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Review of the organizational structure for the planning and delivery of Emergency Social Services in… Waterlow, Rodney J. 1992

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REVIEW OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR THE PLANNINGAND DELIVERY OF EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA:THE PARKSVILLE FLOODING CASE STUDYbyRODNEY JOHN WATERLOWDiploma of Architecture (Hammersmith), 1966A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OFTHE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OFMASTER OF ARTS (PLANNING)inTHE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIESSCHOOL OF COMMUNITY AND REGIONAL PLANNINGWe accept this thesis as conformingto the required standardTHE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIAOctober 1992© Rodney John Waterlow, 1992In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of therequirements for an advanced degree at the University of BritishColumbia, I agree that the Library shall make itfreely available for reference and study. I further agree thatpermission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarlypurposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his orher representatives. It is understood that copying orpublication of this thesis for financial gain shall not beallowed without my written permission.Signed School of Community and Regional PlanningThe University of British ColumbiaVancouver, CanadaDate: October 31, 1992ABSTRACTIn major emergencies or disaster situations it can be anticipatedthat the normal emergency services will be severely strained, orexceeded, and assistance which is routinely provided by municipalor provincial agencies may not be available. In such abnormalcircumstances, there is a need for an expandable emergencyresponse capability, designed to supplement the establishedagencies. This may involve a number of different agencies, bothgovernmental and private, in a coordinated effort to respond tothe increased demands of the situation.This thesis focuses on the component of emergency response knownin Canada as 'Emergency Social Services' (ESS) which is basedprimarily on the involvement of community-based agencies andindividual volunteers. ESS is frequently referred to as the'volunteer component', or the informal sector, as distinct fromthe formal, day-to-day, emergency response agencies: the police,fire, ambulance, and social services. However, as discussed inChapter 2, the term 'Emergency Social Services' is not part ofthe accepted lexicon of the professional literature, and thedistinction between ESS and other emergency response agencies,is not the norm in other parts of North America.Chapter 3 reviews the volunteerism literature and concludes thatvolunteer-based organizations require professional management tobe successful, and that without such formal management andsupport the ESS model is most likely to fall short of itsobjectives, or may fail completely.In Chapter 4 the evolution of the governing legislation isexamined to determine the origins of the isolation of EmergencySocial Services from the mainstream of emergency planning, asdistinct from a more integrated approach.Chapter 5 describes the ESS model, as presently espoused by theMinistry of Social Services, and analyzes the role of the ESSDirector, arguing that this model relies heavily on the personalqualities of the individual ESS Director.iiChapter 6 is a case study based on the flooding at Parksvilleon Vancouver Island. This particular event was selected becauseit was known to be a case where things had gone wrong and,therefore, merited further investigation. The case studydemonstrates that, although Parksville was better prepared thanmany other municipalities in British Columbia, there werejurisdictional, administrative and perceptual problems whichexacerbated the situation. Most particularly, the role of theESS component, which was well represented by a local serviceorganization, was minimal, and its potential contribution to themultiple needs of the evacuees (e.g., counselling and otherpersonal services) was discounted by the local authorities.Chapter 7 examines some of the major issues identified in thethesis and the case study to determine what lessons can belearned from the event, including the following: perceptualdifferences between the formal and informal sectors; the needto amend the obsolete legislation; problems related to therespective roles of the Ministry and ESS; the need forprofessional management for ESS; the ambivalent relationshipbetween the Ministry and the Provincial Emergency Program; andthe need for, and the trend towards, a more integrated, holistic,approach to emergency planning.Chapter 8 reviews the thesis, lists the major conclusions,and makes recommendations for changes including: amending theemergency legislation to require municipalities to plan foremergencies which occur within their geographic jurisdiction;transferring formal responsibility for Emergency Social Servicesfrom the Ministry of Social Services to the municipalities; andproviding professional management and support for EmergencySocial Services as an integral part of the emergency preparednesscapability of municipalities throughout British Columbia.iiiTABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT TABLE OF CONTENTS ^  ivCHAPTER 1 - THESIS OUTLINE1.1^INTRODUCTION ^  11.2^SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS ^  4CHAPTER 2 - EMERGENCY LITERATURE REVIEW2.1^INTRODUCTION ^  82.2^EMERGENCY LITERATURE ^  102.2.1 GENERAL PLANNING PRINCIPLES ^ 222.2.2 EVACUATION ^  282.2.3 EMERGENCY RECEPTION CENTRES  312.2.4 PERSONAL SERVICES ^  332.3^CHAPTER SUMMARY ^  35CHAPTER 3 - VOLUNTEERISM LITERATURE REVIEW3.1^INTRODUCTION ^  383.2^VOLUNTEERISM LITERATURE ^  403.3^CHAPTER SUMMARY  46CHAPTER 4 - EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND AUTHORITIES 4.1^FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL ^  484.2^PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL  534.2.1 THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SERVICES ^ 584.2.2 THE PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY PROGRAM  634.3^MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL ^  654.3.1 MUNICIPAL GRANTS  684.3.2 REGIONAL DISTRICTS ^  724.4^CHAPTER SUMMARY ^  74CHAPTER 5 - EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICES 5.1^INTRODUCTION ^  785.2^ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE ^  805.3^EMERGENCY FOOD SERVICE  835.4^EMERGENCY CLOTHING SERVICE  845.5^EMERGENCY LODGING SERVICE ^  855.6^REGISTRATION AND INQUIRY SERVICE ^ 875.7^PERSONAL SERVICES ^  895.8^FINANCIAL SERVICES  915.9^OTHER SUPPORT SERVICES ^  935.10 EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICES DIRECTORS ^ 955.11 CHAPTER SUMMARY ^  98ivCHAPTER 6 - CASE STUDY:^THE PARKSVILLE FLOODING1001021036.16.26.3INTRODUCTION THE OBJECTIVES OF THE CASE STUDY ^DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENT ^6.4 HISTORY OF FLOODING IN THE AREA 1056.5 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FLOODING ^ 1076.6 EMERGENCY PLANNING PRIOR TO THE EVENT 1096.7 THE SOCIETY OF ORGANIZED SERVICES 1126.8 RESCUE AND EVACUATION ^ 1146.9 ACCOMMODATION OF EVACUEES 1176.10 REIMBURSEMENT FOR SERVICES RENDERED ^ 1196.11 CLAIMS FOR DAMAGE AND LOSS 1216.12 RESPONSE TO EMOTIONAL NEEDS OF EVACUEES ^ 1236.13 BLURRED IMAGES ^ 1276.14 CHAPTER SUMMARY 132CHAPTER 7 - ANALYSIS7.1 INTRODUCTION ^ 1357.2 PROBLEMS WITH THE LEGISLATION ^ 1367.3 MSS / ESS 1407.4 ESTABLISH / VOLUNTEER AGENCIES 1437.5 MANAGEMENT OF ESS ^ 1477.6 MSS / PEP ^ 1507.7. INTEGRATION OF EMERGENCY SERVICES ^ 151CHAPTER 8 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS8.1 THESIS REVIEW ^ 1548.2 CONCLUSIONS 1578.3 RECOMMENDATIONS 159BIBLIOGRAPHY ^  160CHAPTER 1 - THESIS OUTLINE1.1 INTRODUCTIONIn emergency situations everyone has an initial responsibilityto do whatever they can to help themselves, their families andtheir neighbours. However, in major emergency or disastersituations, there are limits to what individuals can do, and,as stated in the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) EvaluationStudy, "...government must impose its authoritative direction andcontrol to bring about orderly and effective recovery measures."(PEP Evaluation Study, 1987).At the local government level, minor emergencies are a normalpart of the every-day responsibilities of municipal personnel(police, fire, health, public works, etc.) within a community,and are handled through routine departmental actions. Similarly,trained staff from the Ministry of Social Services respond topersonal emergency situations, or crises, such as those involvingdysfunctional individuals, child abuse, or claims for emergencywelfare assistance, on a daily basis.However, major emergencies, which may require the involvementof several agencies, or disasters, which exceed (or have thepotential to exceed) the emergency response capability of amunicipality, require action beyond normal procedures. Forexample, earthquakes, widespread toxic chemical spills, or severeflooding, can cause serious disruption of normal services and maynecessitate the relocation of large numbers of people. In such1situations it can be anticipated that the established (formal)emergency services which are normally provided by municipal orprovincial agencies, may not be available for some time, and willbe severely strained, or exceeded.A major objective of emergency planning is to provide aneffective and appropriate response to the needs of a continuum ofemergency situations, ranging from individual or family crises tomajor disasters impacting thousands of people. Therefore, thereis a need for an expandable emergency response capability, whichmay involve many different agencies from both the public andprivate sectors, designed to supplement the established municipalagencies in a coordinated effort to respond to the increasedneeds of the situation. In particular, there is a need for atemporary (informal), pre-planned and operational 'EmergencySocial Services' capability, ready to be implemented as requiredwhen the structure of regular social service programs has been,or is likely to be, exceeded.This thesis focuses on this Emergency Social Services componentof emergency planning, and argues that the present organizationalstructure in British Columbia does not adequately address theneed for a flexible and expandable emergency response capability,and does not provide for the full integration of the informalagencies with the established formal agencies. Further, becauseEmergency Social Services is predicated on the involvement ofvolunteer-based organizations and individual volunteers, itscontribution is most likely to be discounted by the establishedemergency response agencies.2The thesis further argues that there are some fundamentalproblems with the organizational structure of Emergency SocialServices which limit the ability of local ESS teams to carry outtheir mandate. This is largely a function of the lack of formaldirection and support for the Emergency Social Services teams.The consequence of this reality is that in extreme circumstances,when the need for such additional services is most acute, theresponse of the volunteer component will likely fall short of thedemands of the situation, or may fail completely.31.2 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERSThe Emergency Social Services model, as practiced in BritishColumbia, is unusual and does not respond well to simple, singleparagraph, problem statements, which may then be defended byreference to an established knowledge base. Although much effortwas expended attempting, unsuccessfully, to conform to thisconventional thesis model, it was finally decided that a casestudy approach would provide the necessary academic framework tolook at the issues, test the validity of the conclusion in thecontext of a real-life emergency situation, and synthesize thelessons to be learned into some practical recommendations.Chapter 2 states that there are inherent difficulties indiscussing those emergency services which in Canada are knowncollectively as Emergency Social Services (ESS). Although thereis a large body of material on many aspects of emergencyplanning, the term 'Emergency Social Services' is not in commonusage, and the literature does not differentiate theorganizational requirements for these services from those ofother emergency services.Chapter 3 reviews the volunteerism literature, particularly themanagement of volunteer organizations, noting that the emergencyliterature does not address the concept of using the volunteer-sector for the planning and delivery of Emergency SocialServices. A recurring theme in the volunteer literature is theneed for professional management and support of volunteeractivity. There also appears to be a basic assumption that4effective volunteer organizations are part of an establishedorganizational framework which supports such activity. This isnot the case with municipal Emergency Social Services teams whichoperate with little direction from either the Ministry of SocialServices, or the municipalities which they are intended to serve.Chapter 4 traces the evolution of emergency legislation sincethe early 1950s, noting that changes in the wording indicate aperceptual shift away from the primary concern with planning forwartime emergencies, towards an emphasis on planning to respondto the effects of natural and man-made disasters, which motivatescurrent emergency planning activity.The legislation which first identified the Ministry of SocialServices (then known as the Ministry of Social Welfare) as theagency with responsibility for Emergency Social Services datesfrom 1966, and is still in effect. Although the separation ofEmergency Social Services from other emergency responseactivities is not identified in the professional literature, thepolicy has become entrenched as part of emergency preparednessdogma in B.C. This separation reinforces the natural tendency ofthe established (formal) agencies to discount the contribution ofthe Emergency Social Services (informal) component of emergencyplanning, noted in Chapter 2.Chapter 5 describes the Emergency Social Services model asespoused by the B.C. Ministry of Social Services, and explainsthat it is largely predicated on the assumption that EmergencyReception Centres will be opened and operated by Emergency Social5Services volunteer personnel, although this is not a preconditionfor the delivery of such services. The basic principle is thatthe Reception Centres provide a safe, temporary, refuge where theneeds of evacuees can be assessed and assistance can be provided,either directly at the Reception Centres or by facilitatingaccess to services at other locations.Each of the Emergency Social Services is then described, togetherwith some of the additional support services. It is noted thatresponsibility for all aspects of the development, maintenance,and delivery of a municipal Emergency Social Services program,together with the coordination of recruitment, training, and themotivation of volunteers, has been delegated to the ESSDirectors, many of whom are themselves volunteers. The role ofthe ESS Directors is discussed in the context of the materialfrom Chapter 3, and the argument is presented that there is aneed for professional management and support of ESS activities,to ensure that volunteers are used effectively, and are motivatedto continue to participate in the program.Chapter 6 is a case study of the flooding which took place justoutside the City of Parksville, on Vancouver Island, during thelatter part of 1990 and the early months of 1991. The localauthorities evacuated some forty families from the flooded area,and provided accommodation at the main hotel in Parksville. Thecase study serves to illustrate some perceptual, jurisdictionaland administrative problems which are not unique to theParksville experience, and have a more general application.6Chapter 7 examines the major issues discussed in the body of thethesis, and in the case study, to determine what lessons can belearned which may bring about a better understanding of emergencyplanning in British Columbia. It notes that many of the problemsdiscussed in the thesis (including the distinction betweenEmergency Social Services and other emergency services, and therelationship of the Ministry of Social Services and the municipalESS teams) are attributable to obsolete emergency legislationwhich is in urgent need of amendment.Other issues discussed include: perceptual differences betweenthe formal and informal sectors; problems related to therespective roles of the Ministry and. ESS; the need forprofessional management for ESS; the ambivalent relationshipbetween the Ministry and the Provincial Emergency Program; andthe need for, and the trend towards, a more integrated, holistic,approach to emergency planning.Chapter 8 reviews the thesis, lists the major conclusions, andmakes recommendations for changes including: amending theemergency legislation to require municipalities to plan foremergencies which occur within their geographic jurisdiction;transferring formal responsibility for Emergency Social Servicesfrom the Ministry of Social Services to the municipalities; andproviding professional management and support for. EmergencySocial Services as an integral part of the emergency preparednesscapability of municipalities throughout British Columbia.7CHAPTER 2 - EMERGENCY LITERATURE REVIEW2.1 INTRODUCTIONThere are inherent difficulties in discussing those emergencyservices which in Canada are known collectively as 'EmergencySocial Services' in the context of established emergency planningliterature. Neither the term 'Emergency Social Services', norits short form 'ESS', are part of the accepted lexicon of thelarge body of work listed under such various headings as:'Disaster Planning', 'Emergency Preparedness', 'Civil Defence',etc. Most of this material originates from the United States,and the distinction between Emergency Social Services and otheremergency response services is not clearly defined.There are similar difficulties when discussing the concept ofusing the volunteer-sector for the planning and delivery ofEmergency Social Services, which is the major thrust of theapproach espoused by the B.C. Ministry of Social Services,because it too is not addressed in the formal literature, suchreferences to 'volunteers' generally being in the context of aresource which becomes available after an event. Therefore,literature related to volunteerism theory and management willbe reviewed separately in Chapter 3.It should also be noted that, although the term Emergency SocialServices is now widely accepted across Canada, there are regionalvariations in the legislation, and in the means by which theservices themselves are delivered. For example, unlike the B.C.8model, which is based on discretionary legislation and reliesalmost exclusively on volunteers, the Disaster Social ServicesBranch of the Alberta Public Safety Services is required toprovides these services, and, although volunteers are an integralpart of the process, the primary responsibility for themanagement and support of these activities remains with theprovincial agency, and staff are provided for this purpose.In order to focus on some of the issues raised by the literature,this chapter will first describe the various types of materialwhich form the body of emergency literature and, in particular,those aspects of the professional and scientific literature whichrelate to problems at the organizational level. The literaturewill then be reviewed in terms of general planning principleswhich should also apply to the Emergency Social Servicescomponent of emergency planning. Finally, some of the keysubject areas associated with Emergency Social Services -Evacuation, Emergency Reception Centres and Personal Services(Counselling) - will be reviewed to provide a broader theoreticalbasis for the analysis of the case study described in Chapter 6.92.2 EMERGENCY LITERATUREThere is general acceptance (Dynes, 1970; Drabek, 1986) thatone of the earliest systematic social and behavioral studies ofdisaster was the doctoral dissertation of Samual Prince (1920),dealing with the explosion in Halifax, Nova Scotia, in 1917.The distinguishing feature of this work was that, in addition toproviding a descriptive portrait of the event itself, the authorput forward hypotheses regarding behavior in disasters, whichmight have more general social theory application.Formal disaster research dates from the early 1950s, and there isnow a wide variety of literature on disaster, which Dynes (1970)has categorized into three distinguishable types:1) Narrative descriptions, or Popular literature,2) Government and quasi-government agency documents,or Official literature, and3) Systematic studies into the nature of disaster,or Professional and Scientific literature.1) Popular LiteratureDynes describes this type of disaster literature as includingeye witness or reconstructed accounts of major emergencies ordisasters, which, in an attempt to capture the drama of theevent, frequently focuses on the unique, the personal, or theatypical aspects of what has occurred. Although the reporting10of the experiences of individuals in such events is of generalinterest, it is of little value in terms of the systematicevaluation of the emergency response to the event as a whole.2) Official LiteratureThis type of literature is produced after a disaster and includesreports on the amount of damage caused by the event, the cost ofreconstruction, official enquires into the nature of what tookplace, and how the various agencies responded. Inevitably, thereis a public relations element in literature of this type, and aprimary consideration in such reports is that the actions of theagency concerned, whether governmental or private, be presentedin the most favorable light to avoid any possible criticism ofthe adequacy of the response, and/or to support future requestsfor funding. Dynes states that official literature seldomcontributes significantly to the understanding of the actualoperation of the organization in a disaster, but is useful interms of factual data concerning organizational activity.3) Professional and Scientific Literature This type of disaster literature is relatively recent, datingfrom the early 1950s. Unlike much of the Popular or Officialliterature, it attempts to apply a systematic approach to thestudy of disasters, and it has the added advantage that thewriters are well aware of the inherent problems in suchinvestigative research. It should be noted that referencesin this literature review are primarily from source materialof this latter type.11Dynes has classified the Professional and Scientific literatureinto three different levels of study, as follows:1) Problems associated with Mass PopulationsThese studies include such concerns as public attitudesto disasters, their response to warnings of impendingdanger, and problems involved in the evacuation andemergency shelter of large numbers of persons.2) Problems associated with Individual Disaster VictimsThese studies include their reactions to potentialthreats, their subsequent behavior under disasterconditions, such as panic or withdrawal, and stress-related changes in their physical and psychologicalhealth, and3) Problems at the Organizational Level These studies focus on the behavior of establishedorganizational groups in times of disaster.As Dynes (1970) points out, a scientifically based understandingof human behavior, both of Individuals and of Mass Populations,is an important aspect of emergency research, and,'perhaps inconsequence, there have been fewer studies dealing with disasterresponse at the Organizational Level. Indeed, as of 1970 onlythree studies (Rosow, 1954; Form and Nosow, 1958; Barton, 1963)had been explicitly concerned with the way organizations functionin disaster situations. However, as discussed below, it isimportant to appreciate the natural tendencies of the establishedemergency response organizations within a community, relative to12other 'outside' agencies, and to acknowledge them in the planningprocess. This is particularly relevant in the context of therelationship between the formal emergency response agencies andthe informal volunteer-based Emergency Social Servicesorganizational structure.Rosow (1954) dealt with the potential conflicts of authority incrisis situations, and determined the following:1) The authority structure which existed prior to thedisaster formed the foundation for the authoritystructure which prevailed during the disaster,2) Although outside agencies tended to defer to theestablished local authority, it was found that therewere conflicts among organizations which were at similarlevels of authority. These conflicts often resultedfrom different perceptions of the disaster situation,particularly between organizations having specifictasks, and others with more general responsibilities,and3) Organizations tended to communicate more within theirown groups than with other groups, and that thiscontributed to a lack of coordination.13Form and Nosow (1958) focused on the activities and theassociated problems of community organizations, following theBeecher tornado in 1953. They suggested that the organizationswhich were most effective during the disaster had the followingcharacteristics:1) They exhibited organizational cohesion,2) Their dependence upon other organizations was minimal,3) The dependence of other organizations upon them wasminimal,4) They were geared, normally, to what may be considereddisaster-oriented activity,5) They were not involved as persons or as organizationalmembers with the immediate consequences of the disaster,and6) They maintained their organizational identity by notacquiring outside "voluntary" help.Form and Nosow also suggested that the effectiveness of anorganizations might be gaged by the following tests:1) The ability to select achievable tasks, and to completethem,2) The ability to avoid tasks which other agencies aredoing, or are capable of doing better,3) The ability to maintain an objective evaluation of theorganization's performance during the emergency stage,and4) The elicitation of positive evaluation by otheragencies.14As Dynes (1970) has pointed out, these tests were borrowedprimarily from industrial organization models, and the results,favoured the established, more highly structured organizations.However, the nature of disasters is such that the organizationsinvolved frequently lack the flexibility of choice and priorknowledge which the criteria would require.Clearly, the determination of the tasks to be used as the basisof such an evaluation, would also have a major effect on theoutcome of the tests. If the activities (tasks) of anorganization were clearly defined and limited in scope, as forexample the emergency response activities of police or firedepartments, the organization would be more likely to be regardedas being effective. In contrast, organizations which do not havesuch formalized organizational structures, such as EmergencySocial Services, are most likely to be evaluated as being lesseffective, and their contribution to the overall emergencyresponse