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In search of peace and security - a study of Indian foreign policy in the cold war Kavic, Lorne John 1960

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IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND SECURITY - A STUDY OP INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR  LORNE JOHN KAVIC  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES  We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming t o the standard r e q u i r e d from candidates f o r the degree of Master of A r t s  Members o f the Departments o f  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , I960  In p r e s e n t i n g  t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of  the r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t the  University  o f B r i t i s h C o l u m b i a , I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t freely  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and  agree t h a t p e r m i s s i o n f o r e x t e n s i v e f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may  study.  I further  c o p y i n g of t h i s  be g r a n t e d by the Head o f  Department o r by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s .  be a l l o w e d w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n  Lome J. Kavic.  Department o f  H i s t o r y ( i n t e r n a t i o n a l Studies)  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Vancouver 3, Canada. Date May 5  T  1960.  Columbia,  my  I t i s understood  that copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r g a i n s h a l l not  thesis  financial  permission.  ABSTRACT  Since I n d i a became independent i n August, 194-7, the Indian government has pursued a ' n e u t r a l i s t ' p o l i c y i n world a f f a i r s which has r a i s e d some doubts and d i f f i c u l t i e s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Western non-communist camp. I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , both g e n e r a l l y and i n i t s v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , has been f r e q u e n t l y subject to b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m and has even been condemned as immoral and motivated by a pro-Communist b i a s . Such an a n a l y s i s i s , of course, e n t i r e l y out of focus. I t i s hoped t h a t t h i s t h e s i s w i l l help d i s p e l some of the doubts and c l e a r away some of the m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s concerning the p o l i c i e s t h a t the Indian government has pursued on the world stage. Various aspects of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y have been d i s c u s s e d by a number of w r i t e r s both i n general and i n s p e c i f i c degrees; however, t o t h i s w r i t e r ' s knowledge, no one has attempted t o view I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the manner t r e a t e d i n t h i s t h e s i s . W i t h i n the l i m i t s p l a c e d by the p r o x i m i t y t o the events d i s c u s s e d , t h i s study t r i e s t o survey o b j e c t i v e l y I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the c o l d war. Throughout t h i s study I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been d i s c u s s e d i n i t s v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s . A country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y n a t u r a l l y d e r i v e s from a complex set of h i s t o r i c a l , geographic, economic and emotional f a c t o r s , and thus the context w i t h i n which I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y was formulated and the determinants upon which i t i s based are examined i n the f i r s t Chapter. Then i n Chapter Two, which d e s c r i b e s I n d i a ' s approach to the problem of s e c u r i t y , are d i s c u s s e d the v a r i o u s e f f o r t s made by the I n d i a n government t o s a t i s f y , w i t h i n the bounds p e r m i t t e d by the country's resources, the s t r a t e g i c requirements of the S t a t e . Recogn i z i n g t h a t I n d i a ' s r e a l s e c u r i t y depends on removing t e n s i o n from the world, however, I n d i a has sought the removal of Western c o n t r o l s over dependent A f r o - A s i a n peoples as a concrete step towards peace. The t h i r d Chapter d i s c u s s e s t h i s , from I n d i a ' s i n i t i a l out-spoken championship of the cause of dependent peoples to a more recent moderate approach caused by a r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t Western i m p e r i a l i s m i s a 'dead i s s u e ' and t h a t Communist i m p e r i a l i s m i s the g r e a t e r t h r e a t . I n r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t the d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o power b l o c s i n c r e a s e s the chances of war, the Indian government has s t r i v e n t o ease t e n s i o n through f u r t h e r i n g the i d e a l s of the U n i t e d Nations Charter, as i l l u s t r a t e d i n Chapter Four by her o p p o s i t i o n t o power b l o c s and to a l l i a n c e s , her advocacy of disarmament, and her championship of Red China's r i g h t t o a seat at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . Aware of the d e l i c a t e peace e x i s t i n g between East and West and r e a l i z i n g t h a t a world  war c o u l d r e s u l t from any dispute i n v o l v i n g the r i v a l i n t e r e s t s of the two power b l o c s , I n d i a has sought t o prevent such an occurrence through d e a l i n g w i t h each i s s u e on i t s i n t r i n s i c m e r i t s . I n d i a a l s o understands t h a t the only a l t e r n a t i v e t o coexistence i s c o - d e s t r u c t i o n , and she has sought t o i n s t i l l t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n i n both the Communist and non-Communist camps. These two aspects of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y are d i s c u s s e d i n Chapters F i v e and S i x . F i n a l l y , a b r i e f attempt i s made to summarize I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y and t o a r r i v e at some general c o n c l u s i o n s . I g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge the constant advice and guidance of Dr. P. Harnetty whose c o n s t r u c t i v e suggestions f a c i l i t a t e d the w r i t i n g of t h i s paper.  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Chapter I  Page Reasons, Aims, and Purposes of I n d i a n Foreign P o l i c y  1  II  I n d i a n S e c u r i t y i n the Cold "War  17  III  I n d i a and the Dependent Peoples  34-  IV  I n d i a and a P o l i c y of Peace  59  V  I n d i a n Mediation i n East-West Disputes . . .  80  VI  I n d i a and the P o l i c y of Panch S h i l a  VII  Conclusion  126  Bibliography  138  ....  106  ABBREVIATIONS  D.S.B.  Department o f State B u l l e t i n (Washington).  Doc. Amer. F o r . R e l . Documents on American F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s (World Peace Foundation, Boston). Doc. I . A f f .  Documents on I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (R.I.I.A., London).  G.O.I.  Government o f I n d i a .  I.C.W.A.  I n d i a n C o u n c i l o f World A f f a i r s (New D e l h i ) .  I.P.R.  American I n s t i t u t e o f P a c i f i c R e l a t i o n s (New Y o r k ) .  R.I.I.A.  Royal I n s t i t u t e o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (London). ,  S.I. A f f .  Survey o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (R.I.I.A.).  Y.B.U.N.  Yearbook o f the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  CHAPTER I REASONS, AIMS, AND PURPOSES OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY A country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y u l t i m a t e l y emerges from i t s own t r a d i t i o n s , from i t s own o b j e c t i v e s and more p a r t i c u l a r l y from i t s recent p a s t . ^  Independence f o r I n d i a unhappily c o i n c i d e d w i t h one of the most t r o u b l e d and menacing p e r i o d s i n world h i s t o r y . The world was r a p i d l y p o l a r i z i n g i n t o the S o v i e t and Western b l o c s , and w i t h the e n u n c i a t i o n on 12 March 194-7 of the Truman d o c t r i n e to c o n t a i n Communism, and the issuance on 5 October 1947 of a Communist Manifesto i n Moscow and Warsaw, no f u r t h e r evidence was needed t o show t h a t the s p l i t i n the two camps was sharp and  world-wide.  The immediate impact of t h i s h o s t i l e  combination  of f o r c e s was f e l t by an I n d i a which looked forward o n l y to a p e r i o d of p e a c e f u l r e c o n s t r u c t i o n i n which to meet the enormous needs of her people.  Instead I n d i a , at her v e r y  b i r t h , was plunged, much a g a i n s t her wishes, i n t o the v e r y centre of g i g a n t i c r e v o l u t i o n a r y f o r c e s and power r i v a l r i e s and was presented w i t h the immediate challenge of choosing a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the conte acfc of a world d i v i d i n g between ;  Communism and anti-Communism.  She was given no o p p o r t u n i t y 1  2 to f e e l her way s l o w l y towards a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of I n d i a n interests.  At once I n d i a was c a l l e d upon to take an a t t i t u d e  on such questions as P a l e s t i n e and Indonesia, and soon a f t e r wards she was faced w i t h a d e c i s i v e change i n A s i a n a f f a i r s when the Communist regime was e s t a b l i s h e d i n China. As a new n a t i o n of v a s t s i z e and great p o s s i b i l i t i e s , I n d i a was f o r c e d by circumstances to c l a r i f y her p o s i t i o n and t h e r e a f t e r t o assume the major r o l e accorded her i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy.  This meant f o r m u l a t i n g a f o r e i g n p o l i c y  i n accordance w i t h her n a t i o n a l b e l i e f s and i n t e r e s t s , a p o l i c y which, i n a d d i t i o n to d e a l i n g w i t h immediate problems, would a l s o act as a means of s t r e n g t h e n i n g i n t e r n a l u n i t y . I n d i a had not o n l y t o present a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c image of hers e l f t o the world.  She had a l s o t o make t h a t image e f f e c t i v e  by d i p l o m a t i c a c t i o n and see t h a t the i n t e r e s t s she  pursued  were consonant w i t h i t and capable of being pursued w i t h i n the context of world a f f a i r s .  One has o n l y to read Mr.  Nehru's speeches between 1946 and 1949 "to see how urgent  was  t h i s sense of need f o r a conception of i n t e r e s t s and p o l i c y which would be both appropriate and  realistic.  I n d i a n views on i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s may be t r a c e d t o a m u l t i t u d e of sources, some rooted i n t r a d i t i o n and experience, others d e r i v i n g from the contemporary world. understand  To  I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i t i s important to have a  sound a p p r e c i a t i o n of the f a c t o r s which c o l l e c t i v e l y  determine  3  t h a t p o l i c y and which have provided and are p r o v i d i n g the m o t i v a t i o n f o r the unequivocal e x e c u t i o n o f t h a t p o l i c y . Only i n the context of I n d i a ' s needs and h e r i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the nature of the world c o n f l i c t can I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y he p r o p e r l y understood.  A c a r e f u l probe i n t o these  w i l l shed the outer mists and l e a d t o a proper assessment of the aims behind I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Napoleon once d e c l a r e d t h a t the f o r e i g n p o l i c y of a s t a t e d e r i v e s e s s e n t i a l l y from i t s geographic p o s i t i o n . While t h i s i s no longer e n t i r e l y accurate, because of the r e v o l u t i o n i n technology d u r i n g the past century, the bare f a c t s of geography do l i m i t a s t a t e ' s freedom of a c t i o n i n foreign a f f a i r s .  That geography i s a determinant of I n d i a ' s  f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s was s t r e s s e d by Mr. Nehru on 23 March 194-7 i n a speech t o the A s i a n R e l a t i o n s Conference i n D e l h i : "Geography i s a compelling f a c t o r , and g e o g r a p h i c a l l y she /Tndia7 i s so s i t u a t e d as t o be the meeting p o i n t of Western  p and Northern and E a s t e r n and South East A s i a . "  India's  geographical c o n t i g u i t y t o the two Great Powers of the Communist world can never be ignored by I n d i a n statesmen, e s p e c i a l l y the simple f a c t t h a t Communist China presses down upon a thousand m i l e s of I n d i a ' s n o r t h e r n and e a s t e r n frontiers.  Thus i t i s a matter of v i t a l n e c e s s i t y f o r I n d i a  to f i n d a modus v i v e n d i w i t h these powerful  neighbours,  though v i t a l i n t e r e s t s must be p r o t e c t e d , as i n the case o f the t i n y border s t a t e s .  4 At the same time I n d i a cannot ignore the f a c t t h a t she has 3500 m i l e s of c o a s t l i n e and i s extremely dependent upon the sea routes f o r the flow of goods and s e r v i c e s . The  importance of t h i s f a c t o r has been acknowledged by  noted I n d i a n p u b l i c i s t K. M.  the  Pannikar:  While to other c o u n t r i e s the Indian Ocean i s o n l y one of the most important Oceanic areas, to I n d i a i t i s the v i t a l sea. Her l i f e l i n e s are concentrated i n t h a t area. Her f u t u r e i s dependent on the freedom of t h a t vast water s u r f a c e . No i n d u s t r i a l development, no commercial growth, no stable p o l i t i c a l structure i s possible for her, unless the Indian Ocean i s f r e e and her own shores f u l l y p r o t e c t e d . ^ Thus i t i s e q u a l l y important f o r I n d i a t o preserve f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h those powers ( i . e . the Western b l o c ) whose navies c o u l d e a s i l y t h r o t t l e I n d i a ' s v i t a l sea-borne l i f e i n the u n l i k e l y event of the need f o r such a c t i o n a r i s i n g . Moreover, I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n at the head of the I n d i a n Ocean g i v e s i t an important stake i n the p o w e r - p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s a f f e c t i n g a l l s t a t e s i n the r e g i o n . C l o s e l y l i n k e d w i t h the geographic pressure  on  I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y are those f a c t o r s stemming from her m i l i t a r y and economic weakness —  4  w e l l aware.  of which her l e a d e r s are  I n d i a f e e l s t h a t she l a c k s the necessary  s t r e n g t h t o choose s i d e s i n the c o l d war, otherwise be apt to do so.  even i f she would  As a r e s u l t Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru  has d e c l a r e d t h a t i t i s b e t t e r f o r I n d i a t o stand aside from  5  i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s f o r " i t would not be i n consonance w i t h . . . d i g n i t y . . . t o i n t e r f e r e without any e f f e c t b e i n g produced."-^ Regarding the p o s s i b i l i t y of a t h r e a t t o I n d i a from the Communist b l o c , p a r t i c u l a r l y China, the government has h i t h e r t o expressed no f e a r s .  Indian  While i t s  a c t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y those concerning P a k i s t a n and her other s m a l l e r Himalayan neighbours would seem to i n d i c a t e a c l e a r awareness and concern f o r I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y against Chinese a c t i o n s , the Nehru government has maintained that I n d i a would not be promoting her s e c u r i t y by j o i n i n g the Western bloc.  This was  c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d by Mr. Nehru's statement  i n the Indian Parliament on 21 December  1950:  I n d i a i s more secure than 90% of the c o u n t r i e s of the world, not on the b a s i s of her armed s t r e n g t h , but judging from the present world s i t u a t i o n , the danger to I n d i a i n the near f u t u r e i s f a r l e s s than t h a t t h r e a t e n i n g more powerful and advanced n a t i o n s . ^ I n d i a ' s economic weakness i s a f u r t h e r c o n d i t i o n i n g f a c t o r i n the general o r i e n t a t i o n of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Domestic economic needs govern the e x t e r n a l p o l i c y of every 7 country and t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y t r u e of I n d i a . '  Nehru has  not h e s i t a t e d to admit t h a t h i s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s d i r e c t e d towards meeting h i s country's p r e s s i n g domestic needs both i n a c q u i r i n g f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l a s s i s t a n c e f o r her i n t e r n a l development and to g a i n i n g time i n which to achieve  6 the necessary degree of development.  "The f i r s t t h i n g we  kept i n view," s a i d Nehru i n one of h i s p a r l i a m e n t a r y speeches, "was to b u i l d our own country on s o l i d foundations and not t o get entangled i n matters which d i d not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t us - not t h a t we are not i n t e r e s t e d i n those matters, but the burden of these entanglements would be too great and the problems we had t o face i n our own country were b i g Q enough f o r any country t o f a c e . " Consequently, I n d i a ' s p r e s s i n g needs of economic development have caused her to keep open the door to a l l p o s s i b l e sources of a i d , Western and S o v i e t , i f the d e s i r e d economic r e v o l u t i o n i s t o be achieved.  The I n d i a n Prime  M i n i s t e r has s t a t e d that. I n d i a i s p e r f e c t l y prepared and happy t o r e c e i v e f o r e i g n a i d from any source, but at the same time he has a l s o p l a i n l y d e c l a r e d t h a t i f h e l p from abroad at any time depended upon a v a r i a t i o n , howsoever s l i g h t , i n I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y , then I n d i a would r e l i n q u i s h t h a t help completely and p r e f e r s t a r v a t i o n and p r i v a t i o n t o t a k i n g such h e l p I n the p u r s u i t of economic development,  then,  I n d i a has considered a p o l i c y of non-alignment t o be i n her best i n t e r e s t s .  For i n the words of the former S e c r e t a r y -  General of I n d i a ' s E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s M i n i s t r y , the l a t e G. S. B a j p a i : I t cannot be argued t h a t any immediate I n d i a n i n t e r e s t s w i l l be served by t h i s country i m p l i c a t i n g h e r s e l f , by ' a r t i f i c i a l  7 t i e s ' . . . i n the o r d i n a r y combinations or c o a l i t i o n s of the f r i e n d s h i p s or enmities of the two camps i n which the major p a r t of the world i s to-day unfortunately divided. Just as the s e c u r i t y and economic needs of I n d i a have demanded / I n the o p i n i o n of the Indian  government/  that I n d i a pursue a p o l i c y of non-alignment i n the c o l d war, so too has the temper of Indian p u b l i c o p i n i o n supported the same view.  While Indian p u b l i c o p i n i o n has tended t o f o l l o w  r a t h e r than l e a d the Government i n the f o r m u l a t i o n  of i t s  f o r e i g n p o l i c y , the Nehru government has g e n e r a l l y been c a r e f u l not t o go against the sentiments of the people. The o v e r - r i d i n g p u b l i c sentiment has i n e v i t a b l y been one of a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m which was bequeathed t o the Indian people as a n a t u r a l by-product of c o l o n i a l s u b j e c t i o n and the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n .  As one well-known  Indian  p u b l i c i s t has observed: The a n t i p a t h y to i m p e r i a l i s m i s deepr o o t e d i n the minds of everyone i n I n d i a , and that has been acquired not from books, but from n a t i o n a l e x p e r i e n c e . ^ Almost two c e n t u r i e s of f o r e i g n r u l e produced an i n s t i n c t i v e antagonism t o any form of Western (white) domination over A s i a n and A f r i c a n (non-white) peoples.  The sharp d i s t i n c t i o n  which Indians make between Western European c o l o n i a l i s m i n A s i a and A f r i c a and Russian c o n t r o l over e a s t e r n Europe and c e n t r a l A s i a i s due t o the f a c t t h a t I n d i a , p r i o r to the  8  recent Chinese i n c u r s i o n s on her borders, had never experienced e x t e r n a l Communist domination of any p o r t i o n of her 12 territory.  On the c o n t r a r y , by championing * a n t i - c o l o n i a l *  movements throughout A s i a and A f r i c a , the Communists powers appeared i n a v e r y favourable l i g h t to most Indians. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, t h a t u n t i l q u i t e recent years, the I n d i a n people considered the term " i m p e r i a l i s m " as synonymous w i t h the n a t i o n s of the West. In a d d i t i o n most of the present Indian l e a d e r s experienced the i n j u r y to p r i d e and n a t i o n a l s e l f - r e s p e c t a r i s i n g from p e r s o n a l mistreatment  and h u m i l i a t i o n under the c o l o n i a l  regime, and thus a r e s i d u a l emotional a n t i p a t h y i n e v i t a b l y clouded t h e i r assessment of the contemporary world s t r u g g l e . The i n t e n s i t y of t h i s resentment and the occasions f o r i t s e x p r e s s i o n have v a r i e d , but i t has c o n s t i t u t e d a f a i r l y f o r m i d a b l y b a r r i e r t o any c l o s e alignment w i t h the West  —  to which I n d i a i s p o l i t i c a l l y and economically drawn. Mr. Nehru expressed t h i s f e e l i n g i n a speech of 22 March 194-9: ...any attempt on our p a r t . . . t o go too f a r i n one d i r e c t i o n would create d i f f i c u l t i e s i n our own country. I t would be resented and would produce c o n f l i c t s which would not be h e l p f u l to us or to any other c o u n t r y . ^ This r e l u c t a n c e to a s s o c i a t e too c l o s e l y w i t h the West i s r e i n f o r c e d by the f a c t t h a t c e r t a i n aspects of communist d o c t r i n e have c o n s i d e r a b l e a t t r a c t i o n f o r I n d i a n s .  