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Aristotle's modal ontology Dickson, Mark William 1989

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ARISTOTLE f S MODAL ONTOLOGY By MARK WILLIAM B ,, A „ ,  The  Un i v e r s i t y  A THESIS  of  SUBMITTED  DICKSON B r i t ish  IN PARTIAL  THE REQUIREMENTS  Co 1 u a b i a ,  FUL.FILLMENT  FOR THE DEGREE OF  MASTER OF ARTS  in THE FACULTY  OF GRADUATE  C Department-  Ue  a ccepi to  this  the  t hes i s  normal  THE UNIVERSITY  Ph i l o s o p h y )  as  c o n f o r ro i n g  standard  OF B R I T I S H  April 0  of  STUDIES  COLUMBIA  1383  Ma r k W :i. 11 i am D i c k s o n ,,  1983  1986  OF  In  presenting  degree  this  at the  thesis  in  partial  University  of  British Columbia,  freely available for reference copying  of  department publication  this or of  thesis by  this  for  his thesis  or  and study. scholarly her  Department  DE-6 (2/88)  v~uiumuia  of  the  requirements  I agree  that the  I further agree  purposes  may  representatives.  for financial  permission.  The University ui d u m m i Vancouver, Canada  fulfilment  gain shall  be  It not  for  an  advanced  Library shall  make it  that permission  for  granted  head  is  by  understood be  allowed  the that  without  extensive of  my  copying  or  my written  i i  Hbstract liocia1  Iog1c  necessity.and ontology are  the  is  summed  This  modal  analysed  in  a  some sea  of  is  is  of  is  primarily  about  that  Aristotle  made  four  clarify  ontology  century  modal  that  of  the when  he  ontology  is  modal  some  problems,, the  have  modal  been  If  it  true  ba 111ew  predictions  that  if  the to  are  namely  the  sea  modality  case  is  is  then  there is  of  battle  The with  always  famous Here  is  th-at  in  will not  One a n a l y s i s that  the  currently  true,  metaphysi ca1  Aristotle,  merges the  that  supported?  length.,  is  tomo r r ow,  inevitable  being  by  phiIosophers»  problem"  if  My  advanced  9.  sea  here  discussions  Interpretatione  holds  effectively  user  De  is  attributed  "What  of  it  interpfeted  question,  argument  sense  Hintikka  modal  considered  the  at  the  of  be  a  studied  problem  following of  of  to  be  determinism  logic  problem  will  battle;  the  cental  Ar i s t o i l e r s  to  modal  first  battlef  there  the  thesis  is  twentieth  summary  The  c on j unc: i i o n • wi t h  Aristotle's  'sea  w i th  commitments  terms,,  objective,  The  in  commitments  employed  certain  up  ontological  ontological  of  concerned  possibiIity.  terminology?"  primary  is  in a  fact form  be of  in  J'aakko  argument  Hintikka. is  best  pr i n c i p 1 e  o f 'pien i tude  principle  of  temporality;  true,  and  vice  plenitude what  is  versa.  a  x  :l  i  Hintikka also interprets Aristotle's stand on the 4  M a s t e r A r g u rn e n t? o f D i o d o r u s i n 1 i g h t o f t h e  attribution of the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. D i o d or us' a r g u rn e n t  i s the s e c o n d o f t h e f o u r problems  that this essay considers,. Unlike Aristotle, Diodorus appears to have favored a strong version of determinism. According to Hintikka, Diodorus  actually strove to  prove the principle of plenitude (as opposed to assuming it, as Aristotle presumably did). I am very sceptical regarding Hintikka's interpretations of these two problems. The sea battle argument is not adequately answered by the solution which Hintikka sees Aristotle adopting. Alternative answers are relatively easy to come by. I he evidence cited by Hintikka for ascribing the principle of plenitude is, it is shown, somewhat  inconclusive.  As for the Master Argument, there is a great deal of paucity in regards to textual evidence. Hinikka himself virtually concedes this point. (Thus, whereas I feel it to be incumbent to offer an alternative  interpretation  of the sea battle argument, 1 do not share this attitude towards the Master Argument.) The third and fourth problems plav a key role in twentieth century analytic philosophy. Both were firstformulated by W.V. Quine in the forties. These problems  are somewhat subtle and will not be explained further. Suffice it to say that an analysis of Aristotle's works by Alan Code reveals that the Stagirite had an answer to Quine's criticisms of modal logic,,  Abstract.  Chapter One-Four Modal Problems in Aristotle  P art I :; H x n t i k k a o n A r i s t o 11 eJ s Modal Ontology  Chapter Two  Hintikka Versus Lovejoy on the P r i n c i p I e o f P1 e n i t u d e  Chapter Three  Hintikka's Account of De Int„ 9  Chapter Four  Hintikka on Aristotle's Account of  Meg a r i a n De te r mi n i sm  Chapter Five  Part 11  Sorab j i on Hint i kka on Ar isto11e  Ar is tot lef s Modal Ontology and t P h i 1 o s o p h y o f I.... a n g u age  *pt.  ' l a t-efnen i- c  t- n e P r o u J. e in s  .j an a  :>3.ut ion  Code on Spat- iot-eropor a 1 Pusizie  AristotIe  B i b l iograp!"  in  Chapter One-Four Modal Problems in  Aristotle  A c u r s o r y r e a d i n g of some of A r i s t o t l e ' s reveals that Aristotle  thought of modal o p e r a t o r s  way which was r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t o f such o p e r a t o r s »  works in a  from t h e modern view  It- i s c 1 e a r t o m any t h a t A r i s t o 11 e  b e l i e v e d modal an d tempor a I ope r a t o r s t o be heav i 1 y interconnected.  But t h e p r e c i s e  k i n d s of o p e r a t o r s  relation  i s opaque. The c h i e f  between t h e two aim of  this  e s s a y i s t o r e j e c t , and e n d o r s e v a r i o u s p r o p o s a l s of what t h e s e views amounted t o . T h i s w i l l a n a l y z i n g t h e e f f e c t s of  be a c c o m p l i s h e d by  t h e s e p r o p o s a l s on f o u r  p r o b l e m s . The a n a l y s i s given c o n c e r n s two problems d a t i n g from A r i s t o t l e ' s  time a s well a s two problems  which were f o r m u l a t e d by Quine* :l - More g e n e r a l l y , interested Aristotle's  in t h e l e s s o n s t o be l e a r n e d  I am  regarding  modal o n t o l o g y from s t u d y i n g f o u r  different  ( moda 1 ') ques t i on s .  A e r i t ical interpretation will  eva 1 u a t ion of J „ Hirit i kka ' s of A r i s t o t l e ' s s t a n d on two arguments  introduce the f i r s t  s e t of problems,,  Both  arguments a r e c o n c e r n e d with d e t e r m i n i s m a s w e l l modality.  The i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ,  t h e n , of  s t a n d s a y s much about t h e m e t a p h y s i c a l  as  Aristotle's theses  which  A r i s totie was, at 1 east oc cas 1 ona 13.y , prepared defend,, f  The first of the two arguments  Sea Battle f  one given by Aristotle  De Interpretations. fatalism  left unrestricted.  in chapter 3 of his  if a certain  that  logical principle  Precisely what the logical  is which Aristotle wishes to constrain qu estion.  is the famous  Briefly, De Int. 3 argues  is vindicated  to  is  principle  is an open  H i n t ikk a a 11empts to i den t ify the p r i n c ip1e  and its attendant restraint in Ti_me and Necessity. The second argument concerned with determinism the  f  Master Argument*  supported  is known as  of Diodorus. The Megarians  the contentions of Diodorus who held that a  f o r m o f determ i n i sm was tenable.  Ari st o 11e, I ike man y  modern philosophers, rejected any non-trivial version of de term in ism „:a  Va r i ous r eadi n gs of how Ar i s to11e under stood determin i st i c pos i tions have been put f orward ,,3 There i s much more debate about what Aristotle thought the sea battle argument achieved than there is about his stand on the Master argument. There are several this unequal balance of attention.  reasons for  Foremost among  these  is that scholars have access to the original version of the argument  in De Int.  3.  The Master argument, on the  other hand, exists only in secondary  literature, A  related point is that Aristotle seems to have  considered  the sea battle argument to involve more weighty phi1osophi ca1 pr obIems than th e ar gumen t of D i odor us„ 0n e o f the m o st appealing aspects of H i n t i k ka f s r eadin g is the extent to which he sees the two arguments as p r ovok :i. ng a c ons i s tent r esponse f r om Ar i sto 11 e „  Central  to the interpretation of Hintikka  explained throughout  I) is his insistence  Aristotle's view of modality  is heavily  (which  is  that  influenced by  the latter  use of the principle of plenitude.  metaphysical  thesis was perhaps best formulated by the  Stagirite himself Corruptions"...a  in Bk„  II of On Generation  thing is eternal  if it is of  and if it is eternal, it is by necessity."  This  and necessity; The  p r i n c i pIe of pIeni tude, then, h o1ds that the d i s t i n c t i on made between temporality and modality on e .  is an  illusory  "!" h e c o r r e s p o n d i n g m e t a 1 i n g u i s t i c for m u 1 a t i o n w o u 1 d  be that for any sentence p, p is necessarily  true iff  for any time t ,, p is true at t. The principle of plenitude  is, by modern standards, a very bizarre way to  a c c oun t f o r moda i i ty „ modality  T h e m o d e I t h e o r e t, i c a c c o u n t o f  (possible worlds semantics) of Kripke and  o t h e r s i s a t c o n s i d e r a b 3. e v a r i a n c e w i t h t h i s p r i n c i p 1 e » Though something  is always true in the actual world in  no way means, for the possible worlds theorist, that it is necessarily true (true in all worlds).  If Aristotle  -4  -  did adhere to the principle of plenitude, it would be reflected issues.  in his stand on modal' and  deterministic  Different events are necessary and fated  to  c o m e t o p a s s f o r A r i s t o 11 e t h a n f o r t h e m o d e r n m o d a 1  J. og i c i an ,  I consider K r i p k e f s model theoretic account of  1963  t o b e b o t h e 1 e g a n t a n d m e t a p h y s i c a 11 y s a t i s f a c t o r y „13 I n a landmark paper, Kripke treated possible worlds as primitive points.  Possible worlds had hitherto been  treated as state descriptions, an approach which popularized by Carnap,  This new approach  brought, about many technical the question of what the term longer obstructs modality.  to modality  improvements. For 4  was  example,  possible world' means no  (or needs to obstruct) the student of  Strong criticisms, it is true, have been  directed at the applications that Kripke has made of his a c c o u n t „ e But K r i p k e ? s approach tenable.  is. by itself, very  Like other treatments of modality, Kripke's  makes room f or an onto1ogi ca1 di st inc t i on between temporal points (however construed) and possibles. Any violation of this result is metaphysically unsatisfactory for any adherent- of the model  theoretic  account of modality,, There are at least two pressing questions here.  The first is whether or not Aristotle  was committed to the principle of plenitude,  In chapter  V of Time and Necessity, Hintikka argues most persuasively  that Aristotle was indeed a firm adherent,,  The salient points of the debate (if  it can be  called one) between Hintikka and A„0„ Lovejoy will surnmar ized  be  in chapter one „ Love j oy he 1 d that Ar istotie  exp 1 i c i. 11 y opposed the pr in c i p 1 e of p 1 en i tude ,, In general, I will side with Hintikka's claim that Lovejoy took advantage of vague sections of Aristotle's text to s u p p o r t h :i. s p o s i t i o n „  F u r t her rn ore, there are n u m e r o u s  examples of unambiguous Aristotelean  text which show the  Stag i r i te to ha.ve f avored the principle.  The second question which needs to be answered assumes that Ar istotle d id make (at least 1irnited) use o f the p r i n c i p 1 e o f p 1 e n i t u d e ., U h a t difference w o u 1 d the adherence to such a metaphysical question  is raised  chapters „  thesis make?  This  in the second, third and fourth  In p a r t i c u l a r 1 ,  what impact wouId t h e  principle of plenitude have on Aristotle's position on ihe determin ist i c issues wi th wh i ch he was  concerned?  Does, to be more direct, the principle of plenitude aid in either the formulation of the problems involved or the solutions which Aristotle seems to offer? section  I will  rely in part on R„ Sorabji's  In this  commentary,  Necessity, Cause and Blame, which offers a fine critique  of Hiritikka's account.,  Sorabj i contends that though  A r i s t o 11 e e in p i o y s t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f p 1 e n i t u d e , a n y interpretation whic!-i is based exc 1 us:i.ve 1 y on acceptance of the principle  Sorabji  has t o say i s .  Aristotls's  is inadequate/ 5 " Much of what  I think .  tota11y c o r r s e t .  have, however, criticisms of H i n t i k k a f s  1  interpretation  w h -i c n a r e s e p a r a t e f r o m t h o s e o f S o r a b j i »  For example, the evaluation  in chapter two of  Hintikka's explanation of the restricted principle of De Int..  3 is, as far as I know, wholly new.  Hintikka  believes this principle to be a sophisticated amalgamation of the necessity operator and the law of exclude ci m :l. d d I e (L. E M) .  It h a s t h e f o 11 o wing f o r m »  C1> necessarily p V necessarily (In that (1) is a modal  not-p.  law of excluded middle, it is  referred to in the text as the MLEM. > Sorabji does not explicitly state why (1) is a faulty reading of principle being restricted by Aristotle. case for the MLEM  is, admittedly, most  Nevertheless, 1 am convinced  the  Hintikkafs  persuasive.  that there are  reasons,  both p h i -1 o s o p h i c a 1 a n d p h i 1 o 1 o g i c a I , a g a i n s t i t. ®  I do not put much emphasis upon the latter There are few phi 1o1ogicaI observations  category.  in this thesis;  there is only one that originates with me,. The point in  question  concerns Aristotle f s formulations of the law of  excluded middle. In brief, I have found that many of Aristotle's comments concerning the law of  excluded 'to b e 11 .  m i >d d I e (and other t a u t o 1 o g i e s > e m p 1 o y t h e verb This observation  is significant because it does serious  damage to H i n t i k ka' s c 1 a i m th at the Stag i r i te d i d not draw a conscious distinction between the law of  excluded  m i d d I e a n d t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f Id i v a 1 e n c e .  Hintikka relies, far too heavily  in my opinion, on  t h i s c 1 a i m to d e m o n s t rate the fa I s i t y o f the 4  1 r a d i t i o n a I ' i n t e r p r e t a t i o ri ( see Glossary) o f  Aristotle's sea battle argument.  Like Sorabji , I  b e I i e v e the t r a d i t i o n a I in t e r p retat i on, w h i c h , a m o n g o ther th i ngs ,, i s tha t the p r ob I em of f u tur e t r u th i s central  to the sea battle argument, is the most-  plausible account yet given.There are other, closely connected, criticisms of Hintikka's account of De 3„ His difficulties stem traditional  Int,  in part from his view that the  interpretation  is focussed solely upon  the  problem of future truth„ Another source of trouble is Hint-ikka's insistence that the problem of future is only concerned with the evaluation of the  truth  truth-value  of sentences that are located  in the present.  mistakes, I argue, contribute  in a big way to Hintikka's  ascription to Aristotle of the MLEM as the  These two  logical  principle being  constrained.  I do not intend to show in this essay Hintikka's views on how to construe  that  Aristotle's  metaphysics of modality are totally without merit,, Indeed, there is much with which  in Hintikka' s work on Ar isto11e  I find myself  in near  total agreement,, For  example, it seems correct that in De Int. 9,  Aristotle  is concerned about the truth--value of predictions which were made in the past. Yet the modal theses that Hintikka ascribes to Aristotle, and hence  the  assumptions Hintikka makes regarding the argument Int.  in De  9, are. from my point of view, most odd. He  prefers to rely on the principle of plenitude and holds that the problem of future truth was never a very serious difficulty for Aristotle. Hintikka's method for generating Aristotle's puzzle seems wrong to me on several grounds. Hintikka's treatment of  Aristotle's  post ion on the Master Argument, in contrast, is much more tenable,,  M>^ own view regarding De Int. 9 is  defended during, the second chapiter,, My defense of traditional  interpretation  is new in only a few  and on the whole, it is consistent with  the  areas,  other  treatments„  The analysis that I prefer concludes by  limiting  the p r i n c i p I e of b i v a I e n c e ,, I rn a i n t a i n that A r i s t o 11 e was arguing for at restriction of what 1 call the modal principle of bivalence which (MPEO  is simply  it is -necessary that every sentence p is true or  false.  Since it is possible that the principle of bivalence  is  false, it- is clearly false that this principle constitutes a necessary truth.  Aristotle, 1 hold, was  arguing for the implausibi1ity of CMPEO on the basis that if the CliPB) were conjoined with whether  predictions,  they are made in the past or not, then  de ter m i n i sm w i11 be suppor ted,  Again, the second problem  to be studied  concerned with Hirrtikka's views regarding  is  Aristotle's  critique of the Master Argument of Diodorus. Hintikka believes that his interpretston of Aristotle on the sea ba t tie i s en t i r ely con s i stent w i th his in te r pr e tat i on of Aristotle on the Master Argument. By the-same  token,  m a n y o f t h e o b j e c t i o n s t h a t c! e m o n s t r a t e t h e i mp 1 aus i b i 1 i ty of H i n t- i k ka f s f i r s t a c oun t do the same to his second.  Independent problems also plague  interoretation of Aristotle on the Master  Hintikkafs  Argument.  As stated at the outset, four main prob1ems wi11 be studied.  The last two, which are familiar  to  philosophers of language, were introduced by Quine in his paper "Reference and Modality".  