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T. D. Pattullo as a party leader Sutherland, Neil 1960

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T. D. PATTULLO AS A PARTY LEADER by JOHN NEIL SUTHERLAND B. A., University of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1 9 5 5 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of Graduate Studies We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , I960 In presenting t h i s thesis i n p a r t i a l fulfilment of the requirements for an advanced degree at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree that the Library s h a l l make i t f r e e l y available for reference and study. I further agree that permission for extensive copying of t h i s thesis f o r scholarly purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by his representatives. It i s understood that copying or publication of t h i s thesis for f i n a n c i a l gain s h a l l not be allowed without my written permission. Department of Graduate Studies The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 8, Canada. Date 15th A p r i l , I960. ABSTRAC T Thomas Dufferin P a t t u l l o had a distinguished career as cabinet minister, leader of the opposition and premier of B r i t i s h Columbia. Born i n Ontario, he was as a young man attracted to the Klondike gold rush and spent a number of years i n the Yukon. He l a t e r moved to Prince Rupert where he opened a business and took part i n l o c a l p o l i t i c s . Following his success i n the 1916 p r o v i n c i a l general election, P a t t u l l o was appointed, as Minister of Lands, to the new L i b e r a l cabinet of Premier Harlan C. Brewster. Under the successive premierships of Brewster, John Oliver and Dr. John Duncan MacLean he continued to hold t h i s p o s i t i o n u n t i l the L i b e r a l s were defeated i n the general e l e c t i o n of 1928. On MacLean's retirement from p o l i t i c s i n 1929, P a t t u l l o was elected House leader of the L i b e r a l party; the following year he was made i t s permanent leader. In t h i s p o s i t i o n he c a r e f u l l y and shrewdly r e b u i l t the L i b e r a l party machine which had been badly shattered i n the 1928 e l e c t i o n . Fortunately for P a t t u l l o , i t was the Conservatives, under Premier Simon Fraser Tolmie, who were f i r s t forced to contend with the problems of the economic depression of the 1930's. The depression quickly undermined the strength and morale of the Conservative government; i n 1932 Tolmie confessed h i s govern-ment's i n a b i l i t y to cope with economic conditions by offering P a t t u l l o a p o s i t i o n i n a c o a l i t i o n cabinet. P a t t u l l o , c a p i t a l -i z i n g on the Conservative's confessed ineptitude, used this o f f e r i i i to buttress the already strong image of himself as a man able and w i l l i n g to solve the province's problems. He was strongly influenced by ideas then current regarding s o c i a l change and "work and wages" became the L i b e r a l ' s slogan. / By 1933, P a t t u l l o was the dominant f i g u r | on the B r i t i s h Columbia p o l i t i c a l scene, his party's machine was the most e f f i c i e n t the province had yet seen, and h i s version of the New Deal had captured the imagination of a large proportion of the c i t i z e n s of B r i t i s h Columbia. In the p r o v i n c i a l general e l e c t i o n held i n the autumn of that year he and his L i b e r a l party d e c i s i v e l y defeated both the Conservative party and the newly-formed Cooperative Commonwealth Federation. In November, 1933, P a t t u l l o became B r i t i s h Columbia's twenty-second premier. During his f i r s t term of o f f i c e the new premier found great d i f f i c u l t y i n t r a n s l a t i n g h i s campaign promises into l e g i s l a t i v e action. Although his government enacted considerable remedial l e g i s l a t i o n , i t was unable to r a i s e the money required for the vast scheme of public works which the L i b e r a l party had promised i n the e l e c t i o n . Since they were beyond the capacity of the province by i t s e l f to f u l f i l , P a t t u l l o ' s promises needed a large measure of federal f i n a n c i a l assistance. Despite an increasingly acrimonious debate, f i r s t with R.B. Bennett and l a t e r with Mackenzie King, the premier was never able to secure federal p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n his economic schemes. In consequence, the Liberals l o s t a great deal of t h e i r early popularity. Between 1935 and 1937, t h i s loss prompted considerable r e s t i v e -ness i n the L i b e r a l party organization and some d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with Pattullo'a leadership. In these years, however, Pattullo*'s hold on the party machinery remained f a i r l y firm and there was no open challenge to his p o s i t i o n . In the spring of 1937, a fortunate combination of a general improvement i n the economic conditions i n the province with a rupture i n the C.C.F., the party which had f o r a time been expected to win the next election, encouraged Pa t t u l l o to c a l l a general e l e c t i o n . Although L i b e r a l support declined from the strength shown i n 1933, the party was again v i c t o r i o u s . In a convention c a l l e d during the following year, P a t t u l l o , c a p i t a l -i z i n g on h i s e l e c t o r a l success, made almost absolute his control over the party. During his second term, Pa t t u l l o became increasingly i n s e n s i t i v e to public opinion. He alienated much of his support i n the metropolitan areas by his handling of the "sit-down" s t r i k e of unemployed men i n Vancouver and V i c t o r i a . In 19^1, misjudging the attitude of the public toward the Report of the Rowell-Sirois Commission, he rejected i t s recommendations at the fed e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l conference c a l l e d to discuss the Report. This conduct was severely c r i t i c i z e d throughout the province. These major p o l i t i c a l errors, more minor p o l i t i c a l issues, and antagon-isms which accumulated during eight years of o f f i c e , r esulted i n the L i b e r a l party's defeat i n the general e l e c t i o n held i n October, I9I4.I. Although short of a majority i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , the L i b e r a l s managed, however, to elect more supporters than either the Conservatives or the C.C.F. V In these circumstances Pattullo decided to attempt to carry on with a minority government. He had, however, misjudged his strength within the L i b e r a l party. Personal l o y a l t y to the leader, so strong i n 1933, had been transformed through the years (In part because of his increasingly d i c t a t o r i a l manner) into a l o y a l t y which was given only to a successful office-holder. When, i n the defiance of i n s i s t e n t demands from the press, from both opposition parties and from many of h i s own supporters for the formation of a c o a l i t i o n government, P a t t u l l o refused to take such a step, h i s strength within the party faded away. Out-manoeuvred by the coalitionists.within the L i b e r a l party, he was forced by a party convention to y i e l d up his place as premier of B r i t i s h Columbia and as leader of the L i b e r a l party. His successor, John Hart, i n s t i t u t e d the c o a l i t i o n of the L i b e r a l and Conservative parties to which Pa t t u l l o had been f o r so long opposed. vi TABLE OP CONTENTS Abstract i i Table of Contents v i Acknowledgements v i i Chapter Is " P o l i t i c a l Apprenticeship" 1 Chapter I I : "Leader of the Opposition" . 15 Chapter I I I : "The F i r s t Administration" 6l Chapter IV: "The Second Administration" 9 3 Chapter V: " C o a l i t i o n and Resignation" 12l| Appendix "A": Diagramatic representation of the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Organization ll|2 Bibliography llf . 3 / ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The P a t t u l l o , Oliver, MacLean and McGeer Papers have been used with the kind permission of Mr. Wi l l a r d E. Ireland, P r o v i n c i a l Archivist-and L i b r a r i a n . The quotations from the l e t t e r s of the Rt. Hon. W. L. M. King have been used with the kind permission of h i s l i t e r a r y executors. * CHAPTER I POLITICAL APPRENTICESHIP On November 2, 1933, the c i t i z e n s of B r i t i s h Columbia went to the p o l l s . This e l e c t i o n was the climax of weeks and months of increasingly phrenetic p o l i t i c a l a c t i v i t y and the voters must have f e l t a sense of r e l i e f that the cacophony of the campaign was now at l a s t at an end. In a province which, through long and b i t t e r experience, was almost hardened to the chronic ebb and flow of prosperity, the people had seen an economic decline of previously unlmagined proportions. They had seen jobs and businesses disappear; markets and investments decline or vanish. They had seen a great p o l i t i c a l party, to which only f i v e years before they had given an overwhelming e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y , crumble and then collapse under the stress of events not of i t s making or within i t s power to control. They had seen, and many had joined, strange parties with new and r a d i c a l philosophies, which had been created i n an attempt to understand and which offered to solve the troubles of the province and to f i l l the vacuum i n the power of the state. They had seen, too, a superb p o l i t i c a l technician, Thomas Dufferin P a t t u l l o , r e b u i l d a defeated and d i s c r e d i t e d party into an e f f i c i e n t p o l i t i c a l machine. With his guidance and under h i s leadership, the L i b e r a l party had had the sagacity 2 to comprehend the universal appeal of Fra n k l i n Delano Roosevelt and the l o c a l a p p l i c a t i o n of his p o l i c i e s . Four out of every ten of these c i t i z e n s voted for P a t t u l l o , for his L i b e r a l party, and for his version of the New Deal. These four votes f a r outweighed the other s i x , which were scattered amongst a v a r i e t y of parties representing the whole p o l i t i c a l spectrum, and these four votes gave P a t t u l l o and his party three quarters of the seats In the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . One week l a t e r , Duff P a t t u l l o appeared before the Honourable J. H. Fordham-Johnson, the province's lieutenant-governor, and took his oath of o f f i c e as the twenty-second premier of B r i t i s h Columbia. The new premier was a f a m i l i a r figure to the people of the province. From the days at the f i r s t L i b e r a l v i c t o r y i n 1916, they had known him as a cabinet minister. In those years, when the L i b e r a l party had been overshadowed and dominated by the personality of John Oliver, P a t t u l l o had not yet projected himself into the status of a public figure; as yet he belonged i n the second rank of the successive L i b e r a l cabinets i n which he was included. Later, when the course of events made him the temporary leader of the party, he seized upon his opportunity, organized most of the sk e l e t a l fragments of the party machinery under his own control and, at the same time, s k i l l f u l l y used the forums of l e g i s l a t u r e , public platform, press and radio to create a sharper and more v i v i d image of himself throughout the province. This apparently sudden change from a passive to an active and co n t r o l l i n g r o l e i n a p o l i t i c a l party i s not uncommon i n p o l i t i c s , 3 and P a t t u l l o ' s e a r l i e r l i f e shows growing p o t e n t i a l character-i s t i c s which were merely awaiting the r i g h t combination of events to demonstrate t h e i r k i n e t i c q u a l i t i e s . Thomas Dufferin P a t t u l l o , the son of George Robson P a t t u l l o and Mary Rounds P a t t u l l o , was born on January 19, 1873, i n Woodstock, Ontario. Apparently George Robson P a t t u l l o had some standing i n the communityj at least he was f r i e n d l y with the 1 family of William Lyon Mackenzie King and had been an o f f i c e r of the Dufferin and Haldimand R i f l e s , a regiment with i t s head-2 quarters i n Brantford, Ontario. T. D. P a t t u l l o attended high school i n Woodstock but h i s papers do not make clear whether or not he completed the f u l l course. While s t i l l i n h i s early twenties, he became interested i n p o l i t i c s and for some time he was the editor of the Gait Reformer, a L i b e r a l newspaper owned 3 by James Young, a p o l i t i c a l associate of S i r Oliver Mowat. The news of the Klondike gold discovery i n I 8 9 6 attracted h i s attention; before the year was out he moved to the Yukon. The dapper young P a t t u l l o (he wore white flannels on the streets of Dawson) found success of two kinds i n the Yukon. In 1 8 9 7 , he 1 William Lyon Mackenzie King to Thomas Dufferin P a t t u l l o , Ij. November 1933, P r o v i n c i a l Archives of B r i t i s h Columbia (hereafter referred to as PABC), P a t t u l l o Papers. Except where otherwise stated, a l l references i n t h i s thesis are to the P a t t u l l o Papers. 2 P a t t u l l o to O f f i c e r Commanding £6 LAA Regiment, R.C.A. (The Dufferin and Haldimand R i f l e s ) , Brantford, Ontario, 2 March 1950. 3 Typescript of a speech to a L i b e r a l party group, 22 A p r i l 191+9. was appointed secretary to the Yukon Commissioner, and the next year he was made the t e r r i t o r y ' s Assistant Gold Commissioner. In November 1899, he married L i l l i a n Reidmaster, an American from Toledo, Ohio. In 1901, P a t t u l l o resigned h i s c i v i l service p o s i t i o n and opened, i n partnership with J. Radford, a brokerage and f i n a n c i a l business i n Dawson. In It s early years, the partner-ship prospered, and, i n 1908, P a t t u l l o opened another o f f i c e for the firm i n Prince Rupert. P a t t u l l o invested heavily i n the land boom i n Prince Rupert which accompanied the building of the Grand Trunk P a c i f i c Railway, and suffered heavy losses when t h i s boom k collapsed just before the F i r s t World War. In 1915, the partners divided the business, Radford r e t a i n i n g the o f f i c e i n Dawson and 5 P a t t u l l o that i n Prince Rupert. In the north he had continued his interest i n p o l i t i c s ; at various times he served as alderman i n both Dawson and Prince Rupert and was once mayor of Prince 6 Rupert• Sometime during the winter of 19li|.-l5, P a t t u l l o decided to enter B r i t i s h Columbia p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s . At that time, the power of the Conservative government of S i r Richard McBride appeared to be weakening. The L i b e r a l party had high hopes of k P a t t u l l o to J . B. P a t t u l l o , 2lf. February 1915. 5 P a t t u l l o to J. B. P a t t u l l o , 17 September 1915. 6 The information on P a t t u l l o ' s l i f e p r i o r to 1915, other than that s p e c i f i c a l l y acknowledged, i s taken from P a t t u l l o to World  Biography, 22 May 1952, and P a t t u l l o to Canadian Who's Who, n.d. 5 replacing the Conservatives as the government of the province, and P a t t u l l o f e l t that he not only had a very good chance of being elected for the Prince Rupert constituency but also of being included i n the L i b e r a l cabinet. He campaigned vigourously and continuously from early i n 1915 u n t i l the e l e c t i o n , i n September, 1916. The time which he spent campaigning, combined with the adverse ef f e c t on his business interests of the war-time depression i n Prince Rupert, seri o u s l y affected his f i n a n c i a l 7 p o s i t i o n . But a turn for the better appeared to be i n the o f f i n g when the L i b e r a l s won the election, and he himself Q defeated h i s Conservative opponent by 116 votes. The new L i b e r a l Premier, Harlan C. Brewster, appointed Pattullo to the cabinet as Minister of Lands, and he continued to hold t h i s p o r t f o l i o i n the l a t e r L i b e r a l cabinets of Premier John Oliver and Premier John Duncan MacLean. Most of P a t t u l l o ' s experience as a minister was obtained i n the Oliver cabinet, since Premier Brewster died suddenly i n March, 1918, and Oliver's successor, Dr. MacLean, was defeated i n July, 1928, less than a year a f t e r he became premier. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the cabinet of John Oliver, P a t t u l l o does not seem to have belonged to the inner group which advised 7 P a t t u l l o to J. B. P a t t u l l o , 21]. February 1915, 23 A p r i l 1915, 3 July 1915, 10 September 1915, 17 September 1915, 15 October 1915, 20 October 1915, 2 November 1915, 15 January 1916, 3 February 1916, 10 March 1916, 2l+ March 1916, and 7 A p r i l 1916. 8 A.L. Normandin (ed.), The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1917, (hereafter CPG), Ottawa, Mortimer Company Limited, 1917, P» i]35» 6 the premier on p o l i t i c a l strategy. The Attorney-General, J . ¥. deB. P a r r i s , appears to have been Oliver's p r i n c i p a l advisor; following P a r r i s ' retirement the future premier, Dr. MacLean, held t h i s p o s i t i o n . As a member of the Oliver cabinet, P a t t u l l o spent his time rebuilding the Department of Lands, a department which had been sadly neglected i n the l a s t years of the Conservative government, and establishing his reputation as an able and e f f i c i e n t administrator. A cabinet colleague of t h i s period pays P a t t u l l o the compliment that he was the most e f f i c i e n t 9 administrator the province had yet had, and a f r i e n d r e c a l l s that "Duff would a r r i v e about a quarter to nine and would know by t e n - t h i r t y what was going on i n every phase of the Department 10 of Lands." In his appearances on the f l o o r of the l e g i s l a t u r e , P a t t u l l o did not yet give any i n d i c a t i o n of the o r a t o r i c a l prowess which he l a t e r displayed. Some years l a t e r , Bruce Hutchison wrote that P a t t u l l o sat: i n the rear row of the treasury benches and was one of the lea s t a r t i c u l a t e voices i n that long-lived ministry. He spoke rapidly...nervously and j e r k i l y , the words tumbling over themselves. But that didn't matter much because the deep bellow of old John Oliver, l i k e the bay of a wounded bear, drowned out nearly everything that came from the back treasury benches.11 9 Senator J . W. deB. P a r r i s , Interview with the writer, 15 September 1958. 10 H. P. Hodges, Interview with the writer, 26 August 1956. 11 Bruce Hutchison i n V i c t o r i a Times, 10 March 1936. 7 In these years, P a t t u l l o ' s p o l i t i c a l r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s were confined to a general supervision of the organization of the northern r i d i n g s . ^ In his own constituency he maintained an e f f i c i e n t organization, f r e e l y spending campaign funds so that i t would remain that way. In the e l e c t i o n of 1 9 2 0 , when L i b e r a l party expenditures i n most constituencies were i n the neighbourhood of one thousand to two thousand d o l l a r s , those i n Prince Rupert reached the figure of eight thousand d o l l a r s , only to be exceeded by the combined t o t a l f or a l l the ridings i n 1 3 Vancouver c i t y . Prom Pa t t u l l o ' s point of view, the money would appear to have been wel l Invested, f o r he was re-elected with comfortable margins i n the elections of 1 9 2 0 , 192i|., and even i n 1928, when Simon Praser Tolmie defeated the L i b e r a l government of Dr. MacLean. The L i b e r a l defeat i n the 1928 e l e c t i o n was one of the most decisive events i n P a t t u l l o 1 s l i f e , f o r i t provided him with the opportunity to become party leader. Premier MacLean had been opt i m i s t i c about the outcome of the e l e c t i o n , which would be h i s 111. f i r s t as leader of the party. But the premier, offering no new programme to in s p i r e the voters, chose to run on the record of twelve years of L i b e r a l government. Not u n t i l the l a s t days of 12 J. D. MacLean to John Oliver, July 1920, PABC, Oliver Papers. 1 3 "Cost of general elections as shown by d i s t r i c t s , " December, 1920, I b i d . 2l\. John Duncan MacLean to D. W. Sutherland, 20 January 1928, PABC, MacLean Papers. 8 the campaign d i d he f e e l any necessity to add new members to his cabinet to give i t wider representation. In the e l e c t i o n the Lib e r a l s were repudiated; the premier himself l o s t h is r i d i n g of 15 Yale, and only four of his cabinet colleagues were re-elected. Two main reasons underlay the defeat of the MacLean government. Except i n i t s 1916 v i c t o r y , the L i b e r a l party had never achieved an o v e r - a l l majority of the popular vote, and i t s share had st e a d i l y declined from $0fo i n 1916 to 39$ i n 1920, and 32% i n I92I4.. In 1920 and 192q. the Li b e r a l s had been re-elected because t h e i r opposition was divided into a number of s p l i n t e r p a r t i e s . This condition had been p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n the e l e c t i o n of 192ij.. In 1923, a f t e r his f a i l u r e to replace ¥. J. Bowser as p r o v i n c i a l Conservative leader, General A.D. McRae l e f t the Conservative, party and, with the support of dissident groups, founded the P r o v i n c i a l party. This new party elected only three members i n the 192lj. election, but i t s candidates attracted Z\% 15 The el e c t i o n changed the r e l a t i v e standing of the parties i n the following manner: BEFORE ELECTION AFTER ELECTION Libe r a l s 23 12 Conservatives 17 35 Labour 3 1 P r o v i n c i a l Party 3 Independent 1 •» Vacant 1 -CPG, 1930, PP. 365-366. 16 A. M. Manson to B. Nicholas, V i c t o r i a Times, PABC, MacLean Papers. 9 of the vote. Soon afte r t h i s election, Bowser resigned as Conservative leader and his resignation provided the occasion fo r a re-union of the Conservative party. This was accomplished with the e l e c t i o n of Dr. Tolmie as party leader, for h i s candidacy had the support of both Conservative f a c t i o n s . The Conservative vote, which had declined from k0% i n 1916, to 3l{.$ i n 1920 and 30$ i n 192i|., rose to 53$ i n 1928. While most persons who had supported the P r o v i n c i a l party i n 192J| voted f o r the Conservatives i n 1928, a small proportion of them voted f o r the L i b e r a l s , and the L i b e r a l share .of the popular vote rose from 32$ i n I92I4. to -1 Q lj.0$ i n 1928. The popular desire f o r a change of government also influenced the L i b e r a l defeat i n 1928. The party had ruled f o r almost twelve years of very uneven economic conditions i n the province. John Oliver, whose name at one time was synonymous with Liberalism i n B r i t i s h Columbia, was succeeded by the e f f i c i e n t but colourless Dr. MacLean. MacLean was opposed by a strong and united Conservative party under an apparently vigourous new leader. Despite MacLean's optimism about the outcome, the only r e a l l y surprising feature of the e l e c t i o n was 17 A f u l l account of the P r o v i n c i a l party and McRae's connec-t i o n with i t can be found i n Margaret A. Ormsby, "The United Farmers of B r i t i s h Columbia — an abortive t h i r d party movement," B r i t i s h Columbia H i s t o r i c a l Quarterly, v o l . 17 (January-April, 1953), PP. 53-73. 18 With the exception of those already c i t e d , the percentages included i n t h i s paragraph are based on s t a t i s t i c s found i n CPG-, 1930, pp. 365-366 and B r i t i s h Columbia, Statement of votes  by e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s : general e l e c t i o n 1928, V i c t o r i a , King's Pri n t e r , 1928, p. 60. 10 that the L i b e r a l s were able to increase s l i g h t l y t h e i r share of the popular vote. At f i r s t i t was thought that the defeated premier, despite his lack of a seat i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , would continue to act as p r o v i n c i a l leader of the L i b e r a l party. It was considered, however, that i f MacLean did decide to r e t i r e the man with the best chance of succeeding him, at l e a s t as house leader of the 1 9 party was, T. D. P a t t u l l o . P a t t u l l o was c e r t a i n l y the strongest figure of the four surviving ministers: A. M. Manson, former Attorney-General; Dr. W. H. Sutherland, former Minister of Public Works; Ian MacKenzie, who had been appointed P r o v i n c i a l Secretary two weeks before the e l e c t i o n ; and P a t t u l l o . In October, MacLean ' 20 announced that he intended to r e t i r e from p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c s , and i n January, 1929, he was appointed to the Federal Farm Loan 21 Commission. In January, 1929, a caucus of the twelve remaining L i b e r a l members met to pick a House leader for the forthcoming session of the l e g i s l a t u r e . On January 19, i t elected P a t t u l l o to t h i s p o s i t i o n and.the choice was confirmed at a meeting of the 22 P r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Executive on January 21. 19 J . C a s t e l l Hopkins, The Canadian Annual Review of Public A f f a i r s , 1928-29, (hereafter CAR), Toronto, Canadian Review Company Limited, 1929, p. 508; and Vancouver Province, 23 July 1928, p. 1. 20 Province, 28 October 1928, p. 1. 21 CAR, 1928-29, p. 508. 22 Loc. c i t . II Ordinarily, the p o s i t i o n of House leader i s a temporary appoint-ment. The party selects a person to co-ordinate the work of the members and to maintain party d i s c i p l i n e u n t i l a permanent leader i s chosen. P a t t u l l o , however, did not regard his appointment i n t h i s way, and immediately set to work to ensure that his temporary leadership was made permanent. The new L i b e r a l House leader quickly demonstrated to the public the q u a l i t i e s that had made him the choice of h i s fellow members of the l e g i s l a t u r e . P o l i t i c a l success had continually strengthened the self-confidence that had always been a strong personal c h a r a c t e r i s t i c . The area between self-assurance and vanity i s a narrow one and there was a measure of t r u t h i n h i s opponent's charges, p a r t i c u l a r l y a f t e r he became premier, that he was v a i n and i n c l i n e d to arrogance. Humility i s not, however, a t r a i t found i n many successful p o l i t i c a l leaders, and there was l i t t l e of i t i n P a t t u l l o . This self-esteem was r e f l e c t e d i n h i s clothes; the province soon became f a m i l i a r with the short, immaculately dressed, rotund figure of the leader. He was a favourite subject for k i n d l y caricature i n newspaper cartoons, but he generally saw the humour himself and took the jibes of opponents and cartoonists without rancour. He could not conceal his changing moods which were mirrored i n h i s round, puckish face: indignation, amusement, anger, embarrassment, and pride were e a s i l y v i s i b l e there, often a l l i n the space of a short time. He had also generosity and charm, and was given to s u r p r i s i n g l y kind l y gestures. Once, much to the prime minister's surprise, 12 he sent red roses to R. B. Bennett on his birthday. P a t t u l l o l i k e d and soon became accustomed to l i v i n g I i n the grand manner; he b u i l t a large and comfortable waterfront' house at Oak Bay; he had his suits f i t t e d i n New York; and he enjoyed playing the genial host at elaborate dinners i n the / Empress Hotel. He held few p o l i t i c a l animosities, and to these dinners he usually i n v i t e d opposing p o l i t i c i a n s and newspapermen as well as his p o l i t i c a l supporters and personal f r i e n d s . He l i k e d to t r a v e l , and his frequent t r i p s to Ottawa usually took him to Montreal and New York as wel l . He derived much pleasure from h i s meetings with the great and near-great; while he was premier, much to the chagrin of Prime Minister Mackenzie King, he v i s i t e d President Roosevelt at Hyde Park and at the White House, and on these occasions he adopted almost the manner of a head-of-state. He was delighted when the president returned h i s v i s i t s and also l a t e r when King George VI and Queen Elizabeth v i s i t e d the province. Pa t t u l l o ' s talents as an able and e f f i c i e n t administ-rator, f i r s t noticed while he was Minister of Lands, also characterized h i s handling of party and, l a t e r , governmental a f f a i r s . He had the a b i l i t y to select good assistants and ministers and from them he drew t h e i r best work. P a r t i c u l a r l y i n the early years of his government the cabinet had an admirable e s p r i t de corps, and the r e l a t i o n s between the leader and most of his l e g i s l a t i v e supporters were generally c o r d i a l . 1 3 P a t t u l l o ' s p o l i t i c a l philosophy was e s s e n t i a l l y pragmatic. He was a c a p i t a l i s t i n the sense that he believed that most of the means of production should remain under private ownership. His main concern, however, was with the welfare of the i n d i v i d u a l . He believed that the state had the r i g h t and the duty to intervene i n business a f f a i r s , both to protect the i n d i v i d u a l from want and from the predatory i n s t i n c t of some businesses, and to encourage the greater development of the country. Development of the province's economic p o t e n t i a l , P a t t u l l o f e l t , was the best way to a s s i s t the i n d i v i d u a l , for i t gave him the opportunity to provide f o r himself. Pattullo's views are well expressed i n a l e t t e r which he x^ote soon a f t e r he became p r o v i n c i a l premiert S c i e n t i f i c discovery and invention have made possible and brought about a higher standard of l i v i n g for an ever-increasing number of our people. It i s useless to say that we must get back to the old days of the simple l i f e . The great majority of our people simply w i l l do nothing of the kind, and no amount of argument w i l l induce them so to do. Nor do I think that there i s any reason why they should. A higher standard of l i v i n g having been made possible there should follow opportunity for an ever-Increasing percentage of our people to r i s e to these standards, not f o r the purpose of over-indulgence but for the greater enjoyment of the d a i l y pursuit, for l e i s u r e and for c u l t u r a l development...Invention having made possible over-production with everybody working along the old l i n e s , i t follows that we must have a shorter work day with more people employed, yet at a standard of wage that w i l l y i e l d a comfortable subsistence.23 In January, 1929, Pattullo approached his new p o s i t i o n with his customary i n t e r e s t , enthusiasm and capacity for hard 23 P a t t u l l o to King, 9 August 1 9 3 ^ . Ik work. I f he was at a l l discouraged by the magnitude of the task, this f e e l i n g was well hidden from both the public and his party supporters. CHAPTER II LEADER OP THE OPPOSITION The immediate task which P a t t u l l o set himself, a f t e r his e l e c t i o n as House leader of the L i b e r a l party, was to secure the p o s i t i o n of permanent leader of the party. In order to achieve this aim i t would be necessary to r e b u i l d the badly shattered party organization and, i n order to guarantee a degree of success i n the next p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , the organization would have to be r e b u i l t quickly. As i t turned out, he had an unforeseen a l l y i n economic conditions - conditions which even-t u a l l y brought about the almost complete d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l Conservative government and party. But to a t t r i b u t e the success of the L i b e r a l party i n the 1933 e l e c t i o n only to economic conditions and Conservative ineptitude would be very unfair to P a t t u l l o . By 1933, there was no doubt that the Conservative government would be d e c i s i v e l y defeated i n the forthcoming e l e c t i o n . It was not nearly so certain, however, that the L i b e r a l s would take the Conservatives' place, and t h e i r eventual success i n doing so must be attributed mainly to the work of P a t t u l l o while he was the leader of the opposition. One motive f o r Pat t u l l o * s great haste to r e b u i l d the party and return i t to o f f i c e was his age. The p o s i t i o n of the L i b e r a l party leader In 1929 was unenviable f o r i f the normal 16> pattern of party p o l i t i c s i n B r i t i s h Columbia prevailed following the Conservative v i c t o r y i n 1928, he could expect to spend at le a s t two and possibly three terms, or eight to twelve years, i n opposition. In 1929, Pa t t u l l o was already 55 years old. His age was therefore a major d i s a b i l i t y to him for, i f he was to be i n opposition f o r two or three terms, he would be at least 63, and probably 67 or 68, before he could hope to be premier. By June, 1930, however, when he was elected permanent party leader, (1.