  opinion. will  be  as  well  as  surveys  done  in  Each  these  of  polls  contained  Canadians' course, makers  views  will  anti-nuclear not  they  impact  determine  to  will  must  also  procurement  and  the  maintaining  or  or not  exerted  analyzed to  politics  be  about  important,  of  Canadian d e c i s i o n  i n an e f f o r t  to  shed l i g h t  to  discuss  nature  of  Canadian p o l i t i c a l  be  both  pro-defence  and  process  of  of  the  the  weapon  associated systems  issues  or  Canadian  be v i e w e d i n t h i s  and importance  of  whether  the  weapon  on t h e s e  role  of p o l i c y . F o u r t h ,  costs  nuclear  the  determine  The  financial the  will  within  assessed.  which w i l l  is  by  determinants  replacing  remaining factors  the  asked  More  discussed  be  bureaucratic  bureaucracy  two  be  were s i g n i f i c a n t of  weapons.  whether  Pressures  groups  directly  by p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  factor  groups.  which  nuclear  influenced  third  interest  on  be t o  were  The  questions  with are  chapter.  that  the It  we t u r n now  personal  beliefs  leaders.  P e r s o n a l B e l i e f s o f P o l i t i c a l Leaders  The  personal  powerful Pearson  effect and  disarmament dislike  beliefs upon  Trudeau  held  the  decision  both  in public.  strongly  Trudeau  o f n u c l e a r weapons and,  criticized discussed  Pearson  for  i n chapter  2,  by  was  w o u l d be 38  to  leaders  de-nuclearize  supported  the  particularly  it will  accepting it  political  in  firm  19 6 3 .  worthwhile to  87  a  Canada. cause  be r e m e m b e r e d ,  them  had  in  of his  harshly Although  review  Trudeau's As  belief  with  system.  the  Prime M i n i s t e r s which  was v e r y much a w a r e o f maintain fact,  good r e l a t i o n s  Trudeau  itself  Canada's  felt  politically  neighbour believed  to  or  felt  reflect  Canada's interests  the had  that  were  Trudeau  every  question Soviet  may  the  from  to  been  Although  these  two  strike  i n Europe  did  outlook  Union,  that  the  Soviet  appeared against  Given  relations  governments Furthermore, closely  This led d i r e c t l y  an  weapon s y s t e m s  his  perception  guage  apparent Soviet  the  the  a  the  Minister's less  Union  weapons  during  illogical  to  that  wartime.  the one  were  Prime  does  not  meant  hostile  It  to  be  would  Minister believe  no to  the  over  relationship  Prime  and h i s  with  of  in  relationship  concern  Union  that  nuclear  end.  nuclear by  to  Mr T r u d e a u  8 9  used  of  exists.  some  positive view  of the  against  doubt arm  the  CF-104  he w o u l d h a v e u n d e r s t a n d a b l y q u e s t i o n e d  nuclear  a threat  the  to  to  the  indicates  exist.  on E a s t - W e s t  the  difficult  provoking  indeed  Soviet  States  this  southern  b r i n g i n g .Canada's  reinforced  views,  of  role  for  to  distance  its  attempt.  was d e s i r a b l e .  United  possibility  the  should]  than previous  willing  opposition to  have  Union.  between  fact  [and  need  h a v i n g C a n a d i a n d e f e n c e p o l i c y more  Mr T r u d e a u ' s  the  extent  personal . reason with  Trudeau  Despite  8 8  squadrons i n Europe l o s i n g t h e i r n u c l e a r r o l e .  involvement  kind  could  economically  a much g r e a t e r  possible  United States.  Canada  and  him,  l i m i t e d power and the  with the  that  preceded  have  oneself  The  above  strengthened the  views  by  this  fact.  major powers, The  the  his belief  g l o b a l community  reflect  of  and  Minister  t h a t C a n a d a was  that Canadian  Nuclear  i f they had  P r i m e M i n i s t e r was  Prime  weapons  to  t o be p o s s e s s e d  also determined  by  policy  be any  outside As  a  revealed  key  role  weapons.  The  provide  one  a  with  was  However,  Prime  also  influential  the  nuclear  influence such  as  position  s t a t e at  t o have defence  Trudeau  why  i t took  Although  and  some o f Donald  been  influencing  the  why  exact  of  the  i t s  above defence  direction and  Trudeau  outlined  i t did.  colleagues  decision to  MacDonald,  relinquish  measure closest were  were  of  their  associates,  certainly  in  a  i n f l u e n c e Trudeau w h i l e p r o v i d i n g a d v i c e . almost  certainly  were  and  similar  chose these  Minister's determination  having  determined  Canada  beliefs  Trudeau's  Prime  book,  ridding  final the  beliefs  their  all.  policy  Minister  for understanding  their  the defence  of  personal  i n reaching the  Head  Prime  Minister's advisers  i s unclear,  to  process  strong  roles.  Ivan  the  and  2,  chapter  basis  ordered  the  in  in  nuclear  review  for  a c t o r s or i n f l u e n c e s .  was  played  in  should  reserved  be d e r i v e d f r o m C a n a d i a n s o c i e t a l i n t e r e s t s and n o t by  again  a modest power  defence  were  were  to  foreign policy  Granatstein very  and  effective  his to  own.  This  achieve  fields.  i n choosing  h i s cabinet m i n i s t e r ' s . For  attests  his  In the  Bothwell  40  individuals  to  the  objectives in  first  describe his  because  chapter Trudeau  adviser's  example,  and  Donald  of as in  MacDonald  was  September,  1970,  but  raise  the  issue  money  for  the  again more  appointed  of  Donald  MacDonald h e l d  for  their  his  troop  national  levels  Department  the  to  of  defence  on  was i m m e d i a t e l y w a r n e d b y T r u d e a u t o  event,  similar  Prime  minister  Minister  was  on  before  i n the  National Defence.  aware  views  own w e l l  assistance  of  i n Europe or to  that  defence  he  issues  for  In  any  Head  and  which  c a l l e d upon e i t h e r  defence  not  ask  9 0  bothlvan  24  were  of  them  review.  Public Opinion  The CUPS  public and  opinion data  CIPO  observations. weapons The  general Forces  of  out  Since  nuclear  fluctuation  of  decade  that  time,  weapons  public  weapons.  is  opinion  of  the  grew  12,  1963,  up t o  its  in  controversy  on  whether  favour  in  that  as  alliance  of  in  of  1,  the  Armed public nuclear  significant  of  commitments  nuclear  past.  possession  Lester  a matter  Table  a  the  only  when  the  Canadian  opposition to The  in  Canada's  1960s  the  nuclear  comparing  The  occurred  favour  that  when  by  interesting  evident  found  us  of  weapons.  As- i l l u s t r a t e d  was g e n e r a l l y  is  steadily.  trend  provided to number  some  however,  this  on J a n u a r y  of  nuclear  the  a  it  this  public  Canada s h o u l d l i v e nuclear  of  possess  in  with,  issue  indication  should  declared  an  are  suggests  begin  been  trend  started role.  To  have  first  polls  which  principle, and  the  weapons  Pearson  acquire Canadian  Table 1 P u b l i c A t t i t u d e s Towards Canadian Forces with Nuclear  Arming of Weapons (in  %)  --CIPO  Support  for  Opposition  to  Qualified No  1962 Nov.  1961 Sept.  Position  Opinion  1963 March  1966 June  61  54  49  34  31  32  31  44  —  6  4  4  8  14 100  100  8  100  100  18  (Taken f r o m R . B . B y e r s a n d Don M u n t o n , " C a n a d i a n D e f e n c e , N u c l e a r Arms and P u b l i c O p i n i o n : Consensus and C o n t r o v e r s y " , p.14) .  Table 2 Position  on n u c l e a r  weapons  in  1988  Responses: 1. 2. 3. 4.  strongly disagree agree strongly  disagree agree  Total  45 40 12 3  101%  ( T a k e n f r o m M i c h a e l D r i e d g e r a n d Don M u n t o n , " S e c u r i t y , Arms C o n t r o l and D e f e n c e : P u b l i c A t t i t u d e s i n C a n a d a , " p . 1 0 7 ) .  42  up  to  and  opinion,  including  however,  possession survey cent  of  that  opposed to ought  question  to  the  was  definite  away  weapons.  have  below,  The  been  from  The  weapons,  nuclear as  1988  CUPS  please  weapons  "X"  e x t e n t to which you d i s a g r e e  the  per  in  each  box  which  opinion  is  even  more  I t . s h o u l d be 1987  to  trend  decision after  of  been  opposing  above) to  this  though  that  opposed to  no p o l l s  an  the  had  increasing  whether leads  was  trend  will  been  issue  well-  that The  9 1  or the  of  one t o c o n s i d e r t h e  be  weapons. 1966  and  assumed by  this  weapons,  the  was  However,  since this  1963 says  Canadians. of the  that polls  period.  systems  Canadians  importance  public  of s u p p l y i n g nuclear  weapon  to  responses  between  (indicated  critical  or  nuclear  1,  nuclear  established.  nuclear  was  Table  during  nuclear  with  their  therefore  weapons  majority  to  taken  issue  consistent  possessing the  It  such  r e l i n q u i s h the  opposed to  about  to  relation  strongly  Canadian forces.  discussed  turn  In  c o n t a i n e d any r e f e r e n c e t o t h e  weapons the  2.  noted  felt  or agree w i t h each d e s c r i p t i o n  who a n s w e r e d t h e q u e s t i o n ,  Table  per  represents  Of t h o s e in  85  description  weapons."  