UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

A study of the American Federation of Musicians Smithers, Douglas Alan 1952

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0 A STUDY GF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS by DOUGLAS ALAN SMITHERS A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Members of the Department of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April, 1952 ABSTRACT It i s the intention i n this study to familiarize the reader with the unionization of the music industry. F i r s t , there i s a discussion of the boundaries of the music industry, followed by a general analysis of musicians as occupational types. This i s necessary because of the unique conditions surrounding music—as a profession and as an industry. Second, a brief historical outline, showing, in particular, the growth and decline of r i v a l unionism in Canada. Third, a discussion of the structure of the International and i t s Federated Locals. Gf particular significance here i s the position of the International President and the constitutional authority conferred on him. Four, the role of collective bargaining-stressing particularly the American Federation of Musicians' unilateral wage rate determination. Five, the problems of technological change, particularly with respect to the use of records, radio, television and motion pictures. The summary chapter, rather than review what has gone before, u t i l i z e s the Report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the Arts, Letters and Sciences to show the insecure position of the musician i n Canada. i i . TABLE OF CONTENTS'. Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . i i Introduction i i i Chapter I —The Music Industry 1 Chapter I I —Musicians as Occupational Types . . . . 11 Chapter I I I — H i s t o r i c a l Growth of the American Federa-tion of Musicians 19 Chapter IV —Analysis of the International Constitution 28 Chapter V —Analysis of Local Constitution Showing the Position of the Locals i n Respect to Internal Structure and Government . . . . 47 Chapter VI —Collective Bargaining Versus Unilateral Control 53 Chapter VII —Wage Scales and Working Rules A. Applicability of Economic Theory to the AFofM's Wage Rate Determination . . . 59 B. Working Rules . 71 C. Wage Scales 76 D. Actual Example of Contract Showing Wage Scales, Hours of Employment and Working Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 Chapter VIII —General Aspects of Technological Change . 87 Chapter IX —The Struggle with the Record Companies . 91 Chapter X —The Radio and Television Industries . . 105 Chapter XI —The AFofM and the Motion Picture Industry 111 Chapter XII —Outlook for Future Musicians 114 Bibliography . . • • ^ Appendix A 122 i . INTRODUCTION In many respects the Musicians': Unionl i s one of the more notorious of contemporary unions. This may be attributable to i t s dynamic leader, James C. P e t r i l l o , or to the fact that music and the musicians themselves to are always in the public eye, or perhaps/a combination of both. At any rate, the AFofM enjoys a great deal of publicity, both good and bad. This •good and bad' feeling brings to mind what a trade-union o f f i c i a l told me when he learned of my proposed study of the AFofM. He maintained that the AFofM, and i t s leader, James C. P e t r i l l o , should be shown as "high-handed, autocratic, and a detriment to the trade union movement".2 While i t i s not the purpose of this thesis to agree or disagree with these opinions, the reader w i l l be impressed with some of the unique features of the music industry. It i s hoped than an enunciation of these features might demonstrate why the AFofM has been so "dictatorial". There i s one point that should be mentioned in so far as i t repre-sents a new answer to an old cry. Employers and the various employers* associations have long railed against trade unions because unionization and, i n particular, the Closed Shop Principle, have meant the loss of the fundamental freedom of the individual, i.e., the Freedom to Work3. However, the AFofM, in spite of i t s s t r i c t closed shop clause, has 1 The term Musicians' Union, along with the abbreviation AFofM, w i l l be used as referring to the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada. 2 The AFofM1s attitude caused Murray C o t t e r i l l , President of the Toronto Labour Council (CCL) to say, "The AFofM has the crummiest public relations on the continent". 3 This i s a rather loose phrase, at best, but does point up one of the arguments of employers against unionization. Union standardization, i n terms of seniority principles, industry-wide uniform wage rates, etc., tend to destroy the worker's i n i t i a t i v e . See "The Closed Shop", published by the National Association of Manufacturers, New York, 1 9 4 1 . i i i . nevertheless allowed for individual incentive, i n i t i a t i v e and efficiency. As w i l l be discussed i n Chapter VII, base rates (union scale) are set unilaterally by the AFofM. Where musicians are in the position to bargain for and receive over-scale rates, they are encouraged to do so by the AFofM. Discriminating rates of pay quite unlike the standard rates that characterize so many other industries are thus the pattern i n the music industry. To the economist, this i s understandable because music i s a personal service^. Union policies are designed to aid the musician in securing a wage rate equal to his a b i l i t y ^ , i n much the same manner as doctors, lawyers and other professional groups. In wage policies the AFofM looks after the interest of two separate groups: (1) the musicians who receive the base rate set by the Local, and (2) the musicians who receive more than the base rates for their services. There i s a similar c l a s s i f i c a t i o n made by the AFofM with regard to the employment of musicians: (1) the casual (part-time) musician, and (2) the professional (full-time) musician.^ Since this thesis constitutes an original contribution on the Canadian scene, much of the information i s lacking which ordinarily would be available to the student. Consequently the reader w i l l find certain aspects of this study developed more fully than others. Newspapers and periodicals of various kinds; interviews with persons either directly 1 Thus within the definition of a "service trade", where labour i s not used i n the creation of a physical product. 2 "Ability" i n the music industry i s dependent upon individuality and popularity. 3 Chapter II contains a f u l l discussion on the differences between these two categories. They are only mentioned here to show the completed picture (wage effect and employment effect). i v . concerned or in a l l i e d f i e l d s j government documents and publications where applicable—have been u t i l i z e d . R e l i a b i l i t y and interpretations of the findings i n this study must become the sole responsibility of the author. The author wishes to acknowledge, with thanks, the assistance given by Mr. George Leach, Secretary of Local 145, AFofM, Vancouver, and the firm of Hal Leyshon and Associates, Public Relations Counsel for the AFofM. To Professor Stuart Jamieson of the Department of Economics, the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, special thanks must be given for his constructive criticism i n the development of this paper. Chapter I THE MUSIC INDUSTRY This t i t l e may appear to be misleading, since the usual conception of the term industry i s associated with clearly defined business a c t i v i t i e s as, the "iron and steel industry". However, some definition of the boundaries within which the instrumental musician works must be given. From the point of view of the AFofM, i t may be said that wherever music i s played professionally i t i s i n the music industry. As may be realized, this i s v i r t u a l l y l i m i t l e s s . The exceptions to this have been rather sharply defined i n an agreement between the AFofM, the Music Educator's National Conference, and the American Association of School Administrators.-The substance of their agreement i s that anything f a l l i n g under the heading of "entertainment" i s i n the province of the professional musician. What therefore i s not entertainment i s called "music education", and i s l i s t e d as follows: (1) School Functions—initiated by the schools as a part of a school program, whether in a school building or other building. (2) Community Functions—as the P.T.A., that are organized for educational purposes. (3) Educational Broadcasts—where a demonstration of a pupil's achievement after a long period of study i s to be shown. (4) Civic Occasions—local, state or patriotic interest (as the Veterans of Foreign Wars) on Memorial Days, (5) Benefit Performances—for local charities such as the Red Cross. (6) Educational or Civic Services—those not covered that were previously agreed to by the locals of the AFofM and the school authorities. 1 See "The Music Code of Ethics", Music Educator's Journal. Chicago, September 22, 1947. (7) Audition Recordings—for study purposes, where they are used exclusively by the students and teachers. The primary purpose of this "Code of Ethics" i s to ensure the professional musician the fu l l e s t protection i n his efforts to earn his l i v i n g from the playing and rendition of music. Therefore the following have been set as within the province of the professional musician, under the heading of "entertainment"r (1) Civic parades, ceremonies, expositions, community concerts, and community-center a c t i v i t i e s ; regattas, non-scholastic contests, festivals, athletic games, a c t i v i t i e s or celebrations, and their l i k e ; national, state, and county f a i r s , ( 2 ) Functions for the furtherance, directly or indirectly, of any public or private enterprise; functions by Chambers of Commerce, Boards of Trade, and commercial clubs or associations. (3) Any occasion that i s partisan or sectarian i n character or purpose, (4) Functions of clubs, societies, c i v i c or fraternal organizations. as distinct This definition of the limits of the professional musician/from those of the teacher has done a great deal to c l a r i f y their respective positions, and thus greatly reduce the conflict between them. An investigation's of the sources of employment of musicians, i n terms of numbers employed, would show that the majority are hired for casual engagements, "Casuals", as they are known, cover a multitude of events occurring i n the established f i e l d s of the music industry as well as i n the non-established f i e l d s . 2 Despite the uncertainty of casual 1 "The Music Code of Ethics", 0 £ . c i t . 2 A casual job can be played i n one of the established f i e l d s when a musician w i l l get someone to take his place so that he can 'have a night o f f 1 . Non-established, or casual f i e l d s , i n addition to those l i s t e d by the Agreement quoted above, might also include: dances, cabarets, radio, 3 . jobs, they constitute the most important source of livelihood for professional musicians. An a r t i c l e i n Fortune Magazine^ of September, 1951, estimates that approximately 160,000 of the 240,000 members of the AFofM i n the United States and Canada do not make their livings entirely from the music profession. According to the a r t i c l e : . , ,'Of the 240,000 AFofM members, relatively few are entirely supported by music. The twenty-eight major symphony orchestras employ fewer than 2500 musicians, , • only about 2000 musicians have f i f t y weeks staff employment i n radio stations. . , between 3000 to 4000 are employed i n single-spot commercial appearances on radio, . • 7000 are employed i n the motion pic-ture industry, . . 4000 non-traveling band members and concert ar t i s t s make a full-time l i v i n g from music. . • a reasonable guess of the number of members i n the AFofM making a l i v i n g at their profession might settle at about 80 ,000, , , , For the 160,000 musicians i n the AFofM who cannot get steady engagements, their musical incomes must come from casual engagements. Next i n importance to the casual engagements come the engagements at various dance-halls, cabarets, and cocktail bars. In one important respect they constitute the backbone of the music industry. The number of musicians employed i n these places cannot be given accurately, but i t can be said that they constitute the largest source of full-time employment for professional musicians. Almost every type of musician has had to lean on the "crutch" provided by the dance-halls and cabarets at one time or another i n his career. Symphony musicians are to be found working during off-seasons i n dance-halls or cabarets to augment their incomes. As the (independent stations), motion pictures, television, private parties, weddings, and the l i k e . The reader might think of many 'jobs' that the writer has missed. However the l i s t i s not intended to be all- i n c l u s i v e , but rather to show the varied assortment of 'jobs' that are included under the heading "casual engagements", 1 See "Petrillo Revisited", Fortune Magazine, September, 1951, The f i g -ures given are taken directly from the Proceedings of the Fifty-Fourth Annual Convention of the AFofM, June, 1951, 4 . public choice w i l l change from one group to another, so the musicians come and go. These two characteristics—off-season work and public choice—have a good deal to do with the high turnover of musicians i n dance-halls, cabarets, and cocktail bars. In addition to having a high turnover, these jobs constitute a very small part of the musical employ-ment for casual musicians. The remaining sections of the music industry that are not covered by the casual engagement, dance-hall or cabaret cl a s s i f i c a t i o n , are the more lucrative i n that they provide the highest paying jobs for musicians i n general. The f i r s t of these that we might b r i e f l y consider i s that of radio entertainment. To get an idea of the role of music i n this f i e l d , imagine turning on the radio and not hearing one note of music- on any program! The listener would be bored i n a very short time. A significant issue i n this f i e l d , as dealt with later, i s the competition between trans-cribed or "canned" music and " l i v e " musicians. The Federal Communications Commission! saw f i t to intercede to the extent that radio stations are under a distinct obligation to hire l i v e musicians. While this i s an excellent theory to go by, the actual case has been the reverse. There i s a small percentage of musicians employed regularly as studio men, receiving hand-some salaries for their services, but by far the largest majority of radio stations do not hire any l i v e musicians.2 Motion picture studios employ musicians i n varying degrees. Because of changing production schedules, however, the nucleus of permanent musicians employed i s rather small. As the purpose of this chapter i s to outline the 1 Report of the Federal Communications Commission/;.. "Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees", Washington, D.C., March 7» 1 9 4 6 . . . • , 2 The F.C.C.'s report revealed the fact that the average of musicians employed, to number of radio stations i n operation, was a figure of less than one musician per radio station. 5 various sections constituting the music industry, the fact that musicians are employed in the motion picture industry i s , for now, sufficient.1 Symphony orchestras2 employ a considerable number of musicians for a period of from three to four months during the year. Like radio employment, symphony employment i s sought because of the higher wage-scale and prestige that i s offered i n comparison with casual and dance-hall jobs. Television, while ostensibly a good f i e l d of employment for the musician, must for the present remain a matter of conjecture. It actually presents to the musician the same problem that f i r s t arose with the intro-duction of radio. This much can be said of this new f i e l d — i t s potentiali-t i e s 'are enormous, both for public service and for competition among 'liv e ' talent of a l l kinds. The physical setting of the industry then i s such that most employment i s found in casual engagements which are played for any number of occasions in any number of locations. The smaller and more lucrative f i e l d s of employment in the industry might be stated as being network broadcasting, recording, network television shows, motion pictures, transcriptions, and personal appearances of "name" bands. The physical setting alone cannot describe the music industry. There are other factors that tend to make the music industry, and musicians, unique. In the f i r s t place, music i s , i n addition to an industry, an a r t . The musician's performance i s a matter of knowledge and s k i l l to effect a desired result, best expressed by the term- 'individuality'. To the listener i t i s a case of personal preference. There i s also an extreme 1 For a f u l l e r treatment of the motion picture industry, see Chapter XI. 2 For the best available study of the economic side of symphony orches-tras, see M. Grant and H. Hettinger, America's Symphony Orchestras and How  They Are Supported, New York, W. W, Norton and Co., 1940. 6 diversity i n the industry i t s e l f , f i r s t of a l l i n the types of music played. Among the more dominant types we should include: symphonic music, chamber music, opera, choral music, musical comedy, folk music, jazz, music, swing music, progressive and Latin music, each differing from the others and each having i t s own following among the listening p u b l i c A second point as regards diversity i s the extreme range among employers found i n the music industry. As pointed out before, the f i e l d of casual engagements covers almost a l l types of jobs. Similarly, the types of employer encountered are as diverse as the music and jobs played. The employer i n fact may be the father of the bride, the secretary of a tennis club, the manager of a l o c a l radio station, proprietor of a night-club, i n short, anyone who hires musicians professionally. In the more established forms of the music industry we find that the employers have frequently banded together i n an effort to combat the musicians. This i s to be expected, since the dance-hall operator, radio station owner, and any other employer constantly using musicians i s interested primarily i n the greatest possible returns. The union has recognized the need for establishing regulations over certain establishments (as dance-halls, theatres, cabarets, etc.) specifying a minimum number of musicians that must be employed. It has been bi t t e r l y resisted by various operators but to date the union has been largely successful i n enforcing this law. A recent example of employer tactics occurred i n the Vancouver Local when the employers asked, by way of an open let t e r to the members of the union, that the union members revert to the pre-war p r i c e - l i s t l and the operators would cut their prices to the public, thereby creating more work for the musicians.^ To some of 1 For casual musicians this would mean a loss of up to 40 per cent of their present income. 2 The employers f e l t that halls that were open only two nights a week could open for the f u l l six nights, and that new halls could open up. 7. the musicians who have not been working regularly, the idea was acceptable, but by the vast majority i t was disregarded© To the marginal operator the cost of music i s considerable, and there i s thus a great willingness to side-step the union at every possible turn. Generally speaking, the more the employer depends on music, as in the case of dance-halls, the greater the power of the AFofM. Similarly, the AFofM has exercised more control over the unorganized employers, to the extent that a casual employer must pay the union price or else have no music. In the case of the really 'big' employers, in terms of money and.interests backing them, the musician has not been so fortunate i n winning •make-work* rules and the l i k e . This category would specifically include the major radio networks, television, the recording industry, and the motion picture industry. No matter how great the efforts have been on the part of the AFofM, the number of musicians employed in these industries i s kept at a minimum. While i t i s neeessary to have music in these industries, i t i s important to note that the music industry just enters but does not control them. Consequently, the employers have u t i l i z e d a minimum number of musi-cians for a maximum number of jobs. A distinction should be made regarding the term "employer" as used i n the music industry. It refers to the employer of the whole orchestra, soloist, or group, but does not refer to the leader of the orchestra. The leader i s known as the "contractor"^, and i t i s his duty to engage the individual members of an orchestra for a specific engagement. The employer, then, secures the services of the musicians through their leader. One of the unique features of the AFofM1s control of i t s membership i s that the 1 In some cases the contractor i s an agent who books engagements for the orchestra. However i t i s s t i l l the function of the leader and not the employer to hire the members of the orchestra. 8 leader, being a union member, i s subject to union control and i s effectively the union's representative to the employer on the job. Contracts are signed between the contractor and the employer, usually for a period of thirteen weeks, providing for the employment of a certain.number of union musicians, at union rates. Originally the union set a l l of the rules for a new industry, as i n the case of the radio industry when i t was starting out. However, the employers became more insistent on having a voice i n their affairs and now formally established rules govern the radio industry. The union has adopted the policy of getting trade agreements established i n these more lucrative fields of employment. Collective bargaining i s carried on between the union and the employer, not the contractor. The signed contract agrees to the conditions previously-agreed to between the union and the employer. That the contractor must abide by the rules of the AFofM can be seen i n the International Constitu-tion-L, which states; "... members of the AFofM are not permitted to sign any form of contract or agreement for an engagement other than that issued by the AFofM. Penalty; fine of not less than $100.00. ..." Copies of the contracts are deposited i n the Local union office, and the union can thus keep a check on the musicians, contractors, and employers, A further check on members i s set out i n the By-Laws of the Locals, whereby no member of an orchestra can enter into contractual relations or discuss wages with an employer, but must do so through their leader. The Toronto Local (149) states this rather definitely i n i t s Price List Regulations^; ". • • A fine of $50,00 shall be imposed on any member who shows or allows any person not a member of the AFofM to read this Price L i s t . . . 1 See Constitution. By-Laws and Policy of the AFofM. 1950 Ed., Art. XIII, Sec, 34, P. 86. 2 Price List Regulations, Local 149> Toronto, Sec. 3, Note 9, 9 Coupled with the extreme range i n types of music and employers i n the industry, we also find a great variety i n types of establishments,, From a bootlegger hiring a three-piece band (or a piano player playing for drinks) on the one hand, to a 60-piece symphony orchestra supported by the top social strata on the other, we find a wide variety of jobs too numerous to mention. In regard to this diversity of music and musicians It should be pointed out that while no estimate in terms of dollar value can be given, the most lucrative f i e l d i n the music industry i s i n popular music. This may well be a traveling band, recording a r t i s t , or a combina-tion of both. The music industry on the North American continent has been subject to extreme fluctuations i n employment because music i t s e l f i s not consi-dered a v i t a l servicel*(like foodstuffs, lumber, coal, railway trans-portation, etc.). Therefore, the union would have less bargaining power since union tactics must be aimed almost entirely at the employer, or the public's a b i l i t y to pay.2 There i s an advantage to the union, however, in that i t can use tactics which the public ignores or i s unaware of which would not be tolerated i n an industry producing a v i t a l good or service. Another point i s that music i s perhaps the most mobile service\ there i s , due to modern communication f a c i l i t i e s . That i s , substitutes 1 In 1948, the British Government passed the Local Government Act which contained an invaluable clause giving powers where necessary for the spending of public money on cultural a c t i v i t i e s . This enabled municipali-ties and borough councils to encourage symphony orchestras i n their efforts to build new audiences in many parts of the country. 2 This would be in sharp contrast to Lewis and the UMW, for instance, who control a v i t a l resource. 10. can easily be found—such as radio, records, transcriptions, etc. Since the product can be transported almost any distance at practically no cost, the individual musician and the separate union Locals alike have no bargaining power. The International Union, then, has had to go to unusual lengths to apply a multitude of detailed regulations so as to control effectively every major aspect of the music industry. Chapter II MUSICIANS AS OCCUPATIONAL TYPES At f i r s t glance few occupational groups would appear so d i f f i c u l t to organize into a union as musicians. To begin with, they are extremely heterogeneous i n composition, tending to lend weight to the belief that antagonism and conflict rather than co-operation would result from efforts to organize. Musicians are characterized by relatively extreme individua-lism, in keeping with the general idea of music being an "art". That i s to say, each musician's popularity and thus his economic bargaining power depends upon his individuality as a performer. This fact leads us to ai. consideration of the financial rewards of individuality. As in the case of other highly specialized occupations, there are extreme divisions i n income among musicians. At one end of the scale are the famous band leaders, successful concert a r t i s t s , conductors, recording a r t i s t s and so on, who enjoy vacations i n Bermuda and incomes which run into six figures. At the other end are the musicians who work one or two jobs a year and must seek permanent employment elsewhere in order to l i v e . Another characteristic of musicians i s that to many of them music i s primarily a hobby. These nevertheless compete directly with the musicians who must depend upon their trade as a sole source of livelihood. In a sense, unionism makes musicians more, rather? than less, competitive. Nearly 100 per cent of a l l musicians are i n the AFofM and i f a man i s desirous of pursuing his hobby he must join the union i n order to play. This i n some measure accounts for the large number of part-time workers i n the industry, as well as the competition of amateurs with professionals. The extreme diversity i n such things as types of music, a b i l i t y , earnings and status would tend to further point up the d i f f i c u l t y of organization amongst musicians. The extreme mobility of musicians l i k e -wise represents an unstable factor. 11. 12. Another d i f f i c u l t y of music as a profession l i e s i n the absence of an objective c r i t e r i a for measuring competency. While doctors, lawyers, and other professional men must prove their competency i n terms of a set standard, such i s not the case with musicians. Perhaps the argument i s not valid for concert a r t i s t s , symphony musicians or music teachers who are graduates of such institutions as the J u i l l i a r d School of Music. But i t i s valid for the majority of dance musicians who comprise the bulk of the AFofM1s membership. What then are some of the factors that tend to strengthen the union's hand? Perhaps one of the key factors i s the casual nature of most musi^ cians' employment. As with employers of longshoremen, building tradesmen, and other such workers, employers of musicians i n many cases prefer to deal with a strong union because: (1) It eliminates the uncertainty of cutthroat competition by establishing minimum rates. (2) The union i s the only agency with sufficient power to discipline i t s members and thus assure the employer of some minimum performance. The union i s able to protect employers on both counts because i t controls the entire f i e l d of employment. The individual employer has no effective disciplinary control over musicians, since musicians only do short jobs for any one employer and the threat of dismissal i s r e a l l y no threat at a l l . Expulsion from the union, on the other hand, means loss of the right to earn a livelihood throughout the entire industry. A good example of union discipline was seen several years ago when a group of Toronto musicians, driving to Owen Sound to f u l f i l l a New Year's Eve engagement, were stopped by a blizzard. They could not play the job and pleaded their case to the union on the grounds of an "act of God" having 13 prevented them. The union, however, refused this argument on the grounds that the musicians should have had the foresight to take a train or bus, both of which got through. The union subsequently ordered the musicians to pay the Owen Sound employer the f u l l cost of the engagement plus a l l of his incidental costs, including advertising, "Group consciousness" i s another characteristic that tends to favour unionism. The common folklore that has sprung up amongst musicians has created a language a l l of i t s own which only musicians can t a l k . l The personal identification of musicians ("he's i n Jack Smith's band") adds to this group consciousness. There i s also a process of selection at work. For a few in the music business, the "rugged l i f e " has a direct appeal. Sleeping u n t i l noon, excessive traveling, working at nights, etc., hold a fascination for some. Such working conditions, however, limit the number who can stay with i t and thus tend to limit competition. S k i l l and training of musicians, while being extremely diverse, i s no criterion for a person joining the union. As the union i s not an employ-ment agency, i t i s only interested i n seeing that ALL musicians are i n the union. Whether or not a musician can play a job adequately must be deter-mined by the leader of the orchestra, not by the union executive. It i s perhaps more useful, for purposes of analysis, to cl a s s i f y musicians according to their tenure of employment rather than their s k i l l and training. There are two main categories i n this regard. One group 1 A man who "blows real cool" i s a musician who can play an instrument in keeping with the sound, style, and techniques of progressive jazz;. Similarly, the tools of the trade undergo changes to the extent that clarinets become "sticks" or else a l l instruments are known as "horns". Therefore a progressive pianist might be described as a man who "blows real great horn". . . and so on. Ik of musicians f a l l s into the casual class (as part-time employment) and the other group into the professional class (as full-time employment ).