UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

Finland's relations with the Soviet Union, 1940-1952 Krosby, Hans Peter 1958

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata


831-UBC_1958_A8 K7 F4.pdf [ 18.23MB ]
JSON: 831-1.0106121.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0106121-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0106121-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0106121-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0106121-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0106121-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0106121-source.json
Full Text

Full Text

FINLAND'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, 1940-1952 by HANS PETER KROSBY B.A., U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1955 A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l F u l f i l m e n t of the Requirements f o r the Degree of MASTER OF ARTS i n INTERNATIONAL STUDIES We accept t h i s Thesis as conforming to the r e q u i r e d standard: UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , 1958 ABSTRACT In March 194-0, Finland had just completed another l i f e and death struggle with the Soviet Union, the second such struggle since Bolshevik autocracy-replaced Tsarist autocracy in Russia in 1917. During the following fifteen months, Soviet diplomacy endeavoured to complete the job which the Red Army had "begun. By a unilateral and extremely l i b e r a l interpretation of the Peace Treaty of March 12, 1940, the Soviet Union tried to isolate Finland from her other neighbours and to establish a favourable basis for a complete annexation of Finland in the manner of the three Baltic States. Surrounded by Soviet and German military might, and noticing the increasing f r i c t i o n in the Nazi-Soviet alliance, Finland, in order to save herself from an imminent Soviet invasion, grasped the only straw which seemed to offer some hope: a transit agreement for German troops from Finland's Bothnian coast to Kirkenes in oc-cupied Norway. The resulting presence of German troops in the country did save Finland from becoming the seventeenth S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republic i n 1940 or 194-1* but i t a l s o involved her deeply i n the Nazi-Soviet c o n f l i c t which fo l l o w e d . When Germany attacked the S o v i e t Union i n June 194-1, F i n l a n d t r i e d i n v a i n to have her n e u t r a l i t y respected, and she was attacked by S o v i e t forces three days a f t e r the German aggression. During the s o - c a l l e d C o n t i n u a t i o n War, F i n l a n d refused to take p a r t i n the general German o f f e n s i v e p l a n , r e s t r i c t i n g h e r s e l f to a t t a i n i n g her own s t r a t e g i c goals only, a l l of them d i c t a t e d by the requirements f o r the defence of F i n n i s h t e r r i t o r y . Nevertheless, when F i n l a n d was f i n a l l y able to p u l l out of the war i n 1944, she was t r e a t e d by the A l l i e d Powers as an a l l y of Germany and subjected to an exceedingly heavy indemnity, payable i n goods to the Soviet Union. She a l s o l o s t more than ten per cent of her t e r r i t o r y and had to give the S o v i e t Union a f i f t y - y e a r s lease on P o r k k a l a , ten miles from the c a p i t a l . The r e t r e a t i n g Germans destroyed n i n e t y per cent of a l l f a c i l i t i e s and resources i n North F i n l a n d . Although F i n l a n d was not occupied, her government worked under the s u p e r v i s i o n of an A l l i e d C o n t r o l Commission i n s t a l l e d by the S o v i e t Union. The government was forced to prosecute hundreds of 'war c r i m i n a l s ' , i n c l u d i n g e i g h t of F i n l a n d ' s war-time l e a d e r s . However, as long as F i n l a n d f u l f i l l e d the conditions of the A r m i s t i c e Agreement, she was allowed to handle her i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s i n r e l a t i v e liberty. The Finnish Communists were unable to out-ma neuvre the government and were removed from a l l positions of control after the Peace Treaty had been signed in 194-7. Finland was also able to meet the obligations of the war indemnity, although the total cost to Finland was approx-imately $900,000,000. The general election of 1948 marked a turning point in that i t inaugurated a period during which Finnish democracy managed to reconquer a l l territory lost to the Communists during the era of the Control Commission. In spite of that, Finnish-Soviet relations grew increasingly better after i t had become clear to the Soviet Union that Finland intended to stay aloof from Great Power conflicts in a l l circumstances. By 1952, i t could safely be said that Finland's relations with the Soviet Union were the best since 1917. But Finnish independence was conditional on her own policy of absolute neutrality and the future developments in the East-West conflict. In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree th a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . I t i s understood that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed, without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of H I S T O R Y The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 5, Canada. Date Apr i l 16. 1958 CONTENTS CHAPTER PAGE Foreword i I From Independence to the Winter War 1 II Ordeal by Peace, March 1940-June 1941 59 III The Continuation War, June 1941-September 1944 .. 102 IV The Price of Peace 156 V The War Indemnity, i t s Impact and Liquidation, 1944-1952 176 VI The Struggle for Survival, 1944-1947 204 VII Democratic Reconstruction, 1948-1952 241 Epilogue 297 MAPS i Proposed border adjustments, October-November 1939, and Finnish-Soviet border of March 12, 1940 55 i i Maximum advance by Finnish Army into Soviet territory during World War II 116 i i i Finnish-Soviet border of September 19, 194-4, and February 10, 1947 171 BIBLIOGRAPHY 313 FOREVTORD When t h i s t h e s i s was f i r s t begun, i t s t i t l e was "Finland's R e l a t i o n s With the S o v i e t Union Since the A r m i s t i c e " . However, as the research progressed, i t was found that i t i s impossible to e x p l a i n s a t i s f a c t o r i l y F i n l a n d ' s postwar r e l a t i o n s w i t h her eastern neighbour without going r a t h e r e x t e n s i v e l y i n t o the preceding war years. Soon i t a l s o became i n e v i t a b l e that an i n t r o d u c t o r y survey of F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s between the B o l s h e v i k r e v o l u t i o n and 194-0 must be i n c l u d e d , s i n c e i t i s d i f f i c u l t to understand one period i n t h i s unique r e l a t i o n s h i p without a general knowledge of the others. The present t h e s i s , t h e r e f o r e , i s perhaps a t -tempting too much i n that i t endeavours to do j u s t i c e to two chapters of F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s which, s t r i c t l y speaking, may be two d i s t i n c t p e r i o d s , but i n r e a l i t y complement each other. The experiences of 1940-44 were the p r e r e q u i s i t e s which d e c i s i v e l y i n f l u e n c e d the conditions governing the S o v i e t Union's approach to F i n l a n d during i i 1944 - 5 2 . And the q u a l i t i e s which sustained the F i n n i s h people during the Winter War of 1939-40, during the ord e a l of peace a f t e r the Moscow Peace, and during the years of the C o n t i n u a t i o n War from 1941 to 1944, were the same q u a l i t i e s which enabled them to ca r r y the burden of the heaviest war indemnity o b l i g a t i o n s s u c c e s s f u l l y discharged by any n a t i o n at any time, the same q u a l i t i e s which allowed F i n l a n d , as the only country among those which f e l l under S o v i e t domination at the end of World War I I , to emerge w i t h her p r i n c i p l e s , her l i b e r t y and her democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n t a c t . One other major reason why the per i o d of 1940-44 was included i n the present t h e s i s was a d e s i r e on the part of the author to attempt to d i s p e l some of the popular misconceptions s t i l l p r e v a i l i n g about the events which l e d to F i n n i s h c o - b e l l i g e r e n c y w i t h Germany from 1941 to 1944. As a l o g i c a l consequence of Great B r i t a i n ' s most r e l u c t a n t d e c i s i o n to accede to S o v i e t demands that she declare war upon F i n l a n d to b o l s t e r the Anglo-Soviet a l l i a n c e against Germany, the S o v i e t v e r s i o n of F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s g r a d u a l l y seeped i n t o the war propaganda of the A l l i e d Powers. This was made e a s i e r by the undeniable presence of German troops on F i n n i s h t e r r i t o r y since the f a l l of 1940, a f a c t which was magnified beyond a l l reasonable proportions i n A l l i e d propaganda. Since the o r i g i n of the t r a n s i t agree-ment, which made the presence of German forces i n F i n l a n d p o s s i b l e , was - and s t i l l i s - the object of considerable i i i dispute, postwar writers on the topic have been able to take their choice of which side of the argument they prefer to accept, which has tended to continue the suspicion of Finnish i n t e g r i t y and democracy sown during the war. The most recent example of such writings appeared only l a s t year. I t i s hoped that the thesis has managed to cast some new l i g h t on the o r i g i n of the Continuation War, because i t i s only when that chapter of Finnish history i s understood that one can f u l l y understand the i n j u s t i c e suffered by Finland after World Vfer II for having accidentally been pushed into one b e l l i g e r e n t camp rather than the other. Her p o s i t i o n d i f f e r s l i t t l e i n this respect from that of Norway. Norway would undoubtedly have r e s i s t e d the planned B r i t i s h invasion as she r e s i s t e d the Germans, but since Germany reached Norway f i r s t - Norway accidentally found herself on the winning side i n the war. I t i s true that there are major differences between the cases of Norway and Finland, but a generalized comparison such as the one above is not e n t i r e l y u n j u s t i f i e d . No reader of the present thesis can f a i l to notice that i t i s written by one who has a profound admiration for the Finnish people. As one who h a i l s from Scandinavia, the author has come by that respect honestly and i t has not been lessened by the rather extensive research which went into the preparation of this thesis. On the contrary, the evidence of history can only serve to increase one's admiration for the four m i l l i o n Finns and for what they have i v accomplished i n the face of supreme hardships. In s p i t e of the presence of t h i s admiration, the author b e l i e v e s that o b j e c t i v i t y of treatment has not been s a c r i f i c e d . A l l evidence of which he has knowledge has been taken i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n , and to the best of h i s knowledge no f a c t has been 'conveniently f o r g o t t e n ' because i t might tend to c o n t r a d i c t opinions expressed i n t h i s t h e s i s . The author i s deeply indebted to Dean F. H. Soward, whose expert advice has always been given f r e e l y , and whose thorough examination of the manuscript has removed at l e a s t the worst d i s c r e p a n c i e s i n language and f a c t . The f a u l t s which s t i l l remain must be a t t r i b u t e d to the n a t u r a l stub-bornness of the author. Acknowledgements are a l s o due to my f a t h e r , D i r e c t o r Peter Korsby of the A g r i c u l t u r a l College of Norway, to my god-father, Head L i b r a r i a n Arne Johnson of the same i n s t i t u t i o n , and to my s i s t e r , cand. t h e o l . S i d s e l Krosby of Vollebekk, Norway, f o r t h e i r a s s i s t a n c e i n searching Scandinavian p e r i o d i c a l indexes and preparing a l i s t of p e r i o d i c a l w r i t i n g s u s e f u l f o r the present t h e s i s ; to the L i b r a r y of the Nobel I n s t i t u t e i n Oslo, Norway, f o r making p h o t o s t a t i c copies of a number of p e r i o d i c a l a r t i c l e s ; to Dr. H e i k k i Valvanne, Head of the I n s t i t u t e of Economic Research of the Bank of F i n l a n d i n H e l s i n k i , f o r h i s advice w i t h respect to l i t e r a t u r e a v a i l a b l e i n F i n l a n d ; to the Academic Book Store i n H e l s i n k i f o r s i m i l a r a s s i s t a n c e ; to Mr. Helge Ekengren, Vice-Consul of F i n l a n d i n Vancouver, f o r making a v a i l a b l e to the author copies of F i n n i s h V p e r i o d i c a l s and numerous issues of the Swedish People's Party's newspaper Hufvudstadsbladet; to my f r i e n d Gunnar Hansen of Grundt Tanum's Book Store i n Oslo f o r keeping me up to date on r e l e v a n t l i t e r a t u r e on the Norwegian book market and forwarding a number of u s e f u l works; and to Mr. Ronald J . Todd, Reference L i b r a r i a n at the U n i v e r s i t y of Washington, f o r h i s kind and always w i l l i n g a s s i s t a n c e i n f i n d i n g m a t e r i a l during four weeks of research i n S e a t t l e . H. P. K. CHAPTER I FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE WINTER WAR To the people of F i n l a n d , the knowledge of So v i e t Communism i n i t s most ominous i m p l i c a t i o n s i s as o l d as S o v i e t Communism i t s e l f . While i t took the exper-iences of World War I I , the r e v e l a t i o n of S o v i e t aims through the p u b l i c a t i o n of Nazi-Germany's documents on f o r e i g n p o l i c y and the f r u s t r a t i o n s of the l a s t twelve years to open the eyes of the Western democracies t o the f a c t that the globe alone i s the l i m i t of Sovi e t - R u s s i a n designs, F i n l a n d possessed t h i s knowledge from the outset of her independent exi s t e n c e as a sovereign s t a t e . Even though there are s t i l l those i n 'the West' who f i n d i t d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e the proclamations of Communism from Marx to Lenin and the evidence of the l a s t f o r t y years' h i s t o r y , the F i n n i s h n a t i o n has faced the w r i t i n g on the w a l l and l i v e d w i t h i t s i n c e 1917. To the F i n n s , the im p e r i a l i s m of S o v i e t Communism was not a d i s c o v e r y made si n c e the Second World War - or during the Winter War of 2 1939-4-0. I t was an aspect of t r a d i t i o n a l Russian p o l i c y which they had f e l t b o d i l y f i r s t i n 1721,1 then continuously and i n c r e a s i n g l y throughout the r e i g n of T s a r i s t Russia from 1809 to 1917 and during the regime of Communism i n Russia from 1917 to the present day. The f a c t that the -Finns have survived as an independent n a t i o n s t a t e i n the face of the tremendous pressure exerted upon them from the East during the l a s t f o r t y years i s no l e s s than a m i r a c l e i n t wentieth century h i s t o r y and r e f l e c t s a measure of courage and devotion to the p r i n c i p l e s of democratic freedom of which the r e s t of the f r e e world could, w i t h great b e n e f i t , take note. From the very outset of i t s e x i s t e n c e , the sovereign F i n n i s h s t a t e has learned that the u l t i m a t e g o a l of S o v i e t Communism does not change, that there i s not n e c e s s a r i l y a c o r e l a t i o n between S o v i e t words and a c t i o n s . I n the wake of the Kerensky r e v o l u t i o n i n March, 1917 > the Finns detached themselves from R u s s i a , and, f o l l o w i n g the ensuing B o l s h e v i k r e v o l u t i o n , the F i n n i s h Parliament, the Riksdag, f o r m a l l y proclaimed the independence of F i n l a n d on December 6, 1917. Already a t t h a t e a r l y date the menace t o F i n l a n d represented by the Bolsheviks i n Russia was r e a l i z e d i n F i n l a n d . Passing through Petersburg i n the middle of 1 F o l l o w i n g the defeat and death of King Charles X I I of Sweden before the Norwegian f o r t r e s s of F r e d r i k s t e n , Peter the Great, under the terms of the Treaty of Nystad (IJusikaupunki) of 1721 , obtained a f r o n t i e r w i t h Sweden s i m i l a r to that sub-sequently imposed by the U.S.S.R. on F i n l a n d by the Peace of Moscow i n 194-0. 3 December, 1917 j on his way home to Finland from his command on the Eastern front, his last i n thirty years of service with the Russian Imperial Army, General Baron Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim expressed his impressions of the revolution in these words: "I soon realized that there was no sign of any attempt to oppose the Soviet power, and that this would quickly consolidate Itself and become a deadly menace to the young Finnish State. Finland must prepare to defend herself...." 2 The Soviet attitude appeared to be not too menacing on the face of i t , however. Reporting to the A l l -Russian Central Executive Committee on January 4, 1918, the People's Commissar of Nationality Affairs, J. V. Stalin, asserted that the decision of the Council of People's Commissars on December 31st to recognize the independence of Finland had been arrived at " . . . i n f u l l accord with the principles of the right of nations to self-determination...." The People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, L. D. Trotsky, had expressed himself to the same effect during a press interview two days e a r l i e r . 4 There was l i t t l e else the Soviet of People's Commissars could do under the circum-stances. However, for those who knew how to interpret 2 C. G. E. Mannerheim, The Memoirs of Marsha1 Mannerheim. London, Cassell, 1953> P» 123* 3 Jane Degras, ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy. London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 195l» vol. 1 (1917-1924), p. 29. 4 Ibid., p. 26. 4 Communist announcements there was ample reason for ap-prehension. Stalin, in the report quoted, went on to say: If we look more closely into the picture of the independence received by Finland, we shall see that in fact the Council of People's Commissars has, against i t s w i l l , given freedom not to the people, not to the representatives of the Finnish proletariat, but to the Finnish bourgeoisie which by a strange coincidence seized power and received independence from the hands of the socialists of Russia. The Finnish workers and Social Democrats found themselves in a situation i n which they had to accept freedom not directly from the hands of the Russian socialists, but with the help of the Finnish bourgeoisie. Seeing i n this the tragedy of the Finnish proletariat, we cannot refrain from pointing out that i t is only because of indecision and an incomprehensible cowardice that the Finnish Social Democrats did not take decisive steps to take power themselves and to wrest their independence from the hands of the Finnish bourgeoisie. ...Let then Finland's independence help forward the cause of the liberation of the Finnish workers and peasants and create a solid basis for the friendship of our peoples.? Stalin's words gave the Finns a f a i r l y good idea of what was the Soviet definition of the word 'people1, and they were informed in no uncertain terms that the group to which Finnish independence had been so magnanimously handed did not represent, or even constitute a part of, the 'people'. Finnish independence had been turned over to the bourgeoisie, and the Finnish workers and peasants were challenged to assert the 'right of nations to self-determination*. They alone, in Communist interpretation, were the nation, the people of Finland. It was quite clear that the formal recognition 5 Degras, op. c i t . . vol. 1, pp. 30-31. 5 extended to Finland by the Soviet of People's Commissars was l i t t l e more than a regrettable but necessary expedient dictated by the prevailing conditions of the day. The real Soviet designs were already in the process of being organized. There was no rush on the part of the new regime i n Petersburg to withdraw Russian troops from the territory of Finland, for instance, as their usefulness had not yet come to an end. Revolutionary ideas had found response i n Finland as well as i n Russia, and the Social Democratic Party, under the influence of i t s extreme l e f t i s t elements, on October 20, 1917> had urged the workers to organize military formations for the purpose of 'self-defence* and to be prepared 'for a l l eventualities'. 0 These formations soon came to be known as 'Red Guards*. 'White Guards', consisting mainly of men from the upper and middle classes, including the peasantry, had been formed a few months earlier during the campaign for independence and as a counterweight for the Russian troops i n the country. The division in the Finnish nation grew ominously each day# On January 26, 1918, the Red Guards mobilized, and two days later they struck, taking possession of Helsinki, Tampere, Kuopio and several other major centres in the south. On the 28th the White Guards retaliated, disarming the Russian troops in the Vaasa region and soon liberating the entire Bothnian coast under the generalship • 6 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 130. of Mannerheim. The active Red Army support of the Red Guards was continued even after the conclusion of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, i n which Russia agreed to with-draw her troops from Finnish territory forthwith.? The White Guards remained victorious, however, and the revolt was doomed even before the Germans decided to Intervene from the Baltic. While this cruelly bitter c i v i l war was i n pro-gress, however, the Soviet leaders further showed their hand by concluding a 'Treaty of Friendship with the Finnish Socialist Workers' Republic 1 on March 1st, thus promptly recognizing the 'real independence' of the Finnish 'people' for which they had.called at the time of the Petersburg uprisings.^ This establishment of diplomatic relations with a rebel regime was to become almost a trademark i n 7 Lenin said of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty: "I shall neither read i t nor carry out i t s terms whenever there is a chance to do so," David Shub, Lenin. New York, The New American Library of World Literature, 1953* p. 154. 8 Stalin actually went to Finland in November, 1917» to attend a conference of the Social Democratic Party, and he urged immediate action in conformity with the revolution i n Russia. Lenin In vain implored the Finnish workers to "Rise, rise Instantly, and take over the government in the hands of organized labor." Anatole G. Mazour, Finland Between East  and" West, Princeton, N. J., D. Van Nostrand, 1956, pp. 56-57. Otto W. Kuusinen, one of the foremost leaders of the l e f t wing of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, later explained that the Russian Revolution came as a complete "surprise" to the Finnish Social Democrats. Strong believers i n the ideals of Communism, they found themselves hesitant and incapable of action when the hour of revolution f i n a l l y struck, and they did not recover u n t i l the opportunity had been passed up and the bourgeoisie had had time to organize 7 Finnish-Soviet relations, as the procedure was duplicated by the Soviet Government twenty years later. The recog-nition extended to independent Finland less than two months earlier was now conveniently overlooked. The Finnish state had experienced i t s f i r s t lesson in the r e l i a b i l i t y of the new regime i n Russia. The Finns had received their f i r s t practical demonstration of the fact that the new leaders of Russia were the heirs of Peter the Great. Not until October 14, 1920, was peace concluded between Finland and the Soviet Union. By the Treaty of Tartu, Finland gained a border with the Soviet Union which roughly paralleled her ancient frontiers. The only notable differences were the cession of the districts of Repola and PorajSrvi i n Eastern Karelia, while the Petsamo d i s t r i c t was gained, giving Finland an ice-free port on the Arctic Ocean. In spite of the peace treaty, however, relations between Finland and her eastern neighbour between the two world wars could never be described as good. Considerable tension continued. Diplomatic representatives were exchanged, but i t was soon found that the Soviet envoy i n Helsinki was i t s defence. An instant uprising i n Finland at the time of the Petersburg revolt would have been the right course. Then there should immediately have been set up an a l l -powerful and absolutely merciless dictatorship of the pro-letariat to safeguard the success of the revolution, Kuusinen declared. The immediate result of this self-chastising analysis was the break with the Social Democrats and the formation of the Finnish Communist Party, "ibid., pp. 5 5 - 5 8 . 8 using his position to promote communist agitation within Finland.^ Of a more serious nature was the dispute which arose in 1921 over the status of Eastern K a r e l i a . ^ In Articles 10 and 11 of the Tartu Treaty, the Soviet Govern-ment had undertaken to guarantee the p o l i t i c a l , economic and cultural autonomy of Eastern Karelia under Russian sovereignty, an undertaking which was further elaborated upon in a unilateral declaration by the Soviet delegation attached to the treaty. From the start, this obligation had been neglected, however, and a popular uprising broke out In November, 1921. The Finnish Government appealed to the League of Nations, which promptly brought a blast from G. V. Chicherin, Commissar for Foreign Affairs, charging Finland's Government with responsibility for the 'raids' on the 'Karelian Labour Commune'. Unless Finland effectively closed the frontier, ceased supporting the organizations aiding the 'bands', liquidated the same organizations and dissolved Russian counter-revolutionary groups operating In Finland - the Soviet Government would be "...compelled to take other steps to secure the real observance by the Finnish Government of the peace treaty i t concluded with 9 Arnold J. Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs  1920-1923. London, Oxford University Press, 1924, p. 240. (Issued under the auspices of the British Institute of International Affairs) (Hereafter volumes in this series w i l l be referred to as Survey 1924. Survey 1925. etc.) 10See'Survey 1920-1923, pp. 245-248, and Mazour, op. c i t . . pp. 68-70 for accounts of the c r i s i s and i t s background. 9 the RSFSR."•LA The League of Nations, acting on an opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice, decided that i t could not take any action i n a dispute between a Member and a state not a Member without the consent of the latter. Meanwhile, the Soviet Government suppressed the Karelian uprising with the greatest severity, and large number of troops were concentrated near the Finnish frontier. Only the 'prudence of the Finnish Government1 prevented any further development of the c r i s i s . ^ 2 But the status of Eastern Karelia remained a bone of contention, a terra  irredenta, i n the opinion of many Finns and a shameful symbol of injustice to a l l . It also remained a constant reminder of the value of Soviet promises, however solemnly made. In the face of these experiences, however, the Communist Party had been given government permission to organize i t s e l f In Finland even before the Tartu Treaty had been signed. In the spring of 1920, i t called a constituent meeting under the name of Finland's Socialist Workers' Party, and no obstacles, were placed i n i t s way. Not even heavily documented representations by the State Police which urged 11 Note from Chicherin to the Finnish Charge d'Affaires in Moscow on Eastern Karelia of December 5» 1921. Degras, op. c i t . . pp. 280-282. 12 Survey 1920-1923. p. 246. In his note of December 5> Chicherin also said that the Soviet Government "...regards the appeal of the Finnish Government to the so-called League of Nations as in a l l i t s implications a hostile act and a radical violation of the peace treaty." Degras, op. c i t . . p. 281. 10 the dissolution of the party and the institution of criminal proceedings against i t s leaders succeeded i n bringing any action against the Communists. In the Riksdag elections of 1922, the Communists returned twenty-seven deputies to the 200-member assembly, their largest representation u n t i l after the Second World War. The eventual t r i a l and conviction of Communist leaders in the summer of 1923> and the dissolution of the party two years later, also failed to put a stop to Communist activity in Finland. Under the name of Finland's Workers' and Smallholders' Party, they were permitted to con-tinue their work un t i l f i n a l l y banned by the Riksdag i n 1930. In this period,.also, began the frustrating chain of Finnish attempts to seek p o l i t i c a l security In regional agreements. The f i r s t such attempt was begun in 1921, resulting in the signature on March 17> 1922, of an agreement among Poland, Finland, Estonia and Latvia providing for unified action in the case of aggression. The Soviet Govern-ment immediately protested that this agreement was tantamount to an alliance directed against the Soviet Union. Although Estonia and Latvia nevertheless r a t i f i e d the accord, Finland bowed to the Soviet objections and rejected the agreement in the summer of 1922. Further conferences during 1923, 1924 and 1925 failed to convince Finland of the wisdom of a Baltic alliance, and she subsequently turned her attentions westward. 13 13 See Louis Fischer, The Soviets i n World Affairs. A History  of the Relations Between the Soviet Union and the Rest of the" World. 1917-1929. Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1951,'vol. 2, ppl 517-519. Also Survey 1920-1923. pp. 241-242. 11 The advent of the Kellogg-Briand Pact for the Renunciation of War provided the Soviet Government with an excellent opportunity to promote i t s own security programme, and i t heralded 'a new era' in Soviet diplomacy. In spite of the caution necessitated by the weak internal position of the country, the Soviet Government had fa i t h f u l l y trumpeted the doctrine of world revolution in the years immediately following the revolution in Russia. It had soon come to realize, however, that the world revolution could not be brought about by merely urging the workers of a l l countries to unite and rise against their bourgeois op-pressors in the fashion demonstrated in Russia. And with this growing realization came the internal struggle between the proponents of immediate world revolution and the pro-ponents of the idea of building a strong and secure base in Russia before again advancing the world-wide revolution. The 'New Economic Policy 1, instituted by Lenin himself, was a victory, in effect, for the latter faction. The expulsion of Trotsky ended this struggle and spelled the consolidation of the 'Russia f i r s t ' faction under the leadership of Stalin. The emphasis on world revolution was shelved for the time being, and everything had to serve the goal of establishing the Russian base which would later f a c i l i t a t e the expansion of Communism to the rest of the world. Soviet diplomacy had a major part to play in this new party line, and soon i t s efforts were directed to a considerable extent towards the campaign to convince the countries of the world that 12 the menace of world revolution was a thing of the past. Hand in hand with this campaign went the efforts to gain the required respite by a system of non-aggression pacts with neighbours of the Soviet Union, and nothing could have aided this campaign more than the Kellogg-Briand Pact. On October 4, 1 9 2 8 , the Soviet Government for-mally adhered to the Treaty for the Renunciation of War which had been signed in Paris less than six weeks earlier. None of the original signatories had r a t i f i e d the treaty at that time, and neither had any of them done so when Maxim Litvinov, Assistant Commissar for Foreign Affairs, on December 2 9 , 1 9 2 8 , invited Poland to sign with the Soviet Union a protocol which would bring the Kellogg-Briand Pact into force between the two countries at the earliest pos-sible date. Litvinov expressed the desire that other European border states of the Soviet Union should become parties to the protocol as well, and by July 4, 1 9 2 9 , instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n of the protocol had been deposited in Moscow by the Soviet Union, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Rumania, Lithuania and Danzig, and also by Turkey and Persia. Finland remained the only one of Russia's neighbours i n Europe outside the Soviet security system.-*-4" And yet Russian suspicions made i t increasingly more d i f f i c u l t for Finland to harbour any illusions about the virtues of a 14 See Max Beloff, The Foreign"Policy of Soviet Russia. London, Oxford University Press, "1947-49, vol. lj p.- 9. Fischer, op. c i t . . chapter 28; Survey 1929, pp. 63-69. 13 policy of isolated neutrality, and westward orientation towards the Scandinavian countries became more marked. The arrival on the Finnish scene of the so-called Lapua Movement and the banning of organized Communist p o l i t i c a l activity did not, of course, improve relations with the Soviet Union. This "brief flare-up of an anti-democratic movement" originated in "...a curious native environment of anti-Communist, anti-democratic, and Russo-? phobe sentiment fused into one", to quote Professor Anatole G. Mazour.-1-^ Starting with a local demonstration against the Young Communist League at Lapua - hence the name - in southern Ostrobothnia in November, 1929, the Lapua Movement soon spanned the entire country and even exerted some influence upon the government. The resignation of Prime Minister KyBsti Kallio, who was succeeded by former President P. E. Svinhufvud, a righ t i s t , on July 1, 1930, further boosted the fortunes of the Lapua Movement. The movement, inspired to a considerable extent by the Lutheran clergy and representing a crusade against a l l godlessness i n Finland, Social Democrats as well as Communists, and for a short i n i t i a l period enjoyed the tacit support of President L. K. Relander, General Mannerheim and other prominent leaders. Soon, however, the movement whipped i t s e l f into a hysteria reminiscent of the simultaneous movement of 15 Op. c i t . , p. 84. For a very vivid and partisan account of the Lapua period by a Finnish Communist," see"A. R. Torni, Finlands tva ansikten. Politiska handelser pi scenen och bakom  kulisserna, Stockholm, Arbetarkulturs Forlag, 1944, pp. 77-95. 14 National Socialism in Germany, and the responsible leaders of Finland found i t necessary to curtail the activities of the Lapua members, who were rapidly becoming as dangerous to Finnish democracy as the Communists they had set out to eliminate. But f i r s t , by a one vote majority, the Riksdag had adopted Svinhufvud's program and outlawed the Communist Party from both the Riksdag and the local city and com-munity councils. An abortive military coup early i n 1932 led to the arrest of the Lapua leaders, and i n March the Riksdag passed legislation which banned a l l Lapua organ-izations. Fascism in Finland had been nipped i n the bud. However, the outlawry of Communism in Finland had, as could be expected, been taken very seriously across the border, and i t has been claimed that the Soviet Govern-ment was making preparations for war during the days of the big Lapua demonstrations i n Helsinki in the summer of 1930."^ Part and parcel of the Lapua controversy had also been the ever-present problem of Eastern Karelia, which had already led to a most serious dispute between the two neighbours only a few years before. The fact that the Lapua Movement proved to be merely a tempest i n a tea cup and had merely an insignificant Influence on Finnish o f f i c i a l policy did not put., the Soviet Government at ease. It i s d i f f i c u l t to believe that the Russians did not realize the true situation, 16 John H.;Wuorinen," ed., Finland and World War II. 1939-1944. New York, The Ronald Press Company, 194b", p. 38. 15 and i t appears that the bombastic declarations of Lapua leaders about a 'Greater Finland 1 reaching as far as the Ural Mountains were only too welcome in Moscow as points of departure for new attacks on Finland. The Lapua practice of abducting Finnish Communists, driving them to the Soviet border and then 'expelling' them, only served to keep the Soviet propaganda machine in constant motion, of course."^'7 In spite of the threatening attitude of the Soviet Government, Finland did her utmost to build and maintain good relations with her eastern neighbour. The banning of the Lapua Movement was not the only measure taken by the Finnish Government which ought to have produced a calming effect in Moscow. Two months before this action was taken, on January 21, 1932, Finland at long last submitted to the overtures begun by the Soviet Government in 1928 and signed a Treaty of Non-Aggression and Pacific Settlement of Disputes, thereby completing the security system of the Soviet Union with it s European neighbours.^ Three months later, this 17 See Note of July 16, 1930 from I. M. Maisky, Soviet envoy in Helsinki, to the Finnish Foreign Minister, i n Degras, op. c i t . , vol. 2, p. 448; Note of September 28, 1 9 3 0 , from Litvinov to the Finnish Minister in Moscow, Ibid., pp. 453-4-56; Tass statement, published in Izvestia on January 2 8 , 1931. ibid., pp. 469-470; and Note of May 17> 1931, from Krestihsky, Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs, to the Finnish Charge d'Affaires in Moscow, ibid., pp. 497-4-99. 18 Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, The Development  of Finnish-Soviet Relations During the Autumn of 1939 In the  Light of O f f i c i a l Documents. Helsinki, Oy. Suomen Kirja, 1940, pp. 23-26. (Hereafter referred to as Finnish-Soviet Relations) 16 treaty was followed by a Convention of Conciliation, which determined the procedure to be followed in settling disputes p e a c e f u l l y . o n July 2 2 , 1933> Finland acceded to the Convention for the Definition of Aggression con-cluded among the other members of the Soviet security system earlier that month, and, f i n a l l y , on April 7> 1 9 3 4 , Finland signed a protocol renewing the Treaty of Non-Aggression un t i l December 31> 1 9 4 5 . F i n l a n d had indeed done her utmost to remove any and a l l suspicions which could possibly be harboured by the leaders of the Soviet Union, but she was soon to find that these efforts were not enough. The f i r s t Five-Year Plan had by now begun to have its impact upon the Soviet economy, in spite of the d i f f i c u l t i e s i n i t i a l l y encountered, and the Soviet leaders were beginning to feel more confident in their new strength. The age-old aspect of imperialism in Russian foreign policy, which for obvious and stated reasons had been buried for the time being following the revolution, now reappeared on the eastern horizon. Early in 1 9 3 3 , Commissar for Foreign Affairs Litvinov made a.statement whichj for the f i r s t time, men-tioned the guarantees of the independence and security of 19 Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 2 7 - 3 1 . 2 0 Ibid., pp. 31-36". 2 1 Ibid., pp. 3 6 - 3 7 . 17 the Baltic States which a few years later proved so f a t e f u l . 2 2 Towards the end of that same year, there were reports to the effect that the Soviet and Polish Governments had suggested to the governments of the Baltic States and Finland that they accept a joint Soviet-Polish guarantee against aggression by Germany. The proposal apparently met with l i t t l e response and can hardly have been pressed by Poland in view of the agreement which she concluded with Germany on January 26, 1934. The Soviet Union promptly suggested a joint Soviet-German guarantee of the four Baltic republics, but the idea was rejected by Germany on April 14th. 2 3 The failure of these maneuvers only helped to increase Soviet suspicions, already expressed by Litvinov to a reporter i n January, that an anti-Russian alliance existed among Germany, Poland and Finland. 2 4" This suspicion, plus the reappearing element of imperialism i n Russian foreign policy which allowed the Soviet Government to speak and act with greater freedom than 22 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 39• 23 See Beloff, op. c i t . . vol. 1, pp. 140-141: Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Baltic States. London, New York and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 193oy pv 76"; Survey 1934. pp. 410-412; Survey 1935. vol. 1, pp. 62-63. 24 Litvinov claimed that by the terms of this alliance Germany was to get the 'Corridor', Memel, part of Lithuania and exclusive rights in the Donetz Basin. Poland was to get the remainder of Lithuania, White Russia and possibly Estonia and Latvia. Finland was to get part of North-West Russia and Soviet Karelia. Linton Wells, Blood on the Moon. New York, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1937, pp. 352-353. Quoted in Beloff, op. c i t . . vol. 1, p. 141. 18 a decade e a r l i e r , gave themselves p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a t i o n s i n the d e p o r t a t i o n of a l a r g e p o r t i o n of the indigenous F i n n i s h p o p u l a t i o n from Eas t e r n K a r e l i a and from I n g r i a i n connection w i t h the c o n s t r u c t i o n of the White Sea-B a l t i c Canal, This c a n a l had been completed i n June, 1933, and i t was accompanied by the c o n s t r u c t i o n of f r o n t i e r f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . Apparently the S o v i e t Government d i d not f e e l i t could s a f e l y a l l o w an a l i e n p o p u l a t i o n element to remain i n the r e g i o n under the circumstances. I n J u l y , 1935> the F i n n i s h Government requested an e x p l a n a t i o n of the d e p o r t a t i o n s , which was refused on the ground that i t was a p u r e l y domestic matter. The p r o v i s i o n s of the T a r t u Treaty were again conveniently overlooked. I n November, the F i n n i s h - b o r n Premier of the Eastern K a r e l i a n Republic was dismissed from h i s post and e x p e l l e d , and the e n t i r e govern-ment of the 'autonomous* r e p u b l i c was taken over by t r u s t e d R u s s i a n s . 2 ^ F i n l a n d ' s attempts to convince her eastern neigh-bour of her p e a c e f u l i n t e n t i o n s and p o l i c y of s t r i c t n e u t r a l i t y were not e x a c t l y s u c c e s s f u l . I n A p r i l , 1935* the Prime M i n i s t e r denied i n a speech to the Riksdag that h i s country had any h o s t i l e designs against the S o v i e t Union, and i n J u l y he found i t necessary to deny s i m i l a r a l l e g a t i o n s again. I n view of the more a c t i v e p o l i c y pursued by the S o v i e t Union s i n c e 1933 > he a l s o took the opportunity, i n 25 B e l o f f . , op. c i t . . v o l . 2, pp. 79-82. 19 his April speech, to state that Finland would not follow the other Baltic States should they decide to conclude mutual assistance agreements with the Soviet Union. 2^ The t r i a l i n Helsinki during 1936 of a Finn named Antikainen, who was suspected of being one of Comintern's most important agents abroad and was accused of having committed atrocities while fighting in the Soviet Army against the Karelian rebels during 1921-22, did not improve Finnish-Soviet relations. 2? The allegations of the Soviet press in August that the commercial ai r f i e l d s being built in eastern Finland were really for military purposes and would be made available to the German Air Force aggravated the situation further, as did a number of minor, but i n the Soviet press widely publicized, frontier incidents. 2 o* The most ominous sign of a l l was seen in a speech held at the Eight Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. on November 2 9 , 1936, by A. A. Zhdanov, then the Commissar of Leningrad: Watching from the window on to Europe what is happening outside, we can hear, ever more loudly, the howling of the fascist beasts and the snapping of their jaws. As you know, the Leningrad region marks the Soviet frontier with Finland, Estonia, and Latvia, countries, with whose peoples the USSR has normal peaceful relations. 26 Beloff, op. c i t . . vol. 2, p. 80. 2 7 Antikainen was condemned to penal servitude for l i f e i n May, 1.936. For the Communist version of his t r i a l , see Torni, op. c i t . , pp. 98-101. 28 Beloff, op. c i t . . vol. 2, pp. 80-81; Survey 1936, p. 534-. 20 And i f , i n some of these l i t t l e countries, for example Finland, feelings of hos t i l i t y to the USSR are being kindled by larger and more adventurist countries, and preparations are being made to make their territory available for aggressive action by fascist Powers, i n the long run i t is these l i t t l e countries alone which w i l l be the losers. It does not pay for l i t t l e countries to get entangled i n big adventures, and i f fascism dares to seek military victories on the northwest frontier of the Soviet Union, then we in Leningrad, placing at the service of defence a l l the technical strength we can command, shall deal i t such a crushing blow that the enemy w i l l never again turn his eyes on Leningrad. 29 The danger was f u l l y realized in Helsinki, and, in an attempt to clear the a i r , Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti accepted a Soviet invitation and went to Moscow on February 8, 1937. He was received in the most friendly manner by the Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, and V. M. Molotov, a member of the Politburo but not yet o f f i c i a l l y connected with the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Holsti took advantage of the friendly reception by doing his utmost to dispel the suspicions of the Soviet leaders against Finland. In a public statement issued after his return to Helsinki, Holsti, then Acting Prime Minister, said: I had "the opportunity for frank talks i n Moscow with the members of the Soviet Cabinet and with Marshal Voroshilov and his colleagues on the General Staff. I wanted to dispel the anxieties f e l t i n Moscow that Finland might have made secret arrange-ments with a Great Power whereby Finland should be the jumping-off ground for an attack on the Soviet Union. No such secret arrangements exist, and the Finnish Government has no plans for warlike adventures of any kind.30 29 Degras, op. c i t . . vol. 3, p. 226. 30 Survey 1936« p. 536. 21 The communique on the v i s i t of the Fin n i s h Foreign Minister, which appeared i n Izvestia on February 11th, was equally neutral and non-committal i n i t s c a r e f u l wording, stating merely that there had been a " f r i e n d l y and comprehensive exchange of views" and that "The conclusion was reached that the agreements i n existence between the USSR and Finland provided the framework for uninterrupted f r i e n d l y and good-neighbourly r e l a t i o n s and that both Governments w i l l continue t h e i r e f f o r t s to thi s end."^ H o l s t i departed from Moscow i n the b e l i e f that the foundations had been l a i d f or improved r e l a t i o n s between Finland and the Soviet Union i n the future. The defeat of President Svinhufvud by former Prime Minister K a l l i o i n the p r e s i d e n t i a l elections the following week was described by Izvestia as depriving B e r l i n of an important trump card and was interpreted as a further improvement of r e l a t i o n s . J However, the e f f o r t s of Dr. H o l s t i were not as successful as had been hoped, and i t was soon made clear that "...Finland remained the most sens i t i v e spot as fa r as the northern flank'of the Soviet Union's European t e r r i t o r y was concerned."33 By July, 1937* only f i v e months afte r H o l s t i ' s peace mission to Moscow, the Soviet press opened 31 Degras, op. c i t . , v o l . 3, p. 234. 32 B e l o f f , op. c i t . . v o l . 2 , p. 81. 33 Ibid., p. 82. 22 the attack on Finland again, and even he admitted defeat.*3 Gf course, the activities of former President Svinhufvud and the Finnish Minister in Berlin, Aarne Wuorimaa, were not designed to give Dr. Holsti much support. In private conversations with o f f i c i a l s of the German Foreign Office in Berlin, Svinhufvud, eight months after his defeat i n the presidential elections, belittled the men who had served him i n the Finnish Government and made statements in the name of the Finnish people on matters of foreign policy which ran very much contrary to the neutrality policy pursued by Finland. Mr. Wuorimaa requested a German o f f i c i a l to bring the conversation to the attention of his superiors.^5 While s t i l l i n the office of President, Svinhufvud had launched similar attacks on o f f i c i a l Finnish policy and revealed unconstitutional actions on his own part to the German Minister i n Finland, Wipert von Blucher.36 34 See Memorandum by the German"Foreign Minister von Neurath of conversation with Holsti.on October 25, 1937 , i n Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945. Series D (1937-1945), vol. 5 : Poland: The Balkans; Latin America; The Smaller Powers, June 19374Mafch 1939, Washington, D.C., United States Govern-ment Printing Office, 1953 (Department of State Publication 4 9 6 4 ) , pp. 5 3 7 - 538 . 35 See Memorandum by the Director of the Press Department of the German Foreign Office, Minister Gottfried Aschmanh, of 'exposition' made to him by Svinhufvud at a luncheon given by Minister Wuorimaa on October 21, 1937 , in ibid., pp. 535-536. 36 Quoted in C. Leonard Lundin. Finland i n the Second  World War, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1957, pp. 29-30. 23 That the allegations of Finnish-German agreements were entirely unfounded has since been proved beyond doubt by the publication of documents from the German Foreign Office.37 How far-reaching, were the Soviet designs against Finland had not been f u l l y appreciated by the Finnish Government until the spring of 1938, however aware they may have been of the danger threatening from the east. On April 14th, Dr. Holsti received a telephone c a l l from Mr. Boris Yartsev, the second secretary of the Soviet Legation i n Helsinki, who urgently requested to see Holsti immediately and privately. Although a meeting between the Foreign Minister and a junior o f f i c i a l of a foreign legation was s t r i c t l y irregular according to diplomatic protocol, Dr. Holsti received Yartsev the same day. He was informed that Yartsev had recently been i n Moscow, where he had been given exceptional powers to discuss secretly with the Finnish Foreign Minister questions concerning the "...improvement of relations between Finland and Russia."38 Reviewing the p o l i t i c a l situation in Europe in general, Yartsev came to the point: The Soviet Government was firmly convinced that Germany was preparing for war against 37 See particularly the memorandum oh "Factors which w i l l determine the attitude of Finland in case of war"," submitted by Minister von Blucher on August 1 , 1938 , " in Documents on  German Foreign Policy (Series D), vol. 5> P P . 5 8 9 - 5 9 3 . 3 8 Vaino Tanner, The Winter War. Finland Against Russia  1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 0 . Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1957 , p. 4. 24 the Soviet Union, and that these plans called for a l e f t flank invasion of Russia over Finnish territory. The Soviet Government wished to respect Finland's independence and t e r r i t o r i a l integrity, but i t must have safeguards against this planned invasion through Finland. Yartsev said that his government was ready to offer Finland almost any concessions she might wish for in the economic f i e l d in return for such safeguards. Asked what such safeguards would involve, Yartsev avoided a direct answer, saying that this could be discussed later.3 9 No further meetings took place for a couple of months, but i t was found that Yartsev had been in touch with certain private persons about the matter, particularly Mr. Arvo.': Inkila, the secretary of Prime Minister A. K. Cajander, General Aarne Sihvo and Mrs. Hella Murrik Wuolijoki, a Finnish Communist playwright and old friend of Madame Aleksandra Kollontay, the Soviet Minister i n Stockholm. Apparently Yartsev had not observed the same secrecy which he had urged upon the Foreign Minister, and, as some of his revelations to these other persons had been more specific than his remarks to Dr. Holsti, Mr. Inkila renewed the contact with Yartsev. Yartsev was received by Prime Minister Cajander at the end of June, and again on July 11th. During this latter conversation, Yartsev was ensured that Finland, 3 9 Fori .the best account of the discussions with Yartsev between April and December, see Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 3 - l 3 « See also-Mannerheim. op. c i t . . pp. 2 9 2 - 2 9 5 ; Wuorinen, op. c i t . . pp. 44-46; Mazour, op. c i t . , pp. 9 4 - 9 6 . 