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The growth of Canadian control over external affairs, 1867-1939 1955

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THE GROWTH OF CANADIAN CONTROL OVER EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, 1867-1939 by ELIZABETH ALDON FRITH A Thesis Submitted i n Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of History We accept this thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of Master of Arts Members of the Department of History THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1955 i i ABSTRACT The Growth of Canadian Control over External Affairs, I867 - 1939- This thesis has two main purposes. The f i r s t i s to trace those particular facets of the development of Canada from the British colony of 1867 to the modern nation-state of 1939 that have to do with the gradual growth of Canadian con- t r o l over external affairs. The second i s to bring together as much as possible of the vast body of writing that has appeared over the years on this part of Canadian development. A l l aspects of the growth of control over external affairs have been treated many times, often far more thoroughly than has been possible within the bounds of this study, but no one, within the knowledge of the writer, has attempted to make a single study of this v i t a l portion of Canadian history. An extensive bibliography i s included. The section entitled "General Works" is not intended to be anything more than a useful l i s t of background reading. In the sections entitled "Primary Sources" and "Secondary—Specific" as far as possible everything available i n the Library of the Univer- sity of British Columbia with direct bearing on the problem is l i s t e d , with comments where i t has seemed these would be help- f u l . Throughout the thesis i t has been taken as fundamental that this development has been the result of the free urge to i i i growth inherent i n a v i t a l democratic society. The point of view has been taken that once Canada was conceded responsible government, the development of f u l l Canadian control over a l l matters, both internal and external, was bound to follow, and that no schemes, such as Imperial Federation, for keeping Canada permanently i n a position subordinate to Great Britain could have succeeded. Throughout, those attitudes, not only in Canada and Britain, but also i n the rest of the world, that have encour- aged or discouraged this development, have been discussed. This is done i n particular detail in the f i r s t chapter, which describes the extent of Canadian control over external affairs at Confederation, and the attitudes towards the future of the new Dominion then prevalent in Britain and Canada. The f i r s t area in which Canada achieved.full control over her external relationships was in commercial matters. The second chapter covers this, from the f i r s t inclusion of a Canadian to assist a British plenipotentiary to the f i n a l achievement of the Halibut Treaty, signed by the Canadian negotiator alone. To control her external relations, i t was necessary for Canada to control her own defence. This i s covered in chapter three. In chapter four are discussed the developments of status and the f i r s t real international recognition of that status achieved during World War I and at the Peace Conferences. Through the part she played i n the League, Canada gained fur- ther international recognition of her new status, as described iv i n chapter five. Chapters six and seven cover the develop- ment of machinery adequate for growing Canadian control over external affairs, both at Ottawa, in the Department of External Affairs, and in representation abroad, culminating i n the right of legation. The f i n a l two chapters trace the changing position of Canada in the Empire-Commonwealth. During the period to 1922, the tendency towards centralization of foreign policy appeared dominant, but always i t was faced with the growing strength of Canadian nationalism. In the period 1922- 1939> f u l l control over external affairs was achieved and i t was recognized that Canada was bound by no international obliga- tionsjthat she had not assumed by her own act. Even the f i n a l control over war and peace was achieved. Finally, a brief attempt i s made to evaluate this development in the light of the attitudes that produced i t and of the place of Canada i n the modern world. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I . The Extent of Canadian Control over External Affairs at Confederation, and the Attitudes toward Extension of that Control then Prevalent i n Britain and Canada 1 II The development of Canadian Participation i n and Control over Commercial and other Non-Political Treaties . 24 III The Development of Canadian Military and Naval Forces 57 IV International Recognition of Canadian Nationhood During World War I and at the Peace Conference 71 V Canada, The League of Nations, and the Post War Search for Security 97 VI The Department of External Affairs 130 VII The Development of Canadian Representation Abroad 141 VIII The Changing Position of Canada i n the Empire: The Trend toward Indirect Control over External Affairs through a Voice in British Foreign Policy 176 BIBLIOGRAPHY 236 Chapter I The Extent of Canadian Control over External Affairs at Confederation, and the Attitudes toward Extension of that Control then Prevalent i n Britain and Canada In 1867 Canada was s t i l l a British Colony. She had achieved responsible government and control over her internal affairs, but the Imperial government s t i l l had f u l l control over Canadian external relations. No claim had yet been substantiated that the new Dominion should ever be con- sulted i n international affairs, even i n those where her interests were most v i t a l l y concerned. In the eyes of her own people, as well as in those of Great Britain and the rest of the world, she was simply a colony. Seventy-two years later, i n 1939 > Canada had become an autonomous p o l i t i c a l entity, with f u l l control over her own affairs, internal and external. Her place in the Commonwealth was that of an equal partner, in no way subordinate to Great Britain. Canada had achieved one by one the various rights of nationhood with regard to external af f a i r s : the right to conclude treaties, the right to establish her own legations abroad, the right to independent representation on such inter- national bodies as the League of Nations, and f i n a l l y the right to declare war. Her new status was recognized not only at home and in the British Commonwealth of Nations, but i n the 2 world at large. In the f i n a l analysis, i t was that world recognition which gave her new nationhood international valadity. Her status, like that of the other British Dominions, was unique i n human history. It combined at once the status of a modern nation-state, with a l l the rights and privileges of any other, with membership as an equal partner in the Commonwealth. That membership no longer meant that the British government exercised any control over Canadian external affairs. It had become f u l l y recognized that Canada and the other Dominions had every right to follow policies entirely different in world affairs from those of Great Britain. Where there was one Commonwealth policy, i t was no longer dictated by Britain, but was the result of discussion and co- operation among Commonwealth statesmen meeting as equals. The tremendous changes of these seventy years were not the result of any planned system of constitutional change. Rather they have been the result of a long slow period of growth, with advance in one f i e l d at one moment, then a step forward somewhere else, as specific conditions made i t possible and necessary. There are two methods by which major constitu- tional changes may be brought about in the history of a state. The f i r s t is by changing the law or the constitution, by recognized constitutional methods. The second is by f i r s t disregarding theory and concentrating on problems as they arise, and then bringing the theory and legal position up to date to meet the new stage of development. It i s by the 3 latter method that Canadian control over external affairs has grown. To Canadian statesmen i t has seemed wiser to make minor gain followed by minor gain, as conditions made each possible, rather than to risk defeat or even strong dis- approval by various sections of the Canadian public or by the British government, on a major issue involving sweeping legal changes. In this way the Canadian treaty power developed by slow stages, from the inclusion of Macdonald i n the Brit i s h delegation to the Washington Conference of 1871» to the empowering of Gait and Tupper to assist i n the negotiation of commercial treaties, down to the f i n a l achievement of the right of Canada to negotiate and sign a treaty entirely on her own, f i r s t realized in the Halibut Treaty of 1923» and recog- nized and regularized by the Imperial Conference of the same year. Again and again i t has been a similar process, an advance, then legal practice and theory brought into conformity with the new conditions. The new Dominion came into being at a time when there were two main trends of thought i n Great Britain i n regard to the colonies. One foresaw separation as inevitable; the other was beginning to see the importance of the Empire and the possibilities of autonomy without separation. Those who held the f i r s t point of view considered that colonies, like ripe f r u i t , would inevitably drop away from the Mother Country as they reached a certain stage of 4 development. Their attitude was strengthened by the surface facts of recent history. The loss of the American colonies and the unsuccessful rebellions i n the Canadas in 1837 were thought to be the logical results of the granting of a certain amount of freedom and self-government. In addition, the end of the old Mercantile System of trade monopoly had eliminated for the moment much of the value of the colonies to Britain, and made them more of a burden than of an advantage. Thus Disraeli said i n 18535 i n reference to the fisheries dispute between the Canadian colonies and the United States, "These wretched colonies w i l l be independent too i n a few years, and are a millstone round our necks." 1 Such colonial pessimists were found among both Whigs and Tories, but were particularly strong among the latte r . For years many of them either regretted or actively opposed every extension of self-government i n the colonies as being a step further towards separation. In Canada this attitude was not reflected so much i n the desire for independence as i t was i n the development of the Annexationist Movement. There was almost nothing of the Canadian nationalist feeling before 1867 that would have been necessary for the immediate development of any strong independ- ence movement. Indeed the very name "Canada" had no national- i s t connotations to many of the citizens of the new Dominion. 1 Quoted in J. S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers. Ottawa 1912, vol. 1, P. 39 . 5 In the Maritimes i t was often strongly resented — to the people there i t meant Ontario and Quebec. The Annexationist Movement, on the other hand, found many supporters i n 1849 and during the next few years. It was mainly economic i n i t s causes, because the sudden reversal of British policy with the adoption of Free Trade had caused a period of depression and great economic d i f f i c u l t y in Canada. Among the most b r i l l i a n t exponents of the separation- i s t theory at this time i n England was Goldwin Smith, then a professor at Oxford. Writing for the Daily News i n 1862-3, he advocated the immediate granting of independence to the colonies. If this were done while they were s t i l l loyal, and before any quarrel should arise, he argued, Britain might at 2 least be able to keep their loyalty and affection. Whatever other effects this attitude may have had, i t doubtless helped to foster the development of an independent and self-reliant attitude i n the colonies. To that extent i t paved the way for the establishment of Canadian control over external affairs. With the revival of Imperialism, every scheme for the closer integration of the Empire had to take into account the growing national s p i r i t i n Canada. Even at this time, however pessimistic these statesmen were i n their views with regard to the immediate future of the colonies and 2 C. A. Bodelsen, Studies i n Mid-Victorian Imperialism, Copenhagen, Gyldendalske Bodhandel, 1924, pp. 52-57* 6 their relationship to Britain, many of them were groping to- 3 wards a new conception of a British group of states. One of these again was Goldwin Smith, who dreamt of "the moral federation of the whole English-speaking race throughout the 4 world." Opposition to this pessimistic outlook i n Britain was f i r s t expressed by the group known as the Colonial Reformers, which included men like Lord Durham, Gibbon Wake- f i e l d , and Lord Elgin. With a firm faith i n both the value and the future of the colonies, they pointed out that most British statesmen had been ready to confuse frequent protests against an unsatisfactory system of government with protests against the British connection i t s e l f . These statesmen had not understood how much real loyalty there was to Britain i n the colonies. For instance, Joseph Howe maintained i n a letter to Lord John Russell in 1839 that the "Population of British North America are sincerely attached to the parent state; that they are proud of their origin, deeply interested 5 i n the integrity of the Empire." 3 H. Duncan Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, London, 1920, p. 51. 4 Goldwin Smith, Canada and the Canadian Question, Toronto, 1891, pp. 265-6. 5 Joseph Howe to Lord John Russell, September 18, 1839> in H. E. Egerton and W. L. Grant, Canadian Constitutional Devel- opment. Toronto, 1907? P- 193* 7 Most of the colonial pessimists were men with l i t t l e first-hand experience with the colonies. The Colonial Reformers had considerable personal contact, and hence had a much better understanding of true conditions. Hence too they hailed Durham's Report as a great advance, with i t s con- tention that responsible government need not mean separation. "On the contrary, the practical r e l i e f from undue interfer- ence ... would strengthen the present bond of feelings and interests; and the connection would become more durable and advantageous by having more of equality, of freedom and of local independence."^ However much the ideas contained i n Durham's Report were to be basic in the development toward dominion autonomy, the Colonial Reformers seem to have had l i t t l e conception of the long slow process of change that was to be involved i n that development, the gathering of scattered colonies into great national units and the development of both internal and external autonomy. Whatever definite plans they had for the future were based on a sort of provincial status for the colonies. Thus Durham spoke of "perfect subordination" to 7 Great Britain, and Wakefield compared colonial responsible government to "municipal government", and again, "a delegation 8 of authority for limited purposes." When they wrote i n 6 Sir C. P. Lucas, ed., Lord Durham's Report, Oxford, 1912, vol. 2, p. 310. 7 Ibid., vol. 2, p. 282. 8 Edward Gibbon Wakefield, A View of the Art of Colonization, Oxford, 1914, p. 271. 8 terms of the imagination they spoke of "growing nations", "equal partners" and the l i k e , but when they got down to precise plans these ideas were contradicted. In one place in his report Durham maintained that a large and growing community such as the British North American colonies could not be kept contented in a position of i n f e r i o r i t y to their neighbours, but i n another he assumed that Canada would be willing to remain in indefinite subordination to the United 9 Kingdom. The limitation of their understanding i s well summarized by Sir Charles Lucas i n his comments on the Report. While he laid stress on self-government as creating a national existence, he did not seem f u l l y to recognize that when once an overseas community has been endowed with national institutions, i t i s d i f f i - cult, i f not impossible, to set a limit to i t s growth as a nation, or permanently to withhold any subject as out- side i t s scope.10 For the purpose of this study i t is significant that two of the four subjects over which Durham recommended that Britain should retain control were foreign affairs and trade. He stated: The matters which concern us are very few. The constitution of the form of government, the regulation of foreign relations, and of trade with the mother country, the other British colonies, and foreign nations, and the disposal of the public lands, are the only points on which the mother country requires a control. This control is now sufficiently secured by the authority of the Imperial legislature. . . . A perfect subordination 9 Lucas, o_p_. c i t . , vol. 2 , pp. 302-312. 10 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 285. 9 on the part of the Colony, on these points, i s secured by the advantages which i t finds in the continuance of i t s connection with the Empire.^ The influence of the Colonial Reformers had almost disappeared by 1850. The next twenty years were the height of the period of pessimism. By 1870 belief i n both the value and the possibilities of the Empire was reviving. Economically, the importance of the colonies as sources for raw materials and as markets began to be realized, particu- l a r l y with the growth of protectionism on the Continent. The new attitudes were both advantageous and disadvantageous to the development of dominion autonomy. The new interest i n the colonies shown by the British government helped to prepare the way for early developments like the consultation with and the appointment of Canadian statesmen to assist in commercial negotiations where Canadian interests were involved. On the other hand the revival of belief in the Empire was accompanied by a great outburst of enthusiastic planning for i t s future. Most of the plans, such as those for Imperial Federation, would have entirely prevented the development of Canada as a nation-state with control over her own external affairs, since they foresaw Britain and the Dominions as a great world-wide federation whose foreign affairs and defence policies would be controlled by an Imperial parliament meeting i n London. 11 Lucas, 0 £ . c i t . , vol. 2 , p. 282. 10 In 1867» the main Canadian attitudes emphasized the importance of the British connection. The American C i v i l War had been widely f e l t as a very real threat to Canada. As a result the Annexationist Movement had just about disappeared. Appreciation of the value of their position i n the British Empire and fear of American aggression had been strong motives among the Canadians responsible for the formation of the new dominion. The achievement of Confederation made no immediate difference i n the views of British or Canadian statesmen on problems of colonial autonomy and imperial control. The prin- ciple of responsible government in internal matters had already been conceded, and in 1859 the colonies had made good their 12 desire to deal with their own t a r i f f s . Otherwise the Imperial government s t i l l had f u l l control over foreign relations. No claim had yet been made that Canada should be consulted on any international question. The situation i n 1867 was, with the exception of t a r i f f s already noted, s t i l l that summed up almost sixty years before, i n a despatch sent i n 1810 from the Colonial Secretary, Lord Liverpool, to Sir James Craig, then Lieutenant Governor of Lower Canada: " A l l laws to regulate the Commercial Intercourse between Canada and other parts of the World may, according to the Constitution, be passed by the 13 Imperial Parliament." 12 P. E. Corbett and H. A. Smith, Canada and World P o l i t i c s , Toronto, 1928, p. 15. 13 Quoted i n W. P. M. Kennedy, Documents of the Canadian Constitution. 1759-1915, Toronto, 1918, p. 278. 11 On the other hand, Britain had not retained much control over Canada except i n foreign affairs, and many states- men foresaw growing Canadian control there. Macdonald regarded Confederation as implying the f i n a l abandonment of the old theory which looked on a colony as an outlying portion of the British realm. In his view, federation would enable Canada to rise from a position of dependency to what would to a l l intents and purposes be the f u l l stature of an independent state. He did not expect the severing of the British connection, both because of i t s value to Canada and because of the strength of the sentimental ties. His frequent references, in speeches preceding Confederation, to Canada as a "vice- royalty", a "great nation", a "friendly nation", show f a i r l y 14 clearly how he saw the future of Canada. He foresaw i n the future the possibility of a group or "alliance" of equal and autonomous states linked together by a common crown. Unfor- tunately the s t i l l prevalent pessimism and the lack of interest in colonies then shown i n Britain prevented any constructive steps in that direction being taken at the time of Confedera- tion. The British reaction to the confederation proposals was a reflection of the pessimistic point of view of the Colonial Office at that time. Sir F. Rogers (afterwards Lord 14 A. B. Keith, Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1763-1917, Oxford, 1948, pp. 321, 324. 12 Blachford), Permanent Undersecretary of State for the Colonial Office, 1860-1871, was a separatist. In his autobiographical notes he stated: I had always believed that the destiny of our colonies is independence, and that i n this point of view the function of the Colonial Office is to secure that our connexion, while i t lasts, shall be as profitable to both parties, and our separation, when i t comes, as amicable as possible., c Gladstone was not a separatist, but he thought separation was probably eventually inevitable. Speaking with regard to plans for confederation and the necessity of the railway i f Canada was to take on her own defence, he said: My belief is that there would be no bounds to the efforts which this country would make for the purpose of aiding and supporting the North American provinces in their willing and energetic efforts to maintain their connection with this country. Sir Richard Cartwright received the impression i n England i n 1866 that both parties would sooner Canada had asked 17 for independence at once. Gait wrote to his wife from England on January 1, 1867s I am more than ever disappointed at the tone of feeling here as to the colonies. I cannot shut my eyes to the fact that they want to get rid of us. They have a servile fear of the United States, and would rather give us up than defend us, or incur the risk of war with that country. 15 Bodelsen, op c i t . , p. 50. 16 Debate on the Railway Loan, Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. 186, Third Series, March 2 8 , 1867, co. 785. 17 Bodelsen, p_p_. c i t . , p. 45. 18 0. D. Skelton, The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Gait, Toronto, 1920, p. 410. 13 As for the British North America Act, the only mention of external affairs i s that which gives the federal government and parliament a l l powers necessary for "performing the obliga- tions of Canada or of any Province thereof, as part of the British Empire, towards foreign countries, arising under 19 treaties between the Empire and such foreign countries." Executive authority is specifically vested i n the Crown, repres- ented in Canada by a governor general, selected at that time entirely by the British government. He would receive instruc- tions on foreign and Imperial policy from the British government, and would be legally in charge of external policy. Through him, by way of the British Colonial Office and the British Foreign Office, a l l dealings with foreign powers were to be 20 carried out, even those involving the United States. At Confederation, Canadian nationalism was confined largely to a few statesmen, and wherever i t occurred among the people of the North American colonies, i t was based rather on a fear of the United States than on a vision of the new Dominion. It found expression in several distinct groups, one of which was the Canada F i r s t Party. This had begun i n 1863 with five young men, of whom, W. A. Foster, a Toronto barrister, was to become most prominent. By 1874- they formed a group of some size and importance. They did not wish to break with Britain, 19 The British North America Act, I867, paragraph 132, i n Kennedy, OJD. c i t . , p. 631. 20 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, 1950, p. 95-6. 14 but they did wish to achieve for Canada the status of a nation. They demanded that as quickly as possible Canada should have a voice i n the making of treaties i n which her interests were involved; that she should have complete control over her own military forces, which should be staffed entirely with Canadian officers; and that import duties should be adjusted to encourage the development of Canadian manufactures. For a time i t was planned to become a p o l i t i c a l party under, i t was hoped, the leadership of Edward Blake, then second only to Alexander Mackenzie i n the Liberal Party. It did not work out. The group soon disappeared, but the influence of their thinking remained.^" Although Edward Blake did not take the leadership of the Canada First Party, he did throughout his long membership in the House of Commons as a member of the Liberal party, have a real influence on the development of a Canadian national s p i r i t . In his famous Aurora speech of 1874 he emphasized the tremendous importance of the development of such a s p i r i t , and likewise some of the unhappy implications of purely colonial status. In your foreign affairs, your relations with other countries, whether peaceful or warlike, commercial or financial or otherwise, you may have no more voice than the people of Japan. . . . We are four millions of Britons who are not free. . . . Tomorrow, by the policy 21 See account of one of the original members of the group, Col. George T. Denison, The Struggle for Imperial Unity, London, 1909, pp. 10-11, 49-61 . 15 of England, i n which you have no voice or control, this country might be plunged into the horrors of a war.22 He advocated, not independence, but some system of Imperial federation. The idea of Imperial federation found many supporters in Canada in the period before 1890. This approach to the future of Canada w i l l be discussed i n detail i n Chapter VIII. Briefly, the main idea was to achieve closer Imperial integra- tion by the establishment of some sort of federal parliament for the whole Empire, with complete control over Imperial concerns and over the external affairs of a l l i t s members. Such a scheme would have l e f t Canada with control over internal affairs only, with l i t t l e control, and that of an indirect nature, over her foreign relations, and with no hope of orderly constitu- tional development of such control at a later date. Another approach entirely was that taken by Goldwin Smith and the Commercial Unionists. Smith had emigrated to Toronto in I 8 7 1 . Though i t was not for some fifteen years that he reached the height of his influence, he had begun at once to spread his views that the ultimate destiny of Canada was separa- tion from Britain and annexation to the United States. He became one of the leading spokesmen for the Commercial Union- i s t s , who believed that the f i r s t step, commercial union, should 22 Quoted by Frank H. Underhill, "Edward Blake and Canadian Liberal Nationalism," i n R. Flenley, ed., Essays i n Canadian History, Toronto, 1939, pp. 147-8. 16 be taken at once. They found considerable support, largely among the agricultural interests. Certain prominent Liberal leaders, Richard Cartwright, former minister of finance, for instance, were won to the support of commercial union. But the Liberal caucus in 1888 decided rather to support reciproc- 24 i t y . As a result, as far as the major p o l i t i c a l parties were concerned, commercial union disappeared as a possible Canadian policy. S t i l l another approach was that taken some time later by J. S. Ewart, that Canada should become a kingdom, i n a l l respects independent, united to Britain merely by goodwill and by the tie of the common Crown. In 1912, when his Kingdom Papers were published, there was l i t t l e popular support for his ideas. Altogether, there was a wide variety of opinion current i n the years after Confederation as to what road of development the young country should follow. Developments of course were as much conditioned by British as by Canadian attitudes. In the years just before and immediately after Confederation, the f i r s t tentative steps had already been taken towards Canadian participation in those external matters of 23 Charles C. Tan s i l l , Canadian-American Relations, 1875- 1911, New Haven, 1943, p. 3oTI 24 Glazebrook, o_£. c i t . , p. 171. 17 most pressing concern to her. The f i r s t outstanding instance had been the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. Lord Elgin had gone to Washington to undertake the necessary negotiations. While legally he had acted purely as a British diplomat, he was never- theless at the time governor of Canada, and he had the advice 25 and close co-operation of his Canadian statesmen. The result of his work was of great value to Canada i n the period of severe economic d i f f i c u l t y caused by the new British policy of free trade. In 1865, the British government was prepared to include Canadian representatives i n negotiations for a new reciprocity arrangement to replace that of 1854, but because of 26 American opposition, nothing came of the proposal. Lord Lyons, the British Ambassador at Washington from 1858 to 1865> was most c r i t i c a l of any suggestions that Canadians should be included i n such negotiations. He refused to accept any Canadian sent to give him advice on the subject. Hi's attitude to any Canadian claim to a share in negotiating a treaty partic- ularly involving Canada was that i t should be out of the question until Canada equipped herself with an army and navy adequate for 27 her own defence. 25 A. B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Oxford, 1928, p. 853- 26 Loc. c i t . 27 Edward Porritt, The Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom of the British Overseas Dominion, Oxford, 1922, p. 164. 18 Some discussion of Canadian participation i n such negotiations took place shortly after Confederation. On March 16, 1870, Mr. Huntington moved a resolution i n the Canadian House of Commons, declaring among other things, that i t would be greatly advantageous to place the Canadian govern- ment in direct communication with other states that might be willing to negotiate commercial arrangements with Canada. Five days later Sir Alexander Gait moved an amendment. After much debate the amended resolution was accepted, declaring that any such attempt to negotiate a treaty with any foreign power, without the support of Great Britain as principal party, 28 must f a i l . No encouragement either was given to the suggestions by a British Royal Commission on treaty power in 1870. Inspired by Belgian neutrality i n the Franco-German war, they urged that the colonies should be given the power to negotiate treaties on matters specifically concerning them, and even the right to be recognized as neutral where they were not directly 29 concerned i n a conflict i n which Britain was involved. The f i r s t inclusion of a Canadian statesman as a member of a British delegation to an international conference where matters of specific interest to Canada were involved, took place i n 1871. Sir John A. Macdonald was appointed as 28 R. L. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, Toronto, 1923, pp. 7 2 - 3 . 29 A. B. Keith, Dominion Autonomy i n Practice, London 1929, P. 52. 19 one of the British members of the joint commission meeting i n Washington that year to settle a l l differences outstanding between Great Britain and the United States. The questions involving Canada had to do with her claims to compensation for the damages suffered in the Fenian raids, with the settlement of the fisheries dispute, and with her desire for a renewal of reciprocity arrangements with the United States. Canadian inshore fisheries had been opened to American fishermen as part of the Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. Although the United States had ended that treaty i n 1866, American fishermen were s t i l l attempting to maintain their right to these fisheries. Many d i f f i c u l t i e s and much bad feeling on both sides had resulted. In 1870 the Canadian government, after consulting Great Britain, had decided to shut out a l l foreign fishermen from her inshore waters and to back this up with a small fleet of cruisers. Outbreaks of violence and threats of greater 30 violence followed. Particularly because of the threatening state of European affairs, the British government was extremely anxious to settle a l l matters outstanding between i t s e l f and the United States. As a result, the Canadian claims were regarded by 31 many British statesmen as an embarrassment. To Canadians they seemed of great importance. 30 Joseph Pope, Memoirs of Sir John A. Macdonald, Toronto, 1930, vol. 2 , p. 82. 31 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 121. 20 A Canadian then residing i n London, Sir John Rose, was sent to Washington i n January 1871 to help in preparing 32 plans for a joint commission. These preparations, however, were apparently carried out without consulting the Canadian interests in the f i n a l arrangements. Macdonald had previously insisted that no steps toward the negotiation of reciprocity should be taken without consulting the Canadian government, and that the government should also be consulted i n the settle- ment of the Fenian claims. Further, he had insisted to Rose that no fisheries arrangement should be arrived at without reference to the Canadian government.33 It was f i n a l l y agreed on i n London to include a Canadian as part of the British commission. Rose, the f i r s t person suggested because of his part in the preliminary arrange- ments, was not suitable because he was no longer a resident of Canada. Macdonald was offered the appointment, but he was not anxious to accept. He was afraid that, as had so often happened in the past, Canadian interests would be sacrificed to British, and that, as a member of the commission, he would have to bear the blame i n Canada. He f i n a l l y decided i t would be better to take the risk rather than to let direct representa- tion of Canada go by default and have her interests l e f t purely at the mercy of British and American negotiators. As a result 32 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 122. 33 Ibid., p. 123. 21 he consented to serve, after obtaining from the British govern- ment assurance on Canada's exclusive right to the fisheries within the three mile l i m i t , and a promise that the Fenian 34 claims would be considered. At the f i r s t session, the head of the British commis- sion, the Marquess of Ripon, pointed out that his delegation was not a British but an Imperial one. When he made i t clear later that any fishing treaty must be ra t i f i e d by the Canadian parliament, the Americans were c r i t i c a l , one of the commission- ers stating that I'they thought they were dealing with the 35 British Empire and not with Canada." The conference thus was a f i r s t step on the long way toward international recognition of the developing status of Canada. When Macdonald arrived at Washington he found that the Fenian claims were not to be discussed at a l l . Through an oversight, they had not been included by the British i n the agenda formally agreed on. The American commissioners refused to agree to add them. The British government decided to with- draw them entirely, assuming responsibility i t s e l f for the losses Canadians had sustained. Further, Macdonald found that the Americans were not interested i n considering reciprocity. Thus the fi n a l discussions were around the Alabama claims and 34 George R. Parkin, Sir John A. Macdonald, The Makers of Canada, Toronto, 1912, vol. 9j p. 173. 35 Quoted i n Glazebrook, p_p_. c i t . , p. 125. 22 the fisheries question. Macdonald found the whole time a constant struggle with both the British and the United States commissioners. He f e l t that the B r i t i t h commissioners did not care what the negotiations cost Canada, as long as they achieved a treaty. The British, on their side, f e l t Macdonald was much too unwilling to make the concessions necessary for 36 the sake of peace. Actually, Canada helped considerably i n reaching an agreement by her concessions on the inshore f i s h - eries and by not insisting on consideration of the Fenian claims. She had hoped in return for the former to get a renewal of reciprocity. The latter seemed as f u l l y justified as the Alabama claims. The results were decidedly disappointing from the Canadian point of view. The only real advantage gained was the promise that the claim to the superior value of the concession made by Canada, when the inshore fisheries of Canada and the United States were opened to each other, would be examined by a special commission. The f i n a l award to Canada, 37 f made some time later, was $ 5 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 . In spite of the grave disappointment at home, Macdonald, i n a statesmanlike speech in the Canadian House of Commons on May 3 , moved that the treaty be rati f i e d . He explained how he had been appointed to the commission and why he had accepted. After defending the various clauses of the 36 Glazebrook, op,, c i t . , pp. 125-6. 37 Parkin, op_. c i t . , p. 190. 38 Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 3 , 1872, pp.294-345. 23 treaty as they affected Canada, he urged the acceptance of the treaty, i n spite of the concessions i t involved, as a sacrifice by Canada necessary for the maintenance of peace between Britain and the United States — peace that was most essential for the future development of Canada. Thus the f i r s t steps were taken i n the representation of Canada where Canadian interests were involved i n external affairs. At the same time, with the familiar pattern of the sacrifice of Canadian interests to gain British ends, i t was increasingly evident that further development of Canadian rep- resentation and control were inevitable to satisfy the growing Canadian national feeling. Chapter II The Development of Canadian Participation i n and Con- tr o l over Commercial and other Non-Political Treaties From the earliest years of the Dominion, foreign trade was necessary to the Canadian economy. Foreign trade i n turn called for diplomatic action. The f i r s t few years after Confederation were a period of prosperity and increasing trade. With the depression of 1873» however, i t became evident that Canadians themselves must take steps to broaden the scope of their commercial relations, and seek whatever power was necessary to enter into commercial negotiations with foreign countries. The experience of Macdonald at Washington had only served to emphasize the fact that Canada could not satisfactorily continue to rely on the services of British negotiators and diplomats. Not only were they as a rule poorly informed about Canadian conditions and needs, but where, as was frequently the case, there was conflict of interests, they inevitably favoured British interests at the expense of Canadian. Macdonald summed up the situation in 1879s A necessity has thus arisen for providing separate and distinct trade conventions with a l l foreign powers with whom Canada has distinct trade. With the different views held by the Parliament of Canada on such subjects, from those of Her Majesty's Government, there is a mani- fest d i f f i c u l t y in asking the latter to become responsible 25 for the representations required to be made, and foreign governments find i t d i f f i c u l t to understand our present system. The Canadian government therefore submit that when occasion requires such negotiations to be undertaken, Her Majesty's Government should advise Her Majesty specially to accredit the representative of Canada to the foreign court, by association for the special object with the resident minister or other Imperial negotiator.^ Again, the f i r s t steps were taken i n negotiations with the United States. The new Liberal administration of 1873? under Alexander Mackenzie, stood for a low t a r i f f policy and wished to see the restoration of some form of reciprocity with the United States. They hoped that the compensation for Canadian fisheries, arranged under the Washington Treaty and not yet awarded, might possibly be replaced with a reciprocity agreement. After making sure that the British government had no objection to such a step, Mackenzie sent George Brown, then a Canadian senator, to Washington i n February 1874, as a confi- dential agent to sound out the American government. Brown's report being hopeful, arrangements were made to open formal negotiations. Mackenzie asked the Imperial government to appoint two Canadians, Brown and a cabinet member, to be assoc- iated with the British ambassador at Washington in negotiations, stipulating that the Canadians must not occupy a position inferior to that Macdonald held there in 1871. Brown was forwarded f u l l plenipotentiary powers, the proposal for a 1 Confidential memorandum concerning the appointment of a High Commissioner for Canada in London, Macdonald, T i l l e y and Tupper to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1879? i n A. B. Keith, Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1763 - 1917, Oxford, 1948, vol. 2, p. 144. 26 2 second Canadian representative having been dropped. Mackenzie had made i t clear that the British minister, without assistance j from a Canadian with knowledge of Canadian conditions and wishes, could not be expected to handle satisfactorily negotiations which directly concerned Canada only. The British government, likewise preferred to leave to Canada the responsibility for any changes i n the consequences of the Treaty of Washington, i f the fisheries compensation were to be traded for reciprocity. In spite of the coolness of Fish, the American Secretary of State, a draft treaty was f i n a l l y completed. It provided for a renewal of the former reciprocity treaty, for reciprocity i n the coasting trade, for a joint commission to look after boundary waters, and for enlargement of the Canadian 3 canals. The treaty was rejected by the American Senate. However, i t did mark a step forward i n the Canadian negotiation of commercial treaties. The precedents established here were followed elsewhere in negotiations where Canadian interests alone were affected. A Canadian was appointed by the British government at the request of the Canadian government to be associated with the resident British minister or other British diplomat in the negotiation. The resulting treaty or convention would be signed by both, and would represent the 2 John Lewis, "The Mackenzie Administration, 1873-1878," Canada and Its Provinces. Toronto, 1913? vol. 6, p. 67. 3 John W. Dafoe, Canada, An American Nation, New York, 1935 > p. 66. 27 views of the Canadian government, but to be operative would have to be ratified by the British as well as the Canadian government.4 Because of the rejection of this treaty, i t was necessary to revive the provisions for arbitration with regard to compensation for Canadian fisheries made by the Treaty of Washington. A board of three was provided for. The Canadian appointee was Sir Alexander Gait, the American, E. H. Kellogg, and the neutral member chosen was the Belgian Minister at Washington. The commission met at Halifax in 1877. The award of $5,500,000 was received with satisfaction in Canada, where i t was held that a Canadian had been able to reverse the long trend of experiences i n diplomatic relations with the 5 United States unfavourable to Canada. Since i t was a case of arbitration, not diplomatic negotiations, the two were not st r i c t l y comparable. Nevertheless i t was a step forward i n Canadian conduct of affairs of Canadian interest. Although there was much dissatisfaction i n the United States with the award, to which Kellogg, the American member of the commission, had dissented, i t was paid. Canada was again represented in negotiations i n Washington in 1887. In 1885 the American government had 4 Dafoe, loc. cit,. 5 G. P. de T. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, 1950, p. 158-9. 28 abrogated the fisheries clause of the Treaty of Washington. There followed a period of violence and confusion, seizure of American vessels and threats by the American government. Bayard, the American Secretary of State, unofficially invited either Macdonald, again Prime Minister, or Tupper, Canadian High Commissioner in Britain, to come to Washington and try to prepare some plan for a peaceful settlement. Tupper went, and was able to arrange for a conference to be held at Washing- ton. The whole dispute was of no direct interest to the British government, but was indeed rather an embarrassment to i t . Thus i t was quite willing that Sir Charles Tupper be appointed a plenipotentiary along with Joseph Chamberlain and Sir Lionel Sackville-West, the British minister at Washington. Chamber- lain,': then leader of the Liberal Unionist Party i n the British House of Commons, was sent by Lord Salisbury as a British rep- resentative. Because purely Canadian interests were involved, Tupper took the heaviest part in the negotiations. With British support, he attempted to arrange that American t a r i f f concessions be made i n return for the renewal of the former 6 fisheries privileges, but without success. A treaty was fi n a l l y drafted, both Sir Charles Tupper and Joseph Chamberlain 7 signing i t . It, too, was rejected by the American Senate. However, an arrangement reached at the same time for a system 6 See E. M. Saunders, The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, London, 1916, vol. 2, pp. 96-113. 7 A. B. Keith, Responsible Government in the Dominions, Oxford, 1928, p. 8^47 29 of l i c e n s i n g American fishermen operated successfully for g the next t h i r t y years. Again i n I 8 9 O - i 8 9 2 , Canadians were involved i n negotiations with the United States. This time the questions involved were the status of the Behring Sea and the r i g h t s of Canadian sealing vessels. In 1890, Charles H. Tupper, Minister of Marine and F i s h e r i e s and son of S i r Charles Tupper, was sent to Washington to as s i s t the B r i t i s h ambassador, S i r J u l i a n Pauncefote, i n making some sort of arrangement. At f i r s t his greatest e f f o r t s were spent i n preventing Pauncefote from preparing a convention unfavourable to Canadian i n t e r - 9 ests. At the end of 1891, the B r i t i s h and United States governments agreed on an in v e s t i g a t i o n by commissioners G. M. Dawson of the Canadian Geological Survey and S i r George Baden- Powell, appointed by the B r i t i s h . Nothing was accomplished. F i n a l l y the whole matter was referred to an in t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n t r i b u n a l , and the res u l t i n g award was favourable to Canadian i n t e r e s t s . ^ During t h i s period, Canadians were also involved i n negotiation with European countries. As w i l l be indicated l a t e r , various B r i t i s h commercial t r e a t i e s , which by Canadian 8 Glazebrook, op,, c i t . , p. 162. 9 C. H. Tupper to Macdonald, Feb. 28, Mar. 3, and Mar. 10, 1890, quoted i n C. C. T a n s i l l , Canadian-American Relations, New Haven, 194-3, pp. 306-7. ,00 George W. Brown, The Growth of Peaceful Settlement Between Canada and the United States. Toronto, 1948, p. 24. 30 assent, applied also to Canada, were of some advantage. But naturally they had not been planned to meet definite Canadian needs. Two of these problems considered 6f great importance at the time were the encouragement of trade with the Spanish West Indies and the sale of Canadian wooden ships to France. In negotiation towards these ends, i t was necessary that a Canadian, with f u l l knowledge of Canadian needs and conditions, be involved. In the latter part of I878, Sir Alexander Gait was sent to Paris and Madrid to work with the British ambassa- dors there to secure draft conventions. The main negotiations were to be l e f t to the ambassadors, who were to arrange to have Gait discuss details with the French and Spanish governments. Had draft conventions been secured, they would have had to have been approved by both British and Canadian governments before they were signed. At Paris, the British ambassador was the same Lord Lyons who had in 1865 been so unwilling to have any Canadian 11 assist him i n negotiations at Washington. At f i r s t Gait complained of Lyons1 discourtesy and lack of assistance, but after appealing to the foreign office, he received much more help. When he f e l t he was about to succeed, complications caused by French-Austrian t a r i f f relations caused the French 12 to refuse to proceed any further. Gait did not achieve any 11 Chapter 1, p. 17. 