-*• Musicians in the f i r s t category, by and large, are interested i n the union for two reasons only:: (1) that i t w i l l demand, and get, a high wage-scale for them and (2) that i t w i l l protect them against employers who may attempt to "chisel" or refuse to pay for a job. While this rather opportunistic attitude i s not perhaps i n the best interests of the union, the fact remains that the AFofM, l i k e other unions, cannot guarantee employment for i t s members. To many i n the union i t has simply meant that not joining means not working. This attitude has been shared by both casual and professional musicians, though many of the latte r realize the more positive benefits derived from their union. Many pro-fessional musicians merely tolerate the AFofM as a matter of necessity, feeling that a union i s far below their dignity. They would prefer an association li k e those of doctors, lawyers, and other professional men. Perhaps the real reason for this preference i s that the socially ambitious desire an association that could eliminate the poorer, "undesirable" musicians. There appears to be a widespread reluctance on the part of musicians generally to classify themselves as workers and, therefore, trade-unionists. Many other musicians, of course, have sought to align them-selves with the trade-union movement as earnestly as others have sought 1 While I have made the distinction between the casual and the profes-sional musician, I do not imply that a man automatically i s relegated to one group or the other. The full-time musician might well be unemployed tomorrow and find himself i n the casual group. 15. connection with a professional association.! Fortunately for the union i t s e l f , the fact that so many of the musicians ARE i n the union has enabled i t to control the membership with a firm hand. Some people express the opinion that musicians should classify themselves as workers i f for no other reason than the fact that the average wage of the f u l l -time musician i s comparable to, but not in excess of, that of the average craft or industrial worker. The number of musicians whoS receive an income comensurate with that of doctors and lawyers (as a comparison with professional men) i s so small i n proportion to the t o t a l number of working musicians that the idea of a professional association does not seem realistic. This i s , of course, presuming that greater benefits (other than social prestige) can be obtained through a trade union than through an association. Coupled with this fact i s the one already stated—that to many i n the union higher wage-scales and the guarantee of wage payment constitute a direct and realizable benefit of unionism. Because of the insecurity of the music industry, with its characteristic good and bad times, many of the full-time musicians have looked toward the union i n the hope that i t w i l l some day provide pension plans out of work benefits and the l i k e . A certain amount of h o s t i l i t y and contempt exists among the professional musicians towards the casuals, based primarily on the fact that the latter are taking work away from the former. This a t t i -tude would prevail no matter how plent i f u l the work was because of the 1 Much of the union support i n Canada has come from the bandsman (that i s military bandsman as distinct from orchestra and dance musicians) i n each l o c a l . The apathy of the orchestra and dance men i s explained because of their i n a b i l i t y to attend union meetings. However, one of the best-known band leaders i n Canada pointed out that, n i f i t wasn't for those older men there«d be nobody to run the union". 16 'greedy1 attitudes that some have adopted i n this profession. It i s characteristic of most occupations that employ casual and full-time workers and therefore i s not unique in the musical profession. Musicians in Canada have never been restricted because of their race, as they have in the United States, but this i s probably due to the fact that there are fewer "non-white" musicians in this country. The negros have been encouraged to set up their own locals i n the United States and these are found in a l l of the principal c i t i e s in the U. S. They have an organization similar to that of the "white" locals but, generally speaking, their wage-scale i s lower than that found i n the comparable white l o c a l . In New York, for instance, white and negro 'sidemen'l i n theatres d i f f e r in their wage-scales by more than $ 3 0 . 0 0 a week. In Canada this has not been the case because of the comparative scarcity of negro musicians. Chinese and Japanese musicians have made l i t t l e or no headway in music in Canada but this i s due primarily to an i n a b i l i t y on the part of these people to play our type of music, the main emphasis here being on modern jazz music. While i t does not apply i n every case, the writer feels, through association with certain of these musicians, that they cannot compete with white musicians. It can be said that musicians tend to c l a s s i f y a person according to his a b i l i t y (and their classification i s not always kind) rather than by his race. This i s only an estimation of a b i l i t y and does not invalidate the fact that negroes form their own Locals, The qualifica-tion exists that the degree of liberalism or r a c i a l tolerance i s directly related to the size of the minority group seeking music as a profession— where the number is sufficiently large, suitable action would be taken to have them checked. 1 1 The term "sidemen" refers to those musicians i n an orchestra other than the leader. 17. A d i f f i c u l t y that i s not generally found amongst other workers i s that the musician must necessarily compete with everyone else who plays the same instrument as himself. A steelworker, say, must prove that he i s capable of doing his job and no more, whereas the musician must be not only capable but must also be a good deal better than' the men who are out of work and are free to accept engagements. To hold a job with a band requires that many of the musicians be able to play two instruments p r o f i -ciently (in the case of saxophone players i t would necessitate being able to play the clarinet), be able to read music, "fake"!, and try to keep abreast of the latest styles. (The word "try" i s used here because the jazz complexities of modern/music, currently exemplified by the "bop" idiom, are so '•. .: exacting that a l l the average musician can do i s try to jazz keep abreast of them.) Progressive/music i s not all-inclusive since a musician i s equally i n as great a demand today i f he i s an interpreter of folk-music ( h i l l b i l l y , cowboy, and others). An additional factor increasing competition amongst musicians i s that music i s a "hobby" for so many people, as a means of self-expression. There i s a relatively small capital investment required i n order to practice one's trade, whereas the steelworker could not begin to carry on the day's work when he arrived home. Despite i t s complexities, more and more people are entering the musical profession on a full-time basis while quite aware of the hazards of the occupation. Perhaps It i s the thought of the few who make the grade and subsequently earn i n excess of #100,000,00 per year, as Guy Lombardo has done for many years, or else the fame and prestige that the 1 To "fake" a. tune i s to play a tune by memory, and be able to improvise. 18. more celebrated musicians enjoy, or simply the fact that i t i s a l l that a person knows (for here a man's I. Q. i s of l i t t l e or no value whatso-ever. At any rate, music w i l l always be an overcrowded f i e l d with new members joining the ranks of the casual musician every day. Chapter I I I HISTORICAL GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF MUSICIANS "It has been a long struggle of the Musicians to get themselves looked upon as workers instead of players." —John R. Commons. This was the viewpoint of a famous labour economist who f e l t that the unionization of the musicians spelled an end to a l l their troubles. We now realize that the problems are as pressing today, with complete unionization, as they were at the turn of the century, when unionism among musicians was in i t s infancy. It was however this struggle which f i r s t led the movement away from the old society form of organization.! The f i r s t of these societies was formed i n Philadelphia i n 1871 and was known as the Musicians! National Protective Association, later the National Music Association. In 1886, delegates from a group of musical societies i n New York, Philadelphia, Cincinnati, Boston, and Milwaukee met i n New York to form the National League of Musicians. This group was l i k e many of the other so-called "national" unions of i t s time i n that i t was i n rea l i t y only a regional union, since two or three of these societies controlled a l l of the other 'locals 1. The number of locals rose to 101 by 1896. There were wide variations among them since there were no standard rules for the locals to follow. There was only the request (and i t was nothing more) by the League that the member locals try to enforce the minimum wage and see that their individual members did not play with non-union musicians. However, as the request was not enforced by the parent body, i t was largely ineffective. From the outset the National League of Musicians was faced by continual competition from locals chartered by the American Federation of 1 For a complete study of the early rise of the AFofM, see J. R. Commons, "The Musicians of St. Louis and New York", i n his Labor & Administration. New York, Macmillan, 1913. 19. 20. Labor and the Knights of Labor. Even though the locals i n the West wanted to a f f i l i a t e with one or the other of these bodies, the League, controlled at that time by the locals.in New York and Philadelphia, resisted, preferring to continue as an independent organization. The conflict became sharper and many of the local leaders i n the League l e f t that body and joined the AFofL. Finally a convention was called i n Indianapolis on October 19, 1896, of delegates from 19 locals of the League and five locals of the AFofL. The delegates voted to form and a f f i l i a t e with a new organization, the American Federation of Musicians, with an International charter from the AFofL. This decision s p l i t the League. The majority of Locals joined the new AFofM, and only a rump remained. By 1902 only three of the original 101 locals were l e f t i n the League and i t had, to a l l intents and pur-poses, disbanded (although the AFofM maintained a "ghost" League for financial reasons u n t i l 1904). The AFofM1s f i r s t president was Owen Miller of St. Louis. Joseph N. Weber succeeded him to the presidency i n 1900 and with the exception of one year held the post u n t i l 1940. James C. Pe t r i l l o has been i t s president since then and there i s every likelihood that he w i l l remain i n this position for some time to come. It i s one of the characteristics of the major trade-unions of today that presidents are changed only after a long term i n office. Union leadership, l i k e other s k i l l e d and specialized occupations, has tended to become "professionalized". The reason generally given i s that continuous leadership by a person or group lends solidarity by virtue of the fact that they are the only ones who are to t a l l y familiar with, and capable of handling, a l l of the diverse problems that arise. 21 in,ooo 104,000 &»,ooo 7ft,ooo a. T Ol W >52(OOo 0 " b ^ O O O z ^ 2,0,000 0 l ? ) , O O Q o T R O P E UMIOM M E M B E R S H I P Tl+e A T R . e S A N D / 0 o IP 8 IP c-o O YfeARS> Chart 1 . The rapid growth of the AFofM can be seen i n the above chart. 1 While the figures i n Chart 1 may be a l i t t l e misleading because of the inclusion of theatrical employees, Wolman2 points out that the Musicians Union rose from 46OO members i n 1897 to 7 5 , 0 0 0 i n 1 9 2 3 . In 1 9 2 0 , 5000 of an estimated 7 0 , 0 0 0 members of the AFofM were Canadians.3 1 Leo Wolman, The Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880-1923, New York, National Bureau of Economic' Research, 1924, p. oO. 2 Ibid., pp. 118-119. 3 Ibid., p. 134. 22. An interesting point i n the development of the AFofM i s that i n 1913 there were some 636 locals i n the United States and Canada, In 1951 we find that there has been a slight increase i n the number of locals compared to the number of musicians unionized* showing a tremendous growth in membership but not i n the territory covered by the union. In Canada, the Toronto local i s the oldest—older than the AFofM i t s e l f . It was formed by 11 musicians on December 2, 1887, and originally was called The Toronto Musical Protective Association,^ Like the other locals that formed i n Canada, i t was relatively poor for a long time after joining the International body, due to the very immaturity of the labor movement i t s e l f , 3 Today there are 30 Locals of the AFofM i n Canada, nine chartered before 1903 and seven of the remaining 21 chartered i n the late 1930,s, The growth of these Locals can be seen i n a consideration of the problems that particularly confronted them due to the advent of r i v a l unionism i n Canada, In March, 1927, the All-Canadian Congress of Labour was formed i n Canada, ostensibly to organize Canadian labor independently of the existing international unions of the American Federation of Labor, One of the f i r s t of a group of independent locals of musicians to a f f i l i a t e with the A l l -Canadian Congress of Labour (hereafter referred to as the AGCL) was the 1 In 1913 there was a membership of 64,000 i n 636 locals. In 1951 there i s an estimated 240,000 i n 701 locals i n the U. S. and Canada. 2 The Toronto Local i s s t i l l known as the Toronto Musical Protective Association, but unlike i t s earlier counterpart i t i s now a member of the AFofM. 3 See H. A. Logan, Trade Unions i n Canada, Toronto, Macmillan & Co., 1948, While Logan discusses problems i n the early growth of trade-unionism in Canada from a general standpoint, which i s applicable to the locals of the AFofM, he does not discuss the musicians union i n particular. 23 National Association of Theatrical Employees, No. 3 (Musicians) in Montreal, Quebec, Organization of rival unions quickly followed across Canada and a national body was set up, known as the Musicians* Union of Canada. Whether or not the national body was established primarily as a protest against alien leadership, or whether the main goal was to establish national unions as such, is difficult to decide. At any rate, the new organization quickly took hold,marked by intense competition with the AFofM.1 This splinter group gained further momentum2 when the competition offered by substitutes, as records, became sharper. Independent unions had been formed in the United States during the late 1920*3 to protest the AFofM's inadequacy in coping with the mounting unemployment resulting from 1 An incident occurred in the Vancouver Local which has since become legendary to local musicians. Vancouver, in 1929, was host to a "Sea-Music Festival" at which appeared an organization called the National Juvenile Band of Vancouver. This group was composed of young boys who, enthusiasti-cally enough, used to play for any and every function that came along. It became the intention of this band to play for the Sea-Music Festival and the Vancouver Local of the AFofM contested the issue on the grounds that i t meant the loss of work to the professional musicians in Vancouver. The Vancouver Local of the rival Musicians Union of Canada however sought to show up the AFofM in this issue, arguing that the AFofM was curbing the encouragement of young musicians. Mr. E. C. Miller, then president of the Vancouver Local of the AFofM stated that the issue was played up by the splinter group whose only comment on the AFofM's policy was that " . . . (it was) the wishes of a gentleman named Joe Weber, who reigns over this labour racket in the world's worst crime centre (Chicago). . . «" See The Canadian Unionist, vol. 11, no. 9, March, 1929. 2 Similar to the "Sea-Music Festival" r i f t was the dispute that took place at the Toronto Exposition in 1928, Canadian bands belonging to the AFofM were ordered not to march with non-union bands (that i s , bands in the Musicians Union of Canada and non-union bands) in the parade opening the Exposition. As a result of this, visiting American bands were so short-handed that three non-union bands had to be used. This caused considerable friction amongst the members of the Toronto Local of the AFofM and many of the musicians broke away completely from the Local declaring that they would work for anyone that would pay the price. 24. the use of mechanical music and "talkies". The AFofM had to resort to public appeal to try to curb the use of "talkies" and i n the process spent well over one million dollars. The argument that "talkies" would destroy the American culture was flimsy and carried l i t t l e weight. The unemployment amongst musicians which became staggering when sound music was introduced i n motion pictures and radio i n 1929 was a serious blow to the power heretofore enjoyed by the AFofM. The AFofM's policy i n regard to radio was to t r y to force the issue of the 'closed shop* in order to protect i t s members, using the blacklist and boycott as offensive measures. The majority of radio stations i n Canada had no other choice than to agree to the AFofM's demands, while a growing minority held out by refusing to hire any other than musicians from the Musicians Union of Canada (MUC). The Canadian Broadcasting Corporation's policy was established by Mr. Hector Charleswdrth, head of the CBG, who followed a policy of hiring any musicians that he saw f i t , from any or no union. In December of 1932 Mr. Charlesworth stated the position of the CBC very clearly when he said, "So far as the relations of the various unions are concerned, the policy of the Commission w i l l be s t r i c t l y neutral and attempts by any organization to dominate stations w i l l be severely dealt:; with". The MUC took up the argument, as i t were, and t r i e d to point out the reaction generally f e l t i n Canada to the AFofM's influence which was termed "insidious and subversive".! The AFofM was s t i l l a very powerful union despite sound music, the declared policy of the CBC, and the 'sounding o f f of the MUC. On June 8, 1 One example of a radio station that was subverted to this 'insidious* influence was Station GKNGI, Toronto. On January 31, 1933, i t issued the following statement: ". . .any musicians playing over our station must belong to the Toronto Musical Protective Association (Local 149, AFofM) and be able to present their union cards at any time. . . . " 2 5 . 1 9 3 4 , i t went out on strike against the CBCts ruling of free hiring of musicians. The demands originally were forced by the Toronto Local for a closed shop and a 3 0 per cent wage boost. By June 1 5 , the strike had spread to a l l of the CBG stations across Canada. The issue was b i t t e r l y contested and the union dropped the demands for the wage boost before any settlement could be reached. This concession was acceptable to the union since i t s principal aim i n calling the strike was to get the MUC out of radio, and i n fact, out of business entirely. Weber, the International President of the AFofM, had to come to Toronto and meet with Charlesworth. The f i n a l result was that the MUG was allowed to remain on the a i r 0 In- June, 1 9 3 5 , the Canadian Federation of Musicians (CFM) was formed out of the MUC and was headed by A. E. Bray, long-time president of the AFofM's Local 4 0 6 i n Montreal and later head of Local 10 of the MUG. The formation of this national body was heralded as striking the death, blow to the AFofM i n Canada. The AFofM countered these wild proclamations by insisting that any v i s i t i n g band from the United States could not play i n any establishment where musicians from the CFM were being used. This proved to be one of the main factors accounting for the downfall of the CFM, because the one-night jobs of touring American name bands alone are a major source of income to the owners of dance-halls and auditoriums i n Canada, It meant that any place hiring CFM musicians could not "book i n " AFofM bands either from distant points i n Canada or from the United States. While the CBC could afford to hold out against the AFofM, the small opera-tors could not and AFofM musicians had to be employed sooner or later. 1 1 The AFofM* s power was s t i l l very much in evidence as the following incidents might well show. In 1 9 3 4 , Loew's Theatres, Montreal, signed a contract with the CFM. It was indeed a hollow victory for the CFM since many of the top vaudeville acts, such as Sally Rand, Benny Ross, Kingston and Case and others, could not appear because of their connections with the AFofM, In the case of Sally Rand, her musical director could not appear due to AFofM regulations forbidding him to play i n an establishment where other than AFofM musicians were employed, 26. One of the main themes of the CFM was that the Canadian Government should put pressure on the American Government to force the employment, dollar for dollar, of Canadian musicians in the United States for the money earned by American musicians i n Canada. Restrictions of this nature were impracticable then as they are now since Canadian musicians are scarcely known outside of their own Locals. Because of this obscurity, American operators would scarcely gamble on an unknown Canadian band when there are always name bands open to engagements in the United States. In regard to what constitutes the *professional status' of a musician the attitudes of the AFofM and the CFM were worlds apart. The AFofM always maintained that the qualification of a professional musician i s that he please the public,1 The CFM's attitude however differed markedly from t h i s , Herman W. Liersch, Secretary of the London, Ontario Local of the CFM pointed out that what was really needed was an apprenticeship plan for musicians so that u n t i l a musician was "qualified" he could not become a member of the union.2 While such a plan might apply to symphony musi-cians, i t has no place i n the f i e l d of dance music. By July, 1938, the CFM had almost broken up, being reduced to.five Locals: two in Montreal and one each i n Ottawa, Edmonton, and London, 1 A reiteration of this view i s found i n the Official Proceedings of the Forty-Second Annual Convention, June, 1937: ". . . xn our profession, everybody must be eligible to become a member as long as he satisfies the public and receives pay for his services. ..." 2 Much of what Liersch had to say can be found i n criticisms of the AFofM by Olin Downes, Music Critic of the New York Times and Walter Damrosch, then Conductor of the New York Philharmonic. The main point of their argu-ment, particularly as voiced by Damrosch i n Metronome, June, 1938, was that the AFofM was interested i n the quantity and not the quality of music and musicians. 27. Further, the ACCL, which was the parent body, had a t o t a l membership only about one-sixth that of the Trades and Labour Congress. Further exapansion of the ACCL could occur only through concentrating on the organization of industrial unions at the expense of the CFM and other craft unions. Finally the ACCL in 1940 combined with Canadian branches of major CIO unions, together with several independent unions, to form the Canadian Congress of Labour. The end of the CFM was i n sight after the formation of the CCL. From then on i t could not even provide a nuisance value to the "anti-AFofM" interests. However, for a certain period of time during the 1930*s the CFM did provide a certain amount of resistance to the AFofM. Probably the best way to describe i t would be to say that i t was "the l i t t l e flea on the big flea's back". We must now turn our attention to the structural set up of the AFofM, the tactics that i t has devised to remain at the head of the music industry, and the effects of technological change on the industry i t s e l f . Chapter 17 ANALYSIS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTION The American Federation of Musicians i s limited t e r r i t o r i a l l y to the United States and i t s possessions, and to Canada. The union does a f f i -l i a t e with'other musicians,' unions, as for example the Japanese and B r i t i s h Musicians-'. Unions through the I. L. 0. The power of the AFofM l i e s in the fact, as i t does with many of the international unions, that i t i s unique among other unions i n the trade i t represents, 1 In size i t i s among the top ten per cent of existing international unions, 2 The supreme authority of the AFofM i s the International Convention, held annually beginning on the f i r s t Monday in June,3 It i s this authority that has been claimed by many to have been rendered useless by the powers given to the International President, The much talked-of "emergency clause"4 gives the President power to suspend any By-Law in the event of what he feels i s an emergency. In order to carry out the emergency powers he i s authorized to promulgate executive orders that are binding on a l l members and Locals of the AFofM, The AFofM feels that this clause i s analogous to the emergency clauses of many organizations and that proof of i t s fairness can be found i n the fact that P e t r i l l o has used the emer-gency powers only twice since he became International President i n 1940,5 For a l l locals of 150 members or less, the Constitution allows one delegate to the Convention, A l l other Locals are allowed one delegate 1 R. A. Lester, Economics of Labor. New York, Macmillan Co,, 1947, p, 576, 2 F. Peterson, American Labor Unions. New York, Harper & Bros., 1945, p. 61. 3 International Constitution of the AFofM, Art. IV, p. 7. 4 Ibid., Art. I, Sec. 1, p. 19, 5 The f i r s t time, Pe t r i l l o gave the large symphony orchestras the right to recruit their personnel from any l o c a l . The second time, P e t r i l l o suspended the obligation of members of the Armed Forces to pay dues, 28. 29. per 1G0 paid-up members, with a maximum of three delegates. Similarly, Locals are allowed one vote per 100 members with a maximum of ten votes. These provisions are designed to prevent the more powerful Locals, such as those i n Chicago and New York, from controlling the Convention. Delegates to the Convention are elected by the membership of the Locals but, as i s usually the case i n Local unions, members of the Executive Board are the only ones sufficiently well-informed to attend the Conven-tions. This situation goes hand-in-hand with the general apathy of members that i s characteristic of most unions. The-officers of the International are as follows: President, Vice-President, Secretary, Treasurer, and an Executive Committee of five members, one of whom must be a Canadian. The selection of members of the Executive Committee i s usually made so as to provide t e r r i t o r i a l equality. While the Canadian member on the Committee can come from any Local, Walter M. Murdoch, the "Petrillo of Canada", has held the position for some time. The five members of the Executive Committe constitute the International Executive Board, and as such, according to the Consti-tution, control the AFofM's policy between Conventions. Whether or not the International Executive Board or the International President controls the AFofM's policies between Conventions i s a matter which we should consider for a moment. Formally, the President i s responsible only to the International Convention.* Further analysis of the powers of the President w i l l , however, show that he i s i n fact a power higher than the International Executive Board, 1 Int. Const, AFofM. Art. I., Sec. 1-F states: "He (the President) shall report his acts and doings to the Annual Convention of the Federation". 30. The president, as pointed out above, has the power to suspend existing by-laws of the Federation. He also has the power to: (1) create new legislation, when the existing by-laws of the Federation are deemed inadequate, (2) draw from the Funds 1 of the Federation for the purposes of "furthering the interests of the Federation". Just what i s implied i n furthering the interests of the Federation i s presumably l e f t to the discretion of the president. The only restriction that i s placed on the president i s found in Art. 1, Sec. 1 of the Constitution, which states that ". . . (the President) may annul and set aside (existing rules) except such which treat with the finances of the organization . . . ." 1 The Funds of the International are comprised of the following: (1) The Charter fee paid by the locals when they enter the Federa-tion. This fee i s variable depending on the size of the local entering the Federation and the jurisdiction that i t covers. (2) A semi-annual per capita tax paid by the locals to the Federa-tion Treasury. This tax does not vary between the locals and i s fixed at a certain amount, (3) Semi-annual subscription paid by the locals to the Federation for every paid-up member which entitles each member to a copy of the monthly magazine of the Federation, known as the "Inter-national Musician". It i s the usual type of union magazine giving a l l of the business of the Federation for the month, (4) "Assessments and taxes as may be deemed necessary". This i s a sort of pool into which a l l fines are paid. (5) Interest on bank funds and other invested monies of the Federation, (6) Donations, This could well include anything because of i t s ambiguity, (7) National i n i t i a t i o n fees, (8) "Fines and fees on locals or members imposed by the Interaational'i This should be distinguished from (4) above, (9) A l l profits of the printing plant. It i s interesting to note that in the event of a lawsuit involving one local (unless otherwise specified) Federation funds are not used. This also includes donations to organizations a f f i l i a t e d with the AFofM, For amounts in excess of $100,00, the Convention takes f i n a l action. 