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Political basis for child-raising Grant, Michael 1984

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POLITICAL BASIS FOR CHILD-RAISING by MICHAEL GRANT B. A., UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1965 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN THE REQUIREMENTS MASTER PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF OF THE DEGREE OF OF ARTS i n THE FACULTY OF EDUCATION Department of Social and Educational Studies We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA October 1984 (c) Michael Grant, 1984 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of th i s thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of th i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of SOCIAL AND EDUCATIONAL STUDIES The University of B r i t i s h Columbia 2075 Wesbrook Place Vancouver, Canada V6T 1W5 Date: October 15, 1984 ABSTRACT A p o l i t i c a l philosopher developing a j u s t i f i c a t o r y system for his society has a r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for providing p r i n c i p l e s which can be applied to a l l the necessary s o c i a l arrangements within h i s p a r t i c u l a r society. It i s d i f f i c u l t to imagine a society which does not include the s o c i a l arrangements for c h i l d - r a i s i n g among i t s necessary arrangements. Yet the pr i n c i p l e s proposed by various philosophers i n j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the s o c i a l arrangements for our North American society are not s u f f i c i e n t for determining our s o c i a l arrangements for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . This thesis i s an attempt to interpret some of those philosophical p r i n c i p l e s i n such a way that they can also act as the p r i n c i p l e s for c h i l d - r a i s i n g within the context of our general society. Since the various systems of p r i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y our s o c i a l arrangements d i f f e r i n the way that they treat the relationship of the in d i v i d u a l to the group, i t i s necessary to locate a common reference point, that of the endowment of opportunity to the c h i l d , and then proceed along the selected paths of the argument to derive a v a l i d set of p r i n c i p l e s for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . The preliminary stage i s an examination of the general requirements of a system of j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s for a society's i n s t i t u t i o n s . The p o l i t i c a l philosophies of Robert Nozick and John Rawls are then examined to determine the l i m i t s placed on interference with the c h i l d and c h i l d - r a i s e r for those i n the Conservative and L i b e r a l Positions. The action-guiding p r i n c i p l e s for c h i l d - r a i s i n g which emerge from these two positions, when taken together, appear to be reasonably close to our commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . However the differences between the Conservative and L i b e r a l Positions are the cause of some of the tensions that develop i n our attempts to establish p o l i c y . These differences are the source of the value c o n f l i c t s which arise when we are endowing children with opportunities. TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract i i Introduction 1 Chapter One: J u s t i f y i n g Child-Raising Institutions 3 1.1. Necessity of Child-Raising 3 1.2. Necessity of J u s t i f i c a t o r y Systems 5 1.3. Secondary J u s t i f i c a t o r y Systems 7 1.4. F i r s t Requirements of Systems 9 1.5. Characteristics of Child-Raising 12 1.6. Participants 13 1.7. Ennis' Analysis 18 1.8. Conclusion 23 Chapter Two: L i b e r a l and Conservative Positions 30 2.1. Relevant Aspects of P o l i t i c a l Philosophy 30 2.2. Ennis' Conservative and L i b e r a l Positions 31 2.3. Paradigm Conservative - Nozick 33 2.4. L i b e r a l Position from Rawls 40 2.5. Comparison of Positions 46 2.6. Reconsideration of Relevant Aspects 49 Chapter Three: Child-Raising Under Nozick 56 3.1. Focus of Analysis of Nozick 56 3.2. Nozick's Worrisome Points 59 3.3. History and Fable 61 3.4. Misallocations 66 3.5. Adjustment Clause 70 i v 3.6. Joining Up 74 3.6.1. Payback , 75 3.6.2. S e l l i n g the Great Corporation 76 3.6.3. P a t e r n a l i s t i c - L i k e Child-Raising 79 3.7. Nozick Summarized 82 Chapter Four: The Well-Ordered Society 90 4.1. Rawls - More or Less Than Nozick 90 4.2. Social Union 94 4.3. P r i o r i t y to Interfere 97 4.4. L i b e r a l Paternalism 99 4.4.1. The Principles 99 4.4.2. Application of the Principles 100 4.4.3. Princip l e s of Justice 102 4.5. Rationality Requirements 104 4.6. J u s t i f i e d Interference 106 4.7. Rawls Summarized 111 Chapter Five Limits of Interference 117 5.1. "The Funnel of Childhood" 117 5.2. Social Arrangements 119 5.3. The Lower Limits from Nozick 122 5.4. The Upper Limits from Rawls 124 5.5. P o s i t i o n a l Prohibitions 126 5.5.1. Conservative Child-Raisers 126 5.5.2. L i b e r a l Child-Raisers 128 v 5.6. Combinations of Positions 129 5.6.1. Endowing with Opportunity 129 5.6.2. The Combinations 130 Bibliography 134 v i INTRODUCTION It i s my contention that any interference with th e i r freedom which children experience while being raised from childhood must be j u s t i f i a b l e i n the same terms and according to the same pr i n c i p l e s as those which apply to a l l persons of th e i r society. My position requires that to be complete any systematic j u s t i f i c a t i o n of s o c i a l arrangements must include c h i l d - r a i s i n g . However, theorists have f a i l e d to treat c h i l d - r a i s i n g as one of society's basic, i n t e g r a l , s o c i a l arrangements. They r e l y on the premise that the differences inherent i n being a c h i l d exempt children from consideration under the system they are investigating. In my mind th i s exemption begs the question. (For example, i n our society we wish to preserve the i n t e g r i t y of the in d i v i d u a l within the context of many indi v i d u a l s . It i s therefore necessary to eliminate any r e s t r i c t i o n s on 'i n d i v i d u a l i t y ' which omit persons such as children from equal consideration within the j u s t i f i c a t o r y system.) If the j u s t i f i c a t o r y system i s intended to j u s t i f y s o c i a l arrangements involving individuals i t must do that for a l l individuals or i t i s an incomplete or de f i c i e n t system. In order to fi n d out how c h i l d - r a i s i n g may be included as part of a complete j u s t i f i c a t o r y system, th i s thesis w i l l f i r s t examine the s o c i a l arrangement of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i n order to determine i t s pertinent c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s , and, secondly, consider two p o l i t i c a l philosophies which taken together include many of the pr i n c i p l e s which we use to j u s t i f y our s o c i a l arrangements. 1 The f i r s t chapter investigates the basis for the parameters for an investigation of a j u s t i f i c a t o r y system for the s o c i a l arrangements required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Chapter Two establishes the basis for investigating two apparently complete but d i f f e r e n t systems of general p r i n c i p l e s . There i s a general outline of each position - the Conservative as presented by Robert Nozick and the L i b e r a l as presented by John Rawls. In the next two chapters I use the parameters from the f i r s t chapter to probe the problematic areas of the Conservative and Li b e r a l positions. The f i n a l chapter compares the conceptions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g that can be derived from each of the p o l i t i c a l positions with our commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . I also consider the p o s s i b i l i t y of combining the p r i n c i p l e s from the Conservative p o s i t i o n with those from the L i b e r a l position for the purpose of establishing s o c i a l arrangements for c h i l d - r a i s i n g which more cl o s e l y approximate our commonsense notions. The upshot of t h i s combination of p r i n c i p l e s i s the v e r i f i c a t i o n of my contention that p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are d i r e c t l y derivable from p r i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y our s o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l arrangements. 2 CHAPTER ONE JUSTIFYING CHILD-RAISING INSTITUTIONS 1.1. Necessity of Child-Raising In t h i s chapter I w i l l establish the parameters I w i l l use in my consideration of j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems for the i n s t i t u t i o n s which are necessary for the reasonable operation of s o c i a l groups. Since my prime concern i s with the s o c i a l arrangements required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g , these parameters w i l l emerge from considering the relationship between c h i l d - r a i s i n g , the existing s o c i a l arrangements, and the d i s t r i b u t i v e nature of the j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s . It i s my contention that there i s a necessary connection between the interferences required by c h i l d - r a i s i n g and the pr i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements within which the c h i l d - r a i s i n g occurs. Before proceeding with my argument I must demonstrate that the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g and the establishment of j u s t i f i c a t o r y arguments to guide our s o c i a l arrangements are i n themselves necessary. The importance of c h i l d - r a i s i n g and of some form of r e s t r i c t i v e actions, carried out i n order to raise children, i s r e l a t i v e l y easy to establish. Persons who find themselves involved i n the task of ra i s i n g children are aware of two things. F i r s t , they are aware that they exist within the context of some s o c i a l arrangements. Second, they are aware that the c h i l d they are r a i s i n g w i l l also 3 exist within the context of some s o c i a l arrangements. These future s o c i a l arrangements w i l l be related to the present arrangements. While c h i l d - r a i s e r s do not necessarily believe that either the present or the future s o c i a l arrangements can be e n t i r e l y foreseen, they must believe that they can shape the c h i l d to the extent necessary for the c h i l d to exist within the anticipated s o c i a l arrangements. Therefore, as long as persons continue to be involved i n r a i s i n g children there w i l l be a pressure exerted on children to allow them to exist within the context of some anticipated s o c i a l arrangements. As long as persons continue to believe that i t i s worthwhile to shape children to f i t into some anticipated s o c i a l arrangement they w i l l continue to do so. But the worthiness of the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are a function of the anticipated s o c i a l arrangement. In order for c h i l d - r a i s i n g to be worthwhile the anticipated s o c i a l arrangement must be worthwhile. Since the antic i p a t i o n of future s o c i a l arrangements i s a mental a c t i v i t y under the control of the c h i l d - r a i s e r , then as long as the c h i l d - r a i s e r i s involved i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g he w i l l be ant i c i p a t i n g worthwhile s o c i a l arrangements. If i t i s not possible for a prospective c h i l d - r a i s e r to anticipate any worthwhile s o c i a l arrangement, then, unless he i s perverse, he w i l l not become involved i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g . I t i s therefore reasonable to conclude that as long as there are children being cared for by adults, there w i l l be some special s o c i a l arrangements imposed on the children, the intent of which w i l l be to raise those children i n a certain way. The only reason for a s o c i a l group to contemplate i t s s o c i a l 4 arrangements beyond the life-s p a n of i t s l i v i n g members i s to ensure i t s regeneration. To the extent that the form of the s o c i a l arrangements into which children are being raised i s influenced by the c h i l d - r a i s e r ' s s o c i a l group, i t i s possible to assume that the anticipated arrangements are necessary for the regeneration of that s o c i a l group. When a c h i l d - r a i s e r cannot anticipate a worthwhile future arrangement into which children can be raised that c h i l d - r a i s e r i s denying the s o c i a l group's expectation of regeneration as well as the worthiness of existing s o c i a l arrangements. On the other hand, an optimistic c h i l d - r a i s e r w i l l see future s o c i a l arrangements as being either a simple continuation or a l o g i c a l improvement of the existing structure. A c r i t i c a l c h i l d - r a i s e r w i l l see future s o c i a l arrangements as being anything from a systematic improvement to a r a d i c a l , d i a l e c t i c a l change of the existing structure. Whatever the relationship between the existing and the future structures, the existence of a relationship implies some form of so c i a l regeneration involving at least two generations. In order for regeneration to occur i t i s a necessary, but not s u f f i c i e n t , condition that some of the children of the early generation be raised by c h i l d - r a i s e r s who are convinced that c h i l d - r a i s i n g as shaping i s not only a worthwhile a c t i v i t y , but also an a c t i v i t y necessary for the existing s o c i a l group to have meaning. 1.2. Necessity of J u s t i f i c a t o r y Systems The necessity for the establishment of some system of j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the arrangements of the s o c i a l group i s less 5 obvious. There are two possible explanations which can be used to demonstrate the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of attempts to establish j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems. The f i r s t explanation r e l i e s on the existence of a natural i n c l i n a t i o n of individuals to s t r i v e for, not only some kind of association with other individuals, but also some kind of reasons for associating i n that p a r t i c u l a r way; This explanation r e l i e s on the assumption that humans are beings with the capacity for deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y . Every human does not engage i n r a t i o n a l deliberation on every occasion involving association with other humans. However, i t i s a l o g i c a l outcome of the r a t i o n a l nature of humans that we seek for a r a t i o n a l explanation for the basis of the arrangements which r e s u l t i n human associations. Furthermore, i t i s a necessary outcome of the r a t i o n a l nature of humans that a rat i o n a l explanation can be used to j u s t i f y the relationship between the various human associations. Therefore the fact that someone starts the r a t i o n a l task of j u s t i f y i n g s o c i a l arrangements establishes the necessity of the task to the extent that i t i s r a t i o n a l . The second explanation of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of attempts to establish j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems for s o c i a l arrangements r e l i e s on the premise that humans s t r i v e to improve th e i r condition to the extent they think possible. If humans are convinced that r a t i o n a l deliberation w i l l produce the best possible answers, then, i f they wish to maximize the benefits available from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a group, they w i l l s t r i v e to determine the most reasonable j u s t i f i c a t i o n for t h e i r s o c i a l arrangements. In the case where a j u s t i f i c a t i o n does not explain the existing s o c i a l 6 arrangement other j u s t i f i c a t i o n s w i l l be sought. 1.3. Secondary J u s t i f i c a t o r y Systems It appears that reliance on superimposed j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems for an explanation of s o c i a l arrangements cannot be j u s t i f i e d . In p a r t i c u l a r the s o c i a l arrangements required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g must be j u s t i f i a b l e i n the same terms as other s o c i a l arrangements. I am not suggesting that there have not been attempts to j u s t i f y the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . In fact there are several kinds. One kind of explanation has r e l i e d on the establishment of discrete categories of persons. In such explanations children are considered to be so d i f f e r e n t from the adults they w i l l become that they belong to a d i f f e r e n t category of persons and, therefore, are subject to a set of j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s who only apply to persons that are i n that category. If one assumes a clear cut, well-ordered theory of developmental stages, the 'different category' kinds of d i s j o i n t j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems i s at least a possible approach. However, the basis for assuming such a d e f i n i t i v e theory of clear-cut developmental stages i s i n my opinion not well-founded. The lack of clear lines between the stages of personhood results i n a p r o l i f e r a t i o n of categories. The i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the categories of c h i l d and adult requires refinement i n order to avoid treating near adults i n the same way as infants. Each refinement requires further modification. Carried to i t s l o g i c a l extreme the procedure of providing a j u s t i f i c a t o r y system for each category w i l l end up with a d i f f e r e n t system for 7 each i n d i v i d u a l , since every in d i v i d u a l w i l l end up i n a category of t h e i r own. Given what I take to be an inevitable s t r i v i n g to establish the most general possible system of j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s , i t i s clear that the p a r t i t i o n i n g of persons into categories i s unsatisfactory. (1-1) Another kind of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g r e l i e s on the premise that 'special' p r i n c i p l e s can be invoked to override the general p r i n c i p l e s i n the case of certain kinds of associations. In the case of c h i l d - r a i s i n g there i s an association between the c h i l d being raised and the person who has taken on the task of r a i s i n g the c h i l d . Where a second set of super-imposed, overriding p r i n c i p l e s are allowed, i t i s possible to j u s t i f y treating children as i f they were not persons simply on the basis of the special nature of the arrangement i n which they f i n d themselves at that p a r t i c u l a r time. In order to be treated as a person the c h i l d must disengage from that arrangement. However, once i t has been accepted that a special set of p r i n c i p l e s apply to certain arrangements there i s no l o g i c a l imperative for that arrangement to terminate. It i s possible to conceive of a c h i l d being raised i n such a way that she (1-2) does not learn how to disengage from the arrangement and thus i s not capable of being treated as a person. This kind of approach to the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g opens the p o s s i b i l i t y of j u s t i f y i n g the treatment of a person i n a way that cannot be j u s t i f i e d by the general j u s t i f i c a t o r y system. (1-3) The only way to avoid such a c o n f l i c t i s to stipulate that any 'special' p r i n c i p l e s for 'special' s o c i a l arrangements must be derived 8 d i r e c t l y from the p r i n c i p l e s that are meant to apply to a l l other s o c i a l arrangements. Such a s t i p u l a t i o n i s the equivalent to claiming that rather than having 'special' p r i n c i p l e s derivable from the general p r i n c i p l e s , the general p r i n c i p l e s must be capable of interpretation for any of the basic, i n t e g r a l s o c i a l arrangements of the society they claim to j u s t i f y . 1.4. E'irst Requirements of Systems In order for the p r i n c i p l e s of a j u s t i f i c a t o r y system to be s u f f i c i e n t children raised according to those p r i n c i p l e s must be able to l i v e i n a future s o c i a l arrangement which has a related j u s t i f i c a t o r y system. Furthermore, children must arrive at that state as a re s u l t of c h i l d - r a i s i n g carried out by ordinary people not by angels. The c r i t e r i a for successful c h i l d - r a i s i n g involves a just outcome a r i s i n g from a f a i r procedure. The scope of the p r i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y the arrangements of s o c i a l groups i s limited to the range of considerations required to determine d i s t r i b u t i o n s of resources among indi v i d u a l s . Two kinds of di s t r i b u t i o n s are determined by the nature of what i s to be dist r i b u t e d . John Rawls has made some useful d i s t i n c t i o n s that f a c i l i t a t e c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the re l a t i o n between the d i s t r i b u t i v e aspects of c h i l d - r a i s i n g and the practices and resultant patterns of di s t r i b u t i o n s of resources. (Rawls, 1971, pp.84-6) One kind of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s concerned with di v i d i n g up and sharing some limited thing. The sharing of a birthday cake i s an example of t h i s kind of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Rawls i d e n t i f i e s the procedures used i n carrying out the d i s t r i b u t i o n as an example of perfect procedural 9 j u s t i c e . According to Rawls two conditions must be met for a case of perfect procedural j u s t i c e . F i r s t , there must be some pre-defined independent c r i t e r i o n for determining what i s a just res u l t of the procedure. Second, i t must be possible to design a procedure for accomplishing the correct r e s u l t (e.g. the person who cuts, chooses l a s t ) . Another kind of d i s t r i b u t i o n i s concerned with providing access to something that i s limited by-d i f f i c u l t y of access rather than shortage of a v a i l a b i l i t y . The provision of an opportunity to appreciate the beauty of a sunset i s an example of thi s kind of d i s t r i b u t i o n . Rawls i d e n t i f i e s t h i s d i s t r i b u t i o n as subject to one of two kinds of procedural j u s t i c e . When the f i r s t condition (that of having some independent c r i t e r i o n ) but not the second condition (that of a sati s f a c t o r y procedure to achieve the correct result) i s met, Rawls c a l l s i t imperfect procedural j u s t i c e . When the f i r s t condition i s replaced with a contractual procedure, which i s taken to re s u l t i n a f a i r and correct outcome only to the extent that the procedure has been properly followed, Rawls i d e n t i f i e s i t as a case of pure procedural j u s t i c e . (Rawls, 1971, p.86) The paradigm example of t h i s i s any form of gambling that involves s t r i c t adherence to agreed procedures of betting. Since i t i s not possible for the c h i l d to agree to pre-determined procedures as i s required i n pure procedural  justice i t i s not possible to consider children being involved i n such an arrangement. Our considerations w i l l thus be limited to perfect and imperfect procedural justice when children are d i r e c t l y involved. 10 Up to t h i s point I have argued that the existence of a s o c i a l group suggests the need for a system of p r i n c i p l e s j u s t i f y i n g the arrangements of the s o c i a l group which necessarily includes some procedure for r a i s i n g children. While there may be a variety of ways to relate the general p r i n c i p l e s and the arrangements for c h i l d - r a i s i n g , I have argued that a d i r e c t connection between the two appears to be desirable. In order to demonstrate how t h i s works I w i l l interpret a general system of j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s and determine i f the derivative c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions are compatible with the commonsense notions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g which characterize the society being considered. I recognize that a compatibility between the derivative and the commonsense notions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i s not s u f f i c i e n t to establish my claim that i n j u s t i f y i n g the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i t i s possible to avoid 'special' p r i n c i p l e s for 'special' associations, or separate categories of persons. The derivative c h i l d - r a i s i n g practices must meet other c r i t e r i a . The c h i l d must be raised so that as an adult she can function within a s o c i a l group that has a system of p r i n c i p l e s related to those i n which she was raised. Her a b i l i t y to l i v e i n that s o c i a l group should not require any heroic e f f o r t s to undo what her c h i l d - r a i s i n g did. The procedures of c h i l d - r a i s i n g must be as f a i r as procedures that anyone else can reasonably be expected to endure. This condition relates to the procedures aff e c t i n g both the c h i l d and the c h i l d - r a i s e r s . The procedures must consider d i s t r i b u t i o n s of resources r e s t r i c t e d by both a v a i l a b i l i t y and by a c c e s s a b i l i t y . This l a s t condition requires an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n 11 of what independent c r i t e r i a are to be used i n determining a proper d i s t r i b u t i o n and, where applicable, what procedure can be used to ensure that the outcome i s the proper r e s u l t . (1-4) 1.5. Characteristics of Child-Raising It would appear that a necessary condition of being a person i s that we engage i n some kind of interaction with other people and that we are not permanently isol a t e d from other persons during the period of our childhood. The nature and quality of this interaction with other persons i s not c l e a r l y prescribed. deMause's investigations (deMause 1974) purport to uncover c h i l d - r a i s i n g environments that are i n dir e c t opposition to those we now consider minimally essential for successful emergence from childhood. If the end-state of the c h i l d - r a i s i n g enterprise were c l e a r l y defined i t would be possible to measure the appropriateness of the c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions from the rate of achievement of that end-state. However, i n order to ensure that the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i d e n t i f i e d allow for more than just a simple means-to-an-end process, I w i l l leave i t open whether children are raised for some end state or not. There i s , however, a general purpose which characterizes c h i l d - r a i s i n g . That i s the endowment of the c h i l d with the opportunities necessary to become a successful member of the s o c i a l group. I w i l l consider the endowment with opportunity i n d e t a i l i n a l a t e r section of t h i s chapter. There are, however, two aspects of t h i s underlying purpose for c h i l d - r a i s i n g which need to be considered at t h i s point. The f i r s t c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the endowment with opportunity i s the need to ensure that the 12 c h i l d w i l l survive to consider the opportunity. There i s no point i n providing the c h i l d with an opportunity i f she w i l l not survive to take advantage of i t . The second c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of opportunity endowments i s related to what one means when one says that one has an opportunity. F i r s t , the having of an opportunity involves the p o s s i b i l i t y of making a choice. If the person has no choice as to whether or not to engage i n an a c t i v i t y we would say that they are compelled to act i n a certain way, not that they have an opportunity. Second, the having of an opportunity i s always the opportunity to do or be or have something. Third, having an opportunity implies that there i s an a b i l i t y to act i n such a way that the opportunity can be seized. In order to seize the opportunity i t i s not, however, s u f f i c i e n t that one i s able to act i n a certain way. Whatever the benefit of the opportunity there must be r e s t r i c t i o n s on the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the opportunity. In this aspect having an opportunity i s clos e l y related to the concept of a d i s t r i b u t i o n . Just as with resources to be distributed, the benefits of having seized an opportunity are limited i n a v a i l a b i l i t y by shortage or by ease of acqu i s i t i o n . 