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The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, 1942-1945 Steeves, Kerry Ragnar 1990

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T H E PACIFIC COAST MILITIA R A N G E R S , 1942-1945  By Kerry Ragnar Steeves B. A. (History), University of British Columbia, 1986  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF  M A S T E R OF ARTS  in  THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES (HISTORY)  We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA  September 1990  © Kerry Ragnar Steeves, 1990  National Library of Canada  Bibliotheque nationale du Canada  Canadian Theses Service  Service des theses canadiennes  Ottawa. Canada Kt A 0N4  The author has granted an irrevocable nonexclusive licence allowing the National Library of Canada to reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of his/her thesis by any means and in any form or format, making this thesis available to interested persons.  L'auteur a accorde une licence irrevocable et non exclusive'permettant a la Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, preter, distribuer ou vendre des copies de sa these de quelque maniere et sous quelque forme que ce soit pour mettre des exemplaires de cette these a la disposition des personnes interessees.  The author retains ownership of the copyright in his/her thesis. Neither the thesis nor substantial extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her permission.  L'auteur conserve la propriete du droit d'auteur qui protege sa these. Ni la these ni des extraits substantias de celle-ci ne doivent etre imprimes ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation.  ISBN 0-315-53879-6  Canada  In  presenting  degree  this  at the  thesis  in  partial  fulfilment  University  of  British Columbia,  freely available for reference and study. copying  of  department publication  this thesis or  by  his  for or  scholarly her  of  for  an  I further agree that permission for  purposes  may be  representatives.  advanced  It  is  granted  by the  understood  that  extensive  head of  my  copying  or  of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written  (Signature)  Department  of  History  The University of British Columbia Vancouver, Canada  DE-6 (2/88)  requirements  I agree that the Library shall make it  permission.  Date  the  September 19,  1990  Abstract  For Canadians the Second World War traditionally evokes images of the invasion of Normandy, the Falaise Gap, and the ill-fated raid on Dieppe.  Over the years Canadians  who served overseas have been recognized but, at the same time, soldiers w h o served on the home front have been overlooked. This is because many of Canada's h o m e defence soldiers were conscripted under the National Resources Mobilization A c t , and were unwilling t o go overseas.  Thousands of Canadians, however, were denied entry into the  regular forces because they were t o o old, t o o young, or classified as medically unfit. In British Columbia during the Second World War, these men were given the opportunity t o enlist in a unique h o m e guard unit called the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers ( P . C . M . R . ) . T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were organized in response t o public pressure, and because existing coastal defences were inadequate. C o m p o s e d of unpaid volunteers trained in guerilla tactics, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were a h o m e defence force peculiar to British Columbia. T h e Rangers were not a typical military organization. Rather, they were a distinctively North American fighting force in the tradition of previous Ranger formations. A sense of historical tradition was evident in the designation of "Rangers" for British Columbia's Second World War guerilla h o m e defence volunteers.  In North  , America, since the 1700s, men b o m in and acquainted with the hinterland-frontiersmen, hunters, cowboys, and trappers proficient in the use of  firearms-have  been formed into  irregular Ranger units in times of emergency. There is a long list of these North American Ranger organizations: Rogers' Rangers in the French and Indian War; Butler's Loyalist Rangers, the East Florida Rangers, and the Queen's Rangers in the American Revolution; the Frontier Battalion of the Texas Rangers in the revolution against Mexican  ii  authority; Mosby's Rangers in the U.S. Civil War; and the R o c k y Mountain Rangers in the Northwest Rebellion. T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were the twentieth century revival of this Ranger tradition.  Throughout history, all Ranger units have used the  same tactics: they employed guerilla warfare with an emphasis on surprise attacks, they operated in small units which were highly mobile, and they focussed on rifle training. A lack of formal military discipline has also been characteristic of all Ranger formations. T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, then, were not an innovation in the Canadian military experience. T h e y were part of a distinct military tradition of irregular troops adapted t o suit North American frontier conditions. T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers reflected the character, fears, and internal conflicts of British Columbia's society. British Columbia was a predominantly white community and the P . C . M . R . mirrored the widespread white ethnic prejudices in the province. Ethnic groups were largely excluded f r o m the Rangers and Native Indians, w h o were accepted as valuable recruits, were treated in a paternalistic manner. Militant trade unionism has been an important facet of B . C . history, and trade unionists were prominent in the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Trade unions fully supported the P . C . M . R . and Ranger membership was dominated by the working class. T h e labour movement's influence in the P . C . M . R . can b e seen in the anxiety over the possible employment of Ranger units t o break strikes. T h e role of war veterans in the P . C . M . R . also reflected the composition of the larger society. First World War veterans were a well-defined group in B . C . society, and their values and outlook were revealed through their Ranger participation. T h e veterans' zeal and rivalry with younger Rangers indicates that their patriotism was, at times, misguided, but it was rooted in a personal need to play a visible role in the war effort. T h e P . C . M . R . operated in a democratic manner: if the commander of a Ranger c o m • pany was disliked by his men, he could b e voted out of his position. Similarly, if Rangers  iii  disagreed with directives f r o m P . C . M . E . headquarters they were quick t o express their displeasure and threatened resignation. This would have been impossible in the regular army, but in the P . C . M . R . - c o m p o s e d of citizen-soldiers-it was a c o m m o n p l a c e pattern. T h e social equality between ranks, and the egalitarian way in which the P . C . M . R . operated expressed the New World frontier values of British Columbia in the 1940s. T h e wartime fears and phobias of British Columbians showed in the actions of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers.  Life in British Columbia during the early years of the  Second World War was, for the most part, as secure as life in other regions of Canada. This was changed, however, with the b o m b i n g of Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. T h e aggressiveness of Japan and the stunning success of her war machine, caused panic in the Pacific Coast province about the vulnerability of B . C . t o an attack.  In addition,  the war sharpened the already existing white racial animosity against the Japanese, and _ provided a socially acceptable outlet for its expression. W h i t e British Columbia has had a history of fear of Asians and, subsequently, anti-Orientalism has been a current in the province's culture. In much the same way that anti-Japanese sentiment forced the federal government t o intern and evacuate British Columbia's Japanese population, so t o o did public outcry prompt the formation of local h o m e guard units. These two problems-the defence of British Columbia and anti-Japanese sentiment-became manifest in the history of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Prom the Dominion government's viewpoint, the P . C . M . R . was a valuable organization. T h e Rangers provided military protection at a low cost, but they also comforted a frightened  population which demanded protection f r o m a Japanese invasion. It will b e  argued here that while the main purpose of the P . C . M . R . was home defence, the organization b e c a m e much more than that t o b o t h the government and the people of British Columbia.  Quite apart f r o m its defence role, the P . C . M . R . provided reassurance, sus-  tained the morale of a population at war, and acted as a means to indoctrinate civilians  iv  with military propaganda.  v  Table of Contents  Abstract Acknowledgement 1  The Ranger Tradition  2  Formation  3  Membership  4  Training and Tactics  5  The Japanese Menace  6  Decline of the Ranger Empire  7  Conclusion  Bibliography Appendices A List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies  vi  List of Tables  3.1  Occupations of Rangers in Number 73 Company. Source: H o p e Museum Archives, P C M R file, applications for enlistment  vii  List of Figures  3.1  Rangers owning automobiles in No.  71 Coy.  (Penticton), No.  73 Coy.  ( H o p e ) , No. 90 C o y (Burnaby North), and No. 105 Coy. (Masset)  35  3.2  Rangers owning automobiles in Number 73 Coy., B y Detachment  36  3.3  A g e Distribution in Number 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , B y Decade of Birth.  3.4  A g e Distribution in Number 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , B y Year of Birth  3.5  A g e Distribution in Number 105 Coy. (Masset), B y Decade of Birth.  39  3.6  A g e Distribution in Number 71 Coy. (Penticton), B y Decade of Birth.  39  3.7  A g e Distribution in Number 90 Coy. (Burnaby North), B y Decade of Birth. 40  3.8  Rangers with military service prior to enlistment in No. 71 Coy. (Pentic-  . .  38 38  t o n ) , No. 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , No. 90 Coy. (Burnaby North), and No. 105 Coy.  3.9  (Masset)  40  Religious Denomination in Number 73 Coy. ( H o p e )  51  3.10 Religious Denomination in Number 105 Coy. (Masset)  51  3.11 Religious Denomination in Number 71 C o m p a n y (Penticton)  52  3.12 Religious Denomination in Number 90 C o m p a n y (Burnaby North).  . . .  52  3.13 Marital Status in Number 73 C o m p a n y ( H o p e )  53  3.14 Marital Status in Number 105 C o m p a n y (Masset)  53  3.15 Marital Status in Number 71 C o m p a n y (Penticton)  54  3.16 Marital Status in Number 90 C o m p a n y (Burnaby North)  54  3.17 Ranger recruits owning firearms prior to enlistment in No. 71 Coy. (Penticton), No. 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , No. 90 Coy. (Burnaby North), and No. 105 Coy. (Masset)  60  vm  6.18 Combined Monthly Strength Returns of all P . C . M . R . units f r o m O c t o b e r 1942 to August 1945  102  6.19 Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Vancouver Island P . C . M . R . c o m panies, October 1942 to August 1945  1UJ  6.20 Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Lower Mainland P . C . M . R . c o m panies, October 1942 to August 1945 6.21 Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Thompson-Okanagan P . C . M . R . companies, October 1942 to August 1945  104  6.22 Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Cariboo-Northern Interior-Yukon P . C . M . R . companies, O c t o b e r 1942 t o August 1945  104  6.23 Combined Monthly Strength Returns for North Coast-Queen Charlotte Islands P . C . M . R . companies, October 1942 t o August 1945  105  6.24 Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Kootenay P . C . M . R . companies, October 1942 t o August 1945  105  6.25 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 73 C o m p a n y ( H o p e ) , October 1942 t o August 1945  122  6.26 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 32 C o m p a n y (Parksville), October 1942 t o August 1945  125  6.27 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 45 C o m p a n y (Salmon A r m ) , O c tober 1942 t o August 1945  126  6.28 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 51 C o m p a n y (Armstrong), October 1942 t o August 1945  126  6.29 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 59 Company (Port Hardy), October 1942 t o August 1945  127  6.30 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 67 C o m p a n y (Vernon), October 1942 to August 1945  127  IX  6.31 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 46 C o m p a n y (Peachland), October 1942 to August 1945  128  6.32 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 123 C o m p a n y ( A h o u s a t ) , October 1942 to August 1945  128  6.33 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 130 C o m p a n y (Nass River), October 1942 t o August 1945  129  6.34 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 137 C o m p a n y (Vanderhoof), O c tober 1942 to August 1945  I29  6.35 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 134 C o m p a n y ( W o o d f i b r e ) , O c t o ber 1942 to August 1945  130  6.36 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 24 C o m p a n y ( T s o l u m ) , October 1942 t o August 1945  130  6.37 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 89 C o m p a n y (Burnaby South), October 1942 t o August 1945  131  6.38 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 22 C o m p a n y (Cumberland), O c t o ber 1942 t o August 1943  13 8  6.39 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 23 C o m p a n y (Courtenay), October 1942 t o August 1945  !38  6.40 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 55 C o m p a n y (Englewood), October 1942 to August 1945  140  6.41 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 136 C o m p a n y (Pinchi Lake), O c tober 1942 t o August 1945  141  6.42 Monthly Strength Returns for Number 128 C o m p a n y (Deep Cove), October 1942 t o August 1945  14 2  x  Acknowledgements  In the research and writing of this thesis I have received kind assistance f r o m many people. From the U . B . C . Department of History, I would like t o thank Jean Barman, Peter Ward, and David Breen for their helpful comments. I am indebdted t o many archivists and museum curators w h o were of great assistance: Veatrice Nystrom ( H o p e and District Historical Society); the staff of the Department of National Defence's Directorate of History; Glenn Wright (Public Archives of Canada); Brian A . Young ( B . C . Provincial Archives); Lori C. Brickenden (Penticton Museum and Archives); Irene Ross (Campbell River Museum and Archives); F . D . W . Nelson and W . Freeman Anderson ( C . F . B . Esquimalt Museum Society); R . L . Clapp (5th B . C . , R . C . A . Regiment, Museum and Archives Society); Barbara J. Sheppard (Prince Rupert Regional Archives); and Anne W . Holt (Alberni District Historical Society). M y parents, themselves b o t h knowledgeable historians, have always offered support and encouragement. I would also like t o express m y gratitude t o Doug Charlton, Martin Hoornaert, Donna Jekabson, and Jason Steeves, w h o all assisted in different ways. A n toinette Sabatini helped proofread the manuscript and was a constant source of thoughtful criticism. A travel grant f r o m the University of Manitoba's J.S. Ewart Memorial Fund financed research in Ottawa. I also wish to thank the many ex-Rangers and others w h o shared their wartime memories with me. T h e y are all acknowledged in the bibliography, but special thanks are due t o Ed Aldridge, C . R . Anderson, Walt Cousins, J . W . Fraser, Jim Kingsley, Hugh Sutherland, and Donald G. Sword.  xi  M y deepest gratitude, however, is reserved for m y brother Alan, and m y thesis supervisor Peter M o o g k . Alan was always available when I needed his computer expertise, and he worked many hours preparing the graphs and the final manuscript.  Finally, I  would like to thank Peter M o o g k w h o guided m e through this project with sound advice and, at all times, with a g o o d sense of humour.  xii  Chapter 1  The Ranger Tradition  T h e Canadian military tradition d e p e n d s u p o n irregular citizen-soldiers as m u c h as it does u p o n a regular professional army. T h e legacy of t h e amateur soldier in C a n a d a extends b a c k t o N e w France, and the militia units raised in the seventeenth century t o protect the n e w colony. W i t h i n this tradition of the part-time soldier, lies a distinctive group of irregulars k n o w n as Rangers. T h e n a m e " R a n g e r " is an historical t e r m that surfaces time and time again in the annals o f N o r t h A m e r i c a n military history.  Visions of the  intrepid Ranger frontier fighter o v e r c o m i n g great o d d s and superior forces are c o m m o n t o novels, c o m i c b o o k s , movies, television and, in general, t o the m y t h o l o g y of the N e w W o r l d . For e x a m p l e , the fictional work of K e n n e t h R o b e r t s , and the dramatic historical narratives o f Francis P a r k m a n have romanticized the exploits o f R o g e r s ' Rangers. 1  In  like manner, the Texas Rangers were immortalized through d i m e novels and Saturday m o v i e matinees o f N o r t h A m e r i c a n society in the 1930s. 2 T h e story of the Rangers in colonial British N o r t h A m e r i c a usually begins with R o b e r t Rogers and his famous b a n d o f irregular wilderness fighters. T h e t e r m " R a n g e r , " however, did not originate w i t h Rogers. Ranger companies, in f a c t , h a d existed ten years b e f o r e Rogers raised his first unit in 1755.  T h e earliest Rangers were active in the northern  British colonies t o protect the settlements "against the skulking parties of the e n e m y . " 3 1  Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962); Kenneth Roberts, Northwest Passage (Toronto: Doubleday, Doran and Company, 1937). 2 For more on the Ranger myth as it pertains to the Texas Rangers see Julian Samora et al., Gunpowder Justice: A Reassessment of the Texas Rangers (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979). 3 H.M. Jackson, Rogers' Rangers: A History (n.p., 1953), 8.  1  Chapter 1.  2  The Ranger Tradition  A t the same time, G o r h a m ' s Independent C o m p a n y of Rangers served in Nova Scotia. 4 Nevertheless, according t o Stewart Bull, R o b e r t Rogers p e r f e c t e d the "organization and m e t h o d s " that m a d e Rangers a distinctive frontier fighting force.® T h e creation of R o g e r s ' Rangers was, in part, the result o f the disastrous defeat of a British f o r c e , led b y General E d w a r d B r a d d o c k , at the battle of the M o n o n g a h e l a . In this battle, at the outset of the French and Indian W a r in 1755, B r a d d o c k ' s c o l u m n of regular infantry was a m b u s h e d b y a c o m b i n e d f o r c e of French and Indians. Half o f B r a d d o c k ' s m e n were killed which led m a n y later writers, including Ernest and Trevor D u p u y , t o c o n c l u d e that the "rigid linear formations of E u r o p e a n warfare" were ineffective against " t h e elusive individualism o f wilderness c o m b a t . " 6 L o r d L o u d o u n , B r a d d o c k ' s successor as British C o m m a n d e r , quickly realized that scouts were required " t o act as advance guards, t o p r o c u r e intelligence o f e n e m y m o v e m e n t s , and t o p r o t e c t working parties or baggage trains f r o m surprise a t t a c k s . " 7 Ultimately, this t a s k - t h a t o f acting as the eyes and ears o f the regular forces-fell t o R o g e r s ' Rangers. Furthermore, the Rangers were at h o m e in the wilderness and, under R o g e r s ' leadership, t h e y b e c a m e experts at guerilla warfare.  A s skilled bushfighters, the Rangers were able t o venture d e e p into e n e m y  territory and successfully carry out raids o n their e n c a m p m e n t s . 8 Several important characteristics set the Rangers apart f r o m the conventional army. Firstly, they were tactically aggressive and carried the fight t o the enemy, but they would retreat in the face of a superior force.  Secondly, they were expert w o o d s m e n  4 Ibid.; Stewart H. Bull, The Queen's York Rangers: A Historic Regiment (Erin, Ontario: The Boston Mills Press, 1984), 22. 5 Bull, 22. 6 R . Ernest and Trevor N. Dupuy, The Encyclopedia of Military History from 3500 B.C. to the Present (New York: Harper and Row, 1986), 706. See also John K. Mahon, "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794,"Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45 (June 1958 to March 1959) : 265. 7 Stanley M. Pargellis, lord Loudoun in North America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1933),  301. 8 For more information on the raids conducted by Rogers' Rangers see Jake T. Hubbard, "Americans As Guerilla Fighters: Robert Rogers and His Rangers," American Heritage 22 (Aug. 1971) : 81-86.  Chapter 1.  3  The Ranger Tradition  and, according t o J o h n C u n e o , could survive in the "wilderness under the most adverse circumstances, including the rigorous limitations i m p o s e d b y warfare." 9 A n e x a m p l e of the endurance of R o g e r s ' Rangers is the f a m o u s raid o n the A b e n a k i Indian village o f St. Francis. In 1759, Rogers led a f o r c e o f a b o u t 200 Rangers through swampy, uncharted territory, with orders t o burn the village and end the threat o f A b e n a k i raids o n N e w England settlements.  T h e Rangers were harried b y French t r o o p s b u t Rogers pressed  o n and attacked St. Francis during the night. T h e village was destroyed and s o m e 200 Indians were killed.  Rogers and his m e n then retreated, using a different route, and  embarked o n a gruelling m a r c h which lasted twenty-five days, and t o o k t h e m through m o r e than 200 miles o f wilderness.  In the end, seventeen Rangers were killed b y the  e n e m y and thirty-two starved t o death. 1 0 Thirdly, unlike regular soldiers, the Rangers were lightly e q u i p p e d and highly mobile.  T h e cross-country mobility o f the Rangers  was necessary b e c a u s e of the w o o d e d terrain, and lack of roads which rendered cavalry useless. 1 1  In addition, their uniforms were practical for the w o o d s and enabled t h e m  t o blend with the -wilderness. T h e y usually wore short green tunics, buckskin breeches, b r o w n or green leggings, a S c o t c h b o n n e t , and moccasins. 1 3  B y contrast, the British  regulars were e n c u m b e r e d b y heavier axms and equipment, and w o r e scarlet red tunics which provided visible targets for e n e m y ambushes. 1 3  Finally, the Rangers were an  undisciplined lot and eschewed parade square drill for m o r e practical c o m b a t training. In 1757, Rogers p r o d u c e d " a short manual of forest  fighting"  which outlined his  m e t h o d s of guerilla warfare. 1 4 A m o n g other things, R o g e r s ' rules of discipline required John R. Cuneo, Robert Rogers of the Rangers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959), 30. See Bull, 29-30; Cuneo, 100-116; Isabel Gomez, "Rogers' Rangers at St. Francis" Vermont History 27, no.l (Jan. 1959): 313-318; Hubbard, 83-84; Jackson, 102-109. u Jackson, 7. 12 See Bull, 22; Cuneo, 74-75; Robin May, Wolfe's Army (Reading: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1974), 36-37. "Jackson, 7-8. See also Jane Bennett Goddard, Hans Waltimeyer (Cobourg, Ontario: Haynes Printing Co., 1980), 118 and 120. 14 Bull, 25. 9  10  Chapter 1.  4  The Ranger Tradition  his troops t o fall d o w n w h e n being fired u p o n ; t o disperse and rendezvous later if t h e y were in danger of being surrounded; t o retreat o n rising ground; t o avoid the usual fords w h e n crossing rivers; and t o circle b a c k and ambush their pursuers.  John Cuneo contended  that Rogers had " c o m p r e s s e d the shapeless mass of b a c k w o o d s fighting experiences into a simple exposition of small unit tactics soundly based o n timeless principles: mobility, security, and surprise." 1 5 T h e response of the British A r m y t o forest warfare in the French and Indian W a r marks a turning point in m o d e r n military tactics.  T h e success o f R o g e r s ' Rangers, at  defeating the Indians in their o w n style o f warfare, p r o m p t e d the training of regular soldiers in Ranger m e t h o d s .  Instruction in guerilla warfare was supervised b y Rogers  himself, 1 6 and a n e w regiment o f light infantry was f o r m e d under Colonel T h o m a s G a g e in 1758. T h e s e light infantry brigades were trained in b o t h regular and irregular, tactics thereby combining the " u n o r t h o d o x techniques of Indian and ranger warfare with the discipline of regulars." 1 7  W h i l e light infantry t r o o p s h a d existed previously in the  British A r m y - m a i n l y Highlanders-this innovation gained a c c e p t a n c e through the success of R o g e r s ' Rangers in their response t o the demands of warfare in the N e w W o r l d . 1 8 Shortly after the outbreak of the A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n , the R a n g e r tradition was o n c e again revived. In 1776, R o b e r t Rogers was e m p o w e r e d t o "raise and c o m m a n d a provincial corps of Loyalists t o b e k n o w n as the K i n g ' s (later Q u e e n ' s ) R a n g e r s . " 1 9  Rogers,  however, was not the leader he o n c e was and his fondness for alcohol led t o his eventual replacement b y M a j o r J o h n Graves Simcoe. S i m c o e , later p r o m o t e d t o lieutenant-colonel, Cuneo, 59. Robert Rogers, The Journals of Major Robert Rogers (Dublin: J . Potts, 1770), 52. 17 Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 26. See also Edward P. Hamilton, The French and Indian Wars (New York: Doubleday, 1962), 191 ; Pargellis, 304-305. "Correlli Barnett, Britain and Her Army 1509-1970: A Military, Political and Social Survey (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 1970), 177; Frederick Myatt, The British Infantry 1660-1945: The Evolution of a Fighting Force (Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press, 1983), 57; Pargellis, 305. 19 Bull, 34. 15  16  Chapter 1.  The Ranger Tradition  5  was familiar with the advantages o f light infantry and p r o c e e d e d t o m o d e l the Queen's Rangers along these lines. It was S i m c o e ' s purpose, as he n o t e d in his journal, " t o instill into the m e n , that their superiority lay in [a] close fight, and in the use o f the b a y o n e t . " 2 0 M u c h like R o g e r s ' Rangers, S i m c o e ' s m e n were t o " p r o t e c t supply d e p o t s and c o n v o y s , . . . t o carry out operations against the e n e m y ' s lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n as well as t o m a k e raids and take prisoners." 2 1 S i m c o e also had little use for parade ground drill and believed that "the most important duties, those of vigilance, activity and patience of fatigue, were best learned in the  field."22  M u c h attention, however, was paid t o the use of the bayonet  and musketry. In the tradition o f R o g e r s ' Rangers, S i m c o e also refused t o outfit his m e n in the red tunics of the British regulars. For his light corps, and its forest campaigns, where concealment was i m p o r t a n t , S i m c o e chose dark green uniforms. 2 3 T h e Queen's Rangers participated in m a n y campaigns, mainly as the advance or rear guard for a larger f o r c e , and were involved in several m a j o r battles including M o n m o u t h in 1777. T h e Queen's Rangers also carried out m a n y successful raids o n e n e m y e n c a m p ments. O n one such raid S i m c o e led his Rangers o n a twenty-four hour, fifty mile m a r c h , attacked a rebel p o s t , captured several m e n including their c o m m a n d i n g officer, Colonel T h o m a s , and m a r c h e d b a c k t o safety. 2 4 In addition t o the Queen's Rangers, the A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n p r o d u c e d several other Loyalist Ranger units. For e x a m p l e , the Orange, Jessup's, K i n g ' s Carolina, East Florida, King's Georgia, and Butler's Rangers all fought for the British C r o w n in the revolution; and, at the same time, a b a n d of rebels, k n o w n as Herrick's Rangers, campaigned against the British. J.G. Simcoe, Simcoe's Military Journal (New York: Bartlett & Welford, 1844), 28. "Bull, 40.  20  " J a m e s Hannay, "History of tlie Queen's Rangers," Transactions of the Royal Society of Canada (1908): 137. "Hannay, 131 and Bull, 41. 34 Bull, 48.  Chapter 1.  6  The Ranger Tradition  Butler's Rangers were perhaps the m o s t effective, and feared, of t h e Loyalist Ranger units. Led b y Colonel J o h n Butler, this group was c o m p o s e d of A m e r i c a n Loyalists and Indians experienced in the ways o f the w o o d s . Unlike the Q u e e n ' s Rangers, w h o primarily acted as a "flying c o l u m n in support o f the regulars," Butler's Rangers were assigned t o long range scouting expeditions, t o harassing the e n e m y and rebel b a c k settlements, and destroying as m u c h of their f o o d supply as possible. 2 6 Butler's Rangers spread fear a m o n g the rebels of the northern colonies b y plundering and burning their settlements. 2 6 Consequently, A m e r i c a n historians have labelled Butler's Rangers a cruel, inhuman b a n d of marauders. 2 7 In any event, Butler's Rangers, in b o t h their tactics and disposition, were directly influenced b y R o g e r s ' Rangers. T h e y were irregulars w h o possessed an intimate knowledge o f the local countryside.  T h e y were proficient m a r k s m e n and were capable  of enduring "privation and fatigue" which they w o u l d encounter in the forest. 2 8  The _  m e n also h a d "little knowledge o f drill or military discipline" b u t , according t o Ernest Cruikshank, these were unnecessary skills for the operations undertaken b y Rangers. 2 9 This neglect was explained b y G o v e r n o r Frederick Haldimand of Q u e b e c :  Rangers are in general separated, and the nature o f their service little requires the f o r m s of parade or the m a n o e u v r e s practised in the field. It is the duty, and I a m persuaded will b e the pleasure, o f every captain t o perfect his c o m pany in dispersing and forming expeditiously, priming and loading carefully, and levelling well.  T h e s e , with personal activity and alertness, are all the  "Hazel C. Mathews, The Mark of Honour (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965), 48. 26 Philip Ranlet, The New York Loyalists (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986), 125. "Howard Swiggett, War Out of Niagara: Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), 3-5. The "Cherry Valley massacre" of 1778 is the event that is most often cited as proof of Butler's Rangers' alleged barbarity. "Ernest Cruikshank, The Story of Butler's Rangers and the Settlement of Niagara (Welland, Ontario: Lundy's Lane Historical Society, 1893), 43. 29 Ibid.  Chapter 1.  7  The Ranger Tradition  qualities that are effective or can b e wished for in a ranger. 3 0  A t the same time, in the colonies o f the deep south, the East Florida Rangers were actively fighting for the Loyalist cause. Led b y T h o m a s B r o w n , the East Florida Rangers were c o m p o s e d o f Loyalist refugees f r o m Georgia and Carolina. Typically, B r o w n ' s c o m p a n y o f m o u n t e d Rangers engaged in reconnaissance duties as well as defending East Florida f r o m the rebels. In addition, the East Florida Rangers "constantly raided into Georgia t o gather cattle t o feed East Florida's swollen refugee p o p u l a t i o n . " 3 1  The men  under his c o m m a n d were, according t o B r o w n , "traders and p a c k h o r s e m e n " w h o were "expert w o o d s m e n capable of swimming any river in the p r o v i n c e . . . the best guides in the southern district." 3 2  B r o w n ' s Rangers, like previous Ranger units, were disdained  b y the British military. A u b r e y C . L a n d effectively argues that the British could have better e m p l o y e d m e n like B r o w n t o suppress the rebellion: A c c u s t o m e d t o European warfare carried o n in a theatre with an established road net and key cities, not t o mention a passive p o p u l a t i o n , the British could have used the first-hand knowledge o f m e n like B r o w n , a c c u s t o m e d t o the terrain and c o n n e c t e d with the local p e o p l e . 3 3 In short, the British A r m y was primarily e m p l o y e d in c o m b a t while the Loyalist regiments were largely shunned. H a d the liaison b e t w e e n the British A r m y and the Loyalists b e e n m o r e effective, as L a n d suggests, it is likely that the British would have enjoyed greater success against the A m e r i c a n rebels. ^Ibid., 78-79. 3 1 Gary D. Olson, "Thomas Brown, the East Florida Rangers, and the Defense of East Florida," in Eighteenth Century Florida and the Revolutionary South, ed. Samuel Proctor (Gainesville: The University Presses of Florida, 1978), 20. 32 Edward J. Cashin, The King's Ranger: Thomas Brown And The American Revolution On The Southern Frontier (Athens, Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1989), 49. 33 Aubrey C. Land, "Commentary," in Eighteenth Century Florida and the Revolutionary South, 32-33.  Chapter 1.  8  The Ranger Tradition  W h e n S i m c o e b e c a m e Governor o f U p p e r C a n a d a in 1791, he raised yet another version of the Queen's Rangers. T h e duties o f this n e w corps were t o defend the colony, construct roads and bridges, and act as a nucleus for n e w settlements. Patterning these Rangers u p o n his previous unit, S i m c o e trained t h e m in b a c k w o o d s  fighting  with an  emphasis o n marksmanship. Unlike regular soldiers, however, the Q u e e n ' s Rangers were t o "spend t w o days a week o n military exercises, t w o o n public works, and t w o for their private advantage." 3 4  In adapting t o the Canadian frontier, the Queen's Rangers  allowed soldiers t o "cultivate and develop their o w n lands without having t o leave t h e m t o give military service." 3 6 T h e Loyalist Ranger units o f the A m e r i c a n R e v o l u t i o n , and the Queen's Rangers in U p p e r Canada, p e r p e t u a t e d the tradition established b y R o b e r t Rogers in the French and Indian Wax. T h e tradition, however, suffered a hiatus in British N o r t h A m e r i c a w h e n the Queen's Rangers were disbanded in 1802. It w o u l d b e almost a century later b e f o r e another irregular Ranger unit was raised north o f the forty-ninth parallel. In the United States, o n the other h a n d , the Ranger tradition was kept alive in the south.  T h e Texas Rangers, f o r m e d in 1835 at the outset o f the Texas  "Revolution,"  are a further e x a m p l e of the use o f irregular troops o n the frontier of settlement.  This  paramilitary f o r c e of m o u n t e d troopers was assigned the task of guarding the borders of Texas f r o m "Indians, M e x i c a n s , and b o r d e r o u t l a w s . " 3 6 Unlike the regular army, the Texas Rangers "furnished their o w n horses and arms; they had n o surgeon, n o n o n e of the paraphernalia of the regular service." 3 7  flag,  Furthermore, as with all Ranger  units throughout history, the Texas Rangers lacked formal discipline.  W . P . W e b b has  described the Rangers' lack o f military discipline as a result o f the frontier: Bull, 69. Ibid., 70. 36 Walter P. Webb, The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense ( Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1935), 452. 37 Ibid., 24. 34  35  Chapter 1.  9  The Ranger Tradition  the very qualities necessary for a Texas Ranger m a d e h i m impatient of discipline. T h e natural turbulence and i n d e p e n d e n c e of the frontiersman m a d e o b e d i e n c e distasteful t o h i m . 3 8  T h e early Frontier Battalion of the Texas Rangers was very m u c h a part of the Ranger tradition.  B y 1881, however, the unsettled frontier in Texas had disappeared and the  Texas Rangers were left with " n o battle front, and therefore n o p r o g r a m or plan o f c a m p a i g n . " 3 9 T h e Texas Rangers n o longer had an e n e m y t o fight, and were transformed into state police, which e n d e d their association with the Ranger tradition. B y the outbreak of the U.S. Civil W a r , the N o r t h A m e r i c a n Ranger tradition was well established. In 1862, the Confederate States passed the Partisan Ranger Law which authorized bands o f m o u n t e d irregulars t o engage in guerilla warfare. T h e most effective of the m a n y Ranger units organized was led b y J o h n S. M o s b y . M o s b y ' s Rangers followed the military tactics o f wilderness warfare p e r f e c t e d b y previous Ranger troops.  They  raided the enemy, trains, wagon trains, and provided valuable intelligence for the regular army. Indeed, their military successes, w r o t e Patricia Faust, " b r a n d e d t h e m the greatest m e n a c e t o Union troops in northern Virginia." 4 0  T h e Union army, in f a c t , raised and  equipped a special unit, k n o w n as Blazer's Scouts, t o "hunt and destroy M o s b y ' s b a n d . " Their mission e n d e d in failure; the Rangers killed or w o u n d e d all b u t t w o o f Blazer's m e n • in an ensuing battle. 4 1 M o s b y ' s f o r c e exhibited the m a n y time-tested virtues of Rangers. T h e y were skilled w o o d s m e n , guerilla fighters, and marksmen. M o r e o v e r , M o s b y ' s Rangers were an irregular formation with a notable lack of discipline.  V . C . Jones has e x p a n d e d u p o n this  "Ibid., 79. 39 Ibid., 425. 4 0 Patricia L. Faust, ed., Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), 514. "Ibid.  Chapter 1.  10  The Ranger Tradition  theme:  It was his [Mosby's] aim t o b e irregular  His operations were built around  his ability t o b e different, to baffle his enemies through his refusal t o follow the routine prescribed b y the military academies. 4 2  Again, the influence o f R o g e r s ' Rangers is apparent in M o s b y ' s group.  His volunteers  exhibited Ranger traits b o r n in the French and Indian W a r , and effectively applied t h e m t o warfare over a century later. For e x a m p l e , in 1863, M o s b y and twenty-nine Rangers ventured well into e n e m y territory, past several infantry and cavalry regiments. reaching the Union e n c a m p m e n t at Fairfax Court House, the Rangers captured  Upon fifty-  eight horses and thirty-three m e n , including Brigadier-General Edwin Stoughton, and successfully led t h e m b a c k through e n e m y lines via wilderness trails. 4 3 N o r t h o f the border, an armed rebellion against the government provided the i m petus for the revival of Ranger units.  W h e n , in 1885, Louis Riel returned t o lead the  Saskatchewan Metis in the Northwest Rebellion, the conflict e x t e n d e d westward into what is n o w Alberta. T h e r e was a fear that Indians south o f the border, as well as the B l a c k f o o t , would j o i n the uprising. P r o m p t e d b y this fear, the R o c k y Mountain Rangers were raised at Fort M a c l e o d t o , as H u g h D e m p s e y w r o t e , "guard the 200-mile frontier between Lethbridge and the Cypress Hills; protect the cattle herds f r o m thieves and rustlers; and act as a buffer t o keep warlike A m e r i c a n Indians from surging north t o j o i n their Canadian cousins.'' 4 4 Captain Jack Stewart, a rancher, was authorized b y the Minister of Militia and Defence, t o raise this Ranger battalion c o m p o s e d of " M o n t a n a and A l b e r t a c o w b o y s " w h o had "immediately volunteered for service." 