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The course of Anglo-Russian relations from the congress of Berlin of 1878 until the Anglo-Russian convention… Fraser, Murray McVey 1956

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THE COURSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN OF 1878 UNTIL THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907  by Murray McVey Fraser  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE RETIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of HISTORY  We accept t h i s thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates f o r the degree of Master of Arts.  Members of tfey Department o f History.  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA April,  1956.  ABSTRACT  of THE COURSE OF ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS FROM THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN OF 1878 UNTIL THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN CONVENTION OF 1907  At the beginning of the present century,  Anglo-Russian  r i v a l r y was perhaps the most important f a c t o r i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n of the day.  At that time i t seemed sound doctrine to believe  that B r i t a i n and Russia were bound to remain implacable enemies f o r an i n d e f i n i t e period of time.  Nevertheless, seven years a f t e r the  century had begun, these two apparently i r r e c o n c i l a b l e r i v a l s had reached an agreement, which, i f not c o r d i a l , was none the l e s s r e a l , and which relegated t h e i r well-night century-old r i v a l r y to the realms of h i s t o r y .  The animosity which was c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s throughout t h i s period had i t s origins i n the Near East during the l a s t part of the eighteenth century, as a r e s u l t of Russian e f f o r t s to obtain c o n t r o l of the S t r a i t s of Bosphorous and of the Dardanelles from the Ottoman Turk.  However, the r i s e of r e v o l u t i o n -  ary France put an end temporarily to t h i s newly-born r i v a l r y , and forced the two countries into a partnership to meet a nation who was a v i t a l threat to both,  with the defeat of Napoleon, though, t h i s  partnership dissolved and the r i v a l r y appeared i n a more intense form than before.  Throughout the nineteenth century i t spread successively  ii from the Near East to Central A s i a , and f i n a l l y to the Far East. However, shortly a f t e r the coming of the twentieth century, both countries discovered they had a common r i v a l i n Imperial Germany, whose growing power now made her the leading European power on the continent.  As i n the case of revolutionary France, the two countries  resolved to forego t h e i r r i v a l r y i n order to meet a common p e r i l . Hence the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  From the B r i t i s h side, the material f o r the study of AngloRussian r e l a t i o n s throughout t h i s period i s on the whole adequate. The o r i g i n a l B r i t i s h Documents f o r the years 1878 - I897 are not available, but those f o r the years 1898 - 1907 are contained i n the general c o l l e c t i o n " B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, - 19lii".  1898,  There i s also much material available i n the memoirs and  biographies of the leading B r i t i s h  statesmen.  On the Russian side, however, there i s much to be desired. A c e r t a i n number of o f f i c i a l documents have been published i n a spasmodic and desultory manner i n the "Krasny Archiv", but much which i s pertinent has been withheld. English t r a n s l a t i o n .  Only a few documents are a v a i l a b l e i n  The memoirs of emigre^ Russian diplomats, while  a v a i l a b l e i n so f a r as they go, s u f f e r from the f a c t that they were composed i n e x i l e , with l i t t l e else save memory to serve as a guide. As a r e s u l t , there i s much on the Russian side which i s , and l i k e l y w i l l remain unknown.  Nevertheless, there i s enough Russian material  extant which, taken i n conjunction with the B r i t i s h m a t e r i a l a v a i l a b l e ,  iii  i s s u f f i c i e n t to enable the determining of the course followed byAnglo- Russian r e l a t i o n s with a reasonable degree o f c e r t a i n t y . In summing up, i t should be emphasized that Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y f l o u r i s h e d most vigorously when neither country was menaced by a strong European power.  When a strong power emerged which threat-  ened to dominate the continent of Europe, t h i s r i v a l r y temporarily ceased.  Since both Great B r i t a i n and Russia had developed immense  empires i n Asia i n close proximity the one to the other, i t was perhaps only natural that they should be serious r i v a l s .  Nevertheless,  they both remained powers whose major i n t e r e s t s l a y i n Europe.  Here,  i n Europe, i f the Near East beoexcluded, the v i t a l interests of the two countries d i d not c o n f l i c t .  Both countries were interested i n  maintaining the status quo i n Europe, as they c l e a r l y recognized that a Europe organized under the hegemony of another single power was a mortal threat t o both.  I t can therefore be said that both  Great B r i t a i n and Imperial Russia considered the maintenance of the European balance o f power as e s s e n t i a l to t h e i r long-term i n t e r e s t s , and were prepared to forego t h e i r mutual r i v a l r y t o maintain i t .  TABLE OF CONTENTS  ABSTRACT  CHAPTER  PAGE  I  The Most Troublesome Years, 1879 - 1885  1  II  From Near East to Far East, 1885 - 1895  39  III  The S u r v i v a l of an Idea, I896 - 1905  89  IV  The Negotiation o f the Convention,  APPENDIX I APPENDIX I I BIBLIOGRAPHY  and I t s Results 1906 - 1907  152  THE MOST TROUBLESOME YEARS : 1879 - 1885  The f e e l i n g of mutual h o s t i l i t y and f e a r which characterized Anglo-Russian  r e l a t i o n s a t the beginning o f the twentieth century had  i t s o r i g i n s l a r g e l y i n thennineteenth century. • Before that time the relationships of the two countries had not been considered of paramount importance by either of them, but there was a t r a d i t i o n of friendship and community of i n t e r e s t s dating back to the time of Queen E l i z a b e t h of England and Ivan IV (The T e r r i b l e ) , Czar of a l l Russias.  This had  been sustained to some extent throughout the periods of Peter and Catherine the Great.  However, during the l a t t e r part of the r e i g n o f Cath-  erine, and j u s t previous to the French Revolution, the Near Eastern question emerged because of Russian designs on Constantinople and the S t r a i t s , and because of the r e s u l t i n g B r i t i s h plans to thwart these designs.  As these countries flanked the continent of Europe geographi c a l l y , i t was to t h e i r i n t e r e s t that no single power should a r i s e on that continent which would be able to dominate i t and thus threaten, t h e i r security.  I t was f o r t h i s reason that the two countries found  themselves a l l i e s i n the long series of wars against revolutionary and Napoleonic France.  With the defeat of Napoleon i n l 8 l 5 , Great B r i t a i n  and Russia were l e f t as the two most powerful states i n Europe.  During  the f i r s t quarter of the nineteenth century, r e l a t i o n s between the two countries were r e l a t i v e l y good, as both had emerged v i c t o r s from the  2 Napoleonic wars, and mutual fear of a resurgent France kept them from becoming estranged. However, f o r the remainder of the century, save f o r temporary interludes, t h e i r p o l i c i e s crossed, and created deep feelings of antagonism so that each came t o consider the other as i t s chief enemy. When events f a i l e d t o sustain the mutual aversion, the suspicion which had been accumulated  over the years on both sides served just as w e l l .  As  a consequence, each power sought t o thwart the other i n both Europe and A s i a t o the extent that both often l o s t sight of and ignored v i t a l i n t erests and pressing dangers nearer home. In t h i s continual diplomatic b a t t l e the B r i t i s h proved t o be the more successful on the whole.  The  antagonism continued unabated u n t i l towards the close of the century when the statesmen of both countries saw that a t h i r d power - Imperial Germany, had arisen which threatened t o dominate completely the councils of Europe.  As the r i s e of revolutionary France had forced Great B r i t a i n ,to forgo her r i v a l r y with Russia i n what were the beginnings of the Eastern Question, so the development of Imperial Germany at the end of the nineteenth century caused both Great B r i t a i n and Russia t o reconc i l e t h e i r differences i n A s i a i n order t o meet a common danger i n Europe.  In the nineteenth century Russian and B r i t i s h p o l i c i e s conf l i c t e d i n two main areas, with a t h i r d area of c o n f l i c t developing as the century closed.  F i r s t i n point of time, and most widely known, was  the Near Eastern Question.  This had grown out of persistent e f f o r t s  5 made by Russia t o obtain a warm water outlet to the west by gaining cont r o l of the S t r a i t s of the Bosphorous and Dardanelles. These attempts had involved her i n various wars with the Ottoman Empire and her aims seemed t o be t o undermine the existence of that Empire and become i t s heir.  To t h i s purpose was added during the century, the h i s t o r i c mis-  sion of the Russians to l i b e r a t e t h e i r Balkan Slavonic brothers from the Turkish misrule, which was r e g u l a r l y s a i d to be oppressing them. This l a s t purpose served as a humanitarian cloak to conceal more oordid Russian aims.  Whatever form these e f f o r t s might assume, they met with  stubborn B r i t i s h resistance as B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s seemed t o require the preservation of an independent Turkey i n the Eastern Mediterranean. However corrupt or weak that state might be was a matter of much l e s s importance.  The other main centre of r i v a l r y developed i n Central A s i a with the t e r r i t o r i a l expansion of Russia i n t o the Turkestan steppes and the Mohammedan khanates.  In a measure t h i s expansion i n t o Central  A s i a was due to the constant B r i t i s h checkmating of Russia i n the Near East.  As a r e s u l t of these attempts upon the part of Great B r i t a i n and  at times of other European powers, t o l i m i t Russia, Russian f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the words of Guy Wint, noted B r i t i s h authority on India, developed a sort of "rhythm - swaying f i r s t towards Europe - then back t o A s i a , and then t o Europe again, according to where i t met currently the least resistance.  1.  1,1  Wint, Guy. The B r i t i s h In A s i a . I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 1954, p. 133.  4 A f t e r the defeat of Russia i n the Crimean War, Russian penetr a t i o n i n Persia and Central A s i a received a marked a c c e l e r a t i o n .  As  the Russian armies advanced nearer the f r o n t i e r s of India, the B r i t i s h became ever more alarmed u n t i l t h i s and not the Near Eastern Question 2 became the sorest point i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s . In the intensely embittered period of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s following the Congress of B e r l i n , Russia once more expanded i n Central A s i a , with such t e r r i f y i n g r a p i d i t y that the years between the Congress of B e r l i n and the settlement of the Penjdeh i n c i d e n t i n Afghanistan were probably the worst i n the long years of Anglo-Russian h o s t i l i t y . Her f r u s t r a t i o n and defeat i n the Bulgarian question of 1885  -  1887 caused Russia to t u r n once more t o Asia, t h i s time t o another f i e l d of expansion - the Far East.  Here was fought out the l a s t great struggle  i n the r i v a l r y between Great B r i t a i n and Imperial Russia.  A f t e r the  disaster of the war with Japan, Russia was prepared to r e t u r n again to Europe and resume her h i s t o r i c  tasks i n the Balkans and the Near East.  Although the course of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s was not t o improve s u b s t a n t i a l l y u n t i l a f t e r the turn of the century, nevertheless, from the time of the r i s e of Bismarck's Germany, neither country f e l t completely free to indulge i n the untrammelled r i v a l r y of o l d . A f e a r that a power had arisen which might eventually become a greater menace to Great B r i t a i n and Russia than e i t h e r was t o the other began t o take possession of the minds of even the most Conservative statesmen i n both  2.  Habberton, W., Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan; 1837-1907, University of I l l i n o i s , Urbana, 1937, p. 23.  5 countries.  There was also the f e e l i n g that the new Germany might make  use of t h e i r mutual r i v a l r y to reap advantages f o r h e r s e l f .  At the Con-  gress of B e r l i n , eight years a f t e r the formation of the German Empire, the new,  united Germany appeared f o r the f i r s t time as an important  f a c t o r i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s .  From the time of the Congress, the  f a c t o r of Germany became more and more decisive i n determining the r e l ationship between the two countries, and f i n a l l y i t pushed i n t o the background t h e i r r i v a l r i e s i n f i e l d s stretching from the Near East to the Far East.  The Congress of B e r l i n had opened on June 13, 1878, under the presidency of Count Bismarck.  Exactly one month l a t e r the t r e a t y was  f i n a l l y ready f o r signature, and the delegates, having signed amidst cheers and congratulations, separated.  At the Congress, D i s r a e l i had  been forced to modify the p o l i c y of the preservation of Turkish i n t e g r i t y , which he had i n h e r i t e d from Palmerston, and to agree to a l i m i t e d p a r t i t i o n of the Turkish Empire, provided Russia was not to gain =fce©much by i t .  In other words, D i s r a e l i had modified h i s o r i g i n a l attitude  to the extent that he would permit the creation of autonomous C h r i s t i a n p r i n c i p a l i t i e s i n the Balkans, provided they d i d not pass completely under the influence of Russia.  T h i s , i n i t s e l f , d i d something to pres-  erve the peace between Great B r i t a i n and Russia.  In the person of Salisbury, h i s f o r e i g n secretary, Beaconsfield had provided himself with the means of a s t r a t e g i c retreat from the demands of the jingoes who  regarded any decrease i n the authority and  power of the Turkish Empire as a sure gain f o r Russia and a b e t r a y a l of British  n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s j and also from the demands of the L i b e r a l s ,  6 who hoped to see the coup de grace administered t o the already declining Turkish Empire, even i f i t should benefit Russia.^  Had D i s r a e l i , been  alone at B e r l i n , he might have found i t extremely d i f f i c u l t t o abandon h i s former Turcophil a t t i t u d e , but i n Salisbury he had a man whose sympathies were with the Balkan Christians and who asked only that the t r e a t y should prove strong enough to maintain t h e i r independence against Russian and Turk a l i k e .  In the words of h i s biographer, Kennedy, S a l i s -  bury, at the Congress of B e r l i n , borrowed "Gladstone's Liberalism i n regard to Turkish reforms i n Europe."^  The r e s u l t s of t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference, perhaps the most s i g n i f i c a n t between the Congress of Vienna i n 1815,  and the Peace Treaty  of V e r s a i l l e s i n 1919, can be b r i e f l y summarized i n so f a r as they a f fected British-Russian r e l a t i o n s .  From the f i r s t , precedence was given t o the Bulgarian quest i o n . I . The b i g Bulgaria of the Treaty of San Stefano, D i s r a e l i ' s p a r t i c u l a r nightmare, was p a r t i t i o n e d i n t o three p a r t s ; ( i ) the new autonomous P r i n c i p a l i t y of Bulgaria with a C h r i s t i a n government and a nati o n a l m i l i t i a ; ( i i ) the semi-autonomous province of Eastern Roumelia, with a C h r i s t i a n governor-general but under the d i r e c t authority of the S u l t a n ; ( i i i ) the Slav and Greek d i s t r i c t s i n Macedonia and Thrace were restored t o unrestricted Turkish r u l e . I I . Rumania was recognized as independent, while at the same time she restored Southern Bessarabia t o  3.  Seton-Watson, R.W., D i s r a e l i , Gladstone and The Eastern Question, MacMillan and Co., London, 1935, p.p. 435-436.  4.  Kennedy, A.L., Salisbury, London, Hohn Murray, 1953, p. 131 •  7 Russia. I I I . In A s i a Minor, Turkey ceded Ardahan, Kars, and Batum to Russia, but recovered Bayazid. Three weeks previous to the summoning of the Congress at Berl i n , a convention had been signed between Great B r i t a i n and Turkey which provided that i f Russia should acquire t e r r i t o r y i n the Caucasus, Turkey would cede Cyprus to B r i t a i n to administer under nominal Turkish sovereignty.  In return f o r t h i s , B r i t a i n bound h e r s e l f to defend Tur-  key's A s i a t i c f r o n t i e r s . T h e f o l l o w i n g week, on May 50, Shuvalov, Russian ambassador i n London, who had worked unceasingly f o r peace throughout the Anglo-Russian c r i s i s , and who had convinced Salisbury, as he had Derby before him,^  of h i s earnest desire f o r peace, was able to  conclude an agreement with Great B r i t a i n .  In t h i s agreement Russia  stated that she would be w i l l i n g to reduce the t e r r i t o r y of B u l g a r i a , In return f o r t h i s concession with regard to Bulgaria, Great B r i t a i n s a i d that she would agree to the Russians acquiring t e r r i t o r y i n the Caucasus.  Although leaving many problems unsettled and undiscussed, t h i s  agreement sketched i n broad outlines the course to be followed at Ithe settlement of B e r l i n .  D i s r a e l i , by the a c q u i s i t i o n of the i s l a n d of Cyprus, was able to s a t i s f y the jingoes at home, who would have regarded the  territorial  concessions made to Russia i n A s i a Minor i n the Anglo-Russian agreement  5.  Seton-Watson, R.W., p.p. 460-462.  D i s r a e l i , Gladstone and The Eastern Question,  6.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Russia, Methuen & co. Ltd., London, 1952, p. 105.  7.  Seton-Watson, op. c i t . p.  41B.  8 between Salisbury and Shuvalov and at the Congress of B e r l i n as outrageous and beyond redemption unless some concrete form o f compensation had been forthcoming.  Now D i s r a e l i was able t o show t o the r e j o i c i n g  B r i t i s h nation the trophy of the s t r a t e g i c i s l e o f Cyprus secured without the f i r i n g of a single shot or the loss of a single s o l d i e r , while Russia, a f t e r a long war, c o s t l y i n both blood and treasure, had emerged with only a few barren, rocky s t r i p s of land i n A s i a Minor, and the r e l a t i v e l y unimportant province of Southern Bessarabia, acquired from Rumania.  This was enough t o quieten even the most v i o l e n t Russophobes i n  Great B r i t a i n .  Although both D i s r a e l i and S a l i s b u r y must have r e a l i z e d that Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s were bound t o deteriorate as a r e s u l t of the decisions of the Congress of B e r l i n , there was cause enough f o r r e j o i c i n g i n the f a c t that peace had been preserved between the two countries.  With a sense of just pride, D i s r a e l i was able t o announce t o  the cheering London crowds: "Gentlemen, we b r i n g you peace, and, I t h i n k I may say, peace with honour."  8  Following h i s triumphal reception i n  London, D i s r a e l i spoke t o the House of Lords where he vigorously defended the p o l i c y which he and S a l i s b u r y had pursued at the Congress. Towards the end of his speech he made the remark that Russia could not be blamed f o r a v a i l i n g h e r s e l f of anarchy i n A s i a t i c Turkey.  Then he  added, " . . . y i e l d i n g t o Russia what she has obtained, we say t o her, thus f a r and no f a r t h e r .  A s i a i s large enough f o r both of us. There i s no  reason f o r these constant wars or fears of wars between Russia and Eng-  8.  Kennedy, S a l i s b u r y p. 129 3  9 land. ^ 11  He had said before that there was ample room i n A s i a f o r both  Russia and England, and he was repeating i t now.  But, i f Russia secured  t e r r i t o r y i n Asia, England would require t e r r i t o r y there also, as a counterpoise t o the gains of Russia.  In t h i s manner, the taking of  Cyprus could not be regarded as Mediterranean: i t was Indian. The Cyprus Convention had been signed f o r the preservation of peace and the development of prosperity within the Empire.  He ended h i s d e l i v e r y on  t h i s note: "We have no reason t o f e a r war. Her Majesty has f l e e t s and armies which are second t o none....But i t i s not on our f l e e t s and armies, however necessary they may be f o r the maintenance of our materi a l strength, that I alone or mainly depend i n that enterprise on which t h i s country i s about t o enter.  I t i s on what I most h i g h l y value - the  consciousness that i n the Eastern nations there i s a confidence i n t h i s country, and that,, while they know we can enforce our p o l i c y , at the same time they know that our Empire i s an Empire of l i b e r t y , o f t r u t h , and of j u s t i c e . " ^ 1  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note, despite the h o s t i l i t y  displayed towards Russia throughout t h i s speech, D i s r a e l i does not ent i r e l y r u l e out the p o s s i b i l i t y of reaching aiunderstanding with that country i n A s i a .  In the long nineteenth-century duel between Great B r i t a i n and Russia, the Treaty of the Congress of B e r l i n can be judged as the most severe check imposed by Great B r i t a i n .on Russia, as w e l l as the greatest setback t o the development of f r i e n d l y Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s , apart  9.  10.  Buckle, G.E., The L i f e of Benjamin D i s r a e l i , John *%rray, London,  1920, V. VI, p. 354. loc. c i t .  10 from the Crimean War.  I f Russia was f o i l e d , whether f o r good or i l l ,  i n her drive i n t o the Balkans and towards the S t r a i t s during the nineteenth century, i t was p r i n c i p a l l y through the diplomacy and force of two B r i t i s h statesmen, Palmerston and D i s r a e l i .  However, i t i s t o  the l a s t i n g c r e d i t of D i s r a e l i that he was able t o check her without a resort t o arms, as had not been the case i n the Crimean War.  Although D i s r a e l i had agreed t o a s i g n i f i c a n t modification of the p o l i c y of preserving the i n t e g r i t y of the Turkish Empire (a t r a d i t i o n a l Palmerston p o l i c y ) by acquiescing i n the creation of an autonomous Bulgaria, he had preserved the e s s e n t i a l core o f t h i s p o l i c y - the r e f u s a l t o see Russian influence paramount at the S t r a i t s , when, with Salisbury, he blocked a Russian move at the Congress t o secure the opening of the S t r a i t s f o r Russian warships.  This move, i f . successful,  would, i n the words of Goriainov, the great Russian authority on the subject, "have been ample compensation f o r a l l the s a c r i f i c e s of a long and c o s t l y war."' " 1  1  Years l a t e r , B r i t i s h statesmen, when t r y i n g t o  reach an agreement with Russia, were t o regret the l a s t i n g impressions made on the minds of the Russians by the f i x e d views of Palmerston and D i s r a e l i on the Near Eastern question.  Another r e s u l t of the p o l i c y pursued by D i s r a e l i a t B e r l i n , which perhaps has not received due stress, was the success which he had i n lessening the effectiveness of the League of The Three Emperors, and thus reducing the danger of a continental c o a l i t i o n directed against  11.  Langer, W.L., European A l l i a n c e s and Alignments A. Knopf, 1950, p. 163.  a  New York, A l f r e d  11. England. 1880,  D i s r a e l i , w r i t i n g to a f r i e n d , Drummond Wolff, on November 4,  said, "Next to making a tolerable settlement f o r the Porte, our  great object was to break up, and permanently prevent, the a l l i a n c e of the three Empires, and I maintain there never was a general diplomatic r e s u l t more completely e f f e c t e d .  Of course, i t does not appear on the 12  protocols; i t was r e a l i z e d by personal influence alone."  Although  D i s r a e l i proved too sanguine i n regard to the permanency of h i s e f f o r t s directed against the League of the Three Emperors, there was a c e r t a i n amount of t r u t h i n h i s pronouncement.  In the words of Langer, the  noted American scholar, "The League of the Three Emperors which always threatened to leave England i s o l a t e d and to throw her back on the M1"5  support of a weakened France or a struggling I t a l y "  J  had been sadly  shaken by the r i v a l r y of two of i t s members, Russia and A u s t r i a , with A u s t r i a i n the l a s t resort openly s i d i n g against Russia and seeking confirmation of her claims through B r i t i s h s u p p o r t . ^  P a r t i a l l y owing  to the adroit diplomatic maneuvering of D i s r a e l i , Great B r i t a i n tempo r a r i l y avoided the nightmare of a continental c o a l i t i o n , but the danger was to return and to return with increasing frequency during the eighties and n i n e t i e s . On the debit side, the Congress of B e r l i n had embittered Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s to an extent unknown since the war i n the Crimea. Russians of a l l p o l i t i c a l convictions became convinced that the h o s t i l 12.  Buckle, D i s r a e l i , v o l . VI, p.  367  13.  Langer, European A l l i a n c e s , p. 161  14.  loc. c i t .  12  ity  which Great B r i t a i n displayed towards Russia was  of an i n t r a n s i -  gent nature and they began to despair of reaching an agreement with her anywhere. There are traces of a Russian proposal to Great B r i t a i n , apparently i n 1877, to resolve together "Persian a f f a i r s i n the i n t e r e s t of our r e c i p r o c a l t r a n q u i l l i t y . A s f a r as can be determined, the B r i t i s h Government seems to have made no r e p l y to t h i s f r i e n d l y gesture. Immediately following the Congress of B e r l i n , the n a t i o n a l mood i n Russia would scarcely have permitted such f r i e n d l y overtures to Great Britain.  In Great B r i t a i n , the Duke of A r g y l l , an able c r i t i c of the 16  D i s r a e l i Government and the author of a work on the Near East, stated; "The Treaty of B e r l i n i s s u b s t a n t i a l l y the Treaty of San  Stefano  i n a l l i t s e s s e n t i a l features....But we i n s i s t e d on a change i n the Treaty of B e r l i n , a change which altered immensely f o r the worse the Treaty of San Stefano.  We i n s i s t e d on r e v e r t i n g to the p r i n c i p l e of the  Treaty of Paris which substituted a European f o r a Russian protectorate ....This, obviously, was taking upon ourselves, i n conjunction with the other Powers of Europe, a function which we had never been able to d i s charge even i n Europe, and i t was s t i l l more impossible we could d i s charge i n A s i a . . . . What was everybody's business was nobody's business. Although the Duke of A r g y l l , could s c a r c e l y be described as v i o l e n t l y 15.  Gorchakov to Shuvalov i n 1877, May 18/30, Unprinted Documents Russo-British r e l a t i o n s during the Eastern C r i s i s j V I . The RussoTurkish War, Slavonic Review, 1927, p. 424  16.  A r g y l l , Duke o f j The Eastern Question, London, 1879,  17.  Douglas, George, Eighth Duke of A r g y l l , Autobiography and Memoirs, London, John Murray, 1906, p 509.  2 vols.  13 Russophil i n h i s sympathies, he was p o i n t i n g out that the mere checkmating of Russia would not solve the problems of the Near East.  When  the war broke out i n Afghanistan i n 1879, the Duke declared i t t o be the 18  r e s u l t of the Government's Near Eastern P o l i c y  with i t s needless i r -  r i t a t i o n of Russia. The years following the Congress, u n t i l the peaceful s e t t l e ment of the Afghan boundary at Penjdeh, were t o be probably the most c r i t i c a l years i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries from the Crimean War u n t i l the World War.  Russia, e f f e c t i v e l y blocked i n the  Near East at the Congress, was to turn f o r compensation t o the wastes off Central Asia, with the r e s u l t that the harrassed governments of London and S t , Petersburg had no sooner reached agreement i n the Balkans  and  Near East than they were confronted by a c r i s i s of almost equal magnitude i n Afghanistan. In the meantime, the B r i t i s h government i n India, under the Viceroy, Lordj Lytton, who had been appointed t o the post by the D i s r a e l i government, was conducting a forward p o l i c y with regard t o Afghanistan. I t seems f a i r l y clear that when D i s r a e l i selected Lord Lytton f o r the post he instructed him t o secure, by means of a forward p o l i c y , the 19  north-western f r o n t i e r ,  although l a t e r he was to c r i t i c i z e the p r e c i p 20  i t a t e haste and l i m i t e d views of the v i c e r o y . On the opposite side, the Russian government was incensed by the t a c t l e s s behaviour of many of i t s IS.  A r g y l l , Duke of, Autobiography, p.  19.  Buckle, D i s r a e l i , V. VI, p. 370.  20.  Ibid.-, p.p. 377 - 380  329.  14 l o c a l o f f i c i a l s i n Turkestan.  Early i n 1877,  a conference had been held at Peshawar between  representatives of the government of India and the Amir of  Afghanistan.  The ostensible purpose of t h i s meeting, i n so f a r as the B r i t i s h were concerned, was to get the Amir, Shere ALL, to accept a B r i t i s h mission which would replace the Moslem agent of the Indian government,  who, 21  according to Lord Lytton, wrote "exactly what the Amir t e l l s Early i n 1875,  him."  Salisbury had written to the viceroy, then Lord North-  brook: " i t (the untrustworthiness  of the information supplied by the  Moslem agent) has the e f f e c t of placing upon our f r o n t i e r a t h i c k covert, behind which any amount of h o s t i l e i n t r i g u e and conspiracy may.be masked. I agree with you i n thinking that a Russian advance upon India i s a chimera.  But I am by no means sure that an attempt to throw the Afghans  upon us i s so improbable."  22  Later events had only confirmed and s t r e n -  gthened such fears as these. The Peshawar discussions f a i l e d to bear any f r u i t .  Shere A l i  emphatically refused to receive an English mission and stated, among his reasons f o r r e f u s a l , that the presence of such a mission i n Afghani s t a n would be used by the Russians as a pretext f o r dispatching a mission of t h e i r own.  The B r i t i s h now  influence i n Afghanistan  saw t h e i r fears as t o a l o s s of  confirmed as the Amir had intended by t h i s  25 statement to place the Russians on an equal footing with the B r i t i s h .  21.  C e c i l , Lady Gwendolen: L i f e of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury. Hodder and Stoughton, London, V. I I , p. 71.  22.  I b i d . , p. 7 2  23.  Dodwell, H.H. (ed.): The Cambridge History of the B r i t i s h Empire Cambridge University Press, 1 9 3 2 , V. V, p. 416.  15 On the other hand, r e l a t i o n s between Shere A l i and General Kaufmann, Russian commander-in-chief i n Central Asia, became i n c r e a s i n g l y f r i e n d l y , so  that the l a t t e r , i n June, 1878, dispatched a l e t t e r to the Amir, i n  which he stated that " i n these days the r e l a t i o n s between the B r i t i s h government and ours with regard to your Kingdom require deep consideration.  As I am unable to communicate my opinion v e r b a l l y to you, I have  deputed my agent, Major-General S t o l i e t o f f . that i s hidden i n my mind.  He w i l l inform you of a l l  I hope that you w i l l pay great attention t o  what he says, and believe him as you would myself, and a f t e r due consideration you w i l l give him your r e p l y ; meanwhile be i t known to you that your union and f r i e n d s h i p with the Russian government w i l l be b e n e f i c i a l to the l a t t e r and s t i l l more to you.  The advantages of a close a l l i a n c e  with the Russian government w i l l be permanently e v i d e n t . " ^ 2  Upon learning of the S t o l i e t o f f mission, the B r i t i s h government i n London instructed i t s ambassador i n S t . Petersburg, Lord Loftus, t o make i n q u i r i e s concerning i t , to the Russian government.  On July 2,  1878,  Lord Loftus inquired of de Giers, acting Russian f o r e i g n minister during Gortehakov's absence at the Congress of B e r l i n , whether the Imperial Government at S t . Petersburg or the Governor-General  of Turkestan had i n -  structed a Russian envoy to proceed to Kabul, the c a p i t a l of Afghanistan. De Giers stated i n h i s r e p l y that no such envoy had been sent i n the post or was to be sent i n the future by either the government i n S t . Petersburg or by General Kaufmann, governor-general of Turkestan.  In r e a l i t y ,  General S t o l i e t o f f was already on h i s way to Kabul with a draft treaty, and he a r r i v e d there on July 22, 1878.  24.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 44.  The Amir received the mission  16 with a l l due honour and respect.  On July 19, 1878,  J  following the Congress of B e r l i n , there  had  appeared i n the Moscow Gazette an i n t e r e s t i n g and stimulating a r t i c l e which outlined the Russian a t t i t u d e towards Central A s i a .  I t stated,  "The time has a r r i v e d f o r Russia to e s t a b l i s h her influence over the whole of Central A s i a , and t h i s i s a l l the more easy as the Ruler of Afghanistan i s not on goood terms with England - our foe i n Central Asia.  The concentration of our influence on the f r o n t i e r s of the t e r r -  i t o r y of the Empress of India would be annatural answer t o the English seizure of Cyprus and a l l the approaches to India.  Such may be the  un-  obtrusive, even peaceable object undertaken by the troops of the Turkestan m i l i t a r y c i r c u i t .  As our correspondent at B e r l i n remarked the  other day - "In A s i a there are two p o l i t i c a l powers confronting each other, and they must i n e v i t a b l y come i n t o c o l l i s i o n " .  England wishes  to be Russia's nearest neighbour i n A s i a Minor, and i t i s only natural, therefore, that Russia, i n her turn, should desire to approach somewhat nearer to the English f r o n t i e r s i n I n d i a .  The reception of General S t o l i e t o f f at Kabul p r e c i p i t a t e d a c r i s i s of the f i r s t order i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between Great B r i t a i n and Russia.  The Indian government sought and received permission from  the home government f o r i n s i s t i n g that Shere A l l receive a B r i t i s h  as  mission by—way-of compensation f o r r e c e i v i n g a Russian one.  This d e c i s -  i o n of the home government to grant the request of the government of  25.  Habberton, Afghanistan,  26.  i b i d . , p.  43.  p.  44  17 India d i d not meet with the entire concurrence of D i s r a e l i , but he  was  forced t o go along with i t -by wayaof p o l i t i c a l necessity. However, he f e l t so strongly on the matter that he wrote to Lady Bradford t o the e f f e c t that " t h i s c r i t i c a l state of a f f a i r s need not have happened, and cd. not have i f my orders had not been disobeyed. more grievous.  This makes i t the  I wrote t o you a month ago - I shd. that I hoped I had  s e t t l e d the Afghan business, but alasI I d i d not reckon on distant and 27 headstrong counsels."  I t would seem from t h i s that even D i s r a e l i  was  beginning t o have serious qualms about a p o l i c y which might only serve to needlessly i r r i t a t e Russia f u r t h e r . Following the decisions of the home government, the government i n India informed Shere A l l of the determination to send a mission to Kabul.  I t ee happened that the l e t t e r announcing the i n t e n t i o n of the  Indian government a r r i v e d i n Kabul on the day of the death of Abdullah Jan, the heir-apparent t o the throne, and as a r e s u l t the Amir requested that the matter should be deferred t i l l some l a t e r date.  S i x days l a t e r ,  on August 23, Shere A l l informed General Kaufmann that S t o l i e t o f f  had  put i n w r i t i n g the verbal representations whose object was t o strengthen the r e l a t i o n s between "the i l l u s t r i o u s government of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor and the God-granted government of Afghanistan."  Two  days before t h i s , the B r i t i s h mission under N e v i l l e Chamberlain had been prevented by Afghan troops from entering the country. The B r i t i s h Cabinet was of divided opinion with regard to the  27.  Buckle, D i s r a e l i , V. 1/1, p.  384.  28.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 46.  IS  Afghan i s s u e .  D i s r a e l i was opposed t o too p r e c i p i t a t e a c t i o n and S a l -  isbury "severely attacked Lytton's conduct and urged the expediency of curbing h i s future proceedings." ^ 2  On the other hand, Lord  Cranbrook,  who had become Secretary f o r India, e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y endorsed the views of the viceroy.-'  0  In the end, the views of Cranbrook and the v i c e r o y  prevailed, and, on November 2, an ultimatum dated t o expire on the twent i e t h was dispatched t o Shere A l i .  The Amir appealed t o the Russians  i n vain; General Kaufmann advised him t o make peace with the B r i t i s h . The Russians, as a r e s u l t of p o l i t i c a l miscalculations, had f a l l e n ,l  into the p i t which they had dug f o r others.  Reckoning too hopefully  on the approach of an Anglo-Russian war, they had l e d Shere A l i i n t o r e l y i n g on t h e i r support, at the moment when they found themselves  un-  31 able t o accord i t .  n >  A war now ensued between Great B r i t a i n and Afghanistan which went disastrously f o r the Amir, Shere A l i , who,  a f t e r s u f f e r i n g numer-  ous defeats, r e t i r e d i n t o Russian t e r r i t o r y where he died the following year (1879).  Following t h e i r m i l i t a r y successes, the B r i t i s h opened  negotiations with Yakub, Shere A l i ' s son.  As a r e s u l t of these negot-  i a t i o n s , a t r e a t y was signed between Great B r i t a i n and Afghanistan, known as the Treaty of Gandamak.  By t h i s treaty, the Amir, Yakub Khan,  assigned c e r t a i n d i s t r i c t s of Afghanistan t o B r i t i s h c o n t r o l and agreed to accept a permanent B r i t i s h agent at Kabul and to conduct h i s f o r e i g n  29.  Cambridge History of the B r i t i s h Empire, V.V. p. 418  30.  Gathorne-Hardy, A.E., Gathorne Hardy, Longmans Green and London, 1910, v o l . I I p.p, 83 - 103.  31.  o p . - c i t . Cambridge History, v o l . V, p. 419.  Co.,  19 p o l i c y i n accordance with the wishes of the Viceroy of I n d i a .  Yakub's r e i g n was, however, short.  J  S i r Louis Cavagn^ri,  who had been sent as B r i t i s h representative to Kabul, was murdered, and, as a r e s u l t , h o s t i l i t i e s were reopened.  In the i n t e r v a l which e l -  apsed between the deposing of Yakub and the choosing of a new Amir? a profound change had occurred i n domestic p o l i t i c s i n England.  At the  general elections i n the spring of 1880, the Conservatives under D i s r a e l i had gone down to defeat, and the L i b e r a l s l e d by Gladstone come i n t o power.  had  This change of ministry was t o involve a sharp change  i n f o r e i g n p o l i c y towards Afghanistan.  The new cabinet d i d not take  long i n deciding that a more cautious p o l i c y should be pursued on the north-west f r o n t i e r than had been the case during the r e i g n of the servatives..  At the same time as Great B r i t a i n received a new  Con-  govern-  ment, so d i d India a new viceroy, with Lord Lytton being replaced by Lord Ripon^who, i t was f e l t , could better carry out new government p o l i c i e s of moderation.  Lord Ripon put i n t o e f f e c t the p o l i c y p r e s c r -  ibed by the new government soon a f t e r h i s a r r i v a l .  The B r i t i s h accepted  as successor to the worthless Yakub, Abdurrahman Khan, the capable nephew of Shere A l i , who had been l i v i n g under Russian protection at Samarkand and who,  with Russian permission, now returned to Afghanistan.  In the words of Lord Ripon, Abdurrahman was "the most Russian of the candidates" f o r the Afghan throne, but a l s o the i n e v i t a b l e choice since  32.  Buckle, D i s r a e l i , p. 402, v o l .  VI  33.  Morley, John, The L i f e of William Ewart Gladstone, MacMillan & Co., London, 1906, v o l . I I , p. 249.  34.  Gwynn and Tuckwell, The L i f e of S i r Charles D i l k e , John Murray, London, 1918, v o l . I, p. 317.  20 without him no hope existed dK e s t a b l i s h i n g "even a semblance of order" 35 on the north-west f r o n t i e r of I n d i a . A c c o r d i n g l y , on July 22,  1880,  Abdurrahman became Amir of Afghanistan, a f t e r having accepted the Treaty of Gandamak with s i g n i f i c a n t a l t e r a t i o n s : Kandahar, a part of Afghanistan which had previously been a l l o t t e d to Britain,was t o be put under a separate r u l e , and the admission of a B r i t i s h envoy to Kabul was not to be  made a major issue, "though i t was suggested that, by mutual agree-  ment, a Mohammedan agent of the B r i t i s h government might be stationed 36 at Kabul f o r convenience  of intercourse."  Provided he l i v e d up t o  these s t i p u l a t i o n s , the Amir was to receive from the B r i t i s h government a guarantee of protection f o r external aggression. With regard to the B r i t i s h r e t e n t i o n of Kandahar, Gladstone and h i s cabinet came to the d e c i s i o n that i t must be abandoned, and t h i s d e c i s i o n was announced to the public i n the r o y a l speech of January, 1881, when Lord Hantington propounded the view of the government "with masterly and crushing force, i n a speech which i s no l e s s than a 37 strong text-book of the argument.  In the meantime, the B r i t i s h forces  under General Roberts, which had occupied.Kandahar during the summer of 1880 and had withdrawn s h o r t l y afterwards, returned i t to the r u l e of the Amir. Despite the c o n c i l i a t o r y moves made by Gladstone's  Liberal  35.  Gwynn & Tuckwell, Dilke, v o l . I, p. 321.  36.  Ward, A.W. & Gooch, G.P. (ed) The Cambridge History of B r i t i s h Foreign Policy, 1886-1919, Cambridge University Press, 1923, v o l . I l l , p. 90  37.  Morley, Gladstone, v o l . I I , p.  250.  21  government, tension and i l l - w i l l continued i n a most acute form between Great B r i t a i n and Russia i n Central A s i a .  Responsible f i g u r e s on both  sides regarded a war there between the two powers as almost i n e v i t a b l e . Charles Boulger, a contemporary authority on the positions occupied by Great B r i t a i n and Russia i n Asia, wrote i n 1879 when the Afghan c r i s i s was at i t s height: "To solve the Central Asian question we must do something more than r e c t i f y the Indian f r o n t i e r , something more than oust Russia from  Kabul,  something more than obtain the r i g h t to place  B r i t i s h agents i n the country.  We must occupy Herat, arnnthe Turcomans,  and restore Persia to something of i t s p r i s t i n e vigour.  When we have  done these things we may leave the f u r t h e r development of England  and  Russia to f a t e with perfect confidence i n the r e s u l t " , and w r i t i n g i n the same v e i n l a t e r on he continued: "Whatever scruple we may have i n sweeping apparently well-disposed feudatories from our path, we  can  have no s i m i l a r reluctance to adopting towards Russia a p o l i c y which s h a l l c u r t a i l that Power's capacity f o r doing us i n j u r y . . . . The best defence f o r India i s to keep Russia at a distance, and no scheme of border improvement can do more than place us i n a p o s i t i o n to defend ourselves against attack.  Our p o l i c y should aim higher than t h i s .  We  can prevent Russia ever being i n a p o s i t i o n to attack India i f we act on the present occasion as our reputation demands. Are we to prove unequal to i t ? The answer l i e s mainly with the reader, but common sense r e p l i e s , No."  38  I t was to prove one of the i r o n i e s of h i s t o r y that the L i b e r a l  58.  Boulger, D.C., England and Russia i n Central Asia, W.H. & Co., London, 1879, v o l . I I , p.p. 571 - 575.  Allen  22  party i n Great B r i t a i n , which favoured reasonable r e l a t i o n s with Russia, and, i f possible, a f r i e n d l y understanding with that power, was i n o f f i c e during the years 1880-1S85 and that these years coincided with those of the most acute tension between the two countries.  Shortly a f t e r taking o f f i c e , Gladstone, writing to the Duke of A r g y l l , foreshadowed "the gradual unravelling of the tangled knots of f o r e i g n and Indian p o l i c y . " ^  He emphasized h i s desire f o r an improve-  ment i n Anglo- Russian r e l a t i o n s , although f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons he d i d not make h i s views p u b l i c . ^  0  Soon a f t e r coming i n t o power, Gladstone  and Lord Granville established very good personal r e l a t i o n s h i p s with Prince Lobanov, the new Russian ambassador^ - l a t e r a b i t t e r foe of Great B r i t a i n .  The dispatches of Gortchakoff and Giers r e v e a l that the  Russian government recognized the f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g of the Liberals and worked i n a measure t o r e c i p r o c a t e . ^  2  But during the next f i v e years  the r e a l i t i e s of f o r e i g n p o l i c y tended to drive the two countries f a r ther apart rather than t o bring them c l o s e r .  The Gladstone government  had to deal with d i f f i c u l t problems both i n A s i a and A f r i c a .  Many have  thought that the immense a c t i v i t i e s of the Russians i n Central A s i a during the 1880*s was due i n no small measure t o a desire t o take advantage of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n which the Gladstone government found i t s e l f , with regard to foreign a f f a i r s .  Lord Fitzmaurice, i n h i s l i f e of Lord  39 •  Seton-Watson, R.W. (ed) Unprinted Documents; Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville and Russia. Slavonic Review, June, 1930, p. 209.  40.  loc. c i t .  41.  i b i d , p. 210  42.  i b i d , p. 210-212  '23  Granville, Gladstone's foreign secretary, s t a t e f j "Although at the time a l l the f a c t s were not f u l l y known, even at the Foreign O f f i c e , the s i t uation had been c o r r e c t l y appreciated by Lord Granville as a whole.  It  hinged on the secret t r e a t y of n e u t r a l i t y which i n 1884 ( s i c ) Prince Bismarck had concluded with Russia without the knowledge and behind the backs of the other p a r t i e s of the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e , v i z . , Austria-Hungary and I t a l y .  I t was intended t o protect Germany i n the event of A u s t r i a -  Hungary becoming reconciled with Russia or of the long-talked-of a l l i a n c e between France and Russia taking e f f e c t .  Russia, however, interpreted  t h i s treaty, which secured her western f r o n t i e r , as also giving her a jfree hand i n Asia, and Prince Bismarck gave a t a c i t approval, as part of the new p o l i c y , t o a system of p e r s i s t i n g annoyance against Great B r i t ain."  4 3  During the l a t t e r s i x t i e s and early seventies, the B r i t i s h government had attempted to reach some agreement with Russia as t o where the northern boundary of Afghanistan l a y and were successful i n the years 1872-1873 i n getting the Oxus accepted as " i n d i c a t i n g broadly the l i m i t of the Amir's sphere of i n f l u e n c e . "  4 4  The boundary had not  been delimited on the spot and was therefore uncertain, lacking the  limits de-finitonosa which would prevent misunderstandings i n the f u t u r e .  As  a r e s u l t of t h i s uncertainty as to f r o n t i e r s , both B r i t i s h and Afghans were uneasy when any new Russian advance occurred.  In 1S83, on account  of these f e a r s , the B r i t i s h renewed t h e i r pledge of a i d to the Amirj a 43.  Fitzmaurice, E., The L i f e of Granville, Longmans Green & Co., London, 1905, v o l . I I , p. 422  44.  Ward & Gooch, B r i t i s h Foreign Policy, v o l . I l l , p. 187.  24 45 pledge which the Amir accepted. In the winter of 1880-1881, the Russians under the i l l u s t r i o u s General Skoboleff subdued the Tekke TurKomans with great slaughter. v i c t o r y was widely acclaimed i n S t . Petersburg.^  The  Three years l a t e r ,  e a r l y i n 1884, Merv, which was considered by B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y experts t o be a place of great strategic importance,^  was occupied by the Rus-  sians and i t s chiefs persuaded to swear allegiance to the Russian Emperor.  On numerous occasions the Russian government had declared to the  B r i t i s h government that Merv l a y outside i t s sphere of i n t e r e s t or desire.  Just before the assassination of Alexander I I , de Giers, acting  i n the place of the a i l i n g Gortchakoff, had declared to Lord Dufferin, now B r i t i s h ambassador i n S t . Petersburg, with regard to Merv; "Not only do we not want to go there, but happily, there i s nothing which can require us to go there."'*  8  As a resulto.of these assurances followed by what appeared to be t h e i r prompt v i o l a t i o n , f e e l i n g i n England was strong against Russia. Then, too, a special concern on account of i t s supposed s t r a t e g i c value had developed with regard to the fate of Merv which the Duke of A r g y l l WQO ploaood 'to caUa} Mervousness i^ tt  w  45.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 49  46.  L y a l l , A., The L i f e of the Marquis D u f f e r i n and Ava, Hohn Murray London, 1905, p.p. 317 - 318. ' ef>» «/ft. o p * - c i % . Habberton, p. 49  47. 48.  Rose, J.H. The Development of the European Nations 1870-1900, London, Archibald Constable & Co., 1905, p. 424.  49.  op. c i t . Habberton, p. 50  25 Although the Gladstone government was much more amenable i n i t s attitude towaa?ete Russia-* than had been the D i s r a e l i government, 0  Lord Granville thought i t h i s duty t o inform the Russian ambassador, Baron Mohrenheim that the news of the occupation of Merv had not been received with indifference by the B r i t i s h government.  He added that he  had decided t o send a memorandum t o S t . Petersburg communicating h i s views.  This memorandum proved t o be a long r e c i t a l of the promises  made by Russia with regard t o Central A s i a since 1873, and ended by imploring the Russian government t o lose no time " i n communicating t o Her Majesty's Government the proposal which the Russian Government may have t o make t o them i n order to provide against the complications t o which t h i s further extension of Russian sovereignty i n the d i r e c t i o n of the f r o n t i e r s of Afghanistan may give r i s e . " ^  1  The Imperial government i n r e p l y declared i t s actions i n r e gard t o Merv j u s t i f i e d since the chiefs of Merv had requested the prot e c t i o n of Russia, and Russia therefore had only accepted something which had been offered t o her. De Giers, now the new Russian f o r e i g n minister, went on to state that i f the B r i t i s h government desired a more complete d e f i n i t i o n of the Afghan boundary thahuthatLmade i n 1873, he could r e c a l l *e them the proposal which the Emperor had made t o them i n 1882.  At t h i s time, Tsar Alexander I I I had suggested that the l i n e  should be extended westward from Khodja-Saleh.  