1.6. Participants The existence of a s o c i a l group implies the existence of some arrangements for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . What, however, are the essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g a c t i v i t i e s ? C h i l d - r a i s i n g a c t i v i t i e s are apparently very diverse even among those who profess to have the same ends for engaging i n them. The only thing we know for certain i s who must be involved i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g . It i s , therefore, i n the nature of those involved that we can expect to fi n d the clues as to what the essential c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are. There are three classes of actors involved i n the c h i l d - r a i s i n g drama. The f i r s t and the most obvious i s the c h i l d . The second and most active are the c h i l d - r a i s e r s or providers. And the l a s t are the rest of the group or the strangers, those with no involvement i n or knowledge of the enterprise. Since the stranger i s the most removed from action of the c h i l d - r a i s i n g i t i s reasonable to conclude that very l i t t l e can be learned about the nature of c h i l d - r a i s i n g from him. The stranger, however, does have a stake i n the success of the c h i l d - r a i s i n g enterprise. To the extent that the group depends on the supply of new members to ensure a continuation and regeneration of i t s i n s t i t u t i o n s , and to the extent that a l l members benefit from the continuity of the i n s t i t u t i o n s , then the stranger r e l i e s on the success of the group's c h i l d - r a i s i n g a c t i v i t i e s . The stranger's d i r e c t concern, however, i s only that the society continue i n whatever ways required by the j u s t i f i c a t o r y system. The de t a i l s of the means used by the ch i l d - r a i s e r s and the nature of the a c t i v i t i e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are, by d e f i n i t i o n , beyond the ken of the stranger and therefore are of no p a r t i c u l a r i n t e r e s t to him other than i n the most general terms of what i s moral and successful. At the other extreme of involvement we have the person who has the most intere s t i n the c h i l d - r a i s i n g enterprise - the c h i l d . At t h i s point I wish to stipulate that I am considering 14 the c h i l d to be a person with no implied or actual differences of category and no special rights or r e s t r i c t i o n s on actions. The c h i l d i s a person who must r e l y on others to nurture and protect her. The provision of t h i s assistance to the c h i l d f a l l s into two broad categories. (1-5) F i r s t , there i s the kind of assistance which f a c i l i t a t e s the growth and emergence of the c h i l d into adulthood. In the most straightforward case t h i s would be the provision of physical, emotional and i n t e l l e c t u a l nurture, provided i n such a way that the c h i l d grows more quickly and more completely than would be the case i f she were just l e f t alone. The second kind of assistance i s that which i n h i b i t s the actions and growth of the c h i l d . The most straightforward case of i n h i b i t i n g assistance would be the protective actions of the c h i l d - r a i s e r i n situations where the c h i l d might r i s k being injured or might develop i n some way that the c h i l d - r a i s e r considers undesirable. In both cases the c h i l d i s , therefore, i n a dependency pos i t i o n . Furthermore, the relationship between the c h i l d and the c h i l d - r a i s e r must tend towards intimacy since the c h i l d , while attempting to express wants and needs, i s as incapable of independently i d e n t i f y i n g what can s a t i s f y those needs as she i s of independently s a t i s f y i n g those needs. In providing assistance by f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g the growth and development of the c h i l d the c h i l d - r a i s e r also f a c i l i t a t e s and i n h i b i t s the child's knowledge of the world. As one would expect the key actors i n the drama of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are the c h i l d - r a i s e r s . There are two possible kinds of c h i l d - r a i s e r s . (1-6) What they are i s determined by the kinds of possible relationships between the c h i l d and the c h i l d - r a i s e r s or providers. The providers may have an intimate relationship with the c h i l d . This f i r s t kind of provider would i n t e n t i o n a l l y provide the necessities for the c h i l d , possibly attempt to anticipate the child's needs and make provision for those needs, and c e r t a i n l y contemplate the p o s s i b i l i t y that the existence of the c h i l d may put the a v a i l a b i l i t y of the resources required to meet those needs at r i s k . On the other hand the provider may have a remote relationship with the c h i l d . This second kind of provider would consider the needs of children i n general and would at least be w i l l i n g to allow an i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d to use any surplus that may be re a d i l y available. For my purposes I take i t that the providers are a l l attempting to act according to some set of general action guiding p r i n c i p l e s . The intention of the intimate and remote providers are entailed i n the nature of the relationship they can have with the c h i l d . While the intimate provider i s mainly concerned with the detailed actions of r a i s i n g one c h i l d , the remote provider i s concerned with more general trends of the child's growth into adulthood. The remoteness of this relationship i s dictated by the i n a b i l i t y of the provider to anticipate and provide for the needs of each and every c h i l d . In a case where there were only 'remote providers' i t would be necessary for a child's survival that a large enough surplus ex i s t amongst a l l the 'remote providers' that the c h i l d would have access to the necessary physical requirements without someone i n t e n t i o n a l l y providing for or anticipating the needs of that i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d . 16 For our purposes i t w i l l be assumed that there i s no p o s s i b i l i t y of having providers who are p a r t i a l l y intimate and p a r t i a l l y remote. This assumption i s based on the fact that when a s p e c i f i c c h i l d - r a i s i n g act occurs the intimate provider i s d i r e c t l y involved with the c h i l d while the remote provider i s at least one step removed from the occurrence. A s i g n i f i c a n t difference between remote and intimate providers concerns the scope of the value judgments each must make. The intimate provider i s concerned with the continued existence of the i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d regardless of whether his existence benefits or harms other persons. The remote provider i s engaged i n value judgments concerning benefits and harms for a l l persons i n general. This allows the remote providers to explain t h e i r concern for the provision for any given c h i l d . Where there i s congruence i n the respective value judgments of the intimate and remote providers concerning the provision of benefits for a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d or children i n general, then i t i s possible to examine the b e l i e f s of the remote providers as i f given the opportunity they would become intimate providers for any s p e c i f i c c h i l d . Where t h i s congruence does not ex i s t there w i l l be inevitable c o n f l i c t s over the a l l o c a t i o n of resources es p e c i a l l y those which may be i n short supply. In such a case i t w i l l be the intimate provider who w i l l ensure that the p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d receives the necessary resources to the greatest extent possible. It i s i n the relationships between the various actors that the j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s must be tested. I w i l l therefore examine two apparently complete but d i f f e r e n t systems of general p r i n c i p l e s giving s p e c i f i c attention to how they may be applied to the relationships between the c h i l d , the providers, and the strangers. I have i d e n t i f i e d some of the pertinent issues i n the relationships of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . C l e arly the opportunities endowed must be s u f f i c i e n t for the c h i l d to meet the l o g i c a l requirements.of membership in the society within the constraints imposed by the j u s t i f i c a t o r y system of that society. That i s , i t must be possible for the providers to ensure that the c h i l d has a chance of seizing the opportunities which allow for f u l l membership i n the society. The l i m i t s imposed on the kinds of f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g actions used by providers must be such that they r e s u l t i n the endowment of minimal opportunities required for membership i n the society. If the l i m i t s are too tight i t w i l l not be possible to ensure that a c h i l d has been endowed with the necessary opportunities. If the l i m i t s on the actions of the providers are too broad, the c h i l d may* have no choice and therefore what appear to be opportunities are actually forced choices. Furthermore, lax l i m i t s on the actions of the providers not only place respect for the child's personhood at r i s k but also require more s p e c i f i c guidelines as to which provider has p r i o r i t y i n determining the opportunities to be endowed, and what actions are to be used i n the process of endowment. 1.7. Ennis' Analysis Most investigations related to c h i l d r a i s i n g are concerned with actual or alleged empirical judgments concerning the impact of environmental factors on bringing children to a point where 18 they have the opportunities required to be a member of a society.(1-3) Since I am concerned with the appropriateness of cert a i n kinds of actions carried out i n the name of c h i l d - r a i s i n g I am concerned with value judgments. It i s my contention that rather than having systems of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of actions for adults d i f f e r e n t from those for children, i t i s possible to derive the p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d r a i s i n g d i r e c t l y from the more general j u s t i f i c a t o r y system. Furthermore, where the more general system i s actually a combination of somewhat contradictory systems the same phenomenon of contradiction i s r e f l e c t e d not only i n the practices of c h i l d - r a i s i n g but in the p r i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y those practices. Using Ennis' analysis (Ennis 1976) i t i s possible to focus attention more p r e c i s e l y on the factors that w i l l a s s i s t i n getting some sense of what i s j u s t i f i a b l e with respect to c h i l d - r a i s i n g and what interferences with the c h i l d - r a i s e r s , i f any, are permissible when the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g exceed those j u s t i f i a b l e l i m i t s . Ennis' analysis provides a means for s h i f t i n g the problem away from the concept of equality with i t s strong emphasis on the i n d i v i d u a l to the value judgments being incorporated i n the expression 'having an opportunity.' Ennis's s t a r t i n g point i s that most of the people he knows are i n favor of equality of educational opportunity. And yet once Ennis presents his f i v e 'cases' of d i f f e r e n t educational experiences (1-7) to these same responsible, i n t e l l i g e n t and sensitive people, there i s strong disagreement among them about whether a p a r t i c u l a r case i s an example of equality or inequality of educational opportunity. Ennis takes t h i s to be "indicative of some deep-seated p o l i c y issues that trouble us these days." (Ennis 1976, p.4) The task he sets for himself i s to achieve an analysis of equality of educational opportunity that removes or relocates the debate. His approach i s to show that t h i s kind of dispute i s often concerned with value judgments. Ennis locates the controversy over the application of the concept of 'equal educational opportunity' i n our ideas of education and of having an opportunity. By r e s t r i c t i n g his analysis to dyadic relationships Ennis avoids the unnecessary complications of accounting for groups. (1-8) The concept of 'equality of educational opportunity' separates r e l a t i v e l y neatly into three parts. The f i r s t part, equality, once i t i s r e s t r i c t e d to a dyadic relationship, i s a simple measurement problem i n which there must be something to be measured and some rule of measurement. The connotation of correctness and uniqueness associated with the concept of measurement may be misleading. However, given agreement on these two points, what i s being measured, and what measurement en t a i l s , there can be no disagreement on the outcome as long as the procedure of measurement i s properly executed. The second part of the concept i s education. To some extent i t i s the d i f f e r e n t conceptions of education held by the various commentators on Ennis' f i v e cases that cause the variance i n answers. As Ennis' analysis suggests, the pres c r i p t i o n of a conception of education does not, however, bring a l l parties into agreement. It i s the t h i r d part of the concept of equality of opportunity that carries the most disruptive elements. In 20 seizing an opportunity an i n d i v i d u a l u t i l i z e s two kinds of 'possessions.' The kind of possession i s described by one of two categories: personal ( i n t e r i o r ) , or environmental (external). (Ennis 1976, Feinberg 1973, Richards 1973) The having of an opportunity i s constituted of the l a t t e r , the environmental, only. When someone i s considering whether an opportunity has been available for himself or someone else he i s only concerned with environmental factors. Disagreements arise over what i s to be i d e n t i f i e d as i n t e r n a l and what i s external to the i n d i v i d u a l . Any decision d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between what i s inte r n a l and what i s external i s laden with value judgments most of which are buried. In an attempt to sort out these kinds of decisions Ennis i d e n t i f i e s two positions on the 'value judgment' spectrum which he labels the "Liberal Position" and the "Conservative Position." (Ennis 1976, p.8) The people who are i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n are those who tend to minimize the personal 'possessions' of the i n d i v i d u a l . It i s important to emphasize that t h i s i s not to suggest that those i n the L i b e r a l position minimize the i n d i v i d u a l , but only the size of the individual's personal component r e l a t i v e to environmental factors. As would be expected those i n the Conservative position are seen by Ennis to have the opposite tendency when determining the r a t i o of personal to environmental factors. Since personal factors are considered to be s o l e l y the possession of the i n d i v i d u a l the Conservative w i l l see very few p o s s i b i l i t i e s for others to intervene or a s s i s t the i n d i v i d u a l i n having an opportunity. This i s exaggerated when those i n the Conservative position. l i k e Nozick, i n s i s t that a group has no more power than a single i n d i v i d u a l . (Nozick 1974,p.33) Both those i n the Conservative position and those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n would agree that where equality of some opportunity i s considered of value, and where some environmental factor i s lacking for one of the individuals, then i t i s v a l i d to consider changing the environment so that there i s equality of opportunity i n that case. Ennis' analysis addresses the problems associated with agreement between the L i b e r a l and Conservative positions on where the focus of change i s best located and whether the change i t s e l f i s worth the e f f o r t . In my opinion, t h i s means that persons concerned with endowing a c h i l d with an opportunity are limited not only i n the kind of f a c i l i t a t i n g or i n h i b i t o r y actions that are allowed, but also i n the degree of intimacy permitted i n carrying out those actions. This i s p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t for the remote provider who must recognize the apparently strong r e s t r i c t i o n on his attempts to endow an opportunity that impinges on the personal factors of the c h i l d . Ennis' analysis suggests the appropriate focus of change. (Ennis 1976, p.17) He i d e n t i f i e s two kinds of judgments required i n deciding about change r e l a t i v e to creating an opportunity. Ennis points out that the f i r s t kind of judgment involves determining the causal relationship between changes i n the chil d ' s environment and the child's opportunities. Determination of t h i s kind of relationship r e l i e s on empirical judgments of fact and prediction. The second kind of judgment highlighted by Ennis i s the judgment concerning "the appropriate focus for change." (Ennis 1976, p.17) Determination of the appropriateness of actions necessarily involves value judgments. The p r i n c i p l e s governing such value judgments are part of the j u s t i f i c a t o r y system of a society. In my opinion, t h i s i s the basis for an important c r i t e r i o n for determining the adequacy of a j u s t i f i c a t o r y system. In applying t h i s c r i t e r i o n to the L i b e r a l and Conservative systems of p r i n c i p l e s to be examined i n the l a t e r chapters of t h i s paper I w i l l be asking the question: Is i t possible to j u s t i f y the interference which the c h i l d experiences as a res u l t of being endowed with an opportunity, from the p r i n c i p l e s of each system? Put another way, are the c h i l d - r a i s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s of the Conservative and L i b e r a l positions consistent with our commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g ? 1.8. Conclusion The purpose of t h i s chapter has been to establish the c r i t e r i a r e l a t i v e to c h i l d - r a i s i n g that must be s a t i s f i e d by a system of p r i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements of a society. Certain approaches have been rejected. F i r s t , the establishment of a separate category for children has been rejected. Second, a v a r i a t i o n i n the application of j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s on the basis of the kind of s o c i a l arrangement involved has also been rejected. These r e s t r i c t i o n s , along with the nature of the a c t i v i t y of c h i l d - r a i s i n g , the properties of r a t i o n a l p r i n c i p l e s used for the j u s t i f i c a t i o n of actions, and the factors necessary for endowing children with an opportunity res u l t i n a set of parameters that can be used for examining the L i b e r a l and Conservative j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems. Therefore, I w i l l consider the following points i n determining the su f f i c i e n c y of each j u s t i f i c a t o r y system for guiding the c h i l d - r a i s i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s essential to a s o c i a l group's continuation. (i) Children raised according to the general p r i n c i p l e s must be able to ' f i t into' any future society with equivalent or derivative general p r i n c i p l e s . ( i i ) The p r i n c i p l e s must govern the d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources limited by supply and by a c c e s s i b i l i t y . ( i i i ) A l l persons involved i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g and a l l relationships between those persons are subject to the same general p r i n c i p l e s . (iv) The s o c i a l arrangements resu l t i n g from an application of the p r i n c i p l e s must be usable by ordinary people. (v) C h i l d - r a i s i n g as the act of endowing children with opportunities and ensuring that they survive long enough to enjoy these opportunities must be one of the basic s o c i a l arrangements j u s t i f i e d by the system of p r i n c i p l e s . (vi) F i n a l l y , the f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t o r y actions j u s t i f i e d by the p r i n c i p l e s , and the permissible focus for change of the c h i l d must be as close to our commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g as the society re s u l t i n g from the general p r i n c i p l e s i s to our commonsense notion of society. 24 Notes to Chapter One 1-1 Case has argued successfully against the use of categories as the basis for j u s t i f y i n g interferences with the rights of certain persons. His argument against the use of a variation from some standard to create categories points out the vagueness implied by such standards as "normal" adults. (Case 1982, p.45ff) 1-2 Throughout t h i s paper I have i d e n t i f i e d the c h i l d and the intimate provider as female, and the remote provider and stranger as male. The only reason for doing t h i s was the c l a r i t y i t provided at points where I am r e f e r r i n g to a l l the participants i n the c h i l d - r a i s i n g enterprise. 1-3 This approach requires some kind of argument that defines the role of public education as the 'corrective devise' for c h i l d - r a i s i n g at home. Schrag argues i n "Rights Over Children" (Schrag 1983, p. 104) that such an approach i s not acceptable i n our society. Schrag concludes that u t i l i t a r i a n considerations do not a s s i s t i n resolving the debate of who possesses rights over our children. Furthermore: "... We cannot therefore judge s o c i a l arrangements for rearing children on the basis of justice alone. F i n a l l y our question c e r t a i n l y involves moral considerations but i t i s not 25 simply a moral question as philosophers t y p i c a l l y use that term. Different s o c i a l arrangements make possible d i f f e r e n t styles of l i f e and diverse forms of happiness. But there i s nothing either moral or immoral i n these forms of happiness themselves." (p. 105) Schrag's point of view i s i n contrast to P. White's argument that parents do not have parental r i g h t s . (White, P. 1983 p. 140 f f . ) "The role of the parent, too, often regarded as a bulwark against the domination of the state or the teaching profession over p u p i l , i s seen i n t h i s essay as another power source which needs to be kept within appropriate bounds." (p. 169) Both arguments, however, introduce premises beyond a general j u s t i f i c a t o r y system, and therefore introduce the confusion of when the special p r i n c i p l e s apply and when only the more general ones apply. (1-4) This l a s t condition refers to the requirement that the procedures of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice be s u f f i c i e n t l y just. From Rawls, the perfect and imperfect forms of procedural justice apply to the i n s t i t u t i o n s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . The independent c r i t e r i o n for determining the proper d i s t r i b u t i o n are, from Nozick, the rights of acqu i s i t i o n from the entitlement theory, and from Rawls, the fairness of the d i s t r i b u t i o n as determined by the two p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness. The procedure for ensuring the proper results i s more d i f f i c u l t to i d e n t i f y . In Nozick's world i t seems that the fact of being born into a r i c h family i s generally s u f f i c i e n t to ensure that the outcome i s the proper r e s u l t . In the Rawlsian world there i s no such p o s s i b i l i t y since the correct d i s t r i b u t i o n r e l i e s on the enforcement of the p r i n c i p l e s of jus t i c e and outside of the o r i g i n a l p osition i t i s clear that those with an over abundance w i l l probably r e s i s t attempts at r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . In such a sit u a t i o n i t i s only the power of the group, exercised in the interests of the less well-off, that can enact a procedure to ensure the proper r e s u l t . 1-5 The terms f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g actions are taken from Ennis. (Ennis 1976, pp.l2ff) He uses the terms to id e n t i f y the factors of the cost-benefit analysis used i n the equality of education debate. He enlarges the meaning of the terms i n his analysis of environmental factors. He concludes by suggesting that consideration of the f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g actions of endowing children with opportunities can be considered empirically ( i . e . do they work? ) and morally ( i . e . are they appropriate? ) 1-6 I have avoided the use of the more s p e c i f i c labels for ch i l d - r a i s e r s such as parent for the intimate provider and community for the remote provider. The reason I did this i s that the use of the s p e c i f i c labels e l i c i t s too many preconceived notions. For example, i n some west coast v i l l a g e s the terms 'aunt' and 'uncle' are used to i d e n t i f y intimate providers. In other small towns i t i s not uncommon for a neighbor to assume the role of intimate provider. In such cases a term such as parent i s too r e s t r i c t i v e . I t i s my suspicion that despite our b e l i e f that the nuclear family dominates, there are many children being raised by 'extended groups.' 1-7 Ennis uses f i v e cases to i l l u s t r a t e the problems of educational opportunity: (Ennis 1976, pp.3-4) Case A Edward Tudor and Tom Canty from Twain's The Prince and The Pauper. Case B J i l l and Jack from r u r a l I l l i n o i s . Both children appear equal i n a b i l i t y and educational experiences. At home, however, J i l l ' s truck-driving father and Jack's G.P. father treat the children d i f f e r e n t l y . While both children o r i g i n a l l y dreamed of studying to become e l e c t r i c a l engineers, only Jack was encouraged to pursue that goal. Case C Fraternal twins, Bonnie and Clyde have d i f f e r e n t IQ 1s (130 and 170 resp e c t i v e l y ) . Bonnie attends EMH class, Clyde goes on to State U. Case D Identical twins, Alpha and Beta, have i d e n t i c a l IQ 1s but d i f f e r e n t i n t e r e s t s . Beta, the outdoors person, does poorly i n school because there are no studies i n outdoor pursuits. Alpha, the academic, succeeds i n school. Case E Alpha's classmate, Running Deer, comes from a background that values Beta's i n t e r e s t s . Like Beta, Running Deer does not succeed i n school. 1-8 As w i l l become evident i n the analysis of Nozick's and Rawls' works, the treatment of the group d i f f e r s s i g n i f i c a n t l y i n the conceptions of the Conservative and L i b e r a l positions. Ennis' emphasis on the dyadic nature of equality allows his 28 a n a l y s i s to be a p p l i e d t o the a n a l y s i s of Nozick and Rawls without s p e c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s concerning group power. 29 CHAPTER TWO LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE POSITIONS 2.1. Relevant Aspect of P o l i t i c a l Philosophy I am interested i n investigating the p r i n c i p l e s guiding the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g r e s u l t i n g from the p o l i t i c a l philosophies embodied i n the North American democracies. However, i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a p o l i t i c a l philosophy which can be taken to embody a l l the p r i n c i p l e s which j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements of the North American democracies i s not a simple task. In order to make a credible attempt I must f i r s t i d e n t i f y what I take to be the relevant and essential aspects of any p r i n c i p l e s j u s t i f y i n g our society. Once those aspects have been established i t w i l l be possible for me to i d e n t i f y p o l i t i c a l philosophies which contain a l l the p r i n c i p l e s necessary to j u s t i f y the i n s t i t u t i o n s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i n a way roughly equivalent to our commonsense notions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . The f i r s t requirement of the p r i n c i p l e s which we use to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements of our society i s that the p r i n c i p l e s themselves must be both reasonable and moral. Since we take t h i s to be a requirement of any j u s t i f i c a t o r y system there i s no further need for elaboration. The second requirement of our j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s i s that they convey the importance of the i n d i v i d u a l and the importance we place on the rights of each i n d i v i d u a l . The l a s t requirement i s for some 30 process of continuity to be embedded i n the p r i n c i p l e s . Furthermore, we are not s a t i s f i e d with a system of p r i n c i p l e s which allows for random or extreme fluctuations in the holdings, positions or status of individuals on an ongoing basis. Thus, only a r a t i o n a l and moral system of p r i n c i p l e s j u s t i f y i n g a complete s o c i a l arrangement, which not only recognizes the p r i o r i t y of individuals but also provides for a r e l a t i v e l y stable d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources, w i l l form the basis for an acceptable p o l i t i c a l philosophy for the North American democracies. 