4 6 Virgil Ibid., 44 Hugh 45 Ibid.,  42  43  Each Ranger  C. Jones, Ranger Mosby (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1944), 109. 89-99. A. Dempsey, "Rocky Mountain Rangers," Alberta Historical Review 5, no.2 (Spring 1957): 3. 4.  Chapter 1.  11  The Ranger Tradition  supplied his o w n gun, horse, and uniform which consisted o f "practical, e v e r y d a y western dress." 4 6 Parade square discipline was virtually u n k n o w n t o this b a n d o f frontier c o w b o y s . A s Hugh D e m p s e y has n o t e d , " t h e c o w b o y s were fighting m e n , and would not take t o the rigid discipline e x p e c t e d of t h e m . " 4 7  A n o t h e r feature which separated t h e m f r o m  the regular military-especially the British A r m y - w a s the social equality b e t w e e n all the ranks. William R o d n e y c o n t e n d e d that "the rigid deference which marked the division between officers and other ranks in the British A r m y did not exist" in the R o c k y M o u n t a i n Rangers. 4 8 In each of the above cases, frontier circumstances p r o d u c e d a group o f m e n w h o had the experience t o deal with rugged, m o s t l y uncharted, terrain. T h e s e m e n k n e w the local territory, b u t they were also intolerant of the authority and discipline desired b y military organizations. T o take advantage o f their fieldcraft, irregular Ranger units were f o r m e d f r o m these frontiersmen. T h e fact that the units lacked discipline did not detract f r o m their effectiveness in the field. In essence, Ranger units have been m o u l d e d t o fit the frontier in N o r t h A m e r i c a . T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were yet another f o r m a l response, within a long tradition, t o the prospect of irregular warfare.  T h e fact that this Second W o r l d Wax  h o m e guard unit was given the n a m e " R a n g e r " was n o accident. A l t h o u g h c o n t e m p o r a r y military thought was influenced b y the trench warfare of the First W o r l d W a r , the Canadian A r m y ' s Pacific C o m m a n d drew o n the Ranger tradition and organized the P . C . M . R . In British Columbia, a sense o f military history was shown b y the choice o f the n a m e " R a n g e r , " and it was acknowledged b y M a j o r - G e n e r a l G . R . Pearkes w h e n he proclaimed William Rodney, Kootnai Brown his life and times 1839-1916 (Sidney, B.C.: Gray's Publishing Ltd., 1969), 146. 47 Dempsey, 5. 48 Rodney, 145. 46  Chapter 1.  12  The Ranger Tradition  that  T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers are the R o g e r s ' Rangers M a r k 1942 . . . . T h e y axe faced t o d a y b y an e n e m y just as cunning, cruel and crafty as ever was any Shawnee or Delaware Indian brave. T h e forests o f British C o l u m b i a axe j u s t as trackless t o d a y as the O h i o wilderness was a century ago [sic]. T h e b o r d e r needed m e n of high courage then, and their sacrifices were m a d e for the b e n efit o f future generations. C a n a d a can still p r o d u c e the same t y p e , and there will b e plenty o f o p p o r t u n i t y for the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers t o show that they are w o r t h y of the n a m e of Ranger should any Jap invader ever dare t o set his f o o t o n British C o l u m b i a soil. T h e troops w h o are n o w guarding our shores c o m e f r o m all parts o f C a n a d a - f r o m the cities and the prairies; they axe not all familiar with the bush, and they will, therefore, need the help of those w h o have lived in the various types o f bush in this province. 4 9  T h e P . C . M . R . , like its predecessors, was part o f a long military tradition. T h e r e axe several characteristics shared b y every irregular unit that has b o r n e the n a m e " R a n g e r . " T h e y all practiced or were trained in the art o f guerilla warfare, with an emphasis o n the ambush. Unlike the regular t r o o p s , t h e y were c o m p o s e d mainly of skilled w o o d s m e n w h o knew their part of the country well enough t o wage guerilla wax effectively.  Mobility,  marksmanship, and reconnaissance were also important in their t y p e of warfare. Finally, a distinct lack of parade square discipline and military d e c o r u m have b e e n characteristic of Ranger organizations. T h e fact that they were volunteer citizen-soldiers gave t h e m a sense o f f r e e d o m not enjoyed b y those in the regular army. T h e r e was, without d o u b t , a continuity of tradition extending f r o m the eighteenth A.G. MacDonald, "Men of the P.C.M.R. Reviving Frontier Tactics," British Columbia Lumberman 26, no. 11 (Nov. 1942): 53-54. 49  Chapter 1.  13  The Ranger Tradition  century Ranger units to the P.C.M.R., but there was also a significant change. T h e twentieth century was certainly worlds apart from the 1700s and the men of the P.C.M.R., unlike their eighteenth century counterparts, were not frontiersmen. Granted, many of them were skilled hunters, trappers, loggers, and outdoorsmen, but their way of life was nothing like that of frontiersmen in colonial America. Members of the P.C.M.R. were, for the most part, wage labourers-both white and blue collar-for whom the urban environment was always close at hand. In short, society had changed and so had the men who enlisted as Rangers. Nevertheless, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers shared in the historic mystique attached to the term "Ranger."  Ranger units throughout history have been  military formations designed to suit North American frontier conditions. This Canadian and American tradition of the Ranger unit was basically a response to the forested and rugged landscape which made conventional military tactics impractical. Traditional military tactics were suitable for battle in open terrain, but the rough landscape in North America precluded this sort of warfare. North American warfare required men accustomed to the territory and terrain and, as a result, irregular military organizations were created to patrol the areas familiar to these men. The Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, "designed by western men to suit western conditions," were, in part, the result of a carryover of British North American colonial history into Canadian folklore. 50  S0  A.G. MacDonald, 53.  Chapter 2  Formation  In the aftermath of the b o m b i n g of Pearl Harbor o n 7 D e c e m b e r 1941, Japanese militaryvictories in the Pacific increased British Columbians' fears that their province could b e invaded next. H o n g K o n g , Malaya, B u r m a , and the Phillipines were all unprepared for a Japanese invasion. Their armed forces were not large enough and weapons were in short supply. 1 E v e n the "impregnable fortress" o f Singapore could not repel the Japanese A r m y . Fifth Columnists were also active in these countries. For e x a m p l e , in Hong K o n g , Chinese Fifth Columnists a c t e d as snipers, incited riots, spread rumours, sabotaged equipment, and i n f o r m e d the Japanese o f gun and pill b o x positions. 2 Japan's militarism, as Peter W a r d n o t e d , "had roused anxiety o n the coast b y stirring u p the region's traditional fears of isolation and vulnerability." 3 It is not surprising, then, that British Columbians appealed in panic t o O t t a w a for reinforcement of the coastal defences. T h e concern o f British Columbians was reflected in the newspapers o f the time. Letters t o the Editor columns frequently contained pleas for the f o r m a t i o n of h o m e guard units. For e x a m p l e , a letter t o the editor of the Victoria Daily Colonist, o n 6 January 1942, claimed that Charles Bateson, The War With Japan (Sydney: Ure Smith, 1968), 91-92 and 126. 'Oliver Lindsay, The Lotting Honour: The Fall of Hong Kong, 1941 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978), 28 and 76. See also Ted Ferguson, Desperate Siege: The Battle of Hong Kong (Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1980. 3 W.P. Ward, "B.C. and the Japanese Evacuation," Canadian Historical Review 57 (September 1976): 672. 1  14  Chapter 2.  Formation  15  There axe many thousands of men in civil life-war veterans, loggers, miners, farmers, fishermen, shipyard workers etc., who are hunters and capable marksmen, who could form the nucleus of such an organization. T h e s e m e n , b e t w e e n the ages of sixteen and sixty-five, could b e organized o n a voluntary or, better still, c o m p u l s o r y basis, in their several districts, and with very little training and a m i n i m u m of equipment b e ready t o act as a guerilla f o r c e T h e people of British C o l u m b i a , realizing the danger, are ready for such a m o v e m e n t . D o n ' t let it b e said o f us: ' T o o little and t o o late.' 4  Five days later, another letter t o the editor v o i c e d the opinion that in the "sparsely p o p u l a t e d province" o f British C o l u m b i a  the incorporation o f m e n of all ages in the defence of the i m m e d i a t e localities in which they live, and with which they are intimately acquainted, would u n d o u b t e d l y b e of great use in providing just that delaying action which would enable the regular forces t o b e e m p l o y e d t o the best advantage, and would furnish advance information of great value.®  Newspaper editorials also urged the federal government t o bolster West Coast defences. For instance, as the editor of the Cowichan Leader proclaimed in February 1942:  T h a t the people of B . C . must organize and prepare 100 per cent for defence is the growing feeling o f an increasingly large n u m b e r of residents of this province, particularly o n the coast 4 5  D.M. Baillie, Letter to the Editor, Victoria Daily Colonist, 6 January 1942. H. Lee Wright, Letter to the Editor, Victoria Daily Colonist, 11 January 1942.  Chapter 2.  16  Formation  . . . it is easily possible t o visualize thousands of residents trained and e q u i p p e d in various ways for service in the case of invasion-for it is very evident that the urgency is realized and that the will has d e v e l o p e d . 6  Shortly after the attack o n Pearl Harbor the Vancouver Sun, in response t o calls from  "all parts of the p r o v i n c e " for i m p r o v e d defences, c o n d u c t e d a survey o f " i n f o r m e d  civilians and f o r m e r military officers" t o determine h o w British C o l u m b i a could b e better defended. Their survey, which p r o p o s e d the " i m m e d i a t e organization of a Civilian D e fence Corps in every t o w n , city and village in B . C . , " u n d o u b t e d l y placed further pressure o n the federal government for action. 7 Yet m o r e pressure was placed u p o n the federal authorities b y several service clubs, trade unions, and other organizations in British Columbia. Various groups such as the R o y a l Canadian Legion, International W o o d w o r k e r s o f A m e r i c a , Co-ordinated Veterans' Association, and even the Housewives' League, all passed resolutions calling f o r the formation of a civilian defence corps. 8 Citizens' c o m m i t t e e s were f o r m e d and meetings were held in communities throughout the province t o discuss the organization of h o m e guard units.  O n 7 January 1942, the  Victoria city council requested that P r i m e Minister King authorize m a n d a t o r y "civilian defense service." 9 Less than t w o m o n t h s later the M a y o r o f V i c t o r i a , A n d r e w M c G a v i n , sent a telegram t o J.L. Ralston, Minister of National D e f e n c e , advising h i m that  T h e r e is great uneasiness in Victoria and district about inadequate defence measures for V a n c o u v e r Island. I a m being deluged with requests for mass meetings t o discuss the s u b j e c t . T o allay public anxiety I urge y o u t o c o m e Cowichan Leader (Duncan), 19 February 1942. Vancouver Sun, 31 December 1941. 8 Victoria Daily Colonist, 15 January 1942; Comox District Free Press (Courtenay), 2 April 1942; Vancouver Sun, 30 December 1941, 7 January 1942, and 25 February 1942. 9 Vancouver Sun, 7 January 1942. 6  7  Chapter 2.  17  Formation  t o V i c t o r i a without delay and address a public meeting o n steps being taken for our protection. 1 0 M u c h of the distress expressed b y British Columbians was directed against the distant federal government in Ottawa. "Western alienation" was alive and well in wartime British Columbia. Given Japan's military victories in the Pacific, inhabitants of British C o l u m b i a were justifiably concerned a b o u t the possibility o f a Japanese invasion, and warnings in the press only served t o strengthen their fears.  For e x a m p l e , in February 1942, the  Vernon News expressed the view that the Pacific coast o f C a n a d a is not properly prepared t o meet the kind of Japanese attack that might n o w b e launched.  This is partly d u e t o the  m o n u m e n t a l folly of the King government in failing t o appreciate the part played b y sabotage in m o d e r n war.  It is even m o r e d u e t o the changed  general picture in this whole Pacific theatre o f war. T h e Japanese have n o w obtained all b u t one or t w o o f their main o b j e c t i v e s in Indonesia. T h e y not only n o w can turn in this direction, if they so desire, b u t they are m o r e likely t o d o so n o w in order t o head off N o r t h A m e r i c a n counter-offensives against them If they so desired-in order t o establish an air base f r o m which they could a t t e m p t t o destroy the Boeing aircraft f a c t o r y at Seattle-or t o cloak a serious attack o n A l a s k a - t h e Japanese could certainly land o n V a n c o u v e r Island. 1 1 Soon after Pearl Harbor was attacked, blackouts were ordered for the coastal areas of British Columbia. In announcing the blackouts, Western Air C o m m a n d reasoned that "the war situation is such that an attack b y Japanese forces o n the Pacific Northwest is 10 u  Victoria Daily Colonist, 6 March 1942. Vernon News, 19 February 1942.  Chapter 2.  18  Formation  imminent."12  Military and civic leaders further warned the public that Japanese raids  were a serious possibility, and the M a y o r o f V i c t o r i a stated that the Japanese were positioned in the Aleutian Islands and "we e x p e c t t h e m here any t i m e . " 1 3 Similarly, o n 5 March 1942, Lieutenant-Governor W . C . W o o d w a r d was reported as saying that "he regarded this province as n o w in the war zone, and that he was expecting Jap raids at n o distant d a t e . " 1 4  Jack Blain, w h o was a Ranger in N u m b e r 89 C o m p a n y ( B u r n a b y  South), recalled the effect the attack o n Pearl Harbor h a d o n the province: T h e war seemed quite far away in E u r o p e for us o n the West Coast at that time, but as soon as that [Pearl Harbor] h a p p e n e d it brought urgency t o the whole thing...the West Coast here was p r o b a b l y the least prepared for anything in Canada or [in] the United States.  16  In this atmosphere of uncertainty, the hysteria over a possible Japanese invasion grew as each day passed. Pressure was increasingly placed o n the government in O t t a w a for i m p r o v e d defences and, at the same time, for the evacuation and internment o f British Columbia's Japanese population. A n t i - O t t a w a sentiments were expressed b y m a n y p e o ple, including o n e First W o r l d W a r veteran, in February 1942:  T o o long have w e waited for apathetic O t t a w a , that is a thousand miles f r o m possible danger, t o understand the position of British Columbia. A p p a r e n t l y the lessons of France, Greece, H o n g K o n g and Singapore m e a n nothing.  We  are misrepresented b y a government that only exists b y coddling pacifistic Quebec Rupert Daily News, 9 December 1941. Ibid. 14 Grand Forks Gazette, 5 March 1942. "Interview with Jack Blain, Burnaby, B.C., 29 November 1988.  12 Prince 13  Chapter 2.  19  Formation  W e d e m a n d that every possible fifth columnist is i m m e d i a t e l y m o v e d east of the Rockies T h a t adequate anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, planes, t r o o p s , e t c . , are stationed here. N o t a skeleton f o r c e with obsolete e q u i p m e n t , as n o w . 1 0  British Columbia's representatives in the House of C o m m o n s in O t t a w a also pressed the government for greater defence measures. H o w a r d C. Green, Conservative M e m b e r of Parliament for V a n c o u v e r South, explained t o the House of C o m m o n s , o n 20 January 1942, that "Canadians o n the Pacific find themselves closer t o war than any other Canadians." Furthermore, as he explained:  o n the Pacific O c e a n there is n o island fortress o f Great Britain b e t w e e n C a n a d a and the enemy.  T h e r e is as our only protection a crippled United  States fleet. T h e r e is an e n e m y - n o t without a fleet, as the G e r m a n Reich, but an e n e m y with a first-class navy; an e n e m y with a first-class and very strong merchant marine, an excellent air f o r c e , and an army that has had experience in warfare for the last ten years. 1 7  Green further warned that British Columbians knew full well that West Coast defences were "hopelessly inadequate t o deal with an a t t e m p t e d invasion." 1 8 A s such, he urged the government t o bolster defences through, a m o n g other things, the organization o f " h o m e guards."19 T h o m a s R e i d , Liberal M e m b e r of Parliament for N e w Westminster, advised the Minister o f National Defence, in early February 1942, that " t h e people o n the Pacific coast Alexander Page, Letter to the Editor, Victoria Daily Colonist, 22 February 1942. "Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 20 January 1942, 152. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid.  16  Chapter 2.  20  Formation  are greatly perturbed with respect to Pacific coast defences." 2 0 Reid also expressed the uncertainty felt by many British Columbians when he asked the House of Commons: If Singapore falls-and who can say with any certainty that it will not?-where, I ask, will Japan strike next? For in that event it will then control almost the entire Pacific. 2 1 Reid expressed the anxiety of British Columbians. People were uncertain where and when Japan would strike next in the Pacific. Without the modern communication techniques of today, the public was imprecisely informed about world events which led to an even greater degree of uncertainty. To b e sure, a climate of danger existed, but in light of the long distance to Japan these fears were exaggerated. As opposed to the East Coast of Canada, which was much closer to hostile forces, the panic on the Pacific Coast was disproportionate to the real danger. Nevertheless, Lloyd Cornett, who was a teenaged Ranger in Number 89 Company (Burnaby South), remembered the anxiety and tension that prevailed in the aftermath of Pearl Harbor: A lot of people don't recognize now, looking back on it, how vulnerable people felt out here on the West Coast.  At first, after Pearl Harbor, we had no  military forces here of any significance  the Japanese had control of the  Pacific virtually and they could have done pretty much what they wanted to do so it seems ludicrous to think now that we were worried about a Japanese invasion, but we had no reason not to  and we didn't know if we were going  to be invaded. So those concerns were there, and it's difficult for people who weren't around at the time to reconstruct the atmosphere that existed which is what gave rise to the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. 22 Ibid., 2 February 1942, 226. Ibid. "interview with Lloyd Cornett, Burnaby, B.C., 29 November 1988.  20  21  Chapter 2.  Formation  21  T h e military authorities realized that Japanese raids or even an invasion were possible and that Pacific defences were inadequate. 2 3  T h e r e were, however, simply not enough  active force troops in British C o l u m b i a t o provide full protection for the province. For example, at the time o f the attack o n Pearl Harbor, the infantry t r o o p s in British C o l u m b i a m a d e u p the "equivalent o f two b r i g a d e s . " 2 4  M u c h m o r e disconcerting was the lack of  anti-aircraft guns o n the Pacific Coast. T h e naval base at Esquimalt had only t w o B o fors anti-aircraft guns for p r o t e c t i o n , and the R . C . A . F . station at Patricia B a y h a d one B o f o r s and t w o 3.7 inch anti-aircraft guns. 2 5 W h i l e the i n a d e q u a c y of the defences was a primary reason for the f o r m a t i o n of the P . C . M . R . , public opinion played an equal, and possibly a greater, role. In m u c h the same way that anti-Japanese sentiment f o r c e d the federal government t o intern and evacuate British C o l u m b i a ' s Japanese p o p u l a t i o n , 2 6 so t o o did public o u t c r y p r o m p t the f o r m a t i o n o f local defence units. O n 31 January 1942, a letter f r o m the Canadian A r m y ' s General Staff in O t t a w a was sent t o M a j o r - G e n e r a l R . O . Alexander, the c o m m a n d e r of Pacific C o m m a n d , advising h i m that "in the present situation it is considered most i m p o r t a n t that everything possible b e d o n e o n the West Coast t o satisfy public opinion in respect t o military security, provided it can b e d o n e without prejudice t o our m a j o r war e f f o r t . " 2 7 In this case, the m a j o r wax effort referred "Intelligence, Pacific Command, "Appreciation of Possible Japanese Action on the Pacific Coast," 16 February 1942, Department of National Defence, Directorate of History (hereafter D. Hist.), file 322.009 (D594). 2 4 C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and, Governments, The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970), 47. J S C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War: The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1955), 168. For further study of artillery units see Peter N. Moogk, Vancouver Defended: A History of the Men and Guns of the Lower Mainland Defences, 1859-1949 (Surrey, B.C.: Antonson Publishing Ltd., 1978). 2 6 For examinations of the impact of racism on the Japanese evacuation see W.P. Ward, White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes And Public Policy Toward Orientals In British Columbia (Montreal: McGillQueens University Press, 1978); Ken Adachi, The Enemy That Never Was (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976); and Ann Gomer Sunahara, The Politics of Racism (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981). "Brigadier, for Chief of the General Staff, to General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Pacific Command, 31 January 1942, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D298).  Chapter 2.  Formation  22  to the European theatre of war and the fight against Nazi Germany. As the General Staff explained: There are a number of coastal points on Vancouver Island and some on the mainland including Prince Rupert and Prince George where the organization of Home Guard platoons or detachments as part of the Reserve Army would meet the public demand for some form of local protection. 2 8 Lieutenant-General Stuart, the Chief of the General Staff, was of the opinion that "action on these lines would b e very popular on the West Coast and would not interfere with our major effort." 2 9 He further urged that the formation of home guard units be undertaken as soon as possible. Major-General R . O . Alexander replied to National Defence Headquarters that he had been under considerable pressure to form home guard units, and Pacific Command was giving it serious consideration. 30 General Alexander noted that in certain coastal areas the British Columbia Police, without aid from the Department of National Defence, had already attempted to form auxiliary units. In any event, Alexander believed that home guard units "would b e of considerable value" to compile intelligence reports, defend against enemy raids, and "alleviate public uneasiness." 31 Alexander, on 3 February, met with eight Members of the Legislative Assembly (Cooperative Commonwealth Federation, Liberal, and Conservative) representing coastal ridings. The idea of home guard units was explained to them and they unanimously supported any such scheme. The premier of British Columbia was also informed and he too gave his approval. 32 General Alexander Ibid. Secret Memorandum, Lieutenant-General Stuart to A.C.G.S., V.C.G.S., 31 January 1942, D. Hist., file 112.1 (D35). 30Major-General R.O. Alexander to the Secretary, Dept. -of National Defence, 7 February 1942, D. Hist., file 159 (Dl). 31 Ibid. 32 Ibid. J8  29  Chapter 2.  23  Formation  believed that there were " a b o u t fifteen places where such organizations would b e o f value," and he further suggested that they b e n a m e d Coastal D e f e n c e Guards. This was preferred t o the designation " H o m e G u a r d " because of " t h e large n u m b e r of requests t h a t " w o u l d " c o m e f r o m places in the interior t o have similar organizations o r g a n i z e d . " 3 3 O n 23 February 1942, the D e p a r t m e n t o f National D e f e n c e issued a press release which announced intentions t o f o r m h o m e guard units in "every B . C . coast t o w n and strategic point in the interior." 3 4  T h e initial n a m e of " C o a s t D e f e n c e G u a r d s " was replaced b y  the designation "Pacific Coast Militia Rangers," and the corps was officially f o r m e d o n 14 M a r c h 1942. M a j o r T . A . H . ( T o m m y ) Taylor was appointed as c o m m a n d i n g officer. Taylor, w h o was subsequently p r o m o t e d t o the rank of lieutenant-colonel, was chosen, in part, because he was familiar with the province through his past work as a timber cruiser in the logging industry . T h e response f r o m volunteers was p r o m p t and overwhelming.  Ranger detachments  were organized in the areas of greatest c o n c e r n - V a n c o u v e r Island and the c o a s t - b u t were also spread throughout the province.  Ranger units were l o c a t e d as far north as the  Y u k o n and east t o the R o c k y Mountains.  Originally the Rangers were organized as a  reserve militia unit, but o n 12 A u g u s t 1942 t h e y b e c a m e a part of the A c t i v e Militia o f Canada. 3 5 This shift t o the active militia required the D e p a r t m e n t of National D e f e n c e t o c o m p e n s a t e m e n injured in training.  E v e n t h o u g h the Rangers were a part o f the  Canadian A r m y , they received n o pay b e c a u s e they served voluntarily. Should they have b e e n called into active service, however, Rangers would have b e e n paid, and granted the same rights as regular soldiers. W i t h i n four m o n t h s some 10,000 recruits had enlisted in the P . C . M . R . and, b y August 1943, the corps reached a peak strength of 14,849 m e n . 3 6 Ibid. Vancouver Province, 23 February 1942. 35 Special PCMR Circular Letter, 2 October 1942, HMA; "Rangers Now Join Non-Permanent Force," Vancouver Province, 14 November 1942. 3 6 C.P. Stacey, Six Years of War, 174. 33  34  Chapter 2.  Formation  24  At its height, the P.C.M.R. consisted of 128 companies, and when the Rangers were disbanded in October 1945, the corps consisted of 122 companies. Meetings were held in communities throughout the province to endorse the formation of local Ranger units. Remote logging and mining camps as well as fish canneries also submitted requests for Ranger companies. For example, the Britannia Mining and Smelting Company applied for the organization of a Ranger detachment identifying thirty to fifty men who would join such a unit. 3 7 In like manner, the manager of the Bones Bay Fish Cannery, near Alert Bay, applied to have a Ranger detachment formed: We have a crew of twenty white men, several of whom saw service in the last war, and this is the kind of spot any invasion force would likely pick to attack, unless we were organized and had the right to defend ourselves we would b e helpless should such an attack take place. 38 Several communities, such as Grand Forks, Stewart, Courtenay, and Victoria, had organized their own unofficial home guard units even before the Pearl Harbor attack. Members of Victoria's Fish and Game Club patrolled the surrounding area six months before they were officially organized as Number 1 Company, P.C.M.R. 3 9 Three prominent members of the Victoria Fish and Game Club, George Beck, Gordon Sword, and Charles Burr, formed this unofficial home guard with the goal of protecting the Sooke Lake pipeline and the Jordan River power station. The men who made up this home guard unit were typical of later P.C.M.R. companies. As George Beck Jr. recalled: Dad, Charlie and Gordie decided to bring the idea to the membership of the Fish and Game Club, whose members, more than a hundred, were made up C.P. Browning to Col. T.A.H. Taylor, 29 April 1942, D.Hist., file 169.009 (D89). J.G. Dorman to Captain George Baldwin, 28 April 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D82). 39 Victoria Times, 5 July 1978; Donald G. Sword, unpublished draft of Gordon Sword's biography.  37  38  Chapter 2.  Formation  25  of men who were too old or [had] some other physical factor that kept them out of 'active' service. Yet they were all eager hunters and anglers who knew that region like the back of their hands. They instantly saw what a good j o b they could do in the protection of these important life lines. 40  From the outset, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers clashed with other home defence organizations. Air Raid Precautions ( A . R . P . ) and reserve army units were already established and, in some cases, they resented the competition for recruits. Shortly after the P.C.M.R. was formed, disputes arose with the A.R.P. regarding whether or not a member of one organization could belong to the other. More specifically, the disputes were over which organization would get preference in the event of hostilities. Colonel Taylor realized the problem and issued a circular letter, in May 1942, to clarify the Ranger-A.R.P. relationship. Taylor reasoned that the P.C.M.R. should have preference over recruits in unsettled areas, because they were primarily a guerilla force. The A.R.P., on the other hand, should have preference over recruits in urban areas where they would b e needed more than Rangers. 41 Moreover, Taylor advised that Rangers should not hold key positions in the A.R.P., and any Rangers enrolled in the A.R.P. would, "in an emergency, remain on A.R.P. duty." 4 2 Taylor's directives cleared up many of the difficulties with the A.R.P., but the animosity between members of the two groups lingered on. This resentment boiled over at an A.R.P. meeting in Courtenay on 6 October 1942. Sergeant R. Haybrook, a member of the London Auxiliary Fire Brigade, was the guest speaker at the meeting which was attended, upon invitation, by several Rangers. During the course of his lecture, Haybrook took some nasty verbal shots at the P.C.M.R., George Beck, personal letter, 1 December 1988. Col. Taylor, P.C.M.R. Circular Letter No. 11, 26 May 1942, D. Hist., file 159 (Dl). 42 Ibid; Col. Taylor, P.C.M.R. Circular Letter No. 33, 5 October 1942, D. Hist., file 159 (Dl).  40  41  Chapter 2.  26  Formation  referring to them as "these people who run around in uniform calling themselves Rangers and who attempt to put out incendiary bombs with shot guns." 4 3 The Rangers present at the meeting took offence to Haybrook's remarks, and contended that in the event of an "incendiary raid" the threat would come not from fires within the city but from the general conflagration in our adjoining forests and bush lands. " W h o " we asked "would have to fight the greater menace?" Definitely not the local A.R.P. with their stirrup pumps, but rather the loggers who are 90% Rangers, and they would not fight the fires with shot-guns but with modern machinery and methods. 4 4 Captain A. MacDonald, of Number 23 Company (Courtenay), believed that Haybrook was "ignorant of the general situation." 4 5  Haybrook's derogatory comments were not  premeditated but, according to MacDonald, he was "primed by an individual... from within our community." 4 6  In this case, Captain MacDonald was referring to A.R.P.  members as those who prompted Haybrook's demeaning remarks. Following the incident, Haybrook was scolded by the editor of the local newspaper for his words. The editor was then, in turn, lambasted by a supporter of the A.R.P.  On  15 October 1942, in a letter to the editor of the Comox District Free Press, Tom Pearse questioned the Rangers' ability to defend British Columbia: I cannot visualize any definite military function that the Rangers might fulfill, and that I would prefer to see men enlisted in some service where, if occasion arise, they can b e of definite use, and for which they can prepare themselves, "Captain A. MacDonald to Col. Taylor, 6 October 1942, T>. Hist., file 169.009 (D80). 44Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.  -  Chapter 2.  27  Formation  rather than in a service whose aims m a y sound m o r e r o m a n t i c and warlike, but Eire questionable in their possibility o f realization T h e r e was a lot of sentimental exaggeration at the inception o f the Ranger idea. O n e had only t o b e o n the payroll of a logging c o m p a n y t o find oneself, ipso f a c t o , a first class rifle shot, able (however unwillingly) t o live off one's gun, e n d o w e d with a knowledge of "every inch of the country," and with an ill-defined faculty k n o w n as "individual initiative."  O n e Eastern journalist  was eagerly q u o t e d b y the "Daily P r o v i n c e " as saying that B . C . is inhabited b y a p e o p l e a c c u s t o m e d t o living off their guns. 4 7 Pearse believed that H a y b r o o k was rightly trying t o deflate the m y t h o f the Rangers as intrepid frontier fighters. Pearse's letter t o the editor shows the tension b e t w e e n the P . C . M . R . and the A . R . P . , b u t it also reveals that s o m e d o u b t e d the c o m b a t ability o f Rangers. In s o m e respects Pearse was correct in his assessment of Rangers; certainly t h e y were not all expert w o o d s m e n , and there was a degree o f mystical r o m a n c e and adventure associated with the P . C . M . R .  Nevertheless, Pearse underestimated the fighting ability  of m a n y Rangers w h o , despite their y o u t h or old age, k n e w their areas and were capable with their rifles.  In the 1940s, British C o l u m b i a was h o m e t o m a n y skilled hunters  and o u t d o o r s m e n , and a g o o d m a n y o f t h e m ended u p joining the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Indeed, the P . C . M . R . intentionally sought o u t , and recruited those m e n w h o knew "every inch o f the country."  A s already n o t e d , m a n y P . C . M . R . recruits were not  w o o d s m e n , but those w h o were provided a solid base with which t o build a formidable guerilla force. T h e m e n of the P . C . M . R . m a y not have looked like well trained soldiers b u t , for the purpose required of t h e m , they were capable m o d e r n "frontier  fighters."  T h e relationship b e t w e e n the P . C . M . R . and the reserve army was also strained at 47  Tom W. Pearse, Letter to the Editor, Comox District Free Press, 15 October 1942.  Chapter 2.  28  Formation  times. Competition for recruits prompted Pacific Command to issue a directive stating that in localities where reserve army units existed, only men suitable as scouts and guides should be enrolled as Rangers. 48  The directive failed to resolve the P.C.M.R.- reserve  army conflict. In March 1943, Colonel Taylor received a "vigorous complaint" from the 13th (Reserve) Ambulance R . C . A . M . C . [Royal Canadian Army Medical Corps], located in Victoria. The commanding officer of the reserve unit claimed that he was unable to bring his corps to strength because most of the eligible recruits "he encountered were enrolled in No. 1 Coy., P . C . M . R . " 4 9 Colonel Taylor asked Captain C . W . Burr, of Number 1 Company (Victoria), to clarify his recruiting methods. In reply, Captain Burr advised that he had turned down more applicants than he accepted. Moreover, as Captain Burr explained: All men enrolled in this company are first required to complete a detailed questionnaire, then are given a personal interview by four members of the Headquarters Staff. Then only those men who are deemed suitable to work in the bush country are enrolled. Present strength of the unit is two hundred ninety-seven, of which seventyfive per cent or approximately two hundred twenty-five are residents of outlying districts, leaving only seventy-two enrollments from the City of Victoria. These seventy-two men were highly recommended by individuals and authorities for their usefulness as Rangers. Speaking generally and in view of the population of Victoria, it is difficult to appreciate that seventy-two men enrolled in this Company could so absorb all eligible persons that it is not possible to recruit the Reserve Medical Unit J.E. Lyon, Brigadier, General Staff, Pacific Command to Col. Taylor, 28 September 1942, D. Hist., file 159 (Dl). 49 Col. Taylor to Captain C.W. Burr, 4 March 1943, D. Hist., file 159 (Dl). 48  Chapter 2.  29  Formation  to strength. 50 Furthermore, Captain Burr informed Colonel Taylor that men enrolled in reserve army units had asked him for transfers to his Ranger company.  In every such case, Burr  informed them that their "proper place" was with the reserve army, and he refused to consider such transfers. Despite the competition that existed between the P . C . M . R . and the reserve army, there were cases of good relations between the two. This was the situation in Penticton, as Ranger instructor Dean Miller reported to Colonel Taylor: G o o d co-operation with the local reserve unit is certainly apparent.  Not  only have the Dragoons made their armouries available to the Rangers, but they have loaned their instructors willingly  Rangers have access to the  Dragoon's outdoor and indoor range. A n intelligence officer of the 19th Infantry Brigade, Vernon, sought the help of this company in the matter of getting information about lines of communication in the Southern Okanagan. Working in co-operation with the B.C. Public Works Office at Penticton, Capt. Atkinson supplied detailed information about roads-kind, surface, drainage; bridges, capacity and type; abandoned roads, by-passes, detours; protection from aerial observation; turning points.  Thus liaison between the nearest active army formation has been  established. 51 Overall relations, however, were poor enough to prompt Colonel Taylor to issue another directive on the P.C.M.R.-reserve army relationship. In Circular Letter Number 51, of 2 April 1943, Taylor outlined the differences-in training and purpose of the two Capt. Burr to Col. Taylor, 18 March 1943, D. Hist., file 159 (Dl). "Corporal Dean Miller to Headquarters, Pacific Command, 2 April 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D85). 50  Chapter 2.  Formation  30  groups. According to the circular letter, Rangers were trained in guerilla tactics and were designed to fight only in their local area, whereas the reserve army was trained along orthodox military lines. This training would enable the reserve army, "when called out, to take the place of Active Army Units." 5 3 In addition, while the reserve army's role was to defend their local area, they could b e required to fight anywhere in Canada. Colonel Taylor further advised P.C.M.R. captains not to interfere with reserve army recruiting, and only to enrol those who, "due to their experience and knowledge of the bush, are very specifically qualified to act as scouts or guides." 5 3 Yet again in June 1944, Taylor made it clear that Ranger recruits had to b e bush-wise, and those who were not were better suited for the reserve army. 54 The rivalry between the Rangers and the reserve army was exacerbated by workers in essential industries, such as loggers, who preferred enlistment in the P.C.M.R.  