process deemed to be of lessor importance.In an attempt to establish a more balanced perspective, Dynesexpresses the opinion that, when considering organizationalactivities which require more difficult and complex decisions andresponse, it is necessary to develop theoretical formulationswhich capture the reality of how organizations actually functionin disasters. However, it should be acknowledged that thisapproach has not yet gained universal acceptance, and there isstill an attitudinal-bias in favour of established organizations,at the expense of informal, volunteer-based, organizations likeEmergency Social Services.15Barton (1963) reviewed the available literature in terms of thefunctioning of what he called the "emergency social system",which he described as follows:"When the disaster is sudden and on a large scale relativeto the capacity of the normal system to cope with it, anemergency social system has to be created to quicklyprovide a large volume of disaster services. Existingorganizations, primary groups, and masses of individualsmust be mobilized to provide such services as rescue,transportation of the injured, medical care, food andshelter, reassurance and psychological support, andrestoration of damaged essential facilities. At the sametime non-postponable maintenance activities must becontinued - including taking care of children and feedingfamilies, as well as keeping up public order and publicutilities output. This improvised system must performthese services under conditions of damaged facilities andpartly incapacitated personnel". (Quoted by Dynes, 1970)It should be noted that although Barton's description of thisemergency social system, includes many Emergency Social Servicesfunctions, such as Feeding, Shelter and Personal Services, hedoes not attempt to differentiate one type of responseorganization from another but, on the contrary, regards them aspart of a total response to the needs of the emergency situation.As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this approach supports theargument that, although Emergency Social Services are requiredless frequently than the formal emergency services, they shouldbe regarded as an integral part of the overall emergency responseprocess, rather than as a separate element which is expected tofunction independently, with minimal direction or support.16The conceptualization of the disaster response as a new emergentsocial system which develops after the impact of a disaster,suggests that not all organizations conform to a single model, inwhich they are more or less bureaucratic, more or less formal,more or less complex, etc., but that there is a difference inkind (Stallings, 1978).As Stallings points out, Barton attempted to synthesizeorganizational behavior, incorporating a two-fold distinctionbetween the actions of individuals, or small groups, (regardlessof whether they were victim or non-victim), and the actions offormal organizations. But this distinction is not comprehensive,and does not, for example, include the collective aspects ofbehavior not housed within formal organizations. In a laterwork, Barton (1969) reviewed case studies of disasters andconstructed a large array of complex models containing sets ofhypothetical propositions, which could be used as a basis forsubsequent field work.More recent research, particularly by the Disaster ResearchCentre at the University of Delaware, has indicated thatorganizations do not conform to a single model, and that disasterorganizational activity has two important dimensions:1) The nature of the disaster-relevant Tasks which areundertaken by community organizations, and2) The post-impact Structure which these organizationsdevelop.17The tasks which some organizations perform in response to adisaster may be the same as those which they perform on a regularbasis, or they may be tasks which are new, and not part of thereregular activity. Similarly, whereas some organizations mayrespond to a disaster with relatively little or no change totheir organizational structure, others may change considerably.Cross-classification of these two dimensions of Task andStructure produces a four-fold typology of disaster organizationsas follows: 1) Established, 2) Expanding, 3) Extending, and4) Emergent (Quarantelli, 1966; Dynes, 1970; Stallings, 1978).Type 1 Established organizations carrying out their regulartasks, primarily with their own highly trained personnel, e.g.,municipal police or fire departments responding to emergencies.Type 2 Community-based organizations carrying out an expandingof their regular tasks, e.g., traditional church or socialservices organizations, supplemented by largely untrainedvolunteers, providing disaster relief to evacuees.Type 3 Organizations extending their regular tasks to includenon-regular, disaster-related, activities, e.g., a constructioncompany using its personnel and equipment for heavy rescue.Type 4 Emergent organizations or groups responding to non-regular tasks, e.g., ad hoc groups of key municipal personnel,and/or representatives of the local community, set up tocoordinate the community response to the disaster.18As will be discussed further in Chapter 5, Emergency SocialServices does not fit neatly into any one of the organizationalgroups of this four-fold typology, but includes elements of allfour. This suggests that the management of Emergency SocialServices requires particular attention.Further insight into the disaster literature was providedin "Human Systems in Extreme Environments" (Mileti, Drabek, andHaas, 1975) in which the authors reviewed nearly two hundredworks, and organized 627 key study findings into a "primitive"inventory. As Drabek (1986) later pointed out, this work, incontrast to the theory construction of Barton (1969), or theorganizational focus of Dynes (1970), was a general summary ofthe literature, and rested exclusively on published findings,which had been supported empirically.A similar approach has been used in a recent addition to theprofessional and scientific literature entitled, "Human SystemsResponses to Disaster: An Inventory of Sociological Findings"(Drabek, 1986), which has been a valuable resource in thisliterature review. This work is a comprehensive review of 146major conclusions and 654 specific sociological findings indisaster research since the 1950s. Again, like Mileti et al,Drabek has used formally published studies giving the empiricalresults of analyses of human responses to disaster events. Hethen presents a codified summary of the findings, together withsome of his own conclusions and insights.19In order to provide a conceptual framework into which the studyfindings can be grouped, Drabek has classified the disaster cycleinto four general categories: 'Preparedness', 'Response','Recovery', and 'Mitigation'. Each category is then divided intotwo sub-topics, giving a total of eight process categories asfollows:20PreparednessResponseRecoveryMitigationA. PlanningB. WarningC. Mobilization/Evacuation (pre-impact)D. Emergency Action (post-impact)E. Restoration (under 6 months)F. Reconstruction (over 6 months)G. Hazard PerceptionsH. AdjustmentsSimilarly, the responses identified in the literature to each ofthe eight process categories have been classified into one of sixlevels of increasing structural complexity, or scale, as follows:I. Individual,^II. Group,^III. Organizational,IV. Community,^V. Society,^VI. International,Within this 48-cell typology the major conclusions (654) andspecific findings (578) in each category are identified by thecell reference code (e.g., IIIA - Organization Planning), eachprocess category being treated as a separate chapter andreferenced back to the source literature.The subject index of the Drabek inventory makes no reference toEmergency Social Services per se, but, even more significantly,there is no reference to 'Emergency Feeding', 'EmergencyClothing', 'Registration and Inquiry', or 'Emergency FinancialServices', after a disaster. Also there is no reference to'Emergency Reception Centres', which are an integral part of thecurrent provincial Emergency Social Services model, although'Emergency Shelter' is listed, and some of the findings wouldalso apply to reception centres.Clearly, Emergency Social Services, in the broadest sense,encompasses many different aspects of emergency planning theory,and includes most, if not all, of the above classifications, butthere appears to be no specific body of disaster theory whichaddresses Emergency Social Services planning and organization asa distinct whole. However, in order to identify researchfindings which may be relevant, Drabek's inventory has beenreviewed in terms of 'General Planning Principles', 'Evacuation','Reception Centres', and 'Personal Services'. References to'Volunteers' have been linked to the review of voluteerismliterature in Chapter 3.212.2.1 GENERAL PLANNING PRINCIPLESWhen considering general planning principles, the literaturedemonstrates that everyday measures used for ordinary emergenciescannot be extrapolated for use in major disasters (Quarantelliand Tierney, 1979; Quarantelli, 1984.) due to the changedconditions in which the response takes place. These changes havebeen classified (Dynes et al, 1972) in terms of the followingqualities:1) Uncertainty,2) Urgency,3) The development of an emergency consensus,4) Expansion of the citizenship role,5) Convergence, and6) De-emphasis of contractual and impersonal relationshipsAs pointed out by Quarantelli (1981), realistic disaster planningrequires that plans be adjusted to people and not that people beforced to adjust to plans. Also, studies show that disasterpreparedness is most effective when officials view the planningactivities as an unending process, rather than equating them withthe drawing up or the production of written plans.Quarantelli emphasizes the distinction between Disaster Planningand Emergency Management, which he says differ in both contentand implementation. He describes Disaster Planning in terms ofthe general Strategy (in anticipation of an event), whereas theprinciples of Emergency Management have reference to the Tacticswhich need to be considered (in response to an event).22Foster (1980) provides some useful insight into the contextwithin which disaster planning takes place. He points out thatsocieties have evolved in a manner which allows them to operatewithin specific levels of tolerance for natural and man-madeevents. These levels of socially acceptable safety reflect suchfactors as past experience, needs, wants, and wealth of thesociety. While it is impossible to avoid all risk, and hazardscannot be eliminated, the limits of tolerance of every society tothe effects of such hazards can be increased, and, therefore, thepotential for disaster reduced.Although the question of what is a "socially acceptable" levelof safety (i.e., emergency preparedness) is largely a functionof the political will of government, which drives such activity,it must be acknowledged that there are many political andsociological factors which can limit the number of actualstrategies which can be applied by any society to reduce loses.Foster, citing Fischhoff et al (1978), lists seven suchconstraints as follows:1) The lack of sufficient knowledge to link causeswith effects,2) An unwillingness to forego associated benefits,3) A limited capacity to react,4) Divergence between perceived and actual risks,5) Conflicting goals,6) Institutional weaknesses, and7) The potential for new hazards.23Foster (1980) provides further insight into appropriate levelsof emergency preparedness in his chapter on Disaster Plans. Hepoints out that since the Galveston hurricane in 1900, in whichsix thousand people died, only four disasters in North Americahave resulted in over one thousand fatalities. More typically,major agents of destruction (earthquakes, floods, tornados, etc.)cause fewer than two hundred deaths and one thousand associatedcasualties, and it is this scale of emergency that a NorthAmerican disaster plan should seek to mitigate. He reasons that," ...although larger losses can almost always be postulated,consideration of more extreme circumstances can lead to theconclusion that they are too catastrophic to allow forrational planning, and that such thinking may lead to adangerous inertia on the part of local authorities".Tierney (1980) identifies four qualities that characterize a gooddisaster plan as follows:1) It is based on realistic expectations,2) It is brief and concise,3) It details a response that can be expanded by stages,calling up resources as needed and avoiding thepotentially disruptive effects of over-response andconvergence at the site, and4) Possesses an official stamp of authority24Dynes (1983) argues that in disasters the formal "command andcontrol" response model is inappropriate, and he suggests aninteresting alternative, which he calls an "emergent humanresources model". This model is based on the assumption that thelocal social system (in the community) is the logical and viablebase for emergency action, rather than that the local system mustbe held together by strengthened centralized control. Thus,those responsible for planning should:1) Utilize existing habit patterns as a basis for emergencyaction,2) Utilize existing social units, rather than create newad hoc ones,3) If outside resources are needed, employ resourcesthat are consistent with local socio-cultural practices,4) Utilize the existing authority structure, rather thancreating new ones,5) Utilize existing channels of communication and increasethem, rather than restrict and narrow them to "officialmessages",6) Recognize that the aim of any emergency planning is tomove back to "normal" as quickly as possible, and7) Not regard the recovery stage as the opportunity formassive (and directed) social change.Although these concepts are presented as overall planningprinciples, they are particularly appropriate in the context ofEmergency Social Services because of their emphasis on theutilization of existing social structures and behavior patterns.25This is consistent with the current Emergency Social Servicesmodel which is predicated on the active participation of existingcommunity-based human resources. However, because of the looseorganizational structure and high volunteer component, EmergencySocial Services are likely to be less effective, both in terms ofperception and fact, than Type 1 organizations (police, fire,etc.) and, therefore, requires careful planning and support inorder to meet the potential demands of a disaster situation.When considering the various prescriptions for disaster planningwhich have been offered in the literature, Drabek (1986) liststhe following eight points (based on Fisher, 1878) as being amongthe best:1) Plans must not be made in isolation by any oneservice - during the planning stage there must befrequent discussions between all services andorganizations likely to be involved in a jointintervention at a disaster.2) Planning can best be achieved by the establishmentof a joint services planning committee on which thefire, police, ambulance, hospital, and local authorityorganizations are represented.3) Plans must also link in with the plans of surroundingareas, especially in the field of casualty documentationand press liaison procedures.4) While incidents can cover a vast field, it is importantthat there should be only one overall general plan whichmust be kept simple, short, and concise.5) The major incident plan should be based on everydayworking methods and procedures.266) Plans must be kept flexible, thereby permitting asupervisory officer to readily adapt the basicprocedures to suit the incident at hand.7) Planning is a continuous process, and8) The personal name of the officer should not be mentionedin the plan, the official appointment (i.e., positiontitle involved) should be used instead.Significantly, although Item 1) of the Drabek/Fisher list refersto "all services and organizations likely to be involved", itshould be noted that Emergency Social Services is not mentioned,either by name, by service function, or by association with therole of community-based organizations in the overall disasterplanning. Similarly, Item 2) of the list stresses the importanceof the multi-services approach, involving a "joint servicesplanning committee", but uses only Type 1 organizations (i.e.,fire, police, etc.,) as examples of which agencies should berepresented on the proposed planning committee.272.2.2 EVACUATIONAlthough 'Evacuation', which is frequently associated withEmergency Social Services, is referenced more often than anyother subject heading in the index of the Drabek inventory, mostof the material relates to how individuals respond when they areordered to evacuate their homes, rather than how the emergencyresponse organizations themselves prepare for an evacuation inthe community.The initial pre-evacuation responses, which have been documentedover several years, are denial and disbelief, followed by variedforms of confirmation-seeking behavior (Drabek, 1986). Contraryto some of the popular disaster mythology identified by Wenger etal (1980), panic is infrequent and does not occur on a mass scale(Fritz, 1961; Quarantelli, 1976), and most persons respond in anadaptive, responsible manner (Singer, 1982).These statements are supported by research findings thatevacuation is almost always by family units, not solitaryindividuals (Dynes and Quarantelli, 1976), and that familieseither evacuate as units or otherwise account for missing membersbefore leaving home (Perry et al., 1981). This may, however,lead to further delay before actual evacuation can take place.28Perry et al. (1980) list three social variables related toevacuation performance, which have been suggested by the researchon natural hazards, as follows:1) The family context in which the warning is received,2) The network of kin relationships in which the familyis enmeshed, and3) The level of community involvement.Therefore, the various characteristics of the receiver of thewarning, and the context in which it is received, will affectevacuation behavior. If, for example, the warning is vague orlacks credibility, or if the individual, or family, does notperceive that a threat exists (either through lack of knowledgeor understanding), or if details of the emergency evacuationplans (if any) are not known or understood, it is less likelythat an evacuation will be deemed to be justified.Perry et al. identified three variables which are critical in theindividual's evacuation decision-making process:1) The definition of the threat as real, (the developmentof a belief in the warning),2) The level of perceived personal risk, (beliefs aboutthe personal consequences of the disaster impact), and3) The presence of an adaptive plan, (being acquaintedwith a means of protection, and the options available).29The research suggests that when there is adequate warning,approximately 50% of the threatened population will evacuate onreceipt of official advisories (Quarantelli, 1980; Perry et al.,1981). However, prior to the Mount St. Helens volcanic eruptionthe figure was considerably higher, and only 11% of the citizensat risk failed to evacuate. This high rate has been explained interms of the uniqueness of the disaster and the high level ofemergency preparedness in the affected communities (Perry, 1983).In the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, 39% of the totalpopulation evacuated, even though the evacuation advisory wasonly issued for pregnant women and young children. This highlevel of so-called "spontaneous" evacuation (i.e., populationmovement away from a threatened area before a full evacuationorder has been issued) appears to be related to the publicperception of a high personal risk associated with a nuclearaccident (Perry, 1983).It appears to be true that, when considering evacuation,"...threat is in the eye of the beholder...(and)...'correctness'of the perception is not the issue". (Drabek, 1986).302.2.3 EMERGENCY RECEPTION CENTRESThere is a clear preference on the part of evacuees to stay withrelatives or friends, if they live within a reasonable distanceof the disaster site and there is sufficient warning, rather thanseeking refuge in mass shelters (Perry et al., 1981). Thispreference was demonstrated during the Mississauga chlorine gasemergency in 1979, when most family units (84%) went to stay withrelatives and friends through private arrangements (Whyte, 1980).Similar figures, ranging from 74% to 81%, have been given byZeigler et al. (1981) in their review of studies related toevacuation resulting from nuclear technological disasters. Theynoted that the proportions exceed those which are characteristicof evacuations from natural disasters. This is probably relatedto the more widespread damage and disruption of normal services(telephones, etc.) associated with natural disasters. However,as pointed out by Drabek (1983), the preference pattern, infavour of staying with relatives or friends, has been documentedrepeatedly in both technological and natural disasters.It has been suggested that (in American society at least)families at the lower end of the socio-economic scale are morelikely to seek refuge in mass shelters, and that white collar andskilled trade workers, who tend to view the need to seek publicshelters as stigmatizing (Moore et al., 1963; Quarantelli, 1980).However, Drabek (1986) points out that this matter has not beenresearched with much precision, and multiple patterns can coexist31For example, although some demographic groups (e.g., the poor,the elderly, and ethnic minorities) are more likely to seekrefuge with relatives, they are also more likely to seek publicshelter than are evacuees with greater financial resources, whomay have the option of going to second homes or commercialaccommodation.The use of public shelters increases when:1) Community preparedness is high,2) Entire communities must be evacuated, and3) Evacuees anticipate that the necessary periodof absence will be long.However, even under these conditions, public shelters attractonly one fourth (25%) of the evacuees at a given site (Perry etal., 1981), and the more recent experience of the Edmontontornado suggests that the number may be closer to ten percent.These findings are significance because if public shelters(i.e., local authorities) had to take full responsibility for allfamilies evacuated, the task would be enormous (Drabek, 1986).322.2.4 PERSONAL SERVICESAlthough the Drabek inventory does not use the actual term'Personal Services', it does identify research findings undersuch related headings as, 'Psychological Impact', 'RefugeeBehaviour', and 'Counselling'. The research clearly demonstratesthat a key element in disaster planning is an awareness that thepsychological effects of a disaster may be felt for many months,or even years, after the event itself. For example, 570 (93%) ofthe survivors of the Buffalo Creek, West Virginia, flood in 1972were found to be suffering from an identifiable emotionaldisturbance 18 months after the event (Erikson, 1976).Laube and Murphy (1985) suggest that the following factors beused as a basis for an assessment of the degree of impact which adisaster has had on an individual:1) The magnitude of the loss2) Bereavement loss3) Property loss4) Threat of potential recurrence5) Control of future events, and6) Prior experience with negative events.When considering such factors, it should be noted that responseto loss is very subjective. The loss of personal items, such asfamily photographs, may be a source of great distress to theindividuals concerned, because they may have great sentimentalvalue, and may be irreplaceable.33As pointed out by Taylor (1983), in addition to victims who havebeen hurt physically, or who have incurred the loss of theirpossessions, there is a wide variety of what he refers to as"hidden victims". These victims can include the relatives andfriends of persons who have been killed or injured, and therescue workers themselves, who, although not directly involved,may also require psychological counselling as a result or theirexposure to the effects of a disaster. As will be discussed inthe case study, although counselling for victims of disasters isan important part of the Emergency Social Services mandate, theneed for such emotional support services is sometimes overlooked.342.3 CHAPTER SUMMARYThere are inherent difficulties in discussing those emergencyservices which in Canada are known collectively as EmergencySocial Services (ESS). Although there is a large body ofmaterial on many aspects of emergency planning, the term'Emergency Social Services' is not in common usage, and theliterature does not attempt to differentiate the organizationalrequirements for these services from those of other emergencyservices. On the contrary, it treats them as part of a totalresponse to the needs of an emergency situation.Three types of emergency literature are described: 1) Narrativedescriptions, or Popular literature, 2) Government and quasi-government agency reports, or Official literature, and, 3)Studies into the nature of disaster, or Professional/Scientificliterature. References in the chapter are primarily based onorganizational material from this latter type.The material demonstrates that there is a strong tendency toperceive established (formal) emergency response organizations(e.g., police, fire and ambulance services), which have clearlydefined tasks and carry out their regular tasks with their ownhighly trained personnel, as being more effective than volunteer(informal) groups with more general, open-ended, tasks and a muchlooser organizational structure (such as is the case with thevolunteer-based Emergency Social Services).35The authority structure which exists prior to a disaster formsthe foundation for the authority structure which prevails duringa disaster. Further, organizations tend to communicate morewithin their own groups than with other groups. These factorscan lead to conflicts and a lack of coordination between thedifferent response agencies.The consequence of this tendency of established response agenciesto focus on the specific tasks with which they are most familiar,together with the perceptual bias in favour of formal agencies,is that the contribution of volunteer-based groups in the overallemergency response process is deemed to be of lessor importanceand, therefore, does not merit the same attention and support.In terms of general planning principles, everyday measures usedfor ordinary emergencies cannot be extrapolated for use in majordisasters, due to the changed conditions in which the responsetakes place. Realistic disaster planning requires that plans beadjusted to people, rather than that people be forced to adjustto the plans. Emergency preparedness is most effective whenofficials view the planning activities as an unending process,rather than equating them with the preparation of written plans.Within emergency planning there are "socially acceptable" levelsof safety which reflect such factors as past experience, needs,wants, and the wealth of the society, but the limits of toleranceof every society to resist hazards can be increased. Theselevels are largely a function of political will, but there areother factors which limit