UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Rome and Germany McGregor, Malcolm Francis 1931

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U . B . C . LIBRARY f CAT, m. Lfrfa- • fta,'*»-.rM> R O M E A N D G E R M A N Y . by MALCOLM FRANCIS MoGRIG0R7B./f. A Thesis submitted f o r the degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the DEPARTMENT OF CLASSICS The Un i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia A p r i l 1931 ROME AND GERMANY Part 1. Germany. 1. Geographical Comments. S. The Tribes, and where they l i v e d . 5. Occupations of the Germans. 4. Physical Characteristics of the Germans. 5. Women and Children. 6. German Warfare. 1. T r i b a l Organization. 8. Religious s u p e r s t i t i o n i n Germany. 9. Customs. 10. Attitude of Rome to the Germani. e. g. Tacitus. 11. The German A t t i t u d e . Part 2. Contact of Rome with Germany. 1. Roman Knowledge of Germany. 2. E a r l i e s t contact with the northern peoples. 5. The Cimbri and the Teutones. 4. Caesar and the Germans. 5. Germany under Augustus. 6. Germany under Tiberius. 7. From Tiberius to the death of Nero. 8. The year of the four emperors and the Flavians. 9. Marcus Aurelius. 10. Germany. A Summary. Part 1. Germany. i i Chapter I Geographical Comments. In e a r l i e s t times the country east of the Rhenus Flumen and. between that r i v e r and. the A l b i s was inhabited by w i l d C e l t i c t r i b e s , savage, nomadic, and barbarian. About 1,000 B.C. these t r i b e s crossed the r i v e r and swarmed over a l l of what l a t e r became G a l l i a , ( l ) I t i s d i f f i c u l t to deter-mine the date of such early and unchronieled incidents but i t i s believed by most a u t h o r i t i e s to have been about the seventh century before C h r i s t . These barbarians became mas-ters of a l l Gaul except what was l a t e r known as Aquitania. This i s mainly the reason why the inhabitants of Gaul through-out ancient h i s t o r y are so c l o s e l y a l l i e d i n custom and man-ner of l i f e with the t r i b e s across the r i v e r . The main authority concerning Germania, i t s t r i b e s , and t h e i r customs i s C. Tacitus the h i s t o r i a n of the f i r s t century A.D. whose work trea t s of Germania down to h i s own time or about 9J? A.D.. Strabo deals with the subject but not at very 'great length while h i s knowledge i s l i m i t e d . J u l i u s Caesar i n h i s commentaries on the G a l l i c wars mentions the Germans with whom he had frequent skirmishes but f o r the most part h i s impressions seem to be jotted down i n passing and mingled with much guesswork. On the other hand Tacitus had evidently made a study of the subject and therefore i t i s h i s work which we propose to follow f o r the most part i n t h i s t r e a t i s e . (1) Duruy, History of Rome, Y o l . 2, Chapter XI. The Germania of Tacitus i s i n the main that see-t i o n beyond the Rhenus between the Rhenus and the Afeiss, bordered on the south by the Danuvius (Danube) while at times the author crosses the A l b i s and treats t r i b e s dwelling as f a r east as and i n one or two instances, beyond the V i s -t u l a , At the same time we must r e a l i z e that the name Ger-mania i s also applied to the two provinces of Germania Superio and Germania I n f e r i o r . In discussing the boundaries of the country Tacitus says that the Western l i m i t was the Rhenus, to the south flowed the Danuvius while the Mare Suebicum surged against the northern shores. (1) When men-tio n i n g the eastern boundary the ancients are purposely vague. Tacitus speaks of wmutuus metus aut montes" as the l i m i t i (2) Strabo the geographer i s unsure of the further peoples and admits as much. To the north the t r i b e s ex-tended r i g h t up to the sea and s e t t l e d on the islands as w e l l . The nature of the land i t s e l f was hardly indu-eive to a c i v i l i z e d prosperity. The general contour sloped north to the Mare Suebicum and apparently consisted f o r the most part of swamps and forests and i s usually described as a marshy waste consisting either of impenetrable f o r e s t s or swamps, though there were mountains along the south. Yet i n another section Tacitus mentions stretches of p l a i n s with good s o i l f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . At any rate between the Rhenus (l)Tac. Germ. I (2) fac. Germ. I. i i i and the A l b i s were t r a c t l e s s marshes and woods. We can imagine what an impregnable defense such country offered to the w i l d t r i b e s of the hinterland accustomed as they were to i t s p e c u l i a r i t i e s and quick to take advantage of the oppor-t u n i t i e s i t presented, as Caesar found to h i s cost. On the other hand such conditions i n f l i c t e d a hardship on the i n -habitants and made i t a l l the more d i f f i c u l t to eke out an existence. The tribesmen l i v e d i n the temperate zone and days and nights were equally divided. Yet they experienced dismal weather, damp mists and constant r a i n and downpours. Referring to the march against the Chatti by Germanicus i n 15 A.D. Tacitus writes, "Nam (rarum i l l i caelo) s i c c i t a t e et omnibus modicis inoffensum i t e r properaverat, imbresque et fluminum auctus regrediente metuebantur. (1) In Central Germany to the east of the Rhenus ex-tended the mighty Hercynia S i l v a . This wood or Black Forest to give i t i t s modern name, was either one or a succession of forests stretching from the borders of the H e l v e t i i i n south west Germany along the d i r e c t l i n e of the Danuvius as f a r as the Daci and the Anartey. (2) Then i t turned inland and wound i t s way through the numerous t r i b e s to the north. I t also had many offshoots spreading through and separating various t r i b e s . (3) Caesar leaves i t here and claims that no man ever reached the edge while i t was a nine day's jour-(1) Tac. Annals I, 56 (2) Caes. De B.G. VI, 23 (3) Caes. De B.G. VI, 26 Iv ney through the "breadth of the wood. I t i s more than l i k e l y that he i s merely guessing f o r he never penetrated f a r i n t o the country and so had no c e r t a i n means of ascertaining the tr u t h of t h i s "statement. P r i m i t i v e animals roamed the v i r g i n forest but nevertheless t h i s did not detract from i t s value as a refuge for harassed t r i b e s e s p e c i a l l y for the ferocious Seubi or Suevi during the campaigns of Caesar. A continuous mountain range cut the country into two sections running down the Danuvius and branching northward to the A l b i s . Along the whole Western boundary of Germany was the v a l l e y of the Rhenus (Rhine). To the east was the r i v e r A l b i s (Elbe) flowing l i k e a l l the German r i v e r s north, to the Oceanus Germanicus. Generally speaking the w r i t e r w i l l deal with the country and t r i b e s between these two great waterways although some mention must be made of the more important t r i b e s across the A l b i s mentioned by Tacitus. The barbarian t r i b e s extended beyond the A l b i s but l i t t l e was known of them and the ancient writers are either i n t e n t i o n a l l y vague or as Strabo admittedly ignorant. Germania proper was r e a l l y a network of waterways. Between the Rhenus and the A l b i s were the Amisia (Ems) a small r i v e r and the Y i s u r g i s (Weser) a mighty stream embracing many smaller ones at i t s source. Numerous t r i b u t a r i e s on both sides of the r i v e r flowed into the A l b i s i n the very heart of Germany while to the east was the Yiadus another large r i v e r with numerous t r i b u t a r i e s , great and small. Far to the east on the very borders of Sarmatia flowed the V i s t u l a . This i s mentioned because V Tacitus notes one or two possible German t r i b e s beyond i t . In the time of Augustus the great emperor es-tablished the two d i s t r i c t s on the l e f t bank of the Rhenus a f t e r he had abandoned the idea of extending the boundaries of empire by conquering Germany. These two provinces so c a l l e d were i n r e a l i t y defensive zones for the protection of the f r o n t i e r against the w i l d t r i b e s beyond and did not ac-t u a l l y become provinces u n t i l the days of Hadrian. They were merely army commands. Germania I n f e r i o r was the country from the mouth of the r i v e r up stream to the bend at Mogun-tiacum where dwelt the TTbii, a l l i e s of Rome,while the tipper province was the t r i a n g u l a r wedge about the southern h a l f of the Rhenus. South of Danuvius were Rhaetia and Mo^ieum created by Augustus as the northern f r o n t i e r to supplement the natural b a r r i e r of the Alps. This elaborate Hie b a r r i e r indicates^ respect with which he held the German trib e s f or i t was with the d e f i n i t e i n t e n t i o n of strengthen-ing the German f r o n t i e r that Augustus undertook the conquest of these lands. v i Chapter 2 The t r i b e s and where they l i v e d . In former times the G-auls were by f a r superior to the Germans and made war upon them, ( l ) Thus, t r i b e s l acking s u f f i c i e n t land of t h e i r own crossed the Rhenus and seized the best sections of the country. One example of these pioneers was the Yolcae Tectosages who penetrated deep into the heart of the Danuvius country and seized the most f e r t i l e l o c a l i t i e s on the borders of the S i l v a Hercynia^ r e -maining there and adopting German habits and t h e i r barbarian mode of l i v i n g . Caesar t e l l s us then that the Gauls d e t e r i -orated i n strength and manliness and i n h i s day were not O). even comparable to the Germans i n valour. From the fo r e -going i t can be e a s i l y r e a l i z e d that no few of the t r i b e s i n Germany were of G a l l i c o r i g i n and that i s why there was p. comparatively l i t t l e fundamental difference between the Gauls and the Germans. (2) The countries north of the Danuvius and east of the Rhenus were Occupied by Galatie and Germanic t r i b e s who apparently d i f f e r e d from the Celts only i n that they were f i e r c e r and more barbaric. (3) These l e d a barbarous and nomadie existence but despite t h e i r wanderings they general-l y returned to t h e i r base. Strabo w r i t i n g i n the time of Tiberius says that the Cimbri 7one of the t r i b e s most addicted (1) Caesar, De B e l l i G a l l i c a , YI, 24 (2) Strabo, Y I I , 1, 2. (3) Strabo, V I I , 1, 13. v i i to t h i s nomadic type of l i f e possessed to that day the coun-t r y they had held i n former times. Thus i t i s possible to a f f i r m with some assurance the l o c a t i o n of the various t r i b e s despite t h e i r various and frequent ehanges of habita-t i o n . A l l these t r i b e s became known by t h e i r wars with the Romans and mistrust was the surest defence as they submitted, revolted and changed t h e i r abodes. The multitudinous t r i b e s of Germany had no common name but nevertheless regarded themselves as being descended from a common ancestor i n Mannus the f i r s t man and son of the god Tuisco. ( l ) I t was the current b e l i e f among the t r i b e s that Mannus had three sons from whom sprang the three great races of the Germans, the Istaevones, the Ingaevones and the Herminones. This view i s preferable to that of P l i n y who says, — »Germanorum genera quinque". (2) I t was the Istaevones with whom the Romans had most contact since the offshoots of t h i s branch occupied both banks of the Rhenus Flumen and were the most westerly of a l l the Germani. Of t h i s d i v i s i o n the more prominent t r i b e s were the TTbii, who dwelt on the Rhenus between Colonia Agrippina and Moguntiacum on the r i g h t bank about t h e i r torcm, oppidum Ubiorum; the TTsipites or TTsipii, Tencteri, Sieambri or I Sugambri and the Bructeri who extended down the r i v e r i n the order named as f a r as BToviomagus; the Chatti who l i v e d i n the country between the Rhenus and the sources of the Yisurgis (1) Tae. Germ. 1 (2) P l i n y , N. H. IT, 14, 99. v i i i and the Batavi l a t e r most l o y a l supporters of Rome who were situated on the west hank at the mouth of the Rhenus and who occupied the i n s u l a Rheni at the mouth and were according to Tacitus foremost i n valour, ( l ) They were o r i g i n a l l y of the Chatti but l e f t a f t e r i n t e r n a l dissension. Of t h i s d i v i s i o n the Usipetes and the Tencteri were driven from t h e i r o r i g i n a l t e r r i t o r y by the Suebi. They i n turn expelled the Menapii, a G a l l i c tribe^from the banks of the Rhenus and s e t t l e d there. (2) The second d i v i s i o n , the Ingaevones, included the F r i s i i who inhabited the country between the mouths of the Rhenus and the Amisia; the Chauci a large t r i b e found at the mouth of the Visurgis ( 3 ) ; and the densely peopled coun-try of the Cherusci noblest of the German races (4), a f i e r c e and troublesome people stretehing from west of the Visurgis across the h i l l s to the A l b i s , divided from the Suebi by a natural w a l l of f o r e s t . These Cherusci became notorious i n hi s t o r y f o r t h e i r slaughter of Varus and h i s three legions i n 9 B.C.. The F r i s i i are worthy of note. Their country was divided by Tacitus into "maiores** and ttminoresw. A f t e r t h e i r l a t e r r e v o l t from Rome they did not disappear from hi s t o r y but formed a section of the English conquerors of B r i t a i n . (1) Tac. Germ. 29 (2) Caes. De. B.G. IV, 4 (3) Tac. Germ. 33 (4) Fourneaux, N. B. to Tac. Ann. I , 60. i x In c e n t r a l Germania were found, the l a s t and largest group of peoples, the Herminones who enfolded the powerful Suebi, a race divided i n t o separate t r i b e s with names of t h e i r own, a race wfeu had branches throughout the whole country and wfrp- gained repute early by t h e i r campaigns against Caesar; the Hermunduri a dense t r i b e f r i e n d l y to Rome and probably Suebie i n race whose t e r r i t o r y extended north from the Danuvius i n a wide sweep to the sources of the A l b i s ; the LangobardiX, also Suebic, who l i v e d to the north of the A l b i s and south of the Chauci; the Vandali who were east of the Viadus about i t s sources; the H e r u l i who l i v e d west of the A l b i s and i n the islands to' the north; and the Quadi a kindred nation of the Mareomanni i n the south east corner of Germania north of the Danuvius. Tacitus t e l l s us that i n the time of Augustus and Tiberius, king Maroby-duus of the Quadi added the l u g i i , Z u ^ i, Guttones, Mugilones and S i b i n i to h i s country. The t r i b e s of the Suebi were most predominant throughout Germany extending as they did from the Rhenus to the A l b i s , t h e i r family cut by a mountain range which ran rig h t through t h e i r t e r r i t o r y . Some dwelt wit h i n the forest while others stretched as f a r east as the Getae. In faet Strabo says that the Hermunduri and the langobardi both members of the Suebic race occupied the d i s t r i c t beyond the A l b i s . (1) According to Caesar these Suebi were the largest i n number and the most warlike of a l l the Germani. (2) We (1) Strabo, VII, 2, 1. ( 2) Caes. De. B.G. IV, 3 X would judge from him that they consisted of more than a hundred cantons and occupied by f a r the greater part of Ger-mania. The whole race was distinguished by a national p e c u l i a r i t y i n that they were accustomed to twist t h e i r h a i r back and knot i t behind the head. Caesar has great respect for the Suebi and i s therefore prone to exaggeration i n h i s description of them. He t e l l s us that f o r s i x hundred miles to the east of Suebia the land was untenanted but t h i s i s obviously absurd. The largest offshoot of these f i e r c e tribesmen was the Semnones the vastness of whose t e r r i t o r y gave them just claim to being head of the Suebic race. Their lands were east of the A l b i s and north of the junction of that r i v e r " w i t h the Sala. The langobardi who were a smaller branch of the family were fenced i n by many l e s s e r peoples who penetrated into the more remote regions of G-ermania. In the south end of modern Jutland Tacitus places the A n g l i i while between the A l b i s and the Viadus l i v e d the Suardones on the coast, the V a r i n i , Eudoses, Reudigni, Aviones and the luithones, north to south i n order, a l l Suebic t r i b e s . In the upper waters of the Viadus on the west side of the r i v e r were the Marsigni, another branch of the Suebic family. North of the Danuvius and between i t and the sources of the A l b i s were the Marcomanni, another Suebic tribe who drove out the B o i i i n early times and occupied t h e i r lands while south of them and on the l e f t bank of the r i v e r were found the Y a r i s e i c a l l e d by Tacitus the N a r i s c i . x i Continuing along the Danuvius eastward, were the Quadi a powerful Suebic $ribe g i r t about by Hons Gabreta on the west the Montes Sarmatici on the east, the S i l v a Hercynia to the north and the Danuvius Plumen to the south. South of the Marcomanni were the B o i i and on. the Danuvius i t s e l f due south l i v e d the Campi. South of the Quadi on the Danuvius l i v e d the Voleae Tectosages a G a l l i c t r i b e who had crossed the Rhenus i n early times and s e t t l e d i n the most f e r t i l e country. (1) They adopted German customs and manners and were f o r a l l intents and purposes Germanic. A l l these Suebi were of a migratory nature and generally speaking extended north and wouth i n central Germany. At the sources of the Yiadus were grouped the Osi, GVthini, C o t i n i and B u r i . Then on both sides of the r i v e r extended the L u g i i a large race embracing many smaller t r i b e s including the H a r i i , Helvecones, Manimi, E l i s i i and Uaharnavali. West of the V i s t u l a on the north coast dwelt the lemovii while across the Sinus Venedicus were the A e s t i i , Exploring down the Rhenus from i t s headwaters we f i n d on i t s l e f t bank the Tribocci followed c l o s e l y by the lemetes and Vangiones the l a s t two mentioned t r i b e s i n -habiting both banks of the r i v e r . On the r i g h t bank and south of the Uemetes were the