At  a union meeting, in March 1942, loggers of the Ladysmith district decided to form a Ranger unit. Apparently, a reserve army officer was present at the meeting, and he told the loggers that they could not join the P . C . M . R . because they were "all fit to join the Reserve force." 5 5  Frank Weir, a game warden at Ladysmith, wrote to Colonel Taylor  and informed him that the loggers would not voluntarily join the army, but they were eager to join an irregular unit. Weir reasoned that the loggers would b e valuable Rangers because they "could travel the hills where the army would find it impossible to go." 6 0 In February 1943, the chairman of the Mobilization Board instructed the British Columbia Pulp and Paper Company that men in their employ, who were given postponement from military service, must join a Ranger company where no local reserve army "P.C.M.R. Circular Letter No. 51, 2 April 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D90). "Ibid. Col. Taylor, memorandum re P.C.M.R.-reserve army relationship, 30 June 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). "Frank P. Weir to Col. Taylor, 23 March 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D91). 56Ibid. 54  Chapter 2.  Formation  unit existed. 57  31  T h e Ranger captain at Port Alice, J . W . Fraser, was not pleased with  the decision to force unwilling men into his Ranger company. Captain Fraser explained to Colonel Taylor that his unit already contained many volunteers rejected for military service, and several "postponees" who worked at the local pulp mill. How, asked Fraser, would these men react to a new class of recruits described as "conscripted postponees?" Indeed, Fraser was not optimistic when he asked Colonel Taylor How will this new set-up with its mixture of volunteers and forced men compare with our organization which came into being through voluntary effort alone? How will the men work together? 6 8 It seems that for some postponees the P.C.M.R. was an easy way to "do their bit" . for the war effort. Rangers did not have to endure harsh military discipline and, unlike in the reserve army, service in the P . C . M . R . did not entail the possibility of being sent to another locality to relieve active army units. Jim Kingsley, the Ranger captain at Parksville, did not take kindly to this type of Ranger: Those that were excluded from service for working in the b u s h . . . didn't give a damn. They were against war. They were no good to me anyhow and I wouldn't report them because they got in t r o u b l e . . . I only had half a dozen of them. I didn't waste time telling them what I thought about them. I had some good men too. 5 9 In the later stages of the war, for some British Columbians, Japan became only a distant threat. The Canadian government and military authorities, however, were aware of the possibility of a Japanese attack even if they did not see it as an immediate danger. "Captain R.F. Lyons to Col. Taylor, 12 February 1943; Col. Taylor to Capt. Lyons, 24 May 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D95). 58 Capt. Fraser to Col. Taylor, 13 February 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D81). "Interview with Jim Kingsley, Parksville, B.C., 16 January 1989.  Chapter 2.  Formation  32  On the other hand, the majority of the voting public was certainly worried about the threat of the Japanese war machine.  During wartime the last thing the authorities  wanted was a dissatisfied and fearful public. While the P . C . M . E . proved to be a valuable adjunct to British Columbia's defences, they were also a low cost venture which placated a nervous population and allowed the government to avoid the people's wrath over its inaction.  Ultimately, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were created for psychological  and political as much as military reasons, and their creation resulted more from local initiatives than from federal directives.  Chapter 3  Membership  W h a t t y p e of m e n volunteered as Rangers? 1 of m e n from all levels of society.  In general, the P . C . M . R . was c o m p o s e d  M o r e specifically, however, Rangers were primarily  British Columbians engaged in the dominant o c c u p a t i o n s of the province. N o r t h B e n d , for example, being a railway terminal, contained a large p r o p o r t i o n of railway workers w h o enlisted as Rangers.  In P e n t i c t o n , the Ranger c o m p a n y was c o m p o s e d  "mainly  of businessmen and ranchers" m a n y o f w h o m were " m e m b e r s o f the local fish and g a m e c l u b . " 3 H o p e and Laidlaw, o n the other h a n d , contained m a n y loggers which was reflected in their Ranger membership (see Table 3.1). A s previously mentioned, R a n g e r units were even organized in r e m o t e logging c a m p s as well as a m o n g workers in mines, sawmills, and fish canneries throughout the province. In virtually all industries b o t h m a n a g e m e n t and unions fully supported the P . C . M . R . 3 T h e other o c c u p a t i o n s of Rangers ranged f r o m prospectors, trappers, carpenters, farmers, c o o k s , and truck drivers t o bankers, accountants, and store owners. Walt Cousins, w h o was a Ranger in N u m b e r 118 C o m p a n y (West Point G r e y ) , r e m e m b e r e d that the m e n in his unit c a m e " f r o m all different walks of life and y o u were, m o r e or less, put into a category where it would b e of benefit  We  had papermakers, truck drivers, we had an engineer, surveyor. G o d , we had e v e r y b o d y The following information regarding P.C.M.R. membership is based upon incomplete collections of application for enlistment forms. Every Ranger recruit was required to fill out one of these application forms but, unfortunately, they have not all survived the years. 3 Cpl. Dean Miller to HQ Pacific Command, 2 April 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D85). 3 For an example of the cooperation of trade unions see the B.C. Lumber Worker, 25 July 1942. 1  33  Chapter 3.  34  Membership  No. 73 Coy. (including all detachments)  Hope Det.  Laidlaw Det.  Yale Det.  35  15  19  1  Cat Driver Prospector  2  2  8  6  Miner  3  3  Trapper  5  5  Construction  4  2  1  1  11  6  1  1  Logger  Mechanic  Boston Bar Det.  1  8  North Bend Det.  1  2  1  1  1  16  6  Electrician  3  2  Guide Farmer  3  2  4  2  2  28  2  3  4  13  2  1  6 1  262  98  51  38  18  57  Truck Driver  Railway Accountant Total No. of Men in unit  1 1  Table 3.1: Occupations of Rangers in Number 73 Company. Archives, P C M R file, applications for enlistment.  Source: Hope Museum  Chapter 3.  35  Membership  Automobile Ownership  Hope, Penticton, Burnaby North, Masset Percentage of Men  Hop* (Total 262)  [223 Penticton (153)  Burnaby North (126)  ES3 MasMt (84)  Sources: HMA; PMA, 4-4377,4-4378; Q«rakJ Chariton Papara; B.C. Prov. ArchlvM, Add. MSS. 2113.  Figure 3.1: Rangers owning automobiles in N o . 71 Coy. ( P e n t i c t o n ) , N o . 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , N o . 90 C o y ( B u r n a b y N o r t h ) , and N o . 105 Coy. ( M a s s e t ) . in there."  4  A u t o m o b i l e ownership a m o n g Rangers serves as one indicator of their e c o n o m i c status. Application for enlistment f o r m s reveal that approximately 27 percent o f all Rangers in N u m b e r 73 C o m p a n y ( H o p e , Laidlaw, Yale, B o s t o n Bar, N o r t h B e n d ) o w n e d automobiles (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2).  N o r t h B e n d was well b e l o w this average with only  9 percent of Rangers in possession o f a vehicle.  This figure, well b e l o w the 1941 B . C .  average of 35 percent, 5 can b e explained b y the fact that N o r t h B e n d was an isolated village with a transient population o f railway employees.  Similarly, automobiles were  scarce in the isolated Queen Charlotte Island c o m m u n i t y o f Masset. W h i l e automobile ownership in N u m b e r 73 C o m p a n y was close t o the provincial average, a high percentage Interview with Walt Cousins, Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Eighth Census of Canada 1941 vol. 1, (Ottawa: King's Printer, 1950), Table XVII, "Percentage of Households With Specified Conveniences, For Canada and the Regions, Rural and Urban, 1941," 421. 4  5  Chapter 3.  36  Membership  Automobile Ownership Detachments of No. 73 Coy.  Percentage of Men  H  Hops (total 98)  £ 5 3 Boston Bar (18)  !ZZ2 Laldtaw (51)  E H Yals (38)  E S S North Bend (57)  Sourcs: Hops Mussum Arohlvss, POMR (II®, applications for snllstmsnt.  Figure 3.2: Rangers owning automobiles in Number 73 Coy., B y Detachment. of Rangers in Penticton owned automobiles, and a relatively low percentage in the urban area of Burnaby. This can b e explained, in part, by the high number of older Rangers in Penticton, and the equally high level of Burnaby Rangers too young to drive or afford a vehicle (see Figures 3.1, 3.6, 3.7). Many Ranger recruits were either too young to enter the regular army or t o o old for active service.  Some became Rangers because they were denied entry into the armed  forces due to their poor health. From the outset it was made clear that P.C.M.R. recruiting standards were flexible: Enrolment will not necessitate a medical examination nor need membership b e limited as to age or physique, but membership should be limited strictly to those fully capable of carrying out any duty that may be required. 8 Yet others were exempt from military service because they were employed in essential Memorandum from Major T.A.H. Taylor, 18 March 1942, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D298).  6  Chapter 3.  industries.  37  Membership  The youngest Rangers in Number 73 Company were fifteen years old and,  when he joined in 1942, the oldest Ranger's age matched his company's number. Figures 3.3-3.7 illustrate the age distribution of Rangers in four companies (No. 73 Coy. Hope, No. 105 Coy. Masset, No. 71 Coy. Penticton, and No. 90 Coy. Burnaby North). In Hope and Masset, many Rangers were in their thirties and would have been eligible to enlist in the regular forces. Most of these men, however, would have been denied entry into the armed forces for medical reasons. Others, particularly in Masset, would have been employed in the logging industry which exempted them from military service.  Figure  3.4 reveals that, in Number 73 Company, the number of Rangers born in 1916, 18, 19, 22, and 23 was considerably lower than in other years. This suggests that men in their twenties joined the regular forces in relatively larger numbers, which also reflects the preferences of military recruiters. Finally, a large number of Rangers in both Hope and Burnaby were born in the 1920s because many in these samples joined before they were old enough to enter the regular forces. This is evident in the Burnaby company in which over one-quarter of its members were active in school army cadets prior to joining the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. 7 Membership data also reveals that previous military experience among Rangers varied from a low of 19 percent in Number 73 Company to a high of 41 percent in Penticton (see Figure 3.8). As the high number of older Rangers with previous military experience suggests, many First World War veterans wanted to demonstrate their loyalty and the P.C.M.R. allowed them to do so.  The pressure to b e a voluntary contributor to the  war effort was great; "zombies"(conscripts), and "conchies" (conscientious objectors) were disdained in Canada during the Second World War. Membership in the P.C.M.R. allowed these veterans to recover the comradeship that they had shared during the First Gerald Charlton Papers, No. 90 Coy. (Burnaby North), applications for enlistment. Thirty-five out of a total of 126 Rangers in No. 90 Coy. had previous cadet training. 7  Chapter 3.  Membership 6199  Age Distribution  No. 73 Company (Hope) Number of Men  18608  1870s  1880s  18908 1900s 1910s Decade of Birth  1920s  1930s  Sourcs: Hop* Museum Archive*, PCMR file, application* for enlistment, 1942 to 1945.  Figure 3.3: A g e Distribution in N u m b e r 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , B y D e c a d e of Birth.  Age Distribution  No. 73 Company (Hope) Number of Men 12 -ft  1910  1913  1916  1919 1922 Year of Birth  1925  1928  Source: Hop* Museum Archives, PCMR flls, applications lor *nllstm*nt, 1942 to 1945.  Figure 3.4: A g e Distribution in N u m b e r 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , B y Year of Birth.  Chapter 3.  39  Membership  Age Distribution  No. 105 Company (Masset) Number of Men  1860s  1870s  1880$ 1890s 1900s Decade of Birth  1910s  1920s  Sourco: 8.C. Provincial Archlwi, Add. MSS.2113.  Figure 3.5: A g e Distribution in N u m b e r 105 Coy. ( M a s s e t ) , B y D e c a d e of Birth.  Age Distribution  No. 71 Company (Penticton) Number of Men  1860s  1870s  1880s 1890s 1900s Decade of Birth  1910s  1920s  Sou roe: Psntlcton (R.N. Atkinson) Mu»«um and ArcfclvM, 4-4377 and 4-4378.  Figure 3.6: A g e Distribution in N u m b e r 71 Coy. ( P e n t i c t o n ) , B y D e c a d e of Birth.  Chapter 3.  40  Membership  Age Distribution No. 90 Company (Burnaby North) Number of Men  1860s  1870s  1880s  1890s  1900s  1910s  1920s  Decade of Birth Source: Gerald Charlton Paper*.  Figure 3.7: A g e Distribution in N u m b e r 90 Coy. ( B u r n a b y N o r t h ) , B y D e c a d e o f Birth.  Previous Military Service Hope, Penticton, Burnaby North, Masset Percentage of Men  Hop* (Total 262) Burnaby North (126)  7ZZX Penticton (155) [S3  Masset (84)  Sources: HMA; PMA, 4-4377,4-4378; Gerald Chartton Papers; B.C. Prov. Archives, Add. MSS. 2113.  Figure 3.8: Rangers with military service prior t o enlistment in N o . 71 Coy. ( P e n t i c t o n ) , No. 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , N o . 90 Coy. ( B u r n a b y N o r t h ) , and N o . 105 Coy. (Masset).  41  Chapter 3. Membership  World Wax. T h e Rangers provided an opportunity for these older men, unable to serve overseas, t o feel wanted again. Those w h o had previous military experience often b e c a m e officers in the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. For example, Lieutenant Stanley Munro, commander of the Laidlaw P . C . M . R . detachment, served during the First World War in France as a machine gunner in the 29th Battalion.  Similarly, Captain Henry Johnson,  the commander of Number 73 C o m p a n y ( H o p e ) , also had an extensive wax record in the 196th Battalion and, later, with the Royal Air Force during the First World Wax. In some companies, First World Wax veterans were valued members of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers.  This was the case for former teenaged Ranger Lloyd Cornett, w h o believed  that they were "lucky" t o have had veterans in Number 89 C o m p a n y (Burnaby South). Cornett contended that the First World Wax veterans were very fine guys who knew that hard end of soldiering, and they passed those skills and attitudes along t o us and we benefitted greatly  W e were taught  how t o respect weapons, and handle them properly, and take care of them, and take the proper safety precautions. Those things were taught very vigorously by these guys because they knew how important they were. 8 In contrast, other younger Rangers saw the veterans as a hindrance to the effectiveness of the P . C . M . R . Likewise, many veterans resented younger men, with little or no military experience, in positions of authority.  First World Wax veterans often clamoured for  the captaincy of their Ranger company. For example, when Ranger Harry Livingstone discovered that there would soon b e a vacant officer position in Number 128 Company (Deep Cove), he advised Colonel Taylor that "it would b e wise" to install "someone w h o has had the A r m y K n o c k . " 9 Livingstone, not surprisingly, was a veteran with four years "Imperial A r m y training," and was dismayed b y his comrades' disrespect for military 8  Interview with Lloyd Cornett, Burnaby, B.C., 29 November 1988. Harry C. Livingstone to Col. Taylor, 16 May 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D93).  9  42  Chapter 3. Membership  decorum.  Livingstone reported to Colonel Taylor that, while on Ranger sentry duty,  men in his unit "march off and do not even give eyes right or left, and a man feels a darn fool standing up there at the present [arms] myself." 1 0 In conclusion, Livingstone promised Colonel Taylor that if he were promoted he would do his "duty as a g o o d soldier." N o action was taken by Colonel Taylor on this matter, and Ranger Livingstone was never given the promotion he desired. T h e above incident was by no means an isolated one. A similar occurrence t o o k place at Port Alice in July 1942. C. Cedric Ryan, in charge of the Port Alice A . R . P . , wrote a five page letter t o Colonel Taylor outlining why he should replace Ranger Captain Fraser. At the very least, Ryan wanted a separate Ranger organization formed which would b e composed entirely of veterans. It is worth quoting Ryan's explanation at some length: All Ranger officers have been appointed from the [pulp mill] office and d o not include old soldiers. All Ranger officers are young men and all are members of the local chemical staff. None have had better that C . O . T . C . (Canadian Officers' Training Corps) training.  It is the local opinion of older m e n that the whole b o d y  would soon b e lost in the woods. I gather f r o m private conversations with local residents that the Ranger officers are quite unpopular. There are a great many retired men w h o saw service in France 1914-1918 but only one has joined the Rangers. N o Ranger organization has been made at Spey Camp (the Company's logging camp), nor at Winter Harbor. Mr. Fraser tells us that Winter Harbor 10Ibid.  ~~  43  Chapter 3. Membership  comes under his jurisdiction.  He cannot be expected to form a unit in a  locality where he is completely unknown. The local Ranger organization has been carried on with great secrecy. As a matter of fact I have heard it suggested that it operated like a secret society. I have pointed out to Fraser that if he wanted public support he must take the public into his confidence. 1 1 Ryan's proposed solution was to form a Ranger company separate from the existing one. The new unit would vote in its officers by secret ballot, and Ryan further claimed that it was sure to include experienced woodsmen, hunters and trappers and practically every old soldier in town. I would like to mention that these old soldiers feel quite strongly against the 'young inexperienced boys' at the head of the Rangers. I feel sure of a membership of at least 80 men. 1 2 Ryan also planned to install a "private electric buzzer" in the homes of his officers, so they would have "a continuous watch who will 'press the button' when dangerous boats or planes approach." Clearly, Ryan was trying to impress upon Colonel Taylor that he had better ideas, and could do a better j o b than Captain Fraser. In conclusion, Ryan pleaded with Colonel Taylor to change the existing framework: Appoint me to a rank above Captain Fraser and I will organize Spey Camp, Winter Harbor and assist the local boys as well. I have a private boat and can reach all points on the Sound. 1 3 U  C . Cedric Ryan to Col. Taylor, 14 July 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D81). "Ibid. 13 Ibid.  44  Chapter 3. Membership  In response t o Ryan's impassioned plea, Colonel Taylor replied that his suggestions were "quite impossible," and that he "misunderstood the organization of the P . C . M . R . " 1 4 Colonel Taylor explained his reasons for disregarding Ryan's suggestions as follows: While I fully appreciate the value of a veteran and being one myself I will give veterans full credit, nevertheless, it is not always a veteran w h o should c o m m a n d in any area. Some of the best organized and functioning Ranger Companies are not commanded by veterans but veterans are serving in them giving their full co-operation and loyalty. This is as it should be. 1 B J . W . Fraser, in retrospect, paxtly attributed the controversy to a split between the First World War veterans w h o had worked at the pulp mill for many years, and the younger educated men w h o brought new technology to the mill.  Animosity was also  apparent between members of the A . R . P . and the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, as J . W . Fraser recalled when asked about the divisions in his company: W e had a lot of trouble with C. Cedric Ryan at one time but he eventually turned out t o b e one of m y best f r i e n d s . . . He was an engineer in the [pulp mill and] . . . he was the head of the A . R . P they were a little jealous of us  T h e y were organized before us and He was a troublemaker t o the manager.  He also thought he should b e manager of the plant . . . . This is showing you a split in the town of the old fellas who used t o run the mill before it became a bleach pulp mill, and the younger men who came in and made it a bleaching pulp mill, and of course there is always resentment. T h e y didn't know the first thing about how to bleach pulp and we had to d o it  A lot of the  veterans f r o m the First World War came up there [to Port Alice] and settled 14 15  Col. Taylor to Ryan, 18 July 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D81). Ibid.  45  Chapter 3. Membership  in as employees, and they formed what you might call an old guard. resented this organization being done without them  They  He wanted the j o b ,  he wanted to do it. I didn't even know that. 1 8 Colonel Taylor made it clear that the most suitable man t o b e a Ranger captain was not necessarily someone with previous military experience.  A b o v e all else, as the  commander of a civilian organization, a Ranger captain had t o b e a g o o d leader and know how t o deal with people. Strict discipline and military spit and polish were not the required order of the day. W h a t was important, on the other hand, was the ability t o f o r m civilians into a formidable group of guerilla  fighters.  Captain Fraser fit this  description, according t o former Port Alice Ranger R o n Wilson: As t o the suitability of who was running the company, I think that Frasera younger man with some military training at U . B . C . - w a s probably the best one t o b e in charge of the company because he was a bit of a disciplinarian himself. He wasn't an easy guy. He knew things about discipline and how t o get things done. He was in charge of the technical department [at the pulp mill and was] probably better educated than any of these other veterans. He did have a g o o d idea about discipline although it wasn't t o o strict t o arouse opposition. Finally, I don't think Ryan would have been a g o o d leader for that company. He was t o o old and his personal characteristics were not equal t o Fraser's. 17 Veterans in Number 70 Company (Terrace) also felt threatened b y the possibility of a younger captain. In July 1943, Ranger Field Supervisor D ' A r c y asked Captain Dubeau to resign as commander of the Terrace company. Captain Dubeau was apparently finding "Interview with J.W. Fraser, North Vancouver, B.C., 12 December 1988. "Interview with Ron Wilson, Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988.  46  Chapter 3. Membership  it difficult to devote the necessary time to the unit because of his civilian j o b . Lieutenant D ' A r c y recommended that twenty-seven year old David Butler succeed Dubeau.  This  angered Dubeau because Butler was a newcomer to Terrace w h o was unfamiliar with the terrain, and the people in the community. Captain Dubeau appealed to Colonel Taylor to reconsider Butler's appointment: In No.  70 Co.  P . C . M . R . we have a goodly number of reliable consci-  entious ex-service men (1914-18) who know more about  fire-arms,  routine  drill and army discipline than this young man under question will ever know. T h e majority of our personnel is made up of woodsmen, loggers, trappers and rivermen who because of their long residence in these parts know every trail and stream f r o m Aiyanch to the Kitimat A r m ; f r o m Prince Rupert to Hazelton. Does it therefore seem reasonable t o suppose that they will serve under the c o m m a n d of inexperienced youth? If the aforementioned qualified Rangers elect t o resign their services f r o m the present field of voluntary activity, none others in the wide area will b e found t o take their places, because I have c o m b e d the district thoroughly with a view t o picking out the best men available for the j o b in hand. 1 8 Captain Dubeau recommended that Lieutenant Sam Kirkaldy, a First World War veteran, take c o m m a n d of the company.  Kirkaldy had lived in Terrace for thirty years and,  according t o Dubeau, was well acquainted with the region. In response t o Dubeau's letter, Colonel Taylor advised that Butler was still the preferred candidate, because his civilian employment did not "confine him to any particular schedule of movement or t o any one point." 1 9 Taylor reasoned that Butler could devote more time t o Ranger duties than either Dubeau or Kircaldy, and he urged Dubeau to "Captain M. Dubeau to Col. Taylor, 5 July 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D84). 19 Col. Taylor to Capt. Dubeau, 28 July 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D84).  47  Chapter 3. Membership  support Butler's appointment. T h e men of Number 70 Company, however, did not want Dubeau replaced by Butler. A letter, signed b y nine non-commissioned officers [N.C.O.'s] of the Terrace unit, was sent t o Colonel Taylor in support of Dubeau's leadership. T h e letter stated that the men liked Butler but "as a commander of our Ranger Co. we d o not believe that he has the stuff which makes an officer tick." 3 0 T h e y believed that the woodsmen enrolled in the Terrace Rangers needed a commander who knew the district, and in w h o m they could "put their whole trust and confidence." Dubeau was respected by the "old timers," whereas the newcomer Butler was not. T h e N . C . O . ' s also t o o k the opportunity t o complain t o Colonel Taylor about a lack of equipment and cooperation f r o m P . C . M . R . headquarters. In summation, the signatories of the letter plainly stated their intentions if Dubeau were forced t o resign: W e the undersigned N . C . O . ' s hereby state that if any change whatsoever is made in our C . O . we will resign our present posts, for we are civilians and a voluntary organization not to b e dictated to by superior authority which has been misinformed. 2 1 T h e Terrace Rangers were unhappy b o t h with the proposed appointment of a young captain, and with the lack of equipment supplied t o them. T h e veterans in Number 70 Company, and elsewhere, resented younger men in positions of authority.  Many First  World War veterans naturally felt that their combat experience made them the most qualified men to b e c o m e Ranger officers.  T h e Terrace N . C . O . ' s made it clear, in a  manner that would b e mutinous in the regular army, that they would not submit t o the orders f r o m Ranger headquarters. T h e y were successful in their stand; Captain Dubeau remained as commander of Number 70 Company for the duration of the war. 20  Letter from nine N.C.O.'s of No. 70 Company (Terrace) to Col. Taylor, 2 August 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D84). "Ibid.  48  Chapter 3. Membership  While an internal struggle was waged between older veterans and younger Rangers in their late twenties and thirties, another distinct group of recruits was also prominent within the organization. This third group was composed of fifteen and sixteen year old boys, and sometimes these recruits were even younger than fifteen. Many of these young Rangers were previously active in school army cadets, and they often lied about their age to enrol in the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Parker Williams recalled how he came t o b e a Ranger: I was only fifteen years old when I joined the Rangers. One day on the way home f r o m school in Ladysmith, a friend and I began wondering if there was any reason that we couldn't join the Rangers since we were t o o young for regular service and most Rangers were t o o old for the regular service.  We  stopped b y the local commander's h o m e who was a small farmer and an exW . W . I army officer. W h e n we asked him, he was completely taken aback and wasn't sure. However, he gave it some thought and could find no reason why we couldn't join.  So we entered the ranks with the older fellows and  participated in the back-woods exercises. 22 In like manner, Harry Hurley was very young when he joined the P . C . M . R . : I was fourteen but looked older as did several others and were more or less taken under the wings of the World War I veterans w h o were in their early forties. 2 3 Several Ranger companies utilized teenagers as runners or messengers. Major-General J.P. Mackenzie, Inspector-General ( A r m y ) , was impressed b y a "Boys platoon" active in Number 135 Company (Dawson, Yukon Territory): _ "Parker Williams, personal letter, 12 November 1988. Officially, the youngest Ranger recruits had to be sixteen years old. 33 Harry Hurley, personal letter, 3 November 1988.  Chapter 3. Membership  49  The boys were all mounted on bicycles, carrying rifles slung. The O.C. informs me that he uses them to convey messages to the various outposts. T h e boys are most enthusiastic. They will become imbued with the military spirit and will in time, no doubt, join the Active Forces of the country. 24 Similarly, Captain Buller, commander of the Bella Coola Rangers, enlisted several fourteen and fifteen year old boys who owned bicycles, to act as a "signalling and messenger section."  Captain Buller explained to Colonel Taylor that the boys would "not carry  rifles. In action they would b e used well behind the front line". 2 5 David Whittaker was a runner in Number 8 Company (Youbou), but was not issued a rifle because he was only a lad of about thirteen. Despite his young age, he was accepted as a Ranger and participated in the war effort. He recalled sitting in the front row of a lecture by a P.C.M.R. instructor and interjecting that he thought the local Rangers were there to protect the sawmill: Somehow I thought the Japanese wanted our logs and lumber. Right away this guy, not putting me down as a kid, said "no its not the mill we're here to protect because we can always rebuild the mill. We're here to save women and children"...I realized suddenly I was not a child. I still went to school and stuff [but] we were kind of now in the world of men. It was that socializing of us young people-I don't know if it happened in other units but that certainly happened in our group-[that] identified us as men even though we were only 12, 13, 14. 28 An article in The Ranger, the P.C.M.R. training magazine, noted that the " P C M R was 24  Major-General J.P. Mackenzie, Inspector-General (Army), "Report of the Inspection of No. 135 Company, Dawson, Yukon Territory," 30 April 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). "Captain Buller to Col. Taylor, 31 December 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D87). 26 Interview with David Whittaker, Vancouver, B.C., 14 February 1989.  50  Chapter 3. Membership  of necessity a great 'leveller' " in which the "labourer and the banker worked t o g e t h e r . " ' 7 This would seem t o have b e e n the case in N u m b e r 73 C o m p a n y as it was c o m p o s e d of m e n from all levels of society, and the officers were not necessarily f r o m the u p p e r echelons of the community. T h e religious affiliation of Rangers also indicates a m i x t u r e (see Figures 3.9-3.12).  N o t surprisingly, in a largely Protestant province, Protestants  m a d e u p the bulk o f Ranger membership.  Nevertheless, R o m a n Catholics were b y n o  means e x c l u d e d f r o m the P . C . M . R . , and in N u m b e r 73 C o m p a n y , at 27 percent, represent a higher p r o p o r t i o n than the 1941 B . C . average of 13.4 percent. 2 8  This, however, has  m u c h t o d o with the fact that approximately 21 percent of H o p e ' s population was R o m a n Catholic. 2 9 In Masset, Penticton, and Burnaby, o n the other h a n d , the n u m b e r of R o m a n Catholics in the P . C . M . R . was well b e l o w the provincial average b u t still in line with local averages. 3 0 In short, the n u m b e r o f R o m a n Catholic Rangers corresponded t o the regional religious distribution in British C o l u m b i a at that time. Married m e n w h o m a y have hesitated t o enlist for active service overseas willingly j o i n e d the P . C . M . R . (see Figures 3.13-3.16). T h e percentage o f married Rangers was high and varied f r o m 50 percent in B u r n a b y t o 70 percent in Penticton. In 1941, 46 percent o f British Columbia's males were married which, w h e n c o m p a r e d t o the high n u m b e r of married Rangers, might indicate that s o m e m e n j o i n e d the P . C . M . R . rather than g o overseas and leave their families behind. M o r e o v e r , there were a substantial n u m b e r of Native Indian Rangers throughout the province. Native Indian Rangers, in fact, were considered t o b e among the most skilled and respected in the corps. 3 1 T h e Ranger group at K a t z , l o c a t e d o n the north side of the Ranger, Stand Down Number (October 1945): 7. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Eighth Census of Canada 1941 vol. 3 (Ottawa: King's  27The 28  Printer, 1946), 294. 29 Ibid., vol. 2, 638. "Ibid. 31 The Ranger, Stand Down Number (October 1945):11. See also Barry Broadfoot, Six War Years 1939-1945 (Don Mills, Ont.: Paper Jacks, 1974), 55.  Chapter  3.  Membership 6212  Religious Affiliation No. 73 Company (Hope)  Protectant (169) 68%  A«no*tlo(3)1% Not Given (5) 2%  Other (5) 2%  Roman Cathoto (66) 27%  s a m p l e size 2 4 8 Source: Hope Mueeum Archives, PCMR fie, Nominal Rolle (1 M2-1 S4S).  Figure 3.9: Religious Denomination in Number 73 Coy. (Hope).  Religious Affiliation No. 105 Company (Masset)  ProtMtant (71) 85%  None (2) 2% Not Given (5) 6% Roman Catholic (6) 7%  s a m p l e size 8 4 Source: 8.C. Provincial AroNvee, Add.MSS.2113.  Figure 3.10: Religious Denomination in Number 105 Coy. (Massef  Chapter  3.  52  Membership  Religious Affiliation No. 71 Company (Penticton)  Protestant (123) 79%  Other (4) 3% Not Given (7) 5% Roman Catholic (21) 14%  s a m p l e size 155 Soutot: Pmticton (RN. Mttaon) Mmuaaum v)d AraNvw, 4-4477 and 4-4378. Figure 3.11: Religious Denomination in Number 71 Company (Penticton).  Religious Affiliation No. 90 Company (Burnaby North)  Protestant (116) 92%  Not Given (3) 2% Roman Catholic (7) 6%  s a m p l e size 126 Sourca: Gerald Charton Papam. Figure 3.12: Religious Denomination in Number 90 Company (Burnaby North).  53  Chapter 3. Membership  Marital Status  No. 73 Company (Hope) Married (155) 59%  Single (107)41%  sample size 262 Soura: Hop* MuMum Archivw, PCMR n ^ «**lcallon> for •ntotment  Figure 3.13: Marital Status in Number 73 Company ( H o p e ) .  Marital Status No. 105 Company (Masset) Married (48) 57%  Widowed (2)2% Not Given (2)2% Single (32)38%  sample size 84 Soura: B £ . Provincial AroNvw, Add.MSS.211S.  Figure 3.14: Marital Status in Number 105 Company (Masset).  Chapter 3.  54  Membership  Marital Status  No. 71 Company (Penticton)  (2)1% sample size 155 Souroa: Pwnjcton (R.N. Afclraon) Muaaum and Arahivaa, 4-4377 and 4-4371. Figure 3.15: Marital Status in Number 71 Company (Penticton).  Marital Status No. 90 Company (Burnaby North) Married (63)50%  Widowed (2)2%  Single (61)48%  sample size 126 Souroa: Qarald Chariton Papan. Figure 3.16: Marital Status in Number 90 Company (Burnaby North).  Chapter 3. Membership  55  Fraser River downstream from Hope, was composed entirely of Indians. In an equipment inspection report this group was commended for having its equipment in "very g o o d shape and well looked after." 3 2 Number 95 Company (Port Simpson) was also composed entirely of Indians and as the Inspector-General noted: I was quite impressed with the company and with the feeling which appears to exist in the community with regaxd to the personnel of this company. T h e community all appear to b e whole-heartedly behind them. 3 3  Yet Native Indian Rangers were still treated in a paternalistic manner by white officers. Indians were not admitted into the Penticton company until the spring of 1943, because there was a "wet canteen in the Armouries." 3 4 T h e Indian Rangers of Number 123 Company (Ahousat) were required to keep their rifles and ammunition in stores, because of a shooting incident. In justifying the weapon lock-up Field Supervisor, Captain B. Harvey, found it necessary to deceive the Natives of Ahousat: T h e reason given t o the Indians was that the situation on the coast had eased off sufficiently t o allow for enough warning t o b e expected, so that Rangers could b e contacted in sufficient time for them t o report t o Coy. H Q and draw the necessary equipment, in an emergency, and that weapons would b e better kept in proper storage. This seemed to b e acceptable without protest.  N o mention was made of the incident in the report of attempted  shooting, though from expressions on the faces of the older Indians, it is felt that they understood [the truth]. 3 6 32  Staff Sergeant Allan H. Gates, "Equipment Inspection Report," 14 November 1943, Hope Museum Archives, P.C.M.R. File (hereafter HMA). 33 Major-General J.P. Mackenzie to Col.-Hon. J.R. Ralston, 15 February 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). 34 Corporal Dean Miller to Headquarters, Pacific Command, 2 April 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D85). 35 Captain B. Harvey to Col. Taylor, 26 October 1943, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592).  56  Chapter 3. Membership  Evidently, Ranger authorities did not trust the Indians of Number 123 Company t o keep their weapons. At Penticton, since Indians could not legally b e served liquor, they were excluded f r o m the Rangers until 1943. Native Indians may have been respected in other units, but the Indian Rangers at Ahousat and Penticton were treated with suspicion. Many Native Indian Rangers were employed in essential industries, such as fish canneries, and were exempt f r o m military service but they were anxious to join P . C . M . R . units. Colonel D . B . Martyn, commander of the Prince Rupert defences, supported the Indians of Kitkatla in their drive to f o r m a Ranger unit. As Martyn explained to Colonel Taylor: T h e Kitkatla Indians are...very patriotic, in fact ever since the call made at that point b y your representative last yeax when the organization of a P C M R Company there was m o o t e d they have been organizing and drilling and do not understand why they have not received any rifles or other equipment whereas other P C M R Companies have. 3 0  T h e enthusiasm of Native Indians was widespread and as Ranger instructor B. Kennelly explained in a report f r o m Kincolith:  All the Indians of these parts are strongly and enthusiastically (almost t o o much) for the Ranger organization.  T h e y see in it their opportunity to d o  their bit and t o b e prepared to help in home defence. 3 7  At the same time, Native Indians were worried that enlistment in the P . C . M . R . required them to eventually join the regular army. Captain B. Kennelly reported that in Port Simpson, Kitkatla, and Metlakatla the fear of being called to join the active forces 36 37  Col. D.B. Martyn to Taylor, 18 February 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D77). Capt. B. Kennelly to Taylor, 28 February 194?, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D94).  Chapter 3. Membership  57  "was the big grievance that had prevented them from feeling like being organized as a P . C . M . R . unit until n o w . " 3 8 As Captain Kennelly further advised Taylor on the situation: T h e question of military call-ups is a serious matter with these men. T h e y claim they have shown their loyalty and that Queen Victoria told them they would never have t o fight unless they wanted to. T h e y are very proud of their Ranger association. 