^ P a t t u l l o had amply demonstrated vigourous powers of leadership jlf^ and, further, had the party machinery f i r m l y i n hand. Pa t t u l l o was charged with the task of managing a very complex organization. T r a d i t i o n a l l y , p o l i t i c a l p arties tend to keep the facts and figures of t h e i r organizations as cl o s e l y guarded as they can, and l i t t l e of important business proceedings and discussions are recorded. It i s , however, possible to reconstruct from the available records a f a i r semblance of the organization of the L i b e r a l party as i t existed i n 1929. The main L i b e r a l body i n B r i t i s h Columbia was the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association. This included the powerful Executive committee, the Organization committee, and, l a t e r , the Finance committee. Beneath this Association were federal and p r o v i n c i a l constituency associations, l o c a l L i b e r a l associations, and various a f f i l i a t e d groups such as the Young L i b e r a l and the Women's L i b e r a l organizations. In some areas, also, there were l o c a l L i b e r a l agents. Together with t h i s o f f i c i a l organization but i n part, at l e a s t , separated from i t , was what might be c a l l e d 17 the party leader's personal organization. This body consisted of the party organizer, ostensibly appointed by the Executive, but i n fact the personal choice of the leader; the o f f i c e s t a f f j and various friends and p o l i t i c a l acquaintances i n a l l parts of the province who reported d i r e c t l y to P a t t u l l o . Generally, a l l these segments of the organization worked together i n close harmony. There were, however, occasions when differences between them did a r i s e , and i n th e i r r e s o l u t i o n the party leader's voice seems to have been the decisive influence. The B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association was organized i n a fashion d i f f e r e n t from most province-wide associations i n that, except under c e r t a i n conditions, i t consisted of only i t s executive o f f i c e r s and executive committees. According to i t s constitution, the Association met "every three years at such times and place as the Executive s h a l l d i r e c t ; " but when these meetings were over, " a l l members, except such as are o f f i c e r s . . . and e x - o f f i c i o members s h a l l ipso facto cease to be members of 2 the Association." The B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association, therefore, existed only from the time when the Executive of that body c a l l e d f o r a meeting and those who were duly authorized to select i t s members made a choice u n t i l the meeting to which they were summoned was adjourned. With the exception of an emergency meeting, i t ceased to function f o r a period of three years. 1 "Constitution: B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association," n.d., a r t i c l e 1I4.. 2 Ibid., a r t i c l e 32. 18 During the whole time when P a t t u l l o was i n opposition, i t met but twice: i n June, 1930 to ele c t P a t t u l l o as permanent party-leader, and i n the autumn of 1932 to adopt the e l e c t i o n platform of the party. The membership of the Association consisted of f i f t y delegates from Vancouver, f o r t y from V i c t o r i a and one delegate "for every f i v e hundred voters or major portion thereof on the 3 l a s t revised l i s t of voters....' from the other constituencies. " L i b e r a l Members of the l o c a l Legislature and of the Parliament of Canada from B r i t i s h Columbia and a l l unsuccessful L i b e r a l k candidates at the l a s t e l e c t i o n . . . . " were e x - o f f i c i o members. The Association members were selected by the D i s t r i c t Associations or, i f such did not exist i n a p a r t i c u l a r r i d i n g , by the various l o c a l Associations i n the constituency. The powers of the Association were severely l i m i t e d . One a r t i c l e of the consti t u t i o n provided that the meeting of the Association could not debate "any re s o l u t i o n a f f e c t i n g the general p o l i c y of the L i b e r a l Party" u n t i l i t had f i r s t been referred. 6 "without debate thereon, to the Committee on Resolutions...." Another a r t i c l e stated that any "motion...proposed to amend the 3 "Constitution: B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association," a r t i c l e 16. k Ibid., a r t i c l e 17. 5* Ibid., a r t i c l e 18. 6 Ibid., a r t i c l e 26. 1 9 Constitution s h a l l f i r s t be referre d without debate thereon to 7 a special committee...." Such committees were appointed by the chairman, who was also the president of the Association. Time was therefore provided for reasoned counsel to p r e v a i l over any sudden challenge to authority or moment of aberration on the part of the membership. Only a determined and well-organized group, commanding a majority of the membership, could change the course of the Executive's well-planned agenda. The leader, then, who commanded the support of the majority of the Executive controlled, almost absolutely, the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Association. P a t t u l l o held t h i s control from before the f i r s t convention held under his leadership i n 1930 u n t i l the spe c i a l convention of 19^1. The meetings of the Association took the form of conventions and, with the exception of those c a l l e d to elect a new party leader, were generally convened just before an e l e c t i o n . The purposes of these pre-election conventions were to adopt, i n the l i g h t of as much p u b l i c i t y as possible, the leader's previously prepared platform, and to stimulate the rank-and-file members into a determined e f f o r t f o r the campaign. The Executive Committee of the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association consisted of the Association's o f f i c e r s and "the President of each Federal and P r o v i n c i a l D i s t r i c t L i b e r a l Association...;" Vancouver and V i c t o r i a respectively were e n t i t l e d 7 "Constitution: B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association," a r t i c l e 2 7 . 20 to s i x and four extra members. The Committee also included " L i b e r a l Senators, L i b e r a l members of the House of Commons, L i b e r a l members of the P r o v i n c i a l Legislature and L i b e r a l candidates... 9 who were unsuccessful i n the l a s t e l e c t i o n . " The Executive Committee of the Association had the power to "transact a l l business of the Association except such...expressly reserved to . ,1° the Association i n general meeting." The powers expressly reserved i n the constit u t i o n to the whole Association were a c t u a l l y very few i n number, the most important being the e l e c t i o n of o f f i c e r s and amendment of the constitution. The Executive Committee, at least on paper, therefore, had the r e a l power i n the L i b e r a l party i n B r i t i s h Columbia; consequently a wise leader attempted to gain control of the Executive Committee. The lower lev e l s of the organization consisted of the Federal and P r o v i n c i a l d i s t r i c t associations, which were sub-ordinate to the P r o v i n c i a l Association; beneath these were the l o c a l associations, subordinate i n turn to the d i s t r i c t 11 associations. A f f i l i a t e d groups, such as the Young L i b e r a l and the Women's L i b e r a l associations, were generally attached to the d i s t r i c t associations, though on occasion they were sub-groups 8 "Constitution: B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association," a r t i c l e 3a» 9 Ibid., a r t i c l e 3 d . 10 Ibid., a r t i c l e 11 . 11 I b i d . t a r t i c l e s 33 and 35 . 21 of l o c a l associations. In addition, i n areas too small to have an organization, the party usually attempted to appoint L i b e r a l E l e c t i o n Commissioners whose r e s p o n s i b i l i t y was to place on the voters' l i s t s the names of l o c a l c i t i z e n s , p a r t i c u l a r l y those whom the commissioner thought might be i n c l i n e d to vote f o r the 12 party i n the next e l e c t i o n . The leader's personal organization was situated i n the Pr o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Headquarters which, during the period when Pat t u l l o was leader of the opposition, was located i n V i c t o r i a . This organization was under the d i r e c t control of the leader and was managed by the P r o v i n c i a l Organizer. Its function, according to Major J. S. Moodie, the P r o v i n c i a l Organizer, was to "serve as a clearing-house for the problems of L i b e r a l Associations and L i b e r a l s . . . " and to "encourage, guide and co-operate i n the work 13 of organization throughout the province." In f a c t , i n the years 1929 to 1933, t h i s central o f f i c e controlled the party. Prom i t poured a steady stream of l e t t e r s and publications. These, together with the v i s i t s of the leader and the organizer directed the ef f o r t s of a l l i n the party toward the ultimate goal of e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y . It i s almost Impossible to estimate even approximately how many members belonged to the L i b e r a l party during t h i s period. 1 2 See appendix "A." f o r a diagramatic representation of the L i b e r a l party organization i n B r i t i s h Columbia. 13 Major J. S. Moodie, "Memorandum on organization e s s e n t i a l to party success" (hereafter "Memo."), 2lj. September 1930. 22 P o l i t i c a l p arties f i n d that, except at e l e c t i o n time, the member-ship remains quite small. The rank-and-file membership of a party represents only a very small portion of those who generally profess to be of one or another p o l i t i c a l persuasion, and the greater part of t h i s small group i s attracted only at the time of an e l e c t i o n . Edith Dobie's comment on the p o l i t i c a l p arties of B r i t i s h Columbia as they existed i n the early 1930's can be considered at l e a s t p a r t i a l l y v a l i d : the officeholders, the presidents of l o c a l and p r o v i n c i a l associations and t h e i r executive Committees, members of P r o v i n c i a l and Dominion parliaments, and d i s t r i c t leaders were the party. It was they who came together i n Association meetings and conventions to name candidates for o f f i c e and to determine which party men must be given consideration, which might with safety be temporarily neglected.II4. Nevertheless, i n September, 1930, there existed two hundred 15 f o r t y L i b e r a l associations of one v a r i e t y or another. Since membership i n p o l i t i c a l organizations generally declines sharply immediately following an e l e c t i o n (and p a r t i c u l a r l y following a defeat) i t would be f a i r to assume that t h i s t o t a l would represent neither the minimum (which would have existed early In 1929), nor the maximum (which would have existed i n the autumn of 1933) , but the basic strength upon which P a t t u l l o would have to b u i l d for the next e l e c t i o n . Edith Dobie, "Party h i s t o r y i n B r i t i s h Columbia," P a c i f i c  Northwest Quarterly, v o l . 27 ( A p r i l , 1936), p. 156. 15 "Memo.?' l o c . c i t . 2 3 Miss Dobie has succinctly stated the aims of the L i b e r a l organization of t h i s period (and perhaps of a l l Canadian p o l i t i c a l parties of any period). These aims were "to get out the vote that made o f f i c e possible and to share and d i s t r i b u t e 16 the rewards of o f f i c e . " Major Moddie outlined the f i r s t of these goals i n more d e t a i l . To him, the es s e n t i a l tasks of the organization were: (a) To see that a l l q u a l i f i e d persons f r i e n d l y to the L i b e r a l cause are duly enrolled as Pr o v i n c i a l voters; (b) To see that as large a proportion as possible of such voters turn out on e l e c t i o n day; (c) To provide as complete p u b l i c i t y as possible for the views of the L i b e r a l party, and the shortcomings of our opponents, through the press, through c i r c u l a r i z a t i o n of the electorate, and through personal propaganda.17 The many branches of the L i b e r a l organization i n B r i t i s h Columbia were constantly directed toward the ful f i l m e n t of these tasks. The work of e n r o l l i n g the sympathetic voter was carr i e d out vigourously by both P a t t u l l o and Moodie. They faced many d i f f i c u l t i e s i n keeping an up-to-date voter's l i s t ; "the scattered nature of settlement i n many parts, and the...principal industries...£which3 keep a large number of persons continually moving from point to point" were tremendous obstacles. The method which they employed was to divide "the province into the smallest practicable units, with some person, or persons, 18 d e f i n i t e l y i n charge of each unit." These persons were made 16 Dobie,loo, c i t . 17 "Memo.", l o c . c i t . 18 Loc. c i t . 2k p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n commissioners, given a booklet by L i b e r a l headquarters, and instructed to "watch those who leave the area,| or move into i t , young persons coming of age, persons to be 19 naturalized, or persons deceased." As a detailed task with this scope could not be carried out s a t i s f a c t o r i l y on the eve of an e l e c t i o n , i t was necessary that the l i s t s be kept up-to-date at a l l times. This system was to be followed i n both r u r a l and urban areas. In the c i t i e s the volunteer worker was to have the assistance of a number of paid organizers who were to work i n the rooming house d i s t r i c t s where there was a constantly s h i f t i n g population, and among workers i n the leading i n d u s t r i e s . The l o c a l L i b e r a l Associations who worked under the general d i r e c t i o n of t h e i r d i s t r i c t Association had the main r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r this work. In f a c t , P a t t u l l o and Moodie supervised t h e i r e f f o r t s from t h e i r V i c t o r i a o f f i c e . In areas where no L i b e r a l organization existed the central o f f i c e , through the l o c a l member i f he were a L i b e r a l or through the p o l i t i c a l friends and acquaintances made i n the area by either the leader or the organizer, arranged to have L i b e r a l agents appointed. The L i b e r a l o f f i c e also endeavoured to have a single person, under whose general d i r e c t i o n the work i n the area could be co-ordinated, responsible for the Voter's L i s t i n each r i d i n g . The campaign to keep the Voters' L i s t s current began i n June, 1929 and continued throughout Pattullo's term as 19 Loc. c i t . 25 opposition leader. In June, 1929 P a t t u l l o wrote to a l l L i b e r a l members, l o c a l and d i s t r i c t presidents and secretaries, and any] other person who might help i n t h i s work reminding them "to keep a watchful eye upon the Voters' L i s t , with the interests of our 20 party i n view." Competitions between d i s t r i c t s for the greatest percentage increase followed and, during periods when i t was f e l t that elections were imminent, further l e t t e r s and telegrams were sent out to the membership to encourage greater e f f o r t . In 1930, Mr. A. M. Manson urged that Moodie "should get the Federal returns f o r each p o l l i n the province, and they 21 should be segregated into P r o v i n c i a l constituencies." This was done, and i n January 1931, because he f e l t an e l e c t i o n would be / c a l l e d very soon, Pa t t u l l o sent a l e t t e r to every constituency / i n the province o u t l i n i n g i n d e t a i l the extent to which the p r o v i n c i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n was lower than the federal i n the p a r t i c u l a r r i d i n g . P a t t u l l o then asked the constituency represen-tatives "to write to me and advise me of the number of d i s t r i c t s i n which you have divided the constituency, and the names of each in d i v i d u a l i n charge of each precinct." Further, he required that he "be advised each week of the number of names added i n 22 each d i s t r i c t . " The p r v i n c i a l r e g i s t r a t i o n was considerably lower than the federal i n most d i s t r i c t s and i n some the 20 P a t t u l l o to Dr. H. C. Wrinch, M.L.A. f o r Skeena, 20 June 1929. 21 Manson to P a t t u l l o , 30 July 1930. 22 P a t t u l l o to C. H. Tupper, Penticton, 26 January 1931. 26 difference was large enough to alarm the leaders. In Vancouver, for example, "an analysis of the vote in the July, 1930 ^federal general] election disclosed that some 51,000 persons voted in 23 Vancouver city; only some 33,000 voted In 1928." In i t s various drives the party managed to enroll a large number of voters in most constituencies. In Vancouver V. J. Creeden reported to Pattullo In A p r i l , 1931 that a campaign started in January of that year resulted " i n the neighbourhood of 20,000 voters...registered i n Vancouver city 2k alone and a total of about 25,000 in Greater Vancouver." Another extensive effort to increase the registration began in /r May, 1932 when the subject was discussed and the local leader- \ 25) ship was exhorted to further efforts at an Executive meeting. In addition to their work i n Victoria, both Pattullo and Moodie made extensive tours of the whole province. Their aim, on these tours, was to strengthen the organization and to encour-age the local associations to increase their efforts to register sympathetic voters. Moodie stated that: It is my experience that i t is absolutely necessary to attend certain meetings in order to bring home the urgent necessity of the work which has been suggested to Liberal Associations by letter...In addition to the practical necessity of occasional v i s i t s , there is the fact not to be overlooked that Liberals of outlying districts expect some attention 23 "Memo.", loc. c i t . 2i|. V. J. Creeden to Pattullo, 7 April 1931. 25 Pattullo to Wrinch, 11 May 1932. 27 from headquarters, and are very c r i t i c a l when no / one v i s i t s them and consults with them.26 Patt u l l o made i t a practice to undertake extensive province-wide tours i n alternate years, and he made special v i s i t s to s p e c i f i c areas i n the other years. The f i r s t of these tours was made i n 1929. At i t s conclusion he reported that " I have been covering pretty well the whole Province, and I think that with a l i t t l e e f f o r t we can have a quite worth while organ-27 i z a t i o n before the next p r o v i n c i a l campaign." In 1930, Moodie did most of the touring. He v i s i t e d s p e c i f i c l o c a l associations, organized areas where by-elections were imminent, and handled delicate matters f o r P a t t u l l o . " I am sending Moodie to the Comox d i s t r i c t tomorrow to sound out the s i t u a t i o n there. The s i t u a t i o n i s a delicate one, and w i l l require nursing," P a t t u l l o 28 reported on one occasion. P a t t u l l o made 1931 another year of extensive v i s i t i n g . This time he held a considerably larger number of public meetings than he attempted i n 1929, when his main e f f o r t s had been concen-trated on strengthening the organization. About the middle of t h i s month I am leaving to cover the whole of Vancouver Island...in June w i l l cover the Praser Valley; July and August, a l l northern B.C., including Peace River; September 2 q and October, Columbia, Okanagan and Kootenay Valleys." " 26 "Memo.", l o c . c i t . 27 P a t t u l l o to Wrinch, II4. November 1929. 28 Pa t t u l l o to Manson, 18 A p r i l 1932. The quarrel concerned L. A. Hanna, the L i b e r a l M.L.A. for the d i s t r i c t . See P a t t u l l o to Hanna, 20 June 1931. 29 P a t t u l l o to Manson, 7 May 1931. 2 6 A f t e r his v i s i t s to Vancouver Island and the Fraser Valley, P a t t u l l o reported that he had "held some eighteen meetings....," and "never heretofore seen public i n t e r e s t so keen on govern-30 mental a f f a i r s as at the present time." The L i b e r a l leader made s i m i l a r comments on his t r i p s to the other parts of the province. In 1932 P a t t u l l o made fewer v i s i t s . He pointed out that " l a s t year was a year of meetings, th i s year w i l l be one of 31 intensive organization." In 1933, however, when the f i v e year term of the l e g i s l a t u r e was almost at a close and Tolmie could not postpone an e l e c t i o n very much longer, he again decided to v i s i t a l l parts of the province. He started out as soon as the l e g i s l a t u r e was prorogued i n A p r i l . This early s t a r t , long before the formal d i s s o l u t i o n of the House i n August, enabled him to v i s i t a l l parts of the province before the e l e c t i o n . Major Moodie suggested, i n his goals f o r the organ-i z a t i o n , that favourable p u b l i c i t y was essential to the success of the party. One of the best methods to p u b l i c i z e the L i b e r a l party and the views of i t s members was through the speeches of i t s leader, both i n the l e g i s l a t u r e and on the hustings. These speeches, i f they were i n t e r e s t i n g enough, would a t t r a c t not only the audiences necessary for meetings, but also through news-paper accounts, the attention of the whole electorate. P a t t u l l o endeavoured to a t t r a c t attention i n this way during his years 30 P a t t u l l o to Hanna, 20 June 1931. 31 P a t t u l l o to Manson, 18 A p r i l 1932. 29 as Opposition leader and, on occasion, succeeded very well. Mr. Hutchison l a t e r observed that: In opposition Mr. P a t t u l l o had time off from departmental work to p o l i s h up his oratory, to coin phrases often memorable, usually very disconcerting to the Tolmie government. In opposition he rose to h i s peak as one of the best speakers known within these walls.32 In addition to speeches made i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , P a t t u l l o Issued a great many press releases, the content of which often r e f l e c t e d an attempt to make in t e r e s t i n g and memorable statements. In June, 1929, he said that the "government i s , apparently, learning nothing with the passing months, and...is just as stup i d l y 33 arrogant and arrogantly stupid as ever." In 1930, commenting on the government's f i n a n c i a l p o l i c i e s , he concluded a statement by saying that "...the wild orgy of expenditure and the t i n s e l f l3li parade continues." In 1932, i n a demand for the government to resign, he i n s i s t e d that: instead of indulging i n a l l the present b l i t h e r i n g k i t e - f l y i n g and cheap intrigue i n a p i t i f u l e f f o r t to hang on to t h e i r jobs, Dr. S. P. Tolmie should... hurry o f f to the Lieutenant-Governor and resign.... If Dr. Tolmie regards the premiership of t h i s province as a p o l i t i c a l oyster created exclusively for the t i t i l l a t i o n of his capacious stomach, he should say so plainly.35 32 Bruce Hutchison i n V i c t o r i a Times, 10 March 1936. 33 Press statement, 16 June 1929. 3l|. Press statement, 16 June 1930. 35 Press statement, 15 September 1932. 30) In the two large c i t i e s of B r i t i s h Columbia, Pattullo had, generally, the support of two papers and the opposition of two papers. His supporters were the V i c t o r i a Times and the Vancouver Sun, and his opponents were the V i c t o r i a Colonist and the Vancouver Province. This support and t h i s opposition were generally confined to the e d i t o r i a l pages of the papers, however, and P a t t u l l o therefore t r i e d to keep on the news pages (preferably the front page) with speeches, press statements and interviews. On occasion, too, he would complain to both f r i e n d l y and unfriendly newspapers about the coverage given to his pronounce-ments. In 1929, he f e l t that the Province was giving undue prominence to the government's viewpoint and not enough to the opposition's, and wrote to the publisher asking: whether your paper would be prepared to publish... with the same prominence that you give to governmental statements, statements which I deem i t advisable to make as Leader of the Opposition upon public issue.36 The Province denied either favouring the government or misrep-37 resenting the opposition. In 1930, a temporary r i f t , which had i t s o r i g i n i n the days of the MacLean government, was ended when Mr. Manson reported to P a t t u l l o that the Sun was going to give whole-hearted j support to the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l party i n i t s campaign against 38 the government. By 1932, on the strength of t h i s r e c o n c i l i a t i o n 36 P a t t u l l o to Prank J. Burd,- 20 July 1929 37 R. ¥. Brown to P a t t u l l o , 22 July 1929. 38 Manson to P a t t u l l o , 30 July 1930.. 31 and the Sun's subsequent support for the L i b e r a l party, P a t t u l l o f e l t free to write to R. J. Cromie, the paper's owner and publisher, to complain about the coverage that the paper was •39 giving to his press statements. P a t t u l l o was one of the f i r s t p o l i t i c i a n s i n the province to use radio extensively. In the spring of 1931, he reported to a f r i e n d that i n the previous month "I broadcasted once a week. It seemed to be received with favour, as I avoided J+O-part izan speeches." As part of i t s campaign to obtain p u b l i c i t y , p a r t i c -u l a r l y i n the r u r a l papers, the L i b e r a l o f f i c e asked the constituency organizations to provide pertinent information on which i t could base embarrassing questions i n the l e g i s l a t u r e . Moodie stated the value of t h i s procedure. I t has been found that nothing has more e f f e c t -i v e l y undermined confidence i n the present admin-i s t r a t i o n than the large number of pertinent questions which have been asked i n the Legislature, each i l l u s t r a t i n g a matter of importance to some l o c a l i t y , or some group amongst the electorate.ip-P a t t u l l o gathered t h i s Information well i n advance of the s i t t i n g of the l e g i s l a t u r e . He wrote to a l l L i b e r a l members, d i s t r i c t and l o c a l presidents, L i b e r a l nominees, and other persons who might have the information upon which questions could be based. In order to achieve the maximum response from t h i s t a c t i c , 39 P a t t u l l o to Cromie, 21 July 1932. 1+0 P a t t u l l o to William Turnbull, 22 A p r i l 1931 hi "Memo.", l o c . c i t . 3 2 P a t t u l l o i n s i s t e d that the "information obtained should be absolutely authentic, so that i t can be v e r i f i e d beyond question." In the 1930 session, P a t t u l l o had 250 questions to ask the govern-ment . ^ Presumably because i t lacked the necessary funds, the party made l i t t l e e f f o r t p r i o r to the campaign i n 1933 to send out c i r c u l a r s and pamphlets. Most of the money budgeted f o r p r i n t i n g was spent on the l e t t e r s and mimeographed material sent to the rank-and-file as part of the various organizational campaigns. But i n 1932 the resolutions which had been passed at the L i b e r a l Convention i n Vancouver i n October 1932, were published. At that time an e l e c t i o n was expected i n the spring of 1933, and these resolutions were to form the basis on which the L i b e r a l campaign was to be conducted. One further facet of the L i b e r a l organization, that of the party finances, deserves some consideration. In 1929, immediately a f t e r h i s selection as House leader, P a t t u l l o and the P r o v i n c i a l Executive set up an organization committee which was, among other things, responsible for campaign funds. This committee did not l a s t very long f o r by January, 1931, there existed another organization c a l l e d the P r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Organ-i z a t i o n Finance Committee. This committee, which had been appointed by the P r o v i n c i a l Executive, consisted of A. M. Manson, • 1^2 Pattullo to Wrinch, 3 December 1931. h.3 Times, 29 January 1930, p. 15". hk- Resolutions passed by the Convention of the B r i t i s h  Columbia L i b e r a l Association, n.pl., n. pub., n.d. 3 3 chairman; Victor J. Creeden, secretary; and i t s membership included J. W. deB. Parris and George Pearson, M.L.A. for Nanaimo. Two features of the financing of the party c l e a r l y emerge from the l i t t l e a vailable evidence: f i r s t , that the expenses were heavy, and second, that the various finance organ-izations did not c o l l e c t enough to pay these expenses. The organizational expenses of the party t o t a l l e d about $12,000 a year. The p r i n c i p a l expenses were the rental of the V i c t o r i a o f f i c e , the salaries of the organizer and a steno-grapher, and the t r a v e l l i n g expenses of Pat t u l l o and Moodie. At no time during the period i n which the Liberals were i n opposition was anything l i k e t h i s sum contributed by the party's supporters, and i t appears that P a t t u l l o personally made up the difference between contributions and expenses. It was reported i n January, 1932 that of the $12,000 needed Vancouver supporters of the party had been contributing $ij.000 a year and Pat t u l l o had been paying the difference. On a number of occasions, P a t t u l l o t r i e d to stimulate the Finance Committee to increase i t s e f f o r t s , kl but with l i t t l e apparent success. It seems, therefore, that for f i v e years i t cost P a t t u l l o approximately $6,000 a year to kS "Estimated expenses - organization Hdqrs.", n.d. i|.6 Manson to Charles Bishop, Secretary, V i c t o r i a L i b e r a l Association, 22 January 1932. kl P a t t u l l o to Manson, 7 May 1931, 28 May 1931, 18 A p r i l 1932, 5 May 1932, 10 May 1932; Manson to P a t t u l l o , 2lj. December 1931, 9 May 1932; Creeden to P a t t u l l o , 10 January 1931, 7 A p r i l 1931, 17 A p r i l 1931, 25 August 1931, 17 September 1931, 1$ February 1932, 8 March 1932, 21 A p r i l 1933, 13 June 1933. be leader of the L i b e r a l party. This was not, apparently, more than he could afford (although the necessity for paying the sum out of his own pocket was constantly g a l l i n g to him). In 1933, just before the e l e c t i o n , he reported to his brother that although the campaign "has been a long-drawn f i g h t , and neces-s a r i l y a c o s t l y one...I am e n t i r e l y i n the clear, and w i l l .be... when the thing i s over...." Three by-elections took place between the elections of 1928 and 1933. In two of them Patt u l l o ' s organization was tested and improved. The f i r s t by-election occurred i n the North Vancouver constituency a f t e r the s i t t i n g L i b e r a l member, Ian Mackenzie, resigned from the p r o v i n c i a l house to become a candidate i n the Federal general e l e c t i o n of 1930* Although the seat had previously been L i b e r a l , i t was not surprising that the Conservatives now won i t . The by-election took place only three months afte r the Conservative federal v i c t o r y , while the L i b e r a l party was s t i l l suffering loss of prestige; the L i b e r a l candidate, F. J. Bridgman, was not a man of the same calibre as the co l o u r f u l Mackenzie; and, most important, the Conservatives campaigned f a r more vigourously than did the L i b e r a l s . P a t t u l l o ' comment on the defeat i s i n t e r e s t i n g , for i t shows that the lesson was not l o s t on the L i b e r a l leader. He stated that "our own organization had placed no new names on the Voters' L i s t , 1+9 whereas the Government forces had placed some six hundred. n H" 1JJ8 P a t t u l l o to George P a t t u l l o , 30 September 1933. \+9 P a t t u l l o to Wrinch, 6 November 1930. 