such activity including, the lack of36sufficient knowledge to link causes with effects, divergencebetween perceived and actual risks, conflicting goals, andinstitutional weaknesses.Some of the qualities identified in the literature whichcharacterize good emergency planning principles are then listed.These should be based on the utilization of existing authorityand social structures, rather than attempting to introduce new orunfamiliar procedures or behavior patterns into situations whichare already filled with urgency and uncertainty. A common themeis that planning is a continuing process which must include allof the services and organizations likely to be involved.Finally, in order to provide a broader theoretical basis for theanalysis of the case study described in Chapter 6, the literatureis reviewed in terms of some key components of emergency planningwhich have a strong functional relationship to Emergency SocialServices - Evacuation, Emergency Reception Centres and PersonalServices (Counselling).37CHAPTER 3 - VOLUNTEERISM LITERATURE REVIEW3.1 INTRODUCTIONWhen considering the role of volunteers in the emergency planningprocess, it is necessary to differentiate between two distinctplanning concepts: 1) The need to anticipate and plan for theutilization of volunteers who offer their services after a majoremergency has occurred, and 2) The delegation of responsibilityfor the planning and delivery of those emergency services knownas Emergency Social Services, by government to the volunteer-sector of the community, which is the model espoused by theMinistry of Social Services in British Columbia.The emergency literature acknowledges the desirability ofplanning to utilize the services of volunteers after an emergencyevent. Quarantelli (1981) has found that the effectiveness ofcommunity disaster plans covaries with the degree to which theplanning anticipates the volunteer response, and integrates theminto the formal community system.However, in practice, there appears to be some difficulty inmatching this concept with established (formal) emergencyresponse organizational structures. As Drabek (1986) pointsout, when disaster strikes volunteers seem to "come out of thewoodwork", but their integration into the disaster responseremains problematic, as does also the specification of themechanism whereby the process might be facilitated. Clearly,38if insufficient consideration is given to the integration ofvolunteers into the overall emergency response, after the impactof the event, the convergence of well-intentioned but largelyuntrained and uncoordinated volunteers at the disaster site willadd to the inevitable confusion and uncertainty of the situation.As noted in Chapter 2, the concept of using the volunteer-sectorfor the planning and delivery of Emergency Social Services, whichis the major subject of this thesis, is not addressed in theemergency literature. Therefore, in order to establish a contextfor further analysis of the ESS model, which depends almostentirely on the participation of volunteer-based organizationsand individuals, this chapter will review the volunteerismliterature, with particular reference to the management ofvolunteer-based organizations.393.2 VOLUNTEERISM LITERATUREIn "The Effective Management of Volunteer Programs", Wilson(1976) quotes from "Management of Organizational Behavior:Utilizing Human Resources", (Hersey, 1972), in which the authorpoints out that:"The successful organization has one major attributethat sets it apart from unsuccessful organizations- dynamic and effective leadership,..." but that thereis "...a scarcity of people who are willing to assumesignificant leadership roles in our society, and (who)can get the job done effectively."Wilson argues that the need for effective leadership is evenmore important in volunteer organizations, and she poses thechallenging question:" ...why should this (leadership) be any less importantif our work forces are unpaid rather than paid, and ifour organizations are engaged in human services ratherthan industry?"Wilson also quotes Romney (1971) who argues that there is a needin every community to program for voluntary action by the people,not just government action for the people, and most importantly,that there is a need for the "organization of (such) voluntaryeffort".The author expresses the opinion that the probable explanationfor why many volunteers become disillusioned and "burn out", andwhy many volunteer programs experience difficulty, rests not with40the volunteers themselves but with the person directing thevolunteer program. However, she hastens to point out that thisis not because the Director lacks idealism or dedication, butrather that it is more likely the result of a failure of agencyadministration to appreciate the importance of the leadershiprole, and to provide the necessary support to ensure that theDirector is equipped to carry out his/her assigned tasks.In support of this position Wilson states:"How frequently is the job of Director of Volunteers(or Coordinator, Administrator, or Supervisor) regardedso lightly by social services agencies that it ishaphazardly delegated to any staff person who has somefree time? It is assumed that he or she will absorbthese new responsibilities on a part time basis, whilecontinuing other assignments."and"...it is not uncommon for the salary paid to thisperson to reflect the philosophy that the persondirecting volunteers should be willing to donate muchof the time to do (the job)."Some useful evaluative criteria for volunteer organizations aredeveloped in "The Successful Volunteer Organization" (Flanagan,1981) which is based on interviews with the founders of hundredsof the best nonprofit organizations in the United States andCanada. The interviewees were asked two key questions:"What would you tell someone starting a new organization?""What do you wish someone had told you when you werestarting?"41The results were quite consistent, and from the research materialthe author developed lists of things to do and not to do toestablish and maintain a successful volunteer organization.Success FactorsThe factors considered to contribute most to the success ofvolunteer organizations are:1) Clear goals.2) The will to succeed.3) Focus on a limited number of goals.4) Plan and timetable to reach goals.5) Tangible victories.6) Exciting programs.7) Fun.8) Strong board of directors.9) Dependable income.10) Up-to-date bookkeeping.Failure Factors The factors considered most likely to contribute to the failureof volunteer organizations are:1) Unclear or contradictory goals.2) Lack of the will to succeed.3) Conflict of interest.4) Boring programs.5) No plan or timetable to meet goals.6) Out-of-date or inaccurate bookkeeping.7) Too little money.8) Too many goals.9) Lack of dedicated leaders.10) Lack of paid staff.42Similarly, Fletcher (1.987) discusses nine 'keys' that make avolunteer programs work successfully, as follows:1) Good job design2) Staff commitment3) Well-planned recruitment4) Careful screening and selection5) Appropriate training6) Good supervision by staff7) Appropriate surveillance8) Adequate recognition and rewards9) Systematic evaluationIt should be noted that some of the factors considered necessaryfor the success of a volunteer organization are lacking in thepresent organizational structure of Emergency Social Services.For example, there is no strong, consistent and sustaineddirection and leadership (e.g., board of directors); it is notpossible to limit social services activities in emergencysituations to well defined, achievable, goals; it is difficult toidentify tangible victories; and there is no source of dependable(and adequate) income to support the volunteer-based activities.In addition, the present Emergency Social Services structureexhibits some of the factors considered likely to contribute tothe failure of a volunteer organization. For example, there aretoo many (open-ended) goals; there is no plan or timetable tomeet the goals; there is too little money; and, most importantly,there is no formalized management (paid staff) to coordinate suchvolunteer activity.43Fletcher (1987) observes that managers of volunteer programs dealwith many of the same issues as their counterparts in business orgovernment (worker motivation, selection of the right person forthe job, performance evaluation, etc.,) and that much of theliterature on these management functions can be directly appliedto their situation.However, The author goes on to point out that, in addition tothe conventional management issues, there are other issues whichvolunteer managers have to face which make their role even morechallenging, including the following:"...designing jobs that will attract volunteers, recruitingvolunteers in a society where the value of volunteerism forthe individual volunteer and the community is not wellunderstood, helping professional staff work with volunteers,providing appropriate rewards for workers who don't get a paycheque, saying 'no' to well-meaning but unqualified peoplewho don't understand why organizations can't use everyone whowants to volunteer."The author asserts that the new profession of volunteer programmanagement must face these issues, and more, in order to preservevolunteerism as a vital force in America.In addition to the services which volunteer programs providewithin the community, good volunteer programs also serve thevolunteers themselves by giving them the opportunity to make acontribution of time and energy to meaningful work, and to growin both interpersonal and technical skills.44In response to possible criticism regarding the use of businessmanagement techniques in the organization of the volunteer-basedactivities, Fletcher concludes by stating that:"Applying management techniques and professionalizingthe role of the volunteer program manager do not, as somehave feared, drive the human element out of volunteer work.On the contrary, they make it possible for that element tocontinue and grow as volunteer programs prosper."A recurring theme in all of the volunteer literature is the needfor good coordination and the management of volunteer activity.Indeed, there appears to be a basic assumption that effectivevolunteer organizations are part of an established organizationalframework; that their activities supplement services provided byprofessional personnel; and that the services provided byvolunteers are coordinated by management staff who provide thesupport necessary to sustain them.This suggests that the performance of any organization which isvolunteer-based but lacks such management and support, as is thecase with the present organizational structure of EmergencySocial Services in B.C., is most likely to fall short of itsobjectives, or may fail completely453.3 CHAPTER SUMMARYThis chapter reviews the volunteerism literature in order toestablish a context for further analysis of the ESS model and therole of volunteers in the emergency planning process. It statesthat it is necessary to differentiate between two distinctplanning concepts: 1) The need to anticipate and plan for theutilization of volunteers who offer their services after a majoremergency has occurred, and, 2) The delegation of responsibilityfor the planning and delivery of Emergency Social Services bygovernment to the volunteer-sector of the community, the modelespoused by the B.C. Ministry of Social Services.From the literature it is clear that a major attribute ofsuccessful organizations is dynamic and effective leadership.Effective leadership is no less important in organizations whichare volunteer-based simply because the "work force" is unpaid,or because the organizations are engaged in human servicesactivities rather than in business for government).The task of managing a volunteer program requires managementskills equal to, or perhaps even better than, the managementrequirements of business because volunteers do not have theconsistency of background and training which most organizationsrequire as a condition of employment, and because theirinvolvement is less formalized. The lack of effective leadershipand support by agency administration is cited as the probable46explanation for why many volunteers become disillusioned and"burn out", and why many volunteer programs experience difficultyand high turnover.The chapter lists the factors considered to contribute most tothe success of volunteer organizations, and contrasts these withthe factors considered most likely to contribute to the failureof such organizations. Analysis of this material demonstratesthat many of the factors necessary for the success of theEmergency Social Services model are missing right now, and that,in addition, some of the negative factors exist in the presentorganizational structure.There appears to be a basic assumption in the literature thateffective volunteer organizations are part of an establishedorganizational framework supported by management staff. Thissuggests that the performance of any organization which isvolunteer-based but lacks such management and support, as isthe case with the present organizational structure of EmergencySocial Services in B.C., will most likely fall short of itsobjectives, or may fail completely to meet the demands of a majoremergency or disaster.47CHAPTER 4 - EMERGENCY LEGISLATION AND AUTHORITIES4.1 FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEVELIn July 1988 the War Measures Act, which dated back to 1914, wasreplaced by the Emergencies Act. The obsolete legislation (whichachieved notoriety when it was invoked in 1970, in response tothe actions of separatists in Quebec) had been criticized because"...its scope was too broad and too sweeping...", and "...it gaveimmense power to the government without effectively guaranteeingthe rights of the individual..." (Janson, 1988).This new legislation gives the Federal Government the authorityto take prompt, but measured, action to deal with each of thefollowing four types of National Emergencies:1) Public Welfare Emergencies^2) Public Order Emergencies3) International Emergencies^4) War Emergencies.Unlike the War Measures Act, the Emergencies Act defines thelimits of this authority and requires the Government to answer toParliament for the use it makes of any special powers which itmay assume. The Act also limits the time that such powers can bein effect, and requires the Government to specify concisely:1) The state of affairs which constitutes the emergency,2) The special temporary measures which it anticipateswill be needed to deal with the emergency, and3) The area of Canada to which the direct effects of theemergency extend.48The Emergencies Act describes the four types of nationalemergencies which may necessitate the taking of such specialtemporary measures by the Government, which may not beappropriate in normal times, as follows:1) Public Welfare Emergency" ...an emergency that is caused by a real or imminent(a) fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake, or othernatural phenomenon,(b) disease in human beings, animals or plants,(c) accident or pollution, or(d) breakdown in the flow of essential goods, servicesor resources,and that results or may result in a danger to life orproperty, or social disruption, so serious as to be anational emergency."2) Public Order Emergency" ...an emergency that arises from threats to the securityof Canada and that is so serious as to be a nationalemergency."3) International Emergency" ...an emergency involving Canada and one or more othercountries that arises from acts of intimidation or coercionor the real or imminent use of serious force or violence andthat directly threatens the sovereignty of Canada or any ofits allies or any other country in which the political,economic or security interests of Canada or any of its alliesare involved."4) War Emergency"...war or other armed conflict, real or imminent, involvingCanada or any of its allies or any other country in which thepolitical, economic or security interests of Canada or any ofits allies are involved."49In such emergency situations, which may imperil the well-beingof Canada as a whole, the Emergencies Act, 1988, gives theFederal Government the authority to declare that one, or more, ofthe four types of national emergencies exists. Under the Act,the Federal Government is required to consult with the provincialgovernments concerned with respect to the proposed action beforedeclaring the state of emergency.However, in the event of International Emergencies or WarEmergencies, the Federal Government is only required to consultwith provincial governments "...to the extent that it isappropriate and practical to do so in the circumstances...", andit has the authority to act without prior consultation, althoughthe confirmation of the provinces concerned, and Parliament, isstill required after the state of emergency has been declared.A similar situation exists in the case of Public OrderEmergencies in which the Federal Government may again act withoutprior consultation with the provinces, if the emergency extendsto more than one province, and if the governments of the effectedprovinces cannot be adequately consulted without "...undulyjeopardizing the effectiveness of the proposed action...".However, if the effects of a Public Order Emergency are confinedto one province, the Federal Government cannot declare a state ofemergency unless the Provincial Government has indicated that theemergency exceeds its capacity or authority to deal with it.50In the case of Public Welfare Emergencies, which is the mostrelevant in the context of provincial Emergency Social Services,the Federal Government is not only required to consult with theprovincial governments before taking any action, but may notissue an emergency declaration in situations where the directeffects of the emergency are confined to, or occur principallyin, one province, unless, in the same way as with the PublicOrder Emergencies, requested to do so by the provincialgovernment concerned.In practice, it is unlikely that the Federal Government wouldexercise the powers given to it under the Emergencies Act, exceptin extreme circumstances, without prior consultation with theprovincial governments concerned. In emergency situationsconfined to a single province its role would be primarily one ofproviding support as requested by that provincial government, theassumption being that the response to an emergency should be atthe lowest appropriate level.It is interesting to note that, in contrast to the B.C. EmergencyProgram Act, 1979, which omits any such reference, the preambleto the federal Emergencies Act, 1988, describes as one of the"...fundamental obligations of government...(the)...safety andsecurity of the individual", which suggests that there is anacknowledgement, at least at the federal level, that emergencyplanning is an accepted function of government.51This position regarding the function of government is givenadded legitimacy by findings, noted by Drabek (1986), that:"...most citizens accept disaster planning as anappropriate and acceptable function of government."(Based on Turner et al., 1979; Perry and Greene, 1983),"People do see the prospect of an earthquake...(and,presumably, other major emergencies)...as requiringcollective rather than merely individual and familyaction." (Turner et al., 1979), and...they see government, especially local government, asthe appropriate agency for collective response." (Ibid).Although the new Emergencies Act an important step towards acomplete overhaul of emergency preparedness legislationthroughout Canada, as noted, the Federal Government has noauthority to act unilaterally in Public Welfare Emergencies, andthe onus of responsibility for updating the emergency legislationwhich applies at the community level rests with the respectiveprovincial governments.As discussed in the next section, although the existing emergencypreparedness legislation in British Columbia does not reflectcurrent attitudes towards emergency planning, and the ProvincialEmergency Program (PEP) has recommended that it be amended, thereappears to be reluctance on the part of the Provincial Governmentto match the positive emergency preparedness initiative taken byits federal counterpart.524.2 PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT LEVELAs noted in the Evaluation Study of the Provincial EmergencyProgram (PEP), prepared in 1987, "There is an obvious and urgentneed to review and amend provincial legislation for emergencyplanning and response". In fact, the principal piece of relevantlegislation in British Columbia, the Emergency Program Act, 1979,is substantially the same as the legislation which it replaced,the Civil Defence Act, which was enacted in 1951.In 1960 the Civil Defence Act was reprinted. It is this version,virtually the same as the original Act, which is cited in thesubsequent legislation. In 1973, the name of the Civil DefenceAct, 1960, was changed to the Emergency Program Act.The Emergency Program Act, 1979, must be read with other relatedlegislation (listed in Index of Current B.C. Regulations, 1958-1992) which together make up the total Act. For example, threeof the regulations attached to the original Civil Defence Act,1951, are still in effect and form part of the present EmergencyProgram Act, 1979. These are as follows:B.C. Reg. 465/59 (Regulation No. 1) - states that localmunicipalities may "...organize, establish, and put intooperation any plan or scheme for civil defence...".B.C. Reg. 467/59 (Regulation No. 3) - states that theAdvisory Council shall "...prepare a comprehensive plan andprogram for civil defence of the province...".B.C. Reg. 472/59 (Regulation No. 8) - states that "...allDepartments of Government are required to...appoint a seniorofficial to act as Civil Defence Officer...with a view to theintegration of civil defence...".53Both the original Civil Defence Act, 1951, and the more recentEmergency Program Act, 1979, define "civil defence" as including:” ...planning...vital and necessary for the public welfarefor meeting, preventing, reducing and overcoming the effectsof enemy action or civil disaster...".Similarly, the preamble to the Civil Defence Act, 1951 and 1960versions, (which was delete in 1973, and does not form part ofthe present Emergency Program Act, 1979) points out the need:...generally to make provision for the common defence andthe protection of the public peace, health, and safety...".The above references suggest that, although the originallegislation was concerned primarily with preparedness for wartimeemergencies, and did not refer specifically to other types ofmajor emergency or disaster situations (e.g., Earthquakes,floods, or toxic chemical accidents), the response proceduresenvisaged for use in times of war were considered sufficient tomeet the needs of the civil population in peacetime emergenciesas well.In either case it seems clear that the intent of the originallegislation was not limited merely to providing the legalauthority for Municipal Governments to plan for such emergenciesor disasters, but that there was an inherent responsibility ofgovernment in general, to anticipate the threat and to carry outsuch planning.54The B.C. Emergency Program Act, 1979, unlike the federalEmergencies Act, 1988, makes no reference to the "fundamentalobligations of government". It does, however, describe thepowers of the Provincial Government in emergency planningmatters. In particular it states that the Lieutenant Governorin Council (i.e., The Cabinet) may:"...take any measures which he thinks proper...for anyaction concerning civil defence or disaster;"" ...prepare a comprehensive plan and program for civildefence of the Province,"" ...authorize the council of any municipality ...to...organize, establish and put into operation a plan orscheme for civil defence;"" ...make orders, rules and regulations necessary oradvisable to protect the health and welfare of the public."Clearly, the Provincial Government has the authority to carryout emergency planning, but, because much of the legislation isinconsistent, and frequently uses the word "may", rather than"shall", the obligation of the Government to do so has beeninterpreted as discretionary, rather than mandatory. However,the original intent of the legislation must, surely, have beento establish an effective emergency response capability withoutresorting to the use of mandatory language.55As noted, the Emergency Program Act, 1979, has several pieces ofrelated legislation attached to it, carried over from the CivilDefence Act, 1960. In the context of Emergency Social Services,the most important of these is B.C. Regulation 92/66 which again,like the earlier legislation, reflects the major emphasis onwartime situations, and the necessity and advisability of:"...meeting disasters or emergencies from, inter alia,enemy attack, sabotage, or other hostile action and, inparticular, to make regulations as part of the comprehensiveplan and programme for civil defence of the Province."However, it also states that it is advisable to:"...make provisions for the continued functioning of civilgovernment in British Columbia during an emergency causedby real or apprehended war, invasion, or insurrection orby natural causes."and to:"...provide authority for each Provincial Minister to makeplans within his department in peacetime, and to provide forassistance to municipalities, as necessary, to help ensurethe execution of responsibilities in wartime."The wording of this piece of legislation is most significantbecause it indicates the beginning of an attitudinal shift awayfrom the predominant emphasis on having a response capability forwartime emergencies, and towards an acceptance that emergencypreparedness is "necessary and advisable" in order to be able torespond to the wide range of civil emergencies which can occur inpeacetime, which is the predominant view in today's society.56As noted above, under the B.C. Emergency Program Act, 1979,municipal governments have been granted the authority by theProvincial Government to carry out emergency planning, but thereis nothing to ensure that this authority is exercised. Becausethe current legislation does not make it mandatory for anyemergency planning to take place, the decision as to whether ornot to plan for major emergencies, and if so, to what level ofpreparedness, is left solely to the discretion of the individualmunicipalities.574.2.1 THE MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SERVICES The principal piece of legislation governing the normalactivities of the Ministry of Social Services is the GuaranteedAvailable Income for Need (GAIN) Act, 1979. The Act describestwo basic services provided by the Ministry: Social Services andIncome Assistance.Social Services are interpreted as:" ...services or organized activities, provided to or onbehalf of individuals or families or the communities in whichthey live, that are necessary for the purpose of facilitatingaccess to the necessities of life, maintaining or improvingemployability or improving social functioning of individualsand families and, in particular, ...social services having astheir object the lessoning, removal or prevention of thecauses and effects of poverty, child neglect and suffering".Income Assistance means financial