3 9 Native Indians were more than willing to join the P . C . M . R . , even if they were less enthusiastic about service in the regular army. Although Ranger officers' perceptions of Native Indians were coloured by racist attitudes, those same attitudes made Indians a preferred group for Ranger enlistment, because of the belief that Amerindians were adept at irregular guerilla warfare.  For  example, Lieutenant-Colonel W . B . Hendrie, the commander of the Canadian A r m y ' s Mountain and Jungle Warfare School at Terrace, requested the assistance of six Indian Rangers from the Nass River Miska tribe. Hendrie had heaxd that the six Indians had passed through the Sardis Ranger Training School with "very g o o d results," and he wanted them t o act as instructors in the "jungle wing" of his school. 4 0 It seems that an ethnic stereotype made this minority group acceptable and even desired as recruits. Be that as it may, not everyone was welcome to enlist in the P . C . M . R . W . W . Smith, captain of Number 134 Company (Woodfibre), advised P . C . M . R . headquarters that a naturalized German, Guido Krause, had applied to join the Woodfibre Rangers.  As  Captain Smith stated:  Personally I would just as soon not have the man in the organization but he M  Ibid. Ibid. 40 Lieutenant-Colonel W.B. Hendrie to Headquarters 6 Canadian Division, Prince George, B.C., 30 October 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D94). 39  Chapter 3. Membership  58  has volunteered his services, and for such, deserves a hearing at least. 41  In response, P . C . M . R . headquarters suggested that if Mr. Krause were naturalized, he should have a certificate of exemption to b e enrolled. Furthermore, Captain Smith was instructed that if there was "any doubt about this mail being a loyal Ranger, even though he has the certificate...of course he should not b e enrolled." 4 2 There was also concern at Woodfibre over the enlistment of Italians:  Some Italians who were naturalized in 1924, g o o d fellows to all appearances, have wanted to join but [I] have put them off as easily as possible. T h e y were formerly all for Fascism, but it is hard to tell their inside feelings now. 4 3  Similarly, the Ranger units at Alert Bay and Ladysmith requested instructions regarding the enlistment of men of Finnish descent. P . C . M . R . headquarters advised these units to use their own judgement but " W h i t e Finns" were considered desirable while " R e d Finns" were "undesirable" and should b e rejected. 4 4 It is apparent that, even though the Soviet Union was an ally, some residual fear of Bolshevism remained. Chinese Canadians were also accepted b y many P . C . M . R . detachments. James O n Lee, a storekeeper at Yale, was one such example of a Chinese-Canadian Ranger. Yet it is also likely that many Chinese and other racial minorities were informally excluded from the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. In Number 8 Company ( Y o u b o u ) , as David Whittaker recalled: 41  Capt. W. W. Smith to Col. Taylor, 27 March 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D95). Major Barton for Col. Taylor to Capt. W.W. Smith, 29 March 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D95). 43 Capt. R.F. Lyons to Col. Taylor, 3 March 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D95). 44 Lieut. Osborn for Capt. J.B. Armstrong to Col. Taylor, 15 April 1943; Capt. W. Barton for Col. Taylor to Capt. Armstrong, 19 April 1943; Major Barton for Col. Taylor to Capt. S.J. Brinham, 29 June 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D91). See also Lieut. H.V.N. Bankes, R.C.A. 1.0. for Yorke Island, B.C., to G.S.O. 2 Intelligence, Pacific Command, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D82). 42  Chapter 3. Membership  59  W e had a Chinese bunkhouse and Chinese working in the mill and we had Sikhs...but I don't remember those men being in the militia. I think it was just Caucasians that were in that particular unit. 45 Overall, the P.C.M.R. was composed of men from all walks of life. Ultimately, however, Ranger Captains were free to use their own discretion as to who could join their companies. Some minority groups were shunned because of their enemy alien background, while others were overlooked, likely because they were outsiders in a predominantly white British Columbia. At any rate, P.C.M.R. membership reflected the general character of their communities. For example, Ranger units in the Cariboo consisted mainly of ranchers, while farmers dominated many Fraser Valley detachments. Vancouver companies, by contrast, necessarily consisted of urban dwellers mostly unfamiliar with the woods. The contrast is most striking between the urban Burnaby unit and the interior Penticton company. A high proportion of the Burnaby Rangers were younger, while the Penticton unit was mainly composed of older men. The difference between urban and rural is more apparent when one examines the possession of firearms prior to Ranger enlistment (see Figure 3.17). Fifty-seven percent of the Penticton Rangers owned their own firearms, compared to only 28 percent in Burnaby. The low figure in Burnaby can b e partly attributed to the high number of younger Rangers, but it is as likely the result of the urban environment. In rural areas, however, hunting and firearm ownership was more common as the higher figures of 37 percent in Hope, and 42 percent in Masset demonstrate. In outlying areas, therefore, the men of the P.C.M.R. already knew how to handle firearms. Nonetheless, in Vancouver, as well as in other urban areas, Ranger recruits soon became familiar with their rifles. In both urban and rural units, Rangers learned how to shoot in a military manner because, as The Ranger magazine 45  Interview with David Whittaker, Vancouver, B.C., 14 February 1989.  Chapter 3.  Membership  60  Firearm Ownership  Hope, Penticton, Burnaby North, Masset Percentage of Men  • I  Hop* (Total 262)  EZ2  Penticton (155)  N I  Burnaby North (128)  fS3  Matwt (94)  Sourcas: HMA; PMA, 4-4377,4-4376; Qatald Charlton Papare; B.C. Prov. Archlvas, Add. MSS. 2113. Figure 3.17: Ranger recruits owning firearms prior t o enlistment in No. 71 Coy. (Penticton), No. 73 Coy. ( H o p e ) , No. 90 Coy. (Burnaby North), and No. 105 Coy. (Masset). frequently reminded them, they would b e shooting at Japanese soldiers not at deer. Furthermore, the fact that many Rangers grew up or worked in a particular area for a number of years provided them with an intimate knowledge of the backwoods and coastal inlets. Jim Kingsley, former captain of Number 32 Company (Parksville), recalled that the men under his c o m m a n d knew this area right from here through to the West Coast like a b o o k . hunted on it when we were young.  We  46  Ranger recruits unfamiliar with the bush soon learned to know their regions. For example, as A . Frank Smith, formerly of Number 84 Company (Ladner), explained: we were farmers and I wouldn't say I was a great bushman, but the year or "Interview with Jim Kingsley, Parksville, B.C., 16 January 1989.  61  Chapter 3. Membership  two of training in that, you got so you had a pretty g o o d sense of direction in the bush.  47  T h e men of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers came from all economic levels of society within the dominant Anglo-Saxon majority.  Minorities, with the exception of Native  Indians, were generally not involved in the P . C . M . R .  Rangers were of all ages f r o m  teenagers t o men well into their seventies and, sometimes, even their eighties.  Most  adult Rangers were married, which reflects b o t h their age and the appeal of sharing in the war effort while remaining at home.  Older men and those medically unfit t o  serve overseas were eager t o serve on the home front. While many teenagers joined the Rangers for adventure and prestige, they were well aware of the seriousness of the war and their role in it. Previous military experience was also widespread among Rangers as was firearm ownership. This indicates that these recruits already had experience with weapons that would make them valuable members of the P . C . M . R .  Yet others with  little or no military experience were valuable because of their outdoor occupations. For instance, trappers and prospectors were familiar with the back country, and loggers were aware of roads absent f r o m maps. Most Rangers were well acquainted with the area in which they would b e required to fight and, in this respect, they were an asset t o the defence of British Columbia.  47  Interview with A. Frank Smith, Vancouver, B.C., 8 November 1988.  Chapter 4  Training and Tactics  T h e P . C . M . R . was a unique organization because its structure and operations were deliberately unconventional. T o b e sure, the basic goal was t o b e a military unit, b u t the Rangers were dissuaded f r o m the notion that they should rigidly follow military traditions and d e c o r u m . For e x a m p l e , The Ranger  training magazine stressed the fact that  Rangers were not regular soldiers and were never intended t o b e so. Rather, the Ranger's "whole f u n c t i o n " consisted of "not being a regular soldier." 1 T h e Rangers were still civilians, and t h e y continued with their daily work routine while pursuing their training in the evenings and o n weekends. T h e problems o f organizing and training such a group of civilians were recognized b y the military authorities. Consequently, the Rangers were given certain privileges and leeway which would have b e e n intolerable in the regular army. The Ranger magazine was even written in a casual fashion so it would b e understandable t o civilians. Emphasis was o n practical training and Rangers were frequently reminded that "drill m o v e m e n t s should not b e o v e r d o n e . " 2 This was the case f r o m the outset, as a m e m o r a n d u m of 18 M a r c h 1942 indicates: "Drill and training will not b e o n standard military lines, b u t voluntary and informal and designed b y local authorities t o suit local conditions." 3 A spirit o f cooperation existed in most Ranger companies and military discipline was relaxed.  J . W . Fraser, former captain of N u m b e r 43 C o m p a n y (Port A l i c e ) , explained  The Ranger, 5, no. 8 (August 1945): 2. The Ranger, 2, no. 7 (1 April 1943): 50. 3 Memorandum from Major T.A.H. Taylor, 18 March 1942, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D298). 1  2  62  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  63  that lie was Only as strict as was necessary and what the men would take, because Ranger philosophy wasn't strict military discipline. You were there to learn as much as you could, learn to work together and that was about it. There was no such thing as punishment. 4 Walt Cousins, a member of Number 118 Company (West Point Grey), recalled that the P . C . M . R . was a loose outfit. If you were told to do a thing you were simply told 'I want you t o d o so and so' and you used your own judgement. It wasn't a case of, you know, you step out with your left foot. T h e y didn't give a damn if you crawled. But I think everybody respected each other and knew their failings and their g o o d points and just relied on one another. 5 T h e civilian nature of the P . C . M . R . is apparent in the egalitarian way in which it operated.  Military organizations have traditionally been marked by a rigid hierarchy  of ranks and deference.  Ranger units were ultimately responsible to Colonel Taylor,  but were frequently left on their own to deal -with different situations.  The P.C.M.R.  was a decentralized organization, and the democracy which existed within its ranks was unheard of in the regular army. Jim Kingsley, former captain of Number 32 Company (Parksville), ran his company in a typically democratic fashion: I'd ask for suggestions. If we were going to do something I'd say 'now if any of you fellas have any ideas let me know. If you don't tell me how am I going to know'?6 interview with J.W. Eraser, North Vancouver, B.C., 12 December 1988. interview with Walt Cousins, Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988. interview with Jim Kingsley, Parksville, B.C., 16 January 1989.  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  64  Still further evidence o f the relaxation o f military standards can b e seen in their uniforms, which were decidedly different f r o m customaxy military dress.  Their  floppy  hats, tan coloured " D r y - B a k " hunting jackets and pants and, later, khaki d e n i m jackets suited British Columbia's d a m p o u t d o o r conditions rather than following traditional military dress codes. In f a c t , the " D r y - B a k " line o f clothing was popular a m o n g West Coast loggers because it was waterproof.  Lieutenant-General Stuart was aware o f the  need for special uniforms when he remarked that regulation battle dress serge uniform is not suited for the work Rangers are, or will b e , called o n t o p e r f o r m , nor the conditions m e t with in most areas, particularly the heavily t i m b e r e d areas o n V a n c o u v e r Island and the i m m e d i ate Coast Mainland where the rainfall, c o u p l e d with the dense undergrowth, makes special clothing necessary, i.e. clothing such as worn b y hunters, trappers, loggers and others w h o work in these areas. 7 M u c h like their eighteenth century counterparts, then, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers discarded traditional military dress for clothing adapted t o the environment. It was believed that if the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were required t o fend off an invasion, they could b e most effective b y employing hit-and-run guerilla tactics. T h e success o f such operations would b e contingent u p o n the ability o f Rangers t o profit f r o m intimate knowledge of their o w n particular regions. O n training schemes with the regular army, the Rangers o f t e n c a m e out o n t o p because of their skill at using the surrounding countryside t o their advantage. 8 T h e Rangers, however, were not simply guerillas; they were also "militia m e n " trained in traditional military skills. 9 B y combining b o t h types 7  Lieut.-Gen. Stuart to Secretary, Dept. of National Defence, 22 June 1942, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D298). 8 The Ranger, 5, no. 8 (August 1945): 2. 9 Ibid., 3, no. 5 (1 September 1945): 130.  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  65  of training, and utilizing their local area knowledge and w o o d s m a n s h i p , the Rangers were e x p e c t e d t o hinder any e n e m y invasion. T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were unique t o the Canadian A r m y b u t , at the same time, the R o y a l Canadian N a v y had its equivalent called the Fishermen's Reserve. Otherwise k n o w n as the " G u m b o o t Navy," this f o r c e was similar t o the P . C . M . R . because it was c o m p o s e d primarily of civilians-usually f i s h e r m e n - w h o patrolled the B . C . coast in c o m m e r c i a l fishing vessels. 1 0  Like the P . C . M . R . , the Fishermen's Reserve was m a n n e d  b y irregulars w h o k n e w the coastal waters as well as Rangers k n e w the mountains and w o o d s of British Columbia.  A s irregulars, they were also intolerant o f discipline and  authority which inevitably led t o conflicts with officers o f b o t h the reserve and regular navy. Outside Canada, the Second W o r l d Wax p r o d u c e d m a n y other irregular guerilla for-  -  mations. South of the b o r d e r in Oregon, a guerilla f o r c e was organized b y a First W o r l d Wax veteran. A t its inception, this organization was surrounded with the same r o m a n t i c aura that a c c o m p a n i e d the birth of the P . C . M . R .  A Vancouver  Sun article of 17 M a r c h  1942 reflects this enthusiasm: T h e y provide their o w n rifles and ammunition. T h e y have n o uniforms and t h e y d o n o drilling. T h e y intend t o fight, as the Indians did before t h e m , f r o m the sandpits and cliffs along the o c e a n and in the timbered mountain passes leading inland. 1 1 Soon after their formation, these guerilla bands were officially attached t o the Oregon State Guard. 1 3 10  Donald Peck, "The Gumboot Navy," Raincoast Chronicles, no. 7: 12-19; Carol Popp, The Gumboot Navy (Lantzville, B.C.: Oolichan Books, 1988). 11 "Guerillas Organized to Guard Oregon," Vancouver Sun, 12 March 1942. 12 "Guerilla Bands to join Oregon State Guard," Vancouver Sun, 17 March 1942.  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  66  T h e situation in Australia was similar t o that in Canada. Ex-servicemen trained independently b e f o r e the government f o r m e d t h e m into the Volunteer D e f e n c e Corps ( V D C ) . Later, as the threat o f a Japanese invasion increased, other guerilla bands, separate f r o m the V D C , b e g a n t o train. K n o w n as the People's A r m y , this group, according t o Michael M c K e r n a n , appealed " t o the remnant o f the bush legend that encouraged Australians t o think o f themselves as practical and resourceful b a t t l e r s . " 1 3 Australian government officials b e c a m e worried about independent guerillas b e y o n d their control, which p r o m p t e d t h e m t o e x p a n d the V D C in order t o weaken the People's A r m y . T h e V D C , m u c h like the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, had four primary roles: the static defence o f localities, the protection of vulnerable and key points, guerilla warfare and the detection o f e n e m y movements.14 T h e N e w Zealand H o m e G u a r d ' s role was m u c h the same: they were t o harass the _ enemy, defend important sites, and provide intelligence reports for the regular army. Similar t o Rangers, a N e w Zealand H o m e Guardsman, according t o N a n c y M . Taylor,  was defined as a part-time infantry soldier, armed with rifle, machine-gun and b o m b s , w h o having n o government transport or supply must fight and feed near his o w n h o m e , his chief asset being close knowledge of the n e i g h b o u r h o o d . 1 6 Again, like the P . C . M . R . , the N e w Zealand H o m e Guard concentrated o n rifle training and knowledge of their areas, while disregarding military drill. Despite the similarities with the P . C . M . R . , after April 1942 all m e n in N e w Zealand between the ages of thirty-five and fifty were required t o j o i n the H o m e Guard. 1 6 T h e P . C . M . R . remained a voluntary 13  Michael McKernan, All In! Australia During the Second World War (Melbourne: Thomas Nelson Australia, 1983), 122. "Ibid., 124. 15 Nancy M. Taylor, The New Zealand People At War: The Home Front (Wellington, New Zealand: V.R. Ward, Government Printer, 1986), 467. 16 Ibid., 473.  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  67  organization and conscription was never considered, although social pressure was exerted o n m e n t o j o i n the Rangers. Perhaps the most f a m o u s of the British C o m m o n w e a l t h h o m e guard units was the British H o m e G u a r d . 1 7  Officially designated as Local D e f e n c e Volunteers, they were  initially p o o r l y equipped and their tasks were simply t o observe and report e n e m y m o v e ments in the event o f an invasion. A s time passed the supply o f weapons increased, and H o m e Guard training f o c u s e d o n a m o r e mobile defence strategy. M e m b e r s of the British H o m e Guaxd were not paid b u t , after N o v e m b e r 1941, m e n b e t w e e n the ages o f eighteen and fifty-one could b e conscripted into the force. T h e Second W o r l d W a r also p r o d u c e d partisan guerilla groups in China, the Soviet Union, and Eastern E u r o p e .  T h e difference b e t w e e n these groups and those described  thus far, is that these partisan resistance groups in A x i s o c c u p i e d countries actually engaged in c o m b a t .  T i t o ' s partisans in Yugoslavia harassed e n e m y forces with s o m e  success, as did Soviet guerillas. Soviet partisans used tactics in which the P . C . M . R . , in theory, were trained in. For example, m u c h like the P . C . M . R . ' s p r o p o s e d role, the Soviet guerillas, according t o D a v i d Mountfield, went underground after the Germans invaded, and were e x p e c t e d t o harass the Nazis b y means o f sabotage, b y . . . 'blowing u p bridges and railway tracks, destroying e n e m y telephone and telegraph communications, blowing u p e n e m y ammunition d u m p s . ' 1 8 Soviet partisans carried out these guerilla tactics, b u t they were never a serious threat t o the G e r m a n A r m y . T h e y did, however, draw m a n p o w e r away f r o m the G e r m a n ' s main objectives, which t o some extent eased the b u r d e n o f the R e d A r m y . If the Pacific Coast 17  For ail in depth study of the British Home Guard see Norman Longmate, The Real Dad's Army ' (London: Hutchinson Library Services, 1974). "David Mountfield, The Partisans (London: Hamlyn, 1979), 177.  _  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  68  Militia Rangers were called into action, they were expected to engage in the same type of guerilla wax that the partisans waged in the Soviet Union. Accordingly, the chief purpose of Ranger training was to "perfect small but strong self-contained units" that could carry out assignments alone or "in conjunction with active service force units." 1 0  T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were not expected to  meet an invasion head on and successfully repel it. Rather, they were assigned the task of preventing a major breakthrough by harassing and containing the enemy for as long as possible. The Rangers were to force the enemy "into the woods and rugged country denying him the routes of easier travel." 2 0 Clearly, then, the Rangers were to function primarily as an initial defensive screen until further help could arrive. Because Rangers were expected to function as guerilla units, there was necessarily an emphasis on training in guerilla tactics. Therefore, techniques such as the ambush, tree sniping, personal camouflage, and explosives training for blowing up bridges were taught to all companies. Hugh Sutherland, a former Ranger from Number 129 Company (Grand Forks), vividly recalled his unit's training methods: our role was as a guerilla unit, hence we learned the art of killing with a knife, blinding or deafening, and generally close range combat as well as concealment.  Ambush tactics were explained to us: [about] giving us the  best advantage without exposing ourselves, i.e. fire then roll, fire then roll, never shooting from the same position twice so one cannot be located by the muzzle flash etc. 2 1 Yank Levi's booklet, Guerilla  Warfare, was recommended reading for all Rangers, and  the author was even asked to give lectures to P.C.M.R. companies throughout British 19  Ibid., 2, no. 7 (1 April 1943): 50. Ibid., 2, no. 9 (1 May 1943). J1 Hugh Sutherland, personal letter, 5 February 1989.  20  69  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  Columbia. 2 2 M o r e o v e r , Ranger training o f t e n r e c o m m e n d e d a f o r m o f bush warfare m u c h like the Indians waged hundreds o f years ago. A s Ranger instructor B . Kennelly explained t o Colonel Taylor in a report o n the Kincolith Rangers: the night b e f o r e I had pleased t h e m b y saying we a d v o c a t e d the Rangers train t o fight like 'Indians' and not like soldiers, and they b e g a n t o recall their forefathers' days of fighting with the Alaskan and outer island tribes etc.23 A two week long officer training c a m p was established, at the Sardis Engineer Training Centre, t o periodically instruct Rangers f r o m throughout British C o l u m b i a and the Y u k o n Territory. T h e school was taught b y Canadian A r m y senior N . C . O . ' s , b u t it was designed specifically for Rangers. M a n y attending the c a m p were older m e n and Pacific C o m m a n d did not e x p e c t t h e m t o g o " b e y o n d their limitations." A s a result, it was stressed that the training at Sardis would "not b e o n standard military lines." 2 4 Nevertheless, the school covered a b r o a d range of topics including "application o f fire, m e t h o d of instruction, light a u t o m a t i c ( B r e n g u n ) , field and bushcraft, field sanitation, explosives, and m a p reading." 2 6 Lloyd Cornett learned s o m e valuable lessons f r o m the Ranger training c a m p : T h e y brought people in f r o m all over the province  there were trappers  f r o m northern British C o l u m b i a and Indians and w o o d s m e n o f various kinds. L o g g e r s - p e o p l e w h o were very c o m f o r t a b l e in the w o o d s and very experienced. It was worth a lot just t o b e with these guys  W e didn't d o m u c h in the way  of drill b u t w e were taught m a p p i n g very clearly. W e were taught h o w t o m o v e around in the w o o d s .  fieldcraft:  Camouflage: h o w t o hide and keep out  "'Yank' Levy, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1942); "Kill-Or Be Killed: Herb 'Yank* Levi Enunciates the Doctrine of the Guerilla Fighter," Penticton Herald, 14 October 1943. 23 Capt. Kennelly to Col. Taylor, 28 February 194?, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D94). " P . C . M . R . Circular Letter No. 55, 21 April 1943, HMA. 25 The Ranger, 5, no. 2 (February 1945): 7.  70  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  of sight. W e were taught the use of some extra weapons that we didn't get because they weren't available: Anti-tank weapons, grenades of various kinds. Demolitions: how to blow a railway line, how to lay charges on a bridge, how to blow craters in roads. It was a kind of a guerilla warfare thing in a sense. The idea being that if the Japanese ever invaded we would not line up and take them on. W e would go into the woods and harass them. 2 8 Finally, the Ranger training camp was important because it promoted cooperation between the P.C.M.R. and the Canadian Army. If the Rangers were to b e the eyes and ears of the regular army, there had to b e a close alliance between the two. Indeed, as W . K . Dobson, one of the instructors at Sardis, explained: "Essentially our efforts were to show them how they could help us by knowing how to write messages and what information they should include." 2 7  W h e n they returned from the Sardis training camp, Rangers  then passed on their newly-acquired knowledge to their detachments.  These Rangers  became qualified instructors for their own companies. Because P.C.M.R. companies were spread throughout British Columbia, centralized training was not feasible. Training and tactics varied from region to region according to the terrain in which combat would occur.  As Ranger instructor Kennelly observed:  "a great deal must be left to the initiative and enterprize [sic] of Ranger company commanders." 2 8  The Ranger training magazine was sent out to all companies to aid  in training, but was especially useful for the more remote detachments.  In addition,  travelling instructors frequently visited Ranger units to provide instruction in the use of various weapons. J.D. Little describes training given to Number 129 Company (Grand Forks) by travelling instructors: "Interview with Lloyd Cornett, Burnaby, B.C., 29 November 1988. 27 W.K. Dobson, personal letter, 28 November 1988. 28 Lieut. B. Kennelly for Col. Taylor to Capt. C.S. Williams, Officer Commanding No. 118 Company, P.C.M.R. (West Point Grey), 22 August 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D92).  71  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  Periodically we would have military personnel c o m e t o t o w n t o p r o v i d e us with guerilla warfare instruction.  I recall learning a n u m b e r o f potentially  lethal holds; h o w t o m a k e a b o m b f r o m h o m e m a d e chemicals, and a detonator f r o m a flashlight b u l b filled with g u n p o w d e r ; h o w t o use steel wire t o choke someone, e t c . 2 9 T h e s e special Ranger instructors were chosen for their military experience, ability, and knowledge of local terrain.  O f the eight m e n sent into t h e field as travelling instruc-  tors, seven were First W o r l d W a r veterans, while Captain B . Kennelly h a d served in the Irish R e p u b l i c a n A r m y . All o f t h e m were familiar with British Columbia's terrain. Their ranks included a forest ranger, a g a m e warden, a P e a c e River trapper, a timber cruiser and surveyor, and a mining engineer. 3 0  A m o n g other things, these instructors  taught Rangers h o w t o handle m a c h i n e guns and explosives as well as p r o p e r signalling m e t h o d s . Training in N u m b e r 73 C o m p a n y seems t o have b e e n extensive and was taken seriously.  T h e Laidlaw detachment of this c o m p a n y trained in techniques o f personal  concealment, shadow blending, scouting, relaying messages, field signals, m a p p i n g , and the construction o f slit trenches and M o l o t o v Cocktails. 3 1 T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were also e x p e c t e d t o serve in another c a p a c i t y - b y using their local axea k n o w l e d g e - a s scouts and guides for the regular army. Consequently, Ranger units were encouraged t o study their areas " f r o m a military standpoint" t o determine "what places would b e of tactical significance if invading forces c a m e t o their district." 3 2 A progress report f r o m the Yale detachment reveals that they "concentrated o n knowledge and ability to o p e r a t e " in the w o o d s surrounding their village.  Further-  more, as Lieutenant C . E . Barry reported: 29  J.D. Little, personal letter, 5 March 1989. "History Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, Note Re Staff," n.d., D. Hist., file 322.009 (D298), 5. 31 Laidlaw P.C.M.R. detachment Progress Report, 5 July 1944, HMA. 32 The Ranger, 3, no. 2 (15 July 1943): 109.  30  72  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  W e have also studied and planned carefully the defence of the three transcontinental [rail and road] lines in this district.  At the present time we are  picking out spots along these lines where the defence of same would b e easy for a small number of men. 3 3 In a similar report f r o m 1 December 1942, Lieutenant C . C . Young, the North B e n d detachment commander, noted that he had forty-eight men under his command.  They  were broken up into "four groups of eight men each" to cover the North Bend area, and a fifth group of ten older men "for h o m e guard duty." Young also gave an update on their training schedule: Tuesdays, light exercises and study of Morse and exercises, drill, Morse and  flagging.  flagging-Thursdays,  light  Sundays, field manoeuvres (have had  six t o date and have covered the surrounding district for three miles around, with an average turnout of fifteen men on Sundays and about thirty-two on Thursdays). 3 4 A subsequent progress report explained that because North Bend was a railway junction it was "pretty hard t o get all the men together at one time." Those who were able t o attend training sessions, however, appeared "very interested in field manoeuvres" and some were showing an improvement of "50 percent.. .in their shooting." 3 6 Training was much the same in other Ranger companies, with a mix of outdoor exercises and classroom lectures.  Number 54 (Alert B a y ) Company's training report  reflected this mix: Tuesday last was devoted to field manoeuvres-Sten gun instruction and p r a c t i c e grenade throwing and other outdoor exercises. Wednesday, indoor Sten gun 33  Yale P.C.M.R. detachment Progress Report, 15 July 1944, HMA. Lieut. C.C. Young to Capt. H.W. Johnson, 1 December 1942, HMA. 35 North Bend P.C.M.R. detachment Progress Report, n.d., HMA. 34  73  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  instruction and practice aiming, signals, semaphore and map reading. Attendance and enthusiasm g o o d . 3 6 Rangers were instructed extensively in map reading and many remote areas were mapped for their own use, but primarily for the benefit of active force units. T h e West Point Grey Rangers, for example, m a p p e d the entire University of British Columbia Endowment Lands so that it was possible, as Walt Cousins recalled, to "know exactly, if anything landed, where we were going." 3 7 Despite all their preparatory classroom work, realistic training was the number one priority for Rangers. Dave Bunbury, w h o was the lieutenant in charge of the Hope unit during the latter stages of the war, remembered taking his men into the mountains around, the Village of Hope and conducting training exercises: W e knew the whole area. I knew the upper end of the Twenty-Five Mile and the Yale people knew their area after ourselves  W e all had sufficient training to look  W e ' d get up in the hills and practice shooting at certain  areas... Sten gun mostly. 3 8 T h e routine was similar in Number 90 Company (Burnaby North) according to Harry Hurley: T h e training evening once a week entailed a roll call and an intelligence update, followed by instruction in guerilla warfare in the w o o d e d hills nearby where we practiced setting up ambush points, and moving stealthily on our stomachs f r o m point to point. W e also learned how t o improvise field first aid and use available materials t o evacuate casualties, i.e. cut tree limbs and 36  Capt. George Baldwin to Col. Taylor, 13 November 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D82). "Interview with Walt Cousins, Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988. 38 Interview with David Bunbury, Chilliwack, B.C., 9 January 1988.  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  74  put them through the arms of our jackets t o improvise a stretcher. 3 9 Another important aspect of Ranger training consisted of m o c k battles with other P . C . M . R . , reserve, and active force units.  For example, "Evasion Exercise Spud" was  carried out between three Fraser Valley Ranger units, the Royal Canadian Air Force, and the U.S. National Guard to "exercise P . C . M . R . companies in the capture or elimination of enemy saboteurs." 4 0  In this exercise, the Rangers were to prevent acts of sabotage  at strategic points within an eight mile radius of the A b b o t s f o r d Airport, and capture R . C . A . F . airmen posing as enemy paratroops. A similar exercise was conducted among the members of the Alert Bay Rangers. As Ranger instructor B. Harvey observed: This scheme was a simple one of one group acting as enemy, while the other groups went into recce,  [reconnaissance] formations and had to move up  a w o o d road through timber, locate the enemy group and then conduct an encircling movement. It showed that even the best of woodsmen cannot make an approach in w o o d e d country without making some sounds which can be easily heard by those lying in wait. 4 1 Rangers were often very effective in m o c k battles against the regular army.  The  regulars, f r o m places across Canada, were unfamiliar with the territory whereas the Rangers knew their areas well. Donald Sword, whose father was co-captain of Number 1 Company (Victoria), recalled the effectiveness of Rangers against the regular army: Weekends were often spent on para-military exercises, including m o c k battles with the army, which the Rangers frequently 'won' using militarily unorthodox means. O n one of these occasions at the Jordan River Power Station, the 39  Harry Hurley, personal letter, 3 November 1988. "Spud Training Evasion Exercise," 27 May 1945, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D475). 41 Capt. B Harvey to Col. Taylor, 23 August 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D82). 40  75  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  army was defending and the Rangers were attacking. T h e Rangers c a m e out f r o m V i c t o r i a b y fishing b o a t at night (supposedly acting as Japanese C o m m a n d o s from a submarine lying off the coast). T h e skirmish e n d e d quickly w h e n a Ranger swam all the way u p the spillway c o m p l e t e l y out of sight of the defenders and placed a marker ' b o m b ' o n each o f the turbines in the power station. 4 2 Similarly, in a sham battle with the B . C . D r a g o o n s , a militia regiment, the Oliver Rangers, remarkably well camouflaged o n a forward slope, f o u n d g o o d targets and the referees declared that an entire section, o n the D r a g o o n s ' flank, had b e e n put out of action  43  In another training scheme with the B . C . D r a g o o n s , the P e n t i c t o n Rangers m a d e g o o d use of their guerilla tactics. In this m o c k battle the Rangers were attacking, and as one umpire n o t e d , T h e defense h a d a very strong position, b u t the infiltration was also excellent. A t the close, the Rangers seemed t o spring u p from behind every tuft o f grass, and m a n y o f t h e m p r o v e d that they are a lot younger than their years would seem t o indicate in the w a y they snaked around all over the place. 4 4 T h e main f o c u s o f Ranger training, however, was rifle practice.  O n e hundred and  sixty-three rifle ranges were constructed b y P . C . M . R . companies, and g o o d marksmanship was required o f every Ranger. 4 6  Since the rifle was their main w e a p o n and every  "Donald Sword, personal letter, 30 November 1988. 43 "Oliver Rangers Hold the Battleline," article from unknown newspaper probably the Penticton Herald, 25 November 1943, Penticton (R.N. Atkinson) Museum and Archives (hereafter PMA), file 4-464. 44 "No Decision In Sham Battle Here," article from unknown newspaper probably the Penticton Herald, 9 September 1943, PMA, file 4-464. 45a Brief of P.C.M.R.," n.d., D. Hist., file 159 (Dl), 9.  76  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  Ranger was e q u i p p e d with one, most Rangers b e c a m e proficient marksmen.  Shooting  competitions were frequently held against regular army units such as that described in the Kamloops  Sentinel:  T h e biggest get-together this year of military units for a day's shooting o n the K a m l o o p s rifle range t o o k place last Sunday  Units participating  included Pacific Coast Militia Rangers Nos. 85 and 124 Companies; 2nd B a t talion R o c k y M o u n t a i n Rangers; R o y a l Canadian O r d n a n c e Corps and R o y a l Canadian Air Force. T h e P . C . M . R . teams t o o k first, second and third with the R . M . R . ' s c o m i n g fourth.46 Initially, Rangers used their o w n weapons, such as .22 calibre rifles or shotguns, and in m a n y cases they drilled with d u m m y rifles for want o f real weapons. S o o n , however, thousands of .30-30 sporting rifles were supplied t o R a n g e r units and as LieutenantColonel Taylor reported t o Captain Johnson: " t h e D e p a r t m e n t has a c t e d t o release for our use suitable rifles i m p o u n d e d f r o m e n e m y aliens." 4 7 In addition t o the W i n c h e s t e r M o d e l 94 .30-30, Rangers were supplied with the Ross .303, Enfield M o d e l 1917 .30-06, Lee-Enfield .303, Springfield .30-06, and the Marlin .30-30. 4 8 M o s t , however, were armed with the Winchester .30-30 carbine, which is surprising b e c a u s e it was considered a short range hunting rifle rather than a military  firearm.  Rangers preferred t o receive this  rifle precisely because it was a m u c h sought-after hunting weapon. A s Lieutenant Barry complained t o Captain Johnson:  "It's getting near hunting season and I would like t o  get some 3 0 / 3 0 [ s ] . . . t o give the b o y s . " 4 9 W i t h i n the P . C . M . R . , at the local level, military Sentinel, 13 September 1944. Col. Taylor to Capt. Johnson, 26 July 1942, HMA. 48 Donald J. Klancher, "The Arms of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers," Canadian Journal of Arms Collecting 8, no. 4 (November 1970): 122. 