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The formation of cliques in collectivities as a consequence of initial distributions of dimensions of… Foddy, William Henry 1972

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THE FORMATION OF CLIQUES IN COLLECTIVITIES AS A CONSEQUENCE OF INITIAL DISTRIBUTIONS OF DIMENSIONS OF WEALTH by WILLIAM HENRY RODDY M.A. University of Canterbury, New Zealand, 1968 A THESIS SUBMTTTED IN PARTIAL MJT^IIJVENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY i n the Department of Anthropology and Sociology We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the re q u i r e standard THE uTWERSITY OF "BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1971 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i for s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department by h i s representat ives . I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i of t h i s t h e s i s for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permiss ion. Department The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia Vancouver 8, Canada ABSTRACT Past approaches t o the understanding of the occurrence of exchange Interactions and the generation of sentiments of s o c i a l approval and s o c i a l disapproval w i t h i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s are reviewed and a new theory i s formulated. The new theory focuses on i n i t i a l , unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n s of dimensions of wealth w i t h i n the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . On the basis of knowledge about the d i f f e r e n c e s between the members' net wealth l e v e l s , four hypotheses regarding the patterns of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s i n the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s are derived f o r t e s t i n g . These hypotheses concern: ( i ) the emergence, and order of emergence, of c l i q u e s w i t h i n the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , and ( i i ) the generation of sentiments of approval between fe l l o w c l i q u e members and sentiments of disapproval between the members of the d i f f e r e n t c l i q u e s i n each c o l l e c t i v i t y . An experimental paradigm i s then described and the r e s u l t s of a c t u a l , laboratory experiments presented. I t i s concluded that a l l four hypotheses are supported by the data. F i n a l l y , the theory i s placed w i t h i n the wider context of the sociology of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n general. Abstract checked by ' Professor R.A.H. Robson Chairman advisory coirmittee i i TABLE OP CONTENTS ABSTRACT TABLE OP CONTENTS LIST OF TABLES . . LIST OP FIGURES . LIST OP PLATES . . ACMOWLEDGMENT , , Chapter I. I I . I I I . IV. V. BIBLIOGRAPHY APPENDICES I. I I . I I I . TV. V. VI. V I I . V I I I . IX. INTRODUCTION THEORY . . . RESEARCH DESIGN Page i i i i v v i v i i v i i i 1 15 33 RESULTS AND EVALUATION OP RESULTS 43 69 A WIDER CONTEXT 78 83 85 94 95 P i l o t Work Laboratory Set-up Instr u c t i o n s P o s i t i o n E f f e c t s Questions Answered by Subjects A f t e r Seven Opportunities f o r Exchange . Check f o r Assumption 4 yo Sample of Comments E l i c i t e d by Post Experimental Question: Would You Say That You T r i e d To See Your Offer Prom The Other Subject's Point Of View Whenever You Were Deciding What To Offer Another Subject? 97 Sample of Comments E l i c i t e d by Post Experimental Question: I f You Received Two Or More S i m i l a r Offers At The Same Time, What Factors Would You Take Into Account In Deciding Which One To Accept? 99 Coded Results of Comments E l i c i t e d by Post Experimental Question: I f You Received Two Or More S i m i l a r Offers At The Same Tine, What Factors Would You Take Into Account In Deciding Which One To Accept? 102 Raw Data i v LIST OP TABLES Tables Page 1. The i n i t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n s of resources across c o l l e c t i v i t i e s f o r each experimental condition I n i t i a t i o n s d i r e c t e d toward highs during the f i r s t opportunities f o r exchange under each experimental c o n d i t i o n 3. I n t r a wealth l e v e l i n i t i a t i o n s during the f i r s t and seventh opportunities f o r exchange under each experimental condition ^. I n i t i a t i o n s to highs under each experimental c o n d i t i o n : o f f e r s r e l a t i v e to requests 5. Changes of net wealth l e v e l i n i t i a t e d t o a f t e r acceptance and a f t e r r e j e c t i o n under the moderate and extreme differences conditions 6. I n t e r and i n t r a net wealth l e v e l i n i t i a t i o n s accepted under each experimental condition . . . 7- Post experimental approve and disapprove votes d i r e c t e d toward f e l l o w net wealth l e v e l subjects 8. D i s t r i b u t i o n of approval and disapproval votes across d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of acceptance 9- V i s i b i l i t y of p o s i t i o n s and i n i t i a t i o n s during the f i r s t opportunities f o r exchange under the no differences condition V Tables Page 10. Yes/no responses t o the post experimental question: Would you say that you t r i e d t o see your o f f e r from the other subject's point of view whenever you were deciding what to o f f e r another subject? 11. Coded r e s u l t s of comments e l i c i t e d by post experimental question: I f you received two or more s i m i l a r o f f e r s at the same time, what f a c t o r s would you take i n t o account i n deciding which one t o accept? v i LIST OF FIGURES Figure Page 1. A random, unbiased sociometric pattern f o r eight actors 2. An example of a non-random, biased sociometric pattern f o r eight actors 3. 'High' and 'low' net wealth l e v e l s 4. D i s t r i b u t i o n of resources f o r experiments 5. An i n i t i a t i o n form 6. P o s i t i o n of booths v i s a v i s one another, and the colour of the l a r g e s t p i l e of buttons i n f r o n t of each booth, i n every experiment run 7. P o s i t i o n of high and low net wealth members i n the moderate and extreme differences experiments 8. An example of the v i s i b i l i t y of p o t e n t i a l exchange partners 9- A booth 10. Sample cards pinned t o lower bar of each subject's booth 11. Copy of the t a b l e pinned t o the side of each subject's booth v i i LIST OF PLATES Plates Page 1. View of experimental s i t u a t i o n 2. View through a booth window v i i i ACMOWIEDGMEMT The theory and experimental design discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g pages emerged out of a great deal of reading and countless discussions. I am indebted to Homans and Lei k , Emerson and Burgess f o r the many ideas expressed i n the m a t e r i a l they have had published. I am a l s o indebted t o the members of my advisory committee: Dr. R.A.H. Robson (Chairman), Dr. Martha Foschi, Dr. M. Biosnbaum, Dr. M. Humphreys (Psychology), Dr. R. Robinson (Philosophy). The members of my advisory committee have spent a great deal of t h e i r time discussing my work with me. In a d d i t i o n , I would l i k e to thank my student colleagues: Margaret Foddy, Peter Clark, Donald Earner and W i l l i a m Reimer. Both the members of my committee and my student colleagues have (perhaps more than I would l i k e to admit) helped me understand what i t i s that I have been t r y i n g to do. F i n a l l y , I would l i k e to express my gratitude to both the Canada Council f o r the f i n a n c i a l support I have received and the many students who were w i l l i n g to take part i n the experiments. CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION This d i s s e r t a t i o n i s concerned with the r e l a t i o n s h i p between sequences of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s and the manifestation of c e r t a i n aspects of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n w i t h i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that e x h i b i t s p e c i f i e d c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . For the purposes of t h i s chapter, i t w i l l s u f f i c e I f the term 'exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s ' i s taken to r e f e r to i n t e r a c t i o n s between p a i r s of members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y that involve the voluntary swapping of valued e f f e c t s . The words 'valued e f f e c t s ' are used d e l i b e r a t e l y because, as w i l l be noted below, exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s can i m p l i c a t e m a t e r i a l as w e l l as non m a t e r i a l goods. I t should be noted, a l s o , that 'valued e f f e c t s ' w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as 'resources'. A f t e r Simmel\ gratitude i n r e t u r n f o r g i f t s has been seen t o be both a determinant of s o c i a l cohesion and a determinant of s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . The idea of the emergence of s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y i n 2 c o l l e c t i v i t i e s as a consequence of g i f t g i v i n g i s elaborated by Schwartz who focuses on Gouldner's statement of the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y . Gouldner claims that the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y demands that people should help and not hurt those who have helped them. The achievement and maintenance of s o c i a l status through the general e x p l o i t a t i o n of the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y has been 4 5 6 reported, f o r example, by Whyte , Blau and Belshaw and the notion of deference as payment f o r service i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y has been theorized about 7 by Harsanyi. The notion of the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y and the notion that people can create, and manage, networks of o b l i g a t i o n have defined one approach f o r -2-I n v e s t l g a t i n g the general r e l a t i o n s h i p between wealth and s o c i a l i n e q u a l i t y i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . I t should be noted, however, that t h i s approach s p e c i f i c a l l y deals with s i t u a t i o n s i n which one person gives something t o , or does something f o r , another who I s not i n a p o s i t i o n t o reciprocate immediately i n any other way than by g i v i n g esteem or approval i n r e t u r n f o r g the g i f t or s e r v i c e . I f we assume that people cannot make many d i s t i n c t i o n s along the dimensions of high esteem-low esteem or approval-disapproval, we might also assume that t h i s approach w i l l have a l i m i t e d u t i l i t y i n that the s i t u a t i o n s i t focuses on are u n l i k e l y t o give r i s e t o prolonged sequences of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s between the same people. I t does not seem convincing t o argue, f o r instance, that person A can engage person B i n an extended sequence of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s by successively g i v i n g B warmer and warmer esteem or more and more extreme i n d i c a t i o n s of approval. What i s i n question here i s whether successive expressions of esteem or approval can be received as having at l e a s t , s i m i l a r values to the preceding ones. 1 0 The problem i s that i t i s not obvious that successive expression of esteem or approval could be seen as being separate. I t may be the case that expressions of esteem or approval are l i k e keys to a c i t y : i t may not make much sense t o give them again and again. I t would seem that expressions of esteem or approval cannot be accumulated i n the same way that amounts of m a t e r i a l commodities can be accumulated. For t h i s reason, i t might be argued that s i t u a t i o n s i n which one person gives amounts of some valued m a t e r i a l commodity i n return f o r amounts of some other valued commodity would be more l i k e l y t o be associated with extended sequences of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s than s i t u a t i o n s i n which one person gives something to another who i s not i n . a p o s i t i o n to reciprocate immediately i n any other way than by g i v i n g esteem or approval i n return. Because we are i n t e r e s t e d i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between sequences of exchange -3-i n t e r a c t i o n s and c e r t a i n aspects of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , we w i l l focus on s i t u a t i o n s which can be seen as being most l i k e l y to allow extended sequences of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s . This means that we w i l l focus on s i t u a t i o n s i n which one person gives amounts of some valued m a t e r i a l commodity i n return f o r amounts of some other valued m a t e r i a l commodity. This choice should be seen as a matter o f strategy r a t h e r than as an out r i g h t d e n i a l that extended sequences of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s can be associated with s i t u a t i o n s i n v o l v i n g non ma t e r i a l commodities. 11 12 Most exchange t h e o r i s t s , f o r example: Thibaut and K e l l e y , Kuhn , 13 14 15 Longabough , Blau and Boulding focus on the mechanics of s i n g l e exchange and f o r t h i s reason t h e i r works w i l l not be gone i n t o here. I t could be noted, however, that Thibaut and K e l l e y see the relevance of ideas r e l a t e d t o adaptation l e v e l theory"^ to exchange theory ( i . e . , they use the notion that people with a l o t of a resource deal i n large amounts o f i t while people with a l i t t l e d eal i n small amounts). And t h e o r i s t s l i k e Boulding and Blau t r y t o u t i l i z e the notion of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y ( i . e . , they contend that the more a person has of a resource the l e s s he w i l l want more of i t ) . Both the notion of adaptation l e v e l s and the notion of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y have been incorporated i n t o the theory presented i n the next chapter. I t i s generally assumed that an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n w i l l only occur i f both p a r t i e s involved have somehow perceived that they w i l l be b e t t e r o f f a f t e r 17 i t has taken place. Some work has been done on the problem of how the pa r t i e s manage to agree on how much of one resource w i l l be exchanged f o r how l8 much of the other but, given that we are in t e r e s t e d In the consequences of series of exchanges, we w i l l not dwell on t h i s , aspect of exchange theory. While i t i s c l e a r that r e c i p r o c a l g i v i n g or, more formally, exchange in t e r a c t i o n s can be seen to be a determinant of s o c i a l cohesion,it i s not -4-c l e a r that exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s that do not d i r e c t l y involve approval or esteem as one of the resources should be seen to be r e l a t e d t o the generation ,of s o c i a l status. I f i t i s assumed that people enter i n t o exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s because they f i n d them mutually rewarding, however, i t might a l s o be assumed that people w i l l l i k e or approve of those w i t h whom they can enter i n t o exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s (or more p a r t i c u l a r l y s e r i e s of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s ) . This, i n f a c t , I s the theme that underlies the theory presented i n the next chapter. I f exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s are mutually rewarding t o the p a r t i e s Involved, series of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s can be viewed as sequences of r e c i p r o c a l , p o s i t i v e reinforcements. This view opens up the p o s s i b i l i t y of l i n k i n g exchange theory t o le a r n i n g theory. The f i r s t attempt t o do t h i s was made by 19 Romans. Romans, unfortunately, ran i n t o severe c r i t i c i s m f o r h i s e f f o r t s . He'was c r i t i c i z e d f o r ignoring the question of how amounts of d i f f e r e n t 20 resources can be equated to one another. He was accused of f a i l i n g t o give 21 a set of correspondence r u l e s f o r c e n t r a l concepts (e.g., cost, p r o f i t , etc.) 22 and of d e f i n i n g these c e n t r a l terms t a u t o l o g i c a l l y . He was accused of using operant conditioning p r i n c i p l e s badly; f o r instance, i t was noted that he had ignored the important f i n d i n g that i n t e r m i t t e n t reinforcement i s more e f f e c t i v e than continuous reinforcement i n delaying the e x t i n c t i o n of a response. As a consequence of these shortcomings and the f a c t that he f a i l e d to make a l l the propositions he employed e x p l i c i t , Homans' claim that he had formulated an axiomatic theory of s o c i a l exchange has been widely 24 challenged. In s p i t e of the c r i t i c i s m s , i t would be u n f a i r to lose sight of the impetus Homans has given to the t h e o r i z i n g about status systems. His argument that a man's c o n t r o l over scarce resources enables him to reward -5-others and thus achieve high s o c i a l status or a u t h o r i t y i s s i m i l a r to the view that i s advanced i n the next chapter. A more so p h i s t i c a t e d attempt t o l i n k l e a r n i n g theory t o exchange theory than Homans' has more r e c e n t l y been made by L e i k , Emerson and Burgess.' Since the theory advanced i n the next chapter was d i r e c t l y stimulated by L e i k et a l ' s work, a p o r t i o n of t h e i r paper i s reproduced here t o : ( i ) i n d i c a t e the general character of t h e i r theory, and ( i i ) give subsequent comments substance. " . . . S o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n between two actors ( c a l l them aj_ and a j t ) can be described i n terms of r e c i p r o c a l 'expectations', leaning h e a v i l y upon c o g n i t i v e psychology. By contrast, the same s o c i a l process can be described i n terms of r e c i p r o c a l reinforcements, leaning almost e x c l u s i v e l y upon operant psychology. The l a t t e r approach i s the s t a r t i n g point f o r t h i s s o c i a l exchange theory. Let us assume that a s o c i a l r e l a t i o n involves some s p e c i f i a b l e behavior j which a-j_ repeatedly performs i n the r e l a t i o n , and behavior j ' which aj_t performs. Assume f u r t h e r that j and j ' are both operant behavior. I f , i n a d d i t i o n , j i s a r e i n f o r c i n g stimulus (or mediates reinforcement) f o r aj_t, then we say that aj_'s a b i l i t y t o perform j i s a resource of a^ In h i s r e l a t i o n with a ^ i . The magnitude of t h i s resource i s a f u n c t i o n of the value of j to a-j_ i , and the a b i l i t y of a^ t o provide i t . This s o c i a l r e l a t i o n can be symbolized as the exchange r e l a t i o n aj_ 4 a^_, .,, where j and j ' are behavioral resources or a± anda±i } r e s p e c t i v e l y . The two persons are s a i d to 'exchange' j and j ' i n a process of r e c i p r o c a l reinforcement which sustains the r e l a t i o n through time. (For s i m p l i c i t y , the r e l a t i o n may be symbolized a^ a^_i, with the resources understood). As an i n t e r a c t i v e process through time, the exchange r e l a t i o n i s conceived f u r t h e r as a set of temporally interspersed events c a l l e d o pportunities, i n i t i a t i o n s and transactions. I f aj_r Is 'accessible' to aj. at a given time, aj_ i s s a i d t o have an opportunity. Given an opportunity, i f aj_ performs (or symbolically 'promises to perform') j , then we say that a^ has i n i t i a t e d a p o s s i b l e episode of exchange. E i t h e r party might i n i t i a t e , and we introduce the term because who i n i t i a t e s often -6-makes a di f f e r e n c e . F i n a l l y , given an i n i t i a t i o n by aj_, I f aj_t accepts by performing j ' we say that a t r a n s a c t i o n has been consummated or agreed upon. Since both j and j ' are assumed t o be operants and r e i n f o r c i n g s t i m u l i , the exchange r e l a t i o n as an i n t e r a c t i v e r e l a t i o n across time (a h i s t o r y of p r i o r transactions) i s governed by three propositions: 1. Holding the p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance constant and greater than zero, the p r o b a b i l i t y of i n i t i a t i o n i s an incr e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of the resource magnitude of the actor t o whom i n i t i a t i o n i s made. 2. Holding the resource magnitude of the actor t o whom i n i t i a t i o n i s made constant and greater than zero, the p r o b a b i l i t y of i n i t i a t i o n i s an i n c r e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of the p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance during previous transactions. 3. The p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance i s an incr e a s i n g f u n c t i o n of the resource magnitude of the i n i t i a t o r during previous transactions. These propositions assume that transactions i n any r e l a t i o n compete f o r a v a i l a b l e time with possible transactions i n a l t e r n a t i v e r e l a t i o n s . . . . " L eik et a l go on to use t h e i r three propositions t o deduce that when there i s an unequal and f i x e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources across a set of actors, the network of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i l l tend to s t r a t i f y i n t o two or more closed networks or classes with the higher classes forming before the lower classes. That i s , they make the resource d i s t r i b u t i o n t h e i r independent v a r i a b l e and the emergence of a s t r a t i f i e d structure t h e i r dependent v a r i a b l e . Having formulated t h e i r theory, L e i k et a l designed an experiment to te s t i t . They gave each subject a set amount of play money to begin w i t h and had groups of s i x s i t around a t a b l e . On each t r i a l , two of the subjects were given an opportunity t o i n v i t e one or two (whichever they wished) of the other four subjects to attend an exchange booth with them. (There were two exchange booths.) I f a subject was e i t h e r a host or i n v i t e d t o attend a booth -7-and wanted to accept the i n v i t a t i o n he had to pay $50 t o the booth which would pay him an amount that depended upon which of the other subjects attended the booth w i t h him. This amount was set by the f a c t that two of the subjects were weighted as worth $60 each, two were weighted as worth $40 each and two were weighted as worth $20 each. A subject was paid the t o t a l weightings of the subjects that attended a booth with him. No subject was informed about t h i s weighting system. Rather, subjects l e a r n t that they were paid more i f they attended the booth with some subjects than with others. Because subjects were only allowed to attend one booth on any given t r i a l , a subject often had t o choose between two i n v i t a t i o n s . At the end of the experiment, the play money each subject had managed to accumulate was exchanged f o r r e a l money. Notice that L e i k et a l do not c l e a r l y state whether 'resource magnitude' r e f e r s t o the magnitude of the t o t a l amount of a resource that an actor has or to the s i z e of the amount an actor brings t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p . I n d e f i n i n g 'resource magnitude' as the a b i l i t y t o provide a r e i n f o r c i n g stimulus, L e i k et a l seem to be focusing on the t o t a l amount of a resource that an actor has and yet, the way propositions 1 and 3 are worded, i t would seem that the s i z e of the amount that an actor brings t o a r e l a t i o n s h i p i s the required meaning. The unfortunate t h i n g i s that the meaning required may depend upon the resource i n question. I f the resource i s the a b i l i t y to perform a behavior ( i . e . , a s e r v i c e ) , the q u a l i t y of a s i n g l e performance might be the important consideration. I f the resource i s of a m a t e r i a l nature (e.g., money), the t o t a l amount that the actor has might be the important f a c t o r . Perhaps an even more serious shortcoming ..of the L e i k et a l formulation i s the f a c t that they do not give any explanation f o r e i t h e r the f i r s t or the t h i r d propositions. I t i s not c l e a r why they would use these propositions. -8-Exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s occur between p a i r s of actors and the occurrence of an i n i t i a t i o n i s as dependent upon the amount that a would-be i n i t i a t o r holds of i t as i t i s dependent upon the amount that a would-be r e c e i v e r of the i n i t i a t i o n has. Because both actors need t o have an excess of a resource that the other wants before exchanges can be perceived as d e s i r a b l e , propositions that focus on the amount of a resource that one party holds without reference t o the amount of another resource that the other party holds do not make a great deal of sense. The attempt t o provide a set of more defensible propositions Is one of the main t h r u s t s of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . L e i k et a l ' s f i r s t p r o p o s i t i o n would seem to ensure that ego w i l l make a perceived gain providing a l t e r accepts h i s i n i t i a t i o n , and t h e i r t h i r d p r o p o s i t i o n would seem to ensure that a l t e r w i l l make a perceived gain each time he accepts an i n i t i a t i o n from ego. Unfortunately, since they t r e a t ego and a l t e r separately, t h e i r propositions do not give us any basis f o r b e l i e v i n g that exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s w i l l ever take place. Regardless of the perceived gains that ego would make, a l t e r w i l l r e j e c t ego's i n i t i a t i o n s unless he stands to make perceived gains too. Hence i t might be concluded t h a t , i f ego i s t o s u c c e s s f u l l y i n t e r a c t with a l t e r , he must be able t o adjust h i s behavior, e i t h e r by t r i a l and e r r o r or I n s i g h t , t o a l t e r ' s requirements at the same time as he pursues h i s own i n t e r e s t s . This means, presumably, that we need a set of propositions that deal with ego's and a l t e r ' s resource l e v e l s at the same time rather than one at a time. Although Leik et a l hypothesize that the network of exchange r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i l l tend t o s t r a t i f y Into two or more closed networks, they do not discuss the a c t u a l mechanics of t h i s process. I f they.had, they would have found t h a t , i n the absence of d e s c r i p t i v e d e t a i l s about the "unequal and f i x e d d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources" that they assume, the p r e d i c t i o n s they want t o make do not flow - 9 -from t h e i r theory. Indeed, they could have j u s t as e a s i l y predicted a continuous h i e r a r c h i c a l order instead of the hierarchy of d i s c r e t e classes that they chose t o p r e d i c t . While arguing that the experimental s i t u a t i o n they used was relevant to t h e i r t h e o r e t i c a l formulation, Leik et a l advance the notion of " i n t r a -category exchanges" by which they r e f e r t o s i t u a t i o n s In which i n t e r a c t a n t s supposedly exchange resources that are " q u a l i t a t i v e l y s i m i l a r " . A c t u a l l y , they o p e r a t i o n a l i z e " q u a l i t a t i v e l y s i m i l a r " as "the same". That i s , subjects had t o deposit money at a booth i n order t o receive money. The notion of intra-category exchange i s not very convincing. I t hardly seems reasonable to suppose that people w i l l generally exchange amounts of one resource f o r amounts of the same resource. Further problems a r i s e f o r L e i k et a l because: ( i ) up t o three subjects were allowed to attend the same booth at the same time, and ( i i ) none of the subjects were t o l d that the experimenter would i n j e c t new amounts of the resource i n t o the s i t u a t i o n dependent upon which subjects attended the booths during each opportunity f o r exchange. Presumably, Leik et a l f e l t that subjects could extract information about other subjects from t r i a d i c i n t e r a c t i o n s . Yet I t cannot be taken f o r granted that the subjects have the capacity to do t h i s . Host subjects may have learnt to d i r e c t s i n g l e i n i t i a t i o n s t o p a i r s of other subjects r a t h e r than have learnt to d i r e c t two i n i t i a t i o n s t o two d i f f e r e n t subjects. Moreover, i n s p i t e of Leik et a l ' s claim that they lean almost e x c l u s i v e l y upon operant psychology, t h e i r research design does not allow subjects t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e one another, at the beginning of an experiment, i n t e ^ i s of some a t t r i b u t e or c h a r a c t e r i s t i c that i s r e l a t e d t o t h e i r respective resource l e v e l s . Each subject's resource l e v e l can only be known a f t e r the d i f f e r e n t i a l outcomes f o r -10-the d i f f e r e n t subjects have become apparent ( i . e . , a f t e r several opportunities f o r exchange). In other words, i t i s not c l e a r that L e i k et a l can claim that a^ could associate a^, with a stimulus that could be d i f f e r e n t i a l l y 27 rein f o r c e d . At best, such a claim might hold a f t e r several opportunities f o r exchange when the subjects might be able to d i f f e r e n t i a t e one another i n terms of the magnitudes of the p i l e s of play money In front of them. At worst, the claim might never hold because other l e a r n i n g f a c t o r s (e.g., reinforcement associated with past outcomes, etc.) might negate the salie n c e of the supposed d i f f e r e n t i a l stimulus. In any case, the problem can be summed up by saying that the s i t u a t i o n s created by the research design are too complex f o r operant psychology to provide an adequate i n f e r e n t i a l s t r u c t u r e . The c r i t i c i s m s set out i n the preceding paragraphs tempt one to the conclusion that the research design employed by Le i k et a l ne i t h e r focuses on exchange behavior nor t e s t s the hypotheses that they were i n t e r e s t e d i n . Instead of engaging In exchange behavior, the subjects could only l e a r n t o seek lucky s i t u a t i o n s . These c r i t i c i s m s arose because: ( i ) there was only one type of resource i n the s i t u a t i o n , ( i i ) the experimenters kept i n j e c t i n g new amounts of the resource i n t o the s i t u a t i o n i n s p i t e of the fa c t that t h e i r theory c a l l s f o r a " f i x e d set of resources across a f i x e d set of acto r s " , and ( i i i ) subjects could not v i s u a l l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e one another i n a way that would be meaningful i n terms of operant theory. In the next chapter, an attempt i s made to advance a t h e o r e t i c a l formulation t h a t , though s i m i l a r to Leik et a l ' s , meets the c r i t i c i s m s that have j u s t been set out and, i n chapter three, an experimental paradigm i s described that w i l l : ( i ) allow more v a l i d t e s t s of the theory advanced than the Leik et a l ' s paradigm allowed f o r t h e i r theory, and ( i i ) serve as a basis f o r a series of experimental i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . The r e s u l t s of a c t u a l experiments -11-are presented and evaluated i n chapter four. A f i n a l chapter t r i e s to r e l a t e these i n t e r e s t s to other i n t e r e s t s i n the sociology of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . FOOTNOTES See: ( i ) G. Simmel, The Sociology of Georg Simmel. Translated, edited and Introduced by K.H. Wolff. (New York: Free Press, 1950). On page 387, Simmel discusses gratitude f o r g i f t s or service as a non l e g a l form of honour, ( i i ) M. Maus, The G i f t : Forms and Functions of Exchange i n Archaic S o c i e t i e s . Translated by I . Cunnison and introduced by E.E. Evans-Pritchard. (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1967). ( i i i ) C. Levi-Strauss, Les Structures Elementaires de l a Parente. Presses U n i v e r s i t a i r e s de France, 1949- Chapter V- Le P r i n c i p e de Re'ciprocite' abridged and t r a n s l a t e d by Rose L. Coser and Grace Frazer and re p r i n t e d i n S o c i o l o g i c a l Theory, edited by L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg. (New York: MacMillan, 1957), pp. 84-94. 0 B. Schwartz, The s o c i a l psychology of the g i f t . American Journal of Sociology 73 ( 1 9 6 7 ) n l , pp. 1-11. A.W. Gouldner, The norm of r e c i p r o c i t y : A preliminary statement. American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review 25 (1960)n2, pp. 161-178. 4 W.F. Whyte, Street Corner Society. (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1943). On page 74, Whyte advances the idea of the gang leader e s t a b l i s h i n g authority by maintaining a net-work of o b l i g a t i o n s . ''P.M. Blau, Blau, Bureacracy i n Modern Society. (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 72: "...The mere knowledge that the r u l e e x i s t s and po s s i b l y that i t i s enforced elsewhere i n s t i l s a sense of o b l i g a t i o n to l i b e r a l superiors and induces subordinates more r e a d i l y to comply with t h e i r requests...." ^C.S. Belshaw, T r a d i t i o n a l Exchange and Modem Markets. (Englewood C l i f f s , New Jersey: P r e n t i c e - H a l l , 1965), p. 48: "...The man who can c a l l f o r t h resources, who controls wealth, does not hold the resources i n h i s own name nec e s s a r i l y . He has given the cow to another i n a t i l i a r e l a t i o n s h i p , he has given h i s vaygu's t o a t r a d i n g partner, he has passed marriage goods to hi s son's a f f i n e s . But having dispersed m a t e r i a l wealth i n t h i s way, he has through c a p i t a l investment gained continuing c o n t r o l over future services. His command over wealth has been secured and has been expanded. And he i s known to have such power. This i s the true wealth i n a p r e s t a t i o n system, and i t i s the mainspring of entreprenurial a c t i v i t y . . . . " 7 J.C. Harsanyi, A bargaining model f o r s o c i a l status i n informal groups and formal organizations. Behavioral Science V I I (1966)n5, pp. 357-369. -13-UP.M. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureacracy: A study I n Interpersonal r e l a t i o n s In two governmental agencies. (Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1955), p. 108: "...A consultation can be considered an exchange of values; both p a r t i c i p a n t s pay a p r i c e . The questioning agent i s enabled t o perform bet t e r than he could otherwise have done without expressing h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s t o the supervisor. By asking f o r h i s advice, he e x p l i c i t l y pays respect to the superior p r o f i c i e n c y of h i s colleague. This acknowledgment of i n f e r i o r i t y i s the cost of r e c e i v i n g assistance...." -^See: G.C. Homans, S o c i a l Behavior: I t s elementary forms. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1961). On pages 64-68, Homans discusses t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y . See: Homans, I b i d . , p. 65. Homans seems t o be aware of t h i s problem because he notes the p o s s i b i l i t y of A changing the character of the exchanges by asking B f o r advice about personal matters instead of o f f i c e a f f a i r s i n return f o r esteem f o r a new aspect of B. ~^J.W. Thibaut and H.H. K e l l e y , The S o c i a l Psychology of Groups. (New York: Wiley, 19 59)• 12 A. Kuhn, The Study of Society: A u n i f i e d approach. (Homewood, 111.: Irwin-Dorsey, 1963). 13 R. Longabough, A category system f o r coding interpersonal behavior as s o c i a l exchange. Sociometry 26_ (1963), pp. 319-345-14 P.M. Blau, Exchange and Power i n Everyday L i f e . (John Wiley & Sons, 1964). 15 K.E. Boulding, Economic Analysis: V o l . I , Microeconomics. (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 4th e d i t i o n . "^See: ( i ) H. Helson, Adaptation-level Theory: An experimental systematic approach to behavior! (New York: Harper & Row, 1964). ( i i ) W. Bevan and R.E. Adamson, I n t e r n a l referents and the concept of reinforcement. In I n t e r d i s c i p l i n a r y Behavior Sciences Research Conference, Unive r s i t y of New Mexico, Decisions, Values and Groups, V o l . I (New York: Pergamon, 1963). See: K.E. Boulding, op. c i t . , pp. 22-23. - 1 4 -l8 See: ( i ) K.E. Boulding, op. c i t . , chapter 27. ( i i ) S. Sie g e l and L.E. Pouraker, Bargaining and Group Decision Making. (New York: McGraw-Hill, I960), ( i i i ) H.H. K e l l e y , I n t e r a c t i o n process and the attainment of maximum j o i n t p r o f i t . Chapter 16 i n : Decisions and Choice: Contributions of Sidney S i e g e l . Edited by S. Messick and A.H. B r a y f i e l d . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965). 19 / x See: ( i ) G.C. Homans, S o c i a l behavior as exchange. American Journal of Sociology 63 (1957-1958)n6, pp. 597-606. ( i i ) G.C. Homans, S o c i a l Behavior: I t s elementary forms. (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., I96TT. 20 J.A. Davis, Two c r i t i q u e s o f Homans' S o c i a l Behavior: I t s elementary forms, A s o c i o l o g i s t ' s view. American Journal of Sociology 67_ (196l-1962)n4, pp. 454-458. 2 1J . A . Davis, I b i d . 22 B. Abramson, Homans on exchange: Hedonism r e v i v e d . American Journal of Sociology 76 (1970)n2, pp. 273-283. 2^M. Deutsch, Homans i n the Skinner box. S o c i o l o g i c a l Inquiry 3_4 (1964) n2, pp. 156-165. 24 See: ( i ) J.A. Davis, op. c i t . ( i i ) K.C. Land and R.C. Rockwell, A c r i t i c a l and programatic examination of exchange theory. Procedings Southwest S o c i o l o g i c a l A s s o c i a t i o n 16 (1966), pp. 183-187. ( i i i ) R. Mari s , The l o g i c a l adequacy of Homans' s o c i a l theory. American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review 35_ (1970)n6, pp. 1069-1081. 25 See Homans, op. c i t . , (1961), chapter 14. 26 R.K. L e i k , R.M. Emerson and R.L. Burgess, The Emergence of S t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n Exchange Networks: An experimental demonstration. Paper presented at the West Coast Conference f o r Small Group Research, San Diego, March 1968. I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i o l o g i c a l Research, U n i v e r s i t y of Washington, S e a t t l e , Washington. Mimeographed. CHAPTER I I THEORY The coupling of the notion of sequences of exchange Interactions between two p a r t i e s to p r i n c i p l e s of operant and perceptual psychology and the view that these p r i n c i p l e s apply t o both p a r t i e s involved i n the sequences are the bases of the theory presented i n t h i s chapter. This theory focuses on a predicted tendency toward s e l e c t i v e i n t e r a c t i o n s i n c o l l e c t i v i t i e s whose members need to exchange amounts of resources w i t h one another. I t c o n s t i t u t e s an attempt t o expla i n how c e r t a i n unequal d i s t r i b u t i o n s of two dimensions of wealth can: ( i ) give r i s e to the emergence of cli q u e s w i t h i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y , and ( i i ) cause the members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y t o approve of the members of the c l i q u e s to which they belong and t o disapprove of the members of the cliques t o which they do not belong. The theory being advanced w i l l be presented i n sections that center on the f o l l o w i n g four areas of concern: ( i ) the d e f i n i t i o n of basic concepts, ( i i ) the scope conditions or e s s e n t i a l features of the em p i r i c a l s i t u a t i o n s to which the theory i s relevant, ( i i i ) the psychological p r i n c i p l e s that are assumed to govern the behavior of the members of c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that meet the scope conditions, and ( i v ) the formal d e r i v a t i o n of hypotheses regarding the issues we are inte r e s t e d i n . I. THE DEFINITION OF BASIC CONCEPTS Seven concepts w i l l be defined, here, because they are basic to the t h e o r e t i c a l statements that w i l l be made i n succeeding sections. -16-1. Resource Dimension. A resource dimension i s any e f f e c t ( i . e . , behavior or m a t e r i a l or non m a t e r i a l commodity) that i s both valued by another i n d i v i d u a l and can be t r a n s f e r r e d t o that individual." 1" 2. I n i t i a t i o n of Exchange. An i n i t i a t i o n of exchange i s s a i d to occur when a person X o f f e r s an amount of some resource t o another person Y i i n r e turn f o r an amount of some other resource from Y i . 3. Exchange I n t e r a c t i o n . An exchange i n t e r a c t i o n i s s a i d t o occur when a person X makes an i n i t i a t i o n of exchange to another person Y i and t h i s 2 i n i t i a t i o n of exchange i s accepted by Y i . 4. The j o i n t operant conditioning paradigm. An exchange s i t u a t i o n i s seen to imply a sort of double Skinner box i n which not only does the r a t respond to the box but the box responds to the r a t . Just as Y i c o n s t i t u t e s a stimulus s i t u a t i o n f o r X, X c o n s t i t u t e s a stimulus s i t u a t i o n f o r Y i . Just as Yican e l i c i t an i n i t i a t i o n of exchange from X ( i . e . , an o f f e r and a request) and e i t h e r p o s i t i v e l y or negatively r e i n f o r c e t h i s i n i t i a t i o n , X can e l i c i t an i n i t i a t i o n of exchange from Y i and e i t h e r p o s i t i v e l y or negatively r e i n f o r c e t h i s i n i t i a t i o n . This double Skinner box s i t u a t i o n w i l l be r e f e r r e d to as a j o i n t operant conditioning s i t u a t i o n . 5- Perceived Worth. The perceived worth of an amount of a resource i s the subjective u t i l i t y that the amount has f o r an i n d i v i d u a l . 6. Net Perceived Gain f o r X i n an Exchange I n t e r a c t i o n with Y i . The net perceived gain f o r X i n an exchange with Y i i s the perceived worth of what Y i gives him minus the perceived worth of what he has t o give Y i i n return 7. Cliques. A c o l l e c t i v i t y can be s a i d t o have s p l i t i n t o c l i q u e s when the p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r the possible exchange Interactions between a l l the d i f f e r e n t possible p a i r s of members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y are such that the -17-members of p a r t i c u l a r subsets of p a i r s are s i g n i f i c a n t l y more l i k e l y t o enter i n t o exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h one another than with other members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y . More p r e c i s e l y , a c o l l e c t i v i t y can be s a i d t o have s p l i t i n t o cliques when the f o l l o w i n g conditions are evident: ( i ) the p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s between a l l possible p a i r s of members i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y are not equal and hence an unbiased, random, sociometric pattern does not p r e v a i l (see f i g u r e 1), ( i i ) the highest p r o b a b i l i t i e s define two or more d i s c r e t e , sociometric patterns, and ( i i i ) the p r o b a b i l i t i e s w i t h i n any subset of p a i r s are, at l e a s t , approximately equal and the p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r i n t e r a c t i o n s between members w i t h i n any subset of p a i r s and members outside that subset are a l l s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s than the p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r i n t e r a c t i o n s between members w i t h i n that subset. That i s , each subset of p a i r s i s closed (see f i g u r e 2). Figure 1. A random, unbiased sociometric pattern f o r eight actors. A B C D Where a l i n e equals an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n and each l i n e has an equal, non-zero p r o b a b i l i t y of occurrence - i . e . , A,B,C,D,E, F,G, or H are equally l i k e l y t o i n t e r a c t w i t h any one of the other seven because each l i n e has the same p r o b a b i l i t y of occurrence. E F G H -18-Figure 2. An example of a non-random, biased sociometric pattern f o r eight actors. A B C D •:: .-. v. •••.v.v.v.tTT. » » Where A,E,F, and G are equally l i k e l y t o i n t e r a c t w i t h one another and are more l i k e l y to i n t e r a c t with one another than with B,C,D, or H and B,C,D and H are equally l i k e l y t o i n t e r a c t w i t h one another and more l i k e l y t o i n t e r a c t ' . .v.v.";. ' .*:.*.v"."..v.v.w with one another than with E F G H A,E,F or G. I I . THE SCOPE CONDITIONS OF THE THEORY The theory being presented Is relevant to newly formed c o l l e c t i v i t i e s (I.e., c o l l e c t i v i t i e s i n which there are no established patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n ) f o r which the f o l l o w i n g seven statements are true : 1. There are four or more members' (X + Yi....Yn) so t h a t , at l e a s t , two cliques of two can emerge. 2. The members a l l have the same reasons f o r va l u i n g q u a n t i t i e s of 4 two resources that can be described i n the f o l l o w i n g way: (I) both are of a d i v i s i b l e , concrete or m a t e r i a l nature, and 5 ( i i ) successive amounts of both are cumulative or storable. 3. The t o t a l amounts of both resources are f i x e d f o r the c o l l e c t i v i t y and (because of some environmental contingency or other factor) have been unequally d i s t r i b u t e d across the members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y i n such a way that there are at le a s t two members with, at l e a s t , roughly complementary -19-resource p r o f i l e s on each of two or more net wealth l e v e l s (those w i t h the greatest net wealth w i l l be c a l l e d 'highs' and those with the l e a s t net wealth w i l l be c a l l e d 'lows' - see f i g u r e 3 ) • ^ Figure 3- 'High' and 'low' net wealth l e v e l s . net wealth l e v e l resource 1 I j resource 2 Member A Member B Member C Member D Lows Highs 4. The resources that each member has are v i s i b l e to the other 7 members. 5- The c o l l e c t i v i t y has a number of occasions during which every member, who wants t o , can t r y t o i n i t i a t e an exchange with one other member and those members who receive one or more i n i t i a t i o n s can accept e i t h e r none g or one as they wish. 6. The members enter i n t o several exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s before exchanges cease.^ 7. Within the scope of the l a s t c o n d i t i o n , the d e t a i l s of any exchanges that occur are agreed upon by the p a r t i e s involved. In each case, -20-one party proposes how much of one resource w i l l be exchanged f o r how much of the other resource and the other party e i t h e r accepts or r e j e c t s t h i s proposal. I I I . PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS The eight psychological p r i n c i p l e s l i s t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n are assumed to govern the behavior of the members of c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that are characterized by the scope conditions l i s t e d i n the l a s t s e c t ion. They are fundmental to the theory being presented because they underpin the arguments that lead up to the hypotheses that are the c e n t r a l concern of t h i s d i s s e r t a t i o n . Although exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s are t o be viewed i n terms of the j o i n t operant paradigm, some of the assumptions l i s t e d r e f e r t o cog n i t i v e processes. I t i s true that operant t h e o r i s t s u s u a l l y avoid mentioning unobservable fac t o r s and t h e i r findings have generally been phrased i n terms of what e f f e c t past patterns of reinforcement f o r an operant behavior have on the frequency of future non-reinforced occurrences of that operant b e h a v i o r . T h e view taken here, however, i s that behavior i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y - j o i n t - o p e r a n t - p a r a d i g m s i t u a t i o n cannot be adequately explained without reference to a n a l y t i c psychological processes (which i s not to say that these processes are incompatible with operant p r i n c i p l e s ) . Most s i t u a t i o n s that operant t h e o r i s t s deal with are characterized by the fact that reinforcements are not experienced u n t i l the operant behaviors have occurred. In such s i t u a t i o n s , the only way to obtain information about the magnitude of reinforcements that w i l l f o l l o w an operant behavior i s through t r i a l . In such s i t u a t i o n s , propositions of the s o r t : the greater the reinforcement that has followed an operant behavior i n the past the greater w i l l be i t s frequency of occurrence"^, make sense. Yet i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y --21-joint-operant-paradigm s i t u a t i o n defined by the scope conditions, the resources that each member has are v i s i b l e to the other members and the p o s s i b i l i t y that the members might operate on t h i s information and t r y t o estimate the chance that an i n i t i a t i o n would have of being accepted by each of the others taken i n turn has to be admitted. The f i r s t assumption r e f l e c t s t h i s admission. In ad d i t i o n , since operant psychological statements regarding reinforcement are usu a l l y phrased i n terms that seem to imply that organisms are governed by a 12 p r i n c i p l e of maximization of u t i l i t y or l e a s t e f f o r t , the f i r s t assumption w i l l a lso imply the p r i n c i p l e of the maximization of u t i l i t y . 1. I t i s assumed that a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l be most l i k e l y t o make i n i t i a t i o n s that he perceives w i l l r e s u l t i n the greatest net perceived gains f o r himself. Since the resources that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y have are the sources of reinforcements and since each member sets the magnitude of the reinforcement he receives when he decides what t o ask f o r i n r e t u r n f o r what he decides t o o f f e r , i t has t o be shown that some members can be seen t o be sources of greater reinforcements than other members. I f a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y can see the other members' resources and can apply the notion 13 of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y to assess the perceived worth that each of the others would assign to a given amount of one of h i s resources, he could, i n f a c t , d i f f e r e n t i a t e the others i n terms of the amount of another resource that they could be induced t o give him i n re t u r n f o r the given amount of h i s resource. Assumptions 2,3, and 4 r e f l e c t t h i s argument. 2. I t i s assumed t h a t , i f each member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y has the same reasons f o r valuing a resource, each member w i l l assign the same perceived 14 worth to a given t o t a l amount of i t . 3. I t i s assumed that each member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l assign l e s s perceived worth to successive, equal amounts of the same r e s o u r c e . ^ 4. I t i s assumed that each member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y adopts each other member's point of view to gauge how much of one resource each could be induced to give him i n re t u r n f o r a given amount of another resource."^ I t has j u s t been admitted that i n c o l l e c t i v i t y - j o i n t - o p e r a n t paradigm s i t u a t i o n s i n which each member's resources are v i s i b l e t o the others, X may be able t o decide, i n an a p r i o r i fashion, w i t h which other member he could drive the hardest bargain. I t also has t o be admitted that X might be able to perceive the determinants of the schedule of reinforcement associated w i t h each Y. There i s , however, no reason to assume that the l a t t e r could be done i n a completely a p r i o r i fashion. For one t h i n g , X i s not d i r e c t l y informed about how many other i n i t i a t i o n s Y i w i l l receive at the same time as he chooses to make an i n i t i a t i o n to Y i . Nor i s X d i r e c t l y informed about the sort of i n i t i a t i o n s Y i w i l l receive from the others. I t i s most l i k e l y t o be the case that X would require at l e a s t some experience of Y i ' s behavior before he could accurately assess the p r o b a b i l i t y that Y i w i l l accept an i n i t i a t i o n from him. Although the operant t h e o r i s t would u s u a l l y l i m i t himself t o making statements to the e f f e c t that the strength of an operant i s a function of some aspect of the pattern of past reinforcements f o r that operant, the next two assumptions have been worded i n such a way that the p o s s i b i l i t y , that: the members might t r y to estimate the chance that an o f f e r 17 would have of being accepted by each of the other members, i s not denied. 