UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Racial factors in the political development of the federation of Malaya Jayaratnam, K. 1958

You don't seem to have a PDF reader installed, try download the pdf

Item Metadata

Download

Media
UBC_1958_A8 R38 R2.pdf [ 15.31MB ]
[if-you-see-this-DO-NOT-CLICK]
Metadata
JSON: 1.0106166.json
JSON-LD: 1.0106166+ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 1.0106166.xml
RDF/JSON: 1.0106166+rdf.json
Turtle: 1.0106166+rdf-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 1.0106166+rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 1.0106166 +original-record.json
Full Text
1.0106166.txt
Citation
1.0106166.ris

Full Text

RACIAL FACTORS IN THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERATION OF MALAYA by K. JEYABATNAM B.A., University of Malaya, Singapore A thesis submitted i n partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science We accept this thesis as conforming to the standard required from candidates for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS Members of the Department of Economics and P o l i t i c a l Science The University of Br i t i s h Columbia Ap r i l , 1958 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t i s understood tha t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 3, Canada. ABSTRACT A p l u r a l s o c i e t y i s l i k e the p r o v e r b i a l i c e b e r g : l o o k i n g at i t i s not tantamount to seeing the whole of i t . No amount of i d e a l i s m can erase d i v e r s i t i e s as long as the stimulants which generate these d i v e r s i t i e s are r i f e . Only p o l i t i c a l m a t u r i t y and p o l i t i c a l experience can overcome the s e p a r a t i s t trends of a s p l i n t e r e d s o c i e t y . U n t i l the founda- t i o n s f o r such m a t u r i t y and experience are f i r m l y l a i d , p o l i - t i c s i n such a s o c i e t y w i l l remain complicated and confused, and n a t i o n a l i s m w i l l continue being a v i c i o u s a b s t r a c t i o n . Communalism has become the c a r d i n a l problem of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya. The peoples of the country are of d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l origins., conform to d i f f e r e n t s o c i a l p a t t e r n s , f o l l o w d i f f e r e n t courses of occupation, e x h i b i t t e r r i t o r i a l preferences and, consequently, tend to have divergent p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s . Indeed, the most conspicuous demographic f a c t about the F e d e r a t i o n r e s t s i n the balance of numerical power between the indigenous and immigrant segments of the p o p u l a t i o n . Today, the former i s outnumbered by the l a t t e r . Broadly speak- i n g , h e r e i n l i e the roots of the problem. I t i s the purpose of the f o l l o w i n g study to i d e n t i f y and analyse the i n f l u e n c e s exerted by communal f a c t o r s i n the p o l i t i - c a l development of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya. The f i r s t chapter i i i i s aimed at p l a c i n g the communal problem i n the country i n i t s proper h i s t o r i c a l and p o l i t i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e . The c r e a t i o n of Malaya's p l u r a l s o c i e t y i s analysed, f o l l o w e d by a study of the i n t e r - and intra-communal d i v e r s i t i e s which have been so responsible f o r complicating the Malayan p o l i t i c a l scene. The chapter a l s o discusses the impact of the Japanese occupation, both on inter-communal r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as on the country's nascent n a t i o n a l i s m . Chapter two i s based p r i m a r i l y on an a n a l y s i s of Great B r i t a i n ' s attempt at p o l i t i c a l experimentation i n Malaya during the f i r s t few years immediately f o l l o w i n g the war. As such, d i s c u s s i o n i s focussed on the two c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals (namely, the Malayan Union proposals of 1946 and the F e d e r a t i o n Agreement of 1948) which form the main body of t h i s experimenta- t i o n . The p e r i o d i n question i s made p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t by the f a c t that B r i t i s h p o l i c y during t h i s time was c o n s i d e r a b l y i n f l u e n c e d by the r e a c t i o n s and a s p i r a t i o n s of the d i f f e r e n t communities. Included i n the chapter i s a l e s s d e t a i l e d survey of some of the more important developments during the f i r s t decade a f t e r the war. Chapter three, on P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s , i s designed t o give a b e t t e r understanding to present day p o l i t i c s i n the country. I t i s also hoped that t h i s chapter w i l l give adequate i n s i g h t i n t o the present r a c i a l paradox, f o r today's co-operation was achieved l a r g e l y through the a l l i a n c e , f o r inter-communal iv purposes, of three p a r t i e s (the United Malays' N a t i o n a l Organization, the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n , and the Malayan Ind i a n Congress) which, not so long ago, were organized f o r the d i s t i n c t purpose of f u r t h e r i n g the i n d i v i d u a l i n t e r e s t s of the country's three main r a c i a l groups. This makes a study of the country's p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s a n e c e s s i t y i f one i s to s u f f i - c i e n t l y understand the p r i n c i p a l features i n v o l v e d i n the Federation's attempt to solve the s o - c a l l e d " p o p u l a t i o n p u z z l e " . In a broad sense, i t may be observed that the present Malayan n a t i o n i s the c h i l d of immigration. The country's economic p o t e n t i a l i t i e s (coupled w i t h the impoverished c o n d i t i o n of labour i n I n d i a and China) have been r e s p o n s i b l e f o r l u r i n g a f l o o d of immigrants who, today, have become a part of the s e t t l e d p o p u l a t i o n and hence demand r i g h t s equal to those of the indigenous Malays. The problem which needs to be solved i s the extent to which these demands deserve to be s a t i s f i e d . Thus a study of Malayan p o l i t i c s at once becomes i n t e r e s t - i n g to both the p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r i a n as w e l l as the p o l i t i c a l s o c i o l o g i s t . Nor i s i t v o i d of i n t e r e s t to the p o l i t i c a l theor- i s t , to whom the problem of s u c c e s s f u l r e p r e s e n t a t i v e government i n a p l u r a l s o c i e t y , i n v o l v i n g such c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s as the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of m i n o r i t i e s , has always c o n s t i t u t e d an absorbing f i e l d of study. The F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya appears to have solved t h i s problem to an appreciable extent, as evidenced by the e l e c - t o r a t e ' s v o t i n g behaviour during the country's f i r s t (and, to date, only) n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s held i n J u l y 1955. The r e s u l t s V have been most g r a t i f y i n g , not only i n s o f a r as present s o c i o - p o l i t i c a l expedience i s concerned, but also w i t h regard to fut u r e s t a b i l i t y . Issues p e r t a i n i n g to c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s , i n v o l v i n g , on the one hand, the demand f o r l e s s s t r i n g e n t regulations from the non-Malays and, on the other, the n e c e s s i t y to preserve, f o r p o l i t i c a l as w e l l as economic reasons, the " s p e c i a l p o s i - t i o n " accorded to the Malays, have always presented the country's a d m i n i s t r a t o r s w i t h a ve r y t r y i n g problem. Consequently, the i n t e r e s t s of two d i s t i n c t groups (as represented by the " i n d i g - enous Malays on the one hand and the " a l i e n " Chinese and Indians on the other) have had to be p l a c a t e d . While the Malays are apprehensive of the f a c t that l e n i e n t c i t i z e n s h i p requirements would make them a p o l i t i c a l m i n o r i t y i n t h e i r own country (which they already are n u m e r i c a l l y ) , the Chinese and Indians demand equal r i g h t s s t a t i n g t h a t , i n a d d i t i o n to having made i n v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the economic development of the country, they also have, e s p e c i a l l y i n post-war years, changed from a primar- i l y non-resident p o p u l a t i o n to a l a r g e l y r e s i d e n t one. Compro- mises have had to be made, but o p p o s i t i o n has always been s i g n i f i c a n t . From t h i s standpoint, the present C o n s t i t u t i o n i s of p a r t i c u l a r importance, since the compromises inherent i n i t have had to be e f f e c t e d by the d i f f e r e n t races themselves (through the i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of the UMNO-MCA-MIC A l l i a n c e ) , and now i t i s also up to them to implement i t . Those a r t i c l e s i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n r e l a t e d to communal is s u e s w i l l be the focus v i f o r d i s c u s s i o n i n chapter f i v e . The encouraging p o t e n t i a l i t i e s which the present appears to hold f o r the f u t u r e of the Malayan n a t i o n i s a t r i b u t e not o n l y to the races r e s i d e n t t h e r e i n , but a l s o to the f l e x i b i l i t y and good sense di s p l a y e d by B r i t i s h p o l i c y . TABLE OF CONTENTS v i i Page L i s t of Tables v i i i L i s t of Appendices i x Acknowledgement x Chapter 1 The O r i g i n s and Nature of the Communal Problem i n Malaya 1 2 The Malayan Union and the Fe d e r a t i o n of Malaya 49 3 P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s 97 4 The 1955 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s 150 5 The 1957 C o n s t i t u t i o n 181 Conclusion 226 B i b l i o g r a p h y 232 Appendices 242 v l i i LIST OF TABLES Table Page I Federated Malay S t a t e s : General Return of Revenue, Expenditure, Trade and P o p u l a t i o n 10 I I R a c i a l Stock 21 I I I P r o p o r t i o n of Urban P o p u l a t i o n i n Various E t h n i c Groups 2 8 IV Estimated P o p u l a t i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n o f Malaya as on June 3 0 , 1955 • • • • 2 9 V R a c i a l F a c t o r s 69 VI Estimate of Number of C i t i z e n s / S t a t e N a t i o n a l s by Operation of Law 87 V I I A r r i v a l s of Indians at Penang from I n d i a by Sea, 1953 90 V I I I E l e c t o r a l R o l l by Race 156 IX C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Candidates by P a r t i e s and by Race 162 X I n d i c a t i n g the Support Received by the D i f f e r e n t P a r t i e s 169 ix APPENDICES Appendix Page A Details of Election Results 242 B The Constitutional Commission's Recommenda- tions with regard to Special Quotas for the Malays 252 C Nationality and Citizenship Charts 271 X ACKNOWLEDGEMENT The writer wishes to express his sincere appreciation to Dr. J. A. Laponce of the P o l i t i c a l Science Department for the invaluable guidance which has greatly facilitated the writing of this dissertation. K. Jeyeratnam The University of Bri t i s h Columbia Ap r i l , 1958. " I would r a t h e r s i t on a pumpkin and have i t a l l to myself than be crowded on a v e l v e t cushion." Henry David Thoreau Chapter One The Origins and Nature of the Communal Problem in Malaya (A study of ra c i a l factors i n Malayan p o l i t i c s before 194-5) The population of the Federation of Malaya, i n 1955j was estimated at 6,058,317. Of this 2,967,238 were Malaysians, 2,286,883 Chinese, and 713,810 Indians and Pakistanis. 1 As the figures indicate, none of the groups formed a majority. However, i t is significant to note that, i n so far as "indige- nous" and "non-indigenous" people are concerned, the non- Malaysians have the edge over the Malaysians, thereby revealing that the Malays, today, only represent a numerical minority i n their own country. Very broadly speaking, herein l i e s the crux of the entire problem. The Malayan society lacks the ad- vantages of homogeneity. The wholesale influx of foreigners into Malaya is by no means a long-standing phenomenon and, for a l l practical purposes, may be treated as being a twentieth century occurrence. Prior to this migration, the peninsula was populated, very sparsely indeed, by the Malays who were (and s t i l l are, to a significant degree) mainly agricultural folk. In spite of evidence (pro- vided mostly by Chinese accounts) that there had existed some 1 Federation of Malaya, Annual Report 1955. Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 195o, p. 7« 2 contact between China and Malaya since very early times, i t should be noted that the p o l i t i c a l and cultural influences imparted to the country by India were of far greater s i g n i f i - cance. This influence permeated a l l major aspects of human activity, including the country's religious, social and p o l i t i c a l structure. Brief periods under Hindu empires divided up the traditional l i f e of the Malays lacking, as i t did, a l l semblance of p o l i t i c a l unity. Against this back- ground i t would almost seem that the arrival of B r i t i s h admin- istration, followed by the mass migration of Chinese and Indians to provide labour for the expanding economy, v i r t u a l l y trans- ferred the Malay States from a mediaeval to a modern existence over a few years. The Chinese, having originally ventured to the Malayan archipelago i n search of trade, gradually began to take an increasing interest i n mining the peninsula's t i n deposits. With them they brought their own laws and their own secret so- sieties. JLs more t i n was discovered, more Chinese came to the country and, consequently, more mining concerns were set up. More concerns meant an increase i n the number of secret societies (which were built mainly on clan foundations), for i t was through their instrumentality that each group sought to protect i t s own interests from those of r i v a l organizations. Due to the belligerent attitude fostered by many of these societies, force and gang-fights gradually became the order of the day. 3 The Malay States, i n the mean time, did not base their existence on mutual dependence; neither did they lead a l i f e of splendid isolation. On the contrary, intrigue and mutual ho s t i l i t y were r i f e . Hence the activities of the Chinese secret societies merely served to heighten the already-present element of insecurity. Thus the Malays grew increasingly apprehensive of the presence of the Chinese who had conceded but nominal overlordship to the Malay rulers. Mid-nineteenth century was consequently characterised by disintegrating gov- ernment and explosive c i v i l wars. It was amidst such chaos that the B r i t i s h decided to o f f i c i a l l y intervene i n the country's internal p o l i t i c s . Such a step had already been requested a l i t t l e earlier by Chinese merchants and miners, who were doubtful of their future i n the country, on the one hand, and harassed Malay chieftains on the other. The step was f i n a l l y taken i n Perak, where one of the would-be Sultans had requested the B r i t i s h Governor's help i n restoring law and order, stating: ... i f a l l these dissentions are brought to an end, and the country i s restored to peace, we and our 2 great men desire to settle under the Bri t i s h flag. As a consequence of this request, a meeting was called at Pangkor i n January 1874, which resulted i n the negotiation of the Pangkor Agreement. The most important outcome of this Agreement was the acceptance, by the Sultan, of a B r i t i s h 2 Emerson, R. Malaysia. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1937» p. 119. 4 Resident who was to advise him on a l l matters except those 3 pertaining to Malay religion and custom. Such advice was always to be accepted and acted upon. Thus was set the pat- tern for the ensuing expansion of B r i t i s h influence i n Malaya leading to authority over Malays and Chinese alike, and des- tined to bring into the country masses of Indians to provide cheap labour. This assumption of authority by the British, i t should be noted, was i n sharp contrast to their previous behavior. The Portuguese had captured Malacca i n 1511? only to be replaced by the Dutch i n 1641. The Dutch, i n turn, succumbed to the B r i t i s h i n 1795. A l l the while, however, the European powers had done nothing to restore peace and order i n the country. They had, on the contrary, used the chaos to their advantage. Thus, during a greater part of the nineteenth century, the general situation i n the mainland tended to degen- erate continually after the British, exerting p o l i t i c a l i n - fluence without taking the responsibility for i t , had taken over Penang i n the north, Malacca i n the centre, and Singapore 4 i n the south. The situation was made none the better by the fact that the Br i t i s h allowed a continuous flow of Chinese making their bid for wealth i n Malaya's t i n and trade. The establishment of the Residential System i n Perak was followed by the drawing up of agreements leading to the 3 Federated Malay States. Annual Report 1933? p. 1 4 Emerson, op_. c i t , , p. 16. 5 implementation of similar steps i n Selangor (1874), Sungei Ujong, one of the nine states constituting Negri Sembilan (1874), and Pahang (1888), and eventually led to the formation of the Federated Malay States, made up of Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, and Pahang, i n 1895 As the result of a treaty signed with Siam i n 1909, the four northern states - Kedah, Kelantan, Perlis, and Trengganu - were brought under British suzerainty. With Johore i n the south, these formed the Unfederated Malay States. Thus the country was thrown into three different p o l i t i - cal groupings; namely, the Federated Malay States, the Unfed- erated Malay States and the Straits Settlements (composed of Penang, Malacca and Singapore, and founded i n 1867). This anomaly was truly reflective of the lack of p o l i t i c a l conscious- ness and unity which may be attributed to the population i t s e l f during these early years. The Malays were s t i l l under the influence of regional loyalties, and had not as yet developed a national s p i r i t ; the main preoccupation of the Chinese was the improvement of f a c i l i t i e s for economic penetration; and the Indians were mainly composed of labourers whose main ambi- tion was to eke out a li v i n g for themselves and, i f possible, to remit savings to their impoverished relatives at home. Turning to administration one notices that, i n the Straits Settlements, the upper c i v i l service was a f i e l d res- erved for Europeans. E l i g i b i l i t y for entry into the junior 6 administrative service, however, was open to everyone, and selection was carried out on a competitive basis. Probably due to a lack of interest and enthusiam, the Malays were overshadowed i n this f i e l d by the Chinese, Eurasians, and Indians. The administration of the Federated Malay States, though nominally i n the hands of the Sultans, was subject to overwhelming control by B r i t i s h o f f i c i a l s . In the Unfedera- ted Malay States, on the other hand, rule by the Sultans was more direct, though even here the part played by the B r i t i s h was very significant. While i t has been noted that the nineteenth century marked the rise of B r i t i s h influence i n Malaya, one may go even further and observe that the 1880's ushered i n the period which produced Malaya's present status i n the economic world, this being brought about largely through the introduction of rubber and the further development of the t i n industry. What is even more important Insofar as the present study i s con- cerned, i s the fact that i t was this development which gave rise to the country's extremely cosmopolitan ra c i a l composition. The introduction of rubber into Malaya i n 1877? and the subse- quent development of the rubber industry during the f i r s t quarter of the twentieth century, vastly increased the demand for labour. The supply came from South India, this fact being i'- responsible for the presence i n the country of a third major ra c i a l group ; namely, the Indians. 7 The outlines of the ra c i a l picture were f i n a l l y com- pleted, and the racial problem was now introduced into the country i n i t s f u l l form. There were three Asian communities, with the Englishman as a common overlord. The ra c i a l problem was not merely one of p o l i t i c a l and ling u i s t i c differences. Its texture was far more intricate and several other factors, less obvious perhaps, but equally problematic, were involved - social structure.', economic role, religious differences, tempera- ment, degree of education, productive capacity, and, above a l l , each community's individual attitude towards the country. Despite their numerical infe r i o r i t y , the British should be included i n the picture due to their importance as the con- tro l l i n g power. Furthermore, i t should also be borne in mind that "decisions and mistakes of policy which they [made] v i t a l l y affect[ed] the other races." It has been suggested that, by introducing a system of indirect rule, the British had M-at least postponed the e v i l day of reckoning when the people of a wide colonial area come together to present their p o l i t i c a l demands." While this may be accepted as a generalization applicable to the theory of i n - direct rule, the actual situation i n Malaya took a different course. Here indirect rule became as much of a problem as i t was an asset, since the situation was made d i f f i c u l t indeed by the presence of, and economic significance attained by, the non- 5 Morrison, Ian, "Aspects of the Racial Problem i n Malaya," Pacific Affairs, vol. 22, 1949, p. 239. 6 Emerson, op. .cit., p. 17* 8 Malays - notably the Chinese and the Indians. The B r i t i s h could not, with a clear conscience (not to mention the dire consequences which may have followed), refuse to placate the more urgent demands of the Chinese and Indians, on whom the economic well-being of the country leaned so heavily. From the B r i t i s h point of view, herein lay the setting of the prob- lem: they had to maintain the old form of government and the old ruling body while a very significant portion of those governed had progressed beyond that form, and had rejected the effective authority of that ruling body. Thus every major decision made by the B r i t i s h i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d had to breast the d i f f i c u l t and dangerous cross-currents of r a c i a l differences. These were the sentiments on which the decentral- ization issue, which w i l l be discussed shortly, was based. It would be both helpful and relevant, at this juncture, to discuss the nature and extent of Chinese and Indian immigra- tion into Malaya. It has been said, and very correctly too, that the Chin- ese and Indians, the former i n particular, provided Malaya with "the energy, industry and adaptability without which B r i t i s h 7 ambitions would never have been realized." During the f i r s t three decades of the twentieth century i n particular and, by and large, right up to the beginning of the Second World War, most of the Chinese and Indians who came to Malaya had flocked i' 1 7 "Races and Parties i n Malaya," Round Table, v o l . 42 (1951-52), p. 238. 9 in with only one purpose i n mind - to make their fortunes while the going was good and to return home once their pockets were f u l l . Malaya, i n their eyes, was just another Klondike or any other E l Dorado and, i n this sense, these immigrants may be considered as being mere "birds of passage." Fluctuations i n the country^ economic well-being were invariably accompanied by corresponding fluctuations i n the immigration and emigration of Chinese and Indians into and out of Malaya. This was stated very clearly i n the Annual Report of the Federated Malay States for 1933? where i t was observed: Malaya . . . i s subject to somewhat sharp fluctuations i n respect of the numbers of the non-Malay inhabitants. The total population i s swelled by immigration i n times of prosperity and shrinks through emigration during a period of economic stress such as has ruled for the past two or three years.8 The table on page 10will serve to further establish this point. In 1881, 89,900 Chinese arrived at Singapore and Penang. In 1901 this figure had rocketed to 224,100 and, i n 1913, had further increased to 278,100. This phenomenal figure underwent a temporary check during the war years, but rose again soon 9 after the war, reaching the astounding total of 435,708 i n 1927. Two main factors must have contributed towards this unprecedented rise - the increased world prosperity i n general, and the rubber boom i n p a r t i c u l a r . 1 0 As mentioned earlier, the depression 8 Colonial Reports,Annual,No. 1667. Annual Report of the Social and Economic progress of the People of the Federated M a l a y States. 1933, PP- 7 - 8 . 9 Emerson, op., c i t . . pp. 27-28. 10 Ibid., p. 2 8 . Table I Federated Malay States General Return of Revenue. Expenditure. Trade and Population" 11 Year Revenue 1919 72,135,075 1922 52,494,110 Expenditure 1918 68,448,862 45,286,910 70,676,961 1920 72,277,146 100,433,471 1921 54,449,568 114,386,546 49,811,007 Export of T i n & Export of Rubber P o p u l a t i o n T i n ore ( i n tons) ( i n tons) (Duty on t i n - $ - ' (Duty on rubber - i n brackets.) &- i n brackets.) 37,370 (13,141,841) 39,943 (9,944,177) 34,934 (12,203,531) 34,489 (6,153,360) 35,286 (5,766,808) 78,389 (2,254,556) 106,453 (4,883,123) 101,330 (4,443,100) 94,510 (164,169) 128,461 (802,390) 1,279,859 1,315,700 1,300,000 1,298,292 1,360,876 11 C o l o n i a l Reports Annual No. 1667. Annual Report of the S o c i a l and Economic Progress of the People o f the Federated Malay S t a t e s . 1933. pp. 102-103. Condensed from a more complete t a b l e covering the period 1889 to 1933, and i n c l u d i n g f i g u r e s f o r Trade (imports and e x p o r t s ) , Land Revenue and Land S a l e s , and Railway Receipts. 11 witnessed a sharp f a l l i n the number of arrivals, there being only 124,460 i n 1933. 1 2 It should be noted at this point that these immigration figures did not represent any "solid" increase i n the country's population, nor did the vast number of immi- grants add significantly to the number of permanent residents in the country. Large numbers of Chinese were leaving the country a l l the time. During the 192? boom, for example, there 13 were 303,497 departures as compared to the 435,708 who arrived. Indian immigration presents a similar picture. During the period 1911-1920 there were 908,100 immigrants from Madras. During the same period 561,913 Indians returned home from Malaya. 1^ During the 1921 depression, the number of South 15 Indian immigrants f e l l to 74,170. During the depression, vast numbers of Indians were shipped back to India, the figures amounting to 100,452 i n 1930 and 104,952 i n 1931. There were, at the same time, only 26,945 arrivals i n 1932. In 1934, as a result of protests from rubber planters to the effect that their labour force was being cut too drastically, the situation was reversed, there being 102,292 labourers imported from South India during that year."^ 12 Emerson, op. c i t . , p. 28. 13 Loc. c i t . 14- Ibid., p. 32. 15 Ibid., p. 33- 16 Loc. c i t . 12 These figures reveal a very interesting point, namely that Indian labour was, by and large, being treated just like any ordinary economic commodity. It was this feature which brought a wave of protests from o f f i c i a l quarters i n India. The Indians alleged that their countrymen were treated without much regard being given to human values: they were merely imported into the country during times of economic prosperity and thrown back like "sucked oranges" into India during periods of depression. It was as a result of complaints of this nature that the Indian labour force i n Malaya was brought under the supervision of the Malayan Controller of Labour and also of an Indian Agent appointed by the Government of India. Another point of interest may be mentioned with regard to Indian labour during these years. Despite the fact that this labour was procured at exceptionally cheap rates, there were some planters who came to realise that i t was financially more advantageous to offer slightly higher wages and tempt away another man's labour force than to recruit their own labourers from India - a practice known as "crimping". This threatened to upset the entire system involving imported Indian labour, thereby leading to the development of an ingenious immigration system: ... the system of financing Indian immigration and providing a l l the services necessary to maintain i t by means of a special tax levied on a l l employers of Indian labour. 17 Holland, W.L. Asian Nationalism and the West, New York. Macmillan Co., 1953? p. 273- 13 By n e c e s s i t a t i n g i n s p e c t i o n , the f i x i n g of wages, and the se t - t i n g up of s p e c i a l camps i n I n d i a through which labour would be r e c r u i t e d , t h i s system (combined w i t h the labour Code) enabled the e x e r c i s i n g of a h i g h degree of economic c o n t r o l while s t i l l m a intaining an adequate degree of freedom f o r the i n d i v i d u a l l a b o u r e r . ^ The Chinese, on the other hand, continued to le a d a more independent existence and, consequently, the degree t o which they were i n f l u e n c e d by labour l e g i s l a t i o n was not n e a r l y as great as one f i n d s i n the case of the Indians. The B r i t i s h , by t h i s time, were becoming more and more inv o l v e d i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and opening up of the country. However, i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that t h e i r h old i n the econ- omic f i e l d , though dominant f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, was f a r from being e x c l u s i v e - as the tendency has been i n most c o l o n i a l r egions. Without much h e s i t a t i o n , t h i s may be a t t r i b u t e d to the u n t i r i n g e f f o r t s of the Chinese whose i n t e r e s t s , a l l the time, were g e t t i n g f u r t h e r and f u r t h e r away from those of the Malays who, by and l a r g e , continued l i v i n g i n the ways of t h e i r ancestors. The economic pressure of the Chinese on the r u r a l l y i n c l i n e d Malays was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y apparent and t h i s l e d t o the c r e a t i o n of l a r g e Malay land r e s e r v a t i o n s , such 19 areas being made un a v a i l a b l e f o r a l i e n a t i o n t o non-Malays. ' 18 H o l l a n d , op., c i t . , p. 273. 19 P u r c e l l , V. Malaya: Communist or Free? London, V i c t o r Gollancz L t d . , 1954, pp. 37-38. 14 F r i c t i o n was inevitable, the best example of i t during these times being the issues woven around the question of decentral- ization. The r a c i a l factors involved i n the development of, and reactions to, this question are sufficient for the purpose of this study and, consequently, i t would not be expedient to sedulously trace and discuss each move i n proper hi s t o r i c a l sequence. As mentioned earlier, B r i t i s h participation i n Malaya's p o l i t i c a l l i f e was becoming increasingly apparent, a direct out- come of this being a growing tendency towards centralized government. As one would expect, the motives for this were mainly two-fold - economic and p o l i t i c a l : centralized govern- ment would enhance the possibility of a more consistent economic policy; i t would also rule out the necessity for duplication i n p o l i t i c a l action. To the Malays i n general, and the Malay Sultans i n par- ticular, increased centralization tended to obliterate the states, divesting them of a l l their power (or rather what was l e f t of i t ) and individuality. Under the direction of the Resident-General a large and efficient central administration [had] been built up i n which the Sultans [had] had either no share or a share so small as not to be worth speaking o f . 2 Q 21 Consequently, at the second Conference of Malay Rulers held 20 Emerson, op_. c i t . , p. 141. 21 In addition to the Malay rulers the Conference included Malay chiefs and members of State Councils. It was presided over by the High Commissioner. 15 i n Kuala Lumpur i n 1903 the question of increasing over-central- i z a t i o n was introduced. It was obvious that the Sultans were becoming increasingly apprehensive of the fact that the centre of administration had gradually d r i f t e d away from them, t h e i r Residents and t h e i r States to the Resident-General and his secretariat at Kuala Lumpur. L e g i s l a t i o n had undergone a si m i l a r f a t e . Kuala Lumpur was thus becoming a focus of bur- eaucratic c e n t r a l i z a t i o n at the expense of the Sultans and the State Councils. In the face of these complaints (other factors, no doubt, being present as well) an Agreement f o r the Constitution of a Federal Council was drawn up i n 1 9 0 9 , and received the s i g - natures of a l l the Rulers. Despite the f a c t that t h i s Agree- ment appeared to make vague references to some d i s t i n c t i o n i n the powers of the State and Central Governments, what a c t u a l l y followed was very much to the contrary. The State Councils were now l e f t to handle petty a f f a i r s and the p o s i t i o n of the Rulers i n the Federal Council was hardly distinguished to say the l e a s t . Up to t h i s time the reactions of the non-Malay communi- t i e s (the Chinese and European business c l a s s , to be more sp e c i f i c ) had not been too v o c a l . However, when the question was introduced again i n the 1 9 2 0 's and 1930's (thanks to the 22 rejuvenated e f f o r t s of S i r Lawrence Guillemard ) i t became 22 Governor and High Commissioner from 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 2 7 . 16 obvious that these communities were no longer inclined to s i t complacently and watch the Sultans sway o f f i c i a l opinion. The year 1932 saw the adoption of a scheme which was aimed at maintaining the legitimate status and authority of the Malay Rulers and which, by encouraging indirect rule, hoped to prevent "the p o l i t i c a l submersion of the Malays which would result from the development of popular government on 23 Western lines." It was also hoped at the time that such a move, by virtue of i t s promise of greater autonomy to the States, would be v i t a l l y instrumental in attracting the Unfeder- ated Malay States to join the Federation - thus f a c i l i t a t i n g the ultimate formation of some sort of Malayan Union. Although the arrival of the Japanese deprived the scheme of sufficient time to prove i t s effectiveness, the i n i t i a l stages were hardly reflective of much promise. To begin with, the bureaucratic tendencies mentioned above were not effectively checked since the Federal Government at Kuala Lumpur was merely shifted, to 24 a considerable extent, to the High Commissioner at Singapore. Furthermore, the Unfederated Malay States failed to show the anticipated enthusiasm for centripetal movement. Turning now to the reactions of the Chinese and Euro- pean business classes, i t may safely be stated that the views of this group were primarily the outcome of economic considera- tions. To them a greater degree of centralization meant a 23 Dodd, E.E. The New Malaya. London, Fabian Publica- tions Ltd., 1946, p. 1 8 . 24 Loc. c i t . 17 proportionately greater degree of security, i n that this would have made them less dependent on the non-uniform and possibly inconsistent regulations imposed by the individual State gov- ernments. Both the Malays and the Chinese had sufficient grounds to justi f y their respective attitudes, but i t was quite obvious that the interests of the two communities were diametri- cally opposed. While the former fought against the possible extinction of their p o l i t i c a l status i n the country, the latter were mainly preoccupied with the question of economic security. But there was yet another consideration. At a time when Chinese nationalism was rapidly increasing i n i t s proportions and content, the Chinese were considerably disturbed by Sir Cecil dementi's hostile attitude towards the Kuomintang i n Malaya, which they interpreted as being indicative of an anti- 25 Chinese bias on his part. This automatically put them on their guard, and they no\* became suspicious of every move which seemed to imply an improvement i n the status of the Malays. Added to this was the fact that, unlike the British, the Chinese had no reason whatsoever to feel morally responsible for the future well-being of the Malay race. Another reason why the Chinese considered the breaking down of the centralized federal structure as being a move preg- nant with disastrous possibilities lay i n the fact that most 25 Emerson, op., c i t . , p. 322. 18 of the commercial undertakings controlled by this community were centered i n the Federated Malay States and i n the colony of Singapore. Thus the question of decentralization cut right across the f i e l d of Sino-Malay interests. Evidently the Br i t i s h had to effect a compromise and, to a large extent, this is exactly what they did. Faced with the situation where both the Malays and the Chinese seemed equally keen on decentraliza- tion on the one hand and centralized government on the other, they decided to steer a middle course and, consequently, pro- posed to bring about decentralization, but by a gradual process. The policy was to be established i n three stages, the f i r s t dating from 1935 to 1939. The Chief Secretary who had been the real head of the Federal Government gave place to a Federal Secretary, who was to be the High Commissioner's mouthpiece; departments such as Education, Health and Public works were transferred to the States; and, though the central control of finance was maintained, block grants were made to the States to be used by them under supervision. 2 £ The decentralization issue was thus instrumental i n introducing a very concrete basis for inter-racial disharmony. Prior to i t s birth, Sino-Malay relations had been f a i r l y satis- factory - but this, however, does not mean that each community was constantly making friendly overtures to the other. The absence of mutual animosity between the two races had been due, 26 Dodd, op_. c i t . , p. 18. 19 on the other hand, to two other factors. In the f i r s t place one may mention their common submission to pax britannica. This factor was instrumental, not i n completely overruling the possibility of an inter-racial clash, but rather i n postponing i t s day of arriva l . Secondly i t may be noted that, up to this time, neither community had had any substantial reason '•to step on the other's toes." Their ambitions were dif f e r - ent, and so were their fields of interest. The Malay was not impressed with the achievements of the Chinese, the Chinese was not surprised by the Malay's lack of achievements.27 But a l l the time, however, there were the few Malays who, as they gained experience i n the Government Service, could not help but view the activities of the Chinese as being increas- ingly bold and presumptuous. It has been said, with considerable justification, that prior to the Second World War Malaya, unlike India and Ceylon, was a "country with no p o l i t i c s " , displaying a "tranquil and 28 complacent atmosphere of public l i f e . " It i s not surprising that Br i t i s h administrators (and, more particularly, spokesmen of colonial commerce and industry) should have made such a boast, especially when one awakens to the fact that i t was made at a time when nationalist and labour movements, i f not total l y absent, were at least feeble and thereby easily overlooked. 27 Jones, S.W. Public Administration i n Malaya, London, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1953, P» 99• 28 Peet, G.L. P o l i t i c a l Questions of Malaya, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1949, p. 3 . 20 However, i t should be noted that observations such as these were also the product of a detached outlook on the part of these "spokesmen" and administrators whose attitude had been determined by the mere play of circumstances. As far as con- stitutional progress was concerned, the Malaya of that day was essentially a "back-bencher" i n the eyes of the Colonial Office. Paradoxical though i t may seem, this was also the time when the country led the race i n another f i e l d - that of economic usefulness. Its trade figures were of such proportions as to be superior to those of a l l the other countries i n the B r i t i s h Colonial Empire combined.2^ In seeking to explain the comparative p o l i t i c a l stag- nation i n pre-war Malaya i t would be v i t a l l y necessary to turn to the country's racial composition. In this respect an anal- ysis of the individual p o l i t i c a l aspirations and preoccupations of the different racial groupings w i l l be most enlightening. As far as the Chinese are concerned, despite intense concentration i n urban areas there did not exist a unified community worthy of being classified as a distinct p o l i t i c a l or social force. Hence, from a p o l i t i c a l standpoint, the s t a t i s t i c a l classification of two million Chinese under the same category is essentially misleading. A basic factor determining the absence of an adequately cohesive tendency among the Chinese lay i n the fact that the 21 entire community was spl i t into several groupings. Divisive forces were rampant. There were cleavages between the r i c h and the poor, the English-speaking and the non-English-speaking, the local-born and the China-born. On top of i t a l l , the community was broken up into different tribes possessing d i f f e r - ent customs, traditions and dialects, as shown i n the following 30 table: 0 Table II Racial Stock 1921 1931 1947 Hokkien 379,028 538,852 827,411 Cantonese 331,757 417,516 641,945 Hakka (Kheh) 217,697 317,506 437,407 Tiechew 130,026 208,681 364,232 Hainanese (Hailam) 68,200 97,568 157,649 Kwongsai 998 46,095 71,850 Hokchiu 13,821 31,908 48,094 Hokchia 4,058 15,301 12,754 Henghwa Other Tribes 1,659) ) 24,496) 31,025 ( ( 17,065 ( 36,260 Total 1,171,740 1,704,452 2,614,667 Despite the existence of t r i b a l differences the Chinese might have formed a more cohesive unit had the different groups intermingled freely. But as i t was, they tended to exhibit 30 Pureell, V. The Position of the Chinese i n Southeast Asia, New York, Institute of Pacific Relations, International Secretariat, 1950, p. 32. 22 regional and occupational preferences. As far as the former is concerned, the Tiechews were the most numerous group i n Kedah and the Hainanese (Hailams) were the most so i n Trengganu; the Hokchiews tended to accumulate i n Singapore and the Bind- ings; the Kwongsai were usually found i n Lenggong, Kuala Kang- sar and Bentong; the Hokkiens were predominant in Singapore, Penang and Malacca; large numbers of Cantonese were employed i n the Kinta Valley of Perak; the Hakkas (Khehs) inclined towards the rural areas and Tiechiews towards urban, their predominance 31 i n Kedah being exceptional. As far as occupational preferences are concerned, one notices that the Cantonese and the Hakkas exhibited the greatest inclination towards agriculture while the Hainanese and the Hokchias revealed the greatest aversion for such enterprise. The Hokkiens were mostly employed i n trade and small business, this factor being responsible for their predominance i n Singa- pore, Penang and Malacca. The Hakkas (Khehs), along with con- siderable numbers of Cantonese, showed interest in mining and 32 agriculture. The specific occupational preferences of the other groups seem to be less marked. Going back to some of the more important cleavages men- tioned earlier, one notices that there was a considerable amount of difference i n the attitudes fostered by the local-born and the China-born Chinese towards Malaya. Those whose families had been i n the country for a few generations had gradually changed 31 Purcell, op_. c i t . , p. 33. 32 Loc. c i t . 23 their habits and customs - going so far as to use Malay instead of Chinese as their f i r s t tongue. As might be expected, most of the China-born Chinese had their p o l i t i c a l interests mainly centered i n China, this tendency being futher enhanced, no doubt, by the increased pace of p o l i t i c a l activity in that country. The differences between the English-speaking and the non- English- speaking groups were somewhat similar. Interest i n local politics was restricted almost exclusively to the former group, many of whom had joined the Government Services and hence acquired a sense of participation i n the country's p o l i t i c a l l i f e . As far as inequalities i n income.; are concerned, the wealthier classes showed a greater interest i n constitutional changes, this being primarily due to the fact that the future of their vested interests i n the country invariably rested on appropriate legislation. The decentralization issue, discussed earlier, i s typically indicative of this tendency. In analysing the reasons for the comparative absence of p o l i t i c a l movements among the Indians i n Malaya, one notices that the clues are somewhat more apparent. Being primarily an imported labouring class, the Indians failed to strike any per- manent roots i n Malayan society. Unlike the Chinese they were not involved i n the economic penetration of the country and hence their lack of interest i n constitutional changes i s easily understandable; the Indian labouring class was quite satisfied 24 to let i t s fortunes be steered by the patronizing supervision of the Indian Agent and the Malayan Controller of Labour. As i n the case of the Chinese, ling u i s t i c differences tended to isolate the different sections of the Indian popula- tion i n Malaya. Differences i n r a c i a l stock were usually accom- panied by differences i n occupational preferences. These preferences determined the social status of each class - and this i n turn contributed to\\rards determining the degree of p o l i - t i c a l consciousness. The Indian community was thereby made extremely susceptible to social stratification: the South Indian Tamils were mainly labourers; a great proportion of the Sikhs (from Punjab) were either night-watchmen or enrolled i n the police force; the Chettis were the traditional money-lenders; the Ceylon Tamils (most of whom were English-educated) were usually employed i n c l e r i c a l posts - especially i n the Malayan Railways; and the Singhalese were primarily businessmen. The result of this social immobility was that while among the Chinese opportunities for social betterment were open to a l l classes and tribes, the social and economic status of the Indian was almost always fixed - this feature being responsible for the fact that the Indian middle class i n Malaya was essentially an imported middle class, while i n the case of the Chinese i t was one that had been largely recruited from the labouring class i t s e l f . Turning now to the Malays we notice that t e r r i t o r i a l l y they owed allegiance to their respective Sultans, culturally to Islam, 25 ... and more s p e c i f i c a l l y to the maritime branch of i t speaking Malaysian languages and having a common t r a d i - t i o n of c u l t u r e , t r a d e , and inte r m a r r i a g e among r o y a l f a m i l i e s , extending along the coasts of Malaya, Sumatra, Borneo and pa r t s of Java and other i s l a n d s . ^ W i t h i n the (Malay) p e n i n s u l a i t s e l f the non-existence of any appreciable n a t i o n a l u n i t y among the Malays was q u i t e apparent. I n c e r t a i n ways the Malays seemed quite content to enjoy the " s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n " accorded to them by the B r i t i s h , t h i s a t t i t u d e being the p o s s i b l e outcome of the f e a r of Chinese dominance should the B r i t i s h decide to leave the country. Hence the Malays were f a r from being s u i t a b l y disposed f o r p o l i t i c a l a g i t a - t i o n . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note that while p o l i t i c a l l y the Malays have been c l a s s i f i e d "indigenous , r and thus made e l i g i b l e f o r " s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s " , a l a r g e p r o p o r t i o n of those who make up the country's three m i l l i o n "Malaysians" are i n f a c t as much a l i e n s ( i n the p o l i t i c a l sense) as the Chinese and Indians, since l a r g e numbers of them were a c t u a l l y immigrants from the surround- in g areas. I f one were to break t h i s down t o a s t r i c t l y p o l i t i - c a l problem v o i d of c u l t u r a l i n f l u e n c e s , the most s u c c e s s f u l method of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g the "indigenous" s e c t i o n of the popula- t i o n from the "non-indigenous" would a l s o i n v o l v e a d i v i s i o n of the country i n t o three p a r t s which, beside t h e i r d i s t i n c t r a c i a l composition, a l s o d i f f e r i n geographic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s . The f i r s t of these i s the i s l a n d of Singapore which, i n a d d i t i o n to 33 H o l l a n d , W.L. A s i a n Nationalism and the West, New York, Macmillan Co. 1953, p . 279. 26 being p h y s i c a l l y separated from the p e n i n s u l a and se r v i n g a completely d i f f e r e n t economic f u n c t i o n from the mainland, a l s o has an overwhelming Chinese m a j o r i t y . Secondly, there i s what might be c a l l e d "Old Malaya", made up of Kelantan and Trengganu — both of which l i e i n the northeastern s e c t i o n of the pe n i n s u l a . F i n a l l y we have the r e s t of the pe n i n s u l a made up of the remain- i n g seven s t a t e s and which, i n contrast to the second c l a s s i f i c a - t i o n , may be c a l l e d "New Malaya". I t i s i n "New Malaya" t h a t one encounters the k a l e i d o s c o p i c assortment of Malaysians, Chinese and Indians. I t s p o p u l a t i o n i s l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of immigration, determined by the ups and downs i n the country's economic p r o s p e r i t y . The s i t u a t i o n i n "Old Malaya" i s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t . Here i s a l a r g e s e t t l e d p o p u l a t i o n of long standing w i t h o n l y a very small admixture of other races.3 4 Hence, demographically speaking, i t s p o p u l a t i o n has not been widely a l t e r e d by outside i n f l u e n c e s . Although not s t r i c t l y autochthonous, i t s p o p u l a t i o n may l i b e r a l l y be described as being " i n d i g e n o u s " , j y The p e c u l i a r i t i e s of the Malayan concourse are o f t e n ignored by the conventional i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the population.of the F e d e r a t i o n f o s t e r e d by those i d e o l o g i s t s w i t h Malayophile and Sinophobic tendencies. Thus the r e a l l y indigenous s e c t i o n s of the p o p u l a t i o n get l o s t i n a p e c u l i a r but much l a r g e r group 34 V l i e l a n d , C A . "The 1947 Census of Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 22 (1949), p. 60. 35 Loc. c i t . 27 now commonly r e f e r r e d t o as "Malaysians" and thus enjoying the p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s and b e n e f i t s granted to them f o r being "sons of the s o i l " . From a s o c i o l o g i c a l and c u l t u r a l standpoint, however, there i s s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h i s "Malaysian" u n i t . Whether they are a c t u a l l y indigenous or immigrants from surrounding areas, a l l Malaysians have a great d e a l i n common. They have l i n g u i s t i c s i m i l a r i t i e s , s i m i l a r customs and t r a d i t i o n s and, above a l l , a common c u l t u r a l u n i t y provided by I s l a m . ^ The i n f l u x of Chinese and Indians i n t o Malaya has made the p a t t e r n of u r b a n i z a t i o n extremely uneven i n the country. Penang, Perak and Selangor, a l l on the western coast, are the most urbanized while Kedah, Kelantan, P e r l i s and Pahang are the " l e a s t so. With regard to t h i s phenomenon i t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o note that w h i l e a l l the s t a t e s i n the former group have a Chin- ese m a j o r i t y , those i n the l a t t e r have more Malaysians than any other r a c i a l group. This makes one point v e r y obvious - the growth of c i t i e s i n Malaya has not been the r e s u l t of domestic r u r a l - u r b a n m i g r a t i o n but r a t h e r that of immigration from o u t s i d e , notably from China and I n d i a . I n 1947, f o r example, three- f o u r t h s of Malaya's urban p o p u l a t i o n was composed of Chinese and Indi a n elements (two-thirds by the Chinese a l o n e ) , while the 37 Malays accounted f o r o n l y o n e - f i f t h of the t o t a l f i g u r e . 36 V l i e l a n d , op_. c i t . , p. 60. 37 Cooper, E. " U r b a n i z a t i o n i n Malaya," P o p u l a t i o n S t u d i e s , v o l s . 5-6 (1951/52), p. 121,, 28 Table I I I P r o p o r t i o n of Urban P o p u l a t i o n i n Various E t h n i c Groups (1931 f i g u r e s i n parentheses) Malaysians Chinese Indians Others T o t a l * * < < Fed. of Malaya 21.9 62.3 13.8 2.8 100 (19.2) (59.6) (17.8) (3.4) 100 Colony of 11.1 78.7 7.2 3.0 100 Singapore ( 9.8) (76.4) ( 9.3) (4.5) 100 Malaya ( t o t a l ) 17.4 68.3 11.4 2.9 100 (15.9) (65.4) (14.8) (3.9) 100 The Malays' preference f o r r u r a l areas and a l a r g e l y subsistence economy has been commonly i n t e r p r e t e d as being i n d i c a - t i v e of a t r a d i t i o n a l l y l a z y people. This i s not t r u e . I n a c t u a l f a c t , w r i t e r s expressing t h i s viewpoint have merely mis- i n t e r p r e t e d the community's n o n - s u s c e p t i b i l i t y to c a p i t a l i s t i c economy and i t s n a t u r a l a v e r s i o n f o r employment under someone e l s e as being r e f l e c t i v e of a l a z y nature. Among the three main r a c i a l groups the Indians have the highest l i t e r a c y rate (the r e s p e c t i v e r a t e s being determined by a f f i r m a t i v e answers to a question on whether or not they could read and w r i t e i n any language As might be expected (because of t h e i r predominance i n r u r a l areas) the Malays r e g i s t e r e d the 40 lowest r a t e . 38 Cooper, op., c i t . , p. 122. 39 I b i d . , p. 129. 40 Loc. c i t . 29 Number Literate per 1000 population Indians 401 Chinese 354 Malaysians . . . . 253 Table IV Estimated Population of the Federation of Malaya as on June 30, 1955. Distribution by Race Group and Territory Territory Malaysians Chinese Indians and Pakistanis A l l Others Total Perlis 66,399 14,206 2,093 2,515 85,213 Kedah 458,941 141,945 68,577 13,486 682,949 Penang 160,827 300,826 72,629 8,017 542,299 Perak 448,362 537,611 188,233 11,763 1,185,969 Selangor 242,373 446,134 197,236 22,218 907,961 Negri Sembilan 142,653 142,095 54,254 6,663 345,665 Malacca 154,077 117,124 26,730 4,493 302,424 Johore 421,990 427,614 75,293 7,551 932,448 Pahang 158,001 113,901 19,865 3,031 294,798 Trengganu 241,953 17,946 2,129 658 262,686 Kelantan 471,657 27,481 6,771 9,996 515,905 Total 2,967,233 2,286,883 713,810 90,391 6,058,317 Source: Federation of Malaya, Annual Report, 1955. Kuala Lumpur, Government Printer, 1956, p. 8. to follow page 29 RACE GROUPS IN F u l l column height = 500,000 Figures obtained from Federation of Malaya Annual Report. 1955, p. 8. 30 Despite the varied inter- and intra-communal complexi- ties, there did exist i n pre-war years some traces of p o l i t i c a l consciousness among the people i n Malaya. As might be expected this consciousness was, by and large, the direct by-product of, and response to, the rising nationalist movements i n other countries. In this respect the part played by the Chinese nationalist movement in general (and the Kuomintang i n partic- ular) is particularly noteworthy. The Chinese in Malaya contributed their share in helping the (Chinese) Revolution of 1911 - both financially and by giv- ing asylum to i t s workers. The Kuomintang was established i n China i n 1912, and the same year saw a branch being set up i n the Straits Settlements under the Societies Ordinance. In 1914, however, this branch was closed owing to certain deceptions and discrepancies i n the manner i n which i t s affairs were conducted. Other branches i n the Federated Malay States were consequently 41 dissolved or went underground. This l u l l , however, did not last long - the movement being rejuvenated following Dr. Sun Yat Sen's return to power i n Canton. By this time the organization had begun to assume a more l e f t i s t character and this led to i t s suppression again i n 1925 as a subversive element. Despite this the movement was not completely beaten and continued operating 42 under the name of "mutual-benefit associations." 