outlined  Canada's  arsenal.  Canada ought t o e q u i p i t s Armed F o r c e s  are  of  cent  its  "For  public  roughly  statement: 9 2  of  public opinion  was  w h i l e 15  follows:  trend  support  Canadian p u b l i c  nuclear  asked  statement  has  nuclear  reveals  Canada  1963.  The taken even have  little This  nuclear  in  issue  voting public.  Evidence  taken  from the  1962 43  a n d 1963  CIPO p o l l s  seem  to  offer  strong  weapons voted.  was  an  issue  the  notion that  that  would  possession  affect  the  the  party -preference  present)  to  their  of  position  of  way  C r o s s t a b u l a t i o n s were p e r f o r m e d on d a t a  comparing and  support to  nuclear  Canadians  from the  the  respondent  on  nuclear  polls  (both  past  weapons.  The  q u e s t i o n a s k i n g w h e t h e r C a n a d a s h o u l d h a v e n u c l e a r w e a p o n s was identical series  in  both  cases.  of tables  (3a,  party  preference  to  these  tables  partisan  those  opposed. seem  to  weapon this  in  1962.  who h a d  were more  who  feelings  this  that  the  nuclear  nuclear  is  had  supported  Despite bear  supported the  i n c l i n e d to  a  this, direct  acquisition.  had changed  the  was  issue.  weapons  clear  that  the  Conservatives  NDP w e r e in  relationship Tables  in  not  At  this  the  last while  inclined  to  be  a f f i l i a t i o n do  to  position  4a  and  s i g n i f i c a n t l y o n l y months  4b  on  not  nuclear  suggest  later  a  general  weapons,  more  party  in  a  From  were  weapons.  favour nuclear  changes  However,  process  which r e l a t e d differences  about  It  of  was s l i g h t l y i n f a v o u r o f n u c l e a r  those  election  result  3b a n d 3 c )  would appear  issue  population time,  it  The  that  by March  of  1963. It  i s apparent that  t h e n u c l e a r weapons c o n t r o v e r s y ,  was p r e c i p i t a t e d l a r g e l y b y t h e impact upon the election.  Those  committed to 1962  Cuban m i s s i l e  crisis,  way p e o p l e c l a i m e d t h e y w o u l d v o t e who r e m a i n e d l i b e r a l s  acquiring nuclear  weapons  (80.8% as o p p o s e d t o 55.0%) . The l a r g e s t  they  had  i n the  were much more than  which  next  solidly  had been  changes  an  in  in party  T a b l e 3a P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 2 who v o t e d f o r the Liberals i n the last e l e c t i o n Position  on Nuclear  Weapons  Party Liberal PC NDP  Yes  No  Qual  55. 0 33.3 20.0  39.5 33.3 60.0  5.5 33.3 20 . 0  Total  53.7  39.6  7  Table the  Total 135.5 4.5 2.5  100% 100% 100%  10.4%  142.5  N=  3b  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 2 who v o t e d f o r Conservatives i n the last election Position  on Nuclear  Party Liberal PC NDP  Yes 56.9 65.2 60.0  25.5 29.7 20 . 0  No  Total  64.0  29.0  Weapons Qual  Total 25.5 166.5 2.5  17 . 6 5.1 20.0  6.9  N=  100% 100% 100%  14.2%  194.5  T a b l e 3c v  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 2 who v o t e d f o r t h e New D e m o c r a t s i n t h e l a s t e l e c t i o n Position  on Nuclear  Weapons  Party Liberal PC NDP  Yes  60. 0 20 . 0 34. 5  36. 0 60. 0 41. 8  No  Qual  Total  41. 2  41. 2  17 . 6  45  Total  4 . 0 20 . 0 23. 6  N=  12 . 5 2 .5 27 . 5  == == ==  100% 100% 100%  42 . 5  ==  3.1%  T a b l e 4a P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 3 who v o t e d f o r the L i b e r a l s i n the l a s t election  Position  on Nuclear  Weapons  Liberal PC NDP  Yes 80.8 70.4 59.2  No 16.1 18.5 34.7  Qual 3.1 11.1 6.1  Total  79.1  13. 6  3.6  Party  Table the  on Nuclear  =  29.8%  for election  Weapons  Party  Liberal PC NDP  Yes 76.8 45.1 60.0  No 18.2 47 . 5 37 . 1  Qual 5.0 7.4 2.9  Total  51.6  41. 6  6.7  46  N= 4 0 7 . 5  100% 100% 100%  4b  P e o p l e i n 1 9 6 3 who v o t e d Conservatives i n the last  Position  Total 369.5 13.5 24 . 5  Total 90.5 373.5 17.5 N=  481.5  = = = =  100% 100% 100% 35*2%  preference, Of  those  Liberals  however, who  came  from past  switched,  the  Conservative  majority  of  them  supporters. went  to  and were s t r o n g l y i n f a v o u r of n u c l e a r weapons.  who d i d n o t  switch,  on t h e  other  hand,  were  the Those  much more  evenly  s  split  on  the  supporters of  these  cause of  the  same  is  who s w i t c h e d o v e r t o  for  to  in  this  January  obligations take  The  individuals  probable speech  issue.  allies  favour  1963.  of  By  nuclear  importance  of  dominated press The  on t h e The  as w e l l  subject,  increased  significant the  increase  for  by  somewhat weapons  of  both  issue  is  seen -  1962  (those  increased  uncertain  Pearson  Pearson's  was  the  fact  until who  who  their  Canada  switched  seemingly  opinion"  issue  due  were to  the  it  party  and  largely  the  1963.  i n party support,  support  out  that  mid -  the  that  to had  itself  indicates  supporters about  able  supporting  in  is  that  government  1962  responses  most  belief  s h a r p l y between  rate  opinion"  Conservative  is  his  85%  The  n u m b e r o f p e o p l e who h a d " n o  enough t o w a r r a n t a change "no  support  evidence  from l a t e  defection  in  weapons.  but then negotiate  "defectors"  as t h e  Democrat  Liberals with  Diefenbaker  Further  nuclear  reports  number  support),  role.  the  upheld,  New  for the nuclear warheads,  ought t o accept n u c l e a r weapons, the  the  declaring  because the  a c q u i r e d the d e l i v e r y systems  of  nuclear  in party  s h o u l d be  position that  of  support the  change  12,  true  1963. was while  accounted becoming nuclear  debate.  Another  factor  w h i c h may h a v e 47  influenced Canadian p u b l i c  opinion  is  that  Respect  for  paralleled Those  the the  United  in  1963  missile  felt  a  of  and  percent.  by  1970s t h e r e f o r e nuclear  to  during  public's  f r o m 20 of  This  1972  questions confidence  in  1960  handling  with  of  Canadians By  and  respect 54  to  United  States  most  those  dropped  for  Cuban  being  1967  for  percent  the  to  had  1970s  weapons.  declined  figure the  to  States.  who  only  16  only  during  8 the  strongly with increasing opposition  the  1988  CUPS  i n the  problems.  one h a d i n t h e  nuclear  US h a d  -respect  produced Table  of  for  Canada s h o u l d have  world  1960s  increased  percent  the  United  the  weapons.  correlates  with  the  nuclear  they had confidence  deal  view  Kennedy's  this  In  of  have  coincided  respect  weapons.  asked whether extent  rose  Declining  9 3  States  acquiring  increasing  percent  view  who c l a i m e d t o  result  crisis.  supportive  public's  Canadian  States  as  the  United  respondents  the  to  of  5.  9 4  nuclear  respondents  weapons  Crosstabulating suggests  States,  the  what  States  these  that  less  were  and t o  a b i l i t y of the United  This table  United  poll,  two  the  less  likely  that  n u c l e a r weapons w o u l d be f a v o u r e d . O n l y a v e r y s m a l l g r o u p h a d "very  l i t t l e "  weapons.  confidence  Those  who h e l d  i n the no  US a n d s t i l l  confidence  in  the  desired US  whatsoever  unanimously d i s a p p r o v e d of Canada p o s s e s s i n g n u c l e a r This state  finding is that  such  nuclear  weapons.  s u p p o r t e d by M i d d l e m i s s a n d S o k o l s k y when t h e y issues,  48  Table 5 Confidence  Great  Considerable Little Very  Little  None Column Total Chi-square  the  U.S.  Nuclear  Confidence in U.S. Very  in  =  Strongly Disaqree 11 27.8 2.5 169 40.3 38 . 1 181 48.0 40.7 63 53.2 14.2 20 84 . 1 4.5 . 444 45.4 29.5,  P = <  and P o s i t i o n  Weapons for  on N u c l e a r  Canada  Disagree  Agree  15 38.2 3.9 182 43.4 46.2 144 38.1 36.4 49 41.5 12.5 4 15.9 1.0 394 40.3  10 24 . 7 8.6 55 13.1 47 . 9 45 11. 8 38.7 6 4.7 4 .9  115 11. 8  0.001.  49  Weapons  Strongly Aqree 4 9.3 14.7 13 3.1 52 . 1 8 2 .0 30.4 1 . 6 2 . 9  25 2 .6  (Non-respondents  Row Total 40 4 .1 420 42 . 9 377 38 . 5 119 12 . 1 24 2.4 979 100.0  ommitted).  involved, in one form or another, Canada's involvement with U.S. nuclear technology or m i l i t a r y d o c t r i n e . Thus, to an increasingly nationalistic and independently minded Canadian public, they a l l r a i s e d the spectre of Canada's symbolic subordination to U.S. interests and p r e s s u r e s . In t h i s respect, these nuclear issues tapped elements both of a latent ant i--Americanism and of moral r e c t i t u d e i n the Canadian body p o l i t i c . 9 5  Hence,  while  sufficient possession in  the  role  confidence or  of  nuclear  for  Canadians  weapons,  on t h e  United States  those  w h o l e more  was  to  not  support  who d i d h a v e  likely  to  relationship  opinion  data  defence  and  concerns acquiring  from the C U P S 6) .  1988  This  which  the  is  nuclear  weapons.  