35 As a r e s u l t of t h i s defeat, the L i b e r a l s decided not to enter the second by-election which followed two months l a t e r . The Conservative candidate therefore e a s i l y defeated his independent opponent i n the Port George constituency. When the L i b e r a l member for the constituency of Columbia, J. A. Buckham, died, a by-election was c a l l e d for December, 1931* At t h i s time, the depression was well under way and P a t t u l l o 1 s attacks on the government had increased i n th e i r i n t e n s i t y . P a t t u l l o had to defeat the government, for i f he d i d not, his hold on the L i b e r a l leadership would be i n jeopardy. This by-election also showed, i n microcosm, just how e f f i c i e n t the L i b e r a l organization had become and how ably i t attended to the various d e t a i l s of the campaign. Major Moodie, who had been sent to the d i s t r i c t early i n November to manage the campaign, reported at length to P a t t u l l o : The s i t u a t i o n i s becoming c l a r i f i e d to some extent. I think we have a good candidate i n King, although he, l i k e every candidate, has his feet of clay. The greatest p r a c t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y to overcome with him i s his over confidence ( s i c ) . Just now he has the e l e c t i o n won by 3 to 2. There i s nothing to j u s t i f y his view. It i s too early to be clear at a l l . . . t h e best one could c a l l i t now i s a good dog f i g h t . Undoubtedly the Tories w i l l make every possible e f f o r t , and Jones i s a strong candidate. His comparative wealth and h i s reputed s o c i a l prestige w i l l c e r t a i n l y count with a considerable element. He i s using the story i n the Province that he i s to be a member of the reorganized cabinet. I have covered the r i d i n g , and i t seems to me that we must overwhelm them with meetings to t e l l the electors here, who do not r e a l i z e f u l l y or e n t i r e l y believe i t , that the Tolmie administration i s gone, and deservedly so. I suggest yourself, Pearson, and perhaps, Manson. Possibly we could have Parris for a meeting on his return from Ottawa...Your own v i s i t , I would suggest, might be around December 10 for some days. May I hear from you on this as soon as possible? Meanwhile, I have started King on a personal canvass of the r i d i n g . We are getting a few more on the voters' l i s t , which i s p r a c t i c a l l y complete. R e l i e f camps are closed, except one i n which some 50 men are being boarded, and Dominion Government camps on the Banff-Windermere road, which I have checked, and on the Big Bend...highway. The l a t t e r i s the unknown quantity, with men coming and going, and p r a c t i c a l l y impossible transportation d i f f i c u l t i e s . I think, however, i t i s no menace. Rest assured I s h a l l overlook nothing. Send me some f i n a n c i a l assistance. I have King well trained i n this respect, but there are certain inescapable expenses, including my own maintenance. I f e e l I must remain. Just now we have zero weather and snow.50 The Li b e r a l s retained the seat, and t h e i r majority of 22 votes i n 1928 was increased to 30fj>. Mr. Manson, emphasizing the great importance of the size of the victory, wrote to P a t t u l l o that the "Government might have been able to explain less than one hundred £but) i t cannot explain three hundred." Further, The business and professional men here i n Vancouver who are a f r a i d that the Government might concentrate on the country ri d i n g s and carry them no matter what Vancouver did are now s a t i s f i e d that the Government i s through. 51 Next to rebuilding the party organization, Pattullo's most important single concern was the c o a l i t i o n movement i n the province. At f i r s t , this movement marked an attempt by a number of groups i n the province to broaden the base of the government i n order that i t might be able to deal more adequately with the problems of the depression. It soon changed, however, into a 50 Moodie to P a t t u l l o , 17 November 1931. 51 Manson to P a t t u l l o , 2I4. December 1931. 37 partisan dispute, and eventually became one of the important issues i n the 1933 e l e c t i o n . By 1931 It was obvious to many that the Conservative government was not able to solve the problems that the depression had brought to the province. Unemployment was r a p i d l y increasing, personal and corporation income were declining, and these i n turn had reduced government revenues. To deal more e f f e c t i v e l y with these problems, the Province newspaper suggested that a c o a l i t i o n government, modelled on the recently formed National Government i n the United Kingdom, be established. When i n November, 1931 the paper's V i c t o r i a correspondent sounded out the Tolmie govern-52 ment on this matter, the government expressed no i n t e r e s t . Real pressure for t h i s form of government was applied i n 1932 and the movement reached i t s f i r s t climax i n September of that year. A second movement was started early the next year, and another climax was reached i n March, 1933. The idea was then debated i n the press and by a l l p o l i t i c a l parties u n t i l the November el e c t i o n . Of considerable prominence i n a l l these discussions were the Province e d i t o r i a l s which appear to have had considerable influence on the government. After the Province had f i r s t introduced the plan i n 1931» a number of Conservatives who became interested presented the scheme to Premier Tolmie. In March, 1932 the premier denied 53 that he had any inte r e s t i n the plan. In A p r i l of the same 52 Province, 1 November 1931, P« 32. 53 Sun, 19 March 1932, p. 1. 38. year members from both sides of the Legislature defended the party system of government i n the House. Their attacks, how-ever, by no means ended a g i t a t i o n i n the press, which was s t i l l l e d by the Province, and from June u n t i l September the merits of c o a l i t i o n were debated f i e r c e l y throughout the province. So wide-spread was the discussion that even Eastern Canadian papers became interested. The F i n a n c i a l Post chided the c o a l i t i o n i s t s with the comment that "The a l t e r n a t i v e to a party system i s a multi-party system which would tend to increase the amount of 55 p o l i t i c a l l o g - r o l l i n g . . . . " The Sun, which was working i n close co-operation with P a t t u l l o , reacted more bluntly, and stated that the Province "has gagged on that delectable dish of p o l i t i c a l t r i p e known as the Tolmie Government...." and that i t "would not hesitate to tear down the whole system of responsible 56 party government to prevent the return of the L i b e r a l s to power." In the next few weeks, as the i n t e n s i t y of the campaign increased, P a t t u l l o thought through his p o s i t i o n on c o a l i t i o n and rejected the idea, at f i r s t p r i v a t e l y and then p u b l i c l y . He sug-gested, to the press and i n l e t t e r s , that "A grave danger of a Non-Party Government, which the public does not perhaps grasp, i s that the worst forces i n both p o l i t i c a l parties would concentrate 57 to hold control, with the public the common prey;" further, the 51| Times, 12 A p r i l 1932, p. 1. 55 F i n a n c i a l Post, quoted i n the Sun, 27 June 1932, p. if.. 56 Sun, 27 June 1932, p. i|.. 57 P a t t u l l o to G. H. Sallens, 25 July 1932. 3 9 government already had "a three to one majority, and can do any-thing that i t wishes to and i t i s suggested that we should j o i n a Government that has not the courage, although i t has the power, 5 8 to do what should be done." In adopting t h i s attitude, there was danger; of t h i s both P a t t u l l o and other members were aware. Harry Perry warned P a t t u l l o that he had: a f e e l i n g that the tory ( s i c ) game i s to make a play for a non-party cabinet and l e g i s l a t u r e , and place you i n the p o s i t i o n of having to decline the o l i v e branch...and then have the public mind impressed with the idea that you are not concerned With the welfare of B.C. as you are with the party.5 9 Although he was suspicious that they had discussed the matter with some of his supporters, the Conservatives had not as 60 yet approached P a t t u l l o with a c o a l i t i o n o f f e r . In order to f o r e s t a l l any attempt by the Conservatives to present t h e i r case to the public and take advantage of f i r s t p u b l i c i z i n g the matter, Pa t t u l l o outlined his p o s i t i o n at a L i b e r a l nominating convention i n Esquimalt on August 2, 1932. He argued that the government was i n considerable d i f f i c u l t y , and that " i f this Government were a strong Government, upstanding with the people...we would [notj be hearing anything about a c o a l i t i o n Government...." He went on to say that a great many people were "...opposed to extreme partizanship, and they want no more of "the p o l i c y of 1 to the 5 8 Press statement, n.d. 5 9 H.G.T. Perry to P a t t u l l o , 30 August 1932. 60 P a t t u l l o to H. P. Pullen, 2 August 1932. P a t t u l l o reported l a t e r , when the c o a l i t i o n plan again achieved prominence, that John Hart, George Pearson, Wendell Parris and J. W. deB. P a r r i s had, for a time, f e l t that Tolmie's offer of a c o a l i t i o n should be accepted. Pattullo' to King, 22 November 19i|.l. k.0 v i c t o r s belong the s p o i l s . 1 " The government, i n his view, had embraced c o a l i t i o n because they f e l t i t was the only p o l i c y which would save i t from e l e c t i o n defeat. A p o l i c y of no patronage, i n P a t t u l l o 1 s view, was not enough and the "public has a r i g h t to demand l e g i s l a t i o n and administration f a i r l y and equally f or the benefit of a l l . " I t was for this purpose that the " L i b e r a l Party exists today...and the L i b e r a l Party would be recreant to I t s duty to the public i f i t now allowed I t s e l f to be jockeyed 6: into a p o s i t i o n where i t s usefulness would l a r g e l y be n u l l i f i e d . " To further his defence of the party system and p a r t i c u l a r l y of the L i b e r a l party, P a t t u l l o asked that plans be made for the forthcoming L i b e r a l convention to educate the public as "to what r n ,.62 Liberalism stands for...and what l _ i t s j p r i n c i p l e s are." Pattu l l o ' a defence of the party system brought f o r t h the b i t t e r e s t attack to date from the Province. The paper accused him of speaking with tongue-in-cheek on the party system and i n s i s t e d that his r e a l purpose was "to exploit the miseries of B r i t i s h Columbia for the p o l i t i c a l p r o f i t of himself and his party pals." I t went on to charge that the L i b e r a l party was the r e a l cause of B r i t i s h Columbia's troubles, and that the Conservatives were merely the unfortunate "heirs of the system of misgovernment which tPattullcQ and his party friends were c h i e f l y instrumental i n saddling upon an unhappy province...." In conclusion, the paper suggested that P a t t u l l o was planning 61 Press statement, 3 August 1932. 62 P a t t u l l o to Manson, 23 August 1932. to exploit the unfortunate economic conditions "to the uttermost, to the l a s t job fo r the l a s t job-hungry party hack, no matter i f the l a s t shred of p r o v i n c i a l credit disappears i n the process, or no matter i f we exchange confusion for chaos." Por the most part P a t t u l l o ignored unfavourable e d i t o r i a l s , but this time he was angry enough to declare that the Province "was prepared to go to any length to secure an alternative to the Tolmie adminis-t r a t i o n other than a new L i b e r a l administration, headed by 6k myself." Although i t had refrained from comment u n t i l this moment, the government had undoubtedly followed the c o a l i t i o n discussions very c l o s e l y . However, on September 7, 1932, the Premier, acceding to the growing requests of l o c a l Conservative 65 associations, announced that: Realizing that the trend of thought throughout the world today i s that governments should include those men, who, regardless of other considerations, appear to be able to render the best service to the state, I have, afte r careful consideration, and discussion with many responsible c i t i z e n s of the Province, decided to accept t h i s principle.66 Two days l a t e r , on September 9, Tolmie i n a l e t t e r to P a t t u l l o , asked him " i f you would be w i l l i n g to j o i n such a government 67 under my leadership." A similar l e t t e r was sent to W. J. &3 Province. 25 August 1932, p. 6i|. Press Statement, 26 August 1932. 65 CAR, 1933, P. 293. 66 Tolmie press statement, 7 September 1932. 67 Tolmie to P a t t u l l o , 8 September 1932. Bowser, former Conservative premier of the province. P a t t u l l o r e p l i e d on September 1 3 ; I have...no information as to what new p o l i c i e s or administrative measures you may have i n mind, which you could not already have put into effect with the large majority i n the Legislature which you have supporting you. Information i s also lacking as to what you have i n mind with regard to membership i n the House, while you have not indicated the names of the men whom you propose to ask into your new govern-ment. Yet even without this information, the course which I should pursue seems p e r f e c t l y clear. During the period of your government, your view-point and mine i n respect of both p o l i c y and administration have been at almost complete variance. It i s not reasonable to suppose that these differences could be suddenly reconciled. While I appreciate your confidence i n me i n asking me i f I would j o i n a union government under your leadership, I do not believe that the public interests would be best served by ray agreeing to do so.68 Bowser also stated that he was unwilling to enter a c o a l i t i o n ' 69 government headed by Tolmie. P a t t u l l o followed his r e f u s a l with a public demand that the government should resign, since the premier had "now 70 p u b l i c l y admitted his i n a b i l i t y to carry on." Thenceforth Pattullo's answer to a l l c o a l i t i o n suggestions was an insistance that the government should c a l l an e l e c t i o n . The Conservatives themselves were by no means united i n support of c o a l i t i o n . The Executive of the B r i t i s h Columbia Conservative Association, meeting i n October, 1932, unanimously supported Tolmie and his p r i n c i p l e of union government, but the 68 P a t t u l l o to Tolmie, 13 September 1932. 69 CAR, 1933, p. 29ij.. 70 Press statement, 1$ September 1932. 10 whole association, at i t s annual meeting on November 27, decided to r e f e r the matter to the d i s t r i c t associations for consider-71 a t i o n before any o f f i c i a l action was taken by the party. It can be supposed that the federal Conservative members of the party t r i e d to influence the membership between the October and November meetings, since c o a l i t i o n would mean the v i r t u a l abandon-ment of the party machinery i n the province, an eventuality which 72 would have an unfortunate e f f e c t on the next federal election. E a r l y i n October, 1932 the P r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Assoc-i a t i o n convention avoided any d i r e c t mention of c o a l i t i o n i n i t s resolutions. Instead i t passed one r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g upon the Conservative government to resign because i t "has long since not only l o s t the confidence of the electorate, but has brought 73 d i s c r e d i t upon our governmental i n s t i t u t i o n s ; " and another r e s o l u t i o n stating the p r i n c i p l e s of good government, the p r i n c i p l e s of Liberalism, and, f i n a l l y , the opinion that P a t t u l l o was the best man i n the province to put these various p r i n c i p l e s into e f f e c t . ^ P a t t u l l o was very pleased with the r e s u l t s of his maneuvering during the f i r s t phase of the c o a l i t i o n debate. In October, 1932, he commented that: 71 CAR, 1933, p. 29k-72 Times, 28 November 1932, p. llj.. 73 Resolutions passed...Liberal Association, p. 3« 7k Ibid., pp. k~5* Every e f f o r t and every a r t i f i c e has been used during the past eighteen months to disrupt the L i b e r a l Party, i n order that Tory forces may remain i n control under the name of union government, but they now have to admit that up to date we have won every round.75 During the next two or three months, the discussion died away; then i n January, 1933 P a t t u l l o was warned that Bowser was about to return to the p o l i t i c a l scene with either a 76 new party or a completely changed Conservative party. On February 2 3 , p r i o r to the 1933 session of the Legislature, the Conservative caucus decided to r e t a i n party l i n e s f or at l e a s t the duration of the session. The government would therefore remain Conservative i n name. From time to time during the session, however, both Tolmie and other members of the Cabinet, basing t h e i r arguments on the assumption that "a Union Government would s t a r t with a 77 clean sheet, and would be free from c r i t i c i s m , " spoke i n favour of a union government. P a t t u l l o , arguing i n the same manner as he had i n the previous year, and c a l l i n g f or an immed-iat e e l e c t i o n , again refused to j o i n any c o a l i t i o n government. In the face of Pattullo's repeated public re f u s a l s , i t i s somewhat surprising to note that when the Conservative caucus met again on March 17, i t again endorsed the p r i n c i p l e of union government. This action was, perhaps, the clearest i n d i c a t i o n 75 P a t t u l l o to Harry S i f t o n , 21 October 1932. 76 Norman Senior to P a t t u l l o , 18 January 1933 77 Tolmie press statement, 2 March 1933. of the desperate condition to which the increasing severity of the depression had reduced the Conservative party. Further, the Executive of the B r i t i s h Columbia Conservative Association with-drew from the p o s i t i o n which the whole Association had taken the previous October and again supported c o a l i t i o n , this time, however, with many reservations. Meanwhile, Tolmie again i n v i t e d P a t t u l l o to j o i n his government. On September 9th I wrote you asking i f you would consider joining a Union Government.... At that time you did not see your way clear to accept my suggestion. Since then, economic conditions i n the Province have st e a d i l y become more acute, and a point has been reached that was never anticipated by the most far-seeing. No one can form any opinion as to the length of the present depression.... In view of the Federal e l e c t i o n i n the not distant future, i t has been suggested that we bring our various groups together...each one maintaining i t s i d e n t i t y , at the same time working with one end i n view and under one leadership. As the Premier of the day was selected leader of the j o i n t parties both i n Canada i n 1917 and In Great B r i t a i n , there appears to be no reasonable ground to deviate from that course. Such a union I f e e l would do much to meet the present unrest. With the many groups i n the f i e l d , there i s a r i s k that no party would secure a working majority.... Such a combination could more safely be made now than a f t e r an e l e c t i o n i f the party with the bare majority found i t necessary to make an arrange-ment which would perhaps prove incompatible.78 It was unfortunate f o r the premier that on the same day as he wrote to P a t t u l l o , the L i b e r a l leader should have decided to issue a further statement on c o a l i t i o n , i n which he said that "the L i b e r a l Party refuse either to conspire or ,79 a f f i l i a t e with anyone." In his reply to the premier's l e t t e r , 78 Tolmie to P a t t u l l o , 27 March 1933 79 Press statement, 27 March 1933. P a t t u l l o remarked that Tolmie had made no mention of a meeting at which Pooley, Howe and the L i b e r a l leader had discussed c o a l i t i o n . He again refused the premier's request, noting that although the premier s t i l l had his three-to-one majority, he "must now go a f i e l d looking for other leading men to j o i n you i n government." P a t t u l l o repeated an offer which he had made i n the Legislature a few days before; " i f you had any proposals...which you desire to put into e f f e c t , that the Opposition would support you, i f these measures were i n the public i n t e r e s t , without any union." The L i b e r a l leader then went on to examine the premier's motives f o r making the of f e r , stating that'"you appear to be mostly concerned as to the possible outcome of the approaching ele c t i o n . I do not share your alarm." The l e t t e r concluded with Pattullo's customary suggestion that "the best service that you can render t h i s Province at the present time i s to immediately ,,8 0 c a l l a general el e c t i o n , and have the issue s e t t l e d . " By this time, the p o l i t i c a l scene had become further confused by an announcement by the former premier, ¥. J . Bowser, that he was returning to public l i f e to lead a "Non-Party" party i n the forthcoming e l e c t i o n . Bowser t r i e d to a t t r a c t Conservative, L i b e r a l and Labour support to his cause. He managed to persuade Dugald Donaghy, one of the two men appointed by Premier MacLean to a cabinet post just before the 1928 el e c t i o n and now Vice-President of the P r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Association, to announce his 81 support for the new party. P a t t u l l o immediately ejected 80 P a t t u l l o to Tolmie, 28 March 1933 81 CAR, 1933, p. 295. kl Donaghy from the party and denounced Bowser's attempt to seduce Liberals away from his leadership. When, for the second time, Pa t t u l l o refused to enter a c o a l i t i o n government, the plan ceased to a t t r a c t serious party or public consideration, and became but one of the issues i n the forthcoming e l e c t i o n campaign. In i t s early stages the c o a l i t i o n idea had offered a serious threat to Pattullo and the L i b e r a l party, but as time passed, the danger lessened considerably. P a t t u l l o had handled the matter s k i l f u l l y by at a l l times taking the i n i t i a t i v e away from Tolmie and demanding an e l e c t i o n . Furthermore, Tolmie had mismanaged the s i t u a t i o n . A f t e r P a t t u l l o had twice declined his offe r of a p o s i t i o n i n the cabinet and Bowser had s i m i l a r l y refused the premier's o f f e r , the premier continued to plead for a union government and remained i n o f f i c e a f t e r admitting, i n e f f e c t , that he was not competent to deal with the problems of the province. To the voters i t must have been apparent that Pattullo's charge that the c o a l i t i o n p r i n c i p l e was merely a device by which the Conservatives might r e t a i n control had some merit. A quarter of a century l a t e r , It i s most d i f f i c u l t to capture the mood of a time so d i f f e r e n t from the present. In 1933, a f e e l i n g of desperation was i n the a i r . Men by the thousands, many for t h e i r t h i r d or fourth year, were unemployed, and d a i l y t h e i r ranks grew larger. Conditions were l i t t l e better f o r many of those who remained employed. F a l l i n g wage scales, a r a p i d l y shrinking market for the products of B r i t i s h Columbia, a declining demand fo r even the necessities of l i f e ; these 1& conditions were cumulative i n t h e i r e f f e c t on the province's economy. The province, which sold most of i t s products i n the world market where .the p r i c e of primary products had d r a s t i c a l l y declined, and which bought most of i t s necessities i n the t a r i f f -enclosed Canadian market where prices had remained more stable, appeared incapable of sustaining i t s e l f . Por four years t h i s state of a f f a i r s had existed and grown progressively worse; as yet no sure r e l i e f appeared to be i n sight. Desperate circum-stances breed desperate remedies; many people suffering under these conditions accepted theories then current that the root of th e i r d i f f i c u l t i e s lay i n fundamental flaws i n the economic system. In 1933 the remedies which were proposed by the e l e c t i o n candidates r e f l e c t e d the p o l i t i c a l spectrum from the extreme l e f t to the extreme r i g h t . Up to the time of the el e c t i o n , the d i s i n t e g r a t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l Conservative party provided the depression's most obvious p o l i t i c a l consequence. In 1928, the Conservatives had won a great e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y and, upon i t s appointment, Tolmie's cabinet had been h a i l e d as one of the province's best. Yet, within four years, the government confessed, by supporting the scheme fo r c o a l i t i o n and by appointing the Kidd Commission, that i t was incapable of solving the province's problems. In the e l e c t i o n this once-powerful party, now splintered into three separate groups, was almost eliminated as a p o l i t i c a l force i n B r i t i s h Columbia. In i t s appointment of the Kidd Commission, the govern-ment demonstrated i t s almost complete bewilderment i n the face h9 of i t s problems. As depression d e f i c i t s mounted, various business organizations demanded, i n r e f l e c t i o n of t h e i r economic philosophy, that there be an enquiry into the f i n a n c i a l oper-ations of the p r o v i n c i a l government. They i n s i s t e d that ways be found to reduce p r o v i n c i a l expenditure, to balance the p r o v i n c i a l budget, and to reduce taxes. In July, 1932 a committee of businessmen chaired by George Kidd made i t s report to the govern-ment. Of i t s recommendations the most important were: that the lieutenant-governor take charge of p r o v i n c i a l expenditures ( i n ef f e c t , the abandonment of responsible government); that the le g i s l a t u r e be reduced from I4.8 to 28 members; that grants to the un i v e r s i t y cease ( i n e f f e c t , the closing of that i n s t i t u t i o n ) ; that expenditure on education be severely reduced; that public works be discontinued except for e s s e n t i a l maintenance; and that the p r o v i n c i a l budget be pared to s i x m i l l i o n d o l l a r s A The 82 report included many other recommendations of similar severity. Although the government did not attempt to implement any of these recommendations, Tolmie and his cabinet colleagues shared the general opprobrium with which the report was greeted. The Conservative administration obviously does not, however, deserve f u l l blame f o r B r i t i s h Columbia's unhappy economic conditions. Governments i n nearly a l l parts of the world found themselves unable to cope s a t i s f a c t o r i l y with depression conditions, and i n t h i s the government of the province was no exception. 82 CAR. 1933, PP. 296-298 5 0 In A p r i l , 1933 the f i f t h session of the seventeenth B r i t i s h Columbia l e g i s l a t u r e was prorogued, and the l e g i s l a t u r e i t s e l f was dissolved on August 1, i t s f u l l f i v e year term having expired. The date of the e l e c t i o n was not announced by the premier u n t i l l a t e August; i t was set for November 2. At di s s o l u t i o n , the membership of the House was approximately the same as i t had been a f t e r the e l e c t i o n of 1928, the Conservatives having 35 members, the Li b e r a l s 11, Labour 1, and vacant 1. A t o t a l of 219 candidates were nominated f o r the J4.7 seats i n the p o l i t i c a l groups, a fact which could be taken as symptomatic of province formed the central issue of the e l e c t i o n campaign. To the electorate each party and p o l i t i c a l group presented i t s 8 3 As an economy measure, Premier Tolmie had reduced the size of the l e g i s l a t u r e from lj.8 to I4.7 members, eliminating the Columbia seat which Thomas King had held for the Liberals i n the by-election i n 1 9 3 1 * P a t t u l l o restored the seat i n 1 9 3 ^ and i t went to King by acclamation. 8i|. The candidates i n the e l e c t i o n were di s t r i b u t e d as follows: 8 3 House. These candidates represented a great variety of the very unsettled nature of the times. How best to remedy the economic s i t u a t i o n of the Unionist (Tolmie) L i b e r a l Conservative ( u n o f f i c i a l ) Independent (Non-partisan) C.C.P. Independent C.C.P. Independent United Front Labour Independent Labour S o c i a l i s t 13 35 19 3 2 k6 CAR, 193k, p. 328. 5 1 p a r t i c u l a r solution to the problem. There was, however, r e a l l y but one party i n a p o s i t i o n both to f i g h t a vigourous e l e c t i o n campaign and to govern e f f e c t i v e l y i f i t were v i c t o r i o u s . The L i b e r a l party, and p a r t i c u l a r l y P a t t u l l o , had spent f i v e years of single-minded e f f o r t to construct one of the best p o l i t i c a l machines the province had ever seen. These f i v e years of e f f o r t were to be rewarded with overwhelming v i c t o r y on e l e c t i o n day. Pa t t u l l o entered the campaign with his accustomed vigour and enthusiasm; he does not seem to have had any doubts as to the outcome. The L i b e r a l platform was based on the resolutions which had been passed at the October, 1932 conven-t i o n of the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association. It had a flavour of F r a n k l i n Roosevelt's "New Deal" about i t , although P a t t u l l o denied that he had borrowed from the American president, maintaining on the other hand that "Mr. Roosevelt must have been 85 reading the L i b e r a l platform." Among other promises, the Li b e r a l s declared that they would set up an economic council to "study i n d u s t r i a l and s o c i a l e f f o r t s i n the province and suggest „ 8 6 means to correlate these e f f o r t s . " . They promised that they would t r y to cut taxes and p r o v i n c i a l expenditures, give increased a i d to muni c i p a l i t i e s , establish a public u t i l i t i e s commission, give access to the coast to the Peace River area, and e s t a b l i s h 85 T. D. P a t t u l l o , "Premier P a t t u l l o writes," MacLean's  Magazine, v o l . l\S (December 15, 1936), p. 86 A b r i e f synopsis of L i b e r a l p o l i c y , Vancouver, Sun Publishing Company, 1933. 