9 For on the i s s u e of the i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t between East and West the I n d i a n view i s t h a t d i f f e r e n t economic and p o l i t i c a l systems are s u i t e d t o d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s .  Nehru  spoke v e r y c l e a r l y on the s u b j e c t on 22 March 194-9: We must r e a l i z e t h a t there are d i f f e r e n t types o f economic p o l i c y i n the world to-day i n d i f f e r e n t c o u n t r i e s , and they are b e l i e v e d i n by t h e i r people. W e l l , the o n l y t h i n g t o do i s t o leave them t o work out t h e i r d e s t i n y . . . . Any e f f o r t t o change the economic p o l i c y , o r any other i n t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r c i b l y , or t o b r i n g pressure t o bear upon i t leads t o counterpressure and t o continuous c o n f l i c t . . . . We have had a p h i l o s o p h y which i s a l i v e - a n d - l e t - l i v e p h i l o s o p h y o f l i f e . We have no d e s i r e t o convert other people t o any view o r thought.,^ I n d i a b e l i e v e s i n the democratic way and has fought communists at home f o r c o n s t i t u t i n g a t h r e a t t o p u b l i c peace and f o r a c t i o n s c a l c u l a t e d t o challenge the f o u n d a t i o n of democratic government.  But t h i s d i d n o t mean / I n the view o f the Nehru  government/ t h a t I n d i a should p i c k up q u a r r e l s w i t h c o u n t r i e s which were conducting themselves  i n the communist way. She  was not going t o embark upon a 'moral crusade f o r the b e n e f i t 15 of mankind' on b e h a l f o f h e r own way o f l i f e .  y  I n d i a holds  t h a t the problems o f the East-West s t r u g g l e , i f they are t o be s o l v e d , should n o t be seen i n terms of Communism and anti-Communism, one e v i l and the other v i r t u o u s . N e i t h e r side should t r y t o impose i t s own i d e o l o g y on the r e s t of the world.  T h i s p r a c t i c a l and d i s p a s s i o n a t e approach on the  i s s u e was commented upon by Robert Trumbul, New York Times  10 correspondent i n D e l h i : I n d i a as a n a t i o n h a r d l y has such a l u x u r i o u s s o c i a l s t r u c t u r e t h a t the mass of the people are f i e r c e l y d e t e r mined t o defend the way of l i f e a g a i n s t communist e f f o r t s t o make i t over... Indians g e n e r a l l y l a c k t h a t l o a t h i n g of communism t h a t so deeply i n f l u e n c e s United States p o l i c i e s . i e  T h i s , he e x p l a i n e d , was the reason f o r I n d i a ' s s e p a r a t i o n from the f o r e f r o n t of to-day's i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t . A f i n a l f a c t o r t h a t m e r i t s a t t e n t i o n as a d e t e r minant of the general course of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s the s t r o n g n a t i o n a l i s m of the I n d i a n people.  Proud of  t h e i r independence, Indians have "been zealous t o guard i t from any infringement.  Membership of a b l o c i s equated w i t h  l o s s of freedom o f a c t i o n i n e x t e r n a l a f f a i r s .  Mr. Nehru  p o i n t e d t h i s out i n a p a r l i a m e n t a r y debate when, i n answer to  a suggestion t h a t I n d i a give up h e r middle p o l i c y , he  d e c l a r e d t h a t j o i n i n g a b l o c c o u l d only mean t h a t I n d i a give up her own view about a p a r t i c u l a r q u e s t i o n and adopt the other p a r t y ' s view on t h a t question i n order t o please i t 17 and g a i n i t s favour. '  I n d i a considered h e r s e l f t o be an  important n a t i o n i n h e r own r i g h t , d e s t i n e d and determined t o p l a y an important r o l e i n world a f f a i r s .  Mr. C. R.  Rajagopalachari once observed i n Parliament: Our power i s very l i t t l e , but our importance i s not as l i t t l e as our power. There i s a great d i f f e r e n c e between the power t h a t we now possess and the importance which without our seeking has been t h r u s t upon India.-,«  11 This i s the b a s i s of I n d i a ' s independent p o l i c y . not i n t e n d to be the p l a y t h i n g s of o t h e r s .  She does  Consequently  I n d i a i s not prepared to take a d e c i s i o n because one or the other b l o c wishes her t o , but only on the b a s i s of what she considers r i g h t i n her own l i g h t and i n conformity w i t h her own i n t e r e s t s .  She w i l l judge great i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s on  t h e i r m e r i t s and not as Washington or London or any place  other  decrees. These, then, are some of the f a c t o r s t h a t shape  I n d i a ' s d i s t i n c t i v e view of the world.  That outlook i n  t u r n moulds the c h a r a c t e r of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y .  However,  the t a s k of d i s c e r n i n g the b a s i c aims of that p o l i c y presents s e v e r a l d i f f i c u l t i e s i n t h a t I n d i a ' s p o l i c y has been i n a 19 stage of development since independence.  Often Indian  J  f o r e i g n p o l i c y has l a c k e d c l a r i t y and the vague terms i n which i t has been couched, l i k e 'independent p o l i c y , ' 'neutralism,' and ' p o l i c y of non-alignment' has made i t confusing and b a f f l i n g .  This has l e d to w i d e l y h e l d  misconceptions concerning the general aims of I n d i a ' s e x t e r n a l p o l i c y and has provoked many unfavourable  reactions to i t i n 20  both the communist and non-communist worlds, India i t s e l f .  and w i t h i n  The p o l i c y of I n d i a i s o f t e n looked upon i n  the West as simply the r e f l e c t i o n of some perverse,  short-  s i g h t e d or s e l f i s h code of I n d i a n values which f a i l s t o d i s t i n g u i s h between communism and the democratic t r a d i t i o n s of the West —  or s t i l l worse, which favours the M a r x i s t  12 philosophy.  This e x p l a i n s a widespread tendency i n the  West, and e s p e c i a l l y i n the U n i t e d S t a t e s , t o condemn Indian 'neutralism,  1  o r whatever i t can be c a l l e d , as some-  how immoral, and even the spurious facade of an u n d e r l y i n g pro-communist b i a s . Such i l l - t e m p e r e d a n a l y s i s i s , of course, e n t i r e l y out of f o c u s .  I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s based, as has been  i n d i c a t e d above, on a number of f a c t o r s and has consequently manifested i t s e l f i n v a r i o u s ways, a l l of which are but r e f l e c t i o n s of two b a s i c and i n t e r r e l a t e d aims — security.  peace and  The s t a t u t o r y b a s i s f o r these t w i n aims and, by  i n f e r e n c e , of the general o r i e n t a t i o n o f I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n i t s v a r i o u s m a n i f e s t a t i o n s , i s A r t i c l e 51 of the C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a . The s t a t e s h a l l endeavour t o : (a) promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y (b) maintain j u s t and honourable r e l a t i o n s between n a t i o n s (c) f o s t e r respect f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s i n the d e a l i n g s o f organized peoples w i t h one another, and, (d) encourage settlement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l d i s p u t e s by a r b i t r a t i o n . 2 1 In the p o l i c y of non-alignment I n d i a seeks t o achieve  these  aims by a v o i d i n g involvement  Non-  alignment  i n any t h i r d world war.  i s n o t , t h e r e f o r e , as i s o f t e n wrongly b e l i e v e d ,  13  the aim of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y , but the instrument through which I n d i a hopes t o remain n e u t r a l i n a world c o n f l i c t i n which her t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n i s a p h y s i c a l possibility. However, few Indians r e a l l y b e l i e v e t h a t i t would be p o s s i b l e f o r t h e i r country t o remain n e u t r a l i n another major war i n view of the p r o g r e s s i v e e l i m i n a t i o n o f time and space which has brought c o u n t r i e s much nearer each other and made them more dependent on each other than ever b e f o r e . In one of h i s most b l u n t u t t e r a n c e s Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d t h a t I n d i a would not j o i n a war i f she c o u l d h e l p i t but, i n view o f the f a c t t h a t i t was a d i f f i c u l t matter nowadays i n world wars t o be n e u t r a l , i f the choice came I n d i a was going 22 to j o i n the s i d e which was t o her i n t e r e s t .  Nehru him-  s e l f has s t a t e d h i s country's p o s i t i o n i n the event o f a hot war. Speaking before the C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly on 8 March 1948 he s t a t e d t h a t : ...we stand i n t h i s country f o r democracy, we stand f o r an Independent I n d i a . Now o b v i o u s l y , anything t h a t i s opposed t o the democratic concept — the r e a l , e s s e n t i a l l y democratic concept, which i n c l u d e s not o n l y p o l i t i c a l but economic democracy — we ought t o oppose.25 To prevent having t o make such a c h o i c e , the I n d i a n government has been determined t o do a l l i n i t s power t o l e s s e n the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f a world c o n f l i c t and to promote the cause o f world peace.  I n h i s very f i r s t  14 message t o P a r l i a m e n t , the P r e s i d e n t of I n d i a , Dr. Rajendra Prasad r e i t e r a t e d t h a t h i s country had i n h e r i t e d no enmities or t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s and intended to maintain peace and f r i e n d s h i p w i t h a l l the n a t i o n s of the world and t o help i n 24 every way p o s s i b l e i n the maintenance o f world peace. Mrs. P a n d i t , Chairman of the Indian D e l e g a t i o n t o the U n i t e d Nations echoed t h i s aim when, i n h e r f i r s t speech i n the General Assembly, she d e c l a r e d t h a t "We /the I n d i a n d e l e g a t i o n / stand f o r peace and w i l l devote our resources and energy towards the a b o l i t i o n o f a l l the causes which l e a d t o war." ;  25  I n the p u r s u i t of peace I n d i a i s motivated not  o n l y by her s e l f - i n t e r e s t but a l s o by the p r i n c i p l e s o f non-violence  o f ahimsa and the d i c t a t e s o f love and peace  expounded by Buddha some t w e n t y - f i v e hundred years ago. Mr. Nehru s t r e s s e d t h i s p o i n t i n December 1956 while  speaking  on "The I n d i a n Way i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s . " ...the Indian people seemed t o have developed a t r a d i t i o n t o do t h i n g s p e a c e f u l l y . . . . I f there was any message which I n d i a o f f e r e d t o other c o u n t r i e s i t was t h i s message o f doing t h i n g s by p e a c e f u l methods t o solve any p r o b l e m . ^ Although the p u r i s t Gandhian conception of ahimsa has been termed i m p r a c t i c a b l e by Nehru and h i s c o l l e a g u e s , and though f o r c e has been r e s o r t e d t o — and Kashmir (1947-8) —  n o t a b l y i n Hyderabad (1948)  the p r i n c i p l e has been accepted as  15  an i d e a l t o be sought a f t e r and as a method t o be pursued wherever p o s s i b l e .  Indian leaders have endeavoured to give  the s a n c t i t y and a u t h o r i t y of r e l i g i o n t o t h e i r purposes i n world a f f a i r s .  The s p i r i t u a l , the n o n - v i o l e n t , approach of  I n d i a i n her r e l a t i o n t o other n a t i o n s i s a constant theme, and has caused at l e a s t one observer to comment t h a t i t i s i n the l i g h t of I n d i a ' s moral i d e a l i s m t h a t her approach to 27 world a f f a i r s must be viewed. ' That t h i s view i s not n e c e s s a r i l y so i s i n d i c a t e d by the care Nehru has taken t o i n d i c a t e t o h i s Indian audiences t h a t h i s p o l i c y i s one which looks f i r s t t o India's i n t e r e s t s .  But he has a l s o d e c l a r e d t h a t the  general i n t e r e s t s of I n d i a are served by the k i n d of p o l i c y which i s now r e c o g n i z a b l e as d i s t i n c t i v e l y I n d i a n .  In  t r u t h , the p o l i c y of 'dynamic n e u t r a l i s m ' or 'non-alignment' which I n d i a has f o l l o w e d —  and i s f o l l o w i n g —  i s a realistic  p o l i c y c a l c u l a t e d t o p r o t e c t her n a t i o n a l s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Mr. Nehru has h i m s e l f recognized t h a t the a r t of  conducting  the f o r e i g n a f f a i r s of a country l i e s i n f i n d i n g out what i s most advantageous t o the country, whether a country i s 29 i m p e r i a l i s t i c or s o c i a l i s t or communist.  y  I n the p o l i c y of  non-alignment I n d i a has found the t r i p l e coincidence  of  s e r v i n g her l o n g - and short-term i n t e r e s t s , the i n t e r e s t s of world peace and a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n a ' p o l i c y of peace' which i s not easy t o f i n d i n mere n e u t r a l i s m .  16 Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been n e i t h e r passive nor n e g a t i v e ; t h i s i s evidence by the r61e I n d i a has been p l a y i n g i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s since she a t t a i n e d independence i n 194-7.  The c h i e f f e a t u r e s of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n  p o l i c y as r e f l e c t e d i n her d e c i s i o n s and a c t i o n s may summarized as f o l l o w s :  be  the p r e s e r v a t i o n of Indian independence  and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y by non-alignment w i t h e i t h e r side i n the c o l d war, c r e a t i o n of a peace area and p o s i t i v e a c t i o n s on the f r o n t i e r s ; removal of a r o o t cause of t e n s i o n and c o n f l i c t through championing the cause of dependent peoples i n A s i a and A f r i c a ; o p p o s i t i o n to a l l i a n c e s and  the  n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China as steps which increase t e n s i o n i n the world; a p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of independent judgement on a l l c o l d war i s s u e s w i t h a view to  mediating  between the r i v a l b l o c s ; and furtherance of the d o c t r i n e of p e a c e f u l co-existence as the only a l t e r n a t i v e t o mutual destruction.  A l l other f e a t u r e s of I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y  are but refinements  of these core elements.  Footnotes - Chapter  I  1 J a w h a r l a l Nehru, Speeches 194-6-194-9 (New D e l h i , P u b l i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1958), p. 264. 2 I b i d . , p. p.  302.  3 P. M. P a n n i k a r , I n d i a and the I n d i a n Ocean (London, 1 9 4 5 ) , 83.  4 An example i s a statement by Mr. Nehru i n 1950 i n which he d e c l a r e d : "In t h i s country such army, navy and a i r f o r c e t h a t we have i s a t i n y a f f a i r as compared t o the v a s t armadas of other nations...judged by modern standards, we are weak, m i l i t a r i l y weak, economically weak, and so on." " N a t i o n a l i s m i n A s i a , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l J o u r n a l , Winter 19501951,  P.  9.  5 Speech to the I n d i a n C o n s t i t u e n t Assembly ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) on 8 March 1948. Independence and A f t e r , p. 215. 6 Quoted i n J . C. Kundra, I n d i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1947-1954 (Bombay, Vora, 1 9 5 5 ) , p. 71. 7 L. K. Eosinger has a p t l y observed what the consequences would be f o r I n d i a i n the event of war. "A t h i r d world war c o u l d b r i n g d i s a s t e r t o the country, making economic havoc, g e n e r a t i n g tremendous i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l pressures and perhaps t u r n i n g her i n t o a b a t t l e - f i e l d . The Government /of I n d i a / was aware t h a t developments along these l i n e s would make i t s own s u r v i v a l completely u n c e r t a i n . " L. E. E o s i n g e r , I n d i a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1 9 5 0 ) , p. 3 6 . 8 JawaJiarlal Nehru, Speeches 1949-1953 (New D e l h i , P u b l i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1954), p. 141. 9 A speech d u r i n g a f o r e i g n p o l i c y debate on 12 June i n the I n d i a n P a r l i a m e n t , I b i d . , p. 222.  1952  10 G. S. B a j p a i , " I n d i a and the Balance of Power," I n d i a n Yearbook of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 1 (Madras,  1 9 5 2 ) , p.  4.  11 A. Appadorai, "Indian F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (London), January 1949, p. 3 8 . 12 The I n d i a n Communist P a r t y , however, governed the s t a t e of K e r a l a f o r a short p e r i o d as a r e s u l t of i t s e l e c t i o n , by democratic p r o c e s s , i n 1951* i  13 Speech to the C o n s t i t u t i o n Club i n New Independence and A f t e r , p. 257.  Delhi,  14 A speech d e l i v e r e d a t the Indian C o u n c i l of World A f f a i r s , New D e l h i , March 2 2 , 1949, I b i d . , p. 216. 15 Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London, G o l l a n c z ,  1 9 5 4 ) , p.  103.  16 The New York Times. January 28,  1951.  17 Independence and A f t e r , p. 218. 18 Quoted i n T. M. P. Mahadevan, "India's P o l i c y of Non-Alignment," The I n d i a n Yearbook of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 (Madras, 1 9 5 3 ) , p. 2 3 . 19 Nehru s a i d on 22 March 1949 i n New D e l h i : "Foreign p o l i c y i s something which develops g r a d u a l l y . . . i n the present context of f o r e i g n p o l i c y we are a young country and, t h e r e f o r e , our f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s g r a d u a l l y d e v e l o p i n g . " Independence and A f t e r , p. 253* 20 See Senator Knowland's Address, November 1953 on a • P a c i f i c NATO.' Doc. Amer. F o r . E e l . 1953, pp. 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 . Senator Knowland d e s c r i b e d I n d i a ' s n e u t r a l i s t p o l i c y as a "very.naive p o l i c y , " and warned t h a t " i t w i l l be a f a t a l mistake i f the whole Free World s i t s t w i d d l i n g i t s thumbs w a i t i n g f o r I n d i a t o take some e f f e c t i v e steps t h a t would h e l p r e s i s t Communism i n A s i a . " 21 The C o n s t i t u t i o n of I n d i a (New D e l h i , P u b l i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 2 1 . 22 Independence and A f t e r , p. 2 0 0 . 23 I b i d . , p.  217.  24 Quoted i n Mahadevan, op. c i t . , p. 2 9 . 25 The U n i t e d N a t i o n s , The Second S e s s i o n of the General Assembly, v o l . 1, p. 137* 26 Indiagram, No. 8 5 1 , December 2 9 ,  1955.  27 W. Norman Brown, "Indian N a t i o n a l I d e a l s Today," Mary Keatings Das Memorial L e c t u r e , Columbia U n i v e r s i t y . C i t e d i n T. W. Wallbank, I n d i a i n the New E r a (New York, S c o t t , Foresman and Co., 1 9 5 8 ) , p. 310. 28 Independence and A f t e r , p. 2 0 0 . 29 I b i d . , pp. 204-205. ii  CHAPTER I I INDIAN SECURITY IN THE COLD  ...no government can say f o r peace and do nothing have to take precautions ourselves to the best of  The most important  WAR  t h a t i t stands about i t . We and prepare our a b i l i t y ^  aim of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y  has n a t u r a l l y been the p r e s e r v a t i o n of I n d i a ' s independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y .  Paced w i t h the c h a l l e n g i n g  i n t e r n a l task of p r o v i d i n g a b e t t e r l i f e f o r the  poverty-  s t r i c k e n I n d i a n masses, the Government of I n d i a adopted a p o l i c y of non-alignment w i t h e i t h e r of the power b l o c s as being i n the country's best i n t e r e s t s .  I n d i a looked a t the  two g i a n t c o a l i t i o n s of h o s t i l e n a t i o n s , armed to the t e e t h and equipped w i t h d e s t r u c t i v e weapons of c a t e g o r i e s t h a t I n d i a d i d not possess —  c o u l d not possess f o r a long time  and d i d not even want to possess — 2 strength.  and at her own  military  She c a l c u l a t e d t h a t t o be attacked by e i t h e r of  these c o a l i t i o n s would be d i s a s t r o u s to the n a t i o n .  The  Government would, t h e r e f o r e , not provoke e i t h e r of the  two  c o a l i t i o n s to a t t a c k I n d i a , i n case of war, by j o i n i n g on one side or the  other.  y  I f the unexpected were t o happen, however, and 17  18 I n d i a were attacked by the S o v i e t Union and/or Communist China, the I n d i a n government could assume w i t h a  confidence  born of s t r a i g h t l o g i c t h a t the West would come to her a i d i n any event.  Thus I n d i a saw a p o s s i b l e chance of remaining  n e u t r a l , i f a war broke out, under the p r e v a i l i n g m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n .  She c a l c u l a t e d that she would not  be promoting her s e c u r i t y by j o i n i n g e i t h e r of the power b l o c s , a view c l e a r l y enunciated by the l a t e Mr. G. S. B a j p a i , a former Secretary-General  of I n d i a ' s E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s  Ministry: I t cannot be argued t h a t any immediate Indian i n t e r e s t s w i l l be served by t h i s country i m p l i c a t i n g h e r s e l f , by a r t i f i c i a l t i e s . . . i n the o r d i n a r y combinations or c o a l i t i o n s of the f r i e n d s h i p s or enmities of the two camps i n which the major p a r t of the world i s to-day u n f o r t u n a t e l y divided.^ So f a r as I n d i a ' s i n i t i a l e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s were concerned, she had enough t r o u b l e s w i t h neighbouring P a k i s t a n : hence r e l a t i o n s w i t h t h a t country were the main concern of the Indian f o r e i g n o f f i c e . between the successors  The  s t o r y of t h i s t r a g i c enmity  t o the B r i t i s h Raj i s too w e l l known  t o r e q u i r e a lengthy e x p o s i t i o n i n t h i s p a p e r .  