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Caesar's strategy in the Civil War Cadman, Frederick William 1957

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CAESAR'S STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL WAR by FREDERICK WILLIAM CADMAF B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1949  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of CLASSICS  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1957  ii ABSTRACT The purpose of t h i s study i s to determine Caesar's strategy i n the C i v i l War of Rome, 49 B, C. to 45 B. C. The C i v i l War with a l l i t s p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e s has received less a t t e n t i o n than the G a l l i c War but i t i s i n many mays more i n t e r e s t i n g . Roman i s p i t t e d against Roman with an empire as the p r i z e f o r the v i c t o r . Caesar i s s t r u g g l i n g f o r h i s l i f e against forces i n I t a l y and other parts of Europe who do not wish to see Rome r u l e d by a D i c t a t o r . The C i v i l War rings the death k n e l l of the Republic and heralds the b i r t h of the Empire. The basic works f o r t h i s study are the three books of the C i v i l War (De B e l l o C i v i l i ) w r i t t e n by Caesar himself, the Alexandrine War (De B e l l o Alexandrino),  the A f r i c a n War (De B e l l o Afrioo) and the Spanish  War (De B e l l o Hispanienal), a l l of doubtful o r i g i n but nevertheless important and of great value to the student of m i l i t a r y strategy. I have referred often t o the Letters of Cicero, which reveal much information about the m i l i t a r y scene at the time of Caesar's march through I t a l y .  Cicero's work i s the only contemporary account of Caesar's  a c t i v i t i e s a v a i l a b l e to the scholar, but I have supplemented t h i s by a study of l a t e r h i s t o r i a n s of Rome. Such w r i t e r s as Cassius Dio and Appian provide the m i l i t a r y h i s t o r i a n with data on many of Caesar's movements and c l a r i f y h i s strategy.  I have augmented the ancient accounts of Cae-  sar's campaigns i n the C i v i l War by modern studies, as i s evident from the Bibliography.  ill The analysis of a l l the campaigns of the C i v i l War produces a d e f i n i t e s t r a t e g i c pattern.  The elements of s u r p r i s e , manoeuvre,  a n t i c i p a t i o n , and a general understanding o f an enemy's mind, which are displayed by a l l s k i l f u l m i l i t a r y leaders, were also part of Caesar's s t r a t e g i c equipment. Most often through s k i l l but sometimes by luck he applied the above techniques where they were needed and, i n a l l the major c o n f l i c t s , these elements of strategy provided him with v i c t o r y . Though t a c t i c s and strategy are c l o s e l y l i n k e d on the b a t t l e f i e l d , no attempt has been made i n t h i s study to give much d e t a i l to t a c t i c s except where such information i s necessary i n explaining the strategic movement concerned.  The f i e l d of t a c t i c s i s beyond the scope  of my study. Throughout the h i s t o r y of man, c e r t a i n p r i n c i p l e s of war have been followed by great m i l i t a r y leaders.  Caesar was no exception.  When  Caesar i s compared with generals today and h i s conditions of warfare with those that e x i s t now he displays c e r t a i n common p r i n c i p l e s : the s e l e c t i o n and maintenance of the aim, the maintenance o f morale, concent r a t i o n of f o r c e , f l e x i b i l i t y and offensive a c t i o n . Caesar, i n combining the p r i n c i p l e s of war with sound s t r a t e g i c methods, created f o r himself a name respected and feared i n the annals of h i s t o r y .  In presenting  t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of  the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the  University  of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may of my  study.  I further  copying of  this  be granted by the Head  Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .  I t i s under-  stood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my permission.  Department of  Classics  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada. Date  A p r i l 18th, 1957.  written  iv  TABLE OF CONTENTS  page  CHAPTER I  Introduction  1  CHAPTER I I  Intrigue i n I t a l y  8  CHAPTER i n  The March Through I t a l y  14  CHAPTER I T  The F i r s t Spanish Campaign  33  CHAPTER T  From Dyrrachium t o P h a r s a l i a  55  CHAPTER 71  The A f r i c a n Campaign..  79  CHAPTER T i l  The Second Spanish Campaign  113  CHAPTER T i l l  Conclusion  147  BIBLIOGRAPHY  i 5 8  CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The C i v i l War between Caesar and the Republicans was waged i n t e r m i t t e n t l y over a period of f i v e years from 49 B.C. t o 45 B. C. I t was a tumultuous period i n Roman h i s t o r y and one which witnessed the  downfall of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, and the r i s e t o power o f  Gaius J u l i u s Caesar.  Although the war was a c i v i l struggle, i t should  be stressed that most of the f i g h t i n g took place on f o r e i g n s o i l , only the  f i r s t few b a t t l e s being waged on I t a l i a n ground. The C i v i l War produced two important r e s u l t s :  the Republic and the b i r t h of the P r i n c i p a t e .  the death of  I n 49 B.C. the Republican  p o l i t i c a l system was on the verge of collapse; the senate no longer displayed e f f i c i e n c y and the people could more e a s i l y be swayed by the appeal of a powerful m i l i t a r y statesman than by the pleading of a s e r v i l e group o f senators c o n t r o l l e d by an a r i s t o c r a t i c minority. The purpose of t h i s study i s to show how J u l i u s Caesar, during the period of the C i v i l War, increased h i s power and prestige through the  exercise of m i l i t a r y strategy.  To understand better Caesar's s k i l l ,  several points must be made c l e a r about strategy.  We should know what  i t i s , how i t i s applied, and consequently how Caesar used i t . Strategy i s as o l d as mankind. I t has evolved as man has developed. As the science of war became more f a m i l i a r to man, so h i s knowledge and a p p l i c a t i o n of strategy increased.  Strategy has been  defined i n several ways. Let us consider a few of these. K a r l von  2 Clausewitz (1780-1831), defines strategy as: "the use of engagements to a t t a i n the object of the war.  1,1  This d e f i n i t i o n has been c r i t i c z e d  by B. H. L i d d e l l - H a r t because " i t intrudes on the sphere of p o l i c y , o r the higher conduct of the war, which must n e c e s s a r i l y be the responsib i l i t y of the government and not of the m i l i t a r y leaders/* and because " i t narrows the meaning of 'strategy* to the pure u t i l i z a t i o n of b a t t l e , thus conveying the idea that b a t t l e i s the only means to the s t r a t e g i c a l 2 end."  We may say then t h a t , according to Von Clausewitz, strategy i s a  plan o f war by which d e t a i l e d mapping of the proposed campaigns regul a t e s the b a t t l e s fought i n these campaigns. Count von Moltke (1800-1891), a Prussian f i e l d marshal and the greatest s t r a t e g i s t of the l a t t e r h a l f of the nineteenth century, o f f e r s t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of strategy:  "the p r a c t i c a l adaptation o f the  means placed at a general's disposal t o the attainment o f the object 3 i n view."  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the emphasis placed upon the  importance of the general's a b i l i t y i n t h i s d e f i n i t i o n . B. H. L i d d e l l - H a r t defines strategy as:  Finally,  "the a r t of d i s t r i b u t i n g and  applying m i l i t a r y means to f u l f i l the ends of p o l i c y . "  4  This same  author i s a staunch advocate of the strategy of i n d i r e c t approach, which he describes as the technique used "to d i s l o c a t e the enemy's b a l ance i n order to produce a d e c i s i o n . " This technique of the i n d i r e c t 1 K. von Clausewitz, On War, t r a n s . 0. J . M a t t h i j s J o l l e s (Hew York, 1943), p.62. 2 B. H. L i d d e l l - H a r t , Strategy; The I n d i r e c t Approach (London, 1954), p.333. ' « 3 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . , p.334. 4 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . . p.335. 5 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . , p.31.  3 approach of strategy requires some explanation because i t i s of importance t o the study of Caesar's own strategy.  As there are two  forms of experience, d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t , so there are two approaches to the use of strategy, the d i r e c t and the i n d i r e c t .  The d i r e c t  approach involves immediate contact with the enemy without reference to the element of s u r p r i s e . Hope of v i c t o r y i s placed on the strength of one's own force and the weakness of the opponent. On the other hand the i n d i r e c t approach i s concerned with the element of s u r p r i s e , the a n t i c i p a t i o n of the enemy's moves, the placement of forces.  Liddell-  Hart presents the case f o r the i n d i r e c t approach and he i s e s p e c i a l l y convincing i n h i s treatment of Caesar's a p p l i c a t i o n of i t .  He t r i e s  to show how the successful campaigns were won by the i n d i r e c t approach and the unsuccessful were l o s t as a r e s u l t o f the d i r e c t approach. Further reference to t h i s w i l l be made i n a l a t e r chapter. A majority of m i l i t a r y w r i t e r s agree that the s k i l l of the general determines h i s basis of strategy and that a general, by exp l o i t i n g the elements of movement and s u r p r i s e , lessens the opportunity of h i s opponent t o gain a v i c t o r y . The winning of the war i s not n e c e s s a r i l y the aim of strategy, which i s rather the arrangement of b a t t l e s so that they are fought under circumstances most advantageous to the general and the army concerned.  The v i c t o r y i s gained by the  t a c t i c s employed i n c a r r y i n g out the s t r a t e g i c plan. The psychological approach to strategy i s just as important as the p h y s i c a l . The s t r a t e g i c s k i l l of a commander i s keenly tested when he anticipates c o r r e c t l y h i s opponent's next move. Of importance to the commander i s the d i s l o c a t i o n of the enemy {an important aim of  4 strategy) and t h i s d i s l o c a t i o n may be psychologically created by a p h y s i c a l move on the enemy's rear or a f l a n k attack.  Thus a shock  r e s u l t s rather than the s t r a i n which would be produced by a f r o n t a l attack.  Strategy then i s best applied when both p h y s i c a l and psycho-  l o g i c a l forces are u t i l i z e d by the general. Since strategy i s concerned with the p l o t t i n g of m i l i t a r y engagements, there are c e r t a i n f a c t o r s that the s t r a t e g i s t must take into consideration when contemplating an engagement. Von  Clausewitz  considers that these factors e x i s t i n the f i e l d of moral, p h y s i c a l , 6 mathematical, geographical and s t a t i s t i c a l a n a l y s i s .  I t i s therefore  the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the s t r a t e g i s t to see that where possible a l l the above f a c t o r s are f u n c t i o n a l before a m i l i t a r y engagement takes place.  An engagement should be fought i f at a l l possible i n an open  p l a i n , f o r here the talent of the general can best be displayed;  "in  mountains he has too l i t t l e command over the separate p a r t s , and the d i r e c t i o n of a l l gets beyond h i s powers; i n open p l a i n s i t i s simple 7 and does not exhaust those powers.* The element of surprise i s one of the most rewarding and important aspects of strategy.  The a b i l i t y to detect a weakness i n  the enemy's l i n e i s i n i t s e l f commendable but to use t h i s weakness, as Pompey did at Dyrrhachium, and to create a f u r t h e r disadvantage f o r the enemy by an unexpected move i s indeed an i n d i c a t i o n of w e l l planned strategy.  Seerecy and r a p i d i t y contribute g r e a t l y to the  success of a surprise movement. The e f f e c t on the opponent can be a loosening of the bond of u n i t y between leader and followers - a form 6 Von Clausewitz, o p . c i t . , p.124. 7 Von Clausewitz, o p . c i t . , p.127.  5 of psychological warfare i f you l i k e - f o r nothing i s so unnerving f o r a commander on the defensive as the doubt and d i s t r u s t engendered i n himself and h i s troops by an opposing general who has just completed s u c c e s s f u l l y a surprise move. We must understand that "surprise i s 8 psychological i n essence and the antidote i s equally nebulous.** p r i s e then can be a double-edged weapon, f o r the enemy by surprise may o f f s e t any advantage gained.  Sur-  counter-  Thus the s t r a t e g i c a l f a c t o r  of surprise i s , perhaps, the commander's greatest weapon and Caesar did not h e s i t a t e to use i t to advantage when time and place warranted i t . Herman Foertsch, a colonel of the German general s t a f f , places the element of surprise second to s u p e r i o r i t y of forces and he stresses the importance of conducting where possible a strategy of a n n i h i l a t i o n so that the m i l i t a r y organization of the enemy can be crushed as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e .  **It i s the a r t of strategy to b r i n g about a b a t t l e under  the most favorable circumstances p o s s i b l e , both as to the ground and the timing, and to force i t on the opponent under conditions that are most unpropitious f o r him. *^ 1  Thus w i t h i n d e f i n i t e s t r a t e g i c l i m i t s the  goal of strategy i s "to break the w i l l of the enemy by m i l i t a r y means, that i s , to deprive him of h i s means to f i g h t e i t h e r permanently or u n t i l he submits."  10  Strategy i t s e l f has not changed through the ages; the o l d p r i n c i p l e s have merely been adapted to new conditions of f i g h t i n g so 8 E. A. Coolen, "Surprise," Canadian Army Journal, 7(1951), p.71. 9 H. Foertsch, The A r t of Modem Warfare, trans. T. W. Khauth. (New York, 1940), pp.26-27. 10 Foertsch, o p . c i t . , p.21.  6 evident i n the theatres of war today. Modern w r i t e r s on strategy s t i l l draw lessons from the campaigns of ancient s o l d i e r s such as Hannibal and Caesar, who showed the importance i n strategy of the o b j e c t i v e , the s e i z i n g of the offensive, and the e f f i c i e n c y of m o b i l i t y . The p r i n c i p l e s of strategy that they followed, e.g., s u r p r i s e , concentration, team-work, and placement of forces, are s t i l l applicable today. The substance of strategy has been discussed at some length to pave the -way f o r a developed analysis of the method of strategy employed by Caesar to make himself master of the Roman world.  We s h a l l  see how Caesar won complete v i c t o r y i n the C i v i l War by scheming, planning and sometimes f a i l i n g i n h i s strategy.  The strategy of over-  throwing as w e l l as the technique of wearing down an enemy by quick thrusts or prolonged action was very f a m i l i a r t o , and w e l l u t i l i z e d by, Caesar.  The strategy of the C i v i l War i s decidedly personal, f o r the  opposing forces were i n the hands of generals who not only c o n t r o l l e d the strategy of t h e i r respective campaigns, but also the t a c t i c s . We must r e a l i z e that "modern warfare f i n d s i t s roots i n the 11 Napoleonic era,"  not i n the c l a s s i c a l age; however, i n the f i e l d of  strategy and t a c t i c s , and e s p e c i a l l y strategy, the o l d ideas have merely been modified to conform with present f i g h t i n g conditions.  I t i s evi-  dent that Caesar used no f i x e d system of strategy; he instead made great use of unforeseen circumstance.  H i s a r t i f i c e s and contrivances were  often w e l l suited to the s t r a t e g i c s i t u a t i o n and often they involved the element of s u r p r i s e . H i s s t r a t e g i c a l technique was modified t o 11 E. A. Goolen, o p . c i t . , p.62.  7 s u i t the conditions under which he fought. Perhaps he was not the greatest s t r a t e g i s t of h i s t o r y , but he can be ranked with such outstanding m i l i t a r y men as Alexander, Hannibal and Napoleon, and i n many phases of m i l i t a r y s k i l l (not n e c e s s a r i l y strategy) he outranks them.  8  CHAPTER I I INTRIGUE IN ITALY  In order that we may understand Caesar's reasons f o r marching against Pompey and the Republicans i t w i l l be necessary to review, without excessive d e t a i l , the events which took plaee p r i o r t o h i s crossing of the Rubicon,  I t should be noted here that i n t h i s study  the chronology used u n t i l the second Spanish Campaign i s that of the old  calendar and not of Caesar's r e v i s i o n .  Therefore the dates  mentioned w i l l be approximately two months e a r l i e r than those of the s o l a r calendar, a condition which was not r e c t i f i e d (except at times roughly by a form of i n t e r c a l a t i o n adopted by the magistrates) u n t i l near the end of Caesar's career. In the consular elections of 51 B.C., M. Porcius Cato, the S t o i c , f a i l e d as a candidate. Elected as consuls were Ser. S u l p i c i u s Rufus and M. Claudius Marcalius.  Mareellus had incurred Caesar's  wrath mainly through the b i l l he presented to the Senate "that a successor t o him should be sent out even before the appointed t i m e . "  1  He f u r t h e r reminded the Senate t h a t , "when Pompey proposed a b i l l touching the p r i v i l e g e s of o f f i c i a l s , i n the elause where he debarred absentees from candidacy f o r o f f i c e , he forgot to make a s p e c i a l p  exception i n Caesar's case.*  0  Caesar's proconsulship had been,  according t o agreement reached at the conference of Luca, extended for  a second period of f i v e years, u n t i l the end of February, 49 B.C. ^  1  ' "  1 Dio, Roman H i s t o r y . XL, 59. 2 Suetonius, J u l i u s , 28.  l  '  ' I I I !  9 "Caesar's claim was that the law of the Ten Tribunes gave him the r i g h t to be a candidate f o r the consulship i n absentia, to which he apparentlyadded as a c o r o l l a r y that he could r e t a i n h i s governorship and h i s army u n t i l he had exercised that r i g h t .  Such a claim was p l a u s i b l e but i t  was no more." Day by day the power of Pompey increased through the e f f o r t s of Cato, who,  even though a staunch Republican, r e a l i z e d t h a t , i f  Caesar were to be suppressed, the help of a warrior equal to him i n strength was needed. A l l i e d with Cato i n the anti-Caesarian f a c t i o n were such men as Marcellus, the aforementioned consul, and L. Aemilius Paullus as w e l l as M. Scribonius Curio, C. C a e c i l i u s Metellus S c i p i o , Pompey's father-in-law, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and even M. T u l l i u s Cicero himself, who took h i s stand f o r the sake of the Republic  and  h i s f r i e n d Pompey. Caesar intended not to be outwitted by the Roman o l i g a r c h y . He was one of the r i c h e s t men i n the Empire, who would not h e s i t a t e to use t h i s wealth, i f necessary, to win over to h i s cause men who be of the utmost value to him.  could  Such a man was M. Scribonius Curio, who  had incurred much debt through f a u l t y speculation, and who, at the present moment, was a t r i b u n e .  I t was Caesar's i n t e n t i o n to use the  t r i b u n i c i a n power of veto to prolong h i s magistracy, and as Curio was a f i e r y i n d i v i d u a l and a good speaker Caesar, decided that such a man would be an asset to him.  By s k i l f u l bribery Caesar cleared him of  debt, and so won him over to h i s cause, that he promised Caesar that by h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l use of the veto he would t r y to prevent any onesided proceeding against him. 3 ?. E. Adcock, i n Cambridge Ancient H i s t o r y , IX (Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1932), p.634.  10 Caesar had by t h i s time (end of 51) increased the number of legions i n Gaul by new l e v i e s to eleven.  But i n Home M. Mareellus had  introduced a motion to the Senate that the provinces administered by Caesar be given on March 1st, 49 to two consulars who were to be provided with governorships f o r that year.  The Caesarians appealed to  Pompey to permit t h e i r commander to conjoin the consulship with h i s proconsulship, but he formally rejected t h i s request and suggested that Caesar's veterans apply t o the Senate f o r t h e i r discharge.  This attempt  to destroy Caesar's d i s c i p l i n e , combined with the c o a l i t i o n between Pompey and the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l party, disturbed Caesar, and, to be ready f o r any unforeseen move of the Republicans, he transferred one l e g i o n from Gaul to North I t a l y .  Caesar r e a l i z e d that Mareellus wished t o  terminate h i s command on the basis that the G a l l i c war was over and the s o l d i e r s were ready f o r t h e i r discharge. The consuls elected f o r the year 50 were L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Claudius Mareellus.  Curio, to safeguard h i s own p o s i t i o n , had  at f i r s t to dissimulate h i s allegiance to Caesar, but, at the r i g h t moment (when he had come i n t o the disfavour of the a r i s t o c r a t s ) , he openly suggested Caesar's a c t i o n s . I n A p r i l o f 50 B.C. Pompey had commanded Caesar to return to him the l e g i o n he had l e n t him i n 54 and one other, that they might be put to service on the Parthian f r o n t i e r .  By the time these legions had  reached Rome, the Parthian threat had diminished, so Pompey had sent the s o l d i e r s to Capua to await f u r t h e r orders.  Caesar now r e a l i z e d  that e i t h e r a great mistake had been made on the part of the senate, or he had succumbed to the treachery of Pompey. He knew that he could not  11 remain i d l e , so, having strengthened h i s p o s i t i o n by h i s l e v y i n Gaul, he t r a v e l l e d from one region to the other, personally exhorting h i s troops, thereby increasing t h e i r f a i t h i n him.  The a r i s t o c r a t s on the  other hand "merely displayed t h e i r enmity toward Caesar, and then made no further preparations themselves to strengthen t h e i r p o s i t i o n , while they had furnished t o him a p l a u s i b l e excuse f o r r e t a i n i n g the legions that were with him."  Curio struck the f i r s t blow f o r Caesar when on  December 1 s t , 50 B.C., he moved "that a l l persons i n arms must l a y these down and disband t h e i r legions, or else they should not s t r i p Caesar of h i s weapons and expose him to the forces of h i s r i v a l s . " So ended the troublesome year of 50 B.C. L. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Claudius Marcellus, through the popularity of Pompey and the pressure of the a r i s t o c r a t s , were elected consuls f o r 49 B.C.  On the 1st of January, 49, C. Scribonius Curio,  now Caesar's s e n a t o r i a l ambassador, informed the Senate that Caesar was w i l l i n g to give up h i s o f f i c e and disband h i s legions, i f Pompey would do l i k e w i s e .  The Senate a f t e r a heated debate voted that Caesar but not  Pompey, was to surrender h i s arms. Thereupon an unexpected move was made by the new tribunes f o r 49, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius Longinus, who vetoed t h i s motion and continued to do so on succeeding days.  The  Senate's mind was blocked against Caesar, even before Curio presented h i s compromise and, had not the aforenamed tribunes i n s i s t e d , the message would never have been read. C. Marcellus urged that any discussion of 4 Dio, XL, 66. 5 Dio, XL, 62.  V-  12 the problem be postponed u n t i l such time as the senate could enforce a decision by m i l i t a r y strength, as l e v i e s and the r e c r u i t i n g of a new I t a l i a n army were now taking place. Another blow was struck against Caesar when "...Metellus S c i p i o was allowed t o put the deadly motion that Caesar should l a y down h i s command by a date to be f i x e d , and that i f he refused he should be treated as a p u b l i c enemy."  Antony and Cassius of course objected  and were subsequently expelled.  "They l e f t Rome, taking with them the  one c o n s t i t u t i o n a l b a t t l e - c r y with which they could supply t h e i r master, 7 that the r i g h t s of the tribunes were being overborne." passed the ultimum decretum against Caesar:  The Senate  "Caesar should  surrender  his o f f i c e to h i s successors and dismiss h i s legions by a given day, or else be considered an enemy f o r action contrary to the i n t e r e s t s of 8 the country."  Caesar now r e a l i z e d that further negotiation was f u t i l e ,  and a f i n a l blow was struck by the a r i s t o c r a t s when they won over to t h e i r side h i s resourceful lieutenant, T. Labienus. Pompey knew how to conduct the war, but not how to declare i t . To the Catonists he had surrendered the power of commencing h o s t i l i t i e s against Caesar when and how he pleased, and they had now ordered him t o march against Caesar. His forces at home and abroad were greater than Caesar's. He had a naval support which Caesar d i d not possess, and h i s prestige among the powers a l l i e d with Rome was much higher.  So Caesar on the 9th of January,  49, crossed the Rubicon, "...but as he was accustomed to r e l y upon the terror 6 7 8  caused by the c e l e r i t y and audaeity of h i s movements, rather than Adcock, o p . c i t . , p.636. Adcock, o p . c i t . , p.637. Dio, XLI, 3.  13  on the magnitude of h i s preparations, he decided t o take the aggressive i n t h i s great war with h i s f i v e thousand men, and to a n t i c i p a t e the g enemy by s e i z i n g the advantageous p o s i t i o n s i n I t a l y . " The c o n s t i t u t i o n a l motive which forced Caesar to declare war was the expulsion of the tribunes, but Suetonius elaborates f u r t h e r on t h i s f i n a l moment: he crossed to h i t h e r Gaul, ...halted at Ravenna, M  intending t o resort t o war i f the senate took any d r a s t i c a c t i o n against the tribunes of the commons who interposed vetoes i n h i s behalf.  Now  t h i s was h i s excuse f o r the e i v i l war, but i t i s believed that he had other motives. ' B  L0  These other motives were no doubt personal preser-  v a t i o n and increased m i l i t a r y p r e s t i g e . So the c i v i l war had begun and Caesar, a f t e r nine years* absence, trod once more the s o i l of h i s native land. Alea i a c t a erat.  9 Appian, The C i v i l Wars. I I , 5, 34. 10 Suetonius, J u l i u s , 30.  14 CHAPTER I I I THE MARCH THROUGH ITALY " I t may be said that i n general the i n t e r e s t of these campaigns l i e s i n strategy rather than i n t a c t i c s , f o r when the b a t t l e was once 1 joined the issue could generally be f o r e t o l d . " Caesar's s t r a t e g i c a b i l i t y was not tested to i t s l i m i t i n h i s conquest of I t a l y but h i s march from Ariminum t o Brundisium, even though no great challenge a f t e r the many perilous e x p l o i t s of the G a l l i c war, displayed a knowledge of s t r a t e g i c p r i n c i p l e s gained from long experience.  I t i s the object of t h i s study t o explain as c l e a r l y as possible  why Caesar moved, not necessarily how he moved, f o r the l a t t e r problem i s answered by the study of t a c t i c s and not strategy.  This chapter w i l l  eover the events o f the year 49 B.C. from the crossing of the Rubicon (January 11) to the departure o f Pompey from Brundisium (March 17), the action which brought the f i r s t phase of the C i v i l War to a close. What Caesar d i d , he did through compulsion, f o r i t was i n the f i n a l analysis e i t h e r h i s l i f e o r that of the Republic and, once having made a move, i t would be f a t a l f o r him to turn back. H i s strategy was sueh t h a t , although he had no i n t e n t i o n o f turning back, he did leave a loophole f o r the negotiation of a peaceful s o l u t i o n to the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l problem of h i s r e c a l l .  "On a r r i v i n g at the banks of the r i v e r Rubicon,  he hesitated f o r a while, doubtful whether he should s a c r i f i c e himself or venture upon the unconstitutional act; he was probably actuated more 2 by the desire to save himself than to rule.™ 1 Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History, IX, p.646. 2 B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Borne, I I I (London, 1849), p.54.  15 Caesar, a f t e r r e c e i v i n g the expelled tribunes i n Ariminum, had addressed the troops of the Thirteenth l e g i o n , informing them of the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n , and had f i n a l l y encouraged them "to defend from h i s enemies the reputation and d i g n i t y of the commander under whose guidance they have administered the state with u n f a i l i n g good fortune f o r nine years, fought many successful b a t t l e s , and p a c i f i e d the whole of Caul and Germany."  I t was necessary f o r Caesar at  t h i s time to convince h i s troops that he was r i g h t , even though he could not convince himself, f o r there must have been an element of doubt i n his mind. C o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y , he was at f a u l t and no one knew i t any b e t t e r than he, but he r e a l i z e d that he must make the f i r s t move and so we have the f i r s t phase of h i s strategic plans, namely, to convince h i s troops of h i s s i n c e r i t y , that he might creat f o r himself and f o r them the r i g h t psychological s i t u a t i o n f o r f i g h t i n g .  On January 11 Caesar  moved across the Rubicon, d i r e c t l y towards Ariminum on the coastal road ten miles distant from the r i v e r .  The senate did not a n t i c i p a t e so f a s t  a march and Pompey was caught o f f guard. What Caesar lacked i n f i g h t i n g force, he made up i n speed. surprise:  I t was h i s i n t e n t i o n to seize Ariminum by  "Accordingly, he sent forward the centurions with a few of  t h e i r bravest troops i n peaceful garb to go inside the walls of Ariminum and take i t by s u r p r i s e . "  4  There i s no doubt that t h i s plan was carried  out s u c c e s s f u l l y , Ariminum was i n f i l t r a t e d by Caesar's advance guard and quickly overthrown from w i t h i n . Upon h i s approach the townspeople opened t h e i r gates to him.  Ferrero describes t h i s fifth-column a c t i v i t y  as follows: "He communicated the plan to several friends and o f f i c e r s 3 Caesar, B e l l . Civ., I , 7. 4 Appian, I I , 5, 55.  16 who were to go with him, of whom A. P o l l i o was one, and concerted  skil-  f u l arrangements to prevent any report of h i s i n t e n t i o n from reaching g Rimini.**  By the time the conquest of Ariminum had teen completed the  report of h i s advance had reached Rome. "Prayers were offered up i n public as was customary i n times of danger, and the people, who remembered the e v i l times of Marius and S u l l a , clamoured that both Caesar and Pompey ought to l a y down t h e i r commands as the only means of averting war.  Cicero proposed to send messengers to Caesar i n order to come to 6  an arrangement."  Pompey too was confused, f o r **it was impossible f o r  Pompey to get any true information about the enemy, since many reported to him whatever they happened t o hear, and then were vexed i f he did not believe them."' Caesar had joined C. Scribonius Curio, M. Gaelius Rufus and the f u g i t i v e tribunes Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus i n Ariminum. His m i l i t a r y strength on the 12th of January stood at one l e g i o n , the T h i r teenth.  This l e g i o n divided i n t o i t s respective cohorts was assigned  f o r f u r t h e r duty to Caesar's two most responsible l i e u t e n a n t s , Antony 8 and Curio.  To Antony he gave f i v e cohorts and to Curio three,  keeping two cohorts f o r h i s own personal use i n Ariminum. strategy now became two-fold.  while  Caesar's  He intended to send Antony with h i s f i v e  cohorts to seize Arretium, an inland town on the V i a Cassia, while he himself with h i s cohorts pressed on to secure the three coastal towns of Pisaurum, Fanum and Aneona. But Pompey had not been l a x i n f o r t i f y i n g h i s t e r r i t o r y . R e c r u i t i n g o f f i c e r s had been sent throughout the d i s t r i c t s 5 G. Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome, I I , trans. A*!. Zimmern (london, 1909), p.223. 6 Appian, I I , 36. 7 P l u t a r c h , Pompey, 61 (trans. P e r r i n ) • 8 B e l l . C i v . . I , 11.  1? of I t a l y ,  They were not exceptionally good m i l i t a r y men, but, with  proper support, they could present a strong defense. Such persons were i n charge of the coastal towns i n north-east I t a l y . Caesar, as was h i s custom, moved quickly and by January 14 overpowered the towns, l i t t l e i f any resistance being shown:  "...he  9 occupies PIsaurum, Fanum and Aneona...."  Perhaps Caesar wishes to show  us the ease with which he conquered when he explains the overthrow o f these towns by the phrase s i n g u l i s cohortibus (each with one cohort). The seizure of these three towns gave Caesar control over the north end of the V i a Flaminia  "Two highways l e d at that time from the  Roraagna to the south, the Aemilio-Cassian which l e d from Bononia over the  Apennines to Arretium and Rome, and the P o p i l l i o - F l a m i n i a n , which  led  from Ravenna along the coast of the A d r i a t i c t o Fanum and was there  divided, one branch running westward through the Furlo pass to Rome, 10 another southward to Aneona and thence onward to Apulia.** had followed the former road, Caesar the l a t t e r .  Mark Antony  Although Caesar r e -  ports that he sent Antony to Arretium, no mention i s made of the l a t t e r ' s success there.  We must assume then that he met with l i t t l e i f any r e s i s -  tance and e a s i l y brought the i n t e r i o r town under c o n t r o l .  Arretium was  only 135 miles distant from Rome. By the seizure of Pisaurum, Fanum and Aneona, Caesar "was merely t r y i n g to secure an asset which would enable him to treat f o r peace on more favourable conditions, and to prove to h i s enemies t h a t , under provocation, he could answer violence with violence.** ^ About the 9 B e l l . Civ., l o c . c i t . 10 T. Momma en, The History of Rome, IV, trans. W.P.Dickson (London and New York, 1930), p.350. 11 Ferrero, o p . c i t . . pp.234-225. 1  18 19th of January the envoys L, Roscius and L. Caesar reached Caesar at one of these coastal towns and presented him with a message from Pompey, reminding him of the l a t e s t decree of the senate which had urged him to y i e l d f o r the good of the s t a t e . Pompey had stated:  "He had always 12  placed the i n t e r e s t s of the republic before private claims." Caesar's reply to Roscius was d i r e c t and to the point with s p e c i a l emphasis on a meeting between the two:  " l e t Pompeius himself come nearer or allow me 13  to approach him.  I n t h i s way a conference w i l l s e t t l e a l l disputes.*  Caesar had f a i l e d to convince the senate that he was not i n t e n t upon war. Instead of only alarming them he had t e r r i f i e d them and the reports of h i s advance were magnified beyond actual f a c t . While Caesar was consolidating h i s p o s i t i o n i n the conquered coastal towns, Curio was on h i s way to Iguvium to f u l f i l the next part of Caesar's p l a n .  Caesar was aware of the threat presented by t h i s town  which was under the garrison of f i v e Pompelan cohorts under Menueius Thermus, who had reportedly been r e c r u i t i n g troops i n preparation f o r a northward t h r u s t . At fanum, as Mommsen points out, the Y i a Flaminia divided i n t o two roads, one leading to 'Rome, the other south to A p u l i a . Iguvium l i e s approximately the Y i a Flaminia.  s i x t y miles inland and only eight miles from  Caesar e a r l y r e a l i z e d that he who c o n t r o l l e d Iguvium  governed one of the l i f e l i n e s of Borne. I t was part of h i s strategy to seize t h i s town q u i c k l y before the Pompeians could put a strong force there.  Curio moved against i t with two eohorts from Ariminum and  from Pisaurum.  one  Thermus, informed of Curio's a r r i v a l and mistrusting  the goodwill of the community, moved h i s forces from the c i t y and f l e d . His men, new r e c r u i t s most of them, were only half-hearted i n t h e i r 12 B e l l . Civ., I , 8. 13 B e l l . Civ., I , 9.  19 support of Pompey and many, when given the opportunity, deserted him and returned to t h e i r homes. So Curio entered and took the town i n Caesar's name without a struggle. From the v i c t o r i e s of Caesar's legions thus f a r , we can draw the conclusion that many Roman o i t i z e n s n e i t h e r supported the cause of Pompey nor wished to take up arms against Caesar.  I t seems evident that  Caesar r e a l i z e d t h i s and h i s clemency towards the townsfolk i n conquered areas f u r t h e r enhanced h i s prestige.  Most of these r u r a l c i t i z e n s knew  Caesar as the conqueror of Gaul, not as an invader who had v i o l a t e d t h e i r constitution. Now that Arretium and Iguvium were occupied, Caesar was secured against a sudden attack by the enemy, and a march on Rome could now be made by e i t h e r of the two great roads, the V i a Cassia or the Y i a Flaminia. This march never took place, f o r h i s strategic plans were such that he directed h i s action along the east rather than the west coast of the peninsula. tion.  To march on Rome would be too c o s t l y and too r i s k y an opera-  The strength of Pompey's forces was not completely known and  Caesar wished n e i t h e r to be hemmed i n between h i s province and Rome nor to see h i s supply l i n e s and forces cut up piecemeal by the Republican troops. By January 29 Caesar decided that i t was time to regroup h i s forces.  He ordered Antony and Curio to u n i t e t h e i r legions at Aneona  where he already had stationed one cohort. Meanwhile L. Roscius and L. Caesar a r r i v e d , bearing from Pompey a reply to Caesar's l a s t message, which requested a conference and other concessions.  