survey reveals  table  laid  connection  indicates  support  bare  by  between  a  nuclear  the  public  spending  Crosstabulating  an i n t e r e s t i n g that  spending. Likewise, those  n u c l e a r weapons t e n d e d t o d e s i r e whole. spending  Conversely, tended  than others. defence $1.8  the  confidence  those  individuals  to  billion, One m u s t  individuals be  more  The f a c t t h a t ,  spending  who d i s a g r e e d w i t h lower defence  was  who  willing at  frozen  the for  to  agreed  data  who  higher  obtaining  s p e n d i n g on to  the  increased  accept  nuclear  weapons  time of the  defence  review,  a  period  of  three  years  was  strongly  s u p p o r t e d by p u b l i c o p i n i o n .  also  consider  whether 50  on  relationship  a g r e e d t o o b t a i n i n g n u c l e a r weapons t e n d e d a l s o t o want defence  alone  Canada.  Another  (Table  the  necessary  US w e r e  for  in  public opinion  at  influenced  Table 6 P o s i t i o n on D e f e n c e S p e n d i n g a n d P o s i t i o n on N u c l e a r Weapons  Nuclear Spending should be increased?  Strongly Disaqree  Strongly Disagree Disagree Agree Strongly Agree Column Total Chi-square  Weapons- for Canada Disagree  Agree  13 38.2 3.2 192 49 . 6 49.0 159 52.8 40.5 28 25.3 7.2 392 40.5  3 24.7 2 .9 14 3.7 13.0 61 20.3 54.8 33 29.3 29.3 111 11.5  154 27.8 34.9 180 46.3 40.7 77 25.5 17.4 31 27.6 7.0 441 45.5  = 383.9,  P = <  0.001.  51  Strongly Aqree  Row Total 170 17 . 5  1 .3 4.3 4 1.5 17 . 5 20 17 . 8 78.2 25 2.6  388 39.9 301 31.3 111 11.5 970 100.0  the  Canadian  weapon  systems  discussed of  political  the  it  above  public  elite  had  does have  reversal  of  inspired  by a d e s i r e ' t o  in  policy  political Peter  book  Partner by  elite's  the  Canada  The  regain  must  office".  s e n s i t i v i t y to  C . Newman's statement  have  data  that  views  John  stated  W.  that  been  Further  9 6  nuclear  opinion  leaders.  Behemoth,  Liberals  the  argument  Canada's  to  of  public  support the  influenced  in his  rid  acquired.  seem t o  Warnock,  the  to  "the  chiefly  evidence  public opinion  is  of  found  that,  During the negotiations for the Bomarc and the Voodoo, Canadian cabinet m i n i s t e r s had assured t h e i r U n i t e d States o p p o s i t e numbers t h a t t h e y w o u l d arm t h e weapons i n an emergency, b u t d i d n o t want to upset the domestic political situation by publicizing a nuclear commitment. 9 7  S t a t e m e n t s s u c h as t h i s Canada  were  opposition the  watchful to  nuclear  increasing  would suggest  it  that  the  view  of  Canada's  this  to  be  public  weapons of  political  opinion.  has  Since  leaders the  movements  in  would therefore  in political  spheres  i n the  Canada. be  in  1960s,  grown c o i n c i d e n t a l l y  peace  public opinion  d i d i n the  Related to  of  strength  even more s i g n i f i c a n t than  one i n d i c a t e t h a t  with This  deemed  present  day  1960s. question of p u b l i c opinion  commitment  primarily  a factor  to  its  allies.  stemming from  52  is  the  public's  One w o u l d external  expect  considerations.  T h i s i s t o say t h a t  would view a l l i a n c e if  relations  between  However,  notion  alliance  "spill-over"  the  there  two does  countries seem t o  commitments  effect  into  the  morality  of possessing  necessity  fact  that  favourable  neighbors to  the  to  U.S.  i n 1963  chose.  nuclear as  Pearson's  that  this  of  a  an  ally,  Given  as  only  the  very  way  good,  influence  the that  chord i n reliable  insufficient  unique  of  becoming  a sensitive  of  however,  significant,  the  r e s o l v e d was t h e p a t h  thought  There i s ,  for  of  remained  the  the  i n terms  was  but  perhaps  approach struck  being  not  allies.  1960s  weapons,  that  Pearson,  but rather  the  remain  additional  i n terms  made t o  during  c o u l d have been  and a l l i e s .  prove  "promises"  opinion  opposed  of  controversy  Canadians,  keeping  public  increasingly  Pearson  of  n u c l e a r weapons,  an  realm.  issue  to  evidence  had  domestic  s t r o n g l y argued the nuclear  were  be  also  example,  the  leaders  commitments as b e i n g i m p o r t a n t t o m a i n t a i n  favourable. of  Canadian p o l i t i c a l  evidence  on  public  interest  groups  opinion.  Interest  As s t a t e d played nuclear which  a  earlier,  significant roles.  pressure  government  it  -  policy."  does not  role  "Indeed,  appear that  in  the  abandonment  there  are  few  group 9 8  Groups  activity  No c o n c e r t e d 53  has  effort  of  documented altered w a s made  Canada's cases  in  specific during  the  1960s o r 1970s t o l o b b y t h e g o v e r n m e n t b y a n t i - n u c l e a r There  are several  First  o f a l l , i t may b e t h a t  too  "closed"  There  does  "closed" state public  explanations  and thereby  seem is  that  possible  a  and a  precludes  relative  "interest  for this  term.  of  lobbying efforts,  less  accessible  defence  says  very  to  do  so  was  reasonable  about  whether  bureaucracy their  best  t o assume' t h a t  i n the f i r s t  on t h e o t h e r Perhaps  hand,  concerned  were  resources  (financial  defence  -  turn  lead  tactics".  1 0 0  course  action.  It  nature  interest  and  to  interest  "difficulties authors  the  does  this  seem  claim,  required.  to  lobby  the the  Canada  and d i v e r s e  interests"  in defining  common  state  that  of  groups necessary  government  f o r example, in  lack  interest  mobilize  groups  further  that  of the p o l i t i c a l  to prove  that  human)  weaknesses  These  felt  explanation f o r the apparent  unable  have  groups from l o b b y i n g the  In order  is  this  could  they  activity  simply  oriented  to  groups  in  on t h e  Unfortunately,  9 9  Middlemiss and Sokolsky,  "organizational  leadership  whether  the closed  general  than to focus  not  of  Sokolsky  the  a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n w o u l d be  group  effectively.  or  although  and  or i n fact  place.  a more l i k e l y  anti-nuclear  political  bureaucracy".  s y s t e m may h a v e h e l p e d d e t e r government  argument,  rather  is  participation.  Middlemiss  the  public-education  influenced this  outside  groups have tended t o t a r g e t  f e w members  little  phenomenon.  the Canadian p o l i t i c a l system  t o b e some b a s i s very  for this  groups.  describe as  having  which  policies  "because  in and  their  financial workers  resources  and  only  researchers". expect been  to  a  to  Another  focus  to  possible  be  seem  their  credible  committed  the  commitments  made  1  that  Pearson  stated  United  that  in  NATO  his  that,  "the and  therefore  would  a l r e a d y been of  them  expressed  the  interest  been  logical against  earliest  this  that  s u f f e r i n g from the Pro-defence,  of  anti-nuclear  Pearson  rid  had  already  of  nuclear  itself  One  January  a  This  will  recall  12,  to  role which  that  weapons  for  time.  other  Rather,  because  groups had  itself  Trudeau  had  should  also  thinking"  may s i m p l y  on t h e  It  1 0 2  it  rid  impediments o u t l i n e d  industry-based groups, 55  to  in more  one."  "strategic they  be  interest  It  with  Canada  would  convenience.  the  Lester  should discuss  his election.  have been  from  1963,  Canada would attempt possible  may n o t  groups at  departments.  assertion  conclude  nuclear  their  action".  defence  to  not  concerned  Government...  s i m i l a r views p r i o r  be n o t e d t h a t of  be  have  deemed by t h e  to  NATO  and  would  direct  f o r Canada than the p r e s e n t  resolved that  at  of  of  with  and  lack  NORAD.  speech  collective  mobilize  a  was n o t  and  organizers  government  government  volunteer  g r o u p s one  goal  for  course  on  i n such matters  when c o n s i d e r i n g t h a t  and e f f e c t i v e  not  it  "best  via  and  interest  role  relevant  rely  full-time  particular  the  realistic  did  afford  explanation  States  continental  a  Canadian  chapter  the  at  most  words, the  on  involvement i s  groups  can  In other  1 0 1  combined resources  does  few  limited,  f i n d p l a y i n g an a c t i v e  able  group  are  have  above.  other  hand,  likely  d i d not  t h e r e was  no  become i n v o l v e d i n t h e  pay  for  economic oppose  the  nuclear  f a c t t h a t Canada d i d not  weapons  meant  i n t e r e s t s w h i c h would have  the  government's  that  forced  from  the  conventional  replacement  of  the  not  build  were  no  groups  to  known  for  have even s t o o d  nuclear  warheads  analysis  was of  first  with  Processes  the  described  Cuban  with  here  in  by  missile  l i t e r a t u r e on t h i s s u b j e c t any  Graham  crisis.  i s widely great  Allison  The  known and  detail.  in  his  profusion  of  so w i l l n o t  be  However,  given  the  relative  s t r e n g t h of the Departments of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s  National  Defence,  particularly the  bureaucratic  useful tool  Bureaucratic influential  most  the  politics  for analyzing  r e l i n q u i s h i n g of• C a n a d a ' s n u c l e a r  roles.  