5  Suffice i t  to note t h a t I n d i a and P a k i s t a n have been i n a s t a t e of undeclared war, w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of i n t e n s i t y , throughout t h e i r b r i e f h i s t o r y as, independent s t a t e s .  The  constant  t h r e a t of renewed m i l i t a r y h o s t i l i t i e s over Kashmir has compelled I n d i a to channel a l a r g e p o r t i o n of her l i m i t e d  19  fluids i n t o defence — her budget.  an annual average of 50 per cent of  T h i s , i n t u r n , has had grave economic reper-  c u s s i o n s , n o t a b l y the slowing-down of much-needed development programmes.  The  severe.  Indian sub-continent  The  s t r a t e g i c consequences have been no l e s s i s a natural military unit  whose s e c u r i t y depends on j o i n t defence p o l i c i e s and  co-  7  o r d i n a t i o n of t h e i r armed f o r c e s . '  The h i s t o r i c t h r e a t to  the area has been from the north-west, and any  future  i n v a s i o n of t h a t area would i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t I n d i a .  Instead  of m i l i t a r y co-operation w i t h P a k i s t a n , however, I n d i a  was  f o r c e d to prepare f o r a p o s s i b l e war w i t h her neighbour —  a  war which, i f i t occurred, could destroy the s t a b i l i t y of the sub-continent  and cause i n c a l c u l a b l e harm f o r i t s 4-50  m i l l i o n inhabitants.  Under these circumstances i t was  not  unnatural f o r the Indian leaders to i n i t i a l l y take a d i s t a n t view of the c o l d war. summed up as:  'we  T h e i r general approach to i t can  s h a l l have n o t h i n g t o do w i t h  be  it.'  With the coming i n t o power i n China of the Communists, however, I n d i a could no longer be a d i s t a n t onlooker.  For despite p e r s i s t e n t statements by spokesmen of  the Indian government t h a t they considered  the t h r e a t from g  Communism t o be i n t e r n a l r a t h e r than e x t e r n a l ,  t h a t Govern-  ment has drawn the proper conclusions f o r I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y from i t s e v a l u a t i o n of Communist p a r t y p o l i c i e s .  India  b e l i e s i n deeds what i t maintains v e r b a l l y , namely that  20  Communist governments and Communist p a r t i e s are d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e . The l a t t e r pretence i t has maintained f o r p o l i t i c a l but i t has not acted a c c o r d i n g l y .  convenience,  I n a d i s c r e e t and unosten-  t a t i o u s manner I n d i a has taken the precautions a v a i l a b l e w i t h i n i t s l i m i t e d means t o secure i t s f r o n t i e r s , i n i t i a l l y against P a k i s t a n , but since 1950 p r i m a r i l y against the two neighbouring Communist g i a n t s —  and e s p e c i a l l y against China.  The measures that I n d i a has taken on her northern  frontiers,  though o b l i g a t o r y f o r any Government under any c o n d i t i o n s , i n d i c a t e by t h e i r t i m i n g and nature that I n d i a has not overlooked p o s s i b l e aggression  from e i t h e r Communist s t a t e and  n o t a b l y from China. The Nehru a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i s w e l l aware that the huge Chinese s t a t e has an i m p e r i a l t r a d i t i o n o f expansion d u r i n g p e r i o d s of resurgence; t h a t a t one time i t s armies and power c o n t r o l l e d much of c e n t r a l , southern, and southeastern A s i a .  I f the Indian government a c t u a l l y f e l t a t the  outset t h a t the p o l i c y of a Communist Chinese government would be other than e x p a n s i o n i s t , i t was given a sharp reminder when Peking p r i n t e d maps showing p a r t s of Burma, Assam, Kashmir and Nepal under t h e i r r u l e .  Some p u b l i c i s t s  b e l i e v e t h a t a c l a s h i s i n e v i t a b l e between the two g i a n t s of Asia —  I n d i a and China.  Even before the l a t t e r had come  under Communist domination, A r n o l d Toynbee had w r i t t e n : I n the end the current of Chinese expansion i n the t r o p i c s w i l l meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of  21 the s m a l l e r and weaker and l e s s e f f i c i e n t peoples i n between who are a l r e a d y f a s t going under.^ While Nehru may or may not b e l i e v e t h i s e v e n t u a l i t y t o be a v a l i d one, he has taken no chances, f o r the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of Communist Chinese p o l i c y has been t o g r e a t l y d i s t u r b I n d i a s sense of s e c u r i t y . 1  U n t i l the T i b e t a n i n v a s i o n , most Indians f e l t safe behind the towering H i m a l a y a s ^ and the mountains along the 1  North-West F r o n t i e r .  Security —  other than a g a i n s t  P a k i s t a n i i n c u r s i o n s which c o u l d be momentarily embarrassing but never a d i r e t h r e a t t o the s e c u r i t y of the I n d i a n Union  —  was one of the l e a s t d i s c u s s e d s u b j e c t s i n I n d i a n p o l i t i c s . Those who were concerned w i t h i t as laymen were u s u a l l y r a t h e r s p e c u l a t i v e about i t , r a r e l y assuming t h a t the problem might become acute i n the f o r s e e a b l e f u t u r e .  With the  Chinese Communist conquest of T i b e t i n the f a l l of  1950,  however, and the sharp r e b u f f Peking gave t o I n d i a n p r o t e s t s , c o n s t e r n a t i o n was aroused i n I n d i a .  The i m p l i c a t i o n s of the  Chinese a c t i o n f o r long-term I n d i a n s e c u r i t y were not p a r t i c u l a r l y c o n s o l i n g , as l a r g e Chinese f o r c e s were now on I n d i a ' s very b o r d e r s .  x x  Members of Parliament and the Press began  to v o i c e t h e i r concern and the Government was accused of n e g l e c t i n g the country's defenses.  While these charges at  the time may have had some b a s i s i n t r u t h , the subsequent a c t i o n s of the Nehru government have aimed at p r o v i d i n g additional security for India.  These s e c u r i t y d e c i s i o n s ,  22  p a r t i c u l a r l y w i t h reference  t o the Himalayan areas of  Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, deserve n o t i c e . There are f i r s t o f a l l the measures taken w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the I n d i a n government.  Thus i n the  northeast f r o n t i e r area w i t h i n I n d i a the Government has been b u i l d i n g roads and a i r s t r i p s . on the a l e r t at v a r i o u s p o i n t s .  Indian army detachments are I n 1953 a s p e c i a l s e c t i o n  was e s t a b l i s h e d i n the M i n i s t r y of E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s to extend p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over the w i l d border areas w i t h the h e l p of I n d i a n army u n i t s , and e s p e c i a l l y vigorous a c t i o n has 12  been taken against r e b e l l i o u s Naga tribesmen.  In addition  the I n d i a n government has taken a c t i o n to guard the border between Ladakh (Kashmir) and western T i b e t .  Here the  Government o f U t t a r Pradesh, w i t h the h e l p of the c e n t r a l government a t New D e l h i , has e s t a b l i s h e d s p e c i a l  constabulary  f o r c e to p a t r o l and c o n t r o l the f r o n t i e r i n the Kumaon area. In i t s r e l a t i o n s w i t h t i n y Bhutan which, l i k e Sikkim, i s regarded by New D e l h i as being w i t h i n I n d i a ' s i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r , the I n d i a n government showed i t s security-consciousness  i n a t r e a t y concluded w i t h t h a t s t a t e  on August 8, 1 9 4 - 9 . U n d e r the p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s t r e a t y , the Government of I n d i a guaranteed Bhutan's i n t e r n a l autonomy and promised to give Bhutan an annual subsidy o f 500,000 rupees (approximately $100,000.00) i n l i e u of commitments entered i n t o i n the o l d t r e a t i e s w i t h Great B r i t a i n i n 1865  2  and 1910.  5  I n r e t u r n the Government of Bhutan agreed t o be  guided by the advice of New and I n d i a was  Delhi i n i t s external relations  given s u p e r v i s o r y p r i v i l e g e s over the  import-  a t i o n of w a r l i k e m a t e r i a l or s t o r e s which might be  required  or d e s i r e d f o r the s t r e n g t h and welfare of Bhutan.  Since  October 1951,  when the appointment of the D a l a i Lama and  the  Panchen Lama as members of the C o n s u l t a t i v e Conference of the Chinese People's Republic suggested t h a t T i b e t had become an i n t e g r a l p a r t of China, Indian-sponsored defense a c t i v i t i e s i n Bhutan, such as the c o n s t r u c t i o n of road l i n k s and defen14 s i v e f r o n t i e r posts have i n c r e a s e d both i n number and tempo. The complicated.  s i t u a t i o n i n Sikkim has been s l i g h t l y more According to t r e a t i e s signed between Great  B r i t a i n and China i n 1 8 9 0 ^ and 1 8 9 3 , x  B r i t i s h protectorate.  Sikkim had become a  1 6  I n d i a i n h e r i t e d these t r e a t i e s  and  the r i g h t t o send a p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r t o a s s i s t the Maharaja i n the a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of the country.  I n 1949  considerable  unrest and o c c a s i o n a l r i o t i n g developed throughout the country as a r e s u l t of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the f e u d a l system. A c t i n g upon the request of the Maharaja, the Indian government intervened on June 7,  1949,  i n the " i n t e r e s t s of law  order," and a detachment of s o l d i e r s was  sent under the  general d i r e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r who Gangtok and represented  and  r e s i d e d at  I n d i a i n Bhutan as w e l l .  The  government then nominated an o f f i c e r t o serve as Dewan ( i . e . c h i e f a d m i n i s t r a t o r ) of Sikkim.  Indian  24 R e l a t i o n s were r e g u l a r i z e d by a t r e a t y signed on 17 December 5, 1950, ' and S i k k i m was f o r m a l l y designated a " P r o t e c t o r a t e of I n d i a . "  Subsequent a r t i c l e s i n the t r e a t y  made I n d i a r e s p o n s i b l e f o r the defence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of S i k k i m and gave I n d i a the r i g h t t o c o n s t r u c t and m a i n t a i n communications f o r s t r a t e g i c purposes and the r i g h t t o take such measures as i t c o n s i d e r s necessary f o r the defence o f S i k k i m or the s e c u r i t y of I n d i a , whether p r e p a r a t o r y or otherwise, and whether w i t h i n or outside Sikkim.  I n p a r t i c u l a r I n d i a was t o have the r i g h t t o s t a t i o n  troops anywhere w i t h i n the s t a t e .  I t was c l e a r t o a l l con-  cerned t h a t I n d i a ' s a c t i o n s had been motivated by the T i b e t a n a f f a i r , and consequently the Indian P a r l i a m e n t , w i t h the notable e x c e p t i o n of the Communists, approved the t r e a t y . Since the s i g n a t u r e of the t r e a t y , the I n d i a n m i l i t a r y establishment i n the s t a t e has been strengthened  substantially.  The s i t u a t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o Nepal i s d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r Bhutan or Sikkim, f o r Nepal i s an independent state.  At the same time, however, i t i s , from the s t r a t e g i c  standpoint, the most important f r o n t i e r s t a t e .  Nepal con-  f r o n t s T i b e t across a common f r o n t i e r of some f i v e hundred miles.  On the east the kingdom borders Sikkim and West  Bengal; on the south and west, the I n d i a n s t a t e s of B i h a r and U t t a r Pradesh.  As such Nepal's r e l a t i o n s w i t h I n d i a are  complicated and d e l i c a t e .  25 Since the Chinese conquest of T i b e t , the Government o f I n d i a has shown unusual i n t e r e s t i n Nepalese a f f a i r s As c i v i l peace i n Nepal i s a matter of n a t i o n a l s e c u r i t y t o I n d i a , i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t the I n d i a n government w i l l not t o l e r a t e c i v i l disturbances i n such a v i t a l area.  On  numerous occasions the I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r had d e c l a r e d t h a t peace i n Nepal i s e s s e n t i a l t o Indian independence ( i . e . s e c u r i t y ) and p o s s i b l e only through o r d e r l y democratic reform. The p r i n c i p a l b a r r i e r t o I n d i a l i e s on the other side of Nepal. We are not going t o t o l e r a t e any person coming over t h a t b a r r i e r . Therefore, much as we appreciate the i n d e pendence o f Nepal, we cannot r i s k our own s e c u r i t y by anything not done i n Nepal which permits e i t h e r t h a t b a r r i e r t o be crossed o r otherwise leads t o the weakening of our f r o n t i e r s . I n d i a ' s keen i n t e r e s t i n the development of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Nepal was c l e a r l y shown i n 1950 by the view i t took towards the i n c i d e n t s t h a t l e d t o the overthrow of the f e u d a l government c o n t r o l l e d by the Rana f a m i l y .  Sub  r  sequently the I n d i a n government continued t o t r y t o s t r e n g t h and s t a b i l i z e the l i t t l e kingdom.  I n January 1952, Indian  t r o o p s , under the p r o v i s i o n s of the t r e a t y of J u l y 51, 19 1950,  crossed i n t o Nepal t o help put down a Communist-  i n s p i r e d peasant u p r i s i n g .  On January 2 5 , 1952, Nepal,  r e p o r t e d l y on the advice of the I n d i a n government^ banned the Communist p a r t y , and t h e r e a f t e r New D e l h i q u i c k l y acted t o .  26 step up i t s support of the Nepal a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . I n 1954, alone, I n d i a spent c l o s e t o eighteen m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n Nepal f o r development purposes and these expenditures have s i n c e i n c r e a s e d i n both value and scope.  I n spite of  p r e s s i n g needs a t home, the Government o f I n d i a has despatched experts t o Nepal t o reorganize the army and c i v i l s e r v i c e , to b u i l d schools and h o s p i t a l s , and t o b u i l d roads w i t h the help of the I n d i a n army.  New D e l h i r u e f u l l y understands  t h a t Nepal i s no longer i s o l a t e d from the t u g o f power politics.  "Once a hermit, then a b u f f e r , she has now become  the meat o f the sandwich." ^ 2  i  I n d i a ' s , a t t i t u d e towards Kashmir a l s o r e f l e c t s  the s e c u r i t y - c o n s c i o u s n e s s of the I n d i a n government.  Nehru  has f r e q u e n t l y made the c l a i m i n defending h i s Kashmir p o l i c y , t h a t the i n a b i l i t y of any but the Indian army t o defend Kashmir s u c c e s s f u l l y a g a i n s t a t t a c k from across the mountains makes i t imperative f o r I n d i a t o r e t a i n c o n t r o l o f the area. "Kashmir, because o f her geographical p o s i t i o n w i t h h e r f r o n t i e r s w i t h three c o u n t r i e s , namely the S o v i e t Union, China, and A f g h a n i s t a n , i s i n t i m a t e l y connected w i t h the 21  s e c u r i t y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t a c t s o f I n d i a . "  This s t a t e -  ment c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s t h a t a l l c o u n t r i e s a f f e c t i n g the area are e n t e r i n g I n d i a ' s purview. S i m i l a r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s o f s e c u r i t y motivated  Indian  o p p o s i t i o n t o the e x t e n s i o n o f U n i t e d S t a t e s m i l i t a r y a i d t o  27  P a k i s t a n , and to P a k i s t a n ' s membership i n Western-sponsored regional security pacts.  I n p a r t t h i s r e a c t i o n can be  a t t r i b u t e d t o f e a r of P a k i s t a n being strengthened  to the  p o i n t where she could t h r e a t e n I n d i a , but l a r g e l y because of I n d i a ' s d e s i r e to keep the Cold War  and e v e r y t h i n g a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h i t as f a r as p o s s i b l e from I n d i a ' s borders.  A major  aim of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s t o preserve South and SouthEast A s i a as an area of no-war, and i t was because i t was thought t h a t m i l i t a r y pacts extending t o the area would p r e j u d i c e , r a t h e r than f u r t h e r , the prospect of i t s f u l f i l l ment t h a t there was  such outspoken o p p o s i t i o n to them from  the I n d i a n government.  22  When rumours of Anglo-American d i s c u s s i o n s conc e r n i n g the establishment  of a Middle-East  Defence O r g a n i z a t i o n  ( i n which P a k i s t a n was t o be included) reached I n d i a i n the f a l l of 1952,  her o p p o s i t i o n was prompt and v i g o r o u s .  would b r i n g the c o l d war too near I n d i a ' s borders.  This  At the  Hyderabad Session of the Indian N a t i o n a l Congress i n January 1953,  Mr* Nehru s t a t e d t h a t P a k i s t a n ' s proposed i n c l u s i o n  i n the MEDO was of grave concern to I n d i a as i t would a f f e c t a l l kinds of balances and e q u i l i b r i u m i n I n d i a and P a k i s t a n and South A s i a .  I t would appear t h a t I n d i a ' s  o p p o s i t i o n was based both on the f e a r of a stronger P a k i s t a n which would r e s u l t from membership i n the r e g i o n a l pact a l s o on the f a c t t h a t such a step would have f r u s t r a t e d I n d i a ' s aim of b u i l d i n g an area of peace.  Mr. Nehru  and  28 emphasized the l a t t e r reason i n a speech a t the Hyderabad S e s s i o n o f the Congress P a r t y on January 15, 1 9 5 3 : Obviously, i f any such development takes p l a c e , i t means t h a t the r e g i o n o f c o l d war comes r i g h t t o our border i f P a k i s t a n j o i n s . . . . I t i s not the p o s s i b i l i t y of war between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n , but i t i s the p o s s i b i l i t y o f world war coming r i g h t - u p to our doors which i s o f concern t o u s ^ j F o l l o w i n g these developments I n d i a i n c r e a s i n g l y t a l k e d o f a ' t h i r d area' o r 'peace area' from which war might be kept out, even i f i t were t o break out elsewhere.  Since the  MEDO i d e a d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e , i t s main e f f e c t was t h a t the Western b l o c gave I n d i a a cause f o r complaint  without  a t t a i n i n g the aims i t wanted t o achieve. The rumours o f a p o s s i b l e U n i t e d S t a t e s - P a k i s t a n m i l i t a r y pact which leaked out i n November 1953 provoked Indian r e a c t i o n s s i m i l a r t o those shown t o the MEDO, but w i t h f a r g r e a t e r i n t e n s i t y of f e e l i n g .  Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru  r e f e r r e d t o the matter i n a press conference  on November  1 5 t h j and on the f o l l o w i n g day the Indian Ambassador i n Washington c a l l e d on the United S t a t e s S e c r e t a r y o f State to seek i n f o r m a t i o n about the proposed p a c t .  Despite American  assurances that the proposed pact was not d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t I n d i a i n any way — 24 leaders,  a view since r e i t e r a t e d by P a k i s t a n i  the Indian press took up the i s s u e and the whole  country was e m o t i o n a l l y charged i n i t s o p p o s i t i o n t o the American move t o a i d P a k i s t a n m i l i t a r i l y .  Indians s e r i o u s l y  29 f e l t t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s a i d would be used a g a i n s t h e r 25 i n Kashmir,  y  and not against any dangers of e x t e r n a l com-  munist aggression on P a k i s t a n .  Consequently t h i s would  create a p o s s i b i l i t y of war between I n d i a and P a k i s t a n . The Indian people d i d not view the great advantage between I n d i a n and P a k i s t a n i s t r e n g t h as a guarantee against aggression from t h e i r neighbour.  They r e c a l l e d t h a t a much  weaker P a k i s t a n had sent i t s troops i n t o Kashmir i n 1948 t o b o l s t e r the tribesmen b a t t l i n g the Indian army.  That  American arms a i d would not n e c e s s a r i l y be s o l e l y defensive was accepted i n I n d i a because of repeated references by P a k i s t a n i spokesmen t o a 'holy war' t o l i b e r a t e Kashmir from India.  But while the Government of I n d i a were c a r e f u l t o  c a p i t a l i z e on the a n t i - P a k i s t a n mood of the Indian people i n opposing the arms a i d , t h i s was not the primary cause of o f f i c i a l Government resentment.  The Government's f e e l i n g was  based not p r i m a r i l y on f e a r of a stronger P a k i s t a n as on the f a c t t h a t by a l l y i n g i t s e l f w i t h the United S t a t e s , P a k i s t a n had a l i g n e d i t s e l f w i t h one side i n the Cold War and thereby d i s t u r b e d the 'area of peace* t h a t I n d i a wanted t o b u i l d i n co-operation w i t h other A s i a n c o u n t r i e s .  To the Indian way  of t h i n k i n g t h i s was e n t i r e l y t o t h e i r country's  strategic  disadvantage. This same reasoning caused I n d i a t o b i t t e r l y oppose the e x t e n s i o n of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y pacts i n t o A s i a — the  C  30  M a n i l a (SEATO) Pact and the Baghdad Pact — 27 P a k i s t a n ' s membership i n them. '  and p a r t i c u l a r l y  This p o l i c y of A s i a n  r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y pacts ran counter t o what Mr. Nehru had e a r l i e r o u t l i n e d f o r the A s i a n c o u n t r i e s i n June  1950:  I should l i k e the c o u n t r i e s of A s i a t o make i t c l e a r t o those w a r r i n g f a c t i o n s , t o those great c o u n t r i e s which are so much e x e r c i s e d by passions a g a i n s t each o t h e r , t h a t they w i l l not enter the arena of war»2g The v e r y establishment of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s along the f r i n g e of the S o v i e t Union and China, Indians argue, makes i t l i k e l y t h a t these n a t i o n s w i l l take c o u n t e r - a c t i o n s which would c e r t a i n l y have s e r i o u s i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r I n d i a —  especially  i n view of her r e l a t i v e weakness v i s - a - v i s the two n e i g h bouring Communist g i a n t s .  