H e l v e t i i i n the country which i s now modern Baden. Farther inland and north roamed the Turones. Below Moguntiacum and on the r i g h t bank were the Matti a c i followed by the U b i i a powerful nation t r i b u t a r y of (1) Caes. De. B.G. VI, 24" x i i the Suebi and. onee prosperous according to German standards. These l a t t e r were i n close contact with the Gauls as was i n -evitable from t h e i r geographic p o s i t i o n and so were more c i v i l i z e d than the rest of t h e i r Germanic brethen. (1) They were f r i e n d l y to Rome and Tacitus says that the Romans l e f t them i n peace "ut arcerent non ut custodirentur". (2) West of the Rhenus i n Gaul were the N e r v i i i n the north and the Treveri west of Moguntiaeum. Tacitus says that these t r i b e s may have been German and leaves the matter open to question. East of the TTbii were the Chatti mentioned pre-vi o u s l y whose t e r r i t o r y bordered the f o r e s t , a t r i b e holding wide sway over the neighbouring peoples and a branch of the Herminones. These Chatti were always a thorn i n the side of the Romans and were never completely subdues. Their c a p i t a l was at Mattium i n the north of t h e i r possessions. Down the Rhenus below the Sugambri l i v e d the Marsi and north of the Cherusci and the Marsi from the r i v e r eastward were the TTsipites and the B r u c t e r i , the Tubantes and the Chas-s u a r i i , the l a t t e r bordering on the Visurgis Flumen. North of the Chassuarii were the A n g r i v a r i i while on the east bank was the land of the F o s i . Further down the Rhenus and near i t s mouth was the country which the Chamavi and Chat-t u a r i i c a l l e d home. Far to the east at the mouth of the V i s t u l a dwelt the Guttones on the very borders of Germania i n i t s widest sense. At the headwaters of the Viadus l i v e d (1) Caes, De B.G. IV, 3 (2) Tac. Germ. 28 3=3BS5 the l u g l i a large t r i b e which spread over many states. North of them were the H a r i i and to the south the Buri, people who resembled the Suebi although not proven of that race. (1) fhese H a r i i were savage people. They were superior to most of the surrounding t r i b e s i n war and were by nature ferocious The Teutones and the Cimbri^important h i s t o r i c a l -l y f o r t h e i r depredations at the end of the second century before C h r i s t , had t h e i r base i n the Chersonesus of Cimbrica. At the entrance to the peninsula were the Teutones while northwards i n the country known as Cimbrica proper stretched the Cimbri,.inhabiting what i s now Jutland. We learn from Plutarch that these Cimbri and Teutones were Germanic nations belonging to those who extended as f a r as the northern ocean. (2) C e l t i c a extended from the northern sea eastwards whence came the invaders who moved every spring on a warlike course, traversing the whole continent i n t h e i r wanderings. The whole body, writes Plutarch, were Celtoseythians. These two races enjoyed fame among the Germani for t h e i r e x p l o i t s against the Romans as mentioned but by the time of Tacitus they were merely minor t r i b e s and known only f o r these past e x p l o i t s . Their fame was on the wane long before Tacitus, i n f a c t , for Strabo scoffs at the w i l d t a l e s eurrent about the Cimbri and the country they l i v e d i n . (3) Tacitus sums the Cimbri up as follows, — "Parva nunc c i v i t a s , sed g l o r i a (1) Tac. Germ. 43 (2) P l u t . l i f e of Marius (3) S t r . Y I I , 21 ingens". ( l ) North of Germania i t s e l f and east of the Cher-sonesus were groups of islands vaguely known to the Romans as the Insulae Scandiae. Over these islands wandered the Susies, a naval race, and further northwards the Sitonjf^ singled f or mention by Tacitus because they were ruled by women. Both of these peoples were said to be Suebic i n raee while the name Suites was often used to designate generally a l l the wandering barbarian t r i b e s on these i s l a n d s . (1) Tac. Germ. 37 XV Chapter 3 Occupations of the Germans. As has been previously noted a land such as Ger-many was i n ancient times did not y i e l d an easy l i v i n g to i t s inhabitants. To cold and hunger t h e i r s o i l inured them. I t was productive of grain but unfavourable to f r u i t bearing trees. I t len t l i t t l e or no assistance to the task of feed-ing i t s l i v e s t o c k and thus the f l o c k s and herds although numerous were under sized and i l l fed. Numerically speaking the t r i b e s were r i c h i n c a t t l e but these were of poor q u a l i t y i n s i z e and appearance. Yet the number i t s e l f was valued as being the only riches of the people. Of s i l v e r and gold they knew nothing and had no desire to posses i t . I t was undoubtedly there but they had no i n c l i n a t i o n to search f or i t and had no idea of i t s value. Tacitus i n commenting on the nature of the land remarks- that i n the f a r easterly d i s t r i c t s the land was i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y of a better q u a l i t y . West of the V i s t u l a he even conjectures f r u i t f u l woods and groves. Yet i n the more open country the s o i l was r i c h and f e r t i l e and suitable f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . Why then was there so l i t t l e t i l l a g e of the s o i l i n Germany? The truth was that the Germans cared l i t t l e f o r husbandry. In sec-tions of the country there was c e r t a i n l y r i c h s o i l but the Germans f a i l e d or perhaps did not care to r e a l i z e i t s pos-s i b i l i t i e s and value. A l l - they required from the earth was x v i eorn and that i n small q u a n t i t i e s . They were too b u s i l y oc-cupied i n the pursuit of war. In fa c t they even took steps to prevent a desire f o r the c u l t i v a t i o n of the land from a r i s i n g . The land was divided with no p a r t i c u l a r t r a c t as-signments for each occupant but no man could r e t a i n possession of one expanse f o r more than one year. At the end of that time he had to move on. This system of r o t a t i o n was f a c i l i -tated by the wide expanse of p l a i n s . I t i s true that the Suebi i n s t i t u t e d a system which seemed to avoid neglect of the s o i l , by means of which they rotated t h e i r warriors from year to year from war to s o i l but even t h i s does not d i s -guise the f a c t that the chief i n t e r e s t for the Germans was warfare for the Suebi also forbade the holding of land f o r any length of time. The Chauci were an exception i n that they were lovers of peace and avoided war^ making l i t t l e use of t h e i r peaceful i n c l i n a t i o n s . (1) One other exception was the t r i b e of the A e s t i i who were perhaps not German at a l l ( 2 ) , most eastern of the Tacitean Germans. These were more patient i n t h e i r a t t e n t i o n to a g r i c u l t u r e . In consequence of t h i s indifference to the s o i l there was not a very p l e n t i f u l supply of food for eating purposes. In fact the food supply was slender. They l i v e d generally upon cheese, w i l d f r u i t and game which they ob-tained from the chase. From t h e i r c a t t l e also they obtained f l e s h for food. For drinking they had milk^very often curdled^ (1) Tac. Germ. 35 (2) Tac. 45 x v i i from the f l o c k s while they made a kind of wine from barley or grain and allowed i t to ferment. They were much addicted to drunkenness produced by t h i s so c a l l e d wine which was ex-tremely potent. They had no d e l i c a c i e s and indulged i n no elaborate preparations for meals, and were s o c i a l i s t i c i n that they shared t h e i r food supply. Small wonder that men l i v i n g i n such hardship and inured to a l i f e f o r the most part i n the open a i r should develop so magnificent a stature as a l l the c l a s s i c a l authors comment on. The nature of the food i t s e l f aided i n the conservation of strength and the production of hardy frames. The tribesmen spent the greater part of t h e i r l i v e s at war. When not campaigning they had no d e f i n i t e oc-cupation. Their*s was a day to day existence and they i n -dulged mostly i n hunting expeditions opportunities for which the densely wooded forests furnished i n abundance. Upon t h e i r r e s u l t s of t h e i r forays they r e l i e d f o r most of t h e i r food and supplies. Apart from regular f i g h t i n g they carried out periodic raids upon neighbouring t r i b e s committing acts of brigandage which incurred no disgrace among fellow t r i b e s -men. This also aided the food problem. Even i n t h e i r r e -creation they seemed unable to depart from t h e i r m i l i t a r i s t i c code of l i f e . They were accustomed to hold regular gather-ings at each one of which naked youths danced amid a forest of swords and spears ever threatening a cruel death. "Ex-perience gives s k i l l and s k i l l gives grace," ( l ) says Tacitus. (1) Tae. Germ. 24 x v i i i At these gatherings opportunities were made f o r the practice of the second of the great vices upon which Tacitus i s so caustic and that i s gambling. The Germans were inveterate gamblers. They apparently had a form of dice game and were eommonly so venturesome that they would wager t h e i r very persons upon a throw and thus do>om themselves to a miserable though to them honourable slavery. When not engaged i n any one of these pursuits they did nothing while Tacitus writes that i t was not uncommon for them to spend whole days on the hearth i n front of the f i r e , ( l ) Of building they had vague notions but of the ar t of architecture they knew nothing. They had no knowledge of the use of stone for b u i l d i n g purposes but constructed th e i r wretched huts i n rude fashion from timber of which they had abundant quantities. They had l i t t l e import trade but gave access to merchants more f o r the purpose of s e l l i n g t h e i r booty than for buying n e c e s s i t i e s . They did not even import draught horses from Gaul which was noted i n t h i s respect but used t h e i r own breed and these l i k e a l l other domestic c a t t l e bred i n Germany were i l l - f a v o u r e d and t h i n . Yet they were trained to a remarkable degree of usefulness. The t r i b e s on the r i v e r bank imported wine from Gaul but these outer peoples were always as much G a l l i c as Germanic. Thus i t may be seen that as f a r as occupations and produce were concerned the Germans were e s s e n t i a l l y p r i m i t i v e . Tacitus s c o r n f u l l y suggests that t h i s was mostly (1) Tac. Germ. 29 a matter of ignorance. They had l i t t l e sense of value hut l i v e d f o r t h e i r eternal f i g h t i n g . Perhaps they were blessed despite t h e i r squalor and hardships i n comparison to the v i c e , corruption, and often degeneracy of the c i v i l i z e d world of that time. XX Chapter 4 Phys i c a l Charaeteristies of Germans* In appearance the Germans were w i l d l y barbaric and must have presented a t e r r i f y i n g spectacle to the f i r s t Roman armies against whom they fought. They were of huge stature with blue eyes and red h a i r predominating. They boasted huge frames, large close k n i t limbs and f i e r c e countenance. The l i f e they l e d aided t h e i r physical develop-ment and gave them an advantage over the Romans which was l a t e r o f f s e t by the Roman d i s c i p l i n e and the strategy and experience of the Roman leaders. They were excellent i n matters which c a l l e d for great and sudden physical exertion but wQxe unable to bear long and arduous s t r a i n or any de-gree of heat. They could not endure t h i r s t f o r any length of time. They were a pure race, that i s , they never i n t e r -married with other raees and thus were i n d i v i d u a l i n t h e i r state of barbarism. According to c l a s s i c a l d e s c r i p t i o n they c e r t a i n l y had no counterpart. They d i f f e r e d from the Celts only i n physical s u p e r i o r i t y , t h e i r customs and manners being quite s i m i l a r . In most of the t r i b e s the h a i r was un-kempt the Suebi alone being unique i n paying attention to t h i s part of t h e i r appearance. The Suebic chiefs were e l a -borate and did t h e i r h a i r i n such a fashion as to emphasize t h e i r height and s i z e , t h i s aiding to awe the foe. To quote Tacitus once more they adorned themselves " f o r the eye of the enemy", ( l ) I t was a custom among the Chatti f o r the (1) Tac. Germ. 38 x x i men to remain unshaven and unshorn u n t i l they had s l a i n t h e i r f i r s t foe a f t e r reaching man's estate. Their clothing was simple and modest i n i t s very s i m p l i c i t y . The t r i b e s of the r i v e r bank had more op-portunity f o r frade across the r i v e r and t h i s made them able to sport better robes worn i n careless fashion than the skins of the i n t e r i o r tribesmen which were so d a i n t i l y a r -ranged. The Germans used a cloak of scanty nature fastened by a clasp or f a i l i n g t h i s a common thorn. They also used the skins of w i l d beasts the product of t h e i r numerous hunt-ing forays. Caesar t e l l s us that they employed reindeer (1) hide and fashioned small wraps with i t . To produce eff e c t they mingled ordinary skins with the spotted coverings of w i l d beasts. (2) The dress of the women d i f f e r e d l i t t l e from that of the men while they also wore robes of l i n e n embroidered i n purple >sleeveless and leaving the neck bare. The wealthier people set t h e i r own fashion f or i n many cases instead of the flowing robe worn by the plebeian multitude they wore t h e i r c l o t h i n g of skin t i g h t f i t t i n g ^ t h u s e x h i b i -t i n g the l i n e s of the body. Sinceimo mention i s recorded of shoes among these t r i b e s i t must be assumed that they cared f o r no covering f or the feet and legs. (1) Caes. De B.G. VI, 21 (2) Tac. Germ. 27 x x i i Chapter j> Women and. Children* A s i g n i f i c a n t feature of the German mode of l i f e was the part which women took i n i t . I t has already been -r mentioned that the tribesmen counted wa^ J as t h e i r main ob-ject i n l i f e . In a l l t h e i r wars the women took part and were t h e i r i n s p i r a t i o n * "They are to every man the most sacred witnesses of h i s bravery they are h i s most g l o -rious applauders." ( l ) When the men of the country went f o r t h to war t h e i r women accompanied them. During the actual f i g h t i n g they were nearby shrieking encouragement to the f i g h t e r s , nursing the wounded and perhaps i n extreme cases even taking a more active part i n the f i g h t i n g . Their ex-cel l e n t stature and vigourous bodies gave them the physical energy to do t h i s . The men themselves venerated the women while the northern Sitones were ruled by women. "So low have they f a l l e n , " (2) adds Tacitus i n h i s cuttin g Roman s t y l e . The greatest disgrace a German t r i b e could suffer was being compelled to give up t h e i r maidens into c a p t i v i t y and thus when during a battle these female warriors repre-sented to the f i g h t e r s the terrors of slavery an added i n -centive was supplied to secure v i c t o r y . Caesar i n w r i t i n g of h i s early b a t t l e s with the Germans pens the following v i v i d description of the part played by the German women. (1) Tac. Germ. 7 (2) Tac. Germ. 45 x x i i i "Upon wagons and earts they set t h e i r women who with tears and outstretched hands entreated the men as they marched out to f i g h t not to d e l i v e r them i n t o Roman slavery." (1) Caesar also mentions that during the encounter there were a few women s l a i n and i t i s natural to presume that the latter., as the fortunes of war favoured the Romans lent physi-c a l a i d to t h e i r kinsmen. C l a s s i c a l writers speak of women taking an active part i n the invasions of the Cimbri and the Teutones i n the time of Marius. These were also f i e r c e warrior women who i n c i t e d the barbarians to plunder and slaughter. According to Tacitus the Germans at t r i b u t e d a c e r t a i n degree of sanctity to the whole sex and thus followed t h e i r counsels which the men considered as almost prophetic. There are even instances of German women who were regarded as d i v i n i t i e s and one i n p a r t i c u l a r achieved some l i t t l e fame i n the reign of Vespasian for her a c t i v i t y i n arousing r e b e l l i o n among the t r i b e s . rtButtl says Tacitus, "they venerated them no-t with s e r v i l e f l a t t e r i e s and sham d e i f i -cation." (2) In marriage the German code was s t r i c t , a fact which Tacitus h e a r t i l y commends i n comparison to l i f e at Rome. (3) The maidens were married l a t e and for the most part the tribesman could have only one wife to whom he brought a dowry, t h i s custom being contrary to the univer-(1) Caes. De B.G. I , 31 (2) Tac. Germ. 8 (3) Tac. Germ. 18 xxiv s a l r u l e . The only men who possessed, more than one wife were those whose high p o s i t i o n i n a t r i b e gave them spe c i a l p r i v i l e g e s . Not unexpectedly we learn that t h i s dowry con-s i s t e d often of m i l i t a r y equipment such as swords, horses and s h i e l d s . The bride to. be returned s i m i l a r g i f t s and offerings of t h i s kind were counted a powerful bond of union. The wife was i n no way separated from her husband i n h i s pursuits which necessitated physical strength ,,and the mar-riage ceremony included a reminder that she and he were one i n facing t o i l and danger, peace and war, I l l i c i t a f f a i r s were p r a c t i c a l l y unknown and the woman who sinned was sum-marily punished and driven from the t r i b e , an outcast, l o y a l t y between husband and wife dominated t h e i r common l i f e . The ehildren^who were many^ spent t h e i r early l i v e s i n nudity and f i l t h . They dwelt with t h e i r parents h i n the d i r t y puts and endured a l l manner of hardships. Thus they developed the strong and muscular bodies for which the race was famed. 