2.2. Ennis' Conservative and L i b e r a l Positions Ennis' conception of the L i b e r a l and Conservative positions provides a useful device for the analysis of North American p o l i t i c a l philosophies. Even though, according to Ennis, those in L i b e r a l and Conservative positions have d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding each others positions, (Ennis 1976, p.8) i f we accept Ennis' analysis of the underlying cause of t h e i r differences i t i s possible for us to understand both positions. According to Ennis, those i n the Conservative position see most of the power for changing an i n d i v i d u a l as a function of the personal factor. Factors such as b e l i e f s , goals, motivation and t r a i t s are examples of personal factors. (Ennis 1796, p.9) Those i n the L i b e r a l position, on the other hand, consider the external, environmental factors as being more important. (Ennis 1976, p.9) By extending t h i s d i s t i n c t i o n between the Conservative and the L i b e r a l positions i t i s possible to arrive at the es s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the p o l i t i c a l philosophies of each po s i t i o n . In the Conservative position, because the personal factors are taken to be dominant, i t i s necessary to provide for an extremely strong formulation of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Since the i n d i v i d u a l possesses nearly a l l the power to change himself he must be given protection from interference by others. Conversely, since the only thing that others can change i s the environment, and since the environment i s taken by the Conservative to have very l i t t l e impact on changing the in d i v i d u a l , there i s minimal need for others to have power to i n t e r f e r e . Furthermore, i n order to ensure that the i n d i v i d u a l i s not overridden i n his e f f o r t s to shape his own personal factors i t i s imperative that the Conservative p o s i t i o n not allow the group to become a dominating force. As one would expect, the L i b e r a l position occupies the opposite end of the spectrum. While each in d i v i d u a l i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n possesses an i n v i o l a b i l i t y that even the society as a whole cannot override, the significance of environmental factors i n creating change i n individuals within the s o c i a l group results i n a s h i f t of power to the group. A p o l i t i c a l philosophy of the L i b e r a l position must provide for i n s t i t u t i o n s that w i l l balance the rights of the i n d i v i d u a l to change and develop his personal factors with the assurance that the changes to the individual's environment w i l l be carried out by the s o c i a l group on behalf of the i n d i v i d u a l . 32 2.3. Paradigm Conservative - Nozick I w i l l take Robert Nozick's position as presented i n Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick 1974) to be the paradigm of the Conservative p o s i t i o n . In the Conservative p o s i t i o n as represented by Nozick the following occurs: 1. The Lib e r t a r i a n moral side-constraint prohibits a l l aggression, including p a t e r n a l i s t i c aggression. 2. There i s no acceptable basis for any asymmetry between in d i v i d u a l and group r i g h t s . 3. What cannot be interfered with i s that to which one i s j u s t l y e n t i t l e d . Entitlement i s determined by history of acqui s i t i o n , not by a pattern. It i s i n the process of Nozick"s establishment of these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s that the reasons for adopting the perspective of the Conservative p o s i t i o n become clear. Nozick's purpose i s simple. He takes on the task of determining how much state intrusion can be j u s t i f i e d when i t i s assumed that human rights to property completely circumscribe the intrusive authority of the state. Nozick's argument i s based on a conception of justice c a l l e d the 'entitlement theory.' The entitlement theory consists of procedural c r i t e r i a for acq u i s i t i o n of property. The e f f e c t of these procedural c r i t e r i a i s to encumber any good which i s economic with j u s t i f i e d ownership claims. Nozick's notion of property i s more extensive than the commonsense notion of property. Although he does not provide an explanation of the nature of his notion of property, i t i s clear that the possession of property e n t a i l s the right to use that property i n any way one wishes. Therefore, when his arguments lead to the conclusion that there must be an h i s t o r i c a l basis for unqualified property rights, i t i s apparent that Nozick intends to include a l l rights within the notion of 'property rights.' Nozick arrives at his conclusion by using the nature of the acq u i s i t i o n of property, rather than some c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of humans, as the basis of d i s t r i b u t i o n . The resu l t i s a procedural rather than a normative basis for his notion of rig h t s . Nozick's strategy i s to take some non-controversial, everyday, n o n - p o l i t i c a l circumstance, and to apply our judgment i n i t to the more expansive issues of s o c i a l p r i n c i p l e s . There are three parts to Nozick's argument i n Anarchy, State, and Utopia. The f i r s t part, appropriately s u b t i t l e d "How to Back into a State without Really Trying," derives a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the state from a condition of 'non-state' or 'state of nature.' Through a chain of events characterized by t h e i r lack of intentional intervention with the a f f a i r s of individuals, a minimal state equivalent to the c l a s s i c a l l i b e r a l theory's 'night watchman' state arises as i f created by an ' i n v i s i b l e hand.' The 'night watchman' state i s limited to the task of protecting i t s members from any acts of force or fraud. Each member i s free to carry out any act which does not involve the forcing or deceiving of another member. Nozick introduces the notion of the ' i n v i s i b l e hand mechanism' i n order to ensure that there can be no suggestion of any sort of 'hidden agenda' on the part of individuals i n the 'state of 34 nature' who have acted i n such a way as to create the 'protective associations' which are the forerunners of the minimal state. The protective associations are created for the purely s e l f i s h reason of protection from invasions of one's boundaries. A person's boundaries are prescribed by that person's j u s t l y acquired properties. If there i s a p o s s i b i l i t y of a person losing h i s right to use, discard, or hoard a j u s t l y acquired property then, Nozick argues, i t i s inevitable that that person w i l l subscribe to any available protective association i n order to maintain his legitimate property r i g h t s . While Nozick does not elaborate, i t also seems inevitable that some person w i l l recognize that the need for protection i s an unacquired property at least i n the f i r s t instance and w i l l create the protective association. (2-2) Therefore the protective association w i l l arise and w i l l a t t r a c t subscribers without any infringement on the rights of individuals. Nozick i d e n t i f i e s the anarchist as the one who must be convinced of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the emergence of t h i s minimal state. In order to s a t i s f y the anarchist, Nozick must eliminate any p o s s i b i l i t y of infringement of the individual's rights during the process of the emergence of the minimal state. To provide a theory of s o c i a l arrangements, however limited those arrangements may be, Nozick must establish a reason for associations of individuals which makes sense i n our society. In order to establish the l i n k between the explanation of the derivation of the minimal state through the vehicle of the ' i n v i s i b l e hand,' and the actual s i t u a t i o n of r e a l s o c i a l arrangements to which the anarchist objects, Nozick introduces the notion of 'hypothetical h i s t o r i e s . ' Nozick's claim i s that while the r e a l history may have included interference with the rights of individuals, those interferences were not necessary to achieve the minimal state. It i s inevitable, according to Nozick, that the minimal state he i s describing would arise even i n the s i t u a t i o n where there was no interference with ind i v i d u a l s . Therefore, while the hypothetical h i s t o r y of the emergence of the minimal state may never have occurred, since i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to explain the inevitable emergence of a just state, i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to j u s t i f y the state. According to Nozick, t h i s kind of argument should convince the anarchist that a s a t i s f a c t o r y minimal state can e x i s t . In order to e s t a b l i s h the need for protective associations i t i s necessary to accept that individuals do not always act morally. If they did, the need for protective associations would never arise since there would never be an i n f r a c t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Once the imperfection of individuals i s acknowledged and the case i s made for the existence of protective associations, the need to force everyone to join emerges. Once he has established the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the dominant protective association, Nozick must provide another argument to prevent the association from try i n g to ensure the complete security of i t s members by forcing everyone to subscribe to i t . Nozick. uses a strategy which he c a l l s 'side-constraint'. (Nozick 1974, pp.30-1) This concept of moral side-constraint combines Nozick's sense of the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of individuals with the Kantian idea of treating persons, not only as means, but also as ends unto themselves. To i l l u s t r a t e the 36 meaning of 'side-constraint' Nozick equates the using of something as a means with the using of something as a t o o l . He argues that i f there are constraints put on the use of a tool p r o h i b i t i n g i t s use for certain things, i t does not make sense to consider i t to be a to o l to do those prohibited things unless the constraints can be overridden. The moral side-constraint i s not overrideable. The moral side-constraint invoked by Nozick i s the pr o h i b i t i o n against v i o l a t i o n of others rights while i n pursuit of one's own goals. This i s a side-constraint rather than a moral goal because i t constrains behavior with respect to any goal. The basis for Nozick's side-constraint i s the fact of our separate existences. Nozick contends that once we accept that there are only i n d i v i d u a l people with t h e i r own, personal l i v e s , then there can be "no moral balancing act" (Nozick 1974, p.33) which w i l l allow interference with an ind i v i d u a l for some "greater s o c i a l good." (Nozick 1974, p.33) Nozick's case i s complete once the moral side-constraint i s adopted. The second and t h i r d sections of his book are extended arguments against the p o s s i b i l i t y of there being anything more extensive than the minimal state. Each case considered i s defeated by some var i a t i o n on the fact that anything more extensive than the minimal state results i n a v i o l a t i o n of indi v i d u a l r i g h t s . The ways i n which Nozick's strong formulation of in d i v i d u a l rights i s used reveals some properties of the moral side-constraint which I contend demonstrate the need for a re-consideration of the entry point into the realm of entitlements. While he i s not e x p l i c i t about children and what they 37 possess, Nozick seems to assume that each person starts i n the state of nature. Those i n the state of nature have l i f e , health, l i b e r t y and possessions. According to Locke, these possessions are e n t i r e l y under the control of the possessor. There are two notions which Nozick uses to elaborate the meaning of an individual's possessions - that of 'hooks' and of 'shares.' In my opinion Nozick's entitlement theory has a serious gap with respect to children. An examination of his use of the notions of hooks and shares i n the next chapter w i l l reveal the l o g i c a l necessity of some condition which w i l l ensure that children are allowed access to the realm of entitlements from a meaningful entry point. The notion of 'hooks' i s introduced i n Nozick's discussion concerning rights of individuals to engage i n relationships and transactions. (Nozick 1974, p.264-5) Nozick claims that these kinds of rights have hooks i n them. In order for a person to be able to carry out his right to engage i n a relationship or transaction, i t i s necessary that someone else has decided to exercise a matching right to engage i n that same relationship or transaction. Simply stated, I am unable to be friends with someone i f there i s no-one available who wants to be my friend. Even though Nozick expresses reservations about his analysis of the structure of rights related to voluntary exchanges, i t i s obvious that some notion l i k e that of 'hooked' rights i s required for an explanation of rights that are dyadic. Another notion introduced by Nozick i n his hypothetical h i s t o r y for the more-than-minimal state i s that of each person's possession of rights as being equivalent to his possession of 38 shares i n the rights of other individuals. (Nozick 1974, pp.280-292) In t h i s weird t a l e , Nozick depicts the democratic state as a demoktesis, a system of ownership of the people. In the process of the evolution of the demoktesis, i t i s necessary to allow for a p a r t i t i o n i n g and voluntary r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Although Nozick's purpose i n t e l l i n g t h i s repulsive t a l e of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of our s o c i a l arrangements must ce r t a i n l y be to s t a r t l e his readers into the eventual rejection of the l i b e r a l view, i t i s nonetheless, he holds, a just t a l e and therefore the democratic state portrayed i s a just state. The imagery of the stock market i s u t i l i z e d to describe the s e l l i n g , s p l i t t i n g and accumulating of rights as shares. According to the economic metaphor, i t i s possible to consider rights themselves as objects available for disposal- according to Nozick's entitlement p r i n c i p l e s . It i s therefore possible to acquire rights to which no-one else has l a i d claim. It i s possible to transfer rights to other persons. F i n a l l y , i t i s necesary to compensate individuals who have l o s t rights due to unjust interferences. Although i t would be preferable to avoid pressing Nozick on t h i s argument (Williams 1983, p.30) i t i s necessary to seriously consider his story of 'voluntary slavery. 1 Once i t i s accepted that rights can be treated i n the same way as any other possessions, then i t i s possible to consider giving them a l l away. If a person has v o l u n t a r i l y given away a l l his rights, then he i s i n a position of voluntary slavery. If i n the process of giving away rights, the person has acquired shares i n everyone else's rights, then the society becomes an association of mutually voluntary slaves. When a new member seeks entry i t i s necessary to recalculate, or r e - s p l i t each individual's share i n each of th e i r rights i n order to ensure that the 'slavery' i s s t i l l mutual. Because t h i s i s the only point i n his argument where Nozick seriously considers the possessions of children upon t h e i r emergence from the 'state of nature' i t i s necessary for me to consider the notions of shares and s p l i t t i n g of shares i n order to determine how Nozick's p r i n c i p l e s apply to children's entitlements. That investigation w i l l occupy a portion of the next chapter. 2.4. L i b e r a l Position from Rawls The L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n i s represented by the systematic elaboration of justice as fairness i n John Rawls' book A Theory of Ju s t i c e . (Rawls 1971) The following statements characterize the kind of s o c i a l arrangement that results from an application of Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e : 1. Each person possesses an i n v i o l a b i l i t y founded on ju s t i c e . 2. The p r i n c i p l e s of justice are determined i n a hypothetical s i t u a t i o n by persons who are characterized by the i r r a t i o n a l i t y and t h e i r lack of knowledge of th e i r own i n d i v i d u a l i t y . 3. Because decisions on the p r i n c i p l e s of justice are made so that they w i l l be f a i r , they are patterned. The differences between Rawls and Nozick are apparent from the s t a r t . Rawls' purpose i s to establish that the aim of any theory of justice must be to define a plausible general theory that confirms most of our ordinary judgments of what i s just. 40 In contrast to the explorative work of Nozick, Rawls' work i s an attempt to introduce certain simplifying devices into the general framework of the t r a d i t i o n a l s o c i a l contract theory. The purpose of using these devices i s to eliminate the d i f f i c u l t i e s that give r i s e to the u t i l i t a r i a n version of that theory. In t h i s section of my paper I w i l l attempt to highlight some of Rawls 'simplifying devices.' Rawls contends that the conception of justice as fairness best approximates our judgments of justice and therefore constitutes the most appropriate basis for our democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s . Rawls' conception of justice i s obviously a normative one. He conceives of goodness as characterized by deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y , plans for one's l i f e , and self-respect. In order to ensure the existence of the i n s t i t u t i o n s required to achieve goodness through s o c i a l arrangements, Rawls considers i t necessary to have a stable, well-ordered society established on the p r i n c i p l e s of equality. Rawls' argument starts with the establishment of the hypothetical s i t u a t i o n of the 'or i g i n a l position' which i s constructed i n such a way as to guarantee that the p r i n c i p l e s established by the people i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n (the POP'S) w i l l be the p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness, the p r i n c i p l e s which est a b l i s h the basic structure of society. The basic structure of the Rawlsian society i s that structure of i n s t i t u t i o n s which accomplishes the d i s t r i b u t i o n of essential rights and duties. Included among Rawls' major i n s t i t u t i o n s i s at least one component of the i n s t i t u t i o n of c h i l d - r a i s i n g , the monogamous family. (Rawls 1971, p.7) 41 The next phase i n Rawls' argument i s his establishment of the p r i n c i p l e s of justice which the POP would derive from behind' the v e i l of ignorance. The general conception of the p r i n c i p l e s of j ustice for i n s t i t u t i o n s i s that the primary s o c i a l goods of l i b e r t y , opportunity, income, wealth and the basis of self-respect, are to be di s t r i b u t e d equally. The only exceptions to equal d i s t r i b u t i o n allowed are those i n which an unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n i s to the advantage of the least favored. (Rawls 1971, p.302) An examination of the kinds of people that are behind the v e i l of ignorance reveals the power of Rawls' device of the 'original p o s i t i o n . ' The o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n i s a forum for the deliberations of r a t i o n a l persons i n a s i t u a t i o n of complete equality. In order to ensure the appropriate status quo for these persons i t i s necessary to l i m i t the knowledge they are permitted to have i n the o r i g i n a l p osition to that which w i l l permit f a i r agreements to be reached. Once the l i m i t s imposed by the v e i l of ignorance are understood i t i s possible to ascertain the p r i n c i p l e s which would emerge from the r a t i o n a l deliberations of the POP. Because of th i s Rawls claims that there i s a link between his theory of ju s t i c e and the theory of r a t i o n a l choice. Rawls lays out the nature of the v e i l of ignorance with care. (Rawls 1971, pp.136-142) The information allowed behind the v e i l of ignorance i s only that which i s required for the POP to know that t h e i r society i s governed by the circumstances of justice and the implications of j u s t i c e . In order to appreciate an important difference between 42 Nozick and Rawls i t i s necessary to consider the element of 'changes over time.' Using his h i s t o r i c a l approach, Nozick assumes that by programming the machine with his p r i n c i p l e s of acquisi t i o n , transfer, and compensation and setting i t i n motion i n the midst of s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t individuals, the re s u l t w i l l be a just state with the minimum of interference with individuals. A l l transactions w i l l of course be recorded on the machine and w i l l only be allowed i f they are according to the programmed p r i n c i p l e s . At any time the action may be frozen and by reading the memory of the machine i t i s possible to show that a l l transactions are just and, as a res u l t , the society i s just. Any adjustment to the p r i n c i p l e s would be unjust unless i t resulted i n the same d i s t r i b u t i o n . P r i n c i p l e s cannot be changed without great r i s k because, i f after a l l transactions have occurred a p r i n c i p l e i s changed i n such a way that i t s use would have resulted i n a d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n , then the transactions that had gone on before would be unjust and the resultant society would be unjust. Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s on the other hand, use an i t e r a t i v e approach, moving towards the s a t i s f a c t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s that can be derived by the POP. Since access to the o r i g i n a l p o sition i s not closed o f f i t i s possible to imagine returning to i t as long as i t i s possible to imagine stepping behind the appropriate v e i l of ignorance. As the limited knowledge that i s permitted behind the v e i l can change, hopefully improving as the p r i n c i p l e s are implemented, i t i s possible that the p r i n c i p l e s of justice derived by la t e r POP w i l l also change. Rawls embeds the procedure for the readjustment of 'holdings' i n thi s process. It i s i n the return 43 to the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n that the members of the society are able to make the required adjustments i n a series of i t e r a t i v e approximations. Nozick, on the other, hand, expects the p r i n c i p l e of compensation to carry the f u l l weight of correction of misallocations. And yet the p r i n c i p l e of compensation depends upon a comparison of the allocations for two p a r t i c u l a r people. Nozick concedes that such a comparison may not be just even though the society i s considered just. There i s another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of those behind the v e i l of ignorance which i s espe c i a l l y important i n my considerations of the p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g that can be derived from Rawls' general theory. Following Rousseau (The Social Contract, bk. II, ch. IV, par. 5) Rawls i n s i s t s that whatever a person's "temporal position, each i s forced to choose for everyone." (Rawls 1971, p.140) This r e s t r i c t i o n i s accomplished through the imposition of the v e i l of ignorance. The POP must be concerned about both t h e i r generation and the i r off-springs' generation even though they are not aware of which generation they belong to. Given these r e s t r i c t i o n s i t i s Rawls' contention that the p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness necessarily emerge from the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . The second part of A Theory of Justice consists of a description of a possible s o c i a l arrangement which s a t i s f i e s the pri n c i p l e s of justice as fairness. The s o c i a l arrangement selected by Rawls i s that of a con s t i t u t i o n a l democracy. In the process of investigating the i n s t i t u t i o n a l requirements of justice as fairness, Rawls c l a r i f i e s the p r i o r i t y rules covering 44 the p r i n c i p l e s . The f i r s t p r i o r i t y rule establishes the p r i o r i t y of l i b e r t y from the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e . The second p r i o r i t y rule governs the order of application of the second p r i n c i p l e of justice which establishes the basis of s o c i a l and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s of the primary goods. It establishes the p r i o r i t y of justice over e f f i c i e n c y and welfare. (2-3) Rawls accomplishes two tasks with the second part of the book. F i r s t , he establishes the content of the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . Second, he demonstrates that his pi n c i p l e s of justice prescribe a workable p o l i t i c a l conception which i s consistent with our considered judgments of j u s t i c e . The f i n a l part of Rawls' work i s concerned with locating the source of the theory of justice i n human thought, fe e l i n g and aspirations. His strategy i s to argue from the fact of moral psychology and from what he takes to be the process of acqui s i t i o n of the sentiment of justice to the conclusion that goodness i s r a t i o n a l . Another conclusion from t h i s part of Rawls' argument i s that i n the circumstances of a well-ordered society justice and goodness are congruent. Furthermore, because the theory of justice as fairness i s linked with the s o c i a l values and the communal good of our society, to the extent that our society i s a well-ordered society i t i s a stable society. Rawls has thus argued from the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n which he has defined i n such a way that i t i s consistent with what we already accept as reasonable i n our conduct with each other. He has presented the i n s t i t u t i o n s necessary for the well-ordered society. F i n a l l y he has demonstrated the consistency of the p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness with our considered judgments 45 and actual s o c i a l arrangements. Rawls claims that the res u l t i s a perspective on the human sit u a t i o n which permits the r a t i o n a l derivation of a set of action-guiding p r i n c i p l e s which permit everyone to s t r i v e for t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l goals while affirming the same regulative scheme. 2.5. Comparison of Positions I w i l l now address a pair of questions. F i r s t , are Nozick and Rawls as far apart as i s suggested by Ennis's analysis of the Conservative and L i b e r a l position? Second, does the knowledge of the boundaries of j u s t i f i a b l e interference which emerges from Nozick's "strong formulation of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s " and the extensive interference allowed by Rawls' basic structure provide any action guiding p r i n c i p l e s for r a i s i n g children i n a society that operates from both the Conservative and the L i b e r a l positions? This second question requires the analysis of the next two chapters before an answer i s possible. Ennis suggests that the controversies that arise between those i n the Conservative position and those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n are "about buried value judgment(s) that one makes i n applying the concept 'to have an opportunity.'" (Ennis 1974, p.9) As a r e s u l t of Nozick's strong formulation of i n d i v i d u a l rights i n which he takes the p o s i t i o n that the group can have no more power than any i n d i v i d u a l , i t can be concluded that Nozick holds that the i n d i v i d u a l must possess a l l the available resources necessary to c a p i t a l i z e on any p a r t i c u l a r opportunity. In the story of Jack and J i l l , the engineering school candidates of Ennis' Case B (2-4), J i l l ' s apparent lack of motivation i s 46 not a s i g n i f i c a n t issue for the Conservative. If the family or school put pressure on J i l l , i n an attempt to motivate her, Nozick would have to conclude that t h i s i s an interference. The group i s attempting to exert more power on J i l l than she can exert on herself - a clear infringement of Nozick's strong formulation of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . The Conservative value judgments related to 'having an opportunity' are a d i r e c t r e s u l t of the Conservative view concerning neutral s o c i a l arrangements with clear p r i o r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l over any group. For the Conservative po s i t i o n , as represented by Nozick, the necessary conditions for having an opportunity are as follows. F i r s t , from the r i g h t of association the s o c i a l arrangement which includes the opportunity can be created by the i n d i v i d u a l . Second, from the strong formulation of i n d i v i d u a l rights the i n d i v i d u a l can decide to accept or reject the opportunity without interference from in d i v i d u a l or c o l l e c t i v e others. Thus in J i l l ' s case, from the Conservative perspective i t was possible for her to ignore her father's discouraging words and pursue the quest for the iron ring. The s o c i a l arrangement she would have to create would be one where her relationship with her father was d i f f e r e n t , where her locus of a c t i v i t y was di f f e r e n t , and where her associates were d i f f e r e n t from that of being a housewife. Her decision would be made in an environment void of any p a t e r n a l i s i t i c interference. As an i n d i v i d u a l free from any interference of the kind prohibited by the moral side-constraint posed by Nozick, J i l l i n the process of choosing either end-state f u l f i l l s her destiny as an i n d i v i d u a l as long as the moral side constraint i s upheld. 