41 Purcell, The Position of the Chinese i n Southeast Asia, p. 46. 42 Loc. c i t . 31 F o l l o w i n g the achievement of g r e a t e r power by the Kuomintang i n China ( i n 1926) there was a considerable i n c r e a s e i n the volume of r e v o l u t i o n a r y propaganda i n Malaya, w i t h the Hailams (Hainanese) and Hakkas (khehs) p l a y i n g the most a c t i v e r o l e i n t h i s r espect. Apart from the a c t u a l l y subversive p a r t of the Kuomin- tang a c t i v i t i e s , the a t t i t u d e of the Malayan Govern- ments had been decided by the c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h a t r e c o g n i z i n g the Kuomintang would l e g a l i z e i n Malaya an imperium i n imperio . y ^ However, the Kuomintang's triumph i n 1926 and 1927 put the Malayan Governments i n a dilemma. The B r i t i s h Government had recognized the o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s unquestioned l e a d e r s h i p i n China and, consequently, the F o r e i g n O f f i c e was f u l l y aware th a t i t s non-recognition i n Malaya would undoubtedly appear anomalous. The argument put forward by the Kuomintang i n Malaya, f o r the purpose of having the ban on i t l i f t e d , i s worthy of note. Say- in g that there was a general sympathy among the Chinese i n Malaya f o r the n a t i o n a l i s t cause, i t s spokesmen pointed out that there was, furthermore, no i n c l i n a t i o n on the part of t h e i r head- quarters to accept the Hailam-led extremist branches. F u r t h e r - more, both the Chinese mi d d l e - c l a s s and the predominantly Cantonese s k i l l e d - l a b o u r c l a s s were d i s i n c l i n e d to support the l e f t i s t f a c t i o n ' s professed d e s i r e to back Dr. Sun's proposal 44 to u n i t e the i n t e r e s t s of China w i t h those o f the Soviet Union. 43 P u r c e l l , The P o s i t i o n of the Chinese i n Southeast A s i a , p. 46. 44 I b i d . , p. 47. 32 The year 1 9 2 7 saw Chiang Kai-shek purge the communist elements from the ranks of the Kuomintang i n China. This l e d the extremists i n Malaya to break o f f from the c e n t r a l body and to form an o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e i r own - t h i s step being an important landmark i n the development o f the Chinese-dominated Communist P a r t y i n Malaya. Having broken away from the parent body the extre m i s t s immediately set about c h a n n e l l i n g t h e i r energies i n t o producing an upsurge i n communist propaganda. I n the meantime the Malayan Governments remained adamant i n r e f u s - in g to l i f t the ban on the Kuomintang which, as mentioned, was now r i d of i t s communist elements. I n 1 9 3 0 , however, f o l l o w i n g p e r s i s t e n t requests from China, a compromise was e f f e c t e d where- by membership of the Kuomintang i n China ceased to be i l l e g a l ; but t h i s compromise d i d not make i t p o s s i b l e f o r the o r g a n i z a t i o n to r e - e s t a b l i s h branches i n Malaya. With the outbreak of Sino-Japanese h o s t i l i t i e s i n 1 9 3 7 a conscious e f f o r t was made i n Malaya t o c o n s o l i d a t e the n a t i o n - a l i s t sentiments of the Chinese i n the country. The Malayan Governments e x h i b i t e d a sympathetic a t t i t u d e , and allowed the remission of s u b s t a n t i a l sums of money to China as c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the China D i s t r e s s R e l i e f Fund, used f o r purposes of r e s i s t - 46 i n g Japanese aggression. The R e v o l u t i o n i n China had the e f f e c t of e r a d i c a t i n g whatever p o l i t i c a l apathy there was among the Chinese i n Malaya, 46 P u r c e l l , The P o s i t i o n of the Chinese i n Southeast A s i a . P. 47. 33 w i t h the r e s u l t that a sudden exuberance f o r education f o l l o w e d . Chinese schools became the centres f o r n a t i o n a l i s t propaganda, the reasons f o r t h i s being mainly tw o - f o l d : f i r s t , t hat teachers had to be imported from South China and most of them i n v a r i a b l y belonged to the " r e v o l u t i o n a r y i n t e l l i g e n t s i a " of the day; secondly, that the economic importance of Southeast A s i a was becoming more f u l l y r e a l i s e d , t h e r e e x i s t i n g at t h i s time a "tendency to regard Malaya as a province r i p e f o r annexation to C h i n a . " 4 ^ Thus i f the Chinese were to enhance the development of n a t i o n a l i s t ideas i n these regio n s , the most e f f e c t i v e t e c h - nique n a t u r a l l y l a y i n the development of the n a t i o n a l c u l t u r e . As one might expect, the a n t i - B r i t i s h element i n t h i s new educa- t i o n was q u i t e apparent. The Communists f o l l o w e d a s i m i l a r course of a c t i o n , t u r n i n g t o schools and education i n t h e i r search f o r a nursery s u i t a b l e f o r p l a n t i n g the seeds of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l propaganda. However, i t should be noted that throughout t h i s p e r i o d N a t i o n a l - ism was a c o n s i d e r a b l y s u p e r i o r force as compared to Communism i n the i n f l u e n c e i t exerted among the Chinese i n Malaya. Assessing the pre-war p o l i t i c a l scene i n g e n e r a l , i t may be s a i d , w i t h proper j u s t i f i c a t i o n , that Chinese n a t i o n a l i s m was by f a r the most potent p o l i t i c a l f o r c e then i n existence i n the country. Turning to Malay n a t i o n a l i s m now, one n o t i c e s that i t was e s s e n t i a l l y a two-pronged movement. F i r s t , i t r e f l e c t e d 4? H o l l a n d , W., A s i a n N a t i o n a l i s m and the West, p. 280. 34 Islam's c u l t u r a l r e a c t i o n against the West; and secondly, i t r e f l e c t e d the i n f l u e n c e of the r i s i n g n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Indonesia. During the e a r l y years of the t w e n t i e t h century, some members of the Malay a r i s t o c r a c y had chosen C a i r o , B e i r u t and Mecca as places f o r the education of t h e i r sons. On t h e i r r e t u r n , these boys became part of a r a t h e r small and f r u s t r a t e d Malay i n t e l l i g e n t s i a , , c i r c u l a t i n g ( i n p r i v a t e ) magazines which discussed i s s u e s p e r t a i n i n g to n a t i o n a l i s m and the p o l i t i c s of 48 the Middle Ea s t . I n t h e i r own modest s c a l e , they also set about o r g a n i z i n g debates and d i s c u s s i o n s - these being p r i m a r i l y r e s t r i c t e d to t h e i r own Intimate c i r c l e s . During the 1930's t h i s i n t e l l i g e n t s i a was brought under the i n f l u e n c e of the r i s i n g n a t i o n a l i s m i n Indonesia, the pro- cess being enhanced both by p r i v a t e contacts and through the i n f l u e n c e exerted by Malay j o u r n a l s . This awakening of n a t i o n - a l i s t i d e a l s went hand-in-hand w i t h the spread of pan-Asianism, brought about mainly through the i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of Japanese businessmen. 4^ &t the same time, the B r i t i s h p o l i c y of decen- t r a l i z a t i o n had helped i n r e t u r n i n g to the Malay a r i s t o c r a t s some of t h e i r s t a t u s as c u l t u r a l leaders of t h e i r communities - a status which had been co n s i d e r a b l y diminished by the e a r l i e r f e d e r a t i o n p o l i c y . Added to these s t i m u l i was another f a c t o r 48 H o l l a n d , A s i a n Nationalism and the West, p. 284. 35 which c o n t r i b u t e d towards f u r t h e r i n g the n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a - t i o n s of the Malays - the f a c t that the pace set by B r i t i s h and Chinese e n t e r p r i s e r s was r a p i d l y r i s i n g beyond t h e i r comprehen- s i o n . The Malays, i t must be remembered, are t r a d i t i o n a l l y i n c l i n e d towards r u r a l areas, and many of those who migrated to urban d i s t r i c t s found themselves p l a y i n g a r o l e subservient t o that of the non-Malays. The apparent t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of the country must have had a s h a t t e r i n g i n f l u e n c e on t h e i r v e r y existence and hence, wi t h the impetus provided by pan-Islamism, Indonesian Nationalism and pan-Asianism (as preached by the Japanese), the Malays sought to r e a s s e r t themselves - and here- i n l a y the main roots of t h e i r pre-war n a t i o n a l i s t movements. I n s o f a r as the I n d i a n p o p u l a t i o n i s concerned, the degree of p o l i t i c a l consciousness was almost n e g l i g i b l e i n the years before the war. Broadly speaking, there were three i n - fluences which determined the p o l i t i c a l responses of a m a j o r i t y of Indians most of whom, as noted e a r l i e r , were merely imported labourers from South I n d i a . I n the f i r s t place there was the d i r e c t i n f l u e n c e exerted by the Indian Agent i n Malaya. As part of h i s d u t i e s , he made p e r i o d i c v i s i t s to some of the rubber e s t a t e s , i n q u i r i n g i n t o the l i v i n g c o n d i t i o n s to which In d i a n labourers were subjected, and g e n e r a l l y showing a p a t e r n a l i n t e r e s t i n t h e i r w e l f a r e . To the l a b o u r e r s , however, h i s presence was symbolic of the a l l e g i a n c e they owed to I n d i a , and i n the I n d i a n Agent they saw a f i g u r e who reminded them of t h e i r h e r i t a g e . 36 Secondly, one may mention the i n f l u e n c e exerted by the a c t i v i t i e s of the C e n t r a l I n d i a n A s s o c i a t i o n , an o r g a n i z a t i o n founded i n K u a l a Lumpur i n 1937» f o l l o w i n g Mr. Nehru's f i r s t v i s i t to Malaya. Compared to the Kuomintang, f o r example, the p o l i t i c a l i n f l u e n c e exerted by t h i s body was very small indeed. However, i t was the most v i s i b l e example of I n d i a n 50 p o l i t i c a l consciousness i n Malaya before the war. Having gathered i n t o i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the d i f f e r - ent Indian A s s o c i a t i o n s i n the country, the C e n t r a l I n d i a n A s s o c i a t i o n was o b v i o u s l y w e l l equipped to a i d i n the formation of the I n d i a n Independence League during the years when the country was under Japanese r u l e . F i n a l l y , there was the r o l e played by I n d i a n j o u r n a l i s m i n Malaya. I t s main f u n c t i o n , i n a c t u a l f a c t , d i d not i n c l u d e the spread of I n d i a n p o l i t i c a l propaganda i n the country; n e i t h e r was i t i n v o l v e d i n c r e a t i n g a p u r e l y Malayan n a t i o n a l i s t movement i n Malaya. On the other hand, i t s r o l e i n f o s t e r i n g Indian n a t i o n a l i s t ideas was merely i n d i r e c t , t h i s being due to the f a c t that the j o u r n a l i s t s i n v o l v e d were predominantly I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i s t s themselves, and hence the r e s u l t a n t s l a n t i n t h e i r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of news from I n d i a must have been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n h e l p i n g to stimulate a moderate amount of n a t i o n a l i s t f e e l i n g among t h e i r readers. From the foregoing a n a l y s i s one major c o n c l u s i o n may be e s t a b l i s h e d ; namely, that pre-war n a t i o n a l i s m i n Malaya was 50 H o l l a n d , op_. c i t . , p. 28?. 37 composed p r i m a r i l y of the i n d i v i d u a l r e a c t i o n s of the v a r i o u s communities to e x t e r n a l f o r c e s and developments. As such these movements f a i l e d to u n i t e the people i n a common cause - thus f a i l i n g to produce any profound e f f e c t s on the p o l i t i c a l set-up w i t h i n the country i t s e l f . There were no major demands f o r p o l i t i c a l concessions, and the B r i t i s h continued to main- t a i n unquestioned a u t h o r i t y . There e x i s t e d no such p r a c t i c e as r e p r e s e n t a t i o n by e l e c t i o n , f o r the vote as such d i d not even e x i s t . P u b l i c r e p r e s e n t a t i o n at the d i f f e r e n t l e v e l s was determined s o l e l y by Government s e l e c t i o n and nomination. There was, however, one notable exception. The B r i t i s h Chambers of Commerce i n Singapore and Penang had the r i g h t to e l e c t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s t o the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l of the S t r a i t s Settlements, t h i s p r i v i l e g e being denied to the Chinese and I n d i a n Chambers 51 of Commerce. I n each Malayan l e g i s l a t u r e there always e x i s t e d a f i x e d m a j o r i t y of Government o f f i c i a l s . This ensured the success of a l l o f f i c i a l motions, while a l s o g i v i n g the Government the opportunity to decide the f a t e of proposals emanating from u n o f f i c i a l q u a r t e r s . There has been a common tendency f o r people to a t t r i b u t e the s a i d s t a t e of a f f a i r s s o l e l y to the r i g i d conservatism of B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . I n the l i g h t of observations made during the foregoing a n a l y s i s of pre-war n a t i o n a l i s m i n Malaya, i t i s obvious that these people have completely overlooked the f a c t that B r i t a i n was able to f o l l o w such a p o l i c y p r i m a r i l y 51 Peet, P o l i t i c a l Questions of Malaya, p. 4. 38 because of the conspicuous absence of any s u b s t a n t i a l n a t i o n - a l i s t movements of a p u r e l y Malayan nature. Only a few groups had ever taken the i n i t i a t i v e to form a s s o c i a t i o n s to v o i c e and safeguard t h e i r i n t e r e s t s - and even these seldom i f ever made any sustained e f f o r t to a t t a i n t h e i r o b j e c t i v e s . The blame was not a l l Great B r i t a i n ' s . I t was against such a s e t t i n g that the occupation of Malaya by the Japanese took p l a c e . While r a c i a l antagonisms had e s s e n t i a l l y remained dormant during the pre-war years, the per i o d of occupation was to witness an unpleasant d i s i n t e g r a - t i o n i n inter-communal r e l a t i o n s . At the same time, i t was during these three-and-a-half years that "the country without p o l i t i c s " ceased to e x i s t , g i v i n g way to one w i t h an aroused sense of p o l i t i c a l awareness. The d i v i s i v e e f f e c t s of t h e Japanese regime on Malaya's p l u r a l s o c i e t y were con s i d e r a b l y severe, t h i s being due, un- doubtedly, to the high content of "exp l o s i v e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s " i n the country. To begin w i t h , judging from the t r a d i t i o n a l enmity between China and Japan, the f a c t that a hig h p r o p o r t i o n of Malaya's p o p u l a t i o n was Chinese s p e l t t r o u b l e from the ve r y s t a r t . One of the f i r s t t h i n g s the Japanese sought t o do when they occupied the country was to t r y and f r i g h t e n the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n i n t o submission. ( I n t h i s they f a i l e d miserably because t h e i r a c t i o n s had, i n f a c t , the opposite e f f e c t - the Chinese r e t a l i a t e d i n s t e a d of being cowed i n t o submission.) 39 A l l the members of t h e i r race suspected of having communistic or n a t i o n a l i s t i c i n c l i n a t i o n s were promptly executed; t h e i r community was blamed f o r possessing no s p i r i t of cooperation; the c a l i b r e of t h e i r l eaders was branded as being extremely poor; the community i n general was accused of possessing un- d e s i r a b l e t r a i t s , and i t s a c t i o n s were a l l e g e d to be detrimen- t a l to the maintenance of proper peace and order i n the country. I n s o f a r as t h i s l i s t of "undesirables' was meant as a euphemism f o r g u e r r i l l a s i t was s u b s t a n t i a l l y c o r r e c t f o r g u e r r i l l a a c t i v i t y i n Malaya was a l l but e x c l u s - i v e l y the work of the C h i n e s e . ^ Malay and I n d i a n support f o r the r e s i s t e n c e movement were f a r from being s i g n i f i c a n t . On the c o n t r a r y , the Japanese were even s u c c e s s f u l i n using these two communities i n t h e i r f i g h t against the g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s which, as pointed out, were manned predominantly by the Chinese. Thus the r e s i s t a n c e movement and the o p p o s i t i o n that was formed to meet i t became, i n e f f e c t , a r a c i a l war. Led by the Japanese, Malay (and some Indian) u n i t s attacked the r e s i s t - ance forces and, i n r e t a l i a t i o n , the Chinese g u e r r i l l a s began a t t a c k i n g Malay communities - and so proceeded the degeneration i n Sino-Malay r e l a t i o n s , reaching a climax i n the outburst of b i t t e r i n t e r - r a c i a l clashes i n the days immediately f o l l o w i n g the surrender of the Japanese. i&nother f a c t o r which c o n t r i b u t e d t o the t r a g i c d e t e r i o r - a t i o n of i n t e r - r a c i a l r e l a t i o n s during the Japanese regime l a y 52 E l s b r e e , W.H., Japan's Role i n Southeast A s i a n N a t i o n a l - i s f r Movements, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 3 , p. 14-7. 40 i n the f a c t t h a t , i n a p l u r a l s o c i e t y , a sense of i n s e c u r i t y makes people i n c l i n e d to b e l i e v e that they are s a f e s t among members of t h e i r own race. J I n a period of aroused s u s p i c i o n , t h i s tendency i n v a r i a b l y l e d each community to keep ve r y much to i t s e l f , shunning the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of f r e e r inter-communal r e l a t i o n s . Although i t i s q u i t e apparent that the p e r i o d of Japan- ese occupation s e v e r e l y d i v i d e d up the Malayan s o c i e t y , i t would be wrong to a u t o m a t i c a l l y assume that t h i s was the r e s u l t of a d e l i b e r a t e p o l i c y on the part o f the Japanese aimed at producing such a r e s u l t . On the other hand, i t i s o n l y l o g i c a l t h a t the Japanese would not have des i r e d such a d i v i s i o n , since i t was obvious that s o c i a l d i s i n t e g r a t i o n would undoubtedly have ad- verse e f f e c t s both on economic development as w e l l as on defence. Unfortunately, however, the s i t u a t i o n i n Malaya was h a r d l y what the Japanese could consider as being conducive to healthy pro- gress. The Chinese, by t h e i r overwhelming economic s t r e n g t h , posed the main problem. This s t r e n g t h a u t o m a t i c a l l y made t h e i r co-operation a n e c e s s i t y i f the Japanese were to succeed i n a d m inistering the country e f f i c i e n t l y . I t was w i t h t h i s i n mind that they followed the i n i t i a l p o l i c y of i n s t i l l i n g f e a r i n t o the Chinese community - a p o l i c y which, as already noted, was destined to produce d r a s t i c consequences. As f a r as the Ind i a n community was concerned, the Japanese were f o r t u n a t e i n not having t o face the va r i o u s 53 E l s b r e e , op.. c i t . , p. 241. 4 1 d i f f i c u l t i e s which had been t h r u s t i n t o t h e i r hands by the Chinese. One simple f a c t could e x p l a i n t h i s phenomenon - while to the Chinese the Japanese were the invaders of t h e i r homeland (and as such t h e i r power had t o be undermined), they appeared, i n the eyes of the Malayan Indians,"to be the poten- t i a l l i b e r a t o r s of t h e i r own mother-country. England was Japan's opponent and, at a time of aroused n a t i o n a l i s m , the Indians f e l t t hat t h e i r main enemy was Great B r i t a i n too. The Japanese had e f f e c t i v e l y challenged B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y . i n Malaya - could they not be r e l i e d upon to be in s t r u m e n t a l i n doing the same i n Ind i a ? On t h i s reasoning was based the support the Japanese received from the I n d i a n community i n the country. The Japanese found an i n v a l u a b l e a l l y i n Subhas Chandra Bose, an extremist leader of the Indian n a t i o n a l i s t movement - a man i n whom the Indians saw the p e r s o n i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r country's d e s i r e to break away from the B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l yoke. The psychology behind Bose's appeal to the Indians i n Malaya i s noteworthy. The emotional response he s t i r r e d up was b a s i c a l l y founded on two things - n a t i o n a l i s m and an i n s t i l l e d f e e l i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I n s o f a r as n a t i o n a l i s m i s concerned, Bose c a r e f u l l y aroused a heightened sense of l o y a l t y among the Indians i n Malaya. Basing h i s arguments on the n o t i o n that I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i s m was e s s e n t i a l l y an anti-movement, he empha- s i z e d the urgent need f o r more e f f e c t i v e o p p o s i t i o n ( t o the B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ) , s t a t i n g that the B r i t i s h would not r e l i n q u i s h t h e i r hold i n I n d i a i f they were not forced to do 42 so. I t was on t h i s argument that he based h i s p o l i c y of i n s t i l l i n g a f e e l i n g of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y among the Malayan Indians. Saying, " a l l r e v o l u t i o n s have succeeded only w i t h 55 outside h e l p " , he harped on the i d e a that the success or f a i l u r e of the Indian l i b e r a t i o n movement n e c e s s a r i l y r e s t e d on the degree of e f f e c t i v e support given by Indians l i v i n g outside I n d i a . Hence at a time when the l o y a l t y of the Malayan Indians was e s s e n t i a l l y focussed i n I n d i a , the Japanese found l i t t l e t r o u b l e , i f any, i n f i n d i n g potent m a t e r i a l f o r a n t i - B r i t i s h propaganda. The imprisonment of Congress leaders by the B r i t - i s h , the unrest i n Bengal f o l l o w i n g the famine, and other such examples of the turbulence i n Ind i a n p o l i t i c s proved to be i d e a l as f u e l f o r t h e i r campaign. From the foregoing o b s e r v a t i o n , however, one should not derive the mistaken n o t i o n that Congress i n I n d i a was, i n f e c t , pro-Japanese. True, i t d i d not take any outspoken a n t i - Japanese stand, but t h i s was due more to the I n d i a n b i a s against p o l i t i c a l a f f i l i a t i o n than, as some people are i n c l i n e d to be- l i e v e , to the overwhelming pressure of a general pro-Japanese sentiment. With regard to t h i s i t should be noted that Mr. Gandhi himself had warned I n d i a against t u r n i n g to the Japanese f o r a i d i n ou s t i n g the B r i t i s h , saying "Of course the people must not on any account l e a n to the Japanese to get r i d of the 54 E l s b r e e , op., c i t . , p. 152. 55 Loc. c i t . 43 56 B r i t i s h power. That were a remedy worse than the disease." From a p u r e l y p o l i t i c a l standpoint, i t may be s a i d that the I n d i a n community was the one most s u b s t a n t i a l l y a f f e c t e d by the Japanese regime. From being depressed and u n i n t e r e s t e d i n h a b i t a n t s of a p o l i t i c a l backwater, the Indians of Malaya became, i n t h e i r own e s t i m a t i o n at l e a s t , the spearhead of a movement to l i b e r a t e I n d i a . The Indian Independence League was organized ( w i t h consider- able Japanese backing and encouragement), and s e v e r a l branches of i t were set up throughout the country. The i n t e n t i o n s of the Japanese, however, d i d not c o i n c i d e w i t h those of the Indians. While the former regarded the I n d i a n independence movement merely as another wheel i n t h e i r wagon c a r r y i n g the i n g r e d i e n t s necessary f o r the spread of pan-Asianism, the l a t t e r , on the other hand, considered the movement as one s e r v i n g o n l y a s i n g l e purpose, namely, the l i b e r a t i o n of I n d i a . To the Japanese i t was merely a means of reaching a more elaborate end; to the Indians i t was the end i t s e l f . Thus whi l e the Japanese thought that they were using the Indians merely to achieve t h e i r own ends, the Indians viewed the Japanese i n an i d e n t i c a l l i g h t . 5 8 The ambitions of the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Army never went very f a r . I t s defeat was d e c i s i v e and marked the end of a 56 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , I n d i a . Statement pu b l i s h e d by the Government of I n d i a on the Congress Party's R e s p o n s i b i l - i t y f o r the Disturbance i n I n d i a 1942-43. Cmd. 6 4 3 0 , p. 4 . 57 Holland. A s i a n N a t i o n a l i s m and the West, p. 2 9 5 . 5 8 I b i d . , p. 2 9 6 . 44 whole episode. The a r r i v a l of the B r i t i s h soon made the e n t i r e movement a t h i n g of the f o r g o t t e n past. As suddenly as i t had sprung up, Indian n a t i o n a l i s m l o s t a l l i t s promin- ence i n the Malayan p o l i t i c a l scene. The next time an I n d i a n rose as a noteworthy p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e , h i s main concern was Malayan and not Indian p o l i t i c s . Turning to the impact of the occupation on the Malay community, one n o t i c e s t h a t , as a r e s u l t of the Japanese regime (and the p o l i t i c a l responses of the Chinese and Indian communi- t i e s which f o l l o w e d ) , the more r e a l i s t i c and re s p o n s i b l e Malay leaders came t o acknowledge the f a c t that the Malays themselves were not capable of running the e n t i r e p o l i t i c a l gamut i n the country. The occupation had revealed the p o l i t i c a l p o t e n t i a l - i t i e s of the non-Malay communities, and t h i s l e f t the Malays w i t h two p o s s i b l e a l t e r n a t i v e s - e i t h e r to co-operate w i t h the Chinese and I n d i a n communities or to r e l y on B r i t i s h p rotec- t i o n . ^ Some of the younger Malays, however, f a i l e d to sub- s c r i b e to t h i s n o t i o n , having been convinced, during the occupa- t i o n , that Malay domination i n the country's a d m i n i s t r a t i o n could be achieved and maintained without much c o m p l i c a t i o n . As mentioned e a r l i e r , the Japanese occupation was marked by the r i s e of i n t e r - r a c i a l clashes between the Chinese and the Malays. The experience of having had to defend themselves produced a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the outlook of the r u r a l 5 9 H o l l a n d , op_. c i t . , p. 2 9 1 45 Malays, i n that i t l e d to the spread of the " c u l t of i n v u l n e r - a b i l i t y " . This c u l t , a s u r v i v a l of p r e - I s l a m i c Malay magic modified i n some measure by Moslem mysticism, was quite strong among the Malays before the days of B r i t i s h r u l e , and never wholly died out even i n f i f t y years of s e c u r i t y . Under the Japanese the c u l t was revived among the Malay peasants. ... This c u l t probably strengthened the Malay's con- sciousness of race. K i a i S a l l e h (60), f o r example, not merely encouraged h i s ' i n v u l n e r a b l e ' Malays to r e s i s t the attacks and demands of the Chinese g u e r r i l l a s , but also went so f a r as to a t t a c k and l o o t a Chinese v i l l a g e , presumably w i t h a view to keeping a l i v e the c u l t ... even when the r e a l enemy i n the jungle could not be l o c a t e d . f a The experience of having borne arms i n s e l f - d e f e n c e had yet another profound e f f e c t on Malay outlook. Having thus f a r remained a passive community seeking p r o t e c t i o n under the B r i t i s h , they now began to muster up a growing amount of s e l f - confidence i n t h e i r own p o t e n t i a l i t i e s . This seems to have been the r e s u l t , not of the side on which they fought and f o r what cause, but r a t h e r of the simple f a c t that they had p a r t i c i - pated i n the f i g h t i n g . They had no united sentiment worthy of n o t i c e , and while many of them channelled t h e i r energies i n t o supporting the Japanese, there were others ( i n c l u d i n g the S u l t a n of Pahang) who engaged i n anti-Japanese a c t i v i t i e s . With regard to the predominance of Chinese elements i n the present g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s i n Malaya, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that the B r i t i s h , during the war years, d i d not organize 60 K i a i S a l l e h - one of the l e a d i n g f i g u r e s i n the r e v i v a l of the c u l t . 6 1 Holland, op_. c i t . . p. 2 9 1 . 4 6 and t r a i n Malay g u e r i l l a s i n t h e i r e f f o r t s to form anti-Japanese f o r c e s i n the country. As observed by S i l c o c k and A z i z , I t seems probable t h a t a considerable number of them would have been w i l l i n g to do t h i s ; but the B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s were v e r y s k e p t i c a l about the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of g u e r r i l l a warfare, and probably K.M.M. ( 6 2 ) a c t i v i - t i e s had made them d i s t r u s t the l o y a l t y of the M a l a y s ^ Thus the B r i t i s h placed a l l t h e i r hopes i n the a c t i v i t i e s of the Chinese r e s i s t a n c e f o r c e s and the r e s i s t a n c e movement became, i n e f f e c t , a Chinese movement - which i t s t i l l i s today. The inference made here i s open to debate, e s p e c i a l l y when one r e a l i s e s the f a c t that the present g u e r r i l l a f o r c e s ( l i k e those during the Japanese regime) are l e d and manned by communists - and the Malays, perhaps due to t h e i r r e l i g i o u s and s o c i a l back- ground, do not appear to be s u s c e p t i b l e to communist ideol o g y . The r a c i a l d i v i s i o n which r e s u l t e d from the Japanese occupation had almost no l a s t i n g e f f e c t s . I t seems to have been the outcome of momentary a f f e c t a t i o n s - heightened by the prevalent v i o l e n c e and sense of i n s e c u r i t y . I t was merely the outcome of e x c e p t i o n a l circumstances and was soon f o r g o t t e n a f t e r the country was reoccupied and r e s t o r e d to order. Animos- i t y gave way to t o l e r a n c e , and tolerance to co-operation - hence the emergence of the present p o l i t i c a l p a r t n e r s h i p among the three main r a c i a l groups i n the country. 62 Kesatuan Mud a Malayu (Malay Youth Movement). A pro- Japanese o r g a n i z a t i o n . 63 Holland, op., c i t . , p. 2 9 2 . 47 I n summing up the r e a c t i o n s of the v a r i o u s communities towards Japanese r u l e , i t i s important that one should avoid passing judgements that are coloured by preconceived notions about g r a t i t u d e and moral o b l i g a t i o n s . The p r a c t i c a l i m p l i c a - t i o n s behind the problem i n v a l i d a t e the j u s t i f i e d a p p l i c a t i o n of such n o t i o n s . The Malayan p o p u l a t i o n at l a r g e had no s p e c i f i c reason to defend the l e g a l a u t h o r i t y of B r i t i s h colon- i a l r u l e , e s p e c i a l l y when i t was known that the Japanese had a f l a r e f o r harsh r e p r e s s i v e measures. That was a f e a t reserved f o r the more s t o i c diehards. But t h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y brand the people as being " t r a i t o r s " . The Japanese had success- f u l l y challenged the a u t h o r i t y and power of the B r i t i s h , and there were even those who f e l t that the B r i t i s h had deserted the country i n a time of need. The s i t u a t i o n o b v i o u s l y c a l l e d f o r re-adaptation and there were many who were content to "wait and see how t h i n g s went." The Malays r e a l i s e d t h a t , w i t h Japanese backing, there could be a p o s s i b i l i t y of r e s t o r i n g t h e i r race to a p o s i t i o n of unquestioned l e a d e r s h i p i n the country. They were encouraged, i n t h i s view, by Japanese h o s t i l i t y towards the Chinese, whom they considered as being the main t h r e a t as f a r as r a c i a l supremacy was concerned. This e x p l a i n s pro- Japanese sentiments among the Malays. The Indians saw, i n Japanese f o r c e , the encouraging p o s s i b i l i t y of the l i b e r a t i o n of I n d i a - hence t h e i r support f o r the new r u l e r s . True, the Chinese formed a noteworthy r e s i s t a n c e movement, but, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , i t i s q u i t e p l a i n t h a t they d i d not do t h i s because they f e l t themselves 48 p a r t i c u l a r l y endeared to the B r i t i s h . T h e i r f i g h t against the Japanese was e s s e n t i a l l y a personal one. The r e a c t i o n s of the m a j o r i t y of people i n Malaya when the B r i t i s h returned i n 1945 i s not open to d i s p u t e . A l l com- munities were e q u a l l y pleased at t h e i r a r r i v a l . They made i t q u i t e apparent that the emotional appeal behind pan-Asianism was no s u b s t i t u t e f o r proper government and a good l i f e . A new er a was now opened i n Malaya's p o l i t i c a l h i s t o r y . The p e r i o d of occupation had s t i r r e d , i n the people, an awareness of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l needs, and demands f o r concessions from the B r i t i s h government were not slow i n coming. Chapter Two The Malayan Union and the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya I n post-war Malaya Great B r i t a i n was faced w i t h prob- lems p e r t a i n i n g to almost every aspect of c o l o n i a l r u l e - economic development, r i s i n g p o l i t i c a l - m i n d e d n e s s , education, i n t e r n a l unrest and subversion. To these was added the v e r y unique problem of promoting r a c i a l harmony i n a d i v i d e d s o c i e t y - the s o - c a l l e d "population p u z z l e " . F r e s h t h i n k i n g was made imperative regarding the country's problems and needs. The p o l i t i c a l behaviour and a s p i r a t i o n s of the people i n t h i s " a r t i f i e a l l y created colony" had changed, p r i m a r i l y due to the f a c t that the years of occupation had a l t e r e d the non-Malay po p u l a t i o n from being b a s i c a l l y t r a n s i e n t to being l a r g e l y s e t t l e d . The days immediately f o l l o w i n g the surrender of the Jap- anese c o n s t i t u t e perhaps the most unpleasant p e r i o d i n the country's h i s t o r y , i n s o f a r as i n t e r - r a c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s are concerned. Malaya was h i t by a wave of Sino-Malay animosity, c h a r a c t e r i z e d by p h y s i c a l clashes between the two communities. I n the absence of e s t a b l i s h e d B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y , matters were made very much worse by the assumption of a u t h o r i t y , f o r a b r i e f p e r i o d , by members of the communist-manned and Chinese- dominated Malayan People's Anti-Japanese Army ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the MPAJA). The v i o l e n t r a c i a l d i s o r d e r s were 5Q g r a d u a l l y terminated a f t e r the establishment of the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n the country. I n a n a l y s i n g the Malayan Union Proposals of 194-6 and the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Agreement of 194-8, emphasis w i l l have to be placed on the two b a s i c i s s u e s t h e r e i n : the r e l a t i o n - ship between these c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals and the o l d t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s h i p s between the Malays and the E n g l i s h ; and secondly, the question of c i t i z e n s h i p . On the 1st of A p r i l , 1946, the B r i t i s h M i l i t a r y Admin- i s t r a t i o n was replaced by the Malayan Union, which embodied a f r e s h set of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals and which represented the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ' s e f f o r t s at p o l i t i c a l experimentation i n Malaya. Despite the f a c t that the Union proposals turned a b o r t i v e , i t i s important to d i s c u s s the scheme and i t s conse- quences i n some d e t a i l s i n c e , i n a d d i t i o n t o i n t e n s i f y i n g the already-present Sino-Malay t e n s i o n , the proposals also s t i r r e d an unprecedented i n t e r e s t i n p o l i t i c s , a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and the p o l i c i e s of the Government among the Malays. The o p p o s i t i o n caused by the new proposals represents the f i r s t chapter i n organized r a c i a l a g i t a t i o n , f o r c o n s t i t u t i o n a l ends, i n post- war Malaya. I t would be wise, at t h i s j u n c t u r e , to analyse the rele v a n t s e c t i o n s of the Union proposals, s i n c e f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h the e x p l o s i v e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s contained t h e r e i n would be i n v a l u a b l e i n enhancing the study of the communal r e a c t i o n s which f o l l o w e d . 51 Saying that the d i v i d e d nature of the country, which had c h a r a c t e r i z e d the p o l i t i c a l s t r u c t u r e of pre-war Malaya, was not compatible w i t h the need f o r n a t i o n a l progress, the B r i t i s h Government proposed, through the Malayan Union scheme, to b r i n g about greater a d m i n i s t r a t i v e u n i t y . 1 The White Paper ex p l a i n e d : A stage has now been reached when the system of government should be s i m p l i f i e d and reformed. I n t e r - n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s as w e l l as the s e c u r i t y and other i n t e r e s t s of the B r i t i s h Commonwealth r e q u i r e that Malaya should be able to e x e r c i s e an i n f l u e n c e as a united and enlightened country appropriate to her economic and s t r a t e g i c i m p o r t a n c e ^ The implementation of two v i t a l changes was necessary to b r i n g about t h i s union. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e of the country had to be readjusted whereby Singapore would be e s t a b l i s h e d as a separate colony w h i l e the other two Settlements (Penang and Malacca), together w i t h the nine Malay S t a t e s , would c o n s t i t u t e a s i n g l e p o l i t i c a l e n t i t y - t o be known 3 as the Malayan Union. Secondly, r a c i a l preferences had t o be abolished i n s o f a r as c i t i z e n s h i p q u a l i f i c a t i o n s were concerned, so as t o i n c l u d e everyone (except Japanese n a t i o n a l s ) , regard- l e s s of race, born and r e s i d e n t i n the Malayan Union or Singapore. Such a move would enable a l l those who regarded the country as t h e i r homeland to take an a c t i v e share i n i t s p o l i t i c a l and 4 c u l t u r a l i n s t i t u t i o n s . The r a c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the new 1 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , Malayan Union and Singapore, Statement of P o l i c y on Future C o n s t i t u t i o n , London, H.M. S t a t i o n - ery O f f i c e , 1946, Cmd. 6724, p. 2. 2 L o c . c i t . 3 I b i d . , p. 3. 4 £bid., p. 2. 52 proposals are worthy of note, and those s e c t i o n s r e l e v a n t t o the present study are given below. The f o l l o w i n g were to be c i t i z e n s of the Malayan Union: (a) Any person born i n the Malayan Union or Singapore before the date when the Order came i n t o f o r c e , who was o r d i n - 5 a r i l y r e s i d e n t i n e i t h e r of the two areas on tha t date. (b) Any person at l e a s t eighteen years of age, who was o r d i n a r i l y r e s i d e n t i n the Malayan Union or Singapore on the date when the Order came i n t o f o r c e , and who had res i d e d i n e i t h e r t e r r i t o r y f o r a minimum of 1 0 out of the 1 5 years preceding the 1 5 t h of February 1942. (Such persons had to take an oath of a l l e g i a n c e saying that they would be f a i t h f u l and l o y a l to the Union.)^ (c) Any person born e i t h e r i n the Malayan Union or i n Singa- pore on or a f t e r the date when the Order came i n t o 7 f o r c e . (d) toy person born outside the Malayan Union or Singapore on or a f t e r the day when the Order came i n t o f o r c e , whose f a t h e r was a c i t i z e n of the Malayan Union at the 8 time of the person's b i r t h . (e) The minor c h i l d r e n ( c h i l d r e n under 18 years of age) of persons c l a s s i f i e d i n cate g o r i e s (a) and ( b ) . ^ 5 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , Malayan Union and Singapore. Survey of Proposed C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Arrangements, London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 4 6 , Cmd. 6 7 4 9 , p. 9 . 6 Loc. c i t . 7 I b i d . , p. 1 0 . 8 Loc. c i t . 9 Loc. c i t . 53 I n order to be n a t u r a l i z e d as a c i t i z e n of the Malayan Union, a person (a) had to have resided i n the Malayan Union or Singapore f o r one year preceding the date of a p p l i c a t i o n , and f o r 4 out of the 8 years preceding the same d a t e ; 1 0 (b) had to give evidence of good character and an adequate knowledge of e i t h e r Malay or E n g l i s h ; 1 1 (c) had to take an oath of a l l e g i a n c e to the Malayan Union, and a l s o show the i n t e n t i o n to r e s i d e e i t h e r i n the Malayan Union or Singapore i f the a p p l i c a t i o n were 1 2 granted. Being l e n i e n t , these requirements undoubtedly favoured the non- Malays, who almost e x c l u s i v e l y account f o r the numbers who o b t a i n c i t i z e n s h i p through n a t u r a l i z a t i o n . With regard to the t r a d i t i o n a l and s p i r i t u a l l e a d e r s h i p of the Malay R u l e r s , i t was proposed that the Ruler of each state should preside over a Malay Advisory C o u n c i l , appointed by him w i t h the approval of the Governor. Though t h e i r main f u n c t i o n r e s t e d i n matters p e r t a i n i n g to the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n , these c o u n c i l s a l s o had the op p o r t u n i t y of a d v i s i n g the Rulers on other matters at the request of the Resident Commissioner 7 13 a c t i n g w i t h the approval of the Governor. As f a r as l e g i s l a - t i o n concerning the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n was concerned, (which 1 0 , Malayan Union and Singapore, Cmd;; .6749, p. 9. 1 1 Loc. c i t . 1 2 Loc. c i t . 1 3 Cmd. 6 7 2 4 , op_. c i t . , p. 4. 5 4 d i d not in c l u d e the c o l l e c t i o n of t i t h e s and t a x e s ) , each Ru l e r , a c t i n g w i t h the help of h i s C o u n c i l , was to have l e g i s - 14 l a t i v e powers w i t h i n h i s S t a t e . However, i t should be noted 15 that a l l such l e g i s l a t i o n had to win the Governor's approval. P r i o r to d i s c u s s i n g the communal r e a c t i o n s s t i r r e d by the new proposals, i t might prove advantageous t o analyse b r i e f l y the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the new scheme. As mentioned i n the f i r s t chapter of the present study, the B r i t i s h Crown had never before been granted any j u r i s d i c t i o n over the Malay States according to the t r e a t i e s which had been concluded and which had been i n operation during the pre-war years. The s i t u a t i o n had merely been one whereby the Malay Rulers had been obliged to accept the advice given to them by B r i t i s h Residents, on a l l matters except those p e r t a i n i n g to the r e l i g i o n and customs of the Malay i n h a b i t a n t s . According to the Malayan Union scheme, however, t h i s was to be changed and the Malay States were now to be brought under the common j u r i s d i c t i o n of the B r i t i s h Crown. His Majesty was thus en- abled to c a r r y out a p o l i c y of uniform l e g i s l a t i o n f o r a l l s t a t e s under the F o r e i g n J u r i s d i c t i o n A c t . I t was w i t h t h i s i n mind that S i r Harold MacMichael, a S p e c i a l Representative 14 Malayan Union and Singapore. Cmd. 6 7 2 4 , p. 4. 15 To enhance t h i s procedure, the Governor was to be a s s i s t e d by a C e n t r a l A d v i s o r y C o u n c i l of the Malay Rulers s i t t i n g under h i s chairmanship. This c o u n c i l had the a d d i t i o n a l p r i v i l e g e of d i s c u s s i n g matters not p e r t a i n i n g to the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n , e i t h e r at the instance of the Governor or at that of any Ruler a c t i n g w i t h the consent of the Governor. l£ Cmd. 6 7 2 4 , op_. c i t . , p. 3 . 55 of His Majesty's Government, was sent t o Malaya f o r the pur- pose of g e t t i n g the approval of Th e i r Highnesses the Sultans by concluding " w i t h each r u l e r on behalf of His Majesty's Government a formal Agreement by which he (would) cede f u l l 17 j u r i s d i c t i o n to His Majesty i n h i s S t a t e , " and abrogating e x i s t i n g agreements that were i n any way repugnant to the proposals contained i n the new Agreement. From the Malay poi n t of view, t h i s sudden r e v e r s a l of p o l i c y on the part of the B r i t i s h C o l o n i a l O f f i c e was most un- expected, t o say the l e a s t . To the bewildered Malay, the l i b e r a t i o n , followed so soon by the new pr o p o s a l s , i n v a r i a b l y represented a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n B r i t i s h i n t e n t i o n s from the sublime to the very r i d i c u l o u s . H is '* s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n " was suddenly to be ended by the new c i t i z e n s h i p r e g u l a t i o n s ; h i s Ruler was made nothing more than a mere " s t u f f e d s h i r t " endowed w i t h powers which, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, were s t e r i l e ; the p r i n c i p l e of d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n , to which the B r i t i s h had adhered so r e s o l u t e l y i n pre-war years, was now abandoned; and, f i n a l l y , the o l d t r e a t y r e l a t i o n s were now made i n v a l i d - discarded i n favour of a scheme which would place h i s community on a p o l i t i c a l p a r i t y w i t h the Chinese and Indian s , i n whose i n t e n t i o n s and l o y a l t i e s he had no f a i t h . B r i t i s h p o l i c y had, up to t h i s time, been d i c t a t e d by a co n s c i e n t i o u s regard f o r the binding q u a l i t i e s of t r e a t i e s , a r e c o g n i t i o n that i t s economic p o l i c i e s had flooded the country w i t h a l i e n s , and a r e a l i z a t i o n 17 Malayan Union and Singapore, Cmd. 6724, p. 4. 56 that without p r o t e c t i o n Malaya would soon cease t o be a country of the Malays and would i n f a c t become what casual observation had mockingly c a l l e d i t , another province of China. There was the rub . ^ 8 I f they were t o judge by t h e i r r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Great B r i t a i n during the preceding seventy years, the Malays had no cause whatsoever to expect t h i s complete v o l t e face i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Having been a protected race up to t h i s time, they now found t h e i r v e r y existence threatened. Most b a f f l i n g of a l l was the f a c t t h a t , i n t h e i r eyes, the new proposals were not i n any way a compromise. Neither had they been made necessary. Why, f o r example, had there been t h i s sudden rush t o create equal c i t i z e n s h i p ? A f t e r a l l , the Chinese and the Indians had not r e a l l y a g i t a t e d f o r such a move; and t h i s was not an urgent 19 problem demanding an immediate answer.' The Malays at l a r g e f e l t that they had been cheated. They had placed t h e i r t r u s t i n the B r i t i s h Government, and the B r i t i s h Government had l e t them down badly, without any r e a l excuse; they had been anxious to demonstrate t h e i r l o y a l t y t o Great B r i t a i n a f t e r the years of submission to Japanese r u l e - and now that l o y a l t y appeared t o have been misplaced. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c of t h e i r o p i n i o n was the statement made by a Malay M i n i s t e r during t h i s p e r i o d when he s a i d , The question i s not so much one of ceding powers as that of whether we are prepared to t r u s t the B r i t i s h Government or n o t . o n 18 Jones, S.W., P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Malaya, London, Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1953, p. 137« 19 I b i d . , p. 138. 20 Dodd, E.E., The New Malaya, London, Fabian P u b l i c a t i o n s L t d . , 1946, p. 2 7 . 57 Nor was a l l t h i s unknown i n Great B r i t a i n . Viscount Marehwood, f o r example, had s a i d i n warning the House of Lords about the p o s s i b l e consequences of the new proposals, ... the Malay b e l i e v e s i m p l i c i t l y i n the Englishman's word. He b e l i e v e s the Englishman's word i s h i s bond. We must see to i t t h a t we do not break f a i t h i n any way and whatever changes may be introduced the i n t e r - e s t s of the Malay must remain a paramount c o n s i d e r a t i o n . The Chinese and Indi a n s , i t must always be remembered, were admitted to the Malay States on B r i t i s h advice and i f the Malay i s edged out of the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e f i e l d i t w i l l cause considerable d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and b i t t e r resentment Once the i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the new scheme were made c l e a r , the Malays were quick t o r e a c t - and t h e i r stand was unexpectedly strong and c o n s i s t e n t , e s p e c i a l l y when viewed against the background of seventy years o f complacent accept- ance of B r i t i s h p o l i c y . Broadly speaking, t h e i r o p p o s i t i o n may be s a i d to have r e s t e d on three main bases. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , they deplored the haste w i t h which the Sultans had been required to approve the new p l a n . They were r e s e n t f u l of the a r b i t r a r y and high-handed manner i n which the scheme had been rushed through and i n which the consent of the v a r i o u s Sultans had been procured by the S p e c i a l Representative of the Crown, S i r Harold MacMichael. They were convinced that the B r i t i s h Government had taken what Lord E l i b a n k , i n the House of Lords, had termed a "lump i t and take i t " a t t i t u d e towards them. The S u l t a n of Kedah, f o r example, represented that h i s s i g n a t u r e t o 21 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Lords. O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. Second Volume of Session 1945-194-6, p. 931. 58 the new Agreement had been procured "under duress". The con d i t i o n s governing the manner i n which S i r Harold had d i s - patched h i s business gave added weight to these c r i t i c i s m s . He had been given the a u t h o r i t y to confirm as Sultans f o u r a c t - i n g Rulers whose succession had taken place during the Japanese occupation - and t h i s a u t o m a t i c a l l y i n v i t e d the c r i t i c i s m o f 23 "no s i g n a t u r e , no c o n f i r m a t i o n . " J The word "MacMichael" had indeed "gone i n t o the Malay language and had become a word of 24 opprobrium throughout the whole pe n i n s u l a . " Secondly, the Malays regarded the Union proposals as embodying an e f f o r t to lower the status of the Malay Sultanates to that of a colony. S t a t e sovereignty had been taken away, accompanied by the Sultan s ' p o s i t i o n as t r a d i t i o n a l and r e l i g i - ous leaders of t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s . I n each S t a t e , the main body of law had ceased t o req u i r e the assent of the Ruler - i t was now up t o the Governor to approve l e g i s l a t i o n . The Malays c l e a r l y f e l t that there was nothing l e f t which would d i s - t i n g u i s h them from the a l i e n races which had outnumbered them i n t h e i r own country. F i n a l l y , the Malay community was apprehensive of the f a c t t h a t , should the r e s p e c t i v e States be t r a n s f e r r e d t o B r i t a i n , a democratic e l e c t o r a t e could e a s i l y r e s u l t , whereby a Chinese 22 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, Report of Debates, v o l . 419, PP» 358-9. S i r Harold MacMichael denied t h i s a ccusation, w h i l e agreeing that the S u l t a n i n question had expressed c l e a r d i s l i k e f o r the new proposals. 23 Gammans, L.D., M.P. " C r i s i s i n Malaya," The Spectator, v o l . 176 (1946), p. 601. 24 Loc. c i t . t 59 m a j o r i t y would be made i n e v i t a b l e i n the foreseeable f u t u r e . Chinese and I n d i a n immigrants, w i t h comparatively inadequate r e s i d e n t i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , would be given the p r i v i l e g e of a c q u i r i n g c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s equal t o t h e i r own. I f t h e i r p o l i t i c a l sentiments before the war were any i n d i c a t i o n of t h e i r f u t u r e p o l i t i c a l behaviour, i t seemed apparent that o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of the Chinese would give l o y a l t y to Malaya an unquestioned p r i o r i t y over l o y a l t y to China. Faced w i t h p o s s i b l e submersion the Malays objected t h a t , f i r s t , they had not been given s u f f i c i e n t warning about the change i n B r i t i s h p o l i c y and, secondly, that they lacked the education and the economic s t r e n g t h to compete f o r supremacy on an equal f o o t i n g w i t h the other r a c e s . The above argument was echoed, w i t h equal emphasis, by OK ex-Governors and r e t i r e d c i v i l servants r e s i d i n g i n England. I n the House of Lords, Lord E l i b a n k expressed the f e a r t h a t , i f they became more numerous, the new c i t i z e n s h i p scheme would per- mit the Chinese to g r a d u a l l y assume a p o s i t i o n of c o n t r o l i n the Malay S t a t e s . I n answering t h i s the S e c r e t a r y of State f o r Dominion A f f a i r s , Viscount Addison, j u s t i f i e d the Govern- ment's p o l i c y by s t a t i n g that B r i t i s h i d e a l s and methods of government d i d not lend themselves to the establishment of " p r i v i l e g e d m i n o r i t i e s " , adding, "we do not go i n f o r that s o r t 25 P u r c e l l , V., The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, Singapore. Donald Moore, 1956, p. 40. 60 of t h i n g . , , < i C > (This w r i t e r i s unable to r e c o n c i l e the above statement w i t h the granting of " s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s " t o the Malays - who were a numerical m i n o r i t y - both before the war and under the F e d e r a t i o n scheme which followed the Malayan Union. The e x c l u s i o n of non-Malays from the Malayan C i v i l S e r v i c e had already been a source of c o n f l i c t before the war. As explained i n Volume .36 of The Round Table, "the l o c a l l y born and bred Chinese, Indians and E u r a s i a n s , who regarded Malaya as t h e i r r e a l home, f e l t that they had a c l a i m to appointments which were reserved e x c l u s i v e l y f o r Europeans and Malays. Un- f o r t u n a t e l y , the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e took a s h o r t - s i g h t e d view and 27 adhered to i t to the very end." ') Despite t h e i r i n i t i a l complaisance (which, i t was claimed was due to duress on the one hand and f a i t h i n B r i t i s h i n t e g r i t y on the o t h e r ) , the Sultans c o n t r i b u t e d t h e i r share i n a g i t a t i n g f o r the withdrawal of the Malayan Union Agreement. I n making r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to England on t h i s matter, they echoed some of the o b j e c t i o n s already v o i c e d by the Malay community i n g e n e r a l . They were, however, more c a t e g o r i c i n t h e i r demands, g i v i n g i n - d i v i d u a l a t t e n t i o n to matters such as c i t i z e n s h i p ( s t a t i n g , f o r example, that since Singapore I s l a n d was not to form part of the Malayan Union, r e s i d e n t s of Singapore should not q u a l i f y f o r 26 Great B r i t a i n , P arliament, House of Lords, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, Second volume of s e s s i o n 194-5-46, p. 940. 