As a r e s u l t of t h i s pro-  posal, conversations had been opened i n London between the two countries  50.  Guedella, P., The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, 1880-1S98, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1933, p . 113.  51.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 50.  26  as early as 1882 but were discontinued without any d e f i n i t e r e s u l t s being achieved.  Now the f o r e i g n o f f i c e i n London was disturbed by the  annexation o f Merv, and by reports that Russian agents were active i n the d i s t r i c t s of Penjdeh and Maimeneh both of which the B r i t i s h held were Afghan t e r r i t o r y .  As a r e s u l t of these new developments and the  increasing importance of a r r i v i n g at a d e f i n i t i o n o f the Afghan f r o n t i e r , the B r i t i s h government declared i t s e l f ready t o accept the proposa l made by the Tsar i n 1882,  and repeated now by de Giers, f o r the de-  l i m i t a t i o n of the Afghan f r o n t i e r from Khodja-Saleh westwards.  I t pro-  posed that the boundary should be decided on the spot by means of a Joint Commission which would include an Afghan representative and that the Commission should begin i t s work the following autumn.-*  2  The Russian government declared i t s e l f ready enough t o co-operate with the B r i t i s h government i n the work of delimiting the f r o n t i e r , but i t objected to a number of points on the B r i t i s h programme.  I t did  not desire that an Afghan o f f i c i a l should be a member of the Commission and urged that the two governments should conduct a lengthy o f f i c i a l correspondence  on the subject before the. commissioners should be d i s p a t -  ched t o t h e i r place of work.-^  The B r i t i s h , i n t h e i r haste t o conclude a binding agreement on the subject of the Afghan f r o n t i e r , paid scant heed to what they considered minor Russian objections, and appointed as t h e i r Chief Commissioner,  52.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 51.  53.  i b i d , p. 51.  27  S i r Peter Lumsden, a member of the India Council and an o f f i c e r of long standing.  The Russian government, after'some h e s i t a t i o n , appointed  General Zelenoi.  Lumsden and his party arrived at the designated  meeting place i n the autumn of 1884,  but they found there no  delegation, only a picket of Cossacks some f o r t y miles south.  Russian The  Russian government said that Zelenoi's absence was due to i l l n e s s 54 the B r i t i s h suspected a diplomatic i l l n e s s . The report of a s p e c i a l Russian committee meeting i n S t . Petersberg i n December, 1884,  gives us some reason f o r the Russian unwil-  lingness to meet the B r i t i s h commission.  I t was  stated at t h i s confer-  ence that there was "danger of an extension of Afghan pretensions, encouraged by Great B r i t a i n , e s p e c i a l l y with regard to Pendjeh, already occupied by the Afghans, but inhabited by a Turkoman t r i b e , the Saroules. In s a c r i f i c i n g them, the prestige of Russia can be i n j u r e d among the Turkoman population of the Transcaspian region"-'-' The conclusions of t h i s meeting were seen and approved by Tsar Alexander I I I on December, 31,  1884.  During the same month, the Russian government made a series of proposals to the B r i t i s h government to the e f f e c t that Pendjeh and the d i s t r i c t around i t should be independent of the Afghan Amir.  At the  same time, the Russians made complaints that Afghan s o l d i e r s were making encroachments upon Turkoman t e r r i t o r y .  54-  Fitzmaurice, Lord Granville, v o l . I I , p.  421  55.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P., The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939, p. 9.  The  Torch  28  With negotiations reaching a state of deadlock, the Russian government decided to inaugurate m i l i t a r y measures by the seizure of c e r t a i n s t r a t e g i c points to f o r e s t a l l a possible Afghan advance.  The  Russian forces, acting under orders, proceeded t o advance along the Afghan f r o n t i e r , occupying a number of important points including the s t r a t e g i c Z u l f i k a r pass.  Despite the strong protests of the B r i t i s h eg  government, the Russians refused to withdraw from these p o s i t i o n s . Nor were the apprehensions  of the London government lessened by the  assurances of de Giers, that an incident would not take place unless the Afghan s o l d i e r s attacked the Russians. ^ 3  By March, 1885, the s i t -  uation had become so intense that Queen V i c t o r i a attempted to prevent the outbreak of trouble by telegraphing Tsar Alexander asking him to do what he could to avoid a clash between Russian and Afghan t r o o p s . On March 30, the long-awaited catastrophe occurred.  3 8  The  Afghans occupied a p o s i t i o n from which, despite Russian warnings, they f a i l e d to withdraw, and i n the ensuing b a t t l e they were driven out of Penjdeh with a l o s s of l i f e estimated at f i v e hundred men. ^ 3  While each  side alleged that the other was to blame, from the B r i t i s h point of view the incident was the expected outcome of the persistent Russian advance towards the Afghan f r o n t i e r - an advance which had continued regardless of protest.  Upon receiving the news i n S t . Petersburg, the B r i t i s h  56.  Fitzmauriae, Lord Granville, v o l . II, p. 423  57.  Guedella, P., The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, p.p. 340 - 341.  58.  Fitzmaurice, op. c i t . , ' v o l .  59.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 54.  I I , p. 421 - 422.  am-  29 bassador exclaimed, "War  i s inevitablei. ^° In a speech i n the House M  of Commons, Gladstone at f i r s t declared that the attack upon the Afghans bore "the appearance of an unprovoked aggression."^  1  Later he moderated  his o r i g i n a l declaration by saying, "Miose was the provocation i s a matter of the utmost consequence. Russian attack. and i n repute.  We only know that the attack was  a  We know that the Afghans suffered i n l i f e , i n s p i r i t , We know that a blow was struck at the c r e d i t and auth-  o r i t y of a sovereign - our protected a l l y - who had committed no offense. A l l I say i s , we cannot i n that state of things close t h i s book and say, "We w i l l look into i t no more". i n the matter.  We must do our best to have r i g h t done  Gladstone followed t h i s aMi'i-ina d i s p l a y of oratory  by an appeal to the House of Commons f o r a vote of c r e d i t of til,000,000. Of t h i s sum,  L h,500,000 was needed f o r the Sudan where the government  had become involved i n serious trouble since the death of General Gordon, and from which i t had f i n a l l y resolved to withdraw because of f e a r of Russian intentions i n A s i a .  The remaining L 6,500,000 was to be  devoted to m i l i t a r y and naval preparations d i r e c t e d against Russia.  The  measure c a r r i e d ; the vote being supported by L i b e r a l s i n the words of John Morley ''with much more than mechanical l o y a l t y .  j  #  Holland  Rose, the noted h i s t o r i a n , states that Russia had achieved.the impossible f o r the moment at any rate; "She had united L i b e r a l s of a l l shades of  60.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p.  61.  Hansard Parliamentary Debates, 1885, p. 1162. :  62.  Morley, Gladstone, v o l . I I , p.p. U23 -  63.  Ibid., p. I»2lu  $h. v o l . CCXCVI, Third s e r i e s , . . k2k.  50 64.  thought against her, and the joke about Mervousness was heard no more." ^ The f i r s t reaction of the Russian government to the whole af f a i r was one of out and out defiance with de Giers wiring de S t a a l , the new Russian ambassador i n Great B r i t a i n that the Afghan commander at Penjdeh had wished to be on f r i e n d l y terms with the Russians but that the B r i t i s h o f f i c e r s attached to h i s forces had refused him permission to carry out the demands of the Russian commander.  De Staal's  i n s t r u c t i o n s to place the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y on the B r i t i s h were revoked the next day, apparently a f t e r de Giers had learned from de Staal-that 65  the B r i t i s h had voted war c r e d i t s and were i n no mood f o r j e s t i n g . •* De S t a a l d i d h i s best to maintain the peace between the  two  countries while a s s i s t i n g "the L i b e r a l s to r e t a i n o f f i c e at the cost of something less than war".  The B r i t i s h , now i n a s l i g h t l y more pac-  i f i c mood, proposed that i f the Amir, Abdurrahman, must abandon Penjdeh, upon which the Russians i n s i s t e d , he should at l e a s t be allowed to r e t a i n the Z u l f i k a r Pass.  I t was fortunate f o r both p a r t i e s that at t h i s  juncture the Amir saw f i t to express himself at Rawal Pindi where he was attending the Durbar of the Viceroy.  There he declared that he  was  not p a r t i c u l a r l y interested i n the f a t e of Penjdeh and dismissed the i n 67  cident there as a matter of "small account" '  This i n d i f f e r e n t attitude  on the part of the Amir of Afghanistan i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y saved the peace 64.  Rose, European Nations, p.  427  65.  Habberton, Afghanistan, ps  54  66.  Ward & Gooch, Cambridge History of the B r i t i s h Empire, v o l V, p.  67.  Fitzmaurice, G r a n v i l l e , v o l I I , p.  441  424.  31 between Great B r i t a i n and Russia.  The Russians, f o r t h e i r part, declared  the B r i t i s h proposals to be acceptable, since according to t h e i r experts the pass at Z u l f i k a r possessed no great value f o r them.  The  British  demanded that the conduct of the Russian commander, General Komaroff, be subject to an enquiry, but the Tsar p o s i t i v e l y refused to e n t e r t a i n the demand, saying that he alone was the judge of the general's a c t s .  The  B r i t i s h government o f f i c i a l l y pressed the matter, pointing out that r e -  •i f u s a l might mean war.  At the same time, however, Lard Granville assured  de S t a a l that the question was put forward to s a t i s f y aroused p u b l i c opinion, and that i t was not the i n t e n t i o n of the B r i t i s h government to go  bring any o f f i c e r s to t r i a l .  On A p r i l 25, the B r i t i s h f l e e t had occ-  upied Port Hamilton, o f f the southern coast of Korea, a f t e r having i n formed the Chinese, Japanese and Korean governments and stating that the Admiral had orders to hoist the f l a g i f the Russian f l e e t approached. Nevertheless, following the occupation of Port Hamilton, t e n sion lessened between the two countries, and on May 12, Lord G r a n v i l l e was able to announce i n the presence of de S t a a l that "the peace of the world w i l l not be d i s t u r b e d " O n r e f e r the matter to a r b i t r a t i o n .  May 29 both countries agreed t o In the choice of a r b i t r a t o r s , the Rus-  s i a n candidate was the King of Denmark, while the B r i t i s h held out f o r the German Emperor.  The Russians i n s i s t e d that i t should be the King of  68.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 55  69.  Fitzmaurice, Lord G r a n v i l l e , v o l . I I , p. 440  70.  loc. c i t .  1  32  Denmark, and the Gladstone government, beset with problems everywhere, acquiesced.^  Many i n England f e l t that the Government had made shamep  f u l concessions i n order to preserve the peace with Russia.  A hostile  motion, proposed by the o f f i c i a l opposition i n the House of Commons, l o s t by only t h i r t y votes.  Elsewhere, more i r r e s p o n s i b l e c r i t i c s  de-  nounced the Government as the "betrayers of those who had f a l l e n at 72  Penjdeh."'  During t h i s period, the press on both sides was  a r l y i n s u l t i n g and abusive towards the other country.  particul-  To such an extent  was t h i s c a r r i e d that Baron Korff, writing years afterward, stated, "Reading, i n the present day, the memoirs or papers of those days,  one  sometimes wonders how peace could have been maintained under such circum73  stances."  J  Although the Gladstone government had managed to survive the c r i s e s i n A s i a and A f r i c a , i t was nevertheless badly shaken, and a matter of i n t e r n a l p o l i c y , the budget question,served to b r i n g about i t s downf a l l i n June, 1885.  I t was succeeded i n o f f i c e by the Conservatives  under Lord Salisbury, wh*4had the thorny problem of the Afghan question thrust uponfhim.  Lengthy and wearisome discussions took place as t o  what was the area denoted by the term Z u l f i k a r ; which the Russian government had at l a s t consented should remain Afghan territory.'''^  The ques-  t i o n was, how f a r t o the north of the pass should the Afghan f r o n t i e r  71.  Fitzmaurice, Lord G r a n v i l l e, v o l . I I , p. 440  72.  loc. c i t .  73.  Korff, S.A., Russia's Foreign Relations During the Last Half Century, The MacMillan Co., New York, 1922, p. 33.  74.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 56.  33 TUB ±±e.  The B r i t i s h government, having commitments t o the Amir on the  basis o f the Russian concession, now demanded that the Russians accept a lindtory- l i n e which would enable them (the B r i t i s h ; to f u l f i l t h e i r promise t o the Amir.  The Russians proved obstinate, and by August a  deadlock had been reached.  But a f t e r another month of strenuous neg-  o t i a t i o n s , an agreement on the f r o n t i e r was reached by the two c o n f l i c ting parties.  This agreement was embodied i n a protocol signed by S a l 75  isbury and de S t a a l on September 10, 1885.  The proposed a r b i t r a t i o n  with regard t o the Penjdeh incident was allowed to drop and was never 76  heard of again.' The task of delimiting the actual f r o n t i e r s was l e f t t o the j o i n t commission headed on the B r i t i s h side by Colonel Ridgeway, r e p l a c i n g S i r Peter Lumsden, who had f a l l e n i n t o extreme disfavour with the government.  Lumsden, a v i o l e n t Russophobe, had become so estranged  from h i s chiefs i n London that "the tone o f many of h i s communications had been such as i n rather long o f f i c i a l experience he never remembered as between an o f f i c e r employed and h i s o f f i c i a l c h i e f s " .  7 7  There had  been changed also on the Russian side, with Colonel Kuhlberg succeeding 78  General Zelenoi as chief Russian representative.'  The reconstituted  Joint Commission began i t s work at the Z u l f i k a r Pass i n the f a l l o f 1885, and continued t i l l the summer of the following year.  By t h i s time, the  Commissioners had almost reached Khojah&Saleh on the Amu Daria, but 75.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 56  76.  Gwynn and Tuckwell, S i r Charles PiIke, v o l . I I , p . 121.  35$.  Fitzmaurice, Lord G r a n v i l l e , v o l . I I , p. 441  78.  Habberton, op. c i t . p. 56.  34 d i f f e r e d greatly as t o the exact point where the l i n e should meet the river.  As a r e s u l t of these differences, both governments decided  to r e c a l l the Commissioners and solve the apparently i r r e c o n c i l a b l e points by d i r e c t negotiation. When taken i n hand by the f o r e i g n o f f i c e s of the two countries, thejp proved reconcilable, and on July 22, 1887, the f i n a l Protocol was signed at S t . Petersburg by Colonel Ridgeway f o r Great B r i t a i n , and Z i n o v i e f f , Head of the A s i a t i c Department of the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s , f o r Russia.  This was followed by an ex-  80 change of notes which put the protocol i n t o operation on August 3, 1887. A f t e r the signing of the Protocol, there s t i l l remained the task of the l o c a l demarcation of the f r o n t i e r agreed upon.  This work  was accomplished by a Mixed Commission whose chief members were L i e u t enant-Colonel Yate f o r Great B r i t a i n , and Captain Komaroff f o r Russia. A f t e r almost f o u r years of hard work, the Protocols, signed by these two men, were confirmed i n an exchange of notes between t h e i r respective 81 governments on June 12, 1888. At l a s t the north-western f r o n t i e r of Afghanistan had been established with a definiteness which the B r i t i s h had f e l t was necessary since the seventies. Although they had been forced t o make many concessions, at least they now had what amounted to a l e g a l compact with t h e i r adversary.  As f o r the Russians, they were highly g r a t i f i e d by  albnqpri'th the settlement.  With greatly extended f r o n t i e r s i n Central Asia, plus  79.  Habberton, Afghanistan, p. 56.  80.  i b i d . , p. 57.  81.  loc. c i t .  >  35 a series of diplomatic triumphs i n conjunction with a tremendous growth and expansion of influence i n northern Persia, where a Transcaspian r a i l r o a d had been successfully contructed, l i n k i n g Russia with Central Asia, and with P e r s i a ,  In connection with t h i s growth o f Russian i n -  fluence i n Persia, a B r i t i s h diplomatic o f f i c i a l i n that country, Arthur Nicolson, l a t e r , S i r Arthur, had written t o Lord D u f f e r i n i n 1886: "Unless werare prepared t o o f f e r some kind of guarantee to Persia, we should not waste our energies i n endeavouring fluence on the c e n t r a l government at Teheran.  t o counteract Russian i n This part of the world  i s l o s t t o us and we should devote the modicum of a t t e n t i o n which we seem disposed to give t o Persia t o the south alone. ® 11  2  With these com-  bined successes, the Russians had good reason t o f e e l that much of the humiliation i n f l i c t e d on them by Great B r i t a i n by the Treaty of B e r l i n had been paid back wolH nigh i n f u l l .  Wow that some of the Russian documents have become a v a i l a b l e , i t .-wuuld seemSthat much of the c r e d i t f o r the settlement o f the Pendjeh incident, and f o r the avoidance of war during t h i s whole period should be a t t r i b u t e d to the work of c e r t a i n men i n the Russian f o r e i g n o f f i c e and diplomatic service, - e s p e c i a l l y de Giers, f o r e i g n minister, and de Staal, ambassador i n London.  When Baron de Staal- had come t o London i n 1884 to begin h i s lengthy term as Russian ambassador there, de Giers had instructed him as to what Russian p o l i c y i n Central A s i a should be. De Giers declared that  82.  Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock, A Study i n Old Diplomacy, London, Constable and Co., Ltd., 1930, p. 65.  36  the Russian movements there had been the r e s u l t of the necessity of securing a defensive p o s i t i o n against the h o s t i l i t y which Great B r i t a i n had shown t o Russia during the Crimean and Turkish Wars.  Now that these  positions had been secured, he s a i d that Russia wished merely to consolidate them and the Russian government was prepared to behave e i t h e r i n a h o s t i l e or f r i e n d l y manner t o the B r i t i s h , the choice being up t o the latter.  He closed h i s message t o de Staal with the statement: " We  believe that t h i s purpose can be attained i f he (Gladstone) wishes t o persuade himself that the p o s i t i o n taken by us i n Central A s i a i s a purely defensive one, which does not have i n view a t a l l t o do damage to the Indian i n t e r e s t s of Great B r i t a i n , but on the contrary to induce i t to l i v e with us i n peace, understanding and f r i e n d s h i p . "  8 3  should c l e a r l y be borne i n mind that t h i s was not the Russian  While i t Conserv-  ative or M i l i t a r y Party speaking, and that Baton Korff may have been g u i l t y of over-emphasis when he stated: "The only possible excuse f o r the B r i t i s h Conservatives of D i s r a e l i ' s camp, who trembled f o r t h e i r A s i a t i c possessions,was t h e i r absolute l a c k of knowledge about Russia and the Russians } 1  84  "this d e f i n i t e l y shows that even at t h i s  critical  stage i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries, there existed withi n Russia a group of reasonable men who were w i l l i n g even then t o work f o r a permanent arrangement with Great B r i t a i n i n Asia, though how e f f e c t u a l t h e i r e f f o r t s might be against court cliques of adventurers was d i f f i c u l t to say.  83.  Meyendorff, Baron Alexander, (ed) Correspondence Diplomatique de M. de Staal, 1884-1900, Paris, 1929, v o l . I, no. 7, p. 41.  84.  Korff, Russia's Foreign Relations, p. 29.  37 In the midst of the Pendjeh c r i s i s , when the  Conservative  Russian newspapers were erupting defiance at Great B r i t a i n , and urging the strongest possible forward p o l i c y i n A s i a , a s i g n i f i c a n t a r t i c l e appeared i n the i n f l u e n t i a l l i b e r a l Russian newspaper "Vestnik jRwr-npy". This stated: " A combination with India, of which perhaps a few of our p a t r i o t s dream, would s h i f t the center o f g r a v i t y of Russia towards Asia, and rob us f o r a long time of the legitimate share of influence i n Europe.  The Balkan peninsula would then f i n a l l y f a l l t o the c o n t r o l  of A u s t r i a .  One should not forget that our paramount i n t e r e s t s l i e ,  not i n A s i a , but i n Europe: our p o l i t i c a l future i s bound up with the fate of the Dardanelles and the Bosphorous, these two n a t u r a l keys of our house, which have f o r us an immeasurably greater s i g n i f i c a n c e than a l l the keys to I n d i a . ^ n 8  Paradoxically enough, among the strongest  supporters of the l a t t e r view was the reactionary r e l i g i o u s leader and thinker, Pobedonostev, who, although b i t t e r against the " h y p o c r i t i c a l diplomacy of England", reserved most of his spleen f o r A u s t r i a .  He i n -  s i s t e d that i t was A u s t r i a , not England, which was the r e a l r i v a l of 86 Russia i n the Balkans and i n general the mortal enemy of Slavdom. I t was t o be a combination of these two views - that A s i a was large enough t o s a t i s f y the expansionist p o l i c i e s of both Russia and Great B r i t a i n , hence no need f o r i n e v i t a b l e c o n f l i c t , and the b e l i e f that Russia s true i n t e r e s t s l a y i n the d i r e c t i o n of the S t r a i t s and the 1  Balkans, that was i n the end to make possible a conclusion of a Convention  85.  C h u r c h i l l , The Anglo-Russian Convention, p. 11.  86.  Wren, Melvin C./fPobedonostev and Russian Influence i n the Balkans, 1881 - 1888? Journal of "odern History, June, 1947, p. 133.  38 with Great B r i t a i n .  Unfortunately i t was to take another serious  c r i s i s i n the Near East, which was t o bring the two countries to the brink of war, and some years of intense r i v a l r y i n the Far such an idea could become a p r a c t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y .  East,before  Nevertheless, a l -  though both countries were not aware of i t at the time, the t i d e had been turned i n a long saga of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s . to become bad again, even to the point of war,  Relations were  but they were never again  c a l l e d upon to endure the prolonged tension of the years 1878  -  1885.  The successful settlement of the Penjdeh incident was to convince r e s ponsible men i n both countries that the differences separating the two countries need not be i r r e c o n c i l a b l e .  For the f i r s t time, hopes of  a wider understanding which should embrace the continent of Asia began to be entertained on both sides.  •••  39  FROM NEAR EAST TO FAR EAST: 1885  -  1895  In Bulgaria, events had been taking a tumultous course, following the Congress of B e r l i n .  I t had been thought by the powers  that the new state of Bulgaria would become completely subservient to the w i l l of Russia.  What d i d happen seemed almost a reverse process.  Two reasons can be advanced f o r t h i s marked transformation.  Foremost  was the r i s e of a strong national f e e l i n g which encouraged Bulgarians to be Bulgarians f i r s t and Slavs second.  J . Holland Rose says that  one of the most remarkable n a t i o n a l movements of the nineteenth century was that which "endowed a population of downtrodden Bulgarian peasants with a passionate desire f o r n a t i o n a l e x i s t e n c e . ^  The second must, to a large extent, be ascribed to the  Pan-  slav I m p e r i a l i s t ideology of many of the Russian o f f i c i a l s in Bulgaria.. The ideology of the Russian Panslav Imperialists was c l e a r l y  expressed  88 by Danilevski i n h i s famous book "Russia and Europe".  The  Russian  wishes Panslav i m p e r i a l i s t s rejected the dooiro of the l i t t l e Slav peoples to 1  preserve t h e i r own t r a d i t i o n s and outlook.  The Russian Tsar, they  argued, would l i b e r a t e the Slavs from f o r e i g n oppressors whether they •be Turk or German, but i n h i s turn would impose on them Russian  auto-  87.  Rose, J.H., The Development of the European Nations, 1870-191^ London, Constable & Co. Ltd., 19JR5, p. 206.  88,  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Russia, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1952, p. 91.  1*0  cracy and orthodoxy.  89  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that i n the ideology  of the Panslav Imperialists the German powers, not Great B r i t a i n , were the true enemies of Russia and Slavdom.  As early as 1870 one catches  the note of Panslav imperialism i n an address to Tsar Alexander I I by the Moscow Duma.  The address, edited by Aksakov, I u r i Samarin, and  Prince Cherkassy, a l l prominent i n the Panslav movement, stated, "Intern a l a f f a i r s and foreign a f f a i r s are mutually connected.  The pledge of  (Russian) success i n the foreign region l i e s i n the power of n a t i o n a l 90 self-consciousness."  I t can e a s i l y be seen that, with Russian o f f i c -  i a l s i n Bulgaria holding such views, a c l a s h was almost i n e v i t a b l e with the young Bulgarian n a t i o n a l i s t s coming to the f o r e . A l i t t l e known and much neglected feature of the Panslav imp e r i a l i s t ideology was the stress which i t l a i d on a r r i v i n g a t a good understanding with Great B r i t a i n .  This was the opinion of the Slavo-  p h i l e , Ivan Aksakov, and the m i l i t a n t j o u r n a l i s t , M i k h a i l Katkov, who held that a "great understanding" with Great B r i t a i n would be more advantageous to Russia than °a great war".^  1  U n t i l 1862, Katkov had been  $ym per t h e fife to so enthralled by Great B r i t a i n that he declared i t to be h i s personal b e l i e f that Great B r i t a i n and Russia were natural a l l i e s whose duty i t 89.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Russia, 195»2, p. 91  90.  Kornilov, Alexander, Modern Russian History, A l f r e d A. Knopf, New York, 192k, V o l . H , p. 19*u  91.  Baylen, Hoseph, Madame Olga Novikov, Propogandist^ American S l a v i c and East European Review, 1951, p. 255. tf  la was to carry c i v i l i z a t i o n to "the barbarous n a t i o n s " .  9 2  During the  seventies, attempts were made to secure the support of England by i n terpreting to the B r i t i s h public Russian aims i n the Balkans and Central A s i a .  The Russian group were greatly aided i n these  endeavours  93 by sympathetic B r i t i s h j o u r n a l i s t s such as William T. Stead. The most able advocate of Russian p o l i c y i n Great B r i t a i n during t h i s period was Madame Novikoff, a Russian lady of wealth and s o c i a l p o s i t i o n who had come to Great B r i t a i n i n 1868 f o r the purpose of i n t e r p r e t i n g and defending autocratic Russia to democratic England.- ^ 7  So w e l l had she devoted h e r s e l f to carrying out her mission that she had become known i n Great B r i t a i n under the sobriquet Ttf.P. f o r Russi a . "9^  The c h i e f importance of her work i s the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the  p o l i t i c a l ideas of such Russian Panslav thinkers as Samarin, Aksakov, Katkov and Pobednestev,  to such B r i t i s h L i b e r a l s as Lord Napier, S i r  Henry Campbell-Bannerman, S i r Robert Morier, and, most important of a l l , ItfLlliam Ewart Gladstone.  With Madame Novikoff as the connecting  l i n k , a strange, unique understanding, although u n o f f i c i a l , developed between the a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t B r i t i s h L i b e r a l s and the Russian Panslav Imperialists.  This was to function throughout the Near Eastern C r i s i s  of 1876-1878.  96  92.  Baylen, Joseph, Madame Olga Novikov, Propogandist, p. 255  93.  Stead, W., Truth about Russia, C a s s e l l & Co., London, 1888  9h.  Baylen, op. c i t . , p. 258.  95.  Ibid., p. 256  96.  Ibid., p. 255, p. 258-270  1*2 When the Treaty of B e r l i n became known, Madame Novikoff united with the other Panslavs i n denouncing i t as a humiliating "absurdity".  She translated and had published i n Great B r i t a i n ,  Aksakov's v i o l e n t attack on the Congress of B e r l i n , and informed 97  Gladstone that the hope of the Slavs had been betrayed.  Despite  her disappointment, she continued to support the B r i t i s h L i b e r a l s , unlike the majority of the Panslavs who had become d i s i l l u s i o n e d with Great B r i t a i n as a whole.  She believed that only with the accession  of the Liberals t o power could the p o s s i b i l i t y o f a f r i e n d l y entente with Russia take form.  Despite the f a i l u r e o f her highest hopes,  Madame Novikoff had served w e l l the cause of Anglo-Russian i a t i o n , s t i l l so f a r away.  reconcil-  She had succeeded i n explaining Russia's  p o s i t i o n so w e l l that at l e a s t an attempt to understand Russia's viewpoint was v i s i b l e i n B r i t i s h L i b e r a l c i r c l e s from that time on. Years l a t e r , Count Benckendorff, Russian ambassador i n Great B r i t a i n h a i l e d Madame Novikoff as one o f the pioneers of the 98  Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.  In the meantime, i n the c r i s i s  which was breaking out i n Bulgaria, Great B r i t a i n was eventually to f i n d h e r s e l f supporting the Bulgarians, one of the l i t t l e Slav peoples S D i d e a l i z e d by Madame Novikoff and the Panslavs, but scarcely i n a manner which would have met with t h e i r approval. On September 18, 1885, the Bulgarian n a t i o n a l i s t s i n  97.  Baylen, Madame Olga Novikoff, p. 270  98.  Ibid., p. 271  Ii3 Eastern Roumelia ( s t i l l under the suzerainty of the Sultan) seized the c a p i t a l , Plovdiv, and proclaimed the u n i t y of the province with Bulgaria."  Russia, originaLLyythe champion of Bulgarian n a t i o n a l  unity, had by now grown h o s t i l e to the idea.  Because of a breach  with Prince Alexander of Battenberg, now r u l e r of Bulgaria, the Russian government was anxious that no union of the two t e r r i t o r i e s should occur u n t i l Prince Alexander had vanished from the scene.  If  there was to be a union, i t must be under the auspices of Russia, not under those of Alexander of  Battenberg.  The dilemma of Prince Alexander was  100  s e l f - e v i d e n t . I f he  were to take the lead i n the movement f o r n a t i o n a l unity, he  was  sure to incur the displeasure of the Russian Tsar: i f he refused to associate himself with the movement, the Bulgarian p a t r i o t s would depose him.  Alexander, placed i n t h i s s i t u a t i o n , d i d what most  people would have done.  As Langer says: "He defied the danger of  the future i n order to avoid the danger of the present."  He  accepted the union and a few days l a t e r a r r i v e d at Plovdiv, the Eastern Roumelian c a p i t a l .  Following t h i s , Tsar Alexander ordered 102  a l l Russian o f f i c e r s to leave the Bulgarian army.  This demon-  strated c l e a r l y that the Tsar disapproved of Bulgarian u n i f i c a t i o n 99.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, op. c i t . p.  173  100.  Langer, W.L., European A l l i a n c e s and Alignments, New A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1950, p. 3Ub,  101.  I b i d . , p.  102.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, op. c i t . p.  3U7. 173  Xork,  under Prince Alexander.  Throughout maining part of 1885,  the Bulgarian c r i s i s , which occupied the reand was mafcked by continuous Russian e f f o r t s to  secure the deposition o f Prince Alexander, B r i t i s h p o l i c y fostered a strong Bulgaria under Alexander, to act simultaneously as a check on Russia and as a preserver of the crumbling Turkish Empire from the b l a s t of the north.  The B r i t i s h government was championing the i n t e g -  r i t y of Bulgaria, f o r whose freedom Russia had fought Turkey j u s t seven years before.  In summing up t h i s new departure i n B r i t i s h  foreign p o l i c y , Salisbury stated i n a speech on October 27: "Our p o l i c y , I need not t e l l you, i s to uphold the Turkish Empire whenever i t can be genuinely and h e a l t h i l y upheld; but whenever i t i s proved by events to be inconsistent with the welfare of populations, then to s t r i v e and to cherish and f o s t e r a genuine and important contribution . to the future freedom and independence of Europe. n  As he was handing over the reins of o f f i c e to Gladstone i n the winter of 1886,  Salisbury was able to look back upon h i s handling  of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s throughout t h i s phase of the Balkan c r i s i s with a degree of s a t i s f a c t i o n .  Through courageous diplomacy and  great good luck, Salisbury and h i s ambassador ad interim i n Constantinople, S i r William White,  had s u c c e s s f u l l y maintained Alexander  upon h i s throne, and subsequently blocked Russian designs i n the  103.  Medlicott, W.N.,*The Powers and the U n i f i c a t i o n of the Two B u l g a r i a s ^ E n g l i s h H i s t o r i c a l Review, 1939, p. 260.  10li.  Hornik, M.P.^The Mission of S i r Henry Drummond-wblff t o Constantinople, 1885-1887> English H i s t o r i a l Review, 19U0, p. 603  \  16 Near East.^-*  That t h i s check was only temporary, and that i t might  not be i n the long-term interests of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y to cont i n u a l l y f r u s t r a t e Russia i n the Near East, were questions which were very l i k e l y being considered by Salisbury. At any rate, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that, although the f o r e i g n p o l i c y pursued by S a l i s bury at t h i s period was s t i l l avowedly anti-Russian, i t lacked the intense animosity and bitterness of the period of t h e Congress of Berlin. When the L i b e r a l s once more resumed o f f i c e i n February, 1886,  the r e l a t i v e l y young and inexperienced Lord Rosebery was at the  foreign o f f i c e , replaceing the veteran Lord Granville, as  Gladstone s 1  106 foreign secretary.  During the short time they were i n o f f i c e , the  L i b e r a l s , i n t h e i r handling of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , d i d not deviate much from the methods followed by the previous Conservative ment.  4S</  govern-  Salisbury records that i n an interview he had with Rosebery,  the l a t t e r declared h i s intention of maintaining a c e r t a i n c o n t i n u i t y i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s i n foreign a f f a i r s . ^ 1 0  However, i t cannot be  denied that there was an attempt on the part of the L i b e r a l s to pursue a more c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y with regard to Russia, e s p e c i a l l y  100 i n Near Eastern problems. 105.  C e c i l , Lady Gwendolen, L i f e of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, Hodder & Stoughton, London, v o l . I l l , p.p. 251 -  106.  252.  Crewe, Marquis of: Lord Rosebery, London, John Murray, 1931, v o l . I, p.p. 258 -  107.  Ibid., v o l . I, p.  261.  108.  Ibid., v o l . I, p.  270.  259.  2*6 On A p r i l 5, 1886,  two months a f t e r the L i b e r a l s had taken  o f f i c e , an agreement between the powers was Bulgarian question.  reached with regard to the  By the terms of the agreement, Alexander was  not  to be r u l e r over a united Bulgaria, but merely Governor-General of Eastern Roumelia under the suzerainty of Turkey f o r a period of f i v e years.Following  t h i s , i n the summer of 1886,  the L i b e r a l gov-  ernment f e l l from o f f i c e , to be replaced by another Salisbury ministry, while almost simultaneously another c r i s i s i n Bulgaria burst upon Europe.  Despite the agreement of A p r i l , 1886,  Russophile  conspir-  ators had continued to hatch p l o t s with unabated z e a l i n Bulgaria. The Russians had remained determined to get r i d of Prince Alexander at the f i r s t s u i t a b l e opportunity. of Russophile  In the month of August, a group  army o f f i c e r s organised a conspiracy against him.  the night of August 20, he was  On  surprised i n h i s palace, kidnapped,  and deported to Russian t e r r i t o r y .  A few days a f t e r h i s deportation,  Alexander was l i b e r a t e d , and, on August 28, a r r i v e d at Lemberg i n Gallia.  In the meantime, i n Bulgaria, the  counter-revolutionary  forces, l e d by the n a t i o n a l i s t leader, Stambolov, overthrew the revolutionaries and seized power.  Stambolov then sent a message to  Prince Alexander asking him to return.  The Prince consented at once,  109.  Langer, European A l l i a n c e s and Alignments, p.  110.  Ibid., p.  358  357  1*7 and s h o r t l y a f t e r a r r i v e d at Ruschuk i n Bulgaria.  From Ruschuk  Alexander appealed to the Tsar f o r clemency, but the r e p l y when i t came was uncompromising: "Cannot approve your return to Bulgaria, foreseeing disastrous consequences to the country, already so severely tried. "•^  The Prince wisely decided that he could not a f f o r d to  brave the wrath of the Czar of a l l Russias any longer, and  abdicated  on September 7.  When Queen V i c t o r i a heard of the incident, she expressed intense indignation.  To Lord Salisbury, who  as Prime Minister, she wrote:  "We  was once more i n o f f i c e  are h o r r i f i e d at these ( s i c ) news  from Bulgaria.... I t i s these Russian fiends but i t may  rouse a Eur11?  opean war.  I t i s a breach of treaty, and we s h a l l s u f f e r . "  *  Later  she wrote to E a r l Iddesleigh, then a t the foreign o f f i c e : "England must speak out and be f i r m .  Every day we have been warned against  Russian i n t r i g u e s , and t h i s i s the stepping-stone to getting Constantinople. Lord Salisbury shared, to a c e r t a i n degree, the Queen's feelings of indignation against what he believed to be a Russian plot.  However, he shrewdly pointed out to the Queen that there  was  no d i r e c t proof of the complicity of the Russian government i n the depositon of Prince Alexander.  Therefore,  111.  Langer, European A l l i a n c e s , p.  112.  Buckle, G.E., Murray, 1930,  113.  I b i d . , p.  179  the B r i t i s h government  360  The L e t t e r s of Queen V i c t o r i a , London, John v o l . I, Third Series, p. 179  lifl had to proceed with caution before i t could make any diplomatic remonstrances.  Despite h i s note of caution to the Queen, S a l i s b u r y made attempts to draw A u s t r i a , who had been equally alarmed by recent Russian a c t i v i t i e s i n Bulgaria, i n t o a defensive understanding with regard to Near Eastern a f f a i r s .  However, these e f f o r t s f a i l e d to  meet with a success proportionate to the anxiety i n s p i r e d i n Vienna by Russian a c t i v i t i e s .  I t was reported a t t h i s time that an Austrian  diplomatic o f f i c i a l had stated that A u s t r i a "would be delighted to take the f i r s t step as Lord S a l i s b u r y proposes, i f Lord S a l i s b u r y w i l l begin by taking the second.  Because of the worsening of the Bulgarian c r i s i s , culminating i n a diplomatic rupture between Russia and Bulgaria, S a l i s bury, since he could get no d e f i n i t e response out of A u s t r i a , r e solved to t r y I t a l y , the t r a d i t i o n a l f r i e n d o f Great B r i t a i n .  On  November 2k, C o r t i , the I t a l i a n ambassador i n London, had informed Salisbury that h i s government looked with grave concern on the poss i b i l i t y of a Russian occupation of Bulgaria.  Salisbury r e p l i e d he  would l i k e I t a l y to take the lead i n drawing up a plan to meet such 115 an emergency."^  Discussions lapsed f o r about two months following  this interview, but on January 17, 1887, C o r t i having presented deflll+.  Langer, European A l l i a n c e s , p. 366  115.  Medlicott, W.N., The Mediterranean Agreement s o f 1887, Slavonics Review, June, 1926, pp. 70 - 71  k9 i n i t e proposals from Robilant, the I t a l i a n foreign minister, once more began talks with Salisbury.  Shortly a f t e r t h i s , an agreement was  reached between the two governments, which embodied the o r i g i n a l I t a l ian, proposals  i n a modified form.  In the pact, both powers agreed that the status quo i n the Mediterranean, the A d r i a t i c , the Aegean,- and the Black Sea, was t o be maintained as f a r as p o s s i b l e : i f t h i s proved impossible, an agreement should be arrived a t between the two powers before a i y modificat. 116 ion.  Having succeeded with I t a l y , Salisbury resolved once more to attempt to draw A u s t r i a into a s i m i l a r understanding.  On March 5>,  he proposed that A u s t r i a should p a r t i c i p a t e i n the Anglo-Italian agreement by means of an exchange of notes, with Austria taking the initiative.  In a dispatch to Salisbury, on March 12, Kalnoky, the  Austrian foreign minister, whose long dormant suspicions of Russia had revived, agreed that t h i s form of understanding was probably the 117 best which could be devised. Further negotiations followed and an agreement was reached, with notes being exchanged between the two governments on March 2h» In announcing Austria's adhesion to the agreement, Kalnoky declared: "England and Austria-Hungary have the same i n t e r e s t s so f a r as concerns  116.  Pribram, A.F., Secret Treaties of A u s t r i a , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1920, v o l . I, p.p. 95 - 97.  117.  Medlicott, op. c i t . , p. 7h.  50 the Eastern Question as a whole, and therefore the same need of maint a i n i n g the status quo i n the Orient...of preventing the aggrandizement of one Power to the detriment of others, and consequently of acting i n concert i n order to insure these c a r d i n a l p r i n c i p l e s of n fl their policy."  The B r i t i s h and I t a l i a n governments made haste  to acknowledge the adhes^frfiffbf A u s t r i a to the agreement.  119  Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s i n the year 188? were, to a large degree, determined by Bismarck.  Bismarck's diplomacy  throughout  this troubled year has remained the subject of intense controversy. He appeared to be running with the hares and hunting with the hounds. He gave h i s backing to the formation of the Mediterranean Agreement 120 of March, 1887,  between Great B r i t a i n , A u s t r i a , and I t a l y ,  but  on June 18, I887, he signed the Reinsurance Treaty with Russia, i n which he pledged Germany to j o i n with Russia i n opposing every attempt to disturb the t e r r i t o r i a l status quo i n the Balkans without previous agreement between the two powers. Later i n the year, when i t appeared that h i s e f f o r t s to c o n c i l i a t e Russia had f a i l e d , he s i g n i f i e d h i s willingness to" co-operate with the Mediterranean group.  However, as the c r i s i s passed,  during the early months of the following year, Bismarck was to be  118.  Pribram, op. c i t . , p. 101  119;  Gooch, G.P. & Temperley, H., eds. B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898 , 191k, London, 1927, v o l . V I H , No. l t d ; , p. 3  120.  Langer, European A l l i a n c e s , p. 397 - hOk  51 found once more supporting the Russian p o s i t i o n i n the Near East. With regard to Bismarck's p o l i c y as i t concerns both Great  Britain  and Russia, perhaps the only v a l i d conclusion to be reached out of t h i s welter of agreements and alignments i s that he wished to maintain the peace between them through the preservation of the status quo. He was determined to support Great B r i t a i n i f she appeared at a d i s advantage before Russia, and i f positions were reversed, he would support Russia.  But t h i s support of one power would only l a s t u n t i l  the equilibrium had been restored.  He had no desire to see either of  them acquire a d e f i n i t e s u p e r i o r i t y over the other.  He was resolved  to act towards them as the "honest broker*. Following the conclusion of the Mediterranean March, 1887,  agreement of  S i r William White, now B r i t i s h ambassador at Constant-  inople, entered i n t o discussions with h i s Austrian and I t a l i a n c o l leagues, f o r the avowed purpose of strengthening the agreement.  As a  r e s u l t of these conversations, the three ambassadors drew up a d r a f t of eight proposals which, i f put into force, would considerably . strengthen the o r i g i n a l agreement.  121  Salisbury, upon l e a r n i n g that these discussions were taking place, declared h i s personal approval, but added that he thought i t best that the discussions should be confined to the bassadors i n Constantinople.  I t seems c l e a r that Salisbury's a t t i t -  ude at t h i s point had White s e r i o u s l y worried.  121.  am-  Medlicott, Mediterranean Agreements, p.  S i r William, although  77  52 f i r m l y resolved upon an anti-Russian p o l i c y , hinted to h i s fellow bassadors that i n d i s c r e e t measures might turn Salisbury against  am-  the  122 whole idea of a c l o s e r agreement. What were the r e a l reasons behind t h i s seeming reluctance on the part of Salisbury to enter into a more binding agreement with A u s t r i a and I t a l y ?  Doubtless i t was  i n part due to a wish not to be-  come too deeply involved i n continental alignments. B r i t a i n maintained her p o l i c y of splendid i s o l a t i o n . have been another reason, though.  In t h i s  way,  There seems to  What l i t t l e evidence there i s  a v a i l a b l e suggests that Salisbury, as e a r l y as 1887,  was  the idea of a rapprochement with Russia, although he was  considering not yet ready  to implement the p o l i c y which would make such a rapprochement a practical possibility.  In substantiation of t h i s theory,  Salisbury's  conversation with Hatzfeldt, the German ambassador, on August 3, is significant.  1887,  At this time, Salisbury declared to Hatzfeldt that  a general r e c o n c i l i a t i o n between Great B r i t a i n and Russia was not  im-  possible and went on to speak of a "nouveau depart" f o r h i s f o r e i g n 123 policy. ^  Although, as indicated by the previous Mediterranean  agreement, Salisbury was prepared to r e s t r a i n Russia, he did not wish to abandon a l l hope of an eventual r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with that country, through a strengthening  of the Mediterranean alignment without suf-  f i c i e n t caus'e. 122.  Medlicott, Mediterranean Agreements, p. 78  123.  Dugdale, E.T.S., German Diplomatic Documents, l871-19lll, Methuen, London, 192b, v o l . I . p. 301.  $3 Thus the s i t u a t i o n stood when a t the end of September, the apparent triumph of Russian aims i n Bulgaria caused S a l i s b u r y to forego ideas of a rapprochement with Russia u n t i l a more propitious moment.  But much time was to elapse before he would consent to a  strengthening of the Mediterranean Agreement. The s i t u a t i o n favourable to Russia was the r e s u l t of.the Sultan's formulation of a Bulgarian p o l i c y which v i r t u a l l y conceded  12ii a l l Russian demands i n that country.  As a r e s u l t of t h i s new  sit-  uation, A u s t r i a and I t a l y sought to secure the adherence of Great B r i t a i n to the eight point d r a f t drawn up by the three ambassadors. The swing of the pendulum was now complete.  A year prev-  ious, Great B r i t a i n had been seeking the support of A u s t r i a and I t a l y i n an attempt to check Russian designs i n the Near East; now i t was Austria and I t a l y who were seeking the support of Great B r i t a i n to block the a c t i v i t i e s of Russia there. On October 10, Kalnoky presented the eight points to C r i s p i , the I t a l i a n premier.  The l a t t e r promptly accepted them and  begged Salisbury to do l i k e w i s e . Although, according to Eckhards t e i n , German charge i n London, Salisbury had r e j e c t e d already a 125* proposal from the Tsar i n October, ^  he was nevertheless reluctant  to commit himself to the eight point agreement of A u s t r i a and I t a l y . 12k,  Medlicott, op. c i t . , p.  125".  Ibid., p.  82  80  Evidently, this reluctance was due to Salisbury's, f e e l i n g that i f he were to league himself i n a more d e f i n i t e form with A u s t r i a and I t a l y and embark on a course, the main aim of which was to block Russian designs i n the Hear East, he would then forego any chance of reaching a separate agreement with Russia.  Then, too, he wished to  be sure of a t l e a s t the t a c i t approval of Germany, as he had serious doubts as to Austria's a b i l i t y to hold Russia i n check unless she (Austria) were assured of German support.  On November 11,  Salisbury met Hatzfeldt, and stated that  the B r i t i s h Cabinet, before reaching a d e f i n i t e d e c i s i o n on the eight point proposal, wished to be assured of the moral support of  126 Germany.  In order to meet these B r i t i s h objections, Bismarck  showed Malet, the B r i t i s h ambassador iri B e r l i n , the text of the Austro-German t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e . B i s m a r c k followed up this d i s closure by a p r i v a t e l e t t e r to Salisbury.  In answer to the misgivings  of the l a t t e r , Bismarck declared: "The existence of A u s t r i a as a strong and independent great power i s a necessity f o r Germany.,,, "It i s impossible to admit" he went on, "that a German emperor could ever.support Russia m i l i t a r i l y to help her s t r i k e down or enfeeble one of the powers on whose support we reckon either to prevent a war with Russia, or to a s s i s t us i n f a c i n g such a. war. From t h i s standpoint, German p o l i c y w i l l always be obliged to enter the l i n e of b a t t l e i f the independence of Austria-Hungary were to be menaced by Russian aggression".  126.  German Diplomatic Documents, 1871-1911*, v o l . I, p.p.  127.  Ibid.,- p.p.  3k3-3kk  128.  Ibid., p.  3U8  336-337  55 Salisbury, h i s apprehensions removed by t h i s double d e c l a r ation on the part of Bismarck, proceeded with h i s negotiations f o r the proposed agreement with A u s t r i a and I t a l y .  Certain clauses of  the o r i g i n a l eight point proposal were modified and a ninth clause was added i n deference to B r i t i s h s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s . The nine points of the arrangement included the maintenance of peace and of the status quo i n the Near East ( A r t i c l e s I and IV). According to A r t i c l e V, Turkey could not delegate her r i g h t s over Bulgaria or A s i a Minor to any other power.  I t was declared by A r t -  i c l e VII that, should the independence of the Ottoman Empire be threatened, the three powers would reach an arrangement to see that i t was  respected.  I f Turkey were to league h e r s e l f with  another  power, A r t i c l e VIII provided that the three powers would occupy c e r t a i n Ottoman s t r a t e g i c a l t e r r i t o r i e s u n t i l the status quo had been  re-established.  129 '  An exchange of notes confirming the agreement took place between Salisbury and K a r o l y i , the Austrian ambassador, on December 12, 1887,  and was followed four days l a t e r by a s i m i l a r exchange  between Kalnoky and C r i s p i i n Vienna."^  0  I t w i l l be seen from the  terms of t h i s agreement that i t was of much stronger nature than that of the previous March.  Also, the p o t e n t i a l enemy, Russia,  Much more i n evidence, though s t i l l not s p e c i f i c a l l y named.  