49 Lieut. C.E. Barry to Capt. Johnson, 2 September 1944, HMA. 46Kamloops 47  77  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  matters often seem t o have b e e n overshadowed b y civilian interests, such as g a m e hunting. E v e n t h o u g h the .30-30 carbine was a preferred hunting w e a p o n , P . C . M . R . headquarters issued this m o d e l for military reasons alone. In ordinary warfare the .30-30 w o u l d have b e e n a p o o r w e a p o n because of its relatively short range o f 300 yards.  O n the other  h a n d , for use in the bush of British Columbia, where close range shooting would o c c u r , it was considered an ideal w e a p o n . This rifle was also a practical choice b e c a u s e it was a simple w e a p o n that was easy t o l o o k after, it was light (6.5 p o u n d s ) and easy t o carry through dense bush, and m a n y Rangers were already familiar with it because they had used it for hunting. 5 0 Finally, the .30-30 was chosen b e c a u s e it was a standard civilian calibre which alleviated the p r o b l e m o f ammunition supply. 5 1 Rangers were also equipped with bayonets and knives, and were trained t o use explosives, M o l o t o v Cocktails, mortars, .303 Bren guns, and Sten submachine guns. Fired f r o m the waist, the Sten gun could b e used t o engage different targets almost as rapidly as they appeared.  Again, a very useful w e a p o n for close range bush warfare.  These  weapons, however, were not in a b u n d a n c e and were regarded as less important than the rifle. Ranger activity was not all work, training, and planning.  O n the contrary, the  P . C . M . R . also served as a t y p e of social club in which m e n could get together either at meetings or o n the rifle range.  B y the same token, it gave the older generation a  chance t o work with and teach y o u n g Rangers skills such as rifle shooting, and survival techniques. A s i d e f r o m the c o m r a d e r y established during training routines, Rangers also held "smokers," and dances which were o p e n t o the entire c o m m u n i t y . 5 2 A s for younger Rangers, they learned a great deal about military tactics, but they also learned things about life, as David W h i t t a k e r recalled: 50  James Amos Goguen, "Ranger Gun," Victoria Daily Colonist, 1 October 1967, 16. The Ranger, Stand Down Number, 4. "Interview with J.W. Eraser, North Vancouver, B.C., 12 December 1988. 51  -  78  Chapter 4. Training and Tactics  W e played war as k i d s . . . but this was kind of like real. A n d so we were being then socialized into the role of men, and into the role of the militia, and into the role of soldiering, and the adventure and the excitement  W e felt  part of the world of men, and it gave us a lot of self-confidence in terms of adolescents wanting t o belong. It gave us a c h a n c e . . . t o have a rather healthy childhood. 8 3 For old and young Rangers alike, then, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were more than just a defence organization. For many, the P . C . M . R . also served an important social role in British Columbia's wartime society. O n the whole, P . C . M . R . training was many-faceted but the emphasis was on guerilla, tactics. For the most part, practical backwoods training t o o k precedence over military drill and methods.  In the tradition of previous Ranger units, the men of the Pacific  Coast Militia Rangers were trained t o b e c o m e expert marksmen, woodsmen, scouts, and guerilla fighters. From the French and Indian War t o the Second World War, the basic skills of Rangers had remained the same.  "Interview with David Whittaker, Vancouver, B.C., 14 February 1989.  Chapter 5  The Japanese Menace  T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers had diverse roles in the defence of British Columbia: the Rangers were expected to act as combat units to deal with minor raids, and "operate either by themselves or in conjunction with units of the Canadian A r m y Active Forces t o repel a m a j o r attack." 1 More specifically, the duties of the P . C . M . R . included "guerilla warfare in enemy reax, demolitions according t o plan," and "covering rear and flanks of A r m y forces against enemy infiltration." 2  Their primary function, however, was to  act as the eyes and ears of the regular army. As such, the Rangers' duties included the compilation of intelligence reports, coast observation, scouting, and guiding. T h e orders for Vancouver Island P . C . M . R . companies required them to "watch for sabotage and paxa-troops landing," and t o watch and "report enemy movements." 3 Ranger companies were also assigned the task of protecting fuel supplies, lines of communication, and other "vital points." 4  This was particularly challenging for Number 73 Company's Rangers  because three m a j o r railroads passed through H o p e - t h e C . N . R . , C.P.R., and the Kettle Valley line-as well as the Hope-Princeton Trail and Highway Number One. It appears that the Rangers of Number 73 Company took their duties seriously. At one point Lieutenant C.C. Young, of the North Bend detachment, expressed his concern 1  "P.C.M.R. Operation Instruction No. 1," n.d., HMA. 'Major General A.E. Potts, "Operational Role PCMR, Vancouver Island," 15 August 1942, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D813). 3 Ibid. 4 Ibid; "Brief of PCMR," D. Hist., file 159 (Dl).  79  80  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  t o Lieutenant-Colonel T . A . H . Taylor about the "vulnerability of the communication facilities through the Eraser Canyon." 5 On another occasion the C . N . R . tracks near Laidlaw were damaged.  T h e Provincial Police apparently blamed school children, but Ranger  Lieutenant Munro, upon investigation, believed that it could not possibly have been done by children. In this case, b o t h Munro and Captain Johnson were not ruling out the possibility of sabotage.® Concern was also expressed by Lieutenant R . O . Edgar, of the Boston Bar detachment, about the protection of strategic areas. In O c t o b e r 1942, Edgar was in the process of making plans for the defence of the airport at B o o t h r o y d near Boston Bax. According to Edgar, the airport "would have t o b e defended in case of attack" because it would b e a " g o o d manoeuvring place," and "a g o o d landing place for enemy paratroops." 7 T h e Rangers of Number 73 C o m p a n y were well-prepared for any emergency. Each detachment, in fact, had formulated a specific plan of action suitable for its own particular area.  At Yale, the Rangers had made plans to retreat into the woods if it b e c a m e  necessary. For this purpose they located "a natural fortress commanding Yale east and west."  This hiding place was near a water supply and was far enough f r o m Yale that  campfire smoke could not b e detected f r o m the village.  8  For the Hope Rangers, the " T - P l a n " was devised t o deal with "enemy parachute landings," small scale raids or larger invasion attempts, and "sabotage or violence b y enemy aliens." 9 T h e plan of defence for Hope required that, in an emergency, Rangers place themselves at several points of strategic importance. Rangers residing in designated areas were assigned guard duty at bridges, railway stations, the airport, and the village 5  Col. Taylor, Memorandum re security and defences of roads and railways in the Fraser Canyon, 18 May 1943, HMA. 6 Capt. Johnson to Col. Taylor, handwritten draft of letter, no date, HMA. 7 Lieutenant R.O. Edgar to Capt. Johnson, 19 October 1942, HMA. 8 Lieutenant Barry to Capt. Johnson, 19 April 1943, HMA. 9 Secret draft of T-Plan, no date, HMA.  81  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  water pumping station, as well as other locations.  T h e " T - P l a n " even provided for  protection against protests of "discontented elements," such as striking workers. 1 0  The  possible employment of the P . C . M . R as a strikebreaking force was a concern for many Rangers.  Those Rangers who belonged to trade unions, such as loggers, miners, and  railroad workers, were worried that they could b e called out t o supress a strike b y their union brothers. 1 1 This fear of being called upon to aid the civil power was apparent on Vancouver Island.  Colonel Taylor tried to reassure the commanders of the Ladysmith  and Courtenay Rangers that their fears were unfounded: While on Vancouver Island recently I was confronted at several points by P . C . M . R . Company Commanders with information t o the effect that there had been some feeling amongst the P . C . M . R . that consideration was being given to maintaining the P . C . M . R . organization after cessation of hostilities, so that it might b e available for use as a strike-breaking organization, and I wish now to correct any impression to this effect that may exist with you or in your unit. 1 2 Taylor added that the P . C . M . R . was not trained along orthodox military lines, and its training did "not fill requirements of army units that might b e called upon to assist civilian authorities in cases of civil unrest." 1 3 It has been c o m m o n in Canadian history for militia units t o b e called out to protect employers' interests against striking workers, and Vancouver Island had more than its share of this activity. T h e Vancouver Island Rangers w h o protested to Colonel Taylor about the possibility of being called out to aid the civil power, likely had lingering 10  Ibid. "Rumours that the New Zealand Home Guard would be used as strikebreakers was also a concern to its members. See Nancy M. Taylor, op. cit., 456-457. "Col. Taylor to Captain G.V. Osborn, 14 March 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D91); Col. Taylor to Captain A. McDonald, 15 March 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D80). 13 Ibid.  82  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  memories o f militia units breaking local strikes.  For e x a m p l e , in 1913 the militia was  called out t o restore order during the United M i n e Workers o f A m e r i c a strike against the Mackenzie and Mann-controlled coal mines at N a n a i m o , C u m b e r l a n d , L a d y s m i t h , and other areas. T h e militia units, s o m e 1000 strong, p r o v i d e d p r o t e c t i o n for " s c a b " miners, and assisted the police in the arrest o f striking workers. 1 4 T h e enduring memories o f the 1913 strike, and others like it, m a d e s o m e Rangers wary o f their possible role. Rangers were willing t o fight the Japanese, b u t they did not want t o b e used in cases of civil disturbance.  O n c e again, the civilian-largely working c l a s s - m e m b e r s o f the P . C . M . R .  resisted the values o f the military establishment. T h e Rangers were t o act as independent guerilla fighters in the event o f a Japanese invasion b u t , in the m e a n t i m e , they had always b e e n independent thinkers. T h r o u g h o u t British C o l u m b i a Ranger units had the same defensive end in view. B y using guerilla tactics they were t o b e a constant thorn in the e n e m y ' s side. A s G e o r g e Swanson, f o r m e r Ranger f r o m N u m b e r 129 C o m p a n y ( G r a n d Forks), recalled: W e were t o k n o w the location of road and railway bridges, rock cuts and tunnels, and in the case o f invasion, we were t o demolish b y d y n a m i t e these areas, then disappear into the hills and harass the enemy. 1 ® Every Ranger detachment's character was unique, and geography often played an i m portant role in its defence measures. For e x a m p l e , N u m b e r 54 C o m p a n y (Alert B a y ) had 14  Por a review of the militia's role in the 1913 Nanaimo strike see Peter Guy Silverman, "A History of the Militia and Defences of British Columbia 1871-1914'' (M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1956), 180-192. See also Desmond Morton, "Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-1914," Canadian Historical Review 51, no. 4 (December 1970): 407- 425; John Norris, "The Vancouver Island Coal Miners, 1912-1914: A Study of an Organizational Strike," B.C. Studies 45 (Spring 1980): 56-72; and Carlos A. Schwantes, Radical Heritage (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979), 202-204. 15 George Swanson, personal letter, 5 February 1989.  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  83  a maxine detachment which consisted of men who owned their own boats or were " C a p tains of the B . C . Packers seine b o a t s . " 1 8 O n the other hand, the situation in the Cariboo was much different. Captain C. Reay, of Number 64 C o m p a n y (Clinton), explained t o Ranger headquarters that his men carry arms 90 percent of the time during their everyday work, which entails riding for stock and winter feeding at the present time, and at no time would they b e far f r o m their arms. In this manner I feel sure you will see that this area is covered by Rangers all the time as an active unit, which, though it may not b e as spectacular as large bodies of men in drill formation would b e t o an inspection officer; as a Ranger organization to cover this large area of 490 square miles with 170 all ranks, it is the best we have been able to evolve to this date. 1 7 Captain George Baldwin, of P . C . M . R . headquarters, was well aware of the vast area covered by the Clinton Rangers. In reply t o Captain Reay, Baldwin remarked that these mounted cowboys were a perfect Ranger unit: I think it is an ideal one and is about as close as it could possibly b e to the setup which it was originally intended to have in the Ranger organization.., your area is covered by Rangers practically the whole time, and t o a person who is thoroughly Ranger minded, it is filling the bill in a much more efficient manner than a much larger b o d y of men in drill formation could. 1 8 T o b e sure, Ranger units throughout British Columbia had different plans of defence for their regions. Nevertheless, a strategy c o m m o n t o all P . C . M . R . companies involved "Captain A.W. Derrom to Col. Taylor, 3 February 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D82). 17 Captain C. Reay to Col. Taylor, 20 March 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D83). "Capt. Baldwin for Col. Taylor to Capt. C. Reay, 29 March 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D83).  84  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  harassing the enemy in the backwoods, and not engaging them in open combat. Lloyd Cornett reflected upon the probable role of the P . C . M . R . had there been a Japanese invasion: British Columbia has changed a lot. In those days there were a large percentage of people in the population w h o had experience in hunting and had hunting  rifles  W e expected that our members would b e strengthened by  people. T h e y may not have had the training but we would have t o provide the core [or base to which] they would go. W e expected to pick up additional people who, if there was a Japanese invasion, [would] grab the old hunting rifle off the wail and we'd absorb them into our organization  but if we  were forced out of this area, into a more remote area, then we would have t o reorganize and absorb any recruits we got into a larger and stronger force. Presumably, we'd get additional supplies and ammunition, and we would bec o m e the basis of an underground guerilla group here if this area was ever taken over. W e would want to survive that [invasion] and b e available. 19 Wes Walker, another former Burnaby South Ranger, remembered how it was stressed to them that they should not engage the enemy in open combat unless it was absolutely necessary.  W h a t the Canadian A r m y did want from the P . C . M . R . , according t o Wes  Walker, was a group of skilled guides: T h e y wanted us mostly to know every tree and branch and whatever in our own area which we did  it was brought to our attention rather seriously  that we had t o know all these things, because if we had to lead or guide a company or platoon of regular army, then we didn't want to b e making the wrong steps. 2 0 19 J0  Interview with Lloyd Cornett, Burnaby, B.C., 29 November 1988. Interview with Wes Walker, Surrey, B.C., 16 July 1990.  85  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  A s in Britain, rumours o f a " F i f t h C o l u m n " of traitors b e g a n t o circulate in British Columbia.  Pacific C o m m a n d realized that Ranger units could provide valuable infor-  m a t i o n through intelligence reports.  In the Rangers, Pacific C o m m a n d had contacts  throughout the province w h o k n e w their communities and the p e o p l e residing in t h e m . In a report o n N u m b e r 2 C o m p a n y (West V a n c o u v e r ) , the Inspector-General referred t o the value of Rangers in compiling information: T h e role o f the P C M R is t o have an accurate knowledge of all roads, tracks, waterways, etc., in the district for which the coy. is responsible. Also, a thorough knowledge of the countryside and c o m p l e t e information o f all families and personnel living in the vicinity, t o the extent o f knowing their histories, activities and views regarding Canadian affairs, citizenship, etc. In the event of subversive action, the P C M R ' s could put their finger o n any person w h o might b e implicated. 2 1 T h e Inspector-General also n o t e d that, in c o o p e r a t i o n with the Provincial Police, Rangers apprehended "the murderer of t w o trappers in the Prince G e o r g e district." 2 2 In like manner, Rangers helped t o capture escaped prisoners of wax, and soldiers absent without leave ( A . W . O . L . ) f r o m the Aleutian Islands c a m p a i g n . 2 3 T h e Rangers also participated in various search and rescue operations.  Because o f their knowledge o f local  terrain, Rangers were frequently called out t o assist the air force in the search for lost aircraft. 2 4 Ranger detachments throughout British C o l u m b i a also worked in close c o o p e r ation with the Aircraft D e t e c t i o n Corps t o provide a warning system for e n e m y planes. 2 5 "Major-General J.P. Mackenzie, "Report on No. 2 Coy., P.C.M.R.," 25 March 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). "Ibid. 33 "Brief of PCMR," n.d., D. Hist., file 159 (Dl). 34 The Ranger, Stand Down Number (October 1945): 11; "Coast Rangers Will Be Maintained," Vancouver Province, 14 June 1944. "Flight Lieutenant R.E. Slinger to all P.C.M.R. companies, 21 April 1943, HMA; Vancouver Province,  86  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  In addition t o aiding in the search for lost aircraft, Rangers were useful in searches for missing persons. O n e such o c c u r r e n c e t o o k place at H o p e w h e n a w o m a n b e c a m e "lost in the w o o d s , " and the local Rangers subsequently m a d e a "big effort" t o help find her. 2 8 O n another occasion the W o o d f i b r e Rangers, o n a training exercise in the w o o d s , c a m e t o the aid of an injured w o m a n . A s the husband o f the v i c t i m explained t h e event:  A stretcher was quickly improvised b y using G.I. blouses and cedar poles, and transportation d o w n that very steep and rugged hillside was very greatly manoeuvred.  T h e patient was placed in a r o w b o a t (stretcher and all) and  towed t o the d o c t o r at W o o d f i b r e .  A l t h o u g h the accident did not prove  serious, I a m deeply i n d e b t e d t o the b o y s for their solicitude and service b e y o n d the call of duty. 2 7  Like the British H o m e G u a r d , the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were assigned the duty of thwarting any Fifth C o l u m n activity. 2 8 P . C . M . R . detachments were flooded with propaganda warning that "Hitler's invisible army of spies," and "grinning devils f r o m the land o f the Rising Sun" were active in C a n a d a . 2 9  M o r e o v e r , one secret m e m o r a n -  d u m f r o m the D e p a r t m e n t o f National Defence advised Ranger companies that " A x i s saboteurs" m a y have landed o n the Pacific Coast. Considering the lurid nature of most wartime propaganda, it is not surprising that the leader o f these saboteurs was described as having "red hair and o n e finger missing." 3 0  Rangers were instructed t o report the  3 August 1943. 26 Allan K. and Maxjorie Stuart to Commanding Officer, Hope Rangers, 12 March 1943, HMA. 27 G.R. Hurley to Col. Taylor, 14 July 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D95). 28 E.S. Turner, The Phoney War on the Home Front (London: Michael Joseph, 1961), 220-221. For ' a detailed account of the British Home Guard see Norman Longmate, The Real Dad's Army (London: Hutchinson Library Services, 1974). 29 "The Nazis Are Here," newsletter re Fifth Column activity, n.d., HMA. 30 Major H.C. Bray, Secret Memorandum re Axis saboteurs, 24 October 1942, HMA.  87  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  strange behaviour of neighbours; anyone asking questions about the war effort; and anyone loitering around an industrial plant. 3 1 T h e Rangers of Number 73 C o m p a n y carried out these tasks in a manner that reflected their loyalty and the state of wartime paranoia pervading the society at that time. For example, Captain H . W . Johnson, acting in cooperation with the Agassiz Rangers, alerted Pacific C o m m a n d about a suspicious man of German origin, who had recently sold his auto camp at Harrison Hot Springs t o m o v e to Nanaimo. 3 2 Indeed, the Rangers closely observed and diligently reported any activity that was regarded as a security threat.  Another report noted an "eccentric" summer  resident of Hope w h o had been voicing his opinion that Hitler was "the only man in Europe w h o had succeeded in organizing anything." 3 3 Concern was greatest, however, about Japanese Canadians and the Tashme internment c a m p which was located only fourteen miles f r o m Hope.  In fact, even before it  was established, local Ranger officers were worried about the consequences of having an internment c a m p so close t o the Village of Hope. Captain Johnson, on 17 July 1942, suggested t o Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor that contact b e established with military authorities in the United States. 34 Johnson believed that meetings should take place at Whitworth Ranch in the Skagit Valley-located three miles f r o m the Canada-U.S. b o r d e r - t o "exchange i n f o r m a t i o n . . . which may b e of mutual benefit." 3 6 These meetings were deemed t o b e imperative because of the plans to construct the internment camp at "14 Mile Ranch" [Tashme], which was only some twenty-five miles f r o m the United States border. As Captain Johnson saw the situation: In the event of enemy action in this territory the presence of these 31  "The Nazis Are Here," HMA. Capt. Johnson to Major Bray, 21 October 1942, HMA. 33 Ibid., 13 March 1943, HMA. 34 Capt. Johnson to Col. Taylor, 17 July 1942, HMA. 35 Capt. Johnson to Regional Forester #6, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture, Portland, Oregon, 8 October 1942, HMA. 32  -  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  88  Japanese could constitute a serious menace not only to ourselves by their proximity to our communications at Hope, but also t o the two dams just below the Boundary on the Skagit River in the U.S.A. Also it may b e pointed out that in the mountains both west and east of the '14 Mile' Ranch, (as well as at the ranch itself), there are, without question places where paratroops might land and descend into the valley, and seize control of the camp itself; the males could b e armed, and f r o m there raids could b e made on b o t h Hope and R u b y Creek in Washington. 3 6 After Japanese work camps, located eleven and fifteen miles along the Hope-Princeton Trail, and the main camp of Tashme had been established, Captain Johnson, attempted to organize the white employees in these camps into a Ranger detachment. This detachment was t o serve the dual purpose of furnishing Johnson with intelligence reports, and standing b y in readiness "to take over in case of an emergency." 3 7 This proposal was opposed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ( R . C . M . P . ) , w h o were responsible for the camps, because "any military organization of any kind at the c a m p s . . . might excite the Japs." 3 8 As a result, Captain Johnson suggested to Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor that they should proceed t o organize these men, and discreetly furnish them with arms without the R . C . M . P . ' s knowledge. 3 9 Accordingly, one of the main components of Number 73 Company's " T - P l a n " was to defend against a possible uprising in the Tashme camp. T h e Hope Ranger detachment was to b e "ready at a moment's notice to deal with" an attempted breakout of Japanese f r o m the camp. If such a breakout occurred, the Rangers were to "forestall and prevent, by small or large numbers, acts of sabotage by any of these Japanese" until regular forces 36  Capt. Johnson to Col. Taylor, 17 July 1942, HMA. Ibid., 20 March 1943, HMA. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid.  37  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  89  could arrive. 40 Japanese passing through Hope, on their way t o or f r o m Tashme, were watched closely by the local Rangers. Movements of Japanese Canadians in Hope were carefully recorded and the information was sent to Ranger headquarters.  These reports were often quite  detailed: On March 25, [1943], between 11:00 and 12:00 hrs., three Japanese were seen by Rangers f r o m the Fraser River bank at Hope, taking pictures of the Historic Sites Monument and the river and mountains.  These men came into Hope  early in the morning and were seen around Hope until 17:00 hrs. 41 Captain Johnson b e c a m e increasingly concerned about the lack of security at Tashme, and charged the R . C . M . P . with "becoming very lax and careless in their handling of the Japanese coming into or out of the camps." Johnson further complained that "Japanese are allowed to roam around the Village of Hope without any attempt at control and it is causing considerable comment and concern among the citizens here." 4 2 In response t o Johnson's concerns, Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor explained that, with the facilities available, the R . C . M . P . could not avoid stopovers in Hope when transporting Japanese t o Tashme. Work was underway, however, to provide accommodation for the Japanese when they were in Hope to prevent any loitering. 43 Fear of the Japanese, nevertheless, continued to exist among the Hope Rangers. Captain Johnson expressed these feelings in an intelligence report of December 1943, in which he cited two young Japanese men who, in his opinion, were being given t o o much freedom of movement. T h e two Japanese brothers in question were employed by the local Magistrate and b o t h resided in Hope. Apparently they were the sons of a Japanese dentist at 40  Secret draft of T Plan, n.d., HMA. Capt. Johnson to Intelligence (Security) Headquarters, Pacific Command, 13 April 1943, HMA. "Ibid., 22 April 1943, HMA. 43 Col. Taylor to Capt. Johnson, 24 April 1943, HMA. 41  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  90  Tashme and their mother was white. T h e older brother periodically carried the mail to and f r o m Hope, while the younger brother drove a truck between Hope and Vancouver for a local company. According to Johnson, he was not alone in objecting t o this situation: "the fact that a Japanese is put in charge of His Majesty's Mail is the cause of much adverse local c o m m e n t . " 4 4 Moreover, Johnson continued to complain about what he regarded as the poor security measures of the police. Apparently the R . C . M . P . had m o v e d their guard post into town f r o m its previous location on the Hope-Princeton Trail. Johnson believed that the post should have remained on the Hope-Princeton Trail, because its new position allowed alternate routes to b e used b y someone wishing t o avoid detection. 4 8 These reports f r o m Number 73 C o m p a n y were taken into consideration b y Ranger headquarters, but how seriously they were considered is not known. Perhaps the Hope Rangers were trying to impress headquarters with their zeal, or simply trying t o emphasize their strategic importance. In any event, M a j o r H.C. Bray, from the Intelligence branch of Pacific C o m m a n d , tried t o allay the feaxs of the Hope detachment. In response, Bray explained that the two Japanese brothers employed in Hope were "Eurasians born in Canada, and as such" were entitled t o "the same freedom as other British subjects." Furthermore, Bray advised the unit that he had talked to R . C . M . P . officers and was assured that their new location at Hope was "only the headquarters of the Detachment," and that "in the meantime the road" was "covered by patrols." 4 8 Needless t o say, the Village of Hope was not the only area where the Japanese were treated with suspicion. Lieutenant Edgar, commander of the Boston Bar Rangers, provided information t o headquarters about a Japanese woman who frequently visited 44  Acting Adjutant for Capt. Johnson to Intelligence (Security), Pacific Command, 3 December 1943, HMA. 45 Ibid. 46 Major Bray to Acting Adjutant, No. 73 Coy., 14 December 1943, HMA.  -  91  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  Boston Bar. U p o n the request of M a j o r Bray, the woman was closely investigated by the local Rangers. Lieutenant Edgar went so far as to ascertain that "during her visits, she receives and makes telephone calls to and from V a n c o u v e r . . . and usually calls a Hastings number." In the end it was discovered that she was not Japanese but, in fact, was f r o m Shanghai and that her husband, still there, was possibly a prisoner of the Japanese. 4 7 T h e Japanese in and around Yale were also kept under close observation. Even after V - J Day, the Yale Ranger detachment was "ordered t o stand by in readiness" in case the Japanese residents, and the Japanese C.P.R. extra gang at Spuzzum decided to cause trouble. 4 8  Captain Barry reported that T . Sumi, a C.P.R. employee at Spuzzum, w h o  was "at one time an officer in the Japanese Army," claimed that if the "Japanese quit he would blow up the railway bridge and commit hari-kari." 49 Sumi was arrested b y the police, but the Rangers continued t o patrol the C.P.R. yards "for three days after V - J day." As in Number 73 Company, Rangers in other units also doubted the loyalty of Japanese Canadians. Captain C. Reay, commander of Number 64 C o m p a n y (Clinton), expressed his concern over the 200 Japanese employed by the Sorg Pulp Company: Not five minutes ago, a truck laden with about twelve Japanese, passed m y front gate. There was no one in charge of it, but I spoke to the driver who speaks English (and to w h o m I am known), and told him to tell the Head man at Taylor Lake to advise his men not to wander outside their workings. 8 0 Captain Reay was worried that Japanese paratroops would land in the vicinity and b e indistinguishable from the Japanese pulp mill workers.  How, asked Reay, were his  47 Lieutenant Edgar to Capt. Johnson, copy of letter from Major Bray re Japanese woman at Boston Bar, 29 July 1943, HMA; Lieut. Edgar to Major Bray, 1 August 1943, HMA. 48 Col. Taylor to Intelligence (Security), Pacific Command, copy of report received from Captain C.E. Barry re Japanese at Spuzzum, 28 August 1945, HMA. 49 Ibid. 50 Captain Reay to Col. Taylor, 4 June 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D83).  -  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  92  Rangers "to determine hostile f r o m friendly Japanese, without" exposing themselves "to the obvious dangers of recognition through visual or vocal contact, with what might prove to b e an enemy." Reay's proposed solution was simply "to remove these so-called friendly ( ? ) Japanese to a district which is not likely t o . . . b e c o m e a battle zone." 6 1 In response, Pacific C o m m a n d advised the Clinton Rangers that the R . C . M . P . had the "enemy alien" situation under control. Everyone of Japanese origin in Canada was required to carry a registration card; the Japanese employed b y the Sorg Pulp C o m pany were "strictly supervised" by b o t h the R . C . M . P . and the company itself; and the R . C . M . P . ' s special constable checked all trains entering and leaving the district. In short, Pacific C o m m a n d concurred with the R . C . M . P . ' s claim that its precautions regarding the Japanese were "so effective as t o preclude the possibility of any potential saboteur being landed in a locality where Japanese are employed, without the matter being brought t o " their "immediate attention." 6 2 Once again, the concerns of local Rangers were not fully shared by Pacific C o m m a n d .  In this case and many others the Rangers tried t o jus-  tify their existence b y magnifying local dangers. Rangers, as civilians without accurate strategic information, were much more susceptible t o fears generated by the uncertainty of the war and the perceived threat of the "yellow peril." B y contrast, Pacific C o m m a n d provided a rational voice in an atmosphere dominated by rumours of "suicide squads of Japanese" paratroops with designs on North America. 6 3 Japanese Canadians were treated with suspicion everywhere, even as far north as Dawson, Yukon Territory.  Major-General Mackenzie, the Inspector-General, reported  the concerns of Number 135 Company (Dawson, Y . T . ) where the Japanese were not interned: "Ibid. "Brigadier, General Staff, Pacific Command to Capt. Reay, 19 June 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D83). "Lieutenant Hubert Gammie to Capt. Reay, 4 June 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D83).  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  93  There is a general feeling that the Japanese in Dawson have t o o much freedom. This applies also t o the Japs in Whitehorse. Furthermore, I am informed that the P . C . M . Rangers are somewhat disturbed about the Japanese in Dawson as they are all equipped with excellent long and short-wave radio sets. T h e O . C . informs m e that they listen to the Japanese broadcasts, and as many of them are cooks employed in restaurants, they have many opportunities to pass derogatory remarks about the Allies, these remarks being based on information received over the radio sets. T h e y are couched in such a way that no action is possible by the authorities, nevertheless, the sting is there. 8 4 There was a widespread belief that Japanese-Canadian fishermen and workers provided the Japanese military with coastal marine maps and photographs of areas of strategic importance.  R o n Wilson, former Ranger f r o m Number 43 Company (Port Alice),  explained this concern: W e had some thoughts about the likelihood of the Japanese making raids on the British Columbia coastline. W e had Japanese working in our m i l l . . . for some time. W e had a Japanese community [and] there was always some doubt whether they would all b e loyal. T h e Japanese we knew had marine maps of the whole coast of B . C . T h e Japanese Navy probably had them. T h e y knew our weak points. 8 8 British Columbia's representatives in the House of Commons at Ottawa voiced similar fears. Thomas Reid complained that Japanese Canadians had photographed military defence sites, and passed the information on to the Japanese Army. Furthermore, according to Reid, the Japanese military also had 54  Major-General J.P. Mackenzie, "Report of the Inspection of No. 135 Company, Pacific Coast Militia Rangers," 30 April 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). "Interview with Ron Wilson, Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988.  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  94  c o m p l e t e information of Pacific coast waters, bays and harbours, it being well k n o w n that the Japanese had u p - t o - d a t e charts, the data for which were obtained during fishing operations. 5 6 T h e r e was n o evidence of Japanese Canadians engaged in espionage, so that rumours of disloyal Japanese Canadians p r o b a b l y originated f r o m the racism of m a n y white British Columbians. Grand Forks, like H o p e , was near a Japanese internment c a m p . A l t h o u g h Grand Forks is l o c a t e d m u c h farther inland than H o p e , the local population was still apprehensive about nearby Japanese internees. Ranger Hugh Sutherland recalled that his concern was primarily r o o t e d in a fear of Japanese military strength, b u t there was still a lingering distrust of the Japanese Canadians: Hysteria was rampant.  A s High School students we developed friendships  with the evacuees in our school and m e t their parents. Yet we were suspicious of those w e didn't know. W e were b o t h afraid o f the potential invader because o f his reputation in the Sino-Japanese W a r . . . and in Bataan and Corrigidor.  W e e x p e c t e d at anytime for there t o b e e n e m y action o n our Pacific  Coast, hence the i m p o u n d m e n t o f the West Coast Japanese fishing boats and short wave radios. T h o u g h Pearl Harbor was a great distance away, Japanese activity was evident o n the Aleutian Islands and D u t c h Harbor, Alaska and we knew w e ' d little b e t w e e n ' t h e m ' and us in January 1942. 5 7 For D a v i d Whittaker, o n the other hand, fear o f the Japanese was based u p o n a thorough p r o p a g a n d a campaign supervised b y the local Ranger company. recalled the suspicion and dislike he developed for the Japanese: 56 57  Canada, House of Commons, Debates, 2 February 1942, 227. Hugh Sutherland, personal letter, 5 February 1989.  Whittaker  95  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  A lot of p r o p a g a n d a was laid o n the m e n , against especially the Japanese. T o s o m e extent [it was against] the Germans and the Italians but basically against the Japanese  W e also saw p r o p a g a n d a films which weren't in  general circulation t o the public.  For e x a m p l e , captured f i l m s . . . smuggled  out o f China in the 1930s o f the invasion of Manchuria b y the Japanese. . . . W e would s e e . . . situations of J a p a n e s e . . . killing w o m e n and taking their babies f r o m t h e m and throwing their babies u p in the air and then catching t h e m with their bayonets. Well, o f course, that was a p r o p a g a n d a film b u t it was also m a y b e historically true t o o . T h e thing is that it got us all riled up; w e ' v e got t o protect ourselves f r o m the Jap hordes  T h o s e images are  burnt into m y m i n d t o this day. I r e m e m b e r t h e m very well, h o w we hated those J a p s - w e ' l l have t o kill those Japs. 5 8 It t o o k years of "education and growing u p " for W h i t t a k e r t o rid himself of the hatred he felt toward the Japanese. 5 9  T h e P . C . M . R . had served as an effective inculcator o f  propaganda for British Columbia's citizen-soldiers. A l t h o u g h the film viewed b y D a v i d W h i t t a k e r and his fellow Rangers was not available t o the public, other f o r m s o f p r o p a g a n d a were c o m m o n . For example, a magazine titled Jap Blood Cult sold for twenty-five cents at the local newsstand. 6 0 This magazine claimed that a "cult o f b l o o d " called the Black Dragon Society had infiltrated the Japanese government and military, and planned t o conquer the world.  T h e magazine described  brutal Japanese atrocities as well as Fifth C o l u m n activity in China and North A m e r i c a . Japanese soldiers were portrayed as inhuman, sex-mad monsters: I saw Chinese w o m e n torn f r o m the arms of their husbands and attacked "Interview with David Whittaker, Vancouver, B.C., 14 February 1989. 59 Ibid. 60 Jap Blood Cult: Rape! Torture! Kill! Exposing the Shocking Secrets of Japan's Black Dragon Society (Country Press, Inc., 1942).  