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Caesar's strategy in the Civil War Cadman, Frederick William 1957

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CAESAR'S STRATEGY IN THE CIVIL WAR by FREDERICK WILLIAM CADMAF B.A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1949 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of CLASSICS We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1957 i i ABSTRACT The purpose of this study i s to determine Caesar's strategy i n the C i v i l War of Rome, 49 B, C. to 45 B. C. The C i v i l War with a l l i t s p o l i t i c a l intrigues has received less attention than the G a l l i c War but i t i s i n many mays more interesting. Roman i s pitted against Roman with an empire as the prize fo r the v i c t o r . Caesar i s struggling for his l i f e against forces i n I t a l y and other parts of Europe who do not wish to see Rome ruled by a Dictator. The C i v i l War rings the death k n e l l of the Republic and heralds the b i r t h of the Empire. The basic works for t h i s study are the three books of the C i v i l War (De Bello C i v i l i ) written by Caesar himself, the Alexandrine War (De Bello Alexandrino), the African War (De Bello Afrioo) and the Spanish War (De Bello Hispanienal), a l l of doubtful o r i g i n but nevertheless im-portant and of great value to the student of m i l i t a r y strategy. I have referred often to the Letters of Cicero, which reveal much information about the m i l i t a r y scene at the time of Caesar's march through I t a l y . Cicero's work i s the only contemporary account of Caesar's a c t i v i t i e s available to the scholar, but I have supplemented this by a study of l a t e r historians of Rome. Such writers as Cassius Dio and Appian provide the m i l i t a r y historian with data on many of Caesar's movements and c l a r i f y his strategy. I have augmented the ancient accounts of Cae-sar's campaigns i n the C i v i l War by modern studies, as i s evident from the Bibliography. i l l The analysis of a l l the campaigns of the C i v i l War produces a definite strategic pattern. The elements of surprise, manoeuvre, anticipation, and a general understanding of an enemy's mind, which are displayed by a l l s k i l f u l m i l i t a r y leaders, were also part of Caesar's strategic equipment. Most often through s k i l l but sometimes by luck he applied the above techniques where they were needed and, i n a l l the major c o n f l i c t s , these elements of strategy provided him with victory. Though t a c t i c s and strategy are closely linked on the battle f i e l d , no attempt has been made i n this study to give much d e t a i l to tac t i c s except where such information i s necessary i n explaining the strategic movement concerned. The f i e l d of tac t i c s i s beyond the scope of my study. Throughout the history of man, certain principles of war have been followed by great m i l i t a r y leaders. Caesar was no exception. When Caesar i s compared with generals today and his conditions of warfare with those that exist now he displays certain common principles: the selection and maintenance of the aim, the maintenance of morale, concen-tr a t i o n of force, f l e x i b i l i t y and offensive action. Caesar, i n combining the principles of war with sound strategic methods, created f o r himself a name respected and feared i n the annals of history. In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t i s under-stood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of Classics The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada. Date A p r i l 18th, 1957. i v TABLE OF CONTENTS page CHAPTER I Introduction 1 CHAPTER I I Intrigue i n I t a l y 8 CHAPTER i n The March Through I t a l y 14 CHAPTER IT The F i r s t Spanish Campaign 33 CHAPTER T From Dyrrachium to Pharsalia 55 CHAPTER 71 The African Campaign.. 79 CHAPTER T i l The Second Spanish Campaign 113 CHAPTER T i l l Conclusion 147 BIBLIOGRAPHY i 5 8 CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION The C i v i l War between Caesar and the Republicans was waged intermittently over a period of f i v e years from 49 B.C. to 45 B. C. I t was a tumultuous period i n Roman history and one which witnessed the downfall of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus, and the r i s e to power of Gaius Julius Caesar. Although the war was a c i v i l struggle, i t should be stressed that most of the f i g h t i n g took place on foreign s o i l , only the f i r s t few battles being waged on I t a l i a n ground. The C i v i l War produced two important results: the death of the Republic and the b i r t h of the Principate. In 49 B.C. the Republican p o l i t i c a l system was on the verge of collapse; the senate no longer displayed efficiency and the people could more ea s i l y be swayed by the appeal of a powerful m i l i t a r y statesman than by the pleading of a ser v i l e group of senators controlled by an ar i s t o c r a t i c minority. The purpose of t h i s study i s to show how Julius Caesar, during the period of the C i v i l War, increased his power and prestige through the exercise of m i l i t a r y strategy. To understand better Caesar's s k i l l , several points must be made clear about strategy. We should know what i t i s , how i t i s applied, and consequently how Caesar used i t . Strategy i s as old as mankind. I t has evolved as man has developed. As the science of war became more fa m i l i a r to man, so his knowledge and application of strategy increased. Strategy has been defined i n several ways. Let us consider a few of these. K a r l von 2 Clausewitz (1780-1831), defines strategy as: "the use of engagements to attain the object of the war. 1 , 1 This d e f i n i t i o n has been c r i t i c z e d by B. H. Liddell-Hart because " i t intrudes on the sphere of policy, or the higher conduct of the war, which must necessarily be the responsi-b i l i t y of the government and not of the m i l i t a r y leaders/* and because " i t narrows the meaning of 'strategy* to the pure u t i l i z a t i o n of b a t t l e , thus conveying the idea that battle i s the only means to the stra t e g i c a l 2 end." We may say then that, according to Von Clausewitz, strategy i s a plan of war by which detailed mapping of the proposed campaigns regu-lates the battles fought i n these campaigns. Count von Moltke (1800-1891), a Prussian f i e l d marshal and the greatest strategist of the l a t t e r half of the nineteenth century, offers t h i s d e f i n i t i o n of strategy: "the p r a c t i c a l adaptation of the means placed at a general's disposal to the attainment of the object 3 i n view." I t i s interesting to note the emphasis placed upon the importance of the general's a b i l i t y i n this d e f i n i t i o n . F i n a l l y , B. H. Liddell-Hart defines strategy as: "the art of di s t r i b u t i n g and applying m i l i t a r y means to f u l f i l the ends of p o l i c y . " 4 This same author i s a staunch advocate of the strategy of indirect approach, which he describes as the technique used "to dislocate the enemy's bal-ance i n order to produce a decision." This technique of the indirect 1 K. von Clausewitz, On War, trans. 0. J . Matthijs Jolles (Hew York, 1943), p.62. 2 B. H. Liddell-Hart, Strategy; The Indirect Approach (London, 1954), p.333. ' « 3 Liddell-Hart, op.cit., p.334. 4 Liddell-Hart, op.cit.. p.335. 5 Liddell-Hart, op.cit., p.31. 3 approach of strategy requires some explanation because i t i s of importance to the study of Caesar's own strategy. As there are two forms of experience, direct and i n d i r e c t , so there are two approaches to the use of strategy, the direct and the ind i r e c t . The direct approach involves immediate contact with the enemy without reference to the element of surprise. Hope of vic t o r y i s placed on the strength of one's own force and the weakness of the opponent. On the other hand the indirect approach i s concerned with the element of surprise, the anticipation of the enemy's moves, the placement of forces. L i d d e l l -Hart presents the case for the indirect approach and he i s especially convincing i n his treatment of Caesar's application of i t . He t r i e s to show how the successful campaigns were won by the indirect approach and the unsuccessful were l o s t as a result of the direct approach. Further reference to th i s w i l l be made i n a l a t e r chapter. A majority of m i l i t a r y writers agree that the s k i l l of the general determines his basis of strategy and that a general, by ex-p l o i t i n g the elements of movement and surprise, lessens the opportunity of his opponent to gain a vict o r y . The winning of the war i s not necessarily the aim of strategy, which i s rather the arrangement of battles so that they are fought under circumstances most advantageous to the general and the army concerned. The victory i s gained by the tact i c s employed i n carrying out the strategic plan. The psychological approach to strategy i s just as important as the physical. The strategic s k i l l of a commander i s keenly tested when he anticipates correctly his opponent's next move. Of importance to the commander i s the dislocation of the enemy {an important aim of 4 strategy) and t h i s dislocation may be psychologically created by a physical move on the enemy's rear or a flank attack. Thus a shock results rather than the s t r a i n which would be produced by a fr o n t a l attack. Strategy then i s best applied when both physical and psycho-l o g i c a l forces are u t i l i z e d by the general. Since strategy i s concerned with the p l o t t i n g of m i l i t a r y engagements, there are certain factors that the strategist must take into consideration when contemplating an engagement. Von Clausewitz considers that these factors exist i n the f i e l d of moral, physical, 6 mathematical, geographical and s t a t i s t i c a l analysis. I t i s therefore the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the strategist to see that where possible a l l the above factors are functional before a m i l i t a r y engagement takes place. An engagement should be fought i f at a l l possible i n an open pl a i n , f o r here the talent of the general can best be displayed; " i n mountains he has too l i t t l e command over the separate parts, and the direction of a l l gets beyond his powers; i n open plains i t i s simple 7 and does not exhaust those powers.* The element of surprise i s one of the most rewarding and important aspects of strategy. The a b i l i t y to detect a weakness i n the enemy's l i n e i s i n i t s e l f commendable but to use t h i s weakness, as Pompey did at Dyrrhachium, and to create a further disadvantage fo r the enemy by an unexpected move i s indeed an indication of w e l l -planned strategy. Seerecy and rapidity contribute greatly to the success of a surprise movement. The effect on the opponent can be a loosening of the bond of unity between leader and followers - a form 6 Von Clausewitz, op.cit., p.124. 7 Von Clausewitz, op.cit., p.127. 5 of psychological warfare i f you l i k e - f o r nothing i s so unnerving for a commander on the defensive as the doubt and distrust engendered i n himself and his troops by an opposing general who has just completed successfully a surprise move. We must understand that "surprise i s 8 psychological i n essence and the antidote i s equally nebulous.** Sur-prise then can be a double-edged weapon, for the enemy by counter-surprise may offset any advantage gained. Thus the st r a t e g i c a l factor of surprise i s , perhaps, the commander's greatest weapon and Caesar did not hesitate to use i t to advantage when time and place warranted i t . Herman Foertsch, a colonel of the German general s t a f f , places the element of surprise second to superiority of forces and he stresses the importance of conducting where possible a strategy of annihilation so that the m i l i t a r y organization of the enemy can be crushed as quickly as possible. **It i s the art of strategy to bring about a battle under the most favorable circumstances possible, both as to the ground and the timing, and to force i t on the opponent under conditions that are most unpropitious f o r him.1*^ Thus within definite strategic l i m i t s the goal of strategy i s "to break the w i l l of the enemy by m i l i t a r y means, that i s , to deprive him of his means to f i g h t either permanently or u n t i l he submits." 1 0 Strategy i t s e l f has not changed through the ages; the old principles have merely been adapted to new conditions of f i g h t i n g so 8 E. A. Coolen, "Surprise," Canadian Army Journal, 7(1951), p.71. 9 H. Foertsch, The Art of Modem Warfare, trans. T. W. Khauth. (New York, 1940), pp.26-27. 10 Foertsch, op.cit., p.21. 6 evident i n the theatres of war today. Modern writers on strategy s t i l l draw lessons from the campaigns of ancient soldiers such as Hannibal and Caesar, who showed the importance i n strategy of the objective, the seizing of the offensive, and the efficiency of mobility. The principles of strategy that they followed, e.g., surprise, concentration, team-work, and placement of forces, are s t i l l applicable today. The substance of strategy has been discussed at some length to pave the -way for a developed analysis of the method of strategy em-ployed by Caesar to make himself master of the Roman world. We s h a l l see how Caesar won complete victory i n the C i v i l War by scheming, planning and sometimes f a i l i n g i n his strategy. The strategy of over-throwing as wel l as the technique of wearing down an enemy by quick thrusts or prolonged action was very f a m i l i a r to, and wel l u t i l i z e d by, Caesar. The strategy of the C i v i l War i s decidedly personal, for the opposing forces were i n the hands of generals who not only controlled the strategy of thei r respective campaigns, but also the t a c t i c s . We must realize that "modern warfare finds i t s roots i n the 11 Napoleonic era," not i n the c l a s s i c a l age; however, i n the f i e l d of strategy and t a c t i c s , and especially strategy, the old ideas have merely been modified to conform with present fighting conditions. I t i s e v i -dent that Caesar used no fixed system of strategy; he instead made great use of unforeseen circumstance. His a r t i f i c e s and contrivances were often well suited to the strategic situation and often they involved the element of surprise. His strategical technique was modified to 11 E. A. Goolen, op.cit., p.62. 7 suit the conditions under which he fought. Perhaps he was not the greatest strategist of history, but he can be ranked with such out-standing m i l i t a r y men as Alexander, Hannibal and Napoleon, and i n many phases of m i l i t a r y s k i l l (not necessarily strategy) he outranks them. CHAPTER I I INTRIGUE IN ITALY 8 In order that we may understand Caesar's reasons for marching against Pompey and the Republicans i t w i l l be necessary to review, without excessive d e t a i l , the events which took plaee p r i o r to his crossing of the Rubicon, I t should be noted here that i n th i s study the chronology used u n t i l the second Spanish Campaign i s that of the old calendar and not of Caesar's revision. Therefore the dates mentioned w i l l be approximately two months e a r l i e r than those of the solar calendar, a condition which was not r e c t i f i e d (except at times roughly by a form of intercalation adopted by the magistrates) u n t i l near the end of Caesar's career. In the consular elections of 51 B.C., M. Porcius Cato, the Stoic , f a i l e d as a candidate. Elected as consuls were Ser. Sulpicius Rufus and M. Claudius Marcalius. Mareellus had incurred Caesar's wrath mainly through the b i l l he presented to the Senate "that a successor to him should be sent out even before the appointed time." 1 He further reminded the Senate that, "when Pompey proposed a b i l l touching the privileges of o f f i c i a l s , i n the elause where he debarred absentees from candidacy f o r o f f i c e , he forgot to make a special p exception i n Caesar's case.* 0 Caesar's proconsulship had been, according to agreement reached at the conference of Luca, extended for a second period of f i v e years, u n t i l the end of February, 49 B.C. ^ 1 ' " l ' ' I I I ! 1 Dio, Roman History. XL, 59. 2 Suetonius, J u l i u s , 28. 9 "Caesar's claim was that the law of the Ten Tribunes gave him the right to be a candidate for the consulship i n absentia, to which he apparently-added as a corollary that he could r e t a i n his governorship and his army u n t i l he had exercised that r i g h t . Such a claim was plausible but i t was no more." Day by day the power of Pompey increased through the efforts of Cato, who, even though a staunch Republican, realized that, i f Caesar were to be suppressed, the help of a warrior equal to him i n strength was needed. A l l i e d with Cato i n the anti-Caesarian faction were such men as Marcellus, the aforementioned consul, and L. Aemilius Paullus as well as M. Scribonius Curio, C. Caecilius Metellus Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, and even M. Tu l l i u s Cicero himself, who took his stand f o r the sake of the Republic and his friend Pompey. Caesar intended not to be outwitted by the Roman oligarchy. He was one of the richest men i n the Empire, who would not hesitate to use t h i s wealth, i f necessary, to win over to his cause men who could be of the utmost value to him. Such a man was M. Scribonius Curio, who had incurred much debt through fau l t y speculation, and who, at the present moment, was a tribune. I t was Caesar's intention to use the tribunician power of veto to prolong his magistracy, and as Curio was a f i e r y individual and a good speaker Caesar, decided that such a man would be an asset to him. By s k i l f u l bribery Caesar cleared him of debt, and so won him over to his cause, that he promised Caesar that by his constitutional use of the veto he would t r y to prevent any onesided proceeding against him. 3 ?. E. Adcock, i n Cambridge Ancient History, IX (Cambridge University Press, 1932), p.634. 10 Caesar had by th i s time (end of 51) increased the number of legions i n Gaul by new levies to eleven. But i n Home M. Mareellus had introduced a motion to the Senate that the provinces administered by Caesar be given on March 1st, 49 to two consulars who were to be pro-vided with governorships f o r that year. The Caesarians appealed to Pompey to permit t h e i r commander to conjoin the consulship with his proconsulship, but he formally rejected t h i s request and suggested that Caesar's veterans apply to the Senate for t h e i r discharge. This attempt to destroy Caesar's d i s c i p l i n e , combined with the c o a l i t i o n between Pompey and the constitutional party, disturbed Caesar, and, to be ready f o r any unforeseen move of the Republicans, he transferred one legion from Gaul to North I t a l y . Caesar realized that Mareellus wished to terminate his command on the basis that the G a l l i c war was over and the soldiers were ready for t h e i r discharge. The consuls elected f o r the year 50 were L. Aemilius Paullus and C. Claudius Mareellus. Curio, to safeguard his own position, had at f i r s t to dissimulate his allegiance to Caesar, but, at the right moment (when he had come into the disfavour of the ari s t o c r a t s ) , he openly suggested Caesar's actions. In A p r i l of 50 B.C. Pompey had commanded Caesar to return to him the legion he had lent him i n 54 and one other, that they might be put to service on the Parthian f r o n t i e r . By the time these legions had reached Rome, the Parthian threat had diminished, so Pompey had sent the soldiers to Capua to await further orders. Caesar now realized that either a great mistake had been made on the part of the senate, or he had succumbed to the treachery of Pompey. He knew that he could not 11 remain i d l e , so, having strengthened his position by his levy i n Gaul, he travelled from one region to the other, personally exhorting his troops, thereby increasing th e i r f a i t h i n him. The aristocrats on the other hand "merely displayed t h e i r enmity toward Caesar, and then made no further preparations themselves to strengthen thei r position, while they had furnished to him a plausible excuse f o r retaining the legions that were with him." Curio struck the f i r s t blow for Caesar when on December 1st, 50 B.C., he moved "that a l l persons i n arms must lay these down and disband t h e i r legions, or else they should not s t r i p Caesar of his weapons and expose him to the forces of his r i v a l s . " So ended the troublesome year of 50 B.C. L. Cornelius Lentulus and C. Claudius Marcellus, through the popularity of Pompey and the pressure of the aristocrats, were elected consuls f o r 49 B.C. On the 1st of January, 49, C. Scribonius Curio, now Caesar's senatorial ambassador, informed the Senate that Caesar was w i l l i n g to give up his offi c e and disband his legions, i f Pompey would do likewise. The Senate after a heated debate voted that Caesar but not Pompey, was to surrender his arms. Thereupon an unexpected move was made by the new tribunes f o r 49, M. Antonius and Q. Cassius Longinus, who vetoed t h i s motion and continued to do so on succeeding days. The Senate's mind was blocked against Caesar, even before Curio presented his compromise and, had not the aforenamed tribunes insisted, the message would never have been read. C. Marcellus urged that any discussion of 4 Dio, XL, 66. 5 Dio, XL, 62. V-12 the problem be postponed u n t i l such time as the senate could enforce a decision by m i l i t a r y strength, as levies and the recruiting of a new I t a l i a n army were now taking place. Another blow was struck against Caesar when "...Metellus Scipio was allowed to put the deadly motion that Caesar should lay down his command by a date to be fi x e d , and that i f he refused he should be treated as a public enemy." Antony and Cassius of course objected and were subsequently expelled. "They l e f t Rome, taking with them the one constitutional battle-cry with which they could supply t h e i r master, 7 that the rights of the tribunes were being overborne." The Senate passed the ultimum decretum against Caesar: "Caesar should surrender his o f f i c e to his successors and dismiss h is legions by a given day, or else be considered an enemy for action contrary to the interests of 8 the country." Caesar now realized that further negotiation was f u t i l e , and a f i n a l blow was struck by the aristocrats when they won over to th e i r side his resourceful lieutenant, T. Labienus. Pompey knew how to conduct the war, but not how to declare i t . To the Catonists he had surrendered the power of commencing h o s t i l i t i e s against Caesar when and how he pleased, and they had now ordered him to march against Caesar. His forces at home and abroad were greater than Caesar's. He had a naval support which Caesar did not possess, and his prestige among the powers a l l i e d with Rome was much higher. So Caesar on the 9th of January, 49, crossed the Rubicon, "...but as he was accustomed to re l y upon the terror caused by the c e l e r i t y and audaeity of his movements, rather than 6 Adcock, op.cit., p.636. 7 Adcock, op.cit., p.637. 8 Dio, XLI, 3. 13 on the magnitude of his preparations, he decided to take the aggressive i n this great war with his f i v e thousand men, and to anticipate the g enemy by seizing the advantageous positions i n I t a l y . " The constitutional motive which forced Caesar to declare war was the expulsion of the tribunes, but Suetonius elaborates further on thi s f i n a l moment: Mhe crossed to hither Gaul, ...halted at Ravenna, intending to resort to war i f the senate took any drastic action against the tribunes of the commons who interposed vetoes i n his behalf. Now th i s was his excuse for the e i v i l war, but i t i s believed that he had other motives. B' L 0 These other motives were no doubt personal preser-vation and increased m i l i t a r y prestige. So the c i v i l war had begun and Caesar, after nine years* absence, trod once more the s o i l of his native land. Alea iacta erat. 9 Appian, The C i v i l Wars. I I , 5, 34. 10 Suetonius, J u l i u s , 30. 14 CHAPTER I I I THE MARCH THROUGH ITALY " I t may be said that i n general the interest of these campaigns l i e s i n strategy rather than i n t a c t i c s , for when the battle was once 1 joined the issue could generally be foretold." Caesar's strategic a b i l i t y was not tested to i t s l i m i t i n his conquest of I t a l y but his march from Ariminum to Brundisium, even though no great challenge after the many perilous exploits of the G a l l i c war, displayed a knowledge of strategic principles gained from long experi-ence. I t i s the object of this study to explain as cl e a r l y as possible why Caesar moved, not necessarily how he moved, for the l a t t e r problem i s answered by the study of tac t i c s and not strategy. This chapter w i l l eover the events of the year 49 B.C. from the crossing of the Rubicon (January 11) to the departure of Pompey from Brundisium (March 17), the action which brought the f i r s t phase of the C i v i l War to a close. What Caesar did, he did through compulsion, for i t was i n the f i n a l analysis either his l i f e or that of the Republic and, once having made a move, i t would be f a t a l for him to turn back. His strategy was sueh that, although he had no intention of turning back, he did leave a loophole for the negotiation of a peaceful solution to the constitutional problem of his r e c a l l . "On arriv i n g at the banks of the r i v e r Rubicon, he hesitated for a while, doubtful whether he should s a c r i f i c e himself or venture upon the unconstitutional act; he was probably actuated more 2 by the desire to save himself than to rule.™ 1 Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History, IX, p.646. 2 B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Borne, I I I (London, 1849), p.54. 15 Caesar, after receiving the expelled tribunes i n Ariminum, had addressed the troops of the Thirteenth legion, informing them of the p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y situation, and had f i n a l l y encouraged them "to defend from his enemies the reputation and dignity of the commander under whose guidance they have administered the state with u n f a i l i n g good fortune for nine years, fought many successful battles, and paci-f i e d the whole of Caul and Germany." I t was necessary for Caesar at this time to convince his troops that he was r i g h t , even though he could not convince himself, for there must have been an element of doubt i n his mind. Constitutionally, he was at fault and no one knew i t any better than he, but he realized that he must make the f i r s t move and so we have the f i r s t phase of his strategic plans, namely, to convince his troops of his s i n c e r i t y , that he might creat for himself and for them the right psychological situation for f i g h t i n g . On January 11 Caesar moved across the Rubicon, d i r e c t l y towards Ariminum on the coastal road ten miles distant from the r i v e r . The senate did not anticipate so fast a march and Pompey was caught off guard. What Caesar lacked i n fighting force, he made up i n speed. It was his intention to seize Ariminum by surprise: "Accordingly, he sent forward the centurions with a few of thei r bravest troops i n peaceful garb to go inside the walls of Ariminum and take i t by surprise." 4 There i s no doubt that this plan was carried out successfully, Ariminum was i n f i l t r a t e d by Caesar's advance guard and quickly overthrown from within. Upon his approach the townspeople opened their gates to him. Ferrero describes this fifth-column a c t i v i t y as follows: "He communicated the plan to several friends and officers 3 Caesar, B e l l . Civ., I , 7. 4 Appian, I I , 5, 55. 16 who were to go with him, of whom A. P o l l i o was one, and concerted s k i l -f u l arrangements to prevent any report of his intention from reaching g Rimini.** By the time the conquest of Ariminum had teen completed the report of his advance had reached Rome. "Prayers were offered up i n public as was customary i n times of danger, and the people, who remem-bered the e v i l times of Marius and S u l l a , clamoured that both Caesar and Pompey ought to lay down th e i r commands as the only means of averting war. Cicero proposed to send messengers to Caesar i n order to come to 6 an arrangement." Pompey too was confused, f o r **i t was impossible f o r Pompey to get any true information about the enemy, since many reported to him whatever they happened to hear, and then were vexed i f he did not believe them."' Caesar had joined C. Scribonius Curio, M. Gaelius Rufus and the fugitive tribunes Antony and Q. Cassius Longinus i n Ariminum. His m i l i t a r y strength on the 12th of January stood at one legion, the Thir-teenth. This legion divided into i t s respective cohorts was assigned for further duty to Caesar's two most responsible lieutenants, Antony 8 and Curio. To Antony he gave f i v e cohorts and to Curio three, while keeping two cohorts f o r his own personal use i n Ariminum. Caesar's strategy now became two-fold. He intended to send Antony with his f i v e cohorts to seize Arretium, an inland town on the Via Cassia, while he himself with his cohorts pressed on to secure the three coastal towns of Pisaurum, Fanum and Aneona. But Pompey had not been lax i n f o r t i f y i n g his t e r r i t o r y . Recruiting of f i c e r s had been sent throughout the d i s t r i c t s 5 G. Ferrero, The Greatness and Decline of Rome, I I , trans. A*!. Zimmern (london, 1909), p.223. 6 Appian, I I , 36. 7 Plutarch, Pompey, 61 (trans. Perrin)• 8 B e l l . Civ.. I , 11. 1? of I t a l y , They were not exceptionally good m i l i t a r y men, but, with proper support, they could present a strong defense. Such persons were i n charge of the coastal towns i n north-east I t a l y . Caesar, as was h i s custom, moved quickly and by January 14 overpowered the towns, l i t t l e i f any resistance being shown: "...he 9 occupies PIsaurum, Fanum and Aneona...." Perhaps Caesar wishes to show us the ease with which he conquered when he explains the overthrow of these towns by the phrase singulis cohortibus (each with one cohort). The seizure of these three towns gave Caesar control over the north end of the Via Flaminia "Two highways led at that time from the Roraagna to the south, the Aemilio-Cassian which led from Bononia over the Apennines to Arretium and Rome, and the Popillio-Flaminian, which led from Ravenna along the coast of the Adriatic to Fanum and was there divided, one branch running westward through the Furlo pass to Rome, 10 another southward to Aneona and thence onward to Apulia.** Mark Antony had followed the former road, Caesar the l a t t e r . Although Caesar re-ports that he sent Antony to Arretium, no mention i s made of the l a t t e r ' s success there. We must assume then that he met with l i t t l e i f any r e s i s -tance and easily brought the i n t e r i o r town under control. Arretium was only 135 miles distant from Rome. By the seizure of Pisaurum, Fanum and Aneona, Caesar "was merely trying to secure an asset which would enable him to treat for peace on more favourable conditions, and to prove to his enemies that, under provocation, he could answer violence with violence.** 1^ About the 9 B e l l . Civ., l o c . c i t . 10 T. Momma en, The History of Rome, IV, trans. W.P.Dickson (London and New York, 1930), p.350. 11 Ferrero, op.cit.. pp.234-225. 18 19th of January the envoys L, Roscius and L. Caesar reached Caesar at one of these coastal towns and presented him with a message from Pompey, reminding him of the latest decree of the senate which had urged him to y i e l d f o r the good of the state. Pompey had stated: "He had always 12 placed the interests of the republic before private claims." Caesar's reply to Roscius was direct and to the point with special emphasis on a meeting between the two: " l e t Pompeius himself come nearer or allow me 13 to approach him. In this way a conference w i l l settle a l l disputes.* Caesar had f a i l e d to convince the senate that he was not intent upon war. Instead of only alarming them he had t e r r i f i e d them and the reports of his advance were magnified beyond actual fac t . While Caesar was consolidating his position i n the conquered coastal towns, Curio was on his way to Iguvium to f u l f i l the next part of Caesar's plan. Caesar was aware of the threat presented by this town which was under the garrison of f i v e Pompelan cohorts under Menueius Thermus, who had reportedly been recruiting troops i n preparation f o r a northward thrust. At fanum, as Mommsen points out, the Yia Flaminia divided into two roads, one leading to 'Rome, the other south to Apulia. Iguvium l i e s approximately s i x t y miles inland and only eight miles from the Yia Flaminia. Caesar early realized that he who controlled Iguvium governed one of the l i f e l i n e s of Borne. I t was part of his strategy to seize t h i s town quickly before the Pompeians could put a strong force there. Curio moved against i t with two eohorts from Ariminum and one from Pisaurum. Thermus, informed of Curio's a r r i v a l and mistrusting the goodwill of the community, moved his forces from the c i t y and f l e d . His men, new recruits most of them, were only half-hearted i n their 12 B e l l . Civ., I , 8. 13 B e l l . Civ., I, 9. 19 support of Pompey and many, when given the opportunity, deserted him and returned to t h e i r homes. So Curio entered and took the town i n Caesar's name without a struggle. From the v i c t o r i e s of Caesar's legions thus f a r , we can draw the conclusion that many Roman oitizens neither supported the cause of Pompey nor wished to take up arms against Caesar. I t seems evident that Caesar realized t h i s and his clemency towards the townsfolk i n conquered areas further enhanced his prestige. Most of these r u r a l citizens knew Caesar as the conqueror of Gaul, not as an invader who had violated t h e i r constitution. Now that Arretium and Iguvium were occupied, Caesar was secured against a sudden attack by the enemy, and a march on Rome could now be made by either of the two great roads, the Via Cassia or the Yia Flaminia. This march never took place, f o r his strategic plans were such that he directed his action along the east rather than the west coast of the peninsula. To march on Rome would be too costly and too r i s k y an opera-t i o n . The strength of Pompey's forces was not completely known and Caesar wished neither to be hemmed i n between his province and Rome nor to see his supply l i n e s and forces cut up piecemeal by the Republican troops. By January 29 Caesar decided that i t was time to regroup his forces. He ordered Antony and Curio to unite their legions at Aneona where he already had stationed one cohort. Meanwhile L. Roscius and L. Caesar arrived, bearing from Pompey a reply to Caesar's l a s t message, which requested a conference and other concessions. The consuls de-manded: "that Caesar should return to Gaul, quit Ariminum and disband his forees." In return f o r t h i s , "...Pompeius would go to the Spanish 20 provinces'*; u n t i l Caesar agreed, "the consuls and Pompeius would not 14 interrupt t h e i r l e v i e s . " These terms Caesar rejected, r e a l i z i n g that •unless each party could r e l y upon the good f a i t h of his antagonist i t was f u t i l e to propose that they should both disarm.