31. While the Constitution has defined a very broad role for the president, everyday happenings have interpreted his powers as being even broader. That he controls the union i s never questioned and that he has been successful i n his job i s equally uncontested since he enjoys the unqualified support of the Federation. Also, and due principally to the efforts of P e t r i l l o , the musicians are receiving a higher wagel and more employment than they have ever had before. The president's salary i s fixed at $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 per year. He i s usually the president of one of the big locals (as i n the case of Pet r i l l o who receives $ 2 6 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 per annum as head of the Chicago Local) and i s paid some $ 3 0 0 0 . 0 0 a year expense money for which he does not have to account, as well as hotel and traveling expenses. The Federation further buys the president an automobile of his own choice, pays for the upkeep (as gas, o i l , repairs, rent, insurance, and so on), and hires a chauffeur for him.2 As regards such matters as ca l l i n g the Convention, special sessions, removal and suspension of members, and the l i k e , the president's powers conform to those of other international union presidents. However, his powers to amend the Constitution, and to draw upon union funds, are unique. Because of the president's personal power, i t i s the opinion of this writer that the fundamentals of AFofM policy, as shown in i t s fight 1 While the wage-scale of the locals i s determined by the Locals themselves, the Constitution provides for the International Executive Board's supervision of the Local's p r i c e - l i s t . . See Art. I, Sec. 5 - 0 . 2 It i s probably i n respect to such gi f t s as these that P e t r i l l o has been.called a "Typical Labor Czar". Petrillo's reaction to these gi f t s i s not surprising: "I don't abuse the power I have, I'm on the square with our members, so_they give me things." When elected to the presi-dency of the AFofM, P e t r i l l o said, "My services have never been for sale only to the musicians I represent. . . I made you and you made me." 32. against recorded music, the extreme protection which i t gives its members, the insistence that musicians get paid for playing jobs, are a l l embodied in the blanket authority that is given Petrillo each year at the Conven-tion. Altogether, these establish him in a position of such authority that comparison with other labor leaders would be difficult i f not mean-ingless. As the external power of the AFofM rests, in part, on the fact that i t has unique control over its trade, so the internal power of the union rests on the International's effective control over the member Locals, An investigation of this control will show the degree of subordination! and restriction of the Locals by the International, The jurisdiction of the Locals can be one of three classes. The f i r s t is that a local's territory shall include an area of no more than ten miles radius from the centre of the city or town in which the local i s situated. Secondly, a Local's jurisdiction can be "statewide" or, as in the case, of Canada, "Province-wide". For example, Local 571, Halifax, has jurisdiction over the province of Nova Scotia. Thirdly, Locals may be given special charters when they are formed to cover certain regions. This is perhaps the most common of the three types of charters. For example, Vancouver's Local 145 covers the mainland of British Columbia and the city of Nanaimo on Vancouver Island.2 1 Int. Const. AFofM, Art. XII, Sec. 1 states: ", . . the Const, and By-Laws of the Local is subject and subordinate to the Const, (and) By-Laws. . . of the Federation. . . . " 2 The paid-up membership of the Vancouver Local is only 688, mainly from the cities of Vancouver and New Westminister. The control of the out-lying areas is largely ineffective. By comparison, Local 802 in New York, with a membership of 30,222, effectively controls a smaller area, comprised of Greater New York and Long Island. 33 To form a local there must be at least 50 prospective members, a l l residents of the same community, unless otherwise allowed by the Inter-national Executive Board.* This clause i s a rather limiting one i n the sense that many.of the areas not unionized do not have anything approaching 50 musicians (as, for instance, the interior of Bri t i s h Columbia). In order to prevent a renegade local being formed none of the 5© members forming a new local can be formerly expelled or suspended members. The Local i s further warned that any violations of the Constitution, By-Laws and Policy of the International body mean automatic expulsion. Charges against a Local can be made by any of the International officers, and t r i a l i s before the International Executive Board or a sub-committee designated by the Board, In regard to money matters the Constitution i s not so lenient. As stated i n Art, VT, Sec, 8, "» . . charges against a Local shall not apply to a Local f a i l i n g to pay i t s per capita tax or any other amount which may be due from i t to the Federation, and for such non-payment such Local i s subject to suspension or the revocation of i t s ; charter without such t r i a l . . . ." Locals have the opportunity to appeal a case to the International Executive Board and, where the amount of the original fine i s i n excess of $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 , may make a further appeal to the Convention. To show more accurately the position of the local i n relation to the International, i t might be well to outline briefly the limiting sections dealing specifically with the.rights and duties of locals: (1) Locals must investigate a l l jobs played in their jurisdiction to determine whether they are i n the best interests of the Federation, This eliminates personal judgement of the locals and tends to International policy. 1 Before May 1, 1948. charters were issued to locals which had secured 15 members. The exception to the rule now l a i d down for 50 members i s qualified by "being i n the best interests of the Federation", 34 (2) Locals must enforce a l l verdicts against their members for violating the Federation's Laws, (3) When a Local f a i l s to enforce i t s laws, i t must accept the judgement of the International, (4) No local can permit or order.a strike or boycott, unless i t has f i r s t been sanctioned by the International Executive Board, ( 5 ) The closed shop principle must be s t r i c t l y followed, unless . the Federation officers rule otherwise, (6) Locals are allowed to include i n their constitution a clause " providing for a minimum number of men to be used on jobs, but must be able to enforce the law or else accept the judgement handed down by the International, (7) Locals must protest the use of non-union bands, (8) Must be an automatic expulsion of Communist, Nazi, Fascist party members. Thus i t i s , as Lester 1 has pointed out, that the local unions, which hi s t o r i c a l l y came f i r s t and which in the early days were jealous of their autonomy, have gradually been forced to give up more and more of their powers to the International Union, Parallel to the control over the l o c a l i s the control exercised by the International over the individual members, as set down in the Consti-tution, Article III of the International Constitution defines the condi-tions necessary for e l i g i b i l i t y and application for membership of a prospective member. The maximum i n i t i a t i o n fee i s set at $ 5 0 , 0 0 , but i f i t i s proved that the applicant at one time or another played with a non-union band or i n an establishment that was on the "Unfair" l i s t , then an International Initiation fee must be paid i n addition to the local's i n i t i a t i o n fee. Thus the past, present, and future conduct of the member i s effectively controlled by the International body. Unless i t i s otherwise specified, an applicant w i l l not be considered for member** ship i n the AFofM u n t i l he has reached the age of sixteen. Article XIII i 1 E. A. Lester, Economics of Labor, New York, Macmillan Co., 1947, p. 573. -35 i s more explicit i n defining the position of members. The more significant limitations imposed upon the members are l i s t e d as follows: (1) Violation of Federation Law entails a fine of from $10 to . $5000 or expulsion from the union. (2) Membership in any other musical union means automatic expulsion. (3) To include a l l forms of musical instrument, "any person performing with an orchestra i s prohibited from using any kind of contraption or device that lends background rhythm to the rendition of an orchestra unless a member of the AFofM". (4) Playing for or with non-union musicians, teaching non-union musicians, and so on, are a l l subject to the review of the International Executive Board. (5) Share-plan engagements are allowable by the International Board only when they are proved to be non-competitive. (6) Leaders who hire a band, and then cannot pay, cannot ask for and receive Federation protection. (7) Members can only sign forms and contracts that have been issued by the AFofM. This control of membership i s in keeping with the control over the l o c a l and i s defended by the International i t s e l f as being the only way in which discipline and, i n the long run, protection for the membership i t s e l f , can be effected. It would seem, then, that centralized control leading to power-bargaining and, for the casual employer, outright dictatorship, go hand-in-hand. The International has created an "Unfair, Defaulter and Forbidden Territory L i s t " which i s a l i s t of those establishments which, through employment of non-union musicians, or payment of a wage-scale lower than the minimum required by the Local, or violation of Federation Law i n any way, seek to act against the best interests of the Federation. If a Local places an establishment on this l i s t , i t must request the International to do likewise in order to enjoy i t s protection. When the Federation investigates the local's claim that an establishment has circumvented the laws of the Federation, the employer i s placed on the Forbidden Territory L i s t . In each monthly copy of the union's magazine, "International 3 6 . Musician", i s an up-to-date l i s t of the establishments and operators on the Unfair, Defaulter and Forbidden Territory L i s t . This indicates to the union members the establishments which they must not patronize. Employers are considered unfair, locally, nationally, and internationally, u n t i l such time as they can show proof to the local union that they intend to employ union musicians and abide by the laws of the Federation. Because Federation policy i s such that only the President or Inter-national Executive Board can c a l l strikes, the International Constitution makes the provisions for the payment of strike benefits. 1 When a member i s called out on strike by the AFofM, he i s paid up to 50 per cent of his wage (minimum) received on the job he had when the strike became effe c t i v e . 2 Strike benefits are paid for a period up to 15 weeks after the start of the strike. The member who i s receiving strike benefits cannot work at another job during the hours that he normally worked on the job from which he was withdrawn. The International has rather carefully defined the procedures to be followed by both the membership and the locals i n the event of a strike , 3 In general, this i s done to minimize hasty and i l l -advised action on the part of either the membership or the l o c a l . The 1 Analogous to this i s the "Theatre Defence Fund", Here the AFofM taxes musicians working on sound pictures at a rate of one per cent based on the minimum scale of the job they are playing. Strike benefits are only paid out of the Theatre Defence Fund i n the event of a strike over a trade agreement, combatting the 'open shop' or when an emergency exists. Both strike benefits and the situation warranting the c a l l i n g of a strike are determined by the President or International Executive Board. 2 The maximum strike benefit obtainable i s $ 5 0 . 0 0 per week, 3 See Int. Const. AFofM. Art. V, Sec. VIII-XIV. See also Art. XIV, Sec. VI, for the restrictions of transfer of strike-breakers. 37 International of the AFofM is the only body that can c a l l a strike, whereas in other International unions, two-thirds majority vote in the Locals only needs the ratification of the International. It would appear once again as an example of extreme International control. This type of control, while rigid, is not confined to the AFofM alone since some of the Interna-tionals have introduced this singular authorization on the grounds that certain of the strikes are the result of a violation of the union's princi-ples and thus jeopardize the union's existence.* Perhaps one of the hardest features of the music industry that the International has had to control has been the mobility of musicians.^ The regulation of this mobility has been specifically defined in the Constitution through the issuance of Transfer cards. Earlier regulation of transfer members was purely a local affair with the local allowing the musician to work, on deposit of his transfer card, so long as there were no local musicians available. The International vetoed this action on the grounds that the local had no right to allow a member conditional work only.3 Local unions could, and did, exert a troublesome influence on the International to the extent that today there are no local restrictions on the freedom of members to transfer, other than those set down in the Constitution of the International.^ 1 F.Peterson, American Labor Unions, New York, Harper & Bros., 1945, pp. 226-228. 2 According to the former president, Joseph N. Weber: "Of a l l the developments to which our organization in the more than thirty years of its existence has had to adapt its e l f , none has presented such serious problems as did the development of the travelling orchestra". Inter- national Musician. July, 1926, vol. XXIV, p. 19. 3 See case presented in S. H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial  Management, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1941, P« 78. 4 For specific provisions, see Int. Const. AFofM, Art. XIV. 38 Before a member of the AFofM can draw a transfer card, he must have been a member of his home local for a period of six months, paid his dues, and be i n good standing. Upon transferring to a new loc a l , he i s issued a copy of Article XIV of the International Constitution so that he i s f u l l y aware of the existing conditions of his transfer. Upon entering a new lo c a l , i f at the same time remaining a member of his home loc a l , he cannot accept a steady engagement1 for a period of three months. The new local has the right to refuse him FULL-membership i n the new local up to six months, but after this time has elapsed, and on payment of the i n i t i a -tion fee into the new lo c a l , he automatically becomes a member. A transfer card becomes nu l l and void i f during the f i r s t three months of deposit of the transfer, the member leaves the Local to play with an orchestra outside of the Local 1s jurisdiction, for a period of one week or longer. If the transfer member decides, after three months to leave the Local for another job, the transfer i s withdrawn. If he leaves the Local within four weeks after depositing his transfer card, and returns within one year, i t i s subject to the opinion of the Executive Board of the new Local •;, whether or not his transfer card w i l l be accepted. Further, i f the transfer member f a l l s behind i n his dues payments or any other assessment, he must pay the back dues and/or assessments plus a "reinstate-ment fee " 2 to the Local before he can become a f u l l member. One bright spot i n i t a l l i s that a Local cannot reject a transfer member u n t i l one week after the six-month probationary period i s up. This protects the transfer member to the extent that he i s given the maximum 1 Many of the locals maintain a law defining a 1steady engagement1 as being three or more days per week for one employer for two or more con-secutive weeks. 2 The re-instatement fee i s determined by the Locals. 39. time allowable in order to f u l f i l l his obligations and become a member of the new Local. It also stops what might otherwise be a bias on the part of the new Local to keep out certain members. Protection of the new Local i s found in the r u 1 e that transfer members must abide by the Constitution, By-Laws and Price-List of the new Local, and where the new Local can show proof that the transfer card was improperly or fraudulently issued, i t can be immediately confiscated. The Constitution allows for an additional charge of ten per cent of the home Local's price for jobs which are either ''Traveling Engagements" or "Miscellaneous Out-of-Town Engagements", Traveling Engagements are defined as engagements of one week or more played by members outside of the jurisdiction of their home Local. Miscellaneous Out-of-Town Engagements are defined as engagements of less than one week played by members outside of the jurisdiction of their own Local. A "week" i s similarly defined as consisting of f i v e , six, or seven days. The ten per cent additional charge i s known as the "10$ Traveling Surcharge" and was instituted to enable the traveling musician to meet the additional expenses incurred while he i s traveling from one place to another. This charge i s based only on the wage scale and does not include additional p r i c e - l i s t charges, as, say, the Local's charge for wearing apparel. If a Leader retains the money from the 10$ Traveling Surcharge* and does not distribute i t to the members of the orchestra, he i s automatically expelled from the AFofM. An orchestra must charge the price of the Local i n which i t i s playing, but only i f the wage scale i n the Local i n which they are playing i s higher than the rate set i n their home Local, plus the additional ten per cent. This means that i f an orchestra traveling out of Victoria plays i n Vancouver, i t must raise 1 Locals collect the ten per cent where applicable, and the distribution i s as follows: four-tenths to the Local, four-tenths to the International, and the remaining two-tenths to the musicians playing the engagement. 40. its price since the Vancouver Local has a higher wage scale than the Victoria Local. The Local, in turn, must report a l l traveling orchestras playing in its jurisdiction so that the International Treasurer can account for, and receive, the ten per cent surcharge. The Constitution! l i s t s the exemptions to the surcharge as being: (1) Symphony Orchestras. (2) Concert Orchestras and Units. (3) Opera Engagements, (4) Traveling Theatrical Tours, (5) Theatre Engagements, (6) Rodeo and Circus Engagements. (7) Military, Concert or Brass Bands. (8) Radio Engagements. (9) Picnics, where the home Local has no picnic ground. (10) Political Tours, within one state or province. (11) Fair and Carnival Engagements, where there is no dancing. Locals have the right to tax traveling orchestras for a job where the International Law does not already provide a tax. Home locals do not have a claim on the members, in terms of taxing them, i f the job that is played is longer than one week. In addition to the 10$ Traveling Surcharge, the Constitution provides general rules to be followed for a l l traveling and miscellaneous out-of-town engagements. In every case the local office must be notified of the engagement. This notification comes from the orchestra member, who must be a member in good standing and play with members in good standing, and notification must come from the leaders. The penalty imposed by the Consti-tution for the employment of non-union musicians is from $10 to $500 for each offence.2 Leaders of orchestras f u l f i l l i n g traveling or out-of-town engagements must allow the local in whose jurisdiction the job is being played to collect the money due for the engagement, i f i t so desires. 1 See Int. Const. AFofM, Art. 15, Sec. 3, p. 95» 2 Ibid., Art. XVI, Sec. I l l , p. 100. 41. Provision i s also made in this section (Article XVI) for the buying of uniforms by the members of the orchestra. The regular money received from the job cannot be used to buy uniforms, and cannot, be used at a l l unless the job i s for a minimum time period of ten weeks. In such a case, the side-man pays only $ 2 5 . 0 0 of the t o t a l cost of the uniform,, A l l contracts for travelling or out-of-town engagements must include the following preamble: . . . .As the musicians engaged under the stipulations of this contract are members of the American Federation of Musicians, nothing in this contract shall ever be construed as to inter-fere with any obligations which they owe to the American Federa-tion of Musicians as members thereof. . . . In addition then to the musicians signing contracts issued by the AFofM, they must at a l l times be subject to the rules of the AFofM as being higher authority than the contract governing their job, A member can be discharged or can quit on two weeks' notice i n writing ' i f . . / a specified number of weeks i s not named in the contract. That the Federation keeps as close a touch as possible on the membership in regard to payments of jobs i s seen in the fact that leaders, and not their agents, must collect the money due on an engagement. This would ostensibly prohibit those agents who work in collusion with orchestra members to circumvent AFofM laws. Failure of any members of the AFofM to sign a contract for a job in other than the pre-scribed way means their immediate suspension from the AFofM. Control, through contracts, of recorded music i s stipulated by the provision that ". . ,this contract sh a l l not become effective unless i t s h a l l be approved by the International Executive Board of the American Federation of Musi-cians. , . In addition, where the members are prevented from playing by reason of a strike, ban, unfair l i s t , or order of the Federation, the contract becomes null and void, and the members can accept other work. 42 One of the trends that the AFofM has t r i e d to establish has been the provision by the locals for the regulation of musicians i n an establish-ment. It has also t r i e d to force radio stations, which rebroadcast programs originating elsewhere, to use a "stand-by" orchestra.! Similarly, the AFofM has sought to protect l o c a l musicians by having a "stand-by" orchestra employed whenever a traveling band i s f u l f i l l i n g an engagement. Sec. XV of Article XVII rather clearly defines this as follows: . . . i f a dance h a l l or hotel manager arranges with a lodge or society to give i t s own dance on certain nights i n his h a l l or ballroom, and such lodge or society publicly advertises such dance as i t s own, then the traveling orchestra f i l l i n g a perma-nent engagement i n such h a l l or ballroom cannot play for such a dance unless a local orchestra of the same number of men i s also employed. . . .2 Further protection of the l o c a l musician comes from the limitation placed on the traveling orchestra. Traveling orchestras can f u l f i l l the engage-ment which brought them into a Local but cannot s o l i c i t further engagements. Of the "make-work rule" and the'!f eatherbedding" tactics of the union, only this need be said: the pressure f o r them arose mainly from the threat of unemployment and i n view of the methods adopted by the employers Of music i t i s not too drastic a means to employ. Traveling orchestras f u l f i l l i n g engagements i n theatres are not permitted to play miscellaneous jobs i n the jurisdiction of the Local without 1 That i s , i f a local radio station rebroadcasts a program from another cit y , the music i s being used in much the same way as records, one group of musicians playing a show subsequently heard throughout the country. The AFofM then forced the local radio station to hire the same number of l o c a l musicians as appeared on the transcribed radio program, knowing f u l l - w e l l that they would not have to play a note of music. 2 This i s known as "featherbedding" and was outlawed by the Taft-Hartley Act i n 1947« P e t r i l l o won a legal fight against this restriction and the restrictions of the "Lea Act" (which sought to outlaw featherbedding i n the radio industry). It i s discussed more f u l l y in the chapter dealing with the record industry. 43. the Local's consent. An incident occurring in Vancouver in the early 1930's brought out this point when Paul Whiteman and his orchestra were engaged in the Orpheum Theatre as part of a vaudeville circuit. After the engage-ment, Whiteman agreed to play for a dance in the Hotel Vancouver without getting the local union's permission. The Local protested, and the dance had to be cancelled. Federation control for the protection of locals is also specified for traveling theatrical companies. It is set down that the number of musicians employed in a theatre shall not be reduced when a show is played in the establishment. The International also protects musicians traveling with a show by stipulating that i f a theatrical company closes the show before the termination of its contract and then starts up again, no musicians will be employed until the back wages have been paid. This rule applies to the musicians who were with the show and to new musicians that might be offered the contract. The only time that musicians traveling with theatrical com-panies can be laid off is during Holy Week and the week preceding Christmas (December 18 to 24 inclusive). During these two weeks, the musicians are paid half-salary and for these two weeks only. The Constitution allows this for theatrical companies only, which operate on a seasonal basis. It does not apply to vaudeville acts, which presumably run a l l of the time on the basis of a; definite circuit.* As in every case outlined above, whether i t be traveling bands, theatri-cal companies, vaudeville acts, and the like, the AFofM's control is 1 Generally speaking, vaudeville acts cover a specified number of engage-ments in theatres found in a certain territory. Several years ago there were two such circuits in Vancouver, the Pantages Circuit and the Orpheum Circuit, which covered a group of chain-theatres. Theatrical units, however, generally cover so many theatres on a time basis or season. 4 4 . levelled at the employer, the Local concerned, and the musicians involved. It has caused a good many people to think that the union goes too far i n i t s eagerness to impose rules on the employers and discipline on the member-ship. Imposing rules on the employers has served to keep a check on those employers who would exploit musicians, just as r i g i d discipline of i t s membership has prevented the musician from allowing himself and his fellows to be exploited. For a l l of the various types of traveling jobs, the Constitution has made provision for the 'comfort' of the musician: 1. Leaders, contractors (where the contractor i s agent and not leader) or employers must pay the transportation costs of the side-men on any traveling engagement, the cost of which i s generally based on the public transportation service i n that locale, with the following restrictions: (1) Daytime travel by train, bus, or automobile, ( 2 ) Nightime travel (between midnight and 8 :00 A.M.) must by 1st. class with sleeping accomodations provided, ( 3 ) Where the sideman must begin traveling before 8 : 0 0 A.M. he i s entitled to an extra $ 3 , 0 0 , ( 4 ) He can only travel 200 miles i n 24 hours, and where travel i s over 24 hours i s entitled to receive an addi-tional $ 8 . 0 0 , It has been suggested to the writer that i n this respect the musician i s better off than his fellow workers who must generally pay their own way from job to job. We can imagine musicians traveling from one location to another, but we could not conjure up such a picture, for plumbers. There must necessarily be a greater mobility amongst musicians since personal appearances of bands, theatrical units, and the l i k e , are often the only way that they can subsist, and the AFofM has been quick to realize i t . The only wage scales found i n the International Constitution are for traveling theatrical engagements, concert orchestras, f a i r s , circuses, 45 rodeos, and carnivals.* A l l other wage scales are determined by the locals. Symphony orchestras, because of their great cost of operation, have been rather l i b e r a l l y treated by the AFofM. To be c l a s s i f i e d by the union as a symphony orchestra, an orchestra must have at least 60 members and play 15 or more concerts i n i t s annual season. A symphony player is defined as being either a member of a symphony orchestra or a musician who i s acceptable to a symphony orchestra. Orchestras f a l l i n g into this category can travel freely from engagement to engagement, without the restriction of having to submit i t s contracts or the details of i t s engagement to the Local for approval. They do not have to pay any tax or fee to the Local, as i s required of other orchestras. The home Local bargains for the symphony orchestra to set the minimum wage scale, but members themselves can bargain for higher rates. This opportunity allows the better symphony musicians to be their own agents, as they are a r t i s t s or soloists who can oftentimes demand and receive a scale far above that set by the Local. There would therefore be very l i t t l e uniformity amongst symphony musicians in terms of the wages they receive. Unless directly affected, symphony members do not have to go on sympathy strikes or refrain from playing as i s the case with other AFofM members. This i s applicable only so long as the musicians are employed as symphony members. When they are employed i n any other capacity, they f a l l under the rules and regulations of the AFofM. The rates charged for traveling symphony orchestras are set down in the Constitution as follows: (1) For eight or less concerts per week, with three rehearsals of 2jg hours, scale of $125.00 per man minimum. 2 See Tables I, II, and III of Appendix A. 46 ( 2 ) Extra concerts, at rate of #12.00 per man. (3) Where tour finished on fraction of week, $ 1 5 . 0 0 per concert. (4) Extra rehearsals, $ 1 . 