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  96  in the streets by gangs of ten t o twenty men while their husbands were forced to watch. I saw a baby torn f r o m the breasts of its pretty Chinese mother and thrown into a flaming building while the mother was stripped naked and tied to a post at a street corner, where the sobbing, fainting girl was forced t o submit t o brutal indignities which only the minds of sex-mad Japanese could devise. I saw a little girl of twelve or thirteen seized by two ronins as she fled. Her skirts were ripped off and when it was found that she was physically incapable of fulfilling the purposes her captives intended, she was treated in such a way that she would never again b e found desirable by any other man. 0 1 Magazines such as this fanned the flames of hysteria, and increased the public's fear of the "yellow peril." Reports of Japanese atrocities against Canadian prisoners of war in Hong K o n g served the same purpose. Other Rangers claim they were immune to the propaganda which was prevalent in wartime British Columbia. 0 2 For example, in Grand Forks, as former Ranger Ray Orser explained: A n y suggestion that any of the Japanese who came to this community, and were living and working here, might b e involved in any acts of sabotage was greeted with much skepticism  These Japanese were treated as friends,  neighbors, co-workers, and colleagues. T h e y entered into our community life and activities as naturally as the indigent [indigenous] population. It would 61 Ibid.,  30-31. While many of these benign recollections are genuine, others may not reflect contemporary reality. Such recollections occurred long after the events described and may show the effects of the modern revulsion for the forced removal of the Japanese Canadians from the coastal security zone. 62  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  97  have been hard going t o drum up any feeling or atmosphere of enmity among the community residents toward the Japanese deportees. 8 3 Ez Henniger, another Grand Forks Ranger, concurred with Orser about the Japanese Canadians: I divorced these people entirely from the real threat from Japan, and their presence here in no way influenced m y decision to join the P . C . M . R . T h e community as a whole viewed them as a group of people disrupted from their homes and treated them in a compassionate and friendly manner. 6 4 It seems that the perceived threat of the Japanese Canadians varied from region to region throughout the province.  In some areas, at least among the officers of the  P . C . M . R . , all Japanese Canadians were seen as a security threat and were treated accordingly. This was reasonable, if one views the situation from the perspective of a citizen in the early stages of the Pacific Wax, when propaganda about a Japanese Fifth Column was widespread. This propaganda was strengthened b y reports, both true and false, of subversive acts by Japanese residents in nations attacked or conquered by the Japanese. T h e Japanese had already achieved rapid military victories in the Pacific when they captured the Aleutian Islands of Kiska and A t t u in June 1942, and the speed of these conquests was plausibly explained by internal subversion.  Even closer to home, on 20  June 1942, the Estevan Point lighthouse, on Vancouver Island, was shelled by a Japanese submarine. These attacks led many t o believe that British Columbia could be the next victim of Japanese militarism. T h e invasion never materialized, but recent studies have shown that the threat may have been more real than past accounts have claimed. J.L. Granatstein and G . A . Johnson have discovered that the staff of the Japanese consulate in 63 64  Ray Orser, personal letter, 5 February 1989. Ez Henniger, personal letter, 27 February 1989.  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  98  V a n c o u v e r was involved in espionage as early as 1939. 8 6 In 1941, the Japanese c o d e was broken which revealed that the Japanese "were taking great interest in the B . C . c o a s t . " 8 6 Moreover, in January 1941, copies of a message f r o m T o k y o t o Washington were sent t o the Vancouver consulate advising t h e m t o "switch their emphasis f r o m publicity and p r o p a g a n d a t o intelligence gathering."  This telegram " m a d e special reference t o the  'utilization o f our Second Generations [Nisei] and our resident nationals.' " a r  Another  telegram requested the V a n c o u v e r consulate t o f o c u s o n " 'intelligence involving U.S. and C a n a d a , ' especially the strengthening o f Pacific Coast defences, ship and aircraft movements."88 It remains u n k n o w n whether or not the Japanese planned an invasion o f British C o l u m b i a b u t even in June 1942, when coastal defences h a d b e e n strengthened considerably, the military authorities still maintained that it was "entirely inadequate against  -  m a n y types o f attack that are possible and probable f r o m the W e s t . " 6 9 W h i l e the military was uneasy about the weakness o f British Columbia's defences, the public was in a state of panic. T h e perception of a brutal Japanese A r m y which had c o m m i t t e d the Nanking Massacre-bolstered b y knowledge o f the sneak attack o n Pearl H a r b o r - p r o v i d e d justification for the racism which had always b e e n a part o f white British Columbian society. W h e t h e r or not t h e m e n o f the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers disliked Japanese Canadians, in almost every case they feared and loathed their m o t h e r country, Japan, which m a n y believed had designs o n British Columbia. 65  Ultimately, fear o f Japanese military  J.L. Granatstein and Gregory A. Johnson, "The Evacuation of the Japanese Canadians, 1942: A Realist Critique of the Received Version," in On Guard for Thee: War, Ethnicity, and the Canadian State, 1939-1945, eds. Norman Hillmer et al. (Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1988), 106-108. ^ J . L . Granatstein, "The Enemy Within," Saturday Night 101, no. 11 (November 1986): 39. 67 Ibid., 40. ^Granatstein and Johnson, 107. 69 Ibid., 119. While an invasion was unlikely, harassing attacks by the Japanese were not.  Chapter 5. The Japanese Menace  99  strength b e c a m e intertwined with feelings of racial animosity towaxd Japanese Canadians. Unfortunately, many innocent Japanese Canadians were caught in between the two and interned as enemy aliens but, at the same time, the Japanese Consul certainly expected his immigrant countrymen to aid him as spies. It was, however, a time of war and it is not surprising that the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers-charged with the defence of British Columbia-acted in such a manner towards Japanese Canadians who were, in their eyes, potential security threats. For the Rangers, the "Japanese menace" provided golden opportunities to demonstrate their alertness and zeal t o P . C . M . R . headquarters.  Chapter 6  Decline of the Ranger Empire  B y early A u g u s t 1943, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers had reached what Pacific C o m m a n d regaxded as peak strength. Therefore, Pacific C o m m a n d urged Ranger detachments t o limit n e w enlistments and t o concentrate o n "quality rather than o n quantity." 1 British Columbia's defences had i m p r o v e d greatly since the attack o n Pearl Harbor, and the war in the Pacific had b e g u n t o turn in the Allies' favour. when an article in the Vancouver  Nevertheless, in O c t o b e r 1943,  Sun claimed that military authorities in O t t a w a were  contemplating the disbandment of s o m e P . C . M . R . companies, and a drastic strength reduction in others, it created outrage a m o n g the Rangers. 2  Captain R . N . Atkinson,  o f N u m b e r 71 C o m p a n y ( P e n t i c t o n ) , appealed t o his M e m b e r o f Parliament t o prevent the p r o p o s e d strength reduction of 4500 m e n . 3 Captain W . W . Smith o f the W o o d f i b r e Ranger C o m p a n y complained that  E v e n if the article is true it has had a tremendous effect in lowering the morale o f the Coy. as a whole. For some time, m a n y in the Ranger organization have wondered just h o w important was their role; the aforementioned article was just that m u c h m o r e fuel added t o the smouldering fire of complac e n c y [sic]. . . . A Fifth columnist could not d o m o r e in so few words in such a short space of time. 4 1  Major Barton for Col. Taylor, memorandum re strength of Ranger units, 9 August 1943, HMA. "Ranger Units to Be Cut," Vancouver Sun, 18 October 1943. 3 Captain R.N. Atkinson to Hon. Grote Stirling, 29 October 1943, PMA. 4 Captain W.W. Smith to Col. Taylor, 24 October 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D95). 2  100  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  101  Captain Smith further informed Colonel Taylor that "attendance at the last parade following the article was about 50% of previous meetings." 8 Captain Harvey, a P . C . M . R . Field Supervisor, reported t o Colonel Taylor that a similar drop in morale took place throughout Vancouver Island. 8 Captain R.H. Swan, commander of Number 86 Company (Britannia Beach), was similarly perturbed b y the article: Such statements appearing in the press at this time are extremely damaging to the Ranger organization and are precious morsels for the rumor-mongers in our midst.  Our Rangers have recently listened t o talks by Yank Levy  .and also by Corporal D . W . Taylor, of the A . R . P . organization in Vancouver, both of w h o m stressed the importance of preparedness, assuring us that we were not by any means 'out of the w o o d s ' yet. W e recently had a visit f r o m Lt. L o m e Clark, R . C . N . V . R . [Royal Canadian Navy Volunteer Reserve], in connection with the Fifth Victory Loan. In a short address, he warned us against complacency and a false sense of security. Are we to assume, therefore, that this was all 'eye-wash?' Lets face the facts. Has the weir reached the point where we can relax our efforts? Is the Pacific Coast so well guarded and patrolled that we can turn in our rifles? Is all threat of invasion past? W h a t will I tell those Rangers who, after reading this article, will feel that their usefulness is at an end and decide it is unnecessary t o turn out for further manoeuvres or target practice? It is m y considered opinion, for what it is worth, that such a move as contemplated would b e false economy and I would strongly urge that representations b e made to Ottawa to have such ah order rescinded. 7 5  Ibid. Captain B. Harvey to Col. Taylor, 3 February 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D81). 7 Captain R.H. Swan to Col. Taylor, 20 October 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D89).  6  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  102  Monthly Strength Returns Pacific Coast Militia Rangers thousands  —*— Number of Men Source: DJHI»t, file 322.009(099).  Figure 6.18: Combined Monthly Strength Returns of all P . C . M . R . units f r o m October 1942 to August 1945. In response, Colonel Taylor assured Captain Swan that a "higher authority" had advised him that the Rangers still have a useful function to perform and this applies particularly to units in the immediate coastal areas such as yours and that these units should b e maintained in a high state of efficiency. 8 At any rate, the news of strength reductions did cause an overall drop in Ranger enlistments (see Figure 6.18). Figures 6.19-24 indicate that Ranger enrolments in all regions of British Columbia peaked around September 1943. In each case, the most significant decline in Ranger numbers occurred between October and November 1943. On 5 November, P . C . M . R . headquarters officially announced its intentions in a Special Circular Letter, which recommended that Ranger companies proceed to reduce their 8  Col. Taylor to Capt. Swan, 30 October 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D89).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  103  Monthly Strength Returns Vancouver Island PCMR 5000 4500 4000 3500 3000  HMHHISisHI  2500 2000  —7-1- 1 1 r i i i Oct Jan Il942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  1 1-7-7--7-7- 1 1 1 1 l1l i l . Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  Number of Men  Souroa: D-Hbt, lite 322.008(D98). Figure 6.19: Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Vancouver Island P . C . M . R . c o m panies, October 1942 t o August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Lower Mainland PCMR 4000 35003000 2500  2000 I i i [ i i I i i I i i I Oct Jan Il942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  Number of Men  Souroa: DJ-tot. Ilia 322.00S(DS8). Figure 6.20: Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Lower Mainland P.C.M.R. companies, October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  104  Monthly Strength Returns Thompson-Okanagan PCMR  -*— Number of Men Souro»: D X b t , IH* 322.009(099).  Figure 6.21: Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Thompson-Okanagan P . C . M . R . companies, October 1942 t o August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Cariboo - Northern Interior - Yukon PCMR  |  *  -r-i- -r-r- - n -  Oct Jan Il942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  <•» *  i l r-r-r- —i—r~ —i—I—i—I—i— i - r "  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  i m %Ht  -r-H Apr Jul 1945 I  —*— Number of Men Sourca: DJHIsL. Ills 322.009(099).  Figure 6.22: Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Cariboo-Northern Interior-Yukon P.C.M.R. companies, October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  105  Monthly Strength Returns  North Coast - Queen Charlotte Is. PCMR 1600  14001200 1000-  H 800 Oct  1—r~ —I—r~ I I—i—r~ —i—r~ -T-r- i. i-r-H - n - hr-r- i i Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul Oct Jan Apr Jul  h9421  1943  I  1944  I  1945  I  Number of Men Souroa: DJHIat, fBa 322.009(M9).  Figure 6.23: Combined Monthly Strength Returns for North Coast-Queen Charlotte Islands P . C . M . R . companies, October 1942 t o August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Kootenay PCMR 1200  1100 1000  900 800  700 600 Oct  Jan  >1942 I  Apr  Jul  1943  Oct  Jan  I  Apr  Jul  1944  Oct  Jan  I  Apr  Jul  1945  I  -#— Number of Men Souroa: D-Hlal., file 322.008(D89).  Figure 6.24: Combined Monthly Strength Returns for Kootenay P.C.M.R. companies, October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  106  . numbers. B y the end of November, then, most Ranger companies had eliminated significant numbers f r o m their rosters. Captain Swan vehemently disagreed with Taylor's directive and refused t o cooperate. For Swan's company there could b e no strength reductions; it was either no reductions or total disbandment of the unit. A s Captain Swan explained t o Colonel Taylor: No. 86 C o m p a n y must remain as it is, but with no new enlistments to b e added t o strength; or it must b e disbanded in its entirety. All but ten of our present strength have been with the C o m p a n y since its formation in May, 1942 or have been in for a year at least. T h e ten referred to have been with us f r o m six months to a year. T h e men in this Company have done considerable work on local trails, not to mention the weeks of hard spare time work clearing and making a very fine rifle range in the woods. I do feel that a great majority of m y men are keenly interested in Ranger work and, to strike ten or twenty men from strength at this time, would do much harm to the morale of the group as a whole. 9 Captain Swan further advised Colonel Taylor that the final decision was his, but if he agreed, he asked him to "kindly send us the necessary discharge papers." 1 0 Colonel Taylor did not believe that disbandment was the answer, but agreed with Swan that to reduce the strength of his unit would hamper its effectiveness. Moreover, Taylor attempted t o mollify Swan by contending that it was not the intention of N . D . H . Q . that the efficiency of the P . C . M . R . should b e impaired, particularly in the case of units ia Coastal Areas, consequently 9 10  Capt. Swan to Col. Taylor, 10 November 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D89). Ibid.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  107  the provisions of Special Circular letter of 5 November 1943, are not fully applicable in your case. 11 Threatened with disbandment or reduction, Rangers once again stressed their strategic importance to P . C . M . R . headquarters. For example, Captain M . Dubeau, of Number 70 C o m p a n y (Terrace), explained to Colonel Taylor that at Terrace there was a valuable airport, a bridge crossing the Skeena River, a large military hospital and camp. T h e camp is being vacated, and the only local protection of these would b e the local P . C . M . R . , for which disbandment is proposed. Officers of the local unit had presumed that, in view of the current state of affairs, our unit would now b e considered of much greater value, as we would b e b o t h prepared and proud to take on a more important defense role. 1 3 Rangers did not want their numbers reduced and their protests t o P . C . M . R . headquarters are evidence of this. Not only were the Rangers against any f o r m of strength reduction, but the public also opposed such a scheme. For example, a Vancouver  Sun editorial of 19  October 1943, lamented Ottawa's decision t o partially disband the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Once again the familiar theme of western alienation is evident: Allied leaders, including Prime Minister Mackenzie King, have thrown cold water on those optimists who look for an early end to the war. T h e need for continuing watchfulness, and tight-locked defense has also been urged-and not least loudly by Mr. King. N o w it appears that the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, those tough woodsmen who are in some measure the eyes and ears of Pacific Command, face partial disbandment; u  C o l . Taylor to Capt. Swan, 12 November 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D89). "Captain M. Dubeau to Col. Taylor, 10 January 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D84).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  108  T h e Rangers are practical m e n . T h e y showed this when t h e y clamored for service in their o w n wilderness sectors, in their o w n way, at a time when the East inclined t o the c o m f o r t a b l e view that the defense of C a n a d a should begin at the Rockies. Being practical m e n , and having heeded the exhortation o f vigilance, t h e y will find it hard t o understand w h y 4500 of their n u m b e r m a y b e asked t o turn in their rifles. T h e y will certainly brush aside any suggestion that the m o v e is p r o p o s e d for reasons of e c o n o m y . W h a t would the saving amount t o ? A little a m m u n i t i o n a f e w rain-test uniforms promised for all b u t delivered only in driblets-a collection o f old rifles m o r e valuable in t h e hands o f m a r k s m e n w h o can use t h e m than gathering dust in stores. T h e Rangers should and will disband w h e n the need for their services is past. B u t t o assume that this time has arrived is also t o assume that Canada's western seaboard is forever entirely free from d a n g e r - a n d this assumption flies in the teeth of every warning given b y our leaders. 1 3 A similar editorial appeared in the Kamloops  Sentinel  o n 27 O c t o b e r , which e m p h a -  sized the Rangers' usefulness and pleaded for their continuation: T h e real value of the Rangers has never b e e n tested, we axe h u m b l y thankful, because n o part o f the Pacific land defenses has been called u p o n t o d o battle. H o w close we c a m e t o it we m a y never k n o w , but we believe the margin was u n c o m f o r t a b l y narrow. T h e very nature o f British Columbia's terrain-its vastness, its ruggedness, its r e m o t e and isolated stretches-plus the fact that the e n e m y had the country 13  "They're Still Needed," Vancouver Sun, 19 October 1943.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  109  thoroughly impregnated with its agents, makes a force such as the Rangers a most valued part of any defence scheme British Columbians seem t o have failed entirely t o impress upon far distant Ottawa the seriousness of the threat that exists in British Columbia. Japanese are to b e found at every strategic point. A n d our government has even m o v e d others conveniently into strategic positions.  At a given signal  communications could b e cut so completely that we shudder to think of the implications. W e in this province are under no delusions. Fortunately, the tide of war ebbed f r o m our coast, and the hour never struck. W e are convinced in our own minds that our freedom f r o m trouble is due, not to 100 per cent loyalty on the part of the Japanese here but to the fact that their plans failed t o mature. As an aside we would repeat that it is likely that the great majority of Japanese are g o o d Canadians, but there are sufficient agents of the Mikado among them to make it necessary that precautionary measures b e maintained . . . . W e know of no branch of Canada's defenses which operates with such small expense t o the country. No man in the Rangers is paid. 1 4 T h e arms with which they are equipped would not, we believe, b e used otherwise. There is a marked similarity between the Rangers and the Swiss system where every man has his equipment in his home ready for instant mobilization. 14  P.C.M.R. headquarters staff and travelling instructors were paid but all others served without pay.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  110  A s long as the Pacific war continues we believe the Rangers serve a most useful p u r p o s e and their role should b e developed rather than curtailed. 1 6 These editorials show that the P . C . M . R . was a valued part of the province's defenders. In the minds o f m a n y British Columbians, the Rangers guarded the province, b u t t h e y also provided psychological reassurance for the general population. T h e earlier popular o u t c r y for the f o r m a t i o n o f a h o m e defence organization such as the P . C . M . R . , is evidence that the Rangers would b e w e l c o m e d b y the public. Furthermore, M a c g r e g o r M a c i n t o s h , a provincial Coalition candidate for V a n c o u v e r Island, believed that the P . C . M . R . "as trained units meant m u c h t o the p e a c e o f m i n d o f the local p o p u l a t i o n . " 1 8 Nevertheless, s o m e were skeptical about the Rangers' military value. Walt Cousins r e m e m b e r e d those w h o m o c k e d the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers: I d o n ' t think half o f t h e m k n e w what it was all a b o u t . T h e y ' d see y o u going out with your rifle [and say] " y o u ' r e a Saturday Night Soldier," b u t t h e y ' d have sung a different tune if s o m e of the Japs had l a n d e d . 1 7 Similarly, E d Aldridge, a former m e m b e r of N u m b e r 83 C o m p a n y (Squamish), recalled that some p e o p l e m a d e f u n of the Rangers, although they were generally respected in the c o m m u n i t y : I think people pretty well realized that these guys in that Ranger outfit had already d o n e a day's work when they went and started doing their training.  i  T h e y had worked their eight hours at their j o b and then y o u would g o back out at night and y o u might get in b y eight or nine o ' c l o c k . It could b e midnight 15  "The Rangers are needed," Kamloops Sentinel, 27 October 1943. 16 Macgregor Macintosh to Hon. Ian Mackenzie, Minister of Veterans' Affairs, 27 September 1945, Public Archives of Canada (hereafter P.A.C.), MG 27 (III B 5). "Interview with Walt Cousins, Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  111  before y o u ' d come back home. Y o u were doing it for the people's g o o d [and] protection. I would have to say that they were more or less respected. 1 8 Former Port Alice Ranger Captain, J . W . Fraser, corroborated Aldridge's observation: [The Rangers] were also a morale booster for the people.  If that [i.e., an  invasion] had happened they'd have felt a lot better to have something there. I ' m sure that was the general feeling because the attack on Pearl Harbor was quite upsetting. 1 9 While some scoffed at the Rangers' fighting ability and labelled them "Saturday Night Soldiers," it seems that the majority appreciated their role in the defence of British Columbia.  T h e psychological comfort the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers provided to  a population at war was immeasurable.  Although they were never tested in battle,  the reassurance the Rangers gave to people more than justified their existence.  The  Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, as a civilian organization, helped to bring members of the community together much like church, school, and sports groups.  The P.C.M.R.,  however, was different because its members were able t o contribute directly to the wax effort, which provided a link between civilians and the military.  Colonel Taylor wrote  that B y its very nature, [the] P . C . M . R . organization provides a contact between 'Mr. Citizen' and the military that did not exist before and which no amount o f . . . propaganda of the ordinary kind can produce. In effect, the gap between civilian and military was bridged by the existence of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers and reserve army units. This was likely on the minds of government "Interview with Ed Aldridge, Squamish, B.C., 20 January 1990. "Interview with J.W. Fraser, North Vancouver, B.C., 12 December 1988.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  112  and military authorities w h e n the plans were being laid for the f o r m a t i o n o f the Rangers. W h i l e the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers had a military purpose, they also satisfied p u b l i c opinion which d e m a n d e d s o m e protection f r o m the Japanese war machine. B o t h editorials c o n v e y e d recurrent themes prevalent in wartime British Columbia. O n c e again, they express western alienation, and the belief that the federal government in O t t a w a was not concerned about the defence o f the Pacific Coast. Sentinel  The  Kamloops  editorial also reveals the lingering fear o f the Japanese in British C o l u m b i a even  after their internment. Furthermore, it shows that m a n y p e o p l e believed that a Japanese Fifth C o l u m n was active in British Columbia.  T h e public was still concerned a b o u t  the possibility of an attack o n the Pacific Coast find, as long as the threat o f Japanese aggression existed, t h e y wanted the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers t o b e at full strength and prepared for an attack. T h e public o u t c r y over partial disbandment of the P . C . M . R . p r o b a b l y led National D e f e n c e Headquarters t o soften its position. O n 10 N o v e m b e r 1943, word c a m e f r o m O t tawa that the Rangers were t o b e further "streamlined" but not disbanded. B y "clearing out the d e a d w o o d , " as the military authorities argued, it w o u l d "strengthen rather than weaken the R a n g e r s . " 2 0 A l m o s t three m o n t h s later, w h e n the reduction process had b e e n c o m p l e t e d , M a j o r - G e n e r a l G . R . Pearkes was still concerned about the role and morale o f the Rangers:  T h e effort that has b e e n m a d e b y the personnel o f the P . C . M . R . t o reach the standard o f efficiency which they have n o w achieved is appreciated. Their high morale, local knowledge of the country and their fighting qualities are such that in the event of hostile action being taken b y the e n e m y against British C o l u m b i a they could provide a valuable contribution t o the defence of 20  "Rangers To Be Streamlined," Vancouver Province, 10 November 1943.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  113  the country. W h i l e the general situation in the Pacific is such that the risk o f attack against the B . C . coast has been reduced, it cannot yet b e considered impractical for the e n e m y t o deliver an occasional raid o n s o m e point or another which he might select as an o b j e c t i v e . T h e i m p r o v e d strategical position has m a d e it possible t o release s o m e o f the P . C . M . R . , particularly those in the interior of the province f r o m the b u r d e n of their additional duties which they had so gladly a c c e p t e d when a greater danger existed.  T h e p a p e r strength therefore o f the P . C . M . R . was  r e d u c e d f r o m 15,000 t o 10,000 b u t it was never the intention t o give the impression that " t h e y have b e e n let d o w n " because of this or any other action taken b y these Headquarters. T h e S . O . [Senior Officer], P . C . M . R . must ensure that this situation, if it exists, is corrected at o n c e . 2 1 E v e n as late as February 1944, Pearkes believed that Japanese raids o n the Pacific Coast were possible. Pearkes valued the services o f the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, and did not want the organization t o collapse simply because of the i m p r o v e d military situation, or because they felt they were n o longer needed. In June 1944, it was reiterated b y Colonel Taylor that as long as "danger still exists o n the Pacific C o a s t " the Rangers would b e maintained. 2 2 Seven m o n t h s later, however, the Allied successes against Japan p r o m p t e d Pacific C o m m a n d t o authorize the disbandment of Ranger companies "east of the general line" (100 miles f r o m the c o a s t ) . 2 3  Twenty-  nine coastal companies were t o b e the only survivors of the disbandment order. A s with the earlier order f o r disbandment, this proposal elicited protests f r o m the Rangers. For example, as Captain C . R . West, of N u m b e r 18 C o m p a n y ( C o w i c h a n Lake), explained t o 2l Major-General G . E . Pearkes to Brigadier, General Staff, Pacific Command, 7 February 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). 22 "Coast Rangers Will Be Maintained," Vancouver Province, 14 June 1944. "Special P.C.M.R. Circular Letter, 5 January 1945, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D24).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  114  Colonel Taylor: I wish t o g o o n record that I consider the decision t o disband the P . C . M . R . at this time a most unfortunate one. A t a time w h e n strenuous efforts are being m a d e t o c o m b a t the attitude that the war is w o n the psychological effect will b e most definitely negative. 2 4 T h e order for disbandment was subsequently revoked o n 22 January 1945, because o f the threat f r o m Japanese balloons carrying incendiary and antipersonnel b o m b s . 2 8 These hydrogen-filled balloons were constructed o f panels o f "laminated tissue p a p e r m a d e f r o m the long fibers o f the ' k o z o ' bush  and f r o m the ' m a t s u m a t a ' t r e e . " 2 8  T h e layers o f p a p e r were c e m e n t e d together and coated with a waterproof chemical. Usually, each balloon carried o n e fifteen kilogram antipersonnel b o m b , and "four smaller  -  thermite incendiaries weighing 5 kilograms." 2 7 T h e balloons were launched f r o m Japan and reached heights o f 25,000 t o 35,000 feet where the prevailing winds carried t h e m toward N o r t h A m e r i c a .  W h e n a balloon descended t o a certain height f r o m a loss o f  hydrogen, it registered o n an aneroid barometer which automatically activated a blowplug. T h e blow-plug would then cause a sandbag t o b e released and the balloon would rise again.  Theoretically, b y the time all the sandbags had b e e n d r o p p e d , the balloon  should have been over N o r t h A m e r i c a . T h e incendiary b o m b s would then b e d r o p p e d b y the same mechanism that detached the sandbags. T h e highly explosive antipersonnel b o m b would b e released last, which automatically triggered the balloon's "self-destruct "Captain C.R. West to Col. Taylor, 16 January 1945, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D24). "Special P.C.M.R. Circular Letter, 22 January 1945, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D24). 26 Bert Webber, Retaliation: Japanese Attacks and Allied Countermeasures on the Pacific Coast in World War II (Corvallis: Oregon State University Press, 1975), 103. For further details on the balloons see Henry Morris, Japanese Paper Balloon Bombs: The First ICBM (North Hills: Bird and Bull Press, 1982); "Unexploded Bombs, Carried By Balloons, Still Source of Potential Danger in West," Vancouver Province, 31 May 1945; and "Balloons Shown Intricate Weapons," Grand Forks Gazette, 7 June 1945. 2T Webber, 106-107.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  115  mechanism." 2 8 These balloon b o m b s were designed to start forest fires in North America, as well as inflict casualties f r o m the antipersonnel bombs. In addition, as Bert W e b b e r noted, the Japanese expected the balloons t o "disrupt the Allied war effort and possibly force a withdrawal of troops and other resources f r o m the southwest Pacific to protect the homeland." 2 9 While the balloons did create problems for the Canadian and American military authorities, there is no evidence that they caused any forest fires, and the only casualties were six civilians who came upon a downed balloon in Oregon and detonated it. Perhaps the most useful aspect of the balloons was for Japanese propaganda.  T h e Japanese  claimed hundreds of casualties and forest fires were caused by the balloons, which boosted the morale of their war-weary population. Between six and nine thousand balloons were launched f r o m Japan and, in British " Columbia, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were assigned the task of watching the skies for these new weapons. On 16 March 1945, some 100 Ranger captains were summoned t o a meeting in Vancouver to discuss the balloon b o m b threat. T h e meeting was also attended by other active and reserve army officers and civilian officials. All Ranger units were instructed to use a special code and report any balloon sightings t o headquarters. Many balloons were sighted by Rangers and remnants of the balloons were found throughout the province. After an initial outburst of panic in the press concerning the balloons, the media kept silent on the matter. As a result, the Japanese military eventually ended their balloon program because of lack of information regarding its success. While the balloons proved to b e ineffective military weapons, they did have a psychological impact on the population. For example, Captain R . N . Atkinson, of Number 71 Company (Penticton), was concerned about manned balloons in the future: 28 29  Ibid., 105. Ibid., 110.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  116  To date no evidence of passengers has been found but should the experiment b e considered satisfactory and this period has possibly passed in consideration of the increased numbers arriving, therefore the possibility of human passengers on one-way tickets cannot b e overlooked as no doubt many more volunteers than could b e a c c o m m o d a t e d would b e ready t o take flight. These people could b e spies or guerillas and practically all of them would have a first-hand  knowledge of the country through a previous residence. 3 0  Secondarily, Captain Atkinson was also worried about the possibility of the balloons carrying bacteria.  Others were also concerned about biological warfare and, according t o  Bert Webber, the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the United States "was on the lookout for evidence of pestilence brought b y the balloons." 3 1 For many British Columbians, such as Lloyd Cornett, the balloon threat brought the war closer to home: [The balloons] heightened our concern.  W e were actually being attacked.  W h e n the Japanese submarine surfaced on the west coast of Vancouver Island and fired a couple of rounds at the Estevan Point Lighthouse... that all shook us up t o o  Little events like that and the balloons brought it h o m e t o us.  W e couldn't ignore it. It wasn't a theoretical thing that might happen, it was physical evidence t o us. 3 2 T h e Rangers' anger over reports of disbandment, and their work in sighting and reporting Japanese balloons, show their zeal and devotion t o duty. Certainly, during the early stages of the Pacific war, most Rangers were very enthusiastic. In August 1942, Captain Baldwin, a P . C . M . R . Field Supervisor, noted in a report that the Port Alice Rangers were 30 Captain R.N. Atkinson, "Report of Military Conference Held at the Seaforth Armories, Vancouver, B.C.," 16 March 1945, PMA, file 4-478. 31 Webber, 110. 32 Interview with Lloyd Cornett, Burnaby, B.C., 29 November 1988.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  117  a progressive unit, well officered, and the company functioning is taken very seriously, b o t h by its membership and also the B . C . Pulp and Paper Co.; the latter giving every encouragement and facility. 33 Throughout the P . C . M . E . ' s existence, in fact, there were many examples of Rangers undertaking their duties enthusiastically. For example, the Inspector-General described the men of Number 29 Company (Chilliwack) as being "full of enthusiasm, putting a great deal of effort into their work." 3 4 Statements such as the above were c o m m o n in the Inspector-General's reports.  T h e Rangers' personal sacrifice becomes magnified when  one remembers that they were unpaid volunteers, and most of them worked at civilian j o b s during the day. Captain A l e x MacDonald, of Number 23 C o m p a n y (Courtenay), described the dedication of his men in a report to Colonel Taylor: T h e exercise, for which 3 hours' notice was received, lasted f r o m 19 hrs. on [the] 27th to 04 hrs. [on the] 28th and the Rangers engaged were drawn f r o m No. 23 and No. 24 Coys. P . C . M . R . W h e n one realizes that many of these men were on parade on [the] 27th within one hour of coming home f r o m their work and, on the completion of the exercise, were again back t o their daily j o b s within one hour, their keenness can b e appreciated. 3 5 Personal sacrifices were made by many Rangers. Frank Smith, former Ranger in Number 84 Company (Ladner), recalled the commitment of his fellow Rangers: Most of the boys were very serious. T h e y would never miss a practice. Some of us belonged t o churches and things like that. W e more or less gave up all that during those years because that was the time of practice-Sunday 33  Captain Baldwin to Col. Taylor, 25 August 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D81). Major-General J.P. Mackenzie, "Report on Sardis Detachment, No. 29 Coy., P.C.M.R.," 8 December 1943, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592). 38 Captain A. MacDonald to Col. Taylor, 30 August 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D80). 34  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  118  morning f r o m nine o'clock to one. It was, I think, a sort of dedication to the j o b that most of the fellas made a point of giving up whatever they wanted t o do on a Sunday and turned up for these practices. 3 6 T h e concern in Number 73 C o m p a n y about the danger f r o m the Japanese at Tashme is evidence that the officers, at least, took their role seriously.  Yet another initiative,  proposed by the officers of the Hope Rangers, was the question of reserve f o o d supplies in the event of an invasion. Ranger officers f r o m Hope suggested that reserve supplies of wheat b e hidden throughout British Columbia for use in the event of an invasion. 37 Pressure was continually put on headquarters to take action on this matter as it was deemed of high importance. At one point it was suggested by Captain George Baldwin, of headquarters, that the duty of Rangers would simply b e to fight, surviving on existing supplies. W h e n these supplies ran out, Rangers were expected to "commandeer" whatever else they needed t o sustain themselves. As pointed out by officers of the H o p e detachment, appropriations would work if they were fighting on foreign soil but to take f o o d away f r o m their families and friends was out of the question. 