5- I t i s assumed t h a t , during the f i r s t few opportunities f o r exchange, a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l have l i t t l e basis t o a n t i c i p a t e the number of i n i t i a t i o n s that each of the other members i n h i s c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l . 18 receive. -23-6. I t i s assumed that the l i k e l i h o o d of a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y i n i t i a t i n g to a p a r t i c u l a r member i n h i s c o l l e c t i v i t y i s d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o how l i k e l y he perceives i t i s that h i s i n i t i a t i o n w i l l be accepted by that 19 p a r t i c u l a r member. The notion of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y (see assumption 3) implies that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y can increase the perceived worth of t h e i r resources by exchanging amounts of the resources of which they have most f o r amounts of the resources of which they have l e a s t . Since the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y do not have t o accept the i n i t i a t i o n s they re c e i v e and since the d e t a i l s of the i n i t i a t i o n s are set by the i n i t i a t o r s , any exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s that do occur w i l l generally involve r e c i p r o c a l perceived rewards or reinforcements. 7. I t i s assumed that: ( i ) every time a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y makes an i n i t i a t i o n that i s accepted, h i s tendency t o repeat that i n i t i a t i o n i s p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e d , and ( i i ) every time a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y makes an i n i t i a t i o n that i s re j e c t e d , h i s tendency t o repeat that i n i t i a t i o n i s negatively reinforced. 8. I t i s f u r t h e r assumed tha t : ( i ) every time a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y makes an i n i t i a t i o n that i s accepted, p o s i t i v e sentiments held by that member toward the member he i n i t i a t e d to are p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e d . ( i i ) every time a member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y makes an i n i t i a t i o n that i s re j e c t e d , negative sentiments held by that member toward the member he i n i t i a t e d to are p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e d . -24-IV. DERIVATION OF HYPOTHESES The hypotheses l i s t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n apply t o c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that meet the scope conditions l i s t e d i n secti o n I I . Given: assumption 5 (that: during the f i r s t few opportunities f o r exchange, the members have no basis to perceive how much competition t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s w i l l run i n t o ) , assumption 2 (that: the members w i l l equally value given t o t a l amounts of the same resource, i f they have the same reasons f o r valuing i t ) , assumption 3 (that: successive amounts of the same resource are assigned l e s s perceived worth), and assumption 4 (that: the members adopt the points of view of the others), i t follows that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l i n i t i a l l y perceive that they can get l a r g e r amounts of a given resource from those members who have most o f i t . Given t h i s conclusion and assumption 1 (that: each member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y i s most l i k e l y to make i n i t i a t i o n s that he perceives w i l l r e s u l t i n the greatest perceived gains f o r hi m s e l f ) , i t i s p o s s i b l e t o formulate hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1. The members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l be most l i k e l y t o d i r e c t t h e i r f i r s t i n i t i a t i o n s to the members of high net wealth (see scope condition 3 f o r an explanation of the terms 'high' and 'low' net wealth l e v e l s ) . Given the j o i n t operant paradigm, Y i constitutes a stimulus s i t u a t i o n f o r X and X constitutes a stimulus s i t u a t i o n f o r Y i . Given a sequence o f exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s between X and Y i , Y i ' s acceptance of X's l a s t i n i t i a t i o n can be seen not only as an acceptance of X's l a s t i n i t i a t i o n but also as an i n i t i a t i o n f o r X t o respond to. Hence, after, assumption 1 (that: the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y are most l i k e l y to make i n i t i a t i o n s that they perceive w i l l r e s u l t i n the greatest perceived gains f o r them), i t can be argued that the -25-members w i l l be most l i k e l y to accept i n i t i a t i o n s that they perceive w i l l r e s u l t i n the greatest perceived gains f o r them. In a d d i t i o n , i t can be argued, a f t e r assumption 3 (that: successive amounts of the same resource are assigned l e s s perceived worth), that ( i n objective terms) the lows w i l l tend to ask the highs f o r more than they o f f e r . I f , during the f i r s t few opportunities f o r exchange, a l l the members tend t o i n i t i a t e to the highs (see hypothesis 1) but the lows tend to: ( i ) make smaller average o f f e r s (necessitated by scope condition 6), and ( i i ) ask f o r more than they o f f e r , the highs w i l l tend t o accept one another's i n i t i a t i o n s and r e j e c t i n i t i a t i o n s from the lows. Given t h i s conclusion and e i t h e r assumption 7 (that: the acceptance of i n i t i a t i o n s p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e s them and the r e j e c t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s negatively r e i n f o r c e s them) or the argument preceding assumption 6 (that: the membersmight develop an appreciation of the competition they face - i n p a r t i c u l a r , that they w i l l face most competition when i n i t i a t i n g t o highs) and assumption 6 (that: t h i s appreciation.influences t h e i r choice of members to i n i t i a t e t o ) , i t can f u r t h e r be concluded that the highs w i l l continue t o i n i t i a t e to the highs and t h a t , over successive opportunities f o r exchange, more and more of the lows w i l l i n i t i a t e t o lows. Thus over several opportunities f o r exchange, the rate of high t o high i n i t i a t i o r s i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l remain f a i r l y constant while the rat e of low t o low i n i t i a t i o n s i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l tend to increase. Hypothesis 2 i s based on t h i s argument. Hypothesis 2 A c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l s p l i t i n t o cliques as the members, through successive i n i t i a t i o n s , l e a r n with which other members they can enter i n t o exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s . Before going on to the next hypothesis, two reservations concerning hypothesis -26-2 should be noted. The f i r s t r e s e r v a t i o n concerns the i n t e r a c t i o n between the perceived worth of an outcome and the subjective p r o b a b i l i t y of the occurrence of that outcome. I f the subjective p r o b a b i l i t y of acceptance i s looked upon as a r i s k f a c t o r , i t can be hypothesized that the r i s k X w i l l be prepared t o take w i l l be a funct i o n of the s i z e of the net perceived gain that w i l l accrue to him i f h i s i n i t i a t i o n i s accepted. This hypothesis i s of i n t e r e s t because i t suggests t h a t , i n the case of extreme differences between the highs and the lows, the lows may never end up i n i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h one another because they 20 p e r s i s t i n running a high r i s k f o r a high net perceived gain. The question of how extreme the difference between net wealth l e v e l s can be, before the theory w i l l break down, I s , of course, one that c a l l s f o r e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n . The second r e s e r v a t i o n concerns the r o l e of competition i n the c o l l e c t i v i t y . Competitive processes are l i k e l y t o operate when members are deciding: ( i ) what t o ask f o r i n return f o r t h e i r o f f e r s , and ( i i ) w i t h whom they would l i k e to exchange. Since both p a r t i e s i n an exchange i n t e r a c t i o n u s u a l l y increase the perceived worth of t h e i r resources, i t might be assumed that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l be concerned not only with t h e i r own net perceived gains but al s o with the net perceived gains that the others stand to make. A f t e r a l l , what i s one member's r e l a t i v e gain Is another 21 member's r e l a t i v e l o s s . I t may even be the case that concern w i t h net r e l a t i v e perceived gains would cause members t o compete most f i e r c e l y w i t h 22 those closest to them i n terms of net perceived wealth. One might expect, however, that such competitive fa c t o r s would only become important when the members have more to gain by h i g g l i n g and haggling than by f r e e l y cooperating ( i . e . , when each member has almost equal amounts of both r e s o u r c e s ) 2 ^ but such-, s i t u a t i o n s do not f a l l w i t h i n the purview of the theory being presented. Returning to the general argument that hypothesis 2 was based on, i t -27-follows that the number of r e j e c t e d I n i t i a t i o n s w i l l be greater f o r the lows than f o r the highs during the f i r s t few opportunities f o r exchange. Because r e j e c t e d i n i t i a t i o n s w i l l tend to delay the emergence of c l i q u e s and because the delay w i l l be greater f o r cl i q u e s i n v o l v i n g lows than f o r c l i q u e s i n v o l v i n g highs, i t i s possible to formulate the next hypothesis. Hypothesis 3 Cliques of members of high net wealth w i l l emerge w i t h i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y before cl i q u e s of members of low net 24 wealth. I t was assumed (assumption 8) that the acceptance of I n i t i a t i o n s r e i n f o r c e p o s i t i v e sentiments toward the acceptor and r e j e c t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s r e i n f o r c e negative sentiments toward the r e j e c t o r . I t was a l s o noted, In the argument that hypothesis 2 was based on, that Y i ' s acceptance of an i n i t i a t i o n from X can be seen not only as a reinforcement f o r X's i n i t i a t i o n but a l s o as an i n i t i a t i o n f o r X to respond t o . I f Y i ' s acceptance of an i n i t i a t i o n from X i s viewed as an i n i t i a t i o n t o X then an i n i t i a t i o n to Y i from X during the next opportunity f o r exchange can be seen as an acceptance of Y i ' s acceptance of X's l a s t i n i t i a t i o n t o Y i . I t follows from assumption 8 and t h i s l i n e of reasoning that i t can a l s o be assumed that the r e c e i p t of an i n i t i a t i o n that can be accepted re i n f o r c e s p o s i t i v e sentiments toward the i n i t i a t o r and e i t h e r the non re c e i p t of i n i t i a t i o n s or the r e c e i p t of i n i t i a t i o n s that cannot be accepted re i n f o r c e s negative sentiments toward the i n i t i a t o r . Given assumption 8 and i t s c o r o l l a r y and given the argument that the highs w i l l tend to i n i t i a t e only to fe l l o w highs and w i l l r e j e c t i n i t i a t i o n s from the lows and w i l l not return the lows' i n i t i a t i o n s so that the lows w i l l end up both i n i t i a t i n g to one another and accepting one another's i n i t i a t i o n s we can conclude that: ( i ) p o s i t i v e sentiments between the highs w i l l be reinforced, -28-( i i ) negative sentiments between the highs and lows w i l l be r e i n f o r c e d , and ( i i i ) p o s i t i v e sentiments between the lows w i l l be rei n f o r c e d . But i t has already been hypothesized that cliques of highs and lows emerge i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y . The f i n a l hypothesis t o be derived f o l l o w s . Hypothesis 4 The members of each c l i q u e that emerges w i t h i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l approve of one another more than they w i l l approve of the other members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y who are not members of t h e i r c l i q u e . The theory has now been presented. In the next chapter, the research design that was formulated t o t e s t the hypotheses w i l l be described. POOTNOTES ^The problem of d e f i n i n g resources i s complicated by the fa c t that d i f f e r e n t resources appear to have d i f f e r e n t p r o p e r t i e s . For example, some resources can be tr a n s f e r r e d only (e.g., money) while others can be kept and tran s f e r r e d at the same time (e.g., knowledge). See: S. Rosen, the comparative r o l e s of informational and m a t e r i a l commodities i n in t e r p e r s o n a l transactions. Journal of Experimental S o c i a l Psychology 2_ (1966), pp. 211-226, f o r a discussion of an i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o t e s t the t h e s i s that owners of valuable information would engage i n d i f f e r e n t p r i c i n g behavior than owners of valuable m a t e r i a l commodities. Experimental support was found f o r the hypothesis that informants i n a three person game would ask l e s s f o r information than s e l l e r s would f o r m a t e r i a l commodities but that lenders and confiders would set the same p r i c e . 2 I t should be noted, as an em p i r i c a l g e n e r a l i z a t i o n , that exchanges usuall y occur when X: ( i ) notices Y i , ( i i ) sees that Y i i s short of a resource that he has an excess of and that Y i has an excess of some other resource that he i s short of, ( i i i ) o f f e r s Y i some of the resource that Y i i s short of f o r some of the resource that he i s short of, and ( i v ) has t h i s o f f e r accepted by Y i . 3 I t should be appreciated that a precise d e f i n i t i o n of "approximately equal" and " s i g n i f i c a n t l y l e s s " are t h e o r e t i c a l issues. Both terms must ul t i m a t e l y be defined i n terms of t h e o r e t i c a l p r e d i c t i o n s . l\ In the i n t e r e s t of keeping the theory as general as p o s s i b l e , neither the p a r t i c u l a r reasons f o r v a l u i n g the resources nor the a c t u a l resources are s t i p u l a t e d here. 5 A t t e n t i o n i s l i m i t e d to resources with these properties so that: ( i ) the l i m i t a t i o n s associated w i t h the norm of r e c i p r o c i t y approach t o s o c i a l status systems and the problems that Leik et a l encountered (see chapter 1) can be avoided, and ( i i ) the relevance of the psychological assumptions l i s t e d i n the next sect i o n w i l l be maximized. What constitutes a s u f f i c i e n t degree of complementarity between i n d i v i d u a l s and how d i f f e r e n t the two or more l e v e l s of net wealth have to be are e m p i r i c a l issues. What i s being claimed i s that the theory w i l l hold when the complementarities between subjects and the differences between net wealth l e v e l s are such that the subjects can notice them. 7 I t may be the case that i t would be enough t o s t i p u l a t e that human subjects only need a knowledge of the operant conditions but a t t e n t i o n i s nevertheless l i m i t e d to s i t u a t i o n s i n which each member's resources are v i s i b l e to the other members to eliminate the problems that Leik et a l ran i n t o (see chapter 1, pp. f-ld and because i t might be argued that i n n a t u r a l l y occurring s i t u a t i o n s people tend to advertize t h e i r wealth l e v e l s . See, f o r example; -30-( i ) T. Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class. (Viking Press Inc. Copyright: 1899 and 1912 by MacMillan Co.), pp. 60-70 on conspicuous consumption. Reprinted i n : S o c i o l o g i c a l Theory: A book of readings. Edited by L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg] (N.Y. MacMillan Co., 1957), pp. 281-391. ( i i ) Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture. (Boston: Houghton M i f f l i n and Co., 1959). Chapter IV: The Northwest Coast of America. - f o r a discussion of the Northwest Indian p r a c t i c e of p o t l a t c h i n g , ( i i i ) P.M. Blau, A theory of s o c i a l i n t e g r a t i o n . American Journal of Sociology LXV (1960)n6, pp. 545-556. Blau begins with the assumption that persons i n t e r e s t e d In becoming integrated members i n a group are under pressure to impress the other members that they would make a t t r a c t i v e associates, g Cf. the Leik et a l statement ( c i t e d i n chapter 1) that t h e i r propositions assume, "transactions i n any r e l a t i o n compete f o r a v a i l a b l e time with possible transactions i n a l t e r n a t i v e r e l a t i o n s " . 9 Generally t h i s w i l l be when each member has managed t o acquire more or l e s s equal amounts of both resources. N.B., t h i s c o ndition i s s t i p u l a t e d because we are i n t e r e s t e d i n l i n k i n g the notion of r e c i p r o c a l reinforcement and l e a r n i n g e f f e c t s t o exchange theory ( i . e . , we want t o look at extended sequences of exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s . ) x 0See: R.L. Burgess and R.L. Akers, Are operant p r i n c i p l e s t a u t o l o g i c a l ? Psychological Record 16_ (1966), pp. 305-312. . The authors l i s t the operant psychological f i n d i n g s . x lSee: Burgess and Akers (1966), I b i d . , p. 310. "The strength of an operant i s a function of the amount of i t s reinforcement." Note that the authors do not formally define 'amount' but state that the strength of an operant i s a f u n c t i o n of both the frequency of past reinforcement and the r a t i o of past reinforcements to non reinforcements - i n e i t h e r case, however, the gross quantity of reinforcement received can be seen as a f a c t o r . 12 ( i ) See note 8 above, ( i i ) Cf.: P.T. Young, Motivation and Emotion: A survey of determinants of human and animal a c t i v i t y . (New York: John Wiley & Sons, L t d . , 1961). Chapter 6. Young reviews the l i t e r a t u r e on s i z e of incentives and performance and concludes: " . . . i n other words, the strength of a motive to approach may be, i n p a r t , determined by the perceived magnitude of the reward." " L JSee: K.E. Boulding, Economic A n a l y s i s : Vol.1 Mcroeconomics. (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), 4th e d i t i o n . Chapter 24. Boulding discusses the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing u t i l i t y . 14 This assumption eliminates the problem of i n d i v i d u a l differences while allowing the next assumption regarding the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing u t i l i t y to hold. I t a l s o eliminates the d i f f i c u l t y of d e f i n i n g resources i n a t a u t o l o g i c a l fashion that Homans ran i n t o (see chapter 1, p. 4 )• -31-1 5See note 10. l f ^ ( i ) The idea that s o c i a l actors have to adopt the standpoint of the other i s w e l l entrenched i n the l i t e r a t u r e . See, f o r example: K.H. Turner, Role-taking, r o l e standpoint and reference-group behavior. American Journal of Sociology 61 (1956), pp. 316-328. The only e m p i r i c a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n (known to t h i s authorT, however, i s that reported by C o t t r e l l and Dymond. See: L.S. C o t t r e l l , J r . and Rosalind P. Dymond, The empathic responses: A neglected f i e l d f o r research. Psychiatry X I I (1949), pp. 355-359, and Rosalind F. Dymond, A scale f o r the measurement of empathic a b i l i t y . Journal of Consulting Psychiatry X I I I (1949), pp. 127-133. See al s o appendix V of t h i s work, ( i i ) Note. I t i s assumed that each member adopts the point of view of the others regarding himself. I t i s not assumed that they adopt the point of view of each of the others regarding a l l of the others. While i t i s a l o g i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y that members could do the l a t t e r , i t i s assumed that t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y w i l l generally l i e outside a member's psychological capacity. 17 See: ( i ) R.D. Luce, Psychological studies of r i s k y d e c i s i o n making -i n : S o c i a l Science Approaches to Business Behavior. G.B. Strother ( e d i t o r ) . R.D. Irwin Inc., (1962). Reprinted i n : DecisionTfaklng. W. Edwards and A. Tversky ( e d i t o r s ) . Penguin, (1967). Luce looks at the l i t e r a t u r e on "choices that people make among a l t e r n a t i v e s that are r i s k y " and concludes, "...Human beings appear to be both 'adaptive' and cogni t i v e ' ; they sometimes adjust t h e i r behavior gradually to experience, and they sometimes 'understand' and analyze choice s i t u a t i o n s . Furthermore, both processes often seem t o go on at the same time. The current l e a r n i n g theories are e x c l u s i v e l y adaptive whereas, almost by d e f i n i t i o n , the s t a t i c assumptions of the preference theories are c o g n i t i v e . " (p. 350, Edwards & Tversky). Luce goes on to point out that models which synthesize the two processes are required, ( i i ) appendix IX f o r coded comments e l i c i t e d by post experimental question: I f you received two or more s i m i l a r o f f e r s at the same time what f a c t o r s would you take i n t o account i n deciding which one to accept? 18 See: note 16 ( i i ) . Assumption 5 r e s t s on a s i m i l a r assessment of the psychological capacity of the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y . "^See: Burgess and Akers (1966), op. c i t . "2.a.9. Law of D i f f e r e n t i a l Reinforcement: Given a number of a v a i l a b l e operants, a l l of which produce the same r e i n f o r c e r , the operant which produces the r e i n f o r c e r In the greatest amount, frequency and p r o b a b i l i t y w i l l have the greatest p r o b a b i l i t y of occurence." 20 ( i ) See: S. S i e g e l , Levels of a s p i r a t i o n and d e c i s i o n making, chapter 8 i n : Decision and Choice: Contributions of Sidney S i e g e l . S. Messick and A. H. B r a y f i e l d ( e d i t o r s ) . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). tT. . . I t may be sa i d that i f various a l t e r n a t i v e s are a v a i l a b l e t o an i n d i v i d u a l , he w i l l choose from among the a l t e r n a t i v e s , toward each of which he has a subjective p r o b a b i l i t y of attainment and a u t i l i t y , so as to maximize subjective expected u t i l i t y . . . " (p. 124). Also chapters 11, 13 and 17 by S. S i e g e l ; S. Si e g e l and J u l i a M. Andrews; and J u l i a M. Andrews, r e s p e c t i v e l y . Also S. S i e g e l i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n with A l b e r t a E. S i e g e l and J u l i a M. Andrews, Choice Strategy and U t i l i t y . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), f o r reports of experimental i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of Siegel's subjective expected u t i l i t y hypothesis, ( i i ) Cf. the operant psychological f i n d i n g that i n t e r m i t t a n t reinforcement leads to more en daring response rates than continuous reinforcement - see: Burgess and Akers (1966), op. c i t . , p. 310, 2.a.3- and 2.a.4. 21 See: D.M. Messick and W.B. Thorngate, R e l a t i v e gain maximization m experimental games, Journal of Experimental S o c i a l Psychology 3_ (1967), pp. 85-101. The authors advance evidence f o r the hypothesis that r e l a t i v e gain i s an important goal i n experimental games. 22 See: I.C. Whittemore, The competitive consciousness. Journal of Abnormal and S o c i a l Psychology 20 (1925-26)nl, pp. 17-33- Whittemore ran the same groups of 4 subjects f o r a number of sessions during each of which the subjects worked at a competitive task. He concluded that subjects tended t o sin g l e out the f e l l o w group member whose s k i l l was most nearly the same as hi s own as his p r i n c i p a l r i v a l . 23 During p i l o t work with the research design described i n the next chapter, i t was observed that subjects d i d tend t o begin h i g g l i n g and haggling at t h i s point and hence the experiments that were eventually run, and reported In chapter 4, were terminated before each subject had managed t o get two s i m i l a r s i z e d p i l e s of resources i n front of him. Hypotheses 2 and 3 were derived to see how w e l l the theory advanced here handles the p r e d i c t i o n s that Leik et a l (1968) were i n t e r e s t e d i n making (see chapter 1, p. 6 ). CHAPTER I I I RESEARCH DESIGN The research design, described i n t h i s chapter, was formulated t o t e s t the hypotheses derived from the theory that was presented i n the l a s t chapter. I t was formulated to meet both the c r i t i c i s m s that were l e v e l e d against the research design used by L e i k et a l (see chapter 1) and the scope conditions l i s t e d at the beginning of the l a s t chapter. I t was the end r e s u l t of p i l o t work i n which over two hundred subjects were used i n some f o r t y d i f f e r e n t experiments (see appendix 1). B a s i c a l l y , the research design centered on a type of game s i t u a t i o n . Subjects who had been given supplies of both yellow and blue buttons sat i n a c i r c l e and exchanged buttons of one colour f o r buttons of the other colour. The theory, set out i n the l a s t chapter, deals with f i x e d amounts of two d i f f e r e n t resources that have been d i s t r i b u t e d across the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y . A resource was defined as any e f f e c t that i s both valued by another i n d i v i d u a l and can be tra n s f e r r e d t o him ( d e f i n i t i o n 1, p.16). I t was then s p e c i f i e d that a t t e n t i o n would be l i m i t e d to only those resources that have the properties of: d i v i s i b i l i t y , concreteness and cumulativity (scope condition 2). I t was fur t h e r s t i p u l a t e d that each member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y would have the same reasons f o r valuing the resources (scope condition 2). To s a t i s f y these requirements the two resources were operationalized as 2520, 7/8" diameter,blue buttons and 2520, 7/8" diameter,yellow buttons. Subjects l i s t e n e d to tape recorded i n s t r u c t i o n s (see appendix I I I ) from which they gained c e r t a i n information concerning these buttons. F i r s t , subjects were t o l d that they were going to play a game that would be run i n two parts and that i n -34-the second part of the game they would need q u a n t i t i e s of both colours because the two colours would be used f o r completely d i f f e r e n t purposes. Second, by reference to a t a b l e of fi g u r e s pinned i n front of each subject (see appendix I I ) , i t was demonstrated that the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y applied t o both resources. This t a b l e was provided because the r e s u l t s of p i l o t work (see appendix I) had suggested that the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y only operates i n conjunction w i t h knowledge about prospective use ( i . e . , the s i z e of the u n i t s that are used t o measure amounts of the resource i s set i n accordance with the use t o which the resource gets put). I t had the advantage of standardizing the value of given numbers of the d i f f e r e n t coloured buttons without n e c e s s i t a t i n g f u r t h e r information about the second part of the game. Buttons were employed since i t was assumed that they would be free from associations that would i n t e r f e r e w i t h the information given to the subjects. Each experiment began with a l l the resources d i s t r i b u t e d across a c o l l e c t i v i t y . No f u r t h e r resources entered the s i t u a t i o n once an experiment had begun. The theory deals w i t h s i t u a t i o n s i n which the resources have been d i s t r i b u t e d i n such a way that at le a s t two subjects have complementary resource p r o f i l e s on at least two perceivably d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s of net wealth (scope condition 3). P i l o t work (see appendix 1), however, ind i c a t e d that the si t u a t i o n s should accommodate subjects' tendency to vary t h e i r responses (perhaps to r e l i e v e boredom). 