5 0 per half-hour per man. Records and transcriptions are controlled by the International President and his power is specifically set down in Article XXIV, Sec. 1 of the Constitution: ". . .for prices and conditions for a l l Mechanical Recordings consult the International President's Office. . . . " This can perhaps be rationalized as being i n keeping with the power that he already has shown in his fight with the record companies, and more, the results that he has gained for the benefit of the average musician. In summary then, we can say that the control by the International of a l l phases of the music industry i s r i g i d l y defined and s t r i c t l y maintained. The AFofM, l i k e very few of the unions of today, unequivocally gives i t s President very broad powers which, i f f u l l y exercised, would enable him to become f i n a l authority over the rules and policies of the AFofM. P e t r i l l o , as has been said, has not abused his powers and has used them only for the benefit of the musicians. Whether or not he has used his powers or i n f l u -ence to control minor factions in the AFofM would be pure conjecture since i t could not.be determined as solely i n Petrillo's interests any more than i t could be i n the interests of the Federation. While the International exerts elaborate restrictions over the organization and membership of Locals and traveling bands alike, as well as over employers, such r e s t r i c -tions, and the power behind them, are accepted as necessary for adequate protection of the musicians' livelihood. Chapter V ANALYSIS OF LOCAL CONSTITUTION SHOWING THE POSITION OF THE LOCALS IN RESPECT TO INTERNAL STRUCTURE AND GOVERNMENT The real function of the Local i n the AFofM i s that of a subordinate unit of the International, through which the International can reach and control the entire membership. The Constitutions and By-Laws and subse-quent amendments adopted by the more than 7 0 0 Locals of the AFofM must be submitted to the International Executive Board before a Charter i s issued in order that International Law can be carried out. It i s i n this way that there i s a conformity between the basic policies and procedures of the Inter-national and i t s various Locals. Why, i t i s so often asked, i s there such a r i g i d centralization of authority i n the AFofM? Perhaps the main reason i s that because the music industry i s so diverse there is a very real need for detailed over-all regulation. Secondly, some of the major issues facing the union require industry-wide bargaining and thus have to.be handled by the International Executive Board. In a l l other cases, where the AFofM unilaterally sets the working rules and wage scales of the various jobs, a certain amount of Local autonomy must be granted, but only to the extent that i t does not conflict with International policy, A third reason why there i s such r i g i d control by the International i s that the majority of Locals are relatively weak i n terms of bargaining power. The two contributing factors to this weakness are f i r s t , the mobility of musicians and, second, the a v a i l a b i l i t y of substi-tutes, such as records, transcriptions and the l i k e . This i s not meant to suggest that the Locals are "weak" as such. Indeed, the Locals of the AFofM are very powerful, but only because they have the entire International organization to back them up. The Locals of the AFofM are encouraged to join labour organizations a f f i l i a t e d to the AFofL, whether local, state- or province-wide. In Canada 4 7 , 4 8 a f f i l i a t i o n i s with organizations i n the Trades and Labour Congress of Canada. These organizations directly assist the AFofM Locals wherever possible, at the same time supporting the use of union musicians. However, when a Local's Charter i s revoked by the International Executive Board, the Local can no longer claim the assistance of these outside organizations, since a f f i l i a t i o n i s determined on the basis of the Locals being a member in good standing with the International body. In addition to membership restrictions on the formation of a Local*, there are several fees and taxes which must be paid by the Local i n order to remain i n good standing. While some of these taxes have been mentioned b e f o r e 2 , specific mention should be made of those applicable to a Local: (1) charter fee of # 2 5 . 0 0 plus an i n i t i a t i o n fee of from # 5 . 0 0 to $ 5 0 . 0 0 , ( 2 ) per capita tax of f i f t y cents per member per six months, and ( 3 ) a subscription tax (to the publication "International Musician") of th i r t y cents per member per six months. Failure, of the Local to make the required i s penalized by payments .v'; : .: , a fine. Where the fine i s not paid, the Local i s automatically expelled from the International. The power of the Local officers varies with the size of the Local, In the larger Locals i n Canada, the President i s the main figure, as for example Walter Murdoch of the Toronto Local, Many of the smaller Locals employ a full-time Secretary-Business Manager who i s actually the head of the Local, A l l officers of the AFofM, whether Local or International,must of course by AFofM members. Monthly meetings are held by the Locals to conduct general union business, with special meetings called whenever necessary by the Local's Executive Board, Permanent or semi-permanent music 1 See p. 3 0 . 2 See pp. 3 2 - 3 4 . 49, engagements covered by a proposed agreement can be r a t i f i e d or rejected by the Executive Board in an emergency, but i n a l l cases must have the f i n a l approval of a special or general meeting, this meeting being the highest authority i n the Local© Each Local i n addition to having i t s own Constitution and By-Laws, has a Price-List and Working Ruless effective for i t s jurisdiction. This i s perhaps one of the significant features of the Local's power i n the AFofM and i t s relationship to Locals i n other trade unions. Wages and working conditions i n the Local are decided by the Local i t s e l f , only requiring International approval and not International determination. In fact, the Locals could not follow International determination of wage rates and working conditions, since the policy of "what the public can stand" i s something that requires knowledge available only to the Local o f f i c a l s and members in each l o c a l i t y . Certain significant differences from other unions may be pointed out in this regard: ' (1) The AFofM i s characterized by de-centralized wage-rate determination bound by Local control. Other unions generally follow a pattern of centralized determination of wages. (2) Many of the working conditions, as the "closed shop", etc., are part of either the International or Local Constitutions of the AFofM. The greatest majority of other unions are not so fortunate in that they must formally negotiate for these conditions through collective bargaining on a local, company, plant, regional or industry-wide basis. Where the International Constitution does not provide adequate revenue to the Local, or where there i s not adequate protection of the members, or Local conditions are not covered, they w i l l be found in the 50. Local's Constitutions. One such point i s the protection of members already working on a steady engagement against unemployed musicians auditioning for the same job.l As further protection for the orchestra leaders or con-tractors, some Locals provide that where a side-man gets a substitute for an engagement and does not notify the leader, he must pay the substitute and pay an equal amount as fine to the Local.2 A l l Locals, without excep-tion, specify that the members must notify the union of a change i n their notice sent to address within 48 hours after moving since/the member's address as recorded at the Local headquarters i s taken to be legal notice. Except where a Local i s toosmall, death benefit funds have been set up for the protection of the musician's next-of-kin. The Vancouver Local i s rather typical i n this respect, having a death benefit payable to the next-of-kin to the amount of $800.00. Contributions to this Fund are made by charging members $2.00 on the death of one of the Local's members who was paid-up and i n good standing. The only persons excluded from this pay-ment are l i f e members.3 No member of the AFofM, regardless of the Local to which he belongs, can be disciplined or expelled from the AFofM without a t r i a l by his Local. Thus 'every case, where the condition of "automatic expulsion" from the union has been applicable to the member, i t must be preceded by a t r i a l . An appeal can be f i l e d to the International Secretary of the AFofM within 30 1 The Constitution and By-Laws of Local 283, Pensacola, Florida, for instance, state i n Sec, 30-C: "No band or musical unit i s allowed to audi-tion i n any establishment during the hours that same Is open for business, or while the band or musical unit presently employed there i s not under legal notice to close". 2 See Sec. 11. Const, and By-Laws, Local 283, Pensacola, Florida. 3 Life members are those members of a Local who have been i n good standing for a considerable time and who make their l i v i n g exclusively from music. To be voted a l i f e member requires the ra t i f i c a t i o n of a general or special meeting. Another exception i s found i n the case of musicians joining the Local over 45 years of age. 51 days following the decision i n the case, A further appeal can be made to the International Executive Board, with a f i n a l appeal (where an original fine i s over $500,00) to the International Convention, At the Local lev e l , the T r i a l Board i s made up of the officers of the Executive Board, When a member receives notice that charges have been preferred against him, he i s allowed two days to prepare his defence before the t r i a l takes place. A decision of the T r i a l Board i s secured by a majority vote, but i f the decision awarded i s a conviction of the charge the member remains within the union u n t i l a l l right to appeal i s either exhausted or forfeited. The officers of some Locals have been more far-sighted than others, and have realized the value of entertainment unions working together for their own good. Such i s the case i n New York's Local 802. It participates i n an organization known as the Fact Finding Committee which has grown up since 1935 among AFofL unions in New York City whose jurisdiction covers the theatrical industry. Its purpose i s to meet at regular intervals and discuss problems that confront the various groups, thus remaining as one unit rather than a collection of weak, divided unions. Even though the AFofM would not f i t into this latter Category, i t i s s t i l l better off than remaining alone in the music industry, 1 This i s a case in point where the 1 The o f f i c i a l journal of Local 802, New York, Allegro, v o l . 2 5 , no. 12, October, 1951, l i s t s a l l of the a f f i l i a t e d AFofL unions i n the Central Trades and Labor Council i n the Theatrical Industry i n New York: Actors Equity Association American Federation of Radio Artists American Guild of Musical Artists American Guild of Variety Artists Associated Musicians of Greater New York, Local 802 Association of Theatrical Press Agents and Managers, Drivers, Chauffeurs and Helpers, Local 816 Exhibition Employees Union Legitimate Theatre Employees Union, Local B-183 Radio & Television Directors Guild Television Authority Theatre Authority Theatrical Costumer Works Union, Local 124 Theatrical Drivers Union, Local 817 52. Local has sought to cope with the problems confronting i t by a f f i l i a t i o n with similar groups i n the industry. While very few of the Locals act as booking agents for their members, more attention i s being paid to this function. An "Employer Listing Service" i s now being compiled so that leaders and contractors may readily know the qualifications of the musicians. It i s used mainly by the larger Locals (such as Local 47, Los Angeles which has 13,456 paid-up members) where the musicians are too numerous to congregate at union headquarters or some other central point. The Employment Listing Service i s not designed to create an employment office out of the Local, but to ; be a central point where leaders and contractors can obtain complete information about i n d i -vidual members. In summing up the position of the Local i n the AFofM we should mention the mobility of musicians as a factor contributing to greater power of the Local.* As long as members could go from place to place and get jobs, there was no security for the musician who'was being displaced and there was nothing to indicate that the Local i n whose jurisdiction the job was being played could do anything about i t . Subsequent International regulation of the mobility of musicians gave the Locals power to protect their own members by controlling transfer members and traveling bands or units. Centralized authority of the International Executive Board has tended to keep the Locals i n line i n respect to International policy. But at the same time, allowing the Locals to set their own wage rates and working conditions has allowed the Locals a certain amount of autonomy. Taken c o l ^ lectively, the position between the International and the Locals i s unique in trade-unionism. Theatrical Protective Union, Local 1, I.A.T.S.E. Theatrical Protective Union, Local 4, I.A.T.S.E. Theatrical Wardrobe Attendants Union, Local 764 Treasurers and Ticket Sellers Union, Local 751 United Scene Artists, Local 829 1 For a technical discussion of the Union's control of the mobility of musicians, see pp. 56-57. Chapter VI COLLECTIVE BARGAINING VERSUS UNILATERAL CONTROL As the following two chapters w i l l seek to show, one of the fundamental ways i n which the AFofM differs from other craft and industrial unions i s i n respect to collective bargaining. Implicit i n the functioning of collective bargaining i s a process of "give-and-take", but with the AFofM i t would appear to be a policy of "you give, I take". The process of collective bargaining may take any number of forms, A single employer may bargain with a representative of his employees, or there may be l o c a l bargaining, regional bargaining, company-by-company bar-gaining, plant-by-plant bargaining, and industry-wide bargaining. No matter what form the collective bargaining assumes, however, i t i s not altogether a problem of opposing the other group, since both sides must know and be able to get what the groups they represent actually desire from the negotia-tions. Thus, while union and management could be i n agreement over a contract, there may be an unwillingness on the part of the membership to accept the management's offer. Generally, settlements w i l l be reached only when the respective economic and p o l i t i c a l necessities of the union and management are compatible. Into this broad process of collective bargaining we find no place for the AFofM. To state i t simply: "They do not bargain". Berton 1 quotes one of the "victims" of the AFofM's unilateral policy as saying, "Only trouble i s the union gives us something as a concession we f e e l we should have as a right". Although the phrase, "they do not bargain", so aptly describes the AFofM, i t i s not altogether true. It does negotiate wage scales and working rules, but with very few operators. Chief of these are the record companies 1 P. Berton, "War Dance of the Musicians", MacLeans Magazine, vol.^60yh6.24, Dec. 15, 1947. „ 54. (and then only the major ones), motion picture studios, major radio networks, and the major television networks8 A l l smaller companies i n these fie l d s must abide by the conditions agreed to by the major companies and the AFofM. Similarly, a l l other jobs, as casuals i n cabarets, cocktail bars, independent radio stations, theatres, etc., must pay the wage scale set by the Local and abide by the working rules set either by the Local or Inter-national Constitutions,* It might well be asked why this i s the case. The answer l i e s i n the conditions of the industry and the tactics adopted by the AFofM. The following are perhaps the more important aspects that we might consider: (1) A l l musicians, including famous a r t i s t s and name bands, are subject to the rules and regulations of the AFofM. No individual member or orchestra can become powerful enough to exert an appreciable influence on the union. In fact, there i s a good deal of apathy even on the part of most musicians about/participating i n union a f f a i r s . (2) Because the AFofM has this r i g i d control over i t s entire membership, i t can use i t as a bargaining club against record companies, cabaret owners or anyone else who t r i e s to circumvent union policy, by refusing to allow any or a l l orchestras and a r t i s t s to appear in the establishment, (3) If the employers and the name bands, e t c , are brought into l i n e , the individual musician must follow union policy. If he does not, he w i l l not have a band to play with or a place to play i n . (4) The chances of a non-union musician making a l i v i n g i n the music industry would be appreciable only i n some community (for example, 1 It does not matter here whether the rules are imposed by the International body or the separate Locals since the AFofM's policies are either levied . or directed through the Locals by the International Executive Board, 55 the interior of Br i t i s h Columbia) where the union does not have any effective control. Where the Locals are firmly established, more than 90 per cent of the musicians are unionized. While other unions have had to bargain for the closed shop, the AFofM has insisted on i t through i t s International Constitution. That i s , the hiring of musicians by an employer not only pre-supposes the musicians to be union members. It must be the AFofM to which they belong. This point was the subject of a heated jurisdictional battle between Pet r i l l o of the AFofM and Lawrence Tibbett of the American Federation of Radio Artists. In August, 1940, P e t r i l l o informed the instrumentalists of the American Guild of Musical Artists (Heifetz, Zimbalist, Iturbi, and others) that they had to join the AFofM by Labor Day, 1940, or be barred from the radio and recordings. His argument? "They're musicians and they belong to me. Since when i s there any difference between Heifetz playing a fiddle and the fiddler i n a tavern. They're both musicians." Immediately Lawrence Tibbett, President of the American Guild of Musical Artists and later the American Federation of Radio Artists (September, 1940) sought an injunction to prevent Petrillo»s "blitzkreig", which as Tibbett maintained, reflects "the personal ambition of one man to make himself the dictator of culture and entertainment i n America". Tibbett pointed to Petrillo's control over his union—his power to fine up to |5000, to c a l l a strike at w i l l , to set aside any except financial provisions of the union's Constitution, P e t r i l l o pointed out, i n answer, that he personally had never called a strike and that the Executive Board, not he, had the power to impose fines. His argument was predicated with the thought, "Everybody c a l l s me the 56. Tsar, the Chieftain, and this and that. What can I do?" What can he do, indeedj On November 19, 1940, Justice Stuer refused to grant a temporary injunction to Tibbett. Thus while Tibbett continued a useless fight, P e t r i l l o had assured the closed shop clause and had even gone to the extent of raiding other unions to make i t a "closed" closed shop0 There i s l i t t l e i f any organization amongst the employers to bargain with the AFofM. The only effective resistance has been shown by the major motion picture studios and record companies. Even here the AFofM has been more than successful i n i t s nego-tiations. The AFofM i s actually i n a position similar to that of the United Mine Workers and the Allied Clothing Workers of America. Employers are predominantly small-scale, highly competi-tive and poorly organized. The union on the other hand i s highly organized. The music business i s a l l this and more because the employers are not only small-scale, they are also extremely diversified i n composition. That i s , they represent so many different types of music that they have l i t t l e i n common as a focus for organization. The AFof M being very powerful and highly-centralized i s i n a much stronger position i n bargaining power than any employer or group of employers. This whole situa-tion i s actually the reverse of most industries where a large percentage of employers haye joined together i n associations to deal more effectively with the unions. Labour in the majority of industries i s relatively immobile and does not move from job to job or from one part of the country 5 7 , to another. One of the reasons given by Lester 1 i s that where employers have the practice of hiring workers at an early age, mobility of labor i s reduced because workers fe e l that they w i l l remain there for the rest of their l i v e s . They are encouraged to remain due to seniority and pension rights and other benefits. The union's position has thus been to secure as much employment as i s possible for the labor force i n any l o c a l i t y . But the AFofM has made great use of the mobility of musicians. At one time i t was one of the most pressing problems, but now i t represents a very strong bargaining club. Since "name bands" are constantly sought by employers i n different c i t i e s , the union allows the bands to travel but at the same time allows the bands to play only at establishments that are not on the Unfair List and are i n good standing with the union. Since road tours are also profitable to the bands that travel, i t i s imperative that they remain i n good standing with the union or else they cannot go "on the road". (8) Where collective bargaining i s carried on the union i s treated more as a r i v a l business than as a union. This i s understandable since the AFofM's position i s such that employers have no other choice. One point that should be mentioned in regard to collective bargaining i s that the AFofM leadership at no time feels that i t must consult the membership over negotiations. Decisions that 1 H. Lester, Economics of Labor. New York, Macmillan Go,, 1 9 4 7 , pp, 106-108. Other reasons given by Lester are: 1) Costly and inconvenient for workers to move to another place. 2; Workers are ignorant of opportunities i n other markets. (3) There are many restrictions on shopping around in other labor markets. ( 4 ) Unemployment may be an obstacle to mobility. ( 5 ) Mobility means loss of seniority rights. 58. are made and agreements that are signed are carried out' by the leadership with the knowledge that whatever they bring back to the membership w i l l be acceptable. This confidence eliminates a lot of the uncertainty that most union leaders face—that i s , just what the membership w i l l accept, (9) In carrying out i t s unilateral wage policies, the AFofM has been careful i n basing i t s wage scales to see that adequate considera-tion i s given the employment effect. The policy of "what the public can stand" i s never abused by the AFofM since too high a wage scale would cut out much employment. Further, as many of the jobs pay over-scale wages, there i s no need to raise the minimum guarantee since higher wages can be obtained by the musicians and the marginal operators can s t i l l operate at a lower wage scale, Ghristenson* has likened this unilateral control of the AFofM to that of a "trade association" and not a trade union, resembling the old-time guilds which regulated the charges imposed for the services of i t s members. Others of course have sought to c a l l i t a "dictatorship" and lesser names. But to the average musician i t remains, as one musician succinctly phrased i t , "the most for the mostest". 1 C. Lawrence Christenson, "Chicago Service Trades" i n H. A. M i l l i s , How Collective Bargaining Works. New York, 20th Century Fund, p. 851. Chapter VII WAGE SCALES AND WORKING RULES A. Applicability of Economic Theory to the AFofM'3 Wage Rate Determination Before we examine the AFofM's wage rate determination i n the lig h t of economic theory, we must again note some of the unique characteristics of the music industry. First of a l l , music belongs to that group of pro-fessions or trades which we have called the "service trades". As a general case, we can say that a service trade i s best defined as a group whose members do not create any physical product. Thus the musician i s demanded for himself, and not for the production of other things. At the same time music and musicians are required, and can only be had, i n one place and at one time.* A second feature of the industry i s that music i s an art as well as a profession. This i s tantamount to saying that individuality w i l l characterize the musician's style and. interpretation. The degree to which a musician's individuality i s demanded by the public i s conditioned by a third factor—public appeal, i.e., the musician's popularity. Popularity, then, ensures many an orchestra a substantial income which might be nothing i f the criterion were technical a b i l i t y alone.2 As the following analysis w i l l seek to show, individuality and consumer demand (popularity) are the two main influences i n the AFofM's, and the musician's, determination of the level of the wage rates, A fourth characteristic is the large number of marginal employers i n the music industry. Coupled with this i s the fact that v i r t u a l l y a l l professional musicians are members of the AFofM. With this 'security', 1 The argument may be presented that modern communication devices are such that one musician can be heard by millions of people at one time. The point i s , however, that where employers hire l i v e musicians (and by far the majority do), radio and records do not enter the discussion. 2 But this i s the very point! The fact that the public's choice i s as varied as the musician's s k i l l .and interpretation accounts for the sometimes "unreasonably" high rates that some orchestras demand, and receive. 60. the AFofM has had no trouble in unilaterally setting the base rate. Thus the industry i t s e l f creates two distinct advantages that the AFofM has u t i l i z e d i n i t s wage rate determinationt (1) The musician's individuality and popularity determine the level of the wages (how much the musician can charge). (2) The insecurity of the employers (since a great many are just marginal) and the degree of unionization of musicians (something over 90 per cent) enable the AFofM to unilaterally set the base rates. An examination of the above inherent conditions in the light of economic theory reveals some interesting implications. Fi r s t of a l l , what do we mean when we refer to marginal productivity as a basis for wage-rate deter-mination? To begin with, we must narrow down our use of the term "marginal productivity". In regard to musicians we cannot refer to a musician's physical productivity since we are measuring quality and not quantity. Therefore marginal productivity as thought of hereafter w i l l mean the revenue productivity of musicians. Another condition of marginal productivity—that i t assumes identical units as regards personal efficiency—makes a further distinction necessary. In an occupation lik e that of the musician, the only situation where there i s homogeneity, in the sense of identical inter-changeable units, is at the lowest level of craftsmanship where "scale rates" are charged. Above that level the individual musician's wage rate tends to be i n direct relation to his revenue productivity. In a l l cases where musicians receive above-scale rates, revenue productivity i s determined by their popularity. 1 This raises s t i l l another point i n regard to the productivity of 1 As w i l l be shown later, productivity, as applied to musicians, i s not affected by the size of the orchestra. 61. musicians. While i t i s true that we are measuring quality instead of quantity^, the AFofM, in setting i t s base rates, i s interested i n quantity rather than quality. That i s to say, the effective base rate i s one low enough to encourage the public to employ musicians, and high enough to attract non-union musicians into the AFofM.2 Turning now to a consideration of the wage rates of the AFofM, as compared to wage rates of other unions, we see a marked difference. Labor economists and union leaders are united i n their opinion that unions today support a policy of industry-wide, uniform, wage rates. While unions could discriminate among employers and obtain differential wage rates throughout an industry, standardized wages minimize f r i c t i o n and complaints within the union. Further, as unions are p o l i t i c a l organizations in an economic setting, and survival i s based on minimized conflict, this seems to be a most re a l i s t i c approach. The AFofM, however, encourages i t s members to attain the highest rates possible. At the same time the AFofM does not insist on improved performance of i t s members. Musicians them-selves must take the i n i t i a t i v e i f they wish to: (1) hold down a job and (2) get over-scale rates. The individual bargaining power of such men as Harry James or Jascha Heifetz is enhanced by their (unique) value producti-vity, or i f you l i k e , their individuality. Since a great deal* of the AFofM's control of the music industry i s derived from the use of name bands, concert a r t i s t s and the l i k e , the employers are kept "in l i n e " because they depend almost entirely on these a r t i s t s . Though an employer by using 1 Our measure of quality i s not i n terms of "good" and "bad" but i n terms of "popularity" or "unpopularity". 