129.  B.D.  VIII, no. 2 ( f ) p. 13  130.  Pribram, op. c i t , V o l . I, p.p. 128-130  was  56 Early i n February of 1888,  the Russian government proposed  that the Powers should declare Prince Ferdinand of Coburg, a former o f f i c e r i n the Hungarian army, and now Prince of Bulgaria, to be i l l e g a l l y at the head of the Bulgarian government, and should request that Turkey, as suzerain power, hand the declaration to the usurping Prince.^"  When the r e p l i e s of Great B r i t a i n , A u s t r i a and I t a l y were  received, Giers was leal.  quick to notice that t h e i r arguments were ident-  Salisbury informed Staal that one of two things must  happen: either Ferdinand would not be intimidated by the Porte, i n which case action by the Porte would be f r u i t l e s s , or the prince would leave the country and anarchy would follow.  The only means,  he added, of obtaining a s a t i s f a c t o r y regime i n Bulgaria was the designation of a prince acceptable to both the Bulgarians and to the 133 Powers.  Kalnoky used the same argument with Lobanov, Russian  am-  bassador i n Vienna, as d i d C r i s p i with A x k u l l , Russian ambassador in Italy.  1 3 l i  Nevertheless, on March.7, the Porte i n compliance with Russian wishes, telegraphed Prince Ferdinand that h i s presence i l l e g a l i n Bulgaria.  was  But the Bulgarian government c l e a r l y r e a l i z e d  by t h i s time that i t had the backing of the Mediterranean powers and  131.  Medlicott, Mediterranean Agreements, p.  132.  Ibid., p.  133.  Loc. c i t .  13k.  Loc. c i t .  87  87  57 13? consequently paid no heed to the pronouncement of the Porte.  There .  the Bulgarian question ended, at l e a s t f o r the time being, and Russia had to be content with the Porte's condemnation. No amount of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n could hide from the Russian foreign o f f i c e the fact that she (Russia) had been checked i n the Balkans.  Great B r i t a i n , i n a much more cautious and reluctant manner  than hitherto employed, had succeeded with the support of two continental powers, i n blocking the way to the r e a l i z a t i o n of Russian aspirations i n the Near East.  The r e s u l t of the Mediterranean Ag-  reements was to lessen noticeably Russian influence i n Bulgaria, u n t i l a f t e r the turn of the century.  Disappointed and defeated i n Bulgaria,  again, as a f t e r the Congress of B e r l i n , Russia was to turn to A s i a f o r compensation.  But t h i s time not to Central A s i a , but to a new  f i e l d of a c t i v i t y and expansion - the F a r East. Russo-British r e l a t i o n s emerged from the Bulgarian c r i s i s i n a much better shape- than they had from the Congress o f B e r l i n . The check i n Bulgaria, i n the c r i s i s o f  1885-1887, had  not been of  so serious a nature f o r Russia as that received at B e r l i n . Now, f o r almost the f i r s t time, powerful forces were at work i n both countr i e s , seeking some way of overcoming t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l animosity. As early as 1885,  Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l , during h i s tenure of the  India o f f i c e , became hopeful of an understanding o f a permanent  135.  Medlicott, Mediterranean A l l i a n c e s ,  p.88  t  I,  58 nature with Russia, at l e a s t i n respect to Afghanistan. following year, 1886,  136  In the  while i n the midst of the Bulgarian c r i s i s ,  Salisbury remarked to the Queen that three members of h i s cabinet, (Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l , Lord George Hamilton, and W.H.  Smith)  were ready to abandon a l l e f f o r t s a t staying the progress of Russia  137 i n the Balkan peninsula. What Salisbury's personal views were on the subject of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s i s rather d i f f i c u l t to ascertain and what l i t t l e there i s a v a i l a b l e verges almost on the paradoxical.  In the  same report to the Queen he declared that therperversity of the Turk had made i t d i f f i c u l t to do much f o r him"^ ation that he was  -  a  f a i r l y clear indic-  thoroughly s i c k of the Palmerstonian heritage of  preserving the i n t e g r i t y of the Turkish Empire. C h u r c h i l l i n a s l i g h t l y d i f f e r e n t vein and  Later he wrote to  stated:  "The possession by Russia of Constantinople w i l l be an awkward piece of news f o r the Minister who receives i t . The prestige e f f e c t on the A s i a t i c popu l a t i o n w i l l be enormous, and I p i t y the English party that has t h i s item on t h e i r redord." 139  An extremely shrewd observer of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y at this period, Baron de S t a a l , the Russian ambassador, has  declared  136.  C h u r c h i l l , W.S., Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l , MacMillan & London, 1907, p.p. 391-396  Co.,  137.  Buckle, G.E., Letters of Queen V i c t o r i a , Third Series, v o l I London, John Murray, 1930, p.p. 201-203  138.  Ibid, p.  139.  Medlicott, W.N., Bulgarias, 1885,  201 The Powers and the U n i f i c a t i o n of the Two English H i s t o r i c a l Review, 1939, p. 67  59 that "Salisbury's p o l i c y was mainly directed by parliamentary considerations and the necessity f o r i d e n t i f y i n g himself with the current popular v i e w s . A s  i f i n confirmation of t h i s view of S t a a l , S a l -  isbury had remarked i n the same dispatch wherein he had informed the Queen of the views of Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l and h i s colleagues, that the majority of the Cabinet were opposed to an abandonment o f t r a d i t i o n a l B r i t i s h Near Eastern p o l i c y , and that therefore the stand of the three dissenters would not a f f e c t the p o l i c y of the government.^"  However, a year l a t e r , when he was to intimate t o  Hatzfeldt that an Anglo-Russian understanding  was not an i m p o s s i b i l i t y , ^  i t would seem that some of the ideas of the ingenious Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l were transmitted to Salisbury.  Salisbury's r e a l views on  Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s during this period have been and w i l l i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y remain a mystery, but one i s tempted to believe, from what scanty evidence there i s a v a i l a b l e , that they were moving i n the d i r e c t i o n of an agreement with Russia, although with the most extreme caution, so as not to o u t s t r i p B r i t i s h public opinion of the day. Therefore Russia could not be allowed by the B r i t i s h government to r e a l i z e her aims i n the Near East, regrettable as i t might be, i f only because the B r i t i s h people were not yet prepared to do -oo.  litO.  Penson, L i l l i a n , The P r i n c i p l e s of Lord Salisbury's Foreign P o l i c y , Cambridge, H i s t o r i c a l Journal, V, 1935, p.p. 87-106  II4I.  C e c i l , Lady Gwendolyn, L i f e of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, Hodder & Stoughton, London, V o l . I l l , p. 319  lij.2.  Hornik, M.P., The Mission of S i r Henry Drummond-wblff To Constantinople, 1885-18b7, English H i s t o r i c a l Review, 19U0, p. 622  1  60 To put M s  p a r t i c u l a r conception of an Anglo-Russian under-  standing into p r a c t i c e , Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l i n November,  1887,  before the Bulgarian c r i s i s had e f f e c t i v e l y subsided, undertook a journey into Russia, remaining there w e l l into the following year, to the dismay of the B r i t i s h and Russian foreign o f f i c e s a l i k e . Before leaving f o r Russia, C h u r c h i l l had informed the Prince of Wales of h i s intention of v i s i t i n g that country.  The Prince had  become convinced of the d e s i r a b i l i t y of improving Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s and gave C h u r c h i l l h i s encouragement, but a t the same time , warned him against giving an o f f i c i a l colour to h i s v i s i t . ' ^ ' '  Once he arrived i n Russia, Lord Randolph c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y ignored a l l warnings and "according to h i s communications to the Prince, proclaimed i n a l l Russian quarters - o f f i c i a l and s o c i a l -  j),5 a complete i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t between England and Russia. The Tsar, Lord Randolph stated i n one of h i s many communications to the Prince of Wales, was f i l l e d with an "extreme desire f o r an AngloRussian understanding".'^  Queen V i c t o r i a was outraged by Lord RanbftTti  dolph's behaviour and declared to the Prince of Wales that they must t r y to keep him from expounding such dangerous doctrines. II4.3.  Lee, Sidney, King Edward VII, MacMillan & Co., London, 192$, p. 683  ikh.  Loc. c i t .  11+5.  Loc. c i t .  II46.  Loc. c i t .  lU7.  Loc. c i t .  61  Another, but s l i g h t l y more r a t i o n a l proponent of AngloRussian friendship, was S i r Henry Drummond-Wolff.  Following the i) ft  conclusion of h i s mission to Constantinople i n 1887 pointed B r i t i s h minister to Teheran. f r i e n d of the Prince of Wales.  , he was  ap-  Wolff was an i n f l u e n t i a l  In the summer of 1889, while he  was  temporarily on a v i s i t to London, he met the Prince and outlined to him a scheme by which P e r s i a was to be divided economically i n t o two spheres with the B r i t i s h predominating i n the south and the Russians i n the north.  At the same time, S i r Hency, who" was w e l l acquain-  ted with Baron de Staal, the Russian ambassador, often expressed the same opinion to him.  S t a a l , f o r h i s part, assured Drummond-Wolff of  h i s own personal agreement with the scheme and a t the same time reported to Giers that " S i r H.D.-Wolff's profession of faith...seemed to me to be too e x p l i c i t not to derive from instructions of the p r i n c i p a l secretary of state f o r foreign a f f a i r s " . " ^  The Prince was so  impressed with the plans of Drummond-Wolff that he c a l l e d him to l a y them before the Czar i n B e r l i n , where he (the Czar) was on an o f f i c ial visit.  To f a c i l i t a t e the meeting, the Prince furnished S i r Henry  with a l e t t e r of introduction and l a t e r , upon meeting the Czar at Fredensborg, requested the l a t t e r to give Drummond Wolff an attentive  151  hearing.  The Tsar seems to have responded i n a f r i e n d l y fashion to  li|8.  Hornik, M.P.  ll#.  Lee, Sidney, King Edward VII, p. 685-686  150.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P. The Anglo Russian Convention of 1907, Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939, p.p. 11-12  151.  Op. c i t . , p.  Mission of Drummond-Molff, p.  687  623  Torch  62 the proposals of S i r Henry, and declared he was most desirous to "come to an understanding with England i n Persia. ests i n common i n Europe.  We have no i n t e r -  Our common i n t e r e s t s l i e i n Asia.  There  I d e s i r e to l i v e i n friendship with her, and to e s t a b l i s h an under-  lie standing which w i l l enable us to be f r i e n d s . "  J  When Salisbury  learned of t h i s d i r e c t appeal to the Czar, he resented the f a c t that i t was made over h i s head, but declared himself not averse to the general p r i n c i p l e s of  Drummond-Tfifolff, though he expressed the view  that Wolff's Persian dream was u n l i k e l y to come true f o r a t l e a s t a  153 generation.  Now that the Bulgarian issue had receded into the  background, Salisbury was able to lend more countenance to schemes for  improving Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s .  August, 1889,  In a Mansion House speech i n  he heaped such effusive praise upon Russia and her  Czar that a Conservative Party member, A l f r e d Austin, wrote Lord Salisbury and inquired what was to be understood from "such c i v i l i t y to the t r a d i t i o n a l enemy.  Staal, upon reporting these same r e -  marks to Giers, added, " I t has been a long time since s i m i l a r words would have been pronounced by a B r i t i s h minister i n an o f f i c i a l  155 meeting".  ^  By the end of the year, the B r i t i s h ambassador i n S t .  152.  Lee, Sidney, King Edward VII, p.  153.  Loc. c i t .  15U.  C e c i l , Lady Gwendolyn, Marquis of Salisbury, V o l . IV, p.  155.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P.,  p. 12.  68?  The Anglo Russian Convention o f  1907,  83  63 Petersburg was presenting a s t i l l reluctant Giers with DrummondWolff 's thesis of Persia p a r t i t i o n e d into two commercial s p h e r e s , " ^  Opponents of t h i s new trend i n B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t o wards an agreement with Russia, found new hope and i n s p i r a t i o n under the leadership of an arresting figure, j u s t making h i s appearance i n B r i t i s h p o l i t i c s , George Nathaniel Curzon.  Curzon, following a  number o f years of t r a v e l and study i n Persia, published a work on 157 that country e n t i t l e d "Persia and the Persian Question. ""^ •  The l a s t -j  H O  chapter was devoted to B r i t i s h and Russian p o l i c y i n P e r s i a .  Cur-  zon declared that B r i t i s h p o l i c y i n Persia was of a f a r nobler natJ.59  ure than that of Russia, which he described as "avowedly h o s t i l e . * ^ ' He declared that B r i t i s h statesmen should make up t h e i r minds as to what they meant to hold i n A s i a and what they were prepared to abandon to Russia.  He continued that a responsible B r i t i s h ministry  should then state: "Thus f a r and no f a r t h e r . let  Short of that point,  England and Russia, so f a r as i t i s possible, co-operate.  But  once i t has been passed, l e t the Foreign O f f i c e c l e r k s dry t h e i r pens and the h i s t o r i c a l K r i e g mobil be f l a s h e d from Whitehall.""'"^  0  Curzon expressed the hope that he would not be considered a Russo156.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P. The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  157-.  Ronalshay, E a r l of, The L i f e of Lord Curzon, London, Ernest Benn, 1928, V o l I . p.p. I I J D - 1 5 7 .  158.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P., op. c i t .  159.  Loc. c i t .  160.  Ronalshay, E a r l of, Lord Curzon, p. l l t f , V o l . I  p. 12  p. 12  6k phobe, but from the p u b l i c a t i o n of this work, the Russians never ceased to regard him as t h e i r natural enemy. As i f i n confirmation of these fears of Curzon, another Anglo-Russian storm was brewing over Afghanistan i n the eafily nineties. Although the north-west f r o n t i e r of Afghanistan had been adequately defined by the British-Russian agreement following the Penjdeh i n c i d ent,  the Pamirs region to the east had remained undemarcated as a  r e s u l t of lack of geographical knowledge, a t l e a s t on the part of the  l62 British.  A f t e r the settlement o f the Penjdeh incident, Russian  agents had been busy exploring the Pamirs region.  These explorations  attracted very l i t t l e attention u n t i l the f a l l of 1891, when Captain Younghusband, a B r i t i s h o f f i c e r engaged i n exploring the country north of the Himalayas, met a Russian force under Colonel Yanoff At  first,  r e l a t i o n s between the two o f f i c e r s were c o r d i a l , but t h i s  happy state o f a f f a i r s ended when Yanoff announced to Younghusband that he had orders from the Governor-General of Turkestan to arrest him unless he promised to leave Russian t e r r i t o r y immediately.  With  no alternative i n sight, Younghusband was forced to y i e l d , but news of h i s expulsion aroused a furor i n Great B r i t a i n .  The r e s u l t was  _  16k  that the Central Asian question was re-opened i n 1892. l6l.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P. Anglo Russian Convention, p. 13  162.  Habberton, W., Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan Urbana, University of I l l i n o i s , 1937, p. 58,  65 The next three years,  1892-1895,  were to be f i l l e d with a  series of negotiations which, though contentious and protracted, were i n the end to bring Great B r i t a i n and Russia c l o s e r to a permanent understanding.  At no time was the c r i s i s ever t o assume the danger-  ous proportions of that which followed the Penjdeh incident.  Also  at this time the a n t i t h e t i c a l views of the Russian foreign ministry and of the Russian war ministry clashed frequently.  Prince Lobanov-  Rostovsky has ascribed t h i s s i t u a t i o n as etong i n part to the death of Alexander I I I and i n part to the advent of new and less able mini s t e r s , and a r e s u l t i n g break i n the methodical cautiousness which had characterized Russian A s i a t i c p o l i c y during the time of Gortchakoff and  Giers.^  In the midst of these discussions the L i b e r a l s under Gladstone took ewe? o f f i c e , with Rosebery assuming the post of foreign secretary. question.  At f i r s t , Rosebery showed l i t t l e i n t e r e s t i n the Pamirs Throughout 1893,  negotiations between the two countries  continued without leading to any d e f i n i t e r e s u l t s .  The r o l e of Rose-  bery with regard to the India O f f i c e , however, proved analogous to that of Kopnist with regard to the Russian war ministry: both these departments were thought to be hoping f o r a f a i l u r e of the negotiations."^  165.  166.  Chickkine, an o f f i c i a l  i n the Russian foreign o f f i c e ,  Lobanov-Rostovsky, A. Russia and Asia, MacMilland& Co. York, 1933, p. 181. Mabcerton, W.,  p. 62-63  New  Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan  66  believed an agreement would be reached on the Pamirs question, but whether or not i t wou]d be i n the near future, he could not say.  '  Kopnist, temporarily minister of f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , expressed his f a i t h that the Tsar, although i n the embarrassing p o s i t i o n of having to choose between two ministers, was, a t the bottom of his heart, with the foreign ministry. For a considerable time, the Russians had regarded Lord 169 Lansdowne, Viceroy of India, with suspicion. '  Nevertheless, i t was  his despatch of S i r Mortimer Durand to Kabul which paved the way 170 f o r an eventual Anglo-Russian agreement on the Pamirs question. Durand informed the Amire that the Russian government was  insisting  that the Amir withdraw h i s forces from the t e r r i t o r y across the Oxus river.  After considerable negotiations, aided by the f a c t that the  Amir's forces had suffered i n engagements with the Russians, Durand was successful i n h i s mission, and the Amir consented to a with171 drawal of the Afghan troops. The year 1891; saw the retirement of Gladstone, who succeeded by h i s foreign secretary Lord Rosebery.  was  Qiord Rosebery's  p o s i t i o n a t the foreign o f f i c e was taken by Lord Kimberly, formerly Ojo. 167.  Habberton, W. Anglo Ru-onian Re"lntinn i nnnnprninc rtfchrafagte^ p.  168.  Loc. c i t .  169.  Loc. c i t .  170.  Loc. c i t .  171.  Loc. c i t .  f  67 head of the India O f f i c e . The B r i t i s h government, beset with i n t e r n a l d i f f i c u l t i e s during t h i s year, had l i t t l e time f o r active consideration of the Pamirs question, but towards the end of December S t a a l was able to. write i e r s that he believed the B r i t i s h cabinet had assented to the G  179 demands of the Russian government. '  S t a a l proved p r a c t i c a l l y cor-  r e c t i n h i s surmises, and on March 11 of the following year, Kimberl y and Staal were able to exchange notes s i g n i f y i n g an agreement had  173 been reached between the two countries. By the agreement reached: "The spheres of influence of Great B r i t a i n and .Russia to the east of Lake V i c t o r i a were to be divided by a l i n e which, s t a r t i n g from a point on that lake near i t s eastern extremity, should follow a mountainous course to the Chinese f r o n t i e r . " 171; The way was now c l e a r f o r the work of l o c a l demarcation by a J o i n t Commission, a task which was completed before the end of the year,. amidst f e e l i n g s of good fellowship between B r i t i s h and Russian a l i k e - a contrast indeed to the stormy s i t t i n g s of the J o i n t Commission of 1885.  The agreement of 1895 marked the l a s t step i n the defining  of the Afghan f r o n t i e r . ^ Although the Pamirs agreement cannot i n i t s e l f be considered a diplomatic event of great magnitude, i t was one more agreement which  172.  Habberton, ¥. Anglo Russian Relations, p. 65  173.  Loc. c i t .  68 Great B r i t a i n and Russia had been able to reach i n Central A s i a , and i t marked another important step towards an ultimate convention which would cover a l l disputed areas i n that continent. Before the conclusion of the Pamirs agreement, Czar Alexander I I I died on November 1,  I89U.  The Prince of Wales seized the  opportunity of the Czar's i l l n e s s and death to press f o r an AngloRussian p o l i t i c a l rapprochement.  Upon learning of the Czar's  ill-  ness, he had t r a v e l l e d to Russia and prolonged h i s stay a f t e r Alexander's death f o r more than a month.  During this time he had lengthy  conversations with the new Czar as regards Anglo-Russian relations." ' * 1  7  In t h i s way the Prince was a c t i v e l y supplementing the p o l i c y of the Rosebery administration.  As w e l l as having shown consideration f o r  Russian claims i n the Pamir's question, the Rosebery government had sought to co-operate with Russia i n solving d i f f i c u l t i e s which had arisen between China and Japan over the Korean question i n the Far East.  1 7 7  On November 9,  while the Prince was s t i l l i n Russia, Lord  Rosebery delivered a r-omarkablc speech a t the Lord Mayor's banquet. In t h i s speech he noted with great pleasure the f a c t that B r i t a i n and Russia were co-operating with regard to the Far Eastern Question, and went on to say that the relationship between the two countries  689  176.  Lee, Sidney, King Edward VII, p.  177.  Langer, W.L.,. The Diplomacy of Imperialism, New A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1935, V o l . I, p. 145.  York,  69 had, i n h i s opinion, never been "more hearty".  I89J4.,  On December 6,  the Prince came home and found that h i s v i s i t was widely ac-  claimed by government and public a l i k e .  Lord Rosebery wrote to him  on the day of h i s a r r i v a l : "Never has your Royal Highness stood so high i n the national esteem as today, f o r never have you had such an opportunity.  That at l a s t has come and has enabled you to j u s t i f y  the highest a n t i c i p a t i o n s , and to render a signal service to your 179 country as w e l l as to Russia and the peace of the world."  7  The Prince was highly pleased with the results of h i s v i s i t and with premature optimism wrote to an Austrian f r i e n d : "The character and personality of the new Tsar give assurance of the benefits which would come of an a l l i a n c e between England and Russia. The personal idiosyncrasies and the i n s t a b i l i t y of Nicholas  1  char-  acter had not s u f f i c i e n t time to manifest themselves and throw doubt upon this l a s t  statement.  In s p i t e of the f r i e n d l y overtures of B r i t i s h the Russians remained suspicious of B r i t i s h p o l i c y .  statesmen,  In March,  1§95,  l8l the veteran de Giers died,  and was succeeded at the foreign  o f f i c e by Prince Lobanov, an experienced Russian diplomat, and no  178.  Langer, W.L.,  179.  Lee, Sidney, King Edward VII, p.  180.  Ibid., p.  181.  See the i n t e r e s t i n g but by no means objective account of de Giers as foreign minister i n H. von Samson-Himmelstierna's work, Russia under Alexander I I I , New York, MacMillan & Co. 1893, p.p. 43-51  The Diplomacy of Imperialism, p.  II46  690  692  70 f r i e n d of Great B r i t a i n .  He was one who saw h i s own ends i n t h e i r  proper perspective and was prepared to make the necessary s a c r i f i c e s to get what he wanted.  As w e l l as reaching an agreement with Russia on the Pamirs issue, Rosebery sought to co-operate with Russia i n what had begun to be known i n the European chancelleries as the Far Eastern Question. Here, r i v a l r y i n China, f o r p o l i t i c a l influence and commercial concessions, between the two countries, although comparatively new, was becoming unpleasantly acute.  During the nineteenth century, the once great Chinese Emp i r e had been forced, through diplomacy and war, to abandon i t s long i s o l a t i o n and to open i t s ports to European commerce.  Great B r i t a i n  had played the leading r o l e i n f o r c i n g open the gates of China, and B r i t i s h traders had made untold fortunes i n e x p l o i t i n g the ancient country.  In I89I4., 65% of Chinese export trade and Q$% of Chinese 182  imports were c a r r i e d i n B r i t i s h ships.  Germany and France were  quick to f o l l o w i n the path blazed by Great B r i t a i n . In the meantime, to the north o f China, an even greater menace than the commercial pretensions of the Western European powers was developing and had been developing i n the slow but permanent expansion of Russia into Far Eastern regions.  Guy Wint has  t r u l y s a i d : "An A s i a t i c province of the B r i t i s h Empire expected aJL-  182.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol I, p. 167  71 ways to regain i t s freedom ultimately, but a province once annexed 1ft"3  to Russia remained annexed.  11  T e r r i t o r i a l gains i n the Far East had established Russia as  i860 when  a P a c i f i c power as early as  the eminent Russian  governor,  Count Muraviev-Amurski, had secured Chinese recognition of Russian claims to Siberian t e r r i t o r y as f a r south as the Amur River as w e l l as to the Maritime Province at whose southern t i p he founded Vladivostok i n  i860.  Neither Muraviev nor the Russian government  were s a t i s f i e d by these acquisitions, as Vladivostok was f o r four months of the year. P a c i f i c f o r a naval base. secure such a harbour.  ice-bound  Russia needed an open harbour on the  In l 8 6 l she made her f i r s t e f f o r t s to  A Russian naval force occupied the i s l a n d  of Tsushima, a Japanese possession which l a y o f f the southeast coast of Korea.  The B r i t i s h took prompt action and the o f f i c e r commanding  185 the B r i t i s h Far Eastern squadron forced the Russians to leave. Thus checked i n t h e i r plans f o r a warm water port the Russians began to concentrate t h e i r attention on Korea, nominally a vassal of the Chinese Empire, but i n p r a c t i c e independent.  Korea's  broken c o a s t l i n e possessed some of the f i n e s t harbours; i n the Far East.  Twenty years a f t e r the Tsushima episode, during the Afghan  183.  Wint, Guy, The B r i t i s h i n Asia, I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 19fiii, p. 131  I8I4.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. I, p.  185".  Hudson, G.F., The Far East In World P o l i t i c s , Oxford Unive r s i t y Press, 1937, p.  168  72 c r i s i s i n 1885,  reports reached the B r i t i s h that the Russians were  on the point of seizing the Korean port of Lagareff.  This port they  were demanding i n payment f o r the Russian i n s t r u c t o r s sent to the Korean army.  Once again the B r i t i s h acted promptly.  They sent  a naval squadron to occupy Port Hamilton, an i s l a n d l y i n g o f f the south coast of Korea. the .spring of 1887.  Here the B r i t i s h remained i n occupation u n t i l At this time the Chinese government secured a  promise from the Russian government that i t would not occupy any Korean t e r r i t o r y . ^ 1  7  For seven or eight years a f t e r the c r i s i s of 1885, uation i n the Far East remained unsettled and complicated.  the s i t Matters  were given a completely new turn by the emergence of Japan as a f i r s t c l a s s power.  G.F. Hudson, noted B r i t i s h authority on Far  Eastern problems says: "The r i s e of Japan as a powerful, modernized state, capable of taking the offensive, was a development contrary to a l l experience, a caprice of destiny deranging c a l culations which assumed as beyond question the p r i n c i p l e that a l l p o l i t i c s i n A s i a and A f r i c a were c o l o n i a l , with native states as passive and not a c t i v e factors i n the making of h i s t o r y . " 188 The Chinese, although f a i l i n g to keep pace with the modernizing tendencies of Japan, were throughout the same period t r y i n g feveri s h l y to exert once more t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l authority over Korea.  186.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Russia, p.  187.  Langer, W.L.,  188.  Hudson, G.F., The Far East In World P o l i t i c s , Oxford Unive r s i t y Press, 1937, p. Ik  198  Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol I, p. I69  73 The Russians strongly resented these attempts upon the part of the Chinese government, but f o r various reasons hesitated to take any d i r e c t means to counteract them. i n May,  In a discussion which took place  1888, between Baron Korff, governor-general of the Amurian  province, and Zinoviev, head of the A s i a t i c department o f the Russian foreign o f f i c e , both men agreed that Korea was of great importance to Russia.  However, they believed that  "our occupation of Korea would s p o i l our r e l a t i o n s not only with China, but also with England, which has her own designs on that country....The AngloChinese press, which p e r s i s t e n t l y supports Chinese apprehensions about Russian p l o t s , shows t h i s d i r e c t i o n of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . " 189 The best course of action t o be adopted, circumstances being as they were, was that Russia should work with Japan whose government had begun "to show some anxiety about the means of securing Korea from being seized by the Chinese""* ^ and with the United States, who -  had shown "an unwillingness to encourage ambitious designs of China 191 on Korea" ' , i n f r u s t r a t i n g Chinese intentions with regard to Korea. At the same time, the B r i t i s h were resolved that Russia should be prevented from encroaching on Korea, and that she should not be allowed to possess an i c e - f r e e port anywhere on the P a c i f i c  189.  Popov, A., and Dimant, S.R., eds., F i r s t Steps of Russian Imperialism i n the Far East, Krasny Archiv, Vol. L I I , translated i n the Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, XVIII, 193U, p.p. 237-239  190.  Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 193U, XVIII, p. 238.  Vol.  Ik coast.  Curzon stated that "permanent Russian squadrons at Port Lag-  a r e f f and Fusan would convert her (Russia) into the greatest naval 192 power i n the P a c i f i c " .  The B r i t i s h p u b l i c i s t , Archibald Ross  Coloquho^n, i n a f i e r y a r t i c l e , declared, "Russia i s the nightmare of a l l Chinese statesmen...and a burning, ineradicable sore i n the 193 breast of the Manchus",  and urged that to meet a mutual danger,  an Anglo-Chinese a l l i a n c e should be formed, with the p o s s i b i l i t y of Japan as a t h i r d partner.  To counter Russian plans, S i r George  Curzon .and S i r Charles D i l k e suggested something i n the nature of an Anglo-Chinese Entente.  In 1893,  some overtures of this- nature  seem to have been made by the B r i t i s h government to China.  Nothing  concrete resulted, but Great B r i t a i n continued f i r m l y to support the  195 Korean p o l i c y of L i Hung Chang, the Chinese statesman. '  Thus, i n  the Far East, Great B r i t a i n was attempting something s i m i l a r to the Mediterranean Agreements of 1887 with A u s t r i a and I t a l y . The Russians, r e a l i z i n g that the B r i t i s h were seeking to 196 checkmate them,  began to take vigorous counter measures.  Plans  had long been afoot f o r the connection of Vladivostok with the 192. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p. 170  193.  Loc. c i t .  194.  Loc. c i t .  195.  Loc. c i t .  196.  Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, 193U, XVIII, p.p. 236-214*.  Vol.  75 hinterland by r a i l .  In February, 1891, with Czar Alexander's f i r m  approval, the decision was taken to begin construction of the l i n e . 5  In September, 1892, Count Sergius Witte became Russian minister of 197 finance.  7  He was a strong supporter of the l i n e , f o r i t s economxc  as w e l l as f o r i t s strategic value.  In h i s recommendation of the  scheme to the Czar, occurred the s i g n i f i c a n t sentencesVRussia, from the shores of the P a c i f i c and the summit of the Himalayas, w i l l dominate not only A s i a t i c , but also European a f f a i r s . his able d i r e c t i o n , construction advanced r a p i d l y .  Under  I t soon became  evident that the l i n e was l i k e l y to be completed before the scheduled time.  1 9 9  The knowledge that the Transiberian Railway was under cons t r u c t i o n caused grave apprehensions i n B r i t a i n ,  I t was feared,  and with good reason, that once the l i n e had been completed Russia would be i n a p o s i t i o n to threaten the diplomatic and commercial preponderance which B r i t a i n had h i t h e r t o enjoyed i n China. The Japanese were also apprehensive of Russian intentions i f the Transiberian l i n e should be completed.  Spurred on by these  fears, the Japanese government decided to wrest from China the t r a d -  197.  Tompkins, S.R., Witte as Minister of Finance, Slavonic Re> view, A p r i l , 1933, p.p. 590-606  198.  Seton-Watson, H., The Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 201  199.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. I, p.p. 171-172  200.  Simpson, J.Y., The Great Siberian Iron Road, Blackwood's Magazine, January 1897, p.p. 1-20  76  i t i o n a l Chinese suzerainty over Korea.  However, before embarking on  a struggle with China, the Japanese government inquired of both Great B r i t a i n and Russia as to what t h e i r attitude would be i n the event of war between China and Japan.  The B r i t i s h , as friends of China,  warned the Japanese that they would not tolerate any actions which menaced t h e i r i n t e r e s t s i n China, nor would they acquiesce i n the annexation of Korean t e r r i t o r y by Japan.  They further stated that  any attempt on the part of Japan to c o n t r o l Korean t e r r i t o r y would lead to Russian intervention, and might even r e s u l t i n her seizure  201 of a Korean harbour.  The Russians too d i d t h e i r best to prevent  China and Japan from resorting to arms.  Their minister i n Tokyo,  Hitroyo, repeatedly warned the Japanese government o f the unfavourable consequences with China.  f o r Japan i f she f a i l e d to negotiate i n her dispute  From the o f f i c i a l dispatches of Giers and the Russian  diplomats i n the Far East, i t i s c l e a r that Russia much preferred that Korea should remain under the nominal control of a weak China,  202 than pass under that of an aggressive Japan.  However, despite  the combined e f f o r t s of Great B r i t a i n and Russia to prevent an outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s , August 1, 1894,  found China and Japan at war.  Contrary to general expectation i n Europe, which had held that the immense resouarces of China must ultimately p r e v a i l , the 201.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . 1, p.p. 373-174  202.  Russian Documents Relating to Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 Krasny Archiv, V o l . LLI, Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, October, 1933, p.p. 480-515 & January, 1934, V o l . XVIII, p.p. 632-670  77 Japanese army and navy scored decisive successes early i n the war. I t was soon c l e a r that ancient China was hopelessly inadequate to cope with modern Japan.  Almost immediately, B r i t i s h public opinion,  impressed by the v i c t o r i e s of Japan, began to contemplate a r e v i s i o n of p o l i c y i n the Far East.  On September 2l|, 189U,  the London Times s a i d : "Great B r i t a i n  and Japan have no i n t e r e s t s which are obviously i n c o n f l i c t with each other.  There are some i n t e r e s t s which may prove of the highest  importance that are common to both nations.... Despite her pledge to China not to occupy Korea, Russia s t i l l hankers a f t e r the possession o f a secure and open harbour on the P a c i f i c , . . . But neither Great B r i t a i n nor Japan could look upon i t s f u l f i l m e n t without concern. To Japan's future development as a maritime state, no more dangerous blow could be i n f l i c t e d . To ourselves, i t would be a cause of considerable cost and anxiety." 203 The B r i t i s h government, unwilling to exhibit a complete volte face, proposed on October 6 that Germany, France, Russia, and the United States (who had begun to take a l i v e l y i n t e r e s t i n Far Eastern a f f a i r s ) should intervene on the basis of independence f o r Korea, and an indemnity f o r J a p a n . ^ 2  Giers, s t i l l i n charge of Russian f o r -  eign a f f a i r s , considered the preservation of the status quo i n Korea 205"  as a desirable issue of the Sino-Japanese war.  ^  He was favourably  203.  Langer, W.L.,  Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. I, p. 17^  20lj..  Letters of Queen V i c t o r i a , V o l I I , Third Series, p.  205.  F i r s t Steps of Russian Imperialism i n the Far East, Krasny Archiv, V o l . L I I , Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, July, 193U, V o l . XVIII, p. 251.  U28  78 impressed by the overtures of the B r i t i s h government, and desired that common action should be taken with Great B r i t a i n i n t h e Far 206  East.  I t was i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y this favourable attitude that  Rosebery had i n mind i n h i s speech at the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 9, when he declared that i n the Far Eastern Question, 207 Great B r i t a i n and Russia had proceeded "hand i n hand".  However,  1  the proposal came to naught, owing to the r e f u s a l of the United States and Germany to p a r t i c i p a t e . ^ ^ Meanwhile.Chinese disasters continued, with the Japanese invading Manchuria and capturing Port Arthur.  By the spring of  1895,  the Chinese had been completely routed and were suing f o r peace.  The  great question which the Powers were asking was what terms would the v i c t o r impose upon the vanquished.  In a n t i c i p a t i o n of the peace to  come, a Russian Council of Ministers was held on February 1,  1895.  Sarious l i n e s of a c t i o n were discussed, but i t was found d i f f i c u l t to decide on a d e f i n i t e p o l i c y to be followed, since the terms Japan was prepared to force upon China were, as yet, unknown.  However,  a f t e r much discussion, the Committee decided upon the following l i n e of a c t i o n : (1)  to increase the strength of the Russian naval squadron i n the P a c i f i c to such a point that i t would be considerably stronger than the naval  206..  Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, July, V o l . XVIII, p.p. 245-251  207.  Langer, W.L,  208.  I b i d . , p.  Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p.  175  1934, 146  79 forces of Japan. (2)  To i n s t r u c t the M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s to t r y to reach an agreement with England, e s p e c i a l l y , and with other European powers,for c o l l e c t i v e pressure upon Japan i n case the Japanese government should present claims upon China which would a f f e c t the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of Russia.  The M i n i s t r y of Foreign A f f a i r s was to bear i n mind that the c h i e f aim of Russia i n the Far East was to see Korean independence preserved.  Following the decisions of the Council, the Russian  govern-  ment put i t s e l f i n touch with the B r i t i s h government of Lord Rosebery and with the French government as w e l l .  I t would appear from  Staal"s memoirs that i n the conversations between tiie three governments, general agreement was reached with regard to the independ210 ence and i n t e g r i t y of Korea. On March 20,  negotiations f o r peace between China and Japan  were opened at Shimanoseki, with L i Hung-Chang a c t i n g as c h i e f representative f o r China.  The Japanese terms were severe.  The Tokyo  government asked that China recognize the complete independence of Korea, and that she cede to Japan the whole of the Liatung peninsula, including Port Arthur.  As well, she demanded that China  grant her most-favoured nation treatment and that she open seven new ports to the commerce of the nations.  This l a s t point i s s i g -  209.  F i r s t Steps of Russian Imperialism i n the Far East, Krasny Archiv, V o l . L I I , Chinese Social and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, J u l y , 193U, V o l . XVIII, p.p. 259-260.  210.  Langer, W.L.  Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p.  176  80 n i f i c a n t i n that i t was p a r t l y responsible f o r the modification of the o r i g i n a l h o s t i l e B r i t i s h attitude to Japan.  The Chinese, as  t h e i r m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n was hopeless, were obliged to accept these terms.  Accordingly, on A p r i l 17, 1895, the Treaty of Shimanoseki  . 211 was signed. During the negotiations, L i Hung-Chang had taken good care to keep the European powers w e l l informed of what was going on.  He  had even t r i e d to arrange f o r European intervention before he l e f t f o r Japan, and a f t e r the submission of the Japanese terms he had communicated  them to the European powers.  When the Japanese demand  f o r the surrender of Liatung became known i n London, Lord Kimberly, the foreign secretary admitted to S t a a l that with Port Arthur i n Japanese hands the balance of power i n the Far East would be upset, and the s e c u r i t y of both Peking and Korea threatened.  But he was  reluctant to i n t e r f e r e , since the commercial clause of the Japanese peace terms promised w e l l to a l l the Powers.  Later Kimber]^ de-  clared to S t a a l that since Great B r i t a i n ' s i n t e r e s t s were p r i m a r i l y commercial, she would benefit from the terms imposed by Japan, and that intervention was a very r i s k y business as the Japanese might 212 r e s i s t , and t h i s would e n t a i l the use of force.  This reluctance  on the part of Great B r i t a i n to commit h e r s e l f to any d e f i n i t e course of action against Japan foreshadowed the end of Anglo-Russian 211.  Langer, W.L., 179.  212.  Ibid., p. 179  Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. 1, p.p. 178-  81 co-operation i n the Far East. In Russia, as i n Great B r i t a i n , the Japanese peace temis were w e l l known by A p r i l , and the Russian f o r e i g n o f f i c e was forced to devise a p r a c t i c a l plan to meet the new s i t u a t i o n .  Prince Lobanov,  the new f o r e i g n minister, prepared two memoranda f o r the Tsar, i n which he outlined the course which Russian foreign p o l i c y should pursue i n the Far East, both from a short term and from a long term viewpoint.  In the f i r s t memorandum, Lobanov said that the occupation of  Liaotung and of Port Arthur by Japan was extremely d i s t a s t e f u l to Russia.  The B r i t i s h ambassador had informed him that although the  B r i t i s h government shared the same point of view as to the occupation of Port Arthur, i t nevertheless declined to employ measures of force against Japan, as B r i t i s h public opinion was i n c l i n i n g more and more to the side of that nation.  Also the attitude of France and Germany  with regard to the matter remained uncertain.  Therefore he sounded  a note of caution and argued that under the circumstances the best that Russia could do was to indicate to the Japanese government, i n a f r i e n d l y way,  that the occupation of Port Arthur would be a l a s t i n g  obstacle to a restoration of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with China, and a pretext f o r the disturbance of peace i n the East.  But, before she  made such a communication to the Japanese government, Russia should be c e r t a i n that the other powers would j o i n i n expressing the same 213 apprehensions.  213.  F i r s t Steps of Russian Imperialism i n the *ar East, Krasny Archiv, Vol. L I I , Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, July, 193U, Vol. XVIII, p.p. 260-261  82 In the second memorandum, Lobanov discussed Far Eastern problems i n t h e i r larger perspective. Russia's problem was whether her aim i n future should be to make an a l l y of China or of Japan. I f Russia was s a t i s f i e d with her present p o s i t i o n i n the F a r E a s t , !  and intended to follow a more or l e s s passive p o l i c y , he s a i d that China would be the best a l l y , because, a f t e r her m i l i t a r y defeat, she would remain f o r a long time weak and i n s i g n i f i c a n t .  I f , on the  other hand, Russia desired to pursue a forward p o l i c y i n the Far Hast, and achieve her aims of an i c e - f r e e port on the P a c i f i c coast, and of the annexation of a c e r t a i n part of Manchuria - needed f o r the convenient construction of the Siberian railway - then Japan was the more suitable a l l y .  Japan, he i n s i s t e d , despite her unexpected  r i s e as a great power, would need Russian assistance against the predominant maritime influence of Great B r i t a i n .  To obtain t h i s  assistance, she would be more than w i l l i n g to meet Russia's moderate claims.  He declared that Great B r i t a i n was Russia's p r i n c i p a l and most dangerous adversary i n A s i a .  Whenever any d i f f i c u l t i e s arose  i n Asia, B r i t a i n ' s friends were always Russia's enemies and vice versa.  In the constant struggle with Russia, Great B r i t a i n was  r e l y i n g on China, as China was c h i e f l y a Land-power.  On the other  hand, since Japan was c h i e f l y a naval power, she must of necessity enter into maritime r i v a l r y , with Great B r i t a i n , at l e a s t i n her own waters. Britain.  Therefore, Japan would be useful as a check on Great  83 However, Lobanov d i d not t r u s t the Japanese and had no des i r e to see them emerge tremendously  strengthened by the war.  Ac-  cordingly, he was c a r e f u l to add t h a t Russia, i n conjunction with the other powers, and e s p e c i a l l y with Great B r i t a i n , should aim to prevent Japan from becoming predominant.in the Far East.  At the same  time, Russia must c a r e f u l l y abstain from any p o l i c y which necessitated single action against Japan, i n order not to a f f e c t future good 2lii r e l a t i o n s with that country.  On the o r i g i n a l memorandum, Czar  Nicholas noted: "Russia absolutely needs a port free and open throughout the whole year. This port must be located on the mainland (south-east of Korea) and c e r t a i n l y connected with our possessions by a s t r i p of land." 215'  On A p r i l 8, i n pursuance of t h i s p o l i c y , Lobanov suggested to the Powers that they j o i n Russia i n her protest to Japan.  The  German government, only too glad to d i v e r t Russian i n t e r e s t s from the Balkans and the f r o n t i e r of Austria, h a s t i l y agreed.  The French  government, i n order to be on the same side as i t s a l l y , Russia, 216 followed s u i t . mained aloof.  Of the European powers, Great B r i t a i n alone r e The Russians seemed to have hoped f o r B r i t i s h co-  on 7 operation up u n t i l the l a s t moment. Unfortunately, there i s no 1  2lJ+.  Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, J u l y , 193k, XVIII, p. p. 261-263  215.  Ibid., P.  216.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p. 182  217.  Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, July, Vol. XVIII, p.p. 263-261;.  263  193^,  Vol.  84 record of the actual discussion which took place i n the B r i t i s h cabinet or of the motives which prevented the B r i t i s h from j o i n i n g the other powers.  But i t can be gleaned from Queen V i c t o r i a ' s  personal correspondence  that Rosebery personally would have l i k e d  to co-operate with Russia, that t h i s involved him i n serious d i f f i c u l t i e s with h i s colleagues, and that i n the l a s t resort he f a i l e d to c a r r y them with him.  The Queen herself, overcoming her t r a d i t -  i o n a l Russophobia, regretted that Great B r i t a i n did not j o i n the other powers and wrote the Tsar to t h i s e f f e c t .  British policy  at this time has been and probably w i l l remain somewhat of a mystery.  Since Great B r i t a i n proved reluctant to a s s i s t Russia i n coercing Japan, the Russian cabinet hastened to reconsider the whole matter.  At the meeting of the S p e c i a l Committee of Ministers, the  Grand Duke A l e x i s Alexandrovich, acting,President, argued strongly f o r Russian co-operation with Japan.  He declared that Russia must  preserve good r e l a t i o n s with Japan because the l a t t e r was a strong maritime power and because her p o s i t i o n i n the P a c i f i c would always make her an enemy of B r i t a i n .  Russia must take advantage of the  present opportunity and, without p u b l i c i t y , take the side of Japan and reach an agreement with her f o r the p r o t e c t i o n of Russian i n t erests i n the Far East,  In t h i s way,  Russia, without l o s i n g any-  thing, would acquire a strong a l l y i n case of complications with  218.  Letters of Queen V i c t o r i a , Vol. I I , T h i r d Series, pp 507  497,  496,  85 Great B r i t a i n .  I f Russia, he added, should act against Japan at  t h i s juncture, she would make of her a permanent and strong enemy, and would compel Japan, by force of circumstance, to a c t i n concert with Great B r i t a i n .  Count Sergius Witte, Minister of Finance, strongly advised a course of action which ran contrary to that proposed by the Grand Duke.  Witte was much l e s s concerned with the immediate a c q u i s i t i o n  of an i c e - f r e e port than with the Russian c o n t r o l of the Chinese market, and i n the more d i s t a n t future, the p o l i t i c a l domination of China.  According to Witte, the war undertaken by Japan was a con-  sequence of the construction of the Siberian railway by Russia.  In  the p a r t i t i o n of China which was coming, Russia's chances would be increased considerably by the successful construction of t h i s r a i l way and Japan r e a l i z e d t h i s more f u l l y than d i d any of the other powers.  Therefore, the h o s t i l i t y of Japan was directed c h i e f l y at  Russia.  She (Japan) regarded the occupation of Liaotung as the  f i r s t step i n a t e r r i t o r i a l expansion that she hoped would see i t s f u l f i l m e n t with the Mikado as Chinese Emperor.  In order to prevent t h i s happening, Russia should proceed at once to declare to Japan that she could not t o l e r a t e the Japanese occupation of southern Manchuria (Liaotung peninsula).  I f Japan  should refuse to y i e l d , the Russian squadron must open h o s t i l i t i e s against the Japanese f l e e t and bombard Japanese p o r t s .  I f war  had  to come, i t was much better that i t should come now while Japan was  86 not yet f u l l y prepared f o r i t .  Besides i t was highly u n l i k e l y that  war should develop once Japan became convinced that Russia was prepared to act energetically.  Another reason f o r acting now was that  Russia was assured o f the support o f France and Germany;'- Russia, by acting thus, would acquire the role of saviour of China, and the l a t t e r would appreciate the service rendered her by Russia and agree 219 to a peaceful correction of the f r o n t i e r .  '  The Tsar s i g n i f i e d  his approval o f the stand taken by Witte and on A p r i l 17> Lobanov approached the other powers and once more asked that they support the Russian protest.  As before, Germany and France agreed, but  Great B r i t a i n declined to do so. On A p r i l 23, s i x days a f t e r the signing of the peace a t Shimanoseki, the three powers (Russia,' Germany and France) presented notes to the Japanese government i n which they advised i t i n no un22' c e r t a i n terms to renounce possession of the peninsula of Liaotung. " The Japanese assistant foreign minister, Hayashi, future Japanese ambassador t o London, asked f o r time to enable the Japanese government to reach a decision. days.  