Open Collections

UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Collective bargaining under a compulsory conciliation system in the British Columbia coast forest industry… Anderson, Clifford Houlton 1971

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Notice for Google Chrome users:
If you are having trouble viewing or searching the PDF with Google Chrome, please download it here instead.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1971_A8 A53.pdf [ 7.13MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0302217.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0302217-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0302217-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0302217-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0302217-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0302217-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0302217-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0302217-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0302217.ris

Full Text

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING UNDER A COMPULSORY CONCILIATION SYSTEM IN THE BRITISH COLUMBIA COAST FOREST INDUSTRY 1947-1968 by CLIFFORD HOULTON ANDERSON B.A., University of C a l i f o r n i a , Berkeley, 1967 J.D., U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , Hastings College of the Law, 1970 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Economics We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1971 In p r e s e n t i n g t h i s t h e s i s in p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t t he U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I a g r e e t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and s t u d y . I f u r t h e r ag ree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e c o p y i n g o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y pu rpo se s may be g r a n t e d by the Head o f my Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s u n d e r s t o o d t h a t c o p y i n g o r p u b l i c a t i o n o f t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n p e r m i s s i o n . Department o f E c o n o m i c s The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co l umb i a Vancouve r 8, Canada ABSTRACT This thesis examines the behavior of bargaining parties under a statutory scheme of compulsory conciliation. The statutory scheme used in the study is the basic pat-tern of conciliation effective in B r i t i s h Columbia from 1947 to 1968. Its general function is explained in a summarization of published criticisms of the process. A particular bargaining relationship — that of the coast forest industry negotiations — is examined on a historical and i n s t i -tutional basis to discover specific characteristics which would i n -fluence behavior under a conciliation process. Using this predicted pattern of interaction, a model of party behavior is constructed for the parties involved in actual negotiations. This is tested against a summarized chronology of the actual bargaining that occurred from 1947 to 1968. The model reveals the important sections within a system of compulsory conciliation which influence the behavior of the parties during negotiations. It also emphasizes the importance of the apparent fairness of the recommendation stage of conciliation and i t s value to the union as a tactical "watershed" for continued bargaining. The development of the dynamic process of party interaction in the coast forest industry emphasizes the importance of union internal or intra-organizational d i f f i c u l t i e s . It suggests the existence of a i i l i l limit to the effectiveness of any bargaining system which, does not con-tr o l the desires of the union rank and f i l e . With the dynamic process in mind, the analysis examines some of the influences that changing the statutory process would have upon the behavior of the parties. On this basis the actual significance or effectiveness of some past changes is analyzed and new changes are proposed. Too^ the basic limits inherent in the compulsory conciliation system as a control over party behavior are emphasized. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page LIST OF TABLES v l LIST OF CHARTS v i i LIST OF MAPS v i i i Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION . . . 1 2. A GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATUTE 5 3. THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES . . . 12 A. Organization of A Union i n B.C. Forestry ,14 B. Union Structure and Internal Government 26 C. Summary of the I n s t i t u t i o n a l C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the Union 31 D. Employers and Their Association 32 E. The State 33 F. Summary of Chapter Three: I n s t i t u t i o n a l Factors . 35 4. AN INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC MODEL OF NEGOTIATION UNDER COMPULSORY CONCILIATION 36 5. THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS 1947-19.68 47 A. The I n d u s t r i a l C o n c i l i a t i o n and A r b i t r a t i o n Act: 1947 - 1954 48 B. 1954 to 1961 66 C. Summary: 1954 to 1961 77 D. 1961 to 1968 80 E. Summary: 1961 to 1968 87 i v Page 6. EVALUATION OF THE MODEL 91 7. EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE PROCESS . 105 8. A CONCLUDING VIEW OF COMPULSORY CONCILIATION . . . . . 116 BIBLIOGRAPHY 121 APPENDIXES 125 I. CONTRACT SUMMARIES 126 I I . ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 132 I I I . WAGE COMPARISONS 137 IV. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 142 v LIST OF TABLES Table Page I. EXTENT OF PROCESS UTILIZATION 90 I I . BI-MONTHLY INDEX OF LUMBER PRICES 1953-1968 . . . . 133 I I I . PRODUCTION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA COAST FOREST INDUSTRY 135 IV. EMPLOYMENT AND HOURS IN THE COASTAL LOGGING INDUSTRY 136 V. INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS' OF AMERICA COMMON LABOUR RATES 138 VI. ANNUAL AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES IN THREE BRITISH COLUMBIA INDUSTRIES 140 VII. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 142 v i LIST OF CHARTS Chart Page 1. PRICES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA LUMBER 134 2. INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS' OF AMERICA COMMON LABOUR RATES . . 139 3. AVERAGE HOURLY WAGES IN THREE BRITISH COLUMBIA INDUSTRIES 141 4. INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA 143 v i i LIST OF MAPS FOREST DISTRICT AND COAST-INTERIOR BOUNDARIES viii CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION This paper analyzes the process of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n en-forced i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining negotiations i n B r i t i s h Columbia from 1947 to 1968. More p a r t i c u l a r l y , i t explains the behavior of the bargaining pa r t i e s during the c o n c i l i a t i o n process. An i n v e s t i g a t i o n i s made of the influence of l a t e r stages of c o n c i l i a t i o n upon the e a r l i e r stages, i . e . : to what degree does a n t i c i p a t i o n of l a t e r stages of c o n c i l i a t i o n a l t e r be-havior i n e a r l i e r stages? Also examined are changes of behavior of the part i e s over successive years of c o n c i l i a t i o n u t i l i z a t i o n . For example, i s the process stable over a period of time? By discovering how the c o n c i l i a t i o n process influences the bar-gaining p a r t i c i p a n t s , knowledge may be gained of ways to make the process more e f f e c t i v e i n ensuring i n d u s t r i a l peace. A general d e s c r i p t i v e model of the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n process i s presented by u t i l i z i n g c r i t i c a l analyses of the c o n c i l i a t i o n process which e x i s t i n the l i t e r a t u r e . These studies were made by looking at the actual statutory process i n operation. In constructing a t h e o r e t i c a l model of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n , a p a r t i c u -l a r bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p was i s o l a t e d . Case h i s t o r i e s which revealed a stable bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p through the statutory period, 1947-1968, were selected for t h i s purpose. More s p e c i f i c a l l y , p a r t i e s to the coast f o r e s t industry negotia-tions are examined to reveal p a r t i c u l a r i n s t i t u t i o n a l and h i s t o r i c a l 1 2 c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . By evaluating backgrounds and structures of the p a r t i e s to the negotiation, a model of behavior under compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n nego-t i a t i o n s i s thus created. This "forest industry negotiation model i s tested against a contract-by-contract exposition of the actual behavior of the p a r t i e s over the period. In t h i s way, the predicted behavior of the par-t i e s i s compared with a summarized version of t h e i r actual behavior. The e f f i c a c y of the model's a b i l i t y to p r edict behavior under the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n scheme may be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n of the model's effectiveness i n explaining the same c o n c i l i a t i o n process. This model may then be used to suggest ways of modifying the statutes to better regulate the behavior of the p a r t i e s . Within l i m i t s , the relevance of the model to the f o r e s t r y negotiations may be extended to c o l l e c t i v e bargain-ing negotiations i n general. The analysis proceeds on a step-by-step b a s i s . Chapter Two examines the p r o v i n c i a l c o n c i l i a t i o n process under i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Observations and c r i t i c i s m s applicable to the c o n c i l i a t i o n system, as i t has existed i n B r i t i s h Columbia and elsewhere, are developed. These comments then provide a general p i c t u r e of the e f f e c t s of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n upon bargaining negotiations. Chapter Three examines the background and organization of the parti e s to the coast f o r e s t industry negotiations: union, employers, em-ployer bargaining organization, and state. The union's h i s t o r y , structure and i n t e r n a l p o l i c i e s are studied for c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which, would tend to influence i t s behavior. The i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s h i p between the state and the employers i s examined to i n d i c a t e how the state i s able to influence the 3 bargaining process. The influence of p a r t i c u l a r employers over the em-ployers' agent, FIE. i s also discussed. A l l such p a r t i c u l a r conditions are compiled for the purpose of projecting s p e c i f i c p r e dictions of party behavior. Based upon these conditions, Chapter Four creates our forest industry negotiating model which operates under the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures for c o l l e c t i v e bargaining as discussed i n Chapter Two. This model u t i l i z e s the general information i n Chapter Two and i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s to predict the behavior of the p a r t i e s . This model i s tested against the h i s t o r i c a l record of actual c o l l e c t i v e bargaining nego-t i a t i o n s i n the f o r e s t industry from 1947 to 1968. Actual records of the negotiations provide the important events of each bargaining year and these are developed i n chronological order. Statutory requirements, where relevant, are included along with s i g n i f i c a n t resultant changes i n the status of the bargaining p a r t i e s . Chapter Five thus represents the con-t r o l for t e s t i n g the model. Chapter Six outlines r e s u l t s of the comparison between the pre-d i c t i o n s of the model and the actual events represented i n Chapter Fi v e . The model i s evaluated on i t s a b i l i t y to explain the mechanisms of compul-sory c o n c i l i a t i o n within the industry. The various changes which occurred within the actual c o n c i l i a t i o n process are analyzed i n Chapter Seven. The general effectiveness of the present and other proposed changes i n the statutes are discussed. In the f i n a l chapter, Chapter Eight, the general s i g n i f i c a n c e of the model's process of party i n t e r a c t i o n i s examined both i n respect 4 to the industry i t s e l f and the negotiations in general. An attempt is made to combine the general comments of Chapter Two and the process des-cribed in Chapters Six and Seven. A general emphasis is given both the influence of recommendations and the intra-organizational processes of the union. These offer the two most c r i t i c a l areas for more effective regula-tion of bargaining within a compulsory conciliation system. CHAPTER TWO A GENERAL VIEW OF THE STATUTE The process of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n i n operation i n B r i t i s h Columbia from 1947 to 1968 has been described as a "unique Canadian ex-perience.""'" I t was the r e s u l t of two separate developments i n Canadian labour law: . the compulsory mediation of labour disputes beginning i n 2 1907 with the I n d u s t r i a l Disputes and Investigation Act; the process of c e r t i f i c a t i o n of labour unions and enactment of requirement of c o l l e c t i v e 3 4 bargaining i n World War 2. ' The process of c e r t i f i c a t i o n underwent minor changes over the years but remained b a s i c a l l y unchanged. A union could become c e r t i f i e d as the exclusive bargaining agent f o r a group of employees by gaining majority worker support. Within a stated period p r i o r to expi r a t i o n of an e x i s t i n g labour contract, either party could require the other to j o i n i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining over terms of the new labour contract. Donald J. M. Brown, Interest Arbitration (Ottawa: Task Force of Labour Relations, 1970), p. 243. 2C.S. 1907, c. 20. 3 Order i n Council (PC 1003), February 1944 and others. 4 For a b r i e f h i s t o r y of this l e g i s l a t i o n , see H. D. Woods, "Cana-dian C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and Dispute Settlement P o l i c y : An A p p r a i s a l , " The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Volume XXI, (November, 1955), pp. 447-63. 5 6 I f , a f t e r a s p e c i f i c time, bargaining was unsuccessful i n reach-ing agreement on terms of a new contract, a government appointed c o n c i l i -a tion o f f i c e r could be brought i n at the request of e i t h e r party to help b r i n g p a r t i e s to agreement. If he f a i l e d to do so within a time l i m i t a -t i o n (subject to s p e c i a l extensions conferred by the minister of labour), a second l e v e l of government intervention was applied. In l a t e r years th i s second l e v e l became optional on the part of the government. E a r l i e r i t was i n s t i t u t e d at the request of e i t h e r party or the government. The second l e v e l of intervention involved hearings to a r r i v e at proposed terms for r e s o l v i n g the dispute. This higher l e v e l consisted generally of one nominee from each side and a chairman selected by the nominees. [Later i n the 1947-1968 period, s i n g l e members selected by the government brought i n recommendations]. The majority determined the recommendations. The recommendations were then submitted to the disput-ants for acceptance or r e j e c t i o n by b a l l o t . Only i f the e n t i r e process was completed and the recommendations were rejected by a party, could the party resort to a s t r i k e or lockout. The p a r t i e s did not gain the r i g h t to use the s t r i k e or lock-out weapon even i f the contract had expired during the compulsory processes of c o n c i l i a t i o n . Penalties were imposed i n the case of e i t h e r an i l l e g a l l y struck or locked out plant during the process period. Various motives may be ascribed to the p r o v i n c i a l authority r e q u i r i n g such a process of c o n c i l i a t i o n during a bargaining process. For instance, i f we assume that the state f e e l s that c o l l e c t i v e bargain-ing i s a desirable method of achieving the terms of an employment r e l a t i o n -7 ship, then mandatory c o l l e c t i v e bargaining i s one way of i n s t i t u t i n g i t . C e r t i f i c a t i o n of unions may be assumed to be valuable for preventing recognitional disputes; t h i s , however, i s a topic not within the scope of t h i s paper. When i n d u s t r i a l peace becomes the sole motive of the state, then the process of c o n c i l i a t i o n may be taken as i n s t i t u t e d e x c l u s i v e l y f or the purpose of ensuring a peaceful conclusion to the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process. The motive of the government, however, may be stated i n the reverse: the required c o n c i l i a t i o n process i s designed to prevent the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining process from r e s u l t i n g i n a s t r i k e or lockout. I t i s assumed that the r o l e of these procedures i s designed to reduce con-f l i c t within the i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. For independent reasons, i t i s assumed that c o l l e c t i v e bargaining and c e r t i f i c a t i o n s of unions are foundations of that i n d u s t r i a l r e l a t i o n s system. A s u p e r f i c i a l examination of the steps i n the c o n c i l i a t i o n pro-cedure reveals some of the goals of the process. The f i r s t - s t a g e c o n c i l -i a t i o n o f f i c e r can.furnish the p a r t i e s with s k i l l e d mediation of t h e i r dispute. The second stage-recommending process can serve to generate public pressures on the partie s to reach a settlement. Denying the par-t i e s the r i g h t to s t r i k e or lock out u n t i l the process i s completed pre-vents heated or i l l - c o n s i d e r e d s t r i k e s from defeating the purposes of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n . The e f f e c t s of a staged process of c o n c i l i a t i o n must be analyzed both over the e n t i r e process and over subsequent years of process u t i l i -zation. The anticipated e f f e c t s of l a t e r stages i n the process may a l t e r 8 the influence of e a r l i e r stages. Continued use of the process i n succes^-sive years may i n some way change the e f f e c t s of the process upon the bar-gaining p a r t i e s . This chapter aims to construct a general model of behavior of bargaining p a r t i e s under t h i s compulsory behavior process. Insofar as i s possible, both the theory of bargaining and comments i n the l i t e r a t u r e on the working of the compulsory.conciliation process are used to form a rudimentary model of behavior for bargaining partie s i n general under the statutory process. In a l a t e r chapter s p e c i f i c p a r t i e s are used to r e f i n e the workings of the model. C r i t i c s of the compulsory bargaining system have suggested, by aggregation, a simple model of how the process functions. The compulsory delay of any probable work stoppage removes any i n i t i a t i v e the p a r t i e s had to bargain. There i s no danger of cost i n refusing to make concessions.^ Indeed, there may be gain i n taking a r i g i d and uncompromising p o s i t i o n p r i o r to a recommendation hearing on grounds that the recommendations w i l l be p r i -marily a compromise between the two pos i t i o n s taken before the hearings. The e f f e c t of t h i s i s a devaluation of the bargaining process as a mediating influence on the p a r t i e s . ^ H. D. Woods and S y l v i a Ostry, Labour Policy and Labour Economics, (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1962), p. 194. Stuart M. Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1957), p. 119. ^H. D. Woods, "Canadian C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and Dispute S e t t l e -ment P o l i c y : An A p p r a i s a l , " op. cit., p. 453. 9 The f a i l u r e of the bargaining process puts complete r e s p o n s i b i l -i t y on the recommendation agency for supplying a s o l u t i o n . C o n c i l i a t i o n boards, however, have experienced d i f f i c u l t i e s i n determining t h e i r r o l e s i n the process. As c o n c i l i a t o r s , they would aim to produce a recommenda-t i o n that would maximize the chances of settlement between the p a r t i e s . As representatives of the p u b l i c , they might tend to produce settlements that are near the public i n t e r e s t . Where the recommendations are not accom-g modative, they do not bring about a settlement. Carrothers has also sug-gested that the influence of the board's recommendations depends upon the supporting votes of the disputants' representatives. To the extent that they are divided, the recommendations w i l l represent a " f a i l u r e " to bring 9 the p a r t i e s together. The procedures may also r e s u l t i n increased delay because the p a r t i e s l e a r n to use them as t a c t i c a l devices against each o t h e r . T h e unions are p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable to delay, for i t i s contended, the status quo generally favors the employers. The delay then tends to i n -crease union passion Where the recommending agency i s successful i n 8 Stuart M. Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1957), p. 119. 9 A. W. R. Carrothers, Collective Bargaining Law in Canada, (Toronto: Butterworths, 1965), p. 304. "^Woods, "Canadian C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining," op. cit., p. 464. "^Jamieson, op. cit., p. 118. 10 producing recommendations conducive to a settlement, i t i s not c l e a r that a settlement would not have been reached through normal c o l l e c t i v e bargain-12 ing. When the recommendations f a i l to produce a settlement, there i s evidence that the work stoppage i s longer, because the procedures leading 13 to i t hardened the pos i t i o n s of the disputants. This model suggest that a n t i c i p a t i o n of the recommending stage of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n hinders r e a l give-and-take c o l l e c t i v e bargain-ing. Both p a r t i e s bargain only during or after.. the recommending...f,unction. The delay i n negotiation, u n t i l t h i s l a t e period i n the bargaining r e l a t i o n -ship, may be used as a t a c t i c of management and i s , i n any event, resented by the union. Repeated u t i l i z a t i o n of the process tends to d u l l i t s moder-ating e f f e c t s over time. The model described i s extremely general i n i t s d e s c r i p t i o n of the behavior of the p a r t i e s and o f f e r s l i t t l e explanatory power as to the i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s of the p a r t i e s . C r i t i c s of the statutory process have con-cerned themselves with pointing out aspects of party behavior which are not "desirable" for s o c i e t y . They have not attempted to i l l u s t r a t e the work-ings of the process i n i t s e n t i r e t y . Their comments are also not neces-s a r i l y directed to every bargaining s i t u a t i o n . Bargaining theory has not been widely extended into the media-t i o n process. Stevens found his i n v e s t i g a t i o n into mediation function and 'Woods, op. cit., p. 464. Jamieson, op. cit., p. 117. 11 tactics to be one of but very few in the f i e l d . His arbitration model is useful in analyzing the mediation process under study here. This model,^ like other institutional theories of bargaining, however, requires some degree of information concerning the specific parties who are bargaining. Stevens says: An analysis of mediation is not possible except i n the context of a general analysis of col -lective bargaining negotiation. That i s , unless the investigator has.some theories about the agreement process in negotiation, about why and in what ways the parties do (or do not) reach agreement, i t is d i f f i c u l t to see how he can analyze the contribution of the mediator to the resolution of conflict.16 A general bargaining model cannot encompass characteristics specific to a particular bargaining relationship. To obtain specific information about "why and in what ways parties do (or do not) reach agreement," the charac-teri s t i c s of the parties involved in coast forest bargaining are analyzed in the next chapter. On the basis of that "industry specific" information, the model of collective bargaining behavior under the compulsory bargain-ing process w i l l be extended in Chapter Four. Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotia-tions (Toronto: McGraw H i l l , 1963), pp. 122-23. "'"^Carl M. Stevens, "Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining," in Industrial Relations, Volume V (Februaryj 1966), pp. 38-52. 16 Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations, op. cit., p. 123. CHAPTER THREE THE INSTITUTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE PARTIES General observations concerning the way parti e s w i l l behave under a p a r t i c u l a r bargaining procedure can be strengthened by examining p a r t i c u l a r bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s . I n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p a r t i e s can lead to predictions as to how the p a r t i e s w i l l i n t e r a c t i n the bargaining procedure. Within the coast f o r e s t bargaining unit three p a r t i e s may be seen to i n t e r - r e l a t e : the employers and t h e i r agent, FIR: the union, IWA; and the s t a t e . E a c h , party i s examined for c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s i n t h e i r h i s -tory, structure and outlook, which would generate predictions about s p e c i -f i c behavior. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s , then, attempts to provide more accu-rate predictions than a general theory of party behavior. Thus, a model using i n d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c information as w e l l as general theory should be superior to general theory alone i n pr e d i c t i n g how the p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i e s w i l l behave i n a given bargaining procedure. Factors examined i n t h i s chapter are those i n which the charac-t e r i s t i c s of the p a r t i c u l a r p a r t i e s d i f f e r e d widely from normal or average The state's behavior i s here defined as that behavior which i s exhibited because of the nature of the s p e c i f i c bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . General s t a t e behavior, such as the passage of the labour statutes, i s ex-cluded from this a n a l y s i s . If the response i s not caused by i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t o r s i t could not be predicted by an i n s t i t u t i o n a l a n a l y s i s . 12 13 form. The ways i n which the par t i e s d i f f e r e d from t y p i c a l bargaining p a r t i c i p a n t s are weighted to some degree by t h e i r anticipated p r e d i c t i v e force i n the i n d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c model of behavior.. For example, the chap-ter considers i n considerable d e t a i l the h i s t o r y of the union because of i t s a n t i c i p a t e d importance i n determining bargaining behavior. The h i s t o r y of the firms i s omitted because i t was expected that an analysis based upon present organizational structure during the bargaining period would be sup-e r i o r i n p r e d i c t i n g the. behavior of the p a r t i e s i n negotiations. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l f a c t ors here considered are u t i l i z e d to make i n d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c predictions about the behavior of the p a r t i e s . This be-havior analysis i s undertaken i n the next chapter. The analysis of the par-t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p a r t i e s i s summarized i n rather gross form following each discussion i n the chapter. In l a t e r chapters, reference: w i l l be made to the more s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of behavior. Certain of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l propensities discussed hereunder r e s u l t from incidents occurring during the period from 1947-1968. The r e -s u l t i s a degree of d u p l i c a t i o n between the i n s t i t u t i o n a l analysis here and the l a t e r examination of the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p over the same period. Where po s s i b l e , cross references have been used to avoid undue r e p e t i t i o n . For example, the 1948 schism within the IWA i n B.C. i s impor-tant to an understanding of both the h i s t o r y of the union and the 1949 bargaining; consequently, references.to t h i s i n t e r n a l factor appear i n both places i n the presentation. To some degree, however, the reader i s r e f e r r e d back to the i n s t i t u t i o n a l a nalysis wherein the bargaining h i s -tory i s examined. 