2 This i s of course in addition to the rules imposed by the AFofM, as the closed shop, make-work rules, minimum number rules, and so on. 62. a name band may merely "break even", or even lose money, nevertheless, his over-all revenue may depend upon his reputation for having the best entertainment available. Consequently, top bands and a r t i s t s , etc., can demand very high rates. The relationship i s thus clear for rates received above the scale set by the Locals. But what of the base rates themselves? We have said that the insecurity of the employers and the high rate of unionization of musicians enables the AFofM to set these rates, but this does not t e l l us how they are set. The AFofM sets the base rates i n much the same manner as the individual musicians claim rates beyond scale; i.e., on the basis of individuality and popularity. For example, orthodox economic theory t e l l s us that the interaction of supply and demand on the market deter-mines the wage, which i n turn determines the number to be employed. Further, productivity can be measured for each individual employee (based on the idea of interchangeable units). In the music industry, productivity i s determined by tot a l consumer demand for music i n the local market. That i s , consumer demand i s equal to the sum of the demands for bands, solo jobs, concerts, etc., i n relation to the supply of each type of musician available. The union wage, then, i s aimed at a level which allows for a minimum of unemployment based, as i n economic theory, on the idea of 'mediocre' inter-changeable units. Therefore the volume of employment of each type of musician i s determined broadly speaking by marginal producti-vity i n the local market. The wage i s set by the AFofM i n relation to marginal revenue as determined by tot a l consumer demand i n the Local. In the music industry, marginal productivity does not determine the number of musicians hired by individual employers, because revenue-earning capacity does not depend on the size of the band. A t r i o may earn larger 6 3 . gross revenues than a twenty-piece band. This means that i n many individual establishments the revenue productivity of each musician, and of the unit as a whole, may be well above the union scale. R N U M B E R E M P L O Y E D Chart 2 . The above chart can be used to show the position of the individual employer i n the general case and i n the music industry. Considering the general case f i r s t , the line EF equals the union wage, at which price OB units of labour are,hired from the demand curve RDF. This assumes the conditions of orthodox economic theory . ; <: i n that we have: (1) A standardized product. ( 2 ) An homogeneous labour force. (3) A perfectly mobile labour force. In considering the music industry we find a to t a l l y different case. The line EF equals the base rate unilaterally set by the Local and RDF i s the demand curve for the individual employer. Assuming: (1) a standardized 64. product, ( 2 ) a-, homogeneous labour force, and (3) a perfectly mobile labour force, we could agree to the employer hiring OB musicians at scale rates, EF.l However, we have already said that the individual musician's wage rate tends to be i n direct relation to his revenue productivity. Thus the individual employer can only hire OA musicians at a cost of OC per musician. There i s a further restriction upon the employer's a b i l i t y to maximize his profit i n that the AFofM, i n many cases, sets the minimum number of musicians to be employed in an establishment. N U M B E R E n P L O V E D } Chart 3 . If then HP i s the demand curve of the individual employer and EF equals the base rate set by the Local, OB musicians w i l l be employed. However, the Local declares that the establishment must now employ OA musicians at base rates EF which would now be projected to EN. The addition of the unit(s) would be an additional cost of FNP or loss of an equal 1 This would refer to units whose revenue productivity was just equal to the base rate set by the Local. In other words, OB musicians or units could be a l l the musicians i n the market receiving base rates EF from a l l employers. 65 amount of profit, TFM. As long as the employer's area of profit RFE>FNP, he could absorb the extra cost. However, i f FNP>RFE, the employer would be operating at a loss and be unable to do anything about i t since the AFofM unilaterally sets the base rate and the minimum number to be.employed. The position of the AFofM i s thus one of a discriminating monopoly, but with one important distinction. Base rates are unilaterally set by the AFofM i t s e l f , i n much the same way that a monopoly would f i x i t s price. However, beyond the base rates, the individual musicians, and not the AFofM, set the rates. The following chart shows this relationship: UJ J or U/ J Q N U M B E R O F M U S » C » P » N S Chart 4. 66. In view of the foregoing analysis, we should point out that the basic minimum scale set by the Local, ON, i s not the one position on the scale but many positions. That i s , base rates vary for the different types of jobs.1 However, we shall define the base rate as ON, at which price OM musicians w i l l be hired. Musicians receiving a wage scale i n excess of ON, as we have said before, do so on the basis of their individual revenue.productivity. Thus 0 % musicians receive a wage of N]Pu N]N2 musicians receive N2P2wagesj ^N^musicians receive N3P3 wages, and so on u n t i l OM musicians receive MP wages, or the scale set by the Local, The demand curve RPQ i s cut off at P, since below the level NP no musicians could be h i r e d — I f hired, they would be working for less than scale rates. The area RNP represents the area for individual bargaining for premium wages received above the base rate set by the Local, In other industries with standard wage rates and homogeneous units of labour, this area would represent the return to the employer as profit. But i n the music industry much of i t i s claimed by the musicians, as represented i n Chart 4 by the rectangles above the line NP. There i s s t i l l one question which we have not answered: how does a musician know how much he can charge above the existing wage scale, or more specifically, how does he know that he can charge over-scale rates since musicians are, by and large, unique? Answering the last question f i r s t , musicians know intuitively whether or not they can satisfy the public and, depending on the type of music played, whether they have enough 2 a b i l i t y to get to the top. If the musician does not possess this 1 The different categories for the wages may be due to: (1) higher standards (in terms of value productivity); (2) more limited supply; (3) higher standards of musicianship. 2 This introduces a point of considerable importance, particularly i n the dance-band f i e l d . As much as musicianship i s a necessary feature of a musician's popularity, showmanship i s , i n many cases, of equal importance. 67. intuitive a b i l i t y , box-office receipts w i l l aid him considerably. In regard to the price charged, musicians tend to charge "what the t r a f f i c w i l l bear". This i s conditioned by two things: (1) comparative popularity —based on record sales, public appearances, etc., and (2) the relative position of the unit i n relation to other u n i t s — i . e . , the position of an "up and coming band" to that of an established top orchestra. We are now i n a position to consider wage rates i n relation to the number of musicians, or size of orchestra. Music, as we have said, i s one of the personal services that claim exception to the rule that labour i s demanded not for i t s e l f , but for the production of other things. There-fore, for several reasons, considerations about output and the productivity of marginal "doses" of labour are i l l o g i c a l . F i r s t l y , music i s an end i n i t s e l f and not a means to an end. Secondly, i n establishments where both the wage rate and the minimum number of musicians to be employed are con-tro l l e d by the AFofM, the employer i s powerless to experiment with smaller groups i n search of a higher productivity.! Thirdly, the size of the orchestra i s determined by technical considerations and consumer demand (popularity) apart from the wage rate that i s paid. For example, a t r i o consisting of piano, bass, and guitar, could scarcely become a quartet by the addition of another piano player. Also consumer fad would make the fourth man unnecessary because the sound and style of the three musicians determines i t s demand. The addition of a fourth musician Would create an entirely different unit which might lessen the group's popularity. J. T. Dunlop2 introduces the proposition of the size of the orchestra from the standpoint of the employer. He claims that in the long run the 1 The exception to this might be where the employer i s making a substan-t i a l profit and can hire a more popular (expensive) band. This again i s the idea of quality (popularity) vs. output. 2 J. T. Dunlop, Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, New York, Augustus M. Kelley, Inc.,.1950, p. 62. 68. employer i s not affected by changes i n the number of musicians i n an orchestra. That i s , over a period of time the size of the orchestra might increase or decrease—depending upon public taste.* The increase or decrease i n the size of the orchestra does not change the size of the plant, but merely the orchestra. The employer, i f he i s to be successful, must employ p a unit that can attract the public regardless of size. Our conclusion to this point must then be that the individual employer does not add to the numbers of each type of musician because the musician's productivity i s greater than his wage, though employers i n the aggregate would tend to do so. However, the point which we must stress i s that because a musician's productivity exceeds his wage, he i s i n a position to bargain for a wage rate above the minimum set by the Local. There has been considerable discussion amongst labour economists as to whether unions are interested i n the "employment effect" or the "wage effect". Economic theorists tend to suggest that unions are mainly inter-ested in the "employment effect", whereas A. M. Ross3 and others maintain that unions are primarily interested i n the "wage effect". The substance of Ross's thesis i s that the unions, i n response to membership demands, go after a higher wage scale at the expense of better working conditions. That i t has greater appeal to the working union member i s natural since his main concern i s , "what i s best for me". Ross's argument, however, does not apply to the AFofM. For example, i f the AFofM was solely interested i n the wage rate,. employers would only employ the absolute minimum and directly cut down the volume of employment. Such has not been the case, 1 For example, organ tr i o s are part of the present trend, as opposed to the rage for 15 to 20 piece bands of a few short years ago, 2 The limitations to this w i l l of course be determined by the size of the establishment, providing there i s to be an increase in the size of the orchestra. 3 A. M. Ross, Trade Union Wage Policy. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1948. 69. The "minimum number law" • (while not applicable to a l l jobs), coupled with the low base rate, have been capitalized on by the AFofM to provide greater employment.1 Perhaps one of the main reasons for the AFofM's concern over the employment effect has been the mounting unemployment caused by tech-nological change. While the problem i s more f u l l y discussed i n a later chapter, i t can be pointed out that the royalty payment on r e t a i l record sales, won from the recording companies by the AFofM, was based on the argument that technological change was creating serious unemployment i n the music industry. One of the main objects i n the music industry would thus be the effective control of substitutes through regulations governing minimum employment, rather than simply obtaining the maximum wage possible for i t s members. Substitute products do, i n fact, keep a check on the AFofM that i s d i f f i c u l t to overcome. If the Local sets the rate too high and dis-regards the'public*s a b i l i t y to pay", the public i n turn w i l l accept substitutes 2 or refrain entirely from buying " l i v e " music u n t i l such times as the price i s more reasonable,3 In regard to the wage rate determination of the AFofM, we may say that i t represents the case of a discriminating monopoly, and that i t s power, i f anything, i s understated.^- Three distinct factors influence the wage rate that i s sett v 1 As, say, a night-club that features floor-shows. Where i t might take at least five musicians to adequately play the music, the Local might raise the minimum number to eight or nine depending on the size of the club, location, volume of business, etc. 2 As, for example, record or film dances. 3 Where this does occur, the AFofM usually would not consider i t s e l f to blame since i t i s not a "hiring-hall—union of f i c e " as some of the other unions. Also, i t i s the membership that votes on what the base rates shall be. 4 This i s i n direct contrast to Neil Chamberlain's view that the monopoly power of most unions i s overstated. See Neil W. Chamberlain, Collective  Bargaining. New York,. McGraw-Hill. Book. Co ...Inc.. 1951, Chapter 17. 7©. (1) That the wage rate must take into account the "employment effect" i n securing the maximum employment of musicians. (2) Bertrehue productivity i s the measure by which musicians get over-scale rates. (3) At base rates, the idea of the marginal productivity of the musician equaling his wage applies, since the AFofM unilaterally sets the wage rate at a level which, i n relation to consumer demand, w i l l maintain employment. 1 71. B. Working Rules. The uniformity of the Locals of the AFofM i n regard to working rules i s found only i n the sections of the International Constitution dealing specifically with the working conditions of the Locals. As pointed out previously, this i s i n i t s e l f a unique situation since the general case i s that International Constitutions do not deal with working rules but rather leave them to the Locals to fight for i n their contract negotiations. Typical of the AFofMfs position however would be the 10$ Traveling Surcharge and rules for traveling bands,* Similarity between Locals i s also seen in several other ways where the Locals have realized the benefits of uniformity. One such way i s the insistence by the Locals that the " . . . prices quoted herein are the minimum salaries to be paid members for their services rendered within the respective time limits prescribed and shall not be construed to deter any member from quoting higher prices. • • Thus the Locals, i n setting a p r i c e - l i s t in keeping with what the public can pay, also recognize that many employers can pay more than scale price, and the Locals specifically encourage their members to get over-scale whenever they can. The interesting point i n this connection i s that most trade unions negotiate wage-scale agreements with employers and the members receive only the agreed-to scale. With the AFofM however this paying of over-scale rates i s at times the rule and not the exception to the rule. While s t a t i s -t i c s would be impossible to obtain, we do know that certain members of the AFofM have consistently grossed in excess of $100,000 per annum for decades (for example, orchestra-leader Guy Lombardo). 1 See pp. 39-40. 2 See Price List and Working Rules of Local 76, Seattle, p. 2. 72 The variance with which the "minimum number" law has been applied i s indicative of the size of the Local and not the inapplicability of the law i t s e l f . For example, Local 247 of Victoria (having 2 2 0 paid-up members) has used the minimum law i n the six theatres, drama shows, and parades, 1 The control of the Local i s not questioned, since i t exercises as much control 2 over i t s jurisdiction as does the Toronto Local over i t s jurisdiction. Rest periods show a marked difference between the Locals, as the following comparison i l l u s t r a t e s . In the Toronto Local, Note 13 of the Price List states, "on a l l dance engagements of three hours or more, there shall be an intermission of five minutes per hour, which shall be taken at one time. . . . " Local 6 5 5 , Miami, Florida, i s comparable to the Toronto Local in both size^ and influence, yet i t states that, " . . . members must receive at least twenty ( 2 0 ) minutes rest period per hour on ALL engage-ments. Any engagement on which members receive less than twenty ( 2 0 ) minutes rest period per hour shall be considered to be continuous playing for which members shall receive, i n addition to the prevailing wage scale, per hour or fraction thereof, Per man | 2 . 0 0 Leader or Contractor . . . . . . 4 . 0 0 . Where show policy prevails, members must receive sufficient rest period before and after each 1 The theatre minimums specifically stated are: Royal 7 men Capitol 6 men Odeon 6 men Dominion 5 men York 5 men Plaza . 3 men 2 Where there are applicable jobs, as say the "Ice F o l l i e s " , the Local sets the minimum number for the job. Otherwise the small population of Victoria cannot support orchestras long enough for minimum numbers to be established, 3 The size of the Toronto Local i s 2270 paid-up members and i n influence i s the strongest i n Canada. The Miami Local i s 2179 strong and generally reckoned as comparable to the Toronto Local, 73. show to compensate for rest periods not received during the show. . . , u J-The Seattle Local fixes an intermission period of ten minutes per hour plus two minutes rest between each group of three numbers.2 The issues of musicians "doubling" on various instruments was hotly contested by the AFofM at one time on the grounds that i t meant other musi-cians would be put out of work. Although the union had to recede from this attack, i t has instituted doubling rates, so that the musician who does play more than the allowable number of instruments gets extra pay. The International Constitution, in Article 20, Section 14, allows the following sets of instruments to be played without the doubling rate being charged: . . .members . . .shall receive an additional 25 percent of the regular salary for each double. The following are not construed as doubling: Saxaphone family; Clarinet and Bass Clarinet; Flute and Piccolo; Oboe and English Horn; Piano and Celeste; Organ and Celeste; Bassoon and Contra-Bassoon; Drummer's regula-tion outfit consisting of (bass drum', snare drum, pedal cymbals, gongs, bells, wood blocks and small traps). Xylophones, vibra-harp, chimes and bells are not construed as doubles when played by one musician without any other double. . . . " Because the modern instrumentation of dance-bands in the reed sections involves the use of clarinet and saxophone, the Locals have made this allowance and have added their own doubling sections i n their working rules.3 One of the working rules adopted by the Locals i s unique among unions. On a l l dance engagements i n which a supper i s served the guests, supper must also be provided for the orchestra.4- The interesting condition to 1 Local 655, Miami, Wage Scale and Price L i s t , Section 5, P» 6. 2 Price List and Working Rules, Local 76, Seattle, Wash., p. 7. While many of the Locals do not specify the two minute rest period between three number groups, i t i s t a c i t l y assumed as being applicable. Such conditions do not refer to radio or television programs. 3 See Price List and Membership Directory, Local 145, Vancouver, B. C , Section 38. 4 Where meals are not provided, musicians receive an extra $1.00 to the price of the engagement. 74. this i s that i t must be a supper similar to that served the guests and must be served to the musicians i n a room suitable for the guests' use. Under no circumstance may supper be served to the orchestra in a kitchen, pantry or other service room. This then establishes the musicians' professional status by reason of the fact that they must be treated as the guests are treated. (The writer w i l l leave i t up to the reader to discuss the pros and cons of such a condition, since his own personal bias would far out-weigh any objective criticism of such a rule.) "Kickbacks"1 are forbidden on any job at any time by the AFofM. The practise was f a i r l y wide-spread at one time during the 1930's when l i v i n g was a 'hand-to-mouth' existence for a great number of people. This situa-tion would be more prevalent in the case of musicians, for, as indicated i n Chapter I, music i s not a v i t a l commodity, particularly in a period of depression. The practice has by no means come to an end today but the general level of prosperity i s such that many operators can afford to pay the existing wage-scale. Kickbacks have largely been replaced by co-operative or share-plan engagements. These engagements diff e r from kickbacks i n that the orchestra hires a h a l l for a given sum and "splits the take" after expenses are paid. This type of job i s allowed by the union i f i t can be proven that the job to be performed i s absolutely non-competitive i n nature, and that the musicians themselves are not to claim any protection from the union while performing such a job. The d i f f i c u l t problem that confronts the union on kickbacks and co-operative engagements i s to prove that the musicians are violating union rules. In other words, how can the union prove that the band Is 'kicking back' to the employer? Usually the 1 Kickbacks are arrangements made between musicians and employer whereby the musicians turn back part of their salary to the employer as the price of getting a job. 75 only way that such jobs become known i s that after the job has been performed some of the musicians w i l l speak about i t to their friends. If the union sought to prove the case, however, word of mouth would be insufficient proof. Reduction i n the size of an orchestra i s also forbidden during the l i f e of any contract signed between an orchestra and management. Similarly, many of the Locals forbid members from 'sitting i n 1 * on an engagement because the management i s then getting more than i t i s paying for. The logic of such rules need not be stressed since i t seems f a i r l y obvious that many musicians would gladly s i t in with a band for the "kicks", as the saying goes, with no concern about getting paid for the job. This follows from what we have previously said about musicians—some, not a l l — p l a y i n g music i n much the same manner as a man paints, that i s , as a hobby. 1 Where a musician w i l l play with an orchestra for part or a l l of an engagement even though he was not contracted to play the job. 76 C. Wage Scales. The wage scales of any of the Locals of the AFofM are not easily analyzed since they arise from different types of employment and different conditions of work, as hours and so on. For example, radio employment has a different rate for each of the following: morning show, afternoon show, evening show, local broadcast, sustaining program, national broadcast, top grade show, poor grade show, etc. Because the unilateral wage scale of the Local i s based on 'what the public can stand', there could not be any uniformity between Locals. Similarly, there would not be any uniform resemblance to the wage scales of any other union, thus making comparison i l l o g i c a l . If comparison i s desired with other trade unions, suffice i t to say the the AFofM secures a wage for i t s working musicians commensurate to that of most other trade unions. To further classify wage scales, we find that there are wage scales for each type of engagement such as night-club, cocktail lounge, dance-hall, hotel, restaurant, tavern, symphony concert, parade, etc. Some of these groups, such as hotels, are'further cl a s s i f i e d as being "AA", "A", "B", "CH, and "D", with varying scales for each class. The main factor i n the number of engagements w i l l of course by the size of the Local, and the "state" of the liquor laws. A l l wage scales that are given are the minimum chargeable for side-men (musicians other than leader). Leaders' scales vary from one and one-half side-men's pay, as i n the Vancouver Local, to double side-men's pay, as i n the Miami Local. Some Locals decide which i s the most expensive (in terms of the highest wage scales) by the maximum floor space, while other Locals base their decision on location and admission price, Negro Locals base their wage scales on the same lines although their highest scales do not match those 77. of the white Local i n whose jurisdiction they are located. Rehearsal and overtime rates are detailed by a l l of the Locals, with hardly any 'free 1 time allowable. The only case that this writer can think of i s i n night-clubs where the management i s alloiired one free two-hour rehearsal per week to co-ordinate new acts coming into the club. If the act that comes into a club decides with management to put on a supper show, i t i s considered as overtime and the Local office fixes a rate to be paid the musicians. Some of the Locals set a higher rate on Fridays and Saturdays because of the many weekend jobs and few weekday jobs. In this way the casual musician receives the maximum amount for the one or two nights 1 work that he may be able to get. Other Locals set a uniform rate applicable for the six-day work week. This i s done where there i s a more even distribution of jobs. When special occasions arise and there i s no existing scale set for the job, the Executive Board of the Local i s consulted and a rate i s fixed.* For example, the price l i s t of the Vancouver Local does not specify the rates for fashion shows i n department stores or for school performances, to name two, and the rates for these jobs, while being casual engagements, are generally fixed by the Local. To further complicate the issue, suppose that a concert was played at a school and i t was followed by a dance. In this case the Local would set the rate, basing the scale rate on the location of the school, length of the concert, hours of the concert, length of the dance, and hours of the dance. As there i s no uniformity in wage scales, so there i s no uniformity i n hours of work. Jobs performed before 8:3© P.M. are generally at a lower 1 In Miami, the rates for work i n bars and taverns are subject to the discretion of the Executive Board of the Local. In Toronto, rates are set for bars and taverns but not television, film recording, and the l i k e . 78 rate than jobs performed up u n t i l 1 2 : 0 0 P.M. For straight dance-hall jobs i n the Vancouver Local, musicians are paid from 9 : 0 0 P.M. If, there-fore, a job i s from 1 0 : 0 0 P.M. u n t i l 1 : 0 0 A.M., the musicians must be paid from 9 : 0 0 P.M. Government intervention, through the police, has done much in Canada to regulate the hours of employment i n dance-halls and clubs i n Canada. As these are a l l public places, they come under the government's jurisdiction, and dance-halls observe a midnight closing time,-while clubs are allowed to have l i v e music u n t i l 1 : 0 0 A.M. Casual jobs however do not come under government regulation and musicians are frequently asked to play u n t i l 3 : 0 0 A.M. Thus closed dances (such as company dances where invitation i s by ticket only) can go on ' t i l l a l l hours of the night' i n an establishment lik e the Hotel Georgia i n Vancouver, These provide musicians with a very lucrative source of employment, even though they may work only three nights a week.l The wage scales of symphony orchestras are generally determined by the respective Locals i n whose jurisdiction the orchestras are located. The Locals usually meet with representatives of the Community who form a "Symphony Society" (various other names are sometimes given) and a wage scale for a definite number of concerts and rehearsals i s agreed to. There are 28 major symphony orchestras (major because they engage musicians at regular weekly salaries for a specified number of weeks per season), 2 The 1 On one such job, at an estimated three nights per week from October 1 , 1 9 4 9 , u n t i l May 1 , 1 9 5 0 , one musician estimated his pay to have been approximately $ 2 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 . 2 These orchestras are found i n the following c i t i e s : Boston, Philadel-phia, New York, Chicago, Cleveland, Cincinnati, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Pittsburgh, Washington, Minneapolis, Houston, Dallas, Hollywood, St. Louis, San Antonio, Toronto, Rochester, Indianapolis, Baltimore, Kansas, Buffalo, Vancouver,. New Orleans, Denver, Oklahoma, Utah (Salt Lake), and the North Carolina Symphony at Raleigh. 79. average regular season, during the year 1 9 5 0 , for these orchestras was 2 3 . 3 weeks, and the average summer season was 7.4 weeks. Minimum weekly scale for the winter season was $ 7 8 . 1 5 . This, incidentally, is considerably higher than the average minimum scale paid to musicians in the Vancouver Symphony Orchestra, which was $ 5 0 . 0 0 . There are 125 secondary orchestras (secondary because musicians are engaged on a per concert basis for an indefinite number of concerts each season), 13 of which are in Canada, Many of these orchestras have non-union members but in most cases only the union members are paid. Considering the major symphony orchestras again, we find that only nine of these 'top' orchestras receive appropriations by municipal grant or city or county taxes, and they are: Los Angeles, San Francisco, Baltimore, Indianapolis, Buffalo, Vancouver, New Orleans, Salt Lake City, and Raleigh, The remaining 19 major symphony orchestras receive no appro-priations whatsoever unless by public donation.1 Wage rates have proved too costly for many small centres and regular seasons have been given over to the engagement of a symphony orchestra on a per concert basis with no specified number of concerts being given. 1 For a detailed report of the major and secondary symphony orchestras, see President's Report, Official Proceedings of the Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of,,the AFofM, New York, June, 1951, pp. 126-128. 80. D» Actual Example of Contract Showing Wage Scales. Hours of Employment and  Working Conditions. (NOTE: This contract was drawn up by the AFofM for purposes of i l l u s -trating the new conditions agreed to i n the Television Film Labor Agreement, and adequately shows the detailed terms which the AFofM has forced the television companies to comply with.) EXHIBIT "A" WAGE SCALES, HOURS OF EMPLOYMENT AND WORKING CONDITIONS; I. Side Line Musicians 1. "Side l i n e " , "Atmosphere" or "Silent". Work day starts at time and place ordered to report and ends when dismissed at studio or i n the c i t y . 2. Weather Permitting Calls: When side line musicians are ordered to and do report and are then dis-missed on account of weather conditions which preclude the picture from being photographed, musicians so dismissed shall be paid $9.38. Leader, double. 3. F i t t i n g and Interviews: When called upon any day or time other than the day of employment for f i t t i n g of costumes or type interview, musicians shall receive $9.38 for two hours and th i r t y minutes. Leader, double. 4. There shall be no Stand-By Calls. 5. Notification of Calls: A l l calls for side li n e musicians shall be made not later than 6:00 P.M. on the day preceding the c a l l , except i n emergency, and except at the end of any photographic day; c a l l s for the following day may be given to the side line musicians. 6. Basic Scales: Minimum pay for any c a l l (except otherwise specified) Consecutive work hours between 6:00 A.M. and 6:00 P.M. paid at rate of straight time—per hour or fraction Consecutive work hours after 6:00 P.M. shall be paid at rate of time and one-half—per hour or fraction thereof When minimum of $28.13 i s earned, excess to be paid as follows: before 6:00 P.M.—per hour or fraction thereof Overtime after 6:00 P.M. up to 10 minutes, one-half hour at time and one-half hour shall be paid Overtime after 6:00 P.M. in excess of 10 minutes, per hour or fraction thereof A l l work hours must be consecutive (except that one-hour meal period, deductible from work time, w i l l be allowed in nine hours). $28.13 3.51 5.28 3.51 2.64 5.28 7. One Person Alone: Subject to above schedule of hours 34.38 81. 8. Leaders' and Contractors' Pay: Leaders or contractors shall receive double the sideman's scale. 