5 a 87 some form of state health insurance. More important, however, than these detailed promises was Pattullo's attitude to the problem of unemployment. He stated that unemployment was the "outstanding problem confronting B r i t i s h Columbia, Canada, and the r e s t of the world at the present time...Those of us who have reached maturity have got to 88 offer something more hopeful to the r i s i n g generation." Instead of keeping men on the dole and In work camps, he proposed that "useful public, works, not only of desirable, but one may 89 well say, of e s s e n t i a l character, could have been carried on." The money for such large expenditures was to be found: through the use of the national c r e d i t . Some people suggest that this means uncontrolled i n f l a t i o n . I t means nothing of the kind. Deliberate i n f l a t i o n , and the use of national credit f o r carrying on public works are e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t matters. The banks are carrying nearly nine hundred m i l l i o n interest-bearing Government s e c u r i t i e s , which the public i n d i v i d u a l l y have refused to absorb. I f the credit of Canada can be maintained, such as i t i s , with nine-hundred m i l l i o n i n t e r e s t -bearing s e c u r i t i e s outstanding, which the public would not absorb, i s i t not reasonable to suppose that the c r e d i t of Canada could be equally maintained i f i t issued nine-hundred m i l l i o n non-i n t e r e s t bearing securities ? 9 0 This money was to increase the purchasing power of the people who would receive i t as wages. These wages i n turn would stimulate 87 Loc c i t . 88 Typescript of a speech accepting the L i b e r a l nomination i n Prince Rupert, n.d. 89 Loc. c i t . 90 Loc. c i t . S3 business a c t i v i t y and the depression would come to an end. The "national c r e d i t " would, of course, have to be advanced by the federal government, but P a t t u l l o promised that: If the national credit were used to provide money for public works i n B r i t i s h Columbia...we would set aside a sinking fund, which would redeem the credit or currency advanced by the Dominion govern-ment within a reasonable period.91 Pattullo's economic arguments, but they did understand the slogan of "Work and Wages" which his supporters coined to describe that aspect of the L i b e r a l platform. Mr. Hutchison has described suddenly the windows of every L i b e r a l committee room shrieked the magic words, "Work and Wages." Banners with this strange device streamed across the main street of every town and hamlet. L i b e r a l speakers, most of them having no idea what they Q 2 meant, shouted "Work and Wages" from every platform. Prim a r i l y as a r e s u l t of thi s unfortunate slogan, P a t t u l l o found himself not merely committed to persuading the federal govern-ment to advance him some of the "national cr e d i t " so that he could stimulate a c t i v i t y through public works i n B r i t i s h Columbia, but, i n the minds of a great many people, committed to providing jobs for a l l the unemployed i n the province and 93 prosperity f o r the res t of the c i t i z e n s . "Work and Wages" was 91 Typescript of a speech accepting the L i b e r a l nomination .••, l o c . c i t . It i s doubtful whether many persons understood the e f f e c t of the slogan: Rockies," MacLean's 93 Loc. c i t . to haunt him for the remainder of his p o l i t i c a l career. Although he avoided as far as possible involvement i n l o c a l nomination disputes, P a t t u l l o made an e f f o r t to have the party select the best possible candidate i n each r i d i n g . Two ridings f a i l e d to nominate t h e i r s i t t i n g L i b e r a l members: Skeena replaced Dr. Wrinch with E. T. Kenney and A t l i n replaced Bert Kergin with ¥. J. Ass e l s t i n e . In the former constituency, Dr. Wrinch dropped out with good grace when i t was evident to him that two L i b e r a l candidates would be running i f he did not 9k do so. In A t l i n , however, there was considerable protest about the way i n which Asselstine was nominated, and Kergin ran 95 as an Independent. A former prominent L i b e r a l member, Mrs. Mary E l l e n Smith, was eased out of a candidacy by P a t t u l l o , and he used h i s influence to get men of pote n t i a l cabinet c a l i b r e to 96 run i n some r i d i n g s . Dr. George M. Weir, one of the Point Grey candidates, was one example of th i s influence at work. In a number of ridings former L i b e r a l members of the Legislature who had either r e t i r e d or had been defeated i n the 1928 e l e c t i o n were again selected as candidates: E. D. Barrow i n Chilliwack, John Hart i n V i c t o r i a , Harry Perry i n Port George, and Dr. K. C. MacDonald i n North Okanagan. 9^ Wrinch to P a t t u l l o , lk A p r i l 1933, 20 A p r i l 1933, 26 A p r i l 1933. 95 J.S. McDonald to P a t t u l l o , 22 June 1933. McDonald was secretary of the Telegraph Creek L i b e r a l Association and protested the.nomination procedure. Pa t t u l l o also received s i m i l a r l e t t e r s from Anyox, A l i c e Arm and Stewart. 96 P a t t u l l o to M.E. Smith, 31 March 1933. 55 The Conservatives were divided into three groups for the campaign. On A p r i l 21 the Executive of the B r i t i s h Columbia Conservative Association announced that the party "would with-draw as a P r o v i n c i a l Organization from p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the forthcoming General E l e c t i o n , but that the d i s t r i c t conventions 97 would be l e f t free to nominate their own candidates." Some Conservatives ran as u n o f f i c i a l Conservative candidates i n the e l e c t i o n , more ran under the "Unionist" l a b e l of Premier Tolmie, and others joined Bowser's Non-Partisan group. A f t e r the closing of the l a s t session of the House, Tolmie's cabinet gradually disintegrated. Two ministers resigned on June 1 . Hon. W. A. Mackenzie resigned as Minister of Mines i n protest over Tolmie's p o l i c y i n regard to the Conservation Fund, and Hon. Rolf Bruhn resigned as Minister of Public Works because he f e l t Tolmie was 98 doing nothing to form a union government* As a f i r s t step to a union government, Tolmie appointed William M. Dennies, the president of the National Labour Council, to the newly created post of Minister of Labour. His government, however, continued to do nothing to solve the depression, and the premier seemed to be trying desperately to postpone the e l e c t i o n i n the hope that economic conditions would improve. Tolmie f e l t that no party would win a majority of the seats i n the l e g i s l a t u r e and that he might continue as premier at l e a s t u n t i l the neitf l e g i s l a t u r e met for i t s 193k session. To t h i s view P a t t u l l o commented that i f 97 CAR, 1 9 3 3 , p. 2 9 k . 98 CAR, 1 9 3 k , p. 328 . 56> the voters "evidence by t h e i r votes that they desire to control administration through the...Liberal Party. Premier Tolmie w i l l remain i n o f f i c e after the e l e c t i o n no longer than i s necessary 9 9 to vacate properly." On A p r i l 21]., the Independent or Non-Partisan branch of the Conservatives, under Bowser's leadership, announced t h e i r platform. In the main the programme of r i g i d economy on the part of the p r o v i n c i a l government was reminiscent of the recom-mendations of the Kidd report. Later, this group announced that i t was not a p o l i t i c a l party at a l l . It decided that i t would have no leader, and that each area would independently choose i t s candidate. If enough Non-Partisan candidates were elected to form a majority i n the l e g i s l a t u r e , they would select one of t h e i r number to be premier, but would not be bound by any party allegiance to support him. In accordance with t h i s p o l i c y , on September 9 Bowser resigned as party leader. The only other party to contest the e l e c t i o n on a province-wide basis was the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, which ran candidates i n a l l ridings except Fernie, where i t supported the candidacy of Mr. U p h i l l . The C.C.F. programme was one of socialism, based on the party's recently adopted Regina Manifesto. The p r o v i n c i a l unit of the party had only been organized i n February, 1933, and was, as the name implied, a 9 9 Press statement, 1], August 1 9 3 3 . 1 0 0 CAR, 1 9 3 3 , p. 2 9 5 ; CAR, 193k. p. 3 2 9 ; Province, 9 September 1 9 3 3 , P. 1 . 5 7 federation of various p o l i t i c a l groups. The two most important of these i n B r i t i s h Columbia were the S o c i a l i s t Party of Canada and the Reconstruction party. The new party entered into the campaign with surprising energy, and was quite quickly recognized by some Li b e r a l s at l e a s t , as the major threat to t h e i r own chances of v i c t o r y . Mr. Manson decided that the Liberals "should concentrate a barrage on the C.C.P. Don't l e t us make any mis-take. C.C.P. are, for the time being at l e a s t , quite strong i n , ,101 some places....." The C.C.P. had l i t t l e money and less campaign experience but made up i n part for these deficiencies with tremendous energy and enthusiasm. Some of i t s speakers were, however, somewhat inept i n their remarks and they had by e l e c t i o n day succeeded i n frightening a good part of the electorate with t h e i r extreme plans for s o c i a l change. Also, the party was not at t h i s point' s u f f i c i e n t l y organized and prepared for o f f i c e , and some of i t s members were act u a l l y r e l i e v e d that the party did not win the e l e c t i o n . P a t t u l l o campaigned widely and e f f e c t i v e l y throughout the province, both before and a f t e r the actual announcement of the date of the e l e c t i o n . He was extremely confident of the outcome and wrote i n May that: 1 0 1 Manson to P a t t u l l o , 1 September 1 9 3 3 . 1 0 2 Most of the information on the C.C.P. was found i n John A. Bovey, "The early h i s t o r y of the Cooperative Common-wealth Federation i n B r i t i s h Columbia 1932-1937," an unpublished seminar paper submitted for History 5 3 3 , 1 9 5 7 . 5a I have just returned from a t r i p through the Okanagan country. We had very large and successful meetings. The Bowser movement i s a complete f l o p , and the Tolmie administration i s held i n r i d i c u l e and contempt by everybody...Prom a l l parts of the Province come enthusiastic reports, and I f e e l sure that the re s u l t w i l l be satisfactory. 1 0 3 The e l e c t i o n , due to the death of candidates i n two r i d i n g s , was held on two separate voting days. The results were an overwhelming majority for P a t t u l l o and the L i b e r a l party. The d i s t r i b u t i o n of the seats was: L i b e r a l . 3^ C.C.F. 7 Independent Non Partisan 2 Labour 1 Unionist 1 . Independent 2 1 0 i l -Premier Tolmie was defeated by the L i b e r a l Norman Whittaker i n Saanich; Bowser had died on October 25 , a week before the el e c t i o n ; and P a t t u l l o was returned with a two-to-one majority over his opponents i n Prince Rupert. On November li}., P a t t u l l o submitted the names of those he proposed to appoint to his Ministry to the lieutenant-governor. This tentative cabinet opened the only major d i v i s i o n i n L i b e r a l ranks that occurred during the campaign. On the day before the delayed p o l l i n g i n Vancouver, G. G. McGeer made a public state-ment and radio speech advising the voters i n Vancouver to vote against the Liberals since "the crying need of t h i s province i s 103 P a t t u l l o to George Pearson, 25 May 1933. lOli CPG, 1935, p. lj-lij.. 59 a r e a l Opposition to the Government Mr. P a t t u l l o has created." Although he vehemently denied that this was the case, i t was thought at the time that McGeer was highly i r r i t a t e d at his 106 being l e f t out of the L i b e r a l cabinet. P a t t u l l o , i n a l e t t e r to Mackenzie King, commented that: You w i l l have seen of the defection of Mr. McGeer through my having l e f t him out of the Cabinet. There i s some s a t i s f a c t i o n i n having one's judgement so speedily confirmed.107 P a t t u l l o ' s v i c t o r y at the p o l l s could not have been very surprising to most of the people i n the province. Of a l l the groups contesting the election, the L i b e r a l party was alone i n being an orthodox party i n a p o s i t i o n to form a stable govern-ment i f i t were v i c t o r i o u s . The Conservatives had, as an organ-ized p o l i t i c a l party, abandoned the p r o v i n c i a l f i e l d . The C.C.P. was a new and untried movement, preaching a r a d i c a l philosophy which the orthodox voter would l i k e l y shun. There were, i t i s true, a great many unemployed voters who would be w i l l i n g to have a s o c i a l experiment conducted i n B r i t i s h Columbia, but there were also a larger number of voters who s t i l l held their jobs and t h e i r businesses and whose p o l i t i c a l philosophy was not l i k e l y to be as r a d i c a l as that of the C.C.P. It must be remembered, too, that the L i b e r a l platform was a progressive 105 CAR, 193k, p. 331. 106 For McGeer's changing opinion of P a t t u l l o , v. McGeer to King, 1 November 1933 and 11+ November 1933, PABC, McGeer Papers. 107 P a t t u l l o to King, 29 November 1933-60) one, s i m i l a r to that which had shown so much appeal i n the U n i t e d States i n the previous November. The main reason f o r the L i b e r a l v i c t o r y was, however, P a t t u l l o h i m s e l f . He had i n c r e a s i n g l y dominated the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e during the years of the Conservative government; he had toured the province thoroughly; and he had given the voters a good idea of where he stood on most matters. He had done h i s best t o appear to be the predominant f i g u r e on the l o c a l p o l i t i c a l stage, and had been most s u c c e s s f u l i n e s t a b l i s h i n g t h i s p o s i t i o n as h i s own. F u r t h e r , P a t t u l l o had organized h i s p a r t y i n t o a superb p o l i t i c a l machine. This machine was at i t s best by 1933* and c o n t r i b u t e d i n no small way to the L i b e r a l v i c t o r y . P a t t u l l o ' s one great danger had e x i s t e d when he had r e f u s e d Tolmie's f i r s t c o a l i t i o n o f f e r i n 1932, but he was helped out of t h i s d i f f i c u l t y by Tolmie h i m s e l f . The longer the Conservative premier remained i n o f f i c e the more i t appeared that Tolmie's sole a n x i e t y was f o r h i s own p o l i t i c a l career. At l e a s t P a t t u l l o was s u c c e s s f u l i n persuading the p u b l i c to accept t h i s view. Perhaps the premier h i m s e l f had p a i d the highest compliment to the p o s i t i o n t h a t P a t t u l l o a l r eady occupied i n the p u b l i c l i f e of the province: endeavouring t o add a l u s t r e to that sad body, the government, he had i n v i t e d P a t t u l l o to j o i n i t . CHAPTER II I THE FIRST ADMINISTRATION Although he reported that "at no time had I any doubt 1 as to what the f i n a l outcome would be," P a t t u l l o was, of course, delighted by h i s e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y . His f i r s t task was that of constructing his cabinet, and i n this endeavour he was i n the rather embarrassing p o s i t i o n of having available almost too much i n the way of p o t e n t i a l material. Four members of the new l e g i s l a t u r e at one time or another had been Pattullo's cabinet colleagues: John Hart had served f o r seven years as Minister of Finance before r e t i r i n g from p o l i t i c s ; E.D. Barrow had been Minister of Agriculture; A.M. Manson had been Attorney-General; and Dr. W.H. Sutherland had been Minister of Public Works. Also among the members-elect were fourteen men who would serve In the p r o v i n c i a l cabinet at some time before the L i b e r a l party f i n a l l y l e f t o f f i c e i n 195>2, and two who would be future senators. In addition, others of the new L i b e r a l members were able men who might have made successful cabinet ministers. The L i b e r a l platform had promised that i f the party were successful i n the e l e c t i o n the L i b e r a l premier could choose "for h i s associates i n government, men of character, a b i l i t y and 1 P a t t u l l o to King, 17 November 1933. 6 2 2 standing, having regard s o l e l y to the public i n t e r e s t . " This statement had been interpreted by the electorate to mean that P a t t u l l o would not be bound by party a f f i l i a t i o n i n the selec-t i o n of his cabinet, and neither P a t t u l l o nor the party had done anything during the el e c t i o n campaign to counter this view. A f t e r a week's consideration, P a t t u l l o submitted the following names to the lieutenant-governor: Premier, President of the Council and Minister of Railways Thomas Dufferin P a t t u l l o P r o v i n c i a l Secretary and Minister of Education George Moir Weir Attorney-General Gordon McGregor Sloan Minister of Finance John Hart Minister of Lands Arthur Wellesley Gray Minister of Mines and Minister of Labour George Sharrett Pearson Minister of Agriculture Kenneth Cattanech MacDonald 3 Minister of Public Works Prank M i t c h e l l MacPherson A l l were Liberals and John Hart was the only former minister to be included i n the new administration. P a t t u l l o probably ignored other former colleagues because he did not want his administration to be too c l o s e l y i d e n t i f i e d with those of his L i b e r a l predec-essors. MacLean's government had, a f t e r a l l , been defeated i n the 1928 el e c t i o n , and i t would be p o l i t i c a l l y unwise to imply that the defeated government was returning to o f f i c e . P a t t u l l o had, i n e f f e c t , constructed a new L i b e r a l party, and he wished i t to be i d e n t i f i e d with himself. Another very important factor i n cabinet making i s to secure proper regional representation and 2 A b r i e f synopsis...., l o c . c i t . 3 Pa t t u l l o to Hon. J. H. Fordham-Johnson, November 1933 6 3 P a t t u l l o reported to Mackenzie King that he was s a t i s f i e d that the members that he had selected "represent a l l portions of the k province." It i s extremely doubtful that P a t t u l l o ever considered selecting part of his cabinet from outside the ranks of his own party. As h i s attitude toward c o a l i t i o n , both i n 1 9 3 2 and 19^1, makes abundantly clear, i t was not i n his nature to favour any sort of interparty co-operation. In any case, with a house containing 35 L i b e r a l s , and with many of them eminently suitable f o r cabinet positions, there was no r e a l need for the premier to look beyond his own party, and i f he had, he would probably have aroused considerable resentment i n the L i b e r a l ranks. Pattullo was content with his choice and remarked that: I did not c a l l i n a number of strong men, some of whom were formerly associated with me i n government, but I believe that I made the best s e l e c t i o n under the circumstances, as a l l the men appointed have capacity i n their respective spheres....5 The new cabinet set to work at once to study the many serious problems faced by the province and to seek t h e i r solution. P a t t u l l o knew that the future of the L i b e r a l party i n the province and his own career as i t s leader and as p r o v i n c i a l premier a f t e r 1 9 3 3 depended f a r less on the e f f i c i e n c y of the p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l machine than on the strength of the p r o v i n c i a l economy. Unless P a t t u l l o could demonstrate that he and his party were k P a t t u l l o to King, 1 7 November 1 9 3 3 . 5 P a t t u l l o to King, 1 7 November 1 9 3 3 . 64 making a genuine e f f o r t to improve conditions, and, further, that these e f f o r t s were meeting some measure of success, then, as surely as i t had destroyed the Tolmie government, the depression would i n turn destroy the new government. Although the L i b e r a l organization played an important part i n the e l e c t o r a l success of the party i n 1937 and was to play an important role i n the defeat i n 191+1* a f t e r 1933 i t was, i n i t s p o l i t i c a l e f f e c t s , secondary i n importance to the actions of the government i t s e l f . In the e l e c t i o n campaign, P a t t u l l o had outlined a general plan which was to ameliorate the most important problems created by the depression - growing unemployment, declining municipal and p r o v i n c i a l tax revenues, and increasing r e l i e f payments. One of the most important features of t h i s plan was what he often termed a "broad gauge p o l i c y " i n economic a f f a i r s , a p o l i c y which involved large-scale spending on public works by both p r o v i n c i a l and federal governments. Since the province had "not a cent i n the Treasury even to pay current accounts and some #20,000,000 of early financing to do,"^ P a t t u l l o immediately-asked for an in t e r e s t - f r e e loan from the federal government. He f e l t that i f the federal government: would lend this province, say, #15,000,000 a year, without interest...a great deal of public good would r e s u l t . The unemployment problem would be l a r g e l y solved and we would enjoy prosperity...not to speak of the necessary improvement i n the morale of our people.7 6 P a t t u l l o to King, 29 November 1933. 7 P a t t u l l o to S i r George Perley, Acting Prime Minister of Canada, 27 A p r i l 1935. 66 He would repay these loans by returning "to the Dominion each year...an amount that would liq u i d a t e the p r i n c i p a l within the „8 l i f e t i m e of the works carried out." In addition to these loans, P a t t u l l o hoped to Increase p r o v i n c i a l revenues (and thus p r o v i n c i a l expenditures) by persuading the federal government to a p o l i c y of "better terms" for B r i t i s h Columbia i n f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l tax-sharing and i n Q the federal grant to the provinces. In the e l e c t i o n campaign, one of the p r i n c i p a l planks In the L i b e r a l platform had been the promise to establish an Economic Council for B r i t i s h Columbia. This Council, or "brains t r u s t , " as i t was popularly c a l l e d , was established during the 193k session of the Legislature with Dr. ¥. A. Carrothers, an economist, as i t s head. The Council's f i r s t functions were to c o l l e c t general economic information r e l a t i n g to the province and, more important, to prepare the province's case both for loans for public works and f o r better terms. P a t t u l l o was never very successful i n h i s e f f o r t s to persuade the federal government to p a r t i c i p a t e i n his public works schemes. R. B. Bennett's Conservative government, despite repeated l e t t e r s , telegrams, and v i s i t s to Ottawa by the premier and various members of his cabinet, ignored the pleas of the 8 P a t t u l l o to King, 9 August 193k« 9 The matter of B r i t i s h Columbia's claims f o r better terms i s highly complex and outside the scope of t h i s work. The views of the P a t t u l l o government on this problem at this time are outlined i n B r i t i s h Columbia's claim for readjustment of  Terms of Union, V i c t o r i a , King's Printer, 193k» 66 B r i t i s h Columbia government. In 1935, the return of the L i b e r a l party under the leadership of Mackenzie King raised P a t t u l l o 1 s hopes somewhat, but King, too, proved a disappointment when he refused to lend money to the province except under the very s t r i c t control of the federal government's proposed Loan Council. In the matter of better terms, P a t t u l l o was s l i g h t l y more successful. In 193k> he persuaded Bennett to make a small annual grant of $750,000 u n t i l the whole matter was thoroughly 10 investigated. When Pa t t u l l o discovered, early i n 1934-* that the federal government was unwilling to a s s i s t him i n public works projects, he was forced to attempt to f u l f i l h is e l e c t i o n promises with the meagre p r o v i n c i a l revenues. The precarious p o s i t i o n of the p r o v i n c i a l treasury would not allow the government to embark on a large plan of spending at the same time as i t was providing for the repayment of the p r o v i n c i a l debt. The premier threatened that i f he had to choose between essential govern-ment expenditure and defaulting on the debt, he would default. Finance Minister John Hart, however, arranged a compromise plan. This plan was, e s s e n t i a l l y , based on the procedure which was followed by the L i b e r a l government u n t i l the beginning of the war. The p r o v i n c i a l government decided, Hart reported i n 1937: to pay a l l our current expenses out of current revenue by l i m i t i n g them to the income, to borrow 10 Charles Lugrin Shaw, "B.C.'s Secession t a l k , " Maclean's  Magazine, v o l . 4.9 (November 15, 1936), p. 26. 67 for unemployment r e l i e f as every government i n America has been doing, and to pass up the major part of our sinking fund payments for the time being... .11 This plan also enabled the government to "avoid increased 12 taxation which would s t i f l e recovery." Since the amount of money available for "pump-priming" was small, the action taken by the government was r e l a t i v e l y unspectacular, and the Li b e r a l s were severely c r i t i c i z e d for » f a i l i n g to l i v e up to their campaign promises. Perhaps t h i s c r i t i c i s m was the p r i n c i p a l reason for passing, i n the 193k session of the l e g i s l a t u r e , the Special Powers Act which gave to the cabinet most of the powers of the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . Immediately, the government was charged with attempting to set up a dictatorship. P a r t l y as a r e s u l t of t h i s c r i t i c i s m and p a r t l y because h i s l e g i s l a t i v e majority made the powers completely unnecessary, the act was allowed to lapse In the following year. Its passing did, however, serve to divert some attention away from the embarrassing c r i t i c i s m of the f a i l u r e to provide "work and wages" immediately, and provided time for some of the other measures enacted to show some p o s i t i v e e f f e c t . The years of Pattullo's f i r s t term produced an Impressive number of measures, generally small i n their individual e f f e c t ; but, when considered as a whole, r e s u l t i n g i n a consider-able improvement i n economic conditions. In agriculture, 11 Cited i n L e s l i e Pox, "Recovery i n B.C.," MacLean's  Magazine, v o l . 50 (February 15, 1937), p. k&» 12 Loc. c i t . 68 c o l l e c t i v e marketing l e g i s l a t i o n was introduced i n 1934- t o help farmers and f r u i t ranchers to earn a more equitable return on t h e i r products; and i n 1935 seeds were provided both to farmers 13 and to families f o r th e i r private gardens. In 193lf., minimum - Ill-wage laws were enacted. The premier claimed success i n r a i s i n g the "wages of approximately one hundred thousand working men and women. ..and the purchasing pox^ rer of our people Twas") 15 increased by many millions of do l l a r s without injury to industry." In the same year, hours of work were reduced so that employment would be d i s t r i b u t e d amongst more people; r e l i e f scales were Increased considerably; and i n 1935 t r a i n i n g was provided for young men through forestry and mining camps and through a new 16 apprenticeship scheme. Continuous assistance was given to the lumber Industry to help i t enlarge i t s markets; power resources were surveyed; and mapping carried out to encourage private development. 13 "An Act to provide for the Marketing of Natural Products," Statutes of the Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, 193k, V i c t o r i a , . King's Pri n t e r , 193k> c» 3 yJ "An Act to f a c i l i t a t e the Growing of Pure Seed of Vegetable and F i e l d Crops," Statutes of the  Province of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1935, V i c t o r i a , King's Pri n t e r , 1935, c. 69 . lij. "An Act to amend and consolidate the 'Male Minimum Wage Act,''! Statutes.. .193k, c. 4.7; and "An Act to amend and consol-idate, the Act respecting a Minimum Wage Law for Women," Ibid., c. 4.8. 15 Mimeographed copy of a radio address on station C.R.C.V., 20 September 1935-16 "An Act to amend and consolidate the 'Hours of Work Act, 1 9 2 3 , ' " Statutes.... 193k, c. 30; and "An Act respecting the t r a i n i n g of apprentices," Statutes.. . 1 9 3 5 , c. 3» 69 Although they never reached a l e v e l s a t i s f a c t o r y to the government, expenditures on public works, p a r t i c u l a r l y for roads and bridges, each year s t e a d i l y increased. In addition to maintaining e x i s t i n g roads and other public works, the government opened new roads and for the f i r s t time paved many trunk roads. When i n 1935, f o r example, fl, 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 was provided f o r t h i s pur-pose, P a t t u l l o proudly reported that "bituminous surfacing of about three hundred miles of trunk highways w i l l have been made this year. In addition, sections of trunk roads are being 17 improved i n preparation for future surfacing." The largest single public works project of the period, the building of a t o l l bridge across the Praser at New Westmin-ster, aroused considerable public controversy. The opponents of this project c r i t i c i z e d i t because the new bridge was to replace a structure that had been t o l l - f r e e ; because they f e l t that too much money was being spent i n one section of the province at the expense of a l l the other areas; and because there were some reports that a certain amount of patronage was dispersed i n the contracts."^ During his f i r s t term P a t t u l l o also suffered two important reverses. To his disappointment, he f a i l e d to persuade the federal government to take over and complete the P a c i f i c Great Eastern Railway. He stated that: The province has between $75,000,000 and $ 8 0 , 0 0 0 , 0 0 0 now i n the venture but we would, of 17 Radio Address, l o c . c i t . 18 Times, 19 March 1935, p. 1 70 course, not suggest that any such an amount be allowed by the Dominion Government. What we have suggested i s that replacement value be allowed, approximating $35,000,000.19 It i s u n l i k e l y that either Bennett or King would have assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the railway even i f i t had been offered to the federal government as an outright g i f t . In any case, both men f l a t l y refused i t on Pattullo's terms. A further disappointment was the government's f a i l u r e to i n s t i t u t e any system of health insurance. The L i b e r a l p l a t -form i n 1933 had promised "a measure of State Health Insurance should be made e f f e c t i v e , not only to preserve health, but to 20 reduce costs both to the average c i t i z e n and to industry." A measure primarily the work of Dr. Weir, the P r o v i n c i a l Secretary, to bring some health insurance into e f f e c t was passed during the spring session of the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e i n 1936. The government proposed to proclaim the l e g i s l a t i o n on March 1, 1937• But doctors and various boards of trade, encouraged by a shrewd suspicion that the project did not have the f u l l support of the pr o v i n c i a l cabinet, made a concerted e f f o r t to prevent the law 21 from coming into e f f e c t . The threat of a s t r i k e by the doctors had some e f f e c t ; proclamation was postponed u n t i l the views of 19 P a t t u l l o to King, [j. January 1936. He had also offered i t to Bennett i n 193k fo r $30,000,000. V. Pa t t u l l o to King, 9 August 193k-20 A b r i e f synopsis...., l o c . c i t . 