14 The o r i g i n s and ea r l y bargaining h i s t o r y of a union w i l l r e -vea l how the union members or the leaders view t h e i r dealings with the employers, the state and the p u b l i c . In turn, the h i s t o r y and behavior of the union w i l l have shaped the expectations of the employers and the state as to the behavior of the union. Characterization of the union's i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s with the par-t i e s , through an examination of i t s past behavior, i s a powerful p r e d i c -t i v e t o o l . The stronger and more consistent the behavior of the pa r t i e s i n t h e i r i n t e r - r e l a t i o n s i n the past, ceterabus paribus} the more l i k e l y w i l l that behavior continue. A. Organization Of A Union In B.C. Forestry The forests of B r i t i s h Columbia had supplied the need f or l o c a l lumber and hewn timbers since e a r l y settlement days. Commercial sawmills, u t i l i z i n g the l o c a l logs, were erected on a small scale during the middle of the 19th century. Growth of the forest products industry was f a i r l y rapid owing to the demands for lumber on the west coast of North America. The turn of the century brought increasing competition from Northwestern m i l l s f o r the United States market u n t i l the World War I broke out. The war brought increased demand f o r f o r e s t products at the same time that the opening of the Panama Canal, i n 1914, gave B r i t i s h 2 Columbia access to European markets. The Logging Labour Force in Coastal British Columbia, Research Branch, B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour ( V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1969), pp. 1-4. 15 The l a r g e - s i z e timber, coupled with the rough t e r r a i n of coastal B r i t i s h Columbia, r e s t r i c t e d the s i z e and l o c a t i o n of the early logging camps. Lack of techniques for moving logs any distance over land kept camps small and mobile. The work force tended to be migratory and often was 3 composed of part-time farmers or farmers' sons. While working conditions were poor, there was a lack of organ-ized a c t i o n by the workers to improve t h e i r l o t . In 1900, however, forma-t i o n of the B r i t i s h Columbia Woodworkers' Union was i n i t i a t e d by the Van-couver Trades and.Labour Council. Results were but temporary. In 1909 the I n d u s t r i a l Workers of the World introduced the concept of i n d u s t r i a l unionism into the lumber industry. While the "Wobblies" were successful i n exposing the workers to new r a d i c a l unionism, they f a i l e d to e s t a b l i s h a l a s t i n g organization. The l i m i t e d technology and the resultant small-scale production unit made organization d i f f i c u l t . Logan comments on the e f f e c t s of i n -creasing technology i n lumber: But at t h i s stage invention was to play a part i n making the industry more accessible i f not more receptive to unionism. The "high-lead system" of logging (meaning sawing trees and con-t r o l l i n g operations at various heights o f f the ground) and the "McLean loading boom" combined with the enlarged market to r e v o l u t i o n i z e the industry. Camps increased from 50 - 75 workers to 200 - 300 and operated the year through. Communities took on permanence, including f e -males and f a m i l i e s . Companies became larger ^ and fewer by v i r t u e of c o s t l y equipment required. 3 H. A. Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan Co., 1948), p. 280 4 Ibid.* pp. 280-81. 16 The l a r g e r , more permanent camps provided a base for attempts at u n i onization. Thus, i n January, 1919, the B r i t i s h Columbia Logger's Union was formed with organizational help from leaders of the Vancouver Trades and Labour Council. These were r a d i c a l unionists who had been i n -strumental i n the formation of the One Big Union (OBU). In July, 1919, the Logger's Union became an a f f i l i a t e of the OBU and was renamed the Lumber Workers' I n d u s t r i a l Union (LWIU). The year 1919 was one of m i l i t a n t revolutionary unionism i n western Canada. General, s t r i k e s i n Winnipeg and Vancouver formed the back-ground for the s t r i k e a c t i v i t y of the LWIU. The union sought better work-ing conditions and wages without i n s i s t i n g on recognition or bargaining. No statutory protection existed f o r a union member. The employers were able to organize systematic b l a c k l i s t s and, according to union claims, employed Pinkerton men and the RCMP to r e s i s t unions. At the same time as the resistance'of.the employers became e f f e c t i v e , the OBU was s p l i t by fa c t i o n a l i s m . The LWIU withdrew from the OBU over differences concerning how the former should be organized. LWIU personnel were also found to have been aiding the r i v a l IWW i n Canada.^ "The t o t a l e f f e c t of a l l these adverse circumstances was to bring the LWIU to an abrupt close a f t e r i t s burst of aggressive s t r i k e -g breaking and enthusiastic hopes." Logan, op. cit. 3 p. 281. 6Ibid.J p. 282. ~^Loc. cit. ^Loc. cit. 17 In Vancouver, i n 1928, the Lumber and A g r i c u l t u r a l Workers' 9 Union was formed. This was associated with the Workers' Unity League, the representive among the Canadian unions of the m i l i t a n t Communists."^ In January, 1934, the union p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a widespread s t r i k e i n the B r i t i s h Columbia logging camps and the dispute was mediated by a Board of I n d u s t r i a l Relations appointed by the p r o v i n c i a l government."'""'" The Board heard presentations from both sides, the employer and a group repre-senting the employers (not. the union representatives). The Board produced 12 recommendations which s e t t l e d the s t r i k e . During the s t r i k e the union 13 changed i t s name to the Lumber Workers' I n d u s t r i a l Union. In 1935, as a r e s u l t of a p o l i c y of amalgamation with non-Communist unions by the WUL, the LWIU a f f i l i a t e d with the American United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners as D i s t r i c t One i n the lumber work-14 ers' wing. The developing union movement i n the Northwest lumber r e -gion, at that time known as the Northwest Council of Sawmill and Timber-1966), p. 27 10. 9 Myrtle Bergren, Tough Timber (Toronto: Progress Books, Logan, op. cit., p. 340. "'""'"Bergren, op. ait., p. 46. ^Ibid., p. 51. ^Ibid., p. 52. 14 Logan, op. cut., p. 283. 18 workers' Unions, joined the Carpenters' Union one month l a t e r . The lum-ber workers, under the Carpenters' Union, were members of the Lumber and Sawmill Workers' Union, AFL, which consisted of the LWIU, now D i s t r i c t 16 1, LSW, and 10 other d i s t r i c t s i n the U.S. midwest and western states. The LSW members had clas s "B" membership within the Carpenters' U n i o n , w h i c h meant lower dues along with i n f e r i o r pension and voting 18 r i g h t s . The o r i e n t a t i o n of the LSU was i n d u s t r i a l while the Carpenters were supporters of c r a f t unionism. In 1936 the LSU d i s t r i c t s sent delegates to a meeting i n Port-land, Oregon, to draf t a supplementary c o n s t i t u t i o n seeking greater autono-my under the parent Carpenters' Union. The dr a f t document was presented to the Carpenters at t h e i r convention i n F l o r i d a . The delegation was denied the r i g h t to address the convention, the Carpenters considering the move-ment as Communist-inspired and ordering a series of expulsions and charter c a n c e l l a t i o n s . Disenchanted members of the LSU then formed into the Federation of Woodworkers, with Harold P r i t c h e t t , head of the B r i t i s h Columbia D i s -t r i c t Council, as president. Jensen describes the Federation's indeter-Margret S. Glock, Collective Bargaining in the Pacific North-west. Lumber Industry (Berkeley: Ind. Rel. I n s t i t . , Un. Cal. Berk., 1955), p. 9. "^Logan, op. cit., p. 283. ^ Ibid. 18 Glock, op. cit., p. 10. 19 Logan, op. cit., p. 283. 19 minate status: The Federation had no charter, and was not o f f i c i a l l y recognized hy the Carpenters, but had s u f f i c i e n t authority from the various l o c a l s through the d i s t r i c t councils to function. Although con-vened i n protest against the Carpenters, the con-vention voted to stay with the Brotherhood.^ The Carpenters refused to charter the Federation, or recognize i t as part of the Carpenters' Union, so the Federation.entered into nego-. t i a t i o n s with the Committee for I n d u s t r i a l Organization headed by John L. Lewis. A f t e r a convention and referendum i n 1937, the Federation broke completely with the; Carpenters and formed the International Woodworkers 21 of America under the CIO.. Harold P r i t c h e t t became president and was re-elected repeatedly u n t i l i n 1940 he was denied re-entry into the 22 United States and was forced to resign as president. Formation of the IWA created i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s within the f o r e s t industry labour ranks throughout the f i r and western pine regions of the United States. Washington, Oregon, C a l i f o r n i a , Idaho, and Montana were involved i n i n t e r n a l c o n f l i c t s and j u r i s d i c t i o n a l disputes which 23 were to trouble the industry u n t i l World War 2. 20 Vernon H. Jensen, Lumber and Labor (Toronto: Farrar and Rinehart, 1945), p. 204 21 Clock, op. ait.3 p. 11. 22 Logan, op. ait., p. 283. 23 Jensen, op. ott.3 p. 225. 20 The B r i t i s h Columbia d i s t r i c t f u l l y supported the IWA. The Canadian union joined with other Canadian CIO unions to form the Canadian Congress of Labour. Harold P r i t c h e t t was elected president of the Cana-dian Region, D i s t r i c t No. 1, a f t e r his resignation as International P r e s i -dent i n 1941. 2 4 While the Canadian D i s t r i c t , IWA, was not threatened with f a c t i o n a l i s m or j u r i s d i c t i o n a l disputes as were the American regions, i t s leadership was not united on technique. Ill-prepared and i n e f f e c t i v e s t r i k e s were expensive both i n money and loss of support. A prolonged and d i f f i c u l t s t r i k e at Oyster Bay, i n 1938, took a heavy t o l l on the union. By summer the dues-paying membership within the d i s t r i c t had 25 been reduced to 226. With the outbreak of the Second World War, the demand for lum-ber workers exceeded supply. This encouraged the union to change from the t a c t i c of submitting grievances and complaints, to that of seeking 26 recognition and bargaining powers. Among the Communist unions through-out Canada, co-operation with employers became popular. "No s t r i k e " pledges were used by the Canadian Communist unions, the IWA included, as A •  2 7 an organizing device. 2 4Logan, op. cit. s p. 284. 25 Bergren, op.. cvt., p. 125. 26 Logan, op. cit., p. 284. 1 1 Ibid., p. 343. 21 The Communists had two reasons f o r adopting t h i s change. F i r s t , the entry into the war of Russia as an a l l y i n 1941 made the unions very 28 interested i n maintaining war production; secondly, the high demand and short supply of labour provided the unions an excellent opportunity to gain recognition from employers. Unions were v i r t u a l l y forced to concen-tr a t e on recognition by Order-in-Council (P.C. 8253) which established the National War Labour Board and nine regional boards. Wartime regulations 29 put wage agreements outside the area of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. While the power of the unions could not gain wage increases, i t could be used to gain recognition and the r i g h t to represent the employees i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. Pre-war l e g i s l a t i o n governing c o l l e c t i v e bargaining had avoided e x p l i c i t treatment of the c e r t i f i c a t i o n of unions, or of compulsory c o l l e c -t i v e bargaining. Statutes dealing with the settlement of i n d u s t r i a l d i s -putes provided machinery to a s s i s t the p a r t i e s . Statutory language cov-ered "employers" and "employees," not unions as such. P a r t i e s were not forced to bargain, together. 30 The I n d u s t r i a l Disputes and Investigation Act was the f i r s t example of t h i s statutory approach. Woods suggests: "While the IDI Act did not provide for c e r t i f i c a t i o n and made no p o s i t i v e statement about compulsory bargaining, both of these were i m p l i c i t Logan, op. cit.-,- p. 343. 29 Cameron and Young, The Status of Trade Unions in Canada, (Kingston, Ont.: Queens U n i v e r s i t y , 1960), p. 62. 30 C.S. 1907, c. 20, assented to March 22, 1907. 22 . • ..31 i n i t . " Thus, the fed e r a l and p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n that followed i n the 1930s seemed to guarantee something that r e c a l c i t r a n t employers had always been and s t i l l were able to avoid. The IWA started to make organizational gains on the basis of a 32 Wartime Order-in-Council which had the e f f e c t of s t a b i l i z i n g wages at the l e v e l of November 15, 1941. When a company became organized, the union would make a survey of the wages paid to i n d i v i d u a l workers. The highest wages within a c l a s s i f i c a t i o n became the r u l e , r a i s i n g the aver-33 age wage rates within the plant. These gains were l i m i t e d to small em-ployees, rather than the larger mechanized companies i n the B r i t i s h Colum-34 bi a Logging Association which were r e s i s t i n g union organization. Russia's entry into the war aided the Communist IWA i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The union's war e f f o r t s and i t s no-strike clause helped to win public sympathy i n i t s d r i v e for recognition i n the fo r e s t industry. Gov-ernment pressure was increasing on the employers to stop r e s i s t i n g union-i z a t i o n . In March, 1943, the I n d u s t r i a l C o n c i l i a t i o n and A r b i t r a t i o n Woods, "Canadian C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and Dispute S e t t l e -ment P o l i c y : An App r a i s a l , " op. cit., p. 461. 32 Cameron and Young, op. oit., p. 56, discussing l e g i s l a t i o n i n s i x Canadian provinces. 33 Bergren, op. c%t.} p. 212. Ibid., p. 221. 23 35 Amendment Act, 1943 was enacted in British Columbia. It required an employer to bargain with the union in which the majority of his employees 36 were members. In June, 1943, a majority award of an Industrial Disputes In-37 quiry Commission, operating under Order-in-Council (PC 4020), ordered an .employer in the Queen Charlotte Islands to recognize the union. The B.C. Loggers' Association, acting as agent for the employer, refused to 38 do so. A strike resulted, lasting 14 days and involving a thousand workers. Production and shipment were halted in the sitka spruce used for airplane production. The public and the trade union movement supported the IWA recognition strike. The employer signed an agreement with the union 39 as bargaining agent for the employees. The Commission recommendation and public support of the IWA strike convinced the employers to cease resisting union organization. A bargaining agent, R. V. Stuart Research Service Ltd., was created to nego-^  40 tiate for the employers. R. V. Stuart had been the secretary of the B.C. 35S.B.C. 1945, c. 28. "^Cameron and Young, op. cit., 37 Ibid., discusses the functions of IDIC investigations. 38 Bergren, op. ait., p. 218. ^9 Ibid., p. 221. 40 . Stuart Research was incorporated January 8, 1942. See E%story of Forest Industrial Relations Limited (unpublished' mimeograph by FIR: Vancouver, 1956; revised 1963). 24 41 Loggers' Association. In November, 1943, Stuart and the IWA began bar-gaining on a contract which would apply to a l l firms on the coast which were represented by the IWA. The parties signed a memorandum of agree-42 ment on December 1. As the union was successful in gaining wide-spread 43 recognition during the next few months, the basic agreement with Stuart Research was a means of achieving standardization of conditions in the coast forest industry. The f i r s t post-war wage negotiations between employers and the IWA were conducted under federal jurisdiction. Mechanisms for dispute 44 investigation adopted during the war had been amended by Order<-in-Council (P.C. 6482) on October 11, 1945. This order extended wartime procedures in which disputes might tend to "interfere with the transition to a peace-time „45 economy. The union had i n i t i a l l y demanded a 25-cent per hour wage i n -crease, union security and a 40-hour work week. The union slogan was "25-40-Union Security." The employers, through Stuart Research, offered a five-cent increase and rejected the other demands. The parties had bar-gained dowri^to. offers of 18 and 12% cents respectively, but union security was s t i l l in dispute. At this stage the union called for a strike vote on 41 Bergren, op. cit., p. 222. 4? Ibid., p. 223. 43 They were aided by P.C. 1003 passed iii February 1944. 44 Order-in-Council (P.C 4020) passed in June 1944. ^Labour Gazette, Volume XXXXVI, June 1946, p. 775. 25 May 15. 4 6 The federal minister of labour appointed Chief J u s t i c e Gordon Sloan as I n d u s t r i a l Inquiry Commissioner on May 11, 1946. His e f f o r t s were unsuccessful owing to the intransigence of the disputants. The em-ployers would not meet with the union under s t r i k e threat, while the union would not l i f t the s t r i k e c a l l unless concessions were made by employers. The s t r i k e began on May 15 and involved the industry throughout the prov-ince — 37,000 workers, or approximately 20 per cent of the province's 47 t o t a l p a y r o l l . The Sloan Inquiry was extended i n l a t e May to aid the p a r t i e s i n reaching an agreement. Af t e r f i v e days of meetings, on June 1, Judge, Sloan reported s t i l l no agreement, but suggested a compromise settlement s p l i t t i n g the differences i n wages and hours between the p a r t i e s ' respec-^-t i v e demands and compromising the union's stand on increased s e c u r i t y . The employers accepted the recommendations but the union rejected them. The union's r e j e c t i o n alienated p u b l i c opinion, since the pro-v i n c i a l and dominion labour ministers had pronounced the recommendation as f a i r . The p r o v i n c i a l cabinet met with the IWA negotiation committee on June 14 and strongly urged acceptance of the terms. F r u i t was r o t t i n g i n the Okanagan f o r lack of boxes and p u b l i c opinion was r i s i n g against the 48 s t r i k e . By government order the i n t e r i o r box and shook plants were put 46 Logan, op. oit. 3 p. 284. klIbid., p. 284. 48 r Loo. e%t. 26 back i n operation. The union was forced to accept the Sloan recommenda-49 tions on June 26 when further compromises were rejected by the employers and the government threatened sterner measures against the union. D i s t r i c t President Harold P r i t c h e t t , i n an e d i t o r i a l to the membership i n the union newspaper, commented on his union's treatment of the recommendations: They were accepted by the employers and rejected by the union i n a manner which constituted a major error on the part of the union and tended to improve the p o s i t i o n of the employers i n the eyes of the p u b l i c . The r e j e c t i o n also tended to i s o l a t e the union from large sections of support.50 P r i t c h a r t concluded that r e j e c t i o n was not a successful technique and that better means of dealing with recommendations would have to be found. B. Union Structure and Internal Government The behavior of union spokesmen i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with employer representatives during the bargaining process i s heavily influenced by i n -tr a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l considerations. The r e l a t i v e importance of these con-siderations i n i n f l u e n c i n g the behavior of the spokesmen depends upon the actual or p o t e n t i a l disagreement within the union over proper union be~ havior or expectations during bargaining. Logan, op. cit., p. 285. " ^ B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, J u l y 8, 1946, p. 6. 51Ibid. 27 The influence of a given l e v e l of actual or threatened dissen-t i o n also depends upon the union's i n t e r n a l structure. An autocratic union run by popular leaders who are free from challenge within the membership would be able to undertake unpopular a c t i v i t i e s i n the short run that might s p l i t a democratically-governed union which was narrowly divided into entrenched f a c t i o n s . Each element alone and the two elements working together can be used to explain p a r t i c u l a r union behavior i n a v a r i e t y of circumstances. The IWA i s a highly democratic union with a great deal of auton-omy at both the d i s t r i c t and l o c a l l e v e l s . The Canadian sections of the IWA allow great autonomy. Referring to the Woodworkers and three other large i n d u s t r i a l unions, Crispo says: The Canadian sections generally have the power to do almost anything short of amending the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n . For example, they not only determine t h e i r own bargaining goals and s t r a t -egies, but go t h e i r own way i n p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s and the broader issues of the day.~* D i s t r i c t No. 1 of the IWA comprises a l l of B r i t i s h Columbia and i s divided into an i n t e r i o r and a coastal area. The coastal area contains 53 seven of the 12 IWA l o c a l s within the region (see map on the following page). The coastal " s u b - d i s t r i c t " of seven l o c a l s i n the bargaining unit 52 John Crispo, International Unionism (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1967), p. 68. 53 J. R. Vaselenak, " I n d u s t r i a l Dispute Settlement i n the B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Industry, 1946-1953," i n H. D. Woods (Ed.), Patterns of Industrial Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian Industries (Montreal, Que.: The I n d u s t r i a l Relations Research Centre, M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1958), p. 331. FOREST DISTRICT A N D COAST - INTERIOR BOUNDARIES 29 for the master negotiations. The group does not operate as a unit. Stuart Jamieson notes: Within British Columbia, in turn, and particu-la r l y in the Coast lumber sector, there is a high- degree of autonomy of the major.locals in relation to the Dis-t r i c t Executive. The (extreme) degree to which this has developed can be attributed to a variety of factors: the constitution of the IWA; government policies regard^ ing certification and decision-making by union locals; the structure of the industry, and the division of labour this has created and the special traditions, ideologies and attitudes of various occupational groups in the indus* try's labour ' force. The IWA, in British Columbia and within the coast forest industry, may be characterized as highly democratic in structure and procedures. " Intern-national or even regional leaders could not expect to be able to dictate to the smaller union organizations. The highly autonomous union structure was not of great concern under united leadership. Soon after creation of the IWA, factionalism be-* gan to develop. By 1942 the international organization of the CIO had put anti-Communists in power within the international office of the IWA. This isolated the Communist-controlled British Columbia area. The Commu^ -nist leadership remained in office u n t i l 1948. In that year the intern-national executive of the IWA, in co-operation with the Canadian Congress of Labour, began to exert pressure to remove the Communists from the B.C. 54 Stuart Jamieson, "Multi-employer Bargaining: The Case of the British Columbia Coast Lumber Industry." Paper presented to the Annual Con-ference of the Canadian Industrial Relations Research Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 16, 1970. "^Glock, op. cit., p. 12. 30 56 region. The Communists attempted to retain control over the union by withdrawing from the IWA and CCL and forming a new union, the Woodworkers' Industrial Union of C a n a d a . T h e attempt to withdraw from, the IWA failed, resulting in the expulsion of many of the Communist leaders. Jamieson states: These struggles of the left-wing minority to retain control of the union, while unsuccessful, have nevertheless l e f t a strong residue of ideologi-cal and policy differences within the organization that are s t i l l all-too-evident today.^ Factionalism remains today within the IWA Region No. 1. • Syd Thompson, leader of the large Vancouver Local 1-217, is a militant oppo-nent of the more conservative regional leadership. Elections, as well as policy decisions, are questioned or challenged by dissidents. The Local has i t s own newspaper, the "Barker," through which the militant d i s s i -dents attack the regional leadership. The coastal locals, in the last election, voted, in aggregate, in favor of the opposition candidate for regional president. The more conservative interior locals produced a 59 winning margin for the incumbent, however. The election demonstrates the degree of division within the coast locals over the leadership of 56 Jamieson, "Multi-employer Bargaining," op. cit., p. 13. "^Glock, op. cit., p. 12, fn. 15. 58 Jamieson, "Multi-employer Bargaining," op. cit., p. 13. 59 The Barker, Volume XII, November 1970, p. 1. 31 their union. C. Summary of the Institutional Characteristics of the Union The IWA in the coast region has a long tradition of radical, revolutionary unionism. During and aft er World War 2, the tactics of the union seemed to shift from grievance to bargaining tactics. The 1946 strike appears to have suggested to the union that attention should be»?s. paid to public opinion and toward appearing to be reasonable in demand-ing changes. The s p l i t caused by the attempted withdrawal of the union from the IWA, and the resultant expulsion of the Communist leaders in 1948, put strains upon the union. Its structure i s not equipped to deal with faction-alism within the union membership. The entrenched dissenters may contin-ually create disharmony among the membership and make i t d i f f i c u l t for the leadership to control the union. There are two differing patterns of behavior in the union's history; one approximating that of revolutionaries, the other approximating business unionists. The union on the coast is divided on ideological grounds, with the conservatives presently having control of the regional presidency. These splits in both traditional tactics and philosophical view-points w i l l have important consequences in union behavior when the union operates under the conciliation procedures of the provincial government. These consequences form the topic of the succeeding chapter. 32 D. Employers arid Their Association During the period under examination, employers bargained ex-c l u s i v e l y through a corporate agent. The agent had been created f o r the purpose of bargaining and contract administration. Each contract nego-t i a t i o n saw w e l l over 100 companies being represented by FIR or i t s pre-decessor, Stuart Research. FIR has described the wide d i v e r s i t y of oper-ations among i t s p r i n c i p a l s : The operations vary i n s i z e , type of product, and i n many other respects. Some com-panies are engaged i n logging only; others operate logging camps and wood processing plants. Some do not log and a su b s t a n t i a l number' carry on the com-plete cycle of production from logging to del i v e r y of the f i n i s h e d product, in c l u d i n g operation of ships f o r transportation of t h e i r own products and other commodities.60 It i s important to discern how con t r o l over the agent i s d i s -tributed among the population of companies. I f the acts of FIR are nor-mally the r e s u l t of the wishes of a c e r t a i n s i z e or type of employer with-i n the group, the behavior of the agent can be more e a s i l y predicted. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y important since the government has means of exerting pressure on large companies which are not applicable to the smaller ones. That pressure w i l l have an e f f e c t on the corporate bargaining agent only to the extent that the agent i s con t r o l l e d by the employer-members being pressured. Within the employers represented by FIR, the few large i n t e -grated corporations dominate the employment and dollar-volume s t a t i s t i c s FIR B r i e f ; C o n c i l i a t i o n Board Hearings, August 8, 1949, p. 2. 33 of the industry. Moreover, many of the smaller companies depend upon the large ones f o r s u r v i v a l . As a consequence the s i x or seven large employ-ers tend to control bargaining. FIR may be seen to be t h e i r agent alone. E. The State A work stoppage i n the coast f o r e s t industry has s p e c i a l con^ sequences f o r the p r o v i n c i a l government unlike work stoppages i n any other industry. F i r s t , the bargaining unit encompasses the largest number of employees i n the province. The loss of p a y r o l l and p r o f i t s during the work stoppage would have a harmful e f f e c t upon the p r o v i n c i a l economy. P r o v i n c i a l revenues would s u f f e r from the loss i n corporate and personal income taxes, sales taxes, etc. Secondly, the work stoppage h a l t s the c u t t i n g of timber on govern-ment-owned land. "Stumpage," or the fees the p r o v i n c i a l government charges the p r i v a t e users of public forest land, i s based upon trees cut. If har-vesting stops, p r o v i n c i a l "stumpage" revenue stops. Thus, the government has dual reasons f o r avoiding or shortening any work stoppage i n the f o r e s t industry. Because the government i s a large owner of timber lands within the province, i t has assumed an important r o l e i n d i r e c t i n g forest develop-ment. One such technique of the government has been the issuance pf f o r e s t management li c e n s e s . This process combines public and p r i v a t e lands, within Jamieson, "Multi-employer Bargaining," op. cit., pp. 14-15. 34 a geographical area, under one management. The r e s u l t of th i s program has been to place a large proportion of land under the control of a few 63 large companies. 'These are the same companies that by v i r t u e of t h e i r s i z e are the actual force behind FIR as the bargaining agent f o r the i n -dustry. This dependence by the large firms upon continued government co-operation i n land development gives the government leverage i n other areas. The government has a means of influ e n c i n g the parties that c o n t r o l , to a large degree, the bargaining p o l i c y of the employer side. The importance of th i s s p e c i a l influence over the employers has two e f f e c t s . F i r s t , the employers would be much more i n c l i n e d to co-operate with the bargaining procedures established by the government. This would mean that the employers' nominees would tend to dissent less often than labour nominees on c o n c i l i a t i o n boards. Secondly, the influence of the state i n the process would tend to produce employer compromises i n "eleventh hour" mediation by the state. The state would be able to exert extra pressure upon the employer through the employers' dependence upon the state. Such influence would be lack-ing over the union p a r t i c i p a n t s . An important assumption that has been made through t h i s d i s -cussion i s that the government i s w i l l i n g to pressure the employers to make concessions i n the name of peace. Stuart Jamieson has suggested 62 Walter G. Hardwick, Geography of the Forest Industry of Coastal British Columbia (Vancouver, B.C.: Tantaleus Research, 1965), p. 22. ^Ibid. 3 p. 53. i 35 that the B.C. Social Credit government may feel that labour unrest in the coast forest industry is a p o l i t i c a l advantage over, the socialist New 64 Democratic Party. To the extent that this is true, any state influence available would not be necessarily used to gain concessions from the em-ployers. F. Summary of Chapter Three; Institutional Factors As a result of interaction between the state and the large i n -tegrated employers, the large employer could be expected to encourage com-pliance with government procedures. Because the large employers have a great measure of control over the behavior of the employers' agent, FIR, this influence or bias w i l l be reflected in the bargaining behavior of FIR. These particular characteristics within the bargaining relations-ship are used in Chapter Four to generate industry-specific predictions of behavior to augment the general model discussed in Chapter One. Jamieson, "Multi-employer Bargaining," op. cit., p. 16. CHAPTER FOUR AN INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC MODEL OF NEGOTIATION UNDER COMPULSORY CONCILIATION The institutional and historical examination of the parties involved in the coast negotiations may be used to predict particular pat-terns of behavior. These specific modes of intra-organizational and inter-organizational behavior provide an expected range of behavior patterns. A model of behavior, under compulsory conciliation, may be constructed from these expected patterns. In this way, the predicted behavior of these parties, under the conciliation process, may be more definite than the expectations produced from the general model in Chapter Two. Employees in the coast forest negotiations have two forces that put them in the cateogry of extreme militants among workers in general. Fi r s t , the nature of the occupation, in i t s e l f , seems to produce aggressive labour-management behavior. Kerr and Siegel"*" found the lumber industry to 2 be one of the high-propensity-to-strike industries internationally. They have sought to explain this condition by suggesting that the workers' iso-lation on the job, and his physically d i f f i c u l t , dangerous working condi-r Clark Kerr and Abraham Siegel, "The Inter-Industry Propensity to Strike — An International Comparison," in Kornhauser, Dubin. and Ross CEds.), Industrial Conflict (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1954), pp. 189-212. 2Ibid. 3 p. 190. 36 37 t i o n s , tend to develop a "mass s o l i d a r i t y " and "action-oriented" approach to labour r e l a t i o n s . These c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s r e s u l t from the nature of the occupation, independent of the country or system of labour r e l a t i o n s i n existence. The second contributor to predicted militance by the union i s i t s r a d i c a l h i s t o r y . The development o f ; t h e union i n the f o r e s t industry included the revolutionary unionism of the IWW and the OBU as well as the long-time Communist leadership. Few unions i n Canada have had such a r a d i c a l heritage. These t r a d i t i o n s and t h e i r i d e o l o g i c a l residue w i l l i n -e v i t a b l y contribute i n some degree to militancy i n the r e l a t i o n s examined here. Besides m i l i t a n c y , the union has exhibited a d e f i n i t e f a c t i o n -alism. Kerr and Siegal suggest that this i s a r e s u l t of the lumber work-ers' place i n society as an i s o l a t e d mass. Unionism becomes important to the members and "As one consequence, personal and i d e o l o g i c a l f a c t i o n -3 alism and r i v a l unionism are more l i k e l y . " Such fa c t i o n a l i s m within the union makes i t d i f f i c u l t to govern. This i s e s p e c i a l l y true i n the IWA because of the democratic, autonomous organization of the union. The leaders tend to be conscious of opposition to t h e i r actions. The e f f e c t of the leadership's awareness of opposition strength i s to induce them to act with a view to f u l f i l l i n g the expectations of the membership. 4 Walton and McKersie have developed an i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l bargaining model which analyzes these s t r a i n s within the organization. Kerr and S i e g a l , op. cit., p. 193. Richard E. Walton and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavioral Theory of Labour Negotiations (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1965), Chapter VI I I , pp. 281-309. 38 They suggest that the bargaining d e c i s i o n makers (here held to be union leaders) may be faced with membership expectations d i f f e r i n g from t h e i r own i n two areas: the sum of the f i n a l gains expected and the behavior of the leader i n seeking those gains.^ An e n t i r e chapter i n the analysis i s devoted to bargaining t a c t i c s which may be used by the leadership to minimize the d i f f i c u l t i e s produced by these d i f f e r e n t expectations.^ The goal of these t a c t i c s i s to minimize the differences between the members and the leaders. The d i f f i c u l t i e s encountered i n such i n t r a -organizational t a c t i c s on a two-party bargaining system, such as gen-e r a l l y treated i n bargaining theory, i . e . , Walton and McKersie, i s avoided i n a three-party bargaining system. These d i s t i n c t i o n s w i l l be developed hereunder. Hicks has suggested that the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i n t r a - o r g a n i -zational expectations may be exaggerated i n c o n c i l i a t i o n : 7 There remains the p o s s i b i l i t y of a differe n c e of opinion between the Union leaders and t h e i r rank and f i l e . The leaders may be convinced that they have got the best that could be got by any method, but they may f a i l to con-vince t h e i r supporters. Probably c o n c i l i a t i o n a c t u a l l y increases the e v i l , the closer the con-tact between Union o f f i c i a l s and employers, the more the o f f i c i a l s become negotiators instead of ag i t a t o r s , the easier i t i s to persuade the o r d i - ^ nary member that his i n t e r e s t s are being neglected. Walton and McKersie, op. cit., p. 304. hbid., Chapter IX, pp. 310-51. 7 J . R. Hicks, The Theory of Wages, 2nd ed. (Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1963), p. 147. 39 This would mean that i n a divided union l i k e the IWA, with a conserva-t i v e leadership ( r e l a t i v e to the m i l i t a n t f a c t i o n ) , the leaders would have to behave m i l i t a n t l y i n order to prevent a l i e n a t i n g the membership. D i r e c t l y contradicting t h i s push toward militancy i n bar-gaining i s the pressure of public opinion and the danger of government intervention. The union learned i n 1946 that open defiance of mediation recommendations can cost loss of public support and can bring government intervention. The very s i z e of the industry creates concern i n the pub-l i c mind. The "public i n t e r e s t " i n continued production cannot be open-l y defied by the union without grave consequences. Union negotiators are therefore required to conform to the m i l i t a n t expectations of t h e i r membership, while appearing reasonable before the p u b l i c . These requirements for behavior are purely motivated g by Ross-type p o l i t i c a l motivations and are f u l l y independent of any wage gain considerations by the negotiators. These c o n f l i c t i n g pressures would seem to in d i c a t e that the union would be involved i n s t r i k e a ction or constant change of leaders unless some means existed for compromis-ing the two opposite forces. The compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n system provides a way out of the paradox f o r the union negotiators. Through the preliminary negotiations A. M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeley: U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1953). Ross i s the o r i g i n a l advocate of the p r i n -c i p l e that union behavior i s not e n t i r e l y based upon wage maximization, but i s e s s e n t i a l l y p o l i t i c a l . The leaders wish to preserve t h e i r leadership p o s i t i o n s . 40 and during the conciliation officer's term of office, the negotiators may adjust their behavior to conform to the membership's expectations. An i n i t i a l union demand position can be taken that matches the expecta-tions of the membership and allows "concessions," as are f e l t necessary to demonstrate f l e x i b i l i t y before the public. When appearing before the recommending body, the union leadership may argue passionately for their "rights" to a certain reward or recommendation. Hicks suggests this l e g a l i s t i c or adversary position before the recommending body is 9 a natural consequence of the way unions perceive issues. Thus, the union leaders would never tend to engage in actual bargaining before the recommendation agency had heard the representations of the union. An exception to this is suggested by Stevens. His model deals with compulsory arbitrations, but to the extent that a recommenda-tion has an effect upon the f i n a l contract, i t is applicable here. Stevens suggests that, where one side has reason to fear the result of a recommend-ation body (in Stevens' analysis, arbitration), the other side can use the threat of imposing such a hearing to induce compromise. Where the party fearing arbitration i s offered an immediate settlement larger than what he had expected i t possible to gain in the hearings, he w i l l settle."^ Hicks, op. cit., pp. 149-50. "^Carl M. Stevens, "Is Compulsory Bargaining Compatible With Bargaining?" in Industrial Relations, Volume V (February, 1966), pp. 38-52. Ibid., pp. 42-43. 41 Such an early settlement would be rare i n the coast forest industry. I t implies, f i r s t , that there was some reason to fear a recommendation. Since the union always has recourse to a s t r i k e i f the recommendation i s unsatisfactory, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how the union could fear a recommendation. Additionally, for the union leaders to make such an early settlement, they must be convinced that the union member-ship believes, or can be convinced, that such a move i s the correct action to take. This involves convincing the membership that both the settlement l e v e l i s within membership expectations and that the policy of early settlement i s proper union negotiating behavior. The described behavior would be that of the less m i l i t a n t leadership who are avoiding the p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t i e s of appearing too "so f t " i n the eyes of the more mi l i t a n t membership. M i l i t a n t leadership also would not be interested i n compromise at the early stages of nego-t i a t i o n s . I t s demands^would be s i m i l a r i l y large and i n f l e x i b l e . The mil i t a n t t a c t i c s would be to complete the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures as rapidly as possible and to unlimber the st r i k e weapon.-in order to make wage gains. In any s i t u a t i o n , then, the IWA would tend to avoid r e a l bargaining through the process of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n . The employers, i n turn, through FIR, would not be l i k e l y to make concessions i n the early stages of bargaining. The union would be intransigent and no s t r i k e could be threatened u n t i l the procedures were completed. No motive exists for company concession beyond that l e v e l considered necessary to s a t i s f y public opinion. FIR may f e e l that any.early concessions made would hurt employers i n the recommenda-tio n stage where a compromise decision i s expected. No bargaining on 42 either side would thus begin u n t i l the recommending process i s under-way. Recommendations have an important impact i n the coast f o r e s t negotiations. Public and government pressures exist f o r a settlement. In the eyes of the p u b l i c , an "unreasonable" or intransigent disputant would have great d i f f i c u l t y i n carrying on a work stoppage against a "reasonable" opponent. Such l a b e l s give unity to the "virtuous r e s i s t -ance" of the "good" party and weaken the opposition of the " v i l l a i n o u s " party. The government can bring pressure upon the employers to s e t t l e through i t s power over operation of f o r e s t management l i c e n s e s . In ex-treme cases, the government can se i z e and operate plants such as occurred i n the shook plants i n 1946. Neither side can therefore r i s k complete disregard of the public's opinions of i t s behavior. For the employers, the recommendation l e v e l of wage increase, barring some unusual content not normally considered within the range of recommendation p o s s i b i l i t i e s , w i l l be a minimum contract settlement. The union would tend to strongly r e s i s t any settlement below the recommenda-tio n s . For the union, t h i s would be a matter of " p r i n c i p l e " f o r which the leadership would be allowed to accept no compromise. The government would also be pressuring the employers to accept what i s , i n e f f e c t , a government-sponsored, i . e . , produced through government-created procedure, recommendation. The union i s not so bound by the recommendations. The union may be able to discount the recommendations as being u n f a i r . The employ-ers are u n l i k e l y to complain about the i n j u s t i c e of the statutory pro-cess while they depend upon the state for important b e n e f i t s . The union 43 i s a b l e t o c o m p l a i n whenever the p r o c e s s i s u n d u l y d e c a y e d o r e x t e n d s beyond an e x i s t i n g c o n t r a c t . When t h e recommending agency i s t r i p a r t -i t e , t he u n i o n member may be e x p e c t e d t o d i s s e n t f r o m the b o a r d r e p o r t . The u n i o n w o u l d . a t t e m p t t o deny the " r e a s o n a b l e n e s s " o f t h e recommendations any t i m e i t e x p e c t s t h a t i t c o u l d make g a i n s by power n e g o t i a t i o n s a f t e r r e j e c t i n g the s e t t l e m e n t . T h i s c o u l d be more e a s i l y done when some i r r e g u l a r i t y e x i s t e d i n t h e recommending p r o c e s s , o r where t h e u n i o n had a chance t o f o r c e a s p l i t d e c i s i o n on a t r i p a r t i t e body. Where r e a l " i n j u s t i c e " e x i s t s as a r e s u l t o f the recommendation agency s e t t l e m e n t p r o p o s a l s , the employers may g r a n t a d d i t i o n a l i n c r e a s e s . The e m p l o y e r s ' b a r g a i n i n g d e c i s i o n s a r e more economic t h a n p o l i t i c a l . The s t a t e w i l l a l s o e x e r t p r e s s u r e upon the employers t o p r o d u c e t h e a d d i t i o n -a l i n c r e a s e s i f i t i s c o n v i n c e d t h a t the recommendations a r e u n r e a s o n a b l e . I t i s l i k e l y t h a t such an a d j u s t m e n t c o u l d n o t be made by t h e u n i o n . The u n i o n w o u l d p r o b a b l y n o t a c c e p t any s e t t l e m e n t l e s s t h a n t h e recommended' l e v e l e x c e p t under v e r y u n u s u a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s . U n i o n s u c c e s s i n w i n n i n g s e t t l e m e n t s above recommendations agency s u g g e s t i o n s w i l l r a i s e t h e i r f u t u r e e x p e c t a t i o n s , w h i l e t h e em-p l o y e r s w i l l be a n x i o u s t o h o l d t h e wage changes t o t h e l e v e l o f t h e recommendations. The u n i o n t e c h n i q u e f o r d e n y i n g t h e r e l e v a n c e o f t h e recommendations i s n o t an economic one, however. That i s t o s a y , u n i o n c l a i m s t h a t t h e recommendations a r e u n f a i r a r e shrouded' i n p r i n c i p l e r a t h e r t h a n i n economic arguments. The recommending agency i s d e s i g n e d t o compromise t h e c o m p e t i n g economic c l a i m s o f t h e p a r t i e s . On^the one 44 hand, the claims of the union are based upon p r i n c i p l e ; those of the FIR are based upon economics. When the " p r i n c i p l e " arguments of the unions are put f o r t h the intended r e s u l t i s an increased economic settlement. Thus, where the union expects the recommendations to produce a c o n c i l i a t i o n award of, f o r example, f i v e cents per hour increase, and i t believes that i t can gain a larger increase i n post c o n c i l i a t i o n bargaining, i t w i l l seek to debunk the o b j e c t i v i t y or n e u t r a l i t y of the recommendations. Its nominee w i l l not sign the recommendations. If there i s , i n f a c t , a larger increase possible i n the sample year, then the union may win an a d d i t i o n a l increase. Its expectations w i l l be tested against those of the companies. If the l a t t e r do not agree that there i s margin for a post c o n c i l i a t i o n a ddition, i . e . , above the five-cent c o n c i l i a t i o n recommendation, then a work stoppage may ensue. This i s the r e s u l t of d i f f e r i n g expectations of economic p o s i t i o n s . A second type of disagreement i s possible which w i l l induce a s t r i k e where there may be no r e a l d i f f e r e n c e i n economic expectations. Assuming that a recommendation body issues recommendations which are economically sound, i . e . , acceptable to both p a r t i e s though procedurally i r r e g u l a r , the union normally uses i r r e g u l a r i t y as a basis for economic demands. Yet such economic demands w i l l be r e s i s t e d by the employers. The union leadership may f e e l compelled to seek gains because of the ex-pectations of t h e i r membership. Thus the use of i r r e g u l a r i t i e s to de-stroy a recommendation may cause the union to r e j e c t a settlement i t otherwise could accept. 45 The opposite i s also true. If the union i s faced with an economic recommendation which may not be what i t expects, i t cannot r e j e c t i t unless i t can f i n d some basis beyond the economic question. A recommend-ati o n , generally one which i s made by a si n g l e i n d i v i d u a l so that the union has no dissenting nominee, may be forced upon the union by public opinion and the intransigence of the employers i n refusing to o f f e r an increase above the settlement. The union may seek some way to make the process appear unreasonable, but, i f i t i s unable to do so, economic d i s s a t i s f a c -t i o n may not j u s t i f y a s t r i k e . There may be considerable membership dissent i n these s i t u a t i o n s because the leadership i s confronted with the gap i n leadership performance and membership expectations previously avoided by use of the c o n c i l i a t i o n process. The suggested behavior of the p a r t i e s i n t h i s model i s not the "bargaining theory" expectation of the models of such theo r i s t s as 12 Mabry. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p a r t i e s are taken to over-ride any "maximizing" behavior of the disputants with respect to the other party e x c l u s i v e l y . The p a r t i e s under the coast forest bargain-ing model have i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l motives which are s a t i s f i e d through a three-party interchange. Where the two confront one another i n post recom-mendation negotiations, with each party's economic goals serving as prime motivating forces, the c l a s s i c bargaining theory assumptions may apply. This i s an unusual s i t u a t i o n under the i n s t i t u t i o n a l model. Bevars A. Mabry, "The Pure Theory of Bargaining," i n The Industrial and Labour Relations Review} Volume XVIII, No. 4 (July, 1965), pp. 479-502. 46 As with Stevens in his work on bargaining theory, however, this model does not attempt to explain the process of negotiation after a work stoppage has begun. The events during a strike are important in explaining the institutional characteristics of the parties. The strikes themselves have been mentioned as perhaps being periodically necessary to the union for later negotiation strength. In seeking to apply the model to the strike negotiations, Stevens' words best apply: It has seemed to the author that, from the point of view of the contribution this i n -quiry can make, extension of the conceptual format to comprehend such phenomena would only result in a confusing proliferation and heterogeneity in the ^ basic theoretical structure underlying the inquiry. Carl M. Stevens, Strategy and Collective Bargaining Nego-tiations (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 6. CHAPTER FIVE THE ACTUAL NEGOTIATIONS 1947-1968 The collective bargaining negotiations in the forest indus-try from 1947 to 1968 furnish a series of behavior patterns against which an industry conciliation model may be tested. During that period the par-ties conducted regular contract negotiations and enjoyed a stable bargain-ing relationship. The statutes in effect in this period provided basi-cally for the compulsory conciliation procedure discussed in the earlier chapters. Changes in the statutes or case law which had effect upon the bargaining relationship are discussed here. The law and the events are listed as they occurred chrono-logically (see a summary Table I, p. 90 ). Attempts to summarize the data were kept to a minimum to avoid prejudging the importance of the events; aggregation was of necessity selective;"'" names of particular individuals and their occupations were included where the personality was of possible importance to the results of his participation. Certain simplifying assumptions were necessary in recording the actual behavior of the parties in order to limit the variables to a The summarization of negotiations in this chapter does not include any of the outside influences which characterize a wage determina-tion process. On a general level, the industry's economic health and the wage gains of other related workers are tabulated in the Appendix. A de-velopment of the wage determining forces of the coast forest industry was f e l t to be beyond the limits of this analysis. 47 48 manageable number. The wages under discussion are given i n d o l l a r terms and are the amounts of increase over the e a r l i e r contract rather than amounts received. Fringe contributions are l a r g e l y excluded from con-s i d e r a t i o n except where they were the only gain i n one negotiation session. (See Appendix I for wider development of f r i n g e s ) . Dates are included i n the chronology i n order to show the normal progression of events and the e f f e c t s of delays. C o n c i l i a t i o n board reports are described as unanimous or not unanimous with the dissent-ing nominee given, along with his dissenting report, i f any. A. The I n d u s t r i a l C o n c i l i a t i o n and A r b i t r a t i o n Act: 1947-1954 In peacetime, the f e d e r a l government does not have j u r i s d i c -2 t i o n over l o c a l labour issues. These matters are then under p r o v i n c i a l 3 j u r i s d i c t i o n . Thus, on A p r i l 3, 1947, B r i t i s h Columbia enacted a new labour statute t i t l e d The Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of 1947.4 The ICA Act was designed to consolidate the pre-war provin-c i a l ICA Act of 1937, as amended, and the new developments of f e d e r a l l e g -i s l a t i o n . B i l l 39, the ICA Act's t i t l e before passage, was to repeal both See Toronto Electric Commissioners v. Sneider (1925) AC 396 (PC). 3 Section 92, the B r i t i s h North America Act. 4 Statutes of B r i t i s h Columbia 1947, Chapter 44. 49 the 1937 ICA Act with i t s amendments and the B r i t i s h Columbia War Labour Relations Act of 1944.^ The new act was opposed by the p r o v i n c i a l labour movement and the IWA. The Act adopted a two-stage process of p a r t i c i p a t i o n by the state i n c o l l e c t i v e bargaining. It gave each party to a c o l l e c t i v e agree-ment the r i g h t to force the other to bargain c o l l e c t i v e l y whenever two months or l e s s remained before the e x i s t i n g contract e x p i r e d . 7 The c o l -l e c t i v e bargaining was free from state interference. However, i f c o l l e c -t i v e bargaining extended f a r more than 15 days without the p a r t i e s being able to reach an agreement, ei t h e r one could request the services of a 8 9 c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r . The minister of labour could appoint a c o n c i l i a -t i o n o f f i c e r to confer with the disputants at any time."