9 . On Location: When working on location at a distance, making commuting to and from engagement impracticable or impossible, daily schedules to apply. Travel time begins when the musician reports from travel pursuant to instructions, and ends when the musician arrives at destination. Travel time between 6 : 0 0 A.M. and 6 : 0 0 P.M. only w i l l be computed as work time, but not to exceed eight hours per day. Travel time rate, #3.51 per hour. Leader, double. A l l expenses shall be paid by the producer, including transportation, meals and reasonable sleeping accomodations, in addition to regular daily schedules, 1 0 . Meals: Break for meals to come at approximate meal time, twelve to two and six to eight. This provision i s not to be in contravention of any state law, 1 1 . Recording by Side Line Musicians: If side line musicians record, they get paid for recording sessions. This shall not apply i f the men play but do not record. 1 2 . Wardrobe: Side line musicians are not to be required to provide any wardrobe other than tuxedo, business suit or f u l l dress. 1 3 . Sundays and Holidays: Double time scale shall prevail for work on Sundays and the following legal holidays: New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. II . Motion Picture Recording Musicians 1 4 . Rates and Conditions: For a single session, consisting of 3 hours or less, during which (a) only one picture of no longer than 3 0 minutes duration may be made, or (b) no more than 5 pictures of no longer than 3 j minutes duration may be made, or (c) no more than 9 spot announcements of no longer than 1 minute dura-tion may be made, per man # 5 0 . 0 0 Engagements of two sessions (completed within 12 hours of time called) may be divided into two periods at convenience of producer, with not less than one hour between sessions. A l l work time consumed between the hours of midnight and 8 : 0 0 A.M. shall be paid at the rate of time and one-half. Leader or contractor, double recording musicians rates. Overtime not later than midnight, per 15 minutes or fraction thereof, per man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . #4.16 Overtime after midnight, u n t i l 8 : 0 0 A.M., per 15 minutes or 82. fraction thereof, per man . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $6.24 Overtime must immediately follow a regular session. A l l hours not continuous w i l l be charged as additional sessions. 15. Rest Period: Intermission of ten (10) minutes away from stand must be given on a l l engagements, with the understanding that i t means ten minutes from the time musicians leave stands u n t i l they return and are ready to play. The producer i s privileged to accumulate two rest periods. 16. Doubling Rates and Conditions: (a) NOTE: The following are not construed as doubling: Saxaphone family Oboe and English Horn Flute and Piccolo Organ and Celeste (when furnished) Piano and Celeste (when furnished) Drummer's regulation outfit (consisting of bass drum, snare drum, pedal cymbals, gongs, bells, wood blocks and small traps). (b) Xylophones, vibraharp, chimes and bells are not construed as doubles when played by one musician with no other double, (c) Doubling of any instrument, 50$ of basic rate extra. (d) In computing the compensation for doubling, a l l time from the start of the recording engagement shall be considered in three-hour sessions regardless of the unequal division of the two sessions. (e) Doubling of only one instrument shall be allowed i n any such three-hour session. (f) Doubling price shall be paid for minimum of three hours i n any such session i n which two instruments are used, (g) When same double i s continued during overtime, doubling price shall be paid upon overtime basis. (h) When another instrument i s doubled during overtime, doubling price shall be paid for minimum of three hours. (i) Doubling pay shall not be applied against minimum guarantee. 17. On Location: Engagements on location over twenty-five miles but no more than 100 miles from point (inside jurisdiction) ordered to report, $8.31 per hour extra for time consumed in traveling to and from location. Over 100 miles to be arranged with Federation, 18. Sundays and Holidays: Double time scale shall prevail for work on Sundays and the following legal holidays: New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. 19. Meals: Lunch and dinner periods should be between the hours of twelve and two, and six and eight, respectively. 83. III. Single Musician (Non-Recording) The following applies to employment of musicians rehearsing performers such as dancers, singers, etc. 2 0 . Daily Schedule: Single session (three hours or less) . . . . . . . . . . . . Two sessions (6 hours) completed within 12 hours of time called ending not later than midnight Engagements of two sessions (completed within 12 hours of time called) may be divided into two periods at conven-ience of producer, with not less than one hour between sessions. Overtime, not later than midnight, per 15 minutes or fraction thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overtime, after midnight, u n t i l 8:00 A.M., per 15 minutes or fraction thereof . . . . . . . . . . Overtime must immediately follow a regular session. A l l hours continuous w i l l be charged as additional sessions. 2 1 . Sundays and Holidays: Double time scale shall prevail for work on Sundays and the following legal holidays: New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. IV. Arrangers, Orchestrators, Copyists, Proofreaders, Librarians, General Rules 22. Musical orchestrators shall be paid at the prevailing motion picture orchestrating rate for a l l orchestrations when i n i t i a l l y used for motion pictures for exhibition over television broadcasts, but with no additional compensation for any subsequent motion picture use on television broadcasts. This also applies to orchestrations already i n the possession of any orchestra or band leader, which were originally made for other than motion picture or television purposes. Orchestrations i n i t i a l l y used for television motion picture purposes shall not be used for any other purpose unless the orches-trating rate applicable to such other use at the time thereof shall be paid to the orchestrator. 23. Cutting, pasting or a similar musical service, to be charged for at regular time rates as specified in each cl a s s i f i c a t i o n under which musi-cians are engaged at the time, except, when musician i s engaged on work by the page and required to cut, paste or render similar service, such service to be paid for at the rate of #4.16 per hour in periods of not less than 15 minutes. 24. Orchestrating is defined as the art of scoring the various voices of any already written composition complete i n form. A composition i s considered complete i n form when i t f u l l y represents the melodic, harmonic, and rhythmic structure. 25. Prices quoted in this section refer to orchestration only and must not be interpreted as to include or apply to creative contribution such as reharmonization, paraphrasing, or development of a composition already #24.94 41.56 2.08 3 . 1 3 not 84 complete i n form. Prices for arranging are l e f t to the discretion of the person doing the work, provided, however, that the price charged shall never be less than the minimum for orchestrating. 2 6 . Orchestrators shall not attend recordings of their orchestration unless they are paid as per regulations. 27. The pay rate for work on Sundays or legal holidays shall be double a l l prevailing rates and scales herein enumerated. Legal holidays are New Year's Day, Memorial Day, Independence Day, Labor Day, Thanksgiving Day, and Christmas Day. 28. After working on an overtime rate, eight rest hours shall elapse before resuming single scales. When called back-before the expiration of the eight-hour rest period and when intervening time between dismissal and re c a l l i s four hours or less then such intervening time and succeeding con-secutive work hours shall be paid at the applicable overtime rate for a l l succeeding work time. 29. Meal periods shall be observed at approximate conventional times. In no case shall any work session exceed six hours without a meal period of at least one-half hour but no more than one hour. 30. An hourly as well as per page rate i n the copying f i e l d having been agreed upon, the producer agrees that i t i s not i t s intention to u t i l i z e these dual rates to the disadvantage of the copyist, the understanding being that these rates were promulgated for the convenience of the studio and not to give the studio any advantage in the selection of the rate to apply. 31. A l l manuscript paper, score paper, music and other necessary, items shall be furnished by the producer, or shall be charged for at the actual cost. V. Orchestrators 32. Page Rates: A score page to consist of approximately four (4) measures; come sopras to eight measures to be counted in the space of one measure. Not more than 12 parts of which one only may be double stave part 14.99 Not more than 25 parts of which not more than two may be double stave parts 6 . 6 5 More than 25 parts of which not more than two may be double stave parts . . . . . . . . . . 8 . 3 1 Piano part taken from voice 8 . 3 1 Taking down melody and making lead sheet • 4 . 16 Conductor's part, from score . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 1 6 Timing pictures, attending recording sessions, per hour . . . . 8 .31 8 5 . 3 3 . For Vocal Scoring Only: A.vocal page to consist of twelve ( 1 2 ) measures. Up to four ( 4 ) voices, per page $ 3 o 3 3 More than four ( 4 ) voices, per page . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 9 9 With piano accompaniment, add per page . . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 6 6 3 4 . Miscellaneous Workr For odds and ends such as corrections, alterations, additions, and a l l other work where computation at page rates i s impractical per hour or fraction thereof . . . . . . . . . $ 8 , 3 1 Minimum c a l l , two ( 2 ) hours. VI. Copyists, Proofreaders, Etc. 3 5 . Day Calls: Three hours or less, ending not later than 8 : 0 0 P.M. . . . . $ 1 5 . 6 3 Eight hours, between 8 : 0 0 A.M. and 8 : 0 0 P.M 3 1 . 2 5 Continuous hours overtime with day c a l l to midnight, per hour or fraction thereof 4 . 1 6 Continuous hours overtime with day c a l l after midnight, per hour or fraction thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . 2 4 3 6 . Night Calls: Three hours or less, between 8 : 0 0 P.M. and 1 2 midnight . . . 1 8 . 7 5 Six hours, between 1 2 midnight and 8 : 0 0 A.M. 3 1 . 2 5 Continuous hours overtime to midnight, per hour, or fraction thereof . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 . 1 6 Continuous hours overtime after midnight, per hour or fraction thereof . . . . . . . . . . . 6 . 2 4 3 7 . By the Page: A copyist engaged to do work by the page shall be guaranteed not less than $ 1 5 . 6 3 for the engagement ( i t being understood that the producer i s entitled to the equivalent i n service). Waiting time after copyist reports for work to be charged for at the rate of $ 3 . 3 3 per hour or fraction thereof. A l l work to be computed by pages or half-pages. A page i s to consist of twelve ( 1 2 ) staves, and a half page up to six staves. Half pages to be computed at half the amount of the regular full-page price. One ( 1 ) page, including heading, constitutes 1 2 lines: (a) Copying orchestra parts (single), per page . . . . . . . $ 1 . 0 1 Extra line or fraction thereof of line . . . . . . . . . 0 9 D i v i s i parts (when 5 0 $ of the part i s d i v i s i ) to be charged 5 0 $ extra. (b) Copying piano, banjo, guitar, harp, organ, celeste, and similar parts, per page . . . . . . . . . . 1 . 7 3 Extra lines or fraction thereof, per line 0 . 1 6 Writing i n l y r i c s , per page, additional . . . . . . . . 0 , 4 1 Numbering every bar on any or a l l parts, per page . . . 0 . 1 6 (c) Copying on a l l ditto paper, double basic page, price shall be charged. Bar numbering and/or l y r i c s — r a t e not to be included i n ditto computation. 8 6 . (d) Transposition of a l l parts, 50% additional. (e) Conductors' lead sheet (single l i n e ) , per page . . . . . $1.73 Extra lines or fraction thereof, per line . . . . . . . 0.16 Piano conductors' parts constructed from score, page . . 4 . 3 0 Extra lines, pro rata. 3 8 . Federation Representative: • The duly authorized business representative of the Federation shall be furnished a pass to the studio. He shall be permitted to v i s i t during working hours any portion of the studio necessary for the proper conduct of the business of the Federation. 3 9 . Sound Track Regulations: A. The producer agrees that he w i l l not use or deal with music sound track at any time for any purpose whatsoever except to accompany the picture for which the music sound track was originally prepared, B. The producer further agrees to register identification of the picture and music sound track with the Federation and shall clearly mark each film with an identifying code number designated by the Federation. C. It i s agreed that members of the Federation shall not be required or permitted to record music sound track for general usage or for any purpose whatsoever except as provided herein. D. It i s agreed that members of the Federation w i l l not be required or permitted to use music sound track for any purpose in violation of the terms herein provided. 4 0 . Live Musicians: The producer for i t s e l f and i t s subsidiary and a f f i l i a t e d companies agrees not to produce or arrange for the production, directly or indirectly, of f i l m and/or sound track containing pictures of musicians performing or containing or accompanied by musical performances for television broadcast purposes unless such sound track i s recorded by l i v e musicians specifically for that film pursuant to this agreement. Nothing contained i n this agree-ment shall be deemed to grant the producer the right or privilege to use or exploit film and/or sound track produced otherwise than under this agree-ment for any purpose i f such use of exploitation would constitute a v i o l a -tion by producer of rights of the Federation pursuant to agreements made with others than the producer herein named, pertaining to such fi l m and/or sound track. Chapter VIII GENERAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE The effects of labour-saving machinery on employment have been the subject of considerable discussion. There have been as many theories as one can imagine to explain what happens to labour. What i s the position of the musician? Orthodox economics t e l l s us that unrestricted technological change should be upheld on the grounds that i t creates greater "efficiency" and higher "productivity". This may be, even where there i s almost a to t a l displacement of the labour force into other industries. There are however two arguments related to unrestricted technological change in the music industry which must be considered. Fi r s t of a l l , no matter how sweeping the technological change i n music, musicians must s t i l l be used in the f i r s t instance. Thus we have the unique situation where the musi-cians, through records, are displacing themselves. The employers argued that the new industry would take up the slack, but as P e t r i l l o stated, 'they argued falsely'. Said P e t r i l l o : ". . . the place of the iceman was indeed taken by the mechanical refrigerator. But the iceman was not asked to concur in his own destruction, and i n any event—despite harm to the individual iceman—manufacturers of the displacing machine created new jobs somewhere for some one. . . . " Mechanized music does not create new jobs for musicians but constantly invades new fields displacing more musicians every day. P e t r i l l o sums up the AFofM's outlook on unrestricted technological change by saying, "the industries have not tried to soften the blow; instead the musician has been asked to play at his own funeral". The second point i n regard to unrestricted technological change i s that the f i n a l product of the music industry i s quality and not quantity, thus making the argument of greater efficiency and higher productivity irrelevant. Discs, tape, wire, film, broadcasting, and television are constantly improving in quality, but the highest quality that could be 87. 88 attained would be merely to reproduce music as i t i s originally played. The effect then i s that the listener i s not interested i n employing the musician because he i s content to l i s t e n to a reproduction of music made by some of the musician's colleagues. Even though this seems unfair to the musician, i t i s out of the question to suppose that the public i n general, which has the f i n a l say, can be persuaded to give up a l l of the conveniences that technology has provided. Records and their l i k e are here to stay and the musician must be prepared to face this fact. Professor S l i c h t e r l claims that throughout industry as a whole the 'maximum social efficiency" l i e s somewhere between the unrestricted rate of technological change that employers would l i k e to have i f they could, on the one hand, and the restricted rate that unions would impose i f they had a free hand, on the other. In the music industry we find that the employer has not been restricted i n his use of electronic reproductions of music. The only exception that might be brought out i s the opposition by the AFofM to the indiscriminate use of recordings, and this opposition was only temporary. The union on the other hand has not opposed the record or any other device, realizing that public tastes cannot be frustrated to the extent that records,etc., would be eliminated. Union policy has therefore been a case of asking for a f a i r contribution from those who profit from the commercial exploitation of reproduced music without giving employ-ment to l i v e musicians. In newer industries that have sprung up as a result of technological advances, the AFofM, l i k e other unions, has t r i e d , wherever possible, to 1 Sumner H. Slichter, Union Policies and Industrial Management. Washing-ton, D. C , The Brookings Institution, 1941. 89 enforce make-work rules limiting technological unemployment. Leiserson^ l i s t s five general rules that unions have used to create work. The f i r s t , restrictions on technological improvements, has not been used to any great extent by the AFofM. The second, restrictions on the use of prefabricated products, i s much the same as the f i r s t point. The union has sfought financial restitution for the use of records and so on and has, through the "stand-by" system, sought to combat unemployment in radio caused by transcription broadcasts. The third, performance of unnecessary work, i s particularly applicable to the AFofM, as pointed out i n Chapter IV, The fourth rule, hiring unnecessary men, i s u t i l i z e d by the AFofM in i t s "Minimum Number" clause written into practically a l l Local Constitutions. Many of the Locals have uti l i z e d the f i f t h rule, limitations placed on employee output, by restricting the time that a band can play through specifying certain rest periods per hour. As i n the case of the Miami Local, i t can reach staggering sums when the orchestras must take a 20-minute intermission each HOUR, If industry, through unrestricted technological change, benefits by greater efficiency and higher productivity, i t must be prepared to accept i t s "social responsibility", reasons the AFofM, Mr, Edward R, Stettinius 2, former President of the U. S. Steel Corporation, brings out this idea clearly when he states that, "having helped to create this modern society, the business man w i l l not be excused from the duty of coping with i t s pro-blems". Just such an argument was used by the AFofM when i t fought for the Record and Transcription Fund.^ From this subsequently came the Music 1 W. M. Leiserson, "Make-Work Rules of Unions" i n E. W. Bakke and C. Kerr, Unions, Management and the Public, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1 9 4 9 , pp. 5 6 5 - 5 6 6 . 2 E, R. Stettinius, quoted i n Philip Murray's, Technological Unemployment. Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Publication No. 3 , April, 1 9 4 0 , pp. 3 5 - 4 0 . 3 For a thorough discussion of the Record and Transcription Fund, the Music Performance Trust Fund, and the Television Trust Agreement, see Chapter TJC. 90 Performance Trust Fund and the new Television Trust Agreement. Though the AFofM has been, successful i n getting these royalties paid to musicians, the Funds are not nearly adequate to render a l l of the public service requested of them or to furnish employment for a l l musicians who need i t . Whether or not the Funds w i l l grow remains to be seen and i s not our immediate concern. The important point i s that while the Funds do not f i t into make-work rules or restraint of trade, they do provide the AFofM with a good potential source of employment. Technological change in the music industry has created two distinct features. Fi r s t and most important, technological change i n the music industry ultimately meets with the public's approval and acceptance to the extent that there i s an unwillingness on the part of the public to return to the earlier forms of entertainment which created so much work for the musician. Secondly, the very small number of musicians employed on a f u l l -time basis i s sufficient proof to suggest that the make-work rules imposed by the AFofM have been only partially corrective. Therefore, addi-tional rules w i l l have to be used by the AFofM to secure employment that has been taken away by technological change. There has been considerable discussion as to the f e a s i b i l i t y of further rules being imposed by the AFofM and many people, including those sympathetic to the AFofM, have thought this approach useless. Rather, the case now i s that the AFofM must try tor (1) Interest the public i n hearing l i v e music. (Rosenbaum, Trustee of the Music Performance Trust Fund, described reproduced music as "getting a kiss from your sweetheart over the telephone".) (2) Encourage the creation or revival of groups whose purpose i s the presentation of l i v e music. Chapter IX THE STRUGGLE WITH THE RECORD INDUSTRY The development of the recording industry and the role that the AFofM has assumed in combatting the resulting technological unemployment has been the subject of widespread interest. It i s therefore imperative that we examine the AFofM's position to ascertain within what limits the union i s capable of acting and the resulting effect of this action. A l l of the ramifications of the struggle between the record companies and the AFofM cannot be covered because of the rather limited material available. From the union's standpoint, there seems to be no question of the union's retarding technological advancement of methods or techniques of manufacture, nor i s i t opposed to the record or the phonograph machine, because each one implies the need of a musician. Thus the original picture was one i n which the professional musicians and the recording companies were in agreement. The general public was able to enhance its.: musical tastes and the whole industry thrived as a result of the public's desire to see the a r t i s t s they listened to on the recordings.* The important feature of this harmonious relationship was that the records were not put to commercial use and were manufactured for home use only. Technological advancement then produced the microphone and the amplifier and with the aid of these two devices the record, which previously could only be heard i n a room, could now be heard v i r t u a l l y across a country. There was a revolution i n the recording industry and the musicians and record companies s p l i t as a result of i t . The poss i b i l i t i e s of the use of records instead of l i v e music are limitless and the musician has been thrown out of jobs which originally were his alone. One of the main fields i n which records are used i n place of musicians i s i n radio. A survey conducted by the AFofM covering the 1 A brief summary of the beginnings of the record industry i s necessary to show how the problems developed. 91. 9 2 . year 1947, showed that only 422 of the more than 1500 Standard Broadcasting stations i n the United States employed staff musicians steadily. Canadian stations employed 21 musicians. It i s interesting that while the Federal Communications System in the United States has seen f i t to require radio stations to use l i v e talent when they originally get their license, many of the stations never obey this rule. A good example i s cited i n the survey, of one station which was monitored for three days i n connection with i t s license renewal. During the time i t was on the a i r , only 23 minutes of i t s 3 6 hours of operation were given over to programs other than records and commercial announcements. Similarly, the record companies have-made huge profits while many musicians have been l i t e r a l l y starvingl or rather, i n the great majority of cases, have had to seek other employment i n order to make a l i v i n g . If we consider records alone, this injustice does not seem to be W r o n g s since;:.. out of some 225,000 musicians i n the United States and Canada, fewer than 10,000 have made a record. Some three to four thousand have played on one recording session and the remaining six or seven thousand have played a few more. Figures released by the AFofM2 show that the average income from making records, based on union scale for each recording musician employed during the year 1946, by a group of the largest record manufacturers, was $153.25. Similarly, i n the year 1946 the entire record-ing industry paid to a l l of the musicians employed $2,318,162 and sold the records for $156,445,721. This figure does not include the money derived 1 That the record companies make money on "new discoveries" i s seen when Capital Recording Company hired singer E l l a Mae Morse to record a tune called "Cow-Cow Boogie". The success of this record was phenomenal and while Capital sold well over one million copies, singer Morse received a scant $35.00. See "Capital News", published by Capital Recording Company, Los Angeles, October, 1951» 2 See International Musician, December, 1947, pp. 10-15. 9 3 . from the commercial uses to which the records were put. Another survey recently completed by the AFofMl shows us how much was earned by the Musicians through record and transcription sales: Phonograph Records Number of Sessions . . . . . . . . . 5 , 3 6 8 Number of Man Appearances (Sidemen) . 52 , 9 9 9 Number of Appearances (Leader) . . . . . . . . . . . 4 , 9 0 8 Number of Hours Employed . . . 19 , 5 7 8 Number of Masters Recorded . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 9 , 7 0 1 Number of Pressings Sold 1 8 4 , 0 3 7 , 3 6 0 (a) Total Earned by Leaders and Sidemen . . . . . . . . $ 3 , 3 8 0 , 4 7 6 . 9 5 Earned by Leaders . . . . $ 5 7 6,198 , 5 0 Earned by Sidemen . . . . $ 2 , 8 0 4 , 2 7 8 . 4 5 Royalties Paid to Music Performance Trust Fund . . . $ 1 , 4 4 2 , 5 1 6 . 8 9 E l e c t r i c a l Transcriptions (b) Number of Units 9 , 5 8 0 Number of Man Appearances (Sidemen) . • 2 6 , 7 3 9 Number of Appearances (Leader) . 4,824 Number of Hours Employed . . 9 , 6 4 6 (a)Total Earned by Leaders and Sidemen . . . . . . . . $ 2 , 2 0 0 , 8 5 0 . 0 0 Royalties Paid to Music Performance Trust Fund . . . $ 3 6 , 4 1 1 , 8 0 Production Statistics Number of Conventional Records Sold . . . . 1 4 5,628 , 4 7 6 Retail Value . . . . . $ 1 0 2 , 9 8 7 , 6 1 1 . 8 0 Number of Long-playing Records Sold . . . . 5 , 9 0 9 , 9 5 8 Retail Value . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 4 , 0 9 5 , 3 1 2 . 4 6 Number of 7-inch Records Sold . . . . . . . 3 2 , 4 9 8 , 9 2 6 Retail Value . . . . . 2 3 , 9 5 7 , 5 8 8 . 7 6 T o t a l 184,037,360 $151,040,513.02 N.B. (a) These earnings are based on f l a t union scale and do not include royalty payments paid directly to the leader, (b) A "Unit" i s fifteen (15) minutes of recorded music. 1 President's Report, O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of AFofM, June, 1 9 5 1 , New York. The figures i n this survey are comprised of records pressed from the master copies made under the pro-visions of the contract entered into on December 4 , 1 9 4 8 , between the recording companies and the AFofM. The reports have come from the various record companies on records made from January 1 , 1 9 5 0 , to December 3 1 , 1 9 5 0 . 9 4 . While this phenomenal growth was taking place i n the record and transcription industry, the AFofM sought as early as 1928 to draw the musicians away from this f i e l d because of i t s detrimental effect on the musicians themselves. It was not u n t i l 1937 that anything concrete was done and this occurred i n Local 1 0 , Chicago, when i t s President, James C. P e t r i l l o , stopped the making of records i n i t s jurisdiction for 18 months.* At the June 1937 Convention of the AFofM, the International Executive Board was granted powers similar to those that. Pe t r i l l o had used in Local 1 0 . 2 xhe result of this was that a court ruling found the record companies could be licensed and required to include on record labels a prohibition against commercial use of the product. A subsequent ruling reversed this decision, when i t was stated that neither manufacturer nor performer eould control the use of the record after i t had been sold. In.1940, P e t r i l l o became the President of the AFofM, succeeding Joseph Weber, who had held the office for some 4 0 years. One of Petrillo*s f i r s t acts after gaining office was to fight the use of what i s called 1 Petrillo's reaction to the attitudes of the musicians and public alike i s characteristically 'Petrillo-ish', i f I may use the phrase, i n that he dictates the policy and the membership and public must follow i t . The following quotation i s from an a r t i c l e by Milton Mayer in the June, 1 9 3 7 , copy of Esquire entitled, "Mussolini of Music": The president wired me on that one. The wire said, 'Your loss would be the country's gain'. I said i f i t were true, i t would beigranted. But i t would be a gain for only a few manufacturers, We^ won that one. (The future of the union) looks good. The fact that they go out on strike i n the recording matter for twenty-seven months without anyone drawing a string across a v i o l i n shows i t s a strong organization. That cost some of the big band leaders $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 and they did not squawk. 2 O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the Fourty-second Convention of the AFofM, June, 1 9 3 7 . 95. "co-op" broadcasts.