3 8  Assuredly, then,  the officers of Number 73 Company were serious in their assertions about the need for f o o d reserves, providing yet another indication that Rangers took the Japanese threat seriously.  This also reveals that the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were very much a  civilian organization; indeed, they were citizens first and soldiers second. Most ex-Rangers feel that men enlisted out of patriotism: to serve their country in some fashion. Zeal and pride were expected of these unpaid recruits, as former Squamish Ranger Ed Aldridge recalled: 36  Interview with A. Frank Smith, Vancouver, B.C., 8 November 1988. "Reserve of Food in Time of Emergency," unsigned letter, 6 pages, no date, HMA. 38 Capt. Johnson to Capt. Baldwin, 11 October 1942, HMA. 37  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  119  T h e y took pride in being in there, a part of the outfit. T h e only ones that didn't feel that way and showed any laxity at all, Captain Frost would just go and gather up their equipment [and] write them off. 3 9 For many there was also the chance of firing a new rifle, as former Ranger Captain J . W . Fraser explained: Y o u take a lot of men that age and offer to show them how to use a rifle and how to fire it, and give them free a m m u n i t i o n . . . they get interested and I think that was a big part of it. W e had no trouble with a lack of interest. 40 Nevertheless, former West Vancouver Ranger C.F. Tyrell noted that a spirit and zeal usually animated most Rangers since they were staking their lives: T h e y were serious. T h e y knew what they were expected to d o . . . I don't know whether we would have reacted properly or not but we were willing at the time. 4 1 This willingness to do their part for the defence of British Columbia was vital to the continued existence of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Without this commitment, the organization would have collapsed when the possibility of a Japanese invasion ceased to b e a serious threat. T h e commitment of Rangers became evident in 1945 when the life of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers was near its end. A t that time, feelers were sent out by headquarters to obtain Rangers' thoughts regarding a peacetime Ranger organization. Number 73 C o m pany was in unanimous agreement that the Rangers should continue in some f o r m or another. Members of the Yale detachment were of the opinion that the P . C . M . R . should 39  Interview with Ed Aldridge, Squamish, B.C., 20 January 1990. Interview with J.W. Fraser, North Vancouver, B.C., 12 December 1988. "Interview with C.F. Tyrell, West Vancouver, B.C., 5 December 1988. 40  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  120  b e continued " t o further the interests of Canadianism" through teaching the "younger generation" techniques of self and national defence. 4 2  In like m a n n e r , the B o s t o n Bar  D e t a c h m e n t wanted t o continue the m o v e m e n t but did "not wish t o b e used in cases of civil d i s t u r b a n c e . " 4 3 This is understandable considering that B o s t o n Bar was primarily a railway t o w n and hence contained m a n y trade union m e m b e r s . Colonel Taylor estimated that about 100 Ranger companies were interested in perpetuating the organization. 4 4 Support was even evident f r o m outside P . C . M . R . ranks.  For e x a m p l e , A . W . C o o p e r ,  General Manager o f the British C o l u m b i a Federation o f Trade and Industry, fully supp o r t e d the p r o p o s e d P . C . M . R . Association:  N o t only does it furnish a military basis for defence o f the West Coast but t o our m i n d is the best sort o f instrument for p r o m o t i n g g o o d citizenship and counteracting the efforts o f the subversive elements which, as y o u doubtless k n o w , are so prevalent in our province. 4 5 T h e P . C . M . R . Association was eventually f o r m e d under the Societies A c t , with the goal of perpetuating the "ideals and activities o f the Pacific Coast Militia R a n g e r s . " 4 6 Similarly, N u m b e r 1 C o m p a n y ( V i c t o r i a ) continued t o exist as a search and rescue group k n o w n as the South Vancouver Island Rangers. O n e of their main purposes, as their c o n stitution states, was t o "perpetuate Ranger spirit and the traditions o f the P . C . M . R . " 4 7 This voluntary continuation of the Rangers into p e a c e t i m e also suggests a degree o f loyalty and c o m m i t m e n t t o the goals of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. "Lieutenant Barry to Acting Adjutant, No. 73 Coy., 18 October 1944, HMA. "Typewritten notes of Captain H.W. Johnson, n.d., HMA. 44 Col. Taylor, "Progress Report and Suggestions for P.C.M.R. Perpetuation," 11 December 1945, Gerald Charlton Papers. 48 A.W. Cooper to Rt. Hon. Ian A. Mackenzie, 1 March 1947, P.A.C., MG 27 (III B 5). 46 Pacific Coast Militia Rangers Association Declaration, n.d., Gerald Charlton Papers; See also The Ranger, 7, no. 1 (January 1947) which was a special edition of the P.C.M.R. Association. 47 E. Scott, "South Vancouver Island Rangers," RCMP Quarterly 17, no. 1 (July 1951): 49.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  121  But as Ed Aldridge's comment shows, all were not equally dedicated. Ranger activities were affected b y recurrent seasonal work patterns, as well as by the war situation and government policy.  A report f r o m the Hope detachment reveals that, in 1943, Ranger  activities were scheduled for twice a week during the winter, but as one Ranger explained: " I ' m afraid m o s t " of the activities "have fallen b y the wayside, and all the enthusiasm we had worked up during the summer is either dormant or dead." 4 8 This lack of enthusiasm in the Ranger unit at Hope is also eviden, Tom correspondence of February 1943. Lieutenant C.E. Barry, commander of the Yale Rangers, complained t o the Hope detachment because they had not contacted him "since before Christmas."  Barry had heard  rumours that they had not held a meeting in Hope for quite some time. Therefore, he suggested that Ranger officers f r o m Hope attend meetings at Yale if they could not "get anything moving in H o p e . " 4 9  B y April 1943, however, Captain Johnson reported that  present enrolment was 235, with "a g o o d possibility" that it would continue to grow. 6 0 Captain Johnson was correct in assuming that his company's size would increase. Figure 6.25 reveals that Number 73 Company grew steadily until October 1943 when, like other companies, news of possibly disbanding some units caused a drop in enrolment.  The  summer of 1943 brought yet another drop in Number 73 Company's attendance record, at least in North Bend. Lieutenant C.C. Young reported t o Captain Johnson that he "found the movement slackening considerably due to holidays, hot weather and other things, but commencing Sept. 1" he intended t o tighten "up on all delinquents." 5 1 Yet again in the summer of 1944, this time in Boston Bar, Ranger activities were reduced. As Lieutenant Martinson explained the situation to Captain Baldwin: "Unsigned letter to Lieut.-Col. A. Leslie Coote, 5 January 1943, HMA. 49 Lieutenant Barry to Acting Adjutant, No. 73 Coy., 10 February 1943, HMA. 50 Capt. Johnson to Col. Taylor, 13 April 1943, HMA. "Lieutenant Young to Capt. Johnson, 17 August 1943, HMA.  -  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  122  Monthly Strength Returns Number 89 Company(BurnabySouth) 300  Oct Jan Il942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  Number of Men Source: DJHtat, fits 322.009(D99).  Figure 6.25: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 73 Company ( H o p e ) , October 1942 t o August 1945. Y o u will probably agree with me that it is rather difficult to keep the Rangers together at this time of the year due to gardening, work at home, vacations etc. but it would seem that with a little rifle training along with the field work seems t o keep up the morale and gives the boys a certain amount of competition. 6 2 As the wax progressed, other Ranger companies also had problems maintaining enthusiasm and high attendance levels. In Number 101 Company (Ladysmith) attendance at meetings dropped 30 percent between April and August 1943. 63 T h e same company had problems in September 1944, as Field Supervisor Harvey reported: "Lieutenant Martinson to Capt. Baldwin, 5 June 1944, Dr Hist., file 169.009 (D86). 53 R.Q.M.S. Hayhurst, Report on No. 101 Company (Ladysmith), 28 to 31 August 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D91).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  123  Captain Osborn has had to call off his meetings owing to the hot weather and closing of the logging operations, when a lot of his men went off fishing or to other j o b s in the shut-period. 6 4 Captain Harvey found a similar situation in Number 18 C o m p a n y (Cowichan Lake) and, indeed, throughout Vancouver Island: All company commanders have voiced the same opinion as to the general easing off of interest owing to the bettered conditions in Europe and the Pacific zones. 6 5 At times officers, as well as ordinary Rangers, lost interest in P . C . M . R . activities. A t a staff meeting of Number 73 Company in October 1943, it was moved that letters b e sent to some eight absent officers requesting that they attend the next meeting "without fail."  T h e letters were apparently mailed t o the officers in question and they were all  present at the next meeting. 6 6 Evidently, then, interest in Ranger activities varied in intensity depending upon several factors. T h e Rangers were civilians first with j o b s , families, and problems of their own t o deal with.  Domestic matters frequently t o o k precedence over P . C . M . R . train-  ing. Interest in Ranger exercises often waned during the summer months when family vacations, gardening and other leisure pursuits occupied many Rangers' time. Rangers' enthusiasm also varied with popular perceptions of the Japanese military threat. As the war continued and Japan's military power grew weaker, so t o o did interest in the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. In general, monthly strength return statistics for P . C . M . R . companies indicate a sharp decline after October 1943, followed by a fairly constant number until disbandment (see "Captain Harvey to Col. Taylor, 15 September 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D91). "Captain Harvey, "Report on Nos. 15, 17, 18, 19 Coys.," 15 September 1944, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D79). "Lieutenant Edkins to Capt. Johnson, 9 October 1943, HMA.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  124  Figures 6.26-6.30). O n the other hand, some Ranger companies differed f r o m the norm and maintained a relatively constant number of men throughout their existence (see Figures 6.31-6.34). For example, the Ranger units at Ahousat and Nass River, which were composed mainly of Native Indians, experienced only minor manpower  fluctuations.  It is  possible that Native Indians in these remote areas were not influenced by news reports, and rumours of disbanding the Rangers. Yet other Ranger units, such as Number 134 Company (Woodflbre) peaked early and levelled off when most companies were experiencing a sharp decline in numbers (see Figure 6.35). Number 24 Company ( T s o l u m ) maintained a level number until April 1944 when it lost approximately half its men (see Figure 6.36). Finally, as Figure 6.37 indicates, the Burnaby South company grew steadily until September 1943 when it levelled off t o a constant number. T h e number of Ranger recruits varied from unit to unit, and there appear t o b e no _ consistent geographic patterns of enlistment. Each region, in fact, had a similar gradual decline in enrolment after September 1943, but on Vancouver Island, a likely location for Japanese raids, the number of initial recruits was very high (see Figure 6.19).  In  other regions, the number of recruits gradually increased t o a peak in September 1943. Vancouver Island also had the highest number of Rangers, while the Kootenay regionfarthest f r o m the coast and the danger of invasion-contained the smallest number of Rangers. Individual companies also varied in size. Several companies consistently contained between 100 and 200 men, while the Williams Lake and Kamloops units peaked at over 500 men. Other Ranger companies were relatively small in size. For example, the roster .  of Number 58 Company (Port McNeill) varied f r o m between fifteen and twenty-four men. Naturally, the size of companies would depend on the population base of the area, but large numbers would often originate with keen officers who kept interest in Ranger activities at a high level. Conversely, if the officers lacked enthusiasm it would usually b e  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  125  Monthly Strength Returns Number 89 Company(BurnabySouth)  - — Number of Men Source: D-Htat, file 322.00S(D99).  Figure 6.26: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 32 Company (Parksville), October 1942 t o August 1945. reflected by low recruit levels. It should also b e noted at this point that these strength return statistics would not reveal individual parade attendance; they only reveal the total number of men in any given company. For example, a Ranger company could have 100 men enlisted, but not all of them attended every parade or training session. Despite these strength return fluctuations from unit t o unit, a nucleus of dedicated men remained loyal t o the Ranger movement until the war with Japan ended. These Rangers took pride in what they were doing, even if they missed the occasional meeting, because it allowed them t o serve Canada in a useful and respected manner. Needless t o say, problems arose f r o m the fact that Rangers were unpaid volunteers with little logistical support. In Number 73 Company, one of the most pressing initial problems was that of expenses incurred in the line of Ranger duty.  Correspondence  between Number 73 Company and P . C . M . R . headquarters reveals that gasoline and tire  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  126  Monthly Strength Returns Number 22 Company (Cumberland)  —— Number of Men  Souros: DXIst, fll« 322.009(D99). Figure 6.27: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 45 Company (Salmon A r m ) , October 1942 to August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Number 51 Company (Armstrong)  Number of Men  Souros: DJHIst, fits 322.009(D99). Figure 6.39: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 23 Company (Courtenay), October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  127  Monthly Strength Returns Number 22 Company (Cumberland)  —'— Number of Men Sourc»: DXIst, IBs 322.009(099).  Figure 6.29: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 59 Company (Port Hardy), October 1942 t o August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Number 67 Company (Vernon) 180  - V . , i .. 1. • 1 .. .  Oct Jan >1942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  .,  .  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  i Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  Number of Men Souroa: DXIat, fto 322.009(099).  Figure 6.39: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 23 Company (Courtenay), October 1942 to August  1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  128  Monthly Strength Returns Number 46 Company (Peachland) 70 60  50 40 30 20  10  0 Oct Jan 11942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  ~ — Number of Men Source: 0XI»t, file 322.009(099).  Figure 6.31: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 46 Company (Peachland), October 1942 to August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Number 123 Company (Ahousat) 80 70 60  50 40 30 20 10  0 Oct Jan 11942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  — - Number of Men Source: DJHkL, fOe 322.009(D99).  Figure 6.34: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 137 Company (Vanderhoof), October 1942 to August 1945.  129  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  Monthly Strength Returns Number 130 Company (Nass River) 250  i  N s/  200  150 100  50  0 Oct Jan N942 I  . ,  1  Apr  Jul 1943  . „ ., Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945 I  —— Number of Men Source: DXIst, III* 322.009(D99).  Figure 6.33: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 130 Company (Nass River), October 1942 t o August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Number 137 Company (Vanderhoof) 50 40 30 20  10 0 Oct Jan 11942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 1945  —— Number of Men Source: O X b t , fie 322.009(099).  Figure 6.34: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 137 Company (Vanderhoof), October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  130  Monthly Strength Returns  Number 22 Company (Cumberland)  — Number of Men Souroa: OJHiat, flia 322.009(D99).  Figure 6.35: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 134 Company ( W o o d f i b r e ) , October 1942 t o August 1945.  Monthly Strength Returns Number 24 Company (Tsolum)  Oct Jan H 942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 194S I  Number of Men Source: D-Hlst., file 322.009(099).  Figure 6.39: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 23 Company (Courtenay), October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  131  Monthly Strength Returns  Number 89 Company (Burnaby South)  —— Number of Men Souroa: D-HkL, fito 322.009(099).  Figure 6.37: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 89 Company (Burnaby South), October 1942 to August 1945. rationing caused the greatest problems.  At different times b o t h the captain and one  other officer threatened to resign, either because of a lack of gas ration coupons or tire shortages. Vehicles were needed to transport men to and f r o m training exercises, as well as on official business t o outlying areas. Consequently, inflexible war rationing threatened the continued existence of the Hope Ranger detachment. Captain Johnson complained to Colonel Taylor about the unjust situation: Having a detachment each in Yale and Laidlaw and groups at Katz and 11 mile on [the] Hope Princeton Trail, it has been m y custom to visit them once a week with other members of the staff  I have a B X Ration b o o k which  barely allows me enough gas for m y regular work as electrician in charge of the power system of the Hope Utilities Co. During the last few months I have used so much gas on purely Ranger work that even though I drop all Ranger  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  132  work and exercise even more rigid economy I could not get through t o the end of the year on what tickets I have left  It seems unfortunate that we w h o  are giving so heavily of our time and means to forward what is a vital part of the war effort are to b e deprived of gasoline necessary to do that work, while others who appear to b e making no contribution whatever for the cause axe allowed so much gas for purely pleasure driving. 5 7 In order t o alleviate personal hardship on these Rangers, beginning in August 1942, the Department of National Defence provided a monthly grant of 10,000 dollars to cover certain P . C . M . R . expenses. Included in this was a "provision to cover the current running expenses of individual units." 6 8  While this provision eased the burden, the funds still  did not cover all contingencies.  T h e evidence is a memorandum, sent to all P . C . M . R .  companies, stating that " P . C . M . R . funds are limited and they cannot b e stretched t o cover all items of expense that may b e submitted b y P . C . M . R . Companies." 6 9  Rangers  were still expected t o serve without pay, and even share the burden of incidental expenses incurred in the operation of their units. Even with the provision for expenses, Ranger captains often had t o satisfy complex bureaucratic requirements before they received any compensation for personal expenditures. In fact, the operation of the P . C . M . R . proved to b e less expensive than the 10,000 dollars allotted by the Department of National Defence. For example, between August 1942 and March 1943, 78,000 dollars was allotted to the P . C . M . R . , but 34,947 dollars was returned by Ranger headquarters. 8 0 It is possible that the unexpended surplus reflected the Rangers' unwillingness to go through the paperwork necessary t o satisfy requirements for restitution. 57  But it is more likely the  Capt. Johnson to Col. Taylor, 8 August 1942, HMA. "P.C.M.R. Circular Letter No. 22, 17 August 1942, HMA. 59 Capt. Barton for Col. Taylor to all P.C.M.R. Companies, 24 September 1943, HMA. 60 "Utilization of P.C.M.R. Funds, Appendix A," 22 January 1944, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D592); Colonel C.P. Stacey to Major Newlands, 16 February 1956, D. Hist., file 159.049 (Dl).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  133  result of Ranger funds being administered very stringently, which often led to tension between headquarters and the Rangers trying to obtain restitution. Captain D . V . Palin, of Number 19 C o m p a n y (Shawnigan Lake), was annoyed with P . C . M . R . headquarters over such a situation: I, like your other O.C.'s run their cars over rough roads and wear out their tires and don't complain.  Our expenses are heavy in more ways than one  and used to put in many hours of hard work after a day's hard work, Sunday included. Last Sunday I worked 5 hours with pick and shovel and have only missed two Sundays since last March. "All Ranger work." I sometimes wish I had not taken on the work, [since I would] much rather b e in the front line, however I have done m y best and if there is a lot of red tape t o b e contended with, I am afraid it won't improve the goodwill of the Rangers. I hope you do not think I am blaming you, but I am certainly wondering whether the Captain realizes that a Ranger Captain has to contend with "wear and tear of clothes and shoes."  T w o weeks ago  m y car was smashed attending an important meeting of the A . R . P . and as C . O . 19th Coy. I had to attend. W h e n I left I found m y car battered about. I expect m y expense for same will b e around sixteen dollars. These expenses make it hard. 6 1 Particular economic strain was placed on the officers because Ranger administration was, in fact, very time-consuming.  C.E. Barry was promoted to captain in charge of  Number 73 Company in April 1945. T h e hardship the captaincy caused him is evident in a letter he wrote t o headquarters: "Captain D.V. Palin to Col. Taylor, 4 November 1942, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D79).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  134  I certainly would have never accepted the Captaincy had I known what was entailed. I have been absent f r o m m y business on Ranger business now for almost 5 days and have had t o pay a man to take care of the store and office during m y absence and it is far f r o m  finished.62  Some found the economic burden of being a Ranger captain t o o great and were forced to resign. Captain R.S. King, of Number 91 Company (Burnaby East), regretfully resigned his position because: For some considerable time, I have been finding it most difficult to carry on m y work as a Game Warden and also as Officer Commanding No. 91 Company, P . C . M . R . I have b e c o m e so tied up in m y work for the P . C . M . R . that it has been seriously interfering with m y Game Conservation duties, that sooner or later m y employers will b e calling upon m e for an explanation. While I have been very pleased t o have been connected with the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, and have enjoyed working with the officers and men of m y company, I feel, in fairness to m y employers, that I must now tender m y resignation t o take effect forthwith. 6 3 Although Captain King was forced t o resign, he gladly offered t o assist the P . C . M . R . in other ways. In addition t o the economic burden of being a Ranger captain, there was also a great deal of mental strain associated with the position. Jim Kingsley, former captain of the Parksville Rangers, was forced to neglect his business for Ranger duties, but he also felt the psychological pressure of the captaincy: 62 63  Captain C.E. Barry to Captain A.F. Watts, 30 January 1946, HMA. Captain R.S. King to Col. Taylor, 5 June 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D90).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  135  I felt an awful responsibility. I'd go to bed at nights thinking [and] figuring out what we were going to do, and how we were going to do it. It was a big responsibility. 84 While Jim Kingsley was a dedicated captain, others were not as committed to the Rangers and they neglected their military responsibilities.  This was the case in Num-  ber 74 C o m p a n y (Bella Coola), as described in a Field Supervisor's report t o Captain Baldwin:  I have been requested to write you in connection with Ranger Captain Buller. It seems that he is not the man to b e in charge of this Coy. He is away most of the time and is in very b a d health. He also cares for his liquor t o o much for the g o o d of the morale of the Coy.  This Coy.  is gradually  decreasing on that account. Ranger Captain Buller is liked by the people, but as a leader I can't see how he can expect t o lead his men under the circumstances which I have mentioned. Unless something is done real soon this Coy. will fold up.  The  men are very keen but will lose all interest unless they have a g o o d leader. 86 A meeting of the officers and N . C . O . ' s of Number 74 Company decided to appoint an acting captain until a meeting of the entire company could b e held. It was typical of the egalitarian nature of the P . C . M . R . that if a captain were negligent, or disliked by the men, he could b e voted out of his position. In Number 130 Company (Nass River) the men were dissatisfied with Captain Nelson, and Lieutenant Stewart, the detachment commander at Kincolith. B o t h men had been 64  Interview with Jim Kingsley, Parksville, B.C., 16 January 1989. Letter from unknown P.C.M.R. Field Supervisor to Capt. Baldwin, 4 September 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D87). 65  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  136  absent for quite some time and the Rangers under their c o m m a n d resented it. Captain D ' A r c y , a P . C . M . R . Field Supervisor, decided that, given the situation, he would have to ask for the resignations of both Captain Nelson and Lieutenant Stewart. 6 6 In contrast, personal conflicts or dissatisfaction with the operation of the corps sometimes prompted Ranger officers to resign, or at least threaten to resign, of their own free will. One such incident took place at a joint meeting, held on 26 November 1943, between the officers of Number 22 Company (Cumberland) and Number 23 Company (Courtenay). P . C . M . R . Field Supervisor, Captain J.B. Acland, was also invited to attend the meeting and, in his words, the topic of discussion was one of general dissatisfaction with the administration of the P . C . M . R . as now existant [sic] and the apparent lack of interest and imagination shown by those responsible for the creation and development of the Ranger Corps, from N.D.Hq. down t o and including P . C . M . R . Hqs . . . there has been an increasing feeling of discontent with the conditions under which the P . C . M . R . coys, have to carry on after nearly two years of operation. 6 7 T h e officers' complaints included a lack of equipment and uniforms.  T h e y also re-  quested a "better appreciation of their r o l e . . . and the development of training and administration under area control."  Furthermore, the officers favoured "a battalion es-  tablishment similar to that of the reserve army. . . t o the point where O.C. Coys are in favour of inclusion under the Reserve A r m y Administration."  T h e chief concern of  those attending the meeting, however, centered around the strict disciplinarian attitude 66 Staff Sergeant A.A. Young to Col. Taylor, 26 October 1943 and Captain N.J.H. D'Arcy to Col. Taylor, 27 October 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D94). 67 The following details on the P.C.M.R. meeting at Cumberland all come from a report written by Captain J.B. Acland to Col. Taylor, 28 November 1943, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D80).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  of the P . C . M . R . instructor, Regimental Quartermaster Sergeant Hayhurst.  137  Apparently  Hayhurst had given Number 23 Company an unfavourable weapons report, and "made disparaging remarks about the detachment at a lecture given t o a class of No. 23 C o m pany." T h e officers at the meeting believed that "the real reason for the adverse report was personal spite against the detachment leader w h o had reprimanded him for his attitude during the lectures." T h e y further claimed that the company was supplied -with ten .303 Ross rifles which were so badly rusted it was "impossible t o get them clean." In addition, Number 22 Company had fifteen teenagers on its duty roster and Hayhurst had "incensed" the Rangers "by asking why they were running a kindergarden" [sic]. Hayhurst, moreover, "made a point of riding these boys hard during the lecture, and in the opinion of the detachment leader, unnecessarily so." If steps were not taken Acland feared that the two companies would disband. Acland further wrote that the threat of resignation by the officers was not offered b y way of protest but rather because they felt that the authorities were no longer interested in their efforts, at least not sufficiently interested to supply the units with adequate equipment to carry out the role expected of them. Figures 6.38-6.39 reveal that Number 22 Company did disband in April 1944, and Number 23 C o m p a n y maintained a steady number of Rangers until it declined drastically between May and June 1944. Captain Acland's report on the meeting at Cumberland reveals the dissatisfaction of Ranger officers over the lack of equipment, and lack of appreciation for their role. Rangers, as civilians volunteering their time, needed reassurance that their activities were a vital part of the wax effort.  Perhaps even more revealing is the fact that the  Rangers at Cumberland and Courtenay protested the disciplinary actions of R . Q . M . S .  -  138  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  Monthly Strength Returns Number 22 Company (Cumberland)  —'— Number of Men Souroa:  DXIat, (Da 322.009(099),  Figure 6.38: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 22 Company (Cumberland), October 1942 to August 1943.  Monthly Strength Returns Number 23 Company (Courtenay) ! \ 5 V !  1 s  ! ;  |  |  ! i i : 1 —— i— i— i— i— i M i M 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1—i—r~—i—i— Oct Jan Il942 I  Apr  Jul 1943  Oct  Jan I  Apr  Jul 1944  Oct  Jan I  Apr Jul 194S  —1— Number of Men Souroa: D-Hlst, tie 322.009(099).  Figure 6.39: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 23 Company (Courtenay), October 1942 to August 1945.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  139  Hay hurst. Again, the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were civilians and, like their historic predecessors, resented strict military discipline and scornful treatment. A similar protest meeting of P . C . M . R . officers took place at Nanaimo in March 1944. At this meeting, several Vancouver Island company commanders drafted a joint resolution to disband their units, because of the lack of enthusiasm caused by the improved Allied position in the Pacific theatre of war. T h e signatories of the joint letter were also concerned about the lack of equipment for Ranger companies. 6 8 At a subsequent meeting which took place at Qualicum Beach on 22 March 1944, Captain Kingsley of the Parksville Rangers decided t o resign. According t o Kingsley's diary, "all that were present for the meeting decided to resign." 6 0 Kingsley, in the end, did not follow through on his threat to resign and by 23 April made it clear that he was withdrawing his resignation. It is likely that Kingsley was influenced by Colonel Taylor who had visited Parksville on 19 ~ April, to talk t o the company and help Kingsley "decide what to d o to hold the Coy. together." 7 0 In his diary, Kingsley cited several instances of poor attendance at meetings, and a general lack of enthusiasm toward the end of the war. In retrospect, Kingsley recalled later that his temporary resignation was caused by Ranger demoralization: it was just the lack of interest by the men. Made you feel you weren't capable if something was wrong. That was the general feeling too; they knew it was coming to an end [because] we had them [the Japanese] on the run. 7 1 Indeed, as the war progressed and it became clearer that the Allies would defeat Japan, entire Ranger companies disbanded. For example, as Figures 6.40-6.41 indicate, the Ranger companies at Englewood and Pinchi Lake were b o t h disbanded in June 1944. 68  Col. Taylor to Captain G.V. Osborn, 15 March 1944, D- Hist., file 169.009 (D91). Jim Kingsley, "Diary of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers... No. 32 Company. J.E. Kingsley Sr., O.C. Cptn. Nanoose, Red Gap, Parksville, Errington, Coombs, Hilliers, Little and Big Qualicum, and Qualicum Beach, all included. 1942-1946," British Columbia Provincial Archives, Add. MSS. 2516, 25. 70 Ibid. 71 Interview with Jim Kingsley, Parksville, B.C., 16 January 1989. 69  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  140  Monthly Strength Returns Number 89 Company(BurnabySouth)  Number of Men Souror DJHI»t, file 322.009(D99).  Figure 6.40: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 55 C o m p a n y (Englewood), October 1942 to August 1945. Much later in the war, on 7 February 1945, Captain E. Gallant recommended to Colonel Taylor that Number 128 Company (Deep Cove) b e disbanded (see Figure 6.42). Gallant spelled out his reasons for disbandment as follows: H.Q. and No. 1 detachment at Deep Cove now consists of three officers, 1 W . O . [Warrant Officer] 2, 5 N . C . O ' s and 6 Rangers. Included in this number axe three who, through age and defective eyesight, are unable to use weapons effectively. Three others axe employed in shipyards and work on Sundays. T h e y have been absent from most parades for months. 7 2 Furthermore, Lieutenant G. Mantle, the commander of Number 128 Company's Lake Buntzen detachment, reported that his unit was reduced t o "two Rangers and two 72  Captain E. Gallant to Col. Taylor, 7 February 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D93).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  141  Monthly Strength Returns Number 89 Company(BurnabySouth)  — — Number of Men SouTO*:D-Hbt. IM 322.009(D88).  Figure 6.41: Monthly Strength Returns for Number 136 Company (Pinchi Lake), October 1942 t o August 1945. N.C.O.'s."73  For many Rangers, by early 1945 the war was over and their usefulness  past. Throughout its existence the P . C . M . R . was an organization in turmoil. Late in 1943, orders t o cut back Ranger enlistments created a climate of uncertainty, and elicited protests f r o m b o t h Rangers and the general population. T h e threat of disbandment often prompted Ranger officers t o declare their zeal, and exaggerate the strategic importance of their unit's role in the defence of the province.  Morale and motivation varied with  place and time. While some were very dedicated to their Ranger duties and took them seriously, others were less committed to the corps. Strength return statistics show the decline in enrolment after late 1943 when the possibility of a Japanese invasion became unlikely. At any rate, the Rangers were maintained, and there is evidence t o suggest that ^Lieutenant G. Mantle to Capt. Gallant, 3 February 1945, D. Hist., file 169.009 (D93).  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  142  Monthly Strength Returns  Number 89 Company(BurnabySouth)  — ' — Number of Men Souroa: DJHht, fife 322.008(D99).  Figure 6.42: M o n t h l y Strength Returns for N u m b e r 128 C o m p a n y ( D e e p C o v e ) , O c t o b e r 1942 t o A u g u s t 1945. the military authorities valued their contribution t o the defence o f British Columbia. A t the same time, however, the Rangers were p r o b a b l y seen b y military and g o v ernment officials as a cheap means t o satisfy the public's d e m a n d for protection.  The  existence o f the P . C . M . R . could also b e justified as a means t o release m e n o f the " A c t i v e Militia" for overseas service. T h e heavy casualties inflicted u p o n the Canadian A r m y in the Italian campaign, put pressure o n the military authorities in C a n a d a t o recruit National Resources Mobilization A c t ( N R M A ) conscripts for overseas service. 7 4 T h e large h o m e defence f o r c e was d e e m e d unnecessary and, in A u g u s t 1943, Pacific C o m m a n d ' s 8th Division was disbanded while the 6th Division was reorganized into brigade groups. A c c o r d i n g t o M a j o r - G e n e r a l E . L . M . Burns, the N R M A m e n " w h o did not volunteer for general service would b e transferred t o other units in Canada t o release GS [general 74  See R.H. Roy, "Major-General G.R. Pearkes and the Conscription Crisis in British Columbia, 1944," B.C. Studies 28 (Winter 1975-76).  143  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  service] personnel as reinforcements." 7 5 A s the war progressed, and these reserve army units were r e d u c e d t o siphon off N R M A conscripts for general service, the authorities could still maintain that the coast was adequately p r o t e c t e d b y the Rangers. M o r e o v e r , the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, b y incorporating m o r e civilian volunteers into Canada's h o m e defence forces involved a higher p r o p o r t i o n of B . C . ' s population in the war effort. T h e war was brought m u c h closer t o h o m e for 10,000-15,000 m e n w h o were e q u i p p e d , armed, and trained in guerilla tactics. Rangers, as citizen-soldiers directly involved in the wax effort, were m u c h m o r e responsive t o the needs o f the regular army, and less critical of the government's war policies.  T h e existence of the Pacific Coast  Militia Rangers also served as an inducement for enlistment into the regular forces. M a n y y o u n g Rangers were indoctrinated with a military spirit and j o i n e d the regular forces as soon as they c a m e of age. For example, as Colonel Taylor reported: T h e r e have b e e n numerous reports f r o m e x - m e m b e r s of the P . C . M . R . w h o went o n t o serve in the A c t i v e A r m y , c o m m e n t i n g o n the value o f their practical training in the P . C . M . R . 7 6 Taylor further c o n t e n d e d that m a n y m e n w h o j o i n e d the Rangers, soon c a m e t o realize that in order t o protect Canada they "should p r o c e e d overseas with an expeditionary f o r c e with a view t o preventing an e n e m y f r o m landing in the h o m e c o u n t r y . " 7 7 Taylor was p r o b a b l y overly optimistic in his claim, but the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers, although at times h a m p e r e d b y controversy, proved t o b e a military asset as well as a useful disseminator of propaganda. For example, The Ranger training magazine also circulated within the community.  This magazine, t o some extent, would have familiarized the  general population with the government's war policies.  B u t the Rangers themselves,  "Major-General E.L.M. Burns, Manpower In The Canadian Army 1939-1945 (Toronto: Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1956), 135. 