1 P r o v i s i o n of two a l t e r n a t i v e p o t e n t i a l exchange partners on each net resource l e v e l permitted subjects t o vary t h e i r responses without necessarily v i o l a t i n g the p r i n c i p l e on which the theory i s based. Since I t was f e l t that the problem of response v a r i a b i l i t y might also be re l a t e d to the fact t h a t , a f t e r the f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange, some -35-subjects had two p i l e s of resources while others s t i l l had only one because they had f a i l e d t o enter i n t o an exchange, i t was decided that subjects should begin with a small amount of t h e i r non-predominant resource. Thus subjects who f a i l e d t o enter i n t o an exchange during the f i r s t opportunity to do so were not conspicuous at the s t a r t of the next opportunity f o r exchange because they s t i l l had only one resource i n front of them. The resources were i n i t i a l l y d i s t r i b u t e d across c o l l e c t i v i t i e s of eight subjects i n the manner i l l u s t r a t e d i n f i g u r e 4. Figure 4. D i s t r i b u t i o n s of resources f o r experiments, net resource l e v e l resource 1 ] resource 2 Four Lows Note: each low has two possible partners on h i s own net wealth l e v e l . Four Highs Note: each high has two possible partners on h i s own net wealth l e v e l . Each subject, then, began the experiment with predetermined amounts of both resources: a small amount of one and a much l a r g e r amount of the other. The d i f f e r e n t amounts were weighed out, before the subjects a r r i v e d , t o an p accuracy of better than 1%. Scope condition 4 states that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y can see -36-what resources each of the other members have. This requirement necessitated s p e c i a l screens or booths (see appendix I I ) to eliminate uncontrolled f a c t o r s such as f a c i a l expressions, c l o t h i n g d i f f e r e n c e s , etc. that might be expected to a f f e c t choices of i n t e r a c t i o n partners. Booths were constructed that had windows covered with a semi-sheer gauze m a t e r i a l and a 4" gap at the bottom. The gaps made i t possible f o r the subjects to keep t h e i r buttons out i n f r o n t of the booths and the windows allowed each subject t o see what resources the each of the others had. The booths were arranged i n a c i r c l e and a l i g h t i n the center caused each subject t o s i t i n the shadow of h i s booth. Each subject could i d e n t i f y the other members of h i s c o l l e c t i v i t y by l e t t e r s p r i n t e d at the top of the booths (G,H,...N to avoid alpha preference) and each subject's own l e t t e r was p r i n t e d again i n s i d e h i s booth. The copy of the t a b l e that was used t o demonstrate that the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y applied to both resources was pinned to the inner l e f t hand side of each booth. A card pinned j u s t below the window in s i d e each booth t o l d each subject how many buttons of each colour he had to begin with (see appendix I I ) and he was provided with a p e n c i l and paper so that he could keep track of how many buttons of both colours he had. Scope condition 5 s t i p u l a t e s that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y are given a number of opportunities to i n t e r a c t with one another i f they want to and that the d e t a i l s of any exchanges that take place are agreed upon by the p a r t i e s involved (allowing f o r scope condition 6). These conditions were s a t i s f i e d i n the following way. Each subject was given a bowl and a p i l e of i n i t i a t i o n forms (see f i g u r e 5). A second card pinned j u s t below the window inside each booth t o l d each subject that there were r e s t r i c t i o n s on the s i z e of the o f f e r s he could make and the number of buttons he could give i n return. This second set of cards informed the subjects that although they were free to -37-request whatever they thought the other subjects would be prepared t o give them i n r eturn f o r t h e i r o f f e r s , they could neither make o f f e r s of more than 1/20 of the i n i t i a l numbers of buttons i n t h e i r l a r g e s t p i l e s nor accept any o f f e r s that required them to give more than 1/20 of the i n i t i a l numbers of buttons i n t h e i r l a r g e s t p i l e s i n return (see appendix I I ) . These r e s t r i c t i o n s were necessitated by scope condition 6 which states that every member of a c o l l e c t i v i t y enters i n t o several exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h the other members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y . They were imposed so that each subject would have to enter i n t o several exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s . They can a l s o be j u s t i f i e d by appealing to the common sense notion that people with a l o t tend to deal i n lar g e r u n i t s than people with a l i t t l e . I t might also be pointed out that i t i s u n l i k e l y that the l i m i t s would have anything to do w i t h whether subjects asked f o r more or l e s s than they offered. Figure 5. An i n i t i a t i o n form. • — — — : : _ , I n i t i a t o r ' s l e t t e r Offer d i r e c t e d t o : ( l e t t e r ) ! W i l l give (No.) f o r (No.) yellow yellow accept ( c i r c l e one) ( c i r c l e one) blue buttons blue buttons r e j ect The tape recorded i n s t r u c t i o n s (see appendix I I I ) Informed the subjects that during the f i r s t part of the game they have a number of opportunities to exchange buttons with the other subjects and the procedure f o r entering i n t o -38-exchanges was explained i n d e t a i l . In l i n e with scope condition 5j subjects were t o l d that they n e i t h e r had to make an o f f e r of exchange nor had t o accept any o f f e r during an opportunity f o r exchange. They were also t o l d that they could not accept more than one o f f e r during each opportunity f o r exchange. The subjects were t o l d to look through t h e i r screens at the s t a r t of each opportunity f o r exchange t o see what resources each of the other subjects had and decide whether they wanted to send an o f f e r to one of them. I f they wanted t o send an o f f e r , they were t o f i l l i n an i n i t i a t i o n form and count out the buttons that they wanted t o o f f e r . I n i t i a t i o n forms and buttons were then to be put i n the bowls and the experimenter would d e l i v e r each bowl to the booth t o which i t was addressed. Since each subject had only one bowl, each subject could send only one o f f e r during each opportunity f o r exchange. The subjects d i d not t a l k t o one another. At the same time that a subject had sent h i s bowl around t o one of the other booths he could receive more than one bowl, though as stated above, he could not accept more than one o f f e r . I f a subject accepted an o f f e r , he had to put a check on the i n i t i a t i o n form that accompanied i t , take the buttons sent to him and replace them with the buttons requested. I f a subject rejected an o f f e r , he had t o put a cross on the i n i t i a t i o n form that accompanied i t . At the end of each opportunity f o r exchange the experimenter returned the bowls and i n i t i a t i o n forms so that each subject could see the check or cross on the form he had j u s t sent and then the forms were c o l l e c t e d and put to one side. Once the used i n i t i a t i o n forms had been c o l l e c t e d , the next opportunity f o r exchange began. Subjects could not see how many o f f e r s the others received during each opportunity f o r exchange: nor could they see whether t h e i r o f f e r s had been accepted u n t i l t h e i r bowls had been returned. - 3 9 -The procedure used, then, met both the c r i t i c i s m made of L e i k et a l ' s experimental design, that the subjects could i n i t i a t e to more than one person at a time (see chapter I ) , and the t h e o r e t i c a l requirement, that transactions i n any r e l a t i o n compete f o r a v a i l a b l e time with p o s s i b l e transactions i n a l t e r n a t i v e r e l a t i o n s . I t should also be noted that the subjects were t o l d that the f i r s t part of the game would be competitive i n the sense that each subject would be out f o r himself and that there would be plenty of time f o r each subject t o make as many o f f e r s as he needed t o make. A f t e r the seventh opportunity f o r exchange, the subjects were asked t o answer some questions before going on (see appendix V). Once these questions had been answered, the subjects were t o l d that the experiment was a c t u a l l y over and that the experimenter would discuss I t with them. F i n a l l y , a t t e n t i o n should be drawn t o three general features of the research design. F i r s t , i n every experiment run, the high blue, high yellow, low blue and low yellow subjects were always positioned around the c i r c l e according to the same pattern so that possible p o s i t i o n e f f e c t s would be kept constant. Second, the assignment of subjects to the booths can be assumed t o be random i n that the subjects met outside the laboratory before being shown i n and were asked to s i t at any vacant booth. L a s t l y , since the magnitude of the difference between the two l e v e l s of net wealth ( i . e . , x i n f i g u r e 4) was the independent v a r i a b l e , experiments were run with t h i s v a r i a b l e set at d i f f e r e n t values. While much has been programmed i n t o the experimental s i t u a t i o n j u s t described, f o r example, the reasons f o r needing q u a n t i t i e s of buttons of both colours and the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y , the subjects were s t i l l free to choose with whom they wanted to i n i t i a t e exchanges and, w i t h i n the l i m i t s imposed, whose o f f e r s they would accept. In other words, the experimental design should enable us to t e s t whether the hypotheses derived on the basis of the assumptions regarding the way the buttons would be valued a c t u a l l y hold. I t i s true that experimental designs formulated i n the future could p r o f i t a b l y be focused on the assumptions that were programmed i n t o the design advanced i n t h i s chapter. I t i s a l s o taken to be true that no s i n g l e experimental design would enable us to t e s t every aspect of the theory set out In chapter I I . The r e s u l t s f o r experiments based on the design advanced, then, w i l l be presented and evaluated i n the next chapter. FOOTNOTES Sie g a l et a l postulates that the choice of a response i n p r o b a b i l i s t i c s i t u a t i o n s i s determined by the u t i l i t y of a correct response and the u t i l i t y of varying choices to escape boredom. See: e.g., Decisions and Choice: Contributions of Sidney S i e g e l . Edited by S. Messick and A.H. B r a y f i e l d . (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). 2 A beam balance and c a r e f u l l y counted p i l e s of buttons as standard weights were employed f o r t h i s task. -42-CHAPTER IV RESULTS AND EVALUATION OP RESULTS The r e s u l t s of the three sets of experiments that were c a r r i e d out are reported and evaluated i n t h i s chapter. Subjects were f i r s t and second year, male-student v o l u n t e e r s . 1 There were 6 experiments i n the f i r s t s e t , 6 2 experiments i n the second set and 8 experiments i n the t h i r d set. There were no differences between the subjects' i n i t i a l net wealth l e v e l s i n the f i r s t set of experiments, moderate differences between the subjects' i n i t i a l net wealth l e v e l s i n the second set and extreme differences between the subjects' i n i t i a l net wealth l e v e l s i n the t h i r d set. The a c t u a l d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources f o r the three sets of experiments are set out i n Table 1. Table 1. The I n i t i a l D i s t r i b u t i o n s of Resources Across C o l l e c t i v i t i e s f o r Each Experimental Condition No. of No. of No. yellow blue Subjects buttons buttons F i r s t Set: No I n i t i a l net resource 4 600 + 30 = 630 each differences between subjects 4 30 + 600 = 630 each Second Set: Moderate i n i t i a l net 2 700 + 30 = 730 each resource differences between subjects 2 30 + 700 = 730 each 2 500 + 30 = 530 each 2 30 + 500 = 530 each Third Set: Extreme i n i t i a l net 2 800 + 30 = 830 each resource differences between subjects 2 30 + 800 = 830 each 2 400 + 30 = 430 each 2 30 + 400 = 430 each In a l l three sets of experiments, the booths were always placed i n the same l o c a t i o n v i s a v i s one another and the G,H,I and J subjects always began with a greater number of blue buttons than yellow buttons while the K,L,M and N subjects always began with a greater number of yellow buttons than blue buttons (see Figure 6). Figure 6. P o s i t i o n of Booths v i s a v i s One Another, and the Colour of the Largest P i l e of Buttons put i n Front of Each Booth, i n Every Experiment Run Blue H Blue Yellow J M Yellow Yellow L K Yellow Blue N I Blue G In the second and t h i r d sets of experiments, the "high" d i s t r i b u t i o n s ( i . e . , 730 buttons i n the case of the second set and 830 buttons i n the case of the t h i r d set) were always placed i n front of the I,J,M and N booths while the "low" d i s t r i b u t i o n s ( i . e . , 530 buttons i n the case o f the second set and 430 buttons i n the case of the t h i r d set) were always placed i n front of the G,H,K and L booths (see Figure 7)--45-Figure 7- P o s i t i o n of the High and Low Net Wealth Level Members i n the Moderate and Extreme Differences Experiments Low H High High J M Low Low L K High High N I Low G ' Thus the pos i t i o n s of the booths v i s al v i s one another were kept constant and the resources were d i s t r i b u t e d around the c o l l e c t i v i t i e s according t o the same general pattern. In the moderate and extreme differences conditions, the highs were always the I,J,M and N subjects and the lows were always the G,H,K and L subjects. Consequently, the behavior of the I,J,M and N subjects and the G,H,Kand L subjects can be compared both w i t h i n each set of experiments and across sets of experiments. Once again, there were no differences between the I,J,M and N subjects' i n i t i a l net wealth l e v e l s and the G,H,K and L subjects' i n i t i a l net wealth l e v e l s i n the f i r s t set of experiments while there were moderate differences i n the second set and extreme differences i n the t h i r d set. In the second and t h i r d sets of experiments, the I,J,M and N subjects were "highs" and the G,H,K and L subjects were "lows". To f a c i l i t a t e comparisons between the r e s u l t s of -46-the three sets of experiments, the I,J,M and N subjects i n the f i r s t set w i l l be c a l l e d "high-position" subjects and the G,H,K and L subjects i n the f i r s t set of experiments w i l l be c a l l e d "low-position" subjects. Given that the magnitude of the differences between the I,J,M and N subjects and the G,H,K and L subjects i s the independent v a r i a b l e i n the theory to be tested, the emergence of cliques should be evidenced only by the data f o r the second and t h i r d sets of experiments. Moreover, the emergence of cliques should be evidenced most strongly by the data f o r the t h i r d set because the Independent v a r i a b l e was f i x e d at the highest l e v e l for the t h i r d set of experiments. Because the independent v a r i a b l e was f i x e d at zero f o r the f i r s t set of experiments, any non random patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n among the hi g h - p o s i t i o n subjects and among the low-position subjects or between the hi g h - p o s i t i o n and low-position subjects have t o be inter p r e t e d as a consequence of a f a c t o r that was common to a l l sets of experiments (e.g., the order i n which the booths were set up v i s a v i s one another). I t seems that such a f a c t o r d i d , i n f a c t , operate. Twenty-three of the 47 i n i t i a t i o n s made by the f i r s t set of subjects during t h e i r f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange were d i r e c t e d t o the most v i s i b l e p o t e n t i a l partners ( i . e . , the subjects with complementary resource p r o f i l e s who were most d i r e c t l y i n front of them). Thirteen of the 47 i n i t i a t i o n s were directed t o the two side p o s i t i o n s and 11 were directed to the immediately adjacent p o s i t i o n (see Figure 8 and appendix IV). This r e s u l t i s s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t at the .001 p r o b a b i l i t y l e v e l . Given t h i s r e s u l t and the f a c t that the most v i s i b l e p o t e n t i a l partner f o r an I,J,M or N ( i . e . , high-position) subject was a G,H,K or L ( i . e . , low-position) subject and v i c e versa, i t must be concluded that the seating arrangement created a bias toward i n t e r a c t i o n s between high-position subjects and low-position subjects i n the no differences condition. Moreover, because the p o s i t i o n s of the booths v i s a v i s one another were kept constant and the resources were always d i s t r i b u t e d around c o l l e c t i v i t i e s according to the same general pattern, i t must be concluded that the bias toward i n t e r a c t i o n s between I,J,M and N and G,H,K and L subjects would have al s o operated i n the moderate and extreme differences conditions. Figure 8. An Example of the V i s i b i l i t y of P o t e n t i a l Exchange Partners Predominant Blue H Predominant Blue J Predominant Yellow L Predominant Yellow N Predominant Yellow M (Most v i s i b l e p o t e n t i a l partner f o r G) Predominant Yellow K Predominant Blue I Predominant Blue G I f i t i s assumed that a pressure to i n i t i a t e to the most v i s i b l e complementary p r o f i l e p o s i t i o n existed i n each experimental condition i t must also be assumed that the moderate and extreme difference experiments are more severe t e s t s of the hypotheses derived i n chapter I I than would be the case i f t h i s pressure had not operated. That i s , i n the cases of the moderate and extreme difference experiments, the theory predicts the eventual emergence of patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n s not between I,J,M and N subjects and G,H,K and L -48-subjects but among the I,J,M and N subjects and among the G,H,K and L subjects. Put another way, the theory p r e d i c t s the eventual emergence of cliques composed of highs and composed of lows rather than the eventual emergence of cliques composed of both highs and lows. The research design, described i n the l a s t chapter, produced two sources of data that can be used to t e s t d i f f e r e n t aspects of the theory. The i n i t i a t i o n forms that were c o l l e c t e d at the end of each opportunity f o r exchange co n s t i t u t e the f i r s t source of data while the responses to the post experimental questions c o n s t i t u t e the second. Each of the four hypotheses t o be tested w i l l be taken i n t u r n and discussed i n terms of: the kind of data c a l l e d f o r , the sort of r e s u l t s that could be accepted as supporting the hypothesis i n question, the a c t u a l r e s u l t s that were obtained and the conclusions regarding the v a l i d i t y of the hypothesis. Hypothesis 1. The members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l be most l i k e l y to d i r e c t t h e i r f i r s t i n i t i a t i o n s to the members of high net wealth. I f Hypothesis 1 i s v a l i d , s i g n i f i c a n t l y more of the highs and lows i n the second and t h i r d sets of experiments should have d i r e c t e d t h e i r f i r s t i n i t i a t i o n toward a high than toward a low. The hypothesis, moreover, should be more strongly supported by the r e s u l t s of the t h i r d set of experiments than by the r e s u l t s of the second set because the independent v a r i a b l e was set at a more extreme value f o r the t h i r d set of experiments. Table 2 indicates the act u a l r e s u l t s obtained. Table 2. I n i t i a t i o n s Directed Toward Highs During the F i r s t Opportunity f o r Exchange under Each Experimental Condition Imbalance i n D i s t r i b u t i o n of Resources No i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects Moderate i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects Extreme i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects I n i t i a t i o n s made by Highs towards Highs* 17.1% (N23)** 45-8% (N24) 90.3$ (N31)** I n i t i a t i o n s made by Lows towards Highs 62.5$ (N24) 70.8$ (N24) 90.7$ (N32) * High and low terms properly apply only t o moderate and extreme differences conditions ( i . e . , i n the no differences condition, the highs are high-p o s i t i o n subjects and the lows are low-position subjects). ** one subject chose t o not make an i n i t i a t i o n during t h i s opportunity f o r exchange. E f f e c t of resource imbalance ( i ) X ^ f o r proportion of subjects i n no difference experiments and proportion of subjects i n moderate difference experiments that i n i t i a t e d t o Highs = 3.O8 d.f. 1 s i g . between p .10 and p .05. ( i i ) ^ f o r proportion of subjects i n no difference experiments and proportion of subjects i n extreme difference experiments that i n i t i a t e d to Highs = 31.52 d.f. 1 s i g . beyond p .001. Eff e c t of degree of imbalance ( i ) 0C ^ f o r proportion of subjects In moderate di f f e r e n c e experiments and proportion of subjects i n extreme difference experiments that i n i t i a t e d to Highs = 14.63 d.f. 1 s i g . beyond .001. In s p i t e of the pressure toward high to low and low to high i n i t i a t i o n s due to the way the booths were set up v i s a v i s one another, the r e s u l t s of the f i r s t opportunities f o r exchange c l e a r l y support Hypothesis 1. In the case of the highs, the int r o d u c t i o n of moderate differences between subjects was associated with an increase of about 150% of the high - p o s i t i o n subjects' -50-rate of i n i t i a t i n g to f e l l o w h i g h - p o s i t i o n subjects while the i n t r o d u c t i o n of extreme di f f e r e n c e s between subjects was associated w i t h an increase of more than 400% of t h i s r a t e . In the case of the lows, the i n t r o d u c t i o n of moderate differences between subjects was associated with an increase of 12% of the low-position subjects' rate of i n i t i a t i n g to h i g h - p o s i t i o n subjects while the i n t r o d u c t i o n of extreme differences between subjects was associated w i t h an increase of about 50% of t h i s r a t e . The f a c t that the increases are greater f o r the highs than f o r the lows i s not s u r p r i s i n g . As a consequence of the pressure toward i n t e r net wealth i n i t i a t i o n s due to the way the booths were set up v i s a v i s one another, the h i g h - p o s i t i o n to hi g h - p o s i t i o n i n i t i a t i o n base rate i s lower than the l e v e l that would be expected by chance alone and the low-position t o hig h - p o s i t i o n i n i t i a t i o n base rate i s higher than the l e v e l that would be expected by chance alone. Thus i n the case of the highs, there was a greater percentage range ( i . e . , gap between the base rate f o r when the independent v a r i a b l e was set at zero and 100$) across which the e f f e c t of the independent v a r i a b l e could be observed. Hypothesis 2. A c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l s p l i t i n t o cliques as the members, through successive i n i t i a t i o n s , l e a r n w i t h which other members they can enter i n t o exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s . Hypothesis 3. Cliques of members of high net wealth w i l l emerge w i t h i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y before c l i q u e s o f members of low net wealth. Because the experimental paradigm deals with a f i x e d resource s i t u a t i o n , only a l i m i t e d number of exchange transactions can occur before the subjects end up with equal sized p i l e s of buttons i n front of them. For -51-t h i s reason, subjects were only given seven opportunities f o r exchange. Since the number of opportunities f o r exchange was l i m i t e d , however, hypotheses 2 and 3 could not be tested as f u l l y as would be desired. Given that these hypotheses assume learning e f f e c t s , i t i s appropriate to ask whether seven opportunities f o r exchange would allow l e a r n i n g p r i n c i p l e s to operate i n the way argued. The p o s i t i o n taken here i s t h a t , even i f seven opportunities d i d not allow the p r o b a b i l i t i e s f o r i n t r a net wealth l e v e l i n i t i a t i o