25 as a matter of course, would defend herself to the utmost limits of her resources against any aggressor, including Germany. Yartsev then mentioned the matter of safeguards, adding that i f the Soviet Union were to receive guarantees that Finland would give no bases to the Germans, "...the Russians for their part Were prepared to underwrite Fin-land 's i n v i o l a b i l i t y . " 4 ' 0 The hazards involved in such generosity on the part of the Soviet Union did not become apparent u n t i l the following October, but the idea of a pact of mutual assistance was in any case incompatible with the policy of s t r i c t neutrality pursued by Finland, and Yartsev*s proposal did not meet with enthusiasm among Finnish leaders informed of the discussions. Before departing, Yartsev impressed upon Cajander the necessity of keeping the discussions secret, and that no importance should be placed upon anything which the Soviet Minister, Vladimir Derevyanski, might say as Yartsev alone had received his government's authorization to approach the Finnish Govern-ment on these matters. 4 -! During eight meetings between Yartsev and Finance Minister Vaino Tanner, who was also a member of the foreign affairs committee of the Finnish Cabinet, which took place between July 30th and September 15th, a f a i r l y clear idea of what the Soviet Government was aiming at began to take 40 Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 6 41 Loc. c i t . 26 form. Of particular significance was their meeting on August 18th, when, for the f i r s t time, Yartsev was pre-pared to present the objects of his government i n something more than ambiguous sentences. Paraphrased from the notes taken by Tanner, the Soviet proposals were as follows: 1. Provided a p o l i t i c a l understanding could be arrived at, Moscow would receive a Finnish trade delegation. 2. If Finland was disagreeable to concluding a secret military agreement, Moscow would be satisfied with a written guarantee that Finland ward off German attack and accept Russian aid in such event. 3. Moscow would assent to Finnish f o r t i f i c a t i o n of the Aaland Islands i f Russia could participate i n i t and subsequently maintain surveillance over their use in a l l secrecy. 4. Moscow required the lease of the island of Suursaari as an air and naval base. 5 . Moscow would then guarantee Finland's sovereignty and t e r r i t o r i a l integrity, assist Finland by force of arms i f necessary and offer Finland an exceptionally advantageous trade treaty.42 Tanner immediately declared that these proposals could hardly meet with the approval of the Finnish Govern-ment, but he would nevertheless bring them to the attention 42 Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 8-9. The Soviet assent to Finnish f o r t i f i c a t i o n of the Aaland Islands, which amounted to a demand, reopened an old problem in Finland's foreign relations. This archipelago, separated from Sweden by a mere thirty miles' stretch of water and inhabited by Swedish speaking Finns with strong pro-Swedish sympathies, had been demilitar-ized by the treaty of Paris in 1856 with the concurrence of Russia and to the great pleasure and r e l i e f of Sweden. In the spring and summer of 1919, the League of Nations, called upon to arbitrate the matter, confirmed Finnish sovereignty over the islands with the proviso that the population be assured autonomous rights guaranteed by the League. Their autonomy had been granted by the Finnish Riksdag i n May, 1919. The League would arbitrate any conflicts arising. In October, 1921, a special conference.called by the League signed a convention which pledged that the islands must remain demilitarized. of the Prime Minister. Prime Minister Cajander's reply, transmitted to Yartsev on August 2 9 t h , while i t expressed the Finnish Government's favourable opinion with regard to an increase i n trade relations, followed the guiding prin-ciples of Finland's neutrality policy: The proposal tends to violate Finland's sovereignty and is i n conflict with the policy of neutrality which Finland follows i n common with the nations of Scandinavia.43 The reopening of the attacks against Finland i n the Soviet press demonstrated amply the disappointment of the Soviet Government, although i t is d i f f i c u l t to believe that i t could have expected a different reply. The direct con-versations with Finnish o f f i c i a l s were not resumed until Dr. Holsti's return from the League of Nations meetings in October. In the course of their two conversations that month, Yartsev told Holsti that "Since Finland would be unable to defend i t s e l f , i t would be well advised to rely upon the military aid promised by the Soviet Union." 4 4 The Russian's attitude was also becoming more aggressive and demanding, and relations between the two states became increasingly deteriorated. Trade talks, which half-heartedly took place i n Moscow in December, broke down when i t became clear that Finland was not going to yield on the 43 Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 1 0 . 4 4 Ibid., p. 1 2 . 28 p o l i t i c a l issues which by the Russians were held as pre-requisites for a commercial agreement. Among the very few Finnish leaders who knew about the discussions with Yartsev, i t was realized that Finland was definitely in grave danger. The Finnish Defence Council, headed by General Mannerheim, in October presented a report to the government showing the Finnish armed forces to be "totally unfitted for war". And the report continued: It is not impossible that we were recently within a hair *s-breadth of having this combat value put to the test... To put i t shortly, our country is at the present time not i n a position to be defended. The events of the last few weeks show that our respite may be very short.4"? The respite was to be very short indeed. The second phase of the Soviet diplomatic offensive against Finland began on March 5> 1 9 3 9 , when Mr. YrjB-Koskinen, the Finnish Minister i n Moscow, was called to the Kremlin by the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov, and handed a memorandum requesting that Finland lease to the Soviet Union the islands of Suursaari, Lavansaari, Tyta'rsaari and Seiskari for thirty years in order to "...create a favorable atmosphere for...satisfactory settlement ..." of the questions of the f o r t i f i c a t i o n of 0 the Aaland Islands and commercial relations. If the Finnish Government would agree to this, "...relations 4 5 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . pp. 2 9 6 - 2 9 7 . 2 9 would improve in great measure, and this would have a decidedly good effect on commercial relations.n4"° The price for peace was going up. Finland's reply was delivered three days later and merely confirmed the prin-ciples underlying Cajander's reply of the previous summer. Finland would violate her sovereignty and neutrality i f she even undertook to discuss such proposals. A further Soviet proposal suggesting that the islands in question be ex-changed for territory i n the Soviet Karelian Republic was also rejected on March 1 3 t h . Two days earlier, the Soviet Ambassador in Rome, Boris Stein, had arrived in Helsinki to conduct the discussions for his government as a special emmissary. Stein had previously been Minister i n Helsinki. On March 2 0 t h , YrjB-Koskinen expressed his government's position to Litvinov i n the following words: The Finnish government cannot negotiate a matter which may in one manner or another involve the cession of parts of the territory of the state to another power. This negative reply is not to be understood in the sense that the Foreign Minister would be unwilling to continue an exchange of views with the purpose of reaching a solution to the questions raised by the Soviet Union regarding guarantees to its security.^7 The combined efforts of Litvinov and Stein failed to dis-lodge Mr. Eljas Erkko, Finland's Foreign Minister since 46 Tanner, op. 8i"t., pp. 13-14. On the March-April negotiations, see ibid., pp. 1 3 - 1 7 ; Wuorinen, bp. c i t . , pp. 46-48; Mazour, op. c i t . , pp. 9 6 - 9 7 ; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 3 0 0 - 3 0 3 . 47 Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 14-15. 3 0 December, 1 9 3 8 , from this position. Leaving Helsinki on April 6, Ambassador Stein warned that the matter was not at an end. He told Erkko that Finland's negative reply could not be accepted, and the Soviet Union refused to abandon it s demands upon the islands i n the Gulf of Finland. Defending the attitude taken by the Finnish Government at the time, Tanner stresses that i t is hardly f a i r to c r i t i c i z e Finland's refusal to yield in the light of the far greater demands forced upon Finland in 1944. "There s t i l l existed trust in international law and in the 48 binding character of signed and sealed treaties." He also claims that even i f the government should have yielded to the Soviet demands, any such agreement would have been turned down by the Riksdag and result in the f a l l of the government. The government's failure to inform the Riksdag is explained by Tanner as an act of honouring i t s word to the Russians to keep the conversations entirely confidential and secret. General Mannerheim was of a different opinion: I was of the definite opinion that we were bound to meet the Russians i n some way i f this was l i k e l y to lead to improved relations with our: mighty neigh-bour. I discussed Stein's proposal with Foreign Minister Erkko, but could not bring him to share my views. I also visited the President of the Republic and Prime Minister Cajander, to lay my views before them. I said that the islands were of no use to the 48 Tanner, op. c i t . . p. 15. 3 1 country and that we had no means of defending them, as they were neutralized. Nor would Finland's prestige suffer should we agree to the exchange. On the other hand, the islands were of real importance to the Russians, as they commanded the entrance to their naval base at the Bay of Luga, and by leasing them we should draw advantage from one of the few trumps we held. Confronted with the government's argument that i t would immediately f a l l i f -it dared to suggest anything along those lines, Mannerheim replied that " . . . i f there were really no one who was willing to risk his popularity i n a matter so v i t a l to the country, I was prepared to place myself at the disposal of the government, convinced as I was that my honest opinion would be understood." He even claimed that i t would be to Finland's advantage to have the frontier nearest to Leningrad moved "by five or six miles", against a reasonable compensation. "I insistently warned against Ambassador Stein being allowed to depart with empty hands."4"9 On the face of i t , the advice offered by General Mannerheim would appear to be the more r e a l i s t i c of the solutions put forward i n Finnish circles during the c r i s i s . It is d i f f i c u l t to understand f u l l y Tanner's expressed faith in the sanctity of international law and treaties as late as April, 1939. Too much had taken place in the world during the previous decade to leave the leaders of small countries with many of whatever illusions they might have 49 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . pp. 3 0 0 - 3 0 1 . 32 harboured previously. Manchuria may have been far away, but Austria and Czechoslovakia were not. Ethiopia was overrun while Finland was a witness to the rapid deterior-ation of international law and order i n the assemblies of the League of Nations. The German ultimatum to Lithuania regarding Memel came while Erkko was busy talking with Ambassador Stein,5® and the Italian invasion of Albania took place only a few hours after Stein departed from Helsinki. On the other hand, the Finnish refusal may have been caused by the very realization of this state of inter-national af f a i r s , although neither Tanner nor Mannerheim give any indication of i t . Russian i r r e l l a b i l i t y was a phenomenon frequently appearing in the pages of the case history of Finnish-Russian relations, and i n the reigning international climate i t could be expected to occur with an increasing rather than diminishing frequency. Hitler's frank statements i n his Mein Kampf and the policies he had pursued since his ascendancy to power in Germany pointed towards a gigantic Russo-German conflict, and the Soviet demands upon Finland must have been seen i n that light by the Finnish Government i n March-April of 1 9 3 9 . Indeed, the Soviet explanations of these demands expressly stated this. Accordingly, the Finnish leaders might have been aware that by acceding to the Soviet demands they would at the same time be inviting further demands. To follow Mannerheim's 50 March 2 2 , 1 9 3 9 . 33 advice might have established the point that Finland was willing to view the problems r e a l i s t i c a l l y and even make reasonable adjustments, but i t is not l i k e l y that i t would have guaranteed Finland's neutrality i n the coming conflict or saved her from the encroachments on her territory and economy which eventually came in 1944* In the light of what happened i n the Baltic states a few months after the breakdown of the Finnish-Russian negotiations in the early spring of 1939, i t is reasonable, rather, to suggest that the course chosen by the government of Finland at the time was the course which experience dictated and the wisest one in terms of long range policy. The Secret Protocol appended to the Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Soviet Union, signed in Moscow on August 23, 1939, would confirm suspicions that the Soviet demands upon Finland merely represented the f i r s t stage i n a campaign which would eventually spell the end of Finland's independence. Paragraph 1 of the Secret Protocol read i n part: In the event of a t e r r i t o r i a l and p o l i t i c a l rearrange-ment in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R.51 51 Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie, editors, Nazi-Soviet Relations 1931-1941. Documents from the Archives  of The German Foreign Office. Washington, D.C. United States Department of State, 1948 (Department of State Publication 3023), p. 78. (Hereafter referred to as Nazi-Soviet Relations) 3 4 Although nothing was definitely known about this protocol at the time, i t was soon understood that Ribbentrop and Molotov had not limited their discussions to the matters included i n the Non-Aggression Pact. The Pact was r a t i f i e d by the Soviet Union on August 31st. The very next morning the German armed forces poured across the Polish border. On September l?th, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier from the east "...to extend a helping hand to our Brother Ukrainians and Brother White Russians who liv e in Poland."52 The following day began the diplomatic offensive against the Baltic states. Fearing that the Western Powers might accept Germany's peace offer to them once the Polish cam-paign was completed, the Soviet Union had to act with great speed, and no time was wasted. Faced with overwhelming pressure, the Estonians signed a pact of mutual assistance with the Soviet Union on September 28th, by which the two contracting parties undertook "...to render each other every assistance, including military assistance, i n the event of direct aggression or a threat of aggression...."53 On October 5th, the Latvians signed a similar agreement under similar circumstances, and the turn of the Lithuanians came five days later. On October 15th, eleven Soviet warships appeared i n the harbour of Tallinn and landed Soviet troops 52 From Molotov's speech on September l?th. Quoted i n David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-1942. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1947 (copyright 1942), p. 71. 53 Ibid., p. 83. 3? on Estonian territory. On October 3 0 t h , the Red Army entered Latvia. Soviet troops had been on Lithuanian territory since the signing of the treaty on October 1 0 t h , which granted the Soviet Union the right to maintain armed forces of " s t r i c t l y limited strength" on Lithuanian territory. In the midst of these events came the f i n a l Soviet diplomatic attack against Finland, and during the mounting crescendo of Soviet demands came the Baltic examples of what mutual assistance pacts with the Soviet Union involved for small and isolated countries., On September 2 6 t h , Minister von Blilcher related the following i n a telegram to Berlin, a telegram which was promptly forwarded to the German Embassy in Moscow: The Foreign Minister notified me of demands made by Russia on Estonia and observed that Finland was prepared to improve her relations with Russia, but would never accept such demands and would rather let i t come to the worst.54 That Finland knew she was next in line is quite obvious. That she also knew, from the experiences of the past few weeks, that there was more to the Russo-German Non-Aggression Pact than was published is also clear. The pattern of developments was a l l too ominous. On October 2 n d , Minister Wuorimaa called on the State Secretary of the German Foreign 54 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 104. 36 Office, Ernst Freiherr von Weizsacker, and requested him to cl a r i f y "...the significance of the arrangements of spheres of influence between Germany and Russia; he was particularly interested in knowing what effect the Moscow agreements might have on Finland."55 Three days later, in the evening of October 5th, Minister YrjB-Koskinen was called to the Kremlin and asked to request his government to send a plenipotentiary to Moscow for "...an exchange of views...in regard to certain concrete questions of a p o l i t i c a l character."56 Finland's hour had struck, and her leaders were well aware that this time i t was l i k e l y to "come to the worst". Less than three f u l l days after the f i r s t contact had been made in Moscow, the Soviet Minister in Helsinki, Derevyanski, called upon Foreign Minister Errko. Declaring that "...feeling in Moscow was running high because the answer came so late", he complained that Finland had adopted "...quite a different attitude to the invitation than the Baltic States, and this may have an adverse effect on the course of affairs. " 5 7 i t was plain that Moscow was in a hurry to get the problem of Finland out of the way, and that 55 Memorandum by Weizacker of October 2, 1939. Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 111. 56 Finnish-Soviet Relations, p. 42. . 57 See Erkko's notes on the October 8th conversation with Derevyanski in ibid., pp. 43-45. 37 the Soviet leaders desired - and were going to make sure they obtained - a 'Baltic settlement 1. Derevyanski stressed that the international situation was grave and that the Soviet Union wished to establish in the Baltic area "...a state of affairs which would prevent the Soviet Union and her neighbours from becoming the victims of war." He asked that Erkko himself go to Moscow with powers to con-clude an agreement binding upon his government. Erkko indicated that Finland's negotiator would be Dr. Juho K. Paasikivi, State Councillor, Minister i n Stockholm, former Prime Minister and the Finnish negotiator of the Tartu Treaty. Any agreement;that Paasikivi might conclude would, however, as a matter of course, have to be i n accordance with the Finnish Constitution and subject to approval by the Finnish Government and the Riksdag. When Erkko expressed the hope that the negotiations in Moscow would proceed "normally and peacefully", Derevyanski said that "The example of the Baltic States show that negotiations can be successfully managed." Since i t was exactly such 'manage-ment' of the negotiations which the Finnish Government feared, Erkko stated f l a t l y that i t was "impossible to conceive" that Finland could approve of arrangements similar to those agreed upon by the Baltic States. In the evening of October 9th, Minister Paasikivi l e f t for Moscow with instructions which would allow him to concede to an exchange of territory in the event Soviet demands should make this absolutely necessary. However, 38 he was to refuse discussion on the questions of Soviet bases on the Finnish mainland and the Aaland Islands, cession or lease of Finnish ports and frontier adjustments on the Karelian Isthmus. Discussion of the island of Suursaari should also be avoided, while other islands in the Gulf of Finland might be discussed "as an extreme concession". No treaty of mutual assistance could be accepted by Finland under any circumstances.^8 Two meetings took place during this f i r s t v i s i t of the Finnish delegation to Moscow. On October 12th, Stalin and Molotov outlined orally what the Soviet Union expected of Finland. Two days later, they submitted a for-mal memorandum which set forth their demands, including the following main five points: 1. Lease of Hanko for thirty years for the establishment of a naval base. 2. The use of the bay of Lappohja as an anchorage. 3. Cession of the islands of Suursaari, Seiskari, Lavansaari, Tytarsaari and Koivisto, part of the Karelian Isthmus from the village of Lipola to the southern border of the town of Koivisto, and the western parts of the Kalastajasaarento, in a l l 1,066 square miles, in return for which Finland would get territory i n the districts of Repola and Porajarvi amounting to about twice the size of the areas to be ceded. 4 . Strengthening of the Treaty of Non-Aggression. 5. 'Suppression' of the f o r t i f i e d zones on either side of the frontier.59 58 The f u l l instructions are given in Finnish-Soviet  Relations, pp. 46-49. 59 Ibid., pp. 49-51. 39 In his remarks, Stalin elaborated on these demands in a manner which made i t clear that they were indeed 'minimum demands', and he refused to concede that acceptance of them might meet with anything but "ninety-nine percent support" in the Finnish Riksdag.°^ To him and Molotov the whole matter was simple, and Molotov f i n a l l y cut the discussion short by declaring that "We'll sign the agreement on the twentieth and give you a dinner the next day."°^ The lengthy discussions which subsequently took place in Helsinki between the negotiators 0^ on the one hand and the Council of State and the Government on the other upset Molotov's timetable a l i t t l e , and the Moscow talks were not resumed un t i l the return of the Finnish delegation on the 23rd. Finance Minister Tanner had now joined the delegation, and he has given a most interesting account of the proceedings in the Kremlin during the three weeks.which followed.°3 At the outset, the Finns made i t clear that 60 Tanner, op. c i t . p . 30. 61 From the notes of the Finnish interpreter, loc. c i t . 62 In addition to Paasikivi, the delegation included Minister Yrjo-Koskinen, Colonel Aladar Paasonen and Chief of Bureau Johan Nykopp. 63 Tanner, op. c i t . . pp. 36-8O. The tone of the negot-iations was set at the very outset of the f i r s t meeting on October 23rd: "At i t s start I asked whether I might use either German or English, as my Russian was on the weak side. To this Molotov replied dryly with the single word, Nyet." Ibid., p. 40. 40 Finland's stand had changed very l i t t l e since the previous meeting. The only exception of any consequence was that they were now able to offer a frontier adjustment on the Karelian Isthmus which would move the border some eight miles farther away from the city of Leningrad. 6 4" The offer was immediately rejected by Stalin as f a l l i n g far short of the Soviet demands which indeed were "rock bottom".65 Seemingly astounded by the Finnish proposal, Molotov asked bluntly: "Is It your intention to provoke a conflict?" Paasikivi replied: "We want no such thing, but you seem t o . " 6 6 On leaving the meeting, the Finnish delegates f e l t that the talks had i n effect been broken off, and they prepared to return to Helsinki. One hour later, however, they were requested to attend another meeting immediately. Upon arrival, they were handed a memorandum by Stalin and Molotov stating that the Soviet proposals of October 14th had been "...expressly put forward as minimum terms".6? A Soviet naval base at Hanko was "...an absolutely essential minimum condition for the safeguarding of the defence of Leningrad", but the Soviet Government was willing to return such leased territory to Finland at the end of the war 64 The instructions are given i n Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 51-54. 65 Tanner, op. c i t . . p. 42. 66 Loc. c i t . 6? The Soviet Government's memorandum i s given i n Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 54-55. 41 between the Great Powers in Europe rather than insist on a thirty years' lease. With the exception of a small re-duction in the area demanded on the Karelian Isthmus, the Soviet demands otherwise remained unaltered. Again the Finnish delegation returned to Helsinki for fresh instructions. The realization that war might be /TO inevitable was now very clear, and in a series of meetings Finland's stand was reexamined by the Council of State, the government and the party leaders i n the Riksdag, a l l who were appraised of the situation were sworn to secrecy. The result of these talks was that Finland could not offer the Soviet Union much more than had already been suggested to Stalin and Molotov without destroying her own defence po s s i b i l i t i e s . Although the Soviet concern for the security of Leningrad was understood, the Finnish leaders did not trust Stalin's assertion that this was the Soviet Union's only concern. Contrary to Soviet protestations, i t was obvious to a l l that the three Baltic-States had not retained their independence and sovereignty after the conclusion of their treaties with the Soviet Union, and the demands against Finland were very definitely going to render Finland indefen-sible and dependent upon the whims of the Soviet Government. Accordingly, Finland would have to stand firm when the Moscow negotiations continued. To reverse Stalin's expression 68 See Tanner's letter of October 26th to the Swedish Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, in Tanner, bp. c i t . . pp. 45' 42 the party leaders i n the Riksdag had made i t plain that there would be at least "ninety-nine percent support" forthcoming for such a stand. On October 3 1 s t , strengthened by the addition of State Councillor Rafael Hakkarainen, the Finnish delegation again set out for Moscow. Arriving in Viipuri early the next morning, they were profoundly shaken by reports in the morning newspapers that Molotov had made public the Soviet demands against Finland i n a speech the night before. 6 9 Molotov had summed up the Soviet position in the following words: Actually our proposals in the negotiations with Finland are extremely modest, and are confined to that minimum without which i t is impossible to guarantee the security of the USSR and to put relations with Finland on a friendly footing. ...In view of a l l this we do not think that Finland w i l l seek a pretext to frustrate the proposed agreement. This would not be in line with a policy of friendly Soviet-Finnish relations and would, of course, work to the serious detriment of Finland." 0 Finland was suddenly faced with a f a i t accompli as a result of this Soviet breach of f a i t h . The Soviet Union had placed i t s e l f in a position from which i t would now be impossible to back down without making a l i a r of Molotov. To continue the negotiations seemed pointless. However, the Finnish Cabinet, i n an emergency meeting held at 3 o'clock that 6 9 Extracts from the speech are given in Finnish-Soviet  Relations, pp. 5 6 - 6 0 , and i n Degras, op. c i t . . vol. 3 , pp. 3 8 8-4 - 0 0 . 7 0 Ibid., pp. 3 9 6 - 3 9 7 43 morning, had decided to leave the decision of whether to continue on to Moscow or return to Helsinki up to the negotiators themselves. Paasikivi and Tanner f e l t the former course was the lesser of the two evils, and the delegation arrived in Moscow the next day.71 The f i r s t meeting in this third round of negot-iations took place on November 3rd. Stalin was not present. Having heard the Finnish declaration, Molotov repeated that the Soviet demands were 'minimal1 ones, and the two sides failed to approach any closer to an agreement. The meeting ended on a very ominous note when Molotov said that "We civilians can see no further in the matter; now i t is the turn of the military to have their say."? 2 What he was referring to did not for long remain obscure. . On November 9 th , the Finnish and Soviet negotiators met i n a last and f u t i l e attempt to reach a basis for an agreement. Following this brief meeting, the Finnish delegation informed Helsinki that the negotiations were completely deadlocked and must be considered as having been broken off. Four days later the Finns returned home, leaving with Molotov a letter expressing the hope that "...at some future date the negotiations may bring about a 7 1 Later, Tanner wrote: "Subsequently, this turned out to be a mistake. We ought, in fact, to have gone back and received broadeij authority from the government." Op. c i t . . p. 6 0 . 72 Ibid., pp. 6 6 - 6 7 . 44 result satisfactory to both parties." 73 The war of nerves, begun with Molotov's speech on October 3 1 s t and rapidly picked up by the Soviet press, was immediately accelerated. The guiding slogan of this war had been coined by Pravda on November 3 r d : We w i l l continue on our way, wherever i t may lead, to safeguard the Soviet Union without regard for anything, breaking down a l l obstacles of whatever nature they may be for the realization of our aims.^ 4 The entire Soviet propaganda machine concentrated on Finland, and Finnish leaders came in for an uninhibited mud-slinging the like of which had never been encountered in their l i t t l e corner of the world before. Pravda sank to a new low by calling Prime Minister Cajander "...a scarecrow, a fool, a marionette, a clown pirouetting in the circus ring," etc. 7? Other similar examples of Soviet journalism were not lacking. The Finnish leaders were described as "bandits of capitalism", "rapacious bands of Finnish kulaks, armed by capitalism", and similar imaginative labels. 73 Finnish-Soviet Relations, p. 7 0 . The most complete, account of the Finnish-Soviet negotiations during October and November, 1 9 3 9 ) is given by Tanner, op. c i t . , pp. 2 5 - 8 4 . Other accounts are given by-Mannerheim, op. c i t . , 3 0 8 - 3 1 6 ; Wuorinen. op. c i t . , pp. 5 2 - 6 4 ; Mazour, OP'.- c i t . , pp. 9 8 - 1 0 9 ; Beloff, op", c i t . , vol. 2 , pp. 304-306; and William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940, Harper, 1 9 5 2 , pp. 3 2 1 - 3 2 7 . The pertinent documents are printed in Finnish-Soviet Relations, the Finnish Blue Book published in New York after the outbreak of the Winter War, and in Degras, op. c i t . . vol. 3 , pp. 3 8 2 - 4 0 5 . 74 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 3 1 8 ; Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 8 5 . 7 5 Issue of November 2 6 . Quoted in Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 8 5 . 4-5 Members of the Swedish Government, who had made present-ations i n Moscow and in Stockholm on behalf of Finland, were called "lackeys of British and American capitalism".?^ Meanwhile, Soviet planes were observed over Finnish territory with increasing frequency, and concent-ration of considerable armed forces were reported along the border. Finnish military intelligence reported that roads and railways were being constructed on the Soviet side. The long expected provocation came on November 26th, when the Soviet Union arranged the frontier incident known as the 'Mainila shots'. Seven a r t i l l e r y shots k i l l e d four Russian soldiers and wounded another seven close to the village of Mainila, half a mile from the frontier on the Karelian Isthmus. The Soviet Government Immediately accused Finland of having deliberately committed an act of ag-gression and demanded that Finnish troops be withdrawn approximately 15 miles from the frontier.?? The Finnish reply rejected the accusation, showing that the shots had been fired from the Soviet side of the border and asking that a joint inquiry be carried out in accordance with the Convention Concerning Frontier Commissioners, concluded on September 24-, 1928.7°' Soviet's reaction was an intemperate 76 Langer and Gleason, op. c i t . , p. 327. 77 Note from Molotov"to Yrjo-Koskinen of November 26th. Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 70-71. 78 Note from Yrjo-Koskinen to Molotov of November 27th. Ibid., pp. 71-72. 4 6 note which declared that Finland's reply was "...a document which reflects the deeprooted h o s t i l i t y of the Finnish Government towards the U.S.S.R. and is the cause of extreme tension in the relations between the two countries."79 Finland was informed that she had broken the Non-Aggression Treaty concluded in 1932 and extended in 1934, and the Soviet Government considered i t s e l f released from the obligations ensuing from the Treaty, "obligations which are being systematically violated by the Finnish Government." The next day saw the f i n a l propaganda piece in Soviet's diplomatic campaign against Finland delivered to the Finnish Minister in the form of the following note: Attacks on Soviet troops by Finnish troops are known to be continuing, not only on the Carelian Isthmus but also at other parts of the frontier between the U.S.S.R. and Finland. The Government df the U.S.S.R. can no longer tolerate such a situation. As a result of the situation thus created, for which the Finnish Government alone is responsible, the Government of the U.S.S.R. can no longer maintain normal relations with Finland and find themselves compelled to rec a l l their p o l i t i c a l and economic representatives from F i n l a n d . 3 0 On the same day Finnish frontier guards were attacked in Petsamo, and early the next morning, November 3 0 t h , regular operations were commenced by Soviet land, sea and air forces along the entire Finnish border. 79 Note from Molotov to Yrjo-Koskinen of November 2 8 t h . Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 7 2 - 7 4 . 80 Note from Molotov to Yr j8-Koskinen of November 2 9 t h . Ibid., p. 74. 47 The opponents in the ensuing war, popularly-known as Finland's Winter War, were as unevenly matched as a boxing fight between a professional heavyweight champion and an amateur featherweight. Indeed, the Soviet Government i t s e l f expected to crush Finnish resistance in the course of about five: days and with the resources of the Leningrad military d i s t r i c t only.®^ For good measure i t pulled a surprise trump card out of i t s sleeve which i t rather naively trusted would take the trick in short order: On 1 December this year the representative of the People's Government and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, M. Kuusinen, addressed to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR an o f f i c i a l statement on the" formation of the People's Government of Finland and a proposal for the establishment of diplomatic relations between that Republic and the Soviet Union. The presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR resolved to recognize the People's Government of Finland and to establish diplomatic relations with the Finnish Democratic Republic." 2 Otto Kuusinen's government, headed by a man who had been in exile in the Soviet Union ever since the defeat of the Soviet-engineered Finnish Socialist Worker's Government -of which he had been a member - in 1918, had been planned at least as early as the beginning of November.®3 i t was 81 Langer and Gleason, Finnish-Soviet Relations, p. 3 3 2 . 82 Tass communique in Izvestia, December 2, 1939. Quoted in Degras, op. c i t . , vol. 3, p. 406. 83 Tanner claims that the Secretary-General of the Finnish Communist Party, Arvo Tuominen, had been approached by the Soviet Government through Comintern agents on several occasions between November 13th and 21st with urgent requests that he go to Moscow immediately, presumably to head the Finnish People's Government. Op. olt.V pp. 104-105. 48 clearly based on the assumption that the revolutionary con-ditions of 1918 s t i l l prevailed in Finland, and that the workers would flock to Kuusinen1s rebel Terijoki Government. ^ This, of course, did not happen. The Finnish people stood united against the Soviet invasion, and, in spite of being outnumbered nearly sixty to one in terms of population and approximately four to one in terms of troops at the front, the Soviet attack was repelled. For three and a half months Fin-land weathered the storm alone without any other help than the volunteers and equipment which the frightened Swedish Govern-ment dared to allow across the Swedish-Finnish border. A fan-tastic Anglo-French plan to send a military expedition to Fin-land by way of Norway and Sweden failed to materialize, for which the two Allied governments were soon to praise their lucky stars.®5 The obvious implication of such an intervention would, of course, have been to force the Soviet Union into military 84 Although i t never actually l e f t Moscow, Kuusinen*s government was purportedly established in the 'city' of Teri-joki, a frontier hamlet evacuated by the Finnish army at the start of the war. 85 This Allied plan was actually aiming at gaining control of the iron ore mines in Northern Sweden and the v i t a l Nor-wegian port of Narvik through which this ore was shipped. For British accounts of this, see Winston S. Churchill, The Second  World War, vol. 1: The Gathering Storm, Boston, Houghton Mi f f l i n , 1948, pp. 543-548, 560-561 and 573-575 (volumes i n this series w i l l hereafter be referred to by their individual, t i t l e s ) ; J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy, London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1957, vol. 2, pp. 9e>-117; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs: Norway and the War, September 1939-December 1940, ed. Monica °Curtis, London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1941, pp. 30-33. A French account is given in Paul Reynaud, In The  Thick of the Fight, 1930-1945. London, Cassell, 1955, PP. 253-2WT 49 collaboration with Germany, and the outcome of World War I I would very l i k e l y have been much different from the one now recorded by history. Aside from the Scandinavian volunteers, the only support which Finland received was the world-wide moral condemnation of the Soviet aggression which resulted i n the expulsion of the Soviet Union from 86 the League of Nations on December 14th. The poor performance of the Soviet forces was embarrassing, to say the least. 37 To counteract the pub-l i c i t y in the foreign press as well as the surprise at home, the Soviet propaganda machine created the myth of the 'Mannerheim Line', a Finnish defence line across the Karelian Isthmus. This line was claimed to have been con-structed according to the latest technique "...under the supervision of foreign experts...on the model of the 'Maginot Line' and the 'Siegfried Line'." Describing the strength of this line in great detail, Molotov said that the line had been considered "...impregnable, that i s , such as no army had ever broken through before." The Red Army, he boasted, had "covered i t s e l f with glory as the f i r s t army to force i t s way under most d i f f i c u l t conditions through a 86 The resolutions of the Assembly and Council of the League of Nations are printed" in Finnish-Soviet Relations, pp. 94-111. 87 "...everyone i n Moscow, from Stalin down, thought the Red army would be In Helsinki a week after the attack started. They were so sure that they timed an attack on Bessarabia for December 6, and only called i t off at the last minute." William L. Shirer, Berlin Diary. The Journal of a Foreign  Correspondent 1934-1941. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1941, p. 275. 50 deep, powerful zone of perfectly modern military fort-i f i c a t i o n s . . . M a r s h a l Mannerheim, the Finnish Commander in Chief, describes the defence line in somewhat different words: Nor were the fortifications built up along our frontiers l i k e l y to level out any disparity i n strength. They were of a very modest nature and with few exceptions situated on the Karelian Isthmus. Here, in a defensive line about eighty-eight miles long, were sixty-six concrete 'nests', out of which forty-four built in the beginning of the twenties were out of date and also f a u l t i l y constructed and placed. The remainder were modern, but not strong enough to stand heavy gunfire. The recently constructed barbed-wire entangle-ments and tank-traps were of l i t t l e value. Time had not permitted the building out of the position in depth, and i t s foremost line generally merged with the principal defence line. The only fortifications of importance were the coast batteries which guarded the flanks of the principal defence line at the Gulf of Finland and on the Ladoga.89 Evidently, Molotov was unable to find an explanation for the Soviet setbacks north of the Karelian Isthmus, where no fortifications of any kind existed. Nevertheless, for Finland the war was a hopeless one. Her resources of manpower had been strained to the limit from the beginning of the war, and Mannerheim repeatedly urged the government to seek a renewal of the negotiations with the Soviet Union before Finland's military position collapsed.9° Although the Soviet Union had turned 88 Speech to the Supreme Soviet on March 2 9 , 1940. Degras, op. c i t . , vol. 3 , p. 440. 89 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 3 2 5 . 9 0 Ibid., pp. 3 8 2 , 3 8 4 , 3 8 7 . 51 a deaf ear to a l l Finnish attempts to reopen negotiations during December, insisting that she recognized no other Finnish government than Kuusinen's, this attitude was changed towards the end of January, 1940. The war against Finland had turned out to be a very expensive af f a i r , and -although there was no doubt of the Soviet Union's a b i l i t y to bring the war to a victorious conclusion - the general situation in Europe required that the Russians free them-selves of the burdensome Winter War. The projected plans of the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs had been thrown seriously off schedule, but the reports that the Allied Powers were contemplating to Intervene i n Finland against the Soviet Union and simultaneously bomb the Caucasian o i l f i e l d s , may have been the deciding factor which made the Soviet leaders receptive to talking peace with the Finns. On January 29th, Finland was given to know by Madame Kollontay, through Sweden's Foreign Minister Christian Gunther, that "The USSR has no objection in principle to concluding an agreement with the Ryti-Tanner government."91 On February 20th and 22nd, the Swedish Minister in Moscow was informed by Molotov that the minimum Soviet demands included a l l of the HankB peninsula, the Karelian Isthmus with the city of Viipuri, a l l Finnish territory bordering on Lake Ladoga, and that Finland join the Soviet Union and Estonia in an alliance for the defence of the Gulf of Finland. 91 Tanner, op. c i t . . p. 125. 52 This information was transmitted to the ;Finnish Government on February 2 3 r d . 9 2 s t i l l desperately hoping that Sweden might decide upon a more active support of the Finnish cause, which, essentially, was Sweden's cause as well, or that Norway and Sweden would at least allow the Anglo-French expedition force to march through, the Finnish Government delayed i t s answer un t i l i t had consulted with Sweden. On February 2 7 t h , Tanner was told by the Swedish Prime Minister that Sweden would under no circumstances allow the transit of foreign troops and that an attempt by Britain and France to force their way through would nec-essarily bring Sweden into the war on the side of Russia. Prime Minister Hansson urged that Finland make peace on the conditions presented to her by Madame Kollontay. 9^ Three days later, the Finnish Government informed Madame Kollontay that Finland was anxious to bring about a cessation of ho s t i l i t i e s , but that "... since the new frontier contemplated in the proposal is vague, further particulars with regard thereto are requested."9 4 The reply was not forwarded to Moscow, however, as i t was considered to be altogether unsatisfactory. The Finnish Government was advised, through the Swedish Foreign Minister, to submit a reply accepting negotiations on the terms offered by Moscow. On March 2 n d , 92 Tanner, op..cit., p. 172 93 Ibid., p. 1 8 3 . 9 4 Ibid., p. 1 9 7 . 53 Molotov was informed, again through the good offices of the Swedish Foreign Minstry, that Finland accepted the demands i n principle but wished to leave the cities of Yilpuriand Sortavala out of the negotiations. Hanko would be ceded. On March 6th, the Finnish Government was informed that Moscow was ready to start negotiations and that a Finnish delegation would be awaited. There would pe no armistice, however, before Viipurl and Viipuri Bay had been evacuated by Finnish forces. The very same night a delegation consisting of Prime Minister Risto Ryti, Juho K. Paasikivi, General Rudolf Walden and Vaino1 Voionmaa, Chairman of the Riksdag Foreign Relations Committee, l e f t for Moscow by way of Stockholm. The demands which they received on March 9th went far beyond those presented to the Finnish Government as a basis for negotiations and would move the border considerably west of the line estab-lished by Peter the Great. It was quite clear that Moscow was not chiefly concerned about the security of Leningrad, but that the intention was to cripple Finland to an extent sufficient to render her incapable of resisting further Soviet advances in the future. The Finnish Government was shocked, and even Sweden agreed that the demands were unacceptable. However, Mannerheim informed the government that the military situation was deteriorating rapidly, that a l l units were drastically reduced by casualties, and that i t was imperative that peace be secured before the front 54 collapsed. Even i f Anglo-French aid should be sent, i t would not arrive in time to prevent disaster. 95 on March 12th, the Cabinet issued to the delegation in Moscow authority to sign the treaty dictated to them, and the treaty terminating the Winter War was signed the same night.? 6 It was a harsh peace indeed. Under its terms, Finland ceded to the Soviet Union the whole of the province of Viipuri including the Karelian Isthmus and the cities of Viipuri, Sortavala and Kakisalmi; a l l the islands in the eastern part of the Gulf of Finland; part of the Kuusamo and Salla d i s t r i c t s on the eastern frontier of North Finland; and the western part of the Rybachi peninsula near Petsamo. In addition, the Hanko1 peninsula and the group of islands surrounding i t were leased to the Soviet Union for a period of thirty : years. Altogether, the ceded areas amounted to roughly 22,000 square miles, more than the total territory of Estonia.9? 95 Tanner, op. c i t . . pp. 227, 231-232; and Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 387• 96 The feelings of the Finnish people on that dark day were expressed in B i b l i c a l style by President Kallio who, on signing the credentials authorizing the delegation in Moscow to sign the treaty, said: "May the hand wither, that is forced to sign such a paper as this." Tanner, op. c i t . , p. 244. (Some months later the President's right arm was paralyzed by a stroke, and he died within a year.) 97 Mazour, op. c i t . , p. 130. In Canadian terms, Finland, a country the size of the Province of Newfoundland, ceded an area the size of the Province of Nova Scotia. 55 PROPOSED BORDER ADJUSTMENTS OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1939. BORDER OF MARCH 12, 19kO. Border of 1939 Soviet proposal Oct. l l i _ Finnish " Opt. 23 • + + + + +• Soviet " Get. 23 r tc-u *l/ + . + . + Finnish « Nov. 3 UORWM ! t>^) \ \ J i Arr±L<L Dee. G~Y\ Border of 19u0 6 Atarnn»njk Vuol. o \ ^ — 1 \ \ / C \ \ i V KfiittEUM I i T H M H i U . S . S . R 56 Furthermore, Finland was compelled to undertake con-struction on her own territory of a railway which would connect Kandalaksha on the Murmansk railway with Kemijarvi, presumably to f a c i l i t a t e faster transit of goods between the Soviet Union and Sweden. However, since Kemijarvi was the northern terminal of the Finnish railway network and connected with the railways in northern Sweden including the Lulea-Kiruna-Narvik line, i t is reasonable to assume that strategic considerations played a more important role in this demand than commercial considerations. With an eye on the Norwegian warm-water port of Narvik, Tsarist planners had considered the same project many years before. The Moscow Peace of March 12, 1939, was the most clear-cut demonstration u n t i l that time of the fact that Russia had not changed, at least not for the better, since the days of the Tsars. A l l the idealism professed by Litvinov i n the League of Nations had been revealed to be nothing but windowdressing. The treatment of Finland demonstrated the rank disregard for the rights of small nations which is the chief ingredient of militant imperialism. Even the original pretext of supporting a rebel "peoples 1 government" was unceremoniously dropped as Kuusinen dis-appeared from view. Reporting to the Supreme Soviet on March 2 9 t h , Molotov commented that after the signing of the peace treaty "...the question arose of the People's 57 Government dissolving i t s e l f , which i t d i d . . . . " y o The terms forced upon Finland were senseless unless designed to render her p o l i t i c a l l y and economically dependent upon the Soviet Union. She was deprived of her richest agri-cultural and forest areas and a large proportion of her industrial plant. More than ten per cent of her population had to flee across the new frontier in about one week without permission to take away with them anything but their clothes and some personal belongings. Finland had to return to the Soviet Union or pay for in cash everything which had been removed from or damaged in the ceded areas since 1 9 3 8 , and in the ensuing year the Soviet claims on this account were never-ending. How acutely aware the Soviet Union was of the impression l e f t by the Moscow Peace is amply shown by the lengths to which Molotov, in his report to the Supreme Soviet on March 2 9 t h , f e l t i t necessary to go to justify the policy of the Moscow government. Asserting how the Soviet Union had "unswervingly" adhered to a policy of neutrality, he showed how "incontrovertible facts" proved that "foreign influences" had prepared a "place d'armes" in Finland ready for an attack by third Powers on the Soviet Union. Indeed, Soviet forces had encountered in Finland 9 8 Degras, op. c i t . . vol. 3» p. 4-44. After editing a small newspaper for a while, Kuusinen reappeared as President of the new Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic. 58 "...the combined forces of the imperialists of a number of countries...." Consequently, having unearthed this imperialist plot in Finland, i t had been found necessary to place the question of the security of Leningrad "...on a more reliable basis." However, the peace treaty was also "...based on the recognition of the principle that Finland is an independent State...." Molotov proved this convincingly with one of his most sublime pieces of logic; Attempts have been made in the British and French press to depict the Soviet-Finnish treaty...as a 'destruction 1 of the independence of Finland. This, of course, is absurd and a downright falsehood. Finland s t i l l comprises territory nearly four times as large as Hungary, and overweight times as large as Switzerland. If no one has any doubt that Hungary and Switzerland are independent States how can there be any doubt that Finland is independent and sovereign? In conclusion, Molotov declared that "Confident...in our cause and in our strength, we w i l l continue consistently and unswervingly to pursue our foreign policy."99 Finland was to experience the truth i n those words. 