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Aristotle's modal ontology Dickson, Mark William 1989

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ARISTOTLE f S MODAL ONTOLOGY By MARK WILLIAM DICKSON B ,, A „ , T h e Un i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Co 1 u a b i a , 1 9 8 6 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FUL.FILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES C D e p a r t m e n t - o f Ph i l o s o p h y ) U e a c c e p i t h i s t h e s i s a s c o n f o r ro i n g t o t h e n o r m a l s t a n d a r d THE UNIVERSITY OF B R I T I S H COLUMBIA A p r i l 1 3 8 3 0 Ma r k W :i. 11 i am D i c k s o n ,, 1 9 8 3 In presenting this thesis in partial fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of British Columbia, I agree that the Library shall make it freely available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of this thesis for scholarly purposes may be granted by the head of my department or by his or her representatives. It is understood that copying or publication of this thesis for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. The University ui d u m m i v~uiumuia Vancouver, Canada Department DE-6 (2/88) i i H b s t r a c t liocia1 I o g 1 c i s c o n c e r n e d w i t h t h e l o g i c o f n e c e s s i t y . a n d p o s s i b i I i t y . T h e c e n t a l p r o b l e m o f m o d a l o n t o l o g y i s summed up in t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n , " W h a t a r e t h e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s o f t h e u s e r o f m o d a l t e r m i n o l o g y ? " T h i s t h e s i s i s p r i m a r i l y a b o u t t h e o n t o l o g i c a l c o m m i t m e n t s t h a t A r i s t o t l e made when h e e m p l o y e d m o d a l t e r m s , , Ar i s t o i l e r s m o d a l o n t o l o g y i s h e r e a n a l y s e d i n c on j unc: i i o n • wi t h f o u r m o d a l p r o b l e m s , , My p r i m a r y o b j e c t i v e , i s t o c l a r i f y s o m e o f t h e d i s c u s s i o n s o f A r i s t o t l e ' s m o d a l o n t o l o g y t h a t h a v e b e e n a d v a n c e d by c e r t a i n t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y p h i I o s o p h e r s » T h e f i r s t p r o b l e m t o b e c o n s i d e r e d i s t h e f a m o u s ' s e a b a t t l e f a r g u m e n t o f De I n t e r p r e t a t i o n e 9 . H e r e i s a s u m m a r y o f t h e p r o b l e m " I f i t i s c u r r e n t l y t r u e t h - a t t h e r e w i l l b e a s e a b a 1 1 1 e w t o m o r r ow, t h e n i n s o m e s e n s e i t i s i n e v i t a b l e t h a t t h e r e w i l l i n f a c t b e a s e a b a t t l e ; i f p r e d i c t i o n s a r e t r u e , i s n o t a f o r m o f d e t e r m i n i s m b e i n g s u p p o r t e d ? One a n a l y s i s i n i s s t u d i e d a t l e n g t h . , n a m e l y t h a t o f J ' a a k k o H i n t i k k a . H i n t i k k a h o l d s t h a t t h e s e a b a t t l e a r g u m e n t i s b e s t i n t e r p f e t e d i f t h e m e t a p h y s i c a 1 p r i n c i p 1 e o f ' p i e n i t u d e i s a t t r i b u t e d t o A r i s t o t l e , T h e p r i n c i p l e o f p l e n i t u d e e f f e c t i v e l y m e r g e s m o d a l i t y w i t h t e m p o r a l i t y ; w h a t i s t h e c a s e i s a l w a y s t r u e , a n d v i c e v e r s a . x :l i Hintikka also interprets Aristotle's stand on the 4 M a s t e r A r g u rn e n t? o f D i o d o r u s i n 1 i g h t o f t h e attribution of the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. D i o d or us' a r g u rn e n t i s the s e c o n d o f t h e f o u r problems that this essay considers,. Unlike Aristotle, Diodorus appears to have favored a strong version of determinism. According to Hintikka, Diodorus actually strove to prove the principle of plenitude (as opposed to assuming it, as Aristotle presumably did). I am very sceptical regarding Hintikka's interpretations of these two problems. The sea battle argument is not adequately answered by the solution which Hintikka sees Aristotle adopting. Alternative answers are relatively easy to come by. I he evidence cited by Hintikka for ascribing the principle of plenitude is, it is shown, somewhat inconclusive. As for the Master Argument, there is a great deal of paucity in regards to textual evidence. Hinikka himself virtually concedes this point. (Thus, whereas I feel it to be incumbent to offer an alternative interpretation of the sea battle argument, 1 do not share this attitude towards the Master Argument.) The third and fourth problems plav a key role in twentieth century analytic philosophy. Both were first-formulated by W.V. Quine in the forties. These problems are somewhat subtle and will not be explained further. Suffice it to say that an analysis of Aristotle's works by Alan Code reveals that the Stagirite had an answer to Quine's criticisms of modal logic,, Abstract. Chapter One-Four Modal Problems in Aristotle P art I :; H x n t i k k a o n A r i s t o 11 e J s Modal Ontology Chapter Two Hintikka Versus Lovejoy on the P r i n c i p I e o f P1 e n i t u d e Chapter Three Hintikka's Account of De Int„ 9 Chapter Four Hintikka on Aristotle's Account of Meg a r i a n De te r mi n i sm Chapter Five Sorab j i on Hint i kka on Ar isto11e Part 11 Ar is tot lef s Modal Ontology and t P h i 1 o s o p h y o f I.. a n g u age *pt. ' l a t-efnen i- c t- n e P r o u J. e in s .j an a :>3.ut ion Code on Spat- iot-eropor a 1 Pusizie i n A r i s t o t I e B i b l iograp!" Chapter One-Four Modal Problems in A r i s t o t l e A cursory reading of some of A r i s t o t l e ' s works r e v e a l s t h a t A r i s t o t l e thought of modal o p e r a t o r s in a way which was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t from the modern view o f such o p e r a t o r s » It- i s c 1 e a r t o m any t h a t A r i s t o 11 e b e l i e v e d modal an d tempor aI ope r a t o r s to be heav i1y i n t e r c o n n e c t e d . But the p r e c i s e r e l a t i o n between the two kinds of o p e r a t o r s i s opaque. The c h i e f aim of t h i s e s s a y i s to r e j e c t , and endorse v a r i o u s p r o p o s a l s of what t h e s e views amounted t o . T h i s w i l l be accompl ished by a n a l y z i n g the e f f e c t s of t h e s e p r o p o s a l s on f o u r problems . The a n a l y s i s given concerns two problems d a t i n g from A r i s t o t l e ' s t ime a s well as two problems which were formula ted by Quine*:l- More g e n e r a l l y , I am i n t e r e s t e d in the l e s s o n s to be l earned r e g a r d i n g A r i s t o t l e ' s modal onto logy from s tudying four d i f f e r e n t ( moda 1 ') ques t i on s . A e r i t i c a l eva 1 uat ion of J „ Hirit i kka ' s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of A r i s t o t l e ' s s tand on two arguments w i l l i n t r o d u c e the f i r s t s e t of problems,, Both arguments a r e concerned with determinism as wel l as m o d a l i t y . The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , t h e n , of A r i s t o t l e ' s s tand s a y s much about the metaphys ica l t h e s e s which A r i s totie was, at 1 east oc cas 1 ona 13.y , prepared to defend,, The first of the two arguments is the famous fSea Battlef one given by Aristotle in chapter 3 of his De Interpretations. Briefly, De Int. 3 argues that fatalism is vindicated if a certain logical principle is left unrestricted. Precisely what the logical principle is which Aristotle wishes to constrain is an open qu estion. H i n t ikk a a 11empts to i den t ify the p r i n c ip1e and its attendant restraint in Ti_me and Necessity. The second argument concerned with determinism is known as the fMaster Argument* of Diodorus. The Megarians supported the contentions of Diodorus who held that a f o r m o f determ i n i sm was tenable. Ari st o 11e, I ike man y modern philosophers, rejected any non-trivial version of de term in ism „:a Va r i ous r eadi n gs of how Ar i s to11e under stood determin i st i c pos i tions have been put f orward ,,3 There i s much more debate about what Aristotle thought the sea battle argument achieved than there is about his stand on the Master argument. There are several reasons for this unequal balance of attention. Foremost among these is that scholars have access to the original version of the argument in De Int. 3. The Master argument, on the other hand, exists only in secondary literature, A related point is that Aristotle seems to have considered the sea battle argument to involve more weighty phi1osophi ca1 pr obIems than th e ar gumen t of D i odor us„ 0n e o f the m o st appealing aspects of H i n t i k kaf s r eadin g is the extent to which he sees the two arguments as p r ovok :i. ng a c ons i s tent r esponse f r om Ar i sto 11 e „ Central to the interpretation of Hintikka (which is explained throughout I) is his insistence that Aristotle's view of modality is heavily influenced by the latter use of the principle of plenitude. This metaphysical thesis was perhaps best formulated by the Stagirite himself in Bk„ II of On Generation and Corruptions"...a thing is eternal if it is of necessity; and if it is eternal, it is by necessity." The p r i n c i pIe of pIeni tude, then, h o1ds that the d i s t i n c t i on made between temporality and modality is an illusory o n e . "!" h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g m e t a 1 i n g u i s t i c for m u 1 a t i o n w o u 1 d be that for any sentence p, p is necessarily true iff for any time t ,, p is true at t. The principle of plenitude is, by modern standards, a very bizarre way to a c c o u n t f o r m o d a i i t y „ T h e m o d e I t h e o r e t, i c a c c o u n t o f modality (possible worlds semantics) of Kripke and o t h e r s i s a t c o n s i d e r a b 3. e v a r i a n c e w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p 1 e » Though something is always true in the actual world in no way means, for the possible worlds theorist, that it is necessarily true (true in all worlds). If Aristotle - 4 -did adhere to the principle of plenitude, it would be reflected in his stand on modal' and deterministic issues. Different events are necessary and fated to c o m e t o p a s s f o r A r i s t o 11 e t h a n f o r t h e m o d e r n m o d a 1 J. og i c i an , I consider Kripkefs model theoretic account of 1963 t o b e b o t h e 1 e g a n t a n d m e t a p h y s i c a 11 y s a t i s f a c t o r y „13 I n a landmark paper, Kripke treated possible worlds as primitive points. Possible worlds had hitherto been treated as state descriptions, an approach which was popularized by Carnap, This new approach to modality brought, about many technical improvements. For example, the question of what the term 4 possible world' means no longer obstructs (or needs to obstruct) the student of modality. Strong criticisms, it is true, have been directed at the applications that Kripke has made of his account„e But Kripke?s approach is. by itself, very tenable. Like other treatments of modality, Kripke's makes room f or an onto1ogi ca1 di st inc t i on between temporal points (however construed) and possibles. Any violation of this result is metaphysically unsatisfactory for any adherent- of the model theoretic account of modality,, There are at least two pressing questions here. The first is whether or not Aristotle was committed to the principle of plenitude, In chapter V of Time and Necessity, Hintikka argues most persuasively that Aristotle was indeed a firm adherent,, The salient points of the debate (if it can be called one) between Hintikka and A„0„ Lovejoy will be surnmar ized in chapter one „ Love j oy he 1 d that Ar istotie exp 1 i c i. 11 y opposed the pr in c i p 1 e of p 1 en i tude ,, In general, I will side with Hintikka's claim that Lovejoy took advantage of vague sections of Aristotle's text to s u p p o r t h :i. s p o s i t i o n „ F u r t her rn ore, there are n u m e r o u s examples of unambiguous Aristotelean text which show the Stag i r i te to ha.ve f avored the principle. The second question which needs to be answered assumes that Ar istotle d id make (at least 1irnited) use o f the p r i n c i p 1 e o f p 1 e n i t u d e ., U h a t difference w o u 1 d the adherence to such a metaphysical thesis make? This question is raised in the second, third and fourth c h a p t e r s „ In p a r t i c u l a r 1 , what impact wouId the principle of plenitude have on Aristotle's position on ihe determin ist i c issues wi th wh i ch he was concerned? Does, to be more direct, the principle of plenitude aid in either the formulation of the problems involved or the solutions which Aristotle seems to offer? In this section I will rely in part on R„ Sorabji's commentary, Necessity, Cause and Blame, which offers a fine critique of Hiritikka's account., Sorabj i contends that though A r i s t o 11 e e in p i o y s t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f p 1 e n i t u d e , a n y interpretation whic!-i is based exc 1 us:i.ve 1 y on Aristotls's acceptance of the principle is inadequate/5" Much of what S o r a b j i has to say i s . I th ink . t o t a 1 1 y c o r r s e t . 1 have, however, criticisms of Hintikkafs interpretation w h -i c n a r e s e p a r a t e f r o m t h o s e o f S o r a b j i » For example, the evaluation in chapter two of Hintikka's explanation of the restricted principle of De Int.. 3 is, as far as I know, wholly new. Hintikka believes this principle to be a sophisticated amalgamation of the necessity operator and the law of exclude ci m :l. d d I e (L. E M) . It h a s t h e f o 11 o wing f o r m » C1> necessarily p V necessarily not-p. (In that (1) is a modal law of excluded middle, it is referred to in the text as the MLEM. > Sorabji does not explicitly state why (1) is a faulty reading of the principle being restricted by Aristotle. Hintikkafs case for the MLEM is, admittedly, most persuasive. Nevertheless, 1 am convinced that there are reasons, both p h i -1 o s o p h i c a 1 a n d p h i 1 o 1 o g i c a I , a g a i n s t i t. ® I do not put much emphasis upon the latter category. There are few phi 1o1ogicaI observations in this thesis; there is only one that originates with me,. The point in question concerns Aristotlefs formulations of the law of excluded middle. In brief, I have found that many of Aristotle's comments concerning the law of excluded m i >d d I e (and other t a u t o 1 o g i e s > e m p 1 o y t h e verb 'to b e 1 . This observation is significant because it does serious damage to H i n t i k ka' s c 1 a i m th at the Stag i r i te d i d not draw a conscious distinction between the law of excluded m i d d I e a n d t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f Id i v a 1 e n c e . Hintikka relies, far too heavily in my opinion, on t h i s c 1 a i m to d e m o n s t rate the fa I s i t y o f the 41 r a d i t i o n a I ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o ri ( see Glossary) o f Aristotle's sea battle argument. Like Sorabji , I b e I i e v e the t r a d i t i o n a I in t e r p retat i on, w h i c h , a m o n g o ther th i ngs ,, i s tha t the p r ob I em of f u tur e t r u th i s central to the sea battle argument, is the most-plausible account yet given.There are other, closely connected, criticisms of Hintikka's account of De Int, 3„ His difficulties stem in part from his view that the traditional interpretation is focussed solely upon the problem of future truth„ Another source of trouble is Hint-ikka's insistence that the problem of future truth is only concerned with the evaluation of the truth-value of sentences that are located in the present. These two mistakes, I argue, contribute in a big way to Hintikka's ascription to Aristotle of the MLEM as the logical principle being constrained. I do not intend to show in this essay that Hintikka's views on how to construe Aristotle's metaphysics of modality are totally without merit,, Indeed, there is much in Hintikka' s work on Ar isto11e with which I find myself in near total agreement,, For example, it seems correct that in De Int. 9, Aristotle is concerned about the truth--value of predictions which were made in the past. Yet the modal theses that Hintikka ascribes to Aristotle, and hence the assumptions Hintikka makes regarding the argument in De Int. 9, are. from my point of view, most odd. He prefers to rely on the principle of plenitude and holds that the problem of future truth was never a very serious difficulty for Aristotle. Hintikka's method for generating Aristotle's puzzle seems wrong to me on several grounds. Hintikka's treatment of Aristotle's post ion on the Master Argument, in contrast, is much more tenable,, M>^ own view regarding De Int. 9 is defended during, the second chapiter,, My defense of the traditional interpretation is new in only a few areas, and on the whole, it is consistent with other treatments„ The analysis that I prefer concludes by limiting the p r i n c i p I e of b i v a I e n c e ,, I rn a i n t a i n that A r i s t o 11 e was arguing for at restriction of what 1 call the modal principle of bivalence which is simply (MPEO it is -necessary that every sentence p is true or false. Since it is possible that the principle of bivalence is false, it- is clearly false that this principle constitutes a necessary truth. Aristotle, 1 hold, was arguing for the implausibi1ity of CMPEO on the basis that if the CliPB) were conjoined with predictions, whether they are made in the past or not, then de ter m i n i sm w i11 be suppor ted, Again, the second problem to be studied is concerned with Hirrtikka's views regarding Aristotle's critique of the Master Argument of Diodorus. Hintikka believes that his interpretston of Aristotle on the sea ba t tie i s en t i r ely con s i stent w i th his in te r pr e tat i on of Aristotle on the Master Argument. By the-same token, m