12 See Gait to Macdonald, Dec. 20, I878 and Jan. 1, 1879, quoted in Glazebrook, 0 £ . c i t . , p. 149. 31 greater success at Madrid. Again he f e l t very keenly his position as subordinate to the British Ambassador. Gait . . . found himself generally hampered i n discharging the duties imposed on him by the government of Canada, because he stood only i n the position of a commercial commissioner; and i t was necessary that a l l his negotiations with the Government of Spain should be f i l t e r e d through Her Majesty's Minister at the Court of Madrid., The next year, 1879, Gait became the f i r s t Canadian High Commissioner i n London. Both he and Sir Charles Tupper, who succeeded him i n 1883? continued the long, often inter- rupted, negotiations with France and Spain. Both maintained that Canada must be free to negotiate her own commercial treaties, and did this so successfully that "Gait was the last treaty-making commissioner of the Dominion of Canada to complain of limited opportunity, restricted powers and generally hamper- 14 ing conditions." Meanwhile, since negotiations for commercial treaties between Canada and France and Spain had not been successful, Macdonald wrote to Gait i n 1882, instructing him to attempt to include a convention covering Canadian interests in suggested treaties between Britain and France and Spain. There w i l l , I presume, be a temporary (French) treaty with England. In such case the High Commissioner should go to Paris, with the consent of the Foreign Office, to act with Lord Lyons and make a special conven- tion as to trade between Canada and France . . . . 13 C. H. Tupper, "Treaty-making Powers of the Dominion", The Journal of the Society of Comparative Legislation. New Series, no. 37, Jan. 1917, PP» 7-8. 14 Edward Porritt, The Fi s c a l and Diplomatic Freedom of the Bri t i s h Overseas Dominions, Oxford, 1922, p. 191. 32 Should the treaty with France break down, as i s most l i k e l y , negotiations w i l l be opened with Spain, and the High Commissioner must be on hand to deal with Canadian trade., - In 1884, when negotiations were re-opened with Madrid, Tupper received a far more satisfactory status than that accorded Gait i n I879. If the Spanish government are favourably disposed, the f u l l power for these negotiations w i l l be given to Sir Robert Morier (the British ambassador) and Sir Charles Tupper jointly. The actual negotiations would probably be conducted by Sir Charles Tupper, but the convention, i f concluded, must be signed by both plenipotentiaries.^ Thus two decided steps forward were taken — i t was recognized that negotiations would be conducted by the Canadian plenipoten- tiary, thus giving him the dominant role, and that his signature, as well as that of the British ambassador, would be necessary. Again, no results were achieved. No further attempts were made. Canada did gain some advantages from a British agreement with Spain in 1894, in which, since Canada did not request to be l e f t out, she was included. One interesting side- light here rather prematurely foreshadowed the position i n world affairs Canada would achieve during the next twenty-five years. The customs o f f i c i a l s in Havana, until instructed otherwise by Madrid, refused to include Canada, as a separate nation, under 17 the terms of the British treaty. 15 Macdonald to Gait, February 26, 1882, Pope, Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald. Toronto, 1921, p. 286. 16 Foreign Office to Sir Charles Tupper, July 26, 1884, i n Sir Charles Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years i n Canada, Toronto, 1914, p. 175. 17 Glazebrook, p_p_. c i t . , p. 157. 33 After many d i f f i c u l t i e s , negotiations with France f i n a l l y led to a treaty i n 1893- In 1892 Tupper, the High Commissioner, had been sent as plenipotentiary to Paris. After much discussion and many proposals and counter-proposals, an "Agreement regulating the commercial relations between Canada and France in respect of customs t a r i f f " was f i n a l l y reached. Tupper was associated with the British ambassador, Lord Dufferin, but he carried out the major part of the negotia- tions himself. For the f i r s t time such a treaty was signed by a Canadian — on February 6, 1893, Tupper signed along with 18 Lord Dufferin. The treaty was to be rati f i e d by the French and Canadian governments only. As i t turned out, the Canadian government was rather hesitant to r a t i f y i t . In his eagerness to achieve success for Canada in the negotiations, Tupper had 19 gone somewhat beyond his instructions from Ottawa. To achieve the right to negotiate her own commercial treaties, i t was necessary for Canada to gain not only British consent but also acceptance abroad of her new role. In most cases, because of the association of her representative with the British ambassador at the foreign capital concerned, the Canadian was accepted without hesitation. The chief recorded objection during this early period of development was i n connec- tion with the need to re-open fisheries negotiations with the 18 A. Gordon Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, London, 1929, vol. 1, p. 157. 19 Porritt, op., c i t . , p. 193. 34 United States i n 1887, mentioned above. The American ambassador in London informed the British government that his government would not deal directly with the Canadian government. S t i l l less can the United States Government consent to be drawn, at any time, into a discussion of the subject with the Colonial Government of Canada. The treaty in question, and a l l the international relations arising out of i t , exist only as between the governments of the United States and Great Britain, and between those governments only can they be dealt with. 2 Q F6rtunately Canadians had already been too frequently associated with British diplomats in negotiations abroad for this protest to be acceptable to the British government. Hence the American contention that Canada, as having s t i l l a purely colonial status, could not deal with any matter involving 21 treaty rights, was repudiated immediately. Fortunately, too, Bayard, the American Secretary of State, did not share these views. Later, as has been mentioned, he engaged with Sir Charles Tupper in discussions leading to the Washington Confer- ence of 1888. As Canadian control over external affairs was the result of a slow process of development, so was international realization of growing Canadian control. . Canadian rights i n 20 E. J. Phelps to Lord Salisbury, January 26, 1887, Canadian Sessional Papers, 1888, no. 36c. 21 W. P. M. Kennedy, The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937, Second Edition, Oxford, 1938, p. 351. 35 such negotiations received definite international recognition some twenty years later, again i n a dispute involving the fisheries question and the United States. In 1910 the Hague Tribunal provided for, not British, but Canadian legislation, 22 to carry out i t s decisions in this dispute. In addition to gaining the right to be chiefly responsible for the negotiation of commercial treaties and arrangements in her own interests, i t was also necessary for Canada to gain some control over whether or not she would be included i n the various such British treaties. British interests and British free trade policy were so different from Canadian interests, that Canada might find such treaties greatly to her disadvantage as often as to her advantage. In early British treaties i t was customary to include the colonies in their application. This was done, for instance, in treaties with Russia in 1859, with Belgium in 1062, with the North German Confederation i n 1865, and with Austria-Hungary in 23 1868 and 1878. As Canada began to participate i n the nego- tiation of her own commercial treaties, this was replaced i n 1877 with an agreement that henceforward the colonies would no longer be automatically included in British commercial treaties, but should have the right to adhere by act of their own 22 Kennedy, op_. cit_., p. 351. 23 Keith, Responsible Government, p. 848. 36 parliament within a specified time. Thus in l88l the Colonial Secretary wrote to the governor asking whether Canada wished to be included in the British treaty with Egypt then being negotiated. The colonial article referred to in the enclosed letter is the clause now adopted, exempting the colony under your government, and others of the more important colonies, from the operation of the treaty, but provid- ing that i t s stipulations may be applied to any such colonies on notice to that effect being given within one year from the date of the exchange of the r a t i f i c a - tions of the t r e a t y . 2 4 The Canadian government did not ask to be included, nor did i t in a British treaty with Ecuador the same year, but i t did ask to be included in the one made with Morocco, also i n 1881. Further, i t objected when Canada was included by mistake i n a treaty with Serbia the previous year. As a result the British 25 government asked the Serbian government to have Canada excluded. The right of separate Canadian withdrawal was also recognized i n 1899 and 1900, when British treaties with Uruguay and Honduras permitted Canada, or any of the self- governing colonies, to withdraw separately, after giving spec- 26 i f i c notice. There remained certain earlier British treaties, particularly those mentioned above with Belgium and the North German Confederation, i n which Canada had been included and 24 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1883? no. 89- 25 Glazebrook, o_p_. c i t . , pp. 147-8. 26 Keith, Responsible Government, p. 848. 37 from which she wished to withdraw. Plans were being made to arrange a scheme of preferential trade with Britain, but by the terms of these two treaties, Belgium and Germany would have had to be included. At the Ottawa Conference i n 1894 the Canadian government requested the British government to have these treaties abrogated. The British government refused, because i t was not particularly interested i n Imperial preference, certainly not to the extent of denouncing these treaties, and because i t f e l t that Canadian trade with Germany would suffer. .At the Colonial Conference of 1897, the request was again made. The Canadian wish to arrange Imperial prefer- ence was so strong that in I898 the British Government f i n a l l y 27 had the treaties abrogated. During the f i r s t period of growth, then, Canada had achieved the right of separate adherence to and separate with- drawal from British commercial treaties. In this period likewise, after considerable experience in assisting with com- mercial negotiations, a Canadian, S i r Charles Tupper, had signed a Canadian commercial treaty. Thus Canada had achieved the right to make her own commercial arrangements. Growing Canadian control over external affairs had been discussed at length in parliament, in the Commons i n 1882, 27 Richard Jebb, The Imperial Conference, London, 1911? vol. 1, pp. 174, 334. 38 i n both Houses i n 1891, and in the Commons again i n 1889 and 1892. In a l l these debates two points had been emphasized: the need for further extension of Canadian control because of the inadequacy of British diplomacy to meet Canadian needs and hecause of growing Canadian national feeling; and the d i f f i - culty of further extension caused by the Canadian position as a British dependency. During Lord Rosebery's Liberal administration, further development appeared to receive a check. In 1895 a despatch was sent to the governor general of Canada and the governors of the other principal British colonies, from the Colonial Secretary, the Marquess of Ripon, laying down the principles to be followed i n such negotiations. It was stated that to give the colonies the power to negotiate commercial treaties for themselves without reference to the British gov- ernment would be to give them separate international status. Therefore a l l such negotiations would have to result i n a treaty between the British Crown and the head of the foreign power concerned, and should consequently be conducted by the British representative to that power. To handle the colonial interests adequately he should have the assistance, either as a second plenipotentiary, or in a subordinate capacity, of a delegate appointed by the government of the colony concerned. 28 See Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1882, cols. 1068- 1078 and 1080-1094-1 1889, cols. 172-193; 1892, cols. 1103- 1151. Senate Debates, 1891, pp. 610-650. 39 Such a treaty would have to be signed by both the British and the colonial representatives. It would have to be ra t i f i e d by the Crown on the advice of the Imperial government, acting on the request of the colonial government, and, i f any legis- lation to implement i t were necessary, after action by the colonial parliament. No such treaty could be sanctioned unless any concessions made were granted toaall the rest of the Empire as well as to a l l nations entitled to most favoured nation treatment, and no concessions could be accepted that were prejudicial to any part of the Empire.2^ These regulations were never too s t r i c t l y adhered to in practice. They were interpreted in 1907 by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, to be intended principally to pro- tect British interests and to prevent Canadian negotiations from being unknown to the British government. When the Canadian government wished to open negotiations with France that year, Grey sent a despatch to the British Charge d'Affaires at Paris informing him that the negotiations would be under- taken by the Canadian representatives, Mr. W. S. Fielding and Mr. L. P. Brodeur, but that he should expect to be kept informed and that he should sign any resulting agreement along with the 30 two Canadians, who would be given f u l l powers for the purpose. 29 Marquess of Ripon to the Governor General of Canada, June 28, 1895, i n Keith, Speeches and Documents, pp. 159-160. 30 A. 0. Potter, Canada as a P o l i t i c a l Entity, Toronto, 1923, p. 103. 40 It worked well. The Imperial government was kept fully- informed, and ratified the resulting treaty after careful consideration. The same procedure was followed that year 31 in negotiations resulting in a commercial treaty with Italy. During this period, various less formal trade agree- ments were made with different countries through their consular representatives in Ottawa. These were not treaties, so did not require r a t i f i c a t i o n . Since they were usually put Into effect by means of orders i n council, any Imperial objections could have been registered through the governor general. For instance, the Canadian government discussed with the German consul-general the t a r i f f war that had resulted between his country and Canada as a result of the British denunciation in 1898, at the request of the Canadian govern- ment, of the British - German commercial treaty. In 1910 the minister of finance reached an agreement for a settlement with the German consul. In the same year an agreement on t a r i f f 32 concessions was signed with the Italian consul. During this second period of development, from 1895 to 1914, certain Canadian advances received recognition at the Imperial Conferences. In 1902, the right of separate with- 33 drawal from British commercial treaties was recognized. J 31 Potter, Loc. c i t . 32 Canadian Annual Review, 1910, p. 619. 33 Jebb, op_. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 376. 41 In 1911, the whole question of international agreements of not only a commercial, but also a semi-political nature, was thoroughly discussed. Australia had protested because i n the Declaration of London resulting from the Hague Conference of 1907? matters of real importance to the dominions had been dealt with without consulting their governments. This Declara- tion was an attempt to lay down the code of law to be applied by the Prize Court agreed on by the Conference. It was agreed that i n future the dominions should be consulted where their interests were involved, and that when agreements were reached which might affect the dominions, they would not be signed without giving the dominion governments the chance to consider 34 them. As w i l l be seen i n the next chapter, Sir Wilfred Laurier was unwilling to involve Canada i n the responsibilities that f u l l e r consultation i n international affairs would bring. In this period, too, various advances were made i n negotiations with the United States. The period began with a set-back for Canadian interests i n the form of the Alaska Boundary Award, a set-back which, as was so often the case, served to spur the Canadian demand for greater control over external affairs. The Alaskan boundary had been established i n the treaty of 1825 between Britain and Russia, before there was any 34 Keith, Responsible Government, pp. 873-4. 42 accurate geographical information on the region. With the purchase of Alaska by the United States and with the promise of valuable gold discoveries in the north, i t became necessary that a specific line be agreed on. The British Columbia legislature had frequently requested the Canadian government to act, and the latter had begun negotiations through British channels. In the conference at Washington i n 1892, already mentioned, the Canadian delegates had suggested that the dis- pute be submitted for arbitration to some suitable impartial body. Attempts were made to arrange such a body by the Joint High Commission of 1898. At that time the British commission was headed by Lord Herschel, representing the British govern- ment. The other three members were Canadians: Sir Wilfred Laurier, Sir Richard Cartwright, and Sir Louis Davis. It i s noteworthy that this was the f i r s t commission on which Canadian delegates outnumbered the British. The Canadian proposal for a tribunal of three was not acceptable to the United States; the United States' proposal for a tribunal of six, half British and half American, was not acceptable to Canada. The British plan for such a tribunal of six, containing two neutral mem- bers, was rejected by the United States. Though he had promised not to yield to any pressure that might be brought to bear on him when he went to the Colonial Conference of 1902, 36 Laurier agreed while he was in London to the American proposal. 36 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 243. 43 Unfortunately the American members of the resulting commission were i n no sense the "impartial jurists of repute" called for i n the treaty providing for the tribunal. Elihu Root was a member of the government, the Secretary for War; Senator Lodge and Senator Turner had both spoken strongly against the Canadian position. The British delegates were Lord Alverstone, Chief Justice of Britain, and the two Canadians, Sir Louis Jette, Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, and A. B. Aylesworth, a Canadian 37 lawyer. It would be outside the purposes of this study to discuss the arguments brought forward. The f i n a l award, which f a i r l y well accorded with the American claims, was signed by Lord Alverstone and the three Americans. The two Canadian,- commissioners refused to sign on the grounds that the award was not j u d i c i a l , as had been agreed on, but p o l i t i c a l , and ignored the just rights of Canada. However necessary i t s acceptance may have been in the interests of peaceful relations between Britain and the United States, as always essential to Canadian development, the award caused a great outburst of popular indignation i n Canada. With regard to both the circumstances surrounding the Commission, and the proceedings and award i t s e l f , Canadians a l l across the country reacted against the way the Canadian case had apparently been rejected, not by a truly judicial board, but by a commission acting under p o l i t i c a l 37 0. D. Skelton, The Life and Letters of Sir Wilfred Laurier, Toronto, 1921, vol. 2, pp. 144-148. 44 pressure from Washington. Again there was the strong feel- ing that British diplomacy had let Canada down.^8 The award, and the resulting demand that means be found to safeguard Canadian interests i n the future, marked a definite step i n the development of Canada from a colony to a nation-state with control over her own external relations. Many of the statements made i n both parliament and the press were of course exaggerated by the state of popular feeling, but in general they marked the road for future development. Typical of the nationalist reaction was the statement made i n the House of Commons by Laurier. After discussing the way Canada had been made the victim of power politics on both sides of the Atlantic, he went on to say: I have often regretted also that we have not i n our hands the treaty-making power which would enable us to dispose of our own affairs. . . . The d i f f i c u l t y as I conceive i t to be, i s that so long as Canada remains a dependency of the British crown the present powers that we have are not sufficient for the maintenance of our rights. It is important that we should ask the British parliament for more extensive powers so that i f ever we have to deal with matters of a similar nature again, we shall deal with them i n our own way, in our own fashion, according to the best light we have.39 Happily, subsequent Canadian experience in dealings with the United States was more fortunate. The International Waterways Commission and the International Joint Commission 38 Dafoe, p_£. c i t . , pp. 69-70. 39 Quoted in D. G. Creighton, Dominion of the North, Boston, 1944, pp. 409-10. 45 are considered at length i n Chapter VII. In the preparation of the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, setting up the latter, several Canadians were involved. Laurier, as Prime Minister, was closely associated with the work, but most of the prelimi- nary and f i n a l negotiations were conducted for Canada by George C. Gibbons, Canadian representative on the International Water- 41 ways Commission. Ta r r i f f and reciprocity discussions were likewise carried on with the United States during this second period of development, 1895-1914. In Canada a time of prosperity combined with growing economic and p o l i t i c a l nationalism had greatly lessened popular enthusiasm for reciprocity. By 1910 many Americans were questioning the value of the high t a r i f f policy of their country. In the usual round-about way the American Secretary of State informed the Canadian government through Lord Bryce, the British ambassador at Washington, of the American wish for a conference on t a r i f f rates, particu- l a r l y on the Payne - Aldrich t a r i f f as i t applied to Canada. A series of discussions followed at Ottawa, both on the problems caused by this particular t a r i f f , because the Canadian agree- ment with France was interpreted as a technical discrimination against the United States, and on proposals for broader t a r i f f arrangements between the United States and Canada. Successful agreements were made in getting minimum rates for Canada, and 40 Chapter VH, pp. 163-5. 41 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 239. 46 the way was opened for the reciprocity negotiations of 1911. These negotiations were conducted entirely by the two Canadian ministers sent to Washington, Mr. Fielding and Mr. William Paterson, Minister of Customs. Lord Bryce, the British ambassador, took no part except to introduce the Canadians to the United States government. Terms decidedly favourable to Canada were agreed on. The limitations of the Ripon despatch of 1895 were not s t r i c t l y adhered to: the favourable treatment given to certain products of the United States by Canada would also be extended to the rest of the Empire and to countries entitled to such terms by treaty, but the United States would not accord the rest of the Empire the same favourable treatment i t was giving Canada. The agreement was to be put into effect by concurrent legislation i n both 42 Canada and the United States. It was accepted by the American Congress. In Canada, when Laurier found he could not count on having the necessary legislation passed by parliament, he appealed to the country. The Conservatives fought the election mainly on the cry of nationalism and the danger to Canada of such close relations with the United States. Their 43 victory meant the defeat of the reciprocity proposals. A number of agreements were signed between Canada and the United States during this period. Lord Bryce, during 42 L. E. E l l i s , Reciprocity, 1911» New Haven, 1939} pp. 164-185. 43 Ibid., p. 185-6. 47 his term as British ambassador, made a point of being well informed on Canadian interests, and was of great assistance to various Canadians in negotiations at Washington. Treaties not already mentioned included: Arbitration Treaties in 1908 and 1911; Fisheries Arbitration Treaty of 1909; Passamaquoddy 44 Bay Treaty of 1910; and the Pelagic Sealing Treaty of 1911. In the latter, which included Russia and Japan, the Canadian negotiator was Sir Joseph Pope, the Under Secretary of State for External Affairs. In 1919 a treaty was signed between Britain and the United States providing for a permanent International Commission to investigate disputes that might arise between the two powers. Where the dispute involved one of the dominions, the British member might be chosen from that dominion. In 1918, i n fisheries disputes between Canada and the United States, this was done. Sir Douglas Hazen, a former Minister of Marine and Fisheries, was appointed commissioner and signed a resulting 45 treaty for the preservation of Pacific Coast fisheries. In summary, the stage of development reached i n 1914 included the gains and also the remnants of colonial status i n the following: Canada was no longer bound by any treaty to which Canadian assent had not been given; Canada would be 44 Keith, Responsible Government, vol. 2, p. 866. 45 Borden, op_. .cit., p. 87. 48 consulted whenever an Imperial treaty involving her interests was being considered; i f the Canadian government wished to undertake negotiations with a foreign power, the Imperial government would appoint Canadian plenipotentiaries, who would sign any resulting treaty jointly with an Imperial representa- tive; the interests of the rest of the Empire were to be con- sidered, Canada being required to extend to the rest of the empire a l l concessions made to a foreign power, any such treaty concluded by Canadian representatives would be rati f i e d by the Crown on the advice of the Imperial government, acting on request of the Canadian government. During this pre-war period, certain advances had likewise been made at various technical and other non-political conferences. At the International Congress for the Protection of Submarine Cables held at Paris in 1883, Sir Charles Tupper, the Canadian High Commissioner, was the Canadian representative. He did not have formal powers, being there in an advisory capacity only. Consequently he did not sign the resulting convention, which was signed for the whole empire by the British 46 delegate, Lord Lyons. At one point, Tupper took a stand contrary to that of Lord Lyons, and won his point, acting as 47 he later stated, in a very independent fashion. The conven- tion resulting from the Congress was significant because i t was 46 P. E. Corbett and H. A. Smith, Canada and World P o l i t i c s , Toronto, 1928, p. 57« 47 Tupper, Recollections, p. 175• 49 one of the f i r s t to provide that i t should not apply to the dominions unless and until notification of their desire to be 48 included should be made on their behalf by the Crown. At the Postal Union Convention of 1904, the dominion delegates were no longer there purely as advisors. They signed the resulting convention for the dominions as such, not as part of an Imperial delegation. They had been provided with powers to sign by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, but these were not f u l l powers in the form used for diplomatic 49 plenipotentiaries. In 1911 the United States government invited Canada to be present at the International Conference on Industrial Property. Canadian delegates were sent, but as they did not agree to the proposals of the conference, the question of their signing did not come up. At the Radio- Telegraphic Conference of 1912 the Canadian representatives, like those of the other dominions, had equal status with the British representatives, the only difference being that the f u l l powers issued to them were qualified by the insertion of the words "on behalf of Canada". The same procedure was followed at the Conference on the Safety of Life at Sea in 50 1914. This development was significant i n two ways. The right of Canada to sign an international agreement was recog- nized, and the way was paved for Canada to follow a purely 48 Corbett and Smith, OJD. c i t . , p. 57» 49 Ibid., p. 58. 50 Keith, Responsible Government, 1927 ed., vol. 2, p. 860. 50 Canadian policy, possibly in conflict with that of Britain, in future international conferences. The granting of separate f u l l powers meant that the only control Britain had over Canadian participation in such conferences would be to refuse ra t i f i c a t i o n of a resulting treaty. The next major step forward was taken i n the signature of the Halibut Treaty with the United States by the Canadian negotiator alone i n 1923. In December 1922 negotiations were begun by the Canadian and American governments regarding the halibut fisheries in the North Pacific Ocean. The Canadian representative, the Hon. Ernest Lapointe, Minister of Marine and Fisheries, was appointed in the way already customary, receiving his powers from the King on the advice of the British 51 cabinet, acting on request of the Canadian government. The same procedure had been followed in 1922 and early 1923 i n Canadian treaties with France and Italy, and these treaties, as previous treaties mentioned above, had been signed by both the Canadian negotiator and the British ambassador, or, in the 52 latter case, the foreign secretary. But when the halibut negotiations had almost reached the f i n a l stage, the Canadian government made two suggestions. The f i r s t had to do with the t i t l e of the proposed treaty. The United States draft read,"Convention between the United States and Great Britain 51 R. M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, London, 1937, p. 69. 52 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 37; 1923, pp. 67-8. 51 concerning Halibut Fishery". The Canadian government proposed to the British ambassador at Washington, to the Colonial Secretary, and to the United States government that the words "Dominion of Canada" be substituted for "Great Britain". This was not acceptable to the British government, which suggested the compromise t i t l e , "Convention for the Regulation of Halibut Fisheries on the Pacific Coast of Canada and the United States" Although this solution obviated the mention of Great Britain, i t did not clearly recognize the Canadian government as having the power to conclude a treaty in i t s own right. However, i t was accepted. The second suggestion had to do with the signature of the treaty. Since i t concerned no other part of the empire but Canada alone, the Canadian government proposed that Mr. Lapointe should sign i t alone, without the customary accompany- ing signature of the British ambassador. Such a procedure had been followed previously i n informal agreements such as the 54 reciprocity agreements with the United States in 1911, but never in a treaty. On February 21, 1923, the Canadian govern- ment informed the British ambassador at Washington, Sir Aukland Geddes, that "As respects Canada the signature of the treaty by Mr. Lapointe alone w i l l be sufficient, and that i t w i l l not be necessary for you to sign as well". He replied: "I have 53 Dewey, o_p_. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 138. 54 Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 6. 52 been instructed by His Majesty's government to sign treaty i n 55 association with Mr. Lapointe". On February 28 the Canadian government telegraphed to both Geddes and the Duke of Deconshire, the Colonial Secret- ary: "The Treaty, being one of concern solely to Canada and the United: St ate s, and not affecting, i n any particular, any Imperial interest, the signature of the Canadian minister should 56 be sufficient." The Colonial Office f i n a l l y agreed, and on March 2 Mr. Lapointe signed the treaty alone. The Canadian government had successfully asserted the right to negotiate and sign a commercial treaty with a foreign government without the participation of Great Britain. Certain authorities, such as Professor Keith, main- tained that no constitutional change had been involved, since the British government had assumed responsibility for the 57 treaty when the King had issued f u l l powers to Mr. Lapointe. A similar position was taken by Arthur Meighen, leader of the 58 opposition. The Canadian government viewpoint was that the British government had acted merely as an intermediary between the King and the Canadian government. It had been the latter who had really advised the King, and thus who were responsible 55 Dewey, op., c i t . , vol. 2, p. 138 56 Loc. c i t . 57 Keith, Responsible Government. 1927 ed., vol. 2, pp 881-2. 58 Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 24, 1924, p. 551. 53 for his act. This point of view was expressed in the Canadian House of Commons by the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King. In the debate on March 21, 1924, on the treaty powers of the dominion governments, he stated that in case of treaties affecting one dominion only, "I take i t that the view of the British government is that . . . the responsibility shall rest with that particular government, and not with the British 59 government." ' He had this understanding as the result of f u l l discussions on the subject at a subsiduary conference on the treaty powers of the dominions at the Imperial Conference of 1923- Both British authorities and the dominion Prime Ministers had agreed. Recognition of the same position was implicit i n the statement of the Balfour Report of the following Imperial Conference. It stated that Britain and the Dominions are "Autonomous Communities . . . in no way subordinate to one 60 another i n any aspect of their domestic or external affairs." Further recognition to this pint of view was given by the announcement made by the government of the Irish Free State on March 28, 1931. During a v i s i t of the Irish Minister of External Affairs in England, i t had been agreed that the govern- ment of a dominion had the right to advise the King directly, 59 Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 24, 1924, p. 551. 60 Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 331. 54 and not through the British government as an intermediary, on the issuance of f u l l powers to negotiate and sign such 61 treaties. No British interference, even as an intermed- iary was any longer necessary. In the process of rat i f i c a t i o n , the American govern- ment proposed to change the terms of the Halibut Treaty to make i t apply also to "nationals and inhabitants of any other 62 part of Great Britain." Thus i t would have become simply another Imperial Treaty, which Britain would have had to arrange to sign and r a t i f y . The United States ra t i f i e d the Treaty on March 4, 1923, as a "Convention between the United States and Great Britain", with the reservation that i t should apply to the "nationals" mentioned above. Secretary of State Hughes expressed his government's hope to Geddes that the reservation would be acceptable. Geddes asked for the Canadian government's view, and also sent the note from Hughes to the Foreign Secretary, since, the Treaty thus being widened i n 63 scope, i t Would require British assent. The Mackenzie King government wished to keep i t a purely Canadian treaty. In asking parliament to r a t i f y i t , Mr. King and Mr. Lapointe expressed the hope that the American 61 Dawson, op., c i t . , pp. 421-2. 62 A. L. Lowell, "The Treaty-Making Power of Canada," Foreign Affairs, vol. 2, no. 1, September 15, 1923, p. 19- 63 Loc. c i t . 55 Senate would withdraw the reservation and accept the Treaty 64 i n i t s original form. This they did the next year. With regard to the Canadian rati f i c a t i o n , the dis- tin c t l y Canadian nature of the Treaty was made evident in the form used: "His Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts as 65 follows". There was some disagreement i n parliament with the omission of the British signature, mostly among the Con- servative opposition. Mr. Meighen considered i t an affront to the British ambassador, without any adequate justification as a constitutional advance. The Minister of Finance, W. S. Fielding, did not approve either. He had negotiated the Canadian-Italian treaty of 1923, and had previously said i n regard to the signature, in addition to his own, of the British foreign secretary on that treaty, that i t "rather added weight 66 to the document, and I was glad to have i t there." The whole question of the treaty power of the dominions was thoroughly discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1923, i n an attempt to regularize the foreign affairs of the Dominions and Britain. A resolution was drawn up stating the principles henceforward to govern the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of treaties affecting either single 64 Dewey, op. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 143. 65 Statutes of Canada, 1923, p. 405. 66 Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 2, 1923, pp. 2403-4. 56 parts or several parts of the Empire. In any treaty to be negotiated, the interests of the rest of the Empire must be considered; other dominion governments interested were to be given the chance to share in the negotiations; those govern- ments not participating were to be kept f u l l y informed with regard to any points of special interest to them. A l l the governments that would be obligated by the resulting treaty 67 would have to sign i t . The right of Canada to enter into commercial negotiations with any foreign country, and to conclude, sign, and ratify a commercial treaty dealing with matters of specific concern to Canada, thus received o f f i c i a l recognition. 67 Dewey, op_. c i t . , vol. 2, pp. 169-170. Chapter III The Development of Canadian Military and Naval Forces One of the essential early steps i n the growth of Canadian control over external affairs was the development of a purely Canadian army and navy. Lord Lyons, i n his criticism of the Canadian wish to have Canadian representatives included i n the reciprocity negotiations with the United States in 1865, had made the point that before Canadian con- t r o l over such external negotiations could grow to any extent, Canada should develop military and naval forces adequate for her own defence. 1 One was as necessary as the other for complete national development. At Confederation i t was recognized that the defence of Canadian s o i l was primarily a Canadian responsibility, with assistance to be rendered by Britain i f the need should arise. There were at f i r s t some Imperial troops i n Canada. These had been almost entirely withdrawn by 1871, leaving a garrison 1 Edward Porritt, The Fiscal and Diplomatic Freedom of the British Overseas Dominions, Oxford, 1922, p. 164. 58 only at Halifax, and later at Esquimalt. The Red River Rebellion of 1870 was put down with the aid of Imperial forces, that of 1885, by Canadian forces entirely. For a good many years there was no interest whatso- ever i n the development of adequate Canadian forces. There were a number of reasons. Fortunately for Canadian development, in spite of occasional periods of d i f f i c u l t y with the United States, the threat of force has played only a small part i n the story of Canadian foreign relationships. Protected by the oceans and by the British and American navies, Canada seemed to have l i t t l e need for armed forces and less for a navy. With the growth of Canadian national feeling, i t was recognized that neither self-respect nor self-interest would permit total dependence on position and on British and American defence. There were few developments i n the f i r s t thirty years. The permanent force had been organized in 1871 and the 3 Royal Military College opened i n 1876. Commanding officers came from England, and Canadian officers were frequently trained there. With the Venezuela scare of 1895 and the South African War, the permanent force was enlarged and reorganized. By the M i l i t i a Act of 1904 i t was ruled that the commanding officer 2 C. F. Hamilton, "The Canadian M i l i t i a ; The Dead Period," The Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 7, 1929-30, p. 83. 3 George F. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers, 1604-1954, Toronto, 1954, p. 243. 59 need not be British. The Canadian Minister of M i l i t i a 4 became the chief authority. It was suggested i n the Colonial Conference of 1902 that Canadian troops garrison Halifax and 5 Esquimalt, and the offer was repeated i n 1905• It was accepted then, and by the next year the last of Imperial troops had l e f t Canada. In 1907 the Canadian government took over the Halifax dockyard, and received formal transfer of the property there i n 1910, and of the Esquimalt dockyard i n 1911. By 1914, then, there were no longer any Imperial troops stationed in Canada, nor were Canadian troops commanded i n Canada by British officers, though such officers might be invited to inspect the Canadian forces. In general, Canadian practice, whether in weapons, organization, mobilization plans, or administration, was a close copy of British practice. As regards the participation of Canadian troops i n wars abroad before 1914, there was for many years no occasion to c a l l for their assistance. In 1885? Sir Charles Tupper, then Canadian High Commissioner in London, cabled to Macdonald to suggest that a Canadian contingent be/ sent to assist the British i n the d i f f i c u l t i e s they were facing i n the Sudan. Macdonald was not at a l l i n favour. He replied: "The Suez Canal i s nothing to us, and we do not ask England to quarrel 4 Stanley, Ibid., p. 300. 5 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1905? no. 128. 60 with France or Germany for our sakes. . . . Our men and money would be sacrificed to get Gladstone and Company out of the hole they have got themselves into by their own 6 imbecility." In the South African War two contingents of troops were sent shortly after the outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s . The f i r s t step in Canadian participation was the resolution moved in the House of Commons by Laurier himself on July 31j 1899 > to the effect that: "This House . . . desires to express i t s sympathy with the efforts of Her Majesty's Imperial authorities to obtain for the subjects of Her Majesty who have taken up their abode i n the Transvaal such measures of justice and p o l i t i c a l recognition as may be found necessary to secure them 7 in f u l l possession of their rights and l i b e r t i e s . " With the outbreak of war and the public demand in Canada for assistance to Britain, the f i r s t Canadian contingent, 1061 strong, 8 embarked for South Africa on October 30, 1899. Parliament was not in session at the time. Certain nationalists, such as Henri Bourassa of Quebec, maintained that i t would have to be summoned to sanction the sending of troops outside of Canada. Pressed by widespread demands for immediate action, the 6 Quoted i n R. A. Mackay, "Canada and the Empire," Canada: The Empire and the League. Toronto, 1936, p. 74. 7 Quoted in T. G. Marquis, "The South African War," Canada and the Great War, Toronto, 1918, vol. 1, p. 286. 8 Ibid., p. 293. 61 Canadian government authorized the contingent by order in council. Much was involved constitutionally, for this was the f i r s t participation of a Canadian contingent as such i n a war of the Empire not directly involving Canada. By the order in council, the Canadian government assumed responsi- b i l i t y for the cost of the equipment and the transportation of the troops, though i t was stated this action was i n no way 9 to be considered a precedent. On the advice of the British government i t was agreed that the men would serve i n Her Majesty's regular force, receiving the rate of pay prevalent there from the British government. The Canadian government later agreed to make up the difference between the rate of pay 10 i n the Imperial army and that in the Permanent Corps of Canada. A second contingent was offered i n November, but not accepted until the next month. When parliament opened in February 1900, the govern- ment faced attack from two sides. One argued that support of the British had been slow and half-hearted; the other, that by participation in an Imperial war without parliamentary sanction a dangerous precedent had been set. The former represented largely the voters of Ontario and of the Maritimes; the latter, the voters of Quebec. Laurier had to take this second group 9 Stanley, op_. c i t . , p. 280. 10 Marquis, OJD. c i t . , p. 290. 62 into careful consideration, because he depended to a great extent upon the support of the French Canadians, and most of them had no sympathy for the new imperialism.-^ There were two main debates on the subject. In the f i r s t , Sir Charles Tupper attacked the government not only for the lack of vigour i n their attitude toward Canadian participation, but also for not assuming the whole cost of the Canadian contin- 12 gent. In so doing he expressed the opinions of great numbers of English speaking Canadians. The second debate was on an amendment moved by Bourassa which called for a specific declaration that the action of the Canadian government must not be considered as a precedent, and that any changes i n the military or p o l i t i c a l relations of Canada and Britain must be the result of the action of the Canadian parliament and people.^ In both debates the question was confined solely to Canadian p a r t i c i - pation in Imperial wars. The suggestion was scarcely dis- cussed that such participation should i n future mean a share i n the making of the foreign policy that might involve Canada with the rest of the Empire in such wars. Laurier stated: If we were compelled to take part i n a l l the wars of Great Britain, I have no hesitation in saying 11 Stanley, oja. c i t . , p. 279. 12 Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 5? 1900, col. 48. 13 Ibid., March 13, 1900, cols. 1793-1876. 63 . . . that, sharing the burden, we would also share the responsibility. Under that condition of things, which does not exist, we should have the right to say to Great Britain: If you want us to help, c a l l us to your councils . . . . But there i s no occasion to examine this contingency today.^ Canadian participation in the South African Mar, then, was in response to the need of the British government and to the demand of the Canadian people. Its extent was controlled entirely by the Canadian government. Parliament was not called to authorize i t , but in the next regular session approved the policy of the government. In the debates already mentioned, Laurier set out clearly what was to be the continuing policy of his government: I claim for Canada this, that in future Canada shall be at liberty to act, or not to act, to inter- fere or not to interfere, to do just as she pleases, and that she shall reserve to herself the right to , judge whether or not there i s cause for her to act. ? Thus i n the preparations for the Colonial Conference of 1902, Laurier opposed the inclusion of defence on the agenda. His government would be willing to discuss the defence of Canada, but was not willing to be involved in discussions by which Canada might be brought into "the vortex of militarism 16 which is the curse and the blight of Europe." During the 14 Canada, House of Commons Debates, larch 13', 1900, cols. 1846, 1847. ; 15 Ibid., February 5> 1900, col. 72. 16 Julien Amery, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, London, 1951, vol. 4, p. 426. 64 Conference, the Secretary of State for War Mr. Broderick advocated that a small highly trained force be kept i n each colony i n readiness for Imperial service. Laurier objected that such a proposal "would entail an important departure 17 from the principal of colonial self-government." He followed the same policy at the Conference i n 1907s no commitments, and no outside control over Canadian forces. The idea of colonial forces i n readiness for Imperial use was replaced by proposals for an Imperial General Staff. It was definitely stated by the British government that no promise was involved by which the dominions would be obliged to send contingents i n the event of war, nor was any military authority - I Q being set above the Canadian government. Plans were carried further by the subsidiary conference of 1909* An Imperial general staff was set up, and plans made for uniformity of training and equipment. Mr. Asquith summarized the result: "A plan for so organizing the forces of the Crown wherever they are that, while preserving the complete autonomy of each Dominion, should the Dominions desire to assist i n the defence of the Empire i n a real emergency, their forces could be 19 rapidly combined into one homogeneous Imperial army." 17 Quoted i n G. P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, 1950, p. 270. 