There then followed a number o f anxious  Staal was a f r a i d that Japan might r e j e c t the demand of the  Powers, and that i n the event of m i l i t a r y force becoming necessary, 219.  Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, July, V o l . XVIII p.p. 268-272  220.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialismg; V o l . I, p.p.  221.  Ibid., p. 186  1934,  184-185  87 Great B r i t a i n might go to the assistance of Japan.  222  Happily f o r  the future of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s , such a contingency was out when, on May 5,  ruled  the Japanese government yielded completely to  the demands of the Powers.  Following the surrender on the part of  Japan, Lobanov, s t i l l b e l i e v i n g that England was the c h i e f enemy of Russia, declared that China must be made dependent on Russia, 223 and thus drawn away from England.  ^  Russia was determined that,  having taken the r o l e of saviour of China (from Japan) i t should use t h i s r o l e as a means to lessen B r i t i s h influence i n China. In (June, 1895,  the Rosebery government f e l l from o f f i c e ,  and was replaced by a Conservative-Unionist ministry under Lord Salisbury.  Rosebery had l e f t to Salisbury the p o l i c y of an attempt  to co-operate with Russia.  Salisbury was to seek to broaden t h i s  aim and give i t more substantial b a s i s .  The p o l i c y of splendid  i s o l a t i o n , i f i t ever had existed, was c l e a r l y becoming inadequate i n the face of growing c o l o n i a l r i v a l r y with France and Germany. These powers had begun to invade the vast preserves of B r i t i s h enterprise, and to r i v a l Great B r i t a i n i n the scramble f o r A f r i c a . The Germans, i n p a r t i c u l a r , were proving more s k i l f u l and more dangerous r i v a l s of the B r i t i s h than ever the Russians had been. As a result of these developments,  the Conservative government of  222.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p. 186  223.  Ibid., p. 187  88 Lord Salisbury was to s t r i v e , slowly and cautiously, to improve B r i t i s h foreign r e l a t i o n s , as w e l l as to a l t e r t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l orientation.  From- a B r i t i s h point of view, never since the period  of the Napoleonic Wars was the time more propitious f o r an AngloRussian understanding.  This new s i t u a t i o n was to be met by a res-  ponsive Salisbury, and, some time a f t e r , by a responsive  ...  country.  89 THE SURVIVAL OF AN IDEA  1896 -  1905  The Conservatives under Salisbury had come i n t o power i n June, 1895.  Six months a f t e r t h i s , there occurred the unfortunate  incident of the Kruger telegram.  On January 3, I896, Kaiser W i l -  liam sent a telegram to President Kruger of the Transvaal Republic. In this telegram he congratulated him on the stand he had taken i n the Jameson r a i d  22lj  T h e telegram widened the breach already e x i s t i n g  i n Anglo-German r e l a t i o n s .  When Salisbury had become prime minister  once more, many German and Austrian diplomats believed he would seek to establish once more the o l d connection between Great B r i t a i n and the T r i p l e A l l i a n c e of the Bismarckian era. became a v i r t u a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y .  Such a p o s s i b i l i t y  The Kruger telegram had  now  outraged  B r i t i s h public opinion and concentrated on Germany the resentment and hate which had formerly been f e l t towards France and Russia.  Early i n January, I896, Goluchowski, the new Austrian f o r eign minister, instructed Deym, Austrian ambassador i n London, to sound Salisbury i n regard to the p o s s i b i l i t y of strengthening the Mediterranean Agreement of 1887.  In Vienna, i t was  fondly believed  •--»«»  that the prevention of Russia from gaining c o n t r o l of the S t r a i t s 225* s t i l l constituted a major axiom of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y .  22k.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p.  225.  Walters, Eurof, Lord Salisbury's Refusal to Revise and Renew the Mediterranean Agreements, Slavonic Review, Dec. 1950, p.268  237  90  In h i s f i r s t interviews with Salisbury, Deym found the l a t t e r sympathetic and a t t e n t i v e .  Deym then hastened to mention the  Austrian suggestion f o r a r e v i s i o n o f the A r t i c l e dealing with the defence of the S t r a i t s .  He met with the c o o l response that the  circumstances under which Constantinople would have to be defended had m a t e r i a l l y changed.  In h i s next interview, Deym was confronted  by an even more d r a s t i c change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y .  Salisbury stated  that he would consider the renewal of the Accord only i n a form which would not oblige Great B r i t a i n to go to war. This was indeed a s i g n i f i c a n t r e t r e a t , not only destroying the bases of the Agreement of December, 1887, but also by implication weakening the o r i g i n a l mil& agreement between the three countries A u s t r i a ) , arrived a t i n the previous March.  (Great Britain,. I t a l y ,  Salisbury emphasized  that the governing f a c t o r behind h i s decision not to renew the agreement was the state of B r i t i s h public opinion.  Mien Vienna  learned o f Salisbury's stand, negotiations were discontinued.  The  significance of Salisbury's decision i s to be seen i n the f a c t that Great B r i t a i n was slowly but surely i n d i c a t i n g to Russia, i f only i n a negative way, that the f a t e of the S t r a i t s was no longer o f paramount i n t e r e s t to her.  Meanwhile there were other forces at work i n Great B r i t a i n seeking to promote a better understanding with Russia.  One o f the  most enthusiastic proponents of Anglo-Russian friendship turned out  226.  Walters,"Salisbury's Refusal to Revise & Renew the Medit- \/ erranean Agreement^p-gfeb $Igvon \& RgyieVy De&g»nh8T iHgo«VohMX j>«8.Ci 1  >  }  t  91 •fee-fee the able B r i t i s h p o l i t i c a l leader, Joseph Chamberlain.  The  more Chamberlain r e f l e c t e d , the more he became convinced of the p o s s i b i l i t y of Anglo-Russian co-operation. He expressed these views to Staal and declared to him that "Great B r i t a i n and Russia were not separated by any i r r e c o n c i l a b l e i n t e r e s t s .  Russia was vast enough  not to be i n c l i n e d to c o l o n i a l expansion, so that consequently no serious r i v a l r y was able to spring up between i t and Great B r i t a i n , and an entente between the two countries was a valuable pledge to 227 bring forward to the cause of peace and c i v i l i z a t i o n .  Staal,  for h i s part, assured Chamberlain that Russia would not f a i l to reciprocate h i s sentiments f o r an agreement.  I t should be noted that  Staal, despite h i s f r i e n d l y assurances, was c a r e f u l not to commit  228 himself or h i s government too deeply to either  man.  On the l a s t day of August, I896, Salisbury wrote a l e t t e r to a close f r i e n d , Iwan-Muller.  In t h i s l e t t e r he b r i e f l y reviewed  B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y from the time o f Palmerston with respect to France and Russia.  He attacK«d Palmerston f o r shaping his foreign  p o l i c y according to p o l i t i c a l p r o c l i v i t i e s .  He argued that Palmer-  ston' s mistake had been to court France excessively and to unnecess a r i l y antagonize Russia.  He then went on to demand what had been  the results of Palmerston*s p o l i c y and answered:  227.  Meyendorff, Baron Alexander: Correspondence Diplomatique de M. de Staal,&l88l|-1900, L i b r a i r i e des Sciences, Paris, 1929 Vol. I I , no. 6, p. 309  228.  Loc. c i t .  92 "We have not kept France, - she i s more our enemy than ever. But the feud with Russia remains....If we had only l i s t e n e d to the Emperor Nicholas when he spoke to S i r Hamilton Seymour, what a pleasanter outlook would we meet when we contemplate the continent of Europe. I t i s much easier to lament than to repair. I t may not be possible f o r England and Russia to return to t h e i r old r e l a t i o n s . But i t i s an object to be wished f o r and approached as opportunity o f f e r s . At a l l events, e f f o r t s should be made to avoid needless aggravation > of tiie feud between them, which the government and not the nations have made. The French and German people both hate usj the Russian people do not.. I t i s not possible to stop the impulse which past mistakes have given... . A l l we can do i s t r y to narrow the chasm that separates us. I t i s the best chance f o r something l i k e an equilibrium of Europe."229  About this time, the new v i s i t to Great B r i t a i n . month of September,  I896,  Tsar, Nicholas I I , paid an o f f i c i a l  During h i s v i s i t , i n the l a t t e r part of the the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo-Russian  reement was given further discussion.  ag-  Lord S a l i s b u r y went to Bal-  moral and had a long t a l k with the young Czar.  The l a t t e r declared  his willingness to work i n harmony with Great B r i t a i n i n a general way.  He said that Great B r i t a i n should entertain'no fears i n regard  to India, as Russia desired nothing there.  He admitted "only a  single theme of f r i c t i o n between the two countries - the opening of the Dardanelles to Russian ships, which he deemed a matter of primary  importance".^  0  But when Queen V i c t o r i a made e f f o r t s to tempt  him with the prospect of concessions i n the matter of the S t r a i t s ,  229.  Gooch, G.P., and Temperley, Harold, eds., B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, London, 1930, V o l . VI, Appendix XV> p. 780. This c o l l e c t i o n w i l l hereafter be indicated by the i n i t i a l s , B.D.  230.  Lee, Sidney, King Edward VII, V o l . I, p.  696  93 231 the Tsar was c a r e f u l to avoid discussion on t h i s v i t a l question. •* Over a month l a t e r , at the Lord Mayor's banquet on November 93 Salisbury r e p l i e d to remarks made i n the Hamburg^*' Nanhrir.hten, a paper under Bismarck's influence.  This paper had stated that  the antagonism between Great B r i t a i n and Russia was a f i x e d feature i n the e x i s t i n g p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .  Salisbury, i n sharp contradic-  t i o n , stated that Great B r i t a i n and Russia would be able to s e t t l e t h e i r differences by mutual agreement, and went on to say that i t was a "superstition of antiquated diplomacy that there i s any nec232 essary antagonism between Great B r i t a i n and Russia.™ 1897,  Early i n  i n condemning the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of the Crimean "War and the  Congress of B e r l i n , Salisbury made the famous remark that Great 233 B r i t a i n "had put her money on the wrong horse." Throughout the years  1895 - I897,  been going on within the Ottoman Empire.  a b i t t e r c o n f l i c t had This was caused by the  a c t i v i t i e s of the Armenian revolutionaries, the Dashnyaks, who advocated the s e t t i n g up of an autonomous Armenia by v i o l e n t means, and  23k by subsequent massacres of Armenians by the incensed Turks.  231.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, V o l . I, p. 292  232.  Ibid., p. 335  233.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P., The Anglo Russian Convention of 1907, p. 17  23J+.  For an excellent study of the background of the Armenian question and i t s e f f e c t on the relations of the great powers see: Sarkissian, A.O., History of the Armenian .Question To fflfc". University of I l l i n o i s Studies i n S o c i a l Sciences, 1938, p.p. 7 - 15*1  /  9k Public opinion throughout Great B r i t a i n urged the powers to take co-  235 ercive action and force the Sultan to reform h i s empire.  From  the evidence at our disposal, i t seems that Salisbury, along with h i s f r i e n d l y overtures of a general nature, may have hinted to the Russian government that now was  the time f o r Great B r i t a i n and  Russia to s e t t l e the Near Eastern question according to t h e i r l i k i n g . There are even indications that he intimated that Great B r i t a i n would be prepared to see Russia at the S t r a i t s and i n possession of Constantinople. ^ 2  I f Great B r i t a i n was  eager f o r an understanding with Russia,  what then prevented i t ? The f a i l u r e to secure an understanding l i e s i n part with the attitude of Russia.  The Russian d i s t r u s t of B r i t -  i s h p o l i c y during the period of Lobanov had proven as great i f not greater than the B r i t i s h d i s t r u s t of Russian p o l i c y during the period of D i s r a e l i .  While Giers might have been w i l l i n g had a suitable  opportunity presented i t s e l f , to work f o r an understanding with Great B r i t a i n , the same cannot be said of Lobanov.  Queen V i c t o r i a ' s  statement that he was a great misfortune" was true as regards M  Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s . ^ 2  Although the idea seems to have crossed  lobanov*s mind, i t i s doubtful whether he ever s e r i o u s l y contemplated forming a continental c o a l i t i o n against Great B r i t a i n .  His p o l i c y  235.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Russia, p.  236.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. I, p.p.  237.  Buckle, G.E. ed., The L e t t e r s of Queen V i c t o r i a , London, John Murray, 1932, Third Series, Vol. I H , p. 51  195  292-293, 328  95" was to reach a f r i e n d l y understanding with Austria-Hungary i n regard to the Near Eastern a f f a i r s , - t o strengthen Russian influence by d i p lomatic means at Constantinople, but at the same time to cease the t r a d i t i o n a l Russian p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y i n the Balkan peninsula, and 238 to s h i f t the centre of Russian interests to the F a r East. ^  Lob-  anov could never r i d himself of the suspicion that Salisbury's v e i l e d offers to Russia i n regard to the Near East were but an a t tempt to get Russia involved so that Great B r i t a i n might c a r r y out her own designs and thus f r u s t r a t e those of Russia i n the Far East. Besides, Salisbury had as yet made no d e f i n i t e proposals and u n t i l he d i d , i n Lobanov's opinion, i t behuuved Russia -to regard Great B r i t a i n as her c h i e f enemy. Lobanov died i n August, 1896, but h i s successor, Muraviev, was to continue h i s p o l i c y , though i n a much l e s s s k i l f u l manner. In carrying out the p o l i c y advocated by Lobanov, Muraviev i n the spring of 1897 concluded an agreement with Austria-Hungary pect to the Balkans.  i n res-  Goluchowski, Austrian foreign minister, had  l i t t l e love f o r Russia, but Great B r i t a i n ' s reluctance to renew the Mediterranean Agreement of 1887 had l e f t him alone and helpless i n face of growing German pressure to reach an agreement with Russia. He acquiesced as a r e s u l t of t h i s pressure, and i n A p r i l , 1897,  he  went to St. Petersburg f o r the purpose of reaching an understanding.  2^8.  Rosen, Baron, Forty Years of Diplomacy, London, George A l l e n & Unwin, Ltd., 1922, V o l . I I , p.p. 103-106, 108-109, 124-127, 134-141.  96 in  the agreement which was signed i n May, both countries bound them-  selves to maintain the status quo i n the Balkans and to mutually abandon a l l ideas of conquest t h e r e . ^  This new Austro-Russian  2  Agreement received the enthusiastic endorsement of Germany.  Both  Germany and A u s t r i a took pains to encourage Russian expansion i n the Far East so that her a t t e n t i o n might be permanently d i s t r a c t e d from Europe.  In encouragement, Kaiser William excelled a l l others,  writing t o Czar Nicholas that "the great task of the future f o r Russia i s t o c u l t i v a t e the Asian continent and defend Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow  Race." ^ 2  In s t i l l another respect - h o s t i l i t y towards Great  Britain  - Muraviev's ideas on f o r e i g n p o l i c y coincided with those of Lobanov. On J u l y k, 1897, Prince Radolin, German ambassador i n St. Petersburg, reported that " i f there was then any c e r t a i n feature i n the phys?iil iognomy of Russian p o l i c y , i t was opposition to England." ^  -A-  short ^Ewo months l a t e r , Muraviev i n s t r u c t e d General.Obrutcheff t o t e l l Bulow, German foreign minister, that he s t i l l regarded England  2ii2 as the c h i e f a d v e r s a r y . ^  Czar Nicholas a t t h i s time shared the  f e e l i n g of h i s f o r e i g n minister and expressed  to Prince Hohenlohe  239.  Pribram, A.F., The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary, Cambridge, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1920, V o l . I, p.p. 18U-195*  2I4.O.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Eussia, p.p. I96  -197 2kl,  Giffen, M.B., Fashoda, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, I l l i n o i s  1930, p. 166 2i+2.  Loc. c i t .  97 his b e l i e f that the E n g l i s h were responsible f o r the revolutionary  243 movement i n Armenia and the trouble which had ensued.  Later the  Tsar expressed to Bulow the wish that he might l i v e to see England turned out of Egypt.  Despite these genuine Anglophobe f e e l i n g s ,  neither Muraviev nor h i s r o y a l master Nicholas were disposed to lend any p r a c t i c a l a i d to t h e i r a l l y France throughout her dispute with Great B r i t a i n over Fashoda.  ^  In the meantime, dissensions between Great B r i t a i n and Russia i n China, which had grown following the peace t r e a t y of Shimanoseki and the subsequent humiliation of Japan, were rendered more acute.  On November 14, 1897,  a German naval squadron seized  Kiachow, a port on the Chinese coast.  This was followed on November  14 by the despatch of some Russian warships to Port Arthur to winter  ?li6 there - so Muraviev f i r s t declared.  The B r i t i s h f o r t h e i r part  were quick to foresee that the Russian occupation of Port Arthur 2ii7 was apt to develop i n t o a permanent one.  I t was j u s t at t h i s  c r i t i c a l moment i n the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries that S a l isbury paradoxically enough abandoned h i s former reserve and caution 243.  Curtius, F r i e d r i c h , ed., Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of Hohenlohe-Schillingsfuerst, London, William Heinemann, 1906, Vol. I I , p. 969.  244.  Giffen, Fashoda, p.  245.  I b i d . , Chapter IX, p.p. 159-184  246.  B.D.  I, no. 1, p. 2; no.2,  247.  B.D.  I, no. 4, p.p.  166  4-5  p. 3  98  and decided to t r y to reach a d i r e c t agreement with Russia. The reasons which prompted Salisbury to seek an arrangement with Russia at t h i s c r i t i c a l period w i l l probably remain forever obscure. I t can hardly be imagined that h i s keen eye f a i l e d , to note the strong Russophile sympathies of many i n f l u e n t i a l elements i n B r i t i s h public opinion, as r e f l e c t e d by p o l i t i c a l writers i n the F o r t n i g h t l y and Contemporary Reviews, as well as other p a p e r s . * ^ motives may have been, Salisbury on January 17,  Whatever his  I898,  dispatched a  telegram of unusual b r e v i t y t o S i r Nicholas 0'Conor, B r i t i s h ambassador i n St. Petersburg, i n which he expressed the desire that i f i t were practicable, O'Conor should sound out Witte as t o the pos249  s i b i l i t y of England and Russia working together i n China.  Sal-  isbury then continued: "We would go f a r to further Russian  commercial  objects i n the North i f we could regard her ars w i l l i n g to work with us.  Here we have, a f t e r many years, the f i r s t d e f i n i t e B r i t i s h  proposal f o r an agreement with Russia.  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g too that  Salisbury should advise 0*Conor to interview Witte rather than Muraviev on the matter.  Salisbury c l e a r l y discerned that although  nominally only Finance Minister, Witte was the r e a l force behind the Russian government.  S i r Nicholas, however, thought i t more t a c t f u l  to f o l l o w tko expressed rule of- diplomatic etiquette and f i r s t saw 2i|.8.  Gambier, Capt. J.W., R.N., England and the European Concert, Fortnightly Review, LXII, July, 1897, p.p. 5 7 - 6 5 . D i l l o n , E.J., The New P o l i t i c a l Era, Contemporary Review, LXXII, November, 1897, p.p. 609 - 631.  249.  B.D. I, no. 5, p. 5.  250.  Loc. c i t .  99 Muraviev before proceeding to "Witte.  In h i s interview with Muraviev,  S i r Nicholas said that an understanding, to be r e a l l y e f f e c t i v e , ought not t o be confined to questions a f f e c t i n g the Far East, but should cover the general area of B r i t i s h - Russian i n t e r e s t s .  Mur-  aviev, beyond discussing the sphere of influence which Russia desired i n China - a sphere extending from T i e n t s i n northwards into Manchuria, - was c a r e f u l not to make any d e f i n i t e proposals.  But  he d i d express himself as favourable to the idea of a c l o s e r understanding with Great B r i t a i n . aviev, O'Connor met Witte.  Following h i s interview with MurWitte declared himself i n favour of an  Anglo-Russian a l l i a n c e as he c a l l e d i t , and said that he was  ready  to support England's commercial p o l i c y i n the Yangtze v a l l e y , pro-  25" vided that England would not impede Russian ambitions i n the North. Meanwhile, Salisbury further defined h i s p o s i t i o n as regards negotiations with Russia.  On January 25,  1898, i n a dispatch  to O'Connor, he stated: "Our idea was t h i s . The two Empires of China and Turkey are so weak that i n a l l important matters they are constantly guided by the advice of f o r eign powers. In giving t h i s advice, Russia and England are constantly opposed, n e u t r a l i z i n g each o t h e r s e f f o r t s much more frequently than the r e a l antagonism of t h e i r i n t e r e s t s would j u s t i f y ; and t h i s condition of things i s not l i k e l y to diminish, but to increase. I t i s to remove or lessen t h i s e v i l that we have thought an understanding with Russia might benefit both nations.... 1  6  251.  B.D.  I, no. 6, p.  252.  B.D.  I, no. 8, p. 7.  100  I t i s evident that both i n respect to Turkey and China there are large portions which i n t e r e s t Russia much more than England and vice versa. Merely as an i l l u s t r a t i o n , and binding myself to nothing, I would say that the portion of Turkey which drains i n t o the Black Sea, together with the drainage v a l l e y of the Euphrates as f a r as Bagdad, i n t e r e s t s Russia much more than England; whereas Turkish A f r i c a , Arabia, and the v a l l e y of the Euphrates below Bagdad i n t e r e s t England much more than Russia. A s i m i l a r d i s t i n c t i o n exi s t s i n China between the v a l l e y of the Hoangho with t e r r i t o r y north of i t and the v a l l e y of the Yangtze."253 Salisbury's proposal, coming a t t h i s time, was exceedinly welcome to the Russians f o r two reasons.  The growing animosity between Rus-  s i a and Japan was causing the Russian foreign o f f i c e some worry l e s t England should form a m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e with Japan, d i r e c t e d against Russia. -^ 2  At the same time, the Russians dreaded any complications  i n the Far East with the Powers before the Transiberian r a i l r o a d  255 was  completed. Accordingly, Muraviev t o l d the Czar that Salisbury's pro-  posal was valuable and that he advised i t s acceptance on the basis of a d i v i s i o n of China into spheres of influence, so that Russian i n t e r ests would predominate i n the region north, of the Yellow River, with B r i t i s h interests supreme i n the Yangtze basin.  Muraviev f e l t that  such an agreement would prevent the B r i t i s h from i n t e r f e r i n g a t a l l  256 i n the a f f a i r s of North China.  Tsar Nicholas gave h i s approval  253.  B.D.I, no. 9, p. 8  251;.  B.D.I, no. 8, p. 7  255.  B.D.I, no. 6, p. 6  256.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo Russian Convention of 1907, p. 21  .101 f o r the inauguration of discussions on t h i s basis but added s i g n i f i c antly: "Unfortunately, I am not convinced of the favourable outcome of such an arrangement with England, that (by i t ) a l l our i n t e r e s t s i n the Far East w i l l be taken into account." 257  i-  At t h i s point, two other questions which further complicated matters arose.  During the discussions Muraviev was i l l ,  Lamsdorff, h i s assistant, took h i s place.  and Count  The f i r s t question con-  cerned the p o s s i b i l i t y of a new B r i t i s h loan to China.  In 1896,  China had obtained a loan from an Anglo-German syndicate. In 1897, negotiations had been resumed between the syndicate and the Chinese government f o r a further loan, against which the Russian government had protested vehemently to Peking, even to the point of threatening 259 r e t a l i a t o r y action.  The loan was s t i l l hanging f i r e when S a l i s -  bury made h i s f i r s t overture to Russia.  As a r e s u l t , 0'Conor sought  to persuade the Russian government to withdraw the objections to a B r i t i s h loan to China. On February 12, 0'Conor presented the Russian foreign off i c e with a note which was a resume of Anglo-Russian negotiations as f a r as they had gone.  Lamsdorff, who had now taken over from the  a i l i n g Muraviev, had i n the meantime secured the Czar's consent to  257.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo Russian Convention of 1907, footnote, p. 21  25-8.  Ibid., p.  259.  B.D. I, no. 1, p. 2  260.  B.D. I, no. 11, p. 0  22  102 consider the conditions f o r a B r i t i s h loan to China, and to present t  Russian counter-demands f o r t h i s p o s s i b l e concession to Great Britain.' These Russian counter-demands produced the second obstacle to the reaching of an agreement.  On February 16, Lamsdorff informed  0'Conor that as Russia needed an i c e - f r e e commercial outlet, she i n tended to lease Port Arthur and nearby Tailianwan f o r an i n d e f i n i t e period of time.  0'Conor was quick to state that the Russian demands  were "quite disproportionate and of a t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t nature to 262 those preferred by Her Majesty's government."  As a r e s u l t of t h i s  Russian decision, the B r i t i s h government showed signs of wavering i n i t s desire to reach an agreement.  S t i l l another cause f o r B r i t i s h  lukewarmness was the f a c t that China was showing increasing w i l l i n g ness to consider a j o i n t Anglci-German loan.  On March 1, 1898, a  d e f i n i t e agreement f o r t h i s loan was signed. At the next meeting, Lamsdorff informed 0'Conor that the Tsar was extremely displeased upon learning of the Anglo-German loan to China and that, as a r e s u l t , the Czar d i d not wish f o r the moment to pursue the discussions f o r an Anglo-Russian understanding.^^  In  Staal's memoirs the Czar's reaction i s described i n even stronger terms.  I t i s there stated: "The loan concluded i n accord with Germany  261.  B.D.,  I, no.  17,  p.p.  262.  B.D.,  I, no.  18,  p. II4  263.  B.D.,  I, no. 22, p.  16  13-lU  103 to the exclusion of Russia, indisposed Emperor Nicholas so strongly that he repulsed the overtures f o r an arrangement respecting the a f f a i r s of China and Turkey which Lord Salisbury had s k e t c h e d " . ^ * - 0'Conor himself admitted that i t would probably be d i f f i c u l t f o r the . Emperor Nicholas to entertain f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s toward Great B r i t a i n following the B r i t i s h success i n China.  J  A f t e r 0'Conor's interview  with Lamsdorff on March 3, the Russians suspended negotiations and the f i r s t d e f i n i t e attempt a t an Anglo-Russian rapprochment came t o an end.  From the evidence a t our disposal, i t seems that neither party pressed ±oo eagerly f o r an agreement.  Both would have desired i t , i f  i t could have been had without conceding o r abandoning any v i t a l i n t erests to the other party.  However, both s t i l l f e l t too sure of t h e i r  p o s i t i o n as great powers to f e e l the need of help i n maintaining that position.  1  Both Salisbury and 0'Conor were d i s t r u s t f u l o f Russian aims  i n the F a r East as w e l l as elsewhere, and i n view of the Russian occupation o f Fort Arthur, i t i s d i f f i c u l t to see how they c o u l d have f a i l e d to be suspicious.  I n the midst o f the British-Russian negot-  i a t i o n s , Salisbury had informed h i s ambassador i n China, S i r Claude MacDonald,that  "We have had some interchange of f r i e n d l y language a t  26k,  Meyendorff, Correspondence Diplomatique, V o l . I I , footnote 1, p. 359.  265.  B.D. I , no. 22, p. 16.  lok St. Petersburg, but they are insincere, and t h e i r language i s ambig-  266 uous".  0'Conor had, from the beginning, warned h i s government that  i t must take care to reach a d e f i n i t e understanding with Russia, an understanding which would not be set aside by that country when she f e l t i t had served i t s temporary purpose.  At the same time he had  transmitted to the B r i t i s h Foreign O f f i c e extracts from the Petersburgs k i a Viedemosti, an i n f l u e n t i a l Russian paper edited by Prince Esper Ukhtomskii, a personal f r i e n d of Czar Nicholas, and a mystical believer nf.fi  i n Russia's destiny to l e a d A s i a .  According to the Viedemosti,  Russia had "a mission i n A s i a . . . " and the power to destroy B r i t i s h r u l e in India."  2 6 9  .  very  The Russians f o r t h e i r p a r t seem to have been made not •tee'unhappy by the f a i l u r e of the negotiations. Rather there seemed a r e l i e f i n c e r t a i n Russian quarters a t having escaped from the l i m i t a t i o n s that an agreement with England would have thrust upon them.  Many Russians  f e l t that England desired to reach an entente with Russia only i n order that she might i n a l e g a l way hamper Russian expansion i n the Far East, C e r t a i n l y Czar Nicholas had t h i s i n mind when he wrote Kaiser William to the e f f e c t that the B r i t i s h proposals were: "of such a new character that I must say we were  266.  B.D.  I, no. 15, p.  11.  267.  B.D.  I, no. 6, p. 6.  268.  For an i n t e r e s t i n g a r t i c l e discussing the Prince and the views he championed, see Rees, J.R.,"The Tsar's Friend", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, V o l . LXIX, A p r i l , 1901, p.p. 612-622.  269.  Kennedy, A.L., Salisbury, London, John Murray, 1953 pp. 37V275  105 quite amazed and yet t h e i r very nature seemed suspicious to us; never before had England made such o f f e r s t o Russia. That showed us c l e a r l y that England needed our friendship a t that time to be able to check our development i n a masked way i n the Far East." 270  Added to t h i s was the f a c t that Russia was r i d i n g on the c r e s t of a wave of p o l i t i c a l prosperity.  The diplomatic legacy be-  queathed her by Lobanov had been a sound one.  The s o c i a l structure  of the country had not been shaken diaajtruugly by any foreign wars. In a l e t t e r to Theodore Roosevelt a t t h i s period, S i r C e c i l Spring Rice, a B r i t i s h diplomat? remarked: "We a l l seem to be struggling f o r the honour of k i s s i n g the Czar's f e e t . Germany i s as s e r v i l e as France and ( i f i t weren't so evidently useless) I shouldn't be surprised i f England would be as s e r v i l e as Germany. Russia alone i s s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and invulnerable. Russia alone can bide her time." 271 I f Russia was able to impress foreign observers i n such a manner, i t can e a s i l y be seen that Great B r i t a i n would have to pay a high p r i c e f o r an o v e r a l l agreement with t h i s growing giant of Eurasia* A f t e r the f a i l u r e of discussions with the B r i t i s h government, Russia proceeded to take a c t i o n i n China.  The Russian government de-  manded of the Chinese government that i t should lease Port Arthur and Talianwan to Russia.  The Chinese, although protesting, i n the end  270.  Langer, Diplomacy o f Imperialism, Vol. I I , p. 1*70  271.  Gwynn, Stephen, ed., The Letters and Friendships of S i r C e c i l Spring Rice, London, Constable & Co., 192°, V o l . I, p. 210  106 granted the Russian demands, and i n March, 1898,  leased these places  272  to Russia f o r twenty-five years. The B r i t i s h government now decided that i t must obtain compensation f o r the l e a s i n g of Port Arthur to Russia.  Accordingly the  B r i t i s h , through the use of extreme pressure, obliged the Tsung-liYamen, the board f o r Foreign A f f a i r s of China, to lease the harbour of Weihaiwei to Great B r i t a i n upon the same conditions as Russia had tained the l e a s i n g of Port A r t h u r . ^ 2  ob-  Although they had alienated the  ef> Welhafwei Chinese by this? seizure, the B r i t i s h f e l t that the balance of power i n the Gulf of P e c h i l i , upset by the Russian seizure of Port Arthur,  was  27li restored by t h i s move. In J u l y , 1898, S i r Charles Scott replaced S i r Nicholas 0$ConT*or as B r i t i s h ambassador i n St. Petersburg.  With t h i s change i n am-  bassadors, the B r i t i s h resolved once more to t r y to reach an understanding with Russia, but t h i s time of a much more l i m i t e d nature.  When  the o r i g i n a l Russian negotiations had broken down, Chamberlain had turned to Germany with proposals f o r a defensive a l l i a n c e . s t i l l another attempt to end B r i t a i n ' s i s o l a t i o n .  This was  Bat these negot-  i a t i o n s f a i l e d , owing to the i n d i f f e r e n c e of the German Foreign O f f i c e ,  272.  B.D.  I, no. I4I, p.p. 27-29.  273.  B.D. I, no. Ul, p.p. 29-30. . The f u l l text of t h i s agreement i s to be found i n B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, XC, p.p. 16-18.  27li.  B.D. I, no. U7, p. 31  107 and -to %he excessive demands of- that body.  I898,  As a result, by July,  British statesmen were ready to resume negotiations with Russia,  The British now made the modest proposal to the Russian government that the two countries attempt to reach an agreement upon the granting of railway concessions i n C h i n a . ^ 27  Even the Czar f e l t i t would be 277  possible to reach an understanding of such a limited nature. Finally, after nearly a year of negotiations, an agreement was reached at St. Petersburg on A p r i l 28, I899. According to this agreement, the Wis to British sphere i n China comprised the langtse basin, while the Russian sphere, although not clearly defined, was located i n Manchuria. She Bbi-h  -their  oae powers promised not to seek any railroad concessions, either on £ b s •their own behalf or for i t s subjects i n the region designated for the other. Both powers declared emphatically that they had no intention of i n 278  fringing the sovereign rights of China.  Although the Russians them-  selves were extremely sceptical of the value of this agreement with Great B r i t a i n ,  2 7 9  i t was nevertheless the f i r s t definite step i n the  direction of a closer understanding between the two countries. Despite the readiness of Great Britain for a wide under-  275.  Garvin, J . L . , The Life of Joseph Chamberlain, MacMillan & C o . , London, 193U, Vol. I l l , Chapter LVIII, p.p. 25V277. Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism, Vol. I I , Chap. XV, pp. 25U277 .  276.  Churchill, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 28.  277.  Loc. c i t .  278.  British and Foreign State Papers, XCI, p.p. 91-94  279.  Churchill, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p i 32.  108 standing, the Russians showed not d e s i r e to pursue the matter f u r t h e r than the l i m i t e d agreement already concluded, and when Great B r i t a i n became absorbed i n her struggle with the Boers i n South A f r i c a , t h i s ' reluctance on the part o f Muraviev changed i n t o an attitude o f h o s t i l i t y . This h o s t i l e attitude took two forms: Muraviev sought a continental c o a l i t i o n directed against Great B r i t a i n , and a t the same time he considered what gains Russia could make i n d i f f e r e n t regions o f the world now that e f f e c t i v e B r i t i s h objections were out of the question.  Even before the outbreak o f the Boer war, Muraviev had begun h i s attempt to form a continental c o a l i t i o n .  During a hasty v i s i t t o  the Queen-Regent of Spain on October It, 1899, Muraviev declared to S i l v e l a , the Spanish Prime Minister, that "the time had a r r i v e d when i t became necessary f o r the powers of Europe to take common action against the ever-increasing aggressions and expansion o f England." *^ 2  He added there was every i n d i c a t i o n of "an ultimate agreement between Russia, France and Germany f o r t h i s purpose, from which Spain should  981 not stand a l o o f . "  But when Muraviev a r r i v e d i n Paris, he found the  s i t u a t i o n not nearly so favourable to the formation o f a continental c o a l i t i o n as he had imagined.  Delcasse, the French foreign minister,  at once informed Muraviev that the best p o l i c y which France could follow was "to keep on a f r i a n d l y f o o t i n g with England". ** 2  280.  B.D. I, no.  281.  Loc. c i t .  282.  B.D. I , no.  287, p. 23U.  29k, p. 239.  2  As a r e -  109  s u i t of t h i s , Muraviev returned t o St. Petersburg a s o r e l y disappointed man, and nothing more was done during 1899 coalition.  towards an a n t i - B r i t i s h  News of these diplomatic maneuvers on the part of Muraviev  seemed t o have reached the English, and d i d nothing to improve the tenor o f the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries.  But with the coming of the new century, Muraviev,  still  nursing h i s hatred f o r Great B r i t a i n , persevered i n h i s design. On January 12, 1900, Count Osten-Sacken,  the Russian ambassador a t B e r l i n ,  inquired whether the German government would be prepared to take up a common p o s i t i o n against Great B r i t a i n should that power close the H)elage4 Bay harbour to arms destined f o r the Boers.  Bulow declared  that Germany was unwilling to take any such s t a n d . ^ 2  However,  Muraviev remained hopeful, and i n February dispatched a d e f i n i t e proposal t o B e r l i n .  This proposal, made a f t e r the f i r s t important B r i t i s h  v i c t o r i e s of the South A f r i c a n war, stated that the time had come f o r the governments of Europe to j o i n i n f r i e n d l y pressure upon Great B r i t a i n to put a stop to the bloody destruction of the Boer Republic. Provided the governments of Germany and France were i n accord with Russia i n t h i s idea, the Russian government would co-operate with them i n measures which would be i n keeping with the humanitarian p r i n -  285 c i p l e s of the recent Hague Conference.  283.  Diplomaticus, "Count Muraviev s Indiscretion", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, LXVI, December, 1899, p.p. 1036-10145.  28h.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907, p. 36  285.  Ibid., p. 37.  1  110  Although i t seems to have weighed the idea with considerable care, the German government r e s o l u t e l y refused to take the i n i t i a t i v e i n approaching Great B r i t a i n .  In i t s r e p l y t o Russia, 4* i r o n i c a l l y  pointed out that i n view of the existing r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and Russia, i t was much more appropriate that Russia should i n i t i a t e such a c t i o n .  c  As a r e s u l t of B r i t i s h v i c t o r i e s i n South A f r i c a  at the end of March, 1900, Muraviev was f o r c e d to abandon a l l plans f o r interference and the whole scheme f e l l through, with the Tsar of Russia informing the Boer representative, Br. Leyds, that "both on f i n a n c i a l and on p o l i t i c a l grounds, Russia could not i n t e r f e r e with England i n ' South A f r i c a . "  2 8 7  Throughout  the e a r l i e r months of the year, Muraviev, i n con-  junction with other Russian ministers, had drawn up a singular- memorandum which deserves some attention.  The purpose of t h i s memorandum  was to suggest the possible t e r r i t o r i a l acquisitions Russia could make while Great B r i t a i n was absorbed elsewhere. Muraviev argued that, i n the hour of Great B r i t a i n ' s d i s t r e s s , Russia's most suitable f i e l d of expansion l a y i n the Far East.  Acting  upon the recommendation of Admiral Tyrtov, Muraviev declared that i t should be the aim of Russian foreign p o l i c y t o acquire one of the Korean ports, such as Masamp, which could be turned i n t o a naval base as  286.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  287.  B.D. I, no. 321, p.  258.  p.  38  Ill important as Port Arthur o r Vladivostok.  In carrying out the p o l i c y  l a i d down i n the memorandum, Muraviev forced the Korean government, by an agreement signed on March 30, 1900, to grant a concession of land for  a Russian c o a l depot and a naval h o s p i t a l near Masampo, which con-  s t i t u t e d by common consent by f a r the f i n e s t harbour i n the F a r East. "^ 2  9  This concession on the part of Korea caused grave concern to both Great B r i t a i n and Japan, as they both dreaded the strategic p o s i t i o n on the P a c i f i c which a Korean port would give t o Russia.  This Russian  move was one of the f i r s t steps which l e d to the Anglo-Japanese a l liance.  A f t e r a most vigorous opposition on the p a r t o f Japan, the H°s91 ^h-kor^ah 290  agreement was f i n a l l y thwarted. In 1900 Prince Muraviev died and was succeeded a t the Foreign O f f i c e by h i s assistant, Count Lamsdorff.  Although scarcely noticeable  at f i r s t , the passing of Muraviev marked the end o f the d i s t i n c t l y a n t i - B r i t i s h phase of Russian f o r e i g n p o l i e y inaugurated by Lobanov. Despite h i s antagonism towards Great B r i t a i n , and h i s f e v e r i s h e f f o r t s to take advantage of the embarrassment of that country during the Boer War, Muraviev had not been able to make any substantial gains f o r Russia i n that period.  Nevertheless, the r e s u l t s o f the foreign p o l i c y pur-  sued by Muraviev and h i s predecessor Lobanov leads Professor Hugh SetonWatson to state that "at the turn o f the century, Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y  288.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907» p. U2-U3  289.  B.D., I I , no. 1*0,  290.  B.D., I I , no. 117, p. 105*.  p.p. 32-33.  112 seemed the most serious of a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s . .291  Coynt Lamsdorff, who  succeeded Muraviev, had spent h i s en-  t i r e previous career i n the foreign o f f i c e , and Witte, a c l o s e f r i e n d , described him as a "walking archive of t h i s m i n i s t r y " .  2 9 2  While Lam-  sdorff was not pre-eminent i n t e l l e c t u a l l y , he was nevertheless a sensi b l e man.  Lord Lansdowne, now  B r i t i s h f o r e i g n secretary, c l e a r l y  recognized t h i s , as he remarked to S i r Charles S c o t t that he believed Lamsdorff wished to pursue a c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y .  2 9 3  But a t f i r s t  Lamsdorff was not to be given a chance to conduct a reasonable f o r e i g n policy.  A c l i q u e headed by the adventurers and chauvinists, Bezolragov  and Abaza, forced him to acquiesce i n a p o l i c y of reckless and f o o l hardy expansion i n the Far East.  Lamsdorff was helpless i n view of  the intrigues of t h i s group, who were able to gain the f u l l support of the Tsar. Nevertheless, the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n o f f i c e was so  impressed  by the general attitude o f Lamsdorff that i t f e l t the time was r i p e f o r an understanding with Russia on the Chinese question, s i m i l a r t o that proposed i n 1898.  In November, 1901,  Lansdowne suggested to S t a a l  that Great B r i t a i n and Russia reach an agreement with regard to t h e i r r e l a t i o n s i n China.  S t a a l proved evasive i n h i s r e p l y . He stated  291.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, Decline of Imperial Russia, p.  292.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  293.  Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne, MacMillan & Co., London, p. 215.  311.  footnote, p. 1|3 1929,  113 that he desired to see the end of mutual d i s t r u s t between the  two  countries but he believed that Great B r i t a i n should make the f i r s t proposals as i t had always a t t r i b u t e d h o s t i l e intentions and malevolent plans to Russia. l a s t i n g impression  The legacy of D i s r a e l i seems to have l e f t a  on the minds of Russian statesmen.  negotiations came to naught.  At any r a t e , the  Perhaps the r e a l reason f o r the f a i l u r e  can be found i n the statement of S t a a l to the Austrian ambassador i n London.  He said that Russia d i d not need England and could a t t a i n  295 her objectives without the assistance of Great B r i t a i n . Rebuffed by Russia, the B r i t i s h once more began to contemp l a t e an a l l i a n c e with the German Empire.  Joseph Chamberlain declared  that the time had come when Great B r i t a i n must choose between the T r i p l e and Dual A l l i a n c e , and that most o f the cabinet, i n c l u d i n g hims e l f , were desirous of the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e , and would only turn t o  296 the second i n the event of German intransigence.  Despite t h i s aus-  picious beginning, the negotiations were doomed to f a i l u r e . tinued throughout the summer of 1901, intimacy necessary to success.  They con-  but there was l a c k i n g i n them an  They were broken o f f e n t i r e l y i n Dec- .  ember, and the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries was worse instead 297 of b e t t e r .  As a r e s u l t of t h i s f a i l u r e to secure an a l l i a n c e or an  294.  Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1871-1914, 2n Serie, 1901-1911, Paris, 1930, Vol. I, no. 493, p. 581. From now on, D.D.F.  295.  Langer, Diplomacy of Imperialism,  296.  Lee, S., King Edward VII, footnote, V o l . I, p.  297.  Gooch, GiP., History of Modern Europe, I878 - 1919, Go. London, 1923, p.p. 324 - 330.  V o l . I I , p.p. 756-757 798. Cassell &  agreement with e i t h e r Germany or Russia, great B r i t a i n began to contemp l a t e an even more revolutionary departure i n her foreign p o l i c y - an a l l i a n c e with Imperial Japan.  As early as A p r i l 17, 1901,  Baron Hayashi, Japanese ambas-  sador i n London, suggested to Lord Lansdowne that " i t was a matter of urgent necessity f o r Great B r i t a i n and Japan to make a permanent 298 agreement f o r the maintenance of peace i n the Far East.  On J u l y 31,  Lansdowne intimated to Hayashi that he was ready t o discuss Far Eastern p o l i c y "with a view to the p o s s i b l e establishment of an understanding between our two c o u n t r i e s " .  2 9 9  A f t e r two weeks had passed,  Hayashi  t o l d Lansdowne that the Japanese government was prepared to negotiate f o r an u n d e r s t a n d i n g .  On October 16, two months l a t e r , formal  300  negotiations were inaugurated when Hayashi offered the f i r s t d e f i n i t e terms f o r an alliance. ® 3  1  Both p a r t i e s r e a d i l y agreed that i f e i t h e r should be attacked i n defence of t h e i r respective i n t e r e s t s , i t was s u f f i c i e n t f o r the other t o maintain a s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y .  I f , however, the attacking  powers were joined by an a l l y , (and i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y t h i s would be Russia aided by France), then both p a r t i e s to the treaty would conduct  298.  Pooley, A.M.,  ed,, The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi,  London, Eveleigh Nash, 1913,  299.  B.D.  300.  B.D. II, no. 105,  p.p. 91-98.  301.  B.D. I I , no. 105,  p.p. 96-98  I I , no. 102, p. 91.  p.  116.  115 the war henceforth i n common and would make peace by mutual agreement. Hayashi declared to Lansdowne that the Russian advance i n Manchuria posed a threat to Japanese interests i n Korea.  Japan, he stated, would  f i g h t rather than l e t Korea pass under the c o n t r o l of Russia.  Concern  f o r Korea was, i t would seem, the main reason f o r the Japanese approach to Great B r i t a i n .  The B r i t i s h , f o r t h e i r part, i n order to secure the  a l l i a n c e with Japan, were w i l l i n g to recognize that Japan possessed special i n t e r e s t s i n Korea of a commercial, i n d u s t r i a l and even of a 303 p o l i t i c a l nature: so stated the f i r s t a r t i c l e of the t r e a t y . the  "* At  same time, the B r i t i s h desired i n a measure to r e s t r a i n the b e l -  l i c o s e tendencies of Japan, as they had not abandoned the idea o f an ultimate agreement with Russia.  Accordingly i t was stated i n the pre-  amble that Great B r i t a i n and Japan were " s p e c i a l l y i n t e r e s t e d i n maint a i n i n g the independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of the Empire of China and the Empire of Korea. * ^ ^ 0  Although these two statements are  i n apparent contradiction, the paradox was not held to be insurmountable by the two contracting powers.  Both were agreed, e s p e c i a l l y Japan,  that the i n t e g r i t y of Korea should be protected from the designs o f Russia, i f not from those of an even nearer power* Baron Hayashi, i n order to f u r t h e r a l l a y B r i t i s h suspicions on the point of Japanese aggressiveness, t o l d Lansdowne that " i t was  302.  B.D., I I , no. 125,  303.  B.D.,  I I , no.  125, p. 116.  30k.  B.D.,  I I , no.  125, p. 115.  p.p. lUl-120.  116. unthinkable that Japan would lightly- engage i n an aimed c o n f l i c t with Russia. - ^ n  3  Lansdowne remained s c e p t i c a l and suggested that Japan con-  s u l t Great B r i t a i n before taking any a c t i o n i n Korea.  Hayashi returned  306 a d i s t i n c t negative and Lansdowne allowed the matter to drop. At the time that Anglo-Japanese negotiations were on the point of being s u c c e s s f u l l y terminated by a treaty, the matter was jeopardized by the journey of the Marquis Ito to St. Petersburg a t the end of  1901.  Ito, along with Prince Inouye and c e r t a i n other Japanese "elder statesmen", preferred to reach an agreement with Russia rather than Great Britain.  3 0 7  His v i s i t to St. Petersburg caused considerable anxiety  i n London, despite the assurances o f the Japanese government that Ito was not authorized to conclude an arrangement with Russia. apprehensions  The  o f London appear t o have been well-founded, as I t o does  seem to have nearly succeeded i n reaching an agreement with Russia on the basis that Japan should be dominant i n Korea and Russia i n M a n c h u r i a . The projected agreement seems to have f a l l e n through because of the opposition of the m i l i t a r y party i n Russia.  Four years l a t e r , i n  1905,  Witte, i n a stern denunciation o f Russian foreign p o l i c y as i t was pursued throughout t h i s period, remarked, " I f i n 1901  we had accepted  305.  Pooley, Hayashi, p. 165.  306.  Ibid., p.p. 166-167  307.  Kawakami, K.K., Prince Ito's C o n f i d e n t i a l Papers, Foreign A f f a i r s , New York, V o l . XI, 1933, p.p. 493-1*95.  308.  B.D. I I , no. 112, p. 100.  309.  On the Eve o f the Russo-Japanese War, Krasny Archiv, V o l . I I , p.p. 7-54, Transl. Chinese Soc. & Pol,. S c i . Rev. July, 1935.  309  117. Marquis. Ito's proposal, Japan would not have formed an a l l i a n c e with England.  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that both Japan and Great  B r i t a i n had t r i e d to reach an understanding with Russia before they defi n i t e l y turned to each other. Since the Russian government had not afforded Ito a d e f i n i t e reply, the Japanese Emperor, a f t e r having consulted the c o u n c i l of elder statesmen, resolved to conclude the treaty with B r i t a i n , and d e f i n i t e instructions were sent to Hayashi on December 1 0 .  