27 "Complications of Union i n Malaya," Round Table. Volume 36 (Dec. 1945-Sept. 1946), p. 240. 6 1 p o Malayan Union c i t i z e n s h i p - a proposal o b v i o u s l y aimed at pre- v e n t i n g a Chinese m a j o r i t y ) , the a l i e n a t i o n of s t a t e land ( s t a t i n g that t h i s should be l e f t i n the hands of the State 29 C o u n c i l s ) , finance (proposing that the State Governments should c o n t r o l t h e i r own f i n a n c e s ) , and so on. I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , i t i s q u i t e apparent that the m o t i v a t i n g f o r c e s behind t h e i r p r o t e s t s were t h r e e - f o l d : they wanted to r e s t o r e the p r e s t i g e which they themselves had l o s t ; they wanted the St a t e s to r e g a i n t h e i r sovereignty; and, f i n a l l y , they wanted to see the Malay community back i n the p r i v i l e g e d seat i t had occupied before the war. Encouraged by t h e i r S u l t a n s ' r e t a l i a t i o n , the Malays i n t e n s i f i e d t h e i r programme of a g i t a t i o n . Never before had the B r i t i s h known them to d i s p l a y such a potent c a p a c i t y f o r o r a t o r y and p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . ^ 0 The women, f o r example, "staggered a l l conversant w i t h Malay conventions by coming out of t h e i r shy s e c l u s i o n to head processions and address p u b l i c 31 meetings."^ The Malays were convinced that the new proposals represented a camouflaged a t t a c k on t h e i r race, and were deter- mined to b r i n g about i t s withdrawal. From "s l e e p y b e n e f i c i a r i e s of a p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n " they were transformed i n t o "champions 3 2 of t h e i r r i g h t s and c r i t i c s of those who t r i e d to destroy them." 2 8 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates, Volume 420, p. 1 3 6 . 2 9 Loc, c i t . 3 0 Jones, op., c i t . , p. 1 3 8 . 3 1 I b i d . , pp. 1 3 8 - 9 . 32 I b i d . , p. 1 3 9 . 62 Slogans like "Long Live the Malays", "Down with the Malayan Union", and "Has our benign protector turned bully?"*^ were characteristic of the sentiments underlying their opposition. As explained by the Honorable Mr. Gammans, i t was obvious that a l l classes of the Malay community ('from padi-planters to 34 Sultan") were completely united on the issue. The Sultans went to the extent of boycotting the installation of the Gover- nor of the Malayan Union, Sir Edward Gent, on Apri l 1, 1946. This act was repeated at the installation ceremony of the Commissioner-General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, on May 30th. As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the time had now arrived for excuses. With regard to their failure to formulate a policy acceptable, at least i n i t s broad outlines, to the people of Malaya, the Br i t i s h Government sought refuge in the explanation that the war years had changed Malaya consid- erably, and that they had no definite indication regarding the policy they should have adopted. This cannot f a i l to strike one as being perhaps a l i t t l e too naive. The Br i t i s h must have been quite aware of the p o l i t i c a l turmoil which had developed both within the country and i n i t s neighbouring areas during the war years. How, then, could they even pretend that the Japanese withdrawal would have l e f t behind a tabula rasa suit- able for the implementation of a policy without consultation and without compromise? 33 Quoted i n Gammans, og. c i t . , p. 601. 34 Loc. c i t . 63 I n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , the a c t u a l i s s u e at stake was not the merely l e g a l r i g h t s of the Sultans or the questionable methods used by S i r Harold MacMichael i n proc u r i n g the si g n a - t u r e s of the r e s p e c t i v e r u l e r s , but r a t h e r whether or not Great B r i t a i n was going to continue r e c o g n i z i n g Malaya as being essen- 35 t i a l l y a Malay country. The Malays d i d not want to see t h e i r country transformed i n t o another P a l e s t i n e , where they would l o s e t h e i r i d e n t i t y i n a common c i t i z e n s h i p embracing a l l com- munities. The s i t u a t i o n was not a simple one, and could not have been solved by a simple answer. Herein l a y the main cause f o r the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ' s f a i l u r e . Thus the problem at hand i n v a r i a b l y centered around whether or not the B r i t i s h were going t o recognize the de f a c t o p o s i t i o n of the non-Malay races - e s p e c i a l l y the Chinese - who now regarded Malaya as t h e i r r e a l home, and as such considered themselves as being e l i g i b l e f o r w i d e l y increased p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . ^ I n i t s b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s the Malays were w i l l i n g t o agree to t h i s demand, but on l y w i t h r e s e r v a t i o n s which would be 37 v i t a l f o r the maintenance o f t h e i r p r i v i l e g e d p o s i t i o n . Imong the non-Malay r a c e s , the Chinese and the Indians presented a con t r a s t during these times. While the former were 35 "Malays or Malayans?" The Economist. March 16, 1946, p. 403. Despite t h i s statement, however, i t should a l s o be r e a l i s e d t h a t the Sultans continued to be the most concrete sym- bols of Malay n a t i o n a l i t y against the immigrant segments of the country's p o p u l a t i o n . 36 Gammans, op_. c i t . , p. 601. 37 Loc. c i t . 64 beginning t o show growing signs of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y ( s t i r r e d , no doubt, by new developments such as the p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c sep- a r a t i o n of Singapore from the Mainland) w h i l e also being i n - c l i n e d to d i s s o c i a t e themselves from the prolonged p o l i t i c a l s t r i f e i n C h i n a , ^ the l a t t e r , on the other hand, were now t u r n - i n g more and more to t h e i r homeland, mainly because of the i n c r e a s i n g prospects of self-government t h e r e , which were f a r more e x h i l a r a t i n g t o them than the dubious b e n e f i t s to be deri v e d from a Malayan Union c i t i z e n s h i p which [ d i d ] not c a r r y w i t h i t even the connotation of a n a t i o n a l i t y . For the Indians who, p o l i t i c a l l y , were already the l e a s t v o c a l community during these times, t h i s p u l l towards the mother- country was i n t e n s i f i e d by the a t t i t u d e t a k e n by Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru during h i s v i s i t t o Malaya i n March 1946 when he s a i d , w i t h regard to Malayan c i t i z e n s h i p , Obviously i n future Indians i n t h i s country w i l l have to choose whether t o be n a t i o n a l i s t s i n I n d i a or Malaya. I f they c l a i m the p r i v i l e g e s of Malayan c i t i z e n s h i p they cannot at the same time c l a i m the p r i v i l e g e s of In d i a n c i t i z e n s h i p . 4 0 Even the Pan-Malayan Moslem League had i t s i n t e r e s t s centred on the I n d i a n sub-continent, the focus of i t s admiration being 41 Jinnah. 38 A d l o f f , V.T., "Opposition i n Malaya," F a r E a s t e r n Survey, volume 16 (1947), p. 1 3 1 . 39 Loc. c i t . 40 Seitelman, M., " P o l i t i c a l Thought i n Malaya," Far E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 16,(1947), p. 129. 41 A d l o f f , op., c i t . , p. 131. 65 Another major grievance s t i r r e d by the new proposals stemmed from the f a c t that the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e had seen f i t t o attempt the implementation of the new scheme without any e f f o r t whatsoever being made towards compromise, or even c o n s u l t a t i o n . I t i s only proper that a t r e a t y concluded between two p a r t i e s be submitted t o both f o r agreement, at l e a s t on the general p r i n c i p l e s , before p u b l i c a t i o n . As i t was, T h e i r Highnesses the Sultans d i d not even know about the proposed arrangements 42 u n t i l they had read them i n the Malayan newspapers! Needless t o say, t h i s must have proved h u m i l i a t i n g not on l y to the S u l - tans but al s o to the Malay p o p u l a t i o n at l a r g e , which regarded the former as being symbolic of the sovereignty of the i n d i v i d - u a l s t a t e s . Once again, the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e cannot deny know- ledge of the unpleasant p o s s i b i l i t i e s contained i n such a course of a c t i o n . Lord E l i b a n k , f o r example, had already warned the House of Lords t h a t the most g l a r i n g shortcoming of the new scheme rested i n the f a c t that i t had not been moulded through c o n s u l t a t i o n s w i t h the Malay and non-Malay communities.^ There was no doubt t h a t such c o n s u l t a t i o n s would have been v i t a l i n warranting the scheme's acceptance by the Malays. Nor were the non-Malay segments of the populations overjoyed at the nature of the new scheme, despite the f a c t that i t promised them oppor- t u n i t i e s equal to those h e l d by the Malays. Convinced t h a t 42 "Complications of Union i n Malaya," Round Tlable. v o l . 36 (Dec. 1945-Sept. 1946), p. 241. 43 Great B r i t a i n , P arliament, House of Lords, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. 5th s e r i e s , v o l . c x x x v i i i , pp. 933-4. 66 they belonged to the country as much as anyone e l s e , they had cause to f e e l t h a t t h e i r views n e c e s s a r i l y formed an i n t e g r a l p a r t of Malayan o p i n i o n . As st a t e d by Mr. H. B. Lim ( S e c r e t a r y of the Malayan Democratic Union), the people as a whole were the most important f a c t o r i n the i s s u e , e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the f a c t t h a t , as a r e s u l t of the Pangkor Agreement of 1874 and a l l the subsequent t r e a t i e s , the Sultans had, i n a c t u a l f a c t , ceded t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e r i g h t s and s a c r i f i c e d t h e i r e f f e c t i v e 44 sovereignty. T his had made the Malayan Union Agreement nothing unusual as f a r as the Sultans were concerned. ( I t i s of i n t e r e s t to note here the d i f f e r e n c e between Malay and non-Malay o p i n i o n w i t h regard to the p o s i t i o n of the Sultans.) Mr. Lim r e f e r s to C a p t a i n Gammans* (Conservative member f o r Hornsey) attempt to represent the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l c r i s e s as being the product of the v i o l a t i o n of the Su l t a n s ' s o v e r e i g n t y as being 45 "both f a c t u a l l y and c h r o n o l o g i c a l l y i n c o r r e c t . " Thus the main o b j e c t i o n was that the people had not been consulted. S i r Harold MacMichael and the Sultans had no r i g h t to agree on the White Paper i n t o t o on behalf of the people. 4"^ I n r a i s i n g these o b j e c t i o n s to the new " c o n s t i t u t i o n " , Mr. Lim i n d i c a t e s the un- fort u n a t e dangers contained t h e r e i n by saying The aggregate r e s u l t of t h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l swindle i s t h a t , a l l popular Malay, Chinese, I n d i a n and Eu r a s i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s are being antagonized.47 44 Lim, H.B., "Malaya's ' C o n s t i t u t i o n ' , " Labour Monthly, v o l . 28 (1946), p. 381 45 Loc. c i t . 46 Loc. c i t . 47 I b i d . , p. 382. 67 Despite the f a c t that Malay o p p o s i t i o n was based con- s i d e r a b l y on the a l l e g a t i o n that the t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p of the Sultans had been undermined, and that the Sultans had not been t r e a t e d w i t h the d i g n i t y they j u s t l y deserved, i t i s most l i k e l y t hat t h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o the new proposals would not have been q u i t e so intense and c o n s i s t e n t as i t turned out to be, had the Malays been the only people i n the country, or had they formed a l a r g e m a j o r i t y t h e r e i n . Is i t was, i t seems q u i t e obvious that t h e i r h o s t i l i t y towards the Union scheme was more the product of co n s i d e r a t i o n s regarding t h e i r status v i s a v i s the Chinese and the Indians. I n summing up the r e a c t i o n s of the Malays, i t may be noted that three main p o l i t i c a l groupings are d i s c e r n i b l e w i t h i n the community. F i r s t there were the Malay S u l t a n s , who f e l t o b l i g e d t o support those who were mainly preoccupied w i t h the question of Malay r i g h t s . I n a d d i t i o n to the o b j e c t i o n s men- tio n e d e a r l i e r , the Sultans a l s o accused that i t was q u i t e r i d i c - ulous to have the Governor associated w i t h l e g i s l a t i o n concerning matters p r i m a r i l y r e l a t e d t o the Mohammedan r e l i g i o n . Secondly, one may mention the upper c l a s s l o c a l o f f i c i a l s and members of the r u l i n g f a m i l i e s . Despite the f a c t that they held a p o s i t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p i n t h e i r r a t h e r l i m i t e d Malay c i r c l e s , these men now found themselves faced w i t h a s i t u a t i o n which made i t neces- sary f o r them to compete w i t h other r a c i a l groups i n a broader 48 f i e l d of p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . F i n a l l y , there were the " r a d i c a l 48 Seitelman, op_. c i t . , p. 128. 68 elements", made up of the younger generation, w i t h i n s i s t e n c e on the r e c o g n i t i o n of i n d i v i d u a l p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . 4 ^ The somewhat haphazard manner i n which the Union scheme had been formulated and rushed through i n v a r i a b l e l e d to severe comments being made against the B r i t i s h . I t was al l e g e d that o f f i c i a l s i n W h i t e h a l l had assumed that "a document taken from 50 a pigeon-hole could be s a f e l y considered a b l u e p r i n t . S i r Harold MacMichael's t r i p to Malaya and h i s subsequent approaches to the va r i o u s Sultans were s a i d t o have c o n s t i t u t e d a " w h i r l - 51 wind tour" - i n that a l l the t r e a t i e s had been concluded ( i n v o l v i n g nine separate s t a t e s ) between the 20th of October and 52 the 21st of December. A s i g n i f i c a n t outcome of the proposals (and the r e s u l t - ant o p p o s i t i o n from Malay quarters) was the b i r t h of the United Malays' N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as the UMNO) which was formed f o r the purpose of agita t i n g f o r the r e p e a l of 53 the Malayan Union^ J and which, as w i l l be seen i n the f o l l o w i n g chapters, was destined to p l a y a most d e c i s i v e r o l e i n determin- ing the progress of Malayan p o l i t i c s . Dato Onn b i n J a ' a f a r , the f a t h e r of the p a r t y , claimed that i t had the support o f about 70 54 t o 80 per cent of the country's Malay p o p u l a t i o n . 49 Seitelman, op., c i t . , p. 128. 50 "Malayan Union Postponed," The New Statesman and Nation, v o l . 31j (1946), p. 203. 51 Round Table, v o l . 36, p. 241. 52 I b i d . , pp. 241-2. 53 P u r c e l l , Chinese i n Modern Malaya, p. 40. 54 Loc. c i t . 69 I t would be most e n l i g h t e n i n g , at t h i s j u n c t u r e , to analyse the r a c i a l f a c t o r s which c o n t r i b u t e d to the p o l i t i c a l s e p aration of Singapore from the mainland. Despite the f a c t that the word "race" i s not even mentioned i n t h a t part of the C o l o n i a l O f f i c e ' s White Paper which discusses t h i s s e p a r a t i o n , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o note that the f o l l o w i n g e x p l a n a t i o n was given: I n c o n s i d e r i n g the need f o r a clo s e p o l i t i c a l i n t e g r a - t i o n i n Malaya, His Majesty's Government consider t h a t , at l e a s t f o r the time being, Singapore r e q u i r e s s p e c i a l treatment. I t i s a centre of entrepot trade on a ve r y l a r g e s c a l e and has economic and s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s d i s - t i n c t from those of the mainland.55 I t i s the " s o c i a l i n t e r e s t s " r e f e r r e d t o which merit c l o s e a n a l - y s i s i n s o f a r as the present study i s concerned. Table V Taken from O f f i c i a l F i g u r e s as Published i n the F.M.S. Government Gazette dated February 27, 1941 (quoted i n : Complications of Union i n Malaya. Round Table, vol.36 ' Dec. 1945-Sept. 1946, p.238) • percentages Malays Chinese Indians Others T o t a l . % i i i i Singapore I s l a n d 10 78 8 4 100 S t r a i t s Settlements 22 64£ i c i 3 100 F.M.S. 33 44£ 21 14 100 Unfederated Malay States 66i 24£ 7 2 100 Malaya as a whole 4l£ 43 13£ 2 100 55 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , Malayan Union and Singa- pore, Statement of P o l i c y on Future C o n s t i t u t i o n , London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1946, Cmd. 6724, p. 3. 70 As revealed by the above f i g u r e s the Malays, by 1941, had already become a numerical m i n o r i t y i n Malaya as a whole, t h i s being the outcome of the predominance of Chinese i n the S t r a i t s Settlements (Singapore i n p a r t i c u l a r ) and the Federated Malay S t a t e s . A c l o s e r a n a l y s i s of the f a c t s r e v e als yet another most important f e a t u r e . (For t h i s purpose i t might be adequate to use the 1947 census f i g u r e s f o r purposes of approx- i m a t i o n , these being the f i r s t of t h e i r k i n d a f t e r the war. Furthermore, the d i f f e r e n c e between them and the 1946 f i g u r e s i s not l i k e l y t o be s u b s t a n t i a l . The f o l l o w i n g f i g u r e s , taken from the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Annual Report f o r 1953 and the Singapore Annual Report f o r 1947, have been reduced to the near- est 5,000} At a time when the po p u l a t i o n of Malaya as a whole was 5,845,000, of which 2,610,000 were Chinese, Singapore alone accounted f o r 935,000, i n c l u d i n g 725,000 Chinese. I f Singapore were to be excluded from the p e n i n s u l a , the number of Chinese i n the country would have been reduced to 1,880,000 out o f a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of 4,905,000. Such a move would have automat- i c a l l y given the Malaysians approximately 48 per cent of the po p u l a t i o n and a numerical s u p e r i o r i t y over the Chinese who, without Singapore, would have c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y about 38 per cent of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n f i g u r e . Although the p o l i c y statement made no d i r e c t reference to the e f f e c t , there can be l i t t l e doubt that the above c o n s i d e r a t i o n must have played a major r o l e i n determining the e x c l u s i o n of Singapore from the Malayan Union - a s e p a r a t i o n which has been maintained ever s i n c e . F o r 71 the time being at least, the separation of Singapore acted as a guarantee that democratization could be effected without any Immediate danger of the Malays being p o l i t i c a l l y submerged by the Chinese. This, however, failed to satisfy many observers, including left-wing elements i n the British Labour Party. Writing i n The New Statesman and Nation, a writer (Graham Hough) condemned the separation as being " a r t i f i c i a l , expensive, and ridiculously inconvenient." Reviewed i n i t s proper perspective, i t appears quite l i k e l y that the Colonial Office's attempt to create and maintain some kind of racial synthesis i n Malaya through the Union scheme failed largely due to poor timing. At a time when racial antago- nisms were more sharpened than ever before (due both to the inten- si f i c a t i o n of communal riv a l r i e s during the Japanese regime and to the fact that economic factors - such as the predominance of Chin- ese i n the more lucrative fields - had tended to exacerbate commu- nal misunderstandings), i t was inevitable that such a scheme should turn abortive, as indeed i t did. The B r i t i s h realised that, with the upsurge of Malay nationalism, i t was imperative for them to abandon the Malayan Union, set up a federal government, and reinstate the Sultans as "feudal Breakwaters".^ As far as the Secretary of State for the Colonies was concerned, the situation at hand undoubt- edly called for an urgent rethinking i n B r i t i s h policy towards 56 New Statesman and Nation, vol. 33 (194-7), p. 311 • 57 "Britain Faces a New Malaya," What is behind Britain's reversal of policy i n the Malayan Union? Amerasia. vol. 11, no. 1 (January 194-7), p. 15. 72 Malaya. With regard to i t s main o b j e c t i v e s (namely, the establishment of a strong and e f f e c t i v e c e n t r a l government and the c r e a t i o n of a common c i t i z e n s h i p f o r everyone, i r r e s p e c t i v e of race, who regarded Malaya as h i s or her r e a l home), the B r i t i s h Government refused to s h i f t I t s ground. But now, however, i t was w i l l i n g to consult Malay o p i n i o n , knowing f u l l w e l l that such a move would be v i t a l i n f a c i l i t a t i n g the imple- mentation of new p o l i c i e s . With t h i s i n mind a Working Commit- tee was appointed, made up of Government r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s on the one hand, and the R u l e r s , together w i t h r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the UMNO (i n c l u d e d to represent moderate Malay o p i n i o n ) , on the 59 other. The f i n d i n g s of t h i s Committee were submitted f o r examination t o a C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee made up of members rep- 6 0 r e s e n t i n g the non-Malay communities i n the country. TJtiis Committee's suggested amendments were sent back t o the Working 58 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya: Sum- mary of Revised C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals. London, H.M.Stationery O f f i c e , 1947, Cmd. 7171, p. 2. 59 Jones, S.W., P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Malaya, p. 140. 6 0 Loc. c i t . Despite t h i s move, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o note that P u r c e l l , f o r example, i s q u i t e c r i t i c a l of the f a c t that the B r i t i s h d i d not place adequate emphasis on the value of non- Malay o p i n i o n regarding the Fe d e r a t i o n proposals. Having s t a t e d the f a c t that the a l t e r n a t i v e c o n s t i t u t i o n ( i . e . the F e d e r a l plan) had f i r s t been submitted to the Working Committee ("con- s i s t i n g e n t i r e l y of Malay a r i s t o c r a t s " ) f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n , he says, "Then (but not u n t i l then) the report was r e f e r r e d to a Con- s u l t a t i v e Committee o f the non-Malay races f o r comment, but, although t h i s comment was l a r g e l y h o s t i l e , i t was almost completely disregarded by the B r i t i s h Government." * * The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, pp. 40-41. 73 Committee which, a f t e r f u r t h e r study, submitted i t s f i n a l recommendations f o r c o n s i d e r a t i o n by a Ple n a r y Conference of the Governor, the R u l e r s , and other Malay r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . ^ 1 The scheme which emerged out of these d i s c u s s i o n s and c o n s u l t a - t i o n s (aimed, no doubt, at grant i n g some r e c o g n i t i o n t o commu- n a l demands and preferences) was accepted by the B r i t i s h Government as being adequate t o meet the p o l i t i c a l exigencies of the time. The new proposals provided f o r a F e d e r a t i o n Agreement between H i s Majesty and the Malay R u l e r s , each of whom would conclude a f u r t h e r Agreement w i t h H i s Majesty concerning h i s own St a t e . Each State was subsequently t o r a t i f y both the 62 F e d e r a t i o n and the State Agreements. As s t a t e d by P u r c e l l , i n h i s book The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, the net r e s u l t of these proposals was the r e s t o r a t i o n of Malaya as a p r i m a r i l y Malay country. The Sultans were to enjoy the " p r e r o g a t i v e s , power and j u r i s d i c t i o n which they enjoyed p r i o r to the Japanese 64 occupation"; the State Agreements were also to pro v i d e , t h a t the Ruler d e s i r e s , and His Majesty agrees, t h a t i t s h a l l be a p a r t i c u l a r charge upon the Government of the State to provide f o r and encourage the education and t r a i n i n g of the Malay i n h a b i t a n t s of the State so as t o f i t them to take a f u l l share i n the economic progress, s o c i a l welfare and Government of the State and of the F e d e r a t i o n ; ^ the High Commissioner's r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were to i n c l u d e "the 61 Jones, op., c i t . . p. 140. 62 Cmd. 7171» P_p_. £it., p. 1. 63 P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, p. 41. 64 Cmd. 7171? PJD. c i t . , p. 5« 65 Loc. c i t . 74 safeguarding of the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays and the 66 l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s of other communities." As a f a i r i n d i c a t i o n of the extent to which c o n s u l t a - t i o n s w i t h the d i f f e r e n t communities were in s t r u m e n t a l i n mould- i n g the new p o l i c y , one may consider the composition of the Fe d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . According to the Working Commit- tee's proposals, i t was to be composed of the High Commissioner . as P r e s i d e n t , three e x - o f f i c i o members, eleven o f f i c i a l members and 3 4 u n o f f i c i a l members whose nomination was t o be based p a r t l y on d i r e c t r a c i a l l i n e s and p a r t l y on the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of v a r i o u s i n t e r e s t s such as labour, mining, p l a n t i n g and so on, but i n such a manner as to ensure t h a t , excluding ex- o f f i c i o and o f f i c i a l members, Malays would outnumber non-Malays by 18 to 1 6 . 5 7 The C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee, on the other hand, recommen- ded that the number of u n o f f i c i a l members be r a i s e d to 5 2 , and that the nine (Malay) P r e s i d e n t s of Cou n c i l s of State be added as o f f i c i a l members. Of the r e s u l t i n g 6 l seats (that i s , ex- c l u d i n g the three e x - o f f i c i o and eleven o f f i c i a l members as pro- posed i n the o r i g i n a l recommendation), the a l l o c a t i o n made by the C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee gave 29 seats to the Malays and 29 68 to the other communities, three remaining u n a l l o c a t e d . 66 Cmd. 7171} ©P.* c i t . . p. 5« 67 Loc. c i t . The u n o f f i c i a l members were to i n c l u d e the nine P r e s i d e n t s of Co u n c i l s of State and a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from each Settlement C o u n c i l . 68 Loc. c i t . I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that the two Chinese members of the C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee had d e s i r e d the c l a s s i f i c a - t i o n of the nine p r e s i d e n t s of State C o u n c i l as o r d i n a r y Malay members- a proposal which, i f adopted, would have reduced the t o t a l Malay membership to twenty. rt The element of compromise i s q u i t e apparent i n the f i n a l v e r s i o n . The increased s t r e n g t h of the u n o f f i c i a l m a j o r i t y ( i n d i c a t e d below), f o r i n s t a n c e , i s c l e a r l y suggest- i v e of t h i s f a c t , having been undoubtedly motivated by the d e s i r a b i l i t y f o r granting more adequate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n t o a l l important i n t e r e s t s . The number of e x - o f f i c i o and o f f i c i a l members was to remain unchanged. The r e s t of the C o u n c i l was to be made up of the nine P r e s i d e n t s of State C o u n c i l s , two r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from the Settlement Councils (one from each, and e l e c t e d by members of the Coun c i l s themselves), and 50 other u n o f f i c i a l members who would represent i n t e r e s t s , groups and a c t i v i t i e s 69 and who were to be comprised o f : Labour 6 P l a n t i n g (rubber and o i l palm) (a) P u b l i c companies 3 (b) P r o p r i e t a r y e s t a t e s and smallholdings 3 Mining 4 Commerce 6 A g r i c u l t u r e and husbandry (exc l u d i n g rubber and o i l palms). 8 P r o f e s s i o n a l e d u c a t i o n a l and c u l t u r a l 4 Settlements 2 States 9 E u r a s i a n community 1 Ceylonese community 1 Indian community 1 Chinese community 2 T o t a l %0 69 Cmd. 7171? op,, c i t . , p. 7. 76 The above a l l o c a t i o n was expected to give 22 seats t o the Malays, 1 4 t o the Chinese, 5 t o the Ind i a n s , 7 to the Euro- 70 peans, and one each to the Ceylonese and Eu r a s i a n s . Since the nine P r e s i d e n t s of State C o u n c i l s would i n v a r i a b l y be Malays (while the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Settlement C o u n c i l s could belong to any community), t h i s a l l o c a t i o n maintained the s l i g h t Malay m a j o r i t y ( e x c l u d i n g e x - o f f i c i o and o f f i c i a l members) pro- posed by the Working Committee. I n r e c o g n i t i o n of a demand made to that e f f e c t by Malay o p i n i o n , Malay was e s t a b l i s h e d as an o f f i c i a l language of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l together w i t h 71 E n g l i s h . A v e r y important f e a t u r e of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n was that the High Commissioner now had to confer w i t h the Rulers d'as 72 occasion a r i s e s " ) on matters p e r t a i n i n g to immigration.' True, the non-Malays had made immense c o n t r i b u t i o n s towards the de v e l - opment of the country, but there was an outstanding f a c t which could not be overlooked - the non-Malays, as revealed beyond a l l doubt by the 1947 census, were now more numerous than the i n d i g - enous Malays. The reasons f o r the new p o l i c y (the High Commis- sioner's o b l i g a t i o n to consult the Rulers on immigration matters) were made q u i t e c l e a r . Though the new scheme was to i n c l u d e i n a common c i t i z e n s h i p a l l those who regarded Malaya as the object of t h e i r l o y a l t y , no one could deny the f a c t that the 70 Cmd. 7171? op,, c i t . , p. 7 . 71 I b i d , pp. 7-8. However, i t was s t i l l necessary that mat- t e r s which had to be p r i n t e d or "reduced to w r i t i n g " be expressed i n E n g l i s h . 72 I b i d . , p. 8. 77 Malays were " p e c u l i a r l y the people of the country" who had "no other homeland, no other l o y a l t y . " ^ They had cause t o be con- cerned over the immigration p o l i c y . Despite the f a c t that the High Commissioner had to co n s u l t the Conference of R u l e r s , from time t o time, on the immigration p o l i c y of the Government ( e s p e c i a l l y when any major changes were being contemplated by the F e d e r a l Government oh such p o l i c y ) , the f i n a l say i n the matter, i t should be noted, rested w i t h the l e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l which, i n the event of a disagreement between the High Commis- si o n e r and the Rulers would, by r e s o l u t i o n , e i t h e r accept or r e j e c t any proposed change. On r e s o l u t i o n s of t h i s nature, however, only u n o f f i c i a l members had the r i g h t to vote - though o f f i c i a l and e x - o f f i c i o members had the p r i v i l e g e of p a r t i c i p a t - i n g i n the debates. This arrangement i s noteworthy i n t h a t , by t a k i n g a unamimous stand, the Malay members of the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l had the opportunity to e i t h e r accept or r e j e c t a change i n immigration p o l i c y introduced by the Government and unfavour- 74 ably received by T h e i r Highnesses the S u l t a n s . I n a d d i t i o n to the r e s t o r a t i o n of the Sultans as the t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s of the r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s , the Cou n c i l s of State were now empowered to l e g i s l a t e independently on matters p e r t a i n i n g t o Malay customs and the Moslem f a i t h . 73 Cmd. 7171, op_. c i t . , p. 7. 74 I t should be noted, however, that t h i s procedure was not to be adhered to should a proposed change i n immigration p o l i c y be r e l a t e d to Great B r i t a i n ' s r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r Defence or E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s . 78 The c i t i z e n s h i p r e g u l a t i o n s contained i n the new scheme merit d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s , i n that they c o n t a i n s i g n i f i - cant features r e v e a l i n g an a l l - i m p o r t a n t b i a s i n favour of the Malays. They a l s o r e v e a l a c e r t a i n amount of compromise between Malay and non-Malay o p i n i o n . Automatic c i t i z e n s h i p was to be granted t o : (a) any subject of His Highness the S u l t a n o f any S t a t e , i r r e s p e c t i v e of h i s or her date of b i r t h ; (b) any B r i t i s h Subject, born at any time i n e i t h e r of the two Settlements and permanently r e s i d e n t (meaning the completion of a continuous pe r i o d of 15 years residence) i n any of the t e r r i t o r i e s comprised i n the F e d e r a t i o n ; ^ (c) any person who, having been born at any time i n any of the t e r r i t o r i e s to be comprised i n the F e d e r a t i o n , h a b i t u a l l y spoke the Malay language and conformed t o Malay custom; (d) any person born at any time i n one of the above-mentioned t e r r i t o r i e s both of whose parents had themselves been born i n any such t e r r i t o r i e s and had been continuously r e s i - dent i n them f o r a p e r i o d of at l e a s t 15 years; and (e) any person whose f a t h e r , at the date of the person's b i r t h , was himself a f e d e r a l c i t i z e n . The term Vsubject of His Highness the R u l e r of any S t a t e " , as used i n p r o v i s i o n ( a ) , was to mean any person belong- in g to an a b o r i g i n a l t r i b e i n that s t a t e ; or any Malay born i n that s t a t e or born elsewhere of a f a t h e r who, at the time of the person's b i r t h , was himself a subject of the Ruler of t h a t 7* A l l p r o v i s i o n s mentioned here are from Cmd. 7171, op. c i t i : pp. 10-11. 76 With regard to t h i s p r o v i s i o n the Working Committee, which d i d not represent non-Malay o p i n i o n , had recommended th a t o n l y residence i n e i t h e r of the two Settlements would q u a l i f y . Such a p r o p o s a l , i f accepted, would have denied automatic c i t i - zenship to s e v e r a l non-Malays, e s p e c i a l l y i n Penang where t h e i r numerical predominance i s f a i r l y marked. 79 S t a t e ; or any person n a t u r a l i z e d as a subject of the Ru l e r . The word "Malay", as used i n the above d e f i n i t i o n of a "subject of His Highness the Ruler of any S t a t e " , r e f e r r e d to a person who h a b i t u a l l y spoke the Malay language, professed the Moslem r e l i g i o n , and who conformed to Malay customs. T h i s (coupled w i t h p r o v i s i o n (c) mentioned above) i s most s i g n i f i c a n t i n t h a t while a non-Malay could be a c i t i z e n a u t o m a t i c a l l y o n l y i f both h i s parents were born i n the country themselves, a Malay could be one even i f both h i s parents were born elsewhere. A l s o s i g n i f i c a n t i s the f a c t that the p r o v i s i o n i n qu e s t i o n ( p r o v i s i o n (c) above) enabled Indonesians to become c i t i z e n s a u t o m a t i c a l l y i f they were born i n the country ( s i n c e they s a t i s f y the r e q u i r e - ments mentioned i n the p r o v i s i o n ) while the Chinese and Indians were required to f u l f i l more s t r i n g e n t r e g u l a t i o n s . T h i s p r o v i - s i o n was undoubtedly i n favour of the Malays s i n c e , as mentioned i n the f i r s t chapter of the present study, the Indonesians, due to t h e i r r a c i a l , r e l i g i o u s and s o c i o l o g i c a l background, are e a s i l y a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o the Malay community as a matter of course. Hence the more Indonesians there are i n the country, the sma l l e r the p o s s i b i l i t y of the Malays being p o l i t i c a l l y swamped by the Chinese and Indians. With regard to t h i s i t should be noted that the B r i t i s h community - p l a n t e r s , l e s s e r c o l o n i a l s e r v ants, and vested i n t e r e s t s - was l a r g e l y pro-Malay i n I t s a t t i t u d e . T h i s i s understandable i n view of the f a c t t h a t there was a 77 Cmd. 7171, op_. c i t . , p. 11 80 prevalent o p i n i o n , w i t h i n t h i s group, t h a t every step i n the d i r e c t i o n of self-government would give the Malays a gre a t e r say i n t h e i r (the B r i t i s h community's) f u t u r e p o s i t i o n i n the country. The net r e s u l t of the c i t i z e n s h i p r e g u l a t i o n s was t h a t , i n June 1949, only 375,000 Chinese (estimated) out of a t o t a l of 1,952,682 then r e s i d e n t i n the F e d e r a t i o n , were made c i t i - zens by ope r a t i o n of law. 79 I n a d d i t i o n to evidence of good behaviour, an adequate knowledge of e i t h e r Malay or E n g l i s h , and a d e c l a r a t i o n of permanent res i d e n c e , a personvwishing t o become a c i t i z e n by a p p l i c a t i o n a l s o had to s a t i s f y the High Commissioner that he or she had e i t h e r been both born i n one of the t e r r i t o r i e s com- p r i s i n g the F e d e r a t i o n and had resided i n one or more of those t e r r i t o r i e s f o r a period of at l e a s t eight out of the twelve years preceding the date of h i s or her a p p l i c a t i o n , or t h a t he/she had been r e s i d e n t i n one of those t e r r i t o r i e s f o r not 80 l e s s than 15 out of the 20 years preceding t h a t date. Here, once again, the element of compromise between Malay and non- Malay o p i n i o n , as represented by the recommendations of the Working Committee i n the f i r s t case and those of the Consulta- t i v e Committee i n the second, i s apparent. While the former 78 F i n k e l s t e i n , L.S., "Prospects f o r Self-Government i n Malaya," Far E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 21 (1952), p; 10. 79 P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, p. 41. 80 Cmd. 7171, op_. c i t . , p. 11. 81 had recommended a period of 10 out of 15 years f o r those born i n the country and a pe r i o d of 15 out of 20 years ( r e t a i n e d i n the f i n a l form) f o r those not born t h e r e i n , the l a t t e r , w i t h the prospect of making the r e g u l a t i o n s l e s s s t r i n g e n t f o r non- Malays, had proposed a p e r i o d of 5 out of 10 years i n the f i r s t case and 8 out of 15 i n the second. As proposed by the Consul- t a t i v e Committee, i t was adopted t h a t , i n the case of persons over 45 years of age who had r e s i d e d i n the t e r r i t o r y of the F e d e r a t i o n f o r at l e a s t 20 years, the language t e s t be waived - provided the a p p l i c a t i o n f o r c i t i z e n s h i p was made w i t h i n two years of the appointed day. The Chinese community was f a r from s a t i s f i e d by the new proposals. I n p r o t e s t , a h a r t a l was held throughout the Malayan Union and Singapore on October 2 0 , 1947 j sponsored by the Pan- Malayan C o u n c i l of J o i n t A c t i o n l e d by Mr. Tan Cheng Lock (now known as S i r Cheng-lock Tan) and supported by the Associated: Chinese Chambers of Commerce, The Malayan Trade Unions and the Malayan Communist P a r t y . Taken as a whole, the F e d e r a l c o n s t i t u t i o n was f a r from being democratic - say, when compared to post-war c o n s t i t u t i o n s i n I n d i a , P a k i s t a n , Ceylon and the P h i l i p p i n e s . I t d i d , how- ever, c o n s t i t u t e an improvement on the pre-war s i t u a t i o n . Con- t r a r y to the tendency then, the Malays and the B r i t i s h now found 81 P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, p. 41. 82 i t no longer p o s s i b l e t o keep completely a l o o f from the f a c t that the non-Malay segments of the s e t t l e d p o p u l a t i o n had become a most v i t a l f a c t o r i n the country's p o l i t i c a l l i f e and hence had to be given c e r t a i n c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s equal t o those of the Malays themselves. I t would be i n t e r e s t i n g , at t h i s p o i n t , t o analyse the a l t e r n a t i v e s which might have been considered by the B r i t - i s h Government i n deciding the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l f u t u r e of the Malay p e n i n s u l a , and thereby determine the m e r i t s of the F e d e r a t i o n scheme as implemented i n 194-8. To begin w i t h , there was the p o s s i b i l i t y of f o l l o w i n g a p o l i c y which would g r a d u a l l y reduce two of the three main races to s m a l l m i n o r i t i e s - a p o l i c y which, i f implemented s u c c e s s f u l l y , would have meant a t e r m i n a t i o n of the r a c i a l 82 problem. But such a p o l i c y , i t must be r e a l i z e d , would have been both too r a d i c a l and too dangerous t o be contained w i t h i n safe bounds. The communities i n q u e s t i o n would un- doubtedly have had to be the Chinese and the Ind i a n , and though such a p o l i c y might have found favour among the more extremist Malay n a t i o n a l i s t s , i t would i n v a r i a b l y have been contested by the more r e s p o n s i b l e and p o l i t i c a l l y sane s e c t i o n s of that community - not t o mention the v i o l e n t o p p o s i t i o n which would have come from the Chinese and the Indians themselves. The 82 S i l c o c k , T.H. "Forces f o r U n i t y i n Malaya." I n t e r n a t i o n - a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 25 (1949), p. 455. 83 p l a u s i b i l i t y of such a p o l i c y was perhaps best assessed by P r o f e s s o r S i l c o c k when he wrote: So long as Malaya remains p o l i t i c a l l y u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d and i s f i r m l y c o n t r o l l e d by B r i t i s h a d m i n i s t r a t o r s backed by B r i t i s h t r o o p s , i t i s p o s s i b l e to c a l l i t a Malay country and assume that Chinese and Indians are a l i e n s without i m p l y i n g any i n t e n t i o n t o take d r a s t i c a c t i o n against them. But anyone w i t h even a rudiment- ary sense of p o l i t i c a l p o s s i b i l i t i e s must r e a l i z e that a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g Malay Malaya i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y unless most d r a s t i c a c t i o n i s taken against the other two races over a p e r i o d of years.§3 The above p o l i c y would not have been f e a s i b l e f o r yet another reason; namely t h a t , i n order t o implement i t , the country's d i s t r i b u t i v e t r a d e , l a r g e mining concerns and other important f i e l d s of economic a c t i v i t y l a r g e l y held by the Chin- ese would have had t o be t r a n s f e r r e d over to the Malays who, f o r a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes, would have been unable to take over and c a r r y on independently. By a l i e n a t i n g the Chinese popula- t i o n t h i s p o l i c y , i f adopted, could also have been i n s t r u m e n t a l i n t u r n i n g l a r g e p a r t s of t h i s community i n t o supporters of communist t e r r o r i s m . As a second a l t e r n a t i v e the B r i t i s h could have ignored a l l o b l i g a t i o n s to the Malay community, and withdrawn a l l r e - s t r i c t i o n s which, h i t h e r t o , had prevented the other communities from assuming c o n t r o l i n the country. Such a p o l i c y would have i n v a r i a b l y i m p l i e d u n r e s t r i c t e d immigration from China, 83 S i l c o c k , op., c i t . , pp. 455-6. 84 and the n a t u r a l consequence of t h i s would have been the com- p l e t e submersion of the other two communities by the Chinese. I n a d d i t i o n , i t i s a l s o p o s s i b l e t h a t , w i t h the i n f l u x of immigrants from China, t i e s w i t h that country would have been cons i d e r a b l y strengthened - a f a c t o r which could have r e s u l t e d i n serious complications when the "Peoples Government" was set up by the Communists there i n 1949. As i n d i c a t e d by the oppo- s i t i o n which followed the attempt to set up the Malayan Union, there i s a b s o l u t e l y no doubt that the Malays would have used a l l the p o l i t i c a l weapons a v a i l a b l e i n combating the implemen- t a t i o n of such a p o l i c y . Compared- to these a l t e r n a t i v e s the F e d e r a t i o n scheme of 1948 was, without doubt, a f a i r l y s e n s i b l e one. But i t had i t s shortcomings as w e l l . The most g l a r i n g of these was the f a i l u r e of the new c o n s t i t u t i o n to place adequate emphasis on the f a c t that the d i f f e r e n c e s i n i n t e r e s t s between c i t i z e n s and immigrants were f a r greater than those between the d i f f e r - 84 ent races r e s i d i n g w i t h i n the country. As i t was, the c i t i z e n s h i p i s s u e , i n p a r t i c u l a r , brought t o the f o r e f r o n t s e v e r a l aspects of the Sino-Malay c o n f l i c t . I t s i n i t i a l hand- l i n g , both by the B r i t i s h and the Chinese, has been accused of being i n d i c a t i v e of "remarkable i n e p t i t u d e . " ^ But one cannot a f f o r d to be too c r i t i c a l of the Chinese, e s p e c i a l l y i n view 84 S i l c o c k , p_p_. c i t . . p. 465. 85 Thompson, V., and B. A d l o f f , M i n o r i t y Problems i n South- east A s i a , C a l i f o r n i a , Stamford Univ. Pr e s s , 1955> p. 35. 85 of the f a c t that t h e i r changed a t t i t u d e towards Malaya ( i n that a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t of the community now regarded the country as being i t s r e a l home), coupled w i t h t h e i r v i t a l hold i n the country's economy, must n e c e s s a r i l y be accepted as j u s t i f y i n g some of t h e i r claims f o r p o l i t i c a l s e c u r i t y . The inadequate e d u c a t i o n a l f a c i l i t i e s provided by the Government, f o r example, were blamed as being i n s t r u m e n t a l i n preventing l a r g e numbers of aliens' from s a t i s f y i n g the language requirements necessary f o r a c q u i r i n g c i t i z e n s h i p by a p p l i c a t i o n . The F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya (Amendment) Ordinance of 1951 d i d nothing to remedy t h i s s i t u a t i o n . The e x p l a n a t i o n appended to the new proposals gave expre s s i o n t o the f a c t that the b i l l was aimed at safeguarding the Malays against submersion by a l i e n ways of l i f e , and that c i t i z e n s h i p would be open only to those who had demonstrated t h e i r a s s i m i l a t i o n " t o t h i s country's way of l i f e . " 8 6 I n an e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d " K i l l T his B i l l " , the Chinese-owned Singapore Standard asked, " I s t h i s a h o l y code of some k i n d ? " , urging the b i l l ' s defeat "before i t spreads the 87 v i r u s of communalism throughout the l a n d . " On September 15, 1952, new l e g i s l a t i o n was put i n t o e f f e c t i n the F e d e r a t i o n governing c i t i z e n s h i p and State Nation- go a l i t y . Requirements were now s u b s t a n t i a l l y r e l a x e d , and i t 86 The F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Agreement (Amendment) Ordinance. 1951, p. 16, quoted i n F i n k e l s t e i n , "Prospects of Self-Government i n Malaya," Far E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 21 (1952), p. 13. 87 J u l y 11, 1951, quoted i n Far E a s t e r n Survey, p. 13. 88 The changes were brought i n t o e f f e c t through nine State N a t i o n a l i t y B i l l s and a F e d e r a t i o n Agreement Amendment B i l l . 86 was p o s s i b l e f o r a non-Malay t o become a c i t i z e n i f he was born I n e i t h e r of the Settlements or i n any of the nine States com- p r i s i n g the F e d e r a t i o n , and i f on l y one parent was born i n one of those t e r r i t o r i e s . At the same time, c o n d i t i o n s governing 89 c i t i z e n s h i p by a p p l i c a t i o n were also made l e s s s t r i n g e n t . ' The proposals were ob v i o u s l y aimed at enhancing the much-needed s p i r i t of common n a t i o n a l i t y , made so e s s e n t i a l by the prolonged war against communist t e r r o r i s m . As a r e s u l t of the new meas- ures, about 72 per cent of the p o p u l a t i o n became c i t i z e n s , i n c l u d i n g 1 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 Chinese and 180 ,000 I n d i a n s , who represented about 5 0 - 6 0 per cent of the Chinese and about 3 0 per cent of the Indian p o p u l a t i o n i n the F e d e r a t i o n , and who h i t h e r t o had not been given the opportunity to become F e d e r a l c i t i z e n s . 9 0 A S evidence of the outcome of the new proposals, one may l o o k at the f i g u r e s i n d i c a t i n g the estimated number of c i t i z e n s (by op- e r a t i o n of law) i n the country on June 3 0 , 1953* The t o t a l f i g u r e f o r the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya represents an increase of about 50 per cent i n the number of c i t i z e n s i n the country. (See f o l l o w i n g page.) On the same date, the estimated number of persons who, possessing the necessary b i r t h q u a l i f i c a t i o n s , had not r e g i s t e r e d to become c i t i z e n s / s t a t e n a t i o n a l s was as f o l l o w s ( S e e p. 8 8 ) 89 K i n g , J.K., "Malaya's Resettlement Problem," F a r E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 23 ( 1 9 5 4 ) , p. 3 8 . 90 Loc. c i t . 91 Loc. c i t . 92 F i g u r e s obtained from F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1 9 5 3 , P. 1 7 . 87 Table VI Estimate of the Number of C i t i z e n s / S t a t e N a t i o n a l s by Operation of Law as at June 30, 1953. ~ (Figures obtained from the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Annual Report, 1953, p. 16.) Malaysians Chinese Indians and P a k i s t a n i s Others T o t a l Kedah 424,000 72,000 21,000 5,000 522,000 P e r i l s 62,000 7,000 500 1,000 70,500 Penang & P. W e l l e s l e y 149,000 152,000 23,000 3,000 327,000 Perak 411,000 272,000 59,000 4,500 746,500 Selangor 219,000 224,000 61,000 8,000 512,000 Negri Sembilan 128,000- 71,000 17,000 2,500 218,500 Malacca 140,000 59,000 8,000 1,500 208,500 Johore 383,000 218,000 24,000 2,500 626,500 Kelantan 441,000 14,000 2,000 4,000 461,000 Trengganu 224,000 9,000 500 - 233,500 Pahang 147,000 59,000 6,000 1,000 213,000 F e d e r a t i o n 2,727,000 1,157,000 222,000 33,000 4,139,000 88 Malaysians - n i l ; Chinese - 433,000; Indians and P a k i s t a n i s - 186,000; Others - 28,000; T o t a l - 647,300. The estimated number of n o n - c i t i z e n s born outside the Federa- 93 t i o n amounted t o : J Malaysians - 80,700; Chinese - 566,200; Indians and P a k i s t a n i s - 242,900; Others - 21,500; T o t a l - 911,300. As i f to balance the concession made to the non-Malay po p u l a t i o n through the new c i t i z e n s h i p p r o posals, a new immigra- t i o n scheme was brought i n t o e f f e c t on August 1, 1953* I n i t s f i n a l form i t was " v a i n l y opposed by every u n o f f i c i a l Chinese 9 4 member i n the F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l . " ' The new p r o v i s - ions r e s t r i c t e d immigration i n t o Malaya to the a r t i s a n and pro- f e s s i o n a l c l a s s e s , assured of a p o s i t i o n which y i e l d e d a minimum 95 s a l a r y of S t r . 1500/- The r i g h t of u n r e s t r i c t e d r e - e n t r y was confined to F e d e r a l Cit i z e n s and B r i t i s h S u b j e c t s , e i t h e r born 9 6 i n the F e d e r a t i o n or normally r e s i d e n t there. A l l others were o b l i g e d to apply i n d i v i d u a l l y f o r permission to re-e n t e r each time they returned a f t e r an absence from the country. The o f f i c i a l stand regarding the new scheme was stated thus: The new l e g i s l a t i o n provides f o r s e l e c t i v e immigration and, w h i l s t i t does not prevent the en t r y of persons whose presence i s b e n e f i c i a l to the development of the country, i t serves t o prevent the en t r y of a l i e n s and non-aliens of c l a s s e s not necessary to the development of Malaya.97 93 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1953, p. 17. 94 Thompson and A d l o f f , op_. c i t . , p. 34. 95 Loc. c i t . 96 Loc. c i t . 97 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1953, P« 9* 89 I t was s a i d that the scheme would help to r a i s e the l i v i n g standards of workers i n the country by t e r m i n a t i n g the i n f l u x of j o b l e s s immigrants whose s e r v i c e s were no longer b e l i e v e d 98 to be necessary. The Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n , however, saw things i n a d i f f e r e n t l i g h t , going to the extent of a l l e g - i n g that the b i l l was "apparently being used as a p o l i t i c a l weapon to reduce the number of Chinese l i v i n g i n Malaya. „99 While some Indians acknowledged the f a c t that i t was to t h e i r advantage that the country should not be flooded w i t h cheap labour, there were others who resented having to pay higher wages to t h e i r e m p l o y e e s . T a k e n as a whole, the I n - d i a n community regarded the new l e g i s l a t i o n as being a n t i - I n d i a n . C h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y , though, t h e i r p r o t e s t s were channelled t o 101 the I n d i a n Government f o r a c t i o n . I n r e p l y t o these p r o t e s t s from the Chinese and I n d i a n communities, the Government i n s i s t e d that the new scheme was an economic r a t h e r than a communal m e a s u r e , a i m e d at labour i n general and not at any p a r t i c u l a r community or communities. The Indians were those most s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t e d by the new l a w . 1 0 ^ Throughout 1952 and up to J u l y 1953 > there had been 98 Thompson and A d l o f f , op_. c i t . . pp. 34 and 96. 99 I b i d . , p. 34, quoted from The S t r a i t s Times. Nov. 24, 1952. 100 I b i d . , p. 97. 101 Loc. c i t . 102 I b i d . , p. 96. 103 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1953> p. 9* 90 a considerable increase i n the number of immigrants from I n d i a . From August 1953» however, t h i s number underwent a sharp f a l l , the a r r i v a l s being p r a c t i c a l l y confined to wives and c h i l d r e n of r e s i d e n t s . 1 0 4 " Table V I I A r r i v a l s of Indians at Penang from I n d i a by Sea, 1953 (Figures obtained from the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Annual Report, 1953, pp.11-12) Males Females C h i l d r e n T o t a l January 3,347 323 270 3,940 February 3,718 386 420 4,524 March 3,663 453 382 4,498 A p r i l 2,929 304 288 3,521 May 7,213 819 660 8,692 June 5,145 576 467 6,188 J u l y 7,111 903 688 8,702 August 1,298 158 154 1,610 September 212 26 40 278 October 71 11 17 99 November 2,197 334 297 2,828 December 2,136 399 337 2,872 T o t a l 39,040 4,692 4,020 47,752 104 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1953, p. 9. 