assistance, or assistance inkind, given to individuals or agencies for the purpose ofrelieving such "poverty, neglect or suffering".The wording of the GAIN Act indicates that its primary intent isto serve the needs of the "destitute and poor", which is a majormandate of the Ministry. Services to such individuals andfamilies are conditional, and require that the need be testedagainst minimum income and employment criteria. Although some ofthe services provided under the Act are the same as EmergencySocial Services (e.g., emergency food, clothing and shelter), thestrict interpretation of the formal requirements of the Act is58clearly inappropriate when dealing with large numbers of disastervictims. This distinction has been recognized by the Ministry ofSocial Services in its ESS Policies and Procedures guide (MSS,1991) which states:"Emergency Social Services is not a GAIN program. UnlikeIncome Assistance, Emergency Social Services is not needstested."and"There are no firm limits on ESS expenditures. Discretion isbuilt into the program to give ESS personnel flexibility torespond to needs."As noted in the previous section, the Emergency Program Act,1979, includes B.C. Reg. 92/66 (Order in Council No. 1067, withreference to the Civil Defence Act). Section 6 of the Regulationcontains a schedule which describes the duties, powers, andfunctions of fifteen provincial government departments andagencies and states that:"Each Minister...who is listed in the Schedule shall...make such preparations as are required to enable him toexercise and perform the civil emergency powers, duties,and functions set out opposite his name in the Schedule..."The responsibilities of the Minister (i.e., the Ministry)of Social Welfare (subsequently renamed the Ministry of SocialServices and Housing, and most recently, the Ministry of SocialServices) are described in Item 13, Subsection 1 of the Schedulewhich states the following:59"(1) To provide, where required in British Columbia,measures for feeding, clothing, housing, or lodging inprivate or congregational facilities; registration andinformation - locating and reuniting of families; careof unaccompanied children, the aged, the handicapped,and other groups needing specialized care and services;necessary financial assistance or assistance in kind;counselling and referral services to families andindividuals; to aid welfare institutions and all otherfeasible welfare aid and services to people in needduring a civil emergency."Item 13, Subsection 6 of the Schedule states that the Minister isalso responsible for the following:"(6) To provide assistance to municipal governments inthe planning and operation of emergency welfare servicesconsisting of emergency feeding, clothing, lodging,registration and inquiry, and personal services..."The current position of the Ministry of Social Services, asstated to the writer by the MSS Manager for Emergency SocialServices, is that the legislation has been interpreted to meanthat the Ministry is not required directly to plan for ESS formunicipalities, and is only responsible for the delivery of ESSin extreme circumstances when a provincial emergency has beendeclared. It perceives its role to be limited to organizing andoperating Financial Services and to "providing assistance" tomunicipal governments, the assumption being that the localmunicipalities are responsible for providing those services knownas Emergency Social Services as part of their responsibilitiesunder the Municipal Act.60Consequently, the Ministry has encouraged the municipalities toassume responsibility for the development of Emergency SocialServices, and to establish and maintain community-based ESS teamsto provide these expanded emergency response services in times ofmajor emergency.The recently published ESS Policies and Procedures Guide (MSS,1991) confirms the Ministry's position, stating that:"In. British Columbia, municipalities are responsible forproviding Emergency Social Services.""Under the Provincial Emergency Program legislation, theMinistry of Social Services is responsible for helpingmunicipalities plan and operate their Emergency SocialServices.""In addition, the Ministry has assumed responsibility fororganizing and operating the financial services componentof municipal ESS plans."It should be noted that this interpretation of the legislation isat variance with the perception of some municipal officials whoview the Ministry of Social Services as having the legislativeresponsibility for ensuring that Emergency Social Services areprovided. However, there appears to be general agreement thatthe most effective means of achieving this objective is throughthe cooperation of the municipal governments, acting as "agents"of the Ministry, representing the Provincial Government (see alsoSection 4.3 - Municipal Government Level below).61The Ministry of Social Services provides some support tomunicipalities in the form of training to help them to developtheir ESS plans, but this assistance is limited by the lack offunding for such activities. However, the Ministry has recentlyconcluded an agreement with the PEP Academy, at the JusticeInstitute of B.C. to expanded its training program to includecourses designed for ESS volunteers.624.2.2 THE PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY PROGRAMThe Provincial Emergency Program (PEP) is a government agencywhich acts as the administrative link between the ProvincialGovernment, the municipalities, and unincorporated communitiesthroughout British Columbia. The Director of PEP reports to theAssistant Deputy Minister, Police Services Branch, the Ministryof the Attorney General.The mandate of the Provincial Emergency Program is:...to maintain and enhance effective emergency preparedness,response and recovery programs to mitigate human sufferingand property loss caused by emergencies and disasters inBritish Columbia" (PEP, 1991/92).However, it should be noted that PEP does not have the legalauthority, or mandate, to require municipalities to do anything,and its role, therefore, is limited to providing advice andassistance to the Regional and Municipal governments to developtheir own emergency response plans. In support of the overallobjectives of the program, the Justice Institute of B.C. providesspecialized emergency preparedness training to staff and electedofficials in various ministries, municipalities, regionaldistricts, and to volunteer groups, particularly in the area ofSearch and Rescue.For administrative purposes PEP has divided the Province intonine zones, in accordance with the RCMP subdivisions. Each zonehas its own Zone Manager who reports to the Manager Plans and63Operations at PEP Headquarters in Victoria. The PEP zonesincorporates between three to five regional districts, each ofwhich includes from eleven to twenty four municipalities.However, the PEP zone boundaries do not coincide with theboundaries of the regional districts, and in six of the twentyeight regional districts some municipalities within the sameregional district are assigned to different PEP zones. Forexample, as will be discussed in the case study, the RegionalDistrict of Nanaimo includes the City of Nanaimo which is in thePEP Victoria Zone #1, and the City of Parksville and the Town ofQualicum Beach which are in the PEP Courtenay Zone #2.To illustrate further the variation which can occur within asingle zone, PEP Kamloops Zone #6 includes four regionaldistricts, the distribution of which is as follows:Squamish-Lillooet - includes four municipalities,three of which are in PEP Zone #3Thompson-Nicola^- includes eight municipalities,all of which are in PEP Zone #6Cariboo^- includes three municipalities,one of which is in PEP Zone #8Fraser-Fort George - includes four municipalities,three of which are in PEP Zone #8.Clearly, there is the potential for jurisdictional problems invarious parts of the Province in the event that a large-scaleemergency situation, extending over a wide geographic area,necessitated a coordinated, inter-municipal, response.644.3 MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT LEVELMunicipalities have been described as being "...agents of theprovincial governments..." (Rogers, 1959). If we accept thisinterpretation, the primary responsibility for ensuring that theprovince is adequately prepared to respond to disaster situationswould appear to remain with the delegating authority (i.e., TheProvincial Government), and the various municipal governments are" ...merely instruments of the State for more convenientadministration of local government" (Ibid).However, as noted, under B.C. Regulation 465/59 (Reg. No.1 of theCivil Defence Act, 1951), the Provincial Government not only hasthe authority to take any measures thought proper concerningcivil defence and disaster, but it may also authorize localgovernments to carry out emergency planning (because it is moreconvenient administratively). The Regulation states that:"The Council of any municipality may, by resolution orby-law, ...organize, establish, and put into operationany plan or scheme for civil defence..."In addition, the Municipal Act, 1979, elaborates on the authorityof the municipalities to act in emergency situations.Section 287 gives councils, the authority to assume otherincidental powers:" ...to do anything incidental or conducive to the exercise ofan allotted power."65Section 289 makes it clear that the Provincial Government, at therequest of a municipal council, may:"...confer further powers to .the council necessary topreserve and promote the peace, order and good governmentof the municipality and the health, safety, morality andwelfare of the inhabitants, and to provide for the protectionof persons and property."Further, where the powers conferred on a municipal council areinadequate to deal with an emergency, Section 290 of theMunicipal Act states that:"...the council may, by bylaw adopted by a vote of at least2/3 of the council members, declare that an emergency exists,and exercise powers necessary to deal effectively with theemergency."The use of the word "may" in all of the above legislationsuggests that the local emergency planning is not mandatory, andit appears to leave the decision (of whether local governmentsshould, or should not, implement planning for civil disasters) tothe discretion of the individual municipal councils.Because there is no clearly stated directive from the ProvincialGovernment requiring municipalities to plan for emergencies, theextent to which municipal governments are indeed responsible foremergency planning is still unclear. Although, as discussed inthe next section, some grant funding is available through PEP,the amount is limited and falls short of the emergency planningneeds of the municipalities.66A major recommendation of the Provincial Emergency ProgramEvaluation Study (PEP, 1987) was that:"Provincial legislation should require municipalities to planfor, and respond to, emergencies which occur within theirgeographic jurisdiction",and that it should:" ...provide for a tiered responsibility for planningand response to emergencies, beginning at the municipallevel...and escalating up to...the all encompassingprovincial jurisdiction."To date, the PEP recommendation have not been formally acceptedby the Provincial Government (although recommended changes to thelegislation have been drafted) and the obsolete legislationremains in effect.674.3.1 MUNICIPAL GRANTS Under Section 4(k) of the Emergency Program Act, 1979, theProvincial Government is authorized to "...make grants tomunicipalities for civil defence". The total amount budgetedeach year for these municipal grants is determined by theProvincial Government, through the Ministry of the AttorneyGeneral, but the amount of funding allocated to individualmunicipalities is determined by the Provincial Emergency Program(PEP), which administers the grant program.In order to receive grant funding a municipality must submit anapplication to PEP affirming that certain conditions related totheir state of preparedness have been met, and that the grantreceived will be expended for the purpose of emergencyprograming.There is an element of discretion regarding the allocations ofthe grant funding, but in principle the maximum grant which amunicipality may receive is established by the use of a formula,which takes two primary factors into account: 1) the land area(hectares) of the municipality, and 2) the population of themunicipality. These factors are combined to establish a relativeweight, or value, for each municipality. This relative weightis then used to allocate an appropriate proportion of the totalfunding budgeted by the Provincial Government for emergencyplanning province-wide to the individual municipalities.68If a municipality has failed to meet any of the conditionsimposed under the funding program, the amount of the grant isreduced proportionally, as follows:1) 100% reduction if the municipality does not havean emergency bylaw or resolution,2) 100% reduction if the municipality does not havean Area Coordinator,3) 25% reduction if the municipality does not havean active emergency committee, with the Mayor andat least one alderman as members, and4) 25% reduction if the municipality does not havean emergency plan, which has been updated andexercised during the previous 24 months.In addition to the above, there is a further non-compliancepenalty which has recently been introduced by PEP. This reducesthe maximum grant by 50% if the municipality fails to assist theDirector, or other public officers of PEP, in response to a realor imminent emergency which threatens life, health, or welfare,regardless of municipal boundaries.Clearly, each of the factors listed above contributes to theoverall preparedness of a municipality. For example, if amunicipality has not enacted a bylaw, or adopted a resolution,permitting it to put into operation a plan for civil defence(as it is authorized to do under B.C. Regulation 465/59 of theEmergency Program Act, 1979), or if it has not appointed a personto the position of Area Coordinator, its ability to respond to amajor emergency or disaster situation will be severely limited.69Similarly, although emergency planning is primarily concernedwith ensuring a coordinated response to the needs of a situation,rather than the mere preparation of a 'written' plan, there isalso a need for a document which identifies who is responsible,and describes the emergency response procedures which have beendeveloped by the emergency planning committee.However, it should be noted that, although the emergency plan ofeach municipality is subject to review by PEP, there is no formalprocedure for evaluating the adequacy of the individual plans,and no mechanism for ensuring that the grant is actually used foremergency programing, rather than being absorbed into generalrevenue. The onus of responsibility rests with the municipalityconcerned, which is required to certify that all the necessaryconditions of the grant application have been met, including(presumably) the adequacy of the emergency plan itself.The actual funding is insufficient to meet the emergencyprograming needs of the municipalities, particularly those withlarge urban populations, which finance their emergency programs,primarily, from local tax revenue. However, the grant isgenerally regarded as a modest incentive for a municipality tohire an Area Coordinator who, in consequence, is often referredto as the "PEP" Area Coordinator, although the grant only pays asmall part of the cost of such a position. Some municipalitieshave cost-sharing agreements with neighbouring municipalities tofinance the services of a joint Area Coordinator, who, in suchcases, may be responsibility for two or more municipalities.70Until quite recently there was no reference in the PEP grantcriteria to Emergency Social Service, in spite of its importancein the overall disaster response capability of a municipality.This deficiency has been corrected since this thesis was started,and the requirement that an ESS Director be appointed has beenadded to the list of conditions which must be met in order toreceive the full municipal grant. As will be discussed furtherin Chapter 7, this is a significant move toward a greaterrecognition of the need to integrate Emergency Social Serviceinto the mainstream of emergency preparedness, but in the contextof municipal grants, the same financial constraints continue tolimit the emergency planning process.714.3.2 REGIONAL DISTRICTSIn 1983 the Provincial Government enacted the Municipal AmendmentAct, which repealed sections of the Municipal Act, 1979,concerning the authority of the regional districts to prepareregional plans. Although the previous legislation was primarilydirected towards land-use planning, and emergency planning wasnot specifically mentioned, these changes have been interpretedas being inclusive, and have effectively removed the option (orat least have acted as a disincentive) for regional districts todevelop emergency plans on behalf of the municipalities withintheir geographic jurisdiction.However, prior to the changes in the legislation, four of thetwenty-eight regional districts, (Central Coast, Central FraserValley, North Okanagan, and the Sunshine Coast), had already beenauthorized to prepare their emergency response on a multi-municipal basis, and this atypical situation remains in place.Because major emergencies or disasters are not limited bymunicipal boundaries, and can extend over a wide geographic area,there would seem to be some advantages to emergency planningbeing carried out at the regional district level. However, thetheoretical benefits of the economies of scale would have to beweighed against the practical difficulties of coordinating theactivities of the various municipal governments concerned.72As pointed out in the Evaluation Study of the ProvincialEmergency Program (PEP, 1987), "Some municipalities are opposedto the concept of regional district planning and response due totheir dissatisfaction with regional government on other issues".Given this attitude, if the concept of emergency planning at theregional district level were to be reintroduced, the cooperation,which is an essential part of such an approach, may be lacking.In addition, there could problems of jurisdiction, especially inthose municipalities in which key personnel are already in place,and "ownership" of specific courses of action has already beenestablished.Although PEP is recommending legislation which "...should requiremunicipalities to plan for and respond to emergencies which occurwithin their geographic jurisdictions", this does not precludethe option of emergency planning at the regional district level,if so desired by the municipalities concerned, and PEP supportsthe introduction of permissive legislation in this area.734.4 CHAPTER SUMMARYThis chapter reviews the principal pieces of legislationgoverning emergency planning at the Federal, Provincial, andMunicipal levels, to provide an overview of the context in whichsuch planning activity takes place in British Columbia,particularly planning for Emergency Social Services.The key features of the Federal Emergencies Act, introduced in1988, are reviewed. This legislation replaced the controversialand obsolete War Measures Act, enacted during World War I. Thisnew legislation gives the Federal Government the authority todeclare that one, or more, of four types of National Emergencies(Public Welfare, Public Order, International, and War) are ineffect, and to take special measures, for limited periods oftime, to deal with the situation. The Act requires theGovernment to specify the nature of the emergency situation, themeasures proposed, and the area of Canada affected by theproposed measures.In Public Order, International, and War Emergencies, the FederalGovernment may, in extreme circumstances, act unilaterally,without prior consultation with the provincial government(s)concerned. In the case of Public Welfare Emergencies (the typemost relevant to provincial Emergency Social Services), however,the Emergencies Act prohibits the Federal Government from takingaction in situations where the direct effects of an emergency areconfined to, or occur principally in, one province, unlessrequested to do so by the provincial government concerned.74The wording of the Emergencies Act, and the very fact thatthis new legislation has been introduced, demonstrates thatthe Federal Government has accepted that emergency planning is"an appropriate and acceptable function of government" (Turneret al., 1979). This position is consistent with the findings inthe emergency literature, discussed in Chapter 2.In contrast, the principal piece of emergency legislation inBritish Columbia, the Emergency program Act, 1979, is based onthe Civil Defence Act, enacted in 1951, which is predominantlyconcerned with planning for wartime emergencies. However, someof the more recent associated legislation reflects an attitudinalshift towards a greater acceptance that emergency planning is"necessary and advisable" in order to be able to respond to awider range of emergencies which occur in peacetime.The existing legislation in British Columbia is inconsistent, anduses discretionary, rather than mandatory, language, which hasled to confusion at both the provincial and local governmentlevels. Although the Provincial Emergency Program hasrecommended that the legislation be amended, there appears to bereluctance on the part of the Provincial Government to match thepositive emergency preparedness initiative taken by its federalcounterpart.The portions of the legislation governing the role of theMinistry of Social Services are then addressed. The wording ofthe legislation suggests that the Ministry is responsible forproviding those services now known as Emergency Social Services.75However, the Ministry has interpreted the legislation to meanthat it has responsibility only in extreme circumstances when aprovincial emergency is declared. It perceives its role to belimited to organizing and operating Financial Services and to"providing assistance" to municipalities to plan for the deliveryof Emergency Social Services. This perception of the role of theMinistry is not shared by some municipal officials who view theMinistry of Social Services as having the primary legislativeresponsibility for ensuring that Emergency Social Services areprovided through the municipalities.Although the mandate of the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP)is, "...to maintain and enhance effective emergency preparedness,response and recovery programs...", PEP does not have the legalauthority to require municipalities to plan for emergencies. Itscontribution at the local level is limited to providing adviceand assistance to the Regional and Municipal governments todevelop their own emergency response plans.The municipal governments function as "agents of the provincialgovernments", and although they have been granted the authorityto carry out emergency planning, there is no mandatoryrequirement for them to do so. Therefore, the extent to whichmunicipal governments are responsible for emergency preparednessat the local level is unclear.Municipal grant funding provided through the Provincial EmergencyProgram is extremely limited and is generally regarded as amodest incentive for a municipality to hire an Area Coordinator.76Although a municipality must meet certain conditions related toits state of preparedness in order to receive a grant, there isno formal procedure for evaluating the adequacy of the individualplans, and no mechanism for ensuring that the grant is actuallyused for emergency programing - the onus of responsibility havingbeen left to the municipality concerned.The authority of the regional districts to prepare regional planswas removed by the Municipal Amendment Act, enacted in 1983.Although the previous legislation was primarily directed towardsland-use planning, and emergency planning was not specificallymentioned, these changes have been interpreted as beinginclusive. This has effectively removed the option for at leasthas acted as a disincentive) for regional districts to developemergency plans for the municipalities within their geographicjurisdiction. However, current legislation does not preclude theoption of emergency planning by the regional districts, if sodesired by the municipalities concerned, and PEP supports theintroduction of permissive legislation in this area.77CHAPTER 5 - EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICES5.1 INTRODUCTIONThe Emergency Social Services (ESS) model, espoused by theB.C. Ministry of Social Services, and at the federal levelby Health and Welfare Canada (through the Canadian EmergencyPreparedness College, at Arnprior, Ontario), is designed tosupplement the established emergency response agencies, and toexpand the emergency response capability of each municipality,when the regular services have been, or are likely to be,exceeded. The intent is to provide those services which areessential for the survival and wellbeing of all persons affectedby an emergency, both evacuees and relief workers, whose accessto the necessities of life has been disrupted by the event.These 'Emergency Social Services' are as follows:1) Food Service2) Clothing Service3) Lodging Service4) Registration and Inquiry (R & I) Service5) Personal Services (e.g., counselling) and6) Financial Services.The model is predicated on the pre-planned involvement ofestablished community-based service organizations (e.g., TheSalvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross Society) which alreadyhave organizational structures in place, together with individualvolunteers, to provide these Emergency Social Services as part ofan integrated response to the needs of an emergency.78It should be noted that in the context of Emergency SocialServices, the word 'evacuee' has a very broad interpretation, andis applied not only to residents of an affected community, whohave been forced to leave their homes, but also to any person inneed within a community at the time of the disaster, or who maybe evacuated to the area from an adjacent community which hasitself been affected by the disaster.Also, it should be noted that the role of the Canadian Red CrossSociety, unlike its counterpart in the United States which has amuch broader mandate, is limited to providing Registration andInquiry (R & I) services. As discussed in Chapter 2, theemergency literature reflects the more integrated emergencyplanning model used in the United States, where the American RedCross Society is the formal agency with the mandate to provideEmergency Social Services (although not referred to as such) asan integral part of the overall emergency planning and responseprocess in that country.795.2 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTUREWhen viewed in terms of the four-fold typology for disasterorganizations, described in Chapter 2, Emergency Social Servicesis an ill-defined hybrid, which does not fit neatly into any oneof the basic organizational groups, but which includes elementsof all four. For example, the prevailing ESS model in BritishColumbia includes the involvement of the following organizations:Type 1 The Ministry of Social Services (albeit limited to theemergency Financial