18 Ibid., p. 272. 19 Quoted i n Stanley, op_. c i t . , pp. 303-4. 65 The development of a Canadian navy was a more d i f f i c u l t task. So long as Britain maintained unquestioned naval supremacy, there was no suggestion for any distinctly Canadian naval policy. Canadians took British protection for granted. With the growing German threat to the British position, various suggestions were raised i n both Britain and Canada as to ways in which Canada might contribute to her own naval defence. A great part of the discussions at the Colonial Conference of 1877 were taken up with the problem of naval defence on the Pacific, particularly as i t involved the Australian colonies. Canadians took l i t t l e part in this dis- mission. Sir Alexander Campbell did deny that the British navy was larger or more expensive because of i t s responsibility 20 for the defence of Canada. At the Conferences held in 1897 and 1902, Joseph Chamberlain claimed that the great military and naval forces of Britain were made necessary by her empire, and those colonies which had grown so largely both i n self-government and in economic status should help to bear the burden. In discussing naval defence at the latter conference, the f i r s t Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Selborne, stated that a l l the dominions except Canada had offered money grants to the British navy. Again during the Conference of 1907> Canada refused 20 Richard Jebb, The Imperial Conference, London, 1911> vol. l,pp. 275-6. 21 Canadian Annual Review, 1902, pp.110, 146. 66 any contribution. In the previous years there had been various sug- gestions that rather than make a contribution to the British navy, Canada might establish a navy of her own. Laurier had suggested this in reply to Lord Selborne's enquiry about the possibility of a Canadian contribution to the British navy 22 before the Conference of 1902. By 1909, with the obvious German threat to British naval supremacy, Canadian public opinion was largely in favour of action of some sort. J In March of that year, G. E. Foster spoke in the House of Commons advocating that Canada defend her own coasts, establish a Canadian navy, and possibly, conditions being as they were at this time, make an emergency gift to the British navy. Laurier's motion for a "Canadian naval service in co-operation with and in close relation to the Imperial navy" was passed 24 without division. Borden and the Conservatives offered no opposition beyond suggesting certain verbal changes. Convinced of the impossibility of the policy of dominion contributions to a single navy because of the strength of dominion nationalism, the admiralty, at the subsidiary con- ference held in 1909 i n London, recommended a system of distinct 22 Glazebrook, op., c i t . , p. 269- 23 Canadian Annual Review, 1909, pp. 49-55• 24 Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 29, 1909, col. 3564. 67 fleet units in those dominions that so wished. There should be uniformity in equipment, training and discipline, and i t should be understood that in time of war such local naval 25 forces should come under the control of the Admiralty. Laurier rejected the latter part of the proposal. He maintained that the Canadian government must be free to decide the extent of Canadian participation in any war in which she might be involved. The admiralty prepared plans for a naval force within the size of the annual expenditure suggested by the Canadian government. Until this could be built, i t was suggested that two cruisers be lent by the British navy, to be maintained by Canada, largely for training purposes. On January 12, 1910, Laurier introduced a naval service measure based on these 26 admiralty plans, and i t became law on May 4. In the debates on the b i l l the Conservatives strongly opposed plans for establishing a Canadian navy at that time. They called for a direct emergency contribution to the British navy, with the development postponed to a later date of a Canadian navy that should automatically be part of the British navy in time of 27 war. Laurier and most of the Liberals argued for the estab- lishment of a Canadian navy as planned, as at once Canada's duty to the Empire and a necessary step in the further 25 Memorandum of the Britidh Admiralty, in Dewey, op,, c i t . , vol. 1, pp. 253-4. 26 G. M. Tucker, The Naval Service of Canada, Ottawa, 1952, p. 140. 27 R. L. Borden, Canada, House of Commons Debates, Jan. 12, 1910, col. 1748. 68 development of Canadian self-government. Certain of the extreme nationalists, such as Henri Bourassa and J . S. Ewart, supported the idea of a Canadian navy, hut objected stren- uously that i t would be Canadian only in time of peace, that 29 Canada would have no control over i t in an Imperial war. During the Imperial Conference of 1911, naval defence was again discussed. Canadian plans were approved, and detailed provisions were made for the training and discip- line of the dominion fleets and for their relation to the Imperial fle e t . It was agreed that the Canadian naval service would be exclusively under the control of the Canadian govern- ment, but i t would be uniform in training and discipline with the British navy. In time of war, once i t had been put at the disposal of the Imperial government by the Canadian gover- ment, the Canadian fleet would become an integral part of the 30 British fleet for the duration of the war. Before the Liberal policy could be put into effect, Laurier 1s government was defeated at the polls in October 1911? and the Conservatives under R. L. Borden came into power. They s t i l l did not agree with the immediate construction of a Canadian navy. In June 1912 Borden went to England to confer 28 Sir Wilfrid Laurier, Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 3, 1910, cols. 2953-2968. 29 For this point of view, see J . S. Ewart, Kingdom Papers, Ottawa, 1912, nos. 6, 9, 11? 15- 30 Tucker, _oj). c i t . , pp. 166-7. 69 with the Admiralty and attend sessions of the Committee of Imperial Defence. He returned with a specific naval programme prepared, which he introduced into the House of Commons on December 5, 1912, as the Naval Aid B i l l . Its essential feature was an emergency contribution of the cost of three Dreadnoughts to the British navy. This was not to be a regular contribu- tion; the eventual establishment of a Canadian navy would be a good thing, but would be unwise, the Conservatives claimed, i n the current emergency. The three ships would be maintained and controlled as part of the British navy, but i n the case of the development at some future date of a Canadian navy, could 31 be recalled by the Canadian government. There followed a long and bitter debate, i n which the various parties argued from very much the same ground as in 1910. Since the measure was k i l l e d by the Senate, 1914 found Canada with no navy beyond the two old cruisers mentioned above. At the outbreak of war, then, Canada had a small army completely under her own control, and no navy to speak of. The fundamental principle of her defence policy was that she assumed f u l l responsibility for local defence, and reserved complete freedom of action with respect to defence of other interests. She had the power to negotiate commercial treaties, but not to participate i n external affairs of a s t r i c t l y 31 Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 5, 1919, cols. 676-694. 70 p o l i t i c a l nature. The whole question of the dominions being consulted or participating i n any way in British foreign policy i n both the pre-war years and during the war w i l l be discussed at length i n Chapter VIII. Until the idea that different Dominions might have different foreign policies won general acceptance, i t was only through achieving a voice i n British foreign policy that Canada could influence the larger issues of her external affairs. Borden hoped that co-operation i n Imperial naval 32 defence would help to obtain that voice for Canada. He had expressed his basic conviction i n the Canadian House of Commons on November 17, 1910: When Canada, with the other great Dominions within the Empire, embarks upon a policy of permanent co- operation i n the naval defence of the empire, i t ought, from every constitutional standpoint, from every reasonable standpoint as well, to have some voice as to the issues of peace and war within the empire. 32 Tucker, op., c i t . , p. 176. 33 Canada, House of Commons Debates. Nov. 17, 1910, p. 34- Chapter I V International Recognition of Canadian Nationhood During World War I and at the Peace Conferences. Prior to World War I, Canada had gained almost com- plete control over her participation in commercial and technical negotiations. She had achieved recognition of her right to sign, accompanied by a British representative, any treaty of such a nature involving specifically Canadian interests, and of her right to have such a treaty r a t i f i e d by the Crown on the advice of the Canadian parliament. She controlled her own military forces i n Canada and i t had been recognized that when- ever a Canadian navy was established i t would likewise be Canadian-controlled, although i t might, by act of the Canadian government, become part of the British navy for the duration of any war. Control over external affairs of a p o l i t i c a l nature, however, had scarcely begun to develop. The government of Great Britain maintained sole authority over, and responsibility in, a l l matters relating to the conduct of foreign policy, the maintenance of peace, and the declaration of war. Prime Minister Asquith had declared at the Imperial Conference of 1911 that that authority by i t s very nature could not be shared by Canada and the other dominions, without destroying the unity of 72 the Empire. Yet at the close of the war, Canada and the other dominions were given separate representation at the Peace Conference. Canada, through her representatives, signed the Peace Treaties separately with f u l l powers granted i n respect of Canada, and rat i f i e d them by act of the Canadian parliament.'1" During the war years and at the peace negotiations, Canada had made rapid advances i n both control over external affairs and in the international recognition of the growing national status of which that control was one v i t a l aspect. In the present chapter only those developments of the war, and peace conference years that concern the growth of direct Canadian control, and international recognition of that control, w i l l be discussed. For many years Laurier's thesis had been that when Britain was at war, Canada was at war, but that the extent of Canadian participation depended entirely on the decisions of the Canadian government. The British declaration of war legally bound Canada and the rest of the Empire. Even before the outbreak of war, the British government had been assured of f u l l Canadian support. On August 1, 1914-, Borden had sent a telegram stating that his government hoped to see a peaceful solution of international d i f f i c u l t i e s , but that " i f war should ensue, the Canadian people w i l l be united in a common resolve to put forth every effort and to make every sacrifice necessary 1 R. B. Stewart, "Treaty-Making Procedure i n the British Dominions," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 32, no. 3, July 1938, p. 467. 73 to insure the integrity and maintain the honour of our Empire."2 With the outbreak of war the Imperial government f u l l y respected Canadian autonomy. No demands were made for either men or financial assistance; the different legislation, proclamations and statutes made necessary by the war were drafted so as to exclude the Dominions whenever possible. Canadians resident i n Britain were not subject to British draft laws; British laws against aliens and trading with the enemy were not binding on Canada;, there was no Imperial con- nection with the raising of Canadian troops, and British ships registered i n Canada were not under Imperial shipping laws. On one occasion, i n 1916, the Imperial government did attempt to requisition Canadian ships. The Canadian government protested at once, pointing out that the British government might have the legal power for such an action, but certainly did not have the constitutional right, and that i t s actions conflicted with the "constitutional autonomy of Canada i n i t s 3 present stage of development." As far as the powers of the Canadian government were concerned, the chief constitutional question at the outbreak of war involved the sufficiency of Canadian legislation for the control of Canadian forces overseas. It was questioned 2 Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden, His Memoirs, Toronto, 1938, vol. 1, p. 452. 3 Report of the Canadian Privy Council on the Requisition- ing of Canadian Ships, printed i n R. M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, London, 1937, pp. 169-170. 74 whether a Dominion had the power at that time to enact l e g i s l a - tion effective beyond i t s t e r r i t o r i a l limits. Section 69 of the M i l i t i a Act gave the Governor General i n Council the power to place the m i l i t i a on active service beyond Canada where i t was considered necessary for the defence of Canada, and Section 4 of the same Act stated that the King's Regulations and other British laws not inconsistent with Canadian regulations, applied to the Canadian m i l i t i a . Section 177 of the Army Act, thus effective, provided for control by a colony of a force of m i l i t i a raised there, whether the said m i l i t i a should be stationed inside or 4 outside the colony. At f i r s t most of the duties involved i n the supervision and administration of Canadian military forces i n Britain and on the continent were undertaken by the acting-High Commissioner, Sir George Perley. In October 1916 the Canadian government established by order i n council a Ministry of Overseas Military Forces i n London, with a resident minister who had responsibility for the administration of a l l Canadian forces overseas, and who was directly responsible to the Canadian government. Perley held this office i n addition to his other duties u n t i l November 1917» when Sir Edward Kemp was appointed resident minister and he re- mained i n charge un t i l the return of a l l Canadian troops i n 1919. From the time the F i r s t Division reached England In the autumn of 1914, the Canadian forces were a dist i n c t l y 4 Sir Robert L. Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies. Toronto, 1923, p. 98. See also George F. G. Stanley, Canada's Soldiers. 1604-1954, Toronto, 1954, pp. 314-5. 5 H. G. S k i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, Toronto, 1945, p. 112. 75 separate part of the British army. After the establishment of the Overseas Ministry and the promotion of General Byng to Army Command, the Canadian Corps was under the command of a Canadian general, Sir Arthur Currie, responsible to the Canadian government. There was a special Canadian section at the British General Headquarters i n France to maintain an effective relationship with the British army. Military operations i n the f i e l d , of course, were under the f i n a l direction of the 6 British General Headquarters. The question of the development of consultation during the war between Britain and the Dominions w i l l be examined in Chapter VIII. Borden did not make his f i r s t wartime v i s i t to London u n t i l 1915. It was nearly two years later before more continuous consultation was made possible by the Imperial War Cabinet. The part the Canadian members played i n that body was continued after the war i n the British Empire Delega- tion to the Peace Conference. But by the end of the war a number of Canadians, from cabinet ministers to journalists were demanding for their country more of a share i n the making of peace than just membership i n the British Empire delegation. By the part she had played, both on the fighting front and i n industrial production, Canada had proved her ab i l i t y to take her place among the nations of the world. At the Peace 6 Stanley, op. c i t . . p. 312. 76 Conference she achieved the f i r s t international recognition of her long development from a British colony to a nation- state with control over her own external affairs. In the process of gaining recognition, she continued to grow i n national stature, as the f i r s t steps were taken i n working out the new idea of the Commonwealth as a partnership' of equal nations. J. W. Dafoe, who attended the Peace Conference as the representative of the Canadian Department of Public Information, has stated: The Peace Conference . . . was a catalytic agent which broke up the traditional Empire and replaced i t with a brotherhood of nations. . . . The record of Canada's approach to the Conference, the nature and extent of i t s participation in Conference activities and decisions, and the subsequent validation of these innovations, constitute the most important chapter i n the history of Canadian constitutional development.7 The great change i n Canadian status during the war years was due i n no small part to her contribution, both i n terms of men and of money and materials, to the war effort of the A l l i e s . Among Borden's strongest arguments i n getting for Canada representation at the Peace Conference and a l l the other rights and privileges of a nation state there and i n the League, were the size of the Canadian Corps and the b r i l - liant fighting record, and the successful Canadian assertion 8 of military autonomy during the war years. 7 J. W. Dafoe, "Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919>" The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 24, no. 3, September 1943, p. 235. 8 Stanley, 0£. c i t . , p. 315. 77 For a country whose population i n the 1911 census was only 7,204,838, the Canadian contribution was really impressive. In the army 628,462 men were enrolled, of whom 424,589 went overseas; more than 5,000 men joined the navy o and more than 24,000, the British Air Service. Total 10 casualties were over 210,000 of which over 60,000 were k i l l e d . The number of battles in which Canadian troops had distinguished themselves i s too long to number here, but i t included Ypres, the Somme, Vimy Ridge, Passchendaele and Mons. Just as impressive was the Canadian record in supplying the materials of war. Nearly 1,000 vessels of different kinds were turned out for the various allied governments; munitions and war materials to the value of over one b i l l i o n dollars were exported from Canada during the four war years; great quanti- ties of food were shipped to the A l l i e s , and huge credits made available to the Imperial government to finance the purchase of these munitions and foodstuffs.1"'" Early i n the war i t had been announced that Canada and the other dominions would be f u l l y consulted concerning the peace terms. On January 21, 1915, in a telegram to the : dominion governments with regard to the postponement of the Imperial Conference, Mr. Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary, stated clearly the purpose of the British Government to discuss 9 Stanley, op., c i t . , p. 313* 10 Information Branch, Department of External Affairs, Canada's Part in the Great War, Ottawa, 1921, p. 3' 11 Ibid., pp. 17-27. 78 12 possible peace terms with the dominion prime ministers. This was reiterated in the British House of Commons on April 14 the same year. On January 31, 1917, Borden assured the Canadian House of Commons of the British intention to consult the dominions on peace terms and to begin such discussions at 13 the Imperial Conference soon to meet. There was no attempt on the part of the Canadian government to establish committees or otherwise arrange for the study and discussion of possible peace plans. As members of the British Empire Delegation, Canadians had access to the vast collections of material provided by British experts. The advantages that Canada wished to get from the conference were those of recognition rather than those of a material type for which the preparation of briefs and such would have been necessary. Leading Canadians insisted that the development of Canadian national status achieved during the war years somehow receive recognition at the Peace Conferences. The terms of the armistice with Germany were agreed 14 on at a meeting of the Supreme War Council of the A l l i e s . Canada and the other dominions were not consulted. When the Armistice was signed, Borden was already on his way to England, summoned by a cable from Lloyd George: "It i s , I think, very 12 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, Canada at the Paris Peace Confer- ence , Toronto, 1942, p. 26. 13 Canada, House of Commons Debates, January 31, 19175 p.300. 14 See David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, London, 1938, vol. 1, pp. 74-82. 79 important that you should be here in order to participate i n the deliberations which w i l l determine the line to be taken at 15 these conferences by the British delegates." In replying, Borden made i t perfectly clear that not only the Canadian government, but also the press and the people, expected Canada to be represented at the conferences. Borden was accompanied overseas by Sir George Foster, Minister of Trade 16 and Commerce, A. L. Sifton, Minister of Customs, Loring Christie, legal expert i n the Department of External Affairs, and various members of bodies such as the Canada food board and the new Canadian trade mission in London. Mr. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice, was to f o l l o w . ^ Borden was displeased when the Canadians were not invited to conferences held i n London early in December with the French and Italian ministers. Nor was he pleased with Lloyd George's f i r s t suggestion for Canadian representation at Paris. It had been agreed that the major powers might have five representatives at the Peace Conferences. The day Borden arrived in Britain, Lloyd George proposed that he, Balfour, Bonar Law, Barnes and Borden should be the British delegates, 18 with Borden specifically representing the Dominions. Borden objected to the suggestion that his position should be different 15 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1919, Special Session no. 41J. 16 Foster had been one of four British representatives at the Allied Economic Conference held i n Paris in the summer of 1916. 17 Glazebrook, Peace Conference, p. 36. 18 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 866. 80 from the others, but did not express his views at that time as to whether he considered the proposal adequate representa- tion for Canada. In the discussions referred to above with the French and Italian delegates i t had been agreed that the Conference would consist of five representatives each from the five major powers. The small powers would be present at discussions only when matters affecting them were under consideration. Canada and the other dominions would likewise be represented i n such cases. Further, i t was intended that one of the five British delegates should be a representative of the Dominions and I n d i a . ^ This was not enough to satisfy either Borden and the other Canadian ministers i n Britain at the time, or Canadian public opinion at home. Since Canada had contributed more to the war effort than any of the smaller nations, since her casualties were higher than those of the United States, and since the other Dominions had played a similar part, Borden fe l t justified i n demanding direct representation at the Confer- ence. To get this, i t was necessary that a l l the small powers should be represented. The whole subject was thoroughly dis- cussed by the Imperial War Cabinet during the f i n a l two weeks before they l e f t on January 11, 1919 for the Conference. On December 31, 1918, a proposal drawn up by Borden was accepted. 19 Lloyd George, ap_. c i t . , vol. 1, p. 206. 81 Canada and each of the other Dominions should have the same representation at the Conference as the other smaller nations. In addition the representatives of the British Empire at the Conference would be drawn from a panel on which each Dominion Prime Minister would have a place. When the British delegates put this proposal before the meeting of the leaders of the four great powers on January 12, there was considerable opposition. To those who had not yet become aware of the great change that had taken place i n the status of Canada and the other Dominions over the war years, the sudden demand for ten additional delegates for the British Empire naturally aroused surprise, i f nothing more. Clemenceau was inclined to oppose the Dominion demand u n t i l Lloyd George pointed out how great had been the dominion con- tribution to the war effort. Wilson and Lansing were both 21 against i t . If i t had not been for the arrangements worked out for the representation of the small powers, direct Canadian representation would not have been possible. After i t had been agreed that the small powers would have two delegates each at the plenary sessions of the Conference, i t was decided that the Dominions might be represented by one delegate each. When this proposal was reported the same day to Borden, he was not pleased. At a meeting of the Dominion ministers the next 20 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 895* 21 Glazebrook, Peace Conference, p. 50. 82 morning, he got the others to agree that they would insist on the same representation as other small powers. It was natural that Borden, as Prime Minister of Canada, the senior dominion and the one with the most experience i n external affairs, should take the lead i n securing representation for the British Dominions. In the meeting of the British Empire delegation that followed, they were forced to accept the com- promise proposal of one delegate each. Borden especially was not satisfied. At lunch he pressed Lloyd George to see that Canada was not given only half the representation granted the small powers, some of which had made l i t t l e or no contribution to the war effort. That afternoon Lloyd George got Wilson to propose an amendment giving Canada, Australia, South Africa and India, two representatives each, New Zealand, one, and 22 Newfoundland, none. The Great Powers agreed. Equal Canadian representation received a setback on January 17, the day before the f i r s t plenary session of the Conference. That evening the council decided to give Belgium and Serbia three representatives each. Lloyd George protested 23 strongly, but was unable to carry his point. Borden and the other Canadians were annoyed. They had not been consulted on the change, and they f e l t that Canadian public opinion would not approve, especially since the press had already announced that Canada was to have representation equal to the other small powers. 22 H. W. V. Temperley, ed., A History of the Peace Confer- ence of Paris, London, 1924, vol. 6, p. 344. 23 Loc. c i t . 83 Foster and Sifton attended the f i r s t plenary session as Canadian delegates. Borden was to have been included i n the British Empire delegation through the panel system, but was forced to give his place to the Prime Minister of Newfound- land, since that dominion had not been granted separate repres- entation. At the meeting, various rules for the conference were adopted, including one providing for five representatives- each from the Great Powers, three from Belgium, Serbia and Brazil, and two or one for the smaller powers, including the dominions as previously agreed. It was recognized that each delegation might set up a panel from which the representatives would be chosen, and that the British panel might include dominion representatives.^ The Canadian delegates continued to protest against the change in representation, and also against the way decisions were being made at meetings of the Great Powers. With so much i n Canada demanding their presence at home, Borden 25 and Sifton debated whether they should remain i n Paris at a l l . It seemed at the time as i f the two seats Canada had gained would be of l i t t l e value beyond providing international recog- nition of her developing status. On January 21st, Borden wrote two letters to Lloyd George urging that the conference get on with i t s work, which should be carried on through committees 24 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1919, Special Session, no. 41J. 25 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 903. 8 4 26 yet to be appointed. So far Canada was not represented at a l l in the work of the conference, because the one f u l l session held had been largely a formality and because the panel system of choosing British delegates worked only at plenary sessions, not at the meetings between the Great Powers, where only two representatives from each attended. At the second plenary session on January 25, 1919, Borden and Foster were present for Canada, and Doherty for the British Empire. The f i r s t business was the appointment of five commissions to handle the main questions before the Conference: the League of Nations, reparations, labour, international transit, and responsibility for the war. There were objections from many countries on the way decisions as to how the committees were to be made up had already been reached by the small meetings of the major powers. Borden spoke along this line. Clemenceau, as chairman, made i t clear that the conference had been called by the Great Powers, and the small powers were there by invitation only. 2? & meeting of the small powers was held to choose which should send delegates to the different commissions, most of which were to be made up of two delegates from each of the Great Powers and five chosen from a l l the small powers combined. 26 Glazebrook, Peace Conference, pp. 51-2. 27 Dafoe, op., c i t . , p. 242. 85 Canada and the other dominions were not included among the small powers, but were represented at different times on the commissions by being included i n the British Empire delega- 28 tion. The setup was not satisfactory to the Canadian delegates, nor to any of the small powers, but i n many ways i t was a decided step forward for Canada. Separate represen- tation gave her the f i r s t formal international recognition of the development of a Canadian nation-state. Because of their position i n the British Empire delegation the Canadian representatives were kept closely informed of a l l that was going on, and on occasion could use British means to carry a Canadian point. If they were not able to take part i n the meetings of the Great Powers, they certainly could influence the views of their British colleagues i n the continual informal gatherings of the British Empire delegation. Finally, through the close contact with both British and foreign leaders, they gained experience invaluable to the statesmen of a country so new i n international affairs. While the recognition that Canada had achieved at Paris was appreciated both by her delegates there and by the government and people of Canada, i t was not forgotten that i n the f i n a l analysis i t was the power of Great Britain 28 Glazebrook, Peace Conference, pp. 54-5' 86 behind them that had permitted her delegates to gain the 29 position they did at Paris. The matters of greatest interest to Canada discussed at the Conference involved the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. These w i l l be discussed in the next chapter. Few other matters involved either the recognition or the development of Canadian status. The repres- entation of Russia at the Conference and the presence of the Allied Expeditionary Force i n Russia were both problems. Borden had stated that public opinion would not allow Canadian troops to be l e f t i n Russia much longer, that since the Bolsheviks were In power i t was necessary to negotiate with them, and that the Peace Conference could scarcely be ended leaving several governments fighting against each other i n Russia.^ 0 Because the policy decided on towards Russia was very much what he had been urging, Borden was proposed by Lloyd George as chief British delegate to the conference with the Russian dele- gates planned for February 15, 1919, on Princess Island i n the Sea of Marmora. Although he received telegrams from two of his ministers i n Canada, White and Calder, urging him not to go, he accepted the d i f f i c u l t task. However, the conference never took place. 29 Canadian Annual Review, 1919, p. 71. 30 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 890. 31 R. L. Borden, Canada i n the Commonwealth, Oxford, 1929, p. 107. 87 With regard to the question of mandates, the Canadian delegates accepted the British policy that the con- quests the other dominions so much wished to keep should not be taken from them. Throughout the Conference, one of the principal concerns of the Canadian delegates was to build up a strong Anglo-American accord. To do this, i n the mandates question as i n other questions, they were willing to advocate 32 a compromise policy i f this seemed necessary. In matters involving economics and international communication and transportation, Canada was represented through the British Empire delegation. For instance, A. L. Sifton was senior British member on the commission on the international control of ports, waterways and railways. He acted for a time as chairman of the Ki e l Canal Commission, 33 and occasionally of the whole commission. Certain developments with regard to a proposed convention to govern the international aspects of c i v i l aviation were significant. In a letter written to Borden i n December 1918 about these proposals, Doherty had claimed that the convention should not apply to Canada without separate Canadian adherence. At the present stage of the development of the constitutional relations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions, words have their importance. In 32 Glazebrook, Peace Conference, pp. 90-94. 33 Ibid., p. 97. 88 conventions with outside States, i t seems to me but right that His Majesty's Government should convey to them what i s the position of the selfrgoverning Dominions, and let them understand that i n matters such as that now in question, those Dominions are entitled to decide for themselves. Such action may be a step toward placing the new nations of the Commonwealth i n a position where for their national status — though they may not be sovereign states within that Commonwealth they may receive recogni- tion i n the family of nations.34 Canada was represented on the commission dealing with air navigation only as a member of the British Empire delegation. The f i n a l report of the commission gave Canada equality of status and the right of separate adherence. The Canadian delegates were not completely satisfied, and had the British enter a reservation for them, in which they expressed themselves as willing to sign on the understanding that certain objections that they had made s t i l l stood. These had largely to do with the possibility of special arrangements between Canada and the United States. They insisted that the f i n a l decision on these objections must rest with the Canadian gov- 35 ernment. Representation at the Peace Conference brought Canada only a part of the desired recognition. Her delegates and those of the other dominions, again under the leadership of Sir Robert Borden, insisted that they must also sign the Peace Treaties. Borden made the f i r s t move. Breakfasting 34 Quoted i n Glazebrook, Peace Conference, pp. 101. 35 Ibid., pp. 102-3. 8 9 with Lloyd George on February 5, 1919j he suggested that the dominion plenipotentiaries be given the power to sign the treaties for their respective dominions. Lloyd George 36 offered no objections. Later that day Borden discussed the proposal with the ministers from the other dominions. A l l agreed. On March 12, Borden's original proposals were incor- porated into a memorandum on behalf of a l l the Dominion Prime Ministers. This memorandum was accepted i n principle by the British Empire delegation and by the Peace Conference as a whole. It stated i n parts 1. The Dominion Prime Ministers, after careful con- sideration, have reached the conclusion that a l l the treaties and conventions resulting from the Peace Confer- ence should be so drafted as to enable the Dominions to become Parties and Signatories thereto. This procedure w i l l give suitable recognition to the part played at the Peace Table by the British Commonwealth as a whole, and w i l l at the same time record the status attained there by the Dominions. 2. The procedure i s i n consonance with the princi- ples of constitutional government that obtain throughout the Empire. The Crown is the supreme executive i n the United Kingdom and i n a l l the Dominions, but i t acts on the advice of different Ministers within different con- stitutional units; and under Resolution IX of the Imperial War Conference, 1917? the organization of the Empire is to be based upon equality of status. * * * 4. On the constitutional point, i t i s assumed that each treaty or convention w i l l include clauses providing for r a t i f i c a t i o n similar to those in the Hague Convention of 1907- Such clauses w i l l , under the procedure proposed, have the effect of reserving to the Dominion Governments and Legislatures the same power of review as i s provided i n the case of the other contracting parties. 36 Sir Robert Borden's Diary (unpublished), referred to Glazebrook, Peace Conference, p. 198. 90 > 5. It i s conceived that this proposal can be carried out with but a slight alteration of previous treaty forms. Thus: a. The usual r e c i t a l of Heads of States in the Preamble needs no alteration whatever, since the Dominions are adequately included in the present formal description of the King, namely, His Majesty the King of the British Dominions beyond the seas, Emperor of India. b. The r e c i t a l i n the Preamble of the names of ' the Plenipotentiaries appointed by the High Con- tracting parties for the purpose of concluding the treaty would include the names of the Dominion Plenipotentiaries, immediately after the names of the Plenipotentiaries appointed by the United King- dom. Under the general heading 'The British Empire1 the sub-headings 'The United Kingdom', 'The Dominion of Canada', 'The Commonwealth of Australia', 'The Union of South Africa', etc. would be used as head- ings to distinguish the various plenipotentiaries. c. It would then follow that the Dominion Plenipotentiaries would sign according to the same scheme. The Dominion Prime Ministers consider, therefore, that i t should be made an instruction to the British member of the Drafting Commission of the Peace Conference that a l l treaties should be drawn according to the above proposal.->„ Essentially, i f "Equality of nationhood" had developed among the Dominions and Great Britain, then i t was necessary that the treaty should not be signed for Canada by British delegates appointed by the Crown to act on the advice and responsibility of the government of the United Kingdom, but by delegates appointed by the Crown on the advice and responsibil- i t y of the Canadian government. Borden then arranged to have the Canadian delegates issued with f u l l powers to sign. On April 9 he telegraphed 37 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1919, Special Session, no. 41J, pp. 6-7. 91 instructions to Acting Prime Minister S i r Thomas White to have the necessary formal action taken by the Canadian government. An order i n council was passed requesting the issuance of credentials to S i r George E. Foster, Hon. Arthur L. S i f t o n , Hon. C. J . Doherty and S i r Robert Borden, to sign the peace tr e a t i e s i n the name of His Majesty the King i n respect of the 38 Dominion of Canada. He sent a copy, of t h i s telegram to Lloyd George and suggested: When i t [the Order i n Council] reaches the Foreign Of f i c e some appropriate step should be taken to l i n k i t up with the F u l l Powers issued by the King to the Canadian plen i p o t e n t i a r i e s , and with the papers connected therewith, i n order that i t may formally appear i n the records that these f u l l powers were issued on the respon- s i b i l i t y of the Canadian government.39 Because such F u l l Powers are by custom signed by the King as head of the state, without any counter-signature, Borden f e l t t h i s step did not involve any c o n s t i t u t i o n a l compli- cations. It was purely a transaction between the King and his Canadian advisers. The B r i t i s h government was involved only 40 i n handing the Canadian instructions on to the King. Unfortunately, when the draft Treaty was ready, the Canadian representatives found that the method suggested i n Borden's memorandum had not been s t r i c t l y followed. The United Kingdom representatives would be signing on behalf of "The United Kingdom of Great B r i t a i n and Ireland and the 38 Canadian Sessional Papers, 10,1 9. Special Session, no. 41J, 39 I b i d . , p. 8. 40 Borden, Canadian Constitutional Studies, p. 160. 92 British Dominions beyond the Seas", and then the Dominion representatives would sign, each for his own country. S ir A. L. Sifton wrote to Borden, who was about to leave for Canada, urging the necessity of having the treaty changed to the previously proposed form. He stated that i n the present form there was no longer any necessity for Canada to sign at 41 a l l . If she did, she would in effect be signing twice. The form was not changed. The Treaty of Versailles, the Protocol, the Rhine Occupation Agreement, and the A l l i e d Treaty with Poland were a l l signed on June 28, 1919» by the five British plenipotentiaries for "His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India", and immediately below by the Hon. Charles J. Doherty, Minister of Justice, and the Hon. A. L. Sifton, Minister of Customs, "for 42 the Dominion of Canada." The form proposed by Borden would have made clearer the new Canadian position i n international affairs. The fi n a l form led to some questioning i n the debates in the Canadian House of Commons on the approval of the treaties. For instance, Mr. Ernest Lapointe discussed the way this form of signing showed lack of equality with the representatives of 43 Great Britain. The Hon. W. S. Fielding argued that the 41 Sifton to Borden, May 12, 1919? quoted in Glazebrook, Peace Conference, p. 111. 42 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1919» Special Session, no. 41J, pp. 5-6. 43 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Sept. 9» 1919« p?̂  111. 93 Preamble, the way i t was written, did not give Canada national status. He considered that the attempt to make Canada a party to the Treaty was "another attempt to get a shoddy status 44 where no real status exists." Borden had previously promised that the German treaty would be submitted to the Canadian parliament for approval. If this were to be more than a mere formality, i t had to be done before the treaty was r a t i f i e d . He protested strongly when the British government proposed to rush the ra t i f i c a t i o n of the treaty before the end of July, pointing out that i t would be absolutely impossible to keep his pledge 45 to the Canadian parliament within such a time li m i t . He refused to accept the suggestion of Lord Milner, the Secretary of State for the Colonies: Inasmuch as the Dominion Ministries participated i n peace negotiations, and side by side with the Ministers of the United Kingdom signed preliminaries of treaty, we hold that His Majesty, i f he now ra t i f i e d the Treaty for the whole Empire would have the same constitutional justi f i c a t i o n i n so doing i n respect of Dominions as he has i n respect of the United Kingdom.^ Essentially, Milner was suggesting that, considering the urgency of immediate ra t i f i c a t i o n , the Canadian government should follow the British precedent by which the consent of parliament is not necessary before a treaty i s r a t i f i e d . At 44 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Sept. 9> 1919. p. 111. 45 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1919, Special Session, no. 41J, pp. 10-11. 46 Milner to the Governor General of Canada, July 23, 1919? i n ibid., p. 11. 94 Borden's insistence, Lord Milner promised to attempt to hold back ra t i f i c a t i o n u n t i l the approval of the Canadian parliament, 47 summoned for the 1st of September, could be obtained. This was done, and after approval by both Houses, the Canadian Order i n Council requesting the King to r a t i f y the treaty on behalf of Canada was forwarded to the British government on September 12, 1919. 4 8 In the debates on approval, a wide variety of views on Canada's position i n the Empire and i n the world at large were put forward. A considerable amount of time was spent on the question of Canadian membership i n the League, as mentioned in Chapter :.V of this study, and on the wisdom of and necessity for parliamentary approval. For instance, the Hon. D. D. McKenzie, leader of the Opposition, argued that parliamentary 49 approval was totally unnecessary; but the Hon. A. L. Sifton, Minister of Customs, and one of the signatories of the treaty, stated that the government considered parliamentary approval 50 sufficiently important to make i t a question of confidence. Incidentally, there was some doubt among the members as to the difference between ra t i f i c a t i o n and approval. This was clearly explained by the Hon. N. W. Rowell, the President of th. Privv c o u n c i l . 5 1 47 See exchange of telegrams in Canadian Sessional Papers, 1919, Special Session, no. 41J, pp. 11, 12. 48 Ibid., p. 13. 49 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Special Session, Sept. 8, 1919, p. 75. 50 Ibid., pp. 82-84. 51 Ibid., pp. 119-120. 95 Apart from these questions, the main theme through- out the debates was the effect of the Conference and the Treaty on Canadian national status. One of the most extreme views was that taken by the Hon. W. S. Fielding, who denied that there had been any great change in the constitutional status of Canada. In his judgment, both Canadian representation at Paris, and also Canadian approval of the treaty, were entirely 52 unnecessary. He would be among the "foremost to insi s t on 53 the maintenance of autonomy of Canada", but i n matters of not directly Canadian interest, "we have i n the representatives of the British government i n London statesmen who would take 54 due account of the interests of the Empire at large." He insisted, "By their demand for separate recognition apart from the British Empire they are beginning — they may not have 55 meant to do so — to break up the British Empire." The Hon. D. D. McKenzie, likewise a Liberal, and Leader of the Opposi- tion, denied that the Canadian representatives were actually representatives of Canada at a l l . "They were a l l i n the high and honourable position of representing the Empire, . . . and 56 as such they signed the Treaty." And again, "We are not a nation in the true sense of the term. . . . I maintain i t i s 52 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Special Session, 1919? September 11, 1919, p. 180. 53 Loc. c i t . 54 Ibid., p. 181. 55 Loc. c i t . 56 Ibid., September 8, p. 80. 9 6 not a strength but a weakness for us to . . . separate our- selves from the rest of the Empire and attempt to become a separate nation . . . as far as these (treaty) obligations 57 are concerned.1' Various government speakers, on the other hand, maintained that Canada had achieved a genuine advance i n status. This point of view was aptly summarized by the Hon. C. J. Doherty, Minister of Justice and also one of the signa- tories of the Treaty: "We have grown up to nationhood, and i t i s our own. What came over there was a recognition of our nationhood." 5 8 57 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Special Session, 1919? Sept. 8, 1919, p. 80. 58 Ibid., September 11, 1919, p. 197- Chapter V Canada, The League of Nations, and the Post-War Search for Security. "Canada got nothing out of the War but recognition," Sir Robert Borden wrote in his diary at the beginning of the Peace Conference. 1 As a f u l l member of the League of Nations, Canada gained further recognition of that international status she f i r s t attained at Versailles. In League affairs, i n Assembly and Council, in the International Labour Organization and i n League conferences, she continued to prove her nation- hood, her existence as an international entity, and her control over her own external policy. As Borden had insisted that Canada be given her rightful place at the Peace Conference, so he had likewise to- insist that as one of the British Dominions she receive the f u l l rights of a member of the League. In England in December 1918, when preparations were being made for the Peace Confer- ence, he got for Canada representation on the special committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Robert Cecil, set up to formu- late and put forward the views of the British Empire with regard 2 to the establishment of a League of Nations. At Paris he 1 Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Toronto, 1938, vol. 2, p. 899. 