As a  3 1 1  r e s u l t of t h i s , negotiations were hurried along and the f i r s t a l l i a n c e 312 between Great B r i t a i n and Japan was signed on January 30,  1902.  When Great B r i t a i n entered i n t o a t r e a t y of a l l i a n c e with Japan, i t was recognized as being ostensibly directed against Russia.  Neverthe-  l e s s , her ambassador i n St. Petersburg took pains to assure the Russian government that the a l l i a n c e d i d not diminish the hopes of the B r i t i s h government of eventually reaching a frank and friendly- understanding 313 with Russia.^  Lamsdorff could not be expected to view the s i t u a t i o n  i n as optomistic a manner, and he answered rather b i t t e r l y that the conclusion of the Anglo-Japanese  a l l i a n c e would probably retard the  r e a l i z a t i o n of an Anglo-Russian understanding i n the Far.East. 310.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, footnote w, p. $0  311.  Pooley, Hayashi, p.p. 135-162  312.  Ibid., p. 191  313.  B.D.  314.  Loc. c i t .  I I , no. 140, p. 130.  118 Throughout the rest of 1902, hopes f o r an Anglo-Russian  accord remained  dim, with Russian behaviour i n P e r s i a only adding to the general gloom,, Russian encroachment and i n f i l t r a t i o n s i n P e r s i a had such a point that on Hay 5, 1903,  reached  Lord Lansdowne issued a s t e m warning  that Great B r i t a i n should regard the establishment of a naval base or f o r t i f i e d port on the Persian Gulf by any other power "as a very grave menaee to B r i t i s h i n t e r e s t s , and we should c e r t a i n l y r e s i s t with a l l the means a t our disposal,  On A p r i l 6, 1902,  Russia concluded an agreement with China by  which she bound h e r s e l f to withdraw her troops from Manchuria i n three  316 stages, the l a s t to be completed by October 8, 1903. 1903,  By l a t e A p r i l ,  the f a i l u r e of Russia to l i v e up to t h i s agreement, and her i n -  sistence upon seven new conditions with which China must comply before Russian troops would be withdrawn from Manchuria, once more strained Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s .  In Great B r i t a i n these additional demands  aroused extreme indignation as they were considered t o be detrimental to the i n t e r e s t s of the powers, as w e l l as i n f r i n g i n g upon Chinese sovereignty. ^ 31  Lamsdorff, apparently i n a l l s i n c e r i t y , assured S i r Charles Scott that the Russian government had no i n t e n t i o n of departing from  315.  Parliamentary Debates, lith Series, Vol. CXXI, p.  316.  B.D.  317.  B.D. I I , no. 225, p. 197-198 and no. 226, p.p. 198 - 200.  I I , no.  225,  13^8.  p. 198.  11? i t s p u b l i c declarations which i t had given with regard to the evacuation 318 of Manchuria.  I t soon became more than evident that Lamsdorff  was  misinformed as to what was r e a l l y going on, and that the a c t u a l decisions as to the course to be pursued by Russian f o r e i g n p o l i c y were being made elsewhere than i n the o f f i c i a l f o r e i g n o f f i c e .  This was amply con-  firmed i n August when Admiral Alexiev, a strong advocate of a forward p o l i c y , was appointed viceroy of the Far Eastern provinces, with power i n f o r e i g n matters beyond Lamsdorffs j u r i s d i c t i o n , and when the Tsar elevated h i s favourite, Bezobrazov, a former c a v a l r y o f f i c e r , to be a s p e c i a l f o r e i g n minister with the o f f i c i a l t i t l e of Secretary of S t a t e .  Be-*-  6hroi.6v  He was given d i r e c t access over the heads of the regular cabinet to the Czar.  3 1 9  In h i s wild schemes of aggrandizement, Bezobrazov had had the f i r m support of the Kaiser as w e l l as of the Tsar, urged the Tsar not to y i e l d Korea to Japan.  William strongly  He declared that between  Vladivostok and Port Arthur there i s a "tongue of land, Korea, a sort of Dardanelles which must i n the end belong to Russia." though t h i s d i d no  new Al-  n e c e s s a r i l y represent the views of the German  foreign o f f i c e , the e f f e c t produced upon the timid Nicholas by the impetuous William can be well-imagined.  With two c o n f l i c t i n g f o r e i g n  o f f i c e s , each tending to n u l l i f y the p o l i c y pursued by the other, i t  318.  B.D.  I I , no, 231, p.  203.  319.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907, p. 53.  320.  Loc. c i t .  120 was a l l i n vain that Baron Rosen, Russian ambassador i n Japan, should 321 attempt to warn h i s c h i e f s by a r e a l i s t i c appraisal of the s i t u a t i o n , mfluffed The course followed by Russia was one that was f o i cdpomed W d i s a s t e r . 1  Although Russia's recent p o l i c y i n Manchuria had inflamed Japanese public opinion ggainst her, Baron Hayashi informed Lord Lansdowne that the Japanese government was disposed to t r y to reach a settlement with Russia while bearing i n mind i t s obligations to Great 322 Britain.  Baron Komura, Japanese foreign minister, who the Russian  diplomat Izvolsky during h i s tenure as Russian ambassador i n Japan had 323 found to be remarkably p a r t i a l to Russia,  remarked to S i r Claude  MacDonald, now B r i t i s h ambassador i n Japan, that he hoped the B r i t i s h government would not object to the course Japan was following.  The  B r i t i s h government offered no objections, f o r the simple reason that i t was r e a l i z e d they would have no deterrent e f f e c t on the Japanese govemment.3^ Although Great B r i t a i n had no d e s i r e to see Japan and Russia become embroiled i n a Far Eastern War, she had, on the other hand, no desire to see the two countries a r r i v e a t a d e f i n i t e agreement there before she had been able to secure one with Russia.  An agreement  321.  Rosen, Baron, Forty Years o f Diplomacy, Vol. I, p.p. 189-233.  322.  B.D. I I , no. 237, p.  323. -  On the^Eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Chinese Soc. & P o l . S c i . Review, Vol XIX, July 1935, p.p. 2U2-2U7.  32l*.  B.D. I I , no.  205.  2l*0, p. 211.  121 between Japan and Russia would make one with Great B r i t a i n unnecessary i n the Far East, since Great B r i t a i n would not then be i n a p o s i t i o n to o f f e r anything to Russia i n Manchuria.  The B r i t i s h , since they had  been forced to acquiesce i n an unpleasant s i t u a t i o n , resolved not to be outdone by t h e i r Japanese a l l y and promptjlyoopened negotiations with a view to reaching an agreement with Russia.  Lansdowne assured Benck-  endorff, the new Russian ambassador i n England, that provided Russia should include the Manchurian question i n any general settlement, she could c e r t a i n l y count on Great B r i t a i n ' s help i n arranging a s a t i s -  325 factory understanding with China. At the end of October, 1903,  while Lamsdorff was on a v i s i t  i n Paris, Lansdowne declared to the French ambassador i n London, Paul Cambon, that he hoped Delcasse would be able t o persuade Lamsdorff to enter a frank exchange of ideas with Great B r i t a i n .  Delcasse, now that  Great B r i t a i n and France were on the point of s e t t l i n g t h e i r difference es,  was only too glad to take up the cause of an Anglo-Russian rap-  prochement.  He impressed upon Lamsdorff that a l i t t l e more frankness  was desirable i n the r e l a t i o n s between the two countries.  Lamsdorff  admitted t h i s to be true and s a i d that Benckendorff would soon receive instructions which would.deprive the B r i t i s h of a cause f o r such comp l a i n t s i n the f u t u r e .  3 2 7  As a r e s u l t of Delcasse's intimation,  325.  B.D. II, no. 2U3, p. 213.  326.  Gooch, G.P., Before the War Studies i n Diplomacy, Longmans, Green and Co., London, 1936, V o l . I, p.p. 3u-5l.  327.  B.D.  II, no. 257, p. 221.  122 Lansdowne had a long interview with Benckendorff.  Benckendorff declared  that Lamsdorff f e l t "that i t was o f importance that an endeavour should be made t o remove a l l sources o f misunderstanding between the two governments, and that there should be "a change f o r the better* i n our r e l a t i o n s .^2Q n  xansdowhe, although expressing r e a l pleasure a t hearing 329  Benckendorff express such views,  7  remarked to Gambon that only gener330  a l i t i e s were discussed and nothing precise suggested.  Ten days  l a t e r Benckendorff expressed h i s willingness to Lansdowne to discuss the Russian a t t i t u d e , but said that he lacked the authority to make s p e c i f i c proposals.  Lansdowne, as a r e s u l t , was disposed to think that  discussions with Benckendorff, f o r the moment a t any r a t e , were f r u i t l e s s . Parfr-of f h e reluctance of the Russians to discuss matters i n d e t a i l was due to the f a c t that the B r i t i s h had, by an untimely move, once more offended Russian s u s c e p t i b i l i t y i n Asia., A f t e r many promp332 tings from Lord Curzon, now Viceroy of India,  the B r i t i s h government  had decided to send a diplomatic mission t o Tibet.  As the Tibetans  obstinately refused t o treat with i t , m i l i t a r y forces had t o be added, 333 with the r e s u l t that the mission became an armed expedition. Toward  328.  B.D. I I , no.  258, p. 229.  329.  B.D. I I , no.  258, p. 222.  330.  6.D.F., IV, no. 77, p. 103.  331.  B.D. IV, no 18(a), p. 183-18U.  332.  B.D. IV, editor's note, p. 305.  333.  B.D. IV, no. 258, p.p. 223-22U.  123 the end of 19G3> this expedition was slowly fopgiBg into Tibet}, towards the forbidden c i t y o f Lhasa. government f o r two reasons.  This move was d i s t a s t e f u l to the Russian . I t d i s l i k e d to see the spread o f B r i t i s h  influence i n Asia, and i t was a f r a i d o f the e f f e c t i t might have on i t s Buddhist Buriat subjects i n Mongolia.  As a r e s u l t , when Lansdowne i n -  formed Benckendorff of the B r i t i s h decision to send a mission into Tibet, the l a t t e r preserved an ominous s i l e n c e . ^ 3  However, i t was the r a p i d d e t e r i o r a t i o n of the Russo-Japanese s i t u a t i o n which f i n a l l y put ai end to t h i s attempt f o r an AngloRussian understanding. The B r i t i s h saw that they had l i t t l e to worry about from the danger of a Russo-Japanese agreement, and much to f e a r from a Russo-Japanese c o n f l i c t .  F o r two months no Russian reply came  to the Japanese overtures o f July, 1903*  On August 29, Witte, who  favoured a c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y i n the Far East, '* 33  was dismissed from  o f f i c e , owing to the i n t r i g u e s of h i s r i v a l , Plehve, the Minister o f 336 the I n t e r i o r , who had thrown i n h i s l o t with the extremist group. On October 3, the Russian government f i n a l l y r e p l i e d to the Japanese note.  The Russian note declared that the independence, i n -  t e g r i t y of Korea were to be recognized by both powers, but nothing was s a i d of China.  Russia desired a f r e e hand f o r h e r s e l f i n Manchuria,  33lw  Ronaldshay, E a r l of, The L i f e o f Lord Curzon, London, Ernest Benn, 1928, v o l . I I , Chapter XX, p.p. 272 - 280.  335.  Yarmolinsky, Abraham, ed. The Memoirs of Count Witte, Garden C i t y , New York, 1921, Chap. V, p.p. 105, - 133.  336.  Seton-Watson, H., Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 213.  121*  but would not accord the same to Japan i n Korea,  The Japanese r e p l y  rejected the Russian note and i n s i s t e d that Japan must have rights  337 i n Korea equal to those o f Russia i n Manchuria.  These c o n f l i c t i n g  points of view d i d not change s u b s t a n t i a l l y i n subsequent negotiations during December 1903 and January 1904. That the Russians proved intransigent seems to have been through no f a u l t of Lamsdorff. preserve peace with Japan.  He worked might and main throughout to  In desperation now that other measures were  f a i l i n g , he approached the B r i t i s h ambassador and gave an unmistakeable 331 h i n t that he wished Great B r i t a i n to intervene and r e s t r a i n her a l l y . Delcasse also surged that Great B r i t a i n endeavour to exercise a r e s t -  339 raining influence over Japan.  This the B r i t i s h declined to do. A l -  though they dreaded the p o t e n t i a l i t i e s o f a Russo-Japanese c o n f l i c t , at no time throughout the c r i s i s d i d the B r i t i s h government put any pressure upon Japan to prevent her t r y i n g conclusions with Russia. In a l e t t e r to the B r i t i s h ambassador i n Washington, Lansdowne r e vealed why Great B r i t a i n declined to intervene.  He stated, "Our f e e l i n g  i s that considering the nature of the demands upon which Japan i s i n s i s t i n g , we should not be j u s t i f i e d i n putting even moral pressure upon her to abate them.  We might, moreover, incur the l a s t i n g resent-  ment of Japan i f we were to stand i n her way and deprive her of an  337.  Seton-Watson, H., Decline o f Imperial Russia, p. 213-214  338.  B.D. I I , no. 279, p. 236.  339.  B.D.F. IV, no. 215,  p. 293.  125 opportunity which she i s determined to turn to account. to miss her chance now,  I f she were  she might s u f f e r f o r i t hereafter.  her" On February 6, without waiting f o r the Russian r e p l y to t h e i r l a t e s t demands, Japan severed diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Russia.  On  Feburary 8, two days i n advance of the formal declaration of war, host* i l i t i e s commenced between the two countries, with a surprise Japanese attack on Russian warships i n the harbour of Port Arthur.  As a r e -  s u l t of t h i s attack, Russia was plunged i n t o a long and disastrous moMeHrtbwS war which had i n c a l c u l a b l e consequences on both her foreign and domestic policy. During the Russo-Japanese war, i t was quite impossible f o r  4i set ties tohB a continuation of the Anglo-Russian convepootiona f o r an understanding. Russian public opinion tended to regard B r i t a i n , not Japan, ars Russia's chief enemy.  S i r Charles Hardinge, having replaced S i r Charles Scott  as B r i t i s h ambassador i n St. Petersburg, stated i n a revealing dispatch to Lord Lansdowne "that public opinion i n Russia has been much d i s t u r bed during the present year....That a small and despised country such as Japan...should be able to defeat...the greatest m i l i t a r y power i n Europe has been a blow from which the country...will with d i f f i c u l t y recover.  That the Japanese should have been able to achieve these r e -  s u l t s alone i s regarded by the majority of the population as absurd.  340.  B.D. no. 288, p. 243.  341.  Fisher, H.H., ed., Out of My Past, The Memoirs of Count Kofc ovtsov, Stanford University Press, C a l i f o r n i a , 1935, p.p. 8 - 10.  126 The educated classes consider that, had there been no  Anglo-Japanese  a l l i a n c e , Japan would never have dared to go to war with Russia, while the lower classes are f i r m l y convinced that the explanation of the Russian defeats i s to be found i n the f a c t that England i s surreptitiousl y aiding the Japanese.  Consequently, there i s a very widespread  f e e l i n g throughout t h i s country that England i s the r e a l but secret enemy of Russia." On A p r i l 8, 190U,  the Anglo-French Convention was signed.^*  3  By i t , the r i v a l r y of two ancient enemies was f i n a l l y set aside. Great B r i t a i n had taken the second decisive step away from i s o l a t i o n , and France had found a new f r i e n d to supplement her already existing a l l i a n c e with Russia.  Following the signing of the Convention, which  became known as the Anglo-French Entente, King Edward, acting on h i s own i n i t i a t i v e , attempted to lessenttheebitterness as predominant i n Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s .  On A p r i l lk,  190k,  Edward, while on a v i s i t  to Denmark, had a long and f r i e n d l y interview with Alexander Izvolsky, then Russian minister a t Copenhagen,  The King s a i d to Izvolsky that  the conclusion of the Anglo-French Entente "gives me the hope of attaining by the same methods s t i l l more important r e s u l t s , that i s to say, to a s i m i l a r entente with Russia, an entente which has always been and continues to be the object o f my most sincere desires.  3U2.  B.D. IV, no. 26, p.p. 33-35.  3U3.  Gooch, History of Modern Europe, V o l . I, p.  3Wu  Lee, King Edward VII, V o l . I I , p.  281*.  1*8.  127 The conversation then d r i f t e d to the "unfortunate and regrettable" Russo-Japanese war.  Edward deplored the intense a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment  to which i t had given r i s e i n Russia, and with pardonable exaggeration declared that "his government had done everything that was possible t o moderate Japan, which had not desired t o l i s t e n to reason, and had demanded to be l e f t f r e e to regulate i t s differences (with Russia) as i t pleased." ^ 3  Izvolsky allowed t h i s r o y a l remark to pass, but d i d not  hesitate to express h i s conviction  that the a l l i a n c e had been one o f  the p r i n c i p a l causes of h o s t i l i t i e s .  He s a i d that while he was Russian  ambassador at Tokyo he "had been able t o observe personally i t s e f f e c t on the psychology of the Japanese and to judge how much i t had i n flamed the war party i n T o k y o . " ^ 3  Considered i n the l i g h t of future  developments, t h i s Interview must be regarded as a landmark i n furthering the cause of Anglo-Russian r e c o n c i l i a t i o n .  Izvolsky never forgot  the impression King Edward's v i s i t made upon him, and stated i n h i s memoirs that i t was a t t h i s point the bases were established f o r the future Anglo-Russian agreement o f 1 9 0 7 . K i n g Edward came away with the impression that Izvolsky was the most capable Russian diplomat of the t i m e . - ^  Nevertheless, both men r e a l i z e d they would have to  wait f o r a more suitable moment to f u l l y implement t h e i r ideas.  3l*5.  Lee, King Edward VII, p. 285.  3li6.  I b i d . , p.p. 285-286.  31*7.  Seeger, C.L. ed., Recollections o f a Foreign Minister, Memoirs of Alexander JEswolsky, Garden C i t y , New York, 1921, p. 1*  31*8.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907» p. 65.  128  In the autumn o f 1904, there occurred an incident which strained Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s almost to the breaking point. the night of October 21-22, the Russian B a l t i c Sea f l e e t was  During  steaming  through the North Sea on i t s l o n g voyage to meet the Japanese f l e e t . Mien the f l e e t a r r i v e d o f f the Dogger Bank, i t found i t s e l f i n the midst of some f i f t y B r i t i s h f i s h i n g vessels. f l e e t opened f i r e .  Without warning, the Russian  This f i r i n g l a s t e d only a few minutes,, and then  suddenly ceased, with the f l e e t continuing on i t s way as i f nothing had happened.  However, during those few minutes, one f i s h i n g ship had  been sunk and others damaged, two B r i t i s h fishermen k i l l e d and others 349 wounded, and an i n t e r n a t i o n a l c r i s i s created. The B r i t i s h reaction to the whole a f f a i r was violent i n the extreme.  King Edward, with p a r t i c u l a r vehemence, minuted on the d i s 3!>0  patch bearing the news, "a most dastardly outrage".  Lansdowne  declared that only the most culpable negligence could have l e d to the f i s h i n g ships being mistaken f o r anything but what they a c t u a l l y were, 35l  - a peaceful f i s h i n g f l e e t engaged i n i t s ordinary occupations. What made the a c t i o n of Admiral Roghdestvensky more reprehensible i n B r i t i s h eyes was the f a c t that the Russian f l e e t had l e f t the wretched 352 fishermen to t h e i r f a t e . Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s had reached t h e i r 349.  For a f u l l and penetrating account of t h i s episode, see Taube, Baron Michael A., La p o l i t i q u e russe d'avant guerre et l a f i n del empire des Tsars, P a r i s , 1928, Chap I . 1  350.  B.D. IV> ho, %  351.  B.D. IV, no. 6, p. 6.  352.  B.D.  IV, no.  7,  minute by King Edward, p. 6.  p.  7,  & no.  8,  p.p.  7-8  129 lowest point since the Penjdeh incident i n Afghanistan i n 1885.  Count Lamsdorff s a i d that the news f i l l e d him with horror. However, he f e l t that the whole incident was the r e s u l t of some t e r r i b l e misunderstanding.  He assured the B r i t i s h that the Russian gov-  353 eminent would demand a f u l l explanation from t h e i r naval commander. The Tsar expressed h i s sincere regret and promised to make the necessary reparation to those who had s u f f e r e d . ^ *  There was no doubt as  to the s i n c e r i t y o f the Russian regrets, the question was, were r e grets enough to stem the mounting t i d e of B r i t i s h indignation?  Although  the Russian government was prepared to make concessions to Great B r i t ain, i t f e l t i t could not agree to a B r i t i s h demand that the Russian 355 o f f i c e r s responsible should be put on t r i a l . w  At t h i s point the belated report of Admiral Roghdestvensky arrived i n St. Petersburg.  This document declared that the Russian  B a l t i c f l e e t had f i r e d on two Japanese torpedo boats which had appeared out of the night and that mischance accounted f o r the s t r i k i n g of the B r i t i s h f i s h i n g vessels.  When the enemy ships had disappeared, the  f i r i n g had immediately ceased.  The f l e e t had declined to give a s s i s -  tance to the trawlers because, by t h e i r suspicious movements, they seemed to be a c t i n g i n complicity with the enemy. ^ 3  In the l i g h t of  353.  B.D. IV, no.  11, p. 9.  35U.  B.D. IV, no.  15, p. 15.  355.  B.D. IV, no. 16, p.  356,  Taube, La p o l i t i q u e russe de l'avant guerre, p.p. 36-38,  15.  130 future evidence on the subject i t seems that Rozhdestvensky's report bore l i t t l e semblance to the t r u t h and that i t was written to cover up a serious and r i d i c u l o u s blunder.  When the log-books of the f l e e t  were examined i t came t o l i g h t that the two Japanese torpedo boats f i r e d upon had i n reality- been the Russian c r u i s e r s Dmitry Donskoy and Aurora. 357 .  Nevertheless, the Russian government s i g n i f i e d i t s acceptance o f  t h i s account and stated that before the B r i t i s h demand f o r the t r i a l of the responsible o f f i c e r s could be considered, the a c t u a l f a c t s of  358 the encounter must be determined.  When Lamsdorff received Roz-  hdestvensky's report he i s s a i d to have exclaimed t o Hardinge: "You ask f o r an inquest, but I i n s i s t on having one .....Infamous i s the only term f o r the act committed by the Japanese, and that i s a nation having the honour of being an a l l y o f England. 359 The way out of t h i s threatening s i t u a t i o n was found when Tsar Nicholas proposed that the question be submitted to scrupulous examina t i o n by an international commission of enquiry, as foreshadowed by the Convention of the Hague. ^ 36  The Russian government declared that  once t h i s commission had determined what had a c t u a l l y happened, i t would punish i n a suitable manner any persons responsible f o r t h i s reQ grettable i n c i d e n t .  3 6 1  With t h i s c o n c i l i a t o r y move of Uussia, a l l  357.  B.D. Iv, no.  16, p. 15.  358.  B.D. IV, no.  15, p. 15, no. 16, p. 16.  35°.  Savinsky, A., Recollections o f a Russian Diplomat, Hutchinson & Co. London, p. 96.  360.  B.D. IV, no. 18, p. 18.  $61.  B.D. IV, no. 20, p.  21.  131 danger of war between the two countries vanished.  Balfour, the B r i t i s h  Prime M i n i s t e r , declared that Great B r i t a i n was s a t i s f i e d with the a362 t t i t u d e of the Russian government.  King Edward was now e n t i r e l y i n  favour of a p a c i f i c s o l u t i o n , f e e l i n g that the unbridled language of the newspapers had unnecessarily egged on public o p i n i o n . ^ 3  3  Throughout t h i s c r i s i s , Paul Cambon, French ambassador i n London, had done h i s best to act as mediator between Lansdowne and Benckendorff.  He had attempted to explain the viewpoint of the one  364 to the other, and t o moderate each i n t u r n .  As a r e s u l t of t h i s  favourable atmosphere, the Russian government, on November 4,  1904,  accepted i n the main the B r i t i s h d r a f t f o r the International Commission 365 of Enquiry.  ^  With the French government exercising a c o n c i l i a t o r y  influence, the commission was able to conclude i t s hearings on February 25, with a d e c i s i o n which was quite favourable to the Russian position.  The f i n a l award declared that there had been no Japanese  torpedo boats anywhere i n the v i c i n i t y of the Dogger Bank, and as a consequence there was no j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r the Russian f i r e .  As B r i t -  i s h trawlers had been damaged and two B r i t i s h fishermen k i l l e d , and others wounded, the Russian government was c a l l e d upon to pay an i n demnity of &  65,000 i n  compensation.  The commission declined to con-  362.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 16.  36J.  Lee, King Edward VII, p.p. 303 - 304.  364.  Cambon, Paul, Correspondence, 1870-1924, Editions Bernard Grosset, P a r i s , 1940, V o l . I I , p. 160.  365.  B.D. IV, no. .25,  enclosure, 1, p.p. 30 - 31.  132 demn ^SePaeverely Admiral Rozhdestvensky's f a i l u r e to come to the a i d of the distressed fishermen because of the seemingly genuine b e l i e f throughout the f l e e t that Japanese vessels were near.  As a r e s u l t , no  d i s c r e d i t was cast upon either the valour o r humanity o f the Imperial Russian Navy.  Nothing was said about the a a r l i e r B r i t i s h demand f o r  the punishment of the Russian o f f i c e r s responsible f o r the outrage. The B r i t i s h p u b l i c , thankful that peace had been preserved between the two countries, accepted with scarcely a murmur t h i s mild s o l u t i o n o f 366  the entire incident.-~  However, the i n i t i a l B r i t i s h reaction to the Dogger Bank incident had made Russia more responsive t o the blandishments of Germany i n favour of monarchial s o l i d a r i t y .  Maurice Bompard, French am-  bassador i n Russia, stated i n an i l l u m i n a t i n g dispatch to h i s government: "Germany, through her acts of kindness during the Russo-Japanese War has d e f i n i t e l y succeeded i n overcoming the hate which her conduct a t the Congress of B e r l i n had aroused i n Russia. England, on the other hand has i n h e r i t e d since the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War the hatred which Germany formerly bore i n Russian eyes f o r a quarter of a century."367 That this was putting the case i n an extreme way i s possibly quite true, although i t i s safe to say that a t the moment Czar Nicholas shared these sentiments.  The Tsar declared that he could not f i n d  words t o express h i s indignation a t England's conduct with regard t o  366.  Fry, A. ed., A Memoir o f S i r Edward Grey, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1921, p. 1H9 - i £ 3 .  367.  D.D.F. V, no. 1*67, p. 561*.  133 the e n t i r e matter.  Almost immediately a f t e r the Dogger Bank incident, Germany began overtures to Russia f o r the formation of a Continental League of Germany, Russia and France, directed against the maritime powers of Great B r i t a i n and J a p a n .  3 6 9  The reasons, that these overtures d i d not  meet with more success was not due to any reluctance on the p a r t o f Nicholas, but must be ascribed to the a t t i t u d e of Lamsdorff.  Lamsdorff  believed that at t h i s c r i t i c a l period, Russia should take no step t o wards B e r l i n that she would not take towards London.  He also held  that no d e f i n i t e move should be taken toward such a pact u n t i l France had been consulted.  In view of France's new-found friendship with  England, any proposal f o r a continental league was not l i k e l y to meet with much favour i n French eyes.  In the end, the views of Lamsdorff  prevailed with the Tsar of Russia over those of the Kaiser, and the project was temporarily dropped.^®  At t h i s point matters were further complicated by the German decision to seek a reckoning with France over Morfocco.  As a r e s u l t ,  the Morroccan c r i s i s between France and Germany was to be the main feature of the stormy and troubled year:- of 190$,  and one of the main  reasons why renewed German e f f o r t s towards a continental league met  368.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 79.  369.  Loc. c i t .  370.  Savinsky, A., Quillaume I I et l a Rnssie. Ses Depeches a Nicolas I I , 1903, 1905, Revue de Deux Mondes, Septieme Periode, Decembre, 1922, p.p. 781i-796.  134 with f a i l u r e .  371  B r i t i s h p o l i c y a f t e r the unfortunate Dogger Bank incident c a r e f u l l y followed S i r Charles Hardinge's sound advice to avoid any action which might have the semblance of menace or humiliation f o r Russia.  He warned that, owing to the reverses i n the Far East, the Russian  government was i n a p a r t i c u l a r l y s e n s i t i v e mood as regards i t s d i g n i t y 372 as a great power.  In the meantime Russian disasters continued i n the  Far East and culminated i n the almost t o t a l destruction of Rozhdestvensky's f l e e t i n the s t r a i t s of Tsushima on May  27 - 28, 1905.  373  Following t h i s defeat with r e v o l u t i o n and unrest spreading throughout the country, the Russian government came to the decision there was nothing to be done but to make peace with v i c t o r i o u s Japan.  President  Theodore Roosevelt, under whose leadership the United States was taking a greater part i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s than ever before, on June 8, 1905", made an o f f i c i a l o f f e r of mediation. **  This was  37  ac-  cepted by both p a r t i e s , as the Japanese too were wearying of the  war  and were only too glad of a s u i t a b l e opportunity f o r ending i t . " * 3 7  A f t e r much discussion i t was resolved to hold the peace conference i n the United States, and i t was opened on August 10, at Portsmouth, 371.  New  Anderson, Eugene N., The F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s , 1904T1906, U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Press, I l l i n o i s , 1930,  372.  B.D.  373.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907,  374.  Seton-VIatson, H., Decline of Imperial Russia, p.  375.  Pooley, Hayashi, p.  Chaps. XII-XIII.  IV, no. 26, p. 35.  226.  p.  86. 217.  135 Hampshire.  376  Throughout t h i s whole period, despite the f a i l u r e of the nego t i a t i o n s of 1901;, the Kaiser had never ceased to write h i s a f f e c t ionate l e t t e r s to h i s cousin the Tsar, maintaining h i s influence over that impressionable monarch.  As a r e s u l t , the Tsar had been delighted  to accept an i n v i t a t i o n on the p a r t of William to v i s i t him while they were c r u i s i n g i n the Gulf of Finland towards the end of July,  1905.  Nicholas proposed that the two should meet i n the Bjorko Sound, near Viborg.  377 '  Ing The Kaiser came w e l l prepared f o r the meeting, c a r r y i n g  378  with him the text of the proposed a l l i a n c e of the previous year."  During the f i r s t meeting between Kaiser and Tsar, considerable progress was made towards reaching a general agreement.  The  Tsar declared that King Edward would never get the l e a s t agreement 379 from, him which would be d i r e c t e d against Germany."  The next day,  while l i s t e n i n g to the Czar's c r i t i c i s m of the recent Anglo-French rapprochement, the Kaiser f e l t the f a t e f u l hour had come, and he suggested to the Czar that Germany and Russia should enter upon an agreement such as had been considered the previous year. the Tsar h i s copy of the t r e a t y to read.  William gave  A f t e r Nicholas had declared  h i s approval of i t , the Kaiser asked him i f he would care to sign i t as i t would be a f i t t i n g souvenir of t h e i r meeting.  Nicholas assented  376.  Seton-Watson, H.,Decline of Imperial Russia, p.  217.  377.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  87.  378.  Loc. c i t .  379.  Ibid., p.  88.  p.  136 and the two sovereigns proceeded to sign t h i s momentous document. The terms of the treaty provided that when one of the two empires should be attacked by another European power, i t s a l l y would a i d i t with a l l i t s forces i n Europe, by land and by sea.  The fourth  and f i n a l a r t i c l e l e f t to the Czar the task of informing France of the t r e a t y and of securing her adhesion to i t as an a l l y . ^  1  The  Kaiser believed that by t h i s t r e a t y a l l B r i t i s h attempts f o r an AngloFranco-Russo-Japanese grouping would be thwarted and the world hegemony of Great B r i t a i n would be d e f i n i t e l y diminished. before when, during the Boer War,  F i v e years  a continental c o a l i t i o n against  Great B r i t a i n had been s e r i o u s l y mooted, Russia had been i t s c h i e f i n stigator.  Now  the r o l e of c h i e f proponent had passed to Germany.  Within f i v e years, Anglo-Russian  r i v a l r y had been succeeded by Anglo-  German r i v a l r y as the central f a c t o r In world p o l i t i c s .  Meanwhile, negotiations a t Portsmouth had been going w e l l f o r Russia.  extremely  Witte, the c h i e f Russian delegate to the conference,  had shown great s k i l l i n negotiation, and with the a i d of a B r i t i s h j o u r n a l i s t and f r i e n d , Dr. E.J. D i l l o n , he won the sympathy of the  382 American press.  Although Russia transferred the lease o f Liaotung  peninsula with Dafrien and Port Arthur, to Japan, thus abandoning a l l claims i n southern Manchuria as w e l l as recognizing that Japan should 380.  Anderson, F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s , p. 283-281*.  381.  Ibid., p.  382.  Yarmolinsky, Witte, p.  281*. 138.  137 exercise what amounted to a protectorate over Korea, she nevertheless retained her influence i n northern Manchuria as w e l l as the r i g h t t o maintain naval forces i n Far Eastern waters.  Witte was able also  to r e s i s t successfully Japanese demands f o r the whole of the i s l a n d of Sahalin, with the result that the i s l a n d was divided between the two powers.  Witte having made these concessions now gave an u l t -  imatum to the Japanese delegates that they could either accept the Russian terms or resume the war. The Japanese chose to acdept, and Witte, disregarding l a s t minute instructions from the Tsar to break o f f negotiations, ember 5, 1905.  was able to conclude peace with Japan on SeptRarely has a defeated country emerged with so many  of the f r u i t s of v i c t o r y as d i d Russia i n 1°0J>.  Witte could be j u s t l y  proud of h i s achievements, f o r i n the words o f Izvolsky, "no career diplomat could have made such a t r e a t y " .  3 8 7  Almost simultaneously with the Russo-Japanese negotiations, negotiations were underway f o r a renewal of the Anglo-Japanese a l liance.  As both countries had been w e l l s a t i s f i e d by the l a s t a l l i a n c e ,  the terms of the new a l l i a n c e were soon agreed upon and the treaty o f renewal was signed on August 12, 1905. This new treaty proved t o be  383.  Seton-Watson, H., Decline of Imperial Russia, p, 217.  38i+.  Loc. c i t .  385.  Nabokoff, C. Why Russian Statesmanship F a i l e d , Contemporary Review,CLXXXIII, 1923, p. 182.  386.  Seton Watson, H. op c i t . p. 217.  387.  Seeger, Iswolsky,  op.' ckit  p. 125  , ...  138 much broader i n scope than the previous one as w e l l as being drawn up f o r a longer period.  Each party bound i t s e l f to come to the a i d of  the other i n the event of i t s being attacked by another s i n g l e power. Great B r i t a i n was to a s s i s t Japan with the f u l l strength of her navy. Japan, f o r her part, was  to help Great B r i t a i n both on land and sea  within the regions of Eastern Asia and India. The B r i t i s h government resolved to f u r n i s h the Russian government with an advance copy of t h i s treaty.  Accordingly, Sn Septem-  ber 8, three days a f t e r the Treaty of Portsmouth had been signed, S i r Charles Hardinge c a l l e d on Lamsdorff and declared that the AngloJapanese a l l i a n c e was i n ho way directed against Russia, as i t was s o l e l y a defensive a l l i a n c e .  Lamsdorff proved evasive and non-commit-  t a l i n h i s reply. That S i r Charles was disturbed by the attitude displayed by Lamsdorff i s shown by the fact that he c a l l e d again on October U, to inquire of Lamsdorff what the r e a l f e e l i n g of the Russian government was towards the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e and towards the resumption of negotiations with Great B r i t a i n f o r an understanding, that the Japanese war was over. unofficially.  now  In h i s reply, Lamsdorff chose to speak  He admitted with complete candour that the renewal of  the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e was resented i n Russia.  He said'that while  he personally was s i n c e r e l y desirous of good r e l a t i o n s with Great  155,  p.p. 26k - 169.  388.  B.D.  IV, no.  389.  B.D.  IV, no. 172 (b) p.p. 178 - 179  139 B r i t a i n , i t would be a mistake to attempt the resumption of negotiations 390 at the present time.  This was Lamsdorff s v e i l e d way of saying 1  that negotiations with Great B r i t a i n were impossible u n t i l the Treaty of Bjorko had been abrogated. In an audience with Czar Nicholas on August 30,  1905,  Lams-  dorff was informed f o r the f i r s t time of the existence o f the Treaty of Bjorko.  To h i s cautious mind, i t appeared to be a dangerous d i p -  lomatic step, with i n c a l c u l a b l e consequences.  However, he  informed  Nelidov, Russian ambassador i n P a r i s , of t h i s unique s i t u a t i o n , and suggested that he f i n d out the views of the French government on the p o s s i b i l i t y of a continental a s s o c i a t i o n . Acting i n accordance with these i n s t r u c t i o n s , Nelidov brought the matter up h y p o t h e t i c a l l y i n a 21.  conversation with Rouvier, French prime minister, on September Rouvier declared himself emphatically opposed to the idea on the  grounds that the continent was i n no need of protection from Great B r i t a i n and that France d i d not need more than one a l l y - Russia. reply to t h i s , Nelidov said that i n h i s opinion the p r o j e c t was  In  im-  possible and i n i t s place advocated a rapprochment between Great B r i t 391 ain and Russia,  Lamsdorff now saw his apprehensions confirmed,  and resolved to undo the a l l i a n c e i f i t was p o s s i b l e .  In a p r i v a t e  l e t t e r addressed to Nelidov, Lamsdorff declared that a t Bjorko the Tsar had completely succumbed to the f l a t t e r y of "William. IV, no. 195, p.p.  He stated  206 - 207.  390.  B.D.  391.  Seton-Watson, H., Decline o f Imperial Russia, p.p. 3lk  -  315  lilO that i t had always been William's aim to destroy the  Franco-Russian  a l l i a n c e and to compromise Russia In the eyes of France and Great B r i t a i n , so that her i s o l a t i o n being complete, she would be forced to de-  392  pend on German generosity.  In the meantime Witte was journeying back to Europe, f i r m l y convinced that by the Peace of Portsmouth he had saved Russia from Revolution. ^ 39  to P a r i s .  He disembarked a t Cherbourg and proceeded d i r e c t l y  While there Witte avoided antagonizing the French with h i s  ideas on foreign combinations, p a r t l y because of the d i r e Russian need of a French l o a n . ^ 3 9  In h i s conversations with the German ambassador,  Prince Radolin, Witte spoke much more f r e e l y and declared that i n h i s opinion the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e had ruled out the p o s s i b i l i t y of an understanding between Great B r i t a i n and Russia f o r many years to come, and that as a r e s u l t o f t h i s s i t u a t i o n , the three greatest continental states should band together i n order to r e s t r a i n Great B r i t a i n .  Witte said that provided the opportunity was not l o s t  by pressing the d i f f i c u l t y over Morocco too f a r , there never was  a  better time, nor a more favourably disposed French cabinet than that of Rouvier to bring France and Germany together. -* 39  While he was  still  i n P a r i s , the secretary of the Russian embassy i n London, Poklevsky-  392.  Bompard, Maurice, Mon Ambassade en Russie, 1903 - 1908, P a r i s , L i b r a i r i e Plon, Les P e t i t F i l s de Plon et Nourrit, 1937, p. 158.  393.  Nabokoff, Why Russian Statesmanship F a i l e d , Cont. Rev., p.  39k.  Bompard, op. c i t . p.  395.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  11*9-150. p.'96.  183.  K o z e l l c a l l e d on Witte, bearing with him an i n v i t a t i o n , approved by King 396 Edward, from the B r i t i s h government, to v i s i t Great B r i t a i n ,  Pok-  levsky-Kozell informed him that King Edward desired Great B r i t a i n and Russia to reach a f r i e n d l y understanding on a l l issues separating them i n Persia, Afghanistan and T i b e t ,  3 9 7  Witte declared that he would not  accept the i n v i t a t i o n , but agreed that good relations were desirable between Great B r i t a i n and Russia.  He added that he intended to work  f o r harmonious r e l a t i o n s between the two countries, provided, of course, that they d i d not i n t e r f e r e with the maintenance of the f r i e n d l y t i e between Russia and Germany.  For t h i s reason, he expressed doubt as  398 to the a d v i s a b i l i t y o f any d e f i n i t e treaty with Great B r i t a i n . Leaving Paris, he went t o B e r l i n , where he had a meeting with Count Bulow and outlined to him the necessity o f a continental bloc directed against Great B r i t a i n .  3 9 9  The following day he was r e -  ceived by the Kaiser a t the l a t t e r * s hunting lodge a t Rominten.  Here  the Kaiser, with the consent of the Tsar, described to Witte the meeting of the two sovereigns a t Bjorko, and the accomplishment of the a l l i a n c e between Russia and Germany.  To Witte, t h i s seemed t o be the  l i t e r a l f u l f i l m e n t o f h i s highest hopes, and he made haste to declare that the f i r s t task o f the two powers would be to secure the adhesion  396.  Lee, King Edward VII, p.p. 307-308, v o l . I I .  397.  Ibid., p. 308,  398.  Loc. c i t .  399.  Bulow, Prince von, Memoirs, London, 1931, V o l . I I , p. 363.  li+2 of France.  In conversation l a t e r with Prince Eulenberg, Witte i s  said to have exclaimed: "Bjorko i s the greatest comfort of my  life."k  0 1  I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, however, that throughout t h e i r entire meeting, the Kaiser f a i l e d to show Witte the actual text of the t r e a t y . ^  2  P a r t l y as a r e s u l t of Witte's intercession, the Kaiser agreed to moderate German demands as regards the programme of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l conference intended to s e t t l e the Morocco d i s p u t e . ^  3  Following t h i s ,  Witte departed f o r Russiaj unduly o p t i m i s t i c f over what he had accomp l i s h e d f o r Russia, France, and the peaceof  Europe.  When he a r r i v e d i n St. Petersburg, he was received i n audience by the Tsar, and had the t i t l e of Count conferred on which, f o r the services which he had rendered Russia at Portsmouth.  But i t was only  when he v i s i t e d Lamsdorff that he had a chance to read i n i t s e n t i r e t y the Treaty of B j o r k o . ^  A f t e r he had read i t , Witte, l i k e Lamsdorff,  reached the conclusion that i t s terms were incompatible with the FrancoRussian a l l i a n c e . ' * ^ 0  Whether t h i s was a correct i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the  treaty or not i s open to argument.  At any rate, the two counts made  use of i t as a means of getting out of an a l l i a n c e which Lamsdorff had  1*00.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo Russian Convention of 1907,  1*01.  Bulow, Memoirs, p.  1*02.  Yarmolinsky, Witte, p.  1*20.  1*03.  C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . p.  97.  l*0l*.  Yarmolinsky, op. c i t . p. 1*25.  1*05.  Loc. c i t .  165.  p.p. 96 -  97.  143 never wanted and which Witte now  rejected. E a r l y i n October, the  two  ministers went to Feterhof and there, f o r t i f i e d by the presence of the Grand Duke N i k o l a i Nikolaievich, persuaded a r e l u c t a n t Czar to abandon his p r i v a t e overture i n diplomacy, **°^ Following t h i s , the Tsar sent aupersonal l e t t e r t o the Kaiser on October 7, which expressed h i s doubts about the v a l i d i t y of the treaty.*  407  Almost simultaneously, Osten-Sacken, Russian ambassador i n  Berlin, transmitted an informal communication to Bulow which outlined Lamsdorff s objections.** 1  08  On November 23, i n a l e t t e r to the Kaiser,  the Czar proposed that the Treaty of Bjorko be made i n t o a dual a l l i a n ce between Russia and Germany, and should be non-operative only i n the event of a war with France,  This suggestion f a i l e d to get even an  acknowledgement from B e r l i n , * *  09  As a r e s u l t , shortly a f t e r this Osten-  Sacken informed the German government by means of a formal communication that Russia considered the Treaty of Bjorko inoperative,** . 10  The whole matter was therefore dropped.  Germany and Russia parted  company, never to meet again i n f r i e n d l y a l l i a n c e u n t i l Czar and Kaiser had ceased to r u l e .  The conduct of Witte throughout t h i s whole period w i l l always  406.  Yarmolinsky, Witte, p.p. 427 - 429,  407.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 99.  408.  Seeger, Iswolsky, p. £6.  409.  C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t , , p. 100.  410.  Loc. c i t .  Ihh remain somewhat of a mystery to the h i s t o r i a n .  Despite h i s frequent  changes, the firmest conviction of Witte was h i s b e l i e f i n an a l l i a n c e of Russia, Germany and F r a n c e . T h i s d i d not betoken any p a r t i c u l a r sympathy f o r the Germans, since personally he much preferred the French, but he d i d see i n such a grouping a balance to the world-power of Great B r i t a i n .  Not that he ever desired a war against Great B r i t a i n ;  he was too shrewd a f i n a n c i e r and too astute a statesman to ever contemplate such action.  Probably he intended, once the continental c o a l -  i t i o n had been established, to work f o r harmonious r e l a t i o n s with Great B r i t a i n .  Witte dreaded nothing so much as a European war, which  he knew must end i n the destruction of the Russian autocracy.  He held  that i f Russia were a l l i e d with Germany and not Great B r i t a i n , the outbreak of such a war was f a r l e s s l i k e l y .  I f the autocratic i d e a l and  the r u l i n g house i n Russia were to be preserved, a close connection with the r u l i n g house i n Germany was necessary.  By t r a d i t i o n , h i s t o r y  and p o l i t i c a l structure, autocratic Prussia and autocratic Russia had much i n common: autocratic Russia and l i b e r a l England had v i r t u a l l y nil.  At the same time, he desired the adherence of France to the a l -  l i a n c e , so that Russia could b e n e f i t from her f i n a n c i a l power and also so that she should not become a s a t e l l i t e of Germany.  Why then d i d Witte, once the f u l l content of the Bjorko pact had been revealed to him, throw over the whole t r e a t y which at f i r s t glance seemed to embody i n one single document a l l of h i s cherished hopes?  iill.  In view of h i s strong feelings on the matter a vigorous  Yarmolinsky, Witte, Introduction.  145 attempt to secure the adhesion of France should have been forthcoming* Witte may have r e a l i z e d from h i s own t a l k s with French p o l i t i c a l leaders and from the dispatches of Nelidov on the subject, that the task of securing the adherence of 'France was a hopeless one*  A sense  of realism t o l d Witte that Russia f o r the time being could survive without the German a l l i a n c e , but could not survive without the a i d of 412 French money.  Besides,the Russian f o r e i g n o f f i c e , and Lamsdorff i n  p a r t i c u l a r , preferred friendship with France to friendship with Germany. Maurice Borapard i s therefore quite correct when w r i t i n g years a f t e r , he attributes the successful blocking of the Bjorko pact p r i n c i p a l l y to the e f f o r t s of Count Witte and Count Lamsdorff.* * ' 11  1  However, l i k e  most of the others, he f a i l s to throw too much l i g h t on Witte's motives f o r doing so* Another answer, but by no means a conclusive one, was given by Witte himself, i n September, 1914,  that  when i n a conversation  with Maurice Paleolpgue, then French ambassador i n Russia, he remarked: " I t i s a subject on which I am bound to secrecy"*' ^ (the matter of the 1  Bjorko pact),  A secret i t i s l i k e l y to remain.  Even i f successfully inaugurated, i t i s doubtful i f the  lil2.  Bompard, Mon Ambassade en Russie, p,  413.  Seton-Watson, H.,Decline of Imperial Russia, p,  414.  Bompard, M.,  1918, 415.  p.  175, 315.  Le Traite de Bjoerkoe, La Revue de P a r i s , Mai,  448.  Paleologue, M,, An Ambassador's Memoirs, New York, George H. Doran, p,  124,  Bjorko pact could have stood the stress and s t r a i n t o which i t would have been subjected.  But at no other time between the years 1878  -  19lU, was Great B r i t a i n so exposed to the dangers of a continental coalition.  I t was fortunate indeed f o r her that the f e e l i n g over  Fashoda was no longer the p r e v a i l i n g mood i n France and that she had converted a former b i t t e r enemy into a firm f r i e n d .  In keeping with  this f r i e n d l y f e e l i n g , Bompard suggested to Hardinge during the f i r s t week of October that Great B r i t a i n should make some overtures of a f r i e n d l y nature to Russia, i n order to f r u s t r a t e German i n t r i g u e f o r a Russo-German a l l i a n c e . ^  6  Hardinge, although he was not aware of  the f u l l d e t a i l s , knew that following the Bjorko meeting,  official  in 7 c i r c l e s i n Russia were strongly disposed i n favour of Germany.^  1  It  was therefore with a sense of profound r e l i e f that on October 21 he was able to w r i t e : "I am r e l i a b l y informed thatthe idea of any combination with Germany has now been d e f i n i t e l y dropped. "^"^ Throughout this whole period B r i t i s h f e a r of Germany had i n creased r a p i d l y .  The continued success of the German commercial pen-  etration of Turkey, and the launching of the B e r l i n to Bagdhad R a i l way p r o j e c t , ^ "  9  had caused Lord Ellenborough to remark i n 190U that  i t would be f a r b e t t e r to see Russia at Constantinople than to see a  la6.  B.D.  IV, no. 197, p.  1417.  B.D.  IV, no. 201, p. 21k.  Ul8.  For a f u l l discussion of the Bagdhad Railway project and i t s implications, see Earle, E.M., Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdhad Railway, MacMillan, New York, 1923.  1*19.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 101.  209.  147 420  German m i l i t a r y depot on the Persian Gulf.  In an a r t i c l e published during the Russo-Japanese war, Arnold White, i n F o r t n i g h t l y Review, warned h i s readers i n no uncertain terms that the only country to benefit from an Anglo-Russian quarrel would 421 be Germany.  As a r e s u l t of the increasing tension with Germany,  S i r Arthur Nicolson has stated: " I t was not a question of getting Russia to j o i n .England against Germany; i t was s o l e l y a question of preventing Russia from j o i n i n g Germany against England. 422 11  This new trend i n B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y d i d not pass unnoticed i n B e r l i n .  In a sentence which showed considerable f o r e s i g h t ,  Bulow stated: " I f Russia goes with England, then that n e c e s s a r i l y .means a point against us, and t h i s would l e a d withi n a reasonable length of time to a great i n t e r national war." 423 The Hamburger Nachrichten a l s o remarked a t t h i s time that Benckendorff i n London was setting "heaven and h e l l i n motion to bring Russia over from Germany to the side of Great Britain."