Services aspects of disaster response) - anestablished organization carrying out its regular social servicesfunction with its own personnel.Type 2 The Canadian Red Cross Society and the Salvation Army -organizations which expand their operations by the use of trainedor semi-trained volunteers, but which continue to carry out theirregular tasks (providing Registration and Inquiry services, andPersonal Services such as counselling, respectively).Type 3 Local amateur radio clubs - organizations whichextend their regular activities to provide technical equipmentand specialized expertise to meet the need for non-regularcommunications, particularly between the ESS Headquarters andthe Emergency Reception Centres.Type 4 Ad hoc response groups within the overall EmergencySocial Services domain - emergent groups, with very limitedorganizational structure, carrying out non-regular tasks, forwhich they are largely untrained.80The consequence of this intra-organizational diversity is thatthe coordination of the delivery of Emergency Social Servicesrequires particular attention and management if the variouscomponent groups are to work effectively with each other, andwith the other established emergency response agencies.The procedure for setting up an Emergency Social Servicesorganization for a community is that the Area Coordinator,sometimes at the recommendation of the Ministry of SocialServices, appoints an individual to serve as the ESS Director.The ESS Director is then responsible for recruiting one or moreDeputies, and for finding Coordinators for each of the services(Food, Clothing, Lodging, etc.,) within the overall ESS Plan.The Coordinators are then responsible for finding Supervisors fortheir respective services and for the establishment of sub-teamsof volunteers who would be contacted in the event of a majoremergency.Although Emergency Social Services is frequently associatedwith large numbers of evacuees, and the subsequent setting upof Emergency Reception Centres, these are not conditionalrequirements for such services. However, the prevailing ESSmodel is largely predicated on the assumption that EmergencyReception Centres will be opened and staffed by ESS personnel.The Emergency Reception Centre is viewed as a safe, temporary,refuge where the needs of evacuees can be assessed and assistancecan be provided, either directly at the Reception Centre or byfacilitating access to services at other locations.81Under the model, the volunteers are coordinated by the ESSSupervisors for each of the services, who in turn report to theirrespective ESS Coordinators, located at the ESS Headquarters.Each Emergency Reception Centre is operated by its own Manager,usually a staff person familiar with the functional operation ofthe facility (e.g., Building Engineer), whose responsibility isto ensure the smooth running of the facility itself, but not thedelivery of the emergency services provided within the facility.For maximum flexibility, Emergency Reception Centres (typicallyhigh schools, or recreation centres) should have good washroomand kitchen facilities, large-scale general assembly areas, andmultiple ancillary rooms for small-scale activities - child-care,counselling, etc. However, as part of the planning process, eachof these facilities should be assessed, not only in terms of itsphysical suitability for use in possible disaster situations, butalso in terms of its structural ability to withstand the effectsof a massive earthquake, although this would not be a factor inemergencies such as a flooding or hazardous chemical spills.825.3 EMERGENCY FOOD SERVICEThe intent of the Food Service is to supply food to all personsin need following a major emergency or disaster. The service isdesigned to be simple but adequate to meet the basic nutritionalneeds of those served. The service includes arranging for theacquisition, preparation, and the distribution of food andbeverages, to both evacuees and relief workers, as necessary,for the duration of the emergency.Wherever possible, existing retail food outlets will be usedto meet the major feeding requirements. Generally, in order tofacilitate the process of feeding large numbers of people, thepreparation and cooking of the food is kept to a minimum, andpre-packaged foods will be used (e.g., pre-cooked, canned, ordehydrated products), particularly such items as infant formula,baby food, and food for persons with special dietary needs.The Food Service would operate, primarily, from the EmergencyReception Centres, but it may also be required at temporaryStaging Areas (where evacuees can assemble immediately after thefirst impact of a disaster), or directly at the disaster site(s)themselves, in which case it may be more practical and expedientto serve the evacuees and/or relief workers from mobile units.835.4 EMERGENCY CLOTHING SERVICEThe primary purpose of the Clothing Service is to make provisionfor the acquisition and distribution of emergency covering(blankets, footwear, etc.) and/or basic clothing to evacuees andothers in immediate danger, to protect them from the effects ofshock, and exposure to cold (hypothermia). However, it alsoserves to assist evacuees to maintain their dignity, self-reliance, and ability to take care of themselves, thus reducingthe time that they will be dependent on the service.Wherever possible, the supply of clothing will be obtained fromnew clothing distributors (department stores, etc.), rather thanas a result of media appeals for clothing from the generalpublic, thus ensuring that the clothing is clean, and identifiedby size.It should be noted that following the Edmonton tornado in 1986,the response from the public was such that the relief agencieswere overwhelmed by massive donations of clothing and food (muchof which was perishable) which put an excessive, and unnecessary,strain on the relief workers, who were required to unpack andsort each box to determine the nature and useability of thecontents. Indeed, a large quantity of the material donated wasnot used during the disaster, and had to be stored for aconsiderable time after the event.845.5 EMERGENCY LODGING SERVICEThe intent of the Lodging Service is to provide temporary shelterfor persons who have been displaced, or have nowhere to stay, asa result of a disaster. Again, this could apply to bothevacuees, and relief workers who need to rest between shifts.The demand on the Lodging Service is likely to be less than theactual total of persons displaced by a disaster. The experienceof the Edmonton tornado suggests that only about ten percent ofevacuees will go to Emergency Reception Centres, even forRegistration and Inquiry purposes which are described below.However, the destruction caused by the tornado was limited toonly parts of the suburbs of Edmonton, and it would be unwise todiscounted the need to provide emergency shelter for largenumbers of people in a more severe and more widely spreaddisaster, such as a major earthquake in a highly populated area.There is some conceptual ambivalence within the Emergency SocialServices community regarding whether or not Emergency ReceptionCentres should be thought of as lodging facilities. However,because evacuees may arrive at any time, day or night, and mayresist further relocation, there would seem to be a definite needto provide some form of short-term lodging (at least for thefirst twenty-four hours) at the Emergency Reception Centresthemselves, after which time longer-term accommodation may bearranged elsewhere. However, the possibility of a prolonged stayat the Emergency Reception Centres should not be discounted.(Procedures Manual, Disaster Social Services, Alberta, 1987).85As noted in Chapter 2, there is a clear preference on the part ofevacuees to stay with relatives or friends (Perry et al., 1981),and evacuees are encouraged to seek accommodation of this type.If possible, normal commercial establishments (hotels, motels,etc.) are used in preference to Emergency Reception Centres,particularly if the need for lodging is likely to extend overseveral days. As discussed under Financial Services, this pointsout the need to have prior agreements in place to stream line theprocess of providing accommodation for evacuees.865.6 REGISTRATION AND INQUIRY SERVICEThe intent of the Registration and Inquiry (R & I) service isto register evacuees and relief workers, and to answer inquiriesregarding the location of missing persons, in order to providereassurance and to facilitate the process of reuniting separatedfamilies and friends as quickly as possible after a disaster.The R & I service is administered by the Canadian Red CrossSociety, which has been given the mandate, by agreement with theprovincial governments, to provide such service nationally.The R & I team is an integral part of each municipal ESS responseteam, and the B.C. and Yukon Division of the Canadian Red CrossSociety has organized regionally-based mobile teams to visitmunicipalities to provide leadership and training for the R & Ivolunteers. The procedures currently being used are the resultof experience gained in emergency situations around the world.In B.C. all registration information from a disaster site iscoordinated at the R & I Centre in Vancouver which then handlesinquires from outside the area. International inquires can beanswered through the Red Cross national headquarters in Ottawa.The semi-independent organizational structure of R & I exhibitsmany of the effectiveness characteristics of "formal" emergencyresponse agencies, described in Chapter 2, particularly withregard to its limited dependence on other organizations, and itsability to select achievable tasks. It is important to notethat, unlike the Red Cross Society in the United States which has87multiple responsibilities, the Canadian Red Cross Society haschosen to limit its emergency response commitment solely toRegistration and Inquiry, in order not to over extend itsresources, and to ensure that what it does do will be done well.It should also be noted that, as discussed in Chapter 3,volunteers function most effectively within an establishedorganizational framework, which provides good management andsupport. The Canadian Red Cross Society is an internationalorganization which provides guidance and leadership to its teammembers. It is no coincidence, therefore, that R & I is the mosthighly developed of all of the Emergency Social Services, and isof least concern when considering the potential weaknesses of thepresent ESS model.885.7 PERSONAL SERVICES The term 'Personal Services' is now used to describe thatcomponent of ESS which was formerly known as 'Counselling'.Although providing counselling to disaster victims is still animportant part of Personal Services, the services provided arenot limited to just counselling, and include responding to any ofthe multiple needs of evacuees which are not within the mandateof the other five Emergency Social Services.Some of these services fall within the day-to-day activities ofthe Ministry of Social Services. However, as noted in Chapter 4,the Ministry perceives its ESS role to be limited to assistingmunicipalities and providing Financial Services, except inextreme circumstances when a provincial emergency has beendeclared. The Ministry's position is that the provision of ESS,including Personal Services, is the responsibility of themunicipalities, and that such services will be provided bycommunity service organizations, such as local church groups andthe Salvation Army, coordinated by municipal ESS volunteers.In the aftermath of a major emergency it is important thatthe emotional needs of all persons affected, both victims andresponse personnel, be addressed as soon as possible, as anintegral part of the recovery process. In particular, the needsof unattended children and other vulnerable groups such as thehandicapped and the frail elderly, require the services ofprofessionally trained personnel, not merely the sympathy ofwell-intentioned volunteers, as valuable as this may be.89The psychological effects of a traumatic experience such as adisaster may be felt for many months, or even years, after theevent itself. The emotional impact of such an event can bemitigated if the persons affected are given the opportunity todiscuss their feelings and reactions in order to come to termswith their grief and sense of loss. As noted in Chapter 2, thedegree of impact which such an experience has on a individual canbe related to many factors including: the nature and magnitudeof the loss; the threat of potential recurrence; and the degreeof control over future event (Laube and Murphy, 1984).The case-study of the Parksville flooding, described in the nextchapter, suggests that, although Personal Services, includingcounselling, are clearly identified as part of the mandate ofEmergency Social Services, the need for such emotional supportis not always appreciated, and may be overlooked.905.8 FINANCIAL SERVICESAs noted in Chapter 4, the delivery of Financial Services is theonly component of Emergency Social Services which always involvesthe active participation of a Ministry of Social Services staffperson, who holds the position of Financial Services Coordinatoron the municipal Emergency Social Services team.The Emergency Social Services model is based on the premise thatagreements will be set up with local suppliers for the supply ofgoods and services, as required, to all persons affected by anemergency situation. The agreements are intended to serve a dualpurpose in that they identify where resources are available inthe area, and they also reassure the suppliers that they will bereimbursed for the cost of such goods and services supplied,thereby streamlining the process in an emergency, where normalbusiness procedures (proper authorization, etc.) might delay thedelivery of services to persons in need.The agreements state that all invoices are to be submitted to thelocal Ministry of Social Services offices, together with supportdocumentation giving the names of the people assisted and adescription of the goods or services provided. The fact that itis the Ministry, not the local municipality, which handles allreimbursement claims from suppliers, or claims for emergencyfinancial assistance from evacuees, tends to reinforced theperception that the Ministry has responsibility for EmergencySocial Services.91After assessing the individual's needs, Ministry personnel willissue vouchers to disaster victims who can then use them toobtain the services which they need from the local suppliers withwhom prior agreements are in place. This procedure is similarto the normal day-to-day operation of the Ministry of SocialServices, the principal difference being the scale of theoperation, which may involve large numbers of people requiringimmediate assistance and, as noted, the fact that there are (orshould be) agreements already in place with local suppliers(e.g., restaurants, hotels, and department stores).It should be noted that in emergency situations serious enough tobe given a PEP case number, the Ministry of Social Services is,itself, reimbursed for the costs incurred. In such situations,special emergency funding, administered by PEP, is provided bythe Provincial Government.925.9 OTHER SUPPORT SERVICESThere are several other services which need to be coordinatedin support of, the Emergency Social Services, generally providedat Emergency Reception Centres. These include the following:Transportation - Although it is not considered to be one ofthe Emergency Social Services, transportation is an importantsupport service for evacuees who need to be relocated from adisaster site to an Emergency Reception Centre; from a ReceptionCentre to a hotel; or directly to a hotel from a disaster site(as occurred in the Parksville flooding discussed in Chapter 6).Because the need for transportation is not limited to ESS, theTransportation Coordinator is often a municipal staff person whoassists both the Area Coordinator and the ESS Director to provideemergency transportation (buses, trucks, etc.) as required.Health Services - Again this service is not classified as oneof the Emergency Social Services, but the provision of first aidto evacuees, particularly at Emergency Reception Centres wherethere may be a significant number of "walking wounded" who needmedical attention, is an important support service. In addition,some evacuees may need medication during the emergency period(e.g., Insulin for diabetics) which requires profession medicalattention. These services are usually coordinated through theMunicipal Health Department, and St John Ambulance.93Communication - This service is the potential "weak-link" inall emergency preparedness activities, but is particularly acutein ESS because, in contrast to the formal emergency responseagencies, few ESS personnel have an alternative communicationcapability in the event that telephone systems are inoperative.The current ESS model assumes the involvement of local amateur(ham) radio clubs which would establish radio communicationbetween the municipal Emergency Operation Centre, EmergencyReception Centres, Hospitals, and other locations as required.Volunteer Services - As noted in Chapter 3, when disasterstrikes volunteers seem to "come out of the woodwork". It isimportant, therefore, to anticipate this convergence phenomenon,and to plan to utilize this resource effectively. This supportservice registers volunteers as they present themselves andattempts to match their knowledge and skills with the needs ofthe situation, identified by the Emergency Supervisors of thevarious services at the Emergency Reception Centres. Thisservice is often associated with municipal volunteer centres,which assists in the recruitment and placement of ESS volunteerson an on-going, non-emergency, basis.945.10 EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICES DIRECTORSUnder the present model, responsibility for the development andmanagement of all ESS volunteer activities at the local level hasbeen assigned to the ESS Directors of the various municipalities.The current list of ESS Directors (MSS, July 23, 1992) indicatesthat 110 of the 148 municipalities (approximately 74%) haveappointed ESS Directors. In addition, ESS Directors have beenappointed for the UBC Endowment Lands, and some of the smallercommunities, including five islands.There is some variation in the employment status of the variousESS Directors throughout the province. A few individuals areemployed by the Ministry of Social Services, or by the localmunicipalities concerned (approximately a dozen also hold theposition of Area Coordinators). As such, their responsibilitiesas ESS Directors are considered to be part of their regularemployment function. However, most ESS Directors are members ofthe local community who donate their time on a voluntary basis.Clearly, the mere fact that some ESS Directors are paid does notensure that they will carry out their responsibilities morediligently, or more effectively, than a dedicated and competentvolunteers. However, the amount of time that an individual ispermitted to spend as part of his or her regular employment, oris able, or willing, to spend as a volunteer, to carry out theseresponsibilities, is an important factor when considering therole of ESS Directors.95The present arrangement should also be considered in terms ofequity. Even the most public-spirited individual may eventuallyquestion a situation in which, as ESS Director, he or she isexpected to carry out the same service to the community, and toaccept the same responsibly associated with the position, assomeone who is paid to perform the identical function. Indeed,when Ministry staff are assigned to assist during an emergency,overtime payments (recoverable through PEP) may be authorized.As noted in Chapter 3, volunteer programs frequently have a highturnover of personnel, and many volunteers become disillusionedand "burn out", largely because there is insufficient leadershipand support from the controlling agencies. The individualsexpected to providing the ongoing leadership and motivation forESS volunteer activities are the ESS Directors, many of whom, ashas been noted, are themselves volunteers.The turnover of ESS Directors, who are pivotal to the successof ESS, is also high. Comparison of the current list of ESSDirectors (issued by the Ministry, July 1992) with an earlierlist (January 1991) shows that during the past 18 months morethan forty ESS Directors (approximately 29%) resigned theirpositions, or were replaced for undetermined reasons. In thiscontext it should be noted that few ESS Directors are fully awareof what is involved prior to their appointment, and several haveindicated to the writer that had they appreciated the enormity ofthe task, and the lack of official support for their endeavours,they would probably not have accepted the position.96Clearly, the ESS Directors have a vital role to play in thedevelopment of the ESS plans for each municipality, and themaintenance and motivation of their respective ESS teams, but thepurpose of the activity is to provide a viable ESS response tothe needs of major emergency situations. In such situations therole of the ESS Directors takes on even greater importancebecause they have overall responsibility for all aspects of theESS response for the duration of the emergency, which may extendover a period of several weeks, or even months.As noted in Chapter 3, a recurring theme in the volunteerliterature is that a basic requirement for a successfulvolunteer-based organization is formal direction and support,usually provided through an established agency with supportstaff. This is not the case with the Emergency Social Servicesgroups in B.C., which rely, primarily, on the services ofvolunteer ESS Directors to coordinate the activities of othervolunteers. This process takes place with minimal contact with,or support from, the established authorities, and places a highdegree of reliance on the personal qualities and motivation ofthe individual ESS Directors.The literature indicates that the qualities which exemplify thevolunteers must be nurtured, and require professional managementand support to sustain them. This suggests that if the presentEmergency Social Services organizational structure is not giventhe necessary management and support it will most likely fallshort of its objectives, or may fail completely, to meet thedemands of a major emergency or disaster.975.11 CHAPTER SUMMARYThis chapter describes the Emergency Social Services (ESS) modelespoused by the B.C. Ministry of Social Services. The intentof the model is to supplement the services of the establishedemergency response agencies, and to expand the emergency responsecapability of each municipality, when the regular services havebeen, or are likely to be, exceeded. Emergency Social Servicesare those services which are essential for the survival and well-being of all persons affected by an emergency, both evacuees andrelief workers. These services are: Food, Clothing, Lodging,Registration and Inquiry (R & I), Personal Services (e.g.,counselling), and Financial Services.The model is predicated on the pre-planned involvement ofestablished community-based service organizations (e.g., TheSalvation Army and the Canadian Red Cross Society) which alreadyhave organizational structures in place, together with individualvolunteers, to provide these Emergency Social Services as part ofan integrated response to the needs of an emergency.the ESS organizational structure is discussed in the context ofthe four-fold typology, described in Chapter 2, noting that ESSdoes not fit neatly into any one of the basic organizationalgroups but includes elements of all four. Consequently, thecoordination of the delivery of Emergency Social Servicesrequires particular attention and management if the variouscomponent groups are to work effectively with each other, andwith the other established emergency response agencies.98The ESS model is based, primarily, on the assumption thatEmergency Reception Centres will be opened and operated byEmergency Social Services volunteer personnel, although this isnot a precondition for the delivery of such services. EmergencyReception Centres provide a safe, temporary, refuge where theneeds of evacuees can be assessed and assistance can be provided,either directly at the Reception Centres or by facilitatingaccess to services at other locations.Each of the Emergency Social Services is described, together withsome of the additional support services: Transportation, HealthServices, Communications and Volunteer Services. It is notedthat responsibility for all aspects of the development,maintenance, and delivery of a municipal Emergency SocialServices program, together with the coordination of recruitment,training, and the motivation of volunteers, has been delegated tothe ESS Directors, many of whom are themselves volunteers.The role of the ESS Directors is then discussed in the context ofthe material from Chapter 3, and the argument is made that theESS model places an excessive reliance on the personal qualitiesof the individual ESS Director, and that there is a need forprofessional management and support of ESS activities, to ensurethat volunteers are used effectively, and are motivated tocontinue to participate in the program.99CHAPTER 6 - CASE STUDY: THE PARKSVILLE FLOODING6.1 INTRODUCTIONDuring the latter part of 1990 and the early months of 1991,several areas of British Columbia experienced severe floodingwhich necessitated the activation of emergency response plansto meet the multiple needs of the communities involved. Thisresponse activity required the cooperative efforts of variousgovernment agencies, both municipal and provincial, togetherwith private sector organizations.This case study looks at the response to a series of floodingevents which took place just outside the City of Parksville, onVancouver Island. These events forced some forty families toleave their residences on three separate occasions during aperiod of two and a half months, caused great emotional stress,and disrupted their lives for months afterwards.This particular event was selected because it was known to be acase where things had gone wrong and, therefore, merited furtherinvestigation. It was anticipated that the roles of the variousagencies involved would be clearly identifiable, and that theEmergency Social Services component would conform to the basicmodel described in Chapter 5. In fact, the response to theflooding, and the limited involvement of the ESS personnel whowere available to serve the evacuees, was quite different fromwhat had been expected, and is a major issue of concern.100Notwithstanding the very positive features of emergency planningin the Parksville area, the effects of the flooding presentedsome serious problems which were not handled well, but which,given the nature of the hazard, were predictable and should havebeen anticipated. These problems occurred in the 'grey areas' ofthe process, and impacted both the victims of the event and thevarious agencies involved in the response to the event.Analysis of the circumstances leading up to the flooding and ofthe subsequent responses to the event, has served to identify anumber of jurisdictional, administrative and perceptual issueswhich need to be addressed. Although the case study is based onthe events which took place at Parksville, the issues raised arenot unique to the Parksville experience, and they have a moregeneral application, which will be discussed in Chapter 7.1016.2 OBJECTIVES OF THE CASE STUDYThe primary objectives of the case study are:1) To review the nature of the emergency planning, particularlyfor the provision of Emergency Social Services, which was inplace prior to the event, and to establish how, in view ofthe historic evidence of previous flooding in the area, thethreat of potential flooding was perceived by the variousparties involved in the event,2) To investigate the actual response to the needs of thesituation by the various agencies involved: the municipality,the Ministry of Social Services, Emergency Social Services,and the Provincial Emergency Program, and3) To determine what lessons can be learned from the event andwhat problems need to be addressed in order to improve theoverall emergency response to similar events in the future.1026.3 DESCRIPTION OF THE EVENTThe City of Parksville is a picturesque vacation resort locatedon the east coast of Vancouver Island, 37km north of Nanaimo onHighway 19. Noted for its sandy beaches and excellent conferencefacilities, it has a resident population of nearly 6,000 people.This number can increase to over 40,000 during the summer touristseason. The city centre is situated approximately 3km north ofthe mouth of the Englishman River, which in mid-November 1990,overflowed its banks, causing extensive flooding of the low-lyingresidential area known as Martindale.The river crested five times during the period under review.There were three floods in quick succession between mid-Novemberand early December, 1990, which forced two major evacuations.Two months later, further flooding forced a third evacuation ofresidents of the area, many of whom had already been evacuatedonce, and in some cases twice before.Flooding Dates Evacuations Dates No. of EvacueesNov. 