I n d i a n l e a d e r s are w e l l aware t h a t  the sub-continent i s a u n i t and must be defended as such, and the measures t h a t they have taken are but a r e f l e c t i o n of t h i s b a s i c premise.  The a c t i v i t i e s of the I n d i a n govern-  ment along the whole l e n g t h of i t s border, from north-west  to  n o r t h - e a s t , are evidence t h a t the n a t i o n ' s s e c u r i t y has not been p e r m i t t e d to r e s t upon i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Communist theory or ^practice alone.  I n d i a ' s f i r s t l i n e of defence  may be the maintenance of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h a l l n a t i o n s , and e s p e c i a l l y neighbour n a t i o n s , but the I n d i a n government, l i k e a l l r e s p o n s i b l e governments, must n e c e s s a r i l y assume t h a t some n a t i o n s i n the neighbourhood may become dangerous,  31 and i t must take measures of p r o t e c t i o n .  As the  timing,  nature and urgency of I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y measures i n d i c a t e t h i s assumption has become stronger as communism has in Asia.  spread  I n d i a has been r e l u c t a n t l y f o r c e d i n t o undertaking  these a c t i o n s , however, and consequently they must be cons i d e r e d a r e a c t i o n and can never j u s t l y be i n t e r p r e t e d as a  provocation. In a d d i t i o n to the above-mentioned p o s i t i v e a c t i o n s ,  I n d i a has a l s o pursued a p o l i c y of c o n t a i n i n g the tendencies of the Communist bloc — her own  security —  e f f e c t i v e , manner.  expansionist  and thereby f u r t h e r i n g  i n a more s u b t l e , but nonetheless v e r y By d e l i b e r a t e l y adopting a n e u t r a l  posture i n the face of Western warnings, and by p l a c i n g p u b l i c f a i t h i n Communist i n t e n t i o n s , I n d i a has  thereby  c o n s t i t u t e d h e r s e l f a k i n d of earnest of Communist good intentions.  In furtherance  of t h i s p o l i c y the Indian govern-  ment has advanced and promoted the concept of co-existence,  considered  peaceful  the best assurance a g a i n s t  i n f i l t r a t i o n , or subversion.  Having obtained  the  aggression, signatures  and p u b l i c adherence of both the Soviet Union and Communist China to t h i s d o c t r i n e , the motive of the Indian government has apparently been to r a i s e the spectre of the moral approbrium t h a t would a t t a c h to any v i o l a t i o n of the Panch S h i l a pledges. Thus, i n a v a r i e t y of ways, I n d i a has sought to secure i t s e l f from a t t a c k i n a manner c o n s i s t e n t w i t h  her  32  o f f i c i a l ' n e u t r a l i t y ' i n the c o l d war, and at a minimum cost i n money and m a t e r i a l s so s o r e l y needed to f u r t h e r her i n t e r n a l economic development.  Through non-alignment  with  the West and o p p o s i t i o n to the establishment of r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y p a c t s i n her neighbourhood,  I n d i a has sought to  keep the c o l d war as f a r as p o s s i b l e from her borders. But w i t h the Chinese Communist triumph i n China i n 194-9 and i t s subsequent occupation of T i b e t and a c t i o n s elsewhere, I n d i a became aware of the g r e a t e s t f u t u r e t h r e a t to her security.  Unable and/or u n w i l l i n g to counter the Chinese  t h r e a t through defence measures r e l a t i v e to the danger, the I n d i a n government has put i t s f a i t h , and i t s s e c u r i t y , i n the p o l i c y of Panch S h i l a and has c u l t i v a t e d the f r i e n d s h i p of Peking i n every conceivable manner.  To be sure, measures  have been taken t o strengthen s e c u r i t y along the l e n g t h of the n o r t h e r n f r o n t i e r s , but the v e r y l i m i t a t i o n s of these measures would seem to i n d i c a t e t h a t they are more a n a t u r a l r e f l e x to Chinese a c t i o n s than a determined e f f o r t to thwart any t h r e a t t h a t may present i t s e l f i n t h a t q u a r t e r .  Unable  to a f f o r d both of the ' l u x u r i e s ' of a modern, i n d u s t r i a l i z e d state —  guns and b u t t e r —  I n d i a has put her emphasis on  the l a t t e r , the attainment of which i s a formidable t a s k even without the added r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by minimum defence expenditures. That i t s p o l i c y has f a i l e d t o preserve the country's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y r e f l e c t s no d i s c r e d i t on the Government  33  of I n d i a .  I t sought t o achieve s e c u r i t y i n a manner which  would not he i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the economic development of the n a t i o n ; i t was the s a c r i f i c e of a short-range o b j e c t i v e to one which would be the more s o l i d foundation upon which to b u i l d a more r e a l s e c u r i t y i n the f u t u r e .  As such i t  was a f a r more r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y than i s g e n e r a l l y supposed i n the West, a p o l i c y whose f a i l u r e may indeed be i t s greatest triumph.  Footnotes - Chapter I I  1 Independence and A f t e r , p.  284.  2 On December 26, 1950, the E a s t e r n Economist put I n d i a ' s armed s t r e n g t h at 2 2 0 , 0 0 0 men, t e n a i r squadrons, and a very s m a l l and i n s i g n i f i c a n t navy. Mr. Chester Bowles w r i t e s : " I n d i a ' s army, although not l a r g e i n European terms, i s a major d e t e r r e n t t o any aggression against I n d i a i t s e l f . " Ambassador's Report, p. 8 7 . 3 Kundra, I n d i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1947-1954, p. p.  69.  4 B a j p a i , I n d i a n Yearbook of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, 4.  5 See M. Brecher, The S t r u g g l e f o r Kashmir (Toronto, Ryerson, 1 9 5 3 ) ; J« K o r b e l , Danger i n Kashmir ( P r i n c e t o n , P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 4 ) ; Lord Birdwood, Two Nations and Kashmir (London, Hale, 1 9 5 6 ) ; and S i s i r Gupta, I n d i a ' s R e l a t i o n s w i t h P a k i s t a n 1954-1957 (I.P.R., 1 9 5 7 ) . 6 Brecher, op. c i t . , pp. 188-191. 7 Por a comprehensive a n a l y s i s of the defence problems of the area see: Defence and S e c u r i t y i n the I n d i a n Ocean Area (New D e l h i , I.C.W.A., 1 9 5 8 ) . 8 I n a B.B.C. i n t e r v i e w on June 12, 1953, Mr. Nehru s a i d : "I see a b s o l u t e l y no danger — e x t e r n a l danger — to I n d i a from communism or any other source." C i t e d as footnote i n Kundra, op. c i t . , p. 6 9 . 9 Quoted i n Eustace Seligman, What The U n i t e d S t a t e s Can Do About I n d i a (New York, New York U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 6 ) , p. 53. 10 K. M. Pannikar, "The Himalayas and I n d i a n Defense," I n d i a Q u a r t e r l y , v o l . I l l , 2 ( 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 135. The Himalayas developed i n Indiana "a f a l s e sense of s e c u r i t y , a Maginotl i n e m e n t a l i t y . . . I n d i a never considered her neighbours. The p o s s i b i l i t y of a t t a c k seemed d i s t a n t . . . . I t was the Himalayan M a g i n o t - l i n e t h a t was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h i s a t t i t u d e towards India's s e c u r i t y . " 11 T i b e t , however, was not considered a b s o l u t e l y e s s e n t i a l f o r I n d i a ' s s e c u r i t y by Nehru and h i s c o l l e a g u e s . Moreover, i n t h e i r p u b l i c view, the Chinese l e g a l c l a i m was very s t r o n g . And i n any event, they were not prepared to go to war w i t h China. i  12 See Nehru's speech i n the Lok Sabha, New D e l h i , d u r i n g debate on the Naga H i l l s s i t u a t i o n , August 2 3 , 1956. J a w a h a r l a l Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957. pp. 490-499. 13 F o r the complete t e x t o f the t r e a t y , see Indian Year Book o f I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , pp. 295-298. 14 The New York Times, May 9, 1 9 5 2 . 15 Text i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commissions o f J u r i s t s , The Question o f Tibet and the Rule of Law, 1959, pp. 105-106. 16 I b i d . , pp. 107-109. 17 Text o f the t r e a t y i n Indian Year Book of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , pp. 319-322T 18 E x t r a c t from a speech i n i t i a t i n g a debate on f o r e i g n a f f a i r s , Lok Sabha, New D e l h i , December 6, 1950. Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, p. 176. 19 Text i n Indian Year Book of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , pp. 316-318. 20 A. M. Rosenthal, "Grim Shadows Over The Cobra Throne," New York Times Magazine, May 2 7 , 1956, p. 47. 21 Independence and A f t e r , p. 60. 22 On t h i s p o i n t , see the d i s c u s s i o n s a t the F i f t h Commonwealth R e l a t i o n s Conference a t Lahore i n 1954, as r e p o r t e d i n N i c h o l a s Mansergh, The M u l t i - R a c i a l Commonwealth (London, 1 9 5 5 ) . 23 Quoted i n Kundra, op. c i t . , p. 93* 24 Mr. Mohammed A l i , i n an address t o the F o r e i g n Press A s s o c i a t i o n i n London on June 2 5 , 1956 d e c l a r e d : " I t has been s a i d t h a t American m i l i t a r y a i d t o P a k i s t a n c o n s t i t u t e s a t h r e a t t o I n d i a . Such a suggestion i s p a l p a b l y absurd. The d i s p a r i t y between Indian and P a k i s t a n i human and m a t e r i a l resources i s so great t h a t , even a f t e r m i l i t a r y a s s i s t a n c e from the U.S.A., there can be no question of any t h r e a t o f a g g r e s s i o n from P a k i s t a n t o I n d i a . " Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s (London), J u l y 7-14, 1956, p. 14962. 25 Speaking i n the Lok Sabha on November 2 0 , 1958, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, I n d i a ' s Deputy M i n i s t e r f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s stated: "We have i n the past r e p e a t e d l y expressed our concern a t f o r e i g n m i l i t a r y a i d being given t o P a k i s t a n . . . i t may encourage s t i l l f u r t h e r aggressive tendencies t h e r e . C i t e d i n N. D. Palmer, " I n d i a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s : M a t u r i n g R e l a t i o n s , " Current H i s t o r y , v o l . 36 (March 1 9 5 9 ) , No. 2 1 1 , p. 132. ii  26 Nehru i m p l i e d t h i s view i n the Lok Sabha on February 2 2 , 1954 when, i n reference t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s m i l i t a r y a i d t o P a k i s t a n , he s a i d : " I t adds t o the f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y i n A s i a . I t i s . . . a wrong step from the p o i n t of view of peace and removal of t e n s i o n s . " Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957* p. 344. 27 For a more d e t a i l e d account o f I n d i a ' s r e a c t i o n t o these p a c t s , and t o r e g i o n a l pacts i n g e n e r a l , see Chapter IV. 28 The New York Times, June 1 3 , 1950.  iii  CHAPTER I I I INDIA AND  THE  DEPENDENT PEOPLES  . . . i t i s an a s t o n i s h i n g t h i n g t h a t any country should s t i l l venture to h o l d and to set f o r t h t h i s d o c t r i n e of c o l o n i a l i s m . . . . A f t e r a l l that has happened there i s going to he no mere o b j e c t i o n to t h a t , but a c t i v e o b j e c t i o n . . . a g a i n s t any and every form of c o l o n i a l i s m i n any p a r t of the world.-,  Apart from the immediate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of l o o k i n g to i t s s e c u r i t y needs, I n d i a has been motivated by a proAsian, a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t i c p o l i c y .  As p a r t of A s i a , proud  of i t s newly won freedom, I n d i a has i n s i s t e d upon r e c o g n i t i o n of the d i g n i t y and worth of the A s i a n people.  Nehru and h i s  colleagues have, on every p o s s i b l e occasion, s t r e s s e d the proud h i s t o r i c a l legacy, the unique c u l t u r e , and the m i s i n g d e s t i n y of I n d i a and A s i a .  pro-  Any assumption of  s u p e r i o r i t y by the West over A s i a , any s l i g h t by the former, i s deeply resented by Indian l e a d e r s .  Por as Mr. Nehru  d e c l a r e d i n h i s c l o s i n g address t o the famous A s i a n - A f r i c a n  p  Conference h e l d at Bandung, Indonesia i n A p r i l 1955: A s i a i s no longer passive today; i t has been passive enough i n the p a s t . I t i s no more a submissive A s i a ; i t has t o l e r a t e d submissiveness f o r so long. A s i a of today i s dynamic; A s i a i s f u l l of l i f e . I f there i s anything that 34  35  A s i a wants to t e l l . . . i t i s t h i s . There i s going to be no d i c t a t i o n i n the f u t u r e ; no 'yes-men i n A s i a , I hope, or i n A f r i c a . ^ 1  From the day of independence, Indian leaders have been implacably  a n t i - c o l o n i a l and have sought to end the  political  and economic domination of Europe over non-European areas. Hence the removal of the l a s t v e s t i g e of c o l o n i a l i s m i n A s i a as i n A f r i c a has been a major plank of I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n d i a ' s advocacy of the cause of the dependent peoples flows d i r e c t l y from her s o l i c i t u d e f o r the  struggles  f o r freedom from f o r e i g n p o l i t i c a l domination of dependent peoples a l l over the world.  In every phase of i t s long  h i s t o r y , the Indian N a t i o n a l Congress has been a m i l i t a n t l y a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t o r g a n i z a t i o n , upholding the cause of the oppressed, the e x p l o i t e d and the wronged.  Any oppressed or  e x p l o i t e d n a t i o n , however small or however remotely s i t u a t e d i n the w o r l d , could count upon the support of the Congress h.  i n i t s struggle f o r s e l f - a s s e r t i o n .  Soon a f t e r the  Interim  N a t i o n a l Government was formed i n 194-6, Nehru declared i n a broadcast speech: ...we b e l i e v e t h a t peace and freedom are i n d i v i s i b l e and / t h a t / the d e n i a l of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and l e a d to c o n f l i c t and war. Ve are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the emancipation of c o l o n i a l and dependent c o u n t r i e s and p e o p l e s . q  I n d i a has h e r s e l f experienced f o r e i g n domination —  domination  36 which, was benevolent  and b e n e f i c i a l i n many r e s p e c t s —  but  which was a l s o a negative i n f l u e n c e i n w i t h h o l d i n g from the I n d i a n people the o p p o r t u n i t y to work out t h e i r own d e s t i n y by t h e i r own e f f o r t s .  The I n d i a n government and  people  f e e l t h a t a people cannot progress under an a l i e n r u l e or when something i s imposed on them.  They can grow o n l y i f  they develop t h e i r own s t r e n g t h and s e l f - r e l i a n c e and m a i n t a i n t h e i r own  7  integrity.' I n d i a a l s o recognizes the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f -  d e t e r m i n a t i o n because she b e l i e v e s t h a t only s e l f - g o v e r n i n g communities having absolute c o n t r o l over t h e i r own  internal  a f f a i r s , p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l , can e f f e c t i v e l y throw t h e i r weight on the side of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation f o r the establishment of world peace. E l i m i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l domination by one people over another — 8 Indians b e l i e v e i s a r o o t cause of c o n f l i c t and war  a factor —  and  the u n i v e r s a l r e c o g n i t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r mination f o r oppressed peoples are t h e r e f o r e v e r y v i t a l to I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s to f u r t h e r the cause of world peace. anti-Japanese  The  stand of the I n d i a n people i n the S i n o -  Japanese c o n f l i c t , t h e i r u n q u a l i f i e d condemnation of the F a s c i s t aggression a g a i n s t E t h i o p i a , Czechoslovakia, A l b a n i a and Republican Spain, and t h e i r post-independence support f o r the freedom movements i n A s i a and A f r i c a are h i g h l i g h t s i n the continuous and long-standing f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s of the I n d i a n people and t h e i r Government, pledged t o the  37  e l i m i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l suppression of subject n a t i o n a l i t i e s wherever i t may be and i n whatever form i t may be 9 queradmg.  mas-  y  I n i t s a c t i v e championship of freedom f o r the dependent peoples, the Indian government has had the support of the people of I n d i a .  full  The S o c i a l i s t s have been at  one w i t h Government on t h i s i s s u e .  The extreme l e f t - w i n g i n  the country have, f o r obvious reasons, advocated even more a c t i v e steps than the Government has taken i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The extreme r i g h t - w i n g of Indian p o l i t i c a l thought, however, w h i l e supporting the broad p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n , have expressed the d e s i r e t h a t I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n p o l i c y should be l e s s v o c a l l y i d e a l i s t i c  —  i m p l y i n g thereby t h a t I n d i a  must not court the d i s p l e a s u r e of the Great Powers without any advantage t o h e r s e l f .  But even t h i s s e c t i o n of o p i n i o n  has not been b o l d enough to come out openly a g a i n s t the  over-  r i d i n g sentiment of Indian p u b l i c o p i n i o n and to f r a n k l y advocate a p o l i c y of n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n , by I n d i a , i n the d i s c u s s i o n s connected w i t h the freedom of the n o n - s e l f governing peoples.  As Nehru s t a t e d i n the C o n s t i t u e n t  Assembly on March 8, 1948  i t would be i n j u r i o u s to I n d i a  c e r t a i n t y from an i d e a l i s t i c  —  and h i g h moral p o i n t of view,  but e q u a l l y so from the p o i n t of view of opportunism and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the narrowest sense of the word —  for  her to give up her p o l i c y of standing up f o r c e r t a i n i d e a l s i n regard to the oppressed n a t i o n s . ^ x  I n d i a would a c t i v e l y  38 champion the causes of a l l those peoples a g i t a t i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l freedom from West European m e t r o p o l i t a n powers r e g a r d l e s s of the passive h o s t i l i t y she might have to face from the v a r i o u s interests.^"''" In her i n i t i a l f l u s h of independence, I n d i a g e n e r a l l y approached the problem of r e l a t i o n s between Western and A s i a n s t a t e s w i t h extreme s u s p i c i o n .  I f there was a choice between  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of any Western p o l i c y , the i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n was the one most l i k e l y to be chosen, and extenuating ignored.  I t was a one-track p o l i c y ,  anything  understand-  a b l e , but not n e c e s s a r i l y excusable. I n d i a s a t t i t u d e towards the A l l i e d treatment 1  of  Japan was motivated p r i m a r i l y by her a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m and sympathy f o r a f e l l o w - A s i a n people.  Owing l a r g e l y to f e e l i n g s  of A s i a n s o l i d a r i l y , t o Japan's wartime success a g a i n s t c o l o n i a l powers, and perhaps even to vague memories of Japan's deed i n 1905,  there was i n I n d i a a considerable fund  of good w i l l toward Japan upon t h a t country's c a p i t u l a t i o n 12  i n August 194-5.  I n d i a favoured a quick r e i n t e g r a t i o n of  Japan i n t o the s o c i e t y of f r e e n a t i o n s , w i t h economic freedom to safeguard a decent standard of l i v i n g , and w i t h p o l i t i c a l freedom to safeguard i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y . A c c o r d i n g l y she supported those d e c i s i o n s i n the Far E a s t e r n Commission favourable to Japan.  She a l s o s t i m u l a t e d the  renewal of c o n t a c t s between I n d i a and Japan.  But when the  39  West i n September 1951,  decided to go ahead w i t h a separate  Peace Treaty, w i t h Japan t o prevent i t from f a l l i n g i n t o the hands of the Communist b l o c e i t h e r through m i l i t a r y agiz  14-  g r e s s i o n ' or i n t e r n a l r e v o l u t i o n ,  I n d i a d e c l i n e d the  i n v i t a t i o n to a t t e n d the Conference at San F r a n c i s c o .  The  I n d i a n government a l s o r e f u s e d t o s i g n the r e s u l t i n g Japanese Peace T r e a t y . ^ 1  The reason f o r t h i s a c t i o n , Mr. Nehru  e x p l a i n e d to the Indian Parliament on August 27,  1951,  was  because none of the major suggestions put forward by I n d i a had been accepted by the U n i t e d S t a t e s .  Consequently the  Government of I n d i a would make a d e c l a r a t i o n t e r m i n a t i n g the s t a t e of war and would l a t e r n e g o t i a t e a simple b i l a t e r a l treaty. ^ x  17  I n d i a ' s o b j e c t i o n s to the Treaty ' were based, i n p a r t , on the c r i t i c i s m t h a t i n was r e s t r i c t i v e of Japan's s o v e r e i g n t y i n according the United S t a t e s the r i g h t to maintain bases and armed f o r c e s i n Japan.  