'Noble and slave were treated a l i k e ^ no d i s -t i n c t i o n being made i n t h e i r childhood as to caste. They l i v e d i n the same surroundings and tended the same floc k s u n t i l age separated them. They practiced the use of arms from.their e a r l i e s t age and were frequently present at the bat t l e s i n which t h e i r fathers took part. In t h e i r motherSs arms or hanging to her hand they learned to shout encourage-ment and applause. They imitated t h e i r parents and thus developed into generation a f t e r generation of sturdy warriors. XXV Of education they knew nothing and t h e i r upbringing was purely p r a c t i c a l , devoted to the problem of how to l i v e i n the savage surroundings and how to a t t a i n a b i l i t y i n the handling of the p r i m i t i v e weapons. The children were the lawful h e i r s to t h e i r fathers and t h i s avoided a l l the trouble of making w i l l s and appointing successors. The Ger-mans formed a united race men, women and children molded into one u n i f i e d whole^tribe by t r i b e , l i v i n g the same l i f e ^ sharing the same interests^and doing the same things. X.xvi Chapter 6 German Warfare. "To abandon your s h i e l d i s the basest of crimes," ( l ) says Tacitus of the German warrior, and i n t h i s sentence he sums up the whole structure of German l i f e . As has been mentioned frequently m i l i t a r y excellence was a type of mania to the tribesmen and i t i s necessary to stress t h i s point i n order to get into the mind of c l a s s i c a l Germany to under-stand how they l i v e d and t h e i r aims i n l i f e . When the t r i b e s were not warring against a common external foe they were at variance with one another making plundering raids upon t h e i r neighbours or preparing for the next war. Of t h e i r weapons thanks c h i e f l y to Tacitus and Caesar we know a great deal. As one would expect these were not standard-i z e d or embellished i n any way. They were private property and each warrior fashioned h i s own. Tacitus at frequent i n t e r v a l s mentions the lack of i r o n i n the country and thinks that t h i s was responsbile for the poor variety of arms possessed by the tribesmen. Thus weapons of t h i s material were luxuries only owned by a select few generally the chieffeen< of the v i l l a g e s . The same applies to long lances, spears and swords which were scarce among the common tri b e s peoples. The l a t t e r wore short spears with narrow f l a t heads of sharply pointed i r o n or wood. They were so l i g h t and e a s i l y manipulated that they could be managed (1) Tac. Germ. 6 X x v i i with equal ease at short or long range f i g h t i n g . The main body on foot c a r r i e d supplies of small m i s s i l e s i n the throwing of which they became dangerously p r o f i c i e n t . These missi l e s probably consisted of miniature darts or jav e l i n s while one may assume that rocks and stones, always weapons of p r i m i t i v e peoples, had value i n the eyes of the German warrior who entered the b a t t l e l i g h t l y clad and ready to act with perfect freedom. A l l car r i e d shields these being the only parts of t h e i r equipment which were i n any way gaudy painted as they were i n bright colours. The A e s t i i used large clubs as weapons and on t h e i r shields wore the device of a w i l d boar. The Rugii and the Lemovii both used the short sword and the round s h i e l d . The H a r i i , a branch of the L i g i i accentuated t h e i r natural f e r o c i t y by the a i d of ar t and a r t i f i c i a l means. They dyed t h e i r bodies and painted t h e i r shields black. They fought only at night and on dark nights i f possible. Their weird appearance gave them an immediate advantage over the foe for " i n a l l battles i t i s the eye which is' f i r s t vanquished." ( l ) This l a s t the whole German race r e a l i z e d to the f u l l . Armour was p r a c t i c a l l y non-existent a select few owning helmets of leather or metal while some here and there wore c o r s l e t s . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t that Caecjsna i n 15 B.C. recovering the booty won from Varus by the Germans took the Roman armour and weapons from the very bodies of hi s foes. So scarce were f i g h t i n g n e c e s s i t i e s . (1) Tac. Germ. 4? x x v i i i Infantry was the strength of the German f i g h t i n g machine. This body fought alongside the cavalry and made use of i t s speediest young men by stationing them on the wings. The cavalrymen car r i e d only shields and spears but were a poorly equipped body. They were at a disadvantage i n that t h e i r horses were not of very good q u a l i t y , not p a r t i c u l a r l y speedy and untrained i n m i l i t a r y manoeuvres. The whole army fought i n a compact mass turning and wheel-ing i n a body. The shape of the force was that of a wedge which moved to the attack with a w i l d rush accompanied by war c r i e s and the cheers of camp followers, male and female. The very savagery of the f i r s t assault put many an enemy to f l i g h t and always created a t e r r o r not e a s i l y overcome i n the ranks of opposing armies. Here was the r e a l might of the Germans, the f i r s t assault. I t was by t h i s wildness, by t h e i r very appearance that the Cimbri and Teutones over-came so many Roman armies. A s k i l l e d general such as Marius with a trained force of veterans could withstand such an onslaught,and eventually prove v i c t o r i o u s . Provided i t was intended to return to the attack i t was no disgrace among the Germans to retreat but on the other hand for a so l d i e r to show cowardice was the unpardonable s i n only erased by s u i c i d e . The Germans also excelled i n g u e r i l l a warfare. With t h e i r knowledge of the forest passes and the marshes they wreaked havoc upon the Roman armies i n t h e i r neighbour-hood. During the campaigns of Germanicus i n Germany i n 15 A.D. xx i x the t r i b e s stalked, the Roman troops on t h e i r retreat and. d i d great damage. I t was only through the courage of the Roman commander that the Romans eventually reached safety. The Su^ones are the only naval t r i b e mentioned i n the Germania. ( l ) These peoples l i v e d on the borders of the Mare Suebicum among the islands and thus were forced to r e l y upon t h e i r ships. These vessels were types of f e r r i e s with prow and stern a l i k e , t h i s making for convenience i n landing. There were no s a i l s or f i x e d tePS but the rowing f a c i l i t i e s were free to be placed and used as needed. The Sujjones d i f f e r e d from the rest of the t r i b e s i n that the arms of the people were not at general disposal but were state possession and kept i n one spot under the supervision of a slave guard. The sea prevented sudden alarms or invasions and thus these people were l e s s warlike than the average Germans. Considering the many t r i b e s which bordered on the coast i t i s remarkable that we f i n d such l i t t l e mention made of ships of war or any other kind among the Germans. I t seems hardly l i k e l y that these t r i b e s had no c r a f t and so we must assume that the Germans did not pursue sea f i g h t -ing and t h e i r naval strength was n e g l i g i b l e although we do know of a sea b a t t l e between Drusus and the B r u c t e r i which took place on the Rhine at i t s mouth. To i l l u s t r a t e the s p i r i t i n which the Germans entered b a t t l e we mention that Caesar writes of h i s German opponents hedging t h e i r whole l i n e with carts and wagons (1) Tac. Germ. 44 XXX rtne qua spes i n fuga relinqueretur"• (1) This i s a good i n -stance of the German a t t i t u d e . When Caesar (2) received envoys from the t r i b e s they stated the German view of war to the Roman imperator. They pointed out that they did not make war themselves of t h e i r own accord but i f provoked were pe r f e c t l y capable of g i v i n g as good as they received, "Quod Germanorum consuetudo haec s i t a maioribus t r a d i t a quicumque bellum inferant r e s i s t e r e neque deprecari." (3) They ad-mitted i n f e r i o r i t y to the Suebi alone. One chapter of Taci-tus which i s worth while quoting f a i l s to support t h i s . a t t i -tude. " I f t h e i r native state sinks into the sl o t h of pro-longed peace, many of i t s noble youths v o l u n t a r i l y seek those t r i b e s which are waging some war both because ina c t i o n i s odious to t h e i r race and because theyrwin renown more re a d i l y i n the midst of p e r i l and cannot maintain a numerous following except by violence and war The means of t h e i r bounty comes from war and rapine. Nor are they as e a s i l y persuaded to plough the earth and to wait for the year' produce as to challenge an enemy and earn the honors of war and wounds. Nay they a c t u a l l y think i t tame and stupid to acquire by the sweat of t o i l , what they might win by t h e i r (4) blood. (1) Caes. De. Be^fet Gft4=H=ret I , 51 (2) i b i d IT, 7 (3) i b i d IY, 7 (4) Tacitus, Germania, 4. xxx i Chapter 7 T r i b a l Organization. We know enough now of the Germanic mode of l i f e to be able to state how a t r i b e was ruled , i t s organization, o f f i c e s and councils. The organization of the average German t r i b e was loose, there being no complicated system of assemblies and councils. l i k e a l l other phases of German l i f e i n t e r n a l organization was simple. Chief o f f i c e r s i n a t r i b e were the kincp, the chi e f s , p r i e s t s and f i n a l l y the generals. Comparatively few t r i b e s had kings, but a l l had t h e i r chiefmen and p r i e s t s . The o f f i c e of general was not r e a l l y an administrative one but the l a t t e r was chosen f o r h i s merits on the f i e l d and for honours so won. Even so the generals held f a r more p r a c t i c a l power i n the t r i b e than the other o f f i c e r s which i s natural i n so warlike a rac-e. When a t r i b e was ruled by kings these monarchs held sway by r i g h t of b i r t h but at the same time were merely figureheads with no actual authority. The chiefmen were chosen at the councils of the t r i b e s f o r t h e i r services to t h e i r peoples and these were generally of a m i l i t a r y nature. None of these o f f i c i a l s had any actual power to i n f l i c t punishment upon tribesmen even the generals being forbidden to do so upon ref r a c t o r y s o l d i e r s . Corporal punishment was allowed to the p r i e s t s alone and even t h i s was not i n f l i c t e d f o r crime but as an off e r i n g to a t r i b a l god through the p r i e s t . The p r i e s t s we s h a l l discuss l a t e r x x x i i i n connection with the r e l i g i o n of the Germans. The actual management of the t r i b e ' s a f f a i r s was i n the hands of the chiefmen. I f the matter under d i s -cussion were of too great import i t was referred to the council. This council^ the only one i n the tribe,,was an as-sembly of the whole t r i b e which' convened at regular i n t e r -v a l s , at the new or f u l l moon as being the most auspicious occasions, only a f t e r a meeting of the c h i e f s . Except i n unusual circumstances these t r i b a l conventions were held only at the stated times. The tribesmen attended f u l l y armed while i t f e l l to the duty of the p r i e s t s to r e t a i n order. The f i r s t spokesman was always the king or the chief of the v i l l a g e . Unpopular speeches drew murmurs of dissent from the rank and f i l e while,the v i o l e n t brandishing of spears s i g n i f i e d approval. The kings or chiefs had no r e a l c o n s t i t u t i o n a l influence over the tribesmen t h e i r only wea-pons being t h e i r prowess i n war and t h e i r resultant a b i l i -t i e s of persuasion. Unlimited freedom of speech marked the councils and no h e s i t a t i o n was f e l t to express disagreement with the leading men. The p o s i t i o n of chief was reached a f t e r services to a t r i b e and noble deeds by a father gave a son the rank of chief. A l l the noble youths i n a v i l l a g e attached them-selves to a chief according to choice who vied with h i s brother leaders for the r i g h t of having the largest and most honourable escort. The followers themselves competed for the highest positions i n the chiefs retinue. Thus a x x x i i i body consisting of a chief and a band of young and noble youths was, "an ornament i n peace and a defence i n war". (1) The fame of an outstanding chief spread through neighbouring states and thus h i s reputation and influence were enhanced and often by t h i s very thing he could s e t t l e an external dispute and keep order i n t e r n a l l y . But a per-manent and stable power the chief had not. In war the es-cort fought alongside the chief and to return from b a t t l e without the chief was a signal disgrace. "The chief f i g h t s for h i s country, the vassals f i g h t f or t h e i r chief." (2) I t was to the chief that each man looked f o r leadership at home and abroad. In fa c t i t was to the chief that the warrior i n the retinue looked f or h i s arms and horses taken from the booty won. L i t t l e need be or can be said of the German menage. The house was managed not by the women i n p a r t i c u -l a r but by the oldest and weakest members, male and female. The young and active did nothing i n the house but between campaigns led a l i f e of sloth which was remarkable i n so active a race. Slaves at Rome were slaves as we i n modern times understand the term but i n Germany they were l i t t l e more than feudal serfs although Tacitus c a l l s them slaves. Slavery as understood by Tacitus was at a low ebb i n Ger-many. What few serfs there were led a l i f e of ease com-(1) Tac. Germ. \J> (2) Tac. Germ. 14 xxx i v pared to that endured by the average slave at Rome for ex-ample. Each man had a home of h i s own and was i n r e a l i t y only h i s master's tenant. The usual feudal tax was exacted on clot h i n g , g r a i n , and e a t t l e but t h i s marked the l i m i t of subjection. Nor were the slaves i l l - t r e a t e d . I t was an unusual thing f o r a slave to be punished and he was an or-dinary member of the t r i b e to a l l intents and purposes ex-cept of course that he could not hold a t r i b a l o f f i c e . Freedmen hardly d i f f e r e d from slaves counting but l i t t l e i n the l i f e of the t r i b e . XXXV Chapter 8 Religious s u p e r s t i t i o n In Germany., Of German r e l i g i o n we know l i t t l e . In the c l a s s i -c a l w r i t e r s we f i n d general references to the t r i b a l gods but i t i s to Tacitus that we must turn i f we wish to learn anything of a p a r t i c u l a r nature. The various t r i b e s d i f f e r e d to some extent i n t h e i r r e l i g i o u s practices but generally speaking they were uniform. ?/e s h a l l mention these excep-tions i n due turn. In t h e i r songs the Germans celebrated the earth born god Tuisccjand h i s son Mannus and t h i s root they claimed as the source of t h e i r race. The god whom they worshipped more than a l l others was Mercury while Hercules, Mars and I s i s were also known to them and so appeased with offerings but never with human s a c r i f i c e . These gods did not take the form of images to be confined i n temples or houses but on the other hand groves and woods were consecrated to them t h i s being considered more i n keeping."with the grandeur of c e l e s t i a l beings". (1) To Mercury they offered human s a c r i f i c e but such was not the case with the other d e i t i e s . The worship of I s i s was confined to a section of the Suebic race and these peoples c e r t a i n l y did b u i l d images i n d i c a t i v e of a foreign d e i t y according to Tacitus. I t must be re a l i z e d that the Germans themselves did not know this-'^ods by the foregoing names. Tacitus however, judged the name of the pa r t i c u l a r deity by the form of worship and the q u a l i t i e s attributed to i t by the t r i b e . xxxv i The Germans seem to have been a superstitious race and they believed h e a r t i l y i n auguries and d i v i n a t i o n as interpreted by the p r i e s t p u b l i c l y or the father of the family p r i v a t e l y . Their method of d i v i n a t i o n was complicated, several cut sections of a lopped bough, being cast over a white garment and selected by the p r i e s t . When the r e s u l t was unfavorable action f o r the day was at an end but i n the event of a fagorable omen the sanction of the augury was sought. For auguries they were f a m i l i a r with the construction to be put upon the notes and f l i g h t of b i r d s , an ancient type of augury known i n Greece i n the time of Aristophanes. More peculiar was t h e i r use of horses f o r such purposes. White unworked horses were kept i n the sacred groves and t h e i r behaviour was studied by the p r i e s t s or kings or chiefs. During the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the augury these animals were yoked to a car sacred to the god. Often the tribes took auspices to learn the r e s u l t " o f an important war and t h i s was done as follows. A prisoner of the p a r t i c u l a r enemy, was p i t t e d against the l o c a l champion i n single combat-^each man with the weapons of h i s own t r i b e and the r e s u l t foresaw the issue of the war i t s e l f . We know l i t t l e of the p r i e s t s themselves, except that they were powerful members of the t r i b e and were regarded as the ministers of the d e i t i e s . I t i s as w e l l to mention with Tacitus any unusual customs found i n the various t r i b e s . The Semnones were said to bear witness to their- a n t i q u i t y by t h e i r r e l i g i o u s practice. At d e f i n i t e i n t e r v a l s the whole race assembled i n the sacred xxxvi i groves, where dwelt the a l l powerful deity whence the nation was believed to have i t s o r i g i n . As a mark of subservience, no man entered the grove unbound while, i f a man had the misfortune to f a l l he was forced to crawl out of the grove before regaining h i s f e e t . The Reudigni and t h e i r kindred Suebic t r i b e s worship-ped Ertha, goddess of the earth and believed that she control* led human a