*"^ The c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r was l i m i t e d to a maximum of 14 days with the p a r t i e s , unless granted an extension by the minister."'""'" He 5 S t a t u t e s of B r i t i s h Columbia 1947, Chapter 44, Section 76(2) ^ B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, July 14, 1947. ^Section 14, Industrial Conciliation Act of 1947 (hereafter c i t e d as I.C. & A. Act of 1947). 8 S e c t i o n 17, I.C. & A. Act of 1947. 9 The minister of labour had many of h i s duties, under t h i s Act, given to the Labour Relations Board under the 1948 Amendment. 1 0 S e c t i o n 18, I.C. & A. Act of 1947. ^Ibid. , Section 19. 50 was empowered to o f f e r recommendations on both the settlement terms and on were not binding upon the minister or the p a r t i e s . Recommendations by the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r f or settlement of disputes were not treated as a l t e r -natives to the second stage c o n c i l i a t i o n board. No vote could be taken on recommendations...given at the f i r s t l e v e l . This power to make recommenda-tions was not used.under the l e g i s l a t i o n at any time i n the f o r e s t indus-t r y bargaining. The c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r s never undertook to perform other than an accommodative r o l e under t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n . The c o n c i l i a t i o n board was to be brought i n when eit h e r the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r was unable to bring the p a r t i e s to agreement or at any 13 time the minister found i t advisable. The board consisted of three mem-bers. Each party would appoint a nominee. These two nominees would apt-14 point a chairman. This board would then operate under time l i m i t a t i o n s i n the f-ormation^and submission of i t s f i n a l report."*"^ I t was given power to hold hearings and to reach a determination on terms to be recommended for settlement of the dispute. The report of the board was to be sent to the minister who, i n turn, would d i s t r i b u t e i t to the parties and p u b l i -c i z e i t i n any.manner he deemed f i t . " * " 7 the d e s i r a b i l i t y of appointing a c o n c i l i a t i o n board. 12 His recommendations 12 Section 19(a), (b), and ( c ) , I.C. & A. Act of 1947. 13 Ibid, j Section 20. 14 Ibid.3 Section 48. 15 Loc. cit. 16 Ibid. 3 Section 23. 17 Ibid. 3 Section 24. 51 When/the report was received by the pa r t i e s i n dispute, a vote had to be held to e i t h e r accept or r e j e c t the terms of the c o n c i l i a t i o n 18 board. U n t i l t h i s vote was taken, and the recommendations rejected, 19 any s t r i k e s or lockouts were forbidden and organizers and p a r t i c i p a n t s 20 were subject to penalty of a f i n e . A further precondition to work stop-21 page was a s t r i k e vote which, l i k e the vote on the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recommendations, was held pn a unit b a s i s . This meant that each group of employees c e r t i f i e d as a " u n i t " under the ICA Act had to have i t s votes counted independently of the larger bargaining e n t i t y . Thus, i f one plant accepted the recommendations or rejected a s t r i k e vote i t would be f o r b i d -den to s t r i k e , even where a large proportion of the coast bargaining mem-bership decided otherwise. In January, 1947, the IWA requested re-opening of the 1946-1947 22 contract f o r a wage adjustment. The union was successful during t h i s period i n opening contracts i n the P a c i f i c Northwest f o r re-negotiation 23 of the wage package. The employers' bargaining agent, rejected t h i s 18 Sections 31A, 31B, I.C. & A. Act of 1947. 19 Ibid., Sections 27(b), 31. 20 Ibid., Section 35. 21 Ibid., Sections 31A, 31B. 22 B r i t i s h Columbia Limber Worker, January 28, 1947. 23 . . . Harold M. Levinson, Determining Forces in Collective Wage Bargaining (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 105. 52 24 request in February. Wages were to be based upon the contract and the contract was not going to be re-opened during i t s l i f e . Negotiations between the IWA and Stuart Research Ltd. were being carried on as the new provincial labour legislation was being proclaimed. After an i n i t i a l proposal of no wage change, the employers offered 10 25 cents — while the union sought 20 cents with union security. Eighty per cent of the employers rejected this offer and 68 per cent voted in favor of striking should i t be necessary. The New Westminster local, how-26 ever, rejected the strike proposal. The previous year's strike had dissipated some of the aggressive-ness of the union. This lack of militancy was increased by the failure of the New Westminster local to gain from i t s membership the right to strike. Also, and perhaps most importantly, was the fear and suspicion of the con-c i l i a t i o n provisions of the new Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act. A conciliation officerwas 1appointed under the new Act. During his 14-day term the parties reached agreement on a wage package calling for an increase of 12% cents per hour to 95 cents per hour, with no union security. By an early settlement the uncertainties of a provincial con-c i l i a t i o n board were avoided. 2 A British Columbia Lumber Worker, February 11, 1947. 25Ibid., May 5, 1947. 26Ibid., June 30, 1947. 53 One of the c r i t i c i s m s of the 1947 ICA Act was the long period of time required to exhaust c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures. The time l i m i t s i n each stage had been taken from the wartime Order^-in-Council P.C. 1003. Up to 75 days could be required to complete the procedures from the notice of in t e n t i o n to bargain to the f i n a l vote on recommendations. The d i s c r e t i o n -ary powers granted to the labour board could allow even longer periods to 27 28 pass. The ICA Amendment Act of 1948 s u b s t a n t i a l l y reduced the time period required. In addition, the 1948 Act added a section to the ICA Act, 29 requiring the employees to vote on each new o f f e r of the employer. Also, the p r o v i n c i a l labour board was given the authority to cancel the c e r t i f i -30 cation of any employee organization involved i n an i l l e g a l stoppage. 31 Bargaining for the 1948 contract began ei t h e r on A p r i l 29 or . 32 on May 3, sh o r t l y a f t e r the passage of the 1948 Amendment to the 1947 ICA Act. Negotiations continued f o r approximately two months. The union 27 Stuart M. Jamieson, "Labour Disputes Settlement i n the Con-s t r u c t i o n Industry of B r i t i s h Columbia 1948-1954," i n H. D. Woods (Ed.), Patterns of Industrial Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian Industries, (Montreal, Que.: M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1958), p. 249. 28 Statutes of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1948, Chapter 31. of 1947. Aot of 1947. 29 Ibid.j Section 50, adding Section 31(c) to the I.C. & A. Act 30 Ibid.„ Section 72, adding Section 60B(2) to the I.C. & A. 31 J. E. Vaselenak, " B r i t i s h Columbia Logging and Lumber Indus-t r y 1946-1953," i n H. D. Woods (Ed.), Patterns of Industrial Dispute Settle-ment in Five Canadian Industries-, (Montreal, Que.: M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , 1958), p. 345. 32 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, May 5, 1948. 54 had c o n s i s t e n t l y sought a 35 cent increase. At f i r s t the employers offered no increase, but over the period of negotiations f i n a l l y countered with 10 cents. The union was able to get a 95 per cent r e j e c t i o n vote by the mem-33 bership f o r the 10 cent o f f e r , a f t e r which the employers offered 11 cents. The c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r , William Fraser, was appointed July 21, but on 34 August 4 reported f a i l u r e to bring the pa r t i e s together. The IWA sought 35 a c o n c i l i a t i o n board which was appointed on August 16. Its chairman was 36 J u s t i c e H. I. Bi r d . The board reported i t s recommendations on September 19. I t unanimously recommended a 13 cent increase on a 95 cent base, r e t r o -active to July 12. The recommendations were accepted by the parties and a contract was signed. The following year, 1949, coast f o r e s t negotiations began on 37 June 16. The IWA team sought a 13 cent increase i n the basic $1.08 hourly 38 wage. FIR, was seeking to return to the 1947 wage rate, a net decrease of 13 cents per hour from the negotiated 1948 wage rate. A c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i -39 cer was appointed July 2, but was unable to bring the p a r t i e s to agree-ment. A c o n c i l i a t i o n board was appointed on July 30. I t s report on August 33 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, July 14, 1948. 34 Ibid., August 4, 1948. 35Ibid. , July 21, 1948. Ibid., September 22, 1948. 31Ibid., June 23, 1949. 38 Stuart Research changed i t s name to Forest I n d u s t r i a l Rela-tions (F.I.R.) on February 10, 1949. 39 B r i t i s h Columbia Limber Worker, July 15, 1949. 55 18 recommended no wage change and bore only the signatures of the chair-40 man and the employers' nominee. The recommended settlement was accepted by the employers, but was not acceptable to the union. A conference, arranged between the pa r t i e s by the labour r e l a t i o n s board on the eve of an employee s t r i k e vote, resulted i n eventual settlement without a 41 wage increase. The parties agreed to have the c o l l e c t i v e bargaining contracts expire on June 15 of subsequent years. During the 1949 recession, lumber prices were p a r t i c u l a r l y hard h i t with declines i n p r o f i t s and p r i c e s . The negotiated wage rate for 1949 was also unchanged within the P a c i f i c Northwest region of the 42 United States where the IWA had a large membership. The lack of a wage increase was not a serious defeat for the union bargainers. I t i s quite obvious, however, that the union nominee and the union negotiating committee could not have been expected to openly approve of a contract c a l l i n g f o r no wage increase. This was p a r t i c u l a r l y true because the recent attempted breakway by the Communist leadership i n 1948 had not been completely s e t t l e d by early 1949. The 1950 bargaining began with the IWA seeking 17 cents per hour i n base pay increases and a union shop. Equally important was" a strong "no contract, no work" p o s i t i o n . This implied that the work-ers would cease work on the June 15 expiration of the e x i s t i n g contract, 40 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, August 20, 1949. 41 Ibid., September 8, 1949. 42 Levinson, op. ait., p. 104.. See also Appendix II. 56 even i f the process of c o l l e c t i v e bargaining had not produced a new agree-43 ment. Bargaining had reached a deadlock on A p r i l 24. Both p a r t i e s had maintained t h e i r o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n s , and applied to the p r o v i n c i a l govern-ment to have the f i r s t l e v e l of c o n c i l i a t i o n , the c o n c i l i a t i o n ; o f f i c e r , waived. They wished to proceed to a c o n c i l i a t i o n board without delay. 44 The request of the p a r t i e s was rejected. A c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r was appointed on May 1. His recommendation, a f t e r one meeting with the par-t i e s , was that the dispute go d i r e c t l y to a c o n c i l i a t i o n board. The board was appointed on May 5. I t held hearings from May 18 to 22 and on May 25 i t was able to issue a unanimous report, recommending 45 a nine cent wage increase and a maintenance-of-membership clause. The employers accepted. The employees rejected the proposal, however, voting 46 86 per cent i n favor of s t r i k i n g f o r a larger settlement. The Labour Relations Board intervened i n the process on June 12, only three days hefore the contract expired. The board acted as an e x t r a - l e v e l mediator, applying pressure to both sides. The p a r t i e s f i n -a l l y reached an agreement during t h i s period; increasing wages an ad d i t i o n -a l three and one-half cents per hour (over the recommended nine cents) to 12% cents per hour, f o r a base rate of $1,205. A3 B r i t i s h Columbia Limber Worker, March 23, 1950. 44 Ibid., A p r i l 27, 1950. k5Ibid., May 25, 1950. hbIbid., June 15, 1950. 57 The Korean war boom and rapid i n f l a t i o n placed pressure on the wage l e v e l s of the 1950-1951 contract. The IWA sought to open the wage 47 p r o v i s i o n of the contract i n January, 1951. The employers assented to re-negotiation of the contract i n l i g h t of rapid p r i c e increases during the period. A new contract was reached to extend u n t i l June, 1952, thus extending one f u l l year beyond the e x i s t i n g expiration date. The agree-48 ment provided f o r an increase of nine cents i n the old $1,205 base rate. The parti e s reached the new contract agreement without state intervention. The 1952 negotiations began on A p r i l 22. The parties negotia-ted f o r 10 days but with l i t t l e success.- The union sought an increase of 35 cents, while the employers went f o r a reduction of 12% cents per hour. R. G. Clements was again appointed the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r f o r the nego-49 t i a t i o n s on May 8. On the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r ' s recommendation, a con-c i l i a t i o n board was appointed on May 29. On May 30, the IWA D i s t r i c t newspaper, the B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, attacked the slowness of the proceedings. Comparisons were drawn between the 1950 negotiation timetable and the considerably slower 1952 procedure. The union, the e d i -t o r i a l claimed, would i n s i s t that "no contract, no work" would force a stoppage on June 15. B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, January 18, 1951. 48 The 1951 and 1952 contracts contained cost of l i v i n g e l e -ments. These were deleted i n 1953. 49 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, May 16, 1952. 58 On June 7 the time l i m i t for the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recom-mendations expired without a report having been made. The Labour Relations Board at f i r s t rejected an a p p l i c a t i o n f o r an extension of time by the board chairman. The Labour Relations Board l a t e r did, however, grant the c o n c i l i a t i o n board an extension of time. The union nominee issued a min-o r i t y dissenting report on June 7 before an extension was allowed. The majority report of the c o n c i l i a t i o n board was issued on June 10. It suggested no change i n the base wage rate and bore the signature of the chairman and the employer nominee. The IWA rejected the recommended basis f or settlement and sought a s t r i k e vote. The Labour Relations Board endeavoured to bring the p a r t i e s to an agreement. Meetings with the Labour Relations Board extended through June 13-14, but were unsuccessful."^ A s t r i k e commenced on June 15 before the f u l l formal procedure of r e j e c t i n g the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recommendation and taking a s t r i k e vote had been completed. Thus the s t r i k e was t e c h n i c a l l y i l l e g a l . The work stoppage was e f f e c t i v e l y complete within the s t r i k i n g u n i t s . The employers did not s e r i o u s l y attempt to continue operations by bringing i n replacement workers. The s t r i k e continued for 30 days without any major conces-sion from either side. On the request of both p a r t i e s , Chief J u s t i c e Sloan acted as mediator. During t h i s period of mediation the union low-B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Annual Report, ( V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1952), p. E 94. Vaselenak, op. cit., p. 343. 59 ered i t s demand to an increase i n the base rate by s i x cents per hour and a union s e c u r i t y clause. FIR had increased i t s o f f e r to f i v e cents per hour without union s e c u r i t y . The parti e s could not reach an agreement. On July 22, Chief J u s t i c e Sloan proposed terms for a settlement, recommend-ing an increase of b\ cents an hour for a t o t a l base rate of $1.35 per hour and a r e j e c t i o n of union s e c u r i t y . His r a t i o n a l e f or the r e j e c t i o n of de-mands for increased union s e c u r i t y was based upon the i l l e g a l i t y of the e x i s t i n g s t r i k e . He ruled that an i l l e g a l s t r i k e should not be able to 52 produce gains to the union that brought i t about. Anxious to end the long and hard s t r i k e , the union then 53 accepted the terms. A majority of the employers also accepted. Infor-mal speculation by parti e s who chose not to be i d e n t i f i e d , i s that the 16 companies that refused to accept saw the s t r i k e as a p o t e n t i a l opportunity to weaken the IWA. The speculation continues that the firms were dissuaded from f o r c i n g the union to s e t t l e on t h e i r terms by Chief J u s t i c e Sloan. He argued that a severe blow to the union would serve only to s t i r up the r a d i -c a l elements i n the union and thereby increase labour d i f f i c u l t i e s . The s t r i k e was f i n a l l y s e t t l e d on the terms recommended on July 29. The s t r i k e had lasted 39 days and had incurred i n excess of one m i l l i o n man days of labour l o s t . 52 Report of J u s t i c e Sloan, quoted i n FIR C o n c i l i a t i o n Board Rebuttal B r i e f (unpublished b r i e f s , Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations, Vancouver, B.C., 1958). 53 Vaselenak, op. ait., p. 344. 54 B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Annual Report3 ( V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1953), G 98. 60 Direct negotiations between the partie s i n 1953 began on A p r i l 15. The union sought a 15 cent per hour base, rate wage increase and the employers offered no change i n the e x i s t i n g r ate. After nego-t i a t i n g into May, a c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r was appointed on May 4. He was unable to bring the p a r t i e s to a settlement and recommended a c o n c i l i a t i o n board on May 15. A board of c o n c i l i a t i o n was appointed with F. J . Lynn as chairman. The board issued a unanimous recommendation for settlement on July 4. The c o n c i l i a t i o n board suggested a f i v e cent increase i n the basic rate and the incorporation of c o s t - o f - l i v i n g gains, registered i n the 1952 contract, into the base rate f o r 1953, for a new base rate of $1.49 per hour. The IWA accepted the terms of the board. When 35 of the em-ployers r e s i s t e d s e t t l e m e n t , t h e IWA requested a s t r i k e vote against the employers who had rejected the settlement terms. A f t e r three weeks, on July 28 the r e c a l c i t r a n t employers accepted and the agreement was conclu-ded. The Labour Relations Board i n 1953 was reduced from f u l l to 56 a part-time basis for reasons of economy. U n t i l then the board had often served as a t h i r d l e v e l mediator (after a c o n c i l i a t i o n board recommendation was rejected) when a work stoppage seemed imminent. The board does not appear to have offered p a r t i c u l a r r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s b u t instead used i t s Vaselenak, op. cit. , p. 344. 5 6 Jamieson, "Labour Dispute Settlement i n the Construction Industry of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1948-1954," op. cit., p. 259. "^Vaselenak, op. cit., p. 369. 61 wide powers of d i s c r e t i o n over the area of labour r e l a t i o n s as a goad to 58 bringing the pa r t i e s to agreement. This coercive function of the Labour 59 Relations Board met with considerable resistance from labour. There was also much doubt as to the ultimate a b i l i t y of the board to function e f f e c t -60 i v e l y as a mediator. Perhaps most important to the proposed elimination of the Labour Relations Board as a mediating agency was the f e e l i n g of the p r o v i n c i a l Department of Labour that the board's subsequent interventions had the e f f e c t of n e u t r a l i z i n g the e a r l i e r stages i n the statutory media-txon process. The ICA Act of 1948 and i t s 1948 Amendment were law u n t i l A p r i l 1954 when i t was replaced by the Labour Relations Act. During i t s 6 2 l i f e the statute applied to s i x contract negotiations between the IWA and FIR. During this period the pa r t i e s adjusted to functioning under p r o v i n c i a l labour statutes a f t e r the federal c o n t r o l which had existed during World War 2 and the peace-time t r a n s i t i o n year of 1946. The period under the ICA Act saw a steady increase i n union demands upon the system. This i s not measured i n terms of absolute d o l l a r 58 Jamieson, "Labour Dispute Settlement i n the Construction Industry of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1948-1954," op. ait., p. 250. ^Ibid. ^Vaselenak, op. ait., p. 349. ^Tbid., p. 368. The contract renewal of 1951 was unique. It resulted from a contract re-opening and was not subject to the statutory bargaining pro-cesses. For these reasons, i t i s not included as a contract negotiation under the statutes. 62 demands nor i n demands that are not economically r e a l i s t i c . The union militancy was characterized by a refusal to accept the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's suggested settlements. There was an increasing partisanship 63 within the c o n c i l i a t i o n process of union nominee's dissent. The 1947 agreement was reached before a c o n c i l i a t i o n board became necessary. Both the effects of the long 1946 s t r i k e , and the un-certainty of the results of c o n c i l i a t i o n under the new provincial act, tended to induce a mutual willingness to s e t t l e the negotiations. The 1948 negotiations did proceed to a c o n c i l i a t i o n board. I t s report was received without dissent, however, and was quickly accepted by the par-t i e s . The dissension then began. The 1949 c o n c i l i a t i o n board report was issued with, the union nominee dissenting. The union accepted the terms of recommendation as a settlement only after the Labour Relations Board had brought the parties together on the eve of a s t r i k e vote by the union. The following year the union was able to gain 3h cents above and beyond the board's recommendations through dissent and s t r i k e threats. This was done i n the face of a unanimous report through the intervention and medi-ation of the Labour Relations Board. The effectiveness of the recommendations was diluted through the a b i l i t y of the board and bargaining under the Labour Relations Board's final-hour interventions. In the 1952 negotiations, expectations were raised on the union side that additional gains could be made beyond the To the degree that the recommendations are partisan,in favor of the employer, union behaviour would not be m i l i t a n t . For the analysis here i t i s assumed that the recommendations are neutral or non-partisan . 63 recommendations of the c o n c i l i a t i o n board. The union expected more. There may well have been a strong f e e l i n g on the part of the employers to reassert t h e i r own p o s i t i o n which had been undermined by the 1950 compromise. The 1952 s t r i k e was at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y a consequence of the p a r t i e s ' f a i l u r e to reach accommodation through the e x i s t i n g system. At that time i t was f e l t that the Labour Relations Board, i n acting as an a d d i t i o n a l stage of mediation, had contributed to the heightened par-tisanship which, existed at t h e . c o n c i l i a t i o n board stage. This was quite l i k e l y the r e a l , i f unstated, reason for the reduction of the Labour Re-l a t i o n s Board's status from a f u l l - t i m e to a part-time body. The negotiations of 1953 resulted i n c o n c i l i a t i o n board recommendations which were immediately accepted by the union. The d i f f i -c u l t y of the 1952 s t r i k e can be c i t e d as one reason for the lack of union m i l i t a n c y - i n 1953. The resistance of the minority of the employers to the recommendations of the board would also suggest that the recommend-ations were favorable to the union. A combination of these two factors may be the r e a l explanation of the union's quick acceptance of the sug-gested settlement terms. The basic pattern of the bargaining under the ICA Act was a steady d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the uneffectiveness of the process i n suggest-ing a settlement package acceptable to the p a r t i e s . (See Table I, p. 90). Several reasons may underlie t h i s f a c t . F i r s t , the early years of the period were prosperous f o r the industry. The a b i l i t y of the industry to pay i t s workers large wage increases may have stimulated agreement where the l a t e r , less prosperous period generated f r i c t i o n and c o n f l i c t through 64 greater resistance to wage increases. Thus, the d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n the r e -l a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s can be seen as the r e s u l t of simple market forces rather than behavior influenced by the bargaining process i t s e l f . The second explanation for the d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the r e -l a t i o n s h i p of the p a r t i e s was based upon the nature of the bargaining process. As the p a r t i e s became f a m i l i a r with the stages of c o n c i l i a t i o n , they tended to include them i n t h e i r bargaining techniques. The c o n c i l i a -t i o n board's recommendations were no longer an end but a means to an end. The recommendation was used as a s t a r t i n g point to be taken into further negotiations before the Labour Relations Board. This progression resulted i n the negotiations reaching the Labour Relations Board at or near the deadline f o r contract settlement, while the p a r t i e s were s t i l l i n wide disagreement over the terms of settlement. The Labour Board was not suited to be an e f f e c t i v e agency for recommending settlements on a regu-l a r , predictable b a s i s . Consequently, the process of accommodation was destined to be i n c r e a s i n g l y i n e f f e c t i v e and eventually to r e s u l t i n f a i l -ure, as i n 1952. It has been argued that the elaborate c o n c i l i a t i o n proced-ures of the ICA Act lessened the danger of work stoppages to both sides i n a dispute. This may have encouraged each side to hold out for more or to concede les s than i t otherwise might have. Each side would f e e l l e s s i n c l i n e d to compromise. The expectation would be that boards of c o n c i l i a t i o n or the Labour Relations Board might be able to force a •-settlement to preventing work stoppages over small disagreements. "Over a period of years t h i s system may have (had) the e f f e c t of en-65 couraging a pattern of bargaining and c o n c i l i a t i o n that would develop into a prolonged and extensive shutdown, rather than a large number of 64 small shutdowns." These theories a l l explain the behavior of the p a r t i e s through heavy r e l i a n c e on the technique of the Labour Relations Board i n serving as a t h i r d l e v e l of state-supported bargaining. To the degree that the p a r t i e s recognized that the f i n a l settlement would be determined by the negotiations held before the Labour Relations Board, the value of the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recommendations was l o s t . Its recommendations ceased to serve as a compromise s o l u t i o n , but instead became an i n t e r -mediate step i n the bargaining process. If the p a r t i e s had d i f f e r i n g expectations i n regards to the r o l e of the c o n c i l i a t i o n board's recommend-ations i n determining the f i n a l settlement, added c o n f l i c t was generated. The employers were determined to force the board recommendations upon the union i n 1952, to reassert the importance of the recommendations, and to "teach the union a lesson" for i t s aggressiveness. The ICA Act's procedural system can be said to have been by-passed by the l a s t minute mediation p r a c t i c e s of the Labour Relations Board. While t h i s board functioned as a t h i r d l e v e l of bargaining, recom-mendations had no f i n a l c o n f l i c t - r e d u c i n g e f f e c t . So long as the p a r t i e s could predict with c e r t a i n t y that the c o n c i l i a t i o n board was not the l a s t Jamieson, "Labour Dispute Settlement i n the Construction Industry of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1948-1954," op. cit.', p. 258. The quoted analysis deals with the construction industry during the same period. Construction, which bargains i n smaller u n i t s , would be better able to generate "small" shutdowns. 