47 The L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n takes the opposite view with respect to the significance of s o c i a l arrangements resu l t i n g i n groups. Once a group i s created by a s o c i a l arrangement that group acquires special power to act upon the i n d i v i d u a l . This i s c l e a r l y seen i n Rawls' argument establishing a 'sense of one's own worth' as a primary good. (2-5) Those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n not only hold that the existence of some kind of s o c i a l arrangement that results i n a group i s necessary, but that i t i s s u f f i c i e n t to establish power greater than that which any ind i v i d u a l can possess. This fact opens the way for the s h i f t of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y from the ind i v i d u a l to the group of which the indi v i d u a l i s a member. Those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n derive from Rawls' second p r i n c i p l e a set of conditions for the holding of an opportunity. F i r s t , any inequality that results from the holding of an opportunity must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged. Second, the o f f i c e s and positions which J r e s u l t i n s o c i a l and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s must be open to a l l under conditions of f a i r equality of opportunity. For J i l l of Ennis' Case B, t h i s means i f the opportunity to attend engineering school resulted i n s o c i a l and economic inequality, there must be an e f f o r t to ensure that she has a f a i r equality of opportunity. If her father's lack of support i s taken as an indicatio n that J i l l i s i n a position of lesser opportunity, then any measures which are taken by the school of engineering to favor some candidates must resu l t i n an enhancement of J i l l ' s opportunities over Jack's. Since the second p r i n c i p l e of justice i s l e x i c a l l y p r i o r to the p r i n c i p l e of e f f i c i e n c y (2-6) then consideration of Jack's being disadvantaged by the 48 improvement of J i l l ' s circumstances can only be considered after J i l l ' s opportunities have been enhanced. Given these descriptions of the Conservative and L i b e r a l positions, as represented by Nozick and Rawls respectively, i t seems clear that they are i n fact as far apart as Ennis suggests. The point of t h i s essay i s to go around behind the respective p o l i t i c a l philosophies and to investigate how the interferences of c h i l d - r a i s i n g can be j u s t i f i e d using the same premises that are used to j u s t i f y interference i n general. This i s the task I w i l l undertake i n the next two chapters. The re s u l t of t h i s re-examination of the divergent j u s t i f i c a t i o n s of interference i n our society w i l l be the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of what appear to be the general boundaries of j u s t i f i a b l e interferences related to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . 2.6. Reconsideration of Relevant Aspects At the beginning of t h i s chapter I suggested three conditions for the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of action-guiding p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s for democratic s o c i e t i e s . It i s now possible to consider the extent to which Nozick and Rawls s a t i s f y those requirements. The f i r s t requirement I posed was that of the reasonableness and morality of the p r i n c i p l e s . As one would expect both Nozick and Rawls bu i l d t h e i r positions on the premise that s o c i a l arrangements necessarily imply that there are obligations to behave i n certain ways. The basis for those obligations as argued by Nozick and Rawls are, however, d i f f e r e n t . Nozick argues that people generally do what they are supposed to do. Because people w i l l generally follow the moral 49 rules, or side-constraints, i t can be expected that the obligations imposed by i n d i v i d u a l rights w i l l be met. According to Nozick i t i s unreasonable to assume that the obligations implied by i n d i v i d u a l rights could exist and not be generally followed. For those i n the L i b e r a l position, however, i t i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of a serious interference with individual rights which j u s t i f i e s both the existence of the state and the interferences with the 'free market' mechanism within which in d i v i d u a l rights f l o u r i s h . (Sampson 1978, p.96) Although the reasons presented by Nozick and Rawls r e s u l t i n what appear to be contradictory conclusions, i t appears that the resultant p r i n c i p l e s are both reasonable and moral. The second condition I posed for the a c c e p t a b i l i t y of a set of j u s t i f i c a t o r y p r i n c i p l e s was that they convey the importance of the i n d i v i d u a l and the significance we place on the rights of each i n d i v i d u a l . Obviously the p r i n c i p l e s of the Nozickean world meet t h i s requirement. There are, however, those such as Nozick who would argue that Rawls p r i n c i p l e s are i n error to the extent that they permit overiding of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Nozick asks "why (would) individuals i n the o r i g i n a l position choose a p r i n c i p l e that focusses upon groups rather than individuals?" (Nozick 1974, p.190) Through analysis of Rawls' derivation of the basic structure (2-7) Nozick concludes that the problem of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice i s limited to the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the results of the production of " j o i n t s o c i a l cooperation." (Nozick 1974, p.186) Further, Nozick asks, "Why does s o c i a l cooperation create the problem of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice? Would there be no 50 problem of justice and no need of a theory .of ju s t i c e , i f there was no s o c i a l cooperation at a l l , i f each person got his share s o l e l y by his own e f f o r t s ? " (Nozick 1974, p.185) Nozick's argument with Rawls' position concerning groups and the products of s o c i a l cooperation i s understandable i n l i g h t of his insistence that there was no possible case to be made for an asymmetry of power i n favor of groups. Nozick proposes an alternative to what he takes to be the s o c i a l ordering which must accompany any attempt to have a patterned d i s t r i b u t i o n . (Nozick 1974, p.165) As he says, "Individual rights are co-possible; each person may exercise his rights as he chooses. The exercise of these rights fixes some features of the world. Within the constraints of these fixed features a choice may be made by a s o c i a l choice mechanism based upon a s o c i a l ordering; i f there are any choices l e f t to make!" (Nozick 1974, p.166) It i s the establishment of a just 'social choice mechanism' that concerns Rawls. Rawls r e l i e s on the premise that i t i s possible to pre-determine the p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness without losing the sense of i n d i v i d u a l i t y and in d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . In fact Rawls' claim i s the stronger one that i f we do not establish those p r i n c i p l e s i n the o r i g i n a l position, then we ri s k losing some of our ind i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Again i t seems that despite d i f f e r e n t conclusions, both Nozick and Rawls have s a t i s f i e d the requirement of recognizing individuals and indi v i d u a l rights of some kind. The l a s t condition I posed for the acc e p t a b i l i t y of the pr i n c i p l e s used to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements of our society i s the necessity for some continuity processes to be embedded i n the j u s t i f i c a t o r y system. Continuity processes can be of two types. The f i r s t type i s aimed at avoiding random or extreme fluctuations i n holdings, positions or status of ind i v i d u a l s . The second type i s concerned with the extension of related s o c i a l arrangements over successive generations. Cl e a r l y Nozick's entitlement theory ensures that there w i l l be no involuntary adjustments, extreme or otherwise, i n the possessions of ind i v i d u a l s . Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness which govern re d i s t r i b u t i o n s determine a pattern that i s not random even though they allow for fluctuations i n the possessions of individuals i n order to ensure that the least well-off are provided with the primary goods. Rawls provides s p e c i f i c a l l y for the extension of the well-ordered society over the generations. There i s some ambiguity i n Nozick's arguments as to how the entitlement theory operates between generations. I w i l l make some s p e c i f i c comments i n the next chapter as to how Nozick must be interpreted i n order to eliminate t h i s ambiguity. Again i t appears that despite t h e i r d i f f e r e n t conclusions, Nozick and Rawls have presented j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems which s a t i s f y my continuity requirement. The existence of such diverse systems of p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of the s o c i a l arrangements i s not surprising. In fact, i t i s i n an examination of the points of c o n f l i c t and congruence that i t i s possible to i d e n t i f y the causes of the tensions that occur i n the p o l i c y deliberations which define the i n s t i t u t i o n s required by our s o c i a l arrangements. For example, i f those i n the Conservative p o s i t i o n p r o h i b i t interference with the i n d i v i d u a l , how i s i t possible to carry out the f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g actions necessary for the endowment of opportunities to children? Once i t i s acknowledged that some intimate provider of opportunities can i n t e r f e r e with children, then the question arises as to whether i t i s possible for someone else to i n t e r f e r e with the intimate provider on behalf of what that other person (or remote provider) takes to be i n the c h i l d ' s i n t e r e s t . The d i f f i c u l t y i n resolving t h i s tension i s evident i n the p o l i c y deliberations about juvenile and family law, school and parent r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s i n curriculum determination, c h i l d advocacy and c h i l d custody among other things. The r e s u l t of my contention that i t must be possible to interpret a general j u s t i f i c a t o r y system i n such a way that the p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are clear and consistent with the general action-guiding p r i n c i p l e s of the society, i s that the tensions experienced i n p o l i c y deliberations about the treatment of children, arise from the tensions between the d i f f e r e n t j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems being invoked. Therefore i n order to resolve the p o l i c y debate i t i s necessary to be clear as to the locus of the t h e o r e t i c a l disagreement between the competing systems which are being used to j u s t i f y the basic s o c i a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . 53 Notes on Chapter Two 2-1 The notions of L i b e r a l Position and Conservative Position are taken from Ennis. (Ennis 1976, p.8) The use of Rawls and Nozick as representatives of each of these positions was suggested by Dr. J. Coombs. The use to which I have put these notions and suggestions i s , of course, my r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . 2-2 Nozick does not consider the rights of the owners, share holders, and managers of the protective association. Clearly, someone must be the f i r s t to seize the opportunity of st a r t i n g the f i r s t protective association. What an entitlement to a protective association means to Nozick i s anything but clear. 2-3 Second P r i o r i t y Rule "The second p r i n c i p l e of justice i s l e x i c a l l y p r i o r to the p r i n c i p l e of e f f i c i e n c y and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and f a i r opportunity i s p r i o r to the difference p r i n c i p l e . There are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity; (b) an excessive rate of savings must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing t h i s hardship." (Rawls 1971, p.302) 2-4 see note (1-7) for Ennis' cases. 54 2-5 Rawls describes the primary goods as the basis of one's expectations. (Rawls 1971, pp.90-95) The primary goods f a l l into the broad categories of rights and l i b e r t i e s , opportunities and powers, income and wealth. It i s i n the s a t i s f a c t i o n of these primary goods within the context of a person's r a t i o n a l long-term plan of l i f e that the good and happiness can be achieved. 2-6 The f i r s t part of Rawls' second p r i n c i p l e of justice i s i n fact equivalent to the Pareto Optimality Condition. Rawls has substituted the term e f f i c i e n c y for optimality. (Rawls 1971, pp.66-7) "Social and economic i n e q u a l i t i e s are to be arranged so that they are ... to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings p r i n c i p l e , . . . " (Rawls 1971, p.302) An e f f i c i e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n i s thus defined as one where there exists no possible r e d i s t r i b u t i o n that improves one person's circumstance without another being disadvantaged, (see note 2-3) 2-7 Nozick on the l i m i t s of Rawls: "One in d i c a t i o n of the stringency of Rawls 1 difference p r i n c i p l e ... i s i t s inappropriateness as a governing p r i n c i p l e even within a family of individuals who love one another." (Nozick 1974, p.167) 55 CHAPTER THREE CHILD-RAISING UNDER NOZICK 3.1. Focus of Analysis of Nozick Does a strong formulation of ind i v i d u a l rights apply equally to adults and children? If i t does, what j u s t i f i c a t i o n can be given for the interferences with children which arise i n the course of c h i l d - r a i s i n g ? In t h i s chapter I seek answers to these questions by reinterpreting Nozick's explanatory account of the emergence of the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n from the state of nature as presented i n Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Nozick 1974). Rather than using Nozick's perspective of the person with holdings and positions j u s t l y acquired, I take the perspective of the person being raised from childhood who has no possessions other than those received from some generous adult employing the p r i n c i p l e of transfer. (Nozick 1974, p.151) In the process of this examination I s t r i v e to be consistent with the p r i n c i p l e s and arguments used by Nozick (3-1). Given Nozick's emphasis on the i n d i v i d u a l within the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n there i s no need for a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of my t a c t i c of focussing attention on a s p e c i f i c kind of in d i v i d u a l - the c h i l d . There i s , however, a need to j u s t i f y the course of my argument since i t does not follow the same path as Nozick's. Nozick's plan for arguing the case for the minimal state i s 56 that of building, piece by piece, the story of how the state grew from the 'state of nature' to a s o c i a l arrangement involving the least possible interference with i n d i v i d u a l s . The pr i n c i p l e s invoked by Nozick are p r i n c i p l e s which are used to j u s t i f y actual entitlements to holdings and positions. Nozick's i n v i s i b l e hand mechanism i s taken to be responsible for creating the state. Nozick uses the i n v i s i b l e hand explanation to emphasize the lack of u n i f i e d intention to create the s o c i a l arrangement that evolves when individuals are engaged i n the pursuit of the ownership of holdings and positions according to the p r i n c i p l e s of entitlement. In the f i n a l analysis, according to Nozick, there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for an asymmetry of power between the in d i v i d u a l and the group which can be used to j u s t i f y the appropriation of an individual's just entitlements . My plan for interpreting Nozick i n terms of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i s to make the assumption that the strong formulation of ind i v i d u a l rights used by Nozick applies to children, and then to ask the question - how does an in d i v i d u a l enter into the just history of the society? The t a c t i c I w i l l use to answer t h i s question i s to range through Anarchy, State, and Utopia, extracting sections of Nozick's argument, ensuring that the extraction does not di s t o r t the significance of the p r i n c i p l e s being invoked, and reconstructing an argument i n the way I think Nozick would i f he were to systematically address the question of children's rights with respect to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . By examining l o g i c a l relationships between various pairs of concepts such as the ind i v i d u a l and the group, entitlement and aggression, and re d i s t r i b u t i o n and compensation, from the perspective of the 57 person being raised from childhood, I w i l l attempt to c l a r i f y the Nozickean p r i n c i p l e s governing i n d i v i d u a l rights so that children are included. This interpretive analysis w i l l also i d e n t i f y more p r e c i s e l y the locus of the empirical and value questions raised by Ennis within the context of Nozick 1s r e l a t i v e l y complete presentation of the Conservative p o s i t i o n . I w i l l also attempt to c l a r i f y Nozick's entitlement theory to show that Nozick can be understood i n such a way as to allow for the f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g actions required by the c h i l d r a i s e r endowing the c h i l d with opportunities. I have also proposed a tentative solution a r i s i n g from a further c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Nozick's p r i n c i p l e of compensation which make allowance for what I c a l l a 'clause of adjustment.' This clause of adjustment permits children to i n s i s t that they must pa r t i c i p a t e i n some kind of intimate relationship so that an opportunity for the exercise of the p r i n c i p l e of transfer to them w i l l a r i s e . In a sense th i s clause i s feeble i n that the existence of an intimate relationship does not ensure a transfer of holdings or positions, e s p e c i a l l y since I am not proposing that there w i l l be any power created for individuals or groups because of the existence of the relationship. However, i n another sense, the introduction of the r i g h t of the c h i l d to make a claim because of her deprived p o s i t i o n can be seen as too powerful since i t introduces the p o s s i b i l i t y of a pattern of d i s t r i b u t i o n . In my opinion the problem that exists without my proposed ' c l a r i f i c a t i o n ' of the p r i n c i p l e of compensation and the crack that i t introduces i n Nozick's formulation of i n d i v i d u a l rights locates a s i g n i f i c a n t inconsistency i n the 58 Conservative p o s i t i o n . It i s only through a consideration of the derivation of the p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g from Conservative p o l i t i c a l philosophy that i t i s possible to explore t h i s inconsistency. 3.2. Nozick's Worrisome Points The main intent of thi s essay i s not to take up Nozick's general t h e o r e t i c a l 'worries.' It i s necessary, however, to be aware of what Nozick i d e n t i f i e s as 'sensitive' points i n order to ensure that i n the attempt to id e n t i f y the connections between h i s general t h e o r e t i c a l points and the interferences required i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g , I d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the points which Nozick claims are securely based and his 'points of worry.' As much as possible I w i l l follow Nozick's assumptions. Nozick reassures us that "at those p a r t i c u l a r points i n my arguments, t r a n s i t i o n s , assumptions and so forth, where I f e e l the s t r a i n , I t r y to comment, or at least draw the reader's attention to what makes me uneasy." (Nozick 1974, p.xiv) Since i t i s at a point where Nozick 'feels the s t r a i n ' that I propose the introduction of a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of compensation I am reasonably confident that Nozick would allow my reconsideration of his po s i t i o n . Nozick i d e n t i f i e s three general t h e o r e t i c a l 'worries.' F i r s t , he points out that there i s no precise theory of the moral basis of in d i v i d u a l rights even though the non-infringement of ind i v i d u a l rights forms the basis of his argument. Like Nozick, I w i l l assume that there i s some moral basis for ind i v i d u a l rights which could be developed given time. 59 Second, Nozick makes no statement or j u s t i f i c a t i o n of a theory of r e t r i b u t i v e punishment. Since my concern i s with a special form of compensation which i s required for the benefit of the less well-off, not with r e t r i b u t i v e punishment of children, t h i s worry can be ignored for the time being. Third, Nozick's argument lacks a precise statement of the p r i n c i p l e s of the t r i p a r t i t e theory of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . This i s a major snag i n unravelling the p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g within a Nozickean state. It i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s d i f f i c u l t y which requires me to engage in a rather roundabout discussion of children i n the "More-Than-Minimal-State" (Nozick 1974, p.280) It would be in t e r e s t i n g to determine the extent to which i t i s possible to have the child/intimate provider/remote provider t r i a d without some kind of t r i p a r t i t e theory of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . However, i n t h i s chapter, I am only concerned with establishing that there must at least be the opportunity for a b i p a r t i t e theory of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e to be invoked within the confines of the intimate relationship required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . The importance to Nozick's po s i t i o n of the symmetry of power between the i n d i v i d u a l and the group prohibits any attempt to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the power possessed by the intimate and remote providers. As w i l l be seen in the next chapter, which considers the p o s s i b i l i t y of an asymmetry of power between the two kinds of providers, the a b i l i t y for the group to have power over any i n d i v i d u a l i s only s i g n i f i c a n t where the i n d i v i d u a l i s not making r a t i o n a l choices. 60 In the remainder of t h i s chapter I w i l l present an analysis that i s intended to demonstrate that the Conservative position necessarily includes a mechanism for allowing a less well-off person to establish a relationship with another person i n such a way that there w i l l be a r e - d i s t r i b u t i o n . The new d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l be a better approximation of the d i s t r i b u t i o n indicated by the hypothetical story that has been used to j u s t i f y the society. To that extent i t w i l l be a patterned d i s t r i b u t i o n . 3.3. History and Fable Nozick argues i n favor of establishing that a s o c i a l arrangement i s just through the use of hypothetical h i s t o r i e s . Since some questions which arise concerning Nozick's arguments give r i s e to the p o s s i b i l i t y of a d i f f e r e n t hypothetical history, i t i s necessary to understand the p o s s i b i l i t i e s that arise from Nozick's use of the ' h i s t o r i c a l ' explanation. There are three possible relationships between an ' h i s t o r i c a l ' explanation and the actual society to which the story i s applied. The f i r s t relationship i s that where the r e a l h i s t o r y of an actual society i s just. In t h i s case, the actual society i s also just to the extent that the p r i n c i p l e s used to determine the h i s t o r y are just. In the Nozickean society the p r i n c i p l e s which determine the justness of a h i s t o r y are the following three p r i n c i p l e s : 1. The p r i n c i p l e of a c q u i s i t i o n - where a holding has been acquired by appropriating an unheld thing, the receiving person i s e n t i t l e d to the holding. 2. The p r i n c i p l e of transfer - a person may transfer 61 t h e i r entitlement to a holding to another person. 