2 Ibid., vol 2, p. 877. 98 spoke for the smaller nations and Canada — in protest against a suggested change i n the regulations established to set up certain commissions on the League. Further, he set out his own and his Canadian colleagues' views on the League in a careful memorandum which he circulated among the members of the British Empire Delegation, and also sent to President Wilson. But as regards the new Canadian international status, his most important work was his successful struggle to have Article VII of the proposed Labour Convention and Article IV of the proposed League Covenant amended to give Canada her f u l l rights. By the draft Convention presented by the Commission on International Labour Legislation to the Plenary Session of April 11, 1919? the Dominions could send delegates to the proposed General Conference, but as far as the governing body was concerned, Article VII stated that: "No member, together with i t s Dominions and Colonies, whether self-governing or not, shall be entitled to nominate more than one member.""̂  Discus- sing this limitation with Mr. Robinson, Chief American Expert on Labour Conditions, Borden was able to get only the answer that public opinion i n the United States would prevent his agreeing with Borden's proposal to make the Dominions eligible for membership. In two strongly-worded letters to Lloyd George, Borden pointed out that there was no reason why Canada 3 Borden, op_. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 94-6. 99 should be denied the position in the I.E. 0. that she had been conceded i n the Assembly of the League i t s e l f . He mentioned six so-called independent states, such as Liberia and Cuba, over whose policy the United States "can exercise a more effective control than can be exercised by the British 4 Government over Canada." For a nation which had sacrificed more during the war years than any nation outside Europe, and which was prob- ably the seventh industrial nation of the world, to be denied a privilege open to Liberia or Cuba i n the I. L. 0., would be, Borden argued, a state so humiliating that the Canadian Parliament would l i k e l y insist i t be ended by withdrawing from the League altogether. As the result of another strong state- ment at a meeting of the British Delegation a few days later, Borden was informed that the obnoxious clause would be struck out. President Wilson was persuaded to over-ride the objec- tions of his labour advisors, the principle obstacle to Canadian inclusion. A memorandum establishing the right of Canadian membership in the Governing Body of the I. L. 0. was 5 signed by Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George. With regard to Article IV of the League Covenant, i t was rather a matter of terminology than of amendment to give Canada her due. As a f u l l y self-governing dominion and as 4 Borden to lloyd George, April 29, 1919, op., c i t . , vol. 2, p. 951. 5 Borden, Report to the Canadian Government. May 1G, 1919, i b i d . , vol. 2, p. 952. 100 a signatory, she would be a f u l l member of the League, and so entitled to separate representation in the Assembly. What was under discussion was the possibility of her being at some future date, an elected member of the Council. The termin- ology of the proposed Covenant provided for the election of "states" to the Council, rather than of "members of the League." This was being interpreted i n some quarters, by Colonel House and President Wilson, for instance, as meant to 6 debar Canada, or any other dominion, from election. In a secret memorandum to Lloyd George, Borden stated that some delegates, including two of his Canadian colleagues, Mr. Sifton and Mr. Doherty, were disagreeing with the view held by himself, as well as by Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts, that Canada was eligible for election. In conversation, he had gotten President Wilson to agree with him, but he wanted i t o f f i c i a l l y confirmed by Wilson and the delegates of the other Great Powers. He pointed out that none of the other smaller states of the world were similarly handicapped: Canada is asked to make way for a l l these states except where effort and sacj? i f ice;'are demanded; then, but not t i l l then, she i s accorded f u l l and even prior representation. She i s to be in the f i r s t line of 7 battle but not even i n the back seat of the Council. Four days later, the Council of Three agreed. A memorandum stating their "entire concurrence" in the view that Article IV 6 D. H. Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, New York, 1928, vol. 1, p. 481. 7 Borden to Lloyd George, May 2, 1919* Borden, op., c i t . , vol. II, p. 947. 101 was to be interpreted to leave the Dominions f u l l y eligible to be elected as members of the Council was signed by Wilson, Clemenceau and Lloyd George, after the offending word "state" 8 had been changed to "member of the League." Thus Borden was successful in overcoming a l l opposi- tion that threatened in any way to limit the recognition of Canada as having exactly the same rights and obligations as any sovereign state in the Assembly, Council and Secretariat of the League and in the I. L. 0. At the same time, the method of signing the Peace Treaty f i n a l l y used recognized her position as a member of the British Empire group of nations. As a result Canada was l e f t i n a more favourable position with regard to the League Council than other small nations. She had the common right to be elected and to have a represen- tative s i t as a member at any meeting at which matters specifi- cally affecting her were to be discussed. In addition there was nothing to prevent a Canadian appearing on the Council as a British Empire delegate. Borden himself had set a precedent at the Paris Peace Conference, where he on occasion even acted as head of the British delegation. Further, whenever Canadian interests were similar to those of Britain, they were permanently represented on the Council by the British member. 8 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Special Session, 1919, p. 89. 102 Borden, then, was successful in having the new Canadian national status recognized in the Covenant of the League. There were two other changes, one in the Covenant and one i n the Labour Convention, which he wished to make to protect Canadian interests. The former was in Article X which neither he nor later Canadian delegates to the League were successful in amending, however much they aided in watering i t down. To the anxious, security-seeking nations of Europe, i t s guarantees were the cornerstone of the League. The latter involved the nine points respecting labour conditions which were to be included in the Inter- national Labour Convention. In agreeing to certain of these, British delegates had seemed unaware of the differences i n labour conditions i n Canada. The clause that the Canadian delegates foresaw would conflict with provincial legislation, and might easily lead to trouble on the Pacific coast was this: In a l l matters concerning their status as workers and social insurance, foreign workmen lawfully admitted to any country and their families should be ensured the same treatment as the nationals of that country.' After much discussion with the representatives from Britain, Belgium, Japan, the United States, and other nations most concerned in the Labour Convention, Borden prepared an 9 Text proposed by International Labour Commission, Borden, op_. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 958. 103 entirely new draft of the nine points. The eighth now read: The standard set by law i n each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of a l l workers lawfully resident t h e r e i n . ^ This he brought before the plenary Conference as an amendment, and i t was passed without any dissenting voice. In this way, by the action of a Canadian statesman, a treaty which Canada was to sign as one of the nations of the world, was modified to suit Canadian conditions. Article X of the League Covenant was to prove a different matter. At Paris, Borden had foreseen that i t would be an obstacle when the Canadian parliament was asked to approve the Peace Treaty. Most of the opposition did centre round this Article. Parliament was not willing to see Canada become involved in anything that had any resemblance to an automatic guarantee, even against obvious aggression. Canadian control over her own participation i n wars abroad had f i n a l l y been achieved after a long and often d i f f i c u l t period of growth. Members of parliament and the public were not willing to risk losing any of their lately won autonomy to a nev; master, even i f that new master be a League of Nations aiming to prevent a l l war. This opposition was expressed in the amendment moved by Mr. Fielding, leading Nova Scotia Liberal, to the government 10 Amended text to be moved by Sir Robert Borden, i b i d . , vol. 2, p. 959. 104 motion to approve the Treaty: That in giving such approval this House i n no way assents to any impairment of the existing autonomous authority of the Dominions, but declares that the question of what part, i f any, the forces of Canada shall take in any war, actual or threatened, is one to be determined at a l l times as occasion may require by the people of Canada through their representatives in Parliament. 11 In addition to the fear of losing certain control over p a r t i c i - pation ih foreign wars, Canadian opposition to this Article was increased by the strong feeling of isolationism taking form i n various quarters. Many f e l t that Canadian development would be best forwarded by remaining true to Laurier's old phrase,"freedom from the vortex of European militarism." Government speakers assured the Opposition that the League Council would have only the power to advise, not to order, Canadian participation in any war, and also made i t clear that Canada could always work through the League for the amendment of the objectionable art i c l e . The Treaty, including Article X, 12 was approved. Amendment of Article X then became an important aspect of Canadian policy in the League for the next few years. Previously, as has been mentioned, Borden had worked at Paris for a change in i t . Even before the Article had been attacked 11 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Special Session 1919? p. 191. 12 F. H. Soward, "Canada and the League of Nations," International Conciliation, October 1932, number 283, p. 365• 105 in the United States and elsewhere, he had submitted a secret memorandum pointing out that the Article inferred that a l l present boundaries were just and would continue to be so. Even were that true at the time, there was every likelihood that there would arise "national aspirations to which the provisions of the peace treaty w i l l not do justice, 13 and which cannot be permanently repressed." To prevent the signatories from finding themselves responsible for the maintenance of a no longer just status quo i n such a situation, he urged that the Article be amended or deleted. As has been mentioned, he was not able to effect any change. The attack was carried into the F i r s t Assembly, held at Paris i n November 1920. In a long memorandum, prepared the preceding year, the Hon. C. J. Doherty, principal Canadian delegate, moved that Article X be deleted entirely. Much of his case was rather weak, including his argument that Canada and the other small nations had had no say in the fixing of the t e r r i t o r i a l arrangements at Paris, that were thus being guaranteed. Essentially, the obligations under Article X were too "direct and absolute", while the general obligations under the other articles were "exceedingly remote" and subject to conditions which rendered their ever becoming operative 14 improbable. Canada, consequently, as an expression of a 13 Miller, op_. c i t . , vol. 1, p. 358. 14 S. Mack Eastman, Canada at Geneva, Toronto, 1946, p. 65. 106 foreign policy based on the views of many of her statesmen and large groups of her people, found herself one of a group of relatively secure nations who wished the obligations of the Covenant minimized as far as possible. They had not the desperate need for security that France, China, and many other nations had. Mr. Doherty's amendment was referred to the Committee on Amendments, which reported on i t at the Second Assembly, making i t plain that the Article was a statement of principle v i t a l to the whole League system. Mr. Doherty again pointed 15 out i t s "unfairness" to Canada. By the time the Third Assembly met, the Liberals had come into power in Canada. They disliked the implications of Article X as much as did the Conservatives. The Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe was now the leading delegate. If the Article could not be deleted, he determined to try to have i t amended. He moved that the phrase be added, "taking into account the p o l i t i c a l and geographical circumstances of each state," and also a further sentence making i t clear that any action of the Council could only be to advise, "but no member shall be under the obligation to engage i n any act of war without the consent 16 of i t s Parliament, Legislature, or other representative body." 15 R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers, Canada Looks Abroad, London, 1938, p. 96. 16 Report of the Canadian Delegates to the Assembly, 1922, p. 4. 107 Again the opposition of the security-conscious nations was so great that the amendment was not passed. In the Fourth Assembly, Sir Lomer Gouin, the Canadian delegate, recognizing the impossibility of amendment or deletion, submitted an Interpretative Resolution, containing the same Ideas as the former amendment. France and many of the other nations which had been so strong in their opposition before, saw that further resistance might be dangerous, not only with regard to Canada, but even more directly i n affecting American opinion. When the Resolution was put to vote, therefore, twenty-nine states voted in favour, twenty-three showed their opposition in a passive way by refraining from voting, and one, Persia, maintained her former position and voted against i t . As a unanimous vote was necessary, the Resolution was technically defeated. However, since the President of the Assembly did not declare i t rejected, i t in effect modified the disputed 17 Article. Canada would have only those military obligations decided on by her own parliament. The whole struggle made i t clear that there were a number of nations who f e l t as Canada did. Canada had acted as a spokesman for these, in following an independent policy of opposing a part of the Covenant generally f e l t to be against her interests. Throughout the history of the League, Canada 17 C. A. W. Manning, Policies of the British Dominions i n the League of Nations, London, 1932, p. 31• 108 was to stand for the development of machinery for conciliation and arbitration and the peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than for sanctions and rigid guarantees of force against the aggressor i n such disputes. In her attempts to amend Article X, Canada was affected by her relationship to the United States. Article X was exceedingly objectionable particularly to the growing isolationist point of view there. The imposition of sanctions was made almost impossible for Canada as long as the United States remained out of the League, because i t would be impossi- ble for her to carry out the obligations involved and not violate the neutrality of the United States. Further, as Canadian appreciation of the value of the League grew, the desire for the entry of the United States likewise grew. In her old role of interpreting the United States to Great Britain, now extended to Geneva, Canada had had an additional incentive to work for the modification of Article X, i n order to make the League more attractive to the United States. Besides her role as a leader i n the demand for the modification of Article X, and as an interested party i n the various schemes advanced in or outside the League i n the search for security described below, Canada through her representatives played an important and an independent part from year to year in the Assembly. In the Fir s t Assembly, the Hon. N . W. Rowell 109 was classed by the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph among the outstanding figures of the whole 18 Assembly. Other Canadian representatives were Sir George Foster and the Rt. Hon. Charles Doherty, who had represented Canada at the Peace Conference. At that Assembly the Canadian delegates succeeded in getting the right to make nominations separate from those of Great Britain for the panel of judges on which ballotting was to take place for the World Court. After the Assembly had adopted the Statute for the Permanent Court of International Justice, the Protocol was signed separately and at different times by Britain and the Dominions. Canada did not sign u n t i l March 1921, and her signature was solely on instructions from the Canadian . 19 government. In the Third Assembly, because of the new Liberal government in power i n Canada, the delegates were W. S. Field- ing, Ernest Lapointe, and Peter C. Larkin. In order that Canada might be represented on a l l six of the major committees of the League, each representative served on two. Mr. Fielding was chosen chairman of the F i f t h Committee, which position carried with i t a seat on the General Committee of 20 the Assembly. At the Sixth Assembly, 1925, Senator Raoul 18 Soward, op_. c i t . , p. 364. 19 P. E. Corbett and H. A. Smith, Canada and World P o l i t i c s , Toronto, 1928, p. 117. 20 Report of the Canadian Delegates to the Third Assembly, 1922, p. 3 . 110 Dandurand, f i r s t delegate of Canada, was elected president of the Assembly. Two years later he served as chairman of the Second Committee (Technical Organizations). In 1928, the Canadian Prime Minister and f i r s t delegate, the Rt. Hon. H. L. Mackenzie King, was one of the vice-presidents of the Assembly; i n 1930, Sir Robert Borden was chosen chairman of the Sixth Committee (Po l i t i c a l Questions); in 1938 the Rt. Hon. Ernest Lapointe, of the Third Committee (Limitation and Reduction of Armaments); and i n 1939, Mr. Hume Wrong was 21 vice-president of the Assembly. Throughout the years, then, Canadian delegates played a f u l l part i n the affairs of the Assembly, in the offices they held, as committee members, and i n general debate. The policies that they maintained were s t r i c t l y Canadian. While discussions frequently took place between British and Canadian delegates, particularly on matters of outstanding importance, Britain never attempted any control over Canadian policy. There was no longer any way by which she could have constitutionally exercised any such control, had she wished to do so. Canada acted in the League Assembly as an independ- ent international, entity. Indeed Canadian policy was often closer to the American than to the British approach. Canada was, unlike 21 See Report of the Canadian Delegates, 1925, 1927, 1928, 1930, 1938, and 1939- I l l Britain, strongly against every effort to extend League powers, even only of enquiry, into immigration, natural resources, and similar topics. Unlike Great Britain, she did not sign the Imports and Exports Prohibition Convention, preventing embargoes. Canada opposed the Labour government of Great Britain in i t s efforts i n 1929 to work out a t a r i f f truce to prevent the increase of protectionist duties. She tended rather to follow the ilmerican tradition of protectionism, in^ spite of work for freer international trade by both Britain and the Economic section of the League. In the appointment of Canadian delegates to the League, there was not even the formality of British interfer- ence. Canadian delegates were appointed solely by the Governor General i n Council, on the advice of the Canadian Cabinet. They did not bear f u l l powers under the Great Seal of Great Britain, and thus i t was not necessary for the British govern- ment to be involved even in form in their appointment. Even the seating arrangements of the League pointed to Canadian nationhood. Although Canada signed the Peace Treaty i n the l i s t of the British Dominions, indented under the signature of the British Empire, Canadian delegates were seated i n the Assembly, not as a group with the delegates of Britain and the other dominions, but alphabetically, as were the delegates of a l l other member nations. But the question s t i l l remained whether Canada had 112 exactly the same rights and obligations as other members of the League, or whether her continuing membership i n the Common- wealth affected her position i n the League. It could be questioned whether, should a breach of the Covenant have been committed by the British government without the concurrence of the Dominions, Canada might not have been called on to apply sanctions under Article XVI, cutting off trade and personal intercourse with Great Britain. The injured state might have insisted that Canada was subject, as were a l l other members of the League, to the provisions of Article XX, by which member nations accepted the Covenant as abrogating a l l previous obliga- tions or understandings among themselves which were inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant. This is where the method of signing the Peace Treaty was most significant. It showed that in entering the League, Canada and the other Dominions reserved their position i n the Empire, and undertook no obligation that would mean i t s break-up. The Covenant nowhere gave any state the right to demand action of any dominion incompatible with i t s 22 membership in the British Commonwealth. The national status of Canada received further inter- national affirmation in her election, i n 1927) to the League Council. In insisting at Versailles on the Canadian right to stand for election, Borden had been more interestediin obtaining 22 This is the view expressed in Corbett and Smith, p_p_. c i t . , pp. 114-116. Compare H. Duncan Hall, The British Commonwealth of Nations, London, 1920, pp. 195, 342, where the view i s ex- pressed that the dominions have identical rights and obligations with a l l other members of the League, in spite of their member- ship in the Commonwealth. 113 for Canada the f u l l recognition of her new status, than i n the possibility that she might at some time actually become a member of the Council. When the Council was re-organized after the admission of Germany in 1926, the number of temporary seats was increased to nine. It was generally admitted that one third of the seats should go to Latin America, one seat to an Asiatic member, and the rest to European members. Canadian delegate Sir George Foster objected, not making any immediate claim to a seat for Canada, but pointing out that Canada had as much right to representation on the Council as had any other 23 League member. In the ensuing election, Canada, though not a candidate, received two votes. The Canadian delegation recommended to the Cabinet that Canada seek election i n 1927* There was no particular interest i n Canada i n the proposal. Not even the most ardent nationalist urged i t as a step to demonstrate the increasing importance of Canada in international affairs. Only after Senator Dandurand and the other delegates had arrived in Geneva was permission given for them to seek the seat. No attempt was made to lobby for votes, although Britain and the other dominions gave their approval. Speaking before the election, Dandurand summed up his own personal qualifications as the Canadian representative. He 23 Report of the Canadian Delegates, 1927? P» 6. 114 was French by race and culture; as a French Canadian he was specially interested in minorities; he was a native of North America, detached from European questions; and he was the 24 representative of a British dominion. He further strength- ened the Canadian position by his speech on September 12, during the annual discussion of the work of the League, point- ing out Canadian interest i n the development of' arbitration and the judicial settlement of disputes, and i n the rights of 25 minorities. When Canada was elected, satisfaction was widespread at home. As the London Times stated, "There could have been no more emphatic international affirmation of that historical definition of British Imperial Relations which was given at 26 the last Imperial Conference." Although i t became customary for one seat to be reserved for a British dominion, and although Dandurand had claimed as one of his own qualifications before the election that he represented at once a member of the Common- wealth, a North American nation, and a minority, the Canadian delegate on the Council was in no way a representative of the Commonwealth or of any other country. He was responsible solely to the government and people of Canada, and received his instructions solely from the Canadian government. 24 Alfred Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935, London, 1936, p. 449. 25 Soward, op_. c i t . , p. 377* 26 Referring to the Balfour Report and the Imperial Confer- ence of 1926. Quoted in ib i d . , p. 449. 115 Much of the work of the Council, while Canada was a member, had to do with the Pact of Paris and the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, both to be discussed later. Dandurand did his most important work in the discussions of the problem of minorities. Some of his suggestions led to very real improvements i n the handling of this d i f f i c u l t problem. Canada made further contributions i n this respect during 1930, her last year on the Council. In that year her f i r s t delegate i n the Assembly, as has been mentioned, was Sir Robert Borden, who was chosen president of the Sixth Committee, covering among other things, the minorities problem. In summary, then, the main contributions of the Canadian delegates to the League in Assembly and Council were fourfold: their insistence that the League should be world- wide, not solely dominated by European affairs and interests; their sympathy to minorities; their presentation of the American point of view; and their emphasis on the development of machinery for arbitration and the peaceful settlement of disputes rather than oh the use of the threat of force, either economic or military, for the prevention of aggression. In a l l of these they followed a s t r i c t l y Canadian policy. During the 1920's, Canada played her role i n the various schemes, inside and outside the League, that were part of the international search for security. From the point of 116 view of this study, the significant parts of that role were the developments with regard to Canadian representation and a Canadian-controlled policy. At the beginning of preparations for the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1921-2, the new Canadian status received a set-back. The President of the United States sent an invitation to the British Empire only, neglecting the new position of the Dominions. It may be ques- tioned whether this was from lack of realization of the devel- opment that had actually taken place, or because of the opposition many Americans, especially Republicans, had shown to the standing given the Dominion at Paris. The New York Tribune of October 8, 1921, made an interesting comment: The United States couldn't properly invite the Dominions to sit in the Conference of their own right. Their status with regard to other nations is s t i l l somewhat indeterminate, in spite of Mr. Lloyd George's statements at the opening of the recent Imperial Con- ference in London. The British Government hasn't yet notified the world that so far as international p_ relations are concerned they are independent states. ' Because of the importance of the Conference, i t was decided to overlook the omission, and plans for a British Empire Delegation were worked out. Canada did not have the double representation she had had at Paris, where she had 27 Quoted i n Canadian Annual Review, 1921, p. 80. 117 had both her own delegates and representation in the British delegation. However, as at Paris, Canadian delegates repres- ented the British Empire Delegation on various sub-committees, and in the signing, separate " f u l l powers" were given to the Dominion representatives, who each signed for their own dominion. Sir Robert Borden was well satisfied, stating: "The status and distinctive consideration that the Dominions had received at Paris were accorded to them at Washington." The Washington Conference marked the end of a phase in Commonwealth external relations. Since 1911 when the Dominions had f i r s t begun to be informed at a l l on foreign affairs, i t had been considered necessary that the Commonwealth, whatever the differences among i t s members, speak with one voice to the world at large. It v/as held that the Crown could not have one policy i n a given affair on the advice of the Canadian ministers, a different policy on the advice of the British ministers, and possibly s t i l l a different policy on the advice of the ministers of some other dominion. The ideal and the current situation was expressed by Borden, speaking to the Lawyers Club of New York, just before the Washington Confer- ence: The voice of the British Commonwealth in world affairs must not be the voice of the United Kingdom, but the voice of a l l the British self-governing nations. 28 R. L. Borden, "The British Commonwealth of Nations," Yale Review, vol. 12, no. 4, July 1923, p. 783- 118 This principle has been wholly accepted both i n the United Kingdom and the Dominions. The precise method by which i t shall be worked out in actual practice has not yet been f u l l y determined, and is surrounded by d i f f i c u l t i e s of undoubted gravity, but not incapable of s o l u t i o n . ^ 29 The Chanak Incident and the Lausanne Conference marked a change. The Liberals, under W. L. Mackenzie King, had come into power in Canada in 1922. There was no sudden reversal of policy back to that of the days of Laurier — no commitments and no consultation — but neither was there the interest in taking part i n Imperial policy that the Conservative Government under Borden's leadership had shown. At the same time Great Britain neglected to consult the dominions f u l l y , as would have been necessary i f the ideal expressed above by Borden were to have been worked out. The British government had failed to inform the Canadian government of the situation developing in the Near East, where the British at Chanak were le f t alone to guard the Straits against the advancing Turkish Nationalists. Lloyd George's telegram to Mackenzie King, ask- ing i f Canada would stand with the British and send a contingent i f necessary, did not reach the Canadian Prime Minister u n t i l after he had seen i t s contents in a press release. In a public statement Mackenzie King took the stand he was to hold down to 1939 — parliament would have to authorize the despatch of any 29 Canadian Annual Review, 1921, p. 81. 119 30 contingent. This was not a straight refusal, but as matters worked out, no further action was necessary. No greater effort at consultation was made by the British government in arranging for the Lausanne Conference. On October 27? 1922, the Canadian government was informed that the Imperial government was sending two plenipotentiaries who were " f u l l y acquainted with the Imperial aspect of the problems and with the keen interest taken by the Dominion governments 31 in i t s solution." There was no keen interest in Canada. Even the explanation that Canada and the other dominions could not be invited, or the French would insist on representation for their African colonies, was not challenged. The Canadian government took no action to secure representation, but made i t perfectly clear that Canada would not be involved i n any resulting treaty she had not taken part in making. It did not rati f y the Treaty of Lausanne. In the League schemes in the search for security, Canada likewise played an independent part. The Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee tried to combine disarmament and regional guarantees. Following the lead of the Norwegian delegates, the Canadian delegate said that for geographic reasons Canada 30 Canadian Annual Review, 1922, p. 181. 31 Telegram printed in R. M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, London, 1937? p. 2 5 8 . S e e corres- pondence and Mackenzie King's statement in the House of Commons, pp. 258-272. 120 should not be forced to adhere. She needed no guarantee f o r h e r s e l f , and was not w i l l i n g to give guarantees f o r the security of another country, p a r t i c u l a r l y under a treaty European i n i t s conception. Again the doctrine that p a r l i a - 32 ment must decide i n any such case was brought forward. The same attitude was taken i n 1924 to the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, which would have made a r b i t r a t i o n a test of aggression, and aggression an in t e r n a t i o n a l crime. Here Canada followed the example of the new Labour government i n B r i t a i n , but for her own reasons. Again Canada objected to the European l i m i t a t i o n s of the proposed treaty. The next plan put f o ^ a r d was the Protocol of Geneva for the P a c i f i c Settlement of International Disputes. This too was European i n both conception and outlook, though i t could have been extended to other continents as we l l . It t r i e d to combine compulsory a r b i t r a t i o n , security from aggression, and disarmament. Arguing from the point of view of Canadian security on the North American continent and from the doubtful proposition that when Canada entered the League she had not expected "that she would have the sole burden of representing North America when appeals would come to our continent f o r assistance i n maintaining peace i n Europe.""^ Dandurand spoke 32 W. E. Armstrong, Canada and the League of Nations, Geneva, 1930, p. 177. 33 S. Mack Eastman, Canada at Geneva, Toronto, 1946, p. 76. 121 against the proposal at Geneva. The British government suggested an Imperial conference so that the members of the Commonwealth might adopt a "similar attitude", but this proved impossible to arrange. Canada rejected the Protocol, but not t i l l after Britain had done so, though Sir Austen Chamberlain was later to state that the Dominions had deter- 34- mined the rejection of the Protocol.. The next step involved a difference in British and Canadian policies. Since the wider proposals for security had not been adopted, s t r i c t l y regional agreements were made between France, Germany, and Great Britain, in the Locarno Treaties. The Canadian government was kept informed of the progress of negotiations, but took no part whatsoever. The Dominions were specifically exempt unless they should desire otherwise; Canada did not adhere. There was no desire to accept responsibility in what was considered a purely European matter, and the formula that "parliament must decide" had become fundamental i n Canadian policy. Though the Canadian government turned down a l l these proposals, Canadian support for methods of conciliation and arbitration remained strong. In 1930 Canada was one of the members of the Commonwealth who accepted the General Act, a 34 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 376. 122 combination of three Conventions on conciliation and investi- gation of disputes and d i f f i c u l t i e s , arranged by the Assembly of 1929. Likewise two years earlier, in 1928, she had signed the Briand-Kellogg Pact, by which the signatories renounced war as an "instrument of national policy", except, i t was understood, in self-defence. Because there were no provisions for automatic sanctions, and because the United States was both a leader in the formation of the Pact and a signatory, the Pact had been acceptable. Canada took a more positive stand with regard to the Permanent Court of International Justice. In 1921, Mr. Doherty referred to i t as "the soul of the League of Nations."^ In 1926, Sir George Foster represented Canada at a conference called at Geneva to discuss the proposed entry of the United States into the Court, with certain reservations, one of which would have made i t impossible for the Court to discuss without American consent any matter where the United States might be involved. Foster spoke strongly for equality of rights among 36 members of the Court. His stand so influenced the Conference that this particular reservation was not accepted. The United States never did enter the Court. 35 Eastman, ap_. c i t . , p. 79. 36 Report of the Canadian Delegates, 1926, pp. 11-14. 123 In 1925} the Canadian government had stated, in refusing the Geneva Protocol, that i t was ready to adhere to the Optional Clause of the Statute of the Court providing for compulsory judicial settlement. Because of the Canadian situation, this did not have any real implications for Canada, as i t did have for Britain and other European nations. At the Imperial Conference of 1926, the members of the Common- wealth decided not to sign unti l a l l were ready to accept the Clause. In 1928, Dandurand brought the matter up at 37 Geneva, and again the next year the Canadian government urged the rest of the Commonwealth to sign. The Conservative government in Britain had been opposed, but with the coming into office of the Labour government i n 1929, the members of the Commonwealth signed with certain reservations, principally regarding disputes where another part of the Empire might be involved. As a member of the International Labour Organization, Canada was impeded by the form of her constitution. Because most of the Draft Conventions dealt with matters involving provincial rights, Canada was unable to r a t i f y many of them. By 1939, out of sixty-seven Draft Conventions, Canada had 37 Report of Canadian Delegates, 1928, p. 15. 38 Manning, op., c i t . , p. 39. 124 ratified only nine. The constitution of the I. L. 0. had made provision for federal states to treat the Conventions as recommendations only. As Hume Wrong pointed out i n a speech describing the Canadian d i f f i c u l t y , this did not prove satis- 40 factory. In order to refute the idea that lack of r a t i f i c a - tion meant that social and labour conditions in Canada were backward, Canadian delegates at the I. L. 0. frequently drew attention to the true reason. In 1925 and again i n 1935 Dr. W. A. Riddell (Canadian Advisory Officer at Geneva, 1924 - 1937) explained how Canada, had unsuccessfully attempted to get provincial co-operation to rat i f y certain conventions, and W. M. Dickson again reviewed the situation in 1936, as did 41 Gerald Brown in 1938. Though she could not ra t i f y many of the Conventions, Canada played the part of an autonomous member of the I. L. 0. As has been mentioned, Borden obtained for her f u l l privileges, including the right to membership in the Governing Body. Opposing an attempt to reduce the Governing Body to the six great powers in 1922, Mr. Lapointe insisted that Canada came to the I. L. 0. Conference as one among equals. According to the standards used, Canada was among the eight nations of chief industrial importance at that time. In 1934, when the 39 Hume Wrong, speaking at I.L.O.Conference, Geneva, 1939, quoted i n Eastman, op_. .cit., p. 15. 40 Loc. c i t . 4 1 Ibid., p. 16-18. 125 United States and Russia both entered the I. L. 0., i t was proposed to draw up a new l i s t of the eight members entitled to permanent seats, leaving the former seventh and eighth, Canada and Belgium, as deputy members un t i l the triennial election i n 1937* Belgium accepted this; Canada objected. At the I. L. 0. Conference that year, Mr. Riddell stated the viewpoint of the Canadian government. Only the Conference, or the Council of the League on appeal, had the power to revise the l i s t and then only at the "triennial reconstitution." It was unjust to eliminate two members immediately after the reconstitution of 1934. However, as international affairs evolved, Canada soon returned to the governing body, when 42 Germany withdrew from the League and the I. L. 0. Canadian representatives, with other non-European delegates, insisted throughout I. L. 0. history, for a f a i r proportion of representation on the staff of the I. L. 0., in committees and i n the preparation of draft conventions, and also on the staff of the International Labour Office. In 1925, Dr. Riddell maintained that there should be "equal representa- 43 tion for emigration and for immigration countries." In 1931 he again insisted that overseas countries should be on the same 42 Eastman, op_. c i t . , pp. 19-21. 43 Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Inter- national Labour Conference, 192*5, p. 168. 126 44 basis as European nations. Thus, though she was constitu- tionally unable to ra t i f y many Draft Conventions, Canada did continuously uphold her rights to her position as a recognized full-scale member of the I. L. 0. In the period of the breakdown of international security, Canada likewise f u l l y controlled the part she played. Just previous to and after the beginning of Japanese aggression in Manchuria, in 1931 > Canadian delegates, particularly Sir Robert Borden and Sir George Perley, had been working for dis- armament through the Assembly, through the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, and in the Disarmament Confer- ence i t s e l f . On March 8, 1932, Sir George Perley addressed the Special Assembly of the League, calling for an effective armistice, relying, not on sanctions, but on the force of public opinion, to achieve i t . In the Special Assembly held the same year, on December 8, the Canadian delegate, The Hon. C. H. Cahan, feeling that no member of the League was prepared to accept active intervention in the Far East, spoke against any consideration of sanctions and stated the case for both sides, pleading only briefly for the Chinese. The policy advocated by both these delegates was that actually followed by the League. In announcing in the Canadian House of Commons Canadian accept- ance of the report of the Committee of Nineteen (on which Canada 44 Proceedings, 1931> p. 406. 45 MacKay and Rogers, op_. c i t . , App. B V. 127 had not been represented) on the Sino-Japanese conflict, Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. R. B. Bennett, again expressed the view that public opinion was the most effective form of 46 sanctions. Canadian policy was decidedly different at the start of the Italo-Ethiopian c r i s i s . The f i r s t representa- tive in Geneva then was the Hon. G. H. Ferguson, High Commissioner i n London. The Ethiopian government had appealed to the League in January, 1935' The Committee of Eighteen had been set up to handle the c r i s i s . At i t s f i r s t meeting, on October 11, 1935? Ferguson called for firm and immediate action, with the imposition of whatever sanctions 47 a l l could agree on against the aggressor. Two weeks later the Conservative government was defeated i n a general election; Mr. Ferguson l e f t Geneva; and the Canadian Advisory Officer, Mr. Riddell, was l e f t as the Canadian delegate, with no instructions from the new Liberal government. The f i r a t statement from the new government was that made by the Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. W. L. Mackenzie King, i n a press dis- patch on October 29. He stated that the Canadian government would apply the proposed sanctions, but that the present 48 economic sanctions were not to be considered a precedent. 46 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Feb. 24, 1933? p. 2430. 47 G. M. Carter, "Canada and Sanctions in the Italo- Ethiopian Conflict," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1940, p. 76. 48 Ibid., p. 78. 128 Meanwhile Dr. Riddell had become Canadian repres- entative on the Council of Eighteen. He had never been a believer in sanctions but now that they had been imposed, he thought that they should be made effective. Although he s t i l l had not received instructions from Ottawa, he proposed on November 2 that the l i s t of sanctions be increased to include o i l , coal, and iron. In doing so he went further than the Canadian government could approve. On December 2, the Hon. Ernest Lapointe, acting Prime Minister, in a press release, stated that Riddell's proposal embodied only his personal views, not the views of the Canadian government. His action was not immediately repudiated only because i t was not wished to worsen the situation in Europe. Four days later Mackenzie King stated his government would not oppose the suggested sanctions, but would not be responsible for 49 taking the i n i t i a t i v e . Again the Canadian government had reverted to i t s policy of unwillingness to take responsibility for intervention i n affairs i n Europe, and again i t had insisted on complete control of i t s policy, — "parliament w i l l decide." In the Spanish C i v i l War, Canada was not represented on the committee on non-intervention, but forbade assistance by men or materials to either side. In the Munich settlement Canada was not consulted, but both government and people approved. 49 Carter, op_. c i t . , p. 81. 129 In the period of the breakdown of collective security, then, Canada played the part of an independent member of the League. In the years since the peace Settle- ment, she had achieved world recognition of her new position among the nations of the world, as a modern nation state, s t i l l a member of the British Commonwealth, and yet i n complete control of her own external affairs. Chapter VI The Department of External Affairs During the f i r s t decade of the twentieth century- i t became evident that a separate department of the government would have to be set up and developed to handle the growing volume of business created by increasing Canadian participation i n external affairs. Since Confederation, any part of Canada's foreign relations not administered directly from London, had been o f f i c i a l l y under the care of the Canadian Secretary of State. In practice, any department of the government involved in some matter with external ramifications could approach the governor general and recommend a communication to the govern- ment concerned. Unless the matter were of major importance, this would be done without question. With different depart- ments acting without any necessary consultation, the result was often confusion. D i f f i c u l t i e s were common even i n important matters dealt with by the whole cabinet. One department would present some matter; the decision on i t would be made without necessarily any special reference being made to other departments that might be involved. Occasionally such a decision would differ radically from some previous decision. It was almost impossible to refer back to such previous decisions, because a l l correspondence was f i l e d separately by the various 131 departments concerned. There was no single f i l e of a l l correspondence having to do with external matters. More than once a foreign power brought to the attention of the Canadian government two such differing decisions, both of which had 1 been communicated to i t s government. The need for a single department to act as a clearing-house was evident. There was trouble too with incoming despatches. These were referred by the governor general's secretary either to the department he thought best fitt e d to answer or to other- wise deal with the contents, or directly to the cabinet. This made i t quite possible for other departments which might be concerned never to hear of the matter. Further, there was no one responsible for following up such despatches to make sure they had been adequately dealt with. The Colonial Office on a number of occasions complained about despatches that had remained unanswered. The f i r s t o f f i c i a l reference to the need for better machinery was made i n May 1907? by Joseph Pope, then Under- Secretary of State, to a Royal Commission on the C i v i l Service. Referring to the need for establishing a more systematic method of dealing with what he termed the external affairs of the dominion, he said: In the early days of Confederation, when these questions were few, the Prime Minister of the day kept 1 H. L. Keenleyside, "The Department of External Affairs," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 4 (Winter 1937-8), p. 485. 132 them pretty much in his own hands, but with the growth of the Dominion, this i s no longer possible. The practical result of the system in vogue i s that . . . there is no approach to continuity i n any of the departmental f i l e s . Such knowledge concerning them as i s available i s for the most part lodged i n the memories of a few o f f i c i a l s My suggestion i s , that a l l despatches relating to external affairs should be referred by the Privy Council to one department whose staff should contain men trained in the study of these questions and i n diplomatic correspondence.2 Pope was careful to point out that the change he proposed was one of method only: no constitutional change was 3 intended. A l l communications abroad would continue to be sent and received through the governor general. Two years later, on March 4, 1909, a b i l l to create the Department of External Affairs was introduced i n the House of Commons by the Hon. Charles Murphy, the Secretary of State. The name "External Affairs" was chosen because the work of the new department was to cover both foreign relations and inter- Imperial affairs. There would not for many years be enough work for two separate departments. More important, foreign relations were s t i l l conducted through the Colonial Office, so that to have called the department "Foreign Affairs" would not have been even technically correct. The debate was brief; there was l i t t l e opposition. 