21 It would appear from the correspondence, newspapers, and other evidence that the measure had the f u l l support of P a t t u l l o , Weir and Pearson and the opposition of Hart and MacPherson. The views of Wells Gray, McDonald and Sloan are not clear. 7 1 the voters could be obtained i n a p l e b i s c i t e held i n conjunction with the 1937 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . Despite the enactment of these economic and s o c i a l measures, Pattullo's programme did not provide "work and wages" fo r everyone i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The premier maintained continuously that unemployment was e s s e n t i a l l y a federal problem and that the only possible solutions for It had to be nation-wide i n scope. This view was f i n a l l y accepted by Prime Minister Bennett when, i n 1935, he brought down his "New Deal" l e g i s l a t i o n . Bennett's government was defeated i n the federal e l e c t i o n of that year, but his successor, Mackenzie King, had also, i n his campaign addresses, promised that a L i b e r a l government would assume the 22 primary r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r unemployment i n Canada. Neither Bennett's l e g i s l a t i o n nor King's promises, however, had any immediate e f f e c t on the problem i n B r i t i s h Columbia, and the men remained on the r e l i e f r o l l s . Unemployment In B r i t i s h Columbia was further aggravated by the " i n f l u x of thousands of transients 23 to our salubrious climate." Economic conditions i n the province improved very gradually between 193k- a n c * 1937 but, because of t h i s i n f l u x of transients, the number of unemployed remained at about the same l e v e l as i n 1933. 22 King's views on the problem are presented i n considerable d e t a i l i n National L i b e r a l Federation, Mackenzie King to the  Canadian people, 1935, Toronto, National L i b e r a l P u b l i c i t y Committee, 1935« 23 Typescript of an interview given to the Montreal Star and La P a t r i e , 3 December 1936. 72 Although conditions were considerably better i n B r i t i s h Columbia i n 1937 than they had been i n 1933"*' there was much that remained to be done, both by the p r o v i n c i a l and by the federal government to a l l e v i a t e economic d i s t r e s s . Nevertheless, when the achievements of the regime are weighed against i t s f a i l u r e s , i t would seem that Pattullo had considerable j u s t i -f i c a t i o n for pride i n h i s accomplishments. During t h i s f i r s t term i n o f f i c e , l i k e the province i t s e l f , the premier's p o l i t i c a l instrument, the L i b e r a l party, underwent many changes. In 1933, the party had t r i e d to appear to be, and i n part was, an organization which was seeking o f f i c e i n order to implement a programme of s o c i a l reform. In addition, however, i t had been Pattullo's personal organization, set up and managed by him i n order that he could become premier of B r i t i s h Columbia. It would not be f a i r to P a t t u l l o to imply that personal power had been his only aim, for he had done a great deal to make the L i b e r a l party reform-minded, but c e r t a i n l y ambition had spurred his e f f o r t s . After the 1933 e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y and the progressive l e g i s l a t i o n of the f i r s t two or three years of his o f f i c e , the party became less interested i n reform, or at l e a s t i n new reforms, and more content to look backward to praise i t s past. In opposition, parties are forced to seek new men and new ideas to provide appeal. Once i n o f f i c e and having implemented t h e i r o r i g i n a l programme, they tend to be car r i e d forward by the momentum of events and to bring i n new l e g i s l a t i o n as they think necessity d i c t a t e s . By. 1937 the L i b e r a l party had come to t h i s condition. The party s t i l l contained 73 reformers who f e l t that further s o c i a l l e g i s l a t i o n was necessary, but these men were now i n the minority and, with the exception of Weir and Pearson, they lacked cabinet leadership and support. The organization, too, became less the personal vehicle of the premier and more i d e n t i f i e d with the whole government. In e f f e c t , i t became almost a department of the government with the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for making sure that the government was returned to power i n successive elections, As premier, P a t t u l l o had f a r less time to devote to the organization than when he was leader of the opposition. Part of the d i r e c t i o n of a f f a i r s was assumed by the cabinet as a whole and part by the organizers and the inner group of the L i b e r a l Association's executive. Another element i n the changing nature of the L i b e r a l party was the fact that v i c t o r y attracted to i t s ranks those who were interested i n being members of the party i n power. Party success always seems to a t t r a c t persons who are interested not so much i n p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s and the party's programme as i n patronage, p o l i t i c a l favours and appointments, or, less frequently, i n the pleasure of belonging to a successful organization. This new group tends to d i l u t e the effectiveness of reformers and generally looks toward the preservation of the status quo. During these years, P a t t u l l o and the government had to contend with a. number of major problems i n connection with t h e i r p o l i t i c a l organization. After the e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y in-2k Senator Nancy Hodges. Interview with the writer, 26 August 1956. • Ik 1933* P a t t u l l o appointed, on a temporary basis, Major Moodie, who had been the party organizer while the Liberals were i n opposition, to be his o f f i c e a s s i s t a n t . When thi s appointment was announced, i t aroused considerable c r i t i c i s m , and the premier was forced to deny, i n November, 1933, that the appointment meant "that some expenses of organization work of the L i b e r a l Party are l i k e l y to be paid out of public funds." He went on to say that, i f t h i s had been his plan, then " i t might not have been d i f f i c u l t to secure the benefit of Major Moodie's services under cover. 25 I am not going to do business that way...." Moodie remained i n the premier's o f f i c e u n t i l September, 1931+, when he was 26 replaced by Ben Heathey. When he l e f t the premier's o f f i c e Moodie s i g n i f i e d h i s wish to r e t i r e as organizer a f t e r the 1935 federal e l e c t i o n . His announcement aroused a small controversy within the party concerning his replacement and to whom the right belonged to appoint a replacement or replacements. Some members of the party wanted the province "divided into four zones with a sub-organizer for each of those zones under the control of the 27 Premier and Cabinet Ministers...." P a t t u l l o opposed t h i s 28 suggestion, pointing out that " A l l of those things cost money...." and promising that "the Government w i l l give consideration to 25 Press statement, 23 November 1933. 26 Press statement, 8 September 193l+« 27 Typescript "Proceedings at meeting of Executive of B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l .Association," 2lj. July 1936, p. 76. 28 Ibid., p. 2I+. 75> every portion of the Province." Despite the premier's objec-tions, the Executive of the L i b e r a l Association passed, a r e s o l -u tion c a l l i n g for the appointment of four organizers at i t s July, 1936 meeting. At the same executive meeting, some members contended that the organizer should be appointed by the Executive, others that he should be chosen by a small committee of the Executive, and s t i l l others that he should be selected by the cabinet. P a t t u l l o agreed with those who argued that the appointment was the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the Executive, stating that: the Prime Minister must approve of any organizer that i s appointed, because he w i l l have to be i n close touch with the Prime Minister i n a confid-e n t i a l capacity, and i f t h i s meeting appoints somebody with whom I could not work, we would be at cross purposes.30 P a t t u l l o eventually had his way; i n the autumn of 1936, he 31 selected Charles Reid as L i b e r a l organizer. Reid was given an assistant, James S i n c l a i r , for the e l e c t i o n of 1937. A f t e r 32 t h i s e l e c t i o n , Reid did the organizational work on h i s own. The necessity for a L i b e r a l convention posed another problem for P a t t u l l o . The constitution of the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association c a l l e d f o r that body to meet at l e a s t every 29 Typescript "Proceedings at meeting of Executive of B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association," 2l+ July 1936, p. 77. 30 Ibid., p. 26 . 31 Vancouver News Herald, 27 October 1936, p. 8 . 32 Hon. James S i n c l a i r . Interview with the writer, 15 July 1958. 76, three years. According to i t s provisions, a convention should have been c a l l e d not l a t e r than the autumn of 1 9 3 5 " . But none was held at that time. By the spring of 1 9 3 6 there were i n s i s t e n t demands, both from various members of the party and from outside 3k sources, that a convention be c a l l e d . This issue was the subject of a great deal of controversy at the executive meeting held i n July, 1 9 3 6 . Many members agreed with Harry Perry, who i n s i s t e d that the convention be c a l l e d no l a t e r than the autumn of 1 9 3 6 , because: To my mind the L i b e r a l Party i s not i n a healthy state i n this province, and I believe the masses of the people look to the L i b e r a l Party for leadership.. . 1 think i f we defer the date of the convention very long we are making a very serious and grave mistake. 3 5 P a t t u l l o objected to thi s view because: We have got to propose something of a very p r a c t i c a l character, and I can see a number of questions of in t e r e s t that w i l l not be s u f f i c i e n t l y c r y s t a l l i z e d . . . p r o p e r l y , i f we want to adopt a platform that w i l l receive the consideration of the people of the province...When the l a s t convention was ca l l e d , I as leader took the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of saying when i t was going to be c a l l e d . It happened to be well-timed and well thought out...and we 3 3 V. supra, p. 1 7 . 3k Times, 1 3 February 1 9 3 6 , p. 1 ; Province, 1I4. February 1 9 3 6 , p. I j Province, 25 February 1 9 3 6 , p. 6. A Province e d i t o r i a l e n t i t l e d " G a l l that convention!", 1)4 February 1 9 3 6 , p. 6 , prompted another of Pattullo's many l e t t e r s of protest to that newspaper. "The e d i t o r i a l to which have reference i l l u s t r a t e s the a v i d i t y with which you grab and concoct i n order to make a point, and i f you w i l l look up the facts...you w i l l see what a ludicrous p o s i t i o n you are i n . " Pa t t u l l o to Roy W. Brown, 15 February 1 9 3 6 . 3 5 "Proceedings...", op. c i t . , p. 82. 77 adopted r e s o l u t i o n s that r e c e i v e d p u b l i c approbation...If you leave I t open we w i l l c a l l a convention.36 The Executive, f i n a l l y agreeing w i t h the premier t h a t more time was necessary, passed a r e s o l u t i o n c a l l i n g f o r a convention before the end of June, 1937. Before that date a r r i v e d , however, P a t t u l l o had decided to c a l l an e l e c t i o n , to be h e l d on June 1, 1937. The f a i l u r e to c a l l a convention before the e l e c t i o n aroused considerable c r i t i c i s m during the campaign. F i n a l l y , i n the summer of 1938, a p a r t y convention was h e l d . The p a r t y leaders avoided the c o n s t i t u t i o n a l p r o v i s i o n i n a r a t h e r novel way. During the years between the 1932 and the 1938 conventions, a new c o n s t i t u t i o n f o r the party was d r a f t e d . In t h i s d r a f t c o n s t i t u t i o n , the three year time l i m i t was omitted completely and conventions were to be h e l d "at such 37 time and place as the Executive s h a l l d i r e c t . " The d r a f t was approved by the Executive committee i n March, 1936, but i t could 38 not t a k e . e f f e c t u n t i l i t was approved by a p a r t y convention. The 1938 convention adopted the new c o n s t i t u t i o n and thus gave a s o r t of ex post f a c t o l e g a l i t y to the long delay. 36 T y p e s c r i p t "Proceedings at meeting of Executive of B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l . A s s o c i a t i o n , " 2l\. J u l y 1936, p. 79. 37 " C o n s t i t u t i o n : B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l A s s o c i a t i o n , " n . d . , . a r t i c l e 18. This c o n s t i t u t i o n was the d r a f t adopted. by the executive i n 1936 and approved at the convention i n 1938. I t i s of l a t e r date than the c o n s t i t u t i o n discussed i n chapter 2 . 38 V. supra, p. 20. 78 In the e l e c t i o n of 1933, the Lib e r a l s had promised that i t was " L i b e r a l p o l i c y that a government s h a l l be considered to 39 be defeated only upon a straight want-of-confidence motion." This promise arose p a r t i a l l y from the c r i t i c i s m of the party system during the c o a l i t i o n controversy i n 1932 and had been designed " i n order that the utmost Freedom of Action by Members  of the Legislature may be assured i n respect of questions before the House...."^° P a t t u l l o had highly commended this proposal In theory, but he discovered i n practice that i t weakened his control over his followers-. The d i f f i c u l t y of maintaining d i s c i p l i n e came to l i g h t during the debate on the plan to b u i l d the Fraser River bridge. A number of L i b e r a l members opposed the project, and, however persuasive P a t t u l l o was, he could not e n l i s t the support of a l l the back-benchers. One r e c a l c i t r a n t member was to l d that the only way that the province could a f f o r d the bridge was through the charging of t o l l s , and the fact that tenders f o r the bridge had not been ca l l e d was not to be c r i t i c i s e d because "our own Department w i l l know what the cost of the bridge should be, and we w i l l allow...reasonable super-v i s i o n charge." Despite the premier's e f f o r t s f i v e of his supporters voted against the measure. To one of these, P a t t u l l o wrote that he was: 39 A b r i e f synopsis of L i b e r a l P o l i c y , Vancouver, Sun Publishing Company, 1933« k° Ibid. k l P a ttullo to D. W. Strachan, M.L.A., 18 September 193k» 79 very anxious to receive the support and commendation of Members of the House. I believe that Members elected i n support of a Government should look for ways and means to support the Government, rather than be c r i t i c a l . I t would be very easy for members of the Govern-ment to indulge i n recriminations but a House divided f a l l s . 4-2 The bridge issue proved to be the only occasion u n t i l the events which followed the el e c t i o n i n 194-1* when Pattullo was faced with an open r e v o l t on the part of his back-benchers. At times some of his followers did oppose the government, but with less frequency and i n fewer numbers as time went on. When i t became apparent that the premier, while endorsing freedom of action i n p r i n c i p l e , held the view that the deeds of his govern-ment at no time warranted the p r i n c i p l e being translated into action, most of the members, i t can be presumed, ai r e d any opposition that they had to the government's programme i n caucus and not i n the House or on the public platform. A very s i g n i f i c a n t d i f f i c u l t y f o r the party was posed by the three by-elections that i t had to face between 1933 and 1 9 3 7 . The f i r s t by-election took place on July I4., 1 9 3 b i n the North Vancouver constituency after the death of the s i t t i n g member, H. C. E. Anderson of the C.C.P. ;Since the seat had t r a d i t i o n a l l y been L i b e r a l and i n 1933 had been won by the C.C.P. mainly because there had been two L i b e r a l candidates i n the el e c t i o n and a t h i r d prominent L i b e r a l had run as an Independent, the by-election was an important test of the popularity for the 4.2 P a t t u l l o to R.R. Burns, M.L.A., 1$ A p r i l 1935 80 new government. The L i b e r a l o r g a n i z a t i o n i n North Vancouver was r e p a i r e d i n the s p r i n g of 193k when the p a r t y nominated only one candidate, Mackenzie Matheson. The C.C.P. nominated one of i t s most prominent members, Mrs. Dorothy Steeves. Since the Conservatives decided not to enter the b y - e l e c t i o n , the contest was between the two p a r t i e s on the i s s u e of whether or not the P a t t u l l o government had as yet a c t u a l l y done anything to solve the problems of the depression.^" The p u b l i c a t t i t u d e toward the government was summed up by Robert Cromie who pointed out that " P a t t u l l o has been up against a l l s o r t s of t r o u b l e since he got i n , but...he has been i n o f f i c e 6 months and nothing has been k$ done f o r work and wages...." When Mrs. Steeves won the b y - e l e c t i o n by over f i v e hundred votes the r e s u l t was i n t e r p r e t e d by most people as "a f a i r i n d i c a t i o n of the extent to which the P a t t u l l o government has l o s t the confidence of the p u b l i c i n B r i t i s h Columbia." P a t t u l l o defended the l o s s v i g o u r o u s l y , saying t h a t there "has never been a b y - e l e c t i o n i n t h i s Province where the i n d i c a t i o n s were more unfavourable to the government than i n the recent kl b y - e l e c t i o n . " Despite the premier's views, however, the I4.3 H.S. Wood was the o f f i c i a l L i b e r a l candidate and H.E. Ryan als o ran under the L i b e r a l banner. J.M. Bryan ran as an Independent and l a t e r sat i n the L e g i s l a t u r e as a L i b e r a l f o r Mackenzie constituency. kk- The United Front and Independent S o c i a l i s t s both nominated candidates but between them they p o l l e d l e s s than two hundred votes. i|5 Robert Cromie to Major Moodie, k June 193k* kd G.G. McGeer to King, 18 J u l y 193k* PABC, McGeer Papers. kl P a t t u l l o to Cromie, 18 J u l y 1934* 81 government had suffered an important defeat. The loss showed how quickly and by how much the party had l o s t popularity since November. The other two by-elections were caused by the r e s i g -nation of two s i t t i n g L i b e r a l members, A. M. Manson of. Omineca and G. G. McGeer of Vancouver-Burrard, both of whom had decided, i n 1935* to run i n the federal general e l e c t i o n . P a t t u l l o p u b l i c l y encouraged both men i n t h e i r federal ambitions and was not unhappy to see the departure of McGeer, who had been a constant i r r i t a t i o n to him i n the p r o v i n c i a l House. He was annoyed, however, at the necessity to c a l l by-elections to replace these members at a time when his government had become very unpopular and when "barely a round dozen of the t h i r t y - f i v e L i b e r a l members r e a l l y expected the Government to survive the k8 next general e l e c t i o n . " P a t t u l l o was "surprised to f i n d some very prominent Liberals advocating an agreement with the Conservative Party i n respect of these two seats for the alleged purpose of making sure 14-9 of defeating the C.C.P." He rejected t h i s proposal and instead arranged for the by-elections to be postponed as long as possible. In the 1936 session of the Legislature the Elections Act was amended to allow for the postponement of these by-elections, ostensibly because P a t t u l l o found "that there were a large number of names on the Dominion voters' l i s t s that were not I4.8 Pox, op. c i t . , p. ij.9. ij.9 P a t t u l l o to King, 19 October 1935. 82 on the P r o v i n c i a l l i s t s - i n Burrard some llj.,000..." and because "there also arose the necessity of attending conferences i n 50 Ottawa." The r e a l reason for the delay, however, was the government's unpopularity and i t s fear of defeat not only i n the p o l i t i c a l l y unreliable constituency of Vancouver-Burrard but also i n Omineca, which had been for many years almost a pocket-borough for the L i b e r a l party. The amendment was passed, though not without the expression of strong opposition both within and outside the Legislature. The government waited u n t i l a more favourable occasion and f i n a l l y c a l l e d the Omineca by-election i n June, 1936. By t h i s time, some of the measures introduced by the government had taken e f f e c t and a measure of prosperity had returned to the province. Mark Connelly, the L i b e r a l candidate, defeated h i s C.C.P. and Conservative opponents by a small majority and the government, thus encouraged, f i n a l l y c a l l e d the Burrard by-e l e c t i o n for early September of the same year. The Burrard election was p a r t i c u l a r l y s i g n i f i c a n t , since the newly-chosen Conservative and C.C.P. leaders both 51 decided to contest i t . The campaign was p a r t i c u l a r l y b i t t e r , but the government was successful, although the majority of i t s 52 candidate, Howard Forrester, was quite small. P a t t u l l o was 50 Pattullo to M.E. Nichols, 2k January 1936. 51 V. i n f r a , pp. 86.-88 for comment on the new party leaders. 52 The by-election results were as follows: L.H. Forrester (Liberal) 7I4.59 Lyle Telford (C.C.F.) 7072 Dr. F. Patterson (Conservative) 565k R. Walker ( S o c i a l i s t ) \5 CPG-, 1937. p. 1+18. 8 3 extremely pleased with the r e s u l t , not only because of the defeat of the leaders of the two other pa r t i e s , but also because he took the vic t o r y to be a vote of confidence i n his government and " f e l t that the people of the Province were a l i v e to the fact that 53 we were doing the very best possible under d i f f i c u l t conditions." In addition to his other problems, Pattullo faced some d i f f i c u l t i e s i n his re l a t i o n s with some of the more prominent members of the L i b e r a l party. The most public of these d i f f i c u l -t i e s was that with G. G. McGeer. Pattullo also quarreled with the Speaker of the Legislature, the veteran L i b e r a l member from Port George r i d i n g , Harry Perry. The cause of the differences between the two men i s obscure, although the trouble may have started when Perry was l e f t out of Pattu l l o ' s cabinet i n 1933. On more than one occasion t h e i r disagreements were ai r e d i n pub l i c . Although these differences were not the announced reason, P a t t u l l o did not ask Perry to serve as Speaker during 55 his second term. After the e l e c t i o n of 1937, P a t t u l l o b r i e f l y considered Perry f o r the post of Minister of Mines, but f i n a l l y 56 selected W. J. Ass e l s t l n e . Perry knew that he was one of the possible choices and t h i s second r e j e c t i o n was very l i k e l y the reason for h i s open h o s t i l i t y to P a t t u l l o when the premier's 53 Press statement, 3 September 1936. 54 Sun, 19 February 1936, p. 11; and Province, 7 March 1936, p. 5 . 55 Press statement, 12 June 1937. 56 Hon. James S i n c l a i r . Interview with the writer, 15 July 1958. This view was confirmed by Charles Reid. Interview with the writer, 17 July 1958. 84 d i f f i c u l t i e s began a f t e r the e l e c t i o n of 19l±l. P a t t u l l o was also annoyed at his young Attorney-General, Gordon Sloan, who applied to the federal government for an appointment to f i l l the f i r s t vacancy i n the- B r i t i s h Columbia 57 Court of Appeal. Sloan had not informed Pattullo of his request and rel a t i o n s between P a t t u l l o and Sloan were quite cool from December, 1935* when Pattullo was informed of the request, 58 u n t i l Sloan actually received the appointment i n March, 1937. A further area of party discord involved the relations between the Liberals.', federal and p r o v i n c i a l branches. P a t t u l l o campaigned widely for the federal L i b e r a l candidates i n the general e l e c t i o n of 1935. When the party did not do as well i n the B r i t i s h Columbia constituencies as some of i t s members had expected, Pa t t u l l o complained that "Some of the soreheads are 59 looking for a scapegoat and want to take i t out on me." As a r e s u l t of t h i s dissension a move was made to separate the two organizations but Wendell P a r r i s , who during this period had charge of party finances, "pointed out...the i m p o s s i b i l i t y of 60 making such a segregation." Primarily because of P a r r i s ' opposition, the break was not made, although there appears to have been some dissension between the p r o v i n c i a l and federal 57 P a t t u l l o to Hon. Ian Mackenzie, 30 December 1935. 58 P a t t u l l o to Mackenzie, 30 March 1937. 59 Pa t t u l l o to King, 19 October 1935. 60 Wendell Parris to P a t t u l l o , 2.\ September 1937. 8 5 61 members fo r some time. Another factor which tended to separate the two branches of the party was the growing disharmony between Mackenzie King and Pa t t u l l o which arose from t h e i r quarrels over f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l finances. Pattullo was not required to c a l l an e l e c t i o n e a r l i e r than the f a l l of 1938 when the Sixteenth Legislature's f i v e year term would run out. Early i n 1937, however, conditions appeared to be more favourable f o r a L i b e r a l e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y than they had been at any time since the e l e c t i o n of 1933. Por one thing, the economic s i t u a t i o n i n the province was considerably better than i t had been since the depression began. Employment had increased and the numbers on the r e l i e f 62 r o l l s began to decline very early i n 1937• The government had more money than ever before to spend on i t s public works and i t was planning to begin this expanded programme as early as 63 possible i n the year. Throughout the country, wages were 6k increasing at a faster rate than were p r i c e s . i n the previous year Hart, to the surprise of many people, had been successful i n solving a f i n a n c i a l c r i s i s without the government having to 61 This dissension i s p a r t i c u l a r l y apparent i n "Proceedings op. c i t . 62 Province, 27 February 1937, p. 1. 63 P a t t u l l o to Hart, 25 January 1937. 6i+ The cost of l i v i n g index increased from 9 8 .1 i n 1936 to 101.2 i n 1937, but wages rose from 9I4..8 i n 1936 to 101.8 i n 1937. Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s , Canada Year Book, 19k3-kk, Ottawa, King's Pri n t e r , 191(4, pp. 779-80. 86 65 p a r t i c i p a t e i n the federal government's Loan Council plan. For these reasons, there was a f a i r l y widespread f e e l i n g i n B r i t i s h Columbia that the worst of the depression was over and that the province would shortly be returning to a semblance of i t s former prosperity. The fact that the opposition p a r t i e s , and p a r t i c u l a r l y the C.C.F., were not well prepared to f i g h t an election, provided a further reason for an early vote. U n t i l i t s p r o v i n c i a l convention i n July, 1936, the C.C.F. had been conceded a strong 66 chance of winning the next e l e c t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia. At that convention, however, the C.C.F. adopted an extreme programme which the party promised to implement as soon as i t was elected i n the province. Amongst other things, i t promised to nation-a l i z e the d i s t r i b u t i o n of food, the lumber, f i s h i n g , raining, o i l , and liquor industries, and hinted that i t would favour the form-67 a t i o n of c o l l e c t i v e farms i n the province. The p r o v i n c i a l leader of the party, the Reverend Robert Connell, had been endorsed, a f t e r f i e r c e debate, as party leader, but s t r i c t control over the party members i n the l e g i s l a t u r e by the p r o v i n c i a l executive had been established. After some consideration, Connell, whose " a t t r a c t i o n to the C.C.F. had been the result of a genuine humanitarianism rather than that of doctrinaire 65 Fox, op. c i t . , p. 48 . 66 Ibid., p. 49» 67 Sun, 6 July 1936, p. 1 8 7 68 concerns for s o c i a l reconstruction," decided that he could not with conscience advocate t h i s programme. He therefore denounced i t and the r a d i c a l members of the new party executive. For the next few months the party debated the issue b i t t e r l y and p u b l i c l y . The f i n a l outcome came with the expulsion of Connell and three of the other C.C.F. members of the Legislature from the party. These four men formed a new p o l i t i c a l group, the B r i t i s h Columbia Reconstruction Party, leaving but three regular members of the C.C.F. i n the Legislature. One of the f i r s t results of thi s s p l i t was the defeat of the new C.C.F. leader, Dr. Lyle Telford, i n the Burrard by-election. The Conservative party was also unprepared for a p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . The party had been gradually re-united a f t e r i t s defeat i n 1933. When a p r o v i n c i a l convention was called i n June, 1936, Dr. F. P. Patterson was elected p r o v i n c i a l leader to replace Dr. Tolmie. The platform adopted at the convention showed, however, that the party had learned l i t t l e of the economic and p o l i t i c a l lessons of the depression. Its 1937 e l e c t i o n promises centered i n a pledge "to exercise the utmost economy i n 69 the administration of p r o v i n c i a l a f f a i r s . " Not enough time had yet passed for the memories of the ineptitude of the Tolmie government to fade and the most that the Conservatives could 68 Bovey, op. c i t . , p. 32. 69 C.G. Beeaton, Secretary, Association, to P a t t u l l o , 16 B r i t i s h Columbia Conservative November 1936. 88 hope was that the party might replace the C.C.P. as the o f f i c i a l opposition i n the Legislature. The weakness of the party and the lack of appeal of the new leader were demonstrated when Dr. Patterson ran a poor t h i r d i n the Burrard by-election. At one point the Liberals had been disturbed by the appearance of the Social Credit party i n the province and the 70 government had even given the party's ideas some consideration. The S o c i a l Credit economic plans, however, were rejected almost immediately and fear diminished when Premier Aberhart of Alberta f a i l e d to f u l f i l h i s e l e c t i o n promise of payment of a twenty-f i v e d o l l a r s a month dividend. The L i b e r a l government unable to r e s i s t the combination of improved economic conditions and the divided nature of i t s opposition, decided to c a l l an e l e c t i o n for June 1, 1937* Early i n 1937, general d i r e c t i o n of the L i b e r a l cam-paign was given to Wendell P a r r i s , who also had charge of r a i s i n g 71 the required finances. Parris was surprised to f i n d that the party "had old indebtednesses, some of which had been carried from as far back as the 1929 (sic) p r o v i n c i a l campaign, amounting 72 i n a l l to somewhere i n the v i c i n i t y of $29,000." He collected enough money both to pay these debts and to finance the campaign. It i s not at a l l clear just how much money was required or 70 Colonist, 5 October 1935, P. 2; and Province, 10 October 1935, P. 20 71 Wendell P a r r i s to P a t t u l l o , 2l+ September 1937. 