66 step i n the bargaining process, the board could not serve to bring the par t i e s together. In a r e a l sense the devices of the act were not given a chance to operate. Within an industry as important as f o r e s t r y , the p a r t i e s could be c e r t a i n that the Labour Relations Board would intercede before a work stoppage commenced. B. 1954 To 1961 Organized labour i n B r i t i s h Columbia had opposed the pass-age of the ICA Act i n 1947. The objections to t h i s act were met to a large degree by the speeding up of the c o n c i l i a t i o n process i n the ICA Amendment Act of 1948, and the reduction of the Labour Relations Board from a f u l l - t i m e to a part-time body i n 1953. Labour had become accus-tomed to the e x i s t i n g process. It a c t i v e l y opposed the government's i n -troduction of a new labour statute to replace the ICA Act. Labour urged retention of the e x i s t i n g act with the enactment of amendments as neces-. . . 65 sary to meet c r i t i c i s m s . 66 The Labour Relations Act of 1954 was enacted on A p r i l 14. It preserved the two-stage c o n c i l i a t i o n pattern of the e a r l i e r amended act. The new act included some a d d i t i o n a l provisions which had originated 6 7 i n the anti-labour Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 i n the United States and had Jamieson, "Labour Dispute Settlement i n the Construction Industry of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1948-1954," op. cit., p. 250. 66 Statutes of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1954, Chapter 17. 67 Labour Management Relations Act, T i t . 29 U.S. Code 141 et. seq. 67 been c a r r i e d over into the I n d u s t r i a l Relations and Disputes Investiga-68 69 t i o n Act of the Canadian government i n 1948. While these provisions did not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t the bargaining process, they help explain the resistance of labour to the new act. The major statutory change made i n the 1954 act which d i r e c t l y concerned the coast bargaining were involved not with the bar-gaining process but with the procedures following the end of mandatory c o n c i l i a t i o n , and the timing of the s t a r t of the process. The timing and duration of the i n d i v i d u a l stages of negotiation remained the same. The e n t i r e process could be i n i t i a t e d three months before the expi r a t i o n of the c o n t r a c t 7 ^ rather than the two months allowed under the old act. The intent of t h i s a l t e r a t i o n was to allow more time f o r the process so that "no contract, no work" issues could be avoided. Two additions were made to the procedures involved i n gain-ing the r i g h t to use the s t r i k e . Any s t r i k e or lockout vote could sup-port a work stoppage only within three months of the voting.'7"'" The par-t i e s could not gain one s t r i k e vote early i n the bargaining session and use i t as a threat f o r an unlimited period of time. Second, i n a l l cases, 11-12 George VI, Chapter 54, assented to June 30, 1948. 69 For example, the B r i t i s h Columbia 1954 act excluded super-v i s o r s from the d e f i n i t i o n of employee. This had f i r s t been done i n the U.S. i n 1947, and was adopted by the 1948 Federal Canadian Act. ^ S e c t i o n 17, The Labour Relations Act. 11Ibid.3 Sections 50(2)(a) and 51 (2)(a). 68 48 hours notice had to be served on the other disputant before any 72 s t r i k e could be commenced. This notice was an independent precondition to a work stoppage. Its obvious intent was to create a "cooling o f f " period before any s t r i k e , i n which the p a r t i e s could bargain with f u l l awareness of the impending act i o n . I t prevented sudden stoppages which did not allow "eleventh hour" negotiation by p a r t i e s who were aware that a s t r i k e deadline e x i s t e d . With these new r e s t r i c t i o n s on s t r i k e s , the 73 act increased penalties for i l l e g a l s t r i k e s . The union approached the 1954 negotiations f u l l y conscious of t h e i r d i f f i c u l t p o s i t i o n . The economic climate i n the lumber industry 74 on the P a c i f i c Coast was unhealthy. The Labour Relations Act was about to be enacted, over labour opposition, with i t s new s t i f f provisions against i l l e g a l s t r i k e s . The employers had shown increasing resistance i n the 1952 and 1953 negotiations, with a c e r t a i n element opposing compro-mise with the union. Facing these d i f f i c u l t i e s , the union, i n i t s wage conference, decided to bargain for holidays and union s e c u r i t y rather than for a wage i n c r e a s e . ^ The talks opened on A p r i l 15, but collapsed on A p r i l 29 over 7 2 S e c t i o n s 50(2)(b) and 51(2) (b), The Labour Relations Act. 73 Stuart M. Jamieson, Industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto MacMillan of Canada, 1957), p. 112 74 Levinson, op. ait., p. 111. See also Appendix I I . ^ B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, F i r s t Issue, March 1954. 69 76 the issue of union s e c u r i t y . R. G. Clements was appointed c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r under the recently-enacted Labour Relations Act. 7' 7 The union negotiation committee then had to decide i f i t should accept the FIR o f f e r , which was l e s s than the union desired, or go into a c o n c i l i a t i o n board hearing. The f e e l i n g of the leadership was that the immediate o f f e r might well be superior to the possible recommend-ation of a c o n c i l i a t i o n board. C o n c i l i a t i o n boards had not been w i l l i n g to increase union s e c u r i t y terms beyond those already i n existence. The union was also aware that there,would be no further mediation process im-posed upon the p a r t i e s as i n the former Labour Relations Board meetings. The union accepted the FIR o f f e r and the l o c a l s accepted a no-wage i n -78 crease contract by a vote of 74 iper cent. The opening date of the 1955 negotiations was one month 79 e a r l i e r than the usual A p r i l 15 date. The provisions allowed i n s t i -t u t i o n of the bargaining processi one month e a r l i e r than under the former act. The Labour Relations Act had not gone into e f f e c t e a r l y enough i n 1954 to control that year's negotiations. On A p r i l 7 t a l k s were broken 80 off by the union which requested a c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r . The union sought a base rate increase of 10 cents. This the employers r e s i s t e d . 76 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, F i r s t Issue, May 1954. 7 7 B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1954, p. H 72. 78 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, Second Issue, May 1954, 79 Ibid., F i r s t Issue, A p r i l 1955. 80 Ibid., F i r s t Issue, June 1955. 70 Lack of progress i n the negotiations then forced the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i -cer to recommend a c o n c i l i a t i o n board. 81 The board was appointed on May 26 and reported on June 22. Its unanimous report gave the union a 10 cent wage increase by granting f i v e cents per hour increases on the $1.49 cent base over a two-year per-82 iod. The contract was to run u n t i l June 15, 1957. The p a r t i e s accepted these terms. The recommendations formed the basis f or the f i r s t two-year contract i n the bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p . No opening of the contract occured i n 1956. The expected f i v e cent increase went into e f f e c t r a i s i n g the wage from $1.54 to $1.59, on June 15, 1956 as per the contract signed i n June of the previous year. In 1957 the union sought a 20 per cent increase i n wages and was opposed by FIR. The negotiations which had begun i n mid-March became stalemated i n early A p r i l . On A p r i l 11, R. G. Clements was appointed as c o n c i l i a -t i o n o f f i c e r , but was unable to bring the p a r t i e s to a settlement and 83 recommended the appointment of a c o n c i l i a t i o n board, which was appointed. Its chairman was former Attorney General Gordon Wismer. On'June 1 Wis-mer issued the board's report of recommendations which was signed by the chairman and the- employer nominee. I t c a l l e d f o r no wage change over a 81 B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Annual Report, 1955. p. F 88. 82 C o n c i l i a t i o n Board report i n B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Volume 2, No. 25, for the week of June 18-25. 83 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, F i r s t - Issue, May 1957. 71 two-year contract period, and suggested that no wage changes could be j u s t i f i e d "at the present time." Nonetheless, i t suggested that further hearings be held i n September, 1957. U n t i l that time the recommendation was that the p a r t i e s 84 continue operating under the old agreement. The^employee or union nominee issued a b i t t e r minority report. This claimed that the majority report was i l l e g a l i n that i t had attempted to prolong the hearings be-85 yond the time l i m i t s provided i n the Labour Relations Act. The union voted 95 per cent i n favor of r e j e c t i n g the 86 recommendations. S t r i k e action was threatened. The p a r t i e s were then brought together for t a l k s through the o f f i c e s of the Premier. It has been indicated that tremendous pressure was put upon the p a r t i e s , par-t i c u l a r l y the employers, to reach an agreement. The settlement was reached before c o n c i l i a t i o n hearings were to reconvene. Tt provided for a 13 cent hourly increase i n the base rate to $1.72, or a 1\ per cent i n -87 crease i n wages, whichever was greater, and a modified union shop. The contract was to extend for one year. In these negotiations i t was l i k e l y that the c o n c i l i a t i o n board recommendations worked to the detriment of the employers. The suggested delay i n any increase i n wages to some l a t e r indeterminate 84 B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Volume 4, No. 22, June 1, 1957. 85 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, Second Issue, June 1957, 86 Labour Gazette, 1957, p. 792. 87 Loc. cit., and see Appendix I , 72 date created a tremendous h o s t i l i t y within labour ranks. It seems most probable that the f i n a l wage package was higher than i t would have been i f a board recommendation had called for at least a four per cent increase. The passions of the union over p r i n c i p l e and wages may have convinced the government that any work stoppage would be protracted and d i f f i c u l t . This would increase the state pressure upon the employers to produce a compro-mise to prevent a s t r i k e . The year 1958 was a bad one for the forest industry. Adding to the general low l e v e l of economic a c t i v i t y was a record drought. The dry condition forced large-scale closure of the forest areas owing to the 88 extreme f i r e hazard. Negotiations opened on March 17, 1958 and extended 90 u n t i l A p r i l 3. R. G. Clements was again appointed as a c o n c i l i a t o r but proved unsuccessful i n effecting agreement. A c o n c i l i a t i o n board was 91 appointed on A p r i l 15 and reported on May 30. The Chairman, G. S. A l l e n , Dean of Forestry, University of B r i t i s h Columbia, and the employer nominee, signed the report. The union nominee dissented. The recommendations s t i p -ulated no change i n the existing base wage rate of $1.72. Stuart M. Jamieson, "Regional Factors i n Industrial Con-f l i c t , " Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Volume 28, No. 3 (August, 1962), p. 415. 89 B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, Second Issue, A p r i l 1957. ^Ibid. 91 Ibid., F i r s t Issue, June 1957. 73 The union had sought a 10 per cent increase. I t did not immediately proceed to a s t r i k e vote but sought further c o n c i l i a t i o n . William Fraser, head of the Department of Labour's C o n c i l i a t i o n Branch, served as'a mediator from J u l y 7 to July 17. The IWA took a s t r i k e vote at t h i s time.. The vote was s p l i t , v i r t u a l l y c r i p p l i n g any bargain-ing power the union.possessed. The union persisted i n i t s requests for mediation. J u s t i c e Sloan acted as a mediator from July 31 to August 17. Sloan's recommendations produced only a few fr i n g e gains for the union. The recommendations, however, served as the basis for a one-year contract. The union accepted the terms of the settlement because i t f e l t that any s t r i k e at the time would be d i f f i c u l t and unpopular. The employers were unprepared to accept any larger increases but accepted extended mediation so as to avoid creating a s i t u a t i o n wherein the union could generate sup-92 port f o r a s t r i k e f o r higher wage increases. In 1959 the c y c l i c a l l y - s e n s i t i v e lumber industry made a 93 strong recovery from the 1958 recession. The negotiations began on March 16 and extended u n t i l the 26. The IWA was seeking a 20 per cent wage gain. R. G. Clements was once again appointed c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r 94 for the bargaining negotiations. The c o n c i l i a t o r ' s meetings with the 92 The step-by—step development of these negotiations i s covered i n the July and August issues of the f o r t n i g h t l y IWA B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber' Worker, 1958. 93 Levinson, op. ait., p. 118, and Appendix I I . 94 Vancouver Province, May 20, 1959. 74 p a r t i e s extended from A p r i l 5 into May; It was the expectation of the par-95 t i e s that he was to serve a recommending function. His recommendations would allow the pa r t i e s to skip the c o n c i l i a t i o n board stage of the com-pulsory bargaining procedures. The c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r ended h i s term on May 30. He did.not f i l e recommendations. Labour Minister Lyle Wicks stated that recommendations were not made because the parties "had not bar— 96 gained i n good f a i t h . " A c o n c i l i a t i o n board was then appointed i n the 97 l a s t week of May to hold hearings i n June. The union was displeased at the necessity to go through the c o n c i l i a t i o n board hearings. Its b r i e f claimed that the hearings were a r e s u l t of the "bad f a i t h and broken promises" of the p r o v i n c i a l govern-ment i n refusing to allow the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r to make any recommend-ations. Dean G. F. Curtis of the U.B.C. Law School was chairman of th i s c o n c i l i a t i o n board. The majority report of the board, signed by the c h a i r -man and the employer nominee, c a l l e d for a two-year contract with a seven 98 cent increase i n the f i r s t year and f i v e cents i n the second year. This had been the substance of the employers' l a s t o f f e r to the union i n negoti-ations. The labour nominee signed a minority report suggesting an increase 99 of 26 cents, a f i g u r e near the l a s t union request during negotiations. 95 Vancouver Province, May 21, 1959, Q6 Ibid., July 7, 1959, 97 B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activi-ties, week of May 23-30, 1959 98 Vancouver Province, July 7, 1959. 99 Loc. cit. 75 The union held a s t r i k e vote on June 26 and on June. 28 set July 6 as a deadline for the contract to be s e t t l e d . Premier W. A. C. Bennett and Labour Minister Wicks were both involved i n last-minute talks designed to bring the p a r t i e s to a settlement before the deadline. The t a l k s were unsuccessful and ended with a s t r i k e on J u l y 7."*"^  The s t r i k e s u c c e s s f u l l y brought production to a stop. No serious attempts were made by the employers to operate during the s t r i k e , which extended to mid-August. On August 18, the government appointed economist John Deutsch as an Industry Inquiry Commissioner to try to bring the p a r t i e s to a settlement. The union at t h i s stage had been asking for 21 cents i n increases over a one-year contract."'"^"'" Deutsch recommended a settlement of 20 cents, spread equally over a two-year per-, iod, i . e . , 10 cents each year on the $1.72 base. Both sides to the dispute were s p l i t over the terms of the proposed settlement. IWA's m i l i t a n t l o c a l leader Syd Thompson urged r e j e c -102 t i o n even though the majority of the employees were i n favor of ending 103 the s t r i k e at the offered terms. The employers were reported to have s p l i t roughly according to the s i z e of companies. The smaller members were i n favor of accepting the settlement, the larger were divided i n "'"^Vancouver Province, July 7, 1959, 101Ibid. , September 11, 1959, ] 02 Ibid., September 5, 1959. 1 D3 Ibid., September 9, 1959. 76 104 opinion. Terms of the recommendation were accepted by the p a r t i e s on 105 September 14 and became the substance of the new contract. The s t r i k e had involved the e n t i r e industry i n a work stop-page running from early J u l y into September. Well over 1.000,000 man days of labour were l o s t through the dispute. The d a i l y Province reported the 106 s t r i k e as the " S t r i k e Nobody Expected." The passion generated by the misunderstanding of the c o n c i l i a t i o n , o f f i c e r ' s r o l e i n the negotiations was intense. The protests of the union i n i t s submissions to the c o n c i l -i a t i o n board demonstrated that the union f e l t the board hearings were un-f a i r . The chairman, i n signing a majority report with the employer nom-inee, may have done the only thing that he could to submit a report. This endorsement of the employers' p o s i t i o n by the board only added to the union's conviction that a work stoppage was necessary to reassert the union's p o s i t i o n . The Deutsch hearings and eventual recommendations, provided the f i r s t settlement proposal free from a charge of bias.. The recommend-ations represented a compromise to both p a r t i e s . The divided opinions concerning acceptance of the proposals that came from both sides demon-strated neither side was happy with the o f f e r . It cannot be said with c e r t a i n t y that the Deutsch recommendations would have s e t t l e d the dispute without a work stoppage. The pressure generated by the long s t r i k e 104 Vancouver Province, September 9, 1959, 105Ibid., September 15, 1959. 106'ibid., July 7, 1959. 77 served as'a stimulus to both sides to accept the settlement. The h o s t i l -i t y and misunderstanding generated by the appointment of a conciliation board when i t was not expected must be seen as having contributed to the di f f i c u l t y of the dispute. If the media considered the work stoppage as a "strike nobody expected," i t i s quite l i k e l y that the conciliation pro-cess i t s e l f had a large part i n bringing the strike on in 1959. Generally the media are quick to discover and report sentiment among the union for-ces that a stoppage is possible or l i k e l y . Its unexpectedness can be seen as an indication that the economic.situation was not so bad that a con-f l i c t was inevitable because of inab i l i t y of the industry to grant an i n -crease. The usual .behavior that the parties exhibit when they feel they may have to strike to force an issue was lacking. Absence of such senti-ment i n the 1959 bargaining would tend to indicate that a work stoppage was not anticipated by the parties during the early negotiations. C. Summary: 1954 - 1961 Two changes from the earlier ICA Act period were made in the process of compulsory conciliation under the Labour Relations Act. F i r s t , the process was started one month earlier in the contract l i f e . Bargain-ing could be required by one party when three months of the contract re-mained, instead of the previous two months. The forest bargaining adjusted to this timing change, but the significance of this is discussed later in this chapter. The second change was the removal, in 1953, of the Labour Re-lations Board from participation in last-minute negotiation with the par-78 t i e s . This restored the c o n c i l i a t i o n board as the f i n a l step i n the com-pulsory negotiation process. The pa r t i e s could no longer expect to go a step further, i . e . , to the Labour Relations Board, each negotiating year. The introduction of the two-year contract i n 1955, and i t s use again i n 1959, reduced the number of negot i a t i n g years to f i v e : 1954, 1955, 1957, 1958 and 1959. The negotiations i n 1954 began under the o l d -er 1947 Act and were concluded under the rules of the 1954 Act. The un-c e r t a i n t i e s of this t r a n s i t i o n may have stimulated the parties to s e t t l e without going into a c o n c i l i a t i o n board hearing. C e r t a i n l y the union was reluctant to r i s k recommendations under the new act which i t had opposed. This general reluctance had disappeared by the 1955 negotiations. In that year the board was successful i n bringing the parties together with the f i r s t two-year contract the parties had signed. The board recommendations i n 1957 were unfortunate i n two re-spects. F i r s t , the proposed agreement c a l l e d f or no wage increase. In view of the su b s t a n t i a l settlement that was eventually achieved, the board's sugggestion was w e l l below what could have been expected by the pa r t i e s . Secondly, and most important, the recommendations c a l l e d f o r more hearings at a l a t e r date. This had the e f f e c t of extending the c o n c i l i a t i o n process and the bargaining w e l l beyond expiration of the old contract. I t was this that prompted the b i t t e r union nominee's minority report, branding the board's report as i l l e g a l . The 1959 compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures also contributed to a disagreement among the pa r t i e s by creating expectations of one pro-cedure, while imposing a d d i t i o n a l procedures at an unexpected time. The 79 r e s u l t of the imposition of a c o n c i l i a t i o n board, where the parties ex-pected only c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r ' s recommendations, greatly upset the union. This union suspicion may have forced the chairman to sign with the employer nominee. The rather low recommendations-of the majority report added to the union's resistance which led to the 1959 s t r i k e . In 1957 and again i n 1959 the government exerted great pres-sure on the p a r t i e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the employers, to reach agreement. This resulted i n a settlement i n 1957 but f a i l e d i n 1959. In the 1959 eleventh-hour t a l k s , the contract had already been expired f o r over three weeks. The demands of the union were i n f l a t e d as a r e s u l t of the union having been denied the r i g h t to s t r i k e e a r l i e r through what i t f e l t to be the improper imposition of a c o n c i l i a t i o n board. Each of these bargaining sessions revealed a technique used s u c c e s s f u l l y by the union. When the c o n c i l i a t i o n boards i n each year had behaved i r r e g u l a r l y , or the union f e l t that the board was having an un-f a i r impact upon the bargaining, the union would influence i t s nominee to lodge a b i t t e r dissenting report. Whether by righteous indignation or design, the r e s u l t of this dissent was that the chairman was forced to sign with the employer nominee. The "employer report" then was used as evidence of the unf a i r c o n c i l i a t i o n board. This process was successful for the union i n 1957 i n gaining added wage increases at a c r u c i a l moment from the employers who were under intense government pressure to s e t t l e . The technique gained union s o l i d a r i t y and, to some degree, p u b l i c support f o r the union p o s i t i o n . • I t can also be said to have been a main cause of the 1959 s t r i k e . This period may be seen i n perspective i n Table I on p. 90. 80 D. 1961 To 1968 The parties had attempted to u t i l i z e Section 45(B) of the Labour Relations Act in the 1959 negotiations. That section allows, with the min-ister of labour's permission, a conciliation officer to make recommend-ations having the same force and effect as a conciliation board's recom-mendations. The Labour Relations Act Amendment Act, 1961"*"^  replaced the old provision with a broader one. Not only was i t then possible to sub-stitute a conciliation officer for a board, but i t was possible to avoid a conciliation board and s t i l l not receive recommendations from a con-108 c i l i a t i o n officer. The result of this amendment was to allow the min-ister of labour considerable discretion in requiring conciliation pro-cedures. The parties could be prevented from anticipating the co n c i l i -ation procedures ^hat would follow their negotiations. Two additional legal developments served to change the balance of power within the bargaining relationship. In 1959 the Trade Union Act 109 was passed. It limited the range of activities permissible to a union while on strike, limited the definition of a legal strike and provided sanctions for i l l e g a l union activity. The act was feared and actively Statutes of British Columbia 1961, Chapter 31. 108 Labour Relations Amendment Act 1961, Section 26, amending Labour Relations Act, Section 45(B). 109 Statutes of Bri t i s h Columbia 1959, Chapter 90. 81 opposed by labour. Following the Trade Unions Act was the Therien 110 Case. That case established the principle that a union could be sued in i t s own name for i t s wrongful acts. Included in the range of wrongs for which the court provided a remedy were damages resulting from viola-tions of the Labour Relations Act and the Trade Unions Act. This meant that employers or other injured parties could sue the union directly and base their claims on a violation of the labour acts. These changes in the law made i t much more costly for the union to act in violation of the labour legislation. Not only could the government provide for s t r i c t penalty, but private parties could also bring actions based upon the existing statutes. The two-year contract of 1959 was due to expire on June 15, 1961. After the general economic upswing of 1959, the lumber industry was now going through a period of relatively low activity."'""'""'" Negotia^ tions opened on March 15 with the union seeking increases;?of 12% cents in the hourly base rate. The parties did not immediately seek co n c i l i -ation, although either one could have unilaterally requested that a con-c i l i a t i o n officer be appointed. 112 Negotiations continued u n t i l April 13. A conciliation o f f i -cer was then applied for and E. P. Fisher was appointed near the end of ^^International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Therien, S.C.R. 264 (I960), 22 D.L.R. (2d) 1, (1960). I l l Levinson, op. o%t., p. 119 and Appendix II. 112 British Columbia Limber Worker, First Issue, May 13, 1961. 82 A p r i l . The union had to decide whether i t wished to continue negoti-ating or to seek c o n c i l i a t i o n board hearings. No increase had been 114 offered by the employers, but the union f e l t that going to c o n c i l i -ation hearings would r i s k loss of the health and welfare gains the em-ployers had agreed to. The general f e e l i n g was that the board was less sympathetic to new frin g e provisions than wage increases. The employees accepted the l i m i t e d gains by a 69 per cent vote, t h i s suggesting s a t i s -f a c t i o n with the new contract. The combination of the new labour law, the poor economic conditions and the memory of the long 1959 s t r i k e was very e f f e c t i v e i n reducing the workers' aggressiveness. In 1962 negotiations extended from March 15 u n t i l the week ending A p r i l 6, when a c o n c i l i a t o r was appointed."'""'"^ E. P. Fisher, again the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r , was unable to bring the p a r t i e s together. He recommended that no c o n c i l i a t i o n board be appointed. On A p r i l 27, Minist e r of Labour L e s l i e Peterson appointed Dr. Neil.G. Perry, Dean of the Faculty of Commerce and Business Administration at U.B.C, as an I n d u s t r i a l Inquiry Commissioner."'"''"