99 Extracts from Molotov's speech to the Supreme Soviet on the war with Finland and Soviet foreign policy are printed in Degras, op. c i t . . vol. 3, pp. 436-449. CHAPTER II ORDEAL BY PEACE, MARCH 1940 - JUNE 1941 Unable to withstand the immensely superior armed forces of the Soviet Union, Finland had been dictated a peace settlement which robbed her not only of territory and property but also of the free pursuit of her own best inter-ests in foreign relations. Finland had been compelled to accept a peace which required great sacrifices of her entire population, and i n view of this she hoped to be l e f t in peace. Indeed, Molotov had explicitly told Paasikivi during a con-versation in the Kremlin on March 21st that " . . . a l l questions between ourselves and Finland have been settled once and for a l l . 1 , 1 However, the next fifteen months proved the worthlessness of Molotov 1s word. The terms of the Peace Treaty were disregarded by the Soviet forces on numerous occasions during the spring and summer of 1940. The time 1 Finland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Finland Reveals  Her Secret Documents" on Soviet Policy. March 1940-June 1941, New York, Wilfred Funk, 1941, pp. 42-43. (Hereafter referred to as Finnish Blue-White Book.) limits agreed upon for the Finnish withdrawal and the Soviet advance in the ceded territories were frequently ignored, resulting i n the loss of private property which, according to the treaty, should have been removed by the owners. Finnish citizens were overtaken and seized and subsequently detained on grounds of alleged espionage. Arbitrary interpretation of the treaty clause regarding the new frontier line l e f t such important locations as Enso, a center of the woodworking industry in the Vuoksi Valley, on the Soviet side of the line. Along the entire new frontier the floating of timber, chief method of timber transportation, was made either impossible or extremely inconvenient and costly by placing sections of the rivers involved within Soviet territory. Usage of the Saimaa Canal for the passage of merchant vessels was refused by the Soviet Union, which blocked the only exit to the sea available to the entire waterway system of East Finland. Similarly, Finland was refused passage through the waters within the confines of the Hanko lease area, which placed great obstacles in the way of coastal shipping. The l i s t of legitimate Finnish complaints could be extended almost indefinitely, but the examples mentioned w i l l suffice to make i t quite clear that the Soviet Union intended to use the Peace Treaty merely as a stepping stone by which further concessions could be extorted from Finland. F i r s t on the l i s t of Soviet actions based on arbitrary interpretation of the Peace Treaty, and the f i r s t 61 sign of Moscow's intention to supervise Finland's foreign policy, was the prevention of a Northern defensive alliance. The Winter War had, at long last, convinced Finland that i t was impossible to live next door to the Soviet Union without good friends. The Moscow Peace had made this clear even to the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, the party which more than any other had been responsible for Finland's failure to take the diplomatic and military pre-cautions which her security required, and to the socialist governments of Norway and Sweden. It was generally f e l t that the Soviet Union's ambitions would not for long be satisfied with the line established on Finnish territory on March 12th, and that the three Northern countries must join forces i f they should hope to prevent further aggression. On March 13th, the day after the signing of the Moscow Peace Treaty, Foreign Minister Christian Gunther addressed the Swedish Riksdag in the following words: We have learned, in a manner we shall never forget, how closely the fates of the peoples of the North are bound to each other. This is the reason why these nations must stand ready, more purposefully than ever before, to direct their policy to v i t a l common questions, and to consider objectively, on the basis of our new experiences, the question of strengthening co-operation among the peoples of the North. 2 While s t i l l negotiating with the Russians i n Moscow, Finland approached Sweden with the suggestion that a Northern 2 Finnish Blue-White Book, p. 40. 62 defensive alliance be formed soon after peace had been concluded. Gunther*s words were representative of the favourable reaction with which this suggestion was met in Sweden and Norway, and on March 15th the press in these three countries carried o f f i c i a l news releases which announced that the three governments had reached agreement on the possibility of establishing a pact of joint defence.3 The plan was quickly scuttled by the Soviet Union, however. Norway and Sweden were informed through their Ministers in Moscow that their entry into such a pact would indicate that they were abandoning their traditional policy of neutrality. Paasikivi was told by Molotov during the conversation in the Kremlin on March 21st referred to above that the Soviet Union would interpret Finland's association with a Northern alliance as an expression of a desire for revenge: Your security is guaranteed by the nonaggression clause included in the Peace Treaty. If you conclude a defensive alliance with Sweden and Norway, we shall conclude that you have broken the Peace Treaty.^ From a security point of view the Soviet Union could have been expected to regard with favour a defensive alliance which would strengthen the safety of Scandinavia and the Baltic, as the projected Northern alliance undoubtedly 3 Finnish Blue-White Book, pp. 40-41. 4 Ibid., p. 44. 63 would have done. On the other hand, such an alliance could cause some inconvenience to the Soviet Government should i t wish to 'mop up' the rest of Finland at some future date. Also, a Nordic defence pact might tend to remove Finland from Moscow's sphere of influence and weaken it s grip on her foreign relations. Viewed in the light of such considerations, Moscow's refusal to allow Finland to strengthen her defensive position becomes understandable, and the Finns rightly interpreted i t as an ominous sign of what they could expect from their eastern neighbour.5 Finland nevertheless reopened the question i n late September, 194-0, and talks took place with the Swedish Government for a number of weeks. P o l i t i c a l as well as military cooperation was envisaged on this occasion. Molotov said repeatedly that he opposed the idea, and f i n a l l y , on December 6th, he found i t necessary to deliver a statement to the Finnish Ambassador i n Moscow in which i t was declared that the agreement contemplated would lead to "...the subordination of Finland's foreign policy to Stockholm, and that henceforth the foreign policy of Finland w i l l not be directed from Helsinki, but from Stockholm." The Soviet Government would regard such an agreement as in effect liquidating the Peace Treaty of March 12th. "The Soviet Government advises Finland to 5 See Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, pp. 8 9 - 9 0 . weigh what has been said above, and to consider the con-sequences which an agreement of this k i n d . . . w i l l b r i n g . " 6 In the face of this ultimatum a l l thoughts of a Northern a l l i a n c e had to be abandoned. Under A r t i c l e 6 of the Peace Treaty of March 1 2 t h , the Soviet Union was granted the r i g h t to e s t a b l i s h a consulate i n "the Petsamo area". This formulation afforded Moscow another opportunity to interpret the treaty as I t suited i t best, and i t was subsequently demanded that the consulate should function i n a vast d i s t r i c t comprising "...the entire province of Lapland including the towns of Petsamo, Oulu, Tornio, Kemi, Rovaniemi, Kemijarvi and the Harbor of LUna^ian^r!.*' 7 Finland had to agree to extend the d i s t r i c t of the consulate to the area outlined, but even those l i m i t s were abused. Several members of the greatly overstaffed consulate were shown to have engaged i n espionage, and there were frequent attempts to t r a v e l i n r e s t r i c t e d areas, even on f a l s e papers and assumed names. Soviet disregard for t r a v e l r e s t r i c t i o n s was i n f a c t one of the best examples of the complete disregard for Finland's interests and for the l e t t e r of the Peace Treaty i t s e l f . Soviet interference i n the domestic a f f a i r s of Finland became a part of Finland's p o l i t i c a l l i f e . On 6 F i n n i s h Blue-White' Book, p. 82 ; and Degras, Soviet  Documents on Foreign P o l i c y , v o l . 3 , p. 4 7 9 . 7 F i n n i s h Blue-White Book, p. 1 2 . 65 many occasions pressure was brought to bear on the Finnish Government for the release of Finnish citizens serving. sentences for treason or espionage. The Soviet Union also actively supported the treasonable activities of the Society for Peace and Friendship between Finland and the USSR. In fact, Finland was told that "...the development of Finnish-Russian relations would depend on the treatment accorded to the SRS."3 The procedure was always the same: non-compliance with the wishes expressed by the Soviet Union would, be considered a demonstration of Finnish unwillingness to live up to the s p i r i t - or the letter - of the Peace Treaty. In that fashion pressure was exerted to secure the resig-nations from the Government of Ministers Va ino Tanner, Ernst von Born and Karl-August Fagerholm. Of a more serious nature was the statement presented to the Finnish Ambassador in Moscow on December 6, 1940: We do not wish to interfere in the matter, or make any hints with reference to the nominations for a new presidential candidate in Finland, but we are watching closely the preparations for the election. We shall conclude whether Finland desires peace with the USSR, on the basis df who is chosen as President. It is clear that i f some such person as Tanner, KivimSki, Mannerheim, or Svinhufvud is elected President, we shall draw the conclusion that Finland does not wish to observe the Peace Treaty she has concluded with the USSR.9 As already indicated, espionage was pursued 8 Finnish Blue-White Book, p. 15. ""SWS" Were the Finnish i n i t i a l s of the Society for Peace and Friendship between Finland and the USSR. 9 Degras, op. c i t . , vol. 3, p. 479; Finnish Blue-White  Book, p. 82. almost openly. At the Petsamo consulate, described above, there were three consular and twenty-one other o f f i c i a l s , while the German and B r i t i s h consulates there each had one consul and the one or two other o f f i c i a l s needed i n such a loc a l i t y . At the capital of the Aaland Islands, Mariehamn, the Soviet consulate had eight consular and thirty other Of f i c i a l s , as compared to Sweden's one consul and one typist. The o f f i c i a l duties of the Petsamo and Mariehamn consulates were so insignificant compared to the size of the staffs that there could be no mistake about the real purpose of the Soviet o f f i c i a l s . 1 0 Petsamo gave rise to s t i l l another serious point of f r i c t i o n between the Finnish and Soviet governments during the fifteen months of 'peace1. The Peacy Treaty had confirmed Finland's sovereignty over the area, but soon the Soviet Union began to display an extraordinary interest in i t . In June, Molotov requested that Finland cancel the mining concession held by the British-Canadian Mond Nickel Company since 1934. The concession should then be given to the Soviet Union. A proposal that she buy a part of the output of the mines was rejected by the Soviet Union as unsatisfactory, in spite of the fact that such an arrange-ment would have satisfied her economic interests, allegedly her only interest i n the area. 1 1 When the holders of the 10 Finnish Blue-White Book, p. 17. 1 1 Ibid., pp. 5 ° - 5 l . 6 7 concession refused to give i t up, Finland was told by her eastern neighbour to simply withdraw the concession and hand i t to the Soviet Union. On October 3 0 t h , Andrei Vyshinsky, Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs, warned that i f Finland refused to grant the Soviet demands in the Petsamo area without further delay, the Soviet Government "...would be compelled to take the measures which the situation demanded."!2 Negotiations f i n a l l y got under way in Moscow in January 194-1. While slowly yielding to Soviet demands, Finland nevertheless managed to effectively keep the Russians out of Petsamo un t i l the outbreak of war i n June by expertly playing the only trump card she possessed -the Anglo-Canadian and German interest in the nickel mines. Legal d i f f i c u l t i e s kept cropping up at every important turn, and the negotiations dragged on. Finland agreed to a joint Finnish-Soviet concession for the mines, but another series of legal entanglements quickly appeared in the picture, and Molotov and Vyshinsky seemed unable to get anywhere. Fearing a conflict with Germany, the Soviet Union was reluctant to resort to the usual military threats, and at the time of the last Finnish-Soviet contact about the Petsamo question on May 10th, nothing concrete had come of the negotiations. The increasingly strained relationship between the Soviet Union and Germany was undoubtedly the only reason 12 Finnish Blue-White Book, p. 7 3 . 6 8 why Finland was not compelled to walk the road of the Baltic States. Completing a process which had started with the infamous Soviet ultimatums of June 1 5 t h and l6th to the governments of these three unfortunate countries, Estonia, as the last of the three, on August 6 t h became the sixteenth Soviet Socialist Republic. Soviet comments were ominous for Finland. Reporting on the "applications" of the Baltic States to join the Soviet Union, Molotov told the Supreme Soviet on August 1st: "The successes we have achieved are not incon-siderable but we do not intend to rest satisfied with what has been attained."^ on August 7 t h , Pravda had the following comment to make on the decision of the Supreme Soviet to admit Estonia: The sixth of August is a great historical date - the birth of the 1 6 t h Soviet Republic. Only a few days ago there were but twelve republics in the U.S.S.R. To-day there are sixteen. Time works'for Socialism. History has not yet closed her account.14-And on November 7 t h , Field Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, Soviet Commissar for Defence, declared: "The Soviet Union has extended i t s frontiers, but we cannot be contented with what has already been achieved."I"? What further 'achievements' 13 August Rei, ed.,' Nazi-Soviet Conspiracy and the Baltic  States. Diplomatic Documents and other Evidence, London, Boreas, 194-8, p. 5 3 . ' ~ 14- Loc. c i t . 15 Louis Fischer, The Great Challenge, New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1946, p. 3 0 . On the-liquidation of the Baltic States see also Langer and Gleason, The Challenge to Isolation, pp. 6 4 5 -646, and Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, vol. 2, PP. 3 2 9 - 3 3 0 . 69 the Defence Commissar had i n mind became quite clear a few days later, during Molotov's conversations with the German Reich Chancellor, Adolf Hitler, in Berlin. Germany had been a passive bystander during the Winter War because of her Non-Aggression pact with the Soviet Union. On December 2 , 1 9 3 9 , following the Soviet attack upon Finland, German missions abroad were told to "...please avoid any anti-Russian note" in conversations regarding the Finnish-Russian conflict. It was to be explained as a result of the "...inescapable course of events in the revision of the treaties following the last Great War." The security of Leningrad should also be employed as an argument in defense of the Soviet action, and the fact that Finland had rejected a German offer for a non-aggression pact was to be utilized. It should be pointed out that Foreign Minister Rudolf Holsti was hostile to Germany, and that most of the Finnish press " . . . i s outspokenly unfriendly to us."I 6 A further directive, dated December 6 t h , sup-plemented these instructions and went a step further: "In conversations, sympathy is to be expressed for the Russian point of view. Please refrain from expressing any sympathy for the Finnish position." 1 < 7 However, the severe Soviet diplomatic campaign against Finland was watched with mixed feelings in Berlin, and a change in Germany's attitude 16 Nazi-Soviet Relations. pp. 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 . 17 Ibid., pp. 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 . 7 0 toward Finland was discernible In the summer of 1940. Germany's concern was expressed by her Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, when on August 14th he asked the Soviet Ambassador, Alexander Shkvartsev, "...what truth there was to press reports of a stiffening in Russo-Finnish relations."^® During the same month Germany released the Finnish arms shipment confiscated by her i n Norway during the April invasion, which was nothing short of a slight to her Russian partner. The German action was obviously i n the nature of a,retaliation, however. In July, the Soviet Union had demanded that Finland allow Soviet troops to be transported by Finnish railways to and from the Hanko lease territory, a request which flagrantly violated Finland's neutrality according to international law. Eventually Finland had to yield, and the transit agreement was signed on September 6 t h . In spite of the secrecy of the negotiations which preceded the agreement, Germany soon learned about them and saw in them a further step toward complete Soviet domination of the Baltic. Her reaction was swift. On August 1 7 t h , a Lieutenant-Colonel Veltjens, presumable representing the firm of 'Veltjens & Aschpurvis, Waffen und Munition', appeared at the Headquarters of the Finnish Army carrying a communication from Reich Marshal Hermann Goring. He asked whether Finland, like Sweden, would permit 18 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 1 7 7 . 71 "...the transit of materials and men on leave, and sick, to and from Kirkenes." He also stated that i t would now be possible for Finland to obtain war material in Germany. On the instructions of Prime Minister Risto Ryti, who was at the time also acting President, Mannerheim informed Veltjens on the following day that Finland's reply with regard to the transit was in the affirmative. 2 0 Repre-sentatives of the Ministry of Defence were dispatched to Germany immediately for the purchase of materials, and transit negotiations also got under way without delay. A technical agreement on the details of the transit t r a f f i c was reached between the military authorities of Finland and Germany on September 12th, and a p o l i t i c a l agreement was signed ten days later. Moscow was informed of the transit agreement by the German Embassy on the very eve of i t s signature. 2 1 The agreement, formulated by the German Foreign Office, permitted Germany to transport "...material and necessary personnel from northern Baltic ports, through Rovaniemiy along the Arctic road to Kirkenes in northern 19; Mannerheim, Memoirs,-, p. 399. See also German Foreign Office memorandum by Minister Karl Schnurre of August 19, 1940, and entries from the diary of General Franz Haider i n Documents on German Foreign Policy (Series D), vol f t 10, pp. 511-512. Haider wrote on August 31st: "The Fuhrer wants to equip Finland with supplies richly and generously. Speedily.'" 20 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 400. , 21 Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 188-189. In a memorandum con-cerning a meeting held on August 30th, General Georg Thomas, Head of the War Economy and Armaments Office, wrote: "The fact that Germany is giving assistance to Finland is to be made known to the Russians, since the Fuhrer believes that then the Russians w i l l shrink from further steps." Documents on  German Foreign Policy (Series D), vol. 10, p. 512. 72 Norway."22 It also marked the beginning of German i n f i l -tration i n Finland. Since the Finnish-German transit agreement was to come in for particularly severe criticism from Allied quarters, both at the time and, particularly, when Finland's "separate war" claim was rejected by the Allied Powers at the end of World War II, i t is necessary to point out at this stage that Finland actually had no choice but to act as she did. No one has a right to condemn her for grasping the only straw held out to her at a time when sovietization appeared to be imminent. Great Britain, who was to cause so much harm to Finland through the 'made-to-suit-Russia' propaganda against her - propaganda which s t i l l lingers on in i t s effects, was certainly i n no position to offer Finland any assistance worthy of the name. Sweden's position was too precarious to allow her to give Finland any support other than encouraging words. Norway was under German occupation from Svinesund i n the south to Kirkenes in the north, leaving Finland in a sack the only opening of which was at Petsamo, a few miles of land between Kirkenes and • the Soviet-occupied Rybachi peninsula. Finland was a •sitting duck' for her colossal eastern neighbour, and time was running out. She seemed to be the most li k e l y candidate to become the seventeenth Soviet Socialist Republic. Molotov's 22 Wuorlnen. op. c i t . . p. 93-73 speech on August 1 s t pointed in that direction, as did the comments of the Soviet press. The demonstrations organized in Helsinki on July 2 9 t h , August 2 n d and August 7 t h by the Society for Peace and Friendship between Finland and the U.S.S.R. were not only timed to coincide with this diplomatic pressure brought to bear on Finland by the Soviet Govern-ment, but they were directed against the Finnish Government and i n favour of the Soviet Union. Molotov openly supported the society i n his speech on August 1 s t , threatening "certain elements in ruling Finnish circles" with grave reprisals i f the activities of "...those classes of the Finnish population which are endeavoring to strengthen good-neigh-borly relations with the U.S.S.R...." were suppressed.23 Paasikivi, Finnish envoy in Moscow, was so alarmed by the tone of the Moscow newspapers that he hurried to Helsinki to report. Throughout the Scandinavian countries rumours had i t that a new military conflict was about to break out between Finland and the Soviet Union. Accordingly an agreement with Germany was wel-comed in Finland. Germany represented the last and only hope of escaping the fate of the three small nations across the Gulf of Finland. With the transit agreement coming into oper-ation, Finland's fate might no longer be entirely dependent upon the greedy desires of the Soviet Government but rather on 23 Dallin, Soviet Russia's Foreign Policy 1939-1942. pp. 289-290. 74 the development of German-Soviet relations. The result of the former condition was a foregone conclusion, while the latter held out some hope. Finland had truly become a pawn in the p o l i t i c a l chess game of the Great Powers, and she had to make the best of a very unpleasant situation. In the f i n a l analysis, the Soviet Union i t s e l f was responsible for driving Finland into eventual cobelligerency with Germany, a dilemma from which the Finns were unable to extricate them-selves u n t i l the late summer of 1944. The saving straw held out to Finland by Germany proved increasingly firmer. Germany had become strongly interested i n the Petsamo nickel mines demanded by the Soviet Union, and in the Foreign Office i n Berlin i t was soon sug-gested that i t would be necessary to "...strengthen the Finnish w i l l to r e s i s t . " 2 4 The encouragement consequently given Finland also extended to increased deliveries of arms, while the promised arms deliveries to the Soviet Union failed per to materialize. ' The conversations between Hitler and Molotov i n Berlin on November 12th and 13th demonstrated clearly what this new active German interest meant for Finland. While Hitler avoided the problems of the day and urged that they be postponed for the duration of the war, Molotov Insisted "...that a l l these great issues of tomorrow 24 Foreign Office Memorandum of October 8, 1940. Nazi- Soviet Relations, p. 205. 25" On November 2nd, the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Trade, Anastas I. Mikoyan, complained about this to Dr. Karl Schnurre, Counselor of the German Legation in Moscow, " i n a tone of obvious annoyance." Ibid., p. 217. 7 5 could not be separated from the issues of today and the fulfillment of existing agreements. The things that were started must f i r s t be completed before they proceed to new 26 tasks." Uppermost i n Molotov's mind was the question of Finland, to which he returned time and time again during the conversations. He reminded Hitler that the secret agreement of August 2 3 , 1 9 3 9 , had been executed satisfactorily with the single exception of Finland. A l l the other territories placed within the Soviet Union's sphere of influence by the Secret Protocol had now been incorporated into the Soviet Union, and i t was time the-question of Finland was settled as well. Molotov declared that "...he imagined this settle-ment on the same scale as in Bessarabia and in the adjacent countries," and he could not understand "...why Russia should postpone the realization of her wishes for six months or a year." 2 7 Given a completely free hand, the Soviet Union could insure peace in the Baltic region "absolutely". Hitler, perhaps realizing that Molotov had him cornered, claimed that further conflict in the Baltic would probably not only bring Sweden into the war but also result i n Finnish air bases being turned over to England and the United States. This would force Germany to intervene, which she had no desire to do. ~ Germany wanted peace in the Baltic, 26 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 2 5 4 . The German notes of the Berlin conversations are given in ibid., pp. 2 1 7 - 2 5 4 . 2 7 Ibid., p. 240. Bessarabia had been occupied by Soviet forces on July 28th, and was subsequently incorporated into the Ukrainian S.S.R. The "adjacent countries" had been incor-porated into the Soviet Union as the Byelo-Russian S.S.R. and the Moldavian S.S.R. 76 and any Soviet action against Finland at the present time was l i k e l y to disturb this state of affai r s . After the war had been successfully ended, the Soviet Union could have "...everything that in her opinion was due to her."2® In summarizing this part of the conversation, Ribbentrop stated: There was actually no reason at a l l for making an issue of the Finnish question. Perhaps i t was a misunderstanding only. Strategically, a l l of Russia's wishes had been satisfied by her peace treaty with Finland.2° Hitler added that both sides agreed " i n principle" that Finland belonged to the Russian sphere of influence, and that they should turn to "more important problems" rather than discuss "a purely theoretical" matter. 3 0 In the light of the Hitler-Molotov conversations i t should.be crystal clear that Finland's position in the autumn of 1940 would have been desperate without the moral backing of Germany. The German motives do not matter i n this connection, but i t is a slanderous misrepresentation to allege that Finland's involvement with Nazi Germany was based - at least originally - on anything but extreme national emergency. A man about to drown does not question the intentions of the only person able and willing to come 28 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 240. 29 Ibid., p. 242. 3 0 A very interesting first-hand account of the Hitler-Molotov conversations is given by the German interpreter Dr. Paul Schmidt, Statist auf Diplomatischer Buhne 1923-45. Bonn, AthenMum-Verlag, 1949, Chapter XXI. 77 to the rescue - he grabs the outstretched hand. And he also hangs on to that hand as long as i t is necessary for saving himself. Many have said that Finland hung on too long, but nobody has been able to suggest a different course which Finland might have followed with less disastrous consequences than the one she chose to travel between 1941 and 1944. As early as October, 1939, Stalin had told the Finnish negotiators in Moscow that their desire to remain outside the conflicts of the Great Powers was unrealistic, the Great Powers simply would not allow i t . By the autumn of 1940 these words had been demonstrated to Finland i n a way which l e f t her with no such illusions any more. She had to make a choice. Her efforts to win effective support from the Allied Powers and the United States had been unsuccessful. Now Denmark and Norway were under German occupation, and aid from the West was an absolute impossibility. Meanwhile, the pressure from the East had once again become unbearable, and the annihilation of Finland as a free, sovereign state was imminent. Finland could not be expected to turn down the help offered by Germany, allow herself to be absorbed by the Soviet Union, and wait for Allied victory and a peace conference which might or might not restore to her her former territory and sovereignty. No nation could place such trust in the f a i r words of advice coming to Finland from France and Great Britain during.1940 and 1941, particularly not with the sell-out by these same Powers of Czechoslovakia s t i l l fresh 7 8 i n i t s memory. Besides, until the entry into the war of the United States, more than five months after Germany's attack on the Soviet Union, Allied victory appeared to be l i t t l e more, than a forlorn hope. Whatever might be the German plans for post-war Finland, they could not, by any stretch of the imagination, present a future more terrible than a soviet Finland. This was Finland's dilemma, and these are the premises on which her actions during 1940-4-5 must be judged. Her choice was not for or against the Allied Powers at any stage of the developments, i t was simply a question of her survival. Until the Soviet Union,acci-dentally became an a l l y of Great Britain and France, these two Powers appreciated Finland's predicament, but from then on they allowed themselves, for reasons of 'harmony' and military expediency, to have.their policy toward Finland dictated to them from Moscow. The German Foreign Office memorandum of October 8 t h , suggesting that Finland's w i l l to resist must be strengthened,31 was not solely a result of concern about the Petsamo nickel mines, of course. Even before the conclusion of the transit agreement with Finland Hitler had tentatively decided to launch an attack against the Soviet Union i n the spring of 1941.32 Finland was to be one of the avenues of the offensive, 3 1 See above, p. 74, n. 24. 32 The general plan for such an offensive was recorded as early as July 22nd in the diary of General Franz Haider, German Chief of Staff. Hitler declared himself i n favour of the plan on July 31st. See Lundin, Finland in the Second  World War, p. 8 8 . 79 and she could therefore neither be allowed to f a l l under Soviet domination, nor to pursue a policy which might render d i f f i c u l t the execution of the German attack on the Soviet Union i n the Finnish sector. Undoubtedly the decision to inform Finland of the Soviet Union's demands with respect to Finland, expressed by Molotov during the Berlin conversations, was i n line with this policy.3 3 How complete was this German revelation of Soviet aims is uncertain, but an indication may be seen in the optimistic remarks of the Finnish Minister i n Berlin on the occasion of his New Year's v i s i t to the Foreign Office. According to the memorandum written by State Secretary WeizsHcker after his conversation with the Minister, Wuorimaa stated that " . . . i n his homeland people were now reassured, 'because they thought they knew that in a future conflict with Russia they would not stand alone."34 However, Weizsa'cker adds that "In my reply I used the formula that the Russian Govern-ment certainly realized that Germany did not desire any 33 Ribbentrop, testifying before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg on April 1, 194-6, implied that Finland had been f u l l y informed immediately after the"conversations. The T r i a l of German Major War Criminals. Proceedings of the International Military Tribunal sitting at Nuremberg Germany. Part 10: 2,3 March-3 April 1946. Taken from the O f f i c i a l "Transcript. London, His Majesty's Stationery Office. 1947, p. 212. (Hereafter referred to as Nuremberg Trials) Mannerheim, op. c i t . . pp. 402 and 406, claims that the Finnish Government was not"fully informed until the end of May 1941, and that even "fragmentary reports" did not reach Finland u n t i l "several months later". He cites this as "...good evidence that there was no confidential co-operation between Finland and Germany." 34 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 264. I 80 new unrest in the North,"35 a procedure which should have been entirely unnecessary had the Finns already been con-fidentia l l y informed of the Hitler-Molotov discussions at that time. It is more reasonable to assume that Minister Wuorimaa's remark, In view of the recent developments In Finnish-German relations, was in the nature of a feeler, an invitation to the German Foreign Office to state more exp l i c i t l y how far Germany was prepared to go in her obvious desire to keep the Soviet Union from further encroaching upon the territory and sovereignty of Finland. The implication may also be drawn from the Minister's remark that Finland would welcome such support from Germany. Indeed Finland could look for support from no other quarter. The f a l l of France had upset the balance of power in Europe, and England could hope to reestablish i t only with the help of the Soviet Union. In November the Finnish Minister in London had been told by a high o f f i c i a l in the Br i t i s h Foreign Office that Great Britain could not risk any com-plications that might so l i d i f y the Soviet-German alliance, and accordingly she could do nothing to assist or encourage Finland.3 6 The United States, her hopes of remaining outside the conflict vanishing quickly and consequently careful not to offend a potential a l l y , also showed signs of cooling 35 Nazi-Soviet Relations, p. 264. 36 . Wuorinen, op. c i t . . p. 88. 81 off in her attitude to Finland. Small wonder, therefore, that the Finns were seeking i n Berlin the reassurances of a support which at the end of 1940 they only "thought they knew" might be forthcoming in a future conflict with the Soviet Union. The reassurances were soon to be indicated. On December 18, 1940, Hitler issued his famous 'Directive No. 21' concerning 'Operation Barbarossa'. The directive ordered the armed forces of Germany to prepare for an attack on the Soviet Union i n the summer of 1941, an attack which should crush Russia swiftly and render her completely harmless. Discussing the question of probable a l l i e s and their tasks, the directive stated: 1. On the flanks of our operation we can count on the active participation of Rumania arid Finland.... 3 . Finland w i l l cover the concentration of the redeployed German North Group (parts of the XXI Group) coming from Norway and"will operate jointly with i t . Besides, Finland w i l l be assigned the task of elimin-ating Hangft.... The main body of the Finnish Army w i l l be" assigned the task, in coordination with the advance of the German northern flank, of pinning down strong Russian forces by attacking west of or on both sides of Lake Ladoga and of seizing Hang&.37 This crucial decision involving Finland was made without the knowledge of the Finnish Government, and no hint of i t was given the Finns for more than one month. At the time of the 37 Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 261-262. 82 Nuremberg t r i a l s of the major German war criminals in 1946, the Russians made the most of i t , however. General Rudenko, speaking for the Soviet prosecution, quotes a written statement made by the German General Erich Buschenhagen in which Buschenhagen claims that he, then Colonel and Chief of Staff of the German forces in Norway, participated i n a conference near Berlin at the end of December 1940, where 'Operation Barbarossa' was mentioned by General Franz Haider, Chief of the German General Staff. The statement continues: "Present at Zossen, at the time of the meeting, was the Chief of the General Staff of the Finnish Army, General Heinriks /sic7, who was conferring with General Haider...."38 On the basis of 'Directive No. 21' and General Buschenhagen's testimony, General Rudenko considered i t to be "...incontestable that the Hi t l e r i t e Government at this time had already secured the assent of the Roumanian and Finnish Governments for the participation of these countries, together with Germany, i n the aggression against the U.S.S.R."39 The loser of the battle of Stalingrad, Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus, also testified that General Heinrichs had visited Zossen in December 1940 to make a speech about the Winter War before the General Staff officers. Paulus points out that the speech coincided with the issue of'Directive No. 21', and that i t was significant also 38 Nuremberg Trials, vol. 6, p. 176. 39 Loc. c i t . 83 because i t "...gave an insight into the value of the Finnish troops as possible future partners in the war."4"0 The Soviet prosecution had even more damaging evidence available. Colonel Kitschmann, Military Attache in the German Embassy in Helsinki from October 1, 1941, testified that he had learned from an aide of his predecessor's that Major-General Talvela's v i s i t to Berlin i n September 1940 had resulted in an agreement between the German and Finnish General Staffs "...for joint preparations for a war of aggression, and its execution, against the Soviet Union."4"! The Soviet prosecution based i t s case chiefly on the test-mony of General Buschenhagen, however, who proved himself a most cooperative witness. He related how, in February of 1941, he conferred with General Heinrichs and two of his aides i n Helsinki concerning the possibilities for operations against the Soviet Union from middle and northern Finland. "These conferences led to an agreement," Buschenhagen stated. 4 - 2 He then travelled, according to his testimony, along the eastern border of middle and northern Finland to determine the possibilities for deployment, supply and operations from that sector. This survey was followed by a conference with Finnish staff officers, on the basis of which the German High Command worked out detailed plans for 40 Nuremberg Trials, vol. 6, p. 243 41 Ibid., p. 2 8 8 . 42 Ibid., p. 2 7 7 . 84 'Operation Blue Fox'.43 The basic plans for German-Finnish military cooperation were worked out at Salzburg in late May of 1941 during a conference between General Heinrichs, Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl, Buschenhagen claims. He then went to Helsinki for a further conference with the Finnish General Staff on June 2 n d , at which time "...the details were worked out, such as the time-table, the schedule, and measures of secrecy as to the Finnish mobilisation." 4 4' Buschenhagen summed up his testimony as follows: A l l agreements between the O.K.W. /Oberkommando der Wehrmacht7 and the Finnish General Staff had as their sole purpose, from the very beginning, the participation of the Finnish Army and the German troops on Finnish territory in the aggressive war against the Soviet Union. There was no doubt about that. If the Finnish General Staff, to the outside world, always pointed out that a l l these measures had only the character of defence measures, that was just camouflage. There was, from the very beginning, no doubt among the Finnish General Staff that a l l these preparations would serve only in the attack against the Soviet Union, for a l l the preparations that we made pointed in the same direction — namely, the plans for mobilisation, and above a l l , the objectives for the attack." Nobody ever reckoned with the pos-s i b i l i t y of "a Russian attack on Finland. Since for cogent reasons the operations for attack from Finnish territory could only start eight to ten days after the beginning of the attack against Russia, certain security measures were taken during and after the attack, but the whole formation and linlng-up of the troops was for offensive and not defensive purposes. I believe you can see clearly from that, the aggressive character of a l l these preparations. 4? 43 44 4? Nuremberg Trials, vol. 6 , p. 2 7 7 Loc. c i t . Ibid., p. 2 7 8 . 85 Although other observers might s t i l l have t h e i r doubts, the S o v i e t p r o s e c u t i o n d i d not profess to have any. Major-General Zorya declared before the T r i b u n a l that "Buschenhagen's testimony disposes of a l l attempts to a s s e r t that the war waged by F i n l a n d was a separate war and was d i s s o c i a t e d from the war aims of F a s c i s t Germany. F i n l a n d ' s entry i n t o the war had been envisaged i n the war plans of the F a s c i s t c o n s p i r a t o r s and agreed w i t h the aggressive i n t e n t i o n s of the F i n n i s h r u l e r s . " 4 - 6 The language used by Generals Rudenko and Zorya sounds a very f a m i l i a r note. I t i s the ki n d of language employed by the S o v i e t press when denouncing adversaries of the S o v i e t system; the k i n d of language employed i n speeches by S o v i e t leaders f o r the same purpose; the k i n d of language w i t h which F i n l a n d had become f a m i l i a r between 1939 and 194-1. I t i s the language used to p e r f e c t i o n by H i t l e r when presenting the 'Big L i e 1 . And the same k i n d of language i s found i n the statement of Buschenhagen's and i n h i s and Paulus' testimony. I t i s w e l l warranted to keep i n mind t h a t both F i e l d Marshal Paulus and General Buschen-hagen, the c h i e f witnesses of the S o v i e t p r o s e c u t i o n on matters r e l a t i n g to F i n l a n d , had spent a good deal of time i n the S o v i e t Union as p r i s o n e r s of war, and that they had both become converts to Communism. I t i s in c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t they should have s a i d anything before the M i l i t a r y T r i b u n a l 46 Nuremberg T r i a l s , v o l . 6 , pp. 2 8 8 - 2 8 9 . 86 which would have made the s l i g h t e s t dent i n the o f f i c i a l Soviet version of Finland's attitude between 1939 and 1941. Had the Soviet prosecution feared that these two important witnesses might have turned 'independent' once they arrived i n the American occupation zone i n Germany to present t h e i r testimony, Paulus and Buschenhagen would never have been produced as witnesses. I f Buschenhagen did indeed write the statement credited to him, i t was c e r t a i n l y an inspired piece of evidence.- Central i n this statement i s the assertion that General Heinrichs was informed of 'Operation Barbarossa' during his 'conference' with General Haider at Zossen i n December 1940, and that there was f u l l m i l i t a r y cooperation between the General S t a f f s of Germany and Finland from that point on. However, Buschenhagen was not present during any such 'conference* between Heinrichs and Haider i n December 1940. A l l other available sources claim that the f i r s t v i s i t of General Heinrichs to the German Headquarters at Zossen took place i n l a t e January 1941. 4 - 7 Furthermore, this v i s i t was undertaken for the purpose of giving a lecture on the Winter War, as Paulus also states. Neither Paulus nor Buschenhagen state f l a t l y that German-Finnish m i l i t a r y cooperation i n a war against the Soviet Union was discussed at that time, although the Soviet prosecution preferred to read th e i r testimony to that e f f e c t . On the contrary, under 47 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 405; Mazour, op. c i t . , p. 140; Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 95* 87 cross-examination General Buschenhagen was forced to admit that "...I assume that they were concerned with possible co-operation between the Finnish and German troops i n the case of a conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union."4'® A different matter is the fact that the German High Com-mand might have wished to reach a military understanding with Finland at this early point. Marshal Mannerheim says that during General Heinrichs 1 v i s i t to Zossen General Haider "...casually suggested that some day Finland and Germany, as in 1918, might fight side by side, and that then the natural task of the Finnish Srmy would be to march on Leningrad." And Mannerheim continues: The suggestion was firmly rejected by General Heinrichs, who declared himself convinced that neither the govern-ment nor the Commander-in-Chief would agree to such an operation, the more so as the Russians were always asserting that Finland threatened the security of Leningrad. It should be emphasized that neither the so-called Barbarossa Elan, nor any other plan was shown to General Heinrichs.4° General Waldemar Erfurth, who later became German liaison officer at the Finnish Headquarters, supports Mannerheim's contention flatly.5° There is no reliable evidence, there-fore, to show that Finland was informed of German plans to attack the Soviet Union at this early stage of developments, 48 Nuremberg Trials, vol. 6, p. 276. 49 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 40?. 50 Waldemar Erfurth, Per finnische Krieg. 1941-44. Wiesbaden, Limes, 1950, p. 21. Quoted in Lundin, op. c i t . . p. 95. 88 nor that she'had signified any inclination to join with the German forces i n such an attack. The fact that both Paulus and Buschenhagen make the same error in the timing of General Heinrichs' v i s i t to Zossen, and that only these,two Soviet witnesses make that error, might be taken as a further indication that their testimony was inspired by the same source. And there are other assertions made by these two witnesses in which they find themselves contradicting a l l other.sources to a greater or lesser degree, excepting the Soviet sources from which they never deviate. Buschenhagen did go to Finland i n February 194-1. His v i s i t was of a different nature than that outlined i n his testimony at Nuremberg, however. As Chief of Staff of the German forces in Norway he was concerned with the problems connected with the transit of German troops from Finland's Baltic coast to Kirkenes under the provisions of the Transit Agreement. Ostensibly these problems were the reason for his v i s i t to Finland in February, although i t can reasonably be assumed that he was interested in securing information which would be helpful in planning the successful execution of 'Operation Barbarossa' on the Finnish sector. This latter purpose was not therefore necessarily agreeable to his Finnish colleagues, however. Having completed his o f f i c i a l business i n Helsinki, Buschenhagen indicated his desire to learn about the Finnish operative plans for Lapland and to discuss questions relating to t r a f f i c and communications i n the north. He,also indicated that Finland could expect 89 German help were she to be attacked by the Soviet Union. The Finnish reaction was negative. Mannerheim says: I absolutely declined to give him any information about our operative plans, and also refused to discuss an eventual German-Finnish military collaboration. But there was no objection to discussing the system of communications of Lapland within the framework of the Treaty of Transit.?! Accordingly, Buschenhagen, when visiting Rovaniemi, was taken on a brief tour of Lapland, a trip which may have yielded some information useful in the preparation of 'Operation Blue Fox'. However, again supporting Mannerheim's story, General Erfurth declares that "...no negotiations or conversations about a possible later cooperation between Germans and Finns were held i n Helsinki or anywhere else on the occasion of Buschenhagen's visit." ? 2 There was no further contact between Finnish and German authorities u n t i l May 20th, when Hitler sent Minister Karl Schnurre to see President Risto Ryti i n Helsinki. During their conversation Schnurre revealed for the f i r s t time that Molotov, during his talks with Hitler i n Berlin the previous November, had demanded a free hand in Finland, but that he had been turned down by Hitler. The relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were now very strained, Schnurre confided. This would not necessarily lead to war, he said, but such a possibility could not be entirely 51 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 405. 52 Erfurth, op. c i t . . p. 28. Quoted in Lundin, op. c i t . . p. 97. 90 excluded either. For that reason Hitler had suggested that one or more Finnish military experts go to Germany to receive information "regarding the alarming world situation."53 Ryti was also assured that Germany would regard a Soviet attack on Finland as casus b e l l i , which was the f i r s t o f f i c i a l confirmation the Finns had of the hope voiced by Minister Wuorima i n Berlin at the time of his New Year's v i s i t to the German Foreign Office some five months earlier. Now the Finns not merely "thought they knew", now they knew that they would not stand alone i n a future conflict with the Soviet Union. However, i t does not necessarily follow that they wanted such a conflict, although there could be no doubt among the Finns on which side they preferred to stand should they be forced into a Russo-German conflict. And as things were there was no possibility that Finland would be allowed to remain a neutral by-stander. The unanimous decision of President Ryti, the Cabinet and Marshal Mannerheim was that the German offer should be accepted. On May 25th, three days after Schnurre»s v i s i t to Helsinki, a delegation headed by General Heinrichs was received in Salzburg by Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodl. They were informed that the situation was 'not acute', but that i t was a German custom to 'prepare everything thoroughly and in good time in order 53 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 406; Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 98-99; Mazour, op. c i t . , p. 141; Wuorinen, op. c i t . . pp. 97-9B. 91 to act quickly when the hour strikes'. 54 If the hour were to strike, Germany would want Finland to hold down the Russian troops on her frontiers. It was also possible that the Finns might be asked to take part in an offensive against Leningrad and to assist in operations against Murmansk and Salla. The Finnish delegation listened 'with interest 1, but General Heinrichs stressed that he had no authority to negotiate about p o l i t i c a l and military matters. If Finland were attacked by Soviet forces she would defend herself, but even in such a case the delegation could not make any commitments. Heinrichs took the same position in a conversation with General Haider the following day. 55 He agreed to receive a German emissary in Helsinki on June 3rd for further exchange of information, but for some unexplained reason this emissary never arrived.^6 From General Buschenhagen's testimony one may get the impression that he was this emissary; he claims that he arrived in Helsinki on June 2nd for a conference with the Finnish General Staff.5? However, i t seems that again his timing CQ conflicts with that of other sources, J and nobody corro-borates his statement that during his conference with the 54 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 407. 55 Ibid.. pp. 407-408; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 99; Mazour, op. c i t . , p. 141. 56 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 408; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 99. 57 See above, p. 84. 58 Mannerheim says he arrived i n Helsinki "About June 10th". Qp. c i t . , p. 410. 92 Finnish General Staff the details of the joint German-Finnish operative plans against the Soviet Union were worked out. Only Professor C. Leonard Lundin^ repeats Buschenhagen1s testimony as i f he places any credence i n i t , but not even he, who throughout his book willingly accepts any evidence damaging to Finland while casting doubts upon the sworn testimony of most Finnish p o l i t i c a l and military leaders, finds i t possible to establish a case in support of Buschenhagen's version of this particular con-ference and therefore prefers not to comment upon i t . About Buschenhagen1s v i s i t i n June, Marshal Mannerheim has this to say: From his remarks to the General Staff i t appeared that his v i s i t this time was concerned with a dis-cussion of practical details in connection with eventual co-operation in the north i f Finland were attacked by the Soviet Union, and also with obtaining guarantees for Finland participating in the war as Germany's" a l l y . After I had reported to the President of the Republic and he had confirmed that he adhered to his earlier standpoint, I had Colonel Buschenhagen informed that a guarantee for'Finnish participation in the war could not be given. Finland was determined to remain neutral provided she were not exposed to aggression. 