The Indian govern-  ment f u r t h e r viewed the Treaty as b a s i c a l l y a defence comb i n a t i o n among the s i g n a t o r i e s , e s t a b l i s h i n g a s t r a t e g i c l i n e a g a i n s t the Chinese and Russian mainland s t r e t c h i n g from the A l e u t i a n s through the Japanese i s l a n d c h a i n , the the Ryukyus, Bonins, Formosa, and the P h i l i p p i n e s , t d Australia.  I n i t s view, Japan should r e t a i n a l l t e r r i t o r y  whose i n h a b i t a n t s had an h i s t o r i c a l a f f i n i t y w i t h the Japanese and which Japan had not acquired by  aggression.  The Ryukyus and Bonins f e l l i n t o these c a t e g o r i e s .  Further,  40 I n d i a p o i n t e d out t h a t the Treaty should i n c l u d e p r o v i s i o n s f o r the r e t u r n of Formosa t o China and of the K u r i l e i s l a n d s and South S a k h a l i n t o R u s s i a .  The Indian note d e c l a r e d :  The time and manner of such r e t u r n might he the subject of separate n e g o t i a t i o n s , but t o leave the f u t u r e of the i s l a n d (Formosa) undermined...does not appear... to be e i t h e r j u s t o r expedient. Mutatis mutandis the same argument a p p l i e s t o the K u r i l e i s l a n d s and t o South S a k h a l i n . A f u r t h e r grievance, not mentioned i n o f f i c i a l documents, but much t a l k e d about i n a l l Indian c i r c l e s , was t h a t A s i a n n a t i o n s were not p r o p e r l y consulted o r t h a t t h e i r were not p r o p e r l y respected.  suggestions  And few t h i n g s could provoke  g r e a t e r resentment i n modern I n d i a than s l i g h t of nonEuropeans by whites. The stand taken by the Indian government found very few c r i t i c s i n the Indian Parliament and the p r e s s . I n g e n e r a l , p u b l i c o p i n i o n was wholeheartedly  behind  it.  The Treaty was considered an i n s u l t t o a l l Asians — but another e x p r e s s i o n of the white man's haughtiness  and of  the Cold War, u s e l e s s because of the absence of Communist China and S o v i e t R u s s i a and m o r a l l y u n j u s t i f i a b l e .  The  Indian a t t i t u d e , however, e s p e c i a l l y t h a t of the Government, must n o t be viewed as simply a matter of e t h i c s o r i d e a l i s m or o p p o s i t i o n t o Western d i c t a t i o n t o a defeated  Asian  n a t i o n ; i t was a l s o a matter of I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . I n d i a could not a f f o r d t o antagonize 450 m i l l i o n  neighbours,  41 could not subscribe to a p o l i c y l i n i n g up the Japanese a g a i n s t the Chinese people, or t u r n a b l i n d eye t o l i m i t s p l a c e d upon Japan's s o v e r e i g n t y . The a t t i t u d e taken by I n d i a n a t u r a l l y overjoyed the Communist powers, but i t provoked sharp c r i t i c i s m from 19 the American government  J  and p r e s s .  The New  York Times  commented t h a t "Instead of s e i z i n g the l e a d e r s h i p of A s i a f o r i t s good, Nehru turned aside from the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , " and continued on to d e c l a r e that "Nehru's statesmanship  is  not i n s p i r i n g people and n a t i o n s to do t h i n g s but o n l y to 20 have them undone.  How  the mighty have f a l l e n . "  While  t h i s statement was unduly harsh i n i t s c r i t i c i s m , i t was n e v e r t h e l e s s p a r t l y warranted.  I n the i n t e r e s t of her  n e u t r a l p o s i t i o n I n d i a could have avoided launching such a n o t i c e a b l e p u b l i c a t t a c k on the Treaty.  She c o u l d , more  d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , merely have r e f u s e d t o s i g n the Treaty  and  thereby avoided the open controversy which s t r a i n e d IndoAmerican r e l a t i o n s .  But whatever the m e r i t s of I n d i a ' s  stand, the i n c i d e n t d i d i l l u s t r a t e most e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t I n d i a championed the cause of the non-white peoples and would speak her mind on any i s s u e with c o l o n i a l r e g a r d l e s s of who  overtones  i t pleased or d i s p l e a s e d .  During t h i s f i r s t ' f l u s h of independence,' the Indian government f r e e l y expressed which i t regarded  i t s e l f on any i s s u e  as i n v o l v i n g the p r i n c i p l e of  42 s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r dependent peoples.• I n p u b l i c statements and at the United Nations, Indian leaders and r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the Indian government r e p e a t e d l y  declared  I n d i a ' s sympathy f o r the s t r u g g l e s of dependent peoples f o r freedom from f o r e i g n c o n t r o l s .  France and P o r t u g a l were  b i t t e r l y attacked f o r r e f u s i n g t o v o l u n t a r i l y give up t h e i r s m a l l t e r r i t o r i a l h o l d i n g s i n I n d i a ; B r i t a i n was c r i t i c i z e d f o r h e r m i l i t a r y operations a g a i n s t the s m a l l m i n o r i t y o f Communists i n Malaya; and Prance was c a s t i g a t e d f o r her p o l i c i e s i n Indo-China and North A f r i c a .  Indian  initiative  helped t o hasten the independence of L i b y a which was secured on the b a s i s of the r e s o l u t i o n s moved by I n d i a a t the U n i t e d Nations General Assembly i n 1949.  The P r e s i d e n t of  the N a t i o n a l Congress of T r i p o l i t a n i a d e s c r i b e d the r o l e t h a t I n d i a played i n the l i b e r a t i o n of L i b y a "as having earned the e v e r - l a s t i n g g r a t i t u d e of the Libyan n a t i o n , as having confirmed I n d i a ' s l e a d e r s h i p i n the s t r u g g l e f o r the 21 l i b e r a t i o n of A f r i c a and A s i a . "  I n d i a a l s o played a  notable p a r t i n r e s i s t i n g the attempt o f South A f r i c a t o i n c o r p o r a t e the mandated t e r r i t o r y of South-West A f r i c a and i n i n i t i a t i n g the moves f o r the g r a n t i n g of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o T u n i s i a and Morocco. The p r i n c i p l e of support f o r dependent peoples, however, was most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y r e a l i z e d i n connection w i t h the Indonesian s t r u g g l e f o r freedom from Dutch c o n t r o l . To the people of I n d i a (as indeed t o the r e s t of A s i a )  43 Indonesia was a symbol of the a s p i r a t i o n s of many m i l l i o n s of A s i a n peoples f o r freedom and of t h e i r determination t o o b t a i n r e c o g n i t i o n of the freedom a l r e a d y obtained.  From  the time when Nehru and the other n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l l e a d e r s of I n d i a were r e l e a s e d from j a i l on June 15, 1945, and had s h o r t l y afterwards p a i d v i s i t s t o Indonesia and Singapore,  they had been i n d i c a t i n g t h a t they expected  Indonesia t o be s e l f - g o v e r n i n g now that the Dutch had been e x p e l l e d and an Indonesian Republic had come i n t o e x i s t e n c e . They were d i s a p p o i n t e d when the B r i t i s h condoned, even helped, the r e s t o r a t i o n of Dutch power i n Java. throughout the Indonesians* Netherlands  Subsequently,  b i t t e r s t r u g g l e a g a i n s t the  from the defeat of Japan i n 1945 t o the Hague  Round Table Conference of 1948 t h a t r e s u l t e d i n independence f o r Indonesia, I n d i a f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d i t s e l f w i t h the n a t i o n a l i s t movement headed by P r e s i d e n t Soekarno. I n June 1947, when the Dutch f a i l e d t o adhere t o the terms of agreements they had made w i t h the Indonesian r e p u b l i c , the Indian l e a d e r s expressed t h e i r keen d i s a p p r o v a l and u n s u c c e s s f u l l y bade the United States espouse the Indonesian  cause.  Thereupon I n d i a , i n company w i t h A u s t r a l i a ,  c a r r i e d the case t o the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l of the U n i t e d  Nations  where i t v i g o r o u s l y advocated independence f o r Indonesia and urged others t o do the same or f a i l t o sense the mood of A s i a and A f r i c a .  I n d i a ' s case was t h a t the a c t i o n by the Dutch  44 against the Indonesian people endangered the maintenance 22  of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace under A r t i c l e 34 of the Charter. I n answer to the c l a i m of the Netherlands  delegate t h a t the  Dutch a c t i o n was a matter of domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n under A r t i c l e 2(7) of the C h a r t e r , I n d i a maintained  t h a t , according  to the C h a r t e r , even matters which were e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h i n the domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n of a s t a t e should be considered to be w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l i f they had a b e a r i n g upon i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . I n d i a n argument was accepted by the C o u n c i l .  The  Accordingly,  an Indian p r o p o s a l to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n commission to s e t t l e the dispute was i n a r e s o l u t i o n of August 25,  1947.  The t r u c e subsequently 23 A:g££e"efije&1;  adopted by the C o u n c i l  arranged under the R e n v i l l e  however, was not to l a s t .  On December 18,  1948,  the Dutch, i n a ' p o l i c e a c t i o n , ' moved by f o r c e of arms against D j a k J a k a r t a , then the c a p i t a l of the Republic of Indonesia, and put P r e s i d e n t Soekarno and other leaders i n detention.  India reacted s w i f t l y .  Indonesian The  session  of the A l l - I n d i a Congress passed a r e s o l u t i o n on December 1948  19,  s t a t i n g t h a t i t was a matter of utmost concern t o I n d i a  t h a t Indonesia should a t t a i n her f u l l freedom and take her 24 r i g h t f u l p a r t i n A s i a n and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s .  Prime  M i n i s t e r Nehru, addressing the meeting, d e c l a r e d that the people of I n d i a c o u l d not remain i d l e s p e c t a t o r s of events i n Indonesia.  He reminded the Dutch t h a t , as the day of  45 i m p e r i a l i s m was over, no i m p e r i a l i s t power could stay i n 25  A s i a any longer.  The Indian government then proceeded  y  to i n s t i t u t e l i m i t e d sanctions against the Dutch, i n s t r u c t i o n s being i s s u e d t o a i r p o r t a u t h o r i t i e s not t o c l e a r Dutch a i r c r a f t and not t o issue f u e l t o them from January 1, 1949* At the same time, India's intense i n t e r e s t i n the Indonesian question was f u r t h e r evidenced from the f a c t that on January 1, 1949» Nehru i n v i t e d t h i r t e e n A s i a n  countries  to consider the Indonesian s i t u a t i o n . When announcing the d e c i s i o n t o convene such a conference, Mr. Nehru expressed the i n d i g n a t i o n o f the people o f A s i a over the "most maked and unabashed aggression"  by the Dutch i n t h e i r attempt t o  "revive a dying i m p e r i a l i s m . " he remarked:  I n opening the conference  " A s i a , too long submissive and dependent and a  p l a y t h i n g of other c o u n t r i e s , w i l l no longer brook any i n t e r ference w i t h her freedom...so long as any form of c o l o n i a l i s m e x i s t s i n A s i a o r elsewhere, there w i l l be c o n f l i c t and a 27  t h r e a t t o peace." ' He proposed the c r e a t i o n of c o n d i t i o n s i n which the Indonesian Republic  could f u n c t i o n f r e e l y and  could negotiate as a f r e e Government without m i l i t a r y o r economic  pressure. Three days a f t e r i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , the Conference  adopted a s e r i e s of d r a s t i c r e s o l u t i o n s to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l .  which i t presented  Although subsequent a c t i o n of the  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l was d i s a p p o i n t i n g t o I n d i a , the f i n a l  46 winning o f Indonesian independence by n e g o t i a t i o n s between the Indonesian and Dutch a u t h o r i t i e s averted f u r t h e r I n d i a n i n t r a n s i g e n c e which might w e l l have had s e r i o u s consequences. Since the settlement of the Indonesian  question,  however, and making allowance f o r i s o l a t e d i n s t a n c e s of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t outbursts by I n d i a n spokesmen, the Indian government has apparently r e a l i z e d t h a t A s i a n freedoms are b e t t e r served i n the l o n g run by c a u t i o u s procedures.  In  subsequent s i t u a t i o n s , comparable t o Indonesia, Nehru has s t e a d f a s t l y r e f u s e d t o repeat the f e a t f o r reasons never quite s p e c i f i e d .  I t i s probable, though, t h a t they have had  t o do w i t h the r i s i n g t e n s i o n i n the world and are based on the c o n v i c t i o n t h a t such a c t i o n as t h a t taken at the A s i a n Conference might l e a d t o c o n f l i c t r a t h e r than agreement. Experience, m a t u r i t y and some rude shocks t o preconceived i d e a s , e s p e c i a l l y concerning communism, have l e d t o a r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t I n d i a ' s past experience has not n e c e s s a r i l y been u n i v e r s a l and i s not the only p o s s i b l e experience; t h a t i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s absolutes do not e x i s t e i t h e r as regards the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of p r i n c i p l e s o r the c h a r a c t e r of nations.  I t has been a u s e f u l l e s s o n t o many Indians t h a t  circumstances have f o r c e d I n d i a r e p e a t e d l y t o compromise her h i g h p r i n c i p l e s and t o r e v i s e h e r estimates of other n a t i o n s s i n c e 1947*  Mr. Nehru i m p l i e d t h i s new approach i n h i s  speech t o the I n d i a n Parliament i n 1952 on "The Larger Scheme Of  Things":  47 Let us "by a l l means put an end to what remains of c o l o n i a l i s m i n A s i a , i n A f r i c a and wherever i t e x i s t s hut l e t us understand what the r e a l c o n f l i c t i s about.... I t does not help i n the s l i g h t e s t to repeat the slogans of yesterday, t h i n k i n g t h a t they take the place of thought and a c t i o n . Ours i s a complicated, d i f f i c u l t and tormented world. We must not approach our problems w i t h any c e r t i t u d e of success but w i t h a great d e a l of h u m i l i t y and t r y to help where we can. Our aim should be to be h e l p f u l , to do good o r , at any r a t e , t o avoid e v i l . - o I n d i a has not surrendered her i d e a l s , but the Sturm and Drang p e r i o d of t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n has passed.  L i k e so many  n a t i o n s before her, I n d i a has l e a r n e d t h a t the p r i c e of conducting one's own f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s i s the o c c a s i o n a l b e t r a y a l of one's i d e a l s . Malaya was a case i n p o i n t .  The r e l a t i v e  quiescence  of the I n d i a n government towards the q u e s t i o n of Malayan independence p r i o r to i t s achievement i n 1950 provoked accusations t h a t Nehru was s o f t - p e d a l l i n g B r i t i s h c o l o n i a l i s m . The Nehru government, however, o b v i o u s l y not o n l y a p p r e c i a t e d the d i f f i c u l t i e s represented by the three p o p u l a t i o n groups i n Malaya, none of which has a m a j o r i t y , but r e a l i z e d as w e l l the wonderful o p p o r t u n i t y chaos i n Malaya would have o f f e r e d the Communists a f t e r B r i t i s h withdrawal.  Consequently  Nehru, though he was on r e c o r d as demanding freedom f o r Malaya, co-operated c l o s e l y w i t h B r i t a i n i n her e f f o r t s towards these ends.  E v e n t u a l l y q u a l i f y i n g h i s demand f o r  B r i t i s h withdrawal from t h i s area by advocating t h a t i t occur  48 o n l y a f t e r peace and order had "been r e s t o r e d i n Ma3Jay"£  ?  Nehru was e n t i r e l y i n accord w i t h the developments  leading  to Malayan independence, and has expressed no dismay at the subsequent r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n , the F e d e r a t i o n of Malaya and the Crown colony of Singapore. A s i m i l a r t r e n d away from e x t r e m i s t enthusiasm for  freedom and toward a more cautious advocacy of i t i s  d i s c e r n i b l e i n I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e towards Indo-China.  In  January 1947 Nehru c a l l e d upon France t o r e v e r t to p e a c e f u l methods i n Indo-China and show by i t s own example t h a t i t stood f o r freedom everywhere. the  S h o r t l y afterwards he r e c e i v e d  Indo-Chinese d e l e g a t i o n t o the f i r s t A s i a n R e l a t i o n s  Conference w i t h the reminder that i n t h e i r country '*the b a t t l e for  freedom has continued." By 1950, however, the I n d i a n  government had assumed a r a t h e r non-committal a t t i t u d e toward the  two Indo-Chinese governments.  Emperor Bao Dai of V i e t  Nam was suspected of b e i n g merely a French t o o l , while the Communist l e a d e r Ho Chih-minh, although g e n e r a l l y c r e d i t e d w i t h b e i n g a m a t i o n a l i s t and p a t r i o t f i r s t and foremost, was too  c l o s e l y t i e d t o China and the S o v i e t Union t o s u i t the  t a s t e of v e r y many I n d i a n s .  r  Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d on May  22  t h a t the Government of I n d i a had decided not to accord r e c o g n i t i o n e i t h e r t o the Bao Dai Government i n V i e t Nam or to the Vietminh Government under Ho Chih-minh "so long as 30 i t i s not c l e a r which of the two Governments p r e v a i l t h e r e . " ^ I n d i a would watch developments u n t i l the people should d e c i d e .  49 "We  should not jump i n t o the f r a y , " he d e c l a r e d , and added:  " A f t e r a l l , what can we do about i t , except to give moral sympathy and get involved? 31 politics."^  I t was  We do not t h i n k t h a t i s p r a c t i c a l  o n l y when the c o n f l i c t i n Indo-China  appeared about t o touch o f f a major c o n f l i c t i n 1953  that  the Indian government a c t i v e l y expressed i t s concern and 52 sought to mediate the dispute.-' I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e s towards the v a r i o u s aspects of Arab n a t i o n a l i s m a l s o evidence the i n c r e a s i n g c a u t i o n w i t h which New  D e l h i has approached the i s s u e of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n  i n recent years.  I n i t i a l l y I n d i a gave strong support t o the  Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s i n French North A f r i c a , e s p e c i a l l y the s t r u g g l e , e v e n t u a l l y won, independence.  f o r T u n i s i a n and Moroccan  But even here the i n f l u e n c e of the i n c r e a s i n g  t e n s i o n i n the world has caused a n o t i c e a b l e  inclination  towards moderation i n Indian pronouncement.  Thus i n i t s  a t t i t u d e towards the A l g e r i a n question the Indian government has moved from great impatience and strongly-expressed  anti-  c o l o n i a l i s m t o a r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t "strong United Nations r e s o l u t i o n s w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y c o n t r i b u t e to the s o l u t i o n of the complicated  problems i n v o l v e d . "  Hoping to c o n t r i b u t e t o a s o l u t i o n of the problem, Mr. Nehru, i n a statement i n the Lok Sabha on May  22,  1956,  put forward f i v e suggestions as a p o s s i b l e b a s i s f o r a negotiated  settlement:  An atmosphere of p e a c e f u l approach  50 should be promoted by formal d e c l a r a t i o n s by both s i d e s i n favour of ending v i o l e n c e ; the n a t i o n a l e n t i t y and p e r s o n a l i t y of A l g e r i a should be recognized  by the French government on  the b a s i s of freedom; the e q u a l i t y of the peoples i n A l g e r i a , i r r e s p e c t i v e of r a c e , should be recognized  by a l l concerned;  r e c o g n i t i o n t h a t A l g e r i a i s the homeland of a l l the people i n A l g e r i a , i r r e s p e c t i v e of r a c e , and t h a t they should a l l be e n t i t l e d to the b e n e f i t s and share the burdens a r i s i n g from the r e c o g n i t i o n of the n a t i o n a l e n t i t y , p e r s o n a l i t y and freedom of A l g e r i a ; d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s based on the above b a s i c i d e a s , and i n accordance w i t h the p r i n c i p l e s of the •3 3  United Nations Charter, should be inaugurated.  y  I t was  the  Prime M i n i s t e r ' s hope t h a t " t h i s f e r v e n t appeal w i l l reach the f r i e n d l y ears of the p a r t i e s to the present c o n f l i c t , both of whom we regard as our f r i e n d . " In l i n e w i t h t h i s moderate approach, the  Indian  government has d e s i s t e d from any a c t i o n s which might cause an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the A l g e r i a n war.  I n the 1956  General  Assembly the Indian d e l e g a t i o n would commit i t s e l f no f u r t h e r on the A l g e r i a n question other than supporting a compromise r e s o l u t i o n which confined i t s e l f t o expressing a hope t h a t a p e a c e f u l , democratic, and j u s t s o l u t i o n might be found. With t h i s view i n mind Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d at a press conference i n D e l h i on October 12,  1958  t h a t I n d i a would not  f o r the moment give formal r e c o g n i t i o n t o the Free A l g e r i a n government e s t a b l i s h e d i n Cairo on September 19.  He added:  51  I t may w e l l be s a i d t h a t at present there i s what i s c a l l e d the P r o v i s i o n a l government of A l g e r i a , r e p r e s e n t i n g moderates and e x t r e m i s t s and t h e r e f o r e i t should be easy to deal w i t h them as r e p r e s e n t i n g A l g e r i a n n a t i o n a l i s m . I hope t h a t the French Government w i l l n e g o t i a t e w i t h these people, because i t i s obvious t h a t there i s no other way of s e t t l i n g the A l g e r i a n problem except by r e c o g n i z i n g A l g e r i a n f r e e d o m . ^ I n d i a ' s approach towards the v a r i o u s Middle  Eastern  i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g v a r i o u s Arab e f f o r t s t o f r e e themselves of Western c o n t r o l s has a l s o been q u a l i f i e d by the requirements of the Indian n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t .  