91 During the same year, out of a t o t a l of 10,857 persons who were granted documents of en t r y , 3,038 were a l i e n wives of r e s i d e n t s ; 2,28l were a l i e n c h i l d r e n (under 12) of r e s i d e n t s ; 1,195 were persons e n t i t l e d t o enter of own r i g h t ; and 1,007 10 5 were a l i e n females on compassionate grounds. ' I t should be r e a l i s e d t h a t , a l l t h i s time, the B r i t i s h had continued t h e i r e f f o r t s to win over Chinese sentiment. The l a t t e r were encouraged to j o i n the p o l i c e , the armed f o r c e s , and the Malayan Home Guard. A very important move was made i n December 1952, when the Malayan C i v i l S e r v i c e was thrown open to q u a l i f i e d non-Malays i n the p r o p o r t i o n of one non-Malay to i oft every f o u r Malay appointees. However, i n view of the f a c t that p r i v a t e f i r m s o f f e r the more f i n a n c i a l l y a t t r a c t i v e p o s i - t i o n s , i t has been observed that t h i s concession has been of a moral r a t h e r than p r a c t i c a l advantage to the C h i n e s e . 1 0 ^ An a n a l y s i s of Malayan p o l i t i c s since the establishment of the F e d e r a t i o n i n 1948 w i l l not be complete i f the r e l a t i o n - ship between r a c i a l f a c t o r s and economic p o l i c y during the p e r i o d i n question i s completely ignored. The a c t i o n s of the Govern- ment have o f t e n been c r i t i c i s e d , and suggestions have been made regarding the i d e a l economic p o l i c y f o r the Malayan p l u r a l s o c i e t y . 105 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1953, p. 12. 106 Thompson and A d l o f f , op. c i t . . p. 36. 107 Loc. c i t . 92 I n t h i s respect the r a c i a l i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the c a l l f o r a s o c i a l i s t Malaya deserve some a n a l y s i s . W r i t i n g i n The New Statesman and Nation i n 1953? a correspondent s t a t e d : Economists are convinced that the only p o s s i b l e hope f o r a Malayan n a t i o n a l i s m , and a Malayan n a t i o n , i s through S o c i a l i s m , or through some economic p o l i c y which w i l l put the two b i g groups of people, roughly equal i n number, the Malays and the Chinese, on a more or l e s s comparable footing.^ Q Q At that time the Chinese were producing twice as much as the Malays and t h e i r standard of l i v i n g was twice as h i g h . ^ 9 Furthermore, though they produced h a l f the country's wealth i n rubber, t i n and r i c e , 1 1 0 the Malays were g e t t i n g o n l y about a quarter of the n a t i o n a l income - t h i s being l a r g e l y due t o the f a c t that they were commonly e x p l o i t e d by the dealers on both ends, namely those from whom they bought and those to whom they s o l d . Since these dealers were mostly Chinese, a r a c i a l b a s i s was i n e v i t a b l e i n the grievances and misunderstandings which r e s u l t e d . Despite these arguments i n favour of s o c i a l i s m , t h i s w r i t e r i s convinced that the prospects of a s o c i a l i s t Malaya were ra t h e r dubious at that time, and w i l l continue to be so f o r at l e a s t a s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of the foreseeable f u t u r e . The reasons f o r t h i s c o n v i c t i o n are mainly t w o - f o l d : f i r s t , t hat the word " s o c i a l i s m " i s commonly misunderstood and h a s t i l y 108 New Statesman and Nation, v o l . 46, 1953? P« 280. 109 Loc. c i t . 110 Loc. c i t . 93 associated w i t h communism, subversion, s e d i t i o n and so on; and secondly, that the Chinese element i n the UMNQ-MCA-MIC A l l i a n c e (the p a r t y now i n power by an overwhelming m a j o r i t y ) would, understandably, do i t s very best to oppose s o c i a l i s t p o l i c i e s . (The chances are t h a t , i n the i n t e r e s t s of the i n t e r n a l u n i t y of the p a r t y , the Malay elements w i l l probably continue t o r e - f r a i n from proposing any important s o c i a l i s t l e g i s l a t i o n u n t i l e i t h e r the Chinese a t t i t u d e or the balance of power between the Chinese and the Malays undergoes a s u b s t a n t i a l change.) While the f i r s t f a c t o r (namely, the popular m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of s o c i a l i s m ) may be overcome through increased p o l i t i c a l a c t i v - i t y and education i n a comparatively short p e r i o d of time, the second w i l l probably be e f f e c t i v e f o r a much longer p e r i o d . There has, however, been made a d i f f e r e n t approach towards t h i s problem, through the establishment and f u n c t i o n i n g of the R u r a l and I n d u s t r i a l Development A u t h o r i t y . The A u t h o r i t y was formed f o r the b a s i c purpose of h e l p i n g the Malay s m a l l h o l d e r , e s p e c i a l l y i n view of the f a c t that the Malays had g e n e r a l l y been subjected to two main handicaps - the f a c t that they had f a i l e d t o "organize i n t h e i r own i n t e r e s t s " 1 1 " 1 ' and the f a c t that the c o n t r o l of i n d u s t r y , trade and commerce had, over the years, accumulated i n the hands of the non-Malays. The scheme was designed by Dato Onn b i n J a ' a f a r , and the A u t h o r i t y i t s e l f mat- e r i a l i z e d as the r e s u l t of s e v e r a l inter-communal d i s c u s s i o n s 111 Gamba, C. and A z i z , U.A., "RIDA and Malayan Economic Development," Fa r E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 20 (1951)> P- 173* 94 which had been sponsored by the Commissioner-General, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald. What fol l o w e d was nothing short of p o l i t i - c a l b a r g a i n i n g , w i t h the r e s u l t that the Chinese and Indians r e c e i v e d improved c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s i n exchange f o r ameliora- t i o n i n the economic status of the M a l a y s . 1 1 2 Part of the scheme's i n t r i n s i c value stemmed from the f a c t that i n i t i a t i v e was placed w i t h i n the peasantry i t s e l f . The r u r a l Malays were encouraged to organize themselves, the kampongs ( v i l l a g e s ) being expected to formulate t h e i r own plans: which the A u t h o r i t y would 113 help implement. Thus the emphasis was placed on s e l f - h e l p , t h i s being a d e f i n i t e e f f o r t t o get the Malays out of the h a b i t of r e l y i n g e x c e s s i v e l y on o f f i c i a l support and d i r e c t i o n . I n a d d i t i o n to the economic and p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d , the s o c i a l betterment of the r u r a l Malays was another of the main c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . B r i e f mention may be given here to yet another problem w i t h a r a c i a l b a s i s - the re-settlement of s q u a t t e r s . L i v i n g on the peri p h e r y of the j u n g l e , the squatters had always been exposed to communist i n t i m i d a t i o n and e x t o r t i o n and, consequent- l y , had supplied the g u e r r i l l a f orces w i t h food, money and i n f o r - mation. As the communist menace dragged on, the re-settlement of these squatters i n t o areas which could be supervised and protected became impera t i v e . I n view of the f a c t that those 112 Gamba and A z i z , op_. c i t . , pp. 173-4. 113 I b i d . , p. 174. 95 who had to be r e - s e t t l e d were almost e n t i r e l y Chinese (about 500,000 of them), the re-settlement problem came to be commonly regarded as a Chinese problem, and h e r e i n l i e s the r a c i a l b a s i s of the e n t i r e i s s u e . By i t s v e r y nature, the re-settlement programme had t o be forced on most of the s q u a t t e r s , and the f a c t that the "new v i l l a g e s " i n t o which the re-settlement took place were both fenced and guarded, i n v a r i a b l y l e d to a c e r t a i n amount of resent- ment among those who were r e - s e t t l e d . True to t h e i r s p i r i t of opportunism, the Communists have used these unpopular methods of re-settlement as f u e l f o r t h e i r propaganda. By the end of 1953 > about 550 new v i l l a g e s had been con- s t r u c t e d i n t o which about 5000,000 squatters had, according to 114 p l a n , been moved at a p u b l i c cost of more than US$15 m i l l i o n . The MCA played a v e r y commendable r o l e throughout the p e r i o d i n question, making v a l u a b l e c o n t r i b u t i o n s both f i n a n c i a l l y and from the p o i n t of view of manpower. Having been o r i g i n a l l y prompted by s e c u r i t y reasons, the re-settlement scheme g r a d u a l l y outgrew i t s o r i g i n a l scope, be- coming "the f o c a l point of a s o c i o l o g i c a l and i d e o l o g i c a l e f f o r t 115 of major importance to a l l Southeast A s i a . " I n the wake of t h i s advance, however, r a c i a l complications flowed i n . While 114 K i n g , F a r E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 23, p. 35« 96 the Chinese themselves showed ( e s p e c i a l l y i n the i n i t i a l stages) a great deal of resentment to the new scheme, the Malays seemed to grow j e a l o u s at the l a r g e sums of money which were being spent on the Chinese i n the course of s o c i a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n i n 116 the new v i l l a g e s . The re-settlement i s s u e i n v a r i a b l y im- p l i e d a change i n Great B r i t a i n ' s long-standing pro-Malay p o l i c y , and "had the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of weighting the d e l i c a t e Sino- 117 Malay p o l i t i c a l balance i n favour of the Chinese*" The scheme also tended to i s o l a t e the Chinese from the Malay kam- pongs, and consequently, r a c i a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s were perhaps made more r i g i d . 1 1 8 116 K i n g , op. c i t . , p. 39. 117 Thompson and A d l o f f , op_. cit.» p. 35. 118 K i n g , op. c i t . , p. 38. Chapter Three P o l i t i c a l P a r t i e s P o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s are e s s e n t i a l l y a post-war phenomenon i n Malaya: the years of p o l i t i c a l experimentation (which f o l - lowed the reoccupation of the country by the B r i t i s h ) were undoubtedly p r o p i t i o u s f o r t h e i r founding and development. &s mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s study, the war years had c o n s i d e r a b l y sharpened the p o l i t i c a l r e f l e x e s of the Malayans who, p r i o r t o tha t p e r i o d , had complacently accepted t h e i r p o l i t i c a l l e t h a r g y . As f u r t h e r e x p l a i n e d , most of these r e f l e x e s were conditioned i n such a manner as to f u n c t i o n under communal r a t h e r than n a t i o n a l m o t i v a t i o n . This i s r e f l e c t e d both i n the founding and the i n i t i a l f u n c t i o n i n g of many p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s some of which, today, p l a y a c r u c i a l r o l e i n conducting the p o l i t i c a l a f f a i r s of the country i n such a manner as to p r o g r e s s i v e l y e r a d i c a t e a l l t r a c e s of communalism i n the Malayan p o l i t i c a l scene. An a n a l y s i s of the b i r t h , growth and f u n c t i o n i n g of a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n post-war Malaya i s indeed a formidable t a s k , and must n e c e s s a r i l y transcend the p r e c i n c t s of a study of t h i s nature and l e n g t h . Thus i t might be considered most advantageous to concentrate on the more important p a r t i e s and the more s i g n i f i c a n t developments, since perhaps more can be gained from such an a n a l y s i s than from a s u p e r f i c i a l survey of 98 a f a r broader f i e l d which, i f undertaken, would f a i l to give s u f f i c i e n t i n s i g h t i n t o the t o p i c , i n a d d i t i o n to l e a v i n g the w r i t e r unable to elaborate on those f a c t o r s and circumstances which he considers to be of v i t a l importance. I t i s f o r t h i s reason that the N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Perak, the Perak Malay League and the Perak P r o g r e s s i v e ^ a r t y - p a r t i e s that have been r e f e r r e d to as being "merely minor m a n i f e s t a t i o n s of an outmoded Perak p r o v i n c i a l i s m " 1 - have not been subjected t o any a n a l y s i s , since they are not symptomatic of any for c e s and trends d i r e c t l y r e l e v a n t to the present study. The e v o l u t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n Malaya i s made par- t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t by the f a c t that the r i s e and f a l l of each p a r t y , i t s periods of triumph and i t s moments of low morale, can a l l he taken as being v a l u a b l y i n d i c a t i v e of the balance of power between the c o n f l i c t i n g f o r c e s of communalism and non-communalism. I t was not u n t i l 1952 that p a r t y - p o l i t i c s i n Malaya assumed i t s present f l a v o u r . I n that year an e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e was formed between the country's two most s u c c e s s f u l communal or g a n i z a t i o n s - the United Malays' N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n and the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n . The development of Malayan p o l i t i c s s i n c e that date has been v e r y l a r g e l y i n f l u e n c e d by the e v o l u t i o n of t h i s e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e i n t o a more permanent one which l a t e r embraced the Ind i a n community as w e l l . Thus two phases become 1 C a r n e l l , F. G., "The Malayan E l e c t i o n s , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 28 ( 1 9 5 5 ) , p. 3 2 0 . 99 discernible i n a study of p o l i t i c a l parties i n the Federation of Malaya, as represented by the pre-Alliance and the post- Alliance periods. It i s for the purpose of drawing some dis- tinction between these two phases that this chapter has been divided into two different sections. So as to avoid confusion between the several parties that are involved, section I treats each party individually; a more integrated analysis i s attempted i n section II, this being fa c i l i t a t e d by the relatively small number of parties that are involved, and made necessary by the fact that the issues involved exhibit a definite trend which might lose i t s proper significance should an isolated study of the different parties be undertaken. I The Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) The Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) was founded i n Decem- ber, 1945. Despite Its non-communal origins, the party gradu- al l y assumed a bias, whereby i t began to indicate strong inten- tions of being the foremost body in voicing the views of the non-Malay communities domiciled i n the country; i t also sought to win representative government for Malaya within the B r i t i s h Commonwealth. When the United Malays' National Organization (UMNO) was formed (by Dato Onn bin Ja'afar) i n 194-6 to agitate for the withdrawal of the Malayan Union proposals, the MDU came out in a determined effort to oppose the UMNO, and thereby off- set i t s influence. In December of the same year, i t (the MDU) 100 provided the i n c e n t i v e and l e a d e r s h i p i n forming a f e d e r a t i o n of a l l the p a r t i e s which opposed the UMNO, i n an e f f o r t t o e s t a b l i s h g reater p s y c h o l o g i c a l and numerical c o n s o l i d a t i o n i n opposing a common foe. I n a d d i t i o n to the MDU, the f e d e r a t i o n i n question comprised the Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y (an o r g a n i z a - t i o n i n t e n t on i n t e g r a t i n g l e f t - w i n g elements' i n the communally i n c l i n e d segments of the Malay community), the Pan-Malayan F e d e r a t i o n of Trade Unions (which, while being supposedly a mere trade union o r g a n i z a t i o n , g r a d u a l l y tended to l e a n towards com- munist d i r e c t i o n ) , the Malayan Union Congress, the Malayan Peoples' Anti-Japanese Army Old Comrades A s s o c i a t i o n , the Malayan New Democratic Youth, the Angkatan Wanita Sedara (Women's P a r t y ) , 2 and the Angkatan Permuda Insaf (Youth P a r t y ) . The new f e d e r a - t i o n c a l l e d i t s e l f the A l l - M a l a y a n C o u n c i l of J o i n t A c t i o n (AMCJA). P r i o r to viewing the fortunes of the AMCJA, i t would be e n l i g h t e n i n g to o b t a i n a f a i r l y adequate understanding of the nature and f u n c t i o n i n g of the Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y (MNP) since t h i s p a r t y c l e a r l y represents the r e a c t i o n s and a s p i r a t i o n s of the l e f t i s t elements i n Malay n a t i o n a l i s m . The Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y (MNP). The MNP's q u a r r e l w i t h the United Malays' N a t i o n a l Organi- z a t i o n d i d not have anything to do w i t h the Malayan Union 2 P u r c e l l , V., The Chinese i n Modern Malaya. Singapore, Donald Moore, 1956, p. 42. 101 proposals, s i n c e both p a r t i e s were e q u a l l y opposed t o the new scheme. The r i v a l r y n e c e s s a r i l y arose from a contest f o r Malay support i n that each p a r t y sought to be the main spokesman f o r i t s community. Having been e s t a b l i s h e d at a congress held i n Ipoh i n November 1945, the MNP at t h i s time had a membership of about 60,000. I t had the s i n g u l a r honour of being the f i r s t n a t i o n a l i s t p a r t y of any appreciable s t r e n g t h i n the country. Despite i t s communal base, the MNP gave c o n s i d e r a t i o n to some of the common demands of the three major communities i n i t s programme. These included the r i g h t of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , amity between the three r a c e s , c i v i l l i b e r t i e s , lower taxes and a i d f o r the peasants, b e t t e r c o n d i t i o n s f o r labour, and an inde* pendent united Malaya. To these was added the d e s i r a b i l i t y of 4 b r i n g i n g about s o l i d a r i t y w i t h the Indonesian Republic, an item which o b v i o u s l y t i l t e d the balance v e r y much i n favour of the Malays i n that had s o l i d a r i t y w i t h Indonesia been s u c c e s s f u l l y accomplished, the non-Malay races i n Malaya would have been t r a n s - formed from the s t a t u s of a m a j o r i t y ( i n Malaya) to that of a f a i r l y small m i n o r i t y i n the l a r g e r Indonesian-Malayan Union. Despite I t s communal appeal, the MNP f a i l e d t o win over mass- support from the Malays who were understandably s u s p i c i o u s of a p a r t y which had been openly wooing the a f f e c t i o n s of other l e f t - wing o r g a n i z a t i o n s which were composed l a r g e l y of non-Malays. 3 " B r i t a i n Faces a New Malaya," Amerasia, v o l . 11, no. 1 (Jan, 1947), p. 13. 4 Loc. c i t . 102 The A l l - M a l a y a n C o u n c i l o f J o i n t A c t i o n (AMCJA) While many of the p a r t i e s which comprised the AMCJA professed a n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i c y ( o r at l e a s t a semblance of one), there were others which had a s t r i c t l y communal outlook and p o l i c y . Perhaps the best example of such a movement during t h i s p e r i o d was the Malay Peoples P a r t y which had i t s o r i g i n s i n Selangor. I n a d d i t i o n to r e i t e r a t i n g the nation-wide c a l l (among the Malays) f o r the reestablishment of the S u l t a n s ' power and p r e s t i g e , t h i s p a r t y demanded a "Malaya f o r the Malays", g l o r i f i e d the d o c t r i n e s of Islam, and condemned the " r a d i c a l i s m " of the Chinese; 5 i t s membership was l a r g e l y drawn from the Malay Youth movement (Kesatuan Muda Melayu) - a movement which had e a r l i e r been sponsored by the Japanese. On the other extreme of the n o n - n a t i o n a l i s t movements was the Pan-Malayan Congress, an o r g a n i z a t i o n which based i t s programme on undivided l o y a l t y t o the B r i t i s h Government. The Pan-Malayan Congress i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n that i t i s v i t a l l y i n d i c - a t i v e of that s u s p i c i o u s , f e a r - r i d d e n and unimaginative s e c t i o n of the Malay community - s u s p i c i o u s i n that i t was becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y apprehensive of the i n t e n t i o n s of the L e f t i n Malayan p o l i t i c s ; f e a r - r i d d e n i n that i t shuddered at the thought of being l e f t t o fend f o r i t s e l f i n an independent Malaya i n the face of competition from the non-Malay m a j o r i t y ; and unimaginative i n that i t f a i l e d both to grasp the s i g n i f i - cance of the i s s u e s at hand and to adapt i t s e l f s u i t a b l y t o 5 Amerasia, p. 13. 103 the i n e v i t a b l e changes which were sure to f o l l o w i n the wake of p o l i t i c a l concessions from Great B r i t a i n . As opposed to the communal f u n c t i o n i n g of the United Malays' N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n , the AMCJA sought, among other t h i n g s , t o e s t a b l i s h equal p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s f o r a l l those who considered Malaya as t h e i r r e a l home and as the object of t h e i r l o y a l t y . As one might i n f e r from the heavy Malay membership i n t h i s f e d e r a t i o n , concessions had to be made t o pla c a t e t h i s m a j o r i t y and, consequently, i t was also agreed at that time that the Malay Sultans should be r e i n s t a t e d as f u l l y sovereign c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r u l e r s , and tha t matters p e r t a i n i n g to Malay cus- tom and the Moslem r e l i g i o n be l e f t i n the hands of the Malays themselves. I t was also r e s o l v e d that a p o l i c y of encouraging the progress o f the Malay community be s i n c e r e l y adhered t o . The Pusat Tenga Ra'ayat (PUTERA) I t was soon c l e a r that the Malays were Malays f i r s t and l e f t i s t anti-UMNO elements o n l y next. As a r e s u l t , the AMCJA di d not l a s t long i n i t s o r i g i n a l composition. Accompanied by the Angkatan Permuda I n s a f , the Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y withdrew from the main body to organize a Malay C o u n c i l of J o i n t A c t i o n , t h i s move being the prelude t o the founding of yet another f r o n t - the Pusat Tenga Ra'ayat (Peoples United Front.) This o r g a n i - z a t i o n , made up of the main s t r e n g t h of the Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y , a youth o r g a n i z a t i o n , a women's o r g a n i z a t i o n , and s e v e r a l 104 l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t bodies, came to be known as PUTERA ( t h i s name being made up of the f i r s t two l e t t e r s i n each of the three words which comprise the Fr o n t ' s name). Having (understandably) acquired a somewhat pronounced Malay outlook as a r e s u l t of i t s composition, the PUTERA added another three p o i n t s to the AMCJA's 7 main programme, mentioned e a r l i e r , which s t a t e d : (a) that the o f f i c i a l language of the country should be Malay (b) that the Malayan Government should have j o i n t c o n t r o l over f o r e i g n a f f a i r s w i t h the B r i t i s h Government; and (c) that Malaya's n a t i o n a l f l a g should incorporate the Malay n a t i o n a l c o l o u r s . The PUTERA - AMCJA - a c o a l i t i o n between the Pusat Tenga Ra'ayat (People's United Front) and the All - M a l a y a n C o u n c i l of J o i n t A c t i o n On the more general scene, i t was now becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y c l e a r that the sprawling p r o l i f e r a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s was g r a d u a l l y being grouped i n t o two main camps w i t h the AMCJA, a pre- dominantly Chinese o r g a n i z a t i o n , on the one hand, and the PUTERA, e v i d e n t l y based on an anti-UMNO Malay sentiment, on the other. Consequent t o the withdrawal of the Malayan Union proposals, however, a c o a l i t i o n was e f f e c t e d , known as PUTERA - AMCJA. As a n a t u r a l outgrowth of such a move, the c o a l i t i o n r e s u l t e d i n a c e r t a i n amount of Sino-Malay p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g , w i t h the Chin- ese agreeing f i r s t of a l l to use Melayu as the word r e f e r r i n g t o Malayan c i t i z e n s and, secondly (as stated i n the o r i g i n a l AMCJA programme), to the r e t e n t i o n of the Sultans as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l 6 P u r c e l l , The Chinese i n Modern Malaya, pp. 42-3. 7 I b i d . , p. 43. 8 I b i d . , p. 105 r u l e r s of the country - i n exchange f o r p o l i t i c a l p r i v i l e g e s c l o s e r to those of the Malays. The c o a l i t i o n was not without i n i t i a t i v e , and put forward the People's C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals i n the form of p o l i t i c a l demands f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f the B r i t i s h Government. The l a t t e r r e j e c t e d the proposals, j u s t i f y i n g the a c t i o n by i n d i c a t - i n g that the c o a l i t i o n d i d not have the support of any s i g n i f i - cant p o r t i o n , not o n l y of the Malay, but also of the do m i c i l e d non-Malay communities. This was t r u e . The reasons f o r the Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y ' s f a i l u r e to be the accepted mouthpiece of the Malay community have already been e x p l a i n e d ; there are others of equal i f not greater importance which need to be added here. Dato Onn (who, i n a d d i t i o n to being the M e n t r i Besar of Johore, had a l s o r i s e n to the p o s i t i o n of being the undisputed leader of the Malay community), f o r one, was v i t a l l y i n s t r u m e n t a l i n c h a n n e l l i n g support away from the AMCJA-PUTERA s i n c e , l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of h i s outlook and l e a d e r s h i p , the UMNO was i n c l i n e d to concentrate i t s e f f o r t s , by preference, on Anglo-Malay n e g o t i - a t i o n s aimed at s e t t i n g up the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya. A b a s i c reason f o r the f a i l u r e of the l e f t - w i n g c o a l i t i o n to win over, to i t s cause, the non-Malay communities - Chinese, Indians, Ceylonese and Eurasians a l i k e - l a y i n the f a c t that the English-speaking s e c t i o n s of these communities (which, as men- tio n e d i n the f i r s t chapter, were also the more p o l i t i c a l l y a r t i c u l a t e s e c t i o n s ) , having found t h e i r places i n the p r o f e s s i o n s and government s e r v i c e s , refused to acknowledge the extremism 106 d i s p l a y e d by the proponents and adherents of the l e f t wing. The Malayan Democratic Union i s a case i n p o i n t . I t s f a i l u r e may be a t t r i b u t e d l a r g e l y to the f a c t that i t s r a b i d a n t i - B r i t i s h f a n a t i c i s m f a i l e d t o win the approval of the m a j o r i t y of the educated and English-speaking middle c l a s s . The Malays had yet another reason f o r not supporting the l e f t wing i n t h a t they s e r i o u s l y doubted the claims of the non-Malay elements i n that group to be "true Malayans". Above a l l these f a c t o r s was the u n d e r l y i n g f e a r that the l e f t , w i t h i t s demand f o r immediate self-government, was merely being manipulated by the Malayan Communist P a r t y to f u r t h e r i t s own ends. Of course there were a l s o those who feared t h a t , i n a country which had never experienced a f r e e e l e c t i o n , the sudden bestowal of independence could e a s i l y r e s u l t i n deep and hopeless communal s e p a r a t i o n . Those hol d i n g t h i s o p i n i o n d i d not f e e l that the PUTERA-AMCJA and i t s demands held any immediate s o l u t i o n to the w e l t e r of confusing f a c t o r s emerging from communalism. The United Malays' N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (UMNO) Contrary to what one might be l e d to expect (judging from the hardening of communal d i v i s i o n s which took place during the Japanese regime), the i n i t i a l phase of the post-war p e r i o d d i d not witness the emergence of popular and e f f e c t i v e communal par- t i e s . The UMNO may be considered an e x c e p t i o n , but even i n i t s case the r e l i a n c e on p u r e l y negative forces (such as the t h r e a t of the l e f t i s t elements and the adverse i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 107 Malayan Union Scheme) f o r the purpose of encouraging support i s s i g n i f i c a n t . Nevertheless, i t should be noted that the Org a n i z a t i o n was d e f i n i t e l y an e f f e c t i v e one, and also popular by comparison. The e a r l y phase of the UMNO's development i s i n t e r e s t i n g . As already mentioned, the p a r t y was founded to strengthen the Malay b i d f o r the r e p e a l of the Malayan Union proposals. Thus,' i n i t s i n i t i a l stages, the UMNO merely exerted the t r a d i t i o n a l r i g h t s of the Malays as a race - i n that I t strove to b r i n g about a re-establishment of the o l d order. I d e n t i f y i n g the communist t h r e a t as being a Chinese t h r e a t , the Malays rushed to the a i d of the Government and, i n so doing, had the f u l l support of the UMNO. I t was not l o n g , however, before l e a d e r s of the (Malay) community began making p o l i t i c a l demands i n 9 r e t u r n f o r the m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e given to the Government. I t was f o r t h i s s p e c i f i c purpose t h a t , i n the autumn of 194-8, the President of the UMNO made a t r i p to London, where he made the f o l l o w i n g demands:"*"0 (a) Increased Malay p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n f e d e r a l a d m i n i s t r a - t i o n . (This was to inc l u d e the appointment of Malays as heads of some of the departments and of a Malay as the Deputy High Commissioner.) (b) An increase i n the number of Malay m i l i t a r y u n i t s . (c) A grant of £10,000,000 from the B r i t i s h Government, to be givenrjover a peri o d of 5 t o 10 years, f o r u t i l i z a t i o n "in r a i s i n g the economic sta t u s of the Malays l a r g e l y through grants and a i d to the peasantry. 9 Morrison, I . "Aspects of the r a c i a l problem i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 22 (1949), p. 249. 10 Loc. c i t . 108 As one might j u s t l y expect under the circumstances, these demands could not help hut make an unfavourable impression upon the Chinese. I n Penang and Province W e l l e s l e y , f o r example, a move was i n i t i a t e d propagating s e c e s s a t i o n from the Fe d e r a t i o n , i n favour of colony s t a t u s . The Chinese m a j o r i t y i n these regions i n d i c a t e d t h e i r resentment to l i v i n g under a c o n s t i t u t i o n which, i n t h e i r eyes, was c l e a r l y weighted i n favour of the Malays so as t o s u i t the i n t e r e s t s of that commun- i t y . The element of r a c i a l exclusiveness d i d not p e r s i s t i n d e f - i n i t e l y i n the UMNO, and i t was not long before departures from the party's p u r e l y communal scope came to be discussed and advo- cated. Dato Onn, f o r one, began s e r i o u s l y to consider a broad- ening of the party's base, so as t o provide a common roo f f o r a i l the communities. His e f f o r t s i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n , however, d i d not have the f u l l support of the party's rank and f i l e . T h i s l e d to the r e s i g n a t i o n of the o l d leaders of the p a r t y , n o t a b l y of Dato Onn h i m s e l f , who subsequently formed the Independence of Malaya P a r t y (IMP) - a p a r t y w i t h a p r i m a r i l y i n t e r - r a c i a l pro- gramme, to represent a p o l i t i c a l c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of the co-opera- t i v e a s p i r a t i o n s of the Communities L i a i s o n Committee. 1 1 11 The Communities L i a i s o n Committee was formed i n 194-8 w i t h B r i t i s h encouragement (and e s p e c i a l l y at the i n s p i r a t i o n of Mr. Malcom Macdonald, the Commissioner-General) f o r the purpose of b r i n g i n g together the leaders o f the d i f f e r e n t communities. The Committee a l s o represented an e f f o r t t o u n i t e anti-communist sentiment i n the country. 109 Before proceeding to d i s c u s s the Independence of Malaya P a r t y , the i n i t i a l stages of the Malayan Indian Con- gress's and the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n ' s development w i l l f i r s t have to be understood. The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) i n i t i a l l y represented an e f f o r t to embody the p o l i t i c a l i n c l i n a t i o n s of a l l c l a s s e s i n the I n d i a n community, but i t cannot be denied that the p a r t y g r a d u a l l y tended to get submerged i n the l e f t wing i n Malayan p o l i t i c s , once having j o i n e d the A l l - M a l a y a n C o u n c i l of J o i n t A c t i o n . With a l l the other members (of the AMCJA) e i t h e r d i s s o l v e d or d r i v e n underground as a r e s u l t of the d e c l a r a t i o n of the Emergency, the MIC continued to maintain i t s l e g a l e x i s t - no ence by choosing not to oppose the Government. As w i l l be seen l a t e r i n the present study, the p a r t y subsequently returned to i t s o r i g i n a l f u n c t i o n (namely, of being a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of the Indian community f i r s t and foremost), going so f a r as to become a part of the A l l i a n c e P a r t y - the p a r t y i n power today by an overwhelming m a j o r i t y . The Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n (MCA) Despite the i n c r e a s i n g pace i n Malayan p o l i t i c s (as de- p i c t e d , f o r example, by the r i v a l r y between the UMNO and the 12 P u r c e l l , V., Malaya: Communist or Free? London, V i c t o r Gollancz L t d . , 1954, p. 67. 110 L e f t on the one hand and the e f f o r t s of the former to b r i n g about the t e r m i n a t i o n of the Malayan Union on the o t h e r ) , i t i s true t h a t , at the time of the communist outbreak i n 1948, the Chinese i n Malaya were s t i l l i n a s t a t e of p o l i t i c a l apathy. Although the community remained d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, i t s o p p o s i t i o n to the new development d i d not i n any way represent a f o r c e f u l and sustained e f f o r t when compared, f o r example, to the Malay attempt which r e s u l t e d i n the r e p e a l of the Malayan Union. The Associated Chinese Chambers of Commerce, f o r example, w i t h - drew t h e i r o f f i c i a l o p p o s i t i o n t o the F e d e r a t i o n proposals, agreeing to see how things went f o r a w h i l e . Without a shadow of doubt, what the Chinese needed most at t h i s time was l e a d e r s h i p that was b e t t e r organized and that was of a higher c a l i b r e . T h i s l e a d e r s h i p came i n 1949 when the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n (MCA) was formed, under the aegis of the Communities L i a i s o n Committee, w i t h Mr. Tan Cheng Lock as p r e s i d e n t . The founding of the MCA served a dua l purpose: i t gave the B r i t i s h a b e t t e r chance of o b t a i n i n g co-operation from the Chinese community to end the Emergency; and i t gave the wealth- i e r and mi d d l e - c l a s s Chinese a g r e a t l y increased scope i n pro- moting s o l i d a r i t y w i t h i n t h e i r community - f o r the purpose of c r e a t i n g b e t t e r o p p o r t u n i t i e s to improve t h e i r status under the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . The w e a l t h i e r and middle-class Chinese I l l b e n e f i t e d i n yet another manner: they were now given the opportunity and the means to compete more e f f e c t i v e l y w i t h the Communists i n wooing the a l l e g i a n c e of the poorer c l a s s e s w i t h i n t h e i r community - e s p e c i a l l y the s q u a t t e r s . Thus i t may be observed that the MCA was p r i m a r i l y of a short-term value t o the B r i t i s h ( i n t h a t i t s main value to them was connected w i t h ending the Emergency) while to the Chinese, who had a broader c o n s t i t u t i o n a l o b j e c t i v e , i t i n v a r i a b l y was a body w i t h a more permanent s i g n i f i c a n c e . The e a r l y l i f e of the MCA was admittedly n o n - p o l i t i c a l i n essence. T h i s , however, i s not tantamount to saying that the p a r t y was non-communal as w e l l . The i n t e r e s t s of the Chin- ese community at l a r g e , and m a t e r i a l a i d to the handicapped i n that community, were the par t y ' s two foremost c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . With respect to the l a t t e r , i t should be noted that the l e a d e r - ship and f i n a n c i a l a i d given by the p a r t y f o r the b e n e f i t of the r e s e t t l e d squatters were p a r t i c u l a r l y outstanding. The p a r t y ran a l o t t e r y to r a i s e funds f o r t h i s as w e l l as other purposes, and once i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c s became apparent, the l o t t e r y was terminated by the Government. A i d given to the Malay community and the p o l i t i c a l b a r g a i n i n g which ensued as a r e s u l t have already been discussed e a r l i e r , and should be borne i n mind at t h i s j u n c t u r e . As i s s t i l l the case today, the MCA, during the e a r l y years of i t s e x i s t e n c e , represented v a r y i n g p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n s , 112 w h i l e support was obtained mainly from the "Malayanized" sec- 13 t i o n s of the Chinese community. The p a r t y d i d not, however, represent the Chinese to qui t e such an extent as the UMNO rep- resented the Malays. T h i s , too, i s s t i l l the case today. I t should thus be r e a l i z e d t h a t , though the MCA i s the o r g a n i z a t i o n which represents the Chinese i n the A l l i a n c e P a r t y (and hence i n the present Government as w e l l ) , there i s no assurance that i t s views are n e c e s s a r i l y an accurate r e f l e c t i o n of those of the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n at l a r g e . The Independence of Malaya P a r t y (IMP) The l e a d e r s h i p and the non-communal b a s i s of the IMP merit a c e r t a i n amount of d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s . I t has already been noted that the p a r t y emerged out of Dato Onn's f a i l u r e to broaden the base of the UMNO so as to in c l u d e a l l the communi- t i e s . P r i o r to founding h i s new p a r t y , Dato Onn assured him- s e l f of the support of h i s counterpart i n the Chinese community - Dato Tan Cheng Lock - and also of that of Mr. P.P. Narayanan who l e d the trade union movement i n the country and thus i n d i r - e c t l y represented a considerable number of Indians ( f o r , as w i l l be seen l a t e r , the Indians by t h i s time were p l a y i n g a v e r y major r o l e i n labour movements i n the co u n t r y ) . I n d i a n support was f u r t h e r ensured by the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of other l e a d e r s , namely Mr. G.V. Thaver (president of the Malayan Indian Congress) 13 K i n g , F.H.H. The New Malayan Nation, New York, I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1957? p. 52. 113 and Dr. Samuel (president of the F e d e r a t i o n of Ind i a n Organiza- t i o n s ) . Dato Onn c l e a r l y expressed the f a c t t h a t , w h i l e the UMNO would continue to maintain i t s communal outlook, there had to be some b a s i s f o r e f f e c t i v e understanding between the d i f f e r e n t communities i n the country. I n the IMP he p e r s o n a l l y v i s u a l i z e d t h i s much-needed b a s i s - a b a s i s that was necessary to b r i n g about those c o n d i t i o n s and changes which he considered both d e s i r a b l e and urgent, namely the u n i t y of the country, the les s e n i n g of the a u t h o r i t y of the S u l t a n s , common c i t i z e n s h i p and the admission of Chinese and Indians i n t o the a d m i n i s t r a t i v e . 14 s e r v i c e . The IMP had the honour of r e c e i v i n g the High Commission- er's b l e s s i n g s . At the i n a u g u r a l meeting held on September 15 1951j Dato Onn addressed a t r u l y cosmopolitan audience. T h i r t y of the s e v e n t y - f i v e members of the F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l 15 were s a i d to have consequently joined the new p a r t y . The beginnings of the IMP were indeed encouraging. I t was not long, however, before i t became evident that the p a r t y d i d not have the support of e i t h e r the Malay or the Chinese community at l a r g e . As might be expected under the circumstances, the strongest o p p o s i t i o n came from the UMNO which a l l e g e d that the IMP was a " d e s t r u c t i v e move", r e s o l v i n g t o 1 6 expel from i t s own ranks those who belonged to tha t p a r t y as w e l l . 14 P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 99* 15 I b i d . , p. 100. 16 Loc. c i t . 114 The UMNO was also emphatic i n s t a t i n g that the IMP proposal was "not only h i g h l y i r r e g u l a r and improper, but was a b e t r a y a l of 17 the b i r t h r i g h t of the Malays." ' Simultaneously, however, the UMNO i n d i c a t e d i t s w i l l i n g n e s s to co-operate w i t h those non- Malays whose l o y a l t y to Malaya was undivided, going to the extent -l o of i n v i t i n g them to be asso c i a t e members of the p a r t y . Malay o p p o s i t i o n appeared to be g e n e r a l l y vehement, and se v e r a l Malays seemed to be most alarmed at the r i s e of the new par t y . Fear was expressed that the Malays would soon f i n d them- selves "reduced to the sta t u s of the Red Indians s t r i v i n g to. l i v e i n the waste lands of America," supported by the warning: The Malays should f i r s t be put i n a sound economic p o s i - t i o n before they are put to face a t r i a l i n which they are not prepared to compete.^q Perhaps t y p i c a l of the Malay outlook was the statement: We a l l want independence, but t o share our r i g h t s w i t h those of whose l o y a l t y we have grave doubts i s a ra s h p o l i c y . 2 0 The Chinese now began to l o s e a l l enthusiasm f o r the IMP. They j u s t l y began to doubt the e f f e c t i v e l e a d e r s h i p , on an i n t e r - communal l e v e l , of a man (Dato Onn) who could not o b t a i n the support of h i s own race, and of a pa r t y which d i d not have the backing of the most numerous community i n the country. The r e s u l t was that by the l a t t e r h a l f of 1 9 5 2 , IMP membership was 17 Singapore Standard. J u l y 9 , 1 9 5 1 ; quoted i n Far E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 2 1 (1952), p. 1 2 . 1 8 P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 1 0 0 . 19 From a l e t t e r to the S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 7, 1 9 5 1 ; quoted i n F a r E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 21 ( 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 1 2 . 2 0 I b i d . , J u l y 14. 115 s a i d to have been made up of an Indian m a j o r i t y . F i n a l l y , i t should also be observed that one of the f a c - t o r s l e a d i n g to the IMP'S f a i l u r e arose from the f a c t that the pa r t y had the misfortune of having been o f f i c i a l l y sponsored, since t h i s encouraged the tendency f o r i t to be associated w i t h the e x i s t i n g " c o l o n i a l government". Dato Onn, f o r example, was s t i g m a t i z e d owing to the f a c t that he was the paid Member 29 f o r Home A f f a i r s . Commenting on t h i s aspect of the f a c t o r s l e a d i n g to the downfall of the IMP, F r a n c i s G. C a r n e l l , w r i t i n g i n P a c i f i c A f f a i r s i n 1953, observes: Without question one of the main reasons why the n a t i o n - b u i l d i n g p o l i c y f a i l s to win support i s i t s o f f i c i a l sponsorship. To the i n t e l l e c t u a l s , p a r t i c u l a r l y the young, propaganda f o r the Malayan n a t i o n f a l l s on deaf ears; i n t h e i r view the movement i s suspect by reason of i t s o f f i c i a l backing. Those Malays and the s i n g l e Chinese leader who have supported the regime by accept- in g l u c r a t i v e p o r t f o l i o s w i t h the F e d e r a t i o n Government have i n e v i t a b l y been d i s c r e d i t e d i n the eyes of the p o l i t i c a l l y conscious who regard them as subservient government nominees representing nobody but themselves. The best proof of t h i s i s the complete e c l i p s e of Dato Onn as a p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r since he became Member f o r Home Affairs.,,., 21 P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 102. From a p u r e l y p s y c h o l o g i c a l p o i n t of view, there appears to be another expla- n a t i o n f o r the s i t u a t i o n i n t h a t strong groups are n a t u r a l l y i n c l i n e d against merging w i t h other groups t o form a s i n g l e body, since they u s u a l l y expect such a move t o i n v o l v e s a c r i f i c e s on t h e i r part i n favour of the weaker members. The weaker members, on the other hand, as represented by the Indians i n t h i s p a r t i c u - l a r case, i n v a r i a b l y tend to regard such a l l i a n c e s and mergers as being to t h e i r unquestionable advantage - hence the preponderance of Indian p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the IMP. 22 I b i d . , p. 100. 23 C a r n e l l , F.G. "Communalism and Communism i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 23 (1953), pp. 114 -5 . 116 I n r e p l y t o a l l the c r i t i c i s m s that were l e v e l l e d both against him and the IMP, Dato Onn's defence was that the f a u l t d e f i n i t e l y l a y i n the party's l e a d e r s h i p ; l e a d i n g f i g u r e s , he maintained, could not a f f o r d to continue t h e i r t i e s w i t h commu- n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s while at the same time remaining the mainstay 24 of the IMP; such behaviour would i n v a r i a b l y defeat the v e r y purpose behind the p a r t y . T h i s accusation was q u i t e o b v i o u s l y d i r e c t e d at S i r Cheng-lock Tan, who, while being a leader of the IMP, continued to be the p r e s i d e n t of the Malayan Chinese Asso- c i a t i o n . The IMP'S d e c i s i o n , i n October 1952, to l i m i t membership to Malayan F e d e r a l c i t i z e n s s t i r r e d up c r i t i c i s m s from non-Malay quarters which accused the new p o l i c y of being r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of an attempt by Dato Onn to c u l t i v a t e h i s own community. On the p o s i t i v e s i d e , i t was considered that such a move could be hene- f i c i a l to the p a r t y i n that i t would r e s u l t i n increased Malay 25 membership. Nevertheless, the f a c t remains that the i s s u e gave r i s e t o communally-oriented misunderstandings. I I Despite t h e i r communal foundations, the UMNO and the MCA had one t h i n g i n common - t h e i r mutual o p p o s i t i o n to the IMP. I t i s t h i s which l e d to an e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e between the two 24 P u r c e l l , Malayat Communist or Free?, p. 102. 25 Loc. c i t . 117 p a r t i e s during the Ku a l a Lumpur M u n i c i p a l E l e c t i o n s i n February 1952 - an a l l i a n c e which, through i t s marked success, l e d t o s i m i l a r attempts being made i n the other m u n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s which f o l l o w e d ; as i n the f i r s t case, they were a l l c h a r a c t e r - i z e d by success at the p o l l s . The e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e at Ku a l a Lumpur i s s i g n i f i c a n t i n that i t formed a b a s i s f o r the more permanent a l l i a n c e which fo l l o w e d . Furthermore i t should be noted that the experiment at Kuala Lumpur was not i n any sense an experiment to t e s t the p r o b a b i l i t y of non-communal v o t i n g ; nor was i t an e f f o r t t o prove the non-communal a s p i r a t i o n s of the UMNO and the^MCA. What a c t u a l l y happened was t h a t , through a simple system of munic i p a l gerrymandering, MCA candidates were put up i n predomi- n a n t l y Chinese wards and UMNO candidates i n those w i t h a Malay m a j o r i t y . T h i s system of agreeing to share the e l e c t e d seats to t h e i r mutual advantage proved to be a w i n d f a l l both f o r the UMNO and the MCA. The seeming s u p e r f i c i a l i t y of t h e i r success, however, i s e s s e n t i a l l y m i s l e a d i n g . The two p a r t i e s i n qu e s t i o n should be given c r e d i t f o r c o r r e c t l y assessing two b a s i c p o l i t i - c a l f a c t s : f i r s t , they r e a l i z e d that the segregation p a t t e r n i n the Malayan p l u r a l s o c i e t y , e s p e c i a l l y as f a r as the Chinese 26 and the Malays are concerned, i s f a i r l y d i s t i n c t ; secondly, they deserve c r e d i t f o r being p r a c t i c a l enough to r e a l i z e t h a t , i n the f i r s t few e l e c t i o n s to be held i n the country, v o t i n g 26 C a r n e l l , F.G., " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform and E l e c t i o n s i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 27 (1954), p. 222. 118 would almost c e r t a i n l y tend to be communal. 2? Having c l e a r l y understood these f a c t s , a l l t hat was l e f t was f o r the l e a d e r s to agree on t h e i r apparent spheres of i n f l u e n c e i n every e l e c - t i o n . I n achieving i t s immediate ends the A l l i a n c e had, at l e a s t f o r the time being, ignored the d e s i r a b i l i t y of campaign- in g on a non-communal p l a t f o r m . But by doing so, and e s p e c i - a l l y by succeeding as a r e s u l t , i t (the A l l i a n c e ) proved to the IMP and the Labour P a r t y the f a c t t h a t , under the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l order, the n o t i o n that "given a non-communal p o l i t i c a l p l a t f o r m , a Malay can get e l e c t e d i n a Chinese d i s t r i c t or 27 v i c e v e r s a , [was] completely Utopian," - f o r the IMP and the Labour P a r t y had d e f i n i t e l y campaigned on a non-communal p l a t - form; t h i s was laudable, but they had l o s t . Dato Onn, both b i t t e r and alarmed at the success of the UMNO-MCA A l l i a n c e , declared q u i t e p l a i n l y that a l l t a l k concern- i n g communal harmony was mere sham, and hence of no a v a i l . W r i t i n g to the Manchester Guardian (October 29, 1952) Mr. Tan Slew S i n (son of S i r Cheng-lock Tan and Chairman of the MCA) al l e g e d that nothing could be f u r t h e r from the truth than t a l k about the i n c r e a s i n g t e n s i o n between the Malays and the Chinese. He refused to accept the c l a i m that the IMP was a non-communal body, s t a t i n g : 27 C a r n e l l , " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform and E l e c t i o n s i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , p. 222. 119 I t i s non-communal i n everything but i n f a c t . The t o t a l membership cannot be more than 2 , 0 0 0 , of which the m a j o r i t y are I n d i a n s . 2 g As mentioned e a r l i e r , one of the main d r i v i n g f o r c e s which encouraged the a l l i a n c e between the UMNO and the MCA was the common d i s l i k e which the tv/o p a r t i e s and t h e i r leaders had f o r the IMP and Dato Onn. This was commonly known, and l e d to the frequent observation that the A l l i a n c e was nothing more than a mere "marriage of convenience", and hence doomed to a short l i f e . I n the l i g h t of the circumstances governing the d e c i s i o n to form the A l l i a n c e , t h i s o b s e r v a t i o n must necessar- i l y have made some sense at the time. Success i n the Ku a l a Lumpur (and other) e l e c t i o n s , 2 9 however, l e d the UMNO and the MCA to t h i n k more s e r i o u s l y about t h e i r temporary but i n c r e a s i n g l y f r u i t f u l union. A s e r i e s of meetings took place between the leaders of the two p a r t i e s CTengku Abdul Rayman and S i r Cheng-lock Tan), r e s u l t i n g i n the establishment of l i a i s o n committees l i n k i n g the l o c a l branches of the two p a r t i e s throughout the F e d e r a t i o n . Discussions continued a l l the time and f i n a l l y , on March 1 7 , 1953? the A l l i a n c e made an announcement that i t had reached agreement on the question of general e l e c t i o n s f o r the F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , s t a t i n g that "the agreed p r i n c i p l e " would be forwarded 2 8 Quoted i n P u r c e l l , Malayat Communist or Free? p. 1 1 3 . 29 At the K u a l a Lumpur e l e c t i o n s the A l l i a n c e won 9 seats and the IMP only 2$ one seat going to an Independent candidate. During 1 9 5 2 and 1 9 5 3 the A l l i a n c e won 9 4 out of 124 seats con- t e s t e d i n v a r i o u s municipal and town c o u n c i l e l e c t i o n s . 120 30 f o r the c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the UMNO and the MCA. The d r a f t p l a n c a l l e d f o r a C o u n c i l of 75 members of whom 44 were t o be ele c t e d and the other 31 nominated. At a general assembly of the UMNO held i n Malacca on A p r i l 6, the p l a n was approved, accompanied by a unanimous r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r F e d e r a l e l e c - t i o n s by 1954, and f o r the r e s i g n a t i o n of a l l UMNO and MCA members from the nominated F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l should 31 the proposal be r e j e c t e d by the Government. I t i s i n t e r e s t - i n g to note that the A l l i a n c e ' s " b l u e - p r i n t " was l a c k i n g i n issues l e a n i n g towards s o c i a l and economic f a c t o r s . T h i s i s understandable, and may be a t t r i b u t e d to the f a c t that the i n i t i a t o r s of the A l l i a n c e d i d not, at such an e a r l y stage, wish t o d i s r u p t the p o s s i b i l i t y of harmonious r e l a t i o n s by d i s - cussing and making r e s o l u t i o n s on the more " d i f f i c u l t " problems. I t was at t h i s stage that an i n t e r e s t i n g development took pl a c e . A r i v a l group, c o n s i s t i n g mainly of Mentris Besar and a few le a d e r s of the IMP, began or g a n i z i n g i t s e l f under the lead e r s h i p of Dato Panglima B u k i t Gantang (the M e t r i Besar of Perak) who had p r e v i o u s l y been a l e a d i n g f i g u r e i n the UMNO. However, the most prominent f i g u r e was perhaps Dato Onn, who was st r o n g l y suspected of having i n s p i r e d the new move and who, " a f t e r the f a i l u r e of the IMP, was i n the p o l i t i c a l wilderness 32 and c a s t i n g around f o r a new pa r t y . " He appeared uncomfort- able at the success of the UMNO and e s p e c i a l l y at that of h i s 30 C a r n e l l , " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform and E l e c t i o n s i n Malaya," op. c i t . , p. 223. 31 Loc. c i t . 32 Ibid.,, p. 224. 