** ** 2  I t then added prophet-  i c a l l y that the existing i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n was rushing to a d i p lomatic revolution comparable t o that which had occurred i n 1756.  420.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p.  421.  White, Arnold, Anglo-Russian Relations, F o r t n i g h t l y Review, CCCLVI, December, 1904,  422.  p.p. 960  101.  - SbT".  Nicolson, Harold, Lord Carnock, London, Constable Co.  p.p. 234-235. 423.  C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . p. 102,  424.  I b i d . , p. 103. .  425.  Loc. c i t . , footnote.  footnote.  1930,  That these German apprehensions.were  not groundless i s born  out by an a r t i c l e which appeared i n the Revue de Deux Mondes of March, 1918.  This a r t i c l e was w r i t t e n by Nekludoff, a Russian diplomat.  In  i t , he stated that: "Czar Nicholas, humiliated a t having been forced to abrogate the Bjorko pact, an a c t which his conscience commanded him t o , developed, as a r e s u l t , a deep animosity towards the author of t h i s surprise pact (Kaiser William). From that day forward he was i n c l i n e d to orient h i s p o l i c y to the side of England and received with a sincere s a t i s f a c t i o n the d i s c r e e t advances which King Edward made to him. "426 Continuing i n this veen, Nekludoff wrote that:" "Bn leaving the t r a n q u i l waters of the F i n n i s h Skaergaard, William I I believed he had c a r r i e d with the s p i r i t •©£ of the Russian monarchy. On the contrary, he had thrown Nicholas I I into the arms of England and prepared the way f o r the English p o l i t i c a l triumph." 427  With the abandonment of the Treaty of Bjorko by the Russians, Q  the way was now open f o r a renewed attempt to reach an Anglo-Russian understanding.  On October 20, Hardinge remarked that Lamsdorff's  manner was more f r i e n d l y than at any time since the communication of the Anglo-Japanese  a l l i a n c e and that he seemed to be looking forward  to an eventual agreement with Great B r i t a i n . * *  28  As S i r Charles Hardinge  was about to leave Russia f o r Great B r i t a i n , he asked f o r an audience with the Tsar.  This was arranged f o r October 24.  A f t e r having d e l i v -  426.  Nekludoff, A., L'Entrevue de Bjoerkoe, Revue de Deux Mondes, March, 19l8,,p. 142.  427.-  Ibid., p. 144  428.  B.D.  IV, no. 201, p.p.  2l4 - 215".  11*9 h.29  ered a message of friendship from King Edward,  '  Hardinge explained  to the Czar that England was completely unanimous i n her d e s i r e t o reach an agreement with Russia: government, opposition and press were a l l favourably disposed to the idea.  Hardinge and the Tsar concurred  i n the hope that no foreign nation would regard any agreement reached between the two countries as directed against i t s e l f . This interview marked the highest point yet reached by the Conservatives i n t h e i r attempts to reach an understanding with Russia. Nothing further was attempted by Great B r i t a i n as general elections were pending and the government had no wish t o be involved i n serious foreign negotiations at such a time.  However, the coming i n t o power  of the L i b e r a l s made no change i n the p o l i c y of attempting to reach an understanding with Russia.  Whatever domestic differences might  separate them, both the L i b e r a l and Conservative p a r t i e s were resolved to reach t h i s understanding.  In t h i s respect, the Conservatives  handed down to the l i b e r a l s a r i c h heritage.  Seven years before, i n 1898, Lord Salisbury had reached the conclusion that an Anglo-Russian understanding i n A s i a was desirable. The l i m i t e d agreement of 1899 with regard to China was the r e s u l t of Salisbury's conclusion.  I t was t r u e that the l i t t l e good-feeling  created by t h i s agreement disappeared because of the h o s t i l e attitude displayed by Russia during the Boer War.  2*29.  Nevertheless, following the  Lee, King Edward VII, p. 310, v o l . I I .  1*30.' B.D. IV, no. 202, p.p. 215" - 216.  150 war, Lansdowne once more took up the Idea of an Anglo-Russian understanding.  Throughout 1903,  Lansdowne sought patiently- to persuade the  Russians to renew conversations which would lead to an A s i a t i c s e t t l e ment.  Although no s p e c i f i c terms had been discussed, i t could be said  that on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war, a point of hopefulness had been reached i n British-Russian diplomatic exchanges.  Throughout the Russo-Japanese war, negotiations were d i s continued.  During t h i s period a series of unfortunate incidents  strained the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries.  As a r e s u l t ,  Russian foreign policy- took on a deep German o r i e n t a t i o n and i t was only with the f a i l u r e of the Bjorko treaty that i t returned to a course which could lead to an understanding with Great B r i t a i n .  In the short  time l e f t him as foreign secretary, Lansdowne *s renewed attempts at an AnglO-Russian agreement had reached a point where S i r Charles Hardinge could w r i t e : "The improvement which has already shown i t s e l f i n the ..relations between England and Russia only requires careful, f o s t e r i n g to bear f r u i t i n due season." 431 G.P. Gooch has a p t l y stated that Lord Lansdowne smoothed the way f o r a rapprochement with Russia, but "was not himself to enter the Promised li32 Land. " ^  Lord Newton, h i s o f f i c i a l biographer, has declared i n a  s i m i l a r fashion that "By the end of 1905.. .Russia and Bhgland were on more  k31.  B.D.  432.  Gooch, G.P.,  IV, no.  202,  p.  216.  Before the War Studies i n Diplomacy, Vol I, p. 83.  151 amicable terms than they had been f o r over a century. Lord Lansdowne had contributed not a l i t t l e to the c o r d i a l i t y of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s . " 1*33 Although the Conservatives had given nothing i n the way of a d e f i n i t e rapprochement i n Anglo-Russian relations to the L i b e r a l s , they had bequeathed a k i n d l i e r s p i r i t i n the relationship of the two countries. and the hope of even better things to come.  Without.the perseverence  and s k i l l displayed by Lansdowne and Hardinge throughout this t r y i n g time, the eventual Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 would i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y have been impossible.  1*33.  Newton, Lansdowne, p.  339.  • ••  152  THE NEGOTIATION OF THE CONVENTION AND  ITS RESULTS, 1906  -  1907  In December,11905, the L i b e r a l s , a f t e r ten long years i n opposition, came into power i n Great B r i t a i n , with S i r Edward Grey replacing Lord Lansdowne a t the f o r e i g n o f f i c e .  S i r Edward, a t the  time of h i s appointment had not distinguished himself i n the eyes of the B r i t i s h p u b l i c .  Before h i s appointment as foreign secretary, he  had been Parliamentary Under-Secretary i n the government of  1892 - 1895", but  Gladstone-Rosebery  l i k e his Russian counterpart, Count  Lamsdorff, had never held a diplomatic appointment abroad.  However,  despite h i s r e l a t i v e l y unknown record, i t was common knowledge among the diplomats that since the nineties S i r Edward had been an advocate of a rapprochement with Russia as a means to ending the i s o l a t i o n which Great B r i t a i n no longer f e l t to be splendid.  Early i n 1899,  he  had delivered a speech i n which he advocated that the two adversaries should reach an entente i n the Far East.  Baron S t a a l , the Russian  ambassador, was so impressed with the speech that he advised h i s c h i e f , Count Muraviev, to read i t i n i t s e n t i r e t y .  As the years  went by, Grey had held to this view tenaciously, but at the same time with such a degree of moderation that he could scarcely be described as Russophil i n sentiment.  By the time he was appointed foreign  secretary, he had cometo the conclusion that "an agreement with Russia  k3k.  Meyendorff, Correspondance Diplomatique, V o l . I I , no. 6,  p.  1+10.  153"  was the natural complement of the agreement with Francej i t was also the only practical alternative to the old policy of d r i f t , with i t s 1+35 continual complaints, bickerings, and dangerous f r i c t i o n . " As G.P. Gooch has aptly put i t : "Grey longed to remove the causes of friction with Russia as Lansdowne had removed the causes of trouble li36 with France."  On October 20, shortly before the election, Grey  said i n a speech that "there was indeed, no British government that would not gladly let Russia have a free hand i n the Near East i f i t 1x37 should come to a general Anglo-Russian agreement."^-" On January 10, 1906, S i r Charles Hardinge was recalled irom his post as ambassador i n St. Petersburg and appointed permanent under-  U38 secretary for foreign affairs.  Before leaving he had a f i n a l  audience with the Czar wherein the latter spoke with "satisfaction of the improvement which had taken place in the relations between England and Russia since the end of the war, and expressed his conviction 1x39 they would continue to improve." The new British ambassador, Sir Artha-E Nicolson, was unable to proceed immediately to St. Petersberg as the international confer-  1*35.  Grey, Viscount, Twenty-Five Years, Hodder & S tough ton, London, 1925, Vol. I, p. 153.  1x36.  Gooch, G.P., Before the War,Vol. II, p.21.  1x37.  Churchill, Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p 108.  1x38.  B.D. IV, no. 206, p. 221.  1x39.  Loc. c i t .  15U ence over Morocco had opened on January 16, 1906 and he had been chosen as B r i t i s h representative.  The Tsar had informed Hardinge that Russia  and Great B r i t a i n would be on the same side at the conference, since "Russia would also l o y a l l y support France".  The conference had not  been long assembled when i t became c l e a r that the co-operation of Nicolson and C a s s i n i , the Russian representative, formed yet another l i n k i n the developing chain of friendship between the two countries. Prince G. Trubetskoy, a prominent Russia? w r i t i n g with regard to t h i s co-operation, has stated: " I t was evident from the f r i e n d l y agreement displayed by the representatives of the two Powers that the governments i n London and St. Petersburg desired only to be guided by t h e i r consciousness of changed conditions and of e x i s t i n g mutual i n t e r e s t s , and that they wished completely to forget t h e i r e a r l i e r discords." Uljl On account of the great i n t e r n a l disorders p r e v a i l i n g i n Russia and the European importance of the Moroccan conference, only informal exchanges took place between the B r i t i s h and Russian governments during the winter of 1906.  At this time, too, there occurred  a change i n the personnel of the Russian foreign o f f i c e with the rep l a c i n g of the conservative Lamsdorff by the popular Izvolsky. Lamsdorff, p a r t l y on account of h i s a r i s t o c r a t i c bearing and h i s Germanic o r i g i n , had never been t r u l y popular i n Russia.  During a l l h i s l i f e ,  Lamsdorff had f i r m l y believed i n the autocratic form of government as  IV, no. 206,  p.  221.  ijliO.  B.D.  14*1.  Hamman, Otto, The World P o l i c y of Germany, I89O George A l l e n , 1929, footnote 2, p. 169.  1912,  London, -  155 represented by the Czar, and with the coming into the scene of an elected, though l i m i t e d Duma, he f e l t that, having been responsible s o l e l y to the Czar f o r so many years, he could not now submit to any interference by the Duma with the department for. foreign a f f a i r s .  The  contempt which he f e l t f o r the Duma, he expressed i n a statement to the German ambassador Schoen: that he could wait a long time before he would demean himself to t a l k with those p e o p l e . ^  2  As a r e s u l t , when  the f i r s t meeting of the Duma took place on May 10, 1906,  Lamsdorff,  true to h i s convictions, was no longer Russian foreign minister.  The Czar, i n h i s choice of Alexander Petrovich Izvolsky as successor to Lamsdorff, had the merit of f o r once concurring with what there was of "informed Russian public opinion".  ^  Previous to h i s  appointment as foreign minister, Izvolsky had been Russian ambassador to Japan and Denmark, h i s l a s t appointment being a t the Court o f Copenhagen, - a court connected with tfche Romanov dynasty.  Throughout  Europe, Germany as w e l l as elsewhere, h i s appointment was commented upon favourably.  In recent years Izvolsky has come i n f o r a withering  storm of c r i t i c i s m from German writers, and h i s a b i l i t i e s as a statesman have often been l o s t sight of i n the torrent o f abuse which has overwhelmed his name.  However, these polemics do not bear on I z v o l -  sky* s appointment as foreign minister, nor with h i s conduct of Russian foreign r e l a t i o n s f o r the f i r s t year and a half ,**^  iiii2.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 117.  liif-3.  Loc. c i t .  Wi.  Loc. c i t .  156 By those who knew him, Izvolsky was regarded as a man sessed of great a b i l i t y and high i n t e l l i g e n c e which was  pos-  counterbalanced  by an excessive s o c i a l vanity and sensitiveness to c r i t i c i s m , so that others had to empty extreme t a c t and circumspection when dealing with him.*^  According to the h o s t i l e mind of Baron Taube, two  characters  met i n Izvolsky: a statesman of broad views and supple i n t e l l i g e n c e , and an incontestable c o u r t i e r and snob.*^  Gooch, while s t a t i n g that  "his s e l f i s h materialism was equalled only by h i s a b i l i t y  1 1  admits  that he was as industrious as Lamsdorff and i n t e l l e c t u a l l y a giant i n comparison with Muraviev.* ^ 4  7  In h i s p o l i t i c a l outlook, Izvolsky was decidedly l i b e r a l as w e l l as being a strong Russian n a t i o n a l i s t . he was  While foreign minister,  to plead f o r an hour i n vain with the Tsar against the d i s s o l -  ution of the f i r s t Duma.^  8  During a period of prolonged study at  Edinburgh University, he had become well-acquainted with B r i t i s h ways and i n s t i t u t i o n s .  Often he was to speak to diplomatic colleagues i n  admiring terms of Great B r i t a i n . ^  9  Shortly before taking on h i s new duties as foreign minister, Izvolsky went on a v i s i t to Paris, where he met Nelidov and Benken-  UU5.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p.  iii|6.  Taube, La p o l i t i q u e russe, p.p. lOli -  Iiii7.  Gooch,Before the War Studies i n Diplomacy, p. 292,  UU8.  Kerensky, A., "Izvolsky s Personal Diplomatic Correspondence" Slavonic Review, January, 1938, footnote, 5, p. 391.  kh9.  B.D.  1  IV, no. 219, p.  236.  217. 119. v o l . I.  d o r f f , Russian ambassadors i n Paris and London, as w e l l as Muraviev, Russian ambassador i n Rome, the f i r s t two of whom had been strenuously opposed to the idea of the Bjorko p a c t . ^  0  Izvolsky believed, as d i d  S i r Arthur Nicolson, h i s future partner i n the making of the Convention, that Germany should be prevented from obtaining too great an ascend&icy i n Europe.  This would r e s u l t i n the reduction of Russia to  the status of a vassal.  Nicolson feared a s i m i l a r f a t e f o r Great  B r i t a i n i f the s i t u a t i o n should develop.  Izvolsky found, to h i s great  s a t i s f a c t i o n , that the three ambassadors held s i m i l a r viewpoints a working agreement was  and  soon established between them as to the future "-|5*1  l i n e s which Russian f o r e i g n p o l i c y should follow. On May 12, 1906,  Izvolsky assumed h i s new duties as f o r e i g n  minister, with a programme which c a l l e d f o r the l i q u i d a t i o n of the heritage of Count Lamsdorff i n Asia, by means of a r e c o n c i l i a t i o n with the former enemy, Japan.  This was to be followed by an even more im-  portant understanding with Great B r i t a i n , by which the differences separating B r i t a i n and Russia i n A s i a would be solved to the mutual s a t i s f a c t i o n of both countries.  There was a t h i r d point i n  I z v o l s k y s programme which needs to be stressed. 1  his genuine Anglophilism, r e a l i z e d that Russia was  Izvolsky, despite i n no p o s i t i o n to  become involved i n any i n t e r n a t i o n a l troubles i n her weakened condition.  i|5o.  Stieve, F r i e d r i c h , Isvolsky and the World War, A l l e n , 1926, p. 10.  il5l.  Ibid., p.  1*52.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p.p. 237 -  12. 238  London, George  158 Therefore, the r e a l i t i e s of the moment forced Izwolsky to consider as part of h i s programme the retention of c o r d i a l r e l a t i o n s with Germany. This was to act as an e f f e c t i v e check upon h i s d e s i r e f o r a f r i e n d l y li53  agreement with Great B r i t a i n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , with Izwolsky as Russian foreign minister, Europe was soon to be aware of one important f a c t ; Russia's long sojourn i n A s i a was over and the stranger had returned to Europe. With the a r r i v a l of S i r Arthur Nicolson i n St. Petersburg on May 28, 1906,  the two p r i n c i p a l architects of the Anglo-Russian Con-  vention were on the scene.  Nicolson had come to Russia following h i s  success at Algeciras, where, i n conjunction with h i s Russian colleague, Count C a s s i n i , he had blocked German aspirations i n Morocco.  At the  same time, by t h i s very success, he had acquired the reputation i n German eyes of being one of t h e i r "most dogged opponents"^* a t A l g e c i r a s that the Anglo-French-Russian  I t was  alignment f i r s t functioned-  an alignment which was eventually to thwart German plans f o r European hegemony.  Although whole-heartedly d e s i r i n g an agreement with Russia,  Nicolson never became an u n c r i t i c a l admirer of the Russians.  In the  words of the E a r l of Onslow: "he knew Russians and fee. knew t h e i r limitations".  Writing i n h i s own "Narrative", Nicolson declared  that he undertook the post of ambassadorship to Russia "with great  1*53.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907, p. 121.  S5li.  Von Schoen, F r e i h e r r , The Memoirs of an Ambassador, London, George A l l e n , 1922, p. 53.  1*55.  Onslow, E a r l of, Lord Carnock, Slavonic Review, March, 1929,  ;y  P.  55o  159 diffidence and considerable m i s g i v i n g s " . ^  6  He went <bn to admit  frankly that the f e e l i n g of h o s t i l i t y of many c i r c l e s i n England t o wards Russia was s t i l l f l o u r i s h i n g i n conjunction with a f e e l i n g of repugnance over the ruthless measures employed by the Russian  govern-  ment i n i t s suppression of revolutionary disorders. Despite these serious l i m i t a t i o n s to an agreement with Russia, Nicolson, l i k e many others of the time, f e l t that an aggressive and eff i c i e n t Germany was a more dangerous foe f o r Great B r i t a i n than an expanding but lumbering Russia.  The recent experiences of German host-  i l i t y i n the Morocco dispute convinced responsible B r i t i s h e r s that an agreement must be reached with Russia before she f e l l completely, i n her weakened condition, under the c o n t r o l of Germany.  On May  29,  formal discussions were commenced between the two  countries, with a view to reaching a general agreement over d i f f e r e n c e s separating them i n A s i a .  In h i s second interview on June 7, Nicolson  outlined to Izvolsky the procedure which he f e l t they should follow during the ensuing negotiations. He declared that there were three p r i n c i p a l questions to be discussed: Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia, and that the best course to be followed was  to examine each of these  questions separately and when agreement had been reached on one to proceed to the next.  When a conclusion of discussions had been reached,  a convention should be drawn up embracing a l l three agreements.  U56.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p. 197.  145*7.  Ibid., p.p. 206  -  207.  160 Izvolsky expressed h i s assent t o t h i s B r i t i s h proposal.  Throughout  the long and wearisome negotiations which followed, both p a r t i e s adhered i n the main to t h i s manner of procedure.**^  8  Negotiations had no sooner got f a i r l y under way than there occurred an incident which c h i l l e d Anglo-Russian hopes f o r an e a r l y agreement. to Anglo-Russian  r e l a t i o n s and set back  The incident which proved so i n j u r i o u s  relations took place i n London where the representat-  ives of a l l the European parliaments had gathered f o r the meeting of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.  The B r i t i s h prime minister, S i r Henry  Campbell- Bannerraan, was on the point of d e l i v e r i n g the welcoming address on the morning o f J u l y 23, 1906, when i t became known that the f i r s t Russian Duma had been dissolved by the Tsar.  An event of such a  nature could not be ignored and S i r Henry h u r r i e d l y incorporated into his speech a few French sentences which seemed to him f i t t i n g f o r the occasion.  When he came to the passage r e l a t i n g to the Duma, S i r  Henry declared that new i n s t i t u t i o n s are often plagued with troubled youths, but that the Duma would be revived i n some form o r other. What turned out to be h i s crowning faut pas, but which he regarded a t the time as a happy i n s p i r a t i o n , he reserved f o r the end o f his speech, with an adaptation of a f a m i l i a r c r y : "La Douma est morte, Vive l a Douraa."  This brought a tremendous ovation from the assembled p a r t i e s ,  disquieting and p e r s i s t e n t i n q u i r i e s from the Russian government, and  459 moments o f deept<anxiety to the B r i t i s h cabinet.  As a r e s u l t o f  458.  B.D. IV, no. 224, p.p. 239-240.  459.  Spender, J.A., The L i f e of the Right Honourable S i r Henry Campbell-Bannerman, London, 1923, v o l . I I , p.p. 261-264.  161 t h i s incident, Nicolson stated i n h i s d i a r y f o r August 6, 1906, "Izwolsky" s former eagerness has been replaced by silence and apparent indifference.  The Emperor i s wounded.  hope, and now very l i t t l e . " ^ ^  Two months ago there was every  The disastrous consequence of t h i s  B r i t i s h attempt to be f r i e n d l y towards Russia was only gradually l e s s ened by the assurances of S i r Edward Grey that no offence to the Tsar had been i n t e n d e d . ^  1  Even before formal negotiations had commenced, the B r i t i s h foreign o f f i c e had been working on the terms they would consider acceptable f o r an agreement with Russia.  In t h i s they were g r e a t l y ham-  pered by the B r i t i s h government i n India.  In March, 1906, John Morley,  Secretary of State f o r India, inquired of Lord Minto, the Viceroy o f India, as to what guarantees he should require of Russia i f some sort of understanding were to be reached with h e r . ^ strong disapproval o f the proposed agreement.  6 2  Lord Minto expressed  He suggested that i f an  agreement had to be made with Russia, t h e B r i t i s h government should begin elsewhere than i n Central A s i a , and closed h i s communication o f June 12 with the statement: "I have only given you my own views i n answer t o -your l e t t e r , but I c e r t a i n l y think that, f o r reasons a f f e c t i n g the i n t e r n a l administration o f India independently of Imperial f o r e i g n p o l i c y , the Government of India should be f u l l y consulted before any agreement i s entered into with Russia. " 1  1*60.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p. 222.  1*61.  Grey, Twenty-Five Years, v o l . I, p. U?I?.  1*62.  Morley, John, Viscount: Recollections, MacMillan, New York, 1917, V o l . I I , p. 167.  i|63.  Buchan, ffiohn, Lord Minto, Thomas Nelson,London, 1921*, p.p. 226-227  162 This l a s t statement was to bring Morley s stern rejoinder on J u l y 6: 1  "You argue...as i f the p o l i c y of entente with Russia were an open question. That i s j u s t what i t i s not. His Majesty's Government, with almost u n i v e r s a l support i n public opinion, have decided to make such attempt as Russian circumstances may permit to a r range an entente. The grounds f o r t h i s I have often referred to when w r i t i n g to you. Be they good or bad, be we r i g h t or wrong, that i s our p o l i c y . " U61i As f o r Minto's suggestion that the B r i t i s h government should bargain elsewhere than i n Central Asia, Morley r e p l i e d that "an entente with Russia  that should leave out Central Asia would be a sorry trophy f o r  our diplomacy i n d e e d . " ^  Morley c l e a r l y recognized that with Japan  now predominant i n the Far East and the r a p i d growth of German i n fluence i n the Near East, the only region l e f t where Great B r i t a i n could obtain e f f e c t i v e concessions from Russia was C e n t r a l Asia.  Even the  moderate S i r Edward Grey was forced t o remark of h i s dealings with the B r i t i s h government of India: " I t takes a l i t t l e time to l e a d them to the waters o f c o n c i l i a t i o n and get them to agree they are wholesome. 1*66 0  Under pressure from the home government, B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i n India acquiesced i n the attempt to reach an understanding with Russia, but i t remained from f i r s t to l a s t a reluctant acquiescence. At the same time as the B r i t i s h government was experiencing d i f f i c u l t i e s with i t s o f f i c i a l s , i n India, Izvolsky was encountering  l|61i.  Morley, Recollections, V o l . I I , p.p. 177-178.  Ij65.  Buchan, Lord Minto, p. 227.  Ij66.  B.D. IV, no. 227, p. 2Ul.  163 s i m i l a r opposition from the m i l i t a r y party i n Russia whose d e s i r e f o r greater Russian c o n t r o l i n the s t r a t e g i c Persian province of Siestan, next to India, and a port upon the Indian Ocean would not be i n harmony with an agreement with Great B r i t a i n . S p r i n g - R i c e , now B r i t i s h minister a t Teheran, wrote with considerable discernment to a close f r i e n d , as regards the Russian a t t i t u d e : "As f o r the (Russian) Government, you w i l l have noticed .Isvolsky's movements. I won't p a r t i c u l a r i s e , but what I think has happened i s that he began with a keen desire for an agreement and that then the Mar O f f i c e i n t e r f e r e d . As you know, what they desire i s an o u t l e t on the Indian Ocean, outside the Gulf....The Novoye Vrema took f i r e at the rumors of an agreement and pointed out that a l l the hope of Russia was now a t an end. There can be l i t t l e doubt that t h i s paper represents the Court, Grand Ducal and M i l i t a r y Party and that i t has great influence with the Emperor." 1*68 In confirmation of t h i s view, Izvolsky, w r i t i n g p r i v a t e l y t o Benckendorff a t t h i s time, described the Russian General S t a f f as "having l e a r n t nothing and forgotten nothing;- they talk .of Siestan, the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, e t c . exactly as the t a l k used to be, before the Japanese War, of Manchuria, Korea, and the P a c i f i c Ocean. "Ij69 Thus powerful and i n f l u e n t i a l groups i n both countries were opposed to an agreement, and t h e i r resistance had to be a l l a y e d i n a c o n c i l i a t o r y manner, before any r e a l progress could be made. As a r e s u l t of these f a c t o r s , Anglo-Russian negotiations made dishearteningly l i t t l e progress throughout the summer o f 1906.  I167.  B.D. IV, no. 227, p. 2J+1.  1*68.  Gwynn, Spring Rice, V o l . I I , p. 85.  J469.  Sumner, B.H., Tsardom and Imperialism i n the F a r East and Middle East, I880rl9llj., Proceedings of t h e ' B r i t i s h Academy, 19l*0, p.p. 37 - 38.  4  16k E a r l y i n June, Nicolson had presented  Izvolsky with a B r i t i s h scheme  f o r the settlement of.outstanding issues i n T i b e t . *  170  Although a  Russian counter-scheme had been promised, none had been forthcoming  j 1*1 by the middle of August.  As negotiations over Tibet were lagging,  Grey authorized Nicolson to open discussions with Izvolsky as regards Afghanistan, during the f i r s t week of September.  k72  However, as i n  the case of Tibet, Izvolsky showed himself indisposed to take up the li73 topic seriously. E a r l y i n the f a l l of 1906,  reports reached Izvolsky that the  Persian government had made a concession f o r a German bank i n Teheran. klk  This news greatly disturbed Izvolsky who,  while d e s i r i n g to r e t a i n  f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with Germany, had no wish to see German influence grow i n a region where Russian hegemony had hitherto been paramount. As a result of i t , before proceeding any further with Anglo-Russian negotiations, he resolved to undertake a v i s i t to Germany, to ascertain the views of the German government with regard to Persia and towards the whole idea of an Anglo-Russian understanding.  Near the end of October, Izvolsky a r r i v e d i n B e r l i n where between October 28th and 30th, he entered i n t o lengthy discussions  1*70.  B.D. IV, no. 221*, p.p. 239-21*0.  1*71.  C h u r c h i l l , Angle-Russian  1*72.  B.D, IV, no. 227, p,p. 2l*l-2i*2.  1*73,  Ibid., no.  1*71*.,  I b i d . , no. 351,  228,  p.  2l*2  p. 396.  Convention of 1907,  p. 133.  165 with the Kaiser and the German foreign o f f i c e o f f i c i a l s .  Izvolsky  informed the Germans that i t was an absolute n e c e s s i t y f o r h i s country to reach an agreement with Great B r i t a i n as the defeat she had suffered i n the Japanese War l e f t Russia's p o s i t i o n i n A s i a i n a most precarious state..- He declared that the proposed agreement would be confined to regions i n Central Asia, and added that no point of i t could be i n t e r preted as directed against Germany.  Bulow saw f i t to reassure I z v o l -  sky on t h i s point, and s a i d that an Anglo- Russian agreement would meet with f u l l approval i n Germany, provided German i n t e r e s t s were consulted.  He also declared that the concession f o r a German bank i n  Persia had not yet been decided upon, but i f i t should come about, i t would be a commercial bank whose purpose would be to develop German trade with Persia and without any powers of a p o l i t i c a l nature, such as the granting of loans to the l o c a l government  Greatly en-  couraged by t h i s , Izvolsky hastened to assure Bulow that nothing would L.76  be done about the Bagdfcad railway without Germany being consulted. In view of the fundamental axiom of German f o r e i g n p o l i c y that i t was impossible f o r Russia and Great B r i t a i n to become reconciled, one i s tempted to wonder how  sincere Bulow r e a l l y was i n h i s assur-  ances that an Anglo-Russian agreement would meet with nothing but benevolence on the part of Germany.  Probably he was sincere i n so f a r as  he believed an agreement would never be reached and a few manifestations  1*75.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  i*76i  B.D. IV, no. 23U, p.p. 21*8-21*9.  p.p. 136 - 137.  166 of good-will would cost Germany nothing.  At any rate, Bulow s assurances, whether sincere o r not, had 1  succeeded i n putting Izvolsky's mind a t r e s t . Petersburg,  Upon h i s return to S t .  Nicolson noted that he (izvolsky) was  "evidently r e l i e v e d a t the removal of the f e a r which was haunting him that Germany would step i n at a given moment and make matters uncomfortable f o r Russia." 477 Izvolsky, f o r h i s part, informed Nicolson that he intended to devote a l l h i s energies from now on to reaching an agreement with Great Britain. * 1  7 8  Nicolson, resolving to c a p i t a l i z e on Izvolsky s 1  favourable  frame of mind, now presented him with a B r i t i s h plan f o r a settlement of the Persian issue, on the basis of a d i v i s i o n o f the country i n t o spheres o f influence.  The region which Great B r i t a i n desired as her  sphere of influence i n P e r s i a was s p e c i f i c a l l y defined.  I t included  the d i s t r i c t o f Siestan, demanded by the B r i t i s h government i n India, so that India might be f r e e from any f e a r of a Russian attacK. corresponding Russian sphere was l e f t undefined.**  The  79  U n t i l the disastrous Russo-Japanese War, Russia had been unwilling to consider even remotely what i n r e a l i t y amounted to a p a r t i t i o n o f Persia into spheres of influence as she considered the  477.  B.D. IV, no. 254, p.p. 248 - 249.  478.'  Loc. c i t .  479.  B.D. IV, no. 371, enclosure, p.p. 4l5 - 416.  167 whole country was bound- to co e under her c o n t r o l e v e n t u a l l y . " * ffl  the autumn of 1903,  m  when Lansdowne was s t r i v i n g to reach an under-  standing with Russia, Benckendorff had informed him that the Russian government would not favour any arrangement which would place northern Persia under Russian o r southern Persia under B r i t i s h influence. Although Russia had been humbled by the r e s u l t o f the recent war with Japan, the question was s t i l l a t i c k l i s h one.  In the B r i t i s h foreign;  o f f i c e i t was generally agreed that i f Izvolsky were to concede the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n i n Persia, he would seek compensation East.  i n the Near  I f t h i s should prove the case, Grey held that the B r i t i s h gov-  eminent was morally bound to support Russia i n the Near East.  When the B r i t i s h plan was presented him by Nicolson on December 3,  Izvolsky having read the document, requested that he be given  time to study i t c a r e f u l l y .  The time required by Izvolsky to study  the document, ( i . e . overcome the objections of various Russian c i r c l e s ) covered nearly two months.  As a r e s u l t , Anglo-Russian discussion o f  the Persian issue from December 1906 u n t i l February, 1907, v i r t u a l l y lapsed.  Howdver, i n the meantime, r e a l progress was made towards reaching an agreement with gegard to Tibet, where differences were  1*80.  Schreimer, A.G., ed., De Siebert, B.. Entente Diplomacy and the World, New York, 1921, no. 5U8, p. 1*71*.  1*81.  B.D. IV, no. 181(a) p. 183.  1*82.  B.D. IV, no. 370, p. l*ll*.  1*83.  Churchill,  Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907, p. U*6.  168  met on both sides i n a c o n c i l i a t o r y s p i r i t . 15,  1907,  Is a r e s u l t , by January  negotiations on Tibet had reached such a stage that only a  few f i n i s h i n g touches were required to complete the accord.  In i t s  f i n a l form, Russia recognized that Great B r i t a i n , owing to her geographical p o s i t i o n , "has s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t i n seeing that the e x i s t i n g system regulating the external a f f a i r s of Tibet i s maintained i n i t s integrity.  Great B r i t a i n pledged Russia that B r i t i s h troops would  be withdrawn from the Ghambi v a l l e y f o l l o w i n g the payment of an indemn i t y by the Tibetans.  On the question of Buddhist and  missions a compromise was worked out.  scientific  Both countries agreed that  B r i t i s h and Russian Buddhist subjects might enter i n t o r e l i g i o u s rel a t i o n s of a s t r i c t l y n o n - p o l i t i c a l nature with the D a l a i Lama.  As  regards s c i e n t i f i c missions, neither country was to send any such mission into Tibet f o r a period Of threeoyears.  Following t h i s , agree-  ment was v i r t u a l l y assured on one of the three major problems conf r o n t i n g the two countries.  Despite the success of the negotiations over Tibet, Nicolson remained d i s t i n c t l y worried by I z v o l s k y s reluctance to discuss the 1  Persian and Afghan questions.  Regarding h i s annual report f o r  1906,  Nicolson was able to say that he believed Izvolsky to be t r u l y desirous of an understanding with Great B r i t a i n : nevertheless, he f e l t that the attitude of the court and m i l i t a r y party was bound to be i n i m i c a l to  m  1*85",  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, Appendix I I I , p.p. Loc. c i t .  -  U50.  169 any u n d e r s t a n d i n g . ^  6  the f i r s t days of 1907  As a r e s u l t , S i r Arthur was to remark during that he hoped the dismal Russian winter had  not affected h i s judgement, but he nevertheless was f i l l e d with misgivings as regards the Russian a t t i t u d e .  )ift7  , But, before January had passed, N i c o l s o n s hopes had completely 1  revived.  Benckendorff, then on a v i s i t to St. Petersburg, had a t the  wish of Izvolsky and the delighted concurrence of Nicolson, joined i n the Anglo-Russian discussions.  Nicolson believed that Benckendorff  with h i s decided Anglophile leanings, might lessen the opposition i n m i l i t a r y and court c i r c l e s .  In t h i s he was f u l l y j u s t i f i e d , as on  February 9, Benckendorff was able to t e l l Nicolson that the much feared attitude of the Russianggeneral s t a f f had moderated enough to accept i n p r i n c i p l e the idea of an agreement with Great B r i t a i n i f "some concessions of a p o l i t i c a l nature should be made tooRussia i n return f o r her projected withdrawal from a m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n . " 1*89 Previous to the favourable communication o f Benckendorff, a Russian m i n i s t e r i a l c o u n c i l had assembled on February 1, 1907, to discuss the a d v i s a b i l i t y of reaching an agreement with Great B r i t a i n . over Persia.  The majority of the ministers expressed themselves as  1*86.  B.D. IV, no. 21*3, p.p. 255-260.  1*87.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907, p. ll*7.  1*88.  B.D. IV, no. 2l*8, p.p. 269 - 270.  1*89.  B.D. IV, no. 250, p. 272.  170 favourably disposed towards the B r i t i s h proposal to d i v i d e Persia i n t o spheres of influence, although controversy was aroused over the subject of Siestan. The representative of the Russian general s t a f f declared that he was reluctant to see such a natural route from P e r s i a i n t o India pass under B r i t i s h c o n t r o l , but he added that, a t the present time, Russia was not i n a p o s i t i o n to prevent B r i t i s h occupation of this region.  In return f o r so important a concession, Great B r i t a i n ,  he argued, must be prepared t o make corresponding compensations elsewhere.^ ^ 9  In summing up, Izvolsky declared that the time bad arrived  f o r reaching an understanding with Great B r i t a i n .  Therefore he stressed  that Russia should be as f l e x i b l e as possible i n demarcating the l i n e s of the spheres of influence, and should r e l i n q u i s h strategic Siestan i n order t o obtain B r i t i s h support i n other regions.  In the end, the  c o u n c i l of ministers, i n accordance with the ideas of Izvolsky, "accepted the p r i n c i p l e of spheres of influence as the only basis possible f o r an agreement with England." 1x91 The favourable decision of the c o u n c i l marked the most important Russian step yet taken f o r reaching an understanding with Great B r i t a i n . Following the meeting, Izvolsky informed Nicolson on February 18 that the m i l i t a r y p a r t y were prepared to see Siestan included i n the B r i t i s h zone.**  92  . Now that Russia had made a s i g n i f i c a n t opening  with regard t o the Persian question, Nicolson was authorized on Feb-  490.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of J907, p. l 5 l .  491.  Siebert, op. c i t . , no. 548, p.p. 474 - 475.  492.  B.D. IV, no.  388, p.. 429  171 ruary 22 to inform the Russian government of B r i t i s h views with regard to Afghanistan.  On the following day, Nicolson gave Izvolsky a  paper containing f i v e headings which outlined the B r i t i s h p o s i t i o n t h e r e . A t  l a s t the three major issues separating Great B r i t a i n and  Russia had been discussed i n a f r i e n d l y fashion and negotiations f o r a complete agreement were i n f u l l motion.  At this point, Nicolson re-  ceived added encouragement from the Tsar, who said that an agreement must be made between the two countries,  With negotiations between Great B r i t a i n and Russia proceeding i n so smooth a manner, Benckendorff now f e l t f r e e to return to h i s London post.  As was i n e v i t a b l e , the question of the S t r a i t s was never  very f a r from the minds o f B r i t i s h and Russian statesmen throughout these negotiations. On March 15,  1907,  i n an interview with S i r Edward  Grey, Count Benckendorff declared, "that the opening of the S t r a i t s to Russia would .strengthen and ensure a good d i s p o s i t i o n i n that country, and complete "toe success of the arrangements. U96 n  S i r Edward seems t o have been prepared f o r such a statement and r e p l i e d i n a most encouraging manner.  He said that, although a t the moment i t  would be d i f f i c u l t to put anything concerning the S t r a i t s i n the form of an engagement, as he wished to have time t o discuss the matter with  1*93.  B.D. IV, no. 390, p. Ii33.  k9k.  B.D. IV, no. 1*72, p.  1*95.  B.D. IV, no. 255, p. 276-277.  1*96.  B.D. IV, no.  256,  526.  p; 277.  172  the Prime Minister, he d i d not wish the Izvolsky should i n f e r from the  li97 silence that the mention of the subject had been unfavourably received. Although as early as A p r i l , 1904, the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n o f f i c e had come to the conclusion that the concession of an unopposed passage of the S t r a i t s by Russian warships might prove a very u s e f u l asset i n general negotiations f o r an arrangement with Russia,**  98  there were  c e r t a i n reasons why Grey d i d not wish to introduce that subject into a s t r i c t l y A s i a t i c agreement.  In order to make the matter c l e a r to  Benckendorff, he reverted to i t i n h i s interview with him on March 19, He brought forward two main points to show Benckendorff why he believed no d e f i n i t e provisions regarding the S t r a i t s should be written into the forthcoming agreement on A s i a .  He said that c e r t a i n sections of  the B r i t i s h public..would be very c r i t i c a l of a p a r t i c u l a r engagement 499 on this question.  Besides, there was the a t t i t u d e of Germany to  be considered: Germany would have to be informed i f the o r i g i n a l scope of the agreement were widened toinclude an a r t i c l e about the S t r a i t s , as German interests would be d i r e c t l y affected thereby.''  00  In s p i t e  of these l i m i t a t i o n s , Grey ended h i s interview on a most encouraging note.  He stated: "I wish i t to be understood that the ( S t r a i t s ) ,question was one which we were prepared to discuss.  497.  B.D.  IV, no.  257,  498.  B.D.  IV, editor's note, p.  499.  B.D.  IV, no,.  50Cv  Loc. c i t .  258,  p.  280.  p., 281.  60.  173 I f , however, the Russian government desired a d i s cussion now, i t would be f o r them to take the i n i t i a t i v e . " 501 I f S i r Edward could have witnessed the e f f e c t of these l a s t words upon the Russians, been disturbed.  even h i s t r a n q u i l l i t y of s p i r i t would have  Upon hearing from Benckendorff what Grey had said,  Poklevsky-Kozell, counsellor of the Russian embassy i n London departed i n utmost haste f o r St. Petersburg.  There he reported to Izvolsky  and informed him of Grey's important d i s c l o s u r e .  Izvolsky was  entranced  by the p o s s i b i l i t i e s which Grey's views seemed to a f f o r d to Russia. He described t h i s new  B r i t i s h a t t i t u d e to Nicolson as "a great evol-  u t i o n i n our r e l a t i o n s , and a h i s t o r i c a l e v e n t " . N i c o l s o n ,  equally  elated, declared i n a dispatch to Grey: "The statement which you made w i l l undoubtedly have .a b e n e f i c i a l influence on our A s i a t i c discussions, and w i l l render the Russians d i s i n c l i n e d to i n s i s t on any minor points of difference."503 F  Following an intense study of Poklevsky's report, on A p r i l  Ik Izvolsky agreed that the present negotiations would only be compl i c a t e d by the introduction of the S t r a i t s issue and that the matter should be delayed to a more favourable opportunity.  At the same time,  however, he prepared a memorandum containing the views of the  Russian  government on treaty r e v i s i o n , with regard to t h e passage of the  501.  B.D.  IV, no. 258,  p.  28l.  502.  B.D.  IVm no. 26l,  p. 281*.  503.  Loc. c i t .  174 Straits.  In i t he declared: "We... attach the greatest importance to the f a c t that S i r Edward Grey has not made any objection i n p r i n c i p l e to a plan of arrangements which would give to Russian warships the exclusive r i g h t to pass the S t r a i t s i n both d i r e c t i o n s , while the naval forces o f other powers w i l l n o t be permitted to enter the Black Sea." 504  In h i s reply, S i r Edward attempted to moderate Izvolsky's extreme optimism, but a t the same time he took care not to d i s p e l l the favourable e f f e c t o f the o r i g i n a l B r i t i s h declaration.  He stated:  "I do not wish, however, t o discuss the p a r t i c u l a r .conditions under which the e x i s t i n g arrangement with regard to the S t r a i t s might be a l t e r e d . . . and I do not wish to be regarded as committed to any p a r t i c u l a r proposal, though, on the other hand, I do not wish to attach conditions now which would prevent any p a r t i c u l a r proposals from being d i s cussed when the time comes."505 Izvolsky does not seem to have been disturbed by the l i m i t a t i o n s wiihh which Grey sought to hedge h i s o r i g i n a l statement.  A f t e r long delay,  he acknowledged the receipt of Grey's memorandum on the subject and declared that Russia would wait f o r a more opportune moment to begin a discussion of the subject.  5o6  Grey received I z v o l s k y s reply as 1  being'in keeping with B r i t i s h views, and the matter was discussed no  507  more throughout the r e s t of the negotiations.  Despite the lack of a d e f i n i t e commitment, the change o f a t -  50U.  B.D. IV, no, 265,  505.  B.D. IV, no 268, enclosure, p. 291.  506.  B.D. IV, no. 275, enclosure, p.p. 295  507.  B.D. IV, no.  276,  enclosure, p,  p.  296.  287.  -  296.  175 titude as regards the S t r a i t s question upon the p a r t of Great B r i t a i n , had a decisive e f f e c t upon the hastening of an Anglo-Russian Convention.  Apart from one serious h i t c h towards the end, negotiations  from then on ran smoothly.  I.A. Zinoviev, Russian ambassador a t Con-  stantinople, drew up a memorandum which was read before a Russian Council of Ministers meeting on A p r i l lh, 1907.  In t h i s memorandum,  Zinoviev argued that nothing would meet Russian ends b e t t e r than t o secure passage of the S t r a i t s f o r the Russian Black Sea f l e e t .  In  order to achieve t h i s , the firm backing of Great B r i t a i n was a necessity.  I f Great B r i t a i n were w i l l i n g to support Russia i n this s i t -  uation, he argued that Russia must be prepared to make s i m i l a r concessions to her i n Central A s i a .  This l a s t remark was directed to-  wards the Russian m i l i t a r y party which had r a i s e d strenuous objections to the B r i t i s h terms as regards Afghanistan. was disturbed l e s t the 1895  The Russian general s t a f f  agreement on the Pamirs which had s a t i s -  f i e d t h e i r requirements should be revived.  They were also worried by  Kitchener's new p o l i c y of using Afghanistan no longer as a buffer, but as a place d'armes f o r the defence of India, i n conjunction with  509 a reformed Afghan array.  Countering these objections with a touch  of realism, Count Kokovtsov, m i n i s t e r of finance, declared that A f ghanistan was both too distant and too inaccessible to f a l l e a s i l y within the Russian sphere of influence.  Russia should take heed, he  went on, and quiet a l l B r i t i s h apprehensions f o r the s e c u r i t y of the  508.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907,  509.  Sumner,' B.H. Tsardom & Imperialism, Proc. Br. Acad., p. U9.  p.  165.  176 Indian f r o n t i e r by renouncing a l l pretensions i n Afghanistan.  With-  out t h i s security, he declared Great B r i t a i n would never consent to  510 sign a convention with Russia.  The c o u n c i l seems to have decided  that the B r i t i s h proposals with respect to Afghanistan would eventually  511 be found acceptable by the Russian government.  Members of the  Russian government such as Izvolsky and Kokovtsov were resolved on pursuing anconciliatory p o l i c y i n A s i a and r e f r a i n i n g from embarking on any w i l d schemes of expansion there.  I f , i n England, the days of  Palmerston and D i s r a e l i were over, so, i n Russia, were the days of Lobanov and Muraviev. As a r e s u l t of t h i s drawing together of Great B r i t a i n and Russia, agreement was almost complete as regards Persia by the end of April.  Colonel Napier, B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y attache, was able to say to  the Tsar that "Russia and England were now of one mind as regards  512  Persian a f f a i r s . "  y  The Tsar warmly concurred i n t h i s view.  Yet they were not quite s e t t l e d . to make good an afterthought by endeavouring 0  In May,  513  the B r i t i s h t r i e d i  to have the Russians  agree to the i n s e r t i o n of a clause i n the preamble,"relative ( s i c ) to s p e c i a l i n t e r e s t of Great B r i t a i n i n maintenance of ( s i c ) status quo  510.  C h u r c h i l l , AnglQ-Bussian Convention of 1907,  511.  I b i d . , p.p.  512.  B.D.  513.  Loc. c i t .  165-166  IV, no.  266,  p.  288.  p.  365.  177 i n Persian Gulf " . " ^  These e f f o r t s met with no success.  In refusing  to have t h i s clause inserted, Izvolsky, with a c e r t a i n sense of irony, used the same arguments which Grey had used f o r keeping a l l mention of the S t r a i t s out of the agreement: i t would enlarge the scope of the agreement between the two countries, and would d i r e c t l y a f f e c t the i n t e r e s t s of other powers (Germany and T u r k e y ) . T h e B r i t i s h government was so impressed by the f i r m stand taken by Izvolsky on the matter that i t decided to omit the disputed clause from the proposed agreement.^  16  Writing i n h i s Diplomatic Narrative afterwards, N i c o l -  son declared: " I t would be impossible to induce Izvolsky to put h i s ..signature to any document which he considered would fcause umbrage at Berlin...he takes as the bed-rock of h i s p o l i c y to take no step which might i n any way cause f r i c t i o n between Russia and Germany. M. Izvolsky thought we were leading him on to d e l i c a t e and dangerous ground and he shrank from taking any step i n the d i r ection which we had indicated. I am quite sure that I should not have overcome h i s objections." 517 With t h i s concession on the part of Great B r i t a i n , the l a s t serious obstaclento reaching an understanding  on Persia was passed and an  agreement based on the o r i g i n a l B r i t i s h proposal d i v i d i n g P e r s i a i n t o spheres of influence was a p r a c t i c a l surety. With the differences over Tibet and P e r s i a s e t t l e d , the l a s t  5H*.  B.D.  IV, no.  1*28,  p.  1*76.  515.  B.D.  IV, no.  1*29,  p..  U78.  516.  B.D.  IV, no.  1*35,  p.  U85.  517.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p.  253.  178 area of dispute was to be the thorny question of Afghanistan.  The  month of May had been f i l l e d with a series of voluminous exchanges on the question.  This correspondence continued throughout June and the  early part of J u l y , without any d e f i n i t e r e s u l t .  Following f u r t h e r  negotiations, Izvolsky, on July 19, presented Nicolson with an unoff i c i a l memorandum which set f o r t h the Russian views with regard to  5l8 Afghanistan.  At t h i s point, Nicolson decided that the cause of an  Anglo-Russian rapprochement would be furthered i f he were to undertake a personal v i s i t to London i n order to a s c e r t a i n by d i r e c t contact the views of the B r i t i s h government. Izvolsky agreed to t h i s idea. S i r Arthur, taking I z v o l s k y s memorandum with him, went to London on an 1  official visit.  