2 Joseph Pope, Memorandum for the Consideration of the C i v i l Service Commissioners, Sessional Papers of the Dominion of Canada, 1907-8, vol. 15, no. 29a, p. 49. 3 cf. Sir Joseph Pope, "The Federal Government," Canada and i t s Provinces, vol. VI, p. 324. 133 Both parties realized the need for this new machinery. Govern- ment speakers emphasized the growing volume of business and the confusion following from the lack of a central department and central f i l e s . They made i t very clear that the new department was a change only i n organization, not in the constitutional methods of the conduct of external affairs. Speakers from the Conservative party, the Opposition, raised as their main point the additional cost of the new department. It was not yet realized, even in parliament, that external affairs needed expert administration just as much as did internal affairs. Laurier summed up the debate: "The conclusion we have arrived at i s that the foreign affairs with which Canada has to deal, are becoming of such absorbing moment as to necessitate special machinery .'•4 The Order in Council creating the new department stated in part: The Committee of the Privy Council, who have had under consideration the question of the constitution of the Department of External Affairs, are of the opinion that i t would further the purposes for which the Depart- ment was established, i f a l l Despatches at present communicated by Your Excellency to the Privy Council, or direct to individual ministers, should be, i n the f i r s t instance, referred to the Prime Minister, and also to the Secretary of State as head of the Department of External Affairs, which Department shall then distribute them among the several departments to which they relate. The Committee further advise that in the case of such despatches so referred that c a l l for communication with the Secretary of State for the Colonies, or with His Majesty's representatives abroad, or with the 4 Canada, House of Commons Debates, 1909» P« 1978. 134 J government of any British possession, in respect of any matter forming the subject of diplomatic negotiation i n which Canada is interested, or any private claim on the part of any Canadian subject of His Majesty against any government, whether foreign or otherwise, external to the Dominion, the department or departments to which such Despatch was referred, shall furnish the Department of External Affairs with a l l available information bear- ing on the matter to which i t relates, and the Secretary of State having informed himself by this means, shall thereupon make a report in the premises to the Governor in Council.- As i t has developed, the work of the Department of External Affairs has been of six types. It has been responsible for the promotion of Canadian interests abroad. It has charge of the collection and weighing of information l i k e l y to affect Canadian international relationships. It handles a l l Canadian correspondence with foreign governments or foreign representa- tives i n Canada. It i s responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of treaties and other international agreements. It is i n charge of the representation of Canada at foreign capitals and at special international gatherings. Lastly, i t co-operates with the Department of Trade and Commerce i n the gathering of information l i k e l y to affect Canadian trade abroad. The head of the department is the Secretary of State for External Affairs. It had been Joseph Pope's idea that the department should be placed directly under the Prime Minister. When the B i l l was under discussion, this was changed to put i t under the Secretary for State, then the Hon. Charles Murphy. 5 Quoted i n Keenleyside, op_. c i t . , pp. 487-8. 135 In 1912, Borden had become Prime Minister and wished to keep external affairs, about which he was deeply concerned, more directly under his own control. He took charge of the new 6 department himself. Until 1946 the Prime Minister continued to hold the additional portfolio of the Secretary of State for External affairs. By that time the work of the department had become extensive enough to warrant the f u l l attention of one minister i n the Cabinet. The duties of the head of the department were set out in the B i l l creating i t : The Secretary of State, as head of the department, shall have the conduct of a l l o f f i c i a l communication between the government of Canada and the government of any other country i n connection with the external affairs of Canada, and shall be charged with such other duties as may, from time to time, be assigned to the department by order of the Governor in Council i n relation to such external affairs, or to the conduct and management of international or intercolonial negotiations so far as they may appertain to the Government of Canada.^ Also under his jurisdiction are foreign consular services i n Canada and the issuance of Canadian passports. There was some discussion outside parliament at the time that, considering the continuing role of the governor general i n external affairs, the word "conduct" in the above was scarcely accurate. At the time, "care", i t was suggested, would have fitte d the situation more closely. No change was made. 6 Canadian Annual Review. 1909, p. 200. 7 Statutes of Canada, 1909, eh. 13, p. 125. 136 To the Secretary of State for External Affairs belong; the primary responsibilities for the i n i t i a t i v e i n decisions on External Affairs and i n the formulation of policy. He must keep his colleagues in the cabinet informed and win their support for his policies. The conventions of cabinet government make the whole cabinet responsible for the external policy of the government. He defends or explains his policy i n parliament. Through him a l l advice to the governor general in matters pertaining to external affairs is formally given. The conduct of foreign affairs remains the function of the representative of the Crown; that i s , the governor general, on the advice of the minister. Finally, he i s responsible for the administration of the department and 8 for the actions of i t s o f f i c i a l s at home and abroad. The permanent head of the department under him is the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. He i s responsible to the Secretary of State for External Affairs for the work of the department and i s the channel by which matters reach this minister. Joseph Pope (afterwards Sir Joseph) was the f i r s t to hold this position, and the real architect of the department. On his retirement i n 1925 > he was replaced by 0. D. Skelton, then Dean of Arts and Head of the Department of P o l i t i c a l Science at Queen's University. Under him, the 8 G. E. H. Palmer, Consultation and Co-operation i n the British Commonwealth, London, 1934-, p. 34-. 137 9 department made i t s greatest growth. In i t s early years, the department was very small. At the end of World War I there was only one officer from i t included in the delegation to the Peace Conference, the legal adviser, Loring Christie. The department lacked the flow of information from abroad which diplomatic missions would later give i t . Thus i t was not i n a position to supply background material or experts to help the Canadian delegates. The need for the further development of the department was evident. In 1920, the department had a staff of three, not including the cl e r i c a l ranks. This was s t i l l the total staff in 1927- In 1928 there were five, and by 1929 the number at Ottawa had grown only to s e v e n . D u r i n g these earlier years some attempt had been made to organize the work of the various members of the department. However, the smallness of the staff made i t necessary for work often to be assigned to various members outside their special fields, and, since the different fields overlapped considerably, frequent contact and discussion between members was necessary. The work of the permanent staff at Ottawa is not the determination of policy, but rather the collection and organiza- tion of information on which policy w i l l be based, the preparation 9 H. L. Keenleyside, "Canada's Department of External Affairs," International Journal, vol. 1, no. 3, 194-6, p. 201. 10 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, &. History of Canadian External Relations, London, 1950, p. 383. 138 of memoranda on alternative courses of action open and the probable results of each, and the tendering of expert advice whenever required. Likewise, though the external policy of the government is put into effect in many ways, the Department of External Affairs takes charge of a l l correspondence or negotiations with other governments, whether through ordinary channels or through special conferences. In the early 1930's there was just beginning to be received information from the new legations abroad, to be added to that received from the High Commissioner i n London. There was s t i l l needed a body of experts of sufficient size and adequate background to digest what had been received and relate i t to other relevant material. Even the techniques of international relations were so far from being understood 11 that frequent inquiries on procedure had to be made in London. For instance, a few years earlier, during the correspondence in 1920 about proposals for permanent Canadian diplomatic representation at Washington, no one in Ottawa knew what 12 "letters of credence" were, or involved. By 1939 the department had grown considerably, though s t i l l only slowly. By this time there were fifty-eight perma- 13 nent employees stationed at Ottawa :and twenty officers 11 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 335. 12 Ibid., p. 368. 13 Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Statistics of the C i v i l Service of Canada, for the f i s c a l years ending March 31> 1937, 1938, and 1939, p. 24. 139 14 abroad, as High Commissioners in Britain and the other Dominions, and in the legations. There was likewise a con- siderable increase in expenditures. In the f i s c a l years 1929- 1930, the annual estimates gave the Department $748,000; i n 15 1939-40, $1,296,000. J Nearly a l l of these appointments, with the exception of some early ones and certain representatives abroad, had been assigned to the department with rank of third secretary on the basis of open competitive examination, publicly announced and held under the C i v i l Service Commission.1^ With the growing complexity of Canadian involvement in external affairs, and the growing volume of information being received from abroad, better organization of the depart- ment had to be worked out. In 1941 this was done, with a four-fold division of the staff under the Under-Secretary. An Assistant Under-Secretary, Laurent Beaudry, was in charge of the Diplomatic and Commercial Divisions; the legal adviser, J. E. Read, of the Legal Division; an Assistant Under-Secretary L. B. Pearson, of the British Commonwealth and European Division; and an Assistant Under-Secretary, H. L. Keenleyside, of the American and Far-Eastern Division. In addition there was the Administrative Branch, under the Chief Administrative Officer, 14 Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1939, pp. 19, 20. 15 Keenleyside, International Journal, p. 204. 16 H. G. Skill i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, Toronto, 1945, p. 263. 140 responsible for finance, personnel, supplies, and salaries. More or less dependent on this Branch were various other units — Records, Code and Cypher, the Library, and the Translator's 17 Office. The work of the department outside of Canada i s carried on by the legations and other representatives abroad, which are an integral part of the organization and are under i t s direction both as to policy and as to administration. In the following chapter the development of this other half of the department w i l l be discussed. 17 Sk i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, p. 273-4. Chapter VII The Development of Canadian Representation Abroad At the same time as the need for a single department of the government responsible for control over Canadian external affairs was becoming pressing, the need for direct and permanent Canadian representation i n the world abroad was growing increasingly evident. As David M i l l s , a prominent Liberal and an early advocate of the develppment of something resembling a Canadian diplomatic service, pointed out before the House of Commons i n 1882: "If we wish the Agents and Ambassadors residing at foreign ports to take a special interest in the commercial well-being of this country, we must have men whose positions are more or less affected by the attention they 1 give to the people of this country." That was the sore point. Canadian commercial interests, particularly after the adoption of a policy of protection, were frequently at a variance with those of Great Britain. British diplomacy had frequently been, not a bulwark for the growing Canadian economy, but a "history 2 of error, blunder, worry and concession." British agents and consuls knew l i t t l e of Canadian problems or potentialities, they 1 Canada, House of Commons Debates, A p r i l 21, 1882, p. 1081. 2 Edward Blake, quoted i n G. P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations, Toronto, 1950, p. 15o. 1 4 2 were under no obligation to the Canadian government to work for the extension of Canadian trade or the promotion of Canadian interests, and where there was a conflict of interests, they invariably placed the British interests f i r s t . As long as Canada retained a purely colonial status, Canadian diplomatic representation abroad, or even a Canadian consular service, were out of the question. Even with growing Canadian nationhood there were three reasons why this depend- ence on Bri t i s h representation abroad continued. The British government was reluctant to give Canada greater freedom of action. Canadian governments remained unwilling to assume the greater responsibilities that went with greater freedom i n world affair s . Some Canadians were c r i t i c a l of growing Canadian autonomy i n this as i n other spheres. The earliest Canadian representation abroad had two origins. F i r s t , there was the need for continual, responsible presentation of Canadian interests in London. This led, i n 1880, to the appointment of the f i r s t Canadian High Commissioner. Second, there was the need to promote Canadian commercial inter- ests and to secure immigration into Canada. There had been emigration agents abroad even before Confederation, but i n the 1880's these were increased i n number and commercial agents were appointed. As a representative of the Canadian government i n London, the High Commissioner had two predecessors. One 143 evolved from the emigration and commercial agents, to he dis- cussed later. In 1874, Edward Jenkins, a member of the British House of Commons, was appointed as "General Resident Agent for the Dominion and Superintendent of Emigration", changed at his own request to "Agent General for Canada in the United Kingdom". As emigration agent, he was under the Minister of Agriculture; for his other work, involving assistance to Canadians in London, and looking after business of a confidential or p o l i t i c a l nature in Britain, as he should be requested by the Canadian government, he was under the Canadian Secretary of State.^ Thus, while Jenkins had i n no sense ambassadorial powers, he was much more than an emigration agent. The other was Sir John Rose, a former Canadian minister of finance. Upon moving to Britain i n 1869 to become a member of a London banking firm, he was requested by an Order in Council to act there for the Canadian government in a long l i s t of matters specified, and i n others that should from time to time be referred to him. At the same time i t was recom- mended that he "be accredited to her Majesty's Government as a gentleman possessing the confidence of the Canadian government with whom Her Majesty's Government may properly communicate on 4 Canadian Affairs." Rose urged that the appointment be kept 3 H. Gordon Skilling, Canadian Representation Abroad, Toronto, 1945, p. 86. 4 Morden H. Long, "Sir John Rose and the Informal Beginnings of the Canadian High Commissionership," The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 12, no. 1, March 1931» p. 27. 144 informal in character. To this Macdonald agreed, though Rose's status was actually l i t t l e different from that granted when the f i r s t High Commissioner was appointed. During the next ten years he handled a wide variety of matters, though after the Liberal government took office i n 1873, his work tended to be largely financial. He was involved i n negotia- tions concerning the handing over to the Canadian government of territories held by the Hudson's Bay Company i n the North West, and he helped arrange joint action by the British and Canadian governments in the Riel Rebellion in 1869. He helped make arrangements for the Washington Conference of 1871. In addition he sent to the Canadian Prime Minister much valuable 5 information on developments in Britain. His close friendship with Macdonald made him most valuable to the Canadian govern- ment. He was always i n close touch with them, and was expected to act in any matter of importance only on their specific instructions. It was evident that this informal type of representa- tion was not sufficient to handle growing Canadian needs i n London. Macdonald had sent Sir Alexander Gait to Europe i n 1878, to assist i n the discussion of trade treaties between Canada and France and Spain. Only four months later, Gait was back in London again, with other Canadian ministers, to discuss 5 David M. Farr, "Sir John Rose and Imperial Relations," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 33, no. 1, March 1952, p. 24. 145 the railway situation. The need for a permanent Canadian representative in England was obvious. Canadian development required constant and personal communication that neither an informal part-time representative nor o f f i c i a l despatches through the governor general were adequate to give. It had become a serious inconvenience for Canadian ministers to have to travel to London so frequently. As a result, while they were in England i n the summer of 1879» Macdonald, Tupper and Ti l l e y presented a memorandum to the Colonial Secretary, Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, setting forth the proposal for a resident minister, the reasons the appointment seemed necessary, and 6 the functions such a minister would be expected to perform. The functions suggested were four: promotion of emigration, representation of commercial interests, care of financial interests, and representation of the general interests of Canada in Britain, as Canadian spokesman to the British govern- ment. The memorandum was c r i t i c a l l y received. The Colonial Secretary disapproved of the suggested semi-diplomatic charac- ter of the office, and argued that the nature and functions of the proposed office would have to be decided upon by the Imperial Foreign Secretary. In the Canadian reply to this criticism, i t was pointed out that the Canadian government had as much right to advise the Crown as the Imperial government, 6 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1880, no. 105. 146 i n fact more so on the many matters on which complete control 7 had been handed over to Canada. Finally the British govern- ment agreed to the appointment of a "High Commissioner of Canada in London." In April 1880 Macdonald appointed Sir Alexander Gait, who held the office for the next three years. Gait was appointed under the great seal of Canada and received his instructions from the Canadian Secretary of 8 State. On general matters he was to correspond with the Secretary of State; on financial questions, with the Minister of Finance; and on emigration matters, with the Minister of Agriculture. As chief emigration agent, he was instructed to make the encouragement of emigration to the Canadian West his f i r s t responsibility. At his suggestion the various emigration agents abroad were put under the control of the High Commission- er's Office. Both Gait and his successor, Sir Charles Tupper, spent much time and effort on this part of their work. The need was great to reduce the burden of the West on the Canadian 9 taxpayer. The financial responsibilities of the Office involved the handling of matters involving the Canadian public debt in Britain and of other financial correspondence between the Canadian and the British governments. At various times i n 7 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1880, no. 105. 8 The Dominion Annual Register for 1880-1881, Montreal, 1882, p. 71. 9 See O.D.Skelton, The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Gait, Toronto, 1920, pp. 540-4, and E.M.Saunders, The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, Bart.,K.C.M.G., London, 1916, vol. 2, pp. 15, 16. 147 the next few years High Commissioners were charged with carry- ing out negotiations with regard to the Esquimalt graving dock, assisting the Canadian cattle trade, and sounding out the British government on further assistance to the Canadian Pacific Railway and on the possibility of a British zollverein. With regard to foreign affairs, the High Commissioner was responsi- ble for handling the fisheries question arising out of the Treaty of Washington. Finally, he was given careful instruc- tions with regard to commercial treaties. Gait wished this part of his duties to receive the most importance in public attention. He suggested that some important commercial negotiations be begun at the same time as he was sent to England, and that there be a delay of some months in putting him in charge of financial and emigration matters. Whenever special arrangements i n a treaty were desired in Canadian interests, the British government would be asked to accredit the High Commissioner to the foreign power concerned to act i n concert with the Imperial representative. 1^ Gait was succeeded as High Commissioner by Sir Charles Tupper, who held the office until I896. Already the office was growing i n dignity and importance. Tupper was cri t i c i z e d for holding both the office of High Commissioner and of Minister of Railways, and for taking part in the election of 1891> on the grounds that a diplomat should remain outside party p o l i t i c s . Sir John 10 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 153. 148 Thompson, expressing one point of view, stated in the House of Commons that the High Commissioner " i s nothing but the agent of the government li v i n g i n London . . . he does not occupy either at home or abroad such a position as an ambas- sador in the diplomatic service of the British government 11 holds." Macdonald f e l t differently, expressing his views i n a private letter to Lord Stanley, "By degrees the Colonial Ministers have begun to treat the colonial representatives as diplomatic agents rather than as subordinate executive agents and to consult them as such. Canada has found i t advantageous on several occasions to have Sir Charles Tupper dealt with as 12 a quasi-member of the corps diplomatique." Tupper was succeeded i n 1896 by Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal. Following his death i n 1914, Sir George Perley, a Minister without Portfolio in the Borden Cabinet, had gone to London to replace him untilaa new appointment could be made, and to consider the status of the High Commissioner and possible changes. With the outbreak of war, he continued as both a resident Canadian minister and acting High Commissioner u n t i l 1917, when he l e f t the Cabinet and was appointed High Commis- 13 sioner. The war emergency greatly increased the semi- diplomatic duties of the.office i n relation to the British 11 Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 29, 1891, p. 575. 12 Macdonald to Governor General the Lord Stanley of Preston, August 15, 1890. In Sir Joseph Pope, Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald, Toronto, 1921, p. 472. 13 S k i l l i n g , op., c i t . , pp. 110, 111. 149 14 government. The growing number of Canadian troops i n England and on the continent led to further Canadian representation in Britain. At f i r s t most of the duties involved in the super- vision and administration of the Canadian military forces were undertaken by the acting High Commissioner, though there was also a resident representative of the Minister of M i l i t i a . In October 1916, the Department of Overseas Military Forces, with a resident minister in London, was created as a more effective means of administration. At f i r s t Perley held the office, in addition to his duties as Resident Minister and acting High Commissioner. In November 1917? when Perley became High Commissioner, Sir Edward Kemp was put i n charge, and remained u n t i l the Department was closed with the return 15 of Canadian troops in 1919. Also during and after the war there was a great i n - crease in the number of representatives of other Canadian government departments i n London, with consequent overlapping and lack of co-ordination. To cla r i f y matters, two steps were taken. The High Commissioner's Office was, by Order i n Council in March 1921, placed under the jurisdiction of the Department 16 of External Affairs. When the next High Commissioner, the 14 Sk i l l i n g , op. c i t . , p. 111. 15 Ibid., p. 112. 16 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1921, no. 102. 150 Hon. Peter Larkin, was appointed i n 1922, the opportunity was taken to re-define the duties of the office, and to return to the original policy of making the High Commissioner responsible for the supervision of a l l Canadian interests i n Britain and 17 of a l l other Canadian agencies there. To make this more easily possible, Canada House was purchased and opened i n London in 1924. Under the Bennett government, this policy was s t r i c t l y followed, but under the following Liberal regime i t was somewhat relaxed, though the authority of the High Commis- sioner to supervise the activities of a l l other agents was stated again i n the statue of 1938 concerning the High Commis- 18 sioner. Mr. Larkin was succeeded i n 1930 by the Hon. Vincent Massey, who retired almost at once when the Conservatives under Bennett came into power. He was replaced by the Hon. G. H. Ferguson, former Conservative premier of Ontario. With the return of the Liberal government in 1935? Ferguson was replaced 19 by Massey. This was a change from the earlier policy, when appointees like Tupper and Strathcona remained in office for years, despite changes of government i n Canada. Through the years the scope and activities of the office increased. More and more consultation and communication 17 S k i l l i n g , op., c i t . , 122. 18 Statutes of Canada, 1938, 2 Geo. VI, chap. 30, p. 93. 19 Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, (hereafter referred to as External Affairs), 1935? p. 8. 151 on matters of minor importance took place through the High Commissioner directly. An increasing part of his time was taken up with the exercise of what are really diplomatic functions. He was given the right of direct access to the members of the British government, though most of his dealings were with the Colonial Office, later with the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs. The question of the status of the High Commissioners was thoroughly discussed at the Imperial Conference of 1923. As a result i t was announced in a statement made by the Dominions office on July 28, 1924, that the High Commissioners for Canada and the other Dominions should take precedence immediately after British or Dominion ministers i f present, otherwise immediately after that accorded by the Table of Precedence to Secretaries of State. In 1925 they were granted exception from payment of United Kingdom customs and income taxes. They do not, however, possess diplomatic immunity. In 1931, after further discussion at the Imperial Conference in 1930, i t was announced that the Dominion High Commissioners should on a l l ceremonial occasions, except when ministers of the Crown from the respective Dominions are present, rank 20 immediately after the Secretaries of State. A further advance i n the importance of the High Commissioner's office had followed the Imperial Conference of 20 G. E. H. Palmer, Consultation and Co-operation i n the British Commonwealth, Oxford, 1934, p. 242. 152 1926. In the Summary of Proceedings i t was stated: It seemed to us to follow that the practice whereby the Governor General of a Dominion is the formal channel of communication between His Majesty's Government i n Britain and His Governments in the Dominions might be regarded as no longer wholly in accordance with the con- stitutional position of the Governor General. It was thought that the recognized o f f i c i a l channel of communication should be, in future, between Government and Government direct.^. Thus was removed what had been an obstacle to the development of the Office since the time of Gait and Tupper, the insistence by various governors general on their own prerogative as the o f f i c i a l channel of communication between the Canadian and the British governments. Tupper had complained that he was not informed of Cabinet minutes sent to the Colonial Secretary through the governor general, and several governors general had complained that Tupper sometimes communicated directly with the Colonial Office, without waiting for those communica- tions to be initiated by the Canadian government through the governor general. Both Lord Landsdowne and Lord Stanley made 22 this complaint. With the new position of the governor general i n 1926, as solely the representative of the Crown in Canada, the High Commissioner became the o f f i c i a l channel of communication between the Canadian and the British governments, though the 21 Quoted i n H. L. Keenleyside, wThe Department of External Affairs," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 44, no. 4, Winter 1937-8, p. 491. 22 Skil l i n g , op_. c i t . , p. 100. 153 practice of direct correspondence between the two Prime Ministers has also developed. A further development was involved i n the change in status of the governor general. To replace his function as a channel of communication between the British and Canadian governments, i t was necessary to appoint a British government representative at Ottawa. Sir William Clark was appointed the f i r s t British High Commissioner to Canada .in 1928. At this time, various points of view were s t i l l held as to the extent the office was diplomatic in nature. Mackenzie King stated i n 1927> "The position of High Commissioner" has become increasingly significant as a diplomatic post, and within the empire between Canada and Great Britain his position does correspond to the position an ambassador would hold 24 between nations." Some months later, he spoke of the High Commissionership as the highest post in the diplomatic service of Canada, because of the greater importance of Canadian con- 25 tacts with Britain than with any other nation. On the other hand, R. B. Bennett and the Conservatives held a different view. Bennett believed i t necessary that the High Commissioner should enjoy the fullest confidence of the Canadian government, should be practically a member of the government. Thus when 23 External Affairs, 1928, p. 7« 24 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 13, 1927, p. 2465. 25 Ibid., January 31, 1928, pp. 58-9. 154 he took office as Prime Minister i n 1930, he had replaced the recent Liberal appointee, Mr. Massey, with a Conservative, Mr. Ferguson. He also pointed out that the High Commissioner is a c i v i l servant, an appointee of the government, while an ambassador i s not, but i s appointed by the Crown on the advice of the government. Whatever the legal status of the High Commissioner, by 1939 the post was i n a l l but name a diplomatic one, and the highest in the Canadian diplomatic service. Briefly the work of the High Commissioner's Office included: acting as the channel of communication between the governments of Canada and Great Britain; supplying information on Canada to British enquirers; providing assistance to Canadian business men and other Canadians i n Britain; acting as agent for the Canadian government in negotiations with other countries; supplying delegates to international and inter-commonwealth conferences; and keeping the Department of External Affairs in Ottawa informed as to relevant conditions in Britain. In addition to the High Commissioner's Office, there have at different times been various other Canadian representa- tives of a more or less permanent nature i n Great Britain. Emigration agents and trade commissioners are mentioned below. Various provinces had had Agents General from early times, the earliest being Nova Scotia (1761). The separate agencies were replaced In 1833 by the Joint Crown Agents Department, appointed 153 by the British Colonial Secretary to represent both North American and other colonies. After 1880 separate agencies were again established by various provinces. Under Tupper these worked closely with the High Commissioner, but under Lord Strathcona they were denied o f f i c i a l recognition, i t being insisted that the High Commissioner was the sole rep- resentative of the Dominion, including a l l the provinces. After World War I, in spite of the attempt of different provin- c i a l agents to get recognition and access to the Colonial Secretary, the supervision of the High Commissioner's Office over a l l other Canadian agencies was, as has been mentioned, tightened. During the 1930's a l l the provincial agencies, 26 except that of British Columbia, were discontinued. In 1939 there was one other Canadian office i n London. In 1923 the Office of the Royal Canadian Air Force Liaison Officer was established to maintain close contact between the Royal Air Force and the Royal Canadian Air Force. The Officer in charge held a commission in the R. C. A. F., and on routine matters and those involving organization, he communicated directly with the Senior Air Officer i n the R. C. A. F. at Ottawa, but on matters involving policy and finance he communicated through the High Commissioner and the Department of External Affairs. 2? 26 S k i l l i n g , op. c i t . , pp. 107-110, 119-121 27 Palmer, op., c i t . , p. 41. 156 The need for closer communication between the gov- ernments of the dominions as well as with Great Britain had become apparent in the period before 1939. It was urged i n the unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference In 1933 that some system of representation in the dominion capi- 28 tals similar to the High Commissioner in London be worked out. South Africa did send a representative to Canada in 1938, and Ireland, a High Commissioner i n 1939. The Canadian government announced in 1938 that i t was considering sending representa- tives to the other Dominions, but nothing was done until after the outbreak of war in 1939. On September 11 i t was announced that High Commissioners would be sent to Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and Ireland. On November 3, Mr. C. J. Burchell was appointed to the office i n Australia. It was announced that Dr. W. A. Riddell would be sent to New Zealand, Mr. J. H. Kelly, to Ireland, and Dr. Henry Laureys to South Africa. 29 As regards the second of the origins of Canadian representation abroad, the need to secure immigration into Canada and to promote Canadian commercial interests abroad, the f i r s t developments go back even further than the origins of the High Commissionership, further back even than Confederation. In 1866, Mr. William Dixon had been appointed by the Province 28 A. J. Toynbee, ed., British Commonwealth Relations, Proceedings of the F i r s t Unofficial Conference, 1933, London, 1934, p. 74, 75. 29 External Affairs, 1939, p. 15- 157 of Canada to serve as Canadian Agent for Immigration at Liverpool. After the formation of the Dominion, Dixon moved to London as head of a Dominion Agency of Immigration. Under him there were soon appointed subordinate agents in various British c i t i e s , such as Liverpool, Bristo l , Glasgow, Belfast, Dublin, and others, and also on the Continent, at Antwerp and Paris, and from time to time in Switzerland, Germany and Den- mark as conditions permitted. These were followed i n 1873 and 1874- by agents in the United States, appointed particularly to encourage the return of Canadians, especially those of French origin. The numbers of these different agents varied from time to time, affected by economic conditions and govern- ment policy as well as by the ho s t i l i t y of certain European governments, such as that of Germany, to emigration. On the whole, they increased until World War I. In 1903 there were ten in the British Isles, two on the Continent, and twenty-two in the United States. Many more were added i n the next decade, the period of the greatest immigration i n Canadian history. After some temporary interruptions during the war, most of the offices so established remained in operation until the outbreak of World War II. Those i n the United States were closed during the depression years, and a l l the others, except the Commis- sioner of European Emigration for Canada in London and one 31 inspectional post in Lisbon, f e l l victims to the war. 30 H. G. Sk i l l i n g , ""The Development of Canada's Permanent External Representationy" The Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 194-3? p. 82. 61 S k i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, pp. 4, 5. 158 These early agents were the forerunners of the High Commissioners and of the legations abroad, even though they were in no sense diplomatic i n status or function. They were not representatives of the head of their own state, nor were they accredited to the head of the state where they were stationed, nor did they have any o f f i c i a l relationship with the government involved, similar to that a consul has. As a result any quasi-diplomatic immunities or status they held in various places were simply the result of informal arrange- ments with the countries involved, and not a part of the nature of the post. In practice, they did perform many of 32 the functions of consuls. Actually they did not even rep- resent the whole Canadian government, but only the particular department responsible for immigration: the Department of Agriculture to 1892, the Department of the Interior u n t i l 1917? the Department of Immigration and Colonization to 1936, and 33 after that the Department of Mines and Resources. They were brought into being, as were most new devel- opments in Canadian nationhood, not as part of a process of planned constitutional growth, but simply as the most effective way to meet a specific need. Although the British diplomatic and consular services were available to the Canadian govern- ment, these o f f i c i a l s had l i t t l e interest in encouraging 32 S k i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, pp 6. 33 Ibid., p. 7. 159 emigration, particularly from those countries opposed to i t . Representation was needed especially in Britain i t s e l f , con- sidered the most desirable source of settlers, to s e l l the attractions of Canada and reach prospective emigrants. The development of commercial agents too was the result of a specific need. The development of export markets was necessary both as a source of income to Canadians and as a method of interesting and attracting emigrants from abroad. As has been pointed out, British agents and ambassadors were not satisfactory. They had neither sufficient interest nor adequate information, nor any responsibility to the Canadian government. M f i r s t the emigration agents took much of the responsibility for commercial promotion, and many, such as John Dyke in Liverpool, were extremely active in promoting Canadian trade and in sending back extensive reports on trade 34 opportunities. The High Commissioner's Office too spent considerable time and effort on commercial functions. But by the mid-18801s i t was apparent that some distinct form of permanent commercial representation was necessary. In 1885 $10,000 was voted by the government for "Commercial agencies.11 In I887 and just after, agents were sent to the West Indies, Australia, the Sandwich Islands, Japan, Cuba, Puerto l i c o , 35 Brazil and Argentina, but not as permanent residents. By 34 Sk i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, p. 47. 35 Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 17, 1887, p. 1112. 160 1892 the Minister of Finance, Mr. Foster, had eight permanent agencies established, one in Paris, two (also emigration agents,) in Great Britain, and five in the West Indies. He looked to- ward the day when there would be a Canadian commercial representative "at every important trade centre i n countries 36 with which we have large business relations." Two years later the number had almost doubled, and one agent i n Europe, in Norway, was included. A l l these agents, however, were merely businessmen serving on a part-time basis. The f i r s t full-time agent was Mr. J. S. Larke, sent to Australia i n 37 1895. By 1907, when the term "commercial agent" was discarded except for part-time representatives and replaced with the name "trade commissioners," the service had grown considerably. In 1914 there were three commercial agents and sixteen trade 38 commissioners. In 1893 these agents had been placed under the new Department of Trade and Commerce, under the supervision of a special branch that f i n a l l y (1921) became the Commercial Intelligence Service. After World War I the service was con- siderably expanded, until i n 1939 there were 34 offices abroad, 39 with 61 trade commissioners of f u l l or assistant rank. 7 The trade commissioners were even closer than the emigration agents to the status and function of a consul. But 36 Canada, House of Commons Debates. June 30, 1892, pp. 4427-8. 37 S k i l l l n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, p. 51. 38 Loc. c i t . 39 Canada Year Book, 1939, pp. 471-2. 161 they too were actually neither diplomatic nor consular, however many of the duties of a consul they might perform. Any privileges granted similar to those of a consul were unofficial only, not by right of office. Again they were not representatives abroad of the Canadian government, but only of the Department of Trade and Commerce. No Canadian consuls abroad were appointed u n t i l after 1939* Foreign countries, however, had had consuls in Canada since those appointed by Belgium, Portugal and Denmark i n 1850. By 1910 40 there were consular agents from 32 countries i n Canada. Both Laurier and Borden had found i t convenient to carry on diplomatic or commercial negotiations with these representa- 41 tives, because of the lack of Canadian diplomatic service. By 1939) no fewer than 47 countries had consulates in Canada, with a total of 291 officers, of which 121 were full-time 42 career officers, citizens of the countries represented. The right of Canada to truly diplomatic representa- tion abroad, the right of legation, took longer to achieve. Among the reasons were the unwillingness of the British govern- ment and also of many Canadians, including many leading Conser- vative statesmen, to concede the step; the slow development of adequate staff i n the Department of External Affairs; and the long-held doctrine of the diplomatic unity of the Empire- 40 External Affairs, 1910, p. 13-17. 41 Glazebrook, Canadian Representation Abroad, pp. 233? 4. 42 External Affairs, 1939, pp. 24-28. 162 Commonwealth. The right was achieved with the establishment in 1927 of the Canadian Legation in Washington. A long pro- cess of development of less formal representation there took place before this f i n a l step. Canadian dissatisfaction with the services of British diplomacy was f e l t more keenly in Canadian-American relations than elsewhere, because of the volume of the business involved, because of the lack of interest i n and information about Canadian conditions shown by various British representatives, and because of the cumbersome way the system forced matters to be handled. There was no provision for direct contact between Ottawa and Washington; everything had to go through London, travelling by way of the Governor General in Ottawa, the Colonial and then the Foreign Office in London, and the British 43 Ambassador in Washington. J Among early proposals for Canadian representation i n Washington were those made i n 1888 by Sir Richard Cartwright, 44 later Liberal Minister of Finance, and by the High Commissioner Sir Charles Tupper. Tupper wrote, "As the duties devolving upon the British Minister at Washington are almost altogether in connection with Canada, and the United States complain so bitterly of the circumlocution and time lost i n sending to 43 See complaint re the awkwardness of this situation i n the fisheries question made by T. F. Bayard, American Secret- ary of State, to Sir Charles Tupper, May 31, 1887, i n Sir Charles Tupper, Recollections of Sixty Years i n Canada, Toronto, 1914, pp. 177-80. 44 Canada, House of Commons Debates, February 18, 1889, p.174. 163 England — back to Canada — back to England, and then back to Washington and so on ad infinitum, I would meet their 45 objection by sending a Canadian statesman to Washington." His own opinion was that Macdonald should be offered a peer- age and the position of British Minister in Washington. The matter was further brought into public discus- sion by the debates i n parliament during the next few years on the right of Canadian representation in commercial negotiations. One proposal was that made i n 1892 by the independent Conserva- tive D'Alton McCarthy, that a representative should be appointed by the Canadian government and attached to the staff of the British Ambassador i n Washington, to guard and represent 46 Canadian interests. Tupper agreed, as long as the relation- ship between Canada and the Empire were not changed. He proposed discussions be undertaken with the British government 47 on the subject. The Liberals agreed that the idea of a Canadian attache to the British Embassy was the best solution at that time. Because the British government saw a serious threat in any such proposal to the diplomatic unity of the Empire, discussions ceased for several years. The f i r s t real step i n Canadian representation i n Washington was the creation of the International Joint 45 Tupper to Macdonald, December 1, 1888, in Pope, op_. c i t . , pp. 431-2. 46 Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 2, 1892, pp. 1950-1. 47 Ibid., May 11, 1892, pp. 2463, 2467- 164 Commission. This body was the successor of the International Waterways Commission, a Canadian-American body that had evolved in 1905 from the Irrigation Congresses of 1894 and 1895' Its functions were limited to investigation into boun- 48 dary waters problems. A body with wider powers was really needed, as the members of the Commission themselves agreed. The result was the International Joint Commission, set up under the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. It was given four main functions: to pass on applications for the use or diver- sion of boundary waters; to see to the distribution of certain boundary waters for irrigation; to investigate and report on such matters concerning the common frontier as should be submitted to i t by the two governments; and to act as arbitra- 49 tor on any question submitted to i t by both governments. As regards the f i r s t two, i t s decisions are binding; i n the third, i t has the power of recommendation only; and i n the fourth, the only one i n 1939 never yet used, i t would act as a voluntary court of arbitration. In the f i r s t three i t has achieved a 50 notable record of successes. 48 H. L. Keenleyside, Canada and the United States, revised edition, New York, 1952, pp. 397, 8. 49 1909, Treaty Between His Majesty and the United States of America Relating to Boundary Waters and Questions Arising along; the Boundary between Canada and the United States, in Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada in Force between His Ma.jesty and the United States of America, 1814-1925, Ottawa, 1927, Articles 6, 8, 9, and 10, pp. 315-7. 50 See for earlier cases R. A. MacKay, "The International Joint Commission between the United States and Canada," The American Journal of International Law, vol. 22, no. 2, April 1928, pp. 293-311. For cases 1936-9, see L. J. Burpee, "The International Joint Commission," Canada i n World Affairs, The Pre-War Years, Toronto, 1941, pp. 227-235. 