n s t o reach asymptotic values, the sequence of opportunities f o r exchange i s long enough to allow the arguments that the hypotheses are based on (see p. 25) to be tested. Hence, once the hypotheses have been d i r e c t l y t e s t e d , the arguments that the hypotheses are based on w i l l be tested too. I f hypotheses 2 and 3 are v a l i d , increases i n the independent v a r i a b l e ( i . e . , the magnitude of the i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects) should be associated with s i g n i f i c a n t increases i n low t o low i n i t i a t i o n rates over the seven opportunities f o r exchange. The corresponding increases i n the high t o high i n i t i a t i o n rates over the seven opportunities f o r exchange would not be expected to be as large since hypothesis 1 predicted that the high to high i n i t i a t i o n rates would be high even during the f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange. Note that i n i t i a t i o n s rather than acceptances w i l l be looked at because an i n i t i a t i o n occurs temporally p r i o r t o an acceptance and the d i s t r i b u t i o n of acceptances that occured during each opportunity f o r exchange may have been as much the r e s u l t of the r e s t r i c t i o n s on what could be offered or given i n return as the assumed learning p r i n c i p l e s . Though the r e s t r i c t i o n s on what could be offered or given i n r e t u r n would influence the d i s t r i b u t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s too, t h i s influence would only be apparent a f t e r several opportunities f o r exchange. The d i f f e r e n t d i s t r i b u t i o n s of i n i t i a t i o n s f o r the f i r s t and seventh -52-opportunities f o r exchange are reported i n Table 3-Table 3. I n t r a Wealth Level I n i t i a t i o n s During the F i r s t and Seventh Opportunities f o r Exchange under Each Experimental Condition N F i r s t Opportunity For Exchange Seventh Opportunity For Exchange No i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects 24* 17.4%** 39.1%** High-to-High I n i t i a t i o n s Moderate i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects 24 45.8% 70.8% Extreme i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects 32 90.3% 90.0%*** No i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects 24 37.5% 41.6% Low-to-Low I n i t i a t i o n s Moderate i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects 24 30.4%** 52.2%** Extreme i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects 32 9.4% 50.0% "High to high" and "low to low" terms properly apply only t o the moderate and extreme differences conditions ( i . e . , i n the no differences c o n d i t i o n , the high to high i n i t i a t i o n s are high-pos i t i o n t o high-pos i t i o n i n i t i a t i o n s and the low to low i n i t i a t i o n s are low-position t o low-position i n i t i a t i o n s . * N's calculat e d on the basis of four subjects on p a r t i c u l a r net wealth l e v e l per experiment run. ** Base f o r % i s 1 l e s s than i n d i c a t e d N because 1 subject chose t o not make an i n i t i a t i o n during t h i s opportunity f o r exchange. *** Base f o r % i s 2 l e s s than indicated N because 2 subjects chose to not make i n i t i a t i o n s during t h i s opportunity f o r exchange. Although the changes i n the no differences condition percentages, i n Table 3, were not predicted, the percentages f o r the seventh opportunity f o r exchange were s t i l l below the f i f t y per cent l e v e l that would be expected by -53-chance alone. In the cases of the moderate and extreme differences conditions, a l l the changes are congruent with the hypotheses. The small changes i n the high to high i n i t i a t i o n rates i n the extreme differences condition are presumably the consequence of very high f i r s t percentages ( i . e . , i t can be argued that the emergence of cliques composed of highs was immediate i n t h i s condition). The f a c t that the moderate and extreme differences low to low i n i t i a t i o n rates d i d not r i s e higher than around 50% Is presumably a r e f l e c t i o n of the l i m i t e d number of opportunities f o r exchange. In a l l i t would seem reasonable to conclude that hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported by the data reported i n Table 3. Nevertheless, the arguments on which these hypotheses were based w i l l be investigated. In the l a s t chapter, i t was argued that a l l the members of c o l l e c t i v i t i e s which meet the scope conditions of the theory would tend to i n i t i a t e to the high wealth members during the f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange, but that the low wealth members would be l i k e l y to make i n i t i a t i o n s that are less favourable to the high wealth members than the high wealth members when i n i t i a t i n g t o high wealth members. On the basis of these arguments i t was then concluded that the high wealth members would p o s i t i v e l y r e i n f o r c e i n i t i a t i o n s from one another by accepting them and negatively r e i n f o r c e i n i t i a t i o n s from the low wealth members by r e j e c t i n g them. F i r s t we w i l l i n v e s t i g a t e whether the lows d i d i n fa c t make i n i t i a t i o n s that were l e s s favourable to the high wealth members than the highs when i n i t i a t i n g t o highs. I f the I n i t i a t i o n s recorded f o r the three experimental conditions are coded according to whether the i n i t i a t o r : "offered more than requested", "offered the same as requested" or .."offered l e s s than requested", the r e s u l t s f o r the lows should be skewed toward the "offered l e s s than requested" category when compared with the r e s u l t s f o r the highs. Moreover, -54-the degree of skew should be greater f o r the extreme differences c o n d i t i o n than f o r the moderate differences condition. The percentages of i n i t i a t i o n s against which t h i s p r e d i c t i o n can be checked are set out i n Table 4. Table 4. I n i t i a t i o n s to Highs under Each Experimental Condition: R e l a t i v e to Requests* Low-to-High I n i t i a t i o n s * * Offers No i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects Moderate i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects Extreme i n i t i a l net resource differences between subjects Offered more than requested 15.1% (7/24Ss)**** 13.6% (6/24Ss) 5.0? (3/32Ss; Offered l e s s than requested*** 25.5% (1V24SS) N 8 6 4 l . 0 % (l6/24Ss) 44.6% (23/32Ss) N88 High-to-High I n i t i a t i o n s N121 Offered more than requested 23.1% (9/24Ss) 23.0% (ll/24S s ) 17-9% (6/32Ss) Offered l e s s than requested 20.5% (7/24Ss) m 18.7% (9/24Ss) 20.5% (8/32Ss) N109 N179 * The data f o r a l l seven opportunities f o r exchange have been pooled because there were no apparent trends over the seven opportunities f o r exchange. ** The terms "low to high" and "high t o high" properly apply only t o the moderate and extreme differences conditions ( i . e . , i n the no differences co n d i t i o n , the low t o high i n i t i a t i o n s are low-position t o h i g h - p o s i t i o n i n i t i a t i o n s and the high to high i n i t i a t i o n s are hig h - p o s i t i o n t o high-p o s i t i o n i n i t i a t i o n s ) . *** The "offered the same as requested" percentages are omitted f o r the sake of c l a r i t y . **** The numbers i n brackets are the numbers of subjects who made 1 or more of f e r s of t h i s sort ( i . e . , they i n d i c a t e the consistency of the occurrence, across the i n d i v i d u a l s observed, of the type of behavior under s c r u t i n y . I t would seem reasonable to conclude that the data presented i n Table 4 support the argument being investigated. On the one hand, the lows were indeed l e s s l i k e l y than e i t h e r the low-position subjects i n the no differences -55-condition or the highs to o f f e r more than they requested. On the other hand, the lows were more l i k e l y than e i t h e r the hi g h - p o s i t i o n subjects i n the no differences condition or the highs t o o f f e r l e s s than they were requesting. Both of these observations i n d i c a t e that the lows were, i n f a c t , more l i k e l y t o make i n i t i a t i o n s that were l e s s favourable to the highs than the highs when i n i t i a t i n g t o the highs. Since the lows d i d not have the resources t o compete with the highs f o r any length of time by o f f e r i n g more than they requested, t h i s p o s s i b i l i t y need not be seen as having any importance f o r our theory. The only f a c t o r that could have been important, i n the long run, was the impact that acceptance and r e j e c t i o n had on the d i r e c t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s . This i s the point of the second argument which underlies hypotheses 2 and 3 and requires i n v e s t i g a t i o n . Hypotheses 2 and 3 were based on the argument that the highs would negatively r e i n f o r c e i n i t i a t i o n s from the lows. This argument i s equivalent t o the one that there should be a stronger tendency t o change the target of i n i t i a t i o n a f t e r r e j e c t i o n than a f t e r acceptance. A change i n the choice of net wealth l e v e l rather than a change i n the choice of person i s predicted because subjects on the same net wealth l e v e l w i t h the same resource p r o f i l e s are considered to be equivalent stimulus conditions ( a f t e r the stimulus g e n e r a l i z a t i o n p r i n c i p l e i n operant psychology^). Both the highs and the lows should have changed net wealth l e v e l s i n i t i a t e d to more often a f t e r having had i n i t i a t i o n s r e j e c t e d , than a f t e r having had i n i t i a t i o n s accepted. The data required to check t h i s argument are set out i n Table 5. -56-Table 5. Changes of Net Wealth Level I n i t i a t e d t o A f t e r Acceptance and A f t e r Rejection Under the Moderate and Extreme Differences Conditions Last i n i t i a t i o n Last i n i t i a t i o n accepted r e j e c t e d Moderate i n i t i a l net resource differences 40.2% 56.6% between subjects (N157)* (N122) Extreme i n i t i a l net resource differences 27.0% 42.6% between subjects (N208) (Nl65) * Since the data p e r t a i n to what the subjects d i d a f t e r the outcome f o r the l a s t opportunity f o r exchange, there are 7-1 = 6 observations per subject. Note that the data f o r each experimental condition have been pooled, since there were no apparent differences i n the data f o r these opportunities f o r exchange. Note. I t i s not possible t o give a simple i n d i c a t i o n of the consistency of the data because when we evaluate both the notion of p o s i t i v e reinforcement and the notion of negative reinforcement both the s t a b i l i t y and change of choice of net wealth l e v e l i n i t i a t e d t o i n r e l a t i o n to the outcomes f o r the immediately preceding operants has t o be taken Into account. Again, i t would seem reasonable t o conclude that the data presented support the argument being checked out. Subjects In both the moderate and extreme differences conditions were more l i k e l y t o change t h e i r choice of l e v e l i n i t i a t e d t o i f t h e i r l a s t i n i t i a t i o n was rej e c t e d than i f i t was accepted. The claim that the subjects were o r i e n t i n g to l e v e l s of net wealth and not other stimulus fa c t o r s i s supported by the observation that both the highs and the lows tended t o d i r e c t t h e i r f i r s t i n i t i a t i o n s to the highs (see Table 2, p. 49). Hypothesis 4. The members of each c l i q u e that emerges w i t h i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y w i l l approve 'of one another more than they w i l l approve of the other members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y who are not members of t h e i r c l i q u e . -57-The argument that l e d t o hypothesis 4 was based on a number of assumptions concerning the r e l a t i o n s h i p between reinforcement e f f e c t s and the generation of sentiments of approval and disapproval. I t was assumed that the acceptance of i n i t i a t i o n s r e i n f o r c e s p o s i t i v e sentiments toward the acceptor and that r e j e c t i o n of i n i t i a t i o n s reinforce?negative sentiments toward the r e j e c t o r . In a d d i t i o n , i t was assumed that the rec e i p t of an i n i t i a t i o n that can be accepted r e i n f o r c e s p o s i t i v e sentiments towards the i n i t i a t o r and that e i t h e r the non r e c e i p t of i n i t i a t i o n s or the rec e i p t of i n i t i a t i o n s that cannot be accepted r e i n f o r c e negative sentiments toward the i n i t i a t o r . Furthermore, i t was argued (on the basis of hypotheses 1,2 and 3) that the highest rates of r e j e c t i o n (and, correspondingly, the lowest rates of acceptance) would be experienced by low wealth members when they are i n i t i a t i n g to high wealth members and that the highest rates o f acceptance (and, correspondingly, the lowest rates of r e j e c t i o n ) would occur between members on the same net wealth l e v e l s . I f a l l of these assumptions and arguments are sound, the post experimental approve/disapprove votes that subjects cast toward one another (see appendix V) i n the second and t h i r d sets of experiments should have been d i s t r i b u t e d i n the manner predicted by hypothesis 4. The f i r s t step toward t e s t i n g hypothesis 4, then, w i l l be that of ascertaining whether the acceptance and r e j e c t i o n rates were as assumed. The data reported i n Table 6 i n d i c a t e the rates of i n t e r and i n t r a net wealth l e v e l acceptance rates (and, corresponding r e j e c t i o n r a t e s ) . -58-Table 6. I n t e r and I n t r a Net Wealth Level I n i t i a t i o n s Accepted under Each Experimental Condition % Acceptances* N** High-Position-to-High-Position 69.2% 78 I n i t i a t i o n s * * * Low-Pos i t i o n - t o-Low-Position 72.8 77 No I n i t i a l Net I n i t i a t i o n s Resource Differences Between Subjects High-Position-to-Low-Position I n i t i a t i o n s Low-PosIt ion-t o-54.3 83 High-Position 50.0 86 I n i t i a t i o n s High-to-High I n i t i a t i o n s 59.6 109 Moderate I n i t i a l Net Resource Low-to-Low I n i t i a t i o n s 67.5 77 Differences High-to-Low 45.7 57 Between Subjects I n i t i a t i o n s Low-to-High 46.6 P.R I n i t i a t i o n s 00 High-to-High I n i t i a t i o n s 68.2 179 Extreme I n i t i a l Net Resource Low-to-Low I n i t i a t i o n s 77.8 99 Differences Between Subjects High-to-Low I n i t i a t i o n s 31.7 41 Low-to-High I n i t i a t i o n s 31.4 121 Complementary percentages equal the percentages of i n i t i a t i o n s r e j e c t e d . Since subjects were free to decide to which subjects they would d i r e c t t h e i r i n i t i a t i o n s , the N's were free to vary. High-position subjects are those subjects that sat at the same booths as the highs and low-position subjects are those subjects that sat at the same booths as the lows. A l l the percentages f o r the moderate and extreme differences conditions appear to be i n l i n e with the assumptions concerning the relevant reinforcement e f f e c t s that underly hypothesis 4. The percentages f o r the no differences c o n d i t i o n , however,, are not quite as expected. These percentages should, presumably, a l l be s i m i l a r . The discrepancies are due t o the r e s u l t s of three of the s i x experiments that were run under the no differences condition. For some non-obvious reason, cliques seemed t o emerge among the I,J,M and N subjects and among the G,H,K and L subjects i n these experiments. In contrast t o t h i s v a r i a b i l i t y i n the patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n i n the no differences experiments, the v a r i a b i l i t y i n the patterns of i n t e r a c t i o n s i n the extreme differences experiments was minimal. ^  In s p i t e of the anomalies i n the data f o r the no differences experiments, i t should be noted that the predicted pattern of percentages i s stronger i n the extreme difference data than i n the moderate differences data. The next step toward t e s t i n g hypothesis 4 i s that of as c e r t a i n i n g whether the d i s t r i b u t i o n of approve/disapprove votes r e f l e c t the pattern of r e s u l t s i n Table 6: that i s , whether the highest rates of approval and the lowest rates of disapproval occurred between subjects on the same net wealth l e v e l s . The r e s u l t s obtained are set out i n Table 7. -60-Table 7. Post Experimental "Approve" and "Disapprove" Votes Directed Toward Fellow Net Wealth Level Subjects No I n i t i a l Net Resource Differences between Subjects 22 High-Position subjects* d i r e c t e d 48.9% (N45) approve votes and 47.3% (N36) disapprove votes toward f e l l o w High-Position subjects 20 Low-Position subjects d i r e c t e d 40.0% (N45) approve votes and 56.5% (N23) disapprove votes toward f e l l o w Low-Position subjects Moderate I n i t i a l Net Resource Differences between Subjects 23 Highs d i r e c t e d 21 Lows di r e c t e d 52.4% (N42) approve votes and 42.8% (N28) disapprove votes toward f e l l o w Highs 57-2% (N42) approve votes and 34.4% (N32) disapprove votes toward f e l l o w Lows Extreme I n i t i a l Net Resource Differences between Subjects 27 Highs d i r e c t e d 27 Lows d i r e c t e d 71.2% (N59) approve votes and 42.0% (N31) disapprove votes toward f e l l o w Highs 75.6% (N45) approve votes and 21.0% (N43) disapprove votes toward f e l l o w Lows * ( i ) high-position subjects are those that sat at the same booths as the highs and low-position subjects are those that sat at the same booths as the lows. ( i i ) 2/24 high-position and 4/24 low-position subjects i n the n o - i n i t i a l -differences-between-subject s c o n d i t i o n , 1/24 highs and 3/24 lows i n the moderate-differences condition and 5/32 highs and 5/32 lows i n the extreme-differences condition d i d not bother (or were not able) to in d i c a t e approval or disapproval f o r any of the other subjects i n t h e i r c o l l e c t i v i t y . Those subjects that d i d i n d i c a t e approval or disapproval toward other subjects generally l i m i t e d themselves to 2 or 3 of the 7 other subjects i n t h e i r c o l l e c t i v i t y . -61-The percentages i n Table 7 appear to be much as predicted by Hypothesis 4. The only discrepancies would seem to be i n the percentages f o r the low-p o s i t i o n subjects where the fig u r e s are somewhat lower than the 50% l e v e l that would be expected on the basis of chance alone. The a n a l y s i s , nevertheless, can be taken another step. Since the approve/disapprove votes are assumed to be generated through a c t u a l i n t e r a c t i o n or contact between subjects, the pattern of contacts associated with both approve and disapprove votes should be looked at. I f the theory underlying hypothesis 4 i s sound, subjects should have been most l i k e l y to d i r e c t votes toward subjects with whom they had had a c t u a l contact. According to the theory, contact between subjects can be of two s o r t s . F i r s t there are the i n i t i a t i o n s that ego makes, and second there are the i n i t i a t i o n s that ego receives. Both sorts of contact involve acceptances and r e j e c t i o n s . The theory does not include a r a t i o n a l e f o r weighting the importance of the two sorts of contact, and so ego i s predicted t o have been more l i k e l y to approve than disapprove of a l t e r i f the balance between a l l the i n i t i a t i o n s accepted and a l l the i n i t i a t i o n s r e j e c t e d i s i n favour of the i n i t i a t i o n s accepted and v i c e versa. To t e s t t h i s part of the theory, a l l the p a i r s of subjects that had any contact at a l l w i l l be looked at and the h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n s between them w i l l be c l a s s i f i e d according t o the percentage of i n i t i a t i o n s accepted and whether they were associated w i t h an approve vote or a disapprove vote. The r e s u l t s are set out i n Table 8. The v e r t i c a l percentages i n d i c a t e the way the votes that were a c t u a l l y cast were d i s t r i b u t e d across the d i f f e r e n t acceptance l e v e l s while the h o r i z o n t a l percentages i n d i c a t e the l i k e l i h o o d of approval votes and disapproval being associated with h i s t o r i e s of I n t e r a c t i o n which f a l l i n t o the d i f f e r e n t categories of acceptance. Table 8. D i s t r i b u t i o n of Approval and Disapproval Votes Across D i f f e r e n t Levels of Acceptance* Approval Votes (N274) D i s t r i b u t i o n according to percentage of i n i t i a t i o n s ac-cepted i n h i s t o - % r i e s of i n t e r - of a l l a c t i o n h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r -a c t i o n charac-t e r i z e d by ac-ceptance l e v e l and associated with approval votes Disapproval Votes (N197) D i s t r i b u t i o n according t o percentage of i n i t i a t i o n s ac-cepted i n h i s t o - % r i e s of i n t e r - of a l l a c t i o n h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r -a c t i o n charac-t e r i z e d by ac-ceptance l e v e l and associated w i t h disapproval votes % of a l l 50-100% 70.45% 34. 00% I n i t i a t i o n s 54.65% 18.45% N 363** between r a t e r and 17.15% 19.15% 51. rated accepted 0-49% 80% 41.60% N 245 No h i s t o r i e s of int e r a c t i o n s between r a t e r 12.40% 14. 20% and rated i . e . , no i n i t i a t i o n s 4.70% 3.92% N 7140 e i t h e r accepted or rej e c t e d * The data f o r the no, moderate and extreme differences experiments were pooled because there were no apparent differences i n the patterns of contact associated w i t h e i t h e r the approve or disapprove generated under the three conditions. * The column of percentages f o r i n t e r a c t i o n sequences that were not associated w i t h e i t h e r an approve or a disapprove vote has been omitted f o r the sake of c l a r i t y . -63-The r e s u l t s set out i n Table 8 appear t o be i n l i n e w i t h the theory. LxDoking at the v e r t i c a l percentages, 70.45% of the approve votes f a l l i n the • 50-100% acceptance l e v e l and 51.80% of the disapprove votes f a l l i n the 0-49% acceptance l e v e l . Only 12.40% of the approve votes and 14.20% of the disapprove votes are not associated with contact between the r a t e r s and rated. Looking at the h o r i z o n t a l percentages, 54.65% of a l l the i n t e r a c t i o n sequences that f a l l on the 50-100% acceptance l e v e l are associated w i t h an approve vote while 41.60% of a l l the h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n that f a l l on the 0-49% acceptance l e v e l are associated with a disapprove vote. The theory, presented i n chapter I I , p r e d i c t s the generation of approval or disapproval on the basis of the outcomes of a l l the i n i t i a t i o n s that flow between ego and a l t e r . That i s , the theory takes i n t o account both the i n i t i a t i o n s made by ego and the i n i t i a t i o n s made by a l t e r . The s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the element of the data concerning the i n i t i a t i o n s that a l t e r makes might be. questioned. I t can be noted, however, that t h i s element of the data d i d increase the theory's a b i l i t y to predict approval and disapproval votes. I f j u s t the i n i t i a t i o n s that ego made are taken i n t o account, only 65.25% of a l l the h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n associated with approve votes f a l l i n t o the 50-1 100% acceptance category and only 45.65% of a l l the h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n associated with disapprove votes f a l l i n t o the 0-49% acceptance category. Evaluation of Results The data reported i n the f i r s t s ection of t h i s chapter were c o l l e c t e d t o t e s t the theory advanced i n chapter I I . These data w i l l now be evaluated • i n an o v e r a l l sense. In the main, percentage differences have been r e l i e d upon because i t can be argued that s t a t i s t i c a l tests of s i g n i f i c a n c e are not \ i j t -64-a p p l i c a b l e since up t o seven observations of each subject were recorded. That i s , i t can be argued that the subjects' successive i n i t i a t i o n s would have been r e l a t e d so that the observations made are not independent. Interdependence among the data would, of course, lead t o a l e s s than conservative evaluation of r e s u l t s because the power of s t a t i s t i c a l t e s t s of s i g n i f i c a n c e depends upon the number of observations made and interdependence among observations means that the l a t t e r observations do not contribute as much information as the f i r s t observations made. The problem faced i n t h i s s e c t i o n i s that of deciding whether or not the data are s u f f i c i e n t l y r e l i a b l e t o permit conclusions concerning the general v a l i d i t y of the theory. The data f o r the f i r s t opportunity (see Table 2 , p. 4 9 ) are c e r t a i n l y w e l l i n l i n e with the expectation that both highs and lows would begin by i n i t i a t i n g to the highs. The strength of the remaining data, however, i s more d i f f i c u l t t o assess. The main d i f f i c u l t i e s would seem t o stem from the l i m i t e d number of opportunities f o r exchange. Although the data c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e that a high rate of i n t e r a c t i o n between the highs q u i c k l y emerges, i t has to be argued that the i n t e r a c t i o n sequences are hardly long enough f o r comparable rates to emerge between the lows (see Table 3 , p. 5 2 ) . Yet i t can also be argued that the greater tendency f o r the lows to o f f e r fewer buttons than they request when I n i t i a t i n g to highs (see Table 4 , p. 5 4 ) and the stronger tendency f o r subjects t o change t h e i r target of i n i t i a t i o n a f t e r r e j e c t i o n than a f t e r acceptance (see Table 5 , p. 5 6 )> suggest that the p r e d i c t i o n regarding the formation of cliques of lows would be correct i n the long run. The data that was advanced as being relevant to the p r e d i c t i o n s concerning sentiments of approval and disapproval are generally i n l i n e with -65-the p r e d i c t i o n s . Indeed, I t might be f e l t that the data appear stronger than might have been expected given that the h i s t o r i e s of I n t e r a c t i o n were generated by only seven opportunities f o r exchange ( i . e . , a po s s i b l e of 14 exchanges since the experimental