6 0 During the t r i a l of Finnish 'war responsibles 1 in Helsinki in 1945 General Heinrichs stated categorically that no "...written or oral commitments or agreements, binding for Finland's government or military leadership", were given to 59 Op. c i t . . p. 102. 60 Mannerheim. op. c i t . , p. 140. 93 Buschenhagen or anyone e l s e a t any t i m e . 6 ! I t has been claimed that F i n l a n d must have been f u l l y aware of the approaching c o n f l i c t , that i t was impossible a f t e r a l l the conversations between F i n n i s h and German m i l i t a r y leaders that F i n l a n d should not r e a l i z e what was about to happen, and that the o f f i c i a l F i n n i s h avoidance of binding commitments was merely "...the t h i n n e s t and shabbiest of coverings f o r preparations f o r a war of r e t r i b u t i o n , and perhaps...of c o n q u e s t . " ^ Such a c l a i m i s understandable. The s i t u a t i o n i n F i n l a n d i n 1941 was one of great confusion, as was to be expected when a l i t t l e s t a t e f i n d s i t s e l f drawn i n t o the maelstrom of c o n f l i c t i n g Great Power i n t e r e s t s . A number of f a c t s , as w e l l as a number of informants, a l s o appear to support such a c l a i m . However, to go along w i t h those who condemn Fi n l a n d ' s behaviour i n 1941 one has to cl o s e one's eyes to another body of evidence. I t i s easy to say today, w i t h the knowledge of what d i d happen, th a t F i n l a n d must have known the war was unavoidable. Indeed most F i n n i s h leaders a t the time feared t h a t i t was. However, they had never been t o l d ex-p l i c i t l y by the Germans that the d e c i s i o n to a t t a c k had been made. On the contrary, they were repeatedly t o l d that the,Germans wanted to be prepared f o r any e v e n t u a l i t y because of a d e t e r i o r a t i o n i n German-Soviet r e l a t i o n s , but 6 1 Quoted i n Lundin, op. c i t . . p. 1 0 3. Lundin adds th a t sworn testimony by such a d i s t i n g u i s h e d man "cannot be l i g h t l y dismissed", whereupon he dismisses i t by saying t h a t i t i s " e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y d i f f i c u l t to b e l i e v e l i t e r a l l y " . 62 I b i d . , p. 1 1 2 . 9 4 that war was not unavoidable. Rumours were plentiful in the early summer of 1941, and some of them claimed that Germany and the Soviet Union were about to patch up their differences. On May 3 0 t h , believing that a new German-Soviet agreement was entirely possible, the Finnish Govern-ment instructed i t s Minister in Berlin to do what was i n his power to ensure that such a settlement would not be made, as in August 1939, at Finland's expense. The Finnish Minister visited the German Foreign Office with such requests on May 3 1 s t and June 2 n d , and on June 1 0 t h he was able to inform his Government that a satisfactory preliminary reply had been received. The German Foreign Office kept him under the impression that their negotiations with the Soviet Government were progressing normally, which pre-sumably meant satisfactorily. u3 Of course, i f the Finns had any hopes of keeping out of war, they did not really believe i n them. In spite of the optimistic reports from the Minister in Berlin, there were other reports which appeared to correspond more closely with the actual situation. Most of them came from the Finnish Minister in Bucharest. On April 6 t h , he reported that par t i a l mobilization was going on i n Rumania; on April 2 7 t h : border regions were being evacuated by the c i v i l i a n population and German forces moved up to the 63 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 9 9 - 1 0 0 . 95 frontier of Bessarabia; May 9th: the Russians evacuated Bessarabia; June 3rd: further mobilization; June 19th: large concentrations of Russian forces on the border; June 21st: -that decisive events could be expected within the next few days or hours.64- In view of these reports the Tass denial on June 13th of a l l rumours of war, and the repetition of this denial by Minister Orlov in Helsinki on June 20th, were taken with a grain of salt in Finnish government c i r c l e s . 6 5 Ana; there is no reason why one cannot also see the gradual mobilization of the Finnish Army in the light of these reports, although some prefer to view this mobilization as proof of a military understanding between the German and Finnish forces prior to the outbreak of war. On June 9 th , presumably on the basis of the reports received from Bucharest, President Ryti informed the Cabinet that he considered i t possible that war might break out within two weeks. On the same day a partial mobilization was begun. Following reports of "...considerable prepar-ations for war on the eastern frontier, and l i v e l y activity 66 ...in the Gulf of Finland and on the Peninsula of Hanko", ° the whole Finnish f i e l d army was called up on June 17th. The transit t r a f f i c of German troops through Finnish Lapland had assumed unforeseen proportions during 64 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 99. 65 Loc. c i t . ; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 411. 66 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 411. 96 the late spring of 1941. If the Finns viewed this development with misgivings, they did not present any objections to i t , and i t is obvious why they should not do so. The presence of any number of German troops on Finnish territory, be i t very small or large, would be a welcome excuse for Soviet forces to overrun Finland should a Soviet-German conflict break out. They would overrun Finland with or without such an excuse, but an excuse was, of course, to be preferred. Finland had given Germany transit rights in the hope that the presence of German forces would act as a deterrent to the Soviet Union, and in that respect the Transit Treaty had served i t s purpose well. With a Soviet-German conflict appearing to be imminent, and having no chance of remaining neutral anyway, why should the Finns object to an increase i n the German forces along the Kemi-Kirkenes route. They had no desire to share the fate of Belgium and Holland, and they were not very alarmed, there-fore, when, on June 6th, approximately 1 , 5 0 0 German personnel, an increase of about 50 per cent over the previous contingent, were stationed in Finland to handle the growing numbers of German units being transported via the Finnish route. Then numerous German ships arrived in northern Finnish ports, and a f u l l y equipped division disembarked and began marching north. At the same time an SS division stationed i n Norway began marching south. After the Finnish mobilization had begun the demand on the inadequate railway communications became so heavy that serious holdups resulted. "In order to 9 7 introduce some order into the situation," Marshal Mannerheim came to an agreement with the Germans that they should become responsible for the provisioning of the Third Army Corps stationed in Lapland. On June 1 5 t h this corps was placed under the German Commander-in-Chief on the express understanding that i t was not to be subject to German operative orders should such be given. 0? Meanwhile, Minister Schnurre was on a special mission to Stockholm where he was exerting pressure on the Swedish Government to permit a German division to be moved from Norway to Finland by r a i l . This permission was granted on June 2 5 t h , but the ensuing transport turned out to be so extensive and last so long that the Swedes jokingly called i t not a division but a multiplication. ° 8 At any rate, on June 2 2 n d , the day when Germany attacked the Soviet Union, there were at least two f u l l y equipped German divisions in northern Finland, and others were probably disembarking from the ships which had arrived within the last one or two weeks. It was inconceivable that the Finns should protest these movements under the circumstances. They knew what had happened to Yugoslavia, and since they had to choose sides they might as well keep 6 7 .Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 411. 6 8 See confidential memorandum to the Norwegian Foreign Office in London from i t s Minister in Stockholm,"Mr. Bull, of July 9 , 1 9 4 3 , in Norges forhold t i l Sverige under krigen  1940-45. Aktstykker utgitt av Pet Kel. Utenriks-departementet, Oslo, Gyldendal, 1 9 5 0 , vol. 3 , p. 5 7 2 . 9 8 on good terms with the only Great Power that could keep the Russians out of Finland. How the German troops came to be within their boundaries in such impressive numbers i n June 1941 does not really matter too much. The version presented by Professor Wuorinen69 and supported by Marshal Mannerheim and almost a l l other Finnish sources is certainly more acceptable than the one implied by Professor Lundin, who prefers to sus-pect a sinister motive i n most Finnish diplomatic and military activities during the 1940-41 period. Based on what he calls a "formidable array of evidence", Professor Lundin, obviously aware that his evidence is inconclusive, nevertheless implies that a full-scale military and p o l i t i c a l understanding existed between Finland and Germany long before June 1941, and that the events of that month a l l unfolded according to a joint prearranged p l a n . 7 0 Whatever the truth of the matter i s , i t may never be possible to prove i t to the satisfaction of c r i t i c a l historians. Perhaps the second volume of General Heinrichs 1 biography of Marshal Mannerheim w i l l shed some further light on i t when i t is completed,71 although i t cannot be expected that his story w i l l differ much from the testimony he gave at the t r i a l s i n Helsinki. In the evening of June 21st the Finnish authorities 6 9 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 102-105, gives the most com-plete outline of the German troop movements preceding the outbreak of war. 70 Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 103-112. 71 The f i r s t volume, Mannerhelmgestalten: Den vite generalen  1918-1919. was published in Helsinki late i n 1957. 99 were informed that Germany was about to commence ho s t i l i t i e s against the Soviet Union the following morning. 7 2 At 4:00 a.m. on June 22nd the Germans crossed into the Soviet Union a l l along the European demarcation line. No border-crossings took place from Finnish territory, however. Two hours later Hitler proclaimed his crusade against Bolshevism by a radio speech which involved Finland: Side by side with their Finnish comrades stand the victorious fighters of Narvik on the shores of the Arctic. German divisions, commanded by the conqueror of Norway, together with the heroes of Finnish independence, led by their Marshal, guard Finnish soil.73 Five minutes later the f i r s t Soviet bombs were dropped by planes flying in from bases in Estonia. At 7:55 a>m. Soviet batteries opened f i r e from Hanko. A Finnish ship 1 was shelled i n Petsamo, and gunfire was opened from the Soviet side of the border i n the south. 7 4" In a broadcast speech the same day Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, declared that air raids and a r t i l l e r y shelling had taken place from Finnish territory. 75 This accusation was later taken up by the allied propaganda, although painstaking Finnish investigations revealed that no German plane had taken off from a Finnish airport for 72 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 411. 73 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p*-100. 74 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 412; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 105-106. 75 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, Documents  and Materials, London, Hutchinson, 1946, vol. 1, p. 75« 100 the S o v i e t Union during the f i r s t days of the war. Wot u n t i l the 26th d i d two German.planes, r e t u r n i n g from a r a i d undertaken from a base i n East P r u s s i a , land i n F i n l a n d . 7 6 I n s p i t e of the confusion created by H i t l e r ' s announcement F i n l a n d , between the 22nd and the 25th, t r i e d d e s p e r a t e l y to remain n e u t r a l . On the day of the German a t t a c k a l l F i n n i s h l e g a t i o n s abroad were informed that F i n l a n d was n e u t r a l and would remain so as long as p o s s i b l e . Germany was informed of t h i s as w e l l , and as a r e s u l t , on a German r a d i o broadcast on the 24th e x p l a i n i n g the stand of the d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s i n the war a g a i n s t R u s s i a , F i n l a n d was not grouped w i t h Germany's other c o - b e l l i g e r e n t s . The B r i t i s h F o r e i g n O f f i c e a l s o regarded F i n l a n d as a n e u t r a l s t a t e . However, F i n n i s h r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s i n Moscow had no e f f e c t , and the Russians cut the l i n e s of communication on the 23rd. On the morning of the 25th F i n l a n d s t i l l main-tained her p o s i t i o n of n e u t r a l i t y , and Premier R a n g e l l had prepared a statement to the Riksdag f o r that day along the same l i n e s . However, that same morning witnessed such l a r g e - s c a l e a i r a t t a c k s a g a i n s t F i n l a n d , accompanied by heavy a r t i l l e r y f i r e along the border, that a l l hopes of 76 Wuorinen, op. c i t . . p. 108. D a l l i n n , op. c i t . . pp. 378-379, accepts t h i s S o v i e t a l l e g a t i o n : "On June 23, without w a i t i n g f o r a formal d e c l a r a t i o n of war on the p a r t of F i n -l a n d , German bombers took o f f from F i n n i s h t e r r i t o r y and bombed the Kronstadt area. This was f o l l o w e d by I n f a n t r y a c t i o n on the 24th." I t should be remembered, however, that D a l l i n n wrote i n 1942, and that he had no access to the per-t i n e n t documents. His sources were c h i e f l y newspaper r e p o r t s , and, Russia being an a l l y of the 'West', such reports were not l i k e l y to favour F i n l a n d - l e t alone Germany. 101 s t a y i n g n e u t r a l disappeared. When the Riksdag convened, the Premier s t a t e d that F i n l a n d , having been attacked, had begun to o f f e r r e s i s t a n c e and was, t h e r e f o r e , a t war. There was nothing more F i n l a n d could do. S t a l i n had t o l d the Finns i n October 1 9 3 9 t h a t the Great Powers would not al l o w F i n l a n d to remain n e u t r a l , and he had been r i g h t . I n the twenty months which had passed s i n c e the S o v i e t -F i n n i s h n e g o t i a t i o n s preceding the Winter War F i n l a n d had t r u l y come to r e a l i z e that she was but a pawn i n the r u t h l e s s game played by her Great Power neighbours. There was very l i t t l e she could do about i t . Having heard the Prime M i n i s t e r ' s r e p o r t , t h e r e f o r e , the Riksdag unanimously sanctioned the course of a c t i o n followed by the Govern-ment. ? 7 Once again, f o r the t h i r d time i n twenty-three years and f o r the second time i n a l i t t l e more than f i f t e e n months, F i n l a n d was at war w i t h the S o v i e t Union. 77 Wuorinen, op. c i t . . p. 1 0 9 ; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 413 CHAPTER III THE CONTINUATION WAR, JUNE 1941 - SEPTEMBER 1944' The news that they were at war again did not come as a surprise to many Finnish citizens. War is seldom good news to anyone, but to the Finns in June 1941 i t was not entirely bad news either. It takes more than fifteen months to forget the kind of settlement forced upon Finland by the Soviet Union in March 1940, and the Finns had not forgotten. According to President Ryti's diary he had the following to say to the Cabinet on June 9th in connection with the increasing strain in German-Soviet relations: If war breaks out between Russia and Germany i t may be to the advantage of the whole world. Germany is the only state which at the present time can beat Russia or at least weaken i t appreciably, and i t would do no harm, even i f Germany, too, were weakened in the game. But the greatest possible weakening of Russia is the condition of our deliverance.I K The Finnish-Soviet war between 1941-44 i's now commonly referred to as the 'Continuation War1. 1 Quoted in Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, pp. 111-112. 1 0 3 This sentiment was not at a l l limited to Finland, of course. From various motives a Soviet-German conflict was desired by many nations, not least by Great Britain. The Scan-dinavian peoples, a l l of whom had taken a personal interest i n Finland's Winter War, and two of whom were at the time suffering under German occupation, greeted the new turn of events with grim satisfaction, seeing in i t the beginning of the end for Germany, the most deserved weakening and perhaps destruction of Bolshevist Russia, and hope for the Finns.3 A l l nations opposing Germany in the war welcomed this new front as corresponding to their own best interests, because the condition of their deliverance was 'the greatest possible weakening' of Germany. Up until June 22, 1941, there had been no love lost between this camp of Allied nations and the Soviet Union. Their sympathy had been on the side of Finland, and they had nothing but contempt for the methods employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with Finland. They were the very nations who had expelled the Soviet Union from the League of Nations on those grounds. But the violent events of June 1941 drew a new line of demarcation between the. nations of Europe, and Finland, by a brutal accident of history, which had been recognized by a l l up until then, suddenly found herself irrevocably on 2 Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill wrote: "That Germany should at this stage, and before clearing the Balkan scene, open another major war with Russia seemed to me too good to be true." The Grand Alliance. Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1 9 5 1 , p. 3 5 4 . 3 This was the definite impression of the author, who lived in Norway during the Second World War. 104 the wrong side of the line. In the evening of June 22nd, those Finns who had their radio receivers tuned in on the Bri t i s h Broadcasting Corporation heard this-new demar-cation line being drawn by Prime Minister Winston Churchill: Any man or state who fights on against Nazidom w i l l have our aid. Any man or state who marches with Hitler is our foe.... That is our policy and that is our declaration. 4 Three days later Finland marched with Hitler, at least as far as the Allied nations were concerned. It was to l i t t l e avail that President Ryti protested in his broadcast to the nation on June 26th that "The world must understand that Finland is fighting this war only against Russia; we are not parties in the big European struggle."^ Yet, as has been stated above, the outbreak of war was not entirely bad news to the Finns. In the words of President Ryti in his broadcast on June 26th, "...after a l l that has occurred, who would expect us to go into mourning i f M. Molotov, and with him the circles responsible for Russia's policy, now have fal l e n victims to their own policy, which has been the policy of scavengers?" Indeed, their was no feeling of mourning in Finland on the morning of the Continuation War. The only exceptions, perhaps, 4 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 372. 5 The text of Ryti's radio speech is given in Finnish Blue-White Book, pp. 99-105; Royal Institute of International Affairs-, Documents on International Affairs 1939 -1946 . vol. 2: Hitler's Europe, ed. Margaret Carlyle, London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1954 , pp. 296-302. 105 would have to be sought among those whose p o l i t i c a l leanings were towards the extreme l e f t , including such persons as the writer Olavi Paavolainen, whose diary Professor Lundin quotes at length as proof that at least a minority of Finland's population kept i t s head cool. The rest of the population was,.to a greater or lesser degree, caught up in the excitement of the*new war and the prospect that Finland might now, after a l l , obtain the justice which had been denied her by the Soviet Union. In a sense, therefore, those who claim that Finland, in entering the war against her eastern neighbour, was motivated by a feeling of revenge w i l l find a wealth of material to support their contention. The Allied propaganda machine, primarily in the Soviet Union and i n Great Britain, certainly made good use of that theme. The activities of the Lapua and the Akademic Karelia Society during the 1930's were also recalled and used in the anti-Finnish propaganda. The Akademic Karelia Society, an ultra-nationalistic student movement at Helsinki University, had nurtured the dream of a Greater Finland which would include a l l of Karelia and the Kola Peninsula, and some elements within the movement even dreamed of a day when Finland's eastern boundary would be the Ural Mountains. However, this movement, although strong among the students, commanded no following among responsible Finnish authorities. 6 Lundin, on. c i t . , pp. 127, 130, 131, 132, 139, etc. 106 Even among the latter group, however, a desire to see East Karelia once again returned to Finland was not entirely foreign. The Soviet Union, during the 1939 negotiations, had even offered to give this region to Finland in exchange for the Karelian Isthmus, a proposal which the Finns could not possibly accept. Once the Continuation War was a reality, a l l these aspirations were naturally revived. O f f i c i a l l y , Finland's war aims were s t r i c t l y to regain the territory lost i n the Winter War and to take up defensive positions along the old border. Where the old border did not offer suitable conditions for a strong defence, the Finnish forces were to seek such positions on Soviet territory, but the war was not to be one of conquest. In the excitement of the early weeks of the war the strong Finnish sentiments with respect to East Karelia were not to be suppressed, however. On July 7 t h , Marshal Mannerheim proclaimed this goal for his army: We promise the Karelians that our sword w i l l not rest unti l Karelia has been"liberated. The provinces of Viena and Aunus have waited twenty-three years for the fulfillment of this promise, and since the winter campaign of 1939-40 Karelia has waited for the dawn of the day that is to bring her freedom.7 It was a rather bombastic Order of the Day, one which was eminently well suited to raise the morale of the troops, but also one which caused embarrassment to the Finnish 7 Lundin, op. c i t . . p. 127 1 0 7 p o l i t i c a l leadership. Mannerheim does not mention this Order of the Day in his memoirs, which is one of the counts on which Professor Lundin pronounces him something less than a "truthful man".® Whatever the motive for the Order of the Day of July 7 t h may have been, Mannerheim does not say. He says, rather, that the object of the occupation of East Karelia was "...to prevent the enemy from making use of his preparations there to bring the war on to Finnish territory. " 9 There can be no doubt that this contention is a valid one from a strategic point of view, and the military brilliance of Marshal Mannerheim has never been questioned. That the occupation served i t s purpose in this respect is also well known. To make bombastic pro-clamations for the benefit of the uninformed masses was certainly not a practice of which the Finnish military leader-ship could claim a monopoly. It is common practice in any war, and Allied Powers employed i t whenever they found i t advantageous in both world wars. It should be kept in mind, however, that the Finns have a most highly developed sense of justice,- 1- 0 and. that to them the Continuation War represented the correction of the most flagrant injustice suffered by them at the. hands of the Soviet Union a l i t t l e 8 Lundin, op. c i t . . p. 255 and passim. 9 Mannerheim, Memoirs, p. 428. 10 The most commonly known example of this i s , perhaps, the fact that Finland, after a l l other nations defaulted, continued to pay her World War I debt to the United States, even during World War II. 1 0 8 more than a year before. Under the circumstances i t is certainly understandable, and even excusable, that the prospect of regaining the territory stolen from then and seeing the perennial threat from the east destroyed should cause some i n i t i a l elation and i l l considered statements before more sober thoughts could emerge. In spite of what some writers claim, this elation was generally shared by Finland's population in the early months of the Continuation War.11 The so-called 'peace opposition' emerged much later, 11 Carl Olbf Frletseh, formerly a member of the Riksdag for the Swedish People's Party and whose book Finlands  B d e s a r 1939-1943 is one of the principal s o u r c e s used by Professor Lundin, is praised by Lundin as "deeply concerned with the values of l i b e r a l Western c i v i l i z a t i o n " (the highest praise Lundin knows of) and as the foremost example of those who were not carried away by the i n i t i a l elation about the prospect of restoring the 1 9 3 9 frontier and gaining East Karelia. Frietsch, one of the only two of a l l Lundin's sources characterized as being of truly "great stature", had this to say when he spoke at Porvoo (east of Helsinki) on November 1 1 , 1941, five months after the war started: "When our heroic army - to which our thoughts always go - fights over there in the dark of the wild Karelian forests, i t does so in order to secure for our country a frontier which reflects more f u l l y than any frontier we have ever had the demand for strategic security. We can but sincerely hope that the idea of a more secure existence behind a sounder and more just eastern frontier w i l l prove correct." Quoted in Torsten G. Aminoff, "Opinionerna under fortsattningskriget. Ett- utkast," Appell. vol. 1 3 , no. 28 (September 5 , 1957)» p. 8 . There is no indication in Frietsch's book that he ever held such views. Apparently he must have fallen for the sin of convenient forgetfulness of which Professor Lundin accuses a l l other memoir writers from Generals Erfurth and Rendulic to Manner-heim and Vaino Tanner. It is regrettable that Lundin has accepted the version of the role of the 'peace opposition* so capably, but not entirely truthfully, presented by Frietsch. By accepting the testimony of Frietsch as the truth, the whole truth and nothing but" the truth, Professor Lundin has given an inverted picture of Finland's position 1 0 9 particularly after the battle of Stalingrad, and even then there were no basic differences i n outlook between the 'peace opposition' and the responsible p o l i t i c a l and military leadership. They differed only on the all-important question of timing. While the 'peace opposition', not faced with the responsibility of making decisions, i r r e -sponsibly demanded, that Finland quit the war regardless of the consequences, the authorities had to take the existing circumstances into f u l l consideration and await the moment when a departure from the war could be effected in a way which gave Finland a reasonable chance to retain her inde-pendence. However, at the outbreak of the Continuation War the Finns were united in support of the government. On the Finnish sector the war was going well. While the German troops attacking from Norway over Petsamo towards the Murmansk railway were stalled and held by the Russians for the duration of the war, the Finnish forces in the south, having been regrouped for an offensive, enjoyed a series of spectacular successes. Ignoring the repeatedly expressed desire of Germany that the Finns march on Leningrad, the in the Second World War. For some c r i t i c a l Finnish reviews of Professor Lundin 1s book, see ar t i c l e by Professor Arvi Korhonen in the periodical Suomen Kuvalehti, partly reprinted in Appell, vol. 1 3 , no. 3 8 (November 1 1 , 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 8 ; Sven-Erik Astrttm, "Beskt p i l l e r att svai.ia." Hufvudstadsbladet. August 2 2 , 1 9 5 7 , p. 7 ; Torsten G. Aminoff, "Marskalkens memoarer som historisk kalla," Appell. vol. 1 3 , no. 3 0 (September 2 0 , 1957), PP. 1, 8 . See also John H. Wuorinen, "Background to Tragedy," The New York Times  Book Review, vol. 6 2 , no. 7 (February 1 7 , 1 9 5 7 ) , p. 2 3 . 110 Finns commenced operations on July 1 0 t h In the direction of the old border northeast of Lake Ladoga. Eleven days later they stood on the 1 9 3 9 border, having reoccupied the town of Salmi. The city of Sortavala f e l l to them on August 1 6 t h . Meanwhile, on July 3 1 s t , another attack was commenced on the northern section of the Karelian Isthmus, culminating i n the occupation of Kakisalmi on August 2 1 s t . The main operations on the Isthmus got under way between August 2 0 t h and 2 2 n d with such force that i t assumed the character of a pursuit rather than a battle. The railway connection between Viipuri and Leningrad was cut on the 2 5 t h , leaving the three Russian divisions in this area in a surrounded pocket which was cleaned up within a week. On the 2 9 t h , the Finnish flag again flew over the ancient castle in Viipuri, marking the reconquest of the capital of Karelia. Two days later the triumphant Finnish Army reached the 1 9 3 9 frontier at Mainila, the spot where the Soviet Union had arranged the infamous incident which started the Winter War. The immediate war aims of Finland had been f u l f i l l e d . In less than eight weeks her armed forces had regained a l l the territory lost by the Peace of Moscow with the exception of Hank'6, which the Russians evacuated on December 3 r d * and the Petsamo area, which had been recovered by German arms. 1 2 12 For an account of these operations, see Mannerheim, op. c i t . . pp. 415-427. I l l For the time being the advance was halted as the p o l i t i c a l and military authorities debated whether or not the Finnish Army should cross the old frontier into Soviet territory. The question was an important one. Finland's claim that she was waging a separate war and was not a party in the struggle between the,Great Powers was-* s t i l l appreciated to some extent among the Western Allies, and there was considerable reluctance about undertaking operations which might appear to indicate the abandonment of this claim and the beginning of a war of aggression and conquest. On the other hand there was the constant pressure from the Germans that Finland coordinate her military operations with the grand German strategy. Since Finland, even at this early stage, was rapidly becoming economically dependent upon Germany, such pressure was very d i f f i c u l t to resist.. Nevertheless, when In late August Mannerheim received a letter from Field Marshal Keitel requesting that his army attack Leningrad simultaneously with a German attack from the south and east, he replied in the negative after consultation with President Ryti. A request that the Finnish offensive east of Lake Ladoga should be extended across the Svir River was also rejected.^ A second urging 13 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 426-427. Mannerheim asserts that "...from the beginning I had informed the President of the Republic and the government that under no circumstances would I lead-an offensive against the great city on the Neva." Ibid.. p. 416. 112 by Keitel a few days later met with the same response, and on September 4th Keitel dispatched his right-hand man, General Jodl, to Mannerheimfs Headquarters to convince the Finnish Commander-in-Chief of the necessity of Finnish participation in the assault on Leningrad. "My attitude had not changed," says Mannerheim, "and General Jodl, who had evidently been given firm orders, f i n a l l y exclaimed: •Can't you then do anything to show yourself co-operative? "'14 Mannerheim explains his personal determination not to take part in an attack against Leningrad in the following terms: It was because of p o l i t i c a l reasons, which in my opinion outweighed military ones, that I opposed our participation in an attack on Leningrad. In their desire to violate Finnish territory, the usual argument of the Russians was that an in-dependent Finland constituted a threat to the second capital of the Soviet Union. It would therefore be better not to place a weapon in the hands of our adversaries for use in a dispute which would not end with the war.15 It may also be noted that Mannerheim had issued a categorical prohibition to the Finnish Air Force of flights over Lenin-grad, a rule which remained in force throughout the war.l 6 There were probably other reasons why Finland was reluctant to become as irrevocably involved in the German-Soviet war as an attack by her forces against Leningrad 14 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 427. 15 Ibid., p. 428. 16 Ibid., p. 413. 113 would e n t a i l . The F i n n i s h p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y l e a d e r -ship could not be completely c e r t a i n that Germany was going to win the war, and consequently t h e i r plans would have to consider what would be the consequences of t h e i r m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s should F i n l a n d be on the, wrong side of the t a b l e when peace came to be made. Accordingly there could not be any serious c o n t r a d i c t i o n s between her war measures and her c l a i m to f i g h t i n g a separate war. However, although a F i n n i s h t h r u s t a g a i n s t Leningrad could not be r e c o n c i l e d w i t h F i n l a n d ' s o f f i c i a l war aims, an advance i n t o East K a r e l i a would seem l o g i c a l from a s t r a t e g i c p o i n t of view. Except on the K a r e l i a n Isthmus, the 1939 border provided no n a t u r a l l i n e of defence f o r F i n l a n d . Such a l i n e would have to be sought on the isthmus separating Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega and i n s i m i l a r l y advantageous t e r r a i n north of Lake Onega. The Germans had requested t h a t the F i n n i s h Army advance to the S v i r R i v e r , and i t seemed p o s s i b l e to the Finns that t h i s request could be agreed to to a l i m i t e d extent without compromising F i n l a n d ' s p o s i t i o n too much i n the eyes of the A l l i e d Powers. I t was Manner-heim' s o p i n i o n that i n East K a r e l i a "...we n e i t h e r threatened Leningrad, nor...the Murmansk r a i l w a y . " 1 7 17 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 428.' General E r f u r t h , the German l i a i s o n o f f i c e r at .-Mannerheim's Headquarters, claims that the Germans.had requested that the Finns support the German a t t a c k on Leningrad by d i r e c t i n g t h e i r main a t t a c k north of Ladoga against Lodeinoe Pole on the S v i r , w h i l e the Germans would t h r u s t northward from t h e i r p o s i t i o n s southeast of Leningrad and j o i n w i t h the Finns on the S v i r 114 On-August 27 th , the F i n n i s h Army re c e i v e d orders to continue i t s eastward march through East K a r e l i a i n the d i r e c t i o n of the S v i r R i v e r and the c i t y of Petrozavodsk, c a p i t a l of the K a r e l i a n S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R epublic. Advanced u n i t s reached the S v i r as e a r l y as September 7 t h , and the great r a i l w a y bridge over the r i v e r was taken the next day, c u t t i n g the Leningrad-Murmansk r a i l w a y connection. Via a newly b u i l t l o o p - l i n e along the White Sea from Belomorsk to Obozerskaya on the Arkhangelsk-Vologda l i n e , Murmansk s t i l l had r a i l w a y connection w i t h unoccupied S o v i e t t e r -r i t o r y , however, and Murmansk remained a v i t a l terminus f o r A l l i e d convoys to the end of the war. A few days l a t e r the F i n n i s h Army reached Voznesene, where the S v i r flows out of Lake Onega. Petrozavodsk f e l l on October 1st a f t e r two weeks of severe f i g h t i n g , and s i x days l a t e r Marshal Mannerheim. issued orders that the o f f e n s i v e should be halted as soon as Medvezhegorsk at the northern t i p of Lake Onega had been captured.1® On November 6 t h , the army corps on the K a r e l i a n Isthmus was ordered to produce plans f o r a defensive l i n e running from Vammelsuu on the Gulf of F i n l a n d to T a i p a l e on Lake Ladoga. F i v e days l a t e r the forces between.Lake Ladoga and Lake Onega were given i n a surrounding operation. The Germans would then starve Leningrad i n t o surrender. The F i n n i s h advance i n East K a r e l i a was presumably i n accordance w i t h these plans. At h i s post-war t r i a l , P r e s i d e n t R y t i presented an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h i s o p eration which f u l l y supports Mannerheim's v e r s i o n , however. Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 150-151. 18 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 433* The East K a r e l i a n cam-paign i s described i n i b i d . , pp. 430-434. 1 1 5 similar orders, and the troops north of Lake Ladoga received theirs in the beginning of 1942. 1 9 0 n December 6 t h , Finland's Day of Independence, Mannerheim's Order of the Day stated: _ Our operations having attained Karhumaki Jedvezhegorsk7 and the Maanselka /sic7 aselskaya7 station, I order that the offensive operation be ended and defensive measures i n i t i a t e d . 2 0 Finland had attained her strategic objectives, and, with minor exceptions, the front held by her forces remained static from then on u n t i l the great Russian counter-attacks in the early summer of 1944. In spite of the obvious moderation shown by Finland in the military prosecution of the war, d i f f i c u l t i e s soon developed with the Allied Powers, particularly with Great Britain. British public opinion, so favourable to Finland during the Winter War and s t i l l favourable at the outbreak of the Continuation War, was changing as a result 9T of Great Britain's sudden liaison with the Soviet Union. J-The Soviet Union's war was now Great Britain's war, and 19 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 440. 2 0 Wuorinen, Finland and World War II, p. 1 2 6 . 'Maanselka1 should be" 'Maaselka', a railway station oh the Leningrad-Murmansk line south of Lake Seg. The Maaselka Isthmus sep-arates Lake Seg and Lake Onega. 2 1 At the Teheran"Conference in December 1 9 4 3 , Prime Mini-ster Churchill said to Stalin "...that in the days of the Russo-Finnish War I had been sympathetic to Finland, but I had turned against her when she came into the war against the Soviets." He also talked about "the harm the Finns did to Russia by their improper attack". Winston S. Churchill, Closing the Ring, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1 9 5 1 , p. 398. 116 V •ft K t r K c n t f j Ou.1 / MAXIMUM ADVANCE BY FINNISH ARMY INTO SOVIET TERRITORY DURING WORLD WAR I I A A A A A Maximum advance i i i n i i n - Murmansk railway Border of 1939 — •• — • Border of 19^0 -' Arc t i c highway used by German forces i n t r a n s i t s \ Hasilikijfl 117 Finland was the former's enemy. The requirements of cementing the new alliance superseded the impractical demands of traditional British sympathies and moral prin-ciples. Guilty or innocent, Finland was on the wrong side. The Soviet Union, having drawn Finland into the war by i t s attack on June 2 5 t h , soon began to put pressure on Great Britain to sever relations with Finland. Germany also began to put pressure on Finland, demanding that B r i t i s h -Finnish relations be ' c l a r i f i e d ' and that British consular 22 representation i n Finland be ended. Following a personal letter from Hitler to President Ryti on July 1 9 t h , this pressure increased, and the intelligence activities of British representatives i n Finland did not improve the situation. For several reasons, therefore Foreign Minister Rolf Witting was instructed by the government to suggest to the Br i t i s h Minister in Helsinki the possibility of con-siderably reducing or closing the commercial and military sections of his Legation. Overstepping his authority, the Foreign Minister on July 2 8 t h presented to the British Minister a memorandum declaring that in view of existing circumstances"regular diplomatic relations between the two countries can scarcely be maintained without d i f f i c u l t y . " As a "logical consequence of the course of events", Finland would therefore discontinue the functions of her Legation 22 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 1 3 0 . I 118 i n London, and the British Government was invited to take similar measures with regard to i t s Legation in Helsinki. 23 Meanwhile the Soviet Union and Great Britain had enough to do smoothing over i l l - f e e l i n g s of long standing and working out the various aspects of their unexpected alliance. An i n i t i a l 'Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and Great Britain for Joint Action in the War Against Germany1 was signed by Ambassador Sir Stafford Cripps and Molotov in Moscow on July 12th. 2 4 It was followed by a busy period of Soviet diplomatic activity, Including the signing of similar agreements with Czechoslovakia on July 18th and Poland on July 30th, the restoration of dip-lomatic relations with Norway on August 5th and Belgium on August 7th, a military agreement with Poland on August 14th, v i s i t s to Stalin on July 30th by Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's personal representative, and on August 15th by Laurence Steinhardt, the American Ambassador. A further agreement was also concluded with Great Britain on August l 6 t h for exchange of commodities, credit and clearing. 2 5 Having launched the process of warming up to each other, the Soviet 23 'Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 130-132. Two days later the London Daily Herald wrote that Great Britain would have broken off relations with Finland herself and at an earlier date had her Legation in Helsinki not served as an exceptionally valuable observation post. ibid., p. 132. 24 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, vol. 1, pp. 77^78": 25 Ibid., pp. 79-88. 119 Union raised the question of breaking off relations with Finland. In an interview with Prime Minister Churchill on September 4th, Ambassador Ivan Maisky made the f i r s t move in the matter and was assured that Great Britain would be prepared to make i t plain to the Finns that she would declare war upon them i f they advanced beyond their '1918 f r o n t i e r s ' . 2 0 Mr. Churchill gave this assertion in spite of the fact that he realized how necessary East Karelia was for the security of the Finns; "...the history of the previous two years lent strength to their view," he admits. However, he also knew that "...this was a subject on which the Russians f e l t strongly." 2? That same evening Churchill repeated his assertion in a message to Stalin: We are willing to put any pressure upon Finland in our power, including immediate notification that we w i l l declare war upon her should she continue beyond the old frontiers. We are asking the United States to take a l l possible steps to influence Finlan d . 2 8 On September 28th, the Norwegian Minister in Helsinki delivered to the Finnish Government a Brit i s h note dated September 22nd. The note warned Finland that i f she continued the advance into "purely Russian" territory, Great Britain would be forced to consider her as "...an open 26 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp. 458, 526. 2? Ibid., p. 526. 28 Ibid., p..460. 120 enemy, not only while the war lasts, but also when the peace Is made." Finland was requested to end her war against the Soviet Union and withdraw her forces behind the 1939 frontier as a f i r s t condition for the restoration 29 of normal diplomatic relations. ' A neutral observer, the Stockholm newspaper Dagens Nyheter, commented on this note in its issue- of October 8th: If the British demands were acceded to, the Finnish armed forces, after having thrown their adversaries back to the east of i t , would have to withdraw to a frontier which was i n 1939 violated by the Soviet Army. From a p o l i t i c a l point of view this could be conceived under certain conditions, but strategically and m i l i t a r i l y i t is absolutely impossible, and in a situation such as" the one in which Finland finds herself strategic considerations doubtless take precedence over p o l i t i c a l ones, even i f the two should not be in complete accord.30 In her rejection of the British note, published on October 8th, Finland stressed this very same point: "An effective de-fense, to which no one can deny Finland's right, is pos-sible only by establishing the defense i n those very areas."31 Churchill, feeling that a declaration of war was not the correct way of dealing with the situation and hoping that Finland might be agreeable to " f a i r and reasonable peace terms", wrote Stalin on November 4th, asking him to reconsider "whether i t is really good business" that Great Britain 29 Wuorinen, op.-cit., p. 133; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 432 30 Quoted in Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 432. 31 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 133* 121 should take such a d r a s t i c step.-3 S t a l i n was adamant. In his reply, dated November 8th, he declared that "...an intoler a b l e s i t u a t i o n has been created i n the question of the declaration of war by Great B r i t a i n on Finland...." He complained of the wide p u b l i c i t y the matter had received i n the press and implied that the negative B r i t i s h attitude demonstrated a lack of unity between the two a l l i e s . 3 3 When C h u r c h i l l demonstratively f a i l e d to answer Sta l i n ' s ill-tempered l e t t e r , S t a l i n presented his apology through Ambassador Maisky i n London. He r e i t e r a t e d his stand with regard to Finland, however, and again i n a l e t t e r to C h u r c h i l l of November 2 3 r d . 3 4 "As a r e s u l t of S t a l i n ' s pressing appeal," C h u r c h i l l says, the B r i t i s h Government decided to go ahead with arrangements to.present an ultimatum to Finland. That t h i s decision was taken with great reluctance i s shown by the memorandum C h u r c h i l l sent to his Foreign Secretary, Mr. Anthony Eden, on the 29th: Finland and Company. I don't want to be pinched for time i f there i s a chance of Finland p u l l i n g out of the big war.... Procedure therefore should be as follows. I f we have not heard by the 5th that the Finns are not going to p u l l out, or have heard that they are contumacious, we then telegraph to S t a l i n saying that " i f he s t i l l  wishes i t " we w i l l declare war forthwith. The Rumanian and Hungarian declarations w i l l follow, also i n accordance with whatever he may desire.3 5 32 C h u r c h i l l , The Grand Alliance, p. 527. 33 Ibid., p. 529. , , 34 Ibid., pp. 530-532. 35 Ibid., p. 534. 122 This, i t might be kept in mind, was written four days after Finland had formally joined the Anti-Comintern'Pact, her f i r s t p o l i t i c a l agreement with Germany, which indicates that Great Britain was viewing this event r e a l i s t i c a l l y and not as a sign of Finnish p o l i t i c a l subordination to Germany. The existence of this pact had not appeared to be a stumbling block when the Soviet Union signed...the' Non-Aggression Pact with Germany in August 1 9 3 9 . ^ Churchill, seeking another way out of his dilemma, dispatched through the American Minister in Helsinki a personal message to Mannerheim which was received on December 1 s t . He expressed his deep grief "...at what I see coming, namely, that we shall be forced In a few days, out of loyalty to our a l l y Russia, to declare war upon Finland," and he implored Mannerheim to "...simply leave off fighting and cease military operations, for which the severe winter - affords every reason, and make a de facto exit from the war."3 7 .The British ultimatum had been received on November 2 8 t h . It did not demand the withdrawal of the Finnish Army to the 1 9 3 9 frontier, but i t did request the cessation of military operations before December 5 t h . It also placed Finland in a most tragic position in as much as her operations were actually halted on December 6 t h , 36 On Finland's reasons for joining the Anti-Comintern Pact and o f f i c i a l Finnish statements in that connection, see Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 . 3 7 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 4 3 5 - 4 - 3 6 ; Churchill, The Grand  Alliance, p. 5 3 4 . 123 but for obvious reasons she was prevented from divulging this to Prime Minister Churchill. As Mannerheim points out, to reveal to the Soviet Union's a l l y that Finland intended to cease operations would have enabled the Red Army to release troops for new offensives and probably have brought drastic German counter-measures.38 Accordingly the Finnish Government was unable to give a wholly satis-factory answer to the British ultimatum, and on December 6 t h , simultaneously with the news of the capture of Medvezhegorsk, and in the midst of the Independence Day celebrations, the announcement was made that Great Britain had declared war upon Finland. Stalin had achieved another of his objectives; Finland was now to be regarded as an a l l y of Germany in the conflict between the Great Powers. The view expressed by the Soviet Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in a state-ment issued on November 1 1 t h was now to be the basis of Allied policy towards Finland: The present Finnish rulers are helping the bloody Hitler to carry on a war of conquest against the peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. Carrying on this war of conquest against the U.S.S.R., they are helping the H i t l e r i t e gang to rivet the Hi t l e r i t e tyranny on the peoples of Europe. There w i l l be nothing sur-prising i n the peoples of Europe and the U.S.S.R. treating these gentry just as they intend to treat the clique of Hitler.3 9 It was a bitter blow to the Finns, who saw in i t 3 8 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p p . 4 3 6 - 4 3 7 . 3 9 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, vol. 1, p. 1 0 8 . . . . 124 a further sign "...that morality no longer had any meaning in high p o l i t i c s , " to quote the reaction of Mannerheim.40 This reaction was not without foundation, although the fact that a Great Power, faced with a struggle for i t s existence, compromises on i t s principles of morality should not have been surprising to the Finns. During the second half of 1941, Great Britain s t i l l feared that the Soviet Union might make peace with Germany, and i t seemed to be one of the prerequisites of victory that the Anglo-Soviet alliance be firmly established. If this involved a break with Finland, the break would have to be effected in spite of any moral qualms. To the British the break had a distinct advantage, therefore, and the failure of Finland to comply with the 'reasonable* demand of the British Government had even made i t appear that she preferred Berlin to London. This, in turn, made Finland a f a i r target for British propaganda and allowed i t to echo the distortions fabricated in the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. To the United States, who found herself at war the very next morning as Japanese planes bombed Pearl Harbor, the Anglo-Finnish break "...lowered one of the hurdles con-fronting the Administration program of aiding the Soviet U n i o n . B o t h these Powers, however, were aware of the 40 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 438. 41 William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, The Undeclared  War 1940-1941. New York,.Harper, 1953> p. 551. For accounts of American attempts to induce"Finland to quit the war, see ibid., pp.-549-551 and 826-835; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 135-139 and 146-148; Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, New York, Macmillan, 1948, vol. 2, pp. 977-980. 125 fact that Finland had had no real choice in the matter, and i t should have been particularly clear to the British. In 1939 they had witnessed the break-down of the Anglo-French negotiations for an alliance with the Soviet Union over the refusal of Rumania and Poland to allo\v the transit of Russian troops. The Poles had declared that "With the Germans we risk losing our liberty; with the Russians our soul." 4" 2 The history of Finland, both before and after 1917, recorded sufficient evidence to confirm the validity of this contention. The British declaration of war was a triumph for the Soviet Union, but the Soviet leaders were not yet satisfied. Arriving in M0scow in the middle of December for discussions with Stalin and Molotov, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was confronted with demands that Great Britain, as a prerequisite for an expansion of the agreement of July 12th, recognize the borders of the Soviet Union as they had been established subsequent to the German-Soviet secret agreement of August 1939. Stalin and Molotov wanted Eden to sign a secret treaty which would confirm the notorious Secret Protocol i n i t s ful l e s t implications. This, of course, would include recognition of the 194-0 frontier with Finland and the inclusion of Finland in a Soviet sphere of interest. Informed of the demands, Prime Minister 42 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 391. 