** Under these conditions the war had to be prolonged, so Caesar then decided that his next strategic step was to move further south. This displacement involved the control of Picenum, an area i n which Pompey's influence had been strong for many years. Caesar had secured a foothold i n th i s t e r r i t o r y by the capture of Aneona, but should he progress further south the enemy's resistance could be stronger. The important towns against which he intended to direct his attack were Auximum, Cingulum, Firmura, and Asculum. Reports had reached him of a council of war held at Teanum Sidicinum i n Campania on January 23rd, wherein Pompey, Labienus, and both consuls had agreed to spurn his offers of reco n c i l i a t i o n and instead had recommended that Pompey advance into Picenum and there levy a force after he had taken command of the troops stationed at Luceria i n Apulia. This move north Caesar intended to block by a quick southward thrust beginning with the overthrow of Picenum. I f he could bring t h i s region under his control, a major step towards the conquest of I t a l y would be completed. Auximum, the f i r s t of the four Picenian towns mentioned, eleven miles inland from Aneona, was under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of Attius Varus with three Pompeian cohorts. As had been the case i n Iguvium so i n Auxi-mum the inhabitants were partisan to Caesar and unwilling to take a stand against him. But news had reached Caesar that Varus, after eon-14 B e l l . Civ.. I , 10. 15 T. R. Holmes, The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, I I I (Oxford, 1923), p.10. 21 scripting a large force, was intending to march quickly north and attack him. To counteract t h i s impending thrust he regrouped his forces, per-haps at Ancona, and ordered Curio and Antony to evacuate Iguvium and Arretium. Ferrero thinks that this evacuation reveals "that the occu-pation of Arretium had been merely a piece of b l u f f . " I do not entirely share t h i s opinion f o r i t seems to me poor strategy to send a task force many miles to conquer a town and then r e c a l l i t when a bluff has been perpetrated. Caesar withdrew i t for a reason — to strengthen his own force i n case of a sudden movement by Pompey which he f e l t might be underway at Auximum. The eitizens of the town through the i r c i v i c o f f i -c i a l s informed Varus that they did not intend to refuse admittance to so renowned a conqueror: "that neither they nor the rest of th e i r fellow-townsmen can endure that G. Caesar, holding imperial command, having deserved so well of the state and after performing such exploits, should 17 be prevented from entering the walls of the town." So r e a l i z i n g his i n a b i l i t y to hold the town with the al i e n troops he possessed, he f o r -sook i t but was shortly overtaken i n f l i g h t by an advance guard of Cae-sar's troops. Caesar b r i e f l y describes the results of this encounter: "An engagement i s fought and Varus i s deserted by his followers; some of 18 his men r e t i r e to t h e i r homes, the rest make th e i r way to Caesar." The unusual feature of the c i v i l struggle to this point i s the absence of direct combat. Mainly through a lack of manpower, no Pompeian garrison had yet tested Caesar's strength on the b a t t l e f i e l d . Caesar took advantage of th i s and so developed his strategy that he moved quickly 16 Ferrero, op.cit., p.232. 17 B e l l . Civ.. I , 13. 18 B e l l . Civ., l o c . c l t . 22 and regrouped carefully. At Auzimum he was informed by diverse sources of the panic i n Home and was v i s i b l y upset that he would now be prevented from negotiating an equitable peace and so be responsible for prolonging the war. With Auximum now under his control, Caesar delayed a few days i n that region to gather supplies and rest his troops. Yery l i t t l e time could be l o s t i f he was to block Pompey and force a peace, so he pushed further into Picene t e r r i t o r y towards the town of Cingulum, whose bene-factor had been T. Labienus, who had framed i t s municipal charter and who had, through his own expense, seen to the enlargement of the town. Upon his a r r i v a l the townsfolk openly welcomed and greeted him as an a l l y , showing no i l l f e eling and promising him t h e i r assistance: "He requisitions soldiers, they send them." Caesar's m i l i t a r y strength was now reinforced by the a r r i v a l of Mark Antony from Ancona and the Twelfth legion from Gaul. The l a t t e r Caesar had summoned when f i r s t reports came to him that Pompey was be-ginning to arm; a march of two weeks was required for i t to reach him. From Cingulum he had received the new recruits he had requested. Early i n February (about the 3rd), after his reinforcements had arrived and his supplies had been s a t i s f a c t o r i l y arranged, he decided to make his t h i r d move i n Pieenum against Asculum which he would reach by way of the coast town of Firmum. Caesar's intentions reached Lentulus Spinther, the Pompeian legate who had been sent as recruiting o f f i c e r 19 B e l l , Civ.. I , 15 23 to the town and held i t with ten cohorts. As Caesar moved by the coast road towards Firmum, Lentulus evacuated his troops from Asculum and proceeded south towards Corfinium, where the Pompeian forces were ga-thering for a defensive action. Caesar realized that he was losing time i n his raee to i n t e r -cept Pompey, who had now deserted Rome and taken refuge i n Lueeria, i n -tending to proceed from there to Canusium and so on to Brundisium. When Asculum and Firmum f e l l , Pompey, r e a l i z i n g that his struggle to defend I t a l y was at an end, sped up operations to enable the consuls, senators, and a l l his followers to be evacuated from Brundisium to Dyrrhachium i n Epirus. By February 6th, Caesar had reached and subdued Castrum Truen-tinum without a struggle. Now a l l of northern I t a l y and most of the south was under his command. He could reach Rome i n a short time by several of the roads he controlled but he was determined to push on and intercept Pompey. This was his strategy: to cut off Pompey, i f necessary to capture him, and so force a peace. Caesar realized now that Corfinium was to be the r a l l y i n g point for the Pompeians and that he had to continue his advance; i f for no other reason, his enemies had to be pursued. At Firmum his plan of cam-paign changed and he decided to "fight a short and sharp campaign i n I t a l y . " 2 0 Not anticipating so quick a withdrawal by Pompey, he set out south once more i n the direction of Corfinium. Corfinium was a town of considerable strategic importance. I t was Pompey*s best f o r t i f i e d and largest stronghold i n Central Italy, where he had stationed twelve cohorts mostly raised i n the surrounding t e r r i -tory under the direction of Domitius Ahenobarbus, the person appointed 20 Ferrero, op.cit., p.236. 24 by the senate to succeed Caesar i n Gaul. This town had been the f i r s t c a p i t a l of the insurgents i n the great I t a l i a n war and was the centre of the mountainous d i s t r i c t of Abruzzi inhabited by the V e s t l n i , Marsi, Paeligni and other people of Sabellian stock. I t was t h i r t y - f i v e miles inland and close to the Aternus r i v e r , which flowed through the heart of the d i s t r i c t and was bridged three miles from the town. South-east of Corfinium was Sulmo and west of i t near Lake Fucinus was Alba, both held by Pompey. "In this d i s t r i c t the Pompeians had been busy: both to them 21 and to Caesar i t was of f i r s t - r a t e strategic importance.™ By February 6, reinforcements from Pompey under the command of Vi b u l l i u s Bufus, one of his most competent commanders, were on the way to j o i n Domitius. As these troops moved north towards Corfinium they intercepted Lentulus Spinther and part of the retinue l e f t after the f a l l of Aseulum. Bufus took charge of these disi l l u s i o n e d troops and led them with him to Corfinium. Gathered i n Corfinium to make a s o l i d stand i f necessary against Caesar were Domitius, Vi b u l l i u s Bufus, Attius Varus, and eventually Lueilius Hirrus, who had f l e d to the fortress after abandoning Camerinum i n Umbria to Caesar's forces. The l a t t e r announced to the assembled defenders the approach of Caesar. Domitius, on learning of Caesar's sudden a r r i v a l , immediately sent a message to Pompey requesting further assistance. Pompey i n three l e t t e r s , preserved for us i n Cicero's correspondence, replied to Domitius: "Wherefore, as you had arranged ... to start with your army from Corfinium on the 9th of February and to come to me,, I wonder what reason there has 21 1. B. Heitland, The Roman Republic, I I I (Cambridge, 1909), p.284 25 been for your change of plan. The reason mentioned by T i b u l l i u s i s t r i v i a l , namely that you were delayed on hearing that Caesar had l e f t Firmum and arrived at Castrum Truentinum...I entreat and exhort you... to come to Luceria on the f i r s t possible day, before the forces which 22 Caesar has begun to eollect can concentrate and divide us." In a reply to th i s l e t t e r Domitius expressed his intention of watching Caesar and then joining Pompey i n Samnium should Caesar march along the coast; but i f he lingered around Corfinium, Domitius stated, he would oppose him. Pompey cautioned him: "A man of your judgement ought to bear i n mind not only the size of Caesar's present array against you but the number of infantry and cavalry that he w i l l soon collect...Curio i s concentrat-ing the garrisons which were i n Umbria and Et r u r i a and marching to join Caesar."^ Pompey was not sure of Caesar's intentions: "though one div i s i o n may be sent to Alba, and another advance on you, and though Caesar may re f r a i n from the offensive and be content to defend his posi-t i o n , s t i l l you w i l l be i n a f i x , nor w i l l you be able with your follow-ing to make s u f f i c i e n t head against such numbers to allow of your sending 24 out foraging parties." He eloses the l e t t e r with a refusal f o r a s s i s t -ance " I fear I cannot comply with your request for assistance, because I OK do not put much trust i n these legions." The situation had indeed become serious when i n a reply to a dispatch from Domitius of February 17th Pompey informed him, "What I expected and foretold has happened: he refuses to meet you i n the f i e l d at present, and he i s hemming you i n with a l l his forces concentrated, so that the road may not be clear for 22 Cicero, Ad Atticum. T i l l , 12b (trans. Winsted). 23 Ad Att., T i l l , 12c, 24 Ioc. c i t . 5 Ioc. c i t . 26 you to j o i n me and unite your l o y a l contingent with my legions whose allegiance i s questionable...So do your best, i f any tactics can e x t r i -cate you even now, to join me as soon as possible before our enemy can 26 concentrate a l l his forces." A further blow was struck against Domitius when Caesar, who by February 15th had successfully crossed the r i v e r Aternus and was encamped outside the walls of Corfinium, received a des-patch: "that the inhabitants of Sulmo, a town seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to carry out his wishes, but were prevented by the senator Q. Lucretius and by Attius the Pelignian, who were i n occupation 27 of the town with a garrison of seven cohorts." Mark Antony was immed-i a t e l y sent to relieve the town and this he did without any apparent d i f f i c u l t y even causing the defenders Lucretius and Attius to jump from 28 the w a l l . Let us now assess the comparative strength of the opposing forces at Corfinium. Caesar had been reinforced at Gastrum Truentinum by the Eighth legion, twenty-two cohorts and three hundred cavalry loaned to him by the king of Horicum. So his t o t a l strength at this time, gathered i n the v i c i n i t y of Corfinium consisted of three veteran legions (the Eighth, the Twelfth and the Thirteenth), t h i r t y cohorts (mainly re-cruits) and about three hundred horse. In numbers his accumulated force 29 was approximately forty thousand men. The Pompeian force at Corfinium was considerably smaller and less r e l i a b l e . Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts from sur-rounding d i s t r i c t s and had added thirteen eohorts which V i b u l l i u s Rufus 26 Ad A f t , VIII, 12d. 27 B e l l . Civ.. I , 18. 28 Loe. e i t . 29 Mommsen, op.cit., p.353. 2? provided through Pompeian l e v i e s . A t o t a l strength therefore of about t h i r t y cohorts was a l l the manpower available. Here the psychological effect of the weight of Caesar's numbers played an important part i n the surrender of Corfinium. So began the siege of Corfinium. The same internal dissension that betrayed the other Pompeian towns plagued this one too. Domitius t r i e d both by deceit and by bribery to retain the support of his men and townsfolk. When he saw that he was accomplishing nothing and that both his commanders and the leaders of the town intended to surrender a l l to Caesar, he t r i e d to escape by night but, being unsuccessful, he was intercepted and incarcerated. Caesar, before the capitulation of the town, had met outside the gates with Lentulus Spinther who had been sent as a representative of the Pompeians to talk over terms of submission. Caesar informed him why he had marched i n opposition to the decrees of the senate; "he had not quitted his province with any e v i l intent, but to defend himself from the in s u l t s of his foes, to restore to their position the tribunes of the people who at that conjuncture had been expelled from the state, to assert the freedom of himself and the Roman people who had been oppressed by a small f a c t i o n . 1 , 3 0 He then released him with the assurance that no looting would take place i f the town surrendered immediately. On Febru-ary 21st the citizens of Corfinium turned over the c i t y and i t s contents to Caesar, wondering what r e t a l i a t i o n he would take on both the Pompeian commanders and the inhabitants. Caesar, contrary to the Pompeians' ex-pectation, but i n accordance with his overall strategic plan, spurned 30 B e l l . Civ.. I , 22. 28 any offer of treasure (for there was a greater one awaiting him i n Rome), released Domitius, Lentulus, and the other recr u i t i n g o f f i c e r s , and even returned to Domitius a large sum of money which the wealthy aristocrat had placed i n the c i t y ' s treasure. Caesar thus impressed the townsfolk and to a certain degree the Pompeians with his beneficence. We are cor-r e c t l y informed when we are told that "The fame of Caesar's clemency pre-ceded him; he was welcomed i n every town through which he passed; and 31 his reputation was r i s i n g throughout Italy.** The Pompeian garrison at Corfinium consisting of eighteen cohorts was required to swear i t s a l l e -giance to Caesar, after which i t was despatched under Asinius P o l l i o to S i c i l y along with the cohorts which had surrendered at Sulmo and Alba. On February 19 Pompey l e f t Luceria for Canusium and by the 25th had reached Brundisium. I t was now his intention to use this port as a muster-station f o r his galleys and forces. The time that Caesar was de-tained at Corfinium Pompey used to advantage to assemble his newly re-cruited l e v i e s . We know that he intended to set up a provisional govern-ment i n Dyrrhachium but what his other plans were once he reached his destination i s questionable. We can be sure that his large f l e e t was to be put to good use and i t was no id l e report which prompted Cicero, when discussing the evacuation and the results therefrom with Atticus, to say *»yet our chiefs w i l l not hesitate to destroy by starvation th e i r country . . • A l l t h i s f l e e t from Alexandria, Colchis, Tyre, Sidon, Aradus, Cyprus, Pamphylia, Lycia, Rhodes, Chius, Byzantium, Lesbos, Smyrna, Miletus, Cos, i s being got ready to cut off the supplies of I t a l y and to blockade the 12 p grain-producing provinces.** We also have i n this same l e t t e r a state-31 Holmes, op.cit., p.28. 32 Ad Att. . IX, 9. 29 ment of Cicero's position with reference to the invader and the deserters "So i n my doubt what I ought to do, I am greatly swayed by my good fee l i n g towards Pompey. Without that i t were better to perish i n my country, 33 than to destroy my country by saving i t . " While Pompey was evacuating his forces from Brundisium, "Domi-ti u s had gone to seize Massilia with seven merchant-vessels which he had requisitioned from private persons at Igilium and i n Oosanum, and had manned with his own slaves, freedmen, and tenants..." 3 4 Thus we can see that Pompey and the Republicans had not completely yielded I t a l y to Caesar and, though they were abandoning i t , i t was only Intended to be a temporary withdrawal and the plans they were formulating for t h e i r return were not on too grand a scale to be accomplished. While Pompey was on his way to Brundisium, Caesar after delay-ing seven days i n Corfinium marched through the t e r r i t o r i e s of the Marru-e i n i , Funtiani and Larinates into Apulia. Captured i n one of these operations was Pompey's chief engineer N. Magius Cremona, whoa Caesar sent to Pompey with further demands for a conference. Caesar lost some time waiting for a reply from Pompey which Magius was to bring him and which never came. I t seems that Pompey had used this delay as a device for gaining time. Caesar not to be outdone i n his attempts to secure a satisfactory settlement had sent his lieutenant Caninius Rebilus to L. Scribonius Libo requesting him to exercise his authority i n obtaining a conference. Pompey was on the move and when Libo'a answer reached Caesar ("...the consuls being absent, negotiations for a settlement cannot be 33 Ad At t . . IX, 9. 34 B e l l . Civ.. I, 34. 30 35 carried on without them."), Pompey had the evacuation of Brundisium underway. By the time Caesar arrived at Brundisium on March 9th with s i x legions, Pompey*s departure-plans were well advanced. His ships had l e f t March 4th on th e i r f i r s t t r i p to Dyrrhachium carrying part of his army, the consuls, Republican senators, and a l l those of rank who wished to de-sert I t a l y . Mommsen informs us that Pompey had twenty-five thousand per-i l s sons to remove from Brundisium, a sizeable number requiring a large number Of ships, but, as we know from Cieero, these ships were available* Caesar immediately began his blockade and Pompey, r e a l i z i n g that his ships would not return for about a week, had a l l roads and trenches barricaded and f o r t i f i e d , often by sharpened stakes driven into the ground and concealed by earth or other available material. He thus by devious means made a l l entrances treacherous f o r oncoming troops. Even ship-towers had been constructed, higher than Caesar's (on the average Caesar's were only two stories, Pompey*s three). Caesar realized that he must control the harbour i f he was to thwart Pompey*s last move. He thereupon began the construction of piers and moles, pushing them out into the harbour as rapidly as possible. But he did not work fast enough, and on the 17th Pompey's ships returned, by-passed the moles, and docked. I f Caesar was to win he must now reach Pompey by land. This could be done only i f the Brundisians opened thei r c i t y to him and th i s they did. Tired and disgusted after t h e i r oppression at the hands of the Pompeians, they sent scouts to Caesar to direct his men to the harbour by a circuitous route, s k i r t i n g the obstacles Pompey 35 B e l l . Civ. t I , 26. 36 Mommsen, op.cit., p.354. 31 had placed i n t h e i r way. But i t was too l a t e ; by the time the advance guard reached the dock-area Pompey's f l e e t was under s a i l and his eva-cuation complete. A l l t h is was done by March 17th and his only loss was two ships which ran afoul of Caesar's piers. "Except these prisoners, not one Pompeian soldier remained upon I t a l i a n s o i l ; and i n s i x t y - f i v e days •213 the conquest of the peninsula had been achieved almost without a blow." We have thus traced Caesar's movements from Ariminum to Brundi-sium. In the course of t h i s a c t i v i t y , he displayed two strategical tech-niques, speed and surprise. His strategic aim was to intercept Pompey i n his f l i g h t and so terminate the war quickly. His strategy "was essen-t i a l l y guided by his understanding of Pompey*s mind." 3 8 B. H. L i d d e l l -Hart, i n support of his theory of the value of the indirect approach to strategy, claims that Caesar's advance by way of the coast road instead of upon Rome was s t r a t e g i c a l l y sound but, when he changed his plans upon learning of Pompey's retreat and drove d i r e c t l y against his opponent, t h i s , claims Liddell-Hart, was poor strategy and cost him a quick vic t o r y . "Thus an excess of directness and a want of art, In the seeond phase, robbed Caesar of his chance of ending the war i n one campaign, and con-demned him to four more years of obstinate warfare a l l around the Medi-terranean basin."3® Though Pompey was not so quick to move as Caesar, when he did march, he had a definite goal i n mind - Dyrrhachium - and he intended to put every obstacle possible i n Caesar's way and he did. Pom-pey i n t h i s f i r s t phase of the war showed to advantage his own type of strategy - that of withdrawal and eventual regrouping. 37 Holmes, op.cit.. p.32. 58 Liddell-Hart, Strategy, p.54. 39 Loo, c i t . 32 Caesar planned no immediate pursuit of Pompey for he had f i r s t to assemble a f l e e t . His next step would be to reorganize I t a l y on a satisfactory m i l i t a r y basis and then carry on the war against the Pom-peian force i n Spain. 33 CHAPTER IT THE FIRST SPANISH CAMPAIGN "I go to meet an army without a leader, and I s h a l l return to meet a leader without an army.*'! We are not told s p e c i f i c a l l y i n the de Bello C l v l l l why Caesar marched into Spain, but certain occurrences prompted him: "...he was unwilling that a veteran army and two Spanish provinces, one of which was under obligation to Pompeius for very great benefits, should be confirmed i n t h e i r allegiance, that a u x i l i a r y forces and cavalry should be provided, 2 that Gaul and I t a l y should be tampered with, a l l i n his absence." Dio informs us that: "Affairs at home he now committed to Antony's care, while he himself set out f o r Spain, which was strongly favouring the side of Pompey and causing Caesar some fear that i t might induce the Gauls to revolt."® And Applan states that: "As he had apprehensions of Pompey's army i n Spain, which was large and well disciplined by long service (lest while he was pursuing Pompey i t should f a l l upon his rear), he decided A to march to Spain and destroy that army f i r s t . " I t i s evident that before Caesar pursued Pompey to Greece, he wished to leave behind him a consolidated West. Spain, Gaul and I t a l y must be under control i f he was to successfully subdue his enemy. There i s a p a r a l l e l here between Caesar and Alexander who did not wish to march upon Persia u n t i l he had the support of Greece and the use of the Athenian f l e e t . Like Athens against Alexander, Spain within three years rebelled against Caesar's lieutenants and fomented another war. 1 Suetonius, J u l i u s . 34. 2 B e l l . Civ., I , 29. 3 Dio, XLI, 18. 4 Appian, I I , 6, 40. 34 We s h a l l see that during this f i r s t Spanish campaign i t was the strategy of the Pompeians to avoid defeat by engaging i n battle only at a great advantage while the technique of Caesar involved the elimination of Pompey's Spanish armies without resorting to a pitched battle that might expose his troops i n a disadvantageous position. Caesar's intention was to exhaust the patience of the Pompeians. The Pompeian strength at the beginning of the Spanish War was controlled by "Afranius and Petreius and Varro, legates of Pompeius, of whom one held hither Spain with three legions, another further Spain from the pass of Castulo to the Anas with two legions, a t h i r d the d i s -t r i c t of the Yettones from the Anas and also Lusitania with an equal number of legions,...." 5 There were besides "about eighty cohorts, some heavy-armed from the hither province, others light-armed from further Spain, and about f i v e thousand cavalry from each province." Of his own strength he reports: "Caesar had sent forward s i x legions into Spain, f i v e thousand a u x i l i a r y infantry and three thousand cavalry which he had had with him during a l l his former wars, and an equal number from Gaul." 6 We therefore see that Caesar entered upon his Spanish expedition numeri-c a l l y i n f e r i o r to the Pompeians, but i n command of veteran soldiers who had survived the rigours of the G a l l i c campaign and who were w i l l i n g to test the power of this new force arrayed i n the wilds of Spain. Before proceeding with the strategy of the Spanish Campaign i t i s neeessary to consider a very important aspeet of the western theatre of war, the Massilian a f f a i r . I t should be noted that the invasion of Spain and the siege of Massilia are intimately connected. Had Caesar's 5 B e l l . Civ., I , 38. 6 B e l l . Cjv. t I , 39. 35 general f a i l e d i n the siege of Mas s i l i a , a c t i v i t i e s i n Spain would have been delayed seriously i f not i n d e f i n i t e l y postponed; Caesar could not afford to lose even a week. What was the strategic importance of Massilia? Caesar say very l i t t l e about i t , but Colonel S t o f f e l comments: "Ces evenements avaient d'autant plus de gravite' que Massilia n'e'tait pas l o i n d'Aquae Sextiae (Airs) ou passait l a route d ' l t a l l e en Espagne, et qu'ainsi l a ligne de communication de Cesar se trouvait intercepted. De plus, i l e t a i t a craindre que d'autres v i l l e s ne vinssent a imiter 1'example donne par una c i t e important© et ne se declarassent pour Pompee.™ We thus see that a reverse at Massilia could thwart Caesar's plans completely. Caesar arrived at Massilia on A p r i l 19th, and there he learned that V i b u l l i u s Bufus had been sent to Spain to war Lucius Afranius of the danger of Caesar's presence. He also learned that Domi-ti u s Ahenobarbus was on his way towards Massilia by sea. The Massiliotes refused to admit Caesar on the basis that they were non-partisan and did not intend to take sides i n a dispute which involved Borne and not them-selves. Caesar thought that Massilia must come under his control since, as S t o f f e l points out, i t was s t r a t e g i c a l l y placed on the main communication-l i n e between Spain and I t a l y . So he assigned the siege of this ancient town to C. Trebonius with three legions from North I t a l y . He placed Deci-mus Brutus i n charge of the twelve ships which he ordered to be constructed on the Rhone. Thus Trebonius was to direct the attack by land, Brutus by Caesar was now faced with two m i l i t a r y contests, one i n Spain 7 E. C S t o f f e l , Histolre de Jules Cesar (Paris, 1887), I, 44. 36 and another i n Gaul. To furnish enough manpower i n Spain, he withdrew p r a c t i c a l l y a l l his troops from Gaul and carried on these two operations simultaneously. On close analysis the removal of a l l these troops might seem foolhardy but i t appears that Caesar was counting upon speed of ac-tion and a quick victory. No doubt he was somewhat disturbed by the resistance of M a s s i l i a . Gaius Fabius was wintering near Narbo when he received orders from Caesar to move towards Spain and take control of the main pass through the Pyrenees before the Pompeian forces could unite and seize i t . This Fabius did without d i f f i c u l t y with the three legions at his command, shortly to be joined by another three legions l e f t behind by Trebonius at Matlsco. Caesar set out f o r Spain from Massilia on June 5th with an es-cort of nine hundred cavalry. Afranius had intended to reach the pass f i r s t but he neither moved quickly enough nor did he thoroughly realize that Fabius was so close to his t e r r i t o r i e s . With the Pyrenees secure i n Caesar's hands, Afranius moved back to his most advantageous position though not the best strategic one, the c i t y of Ilerda. Fabius advanced down the valley of the S l c o r i s by forced marches i n pursuit of Afranius, hoping to intercept him before he could make a stand and consolidate his forces. But Afranius had too great a start and upon reaching Ilerda took up a position southwest of the c i t y on the present day h i l l of Gardeny, which was separated from the town and the r i v e r Sicoria by sections of l e v e l ground. Fabius, because Ilerda was i n Pompeian hands, took his position up r i v e r from the town. Here he waited for the three legions on their way to joi n him. The forces of Petreius and Afranius now stationed outside Ilerda 37 consisted of cavalry and a u x i l i a r i e s from Lusitania, C e l t i b e r i a and the maritime tribes of the northwest. These native levies were composed of f i v e thousand cavalry and t h i r t y cohorts of infantry both heavy- and light-armed. "Including the legions, some of which had had experience of warfare with native t r i b e s , the entire force, besides camp followers, may have numbered about forty thousand men."8 Before proceeding further l e t us consider the general topo-graphic situation of Ilerda. "Ilerda was b u i l t on a rock Tfthich stands up boldly f i v e hundred feet above the p l a i n , with a plateau of some one hundred and f i f t y acres on the top. Every side of t h i s rock i s p r a c t i -c a l l y inaccessible to assault except that on the south. Here, i n a sort of ravine, i s a slope, up which ran the road to the town, some six hun-dred yards long from the p l a i n . Near the p l a i n the mouth of the ravine i s some three hundred and f i f t y yards wide; at the town, about a t h i r d that width." 9 Although Ilerda was an excellent position for t a c t i c a l defence i t did not lend i t s e l f to such strategic purposes aa controlling or protecting central Spain. The r i v e r Ebro was the true l i n e of defense but to reach this the Pompeians would have to march through barren and mountainous country. I t i s known that Afranius stationed his infantry on the h i l l of Gardeny and i t i s assumed that his cavalry and a u x i l i a r i e s were placed on the low ground adjoining the r i v e r where his supplies and extra equip-ment were located. Fabius* encampment was approximately two miles north of Afranius'. Realizing that he was too weak to strike d i r e c t l y against 8 Holmes, The Roman Republic. I l l , p#52. 9 T. A. Dodge, Great Captain: Caesar, I I (New York, 1892), p.445. 38 the more powerful Pompeians, he constructed two bridges over the S i c o r i s , at a distance of two and four miles above Ilerda. "Over these he kept sending supplies because during the preceding days he had exhausted a l l 10 that there was this side of the river.** Shortly after these crossings were made, the three legions arrived from Matlsco. Ferrero Informs us that Fabius had met with such opposition from Afranius and had so insecurely s o l i c i t e d the help of neighbouring tribes that he quickly retreated to his position north of Ilerda. "One i s i n -clined to ask whether the retreat was not a feint to temp the enemy onwards ...he remained on the defensive awaiting the f a l l of M a r s e i l l e s . w 1 1 I do not think this was the case. Fabius was merely awaiting the a r r i v a l of Caesar f o r i t does not seem possible that Caesar would delay any longer than necessary at Massilia when he had the major force of Pompey's troops to overcome i n Spain. He certainly would not entrust the Spanish campaign to a subordinate, especially Fabius, whose experience i n m i l i t a r y a f f a i r s was not comparable to other of his more prominent legates. The f i r s t encounter on Spanish s o i l took place on the side of the r i v e r opposite Ilerda when Fabius's foragers and t h e i r protective cavalry were barred from returning to the i r camp by a washout, during a sudden storm, of the i r bridge two miles above Ilerda. Afranius detected the severity of the situation from the debris washed downstream and sent four legions and a l l his cavalry to rout the foragers. The l a t t e r were saved by the s k i l l of t h e i r commander, Lucius Plancus, who, noticing reinforcements i n the distance, so arrayed his forces on a slope that he successfully resisted the Afranians. After a brief skirmish, both the Afranians and Fabius's foragers returned to the i r camps. 10 B e l l . Civ.. I, 40. 11 Ferrero, Greatness and Decline, I I , p.253. 39 Caesar arrived on the 23rd of June with his bodyguard of nine hundred cavalry. His f i r s t task was to repair the bridge destroyed i n the recent inclement weather. This was done by night and when the camp was restored to comparative quietness he next surveyed the surrounding area, so acquainting himself with the ter r a i n that he could lay plans for his advance against the Pompeians. He eventually decided to move into a new position midway between the h i l l of Gardeny and Ilerda, on a f l a t stretch of land which Afranius had neglected to occupy. Caesar noticing that Afra-nius was refraining from ba t t l e , "...determined to pitch his camp at an interval of about four hundred paees from the lowest spurs of the moun-t a i n . . . " 1 2 Caesar, keeping i n mind the 'esprit de corps' of his men, decided on the best way to safeguard his troops: "...he forbade the erection of a rampart, which could not f a i l to be prominent and v i s i b l e from a distance, but ordered a ditch of f i f t e e n feet width to be constructed facing the enemy.*13 The strategic location of this camp i s very evident, and there i s no doubt that Caesar had i n mind the eventual blockading of Afranius on his h i l l and the future encirclement of Ilerda. Witnessing these f i r s t movements of Caesar's forces, Afranius, not to be outdone by the opposi-t i o n , shifted his l i n e of defence from the top to half way down the h i l l of Gardeny and, when he saw that Caesar advanced no closer, he stopped and awaited further developments. In the construction of his camp, Caesar so placed his forces that two lines served as a defence while a thi r d l i n e worked. A certain element of deceptive strategy i s herein displayed, f o r , when one side of 12 B e l l . Civ., I, 41. 13 Loc. c i t . 40 the camp was completed, a legion was l e f t to protect i t while a second legion was moved to the other side to protect that one. A l l this was done without revelation to the enemy. By June 26th, three days after his a r r i v a l , a rampart was b u i l t up out of the earth and ffabius* detach-ment with a l l i t s baggage was transferred to the new camp. Afranius was not i d l e while t h i s construction was taking place; he continually sent sorties to the base of the h i l l to draw out the forces of Caesar, but he met with l i t t l e success. Caesar, anxious to force Afranius*s hand, after surveying the situation noticed a small eminence midway between the h i l l of Gardeny and Ilerda. This k n o l l i f occupied by his forces would be of great strategic value to him. *Caesar was confident that i f he occupied and f o r t i f i e d t h i s he would cut off his adversaries from the town and the bridge and 14 from a l l the stores which they had brought into the town.*' Caesar was determined to seize this position and to carry out the task he sent a corp of antesignani. warriors who were especially selected f o r this type of f i g h t i n g . I t i s not necessary to d e t a i l Caesar's tactics i n his at-tempt to reach the h i l l . I t i s suf f i c i e n t to say that he f a i l e d to such a degree that this select band turned and retreated quickly when they had eome. The reason for t h i s setback Caesar attributes to the utter confu-sion experienced by his men as a result of the enemy's unorthodox style of combat. As he says, *the method of fighting adopted by the enemy*s troops was to charge at f i r s t at f u l l speed, boldly seize a position, take no particular trouble to preserve t h e i r ranks, but fight singly and In loose order...* 14 B e l l . Civ., I , 43. 15 B e l l . Civ.. I, 44. 