519 '  he > While he way  520  away, Anglo-Russian negotiations  ceased f o r the time being.'  Although Anglo-Russian negotiations ceased temporarily, r e a l progress was made by Izvolsky i n reaching an agreement with B r i t a i n ' s a l l y and Russia's former enemy, Japan.  Great  This agreement was  at l e a s t to ensure t o l e r a t i o n i f not c o r d i a l i t y between these former foes.  Negotiations were continued r a p i d l y throughout the month of  July, and a t r e a t y binding the two countries to the consolidation of peaceful and f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as to the removal of a l l causes 521 of future misunderstanding was  signed on J u l y 30.  518.  B.D. IV, no. 491,.p.p. 553-554.  519.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  520.  Loc. c i t .  521.  Hayashi, op. c i t . , p.p. 323,-324.  I t i s interesting  p.  168.  179 to note that Great B r i t a i n played no d i r e c t part i n these Russo-Japanese negotiations.  Previous to the Russo-Japanese War,  Great B r i t a i n ,  i n her attempt t o reach an understanding with Russia, had c o n s i s t e n t l y suggested that the two countries commence t h e i r discussions over problems separating them i n the Far East.  The d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y of Japan  had, however, resulted i n a tremendous increase of Japanese influence i n the Far East, and a corresponding  decline i n influence of not only  her enemy, Russia, but also of her a l l y , Great B r i t a i n .  As a r e s u l t ,  through necessity, Anglo-Russian negotiations were confined to Central Asia, since what either country could o f f e r the other i n the Far East was now  virtually n i l .  Following the successful conclusion of the Japanese Treaty, the Tsar went on an o f f i c i a l three day v i s i t to the Kaiser a t Swinemunde, where William was  reviewing the German f l e e t .  Izvolsky  accompanied his r o y a l master on t h i s excursion p a r t l y no doubt f o r the purpose of a l l a y i n g strong German suspicions that the recently-signed Russo-Japanese agreement was i n r e a l i t y directed against Germany. had already denied such German assertions,-*  23  He  but he no doubt f e l t  that h i s presence on such an occasion would add weight to such denials as he might have to make. The days a t Swinemunde seemed to have passed i n the  522.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of  523.  Ibid., p.  169.  1907,  p.p.  spirit  l69-l#0.  180 of monarchial s o l i d a r i t y as provided f o r by the Treaty of Bjorko, desp i t e the f a c t that the treaty was not operative.  Izvolsky presented  a copy of the recent Russo-Japanese agreement to Bulow, the German chancellor.  Bulow, having c a r e f u l l y read the provisions, declared  52li them to be i n keeping with the aims of German p o l i c y i n the Far East. Simultaneously with his presentation of the Russo-Japanese agreement, Izvolsky informed Bulow that an Anglo-Russian agreement was soon to be completed with regard to Asia.  In j u s t i c e to Izvolsky, i t should be  remarked that he does not seem to have revealed any of the exact terms of the proposed agreement to Bulow, although he assured him that no German rights or interests would be harmed by i t , and that there had 525 been no discussion with regard to the Bagdhad Railway.  ^  Upon h i s  return to St. Petersburg, Izvolsky took pains to assure O'Bierne, B r i t i s h charge, that nothing had been divulged to Bulow concerning the proposed terms of the future Anglo-Russian p a c t . ^ ^ 2  passed on these assurances to Grey, who,  O'Bierne  although s c e p t i c a l , stated  that he trusted the Russian government would not be influenced by F Germany to the detriment of Great B r i t a i n " i n matters which affected  527 Russia and ourselves alone". A l l B r i t i s h suspicions of the meeting at Swinemunde were f i n a l l y d i s p e l l e d when an equally successful meeting was heldon August llx, between the Kaiser and King Edward a t Wilhelms528 hohe.  Apparently f o r a change Germany was seeking to act i n a  52ii.  Bulow, Memoirs, Vol.. I I , p^p. 295  525.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  526.  B.D.  IV, no. 279, p. 298.  527.  B.D.  IV, no. 277, p. 297.  £28.  B.D. VI, no. 25, p.p. k3-kh  -  296. p.  171.  181 conciliatory  manner to everyone.  About the middle of August, Nicolson a r r i v e d back i n St. Petersburg, bringing with him the l a t e s t B r i t i s h terms as regards Afghanistan.  Upon h i s presenting them to Izvolsky, the l a t t e r  was  quite favourably impressed and declared that a great step had been  529 taken towards an agreement.  y  Bespite I z v o l s k y s optimism, the l a t e s t B r i t i s h proposals 1  did not meet with f u l l Russian approval.  The main point of c r i t i c i s m  was the B r i t i s h i n s i s t e n c e that Russia should undertake not to occupy any part of Afghanistan nor i n t e r f e r e with the i n t e r n a l government of the country.''^  From the f i r s t ,  the Russian government had opposed  such an unconditional undertaking, since the B r i t i s h government had declined to give a s i m i l a r promise i n return.  However, while Nicolson  was i n London, Grey had authorized him to propose, i f necessary, that "should any change occur i n the p o l i t i c a l status of Afghanistan, the two governments w i l l enter i n t o a f r i e n d l y exchange of views on the 531 subject."-  I f , on the other hand, the Russian government were un-  w i l l i n g to give the unconditional guarantee, then t h i s B r i t i s h formula  532 was to f i n d no place i n the agreement.  .  As a r e s u l t of t h i s important concession on the part of  529.  B.D.  IV2 no.  1*93, p. 556. .  530.  B.D.  IV, no.  1*83,  531.  B.D.  IV, no.  1*92, p. 551*.  532.  B.D.  IV, no.  1*92,  p.  p.  51*3.  551*.  182. Great B r i t a i n , Izvolsky, on August 22, was able to win the Tsar's consent to the treaty, provided that a c o u n c i l of ministers agreed to a l l of the text.  Elated by t h i s important gain, Izvolsky assured Nicolson  on August 23,  that the B r i t i s h proposals as they now  stood with regard  533 to Afghanistan were acceptable to Russia. •  J  He spoke too soon, f o r  i n the meeting of the c o u n c i l on the night of August 24, p o s i t i o n to Izvolsky manifested i t s e l f .  serious op-  Although he had, as he s a i d ,  argued u n t i l he was hoarse i n favour of the agreement, yet when a vote was c a l l e d i n the c o u n c i l , he found himself supported only by the Prime Minister, P.A. one m i l i t a r y member.  Stolypin, a f i r m f r i e n d of Great  Britain,  a  n  d  Genuinely perturbed by t h i s unexpected devel-  opment, Izvolsky had no recourse but to summon Nicolson and explain to  535 him that he had been unable to reach an agreement. Nicolson h i d his intense disappointment under the laconic statement to Grey: "an 536 unexpected and serious h i t c h has occurred. ""^  Opposition to the  agreement had centred on the count that the majority of the c o u n c i l had demanded that Russia be freed from i t s own unconditional promise, but that at the same time the B r i t i s h formula f o r consultation i n the event of a p o l i t i c a l change i n Afghanistan be r e t a i n e d . ^  3 7  At the  533.  B.D. 17, no. 505,  p.p. 563-564.  534.  Pares, Bernard, The F a l l of the Russian Monarchy, Jonathan Cape, London, 1939, p. 170.  535.  B.D. IV, no. 008, p.p. 566-567.  536.  B.D.  IV, no. 506,  p. 564.  537.  B.D.  IV, no. 506,  p.  564.  183 same time Nicolson c l e a r l y r e a l i z e d where I z v o l s k y s true f e e l i n g s l a y 1  as he wrote to Grey: " I t i s not necessary to argue with him, as he i s 538 of our opinion." ^ Grey, l i k e Nicolson, was  deeply disappointed by t h i s unex-  pected h i t c h , but he f e l t that he had gone to the utmost l i m i t i n concessions and that he could go no f u r t h e r .  He could only add that  he hoped the Russian government would bear i n mind "that l a r g e r issues are i n d i r e c t l y at stake, even than .those d i r e c t l y involved i n these agreements, f o r i t has throughout been our b e l i e f that an agreement regarding Asia...would so influence the d i s p o s i t i o n o f . t h i s country towards Russia to make f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s possible on questions which may a r i s e elsewhere i n the future. Without such an agreement t h i s expectation must be disappointed. "5139 Izvolsky, f o r t i f i e d by this i n d i r e c t assurance of Grey's support e l s e where i f an agreement were secured, resolved once more to t r y to win the unanimous support of the c o u n c i l of ministers.  At t h i s meeting,  on August 28, Izvolsky, by the force of h i s eloquence, convinced  the  council i n i t s e n t i r e t y of the necessity f o r reaching an agreement i  with Great B r i t a i n .  The c o u n c i l of ministers resolved to give up the  idea of the unconditional promise of Russia respecting Afghanistan, and of the insistence of an exchange of views with Great B r i t a i n should the p o l i t i c a l status of the country undergo any change.*^  The Russians  f o r t h e i r part recognized that Afghanistan l a y outside t h e i r sphere of  538.  B.D.  IV, no.  506,  p.  561*.  539.  B.D.  IV, no.  507,  p.  565.  51*0.  B.D.  IV, no.  512,  p.  573.  influence and agreed to enter into p o l i t i c a l r e l a t i o n s with that 51*1 country only through the intermediary of the B r i t i s h government. ^ As a r e s u l t of t h i s , Nicolson could f i n a l l y s t a t e what often appeared hopeless:  "the negotiations are now  51*2 concluded".  Through a happy i n s p i r a t i o n during the negotiations, I z volsky had proposed that there should be a general preamble preceding  52i2 the three parts of the agreement, and a s i n g l e r a t i f i c a t i o n f o r a l l . - ' * M  With commendable a l a c r i t y , Greyresponded to t h i s idea and informed Nicolson that the B r i t i s h f o r e i g n o f f i c e was  i n f u l l agreement with  Izvolsky*s idea, and at the same time he expressed the wish that the forthcoming Anglo-Russian arrangement should be known as a  convention.''****  Izvolsky r e a d i l y declared h i s acceptance of t h i s s t y l e f o r the Anglo51*5 Russian understanding. ATI d i f f i c u l t i e s and uncertainties having been overcome, Nicolson and Izvolsky put t h e i r signatures to the f u l l t e x t of the convention between Great B r i t a i n and Russia, r e l a t i n g to P e r s i a , Afghani s t a n and Tibet, on August 31, 1907.*^  Mutual congratulations on the  accomplishment of this arduous task were now the order of the  51*1.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, Appendix 3, p. hh9»  52*2.  B.D.  IV, no. 511,  51*3.  B.D.  IV, no. 283, p.p. 301-302.  51*1*.  B.D. IV, no. 285, p. 303.  51*5.  B.D,  IV, no, 286, p. 30l*.  51*6.  B.D.  IV, Appendix I, p.p. 618-621.  p.  572.  day.  185 S i r Arthur Nicolson wrote S i r Edward Grey: "I cannot refrain...from w r i t i n g a l i n e to thank you, sincerely, f o r the kind support you have given me throughout these negotiations....Tour guidance has been most invaluable." 51*7 S i r Edward responded i n a l i k e fashion: "I can't t e l l you how much a l l of us, who have been cognizant of the Russian negotiations admire the way you.have handled them....In everything i n which you have been engaged, you have made a success. "51*8. Izvolsky was the r e c i p i e n t of a k i n d l y message from Grey, which he 51iQ  greatly appreciated.*"  f7  On the eve of the signing of the convention,  Nicolson wrote to Grey: "He (Izvolsky) has acted most l o y a l l y to us throughout, and I have not detected the s l i g h t e s t attempt to take an u n f a i r advantage. The game has been played most f a i r l y . "550 Izvolsky had good reason to be proud o f h i s achievements to date, and the v i t a l r o l e which he had played i n bringing both the B r i t i s h and Japanese negotiations to a successful conclusion should not be minimi z e d on account of l a t e r mistakes.  Under the guidance of Izvolsky,  the prestige of Russia had r i s e n with astounding r a p i d i t y from the unprecedented disaster of the Russo-Japanese War. A f t e r a l i t t l e over a year i n o f f i c e as f o r e i g n minister, he could point with p r i d e to two successful major achievements.  The f i r s t of these had cleared away the  51*7.  B.D. IV, no. 288,  51*8.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p.p.  51*9.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  550.  B.D. IV, no. 288,  p. 30i*.  p. 30l*.  255-256. p. 176.  186 uncertainties s t i l l e x i s t i n g i n the r e l a t i o n s h i p of Russia to Japan following the Treaty of Portsmouth, and established i f not c o r d i a l , at l e a s t reasonable r e l a t i o n s with the l a t e enemy.  The other and even  more important achievement was the settlement of almost century-old differences with Great B r i t a i n i n such a manner that from the s p i r i t of tolerance i n which the agreement was signed, friendship might event u a l l y mature.  Izvolsky's p o l i t i c a l reputation had i n August,  reached i t s height.  G.P.  1907,  Gooch does him no more than j u s t i c e when he  says, "Had he (Izvolsky) died i n the autumn of 1907,  h i s t o r y would  have judged that a statesman of f r o n t rank had been too e a r l y l o s t to the world. " ^ " n  /  J  At t h i s period, i t was fortunate f o r Izvolsky that  the future i s a closed book.  U n t i l the signing of the pact i t had not seemed possible that Great B r i t a i n and Russia should be able to overcome t h e i r d i f f e r ences.  Professor Schiemann, noted German authority on Russia, de-  clared, when he learned of the agreement, that the theory of i r r e c o n c i l a b l e antagonism between Russia and Great B r i t a i n had broken down. He described the new agreement as a diplomatic v i c t o r y f o r Great  Brit-  ain - a v i c t o r y which a few years ago would have been thought impos-  552 sible.  The p o l i t i c a l writer, Calchas, described by use of a  l i g h t l y drawn h i s t o r i c a l p a r a l l e l the new i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n which had resulted from the signing of the convention.  In the F o r t -  551.  Gooch, G.P.  83.  552.  Cal@has, The Anglo-Russian Agreement, F o r t n i g h t l y Review, CCCCXC, 1907, p. 5i*5.  Before the War  Studies, V o l . I, p.  187  n i g h t l y Review he wrote: "A few weeks a f t e r the Battle of the B a l t i c , the Emperor Alexander intimated to the B r i t i s h admiral 'the greatest desire to return to h i s amicable a l l i a n c e ' with the United Kingdom. Nelson, with c h a r a c t e r i s t i c fervour rep l i e d to Count Pahlen, ' I have now only to pray that a permanent (which must be honoured) peace may be establ i s h e d between our gracious sovereigns and that our august masters' reigns may be blessed with every happiness which t h i s world can afford.' These words may be repeated with firmer hope than at any moment i n the i n t e r v a l of more than a century which has since elapsed. "- ' ^ >  ?  "Calchas" then said that B r i t i s h p o l i c y as regards Russia from the time of the younger P i t t u n t i l the signing of the Anglo-Russian  Con-  551* vention had been a l t e r n a t e l y one of "menace and s c u t t l e " .  He  further stated that S i r Edward Grey, by h i s r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y of coming to an agreement with Russia, had placed Anglo-Russian  relations  above the wash of sentimentalism, whether chauvinist or democratic, and placed them on a s o l i d basis of granite. Although the pact between Great B r i t a i n and Russia had been signed, i t was to meet with severe c r i t i c i s m i n c e r t a i n sections i n both  556 countries.  In Great B r i t a i n , Lord Curzon s i g n a l i z e d h i s r e t u r n t o  public l i f e by a stern denunciation of the agreement with Russia.  Fol-  lowing a quarrel with Kitchener, he had resigned from the v i c e r o y a l t y of India and had become estranged from both p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s .  Now,  553.  Calchas, F o r t n i g h t l y Review, p.  535.  554.  Ibid., p.  538.  555.  Ibid., p.  51*0.  556.  For a l u c i d and b r i l l i a n t discussion of the opposition which the pact met with i n Great B r i t a i n , see: Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle f o r Mastery i n Europe, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1 9 5 4 , p.p. 4 4 5 446.  188 decided t o attempt a p o l i t i c a l comeback, and had been elected to the House of Lords as representative I r i s h peer, j u s t as the understanding with Russia was being reached.  On September 25,  a day before the  public release of the text, he had written to E a r l Percy, one of those B r i t i s h statesmen who,  according to the Russian diplomat, Sazonov, re-  558 garded enmity towards Russia as the beginning of p o l i t i c a l wisdom.^ "The Russian Convention i s i n my view deplorable. I t gives up a l l that we have been f i g h t i n g f o r f o r years, and i t gives up with a wholesale abandon that i s t r u l y c y n i c a l i n i t s recklessness. Ah, me, i t makes one des p a i r of public l i f e . The e f f o r t s of a century s a c r i f i c e d and nothing or next to nothing i n return. When Parliament meets there ought to be, but I suppose w i l l not be, a demonstration i n force."559 On February 6, 1908, i n h i s maiden speech i n the House of Lords, he attacked the Convention i n no uncertain terms dwelling f o r an hour and a quarter on i t s i n i q u i t i e s . ' ' ^ 0  According to Curzon, the Anglo-Russian  Convention of 1907, besides s a c r i f i c i n g everything, was humiliating.  excessively  He admitted that the conception was r i g h t , but stated  that apart from that there was l i t t l e good about i t .  In Persia,  everything of value had been surrendered t o Russia, the Russian region being abnormally large and r i c h , while the B r i t i s h region was both too small and too poor.  In Afghanistan, not even the Amir's consent had  557.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  558.  Sazonov, Serge, F a t e f u l Years, London, Jonathan Cape, London, p.p. 2k - 2 5 1 .  559.  Ronaldshay, Curzon, V o l . I l l , p.  38.  p.  325.  189 been obtained.  To consult Russia about the c i r c u l a t i o n of the Chumbi  v a l l e y was degrading while the other Tibetan clauses were an "absolute surrender".  Despite Curzon s eloquence the 1  the Anglo-Russian  House of Lords accepted  Convention.  In the House of Commons, the attack was taken up by Lord  561 Curzon's confidant, E a r l Percy. d i s t i n c t l y unfavourable.  As with Curzon, h i s remarks were  He f a i l e d to see anything i n the convention  562 upon which Great B r i t a i n might be congratulated.  Percy's  speech  touched o f f a f u l l - s c a l e debate on the question, with Balfour^leader of the opposition expressing his scepticism of an arrangement which he believed conceded too much unnecessarily. Many members who were opposed to the Convention as i t stood, and who had a t one time i n t h e i r l i v e s , no matter how b r i e f l y , v i s i t e d Persia, emulated Lord Curzon, the c h i e f c r i t i c and t r a v e l l e r , i n order to give added weight to t h e i r arguments.  This form of attack was brought t o an abrupt close by a  humourous member of the House, E l l i s G r i f f i t h , who remarked t h a t : "To have v i s i t e d the country seemed to him no great . q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r making a relevant speech....Therefore he would not state one way or the other whether he had been there or not....It was more important to have read the Convention than to have been t o Persia.' '' 1  Following an able defence of the Convention by Grey,^**  the House o f  565 Commons accepted the Convention with good grace.' '  Parliamentary Debates, iith Series, CLXXXIV, p.p. I469-I18O.  561. 562.  The opposition,  .  Ibid., p. 523.  >  563.  Ibid., p.p. 479-U82.  561+.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907,  565.  Loc. c i t .  p.  325.  190 apart from that of a few determined diehards, had never been of a r e a l l y serious nature, and the danger of i t s being rejected by either House had been discounted from the f i r s t .  Among B r i t i s h L i b e r a l groups, there  was c r i t i c i s m of the Convention as i t respected P e r s i a .  Many B r i t i s h  Liberals argued that the government, by d i v i d i n g P e r s i a i n t o spheres of influence, had betrayed the cause of Persian C o n s t i t u t i o n a l government and independence of which i t had previously been the avowed champion.  Th&nmost able exponent of these views was Professor G. Browne,  566 who published a work e n t i t l e d "The Persian Revolution",  , i n which  he defended the cause of Persian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l i s m and unsparingly reproved the B r i t i s h government f o r i t s p o l i c y towards P e r s i a ,  However,  l i k e the Parliamentary c r i t i c s , the L i b e r a l c r i t i c s , being confined f o r the most part to i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s , were able to exert l i t t l e pres567  sure on the government.  . The vast majority of L i b e r a l s and Conser-  vatives a l s o , i f they were i n t e r e s t e d i n f o r e i g n p o l i t i c s , were only too glad to reach an accord with t h e i r ancient foe.  Whether the  agreement was honourable to Persia or not was of purely secondary importance compared to the f a c t -fchrt i t was an e f f e c t i v e guarantee to prevent Russia j o i n i n g Germany against Great B r i t a i n . The opposition which Izvolsky had to encounter i n Russia with regard to the Convention was more deep-rooted and serious than that encountered by Grey i n England.  566.  Browne, G.,  However, he was as successful  The Persian Revolution, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press,  1910. 567.  For another impassioned condemnation of B r i t i s h p o l i c y with r e gard to Persia, see Hammond, J.L., C.P. Scott, London, G. B e l l , 193li, Chaps. X St EL.  before the Russian Duma as Grey had been before the B r i t i s h Parliament. On h i s f i r s t appearance before the Duma on February 27, he gave a gene r a l o u t l i n e of the purposes of h i s foreign policy, and declared that i t was h i s great desire to do a l l that was possible "for the maintenance of the general peace".  5  In f u r t h e r i n g the cause of peace, an  agreement had been arrived at.with Great B r i t a i n , which concerned s e l f with "several s p e c i a l questions r e l a t i n g to C e n t r a l Asia."^°  it9  A f t e r having welcomed Izvolsky upon h i s debut, Professor Paul N. Miliukov, leader of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Democratic Party, expressed h i s pleasure upon learning that Russian foreign p o l i c y would follow a peaceful course.  He was equally glad that the rapprochement with  Great B r i t a i n had removed the danger of a c l a s h of i n t e r e s t s i n Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia.^®  The Duma seems then to have accepted  Izvolsky's p o l i c y without any more comment.  The great difference be-  tween the acceptance of the Convention by the B r i t i s h Parliament and i t s acceptance by the Duma was now to manifest i t s e l f .  Once S i r Edward  Grey had secured the B r i t i s h Parliament's acceptance of the Convention, he could rest assured that even the groups most h o s t i l e to i t were bound to accept i t by the very nature o f the B r i t i s h c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government.  Once Izvolsky had secured the Russian Duma's acceptance  of the convention, he could not rest assured that a l l i n f l u e n t i a l sections of the Russian government would consider themselves bound by i t .  568.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention o f 1907,  569.  Ibid., p. 333.  570.  Ibid., p. 333.  p. 332.  192  Perhaps acceptance of the convention by the Duma would only i n t e n s i f y opposition, since i n reactionary c i r c l e s the Duma was regarded as the offspring of the feared and detested Western Liberalism, and even as an agent o f Great B r i t a i n and France.  The Duma, although exerting a  not n e g l i g i b l e influence upon Russian foreign a f f a i r s , s t i l l lacked c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c ontrol over them.  The l i n e s Russian foreign p o l i c y  intended to take, although influenced by the p r e v a i l i n g mood o f the Duma, were not submitted to i t f o r a c t i v e consideration i n advance, but werecarried on by the government behind the scenes.  As a r e s u l t ,  i t often happened that the Duma was informed o f decisions taken i n Russian foreign p o l i c y only a f t e r they had become f a i t s accomplis. Izvolsky s readiness t o appear before the Duma could be interpreted as 1  a f r i e n d l y gesture to Russian public opinion and to the Western L i b e r a l powers, but as l i t t l e else.  Russian c r i t i c i s m of the Convention was  to remain as v i r u l e n t a f t e r I z v o l s k y s meeting with the Duma as before. 1  This state of a f f a i r s was to continue to the eve of war i n 1914, and even a f t e r .  In Paris, Prince Kotchubey, a b i t t e r Anglophobe, denounced the agreement as one which bound Russia to renounce her natural ambitions i n Asia.  He accused Izvolsky of pursuing a timid p o l i c y both  because he lacked f a i t h i n the m i l i t a r y power o f Russia, and because he desired to be s e r v i l e to a Czar who was imbued with Anglophile sentiments.^ "'" 7  571.  Muraviev, the Russian ambassador i n Rome, considered the  B.D. -IV, no. 542, p. 602.  '  193 d i v i s i o n of Persia into spheres of influence as opposed to Russia's t r a d i t i o n a l p o l i c y , and as highly unprofitable f o r h e r . ^  2  Count  Witte, more than ready to attack something not h i s own work, described the convention as a change from a f l i r t a t i o n with Germany to a f l i r t a t i o n with Great B r i t a i n .  In h i s judgement, the convention by  i t s e l f was of no p a r t i c u l a r value: i t s importance would l i e i n the growth of future r e l a t i o n s h i p s , as Russia was the a l l y and Great 573 B r i t a i n the f r i e n d of France.  X J  Count Witte could not have been  aware at the time how true h i s l a s t observation was to.become. The most penetrating and most sensible Russian c r i t i c i s m of the Convention was to come from the hands of Baron Taube, astute head of the l e g a l department of the foreign o f f i c e , who,  after.he had  read the t r e a t y text given to him by Izvolsky, declared: "I can indeed f i n d i n t h i s document what you wish to ..give England, but not what i t gives us. You renounce Afghanistan, you renounce the Persian Gulf i n the southern zone - which could perhaps someday assure us the o u t l e t to the open sea which we v a i n l y seek i n the d i r e c t i o n of Constantinople - and you receive nothing i n return except the north of P e r s i a , where we are already masters. $lk n  A s i m i l a r view was expressed by Paul Cambon, French ambassador i n London, though i n a much l e s s c r i t i c a l fashion.  Cambon, assuring Grey  that Great B r i t a i n was the r e a l gainer by the agreement, declared:  572.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  573.  Yarmolinsky, Witte, p.  57li.  C h u r c h i l l , op. c i t . , p.  1*32.  339.  p.  321.  "You have secured a great part of the Persian L i t t o r a l , strengthened your p o s i t i o n as regards the Gulls, and obtained a recognition of your protectorate of Afghani s t a n . The inland of Persia of which the Russians have so much i s mountains and desert." 575 In truth, i t must be admitted that the B r i t i s h gained by f a r the better part of the bargain.  When Great B r i t a i n y i e l d e d northern P e r s i a t o  Russia i n return f o r a sphere of influence i n the south, i t i n i t s e l f v i r t u a l l y marked no gain f o r Russia, as northern Persia was already Russian i n f a c t i f not i n name.  When Russia agreed to the B r i t i s h  establishing a near protectorate over Afghanistan t h i s marked a defi n i t e gain f o r Great B r i t a i n , as h i t h e r t o Russia had never been w i l l i n g to recognize that Afghanistan l a y outside her sphere of influence. In return f o r some minor trade concessions i n Afghanistan, and a p l a t o n i c promise of diplomatic a i d i n the Near East, Russia bound h e r s e l f by d e f i n i t e promises to respect the B r i t i s h strategic p o s i t i o n i n Central Asia as w e l l as t o permit the extension of that p o s i t i o n to lands once deemed exclusively Russian.  The British, dominion i n India had  been f o r the f i r s t time guaranteed by Russia. 1911,  As a r e s u l t , on May 26,  S i r Edward Grey was able to d e l i v e r the following words before  the Committee of Imperial Defence: "With regard to the defence o f the Indian f r o n t i e r , .that has been immensely s i m p l i f i e d by the AngloRussian, agreement... .What a relief that has been f o r the l a s t four or f i v e years."576 To no person was i t more evident than to S i r Edward that Great B r i t a i n  575.  B.D. IV, no. 337, p. 597.  576.  B.D. IV, Appendix V, p. 789.  195 had emerged with the major share of the s p o i l s .  With regard to the  Persian part of the Convention he wrote: "The gain was equal - on paper. In p r a c t i c e we gave up nothing. We d i d not wish to pursue a forward p o l i c y i n Persia; nor could a. B r i t i s h advance i n P e r s i a have been the same menace to Russia that a Russian advance i n Persia might be to India. I t i s no wonder that the Russian Foreign Minister had some d i f f i c u l t y i n persuading m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s i n Russia to give up something of r e a l p o t e n t i a l value to them, while we gave up what was of l i t t l e or no p r a c t i c a l value to  us."577  Summing up the convention as a whole he declared: "I do not agree...that even as an i s o l a t e d bargain, ..the convention i s a bad one, because anyone behind the scenes knows that what we have gained s t r a t e g i c a l l y i s r e a l , while the apparent s a c r i f i c e s we have made commercially are not real."578  Nor were the Russian slow to recognize who was the r e a l gainer by the Anglo-Russian Convention.  In the years following, as  Russia once more regained her strength, her d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with a treaty which c l e a r l y l i m i t e d her r i g h t to expand i n A s i a became i n creasingly evident.  In p a r t i c u l a r , i n Persia Russian i n t r i g u e and i n -  f i l t r a t i o n reached such proportions that Grey declared to Benckendorff: "If Russia should make things too d i f f i c u l t ( i n Persia) the p o l i c y of f r i e n d l y agreement with her might become impossible." 579. Then, i n order to soften t h i s admonition he added that i n such a case he would resign as he could not pursue any other p o l i c y himself but  577.  Grey, Speeches, V o l . I, p.  578.  B.D.  579.  Grey, op. c i t . , p.  IV, no.  550,  p.  616. 16U.  160  196  that of friendship with Russia.  p  The Russians, f o r t h e i r part, do  not seem to have been unduly alarmed by such warnings, as they knew f u l l well that Anglo-German r i v a l r y had reached such a degree of i n t e n s i t y that B r i t a i n could not a f f o r d to become involved i n a dispute with Russia over some minor issues i n Central A s i a .  Sazonov, Izffolsky's  successor as Russian f o r e i g n minister, was therefore quite correct when he wrote t o Poklevsky-Kozell, ember 25,  now Russian minister i n Teheran on Sept-  1910: "We may r e s t assured that the English, engaged i n the pursuit of p o l i t i c a l aims of v i t a l importance i n Europe, may, i n case of necessity, be prepared to s a c r i f i c e c e r t a i n i n t e r e s t s i n A s i a i n order to keep a convention a l i v e which i s of such importance to them. This i s a circumstance which we can, o f course, e x p l o i t f o r ourselves, as, f o r instance, i n Persian affairs."581  Nevertheless,  i t was f o r this very^reason, the f a c t that the  Anglo-Russian agreement had netteddRussia so l i t t l e p r o f i t , as w e l l as on account of the t r a d i t i o n a l b e l i e f i n monarchial s o l i d a r i t y that reactionary conservative groups i n Russia were to advance the case f o r Russo-German friendship down to the period immediately preceding the outbreak o f the World War.  One of the most noteworthy advocates of  such an alignment was P.N. Burnovo, a member of the State Council who had been M i n i s t e r of I n t e r i o r i n Witte s Cabinet. 1  Writing a t some  length i n his memorandum, shortly before the outbreak of the war o f 1914,  Durnovo declared:  580.  . Grey, Speeches, p.  581.  169.  Siebert, no. 116, p. 94.  197 "The c e n t r a l f a c t o r of the period of world h i s t o r y through which we are now passing i s the r i v a l r y between England and Germany. This r i v a l r y must i n e v i t a b l y lead to an armed struggle between them, the issue of which w i l l , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , prove f a t a l to the vanquished side. The i n t e r e s t s of these two powers are f a r too incompatible, . and t h e i r simultaneous existence as world powers w i l l sooner or l a t e r prove impossible. One the one hand, there i s an i n s u l a r State, whose world importance r e s t s upon i t s domination of the sea, i t s world trade and i t s innumerable colonies. On the other, there i s a powerful continental empire, whose l i m i t e d t e r r i t o r y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r an increased population. I t has therefore openly and candidly declared that i t s future i s on the seas. I t has, with fabulous speed, developed an enormous would commerce, b u i l t f o r i t s protection a formidable navy, and, with i t s famous trademark, "Made In Germany", created a mortal danger to the i n d u s t r i a l and economic prosperity of i t s r i v a l . Naturally, England cannot y i e l d without a f i g h t , and between, her and Germany a struggle f o r l i f e or death i s inevitable."' but on the other hand: "The v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of Russia and Germany do not c o n f l i c t . There are fundamental grounds f o r a peaceable existence of these two States. Germany's future l i e s on the sea, that i s , i n a realm where Russia, e s s e n t i a l l y the most continental of the great powers, has no i n t e r e s t s whatever. We have no overseas colonies, and s h a l l probably never have them, and communication between the various parts of our empire i s easier overland than by water."583 and i n continuation: "It should not be forgotten that Russia and Germany are .the representatives of the conservative p r i n c i p l e i n the c i v i l i z e d world, as opposed to the democratic p r i n c i p l e , incarnated i n England, and, to an i n f i n i t e l y l e s s degree, i n France. Strange as i t may seem, England, Monarchfistic and conservative to the marrow a t home, has i n her foreign r e l a t i o n s always acted as the protector of the most demagogical tendencies, invariably encouraging a l l popular movements aiming at the weakening of the monarchial p r i n c i p l e . From this point of view, a struggle between Germany and  582.  Golder, F.A.,  Documents of Russian History, The Century Co.,  New York, 1927, 583.  Ibid., p.  12.  p.p.- 3 - U.  198  Russia, regardless of i t s issue, i s profoundly-undesirable to both sides, as undoubtedly involving the weakening of the conservative p r i n c i p l e i n the world of which the above mentioned two great powers a r e the only r e l i a b l e bulwards. More than that, one must r e a l i z e that under the exceptional conditions which e x i s t , a general European war i s , m o r t a l l y dangerous f o r both Russia and Germany, no matter who wins. I t i s our f i r m conviction, based upon a long and c a r e f u l study of a l l contemporary subversive tendencies, that there must i n e v i t a b l y break out i n the defeated country a s o c i a l revolution which, by the very nature of things, w i l l spread to the country o f the v i c t o r . " 581i.  Durnovo's analysis of the contemporary world s i t u a t i o n as i t existed i n the years previous t o the F i r s t World War i s both penetr a t i n g and sound i n many respects.  His prognostications as regards  the l i k e l i h o o d of a Russian revolution should Russia become involved i n a world war were only too amply confirmed by l a t e r events.  Quite a  few would also agree i n a modified form with h i s f i r s t fundamental assumption that the state o f r i v a l r y existing between Great B r i t a i n and Germany was of a serious nature.  Whether i t was the most serious of  a l l i n t e r n a t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s i s however open to question.  In the f i r s t  a r t i c l e of the f i r s t number of the Round Table of November, 1910,  a  non-partisan journal of the p o l i t i c s o f the B r i t i s h Empire, there appeared a f i r s t sentence s i m i l a r to the f i r s t one i n the memorandum of Durnovo.  I t read: "The c e n t r a l f a c t i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n  today i s the antagonism between England and Germany. ^ perhaps exaggerated,  Although , 5  t h i s statement contained a strong element of  581;.  Golder, Documents of Russian History, p. 19.  585.  Schmitt, B.E., The Coming of the War, 191U, Charles Scribners, New York, 1930, V o l . I , p. 69.  199 truth.  Anglo-German r i v a l r y i n the early twentieth century was of the  same nature as Anglo-Spanish r i v a l r y i n the time of P h i l i p I I of Spain and Anglo-French r i v a l r y during the time of Louis XIV and Napoleon. This r i v a l r y involved the a p p l i c a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of the balance of power, a p r i n c i p l e which, i n the words of Bishop Stubbe, the erudite English h i s t o r i a n , "gives unity to the p o l i t i c a l p l o t of modern  586 European h i s t o r y " .  Ever since the period of King Henry VII and  Cardinal Wolsey, Great B r i t a i n had sought to prevent any s i n g l e power on the continent from assuming an absolute hegemony over Europe. Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y had c a l l e d into play the p r i n c i p l e of the balance of power to a much l e s s e r extent than previous r i v a l r y with Spain and France.  The r i v a l r y of Great B r i t a i n and Imperial Russia had always  something i n the nature o f a luxury about i t .  Both countries were  able to a f f o r d i t only so long as a common threat to either had not a r i s e n on the continent of Europe.  To a great extent the reason that  i t was so v i r u l e n t i n the nineteenth century was due to the f a c t that France had i n a measure declined and Germany was s t i l l not f u l l y developed.  The Russian threat to India might be highly irksome to the  B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s on the spot and might even be more real than many have imagined but a decisive blow against Great B r i t a i n was not t o come from a threat to the Indian f r o n t i e r .  Likewise the B r i t i s h i n -  sistence on the closure of the S t r a i t s was highly i r r i t a t i n g to Russia but could scarcely be considered as endangering her p o s i t i o n ; 586.  Schmitt, Coming of the War, V o l . I, p. 69.  ':•  200 as a great power.  Anglo-German r i v a l r y on the other hand had none of  the K ^ s u r e l y q u a l i t i e s  one associates with Anglo-Russian  rivalry.  From i t s inception during the 1890's i t bore the marks of a r i v a l r y which could menace the very existence of Great B r i t a i n as a great power. Three main factors entered into t h i s r i v a l r y . unification  i n 1871,  Following her  Germany had experienced a tremendous i n d u s t r i a l  development which soon made her a serious economic competitor f o r 587  Great B r i t a i n i n world markets.  Although influenced by the f i r s t ,  the second cause was of a much more serious nature.  Germany, under the  impression that she needed a strong navy f o r p r e s t i g e as w e l l as to protect her expanding trade and commerce had embarked on a vast programme of naval construction which, i n the words of German naval autho r i t i e s themselves, was intended to provide " a b a t t l e f l e e t so strong that even f o r the adversary with the greatest sea power a war against i t would involve such dangers as to imperil h i s own p o s i t i o n i n the 58ft  world."  Great B r i t a i n saw f i t to regard t h i s challenge with good  reason as the most serious threat of a l l .  Since she was dependent on  her export trade as the s t a f f of l i f e , England resolved that regardless of s a c r i f i c e , the command of the sea must remain i n her hands.  Each  addition to the German f l e e t was met therefore by a s t i l l greater add i t i o n to the B r i t i s h f l e e t , u n t i l even continental observers came to 587.  Schmitt, Coming of the War,  588.  Ibid., p. 70.  V o l . I, p.p. 69 -  70.  201 regard the growth of conscript armies as much l e s s a danger to peace  589 than Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y . The c o l o n i a l element provided the t h i r d cause f o r Anglo-German misunderstanding.  Great B r i t a i n , so many Germans thought, possessed  an undue share of the valuable lands and riches of the world.  The  German government was e s p e c i a l l y desirous that Great B r i t a i n should not oppose German attempts at expansion i n A f r i c a and the Near East. Great B r i t a i n , conceiving her v i t a l i n t e r e s t s to b e threatened, had r e fused to adopt this passive r o l e and. had supported France i n Morocco against Germany and sought f o r a long time as Russia had as w e l l , to place obstacles i n the way of the b u i l d i n g o f the Bagdad railway, a project which had p a r t i c u l a r l y endeared i t s e l f to German hearts. Added to a l l t h i s , the Germans regarded the B r i t i s h as the prime ori g i n a t o r s of the T r i p l e Entente whose avowed purpose, according to German experts, was, through the reaching of agreements with France and Russia was  to encircle Germany and prevent her from r e a l i z i n g her 591  legitimate ambitions. '  The B r i t i s h , f o r t h e i r part, regarded Imperial  Germany as the greatest threat to the B r i t i s h Empire since the time o f Napoleonic France.  Nevertheless, as a r e s u l t of agreements with r e f -  erence to the Bagdad railway and the Portuguese colonies i n 191*4, tension was considerably relaxed between the two countries, despite 589.  For an excellent discussion of Anglo-German naval r i v a l r y i n r e l a t i o n to the Anglo-Russian Convention, see, Woodward, E.I., Great B r i t a i n and the German Navy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1935, Chap. VII, p.p. H4I-I66.  590;  Schmitt, Coming of the War, V o l . I, p. 71.  591.  Lutz, H., Lord Grey and the World War, London, George A l l e n , & Unwin, 1928.  202  Durnovo's arguments to the contrary. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that throughout h i s memorandum, Durnovo recognizes most of the s a l i e n t features of the r i v a l r y of Great B r i t a i n and Germany.  Although w r i t i n g from the viewpoint of a  Russian reactionary, he tends to magnify them.  I t i s only when he  comes to the second of h i s two fundamental assumptions, that the v i t a l i n t e r e s t s of Germany and Russia do not c o n f l i c t , that h i s sense of realism goes s e r i o u s l y astray.  Such an assumption shows how great  was  the time-lag i n the thinking of the Russian reactionaries i n f o r e i g n as well as i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s .  During the early years of the reign of  Alexander I I I , when conservative methods were i n vogue i n Russian foreign p o l i c y and public opinion, though existent, was  discouraged  from expressing i t s e l f , i t would have been possible to state that the i n t e r e s t s of Russia and a Germany which was  s t i l l the extension of  Prussia, with p o l i t i c a l power centred i n the hands of the Prussian Junkers, d i d not c l a s h .  Since then, new developments had occurred i n  both countries which profoundly a l t e r e d the s i t u a t i o n .  The  Russian  defeat i n the Russo-Japanese war had been a defeat f o r German f o r e i g n p o l i c y not only d i r e c t l y i n the f a c t that i t turned Russia away from A s i a and back to Europe but also i n d i r e c t l y as the war had also r e sulted i n a l i m i t e d change i n the p o l i t i c a l system of Russia i t s e l f which was to react unfavourably on the ideas of monarchial  solidarity.  I t would be a mistake to assume that the revolution of 1905 had given power to the people as a whole i n Russia.  However, as a r e s u l t of i t ,  c e r t a i n i n f l u e n t i a l elements of the Russian people were enfranchised  203 so that they were able t o force the bureaucracy, i f only to a l i m i t e d extent, to share p o l i t i c a l power with them.  The views of the land-  owning n o b i l i t y , business men, wealthy peasantry and the professional c l a s s , - the elements composing the Third and Fourth Dumas, - were now important.  The members of the Duma, although v i o l e n t l y disagreeing  on matters of i n t e r n a l p o l i c y , and, although composed of d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l elements, were united by the common f e e l i n g of Russian nationalism.  The Russian n a t i o n a l i s t deputies of the Duma desired that Russia  i n her foreign p o l i c y should concern h e r s e l f not with some h a i r - b r a i n scheme of expansion i n either the Far East or Central Asia, but should aspire to the leadership of the Slav world, e s p e c i a l l y the orthodox Slav world.  Pan-Slavism dormant since the seventies was once more a 592  dominant feature of Russian national l i f e .  The Russian n a t i o n a l i s t s ,  when given a chance to express themselves, showed themselves to be • much more opposed to the German powers than they were to Great B r i t a i n . This new trend was p e r s o n i f i e d by the Russian Prime Minister, P.A. Stolypin, who, although a conservative i n i n t e r n a l p o l i c y was a convinced Russian n a t i o n a l i s t and had thrown h i s f u l l support behind Izvolsky i n h i s reaching an agreement with Great B r i t a i n .  Without the  whole-hearted backing of Stolypin, i t i s very doubtful whether Izvolsky 593 could have secured the agreement.  L a t e r during the Bosnian c r i s i s  of 1908, Stolypin was to urge that Russia should not give her consent to the annexation of a Slavonic land by a German state despite the 592.  Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 318.  593.  Sumner, op. c i t . , p. 1*0.  20k p o l i t i c a l advantages i t might bring Russia elsewhere.'' ** 9  Under  the leadership of Stolypin, Russian public opinion became a force with which the government must be i n harmony and the Slav p o l i c y i n the Balkans, abandoned a f t e r 1878, however, unlike 1878,  was once more revived.  This time,  Russia was to f i n d not only A u s t r i a as r i v a l ,  but Germany, no longer seeking as i n the days of Bismarck to moderate A u s t r i a , but rather now to a i d and abet her i n a l l enterprises d i r ected against Slavdom. In Germany, s o c i a l developments of equal importance to those i n Russia had occurred.  The a r i s t o c r a t i c monarchy of William I and  Bismarck had been transformed II.  i n t o the demagogic monarchy of William  By the turn of the century, public opinion i n Germany and of the  German element i n A u s t r i a had become i n d i s s o l u b l y bound up along with the economic i n t e r e s t s of the two countries. Hapsburgs and Hohenzollerns  In the period when the  i n conjunction with the Austrian a r i s t o c -  racy and Prussian Junkers had ruled t h e i r respective states i t was f e a s i b l e f o r e i t h e r to make i t s own terms with Russia at the expense of the other.  But, with the c r e a t i o n of a German n a t i o n a l i s t public  opinion, which d i f f e r e d l i t t l e between Hamburg and Graz and between Lubeck and Salzberg, t h i s happy s i t u a t i o n no longer existed. was  Prussia  tending to become absorbed i n t o Germany, and the influence of the  Prussian a r i s t o c r a c y had been lessened by the emergence of the German  $9k.  Tcharykov, N.V., Reminiscences of Nicholas I I , Contemporary Review,vol. CXXXIV, October, 1928, p. k$0.  205 middle c l a s s .  The democratisation of the German Empire and of  Germans-Austria, by which the German boureoise took over p o l i t i c a l power from the a r i s t o c r a c y i n both states was to make f o r a more imperi a l i s t , rather than more peaceful German a t t i t u d e towards the Slav world.  With the r i s e of the German middle c l a s s had also come the foundation of the Pan German League i n  I89U.  The vast majority of  the members and supporters of the Pan German League were not a r i s t o 596 crats, but business men,  bureaucrats, and, above a l l , i n t e l l e c t u a l s .  The Pan Germans d i d not diguise t h e i r h o s t i l i t y towards Great  Britain,  and openly proclaimed t h e i r i n t e n t i o n of ending B r i t a n n i a ^ rule as 1  Mistress of the Sea.  As a consequence,they favoured the construction  of a gigantic German navy, the development of an a c t i v e German e o l 597 o n i a l p o l i c y and as well a Geiraan p o l i t i c a l connection with Holland. At the same time, however, i t was  f o r t h e i r Slav neighbours to the  East that they reserved t h e i r most v i n d i c t i v e hatred.  In the words of  Professor Halle, noted Pan-Germanist, i t was a question "of recovering from the Slavs the whole course of the Danube, from i t s sources i n  598 Germany, to i t s mouths.  As one of the f i r s t steps i n t h i s eventual  11  Eastern expansion, the Pan-Germans h e l d that Germany must obtain both p o l i t i c a l and economic c o n t r o l i n the Ottoman Empire, even to the 595. Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, p. 320. 596.  Ibid., footnote 2,  597.  Anonymous, Pan-Germanism, Quarterly Review, CXGVT, p.p.  598.  Ibid., p.  l63 - 165. 166.  p.  320. 1902,  206 extent of establishing a German colony i n Anatolia i f i t were feasible.  The German government, although i t may have been d i s -  turbed by the more f a n t a s t i c notions of the Pan-Germanic f a c t i o n , was prepared to go along with them i n a programme of c o l o n i a l , naval and Near Eastern expansion, a programme which was bound to antagonize Great B r i t a i n and Russia simultaneously.  With the r i s e of Pan-Germanism  i n A u s t r i a and Germany, and the r e v i v a l of Pan-Slavism i n Russia, a l l hope of Russian-German friendship on the basis of the monarchial -idea, despite the opinion of both Russian and Prussian Conservatives to the contrary, could be considered a v i r t u a l i m p o s s i b i l i t y . In the Near East, German p o l i c y was antagonistic towards Russia on two important issues.  Germany now gave her f u l l support to  Austrian schemes of expansion i n the Balkans a t the expense of the l i t t l e Slav powers of Serbia and Montenegro to such an extent that Russian Pan-Slavists saw Germany and not A u s t r i a as the c h i e f enemy of the Balkan Orthodox S3avs and the mortal foe of Slavdom.  Although  Kaiser William, along with many Prussian o f f i c i a l s , may have deplored this s i t u a t i o n , he could not have dared do otherwise than support Austria.  Public opinion i n Germany would never have stood f o r an  Emperor who, however wise h i s measures might be, was prepared to sacr i f i c e the interests of "Deutschtum" to Slavdom i n Eastern Europe.  