165 The Commission meets twice a year, in April i n Washington and i n October in Ottawa, and may be specially called at any time. It is composed of six members, three from each country, each division choosing i t s own chairman, 51 who acts in a l l meetings on his own side of the boundary. Canadian appointments are made by the King on the advice of the Canadian government, but after 1928 there was no longer even the formality of any participation by the British gov- ernment. As Mackenzie King announced then, members there- after would have their commissions signed, not by the British Foreign Secretary, but by the Canadian Secretary of State for 52 External Affairs. The work of the Commission has been much more that of a jud i c i a l than of a diplomatic nature. Nevertheless, i t marked a big step forward i n Canadian control over external affairs. It removed a large part of Canadian foreign relations from British to direct Canadian control. The next big step was brought about by the entry of the United States into the war in 1917. Some better form of machinery was necessary to make easier the necessary co-opera- tion and co-ordination between the two governments. In 51 MacKay, op., c i t . , p. 314. 52 Canada, House of Commons Debates, March 15, 1928, pp. 1347-8. 166 October 1917, Borden telegraphed to the High Commissioner the government's decision to set up some sort of direct channel of communication, proposing that the Minister of Mar- ine and Fisheries, J. D. Hazen, be appointed with some suitable t i t l e . In everything involving Britain or the rest of the Empire, he would consult with the British Embassy, but i n matters concerning Canada only, he would deal directly with the United States government. Sir George Perley, the High Commissioner, reported the Colonial Secretary's reactions — he would approve i f the appointment were for the duration of the war only, and i f Hazen should be attached to the British Embassy. J. The f i r s t condition was acceptable to Borden, the second was not. His reply i s interesting. For many years questions of great importance arising between the United States and Canada, respect- ing disputes as to delimitation and use of boundary waters, the management of international fishery waters and many other subjects have been disposed of by com- missioners appointed by the two governments or by conference between United States and Canadian o f f i c i a l s and with excellent results. . . . To these methods of procedure I am not aware that any constitutional objections have been or can be urged. They have developed naturally by ignoring old forms which have lost their meaning and adopting direct and business- like methods of communication. It i s v i t a l l y important that such development should continue. . . . My proposal involves a suitable and dignified status for Canada's representative, but there is no desire ^ to create anything i n the nature of a separate Embassy. Further action was postponed for a time because of the November election, and because Hazen had accepted a 53 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 366 54 Ibid., pp. 366, 7. 167 Judicial appointment. On February 2, 1918, however, an Order In Council was signed constituting the Canadian War Mission at Washington, with Lloyd Harris, representative of the Imperial Munitions Board i n Washington, appointed chairs-- 55 man. The status of the War Mission was somewhat peculiar. Borden stated that i n effect i f not i n form i t was "a diplo- matic mission," i t s duties including those usually considered 56 diplomatic. But because of the fear that separate diplomatic representation would be entirely incompatible with the diplomatic unity of the Empire, diplomatic standing was refused the Mission. After the war, while discussions as to arrangements for permanent Canadian representation i n Washington were being carried on, the War Mission was continued for a time. Even after the other members had returned home, Merchant Mahoney, the secretary, remained un t i l the closing of the Mission in 1921. After that he stayed i n Washington as Agent of the Department of External Affairs, in an office i n the British Embassy. He had no diplomatic status, and was involved almost entirely i n commercial work, that of a diplomatic nature s t i l l being handled by the British Embassy. Until the opening of the Canadian legation i n 1927, he was the only Canadian repres- entative i n the United States, except for a trade commissioner and later a customs officer i n New York. 55 Henry Borden, ed., Robert Laird Bordenr His Memoirs. Toronto, 1938, vol. 2, p. 678. 56 R. L. Borden, Canada i n the Commonwealth, Oxford, 1929, p. 96. 168 Late i n 1918 the question of permanent representation was again raised. The case for the Canadian government was stated by Borden i n a despatch sent on October 3, 1918, to Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary. After pointing out the need and the strong feeling i n Canada i n favour of better representation, he recommended the appointment of a Canadian minister i n Washington, to be appointed by the Canadian govern- ment and to receive his instructions through the Canadian Department of External Affairs, but to form a part of the 57 British Embassy. Until this time the British Foreign Office had been strongly opposed to separate Canadian representation abroad, but Lord Milner was more favourable, as long as the diplomatic unity of the Empire could be maintained. After considerable further discussion and correspondence between the British and Canadian governments, an agreement was reached and announced simultaneously in both parliaments. As a result of recent discussions, an arrangement has been concluded between the British and Canadian governments to provide more complete representation at Washington of Canadian interests than has hitherto existed. Accordingly i t has been agreed that His Majesty, on the advice of His Canadian Ministers, shall appoint a Minister Plenipotentiary, who w i l l have charge of Canadian affairs, and w i l l at a l l times be the ordinary channel of communication with the United States government i n matters of purely Canadian concern, acting on instructions from, and reporting direct to, the Canadian government. In the absence of the Ambas- sador, the Canadian minister w i l l take charge of the whole Embassy and of representation of Imperial, as well as Canadian, interests. He w i l l be accredited by His Majesty to the President with necessary powers for the purpose. 57 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, pp. 1002,3 169 This new arrangement w i l l not denote any departure, either on the part of the British Government or of the Canadian Government, from the principle of the diplomatic unity of the British Empire.^g In spite of this, no appointment was made for six years, even though funds were voted annually in parliament for the establishment of a mission. There were several d i f f i c u l t i e s . It was hard to find a suitable man for the post. The Canadian Department of External Affairs was s t i l l very small, lacking both adequate staff and knowledge for the proposed change. The Borden government was defeated i n 1921, and while the new Prime Minister, Mackenzie King, supported the idea of represen- tation in Washington, he strongly disapproved of the way i t had been arranged, associated there with the British Embassy. Further, the Minister of Finance, W. S. Fielding, was strongly opposed to the whole idea, and certain other Liberal leaders were certainly not too favourable. Finally on November 5» 1926, the King was requested by the Canadian government to appoint the Hon. Vincent Massey as "Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the United States, to have charge of Canadian affairs and to serve as the ordinary channel of communication with the United States government i n matters of Canadian concern, acting upon 58 iftnnouncment in the British House of Commons, May 10, 1920, in R. M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936, London, 1937>" p. 202. 170 instructions from the Canadian government and reporting to 59 i t . " The British government was informed that Canada no longer wished her representative to be part of the British Embassy nor to be responsible for Imperial as well as Canadian affairs i n the absence of the Ambassador. The approval of the United States was secured through the British government. On February 18, 1927? Mr. Massey formally presented his credentials to the President. Thus with the f i n a l achievement of the right of legation, a long step forward was t aken in the development and international recognition of Canada's new international status, and i n Canadian control over external affairs. It was made perfectly clear i n the correspondence prior to the appointment that the new Canadian minister would in no way be subject to the control of the British Ambassador i n Washington. The concept of diplomatic unity was satified by the fact that f u l l powers and letters of credence were issued to the Canadian minister by the King under the Great Seal of the Realm and thus with the co- operation of the Imperial government. The arrangements made were subsequently approved at the Imperial Conference, and the way opened to the establishment of other Canadian legations. The original staff at Washington was very small, consisting only of the Minister, a F i r s t Secretary, a Commercial 59 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1927? no. 131, not printed, quoted in Ski l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, p. 212. 171 60 Secretary (Merchant Mahoney), and a Third Secretary. By 1933 there was s t i l l only a staff of five, and by 1938, only of six. Massey was replaced as Minister i n 1930 by the Hon. W. D. Herridge, who held the office u n t i l 1935. The Hon. Sir 61 Herbert Marler was Minister from 1936 to 1939. At f i r s t the American government had not been anxious to reciprocate. President Coolidge apparently was not i n favour. However, in February 1927 i t was decided to open a legation in Ottawa. William P h i l l i p s , then American Ambassa- dor to Belgium, was appointed and presented his credentials to 62 the Governor General i n Ottawa on June 1, 1927 • Before the f i n a l establishment of the legation at Washington, one permanent representative abroad had already been appointed, the Advisory Officer at Geneva. The distance of Canada from the League of Nations and the consequent d i f f i - culty and expense of arranging representation, not only at the regular Assembly meetings, but i n a l l League affairs and in the increasing number of League Conferences to which Canada was being invited, made i t desirable to have a Canadian sta- tioned at Geneva. Particularly d i f f i c u l t to achieve had been representation on the Governing Body of the International Labour Organization, since the Minister of Labour, nominally the 60 S k i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, p. 216. 61 Ibid., Appendix, p. 346. 62 Ibid., p. 232, note 105. 172 Canadian representative, found i t impossible to be absent so much from Ottawa. At times a British representative had been used, but this was not desirable. Consequently on December 17> 1924, the position of Canadian Advisory Officer, League of Nations, was created, and Dr. W. A. Riddell, an o f f i c i a l of the 6̂ I. L. 0. since 1920, appointed. This can be described as the f i r s t appointment of a Canadian to represent Canada permanently in an international 64 capacity abroad. While the Canadian government did not con- sider the post diplomatic i n status, and though the post was different from the ordinary diplomatic one, in that the Advisory Officer was not accredited to the head of a state, Riddell found the work involved was largely diplomatic i n character. I soon found my diplomatic functions were legion. Apart from a High Commissioner i n London and an Agent - General i n Paris, two conntries raci a l l y linked with Canada, I was the f i r s t Canadian representative to be accredited to the outside world, although in my case i t was to an institution instead of to a government or to the head of a state. My new duties, I soon discovered, consisted primar- i l y of representing my Government at Conferences and Commissions. There were years when I sat in League and International Labour Organization meetings more than two hundred days .zc It at once became customary to appoint Dr. Riddell as representative to the Governing Body of the I. L. 0. and to 63 Sk i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, pp. 165-6. 64 F. H. Soward, "Canada and the League of Nations," International Conciliation, no. 283, October 1932, p. 373. 65 W. A. Riddell, World Security bv Conference, Toronto, 1947, p. 28. 173 the annual Labour Conferences. In addition he served from year to year as alternate delegate to the Assembly, and at times as a f u l l Canadian delegate. Dr. Riddell was succeeded in 1937 by Mr. H. Hume Wrong. His t i t l e was changed i n 1938 to "Permanent Delegate of Canada to the League of Nations," as being more descriptive of the true nature of the office. The opening of the f i r s t Canadian legation i n Wash- ington was followed by others. The logical second was i n Paris, because of both racial and commercial tie s . Canada had been represented in France ever since the Hon. Hector Fabre was appointed Commissioner General i n 1882. He had been spec i f i - cally charged with the promotion of emigration to Canada and of trade. In this he was later assisted by an emigration agent and a trade commissioner. Certainly valuable was the contact he provided between Canada and France, especially for French Canadians. Actually he had originally been an agent for Quebec, and continued to represent both Province and Dominion u n t i l his retirement i n 1911. He was replaced by the Hon. Philippe Roy, During the war M. Roy began to perform duties of a partly diplomatic nature, communicating in certain minor matters 66 directly with the French and also foreign governments. Mac- kenzie King considered his position to have been close to that 67 of a minister. ' 66 S k i l l i n g , Canadian Representation Abroad, p. 240. 67 W, L. Mackenzie King, "Canada's Legations Abroad," The Canadian Nation, March-April 1929, p. 25. 174 In 1928 i t was decided to open a legation in Paris, which, though i t would perform very much the same functions the Commissioner General had, yet would give the Canadian rep- resentative the prestige of f u l l diplomatic status and make i t easier for him to maintain direct contact with the French government and to take part i n international negotiations. M. Roy was appointed minister and remained for ten years. In 1938 Lt. Col. G. P. Vanier took the office. In 1928 likewise 68 a French minister, M. Jean Knight, was sent to Ottawa. The next legation opened was in Tokyo. The main reasons here were to encourage Canadian trade with the Orient and to assist Canadian financial interests i n Japan. In 1928 the Hon. Herbert Marler was sent to Tokyo as Canadian minister, and Mr. Shuh Tomii received in Ottawa as Japanese Charge d'Af- 69 faires, pending the appointment of a minister. During the Bennett regime (1930-1935) no further advance was made. The Conservatives had been opposed to the opening of legations, c r i t i c i z i n g them as useless, extravagant, dangerous gestures of the new Dominion autonomy, and a direct threat to Imperial unity. However, those already opened were maintained. No new legations were opened either upon the return of the Mackenzie King government i n 1935. The next were 68 External Affairs, 1928, p. 7. 69 Loc. c i t . 175 i n Brussels and the Hague, when in the early part of 1939 Mr. Jean Desy was appointed Canadian Minister to both Belgium and Holland, to divide his time equally between the two capi- 70 tals. Legations were opened i n Ottawa the same year by both countries. Although by 1939 Canada had only a small diplomatic service with a very brief history, her right to send and receive legations had become firmly established. Until she had achieved that right, her conduct and control of external affairs had been handicapped. The recognition of the right had not come as a sudden major constitutional change, but as the culminating point of a long slow period of growth, of making adaptions to f i t changing conditions and growing needs. Development had often been held back by Canadian opinion, British opposition, and foreign misunderstanding of the new Canadian position in world affairs. Nevertheless the right of legation had f i n a l l y been firmly achieved, and with i t Canada had gained one more of the characteristics of an autono mous nation of the world with f u l l power over her own affai r s . 70 External Affairs, 1939? p. 12. Chapter VIII The Changing Position of Canada i n the Empire: the Trend toward Indirect Control over External Affairs through a Voice i n British Foreign Policy. The f i r s t six chapters of this study have been an attempt to trace the development of Canadian control over external affairs -in their various phases: trade relations, international activities, and representation abroad. During the years involved (1867-1939), Canadian relations with Britain were always among the most important "Canadian external affairs". At the same time that Canadian control was being extended elsewhere, these relationships too were i n a constant state of change. In the fi n a l two chapters of this study i t is proposed to trace that change from the "colonial status" of 1867 to the "autonomous communities" of 1926 and subsequent years. Two main tendencies w i l l be found to stand out: the tendency to centralization and the tendency to decentralization. The former led towards some form of Imperial organization with a common foreign policy in which the Dominions should have a voice. That i s , except in minor matters, Dominion control over external affairs would be indirect only, through Dominion influence on whatever body was responsible for the f i n a l decisions on Imperial foreign policy. Although i t was con- stantly threatened by the strength of Dominion nationalism, 177 this tendency to centralization showed the greatest promise during the period 1867-1921. In this chapter the development of this indirect control over external affairs w i l l be studied, from i t s f i r s t signs i n the Imperial Federation Movement, through the early Colonial and Imperial Conferences and the Imperial War Cabinet and War Conferences, to i t s virtual dis- appearance i n the immediate post-World War I years. In the f i n a l chapter the tendency to the decentralization of control i n the Commonwealth in the years 1922-1939 w i l l be examined. It w i l l be seen that by 1939 Canada and the other Dominions had developed complete control over ..external affairs, even to the right to declare war. As discussed i n Chapter I, the Dominion of Canada was formed during the ascendency of "colonial pessimism" in the 1 Colonial Office and i n Britain generally. Shortly afterwards keen interest i n and appreciation of the value of the British colonies became widespread. There was l i t t l e actual change in the constitutional relationship between Canada and Britain during the f i r s t three decades in the history of the new Dominion. There was, however, widespread realization that development i n one way or another was bound to take place. At the beginning of these three decades, the idea of the inevita- b i l i t y of eventual separation from Britain was disappearing; 1 Chapter I, pp.3-5. 178 in the latter half of the period there was a powerful movement for closer integration of the Empire. An interesting discussion of the value, present position, and suggested future of the colonies took place i n Britain not long after Confederation. The ministry i n power during this concluding period of anti-Imperial sentiment was the f i r s t Gladstone administration of 1868-1874. Its colonial policies included the extension of colonial autonomy, the promotion of freer trade, the reduction of expenditure on colonial defence, no acquisition of new territories, and possibly no great oppo- sition to colonial secession. Gladstone himself was not a strong separatist, but some of his ministers were. In April I87G, in the British House of Commons, R. R. Torrens, later f i r s t premier of South Australia, moved that a select committee be appointed to deal with existing methods of communication between the colonies and Great Britain, and to report what modi- fications were necessary to maintain a "common nationality 2 cemented by cordial good understanding." The Colonial Office, anxious to get colonial opinion, asked Sir John Rose, then the quasi-official agent of Canada in 3 London, to write a memorandum setting out his views on the questions thus raised. In letters to The Times earlier i n the same year, Rose had summed up British attitudes to the colonies. 2 David M. L. Farr, "Sir John Rose and Imperial Relations," The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 33, no. 1, March 1912, p.21. 3 See chapter VII, p. 14-3' 179 These were i n the main three: one favoured separation; the second, consolidation of the Empire through reducing colonial autonomy; the third, to which Rose himself belonged, considered that, a l l things taken into account, the present system of 4 relations was f a i r l y adequate. Rose tried to prove that Canada had not been an embarrassment and an unnecessary expense to Britain. Any disputes between Britain and the United States during the C i v i l War years had not been Canadian i n origin. Rather the continued possession of Canada was neces- sary to British sea-power i n both the North Atlantic and the Pacific. In his memorandum Rose claimed a greater control for Canada i n recent commercial negotiations than had actually been achieved, stating among other things that the Imperial gover- ment had sanctioned direct negotiations between Canada and the 5 United States over reciprocity. This was denied by the Colonial Office. Otherwise his memorandum was largely used in the debate following Torrens' motion by Viscount Bury, by this time an avowed imperialist. He pointed out the value to Britain of the colonies, and the uselessness of any such committee as that suggested i n the motion. Gladstone himself spoke at the end of the debate. He admitted the uneasiness that had existed in the colonies for thirty years past, and 4 Farr, op_. c i t . , p. 22. 5 Ibid., pp. 25-6. 180 claimed his government was not following any new policies, but simply applying what had come to be the admitted principle of colonial autonomy. He did not see what changes could be pro- posed i n the Imperial connection that would not cut down on colonial freedom. He claimed that his policy had not tended "to weaken the relations between the mother country and the colonies, but on the contrary, while securing the greatest l i k e - lihood of a perfectly peaceful separation, whenever separation may arrive, gives the best chance of an indefinitely long 6 continuance of free and voluntary connection." Such was the best hope of the colonial pessimists. A growing section of public opinion reacted strongly against this view; the new imperialists saw the future i n quite a different light. But they too had to take into account the growing autonomy and national s p i r i t of Canada and the other principal colonies. Many thought they found the solution in some form of Imperial federation, by which these colonies would retain their autonomy i n domestic affairs, and would at the same time be given some voice in the common policy of the Empire i n foreign affairs, through representation i n some sort of Imperial parliament. One of the f i r s t results of this new imperialism was the founding of the Royal Colonial Society i n 1868. At f i r s t this 6 Farr, op_. c i t . , pp. 37-8. 181 group was intended simply for the study of colonial problems, but soon i t became a propaganda centre for"united Empire" 7 ideas. Among the f i r s t to bring the idea of Imperial federa- tion before the public was Edward Jenkins, formerly agent- general for Canada, i n his article i n the Contemporary Review Q for January and April 1871. The Idea was supported by many important statesmen and writers, both i n Britain and in the colonies. Both Disraeli; and Lord Russell gave their approval 9 i n the early 18.70'-s, as did Edward Blake i n Canada. Very influential was the publication i n 1885 of Seeley's The Expan- sion of England. The idea of imperial federation covered only one group of suggestions for the closer union of the Empire. Within this one idea there were various approaches to the solution of the problem of reconciling dominion autonomy and a united empire. Some proposed the colonies should send representatives to the British parliament, others, that the colonies should appoint secretaries of state to s i t i n the British Cabinet. 1 0 Neither of these schemes would have given the colonies any real control. Their representatives would have been such insignificant minori- ties that they would have had very l i t t l e influence i n London. 7 J. E. Tyler, The Struggle for Imperial Unity (1868-1895), London, 1938, p. 1. 8 S. C. Cheng, Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire. New York, 1931, P« 34-. 9 Ibid., p. 35. 10 Tyler, op_. c i t . , pp. 96, 7> 182 Other suggestions called for the establishment of some sort of truly Imperial body, varying from a Council of Advice, perhaps drawn from a panel of former colonial governors, to a true Imperial Parliament, representative of Britain and the colonies, and having f u l l control over their external rela- 11 tions. Typical of the latter was the scheme put forward i n 1872 by the Canadian, Jehu Mathews, i n his work A Colonist on the Colonial Question. He advocated Britain and the colonies be l e f t i n possession of their local self-government. The federal government should have five chief powers: i t must control diplomacy; i t must raise, equip and control the military and naval forces of the Empire; i t must be enabled to raise the necessary revenue by taxation of some form; i t must regulate trade; and i t should probably control the monetary 12 system and the post office. A l l these various proposals found supporters among the members of the Imperial Federation League. The f i r s t meeting of the League had been held i n August 1884, under the chairman- ship of W. E. Forster, a former under-secretary for the colonies. It was attended by many men prominent i n the p o l i t i c a l l i f e of Britain, Canada, and the other colonies, among them Lord Rosebery, 11 C. A. Bodelsen, Studies in Mid-Victorian Imperialism, Copenhagen, 1924, p. 124. 12 Jehu Mathews, A Colonist on the Colonial Question, London, 1872, pp. 65 f f . 183 Sir Charles Tupper (then Canadian High Commissioner, and a Conservative), and Oliver Mowat (then Liberal Premier of , 13 Ontario). The Imperial Federation League in Canada was founded i n Montreal in 1885. During the next two years four other branches were started, i n Ingersoll, Peterborough, 14 Halifax, and Toronto. In Canada the movement gained i t s greatest support as an alternative to the proposals for Commer- ci a l Union with the United States. As i n Britain, the members of the League held widely varying views of what Imperial Federation should mean. Public opinion i n Canada, as reflected in the leading newspapers, was divided. The majority strongly opposed the idea of federation. In the words of the Manitoba Free Press; "When there i s a change i t w i l l be in a direction 15 opposite to that sought by the Imperial Federationists". y In Canada, as i n the other colonies, the proposals were f e l t to be too great a threat to both the present and the future powers of dominion self-government. In Britain the League i n i t s earlier years was largely a discussion group whose members held a variety of more or less vague schemes for Imperial Federation. It broke up i n 1893 when the f i r s t real attempt was made to work out one definite 13 Tyler, op., c i t . , p. 107* 14 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian External Relations. Toronto, 1950, p. 176. 15 Ibid., p. 178. 184 scheme that a l l might support. The idea of Imperial Federation, however, s t i l l found supporters until after World War I. One tangible result of the movement was the decision of the British government to c a l l the f i r s t Colonial Conference at the time of Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee i n 1887. Such a conference was suggested to the British Prime Minister in 17 August 1886 by a delegation from the League. In spite of this origin of the idea of the conference, the British government did not propose that Imperial Federation be discussed; there 18 was not enough support i n any of the colonies. The Conference was called without any particular concern that in i t might be a precedent for the future that would help solve the problem of the relationships of Britain and her colonies. Rather, with the presence of so many colonial states- men i n England for the Jubilee celebrations, i t seemed a wise move to c a l l such a gathering where the views of the colonies on such questions as defence, closer economic ties, and better communication, might be available to the British government. In the despatch sent by Lord Stanhope, the Colonial Secretary, proposing the Conference, i t was emphasized that i t would be 16 David M. L. Farr, The Colonial Office and Canada. 1867- 1887, Toronto, 1955, p. 297- 17 Richard Jebb, The Imperial Conference, London, 1911, vol. 1, p. 7« 18 Farr, Colonial Office and Canada, p. 296. 185 19 "purely consultative" i n nature. From the point of view of this study, i t was the precedent set by the calling of this Conference, rather than anything that happened during i t s sessions, that is most significant i n the development of Canadian relationship with Britain. Except for the discussion of Imperial preference, and the fact that i t was summoned by the Canadian, rather than the British, government, the second Conference, held i n Ottawa in 1894-, likewise had l i t t l e significance from this point of view. The precedent, however, was extremely important. Con- sultation and co-operation between Britain and the dominions was the chief alternative to Imperial Federation i f a unified Imperial foreign policy were to be maintained, and i f the domin- ions were to continue their growth toward national status. There were two chief methods by which such consultation and co- operation might take place: through intermediaries, or by direct meetings of responsible members of the governments involved. The former was the chief method of contact with foreign govern- ments, through diplomatic representation. It had already been developed to some extent in the relations of Canada and Britain, i n the earlier days through the Colonial Agents-General i n London, and after 1879 through the Canadian High Commissioner. The new 19 Tyler, p_£. c i t . , p. 10. 186 Colonial Conferences provided the precedent for the latter, the regular meeting of the heads of the British and dominion governments. In the third Conference, held i n London i n 1897, i n connection with the Diamond Jubilee celebrations, an attempt was made to review the existing relations between the colonies and the Mother Country, and to takex some steps towards closer integration. In his opening speech, Mr. Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary, suggested that "It might be feasible to create a great council of the Empire to which the Colonies 20 would send representative plenipotentiaries." He f e l t that such a council "might slowly grow to that federal council to which we must look forward as our ultimate i d e a l . " 2 l The colonial representatives were not prepared to see this happen. They adopted resolutions stating that i n their opinion the relations then existing between the United Kingdom and the colonies were generally satisfactory. They f e l t that i t would be desirable to continue to hold"periodical confer- ences of representatives of the Colonies and Great Britain for 22 the discussion of matters of common interest." The Report continued: There was a strong feeling among some of them, that with the rapid growth of population in the Colonies, 20 Jebb, O P . c i t . , vol. 1, p. 322. 21 Ibid., vol. 1, p. 323. 22 Report of Proceedings, quoted in A. G. Dewey, The Dominions and Diplomacy, London, 1929, vol. 1, p. 94. 187 the present relations could not continue indefinitely, and some means would have to be devised for giving the Colonies more voice in the control and direction of those questions of Imperial interest i n which they are concerned equally with the Mother Country. It was recognized at the same time that such a share i n the direction of Imperial policy would involve a proportionate contribution,in aid of Imperial expendi- ture, for which at present, at any rate, the Colonies are not prepared.^ This was certainly true of Canada, and continued to be the policy of Laurier and his government — "no commitments". In the Conference of 1902, Chamberlain again proposed an Imperial Council. At once encouraged by the assistance given by the colonies during the Boer war, and alarmed by the growing threat of war in Europe, he made the Dominions a clear offer of a voice i n the policies of the Empire. Gentlemen, we do want your aid. We do want your assistance i n the administration of the vast Empire which is yours as well as ours. The weary Titan staggers under the too vast orb of his fate. . . . If you are prepared at any time to take any share, any proportionate share, i n the burdens of the Empire, we are prepared to meet you with any proposal for giving you a corresponding voice in the policy of the Empire.0 . Wo steps were taken towards the formation of any such Imperial council during the Conference. The only advance was the resolution that similar meetings should be held every four 25 years. Anything further would have met the strenuous 23 Report of Proceedings, op_. c i t . , p. 24. 24 Summary of Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1902, Canadian Sessional Papers, no. 29a, 1903, P« 4. 25 Ibid., p. 35. 188 opposition to Laurier. He insisted growing Canadian control over her external affairs must continue to develop directly, not indirectly through a voice in British councils, and further, that Canada must be kept out of the "vortex of European militar- ism." He had expressed his continuing position in the Canadian House of Commons that same year: The basis upon which the British Empire rests, the basis upon which i t has grown, has been the local autonomy of a l l i t s constituent p a r t s . ^ As yet, none of the statesmen of Britain, Canada, or the other dominions, could foresee any possible autonomy for the various parts of the Empire in foreign affairs. The idea that the Crown could have one policy as regards Britain on the advice of i t s British ministers, another as regards Canada on the advice of Canadian ministers, and possibly others as regards other dominions on the advice of i t s ministers there, seemed impossible. Thinking was s t i l l based entirely on the concept of the necessity of the diplomatic unity of the Empire. But with the extent to which the dominions had developed, i t seemed essential to evolve some better scheme, providing more continuous consultation than that so far provided by the Colonial Conferences. Two plans were put forward: one for an Imperial Council; the other for a permanent secretariat for the Colonial Conference. 26 Canada, House of Commons Debates. April 15, 1902, col. 2740. 189 The former was embodied i n the plan brought before the Royal Colonial Institute on April 11, 1905? by Sir Frederick Pollock. He suggested an Imperial Council which should be a Committee of the Privy Council, should be advisory in function, and should have a permanent secretariat and a 27 standing Imperial advisory commission of experts. Similar proposals were contained i n the circular despatch issued to the dominions on April 20 the same year, by Mr. Alfred Lytteiton, the Colonial Secretary. After re- viewing the history of the previous conferences and suggesting that in future these be known as meetings of the "Imperial Council", he suggested a permanent Imperial Commission, with a secretariat, whose expenses the British Government would 28 pay. In his reply Laurier again opposed the idea of a council, particularly an "Imperial Council" which suggested a permanent institution which "might eventually come to be regarded as an encroachment upon the f u l l measure of autono- mous legislative and administrative power now enjoyed by a l l the self-governing Colonies." Even the suggested commission he f e l t should be l e f t over for the careful discussion of the next Conference. While i t would "greatly f a c i l i t a t e the work 27 Royal Colonial Institute, Report of Proceedings, 1904-5, vol. 34, pp. 294-5. 28 Quoted i n Dewey, ©J>. c i t . , vol. 1, p. 102. 190 of the Conference", he and his ministers feared i t might 29 "interfere with the working of responsible government." At the 1907 Conference these proposals were thoroughly discussed. While they were not implemented, at least the discussion then and during the previous few years led to the passing of the Constitutional Resolution, setting out the structure and the scope of the Imperial Conference, as i t had come to be the means of co-operation between Britain and the Dominions. It i s significant that the resolution recognized the Conferences as being between governments, — a step towards that equality of status that was to be recognized i n the Conference of 1926. Former Conferences had been between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Prime Ministers of the self-governing Colonies; future ones would be between His Majesty's Government i n Great Britain and Ms Governments of the self-governing Dominions. In future the chairman would 30 be the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The organization of a permanent secretariat was dis- cussed. Laurier and others saw again too great a threat to dominion autonomy and rejected the proposals for a separate and distinct secretariat. Essential functions of such a secretariat between conferences were instead to be performed 29 Quoted i n Dewey, ibid . , vol. 1, p. 105• 30 Minutes of Proceedings, Colonial Conference, 1907, Canadian Sessional Papers no. 58, 1908, p. 105. 191 by certain of the staff of the Colonial Department. One beneficial result was a change in the organization of the Colonial Office, with the creation of a new "Dominions Division" to handle dominion affairs. Thus the basis for the future was fixed. There was to be no closely integrated Imperial organization under which further dominion development would be checked, but rather free co-operation leading towards greater equality and f i n a l l y f u l l development of direct control by the dominions over their own affairs. The Conference of 1911 i s particularly significant because for the f i r s t time the Dominion Prime Ministers were given a careful exposition of British foreign policy. While the Conference was i n session, they were summoned to a meeting of the Committee of Imperial Defence for this purpose and addressed by Sir Edward Grey, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. This was but a small beginning. At the same Con- ference Mr. Asquith warned them that there were certain matters on which authority could not be shared: . . . i n such grave matters as the conduct of foreign policy, the conclusion of treaties, the declaration of maintenance of peace or the declaration of war, and indeed a l l those relations with Foreign powers, neces- sarily of the most delicate character, which are now in the hands of the Imperial government, subject to i t s responsibility to the Imperial Parliament 31 Minutes of Proceedings, ib i d . , p. v. 32 Ibid., no. 208, 1911, p. 76. 192 Laurier again was not anxious to participate i n such matters. He preferred to see Canada without a voice i n British policies, rather than to see her pay the cost of such a voice. His own policy continued to be "no commitments". Canada should not be pledged ahead of time to any course of action, but must be kept free in a war to act or not as her parliament saw f i t . The other side of this question — the participation of Canada and the other Dominions i n Imperial Defence -- is 33 discussed i n Chapter III. With the defeat of the Laurier government i n 19115 there was a decided change in attitude. Borden, the new Prime Minister, was anxious that Canada should take part i n both the defence and the foreign policy of the Empire. Mr. Asquith gave further encouragement. He expressed a greater willingness than he had shown the previous year to give the Dominions more voice in foreign affairs: Side by side with this growing participation i n the active burdens of the Empire on the part of our Domin- ions there rests with us, undoubtedly the duty of making such response as we can to their obviously reasonable appeal that they should be entitled to be heard i n the determination of policy and in the direction of Imperial A f f a i r s . ^ Borden wished to see the growth of an Imperial partner- ship. He foresaw the development of Canada as a nation and at 33 See pp. 65-69* 34 Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, July 22, 1912. p. 872. 193 the same time a partner i n a collective Empire in whose policies she should have a real voice. In introducing the Naval Aid B i l l in the Canadian House of Commons on December 5 1912, he said: When Great Britain no longer assumes sole responsi- b i l i t y for defence upon the high seas, she can no longer undertake to assume sole responsibility for and sole control of foreign policy which is closely, v i t a l l y and constantly associated in that defence in which the Dominions participate. 35 He considered i t necessary for the Empire to be a diplomatic unit as far as the primary issues of foreign policy were con- cerned. That common foreign policy should be worked out, not by an all-powerful Imperial government nor by some new form, of federal government, but by consultation and co-operation between the autonomous governments of the various parts. Such development, he thought, would not reduce Canadian autonomy, but rather increase i t as Canada grew as a member of a partner- ship of equal nations. In 1912 he suggested that as an immediate step in that direction the Dominion representatives on the Committee of Imperial Defence should be given permanent seats. This would serve two purposes: they could be consulted by the Committee on questions of defence involving their own countries; and they could serve as a channel of information on Imperial foreign policy for their governments. After the Committee of Imperial 35 Canada, House of Commons Debates, December 5» 1912, cols. 676-7. 194 Defence was f i r s t used i n 1911 as a means of giving the Dominion Prime Ministers confidential information on foreign affairs, i t had been resolved that in future Dominion minis- ters appointed by their own governments should be invited to attend the meetings whenever defence questions specifically 36 affecting them were under consideration. The Colonial Secretary was agreeable to Borden's idea of giving these rep- resentatives permanent seats, but he did point out that the Committee was purely an advisory body. The other Dominions did not approve of the proposal. However, Canadian represen- tatives did attend some of the sessions of the Committee in 37 1912, 1913 and 1914. At least the principle of consultation was thus established. To summarize the developments by the outbreak of World War I, then: the relation of Canada to Britain was s t i l l essentially that of colony to mother country. But the colony had reached such a stage of development that i t was essential that some way be found for her to influence the major issues of Imperial foreign policy. The idea of Imperial Federation had been largely discarded. Whatever progress made had been through the beginning of consultation and co-operation. This trend was to continue through the War, as long as a single foreign policy was deemed essential. When Great Britain 36 R. M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, London, 1937, P. 12. 37 Ibid., p. 13. 195 declared war in 1914, Canada was automatically at war. The British government, however, had no control over the extent of Canadian participation in the war. Canadian statesmen had insisted for years that only the Canadian government had the right to decide to what extent Canada would participate in any war in which she should become involved as a result of her membership i n the British Empire. Thanks to Laurier's policy of "no commitments", Canada, unlike Britain, entered World War I with no pledges to other countries. While Canada, then, had had no share i n the diplomacy leading up to the war, and had been automatically involved by the British declaration, her immediate offers of aid and her f u l l participation throughout the four years, were solely her own responsibility. During the early years of the war, formal co-operation between the governments of Britain and of Canada and the other dominions did not work too well. There i s no evidence that Borden had made any real effort to secure consultation on foreign affairs in the time between his proposal that Canada be permanently represented on the Committee for Imperial Defence and the outbreak of war. He was not satisfied with things as they stood during the f i r s t year of the war. Making his f i r s t wartime v i s i t to Britain in the summer of 1915, he insisted that Canada and the other Dominions should have a voice i n the conduct of the foreign policy of the Empire. In his record of a conversation with Lord Bryce, Borden wrote, "I told him they would either have such a voice or each of them would have 196 a foreign policy of i t s own." Borden was dissatisfied with the way the war was going; he was even more dissatisfied with the d i f f i c u l t y he had i n getting information about various essential phases of war organ- 39 ization. Things were no better on his return to Canada. During the next four months he received no direct information on war policy from the Colonial Secretary, Bonar Law. He had to depend upon what the Resident Canadian Minister and Acting High Commissioner Sir George Perley could send him, and also 40 upon Sir Max Alt ken, later Lord Beaverbrook. Finally Perley complained to Bonar Law, insisting that the Canadian government had a right to be kept f u l l y informed on events and policies, and should be consulted "respecting general policy in War 41 operations". Bonar Law returned a vague answer, pointing out the d i f f i c u l t y of keeping in touch with Borden when he was in Canada, and the lack of any practical scheme of consulta- 42 tion. Borden protested vigorously; the only result was that five weeks later a number of documents were forwarded to him from the War Cabinet. Consultation was not mentioned. 38 Henry Borden, ed. Robert Laird Borden; His Memoirs, Toronto, 1938, vol. 1 , p. 506. 39 Ibid., p. 509. 40 F. H. Soward, "Sir Robert Borden and Canada's External Policy, 1911-1920," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1941, p. 69. 41 Borden to Perley, Nov. 1915? Memoirs, vol. 2 , p. 621. 42 Bonar Law to Perley, Nov. 3 5 1915» loc. c i t . 197 There was an immediate change with the formation of the Lloyd George ministry i n December 1916. To the new Prime Minister i t seemed only logical that Canada and the other dominions, who had made such sacrifices, should be con- sulted on policies. The f i r s t result was an invitation to a l l Dominion Prime Ministers to attend a special War Confer- ence, and also a series of meetings of the War Cabinet. Borden went to London determined that out of the Conference would be established "a new conception of the status of the Dominions in their relation to their governance of the Empire". 4 3 The Imperial War Conference of 1917 was composed of the Colonial Secretary, a number of other British ministers, the Prime Ministers of the Dominions, and representatives from India. It dealt with the less important war problems and with questions not connected with the war. From the point of view of this study, the most important result was Resolution IX, which was largely the work of Borden and Smuts. After suggesting that the readjustment of the constitutional relations within the Empire should be l e f t to be dealt with by a special Imperial Conference after the war, i t stated: They (the Imperial War Conference) deem i t their duty, however, to place on record their view that any such re-adjustment, while thoroughly preserving a l l existing powers of self-government and complete control of domestic affairs, should be based upon a f u l l 43 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 667. 