126 Churchill "reacted violently", as demonstrates a telegram of December 20th: Stalin's demand about Finland, Baltic States and Rumania are directly contrary to the f i r s t , second, and third articles of the Atlantic Charter, to which Stalin has subscribed. There can be no question whatever of our making such an agreement, secret or public, direct or implied.... 4-3 The demand was shelved for the time being, but not for long. Within three months the British position on this issue was already i n the process of crumbling, as the physical pres-sures of the war again overcame the principles of morality. On March 7 t h , 1942, Churchill apologetically wrote President F. D. Roosevelt that "The increasing gravity of the war has led me to feel that the principles of the Atlantic Charter ought not to be construed so as to deny Russia the frontiers she occupied when Germany attacked her."4"4' On May 20th, Molotov arrived in London for further talks regarding an Anglo-Soviet treaty and at once repeated the demands of the previous December. During the last few months American pressure had been brought to bear upon the Soviet Union, however, and when, after two days of f u t i l e negotiations, Eden suggested a general and public treaty of alliance for twenty years, Molotov agreed to ask Stalin for further instructions. On the 24th, he received per-43 Churchill, The Grand Alliance, p. 63O. 44" Winston S. Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, Boston, Houghton M i f f l i n , 1950, p. 327. 1 2 7 mission to negotiate on the basis of Eden's suggestion, and the Treaty of alliance, without any t e r r i t o r i a l pro-visions, was signed on the 26th. As a concession to the Soviet Union in return for her cooperation In this matter, the United States cancelled her consular representation in Finland in July.45 It is impossible within the limited scope of this work to discuss in detail the military activities of Finland from the time she reached her strategic goals until the day of her surrender to the Soviet Union. These actions had l i t t l e or no bearing on the development of Finnish-Soviet relations from 1942 to the present day. It is important, however, to discuss in some detail the diplomatic activities which eventually resulted in the conclusion of an armistice between Finland and her Anglo-Soviet adversaries in September 1944. At the mercy of the Soviet Union during the 1940-41 period of uneasy peace, Finland had been drawn closer to Germany. By the provocation of the Soviet Union, she had become involved in the war between the Soviet Union and Germany. Now at the mercy of Germany, getting out of the war was an extremely d i f f i c u l t and delicate problem. While the Continuation War was s t i l l in i t s early stages, a number of rumours were circulated to the effect that the 4 5 Hull, op. c i t . . vol. 2, p. 1 1 7 7 . For accounts of the Soviet demands and the developments- prior to the agreement of May 2 6 t h , see ibid., pp. 1 1 6 6 - 1 1 6 7 and 1 1 7 1 - 1 1 7 3 ; Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 3 3 2 - 3 3 6 . Text of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty of Alliance is printed in Soviet Foreign Policy During  the Patriotic War, pp. 1 5 8 - 1 6 0 . 128 Soviet Union was willing to conclude peace with Finland on the basis of the 1939 borders. None of these rumours could be substantiated, however. The only one which ap-peared to have something to i t was a feeler presented through the American Under Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, to the Finnish Minister i n Washington on August 1 8 , 194-1. Minister Mjalmar Procope was informed that the Soviet Govern-ment might be willing to discuss a new peace treaty with Finland which would include Soviet t e r r i t o r i a l concessions. The indefinite nature of the information received was such that the Finnish Government was unable to place trust in the authenticity of the feeler. 4" 6 A communication issued in Moscow on September 4th indicated that any i n i t i a t i v e with respect to peace negotiations would have to come from Finland, as she alone was in need of peace.4"'7 A report from the Kuibyshev correspondent of The New York Times on November 12th quoted Litvinov and A. Losovsky, the Soviet press chief, as saying that no action had been initiated by the Soviet Union for a separate peace with Finland.4"® After the Finnish Government had formally rejected the feeler presented by Mr. Welles, the Soviet Government . hastened to declare that the Under Secretary of State had 46 See Hull, op. c i t . , vol. 2, pp. 977-980; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 826-828. 47 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 146. 48 Ibid., p. 148. 129 acted "on entirely correct assumptions", 4-9 and sub-sequently Soviet leaders were fond of telling foreign correspondents how, in the early f a l l of 194-1, they had been most willing to give Finland back not only a l l the territory she had lost in 194-0, but also a part of East Karelia.5° That this display of generosity was nothing but free advertising, suitable for American consumption, is rather obvious, however, judging from past performance and the relentless demands on Finland pressed by the Soviet Union in conferences with her a l l i e s a l l through the war. The 'peace feeler 1 communicated through the Swedish Foreign Minister on December 24th was hardly any more genuine than its predecessor, particularly when viewed in the light of the demands presented to Mr. Eden by Stalin and Molotov only a few days previously.5 1 There can be no doubt that the responsible Finnish authorities wanted peace, provided they could obtain i t on just terms and without getting involved in h o s t i l i t i e s with the Germans, which would, as a matter of course, be suicidal. As long as the Allied Powers were unable to give Finland guarantees against Germany, the conclusion of a separate peace was an absolute impossibility. Also in-" 49 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, vol. 1, p. 108. 50 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 148-149. 51 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 443. 1 3 0 fluencing the Finnish p o l i t i c a l and military leadership was the already budding realization that Germany might not win the war. Mannerheim had begun to doubt the a b i l i t y of Germany to carry the war against the Soviet Union to a successful conclusion as early as late 1941, and he informed President Ryti of this in January 1942.52 But the existing situation ruled out any hopes of disengaging Finland from the war at that time, and, furthermore, the year 1942 was remarkably quiet on the diplomatic front as far as Finnish-Soviet peace feelers were concerned. The only event worthy of note occurred at the end of October, when i t was learned in Helsinki that Yartsev, then posted to Stockholm, had indicated that the Soviet Union might be willing to discuss peace on the basis of the 1939 frontier. There could be no bargaining about Hanko, however, and Ryti and Tanner would have to be removed before talks could begin. As received in Helsinki, the report seemed unreliable in every respect and was never seriously considered. Further-more, as a result of informal inquiries in Berlin i t was found that peace talks of any kind with the Soviet Union were l i k e l y to lead to serious consequences for Finland.53 The surrender at Stalingrad on February 3> 194-3, of Field Marshal Paulus and his army was the catastrophe which for the f i r s t time convinced the Finnish public that 52 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 433. 53 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 149-150. 131 peace was not only desirable but necessary. The following day President R y t i , Prime Minister Rangell, Foreign Minister Witting, Defence Minister Walden and Supply Minister Tanner called on Marshal Mannerheim at Headquarters to obtain his view on the m i l i t a r y s i t u a t i o n . The Commander-in-Chief's review was not encouraging. I t was agreed that-a turning-point i n the war had been reached, and that Finland must get out of the war as soon as a p o s s i b i l i t y presented i t s e l f . . How this should be achieved they did not know, but they f e l t that i t would have to be attempted through an agreement with Germany i n order to avoid a wholesale destruction of the country by German troops. The conquered t e r r i t o r y should be held for the time being as a trump card which could be used i n negotiations with the Russians.54 six days l a t e r the Riksdag met i n secret session to hear a review of the m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n by Colonel Paasonen, the Head of the Intelligence Department at Head-quarters. The commotion caused by this frank and complete report, which concluded by warning the members that they must prepare themselves for another Peace of Moscow, was such that i t was found necessary to repeat the review two days l a t e r , this time by the Chief of the General S t a f f , General Heinrichs.55 The public was beginning to wake up 54 -Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 460-461; Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 176; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 150-151. 55 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 461-462; Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 177. 1 3 ? to the f a c t that F i n l a n d was once more f i g h t i n g a l o s i n g b a t t l e , and the 'peace o p p o s i t i o n ' began to assume pro-p o r t i o n s . On February 1 5 t h , the executive committee of the S o c i a l Democratic p a r t y adopted a r e s o l u t i o n r e f l e c t i n g the new mood: ' F i n l a n d ' s present war, a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the Winter War, i s a defensive war, i n t o which our people were forced a g a i n s t t h e i r w i l l . I t s purpose i s s o l e l y to safeguard the freedom and independence of our country. I t i s , t h e r e f o r e , a separate war; we have no pa r t i n the war between the great Powers and are not f i g h t i n g f o r the o b j e c t i v e s of e i t h e r group of great Powers. The f a c t that F i n l a n d and Germany are f i g h t i n g the same enemy, Ru s s i a , does not a l t e r t h i s f a c t . F i n l a n d i s , t h e r e f o r e , f r e e to decide on withdrawing from the war whenever a f a v o r a b l e moment appears and her freedom and independence are guaranteed.56 This expressed the f e e l i n g s of F i n l a n d ' s leaders as w e l l as the f e e l i n g s of the 'peace o p p o s i t i o n ' . However, the crux of the matter was the d e f i n i t i o n of what c o n s t i t u t e d a favourable moment. On March 5 t h , Rahgell's government was succeeded by that of P r o f e s s o r Edwin Linkomies. Perhaps because of h i s S c o t t i s h name and h i s good connections i n Great B r i t a i n , Dr. Henrik Ramsay became F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r . Two weeks a f t e r the new government took o f f i c e , i t r e ceived a memorandum from the American Charge d ' A f f a i r e s i n H e l s i n k i , Mr. McClintock, o f f e r i n g the good o f f i c e s of the United States 56 Wuorinen, o j u c i t . , pp. 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 . See a l s o Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 180-181, and Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 462. 133 i f Finland wished to explore the possibilities of disengaging herself from the war. It was stressed that the offer would probably-not be repeated. The Government's Foreign Affairs Committee, in discussing the American offer, came to the conclusion that acceptance would in effect mean that relations with Germany would be broken, leaving Finland at the mercy of both Germany and the Soviet Union without any chance of being aided by the United States. German approval, therefore, should be obtained before replying to the American memorandum. Accordingly, Foreign Minister Ramsay flew to Berlin and saw Ribbentrop on the 26th. The German Foreign Minister was furious and refused to l i s t e n to Dr. Ramsay. He stated that Germany would draw "extreme conclusions" should Finland accept the American offer and demanded that i t be rejected. Instead, Finland should sign a treaty with Germany to the effect that neither party would make separate peace. After having been informed by Mr. McClintock that he was not prepared to give any details regarding the Soviet peace terms, and that the United States could not give Finland any guarantees, the Finnish Government drafted and ^7 forwarded a reply rejecting the American offer. It has been implied that Dr. Ramsay's trip to Berlin to consult his German colleague ridiculed any claims 57 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 152-154; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 463-464; Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 183-186; Mazour, Finland  Between East and West, pp. 158-159. 134 that Finland was fighting her own war.5® The Foreign Affairs Committee's reason for sending him there was not without validity, however. There can "be no doubt that German intelligence would learn about the American contact sooner or later anyway, and such a discovery would not bring pleasant consequences for Finland. Finland was fighting her own war, but she was also entirely dependent upon Germany for her supplies of food. Until somebody else could undertake to guarantee Finland against the military might of Germany and supply the necessary goods, Finland would be unable to break with Germany. Germany utilized this trump card in pressing the demand made by Ribbentrop for a p o l i t i c a l treaty. The German Minister visited Dr. Ramsay almost daily to press the matter. The government refused to yield on this v i t a l point, however, in spite of the interruption of food deliveries from Germany. The disastrous German defeat in Tunisia soon gave Berlin other things to worry about than a treaty with Finland, and the matter was dropped with no other reprisals than a reduction i n the food shipments.59 There was another incident which may,have in -fluenced the Finnish Government in its decision that the American offer of establishing contact with the Soviet 58 Carl Olof Frietsch, Finlands odesar 1939-1943. p. 508. Quoted in Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 184. : 59 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 464-466; Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 186-188; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 154-155. 135 Government was not very safe to accept. On March 10th, five days after Linkomies' government took office and ten days before the contact with Mr. McClintock, the London Times had editorially given vent to opinions which were well suited to f i l l Finnish hearts with cold apprehension. Professing that there could be no security in Western Europe unless there was also security in Eastern Europe, and that security in Eastern Europe was unattainable "...unless i t is buttressed by the military power of Russia," the Times editorial proclaimed: Russia w i l l , at the moment of a victory so largely ' due to her outstanding effort, enjoy the same right as her Allies to judge for herself of the conditions which she "deems necessary for the security of her fronti e r s . " 0 In other words, the Times, a newspaper close to the govern-ment of Great Britain, was indicating that in i t s opinion the British would regard as justifiable a Soviet claim to a free hand in the post-war settlement of her frontier. It could not be expected that Finland would place her fate unquestioningly in the hands of the Soviet Union under the circumstances without firm guarantees from the British Government, and no such guarantees were offered. On the contrary, indications were that Great Britain had abandoned Finland Into the Soviet sphere of interest. 60" Quoted in Vera M. Dean, "The U.S.S.R. and Post-War Europe." Foreign.Policy Reports, vol. 19, no. 11 (August 15, 1943% P. 131. See also David J. Dallin,Russia and Postwar  Europe, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1945, p. lb"b". 136 The next indirect contact with the Soviet Govern-ment occurred in July, when the Belgian Minister in Stock-holm confided that he had been informed by a Soviet o f f i c i a l that the Soviet Government was prepared to negotiate a peace settlement with Finland, provided that Finland state her views in writing to the Soviet Union. Finland replied within a week, not in writing but orally to the Belgian Minister, that she was willing to negotiate on the basis of the proposals made by Stalin and Molotov in 1939, involving the cession by Finland of the Gulf of Finland islands and territory on the Karelian Isthmus, to be compensated for with territory in East Karelia. Remembering the breach of faith on the part of the Soviet Union in f a i l i n g to keep secret the 1939 negotiations, Finland was not prepared to commit her proposals to paper, of course. In due course she was informed by the Belgian Minister that the Soviet contact man had found the reply unsatisfactory and refused to transmit i t to Moscow.61 Beginning in November, 1943, a regular peace offensive was opened up by the Soviet Government. On the 20th of that month, Madame Kollontay, through Mr. Boheman in the Swedish Foreign Office, l e t the Finns know that they were welcome to send a representative to Moscow to discuss peace. F i r s t they would have to submit a statement of 61 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 156; Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 191; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 467; Mazour, op. c i t . , p. 160. 1 3 7 their "observations and proposals", however, and i f Moscow found them agreeable, "the peace i t s e l f can be worked out later." Madame Kollontay added that "Moscow has no intention of making Finland a province or of violating Finnish in-dependence, unless forced to do so by future Finnish policy."' Since this approach seemed the most promising one to date, the Government's Committee on Foreign Affairs decided to do what was possible to find out whether i t could be developed to the stage of o f f i c i a l discussions. When Finland reported to Madame Kollontay, through Mr. Boheman, that she thought the 1 9 3 9 frontier, with possible adjustments, should be the basis of negotiations, Madame Kollontay replied that in any case the Moscow Peace of 194-0 would be the basis and that "other matters" could be discussed later. The conversations came to an end in early January, 194-4, after a few more fruitless exchanges.u3 What those "other matters" were was revealed confidentially by Stalin at the Teheran Conference of the 'Big Three' on December 1st. Stalin declared that he could not diverge from the following six conditions: "(1) Restoration of the 1940 treaty. (2) Hangtt or Petsamo. (Here he added that Hangtt was leased to Soviet Union, but he would propose to take Petsamo.) ( 3 ) Compensation in kind as to 50 per cent for damage. Quantities could be discussed 62 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. I6l-l62.. 63 -See Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 470; Mazour, op. c i t . , pp. 160-161; Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 191-192. 1 3 8 later. (4) A breach with Germany. ( 5 ) The expulsion of a l l Germans. ( 6 ) Demobilization." 6 4' Neither President Roosevelt, nor Prime Minister Churchill made any serious attempt to thwart these Soviet claims. The following example from Churchill's account of the Teheran discussions, is very descriptive: The conversation then turned to t e r r i t o r i a l detail -Viborg ("Nothing doing about Viborg," said Stalin), the Karelian Isthmus, Hangb. "If the cession of Hangb presents a d i f f i c u l t y , " said Stalin, "I am willing to take Petsamo instead." "A f a i r exchange," said Roosevelt. 6 5 On January 3 0 , 1944, Mr. McClintock again pre-sented a request from the American Government that Finland take steps to in i t i a t e peace negotiations with the Soviet Union. That Finland wished to get out of the war was well known by this time. According to reports from Stockholm, the Lahti radio had stated that "Finland wants peace and is willing to make peace," but that the Soviet terms would have to be known f i r s t . The Stockholm Aftonbladet quoted Lahti radio as saying that "...since the Teheran con-ference, Finland has been willing to discuss peace and has tried to get the Russian peace terms. Finland wants the terms of capitulation but has been unable to get them and 66 Finland won't discuss peace without them." When a secret 64 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 400. 6 5 Ibid., p. 3 9 9 . 66 The New York Times. January 9, 1944, p. 3 3 . 139 session of the Riksdag was scheduled for January 2 2 n d , It was reported that Dr. Paasikivi had offered to go to Moscow at any time i f such a trip could be arranged. 6? It was also reported that the Linkomies Government had escaped defeat on the 2 2 n d .by a margin of only two votes, and that the Opposition had asked that Dr. Paasikivi be appointed either Prime Minister or Foreign Minister. The only thing which saved the government, the reports said, was the reading by the Speaker of clippings from British newspapers asking that Finland surrender unconditionally. 6 8 The new American approach, therefore, was well timed. While i t was being considered by the government, the Soviet and Allied press campaign against Finland was stepped up. Helsinki was teeming with rumours that the Soviet Union had given Finland an ultimatum granting her six weeks to get out of the war. On February 6 t h , Helsinki was bombed by more than 100 planes, and thousands of civilians fled the capital. There were two more alerts the next day, but no bombs were dropped, leaving the impression that the Soviet Union merely wished to scare the Finns. It was f e l t that the Russians would hesitate to start a major bombing offensive against major Finnish c i t i e s , since such attacks might drive the Opposition, now a potential asset for Moscow, back into the fold. The 6 ? The New York Times. January 24, 1944, p. 5 . 6 8 Ibid.. January 2 6 , 1944, p. 6 . 140 Soviet successes at Leningrad and subsequent drive into Estonia were also suited to make the Finns inclined towards peace. On February 7 t h , the o f f i c i a l Soviet news agency, Tass, stated that reports to the effect that the Soviet Union was carrying on negotiations for peace with Finland did "not in the least correspond with f a c t s " . ^ The f o l -lowing day, however, the United States Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, made public the American approach to Helsinki, again warning that the United States could not help Finland in the future were the offer rejected. 7 0 Simultaneously, the newspaper Izvestia said that the Russian bombers had merely given Finland a taste of what was to come and asserted that the Soviet Union had forces to spare for a full-scale attack on F i n l and. 7 1 The Moscow correspondent of The New  York Times reported that there was much bitterness in the Soviet Union against Finland, and that a separate peace, or even unconditional surrender, was not deemed enough retribution. The least the Russians expected out of the defeat of Finland, James Aldridge reported, was the destruction of the Finnish White Army and the Mannerheim-Ryti regime. 7 2 This point of view was underlined by an ar t i c l e 69 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, vol. 2, p. 202. 70 The New York Times, February 9,, .1944, p. 1. 71 Quoted in ibid., p. 3» 72 Ibid., February 10, 1944, p. 3 . 141 in the Red Army newspaper Red Star, which listed a series of Soviet complaints against Finland. "It w i l l be the Red Army," the paper said, "that w i l l settle the question of Finnish frontiers and the Red Army is capable of maintaining that viewpoint in Helsinki itself."?3 On February 12th, the Finnish Government decided to send Dr. Paasikivi to Stockholm to see Madame Kollontay. The terms which he brought with him when he returned on the 23rd were harsh. As a prerequisite to peace negotiations, Finland would have to sever a l l relations with Germany and expel or intern the German troops within her borders, either alone or with the help of Soviet arms; she would have to accept the restoration of the 1940 eastern frontier and withdraw to that line; and she must return Soviet prisoners of war immediately. The peace negotiations would then dis-cuss the questions of partial or total demobilization, reparations for damage caused by Finnish military operations, and Petsamo.?4" The immediate reaction of the Finnish Govern-ment was that the internment of the almost 200,000 Germans in Finland was physically impossible without Soviet aid, and nobody was prepared to invite the Red Army into Finland. The Riksdag was informed of the Soviet proposals on the 29th 73 Quoted in The New York Times, February 11, 1944, p. 5. 74 The o f f i c i a l text, issued over the Moscow radio on February 28th, is given in ibid., March 1, 1944, p. 5; Current History, vol. 6, no. 32 (April 1944), pp. 351-352; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 163-164, and Soviet Foreign Policy  During the .Patriotic War, vol. 2, pp. 56-57. 142 and upheld the government's decision to continue the dis-cussions with the Russians by a clear majority. On March 8 t h , the Finnish reply was delivered to Madame Kollontay. It pointed out the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved in the ejection or internment of the German forces and asked that Finland be allowed to present her views on the proposed armistice terms. Two days later the Finns were informed that their reply was completely unsatisfactory, that the Soviet terms were minimum terms, and that they would have to be approved by the 18th i f Finland desired a continuation of the t a l k s . 7 ^ The Riksdag was informed of the developments in another secret session, held on the 14th, and again the government was given a vote of confidence. With this backing, the govern-ment presented the Finnish reply to the Soviet Union on the 17th. It was regretted that the Soviet Union would not allow Finland to present her views. She was anxious to begin negotiations, but i t was not possible to accept in advance terms which had not been clearly defined. The Soviet Govern-ment then invited the Finns to "...send one or two delegates to obtain from the Soviet Union an explanation of the armistice terms proposed by Russia." On the 2 5 t h , Dr. Paasikivi and Minister Carl Enckell l e f t for Moscow, where, on the 2 7 t h and 2 9 t h , they were received by Molotov. As i t turned out, the armistice terms, not peace terms, were even more severe 75 Wuorinen, op. c i t . . p. 1 6 5 . 143 than Madame Kollontay's communications had indicated. The Finnish withdrawal to the 1940 frontier must he com-pleted during the month of April; the Finns were to return to the Soviet Union a l l Soviet citizens held in Finland without promise of having their own prisoners-of-war returned from the Soviet Union; the Germans must be ousted or interned by the end of April at the latest, while at the same time the Finnish ..Army should be reduced; the entire Petsamo region must be ceded to the Soviet Union; and Finland must pay reparations amounting to 1600,000,000 in five years.- In return for a l l this, the Soviet Union might consider i t possible to relinquish her lease of Hanko "without any compensation".76 On the return of the delegation to Helsinki on April 1st, the Finnish Government at once requested the opinion of both Finnish and Swedish experts on finance and national economy, and the unanimous advice was that the demanded indemnity far exceeded the economic capacity of Finland. Military experts asserted that i t was physically impossible to redeploy the necessary forces in time to drive the Germans out by the end of April. On April 12th, Prime Minister Linkomies submitted the Soviet terms and the analysis of their implications to a secret session of the Riksdag. He also asked for a vote of confidence on the 76 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 167-169. 144 Cabinet's decision to reject the terms on the grounds that i t was physically impossible for Finland to carry them out. The vote was a unanimous endorsation of the Government's stand, and the Finnish reply was presented to the Soviet Union on the 18th, explaining f u l l y the reasons for the rejection.?? Four days later the Soviet Government announced that the armistice negotiations had been broken off, and on the 24th, Finland made public the demands of the Soviet Union. While the impact of the severity of the Soviet demands sufficed to reduce opposition to the government within Finland, foreign commentators, on the whole, failed to realize what the proposed terms would mean to Finland. One commentator opined that the terms "...seemed reasonable and even generous.... There was no threat to Finnish independence." The Russians would generously help Finland to expel General Edward Dietl's divisions and then, as a matter of course, at once withdraw from Finland.? 8 'Leading UN diplomats' in Moscow generally took the view that the terms were generous and the best the Finns could hope to get.79 The London Times f e l t the terms were "surprisingly lenient" and published a vicious editorial attack on some 77 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 169-170; Lundin, op. c i t . . pp. 198-202; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 473-474. 78 Sidney BY Fay, "Russo-Finnish Relations," Current  History, vol. 6 , no. 33 (May 1944), p. 3 8 9 . 79 The New York Times, March 2, 1944, p. 3 . 14-5 leading members of the Finnish Government.ou Similar surprise was expressed by Time, which said that the terms, . " - to everybody but the Finns - had seemed surprisingly 8l mild." One-of the few to strike a more sober note was Mr. Gunnar Leistikow, a p o l i t i c a l commentator with long experience in Scandinavian and Finnish affairs, who wrote a letter to the editor of The New York Times explaining the reluctance of the Finns to throw themselves at the mercy of the Soviet Union. On the basis of past experiences, he showed why the Finns had reason to fear that the Soviet terms were "...not so much the end of a bad war as the beginning of a worse peace." The fact that the Russians have won the A l l i e s ' trust has not made the Finns less suspicious, and the high-handed manner in which the Soviet Union seems to handle i t s relations with Poland, which after a l l is an al l y , gives the Finns the ji t t e r s about what fate a former enemy may have to expect.°2 As a result of the negative outcome of the Soviet-Finnish contact, the mood in Finland was one of depression, a mood which the catastrophic setbacks suffered by the German forces everywhere did not help to improve. In his May Day address, Stalin indicated, furthermore, that the Soviet Union was no longer willing to deal with the present 80 Quoted in The New York Times. March 6, 1944, p. 3 . 81 "No Hurry in Helsinki," Time, vol. 43, no. 17 (April 24, 1944), p. 3 4 . - _ 82 The New York Times. May 3 0 , 1944, p. 20. 146 Finnish Government,®3 and this was confirmed three weeks later when the Finns attempted to reestablish contact with the Soviet Legation in Stockholm.®4 On June 9th, the long expected Soviet attack materialized on the Karelian Isthmus in the wake of an aerial and a r t i l l e r y bombardment which could be heard in Helsinki, 170 miles away. Within a week the Finnish military position had been profoundly shaken. On June 20th came the attack i n East Karelia. On the Isthmus, Viipuri f e l l the next day, and the Finnish Army was compelled to retreat to the so-called V.K.T. line (Viipuri-Kuparsaari-Taipale). Here the defence held firm, and i t was to remain firm against a l l attacks until the end of the war. In East Karelia the. Finnish forces were ordered to draw back to the so-called U. line running from PitkSranta to Loimolanjarvi, where they repelled a l l attacks by the enemy. The Red irmy had,once again been stopped by the Finns.®5 However, the Finnish forces were dependent upon Germany for their supply of munitions and anti-tank weapons as well as for food. Urgent requests for supplies were submitted when the Soviet attack was launched, and the Germans agreed to comply - but for a price. On June 21st, 83 The New York Times, May 1, 1944, p. 6. 84 Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 170-171. 85 For an account of these operations, see Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 475-487. the day after the f a l l of Viipuri, the German Foreign Minister made a surprise appearance in Helsinki. Germany was willing to help Finland, he told President Ryti and Foreign Minister Ramsay, but a prerequisite for such help was that Finland took a "clearly defined attitude" on the side of Germany. This would entail a public declaration promising that Finland would fight on the side of Germany to the end of the war. At the same time Finland was con-fronted with a Soviet demand, delivered on the 2 3 r d , that she surrender and ask for peace. "The choice," says Mannerheim, "was between unconditional surrender and the signing of a treaty which increased the chances of creating conditions for obtaining an acceptable peace." The government saw i t in the same light, and the Soviet com-munication was l e f t unanswered. Instead President Ryti, on his own responsibility and without consulting the Riksdag but with the concurrence of the,Cabinet and the Commander-in-Chief, signed a document giving the assurances demanded by Ribbentrop: ...I declare as President of the Republic of Finland that I w i l l not make peace with the Soviet Union other-wise than by agreement with the German Reich and w i l l not allow any government of Finland appointed by me or any person at a l l to i n i t i a t e conversations concerning an armistice or a peace or negotiations serving these ends otherwise than by agreement with the Government of the German Reich. 8' 86 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 4-82. 87 L undin, op. c i t . , p. 2 1 6 . Accounts of Ribbentrop's v i s i t are given in ibid., pp. 212-221; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , pp. 173-174; Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 481-483. 148 A stranger to the ways of a democratic system of govern-ment, Ribbentrop had stumbled into a trap he was unable to see. In totalitarian Germany an agreement signed by Hitler would be legally valid, but in democratic Finland the Head of State was powerless to conclude binding agree-ments without the consent of the Riksdag. President Ryti and his advisers were aware that the guarantee signed by him was not in keeping with Finnish constitutional law and could be declared invalid at any time by the elected re-presentatives of the people. Nevertheless, having assured Ribbentrop that the Riksdag would never sanction such a treaty as he demanded, and having been assured by Ribbentrop that he would be perfectly satisfied with a declaration by President Ryti to the same effect, the government decided to let Ribbentrop have his way. The so-called Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement was signed on the 26th, and as a result Finland soon received v i t a l supplies of ammunition, anti-tank weapons and food. The front could be stabilized, and the road could be cleared for further talks with the Russians simply by replacing Ryti as President. This masterful trick played on the German Foreign Minister by the Finnish leadership was in stark contrast to the ideals of honesty and good faith always practised by Finland in her dealings with other states, as Professor Lundin does not f a i l to point out in most sarcastic terms. But the d i f f i c u l t i e s with which the decision to sign the 88 Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 2 1 5 - 2 2 1 . 149 agreement was reached by the Cabinet, and the violent reaction expressed against i t in the Riksdag on primarily ethical grounds, well demonstrate how the Finns f e l t about using deceit in their international dealings, even when the very existence of their nation appeared to depend on i t . The fact that everybody regarded the resignation of Ryti from his office as President as an obvious prerequisite for the repudiation of the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement also demonstrates the basic honesty -of the Finnish character. The Finns had been faithful.to their high principles in a l l their dealings with the Russians, even during the most trying period.of 1939-41, and in spite of the constant trickery and deceit employed by the Russians whenever they found i t expedient. The Finns had remained fai t h f u l to these high principles in a l l their dealings with the Germans since 1940-41, in spite of the growing realization that Germany was only using them to her own advantage and without any genuine regard for Finnish interests. Dr. Urho Kekkonen, the present President of Finland, well expressed the Finnish attitude when, i n an article in the periodical Suomen Kuvalehti on August 4, 1943, he wrote these bitter words: But the last three or four years have opened our. eyes to the fact that a nation cannot always afford to operate with ideas. We have seen how the big and mighty have broken their word when the interests of power politics demanded i t ; we have ourselves been used as small change in the transactions 150 of power p o l i t i c s . And we have become hardened and s e l f i s h . a 9 Seven months later Kekkonen's ideas had developed further along those lines, and, in an art i c l e in the same public-ation on March 3 , 1944 , he had this to say: But the continued existence and welfare of a nation may require that one follow, for instance, other conceptions of honour than those of the individual citizen. One ought to strive to secure a possibility for the nation to survive under a l l circumstances. A man may die a hero's death, but a man who leads his nation to i t s death in obedience to his own conceptions of heroism has not shown responsibility for his nation.°o That similar ideas had developed within Finland's respon-sible leadership is clear and understandable, and, with nothing less than- the existence of the Finnish nation at stake, the Cabinet can hardly be blamed for having advised Ryti to sign the agreement presented by Ribbentrop - or for having failed to enlighten the German Foreign Minister with regard to the processes of Finnish constitutional law. Indeed, at the time of the t r i a l s of Finnish "war respon-sibles" in Helsinki during the winter of 1 9 4 5 - 4 6 , Mannerheim, then President of Finland, submitted a deposition to the investigation committee which was read into court on November 1 6 , 1945 , and i n which he described Ryti's action 89 Urho Kekkonen, For fosterlandet.;Tal och artiklar  1 9 3 8 - 1 9 5 5 , Helsinki, Union, 1 9 5 5 , p. 56 . 90 Ibid., p. 6 6 . 1 5 1 as "... a patriotic action that offered the country new po s s i b i l i t i e s . " And Mannerheim continued proudly: "I always defended, and w i l l always defend the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement."?1 One serious consequence of the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement came on June 3 0 t h when the United States severed diplomatic relations with Finland.? 2 The road to peace s t i l l appeared to be open, however, as demonstrated an article in Pravda on July 2 n d . The art i c l e declared that Finland did not have to accept "complete capitulation" as a basis for negotiations. "Such rumours have no foundation. These rumours are circulated by the Germans to force the Finns to continue the war."?3 When the German air force was withdrawn from Finland after the middle of July and a withdrawal of German infantry units began at the end of the month, the Finns thus considered the time suitable to prepare for peace negotiations. The Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement had f u l f i l l e d i t s purpose. On August 1 s t , President Ryti resigned, and four days later the Riksdag unanimously enacted a law making possible succession to the presidency of the only man who could save Finland -Marshal Mannerheim. He took the oath of office a few 91 The New York Times. November 17, 194-5, p. 6. 92 See Hull, op. c i t . , vol. 2 , p. 1450. 93 Quoted in The New York Times. July 3> 1944, p. 3. 152 hours.later. For the second time since their independence, the Finns had turned to the Marshal of Finland to lead them out of a desperate situation. On the 7th, a new government was formed under the Premiership of Mr. Antti V. Hackzell, a former Foreign Minister and Minister to Moscow. The new Foreign Minister was Mr. Carl Enckell, who had travelled to Moscow with Dr. Paasikivi the previous March. Also included i n the government as Minister Without Portfolio was Mr. Eero Vuori, who had been a Bolshevist in 1918 and had served many terms In prison for Communist activities prior to the Winter War. Obviously the new government would be acceptable to the Soviet Union. In order to pre-pare the Finnish population for what was to come, the newspapers began to carry extensive reports on Allied advances in Estonia and France. The sudden developments in Finland hit Berlin like a bomb. Not u n t i l the 17th, however,, did the Germans find time to do anything about the new situation. On that day Field Marshal Keitel arrived at Mannerheim»s headquarters, ostensibly to convey the congratulations of Hitler upon the Marshal's election as President, but also to find out what effect Ryti's resignation might have on German-Finnish relations. Mannerheim told him in plain words: because of "compelling circumstances" Ryti had not been able to retain his freedom of action, and his resignation made i t possible for the Finns "to act according to their own best interests". Keitel correctly interpreted Mannerheim's words 153 to mean tha t F i n l a n d Intended to disengage h e r s e l f from 94 the war. No German r e p r i s a l s were taken a t that p o i n t , however, and the German for c e s were reported to continue t h e i r withdrawal northward.95 The expected F i n n i s h request f o r an a r m i s t i c e came on August 25th, when Madame K o l l o n t a y was handed a communication which asked whether the S o v i e t Union would r e c e i v e a F i n n i s h d e l e g a t i o n f o r the purpose. On the same day F i n l a n d served o f f i c i a l n o t i c e i n B e r l i n that she no longer regarded h e r s e l f bound by the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement. The S o v i e t r e p l y , received on the 29th, t o l d F i n l a n d to sever r e l a t i o n s w i t h Germany and get the German troops out of F i n l a n d or i n t e r n them by September 15th. I f F i n l a n d agreed to take such a c t i o n , the S o v i e t Govern-ment would be agreeable to r e c e i v e i n Moscow a F i n n i s h d e l e g a t i o n f o r n e g o t i a t i o n s "on an a r m i s t i c e or on peace, 96 or on both together". The B r i t i s h Government had agreed w i t h t h i s r e p l y , F i n l a n d was informed. H e l s i n k i was shocked by these demands, which would f o r c e her to break w i t h Germany without even knowing whether the Russians were going to grant an a r m i s t i c e or not. The time l i m i t f o r 94 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , pp. 492-493; Lundin, op. c i t . . pp. 223-224. 95 The New York Times. August 15, 1944, p. 8. 96 S o v i e t F o r e i g n P o l i c y During the P a t r i o t i c War, v o l . 2, pp. 106-107. 1 5 4 expelling the German forces was even shorter and more impossible than previously. However, the time had come for Finland to make her f i n a l decision. The Soviet Union had i t i n her power to crush the Finnish Army whenever sufficient forces could be released from other fronts to do so. It was most unlikely that a more favourable situation would develop in the future, and Finland had not been occupied, at least not yet. Consequently the Riksdag was summoned for a secret session on September 2nd to decide the crucial issue. Of the 155 members present, 108 voted.in favour of the government's decision that the preliminary conditions be accepted to clear the way for armistice or peace negotiations. The Soviet Union was. informed immediately, and Mannerheim proposed to Stalin that an early date be set for the discontinuation of h o s t i l i t i e s i n order that unnecessary bloodshed might be. avoided. On the 4th, Stalin replied that the Russians would cease h o s t i l i t i e s at 7s00 a.m. the following morning provided the Finns agreed. Orders to that effect were issued to a l l Finnish forces, and no shots were fired from the western side of the demarcation line after, the appointed hour. The Russians, however, continued a one-sided shooting for another twenty-five hours, causing considerable losses among the Finns. No explanation or apology was ever offered for this behaviour, but the incident was f a i t h f u l l y recorded in Article, 1 of the Armistice Agreement signed 155 on September 1 9 t h . ? ? The people of Finland learned of t h e i r country's withdrawal from the war immediately af t e r the Riksdag meeting on September 2 n d . In his radio message to the nation, out-l i n i n g the course of events since August 2 5 t h , Prime Minister Hackzell concluded with the following urgent appeals Our task consists i n the necessity of maintaining complete unity amongst ourselves. We must r a l l y f i r m l y around our President and the movement for peace, with the object of safeguarding the future of the F i n n i s h people.98 The Continuation War was at an end. The Finns had no way of knowing whether they would be allowed to l i v e i n independence or whether the future would bring to them the suf-ferings of t h e i r neighbours across the Gulf of Finland. They had burned t h e i r bridges behind them, however. On September 3 r d , strong forces were withdrawn from the Karelian front l i n e and sent north i n a n t i c i p a t i o n of trouble developing with the German troops a f t e r the 1 5 t h . ? ? By this action, further e f f e c t i v e resistance against the Soviet Union was rendered impossible, and the Finns could only hope that the Russians would not make use of this tempting opportunity to destroy independent Finland. 9 7 For accounts of the events between August 2 5 t h and September 5 t h , see Mannerheim, op. c i t . . pp. 4 9 3 - 4 - 9 7 ; Lundin, op. c i t . . pp. 224 -228; Wuorinen, op. c i t . , p. 1 7 8 . The relevant documents are given i n Soviet- Foreign P o l i c y During the  P a t r i o t i c War, v o l , 2 , pp. 106 -107. 9 8 Soviet Foreign P o l i c y During the P a t r i o t i c War, v o l . 2 , pp. 206 - 2 0 7 . 9 9 Mannerheim, op. c i t . , p. 4 9 7 . CHAPTER IV THE PRICE OF PEACE The Finnish negotiators flew to Moscow on September 6th. Headed by Prime Minister Hackzell, the fourteen-man delegation included Defence Minister Walden, the Chief of the General Staff, General Heinrichs, the. Foreign Minister's brother, Lieut.-General Oscar Enckell, who represented the largest industrial concern in south-eastern Finland, and a number of economic and juridical experts. The composition of the delegation clearly sug-gested that the Finnish Government was preparing i t s e l f for a thorough round of negotiations. The Russians were in no hurry, however. For a f u l l week, the Finnish negotiators waited nervously while the Soviet Government attended to more important business. Not unti l the 14th were they presented'' with the Soviet Union's armistice conditions, which turned out to be harsher than anything that had been expected. Generally, the armistice conditions, which were in effect preliminary 157 peace conditions rather than a basis for a cease-fire agreement, restored the situation imposed by the peace treaty of March 1 2 , 1940. But there were serious additional demands. Finland must cede the entire area of Petsamo, thereby losing her only access to the Arctic Sea. She must, in exchange for Hanko, lease Point Porkkala and the sur-rounding area, including a stretch of the Helsinki-Turku railway line, to the Soviet Union for a period of f i f t y years, which would mean giving the Soviet Union a f o r t i f i e d strong-hold within a r t i l l e r y reach of Helsinki as well as the severance of Finland's economically most important line of transportation. An indemnity amounting to U.S. $300,000,000 must be paid to the Soviet Union within a period of six years, in commodities. A l l German property and other assets in Finland must be turned over to the Soviet Union, and a l l valuables and materials removed from Soviet territory, including the Karelian Isthmus, must be returned in good condition or replaced. The entire Finnish merchant marine -what was l e f t of i t - must be placed at the disposal of the Soviet Union, and a l l a i r f i e l d s in southern and southwestern Finland must be made available for Soviet aircraft for as long as the war against Germany made i t necessary. Finnish citizens accused of war crimes must be apprehended and tried. A l l Finnish troops must be withdrawn behind the 1940 frontier at once, and the army must be placed on a peace footing within two and a half months. At the same time, Finland must disarm and hand over to the Russians a l l German forces which remained in Finland after September 1 5 t h . 158 Prime Minister Hackzell suffered a paralytic stroke on the very same day that these Soviet armistice terms were presented. Foreign Minister Enckell arrived in Moscow to take his place as head of the delegation two days later, and on the l 8 t h he saw Molotov in an attempt to gain sufficient time to allow the Riksdag to discuss the proposals as required by Finland's constitution. Molotov flew into a rage. After a scathing denunciation of the "bloody, criminal" government in Helsinki, he told Enckell to sign the document by noon the following day or face immediate occupation of Finland by the Red Army. Faced with this ultimatum, and with a l l hopes of regular negot-iations shattered, Enckell telegraphed his government for authorization to accept the Soviet demands. The Riksdag gathered for an emergency session at six o'clock the f o l -lowing morning and, realizing that further resistance was tantamount to national suicide, voted that the demands be accepted. 1 The Armistice Agreement was signed before noon on September 1 9 t h by Foreign Minister Carl Enckell, Defence Minister Walden, General Heinrichs and General Oscar Enckell for Finland, and by General Zhdanov, commander of the Leningrad military d i s t r i c t and p o l i t i c a l commissar in the Red Army, for the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The news were broadcast to the Finnish people a 1 Lundin, Finland in the Second World War, pp. 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 1 5 9 few hours later, and i t struck them like thunder. In the homes and in public gathering places people wept openly as they listened to the speech of the Acting Prime Minister, Justice Minister Ernst von Born: Citizens. 1 The nineteenth of September 1944 w i l l be recorded in our history as the day of heavy t r i a l s for our nation. As deeply as Finland's people has longed for peace during these•difficult years, equally deeply has i t been disturbed to the core at the thought of the moment when i t should find i t s e l f before the necessity of considering i t s possibilities for continued national l i f e in the face of the terms of peace. That moment has now come.2 Commenting on the severity of the terms, von Born said reflectively that "In these times opinions differ as to what is just and what is not," adding that i t was the unavoidable destiny of the Finns to live forever as neigh-bours of the Soviet Union; they might as well get used to i t and make the best of i t . He openly questioned whether the nation could survive, but added in conclusion: "Time heals a l l wounds - the Lord does not reject, He only tests." Then a band played "A Mighty Fortress is. Our God", the national anthem and Sibelius' "Finlandia" . 