a n y o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s t h a t c! e m o n s t r a t e t h e i mp 1 aus i b i 1 i ty of H i n t- i k kaf s f i r s t a c oun t do the same to his second. Independent problems also plague Hintikkafs interoretation of Aristotle on the Master Argument. As stated at the outset, four main prob1ems wi11 be studied. The last two, which are familiar to philosophers of language, were introduced by Quine in his paper "Reference and Modality". The first is the problem of the substitutivity of identicals (SI) and the second is the prob 1 em of existentia 1 general i;:ation (E6) „ "i"hese two prob 1 ems were used bv 0.uine as criticisms of modal logic, Alan Code, in his "Aristotle's Response to Guineas Objections to Modal Logic", 'shows that the problems of (SI) and (EG) can be aimed at accounts of temporal change as well. It is my contention that these two problems can be dealt with by the procedure which is outlined by Code, The solution favored by Code requires a certain degree of language engineering. Individual concepts, w h i c h f o r m p a r t o f F r e g e * s i n t e n s i o n a I o n t o 1 o g y , p 1 a y a n important role in the solution. Individual concepts are fundi o n s f r o m ( u s u ally, b u t. n o t always) t h e d o m a i n o f possible worlds to the domain of objects which c ons ti tu te ea c h wo rid. Briefly, Code h o1ds tha t th e problems of (SI) and (EG) can be dealt with if the r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s o f p o s s .i b I e w o r 1 d s a r e r e p lac e d b y o n e s of times. I agree with Code's solution, but in a th or oughIy quaIi f i ed way. I agree with the view that the problems of (SI) and (EG) can be solved with Code's answer. The modified -11 -individual concepts which Code invokes are both strong and elegant. But I take exception with Code's subsequent-attempt to attribute this solution to Aristotle. Code's arguments for attributing the solution to Aristotle rely too much on the thesis that modal operators are interchangeable with their temporal counterparts. This thesis is the pr inc iple of p1eni tude. Whereas chapters two and three are more concerned with undermining the coritributive role played by this principle, chapter four shows a more specific fault with the principle, namely, that it simply was not an unrestricted metaphysical thesis f r om A r i s to 11e's po i n t of view.9 Following the criticism of Hintikka's interpretion, i t might be thought that the pr inc ip1e of p1en itude is s u p e r f 1 u o li s w h e n t a c k 1 i n g a n y o f t h e p r o b 1 e m s w h i c h Aristotle may have been faced with. I doubt the accuracy of this view, for the solution endorsed by Code of the problems of C S I j and ( E G ) is suggested by the view that the principle is a viable one. However, if 'my criticisms in chapter eight are correct, the solution would not have been available to Aristotle. An interesting byproduct of this thesis is the discovery that Aristotle was interested in some of the problems which are the predominant concerns of modern - 1 2 -philosophy. Examples include his concern about scope ambiguities (see the Appendix for my analysis) and his 0 w n f o r m u 1 a t i o n o f t h e ( SI) p r o b I e m . R u s s e 11 i s p e r h -a p s the best-known philosopher of our time to dismiss, rather hastily, Aristotle's achievements. Some comment on the programme of this essay is required. My principal intention here is test various hypotheses of which metaphysical tools were available to Aristotle., Such a mandate need not confine one to a study of Aristotle's text; more recent problems can and should be discussed. Furthermore, I am less interested 1 n th e doct. r i nes wh i c h A r i s to 11 e def i n i te 1 y advan c ed than in showing what alternatives were open to him in r espon d i ng to a h os t of pr ob 1 ems „ The historical side of this essay lies in the attribution to Aristotle of the peculiar thesis of the p r i n c i p I e o f p 1 e n :i. t u d e „ B u t t h i s i s m o r e a p o i n t o f departure than an all-consuming interest,. After establishing that Aristotle did treat modal and temporal operators as (merely) partia 11y interchangeab1e, the question to be answered is how the principle bears on both the sea battle argument and Aristotle's analysis of the argument of Diodorus. Hintikka's treatment of these problems stresses the importance of the principle while --13™ both Sorabji and I doubt its relevance. One of the more interesting results of this essay is that interpretations based on the principle are both unnecessary and false,, However, the principle of plenitude does serve a illuminating (and thus useful) r o I e w h e n t h e p r o b I e m s i n 11 a r e b e i n g t r e a t e d „;L ° 14 Hintikka on Ar Modal Ontologv 15 Chapter Two "-Hintikka versus Love joy on the Principle of Plenitude This essaiy began with the observation that Aristotle's use of modal operators was at considerable v a r i a n c e w i t h t h a t o f m o d e r n p h i 1 o s o p h e r s „ T h e i ri'i p o r t a n c e o f c o r r e c 11 y i n t e r p r e t i n g A r i s t o tie' s metaphysical theses of moda1ity lies in their impact on v a r i o u s p r o b I e m s „ .J a a k k o Hi n t i k k a c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e m o s t important of these theses is, to repeat, the principle of p1en i tude. In thi s sect i on, the a r gumen ts f o r an d against Aristotle's endorsement of this thesis will be reviewed,. It will be concluded, that Aristotle was indeed an advocate of the principle of plenitude, (There are, however, legitimate doubts as to the extent, and hence the importance, of this advocacy,,) Following this will b e a n e v a I u a t i o n o f 1-li. n t i k k -a ' s I e s s m o d e s t c 1 a i m t h a t the sea-battle argument and Aristotle's position on the Master argument can best be understood by first assuming Ar istot .1 e ' s suppor t of the princip 1 e „ Hintikka's tentative formulation of the principle is as follows" (2) each possibility is realized at some moment of t i me , It may not be entirely clear why (2) is u n a c c e p t a b l e a t • 1 6 -least one modern philosopher entertains a thesis reminiscent of <2), x x Aristotle showed, in De Int» 3, why it would be inaccurate to attribute (2) to him. (2) precludes possibilities which are never actualized and Aristotle definitely believed in these., "...it is possible for this cloak to be cut up, and yet it will not be cut up, but will wear out first."112 Because of Aristotle's belief in unactualized possibilities, Hin t i kka improves the formu1at ion of the pr inciple of p I en i tucle ; (2 J) Mo possbility remains unrealized throughout an infinity of time. Hintikka then gives three variants of (2');: (VI) that which never is, is impossiId 1 e , an d (V2) what always is, is by necessity. and ( V 3) n o t h i n g e t e r n a 1 i s c o n t i n g e n t. The variants, I take it, have the same truth value as (2 f) . But we are proceeding too quickly. What evidence exists f or a 11 r i but i ng (2) and 1a ter the improved version (2'), to Aristotle? The question is a subject of lively debate. There is both confirming and damaging evidence. Let us begin with t h e I a 11 e r . A r t h u r L o v e j o y m a i n t -a i n e d t h a t A r i s t o t .1 e •I '7-explicitly rejected the principle. Lovejoy supports this claim with two passages, which are both located in the Metaphysics. The first is in Bk. Ill (at 1003a2), the second in Bk„ XII (at 1071bl8-20>„ In The Great Chain of Being, the translations Lovejoy uses for these passsages are, respectively, •'•'.„„ i t is not necessary t hat everything t h at i s poss i b1e shou1d e x i st i n actuality" and "...it is possible for that which has potency not to realize it". 1 3 On the basis of these two q u o tat i on s, Love j oy c on c1udes th a t A ri s to 11e openIy r e noun c ed th e pr i n c i pIe of pien i tude « Hintikka exposes the ambiguity of these passages and accuses Lovejoy of exploiting that ambiguity. Four differen t c on s t r uaIs are poss i bIe : I. Some potentialities may sometimes fail to be. ac tuaIi zed. II. Each potentiality may sometimes fail to be actualized. III. Some potentialities may always fail to be ac: tual ized . IV. Each potentiality may always fail to be •ac tual ized . Lovejoy fails to consider the first pair of interpretations, which is consistent with HintikkaJs (.2*') . The second pair contradicts (2f). Hintikka argues that the first pair is more plausible and thus that Lovejoy's conclusion that Aristotle renounced the p r i n c i pIe of pIen i tude is i n c o r r ect. 1 A Hintikkafs comments on the passage from the second book of the Metaphysics are very terse. He maintains that even if here were a. way of extracting Aristotle's meaning from the text, "it would still not settle the question, for Aristotle is in this passage formulating a problem rather than giving his own considered opinion,,115 Later Hintikka indicates that the problem to which he is ref er r ing is " whether the e 1 emen ts ex ist. poten t i a 11y or in some other way." The passage relied on by Lovejoy c o m e s i n a s e i t h e r a n i. m p I i c a t i o n o r a c a v e a t. t o t h e hypothesis that the elements exist in some other way. If (as Hintikka appears to hold) the passage is an i m p I i c a t i o n „ t h e n i t i s i nde ed p a rt of t h e f o r m u I a t i o n of a problem and Hintikka would be correct in holding that, we cannot be sure of an answer. On the other hand, i f (. a s L o v e j o y h o 1 d s ) t h e p a s s a g e i s a d e c 1 a r a t i o n o n Aristotle's part, we still could not be certain about settling the question.161 For even if the passage in question is a declaration of Aristotle's views, it would be unclear which of l.-lV, was beins endorsed Nor does the s e c o nd passage , by yield results - 1 9 -G which settle the dispute with Love joy,, More illuminating is the sentence which occurs a little later (at 107lb18-20 of Bk .XII of the Metaphysics: Further, even if it [a Form'] acts, this will not be enough , if i ts substance is potentia 1 i ty ; f or there will not be eternal movement, for that which is po ten t i a 11 y may poss i b I y no t be . :t ^  Hint ikka i s cor r e c t in mainta in ing t h a t the pr inc i p I e Aristotle is invoking in the passaige-at 1071bl8-20 is identical to the the one previously mentioned at • 107lb 13-14 . This being the case, we can exclude both III. and IV . a s p o s s i b 1 e re a d i n g s o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f i_ o v e j o y „ A s Hintikka points out, the principle in question permits A r i s t o 11 e t o c o n c 1 u d e t h a t a F o r m F w h i c h o n I y potentially exists does not entail eternal movement because F may be uri actual ized at some times, actualized at others. The crucial point here is that there is no discussion here of a potentiality which always remains u rt a c t u a I i z e d . T h u s t h e c o n c '1 u s i o n t h a t b o t h p -a s s a g e s from Bk „ XII of the Metaphysics fail to vindicate interpretations III. and IV. given above. So L.ove j ov ' s view that Ar isto11e repudiated the pr inc ip 1 e o f p 1 e n i t u d e i s g r o u n d 1 e s s „ This leaves us a choice between interpretations I. and II. Hintikka holds that I. is "clearly too weak to support Aristotle's argument Ein Bk„ XII of the Metaphysics-1 i a The conditional which expresses Aristotle's point is that ('.Al> if F only potentially exists, then F might not exist. Assume CAD» Now, if only some potentialities are unactualized, and thus do not exist, at some times CI.), t h e n i t i s p o s s i b I e t h a t t h e F' s a r e n o t i n c I u d e d a m o n g the potentialities. So the antecedent of CA1) is false. (It is not being said that a conjunction of CA1) and interpretation I. show that C A D is false. That would, of c our se , c ons t i tu te c omm i 11 i ng the f a 11 ac y of den y i n g the antecedent.) But Aristotle maintained that this antecedent was true. It follows, then, that interpretation II. is a better reading than I. of the pr inc ip1e of pien i t u d e . Hintikka uses the passage from the Metaphysics to further argue in favor of an even stronger version of II;; Even if it is true of each merely potential being that it may'fail to exist at some moment of time, it may still happen to exist all through an eternity. Or, rather „ it ay so' exist unless it is assumed that its possibility of not existing is -at some time actualized,,13 [Hintikka's italics! That- is, Ar i sto11 e wou 1 d be 1 oathe to say that when a For m on I y po ten t i a 11 y ex :i. s ts , i t never the I ess does ex is t throughout, an infinity of time. To prevent this result, 2 1 Ar isto11 e needed the f o 11 ow i rig assumpt ion CA2) Every mere possibility is, at some time, not actualized,, <A2> is a stronger version of II.'-'£° Hintikka concludes that the attribution to Aristotle of (. A2 > definitely shows Lovejoy to be wrong, A proper reading of the Metaphysics shows that Aristotle supported, rather than claimed to be false, the principle of plenitude. Hintikka offers a very thorough treatment of the positive and negative evidence for Aristotle's adherence to the pr i n c i pIe of p1en itude . Accordingly, Hi n t i k ka considers pieces of apparent counter evidence other than that offered by Lovejoy. One such piece of evidence comes from Bk. I of the Posterior Analytics: For what is accidental is not necessary, so you do not necessarily know why the conclusion hoIds-not even if it should always be the case but not in i t s e 1 f (. e . g . d e d u c t i o ri s t h r o u g h s i g n is') . F o r y o u will not understand in itself something that holds i n i t s e I f ; n o r will y o u u n ci erst a n d why it h o 1 d s „ 1 Hintikka entertains the notion that this passage c o n t r a ci i c t s £ V1) w h i c h is t r u t h - f u n c t i o n all y e q u i v a I e m t t o H i n t i k k a' s p r e f e r r e d f o r m u 1 a t i o n o f t h e p r i n c i p I e o f pien i tude . But th i s c on c 1 us i on i s n ot- a we 11 -f ounded one. "The only thing we cam definitely extract from the passage is that even an attribute that always belongs to a subject is not necessarily known to do so,,.." 2 2 If Aristotle made the natural distinction between epistemological and metaphysical necessity, we cannot interpret, the passage from the Posterior Analytics as a denial of <:V:L}„ I stated above that, for Hintikka, C2f) is better than (2) because the former is left untouched by cases of unactualized potentialities. But Hintikka goes further than arguing that <2') is forced on us by such cases; he denies that they demonstrate that Aristotle was not an adherent of the "principal forms' of the principle of pien i tucje „323 H i n t :i. k ka believes th a t some commentators ser iously overestimate the signif icance of instances of unac tual ized potentialities,, Hintikka's explanation of the passage from Int. 3 (see n . f o c u s s e s o n t h e f a c t t h a t- t h e c 1 o a k d o e s n o t e t e r n a 11 y exist; ", . .for when the cloak wears out, it goes out of existence, and no possibility can any longer be attributed to it,,"-*"- Effectively, then, the principle of p 1 e n i t u >d e w ill n o t a p p I y t- o m a n y c a s e s w h e r e t h e r e i s a prima facie reason to invoke modality,. This matter will be discussed at more length in chapter three. Several of the pieces of apparent negative evidence are like the passage from De Int. 9 given above „ That is, these other pieces of evidence also supposedly show that Aristotle was committed to unactualized potentialities,, For example, Bk * III of the Physics contains a passage which might be read as such a commi ttrnent;; "Some th ings are in f u 1 f i 11 ment only, o t h e r s i n p o t e n t i a 1 i t y a n d i n f u 1 f i 11 m e n t - o n e b e i n g a * this* , another so much....and. similarly for the other categories of being It is by no means clear that this implies for Aristotle that a 'genuine' potentiality will not be actualized at some time or other. Another example occurs in Bk. XI of the Metaphysics: "Some things exist only actually,, some P o te nt i a11y, some po tent i a11y an d a c tually-some as b e i ngs, some as quan t i t i es, o th e rs i n th e o th e r categories,"265 This passage seems to be very strong e v i d e n c e i n f a v o r o f p o t e n t i a 1 i t i e s w h i. c h f o r e v e r r e m a i n unactualized„ If such potentialities do not exist, how cam we explain the difference between things which exist potentially and those which exist both potentially and actually? But Aristotle's distinction here might be one of how many times a potentiality is actualized; things which exist potentially may only be actualized once, while things which exist both potentially and actually m a. y s i m p I y b e p o t e n t i a I i t i e s w h i c h a r e a c t u a 1 i z e d m o r e than once. This interpretation is as plausible as the one which ascribes permanently unactualized p o t e n t i a 1 i t i e s t. o A r i s t o 11 e . 