121 successor there - Tengku Abdul Rahman; he was outraged and disappointed that S i r Cheng-lock Tan had deserted the IMP i n favour of the A l l i a n c e . He now went to the extent of r e v i v i n g the o l d charge that the MCA was nothing more than an instrument used by the Chinese Chambers of Commerce t o " c a r r y out a p l a n 33 to make t h i s country the t w e n t i e t h Chinese pro v i n c e . " Dato Onn was r e v i v i n g ( c o n s c i o u s l y or otherwise) t h a t very same communal f e e l i n g which he had sought t o su f f o c a t e and destroy through the founding of the IMP. I t was under these c o n d i t i o n s that the above-mentioned group of Ment r i s Besar c a l l e d f o r a Malayan N a t i o n a l Conference i n which a l l p a r t i e s were i n v i t e d t o p a r t i c i p a t e , on J u l y 27, 1953. The A l l i a n c e and the Pan-Malayan Labour P a r t y d e c l i n e d the i n v i t a t i o n . The composition of those p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the Conference i s most i n t e r e s t i n g . There were seven Mentris Besar ( a l l of whom had once been members of the UMNO), the Malay l e a d e r s of the IMP (every one of them an ex-member of the UMNO), a few Chinese ( a l l of whom were e i t h e r members or ex-members of the MCA), and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the India n , Ceylonese and E u r a s i a n o r g a n i z a t i o n s who, i t seemed apparent, were becoming i n c r e a s i n g - 34 l y s u s p i c i o u s of the A l l i a n c e ' s a t t i t u d e towards the m i n o r i t i e s . Thus i t i s evident that almost every person present f o s t e r e d 33 Malay M a i l , March 28, 1953, quoted i n C a r n e l l , 1 6 c . , c i t . 34 Loc. c i t . 122 some k i n d of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n and s u s p i c i o n , w i t h regard to the p o l i c i e s and ambitions of the A l l i a n c e . As expected, the c e n t r a l f i g u r e throughout the conference was Dato Onn. In a d d i t i o n to condemning communalism f o r what i t was, the Conference also appointed a working committee to c o n s t r u c t a p l a n f o r a f u t u r e s e l f - g o v e r n i n g Malaya. The e f f o r t s which f o l l o w e d , however, l o s t some of t h e i r appeal and dynamism ..when, q u i t e unexpectedly, General Templer (the High Commissioner) took the i n i t i a t i v e by agreeing to appoint a F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s Com- mit t e e . - ^ On J u l y 15, 1953» a 46-man Committee of the F e d e r a l C o u n c i l was e s t a b l i s h e d ; on August 17 t h i s somewhat bulky body delegated a l l d e t a i l e d i n v e s t i g a t i o n to a group of 20, made up of 10 Malays, 3 Chinese, 3 Europeans, 2 I n d i a n s , 1 Ceylonese 36 and 1 E u r a s i a n . Other p a r t i e s now began to formulate t h e i r own c o n s t i t u - t i o n a l " b l u e - p r i n t s " , thus f o l l o w i n g i n the f o o t s t e p s of the A l l i a n c e which had taken the i n i t i a t i v e i n t h i s f i e l d . The Pan-Malayan Labour P a r t y (PMLP), f o r example, sought to estab- l i s h a u n i t e d independence front w i t h the A l l i a n c e . The attempt was a f a i l u r e , and understandably so too, since the PMLP's p l a n c a l l i n g f o r the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Malaya's b a s i c i n d u s t r i e s , could h a r d l y win the a l l i a n c e ' s approval. (The reasons f o r t h i s have already been discussed e a r l i e r , while analysing i.'v. 35 Malay M a i l , March 28, 1953, quoted i n C a r n e l l , l o c . c i t . 36 Loc. c i t . 123 the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a s o c i a l i s t Malaya.) Inche Mohammed Sopiee, the l e a d e r of the PMLP, had no other a l t e r n a t i v e but to break o f f n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the A l l i a n c e . T h i s he d i d , and i n f i n e s t y l e too, accusing the A l l i a n c e of being nothing 37 more than a "feudal-commercial-communal a l l i a n c e . " Having thus eased i t s f r u s t r a t i o n s , the PMLP went on to forward i t s own b l u e - p r i n t which c a l l e d f o r an 11-year p l a n f o r independ- ence and s o c i a l i s m . This p e r i o d was to be d i v i d e d i n t o three phases, culmin a t i n g i n independence by 1964. I n agreement w i t h the A l l i a n c e , the p a r t y c a l l e d f o r e l e c t i o n s by 1954, but wanted to have a f a r l a r g e r m a j o r i t y of e l e c t e d members than the A l l i a n c e was w i l l i n g to support The Malayan N a t i o n a l Conference (MNC) submitted i t s own p l a n too, but owing to the m i l d and cautious approach inherent t h e r e i n ( i t had suggested, f o r example, that the F e d e r a t i o n was not ready f o r an e l e c t e d l e g i s l a t u r e , a r g u i n g that any move to f o r c e an e l e c t i o n immediately would make "a mockery of democ- racy"), 39 the p l a n was h e a r t i l y condemned by most of the other p a r t i e s - the A l l i a n c e and the PMLP i n p a r t i c u l a r . The former c a l l e d the scheme "a retrograde step" and "a brazen e f f o r t t o postpone the day when the F e d e r a t i o n would have a popular Gov- 40 ernment"; the l a t t e r branded i t as being nothing more than "a job-preserving b l u e - p r i n t " . 4 " ! The Singapore Standard warned 37 New Statesman and Nation, v o l . 46 (July-Dec. 1953),p. 280. 38 C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 27 (1954), p. 225. 39 Loc. c i t . 40 S t r a i t s Times, August 31, 1953, quoted i n l o c . c i t . 41 Malay M a i l , Sept. 14, 1953, quoted i n l o c . c i t . 124 th a t the acceptance of such "stoogeocracy" would reduce Malaya to a p o s i t i o n where i t would be made "the laughing stock of A s i a and A f r i c a , " suggesting, r a t h e r b o l d l y , that the MNC's pla n was "the product of men who [were] i n a blue funk as t o what t h e i r f a t e would be i n a s e l f - g o v e r n i n g and democratic M a l a y a . " 4 2 As one might j u s t l y expect, a considerable amount of confusion and b i t t e r n e s s i n v a r i a b l y r e s u l t e d from the attempt by these d i f f e r e n t p o l i t i c a l groups to forward t h e i r separate c o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals. To broaden the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of success, the F e d e r a t i o n E l e c t i o n s Committee soon saw f i t to i n v i t e suggestions on which i t could base i t s own proposals. I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note, at t h i s p o i n t , that a l a r g e propor- t i o n of those s i t t i n g i n t h i s Committee were e i t h e r MNC or A l l i - ance l e a d e r s , which meant that they were i n the curious s i t u a - t i o n of having to review t h e i r own proposals. However, si n c e the MNC members had a numerical advantage over the A l l i a n c e members, many of the proposals made by the A l l i a n c e were defeated. Consequently, the p l a n which f i n a l l y emerged c a l l e d f o r a Coun- c i l of 9 2 w i t h an e l e c t e d m i n o r i t y of 44, t h i s being the proposal of the m a j o r i t y group of 2 9 , made up mostly of MNC members. The m i n o r i t y group (mostly A l l i a n c e and Labour l e a d e r s ) , on the other hand, proposed a C o u n c i l of 1 0 0 , w i t h a t h r e e - f i f t h s e l e c t e d m a j o r i t y of 6 0 . 4 " ^ With regard to the date f o r h o l d i n g 42 Singapore Standard, Aug. 24, 1 9 5 3 » quoted i n i b i d . , p.2 2 6 . J 44 Loc. c i t . 1 2 5 F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , the m i n o r i t y A l l i a n c e group maintained that i t was p o s s i b l e f o r a c o n s t i t u e n c y d e l i m i t a t i o n commission to complete i t s work i n time to enable F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s by November 1954. 4 4 The m a j o r i t y MNC group, however, d i d not share t h i s enthusiasm and optimism and hence deplored any haste, s t a t i n g that the proper date would be f i x e d at the appropriate t i m e . 4 ^ The r e a c t i o n s of the A l l i a n c e were f a r from being tame and subdued. Led by Tengku Abdul Rahman and S i r Cheng-lock Tan, the p a r t y expressed, i n no u n c e r t a i n terms, i t s determina- t i o n to oppose the proposals to the b i t t e r end; there was no room f o r compromise. Nor was the A l l i a n c e v o i d of support i n i t s stand, s i n c e the PMLP h e l d e q u a l l y strong views on t h e sub- j e c t . At the f i r s t meeting between General Templer and the R u l e r s , h e l d t o consider the E l e c t i o n Committee's Report, no agreement could be reached since the Rulers were apparently l a c k i n g i n u n i t y over the e l e c t i o n i s s u e . Apprehensive of the f a c t that the m a j o r i t y p r o p o s a l , c a l l i n g f o r an e l e c t e d minority, might be accepted should t h e i r pressure be r e l a x e d , the A l l i a n c e p e t i t i o n e d the Rulers as w e l l as the High Commissioner, wh i l e at the same time making demands f o r t a l k s w i t h the C o l o n i a l Secretary, Mr. O l i v e r L y t t l e t o n , i n London. 4 - 0 Mr. L y t t l e t o n , 44 Singapore Standard, Aug. 24, 1953? quoted i n i b i d . , p. 226. 45 Loc. c i t . 46 I b i d . , p. 228. 126 however, d e c l i n e d to receive a d e l e g a t i o n and the A l l i a n c e , i n t u r n , reacted by demanding a f u l l y e l e c t e d C o u n c i l , thus aban- doning i t s o r i g i n a l demand f o r an e l e c t e d m a j o r i t y of three- f i f t h s . Despite the C o l o n i a l Secretary's r e f u s a l to see them, the A l l i a n c e d e l e g a t i o n , headed by Tengku Abdul Rahman, l e f t f o r London where, a f t e r s u c c e s s f u l l y lobbying f o r B r i t i s h sup- 47 p o r t , i t was e v e n t u a l l y received by Mr. L y t t l e t o n . As f a r as B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l p o l i c y was i n question, sub- mission to the A l l i a n c e ' s demands would have c o n s t i t u t e d a marked d e v i a t i o n from e s t a b l i s h e d p r a c t i c e . No colony had h i t h e r t o advanced from having a wholly nominated l e g i s l a t i v e c o u n c i l to having one w i t h an e l e c t e d m a j o r i t y . Despite t h i s , however, B r i t a i n saw f i t to make a compromise i n the A l l i a n c e ' s f a v o u r . This was made known when General Templer and the Malay R u l e r s , a c t i n g i n co n j u n c t i o n w i t h the Government of Great B r i t a i n , r e - je c t e d the E l e c t i o n Committee's proposal advocating an e l e c t e d m i n o r i t y , and made p r o v i s i o n f o r a C o u n c i l of 98 w i t h 52 e l e c t e d seats - a m a j o r i t y of s i x . This concession, however, should not be mistaken f o r a " s u r p r i s e g i f t " from the B r i t i s h Government to the Malayan people f o r i t was, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , v e r y l a r g e l y the r e s u l t of sustained A l l i a n c e pressure. (This w r i t e r , by t h i s statement, i s not attempting to minimize the good i n t e n t i o n s of the B r i t i s h Government o r , even l e s s , t o give the impression that they were 47 Singapore Standard, Aug. 24, 1953? quoted i n i b i d . , p. 229. 127 t o t a l l y n on-existent. He merely wishes to a t t r a c t s u f f i c i e n t a t t e n t i o n to the r o l e played by the A l l i a n c e i n deciding the issue.) F o r the f i r s t time ever, the F e d e r a t i o n now beheld an undaunted, p e r s i s t e n t and uni t e d Sino-Malay p o l i t i c a l movement - a movement that was able to put weight behind i t s words. On the other hand the MNC (which, under the l e a d e r s h i p of Dato Onn, had changed i t s name to P a r t y Negara on February 28,1954 - by which name i t w i l l be r e f e r r e d to h e r e a f t e r ) could make no such c l a i m ; i t could not p o s s i b l y pose as a re p r e s e n t a t i v e of the e l e c t o r a t e at l a r g e . I n t e r e s t was beginning to mount i n Malayan p o l i t i c s . I n 1952 the C o l o n i a l Secretary had stated that Malaya was u n f i t t o 48 r e c e i v e any major p o l i t i c a l concessions, and that independence would not be forthcoming u n t i l u n i t y between the d i f f e r e n t races 49 domiciled i n the country had been e s t a b l i s h e d . ' Through i t s a b i l i t y to present a strong and united f r o n t , the A l l i a n c e had now challenged that statement. C a r r i e d by the momentum i t had already gained, the A l l i - ance continued to p r o t e s t , saying that a m a j o r i t y of s i x was f a r too small to enable any s i n g l e p a r t y i n the F e d e r a l C o u n c i l to ob t a i n s u f f i c i e n t support so as to d i r e c t , s u c c e s s f u l l y , the p o l i c i e s of the Executive C o u n c i l . Consequently, the A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s c a l l e d f o r an immediate review of the whole e l e c t i o n 48 Singapore Standard, Aug 24, 1953> quoted i n i b i d . , p. 229. 49 P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 108. 128 i s s u e by a Royal Commission, which f a i l i n g , they promised to boycott the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . This t h r e a t was given some weight when the p a r t y withdrew i t s 14 members from the C o u n c i l as i t met to debate the F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s B i l l . Although the move f a i l e d to a l t e r the f a t e of the B i l l , the A l l i a n c e had succeeded i n adding to i t s r e p u t a t i o n f o r being the country's most dynamic p o l i t i c a l p a r t y . Some of the a t t i t u d e s f o s t e r e d both by the A l l i a n c e and the other p a r t i e s w i l l be discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter, i n c o n j unction w i t h p a r t y campaigns i n the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . However, i t would be e n l i g h t e n i n g to make c e r t a i n b a s i c obser- v a t i o n s here p e r t a i n i n g to the i d e a l s and foundations of the other major p a r t i e s (that i s , besides the A l l i a n c e ) which are n a t i o n a l l y organized - namely, the P a r t y Negara, the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y and the Labour P a r t y of Malaya. As opposed to.the A l l i a n c e , the P a r t y Negara represents an outlook which, i n some ways, has a foundation s i m i l a r to that of French c o l o n i a l p o l i c y . Not wanting to present i t s e l f as a supra-communal or non-communal p a r t y , Negara s t r o n g l y advo- cated j u s t before the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n 1955, that i t was p o s s i b l e - and indeed d e s i r a b l e - that the non-Malay communities be a s s i m i l a t e d i n t o a common Malay base. From an o r g a n i z a t i o n a l point of view t h i s a t t i t u d e had an advantage i n that i t enabled 50 the party's programme to be more cohesive. Negara's goal was 50 T i n k e r , I . , "Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 9 (1956) p. 275. 129 a united Malay s t a t e . With t h i s i n mind i t proposed a s i n g l e 51 n a t i o n a l language and a s i n g l e Malayan n a t i o n a l i t y . Dato Onnte b e l i e f appeared to be that a s i n g l e n a t i o n , w i t h a Malay base, could absorb other n a t i o n a l i t i e s w i l l i n g t o forego t h e i r own n a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s . To encourage such absorptions, p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s should i n c l u d e those non-Malays w i l l i n g to adapt themselves to a s i n g l e Malay n a t i o n a l i s m . ^ . I t i s indeed d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e that a man of Dato Onn's stat u r e and p o l i t i c a l experience could have succumbed to such i d e a l i s m at such a moment - and s e r i o u s l y contemplated success at t h a t ! Optimism would indeed have.had to be i n i t s hey-day f o r any p r a c t i c a l p o l i t i c i a n to s e r i o u s l y expect the Chinese and the Indians, w i t h t h e i r deep-rooted and l o n g - standing c u l t u r a l backgrounds, made manifest i n t h e i r s o c i a l behaviour, t o conform to a "Malay base" and to forego t h e i r own " n a t i o n a l t r a d i t i o n s " - e s p e c i a l l y when a m a j o r i t y of them were e i t h e r i l l i t e r a t e or monolingual and hence prone to communal i s o l a t i o n . True, Negara had conceded that the c u l t u r e of other 53 groups should be ""conserved", but then t h i s would s t i l l not have solved the b a s i c problem of g e t t i n g a l l the non-Malays i n question even acquainted w i t h the d i f f e r e n t f a c e t s of the "Malay base" and of "Malay n a t i o n a l i s m " . The above observation should not be taken to mean tha t P a r t y Negara's goal i s e s s e n t i a l l y e i t h e r undesirable or 51 T i n k e r , op_. c i t . , p. 275. 52 Loc. c i t . 130 impossible at any time i n Malaya's f u t u r e . There i s every hope that the country w i l l some day reach that g o a l . The p o i n t i n question i s t h a t there i s no doubt that the propagation of such a p o l i c y as e a r l y as 1 9 5 5 was s o r e l y i n d i c a t i v e of "poor p o l i t i c s " . The e l e c t i o n s proved t h a t . For those who have hopes i n the gradual e v o l u t i o n of a we11-integrated Malayan s o c i e t y , the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y (PMIP) i s indeed an uncomfortable phenomenon and a dangerous symptom. R e l i g i o n , perhaps more than anything e l s e , could delay or p o s s i b l y even destroy the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of mutual t o l e r a n c e among the d i f f e r e n t races r e s i d e n t i n Malaya. Jus t before the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , f o r example, there was a most d i s t u r b i n g "whisper campaign", a t t r i b u t e d to the PMIP, which warned the v o t e r s that i t was haram (forbidden) f o r a Moslem to cast h i s 54 vote f o r a non-Moslem, I n r e f u t i n g the v a l i d i t y of t h i s warn- i n g Inche Nasaruddin Z a k a r i a , a K u a l a Lumpur r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r who was also an UMNO o f f i c e r , explained that there was nothing 55 i n the Koran to prove such a n o t i o n . I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g to note that t h i s apparent concern over the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of Moslems by non-Moslems was by no means a new one at t h i s time. One could go back to the days when the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya had i t s b i r t h to f i n d a s i m i l a r example. Despite the f a c t that the F e d e r a t i o n scheme had d e f i n i t e l y weighted the balance i n favour of the Malays, i t had f a i l e d to 54 T i n k e r , op_. c i t . , p. 277. 55 Loc. c i t . 1 3 1 f u l l y s a t i s f y t h i s community - e s p e c i a l l y those to the extreme Rig h t . The example that needs mention here i s the Lembaga Kesatuan Melayu ( a t r a d i t i o n a l - c o n s e r v a t i v e Malay o r g a n i z a t i o n ) which s t a t e d , i n i t s evidence t o the C o n s u l t a t i v e Committee: When we look at the handing over of the Government of Islam to the Government of non-Islam we s h a l l f i n d that the a c t i o n i s against the wishes of Islam ( h o l y Qu'ran (Koran), 4 : 5 8 , 2 : 3 8 , 3 * 1 5 8 ) ... according to Islam there i s no se p a r a t i o n between p o l i t i c s and r e l i g i o n . I t i s a great s i n f o r I s l a m i c peoples to t r a n s f e r the Government of the Malay States to non-Islam ... 5 6 To the A l l i a n c e , the r e l i g i o u s appeal of the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y was indeed pregnant w i t h dangerous p o s s i b i l i t i e s i n that the tendency was f o r people i n r u r a l areas to give un- h e s i t a t i n g support to t h e i r r e l i g i o u s l e a d e r s . To understand the foundations and p o t e n t i a l i t i e s of the Labour Party', one would have to get a b a s i c understanding of the part played by Labour i n Malayan p o l i t i c s ever since the immediate post-war years. Between 1 9 4 5 and 1 9 4 8 there were many trade u n i o n i s t s who p a r t i c i p a t e d a c t i v e l y i n Malayan p o l i t i c s . With the d e c l a - r a t i o n of the Emergency, however, many communist and communist- i n c l i n e d trade union leaders were arrested on s e c u r i t y grounds. This t o l l e d the k n e l l f o r many trade unions and r e s u l t e d i n a sharp f a l l i n trade union membership i n the country. T h i s , 5 6 Quotation taken from P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 9 8 . 132 however, should not i n s t i n c t i v e l y l e a d one to the accusation that the B r i t i s h had found i t expedient to completely s t i f l e the growth of democratic trade unionism per se. I n a d d i t i o n to being e s s e n t i a l l y m i s l e a d i n g , such an a c c u s a t i o n would a l s o tend to overlook the r e a l substance behind the shadow. Of p a r t i c u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e i s the f a c t that Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n during t h i s phase i n Malayan trade unionism was considerable a c t i v e . The d e c l a r a t i o n of the Emergency and the subsequent de- c l i n e i n trade union a c t i v i t i e s produced a marked change i n the r a c i a l composition of the labour movements which l a t e r emerged. I n more recent years, s t a t i s t i c s p e r t a i n i n g t o these movements have revealed a most i n t e r e s t i n g phenomenon. Of the 126,000 r e g i s t e r e d trade union members at the end of 1955» about 62 per cent were India n s , 2Q; per cent Malays, 16 per cent Chinese, and 57 2 per cent " o t h e r s " . Thus a s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of the labour movement i n Malaya today, i n s o f a r as r a c i a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i s concerned, i s the preponderance of Indian members. While the low p r o p o r t i o n of Malays can e a s i l y be explained by the f a c t t h a t , of the three communities, they are the l e a s t i n c l i n e d 57 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, p. 6 0 . There i s considerable v a r i a t i o n between these f i g u r e s and those given by Palmer, J.N., i n h i s a r t i c l e "Trade Unions and P o l i - t i c s i n Malaya," published i n the Far E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 24, No. 3 (March, 1 9 5 5 ) . I n t h i s a r t i c l e the w r i t e r says that 75$ of the e n t i r e trade union membership ( i n c l u d i n g almost the e n t i r e membership of estate workers' unions) i s I n d i a n . I t does not seem v e r y p o s s i b l e t h a t such a s i g n i f i c a n t s h i f t i n the r a c i a l composition of trade union membership could have been brought about between March and the end of the year. 133 towards unionized i n d u s t r y , the remarkably low percentage r e g i s t e r e d by the Chinese i s completely out of p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r employment f i g u r e s . The poi n t to be noted here i s that t h i s tendency has l e d Malay p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s to accuse the Indian community of being r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a l l the labour d i s - content i n the c o u n t r y . ^ 8 I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that i n r e c o g n i t i o n of Chinese c o n t r o l i n the country's economy and Indian c o n t r o l i n i t s labour movements, the Finance M i n i s t e r i n the present A l l i a n c e Government i s Chinese (Co. H.S. Lee) and the M i n i s t e r of Labour i s Indian (Mr. V.T. Sambantham). Broadly speaking, four main reasons may be g i v e n f o r the poor Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n Malayan trade unions i n recent y e a r s . F i r s t , there i s the f a c t that the p o l i c e , and even some employers, have tended to be apprehensive of p o s s i b l e com- munist i n f l u e n c e where there has been s u b s t a n t i a l Chinese par- 60 t i c i p a t i o n i n trade unions. This may be a t t r i b u t e d to two f a c t o r s : t h e i r knowledge of the f a c t that between 194-5 and 58 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, p. 60. 59 The low degree of Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the Federation's labour movements, i t should be noted, i s v e r y much i n c o n t r a d i c - t i o n t o Singapore's experience i n the same f i e l d . The a c t i v i - t i e s of the predominantly Chinese-manned and seemingly communist- i n f i l t r a t e d unions i n Singapore appears to be one of the f a c t o r s discouraging the conservative UMNO (and hence A l l i a n c e ) l e a d e r s from s e r i o u s l y c o n s i d e r i n g p o l i t i c a l union w i t h Singapore. I b i d . , p. 6 l . 60 Palmer, J.N. "Trade Unions and P o l i t i c s i n Malaya," F a r E a s t e r n Survey, v o l . 24-, number 3 (March, 1955)? p. 34-. 134 1948, when Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n labour movements was heavy, these movements had been i n c l i n e d v e r y much to the l e f t ; and the f a c t that about 95 per cent of the communist t e r r o r i s t s today are Chinese. Secondly, one may consider the f a c t that q u i t e a few Chinese are h e s i t a n t to j o i n trade unions f o r f e a r of communist r e p r i s a l s . T h i s i s understandable i n view of the f a c t that trade unions are no longer associated w i t h any s u b s t a n t i a l o p p o s i t i o n to government p o l i c i e s . T h i r d l y , i t i s tru e that some Chinese are, by nature, averse to government r e g u l a t i o n s wherever and whenever they encounter them - and due to the Emergency, the Government i n the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya has found i t necessary to keep a cl o s e watch on the a c t i v i t i e s of trade unions. F i n a l l y , there i s the ve r y r e a l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , once the Indians began t o dominate the labour movements i n the country, the Chinese i n s t i n c t i v e l y began t o l o s e i n t e r e s t i n trade union membership. This p o s s i b i l i t y would appear to be true p a r t i c u l a r l y i n view of the f a c t that, among the labour- ing c l a s s e s , there has been v e r y l i t t l e f u s i o n among the races. The reasons f o r the poor support r e c e i v e d by the Labour P a r t y now become obvious. The Pan-Malayan Labour P a r t y , formed 61 I n June 1948, there were 302 such unions i n Malaya which had a t o t a l membership of 150,000. Of these, 129 unions, accounting f o r about 82,000 of the t o t a l membership, were under the c o n t r o l of the Malayan Communist P a r t y through the Pan- Malayan F e d e r a t i o n of Trade Unions. Josey, A. Trade Unionism i n Malaya. Singapore, Donald Moore, 1954, p. 17. 62 Palmer, op_. c i t . , p. 34. 135 f o r the b a s i c purpose of c o - o r d i n a t i n g the a c t i v i t i e s of labour and s o c i a l i s t organizations, 6-^ found that i t d i d not have the dynamic inter-communal appeal which might have been a guarantee f o r a considerable amount of success i n p o l i t i c s . Consequently, i n 1953 the p a r t y was s a i d to have been nothing more than a " d i s c u s s i o n club f o r s o c i a l democratic i n t e l l e c t u a l s , d e r i v i n g 64 scant support even from the trade union movement." I t would perhaps be r e l e v a n t to note i n a d d i t i o n that the a c t i v i t i e s of the Independence of Malaya P a r t y had been co n s i d e r a b l y r e s p o n s i - b l e f o r the b i r t h of the Pan-Malayan Labour P a r t y i n t h a t , con- 65 t r a r y to Mr. Narayanan's hopes, the former had f a i l e d to meet the needs of labour. This was probably due to the f a c t that the IMP was unduly preoccupied w i t h communal i s s u e s , t h i n k i n g that a s o l u t i o n to that problem would act as some so r t of panacea, b r i n g i n g an end to a l l the country's i l l s . Despite the f a c t that i t i s now outlawed and hence unable to p a r t i c i p a t e openly i n the country's p o l i t i c a l scene, the Malayan Communist P a r t y needs to be discussed i n the present study. To begin w i t h , i t should be c l e a r l y understood t h a t the party's c l a i m to be a f o r c e working to l i b e r a t e the country from 63 P u r c e l l , Malaya; Communist or Free? p. 103. 64 Carnell,"Communalism and Communism i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 26, p. 108. 65 Mr. P. P. Narayanan was the President of the Malayan Trade Union C o u n c i l . 136 " B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s m " i s e s s e n t i a l l y n o n s e n s i c a l ; otherwise the p a r t y would have no excuse f o r continuing i t s existence today. Secondly, i t i s also v i t a l that one should not erroneously i d e n - t i f y the communist movement i n Malaya as being an indigenous one. I n the f i r s t place a vast m a j o r i t y of the communist g u e r i l l a s i n 66 the country are Chinese. T h i s might not be accepted as being c o n c l u s i v e proof to s u b s t a n t i a t e the o b s e r v a t i o n , i n which case i t might also be added that a m a j o r i t y of t h i s group are, i n f a c t , China-born.^ 7 Furthermore, there i s no denying the f a c t that the Malayan Communist P a r t y i s i n no way steeped i n the a s p i r a - t i o n s of the n a t i o n as a whole. The party's r e f u s a l to comply w i t h the requests of the present e l e c t e d Government would necessar- i l y i n v a l i d a t e any claim to that e f f e c t . The f a c t that a m a j o r i t y of the communist t e r r o r i s t s i n the F e d e r a t i o n are Chinese i s no excuse f o r b e l i e v i n g that the e n t i r e Chinese p o p u l a t i o n i n the country - or even any consider- able part of i t - i s i n sympathy w i t h the movement. One o n l y has 66 According to the c a s u a l t y l i s t s published by the F e d e r a t i o n Government i n K u a l a Lumpur, and covering the p e r i o d from June 1948 (the beginning of the Emergency) to 3 1 January 1 9 5 2 , out of a t o t a l of 2 , 7 7 8 communists k i l l e d during that p e r i o d , 2 5 5 9 were Chinese, 1 0 2 Malays, and the remaining 117 were Indi a n , Siamese, Indonesian and a b o r i g i n e . According to the o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s published i n January 1953> out of a t o t a l of 3 , 7 9 1 communists k i l l e d up to that time, 3 , 5 1 0 were Chinese - or 92.6$ of the t o t a l . P u r c e l l , Malaya: Communist or Free? p. 146. 6 7 Peet, P o l i t i c a l Questions of Malaya, Cambridge, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 4 9 , p. 2 1 . 137 t o look at the c i v i l i a n c a s u a l t y l i s t covering the f i r s t e i g h t years of the Emergency to prove t h i s p o i n t . Out of a t o t a l of 2,504 c i v i l i a n s who were k i l l e d , 1,685 were Chinese, while 68 only about 100 were Europeans. What gre a t e r i n c e n t i v e could there be f o r the m a j o r i t y of Chinese to despise the communist movement as much as any other race does? I n view of the m u l t i - r a c i a l content of the country's pop- u l a t i o n , the Malayan Communist P a r t y would be faced w i t h a problem unprecedented i n the h i s t o r y of Communism i t s e l f , i f i t were given the opportunity to implement i t s i d e o l o g i c a l o b j e c t - i v e by b r i n g i n g about the t r a d i t i o n a l " a l l i a n c e between the 69 p r o l e t a r i a t and the peasantry." 7 The f a c t o r of importance and i n t e r e s t here i s the composition of the " p r o l e t a r i a t " on the one hand and that of the "peasantry" on the other. Under the former category one would i n c l u d e the Chinese who work on es- t a t e s , mines, and i n the towns and c i t i e s . To t h i s group w i l l have to be added the numerous Indian l a b o u r e r s , both i n the est a t e s as w e l l as i n the urban areas. The peasantry, on the other hand, i s ve r y predominantly Malay. T h i s creates a unique s i t u a t i o n : i n t r y i n g to overthrow the e x i s t i n g s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic order i n the country, the Malayan Communist P a r t y w i l l also have to bridge r a c i a l b a r r i e r s - those v e r y same bar- r i e r s which prominent p o l i t i c a l leaders have found and s t i l l are 68 Great B r i t a i n , C e n t r a l O f f i c e of Information, Malayan Record, Swindon, p r i n t e d f o r H.M.Stationery O f f i c e by the Swindon Press L t d . , p. 11. 69 Peet, op_. c i t . , p. 21. 138 f i n d i n g d i f f i c u l t to overcome, working under c o n d i t i o n s f a r more temperate than one would expect a f t e r a p o l i t i c a l upheaval of such a type as there w i l l have to be i f the communists are to assume power. From the a n a l y s i s thus f a r , i t would seem that the f u t u r e of Malayan p o l i t i c s could v e r y w e l l depend upon the success or f a i l u r e of the A l l i a n c e to f u l f i l the tasks of government w h i l e at the same time p l a c a t i n g the i n t e r e s t s of the d i f f e r e n t com- munities. Thus i t would be i n order to d i s c u s s those i s s u e s which might throw some l i g h t on the nature of the A l l i a n c e and i t s chances of s u r v i v a l as the foremost p o l i t i c a l p a r t y i n Malaya. S h o r t l y before Nomination Day ( f o r the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s i n 1955)? the o r i g i n a l UMNO-MCA A l l i a n c e accepted the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) i n t o i t s f o l d . This was d e c i d e d l y a mag- nanimous gesture i n view of the f a c t that the Indians, w i t h a t o t a l of 50,000 r e g i s t e r e d v o t e r s , were s p l i t i n t o d i f f e r e n t o r g a n i z a t i o n s and hence unable to act as a pressure group on any 70 s u b s t a n t i a l s c a l e . Even more magnanimous was the gesture promising the MIC two e l e c t e d seats d e s p i t e the f a c t that there was not a s i n g l e constituency where the I n d i a n community amounted to even 15 per cent of the e l e c t o r a t e . ^ 1 70 T i n k e r , I . "Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 9 (1956), p. 268. 71 Smith, T.E. Report on the F i r s t E l e c t i o n of Members to the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, K u a l a Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1955? PP« 10-11. 139 By means of the p a r t n e r s h i p i t has e s t a b l i s h e d between the Malay, Chinese and Ind i a n communities, the A l l i a n c e has been s u c c e s s f u l i n s t r i k i n g a more e f f e c t i v e note i n Malayan p o l i t i c s than any other p a r t y i n recent years. T h i s , however, does not also mean that the three communities i n v o l v e d have f u r t h e r suc- ceeded i n a t t a i n i n g a complete i d e n t i t y of i n t e r e s t s ; the UMNO, f o r example, i s not an o r g a n i z a t i o n that i s t o t a l l y v o i d of Malay n a t i o n a l i s t sentiment. With regard to t h i s , F.H.H. King observes w i t h an obvious t i n g e of cynicism, The Malay leaders of the UMNO have not renounced t h e i r b i r t h r i g h t nor denied what they consider to be the e s s e n t i a l l y Malay nature of the country. I n order to present the kampong Malay w i t h an a t t r a c t i v e a l t e r n a t i v e to the st a t u s quo, n a t i o n a l leaders must promise some- t h i n g , and l o c a l l eaders tend to promise a great d e a l more. There i s l i t t l e substance to promise, however, and p o l i t i c i a n s can be accused of p l a y i n g o f f the a n t i - Chinese sentiments of the Malays o f t e n t h i n l y d i s g u i s e d as anti-communist or a n t i - c a p i t a l i s t campaign t a l k . Thus many a country youth expects merdeka (independence) to work m i r a c l e s - rubber w i l l f low from the trees w i t h - out tapping, the es t a t e s of the " e x p l o i t i n g B r i t i s h " w i l l be expr o p r i a t e d , the Chinese w i l l be forced to leave and debts w i l l be c a n c e l l e d . When t h i s does not happen, UMNO may l o s e support.y 2 While these l o c a l a s p i r a t i o n s may have e x i s t e d (but s u r e l y to a somewhat l e s s e r degreeJ ) i n the v i l l a g e s , the educated and urbanized s e c t i o n s of the Malay community recognized the supra- communal nature of the party's outlook on the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , conscious, no doubt, of the s t r e s s e s and s t r a i n s which would ac- company progress towards independence and which would f o l l o w i t s 73 achievement. 72 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, pp. 10-11. 73 I b i d . , p. 11. 140 There was als o a t h i r d opinion-group to the i n t e r e s t s of which the UMNO has had to c a t e r , made up of the Malay Rulers and t h e i r advisors - a group beset by two f e a r s : that the new trend might r e s u l t i n the gradual a b o l i t i o n of the " s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n " of the Malays; and that t h e i r own p o s i t i o n and powers could p o s s i b l y undergo a marked change f o r the worse. However, i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note t h a t , i n view of the manner i n which the s i t u a t i o n was balanced ( i n that the A l l i a n c e had such a wide f o l l o w i n g ) , t h i s group decided to give i t s support to the Malayan p o l i t i c a l d e l e g a t i o n at the 1955 London C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Confer- 74 ence. Thus i t i s q u i t e apparent that d e s p i t e i t s i n t e r n a l d i v i s i o n s , Malay n a t i o n a l i s m has presented a f a i r l y w e l l - i n t e g r a t e d f r o n t , thanks l a r g e l y to the i n s t r u m e n t a l i t y of the UMNO and i t s membership i n the A l l i a n c e . But t h i s , however, does not completely o b l i t e r a t e the f a c t that there s t i l l e x i s t submerged d i f f e r e n c e s which need to be d e l i c a t e l y erased i f f u t u r e s o l i d a r i t y i s to be assured. I n s o f a r as the Chinese are concerned, the a t t i t u d e towards merdeka v a r i e s from "the extreme conservatism of the S t r a i t s Chinese B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n t o the t e r r o r i s m of the Malayan Com- 74a munist P a r t y . " I n a way i t may be s a i d that both these extremes r e f l e c t a s u s p i c i o n of Malay outlook towards l a r g e r concessions to the Chinese community. To those belonging to these extremes, the r e a c t i o n s and demands of the Malays which followed the Malayan Union proposals i n v a r i a b l y seem to cast a gloom over the 74 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, p. H . 74a Loc. c i t . 141 p o s s i b i l i t i e s which e x i s t f o r compromises and concessions on an inter-communal l e v e l . This a t t i t u d e , however, appears to have had l i t t l e widespread support, as evidenced by the encouraging measure of p o p u l a r i t y enjoyed by the MCA, a p a r t y w i t h a 'middle p o l i c y ' . Between them the UMNO and the MCA have, through d i r e c t contact, been able to s a t i s f y both the Malay and the Chinese communities - by c a l l i n g f o r c e r t a i n preferences and p r i v i l e g e s on behalf of the former, and by guaranteeing c o n d i t i o n s which would make l o y a l t y to Malaya a f a i r l y decent p r o p o s i t i o n to the l a t t e r . Despite the above statement, there, i s always the shortcom- in g that some of the compromises reached w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e might f a i l to s a t i s f y many of the Chinese i n Malaya. ^ This appears to have been the most outstanding factor?which l e d the MCA lead e r s to urge that the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission set up i n 1956 be made 75 up e n t i r e l y of non-Malayans - a move o b v i o u s l y aimed t o i n v a l i d a t e a l l accusations of one community " s e l l i n g out" to the other. Although the MCA i s decidedly a pa r t y of moderates, i t would c e r t a i n l y be an overstatement to say that the p a r t y has the support of a l l moderates. As observed e a r l i e r , the MCA does not have n e a r l y as much contact w i t h the people as the UMNO c e r t a i n l y 75 This independent body of non-Malayans, i t should be noted, was not one that was completely detached i n i t s outlook, since i t s d e c i s i o n s were l a r g e l y the outcome of the testimony and evidence g i v e n by the people i n the country. I n t h i s respect the A l l i a n c e made s u b s t a n t i a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s i n that the memorandum submitted by i t came to be accepted i n most i n s t a n c e s . I b i d . , p. 12. 142 seems to have. As v e r i f i c a t i o n of t h i s f a c t one might mention the o f t - n o t i c e d tendency f o r the Chinese g u i l d s , labour unions and chambers of commerce to represent views and v o i c e opinions that are d e f i n i t e l y d i f f e r e n t from those of the MCA. As an exam- pl e one may take the v a r i e d r e a c t i o n s of the Chinese community to the manner i n which the question of c i t i z e n s h i p was s e t t l e d i n the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . Outraged by the f a c t that the r e g u l a t i o n s appeared to be unduly s t r i n g e n t , a number of Chinese g u i l d s and as s o c i a t i o n s sought B r i t i s h i n t e r v e n t i o n f o r the purpose of assur- i n g greater l e n i e n c y . F o r t u n a t e l y , however, the B r i t i s h Govern- ment decided against such i n t e r v e n t i o n , knowing f u l l w e l l that any attempt to pl a c a t e more i n t e r e s t s than was a b s o l u t e l y necessary ( e s p e c i a l l y those a r i s i n g from Intra-communal d i v e r s i t i e s ) would only have served to throw the e n t i r e i s s u e "back i n t o the pot". The stand taken by the MCA over these demands was most com- mendable. I t s statement on the issue made qu i t e c l e a r the f a c t that "the g u i l d s ' p r o t e s t [was] a deplorable attempt t o d i v i d e Chinese o p i n i o n on an issu e which [could] o n l y too e a s i l y inflame 76 Malay o p i n i o n . " The MCA deserves to be congratulated here i n that i t appears to have f u l l y understood the i m p l i c a t i o n s and r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s inherent i n an a l l i a n c e w i t h the UMNO and, conse- quently, f o r r e a l i z i n g that a g i t a t i o n , w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e , f o r r a c i a l concessions, can succeed only i f one knew how f a r one should go - and went no f u r t h e r . 76 S t r a i t s Budget, Singapore, Thursday, A p r i l 18, 1957? p. 4. 143 The tasks f a c i n g the A l l i a n c e are indeed manifold and, to i t e r a t e a former observation, the manner i n which these tasks are handled could very w e l l decide the p o l i t i c a l f u t u r e of Malaya. The f a c t that the A l l i a n c e won 51 out of the 52 e l e c t e d seats i n the 1955 F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , coupled w i t h the f a c t that the p a r t y has continued to maintain i t s p o p u l a r i t y , would j u s t i f y one i n t h i n k i n g that t h i s t r i a n g u l a r union w i l l perhaps continue to run the a f f a i r s of the country f o r a con- s i d e r a b l e p e r i o d of time. I n e l a b o r a t i n g on some of the tasks r e f e r r e d to above, one may f i r s t of a l l observe that the A l l i a n c e has had to be, and w i l l have to continue being, extremely c a r e f u l i n handling those marginal Chinese who appear to have been prone to a ten- dency to equate communism w i t h n a t i o n a l i s m , despite the f a c t that the former has been thoroughly d i s c r e d i t e d i n the country. Rac- i a l harmony i s s t i l l f a r from being f u l l y achieved. The a n t i - communist measures taken by the B r i t i s h Government, and supported by the Malays, have been dangerously v u l n e r a b l e t o m i s i n t e r p r e - t a t i o n by those Chinese s u s c e p t i b l e to propaganda i n s i n u a t i n g an anti-Chinese b i a s i n Government p o l i c y . The Malays, on the other hand, are now more s t r o n g l y aware than perhaps ever before that they have to "hold t h e i r own" i n an a l l i a n c e w i t h the econ- o m i c a l l y and n u m e r i c a l l y s u p e r i o r non-Malay s e c t i o n of the p o p u l a t i o n . While they (the Malays) may tend to wonder whether or not i t would be imperative f o r them to possess that amount of p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l as would be necessary to balance the economic 144 c o n t r o l which i s i n the hands of the Chinese, the l a t t e r could v e r y w e l l f e e l that the degree of p o l i t i c a l power at t h e i r d i s p o s a l should, as f a r as p o s s i b l e , be i n p r o p o r t i o n to t h e i r economic s t r e n g t h . A problem which permeates the ver y existence of the A l l i a n c e P a r t y i s the long-term need f o r the c r e a t i o n of a common s o c i o - c u l t u r a l b a s i s which would give greater substance to Malayan n a t i o n a l i t y . By standing u n i t e d i n the demand f o r independence t h i s t r i a n g u l a r union has i n no way solved the sai d problem f o r the f u t u r e . I t has, however, proved i t s e l f to be the b e s t - a v a i l a b l e agent f o r attempting such a s o l u t i o n . Those w i t h A n g l o p h i l e tendencies had hoped that the s o c i a l h a b i t s end common language introduced by the B r i t i s h and accepted, to some degree, by the middle and upper c l a s s e s , would p o s s i b l y solve the problem by p r o v i d i n g a common base on which the d i f f e r e n t communities could e f f e c t some k i n d of s o c i a l s y n t h e s i s . There are two major f a c t o r s which would discourage any optimism i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . I n the f i r s t place the r u r a l Malays, who c o n s t i t u t e a s i z e a b l e p o r t i o n of the country's popu- l a t i o n , have not had any appreciable contact w i t h t h i s Western base. Secondly, there have been, e s p e c i a l l y since the war, no t i c e a b l e s t r e a k s of a n t i - B r i t i s h sentiment among the Chinese who have accused the C o l o n i a l Government of having p e r s i s t e n t l y adhered to a pro-Malay p o l i c y at t h e i r expense and i n c o n t r a d i c - t i o n t o t h e i r j u s t i f i e d c l a i ms. 145 Despite these problems, there i s every j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r one to have at l e a s t a c e r t a i n amount of optimism w i t h regard to the f u t u r e a b i l i t y of the A l l i a n c e P a r t y to maintain i t s e l f i n i t s present form. I n defending such optimism, one might mention four main f a c t o r s , the v a l i d i t y and s i g n i f i c a n c e of which cannot be e a s i l y denied. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , d e s p i t e the f a c t that the UMNO can e a s i l y form a government should the A l l i a n c e break up i n the near f u t u r e , i t i s almost c e r t a i n t h a t the moderate and r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y of i t s l e a d e r s h i p would pre- vent such a breach as long as i t i s p o s s i b l e t o do so. The value of Chinese support i n the f u t u r e i s beyond question and the leaders of the UMNO appear to be qui t e aware of t h i s - hence t h e i r r e a l i z a t i o n that communal p a r t n e r s h i p w i l l have to be con- s o l i d a t e d now i f i t i s to bear f r u i t s i n the f u t u r e . On the more p r a c t i c a l l e v e l , i t should be r e a l i z e d that the f i n a n c i a l backing given by the MCA f o r the b e n e f i t of the A l l i a n c e i s a f a c t o r which w i l l not be e a s i l y dismissed by many p o l i t i c i a n s , e s p e c i a l l y when there i s every i n d i c a t i o n that i t i s being given i n the i n t e r e s t s of a common g o a l . Secondly, one might consider the reasons which must nec- e s s a r i l y urge the MCA to regard as being d e s i r a b l e the perpetua- t i o n of the communal pa r t n e r s h i p which the A l l i a n c e has made p o s s i b l e , and to which i t has given considerable r e a l i t y . To begin w i t h , there i s no reason why the p a r t y (MCA) should be unduly averse to a p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e w i t h the Malays and the Indians, e s p e c i a l l y when i t s members, as i n d i c a t e d e a r l i e r , are mostly Maiayan-oriented. Along w i t h t h i s goes the f a c t t h a t , 146 due to the v a r i a t i o n s i n p o l i t i c a l o p i n i o n which i t s members have, the p a r t y l a c k s that narrow-minded m i l i t a n c y which may v e r y w e l l prove to be the main obstacle t o compromise. To mention a more p r a c t i c a l f a c t o r again, the MCA must be f u l l y cognizant of the f a c t t h a t , without e n t e r i n g i n t o a p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h the UMNO, the chances of i t s candidates being e l e c t e d at the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s (and hence the chances of i t s community being favourably represented i n the Government) would indeed be d i s c o u r a g i n g l y poor. The v a l i d i t y of t h i s assumption was more than s u f f i c i e n t l y proved at the 1955 F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , the d e t a i l s and s i g n i f i c a n c e of which w i l l be discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g chapter. With the e n t r y of the MIC i n t o i t s f o l d , the A l l i a n c e has d e f i n i t e l y grown i n s t a t u r e . With a t h i r d member added to i t s ranks, the p a r t y has indeed acquired a t r u l y n a t i o n a l s i g n i f i - cance - a s t a t u s which can o n l y be maintained by keeping the t r i a n g u l a r p a r t n e r s h i p i n t a c t . As i n the case of the MCA, the MIC p r o f i t s c o n s i d e r a b l y from i t s membership from the p o i n t of view of p o l i t i c a l r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n c e , as e a r l i e r mentioned, there i s not a s i n g l e constituency where the Indians have any- t h i n g c l o s e to a m a j o r i t y . I t appears that the l e a d e r s of the A l l i a n c e have recognized the v i t a l n e c e s s i t y f o r a n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l p a r t y to transcend communal l i m i t s . Despite t h i s , however, the p a r t y i s s t i l l beset by f a i r l y s i g n i f i c a n t communal undercurrents. I t i s 147 p o s s i b l e t h a t , i n the course of s o l v i n g the p r a c t i c a l day-to- day problems, the leaders may be able to p r o g r e s s i v e l y overcome these undercurrents. F i n a l l y , i t should be r e a l i z e d t h a t , c o n t r a r y to the experience i n bigger c o u n t r i e s , the A l l i a n c e does not s e r i o u s l y have to contend w i t h c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t i e s of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and of f a i l i n g r e g i o n a l enthusiasm (which the Congress P a r t y i n I n d i a , f o r example, i s having to f a c e ) . The contact estab- l i s h e d by the UMNO, i n p a r t i c u l a r , i s both extensive as w e l l as e f f e c t i v e . As f a r as the Chinese are concerned, despite the e f f o r t s of t h e i r g u i l d s and chambers of commerce to ease c i t i - zenship requirements and to introduce m u l t i - l i n g u a l i s m i n the country, the MCA (and hence the A l l i a n c e ) s t i l l continues to be the best o r g a n i z a t i o n to support - s i n c e , u n l i k e the o t h e r s , i t has got i t s e l f i n t o a p o s i t i o n where i t can get things done f a r more e a s i l y and f a r more e f f e c t i v e l y . The A l l i a n c e , n e v e r t h e l e s s , i s not the only p a r t y which aims to e r a d i c a t e communalism. The Labour P a r t y and the S t r a i t s Chinese B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n appear to be other examples. While the former bases i t s s o l u t i o n to the problem on the assumption that communal motives are subservient to c l a s s mo- t i v e s (thereby b e l i e v i n g , f o r example, that e f f e c t i v e trade union movements would be f u l l y non-communal), the l a t t e r seems to be attempting an extension of the i d e a l s and a s p i r a t i o n s of the A l l i a n c e . With regard to h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n ' s d e c i s i o n to j o i n the A l l i a n c e , the P r e s i d e n t of the S t r a i t s Chinese B r i t i s h 148 A s s o c i a t i o n i s reported to have s a i d that such a move would n e c e s s a r i l y have to be of a temporary nature since there was 77 no room f o r communal p o l i t i c s i n an independent Malaya.'' His suggestion was that the member p a r t i e s of the A l l i a n c e 78 fuse completely to form a United. Malayans..'. N a t i o n a l Organi- z a t i o n . I n suggesting t h i s he was undoubtedly expressing more than h i s own share of optimism s i n c e , as pointed out by the Chief M i n i s t e r , communal p a r t i e s w i l l continue to e x i s t as long as there i s communal f e e l i n g , since p a r t i e s necessar- 79 i l y represent t h e i r members. In c o n c l u s i o n i t may be observed that the thr e a t of e s s e n t i a l l y pro-Malay p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i s not completely wiped out as f a r as the A l l i a n c e i s concerned. There i s always the fe a r that the r u r a l Malays might swing over to the support of these p a r t i e s should i t be f e l t that the p o l i t i c a l manoeuver- ings of the A l l i a n c e l e a d e r s h i p e x h i b i t an unduly l i b e r a l trend i n favour of the non-Malay communities. With the hope of "cashing i n " on such a s i t u a t i o n , a Malay Congress has been or- ganized by an UMNO r e b e l , demanding, among other t h i n g s , that 80 c i t i z e n s of the Fe d e r a t i o n be r e f e r r e d to as "Malays". The 77 Kin g , The New Malayan Nation, p. 53. 78 Note "Malayans" i n s t e a d of "Malays" as i n the present "UMNO". 79 K i n g , op. c i t . , p. 53. 80 Loc. c i t . 149 Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y i s another s i m i l a r t h r e a t , since i t i s e q u a l l y i f not more capable of s t i r r i n g up a consider- able amount of emotional appeal should the r i g h t s i t u a t i o n a r i s e . Dato Onn's P a r t y Negara, on the other hand, appears to be i n a curious s i t u a t i o n : i t has not swung f a r enough i n e i t h e r d i r e c t i o n to appear dynamic i n the eyes of the e l e c t - orate - i t i s n e i t h e r v i o l e n t l y pro-Malay nor s u f f i c i e n t l y supra-communali Chapter Four The 1955 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s I n a n a l y s i n g the 1955 F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s (the o n l y e l e c - t i o n s of that nature to d a t e ) , emphasis w i l l have to be placed on what must n e c e s s a r i l y be considered the f o u r dominant aspects of the i s s u e : the d e l i m i t a t i o n of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , the r a c i a l composition of both the e l e c t o r a t e as w e l l as the c a n d i - dates, the nature of and i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the d i f f e r e n t e l e c t o r a l campaigns and, f i n a l l y , an assessment of the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s themselves. I t i s hoped t h a t , by using the above p a t t e r n as the b a s i s , the chances of one's g e t t i n g a p r o p e r l y i n t e g r a t e d understanding of the subject i n question w i l l be c o n s i d e r a b l y enhanced. I n d e c i d i n g on the nature of the Federation's i n t r o d u c - t i o n to n a t i o n a l e l e c t i o n s , the F e d e r a l E l e c t i o n s Committee ( r e f e r r e d to i n the l a s t chapter) r e j e c t e d , without any opposi- t i o n , the i d e a of communal r o l l s . T h i s i s understandable i n view of the f a c t that the Committee was dominated by IMP and A l l i a n c e members - and both groups had s u f f i c i e n t reasons to want a r e t e n t i o n of the e x i s t i n g system: the former, being an i n t e r - r a c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , r e a l i z e d that i t would undoubtedly have stood the r i s k of c r e a t i n g s e r i o u s r i f t s w i t h i n i t s own ranks should a system demanding communal r o l l s have been i n t r o - duced; the l a t t e r , having found the precedent set by m u n i c i p a l 151 d e l i m i t a t i o n s (which had no communal d i r e c t i v e s ) to i t s d e f i - n i t e advantage, saw no reason which could p o s s i b l y prompt a d e s i r e to experiment w i t h a new system. U n i v e r s a l adult s u f f r a g e , on a non-communal b a s i s , was the r e s u l t a n t agreement. The Committee's r e p o r t , however, was not t o t a l l y l a c k i n g i n any communal gesture, there having been p r o v i s i o n made f o r the r e s e r v a t i o n of three nominated seats f o r the l e s s e r m i n o r i - t i e s - Ceylonese, Eurasians and A b o r i g i n a l s - and another seven f o r the "unrepresented m i n o r i t i e s . " 1 The f a c t o r of greatest o v e r a l l importance was that everyone, i r r e s p e c t i v e of race, was to vote together. I n A p r i l 1954, a three-man Constituency D e l i n e a t i o n Com- 2 m i s s i o n was appointed, "f o r the purpose of d i v i d i n g the country i n t o c o n s t i t u e n c i e s i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the h o l d i n g of e l e c t i o n s t o the F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e Council." -^ According t o i t s terms of reference the Commission was merely asked to d i v i d e the country i n t o c o n s t i t u e n c i e s which would provide f o r the e l e c t i o n of 52 members to the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , 4 " drawn i n such a manner as to p o s s i b l y c o i n c i d e w i t h the country's a d m i n i s t r a t i v e d i s - t r i c t s w h i l e , at the same time, embracing approximately equal 1 T i n k e r , I . "Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 9 (1956), p. 265. 