41 So me see that Caesar underestimated both the speed of the l i g h t l y armed Spaniards and the distance to the h i l l . When he realized the seriousness of the situation, Caesar sent to t h e i r assistance the veteran Ninth legion, which quickly dispersed the Afranians after checking t h e i r onrush. The Ninth pursued the Afranians to the gates of Ilerda where they became engaged i n a battle that brought them close to annihi-l a t i o n . The s i t e of the battle Caesar describes as "unfavourable both from i t s confined l i m i t s and because they had halted just under the very 16 spurs of the mountain, so that no missile f a i l e d to reach them." The battle -lasted f o r f i v e hours and r e l i e f could be given only from the rear. F i n a l l y , i n a state of exhaustion and with a l l t h e i r missiles spent, the Ninth, i n a desperate s a l l y , drew their swords and fought with such deter-mination that the Afranians were forced to retreat within the town. This enabled Caesar's cavalry to relieve the weary m i l i t i a and so permit them to retreat to the safety of t h e i r camp. "Caesar had lost the prize f o r which he fought; and Afranius, now recognizing the value of the k n o l l , 1? strongly entrenched i t and detailed a foree for i t s protection." Caesar's strategy had f a i l e d . An analysis of t h i s reveals two points: one, Caesar's inattentiveness i n assessing the situation closely, and, two, the impetuosity of his troops. Whether Caesar ordered the Ninth to pursue the retreating Afranius i s not known. I f he did, i t was con-trary to his policy, f o r he did not wish to engage i n a pitched battle as the Ninth had served the purpose for which they had been sent. Perhaps the soldiers of t h i s legion were anxious f o r battle after so long a delay, or perhaps they were imbued with thoughts pf victory, as i s often the 16 B e l l . Civ.. I , 45. 17 Holmes, op.cit., p.57. 42 case with the pursuer. Why they made the move we s h a l l never know but t h i s error i n command cost Caesar unnecessary casualties and placed him and his men i n a position of psychological stress which was to be made worse by the events of the next few weeks. Caesar's position was now c r u c i a l and to add to the t r i b u l a t i o n came the report that a sudden flood had washed out both the bridges con-structed under Fabius' order. This occurred within two days of his recent setbaek at the hands of Afranius. Now that he had no means of crossing the r i v e r , he was rest r i c t e d to a smaller f i e l d of operations. Friendly states could not supply provisions, foragers who happened to be on the other side of the r i v e r could not return; huge supplies on the way from I t a l y and Gaul could not reach his camp; he had l i t t l e com i n winter stores as the crops were not yet ripe and Afranius had transported most of the grain to Ilerda before Caesar's a r r i v a l ; what l i t t l e had been l e f t i n wayside granaries, Caesar's forces had consumed. A f i n a l blow occurred when neighbouring tribes moved t h e i r cattle (which could be used as a re-serve by Caesar) some distance from the theatre of war. In direct contrast to Caesar's privations was Afranius' abun-dance of grain and the support he received from neighbouring t r i b e s . Be-cause Afranius s t i l l commanded the stone bridge at Ilerda, Caesar was prevented from rebuilding his washed out bridges both by the Afranians, who, having access to the east side of the S i c o r i s , harassed the workers, and by the high water. A further calamity occurred when the Ga l l i c con-voy bringing help to Caesar was forced to halt down r i v e r because of the rough te r r a i n and high water. Here were approximately s i x thousand men consisting of infantry, archers, and cavalry, a l l their supplies, and 43 even t h e i r families. This task force was soon attacked by Afranius, who used three legions and a l l his cavalry, but, by clever manoeuvring on the part of th e i r commander, the Gauls were able to take to the h i l l s (an action with which they were very familiar) where they found safety and from which they were successful i n turning back Afranius' troops with a reported loss of only two hundred archers, a few horsemen and a small number of camp followers and beasts of burden. "So completely had the situation been reversed i n a few days, and such had been the s h i f t i n g of the balance of fortune, that our men were being oppressed by a serious deficiency of necessaries, while the enemy had abundance of everything 18 and were i n an acknowledged position of superiority." Caesar may have been dejected but he was not defeated and, to counteract this sudden change of fortune, he had coracles constructed on the B r i t i s h style and these he ordered to be transported twenty-two miles above his camp at Ilerda. At this point the r i v e r was evidently not too swift and permitted operations to be carried on with reasonable safety. This movement up r i v e r was a foreed operation. Caesar had to act quickly. He could venture down r i v e r only with d i f f i c u l t y and at great disadvantage for t h i s area was under Afranius' control; thus the l o g i c a l move was up-stream beyond the washed out bridges. By means of the coracles he was able, i n a reasonable length of time, to transport a legion across the r i v e r , and so begin construction of a new bridge. This bridge was finished i n two days and i t s completion provided Caesar with two strategic advan-tages: "he recovers i n safety the stores and the men who had gone out on the foraging expedition, and begins to settle the d i f f i c u l t i e s of his 18 B e l l . Civ., I , 52. 4i4s food supply." 1 9 By July 10 Caesar had control of the eastern bank of the r i v e r and his foragers now moved more freely; his cavalry was able to surprise and capture many of Afranius* foragers with t h e i r cavalry support. Caesar at this point pauses i n his narrative of the Spanish campaign and turns to a description of the naval battle at Massilia be-tween his own legate Decimus Brutus and Pompey*s general Lueius Domitius. Domitius had the advantage of numbers while Brutus had the use of the iro n elaw which, when an enemy ship was successfully grappled, exposed the opposing force to the f u l l might of Caesar's veterans. Brutus was suc-cessful i n t h i s naval battle: "and after slaying a large number of the A l b i c i and the herdsmen, they sink some of the ships, take others with t h e i r crews, and drive the rest into port. On that day nine ships of the 20 Massilians are l o s t , including those that were captured." This success-f u l naval engagement considerable affected Caesar's strategic position. The native tribes were informed immediately of the Pompeian setback and therefore transferred t h e i r allegiance to Caesar. We can agree to a point with Dio when he says of this naval success: "But for this nothing would 21 have prevented Caesar's projects from being ruined." Caesar's star was now i n the ascendancy. Six tribes between the Pyrenees and the Ebro and even one Afranian cohort of the Illurgavon-enses pledged t h e i r allegiance to him. Caesar considered this welcome news as a great change of fortune, and he was not far wrong, for, by th i s time, the Afranians were i l l at ease and giving much thought to a retreat from Ilerda to a more favourable position. " F i n a l l y , they made up their 19 B e l l . Civ.. I , 54. 20 B e l l . Civ.. I , 58. 1 Dio, XLI, 21. 45 mind to stay action for several days, and, contrary to the general custom, 22 to forage by night." Such was t h e i r p l i g h t . So f a r we can consider the battle a stalemate. Victories had been won and lost by both sides but gradually the tide of war began to turn i n Caesar's favour. Caesar realized that the war must be terminated as quiekly as possible and that, as Afranius could not be compelled to fight a decisive battle, he must be starved into surrender. To do this he would require closer contact with the Afranian forces. This would ne-cessitate the elimination of the great distance he had to send his eavalry upstream i n order that they might cross the S i c o r i s . A change i n strategy demanded a change i n t a c t i c s , and to overcome the vexing problem of dis-tance Caesar decided to construct an a r t i f i c i a l ford one and a half miles above Ilerda. T. A. Dodge considers this enterprise to be "as remarkable 23 by i t s si m p l i c i t y as by i t s ingenuity." By this ford Caesar intended to divert some part of the Sicoris and so lower the water to a l e v e l which would enable his infantry and eavalry to cross safely. The exact purpose of this ford was "...to prevent the need of always sending the cavalry over the bridge by a long circuitous route..." 8' This work continued night and day, f o r Caesar was spurred on by reports of Afranius's a c t i v i t i e s which involved the construction of a bridge at Octogesa, on the Ebro, t h i r t y miles south of Ilerda. This bridge was to be made by coupling ships together and laying a crosswalk over them, so permitting several legions to cross. Also, as Octogesa i s i n the t e r r i -tory of Celtiberia where the natives were friendly to Pompey, Afranius 22 B e l l . Civ.. I, 59. 23 Dodge, op.clt., p.445. 24 B e l l . Civ., I , 61. 46 would f i n d reinforeements there and so be able to prolong the war into the winter. Afranius and Petreius, r e a l i z i n g that foraging had become im-possible on the East bank and that the i r position i n Ilerda would eventu-a l l y become untenable, decided, now that the i r pontoon bridge was under construction, to desert Ilerda and march by the most convenient route to Octogesa on the Ebro. "Nevertheless about one and the same time the bridge over the Ebro was announced to be nearly finished and a ford was being 25 found i n the S i c o r i s . " So began the abandonment of Ilerda. Afranius l e f t behind two a u x i l i a r y cohorts to garrison the c i t y , and led the rest of his force (Caesar i s not sure of the exact number) to joi n the two legions which he had sent across to the other side of the bridge on the previous day. This exodus took place during the early hours of July 25th. Caesar, learning of Afranius' sudden withdrawal, rushed the diversion of the S i c o r i s and so lessened the volume of water that his infantry were able to eross, though at times only the i r heads were above water. A l i n e of cavalry was placed a short distance downstream to retrieve any soldier who unfortunately l o s t his footing and was washed downstream. This opera-t i o n was carried through successfully with no loss of either infantry or cavalry. The pursuit of Afranius was not carried out immediately, "for Caesar did not think i t safe i n the darkness and with men ignorant of the 26 country to follow up an enemy that was well acquainted with i t . " His strategy was now restricted: "The only course l e f t for Caesar was to 25 B e l l . Civ.. I , 61. 26 Bio, XII, 22. 47 annoy and harass the enemy's l i n e of march with his cavalry..." 2 7 So, with his forces safely arrayed on the east bank of the S i c o r i s , he organ-ized his troops and sent his horsemen i n pursuit of the enemy's rearguard. The road Afranius had decided to follow was almost waterless, but i t had the advantage of providing many places f o r quick defence. Cae-sar knew that the enemy could reach the Ebro before him by this shorter route, his own involving a wide c i r c u i t via the bridge just constructed or the ford. So to effect as much speed as possible he led forth his men (the cavalry contingent exempted) i n a three-line formation ( t r i p l e x acies). Caesar's enforced speed combined with the eagerness of his men soon brought them within easy distance of the enemy who were already being harassed by Caesar's cavalry. "And there was such zeal i n the soldiery that, though a c i r c u i t of s i x miles was added to th e i r route and a long delay was interposed at the ford, they overtook by the ninth hour of the day those op who had gone out at the th i r d watch." Afranius and his troops were so unnerved by the cavalry charges and the sight of Caesar's soldiers that they took up a position on r i s i n g ground about two miles southwest of the small inland town of Sarroca and there formed lines of battle. His men were worn out by fighting and the t o l l of thei r march. I t iaast have grieved Afranius immensely to stop at t h i s point for he had but f i v e miles to travel to reach the narrow defiles of the mountain range which would carry him to the Ibro. This defile was to play an important part i n the events of the following days. Caesar took up his position on the plains and when he noticed that the Pompeians showed no signs of attacking he encamped upon the 87 B e l l . Civ., I , 63. 80 B e l l . Civ., I , 64. 48 nearest h i l l not f a r north of Afranius. Reconnoitring showed that there was r e l a t i v e l y f l a t land between Afranius»s camp and the mountains and Caesar realized that he must reach the d e f i l e f i r s t i f he was to bar the enemy's advance to the Ebro. Afranius' camp was so situated that he had access to, and could easily defend, a l l routes leading to this d e f i l e . Caesar, wary of t h i s , decided that his next strategic move was: '•to cut 29 o f f the foe from the Ebro and prevent him from foraging." This Involved for him a dangerous detour over rugged land but i f he could outdistance Afranius i n a f i n a l dash for the de f i l e he would command an important strategic position which would have great bearing on turning the struggle i n his favour. Caesar at dawn began a withdrawal which at f i r s t appeared to the Afranians to be a retreat but which actually was a rotation to the right that produced an outflanking movement. When the enemy saw these f i r s t manoeuvres of Caesar's troops they were overjoyed for they thought they had outlasted th e i r opponents and that a shortage of supplies combined with other circumstances unknown to them had produced this unexpected with-drawal. To their amazement they suddenly realized that Caesar had turned and had drawn p a r a l l e l with them. They now took up arms and began thei r march on a straight course to the Ibro. Caesar gives an account of this withdrawal, the obstacles met, and the subsequent result: "the whole con-test turned on speed - which of the two would f i r s t seize the defiles and the h i l l s - but the d i f f i c u l t i e s of the roads delayed Caesar's army, while Caesar's pursuing cavalry hindered the forces of Afranius." Caesar reached the defiles f i r s t and came to a ha l t . He had outflanked Afranius 29 B e l l . Civ.. I , 68. 30 B e l l . Civ.. I , 70. 49 and with, the cavalry behind and Caesar's troops i n front controlling a l l routes to the various d e f i l e s , the Afranians took refuge on a nearby h i l l . Caesar now waited for Afranius to make the next move. After assessing the situation closely Afranius noticed that approximately two miles from his encampment was a mountain which, i f controlled, would give the holder access to a ridge that would permit an easy route to the con-fluence of the S i c o r i s and Ebro r i v e r s . I t was Afranius' intention to capture this h i l l and so by a change of route arrive at Octogesa. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t to say that he f a i l e d i n his attempt and the force he despatched was cut to pieces by Caesar's cavalry. Thus the last vestige of hope was rapidly disappearing for the Pompeians. Caesar had been successful i n the accomplishment of his strategic purpose. He had pursued Afranius successfully from Ilerda; he had reached the passes before him, and he had slaughtered before the eyes of a l l a portion of the enemy's troops. The i n i t i a t i v e lay with Caesar. Should he attack and annihilate his opponents or should he wait and starve them out? Since Afranius would not engage i n open battle, Caesar was unwilling to expose his men to the rigours of an u p h i l l attack, and resorted instead to a strategy of waiting combined with tactics so applied as to prevent the Afranians from securing water. "Caesar had entertained the hope that, having eut off his adversaries from thei r food supply, he would be able to f i n i s h the business without exposing his men to fighting or bloodshed." 3 3 Caesar took the time available to consolidate his forces while Afranius and Petreius returned to t h e i r camp only to find that the various routes leading to the Ebro had been elosed off by outposts strategically placed 51 B e l l . Civ.. I , 72. 50 by Caesar. By July 28, Afranius and Petreius, after several days of i s o l a -t i o n , were hard pressed f o r water. Their scouts had discovered a small reservoir but constant action by Caesar's cavalry had prevented the water-gatherers from returning with any sizeable quantity of water. To counter-act t h i s situation, the Pompeian commanders decided to strengthen t h i s supply l i n e . Before this was done the problem of the i r next move had come before the council of the Pompeians and a decision had to be made on one of two alternatives: to t r y to return to Ilerda where they had a small amount of grain stored or to t r y to reach Tarraco, only a short distance away along a circuitous and somewhat dangerous road. Caesar kept his distance, attacking spasmodically and only when necessary. T o r he did not wish to come to close quarters with the enemy, partly because he was afraid that they might become desperate and carry out some rash undertaking, and partly because he hoped to win them over 32 anyway without a c o n f l i c t . " After a brie f period of fraternization between the two camps, which was carried on while Afranius and Petreius were away supervising the safeguarding of t h e i r water supply, the Afranians deeide to return to Ilerda and t h e i r reserve grain store. So the i r retreat began, but be-fore i t was long underway many of t h e i r Spanish a u x i l i a r i e s deserted them and either took to the h i l l s or transferred t h e i r allegiance to Caesar. As Afranius moved so did Caesar; and his cavalry kept i n constant touch with Afranius' rearguard. No movement u p h i l l or down could be made by the Afranians without receiving some sort of setback at the hands of the 32 Dio, XLI, 22 51 eavalry whether from the speare hurled at them as they proceeded downhill or from the general weariness they sustained i n beating back the attacks of the cavalry as they advanced upwards. We must not, even at t h i s dismal period for the Afranians, under-estimate t h e i r leaders' a b i l i t y i n counteracting the charges of the cavalry; In proceeding downhill they of course were not completely at Caesar's meres for , when a new decline was reached, Afranius' rear column would take a stand at the h i l l ' s topmost approach and there hold the cavalry i n abey-ance u n t i l such time as t h e i r companions had nearly reached the bottom of the h i l l and then, t h e i r job finished, carry on the i r retreat. So t h i s method of retreat and pursuit was extended for four miles u n t i l the Afra-nians, completely exhausted both by the ruggedness of the route and the inconvenience caused by the cavalry, took up a position on a l o f t y h i l l and there proceeded to encamp without unloading the i r baggage animals and with only one l i n e of defence facing Caesar. This h i l l was i n a very disadvantageous position f a r from a reservoir and some distance from Ilerda. Caesar i n his accustomed manner stopped and, when the enemy showed no signs of moving on, ordered his foragers to t h e i r tasks. This was the moment the Afranians had awaited and, as soon as they noticed the foragers move away, they set out again, hoping that Caesar would be too preoccupied with making a camp to follow them. But they were mistaken and Caesar, though a short time was lost i n regrouping, returned to his former plan of harassing the Af rani an rearguard. This time not only were the Afranians troubled by the spasmodic sorties of Caesar's eavalry, but they also were threatened by his main force which was moving forwards ever anxious f o r a pitched battl e . But Caesar's strategy of forced 52 exhaustion did not change. "Caesar preferred that they should be harassed by such sufferings and submit to a compulsory surrender rather than fight a pitched b a t t l e . " 3 3 How he further carried t h i s out we s h a l l soon see. The Afranians again were compelled to halt even though i n a very unfavourable location. Here under eover of night they pushed forward entrenchments that the i r camp might be changed to another position. Caesar notieed their movements and began to surround them by rampart and ditch circumscribing the enemy's trenchwork. The Afranians, short of water and food, k i l l e d t h e i r baggage animals; sustained by this food only a short time, Petreius i n sheer des-peration led out his legions and took a position on the plain opposite Caesar's camp. A distance of only seven hundred yards separated the two camps and Caesar drew up his l i n e accordingly. What Caesar had planned was nearing accomplishment. The Afranians were gradually weakening. His technique of causing mental and physical deterioration was well displayed here. " I f battle were joined, the propinquity of the camps afforded the conquered a speedy retreat i n their f l i g h t . For this reason he had made up his mind to r e s i s t them i f they advanced their colours, but not to be the f i r s t to a t t a c k . " 3 4 Caesar's defense works were near completion and one more day would be sufficient to f i n i s h them. The Afranians knew this and they hoped by a sudden show of arms to hinder Caesar i n his workings. This they did but Caesar by refusing to engage i n battle remained the master of the situation. So, at sunset, without an engagement, the two armies retreated to thei r camps, Caesar to complete the defense works and the 33 B e l l . Civ., I , 81. 34 B e l l . Civ.. I , 82. 53 Afranians to t r y another avenue of esoape, the r i v e r S i c o r i s . In one l a s t valiant effort Afranius t r i e d to ford the r i v e r , hut Caesar quickly dispatched his cavalry to the opposite bank so frustrating the attempt. The Afranians withdrew to thei r camp. "At last blockaded i n every way, th e i r baggage animals now kept without fodder for four days, through t h e i r want of water, firewood, and forage, they beg for a conference,....* 3 5 So the struggle was now over. Caesar consented to a conference on his own terms and therein set forth his conditions of surrender. They were accepted and according to the terms stated the army of Pompey i n Spain was disbanded at the r i v e r Varus. No opponent of Caesar was required to take an oath of allegiance to him nor was any property lost by the enemy* s soldiers and i n the hands of his men kept from the or i g i n a l owners. The peace was settled f a i r l y . Afranius and Petreius were released un-harmed and with the i r departure the Pompeian threat i n Spain disappeared. Two more phases of a c t i v i t y yet remained to be settled, one at Massilia and the other i n further Spain where the legate of Pompey, M. Terentius Varro, was i n control with a levied force of two legions and t h i r t y a u x i l i a r y cohorts. The contest with Varro was an anticlimax to Caesar's previous a c t i v i t i e s i n Spain. His opponent i n the Further Province was f i r s t and foremost a scholar not a s k i l l f u l m i l i t a r y man. I t i s not necessary to go into d e t a i l over this campaign for i t was no effort for Caesar to consolidate himself i n Varro's province, but i t was important that he control t h i s part of Spain. "Caesar, though many urgent a f f a i r s were summoning him back to I t a l y , had nevertheless determined to abandon no 35 B e l l . Civ., I , 84. 54 section of the war i n the two Spains, because he knew how great were the benefactions of Pompeius and what large bodies of retainers he had i n the hither province. 1 , 3 6 We know then why Caesar decided to bring a l l Spain under his control. Through a meeting called by him and held at Corduba, the Spanish communities were informed of his intentions and his demands. In a short time most c i t i e s previously friendly to Pompey changed th e i r allegiance to Caesar and closed the i r gates against Yarro. A sur-render quickly followed. Caesar now controlled a l l of Spain after a campaign that lasted no longer than s i x weeks. The siege of Massilia i s beyond the scope of this study. I t was carried out successfully by land and sea and the Massiliotes, s k i l l e d i n the use of war machines, prolonged the siege and taxed to capacity the m i l i t a r y s k i l l of the Romans. 36 B e l l . Cjv.. I I , 18 55 CHAPTER V FROM DYRRHACHIUM TO PHARSALIA While Caesar was conducting operations i n Spain, he had not neglected to consider his position i n I t a l y i n the event of a Pompeian attack, and had ready a plan for the deployment of his troops. The state i t s e l f was placed under the propraetorian power of Mark Antony. Under his direction the south-eastern ports of Brundisium and Tarentum were garrisoned with three legions. Q. Hortensius cruised the Tyrhhene Sea; P. Dolabella patrolled the A d r i a t i c . M. Crassus was responsible for C i s -alpine Gaul; Illyrieum was under the control of G. Antonius, Mark Antony's brother. Although Caesar was rul e r at Rome, Pompey controlled the sea, and the events which preceded Caesar's departure from Brundisium i l l u s -trated t h i s . One of Caesar's naval lieutenants, P. Dolabella, suffered a disaster i n the Adr i a t i c at the hands of Scribonius L i bo and M. Octavius. G. Antonius, who came to assist him, was compelled by a superior enemy to fl e e to Corcyra Nigra, where he was forced to surrender his f i f t e e n co-horts of r e c r u i t s . In the above incidents Caesar lost forty ships of war and several thousand men. Although Caesar suffered these disasters by sea, a greater one took place by land. G. Curio, after successfully winning S i c i l y from Cato, was especially commissioned by Caesar to proceed to A f r i c a to meet and conquer the forces of Pompey gathered under Attius Varus. But because Caesar was forced to keep his best troops f o r the Spanish war, he had been compelled to form the Si c i l i a n - A f r i c a n foree mainly from the legions taken over from the enemy at Corfinium. This foree was defeated by Juba, King of Mauretania, and Curio died i n the f i g h t . 56 Curio*s defeat, which can be traced to an error of judgement as well as to over-eagerness, seriously affected Caesar and permitted the Pompeians so to arrange a f f a i r s i n A f r i c a that they were able to present a firm front to him l a t e r . Though Curio was now lost to Caesar, his capture of S i c i l y had frustrated Pompey*s plan to starve out the peninsula. Undoubtedly Caesar regretted Curio*s death, for i t was a personal los s , and he knew the African defeat would encourage the opposition and produce consequences unfavourable to him. "Thus Curio died after rendering most valuable assistance to Caesar and inspiring i n him many hopes.*1 While Caesar campaigned i n Spain, Pompey centred his forces around his training camp at Berrhoea, A l l the m i l i t a r y equipment which was not required was stored at Dyrrhachium, the arsenal which Caesar hoped eventually to capture. By the time Caesar had completed the Spanish war, Pompey was moving towards Macedonia. Caesar remained eleven days i n Rome, then resigned his dictatorship, and, although he had not formally entered upon his consulship, set out i n mid December for Brundisium while Pompey marched by the Ignatian Way towards Candavia. "Caesar ...hastened to Brundusium about the winter s o l s t i c e , intending to str i k e terror into 2 his enemies by taking them by surprise." Here i s the essence of Caesar's strategy and Appian adds: "...the most potent thing i n war i s unexpected-ness." 3 Caesar had learned of Pompey*s intentions through divers sources: "He had made up his mind to winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and a l l the coast towns, so as to prevent Caesar from crossing the sea, and for that 1 Dio, XLI, 42. 2 Appian, I I , 8, 52. 3 Appian, I I , 8, 53. 57 reason haa distributed his f l e e t a l l along the sea-coast." 4 A year short of a few days since he crossed the Rubicon, Caesar l e f t Brundisium f o r Epirus. "Pompeius was at that time i n Candavia, and was on his way from Macedonia to Apollonia and Dyrrachium to winter quar-t e r s . " 5 As he set s a i l and contemplated his next move no doubt the thought came to his mind that Pompey at the beginning of navigation i n early spring might land at Brundisium or some point along the coast within easy reach of Epirus and undertake the recovery of I t a l y . This thought spurred him on. By January 5th of 48 B.C., Caesar had reached Palaeste on the coast of Epirus, a port which provided a good landing place and prevented molestation by enemy ships. When disembarkation was complete, Caesar's immediate purpose was to seize Oricum, a town about twenty-five miles north and s l i g h t l y west, and from there move north again to Apollonia, a Pompeian stronghold. Caesar had now begun the fulfilment of a twofold policy of c o n c i l i a t i o n and aggression. Both towns, recognising his con-sular authority, surrendered without a struggle and were followed by the surrounding communities of B y l l i s and Amantia. Thus with l i t t l e trouble, Caesar had established a foothold i n Epirus. He had employed a strategic policy of surprise and rapid movement, combined with the use of his con-sular authority. This authority was a very impressive weapon as he was the o f f i c i a l representative of Rome and what he did was thought to be done for the good of the state. By the time Pompey reached Scampa on the Egnatian Way, a report had reached him of the f a l l of Oricum and Apollonia. The psychological 4 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 5. 5 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 11. 58 affect of t h i s news upon his men was alarming. Many panicked while others deserted. He r a l l i e d those he could restrain and made his way quickly towards the coast: "But Pompeius, when he learnt of what had happened at Oricum and Apollonia, fearing f o r Dyrraehium, hurried there, marching night and day."6 The news of Pompey's rapid approach disturbed Caesar. Without proceeding further, he drew up his l i n e at F i e r i on the r i v e r Apsus. Pompey, upon securing his supply route from Dyrrhachium, reached a point on the northern side of the Apsus opposite Caesar. Here the two forces were destined to stay, neither commander promoting an engagement. Although Caesar would have wished to force Pompey to f i g h t , the small size of his army prevented him from doing so u n t i l reinforcements under the command of Mark Antony could reach him. Pompey, however, with his larger force, intended to contain Caesar i n a limited t e r r i t o r y and gradually to starve him out. To ensure t h i s , a message had gone out to Metellus Scipio i n Macedonia to j o i n him as quickly as possible. In recapitulating, we f i n d that Caesar had established a posi-t i o n i n Spirus, s t r a t e g i c a l l y unsound, for Pompey's blockade of the coast had cost him the t h i r t y ships used to transport his troops across the A d r i a t i c . Bibulus, Pompey's naval commander, nourishing an intense hatred of Caesar and everything f o r which he stood, had destroyed both men and ships. His move against Pompey i n Epirus shows us that "Caesar decided on what appeared to be the impossible not because the operation he had determined upon was st r a t e g i c a l l y sound, but because i t i s the seemingly impossible which of a l l things surprises most."7 Pompey, as his actions 6 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 13. ? j , J , C, F u l l e r , The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History (London, 1954), p.185. 59 proved, was d e f i n i t e l y caught o f f guard. I t i s reasonable to assume that he was biding his time i n the hope that when an engagement with Oaesar did take place, he eould overwhelm him by mere weight of numbers. Caesar realized this and so resorted to the strategy of surprise. The question has often been raised why Caesar who controlled the coast of Illyricum did not take the land route to Greeoe. The holding of Illyricum proved i n time to be more a source of anxiety than of strength to Caesar, for the longer Pompey was l e f t unassailed, the stronger the l a t t e r became, and the more dangerous appeared the p o s s i b i l i t y of his using Illyricum as a route to I t a l y . Many f e e l that Caesar should have chosen the land route. Among such advocates i s B, H. Liddell-Hart, who claims that "In strategy, the longest way round i s often the shortest way Q home." A sharp c r i t i c i s m of Caesar's movements comes from this supporter of indirect strategy when he points out that "Instead of advancing into Greece by the indirect land route through Illyricum, Caesar decided on the direct sea route. Thereby he gained time i n i t i a l l y but lost i t u l t i -Q mately." I do not completely concur with Liddell-Hart. The land t r i p to Epirus i n mid-winter would be a hazardous undertaking, for his troops would be exposed to the uncertain mercy of the elements and would emerge into Epirus an impoverished army ready to f a l l into the grip of Pompey who would certainly have had time to regroup his forces and present a strong i f not insurmountable barrier to their advance. One need only consider the disastrous attempt of Aulus Gabinius to march through Illyricum and i t s consequences. He lost forty-one o f f i c e r s , over two thousand men, 8 Liddell-Hart, Strategy, p.£5. 9 Liddell-Hart, op.clt., p.55. 60 disease f i n a l l y claiming him shortly a f t e r . This occurred i n October of 48 B. C. after Caesar had won at Pharsalia and Pompey was dead. The Pompeian fugitives had done thei r job well. We cannot overlook the mass-ive power of Pompey both on land and sea. By mid-March Caesar's position was perilous. A stalemate of two months had brought no reinforcements either to him or to Pompey, and the l a t t e r had a s u f f i c i e n t l y large force without the help of Scipio. There was a feeling i n Caesar's camp that Antony was showing excessive caution i n not s a i l i n g with reinforcements, for i t was generally understood that at any time of the year some r i s k must be incurred when t r a v e l l i n g by sea. Pompey's blockade was more than harmful to Caesar; i t was disastrous. Winter was well advanced and though Bibulus was dead, his successors never once relinquished th e i r control of the sea. "And the further this period of time extended the more keen were the officers of the enemy's f l e e t i n the i r vigilance, and the greater confidence they had of stopping him."-*-0 By frequent messages Caesar urged Antony to set s a i l on the next favourable wind for the coast near Apollonia and Scodra. These two places were s p e c i f i c a l l y stressed because they were of definite strategic importance: "...at neither of these places were they l i k e l y to encounter hostile cruisers, for the enemy were afraid to venture far from their p r i n c i p a l stations, Corcyra and Dyrraehium." 1 1 Caesar had previously arranged that Aulus Gabinius and f i f t e e n cohorts were to come by land through Dalmatia and j o i n him i n Albania, while Q. Calenus and Antony were to come by sea. 10 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 25. .11 Holmes, The Boman Republic. I l l , p.129. 