3. The p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e justice - a d i s t r i b u t i o n i s just i f everyone i s e n t i t l e d to the holdings they possess. (Nozick 1974, pp.150-3) Clearly, where the actual history of a society has followed these p r i n c i p l e s , i t necessarily has as just a d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings and positions as i t ever had. I take i t that Nozick"s claim i s that a society with a just d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings and positions i s necessarily a just society. The st a r t i n g point for the consideration of an h i s t o r i c a l explanation i s that hypothetical point before which there were no transactions - the state of nature. According to Nozick's argument, i f a society i s as just as the state of nature then i t i s necessarily just. The second relationship suggested by Nozick i s the one where i t i s not possible to even imagine a story that explains an actual society that maintains Nozick's p r i n c i p l e of d i s t r i b u t i v e j u s t i c e . Since i t i s clear that such a society cannot be as just as the state of nature i t i s also clear that i t i s not a just society. Nozick presents the t h i r d possible relationship as follows: "More complicated are the cases where the actual history of a society i s unjust yet some hypothetical just history could have led to i t s current structure (though not perhaps to the p a r t i c u l a r d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings or positions under i t ) . " (Nozick 1974, p.293) Before examining the relationship between hypothetical h i s t o r y and actual s o c i a l arrangements posed by Nozick i n th i s l a s t possible relationship i t i s important to look behind the 62 statement to locate a reason for his putting so much emphasis on the h i s t o r y of entitlements. Nozick must be operating from the assumption that i t i s possible to determine a history of entitlements for a given society. The history of entitlements can only be an accumulation of reports about episodes involving i n d i v i d u a l s . A hypothetical history, therefore, can be nothing more than a story with an ending that approximates the actual state of a society and which uses episodes that are consistent with Nozick's basic p r i n c i p l e s . If the actual episodes involving r e a l individuals v i o l a t e one of Nozick's p r i n c i p l e s then the f i r s t r elationship between an actual just history and the r e s u l t i n g society mentioned above does not hold since there i s an i n j u s t i c e i n the actual history of the society. If Nozick allows for another story that does not v i o l a t e his d i s t r i b u t i v e p r i n c i p l e to carry an equivalent weight to the actual story, the result i s two d i f f e r e n t explanations for the same episode. Since Nozick does not give examples of what he means by hypothetical history i t i s necessary to provide our own. The following i s an example: May has a beautiful diamond. The actual history i s that she stole i t from Mon. The hypothetical history i s that Mon gave her the diamond. This hypothetical story (and a l l the equivalent ones that are used to explain the society of May and Mon) are not s u f f i c i e n t to show that t h e i r society i s just. If Mon had decided to give the diamond to May, anyway, would t h e i r 'society' be just? To conclude that May's and Mon1s society i s just i s problematic. Nozick l i s t s a series of p r i n c i p l e s for deciding on the more 63 complicated case of the just hypothetical history overriding the unjust actual h i s t o r y . (Nozick 1974, pp.293-4) The f i r s t p r i n c i p l e holds that i f the differences between the just hypothetical story and the unjust actual history have had no s i g n i f i c a n t impact on the actual i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure, then the actual society i s e s s e n t i a l l y just. The second p r i n c i p l e concerns the consent of the members to the unjust aspect of the actual h i s t o r y . I f a l l persons who are subjected to a l i m i t a t i o n of t h e i r rights as a r e s u l t of the i n s t i t u t i o n a l structure consent then the actual society can be considered just. In the case where no consent i s required then the t h i r d p r i n c i p l e requires an evaluation of the process by which the structure could have arisen. If the possible process of development of the structure i s better than the actual pattern of development and i f the individuals who would be required to develop the structure i n the hypothetical way do not have to be unreasonably 'perfect', then the hypothetical story can be accepted. The t h i r d p r i n c i p l e , while not requiring the consent of individuals, can s t i l l be related to i n d i v i d u a l rights as s p e c i f i e d by the moral side-constraints i n force. As explained i n the previous chapter, the moral side-constraint i n force i n the Nozickean state arises from the recognition of our separate existences. (Nozick 1974, p.33) The moral side-constraint prohibits the s a c r i f i c i n g of one person for the benefit of another. (Nozick 1974, p.34) Nozick l i m i t s the scope of the side-constraint with which he i s concerned. " P o l i t i c a l philosophy i s concerned only with certain ways that persons may not use others; primarily p h y s i c a l l y aggressing 64 against them." (Nozick 1974, p.32) Using the "moral side-constraint" approach instead of an "end-state view", Nozick constructs an argument that leads him to proclaim the f u l l l i b e r t a r i a n constraint. (Nozick 1974, p.34) The f u l l l i b e r t a r i a n side-constraint, following from the root idea "that there are d i f f e r e n t individuals with separate l i v e s " (Nozick 1974, p.33) prohibits a l l aggression including p a t e r n a l i s t i c aggression against others. P a t e r n a l i s t i c aggression i s the use or threat of force for the benefit of the person against whom i t i s wielded. The l i b e r t a r i a n side-constraint e f f e c t i v e l y removes any basis for an interference with children by way of a physical aggression. However, the occurrence of physical aggression against children for the purposes of f a c i l i t a t i n g or i n h i b i t i n g the child's actions (not for the deviant purposes that generate true c h i l d abuse) i s generally accepted i n our society. In order to j u s t i f y such an interference we must either f a l l back on the venerable t r a d i t i o n of omitting children from the category of individuals (3-2), drop the l i b e r t a r i a n side-constraint on p a t e r n a l i s t i c aggression, or establish that some relationship exists which allows ' p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e ' actions without i n t e r f e r i n g with either party's rights to non-interference. It would, however, be preferable to establish a stronger claim -that i s that the rights of the recipient are being interfered with i f the ' p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e ' actions do not occur. The best I can propose i s a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Nozick's p r i n c i p l e of compensation which w i l l at least allow for an association for each c h i l d i n which an intimate, n o n - p o l i t i c a l structure can 65 function the purpose of which i s bringing the c h i l d to a point where 'consenting to the actual p o l i t i c a l structure' i s meaningful. Nozick's argument that our actions must be guided by the l i b e r t a r i a n side-constraint prohibits a l l aggression against others. (3-3) This seems contrary to our commonsense notion that c h i l d - r a i s i n g requires f a c i l i t a t i n g and i n h i b i t i n g actions which involve physical aggression. There i s another commonsense notion which must also be considered. We do not usually assume that children are born with t h e i r entitlement of possessions. Nor do we consider children to be capable of acquiring those possessions without some kind of assistance. If however, the hypothetical history which j u s t i f i e s our actual d i s t r i b u t i o n s must be the basis of the justice of our society i t must also be the basis of the allocations for future generations. The relationship between the hypothetical story or fable and the actual d i s t r i b u t i o n s i s not necessarily so straightforward. It i s i n the ramifications of the discrepancy between the d i s t r i b u t i o n described by the fable and the actual d i s t r i b u t i o n that i t i s possible to r e a l i z e the method of c l a r i f y i n g Nozick's p r i n c i p l e of compensation. 3.4. Misallocation In Nozick's quotation above (Nozick 1974, p.293) concerning the possible relationships between a hypothetical h i s t o r y and the . actual s o c i e t a l structures, Nozick accepts that a state may be just even though i t s actual d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings and positions i s d i f f e r e n t from that s p e c i f i e d by the hypothetical history used to j u s t i f y the structure of that society. Several questions r e l a t i v e to t h i s acceptance of a discrepancy between hypothetical and actual i n d i v i d u a l entitlements require consideration. Is the acceptance of a discrepancy between the justness of the actual holdings and the hypothetical holdings equivalent to replacing the actual society with a hypothetical society? In order to ensure that t h i s i s not the case, i t i s necessary to i d e n t i f y some mechanism for correcting the misallocation of holdings. As w i l l become clear, t h i s i s the general e f f e c t of my c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Nozick's p r i n c i p l e of compensation which I label the 'clause of adjustment.' What are the implications for children, of the 'misallocations' that can exist within a just society, i f a discrepancy between actual and hypothetical entitlements i s acceptable? The attempt to answer th i s question w i l l also introduce the ways children f i t into the Nozickean society's history, actual or hypothetical. With respect to the actual holdings and positions of s p e c i f i c individuals 'misallocation' w i l l have two dimensions. Let us assume that 'Some Other Person' (called SOPmore) has more in terms of holdings or position than can be legitimized by a just h i s t o r i c a l story. Let us also assume, as does Nozick, that "people do not conceive of ownership as having a thing, but as possessing rights (perhaps connected with a thing) which are t h e o r e t i c a l l y separable." (Nozick 1974, p.281) (3-4) Then because SOPmore1s in d i v i d u a l rights are greater than can be explained by a just h i s t o r i c a l story, SOPmore cannot establish his entitlement to h i s excess r i g h t s . There i s no just hypothetical story which w i l l e n t i t l e SOPmore to the excess 67 rights represented by h i s holdings or p o s i t i o n . Nonetheless, Nozick's assertion that the d e t a i l s of the d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings and positions may vary from the d i s t r i b u t i o n that arises from the hypothetical history opens the door to the existence of the possession of rights i n excess of entitlement. To i l l u s t r a t e the second dimension of 'misallocation' we need to assume that there i s 'Some Other Person' (called SOPless), who i n terms of holdings and po s i t i o n has less than i s legitimized by the same h i s t o r i c a l t a l e that was applied to SOPmore's just society. Furthermore, using the t h e o r e t i c a l s e p a r a b i l i t y of rights condition from above, we fi n d that one of the rights which SOPless should have, SOPmore has i n excess. Since possession of rights i s ownership, we have a sit u a t i o n where SOPmore owns a ri g h t which could be thought of as belonging to SOPless even though SOPmore did not take i t from SOPless. Nozick's response to th i s kind of dilemma i s to resort to some kind of argument that results i n compensation for SOPless. The p r i n c i p l e of compensation determines some method for compensating an i n d i v i d u a l for r i s k , damages, or interference. A clear case for the need for the p r i n c i p l e of compensation i s that i n which one person has more as a d i r e c t r e s u l t of another person's lack. I w i l l c a l l this aspect of the p r i n c i p l e of compensation the d i r e c t - l i n k clause: where an ind i v i d u a l benefits at the d i r e c t expense of another some form of compensation i s required. In the case where there i s no direc t l i n k between SOPmore and SOPless i t seems that requiring some payment from SOPmore i s an infringement of h i s rig h t s . SOPmore has acquired his excess right within a society that i s 68 just and therefore forced removal of that right for someone else's sake i s an infringement of SOPmore's right to non-interference. The correction of the error i s not required i n order to make the society just - i t i s already established as just by the fable. And yet, i f as a result of SOPmore's philanthropic s p i r i t SOPmore transfers the right to SOPless with no expectation of compensation, SOPmore appears to have made the state more just since SOPless' entitlement of rights i s now more complete. SOPmore's philanthropy i s not required for the just h i s t o r i c a l t a l e for the society and yet i t results i n a just t a l e for SOPless. If a group of SOPless' friends r e a l i z e that a re a l l o c a t i o n of SOPmore's possession could r e s u l t i n a more just society then i t would seem to be necessary for them to force SOPmore to act 'philanthropically.' Nozick argues that "there i s no legitimate way to arrive at the asymmetry i n rig h t s " (Nozick 1974, p. 276) between individuals and groups. It seems that the admission of 'more or less just s o c i e t i e s ' based on the possession of rights by legitimate versus i l l e g i t i m a t e right-holders introduces the need for a major reconsideration of Nozick's arguments. Rather than undertake such a reconsideration I w i l l simply attempt some tinkering. In doing so, I introduce the 'adjustment clause' to cover Nozick's parenthetical s i t u a t i o n i n the problematic t h i r d relationship between just hypothetical and unjust actual h i s t o r i c a l explanations quoted above. 69 3.5. Adjustment Clause Adjustments within the minimal state are governed by the p r i n c i p l e of compensation. There i s a whole class of reallocations which are not included i n Nozick's explanation of compensation. They are t y p i f i e d by the fact that there i s no i d e n t i f i a b l e agent who both caused the unjust a l l o c a t i o n , benefited from i t , and i s available to compensate for the damage. There are, however, others available who have a r e l a t i v e excess of holdings. In order to d i f f e r e n t i a t e between the two senses of compensation and to maintain the primacy of ind i v i d u a l rights on the part of both parties who are involved i n the r e l a t i v e imbalance of holdings, i t i s necessary to consider i n d e t a i l a second part to the p r i n c i p l e of compensation which I s h a l l c a l l the clause of adjustment. Clause of Adjustment Where an actual society has a just, hypothetical h i s t o r i c a l story, but where the d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings and positions varies from that which can be explained by the story, and where a person i s aware that he has an excess of holdings and positions (or the resultant r i g h t s ) , then that person has no right to compensation from some other person who has a matching shortage which cannot be j u s t i f i e d by the hypothetical story, and who i n order to gain ownership of that holding or pos i t i o n (and the resultant right) exercises the ri g h t of association i n order to form an intimate relationship which w i l l probably lead to the person with the excess transferring the holding. 70 The clause of adjustment places a l i m i t on the 'hook' requirement which i s part of the voluntary right to engage i n relationships or transactions. (Nozick 1974, p.264) The implication that emerges from Nozick's conjecture concerning 'rights with hooks' i s that "the corresponding hook of another's right that comes out to meet" (Nozick 1974, p.264) the i n i t i a t o r ' s hook must be put out by the right holder. In our case, where the right holder i s not e n t i t l e d to the right he holds the hook comes out as a r e s u l t of the story which i l l u s t r a t e s that the hook i s connected to a misallocated right as evidenced by the u n j u s t i f i a b l e ownership of the holdings or p o s i t i o n . Nozick admits that he i s "unsure of t h i s point" concerning "the structure of rights to engage i n relationships with others." (Nozick 1974, p.264) Given the d i f f i c u l t y i n c a l l i n g a society just when i t allows for the continuation of acknowledged i n j u s t i c e s , i t seems reasonable to l i m i t the voluntary nature of exchanges f a l l i n g within the rights to engage i n transactions or relationships i n the way I have suggested i n the clause of adjustment. The requirement that the right to refuse to engage i n a transaction be made conditional upon the justness of the actual d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings or positions (and the resultant rights) brings up the spectre of patterned j u s t i c e . Where Nozick's arguments have been c l e a r l y aimed at developing the case for an h i s t o r i c a l , non-patterned j u s t i f i c a t i o n for the state, the clause of adjustment c l e a r l y introduces the patterned aspect. While Nozick lumps transactions together with relationships i n his arguments, i t i s arguable that t h i s results i n some strained examples that use our assumptions about f i s c a l relationships to smooth over some of the problems that are special to the intimate relationships that r e s u l t from the exercise of the right of association. Because my prime concern i s with children, and because i t seems rather strange to t a l k of children being involved i n the kinds of transactions with which Nozick i s concerned, i t appears to be reasonable to l i m i t my attention at t h i s point to the right to engage i n relationships. Admittedly t h i s l i m i t a t i o n of my discussion does not resolve the problem of my introducing a clause that appears to e n t a i l r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . Since, however, i t i s a r e d i s t r i b u t i o n that i s suggested by Nozick's just t a l e , not by some independently determined just d i s t r i b u t i o n , i t may be possible to argue that there i s some kind of ' i n v i s i b l e ' compensation process occurring within the transaction. (3-5) For my purposes, however, I w i l l maintain that there i s a clause of adjustment which causes a hook to emerge which results i n a compulsory rather than a voluntary relationship between SOPless and SOPmore, in case SOPmore's possessions are i n the relationship described above ( i . e . SOPmore has more than he i s e n t i t l e d to and SOPless has less than she i s e n t i t l e d to) and i n case SOPless r e a l i z e s that the imbalance exists, as described by the just t a l e that i s used to prove that SOPmore's society i s just, and i n case SOPless puts out the hook which her right to engage i n relationships legitimizes. It i s important to point out that the clause of adjustment does not get hung up on the objection that Nozick outlines concerning other kinds of r i g h t s . "The major objection to speaking of everyone's having a r i g h t to various things such as equality of opportunity, l i f e , and so on, and enforcing t h i s right, i s that these 'rights' require a substructure of things and materials and actions; and other people may have rights and entitlements over these." (Nozick 1974, p.238) In my story, the just t a l e has pointed out to a l l who have listened to i t that the present possessors do not have entitlements. It i s my contention that the adjustment clause i s a necessary part of the Conservative p o s i t i o n . Without i t those in the Conservative p o s i t i o n can claim that the fable j u s t i f i e s the actual possessions of the i r society when i t i s used as a proof that the society i s just. But they must also accept that the fable j u s t i f i e s a society where some people do not have th e i r just entitlements and that there are people who are not required to correct an over-entitlement i n order to eliminate an under-entitlement. It seems to be the case that where a hypothetical history i s used to j u s t i f y an actual d i s t r i b u t i o n there w i l l probably be cases where actual possessions are not i n accord with that described by the fable. The person who i s short-changed w i l l not have had the opportunity to acquire what should have been available according to the hypothetical history. There are many kinds of reasons for such a lack of opportunity, the most obvious of which i s youth. While I am using the adjustment p r i n c i p l e i n connection with c h i l d - r a i s i n g i t could also be applied to any other case of lack of opportunity to acquire what the j u s t i f y i n g h i s t o r y allocates to some person other than the actual possessor. 73 3.6. Joining Up Adults, we may assume, w i l l be able to understand the implications of the discrepancy between the d i s t r i b u t i o n s described by a just t a l e and the actual a l l o c a t i o n of holdings and positions. Children, on the other hand, are l i k e l y to have d i f f i c u l t y understanding when such a misallocation applies to them. The fact of children having d i f f i c u l t y i n understanding the significance of misallocations i s related to Nozick's considerations of how children f i t into society's history -actual or hypothetical. I s t a r t with the most extensive explication of the involvement of youngsters i n Nozick's just t a l e of the development of the more-than-minimal state which i s the closest r e l a t i v e of the modern state. It i s important to understand the context i n which Nozick i s working at t h i s point i n his argument. "Is there some way to continue our story of the o r i g i n of the (minimal) state from the state of nature to arriv e , v i a , only legitimate steps which vi o l a t e no one's rights' at something more clos e l y resembling a modern state. Were such a continuation of the story possible, i t would illuminate essential aspects of the more extensive states people everywhere now l i v e under laying bare t h e i r nature. I s h a l l o f f e r a modest e f f o r t i n that d i r e c t i o n . " (Nozick 1974, p.276) 74 3.6.1. Payback There are two components to Nozick's modest e f f o r t . The f i r s t i s an attempt to establish the balance between the i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of the pos i t i v e e x t e r n a l i t i e s (3-6) of a c t i v i t i e s with the p r i n c i p l e (strong or weak) of f u l l payback of benefits. Nozick concludes from his examination of the " f u l l i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of a l l posit i v e e x t e r n a l i t i e s " (Nozick 1974, p.280) that "the advantages of l i v i n g under t h i s scheme (of f u l l i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of p o s i t i v e e x t e r n a l i t i e s ) would not be the benefits others provide you, but rather the payback they give you for the benefits you provide them." (Nozick 1974, p.281) The extent of payback i s equivalent to that which su f f i c e s for e f f i c i e n c y i n the marketplace, as determined by economists; namely "that there be s u f f i c i e n t payback to cover the costs to the agent of performing the a c t i v i t y with the po s i t i v e e x t e r n a l i t i e s , so that the a c t i v i t y w i l l be c a l l e d f o r t h . " (Nozick 1974, p.281) /An example of interests comes from consideration of what kind of payback would apply i n the case of the 'self-engaging hook' proposed above i n the clause of adjustment. SOPmore i s the agent performing the a c t i v i t y with the pos i t i v e e x t e r n a l i t i e s , namely allowing the re a l l o c a t i o n of holdings or positions to SOPless who i s e n t i t l e d to them according to the just t a l e . Nozick has stipulated that SOPmore i s not e n t i t l e d to any compensation, since again, according to the just t a l e , he i s not e n t i t l e d to the holdings or position which represent the ri g h t . The question which remains i s : why would SOPmore not 75 r e s t r a i n the 'self-engaging hook' i n order to eliminate the p o s s i b i l i t y that, because the right to engage i n a relationship has been enacted by SOPless, SOPmore may end up less well-off? The only reason that the 'self-engaging hook' comes out i s that the just t a l e has i d e n t i f i e d a matching of the excess with the deficiency i n the persons who are involved. If the just tale i s used to maintain the just society that i t explains, then i t i s i n the interests of each in d i v i d u a l to f i n d the tale which most clo s e l y approximates the actual d i s t r i b u t i o n of holdings and positions. Assuming that no other more 'accurate' t a l e i s on the horizon, then i t seems reasonable to suggest that SOPmore's payback i s the preservation of the t a l e which secures the rights to which he a c t u a l l y i s e n t i t l e d , rather than looking for further payback for rights for which the t a l e provides no explanation. Combined with SOPless' inter e s t i n gaining a f u l l e r compliment of e n t i t l e d rights t h i s explanation of the payback as the security from the just tale appears to ensure that the payback w i l l be s u f f i c i e n t for the a c t i v i t y required for adjustment of misallocated rights between persons engaged i n relationships c a l l e d forth. 3.6.2. S e l l i n g the Great Corporation The second component a Nozick 1s derivation of the more-than-minimal state i s his rapid f i r e story of the self-incorporation of individuals and the r e s u l t i n g 'market trends' and corporate happenings. B r i e f l y the story goes l i k e t h i s . Property rights are i n fact rights to use something in certain ways. Therefore i t i s possible for several people to possess rights that apply to a single object. Since i t i s possible to compensate someone i n return for the transfer of t h e i r rights i t i s possible to acquire a l l the rights r e l a t i v e to some object. Through a series of stages Nozick portrays a hypothetical history which results i n the emergence of the Great Corporation. (Nozick 1974, pp.285-7) The Great Corporation i s the agency which c o l l e c t s a l l the shares from a l l the members and red i s t r i b u t e s them so that everyone has exactly one share i n each right of each member. For my purposes, i t i s the problem of uncooperative newcomers to the marketplace which i s most i l l u s t r a t i v e . Suffice to say that there i s a just tale that explains how shares of rights are dispersed and how decisions are made concerning the exercise of those rig h t s . However, as Nozick points out "a major problem i s how the children are to be included.... For children to wait u n t i l t h e i r parents die so they could i n h e r i t shares would leave these children shareless for most of t h e i r adult lives....(And yet) shares cannot just be given to a youngster.... So s p l i t t i n g i s introduced as a way of allowing young people to enter the guild of stockholders." (Nozick 1974, p.285) Nozick gives no evidence of investigating methods other than inheritance and s p l i t t i n g for including children. (3-7) It i s clear inheritance i s a h i s t o r i c a l , non-patterned process of d i s t r i b u t i o n . While not so clear, i t seems that ' s p l i t t i n g ' as outlined by Nozick (Nozick 1974, p.286) i s non-historical and patterned. Given the tendency of d i s t r i b u t i o n s based on patterns to infring e on individual rig h t s , and given that i t i s only the increase i n the t o t a l number of people belonging which j u s t i f i e s the s p l i t , i t i s important that Nozick's computations 'add up.' While Nozick only mentions death and 'coming of age' as the occurrences that w i l l r e s u l t i n exit and entry from the "Great Corporation" (Nozick 1974, p.287) i t i s possible to imagine other happenings that would have the same r e s u l t . Whatever the causes, however, we know that the number of people withdrawing (m) from the Great Corporation and the number of people seeking to enter (n) can be related to each other i n one of three ways. B r i e f l y , (m) i s greater, equal to or less than (n). The number of the r e s u l t i n g shares available for ownership after stock s p l i t t i n g for the three possible variations i n m/n varies s i g n i f i c a n t l y . (3-8) We end up with the odd s i t u a t i o n where, only i f there i s an increasing number of persons i n the corporation, i s there an improvement i n the sense that each stock i s a share i n more people. This i s a strange incentive for a population explosion and i t c e r t a i n l y mitigates against any e f f o r t to decrease the corporation's population. More importantly, i t points out the need to conduct a successful sales program amongst the prospective members, children. From the perspective of the Great Corporation, successful c h i l d - r a i s e r s are those who raise children who w i l l i n g l y "sign the stockholders' guild S c r o l l of Membership" (Nozick 1974, p.287) and agree to incorporate themselves and sign over " a l l of the stock i n themselves to the corporation." (Nozick 1974, p.286) What happens when malcontents refuse to sign up? The solutions available to a society are e a s i l y imagined. Nozick 78 concludes that "About the youngsters, i t i s decided they do not have to join the stockholders' guild, after a l l . They can refuse i t s benefits and leave the corporation area, without any hard fee l i n g s . " (Nozick 1974, p.289) As long as the refusal to join and the decision to forgo the benefits of membership are informed, as for example those of the conscientious objector (3-10), then Nozick's conclusion appears to be inevitable within a society upholding the strong formulation of in d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . I f , on the other hand, the prospective candidate does not know what i s at stake, then the notion that action to bring about membership would be an interference would appear to be mistaken. If no e f f o r t i s made to bring the prospective member out of h i s ignorance then i t would seem that he i s not being recognized as an i n d i v i d u a l . What are the l i m i t s which r e s t r i c t the c h i l d - r a i s e r from bringing the c h i l d up i n such a way that enrollment i s nearly automatic? Is i t possible to raise a c h i l d i n such a way that she can be a conscientious objector to enrollment but that she won't choose to opt out? If the society i s to remain within the just, hypothetical history, then the c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions required to raise the c h i l d to the point where she knowingly rejects being a conscientious objector must not i n t e r f e r e with the rights of the c h i l d - r a i s e r . 