to  i n f l u e n c e o f b u r e a u c r a t i c p o l i t i c s on d e c i s i o n m a k i n g  processes  dealt  these  of  weapon s y s t e m s .  Bureaucratic  The  there  p o s i t i o n . Although  c e r t a i n , t h e d e f e n c e i n d u s t r y i n Canada may benefit  because  f i n a n c i a l r i s k associated with the retirement  t h e n u c l e a r weapon s y s t e m s . The or  defence review  in  resistance the  process  M i d d l e m i s s and  thorough  analysis  of  to  abandoning provide  bureaucratic  processes  have  a  behind  been  Canada's  very  nuclear  what seems t o be processes  and  e f f e c t u p o n C a n a d i a n d e f e n c e p o l i c y . They a s s e r t t h a t 56  be  commitments.  appears  Sokolsky of  the  m o d e l may  and  the their  the  defence  bureaucracy plays i t s  process.  They  complex  but  bypassed the  also  that  note "in  or  decisions  ^no'  later  fact that  the  p r o d u c t i o n of  degrees  felt  the  continued  alliance.  many of  the  1971  of  to  nuclear  roles  more  league"  rather  neither  of  the  weapons  as  being  than  the  of  troop  withdrawal  damaging to from i t s  would  in  Europe were  forces  troops,  Europe  managed t o  nuclear  standing  and  for  bread  "players  funding.  a  weapons  The  the  event  stationed 57  NATO the big  However, nuclear  of  troops  the matter  been  much  the  deployment for  of  more  withdrawing  Defence  the  should  i n the  seen  than simply  justification  In  Affairs  the  number  have  to  supported  have  the  For National  and b u t t e r .  DND w i t h  a few n u c l e a r  roles  in  being  would  delay  Defence  External  hand,  stature  commitments.  its  provided  manpower  from  final  s u p p o r t e d by  other  than  or  than  block  and N a t i o n a l  likely  important  Canada's a l l i a n c e  nuclear  rather  or  Canada s t a t i o n e d i n E u r o p e . For E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s a  omitted  diplomatic considerations.  departments  very  defence.  reasons.  good  on t h e sake  are  Canada had a c c e p t e d  Canada's  for  more  on  Canada's  commitments  for  delay  resistance  White Paper  Defence,  are  Vaybe'  External Affairs  ensure  National  stages  to  and f o r d i f f e r e n t  nuclear  procurement  This claim is  1 0 3  of  i n the  processes  the  order  process".  maintenance  different  be  in  role  formal  intense bureaucratic  the  that  the  often  variety  The D e p a r t m e n t s supported  are  i n the  the  that  reality,  and d e c i s i o n s  *yes'  largest  of  troops these  significant  loss  of  i n Europe and  these North  America  would  have  National  Defence  relinquishing probably  was  in  part  a  much  to  the  back  console  troop  Defence  would  nuclear  the  i n Europe  roles,  issue  in  in  Europe  the  hopes  review.  constituted  than  did  the  Department  of  h a d a much g r e a t e r  weapon  would  defence  budget  of  issue.  weapons  the  defence  nuclear  have  nuclear  in  in  a choice  departments  and n u c l e a r  deployments  of  Canada's  both  factor  officials  Faced w i t h  down on t h e  levels  portion  of  up on t h e  to  other,  cost-related  greater  National  the  troop  that  maintenance  give  of a  Considering  or  chosen  issue  little  and E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s .  one  have  The  done  incentive of  to  maintaining  t h e t r o o p d e p l o y m e n t s i n E u r o p e . T r u d e a u ' s adamant p o s i t i o n on r e l i n q u i s h i n g the possible  course  Within  the  procurement military  was  the  was  the  necessary  Honest  related  The  bureaucratic  procurement  arrangements alliance  CF-101  relinquish  lay  used  by  the  delayed  the  process  and  Bomarc  them  had  system  for  of  been  this  this  the  nuclear  were  T r a i n i n g would  CF-104  affected also  announced.  have  weapon  kind.  time  system  Finding  a  and  making  the  strike  by  procurement  w i t h i n NATO t o t r a n s f e r member,  roles  r e t i r e d by the  white paper,  processes  58  best  processes  consuming and t h e r e b y  defence  by  weapon  processes.  time  of  John had a l r e a d y been  affected  another  realm  to  approach the  f o r DND.  CF-104,  p u b l i c a t i o n of the  conventional  to  larger  decision  also  w e a p o n s made t h i s  action  somewhat of  Although the of  of  processes.  replacement after  nuclear  to  be  the role  provided  and  removing  the  nuclear  weapons  also  considerable time. While procurement processes in  the  timing  reasonable have  of  to  the  point  review's  out  any i m p a c t on t h e  that  it  is  processes  decision to  take  d i d p l a y a hand  implementation,  procurement  actual  would  retire  also  did  the  not  weapons.  Financial Constraints  The have  concern  had  nuclear  a  created  filled.  In  cost  of  effect  and a l s o  the  defending  upon b o t h  timing  of  of the Avro Arrow p r o j e c t , a  "gap"  order  i n Canada's to  decided  to  purchase  States,  the  CF-101  if  were t o  they  the  substantial  weapons  cancellation had  over  do two  of  and CF-104.  be  fully  the  types  the  their  seems  to  acquisition  of  retirement.  due t o  defences  this,  Canada  its  which  high  aircraft  from  the  and p e r f o r m the  Americans  had  agreed  reducing the Canadian share $14  million".  therefore term  itself  financial The h i g h  Starfighter ridding  The  1 0 4  be  to  pay  the  of  as h a v i n g been  weapons  nuclear  they  missiles,  missiles,  of t h e Bomarc p r o g r a m t o  acquisition  seen  for  be  United  tasks  were d e s i g n e d t o p e r f o r m . W i t h r e g a r d s t o t h e Bomarc "the  to  government  Both required nuclear  effective  costs,  needed  Diefenbaker  The  thus  less  than  weapons  may  i n f l u e n c e d by s h o r t  -  considerations.  cost also  Canada of  of  a replacement  played its  a  hand  nuclear  in  fighter terms  commitments. 5 9  for of  the the  The  Voodoo and timing  for  Starfighters  had been  s t r i p p e d of t h e i r nuclear d u t i e s  t h e y were due t o weapons  from  this  need to r e p l a c e to  be  retired  condition  retire  the in  by  i n 1975.  system  was  this  and  1 0 5  time.  The r e t i r e m e n t  and d i d not the  constraints nuclear  to  delayed  weapon  accompanying  phase  system  Genie  in  not  of the  The V o o d o o s w e r e a l s o  due  in  "Plans  poor to  mechanical replace  1974-75 p e r i o d because of  out  the in  Hence,  Canada's  although not nuclear  retirement Canada,  missile.  60  nuclear the  However,  1982.  before  by  fact  affected  o f t h e V o o d o o was t h e r e f o r e  occur u n t i l  decision  therefore  were  Voodoos were s c r a p p e d i n the funds".  The r e t i r e m e n t  actual aircraft. 1975  several years  the  of  the  CF-101  lack  the of  postponed  a factor  in  role,  financial  last  remaining  Voodoo  and  its  II.  External  The  external  relinquish pressure defence the  Factors  Canada's  policy,  global  first  the  which  nuclear  the  roles  changing  political  climate.  view the  given  constraints  Trudeau's  considerations. role  climate  detente  and  will  be  of  alliance  Let  politics  on  minor r o l e  in  politics  view  that  Canadian  foreign  d e t e r m i n e d by n a t i o n a l , Pressure  may h a v e  been  rather  and than  from the a l l i e s to maintain  stern,  but  never  entailed  any  f i n a n c i a l or p o l i t i c a l costs f o r the Canadian government.  Their  resistance  for  the  a  in  most  representatives. on  of  in U.S.  review. This i s not wholly s u r p r i s i n g ,  p o l i c y s h o u l d be  nuclear  real  era  p o l i t i c s seemingly played a rather  i n f l u e n c i n g the defence  external,  The  politics,  changes  strategic  to  process.  Alliance  however,  decision  include alliance  military  Alliance  the  the  i n r e l a t i o n to Trudeau's personal b e l i e f s .  turn to  review  defence  influenced  from the U n i t e d S t a t e s and subsequent  considered also us  factors  complete  1 0 5  fact part  never  went  private,  beyond  verbal  aimed  Had the C a n a d i a n government  withdrawal  of  its  assaults,  at  Canada's  finally  conventional  decided  forces  from  Europe, have  it  is  been It  cause  reasonable  much more logical  to  for  concern  over  member,  This  members  assert  that  made  concerned  gap l e f t  also  understandably concerned  the  grounds  the  1970  Europe  might  as  part  of  have  States.  about send  This  Paper  was  and  the  NATO  some  difficulties  wrong  was  squadrons were l e s s e f f e c t i v e  announced  strike-role element this the  of  role  of  the  NATO  integrated  SACEUR  very  maintained because  strategy  w e r e much more e f f e c t i v e  and  the  fact  to  in  the  the  end  that  the-  concept  Canada  force  would  forces  in  structure".  