f f a i r s and v i s i t e d the t r i b e s i n her sacred car represented by a consecrated chariot i n the grove. The l a t t e r was covered with c l o t h and could be touched by the p r i e s t alone. At c e r t a i n times, sensed by the p r i e s t the goddess drove among the tribesmen. Then a l l was peace and weapons were put away u n t i l wearied by human contact she returned i n the chariot to- her grove. Her p e r i o d i c a l earthly v i s i t s , announced by the p r i e s t , brought f e s t i v i t y , r e j o i c i n g and cessation from warfare. Afterwards car and vestments were p u r i f i e d by slaves who immediately disappeared af t e r bathing these i n a mystic lake. A l l t h i s added a t e r r i f y i n g and strange awe to the grove. The Naharnavali had a sacred grove ruled by a p r i e s t i n female a t t i r e . The god was A l o i s but Tacitus interprets the d e i t i e s of the grove as Castor and Pollu x , and notes that r e l a t i o n s between god and man i n th i s t r i b e were brotherly (1) while the d e i t i e s were considered as youths. This i s p r a c t i c a l l y a summary of the remarks of Tacitus on the subject since he i s the only r e l i a b l e authority Caesar merely states that the Germans counted as gods only v i s i b l e and h e l p f u l things such as Sun, Moon, Stars and F i r e . He claims that they knew nothing of others. ( i ) . gjac. Germ. 43. x x x v i i i We may add, however, that i t i s worth noting that the r e l i g i o n of the Germans was as simple as the other phases of l i f e i n that country. xxxix Chapter 9 Customs. Many of the customs of the G-erman tr i b e s have been mentioned and explained i n other sections of t h i s t r e a t i s e where the context i s more su i t a b l e . I t i s the i n -tention of t h i s chapter to gather i n the loose ends so as not to omit any phase of German l i f e i f possible. We have had nothing to say yet on the subject of the administration of German j u s t i c e and we propose to devote a small amount of attention to i t before garnering i n stray German customs. The German court of justice was the council or assembly of a l l the tribesmen. This was also an e l e c t i v e body which chose minor magistrates who administered law i n the outlying d i s t r i c t s of the t r i b e . Each of these had one hundred assistants f o r advisory purposes. In criminal cases the condemned man was punished according to the nature of h i s crime. "This d i s t i n c t i o n i n punishment means that crime they think ought i n being punished to be exposed while infamy ought to be buried out of sight." (1) Thus t r a i t o r s and deserters were hanged while cowards and hardened de-generates were cast into the marshes and buried there. Minor offenses drew minor penalties such as f i n e s to be paid i n horses and c a t t l e , h a l f going to the king or the state and h a l f to the p l a i n t i f f and h i s family. Homicides and feuds could also be s e t t l e d by the payment of c a t t l e . (1) Tac. Germ. 12 x l These were t h e i r methods of administering j u s t i c e hut seldom was i t - s necessary to put them into e f f e c t . The Germans were remarkably free from vice and here i s another instance of the s i m p l i c i t y of t h e i r barbarian l i f e which has been stressed so often. "No one i n Germany laughs at vice nor do they c a l l i t the fashion to corrupt and to be corrupted." (1) No business^ public or private was transacted unarmed and the bestowal of a lad's f i r s t arms involved no l i t t l e ceremony. Arms were granted to a German youth a f t e r he had proven h i s a b i l i t y to wear them i n b a t t l e . Then at the next assembly of the people a s h i e l d and a spear were presented p u b l i c l y e i t h e r by a chief or the father of the r e c i p i e n t . From t h i s time on the youth was p r i m a r i l y a member of the state as w e l l as a private household member. The tribesmen did not dwell i n c i t i e s or i n -habit houses c l o s e l y contiguous to one another. They erected t h e i r huts scattered i n the f i e l d s just as fancy attracted them. .Each house had open spaces on a l l sides while parts of the buil d i n g were stained with a certain kind of clay which gave the impression of gaudy painting. They also dug caves from the l e v e l ground which they blocked with p i l e s of earth and used either as warm shelters i n t h e i r cold-winters or merely as safe storehouses for t h e i r food and plunder. There was an added value to t h i s plan. When an enemy approached he generally l a i d waste the sur-(1) Tac. Germ. 14 x l i rounding country with f i r e and sword hut he was more than l i k e l y to overlook underground r e t r e a t s . As a race the Germans were generous i n t h e i r h o s p i t a l i t y . Any and every guest f r i e n d l y or otherwise^ was w e l l r e c e i v e d ^ i t being thought a breach of piety f o r a stranger to be sent away. When the meagre supplies were exhausted guest and host moved to the next habitation and partook of the neighbour's h o s p i t a l i t y and fare. At the de-parture of the guest i t was customary to exchange g i f t s ^ a custom which delighted the simple German heart. In peace the tribes^eople l i v e d a lazy l i f e . They arose la t e i n the day and bathed i n warm water before eating. Then there were f e s t i v a l s or assemblies to which they proceeded^armed as usual. Their spare time they spent hunting or i n l e i s u r e . Rights were often spent i n pro-longed drinking bouts ending frequently i n quarrels and bloodshed. Their assemblies more often than not coincided with t h e i r t r i b a l feasts and not only did they elect chiefs and other o f f i c e r s and transact regular business but they also decided upon private matters such as matrimonial a l l i a n c e s . In t h e i r funeral r i t e s they were simple as i n a l l else. They practiced cremation^burning the man's arms and horse with the corpse, leading men were burned along with a ce r t a i n kind of wood but they had no use f o r spices and scented material f or the pyre. No l o f t y monument .graced the grave but a mere t u r f mound su f f i c e d as homage to the dead. They set l i t t l e value i n ostentatious tears and lamentation. " I t i s thought becoming for women to bewail and men to remember the dead." (1) So much f o r the general customs of the Germans. The customs peculiar to c e r t a i n t r i b e s have been mentioned i n due place. (1) Tac. Germ. 27 x l i i i Chapter 10 Attitude of Rome to the Germani. Example — Tacitus* I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note i n what l i g h t the Romans considered the Germans, whether they admired or des-pised them, feared them or scorned them* The Romans always treated a foreign people with disdain and to a certain degree t h i s was no exception. In 390 B.C. the Romans were haughty to the Gauls u n t i l the l a t t e r brought Rome to her knees. When the Cimbri and the Teutones appeared on the borders of I t a l y the usual Roman contempt for the barbarians was tempered somewhat by an ever increasing fear as one a f t e r another of her armies f e l l before the furious onslaughts of the invaders. Never-theless the reply to the demand for lands made by the Cimbri and t h e i r a l l i e s was couched i n t y p i c a l l y proud Ro-man fashion. Rome feared them but yet despised them as be-neath her. Her l o r d l y manner had no influence i n t h i s case and she was forced to treat the Cimbri as very dangerous foes. Caesar writes of the t r i b e s as barbaric and un-c i v i l i z e d but wonderfully good f i g h t e r s . The true Roman speaks when he writes of the U b i i , - "once prosperous ac-cording to German standards". (1) He continues to describe the Germans and t h e i r customs as i f they belonged to an i n -(1) Caes. De. B.G. IT, 3 x l i v f e r i o r race honoured highly to he even noticed by him. The work of Strabo i s written i n a purely impersonal manner and for one under Roman influence i s remarkably untainted by personal opinion. I t i s In Tacitus that we f i n d r e f l e c t e d the true Roman view point. He i s e s s e n t i a l l y Roman i n s t y l e , i n the l o f t y tone which we can f e e l throughout the Germania and yet at times he cannot help comparing Roman and German very often to the detriment of the former. He i s not slow to recognize the merits of these so c a l l e d barbarians but we U f e e l that^only does so to s t r i k e shrewd blows at Roman so-ciet y i n a cr y p t i c phrase or clause. "In the rude and simple virt u e s of the Germans Tacitus saw a conspicuous contrast to Roman degeneracy There are c e r t a i n l y passages i n the Germany which suggest a comparison between the merits of barbarian s i m p l i c i t y and the complicated e v i l s of a highly a r t i f i c i a l and luxurious c i v i l i z a t i o n . " (1) A few instances w i l l s u f f i c e . He mentions that the Germans knew nothing of usury and then adds; - "A more ef f e c t u a l safe-guard than i f i t was prohibited." (2) At the back of h i s mind i s always the greatness of Roma and her f a u l t s which were many. In speaking of the subjection of the Batavi he says; - "For the greatness of the Roman people has spread reverence f or our empire beyond the Rhine and the old boun-(1) Church & Boveiorh. Minor Works of Tacitus. Introd. to Germ. (2) Tac. Germ. 26 x l v daries." ( l ) Yet he r e a l i z e s that the Germans were a great people for a l l h i s Roman i m p e r i a l i s t i c views. He t e l l s us that the TTbii never blushed to own t h e i r o r i g i n as Germanic. (2) Again we see the Roman when we read; - "For Germans these t r i b e s have much i n t e l l i g e n c e and sagacity." (3) Once more the i m p e r i a l i s t i s glimpsed when Tacitus commenting on t r i b a l wars writes unrelentingly; - "May the t r i b e s , I pray, ever r e t a i n ^ i f not love for us^at least hatred f o r each other fortune can grant us no greater boon than discord among our foes." (4) In t h i s section the Roman gazes with joy on the spectacle of these savage barbarians slaughtering each other. He recognizes German f a u l t s and i s very c r i t i c a l on the German habit of drinking and gam-bl i n g to excess. But what a t r i b u t e i s paid to German armsl Here i s a genuine appreciation of a b i t t e r and dangerous foe. He admits that Germany was never been conquered by the Romans. Writing of the invasions of the Cimbri i n r e l a t i o n to h i s own day he, remarks; - "So long have we been i n con-quering the Germans," (5) and t h i s i n a re s p e c t f u l tone. He counts Germany as Rome's greatest foe who "deprived the Roman people of f i v e consular armies and robbed even a Caesar (1) Tac. Germ. 29 (2) Tac. Germ. 27 (3) Tac. Germ. 30 (4) Tac. Germ. 33 (3) Tac. Germ. 37 x l v i of Varus and h i s three legions. Not without loss to us were they discomfoVted." (1) And then i n another of those pithy observants of which he i s so fond; - "We have celebrated triumphs over them rather than won conquests." (2) He ap-preciated the Germanic love of independence and i s quite f a i r i n h i s observations on these savage nomads^at leas t according to Roman standards of fair n e s s . At the back of h i s mind there seems always to be the knowledge that he i s a Roman, a c i t i z e n of the greatest c i t y i n the world, a c i t y c o n t r o l l i n g the world and mistress of a l l other peoples i n the world. This^ one might say without contradiction_sums up the a t t i t u d e of the average Roman c i t i z e n to the Germans; a superior pride of c i v i l i z a t i o n as opposed to barbarism^ tempered by a grudging recognition and a hidden fear of m i l i t a r y achievement, and the acknowledgement of advantages of barbarian s i m p l i c i t y over c i v i l i z e d s e l f indulgence. We must not overlook the undercurrent of fear which the Romans always f e l t , a fear inaugurated by the Gauls i n 390 B.C., increased by the .Cimbri and Teutones from 113 to 101 B.C., assuaged by the v i c t o r i e s of Caesar and renewed by the d i -saster of 9 A.D., a fear which remained f a i n t at times i t i s true but a fear which remained a l l the same i n Roman hearts to the end of her h i s t o r y . (1) Tac. Germ. 37 (2) Tac. Germ. 37 x l v i i Chapter 11 The German Att i t u d e . Tacitus i s i n c l i n e d to write of the Germans through Roman eyes. To understand the German view of l i f e and i t s attitude to the Romans we are compelled to a certain extent to read between the l i n e s . We are t o l d d e f i n i t e l y a l i t t l e i n the Germania while we can i n f e r a great deal. In the Annals there are several speeches made by German leaders which are representative of German f e e l i n g and i t i s from these that we propose to form our own conclusions. The Germans cojreted t h e i r l i b e r t y beyond a l l else i n l i f e and we can sense t h i s f e e l i n g whenever we read of' them. Admittedly the Cimbri and the Teutones were ag-gressors although i n a sense looking f o r freedom i n a new environment but from that time on the Germans were defenders f i g h t i n g for t h e i r land and country against the hated Roman invader. "German independence t r u l y i s greater than the despotism of an Arsaees." (1) and here l i e s the r e a l cause of the love of war which was ingrained i n every t r i b e s -man. They fought because they loved doing so. true, but they loved i t because they were f i g h t i n g for a l l that was t h e i r s by r i g h t of b i r t h , by r i g h t of possession, sometimes by r i g h t of conquest. I t was with t h i s s p i r i t behind them that they diseomf-eeted sg. many ja Roman leaders and thzrs w e l l -d i s c i p l i n e d forces. I t was with t h i s s p i r i t behind tham that they caused so much trouble to the Romans throughout the (1) Tac. Germ. 37 x l v i i i whole h i s t o r y of the Empire and even as early as the cam-paigns of Caesar. Thus they forced the elaborate northern boundary considered by Augustus to be so necessary. In the f i r s t book of the Annals the outstanding characters on the German side are Segestes and Arminius, i n f act these two chiefs are the outstanding characters of the whole campaign across the Rhenus. These two held views i n d i r e c t contrast to one another f o r Segestes was f r i e n d l y to Rome while Arminius had been a leader of the Cherusci who destroyed Yarus and h i s three legions i n 9 A.D.. Seges-tes was more a thinker than the average German while Ar-minius demands our admiration because he was more a German than h i s fellow c h i e f . A comparison of the speeches of the two men w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the point. Segestes i n h i s speech to Germanicus says, "Non hie mihi primus erga populum Romanum f i d e i et constantiae dies.. neque fidio patriae verum quia Romanis Germanisque idem conducere et pacem quam bellum proba-bum." (1) He speaks of the c o n f l i c t with Yarns, "Quae secuta sunt diu^QA-o magis quam defendi possunt". (1) l a t e r he states that he wishes to be, "genti Germanorum idoneus c o n c i l i a t o r s i paenitentiam quam perniciem maluerit." ( l ) This view i s pe r f e c t l y sane and as such i s too sane for any t r u | German and therefore we cannot consider him a t y p i c a l German for nowhere else are these views agreed with i n c l a s s i c a l w r i t e r s . His words appear tame when we contrast them with the f i e r y (1) Tac. Annals I , 58 x l i x exhortations of h i s brother-in-law Arminius to h i s men. Tacitus attempts to paint Arminius i n a bad. l i g h t and. marks him as a rebel against the Romans. Yet we cannot but ad-mire the s p i r i t of the Cherusean chief i n defying the whole might of the Roman Empire which stood behind Germanicus i t s chosen representative. Arminius i s c a l l e d , "Turbator Ger-maniae". ( l ) Perhaps he was but i s i t so r e b e l l i o u s f or a chief to wish to free h i s people from the shackles of a foreign foe? Tacitus attempts to show Segestes as a pathetic figure i n the speech we have quoted. Yet i t i s Arminius who earns our sympathy i n h i s courageous e f f o r t s to beat back the Romans, a task which even he must have recognized as hopeless. Repulsed at least for the moment, despised by h i s Roman enemies, stripped of h i s l o y a l wife he i s a noble figure as he harangues h i s w i l d Gherusci i n a speech which endears him to the hearts of a l l understanding readers, Here speaks the true German imbued with the true German love of freedom. His .speech i s a masterpiece of i t s kind and since i t i l l u s t r a t e s as no modern w r i t e r can the German a t -titude to these arrogant Romans who were taking t h e i r own country from them i t i s w e l l worth quoting i n a body. "Arminius ^ o l i t a b a t per Cheruscos arma i n Segestem arma i n Gaesarem poscens; neque probris temperabat; egregium patrem, magnum imperatorem, fortem exercitum quorum tot manus unam mulierculam avexerint. s i b i tres legiones totidem legates (1) Tac. Annals I, 55 1 procubuisse; non enim se proditione neque adversus feminas gravidas sed palam adversus armatos bellum t r a c t a r e . eerni adhue Germanorum i n lueos signa Romana quae d i s p a t r i i s suspenderit. eoleret Segestes Victam ripam, redderet f i l i o sacerdotium hominum; Germanos numquam s a t i s excusatoros quod i n t e r Albim et Rhenum virgas et securis et togam v i d e r i n t ; a l i i s gentibus ignorantia imperi Romani inexperta esse s u p p l i c i a , nescia t r i b u t a ; quae quoniam exuerint inr#-tusque d i s c e s s e r i t i l l e i n t e r numina dicatus Augustus i l l e delectus Tiberius ne inpertum adulescentulum ne seditiosum exercitum paveseerent. s i patriam parentes antiqua mallent quam dominos et colonias novas Arminium potius glo r i a e ae l i b e r t a t i s quam Segestem-fiagitiosae s e r v i t u t i s dueem sequerentur." ( l ) Not only does t h i s t y p i f y the German point of view; i t i s also one of the f i n e s t examples of p a t r i o t i c f e e l i n g i n a l l l i t e r a t u r e . Granted that t h i s i s written by Tacitus