For the Middle East i s an  area of great importance to I n d i a , p o s s i b l y g r e a t e r even than Southeast A s i a .  I t i s of s t r a t e g i c importance, i t i s v i t a l  as a s u p p l i e r of o i l , i t enters Indo-Pakistan p o l i t i c s ,  and  35  i t i s a road through which communism might  enter.All  these p o i n t s have i n f l u e n c e d I n d i a ' s p o l i c i e s i n that area, for  o b v i o u s l y the rash and u n q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a t i o n of a n t i -  i m p e r i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s would i n v o l v e the g r e a t e s t r i s k s . Consequently i t i s not unnatural t h a t the I n d i a n government has proceeded w i t h the g r e a t e s t c a u t i o n i n i t s Middle  Eastern  p o l i c i e s , even i f t h i s has n e c e s s i t a t e d an o c c a s i o n a l modera t i o n i n the championship of great p r i n c i p l e s . P r i o r t o the Anglo-French i n v a s i o n of Suez i n  1956,  the o n l y instance i n which I n d i a took a more or l e s s adamant stand towards a Middle E a s t e r n question w i t h " i m p e r i a l i s t overtones" was over the i s s u e of the f u t u r e of the B r i t i s h mandate of P a l e s t i n e .  The B r i t i s h , unable to r e c o n c i l e  52  Arab-Jew d i f f e r e n c e s and t i r i n g of the heavy burdens of p o l i c i n g the area, announced i n March 194-7 t h a t they were r e f e r r i n g the matter t o the United Nations.  I n the sub-  sequent prolonged d i s c u s s i o n s on the i s s u e the Indian  delegates  came out s t r o n g l y on a pro-Arab l i n e , prompted l a r g e l y by the d e s i r e t o a v o i d o f f e n d i n g the s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s of the Muslim world i n general, and her own t h i r t y m i l l i o n Muslim citizens i nparticular. co-operation  New D e l h i aimed a t encouraging  among A s i a n c o u n t r i e s i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  f i e l d and could not, t h e r e f o r e , a f f o r d t o antagonize the Muslim s t a t e s of West A s i a and P a k i s t a n by adopting p o l i c y on t h i s i s s u e .  any other  I n a d d i t i o n , I n d i a could not agree  w i t h the view g e n e r a l l y h e l d i n the West t h a t , because many Jews were i l l - t r e a t e d by the Europeans, P a l e s t i n e  should  provide a home from them. The  general support given t o a Jewish s t a t e i n  P a l e s t i n e by the European powers made i t appear t o Indians as y e t another case of i m p e r i a l i s m committed by Europeans against a non-European people.  Consequently I n d i a adamantly  opposed the p a r t i t i o n of P a l e s t i n e and i n i t i a l l y withheld d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n of I s r a e l .  But i n " r e c o g n i t i o n of  an e s t a b l i s h e d f a c t , " New D e l h i announced I n d i a ' s  recog-  n i t i o n of the State of I s r a e l on September 17, 1950.  The  o f f i c i a l statement e x p l a i n e d t h a t the delay i n India's r e c o g n i t i o n has been caused by the f a c t t h a t a l l aspects of the question had t o be very c a r e f u l l y considered,  including  53  the sentiments  of the Arab c o u n t r i e s .  I t was now  felt  that continued mutual n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n was not o n l y " i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the  two  c o u n t r i e s , " but would a l s o l i m i t the Government of I n d i a ' s r d l e as a p o s s i b l e i n t e r m e d i a r y between I s r a e l and States.  other  5 6  I n other Middle E a s t e r n i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g the d i r e c t i n t e r e s t s of Great B r i t a i n , however, the I n d i a n government proceeded w i t h more c a u t i o n .  Thus while I n d i a  d i d not h e s i t a t e to d e c l a r e i t s sympathy w i t h I r a n i n t h a t country's dispute w i t h Great B r i t a i n over the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of o i l resources i n 1951>  New  D e l h i , t r y i n g to combine the  p r i n c i p l e s of peace, a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s m , and s e c u r i t y , couns e l l e d a p e a c e f u l settlement of the c o n f l i c t through b i l a t e r a l 37 n e g o t i a t i o n s between the two d i s p u t a n t s . '  I n d i a depended  upon I r a n f o r o i l , upon B r i t a i n f o r tankers and upon the f r i e n d s h i p of both to safeguard her v i t a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s i n the area.  I n a d d i t i o n , the p o s s i b i l i t y of Communist  subversion or Russian i n t e r v e n t i o n anywhere i n the  Middle  East has been an ever present thought i n Indian minds.  Thus  a p e a c e f u l settlement of the c o n f l i c t so t h a t nobody would have a p r e t e x t t o intervene was of the g r e a t e s t concern to I n d i a and an a d d i t i o n a l i n c e n t i v e f o r her t o remain n e u t r a l i n the d i s p u t e . For s i m i l a r reasons I n d i a , i n the  Anglo-Egyptian  54  d i s p u t e over the Suez Canal and B r i t a i n ' s r i g h t to maintain m i l i t a r y f o r c e s t h e r e , would only go so f a r i n support the E g y p t i a n cause.  of  Here again the m i l i t a r y c o n s i d e r a t i o n  was the cause of the dilemma.  Egypt's demands were recog-  n i z e d as the " l e g i t i m a t e " claims of n a t i o n a l i s m on the  one  hand, hut on the other hand, the need f o r s t a b i l i t y i n an area of such s t r a t e g i c importance was  also r e a l i z e d .  Thus  the I n d i a n government o n l y committed i t s e l f as i n favour of Egypt e v e n t u a l l y o b t a i n i n g f u l l s o v e r e i g n t y over the Suez Canal and of making i t afterward an i n t e r n a t i o n a l highway by 38 special,treaties.-^ 1954  The announcement from C a i r o on J u l y 27,  of the agreement between B r i t a i n and Egypt on the  evacuation of B r i t i s h troops from the Suez Canal Zone, however, was welcomed by Nehru as having removed another cause of t e n s i o n , and of having thereby helped to t u r n people's minds 39 toward p e a c e f u l p r o g r e s s . ^ The most e x t r a o r d i n a r y example of r e s t r a i n t , however, and an example, i t might be added, t h a t from the standpoint of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s most admirable, been shown by I n d i a i n regard to the small number of  has  enclaves  belonging to France and P o r t u g a l which s u r v i v e d India's independence as the remnants of the o l d days of European expansion.  The p o l i c y of the Indian government toward these  f o r e i g n f o o t h o l d s was c l e a r l y s t a t e d by Nehru i n 1949.  India  wanted a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n i n regard to these f o r e i g n possessions but the only f u t u r e f o r these possessions  was  55 complete i n t e g r a t i o n w i t h I n d i a .  "We  are prepared to wait  a l i t t l e f o r i t , t o a v o i d c o n f l i c t , " Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d , "hut i t i s an i n c o n c e i v a b l e t h a t i n t h i s new,, resurgent I n d i a , 40 b i t s of t e r r i t o r y should belong to Powers f a r away." Since independence, the Indian government has sought to b r i n g about the p e a c e f u l i n t e g r a t i o n of these f o r e i g n f o o t h o l d s w i t h the Republic of I n d i a , but o n l y w i t h p a r t i a l success.  I n the case of Prance, I n d i a has been  s u c c e s s f u l thanks to the g e n e r a l l y c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e of French governments towards the d i s p o s i t i o n of the French settlements of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Yanam, K a r i k a l , and Make —  together t o t a l l i n g 196 square m i l e s .  A joint  d e c l a r a t i o n by the Governments of France and I n d i a made i n 1948 d e c l a r e d t h e i r j o i n t d e c i s i o n t o study, i n common, ways and means of a f r i e n d l y r e g u l a t i o n of the problems of the French establishments i n I n d i a , w i t h due regard to the i n t e r e s t s and a s p i r a t i o n s of the p o p u l a t i o n of these t e r r i t o r i e s , t o the h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l l i n k s of these 41 people w i t h France, and to the e v o l u t i o n of I n d i a . P r o t r a c t e d and oftentimes b i t t e r n e g o t i a t i o n s ensued but e v e n t u a l l y Pondicherry and the other h o l d i n g s were ceded to I n d i a a f t e r 240 years of French r u l e .  A formal t r e a t y t o  t h i s e f f e c t was signed i n November 1954. I n the case of P o r t u g a l , however, no progress  has  been made i n face of Lisbon's uncompromising stand a g a i n s t  56  c e s s i o n o f Goa, Damao and D i u —  an area of some 1,496  square m i l e s embracing some 600,000 people.  To most I n d i a n s ,  Goa i s a symbol of i m p e r i a l i s m , an i r r i t a t i n g reminder o f Western e x p l o i t a t i o n i n an almost completely f r e e motherland. Nehru has c a l l e d the Portuguese possessions i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h I n d i a ' s p o l i t i c a l system."  "a c o n t i n u i n g 42 Since 1947,  the I n d i a n government has made repeated requests t o L i s b o n to open n e g o t i a t i o n s f o r c e s s i o n , n e g o t i a t i o n s being f o r m a l l y i n i t i a t e d by the I n d i a n M i n i s t e r a t L i s b o n by p r e s e n t i n g an Aide Memoire, dated February 2 7 , 1950, on b e h a l f o f the Government of I n d i a t o the Portuguese government.  But L i s b o n  r e f u s e d t o d i s c u s s the q u e s t i o n o f t h e i r s o v e r e i g n t y over t h e i r I n d i a n possessions w i t h New D e l h i , and has maintained the a t t i t u d e ever since t h a t these possessions are an i n t e g r a l p a r t o f the homeland, a c l a i m Nehru has e m p h a t i c a l l y r e j e c t e d . Frequent clashes have taken p l a c e on the Goanese border as p a s s i v e r e s i s t o r s , n o n - v i o l e n t a g i t a t o r s , have sought t o c r o s s the f r o n t i e r of Goa t o f u r t h e r a l i b e r a t i o n movement.  These clashes have provoked a r o u s i n g c r y i n I n d i a  f o r armed i n t e r v e n t i o n , but Nehru has remained i n s i s t e n t t h a t the problem can only be s o l v e d by p e a c e f u l n e g o t i a t i o n s . Indeed, any other p o l i c y would c o n t r a d i c t h i s o f t - r e p e a t e d adherence t o Pancha S h i l a .  "The h i g h r e p u t a t i o n t h a t we  enjoy i n the world today and the weight t h a t our words c a r r y . " Mr. Nehru admitted i n 1955, "are due t o the f a c t t h a t we  57  adhere t o and honour our p r i n c i p l e s . I f we suddenly reverse our p o l i c y , the world w i l l get an o p p o r t u n i t y t o say t h a t  we  44  are d e c e i t f u l . "  Thus the I n d i a n government remains d e t e r -  mined to employ n e g o t i a t i o n s , not f o r c e , to r i d I n d i a of these l a s t v e s t i g e s of European c o l o n i a l i s m . In a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of I n d i a ' s p o l i c y towards the i s s u e of dependent peoples, then, s e v e r a l f a c t o r s stand  out.  The i n i t i a l a p r i o r i assumption t h a t p r a c t i c a l l y a l l Western diplomacy was motivated by i m p e r i a l i s m and the r e s u l t a n t one-track approach of extreme s u s p i c i o n to the problem of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s has given way e v a l u a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s .  to a more d i s c r i m i n a t o r y The genuine f e a r of  renewed Western i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a remains, as i s amply i l l u s t r a t e d by c e r t a i n events of recent y e a r s .  Thus the  extreme s e n s i t i v i t y of Nehru and others to Western-sponsored a l l i a n c e s such as SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955) may  be p a r t i a l l y e x p l a i n e d by the b e l i e f t h a t these m i l i t a r y  pacts  .represented  an i n d i r e c t r e t u r n of Western power to an 45  area from which i t had r e c e n t l y r e t r e a t e d .  y  S i m i l a r l y , the  sharp I n d i a n condemnation of the Anglo-French i n v a s i o n of Egypt and i n i t i a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Russia's Hungary i l l u s t r a t e d three f a c t s :  actions i n  f i r s t , a continuing  m i s t r u s t of Western a c t i o n s because of the lengthy h i s t o r y of Anglo-French c o l o n i a l i s m i n A s i a and A f r i c a ; secondly,  a  w i l l i n g n e s s to give the Russian case a f a i r h e a r i n g because of the absence of d i r e c t p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o South and Southeast  58 A s i a ; t h i r d , an unstated b e l i e f t h a t v i o l e n c e i s bad  but  white v i o l e n c e against non-whites i s worse. In recent y e a r s , however, there has been an i n c r e a s i n g r e a l i z a t i o n i n I n d i a t h a t the more immediate and greater " i m p e r i a l i s t t h r e a t " i s now  presented by the  Communist g i a n t s , and e s p e c i a l l y Communist China.  two  Hence  there has been a s i g n i f i c a n t s o f t e n i n g i n the former a l l - o u t support of A s i a n freedom movements when these threatened  to  provide openings f o r Communist advances as i n Malaya and Indo-China.  S i m i l a r l y , where outspoken a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m  served only to f u r t h e r embarrass a c o l o n i a l power's e f f o r t s to prepare dependent peoples f o r independence by  gradual  processes,  Indian  as i n B r i t a i n ' s A f r i c a n c o l o n i e s , the  government has become p r u d e n t l y s i l e n t . considerably  I n d i a has  also  'mellowed her tune' i n areas where the t r a n s f e r  of power t o r e s i d e n t peoples i s complicated  by l a r g e opposing  groups, as i s the case i n A l g e r i a where there i s a l a r g e French m i n o r i t y , or on Cyprus where Greek-Turkish a n i m o s i t i e s could have s e r i o u s consequences should B r i t a i n t r a n s f e r power to the Greek m a j o r i t y .  India's d e s i r e now  appears t o be to  prevent A s i a n , A f r i c a n , (or European n a t i o n a l i s m ) from d i s r u p t i n g world peace.  The c o n c l u s i o n may  t h e r e f o r e be per-  m i t t e d t h a t i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s , and n o t a b l y the aggressiveness of communism i n A s i a , have.caused I n d i a to considerably, mellow her championship of dependent peoples.  Footnotes - Chapter I I I 1 J a w a h a r l a l Nehru: an address t o the U n i t e d Nations General Assembly i n P a r i s , November 3, 1948. Speeches 1946-1949, pp. 319-320. 2 For a d e t a i l e d account of the conference, see George McTurnan Kahin, The A s i a n - A f r i c a n Conference ( I t h a c a , C o r n e l l U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956). 3 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 289. 4 B. S. N. M u r t i , Nehru s F o r e i g n P o l i c y (New D e l h i , Beacon I n f o r m a t i o n and P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1953)» pp. 2 4 - 2 5 . 1  5 Broadcast from New D e l h i , September 7, 1946. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 2. 6 The I n d i a n experience has been w e l l summed up by P r o f e s s o r Toynbee: " I n d i a i s . . . t h e /onlj7 great non-Western s o c i e t y t h a t has been...overrun and conquered by Western arms and r u l e d a f t e r t h a t by Western a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . . . I n d i a ' s experience of the West has thus been p a i n f u l and... h u m i l i a t i n g . " A r n o l d Toynbee, The World and The West (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1953)* p. 34. 7 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 302. 8 Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 266. 9 Robert A. S c a l p i n o i n an a r t i c l e "Neutralism i n A s i a " p u b l i s h e d i n American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, v o l . X L Y I I I , 1 (March 1954), pp. 49-62, observes t h a t "an examination of the numerous f o r e i g n p o l i c y statements of the I n d i a n N a t i o n a l Congress i n the past ( B r i t i s h r u l e p e r i o d ) r e v e a l s a s t r o n g element of c o n t i n u i t y i n the present I n d i a n f o r e i g n policy." 10 Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 215. 11 I b i d . , p. 216. 12 Werner L e v i , Free I n d i a i n A s i a ( M i n n e a p o l i s , U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota P r e s s , 1953)» p. 119. 13 S. I . A f f . 1949-1950, p. 462. 14 Doc. Amer. F o r . R e l . 1951, pp. 462-466. 15 See the I n d i a n note t o the U n i t e d S t a t e s government on August 2 3 , 1951. I b i d . , pp. 606-608. i  16 The Hew York Times, August 28, 1951. I n d i a signed a separate Peace Treaty w i t h Japan at Tokyo on June 9, 1952, which ended the s t a t e of war w i t h Japan; i t waived a l l I n d i a n claims to r e p a r a t i o n s . I n d i a agreed t o r e t u r n Japanese p r o p e r t y , e t c . , but the Treaty d i d not mention anything about the c o n t r o v e r s i a l s u b j e c t s r e f e r r e d to i n the I n d i a n note of August 2 3 , 1951. Text i n Doc. I . A f f . (E.I.I.A., 1 9 5 2 ) , pp. 483-4-87. 17  I n d i a n note of August 2 3 ,  1951.  18 Since the Pormosan t r o u b l e arose i n January 1955» there has been much l e g a l controversy r e g a r d i n g the s t a t u s of Formosa. Some c l a i m t h a t Formosa i s not Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Had such a p r o v i s i o n been made i n the Japanese Peace Treaty, there would have been no room f o r such c o n t r o v e r s i e s . 19 In U n i t e d S t a t e s i n World A f f a i r s ( 1 9 5 1 ) , p. 192 i s the comment t h a t the I n d i a n o b j e c t i o n s were " f l a t l y r e j e c t e d " by the U n i t e d S t a t e s "with signs of i r r i t a t i o n t h a t were unusual i n i t s d i p l o m a t i c exchanges w i t h n o n - S t a l i n i s t countries." 20 The New  York Times, August 28,  21 Quoted i n M u r t i , op. c i t . , pp. p.  22 Text of the I n d i a n note i n Doc. 74-8.  1951. 74-75* I . A f f . , 194-7-194-8,  23 See U. N. Document S/649. 24 K. P. Karunakarn, I n d i a i n World A f f a i r s 1947-1950 (London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 229. 25  Ibid.  26 He a l s o expressed the hope t h a t A u s t r a l i a and New would a t t e n d , and h i s i n v i t a t i o n was accepted.  Zealand  27 P r e s i d e n t i a l speech d e l i v e r e d i n New D e l h i i n a u g u r a t i n g the e i g h t e e n - n a t i o n Conference on Indonesia, January 2 0 , 1949. The, Governments of A f g h a n i s t a n , A u s t r a l i a , Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, E t h i o p i a , I n d i a , I r a n , the Lebanon, P a k i s t a n , the P h i l i p p i n e s , Saudi A r a b i a , S y r i a and Yemen were r e p r e sented at t h i s Conference by delegates at m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l , while China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam sent observers. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, pp. 3 2 7 - 3 2 9 . 28 Text 6f the E e s o l u t i o n i n Doc. 569. ii  I . A f f . 1949-1950, pp.  567-  29 Speech, i n r e p l y t o the two-day debate on F o r e i g n P o l i c y , P a r l i a m e n t , New D e l h i , June 12, 1952. Nehru s Speeches 194-9-1955. p. 2 1 5 . 1  June 10-17, 1 9 5 0 ,  30 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s ,  p. 10754-.  31 The New York Times, June 1 7 , 1 9 5 0 . 32 I n d i a ' s d i p l o m a t i c Chapter V.  i n t e r v e n t i o n i s discussed i n  33 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , p. 14-^65^  J u l y 7-14-, 1956,  34- I b i d . , October 25 - November 1, 1958, p. 16468. 35 Defence and S e c u r i t y i n the Indian Ocean Area (New D e l h i , I.C.W.A., 1958), p. 11. September 23-30, 1950,  36 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , p. 10974.  37 The New York Times, June 29, 1 9 5 1 . 38 L e v i , Free I n d i a i n A s i a , p. 128. 39 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , 1954, p. 13704.  J u l y 31 - August 7,  40 Speech i n the Constituent Assembly ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) , New D e l h i , March 8, 1949. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 241. 41 M u r t i , op. c i t . , p. 5 2 . 42 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957. p. 380. 43 I n a r e p l y t o debate on Goa i n the Lok Sabha on J u l y 26, 1955, Nehru declared t h a t : "To say t h a t Goa i s a p a r t of P o r t u g a l i s something i n the nature of a f a i r y t a l e or n u r s e r y rhyme...it has no r e l a t i o n s h i p t o f a c t s , and any k i n d of w i l l , decree o r law passed i n P o r t u g a l i s not going t o make Goa a p a r t o f P o r t u g a l . " I b i d . , pp. 377-378. 44 E x t r a c t from Nehru's r e p l y t o the debate on the i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , Lok Sabha, September 17, 1955* I b i d . , p. 390. 45 Nehru has described the M a n i l a Treaty as " i n c l i n e d dangerously i n the d i r e c t i o n of spheres o f i n f l u e n c e t o be e x e r c i s e d by powerful c o u n t r i e s . " I b i d . , p. 267. iii  CHAPTER IV INDIA AND A POLICY OP PEACE  ...the approach of m i l i t a r y p a c t s . . . i s a wrong approach, a dangerous approach and a harmful approach. I t sets i n motion a l l the wrong tendencies and prevents the r i g h t tendencies from d e v e l o p i n g . ^  The fundamental problem f a c i n g I n d i a since independence has been i n t e r n a l r a t h e r than e x t e r n a l .  