61 Towards the end of March, Antony's f l e e t put to sea and, since i t was too stormy to land at Apollonia, he sailed north f o r Scodra. As he passed Dyrrhaehium, G. Coponius and his Rhodian f l e e t gave chase forc-ing him to bypass Scodra and continue further north. Nymphaeum was the closest harbour available and for this port Antony sa i l e d , reaching i t s protection with Coponius close behind. A favourable breeze carried Antony safely to shore but, unfortunately f o r Coponius, the wind suddenly changed dashing his ships upon the rocks and destroying a l l but one or two. Now that he was safe, Antony sent messages to Caesar revealing his strength and position. Antony now moved inland not by the direct road which led from Nymphaeum to Dyrrhaehium, which would expose him to an attack by Pompey's forces, but by the only other route available, one which led from Nymphaeum to Lissus; from there to Bassania on the r i v e r Wati; thense south-east to Scampa on the Egnatian Way. Antony's a r r i v a l had not gone unnoticed by Pompey or Caesar, f o r both had witnessed the sea chase as the ships passed Dyrrhaehium. Their plans quickly changed. "And when they had found t h i s out they each adopted different plans, Caesar to unite himself as quickly as possible with Antonius, Pompelus to confront the approaching enemy on their march, i n case he might be able to attack them unawares from an ambuscade; ...**^ 2 Antony, informed by natives of Pompey's approach, moved no fur-ther and awaited Caesar's a r r i v a l . Caesar, to avoid Pompey and reach Antony, had to cross the Apsus by ford far up ri v e r and then procede by a circuitous mountain route. Pompey moved on Antony by forced marches 12 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 30. 62 and waited i n ambush. When he realized that Antony was aware of his plan and that Caesar was near, he changed his tact i c s : H...to escape being shut i n by two armies, he quits that spot and with a l l his forces arrives at Asparagium, a town of the Dyrrachians, and there pitches his camp i n a suitable p l a c e . " 1 3 By the time Pompey had withdrawn, Antony, after a four days' march, had joined up with Caesar on the south side of the Graba Balkan pass just beyond the north bank of the Apsus. Now that the two commanders had joined forces, Caesar was better able to arrange the expansion of his operational area and to establish his influence further inland. I t was his intention to contain Pompey by using the bulk of his force while f l y i n g columns were to be sent into the i n t e r i o r to win the friendship of the Greeks and keep the two Syrian legions of Pompey under Scipio at bay, i n his own words: "...to t r y to win over the provinces and to make a further advance....*"'"4 Domitius Calvinus was sent to intercept Scipio who was marching with two legions through Macedonia to join Pompey; L. Cassius moved into Thessaly and Calvisius Sabinus into Aetolia, both to procure grain. Caesar moved his combined force to a position opposite Pompey who occupied Asparagium on the ri v e r Genusus, which ran p a r a l l e l to the Apsus. As on the r i v e r Apsus, so on the Genusus, Pompey followed a wait-and-watch policy. Caesar, on the other hand, considerably strength-ened by Antony's force, t r i e d unsuccessfully to lure his adversary into a pitched b a t t l e . "He then determined to manoeuvre his opponent out of 1 3 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 30. 14 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 34. 65 15 his position by s t r i k i n g at Dyrrhachium." Dyrrhachium was Pompey's aresenal, and according to Caesar's plan, one of the strategic points to be captured. "So on the next day he set out i n f u l l force for Dyrrhachium, taking a wide c i r c u i t by a d i f f i c u l t and narrow route, i n the hope that Pompeius could be either driven to Dyrrachium or cut off from i t , . . . . " 1 6 Caesar had l e f t Pompey at Asparagium and moved eastward towards the h i l l s as though scouting for supplies. Suddenly, by a sharp turn to the north, he had covered the for t y - f i v e miles to Dyrrhachium within one day and night. "Success depended on Caesar's keeping Pompey i n ignorance of his intentions during a whole day, and on his making the march i n not much 17 over twenty-four hours;...." Thus the deadlock was broken i n one swift stroke by Caesar i n his forced march over d i f f i c u l t terrain to invest Pompey's arsenal. "Onee more Caesar's supreme speed and energy i n taking on offensive form of i n i t i a t i v e startled and disconcerted the elderly s t r a t e g i s t . " 1 8 In cutting Pompey off from Dyrrhachium by land, Caesar had won the f i r s t round. Pompey took up a position on the rock of Petra, a high point on the coast near Dyrrhachium, separated from his opponent's forces by the valley of Shimmihl. Caesar intended to exploit his early advantage by confining Pompey's large and well supplied force to the narrow coast land around Petra, using only a smaller army less well supplied. Although Caesar had cut off his land route to Dyrrhachium, Pom-pey kept supply li n e s open by sea. Gradually Caesar's forces began to 15 Adeoek, Cambridge Ancient History, IX, p.659. 16 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 41. 17 Dodge, Caesar, I I , p.511. 18 E. G. S i h l e r , Annals of Caesar (New York, 1911), p.206. 64 f e e l the pressure of a famine. Pompey's strategy was undoubtedly a defen-sive one. For f i n a l success he intended to concentrate on his power of starving out Caesar, by elimination of his supply route by sea. The sea had given Pompey the strategic advantage and t h i s , combined with his su-pe r i o r i t y of numbers and equipment, placed Caesar i n a very perilous position. "Inaction was to Caesar of a l l things the most unbearable, but he had now to pay the penalty for his own magnificent audacity." 1 9 Caesar's great attempt to blockade his enemy by land had begun. After reconnoitring, he decided to construct a series of redoubts linked by entrenchments along the higher ridges above and around Dyrrhaehium. I t was his object to confine Pompey within the narrowest possible l i m i t s . Pompey i n r e t a l i a t i o n did the same but followed a l i n e closer to the sea. Caesar's contravallation enclosed about twenty square miles, Pompey's approximately sixteen. Caesar followed the furthest inland curve of a three-fold chain of h i l l s around Pompey's camp. This gave him access to a l l water courses and land routes. So began "...the most wonderful piece 20 of spade-work i n the wars of the ancient world." Caesar gives us the reasons for this great undertaking, l a t e r destined to f a i l u r e ; " . . . f i r s t , that...he might be able to bring i n for his army corn and stores from any direction at less r i s k ; and also that he might prevent Pompeius from f o r -aging and might make his cavalry useless for active operations; and, t h i r d l y , that he might diminish the moral influence on which Pompeius seemed chiefly to r e l y among foreign nations, when the report should have spread throughout the world that he was being beleaguered by Caesar and 19 W. W. Fowler, Julius Caesar and The Foundation of The Boman Imperial System (Hew York, 1908), p.285. 20 C. Oman, Seven Boman Statesmen of the Later Bepublie (London, 1921), p.329. 65 did not dare to fight a pitched battle." A B r i e f l y , Caesar's purpose was to ease supply for himself and hinder i t for Pompey, but f i r s t and fore-most, to achieve a moral advantage by showing the ancient world that Pom-pey was afraid to f i g h t . We must admit that Caesar's reasons for the contravallation were sound but, considering his manpower, they appear foolhardy. "Caesar ...took the o r i g i n a l but singularly p r o f i t l e s s course of constructing extensive l i n e s of investment round an army which was not only stronger than his own but could supply i t s e l f e asily, or move away, by sea, when-22 ever i t wished." How that Caesar had revealed his strategy, Pompey showed that his objective was to seize as many h i l l s as possible and force his opponent to enlarge his perimeter to the point where the con-taining forces were so t h i n l y spread that they would be vulnerable to attack. We cannot help but admire Pompey's strategy, reminiscent of Fabius Maximus' delaying t a c t i c s which so hindered Hannibal i n the Second Punic War. Caesar realized that Pompey was carrying out a strategic plan of a t t r i t i o n and he was, to a great extent, powerless to prevent i t . While Caesar t r i e d to confine Pompey the l a t t e r struggled to force the former outward. "Caesar...ventured upon an extremely d i f f i c u l t and c h i -merical task; that i s , to carry a l i n e of circumvallation around the whole of Pompey*s positions from sea to sea, thinking that even i f he should f a i l he would acquire great renown from the boldness of the enterprise." 2 3 Pompey refused to fight a pitched battle. This l e f t only one outlet 21 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 43. 22 Liddell-Hart, op.cit., p.56. 23 Appian, I I , 61. 66 fo r him; ".••to adopt a desperate method of warfare by occupying as many h i l l s as possible, by holding with garrisons the widest extent of land possible, and by keeping Caesar's forces as far extended as he could; 24 ...." The strategy of the opposing commanders i s b r i e f l y summarized by Caesar: "...Caesar to confine Pompeius within the narrowest l i m i t s , Pompeius to occupy as many h i l l s as he could i n the widest possible c i r -25 c u l t ; . . . . " Caesar hoped to extend his contravallation to the sea and so terminate the unwieldy expanse of l i n e i t was now becoming. To do th i s he would have to control an important h i l l called Paliama. His Ninth legion was sent to accomplish t h i s , but Pompey, forseeing t h i s , occupied a h i l l to the northwest by a quick attack and forced Caesar's troops to abandon thei r position and so f o r f e i t the attempt. "Caesar was constrained to f a l l back upon the l i n e from which he had diverged, and thus ultimately to give his contravallation an extension nearly twice as great as that which he had designed." While Caesar kept to the ridges of his contravallation he could not be dislodged but when he l e f t t h e i r protection, Pompey's mass of manpower was too great an obstacle to over-come. I f Caesar had won possession of th i s h i l l , besides reaching the sea, he eould have cut Pompey off from an important water supply and re-s t r i c t his forces to rather narrow bounds. The loss of the h i l l was the f i r s t blow of the many Caesar was to receive around Dyrrhaehium. Caesar, i n an effort to break the deadlock journeyed to Dyrrha-ehium, hopeful that the town would be betrayed to him. His t r i p was i n vain; the town would not y i e l d . Some authorities suspect that he was 2 4 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 44. 25 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 45. 26 Holmes, op.cit., p.140. 67 enticed thither by a stratagem of Pompey f o r while he was there .Pompey took courage and planned a night assault upon the enclosing wall; and attacking i t unexpectedly, he captured a portion of i t by storm and caused great slaughter among the men enoamped near i t . 1 , 8 7 I t was Sulla who eventually repulsed this attack and who was severely c r i t i c i z e d for not carrying out the pursuit of the opposing forces. Had he done so, some think the war would have been concluded. But S u l l a , true to his position as an o f f i c e r carried out Caesar's orders to the l e t t e r and then awaited the a r r i v a l of his general. Had Pompey succeeded with this s o r t i e , he would have dominated an entire ridge of the contravallation. His with-drawal while under Sulla's f i r e was strate g i c a l l y sound. Meanwhile Caesar's blockade by land gradually began to produce res u l t s . Pompey's cattle were threatened with starvation and his water supply was a l l but cut o f f . The supplying of foodstuffs by sea was proving to be a very onerous task. Nevertheless he s t i l l waited patiently for an opportunity to break through Caesar's l i n e and to attack him i n the rear. He did not have to wait long. Caesar's movements were restricted because he had to reach the sea soon or give up his contravallation. In a l a s t determined effort he descended from the ridge he now occupied and con-structed the l a s t phase of his p a r a l l e l entrenchments across the plain south of the Lesnikia r i v e r . Pompey, following Caesar's l i n e , had extended his defence to the sea and i n addition had secured an abandoned camp of Caesar's a short distance from the shore and about a half mile from his opponents i n t e r i o r perimeter. Having enlarged this camp, from one corner of i t he drew an entrenchment to the Lesnikia to secure a water supply, 87 Dio, XLI, 50. 68 while continually watching Caesar*s movements. "He now intended to attack Caesar's inner p a r a l l e l i n overwhelming strength before he could complete his works, and to land a force whieh should simultaneously assault the 28 outer l i n e ; ....** An unforeseen incident gave Pompey the strategic advantage. Two G a l l i c o f f i c e r s under charge of treachery by Caesar deserted to Pompey. To the l a t t e r they conveyed a wealth of important information about a l l phases of Caesar's l i n e , especially the l e f t flank. Pompey now directed his attack against the southern extension of Caesar's l i n e by both land and sea, catching the Hinth legion and Len-tulus Marcellinus (encamped two miles inland) completely unawares. The advance forces of Pompey penetrated through a gap on the unfinished trans-verse trench and, f i l l i n g the area between the two p a r a l l e l l i n e s , forced the troops i n the rear l i n e to f l e e . Those Pompeians not engaged i n this action were constructing a camp near the sea just behind Caesar's lines from which thei r cavalry might safely forage and to which thei r ships could come. Pompey's attack on Caesar "...was excellently planned, stoutly 29 given, and was a complete surprise.** I t i s beyond the scope of this study to explain the various engagements which took place i n the l a t t e r phase of the siege. What i s more important i s the fact that Caesar was defeated at his own game. He made one last attempt to reinforce a camp near Pompey's sea base. In an engagement at this southern extremity of his l i n e , Caesar's men panicked and f l e d . Pompey, seeing them i n f l i g h t , 28 Holmes, op.cit.. p.147. 29 Dodge, op.cit., p.532. 69 hesitated to pursue l e s t he might f a l l into a trap. Through this hesita-t i o n many of Caesar's troops were saved. Now that the siege of Dyrrhachium was broken, Caesar was i n a discouraging position. His entrenchments of four months preparation were, lost and the sea was closed to him. Cn. Pom-peius the younger had sacked, burned or captured most of his vessels around Oricum and Lissus. "Caesar was entirely beaten not merely i n tac-t i e s but also i n strategy, and i t seemed as i f he could neither maintain himself i n his present position or judiciously change i t . * 5 0 Caesar i n his Commentaries does not hesitate to state the reasons for his defeat; "...the cause of thei r success had been the small number of our troops, the unfavourable conditions of the s i t e and the narrow space, when they had forestalled us i n the occupation of the camp; the twofold panic, within and without the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s ; the severance of the army into two parts, one being unable to bear aid to the other." 3 1 I t i s easy to condemn Caesar's defeat at Dyrrhaehium; "The position of Caesar at Dyrrachium was a false one, brought on by conduct rash rather than judicious; . . . i t must be d i s t i n c t l y condemned as unsound m i l i t a r y p o l i c y . " 3 2 The question of what he should have done i s d i f f i c u l t to answer. Throughout his m i l i t a r y career Caesar made very few mistakes. This was one of them. He was i n f e r i o r i n troops and equipment. Should he have marched against Scipio i n the east, or should he have waited for Pompey to make the f i r s t move? Perhaps he would have been wise to wait u n t i l spring to launch his attack against Pompey i n Epirus. Whatever questions may be asked, whatever answers may be given, the important factor 50 Mommsen, The History of Rome, IV, p.386. 31 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 72. 32 Dodge, op.cit., p.573. 70 Is that Caesar l o s t the strategic advantage only temporarily and the way i n which he regained i t has won the admiration and respect of the m i l i t a r y world. Dodge i s severe i n his c r i t i c i s m of Caesar's strategy at Dyrrha-ehium. In the l i g h t of the result - Pharsalia - his defeat should not be overemphasized. Now that Caesar was withdrawing, Pompey had three possible moves. He could a s s a i l and i f necessary pursue the defeated army. This would mean that he must march against Domitius Galvinus and would necessitate abandoning his stores at Dyrrhaehium. This move would result i n a union with the legions of Soipio, doubly strengthening his army. Secondly, he could leave Caesar i n Greece and cross with his army to invade I t a l y , but t h i s would give Caesar the opportunity of marching through Illyricum. F i n a l l y he could t r y to recover Apollonia and Oricum and so exclude Caesar from the coast; but Caesar could then move against Scipio i n the Sast and so force Pompey to send help. His decision to pursue Caesar was brought about partly by the prompting of the aristocrats; partly through his k i n -ship to Scipio. •Caesar, driven from his former plans, came to the conclusion that he must a l t e r his whole method of campaign."33 Caesar's forces re-grouped a short distance from Dyrrhaehium and he confessed to his men "...that he had made a mistake i n encamping before Dyrrachium where Pom-pey had abundance of supplies, whereas he ought to have drawn him to some plaee where he would be subject to the same scarcity as themselves."*3 His men, infuriated with themselves for panicking, pleaded with him for 33 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 73. 34 Appian, I I , 10, 64. 71 permission to renew the struggle at Dyrrhachium, hut Caesar was too wise a commander and knew that such a move would be strat e g i c a l l y unsound, "...Caesar had not suf f i c i e n t confidence i n his panic-stricken troops and thought that an interva l should be allowed to restore th e i r s p i r i t s . . . " 3 5 So relieved was Caesar at Pompey's i n a c t i v i t y after his victory, that he i s reported to have said: "To-day victory had been with the enemy, i f they had had a v i c t o r i n command."36 The task now before Caesar was to withdraw from a triumphant enemy over two bridgeless r i v e r s , the Genusus and Apsus, with rapid waters and steep banks. His plan was to move his wounded to Apollonia, where he could pay his army, bolster the morale of his a l l i e s i n that v i c i n i t y , and put garrisons i n unfriendly towns. So swift was Caesar's retreat that Pompey was unable to hamper him but for a small rearguard action. A p o l l -onia was reached on the fourth day, three days after Pompey had given up the pursuit. To Caesar's credit i s the fact that he avoided a f a t a l dis-aster i n the aftermath of Dyrrhachium. This could be considered one of his greatest m i l i t a r y achievements for even i n defeat he was i n d i r e c t l y master of the situation. The success of Caesar's retreat stemmed from the superior energy and discipline of his troops and his knowledge of the enemy's weaknesses and how to benefit from them. G, P. Baker c a l l s the retreat from Dyrrhachium "a masterpiece of sympathetic psychology." 3 7 Caesar was d e f i n i t e l y sympathetic to both the existing situation and the needs of his men while psychology was certainly used i n outmanoeuvring Pompey. 35 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 74. 36 Plutarch, Caesar, 39, 5. 37 G* P. Baker, Twelve Centuries of Borne (London, 1934), p.345. 72 Pompey's i n e r t i a having saved him, Caesar now resorted to a strategy of indirect approach, by which he forced his opponent, though superior i n strength to follow him. "Caesar's indirect approach had been made to restore the strategic balance, and a further one was needed to upset Pompey's balance." ° Somewhere along the Egnatlan Way Pompey held a council of war. His strategy was developed to match that of Caesar who had decided to march to the aid of Cn. Domitius Calvinua "fearing for Domitius, l e s t he should be taken unawares by the a r r i v a l of Pompeius, Caesar hastened to him with a l l speed and urgent encouragement."39 Pompey of course was not sure of this move so he planned that "...he should go to the aid of Scipio, ..." i f Caesar marched east or "...should himself attack Domitius i n f u l l force," i f Caesar waited at the coast for further reinforcements. 4 0 He f i n a l l y decided to march along the Egnatian Way to help Scipio who had been hard pressed by the Caesarian forces. As he marched, Pompey learned that Domitius was between him and Scipio on the Egnatian Way, supposedly at Heracles. Moving quickly to th i s spot he discovered that Domitius, warned of his approach by some itinerant Gauls, had f l e d south to Thessaly to j o i n Caesar. Caesar now revealed his new strategy. He intended "...to trans-f e r the struggle from the coast away into the i n t e r i o r , with the view of getting beyond the reach of the enemy's fl e e t - the ultimate cause of the f a i l u r e of his previous exertions." 4 1 Leaving three cohorts at Oricum, one at Lissus and four at Apollonia, he marched up the valley of the Dryno 38 Liddell-Hart, op.cit., p.56. 3 9 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 78. 40 Loc. c i t . 41 Mommsen, op.cit., p.387. 73 hoping to reach Thessaly by the pass of Metzovo. On July 29th, 48 B.C. he joined forces with Domitius at Aeginium, a town which l i e s over against Thessaly. According to T. A, Dodge, a "quadrilateral of importance" 4 2 now faced Caesar, v i z . the towns of Pelinaeum, Trieca, Gomphi, and Metropolis. Gomphl was stormed and taken by the new army. An example wa3 made of i t and the surrounding towns surrendered without a struggle. From Metropolis Caesar moved eastward across the Apidanus at Pyrgo, thence into l e v e l country coming to a halt near Pharsalus on the north bank of the Enipeus. "Finding a suitable place i n the country d i s t r i c t where the crops were now nearly ripe, he determined there to await the a r r i v a l of Pompeius and to transfer thither a l l his m i l i t a r y operations." 4 3 Pompey had now joined forces with Scipio at Larissa, He knew the position of Caesar's troops at Pharsalus but rather than r i s k a l l i n a single battle he f e l t s "that i t would be easier and safer to reduce them by want as they controlled no f e r t i l e t e r r i t o r y , and could get nothing by sea, and had no ships f o r rapid f l i g h t . So on the most prudent calculation he decided to protract 44 the war and drive the enemy from famine to plague,...." This strategic move would force Caesar to wander about Greece u n t i l he was bereft of supplies and his army weakened by continuous marches. Caesar had gained control of the f e r t i l e western plain of the Peneus by various means, but we are not informed of the manoeuvres which brought the armies together. He had now no great worry about supplies. His men could forage where they pleased and a pitched battle i n such a place would be to th e i r l i k i n g . 42 Dodge, op.cit., p.548. 43 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 81. 44 Appian, I I , 10, 66. 74 When Pompey reached Pharsalus he entrenched his camp on the slope of Mount Dogondzis, three miles north-west of Caesar. Caesar took up his position i n the p l a i n . Daily he formed a l i n e of battle i n front of Pompey's camp but Pompey, true to his strategy, could not be enticed to f i g h t . When Caesar saw that his opponent had no intention of fight i n g a pitched battle, he decided to move on from Pharsalus, and, i f Pompey pursued, create a new opportunity to f i g h t . A l l was not well i n Pompey's camp. While Pompey and other prom-inent persons wished to decimate Caesar's force i n a prolonged war, the senators and others of rank demanded an immediate engagement on the open pl a i n . Evidently Pompey was not s u f f i c i e n t l y master of the situation to refuse their demand. Much against his better judgement he decided to meet Caesar i n a pitched battle, and changed his plans accordingly. 45 "And i n Pompey's camp men pray f o r Pharsalia." The s i t e of the battle of Pharsalia has provoked much discussion. Caesar i s f a r from specific i n identifying i t s location. He states that the battle took place i n Thessaly i n "...a suitable place i n the country d i s t r i c t where the crops were now nearly r i p e , . . . . " 4 6 We must depend upon l a t e r writers and mostly those of our own day for a closer i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of the battle ground. T. Rice Holmes gives an excellent account of the 47 site s suggested by ancient and modern authors. This author along with several others including G. Long and Napier claims the battle was fought on the north bank of the Enipeus. Summarizing the positions advocated: Rice Holmes, F. L. Lucas, J . P. Postgate, G. Long suggest the north bank 45 Lucan, de Bello C i v i l i , VII, 61. . 46 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 81. 47 Holmes, op.cit., pp. 452-468. 75 while W, M. Leake, Mommsen, Heusey, S t o f f e l and Kromayer claim a si t e on the south hank. The reasons for supposing that the battle was fought on the north bank are more convincing i n l i g h t of present day investigation 48 and I have followed Holmes i n placing the s i t e on the north bank. Pompey's camp has been placed on Mount Dogondzis by both Holmes and Lucas while Caesar's, according to Postgate, was " . . . i n the neighbourhood of Eontouri which Heuzey and Mr. Lucas i d e n t i f y with Old Pharsalus or Palaepharsalus." 4 When Pompey did not offer battle, i t was Caesar's plan to march northeast to Scotussa just south of Cynoscephalae, thereby threatening Pompey's communications with Larissa and perhaps forcing him to give up his present position. "Caesar, thinking that Pompeius could by no means be enticed out to a battle, judged that his most convenient plan of cam-paign was to move his camp from that place, and to be always on the march, with the view of getting his supplies more conveniently by moving camp and v i s i t i n g various places, and at the same time of meeting with some opportunity of fighting on the route, and of wearing out the army of Pom-peius, which was unaccustomed to hard work, by daily marches." As he moved off on the morning of August 9th, Pompey's army, i n a surprise move, took up a position at the foot of the h i l l (Mount Dogondzis). Caesar drew up his troops i n l i n e of battle and observed the enemy's tactics closely. Pompey, while addressing his men, reveals his strategy: " I have induced my cavalry ...as soon as the two armies have drawn nearer, to attack Cae-sar's right wing on his open flank, and by surrounding-his column from 48 Further information i s contained i n The Decline of The Roman Re-p u b l i c by G. Long, Chapter XVII, and J . P. Postgate, "The Site of the Battle of Pharsalia," Journal of Roman Studies, XII (1922), pp.187-191. 49 Postgate, op.cit*, p.189. 50 B e l l . Civ., I l l , 85. 76 the rear to drive his army i n confused rout before a weapon i s east at the foe by u s . " 5 1 Pompey had stationed on the right wing under P. Corne-l i u s Lentulus his C i l i c i a n and Spanish cohorts, protected by a force of s i x hundred cavalry from Pontus. On the l e f t wing, the ground was held by the F i r s t and Third legions which were sent to Rome by Caesar i n 49 B.C. These were under the control of Domitius Ahenobarbus. At the centre Soipio stood on guard with two Syrian legions. "Caesar...had posted his Tenth legion on the right wing, and his Ninth on the left...To this legion he added the Eighth...He had eighty cohorts posted i n his lines making a t o t a l of twenty-two thousand men...He had placed Antonius i n command on the l e f t wing, P. Su l l a on the ri g h t , and Cn. Domitius i n the centre." 5 2 From close scrutiny of his opponents l i n e , Caesar observed that Pompey planned to use his infantry defensively so that when the cavalry had scattered Caesar's horse and foot, the infantry would move i n and, by i t s mass, overwhelm any opposition. To counteract this Caesar placed eight cohorts obliquely as a fourth l i n e and concealed i t by the right wing. Pompey made the f i r s t move by ordering his men to march towards the enemy. When they had reached a certain point, he brought them to a halt and here they waited for Caesar to attack, their spears at the ready. "Here...Pompey made a mistake, not knowing that the i n i t i a l clash with a l l the impetus of running adds force to the blows and f i r e s the courage, which everything then conspires to f a n . " 5 5 Caesar's troops, on approaching slowly, became suspicious of the enemy's delaying t a c t i c s . Thinking that the Pompelans hesitated through fear, the Caesarians stopped to regroup 51 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 86. 5 2 B e l l . Civ.. I l l , 89. 53 Plutarch, Caesar, 44. 77 and, when thei r lines were consolidated, they charged the enemy. Caesar knew the moral and physical value of impetus. He was also aware that his men on the attack were better prepared psychologically, i f they thought that Pompey's forces were afraid of them. As the l i n e s dashed, Pompey's weight of cavalry forced back Caesar's r i g h t . On a given signal, Caesar's oblique l i n e , thus far con-cealed by the right wing, was brought into action. "No circumstances contributed more than t h i s to Caesar's vietory on that day; for as soon as Pompey's cavalry poured forth, these cohorts routed i t by an unexpected onset and delivered i t up to the rest of the troops for slaughter." 5 4 The th i r d l i n e , which was held back by Caesar for such a time as this was now introduced and so effective was i t s power that i t routed the already un-nerved forces of Pompey. Caesar was once again victorious. I t i s certainly evident that Pharsalia, a complete disaster f o r Pompey, revealed Caesar as the superior t a c t i c i a n i n equal battl e . How-ever, for Pompey i t must be said that his troops were of i n f e r i o r quality when compared with Caesar's highly trained cohorts. "This splendid v i c -tory was won by Caesar's admirable dispositions, the lack of vigor of Pompey's soldiers, and the want of steadfastness of Pompey's cavalry."*^ The battle was over, and Pompey f l e d to Larissa. Caesar followed but was unable to intercept him. After gathering his wife and family, the downcast commander sought refuge at the court of Ptolemy Auletes and, as he was being welcomed ashore, was ignominiously stabbed i n the back by a soldier formerly under his command. So he died on the sands of 54 Frontinus, Strategemata, 2, 3, 22. 55 Bodge, op.cit«, p.568. 78 Egypt; even Caesar mourned his passing. The f i r s t phase of the C i v i l War closed with Pharsalia, a battle among battles. "We may c a l l i t the m i l i t a r y expression of the coming p o l i t i c a l change...The psychological strategy of Caesar i n t h i s campaign was based on a thorough understanding of his r i v a l ' s embarrass-ments," 5 6 The war was not yet over for the aristocrats were to assemble i n A f r i c a and provide for Caesar further battles and more complex situa-tions. "...Caesar was accustomed to stake his fortune upon desperate 57 measures, and glad to put i t to the proof i n utmost r i s k s . . . . " 56 Heitland, The Boman Republic, I I I , p.308 57 Lucan, V, 301-302. 79 CHAPTER 71 THE AFRICAN CAMPAIGN Now that Pharsalia was over, the Pompeians scattered; Lablenus hastened to Dyrrhachium where he "pretended that the fortune of the two sides had been equalized i n consequence of a severe wound received by Caesar. By t h i s pretence he created confidence i n the other followers of Pompey's party." 1 Cato with f i f t e e n cohorts travelled to Corcyra, where he was joined l a t e r by Scipio and Afranius. Headed by Scipio and Afranius, the rebels, inspired by Labienus's news, deserted the island stronghold f o r A f r i c a . After landing at U t i c a , they joined forces with Juba and Attius "Varus and quickly began recruiting a new army. Corcyra was an important base for Pompeian operations and one of the v i t a l m i l i t a r y l i n k s between Pharsalus and Africa : "Les fuyards de Pharsale n'avaient done touche leur place d'armes que pour l'evacuer en desordre, et refluer sur Corcyre avec l a garnison de quinze cohortes que Caton avait su maintenir intacte, et les seize cents cavaliers que Lablenus avait sauves de Thessalie." 2 After Pharsalia M. Octavius, one of Pompey's generals, who had assembled a few troops i n Macedonia, moved from there into I l l y r i a , whence he was compelled to flee by two of Caesar's lieutenants, P. Vatirdus and Q,. Cornuficius. He gathered a fleet and was able to take i t to A f r i c a . After the union of t h i s f l e e t with the rebels and the only Pompeian army that could boast of a victory, rumours reached I t a l y , and eventually Caesar, that Octavius was gathering an army out of available forces i n A f r i c a , and 1, Irontinus, Strategemata, I I , 7, 13. 2 J . Carcopino, Cesar. I I (Paris, 1950), p.927. 80 with his f l e e t intended to invade I t a l y . These naval squadrons contin-u a l l y troubled S i c i l y and Sardinia, plundering t h e i r towns. The rem-nants of Pharsalus could not benefit from surrender, but they did have a chance i n a partisan war - a war which was to be carried on not by the forces of Pompey, but by those of the aristocrats. What the a l l i e s lacked i n strength, they gained i n fanaticism. Cato did not j o i n the rebels immediately, as new of Pompey's death had not yet reached him. Instead, hoping to recover Achaia, he moved into the Peloponnese, and on the march was informed that Oalenus was on the way to intercept him. Cato withdrew and decided to go to Egypt where he could join forces with Pompey but, informed of the l a t -ter' s death, he changed his plans and made his way to A f r i c a . "The great majority of the republicans, as of the Pompeians, betook them-selves to A f r i c a , where alone an honourable and constitutional warfare might s t i l l be waged against the usurper." Cato's moderating i n f l u -ence was needed i n A f r i c a , as the choice of a leader troubled a l l i n the Pompeian camp. Scipio and Varus contested the leadership. The ordinary soldiers and statesmen wished Cato to command, but the Stole refused the position, for he was not a m i l i t a r y man at heart, and Scipio became commander-in-chief, Cato receiving the governor ship of u"tica. On or about 24 September 47, Caesar arrived i n Rome and, after giving considerable attention to the immediate problems facing him, made preparations to suppress the unruly forces i n A f r i c a . Two months la t e r he l e f t the c i t y , and, on 17 December 47, reached Lilybaeum i n S i c i l y , 3 Mommsen, The History of Rome, IV, p.410. 81 where he pitched his tent near the shore: "This he did with a view that none should think he had time to delay, and that his men might be kept i n readiness at a day or an hour's warning." 