the speech i t s e l f being merely reported, b^ et at the same time Tacitus would not give more than h i s due to any German leader judging from h i s b i t t e r outbursts i n the Germania. (2) We can therefore take i t for granted that t h i s was the substance of Arminius' address to h i s tribesmen and we point to t h i s as containing the essence of the German point of view. Germanicus addressed h i s soldiers on the eve of battle i n Germany l a t e r i n h i s campaigns and states that the (1) Tac. Annals I, 59 (2) Tac. Germ. 37 i . A l i Germans are cowardly, prone to f l i g h t and. unenduring s o l d i e r s . (1) But here i t seems he i s mistaken. The Germans were any-thing hut cowards as the Romans found only too frequently. A l l c l a s s i c a l writers are unanimous i n h a i l i n g them as won-de r f u l f i g h t e r s , f i t opposition f o r any army of the day. Thus we must conclude that these remarks of the Roman leader were only propaganda to h i s troops to r a i s e t h e i r s p i r i t for the coming b a t t l e . Only a race w e l l schooled to adversity and with an untamable courage could have waged a l o s i n g battle f o r so many years against the Roman people, r e b e l l i n g at every opportunity, never quiet enough to be l e f t alone and always being a problem to the Roman Smperor. And so we conclude t h i s discussion no more f i t t i n g l y than with the cry of Ar-minius, "Aliud s i b i reliquum quam tenere libertatem aut mori ante servitium?" (2) (1) Tac. Annals I I , 14 (2) Tac. Annals I I , 15 E 0 I 1 i O G E R M A N Y PAST II. CONTACT OF ROME WITH GERMANY Chapter I . The Roman knowledge of Germany Up to a l a t e period, Rome knew eamparatively l i t t l e of Germany and the Germans. In early times, at least u n t i l a f t e r 125 B. C , she had only vague ideas concerning the peoples and tribes to the north. The Romans themselves were never very far from the Mediterranean, the Roman Lake. As f a r as the Romans were concerned the Gauls and t h e i r kindred races were merely a barbarian menace somewhere to the north of the Alps. Of onurse, the early invasion of I t a l y by the Gauls and the subsequent sacking of the c i t y l e f t impressions upon the c i t i z e n s which lasted for centuries. The early disaster occurred i n 390 B. C , just a f t e r the destruction of V e i i , by Camillus. Before that time Rome had absolutely no know-ledge of the northerners. To them "they were a distant and therefore unknown people. w They were an "enemy never seen 12) or heard of before" and to the Romans t h e i r coming heralded the existence of a horde of u n c i v i l i z e d barbarians to the north. The Romans at t h i s time had never ventured far from the Mediterranean and t h e i r own narrow sphere of influence while "beyond the Alps were C e l t i c , Germanic, and Slavonic t r i b e s , barbaric manners, encampments here and there, a nomadic or unsettled l i f e , the authority of c h i e f s , and i n the germ many of the customs which the mediaeval period inherited. (3) Rome had not sought to cross her b a r r i e r . " This held true (1) Liv y , V. 32. (2) Liv y , V. 37. (3) Dur^y, H i s t . Rome, Vol.11 Chapter XL up to the end of the second century B.C. Plutarch i n his l i f e of Marius speaks of the orig i n s of the Cimbri and the Teutones, but adds; - "But a l l t h i s i s rather founded on conjecture than (1) on sure h i s t o r i c a l evidence." Thus we see Rome a strong c i t y state i n I t a l y and af t e r the f a l l of V e i i , a leader In the peninsula but a l l the while b l i s s f u l l y ignorant of the peoples of the north. Then came the barbarian hordes across th;e Alps and i n t o I t a l y to wreak havoc on the Romans and to imprint a terr o r into asHtA* hearts which was destined to l a s t a l l through her history as a r u l i n g power. Admittedly these t r i b e s ?irere Gauls and not Germans but Rome knew not of what race they sprang. They were a l l one to her at t h i s time and a l l she cared was that across the Alps dwelt barbarians f i e r c e and t e r r i b l e i n b a t t l e and an ever present menace to the c i t y i t s e l f . A f t e r the successes of Marius i n 102 and 101 B . C., the menace to the north was somewhat abated but a shadow of the old fear remained. The northern peoples were s t i l l wild barbarians and s t i l l the Romans knew l i t t l e of them; they had not as yet penetrated northwards into the country of the invaders. Then came Caesar and his expeditions into Gaul and across the Rhise? This was the f i r s t occasion on which a Roman force had taken offensive measures against the northern-ers. On the publication of the works of the great general i t was possible for the Romans to gain more information about the Germans, but nevertheless most of Caesar's comments merely heightened the vague impressions which the c i v i l i z e d world (1) Plutarch " L i f e of Marius. already had. According to Caesar the t r i b e s were s t i l l wild and nomadic. They were savage enemies and good fi g h t e r s as always. But Caesar did not penetrate f a r i n t o Germany and so only dealt t r u t h f u l l y with the t r i b e s near the Rhlas^and indulged i n guesswork f o r the r e s t . Nevertheless most of his information i s accurate for he spent ten y e a r s ^ campaigning i n Gaul and Germany or at lea s t on the borders of Germany,,. |frone as he i s to exaggeration i n c e r t a i n sections, i t must be remembered that he e n l i s t e d Germans i n h i s army and derived a great deal of information from them. Most of the Roman writers evaded the issue when speaking of the Germanies. Strabo wr i t i n g i n the time of Augustus says that the Romans had not yet s a i l e d coastwise beyond the Alhis'and so he i s unsure of conditions across the r i v e r . He treats^a few of the farther peoples but admits i n unconscious agreement with Plutarch that, " a l l t h i s i s a fh matter rather for conjecture than of sure knowledge." As a matter of fact there are very few references i n c l a s s i c a l writers to the German tribes which i n i t s e l f accentuates the ignorance prevalent i n the ancient world. F i n a l l y l a t e i n the f i r s t century A. D., Tacitua compiled his work the "Germania.1 This i s the most complete record which we have of the north country, i t s t r i b e s , t h e i r customs and r e l i g i o n s which^prevailed at that time. We must accept h i s information as true for i t i s believed by many author i t i e s that he spent the years 89 to 93 A. D. i n Germany. In addition the elder P l i n y who had campaigned i n Germany had written twenty books describing the Germanic wars and the h i s -t o r i a n douhtless had access to these which are now l o s t . ^ Further-more he had opportunities at t h i s time o f ^ conversing with Romans who had a c t u a l l y taken part i n the wars i n Germany and who therefore knew the country. At any rate his t r e a t i s e rings true and sheds much l i g h t on hitherto unknown t r i b e s and facts concerning the t r i b e s and his knowledge i s f u l l e r than that of any other writer whose work i s extant. He writes with decision as opposed to his predecessor Strabo and i s b i t i n g l y c y n i c a l at times when commenting on simple German customs as against Roman f o l l i e s . He writes conscientiously and i t i s quite l i k e l y that he checked his information f o r he ends as follows; - HA11 else i s unauthenticated and I s h a l l (2) leave i t open." The mystic^and t e r r i f y i n g mist which had surrounded the Germans f i r s t began to clear a f t e r the arrangements of Augustus with regard to the f r o n t i e r s * The defensive zones of Germania Superior and Germania I n f e r i o r , were created and Roman legions quartered on the Rhine. Under the Empire, Roman generals waged numerous wars on the east side of the Rhenus, i n the t e r r i t o r y of and against the Germans. The slaughter of Varus with h i s three legions i n 9 A. D. c e r t a i n l y renewed Roman fears whieh had been l u l l e d but the successes of German-ious under Tiberius did much to n u l l i f y them. As far as Rome was concerned these legions on the borders of Empire not only had a tremendous influence on Roman p o l i t i c s but also opened the way for further information concerning the ferocious (1} Tac. Annals, I , 69, (2) Tac. Germ. 46. 5 t r i b e s and t h e i r country beyond the r i v e r and made i t possible for Roman explorers and h i s t o r i a n s to gather material more or less i n safety. During the Umpire, most of the dread f e l t by the Romans against the German t r i b e s themselves disappeared. Perhaps t h i s was p a r t l y because ROME began to f e e l the power of the forces stationed on the Rhenus and to r e a l i z e what a weapon they formed against h e r s e l f . Not a l l the dread was banished, however, for a trace remained and not without reason for i t was from the northern hinterland that the overwhelming avalanche swept, which was to annihilate Rome and her Empire. Chapter I I E a r l i e s t Contact with the Northern Peoples Liv y t e l l s us that the Gauls crossed the Alps into I t a l y long before they sacked Home, that they fought many engagements with the Etruscans, who dwelt between the Appenines and the Alps. Nevertheless, the f i r s t contact of Rome with these barbarians from the north occurred a f t e r the destruction of V e i i by Camillus and the subsequent banishment of the Dictator. G a l l i c t r i b e s wandering i n th e i r nomadic fashion, poured across the Alps and i n t o I t a l y and defeated a Roman army i n the north. The Romans were t e r r i f i e d by t h i s strange foe, by t h e i r ferocious methods of warfare and by t h e i r very appearance which was wild and rough. The Gauls advanced and the c i t i z e n s evacuated Rome. Thereupon they proceeded to the c i t y and sacked i t but the able-bodied Romans i n the c i t a d e l i t s e l f , defended t h i s l a s t r e t r e a t , beating o f f the savage (1) attacks on i t . F i n a l l y a f t e r a long siege M. Jurius Camillus was re c a l l e d and he beat the G a l l i c hosts who were demanding a ransom of one thousand pounds of gold. The ransom was paid (2) but Camillus recovered i t and redeemed the name of his country. The sack of the c i t y occurred i n 390 B. C , but the Gauls did not a c t u a l l y withdraw u n t i l 348 B. C. In that year the Gauls were a menace and continued so u n t i l as l a t e as £85 B. C., when they were u t t e r l y defeated by the Romans. After the retreat of the Gauls from Camillus the c i t y was r e b u i l t un^bi the d i r e c t i o n of the general^the saviour of the c i t y but the Romans themselves never forgot the harrowing experience and f o r centuries the northern threat hovered over the c i t y of seven JhjUU>t \l) Livy, V, x l v . (2) D#odorus. M i l s . Chapter I I I . The Cimbri and the Teutones. For two and a half centuries Home remained un-molested from the north. During t h i s time the c i t y state had no outlet over the Alps into Gaul, Spain and Asia and her next r e l a t i o n with the peoples to the north was due to the desire to effe c t roads into these countries. The Alps were a good defense but c e r t a i n l y passable as. f i r s t the Gauls and then Hannibal had made inroads into I t a l y by t h i s route. Obviously i t was necessary to es t a b l i s h out-posts i n Spain and i n Gaul not only as bulwarks against invasion and for the sake of roads to Spain and Greece but also f o r economic reasons. The e a r l i e s t ventures beyond the mountain b a r r i e r took place i n 125 B. C , when on the complaint of the people of Greeks M a s s i l i a , the Oxybii and the Deciates two G a l l i c t r i b e s were defeated by Fulvius Flaccus and Sextius. In 122 B. C , a f t e r war i n G a l l i a , Aquae Sextiae was founded i n G a l l i a ]8arbonensis, as i t s name implies, by Sextius. In the next year, the G a l l i c Allobroges were defeated by Domitius Ahenobarbus, who cleared the V i a Domitia to Spain. The next few years saw Roman generals warring against G a l l i c t r i b e s , to gain possession of the Alps. In 118 B. C , Marcius secured the Alpes Maritimae, by the destruction of the Stoeni. Next, Aemilius Scaurus defeated the Carni, to gain the Alpes Carnicae; while Porcius Cato won the I l l y r i a n Alps, i n wars against the savage Scordlscit~who had appeared on the borders of I l l y r i a , although the Roman leader perished i n battle i n (1) Durny, H i s t . Rome Vol. I I , Ofe. x l . 114 B. C. These Scordisci had caused r e a l terror i n Rome by t h e i r appearance i n 118. B. C , on the eastern coast of the A d r i a t i c ; but they were repelled by the legions of Macedonia and Thraeia as f a r back as the Danuvius. Thus far a f f a i r s were progressing well for the Romans They had secured pessession of the Alps and had made possible the roads they needed. Then, from a seemingly clear sky, a new horde of barbarians from the north swooped down upon the Roman horizon, to throw confusion into Roman arms, and to harass the legions, and even the c i t y i t s e l f f o r twelve years. These were the Gimbri and the Teutones who t e r r i f i e d t h e i r (1) foes; - HQ,uo metu I t a l i a omnis contremuit. n The f i r s t clash of many occurred i n 113 B. G., when the C i m b r i ^ t o t a l l y defeated the army of the consul Papirius Carbo and i n the three following years, 113, 112, 111, B. C., the barbarian host ravaged Pannonia, Noricum, and I l l y r i c u m . In 110 B. 0., af t e r an a l l i a n c e with the Belgae, Gaul was overrun and de-vastated. This ex p l o i t was followed by a second engagement with the legions i n 109 B. C.,.when another consul, M. Junius Silanus confronted the invaders with a strong force. He also f e l l before the Gimbri. The enemy was now on the v#ry borders of I t a l y and a threat to the l i f e of the c i t y i t s e l f . The v i c t o r s now appealed to the senate claiming lands and promising peace i n payment. Not unnaturally for Romans, the senate refused and treated the envoys rather c u r t l y . The Cimbri and Teutones had been joined during the plundering by the Tugeni, T i g u r i n i of the Gauls and.the Ambrones a branch of the H e l v e t i i and t h i s according to Plutarah swelled the numbers of the bar-i l ) S a l l u s t , i u g . 114. 9 barians to three hundred thousand strong. In 10? B. C , Gassius Longinus suffered the fate of his two predecessors against the T l g u r i n i while the Cimbri and Teutones scattered the troops of Aemilius Scaurus. These disasters following upon early defeats caused Home to r e a l i z e that her danger was very r e a l indeed. Yet two years l a t e r Cn. Manlius and Se r v i -l i u s Caepio f a i l e d to check the invaders. Their armies were u t t e r l y routed and both the legionary camps were destroyed and razed. This made a t o t a l of s i x Roman armies, f i v e of them consular, scattered by the barbarians. Floras phrases the defeats s u c c i n t l y as follows: "Sed nec primum impetum barbarorum Silanus, nec secundum Manlius, nec tertium Caepio (1) sustinere potuerunt." These v i c t o r i e s in the Rhodanus d i s t r i c t placed Rome at the mercy of the Intolerably arrogant northmen. In addition the prestige of the Roman ns,me began to wane i n the atinds of these barbarians who had now so often defeated the legions. Then Rome had a stroke of luck. The Cimbri and the Teutones with the c i t y at t h e i r mercy and the whole Roman world dazed at t h e i r accompj^ishments separated. They f o r f e i t e d t h i s splendid opportunity, when the way lay c l e a r 7 f o r the sake of minor plunderingsVben the Cimbri pro-ceeded westwards to Spain and Gaul and the Teutones ravaged the neighbouring country for the following three years. This gave a b r i e f respite f o r the m i l i t i a of Rome to be reorganized and a leader to be found f o r the purpose of opposing the inevitable f i n a l onslaught of the barbarians. At t h i s time the r i s i n g man i n Rome was Marius. .. I t (1) Floras, I , 38. was to Marius that Rome turned i n her emergency and i t became his l i f e work to save Rome from being submerged by a state of barbarism. In 105 B. C , a f t e r the two t e r r i b l e defeats suffered by the Roman generals he was elected consul for 104 B. C , "propter Gimbrici B e l l i metum? Marius immediately began preparations for the reorganization of the army-f'given time as mentioned above by the move of the Cimbri to Hispania. Marius introduced m i l i t a r y innovations i n Rome by c a l l i n g for volunteers, thus paving the way for a professional army to take the place of the former system of conscription. He made numerous other changes, trained his army to perfection and was elected consul year after year by necessity. T e l l e i u s Paterculus writes of Marius "Tertius consulatus i n apparatu -belljJconsumptus. w and between the separation and reunion of the Cimbri and Teutones i n 10f$ B. C, t h i s phrase can be applied (1) to a l l the intervening years. By 102 B . C , when the Cimbri a f t e r t h e i r depredations abroad returned to r e j o i n t h e i r a l l i e s i n G a l l i a Narbonensis, Marius had at his command a strong and we l l trained army. The stage was now set for the l a s t act i n the drama between barbarism as personified by the invaders and c i v i l i z a t i o n as represented by Rome and her domains through her leader Marius. The consuls for 102 B. C , were Catulus and Marius. Catulus marched to G a l l i a Cisalpina while Marius proceeded as far north as the Rhodanus Flumen. The climax was not long delayed. The Teutones engaged with Marius but th i s time t h e i r unorthodox and wild f i g h t i n g methods were no match for" the genius of Marius at the head of one of the most e f f i c i e n t (1) V e l l e i u s , I I , 2. 