The first is the  problem of the substitutivity of identicals (SI) and the second  is the prob 1 em of existentia 1 general i;:ation  (E6) „  "i"hese two prob 1 ems were used bv 0.uine as  criticisms of modal logic,  Alan Code, in his  "Aristotle's Response to Guineas Objections to Modal Logic", 'shows that the problems of (SI) and (EG) can be aimed at accounts of temporal change as well.  It is my  contention that these two problems can be dealt with by the procedure which  is outlined by Code,  The solution favored by Code requires a certain degree of language engineering. Individual  concepts,  wh i c h f o r m pa r t o f F r ege * s i n ten s i on a I on to 1 ogy , p 1 ay an important role in the solution. Individual concepts are f u n d i o n s f r o m ( u s u ally, b u t. n o t always) t h e d o m a i n o f possible worlds to the domain of objects which c ons ti tu te ea c h wo rid. Briefly, Code h o1ds tha t th e problems of (SI) and  (EG) can be dealt with if the  r e f e r e n c e p o i n t s o f p o s s .i b I e w o r 1 d s a r e r e p lac e d b y o n e s of times. I agree with Code's solution, but in a th or oughIy quaIi f i ed way.  I agree with the view that the problems of (SI) and (EG) can be solved with Code's answer. The modified  -11 -  individual  concepts which Code invokes are both  strong  and elegant. But I take exception with Code's subsequentattempt to attribute this solution to Aristotle. Code's arguments for attributing  the solution  to Aristotle  rely  too much on the thesis that modal operators are interchangeable with their temporal  counterparts. This  thesis is the pr inc iple of p1eni tude. two and  Whereas  chapters  three are more concerned with undermining  the  coritributive role played by this principle, chapter  four  shows a more specific fault with the principle, namely, that it simply was not an unrestricted thesis f r om A r i s to 11e's po i n t of  metaphysical  view.9  Following the criticism of Hintikka's  interpretion,  i t might be thought that the pr inc ip1e of p1en itude is s u p e r f 1 u o li s w h e n t a c k 1 i n g a n y o f t h e p r o b 1 e m s w h i c h Aristotle may have been faced with. I doubt the accuracy of this view, for the solution endorsed by Code of  the  problems of C S I j  that  the principle  and ( E G )  is suggested by the view  is a viable one.  However, if 'my  criticisms in chapter eight are correct, the solution would not have been available to Aristotle.  An interesting byproduct of this thesis is the discovery  that Aristotle was interested  in some of  problems which are the predominant concerns of  the  modern  -12 -  philosophy.  Examples include his concern about scope  ambiguities (see the Appendix for my analysis) and his 0 w n f o r m u 1 a t i o n o f t h e ( SI) p r o b I e m .  R u s s e 11 i s p e r h -a p s  the best-known philosopher of our time to dismiss, rather hastily, Aristotle's  achievements.  Some comment on the programme of this essay required.  My principal  is  intention here is test various  hypotheses of which metaphysical  tools were available to  Aristotle., Such a mandate need not confine one to a study of Aristotle's text; more recent problems can and should be discussed.  Furthermore, I am less  interested  1 n th e doct. r i nes wh i c h A r i s to 11 e def i n i te 1 y advan c ed than in showing what alternatives were open to him in r espon d i ng to a h os t of pr ob 1 ems „  The historical side of this essay attribution  lies in the  to Aristotle of the peculiar  thesis of  the  p r i n c i p I e o f p 1 e n :i. t u d e „ B u t t h i s i s m o r e a p o i n t o f departure than an all-consuming establishing  interest,. After  that Aristotle did treat modal and  temporal  operators as (merely) partia 11y interchangeab1e, question  to be answered  the  is how the principle bears on  both the sea battle argument and Aristotle's analysis of the argument of Diodorus. Hintikka's treatment of  these  problems stresses the importance of the principle while  --13™  both Sorabji and I doubt its relevance. One of the more interesting results of this essay  is  that interpretations based on the principle are both unnecessary and false,,  However, the principle of  plenitude does serve a illuminating  (and thus useful)  r o I e w h e n t h e p r o b I e m s i n 11 a r e b e i n g t r e a t e d „;L °  14  Hintikka on Ar  Modal  Ontologv  15  Chapter Two "-Hintikka versus Love joy on the Principle of  Plenitude  This essaiy began with the observation Aristotle's use of modal operators was at  that considerable  va r i an c e w i th t h a t of mode r n ph i 1 osoph e r s „ Th e i ri'i p o r t a n c e o f c o r r e c 11 y i n t e r p r e t i n g A r i s t o tie' s metaphysical  theses of moda1ity  lies in their  impact on  v a r i o u s p r o b I e m s „ .J a a k k o Hi n t i k k a c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e m o s t important of these theses is, to repeat, the principle of p1en i tude. In thi s sect i on, the a r gumen ts f o r an d against Aristotle's endorsement of this thesis will be reviewed,. It will be concluded, that Aristotle was  indeed  an advocate of the principle of plenitude, (There are, however, legitimate doubts as to the extent, and hence the importance, of this advocacy,,) Following  this will  b e a n e v a I u a t i o n o f 1-li. n t i k k -a ' s I e s s m o d e s t c 1 a i m t h a t the sea-battle argument and Aristotle's position on the Master argument can best be understood by first  assuming  Ar istot .1 e ' s suppor t of the princip 1 e „  Hintikka's tentative formulation of the principle  is  as follows" (2) each possibility  is realized at some moment of  t i me , It may not be entirely clear why (2) is  unacceptableat  •16-  least one modern philosopher reminiscent of why  <2),xx  e n t e r t a i n s a thesis  A r i s t o t l e s h o w e d , in De  it would be inaccurate to a t t r i b u t e  Int» 3,  (2) to h i m .  p r e c l u d e s p o s s i b i l i t i e s which are never actualized A r i s t o t l e definitely believed possible for this cloak  in these.,  "...it  to be cut u p , and yet  (2) and  is  it will  not be cut u p , but will wear out first." 1 1 2 B e c a u s e of A r i s t o t l e ' s belief  in u n a c t u a l i z e d  possibilities,  Hin t i kka improves the formu1at ion of the pr inciple of p I en i tucle ; ( 2 J ) Mo possbility infinity of  remains unrealized  throughout an  time.  Hintikka then g i v e s three v a r i a n t s of (VI) that which never  (2');:  is, is impossiId 1 e ,  an d (V2) what always  is, is by  necessity.  and ( V 3) n o t h i n g e t e r n a 1 i s c o n t i n g e n t. The v a r i a n t s , (2f)  .  I take it, have the same truth value as  But we are proceeding  too q u i c k l y .  e v i d e n c e exists f or a 11 r i but i ng improved version  The question  (2) and  What  1a ter  the  (2'), to Aristotle?  is a subject of  lively d e b a t e . There  both confirming and damaging e v i d e n c e . Let us begin t h e I a 11 e r .  is  with  A r t h u r L o v e j o y m a i n t -a i n e d t h a t A r i s t o t .1 e  •I '7-  explicitly rejected the principle.  Lovejoy  supports  this claim with two passages, which are both  located in  the Metaphysics. The first is in Bk. Ill (at  1003a2),  the second  in Bk„ XII (at 1071bl8-20>„  In The Great  Chain of Being, the translations Lovejoy uses for passsages are, respectively, t hat everything  these  •'•'.„„ i t is not necessary  t h at i s poss i b1e shou1d e x i st i n  actuality" and "...it is possible for that which  has  potency not to realize i t " . 1 3 On the basis of these two q u o tat i on s, Love j oy c on c1udes th a t A ri s to 11e openIy r e noun c ed th e pr i n c i pIe of pien i tude «  Hintikka exposes the ambiguity of these passages and accuses Lovejoy of exploiting  that ambiguity.  Four  differen t c on s t r uaIs are poss i bIe : I. Some potentialities may sometimes fail to be. ac tuaIi zed. II. Each potentiality may sometimes fail to be actualized. III. Some potentialities may always fail to be ac: tual ized . IV. Each potentiality may always fail  to be  •ac tual ized . Lovejoy fails to consider interpretations, which (.2*') .  the first pair of  is consistent with  The second pair contradicts  HintikkaJs  (2 f ). Hintikka  argues  that the first pair is more plausible and thus that Lovejoy's conclusion that Aristotle renounced  the  p r i n c i pIe of pIen i tude is i n c o r r e c t . 1 A  Hintikka f s comments on the passage from the second book of the Metaphysics are very terse. He maintains that even if here were a. way of extracting  Aristotle's  meaning from the text, "it would still not settle the question, for Aristotle is in this passage formulating a problem rather than giving his own considered opinion,,115 Later Hintikka  indicates that the problem to which he is  ref er r ing is " whether the e 1 emen ts ex ist. poten t i a 11y or in some other way." The passage relied on by Lovejoy c o m e s i n a s e i t h e r a n i. m p I i c a t i o n o r a c a v e a t. t o t h e hypothesis that the elements exist in some other way. If (as Hintikka appears to hold) the passage is an impIication„  then  it  is  indeed part of  the  formuIation  of a problem and Hintikka would be correct in holding that, we cannot be sure of an answer. On the other  hand,  i f (. a s L o v e j o y h o 1 d s ) t h e p a s s a g e i s a d e c 1 a r a t i o n o n Aristotle's part, we still could not be certain  about  settling the question. 1 6 1 For even if the passage in question  is a declaration of Aristotle's views, it would  be unclear which of l.-lV, was beins endorsed  Nor does the s e c o nd passage , by  yield  results  -19-  G  which settle the dispute with Love joy,, More  illuminating  is the sentence which occurs a little later  (at  107lb18-20 of Bk .XII of the Metaphysics: Further, even if it [a Form'] acts, this will not be enough , if i ts substance is potentia 1 i ty ; f or there will not be eternal movement, for that which is po ten t i a 11 y may poss i b I y no t be . :t ^  Hint i k k a i s cor r e c t  in m a i n t a i n ing t h a t t h e pr inc i p I e  Aristotle  is invoking  in the passaige-at 1071bl8-20 is  identical  to the the one previously mentioned  at  • 107lb 13-14 .  This being the case, we can exclude both  III. and  IV . a s p o s s i b 1 e re a d i n g s o f t h e e v i d e n c e o f i_ o v e j o y „ A s Hintikka points out, the principle  in question  permits  A r i s t o 11 e t o c o n c 1 u d e t h a t a F o r m F w h i c h o n I y potentially exists does not entail eternal  movement  because F may be uri actual ized at some times, actualized at others.  The crucial point here is that there is no  discussion here of a potentiality which always u rt a c t u a I i z e d . from Bk „  remains  T h u s t h e c o n c '1 u s i o n t h a t b o t h p -a s s a g e s  XII of the Metaphysics fail to vindicate  interpretations  III.  and IV.  given above.  So  L.ove j ov ' s view that Ar isto11e repudiated the pr inc ip 1 e o f p 1 en i tude i s g r oun d 1 ess „  This leaves us a choice between  interpretations  I.  and II. Hintikka holds that I. is "clearly too weak  to  support Aristotle's argument Metaphysics-1  ia  Ein Bk„ XII of  The conditional which  the  expresses  Aristotle's point is that ('.Al> if F only potentially exists, then F might not exist. Assume C A D »  Now, if only some potentialities  are  unactualized, and thus do not exist, at some times  CI.),  t h e n i t i s p o s s i b I e t h a t t h e F' s a r e n o t i n c I u d e d a m o n g the potentialities. So the antecedent of CA1) is false. (It is not being said that a conjunction of interpretation  I.  show that C A D  CA1) and  is false. That  would,  of c our se , c ons t i tu te c omm i 11 i ng the f a 11 ac y of den y i n g the antecedent.) But Aristotle maintained antecedent was true. interpretation  that  this  It follows, then, that  II. is a better  reading than  I. of  the  pr inc i p 1 e of p i e n i t u d e .  Hintikka uses the passage from the Metaphysics to further argue in favor  of an even stronger version of  II;; Even if it is true of each merely potential  being  that it may'fail to exist at some moment of time, it may still happen to exist all through an eternity. Or, rather „ it ay so' exist unless it is assumed that its possibility of not existing is -at some time actualized,, 13 [Hintikka's italics! That- is, Ar i sto11 e wou 1 d be 1 oathe to say that when a For m on I y po ten t i a 11 y ex :i. s ts , i t never the I ess does ex is t throughout, an infinity of time. To prevent this  result,  21  Ar isto11 e needed the f o 11 ow i rig assumpt ion CA2) Every mere possibility  is, at some time, not  actualized,, <A2>  is a stronger version of  that the attribution  II.'-'£° Hintikka  concludes  to Aristotle of (. A2 > definitely  shows Lovejoy to be wrong, A proper reading of  the  Metaphysics shows that Aristotle supported, rather claimed to be false, the principle of  plenitude.  Hintikka offers a very thorough treatment of positive and negative evidence for Aristotle's to the pr i n c i pIe of p1en itude .  than  the  adherence  Accordingly, Hi n t i k ka  considers pieces of apparent counter evidence other that offered by Lovejoy. One such piece of comes from Bk. I of the Posterior  than  evidence  Analytics:  For what is accidental is not necessary, so you do not necessarily know why the conclusion hoIds-not even if it should always be the case but not in i t s e 1 f (. e . g . d e d u c t i o ri s t h r o u g h s i g n is') . F o r y o u will not understand in itself something that holds i n i t s e I f ; n o r will y o u u n ci erst a n d why it h o 1 d s „ 1 Hintikka entertains the notion that this passage c o n t r a ci i c t s £ V1) w h i c h is t r u t h - f u n c t i o n all y e q u i v a I e m t t o H i n t i k k a' s p r e f e r r e d f o r m u 1 a t i o n o f  th e p r i n c i p I e of  pien i tude . But th i s c on c 1 us i on i s n ot- a we 11 -f ounded one. "The only thing we cam definitely extract from  the  passage is that even an attribute that always belongs to a subject  is not necessarily  known to do s o , , . . " 2 2  Aristotle made the natural distinction  between  If  epistemological  and metaphysical  necessity, we cannot  interpret, the passage from the Posterior Analytics as a denial of <:V:L}„  I stated above that, for Hintikka, C 2 f ) is better than  (2) because the former  is left untouched by  of unactualized potentialities. But Hintikka further  cases  goes  than arguing that <2') is forced on us by such  cases; he denies that they demonstrate that Aristotle was not an adherent of the "principal forms' of  the  principle of pien i tucje „323 H i n t :i. k ka believes th a t some commentators ser iously overestimate the signif icance of instances of unac tual ized potentialities,, explanation of the passage from  Int.  Hintikka's 3 (see n .  f o c u s s e s o n t h e f a c t t h a t- t h e c 1 o a k d o e s n o t e t e r n a 11 y exist; ", . .for when the cloak wears out, it goes out of existence, and no possibility can any longer be attributed  to it,,"-*"- Effectively, then, the principle of  p 1 e n i t u >d e w ill n o t a p p I y t- o m a n y c a s e s w h e r e t h e r e i s a prima facie reason to invoke modality,. This matter be discussed at more length  in chapter  will  three.  Several of the pieces of apparent negative evidence are like the passage from De Int. 9 given above  „ That  is, these other pieces of evidence also supposedly that Aristotle was committed  to unactualized  show  potentialities,,  For example, Bk * III of the Physics  contains a passage which might be read as such a commi ttrnent;; "Some th ings are in f u 1 f i 11 ment only, o t h e r s i n p o t e n t i a 1 i t y a n d i n f u 1 f i 11 m e n t - o n e b e i n g a * this* , another so much....and. similarly for the other categories of being  It is by no means clear  this implies for Aristotle that a 'genuine'  that  potentiality  will not be actualized at some time or other.  Another example occurs in Bk.  XI of  the  Metaphysics: "Some things exist only actually,, some P o te nt i a11y, some po tent i a11y an d a c tually-some as b e i ngs, some as quan t i t i es, o th e rs i n th e o th e r categories," 2 6 5 This passage seems to be very  strong  e v i d e n c e i n f a v o r o f p o t e n t i a 1 i t i e s w h i. c h f o r e v e r r e m a i n unactualized„ cam we explain  If such potentialities do not exist, how the difference between  things which  potentially and those which exist both potentially actually?  exist and  But Aristotle's distinction here might be one  of how many times a potentiality  is actualized;  which exist potentially may only be actualized while things which exist both potentially and  things once,  actually  m a. y s i m p I y b e p o t e n t i a I i t i e s w h i c h a r e a c t u a 1 i z e d m o r e than once.  This interpretation  one which ascribes permanently  is as plausible as the unactualized  p o t e n t i a 1 i t i e s t. o A r i s t o 11 e . 11 f o 11 o w s t h a t t h e pas s a g e  24  just given from the Metaphysics cannot be admitted as definite evidence that Aristotle believed potentialities which are never  in  actualized.  Hintikka's argument that Aristotle was committed  to  the principle of plenitude is not composed merely of attacks on negative pieces of evidence.  Hintikka  concedes that many of the pieces of positive  evidence  which he adduces are not -as st rong as others of it, seems most convincing.  But much  For example, Bk . II of On  Generation and Corruption, contains the following; For what is of necessity coincides with what, is always, since that which must be cannot not be. Hence a thing is eternal if it is of necessity; and if it is eternal it is of necessity. And if, therefore, the coming--to-be of a thing is necessary, its coming-to-be is eternal, (See n •d. In my opinion, this is the most compelling pass.age in favor of attributing Aristotle.  