10/11, 1990Nov. 23, 1990 Nov. 23, 1990 31 PersonsDec. 3/4, 1990 Dec. 3, 1990 46 PersonsFeb. 1/2, 1991 Feb. 1, 1991 32 PersonsFeb. 4, 1991103The major impact of the flooding was to the occupants of Parry'sTrailer Park, and to the residents of approximately a dozen homesin the adjacent area. Most of evacuees were rescued by the RCMP,under extremely severe weather conditions, and transported to theIsland Hall Hotel in Parksville, where they were given free foodand lodging for about three days. The subsequent evacuationswere handled in a similar manner, with the RCMP and the AreaCoordinator for Parksville assuming a leading role.Given the difficult circumstances, the rescue and evacuationoperation appears have been handled reasonably well, and it isclear that the local authorities thought that they had done a"good job". Once the danger was past, and the evacuees weresafely established at the hotel, the formal responders consideredthat the needs of the situation had been met. However, from anEmergency Social Services perspective, the problems had onlystarted to become evident, and the plight of the evacuees was tocontinue for several months after the actual flooding.1046.4 HISTORY OF FLOODING IN THE  AREAIt appears, that prior to the events under review, the presentresidents of the Martindale area had experienced only limitedinconvenience from the seasonal cresting of the river, and thatthere was no great awareness or concern, on the part of eitherthe residents or the local authorities, that flooding of thismagnitude had occurred before and, therefore, posed a seriousthreat to life and property in the area.However, the history of flooding in the area was described insome detail by a former resident of the area in a letter to theeditor of the Arrowsmith Star (June 21, 1991). He pointed outthat the area is actually on a portion of an old gravel bar inthe river basin, and that in the 1950s and 60s, because of theperiodic high waters from November through March, the area atParry's Trailer Park (formerly known as the Caravan Camp Grounds)was used only for seasonal camping.The trailer park has been in operation for the past twenty-twoyears, and the present owner has run the business on a year-roundbasis since 1982. There are seventy-two recreational vehiclesites, each of which has sewer, water and hydro service, withoptional cable and telephone service. There are also a numberof semi-permanent 'mobile' homes which have been mounted onunreinforced concrete block foundations.105The owner stated that he had known that the area was subject toflooding when he bought the business nine years ago. Since then,including the five floods during the period under review, hisproperty has been flooded nine times, (i.e., an average of onceevery year), but the most recent flooding was the worst he hadexperienced.The severe flooding in the area was not, therefore, anunprecedented occurrence - something which could not have beenanticipated, but, rather, was something which had happened beforeand could reasonably be expected to happen again, albeit atinfrequent intervals. Given this reality, it is surprising thatthe Nanaimo Regional District had not taken a more proactiveapproach to emergency planning for the area.For example, the trailer park is advertised and operated as ayear-round facility, although it is not licensed as such. TheNanaimo Regional District has made no attempt to restrict the useof the facilities during periods of the year when the area isprone to flooding, or to prohibit the year-round tenancies.Clearly, if the Regional District had imposed restrictions on theuse of the trailer park, and on the building of residences in thearea, the flooding would have impacted fewer people, and muchemotional suffering could have been avoided. There seems littledoubt that the somewhat casual, laissez-faire, attitude of theauthorities having jurisdiction, and the lack of prior planning,exacerbated the problems associated with the emergency responseand recovery process.1066.5 FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE FLOODINGThere seems little doubt that the major factor contributing tothe flooding of the Englishman River was the extremely severeweather conditions during the period under review. One reportdescribed November 1990 as, "the wettest November in 35 years".The climatological reports of the Transport Canada Coast Guarddocumented heavy rain coinciding with each of the five floods.For example, a total of 54mm of rain was recorded for November10, 1990, and the first flood peaked between 10:00pm and midnightof the same day. The rain eased from heavy to light during thenext twelve hours, during which time there was only 4.2mm ofrain, and the level of the flood water dropped by over a metre.The Parksville Engineering Department maintains accurate recordsof the water level at Pump Station #2, located downstream fromthe Martindale area. The water level in the measuring chamber isrecorded automatically every hour. Water levels of over 5m (fivemetres) are considered to present a flooding hazard to the area.The data clearly documents the five separate flooding events, andgives an accurate measurement of the rate at which the waterlevel increased to the point where the river overflowed itsbanks. The highest water levels were recorded during the secondflooding event which took place on the night of December 3/4,1990. The water level rose over 2.5m (8'-0") in 24 hours andreached a maximum reading of 5.83m. This was 2.38m higher thanthe average (3.45m) for the whole month of December.107The local newspapers published conflicting reports on whetherclear cut logging in the region had been a factor in theexceptionally high level of the river. Some claimed that clearcut logging in the watershed had increased the likelihood ofdownstream flooding by increasing the amount of water run-offinto the river. They further argued that the amount of silt anddebris flowing down the river has also increased, therebyreducing the capacity of the river to handle the increased volumeof water.Others, including the Ministry of Environment, argued that theeffect of the logging had been minimal and that, at worst, it wasonly a contributing factor, the major cause of the flooding beingthe unusual, but not unprecedented, combination of early snow,high rainfall, high tides and strong off-shore winds whichadversely impacted on a low-lying area known to have a history offlooding.In the context of this thesis, the precise cause of the floodingis less important than the fact that flooding was known to haveoccurred in the Martindale area in the recent past. It was,therefore, a known hazard which local authorities and residentsof the area could reasonably have anticipated, and for which theycould have prepared, but which appears to have been discounted byall concerned.1086.6 EMERGENCY PLANNING PRIOR TO THE FLOODINGAt first glance, the area under review appeared to be wellprepared to meet the needs of a potential disaster. In contrastto many other communities in British Columbia, the City ofParksville had fulfilled all of the Provincial Emergency Programrequirements in order to receive an Emergency PreparednessAssistance Grant.As described in Chapter 4, under the provisions of the EmergencyProgram Act, 1979, the Provincial Government is authorized to" ...make grants to municipalities for civil defence", and that inorder to receive grant funding a local municipality must submitan application to the Provincial Emergency Program affirming thatthe conditions related to their state of preparedness have beenmet, and that the funds will be used for emergency programing.As noted, these conditions had been met in Parksville, namely:1) The City had passed a bylaw to establish anEmergency Program (Bylaw 934, 1988),2) The City had an active Emergency Committee,3) The City had appointed an Emergency Coordinator, and4) The City had a written Emergency Plan.The City of Parksville also had an Emergency Operations Centre,located in the City Hall, with an emergency radio and a generatorto provide emergency power.109In addition, as described below, and most importantly in thecontext of this thesis, the Emergency Social Services component,frequently the weakest link in the emergency planning andresponse process, was also well established in the area.Further reassurance regarding the emergency preparedness in thearea prior to the event was also to be found in the policystatement at the beginning of the Parksville Emergency ProgramPlan which starts with the following words:"The protection of life, property and the environmentand the alleviation of suffering and hardship caused bydisasters are fundamental responsibilities of municipalgovernment. Your Municipal Officials are cognizant ofthese responsibilities and are determined that they willbe met."This clearly demonstrates that there was an awareness by theelected officials of the City of Parksville of the need for localauthorities to be able to respond to emergency situations, and anacceptance by the municipality that emergency preparedness is alegitimate role of local government. It further affirmed thatevery effort would be made to assist the victims of a disaster.However, although the Englishman River is the natural geographicboundary between the City of Parksville and the Nanaimo RegionalDistrict, the legal boundary is actually Martindale Road, whichis located some 300m north of the river. Therefore, althoughParksville was involved in the response to the situation, theMartindale area was technically out of its jurisdiction, and theresponsibility for the area remained with the Regional District.110In marked contrast to the emergency preparedness initiativesundertaken by the City of Parksville, the Nanaimo RegionalDistrict had done little to prepare for major emergencies in anyof the Electoral Areas outside Nanaimo, Parksville and QualicumBeach, for which it had jurisdictional responsibility. As waspointed out by the Area Coordinator for Parksville (Parksville-Qualicum Beach News, February 12, 1991), the Regional Districthad not applied for a grant from the Provincial Emergency Programand, more importantly, it had not appointed its own EmergencyCoordinator for the areas in question.There are eight such Electoral Areas with a total population ofapproximately 24,000 persons, or 29% of the total population ofthe Nanaimo Regional District. The second largest (Area 'G') hasa resident population of 4,300 persons, and includes Martindale,where most of the severe flooding took place. As noted inChapter 4, the City of Nanaimo is in PEP Victoria Zone #1 andParksville and Qualicum Beach are in PEP Courtenay Zone #2.In the event of a serious emergency, people living in any ofthese eight areas are dependent on support through the PEP ZoneOffices in Victoria or Courtenay, and/or the goodwill of thethree established municipalities, Nanaimo, Qualicum Beach andParksville. In view of the experience of the flooding, and thefact that there will undoubtedly be emergency situations in thefuture, these citizens are not well served, and the need forbetter planning and coordination of emergency services is clearlyindicated, if the is experience is not to be repeated .1116.7 SOCIETY OF ORGANIZED SERVICESThe Society of Organized Services, or S.O.S. as it has becomeknown, is a local organization which provides twenty-threeservices to the community. In the 23 years since it waschartered as a non-profit society it has become a vital part ofthe social fabric of the region with a membership of over 700volunteers. It was formed through the efforts of a number oflocal professionals and community workers concerned for thewelfare of disadvantaged persons in the geographic area definedby the boundaries of School District 69. This area includesParksville, where the Society has its offices, and Martindale.Some of the objectives for which the Society was established,as described in its Constitution, are as follows:a) To provide measures to alleviate needs of an emotional,mental, and/or physical character for persons who aresocially or economically disadvantaged, i.e., the poorand the powerless and those whose needs are not metthrough government agencies or services or charitableorganizations.b) To establish one or more screening committees of professionaland qualified lay people to assess the urgency of qualifyingneeds of the disadvantaged persons concerned.c) To develop an organized volunteer service to assist with theneeds designated in a) and to maintain a registry of suchvolunteers.d) To provide a referral service through which members ofa family may receive competent professional help andassistance.e) To establish, support, and maintain a fund for emergencyneeds as stated in a) and to apply for and receive grants-in-aid for such purposes.112As may be seen, the objectives of S.O.S. closely parallel someof the services normally provided by the Ministry of SocialServices. The Society is generally recognized within the areaas a valuable community resource, and the Area Coordinator forParksville had appointed an S.O.S. staff person as the ESSDirector for the municipality.As will be discussed in Chapter 7, this raises importantjurisdictional and administrative questions regarding whoactually had the responsibility to provide Emergency SocialServices to the victims of the flooding at Parksville, and why,for example, such an important service as Personal Services(counselling) was not provided for the evacuees as soon aspossible after each event.Further, there are some basic problems which will also bediscussed concerning the change of approach and proceduresnecessary to deal with the transition between normal day-to-dayemergencies, which are governed by standard procedures of theMinistry of Social Services, and the Emergency Social Servicesorganizational structure, involving non-Ministry personnel, whichis activated in more extreme circumstances and requires a moreflexible approach.1136.8 RESCUE AND EVACUATIONOn the day before the river first overflowed its banks, theowner of the trailer park had warned residents that there was apossibility of flooding. Some people took his advice and leftthe area, but many waited too long and were stranded in theirhomes and had to be rescued by boat. The RCMP received severaltelephone calls from concerned residents informing them that theflooding situation was worsening, and requesting assistance.A local newspaper reported that two boats were used in the firstevacuation, an aluminum boat provided by a friend of one of theRCMP officers, and a Zodiac from the Transport Canada Coast Guardstation. However, it seems that most of the rescue was carriedout by the one privately owned craft, using a borrowed engine.A staff person at the Coast Guard station stated that the RCMPhad requested the Zodiac but that "it just didn't work out".Although they made several attempts, they were unable to launchthe Zodiac because the water was too shallow at Martindale Road.As was pointed out, the Zodiac is more suitable for emergencyrescue in the open waters. Even if Coast Guard personnel hadbeen able to launch the craft, they would have had considerabledifficulty maneuvering through the inland treed areas in the fastflowing water. This was made even more hazardous by the largeamounts of floating debris, such as loose building material anduprooted trees, which filled the river.Some of the flood victims were rescued and given temporaryshelter by other residents of the Martindale area whose homeswere located on higher ground further inland. Although theythemselves were not threatened by the rising flood waters, theywere cut of from Highway 19 by the flooding of Martindale Road,which was under 2m of water. Some of these flood victims wereescorted or found their way to Parksville by way of little knowntrails through the undeveloped area to the north.The response to the emergency was made more difficult by the factthat, because Martindale was outside their jurisdiction, neitherthe City of Parksville nor the RCMP had current maps of the areaand, therefore, none of the agencies involved in the actualresponse had accurate information on the number of people living,and at risk, in the Martindale area.Although there were reports that some evacuees felt thatthe authorities were slow to respond, the rescue operationsuccessfully evacuated more that 30 residents, many of themelderly, from the trailer park to higher ground, approximatelyhalf a mile away at the west end of Martindale Road. The AreaCoordinator for Parksville, in a letter published in the localnewspaper (Arrowsmith Star, February 15, 1991), defended theaction taken by the local authorities, and stated that the RCMPduty officer had anticipated the danger and was getting emergencyteams and boats ready two hours before the call for help camefrom the trailer park.115He further stated that during the rescue, volunteers from theArrowsmith Search and Rescue Society were on standby and ready tohelp. As the victims were brought to dry land they were met bytaxis, commissioned by the Provincial Emergency Program (asrepresented by the Area Coordinator for Parksville), whichconveyed them to the Island Hall Hotel where they were givenmeals and accommodation until it was safe for them to return totheir homes. These expenses, and those of the two subsequentevacuations were covered by the Provincial Emergency Program.Clearly, the local authorities felt that they had responded tothe needs of the situation in an appropriate manner, but thisassessment demonstrated a very narrow view of what the needs ofthe victims of the flooding actually were. The perception ofthe authorities was certainly not shared by many of the floodvictims, one of whom was quoted as saying, "God help us ifParksville ever has a real disaster". However, this was morelikely a reaction to the way in which the needs of the floodvictims were handled after the evacuation, rather than criticismof the rescue operation itself which, although it involved a fairdegree of improvisation, appears to have been handled reasonablywell by the RCMP and the Area Coordinator for Parksville.1166.9 ACCOMMODATION OF EVACUEESMost of the evacuees were taken to the Island Hall Hotel, indowntown Parksville, until the worst of the flooding was over.After about three days evacuees were permitted, and actuallyencouraged, to return to their water-damaged homes. Evacueesinterviewed stated that shortly after their arrival at the hotela staff person from the Ministry of Social Services told themthat their first three days accommodation would be paid for.This information raised concerns in the minds of the evacueesregarding who would be responsible for paying the hotel bills ifit were necessary to stay longer than three days.When questioned on this matter, the MSS District Supervisorresponded that in fact there was no formal limit on the number ofdays which might be paid for, and she stated that if any of theevacuees had found their homes were uninhabitable, they couldhave continued to stay at the hotel, or could have returned tothe hotel, and the Ministry would have continued to pay the billsfor their accommodation as long as was reasonably necessary.It is possible that the MSS staff person concerned was referringto the maximum number of days which may be certified in advanceunder the GAIN Act. The rates allow $300.00 for shelter (incl.utilities) for a single person. This would provide approximatelythree days accommodation, after which time the situation would bereassessed. As pointed out in Chapter 4, the GAIN payment systemshould not be used for disaster victims, but this policy may nothave been clearly understood by all of the Ministry's personnel.117Also, the PEP Disaster Financial Assistance Guidelines in effectat the time lists items for which Homeowners/Renters may claimunder the Provincial Emergency Program. These items includereimbursement for temporary accommodation to a maximum of $60.00per diem per claim, to a maximum of three days, after which timethey are subject to demonstrated need or a maximum of $600.00 permonth, and to Ministry of Social Services referral.Making provision for the temporary accommodation of persons inneed in day-to-day emergency situations is a Ministry of SocialServices function. Similarly, as described in Chapter 5, inmajor emergency situations Emergency Lodging is an EmergencySocial Services function. However, in the Parksville experienceneither the Ministry nor the Society of Organized Services(S.O.S.) were involved. Indeed, the Manager of the Island HallHotel, when interviewed in August 1991, was unaware of theadministrative role of the Ministry of Social Services. Thelodging arrangements were made by the Area Coordinator forParksville, who was assumed to be representing the ProvincialEmergency Program.The hotel Manager stated that no prior agreements to provideaccommodation in emergency situations were in place, either withthe City of Parksville or with any other government or privateagency. Apparently, when the Area Coordinator for Parksvillerealized that accommodation would be needed, he immediatelycontacted the Island Hall Hotel and simply requested some rooms.Because it was the quiet winter season, the hotel had sufficientrooms available and was happy to receive the business.1186.10 REIMBURSEMENT FOR SERVICES RENDEREDAs noted above, the PEP Disaster Financial Assistance Guidelinesrefer to the reimbursement of the cost of temporary accommodationfor a maximum of three days, after which time the Ministry ofSocial services becomes involved. Emergency situations lastingno longer than three days are usually paid for directly by theProvincial Emergency Program, Claims for reimbursement of costsassociated with Emergency Social Services, which are frequentlythe result of emergency situations extending over longer periodsof time, are normally processed through the Ministry of SocialServices, who in turn are reimbursed from emergency fundsadministered by the Provincial Emergency Program.Because it was the "PEP" Area Coordinator for Parksville whoorganized the transportation of the evacuees to the Island HallHotel, and arranged for their accommodation, the Manager of thehotel was under the impression that all costs would be paid forby the Provincial Emergency Program and, like most members of thegeneral public, including the evacuees, she was not aware of thedistinction between PEP and the Ministry of Social Services.Consequently, all of the hotel bills for accommodation andservices (and presumably many other bills from individuals) weresent directly to the PEP Zone Office at Courtenay, withoutreference to the Ministry, who would eventually have to certifythem before payment could be made.119If the needs of the emergency had only lasted for a few days,billing the Provincial Emergency Program directly would not havebeen a problem because the role of the Ministry of SocialServices would have been quite limited. However, because of thenature of the multiple flooding events, which continued over aperiod of several months, the confusion regarding how claims forreimbursement were to be handled slowed down the process.The problem was compounded by the fact that the PEP Zone Manager,whose office is in Courtenay, was out of town for a period oftime after the flooding, and claims which were sent to the PEPoffice, and which could have been processed by Ministry of SocialServices personnel in Parksville, were not dealt with until hisreturn. For example, the manager of the Island Hall Hotel, whichhad provided accommodation and other services for evacuees ingood faith, stated that they had still not been fully reimbursedfor such services rendered, some six months after the flooding.Reports in the local newspapers indicated a great deal of angerand frustration on the part of the evacuees at what were seen tobe excessive delays on the part of the authorities, and a generalsense of dissatisfaction with the response by the authorities tothe emergency. Undoubtedly, many of the difficulties experiencedby the evacuees were related to differences in perception of whatwas required to meet the needs of the situation, but there appearto have been serious jurisdictional and procedural problems whichexacerbated an already difficult situation.1206.11 CLAIMS FOR DAMAGE AND LOSSThe provision of financial services for the evacuees seems tohave been inhibited by the rigors of a process more suited to thenormal services provided by Ministry of Social Services staff,than to the multiple and changing needs of the flood victims.This may be explained, though not justified, by the fact thatMinistry personnel are trained to respond to routine, day-to-day,personal emergencies in a proscribed manner.In such situations, basic questions such as who is eligible forassistance, and what the limits of such assistance should be, areclearly defined in corporate procedures manuals. However,emergencies affecting large numbers of people, each with his orher own problems and needs, requires a more flexible, lessbureaucratic, approach than might be the normal procedure in lessdemanding situations.For example, one such MSS manual states that, "...temporaryassistance for food, clothing and shelter is provided to victimsof a declared civil disaster, along with other social servicessuch