because  was  that  its the  1 0 8  debate  within  the  CF-104  v i e w e d as  strongly of  on  willing  the  reduced  when a r m e d w i t h n u c l e a r  62  to was  conventional warheads.  Starfighter  strategy.  s h o u l d be  alliance's  CF-104  NATO  to  truly  that  though  with  control  signal  stating  adherence  posed  NATO  c a l l e d upon  allayed  released,  were  other  The o t h e r  1 0 7  A l t h o u g h t h e W h i t e P a p e r managed t o c o o l o f f t h e NATO,  CF-104  Canadian decision  the  significant  had  The U n i t e d S t a t e s  the  fear  the  joint  N o r t h A m e r i c a n s were not  security, station  from  who w o u l d b e  had " r e a f f i r m e d Canada's  to  would  particular  only  to  C a n a d i a n move.  Europe.  White  collective  continue  it  Western  government of  that  namely that  defend  when  by the  in  the  forces,  over  the  to  resistance  withdrawal  United  f i l l  Europeans,  the  Germany  own n u c l e a r  weapons w i t h t h e  were more  that  Germany  Canada's  move  without i t s  over nuclear  assume  formidable.  is  strike-role.  to  a  argued  The  vital that  importance  to  Starfighters weapons  than  without. fuss  The  1 0 9  upon  hearing  became  clear  seemed  to  because  United  that  be of  fact  put  retain  to  them.  that  Canada  arise  as t o  would  by  the  NATO m i n i s t e r s  was  able  seems p l a i n .  T r u d e a u was  of  nuclear  not  weapons  on.  The to  have  States.  fact  eased that the  when  it  Europe,  it  this  was  withdrawing  that  of  was  the  so  simply  Canada's  weapons.  an  issue  States  countries the  with  The  allies,  answer  would  one  have  not  g r o w i n g more weapons  government.  the  would  was  the  r i d Canada  he  nuclear  Trudeau  Canadian p o s i t i o n  reverse  determined to  United  on  to  most  been  may  It  is  able  to  the  United  Dropping the nuclear s t r i k e r o l e i n Europe c l e a r l y d i d NATO m i l i t a r y in this  throughout  were based  the  regard.  alliance,  European c o u n t r i e s . about  chose not to t r y to military  essentially  strategy,  on C a n a d i a n s o i l  reservations  many  it  pressure  an i n c o n v e n i e n c e  the  that  supply other  go a g a i n s t  retire  be  a  why t h e d i s a p p r o v a l  not  this  influence  not  exactly  to  probable  in  of  f r o m NATO.  p o s i t i o n on n u c l e a r  also  However,  Without doubt  government's  reluctant  something  troops  Trudeau  relent  up  intentions.  would  acceptable  The q u e s t i o n d o e s expressed  may h a v e  Canadian  Canada  more the  completely  of  States  experts  useless  and the  and were  giving  the  CF-lOls  not  really  up  the  and  a concern may h a v e  Bomarcs,  system  63  that and  the so  to  to  Bomarcs  but  C a n a d i a n p o s i t i o n . In any  realized  -weapon  did create  The H o n e s t J o h n s w e r e due  Some A m e r i c a n o f f i c i a l s  Canada alter  although i t  of had  they event,  Bomarc  was  an  argue  that  it  ought  to  It  be  f i e l d e d by Canada w o u l d be h y p o c r i t i c a l .  must  be  discussion decision  took  to  matter  of  se  not  did  process  its  of  the  of  is  nuclear  with  the  The  weapons.  of  the  roles  This  is  was v e r y adamant  Canadian forces  to  to  government  in voicing  from the  strike  was  per  been  after  more  and  nuclear  weapons  doctrine United weapons. NATO  Canadian defence  to  coincided  flexible  States  not  The  US w a s  a n d NORAD t h a n  and S t a r f i g h t e r s  policy  abandon  its  its  nuclear  desire  stray  SACEUR,  among  that  view that  role  w o u l d be  with  response  to  the  removal  damaging.  about  countries about  keeping the  in operation  with  Political  64  in  The US  Bomarc,  nuclear  climate  of  strategic  with  Canada  between loss  growing pressure  other  concerned  whole.  change  and t o  provide more  the  the  to  d i d not  his  on  a  approaching  T h e r e has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been an o b v i o u s c o n n e c t i o n U.S.  that  consultation  have  fact  this  in  apparently  the  the  decision  declared  and t h e n despite  regarding  nuclear  issue  determination  how m u c h  O p i n i o n s on  but t h a t  on t h e  just  perception  appears  out  Trudeau  nuclear  It  1 1 0  clear  allies  general  informed  place.  not  Canada's  p u b l i c announcement,  course.  others,  it  The  Canada h o l d i n g  commitments.  its  were  take  allies  abandon  with  somewhat.  allies  advance  from  place  r e l i n q u i s h the  differ  Canada's  its  remembered t h a t  in  nuclear  staying  Honest  weapons.  the  in  Johns,  Relating whole  bring  America  of  influential  issue.  to  concern  of  because  of  Europe.  For the  roles  in  their  sake  Union  but  position  the  Soviets This  saw t h e  the  (as  targets  relations  there  was  *soft  growth of  the  European  War  relegated  Canada  to  a  the  targets')  and  into  between  Eastern  Canada and of  believed that  the it  economies secondary  in  since  world  the  position  longer  as  assessment  of  reality.  insistence  had been  This  that  was  in  nuclear affairs.  Second on  the  World global  C a n a d a was no  p r e v i o u s l y , was a n  r e a l i t y may h a v e  defence  arms  role.  In other words, Trudeau's p e r c e p t i o n that it  as  to  well  scene.  p o w e r f u l as  was  role  due  stability  d e c l i n i n g Canadian p o s i t i o n  The  as  nuclear  p u s h i n g Canada toward a w i t h d r a w a l from i t s  was  Trudeau's  the  CF-104  belief  aircraft  up t h i s  on  contend,  i n c r e a s i n g the  give  such  were  attack  doubt  from  Moreover, such c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  of b e t t e r i n g  to  Canada  The  very  Trudeau and a d v i s e r s  interests  North  were  nature.  and f o r  which  and  factors,  no  the  desirable. keep  other  opinion,  others  a b i l i t y to  be  was  Union  Europe  helped  and  CF-104  regards,  Soviet  may  government  that  the  therefore,  Also  the  cuts  cabinet  some  Western  f r o m NATO,  the  first-strike  Canada's  military  and  alter  vulnerability  race,  in  Thordarson  considerable  Soviet  feeling  on t h i s m a t t e r .  As  being  with  completely  politics  able  in  detente  a  partial  politics  C z e c h o s l o v a k i a may h a v e  withdrawing alliance  of  about  that  invasion  the  alliance  environment  helped  not  to  led,  accurate  in turn,  to  p o l i c y be more r e s p o n s i v e  to  Canadian policy  interests, of  Canada's against  a  that  modest  military this  it  power.  forces  line  reflect  of  Trudeau  with  nuclear was  mutual  the  flexible  capabilities forces.  build  to fight  at  the  aggressor,  at  the conventional  The also the  weapon  its  went  directly  configuration  at  of  stage,  By  the  of  and  committed  a l l levels attack.  force  It  the  to  systems  being  or  its  supposed  a  that  the the  the  by  actions violence  escalation  conventional  was t e c h n i c a l l y  not  doctrine.  d e p l o y e d by t h e  nuclear  changed r a p d i l y d u r i n g t h e 1960s and 1970s. 1950s h a d been  the  with  control  t h e Canadian government NATO s t r a t e g y  strengthen  hoped  to  for  Pact  contain  CF-104  called  conventional  which was  of  t h e Warsaw  to  commensurate  and thereby  changing  at  It of  doctrine  doctrine  nuclear  NATO w o u l d b e a b l e  conflict.  against  adopted  response  was t h e r e b y  possibly  of  acting  and  [and win] a war a g a i n s t  a level  therefore,  arming  NATO m o v e d f r o m a s t r a t e g y and  up  capabilites  responding  role,  that  The f l e x i b l e  to  could  the  strategy  destruction  aggressor  of  1960s  The a l l i a n c e  warfighting  that  d u r i n g t h e 1960s and 1970s were d y n a m i c .  response.  alliance  defence  environment  overall  late  assured  weapons  the  reasoning.  the  deterrence  during  the  in  closely  believed  nuclear  Strategic  Changes  more  d o m i n a t e d by d e p l o y m e n t s  powers  The decade  o f manned  of  bombers  and  tactical  bombers  nuclear  being  weapons.  replaced  missiles  and  this  nuclear  roles.  with  change It  The the  was  becomes  of  S o v i e t bombers,  were v i r t u a l l y  CF-  s t i l l  could  nothing Thus,  to  prevent  without  1950s,  the  them  the  bomber  CF-101  became  defence.  However, the  Canadian  needs,  maintaining with  the  made  the  as  addition,  valuable the  strengthened  the  strategic  defence  The for  against  role.  then  had  the  systems.  The  could  Canada's  do  airspace.  