The consuls de-  manded: "that Caesar should return to Gaul, quit Ariminum and disband h i s forees." I n return f o r t h i s , "...Pompeius would go to the Spanish  20 provinces'*; u n t i l Caesar agreed, "the consuls and Pompeius would not 14 interrupt t h e i r l e v i e s . "  These terms Caesar r e j e c t e d , r e a l i z i n g that  •unless each party could r e l y upon the good f a i t h of h i s antagonist i t was f u t i l e to propose that they should both disarm.** Under these conditions the war had to be prolonged, so Caesar then decided that h i s next s t r a t e g i c step was to move f u r t h e r south. This displacement involved the control of Picenum, an area i n which Pompey's influence had been strong f o r many years.  Caesar had secured  a foothold i n t h i s t e r r i t o r y by the capture of Aneona, but should he progress f u r t h e r south the enemy's resistance could be stronger. The important towns against which he intended to direct h i s attack were Auximum, Cingulum, Firmura, and Asculum. Reports had reached him of a council of war held at Teanum Sidicinum i n Campania on January 23rd, wherein Pompey, Labienus, and both consuls had agreed to spurn h i s o f f e r s of r e c o n c i l i a t i o n and instead had recommended that Pompey advance into Picenum and there l e v y a force a f t e r he had taken command of the troops stationed at Luceria i n A p u l i a .  This move north Caesar intended  to block by a quick southward thrust beginning with the overthrow of Picenum.  I f he could b r i n g t h i s region under h i s c o n t r o l , a major step  towards the conquest of I t a l y would be completed. Auximum, the f i r s t of the four Picenian towns mentioned, eleven miles inland from Aneona, was under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of A t t i u s Varus with three Pompeian cohorts. As had been the case i n Iguvium so i n Auximum the inhabitants were p a r t i s a n to Caesar and u n w i l l i n g to take a stand against him. But news had reached Caesar that Varus, a f t e r eon14 B e l l . C i v . . I , 10. 15 T. R. Holmes, The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, I I I (Oxford, 1923), p.10.  21 s c r i p t i n g a large f o r c e , was intending to march q u i c k l y north and attack him.  To counteract t h i s impending thrust he regrouped h i s forces, per-  haps at Ancona, and ordered Curio and Antony t o evacuate Iguvium and Arretium.  Ferrero thinks that t h i s evacuation reveals "that the occu-  pation of Arretium had been merely a piece of b l u f f . "  I do not e n t i r e l y  share t h i s opinion f o r i t seems to me poor strategy to send a task force many miles to conquer a town and then r e c a l l i t when a b l u f f has been perpetrated.  Caesar withdrew i t f o r a reason —  t o strengthen h i s own  force i n case of a sudden movement by Pompey which he f e l t might be underway at Auximum. The e i t i z e n s of the town through t h e i r c i v i c o f f i c i a l s informed Varus that they did not intend to refuse admittance t o so renowned a conqueror:  "that neither they nor the r e s t o f t h e i r f e l l o w -  townsmen can endure that G. Caesar, holding i m p e r i a l command, having deserved so w e l l of the state and a f t e r performing such e x p l o i t s , should 17 be prevented from entering the walls of the town."  So r e a l i z i n g h i s  i n a b i l i t y to hold the town with the a l i e n troops he possessed, he f o r sook i t but was s h o r t l y overtaken i n f l i g h t by an advance guard of Caesar's troops.  Caesar b r i e f l y describes the r e s u l t s of t h i s encounter:  "An engagement i s fought and Varus i s deserted by h i s followers; some of 18 his men r e t i r e to t h e i r homes, the r e s t make t h e i r way to Caesar." The unusual feature of the c i v i l struggle to t h i s point i s the absence o f d i r e c t combat. Mainly through a lack of manpower, no Pompeian garrison had yet tested Caesar's strength on the b a t t l e f i e l d .  Caesar  took advantage of t h i s and so developed h i s strategy that he moved quickly 16 Ferrero, o p . c i t . , p.232. 17 B e l l . Civ.. I , 13. 18 B e l l . Civ., l o c . c l t .  22 and regrouped c a r e f u l l y .  At Auzimum he was informed by diverse sources  of the panic i n Home and was v i s i b l y upset that he would now be prevented from negotiating an equitable peace and so be responsible f o r prolonging the war. With Auximum now under h i s c o n t r o l , Caesar delayed a few days i n that region to gather supplies and rest h i s troops. Yery l i t t l e time could be l o s t i f he was t o block Pompey and force a peace, so he pushed further i n t o Picene t e r r i t o r y towards the town of Cingulum, whose benef a c t o r had been T. Labienus, who had framed i t s municipal charter and who had, through h i s own expense, seen to the enlargement of the town. Upon h i s a r r i v a l the townsfolk openly welcomed and greeted him as an a l l y , showing no i l l f e e l i n g and promising him t h e i r assistance:  "He  r e q u i s i t i o n s s o l d i e r s , they send them." Caesar's m i l i t a r y strength was now reinforced by the a r r i v a l of Mark Antony from Ancona and the Twelfth l e g i o n from Gaul.  The l a t t e r  Caesar had summoned when f i r s t reports came to him that Pompey was beginning to arm; a march of two weeks was required f o r i t to reach him. From Cingulum he had received the new r e c r u i t s he had requested. E a r l y i n February (about the 3rd), a f t e r h i s reinforcements had a r r i v e d and h i s supplies had been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y arranged, he decided to make h i s t h i r d move i n Pieenum against Asculum which he would reach by way of the coast town of Firmum. Caesar's intentions reached Lentulus Spinther, the Pompeian legate who had been sent as r e c r u i t i n g o f f i c e r 19 B e l l , C i v . . I , 15  23 to the town and held i t with ten cohorts. As Caesar moved by the coast road towards Firmum, Lentulus evacuated h i s troops from Asculum and proceeded south towards Corfinium, where the Pompeian forces were gathering f o r a defensive a c t i o n . Caesar r e a l i z e d that he was l o s i n g time i n h i s raee to i n t e r cept Pompey, who had now deserted Rome and taken refuge i n Lueeria, i n tending to proceed from there to Canusium and so on to Brundisium.  When  Asculum and Firmum f e l l , Pompey, r e a l i z i n g that h i s struggle to defend I t a l y was at an end, sped up operations to enable the consuls, senators, and a l l h i s followers to be evacuated from Brundisium to Dyrrhachium i n Epirus.  By February 6th, Caesar had reached and subdued Castrum Truen-  tinum without a struggle. Now a l l of northern I t a l y and most of the south was under h i s command. He could reach Rome i n a short time by several of the roads he controlled but he was determined to push on and intercept Pompey. This was h i s strategy: t o cut o f f Pompey, i f necessary to capture him, and so force a peace. Caesar r e a l i z e d now that Corfinium was to be the r a l l y i n g point f o r the Pompeians and that he had to continue h i s advance; i f f o r no other reason, h i s enemies had to be pursued.  At Firmum h i s plan of cam-  paign changed and he decided to " f i g h t a short and sharp campaign i n Italy."  2 0  Not a n t i c i p a t i n g so quick a withdrawal by Pompey, he set out  south once more i n the d i r e c t i o n of Corfinium. Corfinium was a town o f considerable strategic importance. I t was Pompey*s best f o r t i f i e d and largest stronghold i n Central Italy, where he had stationed twelve cohorts mostly raised i n the surrounding t e r r i t o r y under the d i r e c t i o n o f Domitius Ahenobarbus, the person appointed 20 Ferrero, o p . c i t . , p.236.  24 by the senate to succeed Caesar i n Gaul. This town had been the f i r s t c a p i t a l of the insurgents i n the great I t a l i a n war and was the centre of the mountainous d i s t r i c t of Abruzzi inhabited by the V e s t l n i , M a r s i , P a e l i g n i and other people of S a b e l l i a n stock. I t was t h i r t y - f i v e miles inland and close to the Aternus r i v e r , which flowed through the heart of the d i s t r i c t and was bridged three miles from the town. South-east of Corfinium was Sulmo and west of i t near Lake Fucinus was Alba, both held by Pompey. " I n t h i s d i s t r i c t the Pompeians had been busy: both to them 21 and to Caesar i t was of f i r s t - r a t e s t r a t e g i c importance.™ By February 6, reinforcements from Pompey under the command of V i b u l l i u s Bufus, one of h i s most competent commanders, were on the way to j o i n Domitius. As these troops moved north towards Corfinium they intercepted Lentulus Spinther and part of the retinue l e f t a f t e r the f a l l of Aseulum. Bufus took charge of these d i s i l l u s i o n e d troops and l e d them with him to Corfinium. Gathered i n Corfinium to make a s o l i d stand i f necessary against Caesar were Domitius, V i b u l l i u s Bufus, A t t i u s Varus, and eventually L u e i l i u s H i r r u s , who had f l e d to the f o r t r e s s a f t e r abandoning Camerinum i n Umbria to Caesar's f o r c e s .  The l a t t e r announced to the assembled  defenders the approach of Caesar. Domitius, on learning of Caesar's sudden a r r i v a l , immediately sent a message to Pompey requesting further assistance.  Pompey i n three  l e t t e r s , preserved f o r us i n Cicero's correspondence, r e p l i e d to Domitius: "Wherefore, as you had arranged ... to s t a r t with your army from Corfinium on the 9th of February and to come to me,, I wonder what reason there has 21 1. B. Heitland, The Roman Republic, I I I (Cambridge, 1909), p.284  25 been f o r your change of plan.  The reason mentioned by T i b u l l i u s i s  t r i v i a l , namely that you were delayed on hearing that Caesar had l e f t Firmum and a r r i v e d at Castrum Truentinum...I entreat and exhort you... to come to Luceria on the f i r s t possible day, before the forces which 22 Caesar has begun t o e o l l e c t can concentrate and divide us."  In a  reply to t h i s l e t t e r Domitius expressed h i s i n t e n t i o n of watching Caesar and then j o i n i n g Pompey i n Samnium should Caesar march along the coast; but i f he lingered around Corfinium, Domitius stated, he would oppose him. Pompey cautioned him:  "A man of your judgement ought to bear i n mind  not only the s i z e o f Caesar's present array against you but the number of i n f a n t r y and cavalry that he w i l l soon c o l l e c t . . . C u r i o i s concentrating the garrisons which were i n Umbria and E t r u r i a and marching to j o i n Caesar."^  Pompey was not sure o f Caesar's intentions:  "though one  d i v i s i o n may be sent to Alba, and another advance on you, and though Caesar may r e f r a i n from the offensive and be content to defend h i s p o s i t i o n , s t i l l you w i l l be i n a f i x , nor w i l l you be able with your f o l l o w ing to make s u f f i c i e n t head against such numbers to allow of your sending 24 out foraging p a r t i e s . "  He eloses the l e t t e r with a r e f u s a l f o r a s s i s t -  ance " I fear I cannot comply with your request f o r assistance, because I OK  do not put much t r u s t i n these legions."  The s i t u a t i o n had indeed  become serious when i n a reply to a dispatch from Domitius of February 17th  Pompey informed him, "What I expected and foretold has happened: he  refuses t o meet you i n the f i e l d at present, and he i s hemming you i n with a l l h i s forces concentrated, so that the road may not be clear f o r 22 Cicero, Ad Atticum. T i l l , 12b (trans. Winsted). 25 Ad I o cA.t tc. ,i t .T i l l , 12c, 23 24 Ioc. c i t .  26 you to j o i n me and unite your l o y a l contingent with my legions whose allegiance i s questionable...So do your best, i f any t a c t i c s can e x t r i cate you even now, to j o i n me as soon as possible before our enemy can 26 concentrate a l l h i s forces."  A f u r t h e r blow was struck against Domitius  when Caesar, who by February 15th had successfully crossed the r i v e r Aternus and was encamped outside the walls of Corfinium, received a despatch:  "that the inhabitants of Sulmo, a town seven miles distant from  Corfinium, were ready to carry out h i s wishes, but were prevented by the senator Q. Lucretius and by A t t i u s the Pelignian, who were i n occupation 27 of the town with a garrison of seven cohorts."  Mark Antony was immed-  i a t e l y sent to r e l i e v e the town and t h i s he did without any apparent d i f f i c u l t y even causing the defenders Lucretius and A t t i u s to jump from 28 the w a l l . Let us now assess the comparative strength of the opposing forces at Corfinium.  Caesar had been reinforced at Gastrum Truentinum  by the Eighth l e g i o n , twenty-two cohorts and three hundred cavalry loaned to him by the king of Horicum.  So h i s t o t a l strength at t h i s time,  gathered i n the v i c i n i t y of Corfinium consisted of three veteran legions (the Eighth, the Twelfth and the Thirteenth), t h i r t y cohorts (mainly r e c r u i t s ) and about three hundred horse. In numbers h i s accumulated force 29 was approximately f o r t y thousand men. The Pompeian force at Corfinium was considerably smaller and less reliable.  Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from sur-  rounding d i s t r i c t s and had added t h i r t e e n eohorts which V i b u l l i u s Rufus 26 Ad A f t , V I I I , 12d. 27 B e l l . C i v . . I , 18. 28 Loe. e i t . 29 Mommsen, o p . c i t . , p.353.  2? provided through Pompeian l e v i e s .  A t o t a l strength therefore of about  t h i r t y cohorts was a l l the manpower a v a i l a b l e .  Here the psychological  effect of the weight of Caesar's numbers played an important part i n the surrender of Corfinium. So began the siege of Corfinium.  The same i n t e r n a l dissension  that betrayed the other Pompeian towns plagued t h i s one too.  Domitius  t r i e d both by deceit and by bribery to r e t a i n the support of h i s men townsfolk.  and  When he saw that he was accomplishing nothing and that both  h i s commanders and the leaders of the town intended to surrender a l l to Caesar, he t r i e d to escape by night but, being unsuccessful, he  was  intercepted and incarcerated. Caesar, before the c a p i t u l a t i o n of the town, had met outside the gates with Lentulus Spinther who had been sent as a representative of the Pompeians to t a l k over terms of submission.  Caesar informed  why he had marched i n opposition to the decrees of the senate;  "he  him had  not quitted h i s province with any e v i l i n t e n t , but to defend himself from the i n s u l t s of h i s foes, to restore to t h e i r p o s i t i o n the tribunes of the people who at that conjuncture had been expelled from the state, to assert the freedom of himself and the Roman people who had been oppressed by a small f a c t i o n .  1 , 3 0  He then released him with the assurance that no  l o o t i n g would take place i f the town surrendered immediately.  On Febru-  ary 21st the c i t i z e n s of Corfinium turned over the c i t y and i t s contents to Caesar, wondering what r e t a l i a t i o n he would take on both the Pompeian commanders and the inhabitants. Caesar, contrary to the Pompeians' expectation, but i n accordance with h i s o v e r a l l strategic plan, spurned 30 B e l l . Civ.. I , 22.  28 any o f f e r of treasure (for there was a greater one awaiting him i n Rome), released Domitius, Lentulus, and the other r e c r u i t i n g o f f i c e r s , and even returned to Domitius a large sum of money which the wealthy a r i s t o c r a t had placed i n the c i t y ' s treasure. Caesar thus impressed the townsfolk and to a c e r t a i n degree the Pompeians with h i s beneficence.  We are cor-  r e c t l y informed when we are t o l d that "The fame of Caesar's clemency preceded him; he was welcomed i n every town through which he passed; and 31 h i s reputation was r i s i n g throughout Italy.**  The Pompeian garrison at  Corfinium c o n s i s t i n g of eighteen cohorts was required to swear i t s a l l e giance to Caesar, a f t e r which i t was despatched under Asinius P o l l i o t o S i c i l y along with the cohorts which had surrendered a t Sulmo and A l b a . On February 19 Pompey l e f t Luceria f o r Canusium and by the 25th had reached Brundisium.  I t was now h i s i n t e n t i o n to use t h i s port as a  muster-station f o r h i s g a l l e y s and f o r c e s . The time that Caesar was detained at Corfinium Pompey used to advantage to assemble h i s newly r e cruited l e v i e s .  We know that he intended to set up a p r o v i s i o n a l govern-  ment i n Dyrrhachium but what h i s other plans were once he reached h i s destination i s questionable. We can be sure that h i s large f l e e t was t o be put to good use and i t was no i d l e report which prompted Cicero, when discussing the evacuation and the r e s u l t s therefrom with A t t i c u s , to say *»yet our chiefs w i l l not h e s i t a t e to destroy by starvation t h e i r country . . • A l l t h i s f l e e t from Alexandria, C o l c h i s , Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, L y c i a , Rhodes, Chius, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, M i l e t u s , Cos, i s being got ready to cut o f f the supplies of I t a l y and to blockade the 12 p  grain-producing 31 Holmes, provinces.** o p . c i t . , p.28. We also have i n t h i s same l e t t e r a state32 Ad A t t . . IX, 9.  29 ment of Cicero's p o s i t i o n with reference to the invader and the deserters "So i n my doubt what I ought to do, I am greatly swayed by my good f e e l i n g towards Pompey. Without that i t were better to p e r i s h i n my country, 33 than to destroy my country by saving i t . " While Pompey was evacuating h i s forces from Brundisium, "Domit i u s had gone t o s e i z e M a s s i l i a with seven merchant-vessels which he had r e q u i s i t i o n e d from p r i v a t e persons at I g i l i u m and i n Oosanum, and had manned with h i s own slaves, freedmen, and t e n a n t s . . . "  34  Thus we can see  that Pompey and the Republicans had not completely yielded I t a l y to Caesar and, though they were abandoning i t , i t was only Intended to be a temporary withdrawal and the plans they were formulating f o r t h e i r return were not on too grand a scale t o be accomplished. While Pompey was on h i s way to Brundisium, Caesar a f t e r delaying seven days i n Corfinium marched through the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Marrue i n i , F u n t i a n i and Larinates i n t o A p u l i a . Captured i n one of these operations was Pompey's chief engineer N. Magius Cremona, whoa Caesar sent to Pompey with f u r t h e r demands f o r a conference.  Caesar l o s t some  time waiting f o r a r e p l y from Pompey which Magius was to b r i n g him and which never came. I t seems that Pompey had used t h i s delay as a device f o r gaining time.  Caesar not to be outdone i n h i s attempts to secure a  s a t i s f a c t o r y settlement had sent h i s lieutenant Caninius Rebilus t o L. Scribonius Libo requesting him to exercise h i s authority i n obtaining a conference.  Pompey was on the move and when Libo'a answer reached Caesar  ("...the consuls being absent, negotiations f o r a settlement cannot be 33 Ad A t t . . IX, 9. 34 B e l l . C i v . . I , 34.  30 35 c a r r i e d on without them."), Pompey had the evacuation of Brundisium underway. By the time Caesar a r r i v e d at Brundisium on March 9th with s i x l e g i o n s , Pompey*s departure-plans were w e l l advanced. H i s ships had l e f t March 4th on t h e i r f i r s t t r i p t o Dyrrhachium carrying part of h i s army, the consuls, Republican senators, and a l l those o f rank who wished t o desert I t a l y .  Mommsen informs us that Pompey had twenty-five thousand perils  sons t o remove from Brundisium,  a sizeable number r e q u i r i n g a large  number Of ships, but, as we know from Cieero, these ships were a v a i l a b l e * Caesar immediately began h i s blockade and Pompey, r e a l i z i n g that h i s ships would not return f o r about a week, had a l l roads and trenches barricaded and f o r t i f i e d , often by sharpened stakes driven i n t o the ground and concealed by earth or other a v a i l a b l e m a t e r i a l . He thus by devious means made a l l entrances treacherous f o r oncoming troops.  Even ship-  towers had been constructed, higher than Caesar's (on the average Caesar's were only two s t o r i e s , Pompey*s t h r e e ) . Caesar r e a l i z e d that he must c o n t r o l the harbour i f he was t o thwart Pompey*s l a s t move. He thereupon began the construction of p i e r s and moles, pushing them out into the harbour as r a p i d l y as p o s s i b l e . But he did not work f a s t enough, and on the 17th Pompey's ships returned, bypassed the moles, and docked. Pompey by land.  I f Caesar was to win he must now reach  This could be done only i f the Brundisians opened t h e i r  c i t y to him and t h i s they d i d . Tired and disgusted a f t e r t h e i r oppression at the hands of the Pompeians, they sent scouts to Caesar to direct h i s men to the harbour by a c i r c u i t o u s route, s k i r t i n g the obstacles Pompey 35 B e l l . C i v . I , 26. 36 Mommsen, o p . c i t . , p.354. t  31 had placed i n t h e i r way.  But i t was too l a t e ; by the time the advance  guard reached the dock-area Pompey's f l e e t was under s a i l and h i s evacuation complete.  A l l t h i s was done by March 17th and h i s only loss was  two ships which ran a f o u l of Caesar's p i e r s .  "Except these prisoners,  not one Pompeian s o l d i e r remained upon I t a l i a n s o i l ; and i n s i x t y - f i v e days •213  the  conquest of the peninsula had been achieved almost without a blow." We have thus traced Caesar's movements from Ariminum to Brundi-  sium.  In the course of t h i s a c t i v i t y , he displayed two s t r a t e g i c a l tech-  niques, speed and s u r p r i s e .  His strategic aim was to intercept Pompey i n  his f l i g h t and so terminate the war q u i c k l y .  His strategy "was essen-  t i a l l y guided by h i s understanding of Pompey*s mind."  38  B. H. L i d d e l l -  Hart, i n support of h i s theory of the value of the i n d i r e c t approach to strategy, claims that Caesar's advance by way of the coast road instead of upon Rome was s t r a t e g i c a l l y sound but, when he changed h i s plans upon learning of Pompey's retreat and drove d i r e c t l y against h i s opponent, t h i s , claims L i d d e l l - H a r t , was poor strategy and cost him a quick v i c t o r y . "Thus an excess of directness and a want of a r t , In the seeond phase, robbed Caesar of h i s chance of ending the war i n one campaign, and condemned him to four more years of obstinate warfare a l l around the Mediterranean basin." ® Though Pompey was not so quick to move as Caesar, 3  when he did march, he had a d e f i n i t e goal i n mind - Dyrrhachium - and he intended to put every obstacle possible i n Caesar's way and he d i d . Pompey i n t h i s f i r s t phase of the war showed to advantage h i s own type of strategy - that of withdrawal and eventual regrouping. 37 Holmes, o p . c i t . . p.32. 58 L i d d e l l - H a r t , Strategy, p.54. 39 Loo, c i t .  32 Caesar planned no immediate pursuit of Pompey f o r he had f i r s t to assemble a f l e e t . His next step would be to reorganize I t a l y on a s a t i s f a c t o r y m i l i t a r y basis and then carry on the war against the Pompeian force i n Spain.  33 CHAPTER IT THE FIRST SPANISH CAMPAIGN "I go to meet an army without a leader, and I s h a l l return to meet a leader without an army.*'! We are not t o l d s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the de B e l l o C l v l l l why Caesar marched into Spain, but c e r t a i n occurrences prompted him:  "...he was  u n w i l l i n g that a veteran army and two Spanish provinces, one of which was under o b l i g a t i o n to Pompeius f o r very great benefits, should be confirmed i n t h e i r a l l e g i a n c e , that a u x i l i a r y forces and cavalry should be provided, 2 that Gaul and I t a l y should be tampered with, a l l i n h i s absence." informs us that:  Dio  " A f f a i r s at home he now committed to Antony's care,  while he himself set out f o r Spain, which was strongly favouring the side of Pompey and causing Caesar some fear that i t might induce the Gauls to revolt."® And Applan states that:  "As he had apprehensions of Pompey's  army i n Spain, which was large and w e l l d i s c i p l i n e d by long service (lest while he was pursuing Pompey i t should f a l l upon h i s r e a r ) , he decided A  to march to Spain and destroy that army f i r s t . " I t i s evident that before Caesar pursued Pompey to Greece, he wished to leave behind him a consolidated West. Spain, Gaul and I t a l y must be under control i f he was to successfully subdue h i s enemy. There i s a p a r a l l e l here between Caesar and Alexander who did not wish to march upon P e r s i a u n t i l he had the support of Greece and the use of the Athenian fleet.  Like Athens against Alexander, Spain w i t h i n three years rebelled  against Caesar's lieutenants and fomented another war. 1 Suetonius, J u l i u s . 34. 2 B e l l . C i v . , I , 29. 3 Dio, XLI, 18. 4 Appian, I I , 6, 40.  34 We s h a l l see that during t h i s f i r s t Spanish campaign i t was the strategy of the Pompeians to avoid defeat by engaging i n b a t t l e only at a great advantage while the technique of Caesar involved the e l i m i n a t i o n of Pompey's Spanish armies without r e s o r t i n g to a pitched b a t t l e that might expose h i s troops i n a disadvantageous p o s i t i o n .  Caesar's i n t e n t i o n  was to exhaust the patience of the Pompeians. The Pompeian strength at the beginning of the Spanish War  was  controlled by "Afranius and Petreius and Varro, legates of Pompeius, of whom one held h i t h e r Spain with three legions, another f u r t h e r Spain from the pass of Castulo to the Anas with two legions, a t h i r d the d i s t r i c t of the Yettones from the Anas and also L u s i t a n i a with an equal number of l e g i o n s , . . . . "  5  There were besides "about eighty cohorts, some  heavy-armed from the h i t h e r province, others light-armed from f u r t h e r Spain, and about f i v e thousand cavalry from each province." strength he reports:  Of his own  "Caesar had sent forward s i x legions into Spain,  f i v e thousand a u x i l i a r y i n f a n t r y and three thousand cavalry which he had had with him during a l l h i s former wars, and an equal number from Gaul." We therefore see that Caesar entered upon h i s Spanish expedition numeric a l l y i n f e r i o r to the Pompeians, but i n command of veteran s o l d i e r s who had survived the rigours of the G a l l i c campaign and who were w i l l i n g to test the power of t h i s new force arrayed i n the wilds of Spain. Before proceeding with the strategy of the Spanish Campaign i t i s neeessary to consider a very important aspeet of the western theatre of war, the M a s s i l i a n a f f a i r .  I t should be noted that the invasion of  Spain and the siege of M a s s i l i a are intimately connected. Had Caesar's 5 B e l l . C i v . , I , 38. 6 B e l l . C j v . I , 39. t  6  35 general f a i l e d i n the siege of M a s s i l i a , a c t i v i t i e s i n Spain would have been delayed s e r i o u s l y i f not i n d e f i n i t e l y postponed; Caesar could not afford to lose even a week. What was the s t r a t e g i c importance of M a s s i l i a ? Caesar say very l i t t l e about i t , but Colonel S t o f f e l comments:  "Ces evenements avaient  d'autant plus de gravite' que M a s s i l i a n'e'tait pas l o i n d'Aquae Sextiae (Airs) ou passait l a route d ' l t a l l e en Espagne, et qu'ainsi l a l i g n e de communication de Cesar se t r o u v a i t intercepted. De p l u s , i l e t a i t a craindre que d'autres v i l l e s ne vinssent a i m i t e r 1'example donne par una c i t e important© et ne se declarassent pour Pompee.™ We thus see that a reverse at M a s s i l i a could thwart Caesar's plans completely.  Caesar a r r i v e d at M a s s i l i a on A p r i l 19th, and there  he learned that V i b u l l i u s Bufus had been sent to Spain to war Lucius Afranius of the danger of Caesar's presence. He also learned that Domit i u s Ahenobarbus was on h i s way towards M a s s i l i a by sea.  The M a s s i l i o t e s  refused to admit Caesar on the basis that they were non-partisan and did not intend to take sides i n a dispute which involved Borne and not themselves.  Caesar thought that M a s s i l i a must come under h i s c o n t r o l since, as  S t o f f e l points out, i t was s t r a t e g i c a l l y placed on the main communicationl i n e between Spain and I t a l y .  So he assigned the siege of t h i s ancient  town to C. Trebonius with three legions from North I t a l y .  He placed Deci-  mus Brutus i n charge of the twelve ships which he ordered to be constructed on the Rhone. Thus Trebonius was to direct the attack by land, Brutus by  Caesar was now faced with two m i l i t a r y contests, one i n Spain 7 E. C  S t o f f e l , H i s t o l r e de Jules Cesar (Paris, 1887), I , 44.  36 and another i n Gaul.  To f u r n i s h enough manpower i n Spain, he withdrew  p r a c t i c a l l y a l l h i s troops from Gaul and carried on these two operations simultaneously.  On close analysis the removal of a l l these troops might  seem foolhardy but i t appears that Caesar was counting upon speed of act i o n and a quick v i c t o r y .  No doubt he was somewhat disturbed by the  resistance of M a s s i l i a . Gaius Fabius was wintering near Narbo when he received orders from Caesar to move towards Spain and take control of the main pass through the Pyrenees before the Pompeian forces could unite and seize i t . This Fabius d i d without d i f f i c u l t y with the three legions at h i s command, s h o r t l y to be joined by another three legions l e f t behind by Trebonius at Matlsco.  Caesar set out f o r Spain from M a s s i l i a on June 5th with an es-  cort of nine hundred cavalry. Afranius had intended to reach the pass f i r s t but he neither moved quickly enough nor did he thoroughly r e a l i z e that Fabius was so close to h i s t e r r i t o r i e s .  With the Pyrenees secure  i n Caesar's hands, Afranius moved back to h i s most advantageous p o s i t i o n though not the best s t r a t e g i c one, the c i t y of I l e r d a .  Fabius advanced  down the v a l l e y of the S l c o r i s by forced marches i n pursuit of Afranius, hoping to intercept him before he could make a stand and consolidate h i s forces.  But Afranius had too great a start and upon reaching Ilerda took  up a p o s i t i o n southwest of the c i t y on the present day h i l l of Gardeny, which was separated from the town and the r i v e r S i c o r i a by sections of l e v e l ground. Fabius, because Ilerda was i n Pompeian hands, took h i s p o s i t i o n up r i v e r from the town. Here he waited f o r the three legions on t h e i r way to j o i n him. The forces of Petreius and Afranius now stationed outside I l e r d a  37 consisted of cavalry and a u x i l i a r i e s from L u s i t a n i a , C e l t i b e r i a and maritime t r i b e s of the northwest.  the  These native l e v i e s were composed of  f i v e thousand cavalry and t h i r t y cohorts of i n f a n t r y both heavy- and light-armed.  "Including the legions, some of which had had experience  of warfare with native t r i b e s , the e n t i r e force, besides camp followers, may have numbered about f o r t y thousand men."  8  Before proceeding further l e t us consider the general topographic s i t u a t i o n of I l e r d a . " I l e r d a was b u i l t on a rock  Tfthich  stands  up b o l d l y f i v e hundred feet above the p l a i n , with a plateau of some one hundred and f i f t y acres on the top.  Every side of t h i s rock i s p r a c t i -  c a l l y inaccessible to assault except that on the south.  Here, i n a sort  of ravine, i s a slope, up which ran the road to the town, some s i x hundred yards long from the p l a i n .  Near the p l a i n the mouth of the ravine  i s some three hundred and f i f t y yards wide; at the town, about a t h i r d that width."  9  Although I l e r d a was an excellent p o s i t i o n f o r t a c t i c a l  defence i t did not lend i t s e l f to such s t r a t e g i c purposes aa c o n t r o l l i n g or protecting c e n t r a l Spain.  The r i v e r Ebro was the true l i n e of defense  but to reach t h i s the Pompeians would have to march through barren and mountainous country. I t i s known that Afranius stationed h i s i n f a n t r y on the h i l l of Gardeny and i t i s assumed that h i s cavalry and a u x i l i a r i e s were placed on the low ground adjoining the r i v e r where h i s supplies and extra equipment were located. of Afranius'.  Fabius* encampment was approximately two miles north  R e a l i z i n g that he was too weak to s t r i k e d i r e c t l y against  8 Holmes, The Roman Republic. I l l , p#52. 9 T. A. Dodge, Great Captain: Caesar, I I (New York, 1892), p.445.  38 the more powerful Pompeians, he constructed two bridges over the S i c o r i s , at a distance of two and four miles above I l e r d a .  "Over these he kept  sending supplies because during the preceding days he had exhausted a l l 10 that there was t h i s side of the river.**  S h o r t l y a f t e r these crossings  were made, the three legions a r r i v e d from Matlsco. Ferrero Informs us that Fabius had met with such opposition from Afranius and had so insecurely s o l i c i t e d the help of neighbouring t r i b e s that he q u i c k l y retreated to h i s p o s i t i o n north of I l e r d a .  "One i s i n -  c l i n e d to ask whether the r e t r e a t was not a f e i n t to temp the enemy onwards ...he remained on the defensive awaiting the f a l l of M a r s e i l l e s . not think t h i s was the case.  w 1 1  I do  Fabius was merely awaiting the a r r i v a l of  Caesar f o r i t does not seem possible that Caesar would delay any longer than necessary at M a s s i l i a when he had the major force of Pompey's troops to overcome i n Spain.  He c e r t a i n l y would not entrust the Spanish campaign  to a subordinate, e s p e c i a l l y Fabius, whose experience i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s was not comparable to other of h i s more prominent legates. The f i r s t encounter on Spanish s o i l took place on the side of the r i v e r opposite I l e r d a when Fabius's foragers and t h e i r protective cavalry were barred from returning to t h e i r camp by a washout, during a sudden storm, of t h e i r bridge two miles above I l e r d a .  Afranius detected  the s e v e r i t y of the s i t u a t i o n from the debris washed downstream and sent four legions and a l l h i s cavalry to rout the foragers. The l a t t e r were saved by the s k i l l of t h e i r commander, Lucius Plancus, who,  noticing  reinforcements i n the distance, so arrayed h i s forces on a slope that he successfully r e s i s t e d the Afranians. A f t e r a b r i e f skirmish, both the Afranians and Fabius's foragers returned to t h e i r camps. 10 B e l l . Civ.. I , 40. 11 Ferrero, Greatness and Decline, I I , p.253.  39 Caesar arrived on the 23rd of June with h i s bodyguard of nine hundred cavalry. His f i r s t task was to r e p a i r the bridge destroyed i n the recent inclement weather.  This was done by night and when the camp was  restored to comparative quietness he next surveyed the surrounding area, so acquainting himself with the t e r r a i n that he could l a y plans f o r h i s advance against the Pompeians.  He eventually decided to move into a new  p o s i t i o n midway between the h i l l of Gardeny and I l e r d a , on a f l a t s t r e t c h of land which Afranius had neglected to occupy.  Caesar n o t i c i n g that A f r a -  nius was r e f r a i n i n g from b a t t l e , "...determined to p i t c h h i s camp at an i n t e r v a l of about four hundred paees from the lowest spurs of the mountain..."  1 2  Caesar, keeping i n mind the 'esprit de corps' of h i s men, decided on the best way to safeguard h i s troops: "...he forbade the erection of a rampart, which could not f a i l to be prominent and v i s i b l e from a distance, but ordered a d i t c h of f i f t e e n feet width to be constructed f a c i n g the enemy.*  13  The strategic l o c a t i o n of t h i s camp i s very evident, and there  i s no doubt that Caesar had i n mind the eventual blockading of Afranius on h i s h i l l and the future encirclement of I l e r d a .  Witnessing these f i r s t  movements of Caesar's forces, Afranius, not to be outdone by the opposit i o n , s h i f t e d h i s l i n e of defence from the top to h a l f way down the h i l l of Gardeny and, when he saw that Caesar advanced no c l o s e r , he stopped and awaited f u r t h e r developments. I n the construction of h i s camp, Caesar so placed h i s forces that two l i n e s served as a defence while a t h i r d l i n e worked. A c e r t a i n element of deceptive strategy i s herein displayed, f o r , when one side of 12 B e l l . C i v . , I , 41. 13 Loc. c i t .  40 the camp was completed, a l e g i o n was l e f t to protect i t while a second legion was moved to the other side to protect that one. A l l t h i s was done without r e v e l a t i o n to the enemy. By June 26th, three days a f t e r his  a r r i v a l , a rampart was b u i l t up out of the earth and ffabius* detach-  ment with a l l i t s baggage was transferred t o the new camp. Afranius was not i d l e while t h i s construction was taking place; he c o n t i n u a l l y sent s o r t i e s to the base of the h i l l to draw out the forces of Caesar, but he met with l i t t l e  success.  Caesar, anxious to force Afranius*s hand, a f t e r surveying the s i t u a t i o n noticed a small eminence midway between the h i l l of Gardeny and Ilerda.  This k n o l l i f occupied by h i s forces would be of great s t r a t e g i c  value to him. *Caesar was confident that i f he occupied and f o r t i f i e d t h i s he would cut o f f h i s adversaries from the town and the bridge and 14 from a l l the stores which they had brought into the town.*'  Caesar was  determined to seize t h i s p o s i t i o n and to carry out the task he sent a corp o f antesignani. warriors who were e s p e c i a l l y selected f o r t h i s type of f i g h t i n g .  I t i s not necessary to d e t a i l Caesar's t a c t i c s i n h i s a t -  tempt t o reach the h i l l .  I t i s s u f f i c i e n t to say that he f a i l e d to such  a degree that t h i s select band turned and retreated q u i c k l y when they had eome.  