2 The Chairman of t h i s Commission was Lord Merthyr, wh i l e the two other members were Mr. W.C.S. Correy, C.B.E., and Mr. E.G. F a r r i n g t o n , A c t i n g Surveyor-General, Malaya. Mr. T.E. Smith was appointed S e c r e t a r y to the Commission. 3 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Report of the Constituency D e l i n e a t i o n Commission, (Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1954), p. 1.; 4 Loc. c i t . 152 p o r t i o n s of the p o p u l a t i o n . ' Although the Commission was g i v e n d i s c r e t i o n t o recommend multiple-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s " f o r 6 urban d i s t r i c t s together w i t h t h e i r contiguous areas," i t s mem- bers decided against the c r e a t i o n of such c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , s t a t i n g that a s i n g l e member [could] represent the views and a s p i r a - t i o n s of a l i m i t e d number of people i n a comparatively- small constituency more c l e a r l y and a c c u r a t e l y than can two or more members i n a correspondingly l a r g e r c o n s t i t - uency, 7 adding: The n e c e s s i t y f o r s i m p l i c i t y and u n i f o r m i t y of procedure at the s t a r t of these new democratic processes i n the F e d e r a t i o n i s a f u r t h e r argument against multiple-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . g The r e s u l t , consequently, was the c r e a t i o n of 52 single-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s . The terms of reference were s i l e n t as to whether or not the Commission should give due c o n s i d e r a t i o n t o the preponderance 9 of any one race i n p a r t i c u l a r l o c a l i t i e s . Saying that the reasons f o r t h i s were not d i f f i c u l t to understand since there d i d not e x i s t any doubt regarding the hope that the f u t u r e would b r i n g the d i f f e r e n t r a c i a l groups i n t o a s i n g l e community, the Commission d e c l a r e d : 5 Despite t h e i r e f f o r t s to adhere as c l o s e l y as p o s s i b l e to the terms of reference, the Commission succeeded i n doing t h i s i n only f o u r States and Settlements. I b i d . . p. 8. 6 Loc. c i t . 7 I b i d . , p. 9. 8 Loc. c i t . 9 I b i d . , p. 4. 153 I n pursuance of t h i s p o l i c y we have, i n d e l i n e a t i n g c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , w h o lly ignored r a c i a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ; but we have taken i n t o account community of i n t e r e s t where i t e x i s t s , f o r example i n c o a s t a l as opposed t o i n l a n d p o p u l a t i o n groups; or where i t depends upon occupation and i n d u s t r y . ^ The outcome was t h a t , of the 52 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , 50 had a Malay m a j o r i t y and 2 a Chinese m a j o r i t y , w h i l e there was not a s i n g l e one where the Indians formed as much as 15 per cent of the e l e c t o r a t e . This might v e r y w e l l have appeared alarming t o some, but the e l e c t i o n s i n 1955 proved the wisdom and forethought i m p l i c i t i n the Commission's d e c i s i o n . I n the meantime, however, c r i t i c i s m was abundant. F.G. C a r n e l l ' s a r t i c l e e n t i t l e d " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform and E l e c - t i o n s i n Malaya", published i n Volume 27 of P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , abounds i n such c r i t i c i s m . I n that a r t i c l e the w r i t e r r e f e r s to the Commission's proposals as "a r a t h e r p e d e s t r i a n and unimag- i n a t i v e document", and f u r t h e r adds: I n conformity w i t h the growing o s t r i c h - l i k e b e l i e f i n Malaya that communalism can best be scotched by r e f u s i n g to recognize i t s e x i s t e n c e , nothing at a l l was s a i d about communalism as a f a c t o r to be taken i n t o account i n the drawing of the constituency boundaries. The Commission has b l i n d l y adhered to i t s terms of reference. No attempt has been made to estimate, on the b a s i s of F e d e r a l c i t i - zenship s t a t i s t i c s the r e l a t i v e Malay, Chinese and I n d i a n strengths i n the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s that have been devised, and thus to f o r e c a s t the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n each community may expect to secure i n the L e g i s l a t u r e . Moreover, the claims of m i n o r i t i e s have been ignored. Multi-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h "fancy f r a n c h i s e s " such as "plumping" and the l i m i t e d v o t e , which might p o s s i b l y give some r e p r e s e n t a t i o n to the Ind i a n m i n o r i t y i n l a r g e urban areas 10 Report of the Constituency D e l i n e a t i o n Commission, p. 4. 154 l i k e K u a l a Lumpur and Penang have been r e j e c t e d f o r the r a t h e r naive reason that multiple-member c o n s t i t u e n c i e s have now been abandoned i n E n g l a n d . ^ I n attempting to give weight t o h i s r a t h e r scathing attack on the Commission's recommendation, the w r i t e r went on to suggest that i t (the Commission) would have done w e l l to b e n e f i t from the Ceylonese experiment i n "honest gerrymandering" (or "honest s w i n d l i n g " as sometimes c a l l e d ) , so as to ensure the representa- t i o n of m i n o r i t i e s by segregating the d i f f e r e n t races i n such a 12 manner as to l i m i t communal antagonisms. C r i t i c i s m s of t h i s nature had n e i t h e r a foundation nor s u f f i c i e n t j u s t i f i c a t i o n . Indeed, i t i s p e s s i m i s t s and alarm- i s t s l i k e Mr. C a r n e l l who, i n the l a s t a n a l y s i s , appear t o have been sadly "unimaginative". There was l i t t l e i n the way of s u b s t a n t i a l evidence which Mr. C a r n e l l could have had at h i s d i s p o s a l . Up to J u l y 27, 1955 (the date of the F e d e r a l e l e c - t i o n s ) , o n l y some 25 per cent of the r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r a t e had 13 had the o p p o r t u n i t y to vote i n a previous e l e c t i o n . Even they had not given any c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n (assuming, f o r a w h i l e , t h a t they could) as to what the v o t i n g behaviour of the country would be should the e l e c t i o n s be conducted on a non-communal b a s i s , since the A l l i a n c e (which, as pointed out i n the l a s t chapter, had won most of these e l e c t i o n s ) , during the f i r s t few years, 11 C a r n e l l , F.G., " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform and E l e c t i o n s i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 27 (1954) , p. 2 3 0 . 12 I b i d . , p. 231 . 13 Smith, T.E.. Report of the F i r s t E l e c t i o n o f Members to the L e g i s l a t i v e of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya. K u a l a Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1955j p. !• 155 had merely f o l l o w e d a p o l i c y of "honest gerrymandering" whereby Chinese candidates had been put up i n Chinese areas and Malay candidates i n Malay areas - a p o l i c y which had i n no way t e s t e d the e l e c t o r a t e ' s response to a n a t i o n a l and supra-communal pl a t f o r m . These e l e c t i o n s , furthermore, had mainly been held i n urban areas; the votes of the mass of the e l e c t o r a t e l i v i n g i n r u r a l areas had never been t e s t e d . I f Mr. C a r n e l l had any reasons at a l l f o r h i s f e a r s , they must n e c e s s a r i l y have been based on c e r t a i n assumptions which, i n h i s eye's, may have seemed l e g i t i m a t e . I n the f i r s t p l a c e , there was the p o s s i b i l i t y that the A l l i a n c e might not be a l a s t i n g union. But then i t should be r e a l i z e d t h a t , w i t h the mounting success experienced during 1952 and 1953» there must s u r e l y have been a growing l i k e l i h o o d of a more permanent union being contemplated by the UMNO and the MCA. Secondly, there was the f e a r t h a t , w i t h o n l y two c o n s t i t u e n c i e s having a Chinese m a j o r i t y , there would i n v a r i a b l y be some d i f f i c u l t y i n assigning a s u f f i c i e n t number of c o n s t i t u e n c i e s to Chinese can- d i d a t e s . Although there i s some j u s t i f i c a t i o n to t h i s f e a r , i t should a l s o be noted t h a t , i n view of UMNO's des i r e to f u r - t h e r c o n s o l i d a t e the A l l i a n c e ( a f t e r a l l , i t had "been i n the dumps" i n 1952 before i t s d e c i s i o n to form an e l e c t o r a l a l l i a n c e w i t h the MCA), there was at l e a s t some room f o r optimism regard- i n g a s o l u t i o n to t h i s problem. F i n a l l y , Mr. C a r n e l l could have been a l i t t l e s u s p i c i o u s of the f a c t that the "honest gerry- mandering" c a r r i e d on by the A l l i a n c e up t o tha t time had not i n 156 any way i n d i c a t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of non-communal v o t i n g should a p a r t y have chosen to present a non-communal p l a t f o r m . T h i s i s t r u e , and one only has to loo k at the f a i l u r e of the IMP t o prove the p o i n t . But t h i s i s not the i s s u e i n question. S u r e l y such a b e l i e f overlooks the f a c t t h a t , since a l l previous e l e c t i o n s had been f o r l o c a l c o u n c i l s , they had not s u b s t a n t i - a l l y i n d i c a t e d whether or not the e l e c t o r a t e ( o r at l e a s t that part of i t which had voted i n these e l e c t i o n s ) would react d i f - f e r e n t l y i n the face of n a t i o n a l i s s u e s - e s p e c i a l l y at a time when independence appeared to be w i t h i n reach. I n d i s c u s s i n g the composition of the e l e c t o r a t e , i t has to be observed at the very outset t h a t , of a t o t a l of j u s t over 1,280,000 persons who were u l t i m a t e l y r e g i s t e r e d as e l e c t o r s , about 84.2 per cent were Malays, 11.2 per cent Chinese, and the remaining 4.6 per cent mainly Indians. Table V I I I 14 E l e c t o r a l R o l l by Race Race Voters Per cent Malays 1,078,000 84.2 Chinese 143,000 11.2 Indians 50,000 3.9 Others 9,000 .7 T o t a l 1,280,000 100.00 14 T i n k e r , op. c i t . . p. 269. 157 There were o n l y two c o n s t i t u e n c i e s where the Malays accounted f o r l e s s than 50 per cent of the e l e c t o r a t e , w h i l e there were 37 (out of a t o t a l of 52) where they amounted to more than 75 15 per cent. One of the reasons f o r the preponderance of Malay e l e c t o r s (beside the f a c t that a good m a j o r i t y o f F e d e r a l c i t i - zens were Malays) l a y i n the f a c t that about 75 per cent of the Chinese and I n d i a n F e d e r a l c i t i z e n s were under 21 years of age 16 at that time, and hence i n e l i g i b l e to r e g i s t e r as v o t e r s . Among the Malays, male and female e l e c t o r s were f a i r l y even; among the Chinese the males outnumbered the females by about two to one; and among the Indians the former outnumbered the 17 l a t t e r by about four to one. A more d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s of the Chinese and I n d i a n sec- t i o n s of the e l e c t o r a t e brings out c e r t a i n v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t f e a t u r e s . I t has been estimated that the number of Chinese e l i g i b l e to vote amounted to 600,000, or about h a l f that commu- 18 n i t y ' s adult p o p u l a t i o n . Of these, those who r e g i s t e r e d amounted only to 143,000, roughly one i n every f o u r , the r e s u l t - ant f a c t being that only one adult Chinese i n approximately 15 Smith, op_. c i t . , p. 10. 16 I b i d . , p. 11. 17 Loc. c i t . 18 Carnell,"The Malayan E l e c t i o n s , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 28, (1955), p. 316. 158 every eight a c t u a l l y cast a vote. While l a c k of i n t e r e s t and i n s u f f i c i e n t confidence i n e l e c t i o n s may be given as p o s s i b l e reasons f o r the low rate of Chinese p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the e l e c - t i o n s , ^ there i s also considerable t r u t h i n the obs e r v a t i o n that one of the main reasons f o r t h i s was "the f e e l i n g of i n e f - 20 f e c t i v e n e s s which a m i n o r i t y group so o f t e n f e e l s . " Turning to the Indians now, one f i n d s that the e n t i r e community amounted to about 650,000 i n p o p u l a t i o n . Of these, those who r e g i s t e r e d as e l e c t o r s amounted to only about 50,000. Should the In d i a n adult p o p u l a t i o n be estimated at h a l f the t o t a l f i g u r e s , the r e s u l t would be that o n l y one Indian i n every seven cast a vote at the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . T h i s i s indeed s u r p r i s i n g when viewed i n con t r a s t to the d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y high degree of p o l i t i c a l consciousness and p a r t i c i p a t i o n d i s - played by the community i n Singapore. The net r e s u l t of t h i s badly r e s t r i c t e d number of Chinese and I n d i a n v o t e r s was t h a t , p a r t i c u l a r l y i n urban c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , the e l e c t o r a t e s were, i n e f f e c t , somewhat unrepresentative minor- i t i e s . As an example one might take the two K u a l a Lumpur con- s t i t u e n c i e s (Kuala Lumpur Barat and Kua l a Lumpur Timor) where, out of a t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of 255,000, only 22,000 people r e g i s - 21 tered as v o t e r s . Furthermore, of those who had r e g i s t e r e d , 19 The Economist. June 25, 1955, p. 1139- 20 T i n k e r , op., c i t . , p. 260. 21 Loc. c i t . 159 64 per cent were Malays - and the Malays, as a community, are h e a v i l y outnumbered by the Chinese and Indians i n Kuala Lumpur. I n passing from the r a c i a l composition of the e l e c t o r a t e to that of the candidates themselves, i t might perhaps be more e n l i g h t e n i n g to begin the a n a l y s i s by submitting to d i s c u s s i o n the manner i n which r a c i a l a l l o c a t i o n was conducted by the r e s - p e c t i v e p a r t i e s . Had there been any s p e c i f i c i n d i c a t i o n J suggesting p u r e l y communal v o t i n g , the A l l i a n c e would have had the a l t e r n a t i v e of e i t h e r running more Chinese candidates than the e l e c t o r a t e s i n the d i f f e r e n t c o n s t i t u e n c i e s would have per- m i t t e d , thereby standing the r i s k of l o s i n g seats (to Negara and the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y i n p a r t i c u l a r ) i n the i n t e r e s t s of i n t r a - p a r t y d i s c i p l i n e , or of doing e x a c t l y the reverse and p u t t i n g up 50 Malay and only two Chinese candidates, thereby s a c r i f i c i n g i n t r a - p a r t y g o o d w i l l i n the i n t e r e s t s of winning the e l e c t i o n s . But, as e a r l i e r i n d i c a t e d , there was nothing which i n d i - cated communal v o t i n g on any l a r g e s c a l e ; thus Tengku Abdul Rahman decided to give the MCA f i f t e e n nominations. This d e c i - s i o n , however, was not accompanied by a complete absence of o p p o s i t i o n from a l l UMNO q u a r t e r s . The MCA had o r i g i n a l l y been given o n l y 12 nominations but, f o l l o w i n g c e r t a i n changes that 22 were made i n the whole l i n e u p ("to stave o f f a threatened r i f t " ) 22 T i n k e r , op_. c i t . , p. 267. 160 the f i g u r e had been r a i s e d to 15. While some Malays ques- tioned t h i s d e c i s i o n on the grounds th a t there had not been any absolute n e c e s s i t y to be unduly l i b e r a l towards the MCA, the Chinese, on the other hand, c r i t i c i s e d the l e a d e r s of the MCA f o r having been too submissive. I n defending the number as being adequate, Mr. Leong Yew Koh, Secretary-General of the MCA, explained that the Chinese expected to provide t e n nominated members i n the new C o u n c i l : "the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f o r Penang and Malacca, two of the s i x r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f o r Commerce, two of the four r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s f o r Mining, one of the s i x f o r P l a n t - 23 i n g , and three of the seven 'nominated reserve'." I n view of the f a c t that t h i s would have given them 25 out of the 98 seats i n the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l (provided, of course, that a l l t h e i r candidates got e l e c t e d ) , the s i t u a t i o n seemed to i n d i c a t e a f a i r compromise i n that i t would have enabled the Chinese to get 25.5 per cent of the seats i n the C o u n c i l w h i l e they c o n s t i t u t e d about 11 per cent of the e l e c t o r a t e and about 40 per cent of the 24 country's p o p u l a t i o n . Despite t h i s , the Chinese were f a r from being f u l l y s a t - i s f i e d . The Singapore Standard appeared to be convinced that there would be s e v e r a l c o n s t i t u e n c i e s where the Chinese would vote against the A l l i a n c e c a n d i d a t e s ; 2 5 and d i s s e n s i o n went to 23 T i n k e r , op_. c i t . , p. 267. As things turned out, the Chinese a c t u a l l y received 26 seats i n the end, since they were given 2 of the 6 P l a n t i n g seats. 24 Loc. c i t . 25 Loc. c i t . 161 the point where a member of the MCA considered opposing Mr. 26 Leong Yew Koh i n Ipoh. The s i t u a t i o n worsened when, three days before Nomination Day on June 15, C o l . H.S. Lee, the man l a t e r r e f e r r e d to as the "br a i n s behind the almost f r i g h t e n i n g l y - e f f i c i e n t machine" of the A l l i a n c e , 2 7 decided t o withdraw from c o n t e s t i n g the e l e c t i o n s . H i s d e c i s i o n was se v e r e l y c r i t i c i s e d i n an e d i t o r i a l i n the Singapore Standard where i t was s a i d : "The p u b l i c would l i k e , a l l s e l f - s t y l e d leaders to have the cour- age to put t h e i r q u a l i t i e s of l e a d e r s h i p t o the p u b l i c t e s t by II 28 standing f o r e l e c t i o n s . With two e l e c t e d seats assigned to the MIC, the 52 A l l i - ance candidates were e v e n t u a l l y composed of 35 Malays, 15 Chinese, one Ind i a n and one Ceylonese (one of the MIC candidates being Ceylonese) - a d i s t r i b u t i o n which no community could s e r i - o u s l y condemn. P a r t y Negara, on the other hand, put up 30 candidates of whom 29 were Malays and one Chinese. Since the par t y d i d not contest the two c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h a Chinese major- i t y , i t s lone Chinese candidate contested the e l e c t i o n i n a constituency w i t h a Malay m a j o r i t y (Seremben), but i n f a c t was opposed by another Chinese candidate, r e p r e s e n t i n g the A l l i a n c e . The eleven candidates who represented the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y were a l l Malays. This i s understandable and needs 26 T i n k e r , "Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 9 (1956), p. 267. 27 I b i d . , p. 268,(from the S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 29, 1955. 28 Loc. c i t . , (from the Singapore Standard, June 12, 1955). 162 no e l a b o r a t i o n . A l l the candidates belonging to the N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Perak, the Perak Malay League, and the Perak Pr o g r e s s i v e P a r t y , contested seats i n Perak. There i s nothing unusual i n t h i s since the p a r t i e s i n q u e s t i o n were p r o v i n c i a l both i n o r g a n i z a t i o n and outlook. I n a l l there were 129 candidates c o n t e s t i n g the 52 seats. The f o l l o w i n g t a b l e i l l u s t r a t e s t h e i r c l a s s i f i c a t i o n by p a r t i e s and by race: Table IX C l a s s i f i c a t i o n of Candidates by P a r t i e s and by Race Malays Chinese Indians T o t a l UMNO/MCA/MIC A l l i a n c e P a r t y Negara Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y Labour P a r t y N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Perak Perak Malay League Perak P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y 35 29 11 8 3 1 16 Independent Candidates T o t a l 103 15 2 ( i n c l u d i n g 1 Ceylonese) 20 (Ceylonese) 52 30 11 4 9 3 2 18" 129 * One of the Independent candidates, f i n d i n g t h a t he had t o contest the e l e c t i o n against Tengku Abdul Rahman, withdrew from the contest. Since there d i d not e x i s t any p r o v i s i o n f o r such withdrawal, h i s name nonetheless appeared on the f i n a l l i s t of candidates. ( I b i d . , p. 271) 163 There was at l e a s t one Malay candidate c o n t e s t i n g i n a l l but three of the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , the exceptions being George Town (which had a c l e a r m a j o r i t y of Chinese v o t e r s and where a l l three candidates c o n t e s t i n g were Chinese), Ipoh- Menglembu (the other c o n s t i t u e n c y w i t h a Chinese m a j o r i t y ) where there were two Chinese candidates ( A l l i a n c e and N a t i o n a l A s s o c i - a t i o n of Perak), one Indian (Independent) and one Ceylonese (Perak P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y ) , and f i n a l l y Seremban where there was a s t r a i g h t f i g h t between two Chinese ( A l l i a n c e and Negara). The e l e c t o r a l campaign d i d not by any means appear to be l a c k i n g i n communal i s s u e s . One would be j u s t i f i e d i n suggest- i n g t h a t , i n the event of p u r e l y communal v o t i n g , P a r t y Negara would have stood a f a i r chance of beating the A l l i a n c e since there would have been the p o s s i b i l i t y that UMNO's communal appeal might very w e l l have diminished as a r e s u l t of i t s p a r t n e r s h i p w i t h the MCA and MIC. Even i f UMNO's p o p u l a r i t y had ensured success f o r a l l the Malay candidates r e p r e s e n t i n g the A l l i a n c e , the p a r t y that would have stood t o ga i n most as a r e s u l t of com- munal v o t i n g would s t i l l have been Negara: o f the 20 Malay can- didates who opposed the A l l i a n c e ' s non-Malay candidates i n co n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h a Malay m a j o r i t y , 8 belonged to P a r t y Negara, 3 to the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y , 3 to the N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Perak, 2 to the Perak Malay League and one to the Perak Prog r e s s i v e P a r t y , while 3 were Independents. I t i s f u r t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t to note that 6 of the 8 Negara candidates mentioned above were i n the p o s i t i o n of being the o n l y Malay candidates running against non-Malays. 1 6 4 Knowing these f a c t s , and perhaps assuming that v o t i n g would, i n e f f e c t , be most probably communal, P a r t y Negara l o s t no time i n launching a communally-oriented campaign. I n keeping w i t h h i s p o s i t i o n of l e a d e r s h i p i n the p a r t y , Dato Onn featured very prominently i n t h i s respect. I n a speech made over Radio Malaya on J u l y 5, he warned the Malays t h a t , i n the face of the i n c r e a s i n g b i r t h - r a t e among the Chinese and I n d i a n communities, a quota immigration system encouraging Malaysian immigration would have to be introduced i f the Malays were to avoid the f a t e of being made a r a c i a l m i n o r i t y i n t h e i r own country, and i f they were to solve the problem of having t o cope w i t h a "babel of l a n g u a g e s " T h e e d i t o r i a l i n the S t r a i t s Times the f o l l o w i n g day commented; "His approach (Dato Onn's) i s d i s t u r b i n g l y communal. I t seems to i n v o l v e some s o r t of r a c i a l a r i t h m e t i c . S t r o n g e r r e a c t i o n s came from a "Federal c i t i z e n " who, i n w r i t i n g to the S t r a i t s Times, s t a t e d : Such ideas coming from the s e c r e t a r y of a p a r t y pledged to support the n a t i o n a l and moral progress of the m i n o r i t i e s i s v e r y d i s a p p o i n t i n g to say the l e a s t . ... I f he considers Sumatrans are b e t t e r c i t i z e n s than those born here ... then I say Dato Onn i s a communalist. Once again r e l i g i o n I s con- fused w i t h n a t i o n a l i s m . 2 1 Nor was t h i s the l i m i t of Dato Onn's confusion. Despite the f a c t that Negara appeared t o be based on conservative 29 Tinker,"Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " _op. _ c l t . , p. 273. 30 Quoted i n Loc. c i t . 31 S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 20, 1955, quoted i n i b i d . , p. 277. 165 foundations,-^ 2 Dato Onn was now found making overtures t o former leaders of the banned l e f t - w i n g Malay N a t i o n a l i s t P a r t y (which had been s t r o n g l y suspect of communist i n f l u e n c e , i f not domination) i n an obvious e f f o r t t o endear h i s p a r t y t o the a s p i r a t i o n s of Malay youth - both i n the UMNO and i n the r e c e n t l y organized Malay N a t i o n a l i s t Front - many of whom 33 found great i n s p i r a t i o n i n the i d e a of "Malaya f o r the Malays". T h i s was de c i d e d l y h i s reason f o r supporting men l i k e Dr. Burhannudin; men w i t h close t i e s w i t h Indonesia. Success at the e l e c t i o n s would indeed have l e f t Dato Onn w i t h a curious s e l e c t i o n of bedfellows! With regard to the A l l i a n c e ' s proposal t o e s t a b l i s h a sta t e bank, Dato Onn claimed that the move was the product of c e r t a i n u l t e r i o r motives, i n that he i n t e r p r e t e d i t as a scheme designed to b e n e f i t the MCA Chinese. Tengku Abdul Rahman was quick to r e a c t . Claiming that "stooges" were being used t o spread f a l s e propaganda against the A l l i a n c e , to the e f f e c t t h a t he was s e l l i n g "the UMNO t o the MCA and the Malays t o the Chinese", he decl a r e d : I want t o t e l l you that no amount of money can buy the Malay race - the Malays can only be bought w i t h my l i f e . 34 32 With regard to independence, f o r example, the A l l i a n c e E l e c t i o n Manifesto sought i t s achievement w i t h i n f o u r years, w h i l e Negara considered a pe r i o d of 10 years t o be a more appropriate f i g u r e . I b i d . . p. 274. 33 C a r n e l l , "The Malayan E l e c t i o n s , " op., c i t . , p. 319. 34 Quoted i n T i n k e r , op., c i t . , p. 274. 166 I n the face of communal attacks of t h i s nature, h e i g h t - ened by the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c Party's a c c u s a t i o n t h a t the UMNO was doing a forbidden t h i n g i n co-operating w i t h non- Moslems, 35 the A l l i a n c e ' s campaign simply centred around the c a l l f o r merdeka. Over the question of c i t i z e n s h i p the p a r t y now began to modify i t s stand; having e a r l i e r promised t o a g i t a t e f o r equal c i t i z e n s h i p r i g h t s f o r a l l r a c e s , i t now began to c a l l f o r the s e t t i n g up of a n e u t r a l commission t o conduct i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i n t o the problem. A v e r y s t r i k i n g f e a t u r e of the party's Manifesto l a y i n the f a c t that the more c o n t r o v e r s i a l i s s u e s such as those p e r t a i n i n g to education and language remained i n t e n t i o n a l l y vague. Despite the somewhat alarming p o s s i b i l i t i e s i m p l i c i t i n the communal p a t t e r n followed by P a r t y Negara and the Pan- Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e e l e c t o r a l campaigns, the A l l i a n c e d i d not appear to be too perturbed. Indeed, i f the trend e x h i b i t e d by the e l e c t o r a t e i n the more recent l o c a l e l e c t i o n s had i n any way been i n d i c a t i v e of the f u t u r e behaviour of the e l e c t o r a t e i n the country as a whole, the A l l i a n c e had no cause f o r worry. As a c l e a r i n d i c a t i o n of the s a i d trend one might quote the r e s u l t s o f the Johore State e l e c t i o n s . Despite the f a c t that P a r t y Negara had put up b i t t e r o p p o s i t i o n to the end (and the e l e c t o r a t e , i t should be borne i n mind, was predominantly Malay), the A l l i a n c e had won a l l the s i x t e e n 35 Quoted i n T i n k e r , op., c i t . , p. 274. 36 Loc. c i t . 167 seats contested, gathering 64 per cent of the t o t a l number of votes while Negara had been able t o get o n l y 9.4 per c e n t . ^ 7 P a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t was the f a c t t h a t a Ceylonese c a n d i - date, c o n t e s t i n g the e l e c t i o n on an A l l i a n c e t i c k e t , had been e l e c t e d w i t h the day's greatest m a j o r i t y - 8,018 votes over h i s c l o s e s t r i v a l . Ceylonese votes had c o n s t i t u t e d o n l y an extremely small percentage of the t o t a l , and the overwhelming support given t o the candidate i n qu e s t i o n by the Malay and Chinese v o t e r s had indeed g i v e n a v a l u a b l e boost to the A l l i - ance 's morale. I t appears quite obvious that the Labour P a r t y d i d not contemplate much success at the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s , s i n c e the very l i m i t e d support received by the p a r t y and by s o c i a l i s m i n general (the reasons f o r which have already been discussed) was a f a c t w e l l known i n Malayan p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s . Motivated by doubts as t o whether a f f i l i a t i o n to the Labour P a r t y would i n f a c t be i n the i n t e r e s t s o f the s a t i s f a c t o r y development of trade unionism, the Indian-dominated l e a d e r s h i p of the Malayan Trade Union C o u n c i l decided t o give i t s support t o P a r t y Negara-. Condemning the e l e c t i o n s as being nothing more than a mere Mfarce", the Labour P a r t y put up i t s f o u r candidates mainly as a gesture against the " r e a c t i o n a r y aims" of the opposing par- ties.39 37 New Commonwealth, v o l . 28 (1954), p. 528. 38 Malay M a i l . J u l y 30, 1955? q. i n C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 28, p. 320. 39 Malay M a i l , J u l y 27, 1955, q. i n l o c . c i t . 168 F o r a p e r i o d of time during the p r e - e l e c t i o n p e r i o d there e x i s t e d some p o s s i b i l i t y of an a n t i - A l l i a n c e e l e c t o r a l f r o n t , c o n s i s t i n g of a l l the p a r t i e s w i t h the exception of the 40 Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y ; however, as i s q u i t e o f t e n the case i n such attempts, the d i f f e r e n t p a r t i e s could not come t o f u l l agreement, the r e s u l t being that of the t e n contests i n 41 Perak, only one was a s t r a i g h t f i g h t . On J u l y 27, 84,86 per cent of the r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r a t e cast t h e i r votes i n the country's f i r s t F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . I n winning 51 out of the 52 e l e c t e d s e a t s , the A l l i a n c e got a t o t a l of 818,013 votes - fo u r times the combined t o t a l of a l l i t s opponents together and t e n times that of Negara, a f a c t which c l e a r l y o verruled a l l p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t the Negara had l o s t because Malay votes had been s p l i t among the d i f f e r e n t Malay p a r t i e s . The only seat l o s t by the A l l i a n c e was i n K r i a n (Perak) where a Malay candidate ( H a j i Ahmad b i n H a j i Hussain) belonging to the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y beat the A l l i a n c e candidate ( a l s o Malay) by a mere 450 v o t e s . The number of votes declared i n v a l i d i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c o n s t i t u e n c y amounted to 1,071.42 40 T i n k e r , op_. c i t . . p. 269. 41 Loc. c i t . 42 Smith, T.E. Report on the F i r s t E l e c t i o n o f Members t o the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l of the Fe d e r a t i o n of Malaya. K u a l a Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1955, p. 69. 169 Table X I n d i c a t i n g the Support Received by the D i f f e r e n t P a r t i e s P a r t y No. of Candidates Seats won Votes P o l l e d Percentage of t o t a l votes A l l i a n c e 52 51 818,013 79.6 Negara 30 - 78,909 7.6 Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y 11 1 40,667 3.9 N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Perak 9 - 20,996 2.0 Perak Malay League 3 - 5,433 0.5 Perak P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y 2 - 1,081 0.1 Labour P a r t y 4 - 4,786 0.4 Independents 18 mm 31,642 3.0 Whether or not the outcome of the e l e c t i o n was a f f e c t e d by t h i s is. a matter p u r e l y f o r s p e c u l a t i o n . Out of a t o t a l of 77 can- didates who opposed the A l l i a n c e , 43 l o s t t h e i r deposits (having p o l l e d l e s s than one-eighth of the t o t a l number of v a l i d votes counted i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ) . The smallest margin gained by an A l l i a n c e candidate amounted to more than 3,000. Inche J o h a r i , the General S e c r e t a r y of the UMNO, had the greatest m a j o r i t y of the day - 29,646 v o t e s . 43 C a r n e l l , F.G. "The Malayan E l e c t i o n s , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 28 (1955), p. 315. According to Mr. C a r n e l l ' s t a b l e , Negara was supposed to have f i e l d e d 33 candidates, of whom 32 were Malays. T h i s i s an e r r o r . 170 There was no doubt th a t the e l e c t o r a t e had given n a t i o n - a l i s s u e s and the A l l i a n c e p l a t f o r m an unquestioned p r i o r i t y - over communal i s s u e s and i n d i v i d u a l candidates. One only has to take the e a r l i e r - d i s c u s s e d example of the 14 Malay-dominated c o n s t i t u e n c i e s (where non-Malay A l l i a n c e candidates had con- t e s t e d Malay candidates belonging to other p a r t i e s ) to prove t h i s p o i n t . Out of a t o t a l of 247,069 v a l i d votes that were cast i n these c o n s t i t u e n c i e s , 205,004 were f o r the 14 A l l i a n c e candidates and only 39,929 f o r the 20 no n - A l l i a n c e Malay candi- dates, while 2,136 went to other non-Malays; that i s , non-Malays who d i d not represent the A l l i a n c e . Perhaps no example can do more j u s t i c e to the point i n question than that of Mr. S. Chelvasingam Maclntyre, the MIC candidate r e p r e s e n t i n g the A l l i - ance, who contested the e l e c t i o n i n Batu Pahat. Of the 27,323 r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r s i n the con s t i t u e n c y , o n l y 530 were Indians and 5,679 C h i n e s e . 4 4 And y e t , of a t o t a l of 21,685 v a l i d votes that were cast I n the constituency, Mr. Maclntyre c o l l e c t e d 18,968 while h i s s o l e opponent, a Malay rep r e s e n t i n g Negara, was 45 able to get only 2,717. ' The r e s u l t s i n the other 13 c o n s t i t - uencies were not ver y d i f f e r e n t , and an examination of appendix "A" of t h i s study w i l l help i n e s t a b l i s h i n g the p o i n t . 44 T i n k e r , op., c i t . , p. 271. 45 Despite the f a c t that Mr. Maclntyre belonged to the MIC, he was, i n f a c t , a Ceylonese. This proves the point even more emphatically since the Ceylonese are even a sma l l e r m i n o r i t y than the Indians. 171 The A l l i a n c e had assumed that i t could win the e l e c t i o n s because i t had expected v o t i n g t o be non-communal. Said the el a t e d Tengku (Abdul Rahman) when the r e s u l t s were a l l knownt The r e s u l t today i s the f i r s t step towards r a c i a l harmony i n t h i s p l u r a l s o c i e t y country. ... I t i s one t h i n g I am damned proud of E a r l i e r e l e c t i o n s i n Singapore had revealed poor p a r t i c i - p a t i o n on the part of the Chinese; but the A p r i l (1955) e l e c - t i o n s there had been d i f f e r e n t i n that a l a r g e Chinese vote had 47 been recorded. Consequently, there was considerable specula- t i o n regarding the extent to which the community would 48 p a r t i c i p a t e i n the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s . As the r e s u l t s were analyzed i t was found t h a t , i n the 23 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s where the Chinese e l e c t o r a t e had accounted f o r at l e a s t 10 per cent o f the t o t a l , the percentage vote was s l i g h t l y lower than f o r the Fe d e r a t i o n as a whole: 79«92 per cent as compared to 84.86 per c e n t . 4 ^ T h i s does not n e c e s s a r i l y i n d i c a t e anything of p a r t i c - u l a r s i g n i f i c a n c e since the tendency i n the e a r l i e r l o c a l e l e c t i o n s had been f o r the r u r a l v o t e r s to p a r t i c i p a t e more h e a v i l y than urban v o t e r s - and almost a l l Chinese areas i n the Fe d e r a t i o n are urban i n n a t u r e . ^ 0 At the same time, i t i s 46 S t r a i t s Times, J u l y 29, 1955, quoted i n T i n k e r , op., c i t . , p. 280. 47 I b i d . , p. 279. 48 Loc. c i t . 172 s i g n i f i c a n t to note that the lowest percentage p o l l recorded i n the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s (52.6 per cent) was i n George Town, one of the two c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h a Chinese m a j o r i t y and a constituency where a l l three candidates c o n t e s t i n g were Chinese. I n the other c o n s t i t u e n c y w i t h a Chinese m a j o r i t y (Ipoh- Menglembu), however, the vote turnout amounted to 82.7 per cent, and here (perhaps s i g n i f i c a n t l y ) there were a l s o an In d i a n and a Ceylonese candidate i n a d d i t i o n to the two Chinese. I t i s p o s s i b l e that the r e s u l t s i n the two c o n s t i t u e n - c i e s i n question ( t h a t i s , the two w i t h a Chinese m a j o r i t y ) , r e v e a l a trend towards communal v o t i n g by the Chinese community. I t may be argued that the vote turnout i n George Town was low because, i n view of the f a c t that a l l three candidates c o n t e s t - i n g were Chinese, the e l e c t o r a t e had been c e r t a i n that a Chinese would have been e l e c t e d i n any event; conversely, the turnout i n Ipoh-Menglembu could have been hig h because since there were two non-Chinese competing as w e l l , the e l e c t o r a t e might have wanted to ensure a Chinese v i c t o r y . But there are other f a c t o r s which need t o be considered as w e l l . As explained i n the Report on the F i r s t E l e c t i o n of Members t o the L e g i s l a t i v e Coun- c i l of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya (p. 26), Penang (where George Town i s s i t u a t e d ) was "one of the few areas which experienced heavy showers on P o l l i n g Day." To t h i s may be added the f a c t that George Town i s an urban area and hence l e s s l i k e l y t o have had heavy p o l l i n g when compared to the more r u r a l d i s t r i c t s . Penang I s l a n d , one of the two c o n s t i t u e n c i e s w i t h a o n e - t h i r d 173 Chinese e l e c t o r a t e , was the o n l y other c o n s t i t u e n c y where the votes f e l l below 70 per cent. Here, both candidates c o n t e s t i n g were Malays, and hence i t may be suggested that the low percent- age was due to the f a c t that the Chinese, expecting a Malay candidate to win r e g a r d l e s s of how they voted, had not seen much po i n t i n c a s t i n g t h e i r v o t e s . While t h i s might be a p o s s i b i l i t y , i t should also be borne i n mind th a t the two f a c - t o r s which could destroy the v a l i d i t y of the assumption i n the case of George Town are also a p p l i c a b l e i n the case of Penang I s l a n d . I n any event, there i s nothing i n the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s which could c o n c l u s i v e l y prove that those Chinese who had r e g i s t e r e d as e l e c t o r s had i n any way been l e s s a c t i v e than t h e i r Malay counterparts, i f indeed they were. In almost every r e s p e c t , the e l e c t i o n r e s u l t s were more than g r a t i f y i n g ; t o those who had e a r l i e r been s c e p t i c a l , they 51 were indeed s t a r t l i n g . Expecting to f i n d 50 Malays and two Chinese e l e c t e d , they saw 35 Malays, 15 Chinese, 1 I n d i a n and 1 Ceylonese emerge as the day's v i c t o r s ; a l l but one Malay on an A l l i a n c e t i c k e t . 51 Mr. C a r n e l l i s a good example. His condemnations of the Constituency D e l i n e a t i o n Commission and h i s grave doubts r e - garding the outcome of the e l e c t i o n s have already been di s c u s s e d . I n analysing the outcome of the e l e c t i o n s , however, he says: The r e s u l t s ... have confounded some of the p o l i t i c a l prophets. ... The most s u r p r i s i n g t h i n g about the e l e c t i o n f o r the new Malayan L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l was not the triumph of the t r i p l e A l l i a n c e of the United Malays N a t i o n a l Organiz- a t i o n , the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n and the Malayan I n d i a n Congress - t h i s was g e n e r a l l y expected - but that t h i s p a r t y should have so completely a n n i h i l a t e d i t s opponents. ("The Malayan E l e c t i o n s " , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , v o l . 28 (1955)? p. 315.) 174 The reasons f o r the A l l i a n c e ' s overwhelming success are indeed manifold. I n one sentence, Mr. C a r n e l l has summed them up as f o l l o w s : The A l l i a n c e won on account of i t s s u p e r i o r party- o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t s success at m u n i c i p a l , State and Settlement e l e c t i o n s , i t s record of o p p o s i t i o n i n the o l d nominated L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l , and i t s h i g h l y emotional a n t i - c o l o n i a l slogan of merdeka.^o In analysing the f i r s t reason ( " i t s s u p e r i o r p a r t y or- g a n i z a t i o n " ) , i t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note t h a t , ever since the K u a l a Lumpur mu n i c i p a l e l e c t i o n s i n 1952, the A l l i a n c e had grad- u a l l y been b u i l d i n g up an extremely e f f i c i e n t e l e c t i o n machinery. With regard to t h i s Mr. C a r n e l l observes: I t s e f f i c i e n c y was the outcome of Chinese business acumen r a t h e r than of p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the Western sense. None of the p o v e r t y - s t r i c k e n o p p o s i t i o n p a r t i e s could compete w i t h the v o t e - c a t c h i n g machine created by the wealthy Chinese tin-magnate, C o l o n e l H.S. Lee, a behind-the-scenes o r g a n i z e r of v i c t o r y ... 53 Secondly, i t may be s t a t e d that the A l l i a n c e also owed i t s success t o i t s repeated v i c t o r i e s i n the l o c a l e l e c t i o n s between 1952 and 1955. I t had gained s u f f i c i e n t momentum to warrant some success at the F e d e r a l e l e c t i o n s ; there was "some- t h i n g l i k e a stampede to be associated w i t h the winning s i d e . " ^ 4 " 52 C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , p. 317* 53 I b i d . , pp. 317-8. 54 I b i d . , p. 318. 175 The t h i r d f a c t o r ( " i t s record of o p p o s i t i o n i n the o l d nominated L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l " ) brings out an i n t e r e s t i n g p o i n t : u n l i k e the case w i t h most members of " c o l o n i a l c o u n c i l s " , a l a r g e number of A l l i a n c e leaders who had been nominated u n o f f i - c i a l members i n the o l d ( c o l o n i a l ) council.' were now s u c c e s s f u l at the p o l l s . There has been a tendency i n other c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s (Singapore, f o r example, as evidenced by the d e c l i n e of the Prog r e s s i v e Party) f o r the e l e c t o r a t e to deny support to candidates who, having been nominated members i n c o l o n i a l coun- c i l s , had exposed themselves to c r i t i c i s m f o r being " c o l o n i a l stooges". The A l l i a n c e was s u c c e s s f u l i n overcoming t h i s tendency, and no l e s s than s i x of the ten A l l i a n c e M i n i s t e r s who were l a t e r given p o r t f o l i o s had been nominated u n o f f i c i a l members i n the o l d c o u n c i l . I n seeking to e x p l a i n t h i s , one would be j u s t i f i e d i n t u r n i n g t o the f a c t t h a t the A l l i a n c e had gained a v a l u a b l e r e p u t a t i o n f o r m i l i t a n t o p p o s i t i o n i n the o l d 55 nominated c o u n c i l , e s p e c i a l l y i n i t s c l o s i n g stages. I t had made a v e r y commendable stand i n demanding the e l e c t e d m a j o r i t y which had been granted by the B r i t i s h Government, and had f u r t h e r added to i t s dynamism by using the "walk-out" as a p o l i t i c a l 56 weapon. The f o u r t h reason f o r the A l l i a n c e ' s success C i t s h i g h l y emotional a n t i - c o l o n i a l slogan of merdeka") i s indeed, s e l f - 55 C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , p. 318. 56 Loc. c i t . 176 explanatory. Said Tengku Abdul Rahman a f t e r the e l e c t i o n s : "Our tremendous success r e s u l t e d from t h i s i s s u e of independence 57 and nothing e l s e - a b s o l u t e l y nothing e l s e . " " True, Negara had wanted independence as w e l l , but then i t had to labour under a very r e a l handicap. I t has e a r l i e r been pointed out that the p a r t y had had i t s o r i g i n s i n the Malay N a t i o n a l Conference, a movement s t a r t e d by the Mentris Besar and other members of the Malay a r i s t o c r a c y . Herein l a y the party's weakness i n t h a t , as pointed out by C a r n e l l , i t was never able to overcome the widespread s u s p i c i o n of the e l e c t o r a t e that i t was the t o o l of the Sultans and of u l t r a - c o n s e r v a t i v e B r i t i s h elements h o s t i l e to a r a p i d move towards self-government.^g Despite the f a c t that v o t i n g appears to have been i n d i c a - t i v e of a completely non-communal approach on the part of the e l e c t o r a t e , there i s one f a c t o r which should not be overlooked. On J u l y 27 the Malayan e l e c t o r a t e had been put to a t e s t - a t e s t which was t o i n d i c a t e i t s a b i l i t y (or i n a b i l i t y ) to place n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l i s sues over the more emotional demands of communalism. On the surface the r e s u l t s of the e l e c t i o n s would appear to i n d i c a t e , without any r e s e r v a t i o n s , t h a t the e l e c t o r a t e had emerged triumphant; that i t had proved i t s p o l i t i c a l matur- i t y beyond a l l question. This may be t r u e , but only w i t h a 57 S t r a i t s Times. J u l y 29, 1955, quoted i n C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , p. 318. 58 I b i d . , p. 319. 177 v i t a l l i m i t a t i o n : the triumph of the e l e c t o r a t e has, i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , o n l y been a Malay triumph; the t e s t has o n l y proved the a b i l i t y of the Malays t o surmount communal appeal. I n both the c o n s t i t u e n c i e s where the Chinese had formed a maj- o r i t y of the e l e c t o r a t e , Chinese candidates were e l e c t e d . This means that the Chinese have not e x h i b i t e d t h e i r a b i l i t y to vote non-communally. The Indians, on the other hand, had not even approached a m a j o r i t y i n any c o n s t i t u e n c y - and t h i s means that t h e i r votes have not been t e s t e d e i t h e r . Only the Malays had returned candidates not of t h e i r own race. But t h i s , however, does not prove that the Chinese and the Indians had i n f a c t voted communally. There i s every p o s s i b i l i t y t h a t , l i k e the Malays, they had voted f o r a p a r t y and not f o r a community. Both the Chinese c o n s t i t u e n c i e s had e l e c t e d candidates belonging to the A l l i a n c e - and, i n doing t h i s , the Chinese had not i n any way acted d i f f e r e n t l y from the Malays. I n George Town they had had to choose between two Chinese candidates - and they had e l e c t e d the one representing the A l l i a n c e ; i n Ipoh-Menglembu they had been faced w i t h f o u r candidates - two Chinese, one I n d i a n and one Ceylonese - and they had e l e c t e d the Chinese rep- r e s e n t i n g the A l l i a n c e . The Ceylonese had represented the Perak P r o g r e s s i v e P a r t y and the Indian had been an Independent - and there i s l i t t l e p o s s i b i l i t y that they had l o s t because they were not Chinese. Thus i t may be sai d that while the Malays have shown t h e i r a b i l i t y t o vote non-communally, the Chinese and the Indians 178 have not been given the opp o r t u n i t y to do l i k e w i s e . Even i f the sentiments of the two communities (Chinese and Indian) had been communally o r i e n t e d on p o l l i n g day, there i s a strong p o s s i b i l i t y that they w i l l not continue to be so i n the f u t u r e , since the Malays have already set the necessary example by i n d i - c a t i n g t h e i r good f a i t h to the f u l l e s t p o s s i b l e extent. The p a r t y - l i n e v o t i n g of the e l e c t o r a t e produced another v e r y s i g n i f i c a n t r e s u l t . Despite the f a c t that the c o n s t i t u t i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n , i n 1955, had not been as advanced as that of Singapore, the overwhelming success achieved by the A l l i a n c e gave Tengku Abdul Rahman a f a r greater measure of c o n t r o l over h i s c o u n c i l than Mr. David M a r s h a l l had over h i s i n Singapore. The c l e a r mandate which the Tengku r e c e i v e d , although i t came mainly from the Malays, stood i n d i r e c t c o n t r a s t to the 27 per cent p o l l of Mr. Ma r s h a l l ' s Labour Front i n S i n g a p o r e . ^ Indeed, the Federation's new C o u n c i l contained a formidable phalanx of A l l i a n c e members; Tengku Abdul Rahman d i d not have to depend on an improvised c o a l i t i o n , as had Mr. M a r s h a l l . Of the 98 members i n the new L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l (52 e l e c t e d and 46 nominated), 50 were Malays, 26 Chinese, 12 Euro- peans, 7 Indians, 2 Ceylonese and one E u r a s i a n . The nominated seats were f i l l e d by 9 Malay M e n t r i s Besar, 2 Settlement members, 5 European o f f i c i a l s , and 30 other members appointed to represent 59 C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , p. 321. 179 "Scheduled I n t e r e s t s " , namely P l a n t i n g , M i n i n g , Commerce, A g r i - 60 c u l t u r e , Trade Unions and R a c i a l M i n o r i t i e s . The Executive C o u n c i l , "a quasi-cabinet w i t h a d i v i d e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the L e g i s l a t u r e and to the High Commissioner and Malay R u l e r s " , c o n s i s t e d of 5 European o f f i c i a l s , 6 Malays, 3 Chinese and one Indian , a l l of whom had seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . ^ - The f i v e Europeans were made up of the Ch i e f S e c r e t a r y , the Attorney- General, the Secre t a r y f o r Finance, the Se c r e t a r y f o r Defense and the M i n i s t e r f o r Economic A f f a i r s ; the s i x Malays were the Chief M i n i s t e r (who also held the p o r t f o l i o of Home A f f a i r s ) , and the M i n i s t e r s of A g r i c u l t u r e , N a t u r a l Resources, Education, Works and L o c a l Government and Housing; the three p o r t f o l i o s held by Chinese were those of Transport, H e a l t h and S o c i a l Ser- v i c e s and Posts and Telecommunications; the only Indian member i n the Executive C o u n c i l , Mr. Sambanthan, was the M i n i s t e r f o r 6 2 Labour. By not r e s o r t i n g to any sort of e l e c t o r a l device to ensure m i n o r i t y r e p r e s e n t a t i o n , and by succeeding despite the s p l i n - t e red nature of i t s s o c i e t y , the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya appears to have made a unique c o n t r i b u t i o n towards the s o l v i n g of e l e c t o r a l problems i n p l u r a l s o c i e t i e s . Precedents, ranging from the 60 C a r n e l l , P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , p. 3 2 1 . 6 1 Loc. c i t . 62 Loc. c i t . 180 communal r o l l s attempted i n I n d i a to the "honest gerrymandering" of Ceylon, were ignored i n favour of a system which, by reason of i t s non-proven p o t e n t i a l i t y , was n e c e s s a r i l y both bold and imagi n a t i v e . Furthermore, by overlooking the very existence of r a c i a l d i f f e r e n c e s and c o n f l i c t s , the Malayan e l e c t o r a l system has the "merit of s i m p l i c i t y . " The A l l i a n c e P a r t y deserves some of the c r e d i t f o r having i n s p i r e d the success of the e x p e r i - ment. By r e a l i z i n g that communal co-operation was "the best way 64 to maximize t h e i r own power and the only way to achieve merdeka", and e s p e c i a l l y by succeeding i n convincing the e l e c t o r a t e of t h i s , the leaders of the A l l i a n c e appear to have been at l e a s t p a r t l y r e s p o n s i b l e f o r having made Malaya's e l e c t o r a l system a f e a s i b l e one; t h e i r success has added substance to i t . The dramatic success of the system, made q u i t e evident by the outcome of the e l e c t i o n s , has made a strong p o s s i b i l i t y out of an ageing hope, i n s o f a r as p o l i t i c a l a s p i r a t i o n s i n p l u r a l s o c i e - t i e s are concerned. By encouraging r a c i a l co-operation, t h i s new formula appears to have the c a p a b i l i t y of c o n t r i b u t i n g towards the establishment of a Malay e t a t i s m which can e r a d i c a t e the s e p a r a t i s t and o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t i n g trends of Malay, Chinese and In d i a n 65 n a t i o n a l i s m . 63 T i n k e r , "Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 9> p. 2 6 5 . 