the principle of plenitude to  The other pieces of positive  evidence  m e n t i o n e d b y H i ri t i k k a. a r e f a r I e s s c o n c 1 u s i v e „ T h e y d o , h o w e v e r , s u g g e s t t h a t A r i s t o 11 e t h o u g h t o f m o d a I i t y a s being intrinsically  linked with temporality; this in  turn implies for Hintikka that Aristotle .adhered to the pr i n c: i p I e of p 1 en i tude „  A clear  instance of this latter category of  positive evidence occurs in Bk. IX of the "...no eternal  thing exists potentially,"  Metaphysics: This  passa.se, Hintikka notes, announces the presence of  (V3)  (Hintikka would not, I think, invoke this passage as d e f i n i t e p r o o f for the more modest  (2 s )-although  it i s good evidence f o r (2?>,  (2). If (V3) semantically entails  then the text from the Metaphysics just cited definite proof for  CVS).)  Hintikka gives am interpretation of Metaphysics which required scholarly  is not  Bk. IX of  is very disputed. In that I lack training, I will only present  facts and leave it up to others to adjudicate. debate concerns the following  the the  the The  citation:  If what we have described is identical to the potential or convertible with it, evidently it cannot be true to say « it- is possible but wa 11 not be . wh i c h won 1 d i mp I y that th i ngs . i n c apab I e of be i n g wou I d van i sh . One might suppose that this passage- is very evidence for the thesis that  Aristotle was opposed to  the view that possibilities could forever una.c tual ized »  be  But there is an alternate reading, one  which has been endorsed both by Q„ E„ Martha Kneale.  strong  After  L. Owen and  'it cannot be true to say*, they  translate "that this is possible but will not happen anc to say this to such effect that the existence of  the  impossible will escape us in this w a y . " 3 0 This second translation  interprets Aristotle as contending  that  th ere w i 11 be cases of un a c tua 1 i zed po ten ta 1 i t i es •••• as long as this does not entail vitiation of (the concept .  26-  of ) the i rnposs i'b 1 e . 3 1  The weakest p:i.ece of evidence which Hintikka  is also from Bk .  is adduced by  IX the Metaphysics::  Aga i n , i f th a t wh i c h i s dep r i ved of po ten t i a I i t y is incapable, that which is not happening will be incapable of not happening; but he who says of thait wh i ch is incapable of happen ing that it is or wi11 be will say what is untrue; for this is what i n c a pa c i ty mean t» 312 It strikes me that a supporter of almost, any modal th eo r y wou 1 d be c on ten t w i th th i s passage » I do n o t think there is any reason to suppose that the passage  is  def ending the tru th of e i th er (2) o r (2 s )„ Th us it is bizarre, in my opinion, that Hintikka should single out this passage as evidence in favor of attributing  the  principle of plenitude to Aristotle.,  0 n e o f t h e p i e c e s o f p o s i t i v e e v i d e n c e a 11 o w s Hintikka to claim th.at Aristotle offered a 'kind of proof for the principle' This evidence following  in Bk. I of On the Heavens.  is also somewhat  is the argument's  inconclusive,,  The  conclusion:  Neither that which always is, therefore, nor that which always is not is either generated or destructible. And clearly whatever- is generated or destructible is not eternal,, If it were, it would be at once capable of always being and of not always being? but ,this has been shown to be 1rnpossib I e „ 3 3 The pas  in Question does not seem to be an argument  for the principle of plenitude at all, although be argued that the principle  is being alluded  it could  to.  Hintikka refrains from using the the argument from De Int. 9 as positive evidence for attributing  the  principle of plenitude to Aristotle,, For his main objective with respect to De Int. 9 is to highlight effect of assuming the principle of plenitude; avoids the problem posed Int. 9  the  Hintikka  if he were both to rely on De  as reason for attributing the principle in  question to Aristotle  and claim that the principle  helps to best explicate the argument in De Int. 9.  It is certainly true that Hintikka  is doubtful  about  the worth of many of the passages which he cites to support his case.  In particular, many of the citations  simply feature modal and temporal proximity  terms in close  to one another; rather than claim  these  examples have the status of definite proof, he points to their circumstantial such openly  role.  The following  inconclusive proof:! Bk „  is a list  of  II of the Topics  C1i2b1) ; Bk „ II of On Generation and Corruption  C335a32~  b'7> ; Bk . I of Parts of Animals <644b21-23) ; Books I and XI of the Metaphysics  <102Sb27™37 and  1064b32,  respectively.) Hintikka then claims that these passages are supportive of his overall  contention  "especially  when combined with Aristotle's remarks in An. Prior I 13. 32b4  on the classification of events  necessary, general, indeterminate, and  into  rare,..." 3 ^  Hintikka>s positive argument for attributing  the  principle of plenitude to Aristotle, then, has both strong points and weaknesses.  Some of the evidence  which he cites (especially Bk. II of On Generation  and  Corruption 333al-3) is very compelling. But the majority of h is evidence is ei ther weak or inconc1usi ve „  23 -  Chapter Three-Hintikka*s Account of De Int. 3  Hint i kka begins his analysis of the n in th chapter of Aristotle's De Interpretations by noting thatdifferent scholars fundamentally disagree on the nature of the prob1em being addressed. The cen tra1 prob1em captured  is  in the following question; "What is the view he  [Aristotle] wants to refute there, and what is the view for which he wants to argue?" Hintikka  3  ® The account endorsed by  is at considerable variance with  the  overwhelming majority of treatments of De Int.  Most accounts focus on the problem of which  is that if sentences about the future  3.  future-truth, (i.e.,  predictions) are already true, then fatalism will be t rue,, The f o 11 ow i ng is H i n t- i k ka f s own f or mu I a t i on of problem :: Assume that „ „ „ „ Cp or not-p] or ..... [necessarily (p or not-p)3 is true universally. Then it will be the case, as Aristotle says, that if someone dec 1 ares a c:ertain individua 1 event wi 11 take place and someone declares that it will not take place, one of them will be making a true statement while the other will be making a false one; necessarily so, if (2) is universally true. For instance, it will either be true to say that a sea f i gh t w i11 tak e place or eIse tr ue to say that it will not take place tomorrow. Suppose .... that  t h e former a l t e r n a t i v e happens t o o b t a i n .  Then  it  is true (already true) that there will be a sea fight tomorrow,, But if this is already true today, how can the occurrence of the sea fight tomorrow be contingent? 3 * 5 Hintikka then assumes that the latter alternative  is  the  true? (that the prediction about the non-oc curence of the sea fight tomorrow  is already true),, The sea fight in  this case will be impossible., According to the tradi tiona 1 int-erpretat ion , then, a constraint must- be placed on tertium non datur „ If a constraint  is not-  effected, then all events are either fated to be or farted not to be „  Such accounts are referred  versions of the traditional are almost as old argument  in  interpretation, because  they  (and interesting) as Aristotle's  Int.  The m e r i t s of  to as  3  t h i s tormuIation  by H i n t i k k a of  the  t r a d i t i o n a 1 i n t e r p r e t a t i o n a r e a Is o d i s c u s s e d i n c h a p t e r four,,  For now, it is clear that Hintikka sees the  t r ad i t i on a 1 i n te r p r e ta t i on as an a c c oun t a :i. rned a t th e truth-value o f pre di c t i on s„  It is a1so clear  that  Hintikka views the problem of future truth with a time of evaluation of the truth-value of the predictions which  is located solely  in the present. This  latter  point is an important one, since it allows Hintikka to separate the traditional  interpretation, which  relies on  t h e p r o b 1 e rn o f f u t u r e t r u t h (a s h e d e s c r i b e s i t) f r o rn his own  interpretation, which  relies on the problem of  infinite past truth. To properly explain  this  (supposedly alternative) problem, the impact (as viewed by Hintikka) of attributing to Aristotle the principle  -Sl-  ot plenitude must first be assessed,, In chapter VIII of Time and Necessity,  Hintikka  writes th-at in ''pas s a g e af ter passage, he; [ Ar istotie] explicitly or tacitly equates possibility with truth and necessity with omnitemporal  sometime  truth«"3e  Hintikka  th i n k s of th e p r i n c i p 1 e of p 1 en i tude as suppo r t i n g a c 1 ose Ii n k between  ti me and modaIi ty, w i th the prov i sos  already mentioned, 3 ® Hintikka makes the natural move of applying the pr i n c i pIe of pIen i tude to sen tences„  He  notes that the following two types of sentences will p o s e d i f f e r e n t p r o b I e m s f o r A r i s t o 11 e : (.3) p at to and C 4) p „ Both C3) and (4) c on ta in references to time: whereas the t 0 of (3) need not be tied to the present, (4) could be paraphrased  as  (4*) p n o w . 4 0 Any sentence which  is fixed to a specific  time like (3)  i s , by the pr i n c i p1e of p1eni tude, nec essa r i1y t r ue if true at all  (i„e„, true at one time)„ For such a  sentence is always true if true at all. Conversely, if C3) was false at all, it would be impossible. result does not usually hold for more ordinary like (4)„  This sentences  Hintikka  interprets (8) as a perfect example of  the  future particulars Aristotle mentions in De Int. 3. That is, the warning about future particulars being true or false which Aristotle makes at the beginning and the end of the chapter  is, according to Hintikka, being  a i m e d a t s e n t e n c e s w i t h t h e f o r m o f (3) „ H i n t i k k a t h e n observes that Aristotle's problems are  compounded  b y t h e f -a c t t h a. t h e [ A r i s t o 11 e 3 n e i t h e r c 1 e a r 1 y r e a I i z e d h o w c I o s e 1 y h e w a s c o m m i 11. e d i n h i s conceptual system to cons ider ing ,„,„ [ (. 4) -and C4 # )3 . ., „ „ rather than . „ , , [(3) 3 , „ „ ,as a paradigm of an informative sentence nor fully realized what a .11 e r n a t i v e s w e r e o p e n t o h i m . I w a n t t o s u g g e s t that in De Int. 3 the difficulties broke to"the surface„ Unfortunately, Hintikka does not immediately explain  the  s i gn j. f i c an c e f or Ar i s to 11 e of a sen ten c e . be i n g i n f o r ma t i ve „  Nor does Hintikka refer to any of Aristotle's  works  to support this contention. Yet the view that Aristotle was committed  to informative sentences  (or, as Hintikka  subsequen 11 y c a 13. s th em , " tempo r a 11 y i n def i n i t e " sentences)  is a crucial one for  Hintikka's  i n te r p r e ta t i on , as H i n t i k ka h i mse I f pu ts it: Aristotle's main problem was not a metaphysician's vague worry about whether present truth about the future prejudges future events; it was the difficulty of a systematist who had defined his notions for too narrow a range of cases and was then forced to accomodate awkward new cases in his f r amewor k „ wor ds , because Ar i s totie both  (. a) pre d o m i n a n 13.  though t i n t e rms of sen ten c es I i ke those of the f or m C 4) and Cb) was a firm defender of the principle of pIen i tude (including  i ts meta1inguist ic imp1i cat i o n s) ,  he was perplexed by the results obtained with  sentences  of the same form as (3) (which Hintikka  labels  later  "tempor a11y quaIif i ed" sen ten c es) . Par t of Hin t ikka f s interpretation, then, is that sentences of the same form as (3), combined with  Cb), yield sentences of the form  of (3#) it is necessary that Cp at t 0 ) .  Hintikka sees the need for providing  textua1  evidence Cfrom De Int., 9) to support his claim  that  Ar is to11e f s ar gumen t is bu i 11 on the di st i nc t i on between t e m p o r a 1 1 y i n d e f i n i t e a s o p p o s e d t o t e m p o r a .1 1 y q u a I i f i e d sentences.  He has two pieces of evidence, one; direct  and the other  indi r ec t. 1"he d i r e d  the following  excerpt:  piece i s c on ta i ned in  What is, necessarily is, when it is; and what is not, necessarily is not, when it is not. But not everything that is, necessarily is; and not everything that is not, necessarily is not. For to say that everything that is, is of necessity, when it is, is not th e same as say i n g un c on di t ion a11y that it is of n e c e s s i t y „ 4 3 Hi n t ik ka c on c en trates on the sense, the word  'unconditionally*  Chaplos). He holds that  haplos is best translated as 'without tions*  The phrase  4  f o r Aristotle, of  qualifica-  when it is ? suggests to Hintikka  that the qualifications being discussed are temporal in  nature.  It has been suggested to me that the passage just given might be translated as "What is, necessarily if it is; arid what is not, necessarily  is,  is not, if it is  not." 4 ® This is a fascinating possibility: if it were  t r u e , then H i n t i k k a ' s e n t i r e  account  is  in s e r i o u s  trouble. For Hintikka's assertions regarding the role being played by temporal qualifications would be utterly groundless. In this case, however, no mistakes have been made with the translation. original  text of De Int. 3;:  T o ^acx/ 'Vo  mi^  The following is from the  ov  £tVq_<_ T o  )U.r) aVq(  O Tav  OK  r  otcxY  JLA.T]  l^j ,  /)cu q.KQy/tr)„  ct  ,  ihe presence of the word tor "when" ( o XCLv  ) ii  undeniable. The evidence which  lends indirect support to  Hit-ikka's claim also serves to justify the transition from sentences of type (3) to ones of type (3'fr) with the following passage from De Int. 3: Again, if it is white now it was true to say earlier that it would be white;; so that it was always true to say of anything that has happened that it would be so. But if it was always true to say that it would be so, or would be so, it could not not be so, or not be going to be so. But if  something cannot not happen it is impossible for it not to happen; and if it is impossible for something not to happen it is necessary for it to h a p p e n „ E v e r y t h i n g t h a t w i 11 h a p p e n , t h e r e f o r e , happens necessarily,, So nothing will come about ' as chance has it or by chance; for if by chance, not of necessity,,'36 Recall from the previous chapter that Hintikka also considers this part of De Int., 3 as reason to attribute t h e p r i n c i p I e o f p 1 e n i t u d e t o A r i s t o 11 e „ Predictions with the same form as (3) have been t r u e t h r o u g h o u t t h e pi a s t« H e n c e H i n t i k k a s' s t. e r m ' t h e problem of  infinite past truth'. Hintikka believes the  restrain t being recommended by Ar istotie is aimed at sentences which are directly prefixed by an  'it is  n e c e s s a r y t h a t' o p e r a t o r , T h e t r a n s i t i o n f r o m s e n t e n c e s of type (3> to ones of type (3*) is, Hintikka  contends,  blocked by Aristotle's restriction on the MLEM , The MLEM, recall, is the principle that, for any sentence p, either necessarily p or necessarily not-p is true. The MLEH arguably applies to sentences concerned with both the past and the present. (This includes sentences of type C3)„) Yet Hintikka generates the problem  by  c omb i n i n g the MLEM soIe1y w i th th e pas t evaluat i on of sentences concerned with the future."-'5' It may be  thought  t h a t o t h e r r e a s o n s c a n b e g i v e n f o r w i t h o 1 d i n g t h e M L. E M from future sentences.  Consider  <S) A sea battle will occur If (5) is true at present, then  tomorrow. it is in an obvious  sense inevitable that there will, in fact, be a sea b a 11,1 e t o rn o r r o w .  Following Quine, it might be objected that two modifications on (S) are required the desired result.  in order to achieve  The first modification  concerns the  verb construction of (S>; Quine would hold that the future tense should not be used to express an eternal truth.  That is, a tenseIess verb construction  is to be  pr ef er r ecl. Ac c o r d i n g I y , we ob ta i n C 5') A sea battle occurs  tomorrow.  The second modification needed to obtain an eternal sentence, is the replacement of the indexical by a specific  "tomorrow"  moment. Thus,  ( 5 f i ) A sea battle occurs at t« If we apply the ML Eli to the present truth of (as opposed to Hintikka's evaluation of the past  (5 f J > truth  o f (5 > , a n d a d d i t i o n a 11 y a s s u m e b o t h t h a t ( a') t h e r e a r e times earlier, and later, than t 2 (tn. and ts,, respectively) and that (b) t* is the present time, itfollows that the sea battle is presently That is,  when  unavoidable.  (S f ! ) is evaluated via the MLEIi at t,. ,  the events at t s are inevitably true. Hintikka, as we h ave seen , uses on 1 y th e pas t eva I ua t i on of sen ten c es along with the MLEIi to generate the problem. I take then, that Hintikka would not object to taking  it,  ( 5 ? J ) and  evaluating  it at t 3 and concluding that the events at tS:  were necessary,,  (Conditions the reader.  (a) and Cb) no doubt seem curious to  I agree. We are uncomfortably shifting from  indexicals to non-indexicals  (a) and vice versa Cb). But  both conditions are justif ied , in that H.i.nt i kka adopts analagous conditions  (albeit implicitly) when  the evaluation of predictions located  discussing  in the past . >  Mow, Hint, i kka does not provide a clear  explanation  as to why predictions must be evaluated solely from point of view of the past in order to obtain  the  vindication of determinism-  three  I will now give  the  reasons w hi c h a t temp t to a c coun t f o r Hi r 11i k k a f s preference.  I will then show that they are untenable.  