^ The advantage of this a l t e r n a t i v e agency was that i t was 113 . . . B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Week of A p r i l 28, 1961. "'""'"^ See May issues of the B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Worker, 1961. "'""'"^British Columbia Department of Labour, Summary- of Activities, Week ending A p r i l 6, 1962. 116 Ibid., Week ending June 1, 1962. 83 not limited in time and was non-partisan. Dean Perry, reporting to the minister on May 30, recommended a settlement of 16 cents in base pay increases divided equally over a two-year contract on a $1.92 base."'""'"7 This offer was accepted by both sides in a mid-June referendum vote and became the new two-year contract i "'""^ In 1964 the economic situation had improved in the lumber in -dustry and the IWA became determined to make substantial gains. The i n i t i a l demand df the union was for a 40 cent increase over a one-year contract. Negotiations began in mid-March and halted after less than two weeks. A conciliation officer,' E. P. Fisher, was appointed the week 119 ending April 3. He remained with the parties u n t i l May 5. On that date the disputants agreed to allow the conciliation officer 30 days additional time to try to gain a mutual agreement. It was decided that i f he were unsuccessful by that time he would issue recommendations. These 120. recommendations would take the place of a conciliation board. The conciliation officer's recommendations called for a two-year contract. Wages the f i r s t year were to increase 15 cents and in the second year, 13 cents, for a two-year total of 28 cents over the existing T17 . . . British Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Week ending June 1, 1962. 118 Labour Gazette, 1962, Volume LXII, p. 802. 119 . . . British Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Week ending April 3, 1964. 120 Vancouver Province, May 5, 1964, p. 17. 84 base rate of $2.08. The'IWA leadership believed that the government would 121 not t o l e r a t e a s t r i k e f or higher wages and that a successful s t r i k e vote would be d i f f i c u l t to achieve. Hence the IWA negotiating council, agreed to recommend the terms to the membership; Within the region a s p l i t formed on acceptance of the recommend-ations. The regional president, Jack Moore, t r a v e l l e d through, the region recommending the settlement. Syd Thompson, head of Local 1-217 and leader 122 of the m i l i t a n t wing of the region,' recommended r e j e c t i o n . The o f f i c i a l 123 vote was held on June 8, 1964 when the terms were accepted by a majority of the employees and by seven of the eight l o c a l s concerned. Only the mili-fe 124 tant Vancouver l o c a l rejected the contract. The e f f e c t of the d i v i s i o n within the membership was to move the more conservative regional leadership to the l e f t . I t i s an unfortunate feature of the s i t u a t i o n that moderates i n the union, aware of the things that common sense recommends as sound p o l i c y f o r the union to pursuef nevertheless, may f e e l compelled competitive-l y to about equal the more r a d i c a l element i n aggressive-ness and "we-don't-get-along-with-the-boss" a t t i t u d e . They may do t h i s i n order to prove t h e i r vigor and merit .^5 as representatives of the rank and f i l e of union members. 121 Vancouver Province, May 26, 1964. 1 77 Ibid.., May 28, 1964. 123 Ibid., June 6, 1964. Labour Gazette, August 1964, p. 679. 125 E d i t o r i a l , "IWA Deal Subject to R i v a l Attack," i n the B r i t i s h Columbia Lumberman, June 1964. 85 The negotiations i n 1966 began March 15. A c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i -126 * cer was appointed the week ending A p r i l 1. No agreement was reached under the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r , who recommended no c o n c i l i a t i o n board. In May the union took a s t r i k e vote of i t s membership, r e s u l t i n g i n a 94 per cent vote i n favor of a s t r i k e i f an agreement could not be 127 reached. Repeating the 1962 pattern, the minister appointed J u s t i c e 128 N. Nemetz as an I n d u s t r i a l Inquiry Commissioner on May 25, 1966. The Commissioner met with the p a r t i e s f o r d i r e c t negotiations and l a t e r met with them separately. Although the union negotiators had attempted to keep the membership at work a f t e r the contract expired on June 15, 129 d i s s i d e n t elements did stop work. J u s t i c e Nemetz remained as commis-sioner during t h i s period and submitted hi s recommendations on June 22. These c a l l e d f o r a general wage increase of 40 cents to be s p l i t i nto 130 two 20 cent increases over two years on the $2.26 base rate. The Nemetz recommendations were accepted by both sides and be^-came the basis of the new two-year contract. The employers were r e s e n t f u l of the manner i n which the government added i t s weight to pressure to reach a settlement acceptable to both p a r t i e s . 126 B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Week ending A p r i l 1, 1966. 127 Nemetz Report, June 22, 1966, i n B r i t i s h Columbia Department of Labour, Summary of Activities, Week ending June 24, 1966. 128Ibid. 129 Ibid., Week ending May 27, 1966. U0Ibid. 86 For the government to forget i t s prodding part in a negotiation that ended in what could be discovered to be an ill-timed, ill-advised, and destructively costly wage settlement w i l l not be good enough. . .A more wholesome situation would exist i f government stopped far short of "prac-t i c a l compromises to keep the wheels turning" when such interference involves. . .the highest award figures the industry could be induced to swallow under duress of a threatened^cjippling strike and governmental displeasure. The 1968 negotiations were influenced by the introduction of B i l l 33 into the Legislative Assembly on February 21 by Minister of Labour Leslie Peterson. This b i l l , later to become the Mediation Com-mission Act, was violently opposed by labour because of i t s provisions calling for compulsory arbitration of labour disputes. In 1968, the parties began negotiation on March 18 and nego-tiations continued u n t i l a conciliation officer was appointed the week ending April 19, 1968. The conciliation officer was unable to bring the parties to a settlement. He issued no recommendations of his own and did 132 not suggest a conciliation board be appointed. While the union had 133 held a strike vote on May 15, and the employers had later served the 134 union with lockout warnings, each party did not wish a work stoppage. The parties both f e l t that a work stoppage would c a l l the compulsory 131 British Columbia Lumberman, Editorial, September 1966, p. 10., 1 3 ? IWA Local 1-217, Barker, Volume 9, No. 10, May 1968. 133Ibid. 134 Vancouver Province, June 11, 1968. 87 provisions of'the developing Mediation Commission into play. That act was proclaimed in sections as the machinery of the Mediation Commission was established. The parties reached agreement on wage increases of 18 cents per year for a two-year contract which would bring the base rate from $2.76 to $3.12 by June 1969. While the 1968 negotiations may be said to have been carried out under the Labour Relations Act, the fear of bringing down an appli-cation of the unproclaimed sections of the Mediation Commission Act con-trolled the bargaining. When the government refused to provide a recom-mending agency the parties were virtually forced to settle on their own without any work stoppage. Although the Mediation Commission Act does not concern this study, the pressures upon a l l concerned were to avoid a p o l i t i c a l confrontation through a work stoppage in the forest industry in 1968. E. Summary: 1961 - 1968 The period after the strike of 1959 is notable for i t s total lack of conciliation boards. The trip a r t i t e recommendation agency did not pass from normal usage within the system of provincial industrial relations, but i t was consistently avoided within the forest industry. The 1961 negotiations were resolved without recourse to a recommendation agency as were the 1968 negotiations. These negotiations were held in years in which there was considerable pressure not to strike. In 1968 the Mediation .Commission Act had loomed over the negoti-ations and 1961 was the contract negotiation following the d i f f i c u l t strike year of 1959. In each year there were forces stimulating agree-88 ment at an early l e v e l . The years 1962, 1964 and 1966 demonstrate the success of the one-man recommendation body. The recommendations produced by one man tended to r e f l e c t a compromise view more cons i s t e n t l y than t r i p a r t i t e agencies which were susceptible to i n t e r n a l dissent. The d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t of an award made by a c o n c i l i a t i o n board chairman and one nomi-nee, generally the employer's, was avoided by a s i n g l e a r b i t e r . Despite the success of the negotiations i n avoiding o f f i c i a l work stoppages, In t e r n a l dissension within union ranks seemed to grow. When the recommendations were "s u c c e s s f u l " i n the sense of serving as a package acceptable to both p a r t i e s , the m i l i t a n t elements of the union were d i s s a t i s f i e d . . This dissension grew to the point where up to 10,000 workers i n the industry were on wildcat s t r i k e s during the period of the Nemetz Inquiry Commission a f t e r the expiration of the 1964 contract from June 15 to June 22, 1966. The e f f o r t s of the IWA negotiating committee were not able to get a l l the members back to work during that period. The i n t e r e s t of the state i n preserving i n d u s t r i a l peace i n the f o r e s t industry was revealed c o n s i s t e n t l y throughout this period. The tendency seemed to be for the recommendations to r e f l e c t the amount expected to be acceptable to the union leadership. The employ-ers were expected to agree to the package under state pressures. When . the recommendations are offered by the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r — an em-ployer of the state — t h i s i s even more natural. The state had greater power over the employers than over the union to stop any plans to h a l t production. 89 The very need of the state to ensure an uninterrupted stream of labour services in certain industries may have led to the passage of the Mediation Commission Act. That act ended the two-stage compulsory conciliation system which was only able to delay rather than prevent the use of the work stoppage as an instrument of negotiation. 90 TABLE I EXTENT OF PROCESS UTILIZATION POST CONTRACT FIRST STAGE SECOND STAGE RECOMMENDATION YEAR UTILIZED RECOMMENDATION NEGOTIATIONS STRIKE 1947 X 1948 X X 1949 X X 1950 X X X 1952 X X X X 1953 X X 1954 X 1955 X X 1957 X X X 1958 X X X 1959 X X X X 1961 X 1962 X X 1964 X X 1966 X X ( p a r t i a l ) 1968 X CHAPTER SIX EVALUATION OF THE MODEL The model of party i n t e r a c t i o n developed i n Chapter Four for the f o r e s t bargaining p a r t i e s may be tested against the actual events given i n Chapter Five. The means or strategies used i n the actual bar-gaining may be predicted by the model. If the .^model i s considered to have any explanatory power over the process of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n within the p a r t i c u l a r industry, i t must f i r s t demonstrate p r e d i c t i v e power. If the predicted forms of party i n t e r a c t i o n are not found i n the actual bargaining, then the model has f a i l e d to consider important a d d i t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s among the parties or i t has not succeeded i n i n t e r -r e l a t i n g the va r i a b l e s present. In either case, the model would not be of use i n explaining the process of party i n t e r a c t i o n . Both the general comments upon compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n i n Chapter Two, and the i n d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c model of negotiation behavior i n Chapter Four, suggest that the existence of the second-stage recommending agency w i l l g r e atly weaken the e f f e c t s of e a r l i e r contract bargaining and mediation. This appears to be the case. In 12 out of 16 of the regular"*" contract negotiations the bargaining process advanced to the recommending The 1951 negotiations are omitted from consideration. 91 92 s t a g e w i t h o u t s e t t l e m e n t . No agreement was re a c h e d b e f o r e a c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r was i n t r o d u c e d I n t o n e g o t i a t i o n s . F o u r c o n t r a c t s o f the 16 were r e a c h e d by s e t t l e m e n t between t h e p a r t i e s p r i o r t o a recommending body b e i n g convened. The i n d u s t r y model r e q u i r e s two elements t o be p r e s e n t b e f o r e s u c h an e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t c o u l d be e x p e c t e d . The f i r s t would be a f e e l i n g upon t h e p a r t o f the u n i o n l e a d e r s h i p t h a t t h e l a s t o f f e r o f the e m p l o y e r s , made b e f o r e a recommenda-t i o n agency i s convened, i s b e t t e r t h a n t h a t w h i c h c o u l d be g a i n e d by a d -v a n c i n g t o o r beyond t h e recommending p r o c e s s . The cause o f the r e q u i r e d d i s t r u s t o f the. f i n a l r e s u l t o f t h e p r o c e s s , i f c o n t i n u e d , i s n o t ex-p l a i n e d by t h e model., b u t i t s e f f e c t i s s i m i l a r t o S t e v e n s ' model o f com-p u l s o r y a r b i t r a t i o n where t h e p e r c e i v e d dangers o f t h i r d - p a r t y i n t e r v e n -t i o n f o r c e o r a l l o w s e t t l e m e n t a t an e a r l i e r l e v e l . There i s s t i m u l u s t o b a r g a i n d u r i n g l e v e l one c o n c i l i a t i o n . The second element p r e c o n d i t i o n i n g e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t under t h e f o r e s t r y m o d e l j e x i s t e n c e o f a u n i o n , l e a d e r s h i p b e l i e f t h a t t h e u n i o n membership w i l l be s a t i s f i e d w i t h t h e e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t . There must be some s o r t o f common u n d e r s t a n d i n g between the l e a d e r s and the r a n k and f i l e t h a t t h e c h o i c e b e f o r e t h e u n i o n i s between g o i n g on w i t h c o m p u l s o r y c o n c i l i a t i o n o r s e t t l i n g a t t h e employer's l a s t o f f e r . The l a t t e r must appear t o be t h e b e t t e r c h o i c e t o b o t h membership •and l e a d e r s h i p f o r t h e l e a d e r s h i p t o s e l e c t i t . On t h e o t h e r s i d e o f t h e b a r g a i n i n g . , t h e e m p l o y e r s ' o f f e r f o r e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t w i l l t e n d t o r e f l e c t t h e v a l u e t h e y p l a c e upon e a r l y s e t t l e m e n t . They a l s o , t o some d e g r e e , must s h a r e t h e v i e w t h a t c o n t i n u e d 93 uti l i z a t i o n , of the compulsory- conciliation procedure w i l l risk, some possible harm, more detrimental than the added cost of the offer made to the employees. The more the employers fear the outcome of continued conciliation, the higher their offer w i l l be in the early stages. If they do not fear the outcome of conciliation, there is l i t t l e reason for their early settlement offers to be high enough to induce the union re-action discussed above. The four years that involved an early settlement were: 1947, 1954, 1961 and 1968. The year of the i n i t i a t i o n of the compulsory conciliation process, 1947,.may be seen, as not a year in which the par-ties actually anticipated the later-stages effects with certainty. The process was new and untried. Each party, then, was to a degree uncertain about the consequences of u t i l i z i n g the entire process and may have been open to bargaining in the early stages. The f i r s t negotiating year can be taken as a "learning" year required to familiarize the parties with the process, and not viewed as an "early settlement" year. The 1968 negotiations are not of great importance to an analysis of the compulsory conciliation process. The p o l i t i c a l and tac-t i c a l behavior of the parties to the negotiation in that year was primar-i l y caused by the existence of the pending Mediation Commission Act. The 1968 negotiations could be better viewed as negotiations under B i l l 33 or the Mediation Commission.Act. The significant influence of the compulsory conciliation process existing under the Labour Relations Act was so negli-gible as to be excluded from analysis. The other two negotiation.settlements that may be said to 94 have occurred "within" the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n process were those of 1954 and 1961. Each year was the f i r s t experience of the p a r t i e s under a new p r o v i n c i a l labour act or an important amendment of i t . These new laws did not s i g n i f i c a n t l y e f f e c t the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures so as to make the bargaining p a r t i e s fear an unexpected r e s u l t from the stage-two c o n c i l i a t i o n process. Both years, however, were d i f f i c u l t economically within the forest industry. In each year the employees had f i n a l l y accep-ted a contract c a l l i n g for no wage increse, but some frin g e benefit i n -creases. The fear was expressed each year i n the union newspaper that a c o n c i l i a t i o n board would r e j e c t the fringe benefits offered by the em-ployers along with any wage increase, leaving the union below the l e v e l of the employers-' l a s t o f f e r . There was also a general recognition that a work stoppage would be i n e f f e c t i v e i n the d i f f i c u l t economic s i t u a t i o n so that the recommendations would l i k e l y become the contract. In the three years i n which the bargainers were unaffected by a d i f f e r e n t type of pending labour l e g i s l a t i o n , excluding, therefore 1968, membership aggressiveness had diminished owing to recent s t r i k e s . The three s t r i k e s within the post-war coast labour h i s t o r y occurred i n 1946, 1952 and 1959. These were close behind the "early settlement" years of 1947, 1954 and 1961. The influence of these s t r i k e s may have been to help convince the union leaders that the membership was indeed w i l l i n g to accept an early settlement rather than face the danger of an a d d i t i o n a l work stoppage through m i l i t a n t behavior. The exceptions to the model's general p r e d i c t i o n of post-recommendation settlement, then, f a l l within the anticipated behavior under the model. The circumstances which lead to such early settlements 95 may occur more frequently than might, be assumed. The.actions? of the par-ties in early settlement depend upon subjective determinations by the parties of future events and cannot be more accurately predicted without an analysis of how those events are perceived by an analysis outside the scope of this study. For example, the apparent view of the union that a conciliation board w i l l be Inclined to be more hostile to granting fringe benefits than wage increases would be of interest. The general strength of the model's general suggestion about the preponderance of late settle-ments i s not challenged by the existing early settlements. Certain tactics of recommendation bargaining are developed by the model. The employer is constrained to co-operative participation in the compulsory conciliation process. Within wide limits the f i n a l recommendations of the conciliation-recommending agency w i l l form the minimum possible settlement for the parties. The employers are faced with the pressures of public opinion and the state, and the expectations of the union membership to agree at least to that amount. On the basis of this prediction we would expect to see no settlements agreed upon which are below the recommendations issued by the authorized body. Additionally, where the recommending function is com-posed of members from both parties and a chairman, the employer nominee w i l l rarely i f ever dissent from the recommendations. His nominee w i l l be bound to "co-operate" and therefore not dissent. The record of the actual negotiations shows that recommend-ations were issued in 12 contract negotiations. In a l l years the recommend-ations were met or exceeded by the f i n a l settlement. In only one, 1953, was 96 t h e i r widespread public employer d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with accepting.the r e -commended l e v e l . In that year the recommendations became the s e t t l e -ment when s t i f f union and s t a t e pressure was placed upon the dissenting employers, f o r c i n g them to accept the recommendations. In the nine con-c i l i a t i o n boards that sat during the period, no employer nominee dissented from the issued recommendations. The actual negotiations seem to confirm the f a c t that the recommendation process i s a floor-producing mechanism within the f o r e s t industry. Recommendations are never higher than the f i n a l settlement between the p a r t i e s . For.the union, the strategy at the recommending stage i s v a r i e d . The union may support the f i n a l recommendations or may seek to d i s c r e d i t them and the e n t i r e recommendation process by attacking its.: " u n f a i r " because of i r r e g u l a r procedure or extended hearings, since the union must, through i t s nominee, seek a recommendation, i t may sign or dissent and allow the recommendations to issue from the employer and the chairman. There i s a cost to dissent. The cost i s the d i f f e r e n c e between a recommendation that could have been gained by the nominee "stay-ing with" the board i n i t s recommendations, and the recommendations issued without a labour nominees' signature.. To the extent that there i s a "cost" to dissent, the union w i l l have to decide to either accept the s l i g h t l y higher recommendationjunanimously issued, or to r i s k a strike-through post-recommendation bargaining to gain a settlement above the lower, labour-dissenting recommendations. Dissent would increase as the union was more w i l l i n g to r i s k through l a t e r negotiation. 97 In Chapter Two, the consensus among c r i t i c s of the compul-sory c o n c i l i a t i o n system was that i t was of decreasing effectiveness i n moderating t a c t i c a l behavior during the c o n c i l i a t i o n process. Membership militance would also tend to increase as the time span increases between the present contract negotiations and the l a s t work stoppage. F i n a l l y , Hick's p r e d i c t i o n that the union must s t r i k e p e r i o d i c a l l y to keep the s t r i k e threat v i a b l e also suggests increasing militance over time. These predictions combine and r e i n f o r c e one another. The concept of increasing union militance over a period of time may be taken as given f o r the pur-pose of t e s t i n g union dissent as a t a c t i c a l device of the union. If union dissent from recommendations increases over the s t r i k e cycle, or over the statute cycle, then i t may be viewed as a union t a c t i c a l weapon. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with p a r t i c u l a r recommendations based upon the character-i s t i c s of each p a r t i c u l a r procedure and r e s u l t would not y i e l d a pattern of increasing dissent over some cycle. The dissents of union nominees increased i n frequency both as the statute grew older and as the l a s t s t r i k e was forgotten. Because the statutes tended to change immediately a f t e r f o r e s t industry s t r i k e s , the pattern was a si n g l e one. From 1947 to 1952 there was a progression from early settlement i n 1947 to unanimous settlement recommendations i n 2 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1952. These were in c r e a s i n g l y opposed by the union, The 1950 recommendations were unanimous, but the union rejected them with great force. The union nominee had not been aware of the union p o s i t i o n . 98 leading to the 1952 work stoppage. The 1953 and 1955 boards were able to issue unanimous recommendations. Dissension by labour nominees occurred i n 1957, 1958 and 1959. Neither the model nor the record of behavior can i n d i -cate the "reasonableness" of the recommendations. The union could be dissenting from recommendations in.order, to gain "excess" settlements or to r a i s e . "inadequate" settlements to "reasonable" l e v e l s . The model suggests only that dissent may be used as a t a c t i c to win increases larger than the c o n c i l i a t i o n recommendations. The model also can draw no conclusion concerning the r e l a t i v e s i z e of the increase i n recommend-ation, l e v e l s foregone by the.union i n dissenting, and the increase gained by dissent and further negotiation. Dissent i s , then, to some degree, l i k e l y used as a bar-gaining t o o l f o r economic gain. I t serves an ad d i t i o n a l function under the model. Because the c o n c i l i a t i o n process i s viewed as inherently "anti-union," i n i t s st r i k e - d e l a y i n g e f f e c t s , the union w i l l tend to be very s e n s i t i v e to both delay i n the c o n c i l i a t i o n process and i n i r r e g u -l a r i t i e s i n the c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures. These " i n j u s t i c e s " i n the sys-tem are generally the reason given by the union whenever i t dissents from the recommendations, because economic reasons do not constitute a s u f f i c i e n t reason i n the public eye. Economic compromise i s expected. Thus, anticipated recommendation l e v e l s that are economically inadequate may be dammed through attacks, upon, the procedure i t s e l f ..as being unjust and u n f a i r f o r non-economic reasons. The non-economic grievances can be r e a l , however. They may also be t o t a l l y independent of economic complaints, although they 99 generally occur together. Thus, I f a c o n c i l i a t i o n recommendation pro-cess runs well past the contract e x p i r a t i o n date, the recommendations w i l l be h o s t i l e l y received regardless of t h e i r economic content. These non-economic grievances of the union may.well generate.the f e e l i n g that they deserve a d d i t i o n a l economic reward. This i s a l i k e l y r e s u l t of continued use of " i n j u s t i c e 1 ' as a l a b e l for dissenting from recommenda-tions on economic grounds. The membership comes to associate " i n j u s t i c e " w i t h the existence of inadequate present economic recommendations. The model w i l l therefore predict that the recommendation function may cause the union to r e j e c t a s a t i s f a c t o r y economic settlement because of procedural errors or delays by the recommendation agency. Be-cause the employer may not be prepared to o f f e r the a d d i t i o n a l amount held necessary by the union, t h i s could produce a work stoppage where the settlement could have been reached i f the procedural errors had not been made. The s t r i k e would be: a r t i f i c i a l l y induced by the recommendation body and made even more d i f f i c u l t because the union would be s t r i k i n g i n the name of p r i n c i p l e rather than on economic grounds. " P r i n c i p l e " becomes more d i f f i c u l t to compromise because no economic reasons f or concession may e x i s t . Employers w i l l r e s i s t "economically u n j u s t i f i e d " increases more than those f or which economic grounds may be found. The behavior manifested by th i s union.reaction to the recommendation functions i s d i f f i c u l t to i s o l a t e , by looking at the actual, recommendations, without .judging. them as " f a i r " or "unfair"''econ-omically. A very rough and possibly misleading technique for judging the l e v e l of the recommendation i s to examine the f i n a l settlement. 100 Within the l i m i t s that t h i s process allows, an analysis of the union's gains through dissent may be made. The f i r s t union, dissent from a c o n c i l i a t i o n board was i n 1948. The.economic s i t u a t i o n was poor and the recommendation was for no wage increase. I t was:accepted by the union even before a s t r i k e vote. The probable reason for the dissent was that a union nominee could not be expected to sign a recommendation c a l l i n g for no wage change. The 1950 .recommendations were issued unanimously. This r e s u l t was owing to the lack of understanding on the part of that p a r t i c u l a r union nominee,, of the economic r e a l i t i e s and power p o s i t i o n of. the. union and companies.