198 recognition of the Dominions as autonomous nations of an Imperial Commonwealth, and of India as an important part of the same, should recognize the right of the Dominions and India to an adequate voice in foreign policy and foreign relations, and should provide effective arrangements for continuous consultation i n a l l important matters of common Imperial concern, and for such necessary concerted action, founded on consultation, as the several Governments may decide.. Although the working out of the implications of this resolution was l e f t for the suggested post-war conference, recognition was given of the great advance that had already taken place in the development of national status in Canada and the other Dominions. In the words of John W. Dafoe, writing i n the Manitoba Free Press: It excluded the idea of formal federation. . . . Equally, i t excluded the idea of separation. And i t repudiated, at the same time, the idea of the continued subordination of the Dominions in external affairs. ^ Immediate opportunity for consultation and co-operation was being given at the same time the Conference was held, in the meetings of the Imperial War Cabinet, held on alternate days with those of the Conference. The Imperial War Cabinet was scarcely accurately named, even as explained by Borden as 46 a "Cabinet of Governments". It was composed of the five members of the British War Cabinet, the Dominion Prime Ministers 44 Report of the Imperial War Conference, 1917, printed i n Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 175. 45 Quoted in Dawson, p_p_. c i t . , p. 2 5 . 46 Quoted in Soward, 0 £ . cit;.., p. 72. 199 or their representatives, a representative of India, and the Colonial Secretary, who represented the Crown Colonies and 47 Protectorates. As Borden saw i t , "In that Cabinet, Great 4-8 Britain presided, but the Dominions met her on equal terms." The Imperial War Cabinet had as it's main object the making of decisions on the conduct of the war and on the larger questions of foreign policy — the very subject which Asquith had insisted i n 1911 must remain the sole responsibility of the British government. The decisions of this group were only recommendations. They were put into effect by the action of the various Dominion governments concerned. Speaking before the Canadian House of Commons on his return, Borden said that "The principle has been f i n a l l y and definitely laid down that in these matters (foreign affairs) the Dominions shall be consulted before the Empire is commit- ted to any important policy which might involve the issues of 49 peace or war." The precedent set by the Imperial War Cabinet provided one possible method by which such consultation might develop. In the British House of Commons on May 17? 1917? Lloyd George said: The Imperial War Cabinet was unanimous that the new procedure had been of such service not only to a l l i t s members but to the Empire, that i t ought not to be 47 Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 75» 48 Borden, Memoirs, vol. 2, p. 666. 49 Canada, House of Commons Debates, May 18, 1917, p. 1528. 200 allowed to f a l l into desuetude. We hope that the hold- ing of an annual Imperial Cabinet to discuss foreign affairs and other aspects of Imperial policy w i l l become an accepted convention of the British Constitution.^ The War Cabinet opened i t s second session on June 11, 1918. In the published report i t was stated: The deliberations of the Imperial War Cabinet are necessarily secret, but i t i s well known that they were not confined to the all-absorbing military problems, but covered the whole f i e l d of Imperial policy, including many aspects of foreign policy.^. !?1 Further improvements were made i n the means of communica- tion between the governments of Britain and of Canada and the other dominions by providing that the Prime Ministers of the Dominions should correspond directly with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on important matters. Further, since Dominion voice i n British policies could only make i t s e l f direct- l y f e l t during the very short time of the year that the Prime Ministers could be i n London to attend the War Cabinet, and since many important questions necessarily arose and had to be decided between these times, i t was agreed: "The natural remedy for this defect lay i n giving the Imperial War Cabinet continuity by the presence i n London of Overseas Cabinet Ministers definitely nominated to represent the Prime Ministers in their absence."52 50 Great Brit ain, House of Commons Debates, May 17? 1917? p. 1791. 51 Quoted i n G. E. H. Palmer, Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth, London, 1934, p. 224. 52 Ibid., p. 225. 201 As i t worked out, no Canadian minister took advantage of this privilege because the third session of the War Cabinet was held later that same year, on November 20, 1918, to discuss the prob- lems of peace-making. So far the trend of developing Dominion status had been towards a voice i n the control of a common foreign policy for a l l the Empire. At the Peace Conference, as has been discussed in Chapter II, Canada and the other Dominions f i r s t took their place i n the eyes of the world as modern nation-states, with the rights and privileges inherent in such standing. Except for a brief period in 1920-1922, when i t seemed as i f the old ideas about a common Imperial foreign policy might actually be the trend of the future, development during the period between the two wars followed the new direction towards separate, self- controlled foreign policies for Canada and the other Dominions. At the Peace Conference the Dominions had separate rep- resentatives responsible solely to the government of the Dominion concerned, and Dominion representatives signed the Peace Treaties separately. Their signatures, however, were indented under those specifically foi* "The United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas". Thus the form of signature included both the old and the newer relation- ship. The two years after the war held no new developments and l i t t l e interest i n the constitutional problems facing the 202 Empire. The dominions were not anxious either to hold the constitutional conference proposed i n 1917, or to take advantage of the opportunity to have one of their ministers s i t i n on 53 British Cabinet meetings, as proposed in 1918. Even the holding of the Conference of Prime Ministers in 1921 was largely the result of the need for an immediate decision on the question of the Japanese alliance, to which Canada and some of the other dominions were known to be strongly opposed. The suggested agenda was to include, in addition to this, a discussion of the proposed constitutional conference, a general review of foreign relations, and other questions of common interest.^ 4" Except i n British Columbia.there was l i t t l e real opposi- tiontto the renewal of the Japanese treaty in Canada. The new Prime Minister, Arthur Meighen, opposed i t largely because of the strong feeling against i t i n the United States.^ Ernest Lapointe, a member of the Liberal opposition, insisted that should i t be renewed, there must be a clause in i t excluding Canada from i t s provisions. He f e l t that Canada had no right to advise Britain as to whether or not she should renew such a 56 treaty with Japan. If Britain did renew the treaty with such a clause, then the Canadian parliament might decide whether or 53 Keith, 0£. c i t . , p. 1201. 54 Canada, House of Commons Debates. April 25, 1921, pp. 2504- 2505. 55 J. B. Brehner, "Canada, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, vol. 50 no. 1, March 1935, p. 49. 56 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 27, 1921, p. 2668. 203 not i t should be binding on Canada. Lapointe represented at once the growing isolationism i n Canada and the view so long typified by Laurier, that the price of a voice in the Imperial foreign policy — responsibility for a l l that policy might involve — was too great. The effect of the Dominion opposi- tion was to postpone the question of the Alliance t i l l the Washington Conference. There i t was replaced with the "Four Power Treaty" for the maintenance of the status quo i n the 58 Pacific. It i s significant that the opposition of Meighen and the other Canadians at this time was able to effect for the f i r s t time a change of policy In a matter of fundamental Importance i n Imperial foreign affairs. With regard to the future constitutional relations between Britain and the Dominions, the British government suggested the precedent set by the Imperial War Cabinet be followed. Before the meeting of the Conference, Lloyd George had said, "I have been anxious for some time past to renew as soon as possible that personal consultation between Prime Ministers which produced such good results i n the last two 59 years of the War and at P a r i s . n ' 7 Some statesmen, such as the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, saw the Conference as 60 "the f i r s t peace meeting of the Imperial Cabinet". Various 58 P. E. Corbett and H. A. Smith, Canada and World P o l i t i c s , Toronto, 1928, p. 88. 59 Great Britain, House of Commons Debates, November 11, 1920, p. 1361. 60 Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 41. 204 Dominion Prime Ministers did not approve. Mr. Meighen was careful to explain to the Canadian House of Commons before he le f t for London that the proposed meeting was purely a confer- ence. Actually the meetings followed precedents set by both the former Imperial Conferences and by the War Cabinet. The Conference met in f u l l session as a group of Prime Ministers, as had the older Conferences; but i t also "sat with members of the Bri t i s h Cabinet to determine British policy on 'Imperial and foreign questions of immediate urgency which arose i n the course of the settings' . . . and in that joint or collective capacity i t has recommended action to the Sovereign like any ,62 ordinary Cabinet." The delegates revealed "a deep conviction that the whole weight of the Empire should be concentrated behind a united understanding and common action in foreign a f f a i r s . " ^ 3 It seemed that such a common policy was to be the work of an Imperial Cabinet. On the question of a constitutional con- ference, they reached these conclusions: (a) Continuous consultation, to which the Prime Ministers attach no less importance than the Imperial War Cabinet of 1917? can only be secured by a substantial improvement in the communication between the component parts of the Empire. Having regard to the constitu- tional developments since 1917? no advantage is to be gained by holding a constitutional conference. (b) The Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and 61 Canada, House of Commons Debates, April 27? 1921, p. 2641. 62 "The Imperial Conference," The Round Table, vol. 9? September 1921, pp. 73-6. 63 Summary of Proceedings of the Conference of Prime Minis- ters, 1921, printed in ibid . , p. 747. 205 the Dominions, and;.the representatives of India should aim at meeting annually, or at such longer intervals as may prove feasible. (c) The existing practice of direct communication between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom and the Dominions, as well as the right of the latter to nominate Cabinet Ministers to represent them in consul- tation with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom are maintained.£4 For the time being, then, there was to continue a common foreign policy, determined periodically by a body similar to the War Cabinet. Between meetings the Dominions were to be kept informed, but administration of foreign affairs and the working out of the policy was l e f t i n the hands of the British government. It was anything but an ideal arrangement for Canada and the other dominions. Their voice in the control of foreign affairs was far from continuous, no really effective means of consultation had been worked out, yet they were far more deeply committed to the support of the Imperial policy than they had been before the war. Circumstances compelled the Empire to be represented at the Washington Conference by a single delegation. The United States government, either unaware of the extent of the change in Dominion status, or unwilling to admit that change, did not send separate invitations to the Dominions. The Imperial delegation was made up of representatives from both Britain and 64 Summary of Proceedings of the Conference of Prime Ministers, 1921, printed in ibid., pp. 752-3• 206 the Dominions, and, however they.may have disagreed among themselves on the question of the renewal of the Japanese 65 Alliance, at the Conference they spoke with a single voice. Dominion acceptance of the Washington Agreements was absolutely essential to Britain's acceptance of the naval quota for the Empire. At the same time the autonomy of the Dominions was s t r i c t l y recognized and they received the f u l l standing they had had at Paris, except that they were represented only as a part of the British Empire Delegation. At the end of 1921, then, the Empire seemed to be under- going a period of centralization, with the promise of the development, under British i n i t i a t i v e , of a central body to determine foreign policy. The appearance of Empire unity was even at that time somewhat of an i l l u s i o n . Canada and the other dominions had been decidedly upset when they f e l t they were not to receive at Washington the f u l l national standing they had had at Paris. The Importance of the Conference of 1921, as being a revival of the War Cabinet and a precedent for the future, was seen far more clearly i n Britain than i n the dominions. Dominion public opinion did not recognize how deeply dominion governments would be committed to responsibility 66 for policies so decided on. This tendency to centralization, 65 Glazebrook, op_. c i t . , p. 356. 66 Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 53* 207 never genuinely strong, broke down at the f i r s t test, and the rest of the between-war period shows a growing tendency to decentralization in the relations of Britain and the domin- ions . Chapter IX Canada in the Commonwealth: the Growth of F u l l Control over External Affairs. In the last chapter the tendency to centralization in the foreign affairs of the Empire was examined from i t s appearance i n the last quarter of the nineteenth century to i t s break-down after World War I. Indirect control over external affairs was not enough to suit Canadian national feeling, nor were Canadian and British interests similar enough to make such centralization really practical. For instance, throughout the years between the wars, Britain was deeply concerned with European problems. The strong isola- tionist section of Canadian public opinion refused to see that Canada should take any interest in such matters. To most Canadians, indeed, these problems at that time seemed far away and far from being of direct concern to Canada. Thus Canada did not wish to be involved in agreements such as the Locarno Treaties, and opposed, as has been mentioned, certain League schemes such as- the Draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, because they were too "continental in conception". 1 1 S. Mack Eastman, Canada at Geneva. Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 194-6, p. 73. 209 It must be remembered that even during the period when the future seemed to promise the development of a common Imperial policy, this tendency to decentralization remained strong, showing i t s e l f in many ways, from Laurier"s policy of "no commitments" to Borden's insistence on separate Canadian representation at the Peace Conference. In the f i r s t half of the 1920's i t began to appear that the tendency towards separate Dominion foreign policies under the direct control of the Dominion governments concerned had quite superseded the old ideal of a common Imperial policy. In the period before the Imperial Conference of 1923 > this tendency was shown i n the strong reaction i n Canada to the handling by the British government of the Chanak Incident; and in the independent policy followed by Canadian delegates to the League of Nations, particularly as regards Article X. It found expression also i n the signing of the Halibut Treaty by the Canadian representative alone without the accompanying signature of the British ambassador; and in the decision of the Canadian government not to be bound, except by action of the Canadian parliament, by any treaty arising out of the Lausanne Conference. Actually the attitudes of the Canadian government on the Treaty of Lausanne and on the Halibut Treaty represented two sides of this attitude that was to make a single Imperial foreign policy impossible. In the former, Canada was not 210 directly concerned, and so did not desire to be involved. In the latter, Canada alone was concerned, and insisted that Canadian action alone was sufficient. The attitude was grow- ing in Canada and some of the other dominions, particularly i n Eire and South Africa, that each should be concerned chiefly with i t s own external affairs. The only justification for a common policy, from this point of view, was some common problem. British plans for the Conference of 1923 were for a meeting similar i n purpose to the previous one. The agenda provided for a report on foreign affairs since 1921, and for 2 discussions on foreign policy and Imperial defence. But the events of the two intervening years had made impossible the attitude favourable to a single Imperial policy in foreign affairs found in 1921. Dominion nationalism had grown consid- erably, as had the sp i r i t of isolationism. In Canada particu- l a r l y there was considerable interest, especially in the Liberal party, i n the idea of direct Dominion control over external affairs. Mackenzie King, who had just become Prime Minister, was more nationalistic than Meighen had been. He was further influenced by distrust of the way the British government had 3 handled the Chanak Incident, and by satisfaction in the achieve- ment of the separate signature of the Halibut Treaty. 2 Canada, House of Commons Debates, June 5, 1923? p. 34-52. 3 R. M. Dawson, The Development of Dominion Status, London 1937, PP. 81-2. 211 In contrast to previous ones, the published report of the Conference did not make any mention of future conferences nor of means of consultation between such conferences. By implication, the idea of a common foreign policy was dropped, because of the increasing divergence of interests between Britain and the Dominions, and because such a policy was impos- sible without frequent top-level conferences and provision for adequate consultation at a l l times. Further, i t is made clear i n the report that the Conference made no claim to be binding — " i t s views and conclusions on Foreign Policy . . . are necessarily subject to the action of the Governments and Parlia- 4 ments of the various portions of the Empire." The greatest achievement of this Conference was the recognition of the right of the Dominions to negotiate and sign, without even nominal British control, a l l bilateral p o l i t i c a l , commercial and technical treaties, with the provision only that other parts of the Empire must be kept informed and allowed to 5 participate i f they so desired. Thus an advance essential to direct Dominion control over separate Dominion foreign policies was recognized. An attempt was made by the new Labour government i n Britain to c a l l a small, informal Imperial Conference the next year, which might be more successful i n improving consultation 4 Canadian Sessional Papers, 1924, no. 37» p. 12. 5 Ibid., 12-14. 212 and co-operation within the Empire. In response to the invitation received from the Colonial Secretary, the Canadian Government did not show i t s e l f anxious for further discussions. Its reply was c r i t i c a l of any suggestion that might interfere 6 with the supremacy of the Canadian parliament. Proposals for such a conference were dropped with the defeat of the Macdonald government i n October 1924. One useful change was made by the British Government in the period before the next Conference. In 1925 a new Secretaryship of State for the Dominions was created, although the same minister continued to hold both this and the Secretary- ship of State for the Colonies. The work i n relation to the Dominions had become of so different a nature as to make such a division almost necessary, since with the development of dominion status, i t had become no longer administrative, but 7 rather consultative and semi-diplimatic i n nature. The developments of these years culminated i n the Imperial Conference of 1926. At the same time, in the words of Professor Glazebrook, "By laying the ghost of Imperial con- t r o l the conference l e f t the way open for freedom of action in 8 foreign policy." The British Prime Minister suggested that the Conference, 6 The Governor General of Canada to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Aug. 7» 1924, printed i n Dawson, op. c i t . , p. 313* 7 G. E. H. Palmer, Consultation and Co-operation in the British Commonwealth, London, 1934, p. 23. 8 G. P. deT. Glazebrook, A History of Canadian Foreign Rela- tions, Toronto, 1950, p. 379. 213 as i n the past, should involve a general review of foreign policy and defence, and a discussion of better methods of com- munication and consultation within the Empire. Canada, moved by the King - Byng dispute of June 1926, wanted a more exact statement of the constitutional status of the dominions. In this she was joined by South Africa and Eire. The task facing the Conference was stated i n The Round Table for September, 1926: The practical problem of the Empire today is how to reconcile these two fundamentals, unity and responsibility, i n foreign affairs. The d i f f i c u l t y of the present-day solution i s largely due to the fact that the assumption which has governed the conduct of foreign affairs since the appearance of the Imperial War Cabinet i n 1917 — namely, that i t was possible for the six self ̂ -governing nations of the Empire to consult together continuously and sufficiently effectively to formulate a common policy for dealing with foreign affairs, and to make themselves jointly responsi- ble for such a common policy — has broken down.9 The Conference of 1926 was concerned not with future plans for the Empire, but with bringing up to date the consti- tutional theory of the Empire. The most important work done was that of the Inter-Imperial Relations Committee, under the chairmanship of Lord Balfour. This committee was made up of the Dominion Prime Ministers, the Secretary of State for India, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Secretary of State for Dominion A f f a i r s . 1 0 Its recommendations, 9 "The Imperial Complex," The Round Table, September 1926, p. 674. 10 See personal account by the Dominion Secretary, L. S. Amery, i n his My P o l i t i c a l L i f e , London, 1953, vol. 2, pp. 384- 392. 214 embodied in what has come to be known as the Balfour Report, were unanimously accepted by the whole Conference. To this group were submitted a l l questions affecting Inter-Imperial Relations. Discussions were long and involved: We found, on examination, that they (these questions) involved consideration of fundamental principles affect- ing the relations of the various parts of the British Empire inter se, as well as the relations of each part to foreign countries. For such examination the time at our disposal has been a l l too short. Yet we hope that we may have laid a foundation on which subsequent Con- ferences may build. The most famous words of the Report were at once a statement of the stage of development of the relationships between Britain and the self-governing Dominions at that time and the foundation for a l l future thinking about Commonwealth relations. They are autonomous Communities within the Br i t i s h Empire, equal In status, In no way subordinate one to another in any aspect of their domestic or external affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . . The tendency towards equality of status was both right and inevitable. Geographical and other con- ditions made this impossible of attainment by the way of federation. The only alternative was by the way of autonomy; and along this road i t has been steadily sought. Every self^governing member of the Empire is now the master of i t s own destiny. In fact, i f not always in form, i t is subject to no compulsion whatever. . . . Equality of status, so far as Britain and the Dominions are concerned, i s thus the root principle governing our Inter-Imperial Relations. But the prin- ciples of equality and similarity, appropriate to status, do not universally extend to function. Here we require something more than immutable dogmas. For example, to 11 Summary of Proceedings of the Imperial Conference, 1926, printed in Dawson, op_. c i t . , p. 331« 215 deal with questions of diplomacy and questions of defence, we require also flexible machinery — machinery which can, from time to time, be adapted to the changing circumstances of the world» 1 2 In the rest of the Report are considered the changes in the relationships between the parts of the Commonwealth and the adjustments of their external relations which this clearly recognized equality of status had made necessary. The f i r s t point significant for the purpose of this study had to do with the position of the governor general. If equality of status between Britain and the Dominions were a fact, he could no longer be "the representative or agent of His Majesty's Govern- ment in Great Britain or of any Department of that Government." Rather, he must be only f,the representative of the Crown, hold- ing i n a l l essential respects the same position in relation to the administration of public affairs as is held by His Majesty the King in Great B r i t a i n . " 1 3 In order to make this possible, the British government began in 1928 the practice of having a High Commissioner stationed at Ottawa to act as the channel of communication 14 between the British and the Canadian governments. In the section on the operation of Dominion Legislation one point only needs mention here, that to do with the-fact that 12 Proceedings, pp. 331-2. 13 Ibid., p. 333- 14 See chapter VII, p. 216 Dominion l e g i s l a t i o n g e n e r a l l y operated o n l y w i t h i n the boundaries o f the Dominion concerned. I t was recommended t h a t a committee be set up to c o n s i d e r these l i m i t a t i o n s . I t s f u n c t i o n should be to i n q u i r e i n t o and make recommendations on: (a) The present p o s i t i o n as to the competence o f ' Dominion Parliaments t o give t h e i r l e g i s l a t i o n e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l o p e r a t i o n . (b) The p r a c t i c a b i l i t y and most convenient method of g i v i n g e f f e c t t o the p r i n c i p l e t h a t each Dominion should have power to give e x t r a - t e r r i t o r i a l o p e r a t i o n to i t s l e g i s l a t i o n i n a l l cases where such o p e r a t i o n i s a n c i l l a r y to p r o v i s i o n f o r the peace, order, and good government o f the D o m i n i o n . ^ As regards r e l a t i o n s with f o r e i g n c o u n t r i e s , a number of s i g n i f i c a n t p o i n t s were s t u d i e d . The working o f the R e s o l u t i o n o f the I m p e r i a l Conference o f 1923 on the n e g o t i a - tion'-, s i g n a t u r e and r a t i f i c a t i o n of t r e a t i e s was reviewed and ela b o r a t e d on. A s p e c i a l sub-committee, under the chairman- ship o f the Hon. Er n e s t L a p o i n t e , M i n i s t e r of J u s t i c e o f Canada, was appointed t o study t h i s s u b j e c t . Changes were suggested i n the u s u a l form of t r e a t y . The wording then used to d e s c r i b e the c o n t r a c t i n g p a r t y , t h a t g i v e n i n the Annex to the Covenant of the League of Nations, was mi s l e a d i n g as i t suggested an i n e q u a l i t y o f s t a t u s between B r i t a i n and the Dominions. The term " B r i t i s h Empire" had been used, f o l l o w e d by a l i s t of the Dominions concerned. I t was recommended that i n f u t u r e t r e a t i e s should be made i n the name of Heads o f S t a t e s , 15 Proceedings, pp. 335-6. 217 and where one or more parts of the Empire were involved, the treaty should be made i n the name of the King i n respect of that part or those parts. In the specimen form of treaty attached to the Report as an appendix, the following form of signature i s suggested: His Majesty the King ( f u l l t i t l e ) fo r Great B r i t a i n and Northern Ireland and a l l parts of the B r i t i s h Empire which are not separate members of the League of nations, AB for the Dominion of Canada, CD for the Commonwealth of A u s t r a l i a EF .̂6 etc. Thus i t would be clear that the B r i t i s h signature did not involve the Dominions. There likewise would be no longer the double signature that had troubled Borden and the other Canadian delegates at P a r i s , and made the Canadian signature scarcely necessary. In addition i t was recommended that f u l l powers should be issued to plenipotentiaries from each B r i t i s h unit by the King only on the advice of the p a r t i c u l a r government represented. I f f o r the sake of convenience, one plenipotentiary were to sign a treaty for other units as well as his own, he should be issued f u l l powers i n respect of those units only on the advice 17 of t h e i r governments. ' Thus i t was made pe r f e c t l y clear 16 Proceedings, p. 345* 17 Ibid., p. 339. 218 that no signature of a treaty by a British diplomat could obligate Canada unless that diplomat had been given special f u l l powers in respect of Canada on the advice of the Canadian government. Where a multilateral treaty contained a clause that i t should come into effect only on the deposit of a certain number of ratifications, i t had in the past sometimes been questioned whether the separate ratifications on behalf of different Dominions 6 h o u l d be counted. In order to avoid this confusion i t was suggested that in future any clause of this character should provide that the treaty come into effect when i t had been ratified on behalf of so many separate members 18 of the League. This would make considerably clearer to the rest of the world the status of Canada and the other Dominions. Certain conclusions were reached with regard to the future representation of the different parts of the Commonwealth at international conferences. No d i f f i c u l t y was involved where such conferences were held under the auspices of the League of Nations. Then each Dominion, as a separate member of the League, would automatically have separate representation. In conferences called by foreign governments, representation would have to depend in part at least upon the form of invitation received. Basically, when more than one part of the Empire 18 Proceedings, p. 340. 219 desires to be represented, there are three possible forms: (i) By means of a common plenipotentiary or pleni- potentiaries, the issue of f u l l powers to whom should be on the advice of a l l parts of the Empire p a r t i c i - pating. (11) By a single British Empire delegation composed of separate representatives of such parts of the Empire as are participating in the conference. This was the form of representation employed at the Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921. (l±i) By separate delegations representing each part of the Empire participating in the conference. If, as a result of consultation, this third method is desired, an effort must be made to ensure that the form of invitation from the convening Government w i l l make this method of representation possible.19 As regards the conduct of foreign affairs generally, i t was realized that this was one area in which equality of status did not extend to equality of function: It was frankly recognized that in this sphere, as i n the sphere of defence, the major share of the responsi- b i l i t y rests now, and must for some time continue to rest, with His Majesty's Government i n Great Britain. . . . We f e l t that the governing consideration under- lying a l l discussions of this problem must be that neither Great Britain nor the Dominions could be com- mitted to the acceptance of active obligations except with the definite assent of their own Governments.20 As at previous Conferences, the need for closer personal contact between the governments of the Commonwealth was emphasized. With the suggested change in the position of the governor general, one former channel of communication was elimi- nated. It was recommended that new means be developed to ensure close and frequent personal contact between the govern- ments of Britain, and the Dominions. Such new arrangements 19 Proceedings, p. 341. 20 Ibid., p. 342. 220 "should be supplementary to and not i n replacement of, the system of direct communication from Government to Government and the special arrangements which have been in force since 21 1918 for communication between Prime Ministers." The Balfour Report was so important in the development of the Commonwealth that i t has tended to overshadow a l l the other work of the Conference. However, there was, as at prev- ious Conferences, a review of foreign relations given by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and a general discussion on the subject. There was also considerable attention given to the subject of defence. No definite commitments were made, on foreign policy, and the reso- lutions on i t were only general. While the Balfour Report clearly recognized the equality of status of the Dominions and their right to assume f u l l responsibility i n a l l matters which were their sole and direct concern, some authorities s t i l l questioned whether any real changes had taken place. Mr. A. B. Keith maintained that "Outside the actual sphere of League operations the Dominions remain essentially i n their former status regarding foreign 22 affairs." Others, such as P. J. Noel Baker, argued that the Report marked a real advance, that i t so "codified and confirmed the previously evolving practice of the Commonwealth as to 21 Proceedings, p. 344. 22 Responsible Government in the Dominions, Oxford, 1928, vol. 1, p. 893. [ 221 establish a firm body of Dominion rights i n international 23 affairs." In the following Imperial Conference, held i n 1930, the principles to be followed by the Dominions i n conducting relations with other countries were again summarized. Again i t was emphasized that other parts of the Commonwealth must be given an opportunity to express their views, and again the principle of direct and complete Dominion control over a l l obligations assumed was clearly stated: "None of His Majesty's Governments can take any steps which might involve the other Governments of His Majesty i n any active obligations without 24 their definite assent." In 1929, i n preparation for this Conference, arrange- ments were made for the Conference on Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation recommended i n 1926. As suggested then, this body was to discuss certain questions involved i n the operation of Dominion legislation, and report to the Confer- ence of 1930. This was not the group of experts planned in 1926, but rather a mixture of c i v i l servants and p o l i t i c a l leaders. With regard to the question of the extra-territorial operation of Dominion legislation, they f i r s t pointed out both the practical d i f f i c u l t i e s and the legal confusion surrounding the problem and also the fact that i t was not possible to come 23 The Present Juridical Status of the British Dominions in International Law, London, 1929, p. 204. 24 Summary of Proceedings, Imperial Conference, 1930, i n A. B. Keith, ed., Speeches and Documents on the British Domin- ions, 1918-1931, London, 1932, p. 427. 222 to any definite conclusion as to the competence of the Domin- ion parliaments to give their own legislation extra-territorial operation. They recommended: We are agreed that the most suitable method of placing the matter beyond possibility of a doubt would be by means of an enactment i n the terms set out below, with the consent of a l l the Dominions, by the Parliament of the United Kingdom. . . . 'It i s hereby declared and enacted that the Parliament of a Dominion has f u l l power to make laws having extra-territorial operation.' 2^ It was also recommended that hence forward i t be recognized that each Dominion had f u l l legislative authority over a l l ships of i t s own registry both i n t e r - t e r r i t o r i a l l y and extra- t e r r i t o r i a l l y . 2 ^ These recommendations were embodied i n the Statute of Westminster, passed by the British parliament i n 1931. This statute, which was subtitled "An Act to give effect to certain resolutions passed by the Imperial Conferences held i n the years 27 1926 and 1930.", also stated that " i t i s i n accord with the established constitutional position that no law hereafter made by the Parliament of the United Kingdom shall extend to any of the said Dominions as part of the law of that Dominion otherwise than at the request and with the consent of that Dominion." 25 Report of the Conference on the Operation of Dominion Legislation and Merchant Shipping Legislation, 1929j i n Dawson, op. c i t . , p. 380 26 Report, p. 390. 27 K. C. Wheare, The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status, Oxford, 1938, Appendix II, p. 308. 28 Loc. c i t . 223 Canada in 1931» then, had almost a l l the rights of a nation-state with regard to the control of external affai r s . She could open negotiations on any subject, commercial, techni- cal or p o l i t i c a l , with any foreign nation; she could conclude and sign any treaty resulting from such negotiations, and have that treaty r a t i f i e d by the Crown on the advice of the Canadian government. She had achieved the right of legation to foreign powers, the right to receive diplomatic missions from such powers, and the right to establish her own consular services and to decide whether foreign consuls would be received i n Canada. She had gained international recognition of her right to be represented i n international conferences, whether League or otherwise, by separate Canadian delegations. Most important, i t was recognized both i n the Commonwealth and abroad, that Canada would be bound by no international obligation of any sort to which she had not specifically agreed. There s t i l l remained that most fundamental right, the right to declare war or the maintenance of peace. Even before 1914 the constitutional right of Canada to control by action of her own parliament the extent of her participation in any Imperial war was recognized. In 1914, however, there was no question whatever but that when Britain was at war, Canada was also at war. In 1939 the picture was different. Canada declared war separately after action by her parliament, a f u l l week after Britain had done so. But the government had clouded the Canadian position by invoking the War Measures Act 224 and other emergency legislation immediately on the outbreak of war. As a result the actual legal significance of the 29 separate declaration of war was l e f t somewhat i n doubt. Thus i t could be argued that the problem of the right of Canada or any other Dominion to remain neutral i n a war i n which Britain was involved, a problem that caused considerable dis- cussion during the later 1930's, was not f i n a l l y settled by the Canadian declaration of war on September 10, 1939. It i s ironical to note that the F i r s t Unofficial British Commonwealth Relations Conference, held at Toronto i n September 1933} decided to shelve the discussion of the question of neutrality, because the\ League of Nations and the Pact of Paris had made i t clear that "old conceptions as to the declara- tion of war and as to neutrality can have l i t t l e i f any place 30 in the policies of the law-abiding nations.1" But with the rise of Hitler and with the Ethiopian cr i s i s and the Spanish C i v i l War, neutrality soon again became a very practical question. The legal implications were wide and serious. If, as in 1914, Canada were automatically at war whenever Britain were, yet she certainly had the right to decide for herself to what extent she should participate. But i f she decided on passive belligerency, her territory would be legally open to attack; the enemy would be entitled to seize 29 N. A. M. MacKenzie, "International Law and Diplomacy," i n F. H. Soward and others, Canada in World Affairs, the Pre-War Years, Toronto, 1941, p. 256. 30 A. J. Toynbee, ed., British Commonwealth Relations.^ London, 1934, p. 180. 225 her ships and cargoes as prize of war; and her citizens abroad would be liable to treatment as enemy aliens, and their property to seizure as enemy property. Should she decide on passive belligerency, Canada would s t i l l be obliged to prevent trade with the enemy and use of Canadian ports or territory by the enemy. As long as the legal unity of the Empire was insisted on — as long as the Empire was regarded i n international law as a single unit i n the issues of war, peace, and neutrality, this had to be the position of Canada i f she did not want to participate f u l l y i n an Imperial war. Her choice was only between active and passive belligerency. On the other hand, many arguments were raised to show that Canada could control, not only the extent of her participation i n such a war, but also the question as to whether she would be at war at a l l . One approach was that since Canada had already been given recognition as a nation-state by being granted f u l l membership in the League of Nations, i t followed that she had the right of neutrality. This hardly held true — because Canada had some of the rights of a nation-state did not necessarily mean that she had achieved a l l of these rights, and further, the League Covenant provided that "any f u l l y self- 31 governing State, Dominion, or Colony" could become a member. 31 Article I. 226 A more promising line of argument was the one which held that, just as the King already acted on the advice of his Canadian ministers i n such matters as the negotiation and r a t i f i c a t i o n of treaties and the appointment of diplomatic representatives on hehalf of Canada, so he might act on their advice i n the matters of war, peace, and neutrality. In such a case the principle of the unity of the Crown would no longer 32 hold. Neither the Balfour Report nor the Statute of Westmin- ster specifically solved the question. The former, i t must be remembered, said that the principle of equality of status did not necessarily extend to function. Further, as a report of an Imperial Conference, i t could not legally change the law. That could only be done by the parliament with the appropriate power, as was done i n the Statute of Westminster. This statute perhaps cleared the way for neutrality i n the cases of Eire and South Africa, because i t apparently leaves the parliaments of those Dominions completely free to draft new constitutions or 33 to change their relationships with Great Britain, Such was not the case with Canada. At Canadian request the Canadian parliament was limited i n action to those fields entrusted to i t by the British North America Act and i t s amendments. These certainly do not suggest anywhere i n their provisions that the 32 The best contemporary discussion of the problem i s i n R. A. MacKay and E. B. Rogers, Canada Looks Abroad, Toronto, 1938, chapter 15, "The Problem of Neutrality," pp. 233-240. 33 H. BcD. Clokie, "The British Dominions and Neutrality," The American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, vol. 34, no. 4, August 1940, p. 740. 22? Canadian parliament has the power to change the existing legal relationships between Canada and Britain, as would have to be done i f Canada were to remain neutral i n a major British war.34- Moreover, wherever i t was realized during the late 1930's just what neutrality i n an Imperial war would have to involve, the question, to the great majority of Canadians, could not help but be largely a theoretical one. In most English-speaking parts of Canada the ties with Britain were so strong that these necessary actions would have been unthinkable. To maintain st r i c t neutrality, Canada would have had to request the British government to pass legislation to the effect that the King acted on a l l matters on behalf of Canada only on the advice of his Canadian ministers. The Seals Act of 1939 removed what might 35 have been one d i f f i c u l t y here. If Canadian neutrality were to be respected, i t would have to be recognized by both friends and enemies among the nations. To gain this recognition, Canada would have to f u l f i l the obligations of neutrality as s t r i c t l y towards Britain as towards Britain's enemies. Neutrality by definition i s "the legal status arising from the abstention of a state from a l l participation in a war between other states, the maintenance by It of an attitude of impartiality i n i t s deal- ings with the belligerent states, and the recognition by the latter of this abstention and impartiality." 3^ Such s t r i c t 34 MacKay and Rogers, op_. c i t . , p. 238. 35 MacKenzie, op_. c i t . , p. 257* 36 "Neutrality," The Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1953* vol. 16, p. 264. 228 impartiality of treatment towards Great Britain and Nazi Germany would have been impossible. Nevertheless i t was s t i l l desirable that the legal position of Canada be defined with regard to the right of neutrality, which might or might not be exercised at some future time. Unfortunately the actions of the Canadian government at the outbreak of World War II did not leave the situation entirely clear. Yet their action at that time, together with the recognized fact that Canada is subject to no obligations i n the f i e l d of external affairs except those undertaken by her own free w i l l , and with the successful maintenance of neutrality by Eire throughout the war, makes i t obvious that Canada and the other Dominions would not i n the future neces- sarily be involved i n a war engaged i n by British or other parts of the Commonwealth. In effect, i n 1939 the Canadian right of neutrality was recognized. In the immediate pre-war period, Mackenzie King gave a rather confusing picture of the Canadian government policy and position with regard to neutrality. On May 24, 1938, he stated i n the Canadian House of Commons, "The policy of the Government i n respect to participation and neutrality is that Parliament w i l l decide what i s to be done." 3 7 But the next January he quoted Laurier's old position as his own, 37 Canada, House of Commons Debates. May 24, 1938, p. 3183. 229 "If England i s at war we are at war," and added, as Laurier had likewise done, that the extent of Canadian participation 38 would be determined by the Canadian government. On March 30, 1939> he explained that he had taken this position simply to show that i n case of an Imperial war, an enemy of Britain might force participation upon Canada. He maintained that i t would be up to Canada alone to choose which policy she would follow — neutrality, active belligerency or passive belliger- 39 ency. ' In an effort to c l a r i f y the situation, J.T. Thorson, a Liberal, introduced into the House of Commons on February 2, 1939» a private b i l l stating: "Canada shall not assume the status of belligerent otherwise than by a declaration of war made by His Majesty with specific reference to Canada and only 40 on the advice of His Majesty's government i n Canada." In speaking i n support of the b i l l , Thorson declared: The purpose of this b i l l i s to make clear and declare to the other nations of the world the status of Canada in the event of war. . . • Canada has complete autonomy over every aspect of her affairs, whether internal or external'. This autonomy extends to the declaration of war. ., 41 He stressed the difference between the right to neutrality and the exercise of that right. It was the former he wanted recog- nized — the latter would be l e f t of course for parliament to 38 Canada, House of Commons Debates. Jan. 16, 1939> p. 52. 39 R«M. Dawson, Canada i n World Affairs. Two Years of War, 1939-1941, Toronto, 1943, p. 7. 40 Canada, House of Commons Debates, Feb. 2, 1939* p. 639* 41 Loc. c i t . 230 decide as conditions should warrant. The b i l l was talked 42 out. When Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939» Mackenzie King summoned parliament and had i t proclaimed that an "apprehended state of war" existed and had existed since August 25. The War Measures Act of 1914 provided for such a 43 state as well as for actual war. Between that time and the meeting of parliament on September 7, the Defence of Canada Regulations were put into effect, the armed forces were placed on a war basis, the Wartime Prices and Trade Board was set up, trading with the "enemy" was prohibited, and "enemy" aliens 44 were interned — although i f Canada were not at war u n t i l her government proclaimed her so, German nationals could surely only be "apprehended enemies". When parliament gathered, the Speech from the Throne did not make clear the Government's intentions with regard to a Canadian declaration of war and to the extent of Canadian par- ticipation i n that war. The reason was probably that, as always i n Canadian history, i t was necessary for the Prime Minis- ter to preserve a united Canada, and he was unwilling to make his position clear u n t i l he was sure how far popular support, including of course French Canadian support, would enable him 42 Soward, oj). c i t . , p. 133. 43 Dawson, World Affairs, p. 8. 44 Loc. c i t . 