It is  the g i g a n t i c problem of p r o v i d i n g a v a s t p o p u l a t i o n w i t h the n e c e s s i t i e s of l i f e —  food, c l o t h i n g and housing. The  Government o f I n d i a i s f u l l y conscious o f these d i f f i c u l t i e s and a l s o of the economic and m i l i t a r y weakness of the country. I n d i a n l e a d e r s c l e a r l y r e a l i z e t h a t whether I n d i a i s i n v o l v e d i n a war o r n o t , the mere f a c t of a world c o n f l a g r a t i o n b r e a k i n g out would s e r i o u s l y hamper the country's i n d u s t r i a l and economic development.  I t would generate tremendous  i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l p r e s s u r e s , and perhaps t u r n India into a b a t t l e - f i e l d .  Such developments along these  l i n e s would make the s u r v i v a l o f the Government i t s e l f comp  p l e t e l y uncertain.  Therefore the I n d i a n government, t o  gain time i n which t o make economic p r o g r e s s ,  has g i v e n the  h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y t o the p u r s u i t o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. 59  60 The  Indian government i s convinced t h a t , unless  member-states owe u n q u a l i f i e d a l l e g i a n c e t o the Nations, i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace w i l l be endangered.  United As  the  d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o power b l o c s i s not i n the i n t e r e s t s of the world o r g a n i z a t i o n , I n d i a has refused to be a p a r t y to any such development e i t h e r by h e l p i n g i n the of new  formation  'blocs' or by j o i n i n g any of the e x i s t i n g ones.  The  p o s i t i o n of dynamic n e u t r a l i s m or non-alignment which I n d i a has adopted i n the East-Vest s t r u g g l e i s thus represented  by  the I n d i a n government as a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the avoidance of war.  Indian leaders f e e l t h a t by j o i n i n g one  of the two power b l o c s , I n d i a would be l e s s i n a p o s i t i o n t o work e f f e c t i v e l y f o r the p r e v e n t i o n of war.  Mr. Nehru has  d e c l a r e d t h a t I n d i a would l o s e the advantage of great i n f l u e n c e by a l i g n i n g h e r s e l f w i t h one group of n a t i o n s ,  an  i n f l u e n c e he d e s c r i b e d as growing and i n the favour of world 4peace• I n d i a b e l i e v e s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t by r e f u s i n g to take s i d e s i n the world power s t r u g g l e she i s f o l l o w i n g a p o s i t i v e policy.  5  Such a p o l i c y w i l l , i n the view of many Indians,  slow down the d r i f t toward a b i p o l a r world i n which i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s would be r a i s e d to an i n t o l e r a b l e p i t c h and armed c o n f l i c t become i n e v i t a b l e . I t i s o f t e n a s s e r t e d by Indians t h a t t h e i r country, by v i r t u e of i t s unique p o s i t i o n , a f f o r d s the best remaining hope f o r u l t i m a t e l y b r i d g i n g the ever-widening gap between the Communist n a t i o n s  61 and the West.  Indeed, I n d i a ' s 'middle' p o s i t i o n does  enable her t o m a i n t a i n amicable r e l a t i o n s w i t h both s i d e s and t o p r o v i d e an acceptable channel of communication i n a world where normal channels are i n c r e a s i n g l y b r e a k i n g down. This has caused Lord Birdwood t o remark t h a t I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of dynamic n e u t r a l i t y i n the c o l d war i s a matter, not f o r f a c i l e r e g r e t , but perhaps f o r hope, because o f the p o s s i b l e advantage of having one power i n the world w i t h access t o l e a d e r s h i p on both s i d e s . Many people i n the West have charged non-alignment to be immoral, but I n d i a r e j e c t s the premises and, t h e r e f o r e , the  p o l i c y i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s argument.  To d i v i d e the  world i n t o r i g i d moral c a t e g o r i e s , Indians r e p l y , i s t o indulge i n f a n c i f u l s e l f - r i g h t e o u s n e s s .  No s t a t e or way of  l i f e has a monopoly of t r u t h or v i r t u e , though one may be admired more than another. peace and freedom.  None i s an absolute t h r e a t t o  On the c o n t r a r y , Indians argue, both  East and West share the blame f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n which hangs l i k e a shadow of impending death over the e n t i r e planet.  Both s i d e s are g u i l t y of p r o v o c a t i v e deeds and  words, but both are f i r m l y e s t a b l i s h e d i n the present world and can o n l y be e r a d i c a t e d by a contest on the b a t t l e f i e l d . The I n d i a n f o r e i g n policy-makers argue t h a t the moral imperative i s t o r u l e out war and to concentrate on the d i f f i c u l t but e s s e n t i a l t a s k of r e l a x i n g t e n s i o n s , t o recognize the harsh r e a l i t i e s o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e , and t o  62 search u n c e a s i n g l y f o r a n e g o t i a t e d settlement between the opposing power b l o c s . Mr. Nehru has r e p e a t e d l y h e l d t h a t the major f a c t o r 7  t h a t might l e a d t o war i s the p s y c h o s i s of f e a r ' p r e v a i l i n g among the two b l o c s of n a t i o n s who are o f t e n f e a r i n g aggression from each other.  I f e i t h e r o f the two groups o r  both proceed from the premise t h a t sooner o r l a t e r an armed c o n f l i c t i s i n e v i t a b l e , then there i s l i t t l e e v e n t u a l l y , of world peace. such a war i s not i n e v i t a b l e .  chance,  I n d i a ' s p o s i t i o n has been t h a t The Government o f I n d i a ,  t h e r e f o r e , has t r i e d i n the i n t e r e s t s o f I n d i a and of world peace t o impress upon the world t h a t view through openly v o i c i n g o p i n i o n s a g a i n s t steps which, a c c o r d i n g t o i t s c a l c u l a t i o n s , might l e a d t o war. Among the steps which augur d i s a s t e r i n the f u t u r e are the t r a d i t i o n a l attempts to secure peace and s e c u r i t y by means of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s —  steps which are r e j e c t e d by  the I n d i a n government because they jeopardize the e f f o r t s t o t r e a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems i n a c o n c i l i a t o r y environment free of fear.  During h i s v i s i t t o America i n 1 9 5 0 , the  I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r emphasized t h i s view: The v e r y process of a m a r s h a l l i n g of the world i n t o two h o s t i l e camps p r e c i p i t a t e s the c o n f l i c t which i t i s sought t o a v o i d . I t produces a sense of t e r r i b l e f e a r and t h a t f e a r darkens men's minds and leads them i n t o wrong courses. There i s perhaps n o t h i n g so bad and so dangerous i n l i f e as f e a r . . . .  63 Our problem, t h e r e f o r e , becomes one of l e s s e n i n g and u l t i m a t e l y p u t t i n g an end to t h i s f e a r . That w i l l not happen i f a l l the world takes s i d e s and t a l k s of war. War becomes almost c e r t a i n then.g I n d i a i s not convinced t h a t the a c t i o n s of one o f the power b l o c s c o n s t i t u t e the e x c l u s i v e t h r e a t t o the peace of the world and i t i s not, t h e r e f o r e , eager t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n any scheme of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , e i t h e r outside or w i t h i n the United Nations framework, t h a t would i n v o l v e f o r c e f u l a c t i o n by one of the power b l o c s against the other. In h e r a t t i t u d e towards the Western system of a l l i a n c e s aimed against Communism, India's o p p o s i t i o n i s l a r g e l y c o n d i t i o n e d by her own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the nature of the Communist t h r e a t .  Indian l e a d e r s have d e c l i n e d t o  accept a b l a c k and white p i c t u r e of postwar developments t h a t a s s e r t s the presence of r i g h t on one side e x c l u s i v e l y . Most l e a d e r s of Indian thought a l s o conclude t h a t the S o v i e t Union and Communist China f e a r Western i n t e n t i o n s a t l e a s t as much as the West f e a r s Russian and Chinese aims.  In  support of t h i s c o n c l u s i o n they have p o i n t e d t o the S o v i e t emphasis on Western i n t e r v e n t i o n a f t e r the Bolshevik revolution.  They p o i n t a l s o t o the postwar S o v i e t f e a r s of  American atomic weapons and t o the complaints of Russian l e a d e r s a f t e r the Second World War concerning Western aggressive  designs.  Thus, a f t e r the Western n a t i o n s had  organized themselves i n t o the North A t l a n t i c Treaty  64 O r g a n i z a t i o n , i t appeared t o many Indians t o be a barren c o n t r o v e r s y whether the S o v i e t Union was d r i v e n by ambition or f e a r o r both:  f e a r was evident on both s i d e s as Europe  was d i v i d e d between competing and h o s t i l e a l l i a n c e s . Looking t o A s i a , I n d i a n leaders have i n t e r p r e t e d the Communist t h r e a t as coming from w i t h i n A s i a n s o c i e t i e s r a t h e r than from S o v i e t or Chinese m i l i t a r y aggression. They can see no advantage a c c r u i n g t o Communist power through f o r c i b l e occupation o f the under-developed A s i a n c o u n t r i e s as such an occupation would h a r d l y add t o Communist m i l i t a r y strength.  The p r e v a i l i n g I n d i a n a t t i t u d e i s t h a t the  Communist programme f o r A s i a r e s t s on p o l i t i c a l ,  cultural  and economic p e n e t r a t i o n r a t h e r than on m i l i t a r y conquest. Thus, they argue, any attempt t o t a l k of the Communist danger t o the f r e e world —  of which the o r d i n a r y people of A s i a  have l i t t l e , i f any, conception —  or t o s t r e s s the importance  of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s and under-emphasize s o c i a l and economic measures i s an extremely s h o r t - s i g h t e d and erroneous p o l i c y . Such a p o l i c y leaves the s o c i a l and economic back door wide open t o subversion w h i l e guarding the m i l i t a r y f r o n t against an u n l i k e l y overt S o v i e t and/or Chinese aggression. The I n d i a n government f e e l s , t h e r e f o r e , t h a t the 9  best way t o f i g h t Communism i s n o t m i l i t a r y containment, but through b u i l d i n g economic s t a b i l i t y and h e l p i n g t o f u l f i l l l e g i t i m a t e n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s . ^ One f o r e i g n observer  65 has confirmed t h i s view: There i s ample evidence to show t h a t f o r most Asians the main i s s u e i s not Moscow versus Washington, or c a p i t a l i s m versus communism, but r a t h e r n a t i o n a l i s m , a r e a l v o i c e f o r the people i n government and economic progress, versus c o l o n i a l i s m , d e s p o t i c government and economic backwardness.^ Consequently I n d i a has deprecated  m i l i t a r y alignments  n a t i o n s because such steps l e d to the c r e a t i o n of a  of 'war  psychosis,* i n c r e a s i n g f e a r and a race of armaments — a l l these f a c t o r s working together i n the d i r e c t i o n of  war.  While not denying the r i g h t of n a t i o n s t o take l e g i t i m a t e precautions f o r s e l f - d e f e n c e , Mr. Nehru has d e c l a r e d t h a t defensive a l l i a n c e s openly d i r e c t e d a g a i n s t some other country or c o u n t r i e s defeat t h e i r own purpose of t r y i n g t o 12 m a i n t a i n peace through s t r e n g t h . w h o l l y groundless  That t h i s view i s not  i s confirmed by L e s t e r B. Pearson, the  former Canadian S e c r e t a r y of State f o r E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s ,  who  s t a t e d t h a t " i n a l l the long s t o r y of mankind, arms alone, however p o w e r f u l , have never been s u f f i c i e n t to guarantee s e c u r i t y f o r any l e n g t h of time." '  One  side's s e c u r i t y  becomes the other's i n s e c u r i t y w i t h the r e s u l t t h a t an arms race develops, a v i c i o u s c i r c l e which i n the past has caused u n t o l d misery and d e s t r u c t i o n and at the present time could cause mankind's e x t i n c t i o n .  Therefore i t i s a l l the more  necessary to reduce t e n s i o n i n order to avoid a war caused by accident or m i s c a l c u l a t i o n .  66 Thus I n d i a ' s o p p o s i t i o n to a l l i a n c e s stems both from her non-agreement w i t h the Western b l o c as to the nature of the Communist t h r e a t and, of course, from her main o b j e c t i v e of not g e t t i n g i n v o l v e d i n a world war, f o r which end she wanted to minimize i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n s .  However,  while opposing m i l i t a r y pacts i n g e n e r a l , I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e t o them has been of more or l e s s concern depending on whether the area i n v o l v e d was d i s t a n t or c l o s e t o her  own  t e r r i t o r y geographically. Towards the Rio Pact 14 and the Brussels Treaty, 15 y  I n d i a has never expressed o p p o s i t i o n as she has them as l e g i t i m a t e measures of s e l f - d e f e n c e .  recognized  The Rio Pact  covered an area which d i d not a f f e c t I n d i a v e r y much, whereas the B r u s s e l s Treaty was viewed by I n d i a as the r e s u l t of a f e a r on the p a r t of c e r t a i n n a t i o n s of Western Europe of the S o v i e t Union whose expansion i n t o E a s t e r n Europe was  not  regarded w i t h favour even by I n d i a . 16 On the North A t l a n t i c Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n , has o f t e n expressed her views.  India  She has never i m p l i e d t h a t  the Western powers were motivated  by any other c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  than t h e i r f e a r of the Communist b l o c , although i n her view 17 t h a t v e r y f e a r created counter-fear and a war psychology. ' But the Indian government has expressed concern over the geographical development of NATO t o embrace c o u n t r i e s which have n o t h i n g to do w i t h the A t l a n t i c community, and e s p e c i a l l y over the i m p l i c a t i o n s of statements by Portuguese o f f i c i a l s  67 t h a t NATO was committed t o a i d P o r t u g a l t o maintain i t s I n d i a n settlements.  Mr. Nehru gave e x p r e s s i o n t o t h i s  I n d i a n concern i n a speech t o the I n d i a n Parliament on June 12, 1952: I t / N A T 0 7 began as a pact f o r defence a g a i n s t aggression, but i t has apparently widened i t s scope and taken upon i t s e l f the defence of the c o l o n i a l possessions of the n a t i o n s concerned. That, so f a r as we are concerned, i s a very s e r i o u s matter. I t means t h a t c e r t a i n c o u n t r i e s must give assurances whether formal o r i n f o r m a l t h a t they w i l l p r o t e c t and m a i n t a i n c o l o n i a l r u l e wherever i t e x i s t s . I n d i a ' s concern would be understandable valid.  —  i f h e r f e a r s were  F o r thereby the movements f o r freedom of dependent  peoples would come i n t o c o n f l i c t w i t h the organized and coordinated might of a l l the NATO powers.  But the NATO  t r e a t y , though i t permits a member t o b r i n g any question before i t f o r d i s c u s s i o n , does not provide f o r the of member-states i n t h e i r c o l o n i a l possessions.  support  The com-  p l i c a t i o n s which were i n h e r e n t i n any such commitment were c e r t a i n l y a p p r e c i a t e d by the d r a f t e r s of the Treaty and p o i n t e d l y avoided.  For P o r t u g a l t o imply t h a t h e r NATO  p a r t n e r s were bound t o h e l p her m a i n t a i n p o s s e s s i o n of Goa must c e r t a i n l y have been embarrassing  t o the A l l i a n c e . 19  C e r t a i n l y i t was not considered r e l e v a n t by Nehru,  y  and  thus I n d i a , d e s p i t e c e r t a i n p u b l i c statements by government o f f i c i a l s t o the c o n t r a r y , does not consider NATO as too d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g her.  68 But while I n d i a has acquiesced i n European and American a l l i a n c e s , h e r r e a c t i o n t o the e x t e n s i o n of these arrangements i n t o areas nearer home has been one of strenuous o b j e c t i o n . The I n d i a n government openly opposed 20 the formation of a P a c i f i c P a c t .  Concern was shown by-  some members i n the I n d i a n Parliament about the p o s s i b l e formation o f a P a c i f i c Pact as e a r l y as A p r i l , 194-9. Mr. Nehru r e l i e v e d t h a t concern by i n f o r m i n g the House t h a t there was no d i s c u s s i o n going on f o r such a pact a t the 21 time. At the Colombo meeting of the Commonwealth on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s i n 1950, I n d i a d e c l a r e d t h a t she had no 22 i n t e n t i o n t o j o i n such a p a c t ,  apparently opposing i t f o r  the reason t h a t the time was not r i p e f o r such a step because of the u n s e t t l e d s t a t e of South-East A s i a , the s i t u a t i o n s i n Indonesia and Indo-China being s t i l l unresolved.  Here again  i t seems t h a t I n d i a ' s primary f e a r was t h a t such a pact might be used t o b o l s t e r up the s h r i n k i n g s t r e n g t h of the c o l o n i a l powers i n those areas.  L a t e r , however, when the  Chinese  Communists came i n t o power, and the U n i t e d S t a t e s began t o i n s t i t u t e a change i n h e r A s i a n p o l i c y , I n d i a opposed the P a c i f i c Pact f o r the reason t h a t i t would create t e n s i o n s i n the area.  When h e r d i s a p p r o v a l f a i l e d t o h a l t the s i g n a t u r e  of the P a c t , however, I n d i a d i d not show a c t i v e h o s t i l i t y t o i t , n o r has she subsequently done so. She apparently recogn i z e s t h a t the Pact i s a defensive arrangement which, by reason of the area of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , cannot be considered  69 an overt p r o v o c a t i o n by Peking and t h e r e f o r e w i l l n o t , i n i t s e l f , increase tension i n A s i a . Towards the M a n i l a Pact (SEATO),  25  however, I n d i a  has been adamantly opposed from the o u t s e t , and i n t h i s o p p o s i t i o n she has been able t o take Burma and Indonesia w i t h her and e x e r c i s e d enough i n f l u e n c e to keep a wavering Ceylon away from the P a c t .  The Geneva settlement had j u s t brought  about a c e a s e - f i r e i n l n d o - C h i n a , and I n d i a had as r e c e n t l y as A p r i l 28, 1954, signed w i t h China the S i n o - I n d i a n Agreement on T i b e t t o which was attached a general statement c o n t a i n i n g the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of p e a c e f u l co-existence t o which I n d i a apparently attached the highest importance.  Consequently  the Indian government r e a c t e d extremely unfavourably t o the Western b l o c ' s d e s i r e t o go ahead w i t h a South-East A s i a Defence Treaty.  Mr. Nehru made h i s views known i n the Indian 24  Parliament on September 29, 1954.  H i s c r i t i c i s m s were  more o r l e s s based on the grounds t h a t SEATO was not, as i t s s i g n a t o r i e s claimed, a bulwark f o r peace and s e c u r i t y i n South-East A s i a , but r a t h e r t h a t i t would d e f i n i t e l y add t o the t e n s i o n s and f e a r s o f the s i t u a t i o n . He d e c l a r e d : ...the approach of t h i s Treaty i s wrong and may antagonize a great p a r t of A s i a . Are you going t o have peace and s e c u r i t y by c r e a t i n g more c o n f l i c t s and antagonisms and by making people t h i n k t h a t i n s t e a d o f b r i n g i n g s e c u r i t y you b r i n g i n s e c u r i t y . . . . p c I n d i a c o u l d not accept the c o n t e n t i o n t h a t the South-East  70  A s i a Defence O r g a n i z a t i o n was a r e g i o n a l body as d e f i n e d i n the United Nations Charter, because some of the s i g n a t o r y s t a t e s were not g e o g r a p h i c a l l y s i t u a t e d i n that r e g i o n —  a  p o i n t which i n c l i n e d the Treaty "dangerously i n the d i r e c t i o n of spheres of i n f l u e n c e t o be e x e r c i s e d by powerful  countries.  The f a c t t h a t the Pact was signed d e s p i t e I n d i a ' s v e r y v o c a l o b j e c t i o n s only served t o f u r t h e r alarm Indian o p i n i o n as t o the a c t u a l motives of the West.  Why, Nehru enquired,  should  the Western powers seek to s e t up m i l i t a r y bases i n p a r t s of the world where the c h i e f d e s i r e was t o keep out of war, t o p r o t e c t c o u n t r i e s which f o r the most p a r t have not asked f o r t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n , or t o elaborate m i l i t a r y p l a n s w i t h l e s s e r A s i a n n a t i o n s when the stronger and o f t e n more democratic A s i a n governments were outspokenly  opposed t o them?  Military  a l l i a n c e s were f a m i l i a r but here Nehru detected something new and r a t h e r e x t r a o r d i n a r y —  i n t e r l o c k i n g a l l i a n c e s which,  i n h i s o p i n i o n , i n c r e a s e d the prospect  of war on a world  scale and was something, t h e r e f o r e , undesirable i n p r i n c i p l e . 28 The n e g o t i a t i o n and s i g n i n g of the Baghdad Pact provoked e q u a l l y strong o p p o s i t i o n from I n d i a , f o r i t embraced Middle E a s t e r n s t a t e s and thereby an area of great s t r a g e g i c importance t o l n d i a .  