4 There was much comment on his impatience to be o f f , as i t seemed foolhardy to set s a i l now with so few troops available, while Scipio, who was nearing the height of his power, had amassed not only ten legions augmented by a u x i l i a r i e s but also a larger f l e e t than Caesar's. Caesar's mobilization was slow, one legion and s i x hundred cavalry being a l l that he could muster. The men were ordered to take with them a minimum of baggage and no slaves, for the shortage of ships and a scarcity of food and water precluded the contrary. I t i s interesting to consider why Caesar took such a small force to combat so powerful an enemy - i t does not seem to be akin to his general pattern of strategy. Possibly he thought that the enemy flee t would again be i n winter quarters; i f such was the case he would be afforded a crossing to A f r i c a as easy as that to Epirus. Perhaps Caesar f e l t that i f his weary legions knew he were i n danger, they would be aroused to greater than human efforts i n his behalf - such was the admiration he inspired i n his men. At the time of his departure for A f r i c a , the Pompeian forces were somewhat scattered. There were squadrons of ships at Utica and along the coast. Scipio with most of his forces was encamped at Utica, while Labienus with his eavalry and a u x i l i a r i e s was on the watch near Leptis Minor. Caesar set s a i l for the promontory of Mercury (Cape Bon), i n -tending to land some distance south of Scipio, whom he knew to be stationed at Utica* Realizing that Utica was exceptionally well f o r t i f i e d and pro-tected, Caesar decided to establish a bridgehead south of Cape Bon and 4 Caesar, de Bello Afrleo. 1. 82 work inland from there. "The theatre of the campaign upon which Caesar was about to enter extends southward some t h i r t y - f i v e miles from the sea-port of Sousse, embraces Monastir, Lemta, Cape Dimasse, Mahedia, and SI A a l i a and reaehes i t s southernmost point at E l Djem...."5 Although the sky was clear when he sailed, a storm suddenly arose and scattered his f l e e t . As no definite destination had been assigned to the captains, each directed his ship as best he could. Caesar landed with his small force near Hadrumetum and encamped there. Dodge considers i t a repre-hensible oversight on Caesar's part not to have given his captains i n -structions where to assemble i n case of an unexpected turn of events. That no rendezvous had been d e f i n i t e l y assigned was a flaw i n his strategy, but the fact that the weather and the position of the enemy were both indeterminable factors perhaps vindicates Caesar somewhat. "But i n this Caesar aeted not without design; f o r as he knew of no port i n A f r i c a that was clear of the enemy's forces, and where the f l e e t might rendezvous i n security, he chose to r e l y entirely upon fortune, and land where occasion offered." 6 At Hadrumetum, a l l overtures f o r a peaceful surrender were spurned by Considius Longus, who was i n charge of the town, and who had for his garrison two legions and seven hundred horse. Caesar had at f i r s t intended to raze the town, but, after considering i t s strength and the smallness of his forces, thought i t advisable not to remain and be-siege the town, l e s t , while he pursued that design, the enemy's cavalry should come behind and surround him." 7 5 Holmes, The Roman Republic, I I I , p*237. 6 B e l l . Afr., 1. 7 B e l l . Afr., 5. 83 Caesar's next move was down coast to a point where he could assemble his scattered f l e e t . I t was his desire to find a town or towns whose people, d i s s a t i s f i e d with Pompeian rule, would be w i l l i n g to defect to his side. He found the inhabitants of Leptis Minor and Ruspina amen-able towards him. At Leptis he stopped and proceeded to construct landing f a c i l i t i e s . I t i s possible that advance scouts had secured this port f o r Caesar as well as the neighbouring harbour of Ruspina, f o r , on leaving Hadrumetum, his rear was harassed by Numidian cavalry who slowed down his march and caused his men endless trouble. By a sound manoeuvre Caesar gained protection f o r his forces, and eventually reached Ruspina. Caesar f o r t i f i e d the harbours of Ruspina and Leptis. The former he used as his centre of operations because of i t s topographical advantages while the l a t t e r was to be his anchorage; "...by keeping possession of the maritime c i t i e s , and providing them with garrisons, he might secure a retreat for his f l e e t . " Caesar's f i r s t camp was at Ruspina but a move to Leptis, which was a poor place f o r defence as i t was located on a f l a t section of the seashore, convinced him that the former afforded more protection. About January 3, a report reached him that most of his ships ware i n sight and steering for Utica. Caesar must have thought here that his hesitation to assign a rendezvous for his ships was transferring them into the hands of his enemies. As he was about to take ship i n an attempt to retrieve his lost f l e e t , by a stroke of luck, the ships suddenly turned, made for Leptis, and came safe to land i n a short time. Caesar's l u c k " had not changed. Who else ever benefitted i n such a way from so elusive a goddess? Through negotiation with the natives of the area, Caesar 8 B e l l . Afr.. 9* 84 guaranteed a grain supply of sorts f o r his troops. This source of supply proved to be of great help to him even after his missing transports arrived bearing more men and supplies. Throughout this campaign Caesar suffered from continual shortage of grain. Scipio had wisely gathered a l l known quantities of wheat into his numerous granaries, leaving l i t t l e for Caesar. Though one l o t of reinforcements had arrived, the army of Caesar was not yet strong enough to begin offensive operations, and would not be so u n t i l a satisfactory grain supply was available. Upon Caesar's a r r i v a l at Hadrumetum, a strong enemy force under Labienus had set out to intercept him. This army met Caesar's troops as they were returning from a foraging expedition on the pl a i n of Ruspina. Labienus's foree was made up predominantly of Numldian cavalry sprinkled with G a l l i c and German troopers, whose a b i l i t y Caesar well knew. Caesar was d e f i n i t e l y caught off guard i n this surprise move of his former l i e u -tenant, who had marched against him with such s k i l l that the great general nearly met defeat. Labienus had trapped Caesar on le v e l ground, and i n -tended to use against his adversary the same tactics by which the Par-thians overcame Grassus, and Tuba annihilated Curio. Caesar was completely surrounded by Humidians, but he knew what course he had to follow. "As both sides stood i n expectation of the signal, Caesar would not s t i r from his post, as he saw that with such few troops against so great a foree g he must depend more on stratagem than strength...." Caesar's strategy was to draw his cohorts out into a long l i n e stationing the arehers i n front and the cavalry on the wings. As Labienus attacked, and his cavalry gradually enclosed Caesar's troops i n an enveloping movement, Caesar's 9 B e l l . Afr.. 14. 85 men extended t h e i r l i n e , each alternate cohort facing about and taking up a position behind the cohort next to i t , and so fighting back to back, •Caesar had never found himself i n such s t r a i t s since he had fought i n the ranks against the Ner v i i on the heights above the Sambre."10 Labienus had so mingled the horse and foot i n this long l i n e , that Caesar thought he was encountering only infantry, but the two fronts which he presented to the enemy created a formidable barrier which the Numidians were unable to penetrate. Labienus's forces, which were caught o f f guard, gradually gave way and eventually f l e d . The a r r i v a l of Petreius rejuvenated the Pompeians, who quickly regrouped and renewed the attack. Caesar was de-f i n i t e l y i n dire s t r a i t s "...and had Ruspina not been so near, the Moor-is h j a v e l i n would perhaps have accomplished the same result here as the Parthian bow at Carrhae." 1 1 One l a s t thrust from a l l points within Caesar lines provided the impetus needed to upset Labienus's troops. Unwilling to engage i n close combat, the Numidians were driven from the pl a i n , and Caesar reached Ruspina safely. The battle lasted from the f i f t h hour after sunrise u n t i l sunset That day, January 4, Labienus's attempt to crush Caesar by numbers had f a i l e d , not because the renegade lacked the a b i l i t y to carry out his plan, but because his opponent was more s k i l f u l . The question has often been asked whether Caesar could have sent to his camp for help. He might have done t h i s , but a quick assessment of the perilous situation indicated that he must depend more upon his s k i l l of stratagem and his application of tac t i c s than m i l i t a r y strength. I t i s interesting to note that i n this encounter near Ruspina, the tactics used by Labienus's Numidians were the 10 Holmes, op.cit., p.243. 11 Mommaen, op.cit., p.416. 86 same as those used by Hannibal's Numidian force which so frequently out-manoeuvred and outfought the legions of Rome i n the Second Punic War. Caesar's men wanted to engage the Numidians i n close combat with their swords, but were prevented from doing so by the charge and retreat tactics of t h e i r elusive enemy. One of Caesar's greatest problems i n this battle was that pro-duced by his r e c r u i t s . He knew that i t would only be a matter of time u n t i l t h e i r courage would collapse. Fortunately the enemy's c i r c l e was broken at i t s two extremes before t h i s happened. His opponents were divided and soon became dis s i l l u s i o n e d . Caesar's men gradually regained t h e i r composure and turned back t h e i r opponents with a concentrated attack which forced the Numidians to scatter. "The surprise of the whole manoeuvre, pa r t i c u l a r l y by troops which Labienus thought were a l l but defeated, was what gave i t i t s success.""1* Labienus f a i l e d because he put his f a i t h i n numbers rather than i n d i s c i p l i n e . He had misjudged Caesar's a b i l i t y to extricate himself from an awkward situation when hard pressed. After Labienus*s near-successful cavalry attack, Caesar was di s p i r i t e d , "for he was not yet able to carry through the war to a s a t i s -factory conclusion; and he saw that to stay i n the same place was d i f f i c u l t because of the lack of subsistence, even i f the foe should leave his troops alone, and that to r e t i r e was impossible, with the enemy pressing upon him both by land and by sea." 1 3 He had learned a hard lesson. No longer would he take the offensive or encourage attack. Instead he decided to follow a policy of 'watch and wait' u n t i l further reinforcements arrived. He so f o r t i f i e d his camp that his forces received from the coast what food 12 Dodge, Caesar, I I , p.636. 13 Dio, XLIII, 2. 87 eould be provided. "The question of subsistence taxed him to the utmost. The motif of the entire African campaign may be said to be the lack of v i c t u a l i n Caesar's camp."14 At Leptis he had created a safe harbour for his f l e e t and an arsenal for his engines of war. These he gradually moved to Ruspina, and, that they might s a t i s f a c t o r i l y be accommodated, he constructed earthworks from both town and camp to the sea. These entrenchments were more quickly attended to, when, two days after the bat t l e , news was received that Scipio, after marching with eight legions and three thousand cavalry from TJtica, was near a junction with Labienus. "Meantime Caesar f o r t i f i e d his camp with much greater care, reinforced the guards, and threw up two entrenchments; one from Ruspina quite to the sea, the other from his camp to the sea likewise, to secure the communication, 15 and receive supplies without danger." When reinforcements did not ar-r i v e , Caesar transferred archers, s a i l o r s , and even oarsmen from ship to camp. He had decided to t r a i n them to fight alongside his cavalry and so counterbalance Labienus*s light-armed foot. Caesar's "only hope of safety was i n making his defences at Ruspina so strong that they could not be taken by assault, and i n waiting for fresh troops and supplies from S i c i l y . " 1 5 Labienus had established a p a r t i a l blockade of Ruspina by posting cavalry battalions on surrounding h i l l s . Although this blockade greatly restricted Caesar's movements, the roads south of Ruspina were s t i l l open, and these he used to send messages of encouragement to the outside trib e s . "Pendant tout Janvier sa position e t a i t f o r t critique et i l n'a du son 14 Dodge, op.cit., p.637. 15 B e l l . A f r . , 20. 16 Long, The Decline of the Roman Republic. ¥, p.325. 88 salut qu'aux f o r t i f i c a t i o n s de son camp et a l'impuissance des armes offen-sives anciennes pour forcer des retranchemens, ressources que n'aurait pas un general moderne."17 Caesar had at his disposal much equipment and an amount of food suf f i c i e n t for survival. He was well equipped to hold out against his enemy. " A l l t his preparation had been made on account of the smallness of his numbers and the want of experience i n his men, and not because of the strength of the enemy and because he was afraid of themj he was well content they should think that he was frightened." 1 8 The Pompeians had encamped about three miles south of Caesar's position and, although they f a i l e d to lure Caesar into battle, through their superiority of cavalry and their a b i l i t y to intercept foragers, they did foree him to exercise great caution. Caesar was firmly entrenched at Ruspina and, though he might soon be short of vi c t u a l s , the Pompeians could not move him. The corn he received from nearby farmers permitted him to issue a subsistence ration to his forces. Throughout t h i s period Caesar had sent his warships to patrol the seas i n search of the vessels carrying further reinforcements. Some of these troop ships had been captured by the Pompeians and burned, while others were helplessly wandering about, their captains hoping they would f i n d a safe anchorage. "Caesar, being informed of t h i s , stationed his f l e e t along the coast and islands f o r the security of his convoys." 1 9 But f o r an occassional skirmish between the two camps, there was l i t t l e a c t i v i t y on the battlefront. Scipio's forces had joined up with those of Petreius and Labienus, thus increasing Caesar's discomfort. "Their 17 Napoleon, Precis des Guerres de Cesar (Paris, 1836), p.195. 18 Long, op.cit., p.330. 19 B e l l . A f r., 21. 89 cavalry made continual excursions to our very works, and intercepted those who ventured too far i n quest of wood or water, and obliged us to keep SO within our entrenchments.tt The enemy waited for Caesar to move, but existing conditions prevented him from doing so. No supplies had yet arrived from S i c i l y and Sardinia; the season was too dangerous for naviga-tio n ; s i x miles i n each direction from his camp was a l l the land Caesar possessed i n A f r i c a , while lack of forage caused much distress among his troops. News had reached Caesar that his a r r i v a l i n the province had been received with skepticism by the natives, who thought that rather than come i n person, he had sent his lieutenants to do battle with Scipio. To nul-l i f y t h i s misconception he sent messages by courier to a l l the surrounding states to inform them that i t was actually Caesar who had arrived. Scipio, drawing his l i n e right up to his opponent's entrench-ments, offered Caesar battle on three successive days, only to have i t declined. Caesar had given s t r i c t orders that a pitched battle was not to be fought yet. "He very well knew, that whatever confidence the enemy might have i n their numbers, they would yet never dare to attack the camp of a general who had so often repulsed, t e r r i f i e d , and put them to f l i g h t ; who had frequently pardoned and granted them their l i v e s ; and whose very 21 name had weight and authority enough to intimidate their army. M & x The historian of the African. War further explains that Caesar's delaying policy was not one of cowardice as "...he thought that i t would disgrace him, i f , after so many noble exploits, and defeating such powerful armies, and after gaining so many glorious v i c t o r i e s , he should appear to have 20 B e l l . A f r . . 24. 1 3190 gained a bloody victory over the remnants who had r a l l i e d after their f l i g h t . " 2 2 Here Caesar's strategy, unlike that at Dyrrhaehium, was sound, and provided him with the opportunity for a concerted attack l a t e r . Scipio had f a i l e d i n his attempt to attack Caesar before he beeame firmly entrenched at Ruspina. Intending to shut Caesar i n , he had garrisoned both Hadrumetum and Thapsus; but Cato had warned him against this and suggested instead that he move inland, thus luring Caesar away from the coast and rendering i t d i f f i c u l t for him to provide food for his troops. Scipio had benefited by Pompey's fate, for he had learned to become cautious and to avoid battle whenever possible. I t i s a point of interest whether Scipio would have openly engaged Caesar's forces had the dictator accepted the challenge when the Pompeian's troops were arrayed before Ruspina. Caesar's delaying tactics had an unnerving effect upon Scipio and his associates: "Scipio and the other generals were greatly surprised at t h i s conduct, and could not conceive why Caesar, who had always been forward and aetive i n war, should a l l of a sudden change his measures; which they therefore suspected must proceed from some very 23 powerful reasons." Caesar gained as an a l l y one of the most interesting personali-t i e s of the African campaign, P. S i t t i u s of Hueerla, a Roman adventurer Who had won to his cause a regiment of freebooters. He was the last of the Catilinarians who sold himself and his legionaires to the highest bidder regardless of the task. At the present moment he and his followers were serving under King Bogud of Mauretania, who had become Caesar's 22 B e l l . Afr.. 31. 23 B e l l . Afr.. 35. 91 partisan i n a series of attacks against Juba. Already Cirta and other villages i n Juba's realm had f a l l e n to these a l l i e s of Caesar. Juba at the time was on his way to jo i n Seipio, but this unexpected attack on his t e r r i t o r i e s had forced him to return and to send only a small detachment under Saburra to jo i n Scipio. These victories over Juba were claimed i n Caesar's name and greatly f a c i l i t a t e d Caesar's work. Juba's change of mind i n his decision to return to Mauretania lightened the load Caesar had to bear. Had the Numidian king's forces been added to those of the Pompeians at Ruspina, Caesar's strategy could have been disrupted. "Cae-sar's constrained position was due to his own overeager act i n attacking the African problem with ins u f f i c i e n t means."24 As well as obtaining the service of P. S i t t i u s , Caesar had won over many of the Gaetulian pastoral tribes, who cherished the kindnesses bestowed upon t h e i r ancestors by Marius and Su l l a . They were only too w i l l i n g to assist the nephew of Marius. Many Numidians and Gaetulians from Scipio's army had deserted to Caesar. Such deserters Caesar used by sending them back to their own country with lette r s to their t r i b a l chiefs suggesting that they rebel against the harsh rule of Juba. " I t was be-ginning to be evident that the native population sympathized with the gen-er a l who was known to respect the rights of non-combatants, and whose prestige, not-withstanding his temporary weakness, seemed to make his ultimate victory certain. By the end of January 47, as Caesar was on the verge of a famine, ships bearing corn, troopers, archers and slingers reached Ruspina from the island of Cercina, which G. Sallustius .Crispus had captured, and along 24 Dodge, op.cit., p.641. 25 Holmes, op.cit., p.249. 92 with i t the enemy*s grain stockade. Caesar*s army was now strengthened and the morale of his troops increased. "Thus he experienced a double pleasure on t h i s occasion, receiving at one and the same time both a supply of provisions and a reinforcement of troops, which animated the soldiers, and delivered them from the apprehensions of want." This new force was s t i l l weak i n cavalry and auxiliary troops, but Caesar, aware of t h i s , trained what troops he had to fight i n the most e f f i c i e n t manner under the most arduous conditions. The pl a i n of Ruspina was about twelve miles long and surrounded by a ridge of low h i l l s beginning at the coast and forming into a semi-c i r c u l a r theatre. I t was Caesar's plan to seize these h i l l s and confine his operations to them u n t i l he was strong enough to engage Scipio i n the open p l a i n , " . . . i t was the business of Caesar to control the entire pla-teau, and not to allow his enemy to f o r t i f y the slopes which descended on the west and the south-west to the pl a i n , lest they should prevent him 27 from advancing inland...." A further advantage i n controlling this » h i l l y region lay i n the provision of security for the harbours of Ruspina and Leptis, should they be threatened by Scipio. Control of the surround-ing h i l l s was the f i r s t step towards control of the pl a i n south of Ruspina. When he f e l t ready to move, Caesar planned to attack Scipio from the east-ern side of the p l a i n , where the h i l l s would conceal his approach. There were f i v e ridges i n a l l , the l a s t of which Scipio had f o r t i f i e d , for he was forced by lack of water to move to these h i l l s which lay just west of the important town of U z i t a , whence he procured water and other conven-iences f o r his army. Uzita was situated i n the plain south of Ruspina. 26 B e l l . Afr., 34. 27 Holmes, op.cit., p.517. 93 As Scipio sought the shelter of the h i l l s , so Caesar followed, but, fear-f u l of the Numidian cavalry, he avoided crossing the p l a i n and exposing his force by using a seashore route. I t seems that at this point Caesar was feeling his opponent out, and waiting f o r the right moment to involve him i n an engagement advanta-geous only to Caesar. As he had planned, Caesar safely reached the h i l l s on the eastern side of the p l a i n , the f i r s t three ridges of which he seized without d i f f i c u l t y , the few Pompeians stationed thereon being put to f l i g h t . The fourth h i l l , which was close by Scipio's camp, he invested by constructing an earthwork between the summit and the p l a i n , his cavalry protecting the workers. This sudden movement surprised Scipio and Labie-nus, who quickly deployed the i r troops to give themselves the necessary protection. "Caesar, knowing that Scipio had received a l l the supplies he expected, and judging he would no longer decline eoming to an engage-ment, began to advance along the ridge with his forces, extend his l i n e s , secure them with redoubts, and possess himself of the eminences between him and Scipio.'* 2 8 Caesar's new foothold i n the plain of Ruspina gave him a moral advantage over Scipio. He had repulsed a cavalry attack of Labienus, while entrenching the h i l l . Never could i t be said of the l a t t e r that he ever l e t Caesar rest. His desire to overthrow his former commander was as strong now as ever, and the longer Caesar outwitted him the greater the enmity became. Now that Caesar controlled t h i s strategic range of h i l l s , he was afforded a view of Ruspina, Leptis, and the other areas which had preferred him supplies. Added to this was a close view of the enemy's operations, so important i n a time of war. 28 B e l l . Afr.. 49. 94 Mopping up operations soon took place throughout the various h i l l s seized. "The cavalry having thus cleared the mountain, Caesar resolved to entrench himself there, and distributed the work to the l e -29 ^ gions.** Caesar, ever anxious to test Scipio's strength, formed his infantry i n battle l i n e at the foot of the h i l l s just won. Scipio took up arms and met him; the opposing forces assumed positions facing each other. There was a t r i a l of strength, but neither side showed any i n c l i -nation to fight and at dusk the opposing forces r e t i r e d to their camps. But for odd skirmishes, there was no sharp fighting for several weeks. A l l was not well i n Caesar's camp. The heavy seasonal rains had made the men miserable as well as uncomfortable. They had l i t t l e baggage and were kept constantly on the move i n the restricted area of thei r camp. An even greater discomfort than that caused by the weather existed i n the troops' reaction to things unknown. This was especially evident when the news reached them that Juba was on the way to joi n Scipio I t must be remembered that Caesar had as yet not won a s t i r r i n g victory. I f at a l l , he had barely beaten back Labienus at Ruspina and was unable to force Seipio into a conclusive b a t t l e . "Caesar's army began to be alarmed and a tumult broke out among them on account of the disaster they had a l -ready experienced, and of the reputation of the forces advancing against them, and expecially of the numbers and bravery of the Numidian cavalry. War with elephants, to which they were unaccustomed, also frightened them. These men could not forget Curio's disaster at the hands of so formidable a foe and Juba's a r r i v a l caused more terror i n Caesar's camp than was necessary. To counteract this growing fear, Caesar kept his men busy, 29 B e l l . Afr,, 51. 30 Appian, I I , 14, 96. 95 especially the new r e c r u i t s . They were constantly on the move, sh i f t i n g baggage, working on entrenchments and carrying out the general duties of the camp. So occupied there was l i t t l e time l e f t for them to worry about the growing strength of the enemy. Scipio and Juba Joined forces. Labienus was settled i n a sep-arate camp some distance to the south of Caesar and close to his l e f t flank. Before Caesar could make another move, he knew that t h i 3 flank must be strengthened, for Labienus was too unpredictable a foe. While Caesar was busy strengthening t h i s section of his l i n e , Scipio seized the opportunity to reinforce the piquets on a h i l l s t i l l under his control. In the middle of this operation, Caesar's cavalry force suddenly attacked, outmanoeuvred and routed Scipio's band and, when the skirmish was over, seized the h i l l for t h e i r commander. Labienus, to check Caesar's rapid movement along the ridges, established a strong guard on a h i l l adjoining the one just cap-tured, and was determined to hold i t against anything Caesar threw at him. This h i l l was separated from the previous one by a deep depression, i t s sides indented with a thick olive tree grove. Knowing that an open en-gagement would p r o f i t him l i t t l e he decided to thwart Caesar by stratagem, i . e . , by posting small bands of cavalry and l i g h t infantry i n the grove to surprise and outmanoeuvre Caesar's troops as they passed through. Through deserters, Caesar learned of Labienus's trickery and so bided his time. When he though the opposing force was unready and perhaps scattered, he ordered his troops to move. The Pompeians, unable to regain t h e i r proper stations, became unnerved and quickly f l e d . In a short time this position f e l l to Caesar. In recapitulating, we find that Caesar had placed his hopes i n 96 a pitched battle wherein the enemy would be divided and so possess l i t t l e advantage of position. Ruspina could not easily be supplied and Caesar was now i n somewhat the same position as Pompey had been at Dyrrhachium, especially with respect to fodder. I f Scipio would not carry the war to him, then he must move against Scipio. He could not afford to fight a war of a t t r i t i o n . Caesar's move to the h i l l s about s i x miles south of Ruspina extended his operational area and f a c i l i t a t e d the gathering of supplies; but i t did not accomplish what he had intended, namely, to draw Scipio into the open. Now that the h i l l s surrounding the plain and close to Uzita were under Caesar's control, he could r i d himself of the enemy's cavalry out-posts which interfered with his water-carriers; he could secure his l e f t flank against attack; he could disrupt any offensive manoeuvre on the part of the enemy and possibly bring about an engagement under his own terms. The strategy involved i n seizing the h i l l s surrounding the p l a i n was sound, even though Scipio remained firmly entrenched i n his camp. Slowly but surely Caesar was consolidating his position around Uzita; i t was only l e f t f o r him to move towards the town. I t must be remembered that Scipio had moved from Ruspina to Uzita, his magazine, for stronger protection and a guarantee of supplies; and that Caesar had followed him only to bide his time u n t i l he could strike against the fortress or draw out J c i p i o . " I t was not perhaps so much the capture of Uzita at which Caesar was aiming, as the chance i n some manner of placing Scipio at a disadvantage so as to 31 lead up to his defeat i n a decisive engagement without too much r i s k . " Now that he was i n a strong position to attack Uzita, Caesar 31 Dodge, op.cit., p.655. 97 ordered earthworks constructed, one from the l e f t comer and one from the right corner of his camp, dug i n such a direction that they met severally at the l e f t and right angles of the town. "His design i n this work was, that when he approached the town with his troops, and began to attack i t , these lines might secure his flanks, and hinder the enemy's horse from surrounding him, and compelling him to abandon the siege. I t likewise gave his men more frequent opportunities of conversing with the enemy, and f a c i l i t a t e d the means of desertion...He wanted also by drawing nearer the enemy, to see i f they r e a l l y intended to eome to an a c t i o n . . . . " 3 2 One cannot help but be amazed at Caesar's a b i l i t y to construct and occupy such extensive camps and lines without providing an opportunity for his enemy to penetrate them at any one point especially when they were unfinished. While the work of entrenchment was underway, Caesar's second l o t of reinforcements arrived. To f a c i l i t a t e their a r r i v a l , he was forced to engage i n a naval exploit with the enemy which displayed his audacity, bold decision and inveterate s k i l l . "In almost a l l Caesar's battles, unless forced on him, he was slow i n attack. In strategic i n i t i a t i v e , on the contrary, Caesar was admirable. I t was one constant, never-ceasing push." 3 3 The Pompeians were not i d l e while Caesar prolonged his entrench-ments. They displayed t h e i r strength by arraying their troops on gently r i s i n g ground south of XJzita and not far from Caesar's eamp. Labienus stationed his Numidian cavalry and l i g h t infantry about one mile from the right wing, near the foot of a ridge, so that "...when the two armies should engage, his cavalry at the commencement of the action should take a longer sweep, enclose Caesar's army and throw them into confusion by 32 B e l l . Afr.. 51. 33 Dodge, op.cit., p.665. 98 t h e i r d a r t s . 1 , 3 4 Caesar, expecting the combined force to attack him, was unwilling to c a l l a charge since, "...the enemy having a strong garrison i n Uzita, which was opposite to his right wing, he could not advance be-yond that place without exposing his flank to a s a l l y from the town.* And too "...the ground before Scipio's army was very rough, and he thought i t l i k e l y to disorder his men i n the charge.**35 Caesar, to counteract the threatening movements of the enemy, strengthened his l e f t wing and u t i l i z e d the power of the F i f t h legion: #...as his right wing was defended by the works, he found i t necessary to make his l e f t stronger, that i t might be a match for the numerous cavalry of the enemy; for which reason he had placed a l l his horse there, intermixed with light-armed foot; and as he could not 36 r e l y much upon them, had sent the f i f t h legion to assist them." So the armies stood, and but f o r a small cavalry skirmish i n which the Pompeians triumphed, nothing came of the elaborate movements. At dusk both armies re t i r e d to the i r camps. Juba was informed that C i r t a , the capital of Numidia, had f a l l e n to P. S i t t i u s . The Gaetuli, who nursed much hatred i n their hearts against Pompey for subjecting them to Numidian rule, had risen i n S i t t i u s * s favour, and Juba was now opposed by three forces: Caesar, S i t t i u s , and the rebel-lious Gaetulians. "Juba, having thus three wars to sustain, was compelled to detach s i x cohorts from the army destined to act against Caesar, and send them to defend the frontiers of his kingdom against the Gaetulians.** 3 7 Juba's independent strategy was continually a matter of concern for the 34 B e l l . Afr.. 59. 35 B e l l . A f r . , 58. 36 B e l l . Afr.. 60. 3? B e l l . A f r .. 55. 99 Pompeians gathered i n A f r i c a . His insolence and aloofness s t i r r e d even Cato, who was the only aristocrat capable of quelling Juba's overweening pride. Though Juba's reinforcements were of great assistance to the Pompeian cause, the a l l i e d army possessed no consistency, for i t was made up largely of slaves, freedmen, and peasants whose farms had been burned, and property confiscated. There was no w i l l to fight i n these men. Both the Gaetulian uprising and the increase i n his forces permitted Caesar to adopt a more aggressive strategy. His prestige, too, had a great effect on the natives of the surrounding d i s t r i c t s and brought many over to his side. As he pushed forward his entrenchments towards Uzita, Caesar noticed that Scipio, besides strengthening his hold on the h i l l s back of the c i t y , was drawing a l i n e i n front of the town and opposite to Caesar's trenchworks. This was done " l e s t Caesar should cut off his communication 38 with the mountain." The mountain specified was i n the range behind U z i t a . Small concerted enemy attacks on various parts of his l i n e d i s -turbed Caesar, so he daily kept his men at labour on the works, "...carry-ing a ditch and rampart quite across the pl a i n , to prevent the incurrsions of the enemy."39 As Caesar i n the plain before Uzita extended his ram-parts and ditch across the pl a i n to stop the enemy moving i n that area, Scipio also laboured i n the same way to keep Caesar from cutting him off from the h i l l s . "Two months passed i n marches and campings without any result i n the narrow spaee enclosed between the towns of Leptis, Ruspina, A c h i l l a , and Agar, which Caesar held, and Hadrumetum, Thapsus, Uzita, and Thysdrus, 38 B e l l . A fr., 61. 39 Loc. c j t . 100 40 occupied by Scipio." Caesar saw no results from this state of relative i n a c t i v i t y . He was s t i l l suffering from a shortage of supplies and, even though he had taken advantage of the grain deposited i n vaults, according to African custom, he s t i l l had an insufficient amount to supply his en-larged army. This meant that he must either meet the enemy at a disad-vantage, or abandon his present position and move south i n search of a more p l e n t i f u l food supply. This required a revision of strategy. Caesar was thwarted i n his attempt to blockade Uzita by the s k i l f u l l use of the t e r r a i n by his adversaries. It was a great error on Scipio's part when he decided to defend Uzita and so carry on the war i n the coastal region, further inland, Caesar would have been greatly handicapped both through lack of contact with the coast and i n s u f f i c i e n t means to provide for food. As Caesar's forces increased, Scipio and Juba showed less incentive to engage him i n a pitched battle, and furing the two months of skirmishing, Caesar, by r i g i d routine, gradually accustomed his men to the foreign mode of fighting. Caesar now realized that to bring about a decisive battle he must adopt a strategy of manoeuvre, i . e . , he must bring Scipio out into the open by forcing him to move. This could best be done by garrisoning A c h i l l a , Leptis and Ruspina and moving south against another of Scipio's magazines, Agar, which lay twenty miles to the southeast over r e l a t i v e l y f l a t land, and "...about two kilometres north of Ksour es Saf, whieh i s f i f t e e n Roman miles, i n a straight l i n e , south of Thapsus...." Abandoning the siege of Uzita as a waste of time and yielding 40 V* Duruy, History of Rome and the Roman People, from i t s Origin to the Establishment of the Christian Empire, I I I (London, 1884), p.549. 