existed  in  the  North American  defence meant  was  Bomarc the  air  p o l i c y more  that  capability  position. to  was  focus  nuclear  fact that  system  which  sovereignty,  CF-101  government's  less  defence  such  but  violating  to  Canada's  the  f o r any o t h e r  valuable to  desire  on  d e s i g n e d t o be u s e d  threat less  ballistic  weapon  aircraft  from  of  manned  indirect, role in  nuclear  useless  intercept  that  albeit  r e l i n q u i s h i n g Canada's  saw t h e  influential  evident  The V o o d o o a n d Bomarc s y s t e m s ,  101  1960s  deployment  most  environment played a s i g n i f i c a n t , process  late  temporarily  s t i l l  system same  on  in  line  was  also  reason.  In  the Bomarc's effectiveness  as a bomber  always  also  argument  in  for  the  doubt  would  immediate  removal  have  of  this  system. That 1960s  or  getting Both  Soviet  1970s  the  Bomarc  bomber  bomber  provided  r i d of  the  Soviet  the  the  CF-101  and the  threat  threat  and  d i d not  greatest  and Bomarc Voodoo were so  were 67  materialize  military nuclear  the  rationale  for  weapon  designed  therefore  in  to  systems.  fend  outdated  off by  a the  advent  of  question was  the  it  appeared  immediately  the  ICBM  r a i s e d during the  that  defence  Soviet  retire  Soviets  course  odd t o  the  review that  force  the  in  the  late  of i n t e r v i e w s f o r t h i s  keep  the  Voodoo  Bomarc.  It  was  Voodoos  s h o u l d be  rationale  seems t o  around  reasoned kept  s u d d e n l y i n c r e a s e d t h e i r bomber  more p r o b a b l e  1960s.  be t h a t  study but  to  during in  the  C F - 101  the event  capability.  the  The  The  1 1 1  role  was  m a i n t a i n e d because the Voodoo s e r v e d o t h e r n e c e s s a r y  purposes,  s u c h as  airspace,  the  s u r v e i l l a n c e and p r o t e c t i o n of C a n a d i a n  whereas t h e Bomarc d i d n o t . as  a defender  without i t s  The a i r c r a f t  was v i r t u a l l y  Genie a i r - t o - a i r m i s s i l e ,  would u n d o u b t e d l y have been  considerable  Air  to  Force  fighter due t o  if  they  aircraft. retire  would not The direct  have  been  1970s  result  of  changes.  Although  a d o p t e d as  any  doctrine,  resistance  two,  and t o  the  retool  the  Canada's  but  to  in  may h a v e  doctrine  of  and i t s forces  encourage  nuclear  roles  it  the  home-based V o o d o o was the  fighter  was a n a c t  was n o t i n c o n s i s t e n t  of  was  or  been  f a c i l i t a t e d by  flexible members for any  American  response  68  these  had  were t h e r e b y  to  this  abandon these  f l e x i b l e response  been  called  European defence, states  a  nuclear  Canadian u n i l a t e r a l i s m even  with the  not  NATO  nuclear r o l e s they might have. Withdrawing from commitments  there  from  their primary  i n chapter  changes  NATO s t r a t e g y ,  intended  and  cost-effective.  provide conventional not  lose  anyway,  r e l i n q u i s h i n g of  or  was  As r e v e a l e d  i n the  strategy  on t o  were about  useless  any  nuclear though  doctrine.  1 1 2  Obsolescence  was  Bomarc squadrons have  been  review  very  not  would  other  not  have  within  called  Voodoos and CF-104 and  Star-  been  not  The c h a n g e  to  as  a change  usefulness)  as  it  a  few  for  the  years  their  fighters  retired  considerations  drastic  in  at  this  time  necessitated  (in terms have  CF-101.  without could their  While  the  of  been  CF-101  even  the  was the  s t i l l  carry  out  role  evidence  conventional which  indicates  consideration  during the  review,  the  arguments  presented  by  the  CF-101  it  National  role.  69  The  CF-101 1975,  Starfighter and  Voodoo.  This  may w e l l Defence  of  useless  Although  this  have been for  may  Starfighter  i n NATO. that  was  alliance  virtually CF-104  and  use.  of the nuclear r o l e  air-to-air missile,  no  defence  financial  capability  Genie  is  the  continued  for the  for  Voodoo  had  their  its  a  if  the  likely  were t o be r e p l a c e d i n  a conventional role  would  of  Both would  dismantling.  have h e l p e d r a t i o n a l i z e the maintenance the  retirement  and Honest John b a t t e r i e s .  retired  had  important  was  a  one  of  maintaining  Chapter 5 Conclusions  This  analysis  has  shown  that  C a n a d a ' s n u c l e a r weapon systems domestic  factors.  was i n t e n d e d t o the  world.  their  It  was  top  advisers  relinquishing  based  on  of  beliefs  were  of  Canada's  nuclear  the  defence  by  However, the  Trudeau Ivan  his the  Prime  is  amount  Minister  of  and  utmost  importance  roles.  to  Moreover,  evident other  s i n g l e d them  advisers  out  to  have  for  the  Pierre  behind  the  weapons.  influence  seems  and  p o l i t i c a l leaders  driving that  force  his  factors.  key  and  For  been  as  was  it  weapons  colleagues.  could exert  determined  roles  were  example,  cabinet  an i n d i v i d u a l  behind  actions  T r u d e a u was i n f l u e n c e d o n t h e n u c l e a r personal  of  and  most p o w e r f u l f o r c e  also  and p r o p e l l e d by  appear that  issue  it  retire  NATO m e m b e r s  P r i m e M i n i s t e r was t h e  review,  constrained does  the  the  nuclear  drive  Although  to  p o l i t i c a l rationale  Canadians,  the  single  r e l i n q u i s h the  a  of  T r u d e a u was c l e a r l y t h e to  decision  was p r i m a r i l y a c o n s e q u e n c e  send a message t o  The p e r s o n a l  the  the  by  on  whether  case  with  Head and D o n a l d MacDonald. The  review  views process  of  Canadian was  still  academics quite  7 0  were  young.  invited There  is  while no  the clear  evidence, views  however,  h a d on t h e  influence  the  review process.  academics  and m a r g i n a l at Ivan  r e v e a l p r e c i s e l y what i m p a c t t h e s e  best.  One m u s t  academic  conclude  that  may h a v e h a d w o u l d h a v e b e e n  The o n l y e x c e p t i o n  H e a d whom T r u d e a u  had  This p a r t n e r s h i p i s not  taken  in  to t h i s  as  a  indirect  was o f  personal  surprising given that  any  course  adviser.  Head and Trudeau  s h a r e d many s i m i l a r v i e w s on f o r e i g n p o l i c y m a t t e r s .  H e a d was  therefore  views  the  i n an e x c e l l e n t  influence  the  of  Prime M i n i s t e r . Public  opinion  "unilateral  on t h e  weapons,  although  difficult  to  showed t h a t party  was  nuclear  influence  government's the  nuclear  Trudeau's  and  regarding  of  this  1963  CIPO  h a d become  of  confidence  that  beliefs  polls  is  clearly  influenced  nuclear the  an  nuclear  influence  one w h i c h  growing resentment  personal  Canada's  P u b l i c o p i n i o n d i d have  extent  1962  issue  strongly  p o l i c y choice  exact The  support  Canadian p u b l i c would have s e r v e d at  reinforce  Minister  to  disarmament".  measure. the  shown  a f f i l i a t i o n . The  w i t h i n the to  p o s i t i o n to  weapons  very  least  the  Prime  and g i v e n  he was f o l l o w i n g t h e p r o p e r c o u r s e  of  action. In  addition,  Canadians' nuclear a  more  Canadian soil  views  weapons.  there of  and  United  Anti-American  skeptical forces.  the  was  view It  may  is  States  sentiment  of  nuclear  be  that  correlation and  the  tended  weapons  keeping  w o u l d have been more a c c e p t a b l e 71  a  to the  the  between  position to  being  on  result  in  used  by  warheads  on  US  Canadian p u b l i c  as  some e a r l i e r p o l l s w o u l d s u g g e s t . for nuclear of as  the  weapons has  United States.  Canadians'  negative  Another positions  the  1960s  on  and  spending  were  less  weapons  United  was  spending  increased  States  found  with  who  likely  Also,  perceptions  grew  positions  opposed  to  support  those  when  comparing on  nuclear  increased  defence  the  individuals  acquisition  of  who  to  agreed  o b t a i n i n g n u c l e a r weapons a l s o t e n d e d t o d e s i r e h i g h e r spending. of  One c a n  nuclear  weapons  had p o s i t i v e  most of  a l l ,  reason the  the  "closed"  to  Canadians  of  the  for  is  not  one  or  more  Canadian  defence  groups  they  were  found  necessary to interest  direct  lack  the  considerations  of  four  clear,  and  factors.  not  able  a common g o a l . was  to It  primarily  combine is  not  their  was First  relatively  are  often  not  Secondly, resources  Thirdly,  these  abilities  evident which of  responsible 72  and  is  financial  government.  it  w h i l e t h e y have l a r g e numbers of members,  and were  them at  the  favour  influential.  d e c i s i o n makers.  human  lobby e f f e c t i v e l y  groups,  fragmented  to  entirely  suggestions  t a k e n v e r y s e r i o u s l y by government  in  spending  not  bureaucracy  whose  defence  States.  were  this  of  who w e r e  defence  United  conversely,  result  public  that  favoured higher  groups,  the  likely  also  perceptions  Interest Although  conclude  more  1970s.  individuals  weapons.  