11 f o 11 o w s t h a t t h e pas s a g e 24 just given from the Metaphysics cannot be admitted as definite evidence that Aristotle believed in potentialities which are never actualized. Hintikka's argument that Aristotle was committed to the principle of plenitude is not composed merely of attacks on negative pieces of evidence. Hintikka concedes that many of the pieces of positive evidence which he adduces are not -as st rong as others But much of it, seems most convincing. For example, Bk . II of On Generation and Corruption, contains the following; For what is of necessity coincides with what, is always, since that which must be cannot not be. Hence a thing is eternal if it is of necessity; and if it is eternal it is of necessity. And if, therefore, the coming--to-be of a thing is necessary, its coming-to-be is eternal, (See n •d. In my opinion, this is the most compelling pass.age in favor of attributing the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. The other pieces of positive evidence m e n t i o n e d b y H i ri t i k k a. a r e f a r I e s s c o n c 1 u s i v e „ T h e y d o , h o w e v e r , s u g g e s t t h a t A r i s t o 11 e t h o u g h t o f m o d a I i t y a s being intrinsically linked with temporality; this in turn implies for Hintikka that Aristotle .adhered to the pr i n c: i p I e of p 1 en i tude „ A clear instance of this latter category of positive evidence occurs in Bk. IX of the Metaphysics: "...no eternal thing exists potentially," This passa.se, Hintikka notes, announces the presence of (V3) (Hintikka would not, I think, invoke this passage as d e f i n i t e p r o o f for (2s)-although it i s good evidence f o r the more modest (2). If (V3) semantically entails (2?>, then the text from the Metaphysics just cited is not definite proof for CVS).) Hintikka gives am interpretation of Bk. IX of the Metaphysics which is very disputed. In that I lack the required scholarly training, I will only present the facts and leave it up to others to adjudicate. The debate concerns the following citation: If what we have described is identical to the potential or convertible with it, evidently it cannot be true to say « it- is possible but wa 11 not be . wh i c h won 1 d i mp I y that th i ngs . i n c apab I e of b e i n g w o u I d v a n i s h . One might suppose that this passage- is very strong evidence for the thesis that Aristotle was opposed to the view that possibilities could forever be una.c tual ized » But there is an alternate reading, one which has been endorsed both by Q„ E„ L. Owen and Martha Kneale. After 'it cannot be true to say*, they translate "that this is possible but will not happen anc to say this to such effect that the existence of the impossible will escape us in this way." 3 0 This second translation interprets Aristotle as contending that th ere w i 11 be cases of un a c tua 1 i zed po ten ta 1 i t i es •• as long as this does not entail vitiation of (the concept . 2 6 -of ) the i rnposs i'b 1 e . 3 1 The weakest p:i.ece of evidence which is adduced by Hintikka is also from Bk . IX the Metaphysics:: A g a i n , i f t h a t w h i c h i s d e p r i v e d o f p o t e n t i a I i t y is incapable, that which is not happening will be incapable of not happening; but he who says of thait wh i ch is incapable of happen ing that it is or wi11 be will say what is untrue; for this is what i n c a pa c i ty mean t»312 It strikes me that a supporter of almost, any modal t h e o r y w o u 1 d b e c o n t e n t w i t h t h i s p a s s a g e » I d o n o t think there is any reason to suppose that the passage is def ending the tru th of e i th er (2) o r (2s)„ Th us it is bizarre, in my opinion, that Hintikka should single out this passage as evidence in favor of attributing the principle of plenitude to Aristotle., 0 n e o f t h e p i e c e s o f p o s i t i v e e v i d e n c e a 11 o w s Hintikka to claim th.at Aristotle offered a 'kind of proof for the principle' in Bk. I of On the Heavens. This evidence is also somewhat inconclusive,, The following is the argument's conclusion: Neither that which always is, therefore, nor that which always is not is either generated or destructible. And clearly whatever- is generated or destructible is not eternal,, If it were, it would be at once capable of always being and of not always being? but ,this has been shown to be 1 rnpossi bIe„ 3 3 The pas in Question does not seem to be an argument for the principle of plenitude at all, although it could be argued that the principle is being alluded to. Hintikka refrains from using the the argument from De Int. 9 as positive evidence for attributing the principle of plenitude to Aristotle,, For his main objective with respect to De Int. 9 is to highlight the effect of assuming the principle of plenitude; Hintikka avoids the problem posed if he were both to rely on De Int. 9 as reason for attributing the principle in question to Aristotle and claim that the principle helps to best explicate the argument in De Int. 9. It is certainly true that Hintikka is doubtful about the worth of many of the passages which he cites to support his case. In particular, many of the citations simply feature modal and temporal terms in close proximity to one another; rather than claim these examples have the status of definite proof, he points to their circumstantial role. The following is a list of such openly inconclusive proof:! Bk „ II of the Topics C1i2b1) ; Bk „ II of On Generation and Corruption C335a32~ b'7> ; Bk . I of Parts of Animals <644b21-23) ; Books I and XI of the Metaphysics <102Sb27™37 and 1064b32, respectively.) Hintikka then claims that these passages are supportive of his overall contention "especially when combined with Aristotle's remarks in An. Prior I 13. 32b4 on the classification of events into necessary, general, indeterminate, and rare,..."3^ Hintikka>s positive argument for attributing the principle of plenitude to Aristotle, then, has both strong points and weaknesses. Some of the evidence which he cites (especially Bk. II of On Generation and Corruption 333al-3) is very compelling. But the majority of h is evidence is ei ther weak or inconc1usi ve „ 23 -Chapter Three-Hintikka*s Account of De Int. 3 Hint i kka begins his analysis of the n in th chapter of Aristotle's De Interpretations by noting that-different scholars fundamentally disagree on the nature of the prob1em being addressed. The cen tra1 prob1em is captured in the following question; "What is the view he [Aristotle] wants to refute there, and what is the view for which he wants to argue?" 3® The account endorsed by Hintikka is at considerable variance with the overwhelming majority of treatments of De Int. 3. Most accounts focus on the problem of future-truth, which is that if sentences about the future (i.e., predictions) are already true, then fatalism will be t rue,, The f o 11 ow i ng is H i n t- i k ka f s own f or mu I a t i on of the problem :: Assume that „ „ „ „ Cp or not-p] or ..... [necessarily (p or not-p)3 is true universally. Then it will be the case, as Aristotle says, that if someone dec 1 ares a c:ertain individua 1 event wi 11 take place and someone declares that it will not take place, one of them will be making a true statement while the other will be making a false one; necessarily so, if (2) is universally true. For instance, it will either be true to say that a sea f i gh t w i11 tak e place or eIse tr ue to say that it will not take place tomorrow. Suppose .... that the former a l t e r n a t i v e happens to o b t a i n . Then i t is true (already true) that there will be a sea fight tomorrow,, But if this is already true today, how can the occurrence of the sea fight tomorrow be contingent?3*5 Hintikka then assumes that the latter alternative is true? (that the prediction about the non-oc curence of the sea fight tomorrow is already true),, The sea fight in this case will be impossible., According to the tradi tiona 1 int-erpretat ion , then, a constraint must- be placed on tertium non datur „ If a constraint is not-effected, then all events are either fated to be or farted not to be „ Such accounts are referred to as versions of the traditional interpretation, because they are almost as old (and interesting) as Aristotle's argument in Int. 3 The m e r i t s of t h i s t o r m u I a t i o n by H i n t i k k a of the t r a d i t i o n a 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e a Is o d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r four,, For now, it is clear that Hintikka sees the t r ad i t i on a 1 i n te r p r e ta t i on as an a c c oun t a :i. rned a t th e truth-value o f pre di c t i on s„ It is a1so clear that Hintikka views the problem of future truth with a time of evaluation of the truth-value of the predictions which is located solely in the present. This latter point is an important one, since it allows Hintikka to separate the traditional interpretation, which relies on t h e p r o b 1 e rn o f f u t u r e t r u t h (a s h e d e s c r i b e s i t) f r o rn his own interpretation, which relies on the problem of infinite past truth. To properly explain this (supposedly alternative) problem, the impact (as viewed by Hintikka) of attributing to Aristotle the principle - S l -ot plenitude must first be assessed,, In chapter VIII of Time and Necessity, Hintikka writes th-at in ''pas s a g e af ter passage, he; [ Ar istotie] explicitly or tacitly equates possibility with sometime truth and necessity with omnitemporal truth«" 3 e Hintikka t h i n k s o f t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f p 1 e n i t u d e a s s u p p o r t i n g a c 1 ose Ii n k between ti me and modaIi ty, w i th the prov i sos already mentioned,3® Hintikka makes the natural move of applying the pr i n c i pIe of pIen i tude to sen tences„ He notes that the following two types of sentences will p o s e d i f f e r e n t p r o b I e m s f o r A r i s t o 11 e : (.3) p at to and C 4) p „ Both C3) and (4) c on ta in references to time: whereas the t 0 of (3) need not be tied to the present, (4) could be paraphrased as (4*) p now. 4 0 Any sentence which is fixed to a specific time like (3) i s , by the pr i n c i p1e of p1eni tude, nec essa r i1y t r ue if true at all (i„e„, true at one time)„ For such a sentence is always true if true at all. Conversely, if C3) was false at all, it would be impossible. This result does not usually hold for more ordinary sentences like (4)„ Hintikka interprets (8) as a perfect example of the future particulars Aristotle mentions in De Int. 3. That is, the warning about future particulars being true or false which Aristotle makes at the beginning and the end of the chapter is, according to Hintikka, being a i m e d a t s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e f o r m o f (3) „ H i n t i k k a t h e n observes that Aristotle's problems are compounded b y t h e f -a c t t h a. t h e [ A r i s t o 11 e 3 n e i t h e r c 1 e a r 1 y r e a I i z e d h o w c I o s e 1 y h e w a s c o m m i 11. e d i n h i s conceptual system to cons ider ing ,„,„ [ (. 4) -and C4#)3 . ., „ „ rather than . „ , , [(3) 3 , „ „ ,as a paradigm of an informative sentence nor fully realized what a .11 e r n a t i v e s w e r e o p e n t o h i m . I w a n t t o s u g g e s t that in De Int. 3 the difficulties broke to"the surface„ Unfortunately, Hintikka does not immediately explain the s i gn j. f i c an c e f or Ar i s to 11 e of a sen ten c e . be i n g i n f o r ma t i ve „ Nor does Hintikka refer to any of Aristotle's works to support this contention. Yet the view that Aristotle was committed to informative sentences (or, as Hintikka subsequen 11 y c a 13. s th em , " tempo r a 11 y i n def i n i t e " sentences) is a crucial one for Hintikka's i n te r p r e ta t i on , as H i n t i k ka h i mse I f pu ts it: Aristotle's main problem was not a metaphysician's vague worry about whether present truth about the future prejudges future events; it was the difficulty of a systematist who had defined his notions for too narrow a range of cases and was then forced to accomodate awkward new cases in his f r amewor k „ wor ds , because Ar i s totie both (. a) pre d o m i n a n 13. though t i n t e rms of sen ten c es I i ke those of the f or m C 4) and Cb) was a firm defender of the principle of pIen i tude (including i ts meta1inguist ic imp1i cat i o n s) , he was perplexed by the results obtained with sentences of the same form as (3) (which Hintikka later labels "tempor a11y quaIif i ed" sen ten c es) . Par t of Hin t ikka f s interpretation, then, is that sentences of the same form as (3), combined with Cb), yield sentences of the form of (3#) it is necessary that Cp at t 0). Hintikka sees the need for providing textua1 evidence Cfrom De Int., 9) to support his claim that Ar is to11e f s ar gumen t is bu i 11 on the di st i nc t i on between t e m p o r a 1 1 y i n d e f i n i t e a s o p p o s e d t o t e m p o r a .1 1 y q u a I i f i e d sentences. He has two pieces of evidence, one; direct and the other indi r ec t. 1"he d i r e d piece i s c on ta i ned in the following excerpt: What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not th e same as say i n g un c on di t ion a11y that it is of necessity„ 4 3 Hi n t ik ka c on c en trates on the sense, f o r Aristotle, of the word 'unconditionally* Chaplos). He holds that haplos is best translated as 'without qualifica-tions* The phrase 4when it is? suggests to Hintikka that the qualifications being discussed are temporal in n a t u r e . It has been suggested to me that the passage just given might be translated as "What is, necessarily is, if it is; arid what is not, necessarily is not, if it is not."4® This is a fascinating possibility: if it were t r u e , then H i n t i k k a ' s e n t i r e a c c o u n t i s in s e r i o u s trouble. For Hintikka's assertions regarding the role being played by temporal qualifications would be utterly groundless. In this case, however, no mistakes have been made with the translation. The following is from the original text of De Int. 3;: To ^acx/ £tVq_<_ To OK rotcxY /)cu 'Vo m i ^ ov )U.r) aVq( O Tav JLA.T] l^j , q.KQy/tr)„ ct , ihe presence of the word tor "when" ( o XCLv ) ii undeniable. The evidence which lends indirect support to Hit-ikka's claim also serves to justify the transition from sentences of type (3) to ones of type (3'fr) with the following passage from De Int. 3: Again, if it is white now it was true to say earlier that it would be white;; so that it was always true to say of anything that has happened that it would be so. But if it was always true to say that it would be so, or would be so, it could not not be so, or not be going to be so. But if something cannot not happen it is impossible for it not to happen; and if it is impossible for something not to happen it is necessary for it to h a p p e n „ E v e r y t h i n g t h a t w i 11 h a p p e n , t h e r e f o r e , happens necessarily,, So nothing will come about ' as chance has it or by chance; for if by chance, not of necessity,,'36 Recall from the previous chapter that Hintikka also considers this part of De Int., 3 as reason to attribute t h e p r i n c i p I e o f p 1 e n i t u d e t o A r i s t o 11 e „ Predictions with the same form as (3) have been t r u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e pi a s t« H e n c e H i n t i k k a s' s t. e r m ' t h e problem of infinite past truth'. Hintikka believes the restrain t being recommended by Ar istotie is aimed at sentences which are directly prefixed by an 'it is n e c e s s a r y t h a t' o p e r a t o r , T h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m s e n t e n c e s of type (3> to ones of type (3*) is, Hintikka contends, blocked by Aristotle's restriction on the MLEM , The MLEM, recall, is the principle that, for any sentence p, either necessarily p or necessarily not-p is true. The MLEH arguably applies to sentences concerned with both the past and the present. (This includes sentences of type C3)„) Yet Hintikka generates the problem by c omb i n i n g the MLEM soIe1y w i th th e pas t evaluat i on of sentences concerned with the future."