The reason f o r t h i s setback Caesar a t t r i b u t e s to the u t t e r confu-  s i o n experienced by h i s men as a r e s u l t of the enemy's unorthodox s t y l e of combat. As he says, *the method of f i g h t i n g adopted by the enemy*s troops was to charge at f i r s t at f u l l speed, b o l d l y seize a p o s i t i o n , take no p a r t i c u l a r trouble to preserve t h e i r ranks, but f i g h t s i n g l y and In loose order...* 14 B e l l . Civ., I , 43. 15 B e l l . Civ.. I , 44.  41 So me see that Caesar underestimated  both the speed of the  l i g h t l y armed Spaniards and the distance to the h i l l .  When he r e a l i z e d  the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n , Caesar sent to t h e i r assistance the veteran Ninth l e g i o n , which q u i c k l y dispersed the Afranians a f t e r checking t h e i r onrush.  The Ninth pursued the Afranians to the gates of I l e r d a  where they became engaged i n a b a t t l e that brought them close to a n n i h i lation.  The s i t e of the b a t t l e Caesar describes as "unfavourable both  from i t s confined l i m i t s and because they had halted just under the very 16 spurs of the mountain, so that no m i s s i l e f a i l e d to reach them."  The  b a t t l e -lasted f o r f i v e hours and r e l i e f could be given only from the r e a r . F i n a l l y , i n a state of exhaustion and with a l l t h e i r m i s s i l e s spent, the N i n t h , i n a desperate s a l l y , drew t h e i r swords and fought with such determination that the Afranians were forced to r e t r e a t w i t h i n the town.  This  enabled Caesar's cavalry to r e l i e v e the weary m i l i t i a and so permit them to r e t r e a t to the safety of t h e i r camp. "Caesar had l o s t the prize f o r which he fought; and A f r a n i u s , now recognizing the value of the k n o l l , 1? strongly entrenched i t and detailed a foree f o r i t s p r o t e c t i o n . " Caesar's strategy had f a i l e d . points:  An analysis of t h i s reveals two  one, Caesar's inattentiveness i n assessing the s i t u a t i o n c l o s e l y ,  and, two, the impetuosity of h i s troops.  Whether Caesar ordered the Ninth  to pursue the r e t r e a t i n g Afranius i s not known. I f he d i d , i t was cont r a r y to h i s p o l i c y , f o r he d i d not wish to engage i n a pitched b a t t l e as the N i n t h had served the purpose f o r which they had been sent.  Perhaps  the s o l d i e r s of t h i s l e g i o n were anxious f o r b a t t l e a f t e r so long a delay, or perhaps wereI imbued 16 B e l they l . Civ.. , 45. with thoughts pf v i c t o r y , as i s often the 17 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.57.  42 case with the pursuer.  Why they made the move we s h a l l never know but t h i s  error i n command cost Caesar unnecessary c a s u a l t i e s and placed him and his men i n a p o s i t i o n of psychological stress which was to be made worse by the events of the next few weeks. Caesar's p o s i t i o n was now c r u c i a l and t o add to the t r i b u l a t i o n came the report that a sudden f l o o d had washed out both the bridges constructed under Fabius' order.  This occurred w i t h i n two days of h i s recent  setbaek at the hands of A f r a n i u s . Now that he had no means of crossing the r i v e r , he was r e s t r i c t e d to a smaller f i e l d of operations.  Friendly  states could not supply p r o v i s i o n s , foragers who happened to be on the other side of the r i v e r could not return; huge supplies on the way from I t a l y and Gaul could not reach h i s camp; he had l i t t l e com i n winter stores as the crops were not yet r i p e and Afranius had transported most of the grain to I l e r d a before Caesar's a r r i v a l ; what l i t t l e had been l e f t i n wayside granaries, Caesar's forces had consumed. A f i n a l blow occurred when neighbouring t r i b e s moved t h e i r c a t t l e (which could be used as a r e serve by Caesar) some distance from the theatre of war. I n d i r e c t contrast to Caesar's p r i v a t i o n s was Afranius' abundance o f grain and the support he received from neighbouring t r i b e s . Because Afranius s t i l l commanded the stone bridge at I l e r d a , Caesar was prevented from r e b u i l d i n g h i s washed out bridges both by the Afranians, who, having access to the east side of the S i c o r i s , harassed the workers, and by the high water. A f u r t h e r calamity occurred when the G a l l i c convoy bringing help to Caesar was forced to h a l t down r i v e r because of the rough t e r r a i n and high water. Here were approximately s i x thousand men consisting of i n f a n t r y , archers, and cavalry, a l l t h e i r supplies, and  43 even t h e i r f a m i l i e s .  This task force was soon attacked by Afranius, who  used three legions and a l l h i s cavalry, but, by clever manoeuvring on the part of t h e i r commander, the Gauls were able to take to the h i l l s (an action with which they were very f a m i l i a r ) where they found safety and from which they were successful i n turning back Afranius' troops with a reported l o s s of only two hundred archers, a few horsemen and a small number of camp followers and beasts of burden.  "So completely had the  s i t u a t i o n been reversed i n a few days, and such had been the s h i f t i n g of the balance of fortune, that our men were being oppressed by a serious deficiency of necessaries, while the enemy had abundance of everything 18 and were i n an acknowledged p o s i t i o n o f s u p e r i o r i t y . " Caesar may have been dejected but he was not defeated and, t o counteract t h i s sudden change of fortune, he had coracles constructed on the B r i t i s h s t y l e and these he ordered to be transported twenty-two miles above h i s camp at I l e r d a .  At t h i s point the r i v e r was evidently not too  swift and permitted operations to be carried on with reasonable safety. This movement up r i v e r was a foreed operation.  Caesar had to act q u i c k l y .  He could venture down r i v e r only with d i f f i c u l t y and at great  disadvantage  f o r t h i s area was under Afranius' c o n t r o l ; thus the l o g i c a l move was upstream beyond the washed out bridges.  By means of the coracles he was  able, i n a reasonable length of time, to transport a l e g i o n across the r i v e r , and so begin construction of a new bridge.  This bridge was f i n i s h e d  i n two days and i t s completion provided Caesar with two strategic advantages:  "he recovers i n safety the stores and the men who had gone out on  the foraging expedition, and begins to s e t t l e the d i f f i c u l t i e s of h i s 18 B e l l . C i v . , I , 52.  4i4s  food s u p p l y . "  19  By J u l y 10 Caesar had control of the eastern bank of the  r i v e r and h i s foragers now moved more f r e e l y ; h i s cavalry was able to surprise and capture many o f Afranius* foragers with t h e i r cavalry support. Caesar at t h i s point pauses i n h i s n a r r a t i v e of the Spanish campaign and turns to a description of the naval b a t t l e at M a s s i l i a between h i s own legate Decimus Brutus and Pompey*s general Lueius Domitius. Domitius had the advantage of numbers while Brutus had the use of the i r o n elaw which, when an enemy ship was successfully grappled, exposed the opposing force to the f u l l might of Caesar's veterans. c e s s f u l i n t h i s naval b a t t l e :  Brutus was suc-  "and a f t e r slaying a large number of the  A l b i c i and the herdsmen, they sink some of the ships, take others with t h e i r crews, and drive the rest i n t o p o r t . On that day nine ships o f the 20 Massilians are l o s t , including those that were captured."  This success-  f u l naval engagement considerable affected Caesar's strategic p o s i t i o n . The native t r i b e s were informed immediately of the Pompeian setback and therefore transferred t h e i r allegiance to Caesar. with Dio when he says of t h i s naval success:  We can agree to a point  "But f o r t h i s nothing would 21  have prevented Caesar's projects from being ruined." Caesar's s t a r was now i n the ascendancy. S i x t r i b e s between the Pyrenees and the Ebro and even one Afranian cohort of the I l l u r g a v o n enses pledged t h e i r allegiance to him. Caesar considered t h i s welcome news as a great change of fortune, and he was not f a r wrong, f o r , by t h i s time, the Afranians were i l l at ease and giving much thought to a retreat from I l e r d a to a more favourable p o s i t i o n . 19 B e l l . Civ.. I , 54. 21 BDio, 21. 20 e l l . XLI, Civ.. I , 58.  " F i n a l l y , they made up t h e i r  45 mind to stay a c t i o n f o r several days, and, contrary to the general custom, 22 to forage by night."  Such was t h e i r p l i g h t .  So f a r we can consider the b a t t l e a stalemate.  V i c t o r i e s had  been won and l o s t by both sides but gradually the t i d e of war began to turn i n Caesar's favour.  Caesar r e a l i z e d that the war must be terminated  as quiekly as possible and that, as Afranius could not be compelled to f i g h t a decisive b a t t l e , he must be starved into surrender.  To do t h i s  he would require c l o s e r contact with the Afranian forces. This would nec e s s i t a t e the e l i m i n a t i o n of the great distance he had to send h i s eavalry upstream i n order that they might cross the S i c o r i s .  A change i n strategy  demanded a change i n t a c t i c s , and to overcome the vexing problem of d i s tance Caesar decided to construct an a r t i f i c i a l ford one and a h a l f miles above I l e r d a .  T. A. Dodge considers t h i s enterprise to be "as remarkable 23  by i t s s i m p l i c i t y as by i t s ingenuity."  By t h i s ford Caesar intended  to d i v e r t some part of the S i c o r i s and so lower the water to a l e v e l which would enable h i s i n f a n t r y and eavalry to cross s a f e l y . The exact purpose of t h i s f o r d was "...to prevent the need of always sending the cavalry over the bridge by a long c i r c u i t o u s route..." ' 8  This work continued night and day, f o r Caesar was spurred on by reports of Afranius's a c t i v i t i e s which involved the construction of a bridge at Octogesa, on the Ebro, t h i r t y miles south of I l e r d a .  This bridge was to  be made by coupling ships together and l a y i n g a crosswalk over them, so permitting several legions to cross. A l s o , as Octogesa i s i n the t e r r i tory of the natives were f r i e n d l y to Pompey, Afranius 22 BC ee ll tl i. b Ce ir iv a. .where I , 59. 23 Dodge, o p . c l t . , p.445. 24 B e l l . Civ., I , 61.  46 would f i n d reinforeements there and so be able to prolong the war into the winter. Afranius and P e t r e i u s , r e a l i z i n g that foraging had become impossible on the East bank and that t h e i r p o s i t i o n i n I l e r d a would eventua l l y become untenable, decided, now that t h e i r pontoon bridge was under construction, to desert I l e r d a and march by the most convenient route to Octogesa on the Ebro.  "Nevertheless about one and the same time the bridge  over the Ebro was announced to be nearly f i n i s h e d and a ford was being 25 found i n the S i c o r i s . " So began the abandonment of I l e r d a .  Afranius l e f t behind two  a u x i l i a r y cohorts to garrison the c i t y , and l e d the rest of h i s force (Caesar i s not sure of the exact number) to j o i n the two legions which he had sent across to the other side of the bridge on the previous day. This exodus took place during the e a r l y hours of J u l y 25th.  Caesar,  learning of A f r a n i u s ' sudden withdrawal, rushed the d i v e r s i o n of the S i c o r i s and so lessened the volume of water that h i s infantry were able to eross, though at times only t h e i r heads were above water.  A l i n e of  cavalry was placed a short distance downstream to r e t r i e v e any s o l d i e r who unfortunately l o s t h i s footing and was washed downstream. This operat i o n was carried through successfully with no l o s s of either i n f a n t r y or cavalry. The pursuit of Afranius was not carried out immediately, " f o r Caesar d i d not think i t safe i n the darkness and with men ignorant of the 26 country to follow up an enemy that was w e l l acquainted with i t . " strategy was now r e s t r i c t e d : 25 B e l l . C i v . . I , 61. 26 B i o , X I I , 22.  His  "The only course l e f t f o r Caesar was to  47 annoy and harass the enemy's l i n e of march with h i s c a v a l r y . . . "  27  So,  with h i s forces s a f e l y arrayed on the east bank of the S i c o r i s , he organized h i s troops and sent h i s horsemen i n pursuit of the enemy's rearguard. The road Afranius had decided to follow was almost waterless, but i t had the advantage of providing many places f o r quick defence.  Cae-  sar knew that the enemy could reach the Ebro before him by t h i s shorter route, h i s own i n v o l v i n g a wide c i r c u i t v i a the bridge just constructed or the f o r d . So t o e f f e c t as much speed as possible he l e d f o r t h h i s men (the cavalry contingent exempted) i n a three-line formation ( t r i p l e x a c i e s ) . Caesar's enforced speed combined with the eagerness of h i s men soon brought them w i t h i n easy distance of the enemy who were already being harassed by Caesar's cavalry.  "And there was such z e a l i n the s o l d i e r y that, though  a c i r c u i t of s i x miles was added to t h e i r route and a long delay was interposed at the f o r d , they overtook by the ninth hour of the day those op  who had gone out at the t h i r d watch." Afranius and h i s troops were so unnerved by the cavalry charges and the sight of Caesar's s o l d i e r s that they took up a p o s i t i o n on r i s i n g ground about two miles southwest of the small inland town of Sarroca and there formed l i n e s of b a t t l e . t o l l of t h e i r march.  H i s men were worn out by f i g h t i n g and the  I t iaast have grieved Afranius immensely to stop at  t h i s point f o r he had but f i v e miles t o t r a v e l to reach the narrow d e f i l e s of the mountain range which would carry him t o the I b r o .  This d e f i l e was  to play an important part i n the events of the following days. Caesar took up h i s p o s i t i o n on the p l a i n s and when he noticed that the Pompeians showed no signs of attacking he encamped upon the 87 B e l l . C i v . , I , 63. 80 B e l l . C i v . , I , 64.  48 nearest h i l l not f a r north o f A f r a n i u s .  Reconnoitring showed that there  was r e l a t i v e l y f l a t land between Afranius»s camp and the mountains and Caesar r e a l i z e d that he must reach the d e f i l e f i r s t i f he was to bar the enemy's advance to the Ebro. Afranius' camp was so situated that he had access t o , and could e a s i l y defend, a l l routes leading to t h i s d e f i l e . Caesar, wary o f t h i s , decided that h i s next strategic move was: '•to cut 29  o f f the foe from the Ebro and prevent him from foraging."  This Involved  f o r him a dangerous detour over rugged land but i f he could outdistance Afranius i n a f i n a l dash f o r the d e f i l e he would command an important s t r a t e g i c p o s i t i o n which would have great bearing on turning the struggle i n h i s favour. Caesar at dawn began a withdrawal which at f i r s t appeared to the Afranians t o be a retreat but which a c t u a l l y was a r o t a t i o n to the r i g h t that produced an outflanking movement. When the enemy saw these f i r s t manoeuvres o f Caesar's troops they were overjoyed f o r they thought they had outlasted t h e i r opponents and that a shortage of supplies combined with other circumstances unknown to them had produced t h i s unexpected withdrawal. To t h e i r amazement they suddenly r e a l i z e d that Caesar had turned and had drawn p a r a l l e l with them. They now took up arms and began t h e i r march on a s t r a i g h t course t o the I b r o .  Caesar gives an account of t h i s  withdrawal, the obstacles met, and the subsequent r e s u l t :  "the whole con-  t e s t turned on speed - which of the two would f i r s t seize the d e f i l e s and the  h i l l s - but the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the roads delayed Caesar's army, while  Caesar's pursuing cavalry hindered the forces o f Afranius." reached the d e f i l e s f i r s t and came to a h a l t . 29 B e l l . C i v . . I , 68. 30 B e l l . C i v . . I , 70.  Caesar  He had outflanked Afranius  49 and with, the cavalry behind and Caesar's troops i n front c o n t r o l l i n g a l l routes to the various d e f i l e s , the Afranians took refuge on a nearby h i l l . Caesar now waited f o r Afranius to make the next move. A f t e r assessing the s i t u a t i o n c l o s e l y Afranius noticed that approximately  two  miles from h i s encampment was a mountain which, i f c o n t r o l l e d , would give the holder access to a ridge that would permit an easy route to the confluence of the S i c o r i s and Ebro r i v e r s .  I t was Afranius' i n t e n t i o n to  capture t h i s h i l l and so by a change of route a r r i v e at Octogesa.  It is  s u f f i c i e n t to say that he f a i l e d i n h i s attempt and the force he despatched was cut to pieces by Caesar's cavalry.  Thus the l a s t vestige of hope was  r a p i d l y disappearing f o r the Pompeians. Caesar had been successful i n the accomplishment of h i s s t r a t e g i c purpose. He had pursued Afranius successfully from I l e r d a ; he had reached the passes before him, and he had slaughtered before the eyes of a l l a portion of the enemy's troops.  The i n i t i a t i v e l a y with Caesar.  Should  he attack and a n n i h i l a t e h i s opponents or should he wait and starve them out?  Since Afranius would not engage i n open b a t t l e , Caesar was u n w i l l i n g  to expose h i s men to the rigours of an u p h i l l attack, and resorted instead to a strategy of waiting combined with t a c t i c s so applied as to prevent the Afranians from securing water.  "Caesar had entertained the hope that,  having eut o f f h i s adversaries from t h e i r food supply, he would be able to f i n i s h the business without exposing h i s men to f i g h t i n g or bloodshed." Caesar took the time a v a i l a b l e to consolidate h i s forces while Afranius and Petreius returned to t h e i r camp only to f i n d that the various routes leading to the Ebro had been elosed o f f by outposts s t r a t e g i c a l l y placed 51 B e l l . Civ.. I , 72.  33  50 by Caesar. By J u l y 28, Afranius and P e t r e i u s , a f t e r several days of i s o l a t i o n , were hard pressed f o r water.  Their scouts had discovered a small  r e s e r v o i r but constant a c t i o n by Caesar's cavalry had prevented the watergatherers from returning with any sizeable quantity of water.  To counter-  act t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the Pompeian commanders decided to strengthen t h i s supply l i n e .  Before t h i s was done the problem of t h e i r next move had come  before the council of the Pompeians and a decision had to be made on one of two a l t e r n a t i v e s :  to t r y to return to I l e r d a where they had a small  amount of g r a i n stored or to t r y to reach Tarraco, only a short distance away along a c i r c u i t o u s and somewhat dangerous road. Caesar kept h i s distance, attacking spasmodically and only when necessary.  T o r he d i d not wish to come to close quarters with the enemy,  p a r t l y because he was a f r a i d that they might become desperate and carry out some rash undertaking, and p a r t l y because he hoped to win them over 32  anyway without a c o n f l i c t . " A f t e r a b r i e f period of f r a t e r n i z a t i o n between the two camps, which was c a r r i e d on while Afranius and Petreius were away supervising the safeguarding of t h e i r water supply, the Afranians deeide to return to I l e r d a and t h e i r reserve grain s t o r e . So t h e i r retreat began, but before i t was long underway many of t h e i r Spanish a u x i l i a r i e s deserted them and e i t h e r took to the h i l l s or transferred t h e i r allegiance to Caesar. As Afranius moved so did Caesar; and h i s cavalry kept i n constant touch with Afranius' rearguard.  No movement u p h i l l or down could be made by  the Afranians without r e c e i v i n g some sort of setback at the hands of the 32 Dio, XLI, 22  51 eavalry whether from the speare hurled at them as they proceeded downhill or from the general weariness they sustained i n beating back the attacks of the cavalry as they advanced upwards. We must not, even at t h i s dismal period f o r the Afranians, underestimate t h e i r leaders' a b i l i t y i n counteracting the charges of the cavalry; In proceeding downhill they of course were not completely at Caesar's meres for,  when a new decline was reached, Afranius' rear column would take a  stand at the h i l l ' s topmost approach and there hold the cavalry i n abeyance u n t i l such time as t h e i r companions had nearly reached the bottom o f the  h i l l and then, t h e i r job f i n i s h e d , carry on t h e i r r e t r e a t .  So t h i s  method of retreat and pursuit was extended f o r four miles u n t i l the A f r a nians, completely exhausted both by the ruggedness of the route and the inconvenience caused by the cavalry, took up a p o s i t i o n on a l o f t y h i l l and there proceeded to encamp without unloading t h e i r baggage animals and with only one l i n e of defence facing Caesar.  This h i l l was i n a very  disadvantageous p o s i t i o n f a r from a r e s e r v o i r and some distance from I l e r d a . Caesar i n h i s accustomed manner stopped and, when the enemy showed no signs of moving on, ordered h i s foragers to t h e i r tasks.  This  was the moment the Afranians had awaited and, as soon as they noticed the foragers move away, they set out again, hoping that Caesar would be too preoccupied with making a camp to follow them. But they were mistaken and Caesar, though a short time was l o s t i n regrouping, returned to h i s former plan of harassing the Afr a n i an rearguard. This time not only were the  Afranians troubled by the spasmodic sorties of Caesar's eavalry, but  they also were threatened by h i s main force which was moving forwards ever anxious f o r a pitched b a t t l e .  But Caesar's strategy of forced  52 exhaustion d i d not change.  "Caesar preferred that they should be harassed  by such sufferings and submit to a compulsory surrender rather than f i g h t a pitched b a t t l e . "  3 3  How he f u r t h e r c a r r i e d t h i s out we s h a l l soon see. The Afranians again were compelled to h a l t even though i n a very unfavourable l o c a t i o n . Here under eover of night they pushed forward entrenchments that t h e i r camp might be changed to another p o s i t i o n .  Caesar notieed t h e i r movements  and began to surround them by rampart and d i t c h circumscribing the enemy's trenchwork.  The Afranians, short of water and food, k i l l e d t h e i r baggage  animals; sustained by t h i s food only a short time, Petreius i n sheer desperation l e d out h i s legions and took a p o s i t i o n on the p l a i n opposite Caesar's camp. A distance of only seven hundred yards separated the two camps and Caesar drew up h i s l i n e accordingly. was nearing accomplishment.  What Caesar had planned  The Afranians were gradually weakening.  His  technique of causing mental and p h y s i c a l deterioration was w e l l displayed here.  " I f b a t t l e were joined, the propinquity of the camps afforded the  conquered a speedy retreat i n t h e i r f l i g h t .  For t h i s reason he had made  up h i s mind to r e s i s t them i f they advanced t h e i r colours, but not to be the f i r s t to a t t a c k . "  34  Caesar's defense works were near completion and one more day would be s u f f i c i e n t to f i n i s h them. The Afranians knew t h i s and they hoped by a sudden show of arms to hinder Caesar i n h i s workings. This they d i d but Caesar by refusing to engage i n b a t t l e remained the master of the s i t u a t i o n .  So, at sunset, without an engagement, the two armies  retreated to t h e i r camps, Caesar to complete the defense works and the 33 B e l l . Civ., I , 81. 34 B e l l . C i v . . I , 82.  53 Afranians to t r y another avenue o f esoape, the r i v e r S i c o r i s .  I n one  l a s t v a l i a n t e f f o r t Afranius t r i e d to ford the r i v e r , hut Caesar quickly dispatched h i s cavalry to the opposite bank so f r u s t r a t i n g the attempt. The Afranians withdrew to t h e i r camp. "At l a s t blockaded i n every way, t h e i r baggage animals now kept without fodder f o r four days, through t h e i r want of water, firewood, and forage, they beg f o r a conference,....* So the struggle was now over.  35  Caesar consented to a conference  on h i s own terms and therein set f o r t h h i s conditions of surrender. They were accepted and according to the terms stated the army of Pompey i n Spain was disbanded at the r i v e r Varus.  No opponent of Caesar was required  to take an oath o f allegiance to him nor was any property l o s t by the enemy* s s o l d i e r s and i n the hands of h i s men kept from the o r i g i n a l owners. The peace was s e t t l e d f a i r l y .  Afranius and Petreius were released un-  harmed and with t h e i r departure the Pompeian threat i n Spain disappeared. Two more phases o f a c t i v i t y yet remained to be s e t t l e d , one at M a s s i l i a and the other i n f u r t h e r Spain where the legate of Pompey, M. Terentius Varro, was i n control with a l e v i e d force of two legions and t h i r t y a u x i l i a r y cohorts. The contest with Varro was an anticlimax to Caesar's previous a c t i v i t i e s i n Spain. H i s opponent i n the Further Province was f i r s t and foremost a scholar not a s k i l l f u l m i l i t a r y man.  I t i s not necessary to  go into d e t a i l over t h i s campaign f o r i t was no e f f o r t f o r Caesar to consolidate himself i n Varro's province, but i t was important that he control t h i s part of Spain.  "Caesar, though many urgent a f f a i r s were  summoning him back to I t a l y , had nevertheless determined to abandon no 35 B e l l . C i v . , I , 84.  54 section of the war i n the two Spains, because he knew how great were the benefactions of Pompeius and what large bodies of retainers he had i n the h i t h e r p r o v i n c e .  1,36  We know then why Caesar decided to bring a l l  Spain under h i s c o n t r o l .  Through a meeting c a l l e d by him and held at  Corduba, the Spanish communities were informed of h i s intentions and h i s demands. I n a short time most c i t i e s previously f r i e n d l y to Pompey changed t h e i r allegiance to Caesar and closed t h e i r gates against Yarro. A surrender q u i c k l y followed. Caesar now controlled a l l of Spain a f t e r a campaign that lasted no longer than s i x weeks. The siege of M a s s i l i a i s beyond the scope of t h i s study. I t was carried out s u c c e s s f u l l y by land and sea and the M a s s i l i o t e s , s k i l l e d i n the use o f war machines, prolonged the siege and taxed to capacity the m i l i t a r y s k i l l of the Romans.  36 B e l l . Cjv.. I I , 18  55 CHAPTER V FROM DYRRHACHIUM TO PHARSALIA While Caesar was conducting operations i n Spain, he had not neglected t o consider h i s p o s i t i o n i n I t a l y i n the event of a Pompeian attack, and had ready a plan f o r the deployment of h i s troops.  The state  i t s e l f was placed under the propraetorian power of Mark Antony. Under h i s d i r e c t i o n the south-eastern ports of Brundisium and Tarentum were garrisoned with three l e g i o n s . Q. Hortensius cruised the Tyrhhene Sea; P. Dolabella p a t r o l l e d the A d r i a t i c .  M. Crassus was responsible f o r C i s -  alpine Gaul; I l l y r i e u m was under the control of G. Antonius, Mark Antony's brother. Although Caesar was r u l e r at Rome, Pompey controlled the sea, and the events which preceded Caesar's departure from Brundisium trated t h i s .  illus-  One of Caesar's naval lieutenants, P. Dolabella, suffered  a d i s a s t e r i n the A d r i a t i c at the hands of Scribonius L i bo and M. Octavius. G. Antonius, who came to a s s i s t him, was compelled by a superior enemy to f l e e to Corcyra N i g r a , where he was forced t o surrender h i s f i f t e e n cohorts of r e c r u i t s .  I n the above incidents Caesar l o s t f o r t y ships of war  and several thousand men. Although Caesar suffered these disasters by sea, a greater one took place by land.  G. Curio, a f t e r successfully  winning S i c i l y from Cato, was e s p e c i a l l y commissioned by Caesar to proceed to A f r i c a to meet and conquer the forces of Pompey gathered under A t t i u s Varus.  But because Caesar was forced to keep h i s best troops f o r the  Spanish war, he had been compelled to form the S i c i l i a n - A f r i c a n foree mainly from the legions taken over from the enemy at Corfinium.  This  foree was defeated by Juba, King of Mauretania, and Curio died i n the fight.  56 Curio*s defeat, which can be traced to an error of judgement as w e l l as to over-eagerness, s e r i o u s l y affected Caesar and permitted the Pompeians so to arrange a f f a i r s i n A f r i c a that they were able to present a f i r m front to him l a t e r .  Though Curio was now l o s t to Caesar, h i s  capture of S i c i l y had frustrated Pompey*s plan to starve out the peninsula. Undoubtedly Caesar regretted Curio*s death, f o r i t was a personal l o s s , and he knew the A f r i c a n defeat would encourage the opposition and produce consequences unfavourable to him.  "Thus Curio died a f t e r rendering most  valuable assistance to Caesar and i n s p i r i n g i n him many hopes.*  1  While Caesar campaigned i n Spain, Pompey centred h i s forces around h i s t r a i n i n g camp at Berrhoea, A l l the m i l i t a r y equipment which was not required was stored at Dyrrhachium, the arsenal which Caesar hoped eventually to capture. By the time Caesar had completed the Spanish war, Pompey was moving towards Macedonia.  Caesar remained eleven days i n  Rome, then resigned h i s d i c t a t o r s h i p , and, although he had not formally entered upon h i s consulship, set out i n mid December f o r Brundisium while Pompey marched by the Ignatian Way towards Candavia. "Caesar ...hastened to Brundusium about the winter s o l s t i c e , intending to s t r i k e t e r r o r i n t o 2 h i s enemies by taking them by surprise." strategy and Appian adds: ness."  Here i s the essence of Caesar's  "...the most potent thing i n war i s unexpected-  3  Caesar had learned of Pompey*s intentions through divers sources: "He had made up h i s mind to winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and a l l the coast towns, so as to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea, and f o r that 1 Dio, XLI, 42. 2 Appian, I I , 8, 52. 3 Appian, I I , 8, 53.  57 reason haa d i s t r i b u t e d h i s f l e e t a l l along the sea-coast."  4  A year short of a few days since he crossed the Rubicon, Caesar l e f t Brundisium f o r E p i r u s . "Pompeius was at that time i n Candavia, and was on h i s way from Macedonia to Apollonia and Dyrrachium to winter quarters."  5  As he set s a i l and contemplated h i s next move no doubt the thought  came to h i s mind that Pompey at the beginning of navigation i n early spring might land at Brundisium o r some point along the coast w i t h i n easy reach of Epirus and undertake the recovery of I t a l y .  This thought spurred him on.  By January 5th o f 48 B.C., Caesar had reached Palaeste on the coast of E p i r u s , a port which provided a good landing place and prevented molestation by enemy s h i p s . When disembarkation was complete, Caesar's immediate purpose was to seize Oricum, a town about twenty-five miles north and s l i g h t l y west, and from there move north again to A p o l l o n i a , a Pompeian stronghold.  Caesar had now begun the f u l f i l m e n t of a twofold  p o l i c y of c o n c i l i a t i o n and aggression.  Both towns, recognising h i s con-  s u l a r a u t h o r i t y , surrendered without a struggle and were followed by the surrounding communities of B y l l i s and Amantia.  Thus with l i t t l e trouble,  Caesar had established a foothold i n Epirus. He had employed a strategic p o l i c y of surprise and rapid movement, combined with the use of h i s cons u l a r a u t h o r i t y . This authority was a very impressive weapon as he was the o f f i c i a l representative of Rome and what he did was thought to be done f o r the good of the s t a t e . By the time Pompey reached Scampa on the Egnatian Way, a report had reached him of the f a l l of Oricum and Apollonia. 4 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 5. 5 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 11.  The psychological  58 a f f e c t of t h i s news upon h i s men was alarming. deserted.  Many panicked while others  He r a l l i e d those he could r e s t r a i n and made h i s way quickly  towards the coast:  "But Pompeius, when he learnt of what had happened at  Oricum and A p o l l o n i a , f e a r i n g f o r Dyrraehium, hurried there, marching night and day."  6  The news of Pompey's rapid approach disturbed Caesar.  Without  proceeding f u r t h e r , he drew up h i s l i n e at F i e r i on the r i v e r Apsus. Pompey, upon securing h i s supply route from Dyrrhachium, reached a point on the northern side of the Apsus opposite Caesar. Here the two forces were destined to stay, neither commander promoting an engagement.  Although  Caesar would have wished to force Pompey to f i g h t , the small size of h i s army prevented him from doing so u n t i l reinforcements under the command of Mark Antony could reach him.  Pompey, however, with h i s l a r g e r force,  intended to contain Caesar i n a l i m i t e d t e r r i t o r y and gradually to starve him out.  To ensure t h i s , a message had gone out to Metellus S c i p i o i n  Macedonia to j o i n him as quickly as p o s s i b l e . I n r e c a p i t u l a t i n g , we f i n d that Caesar had established a p o s i t i o n i n Spirus, s t r a t e g i c a l l y unsound, f o r Pompey's blockade of the coast had cost him the t h i r t y ships used to transport h i s troops across the Adriatic.  Bibulus, Pompey's naval commander, nourishing an intense hatred  of Caesar and everything f o r which he stood, had destroyed both men ships.  and  His move against Pompey i n Epirus shows us that "Caesar decided  on what appeared to be the impossible not because the operation he had determined upon was s t r a t e g i c a l l y sound, but because i t i s the seemingly impossible which of a l l things surprises most."  7  Pompey, as h i s actions  6 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 13. ? j , J , C, F u l l e r , The Decisive B a t t l e s of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History (London, 1954), p.185.  59 proved, was d e f i n i t e l y caught o f f guard.  I t i s reasonable to assume that  he was b i d i n g h i s time i n the hope that when an engagement with Oaesar did take place, he eould overwhelm him by mere weight of numbers. Caesar r e a l i z e d t h i s and so resorted to the strategy of surprise. The question has often been raised why Caesar who  controlled  the coast of I l l y r i c u m did not take the land route to Greeoe. The holding of I l l y r i c u m proved i n time to be more a source of anxiety than of strength to Caesar, f o r the longer Pompey was l e f t unassailed, the stronger the l a t t e r became, and the more dangerous appeared the p o s s i b i l i t y of h i s using I l l y r i c u m as a route to I t a l y . Many f e e l that Caesar should have chosen the land route.  Among such advocates i s B, H. L i d d e l l - H a r t ,  who  claims that "In strategy, the longest way round i s often the shortest way Q  home."  A sharp c r i t i c i s m of Caesar's movements comes from t h i s supporter  of i n d i r e c t strategy when he points out that "Instead of advancing into Greece by the i n d i r e c t land route through I l l y r i c u m , Caesar decided on the direct sea route.  Thereby he gained time i n i t i a l l y but l o s t i t u l t i -  Q  mately."  I do not completely concur with L i d d e l l - H a r t .  The land t r i p  to Epirus i n mid-winter would be a hazardous undertaking, f o r his troops would be exposed to the uncertain mercy of the elements and would emerge i n t o Epirus an impoverished army ready to f a l l into the grip of Pompey who would c e r t a i n l y have had time to regroup h i s forces and present a strong i f not insurmountable b a r r i e r to t h e i r advance. One need only consider the disastrous attempt of Aulus Gabinius to march through I l l y r i c u m and i t s consequences. He l o s t forty-one o f f i c e r s , over two thousand men, 8 Liddell-Hart, Strategy, p.£5. 9 Liddell-Hart, o p . c l t . , p.55.  60 disease f i n a l l y claiming him s h o r t l y a f t e r .  This occurred i n October of  48 B. C. a f t e r Caesar had won at Pharsalia and Pompey was dead. The Pompeian f u g i t i v e s had done t h e i r job w e l l .  We cannot overlook the mass-  i v e power o f Pompey both on land and sea. By mid-March Caesar's p o s i t i o n was p e r i l o u s .  A stalemate of  two months had brought no reinforcements either to him or to Pompey, and the l a t t e r had a s u f f i c i e n t l y large force without the help of S c i p i o . There was a f e e l i n g i n Caesar's camp that Antony was showing excessive caution i n not s a i l i n g with reinforcements, f o r i t was generally understood that at any time of the year some r i s k must be incurred when t r a v e l l i n g by sea. Pompey's blockade was more than harmful to Caesar; i t was disastrous. Winter was w e l l advanced and though Bibulus was dead, h i s successors never once relinquished t h e i r control of the sea.  "And the further t h i s period  of time extended the more keen were the o f f i c e r s of the enemy's f l e e t i n t h e i r v i g i l a n c e , and the greater confidence they had of stopping him."-*-  0  By frequent messages Caesar urged Antony t o set s a i l on the next favourable wind f o r the coast near Apollonia and Scodra.  These two  places were s p e c i f i c a l l y stressed because they were of d e f i n i t e strategic importance:  "...at neither of these places were they l i k e l y to encounter  h o s t i l e c r u i s e r s , f o r the enemy were a f r a i d to venture f a r from t h e i r p r i n c i p a l s t a t i o n s , Corcyra and Dyrraehium."  