72 Wendell Par r i s to P a t t u l l o , 13 September 19^0. 89 c o l l e c t e d , but a conservative estimate of $100,000 for the costs of the campaign i n the r i d i n g s outside of Greater Vancouver 73 gives some i n d i c a t i o n of the size of his c o l l e c t i o n s . In any case, the party i n power does not have much trouble r a i s i n g campaign funds, and P a t t u l l o apparently had none of the troubles of party finance that had bothered him i n 1933 • ' ^ Although the general d i r e c t i o n of the campaign had been given to P a r r i s , he a c t u a l l y took charge of only the Greater Vancouver r i d i n g s , leaving a l l the r e s t of the province to the new organizer, Charles Reid, undertaking only to supply Reid 75 with the necessary funds. There appears to have been only one dispute over a nomination and that occurred when James S i n c l a i r , who was P a t t u l l o 1 s choice for the candidate i n the North Vancouver 76 r i d i n g , was rejected by the l o c a l organization. The main issue of the e l e c t i o n was whether or not the L i b e r a l government was doing enough to improve the economic conditions i n the province. The L i b e r a l view was, of course, that the government had f u l f i l l e d i t s duties very well. P a t t u l l o and the party pointed to improved economic conditions as proof of the L i b e r a l e f f o r t s . The C.C.P. under Telford, charging that not nearly enough had been done, promised to implement the r a d i c a l programme of reform drawn up by i t s 1936 convention. 73 Charles Reid. Interview. 74. Hon. James S i n c l a i r and Senator Nancy Hodges. Interviews. 75 Charles Reid. Interview. 76 James S i n c l a i r . Interview. 90 The Conservatives complained mainly about the high cost of government and declared that they could administer the province more e f f i c i e n t l y f o r less money. Connell 1s group promised a mild form of socialism and the S o c i a l Credit party advocated i t s obscure monetary doctrines. Many issues were debated i n the campaign. In 1933, P a t t u l l o had promised a highway board which was to plan the development of the provinces road system i n an orderly fashion. This promise had never been implemented, presumably because the government did not f e e l i t could a f f o r d to part with i t s most important instrument of patronage, although i t defended i t s e l f by saying that i t had found the board unnecessary because "the 77 f i n a l decision i n any case would have been up to the government." The government's handling of health Insurance was also c r i t i c i z e d , but the L i b e r a l candidates were usually able to side-step the issue by pointing out that the decision had been referred to the voters, who were to decide the matter i n a p l e b i s c i t e which was to be held at the same time as the e l e c t i o n . The only r e a l l y surprising event of the campaign occurred when P a t t u l l o produced what he was sure would be the piece de resistance of his administration. On A p r i l 26, 1937, the premier announced to a s t a r t l e d province that i n the near 78 future B r i t i s h Columbia would annex the Yukon T e r r i t o r y . To 77 W.J. A s s e l s t i n e . Interview with the writer, 3 February 1957. 78 Sun, 26 A p r i l 1937, p. 1. 91 h i s great surprise, P a t t u l l o was attacked by a l l opposition p a r t i e s , by the people of the Yukon, and by various n o n - p o l i t i c a l organizations throughout the province. The strength and unity of opposition to the plan, which was based mainly on the view that the administration and development of the t e r r i t o r y were far beyond the province's means, forced the premier to modify h i s stand. P a t t u l l o promised that the whole scheme would be given further study; the matter was eventually referred to the Royal Commission of Dominion-Provincial Relations. Prom the very beginning of the campaign, there appears to have been l i t t l e doubt i n the province as to the f i n a l out-come. The opposition parties were contending with each other and the L i b e r a l s , not f o r v i c t o r y , but for the status of o f f i c i a l opposition party, a p o s i t i o n which might be an i n d i c a t i o n of possible future e l e c t o r a l success. The Liberals were sure that they would be v i c t o r i o u s . These L i b e r a l expectations were amply f u l f i l l e d . The f i n a l r e s u l t s of the e l e c t i o n were: Libe r a l s 31 Conservatives 8 C.C.P. 7 Labour 1 Independent 1 79 The L i b e r a l party's share of the popular vote declined from \\2$ i n 1933 to 37$ i n 1937 and the C.C.P.'s from 31$ to 28$. The Conservative party, making a surprising recovery i n the e l e c t i o n , 79 B r i t i s h Columbia, Statement of votes by e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s : general e l e c t i o n and p l e b i s c i t e : June 1st, 1937, V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 1937, p. 11. 92 gained most from the other p a r t i e s ' decline. It p o l l e d a few more votes than did the C.C.P. and made a very considerable 8 0 increase over i t s t o t a l i n 1933. The Health Insurance p l e b i s -8 c i t e passed with 59$ of the voters being i n favour of the plan. 8 0 B r i t i s h Columbia, Statement of votes by e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s ; general e l e c t i o n and p l e b i s c i t e : June 1st, 1937, V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 1937, p. lq.. 8 1 Ibid., p. 1 6 . CHAPTER IV THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION The e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y i n 1937 did not remove any of the problems confronting the B r i t i s h Columbia government. While economic conditions i n 1937 were considerably better than they had been i n 1933, the solut i o n of economic problems remained the most important concern of the government. Unemployment was s t i l l the primary economic problem, and clo s e l y related to Its solution was a f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l f i n a n c i a l controversy. Relations between the B r i t i s h Columbia government and the federal government became more strained than ever, with the r e s u l t that P a t t u l l o , somewhat unjustly, came to have the reputation of a narrow p r o v i n c i a l i s t . A f t e r September, 1939, the outbreak of the Second World War constituted a new element i n the complex p r o v i n c i a l p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n and the war e f f o r t gradually came to dominate a l l other issues. His handling of these d i f f i c u l t i e s i n some measure explain Pattullo's e l e c t i o n defeat i n 194-1. Earl y i n the summer of 1938, the unemployment s i t u a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia became c r i t i c a l and f o r a time threatened law and order i n the province. Since the government was "convinced from past experience that thousands of the single unemployed can f i n d work during the summer months...," i t had, each spring, removed single unemployed employables from the r e l i e f rolls.''" 1 P a t t u l l o to King, 6 July 1938. 9k This practice had been followed i n previous years with a minimum of d i f f i c u l t y , but i n 1938, when the r e l i e f camps were closed, thousands of the single unemployed men marched to Vancouver. In an attempt to force the government to provide them either with jobs or support, they occupied the Hotel Georgia, the Vancouver Ar t Gallery, and the lobby of the Post O f f i c e . The men were f i n a l l y persuaded to leave the Hotel Georgia and the Art Gallery, but they had to be evicted f o r c i b l y from the Vancouver Post O f f i c e . The ev i c t i o n , which appears to have been accompanied by unnecessary b r u t a l i t y , was followed by a r i o t which resulted i n considerable property damage. The p r o v i n c i a l government was i n a dilemma. On the one hand, a "very considerable public sentiment Qwas} i n support of 2 the a c t i v i t i e s of the single homeless jobless..." and the government was subjected to many pressures to provide jobs, or 3 at l e a s t food and accommodation, for the men. On the other hand, thousands of unemployed men from other parts of Canada continued to come to B r i t i s h Columbia. In June, 1938, P a t t u l l o reported to King that: Our records show that during the period from May 23rd to June 1 1 th , over 990 single unemployed men applied for r e l i e f at the Vancouver o f f i c e , of which number, according to t h e i r own statements, only 120 had been In the Province f o r a period of 2 Pattullo to King, 23 June 1938. 3 V. Ebert Paul to P a t t u l l o , 22 June 1938 and "Proceedings at a conference between the Honourable T.D. Pattullo...and a delegation from various churches i n the City of Vancouver...," 20 June 1938. 9 5 ' one year, and only 6 5 . . . f o r over one year-^-the greatest length of residence reported being two years.4 I f these men were given aid, the action would probably a t t r a c t even more unemployed men to the province from other parts of Canada. Pat t u l l o c o r r e c t l y maintained that i t was "not our r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to provide for every penniless person who may 5 come here from the r e s t of Canada, nor can we do so." As he had i n the past, he continued to i n s i s t that the problem of unemployment was p r i m a r i l y a federal r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . In t h i s instance, he was f i n a l l y able to persuade the federal government 6 to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for unemployed men from other provinces. He again asked the federal government to "tackle the whole prob-lem of employment i n a more comprehensive and broader fashion than has been done heretofore." S p e c i f i c a l l y , and again, he asked the federal government to "undertake, i n conjunction with the Province, a broad and expansive p o l i c y of public works ,8 construction." He suggested that these works include the building of roads, schools, hospi t a l s , and a highway to Alaska. His requests met with l i t t l e success. The number of unemployed i n the province remained high u n t i l the beginning of 4 P a t t u l l o to King, 23 June 1938. 5 P a t t u l l o to King, 25 June 1938. . 6 King to P a t t u l l o , 6 July 1938. 7 P a t t u l l o to King, 16 July 1938. 8 P a t t u l l o to Ian Mackenzie, 22 June 1938. 9& the Second World War, when the armed services and the national defense industries began to absorb the surplus into the labour force. In 1937* In an attempt to f i n d some permanent solution to the problems of unemployment, r e l i e f , and the tangled matter of f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l f i n a n c i a l arrangements, Mackenzie King ^ appointed the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations. The B r i t i s h Columbia government prepared and presented an elabor-ate b r i e f to the commission which, i n short, i n s i s t e d that, to enable the provinces to pursue needed programmes of development, if^ - j I they should be given more sources of revenue, and, i n p a r t i c u l a r ^ 9 exclusive use of the income tax. The B r i t i s h Columbia govern-ment revived both the province's demand for special treatment on the grounds that B r i t i s h Columbia was a "special case," and i t s claims f o r better terms. I t soon became apparent that the p r o v i n c i a l government, i n presenting a b r i e f that i n eff e c t c a l l e d f o r greater decentralization of government i n Canada, was at variance with the current views of most of the people i n the province. In t h e i r b r i e f s to the Royal Commission, many groups i n B r i t i s h Columbia, including the Young L i b e r a l Association, opposed the arguments presented i n the government's b r i e f . In their view, greater c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of government was the only 10 solution to Canada's economic problems. 9 B r i t i s h Columbia, B r i t i s h Columbia i n the Canadian Confed-eration, V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 1936". 10 Province, 22 March 1938, p. 1, and 21; March 1938, p. 1. 97 Not u n t i l 19l|0, a f t e r the war begun, did the Royal Commission present i t s Report. For a time, there was speculation that detailed consideration of the recommendations of the 11 Commission would be postponed u n t i l a f t e r the war but, f i n a l l y , Prime Minister King decided to c a l l a f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l confer-ence which was to discuss the Commission's Report. Pattullo's course of conduct at t h i s conference, which was held i n January,^ 19i|.lj formed the most important issue of the I9I4.I p r o v i n c i a l general e l e c t i o n . The Commission's Report offered, as possible solutions to the vexed problem of f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l r e l a t i o n s , two a l t e r -native plans. The Commission recommended i t s Plan 1 as a permanent answer to most of the matters i n dispute between the federal and p r o v i n c i a l governments. If either the provinces or the federal government decided that t h i s plan was unacceptable to them, the Commission then suggested that i t s Plan 11 be adopted as a temporary expedient u n t i l a permanent solution was discovered. In b r i e f , Plan 1 provided for the federal government is to assume r e s p o n s i b i l i t y both for the whole problem of unemploy-ment and for a l l p r o v i n c i a l debts. In addition, the federal government was to pay an annual "National Adjustment Grant" to V the provinces and was to guarantee, i f they were approved by a proposed Finance Commission, a l l future p r o v i n c i a l and municipal borrowings. In exchange f o r this f i n a n c i a l r e l i e f , the provinces 11 Sun, 20 November 1939, p. 5. 98 were to surrender t h e i r rights to personal and corporation income 12 taxes and succession duties. In his i n v i t a t i o n to P a t t u l l o , the prime minister stated that the federal government believed that: the adoption of the Commission's recommendations i s necessary to put our country i n a p o s i t i o n to pursue a p o l i c y which w i l l achieve a maximum war e f f o r t and, at the same time, to lay a sound foundation for post-war reconstruction. 1 3 P a t t u l l o agreed to attend the conference but, i n a statement to the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e , he warned that he was "not prepared to accept the recommendations of t h i s report i n toto as suitably applicable to B r i t i s h Columbia." He f e l t , because of the war, that "the very bases upon which these conclusions were a r r i v e d at...have...very considerably altered, and changed the picture." The premier also strongly objected ^ to King's opinion that the adoption of the Report was essential to the war e f f o r t . These views of the premier, together with h i s decision to go to Ottawa without permitting the Report to be discussed i n the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e , resulted i n considerable c r i t i c i s m . The government, i n addition to the expected attack from the 12 Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial  Relations, Ottawa, Queen's P r i n t e r , 195k, Book 11, p. 86. 13 King to P a t t u l l o , 2 November 19k°» l k "Statement by Premier T. D. P a t t u l l o In B.C. Legislature," 7 November 19kC Mimeographed. 15 Loc. c i t . 99 Colonist and the Province, was chided hy the usually f r i e n d l y Times, which i n s i s t e d that the members of the l e g i s l a t u r e "should have an opportunity to a i r t h e i r views and to contribute such suggestions as they f e e l might be of assistance to the ministers 16 who may go down to the Ottawa conference." The opening session of the conference was held on January 1I4., 19ip-. At this time the premiers were to "express v the views of the P r o v i n c i a l governments on the general p r i n c i p l e s ,,17 embodied i n the Commission's recommendations." Pattullo's statement expanded the views that he had previously expressed i n the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . He c r i t i c i z e d the Report sharply f o r , "as p l a i n blunt men who love our friends, we should speak frankly." He stated that i t appeared to him that the Commission had "approached the problem on the assumption that the Provinces must be curbed, and checking a f t e r curbing, (sic) and that the central authority i s the medium through which this i s to be accom-19 plished." The adoption of the recommendations by the Conference would r e s u l t i n the end of p r o v i n c i a l "independence to pursue 20 ^ p o l i c i e s developmental i n manner." He concluded his statement 16 Times, 9 November 191+0, p. k. 17 King to P a t t u l l o , 28 December I94.O. 18 Statement by Hon. T. D. P a t t u l l o , K.C, LL. D. Premier of  B r i t i s h Columbia at Dominion-Provincial Conference with  reference to report of Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial  Relations, held at Ottawa, January lk., 19I}1, n. p., n. pub., n.d., p. 3 . 19 Loc. c i t . 20 Loc. c i t . 100 by I n s i s t i n g that " i t would seem the part of wisdom to get on with the war and postpone a so far reaching and contentious prob-lem u n t i l after the war." Premier Hepburn of Ontario and Premier Aberhart of Alberta also objected to the c e n t r a l i z i n g features of the report. Afte r a l l the premiers had presented t h e i r prepared statements, there followed a disagreement over the procedure to be followed by the Conference. Prime Minister King wanted the provinces to go into committee to discuss i n d e t a i l various aspects of Plan 1 of the Report. When P a t t u l l o , Hepburn, and Aberhart objected to this proposal, the nine p r o v i n c i a l premiers met apart from the rest of the Conference with two members of the federal cabinet to discuss a new agenda. At that meeting, P a t t u l l o , and presumably Hepburn and Aberhart, suggested that a new agenda, prepared on a broader basis than that of the Commis-v sion Report, be drawn up, but the federal ministers i n s i s t e d on adherence to the prime minister's plan. This meeting was therefore a f a i l u r e , and, as Pa t t u l l o l a t e r explained: Upon returning to the Conference we offered to discuss any and a l l questions at inter e s t between the Provinces and the Dominion, and p a r t i c u l a r l y questions having to do with the war and post-war problems, but the Dominion Government would not consent to the appointment of any committees, except on the basis of the agenda proposed by themselves. ^ We therefore opposed going into committee on this basis and having so done we were s t i l l ready 21 Statement by Hon. T.D. P a t t u l l o . . . . , p. 6. 101 to discuss any and a l l matters, but as we and other provinces did not concur i n the agenda as outlined, the Prime Minister on behalf of the Dominion closed the Conference i n a f r i e n d l y s p i r i t . 2 2 Immediate and vi o l e n t attacks were made on Premier ^ Pat t u l l o and, to a lesser extent, on hi s whole government. The press of the province was v i r t u a l l y unanimous i n i t s disapproval / of the premier's behaviour at the Conference. Even such papers as the Sun and the Times, which generally supported the government, said that the premier had made a grave error i n not at least 23 discussing the Report. The Colonist and the Province were extremely c r i t i c a l both of Pattu l l o ' s conduct at the Conference, 2k and of his attitude to the Report. The newspapers' attitude i s exemplified i n a Province e d i t o r i a l which attacked the premier for discussing the Report after he had returned from Ottawa. It argued that P a t t u l l o "has no claim to be heard now upon the merits of the Rowell-Sirois report. At the appointed time and place for him to be heard, he refused to speak and he refused to l e t anyone 25 else be heard." The. various Boards of Trade and Chambers of Commerce j were also extremely c r i t i c a l of the premier. The business 22 Press statement, 31 January 194.1* 23 Sun, 20 February I94I, p. 4., and Times, 2*>. January I94I, >• 4 . 24. Colonist, 2I4. January 19l|l, p. 4., and Province, 24, January 19i;l, p. k» and 21 February I94I, p. 4.. 25 Province, 21 February I94I, p. 4.. 102. community appears to have favoured the Report, presumably because the adoption of i t s recommendations would lighten i t s tax load, j ^ or at l e a s t standardize the load throughout the nation and end double taxation i n most provinces. Many Boards throughout the province sent l e t t e r s or telegrams to P a t t u l l o condemning him for his stand at the Conference. These attacks annoyed the premier exceedingly, and he was stung s u f f i c i e n t l y by an e s p e c i a l l y b i t t e r attack by the T r a i l Board of Trade to abandon p o l i t i c a l caution and reply: What an unprejudiced jury you gentlemen would make. It would appear that you are ready to judge and condemn on ex-parte statements based on error, misconstruction, misinterpretation, f a l s i f i c a t i o n , l y i n g and l i b e l . You make yourselves believe that you are Canadians f i r s t , whereas as a matter of fact you are yourselves f i r s t , the Consolidated Mining and Smelting Co. probably second, and the Canadianism t r a i l i n g somewhere down the l i n e . \y Of course you w i l l resent these suggestions, but I counsel that you think i t over. Your inner consciousness should t e l l you what super-induced your conclusions. I expect to be i n T r a i l this summer, and s h a l l be glad to meet you gentlemen and endeavour to put you on the r i g h t " t r a i l . " 2 6 The Board of Trade was, understandably, furious at the statements i n the l e t t e r , and released i t along with their reply to the newspapers. This a c t i o n caused a minor sensation and another 27 round of e d i t o r i a l s . The objections by newspapers and other organizations to P a t t u l l o ' s conduct were, however, just the surface manifest-ations of the general disapproval of the p u b l i c . Mr. D. A. 26 P a t t u l l o to T r a i l Board of Trade, 7 February 191+1. 27 Sun, 27 February 19ip-, p. 1, 28 February 19lp., p. \, and Province, 28 February 19l|l, p. \» 103 McGregor, who at that time was chief e d i t o r i a l writer for the Province, states that he was sure at the time that the people of Canada were greatly interested i n the Commission's work and probably f e l t that a genuine attempt had been made to solve some of the tremendous d i f f i c u l t i e s that had plagued the nation throughout the depression. The ci t i z e n s of B r i t i s h Columbia . were determined that they would not suffer the same hardships again, and concluded that P a t t u l l o , i n refusing even to discuss the Report, had, i n a sense, betrayed them and the members of 28 the Royal Commission as well. It i s s i g n i f i c a n t that only a very few p r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l associations passed resolutions of confidence i n the premier (a r e l a t i v e l y common occurrence i n the party when the leader i s under public attack), and that the only organizational support outside the party came from "fringe" groups l i k e the "New Democracy Committee" and the Soc i a l Credit League. ' Letters to the editor were, i n most cases, c r i t i c a l of the 29 premier's stand. Premier P a t t u l l o ' s conduct at the Conference was undoubtedly the greatest p o l i t i c a l error of hi s career. He shared the blame for the Conference's f a i l u r e with the two other d i s s i -dent premiers and with Prime Minister King, but i n B r i t i s h Columbia he was, naturally, the prime target of those who were disappointed at the outcome of the Conference. 28 D.A. McGregor. Interview with the writer, 2 February 1957. 29 Province, 23 January 191+1, p. k» a n d Colonist, 31 January 191+1, p. k» io4 His error had been pr i m a r i l y t a c t i c a l . Despite h i s genuine objections to Plan 1, P a t t u l l o should have at least been w i l l i n g to discuss the Report i n committee. At the conclusion of t h i s discussion he could have followed one of three possible courses. Although i t was not c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of him to behave i n this way, he could have chosen to remain s i l e n t on the merits of the Report i n the certainty that both Hepburn and Aberhart would prevent the adoption of Plan 1 by the conference. He could have refused outright to accept the Report, an action which could then have been j u s t i f i e d by arguing that the Report had been thoroughly discussed and found unacceptable. F i n a l l y , he could have suggested acceptance of the Report as a wartime measure only, i n s i s t i n g that provision be made for re-opening the whole problem at a l a t e r date. Dr. Weir, recognizing the error i n t a c t i c s , wrote to P a t t u l l o that "the going into Committee on Plan One would...have been a f i r s t class piece of hypocrisy...," but nevertheless he.suggested that t h i s procedure should have been followed, since, by not doing so, "you now appear unnecessarily 30 obstinate...." I t would appear, too, that for once P a t t u l l o was out-manoeuvered by Mackenzie King. The prime minister presented the e s s e n t i a l l y f a l s e view that Plan 1, the adoption of which would have r a d i c a l l y changed the whole structure of the Canadian nation, was necessary to the war e f f o r t , and he i n s i s t e d that the prov-inces discuss the provisions on that basis. Because he had 30 Weir to P a t t u l l o , 25" March 19l|l 10$ refused to discuss the Report i n d e t a i l , P attullo was never J thereafter able to persuade the people of the province that the federal government had "ample power under the War Measures Act to take a l l necessary steps to the winning of the war, without 31 changing the Constitution...." The L i b e r a l government's handling of other economic matters considerably effected the outcome of the 19lj! general el e c t i o n . One important economic issue was the proposed Alaska highway. This scheme, which had originated i n the days of the Tolmie government, had been revived by P a t t u l l o and i n 1937 he had adopted i t as his own. The road was primarily planned as a venture to help unemployment but there was, perhaps, consider-able truth i n Bruce Hutchison's observation that the premier wanted " i n the l a s t days of his public career...to see his name on part of a highway which w i l l run from Cape Horn to the rim of 32 the A r c t i c . " In Pattullo's view, the p r i n c i p a l advantage to this scheme was that he would not have to f i n d the money for the project from p r o v i n c i a l funds, nor would he have the trouble of t r y i n g to pry i t from the federal government. Since he f e l t that the road would be an excellent defense measure for the United States, i t was his plan that that country should pay most of the highway's cost. P a t t u l l o broached the idea to the American government f i r s t , and only aft e r It had shown some int e r e s t did 3 1 Press statement, 3 1 January 191+1. 3 2 Bruce Hutchison, "Highway to Alaska," Maclean's Magazine, v o l . 5 2 (February 1 5 , 1 9 3 9 ) , p. 4 . 8 . 3106. he begin the d i f f i c u l t job of persuading the federal government to agree to the scheme. After much he s i t a t i o n , an extremely reluctant Mackenzie King, unpersuaded but i n desperate need of Pattul l o ' s support i n the forthcoming federal election, then expected sometime i n 1939, appointed a Canadian commission to 33 act with a sim i l a r American group on highway plans. Construc-t i o n was delayed by planning d i f f i c u l t i e s and the highway was not ac t u a l l y begun u n t i l 19l|2, after P a t t u l l o had been defeated. The promise of the road, however, did much to help P a t t u l l o r e t a i n the northern ridings i n the 191+1 general e l e c t i o n . During i t s f i r s t few years of o f f i c e the P a t t u l l o government attempted to a l l e v i a t e the effects of the depression by i n f l a t i o n a r y "pump-priming" devices. In i t s l a t e r years, probably i n part because of the d i f f i c u l t y of r a i s i n g money for i t s public works plans, the government appeared to be trying a second method of helping the p r o v i n c i a l economy. This method was to reduce consumer prices, and thus increase purchasing power 3k A by breaking up monopolies and cutting u t i l i t y costs. As a f i r s t step i n t h i s approach, the government, at the 1937 session of the l e g i s l a t u r e , set up the Coal and Petroleum Products Control Board. Dr. Carrothers, the remaining member of Pattullo's 1933 "brains t r u s t , " was made chairman and sole member of t h i s board. In October 1938, after conducting an enquiry into f u e l p r i c e s , Carrothers ordered a reduction i n the price of gasoline 33 Bruce Hutchison i n Sun, 16 December 1938. 3k Bruce Hutchison i n Sun, 5 August 1939. 107 i n the province. The o i l companies immediately sought and were granted a court injunction and a l e g a l b a t t l e ensued. The o i l companies maintained that the Act se t t i n g up the board, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the sections giving i t the power to f i x pr i c e s , was u l t r a v i r e s the p r o v i n c i a l l e g i s l a t u r e . The l i t i g a t i o n was carried from the B r i t i s h Columbia Supreme Court through the Appeal Court to the Supreme Court of Canada. There the l e g i s l a t i o n and the p r i c e - f i x i n g order were upheld. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada was handed down on A p r i l 23, 19l|.0. The o i l companies thereupon "without any notice to the Govern-ment or Control Board...refused to deliver any more gasoline except to what they termed essential services, they themselves being the judge of these services." The controversy was s e t t l e d quickly with the government emerging v i c t o r i o u s . At a meeting between Carrothers and representatives of the o i l 36 industry, a p r i c e decrease was agreed to by both p a r t i e s . 37 The great controversy surrounding t h i s l e g i s l a t i o n , followed by the outbreak of war, made the gasoline price cut the only measure of th i s type which the Pa t t u l l o government enacted. The government did, however, attempt to f i n d o i l i n the Peace 35 Press statement, 1 May 19J4.O. 36 Press statement, 2 May 19l]X>. 37 "'Gas,' what a harsh word. 'Gas' says I am a d i c t a t o r when a l l I do i s to t e l l people where to get o f f . And would you believe i t , when I come to Ottawa, they a c t u a l l y t e l l ME where I get o f f . Now what do you think about that?" P a t t u l l o to King, 1 June 194-0. 