-'5' It may be thought t h a t o t h e r r e a s o n s c a n b e g i v e n f o r w i t h o 1 d i n g t h e M L. E M from future sentences. Consider <S) A sea battle will occur tomorrow. If (5) is true at present, then it is in an obvious sense inevitable that there will, in fact, be a sea b a 11,1 e t o rn o r r o w . Following Quine, it might be objected that two modifications on (S) are required in order to achieve the desired result. The first modification concerns the verb construction of (S>; Quine would hold that the future tense should not be used to express an eternal truth. That is, a tenseIess verb construction is to be pr ef er r ecl. Ac c o r d i n g I y , we ob ta i n C 5') A sea battle occurs tomorrow. The second modification needed to obtain an eternal sentence, is the replacement of the indexical "tomorrow" by a specific moment. Thus, (5 f i) A sea battle occurs at t« If we apply the ML Eli to the present truth of (5fJ> (as opposed to Hintikka's evaluation of the past truth o f (5 > , a n d a d d i t i o n a 11 y a s s u m e b o t h t h a t ( a') t h e r e a r e times earlier, and later, than t 2 (tn. and ts,, respectively) and that (b) t* is the present time, it-follows that the sea battle is presently unavoidable. That is, when (Sf !) is evaluated via the MLEIi at t,. , the events at t s are inevitably true. Hintikka, as we h a v e s e e n , u s e s o n 1 y t h e p a s t e v a I u a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e s along with the MLEIi to generate the problem. I take it, then, that Hintikka would not object to taking (5 ? J) and evaluating it at t 3 and concluding that the events at tS: were necessary,, (Conditions (a) and Cb) no doubt seem curious to the reader. I agree. We are uncomfortably shifting from indexicals to non-indexicals (a) and vice versa Cb). But both conditions are justif ied , in that H.i.nt i kka adopts analagous conditions (albeit implicitly) when discussing the evaluation of predictions located in the past . > Mow, Hint, i kka does not provide a clear explanation as to why predictions must be evaluated solely from the point of view of the past in order to obtain the vindication of determinism- I will now give three reasons w hi c h a t temp t to a c coun t f o r Hi r 11i k k a fs preference. I will then show that they are untenable. Firstly, if the problem is generated by the evaluation of sentences from the standpoint of the present, then the text of De Int„ 9 will reflect this,, But the text of De Int. 9 does not reflect such evaluation,, By modus tollens, then, the problem is not generated by the evaluation of sentences from the present« Sec on d 1 y , as i n>:::i i c a ted above , the trad i t i ona 1 interpretation seems to commit one to the view that Aristotle sought to restrict the applicabiIity of the law of excluded middle is in4cons:i.stent with Aristotle's u n e q u i v o c: a I s u p p o r t f o r t his law. Ye t t h is c 1 a i m i s once again in direct conflict with textual evidence., Thirdly, the traditional interpretation falls prey to what I w i l l call "The Problem of Unactualized Possibilities",, This objection has already been al luded to. (See p. 2.) Assume that (i) the traditional i n t e r p r e t a t iort i s cor rec t and t h a t ( i i ) the metalinguistic formulation of the MLEM is accurate. Recall that ( i i ) consi.sts of the c 1 aim that C 2 * f ) " Q p" is true iff "(t) (p at t)" is true,, It is easy to derive from ( 2 " ) the following;: < 2 ' > *) "\^p" is true iff " t) (p at t)" is true. (I leave the details of this derivaation to the reader.) (2 f f #) is clearly false. It might, for example, be true that (6) It is possible that Jones will win the lottery. C o m b i n i n g ( 6) with ( 2 * f ) yield s (7) There is a time at which Jones will win the 1 o 11 e r y „ If it is assumed that C2#'*) is true, then the inference from (2?',&) and (6) to (7) is invalid. The obvious premise to abandon is C2 f ,*>; it is false. It follows, does it not, that since the friends of evaluation of predictions located in the present (i.e., the traditional interpretation) are committed to the truth of (2f'*), that they are likewise committed to an absurd posit ion? All three of these criticisms are inconclusive,, The first objection is, I think, somewhat trivial. For it could plausibly be argued that the text makes mention of both methods of generation. Indeed, Hintikka concedes that the problem of future truth does have a role to play in the sea battle argument, only he believes that role to be a subsidiary one, So Hintikka could not, ex hypothesi , rely on this first obj ec t ion„ CIn chapter four, a simi1ar obj ec t ion is made contra Hintikka;; it is held that there is no textual support for sentences that have the form of ( 3 ) . ) The second criticism looks to be decisive at first g 1 a n c e ., I n d e e d , s e v e r a I w r i t e r s s u p port t h i s o b j e c t i o n « Now it is undeniable that Aristotle was strongly committed to the law of excluded middle. The positive <arid compelling) evidence is of both a direct and indirect sort. I will consider the latter evidence •4.0" The indirect evidence is found in the Metaphysics. The law of non-contradiction is, for Aristotle, "the most cer tasin of a 11 pr inc ipies „"A,& Ar isto11 e offers t h r e e f o r m uIa t i uon s of thi s law: 1og i c a1, on to1og i c a I, and psychological. By DeMorgan's Theorem, the law of non -con tratdi c t ion is mater ia11 y equi va 1 en t to the law of excluded middle. That is, Cp/Sjp) ±1 < p V^p) Indirectly, then, Aristotle wars committed to the truth o f t h e I a w o f e x c 1 u d e d m i d d 1 e „ The direct evidence in favor of attributing the Law of excluded middle is also contained in Bk . l'V of the Metaphysics. Aristotle rhetorically asks "is he in error who judges either that the thing is so or that it is not so and is he right who judges both?" (When Aristotle speaks of a person who "judges both" he is referring to someone who c on s c i ous 1 y makes c on t r aid i c tory ascriptions. I think that Aristotle is very close, in Bk . IV of the Metaphysics, to explicitly formulating However, Aristotle was not, I maintain, arguing in favor of a restriction of the law of excluded middle at all in De Int. 9, Aristotle was instead restricting t hi e p r :i. n c i p I e o f b i v a I e nee C t h e p r i n c i p I e t h a t h o 1 d s Oerlorgam * s Theorem .) that every sentence is either true or false). It is crucial that everytime Aristotle discusses tautologies, part of the discussion is always in terms of ontology. For examp1e , as a1ready noted , part of Ar istotie's d i s c u s s :i. o n o f the law o f n o n •• c o n t r a d i c t :i. o n involves a n on to1og i c a1 f or mulation: And it will not be possible for the same thing to be and not to be, except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as one whom we call 'man', others might call * not-manf ; but the point in question is not this, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can in fact.®0 Yet such a formulation is signif icant-ly -absent from De Int. 3 . The significance of such an omission is just that it lends plausibility to the view that Aristotle was placing restraints on the principle of bivalence rather than on the law of excuded middle. (Recall t h a t H i n t i k k a b e 1 i e v e s , a 1 b e i t i n c o r r e c 11 y , t h a t the defenders of the traditional interpretation are committed to contending that Aristotle was ( incor:sisten 11 y) restricking the law of exc luded m i dd1e „) T w o p o i n k s n e e d k o b e m a d e in c o n nee t i o n wit- h t h i s answer to the second criticism" Firstly, one might reply that the distinction between the principle of bivalence and the law of excluded middle is a somewhat arbitrary one. But this is mistaken. Suppose that we have a 4:; three-valued language, L (any sentence p may be either true, or false, neuter) and that there is a rule such that whenever p is neuter , not-p is true. The law of e x c 1 u d e d m i d d 1 e i s i n t a c t, w h i 1 e t h e p r :i. n c i p 1 e o f bivalence is not,®1 It seems rather fantastic to hold that this distinction was not seen by Aristotle,. It is true that Hintikka gives some consideration to the suggestion that Aristotle was restricting the F'B rather than the LEM. But Hintikkafs treatment is far too ephemeral as is shown when Hintikka introduces it in the following footnote from Time and Necessity: Some writers-e.g., Lukasiewicz and Mrs, Kneale-distinguish between the law of excluded middle (every sentence of the form * p or not-p' is true an d the p r i n c i p 1 e of b i va I en c e (ever y sen ten c e i s true or false), A few, including Mrs, Kneale an>: Colin Strang, think that Aristotle is striving make this very distinction in De Int„ 3, What-eve t h e m e r i t s o f t h i s d i s t i n c t, i o n a r e i n t h e abstract, I cannot find it in Aristotle's text. My m a i n r e a s o n f o r t h .i n k i n g t h a t t- h e d i s t i n c t- i o n i. s not Aristotle's is given in the first few pa r agr aphs of section S .,13 This footnote uncomfortably merges two separate ideas. The f i rst is that of the dist inc t,ion in i tse.1 f between the PB and the LEM. This, I take it, is what Hintikka means by the distinction " in the abstract." , He gives the clear impression that the distinction need not- be recognized by all; only "some writers" make it, Sorab/i i would, I think, say that this point was incorrect. The P B a n d t h e L E M a. r e i d e n t i c a 1 n e i t h e r i n f o r m u 1 a t i o n , n o r -•43--in operation . If Hintikka is questioning that there is a difference between the PB and the i_.EIvl, he is simply The third criticism can -also be met. Again, two points are critical: Firstly, the problem of unactualised possibilities arose after a strong form of the principle of plenitude was ascribed to Aristotle. The urtcontroversial aspect of the principle of plenitude is the following conditional: ( 2 ' I f " p" is true, then "C t) ( p at t>" is true. "!"he c on t r over s i a I aspec t of the princ i p 1 e of p I en i tude , the part which is causing the trouble, is the converse of (.2* ' : (.2* >***) If "< t) Cp at t')" is true, then " p " i s t r u e . (From C 2 f * , we obtain C 2? ' f ) If " p" is true, then " (. t) Cp at t>" is true.) B u t , of . c o u r s e , t h e r e i s no reason why the defenders of the traditional interpretation need t h e m s e 1 v e s a d o p t a s p a t e n 11 y b a d a d o c t r i n e 1 j. k e (.2* '***) . Indeed, if Sorab j i is correct, severe limitations must be placed on the applicability of the pr i n c i p 1 e of pien i tude , Sec ond 1 y , and more io the po i n t,, the problem of unactualised possibilities is real for someone who, like Hintikka, does siscribe the strong form 0 f t h e p r i n c i pIe of pien i tude to ft r i s to 11e « It is to Hintikka's credit that he calls into question the value of the solution which he a 11 r i bu tes t o A ri s to tie, Howeve r, hi s c on c ess i on i s somewhat cryptic, "...If my interpretation is right, the distinction [between temporally qua1 if ied and temporally unqualified sentences] looks much more like a r e s t a t e m e n t o f A r i s t o 11 e * s p r o b 1 e m t h a n a s o I u t i o n t o it." s 3 This comment by Hintikka is very puzzling; was there any question as to what Aristotle considered the solution to the problem to be? That solution is simply t o r e s t r i c t t h e a p p 1 i c a t i o n o f s o m e 1 o g i c a 1 r u 1 e, T h e distinction which he makes constitutes a solution only in so far that it helps indicate which logical principle Aristotle was restricting. On the other hand, Hintikka 1 s qui te cIear as to wh i c h pr i n c i pIe i s be i n g restricted, (So Hintikka's comment leaves me somewhat baffled „ j Hintikka also states that Aristotle left unanswered the question, "If something is possible to happen at t h i s v e r y moment, will it have to happen?'"34 This - 4 5 question might be said to be the most important in the evaluation of determinism. Instead,, Hintikk.a says that A r i s t o 1 1 e put th i s ques t ion in terms of sen t e n e s s wh i ch are specified independently of the moment of utterance. Hintikka's treatment of the sea battle argument of De Int. 9 is consistent with the notion that Aristotle was an adherent of the principle of plenitude. It is important, however, to see that the traditional interpretation has not been shown by Hintikka to be inconsistent with the textual evidence of De Int. 9. Moreover, as we sha11 see in chapter f our , there are many powerful reasons to hold that Hintikkafs i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t s e I f i s f a u 11 y „ 11 i s a I s o i m p o r t a n t to see that there is no compelling reason, textual or otherwise , to prefer Hin t i kka,'s in terpretat ion over the t r a d i t i o n -a 1 o n e . Hintikka extends his interpretation of the sea battle argument to Aristotle's treatment of Megarian de ter m i n :i. sm „ Th i s ac c oun t by Ar i s to 11 e c ons t i tu tes the s e c o n d o f t h e f o u r m o d a 1 p r o b 1 e m s h e r e u n d e r a n a I y s i s . 4 6 Chap ter Fou i H i n t i k ka on A r i s to 13. e on Megar i an Determ i n i sm Hintikka's account of Aristotle's treatment- of !iegar i an determ i n ism shares mapy of the f eatures of Hintikka's account- of Aristotle's treatment of De Int., 9„ In both cases, Hintikka sees his task as that of reconstructing the information as given by Aristotle a b o u t t !"i e a r g u m e n t-. 1-1 i n t i k k a' s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o n c e again focusses on the importance of ascribing the pv- inc ip Ie of p 1 en i tude to Ar isto1.1 e „ Hin t i kka ' s main position is that the 1 Master Argument' of Diodorus was designed to remedy the incompatabi1ity of the concept of possibility, as it is usually understood, with the thesis of determinism by replacing the normal concept of possibility w i th an ,e x ten s i on a1' one• Hin t i kka is expI :i. c i t about a f undamenta 1 assijmpton upon which his arguments concerning Megaran determinism are based,, He maintains that "the modes of reasoning that Diodorus used are likely to have been similar to those of Aristotle....[and that on this basis! ....we can fairly confidently say that we know at least a rough outline of how Diodorus argued."®4 This assumption may b e t r o u b I e s o rn e t o s o rn e p h i 1 o s o p hers „ I n m y o p i n i o n , i t is a claim which is incorrect. I will-endorse, in the f o 11 ow i n g chapter, R i c h a r d So r ab j i ' s c on ten t i on th a t th g principle of plenitude had only limited applicability f or Ar isto11e „ So I am not in ac cord with Hinti kk a' s position that Aristotle had unwavering support for the princ ip1e ; so the assufiiption that both Aristotle and Diodorus tacitly believed in C9) appears to be in trouble . But this need not be the case: perhaps Di.odoru< did not have unqualified support either for (9); thus bringing him (I would say) into agreement with Aris tot 1e. At any rate, the task at hand is to illustrate Hintikka's analysis of Aristotle's views regarding the Master Argument of Diodorus. Put simply, that task cannot be achieved if Hintikka's assumption is not granted. As I will show shortly, a great deal of philosophical mileage is obtained by granting Hintikka'1 assumption Here are the main steps of the Master Argument as given by EpictetusS < 6) Everything that is past and true is necessary. C 7) T h e i m p o s s i b 1 e d o e s n o t f o 11 o w f r o m t h e p o s s i b 1 e. • (8) What neither is nor will be is possible,. Epic tet-us holds that Di odor us "used the plausibility of the first two propositions [(6) and C7)-M.D.'J to establish the thesis that nothing is possible which neither is nor will be true."5® Di odor us,, then,, was attempting to demonstrate the plausibility of an alternate definition of possibility. In his work on Stoic logic. Mates gives the following as Diodorus' c on c1us ion (9) The possible is that which is or will be true,157 Hintikka contends that (6), (7), and (9) were e n d o r s e d b y A r i s t o 13. e „ C 9) i s s i m p 1 y t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f plenitude. Most of the arguments for attributing the principle to Aristotle have already been exhaustvely been discussed. Two other arguments of this type are given in ch, nine of Tim© and N@e@ffi®iiy. s®. (As one of these arguments is very similar to one which is e v a 1 u a t e d i n c h a p t e r s i x I w i 11 r e f r .a i n f r o m d e a I i n g with them now. See n »ss' for further comment,) There is little doubt that Aristotle supported the f i r s t p r e m i s e ( C 6) ) „ H i n t- i k k a q u O t e s w i t h a p p r o v a I f r o m Bk, III of Aristotle's Rhetoric: Forensic oratory [as opposed to political oratory~ M„D„] deals with what, is or is not now true, which can better be demonstrated, because not contingent-there is n> already ha.j contingency in what has now pened „650 As we shall see, this passage is not the sole piece of evidence in favor of attributing (6) to Aristotle, 49-(Hintikka notes that ''several interesting implications' can be drawn from this passage,, I fully agree. The most i.nterest:i.ng, f rom my point. of view, is that "for Aristotle everything that is present is necessary in the same way as is everything p a s t A n d H i n t i k ka goes on to po i n t to the s i m i .1 a r i ty be tween th i s passage and the already mentioned 13a23-25 of De Int. 9. The passage from De Int. 9 is the following: "What is, necessarily is, when it is, and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not." I endorse this account of Aristotle given by Hintikka. That is, I concur that A r i s t o 11 e h e I d t h a t t h e p a s t a n d C i n a s e n s e) t h e present were necessary. However, I also say where H i n t. .i k k a d o e s n o t, t h a t a 11 r i b u t i o n o f t h i s v i e w t o Aristotle does not conflict with the 'traditional* interpretation of the sea battle argument,,652) Let us now consider the other evidence that. A r i s t o 11 e w a s a n a d h e r e n t o f ( 6) . T h e f o 11 o w i n g p a s s a g e is from Bk. VI of the Nicomachean Ethics; Nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. No one chooses to have sacked Troy 5 for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and contingent, while what is past is not c a p a b I e o f n o t h a v i n g t a k e n p I a c e , h e n c e A g a t h o n i s r i ght i n sayi ng For this .alone is lacking even in God T o m a I-:  e u n d o n e t h i n g s t h a t h a v e o n c e b e e n d o n e . e 3 Hintikka also refers to Bk . I of On the Heavens to show Aristotle's support for (6): ...it cannot truly be said of a thing that it-exists last year,, nor could it. be said last year that it exists now. It is therefore impossible for w h a t o n c e d i d n o t e x i s t I a t e r t o b e e t e r n a 1 . F o r i n its later state it will possess the capacity of not existing, not only of not existing at a time when it ex ists-sinee then it exists in actuality-but of not existing last year or in the past. Now suppose it to be in actuality what it is capable of being. It will then be true to say that it does; not exist last year. But this is impossible. Mo capacity relates to being in the past, but always being in the present or future , 6 4 Hintikka coneentrates on the final sentence. For my part, this passage -also shows that Aristotle was quite explicit, about, the respective roles played by location in time.of an event and the modality attached to that even t-. Th is in turn undermines at least par t of Hintikka ' s analysis As Hintikka indicates, it is the second premise C(7>) which is the most puzzling. But, once again, there i s a I a r g e a m o u n t o f t- e x t u a I e v i d e n c e w h i c h s u g g e s t s that Aristotle supported this premise. Hintikka first-calls attention to the similarity between C7) and Ariso tie's "def in i tion" of possi bi1i ty contain ed in B k. I of the Prior Analytics: "1 use the terms 1 to be possible' and 4 the possible' of that which is not necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing i m p o s s i b l e „ H i n t i k k a refers next to the following -51-passage, also from Bk „ I of the Prior Analytics to support the ascription to Aristotle of (7): If a particular, as opposed to a universal, premise "is necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary; for from the denial of such a conclusion nothing impossible results. » . „"«'r This passage is not, in my opinion, very good evidence for supposing that Aristotle supported <7> . Aristotle is here stressing that a contradiction i s n o t e n t a i 1 e d b y n e g a t i n g t h e c o n c I u s i o n o f a n inference with a necessary particular premise,, In other words, the conclusion is not a necessary truth. This point, is somewhat, different than the one expressed in (• 7 ) „ Hintikka then cal Is attention to the following, passage from Bk. VIII of the Physics: "...if we assume s o m e t h i n g i s p o s s i b 1 e , n o t h i n g i m p o s s i b 1 e w i 11 f o 11 o w (though something false maty)."'