-. . On sheer economic arguments, without any claim of i r r e -g u l a r i t y , the union gained an a d d i t i o n a l 3h cents i n base wage increases. The recommendations of 1952 were both delayed and i r r e g u -l a r i n scheduling . The s t r i k e was long and d i f f i c u l t with a net increase i n wages over, the recommendations of six cents. There i s no way to deter-mine i f the i r r e g u l a r i t i e s had any major r o l e i n stimulating the o r i g i n a l work stoppage. Union anxiety to get on with the work stoppage could gen-erate impatience with delay. Those delays, however, would help maintain worker m i l i t a n c e . The recommendations of 1957 c a l l e d for what would appear to be an economically u n r e a l i s t i c recommendation of no wage change. Im-portantly, i t did so i n such, a fashion that further hearings were recom-mended. The union.was able to gain a 95 per cent s t r i k e vote response to those recommendations and on that basis make considerable.post recommend-ation-.gains: 13 cents per hour over a recommended zero wage increase. Again, however, there can be no separation of economic and procedural 101 h o s t i l i t y to the recommendations. The. recommendations aroused such hos-t i l i t y , some of which, resulted from the procedures used, that the large gain may be, i n some degree, attributed to the procedural error. The 1959 negotiations, may demonstrate the model's sugges-tion that errors by the recommendation agency may make a settlement im-possible where i t was once possible. Both negotiating parties expected the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r to make recommendations for settlement of the dispute. He did not and a c o n c i l i a t i o n board was formed. This carried the period of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n past the expiration date of the contract. The board, with.the union nominee dissenting, affirmed the l a s t employer of f e r . The resultant s t r i k e was the largest i n terms of man days l o s t i n a l l B r i t i s h Columbia labour history. The resulting economic gains were s u f f i c i e n t l y s l i g h t — three cents extra the f i r s t year and f i v e cents the second — that the passions generated by the irregular procedures may have contributed to the s t r i k e . A clear example of dissatisfaction, independent of the recommended l e v e l of settlement i s evident i n the 1966 Nemetz Commission hearings. They extended beyond the contract date expiration and produced a work stoppage based upon the sole factor of "running long." The recom-mendations had not yet been issued. The s t r i k e organizers, i n defiance of the union negotiators, may.have had inte r n a l union p o l i t i c a l , reasons for beginning the work stoppage. The support of the par t i c i p a t i n g work-ers suggests that "procedures" may,generate considerable passion among the membership. The actual negotiations support the suggestion of the model that procedural i r r e g u l a r i t i e s may generate union d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n 102 i n accordance with, the l e v e l of recommendation. The actual negotiations do not allow a separation of the economic and procedural reasons f o r r e -j e c t i n g recommendations. The existence of procedural d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , i n -dependent of economic d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n , may. be confirmed at l e a s t i n 1966, but i t cannot be i s o l a t e d as a cause of a work stoppage i n the actual ne-go t i a t i o n s . Once.the union has rejected the recommendations i t i s free to s t r i k e . At t h i s stage, i f i t has developed t h i s f a r , the model does not make s p e c i f i c predictions on behavior. Generally the union leaders face the same expectation problems with members forming d i f f e r e n t views of how the. leaders should behave and what they should be able to gain. So, too, the negotiators must face the expectations formed through pre-vious union exhortation. The union membership had to vote s u c c e s s f u l l y to r e j e c t the recommendations and to s t r i k e i n every unit of the larger whole. Any small c e r t i f i e d unit i f i t f a i l s to support the s t r i k e vote cannot j o i n the s t r i k e . This requires much greater haranguing by the leadership than simple majority votes i n the en t i r e u n i t . That union leadership must then s a t i s f y the inflamed passions of the membership. This may w e l l be the reason for longer s t r i k e s . Actual post-recommendation r e j e c t i o n bargaining havior.j ^ . l i k e , s t r i k e n egotiation behavior, i s not pre d i c t a b l e from the. i n s t i t u t i o n a l v a r i a b l e s analyzed. T a c t i c s of b l u f f and n o t - b l u f f , sub-j e c t i v e evaluations of the other's p o s i t i o n , etc., f i t into normal two-party bargaining theory, and w i l l produce indeterminate r e s u l t s . Earbison 103 and Coleman, who describe a type of r e l a t i o n s h i p s i m i l a r to that e x i s t -ing within the coast f o r e s t industry, "The Armed Truce," f i n d they are able to make no predictions on the s t r i k e behavior of these r e l a t i o n -ships. The p a r t i e s w i l l gain experience over time and be less l i k e l y to misjudge what the other side may do i n a c r i s i s , but no other r e s u l t s can be stated. The model has been successful i n p r e d i c t i n g the patterns of be-havior up to acceptance or r e j e c t i o n of the recommendation. I t suggests that t h i s i n i t i a l behavior s a t i s f i e s i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l needs within the union. The treatment of the second-stage or recommending function i s of great importance to the compulsory procedure f o r i t establishes the momen-tum f o r the bargaining strategy of the union. In the c o n c i l i a t i o n process a dec i s i o n must be made to seek a c o n c i l i a t i o n or recommendation award that w i l l most l i k e l y be the f i n a l contract, or to r e j e c t the award and t r y the "power" s o l u t i o n of post-c o n c i l i a t i o n bargaining. The decision of the union leadership to co-operate or dissent i s made during the recommendation stage. I f the union leadership decides to co-operate with the recommenders the recommendations become d i f f i c u l t to avoid. The primary suggestion of th i s model i s to emphasize the importance of the recommendations to the bargaining process. Fredrick H. Harbison and John R. Coleman, Goals and Strategy in Collective Bargaining (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1951), pp. 46-47. 104 These recommendations consist of two independent factors: f i r s t , the size of the recommendations, i.e., their economic impact, and second, the procedural regularity or "fairness" of the proceedings as seen by lab our. CHAPTER SEVEN EFFECTS OF CHANGES IN THE PROCESS The model of i n t e r - and int r a - p a r t y behavior for the f o r e s t industry bargaining seeks to predict behavior within the stautory system. It may also, be used to predict the e f f e c t s of statutory changes within the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n process. The i n s t i t u t i o n a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which give the p a r t i e s t h e i r motives for s p e c i f i c behavior under the system are not changed, by minor.statutory modifications of the system. The model, as discussed i n Chapters Four and Seven, i s used i n two ways. F i r s t , i t i s used to suggest the impact of changes which did occur during the bargaining period. The r e s u l t s of the model may then be generally compared with the actual r e s u l t i n g changes., i f any, by the p a r t i e s under the changed process. Second, a d d i t i o n a l changes i n statutory form are presented which would improve the e f f e c t s of the pro-cess upon the negotiations. The statutes i n the 1947-1968 period made several changes i n the timing of the process. By s t a r t i n g the process e a r l i e r i n the e x i s t i n g contract, and.shortening the terms.of the f i r s t - s t a g e o f f i c e r and the second-stage agency, i t might be.assumed, that the process.would be completed sooner. Because continuation of. the process beyond, the l i f e of the e x i s t i n g contract is. resented by-the union, a f a s t e r system could be expected to reduce the union d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n by preventing suet runr overs. 105 106 The bargaining model would support the idea that preven-t i o n of overruns into the new contract period would remove, a union g r i e -vance. This would deny the union one means, of discounting the merits of the settlement recommendations. Such a reduction i n the union's, power to d i s c r e d i t the.recommendations may contribute to a union strategy de-c i s i o n to support the.recommendations.in the hopes of improving on them. The model does not i n d i c a t e any necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p between pushing.the i n i t i a t i o n of the. process back i n time, and the pre-vention of the :process.extending into the next contract period. There i s no necessary r e l a t i o n s h i p between the s t a r t and the f i n i s h , of the pro-cess. T a c t i c a l , delay, and extension of the process, by.the state, etc., may extend the process. The p a r t i e s may not f e e l compelled to rush i n the early stages. An examination.of the annual timing.of the process shows that although i n each year the contract negotiations began within a very few days of the statutory l i m i t for early commencement, no trend was es-r tablished i n process completion. . Thus, regardless of ..the s t a r t i n g date, the f i n i s h date was not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the time allowed for the pro-cess. In the 1950 to 1968 contract period, the contract expiration date was June 15. When the bargaining began two months before the expiration under the ICA Act, one of three recommendation agency, terms extended be-yond the e x p i r a t i o n date. When the. period was. extended three months over the previous two under the.Lahour Relations. Act, three,of s i x recommenda-tions were issued, in.the post-expiration period. The changes i n the be-ginning of .the process were not c l e a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n c o n t r o l l i n g the end-ing of the process. On th i s ground they were not c l e a r l y e f f e c t i v e i n 107 improving the r e s u l t s of the c o n c i l i a t i o n system. A second.tendency through the c o n c i l i a t i o n process was to increase the a v a i l a b l e sanctions and t h e i r s e v e r i t y . f o r use against v i o -l a t o r s of the. process of conciliation.. The model would suggest that i n the short run.period of the bargaining, negotiations threats of sanctions would not influence the union leadership's decisions. Internal union con-si d e r a t i o n s , and the t a c t i c s of the post-recommending.agency bargaining, would, tend to.overwhelm any fear of v i o l a t i o n of the provisions of the statute. . This would seem to.be p a r t i c u l a r l y true where the union did not expect the. state to attempt to punish labour during the negotiations or work stoppage for. fear of exacerbating the s i t u a t i o n . The actual events of the bargaining period do not a f f o r d much consideration of the e f f e c t s of sanction. They were not i n s t i t u t e d even where the union a c t i v i t i e s were i n clear v i o l a t i o n of the law, such as i n the 1952 s t r i k e which was i n s t i t u t e d without proper voting. In general, the e f f e c t of sanctions which do not influence the l e v e l s of recommendation or the bargaining process i t s e l f w i l l not be a major i n -fluence on the union t a c t i c s . The r e s u l t of reducing the Labour Relations Board to a part-rtime basis i n e a r l y 1953 was to end the self-assigned mediation function of the board. In e f f e c t , the act removed the informal t h i r d -l e v e l negotiation procedure. The model would suggest, that any procedure that f a c i l i t a t e d review of stage-two recommendations, would induce the union ..to discount the recommendations. The union, as the model suggests, makes a decision to 108 accept the recommendations or reject, them.. If the r e j e c t i o n i s made eas-i e r by the presence of an I n s t i t u t i o n a l i z e d process of further review, the union w i l l , tend to r e j e c t .recommendations more often. This same, r e s u l t would be suggested by the general c r i t i c i s m i n Chapter. Two, that l a t e r stages of any. process w i l l undermine the e a r l i e r . Thus, the existence of a " t h i r d l e v e l " undermines the second. The actual negotiations before and a f t e r the removal of the board as an extra l e v e l mediator, does not c l e a r l y support the idea that union dissents diminished. What does seem to be apparent, how-ever, i s that.the union sought to j u s t i f y i t s r e j e c t i o n of the recommend-ations a f t e r the board was removed. Where the process proceeded " n a t u r a l l y " to a t h i r d l e v e l of negotiations, and bargaining under the Labour Relations Board, l i t t l e excuse had to be offered to j u s t i f y the r e j e c t i o n of the second—stage recommendations. Where no mandatory e x t r a - l e v e l mediation was i n s t i t u -t i o n a l i z e d , the union had to j u s t i f y i t s r e j e c t i o n of the second-level recommendations. This j u s t i f i c a t i o n may be seen by noting that the post-1953 c o n c i l i a t i o n recommendation r e j e c t i o n s were supported by attacks against the procedures and the timing of. the recommendation agency. As discussed above, non-economic reasons were used to support the dissent. In pre-1953 r e j e c t i o n s , l i t t l e support was given to dissent. In 1950 the union, was able to s u c c e s s f u l l y dissent even when i t s c o n c i l i -a t i o n board nominee.signed the recommendations. D i r e c t l y related to the union dissent concept was the im-portant change i n 1961 which allowed the government o f f i c e r at the f i r s t 1 0 9 l e v e l , the c o n c i l i a t i o n o f f i c e r , , to recommend no further c o n c i l i a t i o n . This resulted i n the f o r e s t industry i n the replacement of .the three-man c o n c i l i a t i o n board, with the one-man recommending agency. The existence of a one-man recommending agency i s s i g n i f i -cant for the model's conceptualization of union negotiating strategy. The model suggests the union seeks to improve i t s p o s i t i o n vis-a-vis the recommendations by/dissociating i t s e l f from the recommendations. An im-portant technique up to t h i s time had been the dissent of the union nomi-nee from the recommending agency's report. Thus, the report was a pro-duct of employer rather than mutual suggestion. With a one-man recommend-atio n body there was no way i n which the union could symbolically d i s s o -c i a t e from the report. This i n a b i l i t y on the part of the union to d i s s o c i a t e was compounded by the l e g i s l a t i o n required to i n i t i a t e the recommendation stage. Because the option to have a stage-two recommendation hearing rested with the s t a t e , the union had to request such a process. This request made i t d i f f i c u l t to dissent from the r e s u l t s . The union leadership required the recommendations of a con-c i l i a t i o n agency.for the i n t r a - o r g a n i z a t i o n a l reasons discussed i n Chapter Four. The leaders' dependence upon the recommendations, could tend to gen-erate a gap between, membership and. leadership expectations.relating to proper conduct.before the agency. The leadership, i n one sense, needed the recommendations and had requested them. They may f e e l constrained from ac t i v e l y , dissenting during. the process,. The membership, might expect, as i n the case of labour nominees on t r i p a r t i t e c o n c i l i a t i o n boards, leadership 110 dissent and .dissociation with, a c t i v i t i e s by the. recommending agency. Any dis r u p t i o n by the labour negotiators would merely halt the recommendation hearings, i . e . , produce no recommendations. Because the ursioh leadership needs the recommendations to lower the expectations of the membership as to the f i n a l contract settlement, they would be hesitant:to prevent the f i n a l recommendations from being issued. ... The actual negotiations demonstrate the two consequences which follow from the model's view of the process of negotiation. F i r s t , the membership would be concerned when the union leadership was not dissenting from a. hearing procedure which seemed " u n f a i r " to the member-ship. This may be seen In the 1966 negotiations. The leadership was bound to continue hearings and meetings with the I n d u s t r i a l Inquiry Com-missioner past the contract expiration date. The m i l i t a n t elements of the membership under the "no contract-no work" doctrine began a s t r i k e . The leadership desired the recommendations to be issued and so t r i e d to h a l t the walkouts. They were prepared to do t h e i r best to stop the s t r i k e as a condition f or the recommendations to be issued. The second r e s u l t that should be seen from the s i n g l e man recommendations, as described above, i s that the r e l a t i v e i n a b i l i t y of the union ,to dissent would force more recommendations to become the settlement contract. The pressure of ^ p u b l i c opinion would weaken any union attempt to gain more, and.would strengthen any employer r e s i s t a n c e to higher settlement. The recommendations are more influential Db.ecause of the union request f o r a hearing and t h e i r i n a b i l i t y to d i s s o c i a t e themselves with the compromise settlement. The technique of the union, I l l under conciliation, boards, had been to dissociate from.the recommendation body before, the recommendations were issued. The optional single-man recommendation agent, prevented any. pre—recommendation dissent.. The union must support: the recommendation hearings un t i l recommendations were issued or there would be no recommendations. The recommendations are i n a sense the result of the union's co-operation. The result i s the uniform acceptance by the union of the recommendations issued since the amendment in 1961. While the period i s not long enough to conclusively demon-strate that the union was no longer able to dissociate from the recommend-ations, i t .demonstrates a tendency in that direction. The union member-ship, however, i s not necessarily mollified by this procedure. The evi-dence of union affairs since 1961 suggests that the union leadership is suffering from the "expectation gaps" discussed previously. The leader-ship cannot continue to both curse the recommendations during their for-mation and then use them to lower the expectations of the membership. An additional consequence of substitution of state-initiated one-man, recommendation forms, within the coast forest industry negotiations, is that the personnel are chosen by the state rather than by the nominees from each party under conciliation board formation procedure. The model does not consider. this consequence.. If., however,, the selection, by the state and the.selection by the nominees of a chairman w i l l produce d i f -fering recommending.types, then.the effects on the parties of the recom-mendations w i l l be partially a result of the recommender's personality rather than party interaction. 112 Bernard T. Wilson suggests: With, respect to the p r e s t i g e factor i n mediation, there was a. time when any'highly.placed . amiable fathead could, mediate with some assurance of e f f e c t i v e n e s s , but that time i s long past.^ If i t could be demonstrated that the personality character-i s t i c s and experience of. the pre-1961 nominee-elected chairmen were d i f -ferent i n some important way from the post-1961 state-appointed recommend-ers, the value of the change i n structure, of the recommending agency would be discounted by the i n f l u e n c e of the p e r s o n a l i t i e s of the recommenders. The post-1961 p e r s o n a l i t i e s were selected by the state and were pro f e s s i o n a l "middlemen" i n two out of the three cases. The nomi-nees' selections were generally men of prominence but not n e c e s s a r i l y ex-perienced in.mediation. The facts do not support any firm conclusions, but there would seem to be a l a r g e r element of professionalism i n the state-appointed than the nominee-appointed recommendation leaders. To that degree the post-1961 successes must be to some degree a t t r i b u t e d to better recommendations. From the changes made i n the statutes and t h e i r e f f e c t s on the process, and from the predictions of the model about these changes, comments on the form of statutory c o n c i l i a t i o n , are p o s s i b l e . On the basis of the r e a l i n t e r a c t i o n s of the p a r t i e s over time and over s t a t u -tory changes, the s i g n i f i c a n c e of various, aspects of the statute may be suggested. Bernard T. Wilson, " C o n c i l i a t i o n O f f i c e r s ' Techniques i n S e t t l i n g Disputes." Paper presented for discussion at the Eighteenth Annual Conference of the Canadian Association of Administrators of Labour L e g i s l a t i o n , Quebec, September, 1959, as quoted i n Stevens, Strategy anal Collective Bargaining, op. ..cit., p. 183. 113 F i r s t , the timing of the process i s not important unless the end of the process i s c o n t r o l l e d . Perhaps r i g i d maximium time l i m i t s f o r stages, p a r t i c u l a r l y the l a s t one, would be p o s s i b l e . While the model does not reveal the actual mechanism which would be most e f f e c t i v e , i t does .demonstrate that the end of the recommendations,. rather than the beginning, is.important. The bargaining that normally precedes the recom-mending function i s s l i g h t , while the e f f e c t s of an. extension of the bar-gaining process past,the contract expiration may be large. The sanctions are not s i g n i f i c a n t unless they are a c t u a l l y used. The degree of punishment i s therefore not so important as the con-t r o l over, i t s use. This may ind i c a t e that the Thevien d e c i s i o n , which allows the employer to i n s t i t u t e j u d i c i a l sanctions, may i n time prove to be important. The s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s development i s not demonstrated as yet within the bargaining. The most important co n t r i b u t i o n of the model to the s t a t u -tory process i s the emphasis of the recommending function of the c o n c i l i -a tion process. The evolution - of the former compulsory stage into an ad hoc process, introduced at the request of the p a r t i e s , was a major step i n giving the recommendations new effectiveness as a compromise f o r c e . The two changes, f o r c i n g the union to request a second—level recommendation, and making the recommendation body one.man, brought.strong forces on the union to accept the recommendations without attack. Once the recommenda-tions were issued without previous attack by the union on the " n e u t r a l i t y " or " f a i r n e s s " of.the board, the public pressure on the union to accept the d e c i s i o n became d i f f i c u l t to avoid. 114 . The l i m i t a t i o n upon the success of the compulsory process i n avoiding disputes i s based upon the pressure of the membership upon the leaders. The system may be able to cont r o l the " r a t i o n a l " ' a c t s of the union leadership.by making i t most p r o f i t a b l e to accept the terms of recom-mended settlements. . I f , however, the system does not convince the member-ship that.such a settlement would be best for them, a continuing pressure w i l l build.up on the leaders to f u l f i l l member expectations. This force w i l l operate i n conjunction with the Hieksian idea that a union must s t r i k e p e r i o d i c a l l y to demonstrate i t s preparedness to do so. Strikes should per-i o d i c a l l y occur, then, even i n the face of a s k i l l f u l l y - d r a w n compromise recommendation by a second-stage recommendation body. If a s t r i k e must occur p e r i o d i c a l l y , i t may well be, as Stuart Jamieson suggests, a more d i f f i c u l t s t r i k e because of the existence of a recommendation. That recommendation may have hardened the positi o n s of the p a r t i e s and made eventual compromise and settlement more d i f f i c u l t . The steady d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the system's a b i l i t y to moder-ate the behavior of the p a r t i e s , as predicted i n Chapter Two, i s not incon-s i s t e n t with an e f f i c i e n t compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n system. The system pro-duces r e s u l t s by in f l u e n c i n g the judgment of the negotiators; i t i d e a l l y becomes more p r o f i t a b l e for each party to accept the recommendations given i n stage two rather than r e j e c t them and face a s t r i k e . Nothing within the process d i r e c t l y modifies the views of. the union membership concerning proper behavior by. i t s leaders. Where the. leadership, i s suhject to the expectations of the membership or m i l i t a n t elements within i t , c o n c i l i a t i o n w i l l be unable to c o n s i s t e n t l y control the behavior of the leaders of the union. The ultimate .long-run source of motivation.for union actions beyond the reach, of the conciliation system. CHAPTER EIGHT A CONCLUDING VIEW OF COMPULSORY CONCILIATION The s i g n i f i c a n c e of the coast forest bargaining model l i e s i n i t s a b i l i t y to r e l a t e the influence of the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n pro cess to the i n t e r n a l function of the p a r t i e s . By examining the i n t r a -organizational c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , as well as the h i s t o r y of the union, the l i m i t s of the bargaining system's influence upon the behavior of the par-t i e s a r e ' i l l u s t r a t e d . These added i n s i g h t s are based, however, upon i n -d u s t r y - s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . This, decreases the model's•relevance for general bargaining r e l a t i o n s h i p s . General comments may be made upon the basis of the predic tions of the model to complement and contrast the conclusions of various c r i t i c s i n Chapter Two.. It i s important to remember that these g e n e r a l i -zations are taken from a model that examined a union with an unusual h i s -tory and structure, i n the l a r g e s t negotiations within the province. The general comments i n Chapter Two were directed to the general r e s u l t s of the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n procedures, such as those i n B r i t i s h Columbia from 19.47 to 1968. They suggested that the system retarded early bargaining. The parties, thus confronted each_.other throu the recommending agency with-large distances between.them, i n terms of settlements acceptable to both p a r t i e s . The recommendation function, the general comments i n d i -cated, produced r e s u l t s that were sometimes normative rather than accom-116 117 modative and.often the r e s u l t of one party's dissent. The e n t i r e process was subject to t a c t i c a l maneuver as the p a r t i e s learned to manipulate the process over time, thus reducing the e n t i r e system to a partison i n t e r -play. The model's suggestions for the i n t e r p l a y of the p a r t i e s confirms the r e l a t i v e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of the early stages of bargaining. It also o f f e r s a technique which should increase early bargaining and r e -duction of d i f f e r e n c e s between the p a r t i e s . The stimulant to early bar-gaining i s suggested by Stevens as discussed i n Chapter Four. The larger the uncertainty of the-results of stage two recommendations, the greater the tendency to bargain for a pre—recommendation