1 0 8 R i v e r d i s t r i c t . E v e n t u a l l y the war terminated t h i s search. An e a r l y war c a s u a l t y was the h e a l t h insurance scheme. Although the p l e b i s c i t e h e ld on t h i s question at the time of the 1937 e l e c t i o n had shown that a m a j o r i t y of voters favoured the p l a n , the government continued t o delay proclamation of the l e g i s l a t i o n . P a t t u l l o maintained that the i n s t i t u t i o n of the p l a n depended upon the outcome of i n v e s t i g a t i o n s of the Rowell-S i r o i s Commission, as a r e s u l t of which he hoped th a t the f e d e r a l 3 8 government would provide the necessary money. Since the p l a n had been f i r s t presented f o r implementation before the 1937 p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , t h i s e x p l a n a t i o n i s of doubtful v a l i d i t y . I f the government f e l t that I t had had the necessary funds i n 1937, then i t c e r t a i n l y had them i n 1938 and 1939. More l i k e l y explanations f o r the delay can be found i n the government's d e s i r e to postpone as long as p o s s i b l e the q u a r r e l w i t h the medical p r o f e s s i o n which the i n t r o d u c t i o n of the p l a n would again p r e c i p i t a t e , and i t s d e s i r e , f o r obvious reasons, to introduce such a p l a n j u s t before a p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . Wartime r e t r e n c h -ment, however, n e c e s s i t a t e d the postponement of a l l such plans 39 and the act was never proclaimed. The delay and apparent i n d e c i s i o n of the government had an e f f e c t upon one b y - e l e c t i o n 38 P a t t u l l o to Weir, 13 J u l y 1939. 39 Before the war, Weir attempted to arouse i n t e r e s t i n a nation-wide scheme of the same type as the B r i t i s h Columbia p l a n V. Hon. George M. Weir, "A n a t i o n a l h e a l t h programme," Maclean's Magazine, v o l . 1|2 (15 March 1939), pp. 12, 1.09 and probably also influenced the outcome of the 19l)l general e l e c t i o n . Changes i n the nature of the L i b e r a l party which were soon noticeable a f t e r the v i c t o r y i n 1933, continued to take place a f t e r the v i c t o r y i n 1937. By 1938, the L i b e r a l party, by now having l o s t a l l of i t s reforming zeal, was l i t t l e more than an u n o f f i c i a l arm of the government. The government's control over the party i s shown most obviously i n the resolutions passed by the 1938 party convention. F i n a l l y , i n January of that year, P a t t u l l o decided that a party convention should be c a l l e d . He asked L i b e r a l members and associations to "give study to any matters which you think should be brought to the attention of the convention...and express your kl views...and forward them to the L i b e r a l organizer...." While the rank-and-file members were planning t h e i r resolutions, the premier, presumably i n consultation with his cabinet colleagues, prepared his own l i s t of resolutions. At the convention, a l l resolutions were submitted to a resolutions committee for i t s approval and only then were they transmitted to the convention for the delegates' consideration. k0 Weir to P a t t u l l o , 12 July 1939. i+1 P a t t u l l o to Members of the Legislature and Presidents of L i b e r a l Associations, 11 January 1938. k2 Typescript, "Resolutions f o r B.C. L i b e r a l Convention," 8 August 1938. HQ The convention approved twenty-six resolutions, f i v e of which were of the customary courtesy vari e t y . Of the seventeen suggested by the premier, twelve were passed with no changes i n wording and four were accepted i n revised form. Only one of Pattullo's resolutions, a pledge that the Orientals i n the province would never be given the p r o v i n c i a l franchise, was not included at a l l ; i t had been but supplementary to another anti-O r i e n t a l r e s o l u t i o n that had been accepted. Six resolutions, other than those suggested by the premier, were passed by the convention. Only one of the six, a re s o l u t i o n approving a number of c o n s t i t u t i o n a l changes, was p a r t i c u l a r l y important, and there can be no doubt that these changes had received the p r i o r approval of the premier. At the convention, the party moved considerably to the ri g h t of where i t had stood i n 1933* It quietly dropped from i t s platform the slogan promising "work and wages" and proposals f o r monetary reform. This change r e f l e c t s not only the decreasing importance of the reform group i n the party but also the changed views of the leaders, after almost f i v e years of governmental r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . That there was no strong c r i t i c i s m of the executive or the cabinet for the long delay i n the c a l l i n g of the convention 1+3 Typescript, "Copy of resolutions passed by the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association at i t s Convention held i n Kelowna, B.C., August 25-26, 1938," resolutions 1, 2 , 2l+, 25 and 26. !+[}. Resolutions 3 - 9 , 11-17, 22 and 2 3 . I l l ia another i n t e r e s t i n g facet of the meeting. The premier's c r i t i c s and enemies of 1936, strengthened then by t h e i r f e e l i n g that the government faced inevitable defeat, had been silenced by the e l e c t i o n v i c t o r y of 1937. The party was now even more completely i n the premier's control than It had been i n the f a r - o f f days of opposition. The convention's l o y a l t y was not, however, l o y a l t y to P a t t u l l o personally, but l o y a l t y to the successful office-holder, and i t melted away when the d i f f i c u l t i e s of 19i]l arose. The by-elections held during this term revealed a growing weakness i n the L i b e r a l strength i n the province. While support for the government appeared to remain the same or even to grow somewhat i n the other regions of B r i t i s h Columbia, i t was declining noticeably i n the Greater Vancouver area. The f i r s t by-election, i n May, 1938, took place i n the Dewdney r i d i n g , a f t e r the death of the Conservative leader, Dr. Patterson. Bruce Hutchison gives an inter e s t i n g insight into the workings of the L i b e r a l machine at this time. This government has never doubted that i t could win Dewdney i n a walk, but i t takes no chances. That i s the strength of the L i b e r a l party and the secret of i t s a b i l i t y to survive. At a time l i k e t h i s , whenever i t faces even a minor ele c t i o n , the L i b e r a l party and a l l i t s leaders stand together as i f they had never had a difference i n t h e i r l i v e s , as i f the whole future hung on the vote. Other parties, confident of winning Dewdney, might take i t easy i n the campaign, but not the Pa t t u l l o government. Nearly every cabinet minister i s being rushed into Dewdney, headed by the premier. ij.5 Bruce Hutchison b r i l l i a n t l y analyzed the convention for the Province, 3 September 1938. 1 1 2 Mr. Hart has been there a l l week, carrying the news of our finances to the remote settlements...The other ministers are going to Dewdney, each with a separate message about the good works of the govern-ment • Probably B r i t i s h Columbia has never seen an organization so perfect as that of the P a t t u l l o government, and as the premier has t o l d the l e g i s -lature, he g l o r i e s i n i t . At a time l i k e t h i s you see i t working at i t s best, reaching out to a l l the voters, getting out the vote, financing the cost, taking no chances on anything. That i s what wins elections, and other parties anxious for o f f i c e should note i t wel l . Such an organization,is worth ten issues, ten platforms, ten records of accomplish-ment . 1|6 The r e s u l t was close. But the government was vic t o r i o u s and the Conservative strength i n the l e g i s l a t u r e was reduced to seven. There were two other r u r a l by-elections i n t h i s period. In 1939, when the Minister of Public Works, Prank M. MacPherson, was appointed to the Federal Board of Transport, a by-election was held In his constituency of Cranbrook. The L i b e r a l candidate e a s i l y defeated h i s C.C.F. and Independent opponents. The government was a l i t t l e more worried about the September, I9I4.O, by-election i n the Mackenzie r i d i n g , made necessary by the death of the L i b e r a l member, J. M. Bryan. The C.C.F. had won the seat i n 1933, and the L i b e r a l majority had been very small i n 1937. However, Manfred McGeer, the L i b e r a l candidate, defeated his C.C.F. opponent by a comfortable margin. The most important of the four by-elections, and the one that revealed weakness, took place In Vancouver-Centre In May, 1939, a f t e r the s i t t i n g L i b e r a l member, Alderman Fred Crone, ' I4.6 Province, llj. May 1938. 1 1 3 died. The three parties contested the by-election with great vigour. The seat was won by the C.C.F., with the L i b e r a l candidate running second, c l o s e l y followed by his Conservative opponent. After George Weir discussed the r e s u l t with a number of Vancouver Liberals he came to the conclusion "That very A , probably not a L i b e r a l candidate would be elected i n Vancouver 1+7 i n the next p r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n . " Weir blamed the party's defeat on i t s f a i l u r e to implement health insurance. It would appear, however, that he over-simplified the reasons f o r the party's decline i n the c i t y . P a t t u l l o ' s l/i^ i handling of the ugly unemployment c r i s i s i n the c i t y only a year before was undoubtedly an important factor i n the defeat. The L i b e r a l strength i n the c i t y , weak at the best by 191+1, was almost completely wiped out by the premier's stand at the f e d e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l conference. The premier's conduct at the conference was the predominant issue i n Greater Vancouver i n the e l e c t i o n . Its effect on the e l e c t i o n might not, however, have been decisive i f P a t t u l l o had been more astute i n his other dealings with the area. He had made no e f f o r t to c o n c i l i a t e the c i t y a f t e r the warning given i n the by-election and repeated by 1+8 Weir i n 1939; instead he actually denied that any problem existed. The r e l a t i o n s h i p between P a t t u l l o and h i s cabinet colleagues was considerably transformed during the party's years i n o f f i c e . In the early years of the L i b e r a l government, the premier appears to have been regarded as primus i n t e r pares i n 1+7 Weir to P a t t u l l o , 1 2 July 1 9 3 9 1+8 P a t t u l l o to Weir, 1 3 July 1 9 3 9 the eyes of his ministers, but with the passing of time, he with-1+9 drew himself somewhat from them. With the exception of John Hart, none of Pattullo's government was an old p o l i t i c a l colleagu In 1939, Hutchison observed that between Pattullo "and Mr. Hart there i s a touching friendship and l o y a l t y , and probably Mr. Hart i s the only man who can t a l k with Mr. P a t t u l l o with any degree of intimacy." The r e s t of the ministers "stand i n curious awe of him, having seen so often how the i r o n door of his reticence „5l can slam shut for months at a time." One factor that probably al t e r e d the r e l a t i o n s h i p between the premier and his associates was the change that long experience and increasing age wrought on Pa t t u l l o himself. Like h i s great .chieftain, John Oliver, Mr. P a t t u l l o i s getting to be a kind of sage where he was once a rough-and-tumble f i g h t e r . l]S Since minutes are not kept for cabinet meetings, and because ministers write infrequently to each other because of t h e i r d a i l y and intimate association, evidence on this matter i s hard to f i n d . The t r a n s c r i p t , "Proceedings at meeting of Executive of B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association" (v. supra, pp. 75-76), i s the only complete record of a private meeting at which both Pa t t u l l o and most of his ministers were i n attendance. At t h i s time, the government had not yet been i n o f f i c e three years, and i t was i n considerable p o l i t i c a l d i f f i c u l t y . At t h i s meeting some, at l e a s t , of his colleagues were not a f r a i d to oppose the premier. $0 Province, 8 July 1939. 5>1 Loc. c i t . One of P a t t u l l o ' s cabinet colleagues of t h i s period, W. J. Asselstine, argues that Hutchison was completely incorrect i n this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the relationship between the premier and his cabinet. Asselstine went on to say, however, that P a t t u l l o "had been l i k e a father to me....," and had always been very "approachable." This statement i s not.the description of a friendship between equals and i t would appear that Mr. Asselstine confuses "approachability" with "intimacy." Interview with the writer, 3 February 1957. 115 He seems to l i k e this r o l e . He l i k e s to r e c a l l old v i c t o r i e s l i k e the veteran of many wars, to recount again ancient exploits which most of the present generation of p o l i t i c i a n s have never heard of. And he i s reaching that ^ age where a man looks to his place i n h i s t o r y . " Probably another element i n the change was the premier's well-known and apparently increasing s e n s i t i v i t y to c r i t i c i s m , p a r t i c u l a r l y when i t came from h i s p o l i t i c a l supporters. A f t e r the e l e c t i o n of 1937 and the convention of 1938, P a t t u l l o seems, more and more, to have followed the p r i n -c i p l e that i t i s a leader's function to lead and a follower's to follow, and that there must be no confusion as to these roles i n the party. He did not always consult with his colleagues on his intentions; this c h a r a c t e r i s t i c was to add considerably to his d i f f i c u l t i e s a f t e r the e l e c t i o n i n I9I4I. One open d i v i s i o n i n the cabinet appeared i n 1937, when Pat t u l l o forced George Alexander, the p r o v i n c i a l Assistant Commissioner of Fi s h e r i e s , to r e s i g n from the International Halibut Commission to make way for L. W. Patmore, a Prince Rupert 5k lawyer and p o l i t i c a l supporter of the premier. George Pearson, who was Commissioner of Fisheries as well as Minister of Labour, p u b l i c l y admitted that he objected to the change, and i t was assumed at the time that some other members of the cabinet 55 objected as well. 52 Bruce Hutchison, Province, 21 May 1938. 53 V. i n f r a , pp. 128-131. 5k P a t t u l l o to J . E. Michaud, Federal Minister of Fi s h e r i e s , 8 July 1937. 55 Province, 12 August 1937, p. 1, and 6 December 1937, p. 9 . 116 The only other occasion which gave r i s e to rumours of a cabinet s p l i t occurred aft e r the fed e r a l - p r o v i n c i a l conference i n 19l+l« At that time, the newspapers speculated that the cabinet was divided on the issues of both the r e f u s a l to discuss the Report i n committee and the attitude of the government to 56 the Rowell-Sirois Report. The Sun, for example, offered the hypothesis i n an e d i t o r i a l that Finance Minister Hart was opposed to the premier on both these issues, and commented that the minister's press statement i n support of P a t t u l l o was uncon-vincing. The e d i t o r i a l concluded with the rather cryptic ques-t i o n , "Why does Mr. Hart not assert himself and do what he has 57 known for a long time to be the ri g h t thing?" On January 2l+, 19lp-, Hart did, however, issue a state-ment o u t l i n i n g the reasons for the province's objections to the^. Report and the premier's reasons for refusing to discuss i t . He was followed by the Minister of Labour, Pearson, who issued ^ 59 a similar statement i n Nanaimo on January 28, and the Minister 60 of Public Works, Leary, who did the same thing i n Nelson. Dr. Weir gave a weekly series of three radio broadcasts beginning 61 v7 on February 13, and Attorney-General Gordon Wismer delivered 56 Sun, 25 January 191+1, P» k» 57 Sun, 27 January 191+1, p. k* 58 Times, 25 January 191+1, P* 1. 59 Nanaimo Free Press, 28 January 191+1, p. 1» 60 Nelson Dally News, 18 February 191+1, P» 1» 61 Times, ll+ February 191+1, p. 1, Sun, 21 February 191+1, p. 1, and 28 February 191+1, p. 1. 117 62 an address to Vancouver Liberals on March 7« Both men strongly supported the premier's stand. There i s no evidence to. indicate that any of the cabinet did i n f a c t disagree with the premier's stand. The p r i n -c i p l e of cabinet s o l i d a r i t y would force ministers either to support the premier on an issue of such magnitude or to resign, and no cabinet minister did resign. During the morning of July 22, 191+1, P a t t u l l o announced the d i s s o l u t i o n of B r i t i s h Columbia's nineteenth Legislature and ^ set October 21 as the date f o r a p r o v i n c i a l general e l e c t i o n . The decision to c a l l the e l e c t i o n was made sometime between the end of January, when the premier returned from Ottawa, and e a r l y June. At the beginning of February, he was undecided as to the date, for he wrote to his brother "Within eighteen months we s h a l l have to go again to the electorate and I think we should again be 63 returned." By June, however, the decision had been made, and P a t t u l l o reported to King that he "proposed d i s s o l u t i o n of the 6 I 4 . Legislature, with an e l e c t i o n i n October." Although the premier l e f t no written record as to why he chose this p a r t i c u l a r time for an elec t i o n , the reasons for his decision are not too hard to f i n d : i t had been a practice 62 Typescript, "Address by Mr. Wismer to Divisions 3 and 4, of Vancouver Centre L i b e r a l Association," 7 March 194l> also reported i n Times, 8 March 19l|l* p. 1. 63 P a t t u l l o to George P a t t u l l o , 5 February 19i|l. 61+ Pattullo to King, 6 June 19l;l. 118 i n B r i t i s h Columbia not to hold e l e c t i o n s i n the winter or sp r i n g because travels i n the r u r a l areas was d i f f i c u l t , and the vote was t h e r e f o r e l i k e l y to be l i g h t . October was probably the l a s t month i n which the e l e c t i o n could be h e l d i n 191+1; and i f the government waited u n t i l the s p r i n g of 191+2 i t would then have l e t elapse almost a l l of i t s f u l l f i v e year term, which was to end on June 1, 191+2. Because unforeseen things may happen too close to an e l e c t i o n date to be e a s i l y r e c t i f i e d governments t r a d -i t i o n a l l y do not l i k e to wait t h e i r f u l l terms before going to the e l e c t o r a t e . F u r t h e r , P a t t u l l o had, i n 1932 and 1933, made i t p l a i n , i n h i s c r i t i c i s m of Tolmie's p r o c r a s t i n a t i o n , t h a t he 65 objected to t h i s p r a c t i c e i n p r i n c i p l e . The government appears to have become i n s u l a t e d , as governments tend to do, from the undercurrent of f e e l i n g that was running a g a i n s t i t . I t was supremely confident of i t s r e - e l e c t i o n regarding t h i s "as the e a s i e s t c i n c h i n the l a s t t wenty-five 66 years." The case f o r an e l e c t i o n was presented somewhat d i f f e r e n t l y t o the v o t e r s . P a t t u l l o had f i n a l l y s e t t l e d h i s v / f i n a n c i a l q u a r r e l s w i t h the f e d e r a l government and n e g o t i a t i o n s had begun on a tax r e n t a l agreement which would e v e n t u a l l y be signed e a r l y In 191+2. He explained that i n order: 65 P a t t u l l o f e l t s t r o n g l y enough about t h i s matter that he had had the t e m e r i t y , i n 1935, to c r i t i c i z e the A l b e r t a govern-ment f o r a l l o w i n g t h a t province's l e g i s l a t u r e to e x p i r e . " I look upon t h i s as a very bad p r a c t i c e and very much against the p u b l i c i n t e r e s t . " Press statement, 12 J u l y 1935. 66 Bruce Hutchison, Sun, 3 September 191+1. 119 To co-ordinate p r o v i n c i a l taxation with Dominion proposals i t w i l l be necessary to pass l e g i s l a t i o n at the next session of the P r o v i n c i a l Legislature to bring into e f f e c t appropriate measures. The matter i s of such importance that I f e e l the Government should have an expression of the wishes of the electors. 67 The premier's promises to the voters were phrased i n the most general terms. We may...say that broadly speaking three tasks confront us: F i r s t , To do a l l possible to a s s i s t i n x<rar V-e f f o r t , Second, To keep the home front functioning as f adequately as war e f f o r t w i l l permit, Third, To bear i n mind post-war problems and ~" act i n r e l a t i o n thereto as items One and Two w i l l permit.68 The premier's conduct at the January conference was the main issue debated i n the campaign. Lesser issues included the Alaska highway, the gasoline price scheme, and health insurance. One old issue, that of the highway board, was revived again by the Conservatives, and i t appears to. have had more effect on the outcome than i t had i n 1937 • The Province, p a r t i c u l a r l y , attacked the government on i t s road programme and toward the end of the campaign claimed that the highway board and the L i b e r a l record of highway construction were the main issues of the 69 e l e c t i o n . In t h i s matter, however, the Conservatives were highly embarrassed by th e i r candidate i n North Vancouver, Canon 67 Typescript, " E l e c t i o n Manifesto," 22 July 19l|l. 68 Loc. c i t . 69 Province, 4. October I94I, p. i+. 1 2 0 ) H i n c h c l i f f e , who had been a member of Premier Tolmie's Conser-vative cabinet, H i n c h c l i f f e stated that the board was unnecessary and refused to support that part of the Conservative platform 70 which promised to set one up. He was, as a r e s u l t , dropped as 71 the party's candidate i n the r i d i n g . A minor issue i n the campaign, and one which Pa t t u l l o f e l t had some s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t on the outcome, arose quite suddenly. This was the demand for a i d to separate schools for 72 Roman Catholic children. In the week before the elec t i o n , the premier received l e t t e r s from various Roman Catholic lay organ-izations i n the Vancouver Archdiocese, a l l asking the government to give immediate attention to: (1) Health concessions for Catholic children the . same as for other children. (2) The assurance of an a f f i l i a t e d Catholic college . at the University of B r i t i s h Columbia. (3) Exemption from taxation, throughout the province, . of Catholic schools; the same as i n the C i t y of Vancouver.7 3 Although the government made no e f f o r t to comply with these requests, i t s lack of action had no ef f e c t upon the el e c t i o n . Roman Catholic voters no doubt knew that both the Conservatives and the C.C.P. were even less l i k e l y than the Liberals to give public assistance to separate schools. They also knew that the 70 Province, 20 September 191+1, p. 1. 71 Province, 22 September 191+1, P« !• 72 P a t t u l l o to King, II4. November 191+1* 73 George Bruce, Grand Knight, Vancouver Council Knights of Columbus, to P a t t u l l o , ll+ October 191+1 • 1 2 1 L i b e r a l party had, as i t s second i n command and leader-apparent, a prominent Roman Catholic. Despite the government's r e f u s a l , there was no reason, therefore, for Roman Catholic voters to depart from t h e i r various p o l i t i c a l l o y a l t i e s i n the hope of ef f e c t i n g any change on the public school system i n B r i t i s h Columbia. The L i b e r a l organization did not function i n 191+1 as well as i t had i n the elections of 1933 and 1937. It was well-financed and well-managed but i t s members did not work as hard as they had i n previous years. Eight years i n o f f i c e had had the i r e f f e c t and the party, was more "professional" than i t had been i n the past. The e l e c t i o n workers were more interested i n rewards available to them, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the minor patronage involved i n being chosen as e l e c t i o n o f f i c i a l s , than they were i n the hard work of campaigning. Also, the party does not seem to have f e l t that i t s s u r v i v a l depended on the outcome of the ele c t i o n . The confidence i n a L i b e r a l v i c t o r y f e l t by the government was r e f l e c t e d i n the party's rank-and-file who saw no reason f o r making the extra e f f o r t that had been so important i n 1933 and 1 9 3 7 . ^ Por the evening of October 21 , P a t t u l l o i n v i t e d twenty distinguished Liberals to l i s t e n to the e l e c t i o n returns on the radio i n his home i n V i c t o r i a , The party can hardly have been as happy as the premier expected. 74. Charles Reid. Interview. 122 The f i n a l r e s u l t s of the e l e c t i o n were: L i b e r a l s 21 C o n s e r v a t i v e s 12 C.C.P. li+ Labour 1 The L i b e r a l s had l o s t t en s e a t s , the C o n s e r v a t i v e s had gained f o u r and the C.C.P. had gained s i x . The L i b e r a l s s u f f e r e d a drop o f \i i n the popular vote (3b.98$ i n 1937 to 32.59$ i n 194.1)? the C o n s e r v a t i v e s had gained 2$ (28 .32$ to 30.58$); and the C.C.F. by g a i n i n g 5$ (28.29$ to 33.01$) won the l a r g e s t share of the 76 popular v o t e . The most s i g n i f i c a n t l o s s t o the L i b e r a l s was i n G r e a t e r Vancouver. Wells Gray was the p a r t y ' s only s u c c e s s f u l candidate i n the m e t r o p o l i t a n area, and two c a b i n e t m i n i s t e r s , Gordon Wismer and George Weir, were both d e f e a t e d . P a t t u l l o r e f u s e d to f a c e the r e a l reason f o r the out-come of the v o t i n g . At f i r s t , he tended to put the blame on 77 " F e d e r a l matters over which we have no c o n t r o l . " He then s i n g l e d out the g a s o l i n e p r i c e i s s u e as b e i n g the most important, and t h i s g r a d u a l l y became, i n P a t t u l l o ' s view, the u n d e r l y i n g cause of h i s d e f e a t . He i n s i s t e d that the most important f a c t o r i n the e l e c t i o n : was antagonism which I had c r e a t e d through c o n t r o l of the p r i c e of g a s o l i n e . Had t h i s a c t i o n not been taken i t seems c e r t a i n t h a t I would s t i l l be i n 75 B r i t i s h Columbia, Statement of votes by e l e c t o r a l d i s t r i c t s : g e n e r a l e l e c t i o n i n c l u d i n g a c t i v e s e r v i c e v o t i n g : October 2 1 s t , 191LL» V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 19J4-2, p. 12. ~ 7 6 . .Ibid., p. 15 and Statement of v o t e s . . .1937, p. ll+» 77 P a t t u l l o to King, 23 October I94I. 123 o f f i c e but the public would since have been paying at l e a s t two cents and probable (sic) three cents more per gallon for gasoline.78 P a t t u l l o l o s t the e l e c t i o n primarily because of his p r o v i n c i a l standpoint. In the pre-war years, he seems to have had the support of the people of the province In h i s many quarrels with the federal government, but their attitude had changed by 191+1 • The war had transformed the narrow and parochial outlook of the province, for the f i r s t time since 1918, into one of i d e n t i t y with the rest of Canada. The p r o v i n c i a l government, and p a r t i c u l a r l y the premier, had given the impression that i t was more interested i n f i n a n c i a l disputes with the federal govern-ment than i t was i n the war e f f o r t . P a t t u l l o , at least In the public view, was not giving the support he might to a prime minister who, at a time when the war news was unrelievedly bad, was single-mindedly mobilizing the resources of the nation i n defense of i t s i d e a l s . This charge was not, of course, e n t i r e l y f a i r to P a t t u l l o , but the f a c t that i t existed at a l l Is an indictment of his p o l i t i c a l acumen. A. more astute p o l i t i c i a n , or perhaps even a younger Duff P a t t u l l o , would have detected the signs of h i s growing disfavour and would have acted to disp e l them. 78 P a t t u l l o to the Sun, 23 October 191+2 CHAPTER V COALITION AND RESIGNATION The events which followed the e l e c t i o n on October 21 were both complex and confused. A great many, perhaps most, of the Important events of t h i s period took place i n the s t r i c t e s t secrecy and, because no record was kept of many of the meetings and private conversations and because most of the p r i n c i p a l s are now dead, a l l facts may never be known. The general outline of events i s , however, reasonably clear, and i t i s possible, with the evidence which i s available to reconstruct a reasonable approximation of the machinations that occurred. Following the el e c t i o n P a t t u l l o proceeded to make two t a c t i c a l errors. The newspapers immediately began to speculate whether the outcome of the e l e c t i o n might not be the appointment of the premier to the Senate and the formation of a L i b e r a l -1 Conservative c o a l i t i o n government led by John Hart. The premier would have been wise, i n the face of this conjecture, to have c a l l e d a caucus of the elected L i b e r a l members to explain his views on the party's future course and secure support for his plans. This he f a i l e d to dp. Furthermore, when he f i n a l l y —i requested the members i n writing to r e f r a i n from committing 1 Sun, 23 October 191+1, p. 1; Times, 22 October, 191+1, p. 1; Province, 23 October 191+1, P« !• 125 themselves to the c o a l i t i o n i d e a , i t was too l a t e . Instead of t h i s course of a c t i o n , on the day f o l l o w i n g the e l e c t i o n , he announced that Hart and he would, i f " I am p e r s o n a l l y e l e c t e d on the f i n a l r e t u r n s . . . . , " continue w i t h t h e i r p r e - e l e c t i o n p l a n to proceed to Ottawa to work out the f i n a l d e t a i l s of a t a x - r e n t a l 2 agreement w i t h the f e d e r a l government. This t r i p was immediately c r i t i c i z e d by the o p p o s i t i o n and, more important, by at l e a s t one member of the cabinet, George Pearson, on the grounds that P a t t u l l o "no longer c o n t r o l l e d a m a j o r i t y of the Members of the House," and t h e r e f o r e had no r i g h t to negotiate i n Ottawa on behalf of 3 the p r o v i n c e . There i s no record of whether other members of the cabinet took the same stand as Pearson, but the newspapers gave considerable p u b l i c i t y to the f a c t that P a t t u l l o and Hart k took d i f f e r e n t t r a i n s on the t r i p to Ottawa. Hart apparently was a l r e a d y separating h i m s e l f from too c l o s e an a s s o c i a t i o n with the premier. The newspaper s p e c u l a t i o n regarding c o a l i t i o n was soon f o l l o w e d , on October 2 3 , by a statement by R. L. M a i t l a n d , the p r o v i n c i a l Conservative l e a d e r , c a l l i n g f o r the formation of a 5 union government composed of members of a l l three p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s . 2 Press statement, 2 2 October 191+1, The f i r s t r e t u r n s showed the premier l e a d i n g by a very few votes over h i s C.C.P. opponent i n h i s c onstituency of P r i n c e Rupert, and f o r a few days h i s r e -e l e c t i o n appeared i n doubt. 3 Pearson to P a t t u l l o , 1 5 November 19I+1. 1+ Sun, 2 7 October 1 9 l | l , p. 3 . 