3 The shooting war was definitively over, but the Finns did not yet know whether they would be able to survive the coming battle for a peaceful future of their own making. The obstacles con-fronting them appeared almost insurmountable. 2 Kai Brunila, Porkala Mr vart. En aterblick i ord och bild, Borga, Holger Schildt, 1 9 5 5 , p. 3 5 . 3 The New York Times. September 20, 1944, p. 12. 160 The f i r s t obstacle was the obligation to disarm and intern a l l German forces s t i l l on Finnish territory. By the stipulations of Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement, Finland could request the Soviet Union to assist her in this task. The Finns were determined to avail themselves of that possibility only as a last resort, however. They feared that once the Red Army had entered Finnish territory, i t s presence there might tend to become rather permanent. How basic and complete that fear was is demonstrated by the fact that the Finns, rather than request Soviet assistance, were prepared to face more than a quarter of a million German troops with an army which, by Article 4 of the Armistice Agreement, would have to be reduced to "peace footing" by December 5th. The term "peace footing" was not defined in the Armistice Agreement, but i t was subsequently determined to mean 37>000 men. Although i t was known to be technically impossible to evacuate a l l German forces by September 15th, there was some reason to believe that there would not be too much trouble. Even before the Finnish armistice delegation had l e f t Helsinki for Moscow, the Berlin correspondent of Stockholms-T idningen reported that German troops would be withdrawn from Finland to Norway "as soon as possible". A Reuter dispatch claimed to have learned that the German commander in Finland, General Lothar Rendulic, had agreed to leave by the 15th. 4 Events in southern Finland appeared 4 The New York Times. September 4, 1944, p. 10. 1 6 1 to confirm this rumour„ German troops i n this area were picked up as fast as transportation ships, former trans-atlantic liners, could travel back and forth between Helsinki, Turku and Estonian ports. J By the 1 3 t h , southern Finland was virtually cleared of Germans. In northern Finland the situation was not so promising, however. As early as September 2 n d , immediately after the Finnish Government had announced i t s decision to accept the preliminary Soviet conditions for a cease-fire, General Rendulic visited Mannerheim to warn him that a clash between German and Finnish troops, "the best in the world", 7 was li k e l y to develop into "a cruel and bloody war".' On his return to his headquarters in Rovaniemi, Rendulic received orders from Berlin to hold central and northern Lapland. On the 5 t h , he informed Mannerheim that his army had begun i t s evacuation of Lapland, but a l l he was evacuating was his supplies. His troops were 'digging i n 1 . In spite of Rendulic's misleading reports to Mannerheim, the Finns were only too well aware of the actual situation, and the 144,000 inhabitants of Lapland were ordered evacuated to the south or to Sweden. 104,000 were able to get out in time. Mean-while Mannerheim moved an extra division from the Karelian 5 The New York Times. September 6 , 1944, p. 1 2 . 6 Ibid., September 14, 1944, p. 1 2 . 7 Lundin, bp. c i t . , p. 2 3 7 . 162 Isthmus north to Kajaani, a brigade almost to Oulu, and a battalion to the v i c i n i t y of Kemi. Facing his few and tired troops were more than 200,000 Germans. The uneasy truce was shattered on the night of the 14-th, hours before the deadline, but,not in the north. Waves of German invaders were landed on the strategic island of Suursaari in the Finnish Gulf, but they were thrown back into' the sea the following morning by the o Finnish garrison with the aid of Soviet planes. Simult-, aneously i t was discovered that airfields which had been at the disposal of the Germans had been mined before being, evacuated, and shipping lanes along the coast were also blocked by mines. Soon Finnish a r t i l l e r y positions on the Aaland Islands were f i r i n g on German shipping. It was not u n t i l the 28th, however, that the Finns were able to go after the Germans in the north. Although hopelessly out-numbered, the Finnish soldiers again proved their capacity for overcoming a numerically superior enemy. On October 1st, they carried out a spectacular landing behind the German lines at the town of Tornio, on the Swedish border, and the town of Kemi was taken eight days later in an equally spectacular surprise operation. Two of Lapland's three major towns had been saved from the complete destruction 8 Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 2 3 9 ; The New York Times, September 1 6 , 1944, p. 7. 163 the Germans were planning for them. Tornio was only one per cent destroyed and Kemi only five per cent. 1 0 Rovaniemi could not be reached in time, however, and the retreating Germans saw to i t that not a single house was l e f t standing. The same treatment was given to the rest , of Lapland's widely scattered communities as Germans slowly withdrew toward the Norwegian border. The Germans were methodically thorough. Each day reports of further destruction reached General Siilasvuo's headquarters. One,report, dated October 13th, said: Our air reconnaissance discovered that there were conflagrations in the town of Rovaniemi. The barracks at Ounasvaara were burning. The fuel depot at Saarenkyla was af i r e . On the roads from KemijMrvi to Salla and Pelkosenniemi to Savukoski a l l the bridges were blown up. Kemijarvi was a vast sea of f i r e . The view from the air was sad - the destruction of Lapland was con-tinuing purposefully according to plan.H This report was typical, and i t was being repeated every day. Only occasionally were the Finns able to surprise the Germans and save some centers of population from the torch. In spite of the Soviet-imposed d i f f i c u l t i e s facing the Finnish Army in its efforts to drive the Germans out, the Soviet Union professed great dissatisfaction. In a 9 On these operations, see Lundin, op. c i t . , pp. 243-244; Sigyn Alenius, Finland efter vapenstillestandet 1944. En kort  5versikt, Helsingfors, Soderstrom, 1947, pp. 9-10. 10 Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 244. 11 Quoted in ibid., p. 245. 164 statement released by the news agency 'Tass' om October 1 5 t h , the Soviet Government praised Finland for the way in which most of the armistice conditions had been carried out, adding, however, that: At the same time the Finns are not yet satisfactorily f u l f i l l i n g their most important obligations to disarm the German forces in Finland. Finland has dragged out the disarmament of the German armed forces in her ter-ritory. The Finns began military operations against the German troops in the north of Finland only on 1 October, and using only an insignificant part of their army.12 Considering the destruction being wrought by the Germans in Finnish Lapland, i t must have been quite clear to anyone that the Finns had every reason to give top priority to the speedy execution of Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement. There is no evidence to show that they were holding back as alleged by the 'Tass' statement. That i t should eventually take them 224 days to clear Lapland of German troops was certainly no fault of the Finns'. Their reason for not requesting support from the Red Army has been explained, and no such support was forthcoming except in the ceded area of Petsamo where the Germans were thrown back into Norway by an irresistable Soviet attack. Most of Lapland had been cleared of'Germans by December, but with her forces reduced to a total of 37,000 by the _5th of that month, the Finns were unable to force 12 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, vol. 2 , p. 1 5 8 . 165 the German retreat any further and had to satisfy them-selves with moving only as fast as the Germans withdrew. Not until April 27, 1945, did Finnish forces reach the Norwegian "border at a l l points, thus bringing Finland's participation i n the Second World War to an effective close. Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement had proved to be a most expensive obligation. From the River Oulujoki northward approximately ninety per cent of the settlements had been destroyed. 1 3 If one includes the towns of Tornio and Kemi, the two largest population centers in Lapland, which were l e f t almost undamaged, the percentage is reduced to thirty-six, or 41,306 destroyed buildings out of a total 14 of 113,531«> But the Germans had not confined their destruction to public and private buildings. The Kolosjoki nickel mine, which had been Hitler's primary reason for wishing to hold Lapland,^ was thoroughly wrecked. The power station at Janiskoski was blown up. Practically a l l highway bridges were destroyed, including most of the culverts and the roadside telephone poles. Among the destroyed buildings were 125 schools, 165 churches and other congregational buildings, and 130 were damaged. A l l 13 Raye R. Piatt, ed., Finland and its Geography; ah  American Geographical Society Handbook. Boston & Toronto, L i t t l e , Brown, 1955? p. 34. 14 Lundin, op. c i t . . p. 245. 15 Ibid., p. 238. 166 railroads and landing grounds were wrecked, the forests were set afire and the harvest of the year was "burned in the f i e l d s . It has been estimated that over 38,000 head of livestock were ki l l e d and more than 30,000 pieces of farm machinery were wrecked. In addition, the Germans planted hundreds of thousands of mines. By 194-7, 7,000 mines and 250,000 shells used as mines had been disarmed at the cost of about 125 lives. The losses of the Finnish Army amounted to 737 k i l l e d , twenty-seven frozen to death, 16 254 missing in action, and 2,808 wounded. The total property damage has been estimated to amount to approx-imately $300,000,000 - or equal to the amount demanded by 17 the Soviet Union in reparation payments] While the losses suffered by Finland under Article 2 of the Armistice Agreement could, in time, be repaired, with the exception of the losses i n human l i f e , the damage caused by Articles 6 and 7 was permanent. By the provisions of Article 6, the t e r r i t o r i a l losses imposed on Finland by the Moscow Peace of 1940 were confirmed. 16 Lundin, op. c i t . . pp. 245-246; Alenius, op. c i t . . p. 10; Urho Toivola, ed., The Finland Yearbook 1947, Helsinki, Mercatorin Kirjapaino Ja Kustannus Oy, 1947, pp. 71-73 (edited with the assistance of the Press Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and specialists in different branches; hereafter referred to as Finland Yearbook 1947). 17 David Hinshaw, Heroic Finland, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1952, p. 216; William L. Shirer, The Challenge of  Scahdina v i a. Norwa y, Sweden,... Denma rk and Finland in Our Time, Boston, L i t t l e , Brown, 195TT~P« 35TT"Lundin, op. c i t . , p. 245. Finland Yearbook 1947 gives a preliminary, "unrevised" and "conservative" estimate of $120,650,000. 167 Karelia was lost, and the cities of Viipuri, Kakisalmi and Sortavala were now within the boundaries of the Soviet Union. By Article 7, the Petsamo region, with the towns of Petsamo and Liinahamari, were 'returned' to the Russians. Furthermore, by Article 8, the i d y l l i c Porkkala area with its five parishes, hundreds of farms and holiday cottages sprawled on 148 square miles of land and surrounded to the east, west and south by the water of the Gulf of Finland, was turned over to the Soviet Union for a period of f i f t y years to serve as a naval base. The total area thus ceded to the Soviet Union, exclusive of the Porkkala naval lease, amounted to 17,640 square miles, of which 16,576 square miles were land and 1.064 square miles were water.1® In addition, by the treaty of peace signed in 194-7, Finland was obliged to give up a small area adjacent to the Petsamo region containing the Janiskoski power plant and the Niskakoski dam. By the Armistice Agreement, Finland lost approx-l. imately thirteen per cent of her territory. With this ter-ritory went nearly one third of her hydroelectric power and 432 industrial plants. These plants had been responsible for about ten per cent of her total industrial production and had employed some 25,000 persons, or almost ten.per cent 18" Burnett Anderson, ed., The Northern Countries. Uppsala, Almquist & Wiksell, 1 9 5 1 * p. 3 3 . (Issued under the auspices of the Foreign Ministries of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.) 168 of her industrial population. Before the war, these factories had manufactured goods mainly for home con-sumption, and the loss of them was serious enough in i t s e l f . Among them were the only plant in the country producing a r t i f i c i a l fibers, one of the two sugar mills, and thirty-one per cent of a l l flour and grain-grinding mills. Even more serious, however, was the blow to the manufacture of wood products, which had always dominated Finland's export trade. Among the wood working plants i n the ceded area were sixty-five sawmills and planing mills, which in 1938 had produced twelve per cent of Finland's total output; five sul-phite and two sulphate pulpmills, which had produced twenty-five per cent of a l l chemical pulp; four plywood mills, which had been responsible for fourteen per cent of the output; as well as mills which had produced fourteen per cent of the mechanical pulp and five per cent of the paper. A l l that remained to Finland of this industrial capacity were 19 the evacuated workers and their s k i l l s . Most of this industrial capacity was concentrated in Karelia. The ceded area here amounted to 10.4 per cent of the whole area of the country, with a population of 460,000 before the war. The cultivated area of Karelia, about 11.5 per cent of the whole cultivated area of Finland, before the war produced twelve per cent of the cereal crop, 19 Piatt, op. c i t . , pp. 166-167. 169 fourteen per cent of the potato crop, f o u r t e e n per cent of the hay, eleven per cent of the oats, nine per cent of the m i l k and twelve per cent of the t o t a l F i n n i s h meat production. E s p e c i a l l y regrettable was the l o s s of the K a r e l i a n water power. The Vuoksi R i v e r , along which was l o c a t e d more than h a l f of the e n t i r e b u i l t up water power of the country, supplied e l e c t r i c power not only to K a r e l i a but a l s o to extensive outside areas. The Imatra Rapids were l e f t on the F i n n i s h s i d e of the new f r o n t i e r , as were the manufacturing towns along Saimaa Lake, but the e n t i r e waterway system of southeastern F i n l a n d was d i s r u p t e d by the severance of the Saimaa Canal and the c e s s i o n of V i i p u r i , whereby an area of more than 2 5 , 0 0 0 square miles l o s t i t s only d i r e c t com-munication w i t h the sea. Compared to K a r e l i a , t h e r e f o r e , the other ceded areas represented a much l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s to the n a t i o n a l economy. The Petsamo area contained about three per cent of F i n l a n d ' s land area, but i t was s p a r s e l y populated and u n s u i t a b l e f o r a g r i c u l t u r e . I t s c h i e f economic importance was represented by the i c e - f r e e p o r t of L i i n a h a m a r i , the remunerative f i s h i n g i n the Barents Sea, and the c o n t r o v e r s i a l K o l o s j o k i n i c k e l m i n e . 2 0 The Porkkala area, although, s m a l l , was one of the most prosperous productive centres i n the country where a g r i c u l t u r e , » 2Q In an i n t e r v i e w w i t h the Stockholms-Tidriingen correspondent i n H e l s i n k i i n February 1944, Vaino Tanner, then M i n i s t e r of Finance, s a i d that he was s o r r y - F i n l a n d possessed the n i c k e l mines. I t was a calamity f o r a small power, he s a i d , to possess metals that Great Powers coveted because of t h e i r importance i n war. The New York Times, February 24, 1944, p. 6. 1 7 0 cattle breeding and horticulture had attained a high standard. In addition, the lease area cut the important railway between Helsinki and Turku, thereby seriously impeding t r a f f i c in South Finland. 2 1 Losses of territory thus weakened Finland's national economy very considerably. They also brought about other direct burdens affecting the economy, most important of which was the resettlement of the refugees from the ceded areas. To place nearly half a million persons in productive work and compensate them, to a degree, for the property they had been forced to leave behind, would have been colossal tasks in the best of circumstances. To do so within the reduced territory of Finland in the f a l l of 1944, with a major portion of the country completely destroyed by the Germans, with the entire merchant marine lost, with 5 0 , 0 0 0 war invalids to take care of, and with a crushing war indemnity to pay off, seemed an impossibility. One in nearly every eight citizens was a refugee, penniless and propertyless as a rule and in need of immediate r e l i e f and accommodation as well as permanent establishment in a suitable occupation. One reason why this resettlement was carried out as quickly and effectively as i t was, was the fact that the situation 21 On the effects of the t e r r i t o r i a l losses on Finland's national economy, see K. 0.. Alho, "The Present Economic Position in Finland," Bank of Finland Monthly Bulletin, vol. 20, nos. 1-3 (January-March 194-6), pp. 24-29. 171 172 was not altogether new. Following the Winter War, the population of Karelia had also l e f t their homes, fleeing before the advancing Red Army, and extensive legislation had been enacted by the Riksdag subdividing the larger existing farms to provide s o i l for the expelled Karelian farmers. A loan programme enabling others to carve new farms out of the wilderness was also enacted. Altogether, 5,879 cultivation contracts were signed under the Evacuees Emergency Settlement Act of June 2 8 , 194-0. Between the outbreak of war in June 194-1, and the armistice in Sept-ember 1944, a l l but one thousand of those contracts had been rescinded as most of the Karelians returned to their pre-war homes, but the foundation and the experience to handle the refugees existed when the emergency arose again following the armistice. Only six weeks after the con-clusion of the Armistice Agreement, the Riksdag enacted a law authorizing the expropriation of neglected farms for purposes of settling refugees. To further ensure the supply of land for refugees, war invalids, ex-servicemen with families, war widows and orphans and certain other groups of persons, the Land Procuration Act was passed on May 5j 1945. Under the terms of that Act, land was utilized to provide farms, fishermen's and cottage owners' holdings, building plots, common forest and grazing areas, and to increase the size of insufficiently large holdings. Fairly heavy expropriation 22 measures were imposed on private landowners. 22 Finland Yearbook 1947, pp. 148 - 1 5 0 . Only with respect to industrial workers was the re-settlement problem simpler than in 1940, owing to the demand for industrial reparations presented by the Soviet Union and the resulting expansion of Finland's industrial capacity. Altogether, there were some 4 7 8 , 0 0 0 refugees from the ceded territories for whom dwelling space and opportunities for making a living had to be provided. By the end of 1 9 5 2 , this task had entailed the draining of 1 7 0 , 0 0 0 hectares of new land to serve 3 0 , 0 0 0 holdings; the building of more than 7 , 0 0 0 miles of new roads to serve 4 3 , 0 0 0 farms, of which 2 6 , 4 5 6 were new farms, and the building of 9 , 7 4 8 other dwelling sites, such as homesteads.23 About 8 5 , 0 0 0 hectares of hew fields had been cleared, and 5 6 , 0 0 0 families had been supplied with newly constructed homes. Almost every Karelian farmer 24-who had l e f t his native home had found a new farm. What a tremendous social upheaval had been carried out can be seen by comparing the distribution of farms ac-2 5 cording to cultivated land area in 1941 and in 1 9 5 0 : 23 J. Hampden Jackson, "Resettlement of Karelian Refugees, The World Today, vol. 9, no. 6 (June 1953), pp. 2 5 1 - 2 5 2 . 24 Mazour, Finland Between East and West, p. I 8 3 . 2 5 The figures for 1941, taken from Finland Yearbook 1947, p. 144, refer to a period when the Moscow Peace of 1940 had not yet had much affect on the distribution of farm land. Only 5,881 so-called emergency-settlement farms established in 1940-41 are included. The figures for 1950 are taken from Mazour, op. c i t . , p. 184. 174 1941; 1950; Hectares per farm . 2 5 - 2 2 - 10 1 0 - 2 5 2 5 - 50 5 0 - 1 0 0 Over 1 0 0 Total . 2 5 - 2 2 - 10 1 0 - 2 5 2 5 - 50 5 0 - 1 0 0 Over 1 0 0 Total F a r m s Number % Cultivated Land Hectares % 7 6 , 9 6 3 1 3 6 , 7 5 1 5 6 , 5 1 7 1 2 , 3 2 9 2 , 5 2 2 m 2 6 . 9 4 7 . 8 1 9 . 8 4 . 3 . 9 . a 2 8 5 . 8 2 1 1Q0.6 2 . 2 9 1 . 8 0 0 lOOTo 73,600 684,000 841,300 404,300 164,900 1 2 3 , 7 0 0 , ™ V 3 . 2 2 9 . 9 3 6 . 7 1 7 . 6 7 . 2 9 5 , 0 3 6 187,834 62,479 9 , 9 3 1 1,284 1 2 3 2 6 . 6 5 2 . 6 1 7 . 5 2 . 8 . 4 . 1 8 6 , 4 6 9 9 5 3 , 7 9 7 9 1 6 , 6 8 2 3 2 1 , 6 4 9 8 1 , 4 4 5 35,773 3 . 6 3 9 . 2 3 7 . 7 1 3 . 2 3 . 4 ±4 26 3 5 6 , 7 8 7 1 0 0 . 0 2 , 3 9 5 , 8 1 5 9 8 . 6 Had the Armistice Agreement imposed no further hardships than those already outlined, the Finns would have had reason to wonder about the existence of inter-national justice and to worry about the future. But the burdens imposed on them went very much beyond the obligation to expel the Germans and the t e r r i t o r i a l losses with their many inherent effects on the national economy. The war indemnity, relatively heavier than any demands for repar-ations made after World War I, turned out to be very con-siderably heavier in terms of actual expenditures than the sum of $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 written into the Armistice Agreement. 26 The remaining 1.4 per cent is accounted for by 108,900 •farms' which had a total of 35,000 hectares of cultivated land, or, as a rule, less than 0 .25 hectares each. Hugo E. Pipping, Finlands n9ringsliy efter- andra varldskriget, Helsingfors, Sttderstrom, 1954, p. 41. 1 7 5 And the p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n s assumed by F i n l a n d were to a f f e c t the development of her postwar p o l i c i e s and to colour her everyday p o l i t i c a l l i f e to such an extent that the s t o r y of those o b l i g a t i o n s cannot be divorced from the s t o r y of F i n l a n d ' s postwar h i s t o r y i n gene r a l . In s p i t e of the forebodings expressed by Acting Premier von Born i n h i s r a d i o message on September 19th, and i n s p i t e of the f e e l i n g , g e n e r a l l y shared by p u b l i c servants and p r i v a t e c i t i z e n s a l i k e , that F i n l a n d had been pushed almost to the p o i n t where recovery would have become impossible, the f u l l Impact of the terms imposed upon F i n l a n d was not appreciated at the time. Many years were to pass before the Finns could r e a l i z e f u l l y what the S o v i e t -German p o l i t i c a l i n t r i g u e s had cost them. CHAPTER V THE WAR INDEMNITY: ITS IMPACT AND LIQUIDATION, 194-4-1952 The rep a r a t i o n s demanded of Germany f o l l o w i n g World War I proved to be as expensive f o r the v i c t o r s as f o r the vanquished. E v e n t u a l l y , more money was pumped i n t o the German economy by her former enemies than was paid by her i n r e p a r a t i o n s . The c o l l e c t i o n of r e p a r a t i o n pay-ments from Germany turned out to be something l e s s than a s a l u t a r y experience f o r both France and B r i t a i n . As t h e i r c o l l e c t i o n s from Germany became l i n k e d w i t h t h e i r debts to the United S t a t e s , the whole question came to have a dangerous i n f l u e n c e on the p r o s p e r i t y of the world and on the development of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s . Thus, as World War I I got under way, the Western A l l i e s took i t f o r granted that at l e a s t no cash r e p a r a t i o n s would be requested of the Axis powers and t h e i r s a t e l l i t e s a f t e r the war. The S o v i e t Union had d i f f e r e n t ideas on the sub-j e c t , however. At the 'Big Three' meeting at Teheran i n 1 9 4 3 , S t a l i n presented a l i s t of s i x demands against F i n l a n d from 177 which he "could not diverge", the third of them being "Compensation In kind as to 50 per cent for damage".*" Churchill and Roosevelt protested only tamely against this demand, the former saying that he "... did not think i t useful to ask for indemnities. The Finns might cut down 2 a few trees, but that would not do much good." Stalin was determined to teach the Finns a "lesson", however, and he would not consider relinquishing his demand for compensation. Neither Churchill nor Roosevelt appeard to be too concerned, and their protests seemed to have been made 'for the record' rather than anything else. The conversation moved on to "much bigger things".3 How much damage the Finns were supposed to have done to the Soviet Union became known the following March, when Dr. Paasikivi and Mr. Enckell went to Moscow to obtain the Soviet conditions for peace.4" The claim for reparations amounted to $600,000,000 - an amount which was, after thorough investigations by Finnish and Swedish economists, declared to be beyond the capacity of Finland's resources. Subsequently the claim contained in the Armistice Agreement of September 19, 1 Churchill, Closing the Ring. p. 400. 2 Ibid., p. 398. 3 Ibid., p. 400. See also above, pp. 137-138. 4 See above, pp. 142-144. 1 7 8 1944, amounted to $ 3 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 - the same amount which was demanded of Rumania and Hungary. Even this amount was regarded by most experts and informed observers as exceeding the limits of what Finland could possibly pay. One writer commented: The amount is enormous.... Some idea of what i t means to Finland can be given by saying that i t is equal to two and a half times the annual harvest, or to the value of a l l the ships, r a i l trucks, engines, lorries and livestock in Finland, or to the value of six million standards of timber. It represents the payment of one-fifth of the total national income i n the f i r s t two years and of one-tenth in the"later years. The reparations imposed on Germany after the 1914-18 war were never more than 4.per cent of the German national income.? However, the Armistice Agreement contained only a vague description of what the Finnish war reparation deliveries were to be. Article 11 read: Losses caused by Finland to the Soviet Union by military operations and the occupation of Soviet territory w i l l be indemnified by Finland to the Soviet Union to the amount of three hundred million dollars payable over six years, in commodities (timber products, paper, cellulose, sea-going and river craft, sundry machinery). The "precise nomenclature and varieties of commodities" to be delivered were to be defined in a special agreement to be negotiated at a future date, but, judging by the order " 5 J. Hampden Jackson, "Russian Control in Finland," The Contemporary Review, vol. 170 (August 1946), p. 70 179 in which the general classifications were listed i n the Armistice Agreement, i t would seem that the commodities to be delivered would come from Finland's traditional export industries with some exceptions. The pricing of the items to be delivered wasi. also l e f t vague, since the Armistice Agreement merely stipulated the measuring unit, the gold content of the United States dollar ( 1 oz. gold • $ 3 5 ) . On the basis of the Armistice Agreement, therefore, the f u l l impact of the,indemnity could not be foreseen. Finnish-Soviet negotiations concerning.the special agreement on deliveries were not commenced u n t i l the middle of October, when a Soviet war reparation commission arrived in Helsinki. During the negotiations which ensued i t became evident that the Soviet Union was interestedlprimarily in the products of the woodworking industries. With respect to the pricing question, the Soviet delegates explained that the world market prices that prevailed in 1 9 3 8 were the only basis that could be considered in fixing the prices of the individual products. Finnish efforts to have the world mar-ket prices prevailing in 1944, or the current prices during the delivery period, accepted as a pricing basis were rejected. The f i n a l settlement was reached on November;29th, when Finland had to accept the price level of 1 9 3 8 as the basis 6 Jaakko Auer, Suomen sotakbrvaustolmitukset Neuvostoliitolle.. Tutklmus tavaroiden luovutusoh.ielmista. nllden toteuttamisesta  .ia hwityshinnoista. Porvoo, Helsinki, Werner Soderstrttm Osakeyhtio, 1 9 5 6 , p. 3 1 5 . 180 for her reparation deliveries, with the modification that these prices were to be increased by fifteen per cent with respect to capital goods and by ten per cent with respect to consumer goods. The prices of ships taken from the Finnish merchant marine, although being classified as capital goods, were to be increased by ten per cent only. The basic agreement on the schedule of deliveries was signed on December 17th. It defined the "precise nomenclature and varieties of commodities" to be delivered roughly as follows: 7 Machines, installations and factory equipment .. $100,876,000 New sea-going and river craft 60,172,000 Existing craft from Finland's merchant marine .. 13,952,000 Paper industry products 59,000,000 Woodworking industry products 41,000,000 Cable products 25,000,000 Total $300,000,000 What a tremendous revolution this schedule entailed for Finland's industries w i l l be appreciated when one realizes that the products of :the shipbuilding and metal industries between 1929 and 1938 accounted for only 2.3 per cent of Finland's exports, while they constituted 62 per cent of the scheduled reparation deliveries, exclusive of the deliveries out of existing ships in the merchant marine. The paper and woodworking industries, which during the same prewar period 7 See detailed l i s t of delivery and price schedules, covering some 199 different commodities, in Auer, op. c i t . . pp. 262-271. 1 8 1 had accounted for 8 3 . 5 per cent of Finland's export trade, were to contribute only 33*4 per cent of the reparation deliveries. The schedule of the basic agreement had been so drafted, however, as to allow Finland to deliver only about 2 7 per cent of the f i r s t delivery year's total in products of the shipbuilding and metal industries, Increasing this to about 6 1 per cent in the second delivery year, and reaching the peak of 71 per cent in the third year. By this arrangement Finland was able to meet the most urgent require-ments for expansion of the production capacities in her o metal industries and shipyards. As had been the case with the Armistice Agreement, the basic agreement of December 1 7 t h was not a-^negotiated agreement but a dictated one. Very l i t t l e consideration was given to the wishes or circumstances of Finland, as the schedule of reparation deliveries quite clearly had been so composed that i t would f i t into the overall schedule of the Soviet five year plans. In other words, through the pro-visions of the basic agreement the Finnish economy was to be geared to the planned economy of the Soviet Union. Professor Nils Meinander, Member of the Riksdag for the Swedish People's party and later Assistant Minister of Finance in Dr. Kekkonen's f i r s t government, declares f l a t l y that the commodies 8" Auer, op. c i t . , p. 2 6 . See also Piatt, Finland and Its  Geography, p. 1 6 9 . 9 Auer, op. c i t . . p. 2 8 . 182 ... were selected to f i l l holes i n Russian production. Deliveries were probably planned i n approximately the following manner: f i r s t the experts worked out a l i s t of desiderata and then i t was adjusted with a view to what Finland might possibly be thought able to deliver. The burden was not so placed, however, that i t would rest as naturally as possible oh the country's economy. On the contrary, i t Imposes a most unreasonable load on the economy. Their experience with a planned economy's achievements led the Russians to force upon Finland a plan which presupposes an extensive expansion of the industrial capacity.l° It seemed impossible to effect the necessary industrial expansion in time to meet the early deliveries, but i f Finland did not wish to f a l l into perpetual economic servitude to the Soviet Union i t would have to be done. The Russians had inserted an 'incentive' into the basic agreement in order to safeguard their own interests: i f any commodity was delayed Finland was to pay a fine of five per cent per month from the agreed date of delivery, at such a rate a fine would grow very rapidly and would amount to about 80 per cent of the original a r t i c l e should the delay extend to one f u l l year. In view of the condition of Finland's productive machinery and the d i f f i c u l t i e s involved i n obtaining v i t a l raw materials on the world mar-ket, such delays, i t would seem, were bound to occur. Furthermore, the deliveries would have to be complete, which meant that a complete set of machines for a factory would be considered delayed i f a single machine or a part of a 10 Nils Meinander, Tungt skadestand. Vad krigsskadestaridet t i l l Ryssland Innebar for Finlands folkhushall. Helsingfors, Soderstrom, 194-6, pp. 22-23. 183 machine had not been delivered by the due date. Whether the reasons for a delay were beyond the control of Finland or not would in no way affect the calculation of the fine. The Soviet war reparation commission also had the right to supervise the production of reparation commodities at a l l stages, and i t was entitled to present claims for compen-sation i f commodities were declared faulty after their delivery. x • The Russians, could, of course, reject any item on any conceivable pretext, and they could alter the spec-ifications for any item at any time during production. As i t turned out, the following example was to be a l l too.typical of Russian procedure: What happens is that a Finnish shipbuilder, for instance, who has been sent blue-prints and f u l l specifications for the construetionof vessels for Russia and has started work to f u l f i l the order, finds the blue-prints cancelled and the specifications altered week by week, so that his work is disorganised, his engineers distracted and his costs i n f i n i t e l y increased. One iron-framed barge valued at 2.5 million Finnish marks w i l l now cost 20 million, thanks to these changes; but the sum credited as repar-ations on the delivery of this barge w i l l s t i l l be only 2.5 million marks. The"Finns cannot believe that this is Russian inefficiency; they are convinced that i t is part of a policy aimed at their r u i n . l 2 There were ninety such barges to be built according to the basic agreement, each of them priced at $15,000, but actually costing $180,OOO.1^ The total expenditure on this item alone, 11 Auer, op. c i t . . p. 316. 12 Jackson, op. c i t . , p.. 71. 13 John H. Wuorinen, "Democracy Gains in Finland," Part II, Cunrent History, vol. 21, no. 124 (December 195D> p. 329. 184 therefore, surpassed sixteen million dollars, whereas only #1,350,000 were credited Finland on the reparation deliveries account. In addition, i t was necessary to establish entirely new shipyards to build these barges, since that branch of Finnish industry had been discontinued several decades earlier. Thus there was considerable anxiety in Finland during the early period of reparation deliveries. The Finns were never really certain about Soviet motives. They lived with a constant fear that the Russians were going to use the basic agreement as a means to ruin Finland economically, and that they would then use the resultant failure of Finland to meet the deliveries as an excuse for taking p o l i t i c a l measures leading to the elimination of Finland as a free and inde-pendent nation. Their apprehensions may have been exag-gerated, but they were not going to leave anything to chance. They made up their minds that they would honour the basic agreement on reparation deliveries as they had honoured a l l their International agreements in the past, whether they had been imposed upon them or not. In spite of the resignation of the chief of the economic planning committee i n early 1945 - he quit because he considered the task to be an Impossible one 1^ - the Finns were going to at least give i t a try. With 14 Olavi Lounasmeri, "Finnish War Reparations," Bank of  Finland Monthly Bulletin, vol. 26, nos. 11-12 (November-December 1952), p. 21. 15 "Did Finland Outsmart Stalin," U. S. News & World Report, vol. 37, no. 7 (August 15, 1952), p. 32. 1 8 5 thirteen per cent of the prewar national wealth lost, with seven per cent of the prewar ablebodied manpower dead or permanently crippled, and with a tremendous rebuilding job to do within their own borders, the Finns set to work to pay off the heaviest war indemnity load i n history. The f i r s t stage of the reparation deliveries, which included the f u l l f i r s t year and three and a half months of the second year, was by far the most .difficult period experienced by the Finns since the war. Furthermore, the preliminary negotiations reduced the f i r s t delivery year to nine months, during which Finland was obliged to pay the heaviest annual quota of the total period of deliveries. One reason why she was able to f u l f i l l this obligation was that the quota Included 119 ships of her merchant marine and a floating dock, a l l of which were immediately available. Several of these were rejected by the Soviet inspectors, however, with the result that the number of ships surrendered was reduced to 1 0 5 , while several valuable ships which originally had not been demanded by the Soviet Union were delivered as replacement for the rejected units. The reduction i n numbers, therefore, actually represented an increase in value and thus a heavier burden. In addition to the ships of the merchant marine, Finland had to deliver goods for a total value of about $ 4 6 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 during the f i r s t stage of the reparation period. Of this amount products of the woodworking industry accounted for about 6 5 per eent and 186 metal industry products for about 3 5 per cent. Amazingly enough the amount of goods stipulated by the delivery schedule was exceeded during a l l quarters of this stage, except for late 194-4, and the impression might easily be gained that the burden of the war indemnity had been over-rated. A closer examination reveals that there was ample reason for anxiety, however. The metal industry had found the demands placed on i t to be beyond i t s capacity In some respects, and substantial deficits had occurred in the pro-duction of machines. Soviet tardiness in supplying the necessary specifications and a five-months metal industry strike i n Sweden, from where a part of the machines for three mills to produce prefabricated wooden houses had been ordered, further aggravated the situation, and the mills were delayed seven months. The substantial fine which resulted was payable in supplementary deliveries, of course. The delivery of cable products was also continually in arrears during the f i r s t stage, while the delivery quota of new ships was met through the surrender of certaini.tug boats and freighters which were under construction at the end of the war. Ad-vance deliveries of new ships largely counterbalanced the deficits experienced i n other groups, and the woodworking Industries kept well ahead of the delivery schedule. Although advance deliveries more than balanced the deficits, they were not taken into account when the delay fines were worked out, and since the fines were accumulating and certain branches 187 of the metal industry showed l i t t l e promise of being able to catch up, Finland's p o s i t i o n did not look too hopeful as the second year of reparation d e l i v e r i e s commenced on ] 6 September 19, 194-5. There were4 encouraging developments as well, however. Before the conclusion of the f i r s t year of repar-ation d e l i v e r i e s the war between the Great Powers ended, f i r s t i n Europe and then i n the Far East. The external pressure on the Soviet Union was off and much of her resources and manpower could be diverted to the tasks of reconstruction. At the same time the f i r s t serious d i f -ferences between the Soviet Union and her war-time a l l i e s began to appear. What immediate influence, i f any, these developments had on Soviet-Finnish r e l a t i o n s cannot be deter-mined, but there may be some significance i n the f a c t that less than two months a f t e r the surrender of Japan the Soviet Union announced that she had decided to prolong the period of war reparation d e l i v e r i e s by Finland. A revised basic agreement was signed on December 3 1 , 194-5, and, although i t did not reduce the t o t a l b i l l , i t did s i g n i f y an important a l l e v i a t i o n of the war reparation burden by increasing the delivery period from s i x years to eight. As a r e s u l t , the remaining annual schedules were reduced from $50,000,000 to $35,500,000 each, which meant a reduction of about 29 per 16 The most accurate account of the period discussed i n the preceding paragraph i s found i n Auer, op. c i t . . pp. 40-68 & 317-320. 1 8 8 cent annually. ' There may have been another reason for this unexpected Soviet move. One does not usually k i l l the goose which lays the golden eggs, and the Soviet Union may have decided that i t would be more profitable to keep the eggs coming than to discourage further efforts on the part of the goose. Finland had already reached the c r i t i c a l point. In addition to the extremely heavy reparation deliveries during the f i r s t stage, Finland had also been carrying other economic burdens of a similar nature. Under the terms cf Article 14 of the Armistice Agreement, Finland was obliged to return to the Soviet Union "... in complete good order a l l valuables and materials removed from Soviet territory...." The term 'Soviet territory' included, of course, the Karelian Isthmus and a l l other areas annexed by the Soviet Union in March 1940 and subsequently recaptured by Finland during the Continuation War, and property to be 'returned' included the personal possessions carried away by Karelians who had l e f t their homes following the Armistice Agreement. Up to August 1945, goods valued at $28,100,000 had been delivered on this account, and by an agreement concluded in September the remaining obligation was fixed as $22,000,000. 1 8 By the follOT/ing May, approximately half of this amount had been paid off when, as a result of representations in Moscow 17 Auer, op. c i t . . pp. 72 & 3 2 1 . 18 Finland Yearbook 1947. p. 8 8 1 189 by the pro-Communist Prime Minister of Finland, Mr. Mauno Pekkala, the Soviet Government released Finland from any further payments under Article 14,19 The surrender of war booty also constituted an extra burden on the Finnish economy during the f i r s t stage of the reparation deliveries. A l l war material of Germany and her satellites located on Finnish territory was to be transferred to the frontier of the Soviet Union, and the cost of collection, transport etc. reached about $12,000,000. And substantial claims were to follow later in connection with German assets in Finland. In other words, i f the Soviet Union seriously wanted Finland to be able to continue to meet the obligations of the basic agreement of December 17? 1944, an extension of the total delivery period was essential. That such an extension was not a new thought with the Soviet Government is shown by Stalin's statement at the Teheran Conference when he suggested that the Finns might be given "five to eight years" to pay. 2 1 How urgently an alleviation was required as the second year of reparation deliveries got under way was underlined by the devaluation, on October 16, 1945, of the Finnish mark, the third devaluation in four months.22 Since Finland's reparations industries were 19 See Meinander, op. c i t . , pp. 31-34. 20 Finland Yearbook 1947. p. 89. 21 Churchill, Closing the Ring, p. 400. 22 The Hew York Times. October 17, 1945, p. 25. 190 dependent upon foreign imports, and since such imports could only be paid for by exports of forest products, i t was essential that such products be so priced that they could compete on the world market. Even with the reduction in the annual quotas as a result of the two-year extension, there were serious doubts in ' o f f i c i a l circles' in Helsinki as to the chances of f u l f i l l i n g the obligations to the Soviet Union. On October 24th, o f f i c i a l s were reported to have said that only a $50,000,000 loan from abroad could tide. Finland over. 2 3 A month later Prime Minister Paasikivi told C. L. Sulzberger of The New York"Times that Finland was seeking a $150,000,000 loan from the United States i n the form of a long-term credit to assist her in recovering from 24 the war and the heavy drain of reparations. The revised basic agreement opened the second stage of the Finnish reparation deliveries, a stage which was to last u n t i l June 30, 1948, or thirty months. During this stage Finland was to deliver about $64,200,000 worth of metal industry products and about $33,100,000 worth of forest products. 2 5 The l i s t of commodities to be delivered included 186 different items, 147 of which were machines and complete factory installations. Largely because of the predominance of metal industry products on the l i s t the 23 The New York Times. October 25, 1945, p. 8. 24 Ibid.. November 26, 1945, p. 11. 25 Auer, op. c i t . , pp. 74 & 321. 191 reduction of the annual load did not necessarily mean a smooth flow of deliveries. Shortages in industrial plant and skilled labour s t i l l resulted in delays, and delivery 26 deficits within the machinery group became chronic. Deliveries of forest products were strikingly ahead of schedule during the entire second stage period, however, i n a deliberate attempt to appease the Russians and i n the hope that they might not request f u l l payment of the rather substantial fines incurred by the metal industry. These hopes were also partly realized, as about one half of the fines accumulated by the beginning of February 194-7 -$266,000 - were remitted by the Soviet Union. 2 7 Attempts by Finland to have the Paris Peace Con-ference reduce the total amount of reparations were unsuccessful, however. The Finnish delegation, headed by Foreign Minister Carl Enckell, may have taken their cue from Molotov's speech at the plenary meeting on August 1 3 , 1946, when he attacked Mr. De Gasperi of Italy for having concentrated on the t e r r i t o r i a l clauses of the Italian draft treaty rather than on the economic clauses, "although i t is precisely these clauses that may affect the position of every worker, every peasant, every citizen of the Italian Republic and influence the entire future existence of the 26 See Auer, op. c i t . . p. 103 (chart 1 7 ) . 2 7 Alenius, F i n l a n d efter vapenstlllestandet 1944. pp. 39-40. 192 Italian State."^ 0 When Mr. Enckell addressed the conference two days later he said very l i t t l e about the t e r r i t o r i a l clauses of the proposed treaty. In what was reported as "the mildest speech"made before the conference by a delegate of a former enemy state, he suggested that " i t would be well" i f his country's reparations b i l l could be reduced by one third. Although he went to great pains to compliment Stalin, the Soviet Union and Great Britain for the "great generosity" extended to Finland after the war, he also showed the cost of two wars to Finland.and listed the inconveniences caused by the loss of territory to transportation and economic l i f e as a whole. He also stated that Finland would have been unable to pay the reparations had i t not been for credit extended by the United States, Sweden and other countries. 29 Mr. Enckell's approach, although i t appeared to follow Molotov's advice to the Italian Foreign Minister, met with no more success than that of Mr. De Gasperi. In an angry retort, which included a lecture on Finland's ag-gressive designs and actions against the Soviet Union since 1918, Molotov declared that " . . . i n the matter of reparations the Soviet Union has met Finland's wishes to the utmost." Guided by the desire to pursue a policy of goodwill towards a democratic Finland, and realizing that old 28 V. M. Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy. Speeches  and Statements. April 1945-November 1948. Moscow. Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1949, p. 115. 29 The New York'Times. August 16, 1946, p. 11. 193 tsarist Russia had committed many a sin against l i t t l e Finland, the Soviet Government restricted i t s e l f to laying the minimum reparations upon her, which compensate for only a small part of the enormous damage she caused.30 Nobody of any consequence cared to champion Finland's cause. On August 29th, the Peace Conference set a speed record when the Finnish P o l i t i c a l and T e r r i t o r i a l Commission approved the preamble and eleven of the twelve treaty clauses assigned to i t i n about three hours. The majority of the delegates were reported to have spent their time "reading newspapers or polishing their fingernails" . 3 1 The rest of the treaty, including the economic clauses, was approved in similar fashion. American protests were disregarded because the United States had not been at war with Finland. This ineffective American stand came in for a sharp attack by former president Herbert Hoover who, in a public statement, declared that the treatment accorded Finland was wholly unjustified and that the reparations claim against her, in proportion to her national wealth, "... would be equal i n size to an indemnity of $200,000,000,000 upon the United States . " 3 2 Great Britain was not heard from, and the Australian delegation, the only one to make concrete pro-posals for an alleviation of the burden placed on Finland, came in for particularly violent and repeated attacks by 30 Molotov, ou. c i t . , pp. 124-125; The New York'Times. August 17, 1946, p. 5. 31 The New York Times. August 30, 1946, p. 3. 32 Ibid.. October 14, 1946, p. 3. 194 Molotov. With the exception of Foreign Minister Enckell, the entire Finnish delegation, made up chiefly of l e f t wing members of the Riksdag, returned home. In the words of Yrjo Leino, the Communist Minister of the Interior: "What is the use of staying? The Finland treaty is as good as passed by the conference." 3 3 It was suggested in some quarters, however, that the Soviet Union might be prepared to scale down the amount of reparations should Finland be willing to make certain " p o l i t i c a l concessions". 3 4" The future was to prove that these predictions were not far off the mark. Finland laboured on under the unaltered burden imposed by the revised basic agreement of December 31, 1945* When the national budget for 1948 was brought down, the extraordinary items of reparations, resettlement of refugees and installment payments and interest on loans obtained to offset the worst effects of those two items, accounted for 53 per cent of a l l state expenditures. J y Only 47 per cent of the budget was allotted to so-called normal purposes. But the burden was soon to become substantially lighter. On June 3 , 1948, the Soviet Minister in Helsinki, Lieut.-Gen. G. M. Savonenkov, informed Prime Minister Mauno Pekkala that 33 The New. York Times, August 31, 1946, p. 28. 34 Ibid., November 13, 1946, p. 6. 35 Fredrik Valros, Finland efter ar 1946. Helsingfors, Statsradets Tryckeri, 1952, p. 39. ? t 195 the Soviet Union had decided to cancel half of the remaining reparations as of July 1st. In addition, the Soviet Union would grant Finland a loan of $5,000,000 which she could spend in whatever market she chose for the acquiring of needed raw materials. In a broadcast the same night, Moscow radio said that this step had been taken as a result of representations made the previous month by three Communist members of the Finnish Government.3° The timing of this important announcement suggests that the Soviet Government had not merely suddenly decided that the Finns deserved a pat on the back and a reward for a job so far well done. There were sound p o l i t i c a l reasons for the move. Six months earlier, the Finnish Communists had suffered a severe setback in nation-wide municipal elections. Out of more than ten thousand seats at stake, the Communist party had won less than two thousand, which signified a drastic decline in i t s popular backing. This was followed, in February 194-8, by a personal request from Stalin that Finland and the Soviet Union conclude a treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance, and such a treaty was signed on April 6th. However, the desired results did not ensue on the Finnish p o l i t i c a l scene. Gn the contrary, on May 19th the Riksdag passed a vote of non-confidence in the Communist Minister of.;the Interior, Mr. Leino, on the grounds that he had extradited a number of Finnish and foreign citizens to Russia, i n 194-5 36 The New York Times. June 4, 1948, p. 8. 