®2' Hintikka also relies on the already discussed and controversial passage from B k . 4 of the Metaphysics to support his contention (see p. '11 and n„ 3 0> . Hintikka should not, I think, use this latter piece of evidence; whereas the meaning of this, passage is disputed, the definition of possibility e n d o r s e d b y A r i s t o 11 e i s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a 1 „ A n d Aristotle's definition constitutes good evidence in itself ., Hintikka refers to the same positive evidence regarding Aristotle's adherence to the principle of p 1 en i ttide to show tha.t Ar i.sto11 e suppor ted ( 9) , Hin t i kka evidently considers (9) to be identical to the principle of plenitude. I have already raised some of my reservations concerning this matter. In addition, I will endorse in the following chapter Sorabji's objections o f H i n t i k k a' s v i e w s r e g a r d i n g the p r i ri c i p 1 e o f plen i tude . Hintikka provides two main reconstructions of Diodorus ' arguments . He beg:i.ns h is i.n i tia 1 reconstruction of the Master Argument by saying that Diodorus 'had' the following premises: CIO) it is possible that p; and (1:1.) it is not the case that p and it will never be the case that p. Precisely what Hintikka has in mind when he attributes (.10) and (11) to Diodorus is not wholly clear. Certainly it is conceivable that Diodorus thought of both premises as being innocuous. But Hintikka gives no reason for us to suppose that Diodorus actually employed (10) and (11) in his argument. Once again, I will give Hintikka the benefit of the doubt; the assumption that Diodorus made use of these two premises will be (hesitatingly) gran ted„ H i n t i k ka a I so a11 r ibutes to D i odor us t he f o 11 owing r e f i n e d v e r s i o n s o f (6) a n d ( 7) : (6*) any true statement concerning the past is nec essary; and C '7*) if a poss ifoi 1 i ty is assumed to be ac tua I i zed , n o i m p o s s i b1e conclusions follow. (.7*') would, according to Hintikka, allow Di odor us to replace (10) with (10*) at time to- it will b e t r u e i h a t p , w h e r e t o > i. s s o m e u n s p e c i f i e d p a r t i c u 1 a r rri o m e n t o f future time. Evidently (.7*') is not by itself sufficient to explain the entailment-. For Hintikka gives a further-brief argument to show why Diodorus could move from (10) to (10*). Hintikka holds that the fact that Diodorus shared with Aristotle a belief in (9) (the principle of plenitude) justifies this entailment. The thesis contained in (9), to repeat, is that possibilities will be a c tua1i zed at some t i me o r o th er . 11 f o11ows , does i t not, that if p is possible, p will be the case at some m o m e n t i n t h e f u t u r e ? - 5 4 -There are two main c r i t i c i sms tha t Hi n t ik k a ha s not considered in his argument,, Firstly, it appears to be somewhat bizarre to make use of C9) to establish the entailment from CIO) to CIO*). For (9) is taken, by EE! p i c t e t u s , a m o n g o t h e r s , t o b e t h e c o n c 1 u s i o n o f t h e Master Argument. Therefore, unless Hintikka is -accusing D i o d o r u s o f b e i n g h o p e 1 e s s 1 y c i r c u 1 a r , C '3) s h o u 1 d n o t be invoked. I hold that this criticism of Hintikka's reconstruction of the Master Argument is tenable.7'0 S e c o n d 1 y , a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n 11 y , t h e i n f e r e n c e f r o m CIO) to CIO*) is straightforwardly invalid. For even if Diodorus did share with Aristotle a firm belief in the principle of plenitude, it need not follow that there is a particular moment of future time at which p is true. Given the principle of plenitude, it follows that there is some particular moment of either future or present time at which p is true. CIO*) clearly represents only o n e o f t h e s e t w o d i s j u n t: t s . I w i 11 r e t u r n t o t h i s p o i n t af t e r I have comp1eted H i n t i k k a ' s r e c o n s t r u c t i a n of t h e M a s t e r A r g u m e n t . Hintikka then concentrates on showing that a result of CIO*) is rendered impossible by Cll) and C6*)„ This will establish that the "original' set of premises (presumably the set consisting of C6*), C7*), CIO), and (1i)> is inconsistent, From (10*) Hintikka obtains (12) at time tj. it will be true that p was the case yesterday; where t3. is one day after to • . The next step in Hiritikka's reconstruction is analogous to the sequential inference from (10) to (10*) to (12), From (11) Hintikka obtains (11*) a t time to - it wi11 be false that p„ (My comments regarding the inference from (10) to (10*) •also apply to the one from (11) to (11*),) From (11*) he obtains (13) at time t* it will be false that p was the case yesterday. Hintikka then applies (6*) to (13) to reach the f o11ow i n g c on c1us i on n (13*) at time t.t it will be true that it is i m p o s s i b I e f o r p t o h a v e b e e n t h e c a s e y e s t e r d a y „ (13*) expresses "the impossibility Diodorus was looking for.""1 (13*) thus shows (12) not only to be false, but impossible as well. Hintikka actually rejects the inference from (6*), (7*), (10), and (11) to (13*). His motivation for rejecting it is not identical to the criticism just given of the i n f er en c e to ( 10*) froni (10) ( an d , equivalent!'/, to (11*) from (11)) . Rather he contends that a scope ambiguity in the initial premise is i11i c i 11y e x p1o i ted by D i odo r us . I will r e tu r n to Hintikkafs reasons for rejecting the Master Argument in a moment. I said above that two reconstructions of the Master Argument are provided by Hintikka. I have summarized t h e f i r s t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n „ "!" h e f o 11 o w i n g p a s s a g e f r o m Time and Necessity introduces the second one" If someone now asserts 'it is possible that p' does he mean that. p shou 1 d be the case now or that i t should be the case now or sometime in the future. In our reconstruction, we assumed that the latter is meant. [I have ail ready stated my objection to this claim-M „D„1 What happens if the former is what is meant?'5'2 Hint-ikka's second reconstruction therefore is committed to eliminat ing a11 temporally spec if ied sentences and replacing them with ones of the form (4*) p (now). The impossibility which, on this reading, Hintikka i n t e r p r e t s D i o d o r u s a s d e r i v i n g w ill i. n v o 1 v e t h e foil ow i n g sen ten c es I! (14) It is now possible that p; an d (15) p is not now the case. F o r in t h e s a m e w a y , H i n t i k k a c o n f u sing 1 y a s s e r t s , t h a t ( J. 0*) was deduced from (10), the following can be obtained from (14): (14*) p is now the case,, Precisely how one is supposed to derive a contradiction on the basis of (14*) and (15) is by no means clear/ 7 3 Some comments are called for regarding the affinities, both perceived and real, which Hintikka calls -attention to between his -account of the sea battle argument and his account of the Master Argument. In both cases, Hintikka feels the role of temporally q u a 1 i f i e d s e n t e n c e s t o b e v i t a 1 . A n d t h e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f or th is type of ana 1 ysis is just that Ar ist-o11e was supposedly a firm supporter of the principle of plenitude. Hintikka's interpretation of Aristotle's views regarding the Master Argument is, alas, a confusing one. W h e r e a s h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e M ai s t e r A r g u m e n t portray Diodorus as sharing with Aristotle an adherence to the principle of plenitude, Hintikka's evaluation of the Master Argument construe Diodorus as attempting to prove (16) <3 ( ^ t) p at t- ( ^  t) p at t. " ,, . .Diodorus strove to prove the principle of plenitude _ CO instead of just assuming it. [Hintikka-* s italics] . I w i 11 n o vv b r i e f 1 y e x p 1 a i n w h y H i n t i k k a c o n s i d e r s his reconstructions of the Master Argument to be invalid,, To prove CIS), Diodous supposedly assumed ( 16*) ( \/ t ) p at t ,. He also had the following conditional at his disposal: (17) ('V' t) (r-\ p at t — ^ 1 $ p at t)'^ The negation ol t h e d e s i r e d c o n c I u s i o n i s C16**iC^/ t) p at t, If (16) is to be proved, then the set containing (16*) (17), and (16**) will be inconsistent. However, this set does not result in a con t raid i c t ion ., But a contradiction does arise if the friends of the Master Argument confused the de dicto (16*) with the de r e (:!. 6 * f ) ( j i t ) ~ < 0 p a t t Hintikka believes that such a confusion would hardly h a v e b e e n s u r p r i s i n g . F o r t h e E rigl i s h . t r a n s I a t :i. o n s o f (16* ) and (16*!) are, respectively (16*a) It is possible that p should be the case now o r i n t h e f u t u r e , and <16**3} There is some time such that p is possibly the case now or in the future.'76 I do not accept Hintikka*s interpretation of Aristotle's account of the Master argument. This is partially due to my scepticism regarding Hintikka's ascription to Aristotle and Diodorus of the principle of plenitude,, There is also the fact that Hintikka' s reconstructions of the Master Argument appear to have little, if any, connection with the available textual e v i denc e . H i n t ikka hi mself adm its th at hi s in terpretation is at cons iderab1e var iance with Epictetus* presentation of the Master Argument,,7'3' Finally, and'most damaging is that Hintikka's begs the question, albeit somewhat subtly. I have stated some of the objections to Hintikka's analyses of two modal puzzles in Aristotle. By no means, however, have I given as comprehensive a treatment of Hintikka*s views as I would like. Accordingly, then. I will devote one more chapter to the metaphysical views of modality which Hintikka attributes to Aristotle. Chapter I- :i.ve-Sorabj i on Hintikka on Aristotle In his Necessity, Cause and Blame, Richard Sorabji raises some points in opposition to Hintikka's interpretation of the sea battle argument of De Int. 3. S o r a b j i i s e s p e c i a 11 y c r i t i c a I o f t h e v i e w t h a t t h e principle of plenitude sign ificantly helps in analysing the sea battle argument. 7 8 He also makes some illuminating remarks regarding Hintikka's reconstruction of the Master-Argument >, In this chapter, Sorabj i's views on Hintikka's two interpretations will be briefly discussed. His account of H i n t i k k a ' s t h e o r i e s is si m i I a r t o m i n e i n s e v e r a 1 r e s p e c t s . We can begin with Sorabji's analysis of Hintikka's treatment of De Int., 3:, There are three main groups of objections Sorabji's critique of Hintikka's account of De The first group concerns Hintikka's attack on the traditional interpretation. Sorabji rejects Hintikka's view that Aristotle is not, in De Int. 3, focussing on t h e p r o b 1 e m o f f u t u r e t r u t h S o r a b j i believes n o t only t h a t the traditional interpretation is the best avai 1 ab 1 e solution , but a 1 so that- Hint-ikka' s interpretation is inconsistent. To repeat, the traditional interpretation is that Aristotle saw deterministic, and hence unacceptable, consequences as Int.. •- 61"-t h e r e s u 11 i f i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t a 11 p r e d i c t i o n s a r e true or false in advance of the pertinent events,, Recal 1 further that Hintikka holds that the traditional interpretation commits Aristotle to a denial of the law of ex c 1 uded m i ddie. As I have i. ndie a ted p revi ous 1 y , A r i s to 13. e was a strong defender of the LEM. One group of objections is concerned with Sorabji's scepticism of Hintikka's view that, in De Int. 3, Aristotle was preoccupied with the distinction b etwee n s e n tenc es whi c h are tempo r a11y quaIi fi ed a r i d th ose which a r e n o t ,. So r ab j i is espe c i a 11 y critical of H i n t i k k a * s r e a d i n g o f 13 a23 - 26 ,, T h i s i s the p art w h e r e Hintikka sees a temporal contrast being drawn between sentences of the ordinary form p and the more unusual form of 5p at to ' » Sorabji sees three difficulties with Hintikka's reading of 19a23--26» The first is that the phrase * when it is' does not force us to a consider a moment which is specified independently of the time of utterance,, Sorabj i disagrees that sentences of the form <p at to' are what Aristotle has in mind here. 7 9 The second difficulty which Sorabji detects in this par t of Hintikka's analysis is that Ar isto11e is not, in Sorabji's opinion, discussing sentences at all, let alone ones of the form <p at tc,' at 13a23-2S. Sorabj i doubts -b'•••'•• that sentences are mentioned until we reach 13a32. This objection lacks, in my opinion, the textual justification of S o r a b j i * s o t h e r p o i n t s „ A11 h o u g h i t i s t r u e t h -a t A r i s t o 11 e does not explicitly mention that he is discussing sentences in De Int. 3, he does announce, at the outset of the chapter that he is concerned with restricting a principle which applies to affirmations and negations. And what are affirmations and negations if not sentences? The third defect which Sorabji calls attention to g r a n t s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t A r i s t o 11 e w a s c o n c e n t r a t i n g on sentences which were always true or always false. Sorabji points out that many sentences of the form *p at t of are n e i t h e r a 1 w a y s t r u e n o r a 1 w a y s false. 1" h a t i s , t h e presence of a specified time within a tensed sentence is not a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r e t e r n a 1 t r u t h o r e t e r n a 1 f a I s i t y . (Jons X cier (18) There was a sea battle in 1345. •Sorabj i sees that if the tense is altered for (18) , the resulting sentence will not be always true (or always false) For my part, I would question the real strength of this c ri tic ism „ e o Sorabji has more general doubts about Hintikka's interpretation of the sea battle argument. Sorabji writes that "there are plenty of sentences lacking a calendar date S3-tor equivalent) which would nevertheless meet the requirement that concerns us." 0 1 That requirement is that if a sentence § is true tor false) at all, then S is true tor false) at all times. For Hintikka, S will have the form ' p at to '. Sbrabji*s criticism here is that other forms of sentence would also be viable candidates for S„ Consider t IS*) The-re will be a sea battle in the Piraeus. tl8**) A philosopher king who wears cloaks will be born „ t:l.8**f) The first, cloak worn by a philosopher king will w e a r >0 u t.. None of' these sentences are of the form that Hintikka specif i e s i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n „ Y e t t h e y h a v e e i t h e r b e e n a 1 w a y s t r u e o r a I w a y s f a I s e „63 T h u s , A r i s t o 11 e m u s t, o n Hintikka's interpretation, surrender the gate to the determinist5 sentences like SI-S3 would be either necessarily true or necessarily false., This is precisely the opposite of w h a t H i n t i k ka claims h i s i nt e r pr e ta t i on w ill do. In fairness to Hintikka, he does, in Time and Necessity, question the worth of Aristotle's solution. He contends that Aristotle's problem is not satisfactorily solved, but that Aristotle was nonetheless committed to it. The extent to which Aristotle was committed to the principle of plenitude is another reason for doubting the overall worth of Hintikka's view of De Int. 3 . For he [Aristotle] • accepted the principle of plenitude only in connexion with such things as the heavens, their motions, and the resulting seasons, not in connexion with a battle, or, for that matter , wit h t h e truth a b o u t a b at tile 3 But what of Sorabji's own positive account of the sea battle? It is an overly tentative endorsement of the traditional interpretation. I call it thus because he either offers inadequate replies to the charges levelled at this interpretation or he chooses not to answer such charges. For example, Sorabji does not deal with the problem of Aristotle's comment at 13a23„ As indicated above, I take Aristotle simply to be asserting that events located in the present are necessary (though in a qualified way) .. 