paradigm allows ago t o receive i n i t i a t i o n s at the same time as he i n i t i a t e s to one of the other subjects): the f a c t that subjects were not asked t o i n d i c a t e the i n t e n s i t y of t h e i r approval or disapproval may account f o r t h i s . The f a c t that there are c l e a r l y detectable patterns throughout the data f o r each set of experiments, coupled with the f a c t that the predicted differences are greater between the no and extreme differences conditions than between the no and moderate differences conditions would seem to j u s t i f y a good deal of confidence i n the theory set out i n chapter I I . I t might also be claimed that t h i s confidence would j u s t i f y the b e l i e f that the theory advanced constitutes an advance on the Leik et a l formulation that was discussed i n chapter I. Despite t h i s confidence, however, I t has t o be admitted that the theory could stand more severe t e s t i n g . The research design, f o r example, could be modified t o allow more extended i n t e r a c t i o n sequences. This might be achieved e i t h e r by g i v i n g the subjects more buttons at the s t a r t of the experiment, or by imposing smaller l i m i t s on the s i z e of o f f e r s that can be made so that each subject has to enter i n t o a greater number of exchanges before he has two equal p i l e s i n front of him. I t might a l s o be achieved by running the same c o l l e c t i v i t y through a series of sessions i n which the members begin each session with f r e s h sets of resources that are the same as they had i n the f i r s t session. The l a s t p o s s i b i l i t y would, of course, imply continual i n j e c t i o n of new resources i n t o the s i t u a t i o n and would c a l l f o r m o d i f i c a t i o n of scope condition 3 i n the theory. One of the considerations underlying the formulation of the research -66-design described i n chapter I I I was a desire to advance a paradigm that could be used as the basis f o r a se r i e s of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s . The research design advanced meets t h i s o bjective. Besides the suggestions made i n the l a s t paragraph, a number of d i f f e r e n t experiments could be run w i t h p r o f i t . Future work t o i n v e s t i g a t e the consequences of more extreme i n i t i a l net resource difference between subjects would be worthwhile. There Is reason t o t h i n k that the theory w i l l break down i f the difference between the net wealth l e v e l s i s too great. As was pointed out i n chapter I I when hypothesis 2 was advanced, at some point the lows may p e r s i s t i n running very high r i s k f o r high gain so that cliques of lows may never form. In a d d i t i o n , the hypotheses ( e s p e c i a l l y hypothesis 3 about the order i n which cliques emerge) should be retested by running experiments with d i s t r i b u t i o n s of resources that involve more than two net wealth l e v e l s . FOOTNOTES "'"Subjects were s o l i c i t e d from a l l f i r s t and second year, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1970/71 Chemistry classes. The experimenter attended a lec t u r e session f o r each class and asked f o r volunteers. The students were t o l d : "...The experiment that you are being asked t o take part i n involves a type of game s i t u a t i o n . You w i l l s i t around a t a b l e with seven other volunteers and engage i n a type of game. There are no nasty experiences - no e l e c t r i c shocks, etc. At the conclusion of the experiment, the experimenter w i l l f u l l y discuss the theory back of the experiment and the problems involved i n running such experiments. The people who have taken part i n these experiments have s a i d that they enjoyed the experience. Each experiment takes l e s s than one hour - that i s , you w i l l be asked t o come t o the Small Groups Laboratory f o r one one-hour session." Those students who i n d i c a t e d that they wanted t o take part i n an experiment (usually about 10% of the c l a s s ) were given timetables so that they could i n d i c a t e at which time they would be free to come t o the Small Groups Laboratory. Volunteers were also asked t o put t h e i r telephone numbers on the timetable so that the experimenter could l e t them know what time he would l i k e them to come. For each experiment, nine volunteers were contacted and asked t o come at an appointed time. Generally at l e a s t eight would remember to do so. Occasionally, however, only seven would show up i n which case the experimenter would f i n d a s u b s t i t u t e volunteer i n a lounge beside a le c t u r e h a l l In the same b u i l d i n g as that i n which the Small Groups Laboratory i s s i t u a t e d . In a l l some 240 volunteers were used i n p i l o t experiments and 160 were used i n the experiments reported here. The main d i f f i c u l t y encountered during the p i l o t stage concerned the problem of g e t t i n g a set of i n s t r u c t i o n s that were c l e a r enough t o be q u i c k l y a s s i m i l a t e d by a l l the members In a c o l l e c t i v i t y . 2 There were not enough subjects t o run 8 or more experiments i n each set. Eight experiments were run i n the t h i r d set because the t h i r d set of experiments focused on extreme differences i n the d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources and the experimenter f e l t that experiments i n t h i s condition might be the most i n t e r e s t i n g from a t h e o r e t i c a l point of view. o See scope condition 6. Each subject's l i m i t was set at l/20th of the number of buttons that was i n h i s largest p i l e to begin with. Hence, i n the c o n t r o l experiments a l l the subjects had l i m i t s of 30, i n set 2 the highs had l i m i t s of 35 and the lows had l i m i t s of 25 and i n set 3 the highs had l i m i t s of 40 and the lows had l i m i t s of 20. See R.L. Burgess and R.L. Akers, Are operant p r i n c i p l e s t a u t o l o g i c a l ? Psychological Record 16 (1966), pp. 305-312. P. 311, "2.b.2. Law of Generalization Type I I : Whenever a stimulus acquires conditioned r e i n f o r c i n g properties, then other s t i m u l i w i l l take on r e i n f o r c i n g properties to the extent that they are s i m i l a r to the o r i g i n a l conditioned r e i n f o r c e r . " -68-~See appendix X, A: Results f o r experiments 3, 4 and 5. ^E.g., the numbers of acceptances i n the high to low i n i t i a t i o n s f o r each of the eight experiments i n the extreme differences condition were: 16, 16, 17, 14, 16, 16, 12, 17. 7 C.f. When j u s t the i n i t i a t i o n s that a l t e r made are taken i n t o account, only 61.00% of a l l the h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n associated with approve votes would f a l l i n the 50-100% acceptance category and only 37-60% o f a l l the h i s t o r i e s of i n t e r a c t i o n associated with disapprove votes would f a l l i n the 0-49% acceptance category. CHAPTER V A WIDER CONTEXT Preceding chapters have been devoted to an i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o the r e l a t i o n s h i p s between: the d i s t r i b u t i o n of resources, the formation of cliques and the generation of sentiments o f approval and disapproval i n experimental c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . This f i n a l chapter w i l l deal w i t h the problem of p l a c i n g the work reported i n t o the broader context of the sociology of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n general. But before t h i s problem i s broached, one point should be understood. There w i l l be no attempt t o generalize from the findings reported i n chapter IV to n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . The laboratory experiments described i n chapter I I I were s p e c i f i c a l l y designed t o te s t the hypotheses set out i n chapter I I and the data that r e s u l t e d are not relevant to anything but these hypotheses."1" What w i l l be attempted i s a comparison between these hypotheses and recorded observations of n a t u r a l l y -occurring c o l l e c t i v i t i e s . To the degree that these n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g c o l l e c t i v i t i e s can be seen as being characterized by the scope conditions of the theory presented i n chapter I I , these observations can be taken as f u r t h e r data against which the hypotheses can be tested. There i s no i n t e n t i o n , however, t o push the claim that a l l the scope conditions are met by a l l the nat u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that have been looked at. What i s being suggested i s that comparison between the hypotheses and the observations that have been made of these n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g c o l l e c t i v i t i e s may lead to a better understanding of the range of phenomena t o which the theory e i t h e r i s , or could be made, relevant. The strategy that w i l l be adopted i s that of f i r s t considering how -70-hypothetical c o l l e c t i v i t i e s would func t i o n i f they met the scope conditions of the theory and then comparing these conclusions w i t h reported observations of nat u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g c o l l e c t i v i t i e s also meeting these conditions. The cliques predicted by the theory can be concisely described i n the fo l l o w i n g way: ( i ) the members i n each c l i q u e have s i m i l a r net wealth l e v e l s ( i . e . , the cli q u e s can be ordered i n terms of the mean net wealth l e v e l s of t h e i r members), and ( i i ) the members of each c l i q u e approve of one another more than they approve of the members of other c l i q u e s i n t h e i r c o l l e c t i v i t y . I t i s a f a c t that n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g groups have been described i n very s i m i l a r terms. For example, Sorokin has w r i t t e n about n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g groups which he c a l l s s o c i a l classes that are: "...(1) l e g a l l y open but a c t u a l l y semi-closed; (2) normal; (3) s o l i d a r y ; (4) antagonistic t o c e r t a i n other groups ( s o c i a l classes.) of the same general nature, X; (5) p a r t l y organized but mainly quasi-organized; (6) p a r t l y aware of I t s own u n i t y and existence and p a r t l y not; (7) c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the Western society of the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries; (8) a multibonded group bound together by two unibonded t i e s - occupational and economic (both taken i n t h e i r broad sense) and one bond of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n the sense of the t o t a l i t y of i t s e s s e n t i a l r i g h t s and duties as contrasted with the e s s e n t i a l l y d i f f e r e n t r i g h t s and duties of other groups ( s o c i a l classes) of the same general nature, X...."2 And Mayer and Buckley have w r i t t e n about s o c i a l classes i n the fo l l o w i n g way: " . . . i n a class system, the s o c i a l hierarchy i s based p r i m a r i l y upon differences In monetary wealth and income. S o c i a l classes are not sharply marked o f f from each other, nor are they demarcated by tangible boundaries. Unlike estates, they have no l e g a l standing, i n d i v i d u a l s of a l l classes being i n p r i n c i p l e equal before the law. Consequently there are no l e g a l r e s t r a i n t s on the movement of i n d i v i d u a l s and f a m i l i e s from one cl a s s to another. The same i s true of intermarriage which, while i t may be frowned upon and informally discouraged, i s not usual l y prevented by law or Insuperable s o c i a l pressures. Unlike castes, -71-s o c i a l classes are not necessarily organized, closed s o c i a l groups. Rather, they are aggregates of persons with similar amounts of wealth and property and similar sources of income. Nevertheless, they may be a n a l y t i c a l l y separated into s t a t i s t i c a l l y s i g n i f i c a n t subgroups or subcultures i n terms of such c r i t e r i a as interaction patterns, p o l i t i c a l attitudes, and l i f e styles. In societies marked by a class system the differences i n wealth and income are expressed i n different ways of l i f e : patterns of consumption, types of education, speech, manners, dress, tastes and other c u l t u r a l attributes. In turn, these differences give r i s e to the formation of status groups. These are informal s o c i a l groups whose members view each other as equals because they share common understandings - as expressed i n similar attitudes and similar modes of behavior - and who treat or regard outsiders as s o c i a l superiors or i n f e r i o r s . Thus i n a class society there develops a hierarchy of status groups that i s not i d e n t i c a l with the hierarchy of economic classes There i s a considerable amount of movement up and down the class and status hierarchies. Although the individual acquires his i n i t i a l position at b i r t h , ascription does not necessarily determine his l a t e r s o c i a l rank, which can be changed through the acquisition or loss of wealth and other attainments. As a result, class societies are apt to be highly competitive and f l u i d , since individuals and families may compete f o r wealth and s o c i a l position on the basis of personal q u a l i t i e s and achievements...."3 Obviously s o c i a l classes are more complex than the cliques described here: for instance, both Sorokin and Mayer and Buckley t a l k about factors such as "rights" and "duties". Yet i t would seem that the core c r i t e r i a used to define s o c i a l classes are the c r i t e r i a that we have used to define cliques. Because wealth dimensions are valued by a l l the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y i t can be assumed that every member of the c o l l e c t i v i t y would l i k e to have a high net wealth l e v e l , which i s not to say that those members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y who do not belong to cliques of high mean net wealth levels w i l l l i k e or approve of the members of the c o l l e c t i v i t y who do. In -72-fact, the theory suggests that respect for the possession of resources and sentiments of approval w i l l be orthogonally related. It i s interesting that an investigation of t h i s issue i n a naturally-occurring situation^ found that respect was a positive function of the occupational status of the stimulus person and a negative function of the occupational status of the respondent and that friendship was an inverse function of the difference i n status between the person and the respondent. According to the theory, the parties involved i n exchange interactions, i n a c o l l e c t i v i t y which meets the scope conditions, w i l l tend to have: (i) resource dimension l e v e l p r o f i l e s that complement one another, and ( i i ) similar net wealth levels because sequences of exchanges w i l l only occur when reciprocal benefits are realized during each exchange interaction. I f the theory applies to naturally-occurring c o l l e c t i v i t i e s , only cliques that involve individuals of similar net wealth levels w i l l be observed. The l i t e r a t u r e 5 on 'choice of best friend* , as i t happens, strongly suggests that people choose people of similar economic status to themselves as friends. In f a c t , Kahl and Davis^ claim that: "The evidence i s clear, persons of similar prestige are l i k e l y to associate with one another i n those recreational situations where free choice i s available. The d i f f e r e n t i a l costs of the a c t i v i t i e s engaged i n at the different status levels and the different educations, habits and values that characterize people at the separate prestige levels make people more comfortable with t h e i r own kind." (Kahl and Davis, 1965, p. 153) Although the theory was limited to situations i n which one person gives amounts of one material commodity to another i n return for amounts of another material commodity, scope condition 2 could be modified so that the theory encompassed situations involving certain non material resources such as -73-knowledge. I t i s an i n t e r e s t i n g f a c t that the r e s u l t s of a number of studies of conmunication patterns w i t h i n groups reported i n the l i t e r a t u r e have the same general g e s t a l t that we would predict i f the s i t u a t i o n s involved m a t e r i a l resources. For example, R i l e y et a l (1954) asked 9 t h and 10th grade g i r l s whom, i n t h e i r own grade, they would most l i k e l y t a l k with on each of a number of designated t o p i c s which ranged from Issues concerning peer r e l a t i o n s t o problems of r i g h t and wrong, and found that the g i r l s tended to choose others •7 of e i t h e r equal or higher s o c i a l status. And Hurwitz et a l (I960) i n a study of conmunication i n groups composed of mental hygiene workers of high and low occupational status found that both the highs and the lows were most l i k e l y t o d i r e c t t h e i r communications t o highs. F i n a l l y , the basic assumption underlying the theory i s that the members of a c o l l e c t i v i t y exchange amounts of resources with one another because they perceive that they w i l l be b e t t e r o f f with s i m i l a r amounts of both resources than with a l o t of one resource and a l i t t l e of the other. I t follows from t h i s assumption that each member's l e v e l s on the two resources w i l l e q u i l i b r a t e as a consequence of the exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s i n which he i s involved. I f resource dimensions are status dimensions, t h i s argument i s very Q s i m i l a r t o that advanced by Benoit-Smullyan who observed that the status l e v e l s exhibited by the members of n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g groups appear t o e q u i l i b r a t e over time. Conclusion The aim of t h i s chapter has been to suggest that a number of aspects of s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g c o l l e c t i v i t i e s that have been studied might be explained by a theory s i m i l a r t o the theory presented i n -74-chapter I I . Out of need, the case has been sketched rather than demonstrated conclusively because a t t e n t i o n has never been s p e c i f i c a l l y d i r e c t e d toward the i d e n t i f i c a t i o n and t a b u l a t i o n of resources flowing v i a repeated exchange i n t e r a c t i o n s between the members of n a t u r a l l y - o c c u r r i n g s i t u a t i o n . Nevertheless, enough has been demonstrated t o j u s t i f y the claim that the theory presented merits f u r t h e r work. MX)TNOTES 1. "'•See: M. Webster J r . and J . Kervin, The Problem of A r t i f i c i a l i t y I n Experimental Sociology. Paper d e l i v e r e d at Canadian Sociology and Anthropology Association annual meetings held at York U n i v e r s i t y , 1969. John Hopkins U n i v e r s i t y . Mimeographed. To be published i n the Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology (November, 1971). P.A. Sorokin, What i s a s o c i a l class? Journal of Legal and P o l i t i c a l Science (1947), pp. 21-28. Reprinted i n : Class, Status and Power: A reader i n s o c i a l s t r a t i f i c a t i o n . R. Bendix and S.M. Li p s e t ( e d i t o r s ) . (Free Press of Glencoe, 1953), pp. 87-92. K.B. Mayer and W. Buckley, Class and Society. (New York: Random House, 1969), t h i r d e d i t i o n . "'H.C. Triandis and V. V a s s i l i o u , S o c i a l status as a determinant of respect and fr i e n d s h i p acceptance. Sociometry 2£ (1966), pp. 396-405. The researchers interviewed a representative sample of 400 residents i n Athens (Greece). ^See, f o r example: ( i ) J.A. Kahl with an in t r o d u c t i o n by K. Davis, The American Class Structure. (New York: H o l t , Rinehart and Winston, 1965). On pp. 137-138 Kahl reports a study done by Davis and Kahl i n Cambridge, Massachusetts In 1953. They asked 199 men between 30 and 49 years o f age t o give the occupation of t h e i r 3 best f r i e n d s . The occupation of the respondents and t h e i r best friends were coded according t o North & Hatt prestige scores (0 = 1-23, 1 = 24-36, 2 = 37-60, 3 = 61-77 and 4 = 78-90). Table 3, p. 138 (previously unpublished) Cambridge: Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of status of best f r i e n d s . Average status of three best f r i e n d s Status of Respondent n 0-0.9 1-1.9 2-2.9 3+ Has none 0 1 2 3 4 19 34 82 47 17 74 32 10 16 38 15 9 15 50 38 35 3 12 30 35 10 12 13 23 30 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 199 -76-( i i ) D.W.G. Timms, Occupational s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and f r i e n d s h i p nomination: A study i n Brisbane. A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 3_ (1967)nl, pp. 32-43, p. 38 Table 3. Percentage of best f r i e n d s i n each occupational category by occupation of respondent: Percentage of Best Friends No. of No. of n n . t. r> ,^ i n each occ. category respondents Friends Occ. Category of Respondent & J ^ A. Males I I I 1 P r o f e s s i o n a l & managerial 73 20 11 C l e r i c a l & Sales 9 75 I I I S k i l l e d manual 10 22 IV Semi s k i l l e d manual 4 19 V U n s k i l l e d manual 9 16 B. Females I P r o f e s s i o n a l & managerial 76 16 I I C l e r i c a l & Sales 12 61 I I I S k i l l e d manual 11 38 TV Semi s k i l l e d manual 7 25 V U n s k i l l e d manual 8 21 J.A. Kahl, op. c i t . , p. 153. I l l IV V 6 1 - 48 132 6 5 5 51 110 49 10 9 41 87 20 35 23 45 88 12 18 44 55 92 4 2 2 50 147 11 11 5 62 142 28 16 8 41 120 17 37 15 37 86 19 16 35 58 85 'Matilda W. R i l e y et a l , Interpersonal o r i e n t a t i o n s i n small groups: A consideration of the questionnaire approach. American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review 19 (1954), pp. 715-724. Each respondent's status was defined i n terms of questionnaire data that were assumed to Indicate the deference e l i c i t e d by the respondent from a l l the others. Extent of Dyadic "Talking" (by the status of both partners) Status of subj ect low high 0 1 2 3 4 5 Low, Status of object W 0 1 2 3 4 5 H 1 .07 .26 .22 .26 .41 • 49 .11 .26 .26 • 34 .47 .60 .07 .20 • 38 .42 .54 .69 .07 .18 .36 .62 • 76 .81 .05 • 19 .33 • 52 .81 .88 .04 .16 • 25 • 39 .66 1.36 Note: f i g u r e i n c e l l s represent proportion of topi c s they would l i k e to t a l k about ( i . e . , the desired amount of communication). -77-°J.I. Hurwltz et a l , Some e f f e c t s of power i n the r e l a t i o n s among group members, i n Group Dynamics: Research and Theory. Edited by D. Cartwright and A. Zander. (New York: Harper and Row, i960), 2nd e d i t i o n . Frequency of communication between high and low status mental hygiene workers: Status of Status of Frequency of communicator r e c i p i e n t Communication high high 4.89 high low 3.66 low high 3.61 low low 2.71 9 E. Benoit-Smullyan, Status types, status i n t e r r e l a t i o n s . American S o c i o l o g i c a l Review 9 (1944), pp. 151-161. BIBLIOGRAPHY Books Bevan, W. and R.E. Adamson. Internal referents and the concept of reinforcement. In: Interdisciplinary Behavior Sciences Research Conference, University of New Mexico, Decisions, Values and Groups, proceedings, vol. 2. New York: Pergamon, 1963. Bevan W. The pooling mechanism and the phenomena of reinforcement. Chapter 2 in: Motivation and Social Interaction. Edited by O.J. Harvey. New York: Ronald, 1963. Blau, P.M. The Dynamics of Bureaucracy: A study in interpersonal relations in two governmental agencies. 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A bargaining model for s o c i a l status i n informal groups and formal organizations. Behavioral Science VII (1966)n5, pp. 357-369-Heath, A. Maclntyre on Blau. (Correspondence). Sociology 2 (1968)nl, pp. 93-96. Homans, G.C. Social behavior as exchange. American Journal of Sociology 63 (1957-58), pp. 597-606. Kelley, H.H. Communication i n experimentally created hierarchies. Human Relations VIV (195D, pp. 39-56. Land, K.C. and R.C. Rockwell. (University of Texas Austin). A C r i t i c a l and Programatic Examination of Exchange Theory. Proceedings of the Southwest Sociological Association 16(1966), pp. 183-187. Longabough, R. A category system f o r coding Interpersonal behavior as s o c i a l exchange. Sociometry 26_ (1963), pp. 319-345. Maclntyre, A. P.M. Blau: Exchange and Power i n Social L i f e . (Book review). Sociology 1 (1967)n2, pp. 199-201. Maris, R. The l o g i c a l adequacy of Homans' s o c i a l theory. American Sociological Review 35 (1970)n6, pp. 1069-1081. Messick, D.M. and W.B. Thorngate. Relative gain maximization i n experimental games. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 3. (1967), pp. 85-101. Muir, D.E. and E.A. Weinstein. Norms of so c i a l obligation. American Sociological Review 27 (1962), pp. 532-539. Riley, Matilda W. et a l . Interpersonal orientations i n small groups: A questionnaire approach. American Sociological Review 19_ (1954), pp. 715-724. Rosen, S. The comparative roles of informational and material comnodities i n interpersonal transactions. Journal of Experimental and Social Psychology 2 (1966), pp. 211-226. Schwartz, B. The so c i a l psychology of the g i f t . American Journal of Sociology 73 (1967)nl, pp. 1-11. -82-Schwartz, M. The r e c i p r o c i t i e s m u l t i p l i e r : An emp i r i c a l evaluation. Administrative Science Quarterly 9. (1964), pp. 264-277-Timms, D.W.G. Occupational s t r a t i f i c a t i o n and fr i e n d s h i p nomination: A study i n Brisbane. A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand Journal of Sociology 3_ (1971)nl, PP- 32-43. T r i a d i s , H.C. and V. V a s s i l i o u . S o c i a l status as a determinant of respect and frie n d s h i p acceptance. Sociometry 29 (1966), pp. 396-405-Turner, K.H. Role-taking, r o l e standpoint and reference-group behavior. American Journal of Sociology 6 l (1956), pp. 316-328. Weinstein, E.A. and P. Deutschberger. Tasks, bargains and i d e n t i t i e s i n s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n . S o c i a l Forces 42 (1964)n4, pp. 451-456.. Unpublished M a t e r i a l Kriesberg, L. "Non-normative r e c i p r o c i t y : C r i t i q u e of Gouldner's: The norm of r e c i p r o c i t y : A preliminary statement." Microfiche 66-10. C.F.S.L., U n i v e r s i t y of Wisconsin. Milwaukee. Paper presented t o General Session of the Midwest S o c i o l o g i c a l Society, Annual Meetings, i960. L e i k , R.K., R.M. Emerson and R.L. Burgess. "The Emergence of S t r a t i f i c a t i o n i n Exchange Networks: An experimental demonstration." Paper presented at the West Coast Conference f o r Small Group Research. San Diego, 1968. I n s t i t u t e f o r S o c i o l o g i c a l Research: U n i v e r s i t y of Washington, S e a t t l e . (Mimeographed) APPENDIX I PILOT WORK The f i r s t experiments c a r r i e d out suggested that exchanges were almost random and on the basis of informal post experimental interviews i t was decided that as a consequence of the i n s t r u c t i o n s used the p r i n c i p l e of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y was not operating. The problem seemed to l i e i n the f a c t that the subjects d i d not know what the buttons would be used f o r and hence d i d not know how to value the buttons. Hence, subjects were asked t o operate on the basis of a t a b l e that i n d i c a t e d how much d i f f e r e n t numbers of buttons would be worth during the second part of the game. The procedure of g i v i n g subjects a ta b l e to base t h e i r c a l c u l a t i o n s on i s precedented i n a study by S.S. S i e g e l and L.E. Pouraker, Bargaining and Group Decision Making. (New York: McGraw-Hill, i960). I t had the advantage of standardizing the value of given numbers of the d i f f e r e n t coloured buttons without n e c e s s i t a t i n g f u r t h e r information about the second part of the experiment. The p r o v i s i o n of the tables r e s u l t e d i n a skewing of i n i t i a t i o n s toward the highs. Further experiments l e d f i r s t t o the a p p l i c a t i o n of l i m i t s on what the subjects could o f f e r and second t o l i m i t s on what could be given i n return. The f o l l o w i n g data are the r e s u l t s of s i x experiments run using four subjects per experiment: 1 high 600 blue, 1 high 600 yellow, 1 low 300 blue, and 1 low 300 yellow. Highs could not o f f e r more than 50 buttons at a time though there was no r e s t r i c t i o n on how many buttons they could ask f o r i n return. Lows could not o f f e r more than 25 at a time and again there was no r e s t r i c t i o n on how many buttons they could ask f o r i n return. 11/12 highs and 10/12 lows i n i t i a t e d to a high during the f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange. -84-During the second opportunity f o r exchange, however, 8/12 highs and 7/12 lows i n i t i a t e d to lows. From opportunity 3 through to opportunity 6 the subjects returned t o i n i t i a t i n g predominantly t o the highs. I t seemed most l i k e l y that the odd r e s u l t s f o r opportunity 2 were caused by: ( i ) the f a c t that the lows' f a i l u r e to enter i n t o exchanges during the f i r s t opportunity had made them conspicuous i n that they s t i l l had only one p i l e of buttons i n front of them, and ( i i ) the u t i l i t y of response v a r i a b i l i t y (see S. S i e g e l i n c o l l a b o r a t i o n w i t h A l b e r t a S i e g e l and J u l i a M. Andrews, Choice Strategy and U t i l i t y , New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). The fa c t that the lows d i d not give up i n i t i a t i n g t o the highs seemed to be a consequence of the f a c t that the odd large o f f e r s to the lows from the highs that were accepted by the lows ( i . e . , there were no r e s t r i c t i o n s on what subjects could give i n return) mitigated the need f o r the lows t o get together. Subsequent experiments were run g i v i n g subjects i n i t i a l amounts of both resources and applying r e s t r i c t i o n s not only t o what could be offered but also to what could be given i n return. APPENDIX II LABORATORY SET-UP A. The booths used were as I l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 9-Figure 9. A booth 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 . Dacron polyester, semi sheer gauze with 1/16 inch sheer s t r i p s running v e r t i c a l l y and horizontally 1/4 Inch apart. When the room was illuminated from the center, subjects could see through the gauze window i n front of them but not through both t h e i r window and the windows i n front of the other subjects. 2. Card t e l l i n g subject what resources he had to begin with. 3. Subject's l e t t e r (also on the front of the booth so that the other subjects could see i t ) . 4. A 4 inch gap allowed subject to keep his buttons out In front of the booth so that the other subjects could see them. 5. Card t e l l i n g subject that there are l i m i t s on the size of offers he can make and the size of amounts he can give i n return. 6. Table indicating the worth of different numbers of buttons of a given colour f o r the second part of the game. The instructions drew attention to the fact that the table implies law of diminishing marginal u t i l i t y . -86-B. The cards pinned to the lower bar of the booths were as i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 10. Figure 10. Sample cards pinned to lower bar of each subject's booth. G. 600 Blue 30 Yellow LIMITS You cannot o f f e r more than 30 buttons at a time You cannot accept any o f f e r that requires you to give more than 30 buttons i n return. There are no r e s t r i c t i o n s on what you ask f o r i n re t u r n f o r what you o f f e r . C. Figure 11 i s a copy o f the t a b l e pinned t o the side of each subject's booth (note that the table i s based on an exponent of .5 - see: p, 67 Decision Making. Edited by W. Edwards and A. Tversky. Edwards, discussing the u t i l i t y of money, says, "...The most d i r e c t way of f i n d i n g out how valuable $10 i s to someone i s to ask him. No one has done that but Stevens reports anecdotally the r e s u l t s of a semi experiment i n which Galanter asked Ss how much money would be twice (or h a l f ) as desirable as $10, and other amounts. He found r e s u l t s consistent with Steven's general power law f o r psychophysics, w i t h an experiment of 0.5, which implies decreasing marginal u t i l i t y . . . . " ) . -87-Figure 11. Copy of the Table pinned to the side of each subject's booth (upper h a l f ) 800 2826 790 2806 780 2786 770 2766 760 2746 750 2726 7^0 2706 730 2686 720 2666 710 2646 700 2626 690 2606 680 2586 670 2566 660 2546 650 2526 640 2496 630 2476 620 2456 610 2436 600 2416 590 2396 580 2376 570 2356 To t a l number of 560 2336 buttons of a 550 2316 given colour: 540 2296 (Notice that the 530 2276 increments on 520 2256 t h i s side are 510 2236 a l l equal.) 500 2216 490 2196 480 2176 470 2156 460 2136 450 2116 440 2096 430 2072 420 2048 410 2024 400 2000 390 1975 380 1949 370 1923 360 1897 350 1871 340 1843 330 1815 320 1787 310 1759 \ > 1 7 3 V Net worth of t o t a l number of buttons of a given colour i n value u n i t s f o r the second phase of the experiment. (Notice that the increments on t h i s side are smaller at the top than at the bottom.) -88-Figure 11 (continued) (lower h a l f ) y / V \ / > ' 2 9 0 280 270 260 250 240 230 220 210 Tot a l number of 200 buttons of a 190 given colour: 180 (Notice that the 170 increments on 160 t h i s side are 150 a l l equal.) 140 130 120 110 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 Base l i n e zero 0 1703 1672 1642 1612 1580 1548 1516 1484 1450 1416 Net worth of t o t a l 1380 number of buttons 1342 of a given colour 1303 i n value u n i t s f o r 1263 the second phase 1224 of the experiment. 1183 (Notice that the 1141 increments on t h i s 1099 side are smaller 1049 at the top than at 1000 the bottom.) 949 895 837 774 707 632 547 446 316 - Base l i n e zero APPENDIX I I I INSTRUCTIONS The i n s t r u c t i o n s were given by means of a tape recorder - the same i n s t r u c t i o n s were used f o r each experiment. The i n s t r u c t i o n s were taped because i t was noticed during p i l o t work that some subjects seemed to have trouble a s s i m i l a t i n g the i n s t r u c t i o n s when they were given i n w r i t t e n form. The i n s t r u c t i o n s were given i n as informal and relaxed a way as p o s s i b l e . The fo l l o w i n g i s a t r a n s c r i p t of the i n s t r u c t i o n s employed. ". . . H i ! Thanks f o r tuning up t o take part i n t h i s experiment. You are going to play a game c a l l e d exchange and b u i l d and as the name suggests there are going to be two parts to i t . The i n s t r u c t i o n s , that I am going to give you now, only concern the f i r s t part and we are going to forget about the second part u n t i l l a t e r . Exchange and b u i l d i s the sort of game i n which some of you w i l l do better than others - i n other words, you w i l l be out f o r yourselves. During t h i s f i r s t part of the game, you are going t o be exchanging or t r a d i n g buttons w i t h one another and the object of the f i r s t part of the game i s t o b u i l d up the small p i l e of buttons i n front of you without l o s i n g too many buttons from the large p i l e i n f r o n t of you. Let me put that another way. The object of the f i r s t p a r t , then, Is t o increase the number of buttons of which you have le a s t at the moment without l o s i n g too many buttons of which you have most. You need to do t h i s because i n the next part of the game the two colours are used f o r completely d i f f e r e n t purposes. So you w i l l need buttons of both colours i n the next part of the game. Now i f you look at the table on the side of your screen y o u ' l l notice that there are two columns of fi g u r e s there. The column of figures on the l e f t r e f e r to d i f f e r e n t sized p i l e s of buttons of a given colour - the column on the r i g h t t e l l s you how much these d i f f e r e n t sized p i l e s of buttons of a given colour would be -90-worth i n the next part of the game. Now i f you look c l o s e l y at the fig u r e s i n the columns, y o u ' l l notice that the fig u r e s on the l e f t increase ten at a time so they go ten, twenty, t h i r t y , f o r t y and so on r i g h t up to 800. However, the f i g u r e s on the r i g h t increase i n b i g jumps t o begin w i t h and the jumps get smaller and smaller as you go from the bottom up t o the top. Because the figures i n the two columns Increase i n d i f f e r e n t ways, the t a b l e t e l l s us two very important things. The f i r s t t h i n g i t t e l l s us i s that i f you have got a l o t of buttons of a given colour ten more would be worth l e s s to you than I f you only had a few buttons of that colour...ahmm... l e t me show...let me demonstrate that. Say you had a p i l e of 790 blue buttons you see that they would be worth 2806 value u n i t s i n the next part of the game...O.K. ...and i f you got ten more of them i t would put your p i l e up t o 800 and a p i l e of 800 i s worth 2826 so that you would have gained 20 value u n i t s . However, i f you only had a p i l e of 100 blue buttons and you got ten more you f i n d that 100 blue buttons would be worth 1000 value u n i t s f o r the next part of the game and a p i l e of 110 i s worth 1049 - so whereas i f you had 790 buttons ten extra are worth 20 value u n i t s , i f you've only got 100, ten extra are worth 49. Once again the idea i s that the more buttons you have of a given colour the l e s s worth ten extra would be. This i s the same th i n g as saying that $10 i s worth l e s s t o a m i l l i o n a i r e than say t o a person on welfare. ....The second t h i n g that the t a b l e t e l l s you i s that i f you have a l o t of buttons of one colour and only a few of the other colour you w i l l a c t u a l l y increase the worth of your buttons every time you exchange some of the buttons of which you have most f o r some of the buttons of which you have l e a s t . Now l e t me show you how t h i s works i f you had...say 800 blue buttons you f i n d that they are worth 2826 value u n i t s f o r the next part of the game ....O.K and i f that was a l l you had you decided that you had to...that you would exchange one h a l f of your blue buttons f o r some yellow buttons so that you would end up with 400 blue buttons and 400 yellow buttons you'd f i n d that a p i l e of 400 blue buttons would be worth - w e l l see i t from the t a b l e -2000 value u n i t s and since you've also managed to get a p i l e of yellow buttons they would also be worth 2000 value u n i t s so two p i l e s of -91-buttons are worth 2000 + 2000 4000 value u n i t s and you notice that whereas 800 blue buttons were only worth 2826 value u n i t s , two p i l e s : one p i l e of blue and one p i l e of yellow - 400 each - would be worth 4000 value u n i t s . So you would have a c t u a l l y increased the value of your buttons by exchanging. Since b i g p i l e s are of course b e t t e r than small p i l e s , y o u ' l l be even bett e r o f f i f you can p i c k up a few buttons while you are exchanging - that i s , i f you can get the others to give you a few more i n r e t u r n than you have t o give them -though, of course, you may f i n d t h i s d i f f i c u l t t o do because the others might not l i k e the idea. I f you look through your screen, y o u ' l l notice that each of the other screens has a l e t t e r p r i n t e d at the top of i t - y o u ' l l notice that your screen has a l e t t e r p r i n t e d on the lower bar j u s t i n f r o n t of you. Now - I'm going t o run through the steps involved i n a s i n g l e exchange opportunity so that y o u ' l l get a b e t t e r idea of what you are going to do. Remember you are going t o have a number of these exchange opportunities. F i r s t of a l l y o u ' l l look through your screen to see what the others have and decide whether you want to send an o f f e r to one of the others...ahnm...you do not have t o send an o f f e r unless you want to....so i f you decide that you want to send an o f f e r then y o u ' l l f i l l out one of the forms i n front of you....now....you cannot send an o f f e r of more than the l i m i t that's w r i t t e n on the card pinned t o the lower bar of your screen. However, you can ask f o r whatever number of buttons you l i k e i n return f o r the buttons you offer...so that although there i s a l i m i t on what you are allowed t o o f f e r , there i s no r e s t r i c t i o n on what you are allowed to request i n r e turn f o r what you offer....ahmm... Once you've done t h i s - once you've f i l l e d out a form and counted out the buttons that you are o f f e r i n g , put both the form and the buttons i n the bowl i n front of you. When everyone has done t h i s , I ' l l d e l i v e r a l l the bowls to the people that they are addressed t o . Now - i t i s c l e a r that while your bowl i s round at someone else's booth e i t h e r one or more bowls may come round t o your booth and you can accept one - only one - providing i t does not require you to give more than your l i m i t i n return. You cannot accept any o f f e r that requires you to give more than your l i m i t i n return. I f you accept an o f f e r , put a check mark on - 9 2 -the form that came with i t and any o f f e r s that you r e j e c t put crosses on the forms that came with them. When everyone has done t h a t , I ' l l ask those who have accepted an o f f e r t o take the buttons that were sent to them and t o count out the buttons that they were requested to give i n return. I ' l l then r e t u r n a l l the bowls to t h e i r owners and, of course, w e ' l l be ready t o begin the next exchange opportunity. I'd j u s t l i k e to be c l e a r on one point that during each exchange opportunity two things are happening: somebody might be r e j e c t i n g or accepting an o f f e r from you at the same time as you are accepting or r e j e c t i n g an o f f e r from somebody else...O.K. Now...throughout the course of t h i s part of the game, t r y t o keep your buttons out i n front a l l the time so that the others can see what you've got and you can keep t r a c k o f how many buttons you have on your scratch paper - the piece of yellow paper that you've been provided with...ahmm...the numbers that you're beginning with are w r i t t e n on the small card pinned t o the lower bar of your screen. This f i r s t part of the game w i l l take us about 40 minutes and y o u ' l l f i n d that once we get going y o u ' l l have plenty of time to make a l l the exchangesthat you need t o . ( s l i g h t laugh) Now I suppose I should say this...please do not cheat. Count out any buttons that you are o f f e r i n g accurately and observe the l i m i t s on...written on the card on the lower bar of your screen. That i s , don't make any o f f e r s that are l a r g e r than your l i m i t and don't accept any o f f e r s that require you to give more than your l i m i t i n return...O.K. So i f you'd j u s t l i k e to look through your screen now and decide whether you want t o send an o f f e r to one of the others during the f i r s t opportunity, we can begin." (Time f o r tape: 12 minutes) Notice that the i n s t r u c t i o n s emphasize: ( i ) that the two colours are needed because they w i l l be used f o r d i f f e r e n t purposes i n the second part of the game, ( i i ) that the s i t u a t i o n i s competitive i n the sense that some subjects w i l l supposedly do better than others, - 9 3 -( i i i ) that the p r i n c i p l e s of dinrinishing u t i l i t y applies to the two colours, and ( i v ) that there w i l l be plenty of time f o r the subjects to complete a l l the exchanges that they want t o . APPENDIX IV POSITION EFFECTS Table 9 gives the r e s u l t s of the f i r s t i n i t i a t i o n i n Set 1. These r e s u l t s i n d i c a t e that there i s a tendency t o i n i t i a t e to the most v i s i b l e person. Table 9- V i s i b i l i t y of Positions and I n i t i a t i o n s During the F i r s t Opportunities f o r Exchange Under the No Differences Condition I n i t i a t o r : To subject furthest To subject To subject To subject away ( i . e . , on l e f t on r i g h t immediately most v i s i b l e ) side side adjacent G 4 1 0 1 I 4 0 0 2 K 3 0 2 1 M 2 1 1 2 H 2 1 1 2 J 3 1 1 1 L 2 2 2 0 N 3 0 0 2 23 6 7 11 n47 2 f o r row of t o t a l s i s s i g n i f i c a n t p .001 APPENDIX V QUESTIONS ANSWERED BY SUBJECTS AFTER THE SEVEN OPPOFffUNTTIES FOR EXCHANGE SMALL GROUPS LABORATORY DEPARTMENT OF ANTHROPOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Your l e t t e r to approve or disapprove of ( l e t t e r ) to approve or disapprove of ( l e t t e r ) to approve or disapprove of ( l e t t e r ) to approve or disapprove_ of ( l e t t e r ) to approve or disapprove of ( l e t t e r ) to approve or disapprove of ( l e t t e r ) to approve or disapprove of ( l e t t e r ) 2. Would you say that you t r i e d to see your offer-from the other subject's point of view whenever you were deciding what to off e r another subject? yes Comments: no 3. I f you received two or more similar offers at the same time, what factors would you take into account i n deciding which one to accept? Comments: APPENDIX VI CHECK FOR ASSUMPTION H The data reported i n Table 10 was c o l l e c t e d at the conclusion of the experiments that were run to t e s t the hypotheses derived from the theory presented i n chapter I I . Table 8 i n d i c a t e s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of responses to the post experimental question: Would you say that you t r i e d t o see your o f f e r from the other subj ect's point of view whenever you were deciding what t o o f f e r another subject? (see appendix VII f o r the comnents the subjects made i n conjunction with t h i s question.) Table 10. Yes/No Responses to the Post Experimental Question: Would you say that you t r i e d t o see your o f f e r from the other subject's point o f view whenever you were deciding what to o f f e r another subject? Set 1: (No differences high p o s i t i o n Ss 16 8 n24 - experiments) low p o s i t i o n Ss 19 5 n24 • Set 2: (Moderate highs 19 5 n24 lows 19 5 n24 differences experiments) Set 3: (Extreme highs 27 5 n32 differences experiments) lows 30 2 n32 130 30 160 % 2 f o r column t o t a l s s i g n i f i c a n t at p .001 APPENDIX V I I SAMPLE OP COMMENTS ELICITED BY POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTION: Would you say that you t r i e d t o see your o f f e r from the other subject's point of view whenever you were deciding what t o o f f e r another subject? A. Evidence f o r empathy process: ( i ) Set 1 (No differences experiments) high-p o s i t i o n subjects. - I t r i e d t o take i n t o consideration the points he was t r y i n g t o accumulate by the s i z e of h i s two p i l e s . - Several times I offered more chips than I wanted i n order t o ensure that the d e a l was accepted. ( i i ) Set 1 (No differences experiments) low-position subjects. - I t r i e d t o make my o f f e r s as a t t r a c t i v e as p o s s i b l e but also to my b e n e f i t . - N a t u r a l l y - I wanted my o f f e r accepted. - I t r i e d t o f i g u r e out what h i s l i m i t was and then t r i e d t o give him a deal that would benefit both. - Assuming one i s out t o 'win' he must make the best deal and one he f e e l s w i l l be acceptable. - yes but only t o the extent of seeing, by the s i z e of the other's two p i l e s , whether the o f f e r ' s reasonable. ( i i i ) Set 2 (Moderate differences experiments) highs. - I didn't t r y t o make o f f e r s which were unreasonable because I knew they would be rejected. - By always o f f e r i n g more than I intended t o receive I was appealing to h i s greedy nature. - I n order that he would be more l i k e l y t o accept. - I looked t o see who could use the colour most. - I look t o see who has few of the colour he i s t r y i n g to get and make him a b i g o f f e r f o r a few more than I gave. - I looked at the state of h i s p i l e to see i f p r o f i t would work both ways. ( i v ) Set 2 (Moderate differences experiments) lows. - Only o f f e r what you would accept yourself. - I make o f f e r s where we w i l l both optimal number of buttons (hence both gain). - He has to l i k e the deal. - Generally t r y i n g to make i t p r o f i t a b l e f o r both. (v) Set 3 (Extreme differences experiments) highs. - T r i e d to make o f f e r as good as .possible t o opponent while breaking even or making points. - D e f i n i t e l y , you have to see what he wants and how badly he wants i t . - I t r i e d to f i g u r e out j u s t how much he needed blue buttons and how f a r he would go. - I t r y to get as much as I can taking into account what he should be w i l l i n g to give. (vi) Set 3 (Extreme differences experiments) lows. - Yes I figured some guy was undercutting my offers so I put more down - However, I saw that he wasn't receiving any offers so I figured he was crazy. - I wanted to trade down to the best possible number of chips and then t r y to trade for more than I offered, therefore the party must be desperate. - I t r i e d to see what terms they would accept. - Would see what the other subject might require. - Yes depending on the r e l a t i v e difference i n his two p i l e s of buttons. - I've t r i e d to make offers that help us both to an equal extent. It seems no one wants to lose any buttons. - You have to see yourself behind h i s p i l e , estimate approximately ...and then f i n d a mutually agreeable amount. Evidence against empathy process: ( i ) Set 1 (No differences experiments) high-position subjects. - Everyone f o r himself. - Size of respective p i l e s biggest factor. ( i i ) Set 1 (No differences experiments) low-position subjects. - I f you're s t r i c t l y out f o r yourself; i t i s up to the other person to watch out for themselves. - I t r i e d to establish the most number of points possible by equal trading, then by offering less f o r more I t r i e d to improve my position more. - I only looked to see i f I benefited. ( i i i ) Set 2 (Moderate differences experiments) highs. - I was only using my own point of view to obtain my largest gain. I f everyone has different t o t a l s the worth of one colour cannot be approximated. (iv) Set 2 (Moderate differences experiments) lows. - Did what meant more gain f or myself. - I can't say yes or no because i n some cases I do and some cases I don't. One thing I am not going to do i s l e t other people better themselves as a result of me. - Since everyone for himself. - Most of the time, I offered 1 : 1 deals but I experimented on deals that would be profitable f o r myself and found them lacking. (v) Set 3 (Extreme differences experiments) highs. - I treat t h i s only as a game that I don't have to worry about my fellow players. - Tried to get as many f o r myself as possible. - I would only trade even up. - I was i n business merely to make money. (vi) Set 3 (Extreme differences experiments) lows. - I allowed my own situation to influence more than the situation of the other subject. APPENDIX V I I I SAMPLE OF COMMENTS ELICITED BY POST EXPERIMENTAL QUESTION: I f you received two or more s i m i l a r o f f e r s at the same time, what facto r s would you take i n t o account i n deciding which one to accept? ( i ) Set 1 (No differences experiments) h i g h - p o s i t i o n subjects. - chance of another exchange with the same person. - Previous o f f e r s i f bargains or not. - I accepted the one with which I was d e a l i n g , over the one that I was not making an exchange. - I f I could conduct more exchanges with one of them which would f i n a l l y prove p r o f i t a b l e . - I f I had traded with one of them before, I would accept h i s over the other's with a view t o e s t a b l i s h i n g a steady arrangement. - Whether the sender had agreed to my o f f e r s and i f no experience with e i t h e r would choose the order of the l e t t e r of alphabet sender. - How many times I've traded before. - I would not break o f f a p r o f i t a b l e trade aggreement f o r the sake of a few extra buttons. - Turn down the one that turned me down on a previous occasion. - Which one had offered before I would accept. ( i i ) Set 1 (No differences experiment) low-position subjects. - Who gave me good o f f e r s before he would get my business. - I would accept the one who had the most chips of the colour I had to o f f e r so that I could send my next o f f e r t o the one j u s t refused. - what types of o f f e r s he made before. - I would look to see i f one of the persons would be more l i k e l y to trade again i n the future. - the o f f e r e r ' s r e a c t i o n to previous o f f e r s of my own. - Whom I'd dealt with before and the r e s u l t s . - The one that looks l i k e he would be good t o trade with i n the future. - I would probably accept the one where the i n i t i a t i o n benefited l e a s t . - The one which had done business with me. ( i i i ) Set 2 (Moderate differences experiments) highs. - F i r s t one. - Previous deals with other. - I would accept the most regular customer. - Previous trading 'record' with the others. - I ' l l trade with the one that needs i t most. - which one has