76 Col. Taylor to Colonel A. Duiguid, 4 April 1945, D. Hist., file 322.009 (D24). "Ibid.  Chapter 6. Decline of the Ranger Empire  144  as they went about their daily business within the community, were the most effective voices of propaganda the government could wish for. T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were visible proof that the government was doing something to counter the threat of a Japanese invasion, especially in geographically-isolated communities. It was important for the government of a nation at war t o appease public opinion, and the P . C . M . R . served the purpose of reassuring an apprehensive population.  Chapter 7  Conclusion  In October 1945 the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were officially disbanded, thus ending the history of an unusual yet important part of British Columbia's Second World War defences. T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were formed in a climate of wartime hysteria, and were the culmination of b o t h immediate and historic events. T h e historical fear of and dislike for the Japanese-based on race and economic rivalry-was given new life after the bombing of Peaxl Harbor.  Anti-Japanese sentiment was further justified by the  military situation in the early stages of the Pacific war. T h e swiftness and success of the Japanese weir machine, as it conquered colony after colony in the Pacific, presented a threat to British Columbia. T h e public perceived Japan as a threat because n o b o d y was certain who her next victim would be. Furthermore, the Japanese military encouraged fear on the West Coast through pin-prick attacks. For example, in June 1942, the Estevan Point lighthouse on Vancouver Island and Fort Stevens, Oregon, were shelled by Japanese submarines. These small scale attacks created an imminent sense of danger on the Pacific Coast of North America. Hysteria spread rapidly and people on the West Coast feared a Japanese invasion.  T h e public's anxiety was inflamed by rumours of Axis saboteurs  active in British Columbia, which only worsened the situation.  It was in this context  that a popular outcry demanded the formation of home guard units, and the evacuation of Japanese Canadians from the coastal areas o f . British Columbia.  Contrary to the  standard historical accounts which base hostility toward Japanese Canadians solely on racism, study of the P . C . M . R . reveals that it was also rooted in the fear of Japanese  145  Chapter 7. Conclusion  146  militarism. British. Columbians were in a state of panic concerning a Japanese invasion, and their suspicion of the Japanese was as much a result of this fear of being attacked, as it was a result of racism. In an effort to reassure the public and to bolster existing defences, a voluntary home defence organization, quite independent of the Veteran's Guard and the reserve army, was established in the form of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. While the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers were organized as a corps of the Canadian Army, they were not a traditional military unit. Their casual uniforms, sporting rifles, guerilla tactics, and lack of parade square discipline set them apart from other Canadian military formations. Of paramount importance, however, was the fact that Rangers were civilians of all ages and of varying degrees of stamina. As a civilian army of irregularscomposed of medically unfit men, those too young or too old for overseas service, and married men who were reluctant to go overseas-the Rangers were an unorthodox assemblage of soldiers. Ranger membership was dominated by British Columbia's Protestant Anglo-Saxon majority. The P.C.M.R., however, contained a mixture of rich and poor, young and old, and those with and without previous military experience. Many First World War veterans joined the Rangers, and their confidence in their own military expertise often led to conflicts with younger Rangers in command. The operation of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers posed problems unheard of in the regular army. From the outset, Pacific Command recognized the limitations and diverse character of the P.C.M.R., and made efforts to accommodate to its peculiar makeup and needs. The history of the P.C.M.R. also sheds light on British Columbia's wartime society. Study of the P.C.M.R. reveals several aspects of contemporary culture: the historical legacy of the Ranger tradition, fears and internal conflicts, wartime hysteria, racist attitudes, western alienation, and suspicion of the government's war policies. In the early  Chapter 7. Conclusion  147  1940s, British Columbia was still very much an untamed wilderness area. More importantly, a popular romantic image of British Columbia was that it was a province p o p ulated by pioneers, woodsmen, and men who could readily function in the wilderness. This image was partly true, but it emerged largely f r o m popular folklore and reached mythic proportions. Nevertheless, the preconception that British Columbia was a frontier region made it receptive to the North American Ranger tradition. T h e Ranger myth of the hardy frontier fighter, which began with Roger's Rangers in Colonial America, was perpetuated by the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. T h e P . C . M . R . evolved out of this Ranger tradition, and the belief that irregular guerilla warfare was more effective in the wooded terrain of frontier regions. Conflicts within the P . C . M . R . reflected the nature of Canadian culture. T h e rivalry between the P . C . M . R . and the A . R . P . , which centered around the competition for recruits, indicates that there was an intense desire among civilians to serve in the war effort. T h e friction between First World War veterans and younger Rangers reveals that veterans saw themselves as those most capable to lead this organization. T h e vociferous patriotism of First World War veterans was rarely matched by other groups in society. If their sons had t o go overseas to defeat the enemy, just as the veterans themselves had done years before, then they were now anxious t o " d o their bit" for home defence. Finally, apprehension of trade unionists about the possibility of the P . C . M . R . being employed as strikebreakers, reveals the influence of working-class values in British Columbia during the 1940s. Rangers were ready t o fight the Japanese, but they refused to b e used against their fellow-workers. British Columbians have always felt geographically isolated from the rest of Canada. T h e idea that Ottawa was "a million miles away," and that the federal government neglected the needs of the Pacific province, was given new life during the Second World War.  T h e clamour for the formation of the P . C . M . R . can b e partly attributed to the  Chapter 7. Conclusion  148  belief, among British Columbians, that their province was neglected by the government in Ottawa. There was a widespread perception on the West Coast that the government's defence preparations for Canada ended on the east side of the R o c k y Mountains.  The  public's discontent over inadequate coastal defences was often directed at the distant federal capital city of Ottawa. In an attempt to compensate for the government's perceived indifference, British Columbians took steps to provide their own local defence. Western alienation and anti-Ottawa sentiments were commonly expressed in appeals to establish and, later, t o maintain the Rangers. Anti-Oriental prejudice has been an important theme in British Columbian history, and it was also evident in the operation of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. In their role as defenders of British Columbia, Rangers were guided by both the immediate fear of Japanese militarism and long standing racial animosity toward Asians. T h e Chinese, ~ however, were no longer the focus of racial prejudice during the war.  China was an  ally in the war with Japan, and for this reason Chinese Canadians were accepted in the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers. Japanese Canadians had posed a greater economic threat t o white British Columbians than the Chinese, and the Japanese military threat made Japanese Canadians the focus of anti-Oriental prejudice. To b e sure, the Rangers' chief concern was the defence of British Columbia, but their concern was also linked with the traditional fear of the "yellow peril." Racist attitudes, however, were not entirely reserved for the Japanese. In the case of Native Indians, a type of positive racism made them a preferred group for Ranger enlistment. T h e stereotype of the North American Indian as a skilled irregular fighter was prevalent in British Columbia during the Second World War. Although Native Indians were often desired Ranger recruits, they were frequently treated in a paternalistic and condescending manner by white Ranger officers. Despite the initial enthusiasm for enlistment, as the wax progressed and the danger of a Japanese invasion became remote, the appeal of the P . C . M . R . waned. After mid-1943  Chapter 7. Conclusion  149  most Rangers realized that a Japanese attack was unlikely, and they knew that they would not b e called upon t o fight. T h e war, however, continued and the Rangers carried on with vigour, and sometimes listlessly, in fulfilling their duty of defending Canada's westernmost province. Study of the P . C . M . R . also reveals that it was created for obvious military reasons, but equally the corps was formed to satisfy public opinion. T h e initial moves to form the P . C . M . R . were taken locally, and the federal government acted primarily in response to public pressure. T h e Rangers served to reassure an apprehensive population concerned about the defence of British Columbia. Once organized, the P . C . M . R . also helped forward the government's war policies by acting as an instrument of propaganda, and b y providing a visible defence force for all to see even in isolated areas. T h e P . C . M . R . , then, placated a nervous population, acted as an indirect tool of propaganda for the government, gave its members a chance t o participate directly in the war effort, and provided added military protection for the province. These were all important concerns for the government, and they were all achieved at a very low cost. T h e most remarkable fact about the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers is that 10-15,000 civilians volunteered to defend British Columbia against the military might of Japan. How the Rangers would have fared in battle is not the issue here, although they certainly would have played a useful role in hindering a Japanese invasion by acting as scouts for the regular army, and by engaging in guerilla warfare. Most members of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers believed that they were playing an important role, and seriously planned and trained for a possible Japanese assault. Equally important is the fact that Rangers were willing t o fight for Canada, and of this there is no doubt. T h e Rangers were, for the most part, patriots and would have fought, as partisans the world over have fought, for the defence of their homeland.  -  Bibliography  A. Primary  Manuscript Sources  Charlton, Gerald. Number 90 C o m p a n y (Burnaby North) P C M R Papers. In possession of Doug Charlton, North Vancouver, B . C . Directorate of History, National Defence Headquarters, Ottawa, Ontario. File numbers: 145.2P (Dl), 112.1 (D35), 112.21009 (D57), 322.009 ( D 7 ) , 322.009 (D24), 322.009 (D39), 322.009 (D99), 322.009 (D108), 169.009 (D77-95), 112.3S2009 (D232), 322.009 (D298), 322.009 (D391), 322.009 (D475), 322.009 (D592), 322.009 (D813), 159 ( D l ) , 193.009 (D17), 159.049 ( D l ) , 327.009 (D205), 112.3H1.009 (D312). Hope Museum Archives. Number 73 Company ( H o p e ) P C M R Papers. Penticton ( R . N . Atkinson) Museum and Archives. Number 71 Company (Penticton) P C M R Papers. File numbers: 4-4376, 4-2545, 4-477, 4-479, 4-481, 4-2499, 4-473, 4-476, 4-916. Provincial Archives of British Columbia.  Add.  MSS. 2113, Number 105 Company  (Masset) P C M R , application for enlistment forms; A d d . MSS. 2516, Diary of J.E. Kingsley, Commanding Officer of Number 32 Company (Parksville) P C M R , 19421946. Public Archives of Canada. Ian Mackenzie Papers. M G 27, III B5.  150  Bibliography  151  Published Sources  Canada. Dominion Bureau of Statistics. Eighth Census of Canada 1941, Volumes 1-3. Ottawa: King's Printer. Canada. House of Commons. Debates, Roberts, Kenneth.  Northwest  Passage.  20 January 1942 and 2 February 1942. Toronto:  Doubleday, Doran and Company,  1937.  Rogers, Robert. The Journals of Major Robert Rogers. Dublin: J. Potts, 1770. Simcoe, J.G. Simcoe's  Military  Journal.  Newspapers and Periodicals  B.C. Lumber Worker. Comox District Free Press. Cowichan Leader. Grand Forks Gazette Jap Blood Cult. Kamloops Sentinel. Penticton Herald. Prince Rupert Daily News.  New York: Bartlett and Welford, 1844.  Bibliography  152  The Ranger. Vancouver Province. Vancouver Sun. Vernon News. Victoria Daily Colonist. Oral Interviews  Aldridge, James Edward. Ranger in Number 83 Company (Squamish). Interview conducted at Squamish, B . C . , 20 January 1988. Anderson, Arthur A . Ranger in Number 89 Company (Burnaby South). Burnaby, B . C . , 4 November 1988. Battye, Clement.  Ranger in Number 71 Company (Penticton).  Penticton, B . C . , 29  December 1988. Blain, Jack.  Ranger in Number 89 Company (Burnaby South).  Burnaby, B . C . , 29  November 1988. Bunbury, David. Ranger in Number 73 Company (Hope). Chilliwack, B . C . , 9 January 1988. Cornett, Lloyd. Ranger in Number 89 Company (Burnaby South). Burnaby, B . C . , 29 November 1988.  Cousins, Walter A. Ranger in Number 118 Company (West Point Grey). Penticton, B.C., 29 December 1988.  Bibliography  153  Eraser, Joseph W .  Captain and commanding officer of Number 43 Company (Port  Alice). North Vancouver, B . C . , 12 December 1988. Gillmore, Jack.  Ranger in Number 2 Company (West Vancouver). North Vancouver,  B . C . , 25 November 1988. Kingsley, James Edward.  Captain and commanding officer of Number 32 Company  (Parksville). Parksville, B . C . , 16 January 1989. Macintosh, Ralph H. Captain and commanding officer of Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Coquitlam, B . C . , 18 November 1988. Matheson, William Donald.  Ranger in Number 86 Company (Britannia Beach). West  Vancouver, B . C . , 5 December 1988. Scott, Bert. Ranger in Number 73 Company (Hope). Hope, B . C . , 28 October 1986. Smith, A . Frank. Ranger in Number 84 Company (Ladner). Vancouver, B . C . , 8 November 1988. Smith, George.  Ranger in Number 83 Company (Squamish). North Vancouver, B . C . ,  12 December 1988. Tyrell, C.F. Ranger in Number 2 Company (West Vancouver). West Vancouver, B . C . , 5 December 1988. Walker, Wesley Gilbert.  Ranger in Number 89 Company (Burnaby South).  Surrey,  B . C . , 16 July 1990. Whittaker, David. February 1989.  Ranger in Number 8 Company ( Y o u b o u ) .  Vancouver, B . C . , 14  Bibliography  Wilson, Ronald S.  154  Ranger in Number 43 Company (Port Alice). Penticton, B . C . , 29  December 1988.  Personal Communications  Aldridge, James Edward.  Ranger in Number 83 Company (Squamish).  Letters to  author, 27 and 29 October 1988. Anderson, Arthur A .  Ranger in Number 89 Company (Burnaby South).  Letter t o  author, 24 October 1988. Anderson, C. Robert.  Ranger in Number 115 Company (Golden). Letters to author,  10 December 1988 and 2 February 1989. Bakken, Larry. Letter t o author, June 1988. Battye, Clement.  Ranger in Number 71 Company (Penticton).  Letter to author,  November 1988. Beatty, Fred. Ranger in Number 124 Company (Chase). Letter t o author, 19 August 1988. Beck, George. Ranger in Number 1 Company (Victoria). Letters to author, 8 November and 1 December 1988. Beddis, Robert. Ranger in Number 38 Company (Ganges). Letter to author, 8 January 1989 and phone conversation 10 February 1989.  Biggs, Henry. Ranger in Number 27 Company (Quinsam). Letter to author, 9 November 1988.  Bibliography  155  Boggs, Mr. and Mrs. T . R .  Ranger in Number 25 Company (Oyster B a y ) and wife.  Letter to author, 29 October 1988. Botterill, Clarence. M e m b e r of P C M R .  Phone conversation, 10 November 1988.  Bryant, Joe. Ranger in Number 118 Company (West Point Grey). Phone conversations, 27 November and 21 December 1988. Bull, Frank. Ranger in Number 4 Company (Brentwood). Letter t o author, 30 October 1988. Chahley, George. Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Letter to author, 5 February 1989. Claxk, James D.  Ranger in Number 31 Company (Nanaimo).  Letter to author, 28  October 1988. Coell, D . R . Son of H.R. Coell, Ranger in Number 85 Company (Kamloops). Letters t o author, 30 October and 28 November 1988. Comerford, James. Ranger in Number 1 Company (Victoria). Letter to author, 6 March 1989. Cosgrove, Gil.  Ranger in Number 7 Company (Camps 3 and 6 Y o u b o u ) .  Letter to  author, 11 November 1988. Curry, Walter H. Ranger in Number 8 Company ( Y o u b o u ) . Letter to author, 4 November 1988.  Dobson, W.K. Captain at the Sardis R.C.E. Training Centre. Letters to author, 28 November and 13 December 1988.  Bibliography  156  Ede, Arnold. Ranger in Number 114 Company (Cumshewa Inlet). Letter to author, 13 November 1988. Fredrickson, Sven. Ranger in Number 5 Company (Port Alberni). Letters to author, 24 October 1988 and 24 January 1989. Garrod, Mary. W i f e of Ranger in Number 127 Company (Port Washington). Letter to author, 14 November 1988. Gibson, Ken. Son of Captain T o m Gibson, commanding officer of Number 103 Company (Tofino). Letters t o author, 4 and 23 November 1988, and 25 January 1989. Glassford, Lloyd H.  Ranger in Number 32 Company (Parksville). Letter to author, 1  November 1988. Graham, George. Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Letter to author, 2 February 1989. Haws, James. Ranger in Number 2 Company (West Vancouver). Letter to author, 16 November 1988 and phone conversation 27 November 1988. Henniger, Ez.  Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Letter to author, 27  February 1989. Hurley, Harry. Ranger in Number 90 Company (Burnaby North). Letter to author, 3 November 1988. Kierstead, W . H .  Ranger in Number 21 Company (Fanny Bay).  Letter to author,  November 1988.  Lang, Doris V. Daughter of William Muir, Ranger in Number 29 Company (Sardis). Letter to author, 19 November 1988.  157  Bibliography  Langer, Fred. Ranger in Number 78 Company (Kimberley). Letter to author, 19 March 1990. Leach, George. Little, Doug.  Member of P C M R . Letter to author, November 1988. Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks).  Letter to author, 5  March 1989. Little, Gordon. Ranger in Number 70 Company (Terrace). Letter to author, 30 November 1988. MacDonald, W . D . Letters to author, 5 and 20 February 1989. McDougall, F . A .  Ranger in Number 121 Company (South Slocan). Letter to author,  17 March 1989. Mcintosh, James.  Ranger in Number 122 Company (Nootka).  Letter to author, 30  October 1988. McKenzie, Arthur K.  Ranger in Number 23 Company (Courtenay). Letter to author,  21 November 1988. McMillan, Donald S. Ranger in Number 32 Company (Parksville). Letter to author, 8 November 1988. Marrs, Eric and Mary.  Member of P C M R and wife. Letters to author, 7, 21, and 28  November 1988. Mitchell, Hector A . Ranger in Number 81 Company (Invermere). Letter to author, 3 November 1988.  Moore, William. Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Letter to author, 5 February 1989.  158  Bibliography  Morrison, Allan.  Ranger in Number 34 Company (Bralorne).  Letter to author, 9  December 1988. Mouat, Sue.  Daughter of E.J. Greig, Ranger in Number 23 Company (Courtenay).  Letter t o author, January 1989. Neave, Alice P. Letters to author, 24 October 1988 and 4 January 1989. North, Mary. W i f e of Winter Harbour Ranger. Letters to author, 20 November and 2 December 1988. Orser, Ray.  Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks).  Letter t o author, 5  February 1989. Phillips, Howard.  Ranger in Number 105 Company (Masset).  Letter to author, 19  March 1989. Purvis, David. Letter t o author, 15 November 1988 and phone conversation 24 November 1988. Richards, J.H. Ranger in Number 39 Company (Williams Lake). Letter to author, 16 August 1988. Ripka, W . M .  Ranger in Number 5 Company (Port Alberni).  Letter to author, 25  October 1988. Roy, Dr. R.H. Letter to author, 3 December 1987. Sawchuck, M a j o r J.F. Letter to author, 2 November 1988.  Simpson, Sam. Ranger in Number 105 Company (Masset). Letter to author, 18 December 1988.  Bibliography  159  Stewart, D o n W .  Ranger in Number 23 Company (Courtenay). Letter to author, 31  October 1988. Sutherland, Hugh. Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Letters to author, 3 December 1988, 5 and 15 February 1989, and 1 May 1989. Swanson, George. Ranger in Number 129 Company (Grand Forks). Letter to author, 5 February 1989. Sword, Donald G. Son of Gordon Sword, Co-Captain of Number 1 Company (Victoria). Letters t o author, 2 and 30 November, and 27 December 1988. Taylor, Frederick.  Ranger in Number 33 Company (Ocean Falls). Letter t o author, 3  November 1988. Tocher, Geordie. Ranger in Number 2 Company (West Vancouver). Letters to author, 11 and 19 January 1989. Trent, Fred. Ranger in Number 5 Company (Port Alberni). Letter to author, 6 January 1989. Walker, T . A .  Ranger in Number 74 Company (Bella Coola).  Letter to author, 31  October 1988. Watkins, Dick. Ranger in Number 91 Company (Burnaby East). Letter to author, 22 November 1988 and phone conversation 10 December 1988. Whitemore, Mrs. E.G.  Daughter of James Stokes, Ranger in Number 117 Company  (New Westminster). Letters to author, 15 December 1988 and 25 March 1989.  Whitney, John A. Ranger in Number 135 Company (Dawson, Yukon Territory). Letters to author, 5, 14, and 24 November 1988.  Bibliography  160  Williams, Parker. Ranger in Number 101 Company (Ladysmith). Letter to author, 12 November 1988. Wilson, Ronald S.  Ranger in Number 43 Company (Port Alice).  Letter to author,  Summer 1988. B . Secondary Published  Adachi, Ken. The Enemy Angus, Marion T .  That Never  Was. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976.  " T h e Rangers," National Home Monthly (July 1943).  Armstrong, John A . , ed. Soviet Partisans  in World  War II.  Madison: University of  Wisconsin Press, 1964. Barnett, Correlli. Britain Survey.  and Her Army  1509-1970:  A Military,  Political  and Social  London: Allen Lane, T h e Penguin Press, 1970.  Bateson, Charles. The War With Japan. Sydney: Ure Smith, 1968. Broadfoot, Barry. Six War Years 1939-1945.  Don Mills, Ontario: Paper Jacks, 1974.  Bull, Stewart H.  A Historic  The Queen's  York Rangers:  Regiment.  Erin, Ontario: T h e  Boston Mills Press, 1984. Burns, Major-General E.L.M. Manpower  In The Canadian Army,  1939-1945.  Toronto:  Clarke, Irwin and Company Limited, 1956. Cashin, Edward J.  The King's Ranger:  On The Southern 1989.  Frontier.  Thomas Brown And The American  Revolution  Athens, Georgia: T h e University of Georgia Press,  Bibliography  161  Cohen, Eliot A.  Citizens and Soldiers:  The Dilemmas  of Military Service.  Ithaca:  Cornell University Press, 1985.  Cohen, Stan. The Forgotten Northwestern  Canada.  Cruikshank, Ernest.  War: A Pictorial History of World War II In Alaska And Missoula, Montana: Pictorial Histories, 1981.  The Story of Butler's Rangers and the Settlement  of Niagara.  Welland, Ontario: Lundy's Lane Historical Society, 1893. Cuneo, John R .  Robert Rogers  of the Rangers.  New York: Oxford University Press,  1959. Dempsey, Hugh A .  " R o c k y Mountain Rangers."  Alberta  Historical  Review  5, no.  2  (Spring 1957): 3-8.  Dupuy, R. Ernest and Trevor N. The Encyclopedia of Military History from S500 B.C. to the Present.  New York: Harper and R o w , 1986.  Faust, Patricia L., ed. Historical Times Illustrated Encyclopedia of the Civil War. New York: Harper and R o w , 1986.  Ferguson, Ted. Desperate Siege: The Battle of Hong Kong. Toronto: Doubleday Canada Limited, 1980.  Gipson, Lawrence Henry. 1758-1760.  The Great War For The Empire:  The Victorious  Years,  New York: Alfred A . Knopf, 1949.  Goddard, Jane Bennett. Hans Waltimeyer.  Cobourg, Ontario: Haynes Printing Co.,  1980.  Gomez, Isabel. "Rogers' Rangers at St. Francis." Vermont History 27, no. 1 (January 1959): 313-318.  Bibliography  162  Granatstein, J.L.  " T h e Enemy Within." Saturday Night 101, no. 11 (November 1986):  461-469. Granatstein, J.L. and Johnson, Gregory A . " T h e Evacuation of the Japanese Canadians, 1942: A Realist Critique of the Received Version," in On Guard For Thee: Ethnicity,  and the Canadian  State,  1939-1945,  War,  edited by Norman Hillmer et al.  Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1988. Hamilton, Edward P.  The French and Indian Wars. New York: Doubleday, 1962.  Hannay, James. "History of the Queen's Rangers."  Transactions  of the Royal  Society  of Canada (1908): 123-186. Hubbard, Jake T . American  "Americans As Guerilla Fighters: Robert Rogers and His Rangers."  Heritage  Jackson, H . M . Rogers' Jones, Virgil C.  (August 1971): 81-86. Rangers:  Ranger Mosby.  A History,  n.p. 1953.  Chapel Hill: T h e University of North Carolina Press,  1944. Klancher, Donald J.  " T h e Arms of the Pacific Coast Militia Rangers."  Journal of Arms Collecting  Canadian  8, no. 4 (November 1970): 118-123.  Land, Aubrey C. "Commentary," in Eighteenth  Century Florida and the  Revolutionary  South, edited by Samuel Proctor. Gainesville: T h e University Presses of Florida, 1978. Levy, 'Yank.'  Guerrilla  Warfare.  New York: Penguin Books, Inc., 1942.  Lindsay, Oliver. The Lasting Honour: Hamilton, 1978.  The Fall of Hong Kong,  1941. London: Hamish  Bibliography  163  Longmate, Norman.  The Real Dad's  London:  Army.  Hutchinson Library Services,  1974. MacDonaid, A . G . Lumberman  "Men of the P C M R Reviving Frontier Tactics," British  Columbia  26, no. 11 (November 1942): 53-55.  McKernan, Michael.  All In!  Australia  During  the Second  World  War.  Melbourne:  Thomas Nelson Australia, 1983. Macksey, Kenneth.  The Partisans  of Europe  in the Second  World  War.  New York:  Stein and Day, 1975. Mahon, John K . "Anglo-American Methods of Indian Warfare, 1676-1794." Valley Historical Mathews, Hazel C. May, Robin. Wolfe's M o o g k , Peter.  Review 45 (June 1958-March 1959): 254-275. The Mark of Honour. Army.  Vancouver  Mainland Defences, Morris, Henry.  Mississippi  Reading: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 1974. Defended:  1859-1949.  Japanese  Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1965.  A History  of the Men  and Guns of the  Lower  Surrey, B . C . : Antonson Publishing Ltd., 1978.  Paper Balloon  Bombs:  The First ICBM.  North Hills: Bird  and Bull Press, 1982. Morton, Desmond. " A i d to the Civil Power: T h e Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867-1914."  Canadian Historical  Review 51, no. 4 (December 1970): 407-  425. Morton, Desmond. A Military History Mountfield, David. The Partisans.  of Canada. Edmonton: Hurtig, 1985.  London: Hamlyn, 1979.  Bibliography  154  Myatt, Frederick. The British Infantry  1660-1945:  The Evolution  of a Fighting  Force.  Poole, Dorset: Blandford Press, 1983. Norris, John. " T h e Vancouver Island Coal Miners, 1912-1914: A Study of an Organizational Strike." B.C. Studies 45 (Spring 1980): 56-72. Olson, Gary D.  "Thomas Brown, the East Florida Rangers, and the Defense of East  Florida," in Proctor op. cit., 15-28. Pargellis, Stanley M .  Lord Loudoun  in North America.  New Haven: Yale University  Press, 1933. Parkman, Francis. Montcalm  and Wolfe.  London: Collier-Macmillan, 1962.  Peck, Donald. " T h e G u m b o o t Navy." Raincoast Phillips, Howard. Echoes Phillips, Ivan. Society  of Conflict.  Chronicles  7: 12-19.  Privately Printed, n.d.  "Salute To T h e Pacific Coast Militia Rangers."  Okanagan  Historical  Report 39 and 40 (1975-1976): 147-150, 75-79.  Popp, Carol. The Gumboot Navy. Lantzville, B . C . : Oolichan Books, 1988. Ranlet, Phillip.  The New  York Loyalists.  Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press,  1986. Rodney, William. Kootenai  Brown his life and times 1839-1916.  Sidney, B.C.: Gray's  Publishing, 1969. Roy, R.H. For Most Conspicuous Press, 1977.  Bravery.  Vancouver: University of British Columbia  Bibliography  165  Roy, R.H. "Major-General G . R . Pearkes and the Conscription Crisis in British Columbia, 1944." B.C. Roy, R.H.  Studies 28 (Winter 1975-76): 53-72.  " T h e Canadian Military Tradition," in The Canadian  Military:  A  Profile,  edited by H.J. Massey. n.p.: C o p p Clark, 1972. Russell, Peter E. "Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760." The William and Mary Quarterly 35 ( O c t o b e r 1978): 629-652. Samora, Julian et. al. Gunpowder  Justice:  A Reassessment  of the Texas Rangers.  Notre  Dame: University of Notre D a m e Press, 1979. Schwantes, Carlos A . Radical Heritage. Scott, E.  Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1979.  "South Vancouver Island Rangers." RCMP  Stacey, C.P.  Arms,  Men and Governments,  Quarterly  The War Policies  17 (July 1951): 48-57. of Canada  1989-1945.  Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970. Stacey, C.P. Six Years of War:  The Army in Canada, Britain and the Pacific.  Ottawa:  Queen's Printer, 1955. Stanley, G . F . G .  Canada's  Soldiers:  The Military  History  of an Unmilitary  People.  Toronto: Macmillan, 1974. Stuaxt, E. Rae. "Jessup's Rangers As a Factor in Loyalist Settlement," in Three Theses,  History  n.p.: Ontario Department of Public Records and Archives, 1961.  Sunahara, Ann Gomer. The Politics of Racism. Toronto: James Lorimer and Company, 1981.  Bibliography  166  Swiggett, Howard.  War Out of Niagara:  Walter Butler and the Tory Rangers.  New  York: Columbia University Press, 1933.  Taylor, Nancy M.  The New Zealand People At War:  The Home Front.  Wellington,  New Zealand: V . R . Ward, Government Printer, 1986. Turner, E.S.  The Phoney  War on the Home Front. London: Michael Joseph, 1961.  Ward, W . Peter. " B . C . and the Japanese Evacuation." Canadian Historical  Review 57  (September 1976): 289-308.  Ward, W. Peter. White Canada Forever: Popular Attitudes And Public Policy Toward Orientals  In British  Columbia.  Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1978.  Webb, Walter P. The Texas Rangers: A Century of Frontier Defense.  Boston: Houghton  Mifflin Co., 1935.  Webber, Bert. Retaliation: Japanese Attacks and Allied Countermeasures on the Pacific Coast in World War II.  CorvaHis: Oregon State University Press, 1975.  Weigley, Russell F. History of the United States Army. New York: Macmillan, 1967. White, Wallace B.  "Trailing Rogers' Rangers Through T h e Firelands." Inland Seas 6  (1950): 18-25, 80-88.  Willett, T.C. A Heritage at Risk: The Canadian Militia as a Social Institution. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987.  Worthington, Larry. 'Worthy' A Biography of Major-General M.C. M.M. Toronto: Macmillan, 1961.  F.F. Worthington  C.B.  Bibliography  167  Unpublished  Silverman, Peter Guy. A History of the Militia and Defences of British Columbia 18711914. M . A . thesis, University of British Columbia, 1956.  Appendix A  List of Pacific Coast Militia R a n g e r C o m p a n i e s  Number 1 Company, Victoria No. 2 Coy., West  Vancouver  (Goldstream, Sooke, the Jordan River area). (Ambleside, Caulfield, Horseshoe Bay).  No. 3 Coy., Sidney (Sidney, North Saanich Peninsula, Patricia Bay). No. 4 Coy., Brentwood  (Brentwood, Tod Inlet).  No. 5 Coy., Port Alberni (Alberni, Great Central Lake, Franklin River). No. 6 Coy.,  Clo-oose.  No. 7 Coy., Camps 3 and 6, Youbou ( Y o u b o u and North Cowichan Lake). No. 8 Coy., Youbou ( Y o u b o u and West Cowichan Lake). No. 9 Coy., Rounds (Rounds, South Cowichan Lake). No. 10 Coy.,  Chemainus.  No. 11 Coy., Inactive. No. 12 Coy.,  Mayo.  No. 13 Coy., Hillcrest (Hillcrest, Masachie Lake). No. 14 Coy., Bamfield (Bamfield, Cable Station).  168  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies 6330  • No. 15 Coy., Duncan (Duncan, Sahtlam and Paldi). • No. 16 Coy., Crofton (Crofton and Westholme). • No. 17 Coy., Duncan (Duncan, Somenos, Quamichan). • No. 18 Coy., Cowichan  Lake (Cowichan Lake, Hillbank and Cherry Point).  • No. 19 Coy., Shawnigan Lake (Shawnigan Lake and Cobble Hill). • No. 20 Coy., Cowichan  Lake (Cowichan Lake and Chanlog).  • No. 21 Coy., Fanny Bay (Fanny Bay and Bowser). • No. 22 Coy.,  Cumberland.  • No. 23 Coy., Courtenay  (Courtenay and Merville).  • No. 24 Coy., Tsolum (Tsolum, Courtenay and Sandwick). • No. 25 Coy., Oyster Bay (Oyster Bay and Oyster River). • No. 26 Coy., Campbell River (Campbell River and Cape Mudge). • No. 27 Coy., Quinsam (Quinsam, Campbell Lake and Forbes Landing). • No. 28 Coy., Bloedel (Bloedel, Camp 1 and Camp 5, Timber Area). • No. 29 Coy., Sardis (Rosedale, Sardis, Vedder and Cheam). • No. 30 Coy., Inactive. • No. 31 Coy., Nanaimo • No. 32 Coy., Parksville  (Nanaimo, Yellow Point and Wellington). (Parksville, Qualicum, Hilliers and Coombs).  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies  170  • No. 33 Coy., Ocean Falls (Ocean Falls, Link Lake and Cousins Inlet). • No. 34 Coy., Bralorne • No. 35 Coy., Pioneer  (Bralorne, Shalalth, D ' A r c y ) . Mines (Goldbridge, Pioneer Mines).  • No. 36 Coy., Inactive. • No. 37 Coy., Lillooet (Lillooet, Pachelqua and Moha). • No. 38 Coy., Ganges (Ganges and Fulford). • No. 39 Coy., Williams Lake (Williams Lake, Likely, Alexis Creek and Forest Grove). • No. 40 Coy., Sechelt (Sechelt, Halfmoon Bay and Pender Harbour). • No. 41 Coy., Bowen  Island (Bowen Island and Cowan's Point).  • No. 42 Coy., Gibson's Landing (Gibson's Landing and Roberts Creek). • No. 43 Coy., Port Alice (Port Alice, Holberg, Quatsino, and Marble Creek). • No. 44 Coy., Inactive. • No. 45 Coy., Salmon Arm (Salmon A r m and Shuswap Lake). • No. 46 Coy., Peachland  (Peachland and West bank).  • No. 47 Coy., Lasqueti (Lasqueti Island, False Bay and Squitty Bay). • No. 48 Coy., Oliver (Oliver, Testalinda and Osoyoos). • No. 49 Coy., Kingsgate  (Kingsgate and Yahk).  • No. 50 Coy., Creston (Creston, Boswell, Crawford Bay and Gray Creek).  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies 6332  • No. 51 Coy., Armstrong • No. 52 Coy., Smithers  (Armstrong and Hullcar). (Smithers, Hazelton, Telkwa and Quick).  • No. 53 Coy., Castlegar (Castlegar and Robson). • No. 54 Coy., Alert Bay (Alert Bay and Malcolm Island). • No. 55 Coy.,  Englewood.  • No. 56 Coy., Port McNeill • No. 57 Coy., Englewood  (Port McNeill and Cluxeive River).  (Englewood, Beaver Cove and Nimpkish River).  • No. 58 Coy., Port McNeill  (Port McNeill, Suquash and O ' C o n n o r Lake).  • No. 59 Coy., Port Hardy (Port Hardy, Duval and Dillon Point). • No. 60 Coy., Whonnock  ( W h o n n o c k , Ruskin and Silverdale).  • No. 61 Coy., Haney (Haney, Pitt Meadows and Albion). • No. 62 Coy., Deroche  (Deroche, Nicomen and Errock Lake).  • No. 63 Coy., Langley (Langley Prairie). • No. 64 Coy., Clinton (Clinton, Bridge Lake, Gang Ranch and Jesmond). • No. 65 Coy., ZehaJllos (Zeballos, Ceepeecee). • No. 66 Coy., Dewdney  (Dewdney and Nicomen).  • No. 67 Coy., Vernon (Vernon, Coldstream, Lumby and Oyama). • No. 68 Coy., Lytton (Lytton, Styne and Botania).  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies  • No. 69 Coy., Butedale ( Butedale, Gragan, Kilcane Inlet). • No. 70 Coy., Terrace (Copper Creek, Lower Skeena and Usk). • No. 71 Coy., Penticton  (Penticton and Kaleden).  • No. 72 Coy., Trail (Fruitvale, Rossland, Tadanac and Casino). • No. 73 Coy., Hope (Hope, Laidlaw, Yale, North Bend and Boston Bar). • No. 74 Coy., Bella Coola (Bella Coola, Anahim Lake and Hagensborg). • No. 75 Coy., Bella Bella (Bella Bella, Namu, North Bentinck A r m ) . • No. 76 Coy., Inactive. • No. 77 Coy., Coquitlam (Coquitlam, Port M o o d y , Sunnyside and Maillardville). • No. 78 Coy., Kimberley • No. 79 Coy., Merritt  (Kimberley, Chapman C a m p ) .  (Merritt, Douglas Lake, Nicola and Quilchena).  • No. 80 Coy., Princeton  (Princeton, Hedley and Copper Mountain).  • No. 81 Coy., Invermere  (Invermere, Spillimacheen and Canal Flat).  • No. 82 Coy., Sicamous  (Sicamous and Malakwa).  • No. 83 Coy., Squamish (Squamish, Garibaldi and Pemberton). • No. 84 Coy., Ladner (Ladner, East Delta, Boundary Bay and Canoe Pass). • No. 85 Coy., Kamloops  (Barriere, Savona, Blackpool and Blue River).  • No. 86 Coy., Britannia  Beach (Britannia Beach and North East Howe Sound).  172  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies  • No. 87 Coy., West Summerland • No. 88 Coy., Abbotsford  173  (West Summerland and Trout Creek).  (Straiton, Matsqui, Brander and Sumas).  • No. 89 Coy., Burnaby  South (Burnaby Lake, Central Park and Royal Oak).  • No. 90 Coy., Burnaby  North (Capitol Hill and Barnet).  • No. 91 Coy., Burnaby  East (Lozells and Edmonds).  • No. 92 Coy., Inactive. • No. 93 Coy., White Rock ( W h i t e Rock, Cloverdale, Colebrook). • No. 94 Coy., Agassiz (Agassiz, Harrison Mills). • No. 95 Coy., Port Simpson (Port Simpson, Finlayson Island). • No. 96 Coy., Queen Charlotte  City (Queen Charlotte City, Tlell and Skidegate).  • No. 97 Coy., Quesnel (Quesnel, Kersley, Marguerite). • No. 98 Coy., Wells (Wells, Barkerville). • No. 99 Coy., Stave Falls (Stave Falls, Hatzic Prairie and Ferndale). • No. 100 Coy., Kelowna  (Okanagan, Rutland, Glenmore).  • No. 101 Coy., Ladysmith (Ladysmith, Blainy, Brenton). • No. 102 Coy., Ucluelet (Ucluelet, Port Albion, Stapleby and Wreck Bay). • No. 103 Coy., Tofino (Tofino, Long Beach, Clayuquot). • No. 104 Coy., McBride  (McBride, Dore Creek and Teare Mountain).  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies  174  • No. 105 Coy., Masset (Masset, Northern Graham Island). • No. 106 Coy., Hudson Hope (Hudson Hope, Moberly Lake and Gold Bar). • No. 107 Coy., Port Renfrew (Port Renfrew, Malahat and Hennigson). • No. 108 Coy.,  Cumshewa.  • No. 109 Coy., Cumshewa (Cumshewa Inlet, Louise Island, Skedans Bay). • No. 110 Coy., Kaslo (Kaslo, Lardeau, New Denver). • No. I l l Coy., Nakusp. • No. 112 Coy., Chamis Bay (Chamis Bay and K y u q u o t ) . • No. 113 Coy., Huxley Island, Q.C.L • No. 114 Coy., Cumshewa  (Huxley Island, Wernier Island).  Inlet (Cumshewa Inlet, Skidegate Lake).  • No. 115 Coy., Golden (Golden, Parson and Field). • No. 116 Coy., Enderby (Enderby and Hullcar). • No. 117 Coy., New Westminster • No. 118 Coy., West Point  (Queensboro, Brunette and Poplar Island).  Grey (West Point Grey, Vancouver South and Marpole).  • No. 119 Coy., Gambier fsland (Gambier Island, Port Mellon and East Bay). • No. 120 Coy., Ashcroft  (Ashcroft, Hat Creek and Spences Bridge).  • No. 121 Coy., South Slocan (South Slocan, Brilliant and Bonnington). • No. 122 Coy., Nootka (Nootka, Maquinna Point, Friendly Cove).  Appendix: A. List of Pacific Coast Militia Ranger Companies  • No. 123 Coy., Ahousat  175  (Ahousat and Refuge Cove).  • No. 124 Coy., Chase (Chase, Tappen, Sorrento and Pritchard). • No. 125 Coy., Richmond  (Richmond, Steveston, Brighouse).  • No. 126 Coy., Galiano Island (North and South Galiano Island and Mayne Island). • No. 127 Coy., Port  Washington  (Pender Island, Satuma Island and Hope Bay).  • No. 128 Coy., Deep Cove (Deep Cove and North A r m ) . • No. 129 Coy., Grand Forks (Grand Forks and R o c k Creek). • No. 130 Coy., Nass River (Nass River, Aiyanch, Kincolith and Canyon City). • No. 131 Coy., Prince  George (South Fort George, Sinclair Mills and D o m e Creek).  • No. 132 Coy., Rivers Inlet (Rivers Inlet, Goose Bay and Draney Inlet). • No. 133 Coy., James  Island.  • No. 134 Coy., Woodfibre (North West Howe Sound). • No. 135 Coy., Dawson, • No. 136 Coy., Pinchi  Yukon Territory  (Dawson, Bear Creek, Moosehide).  Lake.  • No. 137 Coy., Vanderhoof (Vanderhoof, Fort St. James and Fort Fraser). • No. 138 Coy., Juskatla, Q.C.I.  (Juskatla, H e l l and Skidegate).  

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