11 armies ever before produced by Rome and the barbarian t r i b e was cut to pieces at Aquae Sextiae i n a most bloody b a t t l e . Once more the invaders had erred i n d i v i d i n g t h e i r f i g h t i n g force* In the meantime the other consul Catulus, was hesitatin, to j o i n b a t t l e with the Cimbri and preferred to wait for the reassuring presence of Marius for the l a t t e r to assume the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . The v i c t o r i o u s general reached his confrere i n the next year 101 B. C , and soon afterwards, absolutely annihilated the Teutones and the remnants of the Cimbri at Vercellae i n another savage encounter. This put an end to the threat which had hovered over Roman hearts for so long and re-established Roman supremacy and reputation i n the ancient world. Rome had been saved when.all seemed l o s t . The i n a b i l i t y of the barbarians to slgze t h e i r opportunities, coupled with the l a t e r genius of Marius, had plucked success from what seemed hopeless defeat.' Yet t h i s invasion had far reaching consequence for the power gained by Marius with h i s veterans, the repute he gained by his v i c t o r y , and the successive consulships which were so unconstitutional, caused c i v i l s t r i f e i n Home whieh was not f i n a l l y s e t t l e d , as far as he was concerned, u n t i l h i s death i n 86 B. C , Thus, t h i s was no l i g h t matter but a landmark i n Roman history from the point of view of cause and effe c t and a mere foreshadowing of the influence Germany and her tri b e s were to have upon the affairs of Rome i n years to come. 12 Chapter IV Caesar and the Germans A f t e r the defeat of the Cimbri and the Teutones by Marius i n 102 and 101 B. C , the Germans remained unmolested and unmolesting as f a r as the Romans were concerned u n t i l the time of Caesar's ten year governorship i n Gaul, between the years 59 and 49 B. C. In the meantime there were happenings i n Gaul i t s e l f which concerned the Germans. I t was not u n t i l Caesar's actual command that the clashes with the tribes occurred and forced Caesar to cross the Rhenus twice to reduce the peoples l i v i n g there. The primary cause of the campaigns against the Germans i n Caesar's time was the invasions of the German chief A r i o v i s t u s into Gaul at the request of the Arverni and Sequani to a s s i s t them against the Aedui. The German came and defeated the Aedui but then attracted by the fecundity of the G a l l i c country he remained and set t l e d there reinforced by the fresh swarms who poured across the Rhenus, Soon^even the Sequani r e a l i z e d that Ariovistus^from Being their a l l y had become th e i r master. Accordingly the Sequani and the Arverni joined forces with the Aedui, now a l l i e s of Rome, t h e i r erstwhile foes^ i n an attempt to expel the German invaders. A l l to no a v a i l however for the combined G a l l i c army received a crushing defeat i n 61 B. C , when tfeey. forced b a t t l e . This was another example of the age old e v i l of c a l l i n g upon an outside people for a i d against an i n t e r n a l foe. Before the deciding battle the Gauls had applied to Rome f o r help which was refused a l -IS though a l l future Roman governors i n Gaul were entrusted with consulting Aeduan interests on a l l occasions. In the meantime Ar i o v i s t u s and h i s German barbarians remained ensconced i n modern Alsace which had previously been ceded to them by the Sequani. In addition they threatened to drive the Gauls from t h e i r own country and there was always the danger which hung over I t a l y . The H e l v e t i i a semi Germanic t r i b e , i n t h e i r turn feared the Germans now l i v i n g i n Gaul l e s t the l a t t e r should sunder them from t h e i r C e l t i c kinsmen. Therefore they planned an invasion into the heart of Gaul i t s e l f with a view to establish i n g themselves i n that country permanently. In the years immediately preceding the governorship of Caesar i t •was obvious that the Germans would overrun Gaul and th i s t e r r i f i e d the Romans who had the disasters suffered at the ands of the Cimbri and t h e i r a l l i e s fresh i n t h e i r minds. In addition there was the Helvetian danger. This was the state of a f f a i r s i n 59 B. C , when the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul a£d Transalpine Gaul, were voted.to Caesar and i t became h i s task to teach the Germans a lesson, to remind them that the Rhenus Flumen ¥fas t h e i r boundary and across that they might not come. In 58 B. C. the H e l v e t i i and t h e i r a l l i e s ^ i n c l u d i n g the Boii ?began t h e i r march into the Roman province. Caesar immediately proceeded from Rome to his governorship prepared to restore order i n Gaul and to drive out the h o s t i l e A r i o v i s t u s i f necessary for the peace of the country. The H e l v e t i i opened h o s t i l i t i e s by asking permission to cross the Rhodanus and Caesar aft e r d a l l y i n g for a few weeks refused 14 t h i s request and then f o r c i b l y prevented the t r i b e s from doing so. The H e l v e t i i promptly marched northwards through the country of the Sequani but the Roman general followed cl o s e l y and a f t e r several skirmishes defeated the t r i b a l farce near Bibracte. This was i n 58 B. C. The H e l v e t i i were sent home af t e r the engagement while many of the B o i i remained with the Aedui who appreciated t h e i r warrior strength. There remained the i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t with the German Ar i o v i s t u s who was becoming m%>e and more arragant to the Gauls i n whose country he had s e t t l e d . Envoys came to Caesar from the Aedui and the Sequani seeking a i d against the German, who was reported as being a bloodthirsty tyrant. Caesar promised a i d r e a l i z i n g only too w e l l that i f the hordes 'were not checked i n t h e i r stream across the Rhenus there might very e a s i l y be another invasion of I t a l y . The Romans' request for a consultation was arrogantly refused leaving the way open for an aggressive p o l i c y on the part of the Romans. Then came the news of the appearance of the f i e r c e Suebi on the German side of the Rhenus and Caesar knew that the time had come to act and to do so immediately. These Suebi were obviously awaiting the issue between Caesar and A r i o v i s t u s and i n the X event of the defeat of the former were ready to cross the r i v e r and rush into Gaul, furthermore i n this event the Gauls now hi s a l l i e s , would r i s e against him on the side of the Germans. Accordingly he made a l l possible haste to^siege Yesontio, a G a l l i c stronghold. Thence he proceeded to carry the war to Ari o v i s t u s and held an abortive conference with him. F i n a l l y after preliminary manoeuvring Caesar attacked the German force and completely defeated i t near Argentina turn. The remnants fled to the Rhenus and crossing i t made for home. The Suebi, awaiting the outcome of the b a t t l e learned of the crushing defeat sustained by t h e i r kinsmen and returned home at once* For the moment Caesar was master. Between 58 and 55 B. C , Caesar was busy subduing the G a l l i and the Belgae. In the l a t t e r year the Usipetes and the Tencteri crossed the southern waters of the Rhenus and occupied the t e r r i t o r y of the Menapii a f t e r slaughtering i t s inhabitants, Caesar made no delay i n marching against his new opponents and f i r s t attempted to negotiate but t h i s proved f r u i t l e s s as indeed did a l l attempts to come to terms with the Germans before the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s . F i n a l l y the •Roman attacked his opponents and In a ba t t l e ttesFt was v i r t u a l l y a massacre t o t a l l y routed the Germans. Another invasion was checked i n i t s infancy. Yet Caesar did not leave matters finished at t h i s stage but determined to take the offensive. Accordingly he bridged theRhenus and crossed the r i v e r thus displaying what Roman science could do i n the face of seeming-l y impossible odds.. A section of hi s recent foes had found refuge with the Sugambri to the north and these people Caesar intended to punish. He marched against them and ravaged HA. t h e i r country on t h e i r with-drawal to t h e i r forests and marsh*^ Although asked by the U b i i to help them against the Subei Caesar considered the time to be inopportune and refused. In the meantime the Suebi were i n the forests ready for ba t t l e with the Romans. "But Caesar had neither the force or the i n c l i n a t i o n to undertake the conquest of Germay. Having accomplished every object for which he had entered the country 16 punished his enemies, reassured his f r i e n d s , and made the name c Home respected he recrossed the Rhenus and destroyed his j (1) bridge. w 53 B. C. brought the next encounter with the Germans. Ambiorix, a G a l l i c c h i e f , of the Eburones, had rebelled and en-joyed some success against Caesar. He had been aided by the Germans across the r i v e r . Caesar i n h i s campaign of vengeance f i r s t undertook to punish the a l l i e s . He crushed the Menapii as a preliminary step and then made preparations to cross the Rhenus. He bridged the r i v e r and prepared h i s campaign aft e r making a l l i e s of the U b i i . His enemies i n t h i s case were the fie r e e Suebi. The l a t t e r massed, and waiting as of old i n the woods Caesar found that they were too far. inland to be reached -'with safety and so contented himself with destroying the eastern end of the bridge and se t t i n g up a watch tower there, as warning and reminder to the Germans beyond. Then he returned to Gaul to take stern measures against Ambiorix. He was now free of the German menace. This was Caesar's f i n a l campaign against the Germans although a l l during h i s wars with the Gauls the Germans ang es p e c i a l l y the Suebi, were sending aid to Caesar's foes. During these c o n f l i c t s German and Roman learned to know each other better and thus to respect each other; though the Roman never admitted as much. The value of Caesar's work can never be over emphasized. Not only did he accomplish an innovation i n a c t u a l l y carrying the war to the Germans and crossing the Rhenus into t h e i r country, but he also by his wars and his descriptions of wars opened up a new source of information con-cerning Germany and the Germans which was destined to stand 1? Romans i n good stead i n the future. Caesar c e r t a i n l y treated the Germans savagely. Against the Usepetes and Tencteri he adopted a deliberate p o l i c y of t e r r o r i z a t i o n . Thfc he hoped to secure peace f o r the future. How f a r he succeeded we s h a l l see i n following chapters. Chapter Y. Germany under Augustus. I t was not long before Augustus realized- the German danger which ever threatened I t a l y . Early i n his reign the problem was f o r c i b l y presented to him hy r i s i n g s among the northern t r i b e s . Thus, a f t e r h i s safe establishment i n the principate he turned his attention to the boundary question. He decided eventually to extend the northern l i m i t as f a r as the A l b i s but t h i s necessitated the conquest of Germany. On the other hand i t meant the subjugation of the tribes and t h i s , he hoped, would make fo r peace to the north. These resolutions were only undertaken af t e r trouble with the Germans and the northern boundary*. The f i r s t brush with the t r i b e s occurred i n 1? and 16 B. C , when the Sugambri, ITsipetes and Tencteri crossed the Rhenus and ravaged G a l l i a Belgica. They enjoyed some small success and even went so f a r as to defeat the army of L o l l i u s and capture i t s standard. Accordingly Augustus took Tiberius with him to Gaul to check the Germanic r i s i n g . The t r i b e s , however, retreated and a f t e r crossing the Rhenus came to terms with the Roman leaders. In 15 B. C , Drusus and Tiberius were campaigning along the Danuvius f r o n t i e r against the Rhaeti, and t h e i r kind-red t r i b e s . B r i l l i a n t success marked the progress of the Soman generals and the r e s u l t of the struggle was the formation of the provinces of Noricum and Rhaetia. A l l t h i s time, Augustus had been i n Gaul s e t t l i n g the G a l l i c and Germanic differences but i n 14 B. C , the emperor returned to Rome, leaving Drusus i n charge on the Rhenus f r o n t i e r . 19 In IS B. C , disturbances i n Pannonia caused the immediate despatch of Agrippa to that country. The l a t t e r , however, died upon his a r r i v a l ^ t h i s event encouraging new r i s i n g s i n Pannonia, Tiberius succeeded Agrippa i n the Pannonian command and soon reduced the rebels. Further disturbances forced Augustus to incorporate the d i s t r i c t i n the province of I l l y r i c u m but about 10 A. D., a f t e r the Varian disaster i t was made into a separate province with a strong m i l i t a r y force, fhe rest of I l l y r i c u m then became known as JBalmatia, the whole area extending northwest as a powerful b a r r i e r as f a r as the Danuvius. From 12-9 B. G., Drusus continued a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y of aggression i n Germany. The Sugamhri provoked the Romans •" by again crossing the r i v e r and i n v i t i n g the Gauls to j o i n them against the Romans, Drusus drove the tribesmen across the r i v e r and bridging i t carried the war into t h e i r country. He beat the U s i p i t e s and the- Sugambri and then s a i l e d with his f l e e t along the coast past the Amisia and the Visurgis as f a r as the A l b i s . I t was now his d e f i n i t e aim, acting on the ordexrs of Augustus no doubt, to extend the Roman boundary as far as the A l b i s Flumen. In the same year he reduced the coast tribes as f a r as the V i s u r g i s . In the next year, 11 B. C., t h i s p o l i c y was continued when Drusus advanced inland and occupied the t e r r i t o r y of the Gherusci establishing numerous f o r t s i n the country. The following year was spent i n subduing the Chatti, while i n 9 B. C , he reached the A l b i s and erected a trophy there, marking the l i m i t , of Roman advance. At t h i s point Drusus" career was cut short by an accident which caused his 20 subsequent death on hi s return from the A l b i s and Tiberius succeeded h i s brother i n the command. In 8 B. C , Tiberius commenced to follow the policy of Drusus by an attack against the Sugambri. Rome was now d e f i n i t e l y on the offensive. Since other tr i b e s treated f or peace the Sugambri did likewise and Augustus siezed hostages to ensure the peace being kept. In ? B. C. Tiberius celebrated his triumph which was held j o i n t l y with the name of the deceased Drusus. Thus for a time Germany was quiet. The successors of Tiberius strengthened his and Drusus"conquests and from time to time led expeditions into the country to ensure s u p e r i o r i t y . This l a s t step was forced upon Roman commanders because the country between the two r i v e r s was not o f f i c i a l l y a Roman province and yet had been subdued and p r a c t i c a l l y conquered by Tiberius and Drusus. Accordingly i t had a measure of Roman c i v i l administration. Tiberius himself returned to the command i n 4 A. D.f and at once emulated Drusus by an aggressive march into the hinterland. On hi s route to the A l b i s he reduced the Langobardi Cherusci and Ch^auci supported a l l the while by his f l e e t which s a i l e d a l i t t l e way up the A l b i s . Opposition was promised by Maroboduus and hi s Marcomanni and accordingly he planned a s k i l f u l l y prepared campaign against thejpribe, a campaign whihh would have resulted i n the ac q u i s i t i o n of Germania as a new province. The attack was to take place from two directions converging upon the t e r r i t o r y of the Marcomanni. When a l l was ready to s t r i k e a deadly blow at German independence, a sudden up r i s i n g i n Dalmatia and Pannonia prevented further 31 operations i n Germany. Tiberius made hurried terms with Mare boduus and rushed away to Pannonia. After a long and wearisome struggle he f i n e l y subdued the rebels a f t e r three to four years of f i g h t i n g . In f a c t , Tiberius had f i n i s h e d with his campaign-ing as f a r as Germany was concerned. "Sic perdomuit Germaniam (1) ut i n formam paene stipendiariae redigeret provinciae." During t h i s period (9 A.D to 7 A 3 ) the whole area from the Rhenus to the A l b i s was controlled by Rome, although the main force ytremained on the banks of the Rhenus. The whole oountry was consolidated and roads were b u i l t for the trans-portation of Roman troops. The German command passed into the hand of P. Q u i n t i l i u s Yarus and t h i s appointment proved to be the turning point i n the p o l i c y of Augustus and destined to topple a l l the plans of the Emperor for a trans-Rhenum empire. Yarus had previously been governor of Syria and now he attempted to bring Syrian methods of extortion into his occupancy of Germany between the Rhenus and the A l b i s , overlooking the fact that t h i s d i s t r i c t was not a Roman province. On the other hand "the Germans were under no such i l l u s i o n and i n no way regarded themselves as Roman subjects. The Romans were only (2) masters of so much as t h e i r camps could c o n t r o l . " The Germans chafed under t h i s form of occupancy and accordingly the Cherusci, Ghatti, Marsi and Bructeri under the leadership of Arminius plotted a great r i s i n g against the tyrant Romans. The plans of Arminius and his kinsmen came to a head i n 9 A.D.. when the a l l i e d Germans t o t a l l y defeated the Roman legions, (1) Y e l l e i u s . I I , 97. (2) Shuckburgh "Augustus" Chap. 10. 