Firstly, if the problem  is generated by the  evaluation of sentences from the standpoint of  the  present, then the text of De Int„ 9 will reflect this,, But the text of De Int. 9 does not reflect such evaluation,, By modus tollens, then, the problem generated by the evaluation of sentences from  is not  the  present«  Sec on d 1 y , as i n>:::i i c a ted above , the trad i t i ona 1  interpretation seems to commit one to the view  that  Aristotle sought to restrict the applicabiIity of the law of excluded middle is in4cons:i.stent with u n e q u i v o c: a I s u p p o r t f o r t his law. once again  Ye t t h is c 1 a i m i s  in direct conflict with textual  Thirdly, the traditional to what I w i l l  Aristotle's  evidence.,  interpretation falls prey  call "The Problem of  Unactualized  Possibilities",, This objection has already been al luded to. (See p. 2.) Assume that (i) the  i n t e r p r e t a t iort i s cor r e c t and t h a t metalinguistic Recall  traditional  (ii)  formulation of the MLEM is accurate.  that ( i i ) consi.sts of the c 1 aim  C2*f) " Q  < 2 ' > *) "\^p"  (2")  the following;:  is true iff "  t) (p at t)" is true.  (I leave the details of this derivaation is  that  p" is true iff "(t) (p at t)" is true,,  It is easy to derive from  (2ff#)  the  clearly  to the  reader.)  false. It might, for example, be  true that (6) It is possible that Jones will win the C o m b i n i n g ( 6) with  (2*f )  lottery.  yield s  (7) There is a time at which Jones will win  the  1 o 11 e r y „ If it is assumed that C2 # '*) is true, then the  inference  from (2 ? ' ,& ) and (6) to (7) is invalid. The obvious premise to abandon  is C 2 f , * > ; it is false.  It follows,  does it not, that since the friends of evaluation of  predictions  located in the present (i.e., the  traditional  interpretation) are committed to the truth  of  (2 f '*), that they are likewise committed  to an absurd  posit ion?  All three of these criticisms are The first objection  inconclusive,,  is, I think, somewhat  trivial.  For it could plausibly be argued that the text makes mention of both methods of generation.  Indeed, Hintikka  concedes that the problem of future truth does have a role to play  in the sea battle argument, only he  believes that role to be a subsidiary one,  So  Hintikka could not, ex hypothesi , rely on this first obj ec t ion„  CIn chapter four, a simi1ar obj ec t ion is  made contra Hintikka;; it is held that there is no textual support for sentences that have the form of  ( 3) .)  The second criticism g 1 a n c e .,  looks to be decisive at first  I n d e e d , s e v e r a I w r i t e r s s u p port t h i s o b j e c t i o n «  Now it is undeniable that Aristotle was strongly committed  to the law of excluded middle. The positive  <arid compelling) evidence is of both a direct and indirect sort. I will consider  the latter  evidence  •4.0"  The indirect evidence is found in the Metaphysics. The law of non-contradiction  is, for Aristotle, "the  most cer tasin of a 11 pr inc ipies „"A,& Ar isto11 e offers t h r e e f o r m uIa t i uon s of thi s law: 1og i c a1, on to1og i c a I, and psychological. By DeMorgan's Theorem, the law of non -con tratdi c t ion is mater ia11 y equi va 1 en t to the law of excluded middle.  That  Cp/Sjp) ± 1  is,  < p V^p)  Indirectly, then, Aristotle wars committed to the truth of th e I aw of e x c 1 uded m i dd 1 e „  The direct evidence  in favor of attributing  Law of excluded middle is also contained the Metaphysics.  in Bk . l'V of  Aristotle rhetorically asks "is he in  error who judges either is not so and  the  that the thing is so or that it  is he right who judges both?"  (When  Aristotle speaks of a person who "judges both" he is referring to someone who c on s c i ous 1 y makes c on t r aid i c tory ascriptions. I think that Aristotle  is very close, in  Bk . IV of the Metaphysics, to explicitly  formulating  Oerlorgam * s Theorem .)  However, Aristotle was not, I maintain, arguing in favor of a restriction of the law of excluded middle at all  in De Int.  9,  Aristotle was instead  restricting  t hi e p r :i. n c i p I e o f b i v a I e nee C t h e p r i n c i p I e t h a t h o 1 d s  that every sentence is either true or false). crucial  that everytime Aristotle  part of the discussion  discusses  It is  tautologies,  is always in terms of  ontology.  For examp1e , as a1ready noted , part of Ar istotie's d i s c u s s :i. o n o f the law o f n o n •••• c o n t r a d i c t :i. o n involves a n on to1og i c a1 f or mulation: And it will not be possible for the same thing to be and not to be, except in virtue of an ambiguity, just as one whom we call 'man', others might call * not-man f ; but the point in question is not this, whether the same thing can at the same time be and not be a man in name, but whether it can in f a c t . ® 0 Yet such a formulation De Int. 3 .  is signif icant-ly -absent from  The significance of such an omission  that it lends plausibility  is just  to the view that Aristotle  was placing restraints on the principle of rather than on the law of excuded middle.  bivalence (Recall  t h a t H i n t i k k a b e 1 i e v e s , a 1 b e i t i n c o r r e c 11 y , t h a t the defenders of the traditional are committed  interpretation  to contending that Aristotle was  ( incor:sisten 11 y) restricking  the law of exc luded  m i dd1e „)  T w o p o i n k s n e e d k o b e m a d e in c o n nee t i o n wit- h t h i s answer  to the second criticism" Firstly, one might  that the distinction between  the principle of  and the law of excluded middle is a somewhat one.  But this is mistaken.  reply  bivalence arbitrary  Suppose that we have a  4:;  three-valued  language, L (any sentence p may be either  true, or false, neuter) and that there is a rule such that whenever p is neuter , not-p is true.  The law of  e x c 1 u d e d m i d d 1 e i s i n t a c t, w h i 1 e t h e p r :i. n c i p 1 e o f bivalence  is not,® 1  It seems rather fantastic  to hold  that this distinction was not seen by Aristotle,.  It is true that Hintikka gives some to the suggestion  consideration  that Aristotle was restricting  the F'B  rather than the LEM. But H i n t i k k a f s treatment is far ephemeral as is shown when Hintikka following footnote from Time and  too  introduces it in the  Necessity:  Some writers-e.g., Lukasiewicz and Mrs, Knealedistinguish between the law of excluded middle (every sentence of the form * p or not-p' is true an d the p r i n c i p 1 e of b i va I en c e (ever y sen ten c e i s true or false), A few, including Mrs, Kneale an>: Colin Strang, think that Aristotle is striving make this very distinction in De Int„ 3, What-eve t h e m e r i t s o f t h i s d i s t i n c t, i o n a r e i n t h e abstract, I cannot find it in Aristotle's text. My m a i n r e a s o n f o r t h .i n k i n g t h a t t- h e d i s t i n c t- i o n i. s not Aristotle's is given in the first few pa r agr aphs of section S .,13 This footnote uncomfortably merges two separate  ideas.  The f i rst is that of the dist inc t,ion in i tse.1 f between the PB and the LEM.  This, I take it, is what  means by the distinction the clear  impression  " in the abstract."  Hintikka  , He gives  that the distinction need not- be  recognized by all; only "some writers" make it, Sorab/i i would, I think, say that this point was incorrect. The P B a n d t h e L E M a. r e i d e n t i c a 1 n e i t h e r i n f o r m u 1 a t i o n , n o r  -•43--  in operation . If Hintikka  is questioning that there is a  difference between the PB and the i_.EIvl, he is simply  The third criticism can -also be met.  Again, two  points are critical: Firstly, the problem of unactualised possibilities arose after a strong form of the principle of plenitude was ascribed to Aristotle. The urtcontroversial aspect of the principle of is the following ( 2 ' I f  plenitude  conditional: p"  "  is true, then  t) ( p at  "C  t>" is true. "!"he c on t r over s i a I aspec t of the princ i p 1 e of p I en i tude , the part which of (.2* '  is causing the trouble, is the  : t) Cp at t')" is true, then "  (.2* >***) If "<  is (From C 2 f * C 2? '  converse  p"  true.  , we obtain f  ) If "  p"  is true, then " (.  t) Cp at t>"  is true.)  But, of. c o u r s e ,  there  i s no reason why t h e  defenders of the traditional  interpretation  need  t h e m s e 1 v e s a d o p t a s p a t e n 11 y b a d a d o c t r i n e 1 j. k e (.2* '***) . Indeed, if Sorab j i is correct, severe limitations must be placed on the applicability of the  pr i n c i p 1 e of pien i tude , Sec ond 1 y , and more io the po i n t,, the problem of unactualised possibilities  is real for  someone who, like Hintikka, does siscribe the strong form 0 f t h e p r i n c i pIe of pien i tude to ft r i s to 11e «  It is to Hintikka's credit that he calls question  into  the value of the solution which he  a 11 r i bu tes t o A ri s to tie, Howeve r, hi s c on c ess i on i s somewhat cryptic, "...If my interpretation distinction  is right, the  [between temporally qua1 if ied and  unqualified sentences]  temporally  looks much more like a  r e s t a t e m e n t o f A r i s t o 11 e * s p r o b 1 e m t h a n a s o I u t i o n t o it."s3  This comment by Hintikka  is very puzzling; was  there any question as to what Aristotle considered solution  to the problem to be?  That solution  the  is simply  t o r e s t r i c t t h e a p p 1 i c a t i o n o f s o m e 1 o g i c a 1 r u 1 e, T h e distinction which he makes constitutes a solution in so far that it helps indicate which  logical  only  principle  Aristotle was restricting. On the other hand, Hintikka 1 s qui te cIear as to wh i c h pr i n c i pIe i s be i n g restricted, (So Hintikka's comment  leaves me somewhat  baffled „ j  Hintikka also states that Aristotle the question, "If something this  v e r y moment,  will  left unanswered  is possible to happen at  it have to happen?'" 34 This  -45  question might be said to be the most important evaluation of determinism.  in the  Instead,, Hintikk.a says that  A r i s t o 1 1 e put th i s q u e s t ion in terms of sen t e n e s s wh i ch are specified  independently of the moment of  utterance.  Hintikka's treatment of the sea battle argument of De Int.  9 is consistent with the notion that Aristotle  was an adherent of the principle of plenitude.  It is  important, however, to see that the traditional interpretation has not been shown by Hintikka to be inconsistent with the textual evidence of De Int. 9. Moreover, as we sha11 see in chapter f our , there are many powerful  reasons to hold that  Hintikka f s  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i t s e I f i s f a u 11 y „  11 i s a I s o i m p o r t a n t  to see that there is no compelling reason, textual or otherwise , to prefer Hin t i kka,'s in terpretat ion over  the  t r a d i t i o n -a 1 o n e .  Hintikka extends his interpretation of the sea battle argument to Aristotle's treatment of Megarian de ter m i n :i. sm „  Th i s ac c oun t by Ar i s to 11 e c ons t i tu tes the  s e c on d of th e f ou r moda 1 p r ob 1 ems h e r e un de r an a I ys i s .  46  Chap ter Fou i H i n t i k ka on A r i s to 13. e on Megar i an Determ i n i sm  Hintikka's account of Aristotle's treatment- of !iegar i an determ i n ism shares mapy of the f eatures of Hintikka's account- of Aristotle's treatment of De Int., 9„ In both cases, Hintikka sees his task as that of reconstructing  the information as given by Aristotle  a b o u t t !"i e a r g u m e n t-.  1-1 i n t i k k a' s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o n c e  again focusses on the importance of ascribing pv- inc ip Ie of p 1 en i tude to Ar isto1.1 e „ position  1  is that the  the  Hin t i kka ' s main  Master Argument' of Diodorus was  designed to remedy the incompatabi1ity of the concept of possibility, as it is usually understood, with thesis of determinism by replacing the normal possibility w i th an  ,  the concept of  e x ten s i on a1' one•  Hin t i kka is expI :i. c i t about a f undamenta 1 assijmpton upon which his arguments concerning Megaran are based,, He maintains that "the modes of  determinism reasoning  that Diodorus used are likely to have been similar those of Aristotle....[and  that on this basis! ....we can  fairly confidently say that we know at least a  rough  outline of how Diodorus a r g u e d . " ® 4 This assumption b e t r o u b I e s o rn e t o s o rn e p h i 1 o s o p hers „ is a claim which  to  is incorrect.  may  I n my op i n i on , i t  I will-endorse, in the  f o 11 ow i n g chapter, R i c h a r d So r ab j i ' s c on ten t i on th a t th g principle of plenitude had only f or Ar isto11e „ position  limited  applicability  So I am not in ac cord with Hinti kk a' s  that Aristotle had unwavering support for  the  princ ip1e ; so the assufiiption that both Aristotle and Diodorus tacitly believed  in C9) appears to be in  trouble . But this need not be the case: perhaps Di.odoru< did not have unqualified support either for (9); thus bringing him (I would say) into agreement with Aris tot 1e.  At any rate, the task at hand is to  illustrate  Hintikka's analysis of Aristotle's views regarding  the  Master Argument of Diodorus. Put simply, that task cannot be achieved  if Hintikka's assumption  is not  granted. As I will show shortly, a great deal of philosophical  mileage is obtained by granting Hintikka' 1  assumption  Here are the main steps of the Master Argument as given by EpictetusS < 6) Everything that is past and true is necessary. C 7) T h e i m p o s s i b 1 e d o e s n o t f o 11 o w f r o m t h e p o s s i b 1 e. • (8) What neither  is nor will be is possible,.  Epic tet-us holds that Di odor us "used the plausibility of the first two propositions  [(6) and C7)-M.D.'J  to  establish neither  the thesis that nothing  is possible which  is nor will be true." 5 ® Di odor us,, then,, was  attempting to demonstrate the plausibility of an alternate definition of possibility. Stoic  In his work on  logic. Mates gives the following as Diodorus'  c on c1us ion (9) The possible is that which  is or will be true, 1 5 7  Hintikka contends that (6), (7), and (9) were e n d o r s e d b y A r i s t o 13. e „ C 9) i s s i m p 1 y t h e p r i n c i p 1 e o f plenitude. Most of the arguments for attributing principle to Aristotle have already been  the  exhaustvely  been discussed. Two other arguments of this type are given  in ch, nine of Tim© and  these arguments  N@e@ffi®iiy. s ®.  is very similar  (As one of  to one which  is  e v a 1 u a t e d i n c h a p t e r s i x I w i 11 r e f r .a i n f r o m d e a I i n g with them now. See n »ss' for further  comment,)  There is little doubt that Aristotle supported f i r s t p r e m i s e ( C 6) ) „ Bk, III of Aristotle's  the  H i n t- i k k a q u O t e s w i t h a p p r o v a I f r o m Rhetoric:  Forensic oratory [as opposed to political oratory~ M„D„] deals with what, is or is not now true, which can better be demonstrated, because not contingentthere is n> contingency in what has now already ha.j pened „ 650 As we shall see, this passage  is not the sole piece of  evidence in favor of attributing  (6) to Aristotle,  49-  (Hintikka notes that ''several  interesting  implications' can be drawn from this passage,, I fully agree. The most i.nterest:i.ng, f rom my point. of view, is that "for Aristotle everything necessary  that is present  in the same way as is everything  is  p a s t A n d  H i n t i k ka goes on to po i n t to the s i m i .1 a r i ty be tween th i s passage and the already mentioned  13a23-25 of De Int. 9.  The passage from De Int. 9 is the following: "What necessarily is not, when  is,  is, when it is, and what is not, necessarily it is not."  I endorse this account of  Aristotle given by Hintikka.  That is, I concur  that  A r i s t o 11 e h e I d t h a t t h e p a s t a n d C i n a s e n s e) t h e present were necessary.  However, I also say where  H i n t. .i k k a d o e s n o t, t h a t a 11 r i b u t i o n o f t h i s v i e w t o Aristotle does not conflict with the  'traditional*  interpretation of the sea battle argument,,652)  Let us now consider  the other evidence that.  A r i s t o 11 e w a s a n a d h e r e n t o f ( 6) . T h e f o 11 o w i n g p a s s a g e is from Bk. VI of the Nicomachean  Ethics;  Nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. No one chooses to have sacked Troy 5 for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and contingent, while what is past is not c apab I e of n o t h av i n g ta k en p I a c e , h en c e Aga th on i s r i ght i n sayi ng For this .alone is lacking even in God T o m a I-:: e u n d o n e t h i n g s t h a t h a v e o n c e b e e n d o n e . e3  Hintikka also refers to Bk . I of On the Heavens to show Aristotle's support for  (6):  ...it cannot truly be said of a thing that itexists last year,, nor could it. be said last year that it exists now. It is therefore impossible for wh a t on c e d i d n o t e x i s t I a te r to be e te r n a 1 . Fo r i n its later state it will possess the capacity of not existing, not only of not existing at a time when it ex ists-sinee then it exists in actuality-but of not existing last year or in the past. Now suppose it to be in actuality what it is capable of being. It will then be true to say that it does; not exist last year. But this is impossible. Mo capacity relates to being in the past, but always being in the present or future , 6 4 Hintikka coneentrates on the final sentence. For my part, this passage -also shows that Aristotle was quite explicit, about, the respective roles played by in time.of  location  an event and the modality attached to that  even t-. Th is in turn undermines at least par t of Hintikka ' s analysis  As Hintikka C(7>) which  indicates, it is the second  premise  is the most puzzling. But, once again, there  i s a I a r g e a m o u n t o f t- e x t u a I e v i d e n c e w h i c h s u g g e s t s that Aristotle supported this premise. Hintikka firstcalls attention  to the similarity between  C7) and  Ariso tie's "def in i tion" of possi bi1i ty contain ed in B k. I of the Prior Analytics: "1 possible' and  4  use the terms  the possible' of that which  1  to be  is not  necessary but, being assumed, results in nothing impossible„Hintikka  refers next to the following  -51-  passage, also from Bk „ I of the Prior Analytics to support the ascription  to Aristotle of (7): If a  particular, as opposed to a universal, premise  "is  necessary, the conclusion will not be necessary; for from the denial of such a conclusion nothing  impossible  results. » . „"«'r This passage is not, in my opinion, very good evidence for supposing that Aristotle <7> .  