1 have no reluctance about adopting the traditional interpretation of the sea battle argument. And I would go further than Sorabj i in that I feel that there are no textual g r o u rids for n o t e n d o r sing t h e t r a d i t i o n a 1 i n ierpretat i o n Sorabji's analysis of Hintikka's account of Aristotle's position on the Master argument of Diodorus is far less detailed than the analysis of the sea battle. Nevertheless, many of Sorabji's criticisms of - 6 5 -Hintikka*s first account are pertinent to Hintikka's second one ••. Like me, Sorabji is skeptical of the extent to which Hintikka attributes the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. In particular, Sorabj j. argues that Arisotle makes limited use of the principle. For in nearly all of them i instances where Aristotle invokes the principle], certainly in all the non-controversial ones, the idea that what is always true of something is necessarily true of it is explicitly applied to everlasting things This view is quite plausible, and hence devastating for Hintikka. For there is no independent evidence that Aristotle thought of sentences as eternal. - fc.fc'_ art II: Aristotle's Modal Ontology and the P h i 1 o s o p h y o f L a n g u a g e ••••67" Chapter Sis-The (SI) and (EG) Problems and the Solution of Code This chapter discusses two further difficulties for any theory of modal ontology as well as a solution to them which Aristotle may have had at his disposal- Both problems are very well-known in the philosophy of language and-will here be referred to as the problems of (SI) (for 'substitutive, ty of identicals') and that of (EG) (f or ex i sten t ia1 gener a Ii zat i on * . Both pr obiems have been used by Quine as reasons for abandoning the many versions of modal logic:; Quins holds that the problems expose the incomprehensible nature of modal l o g i c „ & & As mentioned above, though these problems were directed by Quine at the use of the two modal operators ('it is possible that' and 'it is necessary that') they also pose problems for the use of tensed sentences and for sentences which feature the verb 'becomes'., A demonstration adapted from Alan Code's "Aristotle's Response to Quinean Criticisms of Modal Logic" of this result will be pre s en t e d s h o r 11y „ A c on ven i en t pia c e to begin is with a brief review of Quine's objections. Quine holds that the 'it is necessary that' "btt" operator is referential ly opaque,, Consider Quine Js famous i n f e r e n c e !,' (i> It is necessary that; (3 > 7). (ii) 3 " the number of planets, (Therefore) (iii) It is necessary that; (the number of planets > 7)„ Quine of course recognizes that this argument is invalid,, The problem for Quine is to explain why the inference is invalid,, Either the substi tuti vi ty of identicals must be surrendered or some limitation must be placed on the modal operator. Since Quine is boat-he t o g i v e u p L e i b n i z ? s 1 a w , h e o p t s f o r a r e s t r i c t i. o n o n the applicability of the modal operator,, The problem of (EG) arises as follows: Civ) 9 is necessarily greater than 7. (Therefore) Cv) C x) Cx is necessarily greater than 7) But what is the x of Cv)„ Is it 3 which is identical to t h e n u m b e r o f p 1 a n e t s ? The problem of the substit-uvity of identicals arises for tensed semtences as follows,, It is Cat the time of writing) a lamentable truth that C 13) The F:'resident of the U.S. = Bush On the other hand,, it is also true that (20) The President, of the U.S. attended the Yalta Conf e ren e e i n 1945. But it is false that (20*) Bush attended the Yalta Conference in 1945. Thus, if we view (19) and (20) as premises and (20*) as a c o n c I u s ion , w e a r e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h £t n i n v -a lid f o r m o f argumen t, The problem of existential generalization (ES) is related to that of (SI). If (2:0) is true, then surely (20**) ( x) (x attended the Yalta Conference in 1945) is also true. But which individual is (20**) true of? Is it the President, of the U.S., i.e., Bush? It thus seems that the inference from (20) to (20*) cannot properly be made. It is clear that this difficulty of interpreting quantification will arise for many tensed sentences. (Sentences which feature verbs such as "becomes" or phrases such as "changes into" also fall prev to the problems of (SI) and CEG).®7) Temporal contexts, then, a r e r e f e r e n t i a. 11 y o p a q u e » What is the sign ifigance of showing that (SI) and (EG) are problematic for accounts of temporal change, in addi t i on to a c c o u n t s of modal Iog i c Since we have the same problems showing their heads w i t, h m o d a. I s t a t e m e n t s , and w i t h t e n s e d s t a t e m e n t s , and with statements using the verb "becomes",, we have prima facie reason to suppose that in each of the three cases the difficulties should be handled in the same wav. 8 S Code considers three separate responses to Quine's objections to modal logic. These pr ob 1 ems engender a var i ety oi: r esporises , depending in part on one's theory of reference,, Frege was the first champion of an 4 indirect' theory of reference, and it ranks as the most famous approach to the philosophy of language. Individual concepts are among the intensional entities which are necessary for Frege's theory,,3^ In terms of possible worlds semantics, individual concepts are members of the set of functions f r o ni the d o m a i n o f p o s s i b I e w o r 1 d s t o the d o m a i n o f objects in each of the worlds. One of the apparent benefits of assigning individual concepts to singular terms is. Code points out, that it permits a distinction between necessary and c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y c ]. a i m s . The sentence "a ~ b" is true at some possible world w if the individual concept assigned to "a" has the same value at w as does the individual concept assigned to "b" . If land only if-ti.D.3 the sentence is true in all (of a designated set of) PossibIe worlds, the identi ty expressed is necessary; if it holds at some, but not all, such points it is contingent I write "apparent" because there is a well-known argument by Kripke to the effect that ail identity c 3. a i m s betwee n r i g i d d e s i g n a t ors a r e m e t a p hysically, th ough not epis temo1og i cally, n e c essa r y„ Some philosophers have made cogent criticisms of Kripke's argument „25,1 The issue will not be decided here.. Suffice it to say that some philosophers want- to drive a wedge between necessary and contingent identity claims in a non-Kr ipkean f ash ion » 0ne way to do th is is with iridividua 1 concepts . Code n o t i c e s t h a t i f the r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s of possible worlds are replaced by ones of temporal points, a solution is obtained for the problems of (SI) and (EG) (in respect to both modal logic and temporal change). He refers to Bressan's work on modal calculi as the first to use individual concepts to define i n tens i on-a 1 predicates ,9:2 Each n-place predicate is assigned a f u n c t i o n f r o m p o s s i b 1 e w o r I d s t o s e t s o f n -1 u p 3. e s o f i nd i v i dua 3. c on c ep ts , Code ' s so I u t- i on mod i f i es Br essan f s intensional engineering so that possible worlds can be treated as m axi rn a I c h a i n s o n the d o m a i n s of t i m es. A further point is added: „ ., * I prefer to think of the domains of individuals associated with each point in time as space-time slices (from that time) of individuals. In this way the spatio-temporal coincidence of two space ••••time worms can be reflected by the coincidence of the individual concepts with which they are associated. S3 Call the thesis that there are spatially and temporally discontinuous individual concepts the TQ. Adoption of the TQ would give access to Aristotle and anyone else to a remedy to the difficulties posed by Quine,, Quine*s arguments supposedly undermine the credibility of modal logic, I do not agree at all,, Neither the problem of (SI) nor the one of CE6) pose genuine p r o b l e m s H o w e v e r , various solutions to Quine's criticisms are given; many of these solutions tacitly acknowledge the validity of Quine!s criticisms®151 One of the aspects which I find appealing about the TQ is that it views; Quine* s criticisms as pseudo ~ p r ob 1 ems . Chapter Seven-Code on Spatiotemporal Puzzles in Aristotle This chapter is primarily concerned with critically evaluating Code's arguments in favor of attributing the TQ to Aristotle, Code begins by pointing out that Aristotle felt the following (rec onstruc ted) ar gumen t to be invalid; (21) The musical thing has become the literate th i n g . The r ef o r e , (21*) The musical thing is now the literate thing. Therefore, (by (SI)), < 21**) The 1i te ra te thin g has be c ome the musica1 thing. This argument occurs twice in Aristotle's writing; in Bk , I of the Topics and in Bk„ VI of the Metaphysics ,s,sThe inference was apparently used by certain sophists who hoped thereby to show the following metaphysical thesis to be false:; CMa)Everything which is not eternal has come into being. Code concentrates on the fact that Aristotle has c o r r e c 11 v i d e n t i f i is d t h e f a 11 a c y i n v o 1 v e d i n t h e inference: the sophists were confusing merely coincidental entities with identical ones, "One natural way to understand Aristotle here is to think of the musical and the liter arte as being spa t i o tempo r a 1 continuants which coincide in one another„,,"®7 That is, -74 -Code thinks it natural to attribute to Aristotle, at least in this case,, an answer which is obtained by the Now, Code is fully aware that some philosophers do n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t A r i s t o 11 e d i d n o t confuse the coincidental with the identical. The first stage in Code's argument for attributing the TQ to Aristotle involves, then, a defense of Aristotle against some modern critics. The disagreement is over the correct interpretation of an argument presented in Bk„ V of the Metaphysics. Alan White holds that Aristotle? th e r e c onfuses the f o11ow i ng ques t i on s S f.22) When are two individuals, a and b, c o i n c i d e n t a 1 i n s o m e ( p o s s i b 1 y d i s t i n c t) individual c? and (23) When are a and b one and the same individual? Call White's position the "confusion thesis". Adoption of the confusion thesis does manage to explain at least two puzzling passages in Aristotle. Consider first the following passage from Bk. I of the Topi cs:; ...a third use [of numerical unity] is found when • it is rendered in reference to some accident, as when the c r e a t u r e who i s s i t t i n g , or who i s musical, is called the same as Socrates. 1 0 0 A r i s t o t1 e i s ni a k i n g use o f i h e f a e t t h a t t, h e illus i c a 1 creature c o i n c i des with Socrates as a case of numerical unity. White could claim this is an example of the confusion thesis in action. Now consider the following passage taken from Bk. V of the Metaphysics: „ . . [ t h e 3 w h i t e [ t h i n g 3 -a n d [ t h e 3 m u s i c a 1 11 h i n g 1 are the same because they are accidents of [ c o inc i den In other w>: al to3 the same [thing],,.,..101 rds, Aristotle again uses the fact that two individuals coincide as a rationale for saying that they are one. White could again point to this case a s o n e w h e r e A r i s t o 11 e h a s c o n f u s e d c o i n c i d e n c e w i t h i den t i ty ., Code correctly holds that the distinction between (22) and (23) is a rather obvious one. Prima facie, then, it is bizarre for White to support the confusion thesis. Furthermore, White's main argument is shown by Code to be inconsistent. White insists that the concept of spatio-temporal part is crucial to understanding how individuals such as the wh i te th ing and the musicaI thing can be parts of a third individual (Corsicus). Corsicus is simp 1 y a four dimensiona 1 coritinuant.1 ° a But then (22) and (23) become, respectively, ( 2 2' ) When a r e t w o i n ci i v i d u a I s , a a n d b , s p a t i o -1 e m p o r a 3. p a r t- s o f s o m e t h i r d s p a t i o -t e m p o r a 1 c o n t i n u a n t, c ? a n d ( 2 3' ) W h e n a r e t w o s p a t i o -• t e m p o r a 1 e o n t, i n u a n t s a an d b c: o i n c i den t a 1 ]. y t h e sa ine ? The transition from the ( 22) •• ( 23) pair to the ( 22? ) - ( 23 * ') one is significant beeause though t-here are different answers to the former pair of questions, there is precisely the same answer to the latter pair,, Both < 22* > and < 23 * ') have the following answer: either (1) a is a spatio-temporal part of b; o r (2) b is a s p a t i o ~ t e m p o r a I p a r t. o f a ; or (3) a and b are spatio-temporal parts of some continuant c„ The important point here is that, even if we grant White's assumption that (22) means (22*) and that (23) means (23*), then White's overall claim that Aristotle did not distinguish between (22) and (23) in no way does c! a m a g e t o A r i s t o 11 e' s p o s i t .i. o n „ In other words, if White is correct about (22) and (23) , then both (i) Aristotle was not confused about the r e 1 a t i o n b e t w e e n i d e n t i t y a n d c o i n c i d e n c e , a n d ( i i ) A r i s t o tie w a s r e1y i n g on a forma1 def i ni t i on of c o i n c i d e n c e s i m i 1 a r t o t h e f o 11 o w i n g ^  x c o i n c i d e s i n y iff x is a spatio-temporal part of y„ On the assumption, then, that White is correct, this means that Aristotle t h o u g h t o f c o i n c i d e n t a 1 s a m e n e s s t o b e o n a p a r w i t h t _. "7 7 coincidental oneness. The literate thing and the musical thing of (21) and (21*) are the same because they both share spatio-temporal parts with each other. Notice that this interpretation is consistent with the answer obtained by invoking the TQ; the musical thing and the white thing are one arid the same individual (using Aristotle's sense of "same') in precisely the same way that Bush and Reagan were seen to share spatio-temporal parts using the TQ „ Recall that the President will turn out to be an individual who is both spatially and temporally discon tinuous. The strongest piece of evidence which Code cites to suppor t his c 1 a im that Ar istotie was i nvok ing 11"!e TQ occurs in Bk„ I of the Physics,, Consider the following passage : We say that one thing comes to be from another t h i n g , a n d s o m e t h i n g f r o m s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t, in the case both of simple and of complex things....We can say the man becomes musical, or that what is not-musical becomes [that thing which is] musical, or the not-musical man becomes the musical man,, Now what becomes in the first two cases-man and [that thing which is] not-musical-I call simp 1 e , and what ea.ch becowes~musi ca 1 •-simpIe also. But when we say the not-musi cal man. becomes a musical man, both what becomes and what it becomes are complex. . „ „ .When a simple thing is said to become s ome th i n g, in on e case i t su rv i ves through the process, in the other it, does not. For the man remains a man and is such even when he becomes musical, whereas what is not musical „ „ . .does not survive, either si.mply or combined wi th the subj ec t „ T h e s e el i s t i n c t i o n s d r a w n , o n e c a n g a t h e r f r o rn surveying 'the various cases of becoming in the way w e a r e d e s c r i b i n g t h a t t h e r e m u s t b e a n u n d e r 1 y i n g s o rn e 1 h i n g , n a rn e 1 y t h a t w h i c h b e c o rn e s , a n d t h a t t h .i. s , t h o u g h -a .1 w a y s o n e n u rn e r i. c a 11 y ,, i n f o r rn a t least i s n o t one.:l- ° 3 On the strength of this passage, Code concludes that Aristotle was invoking the TQ. His argument is d e c e p t i v e 1 y s i rn p 1 e s i f A r i s t o 11 e d i d n o t h a v e t h e T 0 a t his disposal, the problems with the verb "becomes" (see r> .&y") will recur at this point. I believe that Code has i r i rn i n d t h e f o 11 o w i n g f si u 11 y i n f e r e n c e : (2 4) T h e rn a n b e c o rn e s t h e t h i n g w h i c h i s rn u s i. c a I . (24*) The man becomes the thing which is unmusical. By (EG), we obtain (24**) ( x ) '• becomes both the musical and unmus i c a 1 th i n g .) There are several aspects of Code's interpretation which I find especially appealing. I agree with the view that the problems of (SI) and of (EG) do not pose genuine d i f f ieu11ies f or the rnoda 1 1 ogic ian . I a 1 so agree that it wa>s more than natural for Aristotle to stress the distinction between continuity and identity. Code agrees wi th 0nine's -asser tion that the criticisms of modal logic force a reversion to Aristotelian essential ism. The following is from Quine's "Referen c e and Moda1i ty" : • ««Aristote1ian essen t ia 1ism is requi red if quantification into modal contexts is to be insisted on,, An object, of itself and by whatever name err none, must be seen as having some of its traits necessarily and others contingently, despite the fact that the latter facts follow just as analytically from some ways of specifying the object as the former traits do from other ways of specifying it. It might, seem that Code is among that group of philosophers who accept the soundness of the Quinean criticisms of modal logic. However, I doubt that this is the case, since the TQ effectively shows that the (SI) and (EG) problems are solvable,, -Mi >•  Chapter E l i g h t - S c o p e Ambiguities and other Modal Inexactitudes in Aristotl; Hintikka's view that the ML.EM occurs at both the start and finish of De Int,, 9 would be much more beIievab1e if there were a strong case to be made for the regular appearance of scope ambiguities in Aristotle's works. For, as we have seen, there is but-one modal operator mentioned in the relevant passages where Hintikka believes there are two. Most convincing w o u 1 d b e t hi e o c c u r e n c e o f m o d a I ( o r a p o d e i t i c ) -i-nexac t i tucies in Aristotle's writings » Hint i kka does give two such examples, though he refrains from using it to bolster the plausibility of his claim. In this c hapter , I will argue that these two c r i t i c i sms of sc oj::e ambiguities in Aristotle's thought are untenable. 1 0 5 / The first case involves Aristotle's stand on two modal syllogisms. It can be shown that Aristotle's endorsement of syllogisms of the form (Sa) and his view t h a t t h o s e o f t h e f o r m (S b) w e r e i. n v a 1 i d c o n t r a d i c t s h i s own conversion rules for modal sentences. (S a) (2 5) A n e c e s s a r i I y b e I o n g s t o a 11 B . (26) B belongs to all C. So, (27) A necessarily belongs to all C. ....