22. soiaewhere between the sources of the Luppia (Lippe) and the Amisia. The remnants of the Roman army marched back to the Rhenus only a f t e r i n c u r r i n g tremendous losses from the bar-barians who c a r r i e d on a g u e r r i l l a warfare from their woods and marshes* Thus at one blow a l l the c a r e f u l l y l a i d plans of Augustus, Drusus and Tiberius perished. Tiberius rushed post haste to the Rhenus but only managed to strengthen the f o r t s on the r i v e r banks. One Roman f o r t held out for a time on the Luppia and the garrison f i n a l l y escaped by night a f t e r a brave defense. This f o r t was at A l i s o and i t s successful defense alone prevented the rush of Germans across the Rhenus. The trans-Rhenum possessions were gone and Germany was once more an independent nation. In 12 A.D., Tiberius was succeeded by Germanicus who made no aggressive move daring the remaining years of Augustus. Rome was on the defensive. The l a t e disaster to Varus seems to have been the cause of the forming of the two army commands, Germania I n f e r i o r and Germania Superior. Although they had existed u n o f f i c i a l l y before, and troops were stationed i n them, now they were strengthened and recognized as regular defensive sones and army commands. In Rome i t s e l f some fear was f e l t and i n consequence Germans and Gauls were dismissed from the urban soldiery as an added precaution against possible German aggression. Augustus had d e f i n i t e l y abandoned the A l b i s boundary while he had a strong defensive system on the Rhenus and the Danuvius. In 6 A. D., Moesia had been made into a province thus massing the whole boundary on the south Danuvius as a ba r r i e r for the protection of Rome from the north. The two German commands were each to be under a consular legate with a strong m i l i t a r y force while to the south the Pannonian legions safeguarded Roman i n t e r e s t s . Before the campaigns of 1© to 7 B. C., these two zones had been i n existence and legions were stationed at Castra Vetera, Moguntiacum and Yindonissa. Now a l l these posts were strengthened and four legions were assigned to each section, two being stationed at Castra Yetera and Colonia Agrippinensis respectively and two each at Moguntiacum and Vindon/fissa. The whole command was separated from that of the G a l l i c provinces. Augustus had made his bid for Germany and f a i l e d . Nevertheless there was now a strong b a r r i e r against possible German aggression and i t must be remembered that the princeps had t h i s idea i n view a l l during the campaigns of his generals i n the barbarian country. The formation and defense of the provinces on the lower Danuvius were d e f i n i t e protective measures against the Germans. I t now remained f o r Timberius A decide whether or not the p o l i c y of Augustus should be followed or whether the attempt to extend the Empire to the A l b i s sjjjuld be made once more. 24 Chapter VI Germany Under Tiberius. A f t e r the disaster to Varus the army on the Rhenus was^ for the f i r s t time divided into two separate commands. ^ A l l t e r r i t o r y across the Rhenus, with the exception of small expanses near the back, was German since hones of a Roman Empire there had been shattered. "What we have to describe., therefore, i n t h i s section i s not s t r i c t l y speaking the circumstances of a Roman province but the fortunes of a Roman (1) army." AbOut t h i s time, soon a f t e r 9 A. D., the limes i n the upper waters of the Rhenus seems to have been constructed. A section of the country on the r i g h t bank was depopulated and a picketed f r o n t i e r road marked o f f . Thus between the limes and the Rhenus was "no man's land"to the Germans and another u n i t i n the elaborate boundary system, although the limes was not f o r t i f i e d strongly u n t i l the time of Vespasian and h i s successors. This e a r l y limes was b u i l t by Tiberius and according to Mommsen was the foundation of the Augustan m i l i t a r y system. "The tri b e s on the r i g h t bank of the Rhenus," says a w e l l informed author of the time of Tiberius, "have been i n part transferred by the Romans to the l e f t bank, i n (2) part withdrawn of their own accord into the i n t e r i o r . " Although at t h i s stage the two provinces on the l e f t bank of the Rhenus were supposedly under separate commanders the sole command system was act u a l l y retained for some years. (1) Mommsen, Pr. of R. Em. Vol. I Chap. IT, Page 118. (2) Mommsen, Pr. of R. Em. Y o l . I Chap. IV, Page 123. 35 •Tiberius remained on the Rhenus during 11 and 12 A. D., but i n the next year Germanicus r e l i e v e d him as sole ©ommander and there was a c t u a l l y a state of war with Germany although nothing d e f i n i t e was done. Germanicus had to remember that he was an o f f i c e r of Augustus and that the l a t t e r had now determined upon the Rhenus Flumen as the boundary. Germanicus was young, however, and the son of a great father i n Drusus, the man who f i r s t carried the Roman standards to the A l b i s . Further-more, i t was irksome for a leader such as he, to r e c a l l the three Roman eagles i n the hands of the barbarians. While Germanicus chafed on the Rhenus banks i n h i s unnatural i n -a c t i v i t y , Augustus i n Rome was r a p i d l y sickening. In the meantime, Germanicus was solidifying)! the Rhenus f r o n t i e r and i n reorganizing. I t was 14 A. D., before the pr#8ceps died whereupon the Rhenus general made preparations for h o s t i l i t i e s against the t r i b e s . The curbing influence of Augustus was gone and the imperator could expect condonement for*-his aggres-sion from Tiberius, who had been consort with Drusus i n sub-duing Germany. The campaigns of Germanicus formed a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y of a war of revenge for the shame incurred i n 9 A.D. E a r l y i n 14 A. D., Germanicus began his operations, by crossing the Rhenus, and penetrating deep into the Luppia country, laying waste the surrounding t e r r i t o r y f a r and wide. The t r i b e s were slaughtered mercilessly;—-Germanicus did not e a s i l y forget his father and Varus—and temples were destroyed the B r u c t e r i , Tubantes and usipetes being the chief sufferers. On the return journey, the stalwarts of the legions acquitted themselves nobly and accordingly, thanksgiving honors were 26 decreed to Germanicus. Encouraged by t h i s , Germanicus attacked the Chatti and the Marsi and the Cherusci with his two forces. Against the Cherusci, he was aided by the i n t e r n a l dissension between Arminius the p a t r i o t and Segestes, his brotherpin- law and the f r i e n d of Rome, whose dramatic story i s so s t r i k i n g l y portrayed i n the f i r s t book of the Annals, by Tacitus. In the same year, the Roman leader reached as f a r as the Amisia, His legate, Caecina, led the second force, and together they ravaged the possessions of the Bructeri f i n a l l y ereeting a monument at the scene of the Varian disaster. The homeward journey was fraught with p e r i l for the Romans as Arminius and h i s f i e r c e followers harassed them every inch of the way and i n f l i c t e d disheartening damage upon the Romans. Caecina accomplished a d i f f i c u l t march from the Amisia to the Rhenus while the ships encountered f o u l weather and suffered accordingly. Caecina's march was an epic a l l i t s own. Faced with a c e r t a i n ignorance of-the country and the b i t t e r h o s t i l i t y of the Germanic nations under the savage Arminius the Roman general, with h i s s k i l l and courage, was a l l that saved a r e p e t i t i o n of the fate that b e f e l l Varus, coming upon the legions. When the Roman troops f i n a l l y reached the Rhenus, the losses i n men, horses, and baggage amply counter balanced the success i n the f i e l d of the previous few weeks. Germanicus returned to the attack with as much venom i n 16 A. D., Since the coast t r i b e s , the F r i s i i , the Chauci, a and the Bata^i were not unfriendly to the Romans the advance was made by sea. A huge f l e e t , carrying a l l the Romans, put out to to sea, and reached the mouth of the Amisia. The 27 so l d i e r y marched up-stream and even reached as f a r as the upper waters of the V i s u r g i s . Two f i e r c e l y fought battles with the Cherusci ensued, with Home holding a s l i g h t advantage. The persistent Arminius and his l o y a l i s t s fought as of old, but the former himself, badly wounded barely escaped with h i s l i f e . Matters at any rate looked bright for the Romans, but a l l t h e i r plans went astray once more, on the return journey to the Rhenus. The f l e e t ran into storms, and was p a r t i a l l y destroyed. Once more success on the advance was n u l l i f i e d by adverse fates on the return. After t h i s Germani-ous scored several t e l l i n g v i c t o r i e s over t r i b e s near the Rhenus. KBut taken as a whole the campaigns of the year 16, as compared with those of the preceding year ended i n more b r i l l i a n t v i c t o r i e s doubtless but also i n much more serious (1) l o s s . " nevertheless, Germanicus now believed that a single campaign would complete the conquestdof Germania as f a r as the A l b i s . At t h i s point, at the height of hts career on the border, Germanicus was r e c a l l e d and never again did a sole commander function on the Rhenus f r o n t i e r . The return of Germanicus to Rome, despite his pleas to the contrary, marked a new p o l i c y or perhaps the renewal of an old one on the f r o n t i e r . "The mere d i v i s i o n of the command put an end to the conduct of the war as heretofore pursued; the circumstance that Germanicus was not merely rec a l l e d but obtained no successor was tantamount to ordaining the defensive on the Rhenus. I t i s more than_probable that Tiberius from the outset allowed rather than sanctioned the enterprises of 28 (1) Germanicus on the Rhenus," Tacitus suggests that the r e c a l l of Germanicus was due to jealousy on the part of Tiberius. Surely the h i s t o r i a n i s biased i n assigning such a motive to an emperor who had experienced the success which he had i n Germany and could therefore sympathize personally with the ambition of the youthful Germanicus. The opening years of the new reign at least hint at an emperor who was broad minded and f a i r as b e f i t t e d a man with such a b r i l l i a n t m i l i t a r y record. On the other hand he was conservative and believed i n the po l i c y of Augustus i n t h i s instance namely that i t was not practieal/eto annex the country from the Rhenus to the A l b i s . In view of t h i s we must believe that Germanicus was recalled from Germany with reluctance for l a t e r the young man was entrusted with important duties i n the East and this alone seems to rule out the jealousy motive. From t h i s time on Germany was l e f t by Rome to the Germans. Even the fortress A l i s o was given up and the garrison withdrawn. Left to themselves German fought with German i n eustomary savagery. Mar/boduus and his Marcomanni were over-come by jtfL Arminius and his a l l i e d Cherusci and the former king f i n a l l y died at Rome an exile from his country. Arminius, noblest figure i n early German h i s t o r y , now stood alone i n Germany. Further quarrels caused c i v i l wars and Arminius perished at the hands of an assassin, a miserable and undeserved end. Arminius should be ranked with the highest of national heroes. A German to the core, brave and with s p i r i t unquenchable he resi s t e d the Roman at every step. (1) Mommsen, Pr. of R. Em. Y o l . I , Chap. 1. 29 nTo the high s p i r i t e d man who at the age of s i x and twenty had released h i s Saxon home from the I t a l i a n foreign r u l e , who thereafter had been general as well as sold i e r i n a seven years struggle for that freedom regained, who had staked not-aw merely person and l i f e but also wife and c h i l d for nation, to f a l l at the age of thirty-seven hy an assassin's hand to t h i s man hi s people gave what i t was i n th e i r power to gise, (1) an eternal monument i n heroic song." (1) Mommsen, Pr. of R. Em. ¥ol. I , Ch. I , p. 62. 30 Chapter VII. From Tiberius to the death of. Nero. After the r e c a l l of Germanicus by Tiberius Germanic a f f a i r s were at peace u n t i l near the end of the reign. The t r i b e s on the .Rhenus banks embracing the F r i s i i , Batavi, and Ghauci were f r i e n d l y to Home and injfact had taken M t t l e or n< part i n the r i s i n g of the.Cherusci under Arminius. They had been led into a l l i a n c e by Drusus, the Batavi and F r i s i i with ease, but the Chauci a f t e r some opposition. Sections of the Sugambri had s e t t l e d on the right bank and were considered as subjeet a l l i e s while a l l these t r i b e s were subject to the Roman tr i b u t e which was small and hardly a burden. Thus the Romans s t i l l possessed a certai n amount of t e r r i t o r y on the r i g h t bank. This was the state of a f f a i r s on the German boundary f o r nearly twenty years and at the end of that time h o s t i l i t i e s blazed up afresh. The cause of the new r i s i n g was the oppressive measures used i n c o l l e c t i n g the tri b u t e mentioned above. As a r e s u l t the F r i s i i revolted, slew the tax gatherers and besieged the Roman leader i n charge, i n the fortress of Flevum, which was situated i n the eastern mouth of the Rhenus. The r e b e l l i o n i t s e l f assumed large proportions i n Roman eyes for both the Rhenus armies marched against the F r i s i i . The 1 l a t t e r however, on the retreat knew t h e i r own country only too well and i n f l i c t e d several defeats upon Roman detachments although avoiding a major engagement. Thus the war was l e f t i n abeyance for Tiberius was nearing his end and i n the mean-time, the Chauci were growing r e s t l e s s . This was only natural 31. since they l i v e d so near the F r i s i i . In 41 A. D., an ex-pedition against them met with mediocre success while i n 47. A. D., they p i l l a g e d the G a l l i c coast i n a p i r a t i c a l r a i d . In t h i s year Corbulo was appointed governor of Germania I n f e r i o r by the Emperor Claudius and he took f i r m steps immediately upon assuming his command. His f l e e t put to f l i g h t the r a i d i n g Chauei while he thoroughly subdued the r e c a l c i t r a n t F r i s i i , reorganizing t h e i r government and establishing Roman garrisons i n t h e i r country. He then prepared to take offensive measures against the Chauci having f i r s t executed th e i r leader the deserter Gannascus. I t seemed at t h i s stage that there was to be a p e p i t i t i o n of the Germanic p o l i c y of the days of Germanicus. At t h i s point the Emperor Claudius stepped i n . Corbulo was not only forbidden to cross the Rhenus but was also ordered to withdraw a l l garrisons from the ri g h t bank and prevent Roman occupation of that t e r r i t o r y . The f a r reaching p o l i c y of Augustus was s t i l l not without i t s influence. w I n t h i s step there was a conclusive admission of defeat (1) which had been but p a r t i a l l y owned after the b a t t l e of Yarus." says the m i l i t a r i s t i c Mommsen. Here we must disagree. I t i s much more l i k e l y that Claudius perceived only too well the conservative wisdom of Augustus and himself r e a l i z e d the i m p r a c t i c a b i l i t y , not the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of offensive steps against the Germans. In addition the Emperor was then engaged with the occupation of B r i t a i n and could i l l afford the add i t i o n a l troops neeessary f or the two projects. Nevertheless the Romans s t i l l looked upon sections of the r i g h t bank as (1) Mommsen Pr. of R. E. IY. 32 t h e i r t e r r i t o r y and i n fact r e l i e d upon the conc i l i a t e d F r i s i i and Chauci to protect th e i r f r o n t i e r . "The lower Rhenus was crossed doubtless by the Roman rule but not l i k e the Upper (1) Rhenus by Roman c u l t u r e . w (1) Momasen Ch. IT, p. 127. 33 Chapter V I I I The Year of the Four Emperors and the Flavians. Thus the Germans themselves gave l i t t l e trouble u n t i l the turbulent year of the four emperors, 69-70 A. D., In these years Roman a f f a i r s were i n chaos and the r e s u l t s were far reaching. The whole empire was affected by the riotous condition of the c a p i t a l and i t was not to be expected that Germany should remain immune with another chance of shaking free from the Roman yoke^ however^ t a c i t l y i t was applied. The r i s i n g of Vindex had l e f t Gaul and i t s occupants i n a state of disorder and uncertainty, while the behavious. of Roman troops stationed i n Gaul and on the Rhenus boundary was l i t t l e short of dis g r a c e f u l . At the time the Batavian a u x i l i a r i e s , the mainspring of the Roman army^ and the F r i s i i , and other German detachments were i n Gaul. Before the death of Nero the Batavi had revolted a f t e r unjust treatment had been accorded t h e i r leaders, Paulus and C i v i l i s , and the former summarily executed. Upon the accession of Galba G i v i l i s and his troops were sent back to B r i t a i n . I h i l e on the way V i t e l l i u s was proclaimed emperor and afte r some hes-i t a t i o n the German troops joined the ne?