accepted me previously. -100-- u s u a l l y accepted the one who had l e s s of what they wanted. - I f I am carrying on a good trade with the same person. - I f I could continue t o get steady income of buttons from the person. ( i v ) Set 2 (Moderate differences experiments) lows. - Past t r a d i n g . - How much I had been dealing w i t h each and would choose the most frequented. - I would look at my tra d i n g record and accept the o f f e r from the l e t t e r which I hadn't dealt w i t h . - I'd refuse the guy that was doing w e l l . - whether they had rejected an o f f e r of mine, depending on what kind of o f f e r i t was ( i f i t was outrageous o f f e r of mine, i t would not a f f e c t my d e c i s i o n ) . - a good o f f e r might be turned down t o r e t a i n good r e l a t i o n . - I f I had accepted one of them before I would probably do i t with them. - Previous o f f e r s . - previous behavior of other p l a y e r s . (v) Set 3 (Extreme differences experiments) highs. - Take o f f e r of opponent who had l e s s t o g a i n . - I f l a t e i n the game and you had been doing business with one man quite s t e a d i l y I would take h i s o f f e r , assuming the diff e r e n c e wasn't too much. - Previous o f f e r s to the same booths and how e f f e c t i v e they had been i n be t t e r i n g my p o s i t i o n . A l s o , how many blue buttons they had - I would give t o the one with the l e s s e r p i l e . - What deals had gone on before? Was he a worth while c l i e n t ? Did he have enough buttons to make tra d i n g worth while? - Whether or not a good t r a n s a c t i o n had been made with the o f f e r i n g party i n the past, I would probably accept h i s o f f e r . - Offers from that l e t t e r before and t h e i r acceptance of mine, s i z e of p i l e ( i . e . , which one would gain l e s s from the tr a n s a c t i o n ) . - Previous dealings with the o f f e r e r . - Previous trades, favourable or not. - See how close to becoming even, one player was than another, i f he was leading me and i t would help him I would not trade. - Which one had enough buttons to do more t r a d i n g w i t h . - Who had already been tr a d i n g with me s a t i s f a c t o r i l y . - The kind of previous dealings I had had with the d i f f e r e n t o f f e r e r s and whether i t would be i n my eventual i n t e r e s t s to c u l t i v a t e one or the other. - I take the f i r s t one I come t o . - How the two people involved had dealed previously and the status of the p i l e s at the present time. - probably accept from the person to whom i t would do l e a s t good. - Previous o f f e r - i f o f f e r s were generally better or more frequent from one, would accept, h i s . ( v i ) Set 3 (Extreme differences experiments) lows. - Who you had been dealing with w e l l before. - Decide who had sent i n acceptable o f f e r or accepted mine the most times. -101-Strength of others and trade with weaker. One of the o f f e r s was from a previously f r i e n d l y o f f e r e r whereas the other one had rej e c t e d my previous o f f e r . Past business. Which person the o f f e r would seem to a i d most ( i . e . , not trade with him). I f I had benefited from one I would decide to take that one or i f I had not benefited I would choose the other. Size of the p i l e s (decline l e t t e r with l a r g e r p i l e he i s b u i l d i n g ) , past trades I f refused o f f e r more than once. The guy with the greatest d i f f e r e n c e i n the p i l e s would get the accept. I would look at the two p i l e s of the o f f e r e r s to see who would gain l e a s t advantage by r e c e i v i n g my chips. I f I had gotten a s i m i l a r o f f e r from one of the two before. Previous dealership. The one with whom I have dealt before. APPENDIX IX Table 11. Coded Results of Comments E l i c i t e d by Post Experimental Question: I f you received two or more s i m i l a r o f f e r s at the same time, what facto r s would you take i n t o account i n deciding which one to accept Learning f a c t o r s (frequency of past events mentioned) Cognitive f a c t o r s (benefits that would accrue t o p a r t i e s involved; s i z e s of p i l e s ; chance f o r future trades mentioned) high-position Ss 8 2 Set 1: (No differences experiments) l o w _ p o s l t l o n S s 5 4 Set 2: (Moderate highs 5 3 - differences experiments) lows 5 2 Set 3: (Extreme highs 11 8 differences experiments) lows 9 6 43 25 APPENDIX X RAW DATA I n i t i a t i o n s and Transactions Key to notation: e.g. 11 = set 1, experiment 1 o l = f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange i - k = I made an o f f e r t o K b = blue buttons y = yellow buttons a = o f f e r was accepted r = o f f e r was rejec t e d I l o l i - k l 5 b 2 0 y a = i n experiment 1 during the f i r s t opportunity f o r exchange I made an o f f e r t o K of 15 blue buttons f o r 20 yellow buttons which was accepted by K. Set 1: (No I n i t i a l Net Resource Imbalances Between Subjects) Iloli - k l 5 b 2 0 y a Iloln-h30y30ba Ilo2n-i30y29ba Ilo2i -h l5b20yr Ho3k-g25y25ba Ilo3i -h l5b20yr Ilo4k-i30y30ba Ilo4n-i20y20br llo5n-h28y26ba Ilo5j-n29b30ya Ilo6g-128b20ya Ilo6k-g21y20ba Ilo7h-n30b29ya Ilo7m-j30y30ba 12oln-h30y25ba 12olm-g30y30br 12o2i-k30b30ya 12o2k-j30y30ba 12o3i-k30b30ya 12o3n-g30y30ba 12o4i-k30b30ya 12o41-i30b30yr 12o5k-j20y30ba 12o5n-i30y30ba 12o6n-j30y30ba 12o6m-g30y30ba Ilolh-n30b28ya Ilolg-m30b30yr Ilo2h-k30b29ya Ilo2j-126b30yr Ilo3m-h30y30ba Ilo31- j l0y20br Ilo4h-m30b29ya llo4l-h!3y21br Ilo5k-j21y20ba l lo51-H3y21br Ilo6n - i l l y l 0 b a Ilo6l-g20y30br Ilo7j-127b30ya Ilo7g-n21b20yr 12olg-130b30ya 12olk-h30y30br 12o2n-i30y25ba 12o2h-k30bl00yr 12o3m-h30y30ba 12o3g-125b30yr 12o4k-I30y30ba 12o4j-k30b30yr 12o5m-g30y30ba 12o5i-k30b30ya 12o6g-m30b30ya 12o6h-m30b30ya Ilolj -m30b30ya Ilolm-j30y40br Ilo21-gl0y20ba Ilo2m-i30y40br Ilo3j-n26b30ya Ilo3h-130b29yr Ho4g-k25b25ya Ilo4j -k26y30br Ho5m-g25y22ba I l o 5 i - n l 0 b l 3 y r Ilo6h-n30b29ya Ilo6m-i30y29br Ilo7n-g20yl9ba Ilo71-h20y28br 12olj-n30b30ya 12oli-120b20yr 12o2j-n30b30ya 12o21-i30b28yr 12o3j-130b30ya 12o3h-130b50yr 12o4n-h30y30ba 12o4h-m30b50yr 1205h-n30b30ya 12o5g-130b30yr 12o6i-k30b30ya 12o6j-130b30ya I l o l l - I 3 0 y 3 0 b a Ilolk-I20y25br Ilo2g-130bl5ya Ilo2k-j25y30br l l o 3 n-j 20y20ba Ilo3g-ml0b20yr Ilo4i-127b30ya Ilo4m-jl0yl5br Ilo5h-k30b29ya Ilo5g-k30b30yr Ilo6j-k20b20ya l l o 6 Ilo7k-120y20ba l l o 7 12olh-n30b50yr 12oll-m27y30br 12o2m-j25y25ba 12o2g-4n25b30yr 12o31-I30b30ya 12o3k-g30y30br 12o4g-m30b30ya 12o4m-I30y30br 12o5j-I30b30ya 12o51-g30b30yr 12o6k-i30y30ba 12o6l-j30b30yr -104-12o71-i30y30ba 12o7i-k30b30yr 13oln-g25y25ba 13olj-125b20yr 13o2h-k30b30ya 13o2g-l40b30ya 13o3h-130b30ya 13o3j-mlObllya 13o4k-130y30ba 13o4j-n30b30yr 13o5n-j30y30ba 13o5h-n30b30ya 13o6l-h20y20ba 13o6k-i29y30br 13o7h-m20b20ya 13o7k-j30y30ba I4olk-j30y30ba I4oli-k30b30yr I4o21-g30y30ba I4o2g-k30b25ya I4o3m-j30y30ba I4o3k-g25y30ba I4o4j-130b30ya I4o4g-130b30yr I4o5m-i30y30ba I4o5k-i25y30br 1.4o6h-k30b30ya I4o6m-g25y30ba I4o7g-m25b20ya I4o7m-g25y30br 15olg-m30b30ya 15oll-g30y30ba 15o2g-m30b30ya 15o2m-g30y30br 15o3k-g30y30ba 15o3i-k30b29ya 15o4g-m30b30ya 15o4h-130b30ya 15o5h-k30b30ya 15o5i-m30b30ya 15o6m-130y30ba 15o6g-h28y30ba 15o71-gl0yl0ba 15o7i-g 6y 6br I6oli-130b26ya I6oln-h20y20ba I6o2k-j30y30ba I6o2i-n30b27ya I6o3i-m30b28ya I6o31-g30y30ba I6o4j-m30b30ya I6o4m-i30y30ba 12o7n-g30y30ba 12o7k-120y30br 13olg-m30b30ya 13olm-g30y35br 1 3 o 2 n - i 3 0 y 3 0 b a 13o2k-g20y25br 13o3k-h30y30ba 13o3g-130b40yr 13o4h-n30b30ya 13o4m-120y20br 1 3 o 5 j - k 3 0 b 2 5 y a 1 3 o 5 k - j 2 9 y 3 0 b r 13o6n-g25y25ba 13o6j - k 3 0 b 3 0 y r 13o7j -n30b30ya 13o7m-n 8y 7br I4olm-h30y30ba I 4 o l g - n 3 0 b 3 0 y r I4o2k-h30y30ba I4o2m-h30y30br I 4 o 3 h - 1 3 0 b 3 0 y a I4o3j - n 2 9 b 3 0 y a I4o4l - h 3 0 y 3 0 b a I4o4m- j30y30br I4o5n - j30b21ya I4o51 - i 3 0 y 3 0 b r I 4 o 6 j - 1 3 0 b 3 0 y a I4o6k - i 3 0 y 3 0 b r I4o7k-j30y30ba I4o7j -m24b30yr 15oli - 1 3 0 b 3 0 y a 1 5 o l h - m l 5 b l 8 y r 15o2,i-n30b35ya 15o2k-g30y35br 15o3m-i30y30ba 15o3n-h30y33br 15o4i -n30b29ya 15o4l -g30y30ba 15o5n-j30y25ba 15o5m-i30y30ba 15o6h-130b30ya 15o6i-m30b30ya 1 5 o 7 n - j 3 0 y 2 6 b a 1 5 o 7 j - k 2 0 b 2 5 y r I6olk - j 3 0 y 3 0 b a I6olj - k 2 0 b 2 0 y a I6o2h-m30b30ya I6o2g-n30b30yr I6o3k-130y30ba I6o3h-n30b30yr I6o4l - g 3 0 y 3 0 b a I6o4h-m30b30yr 12o7g-130b30ya 12o7j-125b30yr 13olh-130b30ya 13olk-j20y30br 13o2m-jl0yllba 13o2i-k30b30yr 13o3i-n30b30ya 13o3m-j20y20br 13o4n-h30y30ba 13o4i-130b30yr 1 3 o 5 i H T i 3 0 b 3 0 y a 13o51-j30y30br 13o6g-k30b20ya 13o6m-g30y31br 13o71-il0yl0ba 13o7g-n25b30yr I4olh-k30b30ya I4oll-h30y20br I4o2h-n30b30ya I4o2i-k30b28yr I4o3g-k20b20ya I4o31-130b25yr I4o4n-j30y20ba I4o4k-g20y23br I4o5g-m30b25ya I4o5j-m25b30yr I4o6n-i20yl5ba I4o6g-n25b20yr I4o7h-k30b30ya I4o7i-m30b30yr 15olk-h30y30ba 15olm-h25y25br 15o2n-g30y30ba 15o2i-m30b30yr 15o31-h30y30ba 15o3j-n25b35yr 15o4k-h30y30ba 15o4j-m25b35yr 15o51-g30y30ba 15o5k-j30y35br 15o6l-gl0yl0ba 15o6j-m20b25yr 15o7g-k28b30yr 15o7h-k20b30yr I6olm-130y30ba l6olh-m39b39ya I6o21-g30y30ba I6o2j-n30b30yr I6o3ffl-h30y30ba I6o3g-k30b28yr I6o4g-n30b28ya I6o4i-k30b28yr 12o7m-g30y30br 12o7h-kl5bl5yr 13oll-h30yl0ba 13oli-130b30yr 13o21-g30y30ba 13o2j-k20b20yr 13o3n-j30y30ba 13o31-j20y30br 13o4l-i20y20br 13o4g-m30b20yr 13o5m-g25y28ba 13o5j-m30b30yr 13o6hnii30b30ya 13o6i-m30b30yr 13o7i-k30b30ya 13o7n-h30y30br I4oln-g20yl0ba I4olj-k20b20yr I4o2j-ra30b30ya l4o2n-g25yl5br I4o3n-130yl0ba I4o31-i30y50br I4o4h-k30b30ya I4o4i-130b20yr I4o5i-130b20ya I4o5h-125b30yr I4o6i-n30b20ya I4o6l-130y30br I4o71-g20y20ba I4o7h-i30y25ba 15olj-k30b25ya 15ol 15o2h-n22b25yr 15o2 15o3g-n30b30ya 15o3h-m29b30yr 15o4m-i30y30ba 15o4n-129y30br 15o5g-130b30ya 15o5j-g25b35yr 15o6n-j30y26ba 15o6k-130y32br 15o7k-i30y30br 15o7m-il5yl5br I6oll-g30y30ba I6olg-m30b25yr I6o2n-j30y30ba I6o2m-g30y30br I6o3j-n30b30ya I6o3n-i30y30br I6o4k-j30y30ba I6o4n-j30y30br -105-I6o5k-g30y30ba I6o5n-g30y30br I6o6m-h30y30ba I6o6g-k30b30ya I6o7j-130b30ya !6o7i-k25b25yr I6o5m-h30y30ba I6o51-g30y30br I6o6h-m30b30ya I6o6k-j30y30ba I6o7n-g30y30ba I6o7g-130b30yr I6o5i-n30b28ya I6o5j-130b30yr I6o6j-n30b30ya I6o6i-130b28yr I6o7k-h20y20ba I6o71-m30y30br I6o5g-k30b30ya I6o5h-k30b30yr I6o6n-i30y30ba I6o6l-j30y30br I6o7m-i30y30ba I6o7h-m30b30yr -106-Set 2: (Moderate I n i t i a l Net Resource Imbalances Between Subjects) 21oll - i25y25ba 21oln-h35y30br 21o2j-m25b30ya 21o2m-g30y30br 21o31-g20y20ba 21o3m-125y20ba 21o4l-g20y20ba 21o4k-h25y25ba 21o5k-h25y25ba 21o5j-m30b35ya 21o6l-g20y20ba 21o6m-i30y30br 21o7h-120b25ya 21o7m-i20y25br 22olg-n25b25ya 22oll-j25yl5ba 22o2h-ml9b20ya 22o2k-g25y25ba 22o3h-g25y25ba 22o3m-h20yl9ba 22o4k-i25y25ba 22o4g-125b25ya 22o5j-k25b25ya 22o5k-j25y25ba 22o6i-n20b20ya 22o6m-j35y32ba 22o71-i25y23ba 22o7k-120y25br 23olm-I35y35ba 23olk-hl0y37br 23o2j-m35b35ya 23o2m-j35y35ba 23o3i-n35b35ya 23o3j-m35b40yr 23o4i-n35b35ya 23o4l-j20y25ba 23o5i-n35b35ya 23o5n-h20y25ba 23o6i-n35b35ya 23o6h-m 5bl0yr 23o71-h20y25ba 23o7g-k25b25yr 24oli-120b20ya 24olm-j32y30br 24o2h-n25b25ya 24o2j-k20b25yr 24o3g-n25b25ya 24o3n-i20yl5ba 24o4j-n25b25va 24o4n-i20y20br 21olj-n35b35ya 21olh-n25b25yr 21o2g-120b20ya 21o2i-m20b25yr 2lo3h-j35y30ba 21o3h-m25b25ya 21o4n-j35y30ba 21o4h-125b25yr 21o5g-n20b20ya 21o5h-k25b25ya 21o6g-120b20ya 21o6i-m20b25yr 21o71-g20y20ba 21o7k-h25y25br 22oli-120b20ya 22oln-h30y30br 22o2j-k25b20ya 22o2i-m20b25yr 22o3g-m25b25ya 22o3h-123b24ya 22o4h-n24b25ya 22o4m-i20y20br 22o51-g25y24ba 22o5i-m35b35yr 22o6g-m23b25ya 22o6k-g20y25br 22o7j-125b25ya 22o7i-110bl0yr 23olg-125b25ya 23oli-135b30yr 23o21-h25y25ba 23o2k-g20y50br 23o3m-j35y35ba 23o3k-hl0y25br 23o4m-i35y35ba 2 3 o 4 n-jl0yl5br 23o5m-i35y35ba 23o51-g25y20ba 23o6l-j20y25ba 23o6m-g25y30br 23o7h-kl5bl5ya 23o7m-g25y25br 24olh-ml0bl0ya 24olk-j25y25br 24o2i-m30b25ya 24o21-m25y52br 24o3k-g25y23ba 24o3j-115b20yr 24o4g-k23b25ya 24o4l-h20y25br 21olk-h25y25ba 21o3jn-g20y30br 21o2k-h25y25ba 21o21-i20y20br 21o3i-n20b25ya 21o3gHii25b25yr 21o4j-n30b35ya 21o4m-i30y30br 21o5h-j35y30ba 21o5m-g20y25br 21o6k-h25y25ba 21o6n-g20y20br 2lo7h-j35y30ba 21o7i-n20b25yr 22o]m-h20yl5ba 22olh-nl5bl8yr 22o2n-j25y25ba 22o21-j20yl8br 22o3i-n25b20ya 22o3j-k25b20ya 22o4j-k25b25ya 22o4i -nl5bl8yr 22o5n-i35y30ba 22o5h-m25b25yr 22o6n-i30y30ba 22o6l-j25y24ba 22o7hnn20b20ya 22o7g-m20b25yr 23oln-j35y35ba 23oll-i25y25br 23o2n-i35y35ba 23o2g-m25b25yr 23o3h-m25b25ya 23o3g-k20b30yr 23o4j-m35b35ya 23o4h-nl0bl5yr 23o5h-110bl0ya 23o5g-kl5b25yr 23o6n-j20y25br 23o6k-jl5y25br 23o7k-g25y25ba 23o7j^n35b35yr 24oll-g25y25ba 24olg-ml0bl5yr 24o2g-125b25ya 24o2m-i20y20br 24o3m-h25y20ba 24o31-g25y25br 24o4k-i24y23br 24o4h-m20b25yr 21oli-120b20ya 21olg-n25b25yr 21o2h-i35y30br 21o2h-j25b25yr 21o3k-h25y25ba 21o3j-k25b35yr 21o4g-120b20ya 21o4i-nl0bl5yr 21o51-g20y20ba 21o5i-120b27yr 21o6h-^i25b25ya 21o6j-ml5b20yr 21o7g-n20b20ya 21o7j-nl5b20yr 22olj-k25b20ya 22olk-i20y35br 22o2g-125b25ya 22o2m-j20y20br 22o3k-j20y25ba 22o31-i25y20br 22o4l-h25y21ba 22o4n-k25y25br 22o5g-n25b25ya 22o5m-i35y32br 22o6h-k25b25ya 22o6j-130b30yr 22o7m-i20y25br 22o7n-g35y30br 23olh-nl0b20ya 23olj-n20b40yr 23o2i-n35b35ya 23o2h-kl0b20yr 23o31-g20y25ba 23o3n-g35y40br 23o4g-kl5b25ya 23o4k-il0y20br 23o5j-m35b35ya 23o5k-ml5y25br 23o6j-n35b35yr 23o6g-n25b25yr 23o7i-n35b35ya 23o7n-g 5yl0br 24olj-110bl5yr 24oln-i25y30br 24o2n-j25y25br 24o2k-i25y25br 24o3j^n35b35ya 24o3h-k20b25yr 24o4i-k20b25yr 24o4m-h35y35br -107-24o51-i24y25ba 24o5h-n25b25ya 24o6k-±l4yl4ba 24o6j-k30b30yr 24o7m-j30y30ba 24o7h-n25b25yr 25olh-nl0bl0ya 25olg-m50b50yr 25o2n-j30y25ba 25o21-h20y20br 25o3j-135b25ya 25o3h-ml5b25ya 25o4n-j35y27ba 25o4h-kl5b25yr 25o5k-125yl5ba 25o51-g25y25br 25o6m-h30y20ba 25o6l-k25b25yr 25o7k-125y24ba 25o7g-n25b24ya 26oll-g20y25ba 26oln-hl5yl3ba 26o2i-n35b35ya 26o2g-n20b30yr 26o3g-k20b25ya 26o3h-kl0bl3yr 26o4m-j35y35ba 26o4n-j35y35br 26o5n-h25y20ba 26o5k-i25y30br 26063-m35b35ya 26o6m-j35y35ba 26o7j-m35b35ya 26o71-n35b35yr 24o5g-n23b25ya 24o5jnn20b22yr 24o6l-g25y30ba 24o6n-g30y32br 24o71-hl5yl5ba 24o71-130b33yr 25olk-g20yl8ba 25oln-gl5yl0br 25o2h-ml0bl5ya 25o2j-m35b30yr 25o3n-g30y25ba 25o3k-g22y21br 25o4l-m35b35ya 25o4m-h20yl5br 25o5g-k25b24ya 25o51-135b35yr 25o6j-m35b25ya 25o6g-k25b23yr 25o7m-j35y25ba 25o7i-m35b35yr 26olj-n35b35ya 26oll-135b35yr 26o2h-m25b23ya 26o2j-n35b35yr 26o3i-n35b33ya 26o31-jl5y25br 26o4l-n35b35ya 26o4l-i20y25br 26o5g-k20b25ya 26o51-h25y25br 26o6n-135y35ba 26o6k-gl3yl5ba 26o71-g20y20ba 26o7n-j35y32br 24o5k-hl5yl5ba 24o5n-j30y31br 24o6h-m25b25ya 24o6g-k25b30yr 24o7k-il8yl7ba 24o7g-n25b30yr 25olm-g30y30br 25oll-g25y25br 25o2k-g20yl8ba 25o2m-j20y20br 25o31-k25b25ya 2 5 o 3 g - l l l b l 0 y r 25o4k-125y24ba 25o4g-n25b26yr 25o5n-g33y26ba 25o5m-g25y20br 25o6n-j35y28ba 25o6l-i25y25br 25o7h-120b20ya 25o7n-133y26br 26olm-j35y35ba 26olk-125y45br 26o2h-120yl8ba 26o2m-h35y35br 26o3k-h25yl5ba 26o3n-j30y27br 26o4k-h25yl5br 26o4j-135b35yr 26o5i-n35b35ya 26o5J-135b35yr 26o6g-120b25ya 26o6l-j25y25br 26o7m-j35y35ba 26o7g-ml5b20yr 24o5m-g30y25ba 24o6m-g20y20br 24o6l -kl0bl3yr 24o7j-n25b25ya 24o7n-h30y32br 25oll-n35b35yr 25olj-n35b35yr 25o2i-n35b35ya 25o2g-k25b26yr 25o3m-i30y20ba 25o31-125y25br 25o4j-135b25ya 24o4l-j25y25br 25o5j-n35b25ya 25o5h-nl5b25yr 25o6k-125y24ba 25o6h-m20b25yr 25o7j-m35b25ya 25o71-j25y25br 26olg-m25b25ya 26olh-n25b25yr 26o21-h20y25ba 26o2k-j20y30br 26o3m-j35y35ba 26o3j-n35b35yr 26o4g-n20b25yr 26o4h-jl3yl8br 26o5m-j35y35ba 26o6l-n35b35ya 26o6h-m 2b 2yr 26o7k-gl3yl5br 26o7 -108-Set 3: (Extreme I n i t i a l Net Resource Imbalances Between Subjects) 31oln-j30y35ba 31olk-jl0yl5br 31o2j-n30b35ya 31o2i-n30b40yr 31o3n-j40b40ya 31o3h-kl7b20ya 31o4j-n35b40ya 31o4k-il5y20br 31o5j-m40b40ya 31o51-il5yl5br 31o6n-i40y40ba 31o6j-nl0bl5yr 31o7i-n40b40ya 31o7j-ml0bl5yr 32olg-ml5bl8ya 32olj-n40b40yr 32o2m-i30y40ba 32o2k-j20y20ba 32o31-hl9y20ba 32o3k-j20yl9ba 32o4m-i40y40ba 32o4g-ml0bl5yr 32o5i-m40b40ya 32o5j-m60b40yr 32o6m-i40y40ba 32o6n-j40y38ba 32o7h-120b20ya 32o7m-i40y40ba 33olj-m30b30ya 33olg-m20b20yr 33o2j-n40b40ya 33o2i-m40b40ya 33o3h-n20b20ya 33o3j-m40b40ya 33o4k-g20y20ba 33o4h-j40y40br 33o5g-k20b20ya 33o51-jl0yl0br 33o6k-g20y20ba 33o6i-n40b40ya 33o7h-110bl5ya 33o7m-i25y25br 34olk-il7y20ba 34olm-h40y39br 34o2m-i40y38ba 34o2i-n25b25ya 34o3j-k20b20ya 34o3k-i20y20ba 34o4l-h20y20ba 34o4g-k20b20yr 31olg-n20b20ya 31olm-g40y40br 31o2g-m20b25ya 31o2h-i30y40ba 31o3g-120b20ya 31o3j-m40b40ya 31o4l-g20y20ba 31o4i-n30b40yr 31o5m-j40y40ba 31o5h-kl5b20yr 31o6g-kl5bl5ya 31o6l-i20y20br 31o7n-j35y38br 31o7h-nl8b20yr 32olh-n20b20ya 32olm-j40yl00br 32o2j-m40b40ya 32o2n-j20y25br 32o3n-g20y20ba 32o3h-k20b20ya 32o4k-j20y20ba 32o4n-i30y37br 32o5m-i40y40ba 32o5h-m20b20yr 32o6i-m40b40ya 32o6g-n 5b 4yr 32o7j-m40b30ya 32o7k-i20yl7br 33olh-i40y40ba 33ol l - i l5y l5br 33o21-h20yl0ba 33o2m-j20y20ba 33o3m-i40y40ba 33o3k-jl5y20br 33o4m-j40y40ba 33o4l-gl0yl0br 33o5i-m40b40ya 33o5h-k20b20yr 33o6m-i40y40ba 33o6g-k20b20ya 33o7i-n40b40ya 33o7k-il5y20br 34oli-n25b20ya 34olh-kl5b20yr 34o21-g20y20ba 34o2j-m20b20yr 34o31-h20y20ba 34o3m-j40y38ba 34o4h-k20bl5ya 34o4i-k30b30yr 31olj-m40b40ya 31oll-j20y25br 31o2k-gl5yl5ba 31o21-i20y20br 31o3i-n30b40ya 31o3m-i30y30ba 31o4m-j40y40ba 31o4g-nl5b20yr 31o5k-hl6y20ba 31o5n-i35y38ba 31o6i-m35b40ya 31o6m-i30y30br 31o7g-n20b20yr 31o7k-jl8y20br 32oln-I25yl0ba 32olk-I20y20br 32o21-g20y20ba 32o2g^nl5bl7yr 32o3g-nl5bl8ya 32o3m-i35y40br 32o4h-120b20ya 32o4l-jl6yl9br 32o5n-j30y30ba 32o5k-j20y20br 32o6h-n20b20ya 32o6j-n60b40yr 32o71-g20y20ba 32o7g-m20bl4yr 33olk~jl5y20br 33olh-nl5b20yr 33o2n-j40y40ba 33o2k-h20y20br 33o3g-k20b20ya 33o3i-kl5b25yr 33o4j-n40b40ya 33o4h-ml0b20yr 33o5m-j30y30ba 33o5k-il5y20br 33o6j-110blOya 33o6l-hlOylObr 33o7g-k20b20ya 33o71-il0yl0br 34oln-j40y40ba 34olj-n20b25yr 34o2h-j40y40ba 34o2h-n20b20yr 34o3g-120b20ya 34o3h-120b20yr 34o4m-j40y39ba 34o4k-hl8y20br 31olinn30b40yr 31olh-n20b40yr 31o2m-j40y40ba 31o2h-ml0b20yr 31o3k-hl0yl0ba 31o31-i20yl5br 31o4h-H5b20ya 31o4n-j35y40br 31o5i-130b40ya 31o5gnn20b20yr 31o6h-nl5b20ya 31o6k-gl7y20br 31o71-i20y25br 31o7m-i30y30br 32ol l-i20y20br 32oli-n40b40yr 32o2i-n20b20ya 32o2h-m20b20yr 32o3i-m30b30ya 32o3j-m30b25yr 32o4i-n20b20ya 32o4j-k40b40yr 32o51-i20y20br 32o5g-nl5b20yr 32o6l-h20y20ba 32o6k-j20yl8br 32o7i-n40b40ya, 32o7h-j40y43br 33oli-m25b25yr 33olm-i30y30br 33o2g-120bl9ya 33o2h-m20b20yr 33o31-jl0yl0ba 33o3n-i40y40br 33o4g-120b20ya 33o4i-120b25yr 33o5j-n40b40ya 33o5h-g40y40br 33o6n-h20y20ba 33o6h-n20b20yr 33o7n-i40y40ba 33o7j-m20b20yr 34olg-n20b20yr 34oll-j20y20br 34o2g-m20b20ya 34o2k-gl7y20br 34o3i-n30b30ya 34o3n-j40y40br 34o4n-h30y30br 34o4j-k20b20yr -109-34o5h-kl9b20ya 34o5i-m25b25ya 34o6i-kl7b20ya 34o6h-i20y25br 34o7k-h20y20ba 34o7h-m20b22yr 35oli-m30b30ya 35olg-ml5bl5yr 35o2m-i40y20ba 35o2h-120b20yr 35o3h-k20bl5ya 35o3h-i40y40ba 35o4h-120b20ya 35o4l-120y20br 35o5m-h40y30ba 35o51-k 8bl0ya 35o6g-120b20ya 35o6j-n40b40ya 35o7h-120b20ya 35o7i-k 5bl0yr 36olm-j40yl5ba 36olh-j40y40br 36o2i-n40b40ya 36o2n-h20y20ba 36o3j-125bl5ya 36o3h-i40y40ba 36o4g-k20bl5ya 36o4h-i40y40ba 36o51-g20yl5ba 36o5h-m20b20ya 36o6j-m30b25ya 36o6k-g20y20ba 36o7g-110bl5ya 36o71-h20yl5ba 37oll-j20y20ba 37olm-j40y50br 37o2h-i40y38ba 37o2h-ml0b20yr 37o3m-j40y30ba 37o31-H5y20br 37o4h-jl0yl0ba 37o4l-gl5yl6br 37o5j-m40b40ya 37o5h-ml4b20yr 37o6l-kl4bl5ya 37o6j-n40b40ya 37o7m-j40y40ba 37o7h-i40y40ba 38oll-110y20ba 38olh-j40y40br 38o2k-g20y20ba 38o2g-kl5bl5ya 34o5j-n20b20ya 34o5k-ll8y20ba 34o6j-m20bl9ya 34o6h-n20b25yr 34o7h-j40y40ba 34o7g-m20b25yr 35olk-jl0yl2ba 35oln-j30y40br 35o21-j20y20ba 35o2k-gl0yl5br 35o3k-h20y25ba 35o31-jl9y20br 35o4j-n40b40ya 35o4m-h40y35br 35o5h-m20b20ya 35o5g-m20b20yr 35o6k-g20y20ba 35o6n-i40y40ba 35o7j-n40b40ya 35o7g-n20b20yr 36oli-m40b40ya 36olg-ml0bl0yr 36o2k-i20y20ba 36o2g-hl0bl0yr 36o3h-k20b20ya 36o31-g20yl5ba 36o4i-m40b40ya 36o4l-g20y20ba 36o5h-l40y40ba 36o5m-j35y40br 36o6g-k20b20ya 36o6h-i40y40br 36o7i-ml0bl0ya 36o7h-jl5y20br 37olj-m40b40ya 37olg-m20y20br 37o2g-n20b20ya 37o2ra-i40y30br 37o3b-kl0bl2ya 37o3k-i20y20br 37o4n-137y39ba 37o4j-k40b40yr 37o51-h20y20ba 37o5m-g40y25br 37o6g-m20b30ya 37o6l-119y20br 37o7h-k20b20ya 37o7g-H0bl0ya 38olj-m40b35ya 38olg-ml0bl5yr 38o2m-j30y30ba 38o21-il0y20br 34o51-g20y20ba 34o5h-g30y30br 34o6l-h20y20ba 34o6k-jl9y20br 34o7j-n20b20ya 34o7i-125b25yr 35olj-n30b30ya 35olh-m20b30yr 35o2g-120b20ya 35o2j-m35b35yr 35o3i-m40b40ya 35o3m-j35y35br 35o4h-i40y40ba 35o4k-110yl3br 35o5j-n40b40ya 35b51-h20y20br 35o6i-k 8bl0ya 35o6l-m20y20br 35o7m-j25y25ba 35o7n-i40y40br 36olh-n20b20ya 36ol l-jl5y20br 36o2m-j35y40ba 36o21-h20y20br 36o3k-j20y20ba 36o3m-i35y40br 36o4m-j35y40ba 36o4j-m20b20yr 36o5i-n40b40ya 36o5j-n20bl5yr 36o6i-nl5bl5ya 36o6l-g20y20br 36o7k-j20y20ba 36o7h-k20b20yr 37olh-n 5b40yr 37oln-g40y40br 37o2j-m40b40ya 37o2k-gl0yllbr 37o3j-n40b40ya 37o3g-H0bllyr 37o4g-m20b20ya 37o4m-h40y30br 37o5g-n20b20ya 37o5k-i 8yl0br 37o6k-gl0yl0ba 37o6h-nl9b20yr 37o7j-n40b40ya 37o7k-glOylObr 38olh-n20b20ya 38oli-nl0b40yr 38o2j-n35b40ya 38o2h-115bl5yr 34o5g-l20b20ya 34o5m-n20y20br 34o6g-120b20ya 34o6m-120y20ba 34o71-120y20br 35oll-120y20ba 35olm-j39y25br 35o2i-m35b35y 35o2n-i30y30br 35o3g-n20b20ya' 35o3j-k32b35yr 35o4g-k20b20ya 35o4i-kl0bl5yr 35o5n-i40y40ba 35o5 35o6m-j20y20ba 35o6h-ml5b20yr 35o7k-i 8yl0br 35o71-h20y20br 36olk-120y20ba 36olj-m20b20yr 36o2h-m20b20ya 36o2j-n30b25yr 36o3i-n40b40ya 36o3g-120bl0yr 36o4h-110bl0ya 36o4k-jl8y20br 36o5k-j20y20ba 3605 36o6m-j40y35ba 36o6h-m20b20yr 36o7j-n25b20ya 36o7m-j40y40br 37olk-hl0yl0br 3701 37o21-g20y20ba 3702 37o3n-h37y39ba 3703 37o4i-k32b32yr 37o4h-n30b32yr 37o5n-g37y39br 37o5i-l 2b 3yr 37o6m-j40y40ba 37o6n-j40y40br 37o71-g20y20ba 37o7 38olm-j40y40ba 38olk-j20y20br 38o2h-120y20ba 38o21-kl0b30yr -110-38o3k-h20y20ba 38o3n-j23y20ba 38o4n-130y25ba 38o4l-glOylOba 38o5m-i35y30ba 38o5k-gl5y20br 38o6g-nl5bl5ya 38o6h-i30y25br 38o7m-i25y20ba 38o71-gl0yl0ba 38o3m-i40y40ba 38o31-jl0yl0br 38o4k-h20y20ba 38o4m-i40b40yr 38o5h-110bl0ya 38o5g-ml5bl5yr 38o6k-h20y20ba 38 o 6 l - i l 0 y l 0 b r 38o7h-110bl0ya 38o7j-n40b35ya 38o3h-110blOya 38o3i-120b40yr 38o4h-k20b20ya 38o4i-120b30yr 38o5j-m40b40ya 38o5n-120y20br 38o6m-130y25ba 38o6j-k40b35yr 38o7g-m20b20ya 38o7k-j20y25br 38o3j-m35b40ya 38o3g-115bl5yr 38o4j-n35b40ya 38o4g-kl5bl5yr 38o5i-n25b30ya 38o51-i20y20br 38o6h-k20b20ya 38o6l-135b40yr 38o7n-j30y25ba 38o7i-130b40yr -111-B. Approve and Disapprove Votes Key: 11 = set 1, experiment 1 a = approved d = disapproved eg. 11 l - i d = a f t e r experiment 1 i n set 1, L i n d i c a t e d disapproval of I . Set 1: (No I n i t i a l Net Resource Imbalances Between Subjects) 11 m-g d 11 m-j a 11 m-h a 11 m-i d 11 n-h a 11 n - i d 11 n-j d 11 n-g a 11 i-m d 11 i - 1 d 11 i - n d 11 i - k a 11 j-m d 11 k-g a 11 k-h a 11 k - i a 11 k-j a 11 h-n a 11 h-1 d 11 h-m a 11 1-g d 11 1-h d 11 l - i d 11 l - j d 11 1-k a 11 1-n a 11 1-m a 11 g-1 d 11 g-m a 11 g-k a 11 g-n a 12 j - k d 12 j - 1 a 12 j - n a 12 i - k a 12 i - h d 12 m-1 d 12 m-g a 12 m-i a 12 m-h d 12 n-g a 12 n-j a 12 n - i d 12 n-h a 12 l - i a 12 g-m a 12 g-1 a 12* g n a 12 k - i a 12 k-g d 12 k-g a 12 k-h d 12 h-m a 12 h-n a 12 h-k d 13" n-g a 13 n-h a 13 n-j a 13 n-h a 13 m-g a 13 m-j d 13 m-i a 13 m-h a 13 i - k a 13 i - 1 d 13 i-m a 13 i - n a 13 g-m a 13 g-k a 13 g-n a 13 l - j d 13 l - i a 13 1-g a 13 1-h a 13 1-n a 13 1-m d 13 1-k d 13 k-j a 14 n-j a 14 n - i a 14 n-g a 14 i - n a 14 i - k d 14 l - j d 14 i - h d 14 i - 1 a 14 j-m d 14 j - n a 14 j - 1 a 14 m-j d 14 m-g a 14 m-i a 14 k-h d 14 k - i d 14 k-m a 14 g-1 a 14 g-m d 14 g-n d 14 g-j a 14 g-h d 14 g-k a 14 g - i a 14 l - i d 14 h-k a 14 h-1 d 15 n-j a 15 n-g a 15 n-1 d 15 n-h d 15 n-m d 15 n-k d 15 n - i d 15 m-i a 15 m-g a 15 m-j d 15 m-h d 15 j - n a 15 j-k d 15 j-m d 15 i-m d 15 1-g a 15 k-g a 15 k - i d 15 k-h a 15 k-j d 15 k-m a 15 k-1 a 15 k-n a 16 j - 1 a 16 J-n a 16 j - g d 16 j - k d 16 j-m d 16 j - h d 16 j - i d 16 i - k d 16 i - n a 16 i-m a 16 n - i a 16 n-j a 16 n-g a 16 n-h d 16 1-g d 16 k - i d 16 k-j a 16 k-g a 16 k-h a 16 k-m a 16 h-n a -112-Set 2: (Moderate I n i t i a l Net Resource Imbalances Between Subjects) 21 j - n a 21 m-j d 21 m-g a 21 n-j a 21 j-m d 21 n-g a 21 i-m d 21 i - n a 21 i - h a 21 i - l a 21 i - j a 21 i - k a 21 i - g a 21 h-k d 21 h-m a 21 h-n d 21 l - h d 21 1-g d 21 1-i d 21 g - l a 21 g-n a 21 g-m d 22 m-i d 22 m-j a 22 j - k a 22 j-m a 22 j - 1 a 22 n - i a 22 n-j a 22 n-g a 22 n-k d 22 n-h a 22 n-1 a 22 i - n a 22 i-m d 22 g - l d 22 1-j a 22 k - i d 22 k-g a 22 k-n a 22 k-1 a 22 k-j a 22 k-h a 22 k-m d 22 h-m a 22 h-k a 22 h - i a 22 h-n a 22 h-1 a 23 m-j a 23 m-i a 23 m-g d 23 i - n d 23 i - k a 23 j - n d 23 j - 1 d 23 n - i a 23 n-j a 23 n-g d 23 n - i a 23 l - h a 23 1-j a 23 1-k d 23 g-m a 23 j - n d 23 g-k d 24 i - k a 24 i - l d 24 i - g a 24 i - n a 24 m-j a 24 m-h d 24 n-g d 24 1-g a 24 l - h a 24 1-j d 24 1-i a 24 k-j d 24 k-h d 24 k-g d 24 h-m a 24 h-n d 24 g - l a 24 g-n a 24 g-k a 24 g-m d 25 m-g d 25 m-g a 25 m-h a 25 m-j a 25 n-g d 25 n-h d 25 j-m a 25 j - k d 25 j - n d 25 j - 1 a 25 i - k a 25 I-m d 25 g-n a 25 g-k a 25 g-h a 25 k-I a 25 k-g a 25 k-h d 25 h-m a 25 h-k d 25 h-n d 25 h-1 a 25 1-j d 25 l - h a 25 1-i d 25 1-g d 26 n-h a 26 n-k d 26 n-m d 26 n - i a 26 n-j a 26 n-1 a 26 n-g a 26 j-m a 26 j - i d 26 j - 1 d 26 j - n d 26 i - k d 26 m-j a 26 m-h d 26 m-g d 26 g-n d 26 g-k a 26 h-m d 26 m-1 a 26 h - i d 26 h-j d 26 h-g a 26 h-n a 26 h-k a 26 1-g a 26 1 - i d 26 1-j d 26 l - h a 26 1-m a 26 1-n a 26 1-k d -113-Set 3: (Extreme I n i t i a l Net Resource Imbalances Between Subjects) 31 n-h d 31 n-j a 31 n - i a 31 i - n a 31 i-m d 31 i - l d 31 m-I d 31 j-m a 31 j - k d 31 j - n a 31 1-i d 31 1-g a 31 1-m d 31 1-k a 31 1-g d 31 1-n d 31 l - h a 31 h-k a 31 h-1 a 31 h-n d 31 h-m d 31 h - i d 31 g-n d 31 g - l a 31 g-k a 31 g-m a 31 k-j d 31 k-g d 31 k-h a 32 i - n a 32 i-m a 32 i - l a 32 j - n d 32 j-m a 32 j - k a 32 k-j d 32 k - i d 32 h-1 a 32 h-n d 32 h-m d 32 1-j d 32 1-i d 32 l - h a 32 1-g a 32 g-m d 32 g-n a 33 j-m a 33 j - n a 33 j - i a 33 j - h d 33 j - g a 33 j-1 a 33 j - k a 33 n-g d 33 n - i a 33 n-j a 33 n-h a 33 i-m a 33 i - n a 33 i - l d 33 i - k d 33 m-j a 33 m-i d 33 h-m d 33 h-n d 33 h-1 a 33 g-k a 33 g - l a 33 g-m d 33 g-n d 33 k-g a 33 k-g d 33 k-h d 33 k - i d 34 j - n a 34 j-m a 34 j - k d 34 j-1 d 34 n-j a 34 n-h d 34 m-n d 34 i - n d 34 i - k a 34 i - l d 34 i-m d 34 m-j a 34 m-i d 34 h-k a 34 h-1 a 34 h-m d 34 h-n d 34 g - l a 34 g-n d 34 k-h a 3-4 k-j a 34 k-g d 34 k - i a 35 m-i d 35 m-j a 35 i - k a 35 i-m a 35 i - n a 35 j - n a 35 j-1 d 35 j-m a 35 j - k d 35 n - i a 35 n-j a 35 g-m d 35 g - l a 35 k-h a 35 k - i d 35 h-m a 35 h-1 d 35 1-g a 35 l - h d 35 1-i d 36 j - n d 36 j - n a 36 n-j d 36 n-h a 36 i - g a 36 n-1 a 36 i - n a 36 i - l a 36 i - j a 36 i - h a 36 i-m a , 36 i - k d 3 6 h-m d 36 h - i d 36 h-n d 36 h-k a 36 h-g a 36 h-1 a 36 h-j a 36 l - h a 36 h-g d 36 k-j a 36 k-g a 36 k - i a 37 n-h d 37 n-g d 37 n - i a 37 n-j a 37 m-j a 37 m-i d 37 k-g d 37 k-h a 37 g-n d 37 g-m a 37 g-j d 37 h-n d 37 h-k a 37 h-m a 37 h-1 d 38 j - n a 38 j - g a 38 j - k a 38 j - h a 38 j-m a 38 j-1 a 38 n - i d 38 n-j a 38 j-k d 38 n-g a 38 i-m a 38 i - l d 38 i - n a 38 m-i a 38 m-j d 38 k-h a 38 1-i d 38 1-g a -38 l - h a 38 h-k a 38 h-1 d 38 h-n a 

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