settlement. The impor-tant q u a l i f i c a t i o n of the industry model, however,is the necessity to transmit t h i s uncertainty to the union membership so that the union bar-gainers w i l l not r i s k a l i e n a t i n g t h e i r membership support. The general comments about the t a c t i c a l advantages taken by the employer through delay of the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n process are also accepted by the model. The remedy for such t a c t i c s i s to control the termination date of the mechanism of c o n c i l i a t i o n rather than the s t a r t -ing date. The added importance of stopping process overruns would be the impact upon the union's a b i l i t y to t r a n s l a t e outrage at overly long pro-cesses into economic gain thus reducing union t a c t i c s a l s o . The union recommendation-rejection strategy i s shown to e x i s t as a function of the union's a b i l i t y to d i s s o c i a t e i t s e l f from the recommendation. If a recom-mendation i s f a i r , on i t s face and regular i n every d e t a i l , the union w i l l be reluctant to attempt r e j e c t i o n of i t s terms. This i s the added i n f l u -ence of the " f a i r n e s s " image of the recommendation, both i n procedure and 118 duration. Actions of the union membership become important for the long-run success of the c o n c i l i a t i o n process. While i t may be.possible to place the union negotiators i n a p o s i t i o n where the recommendation l e v e l of settlement w i l l almost always be much better for t h e i r member-ship than a r e j e c t i o n and s t r i k e threat, the membership must also be-l i e v e the f a c t . To the extent that the compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n f a i l s to contribute to changing the expectations of the membership as w e l l as the leadership, the system w i l l not be successful over time. Pressures w i l l b u i l d up u n t i l the leadership i s either voted out of o f f i c e or f e e l s p o l i t i c a l l y forced into intransigent positions which may lead to a s t r i k e . The effectiveness of the present system of bargaining may i n no way be compared to a l t e r n a t i v e ways of bargaining. This study con-siders o n l y ' c o n c i l i a t i o n systems. The two areas of s i g n i f i c a n c e within a system of compulsory c o n c i l i a t i o n are the union membership and the recom-mendation procedure. If the recommendation function i s f u l f i l l e d with proper a t t e n t i o n to i t s r e a l and apparent r e g u l a r i t y i n both form and timing, union dissent w i l l not l i k e l y be p r o f i t a b l e for the leadership i n terms of increased settlement. If the union membership may, i n some way not suggested here, be made aware of the correctness of i t s leaders, then the leaders, would not be forced to act i n an intransigent way by the membership's demands. The union membership's-views of the proper way to behave i n labour management contract negotiations constitute a subjective matter 119 muchly influenced by union history and ideology. Those views are not l i k e l y to be easily influenced by the state. As a result of inab i l i t y to stop pressure from building toward periodic work stoppages, strikes may have to be accepted as an i n -evitable concomitant of our existing system of industrial relations. Work stoppages clearly result from internal union characteristics. They do not indicate either an imperfection in the conciliation system or a deter-ioration of i t s effectiveness over time. The cycles of deteriorating relations from 1947 to 1952 and 1954 to 1961 .suggest that the conciliation, system may be susceptible to increasing militancy in negotiations. There is no evidence to.suggest that the system encouraged disputes because of i t s structure. On the contrary, the 1966 Nemetz hearings would seem to demonstrate that union membership dissatisfaction with procedures w i l l force union leadership into increasingly militant positions. This internal or intra—organizational pressure is the most v i t a l concern of the conciliation process. If ways are found to include the membership in the process whereby expectations are lowered to the level of the recommendations issued by the second-stage agency, then the pressure upon the union leadership for increased militancy w i l l not occur. The recommending level has been emphasized as the v i t a l stage i n controlling the behavior of the union in i t s decision to accept or reject the recommendations. The emphasis, on the fairness of this process, and making dissension from i t more d i f f i c u l t , has been the primary suggestion of 120 this analysis. Extending the apparent fairness of this process to the membership of the union should be the goal of further developments in a compulsory conciliation system. B I B L I O G R A P H Y Bergren, Myrtle. Tough Timber. Toronto: Progress Books, 1966. B r i t i s h . Columbia Department of Labour. Annual Report. V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1946-1968. . The Logging Labour Force (.Coastal Region. V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1965-1970. . Selected Forest Statistics of British Columbia. V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1965-1970. . Summary of Activities. V i c t o r i a , B.C.: 1954-1968. British Columbia Lumberman. " E d i t o r i a l . " Vancouver, B.C.: 1964-1966. Brown, Donald J . M. Interest Arbitration. Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1970. Cameron, James C , and F. J . L. Young. The Status of Trade Unions in Canada. Kingson, Ont.: Queen's Un i v e r s i t y , Department of Indus-t r i a l Relations, 1960. Canada Department of Labour. Labour Gazette. Ottawa, Ont.: 1946-1968. . Wage Rates, Salaries and Average Hours of Employment. Ottawa, Ont.: 1948-1968. Carrothers, A. W. R. Collective Bargaining Law in Canada. Toronto: Butterworths, 1965. 121 122 C o l l i , T. R. "Wage Structure and the. Determining Process for Six B r i -t i s h Columbia Industries." Unpublished Master's d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h . Columbia, 1970. Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s . Annual Review of Man-Hours and Hourly Earnings. Ottawa, Ont.: The Queen's P r i n t e r , 1948-1968. Eckstein, Otto and Thomas Wilson. "Determination of Money Wages i n Ameri-can Industry, " The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 76 (August, 1962), pp. 379-414. Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations Ltd. Conciliation Briefs. Unpublished sub-missions, Forest I n d u s t r i a l Relations, Vancouver, B.C.: 1949-1959. . Industrial Inquiry Commission Briefs. Unpublished submissions, Foest I n d u s t r i a l Relations, Vancouver, B.C.; 1961-1966. Glock, Margaret S. Collective Bargaining in the Pacific Northwest Lumber Industry. Berkeley, C a l i f . : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a , I n s t i t u t e of I n d u s t r i a l Relations, 1955. Guthrie, John A. and George R. Armstrong. Western Forest Industry: An Economic Outlook. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961. Harbison, Fre d r i c k H. and John R. Coleman. Goals and Strategy in Collec-tive Bargaining. New York: Harper- and Brothers, 1951. Hardwick, Walter G. Geography of the Forest Industry of Coastal British Columbia. Vancouver, B.C.: Tantaleus Research, 1965. International Woodworkers of America, Local 1-217. The Barker. Vancouver, B.C.: November 1970, p...l. I nternational Woodworkers of America, Region One. The B r i t i s h . Columbia Lumber Worker. Vancouver, B.C.: 1946-1970. . Economics Report: B.C. Northern Interior Wage Conference, Prince George, B.C. March 21, 1970. Portland, Ore. : 1970. 123 International Woodworkers of America, Region One. Conciliation Briefs. Unpublished submissions, International Woodworkers of America, Region One, Vancouver, B.C.: 1946-1959. . Industrial Inquiry Commission Briefs. Unpublished submissions, International Wood-workers of America, Region One, Vancouver, B.C.: 1961-1966. Jamieson, Stuart M. Industrial Relations in Canada. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cor-n e l l U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1957. 1 "Labour Dispute Settlement i n the Construction Indus-t r y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1948-1954," i n Woods, H. D. (Ed.), Patterns of Industrial Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian Industries. Mon-t r e a l , Que.: Mc G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , The I n d u s t r i a l Relations Research Centre, 1958, pp. 187-261. . "Multi-employer Bargaining: The Case of the B r i t i s h Columbia Coast Lumber Industry." Paper presented to the Annual Con-ference of the Canadian I n d u s t r i a l Relations Research Association, Ottawa, Ontario, June 16, 1970. . "Regional Factors i n I n d u s t r i a l C o n f l i c t : The Case of B r i t i s h Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economies and P o l i t i c a l Science, Volume 28 (August, 1962), pp. 405-16. Jensen, Vernon H. Lumber and Labor. Toronto: Farrer and'Runhart, 1945. Kerr, Clark and Abraham S i e g e l . "The Interindustry Propensity to Stri k e — An International Comparison," i n Kornhauser, A. (Ed.), Industrial Conflict. Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1954. Levinson, Haroldt Determining Forces in. Collective Wage Bargaining. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966. Logan, H. A. Trade' Unions in Canada. Toronto: MacMillan of Canada, 1948. Mabry, B. D. "The Pure Theory of Bargaining," The Industrial and Labour Relations Review, Volume 18 (July, 1965), pp. 479-502. 124 P h i l l i p s , Paul. No Power Greater: A Century of Labour in British Columbia. Vancouver, B.C.: B r i t i s h Columbia Federation of Labour, 1967. Reuber, Grant L. Wage Determination in Canadian Manufacturing Industries. Ottawa, Ont.: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1970. Ross, Arthur M. Trade Union Wage Policy. Berkeley, C a l i f . : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1953. , and Paul Hartman. Changing Patterns of Industrial'.Con-f l i c t . New York: Macmillan, 1960. Stevens, C a r l M. "Is Compulsory A r b i t r a t i o n Compatible With Bargaining?" Industrial Relations, Volume 5 (February, 1966), pp. 38-52. . Strategy and Collective Bargaining Negotiations; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963. Stuart Research Ltd. Conciliation Briefs. Unpublished submissions, Stuart Research Ltd. , Vancouver, B.C.: 1946-1948. Vaselenak, J . R. " I n d u s t r i a l Dispute Settlement i n the B r i t i s h Columbia Lumber Industry, 1946-1953," i n Woods, H. D. (Ed.), Patterns of In-dustrial Dispute Settlement in Five Canadian Industries. Montreal, Que.: M c G i l l U n i v e r s i t y , The I n d u s t r i a l Relations Research Centre, 1958, pp. 325-375. Walton, Richard E. and Robert B. McKersie. A Behavioral Theory of Labour Negotiations. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965. Woods, H. D. "Canadian C o l l e c t i v e Bargaining and Dispute Settlement P o l i c y ; An Ap p r a i s a l , " The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Volume 21 (November, 1955), pp. 447-65. , and S y l v i a Ostry. Labour Policy and Labour Economics. Toronto, Ont.: MacMillan of Canada, 1952). A P P E N D I X E S APPENDIX I CONTRACT SUMMARIES The summarization i n Chapter Five of the behavior of the parties, during the bargaining was s i m p l i f i e d for accentuation of bargain-ing trends. Contract changes were l i m i t e d to base rate changes. The following summarization of contract changes o f f e r s a f u l l e r treatment of the contract terms and conditions. The summarization i s taken from the International Woodworkers of America, Region One, 1970 Submission to the Nemetz Hearing. BARGAINING HISTORY B.C. COAST TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1949_ - B a s i c a l l y no change from 1948 agreement. • - Writing i n of Board and Lodging clause. - A r t i c l e re Bargaining Agency. - Base rate: $1.08. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1950 - 12% cents per hour across the Board - Base Rate $1.20% - 40-hour week for a l l . - Time and one-half for a l l Saturday and Sunday production workers. - Maintenance of,'membership . 126 127 TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1951 -j'9 cents per hour across the Board - Base Rate $1.29% - In addi t i o n the following d i f f e r e n t i a l increases granted on present r a t e s : $1.25 - $1.39% - IC $1.40 - $1.49% - 2c $1.50 - $1.74% - 6c $1.75 and over - 9c - F a l l e r s and Buckers on piece work $1.00 per day i n -crease . - Shingle Sawyers - 4$ increase per sq. Shingle Packers - 3<; increase per sq. OR Employee option, receive $1.00 per day. - Sawmill Graders an a d d i t i o n a l 3$. NOTE: A l l above e f f e c t i v e January 1, 1951. - C.O.L. Bonus 1.3 points - lc per hour. - Time and one—half for Sunday work for Engineers, F i r e -men and Maintenance Workers. - Vacations: 2%% for up to 5 years' s e r v i c e . 5 % for over 5 years' s e r v i c e . TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1952 - 5% cents per hour across the Board. Base Rate $1.35. - Continuation of C.O.L. - 3 Paid Statutory Holidays - Christmas, Dominion Day and Labour Day. - Provisions for Wage reopener i n December i f required, with Chief Justice Sloan as mediator. - A l l injunctions to be dropped. - No discrimination against Union members. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1953 - Consolidate 9 cents C.O.L. Bonus. - 5 cents per hour across the Board. Base Rate - $1.49. - Power House Employees: 2nd Class Engineer $2.10% 3rd Class Engineer $1.95% 4th Class Engineer $1.85% Firemen $1.64 - Plus C.O.L. 9 cents and 5 cents across the Board. - S e n i o r i t y l i s t s supplied. - Employee transferred to supervisory p o s i t i o n can return to bargaining u n i t . / - Casuals w i l l not receive Statutory Holiday Pay. 128 TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1954 - Three a d d i t i o n a l paid Statutory Holidays - Empire Day, Armistice and Good Friday or Easter Monday. - S e n i o r i t y r e t e n t i o n . - F a l l e r s and Buckers basic minimum r a t e . - Hours of work p r o v i s i o n for completion of two hours of s h i f t extending into Statutory Holidays. - Compulsory check-off for new employees. - Board rate of $2.50. - Provision to negotiate wider d i f f e r e n t i a l i n shingles on plant b a s i s . - P r o v i s i o n to transfer MSA coverage from plant to plant. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1955 - Two year agreement. - 5 cents i n 1955; 5 cents i n 1956 - Base 1956, $1.59. - Additional Statutory Holidays: 1955: Dominion Day 1956 : New Year's Day - Travel time 10 hour b a s i s . - Fare allowance both ways for 20 days or l e s s . - one way for 20 days to 40 days. - Standby time - Shingle Sawyers $2.25 Shingle Packers $1.75 - Ad d i t i o n a l 5 cents f o r : Shingle - Cut-off Sawyer, Knee Bol t e r , S p l i t t e r and Deckman Sawmill - Ca r r i e r Driver, Fork L i f t . - E s t a b l i s h job evaluation program i n plywood. - Strengthen union s e c u r i t y p r o v i s i o n . - Protect Boatmen under contract. - Streamline grievance procedure. - R e s t r i c t A r b i t r a t i o n Board procedure. - Provision for negotiating contract rates i n newly-acquired timber. - Exclusion of o f f i c e employees from bargaining u n i t . Deferred Rate Revision: Boommen - 7lgC - e f f e c t i v e October 1, 1955 Graders. & Tallymen - 3C - 15c ) E f f e c t i v e Engineers - 3c - 10<? ) August 22, Logging Engineers * 7%<? ) 1956. 129 TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1957 - Union Shop - Wages 13c per hour or 7%% - Base $1.72. - Committee to r e v i s e 5 logging categories. - Standby time for Grooving Packers & Feeders. - S e n i o r i t y - can be waived i n an emergency. - Employee can accumulate days for probationary purposes. - Amendment to s i c k leave. - Vacations 4% for less than 5 years. 6%% for more than 5 years. - Change i n cookhouse clause. - Hours of Work - delete 1st Aid from exemptions - Swing s h i f t vote - Add 2 ten-minute rest periods. - Computation of holiday pay for piece workers. - C a l l time to provide 4 hours for loggers on early s h i f t . - Fare allowance amended to allow for payment due to sickness or i n j u r y . TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1958 - Hours of work - delete Tow Boatmen and Watchmen. - Statutory Holiday q u a l i f i c a t i o n of 60 days. - Vacations - W.C. or i l l n e s s to be computed for vacation c r e d i t . - S e n i o r i t y - job posting - reduce departments - waiving of s e n i o r i t y r i g h t s - s e n i o r i t y r e t e ntion - departmental s e n i o r i t y to be included i n s e n i o r i t y l i s t s - reinstatement of supervisory workers - Medical Plan agreed on plant b a s i s . TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1959 - 10 cents f i r s t year, 10 cents second year - 1959 Base $1.82. - 1960 Base $1.92. - A d d i t i o n a l 10C for Tradesmen. - Implementation of job evaluation i n plywood. - Jo i n t category r e v i s i o n committee. - Swing s h i f t v o t i n g . - P r e f e r e n t i a l h i r i n g i n companies with, more than, one oper-a t i o n under one c e r t i f i c a t e . - Amend a r b i t r a t i o n . - Amend t r a v e l time to obviate needless delays. - Amend a r b i t r a t i o n . 130 TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1961 - Industry-wide, jointly-administered Health & Welfare Plan, on a 50-50 b a s i s . - One a d d i t i o n a l paid Statutory Holiday. - Revision f o r Engineers: 4th Class - 5 C 3rd Class - 8c 2nd Class -10c Firemen .holding.-4th Class -4%C - Casual Labor confined, to week-end work. - Improved procedure for f i n a l i z i n g r a t e s . - Amendments to S e n i o r i t y . - Amendments to A r b i t r a t i o n . TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1962 - 8 cents across the board June 15, 1962. 8 cents across the board June 15, 1963. - Extra week's vacation for employees with 20 years' s e r v i c e . - Amendments to S e n i o r i t y . - Write i n of medical coverage. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1964 - 15 cents across the board June 15, 1964. 13 cents across the board June 15, 1965. - Tradesmen a d d i t i o n a l wage increase - 30 cents per hour June 15, 1964. - Shingle Sawyers - basic $3.11 per hour Shingle Packers - basic $2.57% per hour. - Survey of Planermen's rates and categories. - Pay days every second week. - Weekly Indemnity payments increased to $50 for 39 weeks. - Improved t r a v e l time for loggers. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1966 - 20 cents across the board June 15, 1966. 20 cents across the board June 15, 1967. - Creation of high l e v e l Standing J o i n t Committee. - Amendments to Plywood Job Evaluation. - Amendments to Hours of Work provisions re swing s h i f t . - 4 cents per hour increase i n s h i f t d i f f e r e n t i a l . - Amendment.to Statutory Holiday arrangements. - P r o v i s i o n f o r leave of absence up to 6 months for com-passionate reasons, or f o r educational or t r a i n i n g pur-poses . 131 - Technological change — 6 mos. advance n o t i f i c a t i o n - t r a i n i n g and r e - t r a i n i n g clause - severance pay p r o v i s i o n . - Improved t r a v e l time provisions for loggers. TERMS OF SETTLEMENT - 1968 - 18 cents across the board June 15, 1968 • 18 cents across the board June 15, 1969 - Amendments fo Check-off form. - P r o v i s i o n for 40 hour week with i n 7-day period with s t r a i g h t time for Saturday, overtime rates on Sunday, for Cook and Bunkhouse employees. - Establishment of J o i n t Committee to study provisions r e l a t i n g to Technological Change i n order to c l a r i f y i n t e n t . - Provision for establishment of Sawmill Job Evaluation . program to be negotiated i n 1970. - Provision for minimum guaranteed earnings for Shingle Sawyers and Packers. - Vacations improvements: 3 weeks a f t e r 4 y r s . at 6%% of gross earnings; 4 weeks a f t e r 15 y r s . at 8%% of gross earnings; 5 weeks a f t e r 25 y r s . at 10%% of gross earnings. - Amendment to fare allowance provisions for loggers. - Weekly Indemnity increased to $75.00 per week. - Amendments to S e n i o r i t y . - Amendments to A r t i c l e on Strikes and Lockouts. - Incorporation into agreement of Memorandum on F i r e F i g h t i n g . APPENDIX I I ECONOMIC CONDITIONS The summary of bargaining behavior i n Chapter Five did not include a f u l l examination of the economic conditions operating on the negotiations.. Where the conditions were extreme they were ref e r r e d to b r i e f l y . P r i c e s , employment and output are tabulated here to sug-gest on a crude l e v e l the market trends that influenced each bargaining period. 132 133 TABLE IL BI-MONTHLY INDEX OF LUMBER PRICES 1953-1968 Crepresentive item: unseasoned DF 8' 2x4 stud) YEAR JAN-FEB MAR-APR MAY-JUNE JULY-AUG SEPT-OCT NOV-DEC 1953 58 59 57 55 49 48 1954 53 55 59 61 60 63 1955 67 69 73 72 63 63 1956 71 72 65 69 56 53 1957 53 56 55 54 52 52 1958 50 53 55 59 59 56 1959 62 69 73 70 61 57 1960 61 61 57 53 51 53 1961 52 58 56 53 51 53 1962 56 58 57 56 53 53 1963 54 56 60 60 52 52 1964 55 57 54 53 51 50 1965 56 51 51 52 52 50 1966 52 59 53 50 46 45 1967 52 53 57 64 64 71 1968 75 81 80 82 87 91 Source: Prices Net FOB M i l l , Douglas F i r , Unseasoned 2 x 4 - 8 ' Studs., 10/15% U t i l & Btr as reported in Random Lengths, an industry price reporting service. * Monthly figures were averaged and rounded to nearest integer to produce bi-monthly figures. CHART 1 85 . . . . . PRICES OF BRITISH COLUMBIA LUMBER 1953 **1954 * *1955 " *1956 * *1957 * *1958" *1959 * *1960 * ^ "1961 * 1^962 * 1^963 *1964 *i-965 *1966 *i967 *1968 Source: Table I I . 135 TABLE I I I PRODUCTION IN BRITISH COLUMBIA FOREST INDUSTRY YEAR SAWMILL (Thousands of Board Feet) LOGGING (Thousands of Cubic Feet) 1946 1,685 1947 1,983 1948 2,100 1949 2,139 1950 2,552 579,349 1951 2,520 555,259 1952 2,576 555,857 1953 2,572 617,016 1954 2,684 666,330 1955 2,756 655,274 1956 2,454 648,405 1957 2,352 591,358 1958 2,565 502,884 1959 2,346 574,451 1960 2,850 701,557 1961 2,956 658,712 1962 3,020 783,350 1963 3,396 814,590 1964 3,492 828,463 1965 3,649 858.318 1966 3,680 909,794 1967 3,913 900,026 1968 4,144 984,822 Sources: Production Sawmills: 1946-1949, Statistical Review, B.C. Lumber Manufacturers' Association, 1952; 1950-1968, D.B.S. 35—204; Production Logging: Logging Labour Force, op. cit., p. 34. TABLE LV EMPLOYMENT AND WEEKLY HOURS IN THE COASTAL LOGGING INDUSTRY YEAR EMPLOYMENT WEEKLY HOURS 1950 18,000 33.8 1951 21,800 33.8 1952 19,100 36.0 1953 16,900 35.8 1954 16,700 34.9 1955 17,100 34.4 1956 19,500 34.5 1957 15,600 34.3 1958 14,400 33.4 1959 14,700 35.8 1960 14,100 35.8 1961 14,100 34.7 1962 14,000 36.8 1963 14,100 36.4 1964 14,200 37.0 1965 14,800 37.4 1966 14,200 37.6 1967 13,000 37.8 1968 14,300 37.9 Source: B r i t i s h . Columbia Department of Labour, The Logging Labour Force CCoastal Region), V i c t o r i a , B.C. 1969, p. 34, Table 9. 137 APPENDIX I I I WAGE COMPARISONS The. behavior of wages within the coast forest industry i s not independent of other wages i n North America. Grant L. Reuber, i n h i s recent Task Force Study,"*" seems to have demonstrated that, within Canada, 2 a national key wage group and a s p i l l o v e r process does not function on an e m p i r i c a l l y discoverable l e v e l . For the union there would seem to be no question that there 3 are " o r b i t s of coercive comparison," as Ross would describe them, be-tween gains made by other workers and the desires of the bargaining work-4 ers. For . B r i t i s h Columbia these f a c t o r s have been discussed by Jamieson and C o l l i . T h e s e works discuss the d e t a i l s of the i n t r a - r e g i o n a l wage r e l a t i o n s that are beyond the scope of t h i s study. Within the appendix, however,are some of the rel a t e d f o r e s t and regional wages which would most c l o s e l y influence the Coast Woodworker's. Grant L. Reuber, Wage Determination in Canadian Manufactur-ing Industries, Task Study on Labour Relations, Study No. 19 (Ottawa, Ont.: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1970). 2 This r e l a t i o n s h i p within U.S. in d u s t r i e s was demonstrated by Otto Eckstein and Thomas Wilson i n "Determination of Money Wages i n American Industry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Volume 76 (August, 1962), pp. 379-414. 3 This i s the c l a s s i c force behind union leadership f i r s t pre-sented by Ross i n Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeley, C a l i f . : U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, 1948), p. 55 f f . 4 Stuart Jamieson, "Regional Factors i n I n d u s t r i a l . C o n f l i c t : The Case of B r i t i s h Columbia," Canadian Journal of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science, Volume 28 (August, 1962), pp. 405-16. ^Terry C o l l i , Wage Structure and the Determining Processes For Six British Columbia Industries, unpublished master's d i s s e r t a t i o n , U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1970. 138 TABLE V INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS' OF AMERICA COMMON LABOUR RATES 1949 - 1968 YEAR B.C. COAST B.C. INTERIOR TWO NW MILL AVERAGE 1949 $1.08 $1.47 1950 1.205 $1.10 1.52 1951 1.295 1.30 1.65 1952 1.35 1.30 1.72 1953 1.49 1.35 1.72 1954 1.49 1.37 1.80 1955 1.54 1.40 1.88 1956 1.59 1.475 1.88 1957 1.72 1.53 1.88 1958 1.72 1.53 1.97 1959 1.82 1.62 2.04 1960 1.92 1.70 2.11 1961 1.92 1.76-- 2.13 1962 2.00 1.85 2.13 1963 2.08 1.89 2.25 1964 : 2.23 1.99 2.34 1965 2.36 2.08 2.40 1966 2.56 2.22 2.60 1967 2.76 2.48 2.72 1968 2.94 2.60 2.82 Average of Northern and Southern I n t e r i o r rates where rates vary. Average of Weyerhaeuser, S p r i n g f i e l d . Oregon Saw-m i l l and Georgia-Pacific, Coos Bay, Oregon Plywood and Board M i l l . Source: Economic Report, B.C. Northern I n t e r i o r Wage Conference, Regional Council Number One, Department of Research and Education, International Woodworker's of America, p. 55. $ 3.oo 2.80 2.60 2.40 2.20 2.00 1.80 1.60 1.40 1.20 1.00 .80 CHART 2 INTERNATIONAL WOODWORKERS' OF AMERICA COMMON LABOUR RATES (Domestic D o l l a r s ) IWA, U.S. N.West IWA, B.C. Coas t _ IWA, B.C. I n t e r i o r 48 4'9 5'0 5 l 52 53 5^ 55 5*6 5? 58 5*9 6b 61 62 65 64 &5 66 67 68 Source: Table V 140 TABLE VI ANNUAL AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE RATES IN THREE BRITISH COLUMBIA INDUSTRIES* YEAR CONSTRUCTION COAST LOGGING SAWMILLING 1948 $1.42 $1.29 $1.30 1949 1.58 1.35 1.34 1950 1.68 1.46 1.48 1951 1.93 1.69 1.69 1952 1.95 1.77 1.70 1953 2.08 1.82 1.71 1954 2.14 1.81 1.77 1955 2.16 1.86 1.77 1956 2.23 1.93 1.81 1957 2.38 2.07 2.03 1958 2.59 2.13 2.03 1959 2.82 2.23 2.08 1960 2.82 2.35 2.15 1961 2.86 2.34 2.19 1962 2.93 2.44 2.27 1963 3.03 2.53 2.35 1964 3.08 2.63 2.47 1965 3.34 2.80 2.57 1966 3.68 3.00 2.82 1967 3.96 3.21 3.01 1968 4.29 3.46 3.25 Source: Wages, Salaries and Average Hours of Earnings, Canada Department of Labour, 1948-1968. Industry wage rates are employment weighted averages of base r a t e s — s t r a i g h t time hourly earnings only. CHART 3 48 4*9 5*0 5 1 5 2 53 5*4 5 5 5*6 5 7 5'8 5 9 6 b 6l 62 6*3 64 65 .6*6 6 7 68 Source: Table VI. APPENDIX IV 142 TABLE VII INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA YEAR TOTAL PAID WORKERS IN B.C. LABOR FORCE (in thousands) TIME LOSS IN WORKING MAN-DAYS OF LABOUR (in thousands) COAST DAYS LOST 1946 322 1,294 * 1,100 1947 334 153 1948 338 151 1949 340 16 1950 335 27 1951 342 75 1952 362 1,132 1,035 1953 368 234 1954 370 141 1955 390 28 1956 421 39 1957 439 226 1958 434 325 1959 452 1,423 1,323 1960 448 36 1961 455 35 1962 477 33 1963 501 24 1964 529 182 1965 561 104 1966 597 273 1967 636 327 1968 663 407 Source: British. Columbia Department of Labour, Labour Relations Branch, Annual Reports, 1946-1968. 1946 strike included Interior units. 1,400 -1,300. -1,200 . 1,100 _ 1,000 . 900 . 800 . 700 -6oo . 500 . 400 300 . 200 . 100 0 4'5'4-6 4*7 4B 4'9 5*0 5*1 5"2 5'3 54 5'5 5'6 5Y 5B 59 6b 61 62 63 64 65 6*6 6? 63 69 Man Days l o s t (000's) CHART 4 INDUSTRIAL DISPUTES IN BRITISH COLUMBIA Source: Table V I I 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            data-media="{[{embed.selectedMedia}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
https://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0302217/manifest

Comment

Related Items