41 Holmes, op.cit., p.525. 101 no results, Caesar ordered the blockade of the harbours of Hadrumetum and Thapsus, and the burning of his present camp. These a c t i v i t i e s brought to a close the second perior of the African campaign, and Caesar moved to Agar. "Scipio meanwhile, hearing of Caesar's departure, followed him along the h i l l s with a l l his forces, and posted himself about s i x miles off i n three different camps."42 Scipio of course was accompanied by Afranius and Juba. These three stationed their forces i n separate camps. Caesar's new camp was approximately two miles southwest of Agar, but closer to the sea than that of Scipio. I t i s interesting to note the position which Scipio assumed when he halted his movements against Caesar. He was so stationed that, without too much d i f f i c u l t y , he could cut off his enemy's foraging lines to the i n t e r i o r . Fortunately for Caesar, Scipio did not have time to carry this out, so quickly did the former move. Close to Agar and near Scipio»s camp lay the town of Zeta, placed by Veith at Beni Hassen, ten miles northwest of Tegea and a l i t t l e 43 less from Scipio*s encampment. Scipio had continuous communication with t h i s town and had there placed his centre of operations for this theatre of war. When he was firmly established at Agar, Caesar decided to raid Zeta i n an attempt to capture i t , for here was Scipio's grain stockade. To accomplish t h i s , Caesar would have to make a flank march past Scipio's camp, besiege the town, and return to Agar by the same route. I t i s possible that famine and the i n a b i l i t y to counteract i t , drove Caesar to this bold and somewhat foolhardy venture. It i s sufficient to say that the manoeuvre was successful. Zeta and a l l i t s possessions f e l l to Caesar and a garrison under a r e l i a b l e lieutenant was placed there. 42 B e l l . Afr.. 67. 43 Holmes, op.cit., p.525. 102 To do th i s i n the eyes of the enemy, Caesar showed the scorn with which he regarded his opponent. Perhaps Caesar's sudden attack was perpetrated to dislodge by surprise some of Scipio's cohorts, but, except for a l i g h t skirmish i n which a few men f e l l , no outright engagement took place. On his return to Agar from Zeta, Caesar was once more troubled by his greatest antagonist of the African campaign, Labienus, "...who lay i n ambuscade among the nearest h i l l s , with...cavalry and light-armed i n -fantry.... 1* 4 4 This enemy force attacked Caesar's rear and cause much confusion within the conqueror's ranks. "...Caesar pl a i n l y saw that t h e i r whole aim was to oblige him to encamp i n that place, where no water was to be had; that his soIdlers...might perish with hunger, and the cattle with t h i r s t . " 4 5 Labienus's Numidian host had so troubled the horses by the i r rearguard action that Caesar was compelled to s h i f t them to the centre of his l i n e , thus slowing down the advance of his army. "In Gaul, Caesar's troops had met a frank, courageous enemy who came out and fought hand to hand on the f i e l d ; here they had to resist the devices of a crafty foe who r e l i e d upon a r t i f i c e , not courage." 4 6 But Caesar's fortune once again won the day for him. The Numidians, thinking they might surround the opposing force, took to the h i l l s intending to move to the plain f u r -ther along Caesar's l i n e . As they were carrying out this manoeuvre, Caesar was given time to regroup and strengthen his weak sections so that when the next Numidian thrust came he was able to repulse i t . "Thus Caesar, at one time marching forward, at another halting, and going on but slowly, reached the camp safe, about seven that evening, having only ten men wounded."47 4 4 B e l l . Afr.. 69. 45 Loc. c i t . 46 Dodge, op.cit., p.674. 47 B e l l . Afr., 70. 103 The Numidians who had intended to head off the force farther down the valley committed a t a c t i c a l mistake, for the i r pressure was removed from the rearguard and transferred to the van — Caesar's strongest section of l i n e . Caesar's most serious loss was i n horses, and, though he narrowly evaded disaster, this awkward situation might have been avoided completely had he possessed a s u f f i c i e n t l y strong cavalry force. This move against Zeta l e f t Caesar's camp garrisoned by a negligible force open to attack, but once again fortune was on Caesar's side and Scipio hesitated to attack. Scipio, through the great name he bore, was expected to be as victorious i n A f r i c a as was his famed predecessor, Scipio Africanus. "...mais Scipion eta l t sans talent et n'avalt pour l u i qu'un nom i l l u s t r e . " 4 8 Perhaps we should not c r i t i c i z e his strategy too harshly, f o r his technique was spasmodically Fabian. He hoped that famine would do the work of v i c t o r i e s , such as had been Pompey's plan at Pharsalus, u n t i l the senators persuaded him otherwise. Scipio's incompetence at anything Fabian was shown by the lack of decision and plan which accompanies his movements. Had he been a bold and s k i l f u l general, he should have attacked Caesar on his return from Zeta. His hesitance to engage Caesar, and his willingness to l e t Labienus do most of the fighting, indicates that either he was afraid to meet Caesar even on terms disadvantageous to the dictator or, such was the confusion within his own camp, he hesitated to attack. I t has been shown thus far throughout the African campaign that Caesar's cavalry without t h e i r infantry support was not equal to Scipio's cavalry. "The war was confined to a small tract of country between Ruspina and Thapsus, but circumstances made i t to Caesar one of the most d i f f i c u l t 48 Napoleon, op.cit., p.183. 104 and dangerous of a l l his m i l i t a r y enterprises, and gave him the opportunity of displaying his great a b i l i t i e s and his generous temper. 1 , 4 9 Scipio cannot be considered a worthy opponent; Labienus alone bore the weight of combat for most of the campaign. "For there are good grounds to suppose that...the s k i l l which so long f o i l e d Caesar and twice brought him within an ace of defeat, was the s k i l l of Labienus," 5 0 When some citizens of Vaga, a town near Zeta, appealed to Caesar for protection, Juba sacked the town and butchered everyone i n i t . "The incident furnished an additional proof that the a l l i e s by thei r insensate cruelties had made enemies of the African people." 5 3- This event shows how determined and fanatical the Pompeians were. They knew that i f they lost the war they would f o r f e i t their l i v e s as well. Caesar, i n no small -way, took advantage of this gross error on the part of the Pompeians. He won the natives to his cause, while Scipio forced them to y i e l d to h i s . On 22 March 46 Caesar offered battle i n front of Scipio's camp, but Scipio refused combat. This convinced Caesar that the only way to move his enemy was to force his hand. Strategic points of attack which attracted Caesar's attention were those within a day or two's march of Agar. Such towns were Sarsura, Thisdra, and Thapsus. Sarsura was Scipio's supply town, garrisoned by a small force, and about a day's march west of Agar. I t was Caesar's design to march against this important torn, using the same tac t i c s that had been so successful at Zeta. He "...directed his march towards Sarsura, where Scipio had a garrison of Numidians, and a magazine of corn." 5 2 Labienus, anticipating Caesar's moves, sent his 49 Long, op.cit., p.367. 50 Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History, IX, p.681. 51 Holmes, op.cit., p.264. 52 B e l l . Afr., 75. 105 cavalry to harass his opponent 's infantry. Having profited by the long period of i n a c t i v i t y and his several engagements with Labienus, Caesar "...was very anxious, and proceeded with more slowness and circumspection than usual, slackening somewhat i n his accustomed speed and a c t i v i t y . " 5 S He had habituated his soldiers to the devices and s k i l l s of a cunning enemy, and he had taught them when to pursue and when to hold back; such was the determination of Caesar to conclude this costly campaign. "Caesar, ar r i v i n g before Sarsura, took i t i n the presence of the enemy, who dared not to advance to i t s r e l i e f ; ...he marched next day to Tisdra...and being deterred from besieging i t by want of corn, set out immediately, and a f t e r a march of four miles, encamped near a r i v e r . He marched from i t on the fourth day, and then returned to his former camp at Agar." 5 4 He was now ready to meet Labienus on more equal terms. As Caesar moved against Labienus, the l a t t e r ' s cavalry did not approach close enough for direct combat, and so were unable to prevent the f a l l of Sarsura, the massacre of i t s garrison, and the seizure of i t s stores. The turning point of the war had come, for now Labienus was looking on passively, hesitant to attack. The morale of the a l l i e s was gradually disintegrating. Scipio followed Caesar i n this c i r c u i t of towns, but kept at a distance a l l the way and f i n a l l y returned to his former camp at Agar, coincident with Caesar. Upon a r r i v a l at Agar, Caesar was informed that the f i n a l r e i n -forcements had arrived. Caesar had been patiently waiting for the right opportunity to fight the battle which would end the struggle, and now i t was i n sight. "Hitherto strategical prudence and t a c t i c a l resource had 53 B e l l . Afr.. 73. 54 B e l l . A fr., 76. 106 baffled Caesar's s k i l l . " 5 5 Caesar f e l t that his strong force could not be used to advantage u n t i l Scipio had found a battle-ground to his l i k i n g . The dictator was sure that this time would not be f a r distant, as his opponent's prestige was slowly but s i g n i f i c a n t l y diminishing, not only i n the eyes of his own men, but i n those of his a l l i e s as w e l l . He realized that he must meet Caesar soon, or be east from his position through the anger of his own comrades. Caesar's force was now at f u l l strength. To test Scipio's manpower "...he advanced into a p l a i n eight miles distant from his own camp, and four from that of Scipio, where he awaited the en-emy i n order of b a t t l e . " 5 6 A brief skirmish took place upon the a r r i v a l of Scipio's cavalry. Though the nearby town of Tegea was not taken by Caesar (for i t contained a strong enemy garrison), Scipio did receive a serious setback which further aggravated his already demoralized force. With this b r i e f but important encounter the third period of the African campaign came to an end. Caesar was becoming more and more conscious of the time he was wasting trying to force Scipio Into an open engagement. He firmly realized that "only i n a pitched battle on equal ground with a limited front could the fighting power of his infantry overcome the superior numbers of the 57 enemy and neutralize the effect of t h e i r cavalry." North of Agar lay Thapsus, another garrison town of Scipio, whose governor C. vergilius ana garrison had been continually f a i t h f u l to the a l l i e s . Should Caesar besiege t h i s town, Scipio would be "...redueed to the necessity of fighting, to avoid the disgrace of abandoning V i r g i l i u s and the Thapsitani, who had 55 Adeock, op.cit.. p.686. 56 B e l l . Afr., 77. 57 Adcock, lo c . c i t . 10? 58 a l l along remained firm to his party....** Caesar was being forced into such a decision because "...he found that he could not by any means i n -duce the enemy to come down to the p l a i n and make t r i a l of the legions, and that he could not encamp nearer them for want of water...." 5 9 When news of Caesar's contemplated move reached Scipio and Juba, they realized that to avoid a direct engagement now, they would be compelled to follow Caesar but not attack him. When their destination was reached they would hem him i n with as l i t t l e fighting as possible, defend the town and starve him into submission. "Accordingly when Caesar perceived that because of the nature of the land he could not foree them to engage i n co n f l i c t unless they chose, he set out for Thapsus, i n order that he might either engage them, i f they came to the help of the c i t y , or might at least capture the place, i f they l e f t i t to i t s f a t e . " 6 0 This took place on 4 A p r i l 46. Caesar's encampment was on the southwest side of the heavily garrisoned town. Upon a r r i v a l , siege-equipment was brought up and a contravallation was begun which Caesar had planned to stretch from sea to sea with piquets stationed at strategic points. Scipio, not to be outdone, led o f f i n pursuit of Caesar, but to avoid an engagement on unfavourable ground, kept to the h i l l s . As for Pompey at Dyrrhaehium, so for Scipio at Agar, three choices were opens he could stay firmly en-trenched at Agar and lose prestige; he could advance to his former position near Uzita and t r y to sever Caesar's supply route before Thapsus f e l l , or he could move his forces to Thapsus and so interrupt the siege. This he and Juba agreed to do, even though they realized i t might produce an open 58 B e l l . Afr., 79. 59 Loo, c i t . 60 Dio, XLIII, 7. 108 engagement. The two a l l i e d generals decided that upon a r r i v a l at Thapsus they would divide t h e i r troops, and, with as much speed as possible, would f o r t i f y one the north and one the south side of the town and so hem i n Caesar's army, "Evidently the purpose of the two leaders was to im-61 prison Caesar i n the isthmus and to starve him into surrender...." Both generals realized that they would have to rely upon each other for a s s i s t -ance should Caesar break through either of t h e i r l i n e s . Juba alone would not be able to hold the opposing veteran force now that i t was at f u l l strength and Scipio, whose troops, so different i n character from the Numidians, were on the verge of rebellion and desertion, would not dare to trust his men i n too involved a campaign without a bolstering force, available i n the person of Juba. L i t t l e i s said of Labienus's movements at t h i s point. I t was unfortunate for the a l l i e s that he was not used more i n their movements. Scipio hoped to occupy the s t r i p lying between the present day lake of Sebke di Moknine and the town of Thapsus i t s e l f . Caesar, on learning of his a r r i v a l , withdrew his trench-digging troops and sent part of his f l e e t close inshore.to threaten his opponent's rear. Scipio, noticing the movements of the enemy, decided that i t was too late to carry out his f i r s t plan of attack, i . e . , to reach and f o r t i f y a side of the town, so, turning north and advancing around the lake, he took up a position near Thapsus. "...there were some s a l t - p i t s , between which and the sea was a narrow pass of about f i f t e e n hundred paces, by which Scipio endeavoured to penetrate and bring help to the inhabitants of Thapsus. But, Caesar anticipating that this might happen, had...raised a very strong fort at the entrance of it...Scipio...advanced within a 61 Holmes, op.cit.. p.267. 109 small distance of the la s t mentioned camp and f o r t , where he began to entrench himself about f i f t e e n hundred paces from the sea.™62 From this point he could cut off Caesar from his supply towns of Leptis and Ruspina and at the same time carry on operations against Caesar's invading force. Caesar realized the seriousness of the situation but, much to his sur-prise and pleasure, he "...observed the enemy about the camp very uneasy, hurrying from place to place, at one time r e t i r i n g behind the rampart, 63 another coming out again i n great tumult and confusion." This was a t o t a l l y unexpected occurrence, f o r i n some way Scipio*s alternate plan had met with unexpected obstacles. "When Scipio committed the f a t a l blunder of placing his stockade upon a narrow s t r i p of land, about one and a half miles wide, between the sea and the salt marshes, the keen eye of the great captain saw promptly that the time and the hour were at hand."6'* Scipio was now at a great disadvantage. He was restricted to the narrowest part of the neck of land between the sea and the lake, too close to both Caesar and the sea to retreat to safety. Leaving two newly raised legions to defend his camp, Caesar moved slowly towards the f l a t land before Scipio's p a r t i a l l y completed entrenchments. Scipio, caught only half prepared, moved his forces to within s t r i k i n g distance of the enemy. Caesar's men were eager for battle and ready to s t r i k e , but the general held them back as though the time was not yet ri g h t . The bulk of his infantry formed i n two lines with the two veteran legions on the right wing, two others on the l e f t , and one or two of the newly recruited legions i n the centre. Somewhere 62 B e l l . Afr., 80. 63 B e l l . Afr.. 82. 64 Si h l e r , Annals of Caesar, p.227. 110 a bugler sounded the advance, and the troops, eager for the f i g h t , burit forth unmindful of the i r commander's orders. "Caesar, perceiving that the ardour of his soldiers would admit of no restraint, giving 'good f o r -tune' for the word, spurred on his horse, and charged the enemy's f r o n t . " 6 5 The two lines met, but the disorganized forces of Scipio were no match for Caesar's experienced veterans. Juba's elephants were turned back upon the i r own forces, and the Numidians, when they saw their a l l i e s fighting a losing struggle, as was t h e i r custom, quickly turned and f l e d , leaving Labienus and a small detachment to fight alone. So ended the threat of Caesar's greatest foe i n the African campaign. No mercy was shown by the Caesarians, f o r they could not forget the past. These men "...were taking t h e i r revenge for the restraint that had been so long placed on them, a restraint which had probably been one cause of the i r recent mutiny. Cae-sar's humanity had t r i e d t h e i r patience too hard, and he now had to learn 66 that there was a l i m i t to his power over them." So speaks the c l a s s i c a l scholar. The m i l i t a r y man on the other hand considers this unordered charge "...one of the most extraordinary instances of slack discipline i n a l l h i s t o r y . " 6 7 I t would be interesting to know what was i n Caesar's mind when this breach of di s c i p l i n e took place. I t i s possible that here the t i r e d warrior erred. He had driven his men to the point of victory so many times and then drawn them back that now, when the enemy was within their grasp, they were not going to lose t h i s , perhaps their last opportunity of wreaking revenge. "There was therefore no difference i n the f i e l d s 65 B e l l . Afr.. 83. 66 Fowler, Julius Caesar, p.320. 6? Dodge, op.cit.. p»685. I l l of Pharsalia and Thapsus, except that the efforts of the Gaesarians were greater and more vigorous, as being indignant that the war should have grown up after the death of Pompey."68 Caesar's victory was complete. Some consider t h i s battle the crowning glory of his many campaigns, f o r i t was a convincing win. "Thus i n a brief portion of one day he made himself master of three camps and slew f i f t y thousand of the enemy, with-out losing as many as f i f t y of his own men."69 Thapsus was b i t t e r l y fought by both sides for a short time, but when the Pompeians broke and f l e d , the veterans were resolute i n the i r pursuit. A l l who came within range of sword or javelin were s l a i n ; not one whit of merey being shown, so great was the vehemence and loathing of the Caesarians. Though Scipio was beaten, Thapsus was s t i l l defiant. Leaving Caninius Rebilius and three legions to blockade the town, Caesar set out for Utica to j o i n the cavalry which he had dispatched e a r l i e r . Marching rapidly northward, he seized Uzita and Hadrumetum, pardoning those Pompeians who pleaded f o r p i t y and agreed to conform with his p o l i -c i e s . Utica opened i t s gates to him several days l a t e r . There was l i t t l e to challenge Caesar's a b i l i t y i n the post-Thapsus operations, as the town-f o l k , hearing that Scipio had been defeated, quickly succumbed to his demands. "The strategy by which Caesar had brought off the battle of Thapsus was his crowning masterpiece. The campaign was over; i n three 70 weeks a l l Roman A f r i c a was i n his hands." I t i s interesting to note how Caesar used the art of manoeuvre i n the African campaign. I t seemed to be his ultimate desire to manipulate 68 Slorus, Epitome of Roman History, IV, 2, 66. 69 Plutarch, Caesar, 80. 70 Adcock, op.cit., p.688. 112 his enemy into an awkward position and then attack and i f possible annihi-l a t e him. This he had done with Scipio. One must not forget that Caesar was at a numerical disadvantage for most of the African campaign. Manoeu-vre then compensated for t h i s , and Scipio could not out-manoeuvre him. " . . . i t seemed that i t was through the bad generalship of the commanders who, as i n Thessaly, neglected the i r opportunity to wear out Caesar by delay u n t i l his supplies were exhausted, i n this foreign land, and i n l i k e manner f a i l e d to reap the f r u i t s of t h e i r f i r s t victory, that this war was 71 also foreshortened and thus sharply brought to a f i n i s h . M So the African campaign ended with Caesar more victorious than ever over a b i t t e r , d i s -illusioned and sadistic enemy. " . . . i t was a merciless struggle which the Pompeians waged by a t r o c i t i e s . ' * 7 8 Perhaps the African war might never have been fought i f Caesar had not become entangled i n unnecessary p o l i t i c a l manoeuvring and question-able personal labours i n Egypt. The time he spent i n Alexandria might well have been used to pursue immediately the remnants of Pharsalus and prevent them from regrouping. Caesar's strategy i n this campaign involved manoeu-vre, as shown i n the several encounters i n which he outwitted both Labienus and Scipio, surprise, whereby he upset the plans of the Pompeians who had not anticipated an attack i n early winter, and pacification, wherein he won over to his side Bogud, S i t t i u s and the main pastoral tribes not only i n the immediate v i c i n i t y of operations, but also i n the land of Mauretania. Of a l l Caesar's v i c t o r i e s , the African campaign displayed most the conquer-or' s a b i l i t y to adapt himself and his troops to new methods of fighting, a changeable climate, and a vicious enemy. 71 Appian, I I , 14, 97. 72 Duruy, op.cit., p.352. IIS CHAPTER VII THE SECOND SPANISH CAMPAIGN "...Let Pharsalia f i l l her ruthless plains, and l e t the shades of the Carthaginians be sated with blood; l e t the hosts meet for the l a s t time at t e a r f u l Munda."1 The second Spanish campaign was necessitated p r i n c i p a l l y by the mismanagement of a f f a i r s by Q. Cassius Longinus, whom Caesar appointed governor of the further province i n 49 B.C. From the time of his appoint-ment u n t i l the year 47, Cassius became involved i n acts of extortion which not only embittered the populace but also st i r r e d up dissension within his own forces. "But during the time that Caesar besieged Pompey at Drrhachium, triumphed at Old Pharsalia, and carried on the war, with so much danger, at Alexandria, Cassius Longinus, who had been l e f t i n Spain as propraetor of the farther province, either through his natural d i s -position, or out of a hatred he had contracted to the province, on account of a wound he had treacherously received when quaestor, drew upon himself the general d i s l i k e of the people." 2 Though Cassius lacked the q u a l i f i -cations of a good ambassador, he did possess a sound knowledge of the country under his control and the people who inhabited i t . The provincials detested him for his excesses and corruption and everyone was familiar with the manner i n which he bribed the troops f o r the i r loyalty which "... seemed, for the present, to increase the good-will of the army, but tended gradually and imperceptibly to the relaxation of m i l i t a r y d i s c i p l i n e . " 3 Thus, from the time of Ilerda, the goodwill of the Roman inhabitants of 1 Luean, de Bello C i v i l l , I , 40. 2 Caesar, de Bello Alexandrino, 48. 3 Loc. c i t t 114 Spain, as well as that of the natives, had been alienated by Cassius. Caesar, too preoccupied with a f f a i r s of state and war, had given l i t t l e attention to the growing dissension within the further province and so serious had the situation become that, "...when Longinus as proconsul did those same things which he had done as quaestor, the provincials formed similar conspiracies against his l i f e . Even his own dependants concurred i n the general hatred; who, though the ministers of his rapine, yet hated the man by whose authority they committed those crimes." 4 Cassius l u c k i l y survived an attempt to assassinate him, but upon recovery from his wounds, he found his forees divided into two armed camps, those who supported him and those who had gathered at Corduba under the banner of M. Claudius Marcellus. These r i v a l factions now took up arms to determine the r u l i n g force of further spaln, but M. Aemilius Lepidus, appointed by Caesar to the governorship of hither Spain, intervened on the side of Marcellus, restored order and put Cassius to f l i g h t . Retiring to the coast, and r e a l i z i n g that to remain i n Spain was unwise, he took ship at Malacca and, while off the mouth of the Ebro, was caught i n a storm and subsequently drowned. Though Cassius was dead, his tyrannical rule of two years had done irreparable damage. At the request of the natives and provincials for a successor to Cassius, Caesar appointed to the position G. Trebonius, the conqueror of M a s s i l i a . Trebonius was unable to cope with the strained situation, especially among the soldiery. A restless peace was established, but i t was soon broken by the army when representatives were sent by various factions to Scipio i n A f r i c a , expressing a.desire to transfer the allegiance 4 B e l l . Alex.. 50. 115 of the rebellious Spanish forces to him. To sati s f y them u n t i l he could personally come to their assistance, he decided to send Gnaeus Pompeius the Younger, with f u l l power to instigate a rebellion against the author-i t y of Rome. U n t i l the new leader arrived, Scipio suggested that the insurgents carry on a g u e r r i l l a type of warfare. This was done, and once more an appeal went out to Rome for r e l i e f . Gaius Didius, a naval commander as well as a land figh t e r , was sent by Caesar i n the hope that his pres-might quell any attempts at open rebellion. Didius's a r r i v a l added fur-ther s a l t to the rebels' wounds and, when news reached the insurgents that Caesar had conquered at Thapsus and Scipio was now dead, "...putting at t h e i r head Titus Quintius Scapula and Quintus Aponius, both knights, they drove out Trebonius and led the whole Baetic nation to revolt at the same time." 5 Early i n the African campaign Gnaeus, the deceased Pompey's eldest son, scarce twenty-four years of age, l e f t Utica with a small force and made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Mauretania. Crossing to the Balearic islands, he easily brought them under his control and so secured his stepping stones to Spain, where he would join the partisans and en-courage the levies which were going on against Caesar. Unexpectedly de-tained i n the islands by a severe i l l n e s s , Gnaeus was compelled to post-pone th i s expedition to Spain and leave preparations for a f u l l scale rebellion to Scapula and Aponius. When Pompey landed i n Spain i n possession of an army of f a i r s i z e , he was elected commander-in-chief of the insurgent forees, Scapula w i l l i n g l y surrendering his position to a man who bore so distinguished a 5 Dio, XLIII, 29. 116 name. I t should not be forgotten that Scipio, who was now dead, had also borne a distinguished name, but i t had perished with him after Thapsus, and he had not enjoyed the renown attained by the conqueror of Hannibal. Gnaeus was a strong-willed youth who was proud of his father's achievements. Gradually the Pompeian leaders who had survived Thapsus began to arrive; Labienus and Varus were joined by the troops who had mutinied i n the further province. Varus was given control of a f l e e t and sent to operate against the threat posed by Gaius Didius. The southern and western d i s t r i c t s of Spain were seething with rebels and malcontents, many of whom were anxious to jo i n Pompey's cause. These people were organized under other leaders as they arrived to join the insurgents. "Elated, therefore, by the multitude of his army and by i t s zeal, he proceeded fearlessly through the country, gaining some c i t i e s of their own accord, and others against t h e i r w i l l , and seemed to surpass even his father i n power."6 Of the many towns which readily joined Pompey, few even of the same province could agree upon the course to follow, a course which had been so clea r l y defined i n the time of Sertorius; this absence of unity was to paralyse Pompey i n Spain as i t had done the Pompeian officers i n Af r i c a and the elder Pompey i n his co n f l i c t with Caesar. Besides the many tribesmen who joined Pompey, a l l i e d under the rebel banner i n Baetica were Gnaeua's brother Sextus, Labienus, Varus and other fugitives from A f r i c a . The l a t t e r had joined with those veterans who had served under Afranius and whom Caesar had permitted to settle i n Spain. Caesar, considering this rebel uprising of l i t t l e importance and just another outbreak to be sup-pressed, sent troops from Sardinia under two men who he thought could 6 Dio, XLIII, 29. 117 handle t h i s a f f a i r expeditiously, Q. Pedius and Fabius Maximus. varus was the f i r s t of the new Spanish insurgents to suffer de-feat. This occurred i n a naval encounter with Gaius Didius at Crantia (possibly Carteia) on the southern coast. Though the sea was made safer f o r Caesar's ships, a l l was not well inland. Maximus and Pedius, unable to stem the r i s i n g tide of rebel opposition, urgently appealed to Caesar for further help. Forwarded with this plea for assistance was an account of Pompey's extensive land gains. These appeals for help had come not only from his lieutenants; even the tribes opposed to Gnaeus requested his assistance: "...those states which were opposed to Pompey, by con-ti n u a l messages despatched to I t a l y , sought protection for themselves." 7 These appeals pointed out to him the present and potential threat i n Pom-pey so he decided to postpone operations no longer, and set out personally for the f i e l d of war, "...when he ascertained that Pompey was gaining great headway and that the men he sent were not sufficient to fight against him." 8 I t was d e f i n i t e l y disadvantageous for Caesar to set out for Spain at this precise time as i t meant that work begun on reform would have to be postponed and preparations for the great war against Parthia set aside. There would, too, be a feeling engendered among the populace that the great Caesar had not yet carried out his promice of a las t i n g peace. Leaving Lepidus i n charge of the a f f a i r s at Rome, Caesar, r i d i n g quickly i n advance of his troops and accompanied by his usual bodyguard, reached.Obuleo, t h i r t y - f i v e miles east of Corduba, i n twenty-seven days after setting out from Rome. His date of departure was at the end of the 7 Caesar, de Bello Hispaniensi, 1 8 Dio, XLIII, 28. 118 year 708 A.U.C. (about 26 November, 46 B.C.). Caesar bad requested Pedlus and Maximus to send to him a l l the cavalry they could muster but, "»... having already proceeded many marches into Spain with prompt despatch, ...he came up with them much sooner than they expected, and had not the protection of the cavalry, according to his desire. 1* 9 Once again Caesar had displayed the promptness of action which had made him so dangerous an enemy i n previous engagements. This time he caught not only the rebels off guard, but also his own expeditionary force. At the moment Caesar could f i e l d eight legions with eight thou-sand cavalry and light-armed a u x i l i a r i e s . Pompey "...had the emblems and standards of thirteen legions, but of those on whom he trusted for support two were natives which had deserted from Trebonius; one was formed out of the Roman colonies i n those parts; and a fourth, belonging to Afranius, he had brought with him from A f r i c a ; the rest were for the most part made up of fugitives and deserters....**l° But for the Roman veterans hardened after many years of war, Pompey's army would have been ineffective against Caesar's troops. The liberated slaves and native levies often responded unfavourably to di s c i p l i n e and enjoyed rebellion more for the mere plea-sure of fighting and the thought of booty than for the struggle i t was meant to be: a fight to the death for control of an empire. I t i s enough to say that Caesar was i n himself a strong enough leader and a sound object of respect for his men. This was not the ease with Gnaeus. He was i n command of a motley crowd and only Labienus could give him the support required of an able lieutenant. His brother Sextus, 9 B e l l . Hisp.. 2. 10 B e l l . Hisp., 7. 119 who was given charge of Corduba, was younger and less experienced i n war, but became notorius for his naval actions l a t e r i n l i f e : "After the death of Caius Caesar he carried on war vigorously and collected a large army, together with ships and money, took islands, became master of the western sea, brought famine upon I t a l y , and compelled his enemies to make peace on such terms as he chose." 1 1 Of the two sons of Pompey we do know that "these were s t i l l young, but had collected an army of amazing numbers and displayed a boldness which j u s t i f i e d t h e i r claims to leadership, so that they beset Caesar with the greatest p e r i l . " 1 2 Afranius, Varus and others of the Pompeians contributed to the rebels 1 cause what thei r a b i l i t y a l -lowed. We can safely say that the heavy burden of responsibility was borne predominantly by Gnaeus. The Pompeians i n Spain realized that their duty was no longer to r e s i s t Caesar i n a scattered campaign, but to consolidate their forces under the banner of one man. No better person than Pompey presented him-s e l f f o r that position. The rebellious legionaries had been offered par-don by Caesar but had refused i t . "The duty of a l l Pompeians was now to desist from useless rebellion and to support the head of the state; and no excuse can be imagined for Gnaeus except that he despaired of receiving the pardon which even to him, i f he had frankly appealed to the magnanimity of the conqueror, would not have been denied."^ The scene of action f o r much of the Spanish War was confined to present-day Granada and Andalusia with most of the fighting restricted to Granada. "The northern mountains of Granada are nearly impregnable; and i t was there that the sons of Pompey 11 Appian, V, 14, 143. 12 Plutarch, Caesar, 56, 1. 13 Holmes, The Soman Republic, I I I , p.297. 120 had established themselves." 