5 Canadian Press r e p o r t , 2 3 " October 19l|l» 126 This idea was rejected immediately by Harold Winch, p r o v i n c i a l C.C.P. leader, who said that such a government was " u t t e r l y 6 impossible and would not work." P a t t u l l o , issuing a statement commenting on the idea, i n s i s t e d that "attempts are being made to do the 'rush act' and p r e c i p i t a t e some action by myself i n the 7 way of a C o a l i t i o n administration." He refused to be rushed, and added that, when he returned from Ottawa: I s h a l l not only be glad to make known the whole s i t u a t i o n to the leaders of the two oppositions, but to the public generally, so that we w i l l be i n a p o s i t i o n to know what should be done at the approaching session of the Legislature.8 The p r i n c i p l e of c o a l i t i o n was not rejected e n t i r e l y , but i t was clear that P a t t u l l o did not view i t with favour. The premier's statement did not s a t i s f y the opposition; both opposition parties and the press continued to object to h i s making the t r i p . The premier, prompted by this opposition, issued a further statement i n which he argued that the meeting between the p r o v i n c i a l and federal governments was already arranged and could not be delayed. He went on to express,for the f i r s t time what was to be his p o s i t i o n i n a l l the events and manoeuverings of the next month. One would think from attacks of m i l i t a n t minorities that I am an i n t e r l o p e r and have no r i g h t to speak upon behalf (sic) of the people of B r i t i s h Columbia. In 1933 I not only l e d the L i b e r a l Party to v i c t o r y , but c e r t a i n l y prevented 6 Canadian Press report, 23 October I9J4.I. 7 Press statement, 23 October 19l|l. 8 Loc. c i t . 127 i t s d i s i n t e g r a t i o n at that time. I also led i t to v i c t o r y i n 1 9 3 7 . At the present time I have been elected for the seventh time i n my own d i s t r i c t x-nLth a clear majority i n the House with some c l o s e l y contested seats against us. The Li b e r a l Party also received a larger vote than any other Party i n B r i t i s h Columbia. Who then i s there to represent the people unless I do? I am not f o o l i s h enough to think that I cannot be defeated i n the House, but the part that I s h a l l take i s that which I believe to be i n the best interests of our Province and Dominion.9 In Ottawa, the premier and Minister of Finance s e t t l e d the tax-rental agreement with the federal government and Hart returned to V i c t o r i a . The premier went on to Montreal and New York. Before leaving Ottawa, however, P a t t u l l o had discussed the p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia with Prime Minister King and Speaker Glen of the House of Commons. What advice he received from the prime minister i s not recorded, but Pattullo was, apparently, not s a t i s f i e d with i t , f o r he wrote to King from 10 Montreal o u t l i n i n g his s i t u a t i o n and asking for advice. King, apparently for the second time, did not commit himself: he r e p l i e d that he could "see no reason to change i n any p a r t i c u l a r 9 Press statement, 26 October 191+1. Patt u l l o presumably means by "clear majority" that the L i b e r a l party had more seats than any other party, not that he had a majority of the seats. In other statements and speeches at t h i s time he corrected t h i s error, pointing out that the " L i b e r a l Group was f i f t y percent larger than either of the other groups and held a majority over and outside the Vancouvers." Typescript of a speech i n the Legislature, 19 January 191+2. Pattullo's reference to the popular vote was correct at this time, because preliminary t o t a l s showed the L i b e r a l party ahead of the C.C.F. 1 0 P a t t u l l o to King, 3 November 191+1. 128 11 view expressed at time of our conversation." This reply, taken together with King's l a t e r r e f u s a l to appoint P a t t u l l o to the Senate, indicates that Hart might also have discussed the s i t u a t i o n with King, or at l e a s t that King Was avjare of what was about to happen i n B r i t i s h Columbia, and did not object to a war-12 time c o a l i t i o n . P a t t u l l o discussed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l procedure with Speaker Glen. He asked him: as to the prerogatives of the Crown under given circumstances....Let us suppose that I were defeated i n the House, would the Lieutenant Governor then grant me a d i s s o l u t i o n , assuming that he had been advised through a cabal that s u f f i c i e n t number i n the House would combine to carry on without an election. 1 3 What the speaker r e p l i e d to the above request i s unknown, and the hypothetical s i t u a t i o n did not take place. When P a t t u l l o arrived i n Vancouver from the east on November 8 , he refused to comment to reporters on the p o l i t i c a l Ik s i t u a t i o n . He c a l l e d a cabinet meeting to take place i n V i c t o r i a on November 10 . At t h i s meeting i t was to be decided who was to f i l l the two vacancies i n the cabinet which had been 11 King cable to P a t t u l l o , 6 November 194-1. 12 Senator P a r r i s and James S i n c l a i r both believe that Mackenzie King did not object to and probably favoured the Liberals entering into a c o a l i t i o n i n B r i t i s h Columbia for the duration of the war. Both of these men also favoured a c o a l i t i o n at the time, although S i n c l a i r took no part i n the events at the time because he was serving overseas. Interviews. 13 P a t t u l l o to King, 3 November I9I4.I. I4. Press statement, 8 November 19l]l» 129 caused by the defeat of the Attorney-General and the P r o v i n c i a l Secretary. The changes were discussed at that meeting, but no d e c i s i o n was made. In the next three days the premier planned h i s cabinet's r e o r g a n i z a t i o n , and a l s o decided that the v a r i o u s s h i f t s i n p o r t f o l i o were to take place on F r i d a y , November 11+. P a t t u l l o does not seem to have taken h i s cabinet colleagues, at l e a s t as a group, i n t o h i s confidence on a l l the changes. Pearson complained to the premier t h a t : At the meeting of the Cabinet on Monday morning you i n t i m a t e d that you intended to c a r r y on and t o face the House w i t h a m i n o r i t y of i t s Members supporting you. You i n t i m a t e d that l a t e r i n the week you would advise the Cabinet of your plans f o r r e - o r g a n i z a t i o n . . . I expected the whole matter would be placed before the Cabinet l a t e r i n the week and I was amazed to hear, only through the channels of rumour, that a new Cabinet was t o be sworn i n on F r i d a y without any opportunity being given t o the Cabinet to discuss your new plans. 1 5 On the ll+th, the premier made Mr. W. J . A s s e l s t i n e M i n i s t e r of Labour; Sidney Leary, M i n i s t e r of Mines and M i n i s t e r of Trade and Industry; and Mr. Norman Whittaker, Attorney-General. He had a l s o planned to make Pearson P r o v i n c i a l Secretary and M i n i s t e r of Education, but Pearson re f u s e d the appointment because he d i d not f e e l " t h a t the. Government has the confidence of the people nor the House....," and a l s o because he f e l t t h a t "steps should have been taken to b r i n g about an arrangement w i t h the Opposition P a r t i e s i n the House f o r the c a r r y i n g on of the 16 Government f o r the d u r a t i o n of the War...." More s i g n i f i c a n t l y , 15 Pearson to P a t t u l l o , 15 November 191+1. 16 Pearson to P a t t u l l o , ll+ November 191+1. 1 3 0 Hart also told, the premier that he favoured a c o a l i t i o n govern-ment, and at the swearing-in ceremony he informed newspaper 17 reporters of his views. Over the weekend, P a t t u l l o considered his senior minister's public statement. He would not want to act p r e c i p i t -ously because he knew that i f Hart were to leave the cabinet, there would be very l i t t l e chance f o r him to extricate himself from h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s . There may also have been some e f f o r t on Pa t t u l l o ' s part to persuade Hart to change his mind, although this i s not an action c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the proud and strong-w i l l e d premier. Whatever happened over the weekend, by Monday, November 17, neither had changed his mind and P a t t u l l o announced that "with very great regret I have f e l t i t necessary to c a l l for the resignation of Honourable Mr. Hart." This resignation was a decisive moment i n Pat t u l l o ' s career for he had now l o s t a l l chance of r e t a i n i n g control of the party. The c o a l i t i o n i s t s i n his own party had a leader around whom they could r a l l y , and the Conservatives had a leading L i b e r a l with which to negotiate. On the 1 7 t h , the premier also announced that he would himself assume the p o r t f o l i o of Finance and, because Dr. Weir was no longer able to carry.on as P r o v i n c i a l Secretary and Minister 1 7 Province, ll+ November 1 9 l | l , p. 1 . The premier reported ( i n a l e t t e r to Mackenzie King of the same date) that Hart had previously made his views known. 18 Press statement, 17 November 19l\l, Hart's resignation followed h i s usual laconic s t y l e . "Pursuant to our sundry conversations and e x i s t i n g circumstances, I wish hereby to tender my resignation as Minister of Finance." Hart to P a t t u l l o , 1 7 November 19l|l<» 1 3 1 of Education, that Wells Gray was to be sworn i n as P r o v i n c i a l Secretary and the Premier would act, temporarily, as Minister of 19 Education. On the same day, P a t t u l l o , belatedly, asked the L i b e r a l members-elect to commit themselves " i n no way to 20 C o a l i t i o n . " He also announced that the Legislature would s i t on December Ij., and that there would be a L i b e r a l caucus on the 21 preceding day. On November 18, the Minister of Agriculture, K. C. MacDonald, c a l l e d f o r c o a l i t i o n . The next day, asked by the 22 premier to resign, he acceded to the demand. On the 19th, the newly appointed Attorney-General, Mr. Whittaker, resigned, because he f e l t that the loss of Hart and Pearson from the cabinet might r e s u l t i n another el e c t i o n , which he f e l t must be avoided 23 at a l l costs. At about t h i s time, the president of the B r i t i s h Columbia L i b e r a l Association, Dr. W. J. Knox of Kelowna, c a l l e d a general convention of the association, to be held on December 2 19 Press statement, 17 November 19l|l. 20 Dayletter to a l l members and members-elect of the L i b e r a l party, 17 November I9I4.L 21 Loc. c i t . 22 Sun, 18 November I9I4I, p. 1, and MacDonald to P a t t u l l o , 19 November 19i+l» 2 3 P a t t u l l o was p a r t i c u l a r l y annoyed at t h i s action. "Our Attorney-General having been defeated i n the election, I appointed Norman Whittaker, who was extremely anxious to secure the p o s i t i o n and to whom I pointed out that he must be ready for any eventuality. Notwithstanding t h i s , he tendered his r e s i g -nation a f t e r only f i v e days i n o f f i c e , without any previous conversation with me." P a t t u l l o to King, 22 November 191+1* 1 i n Vancouver, two days before the new l e g i s l a t u r e was to s i t . P a t t u l l o , the party's p r o v i n c i a l leader, was not consulted i n 2 5 this decision, nor were some of the L i b e r a l members. P a t t u l l o wrote to Knox that his c a l l i n g of the meeting proved that the president "must have been consorting with the Babes i n the Woods By Friday of t h i s eventful week, P a t t u l l o had almost come to r e a l i z e that l i t t l e hope was l e f t . He reported to Mackenzie King that: upon the resignation of so many Ministers, I t o l d the Lieutenant-Governor that I did not wish to embarrass him and was prepared to tender my r e s i g -nation but thought there was no means of his determining what to do u n t i l the House met...The Governor concurred i n my view.27 The premier was p a r t i c u l a r l y b i t t e r about the conduct of h i s former chief lieutenant, remarking that: The C o a l i t i o n i s t s , of which Hart i s now the spearhead, have been doing everything possible to get me out before the House meets. This p l o t t i n g has been i n progress f o r many months, the press constantly boosting Hart and depreciating myself. I f Hart had been l o y a l , he would have squelched this himself.28 P a t t u l l o being P a t t u l l o , however, there crept into his l e t t e r a small note of optimism. After noting that the c o a l i t i o n i s t s were gathering proxies, he went on to say: 21+ Province, 18 November 191+1, p. 1. 2 5 J. J. G i l l l s to P a t t u l l o , 3 January 191+2. 26 Pattullo to Knox, 22 November 191+1. 27 Pattullo to King, 22 November 191+1. 28 Loc. c i t . 1 3 3 I have neither the time nor money to spend i n endeavouring to secure any proxies, but I think I can perhaps force them to deal academ-i c a l l y with the question of C o a l i t i o n by these present, which w i l l help to c l a r i f y the situation.2 9 He was concerned, too, for the future of his p o l i t i c a l instrument, the construction of which had taken so much time and e f f o r t i n the past. At my time of l i f e , my term of o f f i c e would be short at longest, but I am greatly concerned that the action of men who were i n my Cabinet and other prominent L i b e r a l s w i l l r e s u l t i n s p l i t t i n g the L i b e r a l Party i n a way that w i l l keep them out of o f f i c e i n t h i s Province f o r a generation.30 The next ten days saw a l u l l i n p o l i t i c a l events as preparations were made f o r the L i b e r a l convention. P a t t u l l o , as he had reported to King, made no attempt to gather support amongst the delegates to the meeting. The Liberals favouring c o a l i t i o n , however, did work to gain supporters, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n Vancouver. One f r i e n d reported to Pattullo that the "'Three Musketeers' i n U our f a i r c i t y are of course out for your scalp with a large 31 following of yes men at t h e i r back." Another supporter of the premier, Dr. J. J . G i l l i s , member for Yale, wrote: I f i r m l y believe the Convention was c a l l e d by a few from Vancouver, V i c t o r i a and New West-minster, who have been running the L i b e r a l Party for years, not i n the interests of Liberalism but for t h e i r own s e l f i s h i n t e r e s t . . . . 3 2 29 P a t t u l l o to King, 22 November 191+1. 30 Loc. c i t . 31 J. L. MacDougall to P a t t u l l o , 20 November 191+1. The "Musketeers" were Wendell P a r r i s , J. W. deB. P a r r i s , and Brenton Brown. Reid interview. 32 G i l l i s to P a t t u l l o , 3 January 191+2. 13% The Convention began i n Vancouver on December 2 . P a t t u l l o r e c e i v e d a standing o v a t i o n on h i s a r r i v a l , but i t was more a t r i b u t e to h i s f i g h t i n g q u a l i t i e s than a demonstration of . 33 support. The chairman of the r e s o l u t i o n s committee of the convention was Harry Perry, a one-time f r i e n d and l a t t e r l y a b i t t e r opponent of the premier. Perry had been the f i r s t L i b e r a l member to announce, a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , that he favoured a 3k c o a l i t i o n government. I t must have given him considerable pleasure to present the f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n , moved by Bryon I . Johnson, to the delegates. WHEREAS no p o l i t i c a l p a r t y secured a m a j o r i t y i n the recent P r o v i n c i a l e l e c t i o n , and no one of them i s now able t o c a r r y on the Government without the support i n the L e g i s l a t u r e of one or both of the ot h e r s : AND WHEREAS good a d m i n i s t r a t i o n demands st a b l e gov eminent: AND WHEREAS i t i s against the p u b l i c welfare and contrary to the wishes of the people t h a t there s h a l l be another e l e c t i o n i n war times: AND WHEREAS P r o v i n c i a l i ssues that o r d i n a r i l y d i v i d e the p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s i n the Province are now being submerged i n our common war e f f o r t : AND WHEREAS the only e f f e c t i v e method of securing a competent and s t a b l e government f o r the d u r a t i o n of the war, and to avoid another e l e c t i o n , i s by the formation of a C o a l i t i o n Government of the three p a r t i e s , o r , f a i l i n g t h a t , by a c o a l i t i o n of two of them: AND WHEREAS any m i n o r i t y p a r t y government at t h i s time would e x i s t only at the mercy of i t s o p p o s i t i o n , with the consequent l a c k of a u t h o r i t y , i n i t i a t i v e and s t a b i l i t y , and would face i n e v i t a b l e defeat and another e l e c t i o n : THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED that the L i b e r a l P a r t y i n Convention assembled record t h e i r b e l i e f that i n the circumstances as h e r e i n r e c i t e d the formation of a 33 Times, 2 December 19 i | l , p. 1. 3k Sun, 25 October 191+11 p. 1. 1 3 5 C o a l i t i o n Government w i l l at th i s time best serve the public int e r e s t and that every reasonable e f f o r t should be made to secure this r e s u l t . 35 The r e s o l u t i o n was debated hotly and was f i n a l l y put to the 36 vote. It was carr i e d by a vote of 1+77 to 312. The events which followed are best narrated by Dr. G i l l i s , who voted with the minority. The r e s o l u t i o n was carried and as soon as the vote was announced, Mr. Pattullo l e f t the h a l l . Almost immediately afterwards, to my great surprise, Mr. George Pearson worked his way to the front and proceeded to nominate ^Hart] as Leader, (sic) when he concluded, Doctor Weir marched up and seconded the motion, then immediately someone shouted, "I move nominations close," and the great Convention was past history.3 7 The convention was followed the next day by a caucus of the L i b e r a l members. Again Dr. G i l l i s gives an account of the events at that meeting: You w i l l remember that you [Pattullq] asked me to take the Chair. I did, and you wanted to know how the members f e l t towards C o a l i t i o n and nineteen stood up and said they favoured i t . When Wells Gray, who was the l a s t , stood up and said he favoured i t also, r e a l i z i n g that he owes you everything, you made him, well, when he did that i t was just too much for me. I could not be c i v i l to him so I was just t r y i n g to hold onto myself before r i s i n g to say a few words when you walked out. 33 The l e g i s l a t u r e met on the following day. The premier rose to state: 35 "Resolution #2," n.d. 36 Times, 3 December 191+1, p. 13* 37 G i l l i s to P a t t u l l o , 3 January 191+2. 38 Loc. c i t . s 13& that he had. recommended to His Honor Lieutenant-Governor Woodward that he c a l l upon Honourable John Hart, f i r s t member for V i c t o r i a and recently-elected new Leader of the P r o v i n c i a l L i b e r a l Party to form an administration....3 9 Premier Hart and his government were sworn i n the following week. The events following the 191+1 e l e c t i o n give r i s e to the question as to why P a t t u l l o was so determined i n his opposition to a c o a l i t i o n government. The premier's personal q u a l i t i e s and the current p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n are both involved i n the answer to the question. Of primary importance i n his decision to oppose the formation of a c o a l i t i o n government were Pattullo's p o l i t i c a l convictions. He was from Ontario with a background of family attachment to the L i b e r a l and G r i t t r a d i t i o n . Party l i n e s were more r i g i d l y drawn i n the older province than i n B r i t i s h Columbia; the l o y a l t y of party members had about i t a flavour of "my party, right or wrong." To L i b e r a l s of t h i s type the Conservative party was, almost from i n s t i n c t , the main enemy of the L i b e r a l party, and P a t t u l l o , as a L i b e r a l i n t h i s t r a d i t i o n , opposed any sort of an a l l i a n c e with the ancient enemy. Furthermore, he could not understand the view then current that there was l i t t l e difference between the L i b e r a l and Conservative p o l i t i c a l philosophies; that the choice for the voter l a y between a "free enterprise" and a " s o c i a l i s t " government. To P a t t u l l o , the L i b e r a l party stood between two extremes being presented to the people of Canada. 39 Loc.' c i t . 137 I do not think that the people of Canada want a Reactionary Government, nor do I think that they want a S o c i a l i s t i c Government...I believe the majority of our people want a safe, sane and progressive Government. Extremes mean turmoil. 1+0 He f e l t , too, that c o a l i t i o n would be of greatest benefit to the other p a r t i e s . The Conservatives were " i n a dying condition" and c o a l i t i o n with the Liberals would give them "a new lease of l i f e . " The C.C.P. favoured a Liberal-Conservative c o a l i t i o n because they hoped: that people of L i b e r a l mind w i l l throw t h e i r support to the C.C.P. rather than to a combin-ation of Liberals and Conservatives and that the C.C.P. w i l l receive augmented support / -accordingly. 4-2 1 Further, i t was extremely u n l i k e l y that the Conser-vatives would j o i n a C o a l i t i o n government under Pattullo's leadership. He had been t h e i r p r i n c i p a l opponent f o r too many years; they could never agree to work i n the same government with him. It i s apparent that, even before the L i b e r a l convention was c a l l e d , an agreement had been rached between the coal-i t i o n i s t s i n the L i b e r a l party and the leaders of the Conservative party that P a t t u l l o would have to be replaced before a c o a l i t i o n government could be established. P a t t u l l o must have been aware that such an arrangement was being discussed, f o r , since the e l e c t i o n , there had been a great deal of speculation about i t i n the newspapers. His attitude toward c o a l i t i o n would undoubtedly 1+0 T. D. P a t t u l l o , Whither the L i b e r a l Party?, V i c t o r i a , n. pub., 191+2, p. 6 . 1+1 Ibid., p. 1+. 1+2 Loc. c i t . 1 3 ® be somewhat jaundiced i f he knew that even i f such a government were organized, i t would be impossible for him to lead i t . Nevertheless, sometime during the week before the convention, P a t t u l l o made the suggestion to Maitland, through a mutual fr i e n d , that they should meet i n an attempt to reach some sort of understanding. But the premier's off e r was rebuffed by the Conservative leader. In any case, the gesture was made h a l f -heartedly, and far too l a t e to have any effect on the course of events. A further question a r i s i n g from these events i s whether there r e a l l y was a movement to oust P a t t u l l o even before the e l e c t i o n took place. The only evidence for this view that presents i t s e l f i s Pattullo's statements that such a conspiracy k3 did i n f a c t e x i s t . Other persons, prominent i n the party at that time, emphatically deny that there was any plan to overthrow kk the premier before the e l e c t i o n . It i s true that there had been some d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with P a t t u l l o i n the party immediately following the Ottawa conference, but there was no mention of his being replaced as leader i n the four important newspapers from the end of January u n t i l just before the election, and then only k$ i n the Province. There does not appear to be any doubt, however, that immediately following the e l e c t i o n some members of the party k3 Pattullo to King, 3 November 19i]l» a n d 2 2 November 191+1. 4J4. Interviews with Hodges, P a r r i s , and As s e l s t i n e . Only Charles Reid accepted the idea of a pre-election conspiracy when i t was suggested to him, but he could offer no proof f o r his opinion. i+5 Province, 8 August 19l(l. 1 3 9 began to plan f o r a change i n the L i b e r a l leadership, what Pa t t u l l o seems to have forgotten at t h i s time i s the p o l i t i c a l axiom that, as long as a party leader i s successful, h i s word i s law to the party, but as soon as i t appears that the leader's power i s on the wane, two groups immediately begin to attack him. There are those who want the leader's power for themselves, and there are those who, f e e l i n g that they have some grievance against the leader, have been awaiting an opportune moment to exact t h e i r revenge. Of the former group, John Hart provides the most obvious example. If Hart, already expected to succeed P a t t u l l o on h i s retirement, had not acted when he did, at a time when the leadership of the party was being changed, i t appears very l i k e l y that he would never have succeeded i n h i s ambition to be premier of the province. Of the l a t t e r group, although the party no doubt included many others i n the same po s i t i o n , Harry Perry i s an apt i l l u s t r a t i o n . Prom the evidence that i s available, i t would appear that the alleged conspiracy, apart from the normal grumbling of the party members, did not i n fact exist u n t i l a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , and possibly not before i t became clear that P a t t u l l o was deter-mined not to enter into c o a l i t i o n . Further support for this view can be found i n the events following the Ottawa Conference. At th i s time conditions were almost id e a l for the carrying out of a conspiracy. The premier was c e r t a i n l y highly unpopular and was, i n addition, away from the province for a considerable period of time. No action to remove him was taken, however, nor i s there any hin t that such action was even considered. On the ll+0 contrary, a l l of the cabinet and many other prominent L i b e r a l s , whatever their private opinions, gave t h e i r wholehearted public support to the premier. After the memorable L i b e r a l convention, P a t t u l l o applied to Prime Minister Mackenzie King for the vacant B r i t i s h Columbia Senate seat. He t o l d King that "I do not l i k e to see any one else disappointed, but am not able to r e c a l l anyone whose record 1+6 i s quite as outstanding as my own." King r e p l i e d : I s h a l l , of course, be only too glad to discuss with my colleagues the question of the possible appointment of yourself to the Senate. Quite frankly, I doubt i f i t w i l l be f e l t by them, or would be regarded by the L i b e r a l s of the province, a l i k e i n the federal and p r o v i n c i a l f i e l d s , that the present would be an opportune time f o r an appoint-ment . Rightly or wrongly, i t was f e l t at the time of the Dominion-Provincial Conference that your action i n permitting yourself to be aligned i n the public mind with the opposition of Hepburn and Aberhart to the federal government proposal was, i n large part, responsible for the f a i l u r e of the Conference i t s e l f , and, since, i t has been the view of many that i t was responsible for your own defeat i n the recent provin-c i a l campaign. I am not saying that I myself share this view. I have, as you know, been careful to do a l l I could to avoid expressing any opinion which would be other than h e l p f u l towards yourself i n a s i t u a t i o n which, I realized, was bound to have serious react ions. 1+7 P a t t u l l o sat, u n t i l 191+5 > as the only L i b e r a l member of the l e g i s l a t u r e . In the general e l e c t i o n of that year, although unopposed by a c o a l i t i o n candidate, he was defeated by a member of the C.C.P. The good grace which had characterized his retirement from the premiership i n 191+1 was again evidenced 1+6 P a t t u l l o to King, 1+ December 191+1. 1+7 King to P a t t u l l o , 13 December 19I+I i n 19l|5. From then on P a t t u l l o , with a growing detachment, watched the p o l i t i c a l arena from the unaccustomed viewpoint of the L e g i s l a t i v e press g a l l e r y . He l i v e d with his wife i n quiet retirement i n V i c t o r i a u n t i l h i s death i n 1956. It i s doubtful I f a more f i t t i n g epitaph to Duff Pattullo's career could be found than i n the chorus of the old hymn that was sung at his funeral service. Dare to be a Daniel! Dare to stand alone 1. Dare to have a purpose firm! Dare to make i t known!48 1+8 Ira D. Sankey, (ed.), Sacred Songs and Solos, London, Morgan and Scott, Ltd., n. d., p. 708. APPENblX V A" B R I T I S H C O L U M B I A L I B E R A L O R G A N I Z A T I O N PROVIMCIAL EXECUTIVE t o i " \ r \ i t r e e F l M A N C « BRITISH C O L U n B I A L I B E R A L . ASSOCIATION B C ^ l T i s \A C d L O f \ « l A L t f t S R A L ASSOCI A T ' O M P E D E R f i L A S S O C I A T I O N P R O V I N C I A L . ASs0c . iA .r1 O K B R I T I S H C O L O M B I A . ASS© CI A T I O N L O C A L A S S O C I A T I O N L O C A L A S S O C / A . T I « M L O C A L A ^ S O C I A T i O N L O C A L L O C A L L O C A L Y D L > N 4 L I Q E * A L A V i O C I Pi TI ON L O C A L Vslor^trts L l ^ S R A L A S S O C I A T I O N 143 BIBLIOGRAPHY I Manuscript Sources Bovey, John A. "The e a r l y h i s t o r y of the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation i n B r i t i s h Columbia: 1932-1937." Unpublished Seminar paper f o r H i s t o r y 533, U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1957. MacLean Papers. V i c t o r i a , P r o v i n c i a l Archives of B r i t i s h Columbia. McGeer Papers. V i c t o r i a , P r o v i n c i a l Archives of B r i t i s h Columbia. O l i v e r Papers. V i c t o r i a , P r o v i n c i a l A rchives of B r i t i s h Columbia. P a t t u l l o Papers. V i c t o r i a , P r o v i n c i a l Archives of B r i t i s h Columbia. I I P r i n t e d Works A Government documents B r i t i s h Columbia. B r i t i s h Columbia i n the Canadian  Confederation. V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 193b1. 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Statement of votes by e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t s ; general e l e c t i o n and p l e b i s c i t e : June 1s t , 1937. V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 1937. B r i t i s h Columbia. Statement of votes by e l e c t o r a l  d i s t r i c t s : general e l e c t i o n I n c l u d i n g a c t i v e  s e r v i c e v o t i n g : October 21st, 1941. V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 191+2. Canada, Dominion Bureau of S t a t i s t i c s . Canada Year  Book, 1943-U4. Ottawa, King's P r i n t e r , 191+1+. Canada. Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-P r o v i n c i a l R e l a t i o n s . Ottawa, Queen's P r i n t e r , Pearson, George S. Radio Speech on t r a n s i e n t unemployed s i t u a t i o n . V i c t o r i a , King's P r i n t e r , 19381 B P e r i o d i c a l s Dobie, E d i t h . " P a r t y h i s t o r y i n B r i t i s h Columbia." P a c i f i c Northwest Q u a r t e r l y , 27 ( A p r i l 1936), 153-166. Pox, L e s l i e . "Recovery i n B.C." 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Why the women of B r i t i s h Columbia  should vote for the health insurance p l e b i s c i t e ; a radio address. N. p., n. pub., 1937. E General Works Hopkins, J. C a s t e l l . The'Canadian Annual Review of Public A f f a i r s , 1928-1938. Toronto, Canadian Review Company Limited, 1929-1939. Morton, James. Honest John Oliver. Toronto, J.M. Dent and Sons Limited, 1933. Normandin, A.L., ed. The Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1917-19li2. Ottawa, Mortimer Company Limited, 1917-1942. Ormsby, Margaret A. B r i t i s h Columbia: a History. Toronto, Macmillan, 1958. I l l Interviews Ass e l s t i n e , Mr. W.J. Interview with the writer. 3 February 1957. F a r r i s , Senator J. W. deB. Interview with the writer. 15 September 1958. Hodges, Mr. H.P. Interview with the writer. 26 August 1956. Hodges, Senator Nancy. Interview with the writer. 26 August 1956. li+7 I n g l i s , Mr. Peter. Interview with the writer. 18 March 1957. Manson, Hon. Mr. Justice A.M. 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