64 Loc. c i t . Chapter F i v e The 1957 C o n s t i t u t i o n F e d e r a l Government i n Malaya i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by i t s broad base; the l e g a l s t i p u l a t i o n s and s t r u c t u r a l manifesta- t i o n s i m p l i c i t i n a f e d e r a l system merely represent the shadow cast by a more complex and v i t a l set of i s s u e s . The prevalence of r e g i o n a l p e c u l i a r i t i e s deepens the i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the theory of d i v i s i o n of powers between the C e n t r a l and State governments. To begin w i t h , there i s the l a c k o f u n i f o r m i t y i n stages of economic development; Pahang and Perak, f o r example, though they l i e next to one another, present a d i r e c t c o n t r a s t i n t h i s respect - the former i s the most backward of a l l the s t a t e s i n the country while the l a t t e r i s one of the most advanced and d e f i n i t e l y the most populous. Secondly, there are d i f f e r e n c e s i n s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n s : Negri Sembilan and Malacca, f o r example, are m a t r i a r c h a l i n s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e ; due to i t s p r o x i m i t y to T h a i l a n d , Kedah e x h i b i t s s i g n i f i c a n t t r a c e s of Siamese c u l t u r a l t r a d i t i o n ; Penang and Malacca, having c o n s i d - erable numbers of S t r a i t s Chinese, stand out by themselves i n s e v e r a l ways. F i n a l l y , there are v a r i a t i o n s i n communal pro- p o r t i o n s : Trengganu and Kelantan are almost w h o l l y Malay w h i l e 1 8 2 Perak, Selangor and Penang have a Chinese m a j o r i t y . D i f f e r - ences i n communal proportions are also accompanied by c o n f l i c t s i n economic i n t e r e s t . Malay-dominated s t a t e s are l a r g e l y a g r a r i a n i n nature while those w i t h a Chinese m a j o r i t y i n v a r i - a b ly tend t o be urbanized. I n observing the f u n c t i o n i n g of f e d e r a l government i n Malaya, one i n v a r i a b l y n o t i c e s the outstanding f a c t that an i n - crease i n the degree of s t a t e s ' r i g h t s would a u t o m a t i c a l l y imply a somewhat propo r t i o n a t e increase i n the degree of Malay i n f l u e n c e i n Government, since the m a j o r i t y of c i t i z e n s i n a m a j o r i t y of s t a t e s are Malays and w i l l continue to be so f o r some time i n the f u t u r e . ^ On the other hand i t may a l s o be observed t h a t increased s t a t e s ' r i g h t s could be e q u a l l y favourable to the Chin- ese i n that i t would give them the o p p o r t u n i t y to assume a s i g - n i f i c a n t degree of l o c a l c o n t r o l before they can e q u a l i z e the p o l i t i c a l power of the Malays on a n a t i o n a l l e v e l . The Chinese already form the most numerous r a c i a l group i n Perak, Selangor, Penang and Johore (they only have a v e r y s l i g h t advantage over the Malays i n Johore) and, w i t h the new c i t i z e n s h i p r e g u l a t i o n s (which w i l l be discussed i n the f o l l o w i n g a n a l y s i s ) , i t should not be too long before they challenge the e l e c t o r a l c o n t r o l s t i l l 2 held by the Malays i n these s t a t e s . 1 K i n g , F. H. H., The New Malayan Nation, New York, I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1957? p. 13 • 2 I b i d . , p. 2 5 . 183 Thus i t becomes obvious that Federalism i n Malaya s t r i k e s i t s roots very deep i n t o the l i f e of the country; the f a c t that s o c i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic di v e r g e n c i e s are- con- s i d e r a b l y pronounced between the s t a t e s makes i t s f l a v o u r r i c h and i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s f a r - r e a c h i n g . An a n a l y s i s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of the new Malayan n a t i o n w i l l have to be preceded by a study of the Draft C o n s t i - t u t i o n drawn up by the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission set up f o r that purpose. The f o r c e s and circumstances which c o n d i t i o n e d the Commission's proposals, the note of d i s s e n t submitted by one of i t s members, Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid, and the r e a c t i o n s which followed the p u b l i c a t i o n of the d r a f t must f i r s t be anal- ysed i f the f u l l i m p l i c a t i o n s behind the f i n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n are to be adequately understood. From the p o i n t of view of the present study i t would be aimless to analyse the e n t i r e C o n s t i t u t i o n , and hence emphasis w i l l be placed on the f o u r most p e r t i n e n t i s s u e s : c i t i z e n s h i p , r e l i g i o n , n a t i o n a l language and the " s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n " of the Malays. The f i n d i n g s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission^ were l a r g e l y the product of the testimony provided by the people i n the country. Saying that many d i f f e r e n t proposals had been received i n the form of memoranda, the Commission dec l a r e d : 3 As mentioned e a r l i e r i n t h i s study, the Commission was an independent body made up e n t i r e l y of non-Malayans. I t was headed by Lord Reid and the other members were Mr. W.J. M c K e l l , Mr. B. M a l i k , Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid and S i r I v o r Jennings. 184 We have come to the c o n c l u s i o n that the best proposals f o r d e a l i n g f a i r l y w i t h the present s i t u a t i o n are those put forward by the A l l i a n c e . The p a r t i e s of the A l l i a n c e have g i v e n f u l l c o n s i d e r a t i o n to t h i s matter and apart from a few minor p o i n t s they have reached agreement. We are s a t i s f i e d that t h i s agreement i s a reasonable and proper compromise between the views of the p a r t i e s , each of which has the most widespread support from the race which i t represents, and we are f u r t h e r s a t i s f i e d that t h i s agreement i s a b e t t e r way of doing j u s t i c e between the races than any other that has been suggested or occurred to us;.4 The Commission's terms of reference f o s t e r e d c e r t a i n i n - herent c o n t r a d i c t i o n s : i t was asked to create a strong c e n t r a l government w h i l e at the same time p r o v i d i n g f o r s t a t e s ' r i g h t s - a problem complicated by the request to safeguard the p r e s t i g e of the R u l e r s ; i t was asked to draw up a c o n s t i t u t i o n based on democratic i d e a l s while at the same time maintaining the " s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n " of a s i n g l e community; i t was asked to d r a f t proposals f o r a common n a t i o n a l i t y w h i l e ensuring the Rulers that t h i s w i l l not be. i n t e r p r e t e d " i n a s t r i c t l y l e g a l s e n s e . x w Thus the Commission i n v a r i a b l y had to labour under c e r t a i n fundamental d i f f i c u l t i e s and hence whatever shortcomings there were i n i t s recommendations should not be taken as being necessar- i l y r e f l e c t i v e of d e f e c t i v e a n a l y s i s . C i t i z e n s h i p I n submitting i t s recommendations on the question of c i t i - zenship, the Commission explained that there were four main 4 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , Report of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission 19571 London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , C o l o n i a l No. 330, p. 16. 5 I b i d . , p. 6. 185 categories of persons who had to be given c o n s i d e r a t i o n : per- sons who already possessed the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s h i p ; persons born i n the F e d e r a t i o n on or a f t e r Merdeka Day; those born i n the F e d e r a t i o n before Merdeka Day and r e s i d e n t there on that day; and those r e s i d e n t i n the F e d e r a t i o n on Merdeka Day but not born there. The Commission suggested that the f i r s t category o f persons (those already possessing the r i g h t s of c i t i z e n s h i p ) should continue to be c i t i z e n s and that those already e n t i t l e d to become c i t i z e n s should continue to be so e n t i t l e d ( A r t s . 14 and 15(1) ). With regard t o the second category (those born i n the F e d e r a t i o n on or a f t e r Merdeka Day), i t was proposed that those concerned be made c i t i z e n s by o p e r a t i o n of law ( A r t . 14(1) ). I n commenting on suggestions from c e r t a i n quarters that a l l those who were born i n the country should be made c i t i z e n s r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y , the Commission's statement e x p l a i n e d : We are not s a t i s f i e d t h a t i t i s e n t i r e l y p o s s i b l e or d e s i r a b l e to provide that a l l those who were born i n Malaya, whatever be the date of t h e i r b i r t h , wherever they may be now and whatever be t h e i r present n a t i o n - a l i t y should be r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y made c i t i z e n s of the Fe d e r a t i o n by op e r a t i o n of law.^ The recommendations regarding the t h i r d category of per- sons (those born i n the Fe d e r a t i o n before Merdeka Day and r e s i - dent there on that day - A r t s . 16 and 18(1)) were that these persons should be enabled to o b t a i n c i t i z e n s h i p "without undue 6 Report of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commis- s i o n , p. 6. 186 d i f f i c u l t y " provided they showed t h e i r i n t e n t i o n of r e s i d i n g i n the F e d e r a t i o n permanently, were prepared to take an oath of a l l e g i a n c e and were w i l l i n g t o declare that they would not ex e r c i s e any r i g h t or p r i v i l e g e which they might have under 7 the n a t i o n a l i t y laws of any f o r e i g n country. The co n d i t i o n s governing the e l i g i b i l i t y of such persons were that they he over 18 years of age and of good character, t h a t they had r e - sided i n the Fe d e r a t i o n f o r at l e a s t f i v e out of the preceding seven years, and that they had an elementary knowledge of the 8 Malay language. With regard to the language requirement, the Commission agreed ( A r t . 16) that the t e s t should be waived i n favour of a l l who submitted t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n s w i t h i n one year from Merdeka Day. Regarding those who f e l l under the f o u r t h category (those r e s i d e n t i n the Fe d e r a t i o n on Merdeka Day but not born t h e r e ) , the Commission d e c l a r e d : Those to whom t h i s recommendation a p p l i e s are ver y numerous, and, i n order that a sense of common n a t i o n - a l i t y should develop, we t h i n k that i t i s important that those who have shown t h e i r l o y a l t y to the Federa- t i o n and have made i t t h e i r permanent home, should p a r t i c i p a t e i n the r i g h t s and d u t i e s of c i t i z e n s h i p . g I n s o f a r as the requirements were concerned, the on l y d i f f e r e n c e between t h i s and the l a s t category was that the pe r i o d of residence enabling one to q u a l i f y was r a i s e d to 8 out of the 7 Report of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commis- s i o n , p. 6. ( h e r e a f t e r r e f e r r e d to as C o l o n i a l No. 330. Report) 8 Loc. c i t . 18? preceding 12 years, ( a r t . 17(c) ). I t was a l s o proposed t h a t the language t e s t be waived f o r those who were over 45 years of age ( " i t might be unreasonable i n some cases to expect per- sons over 45 years of age to l e a r n Malay"), while others o n l y had t o have an elementary knowledge of that l anguage. 1 0 I t was f u r t h e r recommended ( A r t . 15(2) and (3) ) that women who were or had been married to c i t i z e n s , and c h i l d r e n of c i t i z e n s who were under 21 years of age, be e n t i t l e d t o be r e g i s t e r e d as c i t i z e n s i f they were not c i t i z e n s already. There were s i x main c o n d i t i o n s which governed a person's e l i g i b i l i t y to become a c i t i z e n by n a t u r a l i z a t i o n ( A r t . 19): he had to be at l e a s t 21 years of age; he had to be of good cha r a c t e r ; he had to have r e s i d e d i n the F e d e r a t i o n f o r at ' l e a s t 10 out of the preceding 12 years; he had to give s u f f i c - i e n t i n d i c a t i o n of an i n t e n t i o n to r e s i d e i n the F e d e r a t i o n permanently; he had to take an oath of a l l e g i a n c e and promise not to e x e r c i s e the r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s granted to him by the n a t i o n a l i t y laws of a f o r e i g n country; and, f i n a l l y , he had to have an "adequate" knowledge of the Malay language (as opposed to the "elementary" knowledge required of persons i n the t h i r d and f o u r t h c a t e g o r i e s mentioned above). S t a t e R e l i g i o n The memorandum submitted by the A l l i a n c e to the Commission had taken a d e f i n i t e stand on the matter of State r e l i g i o n . I t 10 C o l o n i a l No. 330, Report. p. 18. 1 8 8 had s t a t e d : The r e l i g i o n of M a l a y s i a s h a l l be Islam. The observ- ance of t h i s p r i n c i p l e s h a l l not impose any d i s a b i l i t y on non-Muslim n a t i o n a l s p r o f e s s i n g and p r a c t i c i n g t h e i r own r e l i g i o n s and s h a l l not imply that the state i s not a s e c u l a r state.-Q Despite t h i s recommendation, the Commission decided not to make any l e g i s l a t i o n on the matter i n question, p o i n t i n g out that the Counsel f o r the Rulers had himself made a request to that e f f e c t when he s t a t e d : I t i s T h e i r Highnesses 1 considered view that i t would not be d e s i r a b l e to i n s e r t some d e c l a r a t i o n such as has been suggested that the Muslim F a i t h or I s l a m i c F a i t h be the e s t a b l i s h e d r e l i g i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n . Their Highnesses are not i n favour of such a d e c l a r a - t i o n being i n s e r t e d . . . 1 2 The reasons behind T h e i r Highnesses" a t t i t u d e on t h i s matter are obvious. As explained l a t e r by the Keeper of the R u l e r s ' S e a l , Tuan H a j i Mustapha JLLbakri, the Rulers were of the o p i n i o n that the establishment of Islam as the State r e l i g i o n would i n v a r i a - b l y have "tended to p r e j u d i c e " t h e i r own p o s i t i o n as Head of 13 the F a i t h i n the r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s . Such a move would f u r t h e r have c o n s t i t u t e d an encroachment upon the r i g h t s of the State s and t h e i r Governments to c o n t r o l matters p e r t a i n i n g to the Mus- 14 l i m f a i t h w i t h i n each S t a t e . The Rulers could also have been apprehensive of the f a c t that the establishment of a State r e l i - g ion would encourage the s e t t i n g up of a M i n i s t r y of R e l i g i o u s 11 C o l o n i a l No. 33 > Report, p. 7 3 . 12 Loc. c i t . 13 S t r a i t s Budget, Singapore, February 2 8 , 1 9 5 7 » p. 1 5 - 14 Loc. c i t . 189 A f f a i r s - a move which would have undoubtedly v i o l a t e d t h e i r s u p e r i o r p o s i t i o n w i t h regard to r e l i g i o u s matters i n t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i e s . 1 ^ As w i l l be seen l a t e r , the Commission's d e c i s i o n not t o adhere to the recommendations of the A l l i a n c e on t h i s matter proved to be one of the most disputed i s s u e s f o l l o w i n g the p u b l i c a t i o n of the Draft C o n s t i t u t i o n i n February 1957. Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid disagreed w i t h the m a j o r i t y view on the subject, and h i s reasons w i l l be discussed while analysing h i s Note of Dis s e n t . N a t i o n a l Language The Commission recommended ( A r t . 140) that Malay be e s t a b l i s h e d as the n a t i o n a l language, but maintained that E n g l i s h should continue being used as an o f f i c i a l language f o r at l e a s t a p e r i o d of 10 years a f t e r Merdeka Day, since i t was qui t e apparent that a very s u b s t a n t i a l p o r t i o n of the non-Malay 16 p o p u l a t i o n was not f l u e n t i n the Malay language. I t was a l s o proposed t h a t , at the end of the 10 years, Parliament should decide on when any change w i t h regard to t h i s matter should be brought i n t o e f f e c t . The Commission then went on to make what l a t e r proved to be a most h o t l y contested p r o p o s a l . Saying; We have been impressed by rep r e s e n t a t i o n s that the law may prevent the e l e c t i o n to the l e g i s l a t u r e s of persons whom the e l e c t o r s may d e s i r e to e l e c t , ]_y 15 S t r a i t s Budget, p. 15. 16 C o l o n i a l No. 330, Report, p. 73. 17 I b i d . , p. 74. 190 18 i t went on to make two recommendations: (a) that there should not e x i s t any language q u a l i f i - c a t i o n f o r candidates wishing t o contest e l e c t i o n s ; and (b) that f o r a p e r i o d of 10 years there should be a l i m i t e d r i g h t f o r members of a l e g i s l a t u r e to speak i n a Chinese or I n d i a n language. E x p l a i n i n g that they d i d not recommend the i n s t i t u t i o n of a system of i n t e r p r e t e r s ( " i t would be cumbrous and expensive and might be d i f f i c u l t to o p e r a t e " ) , the Commission made i t q u i t e c l e a r that speeches i n Chinese or Indian languages should be e x c e p t i o n a l , and that these languages should not be used i n o r d i n a r y debate."^ S p e c i a l P o s i t i o n of the Malays The Commission's terms of reference had s t a t e d that p r o v i s i o n should be made i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n f o r the "safeguard- ing of the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays and the l e g i t i m a t e 20 i n t e r e s t s of the other communities." I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , p r o v i s i o n had t o be made enabling the c r e a t i o n of a common n a t i o n a l i t y f o r the whole of the F e d e r a t i o n and ensuring a demo- c r a t i c form of government. E x p l a i n i n g t h a t , i n c o n s i d e r i n g the above requirements, i t had seemed that a common n a t i o n a l i t y was the b a s i s upon which a u n i f i e d Malayan n a t i o n was to be created and that under a democratic form of government i t was inherent that a l l the c i t i z e n s of the F e d e r a t i o n , regardless 18 C o l o n i a l Noi 330, Report, p. 73- 19 Loc. c i t . 20 I b i d . , p. 70. 191 o f race, creed or c u l t u r e , should have the b e n e f i t s of c e r t a i n 21 fundamental r i g h t s i n c l u d i n g f u l l e q u a l i t y before the law, the Commission gave expression to a problem which had permeated Malayan p o l i t i e s f o r a considerable p e r i o d of time by observing: We found i t d i f f i c u l t , t h e r e f o r e , to r e c o n c i l e the terms of reference i f the p r o t e c t i o n of the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays s i g n i f i e d the granting of s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s , permanently, to one community and not to others.22 The A l l i a n c e had been f u l l y cognizant of t h i s problem when, l e d by Tengku Abdul Rahman, i t s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s had submitted: . . . i n an independent Malaya a l l n a t i o n a l s should be ac- corded equal r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s and o p p o r t u n i t i e s and there must not be d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on the grounds of race and creed ... 23 T h e i r Highnesses had been i n agreement w i t h t h i s broad p r i n c i p l e , and t h e i r memorandum had s a i d that they looked forward to a time w i t h i n the reasonable f u t u r e when i t would become p o s s i b l e to f r e e the economic and p o l i t i c a l l i f e of the country from the 24 f o r c e s of communalism. There were f o u r main matters w i t h regard to which the spec- 25 i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays had to be recognized and safeguarded: land r e s e r v a t i o n s ; quotas f o r admission to the p u b l i c s e r v i c e ; quotas i n respect to the i s s u i n g of permits or l i c e n c e s f o r oper- a t i n g business; and preferences i n connection w i t h s c h o l a r s h i p s , b u r s a r i e s and other forms of a i d f o r e d u c a t i o n a l purposes. The Commission found l i t t l e o p p o s i t i o n i n any quarter to the 21 C o l o n i a l Wo. 330, Report. pp. 70-71. 22 I b i d . , p. 71. 23 Loc. c i t . 24 Loc. c i t . 25 I b i d . , pp. 71-72. 192 continuance of the e x i s t i n g system f o r a c e r t a i n l e n g t h of time, but met w i t h v e r y strong o p p o s i t i o n i n c e r t a i n quarters to any increase i n preferences or prolonged c o n t i n u a t i o n of the p r e f e r - 26 ences given to the Malays. Having assessed a l l the arguments presented w i t h regard to the question, Commissioners found i t necessary t o continue the e x i s t i n g preferences i n c e r t a i n cases, e x p l a i n i n g : The Malays would be at a serious and u n f a i r disadvantage compared w i t h the other communities i f (the preferences) were suddenly withdraw.27 They were confident t h a t , w i t h the i n t e g r a t i o n of the v a r i o u s communities i n t o a common n a t i o n a l i t y , the n e c e s s i t y f o r the main- tenance of the s a i d preferences would a u t o m a t i c a l l y disappear. Thus t h e i r recommendations were made on the b e l i e f that the Malays should be assured that the e x i s t i n g c o n d i t i o n s would continue f o r q u i t e some time i n t o the f u t u r e , but that the u l t i m a t e goal would be the gradual r e d u c t i o n of these preferences, culminating i n 28 t h e i r complete withdrawal. I n c o n s i d e r i n g land r e s e r v a t i o n s , the Commission recommended ( A r t . 82) that there should not be any extension of Malay r e s e r - v a t i o n s and tha t each State should be l e f t to cause reductions i n 29 such r e s e r v a t i o n s "at an appropriate time." 7 There were two con- d i t i o n s which governed the »commendation not to extend Malay r e s e r v a t i o n s : 26 C o l o n i a l No. 330, Report, p. 72. 27 Loc. c i t . 28 Loc. c i t . 29 Loc. c i t . 30 Loc. c i t . 193 (a) i f a reserved area ceased to "be so reserved, an equivalent area could be made a v a i l a b l e f o r r e s e r - v a t i o n , provided i t was not occupied by a non-Malay; and (b) had an undeveloped area been opened up, part of i t could be converted i n t o a Malay r e s e r v a t i o n , provided that an equivalent area was made a v a i l a b l e f o r use by non-Malays. Concerning the e n t i r e i s s u e r e l a t i n g to the s p e c i a l p o s i - t i o n of the Malays, the Commission recommended that the whole matter be reviewed a f t e r 1 5 years and that the procedure should be that the appropriate Government should be re s p o n s i b l e f o r presenting a report on the whole matter to the appropriate l e g i s l a t u r e ; f o l l o w i n g t h i s the l e g i s l a t u r e was to determine whether to r e t a i n , reduce or e n t i r e l y d i s c o n t i n u e any quota 3 1 which might then have been i n e x i s t e n c e . Both the procedure and the p l a c i n g of a time l i m i t on the issue of " s p e c i a l r i g h t s " by the Commission were i n co n t r a - d i c t i o n to the recommendations made on the matter by the A l l i a n c e P a r t y . I n i t s memorandum, the A l l i a n c e had s t a t e d : The C o n s t i t u t i o n should ... provide t h a t the Yang d i - Pertuan Besar ( 3 2 ) should have the s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i - b i l i t y of safeguarding the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Maiays. 3 1 C o l o n i a l No. 3 3 0 , Report. p. 7 2 . 3 2 The Yang di- P e r t u a n Besar was the Chief of S t a t e , t o be el e c t e d by the Conference of Rulers f o r a p e r i o d of f i v e years, and e x e r c i s i n g the powers of a c o n s t i t u t i o n a l monarch. I n the f i n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n he i s r e f e r r e d to as the Yang di- P e r t u a n Agong, to avoid confusion w i t h the Ruler of Negri Sembilan who i s known by the former t i t l e . 3 3 C o l o n i a l No. 3 3 0 , Report. p. 7 2 . 194 The Commission ( w i t h the exception of Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid who dissented) chose to i n t e r p r e t the r o l e of the Yang d i - P e r t u a n Besar over t h i s matter as p a r t of h i s d u t i e s as the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l R u l e r , which meant that he had to act on the advice of the Cabinet - hence the d e c i s i o n to leave the matter i n the hands of the Gov- 34 ernment of the day. Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid, Pakistan's r e p r e s e n t a t i v e on the Commission, was at variance w i t h the other members of the Commis- s i o n i n h i s views on c i t i z e n s h i p , State r e l i g i o n and the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays. On a l l three matters he expressed agree- ment w i t h the suggestions made by the A l l i a n c e , w i t h reference to which he says: We are a l l aware how s o l u t i o n s of those c o n t r o v e r s i a l problems were found by that P a r t y a f t e r long and pro- t r a c t e d d e l i b e r a t i o n s and d i s c u s s i o n s . I t was i n the l i g h t of these c o n s i d e r a t i o n s that I found i t d i f f i c u l t to accept such d e c i s i o n s of the Commission on those c o n t r o v e r s i a l matters as are not i n accofd w i t h the s o l u t i o n s produced by the A l l i a n c e . ^ With t h i s i n mind, the substance behind Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid's Note of Dissent should now be subjected to a n a l y s i s . C i t i z e n s h i p With regard to c i t i z e n s h i p there was o n l y one p o i n t over which Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid disagreed w i t h the other members of the Commission. A r t . 1 5 ( 1 ) of the Draft C o n s t i t u t i o n had provided 34 C o l o n i a l No. 330, Report, p. 73* 35 I b i d . , p. 95. 195 that a l l those who were already e n t i t l e d to become c i t i z e n s before Merdeka Day should continue to be so e n t i t l e d a f t e r that day. According to A r t i c l e 126 of the F e d e r a t i o n Agreement, 1948, c i t i z e n s of the United Kingdom and Colonies born i n the F e d e r a t i o n were as of r i g h t e n t i t l e d to be r e g i s t e r e d as c i t i - zens of the F e d e r a t i o n i f they had r e s i d e d t h e r e i n f o r 5 years o r , i f they had not so r e s i d e d , were c e r t i f i e d to have main- t a i n e d s u b s t a n t i a l connection w i t h the country. This meant that A r t i c l e 15(1) of the Draft C o n s t i t u t i o n enabled these per- sons to continue to be r e t r o s p e c t i v e l y made e l i g i b l e f o r c i t i z e n - ship as of r i g h t by reason of b i r t h i n and connection w i t h the F e d e r a t i o n . Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid was of the o p i n i o n that they should not continue to be so e n t i t l e d , i n view of the f a c t t h a t others who f e l l under the same category but were not c i t i z e n s of the United Kingdom and C o l o n i e s had to s a t i s f y a d d i t i o n a l r e - quirements, namely, those of c h a r a c t e r , residence and language. State R e l i g i o n As mentioned e a r l i e r , the A l l i a n c e had recommended that Islam be e s t a b l i s h e d as the State r e l i g i o n ; Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid maintained that t h i s should be upheld i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n . Say- ing that the A l l i a n c e had been unanimous i n making i t s recommen- d a t i o n , he proposed the i n s e r t i o n of the f o l l o w i n g p r o v i s i o n i n the D r a f t : Islam s h a l l be the r e l i g i o n of the State of Malaya but nothing i n t h i s a r t i c l e s h a l l prevent any c i t i z e n p r o f e s s i n g any r e l i g i o n other than Islam to p r o f e s s , 36 C o l o n i a l Wo. 330, Report, pp. 95-96. 196 p r a c t i c e and propagate that r e l i g i o n , nor s h a l l any c i t i z e n be under any d i s a b i l i t y by reason of h i s being not a Muslim.37 This p r o v i s i o n , according to Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid, was "innocu- •50 ous"; there were no l e s s than 15 other c o u n t r i e s which had 39 a s i m i l a r p r o v i s i o n entrenched i n t h e i r c o n s t i t u t i o n s . " I n f a c t , " he adds, i n a l l the C o n s t i t u t i o n s of the Malay States a p r o v i s i o n of t h i s type already e x i s t s . A l l that i s required to be done i s t o t r a n s p l a n t i t from the State c o n s t i t u t i o n s and t o embed i t i n the F e d e r a l . 4 Q S p e c i a l P o s i t i o n of the Malays With regard to the safeguarding of the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays, Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid once again upheld the recommen- dations made by the A l l i a n c e on the su b j e c t , urging that the matter be l e f t as a s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Yang d i - P e r t u a n Besar and the Ruler or Governor of the State as the case may be, and not that of the Parliament and the L e g i s l a t u r e of the State as set out i n A r t i c l e 157 of the Draft C o n s t i t u t i o n . Mr. J u s t i c e Hamid's i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the A l l i a n c e ' s proposal on thamatter 37 C o l o n i a l No. 330, Report. p. 99. 38 Loc. c i t . 39 Among the C h r i s t i a n c o u n t r i e s there were I r e l a n d ( A r t . 6), Norway ( A r t . 1), Denmark ( A r t . 3), Spain ( A r t . 6), Argentine ( A r t . 2), B o l i v i a ( A r t . 3), Panama ( A r t . 36) and Paraguay ( A r t . 36); and among the Muslim c o u n t r i e s there were Afghanistan ( A r t . 1), I r a n ( A r t . 1), I r a q ( A r t . 13), Jordan ( A r t . 2), Saudi A r a b i a ( A r t . 1), and S y r i a ( A r t . 3). The C o n s t i t u t i o n of Thailand ( A r t . 7) was s i m i l a r i n th a t i t r equired the King to uphold Buddhism. Loc. c i t . 197 was l a t e r acknowledged as being c o r r e c t by a spokesman of t h a t 41 P a r t y . (Appendix "B" - s e c t i o n 1 of t h i s study sets out A r t i c l e 157 of the Draft C o n s t i t u t i o n and the amendments pro- posed to i t by Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid.) The Malayan p u b l i c r e c e i v e d the Draft C o n s t i t u t i o n w i t h mixed f e e l i n g s . Said the S t r a i t s Times of February 21, 1957s I t i s not an i d e a l s o l u t i o n that the f i v e wise men of the Commission have devised, i n the sense that i t does not promise a l l t h i n g s to a l l the i n t e r e s t s a f f e c t e d . But the p e r f e c t i o n i s t approach was r u l e d out by a host of f a c t o r s ; by the problems inherent i n a p l u r a l s o c i e t y , by the r e s i s t a n c e of the past to the claims of the present, by the existence of uneven economic c o n d i t i o n s , by the forced pace of p o l i t i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n , and by the v e r y nature of the task the Commission was s e t , 42 adding l a t e r , I t i s the recommendations on c i t i z e n s h i p , s p e c i a l Malay r i g h t s and on the question of State r e l i g i o n t hat w i l l command wide a t t e n t i o n The r e a c t i o n s which fo l l o w e d proved t h i s p r e d i c t i o n c o r r e c t to the l e t t e r . Chinese and Indian l e a d e r s were g e n e r a l l y e n t h u s i a s t i c i n t h e i r f i r s t r e a c t i o n to the D r a f t C o n s t i t u t i o n . Comments ranged from the Penang S t r a i t s Chinese B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n ' s " t h i s i s what we had prayed f o r " to the "reasonable document" of Dato S i r Cheng-lock Tan and "a broad-minded document" of 41 S t r a i t s Budget. Singapore, February 28, 1957? p. 16. 42 I b i d . , p. 2. 43 I b i d . , p. 3- 44 I b i d . , p. 16. 198 Mr. D. S. Ramanthan, the chairman of the Labour P a r t y of 44 Malaya. The China-born Chinese welcomed the proposal which gave members of the l e g i s l a t u r e s unable to speak f l u e n t l y i n E n g l i s h a l i m i t e d r i g h t to speak i n t h e i r own mother tongues 45 f o r a per i o d of 10 years a f t e r Merdeka Day. At a meeting held on February 26, the working committee of the Malayan I n d i a n Congress accepted " i n p r i n c i p l e " , the Report presented by the 46 C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission. The Malays, on the other hand, found themselves unable to accept some of the p r o v i s i o n s contained i n the D r a f t C o n s t i - t u t i o n . The United Malays' N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n (UMNO), f o r example, was thoroughly d i s s a t i s f i e d w i t h those s e c t i o n s con- cerning Islam and the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays. S a i d Tengku Abdul Rahman: "The report has overlooked p r o v i s i o n s f o r 47 the Malays, but the A l l i a n c e Government has not." Regarding the l i b e r a l p r o v i s i o n s which governed c i t i z e n s h i p , Dato Onn expressed great concern over the f u t u r e v o t i n g s t r e n g t h of the 48 Malay community. He supported Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid's recommendation that Islam be e s t a b l i s h e d as the State r e l i g i o n ; he was f u r t h e r apprehensive of the p o s s i b i l i t y that the s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s enjoyed by the Malays might be evoked at the end of 44 S t r a i t s Budget, p. 16. 45 Loc. c i t . 46 I b i d . . March 7, 1957, p. 9. 47 I b i d . . March 21, 1957, p. 14. 48 I b i d . , March 7, 1957, p. 13. 199 15 years, being p a r t i c u l a r l y worried about the f a t e of land r e s e r v a t i o n s , since he was of the o p i n i o n that the Malays would g r a d u a l l y f i n d themselves pushed out of the b e t t e r areas. 4 9 The Secretary-General of the Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c A s s o c i a t i o n was s i m i l a r l y i n c l i n e d , and l e t i t be known t h a t , i n h i s view, 50 the Malays had been badly l e t down by the Commission.^ A f t e r second thoughts on the subject, the Rulers gave t h e i r agreement to the A l l i a n c e ' s proposal t h a t Islam be estab- l i s h e d as the State r e l i g i o n , on the c o n d i t i o n that such a move would not p r e j u d i c e t h e i r p o s i t i o n as Head of the Muslim F a i t h i n the r e s p e c t i v e s t a t e s . Together w i t h the A l l i a n c e , they agreed that the Fe d e r a t i o n should continue to be a se c u l a r s t a t and that the r i g h t s of the non-Muslims should not be made t o 51 s u f f e r any d i s a b i l i t i e s on account of r e l i g i o n . With regard to t h e i r sovereign r i g h t s over land matters, however, the Ruler stood t h e i r ground. The l i m i t of t h e i r compromise was agree- ment to a uniform land p o l i c y ; they agreed t o t h i s only on c o n d i t i o n that they had the l a s t say i n matters p e r t a i n i n g to 52 t h e i r own t e r r i t o r i e s . The question of dual c i t i z e n s h i p was another i s s u e which the Malays (the UMNO i n p a r t i c u l a r ) showed every i n t e n t i o n of opposing. According to the Draf t C o n s t i t u t i o n , those born i n 49 S t r a i t s Budget, March 7, 1957, p. 13- 50 I b i d . , February 28, 1957, p. 16. 51 I b i d . , March 14, 1957, p. 4. 52 I b i d . , A p r i l 11, 1957, p. 17. 200 Penang or Malacca were t o be given the opportunity t o enjoy the r i g h t s of Malayan c i t i z e n s h i p while c o n t i n u i n g to remain c i t i z e n s of the United Kingdom. The A l l i a n c e took the view that there should o n l y be a s i n g l e n a t i o n a l i t y , and that sub- j e c t s of the United Kingdom and Colonies should be given the a l t e r n a t i v e of e i t h e r maintaining t h e i r former st a t u s or of g i v i n g i t up i n favour of Malayan c i t i z e n s h i p . I n t h i s the P a r t y was supported by the Rulers. 5-^ Saying that there was '•no question of compromise on t h i s i s s u e " , Tengku Abdul Rahman explained h i s a t t i t u d e by s a y i n g : " i f B r i t a i n cedes Penang and Malacca to the F e d e r a t i o n , a l l r i g h t s must go w i t h t h i s ces- s i o n . " 5 4 Being r a t h e r proud of t h e i r B r i t i s h n a t i o n a l i t y , the S t r a i t s Chinese found the A l l i a n c e ' s a t t i t u d e on the matter of dual c i t i z e n s h i p most d i s t u r b i n g . The S t r a i t s Chinese B r i t i s h A s s o c i a t i o n , f o r example, demanded that t i e s be maintained w i t h Great B r i t a i n , going to the extent of suggesting that considera- t i o n be given to the Settlements' r i g h t t o secede from the F e d e r a t i o n . 5 5 There i s l i t t l e doubt to the f a c t that the S t r a i t s Chinese were apprehensive of the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays. I t i s p o s s i b l e that the a c t u a l f a c t o r underlying t h e i r a t t i t u d e was one of l o c a l Chinese confidence i n the Feder- a t i o n . 5 ^ I t i s obvious t h a t , by maintaining c e r t a i n t i e s w i t h 53 S t r a i t s Budget, March 14, 1957, p. 15 54 I b i d . , A p r i l 11, 1957, p. 11. 55 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, p. 13. 56 I b i d . , p. 14. 201 B r i t a i n , they sought the p r e s e r v a t i o n of something they could always f a l l back on. Most of the arguments put forward by the UMNO w i t h regard to the v a r i o u s i s s u e s i n q u e s t i o n were f a i r l y reasonable, and d i d not c a l l f o r any r a d i c a l change i n the r a c i a l balance. However, the A s s o c i a t i o n might have gone a b i t too f a r when i t proposed t h a t the s p e c i a l r i g h t s enjoyed by the Malays i n the nine s t a t e s be extended to the Settlements of Penang and Mal- acca when they assumed s t a t e status under the new c o n s t i t u t i o n . I f one i s to c r i t i c i s e t h i s p r o p o s a l , one should not do so on any moral i s s u e ; i t i s the p r a c t i c a l consequences which deserve the greatest a t t e n t i o n . Post-war c o n s t i t u t i o n a l developments had i n no way v i o l a t e d the concept of a non-communal s t a t e i n these t e r r i t o r i e s , and t h i s had not been found to be d e t r i m e n t a l t o any community i n p a r t i c u l a r . The non-Malay races i n these t e r r i t o r i e s are bound to have viewed a p r o v i s i o n to the e f f e c t proposed w i t h intense m i s g i v i n g s , and the object of t h e i r a n i - mosity would undoubtedly have been the Malay community. The proposal was soundly c r i t i c i s e d i n the e d i t o r i a l of the S t r a i t s Times. A p r i l 8, where i t was s a i d : The proposal i s c e r t a i n t o cause d i s q u i e t . I n the Settlements the foundation of a l l p o l i t i c a l and c o n s t i t u t i o n a l development has been the b e l i e f that a l l c i t i z e n s are equal and that d i f f e r e n c e s i n race or r e l i g i o n confer no b e n e f i t s and impose no d i s - a b i l i t i e s . 57 Saying that the Settlements were proud of the f a c t that a non- communal outlook had been preserved i n t h e i r t e r r i t o r i e s and 57 S t r a i t s Budget. A p r i l 11, 1957? p. 4. 202 that there had been no quotas placed on c i v i l s e r v i c e appoint- ments ("the i d e a of r a c i a l quotas i s repugnant"), the e d i t o r i a l went on to suggest that the UMNO's proposal was i n d i r e c t con- t r a d i c t i o n to the e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n i n the two areas. I n con c l u s i o n i t s t a t e d : I t i s not d i f f i c u l t t o j u s t i f y s p e c i a l Malay r i g h t s i n the Malay S t a t e s . They have been enjoyed i n the past and the time i s not opportune f o r change. But i t i s a retrograde step to destroy e q u a l i t y where e q u a l i t y has always e x i s t e d . At the meeting of the 15-man A l l i a n c e p o l i t i c a l committee (held on A p r i l 2 ) , the UMNO presented i t s proposal f o r the consid- e r a t i o n of i t s two partners i n the A l l i a n c e - the Malayan Chin- ese A s s o c i a t i o n and the Malayan I n d i a n Congress. The two l a t t e r p a r t i e s were i n agreement th a t there should be settlements f o r the Malays i n the two t e r r i t o r i e s i n question, but submitted that there should n e i t h e r be Malay r e s e r v a t i o n s nor any quotas i n favour of that community.^ Due t o the f a c t that the main p o i n t s of contention arose from the Malay community's e f f o r t s t o improve i t s status under the new C o n s t i t u t i o n , i t i s p o s s i b l e that the r e a c t i o n s which followed the p u b l i c a t i o n o f the Dra f t C o n s t i t u t i o n could e a s i l y have i n v o l v e d a major r a c i a l s p l i t between the Malays and the non-Malays i n the f i r s t p l a c e , and a minor one between the 58 S t r a i t s Budget. A p r i l 11, 1957, p. 4. 59 I b i d . , p. 9 . 203 moderates and extremists w i t h i n the l a t t e r i n the second. Statesmanship and p o l i t i c a l m a t u r i t y combined to prevent the fi r s t - m e n t i o n e d c r i s i s ; the l a t t e r was not of s u f f i c i e n t mag- nitude to generate a n a t i o n a l upheaval. Tengku Abdul Rahman, f o r one, recognized the dangers of haste and p a n i c . Addressing the annual meeting of the Malayan A s s o c i a t i o n of Youth Clubs, he warned that there were people who aimed to cause t r o u b l e , upheaval and bad f e e l i n g among the v a r i o u s races i n the country.... The harm that they can cause can be ve r y s e r i o u s , and t h e r e f o r e t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s must be checked.£Q L a t e r , i n speaking to the UMNO General Assembly, he emphasised the f a c t t h a t , while there was a need t o preserve the r i g h t s of the Malays, those of the non-Malay communities should never 61 be made to s u f f e r i n an independent Malaya. To those Malays who wanted a l l r i g h t s f o r t h e i r community, the Tengku s a i d that the h i s t o r y and r a c i a l make-up of Malaya should be borne i n mind while studying the Commission's r e p o r t , asking: How can we s e i z e a l l r i g h t s f o r ourselves alone? W i l l the other races keep q u i e t ? W i l l the world al l o w us to make the other races s u f f e r ? W i l l the B r i t i s h then f r e e our country? £ 2 The stand taken by the Ch i e f M i n i s t e r and other r e s p o n s i - b l e p o l i t i c a l l eaders w i t h a wide f o l l o w i n g was the most substan- t i a l f a c t o r which prevented the e r u p t i o n of r a c i a l misunderstand- ings at a time when the s i t u a t i o n was d e l i c a t e , and at a time 60 S t r a i t s Budget, March 7, 1957, p. 15. 61 I b i d . , A p r i l 4, 1957, p. 9. 62 Loc. c i t . 204 when an e r u p t i o n of t h i s nature could have caused the greatest harm. I t i s apparent that these l e a d e r s , while r e c o g n i s i n g the d e s i r a b i l i t y of u n i t y w i t h i n t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e races, d i d not overlook the deeper i m p l i c a t i o n s of a wider u n i t y which each race had to have w i t h the others. The Tengku had made i t q u i t e c l e a r that the Malays were not seeking to e s t a b l i s h t h e i r own p o s i t i o n at the expense of the other communities. The leaders of the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n and the Malayan Indian Congress now r e c i p r o c a t e d by acknowledging the f a c t that i t would have been wrong, at that moment, to confront the Malays w i t h the p o s s i b i l i t y of change, or to s u b s t a n t i a l l y weaken i n any way the safeguards which that community already had. Thus there was no o p p o s i t i o n from any community (t h a t i s , not on any s i g n i f i c a n t s c a l e ) to the continuance of the s p e c i a l r i g h t s enjoyed by the Malays, as they were, f o r a considerable p e r i o d of time; n e i t h e r d i d the non-Malay members of the A l l i a n c e oppose the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of Islam as the State r e - l i g i o n , e s p e c i a l l y since freedom of worship was t o be guaranteed to a l l . 6 3 The c e n t r a l working committee of the Malayan Chinese A s s o c i a t i o n unanimously agreed not to press f o r those recommen- dations of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission which had gone beyond the proposals made by the A l l i a n c e , despite the f a c t that they 64 were e s s e n t i a l l y to the advantage of the non-Malay communities. 63 S t r a i t s Budget. A p r i l 4, 1957, p. 4. 64 I b i d . . A p r i l 11, 1957, p. 14. 205 I n the t r u e s p i r i t of s o l i d a r i t y and mutual t o l e r a n c e , the three p a r t i e s of the A l l i a n c e now presented a u n i t e d f r o n t w i t h regard to the four main is s u e s at hand - State r e l i g i o n , the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays, c i t i z e n s h i p and n a t i o n a l language. For a while there e x i s t e d the p o s s i b i l i t y of a serious r i f t w i t h i n the UMNO over the question of whether or not the Report of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission was adequate as a b a s i s f o r the f u t u r e C o n s t i t u t i o n of the country, but the s i t u a t i o n was saved when, at a General Meeting of the A s s o c i a t i o n , Tengku Abdul Rahman and the Executive C o u n c i l were given a vote of confidence and the "complete a u t h o r i t y " t o make the Commission's Report the founda- 65 t i o n on which the new C o n s t i t u t i o n would be constructed. The meeting was most important i n t h a t , had the Tengku and the Execu- t i v e C o u n c i l been denied the vote of confidence, the A l l i a n c e 66 Government might have been forced to r e s i g n . While the country was throbbing w i t h p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and v a r y i n g opinions were being expounded to c o n s o l i d a t e the v a r y i n g views i n the Commission's f i n d i n g s , the Report was under- going part of i t s l i f e i n a more temperate and d i g n i f i e d atmos- phere, being the object of s c r u t i n y both by Her Majesty's Govern- 67 ment i n the United Kingdom and by the Working P a r t y ' i n the 65 S t r a i t s Budget, A p r i l 4, 1957, p. 8. 66 I b i d . , p. 11. 67 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals f o r the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, London, H.M.Stationery O f f i c e , 1957, Cmnd. 210, pp. 3*4. The Working P a r t y c o n s i s t e d of the High Com- missioner, f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of T h e i r Highnesses the R u l e r s , f o u r r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Government of the F e d e r a t i o n , the Chief S e c r e t a r y and the Attorney-General. I t held 23 meetings between February 22 and A p r i l 27, and reported to the Conference of Rulers on March 14, A p r i l 10 and May 7, and to the F e d e r a l Executive C o u n c i l on May 3 and 6. 2 0 6 F e d e r a t i o n . When the l a t t e r had agreed on t h e i r recommendations concerning the Commission's proposals, a d e l e g a t i o n c o n s i s t i n g of the High Commissioner, the Chief M i n i s t e r , the Attorney- General and re p r e s e n t a t i v e s of T h e i r Highnesses the Rulers and the Government of the F e d e r a t i o n went to London f o r the purpose of d i s c u s s i n g the Report, and the amendments which they had considered necessary, w i t h Her Majesty's Government. Having l a s t e d from the 1 3 t h May to the 2 1 s t May, the t a l k s r e s u l t e d i n agreement being reached "between a l l p a r t i e s on a l l p o i n t s of 6ft p r i n c i p l e . " ° As the d i s c u s s i o n s on the substance of the C o n s t i t u t i o n were i n progress, i t s d r a f t i n g was the subject of clo s e s c r u t i n y i n the O f f i c e of the Parliamentary Counsel i n the United Kingdom, the purpose of t h i s s c r u t i n y being the removal of ambiguities and i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s and, i n c e r t a i n cases, improvement i n form. Once the recommendations of the Working P a r t y reached the D r a f t s - men, the task of r e v i s i n g the form of the C o n s t i t u t i o n was u n i f i e d w i t h that of i n c o r p o r a t i n g the amendments required to 69 give e f f e c t to the recommendations. On the completion of t h i s process, the r e v i s e d d r a f t was once again submitted f o r consid- e r a t i o n at meetings of the Working P a r t y i n the F e d e r a t i o n , at which o f f i c i a l s of the United Kingdom were present. I t was hoped t h a t , by f o l l o w i n g t h i s procedure, a l l doubts regarding the 6 8 Cmnd. 2 1 0 , C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals, pp. 3 - 4 - . 69 Loc. c i t . 207 accurate r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of agreed p o l i c y i n the r e v i s e d d r a f t 70 would be removed. The C o n s t i t u t i o n s of Malacca and Penang were subjected to the same procedure. The f i n a l outcome was that the C o n s t i t u t i o n s (that i s , c o n s t i t u t i o n s f o r the Federa- t i o n and f o r Penang and Malacca which were being e s t a b l i s h e d as s t a t e s ) proposed by the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission were made to undergo changes "both of substance and of form." The Commis- s i o n , i n presenting i t s r e p o r t , had attempted to e f f e c t a com- promise between a l l the demands which, i n i t s o p i n i o n , had been l e g i t i m a t e . The C o n s t i t u t i o n which now emerged was a compromise between that compromise and the o p p o s i t i o n which had fo l l o w e d the p u b l i c a t i o n of the D r a f t . As opposed to the recommendations of an independent body (the Commission), i t was geared t o s u i t the r e a l i t i e s of Malayan p o l i t i c s . F or purposes of c l a r i t y , the main i s s u e s i n question w i l l be discussed i n d i v i d u a l l y , and the order of p r e s e n t a t i o n w i l l be the same as the one followed i n analysing the report of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission. (The f u l l t e x t of those s e c t i o n s of the C o n s t i t u t i o n which w i l l be discussed i s set out i n Appendix "B" - s e c t i o n 2, of the present study.) C i t i z e n s h i p The C o n s t i t u t i o n upholds the Commission's proposal that a l l those who were c i t i z e n s of the F e d e r a t i o n before Merdeka Day should continue to be c i t i z e n s , and that a l l those born i n 70 Cmnd. 210, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals, p. 4. 208 the country on or a f t e r that day should be made c i t i z e n s by opera t i o n of law ( A r t . 144). With regard t o the Commission's disputed recommendation, namely that c e r t a i n c i t i z e n s of the United Kingdom and Colonies who were born i n the F e d e r a t i o n before Merdeka Day and who were e n t i t l e d , under clause 126 of the F e d e r a t i o n Agreement, 1948, to be r e g i s t e r e d as c i t i z e n s as of r i g h t , should continue to be so e n t i t l e d , the C o n s t i t u t i o n e f f e c t e d a m o d i f i c a t i o n . I t was proposed that these persons be accepted o n l y on c o n d i t i o n that they claimed to be r e g i s t e r e d w i t h i n a p e r i o d of one year from Merdeka Day. An A r t i c l e t o t h i s e f f e c t i s set out among the temporary p r o v i s i o n s i n P a r t X I I I of the F e d e r a l C o n s t i t u t i o n where i t i s s t a t e d : 170-(1) Subject to the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s A r t i c l e , any person who, immediately before Merdeka Day, was q u a l i f i e d to make a p p l i c a t i o n f o r r e g i s t r a t i o n as a c i t i z e n of the F e d e r a t i o n under clause 126 of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Agreement, 1948, s h a l l be e n t i t l e d , upon making a p p l i c a t i o n to the r e g i s t r a - t i o n a u t h o r i t y w i t h i n the p e r i o d of one year be- ginning w i t h that day, to be r e g i s t e r e d as a c i t i - zen. With regard t o those i n the above category who might have absent- ed themselves from the F e d e r a t i o n f o r a continuous p e r i o d of f i v e years during the t e n years immediately preceding the date of a p p l i c a t i o n , i t i s stated t h a t these persons w i l l not be e n t i t l e d to be r e g i s t e r e d unless i t i s c e r t i f i e d by the F e d e r a l Government that they have maintained " s u b s t a n t i a l connection" 71 w i t h the F e d e r a t i o n during the per i o d i n q u e s t i o n . ' 71 Cmnd. 210, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals, p. 110. 209 I n s o f a r as the q u e s t i o n of dual c i t i z e n s h i p i s concerned, a question which had drawn d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed views from the Malays on the one hand and the S t r a i t s Chinese on the other, the C o n s t i t u t i o n provides that a F e d e r a l c i t i z e n can enjoy the r i g h t s of a c i t i z e n of the United Kingdom while i n B r i t a i n but that a United Kingdom c i t i z e n w i l l not be granted Malayan r i g h t s i f he came to the F e d e r a t i o n a f t e r Merdeka Day. I n commenting on t h i s the Tengku s a i d : "There w i l l be no r e c i p r o c i t y on t h i s 72 matter because we are too s m a l l a n a t i o n . " While Commonwealth c i t i z e n s h i p i s made a v a i l a b l e t o every person who i s a c i t i z e n of the F e d e r a t i o n , the C o n s t i t u t i o n also makes i t c l e a r ( A r t . 24) that t h i s w i l l be so o n l y i f a person does not accept r i g h t s and p r i v i l e g e s which are incompatible w i t h undivided a l l e g i a n c e to the F e d e r a t i o n . With regard to the treatment of dual c i t i z e n s h i p ( t h a t i s , concerning c i t i z e n s of the United Kingdom and Colonies born i n the F e d e r a t i o n ) , i t has been observed that the f i n a l outcome i s a great moral v i c t o r y f o r the S t r a i t s Chinese, but of l i t t l e p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t 7 - * since most of those concerned w i l l not leave the F e d e r a t i o n i n any event. State R e l i g i o n Clause (1) of A r t i c l e 3 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n reads: 72 S t r a i t s Budget, June 6, 1957> p. 15. 73 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, p. 36. 210 ••Islam i s the r e l i g i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n ; but other r e l i g i o n s may be p r a c t i c e d i n peace and harmony i n any part of the F e d e r a t i o n . ' This makes the f i n a l v e r d i c t on the i s s u e of State r e l i g i o n a v i c t o r y f o r the A l l i a n c e ; the Commission's recommendation that the C o n s t i t u t i o n be s i l e n t on the matter has been r e j e c t e d , and r e c o g n i t i o n given to Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid's note of d i s - sent on the su b j e c t , based, as already pointed out, on the o r i g i n a l proposals of the A l l i a n c e . Despite t h i s , however, the F e d e r a t i o n continues to maintain a l l the trappings of a secu l a r s t a t e . A l l r e l i g i o n s are given ample safeguards r e - garding t h e i r f u t u r e i n the country. I n t h i s connection i t i s stated ( A r t . 