3.6.3. P a t e r n a l i s t i c - L i k e Child-Raising (3-9) Is there no way within the Nozickean framework to legitimize the p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e interferences that are required by ch i l d - r a i s i n g ? There are two possible directions to take. The f i r s t i s to consider some form of compensation for the c h i l d 79 paid by the corporation members who w i l l benefit from the addition of the new member with the minimum of fuss. The only form of compensation that seems to be available i s the 'free-riding' of the c h i l d on the corporation p r i o r to the i n v i t a t i o n to enter. There are two problems with considering pre-entry f r e e - r i d i n g as compensation. F i r s t , those who chose not to j o i n the corporation have benefited from the same fre e - r i d i n g and are i n v i t e d to leave the t e r r i t o r y without any cost. Second, the cost of providing the free-ride has f a l l e n on a very few - the intimate providers. If the benefits of the provision of the compensatory free-ride f a l l to a l l members of the society, then the cost must be more widespread than just to the intimate providers. Otherwise the l i b e r t a r i a n side-constraint has been violated i n that the rights of an i n d i v i d u a l , the intimate provider, have been interfered with i n order to benefit the group. I w i l l abandon the f i r s t d i r e c t i o n and take the second. The second d i r e c t i o n i s to u t i l i z e the adjustment clause i n order to ensure that certain kinds of relationships w i l l occur and be recognized as e x i s t i n g to f a c i l i t a t e r e a l l o c a t i o n of holdings and positions and t h e i r resultant r i g h t s . Once such a rel a t i o n s h i p exists i t can be argued that intimate-dependency relationships are just. If an intimate-dependency relationship i s just then p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e interferences can occur. My concern i s limited to the occurrence of p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e interferences required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Children require an intimate provider. The reason that each c h i l d needs an intimate provider i s obvious. There are things 80 that a c h i l d must have done for her i n order that she survive. In a way that i s reminiscent of the prenatal state, the newborn demands an intimate provider to meet some very obvious needs. If a f t e r b i r t h the c h i l d i s abandoned by the provider the c h i l d w i l l die. In the more usual case where the adult remains, the c h i l d automatically exercises the adjustment clause and engages the adult i n what w i l l become an intimate relationship. If an adult assumes the role of intimate provider over an extended period, that i s over months and years rather than the few hours of the maternity ward nurse or the daycare s t a f f , then that adult i s i d e n t i f i e d as the intimate provider. Once the adult takes on the role of intimate provider, she w i l l be aware of the child's apparent needs and wants on an ongoing basis. The needs of the c h i l d as observed by the intimate provider w i l l necessarily be r e l a t i v e to the needs of the intimate provider. Where they are not, assuming that the intimate provider's estimation of and provision for the child's needs i s noticeably low by comparison to her own needs, then the adjustment clause can be invoked again. There are three p o s s i b i l i t i e s for the enactment of the adjustment clause. The f i r s t , most obvious and least l i k e l y to occur u n t i l late adolescence, i s that the c h i l d , recognizing that the intimate provider i s not tra n s f e r r i n g enough holdings to place the c h i l d at what appears to be the l e v e l j u s t i f i e d by the just hypothetical story that i s being used as the basis of the society, seeks another intimate provider according to the adjustment clause. The second kind of enactment of the adjustment clause can only occur i f there i s more than one 81 intimate provider for the c h i l d . In this case one of the other intimate providers would provide the just entitlement for the c h i l d . In the t h i r d kind of enactment of the adjustment clause another adult who i s not a po t e n t i a l intimate provider can become involved with the dis p a r i t y i n provisioning. This person has no ri g h t to in t e r f e r e with the action or lack of action of the intimate provider. In the Nozickean sit u a t i o n , the intimate provider has an in v i o l a b l e right to non-interference but this right does not extend to preventing the c h i l d from contact with the outsider. It i s possible for t h i s outsider to approach the c h i l d d i r e c t l y i n an e f f o r t to point out to the c h i l d that she would be well-advised to invoke the adjustment clause. Why would an outsider want to become involved? There i s good reason to r e c r u i t the maximum number of prospective members into the Great Corporation i n order to increase the value of the shares. If i t can be seen by the outsider that the neglect of the intimate provider w i l l possibly re s u l t i n the c h i l d 'opting out' i t behooves the outsider to become involved. The outsider i s the Conservative form of the remote provider. 3.7 Nozick Summarized Cle a r l y those i n the Conservative position including Nozick place extreme l i m i t s on interferences with i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . When t h i s protection from interference i s applied to the sit u a t i o n of the young person being given the opportunity of 'joining up' the resu l t i s unexpected. In order for the c h i l d to be treated as an in d i v i d u a l , i t i s necessary that she be 82 informed as to what i t means to join or not to j o i n . Furthermore, i t i s i n the interests of a l l members that the c h i l d decide to j o i n . Therefore, i f the intimate provider i s not providing the c h i l d with a clear understanding of what joining up means, then i t i s l i k e l y that some other member w i l l want to inform the c h i l d . This i s consistent with our commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g as demonstrated by our reaction to Fagan, the 'parent' of the urchins. To suggest that i t i s just the luck of the draw whether a c h i l d gets conscientious parents or a Fagan for a parent does not f i t in with our hypothetical story. That hypothetical story i n North American democracies contains a strong element of some sort of f a i r chance for children. Those who have acquired a reasonable c o l l e c t i o n of possessions are those who had the opportunities and seized them. Withholding opportunities from them would have been unjust. Therefore i t i s necessary to endow children with opportunities, or the j u s t i f y i n g history w i l l not be upheld and the possessions of present members w i l l have to be considered unjust. Allowance of the adjustment clause eliminates t h i s contradiction. The addition of the adjustment clause allows the c h i l d to be raised i n such a way that she can l i v e i n a Nozickean world. Where the c h i l d does not seize an available opportunity i t i s clear that i t was not due to lack of an endowment. In the case that there was no endowment, the c h i l d can seek someone who has an excess of possessions and can establish a relationship with them. While that person i s not compelled to act according to the p r i n c i p l e of transfer, i t i s l i k e l y that once the 83 misallocation i s apparent, a transfer w i l l occur. Just as with a l l the p r i n c i p l e s from Nozick, the adjustment clause i s available to everyone not just to children. In the concluding section of Chapter One I l i s t e d a series of points which I contend must be s a t i s f i e d by any general system of p r i n c i p l e s which claim to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements of our actual or id e a l society. Consideration of these points i n r e l a t i o n to the Conservative position as presented by Nozick, with the addition of the adjustment clause, indicates two points i n which the commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i s not met. The f i r s t point which i s not firmly met i s the requirement that c h i l d - r a i s i n g as the act of endowing children and ensuring t h e i r survival be considered as one of the basic s o c i a l arrangements. Although Nozick does not disallow c h i l d - r a i s i n g as a basic s o c i a l arrangement there i s no condition i n the Conservative position which guarantees i t s inclu s i o n . The second point which i s not c l e a r l y met i s more basic. According to my requirements, a l l persons involved i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g must be subject to the same general p r i n c i p l e s . In the Conservative position, once i t i s acknowledged that the remote provider can act to influence the c h i l d i n a way di f f e r e n t from that of the intimate provider, i t i s possible to conclude that the remote provider can in t e r f e r e with the actions of the intimate provider by contradicting the intent of her c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions for the purpose of convincing the c h i l d to join up. This would seem to be a case of the general p r i n c i p l e s applying d i f f e r e n t l y to the d i f f e r e n t persons involved i n the c h i l d - r a i s i n g a c t i v i t y . The missing ingredient i s some special 84 status for the group. To attempt to introduce that ingredient into Nozick would be d i f f i c u l t i f not impossible. I consider i t more useful to consider the group i n the context of the L i b e r a l position, since the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n shares the task of explaining our s o c i a l arrangements with the Conservative p o s i t i o n . 85 Notes on Chapter Three 3-1 In my attempt to be consistent with Nozick's arguments I have attempted to adopt Nozick's p o l i t i c a l philosophy i n t h i s chapter. While I have t r i e d to be clear as to which points are Nozick's and which are mine, I f e e l i t i s necessary to emphasize that the p o l i t i c a l philosophy presented i n t h i s chapter i s from Nozick. My contribution i s limited to the considerations of c h i l d - r a i s i n g and the arguments for and the application of the adjustment clause. 3-2 As represented by Locke, t h i s venerable t r a d i t i o n establishes that the chil d ' s good i s the same as the parents'. (Worsfold 1974, p.145) 3-3 Nozick l i m i t s the impact of the moral side-constraint within p o l i t i c a l philosophy to the prohibition of aggression against others. One can only assume that t h i s l i m i t a t i o n results from the ' p o l i t i c a l ' nature of his discussion. When a d e f i n i t i o n of ' p o l i t i c a l aspects' i s considered, Nozick's l i m i t i n g of the impact of the moral side-constraint appears questionable. Easton defines "the property of a s o c i a l act that informs i t with a p o l i t i c a l aspect i s the acts' r e l a t i o n to the authoritative a l l o c a t i o n of values for a society." (Easton 1953, p.134) Easton's d e f i n i t i o n c e r t a i n l y implies the potential for r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . Nozick needs to provide an equivalent 86 d e f i n i t i o n for what he would take to be the p o l i t i c a l aspect of the s o c i a l act. 3-4 According to Nozick: "Property rights are viewed as rights to determine which of a s p e c i f i e d range of admissible options concerning something w i l l be r e a l i z e d . Admissible options are those that do not cross another's moral boundary; to reuse an example, one's property right i n a knife does not include the right to replace i t between someone else's ribs against t h e i r w i l l (unless in j u s t i f i e d punishment for a crime, or self-defense, and so on)" (Nozick 1974, p.282) 3-5 'Invisible compensation' could take a variety of forms. For example, the joy of having children could be c i t e d as a compensation. Since c h i l d - r a i s i n g has no guarantee of joy, or support, or success, i t seems that the p o s s i b i l i t y of an i n v i s i b l e form of compensation i s remote. 3-6 Nozick i s pursuing the consideration of how e x t e r n a l i t i e s may be most e f f i c i e n t l y (least cost) internalized i n order to get a sense of the nature of 'property r i g h t s . ' "The property rights of others i n t e r n a l i z e negative e x t e r n a l i t i e s of your a c t i v i t i e s insofar as you are required to compensate others for your a c t i v i t i e s ' effects on t h e i r property; your property rights i n t e r n a l i z e positive e x t e r n a l i t i e s of your a c t i v i t i e s insofar as these a c t i v i t i e s raise the value of things that you can f i r s t acquire property 87 rights i n . Given boundaries drawn, we can see, roughly and abstractly, what a system that i n t e r n a l i z e d a l l negative e x t e r n a l i t i e s would be l i k e . What, though, would the f u l l i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of a l l p o s i t i v e e x t e r n a l i t i e s involve? In i t s strong form, i t would involve your (each person's) receiving the f u l l benefits of your (his) a c t i v i t i e s to others." (Nozick 1974, p.280) 3-7 There are c e r t a i n l y other procedures for including children i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of the benefits of a society. There could be an annual l o t t e r y for the purpose of d i s t r i b u t i n g the wealth; there could be a potlatch for children, as was the custom i n some v i l l a g e s on the west coast. There could be the establishment of some minimal l e v e l of primary goods, which each c h i l d would be e n t i t l e d to claim at any time. Cl e a r l y Nozick i s t e l l i n g h is story of the More-than-Minimal state for the purpose of demonstrating the problems of our s o c i a l arrangements. Otherwise he would have entertained a broader range of p o s s i b i l i t i e s than just inheritance and s p l i t t i n g of shares. 3-8 We st a r t from the point where "each person holds exactly one share i n each right over every other person including himself."(p.285) Nozick claims that "the people joining and the stock s p l i t t i n g j u s t i f y each other."(p.286) 88 Where r = # rights per person x = # people i n state ( i n i t i a l l y ) each person divides each of r rights into x shares Before any transactions involving shares, each person has x * r shares. Since there are x people, then x * x * r shares are i n existence. After transactions are completed, and p r i o r to the withdrawal of the m people we have S ( m ) = x * x * r where S(m) i s the t o t a l number of shares that e x i s t . m people withdraw, and n people enter. S p l i t t i n g calculations occur. Based on the r a t i o m/n, the following occurs: where m>n S'(n) = (x - m + n)2 * r << S(m) where m<n S"(n) = (x - m + n)2 * r >> S(m) where m=n S"'(n)= S(m) 3-9 I have introduced the expression ' p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e ' i n order to i d e n t i f y actions carried out by c h i l d - r a i s e r s with no pretension of knowing the interests of the c h i l d . The difference being alluded to i s clearest when we consider the intention of d i r e c t i n g a c h i l d towards some goal. A p a t e r n a l i s t i c c h i l d - r a i s e r acts with the intention of i n t e r f e r i n g with the c h i l d for some purpose based on what he takes to be i n the child's i n t e r e s t s . The p a t e r n a l i s t i c - l i k e c h i l d - r a i s e r lacks any intention and claims no knowledge of the child's i n t e r e s t s . 89 CHAPTER FOUR THE WELL-ORDERED SOCIETY 4.1. Rawls - More or Less than Nozick Ennis describes those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n as those who tend to look to the external environmental factors for explanations of persons' actions r e l a t i v e to 'having an opportunity.' (Ennis 1976, p.10) A r i s i n g from t h i s conception are the questions of where and how those i n the L i b e r a l position place the l i m i t s of interference. Ennis i d e n t i f i e s these questions as the locus for value judgments. If i t i s possible to gain some insight into how these value judgments are linked with the p r i n c i p l e s of justice from a p o l i t i c a l philosophy of the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n i t may be possible to i d e n t i f y the boundaries of allowable interference r e l a t i v e to c h i l d - r a i s i n g within the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n . Ennis' characterization of those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n includes the suggestion that there i s a tendency for the environmental factors to expand to f i l l the need for others to intervene on the part of the in d i v i d u a l for the sake of ensuring that the in d i v i d u a l seizes the opportunities that are generally available. As indicated i n Chapter Two, I take the arguments of John Rawls, as presented i n A Theory of Justice (Rawls 1971), to be a paradigm of the Li b e r a l p o s i t i o n . As I have demonstrated with Nozick from the Conservative 90 Position i t i s possible to analyze a p o l i t i c a l philosophy i n such a way as to unravel the inherent action guiding p r i n c i p l e s for c h i l d r a i s i n g within that society. My purpose i n carrying out another exercise i n foraging through a p o l i t i c a l philosophy of the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n i s somewhat d i f f e r e n t . As was clear i n the previous chapter, the Conservative Position allows a minimum of interference with children. The L i b e r a l Position, because of the status i t assigns to the s o c i a l union which necessarily develops with the implementation of L i b e r a l p r i n c i p l e s of jus t i c e , permits the maximum interference allowable i n the context of a democratic society having as an overriding p r i n c i p l e the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of in d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . In our democratic s o c i e t i e s there exists a tension between the explanations of our s o c i a l arrangements provided by the L i b e r a l and Conservative Positions. Therefore, i n addition to my claim that i t i s possible to derive a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of c h i l d - r a i s i n g practices from a p a r t i c u l a r p o l i t i c a l philosophy, I contend that i t i s possible to combine the j u s t i f i c a t i o n s derived from the range of p o l i t i c a l philosophies used to explain our s o c i a l arrangements i n order to determine, not only the range of j u s t i f i e d p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g , but also to i d e n t i f y the pr i n c i p l e s which create the c o n f l i c t s i n value judgments related to r a i s i n g children. In t h i s chapter I w i l l examine Rawls" explanations and arguments for the concept of justice as fairness i n order to arrive at an interpretation of the pr i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g i n Rawls' 'well-ordered' society. I w i l l attempt to remain true to the s p i r i t of his argument (4-1) and to use his p r i n c i p l e s and conceptions as accurately as 91 possible. The question that I pose i s the question of where the p a t e r n a l i s t i c interferences required by c h i l d - r a i s i n g stop. In order to reveal the p r i n c i p l e s from Rawls which l i m i t interferences I raise the following dilemma. A child's remote provider becomes aware that the child's intimate provider i s i n t e r f e r i n g with the c h i l d i n such a way as to l i m i t the child's opportunities i n the future. The intimate provider j u s t i f i e s the action i n what appears to be a r a t i o n a l manner. Yet i t i s clear that i f some other method of child-rearing were used the c h i l d would have more opportunities as an adult. Is i t possible to determine which provider prevails under Rawls' theory? In the preceding chapter I argued that i t i s possible to derive a s o c i a l arrangement from the Conservative position that, while including children as moral beings with no s i g n i f i c a n t difference i n status from other persons, ensures that children w i l l be provided with the i n t e r a c t i o n necessary for growing up to f i t into the society that surrounds them. In the Conservative position, the l i m i t on the intimate provider i s that the c h i l d must be capable of becoming a conscientious objector. This means that children must be able to refuse to become permanent members of the society, even though they w i l l not do so because that i s not the r a t i o n a l thing to do. While i t i s i n everyone's interest that the c h i l d 'join up,' i t i s necessary that the 'joining up' be s t r i c t l y voluntary. However, to be voluntary, the decision must be r a t i o n a l , and to be capable of r a t i o n a l decisions the c h i l d must be subjected to interference - the interference of being forced to do the r a t i o n a l thing when, i n his ignorance, he has mistakenly decided to do otherwise. Like Nozick, Rawls starts from the premise of a strong sense of i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . In Rawls' case, individuals consider the best protection of those rights to consist of the determination of a set of action-guiding p r i n c i p l e s which w i l l apply to everyone. The derivation of the p r i n c i p l e s of justice as fairness by the POP i s a conscious, r a t i o n a l enterprise which can be duplicated by anyone who can step behind the v e i l of ignorance. By comparison, Nozick's p r i n c i p l e s become apparent upon a retrospective examination of what appears to be an unintentional evolution of i n s t i t u t i o n s designed to meet the s e l f i s h needs of individuals i n competition with each other. The difference between Rawls and Nozick i s a r e s u l t of the d i f f e r e n t conceptions of the r e l a t i o n of the single i n d i v i d u a l to the cooperating i n d i v i d u a l s . What i s Rawls' argument and what does he claim to have accomplished with i t ? The arguments i n A Theory of Justice are to e s t a b l i s h the reasonableness of the conception of justice as fairness. E s s e n t i a l l y Rawls claims that his conception of justice as fairness i s the best approximation of our considered judgment of justice and constitutes the most appropriate basis for the s o c i a l arrangement of the democratic society. (Rawls 1971, p . v i i i ) The s o c i a l arrangement of the democratic society c e r t a i n l y contains the s o c i a l union required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . While i t s shape may vary there i s no question that c h i l d - r a i s i n g e n t a i l s both the interference with the c h i l d and the opportunity for interference with the parent on behalf of the c h i l d . If 93 there i s an acceptance of the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of i n d i v i d u a l rights for both the c h i l d and the parent, then there must be some way of understanding the p r i n c i p l e s of justice so that i t i s possible to decide whose right to non-interference p r e v a i l s and how the overriding authority of the remote provider functions i n order to uphold the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . 4.2. Social Union Since those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n allow for a d i f f e r e n t kind of power to ex i s t for the group, compared to the in d i v i d u a l , i t i s worthwhile considering the idea of the 'social union' as presented by Rawls. (Rawls 1971, #79) Rawls outlines the opposite of the 'social union' which i s the 'private society' and which bears a strong resemblance to Nozick's protective associations. According to Rawls, "The private society i s not held together by a public conviction that i t s basic arrangements are just and good i n themselves, but by the calculations of everyone... that any practicable changes would reduce the stock of means whereby they pursue t h e i r personal ends." (Rawls 1971, p. 522) The s o c i a l union, on the other hand, i s described by Rawls as being based on the needs and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of i t s members. The purpose of the s o c i a l union i s to allow the participants access to the f u l l p o t e n t i a l i t i e s "of the r e a l i z e d natural assets of the others." (Rawls 1971, p.523) The r e s u l t i n g community exists over time, with the further r e s u l t that "the j o i n t contributions of successive generations can be s i m i l a r l y conceived." (Rawls 1971, p.523) Rawls argues that, i n general, s o c i a l unions are characterized 94 by two properties; shared f i n a l ends and common a c t i v i t i e s valued for themselves. The well-ordered society, which i s the society derived from the p r i n c i p l e s determined by the POP, i s a s o c i a l union of s o c i a l unions. It has the shared end of "cooperating together to r e a l i z e t h e i r own and another's nature in ways allowed by the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . " (Rawls 1971, p.527 ) The second property of Rawls' s o c i a l union, the fact that the members carry out common a c t i v i t i e s which are valued for themselves, i s evident when the r e s u l t of everyone's understanding of the p r i n c i p l e s that govern the scheme of smaller s o c i a l unions within the well-ordered society i s viewed over the generations. Because each i n d i v i d u a l holds the same pr i n c i p l e s of r a t i o n a l choice i n his plan of l i f e , the in d i v i d u a l plans of l i f e being part of the summation of a l l plans are richer than they could be i n d i v i d u a l l y . If we apply the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e , because the summation of the i n d i v i d u a l a c t i v i t i e s are richer, they must also be experienced as a good. (Rawls 1971, p. 528) The A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e relates the complexity of human a c t i v i t y to a theory of good. According to this p r i n c i p l e , a d i r e c t c o r r e l a t i o n exists between the capacity of innate or trained a b i l i t i e s r e a l i z e d and the enjoyment experienced. (Rawls 1971, pp.414,424) It i s to t h i s p r i n c i p l e that the remote provider must resort i n determining which i n t e r f e r i n g actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g are j u s t i f i a b l e . This p r i n c i p l e also establishes the benefit to be gained from being a rule-following member of a s o c i a l union, where the rules being followed res u l t i n a good 95 which can be shared i n such a way that each member experiences a greater complexity of human a c t i v i t y than would be possible outside the s o c i a l union. In the case of the well-ordered society, following the rules inherent i n pursuing a r a t i o n a l plan of l i f e i s required to be a member i n good standing. The p r i n c i p l e s guiding the pursuit of a r a t i o n a l plan of l i f e , the p r i n c i p l e s of r a t i o n a l choice, are p r i n c i p l e s which r e l y on the best available judgment of the in d i v i d u a l concerned. Of the four p r i n c i p l e s of r a t i o n a l choice for which Rawls argues i t i s the p r i n c i p l e of postponement which i s most relevant to the interferences necessary for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Rawls' p r i n c i p l e of postponement holds that " i f i n the future we may want to do one of several things but are unsure which, then, other things being equal, we are to plan so that these alternatives are both kept open." (Rawls 1971, p.410) When an intimate provider interferes with the primary good of 'having an opportunity' she makes a ra t i o n a l choice on behalf of the c h i l d which ignores the p r i n c i p l e of postponement. If the remote provider looks at the interference as a r e s t r i c t i o n on the opportunity for the c h i l d to p a r t i c i p a t e i n a more complex human a c t i v i t y (which according to the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e would r e s u l t i n good not only for the i n d i v i d u a l , but p o t e n t i a l l y for a l l members of the s o c i a l union) then the remote provider i s obliged to in t e r f e r e with the intimate provider on behalf, not only of the c h i l d , but also of the other members of the s o c i a l union. This condition highlights the difference between the scope of concern held by the intimate provider and that held by the remote provider. This condition also explains the motivation of the Conservative 96 outsider who t r i e s to convince the c h i l d to join up i n order to increase the number of available shares. It i s possible to conceive of the good defined by the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e and the good of an increase of Nozickean shares as being equivalent. 4.3. P r i o r i t y to Interfere The L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n has no problem j u s t i f y i n g p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference. If i t i s i n the intere s t of the c h i l d for someone to i n t e r f e r e then that interference i s j u s t i f i a b l e (4-2). I wish, however, to suggest a very d i f f e r e n t kind of problem for those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n . In t h i s chapter, I consider the conditions that determine the upper l i m i t s on interference r e l a t i v e to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Asking the question, 'What interference with the c h i l d i s j u s t i f i a b l e ? ' simply e l i c i t s a restatement of the p r i n c i p l e of paternalism from those i n the Lib e r a l p o s i t i o n . (4-3) However, asking the question, 'What interference with the providers can be j u s t i f i e d , and how?' raises the problems ' inherent i n deciding which of several p a t e r n a l i s t i c acts i s j u s t i f i e d . When one intimate provider i s in t e r f e r i n g with the c h i l d beyond the l i m i t s of what can reasonably be argued to be i n the interests of the c h i l d , who interferes with the intimate provider on the behalf of the child? When there i s another intimate provider for the same c h i l d i t seems reasonable to assume that the other intimate provider would r e s t r a i n the f i r s t intimate provider from her actions. Both providers can claim that they are attempting to act i n the 97 best inte r e s t of the c h i l d by being p a t e r n a l i s t i c . Both have engaged i n an intimate association with the c h i l d and are apparently i n the p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n of having whatever insight i s possible into the child's future plan for good, be i t hypothetical or r e a l . Their involvement i n an intimate relationship implies that they have an intention to continue i n that r e l a t i o n s h i p . While they may have d i f f i c u l t y determining the j u s t i f i a b l e course of action, the one they chose w i l l c e r t a i n l y have been arrived at by r a t i o n a l beings considering the best evidence of the interests of the c h i l d . In the case where there i s only one intimate provider, and that provider i s i n t e r f e r i n g with the c h i l d beyond the l i m i t s of what can be reasonably argued to be i n the child's interest, then only the stranger or the remote provider are available to intervene on the child's behalf. Since I take the stranger to be someone who has neither an inte r e s t i n nor knowledge of the c h i l d , i t seems reasonable to consider the remote provider as the only other agent who can act on the child's behalf. The remote provider, however, i s operating from a p o s i t i o n of concern for persons i n general and lacks the intimate connection and ongoing commitment to care for a p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d that characterizes the intimate provider. When the remote provider intervenes with the intimate provider there i s a sense of interference that does not exist i n the debate between two intimate providers. Since the remote provider cannot know -the c h i l d i n the d e t a i l possessed by the intimate provider, the remote provider must argue for the child's interests i n the more general terms or p r i n c i p l e s that apply to a l l persons. In the 98 L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n as represented by Rawls, the p r i n c i p l e s that w i l l be applied by the remote provider on the child's behalf must be consistent with, i f not i d e n t i c a l to, the p r i n c i p l e s which are used to j u s t i f y a l l the i n s t i t u t i o n s which arise i n the just society. 