11  Caesar had previously  arranged that Aulus Gabinius and f i f t e e n cohorts were to come by land through Dalmatia and j o i n him i n Albania, while Q. Calenus and Antony were to come by sea. 10 B e l l . C i v . , I l l , 25. .11 Holmes, The Boman Republic. I l l , p.129.  61 Towards the end of March, Antony's f l e e t put to sea and, since i t was too stormy to land at A p o l l o n i a , he s a i l e d north f o r Scodra. As he passed Dyrrhaehium, G. Coponius and h i s Rhodian f l e e t gave chase f o r c ing him to bypass Scodra and continue further north. Nymphaeum was the closest harbour a v a i l a b l e and f o r t h i s port Antony s a i l e d , reaching i t s protection with Coponius close behind. A favourable breeze carried Antony s a f e l y to shore but, unfortunately f o r Coponius, the wind suddenly changed dashing h i s ships upon the rocks and destroying a l l but one or two. Now that he was safe, Antony sent messages to Caesar revealing h i s strength and p o s i t i o n . Antony now moved inland not by the direct road which l e d from Nymphaeum to Dyrrhaehium, which would expose him to an attack by Pompey's forces, but by the only other route a v a i l a b l e , one which l e d from Nymphaeum to Lissus; from there to Bassania on the r i v e r Wati; thense south-east to Scampa on the Egnatian Way. Antony's a r r i v a l had not gone unnoticed by Pompey o r Caesar, f o r both had witnessed the sea chase as the ships passed Dyrrhaehium.  Their plans quickly changed.  "And when they had found t h i s  out they each adopted d i f f e r e n t plans, Caesar to unite himself as quickly as possible with Antonius, Pompelus to confront the approaching enemy on t h e i r march, i n case he might be able to attack them unawares from an ambuscade; ...**^  2  Antony, informed by natives of Pompey's approach, moved no f u r ther and awaited Caesar's a r r i v a l .  Caesar, to avoid Pompey and reach  Antony, had to cross the Apsus by ford f a r up r i v e r and then procede by a c i r c u i t o u s mountain route. 12 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 30.  Pompey moved on Antony by forced marches  62 and waited i n ambush. When he r e a l i z e d that Antony was aware of h i s plan and that Caesar was near, he changed h i s t a c t i c s :  H  . . . t o escape being  shut i n by two armies, he quits that spot and with a l l h i s forces a r r i v e s at Asparagium, a town of the Dyrrachians, and there pitches h i s camp i n a suitable p l a c e . "  1 3  By the time Pompey had withdrawn, Antony, a f t e r a four days' march, had joined up with Caesar on the south side of the Graba Balkan pass just beyond the north bank of the Apsus. Now that the two commanders had joined forces, Caesar was better able to arrange the expansion of h i s operational area and t o e s t a b l i s h h i s influence further inland.  I t was  h i s i n t e n t i o n to contain Pompey by using the bulk of h i s force while f l y i n g columns were to be sent into the i n t e r i o r to win the friendship of the Greeks and keep the two Syrian legions of Pompey under S c i p i o at bay, i n h i s own words:  "...to t r y to win over the provinces and to make  a f u r t h e r advance....*"'"  4  Domitius Calvinus was sent to intercept Scipio  who was marching with two legions through Macedonia to j o i n Pompey; L. Cassius moved into Thessaly and C a l v i s i u s Sabinus into A e t o l i a , both to procure g r a i n . Caesar moved h i s combined force to a p o s i t i o n opposite Pompey who occupied Asparagium on the r i v e r Genusus, which ran p a r a l l e l to the Apsus. As on the r i v e r Apsus, so on the Genusus, Pompey followed a wait-and-watch p o l i c y . Caesar, on the other hand, considerably strengthened by Antony's f o r c e , t r i e d unsuccessfully to lure h i s adversary into a pitched b a t t l e . "He then determined to manoeuvre h i s opponent out of B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 30. 14 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 34. 1 3  65 his p o s i t i o n by s t r i k i n g at Dyrrhachium."  15  Dyrrhachium was Pompey's  aresenal, and according to Caesar's plan, one of the strategic points to be captured. "So on the next day he set out i n f u l l force f o r Dyrrhachium, taking a wide c i r c u i t by a d i f f i c u l t and narrow route, i n the hope that Pompeius could be either driven to Dyrrachium or cut o f f from i t , . . . . "  1 6  Caesar had l e f t Pompey at Asparagium and moved eastward towards the h i l l s as though scouting f o r supplies.  Suddenly, by a sharp turn to the north,  he had covered the f o r t y - f i v e miles to Dyrrhachium within one day and night.  "Success depended on Caesar's keeping Pompey i n ignorance of h i s  intentions during a whole day, and on h i s making the march i n not much 17 over twenty-four hours;...."  Thus the deadlock was broken i n one swift  stroke by Caesar i n h i s forced march over d i f f i c u l t t e r r a i n to invest Pompey's arsenal.  "Onee more Caesar's supreme speed and energy i n taking  on offensive form of i n i t i a t i v e s t a r t l e d and disconcerted the e l d e r l y strategist."  1 8  In c u t t i n g Pompey o f f from Dyrrhachium by land, Caesar had won the f i r s t round. Pompey took up a p o s i t i o n on the rock of Petra, a high point on the coast near Dyrrhachium, separated from h i s opponent's forces by the v a l l e y of Shimmihl. Caesar intended to exploit h i s early advantage by confining Pompey's large and w e l l supplied force to the narrow coast land around P e t r a , using only a smaller army less w e l l supplied. Although Caesar had cut o f f h i s land route to Dyrrhachium, Pompey kept supply l i n e s open by sea. Gradually Caesar's forces began to 15 Adeoek, Cambridge Ancient History, IX, p.659. 16 B e l l . C i v . , I l l , 41. 17 Dodge, Caesar, I I , p.511. 18 E. G. S i h l e r , Annals of Caesar (New York, 1911), p.206.  64 f e e l the pressure of a famine.  Pompey's strategy was undoubtedly a defen-  sive one. For f i n a l success he intended to concentrate on h i s power of starving out Caesar, by elimination of h i s supply route by sea.  The sea  had given Pompey the strategic advantage and t h i s , combined with h i s sup e r i o r i t y of numbers and equipment, placed Caesar i n a very p e r i l o u s position.  "Inaction was to Caesar o f a l l things the most unbearable,  but he had now to pay the penalty f o r h i s own magnificent a u d a c i t y . " Caesar's great attempt to blockade h i s enemy by land had begun.  19  After  reconnoitring, he decided to construct a series of redoubts linked by entrenchments along the higher ridges above and around Dyrrhaehium. I t was h i s object t o confine Pompey w i t h i n the narrowest possible l i m i t s . Pompey i n r e t a l i a t i o n d i d the same but followed a l i n e closer to the sea. Caesar's c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n enclosed about twenty square m i l e s , Pompey's approximately s i x t e e n . Caesar followed the furthest inland curve of a three-fold chain of h i l l s around Pompey's camp. This gave him access to a l l water courses and land routes. So began "...the most wonderful piece 20 of spade-work i n the wars of the ancient world."  Caesar gives us the  reasons f o r t h i s great undertaking, l a t e r destined to f a i l u r e ;  "...first,  that...he might be able t o b r i n g i n f o r h i s army corn and stores from any d i r e c t i o n at l e s s r i s k ; and also that he might prevent Pompeius from f o r aging and might make h i s cavalry useless f o r active operations; and, t h i r d l y , that he might diminish the moral influence on which Pompeius seemed c h i e f l y to r e l y among f o r e i g n nations, when the report should have spread throughout the world that he was being beleaguered by Caesar and 19 W. W. Fowler, J u l i u s Caesar and The Foundation of The Boman Imperial System (Hew York, 1908), p.285. 20 C. Oman, Seven Boman Statesmen of the Later Bepublie (London, 1921), p.329.  65 did not dare to f i g h t a pitched b a t t l e . "  A  B r i e f l y , Caesar's purpose was  to ease supply f o r himself and hinder i t f o r Pompey, but f i r s t and f o r e most, to achieve a moral advantage by showing the ancient world that Pompey was a f r a i d to f i g h t . We must admit that Caesar's reasons f o r the c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n were sound but, considering h i s manpower, they appear foolhardy.  "Caesar  ...took the o r i g i n a l but s i n g u l a r l y p r o f i t l e s s course of constructing extensive l i n e s of investment round an army which was not only stronger than h i s own but could supply i t s e l f e a s i l y , or move away, by sea, when22 ever i t wished."  How that Caesar had revealed h i s strategy, Pompey  showed that h i s objective was to seize as many h i l l s as possible and force h i s opponent to enlarge h i s perimeter to the point where the cont a i n i n g forces were so t h i n l y spread that they would be vulnerable to attack. We cannot help but admire Pompey's strategy, reminiscent of Fabius Maximus' delaying t a c t i c s which so hindered Hannibal i n the Second Punic War.  Caesar r e a l i z e d that Pompey was carrying out a s t r a t e g i c plan  of a t t r i t i o n and he was, to a great extent, powerless to prevent i t . While Caesar t r i e d to confine Pompey the l a t t e r struggled to force the former outward.  "Caesar...ventured upon an extremely d i f f i c u l t and c h i -  merical task; that i s , to carry a l i n e of circumvallation around the whole of Pompey*s positions from sea to sea, thinking that even i f he should f a i l he would acquire great renown from the boldness of the e n t e r p r i s e . " Pompey refused to f i g h t a pitched b a t t l e . 21 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 43. 22 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . , p.56. 23 Appian, I I , 61.  This l e f t only one o u t l e t  23  66 f o r him; ".••to adopt a desperate method of warfare by occupying as many h i l l s as possible, by holding with garrisons the widest extent of land p o s s i b l e , and by keeping Caesar's forces as f a r extended as he could; 24  ...."  The strategy of the opposing commanders i s b r i e f l y summarized  by Caesar:  "...Caesar to confine Pompeius within the narrowest l i m i t s ,  Pompeius to occupy as many h i l l s as he could i n the widest possible c i r 25 cult;...."  Caesar hoped to extend h i s contravallation to the sea and  so terminate the unwieldy expanse of l i n e i t was now becoming. To do t h i s he would have to control an important h i l l c a l l e d Paliama. His Ninth l e g i o n was sent to accomplish t h i s , but Pompey, forseeing t h i s , occupied a h i l l to the northwest by a quick attack and forced Caesar's troops to abandon t h e i r p o s i t i o n and so f o r f e i t the attempt.  "Caesar was  constrained to f a l l back upon the l i n e from which he had diverged, and thus u l t i m a t e l y to give h i s c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n an extension nearly twice as great as that which he had designed."  While Caesar kept to the ridges  of h i s c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n he could not be dislodged but when he l e f t t h e i r protection, Pompey's mass of manpower was too great an obstacle to overcome. I f Caesar had won possession of t h i s h i l l , besides reaching the sea, he eould have cut Pompey o f f from an important water supply and r e s t r i c t h i s forces to rather narrow bounds. The loss of the h i l l was the f i r s t blow of the many Caesar was to receive around  Dyrrhaehium.  Caesar, i n an e f f o r t t o break the deadlock journeyed to Dyrrhaehium, hopeful that the town would be betrayed to him. His t r i p was i n v a i n ; the town would not y i e l d . B e l l . C i v . , I l l , 44. 25 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 45. 26 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.140. 2 4  Some authorities suspect that he was  67 enticed t h i t h e r by a stratagem of Pompey f o r while he was there  .Pompey  took courage and planned a night assault upon the enclosing w a l l ; and attacking i t unexpectedly, he captured a portion of i t by storm and caused great slaughter among the men enoamped near i t .  1 , 8 7  I t was S u l l a who  eventually repulsed t h i s attack and who was severely c r i t i c i z e d f o r not carrying out the pursuit of the opposing forces.  Had he done so, some  think the war would have been concluded. But S u l l a , true to h i s p o s i t i o n as an o f f i c e r c a r r i e d out Caesar's orders to the l e t t e r and then awaited the a r r i v a l of h i s general. Had Pompey succeeded with t h i s s o r t i e , he would have dominated an entire ridge of the c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n .  His with-  drawal while under S u l l a ' s f i r e was s t r a t e g i c a l l y sound. Meanwhile Caesar's blockade by land gradually began to produce results.  Pompey's c a t t l e were threatened with starvation and h i s water  supply was a l l but cut o f f . to be a very onerous task.  The supplying of foodstuffs by sea was proving Nevertheless he s t i l l waited p a t i e n t l y f o r an  opportunity to break through Caesar's l i n e and to attack him i n the rear. He did not have to wait long.  Caesar's movements were r e s t r i c t e d because  he had to reach the sea soon or give up h i s c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n .  In a last  determined e f f o r t he descended from the ridge he now occupied and constructed the l a s t phase o f h i s p a r a l l e l entrenchments across the p l a i n south of the L e s n i k i a r i v e r .  Pompey, following Caesar's l i n e , had extended  h i s defence to the sea and i n addition had secured an abandoned camp o f Caesar's a short distance from the shore and about a h a l f mile from h i s opponents i n t e r i o r perimeter.  Having enlarged t h i s camp, from one corner  of i t he drew an entrenchment to the Lesnikia to secure a water supply, 87 Dio, XLI, 50.  68 while c o n t i n u a l l y watching Caesar*s movements. "He now intended to attack Caesar's inner p a r a l l e l i n overwhelming strength before he could complete h i s works, and to land a force whieh should simultaneously assault the 28 outer l i n e ; ....** An unforeseen incident gave Pompey the s t r a t e g i c advantage.  Two  G a l l i c o f f i c e r s under charge of treachery by Caesar deserted to Pompey. To the l a t t e r they conveyed a wealth of important information about a l l phases of Caesar's l i n e , e s p e c i a l l y the l e f t f l a n k . Pompey now directed h i s attack against the southern extension of Caesar's l i n e by both land and sea, catching the Hinth l e g i o n and Lentulus Marcellinus (encamped two miles inland) completely unawares. The advance forces of Pompey penetrated through a gap on the unfinished transverse trench and, f i l l i n g the area between the two p a r a l l e l l i n e s , forced the troops i n the rear l i n e to f l e e .  Those Pompeians not engaged i n t h i s  a c t i o n were constructing a camp near the sea just behind Caesar's l i n e s from which t h e i r cavalry might s a f e l y forage and to which t h e i r ships could come. Pompey's attack on Caesar "...was e x c e l l e n t l y planned, s t o u t l y 29 given, and was a complete surprise.**  I t i s beyond the scope of t h i s  study to explain the various engagements which took place i n the l a t t e r phase of the siege.  What i s more important i s the f a c t that Caesar was  defeated at h i s own game. He made one l a s t attempt to reinforce a camp near Pompey's sea base.  I n an engagement at t h i s southern extremity of  h i s l i n e , Caesar's men panicked and f l e d . 28 Holmes, o p . c i t . . p.147. 29 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.532.  Pompey, seeing them i n f l i g h t ,  69 hesitated to pursue l e s t he might f a l l into a t r a p .  Through t h i s h e s i t a -  t i o n many of Caesar's troops were saved. Now that the siege of Dyrrhachium was broken, Caesar was i n a discouraging p o s i t i o n .  His entrenchments of  four months preparation were, l o s t and the sea was closed to him.  Cn. Pom-  peius the younger had sacked, burned or captured most of h i s vessels around Oricum and L i s s u s .  "Caesar was e n t i r e l y beaten not merely i n t a c -  t i e s but also i n strategy, and i t seemed as i f he could neither maintain himself i n h i s present p o s i t i o n or j u d i c i o u s l y change i t . *  5 0  Caesar i n h i s Commentaries does not hesitate to state the reasons f o r h i s defeat;  "...the cause of t h e i r success had been the small number  of our troops, the unfavourable conditions of the s i t e and the narrow space, when they had f o r e s t a l l e d us i n the occupation of the camp; the twofold panic, w i t h i n and without the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ; the severance of the army into two p a r t s , one being unable to bear a i d to the o t h e r . " I t i s easy to condemn Caesar's defeat at Dyrrhaehium;  31  "The  p o s i t i o n of Caesar at Dyrrachium was a f a l s e one, brought on by conduct rash rather than judicious; . . . i t must be d i s t i n c t l y condemned as unsound military policy." to answer.  3 2  The question of what he should have done i s d i f f i c u l t  Throughout h i s m i l i t a r y career Caesar made very few mistakes.  This was one of them. He was i n f e r i o r i n troops and equipment.  Should  he have marched against Scipio i n the east, or should he have waited f o r Pompey to make the f i r s t move? Perhaps he would have been wise to wait u n t i l spring to launch h i s attack against Pompey i n Epirus.  Whatever  questions may be asked, whatever answers may be given, the important f a c t o r 50 Mommsen, The History of Rome, IV, p.386. 31 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 72. 32 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.573.  70 Is that Caesar l o s t the s t r a t e g i c advantage only temporarily and the way i n which he regained i t has won the admiration and respect of the m i l i t a r y world.  Dodge i s severe i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of Caesar's strategy at Dyrrha-  ehium. I n the l i g h t of the r e s u l t - P h a r s a l i a - h i s defeat should not be overemphasized. Now  that Caesar was withdrawing, Pompey had three possible moves.  He could a s s a i l and i f necessary pursue the defeated army. This would mean that he must march against Domitius Galvinus and would necessitate abandoning h i s stores at Dyrrhaehium.  This move would r e s u l t i n a union  with the legions of S o i p i o , doubly strengthening h i s army. Secondly, he could leave Caesar i n Greece and cross with h i s army to invade I t a l y , but t h i s would give Caesar the opportunity of marching through I l l y r i c u m . F i n a l l y he could t r y to recover Apollonia and Oricum and so exclude Caesar from the coast; but Caesar could then move against Scipio i n the Sast and so force Pompey to send help.  His decision to pursue Caesar was brought  about p a r t l y by the prompting of the a r i s t o c r a t s ; p a r t l y through h i s k i n ship to S c i p i o . •Caesar, driven from h i s former plans, came to the conclusion that he must a l t e r h i s whole method of campaign."  33  Caesar's forces r e -  grouped a short distance from Dyrrhaehium and he confessed to h i s men "...that he had made a mistake i n encamping before Dyrrachium where Pompey had abundance of supplies, whereas he ought to have drawn him to some plaee where he would be subject to the same s c a r c i t y as themselves."* His men,  3  i n f u r i a t e d with themselves f o r panicking, pleaded with him f o r  33 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 73. 34 Appian, I I , 10, 64.  71 permission to renew the struggle at Dyrrhachium, hut Caesar was too wise a commander and knew that such a move would be s t r a t e g i c a l l y unsound, "...Caesar had not s u f f i c i e n t confidence i n h i s panic-stricken troops and thought that an i n t e r v a l should be allowed to restore t h e i r s p i r i t s . . . "  3 5  So r e l i e v e d was Caesar at Pompey's i n a c t i v i t y a f t e r h i s v i c t o r y , that he i s reported to have said:  "To-day v i c t o r y had been with the enemy, i f  they had had a v i c t o r i n command."  36  The task now before Caesar was to withdraw from a triumphant enemy over two bridgeless r i v e r s , the Genusus and Apsus, with rapid waters and steep banks.  H i s plan was to move h i s wounded to A p o l l o n i a , where he  could pay h i s army, b o l s t e r the morale of h i s a l l i e s i n that v i c i n i t y , and put garrisons i n u n f r i e n d l y towns.  So swift was Caesar's retreat that  Pompey was unable to hamper him but f o r a small rearguard action.  Apoll-  onia was reached on the fourth day, three days a f t e r Pompey had given up the p u r s u i t .  To Caesar's c r e d i t i s the fact that he avoided a f a t a l d i s -  aster i n the aftermath of Dyrrhachium.  This could be considered one o f  h i s greatest m i l i t a r y achievements f o r even i n defeat he was i n d i r e c t l y master of the s i t u a t i o n .  The success of Caesar's retreat stemmed from  the superior energy and d i s c i p l i n e of h i s troops and h i s knowledge of the enemy's weaknesses and how to benefit from them. G, P. Baker c a l l s the retreat from Dyrrhachium "a masterpiece of sympathetic psychology."  37  Caesar was d e f i n i t e l y sympathetic to both the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n and the needs of h i s men while psychology was c e r t a i n l y used i n outmanoeuvring Pompey. 35 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 74. 36 Plutarch, Caesar, 39, 5. 37 G* P. Baker, Twelve Centuries of Borne (London, 1934), p.345.  72 Pompey's i n e r t i a having saved him, Caesar now resorted to a strategy of i n d i r e c t approach, by which he forced h i s opponent, though superior i n strength to follow him. "Caesar's i n d i r e c t approach had been made to restore the s t r a t e g i c balance, and a f u r t h e r one was needed to upset Pompey's balance." ° Somewhere along the Egnatlan Way Pompey held a council of war. His strategy was developed to match that of Caesar who had decided to march to the a i d of Cn. Domitius Calvinua "fearing f o r Domitius, l e s t he should be taken unawares by the a r r i v a l of Pompeius, Caesar hastened to him with a l l speed and urgent encouragement."  39  Pompey of course was not  sure of t h i s move so he planned that "...he should go to the a i d of S c i p i o , ..." i f Caesar marched east or "...should himself attack Domitius i n f u l l f o r c e , " i f Caesar waited at the coast f o r further reinforcements.  40  He  f i n a l l y decided to march along the Egnatian Way to help Scipio who had been hard pressed by the Caesarian forces. As he marched, Pompey learned that Domitius was between him and Scipio on the Egnatian Way, supposedly at Heracles. Moving quickly to t h i s spot he discovered that Domitius, warned of h i s approach by some i t i n e r a n t Gauls, had f l e d south to Thessaly to j o i n Caesar. Caesar now revealed h i s new strategy. He intended "...to transf e r the struggle from the coast away into the i n t e r i o r , with the view of getting beyond the reach of the enemy's f l e e t - the ultimate cause of the f a i l u r e of h i s previous e x e r t i o n s . "  41  Leaving three cohorts at Oricum,  one at Lissus and four at Apollonia, he marched up the v a l l e y of the Dryno 38 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . , p.56. B e l l . C i v . , I l l , 78. 40 Loc. c i t . 41 Mommsen, o p . c i t . , p.387. 3 9  73 hoping to reach Thessaly by the pass of Metzovo.  On J u l y 29th, 48 B.C.  he joined forces with Domitius at Aeginium, a town which l i e s over against Thessaly. According to T. A, Dodge, a " q u a d r i l a t e r a l of importance"  42  now  faced Caesar, v i z . the towns of Pelinaeum, Trieca, Gomphi, and Metropolis. Gomphl was stormed and taken by the new army. An example wa3 made of i t and the surrounding towns surrendered without a struggle.  From Metropolis  Caesar moved eastward across the Apidanus at Pyrgo, thence into l e v e l country coming to a h a l t near Pharsalus on the north bank of the Enipeus. "Finding a s u i t a b l e place i n the country d i s t r i c t where the crops were now nearly r i p e , he determined there to await the a r r i v a l of Pompeius and to t r a n s f e r t h i t h e r a l l h i s m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . " forces with S c i p i o at L a r i s s a ,  43  Pompey had now joined  He knew the p o s i t i o n of Caesar's troops  at Pharsalus but rather than r i s k a l l i n a single b a t t l e he f e l t s "that i t would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no f e r t i l e t e r r i t o r y , and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships f o r rapid f l i g h t .  So on the most prudent c a l c u l a t i o n he decided to protract 44  the war and drive the enemy from famine to plague,...."  This strategic  move would force Caesar to wander about Greece u n t i l he was bereft of supplies and h i s army weakened by continuous marches. Caesar had gained control of the f e r t i l e western p l a i n of the Peneus by various means, but we are not informed of the manoeuvres which brought the armies together. He had now no great worry about supplies. His men could forage where they pleased and a pitched b a t t l e i n such a place would be to t h e i r l i k i n g . 42 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.548. 43 B e l l . C i v . , I l l , 81. 44 Appian, I I , 10, 66.  74 When Pompey reached Pharsalus he entrenched h i s camp on the slope of Mount Dogondzis, three miles north-west of Caesar. up h i s p o s i t i o n i n the p l a i n .  Caesar took  D a i l y he formed a l i n e of b a t t l e i n front  of Pompey's camp but Pompey, true to h i s strategy, could not be enticed to f i g h t .  When Caesar saw that h i s opponent had no i n t e n t i o n of f i g h t i n g  a pitched b a t t l e , he decided to move on from Pharsalus, and, i f Pompey pursued, create a new opportunity to f i g h t . A l l was not w e l l i n Pompey's camp. While Pompey and other prominent persons wished to decimate Caesar's force i n a prolonged war, the senators and others of rank demanded an immediate engagement on the open plain.  E v i d e n t l y Pompey was not s u f f i c i e n t l y master of the s i t u a t i o n to  refuse t h e i r demand. Much against h i s better judgement he decided to meet Caesar i n a pitched b a t t l e , and changed h i s plans accordingly. 45 "And i n Pompey's camp men pray f o r P h a r s a l i a . " The s i t e of the b a t t l e of P h a r s a l i a has provoked much discussion. Caesar i s f a r from s p e c i f i c i n i d e n t i f y i n g i t s l o c a t i o n .  He states that  the b a t t l e took place i n Thessaly i n "...a suitable place i n the country d i s t r i c t where the crops were now nearly r i p e , . . . . "  4 6  We must depend upon  l a t e r w r i t e r s and mostly those of our own day f o r a closer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the b a t t l e ground. T. Rice Holmes gives an excellent account of the 47 s i t e s suggested by ancient and modern authors.  This author along with  several others i n c l u d i n g G. Long and Napier claims the b a t t l e was fought on the north bank of the Enipeus.  Summarizing the positions advocated:  Rice Holmes, F. L. Lucas, J . P. Postgate, G. Long suggest the north bank 45 Lucan, de B e l l o C i v i l i , V I I , 61. . 46 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 81. 47 Holmes, o p . c i t . , pp. 452-468.  75 while W, M. Leake, Mommsen, Heusey, S t o f f e l and Kromayer claim a s i t e on the south hank. The reasons f o r supposing that the b a t t l e was fought on the north bank are more convincing i n l i g h t of present day i n v e s t i g a t i o n 48 and I have followed Holmes i n placing the s i t e on the north bank. Pompey's camp has been placed on Mount Dogondzis by both Holmes and Lucas while Caesar's, according to Postgate, was " . . . i n the neighbourhood of Eontouri which Heuzey and Mr. Lucas i d e n t i f y with Old Pharsalus or Palaepharsalus." When Pompey did not o f f e r b a t t l e , i t was Caesar's plan to march northeast to Scotussa just south of Cynoscephalae, thereby threatening Pompey's communications with L a r i s s a and perhaps f o r c i n g him to give up h i s present p o s i t i o n .  "Caesar, t h i n k i n g that Pompeius could by no means  be enticed out to a b a t t l e , judged that h i s most convenient plan of campaign was to move h i s camp from that place, and to be always on the march, with the view of getting h i s supplies more conveniently by moving camp and v i s i t i n g various places, and at the same time of meeting with some opportunity of f i g h t i n g on the route, and of wearing out the army of peius, which was unaccustomed to hard work, by d a i l y marches."  Pom-  As he  moved o f f on the morning of August 9th, Pompey's army, i n a surprise move, took up a p o s i t i o n at the foot of the h i l l (Mount Dogondzis).  Caesar drew  up h i s troops i n l i n e of b a t t l e and observed the enemy's t a c t i c s c l o s e l y . Pompey, while addressing h i s men,  reveals h i s strategy: " I have induced  my cavalry ...as soon as the two armies have drawn nearer, to attack Caesar's r i g h t wing on h i s open f l a n k , and by surrounding-his column from 48 Further information i s contained i n The Decline of The Roman Rep u b l i c by G. Long, Chapter XVII, and J . P. Postgate, "The S i t e of the B a t t l e of P h a r s a l i a , " Journal of Roman Studies, X I I (1922), pp.187-191. 49 Postgate, o p . c i t * , p.189. 50 B e l l . C i v . , I l l , 85.  4  76 the rear to drive h i s army i n confused rout before a weapon i s east at the foe by u s . "  5 1  Pompey had stationed on the r i g h t wing under P. Corne-  l i u s Lentulus h i s C i l i c i a n and Spanish cohorts, protected by a force of s i x hundred cavalry from Pontus.  On the l e f t wing, the ground was held  by the F i r s t and Third legions which were sent to Rome by Caesar i n 49 B.C. These were under the control o f Domitius Ahenobarbus. Soipio stood on guard with two Syrian legions.  At the centre  "Caesar...had posted h i s  Tenth l e g i o n on the r i g h t wing, and h i s Ninth on the left...To t h i s legion he added the Eighth...He had eighty cohorts posted i n h i s l i n e s making a t o t a l of twenty-two thousand men...He had placed Antonius i n command on the l e f t wing, P. S u l l a on the r i g h t , and Cn. Domitius i n the c e n t r e . "  52  From close scrutiny of h i s opponents l i n e , Caesar observed that Pompey planned to use h i s i n f a n t r y defensively so that when the cavalry had scattered Caesar's horse and foot, the infantry would move i n and, by i t s mass, overwhelm any opposition.  To counteract t h i s Caesar placed eight  cohorts obliquely as a fourth l i n e and concealed i t by the r i g h t wing. Pompey made the f i r s t move by ordering h i s men t o march towards the enemy. When they had reached a c e r t a i n point, he brought them to a h a l t and here they waited f o r Caesar to attack, t h e i r spears at the ready. "Here...Pompey made a mistake, not knowing that the i n i t i a l clash with a l l the impetus of running adds force to the blows and f i r e s the courage, which everything then conspires to f a n . "  5 5  Caesar's troops, on approaching  slowly, became suspicious of the enemy's delaying t a c t i c s .  Thinking that  the Pompelans hesitated through fear, the Caesarians stopped to regroup 51 B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 86. B e l l . C i v . . I l l , 89. 53 P l u t a r c h , Caesar, 44. 5 2  77 and, when t h e i r l i n e s were consolidated, they charged the enemy. Caesar knew the moral and p h y s i c a l value of impetus. He was also aware that h i s men on the attack were better prepared psychologically, i f they thought that Pompey's forces were a f r a i d of them. As the l i n e s d a s h e d , Pompey's weight of cavalry forced back Caesar's r i g h t .  On a given s i g n a l , Caesar's oblique l i n e , thus f a r con-  cealed by the r i g h t wing, was brought into a c t i o n .  "No  circumstances  contributed more than t h i s to Caesar's v i e t o r y on that day; f o r as soon as Pompey's cavalry poured f o r t h , these cohorts routed i t by an unexpected onset and delivered i t up to the rest of the troops f o r s l a u g h t e r . "  54  The  t h i r d l i n e , which was held back by Caesar f o r such a time as t h i s was now introduced and so e f f e c t i v e was i t s power that i t routed the already unnerved forces of Pompey. Caesar was once again v i c t o r i o u s . I t i s c e r t a i n l y evident that P h a r s a l i a , a complete d i s a s t e r f o r Pompey, revealed Caesar as the superior t a c t i c i a n i n equal b a t t l e .  How-  ever, f o r Pompey i t must be said that h i s troops were of i n f e r i o r q u a l i t y when compared with Caesar's h i g h l y trained cohorts.  "This splendid v i c -  t o r y was won by Caesar's admirable d i s p o s i t i o n s , the lack of vigor of Pompey's s o l d i e r s , and the want o f steadfastness o f Pompey's cavalry."*^ The b a t t l e was over, and Pompey f l e d to L a r i s s a . Caesar followed but was unable to intercept him. A f t e r gathering h i s wife and family, the downcast commander sought refuge at the court o f Ptolemy Auletes and, as he was being welcomed ashore, was ignominiously stabbed i n the back by a s o l d i e r formerly under h i s command. So he died on the sands of 54 Frontinus, Strategemata, 2, 3, 22. 55 Bodge, op.cit«, p.568.  78 Egypt; even Caesar mourned h i s passing. The f i r s t phase of the C i v i l War closed with P h a r s a l i a , a b a t t l e among b a t t l e s .  "We may c a l l i t the m i l i t a r y expression of the  coming p o l i t i c a l change...The psychological strategy of Caesar i n t h i s campaign was based on a thorough understanding of h i s r i v a l ' s embarrassments,"  56  The war was not yet over f o r the a r i s t o c r a t s were to assemble  i n A f r i c a and provide f o r Caesar further battles and more complex s i t u a tions. "...Caesar was accustomed to stake h i s fortune upon desperate 57 measures, and glad to put i t to the proof i n utmost r i s k s . . . . "  56 Heitland, The Boman Republic, I I I , p.308 57 Lucan, V, 301-302.  79 CHAPTER 71 THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Now that P h a r s a l i a was over, the Pompeians scattered; Lablenus hastened to Dyrrhachium where he "pretended that the fortune of the two sides had been equalized i n consequence of a severe wound received by Caesar.  By t h i s pretence he created confidence i n the other followers  of Pompey's p a r t y . "  1  Cato with f i f t e e n cohorts t r a v e l l e d to Corcyra,  where he was joined l a t e r by S c i p i o and A f r a n i u s . Headed by Scipio and Afranius, the r e b e l s , i n s p i r e d by Labienus's news, deserted the i s l a n d stronghold f o r A f r i c a .  A f t e r landing at U t i c a , they joined forces with  Juba and A t t i u s "Varus and quickly began r e c r u i t i n g a new army. Corcyra was an important base f o r Pompeian operations and one of the v i t a l m i l i t a r y l i n k s between Pharsalus and A f r i c a :  "Les fuyards  de Pharsale n'avaient done touche l e u r place d'armes que pour l'evacuer en desordre, et r e f l u e r sur Corcyre avec l a garnison de quinze cohortes que Caton avait su maintenir i n t a c t e , et l e s seize cents cavaliers que Lablenus avait sauves de T h e s s a l i e . "  2  A f t e r P h a r s a l i a M. Octavius, one of Pompey's generals, who  had  assembled a few troops i n Macedonia, moved from there into I l l y r i a , whence he was compelled to f l e e by two of Caesar's lieutenants, P. Vatirdus and Q,. C o r n u f i c i u s . He gathered a f l e e t and was able to take i t to A f r i c a . A f t e r the union of t h i s f l e e t with the rebels and the only Pompeian army that could boast of a v i c t o r y , rumours reached I t a l y , and eventually Caesar, that Octavius was gathering an army out of available forces i n A f r i c a , and 1, I r o n t i n u s , Strategemata, I I , 7, 13. 2 J . Carcopino, Cesar. I I (Paris, 1950), p.927.  80 with h i s f l e e t intended to invade I t a l y .  These naval squadrons contin-  u a l l y troubled S i c i l y and Sardinia, plundering t h e i r towns.  The rem-  nants of Pharsalus could not benefit from surrender, but they did have a chance i n a partisan war - a war which was to be carried on not by the forces of Pompey, but by those of the a r i s t o c r a t s .  What the a l l i e s  lacked i n strength, they gained i n fanaticism. Cato d i d not j o i n the rebels immediately, as new of Pompey's death had not yet reached him.  Instead, hoping to recover Achaia, he  moved i n t o the Peloponnese, and on the march was informed that Oalenus was on the way to intercept him.  Cato withdrew and decided to go to  Egypt where he could j o i n forces with Pompey but, informed of the l a t t e r ' s death, he changed h i s plans and made h i s way to A f r i c a .  "The  great majority of the republicans, as of the Pompeians, betook themselves to A f r i c a , where alone an honourable and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l warfare might s t i l l be waged against the usurper."  Cato's moderating i n f l u -  ence was needed i n A f r i c a , as the choice of a leader troubled a l l i n the Pompeian camp. Scipio and Varus contested the leadership.  The  ordinary s o l d i e r s and statesmen wished Cato to command, but the Stole refused the p o s i t i o n , f o r he was not a m i l i t a r y man at heart, and Scipio became commander-in-chief, Cato receiving the governor ship of u"tica. On or about 24 September 47, Caesar arrived i n Rome and, a f t e r g i v i n g considerable attention to the immediate problems facing him, made preparations to suppress the unruly forces i n A f r i c a .  Two months l a t e r  he l e f t the c i t y , and, on 17 December 47, reached Lilybaeum i n S i c i l y , 3 Mommsen, The History of Rome, IV, p.410.  81 where he pitched h i s tent near the shore:  "This he d i d with a view that  none should think he had time to delay, and that h i s men might be kept i n readiness at a day or an hour's warning."  4  There was much comment on  his impatience to be o f f , as i t seemed foolhardy to set s a i l now with so few troops a v a i l a b l e , while S c i p i o , who was nearing the height o f h i s power, had amassed not only ten legions augmented by a u x i l i a r i e s but also a l a r g e r f l e e t than Caesar's.  