196 without Cabinet authorization. When Leino failed to resign after the censure vote, he was dismissed by President Paasikivi on May 22nd. The Communists immediately ordered nation-wide strikes, but the action was an almost complete failure. With a Riksdag election coming up on July 1st and 2nd, the Communists had l i t t l e reason to expect good results. The Soviet announcement of June 3rd would appear to be the most effective publicity they could have received, and i t is d i f f i c u l t to imagine that the Soviet Government reached it s generous decision entirely independent of the p o l i t i c a l situation in Finland. It is actually tempting to say that the decision was a $73,500,000 election bet that failed to pay off. When the ballots had been counted, the Communists and their sympathizers discovered that they had lost twelve seats to finish a poor third i n the party standings. 3 7 The figures involved in the Soviet decision to reduce reparation deliveries were as follows:3® Deliveries Remaining remaining Reduction after June 30'48 % reduction Machines, installations etc. $62,400,000 46.8 $33,200,000 New vessels 39,300,000 0.0 39,300,000 Cable products 11,000,000 100.0 Paper industry products .... 18,200,000 96.2 700,000 Woodworking industry products 15,100,000 100.0 Other deliveries 1,000,000 7 0.0 300,000 $147,000,000 50.0 $73,500,000 37 Details of the p o l i t i c a l developments outlined in the preceding paragraph are given in chapter 6. 38 Bank of Finland Monthly Bulletin, vol. 22, nos. 7-8 (July-August 1948), p. 28. 197 It is noteworthy that no alleviation was granted in the deliveries of new ships, and also that the deliveries of the engineering industries were reduced by less than one half. These two groups, which had been the main sources of d i f f i c u l t i e s to the Finns in meeting reparation payments, now, i n the third stage of deliveries, were to- account for almost 99 per cent of the total. However, the almost com-plete abolition of deliveries within the categories supplied by the forest industries did have an indirect effect on the production of goods s t i l l to be delivered in that Finland's surplus output of forest products could now be sold on the open world market. The extra foreign currency thus earned could be used to supply Finland's hard pressed engineering works with sufficient raw materials to meet the demands placed upon them without expensive delays. The results of this were obvious as the value of Finland's free exports during 1948 exceeded the previous year's by about 25 per 39 cent. Another problem had to be coped with, however. During the f i r s t two stages of the reparation deliveries the quantitative fulfilment of the obligation had been the chief d i f f i c u l t y . During the third and last stage the quality aspect became the most serious problem. The Soviet inspectors now devoted particular attention to such matters as "... the 39 See Pipping, Finlands narlngsllv efter andra vSrldskrlget. p. 150. The term 'free exports' was used to distinguish the goods freely sold on the world market from those delivered to the Soviet Union as war reparations. 1 9 8 technical documents of the delivered commodities, their designs, explanatory material, installation instructions, analyse /sic7 certificates of the raw materials,"the packaging and related matters." 4 0 Nevertheless, during the third stage of deliveries Finland failed to meet the schedule within the machinery group only once, and other delays were rare and insignificant. Communist-led strikes during the summer of 1 9 4 9 and a two-months strike i n the early f a l l of 1950 which completely paralyzed the production of machines and steel ships seriously threatened the schedule, but ad-vance deliveries prior to the strikes sufficed to f i l l the gap. The fines which were incurred were remitted by the Soviet Union. In fact,the Soviet Union had been consistently lenient with respect to fines. The fines accumulated during the f i r s t year of deliveries were paid in f u l l by Finland. During the second, third and fourth years the Soviet Union cancelled most of the fines, and no fines were collected at a l l during the last three delivery years. The total amount paid in delay fines by Finland was only $800,GOO. 4 1 Although advance deliveries always exceeded delayed deliveries in value, the fact remains that the Soviet Union, by the terms of the various delivery agreements, was entitled to collect the stipulated fines on a l l delayed deliveries regardless of whether they were balanced by other deliveries or not. 40 Auer, op. c i t . . p. 3 2 5 . 41 Ibid., p. 3 2 8 . 199 With the treaty of peace signed and r a t i f i e d and with the burden of reparations lightened considerably in 1948, the Finns were relieved of the terrible pressure of uncertainty and apprehension under which they had worked during the early postwar period. It was no longer a matter of whether they could pay the reparations or not, only a matter of time. The danger of economic servitude was a thing of the past. When the "golden schooner" was surrendered to the Soviet Union on September 19, 1952, to end the reparation deliveries, this was what Finland had turned over to her eastern neighbour as penalty for having lost the war:4"2 New vessels $66,000,000) Vessels from the merchant marine \ of 1944 14,000,000< m 1 2 € Various machines and equipment 70,700,000) Cable products 12,900,000 Paper industry products 34,900,000) _.. 28$ Woodworking industry products 28,000,000 $226,500,000 « 100$ The total amount, a l i t t l e more than a quarter of a b i l l i o n dollars, may not seem very impressive. One must remember, however, that the currency in question can in no way be called American dollars. In reality i t is an imaginary currency which is commonly referred to as "war indemnity dollars", generally regarded as corresponding to 2.5 American dollars in purchasing value. On that basis the Finnish reparation deliveries would slightly exceed three quarters of a b i l l i o n American dollars, or approximately $185 for every 42 Lounasmeri, op. c i t . . p. 21. 200 Finnish man, woman and child. Professor Br. Suviranta of the Department of Economics at Helsinki University has calculated the value of the deliveries to be about $740 ,000,000 on the basis of the accountancy figures con-cerning government expenditure on the war indemnity. He believes, however, that the Finnish mark was probably over-rated during the eight delivery years and that the actual book-keeping cost should have been about $ 5 7 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 4 3 This very conservative estimate was subsequently cited without comment by the secretary-general of SOTEVA,44 Mr. Olavi Lounasmeri.4^ Professor John H. Wuorinen has claimed that "... there is reason for concluding that the sum w i l l ultimately approximate $ 9 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 to $ 1 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 . 4 6 This estimate has undoubtedly taken into account many of the factors which would not appear on the books, such as the cost of establishing new industries to produce commodities for which there might be no market after the termination of the delivery period, etc. It might also include the 43 Br. Suviranta, The Completion of Finland's War Indemnity. Helsinki, Keskusklrjapaino, 1 9 5 2 , pp. 1 - 2 . (Reprinted from Unitas, quarterly review of Nordiska Fftreningsbanken.) 44 SOTEVA was the abbreviated and commonly used name for the coordinating body which administered the industries working on reparation orders. 45 Lounasmeri, op. c i t . . p. 2 2 . 46 The New York Times, August 1 2 , 1 9 5 2 , p. 1 8 . 201 •indirect reparations' such as the restoration of goods removed from Soviet territory, the collection and trans-portation costs in connection with the war booty claim, and the transfer of German property and other assets to the Soviet Union. In connection with the last case, i t ^ might be mentioned that Finland never received settlement for $ 1 2 2 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 worth of Finnish property and assets in Germany. In 1944 the opinion prevailed that the war indemnity would be beyond Finland's capacity to pay. In September 1952 i t seemed like a miracle that the task had been accomplished. Finland had delivered goods that would f i l l a freight train stretching from Pittsburgh to San Francisco. 4 7 But, as Professor Suviranta has pointed out, "miracles do not occur in economic l i f e , a l l phenomena having a natural explanation."^"0 The indemnity payments are no different. Professor Suviranta l i s t s four factors among which the key to success should be sought: ( 1 ) the con-tribution of production, ( 2 ) favourable export conditions, ( 3 ) foreign capital and (4) alleviation of the Indemnity plan.4"? Labour peace prevailed almost without interruption during the entire period of deliveries. The workers, the technical staff and the employers a l l went to work immediately after the assignment had been given, refusing to give i n to 4 7 U. S. News & World Report, vol. 3 7 » no. 7 (August 1 5 , 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 3 0 . 48 Suviranta, op. c i t . . p. 4. 49 Loc. c i t . ; Auer, op. c i t . . pp. 243 & 338. 202 discouragement, and they a l l performed their tasks with distinction. The whole production effort was organized in an excellent manner by SOTEVA, which employed a staff of 520 at i t s peak in 1948.5° Exports were at a very low level at the end of the war and the terms of trade were exceptionally adverse, but after 1946 they were.consistently better than they. had. been shortly before World War I I . The following figures w i l l i l l u s t r a t e the postwar developments 51 Volume of Percentage ratio commercial Terms of of war indemnity exports trade to total Year 1935 » 100 1935 - 100 exports 1945 18 64 61 1946 47 89 28 1947 64 124 19 1948 67 133 17 1949 80 121 16 1950 88 107 9 1951 110 144 6 1952 97 5 Thanks to these favourable export conditions Finland was able, by the end of 1951? to reduce her indebtedness to an amount less than that which she carried at the outset of the indemnity period.52 i n other words, the foreign loans which had kept her alive during the f i r s t d i f f i c u l t stage of the reparation deliveries had been made up for by her own production; a l l l i a b i l i t i e s forced on her as a result 50 Lounasmeri, op. c i t . , p. 23. 51 Compiled from Pipping, op. c i t . . p. 150; Suviranta, op. c i t . . p. 4; Auer, op. c i t . . p . 243. 52 Suviranta, op. c i t . . p. 5« 203 of the war had been discharged. But an appalling amount of wealth had been drained out of the country to accomplish that stupendous task. Prime Minister Urho Kekkonen undoubtedly had this in mind when, i n a message on the occasion of the completion of the reparation deliveries, he used the f o l -lowing rather reserved words: "We have good reason to be morally satisfied. We now have better possibilities than before to satisfy our domestic needs." Foreign Minister Sakari Tuomio'ja said pointedly that he hoped the fulfilment of the debt obligations would appear "... even In the Soviet's eyes as convincing proof of our w i l l to live up to our agreements."53 Finland had again managed to do the 'impossible'. The question now was whether the Soviet Union intended to continue as a major customer of the Finnish export industry -but as a paying one. A great deal depended on the answer to that question. 53 The New York Times. September 19, 1952, p. 8 CHAPTER VI THE STRUGGLE FOR SURVIVAL, 1944-1947 Nobody in Finland had expected that peace could be purchased cheaply. The Finns had experience in buying peace for themselves at Soviet prices. Yet they were taken aback completely as the real impact of the 1944 Armistice Agreement began to make i t s e l f f e l t during the last months of that eventful year. One might have thought that the economic burdens resulting from the cession of v i t a l ter-r i t o r i e s , the destruction of Lapland and the war indemnity claim would have been regarded as sufficient punishment even by the Soviet Union. But this was not the case. During the period of uncertainty between the armistice and the signing of the f i n a l peace treaty the p o l i t i c a l burden weighed almost as heavily on the Finns as did the economic o b l i -gations. One observer called the p o l i t i c a l obligations assumed by Finland "... the most formidable problem of a l l . " * " 1 J. Hampden Jackson, "Finland Since the Armistice," International Affairs, vol. 24, no. 4 (October 1948), p. 5 0 6 . 205 Basically, that obligation can be summed up very briefly: the establishment of good relations with the Soviet Union. Such an obligation may not appear to be a very d i f f i c u l t one to meet; i t may even seem to be one which the Finns should be only too happy to honour, since the establishment of good relations with their neighbours to the east had always been the basic problem in Finnish foreign policy. However, the Finns had not forgotten that in the past the expenses connected with such a state of affairs had regularly been charged to them. In the f a l l of 1939 they had been informed that they could improve Finnish-Soviet relations by handing over a strip of land on the Karelian Isthmus and some islands in the Gulf of Finland. In March 1940 the price for the same commodity had risen sharply. During the 1940-41 interval a never-ending stream of installments were asked of them on the 'good relations' account, including the granting of diplomatic immunity and free movement to Soviet consular personnel who subsequently engaged in espionage, the acceptance of Soviet instructions as to who must not run for public office, and a long l i s t of other items. What the Soviet Union would demand of them now that there was no possibility of outside- intervention In their behalf, the Finns could only guess, and they had no reason to believe that the demands would be any more favourable than they had been in the past. Good relations with the Soviet Union had now become an absolute prerequisite for continued Finnish independence. As Dr. Kekkonen put i t in an urgent radio appeal on September 25th, less than one week after the conclusion of the Armistice Agreement: A person who has not yet come to realize what p o l i t i c a l requirements our new position presupposes, and who has not been able to free himself of the effects of inherited views, w i l l surely say ... that we have no possibilities of winning the trust of the Soviet Union. To that one must answer that the winning of that trust and the creation of neighbourly relations are s t i l l the only way which can safeguard our inde-pendence. There is no question of two or more alter-natives but only of one.2 To free themselves of "inherited views" which had been strengthened by two catastrophic wars in five years was certainly no easy assignment for the Finns, and yet i t was clearly of paramount importance that they at least act as i f their opinions on the Soviet Union had been suddenly and drastically changed, as i f the bitter experiences of generations had been entirely forgotten, as I f Soviet policies and demands were perfectly suitable and just. They would have to carry this new attitude with them even into the polling booths, because i t was essential that Fin-land had a government which would be friendly to the Soviet Union and accepted as such by Moscow. And at the same time, i f the efforts of the past quarter of a century were not to be wasted, i t was essential that the appeasement of Moscow should not be carried so far that Finland might 2 Kekkonen, For fosterlandet, pp. 184-185. 207 inadvertently cross the fine and not too clearly drawn line that separated her from sharing the fate of her small neighbours across the gulf to the south. It was no accident that Finland gradually came to be likened to a tightrope a r t i s t . 3 One of the f i r s t consequences of the armistice was the appearance in Helsinki of Soviet police, which caused a near panic. Fantastic sums were paid for passage to Sweden, and a number of suicides were reported as rumours had i t that "... anyone who had ever spoken to a German would be purged."4" The hysteria soon died down, but i t had served as an indication of how basic was the Finnish fear of the Soviet Union and how touchy was the problem facing the Finnish Government with respect to the establish-ment of friendly relations with M0scow. This was also demonstrated by the i n i t i a l d i f f i c u l t y in finding a man to take over as Prime Minister from the incapacitated Hackzell. The President of the Supreme Administrative Court, Mr. Urho J. Castren, accepted the task on September 21st but named no Communists as members of his government. Seven weeks later he was forced to resign when the two most powerful Social Democrats in his government l e f t , claiming that the 3 Elsa Kruse, "Finland and the Tightrope Act," The  Christian Science Monitor Magazine. September 24, 19§9, p. 2; Wendy Hall, "The Finnish Tightrope," The Fortnightly, vol. 170 (November 19.5D, pp. 729-735. 4 The New York Times. October 10, 1944, p. 8. 208 cabinet was incapable of s o l v i n g the burning problems of the day.^ Out of t h i s c r i s i s came the p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y -as f a r as p o l i t i c a l s t a b i l i t y could be achieved - that F i n l a n d was i n such d i r e need of. On November 17th a new cabinet was announced, headed by the man who more than anyone e l s e could hope to command both the l o y a l t y of h i s own people and the confidence and cooperation of the S o v i e t Union, Dr. Juho P a a s i k i v i . H i s l i s t of M i n i s t e r s i n c l u d e d , f o r the f i r s t time i n F i n n i s h h i s t o r y , members of the Communist p a r t y . Together the S o c i a l Democrats and the Communists held seven of the p o r t f o l i o s , seven were held by r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the p a r t i e s of the r i g h t and two by 'expert' M i n i s t e r s . The primary o b j e c t i v e of h i s govern-ment, s a i d Dr. P a a s i k i v i , would be "... to work i n mutual understanding w i t h the S o v i e t Union and m e t i c u l o u s l y to f u l f i l l the a r m i s t i c e terms." He added, however, that "... F i n l a n d w i l l uphold her democratic C o n s t i t u t i o n which i s based on her sovereignty and her r i g h t to self-government," and he warned that "... the Communist par t y , l i k e other p a r t i e s , w i l l a c t i n accordance w i t h p r e v a i l i n g l a w s . " 0 The l i n e had been drawn, and i t was made very c l e a r that no d e v i a t i o n could be allowed. I n an Inde-pendence Day speech on December 6 , 194-4, Prime M i n i s t e r P a a s i k i v i s t r e s s e d the p o i n t again when he declared that i f 5 A l e n i u s , F i n l a n d e f t e r v a p e n s t l l l e s t a n d e t 1944, p. 14. 6 The New York Times, November 18, 1944, p. 4. 209 Finland were to build a peaceful and happy future for her-self, her foreign policy must never be allowed to cross the path of the Soviet Union.' This exhortation was repeated by President Mannerheim who, in his year-end message, emphasized that Finland faced an extremely d i f f i c u l t period and that "unity and self-discipline" were essential i f the Finns wished to "... survive the storms and guarantee the existence and future of our independent State." 8 This policy, which soon became popularly known as the 'Paasikivi l i n e 1 and which has been defined as "against no state, under certain circumstances for the Soviet Union, Scandinavia 9 in a special position," was generally accepted by the vast majority of Finland's population as a sine- qua non. and i t s success was so conspicuous that a foreign observer could write only a few weeks after i t s proclamation that: Since the Premiership of Finland was taken over on Nov. 17 by Juho K. Paasikivi, Finland's more or less professional arbiter with the Russians, relations between Helsinki and Moscow have become extraordinarily smooth. The Soviet press has not only stopped thundering against the former enemy but has actually paid tribute on several occasions to the sincerity with which Finland is f u l -f i l l i n g the armistice conditions.1° One might question whether a foreigner, vi s i t i n g Finland 7 Alenius, op. c i t . . p. 16. 8 The New York Times. January 1, 194-5, p. 7. 9 G5ian von Bonsdorff, "Finland mellan 5st och vMst," Statsvetenskaplig t i d s k r i f t . vol. 54, no. 5 (195D, PP. 349-350. 10 "Patch on the Armistice," Newsweek, vol. 25, no. 1 (January 1, 1945), p. 40. 210 only b r i e f l y i n order to get m a t e r i a l f o r a s t o r y , could c o r r e c t l y gauge the F i n n i s h p o l i t i c a l c l i m a t e . Undoubtedly the above d e s c r i p t i o n was c o r r e c t as a surface a n a l y s i s only. The p o l i t i c a l scene was d e f i n i t e l y remarkably q u i e t , but i t was the k i n d of q u i e t which may be followed by a storm. The b a s i c F i n n i s h d i s t r u s t of anything Russian had not disappeared overnight i n s p i t e of the d e c i d e d l y c o r r e c t a t t i t u d e d i s p l a y e d by members of the A l l i e d ( S o v i e t ) C o n t r o l Commission. But under the A r m i s t i c e Agreement the C o n t r o l Commission nevertheless held wide powers over F i n n i s h i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , and i t was only by c a r r y i n g out the wishes expressed by the C o n t r o l Commission th a t the F i n n i s h Govern-ment could avoid d i r e c t S o v i e t i n t e r f e r e n c e . The whip was always there, and i t might be employed a g a i n s t the Finns any time the S o v i e t Union so d e s i r e d . With those r e s e r -v a t i o n s I n mind, F i n n i s h - S o v i e t r e l a t i o n s might w e l l be described as " e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y smooth". The most immediate problem co n f r o n t i n g P a a s i k i v i ' s government was that of e l e c t i o n to the Riksdag. The s i t t i n g Riksdag, which had been compromised i n Russian eyes because of the support i t had given the government during the war, would as a matter of course have to be replaced, and i t was e s s e n t i a l that the new Riksdag be so composed that i t meet w i t h S o v i e t approval. The Y a l t a D e c l a r a t i o n on L i b e r a t e d Europe, signed by the 'Big Three' on February 11, 194-5? and issued on February 12th, s a i d i n p a r t : 2 1 1 The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic l i f e must be achieved by processes which w i l l enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice.11 The victors also reserved the right to take the necessary steps to achieve such order i f the liberated or former Nazi sa t e l l i t e states failed to do i t on their own. The Finns, knowing from experience"how such phrases as "Nazism",. "Fascism" and "democratic institutions" were defined i n Moscow, feared the "processes" which the Russians might institute by authority of the Yalta Declaration. As an American historian wrote twelve years later: It is hard to judge whether either Soviet or British governments shared the sense of the American formulators that i t s principles might govern events. Its loose net of phrases allowed easy passage to any determined purpose. ... What would happen i f the people of one of the countries on Soviet frontiers elected a government actively opposed to the Soviet Union? 1^ The Finns were asking themselves the same question in the winter of 1944-45, and they thought they had a f a i r l y good idea of what the answer would be. In a broadcast speech entitled "After the Yalta Conference", held two weeks before the election, Mr. Eero A. Vuori, labour leader and Social 11 1946 Britannica Book of the Year. Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1946, pp. 8 5 1 - 8 5 2 . 12 Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt. Stalin. The War  They Waged and the Peace They Sought. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1 9 5 7 , P« 5 5 0 . 212 Democratic Minister of Communications, called attention to the Yalta Declaration and drew some pertinent conclusions from i t . "According to the Yalta Conference definition, Finland is an ex-Nazi s a t e l l i t e , " he pointed out, and he called for Finns who "held responsible positions in directing cooperation with the Nazis" to "draw aside" from the pol-13 i t i c a l scene even i f "they are not tried as war guilty". Vuori's speech was regarded as Moscow-inspired by foreign 14 observers, but that was hardly true in the usual sense. Since the entire p o l i t i c a l situation in Finland could be described as "Moscow-inspired", Vuori's warning.was merely a logical derivative and probably inspired by Paasikivi i f by anyone at a l l . Whatever the source of inspiration, Vuori's speech was underlined a few days later when Pravda. discussing the imminent election, asked whether the complete victory "... of the principles adopted at the Crimea Con-ference" would result. It added that "... the present elections are not to be considered an internal affair of the Finns" and concluded by saying that "some leaders must under-stand that friendship with the Soviet Union is the main guarantee of Finnish independence."xy It would have been d i f f i c u l t to state more clearly what was at stake i n the election, but Izvestia nevertheless tried. On the very eve 13 The New York Times, March 3 , 1945, p. 6 14 See Ibid., March 4, 1945, P.. 19. 1 5 Quoted in ibid., March 13, 194-5, p. 8 . 213 of the election, i t impressed upon the Finns once more the necessity of making a clean break with their "anti-Soviet past and promote cooperation with the Soviet Union"; The results of the election w i l l show whether Finland is determined to eradicate a l l traces of fascism from their midst and thereby gain the right to readmission in the family of peace-loving peoples. As a pointed piece of information for the Finnish voters, Izvestia added that the Democratic Union of the Finnish People was the "nucleus of progressive democratic thought in the country". 1 6 And as i f a l l this was not enough, Prime Minister Paasikivi in a stirring broadcast speech the same day warned his people that the election would be their supreme and, by implication, last chance to put matters 17 right with the Soviet Union. ' Seldom has a nation had a comparably•crucial issue facing i t on an election day. The party lineup before the election showed two changes since the 1939 election. The ultra-conservative I.K.L. party, an off-shoot of the Lapua movement, which had contested elections in the 1930!s without much success, was banned in accordance with Article 21 of the Armistice Agreement as a "pro-Hitlerite organization", while organized Communism reappeared after a fifteen years' imposed absence from the p o l i t i c a l scene. The program and the name of the 16 Quoted in. The New York Times, March 17, 194-5, p. 4-. 17 Loc. c i t . 214 new Communist party differed from it s revolutionary pre-decessor. Communism had now assumed an aura of respectability and the Communist party, on the background of the 'Paasikivi line' policy, a sense of responsibility. However, i t did not feel strong enough to appeal to the voters under i t s own label, and i t contested the election under the banner of the Democratic Union of the Finnish People (S.K.D.L.), a combination which included a number of fellow-travellers and a group which had s p l i t with the Social Democratic Party and formed the Socialist Unity Party. Prominent in this latter group were the members'of the so-called Group of Six who had been arrested during the Continuation War because of their articulate opposition to the government. The leader of this group was Mauno Pekkala, who later was to succeed Paasikivi as Prime Minister. Otherwise the election was contested by the trad-iti o n a l Finnish p o l i t i c a l parties: the Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian Party, the National Unity Party, the National Progressive Party, and the Swedish People's Party. Of these, a l l but the Social Democratic Party could be des-cribed as center or conservative parties. Their repre-sentation in the Riksdag after the 1939 election had been 85, 56, 25, 6 and 18 respectively, while other parties had held 10 seats. 1 8 18 Goran von Bonsdorff, Vara politiska partier, Helsingfors, Sederstrftm, 1951, p. 45. 2 1 5 On March 1 7 t h and 1 8 t h the Finns cast their ballots. When the f i n a l results had been tabulated, the conservative elements in the country s t i l l held a parlia-mentary majority but by the slightest of margins. Between them, the Agrarian Party ( 4 9 ) , the National Unity Party ( 2 8 ) , the Swedish People's Party (14) and the National Progressive Party ( 9 ) had 1 0 1 seats to 99 for the Social Democratic Party ( 5 0 ) and the Democratic Union of the Finnish People ( 4 9 ) . The conservative parties had polled 5 1 . 4 per cent of the popular vote. The Social Democratic Party, from which had come some of the strongest opposition to the Soviet Union and to Finnish Communist elements in the past, had been sup-ported by 2 5 . 1 per cent of the electorate, while the Communists and their sympathizers could only account for 2 3 . 5 per cent 19 of the total vote, or less than one in four. However, this s t i l l represented a remarkable advance for the extreme l e f t since the Communists had never polled more than 14.8 per cent of the vote during the 1920*s when they were s t i l l enjoying f u l l p o l i t i c a l r i g h t s . 2 0 Since a l l the compromised war-time leaders had been prevented from standing for election, and since the conservative parties had seen to i t that their candidates were acceptable in Russian eyes, the outcome of the election 19 Bonsdorff, Vara politiska partier, p. 3 4 . 2 0 That result was achieved in. the 1922 election. Loc. c i t . 2 1 6 was t a c i t l y approved by the Soviet Union and i t s Control Commission in H e l s i n k i . 2 1 Furthermore, on April 1 3 t h the Social Democratic, People's Democratic (the Democratic Union of the Finnish People was commonly referred to as the People's Democratic Party) and the Agrarian Riksdag groups issued a joint declaration proclaiming their intention to work together within the framework of a stated program, the basis of which was that Finland's foreign policy be based on the declarations of the Allied Powers in order that peace and independence of the country might be preserved. Finland's relations with a l l democratic states, and part-icularly with the Soviet Union, must be placed on a frank basis, marked by mutual confidence and friendship, the three-party proclamation continued, and i t called for a close cultural and commercial relationship with the same contacts, f i r s t of a l l with the Soviet Union and Scandinavia. The proclaimed goals of this 'red-green bloc', as the new p o l i t i c a l grouping came to be known, with respect to domestic policies were also of a nature which were designed to placate the Soviet Union. As i f further assurances were needed, President Mannerheim told the new Riksdag as i t was convened on April 7 t h that Finland's task was to "... create lasting friendly relations, founded on common interests and mutual 2 1 The So-called 'Allied (Soviet) Control Commission' was so exclusively under Soviet control that the word 'Allied' might as well have been l e f t out. 22 Alenius, op. c i t . , pp. 1 8 - 2 0 . 217 confidence, with the Soviet Union." 23 Prime Minister Paasikivi told the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nvheter that "... in the future, Finnish policy w i l l never again run counter to the interests of the Soviet Union. The Finnish people w i l l incline even further in the direction of the OA. Soviet Union in their p o l i t i c a l orientation." Paasikivi's second government was formed on April 17th. Of the eighteen portfolios, six were held by People's Democrats, including three declared Communists; the Social Democrats and Agrarians held four portfolios each and the National Progressives one, while two 'expert' Ministers were included. Paasikivi himself had relinquished his ties with the National Unity Party, which he once led, and professed no party connections. By a strange coincidence the National Unity Party, when the Swedish People's Party shortly after joined the government, became the only party per formally in opposition. J The People's Democrats thus had the strongest representation in Finland's government in spite of their position in the party standings i n the Riksdag, a situation which forestalled any possible criticism on that point. Furthermore, among the Ministries controlled by 23 The New York Times, April 8, 194-5, p. 24. 24 As quoted in a Finnish radio broadcast and reported in ibid., March 21, 1945, p. 3 . 25 A complete l i s t of Finnish ministries from Paasikivi's second government of April 17, 1945, to Kekkonen's third government of September 20, 1951, is given in Valros, Finland  efter ar 1946, pp. 79-84. 2 1 8 them was the Ministry of the Interior, which was headed by Communist Yrj5 Leino, the husband of Otto Kuusinen's daughter, Hertta Kuusinen. Since the Ministry of the Interior had come to be regarded as a most suitable springboard for the preparation of revolts because of i t s control of the police and internal security, the news of Leino's appointment was received with apprehension both in Finland and abroad. The appointment of Aino Altona, Chairman of the-Finnish Communist Party, to the position of assistant chief of the p o l i t i c a l police, did not help matters. Moscow-trained, Mr. Altona had entered Finland on a forged passport in 1934, was caught and sentenced for high treason and remaiined in prison u n t i l the armistice in 1944. The appointments of Leino and Altona were particularly.ominous when viewed in connection with Article 13 of the Armistice Agreement which obligated Finland to "... collaborate with the Allied powers in the apprehension of persons accused of war crimes and in their t r i a l . " In an election speech Mr. Vuori, who was to hold four different positions in Paasikivi's new government, had declared that three main tasks would face the govern-ment, and the f i r s t two of them were the clean-up of fascist 2 6 elements and the question of war criminals. With Leino and Altona guiding the execution of these tasks nobody needed to doubt that the Soviet Union would be satisfied. 26 The New York Times. March 1 5 » 1945> p. 6 . 219 The weeding out of organizations and other elements in Finnish l i f e which the Control Commission labeled as fascist was started soon after the armistice had been con-cluded. In fulfillment of the agreement, the Riksdag promptly enacted a law authorizing the government to dis-solve a l l "pro-Hitlerite" organizations, and by October 15th the Soviet news agency Tass could announce that about 400 such organizations had been dissolved. 2 7 On November 5th the Home Defence Corps was disbanded for the same reason, ° and the Comrades in Arms, Finland's veterans•• organization with a membership of close to half a million former soldiers, was ordered dissolved before the March e l e c t i o n . 2 9 Having done away with 'fascist' organizations, attention was concentrated on individuals, particularly on officers of the Finnish army. On October 24th, the Control Commission ordered the arrest of twenty officers on war crimes charges, and some "startling seizures" were reported to have been made.30 Two days later a l i s t of sixty 'war criminals' was submitted to the Finnish authorities by the Control Commission. Heading the l i s t were Major-General Pajari, who had just successfully completed the extremely daring Finnish landing at Tornio behind the German lines 27 Soviet Foreign Policy During the Patriotic War, vol. 2, p. 157. 28 The New York Times. November 6, 1944, p. 5. 29 Ibid., January 1, 1945, p. 3-30 Ibid., October 25, 1944, p. 5. 2 2 0 which saved the cities of Tornio and Kemi from the devastation which was meted out to the rest of northern Finland, and Major-General Palojarvi, former Finnish military-attache in Stockholm. Colonel Palohelmo, who had been a member of Hackzell's 'peace government' and who was a personal friend of Mannerheim, was also on the l i s t along with other prominent men.31 Yet this was only a small beginning. The purge did not really get under way u n t i l Yrjo Lei-no took control of the Ministry of the Interior. Early i n May a secret arms cache was discovered near Oulu, and a thorough search subsequently unearthed hidden weapons a l l over the country. Investigations revealed that the concealment of these arms had been organized by high-ranking officers of the General Staff, and a large number of officers were quickly rounded up and detained by Leino's police. The affair caused a sensation when Leino announced i t In the Riksdag on July 4th. Arrests continued throughout 1 9 4 5 and 1946 u n t i l more than 6 , 0 0 0 persons had been examined and 1 , 4 5 0 of them detained for a longer or shorter period. 3 2 A l l the chiefs of the Finnish General Staff since the armistice were among those arrested. President Mannerheim, who had remained as Commander-in-Chief of the Army until December 31, 1944, and General Heinrichs, who had succeeded him, were both cleared of any connection with the affair, 3 1 The New York Times, October 2 7 , 1944, p. 6, 32 Alenius, op. c i t . , p. 2 9 . 221 but the-latter nevertheless had to resign his post as a result of i t . Not u n t i l March 28, 1947, was the military-plot brought before the courts as the t r i a l of twenty-two staff officers opened on charges of having formed a secret army to fight the Soviet Union "... i f war broke out bet-33 ween her and the western powers."J The t r i a l s dragged on for the rest of the year, and i t was not until April 1948 that the case was closed with the conviction of most of the 34 officers, some of them generals. J Another top officer who went to prison during the regime of Leino was Lieut.-General Karl Lennart Oesch, who had been Chief of the General Staff from 1939 to 1940 and Commander-in-Chief of the powerful Karelian Army during the Continuation War. As a result of the latter circumstance, he was ordered arrested by the Control Commission as a war criminal and, in July 1946, convicted and sentenced to twelve years at hard labour on charges of having ordered harsh treatment of Russian prisoners of war. In May 1947 his sentence was reduced to three years.35 In spite of the sensationalism surrounding the arms concealment affa i r and the general purge of army officers, the most serious purge was on another level. 33 The New York Times. March 29, 194-7, p. 7. 3 4 Gunnar Suolahti and Sven Berger, "Finland: Historia," Svensk Uppslagsbok, Malmo, Norden, 1 9 5 0 , vol. 9 , column 6 4 9 . 3 5 Sven-Eggert Bergelin, "Karl Lennart Oesch," ibid., 1 9 5 2 , vol. 2 1 , columns 8 8 7 - 8 8 8 . 222 The Soviet interpretation of the phrase "persons accused of war crimes", contained i n Article 13 of the Armistice Agree-ment, defined such persons as (1) those accused of crimes committed during the conduct of the war and (2) those responsible for leading Finland into the war against the-Soviet Union. The obligation to purge these two groups was repugnant to any self-respecting Finn, and for a time i t was hoped that at least the task of prosecuting the war-time leaders might be avoided. As early as January 31, 194-5, Prime Minister Paasikivi had appealed to "... those persons who, during the last few years, have held leading positions in p o l i t i c a l l i f e or in a more prominent way have influenced that policy which led to a fateful result and was contrary to the Interests of the country...", asking them to withdraw from p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y . 3 6 Most of the persons to whom this appeal was directed quietly relinquished their p o l i t i c a l connections, although some of them waited as long as five or six months, and i t might,have been theirs and Paasikivi*s hope that by so removing themselves the Control Commission would leave them alone and not compel the government to pro-secute them. The question of war responsibility was handed over to a committee for investigation on February 4th in the hope that i t might be cleared up without too many di f -f i c u l t i e s . The committee, headed by a very well known figure in Finnish public l i f e , the historian E i r i k Hornborg, sub-mitted a lengthy report at the end of July. It c r i t i c i z e d 36 Alenius, op. c i t . , p. 26. 223 the manner In which the Germans had been allowed into Finland in 1940, reprimanded those who had called for the annexation of East Karelia, and condemned the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement as unconstitutional, but no individual was singled out as having acted contrary to Finnish law. The document was historical in i t s approach and did not go into the legal aspect of the question ,at a l l . On this the opinion was asked of former President.Stahlberg, Finland's foremost consultant on constitutional law, who stated that anyone who had made lawful decisions regarding law and peace in accordance with the Finnish Constitution could not be charged with them. This meant that Finland's war-time leaders could not be prosecuted unless the Riksdag passed legislation with retroactive powers, a thing which would be repugnant to a l l principles of Finnish jurisprudence.37 The question was not allowed to rest, however. The respite afforded by the concentration on "pro-Hitlerite" organizations during the last months of 1944 and by the election in March 194-5 had only been a postponement. Finland's Communists were clamouring for the establishment of people's tribunals empowered to deal out summary justice,3 8 and the delaying tactics of the government was becoming conspicuous... It did not pacify the Communists that former Prime Minister Linkomies defended his war-time policy in an 37 Mannerheim, Memoirs, pp. 507-508; Alenius, op. c i t . . pp. 26-27. 38 The New York Times. March 25, 194-5, p. 18. 224 art i c l e i n the newspaper Uusi Suomi on July 5 t h , 3 9 0 r that the news leaked out on July 1 7 t h that the Hornborg Committee had cleared Tanner of any guilt for Finland's 40 policy. On July 14th, the Chairman of the Control Com-mission, General Zhdanov, returned to Helsinki from a two weeks' stay in Moscow and immediately requested Paasikivi to c a l l on him. Five days later i t was made known that Finland was speeding up preparations for trying her "war responsibles".41 i n the world press speculations mounted as to who would be charged, what the charges would be, and how the accused would be tried. There was no possibility of instituting proceedings under existing-Finnish laws, just as i t would have been impossible to institute proceedings under the laws of any democratic country. But proceedings had to be instituted. After Zhdanov's demarche of July 14th, Paasikivi had been forced to abandon a l l hopes of avoiding the prosecution of Finland's former leaders, and he decided that the national interest required speed and vigour in carrying out the distasteful task. The only solution to the legal problem was to create a new court invested with the powers necessary to try the "war responsibles". The Constitutional Committee of the Riksdag was consequently given the job of formulating a 39 Quoted i n The New York Times, July 6, 1945, p. 6. 40 Ibid., July 18, 1945, p. 1 5 . 41 Ibid., July 20, 1945, p. 7 . 2 2 5 b i l l which would meet the situation. The Committee went to i t s task with i t s hands practically tied, and the b i l l almost precipitated a government c r i s i s when i t was submitted to the,Riksdag on August 2 3 r d after two postponements. President Mannerheim, whose signature was required on the b i l l before i t could be submitted, writes i n his memoirs that "My first,impulse, when the proposition was produced for my signature, was to refuse to submit i t to Parliament.... After careful consideration I decided that a l l I could do was to introduce a few alterations, which made the proposed stipulations slightly less repugnant."4"2 Paragraph 1 of the proposed act provided for imprisonment with hard labour, for "... individuals who had i n a decisive way contributed to Finland joining with Germany in the war of 1941 against the Socialist Soviet Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and who, during the course of the war, had prevented the conclusion of peace.',4"3 As altered by Mannerheim, the act would apply only to those who had been guilty of such crimes as members of the govern-ment; prosecution could only be ordered by the Attorney-General; and the general rules regarding the Presidential 44 prerogative of pardon should apply. The President's sharp 42 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 508. 43 As quoted in loc. c i t . 44 Loc. c i t . According to the report received by The New  York Times, August 22, 194-5, p. 10, this was the f i r s t time that a Finnish President had changed a formulation presented to him by the government. 226 reaction was typical of Finnish reaction in general. In the Riksdag, thirty members took part in the impassioned debate, seeking other ways out of the dilemma. But, as one member of the Cabinet stated, only two ways were -. available: (1) to have the "war responsibles" tried and punished immediately, or (2) leave the matter up to the Soviet Union. The government was not prepared to take the consequences of the second alternative, and the passage of the b i l l was made a matter of confidence in the Cabinet in spite of the fact that constitutional changes required a five-sixths majority. Although the Riksdag debate was a long and impas-sioned one, the great majority of the deputies realized that the Soviet Union must not be provoked. The speech of Mr. Osterholm of the Swedish People's Party may be des-cribed as an epitome of most of the speeches delivered during the debate: It is an occurrence which can have dangerous con-sequences for the future, and i t does not place our country and i t s legal system in an advantageous light. But in spite of a l l this and the many other objections and doubts which could be applied against the B i l l , i t is not possible to place oneself in opposition to i t . It expresses a p o l i t i c a l necessity brought about by Finland's present position, a direct result of the Armistice Agreement, and in general is connected with what is taking place in other countries in the same or similar position as Finland after the war. The Govern-ment and the Riksdag are in this case forced to hand down an inheritance of the war, one of i t s many dif -f i c u l t and heavy b i l l s . It is not a simplification of the problem to say that fundamentally the choice is between two alternatives. One is the measure 227 proposed in the B i l l . The other involves complications of wide consequence in foreign relations. These com-plications are of such a nature that they submerge the reluctancies^ The choice is a heavy one, but i t has to be made. ^  During the debate, Paasikivi stressed that his government would do everything i t could to make the l i s t of "war responsibles" as short as possible and the sentences as light as possible. Asked i t s opinion on the proposed mea-sure, the Supreme Court stated that the b i l l contained "... so many basic deviations from our form of govern-ment and from universally recognized principles of law that the B i l l , from a juridical point of view, cannot be considered reconcilable with the customs of our State." 4 6 This opinion drew a strong objection from the Control Commission which had a statement published in the newspapers on September 6th, saying in part: The Control Commission consider the opinions incorrect both In form and in point of view. In form these opinions are contrary to law, in so far as neither the Supreme Court, nor the Constitutional Committee of the Riksdag are entitled to interpret Article 13 of the agreement any more than the other articles of the Armistice Agreement. The statement went on to say that "Article 13 of the agree-ment gives Finland the right and f u l l possibility to arrest and sentence the persons charged with war crimes...", which was clearly a thinly veiled warning that this right 45 Jan-Magnus Jansson, Grundlagsutskottets funktioner vid  Rlksdagarna 1939-1952, Helsingfors, Centraltryckeriet, 1954, pp. 139-140. 46 Ibid., p. 141. 228 was a privilege which could be taken away unless duly exercised. 4 - 7 After this intervention by the Control Commission the outcome of the Riksdag debate was a foregone conclusion, and the b i l l was passed on September 11th by 4.8 a vote of 129 to 12. . Fifty-nine members did not cast their votes at a l l . The passage of the b i l l paved the way for the creation of a Special Court of fifteen, which included the president of the Supreme Court, the president of the Administrative Court, a representative of the Faculty of Law of Helsinki University, and twelve members elected by the Riksdag.4"9 The t r i a l opened in Helsinki on November 16th. in the presence of members of the Control Commission, who were to attend f a i t h f u l l y throughout. The defendants were former President Ryti, former Prime Ministers Rangell and Linkomies, former Finance Ministers Tanner and Reinikka, former Foreign Minister Ramsay, former Education Minister Kukkonen, and former Minister i n Berlin KivimSki. Outside the courtroom, a student demonstration in favour of the accused developed, and police had to clear Helsinki's main square of thousands of people.5° Inside, Ryti's 47 Jans-son, on. c i t . , p. 145. 48 The New York Times, September 12, 1945, p. 2. 49 Alenius, op. c i t . , p. 28. 50 The New York Times, November 1 6 , 1945, p. 9. 229 defence attorney, former Minister in Washington Hjalmar Procope, declared that he considered i t to be his "holy duty" to defend Ryti, because he considered himself and the whole Finnish people gust as 'guilty' as the former 51 President. The main points in the charges were that the defendants had maintained Finland in a virtual state of war during the period between the Winter War and the Contin-uation War and that President Ryti had signed the Ryti-Ribbentrop agreement. The f i r s t stage of the t r i a l lasted only three days, the time required for the prosecution to present the charges. On November 17th, after hours of deliberation, the Court decided that evidence so far produced did not provide sufficient grounds for keeping some of the defen-dants in j a i l , and Tanner, Reinikka, Kukkonen and Kivimaki were consequently released u n t i l the t r i a l resumed on December 10th. Tanner was reported to look "extremely cheerful" as he listened to the prosecutor accusing him of having used his leading position within the Social Demo-cratic Party to influence the working class and public opinion generally.^ 2 His fighting s p i r i t lasted as long as the t r i a l did, and capacity audiences always attended when he was scheduled to speak. On December 17th, he charged that the charges against him were tantamount to a drive against the Social Democratic Party inspired by party 51 The New York Times. November 17, 194-5, p. 6 . 52 Ibid.. December 11, 194-5, p. 10. 2 3 0 politics - a remark meant for the dissident Social Democrats and Communists who sat on the Court, and he asserted that the Finnish people neither wanted nor needed the t r i a l which was being influenced "from outside". "I have always been a red rag both to Moscow and Berlin," he shouted. Ryti also used heavy a r t i l l e r y . His defence speech took three days, and i t pulled no punches in reit e r -ating the claim that Finland had been attacked by the Soviet Union in June 1941 and that she had waged a separate war. Police visited a l l Helsinki editorial offices after the f i r s t day of his speech to make-certain that no word of i t was printed, and the prosecutor asked the Court to rule that the speech jeopardized Finland's relations with a foreign power, a demand which was turned down after two hours' deliberation. The presiding judge, holding a copy of the speech, interrupted Ryti frequently, however, ordering him to omit a number of points that evidently were deemed too dangerous.54 The t r i a l ended on February 2, 1946. The judg-ment, announced on February 21st, found a l l eight defendants guilty. Ryti was sentenced to ten years at hard labour, Rangell to six years imprisonment, Tanner and Linkomies to five and a half years, KivimSki to five years, Ramsay to two and a half years, and Reinikka and Kukkonen to two years. Newspapers were warned not to carry commentaries on the 53 The New York Times. December 18, 1945, p. 8 . 