Aristotle  supported  is here stressing that a contradiction  i s n o t en ta i 1 ed by n e ga t i n g th e c on c I us i on of an inference with a necessary particular premise,, In other words, the conclusion  is not a necessary truth. This  point, is somewhat, different than the one expressed (•  7  )  in  „  Hintikka then cal Is attention passage from Bk.  to the following,  VIII of the Physics: "...if we assume  s o m e t h i n g i s p o s s i b 1 e , n o t h i n g i m p o s s i b 1 e w i 11 f o 11 o w (though something false maty)."'®2' Hintikka also relies on the already discussed and controversial passage from 4 of the Metaphysics to support his contention '11 and n„  30  > .  (see p.  Hintikka should not, I think, use  latter piece of evidence; whereas the meaning of passage is disputed, the definition of  Aristotle's definition itself .,  this this,  possibility  e n d o r s e d b y A r i s t o 11 e i s u n c o n t r o v e r s i a 1 „  Bk.  An d  constitutes good evidence in  Hintikka refers to the same positive evidence regarding Aristotle's adherence to the principle of p 1 en i ttide to show tha.t Ar i.sto11 e suppor ted ( 9) , Hin t i kka evidently considers (9) to be identical  to the principle  of plenitude. I have already raised some of my reservations concerning this matter. In addition, I will endorse in the following chapter Sorabji's  objections  o f H i n t i k k a' s v i e w s r e g a r d i n g the p r i ri c i p 1 e o f plen i tude .  Hintikka provides two main reconstructions of Diodorus ' arguments . He beg:i.ns h is i.n i tia 1 reconstruction of the Master Argument by saying Diodorus  'had' the following  that  premises:  CIO) it is possible that p; and (1:1.) it is not the case that p and it will never  be  the case that p. Precisely what Hintikka has in mind when he attributes (.10) and (11) to Diodorus is not wholly clear. Certainly it is conceivable that Diodorus thought of both as being  premises  innocuous. But Hintikka gives no reason for us  to suppose that Diodorus actually employed  (10) and  in his argument. Once again, I will give Hintikka benefit of the doubt; the assumption  (11)  the  that Diodorus made  use of these two premises will be  (hesitatingly)  gran ted„  H i n t i k ka a I so a11 r ibutes to D i odor us t he f o 11 owing r e f i n e d v e r s i o n s o f (6) a n d ( 7) : (6*) any true statement concerning the past is nec essary; and C '7*) if a poss ifoi 1 i ty is assumed to be ac tua I i zed , n o i m p o s s i b1e conclusions  follow.  (.7*') would, according to Hintikka, allow Di odor us to replace (10) with (10*) at time to-  it will  be t r ue ih a t p , w h e r e t o > i. s s o m e u n s p e c i f i e d p a r t i c u 1 a r rri o m e n t o f future time. Evidently  (.7*')  is not by itself  sufficient  to explain the entailment-. For Hintikka gives a furtherbrief argument to show why Diodorus could move from to (10*).  Hintikka holds that the fact that Diodorus  shared with Aristotle a belief  in (9) (the principle of  plenitude) justifies this entailment. The contained  (10)  thesis  in (9), to repeat, is that possibilities will  be a c tua1i zed at some t i me o r o th er . 11 f o11ows , does i t not, that if p is possible, p will be the case at some momen t i n th e f u tu r e ?  -54 -  There are two main c r i t i c i sms tha t Hi n t ik k a ha s not considered  in his argument,, Firstly, it appears to be  somewhat bizarre to make use of C9) to establish entailment from  the  CIO) to CIO*). For (9) is taken, by  EE! p i c t e t u s , a m o n g o t h e r s , t o b e t h e c o n c 1 u s i o n o f t h e Master Argument. Therefore, unless Hintikka is -accusing D i o d o r u s o f b e i n g h o p e 1 e s s 1 y c i r c u 1 a r , C '3)  sh ou 1 d n ot  be invoked. I hold that this criticism of Hintikka's reconstruction of the Master Argument is tenable. 7 ' 0  S e c o n d 1 y , a n d m o r e i m p o r t a n 11 y , t h e i n f e r e n c e f r o m CIO) to CIO*) is straightforwardly  invalid. For even if  Diodorus did share with Aristotle a firm belief  in the  principle of plenitude, it need not follow that there is a particular moment of future time at which p is true. Given the principle of plenitude, it follows that there is some particular moment of either future or present time at which p is true.  CIO*) clearly represents only  o n e o f t h e s e t w o d i s j u n t: t s . I w i 11 r e t u r n t o t h i s p o i n t  af t e r  I have comp1eted H i n t i k k a ' s  r e c o n s t r u c t i a n of  the  Mas te r A r gumen t .  Hintikka then concentrates on showing that a result of CIO*) is rendered impossible by Cll) and C6*)„  This  will establish that the "original' set of premises (presumably the set consisting of C6*), C7*), CIO), and  (1i)>  is inconsistent, From  (10*) Hintikka  obtains  (12) at time tj. it will be true that p was the case yesterday; where t3. is one day after to • .  The next step in Hiritikka's reconstruction analogous to the sequential (10*) to (12),  From  inference from  (11) Hintikka  is  (10) to  obtains  (11*) a t time to - it wi11 be false that p„ (My comments regarding the inference from  (10) to  •also apply to the one from (11) to (11*),) From  (10*)  (11*) he  obtains (13) at time t* it  will be  false that p was the case yesterday. Hintikka then applies (6*) to (13) to reach  the  f o11ow i n g c on c1us i on n (13*) at time t.t it will be true that it is i mposs i b I e f o r p to h ave been th e c ase yes te r day „ (13*) expresses "the impossibility Diodorus was for."" 1  looking  (13*) thus shows (12) not only to be false, but  impossible as well.  Hintikka actually rejects the inference from (7*), (10), and (11) to (13*). His motivation  for  (6*),  rejecting  it is not identical  to the criticism  just  given of the i n f er en c e to ( 10*) froni (10) ( an d , equivalent!'/, to (11*) from (11)) . Rather he that a scope ambiguity  contends  in the initial premise  is  i11i c i 11y e x p1o i ted by D i odo r us . I will r e tu r n to H i n t i k k a f s reasons for rejecting the Master Argument in a moment.  I said above that two reconstructions of the Master Argument are provided by Hintikka.  I have  summarized  t h e f i r s t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n „ "!" h e f o 11 o w i n g p a s s a g e f r o m Time and Necessity  introduces the second  one"  If someone now asserts 'it is possible that p' does he mean that. p shou 1 d be the case now or that i t should be the case now or sometime in the future. In our reconstruction, we assumed that the latter is meant. [I have ail ready stated my objection to this claim-M „D„1 What happens if the former is what is meant?'5'2 Hint-ikka's second reconstruction  therefore is committed  to eliminat ing a11 temporally spec if ied sentences and replacing  them with ones of the form  (4*) p  (now).  The impossibility which, on this reading, Hintikka i n t e r p r e t s D i o d o r u s a s d e r i v i n g w ill i. n v o 1 v e t h e foil ow i n g sen ten c es I! (14) It is now possible that an d (15) p is not now the case.  p;  F o r in t h e s a m e w a y , H i n t i k k a c o n f u sing 1 y a s s e r t s , t h a t ( J. 0*) was deduced from obtained from  (10), the following can be  (14):  (14*) p is now the case,, Precisely how one is supposed to derive a contradiction on the basis of  (14*) and (15) is by no means  Some comments are called for regarding affinities, both perceived and real, which  clear/73  the Hintikka  calls -attention to between his -account of the sea battle argument and his account of the Master Argument. both cases, Hintikka feels the role of qua 1 i f i ed sen ten c es to be v i ta 1 .  In  temporally  An d th e j us t i f i c a t i on  f or th is type of ana 1 ysis is just that Ar ist-o11e was supposedly a firm supporter of the principle of plenitude.  Hintikka's  interpretation of Aristotle's  views  regarding the Master Argument is, alas, a confusing one. W h e r e a s h i s r e c o n s t r u c t i o n s o f t h e M ai s t e r portray Diodorus as sharing with Aristotle an  A r gumen t adherence  to the principle of plenitude, Hintikka's evaluation of the Master Argument construe Diodorus as attempting to prove (16)  <3  (^  t) p at t-  (^  t) p at t.  " ,, . .Diodorus strove to prove the principle of  plenitude  _ CO  instead of just assuming  it. [Hintikka-* s italics] .  I w i 11 n o vv b r i e f 1 y e x p 1 a i n w h y H i n t i k k a c o n s i d e r s his reconstructions of the Master Argument to be invalid,, To prove CIS), Diodous supposedly  ( 16*)  assumed  ( \/ t ) p at t ,.  He also had the following conditional at his disposal: (17) ('V' t) (r-\ p at t — ^ 1 $  p at t)'^  The negation ol  t h e des i r ed c on c I us i on i s C16**iC^/  t)  p at t,  If (16) is to be proved, then the set (16*) (17), and  containing  (16**) will be inconsistent.  this set does not result in  However,  a con t raid i c t ion .,  But a contradiction does arise if the friends of  the  Master Argument confused the de dicto (16*) with the de  re (:!. 6 * f )  Hintikka  ( j i  t )~<0  p at t  believes that such a confusion would  hardly  h a v e b e e n s u r p r i s i n g . F o r t h e E rigl i s h . t r a n s I a t :i. o n s o f (16* ) and ( 1 6 * ! ) are, respectively (16*a) It is possible that p should be the case now o r i n th e f u tu r e , and  <16**3} There is some time such that p is possibly the case now or in the future.' 76  I do not accept Hintikka*s  interpretation of  Aristotle's account of the Master argument. This is partially due to my scepticism ascription plenitude,,  regarding  Hintikka's  to Aristotle and Diodorus of the principle of There is also the fact that Hintikka' s  reconstructions of the Master Argument appear  to have  little, if any, connection with the available  textual  e v i denc e .  H i n t ikka hi mself adm its th at hi s  in terpretation  Epictetus*  is at cons iderab1e var iance with  presentation of the Master Argument,,7'3'  Finally, and'most damaging question, albeit somewhat  is that Hintikka's begs the subtly.  I have stated some of the objections to Hintikka's analyses of two modal puzzles in Aristotle. By no means, however, have I given as comprehensive a treatment of Hintikka*s views as I would will devote one more chapter  like. Accordingly, then. I to the metaphysical  views  of modality which Hintikka attributes to Aristotle.  Chapter I- :i.ve-Sorabj i on Hintikka on  Aristotle  In his Necessity, Cause and Blame, Richard raises some points in opposition  Sorabji  to Hintikka's  interpretation of the sea battle argument of De Int. 3. S o r a b j i i s e s p e c i a 11 y c r i t i c a I o f t h e v i e w t h a t t h e principle of plenitude sign ificantly helps in analysing the sea battle a r g u m e n t . 7 8 He also makes some remarks regarding Hintikka's reconstruction  illuminating  of the Master-  Argument >, In this chapter, Sorabj i's views on Hintikka's  two  interpretations will be briefly discussed. His account of H i n t i k k a ' s t h e o r i e s is si m i I a r t o m i n e i n s e v e r a 1 r e s p e c t s . We can begin with Sorabji's analysis of Hintikka's  treatment  of De Int., 3:,  There are three main groups of  objections  Sorabji's critique of Hintikka's account of De Int.. The first group concerns Hintikka's attack on the traditional  interpretation. Sorabji  view that Aristotle  rejects  Hintikka's  is not, in De Int. 3, focussing on  th e p r ob 1 em of f u tu r e t r u th  S o r a b j i believes n o t only t h a t  the traditional  is the best  interpretation  avai 1 ab 1 e solution , but a 1 so that- Hint-ikka' s interpretation traditional  is inconsistent. To repeat, the  interpretation  is that Aristotle saw  deterministic, and hence unacceptable, consequences as  •- 61"-  t h e r e s u 11 i f i t i s a s s u m e d t h a t a 11 p r e d i c t i o n s a r e true or false in advance of the pertinent events,, Recal 1 further  that Hintikka holds that the  interpretation  traditional  commits Aristotle to a denial of the law  of ex c 1 uded m i ddie. As I have i. ndie a ted p revi ous 1 y , A r i s to 13. e was a strong defender of the LEM.  One group of objections is concerned with scepticism of Hintikka's view that, in De  Sorabji's  Int.  3, Aristotle was preoccupied with the distinction b etwee n s e n tenc es whi c h are tempo r a11y quaIi fi ed a r i d th ose which a r e n o t ,.  So r ab j i is espe c i a 11 y critical of  H i n t i k k a * s r e a d i n g o f 13 a23 - 26 ,, T h i s i s the p art w h e r e Hintikka sees a temporal  contrast being drawn  between  sentences of the ordinary form p and the more unusual form of  5  p at to ' »  Sorabji sees three difficulties with  Hintikka's reading of * when  19a23--26»  The first is that the phrase  it is' does not force us to a consider a moment which  is specified  independently of the time of utterance,,  disagrees that sentences of the form Aristotle has in mind  Sorabj i  <p at to' are what  here.79  The second difficulty which Sorabji detects  in this  par t of Hintikka's analysis is that Ar isto11e is not, in Sorabji's opinion, discussing sentences at all, let alone ones of the form  <p at tc,' at 13a23-2S.  Sorabj i doubts  -b'•••'••  that sentences are mentioned until we reach  13a32.  objection  justification of  lacks, in my opinion, the textual  So r ab j i * s o th e r po i n t s „  This  A11 h o u g h i t i s t r u e t h -a t A r i s t o 11 e  does not explicitly mention that he is discussing  sentences  in De Int. 3, he does announce, at the outset of the chapter that he is concerned with restricting a principle  which  applies to affirmations and negations. And what are affirmations and negations  if not sentences?  The third defect which Sorabji  calls attention  to  g r a n t s t h e a s s u m p t i o n t h a t A r i s t o 11 e w a s c o n c e n t r a t i n g on sentences which were always true or always false. Sorabji points out that many sentences of the form t o f are n e i t h e r a 1 w a y s t r u e n o r a 1 w a y s false.  *p at 1" h a t i s , t h e  presence of a specified time within a tensed sentence  is not  a n e c e s s a r y c on d i t i o n f o r e t e r n a 1 t r u t h o r e t e r n a 1 f a I s i t y . (Jons X cier (18) There was a sea battle in  1345.  •Sorabj i sees that if the tense is altered for (18) , the resulting sentence will not be always true (or always false) For my part, I would question  the real strength of  this  c ri tic ism „ e o  Sorabji has more general doubts about  Hintikka's  interpretation of the sea battle argument. Sorabji that "there are plenty of sentences  writes  lacking a calendar  date  S3-  tor equivalent) which would nevertheless meet the that concerns u s . " 0 1  That requirement  requirement  is that if a sentence §  is true tor false) at all, then S is true tor false) at all times. For Hintikka, S will have the form  ' p at to '.  Sbrabji*s criticism here is that other forms of would also be viable candidates for S„  t IS*)  sentence  Consider  The-re will be a sea battle in the Piraeus.  tl8**) A philosopher  king who wears cloaks will  be  born „ t:l.8**f) The first, cloak worn by a philosopher  king will  w e a r >0 u t.. None of' these sentences are of the form that Hintikka specif i e s i n h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n „ b e e n a 1 w a y s t r u e o r a I w a y s f a I s e „63 Hintikka's  interpretation, surrender  determinist5 sentences  Ye t th ey h ave e i th e r T h u s , A r i s t o 11 e m u s t, o n the gate to the  like SI-S3 would be either  true or necessarily false.,  necessarily  This is precisely the opposite of  w h a t H i n t i k ka claims h i s i nt e r pr e ta t i on w ill do.  In fairness to Hintikka, he does, in Time and Necessity, question  the worth of Aristotle's  He contends that Aristotle's problem  is not  satisfactorily solved, but that Aristotle was nonetheless committed  to it.  solution.  The extent to which Aristotle was committed to the principle of plenitude  is another reason for  doubting  the overall worth of Hintikka's view of De Int. 3 . For he [Aristotle] • accepted the principle of plenitude only in connexion with such things as the heavens, their motions, and the resulting seasons, not in connexion with a battle, or, for that 3 matter , wit h t h e truth a b o u t a b at tile But what of Sorabji's the sea battle?  own positive account of  It is an overly tentative  of the traditional  endorsement  interpretation. I call it thus  because he either offers inadequate replies to the charges levelled at this interpretation or he chooses not to answer such charges. For example, Sorabji does not deal with the problem of Aristotle's comment at 13a23„ As  indicated  above, I take Aristotle simply to be asserting that events located  in the present are necessary  (though  in a qualified  way) ..  1 have no reluctance about adopting the traditional interpretation of the sea battle argument. further  than Sorabj i in that I feel  And I would go  that there are no textual  g r o u rids for n o t e n d o r sing t h e t r a d i t i o n a 1 i n ierpretat i o n  Sorabji's analysis of Hintikka's account of Aristotle's position on the Master argument of is far  less detailed  Diodorus  than the analysis of the sea  battle. Nevertheless, many of Sorabji's criticisms of  -65 -  Hintikka*s first account are pertinent to Hintikka's  second  one ••. Like me, Sorabji  is skeptical of the extent to which  Hintikka attributes the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. In particular, Sorabj j. argues that Arisotle makes limited use of the principle. For in nearly all of them i instances where Aristotle invokes the principle], certainly in all the noncontroversial ones, the idea that what is always true of something is necessarily true of it is explicitly applied to everlasting things This view is quite plausible, and hence devastating  for  Hintikka. For there is no independent evidence that Aristotle thought of sentences as eternal.  -  fc.fc'_  art II: Aristotle's Modal Ontology and Ph i 1 osoph y of Lan guage  the  ••••67"  Chapter Sis-The  (SI) and (EG) Problems and  the  Solution of Code  This chapter discusses two further difficulties for any theory of modal ontology as well as a solution  to  them which Aristotle may have had at his disposalproblems are very well-known  Both  in the philosophy of  language and-will here be referred to as the problems of (SI) (for  'substitutive, ty of  identicals') and that of  (EG) (f or ex i sten t ia1 gener a Ii zat i on * . Both pr obiems have been used by Quine as reasons for abandoning many versions of modal  the  logic:; Quins holds that the  problems expose the incomprehensible nature of modal  logic„&&  As mentioned above, though these problems were directed by Quine at the use of the two modal ('it is possible that' and  operators  'it is necessary that') they  also pose problems for the use of tensed sentences and for sentences which feature the verb  'becomes'.,  demonstration adapted from Alan Code's  "Aristotle's  Response to Quinean Criticisms of Modal Logic" of result will be pre s en t e d s h o r 11y „ begin  is with a brief  A  this  A c on ven i en t pia c e to  review of Quine's  objections.  Quine holds that the 'it is necessary  that'  "btt"  operator  is referential ly opaque,, Consider  QuineJs  famous i n f e r e n c e !,' (i>  It is necessary that; (3 > 7).  (ii) 3 " the number of  planets,  (Therefore) (iii) It is necessary that; (the number of planets > 7)„  Quine of course recognizes that this argument invalid,, The problem for Quine is to explain why inference  is invalid,, Either  is  the  the substi tuti vi ty of  identicals must be surrendered or some limitation  must  be placed on the modal operator. Since Quine is boat-he t o g i v e u p L e i b n i z ? s 1 a w , h e o p t s f o r a r e s t r i c t i. o n o n the applicability of the modal  operator,,  The problem of (EG) arises as follows: Civ) 9 is necessarily greater than 7. (Therefore) Cv) C  x) Cx is necessarily greater  But what is the x of Cv)„  Is it 3 which  than 7)  is identical  th e n umbe r of p 1 an e ts ?  The problem of the substit-uvity of  identicals  arises for tensed semtences as follows,, It is Cat the time of writing) a lamentable truth  that  C 13) The F:'resident of the U.S. = Bush On the other hand,, it is also true that  to  (20) The President, of the U.S. attended the Yalta Conf e ren e e i n 1945. But it is false that (20*) Bush attended the Yalta Conference  in  Thus, if we view (19) and (20) as premises and  1945. (20*) as  a c o n c I u s ion , w e a r e c o n f r o n t e d w i t h £t n i n v -a lid f o r m o f argumen t,  The problem of existential  generalization  related to that of (SI). If (2:0) is true, then  (20**)  (  x) (x attended  (ES) is surely  the Yalta Conference in  1945)  is also true. But which  individual  is (20**) true of? Is  it the President, of the U.S., i.e., Bush?  It thus seems  that the inference from (20) to (20*) cannot properly be made. It is clear that this difficulty of  interpreting  quantification  sentences.  will arise for many tensed  (Sentences which feature verbs such as "becomes" or phrases such as "changes into" also fall prev to the problems of (SI) and CEG).® 7 ) Temporal  contexts,  then,  a r e r e f e r e n t i a. 11 y o p a q u e »  What is the sign ifigance of showing that (SI) and (EG) are problematic for accounts of temporal  change, in  addi t i on t o a c c o u n t s of modal Iog i c Since we have the same problems showing their heads w i t, h m o d a. I s t a t e m e n t s , and w i t h t e n s e d s t a t e m e n t s , and with statements using the verb "becomes",, we have prima facie reason to suppose that in each of the three cases the difficulties should be handled in the same w a v . 8 S Code considers three separate responses to Quine's objections to modal  logic.  These pr ob 1 ems engender a var i ety oi: r esporises , depending  in part on one's theory of reference,,  was the first champion of an reference, and  4  Frege  indirect' theory of  it ranks as the most famous approach  the philosophy of  language.  Individual  to  concepts are  among the intensional entities which are necessary for Frege's theory,, 3 ^ In terms of possible worlds  semantics,  individual  functions  concepts are members of the set of  f r o ni the d o m a i n o f p o s s i b I e w o r 1 d s t o the d o m a i n o f objects in each of the worlds.  One of the apparent benefits of individual  concepts to singular  assigning  terms is. Code points  out, that it permits a distinction between necessary and c o n t i n g e n t i d e n t i t y c ]. a i m s . The sentence "a ~ b" is true at some possible world w if the individual concept assigned to "a" has the same value at w as does the individual concept assigned to "b" . If land only if-ti.D.3 the sentence is true in all (of a designated set of) PossibIe worlds, the identi ty expressed is  necessary; if it holds at some, but not all, such points it is contingent I write "apparent" because there is a well-known argument by Kripke to the effect that ail  identity  c 3. a i m s betwee n r i g i d d e s i g n a t ors a r e m e t a p hysically, th ough not epis temo1og i cally, n e c essa r y„ Some philosophers have made cogent criticisms of  Kripke's  argument „25,1 The issue will not be decided here..  Suffice  it to say that some philosophers want- to drive a wedge between necessary and contingent non-Kr ipkean f ash ion »  identity claims in a  0ne way to do th is is with  iridividua 1 concepts .  Code n o t i c e s t h a t  if  the r e f e r e n c e points  of  possible worlds are replaced by ones of temporal a solution  points,  is obtained for the problems of (SI) and  (in respect to both modal  logic and temporal  (EG)  change).  He refers to Bressan's  work on modal calculi as the  first to use individual  concepts to define i n tens i on-a 1  predicates , 9:2 Each n-place predicate  is assigned a  f u n c t i o n f r o m p o s s i b 1 e w o r I d s t o s e t s o f n -1 u p 3. e s o f i nd i v i dua 3. c on c ep ts , Code ' s so I u t- i on mod i f i es Br essan f s intensional engineering so that possible worlds can be treated as m axi rn a I c h a i n s o n the d o m a i n s of t i m es. A further point is added: „ ., * I prefer to think of the domains of individuals associated with each point in time as space-time slices (from that time) of individuals. In this way  the spatio-temporal coincidence of two space ••••time worms can be reflected by the coincidence of the individual concepts with which they are associated.  S3  Call the thesis that there are spatially and discontinuous  individual  temporally  concepts the TQ.  Adoption of the TQ would give access to Aristotle and anyone else to a remedy to the difficulties posed by Quine,,  Quine*s arguments supposedly undermine  credibility of modal Neither  the  logic, I do not agree at all,,  the problem of (SI) nor the one  genuine p r o b l e m s H o w e v e r ,  of CE6) pose  various solutions to  Quine's criticisms are given; many of these solutions tacitly acknowledge the validity of Q u i n e ! s One of the aspects which  criticisms®151  I find appealing about the TQ  is that it views; Quine* s criticisms as pseudo ~ p r ob 1 ems .  Chapter Seven-Code on Spatiotemporal Puzzles in Aristotle  This chapter  is primarily concerned with  critically  evaluating Code's arguments in favor of attributing  the  TQ to Aristotle, Code begins by pointing out that Aristotle felt the following  (rec onstruc ted) ar gumen t to  be invalid; (21) The musical thing has become the th i n g .  literate  The r ef o r e ,  (21*) The musical thing is now the literate Therefore, (by  thing.  (SI)),  < 21**) The 1i te ra te thin g has be c ome the musica1 thing.  This argument occurs twice in Aristotle's  writing; in Bk , I of the Topics and in Bk„ VI of the Metaphysics , s,s The inference was apparently used by certain sophists who hoped thereby to show the following metaphysical  thesis to be false:; CMa)Everything which  is  not eternal has come into being. Code concentrates on the fact that Aristotle has c o r r e c 11 v i d e n t i f i is d t h e f a 11 a c y i n v o 1 v e d i n t h e inference: the sophists were confusing merely coincidental entities with identical ones, "One natural way to understand Aristotle here is to think of the musical and the liter arte as being spa t i o tempo r a 1 continuants which coincide in one another„,,"® 7 That is,  -74 -  Code thinks it natural  to attribute to Aristotle, at  least in this case,, an answer which  is obtained by the  Now, Code is fully aware that some philosophers do n o t a g r e e w i t h t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t A r i s t o 11 e d i d n o t confuse the coincidental with the identical. The first stage in Code's argument for attributing Aristotle  the TQ to  involves, then, a defense of Aristotle  some modern critics. The disagreement  is over  against  the  correct interpretation of an argument presented  in Bk„ V  of the Metaphysics. Alan White holds that Aristotle? th e r e c onfuses the f o11ow i ng ques t i on s S f.22) When are two individuals, a and b, c o i n c i d e n t a 1 i n s o m e ( p o s s i b 1 y d i s t i n c t) individual  c?  and (23) When are a and b one and the same Call White's position  the "confusion  Adoption of the confusion  individual?  thesis".  thesis does manage to  explain at least two puzzling passages in Aristotle. Consider first the following passage from Bk. I of the Topi cs:; ...a third use [of numerical unity] is found when • it is rendered in reference to some accident, as  when t h e c r e a t u r e who i s s i t t i n g , musical, is called the same as  or who i s  Socrates.100  A r i s t o t1 e i s ni a k i n g use o f i h e f a e t t h a t t, h e illus i c a 1 creature c o i n c i des with Socrates as a case of numerical unity. White could claim this is an example of the confusion  thesis in action.  Now consider  the  following passage taken from Bk. V of the Metaphysics: „ . . [ t h e 3 w h i t e [ t h i n g 3 -a n d [ t h e 3 m u s i c a 1 11 h i n g 1 are the same because they are accidents of [ c o inc i denal to3 the same [thing],,.,..101 In other w>: rds, Aristotle again uses the fact that two individuals coincide as a rationale for  saying  that they are one. White could again point to this case a s o n e w h e r e A r i s t o 11 e h a s c o n f u s e d c o i n c i d e n c e w i t h i den t i ty .,  Code correctly holds that the distinction  between  (22) and (23) is a rather obvious one. Prima  facie,  then, it is bizarre for White to support the  confusion  thesis.  Furthermore, White's main argument  is shown by  Code to be inconsistent. White insists that the concept of spatio-temporal  part is crucial  to understanding  how  individuals such as the wh i te th ing and the musicaI thing can be parts of a third  individual  (Corsicus).  Corsicus is simp 1 y a four dimensiona 1 coritinuant. 1 ° a But then (22) and  (23) become,  respectively,  ( 2 2' ) When a r e t w o i n ci i v i d u a I s , a a n d b , s p a t i o -1 e m p o r a 3. p a r t- s o f s o m e t h i r d s p a t i o t e m p o r a 1 c o n t i n u a n t, c ? an d  ( 2 3' ) W h e n a r e t w o s p a t i o -• t e m p o r a 1 e o n t, i n u a n t s a an d b c: o i n c i den t a 1 ]. y t h e sa ine ?  The transition from the ( 22) •••• ( 23) pair  to the  ( 22 ? ) - ( 23 *')one is significant beeause though t-here are different answers  to the former pair of questions, there  is precisely the same answer to the latter pair,, Both < 22* > and < 23 *')have the following answer: either ( 1 ) a is a spatio-temporal  part of b ;  or  (2) b is a s p a t i o ~ t e m p o r a I p a r t. o f a ;  or  (3) a and b are spatio-temporal  parts of some  continuant c„ The important point here is that, even if we grant White's assumption  that (22) means (22*) and that  means (23*), then White's overall did not distinguish between  (23)  claim that Aristotle  (22) and (23) in no way does  c! a m a g e t o A r i s t o 11 e' s p o s i t .i. o n „  In other words, if White is correct about (22) and (23) , then both  (i) Aristotle was not confused about the  r e 1 a t i on be tween i den t i ty an d c o i n c i den c e , an d ( i i ) A r i s t o tie w a s r e1y i n g on a forma1 def i ni t i on of c o i n c i d e n c e s i m i 1 a r t o t h e f o 11 o w i n g ^ x c o i n c i d e s i n y iff x is a spatio-temporal  part of y„ On the assumption,  then, that White is correct, this means that Aristotle th ough t of c o i n c i den t a 1 samen ess to be on a pa r w i th  t  _. "7 7  coincidental oneness. The literate thing and the musical thing of (21) and (21*) are the same because they both share spatio-temporal  parts with each other.  that this interpretation  is consistent with the answer  obtained by invoking the TQ; the musical  thing and the  white thing are one arid the same individual Aristotle's sense of  Notice  (using  "same') in precisely the same way  that Bush and Reagan were seen to share  spatio-temporal  parts using the TQ „ Recall that the President will out to be an individual who is both spatially  turn  and  temporally discon tinuous.  The strongest piece of evidence which Code cites to suppor t his c 1 a im that Ar istotie was i nvok ing 11"!e TQ occurs in Bk„  I of the Physics,, Consider  the following  passage : We say that one thing comes to be from another t h i n g , a n d s o m e t h i n g f r o m s o m e t h i n g d i f f e r e n t, in the case both of simple and of complex things....We can say the man becomes musical, or that what is not-musical becomes [that thing which is] musical, or the not-musical man becomes the musical man,, Now what becomes in the first two cases-man and [that thing which is] not-musical-I call simp 1 e , and what ea.ch becowes~musi ca 1 •-simpIe also. But when we say the not-musi cal man. becomes a musical man, both what becomes and what it becomes are complex. . „ „ .When a simple thing is said to become s ome th i n g, in on e case i t su rv i ves through the process, in the other it, does not. For the man remains a man and is such even when he becomes musical, whereas what is not musical „ „ . .does not survive, either si.mply or combined wi th the subj ec t „  T h e s e el i s t i n c t i o n s d r a w n , o n e c a n g a t h e r f r o rn surveying 'the various cases of becoming in the way we a r e des c r i b i n g th a t th e r e mus t be an un de r 1 y i n g s o rn e 1 h i n g , n a rn e 1 y t h a t w h i c h b e c o rn e s , a n d t h a t t h .i. s , t h o u g h -a .1 w a y s o n e n u rn e r i. c a 11 y ,, i n f o r rn a t least i s n o t one.:l- ° 3 On the strength of this passage, Code concludes Aristotle was invoking the TQ. His argument  that  is  d e c e p t i v e 1 y s irnp 1 e s i f A r i s t o 11 e d i d n o t h a v e t h e T 0 a t his disposal, the problems with the verb "becomes" r> .&y") will recur at this point.  (see  I believe that Code has  i r i rn i n d t h e f o 11 o w i n g f si u 11 y i n f e r e n c e : (2 4) T h e rn a n b e c o rn e s t h e t h i n g w h i c h i s rn u s i. c a I . (24*) The man becomes the thing which  is unmusical.  By (EG), we obtain (24**) (  x  ) '••  becomes both the musical  and  unmus i c a 1 th i n g .)  There are several aspects of Code's which  interpretation  I find especially appealing. I agree with the view  that the problems of (SI) and of (EG) do not pose genuine d i f f ieu11ies f or the rnoda 1 1 ogic ian .  I a 1 so  agree that it wa>s more than natural for Aristotle to stress the distinction between  continuity and  identity.  Code agrees wi th 0nine's -asser tion that the criticisms of modal  logic force a reversion  Aristotelian essential ism. The following "Referen c e and Moda1i ty" :  to  is from  Quine's  • ««Aristote1ian essen t ia 1ism is requi red if quantification into modal contexts is to be insisted on,, An object, of itself and by whatever name err none, must be seen as having some of its traits necessarily and others contingently, despite the fact that the latter facts follow just as analytically from some ways of specifying the object as the former traits do from other ways of specifying it.  It might, seem that Code is among that group of philosophers who accept the soundness of the Quinean criticisms of modal  logic. However, I doubt that this is  the case, since the TQ effectively shows that the (SI) and (EG) problems are solvable,,  -Mi >•  Chapter E l i g h t - S c o p e Modal  Ambiguities and other Inexactitudes in Aristotl;  Hintikka's view that the ML.EM occurs at both start and finish of De Int,, 9 would be much beIievab1e  the  more  if there were a strong case to be made for  the regular appearance of scope ambiguities in Aristotle's works. For, as we have seen, there is butone modal operator mentioned  in the relevant  where Hintikka believes there are two. Most wou 1 d  b e t hi e o c c u r e n c e  of moda I  passages convincing  ( o r apode i t i c )  -i-nexac t i tucies in Aristotle's writings » Hint i kka does give two such examples, though he refrains from using it to bolster the plausibility of his claim. In this c hapter , I will argue that these two c r i t i c i sms of sc ambiguities  /  in Aristotle's thought are  oj::e  untenable.105  The first case involves Aristotle's stand on two  modal syllogisms. It can be shown that  Aristotle's  endorsement of syllogisms of the form (Sa) and his view th a t  t h o s e o f t h e f o r m (S b) w e r e i. n v a 1 i d c o n t r a d i c t s h i s  own conversion  rules for modal  sentences.  ( S a ) ( 2 5 ) A n e c e s s a r i I y b e I o n g s t o a 11  B.  (26) B belongs to all C. So,  (27) A necessarily belongs to all C.  ....•:::• 1 ....  < Sb) (28) A belongs to all B. (23) B necessarily belonss to all So,  C.  (30) A necessarily belongs to all C„  Aristotle's p osition, that while (Sa) is valid  (Sb)  while  is  not, shows that the first line of translated ••. o. J  into formal  (Sa) should be  logic either as  •c ? M  or, equivalent!  ( B r  - y  D  A  .  )  (25'?)  (Sa)  Because the first line of (Sa) has the same for m as th third  line of the syllogism, as well as the second and  third lines of  (Sb), corresponding  translations of all  three can be obtained. The result will be that (Sa) is th e on I y va 1 i d a r gumen t of th e two .  The conversion  rules which Aristotle used on modal  sentences do not allow the following  inference:  (Sc) (31) A necessarily belongs to no B (32) B necessarily belongs to no A.. Note that (31) and (23) above.  (  (32)  iiini lar in form to (25) and  So (31) should be translated as  >  )  ( 6 *  ^  0 ~ >  A ^ )  and, bv the same token, (32) should be translated  iV*) (A*  0  as  n&7<)  Hintikka believes that Aristotle must have thought, of the  'it is necessary  first and second  lines of  that* operator  in the  (Sc) as having full scope over  the respective sentences. For Aristotle held that the negation of the first line was ( 3 3 ) it is p o s s i b 1 e that A bel o n g s t o s o m e B , The obvious translation of (33) is the de die to  C oo ? ••,  0 3* (B*A  (33) is supposed to be the negation of the first line of (Sc).  Assuming that the respective translations are  correct, ( 3 3 ? ) should also be the negation of which was the translation of negation of (31*).  (31?),  (31). But ( 3 3 f ) is not the  Instead, the negation of (31*) is  the de re  The t r o u b 1 e h e r e i s t h e t r a n s I a t i o n  of  translation of  fa)  (• O I f J -ft )  (31) is the de dieto  C 3 ~ W  1  (31) . If  , as opposed  to the de re (31*),then Aristotle is correct that (31) and (33) are negations of each  our  in holding  other.  The point, then, is that a de die to reading of "it is necessary  the  that* operator~a reading obtained from  Aristotle's conversion  rules-contradicts the de re  read i n g of tha t oper ato r - wh i c h was suppor ted by Aristotle's defense of (Sa) and his failure to support (Sb)„  There is, then, no consistent way to  Aristotle's modal sentences.  interpret  Or at least this is what  H i n t ik ka c oncludes.  Does this f aiIur e to dr aw a cIear di st i n c tion between de re and de dicto apodeitic  sentence show, by  itself, that Aristotle .intended there to be two occurences of the necessity operator where the passages of De Int. 3 only give one?  I doubt it. For one  thing,  •it is at least arguable that Aristotle was aware of  the  de re/de dicto distinction. (See my analysis of 32b25-3i of the Prior Analytics below.) I would argue  instead  that Hintikka has not been sufficiently  rigorous in his  argument. Consider  (33):  j. u c :  (33'')  I  the de re version of I I W.  U  C  (Bx  I  V  i  „7  J.  l f  i  •_» •—<  «  A  Perhaps it is not obvious but (33'') is the contradictory of  (31') „ Another way to make the same  point is to notice that (31'') is equivalent to  (33'')  Hen c e , c on t r a r y to wh a t H i n t i k k a h o 1 ds , a c on s i s ten t r e ad i n g of apode i t i c p r e m i s es i s pos s i b I e i n t h i s r  = = .. OS  H i n t i k k a c ou I d a r gue th a t  is much  less  natural  than <33 J >  as a translation of  (33) „ Now I would  find such an argument to be very puzzling,,  Since  Hintikka himself does not give such an .argument, I will now do so. Some authors reject de re formulae which use the 'it is possible that' operator. this rejection  in "On What There  Quine  justifies  Is":  We may impose the adverb 'possibly5' upon a statement as a whole, and we may well worry about the semantical analysis of such usage; but little real advance in such analysis is to be hoped for in e x p a n d i n g o u r u n i v e r s e t o i n c 1 u d e s o ~ c a 11 e d possible entities,, I suspect, that the main motive for this expansion is simply the old' notion that Pegasus, for example, must be because otherwise it would be nonsense to say even that he is n o t . 1 0 7 Quine is making two claims here: Ci) the preference for de die to modal formulae is justified because they do not r e q u i r e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f n e w e n t i t i e s ; (. i i ) t h e motivation for the introduction of possible  entities  (which would accompany several, though not all, de re modal formulae) is the orobiem of  non-existence.  Both claims are dubious. Let us consider reverse order . (i i > is, I think,  them in  more clearly  false.  The problem of talking about non-existent entities need not be the reason for allowing de re modalities. It is t r us th a t f i c t i on a 1 en t i t j. es r ep r esen t a spe c i a 1 pr ob 1 em for the de re t h e o r i s t . 1 0 ®  But the problem of  non-existence, as is well known, can be solved poss i b 1 e en t i t i es .  without  Th e mo t i va t i on f o r pos i t i n g th e  existence of de re modalities the problem of non-existence  lies in several -areas, but is not one of them, I have  a 1 r e a d y e x p r e s s e d, i n c h a p t e r s e v e n , m y s c e p t i c i s m a b o u t the problems of (SI) and of (EG). I am equally  dubious  about other criticisms of de re modalities. In addition, de re modal formulae are needed to properly capture our intuitions. Consider  the ambiguous sentence  (34) The author of Hamlet might not have written Hamlet. One de die to version of (34) is  (34* )  O  l  x  C  W  A V y O t y ^ * / ^  x  Now it is clear that ( 3 4?? ) does not. convey the force of r that (34 ) does not. convey the force o (34); (34*) is obviously false, But the de re version of obviously false, But the de re version ( 34) does con vey t he i n tende>j f or ce : onvey the intended force: (34  ?  A  (fly  The fact that de re modal formulae, such as ( 3 4 f ? ) , seem to be required obviously undermines (i) as well as (ii).  New entities are indeed being  (34* f ) . But if this introduction  introduced  in  is required to make  sense of (34), then so be it. I am thus skeptical  about  Quine*s first claim. On the other hand, (i) is not as clearly false as (ii). For Quine would  presumably  justify (i) on the grounds that de re modal presuppose transworld  formulae  identity. And Quine has at his  disposal an analysis of (34**) which  is similar  to his  analysis of de re epistemic formulae in "Quantifiers and Prepositional  Attitudes",, In both cases, the  of quantifying  "problem"  into .in tens ion a I contexts would be  solved.110  At best, Hintikka has shown that the Stagirite was unc 1 ear when  i t came to the sc ope of moda 1 oper ator s ;  Aristotle did not embed modal operators  consistently.  I n s t e a d , h e c h o s e t o i. n t- e r p r e t d i f f e r e n t s y 11 o g i s m s w i t h either a de re or a de dicto reading of the modal premisses „ : l 1  More importantly, the interpretation which gives of the start and finish of De Int.,  Hintikka  9 (the MLEM')  i s t h a t t h e o p e r a t o r .i s e m b e d d e d t w i c e w i t h i n t h e L IE M . So the MLEM cannot be said to be a (clear  instance of)  de re sentence as opposed to the de dicto f^J (p V --jp) . (This latter sentence is what Hintikka believes the f r i e n d s o f t h e t r a d i t i o n a I i n t e r p r e t- a t i o n t o b e committed  to.) However, Hintikka's  interpretation  requires • not onIy cases of scope ambiguity but cases of unexpected occurrence of modal operators as well. cases of the former sort establish  For  that a de dicto  reading of the disputed passages might not be  intended,  and nothing more. A case of the latter sort would show that Aristotle attached modal operators to sentences  even when the 'natural' way to read such sentences would indicate otherwise,,  Hintikka needs such a case to  succsssfully a11r ibute the liLEii to Ar istotie. 1:l  Hintikka maintains that there are sentences in  Av •istotle's syllogistic that feature unexpected currences of modal operators. The following  is taken  orn Bk. 1 of Prior Analytics:; We must understand * that which belongs to every* with no limitation in respect of time. e.g. to the p r e s e n t o r t o a p a r t i c u 1 a r peri o cl, b u t w i t h o u t qualification. For it is with the help of such p r opos i t i on s th a t we ma k e dedu c t i on s . s i n c e i f th e proposition is understood with reference to the p r e s e n t rn o rn e n t, t h e r e c a n n o t b e a d e d u c t i o n . F o r n o t h i n g perhaps prave n t- s rn an b e 1 o n g i n g a t a particular time to everything that is moving, i.e. if nothing else were moving; but moving is possible for every horse; yet man is possible for no horse. Further let the first term be animal, t h e rn i d d 1 e m o v i n g , t he la s t rn a n „ The p r o p o s i t i o n s then will be as bef ore, but the c on cIus ion n ecessary , n o t p o s s i b 1 e . F o r rn an is necessarily a n i m a 1 ,, 11 i s t h e n c 1 e a r t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a I rn u s t b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h o u t q u a I i f i. c a t i o n , a n d n o t I i m i t e d i n r espec t of t i me „ % 1 3  Let us again consider  (26) . Hintikka! argues that the  passage just cited, when conjoined with the principle of plenitude, means that (26) has the same force as  <26.>  D V *  f ^ )  ( 26 * ) w i 3.1 app 1 y to a 13. i nd i v i dua 1 s a t a 13. t i me;  Sorabji* s  remarks on the applicability of the  pr :i.nc ip].e of p 1 en i tude (see p .43) may a r ouse suspicion  in Hintikka's reading of sentences  like (26). That  is,  it might be inappropriate to invoke the principle of p I e n i t u d e f o r e r 11 i t i e s s u c h ai s p r o p o s i t i o n s - L e a v i n g such concerns aside, it is incredible, and almost assuredly false, to charge that sentences which the form of  share  (26) should be read as ones like (26' ) . Many  conditionals have the same form as (26) and yet it would be false to claim that they are true when prefixed by a * i t i s n e c e s s a r y t h -a t  o p e r a t o r s „ 11 m i g h t., f o r e x a. m p 1 e ,  be true that (35) All tresspassers will be prosecuted, but false  that  (36) It is necessary  that (all tresspassers will  be !  p r o s e c u t e d) „  Another good reason for rejecting contention  that Aristotle looked on all  Hintikka's universally  q l i a n t i f i e.d c o n d i t i o n a I s a s b e i n g w i t h i n t h e s c o p e o f a n 1  it  is necessary  that' operator  is that the view  is  inconsistent with Aristotle's rejection of the syllogism given above as (Sb).  Consider  again  (28) A applies to all B» I f H i i"i t i k k a i s c o r r e c t, then A r i s t o tie equate d (2 8) w i t h (37) it is necessary that; A applies to all B» The translation of (36) is (37' )  The rationale for Hinti kka' s transIat ion of is that the whereas the CSb) syllogism syllogism would be valid  conditions  is invalid, the  if (28) were replaced by  (37)„  It is incredible that though Hintikka comments on the fact that unspoken necessity operators having full scope over universally quantified  conditionals  contradicts Aristotle's rejection of. the (Sb) syllogism, h e d o e s n o t s e e t h e i n c o n sis t e n c y o f h i s o w n v i. e w s „ Hintikka argues on the one hand that (23) and (30) must have d e re read i ngs bec ause the sy]. 1 og ism as a who 1 e i s i n va I :i. d ac c o r d i n g to A r i s to11 e „ that the syllogism  H i n t :l k k a th en h o 1 ds  is really a valid one,,  Where then  is  the rationale for giving de re readings to the syllogism? And it?  if it is valid, why did Aristotle reject-  Was he genuinely confused?  Hintikka has some  explaining to do „ Yet all he says is that the validity of (3b) f u r ther suppo r ts the view that A ri sto tie di d n ot embed operators  in a consistent fashion,, This part of  Hintikka's discussion about Aristotelian modality  is  very weak „  Surely  it is more plausible to read, the passage  from the Prior Analytics as a warning .against using conditionals which are tied to times in conjunction with m odaI dr em i ses which m i gh t be t i ed to ti mes.  The  result will be a counter intuive one. The of Hintikka  is not only  interpretation  implausible, but it lacks  j us t i f i c a t i on as we 11 . :l  Hintikka has -another argument which seeks to establish  that sentences like (26) should be understood  as ones like <26').  Consider  also taken from the Prior  the following  syllogism,  Analytics:  < S e) < 3 8) A p o s s i b 1 y b e I o n g s t o e v e r y B . <33) B belongs to every C .  So,  <40) A possibly belongs to every C.  Hintikka then makes the sweeping pronouncement  that it  doesn't "matter how you interpret the premisses, is no hope of turning the syllogism  there  into a valid one  unless you lend modal force,,,,.," to <33), Certainly foI lowing de die to reading of <Se) is invalid:  «8.> (33-:> so,  <40. >  o  w  (  y-y  (C-y  />  V ^  8  ^  A  ^  Q n f ) ( C v  A ^ )  On the basis of this interpretation, Hintikka that <33) must be understood  as  Yet a de re reading of the same syllogism  OS-,  V *  ^  ^  argues  4 / W )  is valid:  the  It was hard to believe that this alternate, and perfectly natural,, interpretation of *  (Se) did not occur  to Hintikka. To be fair, Hintikka does give the de re reading of  (Se), but only after his ill-timed  comment.  However, Hintikka cites a further piece of the Prior Analytics to establish his point that the de dicto, and he de r  re aiding is t h e c ne to b e pr & f er r ed :  The x p r ess ion ' :i. tis Ln s i 1e fo r thi t be 1 orI to at * may be ta ken 'j.n t vVc ways : e ith iri? r 4to wh ich i t be I ongs i or 4 tc whi Ch i f may be J. ong v fo r " A may be sa id of that of wh ic B + rreans ci n e c p othe r i-£{ the se -e i ther 4 of wh i c h B Xs s aid' o r i'Zf wh x ch i t may b e sai d' ; and tso- jv „C a ] t h e r e is n c d i ff er en c e bet we en ' A m ay be s a i d o f th t of B' an d ! A m ay + "ie be 1on c? to ev ery B' . It is r iear t hen th e x. cr e ss ion 4A may poss 1I.JIV be long to e y e ry B' m ight r.n i n two way s . be I jed Ts t then we m S s.1t st a te t he • !"•!"iw.ur +u e and charac t e r i st 'i Cs c f the ded Li!r t i'. J l ~\w hi i ch t a r i s e s if B is pos sibl i th e sub.i ect of C: atn d A X s pOs s i b 1 of the sub j e r t o f B. i- o r thu s th pre po si t i on s ai r e atssum e H Xn the m ode C'f pos S Xbi lit but w hene Ve r A is po s s i bIp f th e .-,i.,J Jl~ec t of B , one prop iis t io 1"! is s i mpI 3 n th e other pos s i b Ie . C o n s e q u e n 11 y w a mu s t s t-art Wi th pre po si t i o wh i c h a r e s xm i 3.a r i n f o r rnc s in ti-e oth e r c ase s . —.  I find it difficult to accept this passage as proof the de dicto reading of  that  (Se) is the only correct one.  Hintikka does not even read the passage as a recognition on Aristotle's behalf of the de re/de dicto distinction in sentences of the form  'A may be1on g to every B'  •-•92-  Perhaps this is unfair, since in chapter two of Time and Necessity, Hintikka seems to be on the verge of endorsing this view., His subsequent rejection strikes me as b i zar r e „ 1  11 i s a 1 so i mpo r tan t to r eroember th a t, as  Hintikka himself  argues, there are .syllogisms for which  a de re, -and others for which a de die to reading of  the  m o d a 1 o p e r a t o r C o f e i t h e r k i. n d) i s m o r e -a p p r o p r i a t e „ I n my opinion, C S e )  belongs to that class of  syllogisms  which should be interpreted which contain modal of the de re variety. tries to show that call attention  premises  So this second argument which  Aristotle did not always  explicitly  to tIne presence of modat 1 operators is ,  like its predecessor,  unconvincing.  I f th is is cor rec t, Hin t i kka does not sue ceed in s h o w i n g t hi a t t h e M L £ M i s t h e p r i n c i p I e b e i n g r e s t r i c t e d . Thus far, we have only considered  the positive  evidence  and have concluded that it is inadequate. Two strong pieces of negative evidence have previously d i s c u ssed„ our attention  been  The f i r s t piece oc c u rs when A ri s to 11e ca11s to the faulty Q  to the conclusion  ,;  -P V  p  inference from P ••'  V £3  -jid .  Ar isto11e's warn ing conc er n ing this inf er en ce occur s at lSa27-33 of De Int.  9. It is highly unlikely that he  would call attention  to the very distinction  which  H i n t i k k a c I a i m s , a I b e i t i rn p 1 i c. i 11 y , is b e i n g i g n o r e d . When  I say that Hintikk.a f s implicit claim is that the  distinction Hintikka  is being ignored, 1 simply mean  that  in no way recognizes that it is prima  facie  bizarre to interpret the inference at 19a27-33 in the way he does.  And the reason his interpretation  is prima  facie bizarre is that the passage in question makes no mention of two separate occurences of the necessary  4  it is  that' operator; the evidence suggests only one  operator. So it is incumbent on Hintikka to give a •f o r c e f u 1 a r g u m e n t f o r t h e allege d p r e s e n c e o f t w o  operators .  The second piece of negative evidence was sc rut in ized in chapter three. attribution  to Aristotle of the view that the MLEM  to be restricted distinguish chapter  needs  implies that Aristotle did not  the PB from the LEIi.  As I have argued in  two, it seems false to suppose that Aristotle  merged the two logical  Hintikka's finish of De Not only  Hint ikka's  principles.  interpretation  regarding  the start and  Int. 3 is thus mistaken on several  counts.  is there no reason to hold that he is correct  there are Cat least) two reasons for doubting  it.  '•Quine formulated these two dif f icul ties in his "Reference and Modality" . CIn From a logical Point of View,, Problems involving the substi tutivi ty of identicals were raised in Russell's seminal essay, "On Denoting" . But the formulation of the problems is different,, By 'trivial determ in isrn f I rnean the sor t contained in the saying "What will be, will be",, Equally trivial is the determinism evinced by Aristotle comment in De Int„ 9 that "everything necessarily will be or will not be,," I contend that Hintikka is incorrect when he asserts that this comment indicates the falsity of the traditional interpretation of the sea battle argument„ ^Hintikka himself is somewhat inconsistent as to how Aristotle is to be understood with respect to determinism,, Aristotle was strongly opposed to fatalism. Hintikka*s rather implausible view is that Aristotle was himself largely unaware of his own reasons for this rejection,, •"•I am using here Ross ' translation of the Metaphysics in The Collected Works of Aristotle, edited by .Jonathan Barnes. The Barnes edition is used t h r o u g h ou t t his thesis. 3  K r i p k e ' s approach in the 1963 paper is considerably more sophisticated than his paper "A C o rn p 1 e t e n e s s T h e o r e m i n M o d a 1 L. o g i c " . ®I have in mind here thhe works of -Joseph Alrnog.  "Richard Sorabji, Necessity, Cause and Blames Pe rspe c t i ves on Aristotle's Theory. a  T h e philological arguments are primarily due to Sorabj i ., sv  I do not wish the reader to confuse this unrestricted principle with the restricted logical p r i n c i p 1 e rn e n t i o n e d before .  :l  °At any rate, this is the clear implication of an end note to Code's paper,,  a 1  - I am r ef e r r i n g to  AImog.  1:'-'Ar  istotle , De I n t . ,  3 ,,  Arthur Love j o y , The G r e a t Chain of  :ia  (Cambr idge , Mass „ , : l-IUP , 1936) ,  Being,  p „ 72 „  ' "-But even if, as Hintikka holds, it is the first pair which Aristotle adhered to, an uncomfortable i n c on s i sten c y soon a ri ses . ls  J a a k k o Hintikka, Time a n d N e c e s s i t y ? OUP, 1373), P„ 35.  (Oxford:  16  S o Lovejoy's account, if not hopelessly a mbiguous, is si mp1y fa Ise. 7  A r i s t o 11 e , Metaphysics.  ^'Hintikka, p. 93. ^ H i n t i k k a , p., 93. :20  Hinti kka goes on to identify "mere possibility" with contingency. Cur ious1y enough, thi s emphas i s on s u b 11 e d i s t i n c i i o n h a s n o r o 1 e t o p 1 a y i n H :i. n t i k k a' s account of Aristotle's stand on unactua1ized particulars„ 21  Aristotle,  Posterior  Analytics.  Hintikka, p., 101,. 23  1 think that Hintikka's subsequent argument is most untenable,, My own view is that Aristotle's recognition of unactua1ized potentialities is tantamount to an exp1i c it renunc iat ion of an unrestr i c ted version o f t h e p r :!. n c i p I e o f p 1 e n i t u d e „ T h i s , c o u p led with s o m e of the textual evidence adduced by Hintikka, forces me t o c o n c1ude t ha t th oug h the pr i nc ip1e of pIen i tude was present in Ar istotie, i t was not, for Ar isto11e, an omnipotent metaphysical thesis,,  ^Hintikka,  p„  100.  s:Ei  Aristotle, Bk „ III,  Physics.  as  A r i s t o t l e , Bk. XI, Metaphysics.  27  H i n t i k k a , p.  5213 2S,  105,  A r i s t o 11 e , B k „ IX, Metaphysics,  Ar istotle , Bk . IX, Metaphysics ,  a.oj...j j n t i k ka * s caise f or the s i gn i t i c an c e of uactualized depotantialities is madein various places in Time and Necessity, I argue iri chapter two that hob: i n g t e m p o r a 1 a n d m o d a I o p e r a t o r s t o b e s t r i c 11 y i n t e r c h a n g e a b 1 e yields t h e uanI|a t a b 1 e r e s u 11 t h a t a 3.1 p o s s i b i I i t i e s a r e act u a I i zed . 31  The closest thing to an affirmation of the pr inc ipie is Ar isto11 e's comment that "it is impossib 1 e for a thing always to exist and yet to be destructible.„. ." Cat 281b34 of On the Heavens). But there is no argument from Aristotle to establish the truth of C2) C let alone aan argument, in favor of C 2' ) ) . 3SB 33  Aristotle, Bk . IX Metaphysics..  A r istotle , Bk. I, On the Heavens.  -"'^Hintikka, p. 105. This argument in particular is confusing. I had thought that H i n t i k k a f s overall contention was that Aristotle's modal terminology is best understood if we first attribute the principle of plenitude to Aristotle. . <But in light of the cited passage, this seems wrong.) 3S  H i n t i k k a , p. 147.  3e  H in t i kka , pp „ 3.48- 149 „  37  1 think that Hintikka's objections to the t r a d i t i o n a I i rite r p retati o n a r e i n c o r r set. I am a I s o critical, in chapter seven, of his positive argument in favor of his own interpretation„ 3S  'Hinti kka , p.  151.  " Y e t , as I have indicated, the provisos regarding unactualized potentialities appear to be most unconvine ing„ "°For H i n t i k k a f s point about the "now" to stand.  elimination here of the indexical  cannot be allowed.  Hintikka , p. 151. Affi A3  Hintikka „ p. 152.  Aristotle,  De I n t .  •"•"•Hintikka, p. as  3.  158.  I h i 5 suggestion was by Richard Robinson, Feb.  16,  **Aristotle, De Int. 3. even  think acceptance of the ML EM would cause damage if sentences lacked the form of C3) . 4G  If, has not been pointed out that, from the point of v i ew of th e def en de r of th e t r ad i t i on a 1 interpretation, it is precisely the fact that Hintikka ascribes to Aristo11e a subsidiary ro1e of the prob1em of future truth which guarantees the deficiency of A r i s to tie's all eged so.l u t i on ,. Fo r the t. r ad i t i on a 1 interpretation does result in a satisfactory solution. "•-'Aristotle, Bk. IV,  Metaphysics.  Ar is to tie, B k. IV, Me taph ys i c s . ® i pr  Q  f  y c; o r a b j i , p . 9 8 .  ^ H i n t i k k a , p. 148. ® 3 H i n t i k k a , p. 153. Sd  H x n t i k k a , p. 181.  ss  E v e n though I am reluctant to accept Hintikka's assumption, I feel that there are other aspects of his argument which have more blatant defects about them . lse  H i n t i k ka , pp . 180- 181.  s7  Beirison Mates, Stoic Logic, (Berkeley: Univ. of Cal„ Publications in Philosophy, 1953), p. 37. e3  H i n t i k k a , p p , 1S 9 - 1 9 0  S9  0 n e of the arguments is designed to show that Ar i sto 11 e ' s use of c ond i t i ona 1 s mus t be uncie r s tood as an employment of modality. This argument is almost assu r ed 1 y f a 1 se . "!"he r am i f i. c at i ons f o r H i n t, i k ka a r e somewha t c ur i ous. so  Aristotle,  Bk. 1 1 1 , R h e t o r i C .  e1  H i n t i k k a , p. 183 .  •^Aristotle's strong defence of the LEM is in no way vitiated if it is assumed that the PB, and not the LEM, is the focus of the attack in De Int. 3. If one wishes to block the fatalistic consequences of the sea battle argument , the PB is a legitimate target. As Sorabji shows, Aristotle's argument in De Int. 9 is best understood by appeal to the traditional interpretation . ® 3 Ar i s t o t i e , Bk. VI, Nicomaeh©ah Sd  Ethics.  A r i s t o t i e , Bk„ I, On the Heavens  This emphasis on the relative roles of temporality and modality is at considerable variance with Hintiikka's position that Aristotle was largely unaware of these relative roles. Ge s 7  ftristotle, Bk. I, Prior Analytics. A r i s t o t i e , Bk. I , Prior Analytics.  s3A quick read o f the passage in question 1 eads one to suspect that Hintikka mmade a simpie error „ e3  A r i s to 11 e , Bk . V111 , Phys i c s  v o i..j n t i k k a ' s view s o n M e g a r i a n d e t e r mini s m a r e f a r less plausible than hs ones on Aristotle's sea battle argument„ 71 72  H i n t i k k a , p. 192.  Hint.i kka , p. 195.  73  M y objection to the inference of (10*) from (10) obviously apply to the inference of (14*) from (14).  '^'•Hint :i. kka, p., 200. The converse of (16) was assumed by Aristotle, according to Hintikka. There is not a shred of textual evidence which would make this contention a plausible one. 7S  N o r is there any compelling textual evidence to justify the ascr i p t i on to D i odor us of (17). •^Hintikka's version of the d e r e susp i c i ous . See p. 208 .  (16*a') seems  '^Hintikka, p. 211 . • '^'l. i k e me , So r ab j i e x p 1 i c 11 y en do r ses the t rad it i ona1 i n te r pr e ta t i ori of De Int. 3„ '^Sorabj i ,NtSC©ffiiSity, CiHUSif and Slam©, (Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1980), p. 134. I concur with Sorabj i *s assessmerit; Hin ti kka simpIy 1.ac ks the tex tua 1 evidence to make his analysis a convincing one. I think that Hintikka could rightly deny that Sorabji's point would somehow vitiate his (Hintikka's) a na1ysis i n te r ms of tempo r a 11y spe c i f i ed sen ten ess. A11 Hintikka would have to do would be: to exhaustively list the necessary and sufficient conditions which are required for his thesis. Space does not allow me to do so here, but I aim nevertheless convinced that Sorabj i is mistaken on this point. 01  Sorabji,  p.  134.  ©sag r a 5 j j f s p 0 j n t. , c an , I th i n k , be pu t an o th e r way: there is no reason to think that sentences of the form of (3) are essential to the position that Aristotle's determinism is generated by predictions whose e v a I u a t i o n is f r o m the pre s e n t 1 o o k i n g b ai c k w a r d s . S33  Sorabj i , p. 135.  eA  T h e d i f f i c u 11y regar ded by Sor ab j i as pr ob I ematt i c for the traditional interpretation is the fact that Aristotle asserts that the LEM is a tautology. I agree, but I believe this is consistent with a restraint on PB. es 3  Sorabji„  p„  132.  ® Q u i n e , "Reference and Modality", in Prom a logical po i n t. of v i ew . Pe r h aps " ph i 1 osoph i c a I uselessness" should take the place of "incomprehensible n a t u re" „ T h e r e a r e at c t u a 11 y t h r e e c r i t i c i s m s w h i e h 0 u i n e levels at modal logic. I will not discuss the third  . OO"  c r i t i c isrn here as i t is a mat-1er of sorne dispute how to interpret- this objection . "I"he prob 1 erns of <SI) and (EG) are, by way of contrast, totally straightforward. e  C o d e uses t h e f o 11 o w i n g i n f e r e n c e t o s h o w t h a t the problem of (EG) occurs with the verb "becomes": ( :i.) The Vice-President becomes the President. (ii) The Speaker of the House becomes the VicePresident. —7 (Therefore) (iii) (. -J x) (x becomes the President the Speaker of the House becomes x) The accompanying assumptions that we make to show the irnp 1 ausibi 1 i ty of th is inference are ( a) that Ford is t he Vice •••• P r e s i d e n t r eferred t o i n ( i ) a n d t h a t (b) t here w a s a t i rn e at w h i c h R oc kef el ler w a s t h e S p sake r o f t h e House referred to in (ii)„Now the x in (iii) is clearly n e i. t h e r F ord n o r Roc kef el ler . Kee p ing these ass u m p tions (actually, (a) is a fact not merely an assumption) we can also show that the verb "becomes" also falls prey to the problem of (SI). Code, pp. 161-162. sie  Code, p „ 162,.  es,  David Kaplan has demonstrated that individual c ori c ep ts can be painlessly eliminated in "How to Russell a FregeChurch"„ 55,0  Code , p. 170.  91  ftlriiog has raised some concerns which are especially p e r t ine n t. Yet- t h e t h e o ry of d i r e c t ref ere n c e remains intact. 3:2:  Sl3  Code, p., 171.  -'•"•ftThe problem of (SI) rnsy be resolved with Russell's Theory of Definite Descriptions. As for the problem of (EG), I am prepared to accept the final existsntially quantif ied sentences. »®For example, David Lewis reacts by outrightdenial of transworld identity. Kit Fine radically alters the doma i ns of h i s poss ib 1 e wor 1 ds , so as to nu 11 if y the de re/de di c to d i sst inc t i on „ 9G  T h i s inference is somewhat does not use three terms,, 37  C o d e , p. 170.  irritating  in that it-  loi  t is by no means a simple problem with which this chapter is based, namely, whether it is correct or not to list Aristotle among the dherents of the TQ „ On the one hand, it seems anachronistic in the extreme to hold that Aristotle thought of individual concepts as does a modern phiIosopher of 1anguage ; he simply lac ked the require d i n tens i o n a I t o o I s » 0 n t h e o t h e r hand, itwould be wrong to view Code's argument as anything besides the attempt to show that the TQ is the modern clay counterpart to Aristotle's own way of handling the (SI) and (EG) problems. -J,3That is, White is accusing Aristotle of identity with mere overlap. 1  confusing  °°Aristo11e, Bk„ I, Topic®.  lol  A r i s t o t l e , Bk. V, Metaphysics.  * O S 5 But, of course, a different example, with a different number of dimensions, could have been used. 103  ftristotle, Bk. I, Physics.  ""'Quine, "Reference and Modality", p. 29. los  T h e original intent of this chapter was to deprive Hintikka of an argument which he did not explicitly make, namely that the presence of modal inexactitudes shows that ascription of the MLEM to Aristotle is not implausible. Lately, however, I have realized that a di f f erent- po i n t can be argued f or :; Aristotle's modal sy11ogisms are valid if the modal formulae are given de re readings. 30G  H i n t i k k a does not specify where there occurs the evidence upon which his argument is based. After an extensive search, I have found that the passage in question is located at 25a31~33 of Bk. I of the Prior Analytics. 107  Quine  "On What- There Is", p. 4.  1  °® A sen tence w i. th an y i n d i v i dua 1 c on s tan t m i gh t- o r might not be true, depending on the semantics and on whethsr the ind j. v idua 1 c onstan t names a f i c t i ona 1 en t i ty o r n o t« *04*Th is example is due to Kripke. •x i oij,.-, f r -j- Lin lately, Qu i n e ' s an a lysis of d& re m o da1i t y wouId compell h i m to use pos s i bIe worlds,  something Quine  is loathe to do,,  111  1 find Hintikka's approach to be puzzling,, 11 odern ph i. 1 o s o p h e r s allow for scope d i s t i n c t ! o n s in moda1 f or m u I a e ; why can't anc ient phiIosopher s be o wed the same o p t i o n ? 2  113  B u t Hint ikka does not ar gue a 1 omg such  A r i s t o t l e , Bk . I,  114  The powerful .,  inconsistency  1 :li5i  Ar istotle , Bk » I,  lines ,.  Prior Analytics. i just mentioned is most  Prior Analytics.  i *«Hintikka,  p. 3 8 . This part of Time and Necessity contains what I consider to be a s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d error;; H i n t i k k a says that A r i s t o t l e thinks of the following sentence as a m b i g u o u s : C P) it is possible for A to apply  to all  I a g r e e . But H i n t i k k a ' s pair of a m b i g u o u s seem to be the de die to  B.  readings  C P i) it is possible th at;; A applies to everything and the de re  to which B in fact  £P:S> A possibly applies  applies,  to  everything which B possibly a p p l i e s . My d i s a g r e e m e n t is with C P a ) ; I prefer f o11ow i n g :  the  ( P 2 . ) A possibly applies to every B„ The trans1aticms of the two de re interpretations ..' >car;;, icapci. vcj. (. (. F'a ') and ( P s; > are , r espec tiy ve, 1 y ,j i  Vxd0  *  ->  O  A  *  i. nd  CP«. (11th hour o b s e r v a t i o n : it o c c u r s to.me that Hintikka mav sirnoly be holding that for A r i s t o t l e has a choice  not between (Pj.) and (Pa) but instead between CPs:) and what I have called C P a » ) . On this reading, Aristotle was exposing the ambiguity between two de re sentences, and was unconcerned about any de dicto interpretations of CP). Because of this latter point, I think that this interpretation is also implausible.)  (31ossarN  de re/de die to  di s ti n c t i on  -a formula F is de re iff F contains a modal op eras tor 0 such that either constant  (i) 0 has scope over any  individual  in F; (ii) 0 has scope over any free variables  in F; or Ciii) at least some of the b o u n d v a r i ab1es of F are bound by at quantifier which  lies outside the scope  of 0 ,, -a formulat F is de dicto iff F operator 0 and  con tat ins a modal  is not de re.  Megarian De term in ism-'T'hat brand of determinism which a r gued f o r by D i do r us „ Plenitude-Metaphysical Aristotle, which  was  Pr i n c i p 1 e of  thesis ascribed by Hintikka to  (roughly) is that, the distinction  between temporality and modality  is more apparent  than  real. In The Great Chain of Being, Love,joy traces the role played by the principle philosophical  in a variety of  the  problems,. These include the argument from  evi 1 ,  Temporally Qualified and Unqualified Sentences-This  is  the key distinction of H i n t i k k a f s treatment of the sea battle argument.  The difference  is between sentences of  'p at to' and ones of the form  Traditions*I  Interpretation-This  p.  term applies to several  separate accounts of Aristotle's arguments in the ninth chapter of his book De Interpret-at- ione, all of  which  share the view that the problem of future truth has a direct bearing on the vindication of fatalism  in the  chapter ,,  Problems of (SI) and (EG)-The two unambiguous posed for modal iioda I i ty " „  logic  problems  in Q u i n e ? s "Reference and  BibIiography  Code, Alan., "Aristotle's Response to Quine's Criticisms of Modal Logic",, In The -Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1977 . Hintikka, J'aakko,, Time and Necessity: Studies in Aristotle's Theory of Modality. Oxford: Oxford Un iv . Press , 1973„ Hintikka, -Jaakko and R ernes, Unto and Knuut-ila, Si mo. Aristotelian Modality and Determinism. In Acta Philosophica Fennica. Vol. 29, No. 1. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1977. Kaplan, David. "How to Russell a Frege-Church" „ In The Possible and the Actual Ed „ Michael -J. Loux „ Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1979. pp. 210-224. Kolmogorov, A.M. "On the Principle of Excluded Middle". In From Frege to Godel. Ed. J'ohan Heijenoort. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1925. Kripke, Saul. Naming and Necessity. Princeton Un i v ,. Press, 1970.  Princeton:  P r i o r , A r o n . •" T h r e e - V a 3. u e d L o g i c a n d F u t u r e Contingents",, In Philosophical Quarterly, 1953. Time and Tense. Oxford: OUP,  1968.  Sorabji , Richard. Necessity, Cause and Blame: Perspectives on Aristotle's Theory. Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1930 Quine, Uillard Van Ormam . From a logical point of Cambridge, Mass.: Harper Torchbooks, 1953.  view.  

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