Caesar's mobilization was slow, one legion  and s i x hundred cavalry being a l l that he could muster.  The men were  ordered to take with them a minimum of baggage and no slaves, f o r the shortage of ships and a s c a r c i t y of food and water precluded the contrary. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to consider why Caesar took such a small force to combat so powerful an enemy - i t does not seem to be akin to h i s general pattern o f strategy.  P o s s i b l y he thought that the enemy f l e e t would again  be i n winter quarters; i f such was the case he would be afforded a crossing to A f r i c a as easy as that to Epirus.  Perhaps Caesar f e l t that i f h i s  weary legions knew he were i n danger, they would be aroused to greater than human e f f o r t s i n h i s behalf - such was the admiration he inspired i n his men.  At the time of h i s departure f o r A f r i c a , the Pompeian forces were  somewhat scattered. coast.  There were squadrons o f ships at U t i c a and along the  S c i p i o with most of h i s forces was encamped at U t i c a , while Labienus  with h i s eavalry and a u x i l i a r i e s was on the watch near Leptis Minor. Caesar set s a i l f o r the promontory of Mercury (Cape Bon), i n tending to land some distance south of S c i p i o , whom he knew to be stationed at U t i c a *  R e a l i z i n g that U t i c a was exceptionally w e l l f o r t i f i e d and pro-  tected, Caesar decided to e s t a b l i s h a bridgehead south of Cape Bon and 4 Caesar, de B e l l o A f r l e o . 1.  82 work inland from there.  "The theatre of the campaign upon which Caesar  was about to enter extends southward some t h i r t y - f i v e miles from the seaport of Sousse, embraces Monastir, Lemta, Cape Dimasse, Mahedia, and S I A a l i a and reaehes i t s southernmost point at E l Djem...."  5  Although  the  sky was c l e a r when he s a i l e d , a storm suddenly arose and scattered h i s fleet.  As no d e f i n i t e destination had been assigned to the captains,  each directed h i s ship as best he could.  Caesar landed with h i s small  force near Hadrumetum and encamped there.  Dodge considers i t a repre-  hensible oversight on Caesar's part not to have given h i s captains i n structions where to assemble i n case of an unexpected turn of events. That no rendezvous had been d e f i n i t e l y assigned was a flaw i n h i s strategy, but the fact that the weather and the p o s i t i o n of the enemy were both indeterminable f a c t o r s perhaps vindicates Caesar somewhat. "But i n t h i s Caesar aeted not without design; f o r as he knew of no port i n A f r i c a that was c l e a r of the enemy's forces, and where the f l e e t might rendezvous i n s e c u r i t y , he chose to r e l y e n t i r e l y upon fortune, and land where occasion offered."  6  At Hadrumetum, a l l overtures f o r a peaceful surrender were spurned by Considius Longus, who was i n charge of the town, and who f o r h i s garrison two legions and seven hundred horse.  had  Caesar had at f i r s t  intended to raze the town, but, a f t e r considering i t s strength and the smallness of h i s forces,  thought i t advisable not to remain and be-  siege the town, l e s t , while he pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry should come behind and surround him."  7  5 Holmes, The Roman Republic, I I I , p*237. 6 B e l l . Afr., 1. 7 B e l l . A f r . , 5.  83 Caesar's next move was down coast to a point where he could assemble h i s scattered f l e e t .  I t was h i s desire to f i n d a town or towns  whose people, d i s s a t i s f i e d with Pompeian r u l e , would be w i l l i n g to defect to h i s side.  He found the inhabitants of Leptis Minor and Ruspina amen-  able towards him. facilities.  At Leptis he stopped and proceeded to construct landing  I t i s possible that advance scouts had secured t h i s port f o r  Caesar as w e l l as the neighbouring harbour of Ruspina, f o r , on leaving Hadrumetum, h i s rear was harassed by Numidian cavalry who slowed down h i s march and caused h i s men endless trouble.  By a sound manoeuvre Caesar  gained p r o t e c t i o n f o r h i s forces, and eventually reached Ruspina. f o r t i f i e d the harbours of Ruspina and L e p t i s .  Caesar  The former he used as h i s  centre of operations because of i t s topographical advantages while the l a t t e r was to be h i s anchorage; "...by keeping possession of the maritime c i t i e s , and providing them with garrisons, he might secure a retreat f o r his f l e e t . "  Caesar's f i r s t camp was at Ruspina but a move to L e p t i s ,  which was a poor place f o r defence as i t was located on a f l a t section of the seashore, convinced him that the former afforded more protection. About January 3, a report reached him that most of h i s ships ware i n sight and steering f o r U t i c a .  Caesar must have thought here that h i s h e s i t a t i o n  to assign a rendezvous f o r h i s ships was t r a n s f e r r i n g them into the hands of h i s enemies.  As he was about to take ship i n an attempt to retrieve  h i s l o s t f l e e t , by a stroke of luck, the ships suddenly turned, made f o r L e p t i s , and came safe to land i n a short time. Caesar's l u c k " had not changed.  Who else ever benefitted i n such a way from so elusive a goddess? Through negotiation with the natives of the area, Caesar  8 B e l l . A f r . . 9*  84 guaranteed a grain supply of sorts f o r h i s troops. This source of supply proved to be of great help to him even a f t e r h i s missing transports arrived bearing more men and s u p p l i e s . Throughout t h i s campaign Caesar suffered from continual shortage of g r a i n .  Scipio had wisely gathered a l l known  quantities of wheat into h i s numerous granaries, leaving l i t t l e f o r Caesar. Though one l o t of reinforcements had arrived, the army of Caesar was not yet strong enough to begin offensive operations, and would not be so u n t i l a s a t i s f a c t o r y g r a i n supply was a v a i l a b l e . Upon Caesar's a r r i v a l at Hadrumetum, a strong enemy force under Labienus had set out to intercept him.  This army met Caesar's troops as  they were returning from a foraging expedition on the p l a i n of Ruspina. Labienus's foree was made up predominantly of Numldian cavalry sprinkled with G a l l i c and German troopers, whose a b i l i t y Caesar w e l l knew. Caesar was d e f i n i t e l y caught o f f guard i n t h i s surprise move of h i s former l i e u tenant, who had marched against him with such s k i l l that the great general nearly met defeat.  Labienus had trapped Caesar on l e v e l ground, and i n -  tended to use against h i s adversary the same t a c t i c s by which the Parthians overcame Grassus, and Tuba annihilated Curio. Caesar was completely surrounded by Humidians, but he knew what course he had to follow. "As both sides stood i n expectation of the s i g n a l , Caesar would not s t i r from his post, as he saw that with such few troops against so great a foree g  he must depend more on stratagem than strength...."  Caesar's strategy  was to draw h i s cohorts out into a long l i n e stationing the arehers i n front and the cavalry on the wings. As Labienus attacked, and his cavalry gradually enclosed Caesar's troops i n an enveloping movement, Caesar's 9 B e l l . A f r . . 14.  85 men extended t h e i r l i n e , each alternate cohort f a c i n g about and taking up a p o s i t i o n behind the cohort next to i t , and so f i g h t i n g back to back, •Caesar had never found himself i n such s t r a i t s since he had fought i n the  ranks against the N e r v i i on the heights above the Sambre."  10  Labienus  had so mingled the horse and foot i n t h i s long l i n e , that Caesar thought he was encountering only i n f a n t r y , but the two fronts which he presented to the enemy created a formidable b a r r i e r which the Numidians were unable to penetrate.  Labienus's forces, which were caught o f f guard, gradually  gave way and eventually f l e d .  The a r r i v a l of Petreius rejuvenated the  Pompeians, who quickly regrouped and renewed the attack.  Caesar was de-  f i n i t e l y i n d i r e s t r a i t s "...and had Ruspina not been so near, the Moori s h j a v e l i n would perhaps have accomplished the same r e s u l t here as the Parthian bow at C a r r h a e . "  11  One l a s t thrust from a l l points within Caesar  l i n e s provided the impetus needed to upset Labienus's troops.  Unwilling  to engage i n close combat, the Numidians were driven from the p l a i n , and Caesar reached Ruspina s a f e l y . The b a t t l e lasted from the f i f t h hour a f t e r sunrise u n t i l sunset That day, January 4, Labienus's attempt to crush Caesar by numbers had f a i l e d , not because the renegade lacked the a b i l i t y to carry out h i s plan, but because h i s opponent was more s k i l f u l .  The question has often been  asked whether Caesar could have sent to h i s camp f o r help.  He might have  done t h i s , but a quick assessment of the perilous s i t u a t i o n indicated that he must depend more upon h i s s k i l l of stratagem and h i s application of t a c t i c s than m i l i t a r y strength.  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that i n t h i s  encounter near Ruspina, the t a c t i c s used by Labienus's Numidians were the 10 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.243. 11 Mommaen, o p . c i t . , p.416.  86 same as those used by Hannibal's Numidian force which so frequently outmanoeuvred and outfought the legions o f Rome i n the Second Punic War. Caesar's men wanted to engage the Numidians i n close combat with t h e i r swords, but were prevented from doing so by the charge and retreat t a c t i c s of t h e i r elusive enemy. One of Caesar's greatest problems i n t h i s b a t t l e was that produced by h i s r e c r u i t s .  He knew that i t would only be a matter of time  u n t i l t h e i r courage would collapse. Fortunately the enemy's c i r c l e was broken at i t s two extremes before t h i s happened. His opponents were divided and soon became d i s s i l l u s i o n e d .  Caesar's men gradually regained t h e i r  composure and turned back t h e i r opponents with a concentrated attack which forced the Numidians to s c a t t e r . "The surprise of the whole manoeuvre, p a r t i c u l a r l y by troops which Labienus thought were a l l but defeated, was what gave i t i t s success."" * 1  Labienus f a i l e d because he put h i s f a i t h  i n numbers rather than i n d i s c i p l i n e .  He had misjudged Caesar's a b i l i t y  to e x t r i c a t e himself from an awkward s i t u a t i o n when hard pressed. A f t e r Labienus*s near-successful cavalry attack, Caesar was d i s p i r i t e d , " f o r he was not yet able to carry through the war to a s a t i s factory conclusion; and he saw that to stay i n the same place was d i f f i c u l t because of the lack of subsistence, even i f the foe should leave h i s troops alone, and that t o r e t i r e was impossible, with the enemy pressing upon him both by land and by s e a . "  13  He had learned a hard lesson. No longer would  he take the offensive or encourage attack.  Instead he decided to follow a  p o l i c y of 'watch and wait' u n t i l f u r t h e r reinforcements a r r i v e d . He so f o r t i f i e d h i s camp that h i s forces received from the coast what food 12 Dodge, Caesar, I I , p.636. 13 Dio, X L I I I , 2.  87 eould be provided. "The question of subsistence taxed him to the utmost. The motif of the entire A f r i c a n campaign may be said to be the lack of v i c t u a l i n Caesar's camp."  14  At Leptis he had created a safe harbour f o r  h i s f l e e t and an arsenal f o r h i s engines of war.  These he gradually  moved to Ruspina, and, that they might s a t i s f a c t o r i l y be accommodated, he constructed earthworks from both town and camp to the sea. These entrenchments were more quickly attended t o , when, two days a f t e r the b a t t l e , news was received that S c i p i o , a f t e r marching with eight legions and three thousand cavalry from TJtica, was near a junction with Labienus. "Meantime Caesar f o r t i f i e d h i s camp with much greater care, reinforced the guards, and threw up two entrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from h i s camp to the sea l i k e w i s e , to secure the communication, 15 and receive supplies without danger."  When reinforcements d i d not a r -  r i v e , Caesar transferred archers, s a i l o r s , and even oarsmen from ship to camp. He had decided to t r a i n them to f i g h t alongside h i s cavalry and so counterbalance Labienus*s light-armed foot.  Caesar's "only hope of safety  was i n making h i s defences at Ruspina so strong that they could not be taken by assault, and i n waiting f o r fresh troops and supplies from Sicily."  1 5  Labienus had established a p a r t i a l blockade of Ruspina by posting cavalry battalions on surrounding h i l l s .  Although t h i s blockade greatly  r e s t r i c t e d Caesar's movements, the roads south of Ruspina were s t i l l open, and these he used to send messages of encouragement to the outside t r i b e s . "Pendant tout Janvier sa p o s i t i o n e t a i t f o r t c r i t i q u e et i l n'a du son 14 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.637. 15 B e l l . A f r . , 20. 16 Long, The Decline of the Roman Republic. ¥, p.325.  88 s a l u t qu'aux f o r t i f i c a t i o n s de son camp et a l'impuissance des armes o f f e n sives anciennes pour f o r c e r des retranchemens, ressources que n'aurait pas un general moderne."  17  Caesar had at h i s disposal much equipment and an  amount of food s u f f i c i e n t f o r s u r v i v a l .  He was w e l l equipped to hold out  against h i s enemy. " A l l t h i s preparation had been made on account of the smallness of h i s numbers and the want of experience i n h i s men, and not because of the strength of the enemy and because he was a f r a i d of themj he was w e l l content they should think that he was f r i g h t e n e d . "  18  The  Pompeians had encamped about three miles south of Caesar's p o s i t i o n and, although they f a i l e d to l u r e Caesar into b a t t l e , through t h e i r s u p e r i o r i t y of cavalry and t h e i r a b i l i t y to intercept foragers, they did foree him to exercise great caution. Caesar was f i r m l y entrenched at Ruspina and, though he might soon be short o f v i c t u a l s , the Pompeians could not move him.  The corn he received from nearby farmers permitted him t o issue a  subsistence r a t i o n t o h i s f o r c e s . Throughout t h i s period Caesar had sent h i s warships t o p a t r o l the seas i n search of the vessels carrying f u r t h e r reinforcements. Some of these troop ships had been captured by the Pompeians and burned, while others were h e l p l e s s l y wandering about, t h e i r captains hoping they would f i n d a safe anchorage.  "Caesar, being informed of t h i s , stationed h i s  f l e e t along the coast and islands f o r the security of h i s convoys."  19  But f o r an occassional skirmish between the two camps, there was l i t t l e a c t i v i t y on the b a t t l e f r o n t .  S c i p i o ' s forces had joined up with those  of Petreius and Labienus, thus increasing Caesar's discomfort.  "Their  17 Napoleon, P r e c i s des Guerres de Cesar (Paris, 1836), p.195. 18 Long, o p . c i t . , p.330. 19 B e l l . A f r . , 21.  89 cavalry made continual excursions to our very works, and intercepted those who ventured too f a r i n quest of wood or water, and obliged us to keep SO w i t h i n our entrenchments.  tt  The enemy waited f o r Caesar to move, but  e x i s t i n g conditions prevented him from doing so. No supplies had yet arrived from S i c i l y and Sardinia; the season was too dangerous f o r navigat i o n ; s i x miles i n each d i r e c t i o n from h i s camp was a l l the land Caesar possessed i n A f r i c a , while lack of forage caused much d i s t r e s s among h i s troops. News had reached Caesar that h i s a r r i v a l i n the province had been received with skepticism by the natives, who thought that rather than come i n person, he had sent h i s lieutenants to do b a t t l e with S c i p i o .  To n u l -  l i f y t h i s misconception he sent messages by courier to a l l the surrounding states to inform them that i t was a c t u a l l y Caesar who had a r r i v e d . S c i p i o , drawing h i s l i n e r i g h t up to h i s opponent's entrenchments, offered Caesar b a t t l e on three successive days, only to have i t declined.  Caesar had given s t r i c t orders that a pitched b a t t l e was not  to be fought y e t . "He very w e l l knew, that whatever confidence the enemy might have i n t h e i r numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the camp of a general who had so often repulsed, t e r r i f i e d , and put them t o f l i g h t ; who had frequently pardoned and granted them t h e i r l i v e s ; and whose very 21  name had weight and authority enough to intimidate t h e i r a r m y .  M&x  The  h i s t o r i a n of the African. War further explains that Caesar's delaying p o l i c y was not one of cowardice as "...he thought that i t would disgrace him, i f , a f t e r so many noble e x p l o i t s , and defeating such powerful armies, and a f t e r gaining so many glorious v i c t o r i e s , he should appear to have 20 24. 21 B e l l . A f r . . 31.  90 gained a bloody v i c t o r y over the remnants who had r a l l i e d a f t e r t h e i r flight."  2 2  Here Caesar's strategy, u n l i k e that at Dyrrhaehium, was sound, and provided him with the opportunity f o r a concerted attack l a t e r . S c i p i o had f a i l e d i n h i s attempt to attack Caesar before he beeame f i r m l y entrenched at Ruspina.  Intending to shut Caesar i n , he had garrisoned  both Hadrumetum and Thapsus; but Cato had warned him against t h i s and suggested instead that he move inland, thus l u r i n g Caesar away from the coast and rendering i t d i f f i c u l t f o r him to provide food f o r h i s troops. S c i p i o had benefited by Pompey's f a t e , f o r he had learned to become cautious and to avoid b a t t l e whenever possible.  I t i s a point of  i n t e r e s t whether Scipio would have openly engaged Caesar's forces had the d i c t a t o r accepted the challenge when the Pompeian's troops were arrayed before Ruspina.  Caesar's delaying t a c t i c s had an unnerving effect upon  S c i p i o and h i s associates: "Scipio and the other generals were greatly surprised at t h i s conduct, and could not conceive why Caesar, who  had  always been forward and aetive i n war, should a l l of a sudden change h i s measures; which they therefore suspected must proceed from some very 23 powerful reasons." Caesar gained as an a l l y one of the most i n t e r e s t i n g personalit i e s of the A f r i c a n campaign, P. S i t t i u s of Hueerla, a Roman adventurer Who had won to h i s cause a regiment of freebooters. He was the l a s t of the C a t i l i n a r i a n s who sold himself and h i s legionaires to the highest bidder regardless of the task. At the present moment he and h i s followers were serving under King Bogud of Mauretania, who had become Caesar's 22 B e l l . A f r . . 31. 23 B e l l . A f r . . 35.  91 partisan i n a s e r i e s of attacks against Juba. Already C i r t a and other v i l l a g e s i n Juba's realm had f a l l e n to these a l l i e s of Caesar.  Juba at  the time was on h i s way to j o i n S e i p i o , but t h i s unexpected attack on h i s t e r r i t o r i e s had forced him to return and to send only a small detachment under Saburra to j o i n S c i p i o . These v i c t o r i e s over Juba were claimed i n Caesar's name and g r e a t l y f a c i l i t a t e d Caesar's work.  Juba's change o f  mind i n h i s decision t o return to Mauretania lightened the load Caesar had t o bear. Had the Numidian king's forces been added to those of the Pompeians at Ruspina, Caesar's strategy could have been disrupted.  "Cae-  sar's constrained p o s i t i o n was due to h i s own overeager act i n attacking the A f r i c a n problem with i n s u f f i c i e n t means."  24  As w e l l as obtaining the service of P. S i t t i u s , Caesar had won over many of the Gaetulian pastoral t r i b e s , who cherished the kindnesses bestowed upon t h e i r ancestors by Marius and S u l l a . w i l l i n g to a s s i s t the nephew of Marius.  They were only too  Many Numidians and Gaetulians  from Scipio's army had deserted t o Caesar. Such deserters Caesar used by sending them back to t h e i r own country with l e t t e r s to t h e i r t r i b a l chiefs suggesting that they rebel against the harsh r u l e of Juba.  " I t was be-  ginning to be evident that the native population sympathized with the gene r a l who was known t o respect the r i g h t s of non-combatants, and whose prestige, not-withstanding h i s temporary weakness, seemed to make h i s ultimate v i c t o r y c e r t a i n . By the end of January 47, as Caesar was on the verge of a famine, ships bearing corn, troopers, archers and s l i n g e r s reached Ruspina from the i s l a n d of Cercina, which G. S a l l u s t i u s .Crispus had captured, and along 24 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.641. 25 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.249.  92 with i t the enemy*s grain stockade. Caesar*s army was now strengthened and the morale of h i s troops increased.  "Thus he experienced a double  pleasure on t h i s occasion, receiving at one and the same time both a supply of provisions and a reinforcement of troops, which animated the s o l d i e r s , and delivered them from the apprehensions of want."  This new  force was s t i l l weak i n cavalry and a u x i l i a r y troops, but Caesar, aware of t h i s , trained what troops he had to f i g h t i n the most e f f i c i e n t manner under the most arduous conditions. The p l a i n o f Ruspina was about twelve miles long and surrounded by a ridge of low h i l l s beginning at the coast and forming into a semic i r c u l a r theatre.  I t was Caesar's plan to seize these h i l l s and confine  h i s operations to them u n t i l he was strong enough to engage Scipio i n the open p l a i n ,  " . . . i t was the business of Caesar to control the entire p l a -  teau, and not to allow h i s enemy to f o r t i f y the slopes which descended on the west and the south-west to the p l a i n , l e s t they should prevent him 27 from advancing inland...."  A f u r t h e r advantage i n c o n t r o l l i n g t h i s »  h i l l y region l a y i n the p r o v i s i o n of security f o r the harbours of Ruspina and L e p t i s , should they be threatened by S c i p i o .  Control of the surround-  ing h i l l s was the f i r s t step towards control of the p l a i n south of Ruspina. When he f e l t ready to move, Caesar planned to attack Scipio from the eastern side of the p l a i n , where the h i l l s would conceal h i s approach.  There  were f i v e ridges i n a l l , the l a s t of which Scipio had f o r t i f i e d , f o r he was forced by l a c k of water to move to these h i l l s which l a y just west of the important town of U z i t a , whence he procured water and other conveniences f o r h i s army. U z i t a was situated i n the p l a i n south of Ruspina. 26 B e l l . A f r . , 34. 27 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.517.  93 As S c i p i o sought the s h e l t e r of the h i l l s , so Caesar followed, but, f e a r f u l of the Numidian cavalry, he avoided crossing the p l a i n and exposing his  force by using a seashore route. I t seems that at t h i s point Caesar was f e e l i n g h i s opponent out,  and waiting f o r the r i g h t moment to involve him i n an engagement advantageous only to Caesar. As he had planned, Caesar s a f e l y reached the h i l l s on the eastern side of the p l a i n , the f i r s t three ridges of which he seized without d i f f i c u l t y , the few Pompeians stationed thereon being put to f l i g h t .  The fourth h i l l , which was close by Scipio's camp, he invested  by constructing an earthwork between the summit and the p l a i n , h i s cavalry protecting the workers.  This sudden movement surprised S c i p i o and Labie-  nus, who q u i c k l y deployed t h e i r troops to give themselves the necessary protection.  "Caesar, knowing that Scipio had received a l l the supplies  he expected, and judging he would no longer decline eoming to an engagement, began to advance along the ridge with h i s forces, extend h i s l i n e s , secure them with redoubts, and possess himself of the eminences between him and S c i p i o . ' *  28  Caesar's new foothold i n the p l a i n of Ruspina gave  him a moral advantage over S c i p i o . He had repulsed a cavalry attack of Labienus, while entrenching the h i l l .  Never could i t be s a i d of the l a t t e r  that he ever l e t Caesar r e s t . His desire to overthrow h i s former commander was as strong now as ever, and the longer Caesar outwitted him the greater the enmity became. Now  that Caesar controlled t h i s s t r a t e g i c range of  h i l l s , he was afforded a view of Ruspina, L e p t i s , and the other areas which had preferred him supplies. Added to t h i s was a close view of the enemy's operations, so important i n a time of 28 B e l l . A f r . . 49.  war.  94 Mopping up operations soon took place throughout the various h i l l s seized.  "The cavalry having thus cleared the mountain, Caesar  resolved to entrench himself there, and distributed the work to the l e 29  ^  gions.**  Caesar, ever anxious to test Scipio's strength, formed h i s  i n f a n t r y i n b a t t l e l i n e at the foot of the h i l l s just won.  Scipio took  up arms and met him; the opposing forces assumed positions facing each other.  There was a t r i a l of strength, but neither side showed any i n c l i -  nation to f i g h t and at dusk the opposing forces r e t i r e d to t h e i r camps. But f o r odd skirmishes, there was no sharp f i g h t i n g f o r several weeks. A l l was not w e l l i n Caesar's camp. The heavy seasonal rains had made the men miserable as w e l l as uncomfortable. They had l i t t l e baggage and were kept constantly on the move i n the r e s t r i c t e d area of t h e i r camp. An even greater discomfort than that caused by the weather existed i n the troops' reaction to things unknown. This was e s p e c i a l l y evident when the news reached them that Juba was on the way to j o i n Scipio I t must be remembered that Caesar had as yet not won a s t i r r i n g v i c t o r y . I f at a l l , he had barely beaten back Labienus at Ruspina and was unable to force Seipio i n t o a conclusive b a t t l e .  "Caesar's army began to be alarmed  and a tumult broke out among them on account of the disaster they had a l ready experienced, and of the reputation of the forces advancing against them, and e x p e c i a l l y of the numbers and bravery of the Numidian cavalry. War with elephants, to which they were unaccustomed, also frightened them. These men could not forget Curio's disaster at the hands of so formidable a foe and Juba's a r r i v a l caused more t e r r o r i n Caesar's camp than was necessary.  To counteract t h i s growing fear, Caesar kept h i s men busy,  29 B e l l . A f r , , 51. 30 Appian, I I , 14, 96.  95 e s p e c i a l l y the new r e c r u i t s .  They were constantly on the move, s h i f t i n g  baggage, working on entrenchments and carrying out the general duties of the  camp. So occupied there was l i t t l e time l e f t f o r them to worry about  the growing strength of the enemy. Scipio and Juba Joined forces.  Labienus was s e t t l e d i n a sep-  arate camp some distance t o the south of Caesar and close to h i s l e f t f l a n k . Before Caesar could make another move, he knew that  thi3  flank must be  strengthened, f o r Labienus was too unpredictable a foe. While Caesar was busy strengthening t h i s section of h i s l i n e , Scipio seized the opportunity to reinforce the piquets on a h i l l s t i l l under h i s c o n t r o l .  I n the middle  of t h i s operation, Caesar's cavalry force suddenly attacked, outmanoeuvred and routed Scipio's band and, when the skirmish was over, seized the h i l l f o r t h e i r commander. Labienus, to check Caesar's rapid movement along the ridges, established a strong guard on a h i l l adjoining the one just captured, and was determined to hold i t against anything Caesar threw at him. This h i l l was separated from the previous one by a deep depression, i t s sides indented with a thick o l i v e tree grove. Knowing that an open engagement would p r o f i t him l i t t l e he decided to thwart Caesar by stratagem, i . e . , by posting small bands of cavalry and l i g h t infantry i n the grove to surprise and outmanoeuvre Caesar's troops as they passed through. Through deserters, Caesar learned of Labienus's t r i c k e r y and so bided h i s time.  When he though the opposing force was unready and perhaps scattered,  he ordered h i s troops to move. The Pompeians, unable to regain t h e i r proper s t a t i o n s , became unnerved and quickly f l e d .  I n a short time t h i s  p o s i t i o n f e l l t o Caesar. In r e c a p i t u l a t i n g , we f i n d that Caesar had placed h i s hopes i n  96 a pitched b a t t l e wherein the enemy would be divided and so possess l i t t l e advantage of p o s i t i o n . Ruspina could not e a s i l y be supplied and Caesar was now i n somewhat the same p o s i t i o n as Pompey had been at Dyrrhachium, e s p e c i a l l y with respect to fodder.  I f Scipio would not carry the war to  him, then he must move against S c i p i o . He could not afford to f i g h t a war of a t t r i t i o n .  Caesar's move to the h i l l s about s i x miles south of Ruspina  extended h i s operational area and f a c i l i t a t e d the gathering of supplies; but i t did not accomplish what he had intended, namely, to draw S c i p i o into the open. Now  that the h i l l s surrounding the p l a i n and close to U z i t a were  under Caesar's c o n t r o l , he could r i d himself of the enemy's cavalry outposts which i n t e r f e r e d with h i s water-carriers; he could secure his l e f t flank against attack; he could disrupt any offensive manoeuvre on the part of the enemy and possibly bring about an engagement under h i s own terms. The strategy involved i n s e i z i n g the h i l l s surrounding the p l a i n was sound, even though S c i p i o remained f i r m l y entrenched i n h i s camp. Slowly but surely Caesar was consolidating h i s p o s i t i o n around U z i t a ; i t was l e f t f o r him to move towards the town.  only  I t must be remembered that S c i p i o  had moved from Ruspina to U z i t a , h i s magazine, f o r stronger protection and a guarantee of supplies; and that Caesar had followed him only to bide his time u n t i l he could s t r i k e against the f o r t r e s s or draw out J c i p i o . " I t was not perhaps so much the capture of U z i t a at which Caesar was aiming, as the chance i n some manner of placing S c i p i o at a disadvantage so as to 31 lead up to h i s defeat i n a decisive engagement without too much r i s k . " Now  that he was i n a strong p o s i t i o n to attack U z i t a , Caesar  31 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.655.  97 ordered earthworks constructed, one from the l e f t comer and one from the r i g h t corner of h i s camp, dug i n such a d i r e c t i o n that they met severally at the l e f t and r i g h t angles of the town.  "His design i n t h i s work was,  that when he approached the town with h i s troops, and began to attack i t , these l i n e s might secure h i s flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from surrounding him, and compelling him to abandon the siege. I t likewise gave h i s men more frequent opportunities of conversing with the enemy, and f a c i l i t a t e d the means of desertion...He wanted also by drawing nearer the enemy, to see i f they r e a l l y intended to eome to an a c t i o n . . . . "  32  One  cannot help but be amazed at Caesar's a b i l i t y to construct and occupy such extensive camps and l i n e s without providing an opportunity f o r h i s enemy to penetrate them at any one point e s p e c i a l l y when they were unfinished. While the work of entrenchment was underway, Caesar's second l o t of reinforcements a r r i v e d .  To f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r a r r i v a l , he was forced  to engage i n a naval exploit with the enemy which displayed h i s audacity, bold decision and inveterate s k i l l .  "In almost a l l Caesar's b a t t l e s ,  unless forced on him, he was slow i n attack. I n strategic i n i t i a t i v e , on the contrary, Caesar was admirable. push."  33  I t was one constant, never-ceasing  The Pompeians were not i d l e while Caesar prolonged h i s entrench-  ments. They displayed t h e i r strength by arraying t h e i r troops on gently r i s i n g ground south of XJzita and not f a r from Caesar's eamp.  Labienus  stationed h i s Numidian cavalry and l i g h t infantry about one mile from the r i g h t wing, near the foot of a ridge, so that "...when the two armies should engage, h i s cavalry at the commencement of the action should take a longer sweep, enclose Caesar's army and throw them into confusion by 32 B e l l . A f r . . 51. 33 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.665.  98 their darts.  Caesar, expecting the combined force to attack him, was  1 , 3 4  u n w i l l i n g to c a l l a charge since, "...the enemy having a strong garrison i n U z i t a , which was opposite to h i s r i g h t wing, he could not advance beyond that place without exposing h i s flank to a s a l l y from the town.* And too "...the ground before Scipio's army was very rough, and he thought i t l i k e l y to disorder h i s men i n the charge.**  35  Caesar, to counteract the  threatening movements of the enemy, strengthened h i s l e f t wing and u t i l i z e d the power of the F i f t h legion: ...as h i s r i g h t wing was defended by the #  works, he found i t necessary to make h i s l e f t stronger, that i t might be a match f o r the numerous cavalry of the enemy; f o r which reason he had placed a l l h i s horse there, intermixed with light-armed foot; and as he could not 36 r e l y much upon them, had sent the f i f t h legion to assist them."  So the  armies stood, and but f o r a small cavalry skirmish i n which the Pompeians triumphed, nothing came of the elaborate movements. At dusk both armies r e t i r e d to t h e i r camps. Juba was informed that C i r t a , the c a p i t a l of Numidia, had f a l l e n to P. S i t t i u s .  The G a e t u l i , who nursed much hatred i n t h e i r hearts against  Pompey f o r subjecting them to Numidian r u l e , had r i s e n i n S i t t i u s * s favour, and Juba was now opposed by three forces: l i o u s Gaetulians.  Caesar, S i t t i u s , and the r e b e l -  "Juba, having thus three wars to sustain, was compelled  to detach s i x cohorts from the army destined to act against Caesar, and send them to defend the f r o n t i e r s of h i s kingdom against the Gaetulians.** Juba's independent strategy was continually a matter of concern f o r the 34 B e l l . A f r . . 59. 35 B e l l . A f r . , 58. 36 B e l l . A f r . . 60. 3? B e l l . A f r . . 55.  37  99 Pompeians gathered i n A f r i c a .  His insolence and aloofness s t i r r e d even  Cato, who was the only a r i s t o c r a t capable of q u e l l i n g Juba's overweening pride.  Though Juba's reinforcements were of great assistance to the  Pompeian cause, the a l l i e d army possessed no consistency, f o r i t was made up l a r g e l y of slaves, freedmen, and peasants whose farms had been burned, and property confiscated.  There was no w i l l to f i g h t i n these men.  Both  the Gaetulian u p r i s i n g and the increase i n h i s forces permitted Caesar to adopt a more aggressive strategy.  His prestige, too, had a great effect on  the natives of the surrounding d i s t r i c t s and brought many over to h i s side. As he pushed forward h i s entrenchments towards U z i t a , Caesar noticed that S c i p i o , besides strengthening h i s hold on the h i l l s back of the c i t y , was drawing a l i n e i n front of the town and opposite to Caesar's trenchworks.  This was done " l e s t Caesar should cut o f f h i s communication 38  with the mountain." Uzita.  The mountain specified was i n the range behind  Small concerted enemy attacks on various parts of h i s l i n e d i s -  turbed Caesar, so he d a i l y kept h i s men at labour on the works, "...carrying a d i t c h and rampart quite across the p l a i n , to prevent the incurrsions of the enemy."  39  As Caesar i n the p l a i n before U z i t a extended h i s ram-  parts and d i t c h across the p l a i n to stop the enemy moving i n that area, S c i p i o also laboured i n the same way to keep Caesar from c u t t i n g him o f f from the h i l l s . "Two months passed i n marches and campings without any result i n the narrow spaee enclosed between the towns of L e p t i s , Ruspina, A c h i l l a , and Agar, which Caesar held, and Hadrumetum, Thapsus, Uzita, and Thysdrus, 38 B e l l . A f r . , 61. 39 Loc. c j t .  100 40 occupied by S c i p i o . " inactivity.  Caesar saw no r e s u l t s from t h i s state of r e l a t i v e  He was s t i l l s u f f e r i n g from a shortage of supplies and, even  though he had taken advantage of the grain deposited i n v a u l t s , according to A f r i c a n custom, he s t i l l had an i n s u f f i c i e n t amount to supply h i s enlarged army. This meant that he must e i t h e r meet the enemy at a disadvantage, or abandon h i s present p o s i t i o n and move south i n search of a more p l e n t i f u l food supply.  This required a r e v i s i o n of strategy.  Caesar  was thwarted i n h i s attempt to blockade U z i t a by the s k i l f u l l use of the t e r r a i n by h i s adversaries. I t was a great error on Scipio's part when he decided to defend U z i t a and so carry on the war i n the coastal region,  further inland,  Caesar would have been greatly handicapped both through lack of contact with the coast and i n s u f f i c i e n t means to provide f o r food.  As Caesar's  forces increased, Scipio and Juba showed l e s s incentive to engage him i n a pitched b a t t l e , and f u r i n g the two months of skirmishing, Caesar, by r i g i d routine, gradually accustomed h i s men to the foreign mode of f i g h t i n g . Caesar now r e a l i z e d that to bring about a decisive b a t t l e he must adopt a strategy of manoeuvre, i . e . , he must bring S c i p i o out into the open by f o r c i n g him to move. This could best be done by garrisoning A c h i l l a , Leptis and Ruspina and moving south against another of Scipio's magazines, Agar, which l a y twenty miles to the southeast over r e l a t i v e l y f l a t land, and "...about two kilometres north of Ksour es Saf, whieh i s f i f t e e n Roman miles, i n a s t r a i g h t l i n e , south of Thapsus...." Abandoning the siege of U z i t a as a waste of time and y i e l d i n g 40 V* Duruy, History of Rome and the Roman People, from i t s Origin to the Establishment of the C h r i s t i a n Empire, I I I (London, 1884), p.549. 