as counselling", (Ministry, 1989). Although there was noformal Declaration of Emergency, by either the City of Parksvilleor the Regional District of Nanaimo, Emergency Social Serviceswere certainly required, and should have been provided, either bythe Ministry or by the Society of Organized Services (S.O.S.),which received no formal notification or request for assistance.121Although the PEP notice published the names of several adjustercompanies, and gave the impression that evacuees could chosetheir own, there appears to have been a tight rein on the claimsprocess. Nearly all of the early claims were handled by oneadjuster, who was subsequently replaced. It was suggested by oneof the evacuees that this was because the adjuster in questionwas too sympathetic to the needs of the evacuees, and was,therefore, costing the Ministry of Social Services too muchmoney, for higher-than-normal settlements.In fact, as pointed out by the MSS Manager of Emergency SocialServices, and confirmed by PEP, adjusters are contracted by theProvincial Emergency Program, not the Ministry, and are givenwritten guidelines to follow in arriving at claims settlements.Apparently, the first adjuster was dismissed because he was notfollowing the limits of the guidelines. As discussed in the nextsection, payments to victims are not intended to provide 100%compensation for all losses in emergency situations which couldhave been anticipated and for which insurance might reasonablyhave been obtained.However, the evacuee in question was clearly of the opinion thatthere was an implicit understanding on the part of the secondadjuster that the settlement of the claim should not be toogenerous, and that, if there was any doubt, he should err infavour of the government agency. Indeed, the claims process waslikened to "psychological warfare" in that it was designed toweaken the victims' will to resist, and to heighten their desireto settle the claim and to get on with the rest of their lives.1226.12 RESPONSE TO EMOTIONAL NEEDS OF EVACUEESAlthough, the services which the evacuees needed were clearlythose included under the mandate of Emergency Social Services(Feeding, Lodging, Personal Services, etc.), the S.O.S. staffperson appointed by the Area Coordinator for Parksville as theESS Director for Parksville, received no formal notification(from either the City of Parksville or the Ministry of SocialServices) of the flooding in Martindale and the evacuation ofresidents to the Island Hall Hotel. The ESS Director, who livedin Qualicum Beach (8km north of Parksville), stated that shefirst became aware of the seriousness of the situation throughlocal news reports on the radio.Her subsequent active participation in the recovery process wasthe result of her personal concern for the way in which theevacuees were being treated by the authorities. She stated thatshe was so frustrated by the process that she resigned from herposition as ESS Director after the second evacuation in order tobe able to assume a more pro-active, advocate, role on behalf ofthe evacuees during the months which followed the flooding.Although most of the criticism was directed at the bureaucraticprocess, rather than at individuals, one evacuee, whose familyhad lost their home, their means of livelihood, and many personalpossessions (including the children's Christmas presents),described how she was made to feel that she was responsible forher own misfortune. She stated that she had been accused by aMinistry staff person of "taking advantage of the situation".123She described how on one occasion she had no money to buy foodfor her family, but that she knew that a relief cheque had beendelivered to the Parksville office from Victoria. It appearsthat the Ministry staff person handling her case attempted todelay issuing the cheque until after the weekend, to show "whowas in charge". In desperation, the victim of this outrageousbehaviour contacted the Ministry offices in Victoria to complainabout her treatment, and the cheque was released without furtherdelay. Recalling her experience reduced this lady to tears, eventhough nearly six months had passed since the flooding forced herand her family to evacuate from their home in Martindale.The plight of the evacuees was made even worse by the fact that,because Martindale was outside the city limits of Parksville, andthe situation was perceived to be under control, there was noneed for City officials to become more involved. Consequently,very little was done after the flooding to inspect the homes andcertify that they were safe and fit for occupancy. The formerESS Director stated that many of the homes had no electrical orpropane power for lighting, heating or cooking, and that many ofthe homes used well water and septic tanks, both of which werecontaminated and presented a serious health hazard.Also, because the levels of the flood waters continued tofluctuate for some time after the initial event, authorities haddifficulty determining when the worst of the flooding was overand, consequently, most of the evacuees were allowed to return totheir homes prematurely, only to be evacuated a second time (andin some cases a third time) when the flood waters rose again.124Because the flooding only impacted a relatively small segmentof the community, the on-going needs of the residents of theaffected area were not fully appreciated. Indeed, although mostParksville residents knew that the flooding of the previouswinter had forced residents of the Martindale area to leave theirhomes for a period of time, many were unaware of the devastatingeffects of the flooding on their neighbours, or that the responseprocess continued to affect the lives of many of the evacuees.The response of the Ministry of Social Services appears to havebeen less than might have reasonably been expected, particularlyin the area of counselling for the evacuees. The former ESSDirector stated that the emotional needs of the evacuees werenever formally addressed by Ministry personnel, who treated themin a detached bureaucratic manner, in much the same way in whichtheir financial needs were addressed - "by the book".It should be noted that, although the PEP Disaster FinancialAssistance Guidelines, which also apply to the Ministry, referto approved disaster assistance payments as unconditional grantsto individuals, businesses and municipalities. As noted, suchpayments are not intended to provide 100% compensation but areintended as government assistance to aid recovery from a disasteror emergency which victims could neither prevent nor readily andreasonably insure against. In support of this position, oneformer resident of the area wrote to the local newspaper toexpress his opinion that, "...for people to be compensated forwater damage when living three feet or more below regular highwater is ridiculous".125The argument that many of the victims of the Parksville floodingmay have contributed to their own misfortune, though not withoutsome validity, should not obscure the fact that there were manypeople in distress who required emergency services. Under thecircumstances, it is reasonable to ask whether the response tothe emergency, and in particular, the response to the emotionalneeds of the persons affected by the flooding, would have beenany different (i.e., better) if the authorities' perception ofthe evacuees and their plight had been more sympathetic. Inother words, was the response coloured by the perception that theMartindale residents did, indeed, have only themselves to blame,and, in consequence, merited only cursory assistance?It seems unlikely that such was the case. The simple truthappears to be that the formal emergency response agenciesperceived the response to be appropriate to the needs of thesituation. However, given the negative coverage of the localauthorities' response to the event, published in the localnewspapers, together with the accounts of personal experiencesgiven to the writer in interviews with the former ESS Director,some of the evacuees, and the Manager of the Island Hall Hotel,and local residents, this perception seems hard to justify.As pointed out by the former ESS Director for Parksville, thereis a "...massive gap between evacuating disaster victims to ahotel and putting the pieces of their lives back together again."(Arrowsmith Star, March 1, 1991)1266.13 BLURRED IMAGESThere is no doubt that there was some considerable confusionand misunderstanding in the minds of many of the participants,both evacuees and responders, regarding the respective roles ofthe Provincial Emergency Program, the City of Parksville, theMinistry of Social Services, and the local Society of OrganizedServices (S.O.S.). This confusion was reflected in newspaperreports which, although well intentioned, only served to blur theimages of the various agencies, and the services which could beexpected from each.For example, although, as noted, the ESS Director was an S.O.S.staff person appointed by the Area Coordinator for Parksville,the local media repeatedly referred to her as "PEP'S EmergencySocial Services Coordinator", or as a "PEP volunteer". One ofthe explanations for this is that all persons involved asvolunteers in emergency preparedness activities, includingEmergency Social Services volunteers, are advised to fill out aPEP Registration Form. This ensures that they will be covered bythe Workers Compensation Board in the event that they areinjured, or killed, as a result of such volunteer activity.Consequently, there are hundreds of ESS volunteers, listed as"PEP volunteers", who do not operate under the direction of PEP,but who are actually working semi-independently as part of anEmergency Social Services team, with limited direction from anyof the established agencies.127Similarly, as noted in Chapter 4, because the municipal grants,administered by PEP, are frequently associated with the positionof the municipal Area Coordinator, the person in that position,although actually employed by the municipality, is often referredto as the "PEP" Area Coordinator. This has had the effect ofblurring the distinction between the role of the ProvincialEmergency Program and that of the local municipalities.In the Parksville experience, these misleading titles, reinforcedby the media, combined to raise the profile of the ProvincialEmergency Program in the eyes of the general public, and tocreate the perception, either unwittingly or, as was cynicallysuggested, by design, that PEP was doing more than was actuallythe case. Indeed, one angry Martindale resident, quoted in thelocal newspaper, described PEP as the "Provincial EmergencyPropaganda Program". The fact that he made no reference to theMinistry of Social Services suggests that he was either unawareof the role of MSS, or that he thought it was a part of PEP.At the time of the flooding the Provincial Emergency Program wasunder the Department of the Solicitor General. On the day afterthe second evacuation, PEP placed a quarter-page notice to floodvictims in the Parksville and Qualicum News (Dec. 4, 1990), whichincluded a smiling photograph of the then Solicitor General,Russell G. Eraser, stating that:"Your Government's Provincial Emergency Program providesassistance to victims of Natural Disaster. Direct financialsupport is available to help you recover from damage causedby flooding from November 22nd to 25th, 1990".128The notice listed, "Who Can Apply", "What Is Covered", and"How Do I Apply", and stated that copies of Disaster FinancialAssistance Guidelines were available at the "Government Agent'sOffice", "Your Municipal Hall" and the "Regional DistrictOffice". It also gave a toll-free number of a Flood Help Line,and listed seven adjuster companies, four of which were locatedin Greater Vancouver or the Fraser Valley. This suggests thatthe notice was not limited to Parksville, but was designed foruse in other areas of the Province where flooding had occurred.It is important to note that, except in the context of where topick up the Guidelines, the PEP notice made no reference to theresponsibilities of other agencies, such as the Regional Districtof Nanaimo, the Ministry of Social Services, Emergency SocialServices, or the Society of Organized Services (S.O.S.) - theParksville-based organization with the delegated responsibilityfor providing such Emergency Social Services.Clearly, it was important that the flood victims should be givenfactual information about the services available to them, inorder that they could be reassured, and could start the processof recovery as soon as possible. However, the PEP notice gavepeople the impression that PEP was the lead agency, through whichall aspects of the emergency response and recovery would beprocessed. In fact, although the media continued to reinforcethis impression, the involvement of PEP was, as in most emergencysituations, limited to advising local agencies, and facilitatingaccess to provincial emergency funds.129If the intent of the notice was to portray PEP in a positivelight, it failed badly. On the contrary, it confused thequestion of what services were available, and which agencies wereinvolved, and served to identify PEP as a target for subsequentcriticism regarding why the flooding had occurred, why theauthorities had not been better prepared to respond to such aneventuality, why the processing of claims took so long, and mostparticularly, why the service to evacuees was handled in such abureaucratic manner.The anger and frustration of the evacuees, directed at PEP and,to a lessor extent, the Ministry of Social Services, was in partdue to the expectations which PEP itself raised in the minds ofthe evacuees. The tone of the notice had been reassuring, withreferences to the "assistance" and "financial support" providedby the Provincial Emergency Program, but the actual response tothe immediate financial needs of the evacuees, and the processingof claims for damage to property and loss of possessions washandled by adjusters and Ministry of Social Services personnel.In addition, because the PEP information notice only referred tothe "flooding from November 22nd to 25th, 1990", which hadnecessitated the first evacuation, it raised administrativequestions later in the response process regarding whether theclaims for financial assistance and compensation associated withthe second evacuation (which had just taken place), and the thirdevacuation (which took place two months later), were to betreated as a separate events, or as parts of a single emergencysituation which continued over several months.130As noted in Chapter 4, part of the formal emergency responseprocedure is for PEP to allocate a case file number in order toinitiate the process of authorizing the release of emergencyfunds. In the case of the Parksville flooding, some of thevictims of the event had been forced to leave their homes two,or three times, which greatly complicating the process ofassessing claims and determining the appropriate compensation.Clearly, many of the issues which manifested themselves duringthe flooding at Parksville, such as the questionable distinctionbetween the emergency responsibilities of the ProvincialEmergency Program and of the Ministry of Social Services, andthe unclear relationship between the Ministry of Social Servicesand volunteer-based Emergency Social Service groups, are problemsbasic to the organizational structure of emergency preparednessthroughout British Columbia. These issues will be discussedfurther in Chapter 7.1316.14 CHAPTER SUMMARYThis chapter studies the impact of the severe flooding which tookplace just outside the City of Parksville, on Vancouver Island,between early November 1990 and February 1991. The event forcedsome forty families to evacuate their homes on three separateoccasions, and disrupted their lives for months afterwards. Theobjective of the case study was to examine what took place, andby so doing, determine what lessons can be learned from theevent, and what problems need to be addressed to improve theoverall emergency response to similar events in the future.The history of flooding in the area is discussed, togetherwith some of the contributing factors in this most recent event.The flooding was a known hazard which the local authorities andresidents of the area could reasonably have anticipated, and forwhich they could have prepared, but both the threat and the needto be prepared appear to have been discounted by all concerned.The emergency planning in place for the City of Parksville priorto the flooding is reviewed. Parksville had met all of the PEPrequirements to receive a municipal grant, and it comparedfavorably with other municipalities in the Province. However,the flooded area (although less than 3km from the centre ofParksville) was actually under the jurisdiction of the NanaimoRegional District. There were no emergency plans for the area,which was, therefore, extremely vulnerable in the event of adisaster, such as the one which took place.132The Society of Organized Services (S.O.S.), a well establishedservice organization in the Parksville area, is then described.The objectives of S.O.S. closely parallel some of the servicesnormally provided by the Ministry of Social Services, and anS.O.S. staff person had been appointed by the Area Coordinatorfor Parksville as the ESS Director for the municipality. Thissection identifies a problem regarding how to operationalize thetransition between day-to-day emergencies, handled by (formal)Ministry personnel, and those emergency services provided by an(informal) Emergency Social Services group, such as S.O.S., whoseorganizational structure is based on volunteer, non-Ministry,personnel.The rescue and evacuation of the residents of the area isdescribed. It is concluded that, although a fair degree ofimprovisation was necessary, the operation appears to have beenhandled reasonably well by the RCMP and the Area Coordinator forthe City of Parksville.However, as pointed out later in the chapter, the perceptionof the evacuees, particularly regarding the response of theauthorities to the needs of the situation as it developed overthe weeks and months following the initial flooding, was far lessfavorable, and led to a great deal of anger and frustration.Significantly, the ESS Director resigned her position in orderto assume a more pro-active, advocate, role on behalf of theevacuees during the months which followed the flooding.133The response to the emergency is described in terms of theaccommodation of evacuees; the reimbursement for servicesrendered by the hotel and other suppliers; evacuee claims fordamage and loss; and the response to the emotional needs of theevacuees. No formal counselling was provided for the evacuees toassist them to come to terms with their grief and sense of loss.It is concluded that there were jurisdictional, procedural andperceptual problems which exacerbated the situation. Inparticular, as was anticipated in Chapter 2, the role of theinformal, volunteer-based, Emergency Social Services team(particularly for counselling) was not only discounted but wascompletely ignored by the formal, established, agencies. Thisadded to the emotional stress experienced by many of theevacuees, and was preventable.The blurred images, both perceptual and administrative, of thevarious agencies involved (the City of Parksville, the ProvincialEmergency Program, the Ministry of Social Services, and the localSociety of Organized Services) are then addressed. There wasconfusion in the minds of the evacuees regarding who should beproviding the recovery services, and who was responsible forcoordinating the response to the multiple needs of the evacuees.The chapter concludes that many problems are attributable to theorganizational structure of emergency preparedness in BritishColumbia, and are not unique to the Parksville experience.134CHAPTER 7 - ANALYSIS7.1 INTRODUCTION As explained in the introduction to this thesis, in majoremergencies or disasters there is a need for an expandableresponse capability which may involve a number of differentagencies, both governmental and private, in a coordinated effortto respond to the increased demands of the abnormal situation.In such abnormal circumstances the existing, (formal) emergencyservices and the expanded, but temporary, (informal) emergencyservices should complement each other, with the activities ofeach being properly coordinated so that the overall responsemeets the needs of the situation. Although this operationalrequirement would seem to be obvious, this thesis has shown thatthis is not the case.This chapter examines some of the factors which have contributedto this present situation. It concludes that there areperceptual, jurisdictional and administrative problems with thepresent organizational structure of emergency preparedness inBritish Columbia, which perpetuate the isolation of EmergencySocial Services from the other branches of emergency response,rather than integrating it into the overall emergency responseprocess. This will inhibit the effective delivery of suchservices to victims of major emergency and disaster situationswhen the need is greatest.1357.2 PROBLEMS WITH THE LEGISLATIONMany of the problems discussed in this thesis are attributableto the obsolete emergency legislation, which is in urgent need ofamendment. Although, as noted, the Provincial Emergency Program(PEP) has recommended that new legislation be introduced, and theamended legislation has been drafted, it has not yet beenaccepted by the Provincial Government. The delay in introducingthe new legislation suggests that the Provincial Government doesnot appreciate the potentially disastrous consequences which arelatent in the current state of emergency preparedness in BritishColumbia. It further suggests a lack of awareness of thedifficulties and frustration being experienced by the emergencyplanning community, in both the public and private sectors.Planning for peacetime disasters, both man-made and natural, hastaken many years to reach even its present level of acceptance.Indeed, the governing emergency legislation is virtually thesame as it was forty years ago, and much of the language stillreflects an emphasis on a civil defence capability for wartimeemergencies, rather than for peacetime emergency situations,which motivates emergency planning activity in today's society.The consequence of this unfortunate reality is that much of thelegislation is inconsistent or ambiguous, particularly regardingwhat planning activity is discretionary and what is mandatory.The Emergency Program Act, 1979 (which evolved from the CivilDefence Act, 1951) uses mostly discretionary language andauthorizes, rather than requires, municipalities to plan for136emergencies. However, the intent of the original legislationmust, surely, have been to provide the legal authority to theProvincial Government, and the municipalities, to establish aneffective emergency response capability, without resorting to theuse of mandatory language. Given the 'cold war' atmosphere ofthe 1950s, the need for emergency preparedness must have seemedself-evident, as it should today, if not for the same reasons.Because there has been no clearly stated directive from theProvincial Government requiring municipalities to plan foremergencies, the extent to which municipal governments are indeedresponsible for emergency planning is still unclear. Although,as discussed, some provincial funding is available through PEP toencourage emergency planning at the local government level, theamount is limited and falls short of the emergency planning needsof the municipalities.The situation regarding who has the legislative responsibilityfor the planning and delivery of Emergency Social Services isparticularly confusing. As noted in Chapter 2, the concept ofusing informal volunteer groups to supplement establishedemergency response agencies is not addressed in the emergencyliterature, and the wording of the legislation suggests that theMinistry of Social Services is responsibility for providing thoseservices now known as Emergency Social Services.However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the legislation has beeninterpreted to mean that the Ministry is not required directly toplan for ESS for municipalities, and is only responsible for the137delivery of ESS in extreme circumstances when a provincialemergency has been declared. The Ministry's position is thatmunicipalities are responsible for providing Emergency SocialServices. It perceives its role to be limited to "providingassistance" to municipalities to plan for the delivery of ESS(as for other emergency services), and for the operation of theFinancial Services component of municipal ESS plans.However, there is a widely held perception that it is theMinistry, rather than the municipalities, which has overallresponsibility for ensuring that Emergency Social Services areprovided, and that, as noted in Chapter 4, the municipalities aremerely acting as "agents" of the Provincial Government. Clearly,there is an urgent need to eliminate any uncertainty regardingwhich level of government has the primary responsibility for theestablishment and maintenance of local ESS programs.Legislation to clarify the respective roles and responsibilitiesof the Provincial Government and the municipal governments islong overdue and highly desirable. A major recommendation in theProvincial Emergency Program's Evaluation Study (PEP, 1987) wasthat the provincial legislation should require municipalities toplan for, and respond to, emergencies which occur within theirgeographic jurisdiction. This recommendation is reaffirmed inthe most recent proposals for amending the Emergency PreparednessAct, which would require municipalities to prepare and developlocal emergency plans and programs and (in addition) wouldrequire municipalities to provide Emergency Social Services.138These proposed amendments to the principal piece of emergencypreparedness legislation in British Columbia are consistent withthe conclusions of this thesis, and, if enacted, will help toreduce much of the uncertainty regarding the relativeresponsibilities of the Ministry of Social Services and municipalgovernments, particularly regarding the "ownership" of EmergencySocial Services.1397.3 MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SERVICES / EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICESAs explained in the introduction to this thesis, the rationalefor Emergency Social Services is to supplement the establishedmunicipal resources in order to provide an expanded emergencyresponse capability. It should be noted that the intent is tosupplement, rather than to replace what is already there withsomething 'new and improved'.Although the distinction between the day-to-day responsibilitiesof MSS staff and those of volunteer-based ESS teams does havesome validity, in practice there is no clearly defined point atwhich the services of ESS personnel will be required, and thetransition from the established MSS organizational structure tothe expanded ESS organization is unclear. Also, the question ofhow these ESS (informal) players are to be integrate with theestablished (formal) MSS personnel is not clearly understood bymany ESS volunteers.With the exception of Registration and Inquiry (an emergencyservice