•:::• 1 .... < Sb) (28) A belongs to all B. (23) B necessarily belonss to all C. So, (30) A necessarily belongs to all C„ Aristotle's p (Sb) i s osition, that while (Sa) is valid while not, shows that the first line of (Sa) should be translated into formal logic either as ••. o. J • c ? or, equivalent! (Sa) (25'?) M ( B r - y D A . ) Because the first line of (Sa) has the same for m as th third line of the syllogism, as well as the second and third lines of (Sb), corresponding translations of all three can be obtained. The result will be that (Sa) is t h e o n I y v a 1 i d a r g u m e n t o f t h e t w o . The conversion rules which Aristotle used on modal sentences do not allow the following inference: (Sc) (31) A necessarily belongs to no B (32) B necessarily belongs to no A.. Note that (31) and (32) iiini lar in form to (25) and (23) above. So (31) should be translated as ( > ) ( 6 * ^ 0 ~ > A ^ ) and, bv the same token, (32) should be translated as iV*) (A* 0 n&7<) Hintikka believes that Aristotle must have thought, of the 'it is necessary that* operator in the first and second lines of (Sc) as having full scope over the respective sentences. For Aristotle held that the negation of the first line was ( 3 3 ) it is p o s s i b 1 e that A bel o n g s t o s o m e B , The obvious translation of (33) is the de die to C oo ? •, 0 3* (B*A (33) is supposed to be the negation of the first line of (Sc). Assuming that the respective translations are correct, (33?) should also be the negation of (31?), which was the translation of (31). But (33f) is not the negation of (31*). Instead, the negation of (31*) is the de re The t roub1e h e r e i s the t r a n s I a t i o n of ( 3 1 ) . I f our translation of (31) is the de dieto (• O I f J -ft ) C 3 ~ W 1 fa) , as opposed to the de re (31*),then Aristotle is correct in holding that (31) and (33) are negations of each other. The point, then, is that a de die to reading of the "it is necessary that* operator~a reading obtained from Aristotle's conversion rules-contradicts the de re read i n g of tha t oper ato r - wh i c h was suppor ted by Aristotle's defense of (Sa) and his failure to support (Sb)„ There is, then, no consistent way to interpret Aristotle's modal sentences. Or at least this is what H i n t ik ka c oncludes. Does this f aiIur e to dr aw a cIear di st i n c tion between de re and de dicto apodeitic sentence show, by itself, that Aristotle .intended there to be two occurences of the necessity operator where the passages of De Int. 3 only give one? I doubt it. For one thing, •it is at least arguable that Aristotle was aware of the de re/de dicto distinction. (See my analysis of 32b25-3i of the Prior Analytics below.) I would argue instead that Hintikka has not been sufficiently rigorous in his argument. Consider the de re version of (33): ( 3 3 ' ' ) Perhaps it is not obvious but (33'') is the contradictory of (31') „ Another way to make the same point is to notice that (31'') is equivalent to (33'') H e n c e , c o n t r a r y t o w h a t H i n t i k k a h o 1 d s , a c o n s i s t e n t r e a d i n g o f a p o d e i t i c p r e m i s e s i s p o s s i b I e i n t h i s r = = .  OS j . u c : I I I W . U C I V i „ 7 J . l f i •_» •—< « (Bx A H i n t i k k a c o u I d a r g u e t h a t is much less natural than <33J> as a translation of (33) „ Now I would find such an argument to be very puzzling,, Since Hintikka himself does not give such an .argument, I will now do so. Some authors reject de re formulae which use the 'it is possible that' operator. Quine justifies this rejection in "On What There Is": We may impose the adverb 'possibly5' upon a statement as a whole, and we may well worry about the semantical analysis of such usage; but little real advance in such analysis is to be hoped for in e x p a n d i n g o u r u n i v e r s e t o i n c 1 u d e s o ~ c a 11 e d possible entities,, I suspect, that the main motive for this expansion is simply the old' notion that Pegasus, for example, must be because otherwise it would be nonsense to say even that he is not. 1 0 7 Quine is making two claims here: Ci) the preference for de die to modal formulae is justified because they do not r e q u i r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f n e w e n t i t i e s ; (. i i ) t h e motivation for the introduction of possible entities (which would accompany several, though not all, de re modal formulae) is the orobiem of non-existence. Both claims are dubious. Let us consider them in reverse order . (i i > is, I think, more clearly false. The problem of talking about non-existent entities need not be the reason for allowing de re modalities. It is t r us th a t f i c t i on a 1 en t i t j. es r ep r esen t a spe c i a 1 pr ob 1 em for the de re theorist.10® But the problem of non-existence, as is well known, can be solved without p o s s i b 1 e e n t i t i e s . T h e m o t i v a t i o n f o r p o s i t i n g t h e existence of de re modalities lies in several -areas, but the problem of non-existence is not one of them, I have a 1 r e a d y e x p r e s s e d, i n c h a p t e r s e v e n , m y s c e p t i c i s m a b o u t the problems of (SI) and of (EG). I am equally dubious about other criticisms of de re modalities. In addition, de re modal formulae are needed to properly capture our intuitions. Consider the ambiguous sentence (34) The author of Hamlet might not have written Hamlet. One de die to version of (34) is (34* ) Now it is clear that (34?) does not. convey the force of (34); (34*) is obviously false, But the de re version of ( 34) does con vey t he i n tende>j f or ce : (34 ? O l x C W x A V y O t y ^ * / ^ r that (34 ? ) does not. convey the force o obviously false, But the de re version onvey the intended force: A (fly The fact that de re modal formulae, such as (34 f ?) , seem to be required obviously undermines (i) as well as (ii). New entities are indeed being introduced in (34*f) . But if this introduction is required to make sense of (34), then so be it. I am thus skeptical about Quine*s first claim. On the other hand, (i) is not as clearly false as (ii). For Quine would presumably justify (i) on the grounds that de re modal formulae presuppose transworld identity. And Quine has at his disposal an analysis of (34**) which is similar to his analysis of de re epistemic formulae in "Quantifiers and Prepositional Attitudes",, In both cases, the "problem" of quantifying into .in tens ion a I contexts would be solved. 1 1 0 At best, Hintikka has shown that the Stagirite was unc 1 ear when i t came to the sc ope of moda 1 oper ator s ; Aristotle did not embed modal operators consistently. I n s t e a d , h e c h o s e t o i. n t- e r p r e t d i f f e r e n t s y 11 o g i s m s w i t h either a de re or a de dicto reading of the modal premisses „ : l 1 More importantly, the interpretation which Hintikka gives of the start and finish of De Int., 9 (the MLEM') i s t h a t t h e o p e r a t o r .i s e m b e d d e d t w i c e w i t h i n t h e L IE M . So the MLEM cannot be said to be a (clear instance of) de re sentence as opposed to the de dicto f^J (p V --jp) . (This latter sentence is what Hintikka believes the f r i e n d s o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a I i n t e r p r e t- a t i o n t o b e committed to.) However, Hintikka's interpretation requires • not onIy cases of scope ambiguity but cases of unexpected occurrence of modal operators as well. For cases of the former sort establish that a de dicto reading of the disputed passages might not be intended, and nothing more. A case of the latter sort would show that Aristotle attached modal operators to sentences even when the 'natural' way to read such sentences would indicate otherwise,, Hintikka needs such a case to succsssfully a11r ibute the liLEii to Ar istotie.1 :l A v Hintikka maintains that there are sentences in •istotle's syllogistic that feature unexpected currences of modal operators. The following is taken orn Bk. 1 of Prior Analytics:; We must understand * that which belongs to every* with no limitation in respect of time. e.g. to the p r e s e n t o r t o a p a r t i c u 1 a r peri o cl, b u t w i t h o u t qualification. For it is with the help of such p r o p o s i t i o n s t h a t w e m a k e d e d u c t i o n s . s i n c e i f t h e proposition is understood with reference to the p r e s e n t rn o rn e n t, t h e r e c a n n o t b e a d e d u c t i o n . F o r n o t h i n g perhaps prave n t- s rn an b e 1 o n g i n g a t a particular time to everything that is moving, i.e. if nothing else were moving; but moving is possible for every horse; yet man is possible for no horse. Further let the first term be animal, t h e rn i d d 1 e m o v i n g , t he la s t rn a n „ The p r o p o s i t i o n s then will be as bef ore, but the c on cIus ion n ecessary , n o t p o s s i b 1 e . F o r rn an is necessarily a n i m a 1 ,, 11 i s t h e n c 1 e a r t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a I rn u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t q u a I i f i. c a t i o n , a n d n o t I i m i t e d i n r espec t of t i me „ % 1 3 Let us again consider (26) . Hintikka! argues that the passage just cited, when conjoined with the principle of plenitude, means that (26) has the same force as <26.> D V * f ^ ) ( 26 * ) w i 3.1 app 1 y to a 13. i nd i v i dua 1 s a t a 13. t i me; Sorabj i * s remarks on the applicability of the pr :i.nc ip].e of p 1 en i tude (see p . 43) may a r ouse suspicion in Hintikka's reading of sentences like (26). That is, it might be inappropriate to invoke the principle of p I e n i t u d e f o r e r 11 i t i e s s u c h ai s p r o p o s i t i o n s - L e a v i n g such concerns aside, it is incredible, and almost assuredly false, to charge that sentences which share the form of (26) should be read as ones like (26' ) . Many conditionals have the same form as (26) and yet it would be false to claim that they are true when prefixed by a * i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h -a t o p e r a t o r s „ 11 m i g h t., f o r e x a. m p 1 e , be true that (35) All tresspassers will be prosecuted, but false that (36) It is necessary that (all tresspassers will be! p r o s e c u t e d) „ Another good reason for rejecting Hintikka's contention that Aristotle looked on all universally q l i a n t i f i e.d c o n d i t i o n a I s a s b e i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f a n 1it is necessary that' operator is that the view is inconsistent with Aristotle's rejection of the syllogism given above as (Sb). Consider again (28) A applies to all B» I f H i i"i t i k k a i s c o r r e c t, then A r i s t o tie equate d (2 8) w i t h (37) it is necessary that; A applies to all B» The translation of (36) is ( 3 7 ' ) The rationale for Hinti kka' s transIat ion of conditions is that the whereas the CSb) syllogism is invalid, the syllogism would be valid if (28) were replaced by (37)„ It is incredible that though Hintikka comments on the fact that unspoken necessity operators having full scope over universally quantified conditionals contradicts Aristotle's rejection of. the (Sb) syllogism, h e d o e s n o t s e e t h e i n c o n sis t e n c y o f h i s o w n v i. e w s „ Hintikka argues on the one hand that (23) and (30) must have d e re read i ngs bec ause the sy]. 1 og ism as a who 1 e i s i n va I :i. d ac c o r d i n g to A r i s to11 e „ H i n t :l k k a th en h o 1 ds that the syllogism is really a valid one,, Where then is the rationale for giving de re readings to the syllogism? And if it is valid, why did Aristotle reject-it? Was he genuinely confused? Hintikka has some explaining to do „ Yet all he says is that the validity of (3b) f u r ther suppo r ts the view that A ri sto tie di d n ot embed operators in a consistent fashion,, This part of Hintikka's discussion about Aristotelian modality is very weak „ Surely it is more plausible to read, the passage from the Prior Analytics as a warning .against using conditionals which are tied to times in conjunction with m odaI dr em i ses which m i gh t be t i ed to ti mes. The result will be a counter intuive one. The interpretation of Hintikka is not only implausible, but it lacks j us t i f i c a t i on as we 11 . :l Hintikka has -another argument which seeks to establish that sentences like (26) should be understood as ones like <26'). Consider the following syllogism, also taken from the Prior Analytics: < S e) < 3 8) A p o s s i b 1 y b e I o n g s t o e v e r y B . <33) B belongs to every C. So, <40) A possibly belongs to every C. Hintikka then makes the sweeping pronouncement that it doesn't "matter how you interpret the premisses, there is no hope of turning the syllogism into a valid one unless you lend modal force,,,,.," to <33), Certainly the foI lowing de die to reading of <Se) is invalid: «8.> o w ( 8 ^ A ^ (33-:> y - y ( C - y Q n f ) s o , <40. > /> V ^ ( C v A ^ ) On the basis of this interpretation, Hintikka argues that <33) must be understood as Yet a de re reading of the same syllogism is valid: O S - , V * ^ ^ 4 / W ) It was hard to believe that this alternate, and perfectly natural,, interpretation of (Se) did not occur * to Hintikka. To be fair, Hintikka does give the de re reading of (Se), but only after his ill-timed comment. However, Hintikka cites a further piece of the Prior Analytics to establish his point that the de dicto, and he de r re aiding is t h e c ne to b e pr & f er r e d : The x p r es s i on ' :i. t is L n s i 1 e fo r thi t be 1 or I to at * m ay be ta ken 'j. n t vV c ways : e i t h iri? r 4 to wh ich i t be I ongs i or 4 tc whi C h i f may be J. on g v fo r " A may be sa id of t hat of wh i c B + rr eans ci n e c p othe r -£ i { the se -e i th er 4 of w h i c h B X s s aid' o r i'Z f wh x c h i t may b e sai d' ; and tso-jv „ C a ] t h e r e is n c d i f f e r en c e bet we en ' A m ay be sa i d o f t h t of B' an d ! A m ay be 1 on c? to ev ery B' . It i s r i ear t hen t h —. + "ie e x. c re ss ion 4 A may poss 1 I.J I V be long to e y e r y B' m i ght be I j r.n ed i n two way s . T s t then we m S .1 st st a t e t he !•"• "i + t ! w. u ur e and charac t e r i s t 'i C s c f the ded Li! r t i '. J l ~\ w hi i c h ar i s e s if B is pos sibl i t h e su b.i ec t of C: at n d A X s pO s s i b 1 of the sub j e r t o f B. i- o r t hu s th pre po si t i on s ai r e at ssum e H X n t he m ode C' f pos S X bi lit but w hene V e r A i s po s s i b I p f th e .-, , l~ i. J e c t of B , one prop ii s t i o 1"! is s i mp I 3 n th e other pos s i b I e . C o n s e q u e n 11 y w a mu s t s t-art W i th pre po si t i o wh i c h a r e s x m i 3. a r i n f o r rn c s in ti-e oth e r c ase s . I find it difficult to accept this passage as proof that the de dicto reading of (Se) is the only correct one. Hintikka does not even read the passage as a recognition on Aristotle's behalf of the de re/de dicto distinction in sentences of the form 'A may be1on g to every B' •-•92-Perhaps this is unfair, since in chapter two of Time and Necessity, Hintikka seems to be on the verge of endorsing this view., His subsequent rejection strikes me as b i zar r e „1 11 i s a 1 so i mpo r tan t to r eroember th a t, as Hintikka himself argues, there are .syllogisms for which a de re, -and others for which a de die to reading of the m o d a 1 o p e r a t o r C o f e i t h e r k i. n d) i s m o r e -a p p r o p r i a t e „ I n my opinion, CSe) belongs to that class of syllogisms which should be interpreted which contain modal premises of the de re variety. So this second argument which tries to show that Aristotle did not always explicitly call attention to tIne presence of modat 1 operators is , like its predecessor, unconvincing. I f th is is cor rec t, Hin t i kka does not sue ceed in s h o w i n g t hi a t t h e M L £ M i s t h e p r i n c i p I e b e i n g r e s t r i c t e d . Thus far, we have only considered the positive evidence and have concluded that it is inadequate. Two strong pieces of negative evidence have previously been d i s c u ssed„ The f i r s t piece oc c u rs when A ri s to 11e ca11s our attention to the faulty inference from Q ,;-P V P •' to the conclusion p V £ 3 -jid . Ar isto11e's warn ing conc er n ing this inf er en ce occur s at lSa27-33 of De Int. 9. It is highly unlikely that he would call attention to the very distinction which H i n t i k k a c I a i m s , a I b e i t i rn p 1 i c. i 11 y , is b e i n g i g n o r e d . When I say that Hintikk.afs implicit claim is that the distinction is being ignored, 1 simply mean that Hintikka in no way recognizes that it is prima facie bizarre to interpret the inference at 19a27-33 in the way he does. And the reason his interpretation is prima facie bizarre is that the passage in question makes no mention of two separate occurences of the 4 it is necessary that' operator; the evidence suggests only one operator. So it is incumbent on Hintikka to give a •f o r c e f u 1 a r g u m e n t f o r t h e allege d p r e s e n c e o f t w o o p e r a t o r s . The second piece of negative evidence was sc rut in ized in chapter three. Hint ikka's attribution to Aristotle of the view that the MLEM needs to be restricted implies that Aristotle did not distinguish the PB from the LEIi. As I have argued in chapter two, it seems false to suppose that Aristotle merged the two logical principles. Hintikka's interpretation regarding the start and finish of De Int. 3 is thus mistaken on several counts. Not only is there no reason to hold that he is correct there are Cat least) two reasons for doubting it. '•Quine formulated these two dif f icul ties in his "Reference and Modality" . CIn From a logical Point of View,, Problems involving the substi tutivi ty of identicals were raised in Russell's seminal essay, "On Denoting" . But the formulation of the problems is different,, By 'trivial determ in isrn f I rnean the sor t contained in the saying "What will be, will be",, Equally trivial is the determinism evinced by Aristotle comment in De Int„ 9 that "everything necessarily will be or will not be,," I contend that Hintikka is incorrect when he asserts that this comment indicates the falsity of the traditional interpretation of the sea battle argument„ ^Hintikka himself is somewhat inconsistent as to how Aristotle is to be understood with respect to determinism,, Aristotle was strongly opposed to fatalism. Hintikka*s rather implausible view is that Aristotle was himself largely unaware of his own reasons for this rejection,, •"•I am using here Ross ' translation of the Metaphysics in The Collected Works of Aristotle, edited by .Jonathan Barnes. The Barnes edition is used t h r o u g h ou t t his thesis. 