41 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.525.  101 no r e s u l t s , Caesar ordered the blockade of the harbours of Hadrumetum and Thapsus, and the burning of h i s present camp. These a c t i v i t i e s brought to a close the second p e r i o r of the A f r i c a n campaign, and Caesar moved to Agar.  "Scipio meanwhile, hearing of Caesar's departure, followed him  along the h i l l s with a l l h i s forces, and posted himself about s i x miles off  i n three d i f f e r e n t camps."  42  Scipio of course was accompanied by  Afranius and Juba. These three stationed t h e i r forces i n separate camps. Caesar's new camp was approximately two miles southwest of Agar, but closer to the sea than that of S c i p i o .  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note the p o s i t i o n  which Scipio assumed when he halted h i s movements against Caesar. He was so stationed that, without too much d i f f i c u l t y , he could cut o f f h i s enemy's foraging l i n e s to the i n t e r i o r . did  Fortunately f o r Caesar, Scipio  not have time to carry t h i s out, so quickly d i d the former move. Close to Agar and near Scipio»s camp l a y the town of Zeta,  placed by V e i t h at Beni Hassen, ten miles northwest of Tegea and a l i t t l e 43 l e s s from Scipio*s encampment.  S c i p i o had continuous communication  with t h i s town and had there placed h i s centre of operations f o r t h i s theatre of war.  When he was f i r m l y established at Agar, Caesar decided  to r a i d Zeta i n an attempt to capture i t , f o r here was Scipio's grain stockade.  To accomplish t h i s , Caesar would have to make a flank march  past S c i p i o ' s camp, besiege the town, and return to Agar by the same route.  I t i s possible that famine and the i n a b i l i t y to counteract i t ,  drove Caesar to t h i s bold and somewhat foolhardy venture. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t to say that the manoeuvre was successful.  Zeta and a l l i t s possessions  f e l l to Caesar and a garrison under a r e l i a b l e lieutenant was placed there. 42 B e l l . Afr.. 67. 43 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.525.  102 To do t h i s i n the eyes of the enemy, Caesar showed the scorn with which he regarded h i s opponent. Perhaps Caesar's sudden attack was perpetrated to dislodge by surprise some of Scipio's cohorts, but, except f o r a l i g h t skirmish i n which a few men f e l l , no outright engagement took place. On h i s return to Agar from Zeta, Caesar was once more troubled by h i s greatest antagonist of the A f r i c a n campaign, Labienus, "...who l a y i n ambuscade among the nearest h i l l s , with...cavalry and light-armed i n fantry.... * 1  44  This enemy force attacked Caesar's rear and cause much  confusion w i t h i n the conqueror's ranks.  "...Caesar p l a i n l y saw that t h e i r  whole aim was t o oblige him to encamp i n that place, where no water was to be had; that h i s soIdlers...might perish with hunger, and the c a t t l e with t h i r s t . "  4 5  Labienus's Numidian host had so troubled the horses by  t h e i r rearguard action that Caesar was compelled to s h i f t them to the centre o f h i s l i n e , thus slowing down the advance of his army. "In Gaul, Caesar's troops had met a frank, courageous enemy who came out and fought hand to hand on the f i e l d ; here they had to r e s i s t the devices of a c r a f t y foe who r e l i e d upon a r t i f i c e , not courage." again won the day f o r him.  46  But Caesar's fortune once  The Numidians, thinking they might surround  the opposing force, took t o the h i l l s intending to move to the p l a i n f u r ther along Caesar's l i n e . As they were carrying out t h i s manoeuvre, Caesar was given time to regroup and strengthen h i s weak sections so that when the next Numidian thrust came he was able to repulse i t . "Thus Caesar, at one time marching forward, at another h a l t i n g , and going on but slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven that evening, having only ten men wounded." B e l l . A f r . . 69. 45 Loc. c i t . 46 Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.674. 47 B e l l . A f r . , 70.  4 4  47  103 The Numidians who had intended to head o f f the force f a r t h e r down the v a l l e y committed a t a c t i c a l mistake, f o r t h e i r pressure was removed from the rearguard and transferred to the van — line.  Caesar's strongest section of  Caesar's most serious l o s s was i n horses, and, though he narrowly  evaded d i s a s t e r , t h i s awkward s i t u a t i o n might have been avoided completely had he possessed a s u f f i c i e n t l y strong cavalry f o r c e . This move against Zeta l e f t Caesar's camp garrisoned by a n e g l i g i b l e force open to attack, but once again fortune was on Caesar's side and Scipio hesitated to attack. S c i p i o , through the great name he bore, was expected to be as v i c t o r i o u s i n A f r i c a as was h i s famed predecessor, Scipio Africanus. "...mais Scipion e t a l t sans talent et n'avalt pour l u i qu'un nom  illustre."  4 8  Perhaps we should not c r i t i c i z e h i s strategy too harshly, f o r his technique was spasmodically Fabian.  He hoped that famine would do the  work of v i c t o r i e s , such as had been Pompey's plan at Pharsalus, u n t i l the senators persuaded him otherwise.  Scipio's incompetence at anything Fabian  was shown by the l a c k of decision and plan which accompanies h i s movements. Had he been a bold and s k i l f u l general, he should have attacked Caesar on his return from Zeta.  His hesitance to engage Caesar, and his willingness  to l e t Labienus do most of the f i g h t i n g , indicates that either he was a f r a i d to meet Caesar even on terms disadvantageous  to the d i c t a t o r or,  such was the confusion w i t h i n h i s own camp, he hesitated to attack. I t has been shown thus f a r throughout the A f r i c a n campaign that Caesar's cavalry without t h e i r i n f a n t r y support was not equal to Scipio's cavalry. "The war was confined to a small t r a c t of country between Ruspina and Thapsus, but circumstances made i t to Caesar one of the most d i f f i c u l t 48 Napoleon, o p . c i t . , p.183.  104 and dangerous o f a l l h i s m i l i t a r y enterprises, and gave him the opportunity of displaying h i s great a b i l i t i e s and h i s generous temper.  1,49  Scipio  cannot be considered a worthy opponent; Labienus alone bore the weight of combat f o r most of the campaign.  "For there are good grounds to suppose  that...the s k i l l which so long f o i l e d Caesar and twice brought him within an ace of defeat, was the s k i l l o f L a b i e n u s , "  50  When some c i t i z e n s of Vaga, a town near Zeta, appealed to Caesar f o r p r o t e c t i o n , Juba sacked the town and butchered everyone i n i t .  "The  incident furnished an a d d i t i o n a l proof that the a l l i e s by t h e i r insensate c r u e l t i e s had made enemies of the A f r i c a n people." - This event shows how 53  determined and f a n a t i c a l the Pompeians were. the  They knew that i f they l o s t  war they would f o r f e i t t h e i r l i v e s as w e l l .  Caesar, i n no small -way,  took advantage of t h i s gross error on the part of the Pompeians. the  He won  natives to h i s cause, while Scipio forced them to y i e l d t o h i s . On 22 March 46 Caesar offered b a t t l e i n front o f Scipio's camp,  but  Scipio refused combat.  This convinced Caesar that the only way to  move h i s enemy was to force h i s hand.  Strategic points of attack which  attracted Caesar's a t t e n t i o n were those within a day or two's march of Agar.  Such towns were Sarsura, Thisdra, and Thapsus.  Sarsura was Scipio's  supply town, garrisoned by a small force, and about a day's march west of Agar. the  I t was Caesar's design to march against t h i s important torn, using  same t a c t i c s that had been so successful at Zeta. He "...directed h i s  march towards Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians, and a magazine of c o r n . " 49 50 51 52  52  Labienus, a n t i c i p a t i n g Caesar's moves, sent h i s  Long, o p . c i t . , p.367. Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History, IX, p.681. Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.264. B e l l . Afr., 75.  105  cavalry to harass h i s opponent 's i n f a n t r y .  Having p r o f i t e d by the long  period of i n a c t i v i t y and h i s several engagements with Labienus, Caesar "...was very anxious, and proceeded with more slowness and circumspection than u s u a l , slackening somewhat i n h i s accustomed speed and a c t i v i t y . "  5 S  He had habituated h i s soldiers to the devices and s k i l l s of a cunning enemy, and he had taught them when to pursue and when to hold back; such was the determination of Caesar to conclude t h i s c o s t l y campaign.  "Caesar,  a r r i v i n g before Sarsura, took i t i n the presence of the enemy, who dared not to advance to i t s r e l i e f ; ...he marched next day to Tisdra...and being deterred from besieging i t by want of corn, set out immediately, and a f t e r a march of four miles, encamped near a r i v e r .  He marched from i t on the  fourth day, and then returned to h i s former camp at A g a r . "  54  He was now  ready to meet Labienus on more equal terms. As Caesar moved against Labienus, the l a t t e r ' s cavalry did not approach close enough f o r direct combat, and so were unable to prevent the f a l l of Sarsura, the massacre of i t s garrison, and the seizure of i t s stores.  The turning point of the  war had come, f o r now Labienus was looking on passively, hesitant to attack.  The morale of the a l l i e s was gradually d i s i n t e g r a t i n g .  Scipio  followed Caesar i n t h i s c i r c u i t of towns, but kept at a distance a l l the way and f i n a l l y returned to h i s former camp at Agar, coincident with Caesar. Upon a r r i v a l at Agar, Caesar was informed that the f i n a l r e i n forcements had a r r i v e d .  Caesar had been p a t i e n t l y waiting f o r the right  opportunity to f i g h t the b a t t l e which would end the struggle, and now i t was i n s i g h t .  "Hitherto s t r a t e g i c a l prudence and t a c t i c a l resource had  53 B e l l . A f r . . 73. 54 B e l l . A f r . , 76.  106 b a f f l e d Caesar's s k i l l . "  5 5  Caesar f e l t that h i s strong force could not  be used to advantage u n t i l Scipio had found a battle-ground to h i s l i k i n g . The d i c t a t o r was sure that t h i s time would not be f a r d i s t a n t , as h i s opponent's prestige was slowly but s i g n i f i c a n t l y diminishing, not only i n the eyes of h i s own men,  but i n those of h i s a l l i e s as w e l l .  He  r e a l i z e d that he must meet Caesar soon, or be east from h i s p o s i t i o n through the anger of h i s own comrades. Caesar's force was now at f u l l strength. To test Scipio's manpower "...he advanced i n t o a p l a i n eight miles distant from h i s own camp, and four from that of S c i p i o , where he awaited the enemy i n order of b a t t l e . " of S c i p i o ' s cavalry.  5 6  A b r i e f skirmish took place upon the a r r i v a l  Though the nearby town of Tegea was not taken by  Caesar (for i t contained a strong enemy garrison), Scipio did receive a serious setback which f u r t h e r aggravated h i s already demoralized f o r c e . With t h i s b r i e f but important encounter the t h i r d period of the A f r i c a n campaign came to an  end.  Caesar was becoming more and more conscious of the time he  was  wasting t r y i n g to force Scipio Into an open engagement. He f i r m l y r e a l i z e d that "only i n a pitched b a t t l e on equal ground with a l i m i t e d front could the f i g h t i n g power of h i s i n f a n t r y overcome the superior numbers of the 57 enemy and n e u t r a l i z e the effect of t h e i r cavalry."  North of Agar l a y  Thapsus, another garrison town of S c i p i o , whose governor C. v e r g i l i u s ana garrison had been continually f a i t h f u l to the a l l i e s .  Should Caesar  besiege t h i s town, S c i p i o would be "...redueed to the necessity of f i g h t i n g , to avoid the disgrace of abandoning V i r g i l i u s and the Thapsitani, who 55 Adeock, o p . c i t . . p.686. 56 B e l l . A f r . , 77. 57 Adcock, l o c . c i t .  had  10?  a l l along remained f i r m to h i s party....**  58  Caesar was being forced into  such a decision because "...he found that he could not by any means i n duce the enemy to come down to the p l a i n and make t r i a l of the legions, and that he could not encamp nearer them f o r want of water...."  59  When news of Caesar's contemplated move reached Scipio and Juba, they r e a l i z e d that to avoid a direct engagement now, they would be compelled to follow Caesar but not attack him.  When t h e i r destination  was reached they would hem him i n with as l i t t l e f i g h t i n g as possible, defend the town and starve him into submission. "Accordingly when Caesar perceived that because of the nature of the land he could not foree them to engage i n c o n f l i c t unless they chose, he set out f o r Thapsus, i n order that he might e i t h e r engage them, i f they came to the help of the c i t y , or might at least capture the place, i f they l e f t i t to i t s f a t e . " This took place on 4 A p r i l 46.  6 0  Caesar's encampment was on the southwest  side of the heavily garrisoned town. Upon a r r i v a l , siege-equipment was brought up and a c o n t r a v a l l a t i o n was begun which Caesar had planned to s t r e t c h from sea to sea with piquets stationed at strategic points.  Scipio,  not to be outdone, l e d o f f i n pursuit of Caesar, but to avoid an engagement on unfavourable ground, kept to the h i l l s .  As f o r Pompey at Dyrrhaehium,  so f o r S c i p i o at Agar, three choices were opens he could stay f i r m l y entrenched at Agar and lose prestige; he could advance to h i s former p o s i t i o n near U z i t a and t r y to sever Caesar's supply route before Thapsus f e l l , or he could move h i s forces to Thapsus and so interrupt the siege.  This he  and Juba agreed to do, even though they r e a l i z e d i t might produce an open 58 B e l l . Afr., 79. 59 Loo, c i t . 60 Dio, X L I I I , 7.  108 engagement. The two a l l i e d generals decided that upon a r r i v a l at Thapsus they would divide t h e i r troops, and, with as much speed as possible, would f o r t i f y one the north and one the south side of the town and so  hem  i n Caesar's army, "Evidently the purpose of the two leaders was to im61  p r i s o n Caesar i n the isthmus and to starve him into surrender...."  Both  generals r e a l i z e d that they would have to r e l y upon each other f o r a s s i s t ance should Caesar break through e i t h e r of t h e i r l i n e s .  Juba alone would  not be able to hold the opposing veteran force now that i t was at f u l l strength and S c i p i o , whose troops, so d i f f e r e n t i n character from the Numidians, were on the verge of r e b e l l i o n and desertion, would not dare to t r u s t h i s men i n too involved a campaign without a b o l s t e r i n g f o r c e , a v a i l a b l e i n the person of Juba. at t h i s p o i n t .  L i t t l e i s said of Labienus's movements  I t was unfortunate f o r the a l l i e s that he was not used  more i n t h e i r movements. Scipio hoped to occupy the s t r i p l y i n g between the present day lake of Sebke d i Moknine and the town of Thapsus i t s e l f . Caesar, on learning of h i s a r r i v a l , withdrew h i s trench-digging  troops  and sent part of h i s f l e e t close inshore.to threaten h i s opponent's rear. S c i p i o , n o t i c i n g the movements of the enemy, decided that i t was too l a t e to carry out h i s f i r s t plan of attack, i . e . , to reach and f o r t i f y a side of the town, so, turning north and advancing around the lake, he took up a p o s i t i o n near Thapsus.  "...there were some s a l t - p i t s , between which  and the sea was a narrow pass of about f i f t e e n hundred paces, by which Scipio endeavoured to penetrate and bring help to the inhabitants of Thapsus. But, Caesar a n t i c i p a t i n g that t h i s might happen, had...raised a very strong f o r t at the entrance of it...Scipio...advanced within a 61 Holmes, o p . c i t . . p.267.  109 small distance of the l a s t mentioned camp and f o r t , where he began to entrench himself about f i f t e e n hundred paces from the sea.™  62  From t h i s  point he could cut o f f Caesar from h i s supply towns of Leptis and Ruspina and at the same time carry on operations against Caesar's invading force. Caesar r e a l i z e d the seriousness of the s i t u a t i o n but, much to h i s surp r i s e and pleasure, he "...observed the enemy about the camp very uneasy, hurrying from place to place, at one time r e t i r i n g behind the rampart, 63  another coming out again i n great tumult and confusion."  This was a  t o t a l l y unexpected occurrence, f o r i n some way Scipio*s alternate plan had met with unexpected obstacles.  "When Scipio committed the f a t a l  blunder of placing h i s stockade upon a narrow s t r i p of land, about one and a h a l f miles wide, between the sea and the s a l t marshes, the keen eye of the great captain saw promptly that the time and the hour were at hand." '* Scipio was now at a great disadvantage. He was r e s t r i c t e d to 6  the narrowest part of the neck of land between the sea and the lake, too close to both Caesar and the sea to retreat to safety. Leaving two newly raised legions to defend h i s camp, Caesar moved slowly towards the f l a t land before Scipio's p a r t i a l l y completed entrenchments.  S c i p i o , caught only h a l f prepared, moved h i s forces t o  within s t r i k i n g distance of the enemy. Caesar's men were eager f o r b a t t l e and ready to s t r i k e , but the general held them back as though the time was not yet r i g h t .  The bulk of h i s infantry formed i n two l i n e s  with the two veteran legions on the right wing, two others on the l e f t , and one 62 63 64  or two of the newly recruited legions i n the centre. Somewhere B e l l . A f r . , 80. B e l l . A f r . . 82. S i h l e r , Annals of Caesar, p.227.  110 a bugler sounded the advance, and the troops, eager f o r the f i g h t , b u r i t f o r t h unmindful of t h e i r commander's orders.  "Caesar, perceiving that  the ardour of h i s s o l d i e r s would admit of no r e s t r a i n t , giving 'good f o r tune' f o r the word, spurred on his horse, and charged the enemy's f r o n t . " The two l i n e s met, but the disorganized forces of S c i p i o were no match f o r Caesar's experienced veterans.  Juba's elephants were turned back upon  t h e i r own f o r c e s , and the Numidians, when they saw t h e i r a l l i e s f i g h t i n g a l o s i n g struggle, as was t h e i r custom, quickly turned and f l e d , leaving Labienus and a small detachment to f i g h t alone.  So ended the threat of  Caesar's greatest foe i n the A f r i c a n campaign. No mercy was shown by the Caesarians, f o r they could not forget the past.  These men "...were taking  t h e i r revenge f o r the r e s t r a i n t that had been so long placed on them, a r e s t r a i n t which had probably been one cause of t h e i r recent mutiny. Caesar's humanity had t r i e d t h e i r patience too hard, and he now had to learn 66  that there was a l i m i t to h i s power over them." scholar.  So speaks the c l a s s i c a l  The m i l i t a r y man on the other hand considers t h i s unordered  charge "...one of the most extraordinary instances of slack d i s c i p l i n e in a l l history."  6 7  I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g to know what was i n Caesar's mind when t h i s breach of d i s c i p l i n e took place. warrior erred.  I t i s possible that here the t i r e d  He had driven h i s men to the point of v i c t o r y so many  times and then drawn them back that now, when the enemy was within t h e i r grasp, they were not going to lose t h i s , perhaps t h e i r l a s t opportunity of wreaking revenge. "There was therefore no difference i n the f i e l d s 65 B e l l . A f r . . 83. 66 Fowler, J u l i u s Caesar, p.320. 6? Dodge, op.cit.. p»685.  6 5  Ill of P h a r s a l i a and Thapsus, except that the e f f o r t s of the Gaesarians were greater and more vigorous, as being indignant that the war should have grown up a f t e r the death of Pompey."  68  Caesar's v i c t o r y was complete.  Some consider t h i s b a t t l e the crowning glory of h i s many campaigns, f o r i t was a convincing win.  "Thus i n a b r i e f portion of one day he made  himself master of three camps and slew f i f t y thousand of the enemy, without l o s i n g as many as f i f t y of h i s own men."  69  Thapsus was b i t t e r l y fought by both sides f o r a short time, but when the Pompeians broke and f l e d , the veterans were resolute i n t h e i r pursuit.  A l l who came w i t h i n range of sword or j a v e l i n were s l a i n ; not  one whit of merey being shown, so great was the vehemence and loathing of the Caesarians. Though Scipio was beaten, Thapsus was s t i l l defiant. Leaving Caninius R e b i l i u s and three legions to blockade the town, Caesar set out f o r U t i c a to j o i n the cavalry which he had dispatched e a r l i e r . Marching r a p i d l y northward, he seized U z i t a and Hadrumetum, pardoning those Pompeians who pleaded f o r p i t y and agreed to conform with h i s p o l i cies.  U t i c a opened i t s gates to him several days l a t e r .  There was l i t t l e  to challenge Caesar's a b i l i t y i n the post-Thapsus operations, as the townf o l k , hearing that S c i p i o had been defeated, quickly succumbed to h i s demands. "The strategy by which Caesar had brought o f f the b a t t l e of Thapsus was h i s crowning masterpiece. The campaign was over; i n three 70 weeks a l l Roman A f r i c a was i n h i s hands." I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note how Caesar used the a r t of manoeuvre i n the A f r i c a n campaign.  I t seemed to be h i s ultimate desire to manipulate  68 Slorus, Epitome of Roman History, IV, 2, 66. 69 P l u t a r c h , Caesar, 80. 70 Adcock, o p . c i t . , p.688.  112 his  enemy into an awkward p o s i t i o n and then attack and i f possible a n n i h i -  l a t e him.  This he had done with S c i p i o .  One must not forget that Caesar  was at a numerical disadvantage f o r most of the A f r i c a n campaign. vre  Manoeu-  then compensated f o r t h i s , and S c i p i o could not out-manoeuvre him.  " . . . i t seemed that i t was through the bad generalship of the commanders who, as i n Thessaly, neglected t h e i r opportunity to wear out Caesar by delay u n t i l h i s supplies were exhausted, i n t h i s foreign land, and i n l i k e manner f a i l e d to reap the f r u i t s of t h e i r f i r s t v i c t o r y , that t h i s war was 71 also foreshortened and thus sharply brought to a f i n i s h .  M  So the A f r i c a n  campaign ended with Caesar more v i c t o r i o u s than ever over a b i t t e r , d i s i l l u s i o n e d and s a d i s t i c enemy. " . . . i t was a merciless struggle which the Pompeians waged by a t r o c i t i e s . ' *  78  Perhaps the A f r i c a n war might never have been fought i f Caesar had not become entangled i n unnecessary p o l i t i c a l manoeuvring and questionable personal labours i n Egypt.  The time he spent i n Alexandria might w e l l  have been used to pursue immediately the remnants of Pharsalus and prevent them from regrouping. Caesar's strategy i n t h i s campaign involved manoeuvre,  as shown i n the several encounters i n which he outwitted both Labienus  and S c i p i o , surprise, whereby he upset the plans of the Pompeians who had not anticipated an attack i n early winter, and p a c i f i c a t i o n , wherein he won over to h i s side Bogud, S i t t i u s and the main pastoral t r i b e s not only i n the  immediate v i c i n i t y of operations, but also i n the land of Mauretania.  Of a l l Caesar's v i c t o r i e s , the A f r i c a n campaign displayed most the conqueror' s a b i l i t y to adapt himself and h i s troops to new methods of f i g h t i n g , a changeable climate, and a vicious enemy. 71 Appian, I I , 14, 97. 72 Duruy, o p . c i t . , p.352.  IIS CHAPTER VII THE SECOND SPANISH CAMPAIGN "...Let P h a r s a l i a f i l l her ruthless p l a i n s , and l e t the shades of the Carthaginians be sated with blood; l e t the hosts meet f o r the l a s t time at t e a r f u l Munda."  1  The second Spanish campaign was necessitated p r i n c i p a l l y by the mismanagement of a f f a i r s by Q. Cassius Longinus, whom Caesar appointed governor of the f u r t h e r province i n 49 B.C.  From the time of h i s appoint-  ment u n t i l the year 47, Cassius became involved i n acts of extortion which not only embittered the populace but also s t i r r e d up dissension w i t h i n h i s own forces.  "But during the time that Caesar besieged Pompey at  Drrhachium, triumphed at Old P h a r s a l i a , and carried on the war, with so much danger, at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had been l e f t i n Spain as propraetor of the f a r t h e r province, e i t h e r through h i s natural d i s p o s i t i o n , or out of a hatred he had contracted to the province, on account of a wound he had treacherously received when quaestor, drew upon himself the general d i s l i k e of the people."  2  Though Cassius lacked the q u a l i f i -  cations of a good ambassador, he did possess a sound knowledge of the country under h i s c o n t r o l and the people who inhabited i t .  The p r o v i n c i a l s  detested him f o r h i s excesses and corruption and everyone was f a m i l i a r with the manner i n which he bribed the troops f o r t h e i r l o y a l t y which  "...  seemed, f o r the present, to increase the good-will of the army, but tended gradually and imperceptibly to the r e l a x a t i o n of m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e . "  3  Thus, from the time of I l e r d a , the goodwill of the Roman inhabitants of 1 Luean, de B e l l o C i v i l l , I , 40. 2 Caesar, de B e l l o Alexandrino, 48. 3 Loc. c i t t  114 Spain, as w e l l as that of the natives, had been alienated by Cassius. Caesar, too preoccupied with a f f a i r s of state and war, had given l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n to the growing dissension within the further province and so serious had the s i t u a t i o n become that, "...when Longinus as proconsul did those same things which he had done as quaestor, the p r o v i n c i a l s formed s i m i l a r conspiracies against h i s l i f e .  Even h i s own dependants concurred  i n the general hatred; who, though the ministers of h i s rapine, yet hated the man by whose authority they committed those crimes."  4  Cassius l u c k i l y survived an attempt to assassinate him, but upon recovery from h i s wounds, he found h i s forees divided i n t o two armed camps, those who supported him and those who had gathered at Corduba under the banner of M. Claudius Marcellus. These r i v a l factions now took up arms to determine the r u l i n g force of f u r t h e r spaln, but M. Aemilius Lepidus, appointed by Caesar to the governorship of h i t h e r Spain, intervened on the side of Marcellus, restored order and put Cassius to f l i g h t .  R e t i r i n g to  the coast, and r e a l i z i n g that to remain i n Spain was unwise, he took ship at Malacca and, while o f f the mouth of the Ebro, was caught i n a storm and subsequently drowned. Though Cassius was dead, his t y r a n n i c a l r u l e of two years had done irreparable damage. At the request of the natives and p r o v i n c i a l s for a successor to Cassius, Caesar appointed to the p o s i t i o n G. Trebonius, the conqueror of M a s s i l i a .  Trebonius was unable to cope with the strained  s i t u a t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y among the s o l d i e r y . A r e s t l e s s peace was established, but i t was soon broken by the army when representatives were sent by various factions to S c i p i o i n A f r i c a , expressing a.desire to transfer the allegiance 4 B e l l . Alex.. 50.  115 of the r e b e l l i o u s Spanish forces to him.  To s a t i s f y them u n t i l he could  personally come to t h e i r assistance, he decided to send Gnaeus Pompeius the Younger, with f u l l power to i n s t i g a t e a r e b e l l i o n against the authori t y of Rome. U n t i l the new leader a r r i v e d , Scipio suggested that the insurgents carry on a g u e r r i l l a type of warfare. This was done, and once more an appeal went out to Rome f o r r e l i e f .  Gaius Didius, a naval commander  as w e l l as a land f i g h t e r , was sent by Caesar i n the hope that h i s presmight q u e l l any attempts at open r e b e l l i o n .  Didius's a r r i v a l added f u r -  ther s a l t to the rebels' wounds and, when news reached the insurgents that Caesar had conquered at Thapsus and Scipio was now dead, "...putting at t h e i r head T i t u s Quintius Scapula and Quintus Aponius, both knights, they drove out Trebonius and l e d the whole Baetic nation to revolt at the same time."  5  E a r l y i n the A f r i c a n campaign Gnaeus, the deceased Pompey's eldest son, scarce twenty-four years of age, l e f t Utica with a small force and made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Mauretania.  Crossing to the  Balearic i s l a n d s , he e a s i l y brought them under h i s control and so secured his  stepping stones to Spain, where he would j o i n the partisans and en-  courage the l e v i e s which were going on against Caesar.  Unexpectedly de-  tained i n the islands by a severe i l l n e s s , Gnaeus was compelled to postpone t h i s expedition to Spain and leave preparations f o r a f u l l scale r e b e l l i o n t o Scapula and Aponius. When Pompey landed i n Spain i n possession of an army of f a i r s i z e , he was elected commander-in-chief  of the insurgent forees, Scapula  w i l l i n g l y surrendering h i s p o s i t i o n to a man who bore so distinguished a 5 Dio, X L I I I , 29.  116 name.  I t should not be forgotten that S c i p i o , who was now dead, had also  borne a distinguished name, but i t had perished with him a f t e r Thapsus, and he had not enjoyed the renown attained by the conqueror of Hannibal. Gnaeus was a strong-willed youth who was proud of h i s father's achievements. Gradually the Pompeian leaders who had survived Thapsus began to a r r i v e ; Labienus and Varus were joined by the troops who had mutinied i n the f u r t h e r province.  Varus was given control of a f l e e t and sent to  operate against the threat posed by Gaius Didius. The southern and western d i s t r i c t s of Spain were seething with rebels and malcontents, many of whom were anxious to j o i n Pompey's cause. These people were organized under other leaders as they a r r i v e d to j o i n the insurgents.  "Elated, therefore,  by the multitude of h i s army and by i t s z e a l , he proceeded f e a r l e s s l y through the country, gaining some c i t i e s of t h e i r own accord, and others against t h e i r w i l l , and seemed to surpass even h i s father i n power."  6  Of the many towns which r e a d i l y joined Pompey, few even of the same province could agree upon the course to follow, a course which had been so c l e a r l y defined i n the time o f Sertorius; t h i s absence of u n i t y was t o paralyse Pompey i n Spain as i t had done the Pompeian o f f i c e r s i n A f r i c a and the elder Pompey i n h i s c o n f l i c t with Caesar. Besides the many tribesmen who joined Pompey, a l l i e d under the r e b e l banner i n Baetica were Gnaeua's brother Sextus, Labienus, Varus and other f u g i t i v e s from A f r i c a . The l a t t e r had joined with those veterans who had served under Afranius and whom Caesar had permitted to s e t t l e i n Spain.  Caesar, considering t h i s  rebel u p r i s i n g of l i t t l e importance and just another outbreak to be suppressed, sent troops from Sardinia under two men who he thought could 6 Dio, X L I I I , 29.  117 handle t h i s a f f a i r expeditiously, Q. Pedius and Fabius Maximus. varus was the f i r s t of the new Spanish insurgents to suffer defeat.  This occurred i n a naval encounter with Gaius Didius at Crantia  (possibly Carteia) on the southern coast. Though the sea was made safer f o r Caesar's ships, a l l was not w e l l inland.  Maximus and Pedius, unable  to stem the r i s i n g t i d e of rebel opposition, urgently appealed to Caesar f o r further help. Forwarded with t h i s plea f o r assistance was an account of Pompey's extensive land gains.  These appeals f o r help had come not  only from h i s lieutenants; even the t r i b e s opposed to Gnaeus requested h i s assistance:  "...those states which were opposed to Pompey, by con-  t i n u a l messages despatched to I t a l y , sought protection f o r themselves."  7  These appeals pointed out to him the present and p o t e n t i a l threat i n Pompey so he decided to postpone operations no longer, and set out personally f o r the f i e l d of war, "...when he ascertained that Pompey was gaining great headway and that the men he sent were not s u f f i c i e n t to f i g h t against him."  8  I t was d e f i n i t e l y disadvantageous f o r Caesar to set out f o r Spain  at t h i s precise time as i t meant that work begun on reform would have to be postponed and preparations f o r the great war against Parthia set aside. There would, too, be a f e e l i n g engendered among the populace that the great Caesar had not yet c a r r i e d out h i s promice of a l a s t i n g peace. Leaving Lepidus i n charge of the a f f a i r s at Rome, Caesar, r i d i n g quickly i n advance of h i s troops and accompanied by h i s usual bodyguard, reached.Obuleo, t h i r t y - f i v e miles east of Corduba, i n twenty-seven days a f t e r s e t t i n g out from Rome. His date of departure was at the end of the 7 Caesar, de B e l l o Hispaniensi, 1 8 Dio, X L I I I , 28.  118 year 708 A.U.C. (about 26 November, 46 B.C.). Caesar bad requested  Pedlus  and Maximus to send to him a l l the cavalry they could muster but, "»... having already proceeded many marches into Spain with prompt despatch, ...he came up with them much sooner than they expected, and had not the protection of the cavalry, according to h i s desire. * 1  9  Once again Caesar  had displayed the promptness of action which had made him so dangerous an enemy i n previous engagements. This time he caught not only the rebels o f f guard, but also h i s own expeditionary f o r c e . At the moment Caesar could f i e l d eight legions with eight thousand cavalry and light-armed a u x i l i a r i e s .  Pompey "...had the emblems and  standards of t h i r t e e n legions, but of those on whom he trusted f o r support two were natives which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed out of the Roman colonies i n those parts; and a fourth, belonging to Afranius, he had brought with him from A f r i c a ; the rest were f o r the most part made up of f u g i t i v e s and deserters....**l° But f o r the Roman veterans hardened a f t e r many years of war, Pompey's army would have been i n e f f e c t i v e against Caesar's troops.  The l i b e r a t e d slaves and native l e v i e s often responded  unfavourably to d i s c i p l i n e and enjoyed r e b e l l i o n more f o r the mere p l e a sure of f i g h t i n g and the thought of booty than f o r the struggle i t was meant to be:  a f i g h t to the death f o r control of an empire.  I t i s enough to say that Caesar was i n himself a strong enough leader and a sound object of respect f o r h i s men.  This was not the ease  with Gnaeus. He was i n command of a motley crowd and only Labienus could give him the support required of an able lieutenant. His brother Sextus, 9 B e l l . Hisp.. 2. 10 B e l l . Hisp., 7.  119 who was given charge of Corduba, was younger and l e s s experienced i n war, but became notorius f o r h i s naval actions l a t e r i n l i f e :  "After the death  of Caius Caesar he carried on war vigorously and collected a large army, together with ships and money, took i s l a n d s , became master of the western sea, brought famine upon I t a l y , and compelled h i s enemies to make peace on such terms as he chose."  11  Of the two sons of Pompey we do know that  "these were s t i l l young, but had collected an army of amazing numbers and displayed a boldness which j u s t i f i e d t h e i r claims to leadership, so that they beset Caesar with the greatest p e r i l . " of the Pompeians contributed to the r e b e l s lowed.  1  1 2  Afranius, Varus and others  cause what t h e i r a b i l i t y a l -  We can s a f e l y say that the heavy burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was borne  predominantly by Gnaeus. The Pompeians i n Spain r e a l i z e d that t h e i r duty was no longer to r e s i s t Caesar i n a scattered campaign, but to consolidate t h e i r forces under the banner of one man. s e l f f o r that p o s i t i o n .  No better person than Pompey presented him-  The r e b e l l i o u s legionaries had been offered par-  don by Caesar but had refused i t .  "The duty of a l l Pompeians was now to  desist from useless r e b e l l i o n and to support the head of the state; and no excuse can be imagined f o r Gnaeus except that he despaired of receiving the pardon which even to him, i f he had f r a n k l y appealed to the magnanimity of the conqueror, would not have been d e n i e d . " ^ The scene of action f o r much of the Spanish War was confined to present-day Granada and Andalusia with most of the f i g h t i n g r e s t r i c t e d to Granada.  "The northern mountains  of Granada are nearly impregnable; and i t was there that the sons of Pompey 11 Appian, V, 14, 143. 12 Plutarch, Caesar, 56, 1. 13 Holmes, The Soman Republic, I I I , p.297.  120 had established themselves."  