The other issue involved was that of Turkey and the S t r a i t s ,  599.  Pan Germanism, Quarterly Review, 1902,  p.  166.  207 where German influence had by now completely superceded that of B r i t a i n . Even the Germanophile, Muraviev, as early as 1900 had argued f o r the sake of Russia's security, that Germany could not be permitted to "play the leading port a t the Bosphorous. " ° ^  In the years following the  conclusion of the Anglo-Russian Convention, German p o l i t i c a l , m i l i t a r y and economic influence became so a l l pervading i n Turkey that Sazonov f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n writing: "The Young Turk Government, which aimed a t l i b e r a t i n g .Turkey from f o r e i g n influence, yet pursued, at the same time, a course which could only end i n p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y bondage to Germany. We watched with anxiety the gradual suppression of Turkish independence by Germany, forseeing the consequences which were bound to follow." 601 In view of these developments, even with the support of Great B r i t a i n , Russia could scarcely hope to secure the opening of the S t r a i t s as Turkey, sure now of the support of Germany, was almost bound to refuse. The only Russian a l t e r n a t i v e was to seize the S t r a i t s and as t h i s would almost c e r t a i n l y involve Russia i n a war with Germany, i t was a step not to be rashly considered.  I t was on account of these dangers  only that the Russian m i n i s t e r i a l c o u n c i l of February 1,  1907,  the  same council which had decided upon reaching an agreement with Great B r i t a i n , resolved not to oppose the construction of the Bagdad railway by Germany, as no other course was p o s s i b l e . A s the s i t u a t i o n stood, however, i t was one to cause the gravest concern even to the  600.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  601.  Sazonov, F a t e f u l Years, p. 12k.  602.  Siebert, bp. c i t . no.  5*1*8,  p.p.  1*76 - 1*77.  p.  39.  208 most conservative and Germanophile of Russian statesmen.  I f i t came  to an emergency, Russia, although i t would be a tremendous l o s s i n national prestige, could abandon the Balkan Slavs to t h e i r f a t e , but she could not afford to see the S t r a i t s pass under the influence of another great power whose intentions she had reason to suspect were h o s t i l e , and who would have Russia a t her mercy i n the event of  war.  I f Sazonov could a f f i r m that Great B r i t a i n would not make trouble f o r Russia i n Central A s i a , as she needed her support i n Europe, the reverse was  equally true.  Great B r i t a i n had l i t t l e to worry about  from Russian designs i n these regions.  True, the Russians would  continue to i n t r i g u e and i n f i l t r a t e the government at Teheran, but they would never do anything which might permanently a l i e n a t e the British.  Any B r i t i s h doubts i n this respect must have been set at  rest by the desperate e f f o r t of Sazonov to convert the T r i p l e Entente into a T r i p l e A l l i a n c e . ^  0 3  In the l i g h t of the momentous developments,  i t seems almost i n c r e d i b l e that a man  of Durnovo's i n t e l l i g e n c e should  argue that there existed no basis f o r c o n f l i c t between Germany and Russia, and that Germany's future l a y e n t i r e l y on the ocean, when the German commercial and economic penetration of Turkey had become s e l f evident.  In t h i s respect, much more i n keeping with the r e a l i t i e s  of the time were the statements of Professor Mitrofanoff, of the Unive r s i t y of St. Petersburg.  In an open l e t t e r addressed to h i s former  teacher, Professor Hans Defarucfc, an eminent German h i s t o r i a n and p o l i t i c a l writer, Mitrofanoff declared that the commercial t r e a t y which  603..  Sazonov, F a t e f u l Years, p.p. 130  - 131.  209 Germany had extorted from Russia during the Russo-Japanese War i n 190ii had made Russia a t r i b u t a r y of Germany.  A f t e r having reviewed devel-  opments i n the Balkans and the Near East, he made i t c l e a r that Russia held Germany responsible, by her support of Austria-Hungary, set-backs Russian p o l i c y had experienced i n recent years.  f o r the  In conclusion  he p l a i n l y indicated that Russia regarded the German Empire as her p r i n c i p a l enemy by s t a t i n g : "The Russia of today demands respect f o r i t s honor, and consideration f o r i t s interests....War with Germany would be a misfortune, but we s h a l l not shrink from £i the b i t t e r necessity, i f i t becomes r e a l l y necessary." Q  To this frank statement o f p o l i c y , Professor Delbruck made an equally frank reply: " I f Russia sees i t as her mission to dominate Europe . .and A s i a - w e l l , we see i t as the mission o f Germany to guard Europe and A s i a from t h i s domination of the Muscovites. I am not i n a p o s i t i o n to give any other , ^ answer to my honored f r i e n d , Professor von Mitrofanoff. * l  )0  >  The r h e t o r i c a l feud of these two professors makes i t p l a i n that RussoGerman r i v a l r y by 19lk was bidding to supercede Anglo-German r i v a l r y .  I t was p r a c t i c a l l y c e r t a i n that German f o r e i g n p o l i c y should succeed i n making Great B r i t a i n and Russia, i n s p i t e of themselves, friends and i n converting what had been i n i t s o r i g i n a l form an agreement applicable only to A s i a , i n t o one whose c h i e f purpose was to defend the mutual i n t e r e s t s of both powers against the encroachments of a t h i r d . Even a f t e r the signing of the Convention,  Izvolsky had continued t o  6oit.  Schmitt, Coming of the War, V o l . I, p.  605.  Loc. c i t . ,  101.  210 assure B e r l i n that he desired at l e a s t c o r d i a l relations with Germany. When the Kaiser proclaimed himself Admiral of the A t l a n t i c and declared himself the f r i e n d of the Sultan of Turkey and the three hundred m i l l i o n Hahommedans of the East,  i t was bound to provoke the f e a r and  h o s t i l i t y of Great B r i t a i n and of Russia.  Great B r i t a i n , faced with a  s i m i l a r group of h o s t i l e and suspicious powers at the beginning o f the century, had made concessions to i t s t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l s , France and Russia, i n order to escape from the p e r i l s of a continental coalition.  Germany, on the other hand, e i t h e r would not or could not make  concessions to any of i t s numerous r i v a l s .  Even so well-meaning a man  as Bulow's successor, Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, was unable to o f f e r a s u f f i c i e n t inducement to any Entente power to wean i t away from i t s connection with the others.  To h i s despair, he  was even forced to continue the very p o l i c y which had biaade the Entente a reality.  When the statement of the President of the Pan-German  League, General von Liebert, that German "lack of diplomatists must be compensated f o r by brute f o r c e  r,D<  * ^ i s considered, i t can be seen that  the d i f f i c u l t i e s which Bethmann had to meet i n h i s attempts to pursue a c o n c i l i a t o r y p o l i c y were notbof i ;acminor nature. naval men,  German m i l i t a r i s t s ,  and high f i n a n c i e r s , were so bemused by the s p i r i t of Pan-  Germanism that a German government which refused to pursue German  606.  C h u r c h i l l , Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907,  607.  Von Kurenberg, Joachim, The Kaiser, Simon & Schuster, New  1955,  p. 3l*3. York,  p.p. 1311-135.  608.  Schmitt, Coming of the War,  609.  Woodward, Great B r i t a i n and the German Navy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933,. p. 152. "  V o l . I, p. 1*5.  211  aspirations i n A f r i c a , the Near East, and on the high sea.s, would have been sure to end on the rocks of d i s a s t e r .  Added to t h i s , German  diplomacy lacked the c o n c i l i a t o r y features which one associates with B r i t i s h diplomacy. In June, 1908, the year a f t e r the signing of the Convention, King Edward v i s i t e d Czar Nicholas a t Reval.  Although a t t h i s meeting  Stolypin assured Admiral Lord F i s h e r that "the German f r o n t i e r was h i s one and only thought, and he was devoting a l l h i s l i f e to make that f r o n t i e r impregnable against Germany both i n men and munitions, and strategic arrangements"^  0  nothing of an aggressive nature seems t o  have been planned against Germany.  Kaiser William, however, upon  learning of the meeting, d i d not hesitate to express a d e f i n i t e conv i c t i o n of i t s portent: "Consequently f i n a n c i a l reforms of the empire! .Many i n d i r e c t taxes; strong f l e e t ; strong army! Powder dry!" No better summing up of the disagreeable features of German foreign p o l i c y i s to be found than t h i s statement of William's. In the following years, u n t i l 1 9 l l i , German assertiveness and tactlessness i n ;  t h e i r r e l a t i o n s with foreign countries became a byword.  German h i s t o r -  ians, i n t h e i r attempts to prove that the T r i p l e Entente was a d e l i b erate encirclement of Germany, a conspiracy of a l l those powers t o r u i n a highly enterprising r i v a l , have i n a large measure ignored the nature of German p o l i c y , which made such a growing a necessity.  There  i s no escaping the f a c t that Great B r i t a i n , France and Russia formed  610.  Schmitt, Coming, of .the War, v o l . I,, p. iiO.  212  a loose geographic r i n g around the German border, or that i n the years immediately preceding 19lii they formed a t r i p l i c e whose purpose was to act as a check on Germany.  Nevertheless, the German h i s t o r i a n s have  tended to f a l l down where the Germans as a nation f e l l down: they f a i l to see that i t was the German p o l i c y of menace and threat which transformed the T r i p l e Entente i n t o an organization directed p r i m a r i l y against Germany.  The o r i g i n a l Anglo-French entente had been an agreement confined to a settlement of c o l o n i a l disputes which had been plaguing the two countries f o r a number of years.  I t was at t h i s point that the  German foreign o f f i c e , acting under the i n s p i r a t i o n o f Holstein and encouraged by the temporary e c l i p s e of Bussia as a.result of Far Eastern disasters, resolved on a reckoning with France over Morocco, and the breaking of her entente with Great B r i t a i n . what happened.  The reverse was  France and Great B r i t a i n refused to be intimidated,  and, as a result of German behaviour at Algeciras, the Entente became t r u l y c o r d i a l , an arrangement f o r strengthening the p o s i t i o n of both countries i n Europe.  In 1909, Bulow, during the c r i s i s following the  Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, resolved to break the newly formed AnglQ-Russian alignment by employing s i m i l a r methods that of f o r c i n g the one to desert the other and thus d i s c r e d i t i n g her i n the eyes of her f r i e n d .  He did succeed i n humiliating Great B r i t a i n  and Russia, and i n f o r c i n g them to agree to German demands, at the expense of changing the Anglo-Russian Convention i n t o an Entente, never as c o r d i a l as the one with France, but e f f e c t i v e f o r a l l that.  In the  213 words of Nicolson:  .-  " I t was the v i o l e n t a t t i t u d e adopted by A u s t r i a and Germany i n the Bosnian c r i s i s which transferred what was a negative arrangement applicable only to A s i a into a p o s i t i v e understanding applicable mainly to Europe.."611 The German foreign p o l i c y of the "Kraft Probe" as practiced by Bulow acting under the i n s p i r a t i o n of H o l s t e i n even a f t e r the l a t t e r s 1  retirement,  012  was not formidable enough to t e r r i f y the members of  the T r i p l e Entente, but i t was of such a nature as to incur t h e i r l a s t i n g resentment.  Possibly the p o l i t i c a l and socialchange within  the German Empire would notft have permitted the German leaders to follow any other course i n t h e i r p o l i c y , but at l e a s t they ought to have seen c l e a r l y the r e s u l t s such a course would have on t h e i r r e l a t ions with neighbouring countries.  For Prince Bulow to boast as he d i d  i n 19li* that h i s p o l i c y i n 1909 had smashed the T r i p l e Sitente beyond hope of recovery, when i n r e a l i t y he had strengthened i t beyond the fondest dreams of i t s founders, i s only one more i n d i c a t i o n of the f a i l u r e of German diplomacy to come to terms.with European r e a l i t i e s .  •  The Anglo-French Entente of 190i* and the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907,  supplemented by the older Franco-Russian alliance',  l a i d the foundations f o r the T r i p l e Entente, which, by 19lU, was moving i n the d i r e c t i o n of an even c l o s e r association.  The Anglo-Russian  611.  Nicolson, Lord Carnock, p.  26l.  612.  Rich, N. & Fisher, M.H. eds. The Holstein Papers, Cambridge University Press, 1955, p.p. 16U - 165.  613.  Von Bulow, Prince Bernhard, Imperial Germany, London, C a s s e l l , 191U, p.p. 50 ^ 55.  211* Convention was strengthened j u s t before the outbreak of war by the agreement of the B r i t i s h to enter into naval discussions with the Russians, with a view to co-operation i n case of war.  The Russians  were immensely pleased by this B r i t i s h decision, f e e l i n g something tangible had emerged from the hitherto a l l too t h e o r e t i c a l and peaceful basis of the e n t e n t e . T h e  Anglo-Russian Convention, which was  but  a weak reed at the time of i t s inauguration, i n 1907, had proved of inestimable value to both countries by 19ll*.  In c i o s i n g , i t should be noted that during the early stages of the World War of 1914  - 1918,  the Anglo-Russian alignment was  one  of the main factors i n the prevention of the establishment of a German hegemony over Europe.  Despite t h i s , L i b e r a l England and Autocratic  Russia, as w e l l as t h e i r r i v a l , Imperial Germany, were to be swept away by the general desolation which engulfed European c i v i l i z a t i o n .  6ll*.  Schmitt, Coming of the War,  v o l . I, p.p. 52 -  . ...  53.  APPENDIX I  Russian Foreign Ministers., I878 -  Prince  Gortchakoff  Monsieur de Giers Prince Lobanov-Rostovsky Count Muraviev Count Lamsdorff Alexander Izvolsky  1910  APPENDIX I I  B r i t i s h Foreign Ministers, I878 - 1910  Lord Salisbury  1878 - 1880  Lord G r a n v i l l e  1880 -  Lord Salisbury  1885 - 1886  Lord Rosebery  1886  Lord Salisbury  1886 - 1892  Lord Rosebery  1892 - 189*1  Lord Kimberley  I89U - 1895"  Lord Salisbury  1895 -  1900  Lord Lansdowne  1900 -  1905  Lord Grey  1905 -  1910  1885  BIBLIOGRAPHY  O r i g i n a l Documents 1.  Gooch, George Peabody, and Temperley, Harold, eds.: B r i t i s h Documents on the Origins of the War, London, 1927, Volumes I -vni.  2.  Popov, A.L., and Dimant S.R., eds.: F i r s t Steps of Russian Imperialism i n the Far East, Krasny Archiv, V o l . L I I , Transl a t e d i n Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, J u l y , 1931*, Vol. XVIII, p.p. 26.  3.  Weber, B.G. and Dimant S.R. eds.: Russian Documents Relating to the Sino-Japanese War, Krasny Archiv, Vols. L-LI. Translated i n Chinese Social and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, October, 1933, and January, 1931*. Vol. XVII, p.p. l*89-5li*  and 632-670.  1*.  On the Eve of the Russo-Japanese War, Krasny Archiv, V o l . I I , Translated i n Chinese S o c i a l and p o l i t i c a l Science Review, January, 1935. V o l . XVIII, p.p. 572-591*: A p r i l and July, 1935. V o l . XIX, p.p. 125-139 and 23l*-267. These Russian Documents are among the few that have been translated i n t o English and are therefore o f considerable value.  5.  Documents Diplomatiques Francais, 1871-1911*, 2nd Serie, 19011911, Paris, 1936, Volumes I - V.  6.  Dugdale, E.T.S, German Diplomatic Documents, 187 Methuen, London, 1928, Vols. I-?U.  7.  Pribram, A.F., Secret Treaties of Austria , Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1920, Two volumes  8.  B r i t i s h and Foreign State Papers, Volumes LXXVII, LXXVIII, LXXIX, LXXXVII, LXXXVIII, XC, XCI.  9.  Hansard, Parliamentary Debates, Third Series, Volume CCXCVI, Fourth Series, Volumes CXXI,.CLXXXIII, CLXXXIV.  10.  Golder, F.A.: Documents of Russian History, The Century Co.," New York, 1WT.  11.  19ll*,  "~  Schreimer A.G., ed. De. Sievert, B, Entente Diplomacy and the World. Matrix o f the History of Europe, 1909-1911*, London, George A l l e n , 1921  12  Meyendorff, Baron Alexander, ed.: Correspondance Diplomatique de M. de S t a a l , l881t - 1900. L i b r a i r i e des Sciences P o l i t i q u e et Sociales, Paris, 1929, Two volumes.  13.  Seton-Watson, R.W. ed.: "Unprinted Documents, Russo-British Relations during the.Eastern C r i s i s : VI. The Russo-Turkish War", Slavonic Review, December, 1926. Volume V, p.p. hlZ-kifT, Contains important documentary material taken from the Russian embassy i n London. C l e a r l y shows the desire f o r peace on the part of Gortchakov and ambassador Shavalov.  Ik.  Seton-Watson, R.W. ed.: "Unprinted Documents: Mr. Gladstone, Lord G r a n v i l l e and Russia." Slavonic Review, June, 1930 Volume IX, p.p. 209-212. .  15.  Walters, Eurof, ed.: "Unpublished Documents. Lord Salisbury's Refusal to Revise.and Renew the Mediterranean Agreements." Slavonic Review, December, 1950. Volume XIX, p.p. 267-286.  16.  Grey, S i r Edward: Speeches on Foreign A f f a i r s , London, George A l l e n ,  1931.  190lt-19lli,  SECONDARY SOURCES  Reference Works  1.  A l b e r t i n i , L u i g i , The Origins of the War o f Oxford Unive r s i t y Press, 1952, two volumes. A monumental h i s t o r y of the o r i g i n s of the F i r s t World War, t h i s work contains a mass erudition and material scarcely to be found elsewhere.  2.  Anderson, Eugene N.,. The F i r s t Moroccan C r i s i s , 190li - 1906, University of Chicago Press, 1930, This work deals i n the main with the f i r s t Moroccan c r i s i s between France and Germany. Nevertheless, i t contains valuable information as t o how t h i s c r i s i s affected AngloRussian r e l a t i o n s .  3.  A r g y l l , Duchess of, ed., George Douglas, Eighth Duke of A r g y l l , London, John Murray, 1906, two volumes. These volumes contain the views of a noted c r i t i c of the f o r e i g n p o l i c y pursued by the D i s r a e l i government with r e gard to Russia and the S t r a i t s . They are e s p e c i a l l y i n t eresting i n view of the f a c t that the c r i t i c had devoted a two-volume work to t h i s subject.  ii.  Bismarck, Otto, von, Reflections and Reminiscences, London, Smith Elder, I898, two volumes.  5.  Bompard, Maurice, Mon Ambassade en Russie, 1903-8, P a r i s , L i b r a i r i e Plon, Les P e t i t s - F U s de Plon et Nourrit, 1937. The memoirs of the French ambassador i n Russia during the years 1903-1908.  6.  Boulger, D.C., England and Russia i n Central Asia, W.H. A l l e n , London, 1879, two volumes. A stimulating and i n t e r e s t i n g work although v i o l e n t l y a n t i Russian i n sentiment. I t makes no claim whatsoever to obj e c t i v i t y . The author i s a convinced B r i t i s h Imperialist, and advocates that Great B r i t a i n should pursue a strong forward p o l i c y i n Central A s i a i n order to preserve her posi t i o n there.  7.  Buchan, Sohn, Lord Minto, Thomas Nelson, London, 192lt. The standard biography of Lord Minto, Viceroy of India. The author argues Minto's case f o r not d e s i r i n g a agreement with Russia.  8.  Brandenburg, E., Bismarck to the World War, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, London, 1933. Brandenburg's work i s considered by many experts to be the best treatment of G foreign p o l i c y from the time of Bismarck u n t i l the f i r s t World War. Brandenburg displays considerable o b j e c t i v i t y i n h i s treatment o f the subject. e r m a n  9.  Browne, G., The Persian Revolution, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press,  1910. This work i s considered the best treatment of t h i s subject a v a i l a b l e i n English. The author i s strongly sympathetic to the cause of Persian c o n s t i t u t i o n a l government. 10.  Buckle, G.E., The L i f e of Benjamin D i s r a e l i , London, John Murray, 1920, V o l . VI. The authoritative biography of the great Conservative statesman, shedding much l i g h t on the p o l i c y pursued by D i s r a e l i i n foreign a f f a i r s , both before and a f t e r the Congress of Berlin.  11.  Buckle, G.E., ed., The Letters of Queen V i c t o r i a , London, John Murray, 1930, Second Series, Vols. I I & I I I , Third Series, Vols. I, I I , & I I I . These l e t t e r s reveal the important influence which Queen V i c t o r i a exerted on B r i t i s h foreign a f f a i r s throughout this period.  12.  Ballard, R., B r i t a i n and the Middle East, Hutchinson's U n i v e r s i t y Library, London, 195*1. A very able and l u c i d account of the p o s i t i o n occupied by Great B r i t a i n i n the Middle East from early u n t i l contemporary times by a B r i t i s h diplomat.  13.  Bulow, Prince Bemhard von, Memoirs, London, Putnam, 1931, four volumes. The voluminous and racy memoirs of the former chancellor of Imperial Germany. Although Bulow*s memoirs contain much information as regards Anglo-German and Russo-German r e l a t ions, they are not considered i n a l l respects r e l i a b l e .  lU.  Bulow, Prince Bernhard von, Imperial Germany, London, C a s s e l l ,  19Hu A b r i e f account of Imperial Germany and i t s p o l i t i c s , written i n 19lk by the then former Imperial Chancellor, von Bulow. The work throughout has.a strong n a t i o n a l i s t i c bias. 15.  Cambon, Paul, Correspondence, 1870-1927, Editions Bernard Grosset, P a r i s , 19U0, three volumes. The correspondence of Paul Cambon, French ambassador i n London, throws much l i g h t on the e f f o r t s of the French government to secure an understanding between i t s f r i e n d Great B r i t a i n , and i t s a l l y , Russia.  v X  16.  C e c i l , Lady Gwendolen, L i f e of Robert, Marquis of Salisbury, Hodder & Stoughton, London, Vols. I I , I I I & IV*. The b r i l l i a n t , though unfinished biography of Lord S a l isbury by h i s daughter. The work i s commendable for i t s o b j e c t i v i t y throughout, and indispensable f o r a study of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y during t h i s period,  17.  C h i r o l , Valentine, F i f t y Years i n a Changing World, London, Jonathan Cape (n.d.) A competent j o u r n a l i s t i c account of the world before 19lii. I t i s p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t i n g when i t discusses the A s i a t i c border lands between the B r i t i s h and Russian Empires.  18.  C h u r c h i l l , R.P., The Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. The The Torch Press, Cedar Rapids, Iowa, 1939. An adequate and comprehensive treatment of the subject. E s p e c i a l l y valuable f o r the f a c t that i t uses o r i g i n a l Russian sources.  19.  C h u r c h i l l , W.S., Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l , MacMillan & Co. London, 1907. A good account i s given here of Lord Randolph C h u r c h i l l ' s work at the India o f f i c e , where he f i r s t became convinced of the p o s s i b i l i t y of an Anglo-Russian understanding and of h i s subsequent dramatic t r i p to Russia.  20.  G o r t i , Egon Caesar Conte, Alexander von Battenberg, C a s s e l l & Co. London. The i n t e r e s t i n g biography of Prince Alexander of Battenberg, l a t e r Prince of Bulgaria.  21.  Crewe, Marquess of, Lord RoseberV, London, John Murray, 1931, two volumes. A good biography of the B r i t i s h L i b e r a l statesman, but contains l i t t l e on Anglo-Russian, r e l a t i o n s .  22.  C r i s p i , Francesco, The Memoirs of Francesco C r i s p i , Hodder & Stoughton, London, Vols. I I & I I I . The memoirs of the well-known I t a l i a n statesman. S material i s to be found i n them with regard to the Bulgari a n c r i s i s of 1887. o m e  23.  Curtius, F r i e d r i c h , ed., Memoirs of Prince Chlodwig of HohenloheS c h i l l i n g s f u e r s t , London, William Heinemann, 1906, two vols These memoirs reveal some i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e l i g h t s on the strained relations existing between Great B r i t a i n and Russia during the l a s t h a l f of the l a s t decade of the nineteenth century. \  2k.  Dennis, A.L., The Anglo-Japanese A l l i a n c e , U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a Press, Berkeley, 1923. A good monograph now somewhat outdated i n the l i g h t o f new material published.  25.  Dodwell, H.H. ed., The Cambridge History of the B r i t i s h Empire The Indian Empire, 185b-191b'. Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1932. Volume V. Contains a good general o u t l i n e i n Chapter XXIII of British-Russian r e l a t i o n s with regard to Afghanistan and the north-west f r o n t i e r of India. ,  26.  Earle, Edward Mead, Turkey, the Great Powers and the Bagdhad Railway, New York, MacMillan Co., 1923. " An excellent t r e a t i s e on the Bagdhad Railway problem and i t s i n t e r n a t i o n a l implications.  27.  Eyck, E r i c h , Bismarck and the German Empire, George A l l e n & Unwih, London, 1951. The abridged English edition of the German l i b e r a l scholar's l i f e of Bismarck. The author devotes considerable space to Bismarck's foreign p o l i c i e s and h i s attempts to balance Germany between England and Russia.  28.  Fay, S.B., The Origins of the World War, New York, MacMillan & Co., 1930, two volumes. A comprehensive and balanced account of the origins of the F i r s t Great War.  29.  Fisher, H.H. ed., Out of My Past, Memoirs of Count Kokovtsov, Standard U n i v e r s i t y Press, C a l i f o r n i a , 1935. The author of this work i s a former Russian statesman. I t i s an excellent and honest study of conditions i n the Imperial Russian bureaucracy, with splendid documentation. However, Kpkovtsov deals mainly with i n t e r n a l Russian problems,, although there are some excerpts which throw l i g h t on the foreign a f f a i r s o f the period.  30.  Fitzmaurice, E., The L i f e of Lord Granville, Longmans Green & Co., London, 1905, two volumes. The standard l i f e of Lord Granville, Gladstone's f o r e i g n secretary. A source of primary importance for.Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s a t the time o f the Penjdeh c r i s i s i n Afghanistan.  31.  Fraser, Lovat, India under Curzon and A f t e r , London, William Heinemann (n.d.) Although admitting the Anglo-Russian Convention has conferred many benefits on both Great B r i t a i n and Russia, the author, l i k e many Anglo-Indians, i s a f r a i d that Great B r i t a i n has conceded too much i n A s i a .  \  32.  Fry, Agnes, ed., A Memoir of S i r Edward Fr|y, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1921. Valuable f o r the l i g h t i t throws upon the attitude of the B r i t i s h delegation a t the Dogger Bank Commission o f Enquiry.  33.  Gardiner, A.G., The L i f e of S i r William Harcourt, Constable & Co., London, 1923, two volumes. The interesting biography of the L i b e r a l leader, S i r William Harcourt, by a well-known j o u r n a l i s t . This work shows that Harcourt's Russophile leanings were of long-standing and deep-rooted o r i g i n s .  3ii.  Garvin, J.L., The L i f e of Joseph Chamberlain, MacMillan & Co., London,. 193it, V o l . I I I . The standard biography of Joseph Chamberlain. Volume I I I deals with Chamberlain's f o r e i g n p o l i c y and h i s attempts to end B r i t i s h i s o l a t i o n .  35.  Giffen, Morrison B e a l l , Fashoda, U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, I l l i n o i s , 1930. A b r i e f but i l l u m i n a t i n g account o f the Fashoda incident and i t s e f f e c t on the diplomatic r e l a t i o n s between Great B r i t a i n and France. Contains a good chapter as to the Russian attitude towards the two powers i n question.  36.  Gooch, G.P., Before the War Studies i n Diplomacy, Longmans Green & Co., London, 1936, two volumes. Ten b r i l l i a n t essays on the foreign ministers of the great powers immediately preceding the f i r s t World War, by one of Great B r i t a i n ' s foremost h i s t o r i a n s .  37.  Gooch, G.P., Recent Revelations of European Diplomacy, Longmans London, 1927.  38.  Gooch, G.P., History of Modern Europe, 1878-1919, C a s s e l l & Co. London, 1932. An i n t e r e s t i n g and s c h o l a r l y work. Scrupulously f a i r i n a l l i t s aspects.  39.  1*0.  G  ooch, G.P., Studies i n German History, Longmans Green Sc. Co.. London, 1955 Gooch's study of Hoistein i s a masterpiece o f diplomatic and personal biography. With scholarly detachment he shows c l e a r l y that the p o l i c y pursued by Holstein was almost bound.to make Great B r i t a i n forego her r i v a l r y with France and Russia. Grey, Viscount, Twenty-Five Years, 1892-1916, Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1925, two volumes. ^ Grey's own personal account of h i s work as f o r e i g n minister. Very-valuable as i t r e f l e c t s the personal views of one of the p r i n c i p a l architects of the Anglo-Russian Convention.  Guedalla, P., The Queen and Mr. Gladstone, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1933, two volumes. These volumes contain some i n t e r e s t i n g s i d e l i g h t s on the c o n f l i c t i n g views of the Queen and Gladstone, as regards Russia. Gurko, V.I., Features and Figures of the Pact, Stanford Univers i t y Press, C a l i f o r n i a , 1939. The p o l i t i c a l memoirs of a Russian statesman of moderately l i b e r a l views. Although l i k e Kokovtsov i n h i s dealing with Russian i n t e r n a l problems f o r the most part, Gurko occasion a l l y digresses into Russian foreign a f f a i r s , e s p e c i a l l y a t the time of the Russo-Japanese War. Gwynn, S., and Tuckwell, G., The L i f e of S i r Charles Dilke , London, George Murray, 191b", two volumes. This work i s e s p e c i a l l y valuable as regards Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s with respect to Afghanistan. Gwynn, S. ed., The Letters and Friendships of S i r C e c i l Spring Rice, London, Constable Co., 1929, two volumes. Both i n t e r e s t i n g and humorous. These two volumes contain considerable information as regards Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s , as w e l l as many pleasing anecdotes. Habberton, W., Anglo-Russian Relations Concerning Afghanistan, 1887-1907, University of I l l i n o i s , Urbana, 1937. An excellent study of a much-neglected sphere of AngloRussian r e l a t i o n s , containing as w e U as t h i s , an exhaustive bibliography. Hamman, Otto, The World P o l i c y o f Germany, 1890-1912, London, George A l l e n , 1929 Jin i n t e r e s t i n g work by the former head of the Press d i v i s i o n of the German foreign o f f i c e during the p e r i o d of the l a s t Kaiser. Hammond, J.G., C P . Scott, London, G. B e l l , 193k* The able biography of the famous editor of the Manchester Guardian. The case i s here put strongly f o r the B r i t i s h group who were opposed to an understanding with Russia. Hardinge, Lord, Old Diplomacy, London, John Murray, 191*7. The reminiscences o f S i r Charles Hardinge, who was B r i t i s h ambassador t o Russia throughout the c r i t i c a l period of the Russo-Japanese War. Both i n t e r e s t i n g and informative. Gathorne-Hardy, A.E., Gathorne Hardy, Lord Cranbrook, Longmans Green, London, 1910, two volumes. . These volumes reveal how the Afghan c r i s i s of I878-I879 was\ viewed by the government i n London, and e s p e c i a l l y the view of Lord Cranbrook, then Secretary f o r India.  Samson-Himraelatierna, H. von, Russia under Alexander I H , New l o r k , MacMillan & Co., 1893. An i n t e r e s t i n g but extremely biased account of Russia during the reign of Alexander I I I by a strongly Germanophile and Russophobe writer. This work should be used with caution. Hudson, G.F., The Far East i n World P o l i t i c s , Oxford University Press, 1937. A b r i l l i a n t , b r i e f exposition of the emergence of the Far Eastern :.Question into world a f f a i r s . I t i s e s p e c i a l l y good on the period leading up to the Russo-Japanese War. Kennedy, A.L., Salisbury, London, John Murray, 1953. A b r i l l i a n t supplement to Lady Gwendolen C e c i l ' s biobraphy of Salisbury. I t contains an excellent treatment of S a l i s bury's foreign p o l i c y viewed from a contemporary standpoint. Kennedy, A.L, Old Diplomacy and New, London, John Murray, A very readable and thoroughly scholarly treatment of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y throughout this period.  1922,  Korff, S.A., Russia's Foreign P o l i c y During the Last Half-Century. New York, MacMillan & Co., 1922. One of the best surveys of Russian foreign p o l i c y , written by a Russian, i n English. Kormilov, Alexander, Modern Russian History, A l f r e d A Knopf, New York, 192l|, two volumes. A good general account of Russian h i s t o r y throughout t h i s period, by a Russian l i b e r a l h i s t o r i a n , Kurenberg, Joachim von., The Kaiser, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1955. ' " The l a t e s t biography of William I I , written by a man who knew him intimately and belonged.to the Junker c l a s s . Strongly sympathetic throughout. Langer, W.L, European A l l i a n c e s and Alignments, New York, A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1950. ' One of the best general surveys of the relationship between the European states during the l a t e Bismarckian era. Langer, W.L, The Diplomacy of Imperialism, A l f r e d A Knopf., New York, 1935, two volumes. An excellent survey a l l i n a l l . The author has done much research into Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s throughout t h i s period of c o l o n i a l expansion.  59.  Lee, S i r Sidney, King Edward VII, MacMillan & Co. London, 1925, two volumes. The voluminous biography of King Edward VII, which has much material on Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s .  6o.  Lutz, Herman, Lord Grey and the World War, London, George A l l e n & Unwin, 192b, An extremely h o s t i l e study of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y as c a r r i e d on by S i r Edward Grey.  61.  L y a l l , A.L, The L i f e of the Mar quia of Dufferin and Ava, London, John Murray,.1905, two volumes. A very able biography of the Marquis of Dufferin, but deals rather s l i g h t l y with h i s period as ambassador i n Russia.  62.  Marriott, J.A.R., The Eastern Question, Oxford, 1917 A b r i e f , conventional survey of the Eastern Question from early times up u n t i l and during the f i r s t years of the World War.  63.  Midhat Bey, A l i Haydar: L i f e of Midhat Pasha, London, John Murray, 1903. The standard l i f e of the Young Turk leader, revealing the Turkish a t t i t u d e to both- Great B r i t a i n and Russia throughout these times.  61*.  65.  Morley, J . , The L i f e of William Swart Gladstone, London, MacM i l l a n , 1906, two volumes. A thorough and pains-taking biography o f Gladstone by h i s great colleague and contemporary, Sohn Morley. An excellent work a l l i n a l l , but deals rather l i g h t l y with B r i t i s h f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s during t h i s period. This i s e s p p c i a l l y true of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s . Morley, John, Viscount, Recollections, Macmillan & Co., New York, 1917, two volumes. The memoirs of the great L i b e r a l statesman, Viscount Morley. These volumes show that Morley, l i k e most of h i s colleagues i n the L i b e r a l cabinet, was strongly i n favour of an understanding with Russia, while at the same time they emphasize the d i f f i c u l t i e s he had i n overcoming the t r a d i t i o n a l a n t i pathies of B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s i n India towards any agreement with Russia.  66.  Newton, Lord, Lord Lansdowne, MacMillan & Co., London, 1929. The authoritative biography of Lord Lansdowne, This work i s extremely valuable f o r the study of Anglo-Russian relations.  67.  Newton, Lord, Lord Lyons, Thomas Nelson & Sons, London (n.d.)  \  68.  Nicolson, H., Lord Carnock, London, Constable & Co., 1930 The b r i l l i a n t l y written biography of S i r Arthur Nicolson, by h i s son Harold. Indispensable f o r a study of AngloRussian r e l a t i o n s , as S i r Arthur conducted the d i r e c t negotiations i n St. Petersburg, leading to the AngloRussian understanding.  69.  Paleologue, M., An Ambassador's Memoirs, New York, George H. Doran, n.d., three volumes. The memoirs of the French ambassador to Russia during the Great War. Although Paleologue deals mainly with a l a t e r period, he often refers to the course which Russian foreign p o l i c y followed before the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention.  70.  Paleologue, M.,  1935.  The Turning Point, Hutchinson & Co., London,  This book c l e a r l y shows that Delcasse was working f o r an Anglo-Russian understanding following the signing of the Anglo-French Entente. 71.  Pares, Bernard, The F a l l of the Russian Monarchy, Jonathan Cape, London, 1939. The scholarly and h i g h l y readable account of the f a l l of Imperial Russia, written by the foremost B r i t i s h expert on Russia. Although treated as a subsidiary to the main theme, the author attaches due importance to the AngloRussian Convention of 1907, and i t s influence upon subsequent events.  72.  Ponsonby, F., ed., Letters of the Empress Frederick, MacMillan & Co., St. Martin*s, London, 1930. This volume contains some i n t e r e s t i n g m a t e r i a l on the Bulgarian c r i s i s of I887 and the attitude of the future Empress Frederick towards i t .  73.  Pooley, A. ed., The Secret Memoirs of Count Tadasu Hayashi, London, Eveleigh Nash, 1915. Probably the best Japanese source f o r t h i s p e r i o d available i n English. Absolutely necessary f o r a study of the AngloJapanese a l l i a n c e .  71*.  Rich, Norman & Fisher, M.H.,eds., The Hoistein Papers, Cambridge University Press, 1935. The recently published papers of F r e i h e r r von Holstein, which throw a more favourable l i g h t on the famous Geheimrat than has been shed up t i l l now.  75.  Roberts, Lord, Forty-One Years i n India, London, Richard Bentley and Son, 189«. .  \, K  76.  Ronaldshay, E a r l of: The L i f e of Lord Curzon, London, Ernest Benn, 1928, three volumes. The volumes of this o f f i c i a l biography of Lord Curzon cont a i n much information as regards h i s a t t i t u d e towards Russia and the p o l i c y he believed Great B r i t a i n should pursue towards her.  77.  Rose, J.H., The Development of the European Nations, 1870-1911*, London, Constable & Co., 19$5. A good, stimulating account of European h i s t o r y during the l a t e r part of the nineteenth century.  78.  Rosen, Baron, Forty Years o f Diplomacy, London, George A l l e n & Unwin, 1922, two volumes. The memoirs of an eminent Russian diplomat, which are extremely valuable f o r a study o f Russian F a r Eastern policy.  79.  Lobanov-Rostovsky, A., Russia and Asia, MacMillan & Co., New York, 1933. A good general account of the p o l i c y pursued by Russia i n A s i a by the son of the former Russian foreign minister.  80.  Russell, G.W.E., L i f e o f Malcolm MacColl, London, Smith Elder & co., 191i*. . A hook which throws much l i g h t upon the attitude of enlightened B r i t i s h public opinion as regards i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems during t h i s p e r i o d .  81.  Sarkissian, A.0,, History of the Armenian Question to 1885, U n i v e r s i t y of I l l i n o i s , Urbana, 1938. " An excellent monograph on the background of a much neglected question, and i t s e f f e c t on great power diplomacy.  82.  Savinsky, A., Recollections of a Russian Diplomat, Hutchinson These memoirs throw much l i g h t on the.relationship between Tsar and Kaiser.  83.  Sazonov, Serge, F a t e f u l Years, London, Jonathan Cape & Co. Sazonov's memoirs are highly i n t e r e s t i n g and are considered i n the main r e l i a b l e . They reveal that he agreed with Izvolsky s p o l i c y of confining Russian objectives to Europe and the Near East, and of pursuing a p o l i c y of friendship with France and England. 1  81*.  Schmitt, B.E., England and Germany, 17i*0-19ll*, Princeton Unive r s i t y Press, 1916. An i n t e r e s t i n g and informative account of the r i s e of Anglo-, German r i v a l r y i n the years preceding the Great War. /  85.  Schmitt, B.E., The Annexation of Bosnia, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press,  1937.  86.  Schmitt, B.E., The Coming of the War, 19lli, Charles Scribner's New York, 1930, two volumes. A scholarly and r e l i a b l e treatment of the o r i g i n s and causes which l e d to the Great War. Devotes much space to the. antagonism which had grown up between Russia and Germany.  87.  Schoen, F r e i h e r r von, The Memoirs of an Ambassador, London, George A l l e n , 1922, The memoirs of the German ambassador i n Russia at the time of the negotiation of the Anglo-Russian Convention.  88.  Seeger, C.L. ed., Recollections of a Foreign Minister, Memoirs of Alexander Iswolsky, Garden C i t y , New York, 1921. The memoirs of the Russian foreign minister. Although Valuable, these memoirs s u f f e r from the f a c t that they were never c a r r i e d beyond the f i r s t volume, due to the death of the author.  89.  Seton-Watson, R.W., B r i t a i n i n Europe, 1789-1914, Cambridge University Press, 1937. One of the best general surveys of B r i t i s h f o r e i g n p o l i c y that has been written. The book i s as remarkable f o r i t s erudition as i t i s f o r i t s i m p a r t i a l i t y and balance.  90.  Seton-Watson, R.W., D i s r a e l i , Gladstone and the Eastern Question, MacMillan & Co., London, 1935. An excellent work of the contrasting attitudes of the two great B r i t i s h statesmen towards the Eastern Question.  91.  Seton-Watson, Hugh, The Decline of Imperial Russia, Methuen & Co. London,1952. A sane and balanced study. The author c l e a r l y shows how the i n t e r n a l s i t u a t i o n i n Russia v i r t u a l l y drove the Russian government to seek an alignment with Great B r i t a i n .  92.  Simpson, J.Y. ed., The Sabarov Memoirs, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1929. Sabarov's memoirs r e f l e c t the viewpoint of the Russian conservatives, who preferred a German to a B r i t i s h a l i g h ment.  93.  Skrine, F.H., The Expansion of Russia, 1815-1900, Cambridge University Press, 1903. A,good conventional survey of the expansion of Russia during the nineteenth century V/  9k.  Skrdme, F.H. & Ross, E.D., The Heart of A s i a , Methuen & Go, London, 1&99, This work i n p a r t i c u l a r deals with Russian expansion i n t o Turkestan and towards Afghanistan.  95.  Spender, J.A*, F i f t y Years of Europe, C a s s e l l & Co., London,  1933. A good, j o u r n a l i s t i c account of diplomatic relationships i n pre-war Europe. 96.  Spender, J.A., The L i f e of the Right Honourable S i r Henry Campbell, Bannerman, London, 1923, two volumes. The standard biography of the B r i t i s h L i b e r a l prime minister.  97.  Stead, W., Truth About Russia, C a s s e l l & Co., London, 1888. A sympathetic description of Russia by a well-known B r i t ish Liberal journalist.  98.  Stieve, F r i e d r i c h , Isvolsky and the World War, London, George A l l e n , 1926. The extremely h o s t i l e account o f Isvolsky's foreign p o l i c y , by the German expert, Dr. F r i e d r i c h Stieve.  99.  Sumner, B.H., Survey of Russian History, Duckworth, London. An able and sympathetic account of Russia and i t s h i s t o r y , containing much of value on Russian diplomatic h i s t o r y .  100.  Taube, Baron Michael A., La p o l i t i q u e russe d'ayant-guerre et l a f i n de 1'empire des Tsars, P a r i s , 1928. One of the best single accounts of Russian foreign p o l i c y before the war. However, the French e d i t i o n i s generally considered i n f e r i o r to the newer German e d i t i o n .  101.  Taylor, A.J.P., The Struggle f o r Mastery i n Europe, 181*8-1918, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 195°U. A b r i l l i a n t survey of European i n t e r n a l i o n a l r e l a t i o n s during the l a t e r nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It throws a new perspective on many doubtful issues.  102.  T i r p i t z , A. von, My Memoirs, London, Hurst & BLackett, two volumes. The memoirs of the p r i n c i p l a a r c h i t e c t of the German High Seas F l e e t .  103.  Trevelyan, G.N., Grey of Falloden, Longmans Green and Co. 1937. The sympathetic biography of S i r Edward Grey, by the British liberal historian.  10i*.  Ward, A.W. & Gooch, G.P., The Cambridge History of B r i t i s h y Foreign A f f a i r s , 1866-1919, Cambridge University Press,192'3. A good, convenient survey of B r i t i s h foreign p o l i c y .  105.  Mint, Guy, The B r i t i s h i n Asia, I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations, New York, 1954. An excellent work which treats i n b r i l l i a n t fashion the development of the B r i t i s h and Russian Empires i n Asia, and the r e s u l t i n g antagonism.  106.  Woodward, E.I,, Great B r i t a i n and the German Navy, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1933. A very good booh, which shows c l e a r l y that as a r e s u l t of the r i s e of the German naval threat, Great B r i t a i n had to make friends with France and Russia.  107.  Yarmolinsky, Abraham, ed., The Memoirs o f Count Witte, GardenC i t y , New York, 1921. The English abridged e d i t i o n of Count W i t t e s memoirs, useful but considered d e f i n i t e l y i n f e r i o r to the Russian original. f  Periodicals  1.  Anonymous, "The Russians on the Pamirs", Blackwood's Magazine, December,  2.  I89I,  V o l . CL, p.p.  755-766,  Anonymous, "Pan Germanism", Quarterly Review, 1902,  V o l . CXCVI,  p.p. 152-175. 3.  Anonymous, "The Marauis o f Salisbury,"  Quarterly Review, 1902,  Vol. CXCVI, p.p. 6I17-676. U.  Baylen, Hoseph 0., "Madame Olga Novikov, Propogandist, » The American Slavic.and East European Review, 195l. Volume X, a  p.p. 255-271.  This a r t i c l e i s an account of a much-neglected f i g u r e i n the history of Anglo-Russian r e l a t i o n s and i t endeavours to establish her i n her proper perspective i n an i n t e r e s t i n g manner, 5.  Bey de B e l i n s k i , "Great B r i t a i n and Russia", Nineteenth Century, November, 1901,  6.  Bompard, Maurice, "Le Troite de Bjoerkoe", La Revue de P a r i s ,  Mai, 1918, 7.  V o l , L, p.p. 723-730.  p.p. k23-kkQ.  .  :  Boulger, Demetrius Co., "The New Situation i n the Far East", Contemporary Review, December, 1895, V o l . LXVIII, p.p. 015 - 825.  N. /  8.  Galenas, "The Anglo Russian Agreement", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, October, 1907, V o l . CCCCJ03, p.p. 53£35oI  9.  Calchas, "Why Not a Treaty With Russia? , F o r t n i g h t l y Review, 8  October, 1900, V o l . CCCGVI, p.p. 10.  6n~6W.  Cheshire, Harold T., "The Expansion o f Imperial Russia to the Indian Border , Slavonic Review, June, 1931*, V o l . I H , 8  P.p. 85-97.  11.  Davis, H.W.C., "The Great Game i n A s i a , " Proceedings of the B r i t i s h Academy, 1926, V o l . XII, p.p. 227-256. An excellent study i n the origins of Anglo-Russian r i v a l r y i n Central A s i a .  12.  D i l l o n , E.J., "The New P o l i t i c a l Era", Contemporary Review, November, 1897, V o l . LXXII, p.p. 609-631.  13.  D i l l o n , E.J., "The Anglo-Russian Agreement and Germany", Contemporary Review, November, 1907, V o l . H3II, p.p. 690"^9.  Ik.  Diplomaticus, "Count Muravieff's Indiscretion", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, December, 1899, V o l . LXVI, p.p. 1036-101*5.  15.  Gambier, Capt. J.W., R.N., "England and the European Concert", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, July, 1897, V o l . LXII, p.p. 57-65.  16.  Gambier, Capt. J.W., R»N«, " A Plea f o r Peace, an Anglo-Russian A l l i a n c e " , F o r t n i g h t l y Review, December, 1900, V o l . CCCVIII, p.p. 998 - lOOS;  17.  Gapanovich, J . J . , "Sino-Russian Relations i n Manchuria, 1892 1906", Chinese S o c i a l and P o l i t i c a l Science Review, J u l y , 1933. and October, 1933, V o l . XVII, p.p. 283-306 and p.p.  1*57-1*79. 18.  Gould, William A., "The Dreikaiserbundnis and the Eastern Question, 1877-1878", English H i s t o r i c a l Review, 1927,  Vol. XLTI, p.p. 560-56TT".  19.  ~"  Hornik, M.P., "The Mission o f S i r Henry Drumraond-Wolff to Constantinople, 1885-1887", English H i s t o r i c a l Review, October,  191*0, Vol. LV, p.p. 598 -T2T.  20.  Kawakami, K.K., "Prince Ito's C o n f i d e n t i a l Papers, Foreign A f f a i r s , New.Iork, 1933, V o l . XI, p.p. 1*90-500.  21.  Kerensley, Alexander, "Izvolsky s Personal Diplomatic Correspondence, Slavonic,Review, January, 1938, p.p. 386-392.  22.  Medlicott, W.N., "The Mediterranean Agreements o f 1887", Slavonic Review, June 1926, V o l . V, p.p. 66-88. ^  8  1  23.  Medlicott, W.N. "The Powers and the U n i f i c a t i o n of the Two Bulgarias, 1888," English H i s t o r i c a l Review, January. 1939, and A p r i l , 1939, V o l . LIT, p.p. 67-82 and p.p. 263-284.  24.  Morison, J.L., From Alexander Burnes to Frederick Roberts", Proceedings of the B r i t i s h Academy, 1936, V o l . XXII, p.p.  179-206.  25.  Nabokoff, C., "Why Russian Statesmanship F a i l e d " , Contemporary Review, February, 1923, Vol. CXXIII, p.p. 178 - 187.  26.  Nekludoff, A., "Autour de L'Entrevue de Bjoerkoe", Revue de Deux Mondes, Mars, 1918, p.p. 127-144.  27.  Norman, Henry, "Russia and England", Contemporary Review, February, 1897, V o l . LXXI, p.p. 153-171.  28.  Onou, A., The Memoirs of Count N, Ignatyev", Slavonic Review, December, 1931, Vol. X, p.p. 386 - 407.  29.  Onslow, Earl of, "Lord Carnock", Slavonic Review, March, 1929, Vol. VII, p.p. 543 - 553.-  30.  Penson, L i l l i a n , "The P r i n c i p l e s of Lord Salisbury's Foreign Policy", Cambridge H i s t o r i c a l Journal, 1935, V o l . V, p.p.  a  87 -  106.  This i s an excellent treatment of a very complicated subject. The author seeks and finds a consistency back o f the apparent contradictions of Salisbury's foreign p o l i c y . 31.  Rees, J.R., "The Tsar's Friend", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, A p r i l , 1901, V o l . LXIX, p.p.  32.  Lobanov-Rostovsky,  612-622. A., "Russian Imperialism i n Asia", Slavonic  Review,, June, 1929,-Vol. VIII, p.p. 28-47. 33.  Savinsky, A., "Guillaume I I et l a Russie. Ses Dgpeches a Nicolas I I , 1903 - 1905", Revue de Deux Mondes, Decembre, 1922, Septieme Periode,.p.p. 765-802. ~~  34.  Seton-Watson, R.W., "William II's Balkan Policy", Slavonic Review, June, 1928, Vol. VII, p.p, 1-29.  35.  Simpson, J.Y., "The Great S i b e r i a n Iron Road", Blackwood's Magazine, January, 1897, Vol.CLXI, p.p. 1-20.  36.  Sumner, B.H., "Tsardom and Imperialism i n the Far East and Middle East, 1880-1914", Proceedings o f the B r i t i s h Academy, London, 1941, Vol. XXVII, p.p. 25-65. A b r i e f , b r i l l i a n t survey of Russian p o l i c y i n the Far and Middle East from the l880's up t o and following the signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.  37.  Sumner, B.H.,  "Lord Augustus Loftus and the Eastern C r i s i s of H i s t o r i c a l Journal, 193U, Vol. IV,  38.  Sumner, B.H., "Russia and Panslavism i n the Eighteen Seventies", Transactions of the Royal H i s t o r i c a l Society, 1935, Vol, XVIII, p.p, 25-52.  39.  Tcharykov, N.V.,  1875-1880", Cambridge p.p. 283 - 295.  "Reminiscences of Nicholas I I " , Contemporary  Review, October,  1928,  Vol. CXXXIV, p.p.  1*1*3  -  i*53.  1*0.  Tompkins, Stuart R., "Witte as Minister of Finance", Slavonic Review, A p r i l , 1933, V o l . XI, p.p. 590-606.  111.  Vambery, A., "The Anglo-Russian Convention", Nineteenth Century, December, .1907, V o l . LXEI, p.p. 895-901*.  1*2.  Wren, Melvin C , "Pobedonostev and Russian Influence i n the Balkans, 1881-1888", Journal of Modern History, June, 191*7, Vol. XIX, p.p. 130.-  UaZ  1*3.  White, Arnold, "Anglo-Russian Relations", F o r t n i g h t l y Review, December, I90I+, V o l . CCCCLVI, p.p. 96O - 968.  

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