1 4 Caesar was familiar with the regions mentioned, f o r he had previously v i s i t e d Corduba and other sites i n the area, remembering prominent features of the land which could be of assistance to him should a campaign ever be necessary i n that t e r r i t o r y . He was now required to put this knowledge to use. Maximus and Pedius considered themselves no match for Pompey and had remained quiet pending Caesar's a r r i v a l . Pompey, on the other hand, when informed of Caesar's plans to come personally and conduct the war, "...thinking that he was not strong enough to gain the mastery of a l l Spain, he did not wait for a reverse before changing his mind, but immediately, before making t r i a l of his adversaries, retired into Baetica." Strategically, this was a good move of Gnaeus's even though i t was made through fear and anticipation. By the time Caesar had reached Obulco, Pompey had moved into Baetica and won the support of most of the t e r r i -tory except for the town of U l i a . When entreaty would not produce the surrender of this stronghold, for Caesar had a supporting party here as well as at Corduba, he l a i d siege to i t . News of this operation reached Caesar on his a r r i v a l at Obulco. The siege of U l i a was more prolonged than Gnaeus had anticipated, as the inhabitants had shown themselves to be unswervingly true to Caesar. "Notice of Caesar's a r r i v a l having been received, messengers having passed Pompey's guards came to him from that town and besought him to send them r e l i e f as soon as possible." Caesar moved d i r e c t l y against U l i a and was successful i n placing within the town "...eleven cohorts, with a l i k e number of horse, under the command of 14 Niebuhr, Lectures on the History of Rome, I I I , p.72. 15 Dio, XLIII, 31. 16 B e l l . Hisp., 3. 121 L. Julius Paciecus, a man known i n that province, and also well acquainted with i t . " 1 7 By stratagem Paciecus had penetrated Pompey's camp, reached the gate of the town and had been admitted. From within the town this able lieutenant carried on sporadic attacks on Gnaeus»s camp and siege-works, weakening the siege thereby. When Caesar himself arrived on the scene Pompey did not discontinue his a c t i v i t i e s , retaining f u l l confidence i n his own strength. Caesar had hoped that his presence, and the fact that U l i a had been reinforced by him, would lure Gnaeus from the siege. But t h i s was not the case. Pompey was l i t t l e disturbed as yet for he considered himself Caesar's equal. Caesar did not carry out a direct attack on Pompey's camp at U l i a , for he was waiting u n t i l his opponent could b© manoeuvred into open ground and there be engaged i n a pitched battle, but as yet no opportunity f o r such a move had presented i t s e l f . Respectful of Gnaeus's strength, Caesar decided to move from U l i a , which was located on the right bank of the Guadajoz r i v e r , and on the same s i t e as the town of Monte Mayor, to Corduba, seventeen miles to the south, where Sextus Pompey with two legions under his command was i n control. Corduba was strategically important to Caesar for, not only was i t the provincial capital, i t was also the chief supply depot for the Pompeian army. leaving a small task force to harass Gnaeus's work from without the walls and relying on the strength of the residents within the town, Caesar "...set out himself for Corduba, partly, to be sure, i n the hope of taking i t by betrayal, but chiefly i n the expectation of drawing Pompey 17 B e l l . Hisp.. 5 122 away from U l i a through fear for t h i s p l a c e . " 1 8 His departure occurred about 8 January, 45, by which time U l i a had been under siege for about a month and a half. In order to test the strength of the opposing force, Caesar, as his troops approached Corduba, ordered each of the legionaries to mount behind a trooper, and, when the enemy force advanced from the town to meet them, these same foot soldiers at the right moment leaped from the horses to the ground and, after causing much havoc and i n f l i c t i n g many casualties, put the Pompeians to f l i g h t . This stratagem had the desired effect: "This so alarmed Sextus Pompey, that he immediately sent l e t t e r s to his brother, requesting him to come speedily to his r e l i e f , 19 l e s t Caesar should make himself master of Corduba before his a r r i v a l . " Gnaeus, r e a l i z i n g now that he had underestimated Caesar's a b i l i t y , regret-f u l l y abandoned the siege of U l i a which he had brought to the point of surrendering. Before Gnaeus could begin his march which would carry him across the Guadajoz River and then south to Corduba, Caesar, according to plan, had taken the f i r s t step i n laying siege to Corduba by moving his forces to a point on the south bank of the Guadalquiver opposite the town. As the enemy held the north end of the permanent bridge which spanned the r i v e r where the width i s about one hundred yards, Caesar was compelled to construct a temporary crossing about one mile south of the permanent structure. Much to his regret he was unable to find a fordable spot i n the v i c i n i t y of the old bridge. By January 10 baskets of stones had been sunk for pier foundations and on the next day the crossing was ready for use. Sextus remained within the town forsaking any opportunity offered 18 Dio, XLIII, 32. 19 B e l l . Hisp., 4. 123 to prevent Caesar from completing his work. On receiving news that Gnaeus was approaching, Caesar established a bridgehead at that end of the bridge across-river from the town. At the northern end he had his troops build three strongly f o r t i f i e d camps that he might better invest the town. I t should be pointed out here that Corduba lay on the right or north bank of the Guadalquiver while Caesar's f i r s t encampment was located on the l e f t or south bank. I t appears that Sextus had devoted what men he had to the defence of the permanent bridge; his dearth of troops possibly prevented him from carrying out an attack on Caesar when the l a t t e r was hampered with bridge construction. On reaching Corduba, Gnaeus camped on the Guadalquiver's l e f t bank opposite the town. I t was his intention to retain control of the area between Corduba and U l i a while supplying his brother with sufficient re-inforcements to hold the town. He hoped, too, to draw on the supplies contained within Corduba; therefore the v i t a l l i n k for the Pompeians was the permanent bridge and this they s o l i d l y held. Caesar was possibly too intent on beginning the siege of Corduba to prevent Gnaeus from estab-l i s h i n g himself so firmly at the south end of the permanent bridge. Ho doubt the bridge-construction and camp-entrenchment took up most of his time and men, but we must not overlook the fact that Caesar wished to manoeuvre Pompey into an open area for battle, and his opponent had not yet given him this opportunity. Gnaeus made no attack on Caesar's position, either at the bridge-head or at the newly entrenched area alongside Corduba, but, instead, waited f o r Caesar to move against him. This was not long i n coming. "Caesar, to cut off his provisions and communication with the town, ran 124 a l i n e from his camp to the bridge." 2 0 We see i n this that i t was Caesar's desire to wrest from Pompey's hands the old bridge which he considered to be Corduba's l i f e - l i n e . Pompey, just as determined that Caesar would not force him from the crossing and so discontinue his contact with the garrison i n Corduba, t r i e d to secure his communication with the town by constructing a l i k e entrenchment from his own camp to the bridge. I t must be remembered that Pompey was stationed on the l e f t bank of the bridge cross-river from Corduba while Caesar was on the right bank near Corduba. Siege operations could not begin i n earnest u n t i l Gnaeus*s threat was eliminated, for the garrison within the town had shown no willingness to surrender. Frequent skirmishes took place on and around the bridge, but neither side could compel the other to y i e l d any great distance. After several days of c o n f l i c t , Gnaeus penetrated Caesar's defences, gained a pathway to the bridge and was successful i n gaining entrance to Corduba. When Caesar saw that Gnaeus had s o l i d l y established communication with Corduba, he t r i e d to lure his opponent on to l e v e l ground near the l e f t bank and there engage him i n an all-out battle. «... and Caesar for many days used a l l possible endeavours to bring the enemy to an engagement on equal terms, that he might bring the war to a con-clusion as soon as p o s s i b l e . " 2 1 Gnaeus carefully avoided this for he did not intend to p i t his troops against Caesar's veterans u n t i l the time was favourable. This unexpected turn of events disturbed Caesar, for he knew that a long siege was inadvisable at this time of year and with the equip-ment at his disposal. 20 B e l l . Hisp., 5. 21 Loc. c i t . 125 Caesar did not rush operations at Corduba, and Dio informs us that the dictator f e l l i l l and renewed the siege when additional troops joined him, but the renewal of winter-fighting did not agree with the attacking forces of Caesar "...for being housed i n miserable l i t t l e huts, they were suffering distress and running short of food." 2 2 Here again Caesar was negligent i n his preparation for a campaign. He had re l i e d too much on the strategic elements of speed and surprise, and too l i t t l e attention had been given to the provision of supplies and the severity of weather. " I t was the same d i f f i c u l t y that had befallen him i n the war against Vercingetorix, i n his f i r s t campaign i n Spain, and during the operations i n Albania; but with this difference, that i t could now only be set down to the carelessness of the master of the great Mediterranean granaries." 2 3 The intended siege of Corduba had turned into a stalemate. Caesar could not draw Gnaeus out into open battle and Gnaeus, using to advantage the safety of the town, did not challenge Caesar's position. He too did not wish to commit his troops to the severity of the weather. As Corduba was too strong a fortress to be taken without a well-planned and lengthy siege, Caesar decided to abandon i t temporarily and move against Ategua, "...now Tela l a Vieja...situated on a h i l l overlooking 24 the Guadajoz, about a day's march south-east of Corduba." Here, he had bean informed, was an abundance of Pompeian grain. "Although i t was a strong place, he hoped by the size of his army and the sudden terror of 25 his appearance to alarm the inhabitants and capture i t . " 22 Dio, XLIII, 32. 23 Ferrero, Greatness and Decline, I I , p.324. 24 Holmes, op.cit., p.301. 25 Dio, XLIII, 33. 126 Concealing his departure by f i r e s l e f t burning overnight, Caesar reached Ategua the next .morning so that, by January 20, he "...began his attack upon Ategua, and carried l i n e s quite round the town." 2 6 So s w i f t l y and secretively did Caesar move that Gnaeus did not know where his opponent had gone u n t i l informed by deserters that he was investing Ategua. Pompey, not v i s i b l y disturbed over this move of Caesar, did not hurry to defend the town f o r he f e l t that the nature of the land and the bitterness of the winter would hinder Caesar. He did not wish to expose unnecessarily his own troops to the rigours of the cold. When word reached him that Caesar had walled off the town after encamping before i t , he became worried and moved to i t s assistance. "Caesar r i g h t l y believed that he could make better headway by attacking Pompey's minor strongholds to the south and perhaps seize an opportunity for battle during the operations." 2 7 Gnaeus was at f i r s t suspicious of the reports concerning Caesar's movements as he did not think he could persevere i n the undertaking of the siege of so formidable a fortress i n the middle of winter, but, on reaching Ategua a week after Caesar had begun the siege by contravallation, terrace, and battering ram, he found that what had been reported to him was true. On many of the h i l l s surrounding the town of Ategua, the natives had constructed towers years before which served both as observation posts and protective barriers against the incursion of hostile t r i b e s . Caesar occupied several of these h i l l s to defend his besiegers from any surprise attack which Gnaeus might perpetrate on his a r r i v a l . "In order to guard against his a r r i v a l , Caesar possessed himself of many fo r t s ; partly to shelter his cavalry, partly to post guards -of infantry for the defence of 26 B e l l . Hisp., 6. 27 Dodge, Caesar, I I , p.703. 127 his camp."28 Pompey pitched his f i r s t camp i n the h i l l s west of Caesar but north of the r i v e r Salsum (Guadajoz). A heavy fog which pervaded the theatre of the siege permitted Pompey to threaten seriously one of Caesar's outposts and very nearly capture i t . About January 28, "...Pompey set f i r e to his camp, passed the r i v e r Salsum, and, marching through the valleys, eneamped on a r i s i n g ground, between the two towns of Ategua and Ucubis." 2 9 The country i n this v i c i n i t y i s very mountainous, much suited for war and strategic manoeuvre. Pompey's new camp i n these mountains was so situated that he was afforded a view of both the besieged fortress and Ucubis, the present-day town of Espejo. I t i s interesting to note how Pompey contin-u a l l y took advantage of the nature of the country to camp i n locations affording him an easy and protracted defense. Such strategy made Caesar's work very d i f f i c u l t . "...Pompey having established his camp between Ategua and Ucubis, ...within view of both towns, Caesar possessed himself of an eminence very conveniently situated, and only about four miles from his 30 own camp, on which he b u i l t a fortress." Pompey, ever anxious to fi n d a weak spot i n Caesar's defences, had watched anxiously while Caesar f o r -t i f i e d a new position which was separated from his main camp by the r i v e r Salsum. I t was Pompey's plan to attack this new fo r t while screened by the intervening h i l l s and before Caesar could cross the Salsum himself and bring help. He was sure this could be done while Caesar was busy with siege operations. On the night of February 4th, he began his attack. Protecting carefully what enemy point he had taken, Caesar had strengthened the fortress considerably and when word reached him of the struggle within 28 B e l l . Hisp., 6. 29 B e l l . Hisp., 7. 30 B e l l . Hisp., 8. 128 his new camp, "...he set out with three legions, and when he approached them, many (of the enemy) were k i l l e d , owing to their trepidation and f l i g h t , and a great number made prisoners." 3 1 Here again Caesar had moved quickly, outguessed his opponent, and frustrated h i s move. This f o r t i f i e d h i l l , the castra Postumiana. was so placed that i t presented a continual threat to Gnaeus and his troops in succeeding days. Caesar knew the importance of strategic placement. Gnaeus was now faced with the problem of supplies, as Caesar, besides pressing the siege of Ategua, had waylaid several supply trains from Corduba, scattering them and confiscating th e i r freight. On or about February 6th, "...Pompey set f i r e to his camp, and drew towards Corduba." 3 2 Two reasons can be offered for Pompey's change of strategy: a need for supplies, and fear of Caesar renewing the attack on the provincial c a p i t o l . l o r the f i r s t time i n the war, Gnaeus was becoming the pursued, and this as a result of Caesar's strategy of manoeuvre. While Caesar was harassing Pompey's caravan trains, there was much a c t i v i t y within Ategua. A supply l i n e had been so established between Pompey and the forces within the town that Caesar had to give his attention to the elimination of another of Pompey's l i f e - l i n e s . On one occasion his cavalry pursued a party carrying provisions to Pompey from Ategua, nearly to the walls of Corduba. At night the Ateguans wasted no time i n raining darts and f i r e down upon the besiegers and when day came, frequent s a l l i e s were made upon those busy at the works, causing much unrest and anxiety among Caesar's troops. "Those who had begun the attack, being vigorously opposed on our side, notwithstanding a l l the inconveniences we 31 B e l l . Hisp.. 9. 32 B e l l . Hisp., 10. 129 fought under, were at length obliged to r e t i r e into the town, with many 33 wounds." In order that he might give some aid to the townspeople, Pompey "...began a l i n e from the camp to the r i v e r Salsum; and a small party of our horse, being attacked by a much larger body of the enemy, were driven from t h e i r post, and three of their number s l a i n . " 5 4 So the co n f l i c t wavered back and forth but Pompey was unable to relieve the siege to the satisfaction of his garrison within Ategua. Tension within the town was increasing as Caesar's prolonged siege was taking effect. Because of Caesar's relentless a c t i v i t y , Gnaeus had been unable to l i v e up to his promises to a garrison which had confidently anticipated that he would make a greater effort to relieve them than he had Gnaeus had succumbed to Caesar's strategy. His supply lines were being continually harrassed; dissension was growing within the town; any attempts he made to relieve the garrison had been frustrated. So serious was the situation within the town and so disheartened were the people becoming that officers were deserting the garrison within the town and many of the townsfolk, whenever the opportunity presented i t s e l f , surrendered themselves to the Caesarians, confident that Caesar's dementia would spare them. I t was not Caesar's plan to annihilate Pompey, instead, he interfered l i t t l e with his actual movements hoping that his opponent would soon resort to open battle through the pressure of public opinion. Pompey was not yet ready to y i e l d . I t appears that he f e l t that he could s t i l l outmanoeuvre Caesar. He s t i l l possessed his self-confidence; "... Pompey erected a fo r t on the other side of the Salsum, i n which he met with no interruption from our men, and exalted not a l i t t l e i n the idea 33 B e l l . Hisp.. 12. 34 B e l l . Hisp., 13. 130 of having possessed himself of a post so near us." 3 5 This move of Pompey enabled him to harass scouts and foraging parties from Caesar's camp but i t interfered l i t t l e with actual siege operations. The garrison within Ategua now resorted to acts of unparalleled barbarity. Caesar retaliates i n turn: "wherefore, surrounding the town with our troops, the conflict was for some time maintained with great violence...." 3 6 To establish better communication with Ategua, and after encouraging a small force within the town to make a sally at midnight, Pompey, "...in expectation that they would be able to effect their design, had crossed the Salsum with his army, where he continued a l l night in order of battle to favour their retreat." This latest attempt of Pompey to relieve the town was destined for disaster. "But though our men had no apprehension of this design, their valour enabled them to frustrate the attempt, and repulse the enemy, with many wounds." Caesar, using the techniques available to a commander for securing information, learned much from deserters as well as slaves from his own camp, one especially who, to help his wife and son imprisoned in the city, had cut his master's throat and had successfully penetrated Pompey's camp, "...whence, by means of a bullet, on which he inscribed his intelligence, Caesar was informed of 39 the preparations made for the defenee of the place." It appears that most of Pompey's movements were familiar to Caesar and that Caesar's l e -gions occupying outposts were able in his absence to withstand any on-slaught Pompey might bring against them. Caesar had strengthened a l l his 35 B e l l . Hisp., 14. 36 B e l l . Hisp., 13. 37 B e l l . Hisp., 16. 38 Loc. e i t . 39 B e l l . Hisp., 18. 131 major and minor camps, and, because there was not the enthusiasm within Ategua that there was at Massilia, the siege was carried out with l i t t l e interruption. This had been for Caesar a two-fold battle, watching Gnaeus on one side and guarding against s a l l i e s from the towns on the other. F i n a l l y r e a l i z i n g that he could not force Caesar to l i f t the siege, Pompey decided to pursue some other course. Caesar was informed by two Lusitanian brothers who had deserted to him that Pompey i n a speech made to his soldiers, had said: "That as he found i t impossible to relieve the town, he was resolved to withdraw i n the night from the sight of the enemy, and r e t i r e towards the sea...." 4 0 When news of Pompey's plans reached the garrison within Ategua, a l l hope was abandoned. A note re-questing clemency was sent to Caesar by the garrison commander Lucius Minatius; Caesar granted the request and i n return received control of the town. "Thus, having made himself master of the place, on the nine-teenth of February he was saluted imperator." 4 1 Caesar had been compensated for his setback at Corduba. Though the weather and land conditions had been' against him, perseverance and the vigour of his troops had given him the victory at Ategua. He had not yet accomplished his design which he was sure would bring an early end to the war, namely, to bring Gnaeus into open battle. This Pompey was clev-e r l y avoiding. The many desertions from Pompey's forces and strongholds can be attributed predominantly to his weak conduct and an i n a b i l i t y to f u l f i l promises. The element of indecision gradually produced i n Pompey a lack of confidence which weighed heavily against him throughout the remainder of the Spanish campaign. The f a l l of Ategua had a beneficial 40 B e l l . Hisp., 18. 41 B e l l . Hisp.. 19. 132 effect on Caesar's forces, morale, and strategy. "Upon the capture of t h i s c i t y the other tribes also no longer held back, but many of th e i r own accord sent envoys and espoused Caesar's cause, and many received him or his lieutenants on their approach." 4 2 Gnaeus fled southward to-wards Ucubis "...where he began to build redoubts, and secure himself 43 with l i n e s . " Caesar, observing closely his enemy's movements, followed Gnaeus and took up a position opposite him, but was unable to draw him into bat t l e . "Pompey under the guidance of Labienus, was wisely avoiding open-field work and seeking to reduce Caesar by famine." 4 4 Caesar, i t must be remembered, was on the opposite bank of the Salsum to Pompey and when he followed him, the r i v e r always intervened, therefore f o r any sor-t i e to take place the r i v e r had to be crossed and this alone deterred Caesar from cornering Pompey. I t was now l e f t for him to outmanoeuvre Gnaeus. "...Caesar removed his camp nearer to Pompey's, and began to 45 draw a l i n e to the r i v e r Salsum." At this point two cavalry encounters seriously hindered Caesar's legions who were busy at the task of entrench-ing. "While our men were employed i n the work, some of the enemy f e l l upon us from the higher ground, and as we were i n no condition to make AO. resistance, wounded great numbers." Gnaeus continued his withdrawal, skirmishing as he moved, and with Caesar i n pursuit, came to a halt near Soricaria, approximately s i x miles south-east of Ategua and on the s i t e of the present-day town of Castro del Rio. About two miles south-east of Soricaria and across the rive r 42 Dio, X I I I I , 35. 43 B e l l . Hisp., 20. 44 Dodge, op.cit., p.710. 45 B e l l . Hisp., 23. 46 Loe. c i t . 133 from It lay the town of Aspavia. This fort was very important to Gnaeus and enough of an arsenal and supply centre for him to fight in its defence. Caesar was sure that his very presence near i t would be sufficient encour-agement to bring Pompey into an open battle. Caesar was successful in moving from the outskirts of Soricaria, across the river Salsum and into a position, which when fortified effectively, would cut off Pompey's communication line between Soricaria and Aspavia. Both parties had now withdrawn from Soricaria and Pompey "...observing that our fort had cut off his communication with Aspavia, which is about five miles distant 4.7 from Ucubis, judged i t necessary to come to a battle." To gain the advantage of higher ground, Pompey attempted to draw up his men on a knoll near Aspavia but Caesar anticipated this and sent a squadron to intercept them. This he was successful in doing; the enemy was forced into the plain and while retreating suffered a heavy loss. "The mountain and their valour protected them; of which advantage, and of a l l r e lief, our men, though few in number, would have deprived them had not night intervened." 4 8 Gnaeus had saved his forces to fight another day and when they advanced in their usual fashion on Caesar's lines, calling out for battle but unwilling to stand and fight, another skirmish took place, not so severe as the previous one but availing Pompey l i t t l e . "Repeated f a i l -ures were so affecting the morale of his army that a l l the Roman knights were conspiring to desert and were only prevented by a slave who betrayed them."49 Pompey was now determined to move from town to town, in the hope of gaining some advantage by prolonging the war. This was the only 47 B e l l . Hisp., 24. 48 Loc. e i t . 49 Holmes, op.cit., p.305. 134 strategy he could employ u n t i l such time as he agreed to a pitched battle. "...Pompey decamped, and posted himself i n an olive-wood over against Hi s p a l i s . Caesar, before he removed, waited t i l l midnight when the moon began to appear." 5 0 The relentless pursuit began again. When Pompey set out he abandoned to Caesar the fort of TJcubis, which the dictator ordered to be burned on his departure. "He afterwards l a i d siege to Ventisponte, which surrendered; and marching thence to Carruca, encamped over against Pompey, who had burned the c i t y , because the garrison refuse to open the gates to him." 5 1 Ventisponte i s the present-day town of Vado Garcia close to modern Casariche and about twenty miles south of Mon t i l i a . The si t e of Corruca i s unknown. Gnaeus, growing ti r e d of the continual chase, had come to realize that he must very soon engage i n open conflict with Caesar, or lose a l l the prestige he possessed. He had t r i e d to bolster his s p i r i t s and those of his supporters pa r t i c u l a r l y i n the town of Ursao close by Munda, by sending l e t t e r s to point out: "That hitherto he had a l l the success against the enemy he could desire, and would have ended the war much sooner than was expected, could he have brought them to engage him upon equal terms; but he did not think i t advisable to venture new-levied troops on a plain; that the enemy, depending on our supplies, as yet protract the war, for they storm c i t y after c i t y , thence supplying themselves with pro-visions: that he would therefore endeavour to protect the towns of his party, and bring the war to as speedy an issue as possible: that he would send them a reinforcement of some cohorts, and that having deprived them 5 0 B e l l . Hisp., 27. 51 Loc. c i t . 135 of provisions, he would necessitate the enemy to come to an engagement."52 This indeed was an amazing piece of propaganda and put to use at a most c r u c i a l time. "He could not disguise his retreat, however roundly he might l i e . His fai l u r e s as well as his cruelties were alienating the natives; the more i n t e l l i g e n t of his followers were abandoning his cause."5' I t seems evident that the inhabitants of Ursao, (the present-day town of Osuna, about s i x miles east of Pompey's position at Munda and t h i r t y - f i v e miles south-west of Montilla) were slowly losing confidence i n thei r chosen leader after being so f a i t h f u l to the Pompeian cause. I t was important, too, that Pompey retain his prestige among the h i 1 I f oik and townspeople, for from them he could gather much information on enemy movements, and could depend upon them for support when campaigning became necessary. Since he became the pursued, he was now losing that support, and he was trying instead to express to them i n words what he had hoped to accomplish i n deeds; but he had met with only temporary success, and now at Munda he decided to stake a l l on a pitched battle. With Caesar approaching and aware that Pompey was w i l l i n g to f i g h t , Ursao was greatly confirmed i n i t s allegiance. "Thus relying on this opinion, he thought he could effect the whole, for he was defended by the nature of his situation, and by the po-s i t i o n for defence of the town, where he had his camp: for, as we observed before, this country i s f u l l of h i l l s which run i n a continued chain, without any plains intervening." 5 4 Having selected Munda as the s i t e of battle, Pompey had a l l the timber within a s i x mile radius f e l l e d and brought within the walls. This was done to prevent Caesar obtaining siege 52 B e l l . Hisp., 26. 53 Holmes, op.cit., p.305. 54 B e l l . Hisp., 28. 136 material i n ease he decided to storm the town. Gnaeus was so preparing the battle ground that Caesar would be fighting at a disadvantage. Pom-pey was now situated between two strong fortresses with Munda at his back and Ursao s i x miles distant. Geographically he enjoyed a double defence, for he had the protection of Munda's elevated position and benefitted much from the nature of the country. Separating the two camps was a plain a-bout f i v e miles i n extent, through the western end of which ran a r i v u l e t , the Peinado, making the approach to the mountain exceptionally d i f f i c u l t because i t had formed a deep morass on the ri g h t . I t was Gnaeus*s hope that Caesar would hesitate before he attacked troops posted, as the former's would be, i n so formidable a position with a fortress at thei r back and a slope i n their favour. He hoped to be af-forded the chance to boast that Caesar was r e a l l y afraid of him, for he was superior i n numbers and had the advantage of position, and this might make just the difference between victory and defeat, and the l a t t e r he could no longer afford to suffer. "Caesar, s t i l l pursuing his march, ar-rived i n the plains of Munda, and pitched his camp opposite to that of Pompey."55 The following day Caesar was informed that Pompey had been i n l i n e of battle since midnight. This was the 17th of March. When he saw that his opponent had chosen his ground well, that the slope was rugged and d i f f i c u l t to attack but very easy to defend, he moved his men onto the pl a i n and halted. "Caesar had no doubt that the enemy would deseend into the p l a i n and come to a battle, when he saw them i n array. This appeared evident to a l l ; the rather because the plain would give their cavalry f u l l room to act, and the day was so serene and clear, that the gods 55 B e l l . Hisp., 27. 137 seemed to have sent i t on purpose to favour the engagement."56 The enemy remained stationary at the top of the h i l l and watched while Caesar moved his men into position. They did not advance to the f i e l d of battle as Caesar had anticipated. His men were now becoming restless and the longer the enemy held back, the greater became the tension. "Our men s t i l l con-tinued before them i n order of battle; but although the equality of the ground sometimes tempted them to come and dispute the victory, they never-theless s t i l l kept their post on the mountain, i n the neighbourhood of the 57 town.""' Pompey did not intend to lose the advantage of his position and Caesar, now that Gnaeus was within his grasp, refused to give up this opportunity f o r open battle after so long a pursuit i n so troublesome a te r r a i n . Although Pompey and Caesar were ready to attack, there seemed to be some concern even within Pompey's camp whether the time was right for an engagement, and several within the enemy's ranks had suggested further postponement of open c o n f l i c t . "Pompeius was misled by this ap-pearance of strength and did not postpone the battle, but engaged Caesar straightway on his a r r i v a l , although the older men, who had learned by experience at Pharsalus and A f r i c a , advised him to wear Caesar out by delay and reduce him to want, as he was i n hostile country." 5 8 Pompey knew that i t would be unwise to withdraw, for his men, though fea r f u l of the foe, ware hesitant to fl e e longer and were w i l l i n g to stake a l l on a f i n a l struggle. I t was desperation which forced his followers to face Caesar and they knew the price o£ defeat. "We doubled our speed to reach 56 B e l l . Hisp.. 29. 57 Loc. o i t . 58 Appian, I I , 15, 103. 138 the r i v u l e t , without t h e i r s t i r r i n g from the place where they stood." 5 9 Pompey waited for Caesar to make a move to the slope and "when we reached the extremity of the p l a i n , the real seat of disadvantage, the enemy were awaiting us above, so that i t would have been exceedingly dangerous to proceed." 6 0 The r i v u l e t had been passed but Caesar, unlike Pharnace at Zela, called a halt at the foot of the slope and there waited, uncertain of his enemy's next move. To fight up this slope would prove to be a great handicap as well as neutralize the training his men had received* Pompey* s force of thirteen legions had been so stationed that "...the cavalry was drawn up upon the wings, with s i x thousand light-armed 61 infantry and about the same number of a u x i l i a r i e s . " Caesar's army of eight heavy-armed cohorts, and eight thousand horse were drawn up so that "the tenth legion, as usual, was on the right, the third and f i f t h on the l e f t , with the a u x i l i a r y troops and cavalry." 6 2 Caesar pointed out to his men the disadvantages of an u p h i l l struggle, but his troops were eager for battle and were w i l l i n g to move determinedly ahead. These soldiers, through t h e i r numbers and experience and- from their leader's presence, had reached a high l e v e l of courage, and were ready for the decisive bat-t l e whieh Caesar sought. Though these hardy veterans considered the mu-tinous legionaries of Pompey their i n f e r i o r s , the Pompeians were a des-perate l o t and were aware of the fact that should they lose the day, no mercy would be shown them. Some of them had witnessed the battle f i e l d s of Pharsalus and Thapsus and the memory of the slaughter which took place there was s t i l l fresh i n t h e i r minds. Caesar was p i t t i n g his veteran 59 B e l l . Hisp.. 29. 60 B e l l . Hisp..30. 61 Loc. c i t . 62 Loc. c i t . 139 force against a b i t t e r , determined and ruthless enemy who expected no quarter and intended to give none. The Gauls who put to f l i g h t the l e -gions at Gergovia struggled no more tenaciously than these seasoned warriors. The Caesarians fought with a bitterness and savagery brought about through privation, continual hardship, and prolonged opposition, and were as stimulated through anger as was their enemy through despair. The fact must not be over-looked that the troops of Caesar often became unnecessarily agitated because of the reports received about the numbers, disc i p l i n e and valour of the enemy. The delay which followed Caesar*s reaching the foot of the h i l l "...served to enliven the enemy, thinking that Caesar's troops shrank from an encounter through fear: they therefore had the boldness to advance a l i t t l e way, yet without quitting the advantage of th e i r post, the ap-proach to which was extremely dangerous.™63 Caesar's men i n t h e i r regular order slowly ascended the slope. Appian reports that Gnaeus, from a dis-tance, accused Caesar of cowardice. This spurred the hesitant general into action and "the battle began with a shout." 6 4 Caesar's strategy thus fa r had followed a pattern of watchfulness. There was no element of sur-prise i n the move at Munda, for Gnaeus was aware of every action Caesar made. Manoeuvre had given Caesar the opportunity to engage Pompey, but not on the dictator's own terms. Quickness of pursuit had forced Pompey to abandon plans of reaching the sea, for Caesar had cut him off from the safe crossing of the Guadalquiver which would carry him to the coast and the safety of his ships at Carteia. Munda was Pompey's last stand, and 63 B e l l . Hisp.. 30. 64 Loc. c i t . 