3Kripke's approach in the 1963 paper is considerably more sophisticated than his paper "A C o rn p 1 e t e n e s s T h e o r e m i n M o d a 1 L. o g i c " . ®I have in mind here thhe works of -Joseph Alrnog. "Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blames Pe rspe c t i ves on Aristotle's Theory. aThe philological arguments are primarily due to Sorabj i ., svI do not wish the reader to confuse this unrestricted principle with the restricted logical p r i n c i p 1 e rn e n t i o n e d before . :l°At any rate, this is the clear implication of an end note to Code's paper,, a-1 I a m r e f e r r i n g t o AImog. 1:'-'Ar istotle , De I n t . , 3 ,, : i a Arthur Love j o y , The Great Chain of B e i n g , (Cambr idge , Mass „ , : l-IUP , 1936) , p „ 72 „ ' "-But even if, as Hintikka holds, it is the first pair which Aristotle adhered to, an uncomfortable i n c on s i sten c y soon a ri ses . l sJaakko Hintikka, Time and N e c e s s i t y ? (Oxford: OUP, 1373), P„ 35. 1 6So Lovejoy's account, if not hopelessly a mbiguous, is si mp1y fa Ise. 7 A r i s t o 11 e , Metaphysics. ^'Hintikka, p. 93. ^Hintikka, p., 93. :20Hinti kka goes on to identify "mere possibility" with contingency. Cur ious1y enough, thi s emphas i s on s u b 11 e d i s t i n c i i o n h a s n o r o 1 e t o p 1 a y i n H :i. n t i k k a' s account of Aristotle's stand on unactua1ized particulars„ 2 1 A r i s t o t l e , P o s t e r i o r A n a l y t i c s . Hintikka, p., 101,. 2 3 1 think that Hintikka's subsequent argument is most untenable,, My own view is that Aristotle's recognition of unactua1ized potentialities is tantamount to an exp1i c it renunc iat ion of an unrestr i c ted version o f t h e p r :!. n c i p I e o f p 1 e n i t u d e „ T h i s , c o u p led with s o m e of the textual evidence adduced by Hintikka, forces me t o c o n c1ude t ha t th oug h the pr i nc ip1e of pIen i tude was present in Ar istotie, i t was not, for Ar isto11e, an omnipotent metaphysical thesis,, ^ H i n t i k k a , p„ 1 0 0 . s:EiAristotle, Bk „ III, P h y s i c s . a sAristotle, Bk. XI, Metaphysics. 2 7Hintikka, p. 105, 5213 A r i s t o 11 e , B k „ IX, Metaphysics, 2S,Ar istotle , Bk . IX, Metaphysics , a.oj...j j n t i k ka * s caise f or the s i gn i t i c an c e of uactualized depotantialities is madein various places in Time and Necessity, I argue iri chapter two that hob: t e m p o r a 1 a n d m o d a I o p e r a t o r s t o b e s t r i c 11 y i n t e r c h a n g e a b 1 e yields t h e u n | p o s s i b i I i t i e s a r e act u a I i zed . i n g a I a t a b 1 e r e s u 11 t h a t a 3.1 3 1 The closest thing to an affirmation of the pr inc ipie is Ar isto11 e's comment that "it is impossib 1 e for a thing always to exist and yet to be destructible.„. ." Cat 281b34 of On the Heavens). But there is no argument from Aristotle to establish the truth of C2) C let alone aan argument, in favor of C 2' ) ) . 3SBAristotle, Bk . IX Metaphysics.. 3 3Ar istotle , Bk. I, On the Heavens. -"'^Hintikka, p. 105. This argument in particular is confusing. I had thought that Hintikkafs overall contention was that Aristotle's modal terminology is best understood if we first attribute the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. . <But in light of the cited passage, this seems wrong.) 3 SHintikka, p. 147. 3 e H in t i kka , pp „ 3.48- 149 „ 3 7 1 think that Hintikka's objections to the t r a d i t i o n a I i rite r p retati o n a r e i n c o r r set. I am a I s o critical, in chapter seven, of his positive argument in favor of his own interpretation„ 3S'Hinti kka , p. 151. " Y e t , as I have indicated, the provisos regarding unactualized potentialities appear to be most unconvine ing„ "°For Hintikkafs point about the "now" to stand. elimination here of the indexical cannot be allowed. Hintikka , p. 151. AffiHintikka „ p. 152. A 3Aristotle , De I n t . 3. •"•"•Hintikka, p. 158. a sIhi5 suggestion was by Richard Robinson, Feb. 16, **Aristotle, De Int. 3. think acceptance of the ML EM would cause damage even if sentences lacked the form of C3) . 4GIf, has not been pointed out that, from the point o f v i e w o f t h e d e f e n d e r o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a 1 interpretation, it is precisely the fact that Hintikka ascribes to Aristo11e a subsidiary ro1e of the prob1em of future truth which guarantees the deficiency of A r i s to tie's all eged so.l u t i on ,. Fo r the t. r ad i t i on a 1 interpretation does result in a satisfactory solution. "•-'Aristotle, Bk. IV, M e t a p h y s i c s . Ar is to tie, B k. IV, Me taph ys i c s . ® i p r Q f y c; o r a b j i , p . 9 8 . ^Hintikka, p. 148. ®3Hintikka, p. 153. S dHxntikka, p. 181. s sEven though I am reluctant to accept Hintikka's assumption, I feel that there are other aspects of his argument which have more blatant defects about them . lseH i n t i k ka , pp . 180- 181. s7Beirison Mates, Stoic Logic, (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal„ Publications in Philosophy, 1953), p. 37. e 3 H i n t i k k a , p p , 1S 9-190 S 90ne of the arguments is designed to show that Ar i sto 11 e ' s use of c ond i t i ona 1 s mus t be uncie r s tood as an employment of modality. This argument is almost assu r ed 1 y f a 1 se . "!"he r am i f i. c at i ons f o r H i n t, i k ka a r e somewha t c ur i ous. s o A r i s t o t l e , Bk . 111 , Rhetor i C . e 1Hintikka , p. 183 . •^Aristotle's strong defence of the LEM is in no way vitiated if it is assumed that the PB, and not the LEM, is the focus of the attack in De Int. 3. If one wishes to block the fatalistic consequences of the sea battle argument , the PB is a legitimate target. As Sorabji shows, Aristotle's argument in De Int. 9 is best understood by appeal to the traditional interpretation . ®3Ar is totie , Bk. VI, Nicomaeh©ah E t h i c s . S dAristotie, Bk„ I, On the Heavens This emphasis on the relative roles of temporality and modality is at considerable variance with Hintiikka's position that Aristotle was largely unaware of these relative roles. Geftristotle, Bk. I, Prior Analytics. s 7 A r i s t o t i e , Bk . I , Prior Analytics. s 3 A quick read o f the passage in question 1 eads one to suspect that Hintikka mmade a simpie error „ e 3Ar i s to 11 e , Bk . V111 , Phys i c s v o i.j n t i k k a ' s view s o n M e g a r i a n d e t e r mini s m a r e f a r less plausible than hs ones on Aristotle's sea battle argument„ 7 1Hintikka, p. 192. 72Hint.i kka , p. 195. 7 3My objection to the inference of (10*) from (10) obviously apply to the inference of (14*) from (14). '^ '•Hint :i. kka, p., 200. The converse of (16) was assumed by Aristotle, according to Hintikka. There is not a shred of textual evidence which would make this contention a plausible one. 7 SNor is there any compelling textual evidence to justify the ascr i p t i on to D i odor us of (17). •^Hintikka's version of the d e r e (16*a') seems susp i c i ous . See p. 208 . '^Hintikka, p. 211 . • '^ 'l. i k e me , So r ab j i e x p 1 i c 11 y en do r ses the t rad it i ona1 i n te r pr e ta t i ori of De Int. 3„ '^Sorabj i ,NtSC©ffiiSity, CiHUSif and Slam©, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), p. 134. I concur with Sorabj i *s assessmerit; Hin ti kka simpIy 1.ac ks the tex tua 1 evidence to make his analysis a convincing one. I think that Hintikka could rightly deny that Sorabji's point would somehow vitiate his (Hintikka's) a na1ysis i n te r ms of tempo r a 11y spe c i f i ed sen ten ess. A11 Hintikka would have to do would be: to exhaustively list the necessary and sufficient conditions which are required for his thesis. Space does not allow me to do so here, but I aim nevertheless convinced that Sorabj i is mistaken on this point. 0 1 S o r a b j i , p . 1 3 4 . ©sagr a 5 j j f s p 0 j n t. , c an , I th i n k , be pu t an o th e r way: there is no reason to think that sentences of the form of (3) are essential to the position that Aristotle's determinism is generated by predictions whose e v a I u a t i o n is f r o m the pre s e n t 1 o o k i n g b ai c k w a r d s . S33Sorabj i , p. 135. e AThe d i f f i c u 11y regar ded by Sor ab j i as pr ob I ematt i c for the traditional interpretation is the fact that Aristotle asserts that the LEM is a tautology. I agree, but I believe this is consistent with a restraint on PB. esSorabji„ p„ 132. 3®Quine, "Reference and Modality", in Prom a logical po i n t. of v i ew . Pe r h aps " ph i 1 osoph i c a I uselessness" should take the place of "incomprehensible n a t u re" „ T h e r e a r e at c t u a 11 y t h r e e c r i t i c i s m s w h i e h 0 u i n e levels at modal logic. I will not discuss the third . OO" c r i t i c isrn here as i t is a mat-1er of sorne dispute how to interpret- this objection . "I"he prob 1 erns of <SI) and (EG) are, by way of contrast, totally straightforward. e C o d e uses t h e f o 11 o w i n g i n f e r e n c e t o s h o w t h a t the problem of (EG) occurs with the verb "becomes": ( :i.) The Vice-President becomes the President. (ii) The Speaker of the House becomes the Vice-President. —7 (Therefore) (iii) (. -J x) (x becomes the President the Speaker of the House becomes x) The accompanying assumptions that we make to show the irnp 1 ausibi 1 i ty of th is inference are ( a) that Ford is t he Vice •• P r e s i d e n t r eferred t o i n ( i ) a n d t h a t (b) t here w a s a t i rn e at w h i c h R oc kef el ler w a s t h e S p sake r o f t h e House referred to in (ii)„Now the x in (iii) is clearly n e i. t h e r F ord n o r Roc kef el ler . Kee p ing these ass u m p tions (actually, (a) is a fact not merely an assumption) we can also show that the verb "becomes" also falls prey to the problem of (SI). Code, pp. 161-162. sieCode, p „ 162,. es,David Kaplan has demonstrated that individual c ori c ep ts can be painlessly eliminated in "How to Russell a Frege-Church"„ 55,0Code , p. 170. 91ftlriiog has raised some concerns which are especially p e r t ine n t. Yet- t h e t h e o ry of d i r e c t ref ere n c e remains intact. 3 : 2 : Sl3Code, p., 171. -'•"•ftThe problem of (SI) rnsy be resolved with Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions. As for the problem of (EG), I am prepared to accept the final existsntially quantif ied sentences. »®For example, David Lewis reacts by outright-denial of transworld identity. Kit Fine radically alters the doma i ns of h i s poss ib 1 e wor 1 ds , so as to nu 11 if y the de re/de di c to d i sst inc t i on „ 9 GThis inference is somewhat irritating in that it-does not use three terms,, 3 7Code, p. 170. l o i t is by no means a simple problem with which this chapter is based, namely, whether it is correct or not to list Aristotle among the dherents of the TQ „ On the one hand, it seems anachronistic in the extreme to hold that Aristotle thought of individual concepts as does a modern phiIosopher of 1anguage ; he simply lac ked the require d i n tens i o n a I t o o I s » 0 n t h e o t h e r hand, it-would be wrong to view Code's argument as anything besides the attempt to show that the TQ is the modern clay counterpart to Aristotle's own way of handling the (SI) and (EG) problems. -J,3That is, White is accusing Aristotle of confusing identity with mere overlap. 1°°Aristo11e, Bk„ I, Topic®. l o lAristotle, Bk. V, Metaphysics. *OS5But, of course, a different example, with a different number of dimensions, could have been used. 103ftristotle, Bk. I, Physics. ""'Quine, "Reference and Modality", p. 29. l o sThe original intent of this chapter was to deprive Hintikka of an argument which he did not explicitly make, namely that the presence of modal inexactitudes shows that ascription of the MLEM to Aristotle is not implausible. Lately, however, I have realized that a di f f erent- po i n t can be argued f or :; Aristotle's modal sy11ogisms are valid if the modal formulae are given de re readings. 3 0 GHintikka does not specify where there occurs the evidence upon which his argument is based. After an extensive search, I have found that the passage in question is located at 25a31~33 of Bk. I of the Prior Analytics. 1 0 7Quine "On What- There Is", p. 4. 1 °® A sen tence w i. th an y i n d i v i dua 1 c on s tan t m i gh t- o r might not be true, depending on the semantics and on whethsr the ind j. v idua 1 c onstan t names a f i c t i ona 1 en t i ty o r n o t« *04*Th is example is due to Kripke. •x i oij,.-, f r -j- Lin lately, Qu i n e ' s an a lysis of d& re m o da1i t y wouId compell h i m to use pos s i bIe worlds, something Quine is loathe to do,, 1 1 1 1 find Hintikka's approach to be puzzling,, 11 odern ph i. 1 osophers allow for scope distinct!ons in moda1 f or muIae; why can't anc ient phiIosopher s be o wed the same o p t i o n ? 2But Hint ikka does not ar gue a 1 omg such lines ,. 1 1 3Aristotle, Bk . I, Prior Analytics. i 1 1 4 T h e inconsistency just mentioned is most powerful ., 1 :li5iAr istotle , Bk » I, Prior Analytics. i *«Hintikka, p. 38. This part of Time and Necessity contains what I consider to be a straightforward error;; Hintikka says that Aristotle thinks of the following sentence as ambiguous: C P) it is possible for A to apply to all B. I agree. But Hintikka's pair of ambiguous readings seem to be the de die to C P i) it is possible th at;; A applies to everything to which B in fact applies, and the de re £P:S> A possibly applies to everything which B possibly applies. My disagreement is with CP a); I prefer the f o11ow i n g : (P 2.) A possibly applies to every B„ The trans1aticms of the two de re interpretations (. (. F'a ') and ( Ps; > > are, r espec t i ve 1 y , .' car;;, icapci. vcj. y , j i V x d 0 * - > O A * i. nd CP«. (11th hour observation: it occurs to.me that Hintikka mav sirnoly be holding that for Aristotle has a choice not between (Pj.) and (Pa) but instead between CPs:) and what I have called C P a»). On this reading, Aristotle was exposing the ambiguity between two de re sentences, and was unconcerned about any de dicto interpretations of CP). Because of this latter point, I think that this interpretation is also implausible.) (31ossarN de re/de die to di s ti n c t i on -a formula F is de re iff F contains a modal op eras tor 0 such that either (i) 0 has scope over any individual constant in F; (ii) 0 has scope over any free variables in F; or Ciii) at least some of the b o u n d v a r i ab1es of F are bound by at quantifier which lies outside the scope of 0 ,, -a formulat F is de dicto iff F con tat ins a modal operator 0 and is not de re. Megarian De term in ism-'T'hat brand of determinism which was a r g u e d f o r b y D i d o r u s „ P r i n c i p 1 e o f Plenitude-Metaphysical thesis ascribed by Hintikka to Aristotle, which (roughly) is that, the distinction between temporality and modality is more apparent than real. In The Great Chain of Being, Love,joy traces the role played by the principle in a variety of the philosophical problems,. These include the argument from evi 1 , Temporally Qualified and Unqualified Sentences-This is the key distinction of Hintikkafs treatment of the sea battle argument. The difference is between sentences of 'p at to' and ones of the form p . Traditions*I Interpretation-This term applies to several separate accounts of Aristotle's arguments in the ninth chapter of his book De Interpret-at- ione, all of which share the view that the problem of future truth has a direct bearing on the vindication of fatalism in the chapter ,, Problems of (SI) and (EG)-The two unambiguous problems posed for modal logic in Quine?s "Reference and iioda I i ty " „ BibIiography Code, Alan., "Aristotle's Response to Quine's Criticisms of Modal Logic",, In The -Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1977 . Hintikka, J'aakko,, Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality. Oxford: Oxford Un iv . Press , 1973„ Hintikka, -Jaakko and R ernes, Unto and Knuut-ila, Si mo. Aristotelian Modality and Determinism. In Acta Philosophica Fennica. Vol. 29, No. 1. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1977. Kaplan, David. "How to Russell a Frege-Church" „ In The Possible and the Actual Ed „ Michael -J. Loux „ Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979. pp. 210-224. Kolmogorov, A.M. "On the Principle of Excluded Middle". In From Frege to Godel. Ed. J'ohan Heijenoort. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1925. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Princeton: Princeton Un i v ,. Press, 1970. P r i o r , A r o n . •" T h r e e - V a 3. u e d L o g i c a n d F u t u r e Contingents",, In Philosophical Quarterly, 1953. Time and Tense. Oxford: OUP, 1968. Sorabji , Richard. Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1930 Quine, Uillard Van Ormam . From a logical point of view. Cambridge, Mass.: Harper Torchbooks, 1953. 


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