which has no day-to-day equivalent, and which has beenspecifically assigned to the Canadian Red Cross Society), theservices known as Emergency Social Services are similar to thoseprovided routinely by MSS personnel (Food, Clothing, Lodging,etc.). In major emergencies the principle differences are thescale of the operation necessary to handle the increased numbersof people affected by the emergency, and the means by which theservices are processed and delivered, which may require thesetting up of Emergency Reception Centres.140There is no question that situations requiring EmergencyReception Centres will certainly require more personnel thanwould normally be available through the local offices of theMinistry of Social Services, and would, therefore, involve ESSvolunteers. However, as noted, moderately sized emergencies maywell exceed the ability of the established organization (i.e.,The Ministry) to respond adequately and, although EmergencyReception Centres may not be required, there may still be a needfor some, if not all, of the Emergency Social Services.Clearly, this lack of formal distinction between the 'normal'emergency services provided by the Ministry, and those 'EmergencySocial Services' to be provided by ESS volunteers in abnormalcircumstances, raises jurisdictional questions regarding how toshare the responsibility and who should be the lead agency inemergency situations of increasing scale and complexity, fromcrises to disasters.This is particularly troublesome in situations where EmergencyReception Centres are not required, as was the case followingthe flooding at Parksville. Although responsibility for ESS inParksville had been delegated to the Society of OrganizedServices (S.O.S.), the actual response to the flooding took placewith no formal involvement of any S.O.S. personnel, who wereavailable to assist the evacuees.The ESS model, as promulgated by the Ministry, assumes that theESS Director is the overall leader of the ESS component of theemergency response operation, but the Parksville experience141demonstrates a basic problem with this assumption. The factthat the ESS Director was not formally notified that EmergencySocial Services might be required, suggests that neither the Cityofficials nor the established MSS personnel regarded the servicesof the volunteer-component to be necessary. There may also havebeen some reluctance on the part of the established agencies torelinquish their authority and control. This would be consistentwith the perceptual-bias in favour of established (formal)agencies, discussed in Chapter 2.Also, as discussed in the next section, under the present ESSmodel it is assumed that the ESS plan will be activated after themunicipal Emergency Response Committee (ERC) has met to assessthe situation, and has determined that Emergency Social Servicesare necessary. In the Parksville case study, the municipal ERCdid not meet and there was no formal activation of the ESS plan.However, it is possible that this formal procedure was preemptedby the arrival in Parksville of the ESS Director, a resident ofQualicum Beach, who proceded to act on her own initiative. TheESS Director stated that her immediate involvement was necessarybecause there appeared to be no coordinated attempt on the partof the established agencies to address the needs of the evacueesbeyond the provision of food and shelter. Clearly, there weredifferent perceptions regarding the needs of the evacuees, andthe roles of the agencies involved, particularly regarding therelative responsibility of the Ministry of Social Services andthe community-based Emergency Social Service volunteers.1427.4 ESTABLISHED (FORMAL) / VOLUNTEER (INFORMAL) AGENCIESThe standard response to a major emergency is that the membersof a municipality's Emergency Response Committee will meet at theEmergency Operations Centre to assess the situation, and willthen take the appropriate action. Under the present model, thedecision regarding whether Emergency Social Services arerequired, and whether or not it is necessary to open EmergencyReception Centres, is made by the Emergency Response Committee.Generally, (but not always) this committee includes the ESSDirector who, when authorized, activates the ESS plan byinitiating the call-out procedure.Because ESS is not part of the "in group" of the establishedemergency response agencies, and is perceived as being a separateorganization under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of SocialServices, this procedure is likely to delay the activation of theESS plan. However, as demonstrated in the Parksville experience,in moderately sized emergencies the Emergency Response Committeemay not meet. In such situations it may be assumed that theperceptual bias in favour of the established agencies at theexpense of the informal volunteer groups, discussed above, willhave the effect of not only delaying the decision that EmergencySocial Services are needed, but may preclude the involvement ofESS personnel entirely.As noted, the emergency planning literature makes no distinctionbetween the organizational requirements for Emergency SocialServices and those of other emergency services, but, on the143contrary, treats them as an integral part of a total responsecapability. Clearly, in extreme situations the formal emergencyagencies play a major role in the response to the situation, buttheir contribution is not preeminent, and should not diminish theequally important contribution of the informal, volunteer-based,Emergency Social Services component of emergency planning.The literature suggests that established response agencies,which have clearly defined tasks carried out by their own highlytrained personnel, tend to focus on the specific tasks with whichthey are most familiar, and are likely to be perceived as beingmore effective than informal groups with more general, lessspecific, tasks and a much looser command structure, such as isthe case with the volunteer-based Emergency Social Services.Further, the literature suggests that the authority structurewhich exists prior to a disaster forms the foundation for theauthority structure which prevails during a disaster, and thatthere is a tendency for established agencies to communicate morewithin their own groups than with other groups, although suchother groups may have an important part to play in the overallemergency response process. This can lead to conflicts and alack of coordination between the different response agencies.Clearly, in the Parksville experience the Area Coordinatorassumed that, because the major problem of accommodation had beendealt with, and because Ministry of Social Services personnelwere involved, the multiple needs of the evacuees were also undercontrol. Again, it should be stressed that the involvement of144the City of Parksville was really by default (in the absence ofemergency planning on the part of the Nanaimo Regional District),a state of emergency was never declared, and the City's EmergencyProgram Committee was not formally involved.The case study demonstrates that the established authorities didnot perceive the emergency to be serious enough to require theactivation of the Emergency Social Services component of theParksville Emergency Plan. This perception is largely based ona lack of awareness of the full range of services which evacueesmay require. Because Emergency Social Services has been treatedas an adjunct to the established emergency response agencies forso many years, it is not surprising that the contribution ofvolunteer-based groups in the overall emergency response processis deemed to be of lesser importance and, therefore, does notmerit the same attention and support.The PEP Courtenay Zone Manager went so far as to describe whattook place as a "non-event". This detached assessment of theeffects of the flooding was echoed in discussions between thewriter and the Area Coordinator for Parksville, and with the MSSDistrict Supervisor, the general attitude being that the responsewas adequate, and that the flood-victims had only themselves toblame for being so foolish as to live in an area known to besubject to flooding.When viewed in terms of the limited emergency response requiredto meet the immediate demands of the situation, and the limitedimpact on the community as a whole, this "no big deal" assessment145of the event was not totally unreasonable. However, this shouldnot obscure the reality that people could have been seriouslyinjured or killed as a result of the flooding, and the fact thatthis was not the case was more the result of good fortune thanof any prior planning on the part of the responsible agencies tomitigate the hazard. Indeed, when viewed from the point of viewof the residents of the Martindale area who had been in fear oftheir lives and who had been forced to leave their homes andpossessions to the mercy of the rising flood water, this was inno way a "non-event", and deserved a more compassionate response.1467.5 MANAGEMENT OF EMERGENCY SOCIAL SERVICESAs discussed in Chapter 3, a basic assumption of the volunteerliterature is that effective volunteer organizations are partof an established organizational framework, and that volunteeractivities supplement the services provided by establishedprofessional personnel. There is also an assumption that theservices provided by volunteers are coordinated by managementstaff who provide the support necessary to sustain them.Clearly, this is not the case in Emergency Social Services,where in most municipalities the leader of the team (i.e., TheESS Director) is also a volunteer who, once appointed, assumesfull responsibility for all aspects of the ESS program, withlittle management support, and virtually no funding. It isimperative, therefore, that the individuals charged with thisonerous responsibility have the time, the management skills,the resources, and the political support to carry out the task.If these conditions are not met, the process of developing andmaintaining an effective ESS response capability and, mostimportantly, the actual delivery of such social services to thecommunity in times of greatest need, will most likely fall shortof their theoretical objectives, or may fail completely.This statement is not intended to devalue the contribution of theexisting ESS Directors in municipalities throughout the province,who are attempting to respond to the multiple requirements of theposition. Indeed, the weaknesses in the ESS organizationalstructure are systemic, and are in no way attributable to a lack147of idealism or dedication on the part of the ESS Directors andother volunteers, whose efforts to create and maintain effectiveESS programs are laudable. The key point is that such dedicationmust be supported, both administratively and financially, nottaken for granted and abused.The turnover of ESS Directors is a symptom of the problems whichplague ESS organizations throughout British Columbia. As pointedout in Chapter 3, many of the factors considered most likely tocontribute to the failure of volunteer organizations exist in thepresent ESS organizational structure. These include: unclear orcontradictory goals (particularly regarding the responsibilitiesshared with the Ministry); no plan or timetable to meet goals;too many open-ended goals; too little financial support; and noformalized management to coordinate such volunteer activity.This situation is further aggravated by the sense of isolationfelt by ESS groups relative to the established emergency responseagencies within the municipalities. Ministry data confirms thatin many communities there is very little communication betweenthe Area Coordinators and the ESS Directors, the perception beingthat ESS is the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Servicesand, therefore, the ESS teams will somehow provide the servicesneeded in a major emergency independently, with little supportfrom other municipal agencies. This perception may account forwhy, until recently, there was no reference to Emergency SocialServices in the PEP criteria for municipal grants, and why somemunicipalities did not have ESS representation on their EmergencyPlanning Committees.148As pointed out above, a major requirement for the success ofany organization is effective leadership and support. This isparticularly important in organizations which rely heavily on theuse of the volunteers, but is critical for an organization likeEmergency Social Services which is expected to provide essentialemergency services to hundreds of evacuees after a disaster,under conditions of great stress and uncertainty.Given the magnitude of the task, it is unrealistic to expect thatthese organizational deficiencies will somehow be made up by theextra commitment and dedication of the volunteers themselves, itis precisely these qualities which should be nurtured to beeffective, and which require professional management and supportto ensure the viability and continuity of the Emergency SocialServices program in British Columbia.1497.6 MINISTRY OF SOCIAL SERVICES / PROVINCIAL EMERGENCY PROGRAMThe general public is not aware of the distinction betweenthe role of the Provincial Emergency Program and other agencies,particularly the Ministry of Social Services. In times of severeemotional stress, such as was present in the aftermath of theParksville flooding, the administrative subtleties of whichagency actually has responsibility for providing those servicesidentified as Emergency Social Services is of far less importanceto the persons in need than that the services be delivered.If, therefore, the process of providing Emergency Social Servicesin major emergency situations (when the need for such services ismost acute) is made more difficult by the continued bureaucraticseparation of agencies with various degrees of jurisdiction andresponsibility, it is appropriate to question why such separationcontinues to be advocated. Discussions with Ministry and PEPpersonnel regarding why ESS is treated differently from the otheremergency response services, and why it is not included under theaegis of the Provincial Emergency Program, suggest that theassumptions on which the present model is based have not beenseriously challenged. It appears that the ambiguous relationshipbetween the Ministry of Social Services and the ProvincialEmergency Program, which has existed for so many years, is onewhich neither agency is anxious to clarify or change.1507.7 INTEGRATION OF EMERGENCY SERVICESThe analysis of the response to the flooding at Parksvilleleads to the conclusion that the representatives of the City ofParksville, the Ministry of Social Services, and the ProvincialEmergency Program each thought that they had responded in anappropriate manner and had fulfilled their commitments to theevacuees. Clearly, there were differences of perceptionregarding the needs of the situation, based mainly on theseparation of functions, which prevented the various agenciesfrom appreciating the need for additional services at the edgesof their respective jurisdictions.It appears that nobody thought to include the ESS Director in anydiscussions regarding what possible additional services might beprovided by the local ESS organization. This illustrates thevery narrow perception of the role of the ESS volunteers in theminds of the established emergency response organizations, andemphasizes the need for a more integrated approach.However, since this thesis was started in 1989, there have beena number of interesting developments in the area of EmergencySocial Services which, though falling short of a major change ofpolicy regarding how these services should be delivered, and whoshould be the controlling agency, demonstrate a significantmovement towards a more integrated approach to emergencypreparedness throughout the province of British Columbia.151An indication of a changing attitude towards Emergency SocialServices may be seen in the creation of a new position in theDepartment of Emergency Management at the City of Vancouver.This person will assist the Director (an equivalent position tothat of an Area Coordinator in other municipalities) in allemergency preparedness activities, and will also serve as theEmergency Social Services Director for the City of Vancouver.As noted previously, most ESS Directors are volunteers, or carryout their ESS functions as an adjunct to their regular employmentactivities. The hiring by the City of Vancouver of a secondfull-time staff person, linking both the established (formal) andthe volunteer (informal) components of emergency preparedness,signals the fact that the City has accepted the principle thatEmergency Social Services is an integral part of a coordinatedemergency response capability, which must be incorporated intothe overall planning, rather than treated in isolation.However, it is also signals the acceptance by the City ofVancouver that, notwithstanding the lack of any legislationrequiring municipalities to provide Emergency Social Services,and the lack of provincial funding for such services, theassumption of responsibility for the delivery of ESS by localgovernments is appropriate. Certainly, the increased visibilityof ESS in the emergency planning for the largest municipality inB.C. is significant.152A further indication of a changing attitude towards ESS, whichis perhaps even more significant because of its province-wideapplication, is that the PEP Academy of the Justice Institute ofB.C. (which provides extensive training programs for the police,fire departments, search and rescue groups, etc.), in cooperationwith the Ministry of Social Services, has recently hired a full-time ESS instructor, and will be providing courses designedspecifically for ESS personnel. These courses will be offeredboth at the PEP Academy in Vancouver and throughout the province.Clearly, the linking of the training functions of the PEP Academyand of the Ministry of Social Services has practical and economicadvantages in terms of the sharing of facilities and expertise,but it will also serve to identify Emergency Social Services as avital part of a integrated emergency response process. Recentchanges will help to break down some of the perceptual barriersthat have discounted the role of Emergency Social Services andhave kept it isolated from other emergency response agencies.When questioned about the new ESS position, and the gradual shifttowards a more integrated approach to emergency preparedness inBritish Columbia, the Director of the PEP Academy explained that...the field of emergency planning needs to be approached from aholistic point of view, and the inclusion of Emergency SocialServices training at the PEP Academy is a logical extension ofthis philosophy". It is to be hoped that this approach will notonly enhance the visibility of ESS, but will increase the overalleffectiveness of emergency planning throughout the province, inthe best interest of all British Columbians.153CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS8.1 THESIS REVIEWThis thesis has served to identify some fundamental problems inthe way in which the organizational structure for emergencyplanning, particularly planning for Emergency Social Services,has been established in British Columbia. Many of these problemsare attributable to the obsolete legislation which has evolvedover the past 40 years, and has served to split the emergencypreparedness community into two administrative camps.The emergency preparedness establishment includes the formalemergency response agencies, which have highly trained personnelwho respond to day-to-day emergencies, and which form the basisof the Provincial Emergency Program (PEP). However, in majoremergency or disaster situations, the incorporation of thesupplementary system known as Emergency Social Services, based,primarily, on informally structured groups of volunteers, theresponsibility for which is not clearly defined, becomes a keyfactor in the overall responseIn such major emergency situations, the role of the establishedagencies remains substantially the same, and they carry on withtheir regular tasks and, to the extent possible, continue todeliver the same services which they are trained to provide. Incontrast, the Emergency Social Services component, because it isrequired so infrequently and is manned by volunteers with very154limited first-hand emergency experience or training, is at adistinct disadvantage. It is disconcerting, therefore, toconsider that in major emergency situations, when the need forprofessionally-managed emergency response services is greatest,the actual response is predicated on the involvement of what isin effect an outside agency with little, if any, operationalcontact with the formal agencies.Clearly, if the task of providing a flexible and efficientemergency response capability for a community is consideredobjectively, without the established territorial of legislativepreconceptions, the present system does not immediately presentitself for consideration. Therefore, the important question tobe asked is, given the reality of the present system, and theresistance to change, what can be done to make the organizationalstructure of emergency planning in British Columbia moreadaptable and responsive to the changeable demands of emergenciesof all types and sizes?One of the difficulties with the present ESS model is that thereis no clearly defined point at which Emergency Social Servicesvolunteers are required, and in many situations the decision toinvolve ESS personnel is somewhat discretionary. Under themodel, because Emergency Social Services is thought of as anadjunct to the established response agencies, none of the ESScomponent functions become part of the official response to thesituation until the decision is made that they are required.155In other words, ESS is outside the process until the specificdecision is made that it should become part of the process,rather than the alternative approach in which ESS would beregarded as an on-going and fully integrated part of the overallemergency response process. This latter approach would provide agreater degree of flexibility, and would allow ESS resources tobe accessed to the degree required, with the minimum of delay.Clearly, in moderately sized emergencies, particularly where noEmergency Reception Centres are required, as was the case in theParksville flooding, the question of whether or not to involvethe ESS volunteers, and if so, to what degree, becomes criticallyimportant.In the Parksville experience one of the factors which was largelyoverlooked by the authorities was the cumulative effect of thestress on the evacuees which was the result of the repetitivenature of the event, and its duration. Many of the evacuees wereforced to evacuate their homes twice, and in some cases threetimes, to escape the rising flood waters. In hindsight, the needfor crisis counselling and other personal services to relieve theemotional hardship experienced by the evacuees seems obvious.However, it appears that from the perspective of the formalagencies, the needs of the situation were never quite severeenough to require additional "outside" assistance.1568.2 CONCLUSIONSAlthough this thesis has identified a number of emergencyplanning and response issues which need to be addressed, theissues which are most important in the context of EmergencySocial Services are captured in the following major conclusions:1) Emergency legislation in British Columbia has evolved overthe past 40 years and has created an administrativedistinction between the formal emergency response agencies,which are administered through the Provincial EmergencyProgram (PEP), and the informal, volunteer-based, EmergencySocial Services, which falls within the purview of the B.C.Ministry of Social Services.2) This distinction is not supported by the formal emergencyliterature, and is not in the best interest of our society(the raison d'etre for emergency planning) because itreinforces the perception that the Emergency Social Servicesorganizational structure is an adjunct to the establishedorder, rather than regarding it as a integral part of anexpanded emergency response capability of a municipality.3) There is an obvious and urgent need to amend the emergencylegislation in British Columbia, in order to eliminate areasof inconsistency, ambiguity, or uncertainty, particularlyregarding the relative responsibilities of the Ministry ofSocial Services and of municipal governments.1574) An important requirement of any successful organization isgood management and support, without which the organizationwill likely fall short of its objectives, or may failcompletely. In a volunteer-based organization like EmergencySocial Services, which is expected to provide vital servicesto large numbers of people, under conditions of great stressand uncertainty, and where the consequences of failure toperform up to expectations are so severe, this requirement isnot merely important, but is essential, and professionalmanagement and support must be provided to ensure itsviability.1588.3 RECOMMENDATIONSA) That the emergency legislation should be amended to requireMunicipalities (and Regional Districts) to plan for, andrespond to, emergencies which occur within their geographicjurisdiction.B) That such planning should include Emergency Social Services,as a integral part of the overall emergency responsecapability of a municipality.C) That the role of the Ministry of Social Services should beamended to reflect the reality of its obvious desire totransfer formal responsibility for Emergency Social Servicesto the municipalities, and to reduce its formal EmergencySocial Services obligations to Financial Services.D) That professional management and support be provided forEmergency Social Services, as presently provided for othermunicipal emergency response agencies, to ensure thedevelopment and maintenance of an effective Emergency SocialServices response capability throughout British Columbia.E) That such management of Emergency Social Services be providedby salaried municipal staff, qualified in business and humanresource management, and assigned specifically for the task.F) That administrative and clerical support be provided, andadequate funding be allocated, consistent with othermunicipal emergency response agencies.159BIBLIOGRAPHYBaltz, D. "How A Disaster Differs From An Emergency...CountriesShould Develop Systems For Dealing With Both", EmergencyPlanning Digest, January-March, 1982.Barton, A.H. Social Organizations Under Stress: A SociologicalReview Of Disaster Studies, Washington: National Academy ofScience-National Research Council, 1963.Barton, A.H. Communities In Disaster: A Sociological Analysis OfCollective Stress Situations, Garden City, New York:Doubleday and Company Inc., 1969.Bresnick, D.A. Managing The Human Services In Hard Times, NewYork, Human Services Press, 1983.Cooper, F.D. "The Prediction No One Wants To Hear: The Great'Quake", Emergency Preparedness Digest, October-December,1987.Drabek, T.E. Human System Responses To Disaster: An Inventory OfSociological Findings, Springer-Verlag New York Inc., 1986.Drabek, T.E. "Shall We Leave? A Study On Family Reactions WhenDisaster Strikes", Emergency Management Review, 1 (Fall),1983.Dynes, R.R. 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