the  correlation  defence  Those  of  p u b l i c support  with  Opposition to nuclear  strong  weapons.  nuclear  corresponded closely  perceptions  over  In any e v e n t ,  for  the  are and  these  lack  of  interest  group  industry  groups d i d not  was  likely  involved  involvement.  the  with  affect  position down  its  which on  the  the  was  found  Trudeau  able  to  attests  to  sources  maintained also  control  indicates  the  1971  decision.  This  be  intense,  overcome  pressure  over  the  Prime the  importance  of  External  A f f a i r s and N a t i o n a l Defence.  o v e r l o o k e d by T h o r d a r s o n ,  Paper  so  on  the  did  slow  and  the  within  the  from these  the  the  government's  resistance  fact  This  This  that  to  have  resistance  nuclear  and the  the  influential  ability  review process.  in  Bureaucratic  hand,  White  Minister's  costs  d i d not  the  and  roles  systems.  other  c o n t r o v e r s y to b o t h the Trudeau government of  nuclear  government  against the  defence  financial  weapon  Canadian  on  the  the  no  that  commitments.  issue,  to  fact  should note,  directed  of  bureaucracy was  of  nuclear  the  nuclear  one  had been  of  being  nuclear  production  implementation  the  position  from  resistance  of  the  to maintain the  there  processes,  the  withdrawal  of  loss  Bureaucratic end  attempt  result  the  Finally,  weapon  Departments  fact  has  been  as w e l l as G r a n a t s t e i n and B o t h w e l l ,  who s u b s e q u e n t l y p r o v i d e a s o m e w h a t m i s l e a d i n g a n a l y s i s o f  the  defence  not  review.  receive  greater  officials  were  commitments, troops  The  reason  the  publicity generally  when  faced  is in  with  nuclear  weapons  that  although  favour the  of  issue  bureaucratic  Canada's  possibility  of  nuclear  issue.  73  nuclear  losing  i n E u r o p e , E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s and N a t i o n a l Defence  down on t h e  did  the  backed  Procurement processes weapon r e t i r e m e n t process  of  nuclear  i n the  personnel  of  constraints  first  delayed  to  turn  age,  became  authorize  had  the  least  government nuclear  purchase  of  the  for  CF-104  the past  allies  for  Voodoos.  the a  life  i n at This  the  of  CF-101  of  the  minor  external to  also  of force  clearly  Cabinet  Canada,  is  willing had  and t h a t  they  was and  due t o  old  government  the  were  seen  course alliance to  the  negotiate that  were  The the  they  to  to  that  be was  politics nuclear concerns Trudeau issue were  off  of not  representative  tendency of Canadian decision-makers to b i t e  74  in  air-to-air  i n Europe, the  decided  were  fighter,  influential. to  not  aircraft.  regards  levels  much more  not  the  Of t h e s e , with  the  retirement  Genie  influences  determine  impact  were  for  a replacement  able  least  weapon systems  replacement  prudent  Trudeau government.  was  a factor  financial considerations  of  the  certain  weapons.  appropriate  cost  increasingly  relatively  Canada's  CF-101  event,  high  indirectly  by t h e  also  that  any  w e a p o n s . On t h e m a t t e r of  the  facilities,  c o s t of m a i n t a i n i n g the Voodoo rose  addition,  a  The  training  retirement  a c q u i s i t i o n of  extended  As the  it  the  fact  In  the  missile.  taken  and C F - l O l s .  storage  i n the  were  f o r the  place.  due  in  of  given the  a primary reason  at  creating  a factor  retirement  surprising,  In  CF-104s  nuclear  weapons.  timing  this  and  was c l e a r l y  Financial  the  case of the  f i n d i n g a c o n v e n t i o n a l weapon s y s t e m ,  necessary example,  d i d a f f e c t the t i m i n g of the  of  more  than  Canada c o u l d  opposed  Canada's  pressure not  (or  chew.  was  l i m i t e d to  in altering  the  the  upon the  effect  giving  of  them  hostile  less  on  t o w a r d NATO's  to  systems  which  would the bettering Europe  strengthen  its  (and  adversary,  rationale  of  nuclear  an  relations  had  ministers,  himself  was  Soviet  less Union.  with  maintaining  to  roles  be  effect  of  decision  to  in  Western  important  as w e l l h o w e v e r ,  upon the  Nor  h e l p e d Canada  outside  an e x t r e m e l y  weapon  provocative.  have  countries  done  objective would  have  retire  the  weapons.  The  strategic  indirect, nuclear  weapons. to  on  strong  send to  environment Canadian  environment  upon the  trying a  indirect  It  anti-nuclear)  the  for  thought  nuclear  and N o r t h America - -  only  review.  cabinet  Trudeau  was  indirect  t h i s time would u n d o u b t e d l y have  of the Prime M i n i s t e r . This f a c t o r had  and  position.  perhaps  supposed  were  maintenance  the  Mr  the  clearly  of  affairs.  The s p r e a d o f d e t e n t e a t nothing  objections  and defence  views  allies  commitments,  seems t o have h a d an  anti-Soviet  world  NATO  nuclear  verbal  decision  moderating the a  perspective  nuclear  the  government's  The g l o b a l p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e effect  Although  withdrawal from these  from them  successful  should)  decision Even the  and p r o c e s s  though  the  rationale.  p r o v i d e d ample The  had of  signal  an  effect,  fact  In  the  that  was  fact,  justification that  the  Soviet  though  relinquishing  w o r l d was a p o l i t i c a l o n e ,  military  policy.  also  for  Cabinet it  the this  bomber  was  based  strategic change threat  in did  not  materialize  Bomarcs  provided  and C F - l O l s . - A f t e r  based  upon  exist  i n the  thereby  the  1960s.  rationale  for  well  as  in  that  such  North  an a c t  it  is  Canada's  decision  taken real  to  importance i s the  perhaps clearly  serve  context  nuclear toward  itself  financial  as  going  to  threat The  i n Europe by  the  as  fact  a n y p a r t i c u l a r NATO  or  a number  of  nuclear  was  with  opposing  of  influence  on  of  i n which these events took p l a c e .  The  these  in  the  the  numerous  nuclear  commitments  when t h e  Soviet  eyes  many  However,  by  weapons.  and  sources  of  Union  posed  no  Canada's  top  made w a s p o l i t i c a l l y  (and  these  of  was  personal  powerful  beliefs  reality  of  were  Canada's  and m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n .  domestic  commitments  domestic  the  determined  the  of  Of  detente,  based.  strengthened  Canadian  general,  been  systems.  weapons  had v a r y i n g degrees  weighing  threat  morally)  Trudeau  bomber  strengthened  that  The d e c i s i o n w h i c h C a b i n e t  political,  of  the  the  had  was  weapon  nuclear  against  clear  rid  in  i n a p e r i o d of  leaders.  retire  threat  these  w i t h d r a w Canada from i t s  military  Canada  doctrine.  considerations  to  of  also  go  a  decline  utility  external  decision  such  The r e l a t i v e  would not  conclusion,  influence  that  A m e r i c a was  for  t h e s e weapon s y s t e m s  r e l i n q u i s h i n g the  NORAD m i l i t a r y  utmost  reason  all,  assumption  undermined the  In  a  to  interests.  Trudeau were  nuclear  have  Canadian  Canadian  The  government,  inappropriate. weapons 76  was  defence  felt  public  that  The  strongly  policy in  Canada's  public  trend  related  to  increasing  negative  desire  freeze  to  surprising allies  that  was n o t  changing opposition the  to  public,  defence  the able  its  perceptions  mild to  nuclear it  is  the  United  States  is  therefore  not  Canada's  NATO  Canadian government  into  spending. opposition  persuade  position  of  on  the  weapons  evident  the  It given  issue. within  that  the  by  Despite  both the decisions  made  Given  the  in  the  midst  opposition  of  intense  within  bureaucratic  External  Affairs  Defence t o r e l i n q u i s h i n g n u c l e a r weapons, not  an  issue  i n the  defence  review,  it  to  and  conduct  a  commitments, resistance. and  National  i f troop levels is  a  growing  government  defence r e v i e w and t o r e l i n q u i s h Canada's n u c l e a r were  the  and  probable  that  were the  c o n t r o v e r s y o v e r n u c l e a r weapons w o u l d h a v e r e c e i v e d much more attention  by t h e  press.  77  Notes  Notes  to Chapter  1  1.  J o n M c L i n . C a n a d a ' s C h a n g i n g D e f e n c e P o l i c y , 1957 - 1 9 6 3 . (Toronto: The Copp C l a r k P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1 9 6 7 ) , p . 87 .  2..  McLin,  3.  J o h n W. W a r n o c k . P a r t n e r of a S a t e l l i t e Canada. 187 .  4.  McLin,  P- 104 .  5.  McLin,  P- 1 3 3 .  6.  McLin,  P-  112 .  7 .  McLin,  P-  113 .  8.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990 .  9.  McLin,  p.  10.  McLin,  pp.  11.  Warnock,  p.  234.  12.  Warnock,  p.  243.  13.  Don M u n t o n .  14.  McLin,  p.  159.  15.  McLin,  p.  160.  16.  McLin,  p.  160.  17.  Canadian Institute of International Affairs. Monthly Report, v o l . I I , n o . 