54 Ibid., December 13, 1945, p. 1 3 . 231 t r i a l and i t s outcome that might jeopardize relations with the Soviet Union, and the result was that only the l e f t i s t press had editorials. Procope claimed that the possibility for defence was limited because Finnish-rSoviet relations were involved.^ The p o l i t i c a l nature of the t r i a l was beyond doubt, and the comparatively mild sentences represented nothing but a compromise, since conviction was -inescapable. In the words of one foreign editorial writer: "Their crime, consisted i n waging war against Russia and losing i t . " 5 ° Less than two weeks later President Mannerheim resigned for reasons of health. He had turned the duties of his office over to Prime Minister Paasikivi on October 19th and l e f t shortly after for a rest cure i n Sweden and Portugal. As his absence from the country coincided with the "war responsibles" t r i a l , some commentators preferred to see a sinister connection between the two events, part-icularly since some of the charges presented by the pro-secution involved him. His- illness was real enough, how-ever, and when he had a relapse after his return to Finland he decided that he would not be able to resume the f u l l burden of the presidency. In his letter of resignation he also pointed out that "... I considered that the task which had induced me to accept the position of Head of State had, 55 The New York Times, February 22, 1946, p. 12 56 Ibid., p. 24. 232 so far as concerned me, been accomplished, as now even the t r i a l of those accused of responsibility for the war had ended."57 Five days later, on March 9 t h , Paasikivi was elected President to complete the unexpired term of Mannerheim. The resignation of Mannerheim signalled a further swing to the l e f t in Finland's p o l i t i c a l tightrope act. The 'red-green bloc' remained operative as the new govern-ment was formed, headed by a People's Democrat, Mauno Pekkala, whose party held seven portfolios to five each for the Social Democrats and Agrarians and one for the Swedish People's Party. The post of Foreign Minister was retained by Carl Enckell, who belonged to no party. The real power in the country was s t i l l Paasikivi, however, and i t was by his intuition and s k i l l that the continued struggle for independence succeeded. The pressure was by no means off. The burden of war reparations was eased on December 31? 1 9 4 5 , but the Soviet claim to German property and assets more than offset that. The refugee resettlement problem was s t i l l very acute, and there was the reconstruction of Lapland to accomplish. And there were the actions of the Control Commission and of Leino, who remained as Minister of the Interior in Pekkala's government. Next to Zhdanov, he was probably the most dangerous threat to Finland's 57 Mannerheim, op. c i t . . p. 5 1 2 . 233 independence on the Finnish p o l i t i c a l scene. His powers had been increased by v i r t u e of a decree of January 1946 which stated i n part: A person exercising, or about whom there i s sound reason to believe he intends to exercise, a c t i v i t y harmful to the country's defense or i t s r e l a t i o n s with foreign powers can be ordered from his place of residence, to take up residence at another sp e c i f i e d l o c a l i t y or reside at a s p e c i f i e d l o c a l i t y , there to be submitted to s p e c i a l surveillance or, of these measures prove i n s u f f i c i e n t , taken into protective custody. Such measures may not be appealed against. An a l l - o u t drive against a l l r i g h t i s t organizations was started by the Ministry of the I n t e r i o r . One of the victims was the conservative student club at Helsinki University which was ordered dissolved and some of i t s members seized -they were released after questioning - following the heckling of the May Day parade i n 1946.59 Action f r e -quently followed 'spontaneous' demonstrations by Communist crowds, demanding a more thorough purge of 'anti-democratic elements'. Leino was only too pleased to accommodate them. His feats did not go e n t i r e l y unnoticed. In November 1946 a heated 24-hour debate and a vote of confidence followed demands i n the Riksdag for an explanation of methods employed by the secret p o l i t i c a l p o l i c e . The vote was won by 93 60 to 72 as 35 members refrained from voting. Censuring 58 The New York Times. January 28, 1946, p. 8. 59. Ibid.. May 18, 1946, p. 6. 60 Ibid., November 6, 1946, p. 17. 234 Leino was s t i l l a rather dangerous business, even though i t was clear to most people that his police was becoming more and more a tool of the Communist Party. Nevertheless, direct Soviet pressure was becoming less severe. By July 1946 the right to c r i t i c i z e appeared to have been partly restored to the Finnish press, and foreign corres-pondents had less troubles with censorship. Another kind of censorship was introduced, however, as a l l references uncomplimentary to the Russians, past and present, were 6l ordered removed from public monuments. In December, following the appearance of certain articles c r i t i c a l of the Soviet Union, Prime Minister Pekkala called a meeting of newspaper editors and warned them that his government could not guarantee the continued freedom of the press but was obliged to follow the directives of the Control Com-mission. 6 2 A weekly newspaper was banned permanently the next day, and the large daily Helsingin Sanomat received a warning. The p o l i t i c a l picture was not entirely gloomy, however. Each day widened the distance from the armistice day and brought closer the day when the armistice obligations 6 1 The New York Times, December 7 , 1946, p. 6 . One monu-ment commemorating the victory of Field Marshal Johan August Sandels over the Russians at the village of Pulkkila in 1808, bore the following inscription: "Here Sandels With His Men Defeated the Russian Devils." The last two words were removed and the word "Russians" substituted. 62 Ibid., December 2 3 , 1946, p. 2. 63 Ibid., December 24, 1946, p. 8. 2 3 5 would be completed. In August 1 9 4 5 hope was renewed that that day would s t i l l find Finland independent. Article 10 of the Potsdam Declaration, issued on August 2nd by Prime Minister Attlee of Britain, President Truman of the United States, and Stalin, said that their three governments con-sidered i t "... desirable that the present anomalous position of Italy, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary and Rumania should be terminated by the conclusion of peace treaties," and charged the Council of Foreign Ministers with the task of preparing such treaties. An immediate result of this decision was the resumption by the Allied Powers of diplomatic relations with Finland - the Soviet Union resumed relations on August 6th, and the easing of the restrictions placed on Finnish air and sea t r a f f i c by the Armistice Agreement. The following month the Council of Foreign Ministers, after a two days' discussion, accepted a Soviet draft as the basis 64 for discussion of a peace treaty with Finland. The con-tents of that draft were not known, but few Finns expected any major deviation from the basic provisions of the Armistice Agreement. This was partly confirmed by Stalin on April 18, 1946, when he received a Finnish Government delegation, headed by Pekkala, in Moscow. Pekkala later reported to a mass meeting in Helsinki that Stalin had told the delegation that the Soviet-Finnish boundaries as 64 The New York Times, September 22, 1945, pp. 1 & 4. 2 3 6 drawn under the Armistice Agreement were "definite" As twenty-one nations sent their representatives to Paris to begin the task of peace-making on July 2 9 t h , Pekkala again warned his countrymen not to expect too much and reminded them that the Soviet Union was and always would be their closest neighbour. "... the sooner we realize Russia is our biggest neighbour and we were on the wrong 66 side in the war, the better," he said. The f u t i l e trip of a Finnish delegation to Paris has been described above, as has Molotov's violent reaction to Foreign Minister Enckell's timid request for a lightening of the reparations burden. 6 7 In private conversations with leaders of the delegation Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshinsky expressed disapproval and indicated that Soviet-Finnish relations had taken a turn for the worse. Arriving home, Pekkala and other members of the delegation were met with Communist outcries against the "reactionary demands" they had put forward in Paris, and even Paasikivi came in for attacks because of "anti-democratic actions".68 On October 14-th the Peace Conference adopted the Finnish draft treaty without any significant alterations and confirming in f u l l the t e r r i t o r i a l and economic obligations 65 The New York Times, April 30, 1946, p. 3. 66 Ibid., August 1, 1946, p. 5. 67 See above,pp. 191-194. 68 The New York Times, September 2, 1946, p. 1 7 . 2 3 7 imposed by the Armistice Agreement. y How insignificant were the changes was perhaps most succinctly summarized by the commentator who, in a 12-page article on the treaties with the Balkan states and Finland, confined himself to the following one-sentence discussion of the Finnish treaty: " L i t t l e comment is required on the treaty with Finland, since i t is generally recognized that Finland's ties with the Soviet Union must become c l o s e . " 7 0 The Peace Treaty made no changes in the ter-r i t o r i a l , p o l i t i c a l and economic provisions embodied in the Armistice Agreement, although i t contained thirteen ad-ditional clauses. These extra clauses, however, were inserted merely to define in detail what types of war material Finland could and could not possess or manufacture, to determine a clear basis for future commercial relations between Finland and the Allied and Associated Powers, and to ensure Finnish acceptance of the principles of the United Nations and of human rights. The latter provision was regarded by a l l who knew the Finns as more superfluous than 'carrying coal to Newcastle'. Finland's armed forces were limited to a land army of 34,400, which included anti-aircraft a r t i l l e r y forces, a navy of 10,000 tons 69 For a discussion of the Finnish draft treaty, see Current History, vol. 11, no. 6 l (September 194-6), pp. 170-177-The new articles and modifications of articles adopted by the Paris Peace Conference are given in Record of Recommendations  by the Conference on the Draft Peace Treaty with Finland. Paris, Imprimerie Nationale (J.H. 607178), 1946. 70 T.E.M.M., "The Draft Treaties of Peace," Ttie World Today, vol. 2, no. 12 (December 1946), p. 5 9 1 . 238 and 4,^00 men, and an airforce of 60 aircraft and 3,000 men. The strengths included "combat, service and overhead per-sonnel". There was no provision for the continued existence of the Control Commission, and the Heads of the British and Soviet missions in Helsinki were charged with the task of supervising the execution of the treaty obligations. Two potentially dangerous loopholes were l e f t , however, whereby the Soviet Union could in the future continue to interfere in Finnish domestic affairs i f she so desired. Article 8, recalling that Finland by the Armistice Agreement had taken measures to dissolve " a l l organizations of a Fascist type on Finnish territory, whether p o l i t i c a l , military or para-military, as well as other organisations conducting pro-paganda hostile to the Soviet Union", ordered Finland not to permit i n the future "the existence and activities of. organisations of that nature which have as their aim denial to the people of their democratic rights." And Article 15 stated that "Personnel not included in the Finnish Army, Navy or Airforce shall not receive any form of military training, naval training or military air training." One instance of such interference came in 1948, after the f a l l of Pekkala's government, when the Soviet Minister in Helsinki called on Foreign Minister Enckell to request the dissolution of Finnish r i f l e clubs on ^he grounds that they violated the 71 Peace Treaty by engaging in target shooting-.' 71 The New York Times. September 26, 1948, p. 6. 2 3 9 However, even though the treaty made i t possible for the Soviet Union to continue to assert a decisive influence on the p o l i t i c a l development i n Finland, the fact that peace had been concluded was a tremendous r e l i e f to the hard-pressed nation. The f i r s t important milestone in the struggle to create the conditions for ruling them-selves had been passed. On January 27th the Riksdag authorized the government to sign the Peace- Treaty, and the solemn ceremony took place in Paris on February 10th. The treaty was r a t i f i e d by the Soviet Union on August 29th, and the instruments of r a t i f i c a t i o n were deposited in Moscow in a 15-minute ceremony at 6 p.m. on September 15, 1947. Finland was o f f i c i a l l y at peace with the Soviet Union. On September 26th, President Paasikivi announced a decree ending the state of war i n Finland, and the members of the Control Commission departed by plane for Moscow. Before they drove to the airport, under a heavy police escort, Prime Minister Pekkala expressed the hope that they would take 72 with them many happy memories of their stay. Finnish memories were not happy, but the future held out some promise of better things. Asked for a state-ment in connection with the Soviet r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Peace Treaty, Dr. Kekkonen wrote: The r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Peace Treaty, which now has taken place quite unexpectedly, concludes a period in our country's history, an unhappy.period which was 72 The New York Times. September 27, 194-7, p. 5. 240 introduced on Anders 1 Day i n 1 9 3 9 . The r a t i f i c a t i o n of the Peace Treaty a l s o s i g n a l s the beginning of an era, a heavy p e r i o d , which w i l l be marked by the heritag e l e f t to us by the war. The F i n n i s h people, whom h i s t o r y has not s p o i l e d w i t h r i c h e s or w i t h a pea c e f u l l i f e behind somebody's broad back, receives the peace which has been d i c t a t e d w i t h peace and q u i e t i n i t s mind. I t w i l l f u l f i l l the hard c o n d i t i o n s of peace w i t h the c e r t a i n t y and determination of a man who keeps h i s word. But a t the same time i t hopes that the p o l i t i c a l freedom which i s guaranteed F i n l a n d i n . the Peace Treaty may be r e t a i n e d i n such a way that we can f r e e l y manage our own p o l i t i c a l and economic a f f a i r s i n accordance w i t h the w i l l of the m a j o r i t y of the people and as our Nordic democracy shows us. We know our p o s i t i o n - a s a neighbour of the great S o v i e t Union and we keep t h i s i n mind i n our a c t i v i t i e s as we t r y to win the confidence of the S o v i e t Union, because we know that the good r e l a t i o n s which are so e s s e n t i a l f o r us can only come about through mutual confidence. I n the same way as we respect the e f f o r t s of our eas t e r n neighbour to r a i s e the p r o s p e r i t y of i t s peoples, we ask f o r respect from that quarter and a l l other quarters f o r the F i n n i s h way of l i f e which i s t y p i c a l f o r us. To t h i s our way of l i v i n g belongs as an i n t e g r a l p a r t the p o l i t i c a l and economic l i b e r t y of our c i t i z e n s . May the Peace Treaty correspond to t h i s our i d e a l of freedom."3 73 Kekkonen, op., c i t . , pp. 7 2 - 7 3 . CHAPTER VII DEMOCRATIC RECONSTRUCTION, 1948-1952 The Finnish nation had won the f i r s t and most crucial round of i t s struggle for survival as the Peace Treaty was r a t i f i e d , but the struggle was by no means over. Another five years of war reparation deliveries lay ahead, and the Finnish Government was s t i l l in the hands of the Communists and their sympathizers by virtue of their control of the strategic Ministries. This control was becoming more and more nominal rather than factual, however. By the Finnish Constitution, executive power is divided between the President and the Cabinet. The President is not merely a figure head. If he wishes, he can assert considerable influence over his Ministers and even, as a last resort, dismiss them. A po l i t i c i a n as wise and thoroughly familiar with every aspect of the Finnish machinery of state as Dr. Paasikivi was always able to prevent the Communists from damaging that machinery to such an extent that Finland's basic democratic processes ceased to function. Although far-reaching concessions to the l e f t were impossible to avoid 242 because of the threat of direct Soviet interference in Finland's p o l i t i c a l l i f e , those .concessions never went so far that there was no return. It was a bitter experience to have to allow the arrest and deportation to the Soviet Union of 'Soviet citizens' from Estonia who had fled to Finland in 1940 and, as frequently was the case, had fought in the Finnish army during the Continuation War. It was bitter to have to stand by while Leino and his specially recruited state police, called Stapo for short, arrested army^  heroes_;f or alleged war crimes and other assorted wrong-doings. It was bitter to allow the war-time leaders to go to j a i l for having done their best to safeguard Finland's independence. But that was the price which had to be paid for the elusive commodity called freedom. Because that price was paid Communism was no further ahead in Finland by the end of 1947 than i t was at the time of the 1945 election. In fact, as was soon to be demonstrated, i t had declined. The Communists had failed to take over or i n f i l t r a t e the army and the ordinary police, and even the trade unions had failed to succumb in spite of the strong and persistent play made, by the Communists to gain f u l l control of them. After three years of favoured existence, Finland's Communists were totally incapable of taking f u l l control of the country without the active assistance of the Red Army. More than that, they were faced with the probability of losing the bastions of control which they had occupied under the pro-tection of the Soviet-dominated Control Commission. 243 The f i r s t sign of governmental unrest came early in 1947, shortly after the signing of the Peace Treaty but while Finland was s t i l l warily awaiting i t s r a t i f i c a t i o n . On April 11th, Prime Minister Pekkala was forced to submit the resignation of his government as a result of a s p l i t in the 'red-green bloc 1 on economic policy. The ensuing c r i s i s , which even featured an unsuccessful attempt by Leino to form a new cabinet, revealed such a basic p o l i t i c a l division that i t could not be solved, and on May 20th Pekkala agreed to continue in office u n t i l Paasikivi decreed new elections. This unhappy solution was probably a result of external con-siderations as well as domestic, since the Control Commission was s t i l l in Helsinki and Zhdanov had declared that the Soviet Union' "... certainly would not welcome a change in the Finnish Cabinet." 1 Simultaneously, relations between Finns and Russians appeared to assume an unusual degree of i r r i t a b i l i t y . The Supreme Soviet failed to acknowledge an invitation ex-tended by the Finnish Government to attend the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Riksdag. A delegation of Helsinki city councillors cancelled a scheduled v i s i t to Moscow. The trip, which was to have been a return of a v i s i t to Helsinki by Moscow municipal o f f i c i a l s , was called off as the Soviet Union reduced the number of promised visas to thirteen and then to five, then said that i t would have to 1 The New York Times. April 12, 1947, p. 8. 244 be postponed for unexplained reasons. A Finnish Government delegation, in Moscow to discuss arrangements whereby the Finns-might make use of the railway through the Pgrkkala enclave and of the Saimaa Canal, found i t s e l f negotiating for months without gaining any worthwhile concessions. On the other side of the ledger, a bomb was thrown into the Soviet legation building in Helsinki in early May, damaging one room. Of forty-eight movies showing in Helsinki, only one was Russian, while forty were produced in the United States. One premiere of a Russian movie was reported to have attracted two patrons. When i t was announced, on May 28th, that Leino's secret police had unmasked a full-fledged under-ground movement, organized along the lines of the French maquis and directed against the Soviet Union, i t did not make much of an impression. The Finns had come to expect such announcements from the Ministry of the Interior, and very few believed in the most-recent expose. Whether these snubs and countersnubs grew out of Finnish-Soviet relations alone is d i f f i c u l t to say. It is possible that the general world situation could be blamed for them. The gulf between the East and the West had grown very wide during the two years which had passed since the Yalta Conference, and there had been a number of sharp clashes during the Paris Peace Conference. The p o l i t i c a l and economic condition of most of Europe was one of turmoil, 2 The New York Times, May 19, 1947, p. 4. 245 and while the United States was considering ways and means of s t a b i l i z i n g the European scene, the Soviet Union was interested i n aggravating i t . As the American Secretary of State George Marshall told President Harry Truman when he returned from the M0scow Conference of Foreign Ministers on A p r i l 2 6 , 1947: "The Russians...were c o l d l y determined to exploit the helpless condition of Europe to further Communism rather than cooperate with the rest of the world." Truman himself, i n a p o l i c y speech on March 12th, had warned that the United States was prepared to back up her p o l i t i c a l p o l i c i e s with economic measures and that she was already busy working out p r a c t i c a l ways to strengthen i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooper-ation i n economic matters.-^ In other words, the Russians had been served notice that their hopes to dominate Europe through economic chaos might not materialize. This was confirmed on June 5 t h , when Secretary of State Marshall out-l i n e d a programme for European economic recovery and invited Europe to take steps.towards implementing i t . The enthusiasm with which the plan was received i n Europe showed how r e a l the need for economic assistance was, and the reaction of the Soviet Union showed what a tremendous blow the plan was to her designs. When the B r i t i s h and French Foreign Ministers, Ernest Bevin and Georges Bidault, invited Molotov to meet with them i n Paris to discuss the American proposal, Molotov 3 Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Garden City, N.Y., Doubleday, 1 9 5 6 , v o l . 2 , pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 . 246 accepted, and the three-power conference opened on June 27th. It broke down after one week, however, as Molotov insisted that an Anglo-French proposal to establish a committee which would survey the resources of the European countries and submit a European recovery plan would be to meddle in the internal.affairs of sovereign states. Molotov proposed instead that the United States be asked to specify the exact amount of help she was prepared to grant, a proposal which was unacceptable as long as the basic economic needs of Europe were not known, and that each country make i t s own survey and estimates. When agreement proved to be impossible, Molotov withdrew. Czechoslovakia, whlchLhad accepted an Anglo-French invitation to attend a conference of European countries starting in Paris on July 16th, withdrew her acceptance after a v i s i t to Moscow by Premier Klement Gottwald and Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk. Poland, which had signified her intention to accept the invitation, also recanted. 4 Finland also received an invitation to take part in the Paris conference to discuss European economic re-covery, and there was a majority in the Foreign Relations Committee of the Riksdag for accepting i t . However, as the government was discussing the invitation on July 8th, a messenger arrived from the Control Commission with a summons for Prime Minister Pekkala to appear there at once. He 4 Harry Bayard Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning. Ithaca, N.Y., Cornell University Press, 1955"? PP. 27-29. 247 returned to inform his colleagues that the Russians had demanded that Finland decline the invitation. In spite of this demand, the Cabinet continued to discuss the i n v i t -ation throughout the following day, and i t was not rejected u n t i l President Paasikivi, on July 10th, intervened to point out that to disobey the wishes of the Control Commission was s t i l l . a most hazardous thing to do and that Finnish-Soviet relations must be regarded as an important consider-5 ation in reaching a decision. In her reply to the invitation, Finland pointed out that her p o l i t i c a l position had not yet been stabilized by a definite peace treaty and that she wished to remain outside international c o n f l i c t s . 0 The Control Commission interfered again in August. Having suffered heavy losses in union elections during the summer, the Communists opened a campaign to undermine the position of the unions. The culmination of this campaign was to be a strike of transport workers, but the strike order was withdrawn when the government threatened to use i t s legal power to draft the strikers. The Control Commission Im-mediately notified the government that i t would regard the threatened government measure as "part mobilization", which was prohibited by the Armistice Agreement. The road was thus cleared for the strike, but no serious work stoppages resulted. Perhaps the source of Communist strength had been too 5 The New York Times. July 15> 1947, p. 6 . 6 Valros, Finland efter ar 1946, p. 14. 248 blatantly revealed. There was s t i l l another episode which Indicated the direction in which Finland would be pulling once she was free of the Control Commission. As negotiations continued in an effort to secure transit concessions through the Porkkala enclave, i t became clear that the fees to be charged by the Russians for letting the Finns use the railway would come to very much more than the five million Finnmarks paid in rent by the Soviet Union for the naval lease. The Soviet Union was also demanding that trains using the line be sealed, their windows covered completely, and other safeguards which would reduce the time saved by using the line to minutes rather than hours. Angered by this, a Helsinki'newspaperman and city councillor, Professor. Ernest! Hentunen, asked i n his periodical Totuuden Torvi: "Are Finns to be treated as cattle? Let us boycott the arrangement by not using that l i n e . " 7 He was promptly placed in 'protective custody' in an insane asylum, but his plight was not allowed to be forgotten. A l l over the country Finns rushed to his aid as newspapers of a l l p o l i t i c a l creeds except the extreme l e f t expressed open or implied sympathy for the "martyr of the free press". On December 4th and 5th, after the Peace Treaty had been ra t i f i e d , the trend toward the fuller application of traditional Finnish democracy was given concrete expression as elections for municipal councils were held a l l over the 7 The New York Times. August 26, 1947, p. 9. 249 country. The real,losers of the election were the People's Democrats, whose total number of municipal councillors was reduced by nearly six hundred. Of the more than 10,000 places at stake, the center and conservative parties captured almost 6,200, while the Social Democrats won about 2,200 and the People's Democrats less than 1,800. The total pro-Communist vote had not been reduced, however, but because of the greater participation in the elections i t was relatively much smaller. The real test came early in the new year. On February 22, 1948, Stalin addressed the following letter to President Paasikivi: As should be known to you, of the three countries bordering on the U.S.S.R. which waged war against the U.S.S.R. on the side of Germany, two - Hungary and Rumania - have signed with the U.S.S.R. treaties of mutual assistance against possible German aggression. It also is known that both our countries greatly suffered from this aggression and i t is the two of us who w i l l be responsible before our peoples i f we permit a repetition of such aggression. I assume that Finland, not less than Rumania and Hungary, is interested in a pact of mutual assistance with the U.S.S.R. against possible German aggression. In view of these considerations, and wishing to establish conditions for a radical improvement in the relations between our countries with the aim of strengthen ing peace and security, the Soviet Government proposes the conclusion of a Soviet-Finnish pact of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance similar to the Hungarian-Soviet and Rumanian-Soviet pacts. If there is no objection on the part of Finland, I would propose that a Finnish delegation be sent to the U.S.S.R. for the conclusion of such a pact. If you consider i t more convenient to carry on negotiations for the conclusion of a pact i n Finland, the Soviet-Government is prepared to send i t s delegation to Helsinki. 8 8 The New York Times. February 29, 1948, p. 4; Current  History, vol. 14, no. 81 (May 1948), pp. 304-305. 2 5 0 The only surprising thing about the letter was the signature. The letter i t s e l f had been expected. The treaties with Rumania and Hungary, copies of which were enclosed in the letter to Paasikivi, had been signed on February 4th and 18th respectively and served to confirm the development toward Communist rule under Soviet auspices which had taken place during 1947. On February 19th, Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Zorin arrived in Prague, ostensibly to supervise the delivery of supplies of Russian wheat, a job one could hardly describe as one of his regular duties. The following day eleven Czech Ministers tendered their resignation. On the 21st, police units converged on the capital from outlying areas, Communist action committees went into action, and Parliament was adjourned. During the night of the 22nd, a wave of arrests occurred. 9 With two treaties already signed, and in the midst of the Czech c r i s i s , Stalin's letter was delivered in Helsinki. The signs were foreboding. And there had been other signs as well. When a Finnish Government delegation headed by Pekkala returned from the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution In Moscow in November 1947, the Finnish Foreign Ministry had found i t necessary to deny reports that a Finnish-Soviet defence agreement had been concluded during the delegation's v i s i t . 1 0 9 Peter Calvocoressi, ed., Survey of International Affairs. 1 9 4 7 A 9 4 8 V London, New York, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1952, pp. 154-155. 10 The New York Times. November 1 7 , 1947 , p. 9 . 2 5 1 Towards the end of January 194-8, Lieut.-General Savonenkov suddenly returned to Helsinki as Soviet Minister. The re c a l l of his predecessor because of illness, which appeared to come as a surprise to the 'sick' man himself, was inter-preted as an indication that Moscow considered It necessary to have as i t s envoy in Helsinki a man of action who was familiar with Finnish a f f a i r s . As Zhdanov's deputy.: on v-the Control Commission, Savonenkov had become known to the Finns as a stern military commander, and his arrival coincided with reports from 'informed circles' in Helsinki, that Finland's turn had come to join the Soviet Union's system of military security pacts. It was believed that Moscow's terms^i'ncluded the establishment of a permanent Soviet military mission with the Finnish army, standard equipment for both armies, repair f a c i l i t i e s in Finnish ports for ships of the Soviet navy,- training courses for Finnish officers in the Soviet Unions etc. Government o f f i c i a l s were said to be "loath" to discuss the matter.1^ One observer claimed that i t was Savonenkov's mission to induce the Finns to ask for such a 12 treaty. If i t was, he failed. It seemed to be too much of a coincidence, however, that a number of hard-core Finnish Communists who had fled to the Soviet Union after the 1918 C i v i l War began to trek across the border into Finland. Among them were three former 'Ministers' in 11 The New York Times, January 23, 1948, p. 3. 12 Stephen Simmons, "Finland and Russia," The New Statesman  and Nation, vol. 35, no. 899 (May 29, 1948), p. 428. 252 Kuusinen's Terijoki government, including Ture Lehen, veteran of the Spanish C i v i l War, general in the Red Army, and expert on street fighting, and Inkeri Lehtinen, who, with Kuusinen, had been Finland's representative on the Comintern Presidium. On the background' of a l l these develop-ments i t was not surprising on February 8th to read in both Pravda and Izvestia that the United States was restoring German militarism, was forming a bloc of western countries including Germany, and was trying to draw Finland into i t s imperialistic web. In articles and editorials both papers stated that the Finnish right wing elements were aiding the American imperialists and "sharply resisting" nationalization and the country's reconstruction "on healthy democratic' foundations".^ j t seemed like the familiar build-up to prepare the ground for drastic action, and with the receipt of Stalin's letter that action appeared to have been initiated. In spite of the build-up, the news of the Soviet demand came as a dreadful shock to the Finnish public when i t became known on February 2 7 t h . A l l efforts to win their Independence seemed to have been in vain. Foreign reactions were not encouraging. London was reported to be very pes-simistic about the outcome, of the negotiations demanded by Stalin: "The only two questions remaining now are - who w i l l be next after Finland and where w i l l i t stop." 1 4 The New York 13 Quoted in The. New York Times. February 2, 1948, p. 4. 14 Ibid., February 28, 194-8, p. 1. 253 Times said editorially that the swallowing up of Finland by the Soviet Union was inevitable; "While the world watches and waits, one more small country is.preparing to go to i t s doom."1^ Helsinki was the f i r s t to recover from the shock, however. Most newspapers stressed that the enormous majority of Finns opposed a military pact and wished to stay outside international conflicts. Interviewed in Stockholm, the Speaker of the Riksdag, Karl-August Fagerholm, said Finland did not want to see in the Soviet proposal "... an overture of events of the kind now occurring in some other countries who have closed agreements with the Soviet Union." 1 6 Meanwhile, on the 28th, President Paasikivi informed General Savonenkov of the steps being taken by the government to produce a definite reply to Stal i n 1 s . l e t t e r . The following day he met with top p o l i t i c a l and military leaders in a secret session to discuss the proposed pact. By March 5th, a majority had been assured In the Riksdag in favour of negotiations, as only the National Unity Party and the Agrarians remained opposed. Four days later Paasikivi forwarded his reply to Stalin, saying in part: Seeing that conclusion of the treaty in question, according to the Finnish Constitution, requires the approval of Parliament, the Government has submitted the proposal included in your letter to preparatory examination by parliamentary groups. When the matter was considered by the aforementioned 15 The New York Times, March 1, 1948, p. 22 16 Ibid., p. 2. 2 5 4 groups, doubts were expressed by parliamentary quarters in regard to conclusion of a military agreement. Especially after the hardships endured during the past wars, the Finnish people hope to be able to remain outside of international conflicts and, conscientiously f u l f i l l i n g the clauses of the peace treaty, to maintain and develop friendly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union. In-wishing by a l l available means to promote and develop good and confident neighbourly relations between Finland and the Soviet Union, the Government accepts the proposal to enter into said negotiations. The Government presupposes that the factual contents of the agreement in a l l respects w i l l be freely considered and decided upon during the negotiations.17 In view of the events in Hungary and Rumania, the coup in Prague which by then was a matter of history, and Finland's precarious position vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in general, the letter demonstrated an amazing degree of courage in the face of the Soviet demand. It reiterated Finland's ambition to work for the further development of good relations with the Soviet Union; i t a l l but rejected the idea of a military pact; and i t stressed the parliamentary procedure to which any kind of agreement would have to be subjected. It was not the sort of letter which a people's democracy was sup-posed to address to the Soviet Union. The selection of the Finnish negotiating delegation further emphasized Finland's determination to resist Soviet demands i f such demands should prove to be contrary to the most v i t a l national interests of the country. Headed by Pekkala, i t included Leino and one other l e f t wing politi c i a n , one representative each of the Swedish People's Party, the Social Democratic Party and 17 The New York Times, March 16, 194-8, p. 14. 255 the Agrarian Party, and Foreign Minister Enckell. The three l e f t i s t s were unequivocally in favour of a treaty. The three other party representatives opposed any military clauses in such a treaty. The vote of the wise, old Foreign Minister would be decisive, and one could rest assured that his policy would not differ from that of Paasikivi himself. In a broad-cast to the nation on March 13th, Pekkala promised that the government would sign no pact that infringed on the Paris Peace Treaty or on Finland's Constitution or sovereignty. The negotiations were not dangerous, he said, nothing out of 18 the ordinary. Events in Helsinki belied Pekkala's optimistic words. On March 9 t h , flying squads of Communists entered the editorial offices of a l l Helsinki's daily newspapers and warned that "anti-Soviet propaganda" must forthwith disappear from the news and editorial columns "or else". The Riksdag building was visited by other groups who demanded to see the leaders of the parties that had opposed the negotiations. When the politicians in question refused to see the Communists,, notes were sent in to them warning that next time they would have to face the 19 groups whether they wished i t or not. At a r a l l y in Helsinki in late March, Hertta Kuusinen declared that "The road 18 The New York Times, March 14, 1948, pp. 1 & 33-19 Ibid., March 10, 1948, pp. 1 & 13. 256 of Czechoslovakia is the road for us." Since she and her husband, Leino, had recently returned from an unofficial v i s i t to Moscow, i t was assumed that her words were not without foundation as far as Soviet desires were concerned. As far as the vast majority of Finns were con-cerned, hoxvever, there was no intention of following in the tragic footsteps of the Czechs. The instructions given the negotiating delegation by Paasikivi before i t s departure for Moscow on March 20th were so limited that i t would be virtually impossible for i t to commit Finland to a military alliance. The instructions were reported to include a l l the reservations made by the various parties against military ties, while approving the principle of a treaty of friend-21 ship. On the 22nd, three days before the Moscow negot-iations got under way, Paasikivi declared confidently that the elections scheduledfor July 1st and 2nd would be com-22 pletely free and express the w i l l of the people. At the same time steps were taken to forestall a possible Communist coup. Weapons were issued to the army and units were guarding j o f f i c i a l buildings in Helsinki. Army munitions and stores were placed under heavy guard. 2^ On April 4th, General 20 Eric C. Bellquist, " P o l i t i c a l and Economic Conditions in the Scandinavian Countries," Foreign Policy Reports, vol. 24, no. 5 (May 1 5 , 194-8), p. 5 6 . 21 The New York Times, March 1 8 , 1948, p. 21. 22 Ibid., March 2 3 , 194-8, p. 7. 23 Ibid., April 1, 1948, pp. 1 & 14. 257 Aarne Sihvo, Commander-in-Chief of the Finnish Army, an-nounced that a l l leaves had been suspended after consultation with the Social Democratic Minister of Defence, Yrjo Kallinen. O f f i c i a l l y , the reason was that there was a lack of recruits to f i l l the gaps in the armed forces. According to Sihvo, the extra guards around the military stores had been placed 94. there to prevent "burglaries and damage by spring f i r e s " . The regular police force, which had played such a v i t a l part in the execution of the Communist coup in Prague, was not reliable from a Communist point of view in Finland. Indeed, i t was expected that any drastic action by Leino's fa i t h f u l motorized mobile guard, reported to number between one and three thousand men, and his State Police would meet with opposition from the regular police throughout the country. The only real threat inside Finland's borders were the approximately 2 0 , 0 0 0 Soviet troops stationed only ten miles from Helsinki within the confines of the Porkkala naval lease area, but not even in Czechoslovakia had Soviet troops openly assisted the domestic Communists on Czech territory. A puzzling change was evident, however, as negotiations f i n a l l y started on March 2 5 t h . Stalin's letter had projected an alliance similar in nature to the ones concluded between the Soviet Union arid Hungary and the Soviet Union and Rumania. Copies of those treaties had even been enclosed with the letter for Paasikivi's information. When, 24 The New York Times, April 4, 1948, p.' 22. 2 58 during the f i r s t meeting w i t h F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Molotov, the F i n n i s h n e g o t i a t o r s s t a r t e d to e x p l a i n the objec t i o n s of the Riksdag to a m i l i t a r y t r e a t y , Molotov r e p l i e d that he f u l l y appreciated that a t t i t u d e . Before the Finns could recover from the s u r p r i s e , he added that s i n c e the Russians had no s p e c i a l proposals to make, perhaps the Finns would wish to submit a d r a f t t r e a t y as a basis f o r d i s c u s s i o n . At the end of the very b r i e f and f r i e n d l y meeting, Molbtov was given a copy of a d r a f t which had been drawn up by P a a s i k i v i as a guide f o r the d e l e g a t i o n . The second meeting took place on March 30th and only l a s t e d one hour. Molotov went through the F i n n i s h d r a f t p o i n t by p o i n t , suggesting amendments to only two of them: there was no time l i m i t s p e c i f i e d i n the d r a f t , and the Sov i e t Union would be happy to extend more m i l i t a r y a i d to F i n l a n d than the d r a f t envisaged. Two of the delegates, Dr. Kekkonen and Johan Sttderhjelm, were sent to H e l s i n k i to consult w i t h P a a s i k i v i and returned to Moscow on March 4th w i t h i n s t r u c t i o n s not to accept the amendment concerning increased m i l i t a r y a i d sug-gested by Molotov. Their r e t u r n to Moscow coincided w i t h the suspension of leaves i n the F i n n i s h Army, as the only moment, of t e n s i o n experienced during the period of n e g o t i a t i o n s arose. There was no need to be nervous, however. At the f i n a l and c r u c i a l meeting, held the f o l l o w i n g day, Molotov l i s t e n e d p a t i e n t l y to Kekkonen 1s and Soderhjelm's explanations of P a a s i k i v i ' s views, and then he not only accepted them but waived.the s l i g h t concessions which were o f f e r e d . Since 259 "this was peace time", the Finnish draft as originally presented was the most suitable. 25 The Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Cooper-ation and Mutual Assistance, signed in Moscow on April 6, 194-8, in the presence of Stalin, was a curious document in view of the events which had taken place during the pre-ceding two months in a l l of the Soviet Union's European neighbour states. There was no trace in the Finnish treaty of the military clauses which had made Hungarian and Rumanian independence a matter of i l l u s i o n . In his speech at the signing ceremony, Molotov did not express the same "pro-found satisfaction" that he had spoken of in connection with 26 the signing of the Hungarian and Rumanian treaties. While he had repeatedly talked about "democratic Hungary" and;"democratic Rumania", he used no such phrase to describe Finland. A l l he could say was that the treaty constituted "an important stage in the development of Soviet-Finnish relations", and he expressed the hope that i t would "con-tribute to broad and amicable cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and Finland." 2 7 The "radical improvement" in Finnish-Soviet relations which Stalin had looked to in proposing the treaty 25 The ful l e s t account of the negotiations is given in Simmons, op. c i t . , p. 428. 26 See Molotov, Problems of Foreign Policy, pp. 556-560. 27 Ibid., pp. 563-564. 260 to Paasikivi had clearly failed to come about to the degree i t had been hoped for. Prime Minister Pekkala had good reason to express his delegation's gratitude to the Soviet Union "... for the benevolent attitude accorded our country and i t s Government during the negotiations, thanks to which i t has been possible to achieve results conducive to our ?8 particular conditions...." The all-important provision of the treaty was con-tained in Article 1: In the eventuality of Finland, or the Soviet Union through Finnish territory, becoming the object of an armed attack by Germany or any State a l l i e d with the latter, Finland w i l l , true to i t s obligations as an independent State, fight to repel the attack. Finland w i l l in such cases use a l l i t s available forces.for defending it s t e r r i t o r i a l integrity by land, sea and air, and w i l l do so within the frontiers of Finland in accordance with obligations defined in the present Agreement and, i f necessary, with the assistance of, or jointly with, the Soviet Union. In the cases aforementioned the Soviet Union w i l l give Finland the help required, the giving of which w i l l be subject to mutual agreement between the Con-tracting Parties. By Article 2, i t was agreed that the two countries should confer with each other i f i t was established that the threat of an armed attack as described in Article 1 was present. Article 3 of the 1940 Peace Treaty, which had pledged either of the contracting parties to refrain from joining any alliance or coalition directed against the other, and which had been reaffirmed in the Peace Treaty of 194-7, 28 The New York Times. April 7, 1948, p. 7. 261 was again confirmed. The Contracting parties also agreed to respect each other's sovereignty and integrity and not . to interfere in each other's internal a f f a i r s . Assurances were given of their decision to act "... in a s p i r i t of co-operation and friendship towards the further development and consolidation of economic and cultural relations...." The agreement was to remain in force for ten years rather than the twenty years which had been suggested by Molotov. Thus the treaty contained nothing new. Not even the provisions of Article 1 were really new. In connection with the signing of the Peace Treaty in 194-7, President Paasikivi had asserted that Finland would fight with a l l resources at her disposal against any aggressor seeking to strike.at the Soviet Union.across Finnish t e r r i t o r y . 2 9 A H that the new agreement did was to put that assertion down on paper. No new devices for controlling Finland's affairs were afforded the Soviet Union, which she could not already employ on the basis of suitable interpretations of existing agreements. It is indeed unlikely that that this is a l l Stalin had intended to obtain when he wrote the Finnish President on February 22nd. Something must clearly have intervened to produce a drastic change of plans. It is possible that this "something" may have been the reaction to Stalin's letter in Finland. F i r s t l y , i t was shown beyond doubt that a coup like the one carried out so smoothly in Prague could not be effected in Helsinki, and, secondly, 29 The New York Times. February 14, 1947, p. 8. 262 the F i n n i s h executive and l e g i s l a t i v e a u t h o r i t i e s demon-s t r a t e d t h a t t h e i r d e s i r e to maintain p e a c e f u l and f r i e n d l y but c o r r e c t r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Sov i e t Union was genuine and r e l i a b l e . I t would be more convenient to have the Finns cooperate w i t h the Russians of t h e i r own v o l i t i o n and under t h e i r f r e e l y chosen leaders than to impose upon them a m i n o r i t y r u l e and take the unpleasant consequences of t h e i r l a s t i n g enmity. These considerations alone, however, would ha r d l y have s u f f i c e d to h a l t the Russians i f they were det e r -mined to p u l l F i n l a n d i n behind the 'Iron C u r t a i n ' . I t i s more l i k e l y that the world r e a c t i o n to the Prague events was the f a c t o r which forced a change i n S o v i e t plans. I f the Prague coup was e f f e c t e d comparatively e a s i l y , and i f that coup could b r i n g about the commotion abroad which i t d i d -what would be the r e a c t i o n to the s u b j e c t i o n of the F i n n s , which c e r t a i n l y could not be brought about without the a c t i v e and massive i n t e r v e n t i o n by S o v i e t troops and widespread bloodshed? Pondering the answer to that question, Moscow may have decided that the p r i c e was too high i n the case of F i n l a n d . S t a l i n ' s l e t t e r had been d e l i v e r e d i n H e l s i n k i before the r e a c t i o n to the Prague coup had manifested i t s e l f , however, and i t would at l e a s t be necessary to go through the motions' of n e g o t i a t i n g w i t h the F i n n s . A show of magnanimity towards F i n l a n d would appear to be the best way of counteracting the e f f e c t s of the events In Czechoslovakia, and since no demands a t a l l would be regarded as a major concession, there was nothing to be l o s t . 263 It may never be known what caused the Soviet change of heart between February , 1 9 t h and March 2 5 t h . The reasons suggested above would, however, seem to be sensible, and they do indeed make sense when viewed against the terms of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The only indication that the Soviet Union might have considered Finland a special case from the outset was the fact that the letter inviting the Finns to negotiate was signed by Stalin himself, a procedure which one may assume was chosen in deference to Paasikivi personally rather than for any mysterious other reason. On April 2 8 t h , the Riksdag r a t i f i e d the treaty by a vote of 1 5 7 to 1 1 . A Communist-sponsored amendment which would have expanded the interpretation of the treaty's military assistance clause was defeated. So was any pos-s i b i l i t y of a Communist coup at that time as General Sihvo, acting on Paasikivi's orders, confiscated a l l automatic weapons in the possession of Leino's mobile guards and placed them in guarded bomb shelters under Helsinki's Great Church while the Riksdag debate lasted.-^ 0 On May 1 1 t h , the treaty 31 was r a t i f i e d by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet.-' 3 0 Elsa Kruse, "Finland and Tightrope Act," The Christian  Science Monitor Magazine. September 24, 1949, p. 2. 3 1 For a discussion of the juridical interpretation of the treaty, see Tauno Suontausta, "Fttrdraget mellan Finland og /sic7 Sovjetunionen," Nordisk tidsskrift for international ret, vol. 18, nos. 2-3 (1947/48), pp. 75-84. An account of the deliberations concerning the treaty in t