11) that every person has the r i g h t to pursue h i s own r e l i g i o u s c o n v i c t i o n s and, subject to clause (4) of the same A r t i c l e which makes t h i s p r o v i s i o n , t o propagate i t . (Clause (4) reads: State law may c o n t r o l or r e s t r i c t the propagation of any r e l i g i o u s d o c t r i n e or b e l i e f among persons pro- f e s s i n g the Muslim r e l i g i o n . I n view of the f a c t that Islam i s the e s t a b l i s h e d r e l i g i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n , t h i s i s understandable, the i d e a being to reduce the v u l n e r a b i l i t y of the Muslims to p r o s e l y t i z a t i o n by other r e l i g i o n s . ) Clause (3) of the same A r t i c l e gives every r e l i g - ious group the r i g h t to manage i t s own a f f a i r s , c a t e r f o r the establishment and maintenance of i n s t i t u t i o n s e i t h e r f o r r e l i g - ious or c h a r i t a b l e ends and, i n accordance w i t h law, t o acquire, own and administer p r o p e r t y . 7 4 " 74 Cmnd. 210, C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals, p. 36. 211 The establishment of Islam as the State r e l i g i o n sends i t s roots i n t o c e r t a i n f i e l d s of education as w e l l . Clause (2) of A r t i c l e 12 makes t h i s q u i t e c l e a r when i t s t a t e s : Every r e l i g i o u s group has the r i g h t to e s t a b l i s h and maintain i n s t i t u t i o n s f o r the education of c h i l d r e n and provide t h e r e i n i n s t r u c t i o n i n i t s own r e l i g i o n , and there s h a l l be no d i s c r i m i n a t i o n on the grounds only of r e l i g i o n on any law r e l a t i n g to such i n s t i - t u t i o n s or i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of any such law; but f e d e r a l law may provide f o r s p e c i a l f i n a n c i a l a i d f o r the establishment or maintenance of Muslim i n s t i - t u t i o n s or the i n s t r u c t i o n i n the Muslim r e l i g i o n of persons p r o f e s s i n g that r e l i g i o n . I n e f f e c t , the l a t t e r p a r t of t h i s Clause grants the F e d e r a l Government the r i g h t to give f i n a n c i a l a i d f o r the b u i l d i n g and maintenance of Malay schools f o r , i n a c t u a l f a c t , t h i s i s what "Muslim i n s t i t u t i o n s " amount t o . However, since the Malay com- munity i s the one which needs most a i d i n t h i s f i e l d , and since t h i s f a c t i s acknowledged by the other communities, the p r o v i s i o n has not proved t o be a c o n t r o v e r s i a l one. The Rulers have been given assurance that the e s t a b l i s h - ment of Islam as the State r e l i g i o n i s not to v i o l a t e t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l l e a d e r s h i p i n the S t a t e s . This guarantee i s given by Clause (2) of A r t i c l e 3 where i t i s stated t h a t , subject t o the C o n s t i t u t i o n of each S t a t e , a l l the r i g h t s , p r i v i l e g e s , pre- r o g a t i v e s and powers enjoyed by the Ruler are l e f t "unaffected and unimpaired". Since there are no Malay Rulers i n Penang and Malacca, the C o n s t i t u t i o n gives the Yang d i - P e r t u a n Agong the p o s i t i o n of Head of the Muslim r e l i g i o n i n the two t e r r i t o r i e s ( A r t . 3, Clause (13) ). 212 Taken as a whole, the treatment of r e l i g i o n i n the Con- s t i t u t i o n i s f a r from being o f f e n s i v e i n any res p e c t . There i s no denying the f a c t that the core of Malayan s o c i e t y i s e s s e n t i a l l y Malay i n nature. The Chinese and the Indians should recognize the f a c t that t h e i r claims i n the country should not take precedence over those of the Malay community; they should r e a l i z e that a pro-Malay p o l i c y need not n e c e s s a r i l y imply an anti-Chinese or a n t i - I n d i a n b i a s . The leaders of the two communities appear to have recognized t h i s . Otherwise the A l l i a n c e would not have come to f u l l agreement on the Con- s t i t u t i o n . N a t i o n a l Language A r t i c l e 152 e s t a b l i s h e s Malay as the n a t i o n a l language, provided: (a) that no person should be prevented from using (other than f o r o f f i c i a l purposes), teaching or l e a r n i n g any other language; and (b) that the F e d e r a l and State Governments should not i n any way be discouraged from p r e s e r v i n g and s u s t a i n i n g the use and study of the languages of the other communities i n the country. Clause (2) of the same A r t i c l e s t a t e s t h a t , f o r a p e r i o d of t e n years a f t e r Merdeka Day, "and t h e r e a f t e r u n t i l Parliament other- wise provides", E n g l i s h may be used i n both Houses of Parliament, i n the L e g i s l a t i v e Assemblies of the States and also f o r a l l other o f f i c i a l purposes. With the same time r e g u l a t i o n s as set out i n Clause (2), Clause (3) s t i p u l a t e s that the a u t h o r i - t a t i v e t e x t s of a l l B i l l s and amendments t o be moved i n e i t h e r House of Parliament, and also of a l l Acts of Parliament together 213 w i t h a l l s u b s i d i a r y l e g i s l a t i o n issued by the F e d e r a l Govern- ment, s h a l l be i n the E n g l i s h language. Clause (4) s t a t e s t h a t , during the same p e r i o d , a l l proceedings of the Supreme Court s h a l l be i n the E n g l i s h language as w e l l . The extensive use of E n g l i s h recommended by the above p r o v i s i o n s i s undoubtedly i n favour of the non-Malay communi- t i e s . Only a n e g l i g i b l e p o r t i o n of the non-Malays i n the country can both speak and w r i t e i n the Malay language, and i t i s not l i k e l y that there w i l l be any d r a s t i c change i n t h e i r p r o f i c i e n c y i n that language w i t h i n the next te n years. Fur- thermore, Malay p o l i t i c a l l eaders w i l l not be unduly handi- capped i f E n g l i s h were to be continued as an o f f i c i a l language f o r q u i t e some time i n t o the f u t u r e and, judging from the present s i t u a t i o n , i t appears to be quite l i k e l y that i t w i l l be. The C o n s t i t u t i o n does not give r e c o g n i t i o n to the Com- mission's proposal that a l i m i t e d use of the Chinese and I n d i a n languages be permitted i n the l e g i s l a t u r e s f o r a period of t e n years from Merdeka Day. This i s a wise d e c i s i o n not only be- cause i t prevents a great deal of confusion i n the l e g i s l a t u r e s , but also because monolingual p o l i t i c i a n s are l i a b l e t o be more communal i n t h e i r outlook than those who speak E n g l i s h as w e l l , or those non-Malays who are f l u e n t i n the Malay language. F i n a l l y , there i s the question of the extension of the s p e c i a l p r i v i l e g e s of the Malays i n t o the States of Penang and 214 Malacca. As mentioned e a r l i e r , a proposal c a l l i n g f o r an extension of t h i s nature had been proposed by the UMNO, and had been the object of severe c r i t i c i s m i n the press. The C o n s t i t u t i o n does not give r e c o g n i t i o n to t h i s request; at the same time i t does not o v e r r u l e a l l p o s s i b i l i t y of any p r e f - erences i n favour of the Malay community i n these t e r r i t o r i e s . T his i s q u i t e e v i d e n t l y the purpose behind Clause (5) of A r t i c l e 89 where i t i s stated that the Government of any State may, i n accordance w i t h law, acquire land f o r the settlement of Malays or other communities, and e s t a b l i s h t r u s t s f o r that purpose. S p e c i a l P o s i t i o n of the Malays The C o n s t i t u t i o n c l e a r l y sets out p r o v i s i o n s which make the Malays e l i g i b l e f o r a c e r t a i n amount of p r e f e r e n t i a l t r e a t - ment. With regard to r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n these matters, the Commission's proposals were r e j e c t e d and, as i n the case of State r e l i g i o n , Mr. J u s t i c e Abdul Hamid's note of d i s s e n t , based on the A l l i a n c e ' s views on the s u b j e c t , accepted. Thus the matter becomes the s p e c i a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Yang d i - Pertuan Agong and not, as suggested by the Commission, that o f the "Government of the day". The question of s p e c i a l Malay r i g h t s i s not r e s t r i c t e d t o any s p e c i a l p r o v i s i o n , but r a t h e r spread out to cover those f i e l d s i n which the Malays need a c e r t a i n amount of p r o t e c t i o n . The f i r s t of these concerns land p o l i c y . Clause (1) of A r t i c l e 89 s t a t e s : 215 Any l a n d i n a State which immediately before Merdeka Day was a Malay r e s e r v a t i o n i n accordance w i t h the e x i s t i n g law may continue as a Malay r e s e r v a t i o n i n accordance w i t h that law u n t i l otherwise provided by an Enactment of the L e g i s l a t u r e of that S t a t e . To be made v a l i d , such an Enactment has to be passed by a maj- o r i t y of the t o t a l membership of the L e g i s l a t i v e Assembly and by the votes of at l e a s t two-thirds of those present and v o t i n g ; i t f u r t h e r has to be approved by r e s o l u t i o n of each House of Parliament passed, as i n the case of the State L e g i s l a t u r e s , by a m a j o r i t y of the t o t a l number of members of that House and by the votes of at l e a s t two-thirds of those present and v o t i n g . These r e g u l a t i o n s make the f u t u r e of Malay r e s e r v a t i o n s safe f o r a considerable p e r i o d of time. As pointed out e a r l i e r , State L e g i s l a t u r e s are mostly dominated by the Malays at present, and t h i s w i l l continue to be the case f o r a s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d i n the f u t u r e . I n a d d i t i o n to t h i s , the Malays also form the most numerous r a c i a l group i n Parliament. This means t h a t , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y , the Malays w i l l have l i t t l e d i f f i c u l t y i n con- t i n u i n g t o b e n e f i t from land r e s e r v a t i o n s designed to favour them u n t i l such time as the Chinese outnumber them i n v o t i n g s t r e n g t h . There i s no doubt that t h i s w i l l not be p o s s i b l e at any time w i t h i n the reasonable f u t u r e ; p o p u l a t i o n and c i t i z e n - ship f i g u r e s prove t h i s c o n c l u s i v e l y . I n June 1955, out of the t o t a l p o p u l a t i o n of 6,058,317? the Malays accounted f o r 2,967,233 w h i l e the Chinese amounted to 2,286,883 - a d i f f e r e n c e of almost 700,000. 7^ According 75 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report. 1955? p. 7. 216 t o o f f i c i a l s t a t i s t i c s f o r the end of 1 9 5 5 , there were 4 , 4 2 7 , 8 4 5 f e d e r a l c i t i z e n s by op e r a t i o n of law; of these 2.9 m i l l i o n 76 were Malays and 1 . 2 m i l l i o n Chinese. Of the 146,762 persons who had acquired c i t i z e n s h i p through r e g i s t r a t i o n and through 77 being n a t u r a l i z e d , 36,891 were Malays and 5 8 , 1 8 7 Chinese. Thus of a t o t a l o f j u s t under 4.6 m i l l i o n c i t i z e n s at that time, about 2.94 m i l l i o n were Malays and only 1.26 m i l l i o n Chinese - that i s , almost the e n t i r e Malay p o p u l a t i o n and j u s t over h a l f that of the Chinese. Under the present C o n s t i t u t i o n , however, every person born i n the F e d e r a t i o n becomes a c i t i z e n by opera- t i o n of law. This deprives the Malays of a l l advantage i n t h i s f i e l d . Despite t h i s , the above o b s e r v a t i o n regarding the sup- e r i o r e l e c t o r a l strength of the Malays f o r a s u b s t a n t i a l p e r i o d i n t o the f u t u r e s t i l l stands. The f i g u r e s t h a t have been quoted e s t a b l i s h t h e i r present dominance i n t h i s r e s p e c t . I n attempt- i n g to f o r e c a s t the future of t h i s dominance, two f a c t o r s w i l l have to be taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n : the r a t e of n a t u r a l i n - crease and the rat e of immigration. According t o the o f f i c i a l f i g u r e s f o r 1955, the r a t e of n a t u r a l i n c r e a s e (per thousand of population) among the Malays was 31*1, while the Chinese recorded 78 a r a t e of 31.6 during the same year. This d i s p a r i t y does not endanger the Malays i n any s u b s t a n t i a l degree. Immigration presents a somewhat uneven p i c t u r e . During 1 9 5 1 , the Malaysians 76 K i n g , The New Malayan Nation, p. 16. 77 Loc. c i t . 78 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1 9 5 5 , p. 9. 217 had an inward m i g r a t i o n d e f i c i t of 2,387; during 1952 and 1953 they had a surplus of 7,922 and 8,079 r e s p e c t i v e l y ; and during 1954 and 1955 they had a d e f i c i t of 12,273 and 25,826.79 The Chinese, on the other hand, recorded a d e f i c i t during every year from 1951 to 1954, the f i g u r e s f o r the r e s p e c t i v e years being 26,169} 9,788; 4,653; and 3,772. I n 1955 they r e g i s - t ered a surplus of 2,298.80 The f a c t now becomes obvious t h a t , w h i l e the Malaysians have shown a trend towards outward m i g r a t i o n during recent years (although t h i s trend i s by no means an e s t a b l i s h e d one - the f l u c t u a t i o n s i n m i g r a t i o n f i g u r e s prevent the r e c o g n i t i o n of any set p a t t e r n ) , the Chinese have e s t a b l i s h e d an unmistakable trend i n the opposite d i r e c t i o n . These f i g u r e s , however, do not merit the drawing of any s p e c i f i c conclusions f o r the f u t u r e . As explained i n the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya Annual Report f o r 1955 (p. 19), the main b u l k of these immigrants from China were wives and c h i l d r e n of r e s i d e n t s . Since the Immigration ( P r o h i b i t i o n of Entry) Order of 1953 (discussed i n Chapter 2 of the present study) continued to be i n f o r c e , the entry of 'other c a t e g o r i e s of persons was sev e r e l y r e s t r i c t e d . The e n t r y of wives and c h i l d r e n must of n e c e s s i t y be a temporary phenomenon, and the i n c r e a s i n g d e s i r e of the l o c a l l y 79 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1955, p. 14. 80 Loc. c i t . 218 r e s i d e n t Chinese to b r i n g t h e i r wives over from China and t o make Malaya t h e i r home w i l l probably make the period even s h o r t e r . At the same time, the i n c e n t i v e on the part of the husband to r e t u r n to China has almost completely disappeared, l a r g e l y as a r e s u l t of the f a c t t h a t , i n many cases, p r o p e r t i e s owned by Overseas Chinese have been c o n f i s c a t e d and r e d i s t r i b u - 82 ted by the P e o p l e s 1 Government i n China. The present C o n s t i t u t i o n of Malaya does not imply any a l t e r a t i o n s i n the immigration trends discussed above since i t i s provided, among the Temporary and T r a n s i t i o n a l P r o v i s i o n s ( A r t . 162), that e x i s t i n g laws would continue i n f o r c e a f t e r Merdeka Day u n t i l repealed by the a u t h o r i t y having the power to do so. Thus the chances appear to be t h a t , i n the not-too- d i s t a n t f u t u r e , the Chinese p o p u l a t i o n i n Malaya w i l l become an almost completely s t a b i l i z e d one, depending almost e x c l u s i v e l y on the r a t e of n a t u r a l increase f o r i t s i n c r e a s e i n p o p u l a t i o n . U n t i l t h i s s t a b i l i t y i s a t t a i n e d , and u n t i l the Malaysians e x h i b i t a set p a t t e r n w i t h regard to m i g r a t i o n , i t would be d i f - f i c u l t to make an estimate of the numerical s t r e n g t h of the Chinese and Malays at the end of a given number of years. There i s also the p o s s i b i l i t y that the present p o l i t i c a l i n s t a b i l i t y i n Indonesia might very w e l l cause an inward m i g r a t i o n surplus among the Malaysian group i n Malaya. Thus, since the advantage 81 F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1955, p. 19- 82 Loc. c i t . 219 held by the Chinese i n p o p u l a t i o n increase at the moment i s n e i t h e r s u b s t a n t i a l nor w i l l be permanent, the f a c t remains that the Malays w i l l be able to maintain t h e i r e l e c t o r a l super- i o r i t y f o r q u i t e some time, and hence maintain t h e i r l a nd r e s e r v a t i o n s while attempting to b r i n g themselves c l o s e r to the Chinese i n economic c a p a c i t y . There are f u r t h e r p r o v i s i o n s regarding Malay r e s e r v a - t i o n s . Clause (2) of A r t i c l e 89 s t i p u l a t e s that new re s e r v a - t i o n s may be created, on c o n d i t i o n that an equal area i s made a v a i l a b l e f o r general a l i e n a t i o n . The Clause i n q u e s t i o n a l s o declares that the t o t a l l a n d area reserved f o r Malays i n a State s h a l l not at any time exceed the t o t a l area ( i n that State) made a v a i l a b l e f o r general a l i e n a t i o n . Clause (4) of the same A r t i c l e states that a u t h o r i t y i s not given f o r the conversion of land owned by non-Malays i n t o Malay r e s e r v a t i o n s . This Clause i s ob v i o u s l y aimed at checking the extent to which Malay r e s e r v a t i o n s can be c a r r i e d , so as t o guarantee c e r t a i n safeguards to the non-Malay communities. The other matter which w i l l have t o be discussed i n r e - l a t i o n to the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays i s the r e s e r v a t i o n of quotas i n respect of s e r v i c e s , permits and s c h o l a r s h i p s f o r that community. Clause (2) of A r t i c l e 153 s t a t e s that the Yang di-Pertuan Agong s h a l l e x e r c i s e h i s f u n c t i o n s under the C o n s t i t u t i o n i n such a way as would be necessary to safeguard the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays: 220 and to ensure the r e s e r v a t i o n f o r Malays of such p r o p o r t i o n as he may deem reasonable of p o s i t i o n s i n the p u b l i c s e r v i c e (other than the p u b l i c s e r v i c e of a State) and of s c h o l a r s h i p s , e x h i b i t i o n and other s i m i l a r e d u c a t i o n a l or t r a i n i n g p r i v i - leges or s p e c i a l f a c i l i t i e s given or accorded by the F e d e r a l Government and, when any permit or l i c e n c e f o r the o p e r a t i o n of any"trade or business i s r e q u i r e d by f e d e r a l law, then, subject to the p r o v i s i o n s of that law, and t h i s A r t i c l e , of such permits and l i c e n c e s . As i n the case of land r e s e r v a t i o n s , the clauses which f o l l o w serve to e s t a b l i s h a l i m i t on t h i s power. With respect to t h i s i t i s s t i p u l a t e d that the above r e s e r v a t i o n s are not to be made 81 at the expense of a person who i s already h o l d i n g an o f f i c e , s c h o l a r s h i p , permit or l i c e n c e . Clause (9) makes i t q u i t e c l e a r that Nothing i n t h i s A r t i c l e s h a l l empower Parliament to r e s t r i c t business or trade s o l e l y f o r the purpose of r e s e r v a t i o n s f o r the Malays. Once again the C o n s t i t u t i o n gives p r i v i l e g e s to the Malays, w h i l e at the same time ensuring the " l e g i t i m a t e i n t e r e s t s " of the other communities. With regard to the Commission's proposal that the e n t i r e i s s u e of Malay r e s e r v a t i o n s be reviewed at the end of 15 years, i t was now decided that i t i s more d e s i r a b l e " i n the i n t e r e s t s of the country as a whole as w e l l as the Malays themselves", f o r the Yang di- P e r t u a n Agong to cause the matter to be reviewed "from time to t i m e . " 8 3 This gives the iss u e greater f l e x i b i l i t y i n that l e g i s l a t i o n can now be made to keep i n step w i t h the rate of economic advancement achieved by the Malay community. 83 Cmd. 210, Const i t utiaanal Proposals, p. 19 221 The f a c t o r of c r u c i a l importance i n s o f a r as the C o n s t i - t u t i o n i s concerned i s the degree to which the f e d e r a l s t r u c t u r e of government solves the problems of the Malayan p l u r a l s o c i e t y . S o l u t i o n can be attempted i n one of two ways - e i t h e r by p l a c i n g emphasis on compromises on the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , or by de l e g a t i n g a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of power to the stat e governments, so th a t each community can f u l l y e s t a b l i s h i t s e l f i n the State where i t s numerical s u p e r i o r i t y gives i t a f i r m c o n t r o l over ad m i n i s t r a - t i o n . I n g i v i n g preference to the former, the present C o n s t i - t u t i o n has e s t a b l i s h e d a strong c e n t r a l government, which enables a wide range of p o l i c i e s to be moulded by inter-communal d i s c u s s i o n s . Had the l a t t e r a l t e r n a t i v e been given precedence, there would have been no b a s i s created f o r the e r a d i c a t i o n of communalism, since the l o g i c a l consequence would have been r a c i a l c o n s o l i d a t i o n and not r a c i a l compromise. Taken as a whole, the C o n s t i t u t i o n appears to be a happy compromise. The establishment of Islam as the State r e l i g i o n and the p r e s e r v a t i o n of the s p e c i a l r i g h t s of the Malays give the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya the trappings of a Malay s t a t e . This - has s a t i s f i e d the Malays. On the other hand, t h e non-Malay communities have not r e a l l y been offended; despite o p p o s i t i o n from c e r t a i n Chinese q u a r t e r s , the c i t i z e n s h i p r e g u l a t i o n s , f o r example, do not give the Malays any permanent advantage. F i n - a l l y , the Rulers are given t h e i r due: i n a d d i t i o n to maintain- in g t h e i r t r a d i t i o n a l p o s i t i o n , they have also been given the r e s i d u a l powers, and t h i s despite the A l l i a n c e ' s request to the co n t r a r y . 222 Reactions to the new C o n s t i t u t i o n have, by and l a r g e , been most favour a b l e . I n commenting on the document, the S t r a i t s Times of J u l y 12 s t a t e d : I t i s a workable c o n s t i t u t i o n , the best that honest patience and g o o d w i l l could devise. I t draws i t s e s s e n t i a l s t r e n g t h from the u n i t y of the A l l i a n c e partners whose memorandum became the broad b a s i s of the Reid Commission's proposals. The agreement on c i t i z e n s h i p i s the main p i l l a r , b u t tressed by demo- c r a t i c i n s t i t u t i o n s which can make Malaya the envy of her neighbours. Some i n d i c a t i o n of the general s p i r i t of g o o d w i l l which c h a r a c t e r i z e d the country's r e a c t i o n s to the C o n s t i t u t i o n can perhaps be obtained by viewing the opinions expressed by mem- bers of the F e d e r a l L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l when they met to debate the new proposals. Mr. Chelvasingam Maclntrye placed the debate i n i t s t r u e perspective when he a s t u t e l y observed that what the House was i n the process of d i s c u s s i n g was not the C o n s t i t u t i o n of a u n i t e d Malayan n a t i o n , but r a t h e r the proposals which were aimed at 85 s t i m u l a t i n g the growth of such a n a t i o n . The t r u t h behind t h i s o bservation can h a r d l y be overestimated; a l l Malaya had at the time was the nascent stage of u n i t y - there was no n a t i o n i n the f u l l sense of the term. Mr. Tan Slew S i n made another v e r y p e r t i n e n t remark when he s t a t e d : 84 S t r a i t s Budget, J u l y 18, 1957, p. 3« 85 I b i d . , p. 12. 223 The C o n s t i t u t i o n has not s a t i s f i e d any community completely. No s i n g l e community has obtained a l l that i t asked f o r or what i t t h i n k s i t should get, but I suggest that no community w i l l be adversely a f f e c t e d by it.35 With regard to the s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n of the Malays, the speaker d i s p l a y e d a remarkable degree of good sense when he s a i d s The Malays ... cannot be expected to give up what they already have i n the same way :as they do not expect the other communities to give up t h e i r e x i s t i n g r i g h t s . g 7 Warning that the Malays would not be able to co-operate f u l l y w i t h the other communities as long as they remained economically depressed, he added t h a t , consequently, i t would be i n the long- term i n t e r e s t s of everyone to extend t h e i r support to that com- 88 munity. Saying that i f the Chinese t r i e d t o understand and respect the Malays, the Malays would r e c i p r o c a t e by doing l i k e w i s e , Mr. Tan added, w i t h great r e a l i s m : There are extremist Malay p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s , but there are also extremist Chinese p a r t i e s . We must not l o s e our sense of pe r s p e c t i v e and balance by paying undue regard to the l u n a t i c f r i n g e which i s to be found i n every country. There i s an enormous fund of go o d w i l l among the Malays and Chinese f o r one another. A l l t h a t i s required i s l e a d e r s h i p to harness t h a t g o o d w i l l towards worthy objects.gQ 86 S t r a i t s Budget, J u l y 18, 1957, p. 12. 87 Loc. c i t . 88 Loc. c i t . 89 Loc. c i t . 224 Despite the f a c t that the atmosphere was one of almost complete agreement, the debate d i d not merely c o n s i s t of a s e r i e s of speeches la u d i n g the C o n s t i t u t i o n on a l l p o i n t s ; t h i s could v e r y w e l l have been the case had i t not been f o r the dramatic attack made by Mr. S. M. Yong, a nominated member of the C o u n c i l and also a member of the Malayan Chinese Assoc- i a t i o n , who opened h i s speech by c l e a r l y r e v e a l i n g h i s i n t e n t i o n to "argue and- take the consequences" i n s o f a r as the A l l i a n c e 90 P a r t y was concerned. Branding the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l proposals 91 as being " r a d i c a l l y wrong and con t r a r y to n a t u r a l j u s t i c e " , Mr. Yong urged the C o u n c i l to examine more c l o s e l y the g r i e v - ances of those Chinese who demanded c i t i z e n s h i p by b i r t h ( t h a t i s , i r r e s p e c t i v e of whether i t was before or a f t e r Merdeka Day), complete e q u a l i t y of a l l c i t i z e n s , m u l t i - l i n g u a l i s m i n the C o u n c i l , and a f i v e - y e a r r e s i d e n t i a l q u a l i f i c a t i o n f o r those 92 seeking c i t i z e n s h i p through n a t u r a l i s a t i o n . Mr. Yong was ob v i o u s l y echoing the demands made by the Chinese G u i l d s and Chambers of Commerce. The views expressed by Mr. Yong were s e v e r e l y attacked by a s e r i e s of speakers how took the f l o o r a f t e r him, most of whom were Chinese. Commenting on the demand f o r m u l t i - l i n g u - a l i s m which came from c e r t a i n Chinese q u a r t e r s , Che Halimahton 90 S t r a i t s Budget, J u l y 18, 1957? p. 12. 91 Loc. c i t . 92 Loc. c i t . 225 B i n t e Abdul M a j i d , the only woman i n the C o u n c i l , s a i d : These people are asking f o r the head a f t e r being given the face and demanding the t h i g h a f t e r g e t t i n g the c a l f . g ^ The C o n s t i t u t i o n came i n t o e f f e c t on August 31, 1957? the day the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya became an independent n a t i o n . I n being the set of laws which reg u l a t e s the l i f e of a p l u r a l s o c i e t y , i t embraces the maximum area of agreement among the d i f f e r e n t communities. The members of t h i s p l u r a l s o c i e t y deserve as much c r e d i t as i t s le a d e r s f o r the compromises which are inherent i n t h i s C o n s t i t u t i o n . U n l i k e the experience i n most other c o l o n i a l t e r r i t o r i e s , independence, i n Malaya, does not appear to have weakened the u n i t y which was necessary f o r i t s achievement. The continued g o o d w i l l w i t h i n the A l l i a n c e and the p o p u l a r i t y which the P a r t y s t i l l enjoys are an adequate testimony f o r t h i s f a c t . 93 S t r a i t s Budget, J u l y 18, 1957, p. 14-. Conclusion Numerically speaking, the Malayan n a t i o n i s one of m i n o r i t i e s . The two most numerous groups, the Malays and the Chinese, tend to o f f s e t each other's s u p e r i o r i t y by t h e i r dominance i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d on the one hand and the econ- omic f i e l d on the other. D e l i c a t e as i s the r a c i a l balance, the manner i n which the scale adjusts i t s e l f t o s u i t the changing times w i l l determine the nature of inter-communal r e l a t i o n s i n the f u t u r e . The Malays occupy a unique p o s i t i o n , perhaps i n the whole world. They are the most numerous group i n the F e d e r a t i o n , and yet are a numerical m i n o r i t y ; they are economically depressed, and p o l i t i c a l l y the most powerful; i n t h e i r own country they have had to take refuge i n a " s p e c i a l p o s i t i o n " to ensure t h e i r status v i s a v i s races which they outnumber; while t h e i r p r i v i - leged p o s i t i o n might be j u s t i f i e d by v i r t u e of the p r i o r i t y which the h i s t o r y of the country bestows on them, there are some (Chinese i n p a r t i c u l a r ) who question the v a l i d i t y of t h i s p o s i - t i o n , saying that the non-Malay communities have c o n t r i b u t e d more i n developing the country than the Malays themselves, and hence deserve complete e q u a l i t y i n a l l things What l i e s they t o l d , and worse s t i l l , what scandalous t r u t h s ! (Winston C h u r c h i l l ) 227 Placed i n the hands of a r u t h l e s s p o l i t i c i a n , commun- ali s m can become a dangerous weapon, f a t a l to the development of a democratic s o c i e t y . The Malayan example r e v e a l s the ex p l o s i v e p o t e n t i a l i t i e s inherent i n r a c i a l p a r t i c u l a r i s m beyond a l l doubt. On the one hand are the Malays, alarmed at the economic power which already e x i s t s i n the hands of the other communities, and apprehensive of the p o l i t i c a l power which the f u t u r e holds f o r them; on the other hand are the Chinese and the Indians,-who complain of an enforced f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y - some of i t r e a l and some-, no doubt, imagined. The consequences of such a s i t u a t i o n can indeed be most d i s c o n - c e r t i n g . P o s s i b i l i t i e s range from p a r t i t i o n , as i n I n d i a , to t o t a l i t a r i a n r u l e , w i t h a u t h o r i t y i n the hands of the strongest community, as i n South A f r i c a . However, i f the p o l i t i c a l e v o l u t i o n of the F e d e r a t i o n thus f a r i s any i n d i c a t i o n regard- ing f u t u r e s t a b i l i t y , the country does not have to f e a r these p o l i t i c a l m o n s t r o s i t i e s . The general temperament of the people seems to guarantee t h i s . The Malays, f o r example, could v e r y w e l l have attempted to c u l t i v a t e t h e i r r a c i a l k i n s h i p w i t h the Indonesians f o r the purpose of c o n s o l i d a t i n g t h e i r own p o s i t i o n at home. P o l i t i c i a n s have t r i e d using t h i s as a v o t e - c a t c h i n g p r o p o s i t i o n , but have found l i t t l e support. The Chinese, on the other hand, could have given t h e i r support f o r the communist movement j u s t because that movement i s manned almost e x c l u s i v e l y by members of t h e i r own race. They have not done so, and, to the contrary, have tended to completely ignore the r a c i a l con- tent of the Malayan Communist P a r t y . 228 I t might be argued that a c o l o n i a l regime i s the o n l y s o l u t i o n to r a c i a l chaos and that B r i t a i n , as i n her A f r i c a n p l u r a l s o c i e t i e s , should have continued her r o l e as a mediator f o r an i n d e f i n i t e p e r i o d of time. I t might f u r t h e r be sug- gested that c o l o n i a l r u l e would be more acceptable to the mass of the people i n that i t would be able to provide them w i t h a common c o n t r o l l i n g power. Any Malayan who uses an argument such as t h i s i s merely t r y i n g to excuse a re l u c t a n c e to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t should also be noted that B r i t i s h r u l e i n Malaya would have had serious d i f f i c u l t y (as has been proved i n the past) i n surmounting a major problem caused by the country's r a c i a l composition. With the i n c r e a s i n g tendency f o r the C h i - nese and the Indians to become Malayan-oriented, i t would h a r d l y have been p o s s i b l e f o r Great B r i t a i n to hold the communal balance w i t h an i m p a r t i a l hand s i n c e , due to the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y they hold f o r the c r e a t i o n of the Malayan p l u r a l s o c i e t y , the B r i t i s h would have been o b l i g e d to favour the Malays, thereby i n t e n s i f y i n g the long-standing grievance, e s p e c i a l l y among the Chinese, that the non-Malay races are denied t h e i r due by being made l e s s e f f e c t i v e as a pressure group. As i t i s , the Malays w i l l have to give greater concessions to the other communities since Malay a u t h o r i t y can never be as strong as B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t y . Nor i s t h i s the only argument against c o l o n i a l i s m as the only s o l u t i o n to chaos i n the Malayan s o c i e t y . Post-war p o l i - t i c a l developments i n A s i a have e s t a b l i s h e d a d e f i n i t e l i n k between prolonged c o l o n i a l r u l e and the r i s e of communism. 229 Communism has gained much of i t s p o p u l a r i t y on an a n t i - c o l o n i a l programme, i n that i s has succeeded i n e s t a b l i s h i n g i t s e l f as a form of t r a n s f e r r e d n a t i o n a l i s m . I n p o l i t i c s , as i n most other t h i n g s , both pessimism and alarmism are e s s e n t i a l l y morbid i n nature. Why assume that the d i f f e r e n c e s between the Malays and the Chinese are un- bridg a b l e ? Great B r i t a i n has l i v e d up t o her pledges to work towards the gran t i n g of independence; a s u b s t a n t i a l amount of r a c i a l co-operation has already m a t e r i a l i z e d ; and Communism i s a diseased and a dying f o r c e . The climate of o p i n i o n i s not h o s t i l e to the development of a s a t i s f a c t o r y democracy, and there i s no r e a l danger which threatens the c r y s t a l l i z a t i o n of a Malayan consciousness. The A l l i a n c e P a r t y perhaps holds the key to the e n t i r e i s s u e . I t s success has been overwhelming, and i t s p o l i c i e s have i n no way been r e a l l y o f f e n s i v e . However, there i s the p o s s i b i l i t y that the P a r t y has been able to overcome the e v i l s of r a c i a l d i v i s i o n through i t s a b i l i t y to make the s e p a r a t i s t trends generated by communalism subservient to the c a l l f o r i n - dependence. Now that independence has already been achieved, the r a c i a l i s s u e i s once again l a i d wide open. Theory would perhaps have i t that the next step would be a retrograde one whereby each r a c e , i n the absence of a common fo e , would r e t u r n to i t s former ground, and attempt to exert i t s e l f against i t s r i v a l groups. Tha a c t u a l p r a c t i c e i n Malaya, however, does 230 not endorse t h i s assumption. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , Great B r i t a i n was not a dangerous f o e , and the Malayans were not r e a l l y d r i v e n to desperation i n t h e i r attempts to g a i n self-government. Secondly, no one can s e r i o u s l y contest the f a c t that the Malays, Chinese, and Indians have found t h e i r agreement to co-operate through the establishment of a p o l i t i c a l a l l i a n c e to t h e i r mutual advantage. The A l l i a n c e P a r t y i s no longer a mere "marriage of convenience". I t s scope has widened, and i t s existence has assumed a more permanent b a s i s . The f a c t o r of importance here i s not the P a r t y i t s e l f , but r a t h e r what i t s i g - n i f i e s . The A l l i a n c e has brought so much w i t h i n the realm of p o s s i b i l i t y and thereby created such a r e p u t a t i o n f o r i t s e l f t h a t , to be defeated i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d , i t w i l l have to be faced by a p a r t y w i t h an e q u a l l y strong inter-communal appeal. Herein l i e s the argument f o r optimism, not i n a b l i n d f a i t h i n the f u t u r e p o l i c i e s of the A l l i a n c e P a r t y i t s e l f , or i t s a b i l i t y to hold the r e i n s of power i n d e f i n i t e l y . The i d e a l , of course, would be the eventual development of a two-party system, where both.the Government as w e l l as the Opposition would be ^on- communal i n outlook. With the increase i n e l e c t o r a l s t r e n g t h which the f u t u r e holds f o r the non-Malays, t h i s might become a p r a c t i c a l n e c e s s i t y since no p a r t y , campaigning on a s t r i c t l y communal p l a t f o r m , w i l l be able to form a m a j o r i t y government. U n t i l such time, there w i l l always be the d i s t u r b i n g p o s s i b i l - i t y that the Malays might succumb to communal appeal i n the course of an e f f o r t to c o n s o l i d a t e themselves f o r the present. 231 The f u t u r e of Malayan p o l i t i c s w i l l depend on whether or not some permanent b a s i s can be e s t a b l i s h e d f o r the d e v e l - opment of a s o c i a l s y n t h e s i s . By b r i n g i n g the d i f f e r e n t races i n a common endeavour, p o l i t i c a l f a c t o r s appear to have pro- vided the nucleus f o r t h i s movement. The u l t i m a t e goal should be the emergence of a common s o c i o - c u l t u r a l base embracing a l l communities. That g o a l , however, i s not l i k e l y to be achieved w i t h i n the reasonable f u t u r e . The new Malayan consciousness w i l l have to continue being r e s t r i c t e d to the p o l i t i c o - e c o n o m i c f i e l d f o r a considerable p e r i o d of time. The i d e a that the s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l " s u p e r s t r u c t u r e s " r a p i d l y adapt themselves to changes i n the economic base i s f a l l a c i o u s and e s s e n t i a l l y Utopian. The e v o l u t i o n of a t r u l y Malayan s o c i e t y w i l l have to be gradual, and the success or f a i l u r e of t h i s e v o l u t i o n w i l l depend on the degree to which the p o l i t i c a l l e aders of the country are able, f i r s t , to convince the non-Malay races that they have more i n common w i t h the Malays and w i t h each other than w i t h members of t h e i r own race coming i n as immigrants; and secondly, to make the Malays b e l i e v e that any increase i n the amount of p o l i t i c a l power held by the non-Malay communities s i g n i f i e s a readjustment w i t h i n the same p o l i t i c a l u n i t , and not a power s h i f t from one u n i t to another. Once t h i s i s done, the Malayan n a t i o n w i l l have been born i n the f u l l sense of the term. 232 BIBLIOGRAPHY Books and Pamphlets A l l e n , G.C. and Donnithorne, A.G.j Western E n t e r p r i s e i n Indonesia Malaya. London: George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1957. B a l l , W. M. Nationalism and Communism i n East A s i a . Melbourne: Melbourne U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956. B a r t l e t t , V. Report from Malaya. London: Andre Deutsch L t d . , 1955 Brimmel, J . H. A Short H i s t o r y of the Malayan Communist P a r t y . Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. Dodd, E.E. The New Malaya. London: Fabian P u b l i c a t i o n s L t d . , 1946": Egmont-Hake, H.B. The New Malaya and You. London: Lindsay Drummond L t d . , 1945. E l s b r e e , W. H. Japan's Role i n Southeast A s i a n N a t i o n a l i s t Movements 1940-1945. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1953. Emerson, R. M a l a y s i a : A Study i n D i r e c t and Rule. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1937. Emerson, R. (With supplementary chapters by E l s b r e e , W.H., and Thompson, V.) Representative Government i n Southeast A s i a . Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1955. Emerson, R., M i l l s , L.A., and Thompson, V. Government and Nati o n a l i s m i n Southeast A s i a . New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , I n t e r n a t i o n a l S e c r e t a r i a t , 1942. 233 Gamba, C. Labour Law i n Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore, 19W. Hanrahan, G.Z. The Communist Struggle i n Malaya. New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1954. H a r r i s o n , B. Southeast A s i a . London: Macmillan and Company L t d . , 1954. Hol l a n d , W.L. (ed.) A s i a n Nationalism and the West. New York! The Macmillan Co., 1953. I n t e r n a t i o n a l Bank f o r Reconstruction and Development, Report of M i s s i o n organized by. The Economic Development of Malaya. B a l t i m o r e : Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 1955. Jones, S. W. P u b l i c A d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n Malaya. London: Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1953. Josey, A. Trade Unionism i n Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore, 19W. K i n g , F.H.H. The New Malayan Nation. New York: I n s t i t u t e of . P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1957. K i n g , J.K. Southeast A s i a i n P e r s p e c t i v e . New York: The Macmillan Co., 1956. Labour Research Department. B r i t i s h Imperialism i n Malaya. London: Labour Research Department, C o l o n i a l S e r i e s No. 2, 1926. Lim Tay Boh Problems of the Malayan Economy. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. Middlebrook, S.M. and P i n n i c k , A.W. How Malaya i s Governed. Great B r i t a i n : Longmans, 1949. M i l l e r , H. Menace i n Malaya. London: George G. Harrad and Co. L t d . , 1954. 234 M i l l s , L. B r i t i s h Malaya, 1824-1867. Singapore: Methodist P u b l i s h i n g House, 1925. M i l l s , L. A., and A s s o c i a t e s . The New World of Southeast A s i a . Minnesota: The U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota P r e s s , 1949. Moore, J . (ed.) Merdeka Outlook. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1957. Panikkar, K.M. The Future of Southeast A s i a . London: George A l l e n & Unwin L t d . , 1943. Parkinson, C.N. B r i t a i n i n the Far E a s t . The Singapore Naval Base. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1955. Parkinson, C.N. A Short H i s t o r y of Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. Peet, G.L. P o l i t i c a l Questions of Malaya. Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1949. P u r c e l l , V. The Chinese i n Modern Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. P u r c e l l , V. The C o l o n i a l P e r i o d i n Southeast A s i a . New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , 1953. P u r c e l l , V. Malaya. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons L t d . 1948. P u r c e l l , V. Malaya: Communist or Free? London: V i c t o r Gollancz L t d . , 1954. P u r c e l l , V. The P o s i t i o n o f the Chinese i n Southeast A s i a . New York: I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s , I n t e r n a t i o n - a l S e c r e t a r i a t , 1950. Pye, L.W. G u e r r i l l a Communism i n Malaya. I t s S o c i a l and P o l i - t i c a l Meaning. P r i n c e t o n , New Jersey: P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956. S i l c o c k , T.H. The Economy of Malaya. Singapore: Donald Moore, 1956. 235 Swettenham, S i r F. B r i t i s h Malaya. London: John Lane, the Bodley Head L t d . , 1929. Talb o t , P. (ed.) South A s i a i n the World Today. Chicago: The U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 1950. Thayer, P. W. (ed.) Nationalism and Progress i n Free A s i a . B a l t i m o r e : The Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 1956. Thayer, P. W. Southeast A s i a i n the Coming World. B a l t i m o r e : The Johns Hopkins P r e s s , 1953* Thompson, E. M. Red Terrorism i n Malaya. Washington: E d i t o r i a l Research Reports, 1952. Thompson, V. and A d l o f f , R. M i n o r i t y Problems i n Southeast A s i a . C a l i f o r n i a : Stanford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1955• T u t o r i a l Classes Department, Sydney. Malaya - Progress Score (Current A f f a i r s B u l l e t i n ) Sydney, 1956. Wheeler, L. R. The Modern Malay. London: George A l l e n and Unwin L t d . , 1928. Winstedt, S i r R. B r i t a i n and Malaya. 1786-1941. Great B r i t a i n : Longmans, Green and Co., 1944. Winstedt, S i r R. The Malays. A C u l t u r a l H i s t o r y . London: Routledge & Kegan P a u l L t d . , 1956. Wright, A. and Reid, T. H. The Malay P e n i n s u l a . London: T. F i s h e r Unwin, 1912. P e r i o d i c a l s and Newspapers A d l o f f , V.T. " B r i t a i n ' s P o l i c y i n Malaya," F a r E a s t e r n Survey, V o l . 16 (1947), P. 112. - A d l o f f , V.T. "Opposition i n Malaya," F a r E a s t e r n Survey. V o l . 16 (1947), pp. 130-1. 236 Bauer, P. T. "Nationalism and P o l i t i c s i n Malaya," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , V o l . 25, No. 3 ( A p r i l 194-7), pp. 503-517- Benson, W. "Labour Problems i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 16 (1943), pp. 389-396. " B r i t a i n Faces a New Malaya," Amerasia, V o l . 11, No. 1 (Jan. 1947), PP. 11-15. C a r n e l l , F. G. " B r i t i s h P o l i c y i n Malaya,* The P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . 23 (1952), pp. 269-2ST: C a r n e l l , F. G. " B r i t i s h P o l i c y i n Malaya," P o l i t i c a l Quar- t e r l y , V o l . 23 (1952), pp. 269-281. C a r n e l l , F. G. "Communalism and Communism i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 26 (1953), pp. 99-117. C a r n e l l , F. G. " C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Reform and E l e c t i o n s i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 27 (1954), pp. 216- 235. C a r n e l l , F. G. "The Malayan E l e c t i o n s , " P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l , 28 (1955), PP. 315-330. "Complications of Union i n Malaya," The Round Table, V o l . 36 (Dec. 1945-Sept. 1946), pp. 238-246. Cooper, E. " U r b a n i z a t i o n i n Malaya," P o p u l a t i o n S t u d i e s , V o l . 5-6 (1951-53), PP. 117-131. Correspondent ( A ) . " S o c i a l i s t Malaya?" New Statesman and Nation, V o l . 46 (July-December 1953), p. 280. Creech-Jones, Rt. Hon. A. "The A s i a n C r i s i s and the Malay P e n i n s u l a . " I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , V o l . V I , No. 1 (Winter, 1950-51), pp. 29-41. Dobby, E.H.G. "Malayan Prospect," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , Vo. 23 (1950), pp. 392-401. 237 " E l e c t i o n e e r i n g i n Malaya," The Economist, June 25, 1955, PP. 1139-1140. F i n k e l s t e i n , L. S. "Prospects f o r Self-Government i n Malaya," Far E a s t e r n Survey, V o l . 22 (1952), pp. 9-17. F l e t c h e r , W. "Malaya," United Empire, V o l . 40, No. 1, (Jan-Feb. 1949), pp. 3-8. Gamba, C. and A z i z , A. "RIDA and Malayan Economic Development," Far E a s t e r n Survey, V o l . 19 (1950), pp. 123-6. Gammans, L. D. " C r i s i s i n Malaya," The Spectator, V o l . 176, (June 14, 1946), pp. 601-2. Hawkins, G. "Marking Time i n Malaya," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , Vo. 24 (1948), pp. 76-88. Hough, G. "Malayan Medley," The New Statesman and Nation, V o l . 33, No. 843 (May 3, 1947), p. 311. K i n g , J . K. "Malaya's Resettlement Problem," Far Ea s t e r n Survey, V o l . 23 (1954), pp. 33-40. Lim, H. B. "Malaya's ' C o n s t i t u t i o n ' , " Labour Monthly, V o l . 28, No. 12 (1946), pp. 380-83. "Malayan Union Postponed," The New Statesman and Nation, V o l . 31, No. 787 (March 23, 1946), p. 203. "Malaya's New Road Ahead," The Economist, V o l . 178 (1-536) January 7, 1956, pp. 18-21. "Malays or Malayans?" The Economist, V o l . 150 (March-June, 1946) March 16, 1946, pp. 403-404. "Mr. M a r s h a l l ' s Problem," The Economist, V o l . 178 (1-536), January 7, 1956, pp. 43-44. 238 Maxwell, S i r G. "Malay Reservations," United Empire, V o l . 37, No. 3 (May-June, 1946), pp. 125-6. Morrison, I . "Aspects of the R a c i a l Problem i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 22 (1949), pp. 239-253. Nicholson, M. "A Problem i n C o l o n i a l Government," P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y . V o l . 20 (1949), pp. 160-171. Palmer, J.N. "Trade Unions and P o l i t i c s i n Malaya," Far Ea s t e r n Survey, V o l . 24, No. 3 (March, 1955), pp. 33- 39. Peterson, A.D.C. "The B i r t h of the Malayan Nation," I n t e r - n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . V o l . 31 (1955), pp. 311-316"! P u r c e l l , V. "Overseas Chinese and the People's Republic," Far E a s t e r n Survey, V o l . 19 (1950), pp. 194-6. "Races end P a r t i e s i n Malaya," Round Table. V o l . 42 (1951-52) pp. 234-9. Rees-Williams, D. R. "The C o n s t i t u t i o n a l P o s i t i o n i n Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 20 (1947), pp. 174-8. Roberts, G. "Making Malaya a Nation," The Geographical Magazine. August 1946, pp. 141-150. Seitelman, M. "Malaya i n T r a n s i t i o n , " Far E a s t e r n Survey, V o l . 16 (1947), pp. 109-111. Seitelman, M. " P o l i t i c a l Thought i n Malaya," F a r E a s t e r n Survey, V o l . 16 (1947), pp. 128-30. S i l c o c k , T.H. "Forces f o r U n i t y i n Malaya," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 25 (1949), pp. 453-465. S i l c o c k , T.H. " P o l i c y f o r Malaya 1952," I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , V o l . 28 (1952), pp. 445-457. S t r a i t s Budget, Singapore, August 1956 - August 1957. 239 T i n k e r , I . "Malayan E l e c t i o n s : E l e c t o r a l P a t t e r n f o r P l u r a l S o c i e t i e s ? " Western P o l i t i c a l Q u a r t e r l y , V o l . 9 (1-534) (1956), pp. 258-282. V l i e l a n d , C A . "The 1947 Census of Malaya," P a c i f i c A f f a i r s , V o l . 22 (1949), pp. 59-63. Whittingham-Jones, B. "The New Malaya," The Spectator, V o l . 180 (1948), pp. 126-7. Winstedt, S i r R. "What's Wrong i n Malaya," The Spect a t o r , V o l . 181 (1948), pp. 70-71. 0 f f i c i a l Sources F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1953. K u a l a Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , Government Pre s s , 1954. F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Annual Report, 1955,. K u a l a Lumpur Government P r i n t e r , Government P r e s s , 1956. F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Report of the Constituency D e l i n e a t i o n Commission, Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1954. F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, Report on the F i r s t E l e c t i o n of Members to the L e g i s l a t i v e C o u n c i l of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya, by T.E. Smith. K u a l a Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1955. Great B r i t a i n , C e n t r a l O f f i c e of Information. Malaya - the Making of a Nation. Ref. Pamphlet 36OO, May 1957. Great B r i t a i n , C e n t r a l O f f i c e of Information. Malayan Record, The B r i t i s h i n Malaya. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , Great B r i t a i n , C e n t r a l O f f i c e of Information. Towards S e l f - Government i n the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya and i n Singa- pore. R.3492, Jan. 1957. Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e , C o l o n i a l Reports - Annual. Johore. Reports f o r 1933-1937. 240 Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . C o l o n i a l Reports - Annual. State of Kedah. Reports f o r 1928-1929; 1932-1933; 1 9 3 3 - 1 9 3 4 ; 1 9 3 4 - 1 9 3 5 ; 1 9 3 5 - 1 9 3 6 ; and 1937-1938. Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . C o l o n i a l Reports - Annual. Malay S t a t e s , Federated. Reports f o r 1 9 2 3 , 1924 , and 1 9 3 3 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . C o l o n i a l Reports - Annual. Malay S t a t e s , Unfederated. Reports f o r 1923 and 1 9 2 4 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . C o l o n i a l Reports - Annual. Colony o f Singapore. Report f o r 1 9 4 7 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . C o l o n i a l Reports - Annual. S t r a i t s Settlements. Reports f o r 1 9 1 3 - 1 9 1 9 ; 1923- 1924 ; 1 9 2 9 ; 1 9 3 2 - 1 9 3 8 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals f o r the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1957, Cmnd. 210. Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya - Summary of Revised C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Proposals. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 4 7 , Cmd. 7 1 7 1 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . Malayan Union and Singapore - Statement of P o l i c y on Future C o n s t i t u t i o n . London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1946 , Cmd. 6 7 2 4 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . Malayan Union and Singapore - Summary of Proposed C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Arrangements. London, H."M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 4 6 , Cmd. 6749. Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . Report by the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Conference. London, H.M. St at i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1956 , Cmd. 9 7 1 4 . Great B r i t a i n , C o l o n i a l O f f i c e . Report of the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya C o n s t i t u t i o n a l Commission. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e , 1 9 5 7 , C o l o n i a l Wo. 330. 241 Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Commons, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e . Relevant debates from 1945-1957. Great B r i t a i n , Parliament, House of Lords, O f f i c i a l Report of Debates. London, H.M. S t a t i o n e r y O f f i c e . Relevant debates from 1945-1957. Great B r i t a i n , United Kingdom Information S e r v i c e , Background Note No. 19. Malaya, a New Nation. Toronto, 1957. Great B r i t a i n , United Kingdom Information S e r v i c e . Malaya. the F a c t s . Ottawa, 1952. Malayan Union, Annual Report, 1947. Kuala Lumpur, Government P r i n t e r , 1948. : United S t a t e s , Department of S t a t e . Malaya; Trouble Spot i n Southeast A s i a . Washington, D.C., 1953* Appendices 242 Appendix A D e t a i l s of E l e c t i o n R e s u l t s (Each candidate has h i s p a r t y and name i n d i c a t e d against h i s name. I n s o f a r as the names o f the r e s p e c t i v e p a r t i e s are con- cerned, A l l . stands f o r A l l i a n c e , Neg. f o r P a r t y Negara, NAP f o r N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n of Perak, Lab. f o r Labour P a r t y of Malaya, PMIP f o r Pan-Malayan I s l a m i c P a r t y , PPP f o r Perak Prog r e s s i v e P a r t y , PML f o r Perak Malay League, and Ind. f o r Independent. Candidates w i t h an a s t e r i s k against t h e i r name f o r f e i t e d t h e i r d e p o s i t s . The 14 Malay-dominated c o n s t i t u e n - c i e s where non-Malay A l l i a n c e candidates had contested against Malay candidates belonging t o other p a r t i e s may be i d e n t i f i e d by a double a s t e r i s k . W e l l e s l e y South; ** Tay Hooi Soo A l l . Chinese 15,697 votes H a j i Z a b i d l t i n H a j i A l l PMIP Malay 3>523 votes No. of r e j e c t e d b a l l o t papers 240 No. of names on r e g i s t e r of e l e c t o r s used at the p o l l 24,320 Percentage of r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r a t e v o t i n g 80.0$ George Town: (Chinese m a j o r i t y ) Chee Swee Eee A l l . Chinese 7,253 votes Ooi Thlam Slew Lab. Chinese 2,650 votes Che ah Phee A i k Ind. Chinese 429 votes No. of r e j e c t e d b a l l o t papers 163 No. o f names on r e g i s t e r of e l e c t o r s 19,935 Percentage of r e g i s t e r e d e l e c t o r a t e v o t i n g 52.6$ Penang I s l a n d : Z a l n u l A b i d i n b i n S u l t a n Mydin A l l . Malay : 14,865 votes Md. I s a