1 . ( T o r o n t o : Canadian I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s , January, 1963), pp. 18-19.  p.  87. t o B e h e m o t h : The M i l i t a r y P o l i c y (Toronto: New P r e s s , 1970), p .  116. 158-9.  Classroom  discussion.  78  March  29,  1990.  18.  McLin,  19.  The G l o b e  and M a i l .  (February  Canadian  Institute  of  20.  Report,  p.  162.  p . 7.  1,  1963),  Internatioanl  21.  P i e r r e S e v i g n y . T h i s Game o f P o l i t i c s . and Stewart L t d . , 1965.  22.  McLin,  p.  166.  23.  McLin,  p.  132.  p.  6.  Affairs,  Monthly-  Toronto:  McLelland  24.  Bruce Thordarson. Trudeau and F o r e i g n P o l i c y . Oxford University Press, 1972), p . 27.  (Toronto:  25.  Thordarson,  p.  69.  26.  Thordarson,  p.  70.  27.  Thordarson,  p.  68.  28.  Thordarson,  p.  70.  29.  Thordarson,  p.  90.  30.  Thordarson,  p.  91.  31.  Thordarson,  p.  75.  32.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone a d v i s e r . September 4,  33.  Thordarson,  34.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone a d v i s e r . S e p t e m b e r 4,  35.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone interview. Senior official in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990 .  36.  Thordarson,  p.  124.  37.  Thordarson,  p.  124.  38.  Thordarson,  p.  127.  Notes  to Chapter  2  p.  interview. 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n p o l i c y  interview. 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n  119.  79  policy  39.  Thordarson,  p.  127.  40.  Thordarson,  p.  132.  41.  Thordarson,  p.  135.  42.  J . L . G r a n a t s t e i n and Robert B o t h w e l l . P i r o u e t t e : Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign P o l i c y . (Toronto: U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Press, 1990), p . 19.  43.  Thordarson,  pp.  44.  Thordarson,  p.  45.  Granatstein,  p.  19.  46.  Granatstein,  p.  20.  47.  Granatstein,  p.  20.  48.  Granatstein,  pp.  49.  Granatstein,  p.  50.  Thordarson,  p.  157.  51.  Thordarson,  p.  157.  52.  Granatstein,  53.  Canada. Department of N a t i o n a l Defence. Defence 70s. W h i t e P a p e r o n D e f e n c e . (Ottawa: Information 1971), p . 30.  54.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone a d v i s e r . September 4,  interview. 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n p o l i c y  55.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone a d v i s e r . September 4,  interview. 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n p o l i c y  56.  Thordarson,  57.  Granatstein,  58.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone interview. Senior official in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g t h e Defence Review. August 23, 1990 .  59.  C o n f i d e n t i a l telephone interview. Senior official in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990.  p.  p. p.  136-7. 149.  20-1. 21.  27. in the Canada,  142. 27.  80  60.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990.  61.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990 .  62.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990 .  Notes  to Chapter  3  63.  Confidential telephone interview. a d v i s e r . September 4, 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n  policy  64.  Confidential telephone interview. a d v i s e r . September 4, 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n  policy  65.  Confidential telephone interview. Former Canadian R e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s on i s s u e s o f Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament. September 13, 1990.  66.  Confidential telephone interview. a d v i s e r . September 4, 1990.  67.  Confidential telephone interview. F o r c e G e n e r a l . S e p t e m b e r 4, 1 9 9 0 .  68.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990 .  69.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g t h e Defence Review. August 23, 1990.  70.  Confidential telephone interview. F o r c e G e n e r a l . September 4, 1990.  Trudeau f o r e i g n Retired  policy  Canadian A i r  Retired  Canadian A i r  71.  Granatstein,  72.  Confidential telephone interview. Retired Force General. September 16, 1990.  Canadian A i r  73.  Jane's Weapon Company, 1 9 7 2 ) ,  74.  Canada.  p.  29.  Systems. p . 28.  Department  of  (London:  National 81  Jane's  Defence.  Publishing  Defence  in the  70s. W h i t e P a p e r on D e f e n c e . 1971), p . 30.  (London:  Information Jane's  Canada,  75.  Jane's Weapon Company, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  76..  Confidential telephone interview. Senior official in E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 23, 1990.  77.  Confidential telephone interview. F o r c e G e n e r a l . September 4, 1990.  78.  Confidential telephone interview. a d v i s e r . September 4, 1990.  79.  McLin,  80.  The t e r m " i m p e n d i n g bomber t h r e a t " r e f e r s t o t h e f a c t t h a t S o v i e t b o m b e r s were no l o n g e r s e e n a s b e i n g t h e primary threat to North American defence. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i m p o r t a n t when c o n s i d e r i n g t h e r e t i r e m e n t o f t h e C F - l O l s a n d t h e B o m a r c s . B o t h h a d b e e n d e p l o y e d on t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t t h e y w o u l d be n e e d e d f o r bomber d e f e n c e . H o w e v e r , by t h e 1960s i t became c l e a r t h a t ICBMs w e r e t o make b o m b e r s o b s o l e t e . Furthermore, the e x i s t e n c e o f l a r g e q u a n t i t i e s o f S o v i e t ICBMs b y t h e 1 9 7 0 s a l s o made t h e C F - l O l s a n d B o m a r c s v u l n e r a b l e t o a t t a c k l o n g b e f o r e t h e y c o u l d be u s e d t o s h o o t down enemy bombers.  81.  C a n a d a . D e p a r t m e n t o f N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e . Defence 70s. W h i t e P a p e r o n D e f e n c e . ( O t t a w a : I n f o r m a t i o n 1971), p . 30.  82.  Confidential telephone interview. F o r c e G e n e r a l . September 4, 1990.  83.  Confidential telephone interview. a d v i s e r . September 4, 1990.  84.  Canada. Department o f N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e . Defence 70s. W h i t e P a p e r o n D e f e n c e . ( O t t a w a : I n f o r m a t i o n 1971), p . 30.  85.  Jane's A l l the World's P u b l i s h i n g Company, 1 9 8 4 ) ,  86.  Confidential telephone interview. F o r c e G e n e r a l . S e p t e m b e r 4, 1 9 9 0 .  p  Systems. p . 34.  (Ottawa:  Retired  Publishing  Canadian A i r  Trudeau f o r e i g n  policy  97.  82  Retired  Canadian A i r  Trudeau f o r e i g n  Aircraft. p . 449.  (London:  Retired  in the Canada,  policy in the Canada, Jane's  Canadian A i r  Notes  to Chapter  4  87.  C. David Crenna, ed. P i e r r e E l l i o t Trudeau: L i f t i n g the Shadow o f W a r . (Edmonton: H u r t i g P u b l i s h e r s L t d . , 1 9 8 7 ) , p. xiii.  88.  Kim Richard Nossal. The P o l i t i c s of Canadian Foreign Policy. ( S c a r b o r o u g h : P r e n t i c e - H a l l Canada I n c . , 1985), p. 12.  89.  Crenna,  90.  Granatstein,  pp.  91.  Don M u n t o n .  "Canadians  p.  2. 235-6.  V o l . 3, N o . 4,  Security.  and t h e i r  (Winter  Defence."  1988/1989),  Peace  p.  4.  and  92.  M i c h a e l D r i e d g e r a n d Don M u n t o n . " S e c u r i t y , Arms C o n t r o l and D e f e n c e : Public Attitudes i n Canada." The 1988 C U P S P u b l i c O p i n i o n S u r v e y . December 1988, p . 107. ,  93  John H . S i g l e r and Dennis Goresky. United States-Canadian Relations." Don M u n t o n .  and  Opinion  on  International Vol. 28, No. 4, (Autumn 1974), p. 641.  , Organization, 94.  "Public  " T h e 1988 C U P S P u b l i c  V o l . 3, N o . 4,  Security.  Opinion Survey."  (Winter 1988/1989),  Peace  p . 2.  95.  D.W. Middlemiss and J o e l J . Sokolsky. Canadian Defence: Decisions and Determinants. (Toronto: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Canada, 1989), p . 117.  96.  Warnock,  97.  Peter C. (Toronto:  98.  Middlemiss,  p.  124.  99.  Middlemiss,  p.  125.  100.  p.191. Newman. True North: M c L e l l a n d and Stewart  Middlemiss,  101.  Middlemiss,  102.  McLin,  103.  Middlemiss,  104.  Newman,  pp.  p.  p. p.  125. 125.  158-9. p.  84.  98. 83  Not Strong and F r e e . L i m i t e d , 1983), p . 99.  105.  Gerald Porter. Trudeau Years. 181-2.  106.  Confidential telephone interview. Former Canadian R e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o t h e U n i t e d N a t i o n s on i s s u e s o f Arms C o n t r o l and Disarmament. September 13, 1990.  107.  Confidential telephone interview. Senior o f f i c i a l E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s d u r i n g the Defence Review. August 1990.  108.  Canada. Department o f N a t i o n a l D e f e n c e . Defence 70s. W h i t e P a p e r o n D e f e n c e . 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