/ movement. Thus they mar%ed to I t a l y for V i t e l l i u s and fought against the army of Otho displaying t h e i r usual valour. They were then ordered to B r i t a i n with their former enemies, the 14th legion. These two forces were unable to act toward each other with anything but h o s t i l i t y and the Batavi proceeded to Germany where C i v i l i s was ineited to r e b e l l i o n by the newly proclaimed Emperor Vespasian. The F r i s i i and many smallerppeoples joined 34. the Batavi and together they defeated Roman forces and marched for I t a l y , for Vespasian. Ostensibly proceeding against V i t e l l i u s on behalf of Vespasian these Germans formed another northern threat again st Rome i t s e l f . They were openly antagonistic to the Rhenus armies and needed l i t t l e incitement to commence a wholesale expulsion of the Romans from Gaul. Germany had entered Roman p o l i t i e s . Upon i n i t i a l successes the true Germans on the right bank flocked to the standards of C i T i l i s , these including the Chauci, B r u c t e r i , Tencteri, M a t t i a c i , C h a t t i , and U s i p i t e s , agelong enemies of Rome, eith e r openly or se c r e t l y . The reinforced body now badly defeated the regular army of Germania I n f e r i o r under Hordeon^usy Flaeeus. German troops s t i l l f i g h t i n g under Roman colors deserted to t h e i r countrymen and Bnow the banners of Roman cohorts stood by the side of the (1) animal standards from the sacred groves of the Germans." Then Vespasian and V i t e l l i u s clashed at Betriaeum i n I t a l y and the former became Emperor. C i v i l i s had to make up h i s mind now and t h i s he did. A l l pretence of supporting Vespasian was gone and the Batavian announced his intention of dri v i n g out the Romans from Gaul, He was no longer a Roman sol d i e r of the a u x i l i a r y cohort f i g h t i n g fo his candidate to the principate, he was a true German f i g h t i n g f or the freedom of h i s country. The Batavian besieged and p a r t l y captured Gelduba. In the meantime the Roman armies of the f r o n t i e r were i n a statejpf open revolt and chaotic confusion. F i n a l l y J u l i u s Classicus, a Gaul of the Treveri, set up a G a l l i c (1) Mommsen Prov. of the R. Em. Chap. IV. 35. Empire, a f t e r taking Castra Vetera. Thereupon Gaul and German joined forces though C i v i l i s had no intention of recognizing t h i s empire i n miniature. While Gaul was insurgent, Vespasian was being esta-blished i n Borne, and as soon as t h i s was effected the mighty machinery of the Roman Empire was set i n motion against the disaffected northerners. Classicus and his empire soon f e l l but the Germans were made of sterner material. S t i l l the Romans, t h e i r c i v i l disorders s e t t l e d , were bound to win. The Germans true to precedent fought a gallant but losi n g battle and although a few isola t e d successes were the rewards of t h e i r bravery, C i v i l i s himself was pushed back to the Rhenus i n the deciding b a t t l e . Late i n 70 A. D., the a u x i l i a r i e s of the Batavi surrendered and the struggle was over. The task of reorganization could begin. Vespasian, though he punished many of the Germans, i n p a r t i c u l a r the mutinous^Batavi, was on the whole merciful. One step the newly crowned emperor did take and that was to disallow the Germanic a l l i e s to be commanded by members of "their own race. Henceforth Romans commanded these a u x i l i a r i e s i n an attempt to avoid a future r i s i n g or the power of another Arminius or C i v i l i s , Vespasian also prevented another revolt of Germans under Roman colors by stationing the t r i b a l a u x i l -i a r i e s as f a r away as possible from t h e i r own country. I t was by Vespasian that the Limes Germanicus was consolidated. The new f r o n t i e r l i n e stretched from Moguntiacum south east to the Danuvi^us at a point on the boundary of Rhaetia. The t e r r i t o r y between the r i v e r s south of the Limes 36. was annexed to Rome. The Limes i t s e l f now became a ve r i t a b l e bulwark. I t consisted of a wall with a d i t c h and a palisade on the outside* I t was picketed by watch towers while inside the l i n e were m i l i t a r y camps^ Jcl though the main forces were s t i l l stationed on the Rhenus. A l l these precautions were undertaken by the Flavian dynasty and were finished by Trajan and the Antonines. The Limes was r e a l l y i n two sections, the Germanicus and the Rhaeticus wi^.tri wg **. TW^I^^H^' i j h e former was a strongly f o r t i f i e d b a r r i e r b u i l t by Vespasian while the l a t t e r was not so fi r m as i t s forerunner being composed l a r g l y of a w a l l of stones loosely p i l e d and meeting the Limes of Germanicus at Lauvlacum. Within this area were Gauls with a few Germans scattered throughout the country. These Gauls acted as a splendid buffer f or the Romans who encouraged them to stay there w£=fca. the Agri Decumates. The Limes i t s e l f was an exped-ient measure since i t so diminished the mileage of the f r o n t i e r which now took a d i r e c t route of 336 English miles, the Limes Germanicus including 228 miles and the Limes Rhaeticus 108, the whole system stretching from Moguntiacum to Rhaetia, instead of winding up the Rhehus and down the Danuvius i n a clumsy l i n e . In addition i t must be remembered that t h i s southern corner of Germanjr was the weakest spot i n the whole northern boundary for defensive purposes. I t was here that invaders could cross the Rhehus and penetrate into Gaul most e a s i l y as did the Cimhri and other invading t r i b e s . Thus Rome had now a strongly f o r t i f i e d , buffer for the protection of the weak l i n k i n her chain of defenses. 37. HJJJL I'll IUM chain of olc-forr-acs. Under the Flavians Rome's dominion was extended by campaigns such as that of Domitian i n 83 A. D., when the princeps pushed forward the Roman l i m i t across the r i v e r . I t i s here that Roman leaders f i r s t departed from the conservativ p o l i c y of the f i r s t emperor. '. The t e r r i t o r y within the Limes was governed as a Roman province with Germania Superior. Roads were constructed while a centre of l o y a l t y was made i n the midst of the country by the erection of a l t a r s , the Arae Flaviae^for the worship of Rome and Augustus. For many years a l l was quiet on the German fr o n t , at least as quiet as those wild tribes could be. ?9 Chapter IX Marcus Aurelius Apart from the h o s t i l e exchanges to he expected Germany and Rome remained for <a)any years i n a state of mutual respect. The German t r i b e s acknowledged the overloftdship of Rome i n a t a c i t manner while on the other hand the Romans were not anxious to t r y conclusions with the barbarians again. Germany and Rome di d not clash again u n t i l the reign of Marcus Aurelius l a t e i n the second century A. D. In t h i s case the Romans were not to blame for hos-t i l i t i e s , while the Germans could not be severely censured. Germany had always been a re s t l e s s country and now the t r i b e s i n the west were pressed by movements i n the i n t e r i o r behind them. Consequently these i n turn, encroached upon Roman Ter r i t o r y . A body of Quadi, Langobardi, Marcomanni, and Buri appeared on the borders of Pannonia and sought new homes there. I t was natural f o r the Romans to r e s i s t them as indeed they had always r e s i s t e d the i n f l u x of the peoples across the Rhenus and the Danuvius. The invaders were driven back and t h e i r request f o r a grant of land was refused by the Roman governor of Pannonia. In the meantime, the Chatti, had crossed the Rhenus i n the north west and were i n open combat with the garrison on the Rhenus, i n the Lower province. Marcus Aurelius was busy i n the east against the Parthians and thus matters on the Rhenus and the Danuvius became dangerous. Marcus had only jus t celebrated h i s triumph over the Parthians when the storm burst. 166 A. D. A force composed of a l l i e d German tr i b e s poured across the Danuvius and a f t e r laying waste the 40 Danuvius provinces, proceeded into I t a l y i t s e l f , t h i s being the f i r s t time an external foe had set foot i n the country since the time of the Cimbri^ and the Teatones. The Germans besieged Aquilea and aft e r a long delay Marcus marched against them i n person. When i t came to the test the Germans had no intentions of f i g h t i n g a pitched b a t t l e and they retreated h u r r i e d l y . The Quadi offered terms f o r peace and went back to t h e i r native land a f t e r returning th e i r captivs-s. Then the Danuvius provinces were cleared of the invaders and Marcus had to confront the Marcomanni who alone held out against the Eomans. Verus who, with the Emperor, was managing the war, died and t h i s caused some delay. Marcus returned to the scene i n 169 A. D., but the Roman troops suffered several defeats at the hands of the f i e r c e tribesmen. Eor three years the war dragged on with the Germans holding the upper hand and then the Romans f i n a l l y i n f l i c t e d a severe defeat upon the Marcomanni. The war appeared to be Rearing i t s end but at a. t h i s point the Q.uadi returned to the c o n f l i c t ^ .After d r i v i n g out t h e i r king, who was of Roman sy/mpathies. Ariogaesus newly elected king was soon driven out and f i n a l l y surrendered to the Romans while the leaderless Quadi were e a s i l y suppress-ed. Mere subjugation of these wild t r i b e s however, was not s u f f i c i e h t as Marcus c l e a r l y foresaw. He realized the permanent danger on the northern f r o n t i e r and may have a n t i -cipated to a certain extent the barbaric invasions of the future from that quarter. Accordingly he decided to create the new province of Mei'oomannia, along with that of Sarmatia. 41. The Marcomanni and the Quadi were compelled to evacuate a s t r i p of land along the Danuvius about ten miles i n breadth and strong Roman garrisons were established among the German tr i b e s themselves. I t was hardly to be expected however that the l i b e r t y loving Germans would remain 16ng at peace. Taking advantage of the fact that the Roman emperor was busy quelling the r e v o l t of Cassius, they rebelled against the garrisons i n t h e i r country thus bringing on the second Marcomannic War. The c o n f l i c t lasted from 178-180 A. D., but the actual d e t a i l s of the campaign are unknown. I t i s sure at least that a certain Paturnus completely defeated the a l l i e d Germans and the war ended as most of these engagements ended with the absolute c a p i t u l a t i o n of the Germans, c h i e f l y the Marcomanni, and the Quadi. In fa c t the l a t t e r incurred such severe losses that they attempted to move from their own lands into the t e r r i t o r y of the Semnones but were prevented from doing so by the Roman troops. Marcus Aurelius now prepared to take d e f i n i t e aggressive measures against Germany on the northern f r o n t i e r . I t was his intention to push the Roman boundary to'the A l b i s and so consummate the dreams of Augustus, Drusus and Germanicus i n the early days of the Empire. But misfortune had always dogged the steps of Roman commanders i n any c r i s i s i n Germany and t h i s occasion proved no exception. Marcus Aurelius died i n camp at vindobona i n the spring of 180 A. D., and his worthless son Commodus abandoned a l l his father© PLANS. Terms were made with the mutinous Germans and the project of Marcus was forgotten. 42 And so we leave Germany, hemmed i n by a strong Roman boundary, to her west and south^but now as ever a menace to the safety of Rome and her people. 43 Chapter X. Germany—A Summary. We have represented the Germans as a freedom loving race manacing Rome always and intensely h o s t i l e to the people of Rome. Yet i n remembering a l l t h i s we must not forget what services the Germans rendered to Rome and her emperors. As one might r e a d i l y suppose, these services were c h i e f l y m i l i t a r y . From the beginning of Rome's re l a t i o n s with Germany, German a u x i l i a r i e s were attached to.the legions, at f i r s t c h i e f l y on the Rhenus but l a t e r a l l over the empire. I t was a German unit which became the most valuable force i n Rome's m i l i t i a . This was the Batavian Cohort which was enl i s t e d i n the y e a r l y empire during the campaigns of Tiberius i n Germany,/jgave splendid and va l i a n t service to the enemies of i t s native land* By the middle of the f i r s t century this cohort had won repute throughout the Roman world by dint of i t s achievements on the f i e l d . I t served i n B r i t a i n under Claudius with d i s t i n c t i o n and even a f t e r the mutinies of 70 A.D*, i t was considered, by Roman commanders, as a b r i l l i a n t and daring body of troops. Nor were these the only Germans to f i g h t under Roman standards. Arminius himself, b i t t e r foe of Rome for many years had endured m i l i t a r y service i n the legions and had even been granted the Roman c i t i z e n s h i p , although i n his case the c a l l of country became greater than the c a l l of Rome. The extent to which some of the Germans had become Romanized i s demonstrated by the conversation of Arminius with h i s brother Flavus across the Visurgis during (1) the campaigns of Germanicus. "?lavus had long been a (1( Tac, itnnals. 2, 10. 44 legionnaire and had become imbued with the Roman s p i r i t . This he pointed out to h i s brother mentioning the greatness of Rome and the Caesars and the kindness shown to her foes i n c a p t i v i t y . Here i s one German thoroughly Romanized expounding the great-ness of Rome to another German, thoroughly German, her rel e n t -l e s s enemy. Germans from a l l the t r i b e s found th e i r way into the Roman legions and even i n the time of J u l i u s Caesar there were German a u x i l i a r i e s i n the Roman troops. Some of the t r i b e s were comparatively quiet. The U b i i gave l i t t l e or no trouble to Rome, and i n fact adopted Roman customs with a remarkable readiness. Such tribes as t h i s l i v i n g near the r i v e r bank were of immense value to Rome by t h e i r very position as buffers against the more h o s t i l e t r i b e s of the i n t e r i o r . The F r i s i i and the Chatti were other f r i e n d l y t r i b e s who a l l i e d themselves to Rome and were on the whole l o y a l with the exception of the troubles r e s u l t i n g from 70 A. D. Yet on the whole the German tri b e s had to be watched cl o s e l y . As we have said some of them were l o y a l , yet they were quick to offence and i n no way overlooked any measures which they thought interfered with t h e i r freedom. The Romans exercised overlordship in^these t r i b e s but were forced to do so i n a most t a c t f u l manner to avoid r i s i n g s . From the time of the f i r s t campaigns i n Germany the Romans always possessed a c e r t a i n amount of t e r r i t o r y on the r i g h t bank, even when the emperors forbade aggressive steps being taken on the part of the Rhenus commanders. In 172 A. D., Marcus Aurelius began a system which 45 tfh£c& lasted a l l through the empire. He developed a policy of s ^ t l i n g German colonies i n Moesia, Dacia, and Pannonia and even went so f a r as to e s t a b l i s h a section of Germans i n northern I t a l y . The l a t t e r coloni true to type no sooner arrived at t h e i r new home than they began ravaging the surrounding country and even dared to attack Ravenna. These coloni c u l t i v a t e d the s o i l and performed m i l i t a r y duties while they were forbidden and often f o r c i b l y prevented from moving from t h e i r own domicile. Yet i n spite of a l l these f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s we cannot avoid the conclusion that Germany was always Rome's most b i t t e r and persistent foe. From the e a r l i e s t r e l a t i o n s of the countries with each other down to the end of Rome's existence as an empire these barbarians hovered continually over I t a l y , continually defeated but always returning to the combat with t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c courage. F i n a l l y i t i s worth noting that i t was from the north that the wave poured which eventually engulfed Rome and her empire. The Germans were a great people at a l l stages of ^ th e i r r e l a t i o n s with the Romans. They set by their code of l i f e and morals an example which Rome might w e l l have followed, and by t h e i r prowess i n the f i e l d a standard which was always admired by Romans. They loved t h e i r country and i t s freedom and were w i l l i n g , even glad^to fight f o r t h e i r i deals. In conclusion l e t us point out that the m i l i t a r i s m of Germany of c l a s s i c a l times was a t r a i t which continued i n the race as f a r as the present age and i s an inherent q u a l i t y i n the Germans of today, s t i l l as then a great people. ROME AMD GERMANY I Bibliography L. Tacitus Annals, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1906. 2. Tacitus Germania, E d i t i o n H. F^urneaux, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1894. 3. Caesar De Bello G a l i l e o . Edition H. J . Edwards. W. Heinemann. London. 1930. 4. Strabo 5. L i v i u s , Titus .History of Rome. Four Volumes. Translated D. S h i l i a r . Henry G. Bohn, London 1849. 6. Cornelius Tacitus, Agricola and Germania, Ed. and Translated by A. J . Church and W. J . Brodribb. Macmillan and Company, London, 1911. 7. Plutarchus. Lives. (Caesar and Marius) 4 Volumes. Translated A. Stewart and G. Long. G. B e l l and Sons, London. 8. C. J u l i u s Caesar. De B e l l o G a l l i c o . Edited T. R. Holmes, Clarendon Press, Oxford. 1914. 9. Hardy, E. G. (Editor,) Monumentum Ancyranum, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923. 10. Duruy, V. History of Rome—K. Paul, London, 1883. 11. Greenidge, A. H. J . , History of Rome. Methuen and Company London, 1904. 12. Gummere, F. B. — Germanic Origins. C. Scribner's Sons. New York. 1892. 13. Baring-Gould, Germany, Past and Present. K. Paul, Trench and Company. London, 1881. i i 14. Menzel, W. History of Germany. G. B e l l and Sons. London and New York, 1892-99. 15. Holmes, T. Rice. The Roman Republic. Clarendon Press. Oxford, 1922. 16. Mommsen, T. History of Rome. Macmillan and Company, London, 1901. 17. Heitland, W. E. The Roman Republic. U n i v e r s i t y Press. Cambridge, 1909. 18. Boak, A. E. R. A History of Rome to 565 A. D. Vol. I I Macmillan and Company. New York. 1923. 19. Ferrero and Barbagallo. Short History of Rome. Two Volumes G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York and London. 20. Greenidge, A. H. J . The Student's Gibbon, Vol. I . John Murray, London, 1909. 21. Arnold, W. T. Roman P r o v i n c i a l Administration. Oxford Press. B. H. Blackwell, 1914. 22. F i r t h , J . B. Augustus Caesar. G. B. Putnam's Sons, New York and London, 1902. 23. Shuckburgh, E. S., Augustus. T. Fisher Unwin, London 1905 24. Holmes, T. Rice, Caesar's Conquest of Gaul. Clarendon Press, Oxford 1911. 25. Bury, J . B. A History of the Roman Empire. John Murray London 1900. 26. Encyclopaedia Britannica. Cambridge University Press. 1910 27. Harper Dictionary of C l a s s i c a l A n t i q u i t i e s . Editor H. T. Peck. American Book Company, N. Y. Cincinnati and Chicago, 1896-1923. 28. Greenidge and Clay. Sources for Roman History. B.C. 133-70 Clarendon Press, Oxford 1903. I l l 29, Kiepert, H. Atlas AntiquJ^is. D. Reimer, B e r l i n 1902. 30. Mommsen, T., Provinces of the Roman Empire. Macmillan and Company, London, 1909. 

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