231 to go. On September 9> however, he announced that i f the Address to the Throne were approved, his government would;take steps at once to formally declare a state of war with Germany. On September 10 the Canadian declaration of war was proclaimed 46 by the King. It would seem obvious that the intention of Mackenzie King and his Cabinet was to make i t clear that Canada had both the right and the power to make a separate declaration of war. The measures of the preceding week had been taken, not because the British declaration of war involved Canada, but because for Canada a state of "apprehended war" did actually exist, and i t seemed wise and expedient to make a l l possible preparations for Canadian involvement i n that war immediatelyy This seems to have heen the point of view taken by both Germany and the United States. The German Consul-General did not leave the country until after September 10, nor did the United States apply the arms embargo against Canada u n t i l then, though i t had been 47 previously applied against the rest of the Commonwealth. Also, when the United States proclaimed i t s neutrality with respect to the war between "Germany and France; Poland; and the United Kingdom, India, Australia and New Zealand", Canada was not men- 48 tioned. It is apparent that i n 1939 Canada did achieve for 45 Mason Wade, The French Canadians. 1760-1945* Toronto, 1955» p. 918. 46 The text i s printed i n Dawson, World Affairs, pp. 285-6. 47 MacKenzie, op_. c i t . , p. 256. 48 F. R. Scott, "How Canada Entered the War," The Canadian Forum, vol. 19, no. 229 (February 1940), p. 345. 232 the future recognition of that fundamental right of a modern nation-state, the control over her own involvement in war and peace. To summarize, then, during the years 1867-1939 Canada achieved by a slow process of development f u l l control over her external affairs. This growth was in response to the inter-action of the challenges offered by the international events of those years, by the development of a Canadian national feeling, and by a variety of attitudes towards the ideal future of Canada and the Empire, held not only i n Canada and Britain, but also i n the rest of the world. Canadian public opinion, by the very nature of the Canadian public, has always been widely divided on these issues. It has ranged from the extreme Tory, found most often in Ontario, to whom any proposed change i n the British connec- tion is almost a blasphemy, to the extreme nationalist found most often in French Canada, to whom, i f the British connection has any value at a l l , i t has been only i n the way i t has preserved for his race the liberties guaranteed i n the Quebec Act. The middle ground of Canadian opinion was typified early i n the history of the Dominion by Sir John A. Macdonald, i n two of his election platforms, "National Policy" and "A British subject I was born; a British subject I w i l l die" — the continuance of the British connection, but development within that connection towards national status. In Canada 233 a l l these attitudes, and a variety of others, two of which see the future of Canada as independent or as a part of the United States, have existed in varying strengths during a l l this time. In Britain the course of events tended to be affected rather by a series of dominant attitudes: f i r s t "colonial pessimism", then the great revival of Imperial sentiment, with i t s plans for a united Empire. As that became obviously impossible i n the face of Dominion nationalism, British states- men showed a growing willingness to share with the Dominions the control of foreign affai r s . Finally, in the period between the wars, Britain recognized freely and f u l l y the extent of the development of dominion autonomy, and accepted a new role i n the Commonwealth, as no longer ruler, but as one among equals. Attitudes in foreign countries were in the main two: willingness and unwillingness to accept both the fact and the implications of Canadian development. Both were typified at various times by the United States: desire to improve the means of communication between the two countries, and unwilling- ness to negotiate with Canadian rather than with British pleni- potentiaries, or, later, to accept a treaty with Canada alone. A l l of these attitudes had their influence on the direction and extent of the growth of Canadian control over external affai r s . The most significant thing i s that i t was 2 3 4 a process of free growth, not the result of a single plan lai d down in Canada or elsewhere i n accordance with certain of the above attitudes. Only a totalitarian society can make detailed plans for the future of i t s parts, and even then such plans frequently produce a Procrustean bed into which the parts can be f i t t e d only by force. In this study, no attempt has been made to evaluate either the steps taken i n the process of growth, or the direction of that growth. There were only two ways by which Canada could have gained the f u l l stature of a modern nation rstate. She could have broken away from Britain entirely — and there was a time early i n her history as a Dominion when this, as has been shown, would have been quite acceptable to many i n the British government. Such a course would l i k e l y have led to eventual union with the United States. If i t had not, Canada would have had to make her place In the world as a small and weak nation with no experience in the conduct of international affairs. The other alternative was to grow to national stature under the protection of Great Britain. In this way Canadian statesmen were able to gain the knowledge and experience neces- sary through association with British diplomats, and Canada has been able to take her place step by step i n world affairs as she has grown and as conditions have made i t possible. As a result Canadian diplomats have played an increasingly useful and respected part on the world stage. 235 It can now be seen that there was no possible successful outcome for the plans for Imperial Federation, which found strong support among many Brit i s h and Canadian statesmen at the turn of the century, nor indeed for any plans for a common foreign policy for the whole Empire. Once responsible government was conceded i n Canada, the ex- tention of Canadian control to include a l l matters, internal and external, had to follow. The natural urge to grow can no more be stopped or controlled i n a v i t a l democratic society than i t can i n a child. Moreover, the interests of the world today can be far better served by a Commonwealth of sovereign states in free and willing association than by a united Empire. If within the Commonwealth Canada and the other members can give an effective example of international co-operation, then the best interests of world peace, as well as of the Canadian people, w i l l have been served by the growth of Canadian control over external affairs. 236 BIBLIOGRAPHY An important part of the purpose of this study has been to compile an extensive l i s t of the almost innumerable books and articles available with either a general or a specific bearing on the various aspects of the development of Canadian control over external affairs. The section Primary Sources contains such a variety of material that considerable subdivision was necessary, particularly as regards contemporary writings. In this section have been gathered memoirs, correspondence and speeches by those v i t a l l y involved in the growth of the Dominion. Because various government attitudes and public opinion generally i n both Britain and Canada fundamentally affected the course of development, a section entitled "Other Works" has been used to include various contemporary arguments influential i n affecting public opinion as regards certain specific forms of development such as Imperial Federation. Three subdivisions are used for the Secondary Sources: General, Specific and Articles. Distinction between the f i r s t two was frequently d i f f i c u l t to make, and i s often quite arbit- rary, depending on whether the writer found the work in question useful chiefly as background reading or for specific information on one or more points i n the study. Such a distinction was considered wise because of the vast body of writing involved. The f i r s t section, "General", has been made quite extensive, but no attempt has been made to include everything available with 237 any reference to the problem. Here are l i s t e d general histories of Canada, the Empire-Commonwealth, and world affairs, a l l biographies used, and discussions of Canadian external relations where the question of the growth of control is not specially considered. In the section entitled "Specific" i s included, as far as possible, every- thing available i n the Library of the University of British Columbia that has considerable specific bearing, either on some important aspect of or on the whole problem of the growth of Canadian control over external affairs. 238 BIBLIOGRAPHY I PRIMARY SOURCES A. Government Publications Canada, Correspondence and Documents Relative to the Represen- tation of the Dominions at the Peace Conference. Canadian Sessional Papers, Special Session, 1919, 41J. Canada Gazette (The) 1909, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1909. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, Journals of the House of Commons (1880, 1889), Ottawa, Queen's Printer. Canada, Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Reports of Debates, House of Commons, 1875-1939, Ottawa, 1875-1939. Canada, Parliament, Senate, Debates of the Senate of the Dominion of Canada, 1870-1939, Ottawa, 1871-1939. Canada, Parliament, Sessional Papers, 1868-1925, Ottawa. Canada, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of the Confedera- tion of the British North American Provinces, 3rd session, 8th Provincial Parliament of Canada, Quebec, Parliamentary; Printers, 1865. Canada Year Books (Various years, including 1909, 1931, 1934-5, 1939, 1943-4, 1945, and 1952-3). Ottawa, King's Printer. Department of External Affairs, Documents Relating to the Italo- Ethiopian Conflict. Ottawa, King's Printer, 1936. Department of External Affairs, Documents Relating to the Out- break of War, September, 1939, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1939. International Labour Conference, Record of Proceedings, 1919- 1939, Geneva, International Labour Office, 1932. Ol l i v i e r , Maurice, compiler and editor, The Colonial and Imperial Conferences, from 1887 to 1937, Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1954. ~~ Proceedings of the Colonial Conference, 1894. Ottawa, Queen's Printer, 1894. 239 Proceedings of the Imperial Conference. 1909j 1911> Canadian Sessional Papers No. 29a, 1909, No. 208, 1911 Report of the Canadian Delegates to the Assembly of the League of Nations, First to Twentieth Assemblies, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1921 to 1940. Report of the Secretary of State for External Affairs, 1909- 1940, Ottawa, King's Printer. Statutes of Canada, 1894, 1909, 1923 and 1938, Ottawa, King's Printer. Summary of Proceedings of the Colonial Conferences, 1902, 1907« Canadian Sessional Papers No. 29a, 1903; No. 58, 1908. Treaties and Agreements Affecting Canada i n force between His Majesty and the United States of America, with subsidiary documents, 1814-1925, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1927. Tucker, Gilbert Norman, The Naval Service of Canada, Its O f f i c i a l History, Ottawa, King's Printer, 1952, 2 vol. (Especially vol. 1, on origins and part i n Canadian - British relations). United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, The Parliamentary Debates of the House of Commons. B. Semi-official Sources Frost, Richard, ed., The British Commonwealth and World Society, Proceedings of the third unofficial conference on British Commonwealth relations, London, 1945, London, Oxford University Press, 1947. Hopkins, J. Castell, The Canadian Annual Review of Public Affairs, Toronto, The Annual Review Publishing Company, 1902 to 1940. (Carried on after Hopkins' death i n 1923 by the Annual Review Publishing Company.) Lucas, Sir C. P. ed., Lord Durham's Report on the Affairs of British North America, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1912, 3 vols. Normandin, Major A. L., The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1929, Ottawa, The Mortimer Co. Ltd., 1929. Royal Empire Society, London, Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, 1904-5, vol. 36, London, 1905. 2 4 0 Royal Society of Canada, Proceedings and Transaction, 1 9 4 1 , Ottawa, 1 9 4 1 . (Skelton obituary - his place i n the development of the Department of External Affairs.) Soward, F. H., The Changing Commonwealth, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950• (Proceedings of the Fourth Unofficial Commonwealth Relation Conference Held at Bigwin Inn, Ontario, Canada, September 8 - 1 8 , 1 9 4 9 . ) Toynbee, Arnold J., British Commonwealth Relations, Proceed- ings of the F i r s t Unofficial Conference at Tononto, 1 1 - 2 1 September, 1 9 3 3 » London, Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 4 . C. Collections of Documents Dawson, Robert MacGregor, The Development of Dominion Status, 1 9 0 0 - 1 9 3 6 , London, Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 7 * (An excellent introduction on the development of Dominion status, and a large collection of formal and informal documents.) Egerton, H. E., and Grant, W . L., Canadian Constitutional Development, shown by selected speeches and despatches, with Introduction and Explanatory Notes, Toronto, The Musson Book Co. Ltd., 1 9 0 7 . Keith, Arthur Berriedale, ed., Selected Speeches and Documents on British Colonial Policy, 1 7 6 3 - 1 9 1 7 . London, Oxford University Press, 1 9 4 8 . Keith, Arthur Berriedale, ed., Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions, 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 3 1 , from Self-government to National Sovereignty, London, Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 2 . Keith, Arthur Berriedale, ed., Speeches and Documents on International Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1 9 3 ^ Madden, Frederick, Imperial Constitutional Documents, 1 7 6 5 - 1 9 5 2 , A Supplement, Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1 9 5 3 . Kennedy, W . P. M . , Documents of the Canadian Constitution, 1759- 1 9 1 5 , Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1 9 1 8 . Mansergh, Nicholas, ed., Documents and Speeches on British Commonwealth Affairs, 1 9 3 1 - 1 9 5 2 , London, Oxford University Press, 1 9 5 3 , 2 vol. 241 D. Contemporary Writings 1. Memoirs Amery, L. S., My P o l i t i c a l L i f e , London, Hutchinson, 1955, 2 vol. Borden, Henry, ed., Robert Laird Borden: His Memoirs, Toronto, The MacMillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1938. House, E. M. and Seymour, Charles, ed., What Really Happened at Paris. The Story of the Peace Conference, 1918-1919- by American Delegates, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921. Denison, Col. George T., The Struggle for Imperial Unity, London, The MacMillan Co. Ltd., 1909* (First hand account of the work towards Imperial Federation i n Canada.) Findlay, Sir John G., The Imperial Conference of 1911 from Within, London, Constable and Co. Ltd., 1912. Lloyd George, David, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, London, Victor Gallancy Ltd., 1938, 2 vol. Riddell, W. A., World Security by Conference, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1947. (An account of the League and Canada's role i n i t . The author held a post i n the I.L.O. 1920-1924, and was permanent Canadian representa- tive at Geneva, 1924-1937. Tupper, Rt. Hon. Sir Charles, Recollections of Sixty Years i n Canada, Toronto, Cassell and Company LLtd., 1914. (On his work as High Commissioner and as Canadian repres- entative in negotiation of various commercial treaties, also viewpoints on Imperial Federation.) 2. Correspondence and Speeches Borden, Rt. Hon. Sir Robert Laird, Speeches on Canada and the War. Speeches given in Canada, United States of America and Britain, 1914-1919 (several separate pamphlets collected and bound by the University of British Columbia Library). Foster, Hon. George E., Canadian Addresses, Toronto, Bell and Cockburn, 1914. (Strong case for Imperial co-operation — especially addresses on Imperial preferences and naval defence.) 242 Pope, Sir Joseph, Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald. Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1 9 2 1 . ( E s p e c i a l l y letters to Gait on position and functions of Canadian High Commission- ers i n London.) Rowel1, N. M., Canada a Nation. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 192JI (An address delivered at the American Bar Association Meeting, Minneapolis, 1923.) St. Laurent, Louis, The Foundations of Canadian Policy in World Affairs (Duncan and John Gray Memorial Lecture, Toronto, 1947), Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1947. 3« Other Works Curtis, Lionel, The Problem of the Commonwealth. Toronto, The MacMillan Co. of Canada, 1916. (Best detailed statement of one viewpoint on the trend Commonwealth development should take - toward Imperial Federation.) Cushing, Caleb, The Treaty of Washington: Its Negotiation. Execution, and the Discussions Relating, Thereto, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1873. (Decidedly anti-British, sees Canada's future as a part of the United States.) Davidson, George, The Alaska Boundary. San Francisco, Alaska Packers Association, 1903. (6trongly pro-American account.) Dilke, Sir Charles Wentworth, Problems of Greater Britain, London, MacMillan and Co., 1^90. (One of the "new imper- l a l i s t s " - interesting on proposals such as Imperial Federation for the strengthening of the Empire.) Ewart, J. S., The Independence Papers. 1925-1930, published i n Ottawa, no publisher or date given. (Comments on a wide variety of topics, a l l used to argue the case for Canadian independence.) Ewart, J. 5., The Kingdom of Canada and other Essays, Toronto Morang and Co., 1908. Ewart, J. S., The Kingdom Papers, Ottawa, no publisher given, 1912. Lome, The Marquis of, Imperial Federation, London, Swan Sonnenschein and Co., 1885. Mathews, Jehu, A Colonist on the Colonial Question, London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1872. (An early proposal for a form of Imperial Federation.) 243 Smith, Goldwin, Canada and the Canadian Question, Toronto, Hunter, Rose and Company, 1891* (Strong, early ease for growing Canadian autonomy and for commercial union with the United States.) Wakefield, Edward Gibbon, A View of the Art of Colonization, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1914. II SECONDARY SOURCES A. General Amery, Julian, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, vol. 4., 1901- 1903» At the Height of His Power, London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 195T. Angus, H. F., Canada and the Far East, 1940-1953? Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 19!?3. Angus, H. F., ed., Memorandum on Canada and the Doctrine of Peaceful Change, Paris, International Institute of Intellectual Co-operation, League of Nations, 1937* (Memorandum for the International Studies Conference, Tenth Session, Paris, 1937.) Angus, H. F., Brebner, J. B., and others, Twenty-five Years of Canadian Foreign Policy, Toronto, C. B. C. Publications Branch, 1953. (Collection of addresses given on C.B.C. and of articles specially written for this booklet by out st anding author!tie s.) Brady, Alexander, Canada, London, Ernest Benn Ltd., 1932. (Part IV "Imperial and External Relations," an excellent summary.) Brady, Alexander, and Scott F. R., Canada after the War, Toronto, The MacMillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1943. (Ch. 5» F. H. Soward, "Canada and the World".) Brebner, John Bartlett, North Atlantic Triangle, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1945~ (Subtitle: "The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain.") Brosseau, Vincent, Ottawa Reearde v^va Washington, Montreal, Ducharme, 1942. 244 Brown, George W., Building the Canadian Nation, Toronto, J. II. Dent and Sons (Canada) Ltd., 1942. (Part Six, a good but not detailed survey of 20th century develop- ment .) Brown, George W., ed., Canada, Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1950 (Part 6, «External Relations," chapters by G. P. deT. Glazebrook, J. B. Brebner, F. A. Knox, and F. H. Soward). Brown, George W., The Growth of Peaceful Settlement Between Canada and the United.,States, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1948. (Contemporary Affairs pamphlet.) Callahan, James Morton, American Foreign Policy i n Canadian Relations, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1937. Canada and the Organization of Peace, Toronto, Canadian Insti- tute of International Affairs, 1935* (Mimeographed draft report — interesting collection of views on Canada, the League, and security.) Canada i n the Great World War, an authentic account of the military history of Canada from the earliest days to the close of the war of nations, by various authorities, Toronto, United Publishers of Canada, Ltd., 1918-1921, 6 vol. -Chacko, Chirakalkoran Joseph, The International Joint Commis- sion between the United States of America and the Dominion of Canada, New York, Columbia University Press, 1932. Corbett, P. E., The Settlement of Canadian-American Disputes, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1937. (Good on boundary and fisheries questions to 1910.) Coupland R., The Empire i n These Days, London, MacMillan.iand Co. Ltd., 1935. Creighton, Donald Grant, Dominion of the North, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1944. (An excellent history of Canada, but not much detail on external affairs.) Creighton, Donald, John A. Macdonald, The Young Po l i t i c i a n . Toronto, The MacMillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 1952. Dafoe, John W., Canada, an American Nation, New York, Columbia University Press, 1935. (Especially on Alaska Boundary Commission and Canadian reactions.) Dafoe, J. W., Laurier, a Study i n Canadian P o l i t i c s , Toronto, T. Allen, 1922. 245 Davies, Raymond Arthur, Canada and Russia, Toronto, Progress Books, 1944. (Commercial and diplomatic relations.) Dawson, R. MacGregor, ed., Problems of Modern Government, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1941. (Article by R. A. MacKay, "Canada and the Balance of World Power,") Dexter, Grant, Canada and the Building of Peace, Toronto, The Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1944. (Canada's position i n the post-war world, and the problems she w i l l have to face.) Egerton, H. E., The Origin and Growth of Greater Britain, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1924. E l l i o t t , W. Y., The New British Empire, New York, Whittlesey House, 1932"! (An interesting survey of the pre-World War II Empire.) Ewart, T. S., The British Commonwealth of Nations, Ottawa, 1942 — mimeographed. (A collection of short quotes on "opinion regarding the composition, objects, etc.") Ferguson, G. V., John W. Dafoe, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1948. Gathorne-Hardy, G. M., A Short History of International Affairs, 1920 to 1934, London, Oxford University Press, 1934. Grigg, Sir Edward, The British Commonwealth, New York, Live- right Publishing Corporation, 1944. (Good on "Its place in the service of the world" - subtitle.) Hutchison, Bruce, The Incredible Canadian, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Company, 1952. Keenleyside, Canada and the United States, revised edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1952. (On boundary question, fisheries disputes, and commercial relations.) Keith, A. Berriedale, The Constitution. Administration and Laws of the Empire, London, W. Collins Sons and Co. Ltd., 1924 (Vol. 3 i n The British Empire, a survey i n Twelve Volumes, ed. Hugh Gunn). Keith, A. Berriedale, The King and the Imperial Crown, London Longmans, Green and Co., 1936. Keith, Arthur Berriedale, Letters on Imperial Relations, Indian Reform, Constitutional and International Law, 1916-1935. Oxford, University Press, 1935. (A collection of letters written to various British papers. Many pertinent comments) 246 Kennedy, W. P. M., The Constitution of Canada, 1534-1937, London, Oxford University Press, 1938. Knapland, Paul, The British Empire, 1815-1939, New York, Harper and Brothers, 1941. Langer, W. L., and Gleason, S. E., The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940, New York, Harper, 1952. Langsam, W. C , The World Since 1914, New York, The MacMillan Company, 1943. Liberal Way (The), a Record of Opinion on Canadian Problems as Expressed and Discussed at the F i r s t Liberal Summer Conference, Port Hope, September, 1933, Toronto, J. M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1933. (Part II,"Canada and the Outside World," gives the attitude and policy of the Liberal party on foreign affairs.) Lingard, C. Cecil, and Trotter, Reginald G., Canada i n World Affairs, September 1941 to May 1944, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950. Lower, A. R. M., Canada and the Far East, 1940, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940. Lower, A. R. M., Canada, Nation and Neighbour, Toronto, Ryerson, 19!?2. Lower, A. R. M., Colony to Nation, a History of Canada, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Company, 1946. MacCormac, John, Canada: America's Problem, New York, The Viking Press, 1940. (Relations of Canada, the United States and Britain, and some of the complications involved.) Mansergh, Nicholas, Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs; problems of External Policy, 1931-1939, London, Oxford University Press, 1952. Martin, Chester, Foundations of Canadian Nationhood, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955. Miller, David Hunter, The Drafting of the Covenant, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928, 2 vol. (Necessary background, but only brief mention of the Canadian contributions.) Morton, W. L., ed., The Voice of Dafoe, a selection of editor- i a l s on collective security, 1931-1944, by John W. Dafoe, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada Ltd., 1945. Parkin, George R. Sir John A. Macdonald, Toronto, Morang and Co. Ltd., 1912. (The Makers of Canada, vol. 9.) 247 Pope, Sir Joseph, Memoirs of the Right Honourable Sir John Alexander Macdonald, G.C.B., F i r s t Prime Minister of the Dominion of Canada, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1930. Preston, W. F. R., The Life and Times of Lord Strathcona. London, Eveleigh Nash, 1914. (His work as High Commis- sioner.) Robinson, Howard, The Development of the British Empire, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n Company, 1936. Rowell, The Hon. Newton W., The British Empire and World Peace, Toronto, Victoria College Press, 1922. (Part III, useful on Canadian-American relations, and Canada i n the League.) Saunders, E. M., The Life and Letters of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Tupper, Bart., K.C.M.G., London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1916, 2 vol. (His role as High Commissioner.) Scott, F. R., Canada Today, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1939. (A clear statement of Canada's Commonwealth and world relationships on the eve of World War II.) Shippee, Lester Burrell, Canadian-American Relations, 1849-1874, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1939. (Reciprocity, fisheries disputes and the Washington Conference.) Shortt, Adam, and Doughty, Arthur G., general editors, Canada and Its Provinces, A History of the Canadian People and their Institutions by One Hundred Associates, Toronto, The Publishers' Association of Canada Ltd., 1913-1917, 23 vol. (Vols. 5, 6, 7 and 8.) Siegfried, Andre, Canada, London, Jonathan Cope, 1937* (Canadian development as seen by a French historian.) Skelton, 0. D., Life and Letters of Sir Wilfred Laurier, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1921. (Invaluable on Laurier's attitudes and influences.) Skelton, 0. D., The Life and Times of Sir Alexander Gait, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1920. (His work as High Commissioner and i n negotiations abroad.) Soward, F. H., Canada and the Americas, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1937. (Report of a Round Table of the Fourth Annual Conference of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, Hamilton, Ontario, May 1937) 248 Soward, F. H., and Macaulay, A. M., Canada and the Pan-American System, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1948. (Attitude i n Canada; reasons Canada has not joined.) Strange, William, Canada, the Pacific and War, Toronto, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1937' (Good on Canada's opposi- tion to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty.) Stoker, Robert, New Imperial Ideas, A Plea for the Association of the Dominions i n the Government of the Dependent Empire, London, John Murray, 1930. (Book I, "The Domin- ions: A Dissolving Empire," a gloomy picture of the situation i n 1930.) Tansill, Charles Callan, Canadian-American Relations, 1875-1911? Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1943* (Fisheries question, Alaska Boundary dispute, the International Joint Commis- sion, and proposed reciprocity.) Temperley, H. W. V., ed., A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, London, Henry Frowde and Hodder and Stoughton, 1920 -1924, 6 vol. Wade, Mason, The French Canadian, 1760-1945, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 195?. Walker, Eric A., The British Empire. Its Structure and Sp i r i t , London, Oxford University Press, 1947. Wallace, W. Stewart, The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Sir George Foster, Toronto, The Macmillan Co, of Canada Ltd., 1933* (Particularly at the Peace Conference and in the League.) Wilson, Beckles, The Life of Lord Strathcona and Mount Royal, G.C.M.G.. G.C.V.O.. London, Cassell and Co. Ltd., 1915. (His work, as High Commissioner.) Wrong, George M., The Canadians, The Story of A People, Toronto, The Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1939. Zimmern, Alfred, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 1918-1935, London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1936.(Not much mention of the Canadian part.) B. Specific Armstrong, William Earl, Canada and the League of Nations, the Problem of Peace, Geneva, The University of Geneva, 1930. 249 Bennett, George, ed., The Concept of Empire; Burke to Atlee, 1774-1947, London, A. and C. Black, 1953. Bodelsen, C. A., Studies i n Mid-Victorian Imperialism, Copen- hagen, Gyldendalske Boghandel, 1924. Borden, Sir Robert, Canada i n the Commonwealth from Conflict to Co-operation, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1929. Borden, The Right Hon. Sir Robert Laird, Canadian Constitutional Studies, Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1923. Canada; The Empire and the League, Toronto, Thomas Nelson and Sons, Ltd., 1936. (Especially Part II, Chap. 6, "Canada and the Empire," and Chap. 7, "Canada and the League of Nations," both by R. A. MacKay.) Carter, Gwendolen M., The British Commonwealth and International Security, The Role of the Dominions, 1919-1939, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1947. Chambers, Captain Ernest J., The Canadian M i l i t i a , Montreal, L. M. Fresco, 1907. (Particularly Chap. 9, "Recent Devel- opments," much detail on handing over of Halifax and Esquimalt bases.) Cheng, Seymour Ching-Yuan, Schemes for the Federation of the British Empire, New York, Columbia University Press, 1931. Corbett, P. E., and Smith, H.A., Canada and World P o l i t i c s , A Study of the Constitutional and International Relations of the British Empire, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1928. (Somewhat reluctant to admit how far development had actually gone.) Currey, C. H., British Colonial Policy, 1783-1915, London, Oxford University Press, 1916. (Early developments of Dominion control, also useful on the relation of that development to the idea of Imperial Federation.) Dafoe, J. W., Great Britain and the Dominions, Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation Lecture, The University of Chicago, 1927. Dawson, Robert MacGregor, Canada i n World Affairs, Two Years of War, 1939-1941, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1943. Dewey, A. Gordon, The Dominions and Diplomacy, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1929, 2 vols. (The development of Dominion status seen as a "Britannic controversy," but throughout shown against i t s international background and implications.) 250 Eastman, S. Mack, Canada at Geneva, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 194-6. (Complete and somewhat c r i t i c a l account of Canada's part i n the League.) Eckles, Robert B., and Hale, Richard W., Jr., Britain, Her Peoples and the Commonwealth, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1954. Egerton, Hugh Edward, British Colonial Policy i n the Twentieth Century, London, Methuen and Co., Ltd., 1922. (A sequal to his earlier Short History of British Colonial Policy, Part I, "The Dominions" i s useful.) Egerton, Hugh Edward, /;A Short History of British Colonial Policy, 1606-1909, London, Methuen and Co., 1920. ^Good on British policy towards Canada i n the nineteenth century.) E l l i s , L. Ethan, Reciprocity, 1911, A Study i n Canadian-American Relations, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1939. Farr, David M. L., The Colonial Office and Canada, I 8 6 7 - I 8 8 7 , Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1955. (Attitudes towards Canada i n the f i r s t two decades.) Fiddes, Sir George, The Dominion and Colonial Offices, London, G. P. Putnam's Sons, Ltd., 1926. (Useful on the Colonial and early Imperial Conferences.) Flenley, R., Essays i n Canadian History. Toronto, The Macmillan Co. Ltd., 1939. (Especially chapters by F. H. Underhill on "Edward Blake and Canadian Liberal Nationalism," and by G.P. deT. Glazebrook on "Permanent Factors i n Canadian External Relations.) Fuller, J. F. C , Empire Unity and Defence, Bristol, Arrowsmith, 1934. Glazebrook, G. P. deT., Canada at the Paris Peace Conference, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1942. Glazebrook, G. P. deT., A History of Canadian External Relations Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1950. (The earlier section, to 1914, i s most useful; the later section i s less concerned with the development of control.) Gough, John, Canada and the Imperial Conferences, 1887-1926, submitted for the Native Sons of Canada Scholarship, 1927- 1928 (typewritten). Hall, H. Duncan, The British Commonwealth of Nations, London, Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1920. (Good on the growth of Canadian nationhood, the early Imperial Conference, and Imperial co- operation during the war.) 251 Hancock, W. K., Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, London, Oxford University Press, 1937* Harvey, Heather J., Consultation and Co-operation i n the Common- wealth, A Handbook on Methods and Practice, London, Oxford University Press, 1952. (Detailed on machinery for inter- Commonwealth relations, defence, and international rela- tions. First prepared in co-operation with £• M. Meade as background material for the British Commonwealth Relations Conference of 194-9.) Hughes, Hector, National Sovereignity and Judicial Autonomy i n the British Commonwealth of Nations, London, P. S. King and Son, Ltd., 1931. (The Privy Council and dominion autonomy.) Jebb, Richard, The Britannic Question, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1913. (Pre-World War I alternatives i n the development of the Commonwealth.) Jebb, Richard, The Imperial Conference, A.History and Study, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1911) 2 vol. (Invaluable on the early conferences.) Jebb, Richard, Studies in Colonial Nationalism, London, E. Arnold, 190TT Keith, A. Berriedale, Dominion Autonomy In Practice, London, Oxford University Press, 1929. Keith, A. Berriedale, The Dominions as Sovereign States, London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1938. (Especially complete on Canada's position in the empire and on the growth of control over non-commercial matters.) Keith A. Berriedale, Responsible Government In the Dominions. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1928, 2 vol. (Information f u l l , clear and straightforward, re relationships with Empire, and growth of commercial autonomy.) Keith, A. Berriedale, The King. The Constitution, The Empire and Foreign Affairs, Letters and Essays, 1936-7? London, Oxford University Press, 1938. Keith, A. Berriedale, The Sovereignty of the British Dominions. London, MacMillan and Co. Ltd., 1929. Lowell, A. Lawrence, and Hall, H. Duncan, The British Common- wealth of Nations, Boston, World Peace Foundation Pamphlets, 1927. 252 L u c a s , S i r C h a r l e s , e d . , T h e E m p i r e a t W a r , L o n d o n , H u m p h r e y M i l f o r d , 1 9 2 3 , 2 volT ( V o l . I I , P a r t I " C a n a d a " , s e c t i o n s 1 a n d 3 b y L u c a s , s e c t i o n 2 , b y F . H . E n d e r h i l l . ) M a c K a y , R . A . , a n d R o g e r s , E . B . , C a n a d a L o o k s A b r o a d . L o n d o n , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 3 8 . ( G o o d o n t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e D e p a r t m e n t o f E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , a l s o o n t h e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a d i s t i n c t l y C a n a d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . ) M a c K e n z l e , N o r m a n , a n d L a i n g , L i o n e l H . , e d i t o r s , C a n a d a a n d t h e L a w o f N a t i o n s . T o r o n t o , T h e R y e r s o n P r e s s , 1 9 3 8 . ( S u b t i t l e : A S e l e c t i o n o f C a s e s i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w A f f e c t i n g C a n a d a o r C a n a d i a n s . . . . U s e f u l i n t h e q u e s - t i o n o f p r o v i n c i a l p o w e r s i n t h e i r r e l a t i o n t o C a n a d i a n t r e a t y - m a k i n g p o w e r , a l s o i n v a r i o u s b o u n d a r y w a t e r a n d f i s h e r i e s t r e a t i e s w i t h t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s o f A m e r i c a . ) M a n n i n g , C . A . W . , T h e P o l i c i e s o f t h e B r i t i s h D o m i n i o n s i n t h e L e a g u e o f N a t i o n s , L o n d o n , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 3 2 . M a n s e r g h , N i c h o l a s , T h e C o m m o n w e a l t h a n d t h e N a t i o n s ; S t u d i e s i n B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h R e l a t i o n s , L o n d o n , R o y a l I n s t i - t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1 9 4 8 . N e u e n d o r f f , G w e n , S t u d i e s i n t h e E v o l u t i o n o f D o m i n i o n S t a t u s , L o n d o n , G e o r g e A l l e n a n d U n w i n L t d . , 1 9 4 2 . ( S t u d i e s o f t h e c h a n g i n g r o l e o f t h e G o v e r n o r - g e n e r a l , a n d o f t h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f C a n a d i a n n a t i o n a l i s m . ) P a l m e r , G e r a l d E . H . , C o n s u l t a t i o n a n d C o - o p e r a t i o n i n t h e B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h , L o n d o n , H u m p h r e y M i l f o r d , 1 9 3 4 . ( U s e f u l t h r o u g h o u t , e s p e c i a l l y o n t h e H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r , d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n a n d E m p i r e C o n f e r e n c e s . ) P o r r i t t , E d w a r d , T h e F i s c a l a n d D i p l o m a t i c F r e e d o m o f t h e B r i t i s h O v e r s e a s D o m i n i o n s . O x f o r d , T h e C l a r e n d o n P r e s s , 1 9 2 2 . ( E x t e n s i v e d e t a i l — p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l o n e a r l y d e v e l o p m e n t s i n t h e p o w e r t o n e g o t i a t e c o m m e r c i a l t r e a t i e s . ) P o t t e r , A l e x a n d e r 0., C a n a d a a s a P o l i t i c a l E n t i t y , T o r o n t o , L o n g m a n s , G r e e n a n d C o . , 1 9 2 3 . ( C o n c i s e b u t d e t a i l e d , o n e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s t o 1923•) S k i l l i n g , H . G o r d o n , C a n a d i a n R e p r e s e n t a t i o n A b r o a d , F r o m A g e n c y t o E m b a s s y , T o r o n t o , T h e R y e r s o n P r e s s , 1 9 4 5 . ( I n d i s p e n s a b l e o n t h i s a s p e c t . ) S o w a r d , F . H . , P a r k i n s o n , J . F . , M a c K e n z i e , N . A . M . , a n d M a c D e r m o t , T . W . L . , C a n a d a i n W o r l d A f f a i r s . T h e P r e - W a r Y e a r s , L o n d o n , O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 4 1 . ( P a r t I , " P o l i t i c s " , b y S o w a r d , a c o m p r e h e n s i v e s t u d y o f C a n a d i a n 253 foreign policy to 1939, and Part 3, ch. 17, "Neutrality", by MacKenzie.) Stacey, C. P., The Military Problems of Canada, Toronto, The Ryerson Press, 1940. Stanley, George F. G., i n collaboration with Harold M. Jackson, Canada's Soldiers 1604-1954, The Military History of an Unmilitary People, Toronto, The Macmillan Company of Canada, Ltd., 1954. Toynbee, Arnold J., The Conduct of British Empire Foreign Relations Since the Peace Settlement. London, Humphrey Milford, 1928. (On the League, inter-Commonwealth relations, and representation abroad.) Trotter, R. G., The British Empire-Commonwealth. A Study i n P o l i t i c a l Evolution, New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1932. Tyler, J. E., The Struggle for Imperial Unity. 1868-1895, London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1938. (The case for Imperial Federation and the reactions to i t i n Britain, Canada, and the various colonies.) Wheare, K. C , The Statute of Westminster and Dominion Status. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1938. C. Articles Ames, Sir Herbert, "Canada and the Council," The Bulletin of the League of Nations Society i n Canada, July 1928. Bennett, R. B., "Canada's Naval Policy," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 4 (July 1937) pp. 388-400. (From the House of Commons Debates, March 25, 1937.) Birchenough, Henry, "England's Opportunity - Germany or Canada?" The Nineteenth Century, vol. 22, no. 245 (July 1897), PP. 1- BTj (Influence of Canadian policy and wishes on British policy re Belgian and German trade treaties.) Borden, Sir Robert Laird, "The British Commonwealth of Nations," Yale Review, vol. 12, no. 4 (July 1923), pp. 774-789. Brebner, J. B., "Canada, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and the Washington Conference," P o l i t i c a l Science Quarterly, vol. 50, no. 1 (March 1935), pp. 45-58. Brown, George W., "Canadian Nationalism, An Historical Approach," International Affairs, vol. 30, no. 2 (April 1954), pp. 166- 174. 254 "Canada and the British Navy," The Round Table, vol. 16, no. 4, (September 1926), p. 748-7fo^ "Canada and Imperial Defence," Canadian Defence Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 1 (October 1934), pp. 40-46; vol. 12, no.2 (January 1935), pp. 183-188. "Canada and the International C r i s i s , " The Round Table, v ol. 26, no. 102 (March 1936), pp. 376-3541 "Canada and the Next War," The Round Table, London, vol. 27, no. 106 (March 1937), pp. 412-425. "Canada and World Affairs," The Round Table, vol. 26, no. 103 (June 1936), pp. 599-602. Carter, Gwendolen, "Canada and Sanctions i n the Italo-Ethiopian Conflict," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1940, pp. 74-84. Chamberlain, N. 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L., "Sir John Rose and Imperial Relations: An Episode i n Gladstone's F i r s t Administration," The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 33, no. 1 (March 1952) pp. 19-38. Foster, Joan M. V., "Reciprocity and the Joint High Commission of 1898-9," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report. 1939, p. Q7-W. 255 Gates, Paul W., " O f f i c i a l Encouragement to Immigration by the Province of Canada," Canadian Historical Review, vol. 15, no. 1 (March 1 9 3 4 ) , pp. 2 4 - 3 8 . Galbralth, J. S., "The Imperial Conference of 1 9 2 1 and the Washington Conference," The Canadian Historical Review, vol. 2 9 , no. 2 (June 1 9 4 8 ) , pp. 143 -152 . Gibson, F. W., "The Alaskan Boundary Dispute." Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1 9 4 5 , pp. 2 5 - 4 1 . (Emphasizes the importance of the strong Canadian re- action. ) Gibson, James A., "Mr. Mackenzie King and Canadian Autonomy, 1 9 2 1 - 4 6 , " The Canadian Historical Association Annual Report, 1 9 5 1 , pp. 1 2 - 2 1 . Glazebrook, G. P. deT. "Canadian Foreign Policy i n the Twentieth Century," Bibliographical Article, The Journal of Modern History, Chicago, vol. 2 1 , no. 1 (March 1 9 4 9 ) , . p p . 4 4 - 5 5 . Glazebrook, G. P. deT. "The External Relations of the Province of Canada," Canadian Historical Association Annual Report. 1 9 3 8 , pp. 1 0 3 - 1 1 0 . (Situation i n the half-century before Confederation.) Grattan, C. Hartley, "Coming, A New British Empire?" Asia, vol. 4 0 , no. 7 (July 1 9 4 0 ) , pp. 3 4 3 - 3 4 6 . Hall, H. Duncan, "British Commonwealth of Nations," American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, vol. 4 7 , no. (December 1 9 5 3 ) , pp. 997-1015. Hamilton, Col. C. F., "The Canadian M i l i t i a , " Canadian Defence Quarterly, VII, "The Dead Period," vol. 7 , no. 1 (October 1 9 2 9 ) , PP. 7 8 - 8 9 ; IX, "The Beginning of Reform," vol. 7 , no. 3 (April 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 3 8 3 - 3 8 9 ; X, "The South African War," vol. 7 , no. 4 (July 1 9 3 0 ) , pp. 5 3 7 - 5 4 2 . "The Imperial Complex." The Round Table, vol. 16 (September 1 9 2 6 ) , pp. 6 7 3 - 6 8 9 . "The Imperial Conference," The Round Table, vol. 1 1 (September 1 9 2 1 ) , pp. 7 3 5 - 7 5 8 . Keenleyside, H. L . , "Canada's Department of External Affairs," International Journal, vol. 1 , no. 3 (July 1 9 4 6 ) , pp. 1 8 9 - 2 1 4 . Keenleyside, H. L., "The Department of External Affairs," Queen's Quarterly, vol. 4 4 , no. 4 (Winter 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 ) , pp. 4 8 3 - 4 9 5 . 256 K e i t h , A . B . , " R e c e n t C h a n g e s i n C a n a d a ' s C o n s t i t u t i o n a l S t a t u s , " C a n a d i a n H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , v o l . 9 , n o . 2 ( J u n e 1 9 2 8 ) , p p . 1 0 2 - 1 1 6 . ( K e i t h i n s i s t e d o n t h e n e e d f o r t h e a s s e n t o f t h e I m p e r i a l g o v e r n m e n t i n C a n a d i a n t r e a t y - m a k i n g . ) K n a p l a n d , P a u l , " I n t r a - I m p e r i a l A s p e c t s o f B r i t a i n ' s D e f e n c e Q u e s t i o n , 1 8 7 0 - 1 9 0 0 , " C a n a d i a n H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , v o l . 3 , n o . 2 ( J u n e 1922), p p . 1 2 0 - 1 4 2 . L a n g , M o r d e n H . , " S i r J o h n R o s e a n d t h e I m p e r i a l B e g i n n i n g s o f t h e C a n a d i a n H i g h C o m m i s s i o n e r s h i p , " C a n a d i a n H i s t o r i c a l R e v i e w , v o l . 1 2 , n o . 1 ( M a r c h 1 9 3 1 ) , p . 23 -43 . " L o c a r n o a n d t h e B r i t i s h C o m m o n w e a l t h , " T h e R o u n d T a b l e , v o l . 15, n o . 4 ( S e p t e m b e r 1 9 2 6 ) , p p . 704 -720 . L o w , S i d n e y , " T h e C o m i n g o f t h e E m p i r e C a b i n e t , " T h e N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y a n d A f t e r , v o l . 7 9 , n o . 4 7 0 ( A p r i l 1 9 1 6 ) , p p . 725- 7 3 9 . L o w e l l , A . L a w r e n c e , " T h e T r e a t y M a k i n g P o w e r o f C a n a d a , " F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , n o . 1 ( S e p t e m b e r 15, 1 9 2 3 ) , p p . 1 2 - 2 2 . M a c K a y , R o b e r t A . , " T h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o i n t C o m m i s s i o n b e t w e e n t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s a n d C a n a d a , " T h e A m e r i c a n J o u r n a l o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l L a w , v o l . 2 2 , n o . 2 ( A p r i l , 1 9 2 8 ) , p p . 292- M a c k e n z i e K i n g , W . L . , " C a n a d a ' s D e f e n c e P o l i c y , " C a n a d i a n D e f e n c e Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 15, n o . 2 ( J a n u a r y 1 9 3 8 ) , p p . 1 2 8 - 1 5 0 . ( S p e e c h i n H o u s e o f C o m m o n s , F e b r u a r y 1 9 , 1 9 3 7 , g i v i n g s i t u a t i o n a t t h a t t i m e . T a k e n f r o m H o u s e o f C o m m o n s D e b a t e s . ) M a c k e n z i e K i n g , W . L . , " C a n a d a ' s L e g a t i o n s A b r o a d , " T h e C a n a d i a n N a t i o n , M a r c h - A p r i l 1 9 2 9 , p . 2 b . O ' L e a r y , M . G r a t t a n , " A P o l i t i c a l E m p i r e D i s a p p e a r s , " T h e C o m m o n w e a l t h , v o l . 15, n o . 26 ( A p r i l 2 7 , 1 9 3 2 ) , p p . 7 1 3 , 4 . P i g g o t t , F . F . , " T h e R e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e E m p i r e , " T h e N i n e - t e e n t h C e n t u r y a n d A f t e r , v o l . 7 9 , n o . 469 ( M a r c h 1 9 1 6 ) , p p . 4 9 3 - 5 1 5 . R e i d , E s c o t t , " C a n a d a a n d L e a g u e S a n c t i o n s , " T h e C a n a d i a n F o r u m , v o l . 1 6 , n o . 1 8 3 ( A p r i l 1 9 3 6 ) , p p . 1 0 - 1 2 . R e i d , E s c o t t , " M r . 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