Caesar was f a m i l i a r with the regions  14  mentioned, f o r he had previously v i s i t e d Corduba and other s i t e s i n the area, remembering prominent features of the land which could be of assistance to him should a campaign ever be necessary i n that t e r r i t o r y . He was now required to put t h i s knowledge to use. Maximus and Pedius considered themselves no match f o r Pompey and had remained quiet pending Caesar's a r r i v a l . Pompey, on the other hand, when informed of Caesar's plans to come personally and conduct the war, "...thinking that he was not strong enough to gain the mastery of a l l Spain, he d i d not wait f o r a reverse before changing h i s mind, but immediately, before making t r i a l of h i s adversaries, r e t i r e d into B a e t i c a . " S t r a t e g i c a l l y , t h i s was a good move of Gnaeus's even though i t was made through fear and a n t i c i p a t i o n .  By the time Caesar had reached Obulco,  Pompey had moved into Baetica and won the support of most of the t e r r i tory except f o r the town of U l i a .  When entreaty would not produce the  surrender of t h i s stronghold, f o r Caesar had a supporting party here as w e l l as at Corduba, he l a i d siege to i t . News of t h i s operation reached Caesar on h i s a r r i v a l at Obulco.  The siege of U l i a was more prolonged  than Gnaeus had anticipated, as the inhabitants had shown themselves to be unswervingly true to Caesar.  "Notice of Caesar's a r r i v a l having been  received, messengers having passed Pompey's guards came to him from that town and besought him to send them r e l i e f as soon as possible."  Caesar  moved d i r e c t l y against U l i a and was successful i n placing within the town "...eleven cohorts, with a l i k e number of horse, under the command of 14 Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Rome, I I I , p.72. 15 Dio, X L I I I , 31. 16 B e l l . Hisp., 3.  121 L. J u l i u s Paciecus, a man known i n that province, and also w e l l acquainted with i t . "  1 7  By stratagem Paciecus had penetrated Pompey's camp, reached  the gate of the town and had been admitted.  From within the town t h i s  able lieutenant c a r r i e d on sporadic attacks on Gnaeus»s camp and siegeworks, weakening the siege thereby.  When Caesar himself a r r i v e d on the  scene Pompey did not discontinue h i s a c t i v i t i e s , r e t a i n i n g f u l l i n h i s own strength.  confidence  Caesar had hoped that h i s presence, and the fact  that U l i a had been reinforced by him, would lure Gnaeus from the siege. But t h i s was not the case.  Pompey was l i t t l e disturbed as yet f o r he  considered himself Caesar's equal. Caesar did not carry out a d i r e c t attack on Pompey's camp at U l i a , f o r he was waiting u n t i l h i s opponent could b© manoeuvred into open ground and there be engaged i n a pitched b a t t l e , but as yet no opportunity f o r such a move had presented i t s e l f .  Respectful o f Gnaeus's strength,  Caesar decided to move from U l i a , which was located on the r i g h t bank of the Guadajoz r i v e r , and on the same s i t e as the town of Monte Mayor, to Corduba, seventeen miles to the south, where Sextus Pompey with two legions under h i s command was i n c o n t r o l . Corduba was s t r a t e g i c a l l y important to Caesar f o r , not only was i t the p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t a l , i t was also the chief supply depot f o r the Pompeian army. leaving a small task force to harass Gnaeus's work from without the walls and r e l y i n g on the strength of the residents w i t h i n the town, Caesar "...set out himself f o r Corduba, p a r t l y , to be sure, i n the hope of taking i t by betrayal, but c h i e f l y i n the expectation of drawing Pompey 17 B e l l . Hisp.. 5  122 away from U l i a through fear f o r t h i s p l a c e . "  1 8  His departure occurred  about 8 January, 45, by which time U l i a had been under siege f o r about a month and a h a l f .  In order to test the strength of the opposing force,  Caesar, as h i s troops approached Corduba, ordered each of the legionaries to mount behind a trooper, and, when the enemy force advanced from the town to meet them, these same foot soldiers at the r i g h t moment leaped from the horses to the ground and, a f t e r causing much havoc and i n f l i c t i n g many c a s u a l t i e s , put the Pompeians to f l i g h t . desired e f f e c t :  This stratagem had the  "This so alarmed Sextus Pompey, that he immediately sent  l e t t e r s to h i s brother, requesting him to come speedily to h i s r e l i e f , 19 l e s t Caesar should make himself master of Corduba before h i s a r r i v a l . " Gnaeus, r e a l i z i n g now that he had underestimated Caesar's a b i l i t y , regretf u l l y abandoned the siege of U l i a which he had brought to the point of surrendering. Before Gnaeus could begin h i s march which would carry him across the Guadajoz River and then south to Corduba, Caesar, according to plan, had taken the f i r s t step i n l a y i n g siege to Corduba by moving h i s forces to a point on the south bank of the Guadalquiver opposite the town.  As  the enemy held the north end of the permanent bridge which spanned the r i v e r where the width i s about one hundred yards, Caesar was compelled to construct a temporary crossing about one mile south of the permanent structure.  Much to h i s regret he was unable to f i n d a fordable spot i n  the v i c i n i t y of the o l d bridge. By January 10 baskets of stones had been sunk f o r p i e r foundations and on the next day the crossing was ready f o r use.  Sextus remained within the town forsaking any opportunity offered 18 Dio, X L I I I , 32. 19 B e l l . Hisp., 4.  123 to prevent Caesar from completing h i s work. On r e c e i v i n g news that Gnaeus was approaching, Caesar established a bridgehead at that end of the bridge across-river from the town. At the northern end he had h i s troops b u i l d three strongly f o r t i f i e d camps that he might better invest the town. I t should be pointed out here that Corduba l a y on the r i g h t or north bank of the Guadalquiver while Caesar's f i r s t encampment was located on the l e f t or south bank.  I t appears that Sextus had devoted what men he had to the  defence of the permanent bridge; his dearth of troops possibly prevented him from carrying out an attack on Caesar when the l a t t e r was hampered with bridge construction. On reaching Corduba, Gnaeus camped on the Guadalquiver's bank opposite the town.  left  I t was h i s i n t e n t i o n to r e t a i n control of the area  between Corduba and U l i a while supplying h i s brother with s u f f i c i e n t r e inforcements to hold the town. He hoped, too, to draw on the supplies contained w i t h i n Corduba; therefore the v i t a l l i n k f o r the Pompeians was the permanent bridge and t h i s they s o l i d l y held.  Caesar was possibly too  intent on beginning the siege of Corduba to prevent Gnaeus from establishing  himself so f i r m l y at the south end of the permanent bridge.  Ho  doubt the bridge-construction and camp-entrenchment took up most of h i s time and men,  but we must not overlook the f a c t that Caesar wished to  manoeuvre Pompey into an open area f o r b a t t l e , and h i s opponent had not yet given him t h i s opportunity. Gnaeus made no attack on Caesar's p o s i t i o n , e i t h e r at the bridgehead or at the newly entrenched area alongside Corduba, but, instead, waited f o r Caesar to move against him.  This was not long i n coming.  "Caesar, to cut o f f h i s provisions and communication with the town, ran  124 a l i n e from h i s camp to the b r i d g e . "  20  We see i n t h i s that i t was Caesar's  desire to wrest from Pompey's hands the old bridge which he to be Corduba's l i f e - l i n e .  considered  Pompey, just as determined that Caesar would  not force him from the crossing and so discontinue his contact with the garrison i n Corduba, t r i e d to secure h i s communication with the town by constructing a l i k e entrenchment from h i s own camp to the bridge.  I t must  be remembered that Pompey was stationed on the l e f t bank of the bridge c r o s s - r i v e r from Corduba while Caesar was on the r i g h t bank near Corduba. Siege operations could not begin i n earnest u n t i l Gnaeus*s threat was eliminated, f o r the garrison within the town had shown no willingness to surrender.  Frequent skirmishes took place on and around the bridge,  but neither side could compel the other to y i e l d any great distance. A f t e r several days of c o n f l i c t , Gnaeus penetrated Caesar's defences, gained a pathway to the bridge and was successful i n gaining entrance to Corduba.  When Caesar saw that Gnaeus had s o l i d l y established  communication with Corduba, he t r i e d to l u r e h i s opponent on to l e v e l ground near the l e f t bank and there engage him i n an a l l - o u t b a t t l e .  «...  and Caesar f o r many days used a l l possible endeavours to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the war to a conc l u s i o n as soon as p o s s i b l e . "  2 1  Gnaeus c a r e f u l l y avoided t h i s f o r he did  not intend to p i t h i s troops against Caesar's veterans u n t i l the time was favourable.  This unexpected turn of events disturbed Caesar, f o r he knew  that a long siege was inadvisable at t h i s time of year and with the equipment at h i s d i s p o s a l . 20 B e l l . Hisp., 5. 21 Loc. c i t .  125 Caesar did not rush operations at Corduba, and Dio informs us that the d i c t a t o r f e l l i l l and renewed the siege when a d d i t i o n a l troops joined him, but the renewal of w i n t e r - f i g h t i n g did not agree with the attacking forces of Caesar " . . . f o r being housed i n miserable l i t t l e huts, they were s u f f e r i n g d i s t r e s s and running short of f o o d . "  22  Here again  Caesar was negligent i n h i s preparation f o r a campaign. He had r e l i e d too much on the s t r a t e g i c elements of speed and surprise, and too l i t t l e a t t e n t i o n had been given to the provision of supplies and the s e v e r i t y of weather.  " I t was the same d i f f i c u l t y that had b e f a l l e n him i n the war  against Vercingetorix, i n h i s f i r s t campaign i n Spain, and during the operations i n Albania; but with t h i s difference, that i t could now only be set down to the carelessness of the master of the great granaries."  23  Mediterranean  The intended siege of Corduba had turned into a stalemate.  Caesar could not draw Gnaeus out into open b a t t l e and Gnaeus, using to advantage the safety of the town, did not challenge Caesar's p o s i t i o n . He too did not wish to commit h i s troops to the severity of the weather. As Corduba was too strong a f o r t r e s s to be taken without a w e l l planned and lengthy siege, Caesar decided to abandon i t temporarily and move against Ategua, "...now Tela l a V i e j a . . . s i t u a t e d on a h i l l overlooking 24 the Guadajoz, about a day's march south-east of Corduba."  Here, he had  bean informed, was an abundance of Pompeian g r a i n . "Although i t was a strong place, he hoped by the s i z e of h i s army and the sudden t e r r o r of 25 his appearance to alarm the inhabitants and capture i t . " 22 Dio, X L I I I , 32. 23 Ferrero, Greatness and Decline, I I , p.324. 24 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.301. 25 Dio, X L I I I , 33.  126 Concealing h i s departure by f i r e s l e f t burning overnight, Caesar reached Ategua the next .morning so that, by January 20, he "...began h i s attack upon Ategua, and carried l i n e s quite round the town."  26  So s w i f t l y  and s e c r e t i v e l y did Caesar move that Gnaeus did not know where h i s opponent had gone u n t i l informed by deserters that he was investing Ategua. Pompey, not v i s i b l y disturbed over t h i s move of Caesar, did not hurry to defend the town f o r he f e l t that the nature of the land and the bitterness of the winter would hinder Caesar. He did not wish to expose unnecessarily h i s own troops to the rigours of the c o l d . When word reached him that Caesar had walled o f f the town a f t e r encamping before i t , he became worried and moved to i t s assistance.  "Caesar r i g h t l y believed that he could make  better headway by attacking Pompey's minor strongholds to the south and perhaps seize an opportunity f o r b a t t l e during the o p e r a t i o n s . "  27  Gnaeus  was at f i r s t suspicious of the reports concerning Caesar's movements as he did not think he could persevere i n the undertaking of the siege of so formidable a f o r t r e s s i n the middle of winter, but, on reaching Ategua a week a f t e r Caesar had begun the siege by contravallation, terrace, and battering ram, he found that what had been reported to him was true. On many of the h i l l s surrounding the town of Ategua, the natives had constructed towers years before which served both as observation posts and p r o t e c t i v e b a r r i e r s against the incursion of h o s t i l e t r i b e s .  Caesar  occupied several of these h i l l s t o defend h i s besiegers from any surprise attack which Gnaeus might perpetrate on h i s a r r i v a l .  "In order to guard  against h i s a r r i v a l , Caesar possessed himself of many f o r t s ; p a r t l y to shelter h i s cavalry, p a r t l y to post guards -of i n f a n t r y f o r the defence of 26 B e l l . Hisp., 6. 27 Dodge, Caesar, I I , p.703.  127 his camp."  28  Pompey pitched h i s f i r s t camp i n the h i l l s west of Caesar  but north of the r i v e r Salsum (Guadajoz).  A heavy fog which pervaded the  theatre of the siege permitted Pompey to threaten seriously one of Caesar's outposts and very nearly capture i t . About January 28, "...Pompey set f i r e to h i s camp, passed the r i v e r Salsum, and, marching through the v a l l e y s , eneamped on a r i s i n g ground, between the two towns of Ategua and U c u b i s . "  29  The country i n t h i s v i c i n i t y i s very mountainous, much suited f o r war and s t r a t e g i c manoeuvre. Pompey's new camp i n these mountains was so situated that he was afforded a view of both the besieged f o r t r e s s and Ucubis, the present-day town of Espejo.  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note how Pompey contin-  u a l l y took advantage of the nature of the country to camp i n locations a f f o r d i n g him an easy and protracted defense. work very d i f f i c u l t .  Such strategy made Caesar's  "...Pompey having established h i s camp between Ategua  and Ucubis, ...within view of both towns, Caesar possessed himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about four miles from h i s 30 own camp, on which he b u i l t a f o r t r e s s . "  Pompey, ever anxious to f i n d  a weak spot i n Caesar's defences, had watched anxiously while Caesar f o r t i f i e d a new p o s i t i o n which was separated from h i s main camp by the r i v e r Salsum.  I t was Pompey's plan to attack t h i s new f o r t while screened by  the intervening h i l l s and before Caesar could cross the Salsum himself and bring help. He was sure t h i s could be done while Caesar was busy with siege operations. On the night of February 4th, he began h i s attack. Protecting c a r e f u l l y what enemy point he had taken, Caesar had strengthened the f o r t r e s s considerably and when word reached him of the struggle within 28 B e l l . Hisp., 6. 29 B e l l . Hisp., 7. 30 B e l l . Hisp., 8.  128 his new camp, "...he set out with three legions, and when he approached them, many (of the enemy) were k i l l e d , owing to t h e i r t r e p i d a t i o n and f l i g h t , and a great number made p r i s o n e r s . "  31  Here again Caesar had  moved q u i c k l y , outguessed h i s opponent, and frustrated h i s move. This f o r t i f i e d h i l l , the castra Postumiana. was so placed that i t presented a continual threat to Gnaeus and h i s troops i n succeeding days.  Caesar  knew the importance of strategic placement. Gnaeus was now faced with the problem of supplies, as Caesar, besides pressing the siege of Ategua, had waylaid several supply t r a i n s from Corduba, scattering them and confiscating t h e i r f r e i g h t .  On or about  February 6th, "...Pompey set f i r e to h i s camp, and drew towards Corduba." Two reasons can be offered f o r Pompey's change of strategy:  32  a need f o r  supplies, and fear of Caesar renewing the attack on the p r o v i n c i a l c a p i t o l . l o r the f i r s t time i n the war, Gnaeus was becoming the pursued, and t h i s as a r e s u l t of Caesar's strategy of manoeuvre. While Caesar was harassing Pompey's caravan t r a i n s , there was much a c t i v i t y within Ategua. A supply l i n e had been so established between Pompey and the forces within the town that Caesar had to give h i s attention to the elimination of another of Pompey's l i f e - l i n e s .  On one occasion  his cavalry pursued a party carrying provisions to Pompey from Ategua, nearly to the walls of Corduba.  At night the Ateguans wasted no time i n  r a i n i n g darts and f i r e down upon the besiegers and when day came, frequent s a l l i e s were made upon those busy at the works, causing much unrest and anxiety among Caesar's troops.  "Those who had begun the attack, being  vigorously opposed on our side, notwithstanding a l l the inconveniences we 31 B e l l . Hisp.. 9. 32 B e l l . Hisp., 10.  129 fought under, were at length obliged to r e t i r e i n t o the town, with many 33 wounds."  I n order that he might give some a i d to the townspeople,  Pompey "...began a l i n e from the camp to the r i v e r Salsum; and a small party of our horse, being attacked by a much l a r g e r body of the enemy, were driven from t h e i r post, and three of t h e i r number s l a i n . "  5 4  So the  c o n f l i c t wavered back and f o r t h but Pompey was unable to r e l i e v e the siege to the s a t i s f a c t i o n of h i s garrison within Ategua.  Tension within the  town was increasing as Caesar's prolonged siege was taking e f f e c t . Because of Caesar's r e l e n t l e s s a c t i v i t y , Gnaeus had been unable to l i v e up to h i s promises to a garrison which had confidently anticipated that he would make a greater e f f o r t to r e l i e v e them than he had Gnaeus had succumbed to Caesar's strategy.  His supply l i n e s were being continually harrassed;  dissension was growing w i t h i n the town; any attempts he made to r e l i e v e the garrison had been f r u s t r a t e d . So serious was the s i t u a t i o n within the town and so disheartened were the people becoming that o f f i c e r s were deserting the garrison w i t h i n the town and many of the townsfolk, whenever the opportunity presented i t s e l f , surrendered themselves to the Caesarians, confident that Caesar's dementia would spare them. I t was not Caesar's plan to annihilate Pompey, instead, he i n t e r f e r e d l i t t l e with h i s actual movements hoping that h i s opponent would soon resort to open b a t t l e through the pressure of public opinion. Pompey was not yet ready to y i e l d .  I t appears that he f e l t that he could  s t i l l outmanoeuvre Caesar. He s t i l l possessed h i s self-confidence;  "...  Pompey erected a f o r t on the other side of the Salsum, i n which he met with no i n t e r r u p t i o n from our men, and exalted not a l i t t l e i n the idea 33 B e l l . Hisp.. 12. 34 B e l l . Hisp., 13.  130 of having possessed himself of a post so near u s . "  This move of Pompey  35  enabled him to harass scouts and foraging parties from Caesar's camp but i t interfered l i t t l e with actual siege operations.  The garrison within  Ategua now resorted to acts of unparalleled barbarity. i n turn:  Caesar retaliates  "wherefore, surrounding the town with our troops, the c o n f l i c t  was for some time maintained  with great v i o l e n c e . . . . "  36  To establish  better communication with Ategua, and after encouraging a small force within the town to make a s a l l y at midnight, Pompey, " . . . i n expectation that they would be able to effect their design, had crossed the Salsum with his army, where he continued a l l night i n order of battle to favour t h e i r retreat."  This latest attempt of Pompey to relieve the town  was destined f o r disaster. "But though our men had no apprehension of this design, their valour enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and repulse the enemy, with many wounds."  Caesar, using the techniques  available to a commander for securing information, learned much from deserters as well as slaves from his own camp, one especially who, to help his wife and son imprisoned i n the c i t y , had cut his master's throat and had successfully penetrated Pompey's camp, "...whence, by means of a b u l l e t , on which he inscribed his intelligence, Caesar was informed of  39 the preparations made for the defenee of the place."  I t appears that  most of Pompey's movements were familiar to Caesar and that Caesar's l e gions occupying outposts were able i n his absence to withstand any onslaught Pompey might bring against them. Caesar had strengthened a l l his 35 B e l l . Hisp., 36 B e l l . Hisp., 37 B e l l . Hisp., 38 Loc. e i t . 39 B e l l . Hisp.,  14. 13. 16. 18.  131 major and minor camps, and, because there was not the enthusiasm w i t h i n Ategua that there was at M a s s i l i a , the siege was carried out with l i t t l e interruption.  This had been f o r Caesar a two-fold b a t t l e , watching Gnaeus  on one side and guarding against s a l l i e s from the towns on the other. F i n a l l y r e a l i z i n g that he could not force Caesar to l i f t the siege, Pompey decided to pursue some other course.  Caesar was informed  by two L u s i t a n i a n brothers who had deserted to him that Pompey i n a speech made to h i s s o l d i e r s , had said: "That as he found i t impossible to r e l i e v e the town, he was resolved to withdraw i n the night from the sight of the enemy, and r e t i r e towards the sea...."  40  When news of Pompey's plans  reached the garrison w i t h i n Ategua, a l l hope was abandoned. A note r e questing clemency was sent to Caesar by the garrison commander Lucius Minatius; Caesar granted the request and i n return received control of the town.  "Thus, having made himself master of the place, on the nine-  teenth of February he was saluted imperator."  41  Caesar had been compensated f o r h i s setback at Corduba. Though the weather and land conditions had been' against him, perseverance and the vigour of h i s troops had given him the v i c t o r y at Ategua. He had not yet accomplished h i s design which he was sure would bring an early end to the war, namely, to b r i n g Gnaeus into open b a t t l e .  This Pompey was c l e v -  e r l y avoiding. The many desertions from Pompey's forces and strongholds can be attributed predominantly to h i s weak conduct and an i n a b i l i t y to f u l f i l promises.  The element of indecision gradually produced i n Pompey  a lack of confidence which weighed h e a v i l y against him throughout the remainder of the Spanish campaign. The f a l l of Ategua had a b e n e f i c i a l 40 B e l l . Hisp., 18. 41 B e l l . Hisp.. 19.  132 effect on Caesar's forces, morale, and strategy. "Upon the capture o f t h i s c i t y the other t r i b e s also no longer held back, but many of t h e i r own accord sent envoys and espoused Caesar's cause, and many received him or h i s lieutenants on t h e i r approach."  42  Gnaeus f l e d southward t o -  wards Ucubis "...where he began to b u i l d redoubts, and secure himself 43 with l i n e s . "  Caesar, observing closely h i s enemy's movements, followed  Gnaeus and took up a p o s i t i o n opposite him, but was unable to draw him into b a t t l e .  "Pompey under the guidance of Labienus, was wisely avoiding  open-field work and seeking to reduce Caesar by famine."  44  Caesar, i t  must be remembered, was on the opposite bank of the Salsum to Pompey and when he followed him, the r i v e r always intervened, therefore f o r any sort i e to take place the r i v e r had to be crossed and t h i s alone deterred Caesar from cornering Pompey. I t was now l e f t f o r him t o outmanoeuvre Gnaeus. "...Caesar removed h i s camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to 45  draw a l i n e to the r i v e r Salsum."  At t h i s point two cavalry encounters  seriously hindered Caesar's legions who were busy at the task of entrenching.  "While our men were employed i n the work, some of the enemy f e l l  upon us from the higher ground, and as we were i n no condition to make AO.  resistance, wounded great numbers."  Gnaeus continued h i s withdrawal,  skirmishing as he moved, and with Caesar i n pursuit, came to a halt near S o r i c a r i a , approximately s i x miles south-east of Ategua and on the s i t e of the present-day town of Castro d e l R i o . 42 43 44 45 46  About two miles south-east of S o r i c a r i a and across the r i v e r Dio, X I I I I , 35. B e l l . Hisp., 20. Dodge, o p . c i t . , p.710. B e l l . Hisp., 23. Loe. c i t .  133 from I t lay the town of Aspavia.  This fort was very important to Gnaeus  and enough of an arsenal and supply centre f o r him to fight i n i t s defence. Caesar was sure that his very presence near i t would be sufficient encouragement to bring Pompey into an open battle.  Caesar was successful i n  moving from the outskirts of Soricaria, across the r i v e r Salsum and into a position, which when f o r t i f i e d effectively, would cut off Pompey's communication l i n e between Soricaria and Aspavia.  Both parties had now  withdrawn from Soricaria and Pompey "...observing that our fort had cut off h i s communication with Aspavia, which i s about five miles distant 4.7  from Ucubis, judged i t necessary to come to a battle."  To gain the  advantage of higher ground, Pompey attempted to draw up his men on a k n o l l near Aspavia but Caesar anticipated this and sent a squadron to intercept them. This he was successful i n doing; the enemy was forced into the plain and while retreating suffered a heavy l o s s .  "The mountain  and t h e i r valour protected them; of which advantage, and of a l l r e l i e f , our men, though few i n number, would have deprived them had not night intervened."  48  Gnaeus had saved his forces to fight another day and when  they advanced i n their usual fashion on Caesar's l i n e s , c a l l i n g out f o r battle but unwilling to stand and fight, another skirmish took place, not so severe as the previous one but availing Pompey l i t t l e .  "Repeated f a i l -  ures were so affecting the morale of his army that a l l the Roman knights were conspiring to desert and were only prevented by a slave who betrayed them."  49  Pompey was now determined  to move from town to town, i n the hope  of gaining some advantage by prolonging the war. This was the only 47 B e l l . Hisp., 24. 48 Loc. e i t . 49 Holmes, op.cit., p.305.  134 strategy he could employ u n t i l such time as he agreed to a pitched b a t t l e . "...Pompey decamped, and posted himself i n an olive-wood over against Hispalis.  Caesar, before he removed, waited t i l l midnight when the moon  began to appear."  50  The r e l e n t l e s s pursuit began again. When Pompey set  out he abandoned to Caesar the f o r t of TJcubis, which the d i c t a t o r ordered to be burned on h i s departure.  "He afterwards l a i d siege to Ventisponte,  which surrendered; and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the c i t y , because the garrison refuse to open the gates to h i m . "  51  Ventisponte i s the present-day town of Vado Garcia close  to modern Casariche and about twenty miles south of M o n t i l i a .  The s i t e of  Corruca i s unknown. Gnaeus, growing t i r e d of the continual chase, had come to r e a l i z e that he must very soon engage i n open c o n f l i c t with Caesar, or lose a l l the prestige he possessed.  He had t r i e d to bolster h i s s p i r i t s and those  of h i s supporters p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the town of Ursao close by Munda, by sending l e t t e r s to point out:  "That hitherto he had a l l the success  against the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner than was expected, could he have brought them to engage him upon equal terms; but he did not think i t advisable to venture new-levied troops on a p l a i n ; that the enemy, depending on our supplies, as yet protract the war, f o r they storm c i t y a f t e r c i t y , thence supplying themselves with prov i s i o n s : that he would therefore endeavour to protect the towns of h i s party, and bring the war to as speedy an issue as possible: that he would send them a reinforcement of some cohorts, and that having deprived them B e l l . Hisp., 27. 51 Loc. c i t . 5 0  135 of provisions, he would necessitate the enemy to come to an engagement."52 This indeed was an amazing piece of propaganda and put to use at a most c r u c i a l time. "He could not disguise h i s r e t r e a t , however roundly he might l i e .  H i s f a i l u r e s as w e l l as h i s c r u e l t i e s were a l i e n a t i n g the  natives; the more i n t e l l i g e n t of h i s followers were abandoning h i s cause." ' 5  I t seems evident that the inhabitants of Ursao, (the present-day town of Osuna, about s i x miles east of Pompey's p o s i t i o n at Munda and t h i r t y - f i v e miles south-west of Montilla) were slowly l o s i n g confidence i n t h e i r chosen leader a f t e r being so f a i t h f u l to the Pompeian cause.  I t was important,  too, that Pompey r e t a i n h i s prestige among the h i 1 I f oik and townspeople, f o r from them he could gather much information on enemy movements, and could depend upon them f o r support when campaigning became necessary. Since he became the pursued, he was now l o s i n g that support, and he was t r y i n g instead to express to them i n words what he had hoped to accomplish i n deeds; but he had met with only temporary success, and now at Munda he decided to stake a l l on a pitched b a t t l e .  With Caesar approaching and  aware that Pompey was w i l l i n g to f i g h t , Ursao was greatly confirmed i n i t s allegiance.  "Thus r e l y i n g on t h i s opinion, he thought he could effect the  whole, f o r he was defended by the nature of h i s s i t u a t i o n , and by the pos i t i o n f o r defence of the town, where he had h i s camp: f o r , as we observed before, t h i s country i s f u l l of h i l l s which run i n a continued chain, without any plains i n t e r v e n i n g . "  54  Having selected Munda as the s i t e of  b a t t l e , Pompey had a l l the timber within a s i x mile radius f e l l e d and brought within the w a l l s .  This was done to prevent Caesar obtaining siege  52 B e l l . Hisp., 26. 53 Holmes, o p . c i t . , p.305. 54 B e l l . Hisp., 28.  136 material i n ease he decided to storm the town.  Gnaeus was so preparing  the b a t t l e ground that Caesar would be f i g h t i n g at a disadvantage. Pompey was now situated between two strong fortresses with Munda at h i s back and Ursao s i x miles d i s t a n t .  Geographically he enjoyed a double defence,  f o r he had the protection of Munda's elevated p o s i t i o n and benefitted much from the nature of the country. Separating the two camps was a p l a i n about f i v e miles i n extent, through the western end of which ran a r i v u l e t , the Peinado, making the approach to the mountain exceptionally d i f f i c u l t because i t had formed a deep morass on the r i g h t . I t was Gnaeus*s hope that Caesar would hesitate before he attacked troops posted, as the former's would be, i n so formidable a p o s i t i o n with a f o r t r e s s at t h e i r back and a slope i n t h e i r favour. He hoped to be a f forded the chance to boast that Caesar was r e a l l y a f r a i d of him, f o r he was superior i n numbers and had the advantage of p o s i t i o n , and t h i s might make just the difference between v i c t o r y and defeat, and the l a t t e r he could no longer afford to s u f f e r .  "Caesar, s t i l l pursuing h i s march, a r -  r i v e d i n the plains of Munda, and pitched h i s camp opposite to that of Pompey."  55  The following day Caesar was informed that Pompey had been  i n l i n e of b a t t l e since midnight. This was the 17th of March.  When he  saw that h i s opponent had chosen h i s ground w e l l , that the slope was rugged and d i f f i c u l t to attack but very easy to defend, he moved h i s men onto the p l a i n and h a l t e d .  "Caesar had no doubt that the enemy would deseend into  the p l a i n and come to a b a t t l e , when he saw them i n array.  This appeared  evident to a l l ; the rather because the p l a i n would give t h e i r cavalry f u l l room to a c t , and the day was so serene and c l e a r , that the gods 55 B e l l . Hisp., 27.  137 seemed to have sent i t on purpose to favour the engagement."  56  The enemy  remained stationary at the top of the h i l l and watched while Caesar moved his  men into p o s i t i o n .  Caesar had a n t i c i p a t e d . the  They d i d not advance to the f i e l d of b a t t l e as H i s men were now becoming r e s t l e s s and the longer  enemy held back, the greater became the tension.  "Our men s t i l l con-  tinued before them i n order of b a t t l e ; but although the equality o f the ground sometimes tempted them to come and dispute the v i c t o r y , they nevertheless s t i l l kept t h e i r post on the mountain, i n the neighbourhood of the 57 town.""'  Pompey d i d not intend to lose the advantage of h i s p o s i t i o n and  Caesar, now that Gnaeus was within h i s grasp, refused to give up t h i s opportunity f o r open b a t t l e a f t e r so long a pursuit i n so troublesome a terrain. Although Pompey and Caesar were ready to attack, there seemed to be some concern even within Pompey's camp whether the time was r i g h t for  an engagement, and several w i t h i n the enemy's ranks had suggested  f u r t h e r postponement of open c o n f l i c t .  "Pompeius was misled by t h i s ap-  pearance of strength and did not postpone the b a t t l e , but engaged Caesar straightway on h i s a r r i v a l , although the older men, who had learned by experience at Pharsalus and A f r i c a , advised him to wear Caesar out by delay and reduce him to want, as he was i n h o s t i l e c o u n t r y . "  58  Pompey  knew that i t would be unwise to withdraw, f o r h i s men, though f e a r f u l of the  foe, ware hesitant to f l e e longer and were w i l l i n g to stake a l l on a  f i n a l struggle.  I t was desperation which forced h i s followers to face  Caesar and they knew the price o£ defeat. 56 B e l l . Hisp.. 29. 57 Loc. o i t . 58 Appian, I I , 15, 103.  "We doubled our speed to reach  138 the  r i v u l e t , without t h e i r s t i r r i n g from the place where they s t o o d . "  59  Pompey waited f o r Caesar to make a move to the slope and "when we reached the  extremity of the p l a i n , the r e a l seat of disadvantage, the enemy were  awaiting us above, so that i t would have been exceedingly dangerous to proceed."  60  The r i v u l e t had been passed but Caesar, unlike Pharnace at  Zela, c a l l e d a h a l t at the foot of the slope and there waited, uncertain of h i s enemy's next move. To f i g h t up t h i s slope would prove to be a great handicap as w e l l as neutralize the t r a i n i n g h i s men had received* Pompey* s force of t h i r t e e n legions had been so stationed that "...the cavalry was drawn up upon the wings, with s i x thousand light-armed 61  i n f a n t r y and about the same number of a u x i l i a r i e s . "  Caesar's army of  eight heavy-armed cohorts, and eight thousand horse were drawn up so that "the  tenth l e g i o n , as usual, was on the r i g h t , the t h i r d and f i f t h on the  l e f t , with the a u x i l i a r y troops and c a v a l r y . "  62  Caesar pointed out to  his men the disadvantages of an u p h i l l struggle, but h i s troops were eager for b a t t l e and were w i l l i n g to move determinedly ahead.  These s o l d i e r s ,  through t h e i r numbers and experience and- from t h e i r leader's presence, had reached a high l e v e l of courage, and were ready f o r the decisive batt l e whieh Caesar sought.  Though these hardy veterans considered the mu-  tinous legionaries of Pompey t h e i r i n f e r i o r s , the Pompeians were a desperate l o t and were aware of the fact that should they lose the day, no mercy would be shown them. Some of them had witnessed the b a t t l e f i e l d s of Pharsalus and Thapsus and the memory of the slaughter which took place there was s t i l l fresh i n t h e i r minds. 59 B e l l . Hisp.. 29. 60 B e l l . Hisp..30. 61 Loc. c i t . 62 Loc. c i t .  Caesar was p i t t i n g h i s veteran  139 force against a b i t t e r , determined and ruthless enemy who expected no quarter and intended to give none. The Gauls who put to f l i g h t the l e gions at Gergovia struggled no more tenaciously than these seasoned warriors.  The Caesarians fought with a bitterness and savagery brought  about through p r i v a t i o n , continual hardship, and prolonged opposition, and were as stimulated through anger as was t h e i r enemy through despair. The f a c t must not be over-looked that the troops of Caesar often became unnecessarily agitated because of the reports received about the numbers, d i s c i p l i n e and valour of the enemy. The delay which followed Caesar*s reaching the foot of the h i l l "...served t o enliven the enemy, thinking that Caesar's troops shrank from an encounter through fear: they therefore had the boldness to advance a l i t t l e way, yet without q u i t t i n g the advantage of t h e i r post, the approach to which was extremely dangerous.™  63  order slowly ascended the slope.  Caesar's men i n t h e i r regular  Appian reports that Gnaeus, from a d i s -  tance, accused Caesar of cowardice.  This spurred the hesitant general  i n t o action and "the b a t t l e began with a s h o u t . " f a r had followed a pattern of watchfulness.  64  Caesar's strategy thus  There was no element of sur-  p r i s e i n the move at Munda, f o r Gnaeus was aware of every action Caesar made. Manoeuvre had given Caesar the opportunity to engage Pompey, but not on the dictator's own terms.  Quickness of pursuit had forced Pompey  to abandon plans of reaching the sea, f o r Caesar had cut him o f f from the safe crossing of the Guadalquiver which would carry him to the coast and the safety of h i s ships at C a r t e i a . Munda was Pompey's l a s t stand, and 63 B e l l . Hisp.. 30. 64 Loc. c i t .  140 he was s k i l f u l enough to have the b a t t l e fought i n h i s favour. He had compelled Caesar to f i g h t at a disadvantage, and now a l l he needed f o r v i c t o r y was a change of luck and a weakening i n Caesar's foroe. Caesar's men may have been determined and eager when the b a t t l e began, but as the f i g h t i n g progressed t h e i r strength began to waver. "But though our men were superior to the enemy i n courage, the l a t t e r neverthel e s s defended themselves so w e l l by the advantage of the higher ground, and the shouts were so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides so great, that we almost began to despair of v i c t o r y . "  6 5  The f i g h t i n g was  pursued r e l e n t l e s s l y by both forces, and i f any side yielded ground i t was Quickly regained or purchased b i t t e r l y by the opposing l i n e .  