-1- The use of this type of program was unlimited for radio stations and was widely exploited before i t was f i n a l l y controlled. At the Fortyrsixth Annual Convention of the AFofM, held in Seattle, Washington, in June, 1941, the delegates voted unanimously to take direct action against the record companies. In June, 1942, as a result of this vote, the International Executive Board informed the recording and trans-cription companies that effective August 1, 1942, no musician would be allowed to record for any company. From the standpoint of the AFofM this was rather bad timing i n that Petrillo was called a "Dictator" and the union was i n effect "Sabotaging the War Effort". While the AFofM pointed out that the ban would not impair the flow of records to the Armed Forces 2 and the War Effort would not i n the least be affected, government reaction to the threatened ban was very strong, culminating i n an appeal by the President to 'go back to work1. Early i n 1943 the AFofM offered to settle the dispute (which had been gathering momentum a l l the time) by the suggestion that a royalty fund be set up based on the sales of records and transcriptions, to be distributed throughout the membership of the AFofM by the International of the union. It was this l a t t e r point, of the AFofM handling the funds, that the record companies objected to. Why, they argued, should they pay money into a fund over which they had no control, but rather was l e f t to the "union 1s uncontrolled discretion"? The idea that they owed something to the 1 A "co-op" broadcast i s a transcribed record program with blank spaces that can be used for local advertising announcements. The usual co-op broadcast is a record program, and i t i s this type that P e t r i l l o hit at. 2 Many records were made during the War for the Armed Forces and were called "V-Discs". The services of the musicians were donated, as were the records themselves, free of charge. 96 musicians whom they employed was also rejected as being fallacious.•*• The AFofM's case, that i s the record ban, was reviewed before the War Labor Board as was the proposal of the AFofM to set up the Royalty Fund. However the issue was settled before the War Labor Board could reach a decision, when several of the larger recording companies accepted the AFofM's conditions, signed contracts, and went back to work. These agree-ments were made in the f a l l of 1943 and they established a separate fund for the royalty payments to be used by the union, "only for purposes of fostering and propagating musical culture and the employment of l i v e musi-cians, members of the Federation". 2 The War Labor Board's decision (which incidentally was reversed from that of a War Labor Board Sub-Panel) was that the record ban did not unduly impede the War Effort and ordered a return to work and acceptance of the royalty principle with i t s exact terms to be arbitrated. The union held out on the latter part of this ruling because i t had signed contracts with 105 of the. 107 companies and thought better of the idea of negotiating new contracts. The AFofM won out and immediately following the 1944 elections the two hold-out companies agreed to sign, 27 months after the ban began. The fund was o f f i c i a l l y known as the "Recording and Transcription Fund" and was administered exclusively by the AFofM. The royalty paid by the recording companies on records ranged 1 Traditional economic theory stresses the effect on employment in regard to technological change. The adaptation of labor to this change i s generally adjusted, but not contested i n the sense that sooner or later labor must conform to the pattern set by new machinery. It i s somewhat surprising then to note that P e t r i l l o based his royalty fund on the idea that the record companies had a "social obligation" to the recording musicians. It i s regarded by many as being a unique principle i n labor-management relations. 2 O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the Forty-eighth Convention of the American Federation of Musicians, June, 1944, Chicago, 111. 97, from one quarter cent per 35-cent record; to one half cent per 50-cent record; with a commission of up to 2 | per cent of the price of records selling for more than $ 2 . 0 0 . What C o t t e r i l l referred to as "crummy public relations" 1 had i n some measure been corrected by the Recording and Transcription Fund because the AFofM had forced an employer to recognize the fact that he owed his employees something for the work they were losing. This was something that no other union had been able to do. Secondly, the Fund provided direct benefit to the musicians by creating employment. Thus the impact of the Fund was two-fold—smoothing out bad public relations and creating more employment for members of the AFofM. It might be well to digress for a moment on just what the Fund sought to do and who benefited from i t . Apart from the original purpose of the Fund—to protect the musician from e x p l o i t a t i o n — i t has also brought music of every description to the listening public, from park concerts to guitar lessons. 2 Just what the Fund has done can be seen in a d i s t r i c t such as that controlled by Local 145, Vancouver, B. G. There were no organized concerts i n Vancouver u n t i l the Record and Transcription Fund got i t s start in 1947, just as many of the hospitals, children's homes, and other such places had never heard or seen a concert. A l l of the programs given under the Fund were done on a "project" basis. That i s , each concert or perfor-mance given had f i r s t to be discussed with the people who would participate in the entertainment, and then i t would have to be submitted to the International for approval or rejection. It was f e l t that i n so doing there 1 See p. i i i . 2 In Canada, the Minister of Labour, Humphrey Mitchell, noted, "the very great effect these concerts had on those confined to hospitals and i n s t i t u -tions" and that "the AFofM gave special consideration to those smaller areas and rural d i s t r i c t s so often neglected i n the carrying out of such programs". For other comments on the Fund, see Three Years of Music pub-lished by the AFofM, New York, 1 9 5 0 . 9 8 . would not be any over-charging*, or misuse of the Fund through performances that did not have any social value. The money was awarded to the Vancouver Local i n semi-annual allotments, which could subsequently be drawn on, project by project. The f i r s t grant made to the Vancouver Local was for approximately $ 2 5 0 0 . 0 0 based on the paid-up membership of the Local.^ When the grant was made, o f f i c i a l s of the Local contacted the Vancouver Parks Board in an effort to set up joint concerts during the summer months. The Parks Board was i n complete agreement with the idea and agreed to sponsor one concert for every one sponsored by the union. The success of these concerts gave the union i n i t i a t i v e to present concerts i n schools, hospitals, veteran's hospitals, crippled children's hospitals, and so on. At f i r s t only schools within Greater Vancouver were approached, and then schools outside Vancouver were approached. The only failure that was experienced by the project was an effort made in conjunction with Community leaders to have a "teen-age" dance put on to encourage this age-group to 'come in off the street'. Its failure was i n no way the responsibility of 1 To prevent the Locals from over-charging existing scale rates, the International stipulated that the amounts paid and to whom had to accompany every completed project returned to the International Executive Board. 2 We thus find a great degree of variation i n the amounts paid the Canadian locals, by province, for the year 1948: B r i t i s h Columbia ' $ 7 , 5 9 5 Alberta 2 , 4 8 1 Saskatchewan 2 , 4 5 3 Manitoba 4 , 4 8 4 Ontario 4 3 , 9 8 3 Quebec 1 4 , 3 0 7 Nova Scotia . 1 , 6 3 6 Considering the provinces i n Canada on the same basis as the states i n the U. S., Ontario received the twelfth largest grant of the #1,700,000 spent i n 1948. Pennsylvania received the largest amount, #192,437, while Vermont received the smallest amount, #573*00. See "Music for the People", a published report by the AFofM, New York, 1949, pp. 22-23. 99. the musicians and was introduced to show the extent of the projects under-taken by the Fund.^" such One of the limitations of the Fund, particularly i n a territory/as that covered by the Vancouver Local, i s that there are no charges allowable for transportation on the price of the project. Thus how far outside the c i t y the musician w i l l go i s determined by the amount of traveling necessary to and from the job. Many of the rural d i s t r i c t s surrounding Vancouver have had the benefit of these concerts and the union has met the need of giving performances in these areas wherever possible. Records^ show that during the f i r s t year of i t s operation, the Fund provided for more than eleven thousand performances, a l l of which were free to the public. A partial breakdown shows that 2328 concerts were given i n veterans'; hospitals, 2384 were given i n c i v i l i a n hospitals and other i n s t i -tutions, 2611 for teen-age dances, 2411 in public parks, parades, concerts, etc .3 When the agreements between the recording companies and the AFofM were due to expire on December 31, 1947, the record companies sought to curb the power of the AFofM, They were successful because on April 1 6 , 1946, Congress had passed the Lea Act, sometimes called the 'Anti-Petrillo Act', as an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934, This Act was designed to curb the union on two counts: (l) i t s 'featherbedding' practises, and (2) the royalty payments of the Record and Transcription Fund. In regard 1 There have been many successful attempts sponsored by Community groups, and aided by the Fund, to attempt to curb juvenile delinquency. 2 See the AFofM pamphlet published on the Recording and Transcription Fund, "Music for the People", New York, 1949. 3 There i s ho record available as to how many of these performances were made in Canada, However, as roughly five per cent of the money paid out of the Fund went to Canada, we can conclude that approximately five per cent of the jobs were performed i n Canada. 1 0 0 . to the 'featherbedding* practises of the AFofM, the Lea Act specifically states i n Sec. 506 (a): . . . It shall be unlawful by use or express or implied threat of the use of force, violence, intimidation, or duress, or by the use or express or implied threat of the use of other means, to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to coerce, compel or con-strain a licensee. . . to employ, in connection with the conduct of the broadcasting business. . . any person or persons in excess of the number of employees needed by such licensee to perform actual services. . . to pay. . . i n excess of the number of employees needed. . . to pay. . . more than once for services per-formed. . . to pay. . . for services not performed. . . to refrain . ... from broadcasting or permitting the broadcasting of any radio communication originating outside the United States. In regard to the last part of this section of the Lea Act, i t should be pointed out that Pe t r i l l o opposed the broadcasts of programs originating outside the United States as he opposed non-union conductors coming from Europe, The following i s a quotation from the New York Times, December 2 6 , 1 9 4 5 : There's the t a r i f f . The Manufacturers' lobby to keep cheap material out of the country. There's the immigration law. The government', everybody protects themselves against labor. Why the h e l l should we be exempt? You know what happened to Swiss Watches. They stopped some from coming'into this country. We're trying to see that foreign musi-cians, i n person or by a i r , don't get our jobs. For a long time the conductors came from London, a l l the stars from Europe. They'd stay here several months, make a l o t of dough and then go home. I said, huh, you boys get into the union. There was a h e l l of a holler from the long-haired boys about that. Well, what about i t ? Then a l l the Heifitzes, the a r t i s t s who play i n front of the orchestra didn't belong to the union. They said they didn't need a musician's card. We say, a l l right, i f you don't need a card, go play by yourselves. They're a l l in now. Secondly, i n respect to the royalty payments, the Lea Act has this to say i n Sec. 506 (b): . . . It shall be unlawful. . . to coerce, compel or constrain or attempt to coerce a licensee or any other person. . . to pay or agree to pay an exaction for the privilege of, or on account of. . . using recordings or transcriptions, . . to be used i n broadcasting, or i n the production, preparation, performance, or 101. presentation of a program or programs for broadcasting: to . . .impose any restriction upon such production . . . i f for the purpose of preventing or limiting the use of such articles. . . to pay or agree to pay any exaction on account of the broad-casting, by means of recordings or transcriptions. . . . The effect of the law was thus to 'put the union in i t s place', something the record companies had fought for since 1942. The case was immediately contested by Petrillo in a Chicago court. On appeal to the Supreme Court, a minority held i t to be unconstitutional and while the majority failed to pass on its constitutionality, they sent the case back for retrial on the facts. To add impetus to the growing movement to halt the AFofM, the Taft-Hartley Law outlawed the 'featherbedding' practises of the AFofM which were originally brought out in the Lea Act as being 'unfair practises'. The Eightieth Congress, on recommendation of the National Association of Broadcasters added to the Lea Act when i t stated that payments of royalties would be prohibited "to unions for their unrestricted use". If we can visualize a pattern being set in 1941 in regard to banning records, we can see i t being followed in 1947 when the annual convention of the AFofM unanimously authorized the International Executive Board to again stop making records until such times as the recording companies were once more brought into agreement with the AFofM. The AFofM banned its musi-cians from making records or transcriptions for a period of 11 months. During this time both the record companies and the International Executive of the AFofM concerned themselves with the immediate problem of finding a workable solution to the administration of the Fund. The record companies, by and large, agreed that the union's administration of the Fund had been honest and efficient.* However the prevalent attitude of the manufacturers 1 The cost of administering the Fund by the AFofM was set at something less than one per cent of the gross. 102 during the dispute seemed to be a desire to handle their money in their own way, independent of the union,, The record companies won out and on December 13, 1948, a new agreement was signed between the record companies and the AFofM known as the "Music Performance Trust Fund". While the main part of the agreement was, as before, the continuation of royalty payments, i t differed from i t s predecessor in that the Fund was to be administered by an independent trustee named by the recording companies rather than by the AFofM. Administration costs were bound to rise since the trustee would have to set up a staff capable of handling such a job and be on familiar terms with procedure that was 'second nature' to the union. This was argued for some time by the AFofM because i t had purposely kept i t s administration costs at a minimum to give the maximum benefit from the Fund. Colonel Samuel R. Rosenbaum of Philadelphia became the industry-appointed trustee. According to his own statements, there i s very l i t t l e difference to choose between the Recording and Transcription Fund and the newer Music Performance Trust Fund. Rosenbaum also stated that a careful study of the methods and practises of the AFofM's handling of the Recording and Transcription Fund revealed that i t "has been, in fact, operated as a public service and not merely as a feed-bag". Thus the record manufacturers and the AFofM are i n agreement as to what can be done for the musician and the future developments between the two w i l l be guided i n large part by this workable principle now i n effect. To conclude the effect of the record on the musician, we might consider the basic policy that the union carried out i n administering the original Recording and Transcription Fund.l The f i r s t condition that the AFofM 1 This policy has been clearly set out i n an a r t i c l e published by the AFofM entitled, "A Pattern for the Future", New York, 1950. 103 realized was the preservation of local autonomy. The locals, in submitting their projects to the International did so with the best knowledge of what types of music were suited to the community from the available talent.1 Thus a brass band was used i f i t were most appropriate i n a particular instance, and there was no insistence on the part of the union that a symphony orchestra be used. Secondly, the administrator of the Fund was free to stop any project that he f e l t might not render genuine public service. This seems to be a contradiction of the f i r s t point, yet the union made sure that each project was for educational, recreational, charitable, or patriotic purposes. The reason for this was to see that no project was played in an establishment or for a person on the "Unfair L i s t " of the AFofM. Thirdly, no waste was permitted, in that a l l the employed musicians were to receive the minimum scale allowable for the job in the particular local where the job was to be performed. This stopped any local from "padding i t s account", and the AFofM from making what Rosenbaum termed a 'feed-bag' of the Fund. Fourthly, a l l admissions to these projects were to be free. While i t prohibited the employer from getting free music by charging admissions, by the same token i t also prohibited 'worthy' causes from benefiting financially from the Fund. In the interests of the Fund i t s e l f , the AFofM was forced to include this latter point since i t would not then serve the purpose that i t had been originally designed to carry out—that of providing free music to the 1 In "Music for the People", some of the more unusual projects of the Fund are given, as for example the professional guitar-playing instruction given the patients at Jefferson Barracks, Mo., Veterans Administration Hospital, 104 public. A f i f t h point, and quite important, was that the AFofM would not agree to any project that competed with regular employment. This was done as a protection to i t s membership, since the Fund was p a r t i a l l y intended to expand employment of musicians and not contract i t . The f i n a l point was that good music was to be furnished by the locals. Once again the AFofM protected i t s claim on the record companies by ensuring that the Fund would not degenerate into an employment bureau for those musicians who could not otherwise get a job. The reaction of organized labor to the Fund i s best expressed by William Green, President of the AFofL: It i s especially gratifying that this significant public service (the Recording and Transcription Fund) w i l l be continued despite i t s negation i n original form by the Taft-Hartley Act. To President P e t r i l l o and his able staff who have administered i t over the last three years at a cost of less than one percent I speak the hearty congratulations of the American Federation of Labor. . . . Chapter X THE RADIO AND TELEVISION INDUSTRIES Radio was a very unstable employer of musicians in i t s beginnings since there was a reluctance on the part of many people to realize the immense potential of the industry i t s e l f . Many of the smaller operators of radio stations asked the musicians to play for nothing u n t i l they (the operators) could get on their feet, and then there would be plenty for a l l . Most of the musicians grabbed at the chance since 'sound' motion pictures had caused a great deal of unemployment in the music industry. As radio grew, one thing became evident—while radio was a potential employer of musicians i t was also a potential user of records and transcriptions, Petrillo instituted his famous 'stand-by'1 clause i n order to protect the musician from unemployment, since he realized that many of the problems of the radio industry were attributable to the use of records, transmitting the music of a few good performers. It has already been mentioned2 that the Federal Communications Commission in principle forces radio" station operators to use 'live musi-cians'. It need only be said here that while this law has not always been enforced, i t has helped to ensure the employment of musicians on the bigger network programs. From a survey of both radio staff and radio commercial broadcast employment for the year 1 9 4 9 , one may get a f a i r l y accurate picture of how great the employment effect i s in radio today.3 1 See pp. 9 9 - 1 0 2 for ruling of the Lea Act. Petrillo's idea was that 'live musicians' had to be on hand in local studios during network musical programs and recorded or transcribed shows since the local station i n relaying a program was not employing any musicians. When the Lea Act was thrown out by the Federal District Court, i t was on the grounds that i t violated the f i r s t , f i f t h and thirteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 2 See p. 4 and pp. 9 1 - 9 2 . 3 This survey was carried out by the AFofM's Research Bureau and question-naires were sent to each of the member locals. Some 579 locals throughout 1 0 5 . 1 0 6 . Radio Staff Employment in Canada Wo. of Staff Men Alberta 6 British Columbia Manitoba Nova Scotia Ontario 18 Quebec Saskatchewan -T o t a l s Staff Salaries 50-52 Weeks 15,824.00 Staff Salaries 3 0 - 3 9 Weeks 2 7 , 1 0 0 . 0 0 $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 Staff Salaries Less Than 3 0 Weeks 24 $ 3 2 , 9 2 4 . 0 0 $ 5 0 0 . 0 0 Miscellaneous Employment $ 3 1 , 9 9 5 . 3 5 1 1 4 , 6 9 8 . 5 6 9 3 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 118,806.13 2 7 9 , 4 3 6 . 1 0 2 7 0 , 2 3 3 . 1 9 5 , 7 3 5 . 0 0 $820,904.33 Local Commercial Employment* United States Canada T o t a l $1,282,877.01 6 6 3 , 2 9 3 . 2 5 $1,946,170.26 Note: 4 These engagements are paid for by local sponsors or local advertising agencies. United States and Canada replied to the questionnaire, and from i t the above table was computed. An analysis of radio time was made in New York City and while i t does not specifically cover the Canadian scene, i t points out the actual time in which live musicians are employed: Stations p e Sketches **>ori*d SfT^ M u s i c and News m s ± c Sketches WNBC(NBC) 25.3* 5 7 . 1 * 13.2* 4 . 4 * WCBS(GBS) 1 9 . 5 * 5 8 . 6 * 1 6 . 5 * 5 . 4 * WJZ(ABC) 2 7 . 9 * 5 2 . 8 * 1 4 . 9 * 4 . 4 * WOR(MBS) 1 0 . 3 * 6 9 . 4 * : 1 0 . 9 * 9 . 4 * The programs were checked from 8 : 0 0 A.M. to 1 : 0 0 A.M. daily constituting 6 , 2 0 5 hours of broadcasting time for each station. The four stations were chosen to represent the four major networks, NBC, CBS, ABC and MBS. 107. Because of the small number of jobs available to the musicians, only the more proficient musicians have been employed, and the calibre of music has been extremely high. The case i s frequently presented where the better musicians work exclusively on radio showsl, handling as many shows as possible. On March 16, 1951, after eight weeks of negotiations, a "National Radio Agreement" and "National Television Agreement" were signed between the AFofM and the radio and television networks 2 in the United States. The main provisions of the National Radio Agreement are as follows: (1) Musicians can be used for simultaneous FM and AM broadcasting or can be interchanged to FM or AM programs. (2) Network programs of the "co-operative" type3, are paid at the same rate as single sponsor programs; "participating" type programs^ pay the musician single engagement rate plus $5.00 for each one-half hour or part thereof; "segmented" type programs5 have each segment treated as a single program; "composite" type programs0 when employing single engagement men, shall pay them at the rate of (a) each segment allocated to a particular sponsor or which i s unsponsored shall be paid for at the single engagement 1 Musicians of this type are known in the trade as 'studio men'. 2 The four main television networks i n the United States are owned by the four main radio networks, NBC, ABC, CBS, MBS. 3 Network programs which are simultaneously sponsored by different sponsors i n various l o c a l i t i e s . 4 Network programs which constitute one integrated unit i n the course of which advertising credits are accorded to two or more sponsors. 5 Network programs i n which advertising credit for a specific period of time i s given to one sponsor. 6 An integrated network program consisting of one or more segments each of which i s allocated to a particular sponsor. (I • 108. rate, or (b) each period of time, in the course of which advertising credits are accorded to more than one sponsor without allocation of any specific portion of such time to any particular sponsor shall be paid for at the single engagement rate applicable to such period of time, plus $5,00 per man in addition to the foregoing sums for each half-hour or portion thereof. (3) The third main section of the Agreement makes provision for the musician when transcriptions of network programs are used, such that any program can be transcribed by any a f f i l i a t e d station i f i t cannot carry the l i v e program when i t i s made. Any commercial program can be trans-cribed and "fed" for broadcast but a "live repeat f e e " l (set by the Inter-national Executive Board) must be paid to the musicians performing on the program. Similarly, an entire program can be transcribed i f an a r t i s t must record i t e a r l i e r 2 , and the transcription fee i s again paid the musi-cians at a re-broadcast. The National Radio Agreement also makes the pro-vision that only AFofM members, in good standing, can be hired for any job, and that while the Federation or i t s locals are the sole bargaining agents of the musicians, the musicians must conform f i r s t , last and always to Federation Law, The main provisions of the National Television Agreement signed between the four main companies and the AFofM are as follows: (1) "Local" television broadcasts are those which originate from one station and are not carried by any other station. The rates for these shows are set by the Locals i n whose jurisdiction the show originates, 1 That i s , musicians must be paid a sum, set by the International, even though they are not actually playing the show. 2 Such programs as the "Bing Crosby Show" are transcribed because of the heavy schedule which Crosby must follow. By transcribing his shows he can make three or four shows at once and then meet his other commitcments. 109 (2) A l l other shows are classed as "Network" shows and are paid at the same rate as radio shows, (3) Audition films (used to s o l i c i t sponsors for l i v e shows) and the rates charged for them are subject to the price l i s t of the Local in whose jurisdiction they are made, and so on. Further analysis of either of these two agreements is unnecessary because of their excessive detail regarding essentially secondary matter,* Following on March 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 , a Trust Agreement was signed with a l l television stations to set up a Fund similar to the Music Performance Trust Fund, The important aspect of this Fund is that the networks have agreed to pay into i t five per cent of their gross revenues received from the use of television film. This i s a good start for the musicians in the television industry, because i t took nearly 20 years to obtain these concessions in the record industry. While the National Television Agreement i s applicable to the shows produced, the AFofM was also instrumental in drawing up a "Television Film Labor Agreement" signed with the major companies on March 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 , 2 While the contract stipulates that AFofM members must be employed and w i l l be subsequently under AFofM law, i t makes several provisions aimed at the television companies which leave l i t t l e room for doubt as to the amount of control that the AFofM exercises in the television industry: (1) Unless AFofM permission i s f i r s t obtained, no f i l m can be shown which embodies or i s accompanied by performances of musicians, except where no admission i s charged for the privilege of watching such film. 1 For a complete wording of the contracts (viz., the National Radio Agreement, the National Television Agreement, the Television Film Labor Agreement and the Trust Agreement), see the International Musician. May, 1 9 5 1 , pp. 1 6 - 3 3 . 2 The wage scale conditions relating to the employment of musicians i s set forth i n "Exhibit A" following the Television Film Labor Agreement, and i s reproduced in Chapter VII, Part D. 110 (2) The Federation must be advised of a l l film made during the month, or sound track made during the month, ( 3 ) No film which embodies pictures of musicians or contains instrumental music can be made without the AFofMls permission, (4) A l l of the provisions of the Act are applicable to Canada and any company formed i n Canada must abide by the provisions of the agreement, (5) Only' AFofM members i n good standing can be used, (6) No contract i s effective u n t i l i t has been approved by the International Executive Board of the AFofM, (7) Because monies are paid by the Television Companies to the Trust Fund, the AFofM holds the right to audit the books of the respective Television Companies during their regular business hours. Thus, the musicians who do find work are amply protected by the AFofM, but the numbers employed are not as comforting to the musician, A typical opinion was voiced i n a letter by Herbert G. Turner, Secretary of Local 3 9 0 , Edmonton, Alberta: . . . the introduction of radio has helped a l i t t l e (from the blow suffered by the musicians with the introduction of 'talkies') but as a result of centralization i n large Locals our better musicians have had to move to these other centres. We are very fearful that the introduction of television w i l l deal another blow, and i t i s problematic whether we shall survive except i n the f i e l d of dance entertainment. Whilst this expression may seem somewhat pessimistic, I am guided by the experience of those centres where television now holds sway and where many thousands of musicians are being thrown out of work as a result thereof, , . « Whether or not Mr, Turner has accurately foreseen the future i s d i f f i c u l t to say since there i s every indication that the AFofM i s much more able to control the new television industry while i t was powerless to control the motion picture industry, i f for no other reason than i t was too young a union and thus too insecure in i t s policy-making. Chapter XI THE AFofM AND THE MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY In 1929, nearly every theatre in the country employed groups of musicians ranging in size from the proverbial 'one-man band' to the large pit orchestra used in Broadway musicals. Probably the thought of a piano player playing "Hearts and Flowers" when Valentino was "slinking up on his prey" w i l l s t i l l f i l l the odd heart with nostalgia for the good old days. Up until 1929, sound movies were unheard of and the musician's position was secure in an established industry. The invention of the Vitaphone, which subsequently led to sound movies, caused some 18,000 musicians to lose their jobs. While this technological displacement was severe enough, i t was aided by the beginning of the Great Depression thus adding several thousand more musicians to the growing l i s t of unemployed. In addition to motion picture unemployment and general Depression unemployment, the end of Prohibition in 1933 saw the end of the night-clubs that had prospered on 'bootleg booze'. Many of the musicians employed in these clubs could not find work in the restaurant bars and lounges that sprang up in their place. Perhaps one of the brighter sides of this rather dismal picture was the introduction of radio right after "talkies" came in, but radio alone could not absorb the surplus musicians and technological unemployment became a permanent thing for a considerable period of time. Musicians :who had been employed (as a full-time occupation) in the theatres, turned to other forms of employment and either gave up music entirely or else played casuals when they could get them. Today, the only utilization of musicians in the motion picture industry is in Hollywood where there are but a handful of musicians who receive steady employment. Theatrical employment of the silent movie days employed 22,000 musicians on a 52-week a year basis. In 1950, 458 of 9,635 theatres 111. 