4.4. L i b e r a l Paternalism Rawls points out that the problem of paternalism i s one that i s considered by the POP only after the basic structure has been established. This i s necessarily the case because, as Rawls describes the o r i g i n a l position, the POP must assume that they are r a t i o n a l beings capable of managing the i r own a f f a i r s . Just l i k e Nozick, the POP do not need to consider the need for paternalism as long as they are making these assumptions. Rawls, however, admits to a broader perspective for the POP once they have agreed to the i d e a l conception represented by the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . In order to protect themselves against the r i s k s that follow from diminished a b i l i t y to be r a t i o n a l , or to manage t h e i r own a f f a i r s , i t i s reasonable and necessary that the POP adopt the 'principles of paternalism.' 4.4.1. The Principles Following Dworkin (Dworkin 1972) Rawls describes the p r i n c i p l e s of paternalism as follows: 1. P a t e r n a l i s t i c actions must be consistent with -(a) the preferences and interests of the i n d i v i d u a l being acted on (to the extent that they are not i r r a t i o n a l ) 99 (b) the theory of primary goods, to the extent that (a) i s not known. 2. P a t e r n a l i s t i c actions must only occur when there i s clear evidence of f a i l u r e of reason and w i l l i n the person being acted on. 3. P a t e r n a l i s i t i c actions must be guided by the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . (Rawls 1971, pp.248-250) The problem I am posing revolves around the p o s s i b i l i t y of disagreement between an intimate provider who i s operating under Pr i n c i p l e l.(a) and a remote provider who i s operating under Pr i n c i p l e l . ( b ) . According to Rawls th i s kind of disagreement should not arise because of the process used to arrive at the p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . Rawls states that "one consequence of trying to be objective, of attempting to frame our moral consequences from a shared point of view, i s that we are more l i k e l y to reach agreement." (Rawls 1971, p.517) The hope of reaching agreement does not eliminate the p o s s i b i l i t y that there w i l l be disagreement. If there i s a disagreement over the p a t e r n a l i s i t i c actions required by c h i l d r a i s i n g i t i s possible that i t w i l l be the kind of dilemma posed at the beginning of t h i s chapter. 4.4.2. Application of the Principles In addition to accepting the need for the p a t e r n a l i s t i c p r i n c i p l e s , the POP, i n agreeing to the p r i n c i p l e s of right, simultaneously "consent to the arrangements necessary to make these p r i n c i p l e s e f f e c t i v e i n t h e i r conduct." (Rawls 1971, 100 p. 515) These arrangements would include the practices of moral in s t r u c t i o n necessary to inculcate a sense of justice i n children. The p r i n c i p l e s of right are defined by Rawls as those p r i n c i p l e s l i m i t i n g the s a t i s f a c t i o n s which have value, and the conceptions of one's good which are reasonable. (Rawls 1971, p.31) I f the p r i n c i p l e s of right and the 'sense of ju s t i c e ' were clear of ambiguity there would be no problem i n s e t t l i n g the dispute between the intimate and the remote providers over the appropriateness of a p a t e r n a l i s i t i c action of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Rawls i n presenting the p r i n c i p l e s of paternalism has c l e a r l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d between the intimate provider, who has a reasonable chance of knowing the "settled preferences and i n t e r e s t s " of the c h i l d , and the remote provider who has minimal knowledge about the child's personal make-up. Rawls points out that "As we know less and less about a person, we act for him as we would act for ourselves from the standpoint of the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . " (Rawls 1971, p.249) I w i l l return to t h i s claim la t e r since as w i l l be seen i t i s indeed the c r i t e r i o n that must be used by the intimate provider. There i s a very r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y that the Paternalism P r i n c i p l e l . ( a ) , which refers the j u s t i f i c a t i o n to the interests of the person being interfered with, and Paternalism P r i n c i p l e l . ( b ) , which uses the theory of primary goods for j u s t i f i c a t i o n of interference, can generate d i f f e r e n t and c o n f l i c t i n g conclusions. Since there i s a l i k e l i h o o d that ambiguity w i l l exist and cause confusion and disagreement over the necessary conditions of a 'sense of j u s t i c e ' and the j u s t i f i a b l e practices for i n s t i l l i n g that sense, i t i s necessary to consider what • 101 p r i n c i p l e s are relevant and how they apply to t h i s kind of disagreement. Rawls summarizes his argument for p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference as follows: "We are not l i t e r a l l y to respect the conscience of an in d i v i d u a l . Rather we are to respect him as a person and we do t h i s by l i m i t i n g h is actions, when t h i s proves necessary, only as the p r i n c i p l e s we would both acknowledge permit" (Rawls 1971, p.519) Rawls' argument i s that the basic structure defined by application of the p r i n c i p l e s of justice embodies the p r i n c i p l e s that a l l r a t i o n a l persons would acknowledge. Therefore, i n order to unravel as far as possible the limi t a t i o n s that the remote provider can impose on the intimate provider, i t i s necessary to examine the application of the p r i n c i p l e s of justice to c h i l d - r a i s i n g i n the context of the i n s t i t u t i o n s derived from the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . 4.4.3. Princi p l e s of Justice The p r i n c i p l e s of justice i n t h e i r f i n a l form are a sequenced set of decision-guiding rules that r e l y on the conception of primary s o c i a l goods. The general conception of the basic structure i s that l i b e r t y , opportunity, income, wealth and the basis of self-respect are to be di s t r i b u t e d equally except where some other d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l r e s u l t i n an improvement to the least favored. (Rawls 1971, p.302) The primary good most susceptible to the interferences of the intimate provider i s that endowing the c h i l d with opportunity. If the intimate provider interferes with the c h i l d by 102 r e s t r i c t i n g the child's wealth, income, l i b e r t y , or self-respect and, i f the good of having an opportunity i s not interfered with, then the c h i l d retains the opportunity of gaining these goods at some future point. I f , however, the intimate provider interferes with the c h i l d i n such a way as to remove the opportunity from the c h i l d , then unless the c h i l d already possesses what can be gained by the opportunity, the c h i l d w i l l have l o s t that p a r t i c u l a r good. Rawls' f i r s t p r i o r i t y rule, the rule placing the p r i o r i t y on justice, allows for two cases of l i b e r t y being r e s t r i c t e d for the sake of l i b e r t y . In the f i r s t case, "a less extensive l i b e r t y must strengthen the t o t a l system of l i b e r t y shared by a l l * . (Rawls 1971, p.302) In the si t u a t i o n I have posed where the remote provider i s questioning the actions of the intimate provider, i t i s clear that the remote provider i n applying the basic structure has concluded that the interference with the c h i l d does not resu l t i n a stronger system of justice o v e r a l l . The second case which allows for a r e s t r i c t i o n of l i b e r t y refers the state of less l i b e r t y back to the one who has the lesser l i b e r t y - i n our case back to the c h i l d who i s being interfered with. The decision to inter f e r e or not i s also made i n reference to the assumed agreement of the c h i l d . The discrepancy results from the d i f f e r e n t views that can arise when one (the intimate provider) i s operating from a position of presumed intimate knowledge of the child's interests and the other (the remote provider) i s applying the basic structure to the c h i l d i n order to ensure that the c h i l d i s raised to possess the primary s o c i a l goods. Consideration of the application of 103 the basic structure appears to lead us right back to the o r i g i n a l dilemma since both providers appear to be using i t for d i f f e r e n t purposes. 4.5. Rationality Requirements It i s important to understand the implication of the intimate provider making r a t i o n a l decisions on behalf of the c h i l d . (Rawls 1971, pp.411-3) (4-4) In order to engage i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y a person must have some competence i n deciding. Thus, i t i s assumed that for children there w i l l be frequent occasions when, i f a r a t i o n a l choice must be made through deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y , someone else must make the choice. Deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y also requires an awareness of the evolution of one's wants. If the c h i l d cannot engage i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y because she does not s a t i s f y the condition of deliberative competence the only other person who could engage i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y for the c h i l d i s the one who could be aware of the evolution of the child's wants, that i s the intimate provider. The intimate provider, recognizing the need for continuity i n the r a t i o n a l choices made on behalf of the c h i l d , necessarily engages i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y concerning the actions which w i l l determine the child's l i f e plan as i f the provider were the person the c h i l d w i l l become. Because she assumes this p o s i t i o n of 'the adult the c h i l d w i l l be,' the intimate provider w i l l expect to be treated by outsiders, including the remote provider, as i f the decisions she makes on the child's behalf, and the actions she 104 carries out i n l i n e with those decisions are the decisions and consequent actions of an adult engaged i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y . The variance and vagueness of deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y i s obvious. The notion of deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y , as posed by Sidgwick and adjusted by Rawls (4-5), applied to the choice of a l i f e plan, i s the choice of the actions that would f u l f i l l the decider's fundamental desires given a f u l l awareness of the consequences of a l l the possible courses of action. (Rawls 1971, pp. 416-7) One important decision that the deliberative person must make i s whether to continue deliberating. In the case of the intimate provider . deliberating for the c h i l d , where the c h i l d i s assumed to have no well-formed plan for the future, there i s no l o g i c a l requirement for the provider to continue deliberating beyond what she would deliberate for h e r s e l f . Therefore, once providers have decided what a reasonable l i f e plan would be for themselves i f they were i n the position of the c h i l d they have i n ef f e c t decided the l i f e plan for 'the adult the c h i l d w i l l be.' The remoteness of the remote provider prohibits involvement in the kind of ra t i o n a l deliberation carried out by the intimate provider acting as 'the adult the c h i l d w i l l be.' The remote provider must view the c h i l d as an in d i v i d u a l who, by r e a l i z i n g his own and other's nature to the f u l l e s t extent possible under the p r i n c i p l e s of ju s t i c e , contributes to the complexity of human a c t i v i t y which results i n increasing the enjoyment experienced by a l l . It i s therefore the differences from the l i f e plan of the intimate provider that are allowed under the p r i n c i p l e s of justice that the remote provider w i l l want to encourage. And yet where i t i s not acceptable to int e r f e r e i n the l i f e plan of an i n d i v i d u a l i t i s acceptable to int e r f e r e with someone else's l i f e plan for a t h i r d party unless the c h i l d and the intimate provider are taken to be one. If the c h i l d and the intimate provider are taken to be one the role of remote provider i s again diminished to that of supporter of the intimate provider, rather than an actual provider for the c h i l d . 4.6. J u s t i f i e d Interference Rawls argues that justice as fairness applies to a l l who have the capacity for a sense of j u s t i c e . Possession of a capacity for a sense of justice i s not synonymous with the a b i l i t y to engage i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y . Therefore, i n addition to the t h i r d p r i n c i p l e of paternalism which ensures that the p r i n c i p l e s of justice apply to those who are being subjected to p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference for t h e i r own good, there i s the additional p r i n c i p l e that justice as fairness applies to a l l who have the capacity for the sense of j u s t i c e . There i s no d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n that puts a p r i o r i t y on treating those who have a sense of justice more f a i r l y , or being more tolerant of them, than those who have not yet achieved a sense of j u s t i c e . Both those who have a sense of justice and those who are capable of a sense of justice are to be treated equally. There are two conceptions of equality that correlate with the two p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . The f i r s t conception of equality i s that related to the " d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods, some of which w i l l almost c e r t a i n l y give higher status or prestige to those 106 who are more favored..." (Rawls 1971, p.511) This conception relates to the second p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e . It i s the second p r i n c i p l e of justice which provides for the s o c i a l arrangements that r e s u l t i n a d i s t r i b u t i v e share of goods characterized by f a i r and e f f i c i e n t s o c i a l cooperation. The remote provider i s i n a p o s i t i o n to influence the s o c i a l arrangements i n providing services that w i l l compensate for the l i m i t i n g interferences of the intimate provider with respect to d i s t r i b u t i o n of goods. The second conception of equality refers to the equal right of each person, irrespective of s o c i a l p osition, to receive respect from every other person. This kind of equality i s prescribed not only by the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of j u s t i c e , but also by the natural duty of mutual respect, where respect i s owed to human beings as moral persons. It i s possible for the remote provider to determine i f the intimate provider i s treating the c h i l d as a separate moral being. The determining factor i s the measure of the p o s s i b i l i t y that 'the adult the c h i l d w i l l be' can be a conscientious refuser i n a case where the intimate provider would obey. Rawls gives s p e c i f i c attention to the problem of the conscientious refuser as part of his consideration of c i v i l disobedience. Rawls' analysis of conscientious r e f u s a l i s limited to consideration of the law of nations and the refusal of an i n d i v i d u a l to personally engage i n war between nations. (Rawls 1971, pp. 363-376) It i s possible to 'translate' Rawls' conceptions of c i v i l disobedience and conscientious refusal to the case of an emerging adult refusing to act i n a way that the respective intimate provider has decided i s the r a t i o n a l way to 107 act. In d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between c i v i l disobedience and conscientious refusal, Rawls uses the intention of the act of disobedience or r e f u s a l . Where the act i s carried out i n order to convince other members of the s o c i a l union that there should be a change, i t i s an act of c i v i l disobedience subject to s p e c i f i c q u a l i f i c a t i o n s outlined by Rawls. Where the act i s carr i e d out simply to avoid complying with the 'order' to act i n such a way, i t i s a case of conscientious r e f u s a l . Unlike the Nozickean world where the balking r e c r u i t could even decide to refuse membership altogether, i n the well-ordered society of the Rawlsian world there i s no option of 'dropping out.' Since the well-ordered society i s e s s e n t i a l l y r a t i o n a l anyone who attempted to drop out would obviously not be capable of managing his own a f f a i r s through deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y and would therefore require p a t e r n a l i s t i c intervention. Because of this 'forced conscription' property, i t i s extremely important that the right of members to question s p e c i f i c s within the well-ordered society be ensured. The need for the c h i l d to be raised i n such a way that he can be questioner i s therefore doubly important. If the 'adult who the c h i l d w i l l be' i s to have control over determining his plan of l i f e beyond that which the intimate provider has i n s t i l l e d i n him he must be capable of adjusting that l i f e plan i n ways that the intimate provider would not. I f the well-ordered society i s to be anything more than a s t a t i c s o c i a l union r e s u l t i n g from the o r i g i n a l POP, there must be an ongoing supply of emerging members who are capable of questioning what t h e i r ancestors have taken to be the r a t i o n a l choice. 108 I claimed above that i t i s possible for the remote provider to determine i f the intimate provider has l e f t 'maneuvering room' for the 'adult who the c h i l d w i l l be'. If the remote provider could wait u n t i l the c h i l d was an adult, then there would be no problem i n determining i f what the intimate provider did was correct. However, since the remote provider i s also a provider, his task i s to provide for the c h i l d and intervene with the intimate provider on the child's behalf at the time of the u n j u s t i f i e d interference. As pointed out above Rawls has suggested that the less we know the person the more we must r e l y on the basic structure to provide us with guidance for our p a t e r n a l i s i t i c actions. I conclude that the remote provider must necessarily act as he would for himself from the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . The remote provider i s therefore, according to Rawls, putting himself i n the place of the c h i l d but as i f the c h i l d was i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . The intimate provider, on the other hand, puts h e r s e l f i n the place of the c h i l d but the c h i l d as the adult that the intimate provider envisages. While the l i f e plan of the intimate provider i s supposedly a plan that i s consistent with the basic structure, i t may simply be a duplicate of her own plan and therefore not constitute the complexity of human a c t i v i t y . If the plan derived by the remote provider from consideration of the c h i l d i n the o r i g i n a l p o s ition i s not a duplicate plan then i t i s better and should be provided to the c h i l d . In the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n created by Rawls, i n order to ensure that the POP do not make decisions on the basis of knowledge that w i l l benefit them disproportionately, i t i s 109 necessary to have a v e i l of ignorance. The v e i l of ignorance must also be placed around the c h i l d i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . Given the remote provider's ignorance of the d e t a i l s of the child ' s wants and talents t h i s v e i l of ignorance i s not d i f f i c u l t to maintain i n the case where the remote provider i s assuming the role of the c h i l d i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n . The debate between the two providers i s now reduced to the same kind of debate which must occur within each in d i v i d u a l engaged i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y attempting to reach a r a t i o n a l choice. Where the remote provider viewing the action from the o r i g i n a l p o sition questions the intimate provider's interference with the c h i l d , the questions which are posed relate to the p r i n c i p l e s for r a t i o n a l choice. The questions are: (1). Are the means to the desired end the most e f f e c t i v e i n the sense of the most achievement for the least expenditure? (2). Does the plan for achievement of the end include a l l the desired aims plus others? (3). Does the plan chosen have the most l i k e l i h o o d of succeeding? (Rawls 1971, pp. 411-3) Not only are these the questions required to determine i f the actions are consistent with 'perfect procedural j u s t i c e , ' but they are also the questions used to determine i f the general p r i n c i p l e s of justice are s u f f i c i e n t with respect to the i n s t i t u t i o n of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . As I have indicated previously i t i s the 'having an opportunity' and the ' a b i l i t y to postpone' which are the factors which must be protected from unnecessary interference. It i s the second question above, the requirement that the plan be the most inc l u s i v e possible, that queries these c r i t i c a l areas. From the A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e we have the necessity of having 110 the c h i l d raised with a potential to perform the most complex of a c t i v i t i e s both for the child's good, and the good of the s o c i a l union. It i s to be expected, therefore, that the remote provider w i l l be es p e c i a l l y concerned with the issue of inclusiveness. 4.7. Rawls Summarized This concludes the examination of Rawls' theory of justice with respect to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . My notion of the two kinds of ch i l d - r a i s e r s necessary for c h i l d - r a i s i n g p a r a l l e l s Rawls' conception of the two aspects of the r a t i o n a l person who makes ra t i o n a l choices according to a plan of l i f e that i s governed by the POP's basic structure. The r a t i o n a l person i s , of course, able to step behind the v e i l of ignorance himself i n order to assume the role of POP. In the case of c h i l d - r a i s i n g , the intimate provider assumes the role of the person making r a t i o n a l choices according to a plan of l i f e , while the remote provider assumes the role of the c h i l d i n the POP. Nozick's analysis, by contrast, only allows for the intimate provider i n a very r e s t r i c t e d sense required by the child's right to engage an intimate provider for the purpose of correcting a misallocation of holdings. Clearly, since those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n accept p a t e r n a l i s t i c interference, they w i l l accept a much f u l l e r range of j u s t i f i e d interferences connected with c h i l d - r a i s i n g . I have argued that the j u s t i f i c a t i o n for p a t e r n a l i s t i c interferences i n the L i b e r a l position, i s limited by the same pr i n c i p l e s of 111 r a t i o n a l choice which govern the i n d i v i d u a l engaged i n deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y regarding t h e i r own plans and actions. This i s i n sharp contrast with those i n the Conservative position who relegate the r a i s i n g of children to an intimate relationship that i s generally beyond the scope of j u s t i f i c a t i o n of s o c i a l arrangements. As Ennis suggested the 'Conservative' sees the experiences of being raised from childhood as personal factors beyond the realm of outside interference. On the other hand, i n the case where the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g l i m i t the good available to 'the adult the c h i l d w i l l be, the 'Liberal' conceptualizes c h i l d - r a i s i n g as environmental. In the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n the r a t i o n a l deliberation i n which an i n d i v i d u a l engages becomes public for the c h i l d . Furthermore, there are two kinds of providers required, one to represent the personal l i f e plan and the other, the general POP plan. In the concluding section of Chapter One, I l i s t e d a series of points which I contend must be s a t i s f i e d by any general system of p r i n c i p l e s which claim to j u s t i f y the s o c i a l arrangements of our society. Consideration of these point i n r e l a t i o n to the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n as presented by Rawls indicates the following. It i s the t h i r d requirement of Rawls' basic structure, that which stipulates that a l l persons involved i n the c h i l d - r a i s i n g enterprise are subject to and therefore protected by the same general p r i n c i p l e s , which i s problematic. Clearly children are treated d i f f e r e n t l y . Rawls argues that the d i f f e r e n t treatment of the c h i l d i s necessarily accepted by the POP with no contradiction to the basic structure. The intimate provider i s also treated d i f f e r e n t l y . It i s not possible to claim that the p r i n c i p l e s of paternalism apply to the remote provider's overriding of the intimate provider's c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions. It i s my contention that i t i s i n the nature of the reason for r a i s i n g children, that i s the endowment of opportunities to children, that i t i s possible to base the argument for subjecting the intimate provider to the di r e c t i o n of the remote provider. This i s not, however, a suggestion that there i s a need to introduce special p r i n c i p l e s related to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . The endowment of opportunities to children i s simply a necessary anticipatory phase i n the recognition of the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of in d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . Where the intimate provider i s not endowing the c h i l d with the appropriate opportunities, she i s i n e f f e c t denying the i n v i o l a b i l i t y of the child's future i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s . She has no right to inter f e r e with the anticipated rights of the c h i l d . Therefore the interference of the remote provider with the intimate provider on behalf of the c h i l d i s the equivalent of any t h i r d party advocacy s i t u a t i o n . The general systems of p r i n c i p l e s posed by Nozick and Rawls have been examined from the perspective of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Neither system completely s a t i s f i e s the requirements for providing a sa t i s f a c t o r y set of action-guiding p r i n c i p l e s which are d i r e c t l y translatable to guiding our i n s t i t u t i o n s for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . The two systems combined do come very close to accounting for our commonsense notion of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . This i s not surprising given our reliance on both systems to explain the s o c i a l arrangements of our society i n general. Furthermore, i t is i n the points of c o n f l i c t between the th e o r e t i c a l positions that we can see the basis for the tensions which emerge when proponents of the two p o s i t i o n s attempt to a r r i v e at an agreement over a p o l i c y which i s r e q u i r e d t o guide the i n s t i t u t i o n s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . In the next chapter I w i l l touch on some of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n s t h a t are p e r t i n e n t t o any attempt to use both j u s t i f i c a t o r y systems c o n c u r r e n t l y . 114 Notes on Chapter Four 4-1 As with Nozick (note 3-1) I wish to point out that the p o l i t i c a l philosophy of t h i s chapter i s that of Rawls. My contribution i s a re-arrangement aimed at highl i g h t i n g the application of Rawls* basic structure to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . 4-2 The problem of determining the meaning of 1 i n the interest' of the c h i l d pervades discussions of paternalism. In the rest of t h i s chapter i t becomes clear that Rawls adopts two perspectives of the interests of the c h i l d . The f i r s t i s that of the intimate provider and i t r e l i e s on the special intimate knowledge of the i n d i v i d u a l c h i l d . The second i s that of the remote provider and i t i s limited to the ordinary knowledge we a l l have of the nature of people i n general. 4-3 Dworkin's p r i n c i p l e s of paternalism are good examples: 1. The burden of proof i s on the p a t e r n a l i s t i c agent. (a) the exact nature of the b e n e f i c i a l consequence and the harmful e f f e c t of the actions must be demonstrable. (b) the p r o b a b i l i t y of the occurrence of the effect must be high. 2. The least r e s t r i c t i v e p a t e r n a l i s t i c approach must be used. (Dworkin 1972) 115 4-4 The p r i n c i p l e s of r a t i o n a l decision-making as used by Rawls are: 1. e f f e c t i v e means - we are to adopt that action which r e a l i z e s the end i n the best way. 2. most inc l u s i v e - our actions must include the most additional benefits possible. 3. greater l i k e l i h o o d - we must select the action with the greatest p r o b a b i l i t y of success. (Rawls 1971, pp.411-3) 4-5 Sidgwick "... characterizes a person's future good on the whole as what he would now desire and seek i f the consequences of a l l the various courses of conduct open to him were, at the present point of time, accurately foreseen by him and adequately rea l i z e d i n imagination. An individual's good i s the hypothetical composition of impulsive forces that results from deliberative r e f l e c t i o n meeting certain conditions. Adjusting Sidgwick's notion to the choice of plans, we can say that the r a t i o n a l plan for a person i s the one (...) which he would choose with deliberative r a t i o n a l i t y . " (Rawls 1971, pp.416-7) and from Sidgwick The Methods of Ethics, 7th ed. (London, Macmillan, 1907), pp. l l l f . 116 CHAPTER FIVE LIMITS OF INTERFERENCE 5.1. "The Funnel of Childhood" deMause's psychogenic theory of history (deMause 1974, p.3) suggests the p o s s i b i l i t y that there may be some way of analyzing the "funnel of childhood" through which the psychic structure must pass from generation to generation. While the p o s s i b i l i t y of being able to describe the mechanism i s interesting i n i t s e l f , possession of the description w i l l not necessarily allow us to make any difference to the r a i s i n g of children now or i n the future. The poten t i a l to i n t e n t i o n a l l y raise children i n a way that w i l l produce a society that i s consistent with our moral and p o l i t i c a l b e l i e f s requires a j u s t i f i c a t i o n of our c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions i n terms that are consistent with the premises upon which our s o c i a l structure i s b u i l t . Where these premises are unanimously held by the members of the society the exercise should be one of r e l a t i v e l y straightforward deduction. In a p l u r a l i s t i c society such as ours i t appears to be overly optimistic to hope for a straightforward process. It would, however, be useful to have some idea of the location of the boundaries of the range of the actions for c h i l d - r a i s i n g j u s t i f i e d by the range of conceptions of j u s t i f i a b l e actions i n general. Let us assume for the moment with deMause that, "...a society's child-rearing practices are not just one item i n a l i s t of c u l t u r a l t r a i t s . They are the very condition for the transmission and development of a l l other c u l t u r a l elements, and place d e f i n i t e l i m i t s on what can be achieved i n a l l other spheres of history. S p e c i f i c childhood experiences must occur to sustain s p e c i f i c c u l t u r a l t r a i t s and once these experiences no longer occur the t r a i t disappears." (deMause 1974, p.3) There i s a r i s k that i n following t h i s assumption one w i l l s l i p into psychic determinism. For my purposes, however, i t i s only necessary to accept that what happens to a c h i l d during child-rearing affects what the child-become-adult does. Otherwise the interferences that the c h i l d - r a i s e r imposes on the c h i l d become inconveniences without import beyond the moment i n which they occur. It i s also necessary to acknowledge that c h i l d - r a i s e r s usually operate on thi s assumption. Otherwise, the c h i l d - r a i s e r i s i n t e r f e r i n g with the c h i l d with no consideration of what impact the interference may have on the c h i l d i n the future. This course, i s not to suggest that c h i l d - r a i s e r s , i n the heat of the moment, are always deliberating on the long-term impact of th e i r c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions. There i s , however, i n my experience, adequate evidence to suggest that the psychoanalytic t r a d i t i o n i s well established i n the sense that c h i l d - r a i s e r s generally accept that t h e i r c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions have an eff e c t on what t h e i r c h i l d w i l l eventually become. 118 5.2. Social Arrangements There i s another assumption that prevails among c h i l d - r a i s e r s . "The constraints of nature are recognized, but men are not powerless to shape t h e i r s o c i a l arrangements." (Rawls 1971, p.547) These assumptions are equivalent to the claim that the s o c i a l arrangements that people shape are d i r e c t l y influenced by the interferences they experienced while being raised from childhood. The s o c i a l arrangements that emerge from the sustained e f f o r t s of people w i l l f a l l into one of three categories. F i r s t , the s o c i a l arrangements could be negative for the i n d i v i d u a l who shapes them. Since my focus has been upon the c h i l d - r a i s e r who i s concerned with minimizing interferences necessary for c h i l d - r a i s i n g i t i s assumed that the c h i l d i s not being raised to create a self-oppressive s o c i a l arrangement. The negative s o c i a l arrangement i s the kind that the anarchist claims arises with any state. Nozick*s attempts to convince the anarchist of the harmless i n e v i t a b i l i t y of the minimal state would c e r t a i n l y not change the confirmed anarchist's mind. (Paul 1981, p.69) It i s therefore necessary to leave open the p o s s i b i l i t y that some c h i l d - r a i s e r s may convey the hegemony of a dominating group thus preparing t h e i r children to create a negative s o c i a l arrangement for themselves. (5-1) The fact that the c h i l d - r a i s i n g actions which would lead to t h i s kind of s o c i a l arrangement have been ignored i n t h i s essay i s not to be taken as an i n d i c a t i o n that there are not s i g n i f i c a n t issues to be investigated. Rather i t r e f l e c t s the omission i n Ennis' 119 analysis that there may be a case for i n t e r f e r i n g with both i n t e r i o r and exterior factors and ignoring most r e s t r i c t i o n s on f o c i for change. This would appear to be the p o s i t i o n of the r a d i c a l democrat. The second possible s o c i a l arrangement which people can create i s a neutral one. This i s the s o c i a l arrangement of the minimal state as described by Nozick. While the minimal state provides for the protection of the rights of the i n d i v i d u a l i t has no special powers that are beyond those of the i n d i v i d u a l . Nozick i s emphatic that h i s derivation of the minimal state prohibits any asymmetry of powers favoring the state. The r e s u l t i s a s o c i a l arrangement which neither adds nor takes away from the powers of the i n d i v i d u a l . It simply preserves the status quo. The t h i r d possible kind of s o c i a l arrangement i s the p o s i t i v e one as portrayed i n the i n s t i t u t i o n s necessary for upholding Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . The i n s t i t u t i o n s for d i s t r i b u t i v e justice have power i n addition to that of any i n d i v i d u a l . These i n s t i t u t i o n s must be able to a l l o c a t e , transfer, and d i s t r i b u t e goods and positions with respect to individuals as well as to s t a b i l i z e the value of holdings. Rawls argues that without these powers the i n s t i t u t i o n s would be unable to ensure f a i r equality of opportunity through r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of wealth. Once there i s a s o c i a l arrangement i t i s important to know how the power i s d i s t r i b u t e d between individuals and groups. There are again three possible sit u a t i o n s . F i r s t , the i n d i v i d u a l can be taken to count for nothing. In t h i s case, the 120 group i s the entity which must be preserved. While examples of t h i s abound i n the non-human world i t i s more d i f f i c u l t to give a clear-cut example for humans. However th i s kind of thing occurs i n team sports where the fate of the i n d i v i d u a l i s meaningless except i n terms of the team's success. The second possible r e l a t i v e status for the i n d i v i d u a l occurs where there i s some kind of balancing between the good of individuals and the good of the group as a whole. This i s c l e a r l y a s i t u a t i o n with which we are a l l f a m i l i a r and i t i s the one systematized by Rawls' p r i n c i p l e s of j u s t i c e . The t h i r d status of individuals i s that where the individuals are the only entity with si g n i f i c a n c e . In t h i s s i t u a t i o n , which i s close to that described by Nozick, there i s no status ascribed to the group only to each i n d i v i d u a l collected into the group. Out of the nine possible combinations of benefit to the creating i n d i v i d u a l and r e l a t i v e status of the i n d i v i d u a l with respect to the group we have considered only two i n t h i s essay. (5-2) From Nozick we get the case where the i n d i v i d u a l i s i n e f f e c t the only entity with s i g n i f i c a n c e . A group cannot acquire any more power or significance than an i n d i v i d u a l , with the r e s u l t that the s o c i a l arrangement was neutral with respect to providing benefits to the i n d i v i d u a l . Rawls on the other hand allows the contractual, c o n s t i t u t i o n a l arrangements of the POP to create a s o c i a l arrangement which attempts to balance the power of the i n d i v i d u a l and the group. Different kinds of power are allocated to each i n order to ensure that the p r i n c i p l e s of justice are upheld. The r e s u l t of t h i s s o c i a l arrangement i s argued by Rawls to be p o s i t i v e for a l l representative i n d i v i d u a l s . ( 5 - 3 ) 5.3. The L o w e r L i m i t s f r o m N o z i c k A t t h e l o w e r b o u n d a r y , where t h e r e i s t h e l e a s t a l l o w a b l e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h t h e i n d i v i d u a l b e i n g r a i s e d , i t was n e c e s s a r y t o p r o p o s e a c l a r i f i c a t i o n o f N o z i c k ' s p r i n c i p l e o f c o m p e n s a t i o n i n o r d e r t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e s t a t e j u s t i f i e d b y a j u s t h i s t o r y was r e a s o n a b l y c l o s e t o t h e a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s o f h o l d i n g s and p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n t h a t s t a t e . T h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n , w h i c h I c a l l e d t h e ' a d j u s t m e n t c l a u s e , ' a l l o w e d t h e l e s s w e l l - o f f p e r s o n t o c r e a t e a s o c i a l a r r a n g e m e n t i n w h i c h he c o u l d engage i n a r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h a b e t t e r - o f f p e r s o n f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e l i c i t i n g t h e e n a c t m e n t o f t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t r a n s f e r i n o r d e r t o r e d i s t r i b u t e t h e w e a l t h b e t w e e n t h e two p e o p l e i n v o l v e d . F o r t h e c h i l d b e i n g r a i s e d t h i s e n s u r e s t h a t t h e r e i s an i n t i m a t e p r o v i d e r a v a i l a b l e t o t r a n s f e r t h e h o l d i n g s and p o s i t i o n s n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t h a t t h e c h i l d h a s t h e o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e a c h a l e v e l w h i c h a p p r o x i m a t e s t h a t w h i c h t h e g e n e r a l l y a c c e p t e d j u s t i f y i n g h i s t o r y e s t a b l i s h e s . The r e l a t i o n s h i p b e t w e e n t h e p a r e n t and c h i l d i s b e y o n d t h e i n f l u e n c e o f o t h e r s . T h e r e i s o n l y a v e r y l i m i t e d r o l e f o r r e m o t e p r o v i d e r s i n t h e N o z i c k e a n s t a t e . The r e m o t e p r o v i d e r o r o u t s i d e r c a n h a v e a c c e s s t o t h e c h i l d f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e n c o u r a g i n g t h e c h i l d t o ' j o i n up.' Any o t h e r i n t e r f e r e n c e b y t h e r e m o t e p r o v i d e r i s u n j u s t i f i a b l e f o r t h o s e i n t h e C o n s e r v a t i v e p o s i t i o n . C h i l d - r a i s i n g i s e s s e n t i a l l y a n i n t i m a t e a s s o c i a t i o n t o w h i c h t h e c h i l d i s e n t i t l e d , a n d i n w h i c h one c a n r e a s o n a b l y e x p e c t t h e p r i n c i p l e o f t r a n s f e r t o be i n v o k e d t o r e d i s t r i b u t e t h e p a r e n t ' s h o l d i n g s 122 to the c h i l d . If the parent does not redi s t r i b u t e wealth through use of the p r i n c i p l e of transfer the c h i l d i s e n t i t l e d to establish relationships with others who have an excess of holdings, with the hope that the new provider w i l l transfer some of his holdings to the c h i l d . In the case where the parent claims that they are less well-off than they should be according to the j u s t i f y i n g t a l e , they, i n turn, may exercise t h e i r adjustment clause with respect to some other person who i s better-off and i n turn may transfer t h e i r newly acquired holdings to t h e i r c h i l d . In the case where an association does not re s u l t i n a transfer of holdings, the less well-off i n d i v i d u a l may look for other better-off individuals with whom to form a relationship. The only exception to t h i s i s where the better-off person has acquired the holding under consideration unjustly from the less well-off person. In such a case, the d i r e c t - l i n k sense of the p r i n c i p l e of compensation mandates that there be some re a l l o c a t i o n between the two involved. What kind of interferences with children, r e s u l t i n g from c h i l d - r a i s i n g , are j u s t i f i e d at the lower boundary? Except i n the case where the c h i l d i s better-off than the c h i l d - r a i s e r and has reached that state by i n f r i n g i n g on the rights of the c h i l d - r a i s e r , there i s no j u s t i f i c a t i o n for interference with the c h i l d . Does t h i s mean that the intimate provider has no power to influence the child? Certainly not 1 When one considers the power inherent i n the p r i n c i p l e of transfer, i t i s clear that the parent or intimate provider i s e n t i t l e d to influence the c h i l d by transferring whatever holdings or positions they possess as long as the c h i l d retains the right to refuse or postpone the transfer. The intimate provider must transfer her entitlements over to the c h i l d i n such a way that, while i t probably w i l l not come to pass, i t i s always possible for the c h i l d to become a conscientious objector with respect to those entitlements gained during childhood. 5.4. Upper Limits from Rawls At the upper end of the scale of interference with the c h i l d i n the process of c h i l d - r a i s i n g , i t i s i n the balancing of the providers' power that the l i m i t s to j u s t i f i a b l e interference are detectible. The perspective of each kind of provider, the intimate and the remote, determines the power and the l i m i t s of interference for each. The intimate provider i s , as one would expect, intimately involved with the c h i l d and capable of making reasonable assumptions as to the immediate needs of the c h i l d . Since these needs are seen from the perspective of the intimate provider, the less immediate the need the more the provider assumes the p o s i t i o n of the 'adult the c h i l d w i l l be.' The r e s u l t of t h i s prospective perspective (5-4) i s that the intimate provider a c t u a l l y establishes the child's l i f e plan. It i s assumed that the selection of the child's l i f e plan i s based on the same p r i n c i p l e s from the o r i g i n a l p o sition and the same kinds of r a t i o n a l choices as the provider's l i f e plan. Therefore i t can be assumed that there i s no basis for i n t e r f e r i n g with the c h i l d - r a i s e r on the basis of her plan not agreeing with the basic structure. The remote provider has a very d i f f e r e n t perspective on the 124 c h i l d and therefore on the interferences required for c h i l d - r a i s i n g . Due to lack of intimate knowledge, the remote provider must assume the position of the c h i l d i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n i n order to adjudicate on the intimate provider's l i f e plan for the c h i l d . The A r i s t o t e l i a n P r i n c i p l e , the prime p r i n c i p l e j u s t i f y i n g the well-ordered society as a s o c i a l union, places a premium on the complexity of human a c t i v i t y within the s o c i a l union and within i n d i v i d u a l l i f e plans. In s t r i v i n g to s a t i s f y t h i s p r i n c i p l e , the remote provider i s concerned with the li m i t a t i o n s on the opportunities made available to the c h i l d . For the c h i l d to engage i n a high l e v e l of complexity i n human a c t i v i t i e s , the limi t a t i o n s of the intimate provider must be surpassed. Where the intimate provider establishes the l i f e plan for the 'adult the c h i l d w i l l be' with allowance for the c h i l d to grow beyond that plan or at least opt for a di f f e r e n t plan, the remote provider can be s a t i s f i e d that the provisions of the basic structure are being met for the c h i l d . In the case, however, where the intimate provider establishes a r e s t r i c t i v e l i f e plan for the c h i l d , i t i s within the power of the remote provider to int e r f e r e with the intimate provider i n order to remove the r e s t r i c t i o n s of the l i f e plan. This power of the remote provider ensures that the opportunity aspect of the theory of primary goods i s made available to a l l children. 125 5.5. P o s i t i o n a l Prohibitions 5.5.1. Conservative Child-Raisers The p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g which I have derived from the p o l i t i c a l philosophies of the Conservative and L i b e r a l positions, each e n t a i l prohibitions for c h i l d - r a i s e r s . An analysis of these prohibitions reveals that, where c h i l d - r a i s e r s are consistent i n t h e i r application of the p r i n c i p l e s of action i n general, they must accept the a d m i s s i b i l i t y of more than one kind of c h i l d - r a i s e r for each c h i l d . Furthermore, since the acceptance of the general p r i n c i p l e s of action necessarily e n t a i l s that the same p r i n c i p l e s apply to other individuals, then the c h i l d - r a i s e r s i n each po s i t i o n must accept the l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y of the 'other kind' of provider 'in t e r f e r i n g ' with t h e i r own e f f o r t s to raise any p a r t i c u l a r c h i l d . F i n a l l y , within the two p o l i t i c a l philosophies examined the degree of paternalism accepted applies equally to the c h i l d and the intimate provider. I have argued that those i n the Conservative p o s i t i o n must accept some device for correcting 'misallocations' beyond the kinds that can be dealt with through dyadic compensation or r e t r i b u t i o n schemes. To t h i s end, I have proposed the 'adjustment clause.' The acceptance of t h i s measure imposes a duty on better-off individuals to allow less well-off individuals to engage them in an intimate relationship for the purpose of allowing the p r i n c i p l e of transfer to occur. A provider who has allowed a c h i l d , as a less well-off person, to 126 employ the adjustment clause with them, because the relationship i s personal, i s beyond the reach of interference by any remote providers. The remote provider may, however, i n i t i a t e a relationship d i r e c t l y with the c h i l d . In a case where the intimate provider i s r e s t r i c t i n g the opportunities available to the c h i l d , to the extent that the c h i l d may not join up with the rest of the individuals i n the minimal state, any remote provider who wishes may seek to provide the c h i l d with a greater breadth of opportunities as an incentive to 'join up.' Thus i n the Conservative p o s i t i o n while the providers are not subject to any special kind of interference neither i s the c h i l d . There i s a sense, however, i n which the remote provider's access to the c h i l d i s an interference i n the actions of c h i l d - r a i s i n g carried out by the intimate provider. Furthermore, the more r e s t r i c t i v e the intimate provider, the more extensive the remote providers e f f o r t s at convincing w i l l have to be. In other words, the more the intimate provider attempts to r e s t r i c t the options of the c h i l d , the more the remote provider w i l l have to explain the options to membership i n the minimal state, i n such a way that the c h i l d w i l l make a knowledgeable decision to 'join up.' This whole point hinges on the premise that i n order to maintain the strong formulation of i n d i v i d u a l rights, i t i s necessary that the r e c r u i t s have the opportunity to opt out of the minimal state. This option w i l l not usually be exercised because the re c r u i t s know better. 127 5.5.2. L i b e r a l Child-Raisers For those i n the L i b e r a l p o sition the d i s t i n c t i o n between the two kinds of providers i s clear. It r e f l e c t s the aspects of the i n d i v i d u a l adult engaged i n making a r a t i o n a l choice. The intimate provider i s primarily concerned with the determination of the chil d ' s l i f e plan and the actions required to give the c h i l d the opportunity to f u l f i l l that plan. The remote provider i s p r i m arily concerned with ensuring that the l i f e plan selected for each c h i l d i s the least r e s t r i c t i v e possible. This concern also extends to the actions used to prepare the c h i l d for using the available opportunities. The remote provider assumes the perspective of the c h i l d i n the o r i g i n a l p o s i t i o n i n order to determine the appropriateness of the intimate provider's actions. Due to the d i f f i c u l t y for the parent i n assuming the po s i t i o n of the c h i l d behind the v e i l of ignorance i n the o r i g i n a l p osition, there i s a strong p o s s i b i l i t y of basic misunderstandings between the two kinds of providers i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n . As one would expect, i n a p o l i t i c a l philosophy that accepts the p r i n c i p l e s of paternalism, and empowers the s o c i a l union with power greater than that possessed by individuals, i n the case of a dispute between providers, the remote provider w i l l p r e v a i l , since he i s operating from the perspective of the basic structure. Thus, while those i n the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n have more c l e a r l y defined powers of interference for the purposes of c h i l d - r a i s i n g , they also are subjected to more di r e c t interferences from other providers for the same c h i l d . 128 5.6. Combinations of Positions 5.6.1. Endowing with Opportunity Before I examine the e f f e c t of combinations of providers from the two positions, i t i s necessary to summarize the p r i n c i p l e s that guide c h i l d - r a i s i n g for each p o s i t i o n . As I argued i n Chapter One and Chapter Two, the underlying notion i n c h i l d - r a i s i n g i s that of providing the c h i l d with opportunities. Therefore, i t i s i n the p r i n c i p l e s of opportunity from each of the Conservative and L i b e r a l positions that I take the p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d - r a i s i n g . In the Conservative position the c h i l d - r a i s i n g versions of the p r i n c i p l e s of opportunity are: f i r s t , the c h i l d i s raised not only so that she can establish her own s o c i a l arrangements, but also so that she can engage i n an intimate relationship i n order to acquire a share of the available holdings i n preparation for being an adult. Second, the c h i l d must be raised i n such a way as to be able to opt i n or out of s o c i a l arrangements acquired during c h i l d - r a i s i n g . For the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n , the p r i n c i p l e s of opportunity i n terms of children are: f i r s t , any s o c i a l arrangement must be to the advantage of the least w e l l - o f f . Second, opting i n or out of a position i s dependent on there being equal opportunity to a t t a i n the po s i t i o n for a l l . 129 5.6.2. The Combinations The f i n a l point to be examined i s the significance of incompatibility between the two positions with respect to c h i l d - r a i s i n g . There are four possible combinations of providers. It can be assumed that i n the two cases where the intimate and remote providers are both from the same position, they w i l l hold the same p r i n c i p l e s . There are two other cases. The f i r s t , i n which the remote provider i s from the Conservative position, and the intimate provider i s from the L i b e r a l position presents no serious c o n f l i c t s . While the L i b e r a l intimate provider would accept interference from the remote provider, the Conservative remote provider only feels obliged to attempt to convince the c h i l d of the benefits of f i t t i n g i n and 'joining up.' If the intimate provider requires the remote providers' assistance, she can u t i l i z e the adjustment clause to put herself in a po s i t i o n to have entitlements transferred to her, which she in turn can transfer to the c h i l d . The second case of mixed positions i s problematic. In t h i s combination, the intimate provider i s from the Conservative position, and the remote provider i s from the L i b e r a l p o s i t i o n . The remote provider expects to be able to adjudicate on the intimate providers actions, i n the case where the c h i l d i s not being given ample opportunity, while the intimate provider expects no di r e c t outside interference. This c o n f l i c t , however i s a c o n f l i c t between the adults. Where the remote provider i s aware of the significance of the Conservative position, he can provide the c h i l d with the opportunity to exercise the 130 adjustment clause i n order to ensure that the c h i l d receives the required opportunities. In t h i s case, while the motivation of the L i b e r a l remote provider i s not that assumed by the intimate provider, the process, while roundabout, reaches the same goal -providing the c h i l d with the opportunities required to p a r t i c i p a t e i n the complexity of human a c t i v i t y . In conclusion, i t has been demonstrated that i t i s possible to derive p r i n c i p l e s of c h i l d r a i s i n g from p o l i t i c a l philosophies of the L i b e r a l and Conservative positions. Furthermore, i t has been v e r i f i e d that the positions e n t a i l divergent p r i n c i p l e s for d i r e c t i n g value judgments concerning the appropriateness of actions preparing children to have opportunities. However, i t has been shown that i t i s possible to conceive of a c h i l d being raised by c h i l d - r a i s e r s from the d i f f e r e n t positions, who are able to act so that the c h i l d i s raised i n such a way that the c h i l d - r a i s i n g p r i n c i p l e s of both positions are s a t i s f i e d . 131 Notes on Chapter Five 5-1 A good example of t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y i s the basis for the work by F r e i r e i n Pedagogy of the Oppressed. The strength of the "culture of silence" as explained by F r e i r e i s derived from the "duality of the oppressed: they (the oppressed) are contradictory, divided beings, shaped by and existing i n a concrete s i t u a t i o n of oppression and violence" (Freire 1983, p.40) It seems to me that although the 'pedagogy of the oppressed' r e l i e s on the p o s s i b i l i t y of the oppressed discovering the equivalent of Rawls' o r i g i n a l position, Freire recognizes a much stronger movement against justice as fairness than Rawls seems prepared to acknowledge. 5-2 The nine p o s s i b i l i t i e s referred to a r i s e from considering the combinations of the three kinds of levels of benefit to the i n d i v i d u a l a r i s i n g from the s o c i a l arrangement that i n d i v i d u a l i s creating, with the three ratios of power between the i n d i v i d u a l and the group. 5-3 One of the c r i t i c i s m s to which Rawls must be subjected i s his reliance on the 'representative man.' 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