Back and  f o r t h the b a t t l e swayed so that "neither sound of paean nor groan was to be heard from any of them, but both sides merely shouted 'Striket Killl'»" ' 6  I t has been reported that Caesar stood i n front of h i s men urging them on to v i c t o r y , and he became sorely disturbed when many of the newly recruited l e g i o n a r i e s turned and showed signs of f l i g h t .  The Pompeians resisted  bravely and i t appeared that they would not y i e l d . Caesar's i n t e n t i o n was to turn one or the other of Gnaeus•s flanks.  So r i g o r o u s l y did h i s tenth legion bear down on Pompey's l e f t  that Gnaeus, f e a r i n g he might be outflanked, ordered Labienus to move h i s l e g i o n from the r i g h t wing to support of the l e f t .  Caesar, seeing h i s  opportunity, ordered Bogud and h i s Moorish horse to move against the l e f t f l a n k and rear of the enemy. Leading f i v e eohorts to intercept Bogud, who seemed t o him t o be moving i n the d i r e c t i o n of h i s camp, Labienus gave the 65 B e l l . Hisp., 31. 66 Dio, X L I I I , 37.  141 appearance to h i s fellow Pompeians of one i n f l i g h t .  Thinking t h e i r l i n e  had been weakened and f a i l i n g to r e a l i z e the true intention of Labienus»s move, the enemy yielded s u f f i c i e n t l y f o r Caesar's hard pressed legions t o break through t h e i r wavering l i n e and cut them down from behind, So the enemy was put to f l i g h t , and t h i s most b i t t e r struggle came to an end. "...But though the enemy fought with the utmost vigour, they were obliged to give ground, and r e t i r e towards the town.  The b a t t l e was fought on  the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were e n t i r e l y routed and put to f l i g h t ; insomuch, that not a man could have escaped, had they not sheltered themselves i n the place whence they advanced to the charge.™  67  The f e r o c i t y of t h i s b a t t l e cannot be underestimated, and to say that Caesar was neither hard pressed nor ever i n fear f o r h i s l i f e would be a misstatement. We are informed that f o r much of the b a t t l e the outcome was i n doubt.  "The d e i f i e d J u l i u s , when h i s troops gave way at  Munda, ordered h i s horse to be removed from sight, and strode forward as a f o o t - s o l d i e r to the front l i n e .  His men, ashamed to desert t h e i r com-  mander, thereupon renewed the f i g h t . "  .Morale was here restored by f i r m -  ness and, had Caesar not used h i s talents i n such a manner, he could not have overcome the many disadvantages under which he fought. Caesar's strategy which won Munda was developed as the b a t t l e progressed. The strengthening of h i s men's s p i r i t s before moving up the slope increased h i s own willingness to move, f o r there was undoubtedly some h e s i t a t i o n on h i s part before he would expose h i s men to a f i g h t against overwhelming odds.  I f nothing e l s e , an u p h i l l struggle taxes to capacity a legionaire's 67 B e l l . Hisp., 31. 68 Frontinus, Strategemata, I I , 8, 13.  142 strength, willpower and determination, and that h i s men weakened halfway up the h i l l when they r e a l i z e d that the enemy would not y i e l d can he a t t r i b u t e d to the unexpected resistance provided by the Pompeians. the contest was not attended with Caesar's previous success, but was  "Here long  doubtful and threatening, so that Fortune seemed evidently h e s i t a t i n g how to a c t . "  6 9  No f i e l d of b a t t l e more perilous or desperate had Caesar ever entered.  His e f f o r t was perhaps greater than that of h i s men,  and i t i s  possible that they were brought to t h e i r senses more by the effect of shame than courage.  " I t was reported that he said that he had often fought f o r 7f)  v i c t o r y , but that t h i s time he had fought even f o r existence,"  Labienus,  one of Caesar's greatest and cleverest opponents, died i n the b a t t l e and along with him Yarns, who had once been the proud commander of the renegade force i n A f r i c a .  Both of these warriors received f u l l m i l i t a r y honours.  Thus did Caesar recognize m i l i t a r y prowess even i n an enemy. Sextus Pompeius, informed of Caesar's v i c t o r y at Munda, abandoned Corduba and sought refuse i n the mountains of the north, while Gnaeus f l e d to Carteia, where he was injured while h u r r i e d l y boarding a ship. Although f o r a long time he evaded Caesar's scouts (under Didius), he f i n a l l y was captured, s l a i n and h i s head brought to Caesar at H i s p a l i s .  How reminiscent of h i s father's  end I "The remains of Pompey's army r e t r e a t i n g to Munda, with the i n tention of defending themselves i n that town, i t became necessary to invest it."  Caesar's strategy i n beginning the siege of Munda l a y i n t e r r o r i z i n g 69 Florus, Epitome of Roman History,' IV. 2, 78, 70 Appian, I I , 15, 104. 71 B e l l . Hisp., 32.  7 1  143 the enemy encamped w i t h i n i t s w a l l s .  "The dead bodies of the enemy,  heaped together, served as a rampart, and t h e i r j a v e l i n s and darts were f i x e d up by way of palisades. Upon these we hung t h e i r bucklers to supp l y the place of a breastwork, and f i x i n g the heads of the deceased upon swords and lances, planted them a l l around the works, to s t r i k e the greater t e r r o r i n t o the besieged, and keep awake i n them a sense of our prowess."  72  Iven such a macabre sight did not bring about the surrender o f the besieged and Caesar, when the circumvallation of the town was complete, l e f t Fabius Maximus i n charge and marched to Corduba.  "Fabius Maximus, whom he had  l e f t to continue the siege of Munda, conducted i t with great zeal; so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut up on a l l sides, s a l l i e d out, but were repulsed with great l o s s .  Our men seized t h i s opportunity to get posses-  s i o n of the town, and took the rest prisoners, i n number about fourteen thousand."  73  One might t h i n k that the capture of Munda would have t e r -  minated a c t i v i t i e s i n the battle-area, but such was not the case.  Those  who escaped Fabius took refuge i n Ursao, and there dug i n f o r another siege; but, when the inhabitants of t h i s town learned too l a t e the uselessness of Gnaeus' s promises, they were sorely disturbed, and without a prolonged siege yielded the town to Caesarian hands. Munda and Ursao f e l l while Caesar was f u l f i l l i n g h i s duties f u r t h e r south. Many of the f u g i t i v e s from the b a t t l e of Munda had f l e d to Corduba and gained possession of the bridge. On his a r r i v a l there, dissension arose w i t h i n the town between the parties of Caesar and Pompey. Caesar c l e v e r l y gained possession of the town by permitting the remnants of Munda to enter when the gates were opened to them by deputies who were 72 B e l l . Hisp., 32. 73 B e l l . Hisp., 31.  144 on t h e i r way to seek aid from Caesar.  "Upon t h i s those who had escaped  out of the b a t t l e set f i r e to the place, and our men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them, besides those who were s l a i n 74 without the w a l l s ; thus Caesar obtained the town."  Once again a s t r a t -  egy of s t r i k i n g at the r i g h t time had gained f o r Caesar the advantage.  He  might have engaged the enemy outside the walls and t r i e d to secure the bridge from them. Instead he waited and kept h i s a c t i v i t y to a minimum, possibly storming parts of the c i t y , perhaps skirmishing now and then f o r a bridge p o s i t i o n , but not u n t i l the gates were opened to the fugitives did he move i n f o r c e . Patience and preciseness had aided him. "Thence Caesar marched to H i s p a l i s , which sent deputies to sue f o r pardon."  75  Within t h i s town was a strong group of pompeians who  called  on the assistance of one C a e c i l i u s Niger, a freebooter who controlled a strong army of Lusitanians. He was successful i n gaining entrance to the town, and immediately began to set up a defence.  The Lusitanians i n t h e i r  accustomed barbaric f e r o c i t y changed what had been a defence to a p i l l a g e . Caesar did not press the siege from outside the town l e s t the renegades w i t h i n should set f i r e to i t i n despair and destroy the w a l l s . "So he made a campaign against them, and by appearing to conduct the siege i n a rather careless fashion he gave them some hope of being able to escape. A f t e r t h i s he would allow them to come outside the w a l l , where he would ambush and destroy them; i n t h i s way he captured the town, which had been gradually stripped of i t s men."  76  H i s p a l i s , Munda, Ursao and f i n a l l y Asta, a small  town t h i r t y miles northwest of Cadiz, had f a l l e n to Caesar. The war near an 74 75 76  was  end, and Spain, but f o r minor skirmishes i n outlying areas, was B e l l . Hisp., 34. Loc. c i t . Dio, X L I I I , 39.  145 once again p a c i f i e d , after a war that might have been avoided had due care and attention been given to the administration of the province upon the conclusion of the f i r s t Spanish campaign. This Spanish war was the most savage of any that Caesar fought. It was one of sieges and marches, surprise manoeuvres, delaying tactics and planned withdrawals, a l l focused on the one objective of bringing Gnaeus to battle on equal ground.  But so s k i l l f u l l y did Gnaeus evade a direct  engagement and so well did he use the nature of the land i n which he fought that he compelled Caesar to fight the c r u c i a l battle at Munda on d i f f i c u l t ground with l i t t l e hope f o r retreat.  Within the c i t i e s of the battle area,  massacres had been fomented by r i v a l factions, and, as l i t t l e as such tact i c s suited Caesar's nature, they did assist his purpose. What Caesar had treated as a minor campaign became l a t e r a struggle of serious proportions.  He had underestimated the strength of  his enemy but he quickly adjusted his m i l i t a r y machine and his m i l i t a r y strategy to this new c o n f l i c t .  As i n previous battles, so i n this one  he displayed a s k i l f u l use of surprise, manoeuvre and anticipation. He had provided i l l f o r his forces' comfort, especially at Corduba, but he did seem better equipped with cavalry and this assisted him greatly i n turning back the thrust of the Pompeians' horse at Munda. Bogud's support of Moorish horse gave him the advantage i n the crucial battle and, whether he or the Mauretanian chief gave the order to advance against Pompey's l e f t or Labienus»s camp, the outcome was such that the tide of battle was turned i n Caesar's favour.  The whole campaign was one of  barbarity on both sides and, as Pompey was naturally brutal, Caesar's  146 strategy was to respond i n a s i m i l a r manner and seek r e p r i s a l s . "...Caesar, having ended the c i v i l wars, hastened to Rome 7? honoured and feared as no one had ever been before."  77 Appian, I I , 16, 106.  147 CHAPTER T i l l CONCLUSION "As regards the r e l a t i o n of strategy to t a c t i c s , while i n execution the borderline i s often shadowy, and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to decide exactly where a s t r a t e g i c a l movement ends and a t a c t i c a l movement begins, yet i n conception the two are d i s t i n c t . province of f i g h t i n g .  Tactics l i e s i n and f i l l s the  Strategy not only stops on the f r o n t i e r , but has  f o r i t s purpose the reduction of f i g h t i n g t o the slenderest possible proportions."  1  Caesar's strategy anticipated the above d e f i n i t i o n and that of Clausewitzj "strategy i s the use of the engagement to a t t a i n the object p of war."  With a l i m i t e d supply of troops and an ever-present  problem  of provisions, Caesar resorted, where possible, to c a r e f u l planning of strategy before the employment of t a c t i c s .  When he took the f i e l d , h i s  goal was nearly always to force h i s opponent into a d i r e c t engagement. The two basic elements of strategy are movement and surprise. Movement i s determined by the time afforded the general, the topography of the scene of action and the means of transport available to him.  Sur-  p r i s e , on the other hand, can r e s u l t from psychological a n t i c i p a t i o n . "For a movement which i s accelerated or changes i t s d i r e c t i o n i n e v i t a b l y c a r r i e s with i t a degree of surprise even though i t be unconcealed; while surprise smooths the path of movement by hindering the enemy's countermeasures and counter-movements."  3  P e r i o d i c a l l y Caesar resorted to a  strategy of l i m i t e d aim which involved a wearing down of the enemy by 1 L i d d e l l - H a r t , Strategy, pp. 337-338. 2 Ton Clausewitz, On War, p.117. 3 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . , p.337.  148 i n f l i c t i n g p r i c k s rather than by r i s k i n g blows.  "The e s s e n t i a l condition  of such a strategy i s that the drain on him should be disproportionately greater than on oneself.  The object may be sought by r a i d i n g h i s supplies;  by l o c a l attacks which a n n i h i l a t e or i n f l i c t disproportionate loss on parts of h i s force; by l u r i n g him into unprofitable attacks; by causing an excessively wide d i s t r i b u t i o n of h i s force; and, not least by exhausting his moral and physical energy."  4  A survey of the campaigns i n the C i v i l War reveals that Caesar used t o great advantage the s t r a t e g i c a l elements of surprise, manoeuvre and l i m i t e d aim.  H i s seizure of Ariminum i n h i s march through I t a l y took  Pompey by surprise, just as h i s a r r i v a l i n Epirus i n the dead of winter caught Bibulus i n h i s cups and Pompey unready f o r immediate action. The decision i n Caesar's favour at Thapsus was p a r t i a l l y gained by h i s surp r i s e attack on Scipio's half-completed  camp. H i s sudden a r r i v a l at  Obulco only twenty-seven days a f t e r he set out from Rome upset the plans made by Gnaeus and the insurgents i n Spain.  A double-edged effect r e -  sulted from t h i s move when Caesar's own'troops were caught o f f guard yet nevertheless were pleased by h i s appearance. The move from Corduba to besiege Ategua occurred so quickly that Gnaeus was forced to a l t e r h i s plans and to campaign i n mid-winter, much against his w i l l .  The seizure  of Corduba a f t e r the b a t t l e of Munda combined stratagem with surprise and was very e f f e c t i v e .  F i n a l l y the f a l l of H i s p a l i s was brought about through  the combination of surprise and delaying t a e t i e s . Strategy as exemplified by r a p i d i t y of movement or manoeuvre was f i r s t displayed by Caesar i n the seizure of the I t a l i a n coast towns 4 L i d d e l l - H a r t , o p . c i t . , p.335.  149 of Pisaurum, Fanum and Ancona.  At Dyrrhaehium, Caesar so manoeuvred h i s  troops that he eut o f f Pompey's land route to the f o r t r e s s and compelled him to take refuge on the rock of Petra.  This manoeuvre of Caesar's was  of course n u l l i f i e d by the action of Pompey's f l e e t , which kept open a supply route between the dock and the port at a l l times. Perhaps Caesar's greatest manoeuvre i n the C i v i l War was h i s retreat from Dyrrhaehium to A p o l l o n i a , during which he was able to outdistance Pompey and s a f e l y bring his troops (both the wounded and the unscathed) to t h e i r destination.  In  Apollonia he regrouped h i s men, assuaged t h e i r anger i n defeat and encouraged them f o r a greater campaign ahead.  Complete v i c t o r y had been within  Pompey's grasp, but Caesar's s k i l f u l manipulation of troops deprived him of i t . A good example of manoeuvre i n the A f r i c a n campaign was Caesar's abandonment o f U z i t a i n favour of a move against Agar.  This forced Scipio  to give up h i s well-established camp near Ruspina and follow h i s enemy. A brash but successful manoeuvre i n t h i s same A f r i c a n campaign was the capture of Zeta by Caesar while the enemy looked on as though powerless to r e s i s t .  Audacity combined with r a p i d i t y of movement gave Caesar the  moral advantage and sank Scipio's prestige even lower i n the eyes of h i s men. The strategy of l i m i t e d aim was f i r s t used by Caesar on a large scale i n the campaign a f t e r I l e r d a .  Thwarted i n h i s attempt to reach the  Ebro, Afranius was forced to return to I l e r d a and eventually succumbed to Caesar's war of a t t r i t i o n .  The second Spanish campaign best i l l u s t r a t e d  Caesar's use of the strategy of l i m i t e d aim. His move against Corduba withdrew pressure from U l i a and forced Gnaeus not only to give up the siege of the l a t t e r town, but also to come to the a i d of Sextus, now under  150 attack by Caesar. The h i l l near Ategua, the Castra Postumiana, gave Caesar an excellent lookout post and enabled him to keep a continual and accurate watch on most of Gnaeus's movements. To bring Gnaeus to b a t t l e , Caesar was forced t o adopt a strategy of l i m i t e d aim, but when h i s purpose was accomplished he was obliged to f i g h t on the enemy's terms.  This s t r a t -  egy o f l i m i t e d aim was then converted to a strategy of manoeuvre. Throughout the C i v i l War Caesar displayed c e r t a i n strategic techniques which can be categorized. v i t a l point.  He never f a i l e d to aim a blow at a  Dyrrhachium, Zeta, Agar and Corduba best display t h i s , and,  but f o r Dyrrhachium, each time he struck the enemy was put o f f balance. "No c r i t i c has detected a moment when he missed h i s chance. A few times he struck too soon, at Gergovia, I l e r d a , Dyrrachium: he never struck too l a t e , and when he struck home, the blow was mortal. No army that he defeated escaped destruction or surrender." Caesar was often superior i n speed and, where possible, l i k e Napoleon i n h i s I t a l i a n campaign, kept h i s troops concentrated while d i v i d i n g those of the enemy. This afforded him the opportunity to deal with the opposing forces section by section.  There was a continual use  on Caesar's part of large-scale manoeuvres and blockades to bring the enemy t o b a t t l e on h i s own terms. This often involved a l l - o u t attacks on magazines and water-supplies, r e s u l t i n g i n the removal of any opportunity the  enemy might have possessed of using the land i n h i s favour. There are  two good examples o f such a strategic technique: the f i r s t Spanish campaign and the operations around Dyrrhachium.  During the l a t t e r c o n f l i c t Pompey  was brought close to starvation and saved-himself only by piercing Caesar's 5 Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History. IX, p.705.  151 lines.  This leads to another point,  Caesar's l i n e s , when hard pressed,  were f l e x i b l e and strong and only at Munda was there any question of their breaking. "Caesar's courage as a soldier lay rather i n the power to push a strategic advantage rather than i n the longing to meet and annihilate the enemy."  This strategic advantage was often gained i n a moment of  6  c r i s i s by instant decision. E s p e c i a l l y applicable here was the use of the diagonal l i n e at Pharsalus and the s h i f t i n g of Bogud's legion at Munda. Both movements caught the enemy o f f guard and gave Caesar the victory. The temperament and personality of his opponents were always foremost i n Caesar's mind.  He f e l t sure that Pompey would not continue the pursuit  after Dyrrhachium. him at Zeta.  He knew that Scipio would hesitate before attacking  Perhaps his only f a i l i n g was i n underestimating Labienus,  who twice nearly brought him to destruction i n the African campaign. This study should not be terminated without a b r i e f discussion of Caesar's interpretations of what we today consider to be the principles 7 of war.  A. leader's m i l i t a r y a b i l i t y i s determined by the -way i n which  he has used the principles of war to his advantage. Modern m i l i t a r y thinking as exemplified by General Montgomery recognizes certain p r i n c i ples of war, some of which are applicable to Caesar.  "An i n t e l l i g e n t  perception of the principles of war w i l l best be gained by an intensive and objective study of the principles and methods of the great leaders of the past."  8  6 Dodge, Caesar. I I , p.758. 7 The principles of war as stated i n the Canadian Army Journal, IY (1950) and V (1951-52). 8 H. S. Macklin, as quoted i n "Military History and the Principles of War," Canadian Army Journal. IY (1950), p.2.  152 The s e l e c t i o n ana maintenance of the aim or object i s the f i r s t p r i n c i p l e of importance.  When the aim or object i s decided upon, every  possible element at a commander's disposal i s used to maintain a c t i v i t y u n t i l the desired r e s u l t s have been obtained. Concentration of forces and c a r e f u l s e l e c t i o n of opportunities play i n t e g r a l parts i n obtaining the object, which i s reached by the t o t a l destruction o f the enemy's armed force.  While the object i s far-reaching i n i t s scope, the objective con-  s i s t s of those steps taken to accomplish the object. Caesar followed closely t h i s p r i n c i p l e .  I t was h i s aim to con-  quer a l l I t a l y i n one vast sweep, and trap Pompey by surprise manoeuvres. When a peace could not be engineered, he moved against Pompey and conquered I t a l y .  His object was then achieved; h i s objectives were the s t r a -  tegic points he captured as he moved down coast. A l l h i s objectives c u l minated i n the f a l l of Brundisium. His object o r aim was then accomplished. In the f i r s t Spanish campaign Caesar's aim was to avoid a pitched b a t t l e , exhaust the patience of the Pompeians and bring them to submission under his own terms.  This he was able to do i n a period of s i x weeks. I n  Greece, where Caesar's aim had been a quick collapse of Pompey's forces, his opponent's v i c t o r y at Dyrrhaehium had prolonged the b a t t l e and prevented consummation o f the aim u n t i l Pharsalus. Underestimation of h i s enemy's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , a grain shortage and constant trouble with new r e c r u i t s made Caesar's hope of a quick, decisive b a t t l e to end the threat i n A f r i c a d i f f i c u l t to maintain. The object was f i n a l l y accomplished a t Thapsus. faced with a stubborn opposition and a prolonged war, Caesar's object i n the Second Spanish Campaign was, changed from the "mopping-up" of enemy garrisons to an a l l - o u t offensive involving h i l l b a t t l e s , sea  153 encounters and a f i n a l struggle at Munda. Caesar observed the p r i n c i p l e of s e l e c t i o n and maintenance of the aim, modifying h i s object where necessary but applying continuous pressure u n t i l the end of the straggle had been reached. A second p r i n c i p l e of war i s the maintenance of morale.  A skil-  f u l commander maintains morale among h i s own men while breaking i t down i n the ranks of the enemy. I n early days the morale of an enemy was often destroyed by crude but clever methods, eu£., f a l s e signals, simulated a t tacks.  Today such mass media as t e l e v i s i o n , radio and the newspaper, when  c l e v e r l y u t i l i z e d , have played an important part i n destroying the morale and lessening the resistance of an opposing f o r c e . Germany i n the early days of World War I I rendered Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway h e l p l e s s , f i r s t by exposing these countries to a propaganda-machine and then by overpowering them with m i l i t a r y might. The defence against a morale-breaking mechanism i s best represented by the leader who inculcates i n h i s men the ideals of t h e i r country and righteousness of the cause f o r whieh they are fighting.  There must be firmness and resolution on the part of the com-  mander and the degree of morale he i n s t i l s i n h i s men w i l l vary with the leadership they possess,  the t r a i n i n g they have received and the admin-  i s t r a t i o n which has guided them. Immediate compliance with orders, promptness, readiness and a willingness to obey r e f l e c t a high standard of morale i n a group of f i g h t i n g men.  Throughout the C i v i l War, Caesar displayed a l l  the a t t r i b u t e s of a general s k i l l e d i n the maintenance of morale.  He  was  closer to h i s men than many a modern general while h i s determination and perseverance l e d many a platoon of new r e c r u i t s to v i c t o r y .  Where possible,  he guided h i s men personally and always appeared i n the thick of the  154 fighting.  There are few factors which contributed more s i g n i f i c a n t l y to  a high standard of morale.  On the f i e l d of Pharsalia no army displayed  better morale than Caesar's, f o r deep i n the heart of every veteran was a desire to avenge the disaster of Dyrrhaehium. At Munda, the Caesarians' morale, which was gradually deteriorating as the b a t t l e progressed, was so restored by firmness on Caesar's part that h i s men went on to win an u p h i l l struggle. A t h i r d p r i n c i p l e of war, administration, which i s so important to today's m i l i t a r y s t a f f s , was no great problem to Caesar. At councils of war he alone presided and d i r e c t i v e s were issued to h i s subordinates f o r the well-being of h i s men and the favourable progress of h i s b a t t l e s . Modern encounters are on a f a r greater scale and involve much more planning than d i d those of Caesar. Caesar's lieutenants were capable enough to handle t h e i r separate assignments, and, so long as b a t t l e were being won, no r e a l administrative problem appeared. Because of the difference i n time and technique i t i s d i f f i c u l t to make a comparison between Caesar's day and ours with respect to administration.  I t can be s a i d , though,  that Caesar knew the value of proper administrative techniques.  Today's  problems of transportation, supply and s i z e of armies are greater than any Caesar had to face.  However, one comparison can be made. In providing  f o r h i s army, Caesar was able to gain subsistence from the countryside and from plunder of storage-depots; the same cannot be said of the present f i g h t i n g force, which i s supplied by various sources through detailed arrangements on a large scale.  Caesar's administrative problems were not  so d e t a i l e d as those of Napoleon, while the l e t t e r ' s problems are not to be compared to the complexity o f modem administration.  155 Concentration of force, a fourth p r i n c i p l e , i s of a mental and p h y s i c a l natures mental i n the effect i t has on the enemy's morale and p h y s i c a l i n the r e s u l t s i t provides m a r t i a l l y .  I t i s not to be confused  with mass, which often involves overthrow of the enemy by sheer weight of number. Concentration of f o r c e , u n l i k e mass, i s more successful when i t goes unnoticed.  This p r i n c i p l e was best displayed by Caesar at Phar-  salus where he used h i s diagonal l i n e to great advantage to unnerve Pompey's forces and eventually to rout them. This diagonal l i n e was a t a c t i c of a mental and p h y s i c a l nature: mental i n the j a r r i n g effect i t had on the morale of Pompey's army, and physical i n the turmoil i t caused among the enemy troops. Concentration of forces and the object are c l o s e l y related.  Caesar's object at Pharsalus was gained by the use of h i s diag-  onal l i n e . A f i f t h p r i n c i p l e of war, f l e x i b i l i t y , best shows i t s e l f i n manoeuvre, systems of command and types of equipment. I t i s the antidote to surprise and provides the opportunity f o r an army "to r o l l with the punch." Caesar made good use of f l e x i b i l i t y i n the skirmishes before Dyrrhaehium and e s p e c i a l l y i n the movement of troops away from the disasterarea to A p o l l o n i a .  On the second Spanish campaign, Caesar's r e l e n t l e s s  pursuit of Gnaeus Pompey and h i s adjustment to whatever p e r i l s Gnaeus created f o r him showed how Caesar could change h i s strategy and t a c t i c s to s u i t the e x i s t i n g s i t u a t i o n . The combined operations of maintenance of the aim or object, surprise, f l e x i b i l i t y and concentration of force and command provide a s i x t h p r i n c i p l e of war, offensive action.  Caesar, l i k e present-day com-  manders, made use of the above operations where they were applicable to  156 h i s s t y l e of f i g h t i n g . When the time was r i g h t he took the offensive. The defensive aspect of war sometimes was disregarded by Caesar i n the hope that surprise through manoeuvre and f l e x i b i l i t y through a n t i c i p a t i o n would win him the b a t t l e .  Dyrrhachium stands alone as an example of h i s  unpreparedness. The main p r i n c i p l e s of war have received our attention.  Two  other p r i n c i p l e s of moderate importance which Caesar observed and which are worthy of mention are mobility and economy of e f f o r t . The f i r s t , m o b i l i t y , i s l i n k e d c l o s e l y with f l e x i b i l i t y and f o r best results should be r e s t r i c t e d to a small, well-controlled radius.  When a commander i s  forced to move, he i s at a disadvantage, f o r he has succumbed to one of two a l t e r n a t i v e s , either of being unable to reach the enemy, or of the enemy's f o r c i n g him to change p o s i t i o n .  Caesar knew the importance o f  mobility and i t s use i n reaching the enemy. In I t a l y , Spain and A f r i c a , f o r most of the campaigns, he was the pursuer. His movements were cont r o l l e d and often strengthened by surprise.  The b a t t l e area, i f a t a l l  possible, was r e s t r i c t e d by Caesar to a small radius.  M o b i l i t y , then,  was an i n t e g r a l part of Caesar's m i l i t a r y machine. The essence of the p r i n c i p l e of economy of e f f o r t i s to achieve success with the employment o f as few troops as possible. by speed and surprise.  This i s gained  Application of t h i s p r i n c i p l e may be seen through-  out a l l Caesar's campaigns i n the C i v i l War.  At no time was he greatly  superior i n strength to h i s enemy, i n most cases having less men, but he continually outmanoeuvred h i s opponents by surprise and speed. In summary, i t i s clear that the p r i n c i p l e s of war as we know them today were, with some exceptions, as applicable to Caesar as to a  157 modern general.  The difference of time, equipment, transportation and  c e r t a i n other f a c t o r s have affected the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s . Each commander adapts himself to the s t y l e of f i g h t i n g common to h i s own era.  The p r i n c i p l e s of war remain the same and Caesar applied them as  they were necessary to the accomplishment of h i s goal - an I t a l y answerable only to him. Caesar's strategic techniques were a r e s u l t of h i s own creative genius and they showed h i s a b i l i t y to develop h i s strategy i n proportion to the s e v e r i t y of b a t t l e .  "Caesar's career as a s o l d i e r shows to a marked  degree how great i n war i s the f a c t o r of personal character. was not a thing he had learned from or could impart to others.  Caesar's a r t I t was a  product of h i s vast i n t e l l e c t and bore the seal of h i s splendid moral force."  9  Throughout the C i v i l War, Caesar was p i t t e d against men of vary-  ing s k i l l and h i s power to exploit t h e i r weak points while l i m i t i n g h i s campaigns against them to such exceptionally short encounters displayed soundly h i s s t r a t e g i c a b i l i t y . This has been a study of the m i l i t a r y strategy of Rome's greatest soldier.  Often he erred, because i t i s human to e r r , but he always r e -  gained the strategic advantage, e s p e c i a l l y when the odds were weighted heavily against him. His accomplishments on the b a t t l e f i e l d have r a r e l y been equalled.  In the words of Cassiusj  "Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world Like a colossus; and we petty men Walk under h i s huge legs, and peep about To f i n d ourselves dishonourable 9 Dodge, o p . c i t . . p.754. 10 J u l i u s Caesar. I , i i , 134-137.  graves."  10  BIBLIOGRAPHY I.  Ancient Sources  1. Primary; Caesar, C. J u l i u s , Commentarlorum pars posterior qua continentur L l b r i I I I de B e l l o C l v i l i cum L i b r i s incertorum de Bello Alexandrino A f r i c o Hiapanienai, edited by Renatus du Pontet. Oxford, 1900. Caesar, de B e l l o C j v i l i . translated by A. G. Peskett. Press, 1951. Caesar, Commentaries, anonymously translated.  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y  London, 1882.  Caesar, Guerre d'Afrique. texte e'tabli et t r a d u i t par A. Bouvet. 1949.  Paris,  Cicero, Marcus T u l l i u s , Letters to A t t i c u a . translated ( i n two volumes) by E. 0. Winstedt. Hew York, 1930. 2. Secondary; Appian, Roman History. V o l . I l l , translated by H. White. New York, 1913. Dio, Roman H i s t o r y , Vols. I l l - IV, translated by E. Cary on the basis of the version of H. B. Foster. New York, 1914. Frontinus, The Stratagems and the Aqueducts of Rome, translated by C. E. Bennet(edited by Mary B. McElwain). New York, 1925. Lucan, The C i v i l War, translated by J . D. Duff. New York, 1928. P l u t a r c h , Pompey and Caesar, Vols. V and V I I , translated by B. P e r r i n . New York, 1928. S a l l u s t , Floras and V e l l e i u s Paterculus, translated by J . S, Watson. London, 1887. Suetonius, V o l . I , translated by J . C. R o l f e .  New York, 1914.  159 II.  Modern Works  1. Books: Adcock, F. £., i n The Cambridge Ancient H i s t o r y V o l . IX. edited by S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, and M. P. Charlesworth, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1951. Adcock, F. E., The Roman A r t of War Under the Republic.  Harvard  U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1940. (Martin C l a s s i c a l Lectures, V o l . V I I I ) . Boak, A. E. R., A H i s t o r y of Rome t o 565 A.D. Hem York, 1952. Baker, G. P., Twelve Centuries of Rome. London, 1934. Buchan, John, J u l i u s Caesar. Edinburgh, 1932. Carcopino, J . , Cesar. P a r i s , 1950(2 V o l s . ) . Von Clausewitz, K., On War, translated by 0. I . M a t t h i j s J o l l e s . Hew York, 1943. Conway, R. S., Makers of Europe.  Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1931.  Dodge, T. A., Great Captains: Caesar.  Boston and Hew York, 1892.  Duruy V., A H i s t o r y of Rome and The Roman People From I t s Origin to the Establishment of the C h r i s t i a n Empire, V o l . I l l , edited by Rev. J . P. Mahaffy. London, 1884. E a r l e , E. M., Makers of Modern Strategy: M i l i t a r y Thought from Maohiavelll to H i t l e r . Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1944. Ferrero, G., The Greatness and Decline of Rome, V o l . I I , translated by A. E. Zinmern, London, 1909. Foertsch, H., The A r t of Modern Warfare, translated by T. W. Khauth. New York, 1940. Fowler, W. W., J u l i u s Caesar and the Foundation of the Boman Imperial System. Hew York, 1908. Froude, J . A., Caesar: a Sketch. New York and London, 1897. F u l l e r J . F. C , The Decisive B a t t l e s of the Western World and Their Influence Upon H i s t o r y , V o l . I . London, 1954. Heitland, W. E., The Roman Republic, V o l . I I I . Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1909.  160 Holmes, T. R., The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, Vols. I I and I I I . Oxford, 1923. How, W. W., and Leigh, H. D., A History of Rome to the Death of Caesar. London, 1896. Leake, W. M., Travels i n Northern Greece.  London, 1835.  L i d d e l l - H a r t , B. H., Strategy: The Indirect Approach.  London, 1954.  Long, G., The Decline of The Roman Republic, Y o l . Y. London, 1874. Marsh, Frank Burr, The Founding of The Roman Empire. Press, 1927.  Oxford U n i v e r s i t y  Marsh, Frank Burr, A History of the Roman World from 146 t o 30 B.C. London, 1935. Momma en, T., The History of Rome, V o l . IV, translated by W. P. Dickson. New York, 1930. Napoleon I , P r e c i s des Guerres de Cesar, edited by M. Marchand. 1836.  Paris,  Nlebuhr, B. G., Lectures on the History of Rome From the E a r l i e s t Times to the F a l l of the Western Empire, V o l . I l l , edited by Dr. L. Scbmitz. London, 1849. Oman, C., Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic: The Gracchi, S u l l a , Crassus, Cato, Pompey, Caesar. London, 1921. Parker, H. M. D., The Roman Legions. Oxford, 1928. Sargeaunt, H. A., and West, G., Grand Strategy: The Search For Victory. London, 1942. Schlegel, F., A Course of Lectures on Modern History, to which are added H i s t o r i c a l Essays on the Beginning of our History, and on Caesar and Alexander, translated by L. P u r c e l l and R. H. Whitelock. London, 1849. Shuckburgh, E. S., A H i s t o r y of Rome to the Battle of Actlum. London, 1896. S i h l e r , E. G., Annals of Caesar: a C r i t i c a l Biography with a Survey of the Sources f o r More Advanced Students i n Ancient History and P a r t i c u l a r l y for the Use and Service of Instructors i n Caesar. New York, 1911.  161 Spaulding, 0. L., Nicherson, H., and Wright, J . ¥., Warfare; A Study of M i l i t a r y Methods from the E a r l i e s t Times. London, 1924. S t o f f e l , E. G., H i s t o i r e de Jules Cesar, Guerre C i v i l e , (3 V o l s . ) .  P a r i s , 1887  Wright, Q.., A Study of War.. Chicago, 1942 (2 V o l s . ) . 2. P e r i o d i c a l s ; Anonymous, "Caesar's A r t of War and of Writing," A t l a n t i c Monthly, XLIV (September, 1879), pp. 273-288. Coolen, E. A., "Surprise," pp. 62-72.  Canadian Army Journal, V (August, 1951),  Kennedy, K. C , "The P r i n c i p l e s of War," Canadian Army Journal, V (November, 1951), pp. 69-74. " M i l i t a r y History and the P r i n c i p l e s of War," Canadian Army Journal, I V (December, 1950), pp. 1-2. Postgate, J . P., "The S i t e of the B a t t l e of P h a r s a l i a , " Journal of Roman Studies. X I I (1922), pp. 187-191. Vokes, C , "Morale," Canadian Army Journal, V (January, 1952), pp.28-31,  

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