140 he was s k i l f u l enough to have the battle fought i n his favour. He had compelled Caesar to fight at a disadvantage, and now a l l he needed for victory was a change of luck and a weakening i n Caesar's foroe. Caesar's men may have been determined and eager when the battle began, but as the fighting progressed their strength began to waver. "But though our men were superior to the enemy i n courage, the l a t t e r neverthe-less defended themselves so well by the advantage of the higher ground, and the shouts were so loud, and the discharge of darts on both sides so great, that we almost began to despair of v i c t o r y . " 6 5 The fighting was pursued relentlessly by both forces, and i f any side yielded ground i t was Quickly regained or purchased b i t t e r l y by the opposing l i n e . Back and forth the battle swayed so that "neither sound of paean nor groan was to be heard from any of them, but both sides merely shouted 'Striket Killl'»"6' I t has been reported that Caesar stood i n front of his men urging them on to victory, and he became sorely disturbed when many of the newly recruited legionaries turned and showed signs of f l i g h t . The Pompeians resisted bravely and i t appeared that they would not y i e l d . Caesar's intention was to turn one or the other of Gnaeus•s flanks. So rigorously did his tenth legion bear down on Pompey's l e f t that Gnaeus, fearing he might be outflanked, ordered Labienus to move his legion from the right wing to support of the l e f t . Caesar, seeing his opportunity, ordered Bogud and his Moorish horse to move against the l e f t flank and rear of the enemy. Leading five eohorts to intercept Bogud, who seemed to him to be moving i n the direction of his camp, Labienus gave the 65 B e l l . Hisp., 31. 66 Dio, XLIII, 37. 141 appearance to his fellow Pompeians of one i n f l i g h t . Thinking their l i n e had been weakened and f a i l i n g to realize the true intention of Labienus»s move, the enemy yielded s u f f i c i e n t l y for Caesar's hard pressed legions to break through t h e i r wavering l i n e and cut them down from behind, So the enemy was put to f l i g h t , and this most b i t t e r struggle came to an end. "...But though the enemy fought with the utmost vigour, they were obliged to give ground, and r e t i r e towards the town. The battle was fought on the feast of Bacchus, and the Pompeians were entirely routed and put to f l i g h t ; insomuch, that not a man could have escaped, had they not sheltered themselves i n the place whence they advanced to the charge.™67 The ferocity of this battle cannot be underestimated, and to say that Caesar was neither hard pressed nor ever i n fear for his l i f e would be a misstatement. We are informed that for much of the battle the outcome was i n doubt. "The deified J u l i u s , when his troops gave way at Munda, ordered his horse to be removed from sight, and strode forward as a foot-soldier to the front l i n e . His men, ashamed to desert their com-mander, thereupon renewed the f i g h t . " .Morale was here restored by firm-ness and, had Caesar not used his talents i n such a manner, he could not have overcome the many disadvantages under which he fought. Caesar's strategy which won Munda was developed as the battle progressed. The strengthening of his men's s p i r i t s before moving up the slope increased his own willingness to move, for there was undoubtedly some hesitation on his part before he would expose his men to a fight against overwhelming odds. I f nothing else, an u p h i l l struggle taxes to capacity a legionaire's 67 B e l l . Hisp., 31. 68 Frontinus, Strategemata, I I , 8, 13. 142 strength, willpower and determination, and that his men weakened halfway up the h i l l when they realized that the enemy would not y i e l d can he attributed to the unexpected resistance provided by the Pompeians. "Here the contest was not attended with Caesar's previous success, but was long doubtful and threatening, so that Fortune seemed evidently hesitating how to a c t . " 6 9 No f i e l d of battle more perilous or desperate had Caesar ever entered. His effort was perhaps greater than that of his men, and i t i s possible that they were brought to their senses more by the effect of shame than courage. " I t was reported that he said that he had often fought for 7f) victory, but that this time he had fought even for existence," Labienus, one of Caesar's greatest and cleverest opponents, died i n the battle and along with him Yarns, who had once been the proud commander of the renegade force i n A f r i c a . Both of these warriors received f u l l m i l i t a r y honours. Thus did Caesar recognize m i l i t a r y prowess even i n an enemy. Sextus Pom-peius, informed of Caesar's victory at Munda, abandoned Corduba and sought refuse i n the mountains of the north, while Gnaeus fled to Carteia, where he was injured while hurriedly boarding a ship. Although for a long time he evaded Caesar's scouts (under Didius), he f i n a l l y was captured, s l a i n and his head brought to Caesar at Hispalis. How reminiscent of his father's end I "The remains of Pompey's army retreating to Munda, with the i n -tention of defending themselves i n that town, i t became necessary to invest i t . " 7 1 Caesar's strategy i n beginning the siege of Munda lay i n te r r o r i z i n g 69 Florus, Epitome of Roman History,' IV. 2, 78, 70 Appian, I I , 15, 104. 71 B e l l . Hisp., 32. 143 the enemy encamped within i t s walls. "The dead bodies of the enemy, heaped together, served as a rampart, and th e i r javelins and darts were fixed up by way of palisades. Upon these we hung their bucklers to sup-ply the place of a breastwork, and f i x i n g the heads of the deceased upon swords and lances, planted them a l l around the works, to strike the greater terror into the besieged, and keep awake i n them a sense of our prowess." 7 2 Iven such a macabre sight did not bring about the surrender of the besieged and Caesar, when the circumvallation of the town was complete, l e f t Fabius Maximus i n charge and marched to Corduba. "Fabius Maximus, whom he had l e f t to continue the siege of Munda, conducted i t with great zeal; so that the enemy, seeing themselves shut up on a l l sides, s a l l i e d out, but were repulsed with great loss. Our men seized this opportunity to get posses-sion of the town, and took the rest prisoners, i n number about fourteen thousand." 7 3 One might think that the capture of Munda would have ter -minated a c t i v i t i e s i n the battle-area, but such was not the case. Those who escaped Fabius took refuge i n Ursao, and there dug i n for another siege; but, when the inhabitants of this town learned too late the use-lessness of Gnaeus' s promises, they were sorely disturbed, and without a prolonged siege yielded the town to Caesarian hands. Munda and Ursao f e l l while Caesar was f u l f i l l i n g his duties further south. Many of the fugitives from the battle of Munda had f l e d to Corduba and gained possession of the bridge. On his a r r i v a l there, dissension arose within the town between the parties of Caesar and Pompey. Caesar cleverly gained possession of the town by permitting the remnants of Munda to enter when the gates were opened to them by deputies who were 72 B e l l . Hisp., 32. 73 B e l l . Hisp., 31. 144 on the i r way to seek aid from Caesar. "Upon this those who had escaped out of the battle set f i r e to the place, and our men entering at the same time, slew about twenty-two thousand of them, besides those who were s l a i n 74 without the walls; thus Caesar obtained the town." Once again a s t r a t -egy of s t r i k i n g at the right time had gained for Caesar the advantage. He might have engaged the enemy outside the walls and tr i e d to secure the bridge from them. Instead he waited and kept his a c t i v i t y to a minimum, possibly storming parts of the c i t y , perhaps skirmishing now and then for a bridge position, but not u n t i l the gates were opened to the fugitives did he move i n force. Patience and preciseness had aided him. "Thence Caesar marched to Hispalis, which sent deputies to sue f o r pardon." 7 5 Within t h i s town was a strong group of pompeians who called on the assistance of one Caecilius Niger, a freebooter who controlled a strong army of Lusitanians. He was successful i n gaining entrance to the town, and immediately began to set up a defence. The Lusitanians i n t h e i r accustomed barbaric ferocity changed what had been a defence to a p i l l a g e . Caesar did not press the siege from outside the town le s t the renegades within should set f i r e to i t i n despair and destroy the walls. "So he made a campaign against them, and by appearing to conduct the siege i n a rather careless fashion he gave them some hope of being able to escape. After this he would allow them to come outside the wall, where he would ambush and destroy them; i n this way he captured the town, which had been gradually stripped of i t s men."76 Hispalis, Munda, Ursao and f i n a l l y Asta, a small town t h i r t y miles northwest of Cadiz, had f a l l e n to Caesar. The war was near an end, and Spain, but for minor skirmishes i n outlying areas, was 74 B e l l . Hisp., 34. 75 Loc. c i t . 76 Dio, XLIII, 39. 145 once again pacified, after a war that might have been avoided had due care and attention been given to the administration of the province upon the conclusion of the f i r s t Spanish campaign. This Spanish war was the most savage of any that Caesar fought. It was one of sieges and marches, surprise manoeuvres, delaying tactics and planned withdrawals, a l l focused on the one objective of bringing Gnaeus to battle on equal ground. But so s k i l l f u l l y did Gnaeus evade a direct engagement and so well did he use the nature of the land in which he fought that he compelled Caesar to fight the crucial battle at Munda on di f f i c u l t ground with l i t t l e hope for retreat. Within the cities of the battle area, massacres had been fomented by ri v a l factions, and, as l i t t l e as such tac-tics suited Caesar's nature, they did assist his purpose. What Caesar had treated as a minor campaign became later a struggle of serious proportions. He had underestimated the strength of his enemy but he quickly adjusted his military machine and his military strategy to this new conflict. As in previous battles, so in this one he displayed a s k i l f u l use of surprise, manoeuvre and anticipation. He had provided i l l for his forces' comfort, especially at Corduba, but he did seem better equipped with cavalry and this assisted him greatly in turning back the thrust of the Pompeians' horse at Munda. Bogud's sup-port of Moorish horse gave him the advantage in the crucial battle and, whether he or the Mauretanian chief gave the order to advance against Pompey's le f t or Labienus»s camp, the outcome was such that the tide of battle was turned in Caesar's favour. The whole campaign was one of barbarity on both sides and, as Pompey was naturally brutal, Caesar's 146 strategy was to respond i n a similar manner and seek reprisals. "...Caesar, having ended the c i v i l wars, hastened to Rome 7? honoured and feared as no one had ever been before." 77 Appian, I I , 16, 106. 147 CHAPTER T i l l CONCLUSION "As regards the relation of strategy to t a c t i c s , while i n execution the borderline i s often shadowy, and i t i s d i f f i c u l t to decide exactly where a strategical movement ends and a t a c t i c a l movement begins, yet i n conception the two are d i s t i n c t . Tactics l i e s i n and f i l l s the province of fig h t i n g . Strategy not only stops on the fr o n t i e r , but has for i t s purpose the reduction of fighting to the slenderest possible proportions." 1 Caesar's strategy anticipated the above definition and that of Clausewitzj "strategy i s the use of the engagement to attain the object p of war." With a limited supply of troops and an ever-present problem of provisions, Caesar resorted, where possible, to careful planning of strategy before the employment of t a c t i c s . When he took the f i e l d , his goal was nearly always to force his opponent into a direct engagement. The two basic elements of strategy are movement and surprise. Movement i s determined by the time afforded the general, the topography of the scene of action and the means of transport available to him. Sur-prise, on the other hand, can result from psychological anticipation. "For a movement which i s accelerated or changes i t s direction inevitably carries with i t a degree of surprise even though i t be unconcealed; while surprise smooths the path of movement by hindering the enemy's counter-measures and counter-movements."3 Periodically Caesar resorted to a strategy of limited aim which involved a wearing down of the enemy by 1 Liddell-Hart, Strategy, pp. 337-338. 2 Ton Clausewitz, On War, p.117. 3 Liddell-Hart, op.cit., p.337. 148 i n f l i c t i n g pricks rather than by risking blows. "The essential condition of such a strategy i s that the drain on him should be disproportionately greater than on oneself. The object may be sought by raiding his supplies; by l o c a l attacks which annihilate or i n f l i c t disproportionate loss on parts of his force; by luri n g him into unprofitable attacks; by causing an excessively wide distribution of his force; and, not least by exhausting his moral and physical energy." 4 A survey of the campaigns i n the C i v i l War reveals that Caesar used to great advantage the strategical elements of surprise, manoeuvre and limited aim. His seizure of Ariminum i n his march through I t a l y took Pompey by surprise, just as his a r r i v a l i n Epirus i n the dead of winter caught Bibulus i n his cups and Pompey unready for immediate action. The decision i n Caesar's favour at Thapsus was p a r t i a l l y gained by his sur-prise attack on Scipio's half-completed camp. His sudden a r r i v a l at Obulco only twenty-seven days after he set out from Rome upset the plans made by Gnaeus and the insurgents i n Spain. A double-edged effect re-sulted from t h i s move when Caesar's own'troops were caught off guard yet nevertheless were pleased by his appearance. The move from Corduba to besiege Ategua occurred so quickly that Gnaeus was forced to al t e r his plans and to campaign i n mid-winter, much against his w i l l . The seizure of Corduba after the battle of Munda combined stratagem with surprise and was very effective. F i n a l l y the f a l l of Hispalis was brought about through the combination of surprise and delaying taeties. Strategy as exemplified by rapidity of movement or manoeuvre was f i r s t displayed by Caesar i n the seizure of the I t a l i a n coast towns 4 Liddell-Hart, op.cit., p.335. 149 of Pisaurum, Fanum and Ancona. At Dyrrhaehium, Caesar so manoeuvred his troops that he eut o f f Pompey's land route to the fortress and compelled him to take refuge on the rock of Petra. This manoeuvre of Caesar's was of course n u l l i f i e d by the action of Pompey's f l e e t , which kept open a supply route between the dock and the port at a l l times. Perhaps Caesar's greatest manoeuvre i n the C i v i l War was his retreat from Dyrrhaehium to Apollonia, during which he was able to outdistance Pompey and safely bring his troops (both the wounded and the unscathed) to their destination. In Apollonia he regrouped his men, assuaged their anger i n defeat and encour-aged them for a greater campaign ahead. Complete victory had been within Pompey's grasp, but Caesar's s k i l f u l manipulation of troops deprived him of i t . A good example of manoeuvre i n the African campaign was Caesar's abandonment of Uzita i n favour of a move against Agar. This forced Scipio to give up his well-established camp near Ruspina and follow his enemy. A brash but successful manoeuvre i n this same African campaign was the capture of Zeta by Caesar while the enemy looked on as though powerless to r e s i s t . Audacity combined with rapidity of movement gave Caesar the moral advantage and sank Scipio's prestige even lower i n the eyes of his men. The strategy of limited aim was f i r s t used by Caesar on a large scale i n the campaign after Ilerda. Thwarted i n his attempt to reach the Ebro, Afranius was forced to return to Ilerda and eventually succumbed to Caesar's war of a t t r i t i o n . The second Spanish campaign best i l l u s t r a t e d Caesar's use of the strategy of limited aim. His move against Corduba withdrew pressure from U l i a and forced Gnaeus not only to give up the siege of the l a t t e r town, but also to come to the aid of Sextus, now under 150 attack by Caesar. The h i l l near Ategua, the Castra Postumiana, gave Caesar an excellent lookout post and enabled him to keep a continual and accurate watch on most of Gnaeus's movements. To bring Gnaeus to battle, Caesar was forced to adopt a strategy of limited aim, but when his purpose was accomplished he was obliged to fight on the enemy's terms. This st r a t -egy of limited aim was then converted to a strategy of manoeuvre. Throughout the C i v i l War Caesar displayed certain strategic techniques which can be categorized. He never f a i l e d to aim a blow at a v i t a l point. Dyrrhachium, Zeta, Agar and Corduba best display t h i s , and, but for Dyrrhachium, each time he struck the enemy was put off balance. "No c r i t i c has detected a moment when he missed his chance. A few times he struck too soon, at Gergovia, Ilerda, Dyrrachium: he never struck too l a t e , and when he struck home, the blow was mortal. No army that he de-feated escaped destruction or surrender." Caesar was often superior i n speed and, where possible, l i k e Napoleon i n his I t a l i a n campaign, kept his troops concentrated while dividing those of the enemy. This afforded him the opportunity to deal with the opposing forces section by section. There was a continual use on Caesar's part of large-scale manoeuvres and blockades to bring the enemy to battle on his own terms. This often involved all-out attacks on magazines and water-supplies, resulting i n the removal of any opportunity the enemy might have possessed of using the land i n his favour. There are two good examples of such a strategic technique: the f i r s t Spanish campaign and the operations around Dyrrhachium. During the l a t t e r conflict Pompey was brought close to starvation and saved-himself only by piercing Caesar's 5 Adcock, Cambridge Ancient History. IX, p.705. 151 lines. This leads to another point, Caesar's lines, when hard pressed, were flexible and strong and only at Munda was there any question of their breaking. "Caesar's courage as a soldier lay rather in the power to push a strategic advantage rather than in the longing to meet and annihilate the enemy."6 This strategic advantage was often gained in a moment of cris i s by instant decision. Especially applicable here was the use of the diagonal line at Pharsalus and the shifting of Bogud's legion at Munda. Both movements caught the enemy off guard and gave Caesar the victory. The temperament and personality of his opponents were always foremost in Caesar's mind. He fe l t sure that Pompey would not continue the pursuit after Dyrrhachium. He knew that Scipio would hesitate before attacking him at Zeta. Perhaps his only fa i l i n g was in underestimating Labienus, who twice nearly brought him to destruction in the African campaign. This study should not be terminated without a brief discussion of Caesar's interpretations of what we today consider to be the principles 7 of war. A. leader's military ability is determined by the -way in which he has used the principles of war to his advantage. Modern military thinking as exemplified by General Montgomery recognizes certain princi-ples of war, some of which are applicable to Caesar. "An intelligent perception of the principles of war w i l l best be gained by an intensive and objective study of the principles and methods of the great leaders of the past." 8 6 Dodge, Caesar. II, p.758. 7 The principles of war as stated in the Canadian Army Journal, IY (1950) and V (1951-52). 8 H. S. Macklin, as quoted in "Military History and the Principles of War," Canadian Army Journal. IY (1950), p.2. 152 The selection ana maintenance of the aim or object i s the f i r s t p r i nciple of importance. When the aim or object i s decided upon, every possible element at a commander's disposal i s used to maintain a c t i v i t y u n t i l the desired results have been obtained. Concentration of forces and careful selection of opportunities play integral parts i n obtaining the object, which i s reached by the t o t a l destruction of the enemy's armed force. While the object i s far-reaching i n i t s scope, the objective con-s i s t s of those steps taken to accomplish the object. Caesar followed closely this p r i n c i p l e . I t was his aim to con-quer a l l I t a l y i n one vast sweep, and trap Pompey by surprise manoeuvres. When a peace could not be engineered, he moved against Pompey and con-quered I t a l y . His object was then achieved; his objectives were the s t r a -tegic points he captured as he moved down coast. A l l his objectives c u l -minated i n the f a l l of Brundisium. His object or aim was then accomplished. In the f i r s t Spanish campaign Caesar's aim was to avoid a pitched battle, exhaust the patience of the Pompeians and bring them to submission under his own terms. This he was able to do i n a period of s i x weeks. In Greece, where Caesar's aim had been a quick collapse of Pompey's forces, his opponent's victory at Dyrrhaehium had prolonged the battle and pre-vented consummation of the aim u n t i l Pharsalus. Underestimation of his enemy's p o t e n t i a l i t i e s , a grain shortage and constant trouble with new recruits made Caesar's hope of a quick, decisive battle to end the threat i n A f r i c a d i f f i c u l t to maintain. The object was f i n a l l y accomplished at Thapsus. faced with a stubborn opposition and a prolonged war, Caesar's object i n the Second Spanish Campaign was, changed from the "mopping-up" of enemy garrisons to an all-out offensive involving h i l l battles, sea 153 encounters and a f i n a l struggle at Munda. Caesar observed the principle of selection and maintenance of the aim, modifying his object where necessary but applying continuous pressure u n t i l the end of the straggle had been reached. A second principle of war i s the maintenance of morale. A s k i l -f u l commander maintains morale among his own men while breaking i t down i n the ranks of the enemy. In early days the morale of an enemy was often destroyed by crude but clever methods, eu£., false signals, simulated at-tacks. Today such mass media as television, radio and the newspaper, when cleverly u t i l i z e d , have played an important part i n destroying the morale and lessening the resistance of an opposing force. Germany i n the early days of World War I I rendered Poland, Czechoslovakia and Norway helpless, f i r s t by exposing these countries to a propaganda-machine and then by over-powering them with m i l i t a r y might. The defence against a morale-breaking mechanism i s best represented by the leader who inculcates i n his men the ideals of t h e i r country and righteousness of the cause for whieh they are fi g h t i n g . There must be firmness and resolution on the part of the com-mander and the degree of morale he i n s t i l s i n his men w i l l vary with the leadership they possess, the training they have received and the admin-i s t r a t i o n which has guided them. Immediate compliance with orders, prompt-ness, readiness and a willingness to obey reflect a high standard of morale i n a group of fighting men. Throughout the C i v i l War, Caesar displayed a l l the attributes of a general s k i l l e d i n the maintenance of morale. He was closer to his men than many a modern general while his determination and perseverance led many a platoon of new recruits to victory. Where possible, he guided his men personally and always appeared i n the thick of the 154 fig h t i n g . There are few factors which contributed more s i g n i f i c a n t l y to a high standard of morale. On the f i e l d of Pharsalia no army displayed better morale than Caesar's, for deep i n the heart of every veteran was a desire to avenge the disaster of Dyrrhaehium. At Munda, the Caesarians' morale, which was gradually deteriorating as the battle progressed, was so restored by firmness on Caesar's part that his men went on to win an u p h i l l struggle. A t h i r d principle of war, administration, which i s so important to today's m i l i t a r y s t a f f s , was no great problem to Caesar. At councils of war he alone presided and directives were issued to his subordinates for the well-being of his men and the favourable progress of his battles. Modern encounters are on a f a r greater scale and involve much more plan-ning than did those of Caesar. Caesar's lieutenants were capable enough to handle t h e i r separate assignments, and, so long as battle were being won, no real administrative problem appeared. Because of the difference i n time and technique i t i s d i f f i c u l t to make a comparison between Cae-sar's day and ours with respect to administration. I t can be said, though, that Caesar knew the value of proper administrative techniques. Today's problems of transportation, supply and size of armies are greater than any Caesar had to face. However, one comparison can be made. In providing for his army, Caesar was able to gain subsistence from the countryside and from plunder of storage-depots; the same cannot be said of the present fighting force, which i s supplied by various sources through detailed arrangements on a large scale. Caesar's administrative problems were not so detailed as those of Napoleon, while the lette r ' s problems are not to be compared to the complexity of modem administration. 155 Concentration of force, a fourth principle, i s of a mental and physical natures mental i n the effect i t has on the enemy's morale and physical i n the results i t provides martially. I t i s not to be confused with mass, which often involves overthrow of the enemy by sheer weight of number. Concentration of force, unlike mass, i s more successful when i t goes unnoticed. This principle was best displayed by Caesar at Phar-salus where he used his diagonal l i n e to great advantage to unnerve Pompey's forces and eventually to rout them. This diagonal l i n e was a t a c t i c of a mental and physical nature: mental i n the jarring effect i t had on the morale of Pompey's army, and physical i n the turmoil i t caused among the enemy troops. Concentration of forces and the object are closely related. Caesar's object at Pharsalus was gained by the use of his diag-onal l i n e . A f i f t h principle of war, f l e x i b i l i t y , best shows i t s e l f i n manoeuvre, systems of command and types of equipment. I t i s the antidote to surprise and provides the opportunity f o r an army "to r o l l with the punch." Caesar made good use of f l e x i b i l i t y i n the skirmishes before Dyrrhaehium and especially i n the movement of troops away from the disaster-area to Apollonia. On the second Spanish campaign, Caesar's relentless pursuit of Gnaeus Pompey and his adjustment to whatever p e r i l s Gnaeus created for him showed how Caesar could change his strategy and tactics to suit the existing situation. The combined operations of maintenance of the aim or object, surprise, f l e x i b i l i t y and concentration of force and command provide a six t h principle of war, offensive action. Caesar, l i k e present-day com-manders, made use of the above operations where they were applicable to 156 his style of fig h t i n g . When the time was right he took the offensive. The defensive aspect of war sometimes was disregarded by Caesar i n the hope that surprise through manoeuvre and f l e x i b i l i t y through anticipation would win him the battle. Dyrrhachium stands alone as an example of his unpreparedness. The main principles of war have received our attention. Two other principles of moderate importance which Caesar observed and which are worthy of mention are mobility and economy of ef f o r t . The f i r s t , mobility, i s linked closely with f l e x i b i l i t y and for best results should be restricted to a small, well-controlled radius. When a commander i s forced to move, he i s at a disadvantage, for he has succumbed to one of two alternatives, either of being unable to reach the enemy, or of the enemy's forcing him to change position. Caesar knew the importance of mobility and i t s use i n reaching the enemy. In I t a l y , Spain and A f r i c a , for most of the campaigns, he was the pursuer. His movements were con-t r o l l e d and often strengthened by surprise. The battle area, i f at a l l possible, was restricted by Caesar to a small radius. Mobility, then, was an integral part of Caesar's m i l i t a r y machine. The essence of the principle of economy of effort i s to achieve success with the employment of as few troops as possible. This i s gained by speed and surprise. Application of this principle may be seen through-out a l l Caesar's campaigns i n the C i v i l War. At no time was he greatly superior i n strength to his enemy, i n most cases having less men, but he continually outmanoeuvred his opponents by surprise and speed. In summary, i t i s clear that the principles of war as we know them today were, with some exceptions, as applicable to Caesar as to a 157 modern general. The difference of time, equipment, transportation and certain other factors have affected the application of the principles. Each commander adapts himself to the style of fighting common to his own era. The principles of war remain the same and Caesar applied them as they were necessary to the accomplishment of his goal - an I t a l y answer-able only to him. Caesar's strategic techniques were a result of his own creative genius and they showed his a b i l i t y to develop his strategy i n proportion to the severity of battle. "Caesar's career as a soldier shows to a marked degree how great i n war i s the factor of personal character. Caesar's art was not a thing he had learned from or could impart to others. I t was a product of his vast i n t e l l e c t and bore the seal of his splendid moral force." 9 Throughout the C i v i l War, Caesar was pitted against men of vary-ing s k i l l and his power to exploit their weak points while l i m i t i n g his campaigns against them to such exceptionally short encounters displayed soundly his strategic a b i l i t y . This has been a study of the mi l i t a r y strategy of Rome's greatest so l d i e r . Often he erred, because i t i s human to err, but he always re-gained the strategic advantage, especially when the odds were weighted heavily against him. His accomplishments on the battle f i e l d have rarely been equalled. In the words of Cassiusj "Why, man, he doth bestride the narrow world Like a colossus; and we petty men Walk under his huge legs, and peep about To f i n d ourselves dishonourable graves." 1 0 9 Dodge, op.cit.. p.754. 10 Julius Caesar. I , i i , 134-137. BIBLIOGRAPHY I. Ancient Sources 1. Primary; Caesar, C. J u l i u s , Commentarlorum pars posterior qua continentur L l b r i I I I de Bello C l v i l i cum L i b r i s incertorum de Bello Alexandrino Africo Hiapanienai, edited by Renatus du Pontet. Oxford, 1900. Caesar, de Bello C j v i l i . translated by A. G. Peskett. Harvard University Press, 1951. Caesar, Commentaries, anonymously translated. London, 1882. Caesar, Guerre d'Afrique. texte e'tabli et traduit par A. Bouvet. Paris, 1949. Cicero, Marcus T u l l i u s , Letters to Atticua. translated (in two volumes) by E. 0. Winstedt. Hew York, 1930. 2. Secondary; Appian, Roman History. Vol. I l l , translated by H. White. New York, 1913. Dio, Roman History, Vols. I l l - IV, translated by E. Cary on the basis of the version of H. B. Foster. New York, 1914. Frontinus, The Stratagems and the Aqueducts of Rome, translated by C. E. Bennet(edited by Mary B. McElwain). New York, 1925. Lucan, The C i v i l War, translated by J . D. Duff. New York, 1928. Plutarch, Pompey and Caesar, Vols. V and VII, translated by B. Perrin. New York, 1928. Sal l u s t , Floras and Velleius Paterculus, translated by J . S, Watson. London, 1887. Suetonius, Vol. I , translated by J . C. Rolfe. New York, 1914. I I . Modern Works 159 1. Books: Adcock, F. £., i n The Cambridge Ancient History Vol. IX. edited by S. A. Cook, F. E. Adcock, and M. P. Charlesworth, Cambridge University Press, 1951. Adcock, F. E., The Roman Art of War Under the Republic. Harvard University Press, 1940. (Martin Cla s s i c a l Lectures, Vol. VIII). Boak, A. E. R., A History of Rome to 565 A.D. Hem York, 1952. Baker, G. P., Twelve Centuries of Rome. London, 1934. Buchan, John, Julius Caesar. Edinburgh, 1932. Carcopino, J . , Cesar. Paris, 1950(2 Vols.). Von Clausewitz, K., On War, translated by 0. I. Matthijs J o l l e s . Hew York, 1943. Conway, R. S., Makers of Europe. Harvard University Press, 1931. Dodge, T. A., Great Captains: Caesar. Boston and Hew York, 1892. Duruy V., A History of Rome and The Roman People From I t s Origin to the Establishment of the Christian Empire, Vol. I l l , edited by Rev. J . P. Mahaffy. London, 1884. Earle, E. M., Makers of Modern Strategy: M i l i t a r y Thought from Maohiavelll to H i t l e r . Princeton University Press, 1944. Ferrero, G., The Greatness and Decline of Rome, Vol. I I , translated by A. E. Zinmern, London, 1909. Foertsch, H., The Art of Modern Warfare, translated by T. W. Khauth. New York, 1940. Fowler, W. W., Julius Caesar and the Foundation of the Boman Imperial System. Hew York, 1908. Froude, J. A., Caesar: a Sketch. New York and London, 1897. Fulle r J . F. C , The Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence Upon History, Vol. I . London, 1954. Heitland, W. E., The Roman Republic, Vol. I I I . Cambridge University Press, 1909. 160 Holmes, T. R., The Roman Republic and the Founder of the Empire, Vols. I I and I I I . Oxford, 1923. How, W. W., and Leigh, H. D., A History of Rome to the Death of Caesar. London, 1896. Leake, W. M., Travels i n Northern Greece. London, 1835. Liddell-Hart, B. H., Strategy: The Indirect Approach. London, 1954. Long, G., The Decline of The Roman Republic, Yol. Y. London, 1874. Marsh, Frank Burr, The Founding of The Roman Empire. Oxford University Press, 1927. Marsh, Frank Burr, A History of the Roman World from 146 to 30 B.C. London, 1935. Momma en, T., The History of Rome, Vol. IV, translated by W. P. Dickson. New York, 1930. Napoleon I, Precis des Guerres de Cesar, edited by M. Marchand. Paris, 1836. Nlebuhr, B. G., Lectures on the History of Rome From the Earli e s t Times to the F a l l of the Western Empire, Vol. I l l , edited by Dr. L. Scbmitz. London, 1849. Oman, C., Seven Roman Statesmen of the Later Republic: The Gracchi, Sul l a , Crassus, Cato, Pompey, Caesar. London, 1921. Parker, H. M. D., The Roman Legions. Oxford, 1928. Sargeaunt, H. A., and West, G., Grand Strategy: The Search For Victory. London, 1942. Schlegel, F., A Course of Lectures on Modern History, to which are added H i s t o r i c a l Essays on the Beginning of our History, and on Caesar and Alexander, translated by L. Purcell and R. H. Whitelock. London, 1849. Shuckburgh, E. S., A History of Rome to the Battle of Actlum. London, 1896. S i h l e r , E. G., Annals of Caesar: a C r i t i c a l Biography with a Survey of the Sources for More Advanced Students i n Ancient History and Particularly for the Use and Service of Instructors i n Caesar. New York, 1911. 161 Spaulding, 0. L., Nicherson, H., and Wright, J . ¥., Warfare; A Study of M i l i t a r y Methods from the Earlie s t Times. London, 1924. S t o f f e l , E. G., Histoire de Jules Cesar, Guerre C i v i l e , Paris, 1887 (3 Vols.). Wright, Q.., A Study of War.. Chicago, 1942 (2 Vols.). 2. Periodicals; Anonymous, "Caesar's Art of War and of Writing," Atlantic Monthly, XLIV (September, 1879), pp. 273-288. Coolen, E. A., "Surprise," Canadian Army Journal, V (August, 1951), pp. 62-72. Kennedy, K. C , "The Principles of War," Canadian Army Journal, V (November, 1951), pp. 69-74. " M i l i t a r y History and the Principles of War," Canadian Army Journal, IV (December, 1950), pp. 1-2. Postgate, J . P., "The Site of the Battle of Pharsalia," Journal of Roman Studies. XII (1922), pp. 187-191. Vokes, C , "Morale," Canadian Army Journal, V (January, 1952), pp.28-31, 


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