112 i n the United States and Canada, having a seating capacity of 500 or more, employed musicians and only 57 of these on a year-round basis. 1 The remaining 4 0 1 theatres employed musicians for periods of from one day to 50 weeks. The number of musicians employed i n this f i e l d are broken down into the following: Vaudeville and Presentation 1617 Dramatic and Musical 1471 Opera and Ballet SOS Burlesque 171 Organ 18 T o t a l 4085 The AFofM has been powerless to enforce 'make-work* rules i n this f i e l d since the public's tastes have changed, away from vaudeville, burlesque and the l i k e to sound movies, television and so on, a l l of which employ fewer and fewer musicians. Musical comedies, opera and ballets are s t i l l very popular but production costs and lack of adequate f a c i l i t i e s to present the productions, limit their employment effect. The eight major motion picture studios 2 gave casual employment to 5158 musicians during the year ending June 3 0 , 1945.3 The average salary paid to the musicians was #1,009.85 a year. Only 239 of the more than 5000 employed received full-time employment. The independent motion picture studios presented an even worse situation employing something less than one hundred musicians on a full-time basis. Further statistics^- released by 1 See President's Report, Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of the AFofM, New York, June, 1951, p. 131. 2 Columbia Pictures Corporation, Loewis Inc.—MGM Studios, Paramount Pictures Inc., RK0 Radio Pictures Inc.,.Twentieth Century - Fox Film Corporation, Republic Pictures, Universal Pictures Co., Inc., and Warner Brothers Pictures Inc. 3 The Record on Records, published by the AFofM, New York, 1948, p. 6. 4 President's Report, Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of the AFofM, New York, June, 1951, pp. 132-133. 1 1 3 . the Federation show somewhat the same picture i n regard to employment. The employed musicians, however, enjoy the ful l e s t protection from the AFofM and as the Presidents Report indicates receive an enviable salary: From January 1 , 1950 to December 3 1 , 1 9 5 0 , the major producers employed 3 3 9 musicians under contract, with a minimum yearly guarantee of $ 6 , 9 1 6 each. In addition these men received two weeks vacation with pay. The gross earnings of these contracted men from January 1, 1 9 5 0 , to December 3 1 , 1 9 5 0 , was $ 2 , 6 0 7 , 9 7 3 . 3 5 . Because the motion picture studios, as the record companies, have not devised a way of creating music without using musicians i n the f i r s t instance, the AFofM, even in i t s limited area, can and does exercise a great deal of power. Since very few films are made in Canada by either American or Canadian companies, employment of musicians i s very limited. During 1 9 5 0 , 336 musi-cians (including leaders) worked in 25 sessions for a t o t a l salary of $ 1 6 , 5 8 9 . 8 7 . 1 The statistics l i s t e d above are valuable only i n that they show the position of the musician as being 'lost' in an industry which musically speaking belonged to the l i v e musician. As long as silent films were used, musicians were guaranteed a job. Sound movies completely changed the industry, requiring but very few musicians. After the unemployment effect of the Great Depression had been overcome, no more musicians were needed than during the Depression because the new industry could not use them. In this respect i t i s actually a repetition of what happened when the recording industry developed i t s commercial uses to the ful l e s t extent. 1 President's Report, Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of the AFofM, New York, June, 1 9 5 1 , p. 1 3 3 . Chapter XII OUTLOOK FOR FUTURE MUSICIANS The outlook for musicians who, i n the future, w i l l seek music as a profession i s improved by the fact that they w i l l belong to one of the strongest and most militant of trade unions that exists today. The main problem that the future musician must contend with, however, i s the place that music w i l l occupy in our society. The AFofM has done everything in i t s power to ensure a l i v i n g wage, for i t s members but the p i t f a l l s of the industry i t s e l f are such that there i s a great deal of insecurity. Perhaps the clearest description of this fact came from President P e t r i l l o 1 s guest column for Victor Riesel, the labour columnist.1 Petrillo stated that the music profession was a starva-tion existence for the average youngster, and i t would continue to be so u n t i l the governments of the United States and Canada saw f i t to intercede by the use of subsidies: Over the centuries serious music has been a ward of the state, particularly abroad. Even i n this free-spending nation serious music was, u n t i l recent years, supported largely by wealthy patrons. . . . In speaking for governmental subsidies P e t r i l l o stated that these could be offset by the repeal, of>. exorbitant war-time taxes on l i v e music perfor-mances. However, i t must be said that the only valid argument that P e t r i l l o , or any else for that matter, can use i n claiming subsidies i s to emphasize the place of music i n our society. Says P e t r i l l o : I'm realist enough to know that right now, with our very security in jeopardy and with a l l of our resources dedicated to the primary job of saving our freedom, we can't hope to go off on rescue missions i n behalf of music and the arts. At the same time let's don't forget that music i s one of the supports of c i v i l i z a t i o n we are trying to save. A Presidentially-appointed planning commission could, however, be at work now so that we may have a formula to apply once we are out of this Communist-inspired fog,2 1 Reprinted i n the International Musician, vol, L, no. kt October, 1951> p. 8. 2 Loc. c i t . 114. 1 1 5 . The findings of the Royal Commission on National Development i n the Arts, Letters and Sciencesl (hereafter referred to as the Massey Commission) lay stress upon the same problem that concerned P e t r i l l o , i.e., the place of music in our society. It would thus be f i t t i n g to conclude this paper with a review of the more important findings of the Commission. The Commission presented the threat of technological change in a clear and concise manner i l l u s t r a t i n g the plight of the musician. Neither the composer of serious music nor the professional musician in Canada has benefited appropriately from the vast increase of interest i n music i n Canada over the last quarter of a century. . . the Canadian concert a r t i s t and the Canadian professional musician find i t not entirely impossible but only extremely d i f f i c u l t to gain a precarious livelihood from their a r t . . . . As a part of their survey the Commission made a thorough study of the effect on the musician of employment opportunities i n Canadian radio i n light of the music programming policies of public and privately owned stations. The Commission revealed what has long been the case, private stations hiring practically no l i v e talent at a l l . For example, Local 190 (AFofM) Winnipeg had no employment in any of the privately owned stations i n Winni-peg during the year 1 9 4 8 . The publicly owned CBC on the other hand has been the mainstay of serious, semi-classical and popular l i v e music. In Toronto, several years ago, the CBC furnished $ 3 8 3 , 2 0 0 worth of employment for musicians, as compared with only $ 3 0 , 0 0 0 expended by the private sta-tions i n that area—though the private stations were able to afford l i v e music.^ This type of contrast caused the Commission to observe, " . . . the 1 A l l of the material used i n this section dealing with the Commission i s taken from the section t i t l e d , "Music in Canada", Report of the Royal  Commission on National Development in the Arts. Letters and Sciences. King fs Printers, Ottawa, 1 9 5 1 , pp. 184-191. 2 One private station in Toronto took i n $ 7 5 0 , 0 0 in advertising revenue, and yet spent almost nothing on l i v e music. 116 skilled professional musician. . . i s able to practise his art i n Canada only because of the CBC, which in effect subsidizes our four principal orchestras^" . . . " Technological advancement i n Canada has been mainly i n the large c i t i e s , causing a centralization of network programs i n Montreal, Toronto, Winnipeg, and Vancouver. As a result c i t i e s l i k e Ottawa, Regina, Calgary, Victoria and others have been particularly hard hit i n terms of employment of musi-cians. The Commission states that the only way i n which the problem of overcentralization can be solved i s i f the CBC i s granted a sufficient sum of money to subsidize local orchestras. While there has been a good deal of centralization of musicians in the principal c i t i e s of Canada, many musi-cians have gone to the United States to l i v e permanently, feeling that employment opportunities, i f no better, could certainly not be any worse.. Television i s not seriously considered by the Commission except when ' itsays3that when i t does operate i n Canada, low program standards and over-commercialization (as seen i n the United States television f i e l d ) w i l l be eliminated. It would seem correct to suggest, however, that were the Commis-recommend sion f u l l y to investigate television It would have to I r a similar subsi-dization in keeping with the very low radio employment. ^ Canadian music i s found to be almost at a stand-still because the Canadian composers cannot get their works heard or played on the Canadian concert stage, largely because of the American influence on the Canadian concert market.2 One of the main reasons for this i s that the very influen-t i a l concert agencies in the United States have dominated the direction of musical tastes by using American artists who are largely indifferent to the 1 The four principal orchestras are i n Montreal, Ottawa, Toronto and Vancouver. 2 One concert given by the Toronto Symphony Orchestra featuring Canadian music was so* poorly attended (even though well advertised) that a d e f i c i t of $3000 was incurred. 117. works of Canadian composers. There are no proper f a c i l i t i e s for insuring the publication of original works in Canada because of the large expenses involved. As the composer i s handicapped by not having his works played so the professional musician i s handicapped by not having adequate halls and auditoriums in which to give concerts. The correction of this would neces-saril y have to come through subsidies from one source or another, something that has become the rule rather than the exception for our more serious music. As to a solution to these problems, the Commission recognizes the position of music and musicians i n much the same manner as indicated by P e t r i l l o . In the last section of the Commission's Report they propose that the Canadian Government establish a Canada Council for the Arts, Letters, Humanities and Social Sciences to stimulate and help voluntary organizations within these f i e l d s . The Council would handle grants-in-aid, maintain contacts with UNESCO and serve as an "information centre—clearing house" for Canadian cultural a c t i v i t i e s . In giving their reasons for establishing such a Council, the Commission pointed out that while the large centres i n Canada enjoyed a limited degree of music, drama and ballet, the smaller centres i n Canada were largely dependent upon the radio and motion pictures for their entertainment. Therefore one of the functions of the Council would be: The encouragement of Canadian music, drama and ballet (through; the appropriate voluntary organizations and i n co-operation with the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation.and the National Film Board) by such means as the underwriting of tours, the commission-ing of music for events of national importance, and the establish-ment of awards to young people of promise whose talents have been revealed i n national festivals of music, drama and the ballet. The Commission readily recognizes that the old cry of state interfer-ence i s bound to be raised when the proposals are made. They fe e l , however, that insofar as the Council i s spending government funds i t w i l l be i n 118. some measure • responsible to the government. Yet at the same time the Council could well be above politics in much the same manner as the Royal Commissions themselves are above politics. To musicians who must face the ever-increasing use of technological innovations, the Report of the Commission is most welcome. Particularly heartening is the Commission's feeling that a nation such as Canada must be prepared to furnish adequate and generous supplementary economic support of music, once the musicians themselves and voluntary organiza-tions have done their utmost. "A relatively small amount of money, wisely expended, could put Canadian music on a footing similar to that in other Western nations.1 It would be difficult to imagine a more profitable investment." 1 For example a British Arts Council was established in Britain in 1945, independent of government interference. BIBLIOGRAPHY "A Pattern for the Future", American Federation of Musicians, New York, 1949. Allegro. O f f i c i a l journal of Local 802 (AFofM) , New York, v o l . XXV, no. 12, October, 1951. Bakke, E. W., and G. Kerr, Unions. Management and the Public. New. York, Harcourt Brace, 1949. Berton, P., "War Dance of the Musicians", MacLeans Magazine, v o l . 60, no. 24, December 15, 1947. Boulding, K. E., Economic Analysis, Revised ed., New York, Harper and Bros., 1948. Capital News, Los Angeles, Capital Recording Company, October, 1951. Chamberlain, N. W., Collective Bargaining, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc., 1951. Christenson, C. L., "Chicago Service Trades", i n H. A. M i l l i s , How Collec- tive Bargaining Works, New York, Twentieth Century Fund, 1945. Commons, J. R., "The Musicians of St. Louis and New York", in Labor and  Administration, New York, Macmillan and Co., 1913• Dobb, M., Wages, London, Nisbet & Co., Cambridge University Press, 1928. Dunlop, J. T., Wage Determination Under Trade Unions, New York, Augustus , M. Kelley, Inc., 1950. Grant, M., and H. Hettinger, America*s Symphony Orchestras and How They are  Supported. New York, W. W. Norton & Co., 1940. ' '. '. ' * International Musician, New York, American Federation of Musicians, July, 1926; December, 1947; May, 1951: October, 1951j January-March, 1952. Lester, R., "Marginalism, Minimum Wages, and Labor Markets", American  Economic Review, March, 1947, pp. 135-148. Lester, R. A., Economics of Labor, New York, Macmillan and Co., 1947. Lester, R. A., and J. Shister, Insights into Labor Issues, New York, Mac-millan and Co., 1948. Logan, H. A., Trade Unions i n Canada, Toronto, Macmillan and Co., 1948. Metronome, June, 1938. Murray, P., "Technological Unemployment", Steel Workers Organizing Committee, Publication No. 3, April, 1940, pp. 35-40. "Music for the People", American Federation of Musicians, New York, 1949. 119. 120. "Mussolini of Music", Esquire, June, 1937. New York Times, December 2 6 , 1945. O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the Forty-second Annual Convention of the AFofM. June, 1937. O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the Fifty-third Annual Convention of the AFofM, June, 1950. O f f i c i a l Proceedings of the Fifty-fourth Annual Convention of the AFofM. June, 1951. "Petrillo Revisited", Fortune Magazine, September, 1951. "Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees", Report of the  Federal Communications Commission. Washington, D. C,, March 7, 1946. Reder, M, W., "A Reconsideration of the Marginal Productivity Theory", Journal of P o l i t i c a l Economy, October, 1947, pp. 450-458. Report of the Royal Commission on National Development i n the Arts, Letters  and Sciences, Ottawa, King's Printers, 1951. Ross, A. M,, Trade Union Wage Policy, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1948. Slichter, S, A,, Union Policies and Industrial Management, Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1941. The Canadian Unionist, vol. II, no, 9, March, 1929. The Closed Shop, New York, National Association of Manufacturers, 1941. "The Music Code of Ethics", Music Educator's Journal, Chicago, September 22, 1947. "The Record on Records", American Federation of Musicians, New York, 1948. "Three Years of Music", American Federation of Musicians, New York, 1950. Wolman, L, The Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880-1923, New York, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1924. Constitution, By-Laws and Policy of the American Federation of Musicians of the United States and Canada, 1 9 5 0 Edition. .Constitutions and By-Laws of the following Locals: Local 145—Vancouver, Br i t i s h Columbia Local 1 4 9—Toronto, Ontario Local 190~Winnipeg, Manitoba 121 Local 2 4 7 — V i c t o r i a , British Columbia Local 283—Pensacola, Florida Local 390—Edmonton, Alberta Local 5 5 0—Cleveland, Ohio (negro Local) Local 553—'Saskatoon, Saskatchewan Local 7 6—Seattle, Washington APPENDIX A Table I Wage scales for traveling theatrical engagements. Section 1. With Comic Operas, Musical Comedies, Farce Comedies, Extrava-ganzas, Spectacular Shows & Similar Attractions. A—When playing week stands, 8 performances (excluding Sundays): Per man #140.00 Leader . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 5 . 0 0 B—When playing broken weeks, i.e., when company shows i n more than one town in a given week: • ; Per man . . . . . . . . . . . # 150.00 Leader . 2 2 5 . 0 0 C—Additional performances during week (excluding Sunday): Pro rata. D—The price for each Sunday performance and for each performance when the engagement ends with a fraction of a week, known as Single Performance Price: Per man . $ 1 9 . 0 0 Leader . . 2 9 . 0 0 E—Rehearsals before and during the season, two hours (excluding Sundays): Daytime Nightime Per man . . $ 8 . 0 0 . . . . $ 1 2 . 0 0 Leader . . 1 2 . 0 0 . . . . 1 6 . 0 0 F—A rehearsal may be substituted for a performance without extra charge (excluding Sunday). G—Overtime at rehearsal shall be at the rate of, for each one-half hour or less: Daytime Nightime Per man . . $ 2 . 0 0 . . . . $ 3 . 0 0 Leader . . 3 . 0 0 . . . . 4 . 0 0 Section 2 . With Ice Fo l l i e s , Ice Capades and A l l Similar Ice Shows. A—When playing week stands, 8 performances (excluding Sundays): Per man . . . . . . . . . . $ 1 5 0 . 0 0 Leader . . . 2 1 5 . 0 0 B—When playing broken weeks, i.e., when company shows i n more than one town i n a given week: Per man $ 1 6 0 . 0 0 Leader 2 3 5 . 0 0 C—Additional performances during week (excluding Sunday): Pro rata. D—The price for each Sunday performance and for each performance when the engagement ends with a fraction of a week, known as Single Performance Price: 1 2 2 . 123. Per man Leader Section 3 , Stage Presentations, A—Per week: Per man $ 1 3 0 , 0 0 Leader . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 5 . 0 0 Class A Houses—28 shows per week. Class B Houses—30 shows per week. Extra show, pro rata, B—One rehearsal of two hours i s permitted i n any one town or theatre at the stipulated price. $ 2 0 . 0 0 3 0 . 0 0 C—Each additional rehearsal not to exceed two hours: Per man $ 8 . 0 0 Leader 1 2 . 0 0 When services are rendered i n the jurisdiction of a Local whose minimum scale or conditions are higher than those set forth above, the higher Local scale or conditions shall govern. D—Leaders with Vaudeville Acts, per week: (Same conditions as above) . $ 1 7 5 . 0 0 Section 4, Vaudeville i n Class C Houses. A—Per day of four performances or less; Per man $ 1 5 , 0 0 Leader , 2 1 . 0 0 B—Extra performance: Per man . $ 4 . 0 0 Leader . . . . . . . . . . 5 . 0 0 C—One-half salary shall be paid for lay-off days. Section 5 . Burlesque Companies. A—Week stands of 14 shows or lessr Per man $ 1 2 5 . 0 0 Leader . . . . . . . . . . 1 7 5 . 0 0 B—Rehearsals before and during the season, two hours:; Per man $ 5 . 0 0 Leader . . . . . 7 . 5 0 C—Overtime at rehearsals shall be at the rate of, for each half-hour or less: Per man $ 2 . 0 0 Leader 3 . 0 0 124. Section 6 . Dramatic Companies, where the price of choisest seat (exclusive of box seats) i s $ 1 . 0 0 or more: A.— Per man . #125.00 Leader . . . . . 1 6 0 . 0 0 B—Such musicians may render services on the stage i n view of the audiences. Section 7. Dramatic Companies (repertoire or otherwise) where companies play i n houses where the price of the choicest seat (exclusive of box seats) i s less than $ 1 . 0 0 : A— Per man $ 8 5 . 0 0 Leader 1 2 0 . 0 0 Section 8 . Grand Opera and Ballet, A—Where the price of the choicest seat exceeds # 4 , 0 0 (exclusive of box seats), for seven performances per week:: Per man . . . . . . . . . . $175.00 . B—Stage Band for same conditions, per man . $ 1 5 0 . 0 0 C—Orchestra work can be done by members of Stage Band at same rate of $ 2 4 . 0 0 per man, per performance, i n addition to weekly salary. Same price applies to member of orchestra doing stage work, D—Where the price of choicest seats does not exceed $ 4 . 0 0 : Per man $ 1 5 0 . 0 0 E--Where they do not exceed $ 3 . 0 0 . . . . . $ 1 2 5 . 0 0 (per man) F—Where they do not exceed $ 2 . 0 0 $ 1 1 0 . 0 0 (per man) G — A l l of the above prices are for seven performances or less per week. H—Additional performances during week shall be paid pro rata rate, I—Leader and Conductor scale shall be double that of the sidemen, J--Performances exceeding four hours from the beginning of the overture shall pay overtime charges as follows: Under Paras, A, B and D, for each hour or less, per man—$5,00 Under Paras. E and F, for each hour or less, per man — $ 4 . 0 0 K—Day rehearsals before the season begins, 3 hours or less; Per man $ 1 0 , 0 0 Per man (night rehearsals) . 1 4 , 0 0 Overtime on day rehearsals, per half-hour or less, per man—$2,00 Overtime on night rehearsals,per half-hour or less,per man—$3.00 L—Day rehearsals during the season, per hour, per man ' — $ 4 . 0 0 Overtime on rehearsals, $ 2 . 0 0 per man for each one-half hour or less, M—Members shall be given fifteen-minute intermission after the second hour of the rehearsal, without pay, N—Extra night rehearsals during the season, four hours lim i t , the price of a performance shall be paid, 0 — A rehearsal may be substituted i n l i e u of a performance, P—An engagement started under one scale cannot be reduced during the season because prices of seats were reduced. If prices of seats are increased the scale applicable to such price shall apply. 125. Note: The wage scales mentioned i n Table I are found i n the Constitution -and By-Laws of the AFofM. ( A l l material used i n this thesis pertaining to the International Constitution i s from the Constitution issued i n 1950.) See Art. 20, Sec. 1-8 inclusive. Table II Wage scales for traveling concert orchestras. Section 1. For eight (8) performances of not more than three (3) hours each, per week of seven ( 7 ) days, per man, $125.00. Leader, double. Extra performances, per man, $15.00; leader, double. Section 2. One free rehearsal of 2g hours i s allowed each week, A rehearsal may be substituted for a performance not played. Section 3. When engagement ends with fraction of the week, performances shall be paid at the rate Of $18.00 each. Section 4. Preliminary Rehearsals—Two free preliminary rehearsals of 2g hours each may be given, provided such rehearsals are held not earlier than two days immediately prior to beginning of tour. Section 5. For day rehearsals before season begins, two hours or less, per man, $10.00. Night rehearsal double. Section 6. For overtime at day-time rehearsals before the season begins for each hour or less, per man, $4.00. Night rehearsals double. Section 7 . For rehearsals after the season begins, for two hours or less, per man, $6.00. Section 8. Overtime at a l l rehearsals after the season begins, per man, per half-hour or less, $2.00. Section 9. A member of the orchestra acting as Librarian shall receive $35.00 extra per week. Note: Data for Table II found i n Art. 21 of the Constitution of the AFofM, 1950. Table III Wage scales for f a i r s , circuses, rodeos, and carnivals. Section 1. Traveling Band and Orchestra price for Fairs for week of: Six or seven days, per man . . . $ 1 0 0 . 0 0 Leader .' 1 5 0 . 0 0 Five days, per man . . . . . . . 8 5 . 0 0 Leader • 1 3 0 . 0 0 Four days, per man . . . . . . . 7 0 . 0 0 Leader , 1 1 0 . 0 0 Three days, per man . . . . . . 5 5 . 0 0 Leader . 9 0 . 0 0 Services to consist of six (6) hours per day within any ten (10) hours. Section 2. Overtime for each one-half hour or fraction thereof, $2.00 per man; $3.00 leader. Section 3. Where Local scale i s higher, the Local scale shall prevail, but only where Local has notified the International Secretary 1 2 6 . of their wage scale no later than six (6) months prior to opening of said f a i r . Section 4 , Traveling orchestras playing f a i r s are restricted to their show and/or dance engagement only and are not permitted to play any engagements incidental to the f a i r such as concerts, night clubs, etc., with the exception of any state f a i r , on which no traveling band w i l l be permitted to play engagements behind more than one paid gate. Section 5 . Members of circus and rodeo bands cannot play with non-members of the Federation. Members must give and receive two weeks notice to cancel the engagement. Members cannot buy a uniform or any part thereof. Members cannot be called earlier than four days before the opening of a season. For prices and conditions, consult the President's Office. In addition to the above, the members traveling with circuses shall be governed by the following rules: A. The members of the band must be provided, free of expense, with satisfactory sleeping accommodations and meals. B. No deduction from salary shall be made for layoffs, except for reason that the performances could not be given on account of conditions over which the company had no control. For performances lost by reason of war, revolution, pestilence, flood ( i f inundating entire dis-t r i c t s ) , pr f i r e , deductions shall be made. C. Transportation must be furnished during the season to the members of the band. D. If a member i s discharged without cause, his transportation to the place wherefrom engaged must be furnished him. E. The o f f i c i a l AFofM contract blank must be used by a l l contractors engaging men. Section 6 . Members of carnival bands or orchestras shall receive: Per man, per week . . . . . . . # 6 0 , 0 0 Leader . 8 5 . 0 0 NOTE: In this instance the wage includes the board charge. Section 7 . A l l conditions governing circus bands as contained i n Section 5 of this a r t i c l e shall apply to a l l carnival engagements. Note: Data from International Constitution, 1 9 5 0 , Art. 2 7 . While the duplication of the preceding sections may be lengthy to the reader, i t affords an excellent opportunity to study the many clauses and conditions imposed by the AFofM on the various employers. 127 Table IV Statement of amounts allocated, contracted for expenditure and  disbursed by areas for the period of six months ended 3 0 June 1951<^ Area Number Location Allocated Contracted for Expenditure Disbursed Disbursed* 621 Brandon $ 2 0 0 . 4 8 # 188.50 $ 188.50 $ ~ 622 Brantford 3 2 1 . 5 1 2 3 6 . 0 0 2 3 6 . 0 0 2 3 6 . 0 0 623 Brockville 2 0 0 . 4 8 — ***** — 624 Calgary 3 9 3 . 4 0 — — — 625 Edmonton 6 0 5 . 1 5 — — 4 6 8 . 0 0 626 Halifax 6 5 8 . 1 4 — — 183.00 62? Hamilton 1 5 1 2 . 9 1 812.00 108.00 4 . 0 0 628 Huntsville 102.13 6 0 . 0 0 6 0 . 0 0 4 5 . 0 0 629 Kingston 3 1 3 . 9 5 1 5 0 . 0 0 — — 6 3 0 Kitchener 1217.93 1 1 9 9 . 0 0 1 0 5 4 . 0 0 4 2 2 . 0 0 631 London 1 3 9 1 . 8 8 1 2 0 1 . 0 0 1 2 0 1 . 0 0 1 1 4 5 . 0 0 632 Montreal 5 2 8 3 . 9 5 5 1 3 5 . 0 0 5 1 3 5 . 0 0 8 7 7 . 0 0 633 Niagra Falls 408.52 4 0 8 . 0 0 4 0 8 . 0 0 2 5 . 0 0 634 Ottawa 1 1 5 3 . 6 0 1 0 3 6 . 0 0 8 0 4 . 0 0 — 635 Peterborough 177.80 1 6 6 . 2 5 1 6 6 . 2 5 6 6 . 5 0 636 Port Arthur- 3 5 5 . 5 3 1 5 5 . 0 0 1 3 2 . 0 0 4 2 1 . 0 0 Fort William 637 Quebec 4 7 2 . 7 8 82 .00 — 1 5 2 . 0 0 638 Regina 582.47 582.47 5 1 9 . 0 0 5 7 . 5 0 639 Sarnia 185.36 1 3 7 . 5 0 1 3 7 . 5 0 1 3 5 . 0 0 640 Saskatoon 4 0 4 . 7 4 3 8 3 . 5 0 1 5 1 . 5 0 1 2 0 . 2 5 641 Sault Ste. Marie 2 1 5 . 6 0 2 1 0 . 0 0 — 2 7 . 0 0 642 St. Catherines 661.92 — — 7 5 . 0 0 643 St. Thomas 2 2 3 . 1 6 1 2 3 . 0 0 1 2 3 . 0 0 1 3 5 . 0 0 644 Stratford 3 0 6 . 3 9 1 7 0 . 0 0 1 7 0 . 0 0 — 645 Toronto 7 4 1 7 . 2 0 5 0 7 8 . 5 0 3891.00 3 2 7 7 . 0 0 646 Vancouver 2 6 5 5 . 2 4 2 1 4 1 . 5 0 1 9 0 9 . 5 0 —. 647 Victoria 4 0 0 . 9 6 381.50 381.50 181.50 648 Waterloo 2 4 5 . 8 4 — — 5 5 . 0 0 6 4 9 Windsor 1 2 8 5 . 9 7 1280.00 1280.00 1 8 4 . 0 0 650 Winnipeg 1 6 0 3 . 7 0 916.50 9 1 6 . 5 0 3 3 2 . 5 0 1 Disbursements for payrolls received after January 1, 1 9 5 1 , on contracts for expenditures for period July 1, 1 9 5 0 , to December 3 1 , 1 9 5 0 . £ Statistics compiled from Fif t h Report and Statement of Trustee of Music Performance Trust Fund for Period January 1, 1 9 5 1 , to June 3 0 , 1 9 5 1 . 

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