Nehru c r i t i c i z e d the Pact f o r  c r e a t i n g i n Western A s i a f a r g r e a t e r t e n s i o n and c o n f l i c t 29 than ever b e f o r e ,  J  and was p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l , however,  of P a k i s t a n ' s membership i n the Pact —  membership which the  I n d i a n government f e l t was not provoked by f e a r of some  71  imminent o r d i s t a n t i n v a s i o n or aggression  from the S o v i e t 30  Union, but because of P a k i s t a n ' s h o s t i l i t y t o I n d i a .  But  undoubtedly the major o p p o s i t i o n from I n d i a was due n e i t h e r to f e a r of P a k i s t a n ' s motives nor t o those of the Western s i g n a t o r i e s o f the defence pacts i n A s i a .  I t can be t r a c e d  to the I n d i a n r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t her peace area was no more. As a r e s u l t of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact I n d i a was e n c i r c l e d by anti-Communist a l l i a n c e s .  This f a c t rendered India's  p o l i c y of non-involvement through non-alignment of l i t t l e consequence i n the event of war. The danger, i n Nehru's view, was t h a t any odd member o f one of the pacts c o u l d s e t i n motion something which would g r a d u a l l y p u l l i n not o n l y the members of t h a t p a c t , but some other i n t e r r e l a t e d pact of which they were common members. That i s why, both f o r l a r g e r reasons and f o r the narrow reason of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , 31 I n d i a took exception t o the SEATO and Baghdad P a c t s . pacts d i d not recognize  y  These  the new f a c t o r s t h a t were a t work.  Instead of t a k i n g advantage of these new f a c t o r s which aimed at peace, disarmament and the l e s s e n i n g of t e n s i o n , these pacts d e l i b e r a t e l y checked them and encouraged other tendencies which increased hatred and f e a r and apprehension and came i n the way f o disarmament.  I t i s f o r t h i s b a s i c reason, the  b e l i e f t h a t m i l i t a r y pacts c o n s t i t u t e a dangerous and harmful approach t o world peace, that I n d i a has maintained her unequivocal  d i s a p p r o v a l of, and o p p o s i t i o n t o , the v e r y  establishment  of such arrangements.  72  C l o s e l y bound up with. I n d i a ' s o p p o s i t i o n t o the e n t i r e concept o f m i l i t a r y pacts has been h e r advocacy o f disarmament and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n t r o l of atomic energy. The r e l e n t l e s s Indian d i a l e c t i c on the f a t a l c o r r e l a t i o n between Great Power armaments races and war leaves l i t t l e room f o r a cautious t e s t i n g o f formulas and proposals f o r t h e i r w a t e r - t i g h t guarantees. some, a p p a l l i n g —  There was great —  and t o  meaning t o the announcement of the Indian  delegate i n the 1951 General Assembly t h a t I n d i a was i n t e r ested not i n the adoption of any p a r t i c u l a r r e s o l u t i o n on 52 disarmament, but i n the a c t u a l beginning of disarmament. "Pear o f aggression i s the root o f a l l c o n f l i c t s , " argued the I n d i a n delegate i n 1951 i n recommending t o the major powers t h a t they subscribe t o a 'No-War D e c l a r a t i o n . '  He  added by way of e x p l a n a t i o n : Por once war as a p o s s i b l e s o l u t i o n t o any q u e s t i o n , i s f i n a l l y r u l e d out — and t h i s i s what i s i m p l i e d by a j o i n t no-war d e c l a r a t i o n — t h a t minds of those i n v o l v e d must i n e v i t a b l y turn to peaceful s o l u t i o n s . ^ Although S i r Benegal Rau's attempt a t t h i s time t o get the major powers t o subscribe t o a b l a n k e t r e n u n c i a t i o n of war as a matter o f p r i n c i p l e proved a b o r t i v e , three years l a t e r Mrs. Pandit r e t u r n e d t o the suggestion of a 'No-War D e c l a r a t i o n ' i n the i n t e r e s t o f producing a c l i m a t e of peace i n the world, but i t was not f o r m a l l y o f f e r e d as an I n d i a n p r o p o s a l i n the U n i t e d Nations*  The I n d i a n government f e l t ,  73  and continues to f e e l , t h a t the s o l u t i o n i n the f i e l d of armaments depends e s s e n t i a l l y on agreement between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and the S o v i e t Union by v i r t u e of t h e i r m i l i t a r y preponderance over a l l other s t a t e s .  But I n d i a i s  determined to do a l l i n her power t o b r i n g the opposing  sides  i n the c o l d war together, and t o somehow save mankind from the h o r r o r s of an arms race which can only end i n mutual d e s t r u c t i o n by n u c l e a r arms.  Consequently the I n d i a n  government has continued to m a i n t a i n t h a t n u c l e a r , chemical, and b i o l o g i c a l knowledge and power should not be used t o forge weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n . They advocate the proh i b i t i o n of such weapons by common consent, and  immediately  be agreement amongst those concerned, which l a t t e r i s , of course, at present the o n l y e f f e c t i v e way to b r i n g about t h e i r abandonment.  Mr. C. S. Jha has d e s c r i b e d I n d i a ' s  views on n u c l e a r disarmament ( i n c l u d i n g t e s t i n g ) as i n v o l v i n g n o t h i n g l e s s than the s u r v i v a l of the human race: T h i s i s the g r e a t e s t challenge of our time, the supreme challenge of the s p i r i t . Shall Man have the wisdom to use the tremendous power p l a c e d i n h i s hands by the d i s c o v e r y of atomic power to make t h i s p l a n e t a world of happiness and p l e n t y , or w i l l he i n u t t e r f o l l y use n u c l e a r power f o r committing mass s u i c i d e and the d e s t r u c t i o n of the human r a c e . ^ I t i s I n d i a ' s p o l i c y to endeavour w i t h f a i t h and hope to promote a l l e f f o r t s t h a t seek t o b r i n g to a h a l t t h i s  drift 35 to what appears to be the menace of t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n . ^  74 Just as I n d i a ' s o p p o s i t i o n to a l l i a n c e s  and  advocacy of disarmament are attempts t o ease t e n s i o n i n the world, so too i s her championship of Communist China's r e c o g n i t i o n and admittance to the United Nations an attempt to l e a d the world away from the b r i n k of the abyss. Red China's aggressiveness,  many people i n I n d i a  Despite  maintain  t h a t the l e s s e n i n g of t e n s i o n i n the Far East depends to a great extent on g i v i n g the Peking government d i p l o m a t i c r e c o g n i t i o n and according i t i t s proper place i n the n a t i o n a l community.  inter-  These are separate but c l o s e l y i n t e r -  r e l a t e d i s s u e s l e a n i n g as they do on the same arguments and b r i n g i n g i n t o p l a y the same emotions.  Both i s s u e s r e s t on a  combination of formal agreements and p o l i t i c a l  considerations.  In extending immediate r e c o g n i t i o n to the Communist 56 Peking government,  I n d i a d i d so on the b a s i s t h a t de f a c t o  c o n t r o l of t e r r i t o r y and a d m i n i s t r a t i o n e n t i t l e s a government *° <ie .jure s t a t u s .  R e c o g n i t i o n was not, t h e r e f o r e , t o mean  t h a t the I n d i a n government approved of the c h a r a c t e r of the new  regime, f o r the Nehru a d m i n i s t r a t i o n r u t h l e s s l y sup-  pressed Communists at home; i t was r a t h e r a r e c o g n i t i o n of political reality.  I n d i a d e a l t w i t h the case on i t s m e r i t s  although t h i s caused s e r i o u s resentment i n the United States a f a c t o r which was  to become a s e r i o u s d i f f i c u l t y i n Indo-  American r e l a t i o n s i n view of what happened l a t e r .  And  although the Indian government explained t h a t no moral judgement was  i n v o l v e d , i t undoubtedly had few qualms about  —  75  the d o w n f a l l of the c o r r u p t Kuomintang o l i g a r c h y . For the same reason of r e c o g n i z i n g r e a l i t i e s , I n d i a supports the e n t r y of Red China i n t o the U n i t e d Nations.  " I t becomes completely u n r e a l and a r t i f i c i a l , "  Mr. Nehru,has d e c l a r e d , "to t a l k about China being r e p r e sented i n the U n i t e d Nations or i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l by 37 someone who cannot speak f o r China."  ' To I n d i a n government  l e a d e r s , the i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e c o g n i t i o n of Communist China would a l s o have symbolic importance as a r e c o g n i t i o n of the new s t a t u s of A s i a n peoples i n world a f f a i r s .  Thus, while  as an I n d i a n Nehru may sometimes have moments of disquietude about the might of the New China, n e v e r t h e l e s s as an A s i a n he has shared what he has considered a Western s l i g h t t o a great power.  I n 1953 be observed:  " I f China i s not there  /xn the U n i t e d Nations/> then from the p o i n t of view o f p o p u l a t i o n , from the p o i n t of view of world  importance, 38 n e a r l y a quarter of the world i s not t h e r e . " y  More u r g e n t l y , however, the I n d i a n government holds the view t h a t there can be no peace i n A s i a u n t i l the Government o f the Chinese People's Republic i s u n i v e r s a l l y recogn i z e d and accepted as the bona f i d e government of the Chinese people.  Mr. Nehru has s t a t e d q u i t e b l u n t l y t h a t "one of the  b i g g e s t f a c t o r s towards ensuring s e c u r i t y i n South-East A s i a and i n the Par East i s the r e c o g n i t i o n o f China...and China 39 coming i n t o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . W i t h the outbreak of the  76  Korean war I n d i a , i n accord w i t h t h a t view, championed more v i g o r o u s l y than ever the r i g h t of Communist China t o be represented.  On J u l y 13,  1950,  Mr. Nehru sent i d e n t i c a l  l e t t e r s t o Marshal S t a l i n and the U n i t e d S t a t e s S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e , Dean Acheson, i n which he suggested the s e a t i n g of 4-0  Communist China at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  This p r o p o s a l  was 41  welcomed by the S o v i e t l e a d e r but r e j e c t e d by the Americans and so came to naught.  Nothing daunted, I n d i a , at the  opening of the f i f t h s e s s i o n of the U n i t e d Nations Assembly i n September 1950,  General  introduced a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n  which s t a t e d t h a t "the C e n t r a l Government of the  People's  Republic of China i s the only...government f u n c t i o n i n g i n the Republic of China, as now c o n s t i t u t e d . "  The Assembly was  asked t o decide t h a t t h i s government should be e n t i t l e d to represent the Republic of China i n the General Assembly and to recommend t h a t the other organs of the U n i t e d Nations adopt 4-2 similar resolutions. Faced by the adamant o p p o s i t i o n of the U n i t e d S t a t e s , o p p o s i t i o n which grew stronger as the Korean war progressed, the I n d i a n proposal was defeated and subsequent suggestions towards the same end have achieved no  success.  Red China continues to be excluded from the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a s i t u a t i o n Mr. Nehru has deplored on many occasions and which prompted even the Statesman ( D e l h i ) , which i s considered a pro-Western and c o n s e r v a t i v e newspaper, to w r i t e on September 16,  1950:  77 ...the u n r e a l i s t i c o b s t i n a c y of the U. S. on the China q u e s t i o n i s p r e j u d i c i n g her r e l a t i o n s , not w i t h China o n l y , but w i t h other A s i a n c o u n t r i e s and l e s s e n i n g the a u t h o r i t y of the U. N. The S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l as at present c o n s t i t u t e d represents n e i t h e r the f a c t s of world power, as was intended, nor ( i t now seems c l e a r ) the wishes of the m a j o r i t y of members. How i t can s u c c e s s f u l l y champion democratic causes, as i t i s not i t s e l f democratically constituted i s a q u e s t i o n which i s l i k e l y to be asked as time goes on.;,. The N a t i o n a l Standard even questioned the claims of the U n i t e d Nations to be considered as an o r g a n i z a t i o n w i t h world-wide r e s p o n s i b i l i t y .  I t wrote on January 16,  1951:  "America deprived the U. N. of i t s moral c l a i m s to enforce i t s d i r e c t i v e by her o b s t i n a t e r e f u s a l t o buy peace through the concession of Red China's c l a i m s on Formosa and f o r the 44 seat i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l . "  The continued r e f u s a l by  the U n i t e d S t a t e s and i t s supporters to permit Red  China's  s e a t i n g i n the U n i t e d Nations i s viewed by Indians as a development i n the context of which the U n i t e d Nations i s being converted from the s t a t u s of a world o r g a n i z a t i o n t o the executive agent of an anti-Communist b l o c .  Such a  development w i l l , i n the I n d i a n view, weaken not strengthen the world body and so make i t l e s s e f f e c t i v e as an agency of peace. In recent y e a r s , however, there has been a n o t i c e a b l e d i s i n c l i n a t i o n on the p a r t of I n d i a t o adamantly  78  demand the admission of Communist China i n t o the U n i t e d Nations.  I n p a r t t h i s may he a t t r i b u t e d t o New  Delhi's  awareness t h a t American n o n - r e c o g n i t i o n of the Peking regime at the present time i s based on a complex set of f a c t o r s  —  emotional, p o l i t i c a l , and s t r a t e g i c —  t h a t only time and a  f a v o r a b l e s e r i e s of events can a l t e r .  And p a r t l y i t i s due  to the s u s p i c i o n aroused i n I n d i a by China's a c t i o n s i n T i b e t , South-East A s i a , and on I n d i a ' s borders, as to the r e s p o n s i b l e nature of the Chinese Communist government. Even Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, w i t h a l l h i s p r e s t i g e and  eloquence,  dares not support Red China's c l a i m s to a seat at the U n i t e d Nations too v o c i f e r o u s l y at a time when t h a t country i s s e i z i n g I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y without regard t o I n d i a n p r o t e s t s and i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of i t s w r i t t e n and spoken adherence to Panch S h i l a .  The Indian government apparently recognizes  t h a t the i s s u e s of r e c o g n i t i o n and U n i t e d Nations membership f o r her Chinese neighbour are p a r t of a l a r g e r problem which must i t s e l f change before any r e a l new developments can be expected. Thus I n d i a ' s approach t o the c o l d war i s based on the view t h a t world peace can o n l y be secured i f a l l n a t i o n s owe u n q u a l i f i e d a l l e g i a n c e t o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  In  furtherance of her own cherished i d e a l s and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t s , no l e s s than those of the other p r o g r e s s i v e n a t i o n s of the world, I n d i a p l a y s her r o l e i n the U n i t e d Nations Organization.  She recognizes i n i t the Supreme Parliament  79  of the n a t i o n s o f the world, where the v o i c e o f any n a t i o n , r e g a r d l e s s of s i z e o r p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g y , s u b s c r i b i n g t o the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s g u i d i n g the great o r g a n i z a t i o n i s heard w i t h due regard.  She recognizes i n i t the symbol o f  the g i g a n t i c e f f o r t humanity i s prepared t o make i n order to stave o f f war. As such I n d i a has sought t o g a i n the admittance  of Red China i n t o the U n i t e d Nations, thereby  hoping t o give the world o r g a n i z a t i o n a more r e p r e s e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r and t o strengthen i t s promotion o f i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation.  F o r the West ( i n general) t o d i s r e g a r d the  e x i s t e n c e o f a quarter of the human race i n the throes of readjustment  i s viewed by New D e l h i as a p o t e n t i a l and very  r e a l t h r e a t t o world peace.  I n d i a opposes the d i v i s i o n of  the world i n t o r i v a l power b l o c s as r e p r e s e n t i n g a s p i r i t of a n i m o s i t y , h a t r e d and s u s p i c i o n which i s c o n t r a r y t o the b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s u n d e r l y i n g the U n i t e d Nations O r g a n i z a t i o n . She c o n s i d e r s t h a t such a d i v i s i o n as represented by r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y p a c t s , leads only t o imaginary s e c u r i t y , but thereby c r e a t e s a war psychology and a race i n armaments which can o n l y l e a d , as i n the p a s t , t o d i s a s t e r f o r a l l concerned. Through non-alignment and continuous e n u n c i a t i o n of her views, I n d i a hopes t o l e a d the world away from t h i s dangerous p o l a r i z a t i o n of power and f e a r psychosis and t o f u r t h e r the cause of peace.  Footnotes - Chapter IV  1 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957* p. 3 1 9 . 2 E o s i n g e r , I n d i a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s , p. 36• 3 On March 22, 194-9, Mr. Nehru, speaking on 'Our F o r e i g n P o l i c y , ' s a i d : "We want a t l e a s t t e n o r f i f t e e n years of peace i n order t o he able t o develop our r e s o u r c e s . " Independence and A f t e r , p. 258. 4- I b i d . , p. 24-2. 5 Nehru s a i d on March 22, 1949: " I t i s not a middle-ofthe-road p o l i c y . I t i s a p o s i t i v e , c o n s t r u c t i v e p o l i c y d e l i b e r a t e l y aiming a t something and d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y i n g t o a v o i d h o s t i l i t y t o other c o u n t r i e s , t o any country as f a r as p o s s i b l e . " I b i d . , p. 254. 6 Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, p. 198. 7 Mr. Nehru's speech i n the I n d i a n Parliament on February 18, 1953 mainly r e v o l v e d around t h i s theme 'Psychosis of Fear.' Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 243-258. 8 J a w a h a r l a l Nehru, V i s i t t o America (New York, John Day, 1 9 5 0 ) , pp. 30-31. 9 T h i s was one of the reasons given by Mr. Nehru f o r h i s o p p o s i t i o n t o the P a c i f i c Pact i n 1 9 4 9 . 10 I n an i n t e r v i e w w i t h Robert Trumbull i n March 1 9 5 1 , Mr. Nehru suggested two ways t o f i g h t communism i n A s i a : by encouragement of n a t i o n a l i s m ; and by h e l p i n g economic p r o g r e s s . He p o i n t e d out: "That i s t o say the people should not be made by circumstances t o t h i n k o f communism as a l i b e r a t i n g f o r c e , which they sometimes do." The New York Times, A p r i l 1, 1951. 11 E o s i n g e r , op. c i t . , p. 146. 1 9 5 3 , p. 7.  12 Nehru's Press Conferences  13 L. B. Pearson, " A f t e r Geneva: A Greater Task For NATO," F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , v o l . 34 (1955-56), pp. 15-16. 14 The Inter-American Treaty of E e c i p r o c a l A s s i s t a n c e (Eio P a c t ) signed on September 2, 1947 a t E i o de J a n e i r o between the U n i t e d S t a t e s and a l l twenty L a t i n American s t a t e s . Text i n Doc. I . A f f . 1947-1948, pp. 773-778. i  15 The B r u s s e l s Treaty, signed on March 17, 194-8 a t B r u s s e l s between Belgium, Prance, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, znd the U n i t e d Kingdom. Text i n Doc. I . Aff7 194-7-194-8,  pp.  225-229.  16 The North A t l a n t i c Treaty, signed A p r i l 4-, 194-9 a t Washington between twelve powers, namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, I c e l a n d , I t a l y , Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, P o r t u g a l , the U n i t e d Kingdom and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Greece and Turkey j o i n e d l a t e r on February 20, 1 9 5 2 , under a separate P r o t o c o l o f February 1 5 , 1 9 5 2 . Text i n Doc. I . A f f . 194-9-1950, pp. 257-260. 17 I n a speech i n the Lok Sabha d u r i n g debate on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s , November 19, 1956, Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d : "The f e a r of Western c o u n t r i e s r e g a r d i n g the armed might of the S o v i e t Union brought i n t o e x i s t e n c e pacts and a l l i a n c e s l i k e the NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad P a c t . Then came i n t o e x i s t e n c e , as a c o u n t e r b l a s t , the Warsaw Treaty. Each of these systems of a l l i a n c e s pretends t o be an a s s o c i a t i o n f o r peace and defence a g a i n s t a t t a c k , but each has the e f f e c t r e a l l y o f f r i g h t e n i n g the other p a r t y and making i t more apprehensive of danger and, t h e r e f o r e , quickening the race of armaments." Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 328. 18 Nehru's Speeches 194-9-1953, p. 2 2 3 . 19 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 378. 20 The S e c u r i t y Treaty between the Governments of A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and the U n i t e d S t a t e s (ANZUS P a c t ) signed a t San F r a n c i s c o on September 1, 1 9 5 1 . Text i n Doc. Amer. F o r . E e l . 1951, PP. 263-265. 21 Kundra, I n d i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y 194-7-1954-, p. 91. 22 L e v i , Free I n d i a i n A s i a , p. 57* 23 The South-East A s i a C o l l e c t i v e Defence Treaty signed a t M a n i l a on September 8, 1954- by e i g h t powers, namely: A u s t r a l i a , France, New Zealand, P a k i s t a n , the P h i l i p p i n e s , T h a i l a n d , the U n i t e d Kingdom and the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Text i n D.S.B. XXI (795), September 20, 1954-, pp. 393-396. 24- "The South-East A s i a Treaty O r g a n i z a t i o n , " Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 265-273. 25 I b i d . , p. 268. 26 I b i d . , p. 267. ii  27 N i c h o l a s Mansergh, "Commonwealth F o r e i g n P o l i c i e s 194-5-56: A P e r s p e c t i v e View," Commonwealth P e r s p e c t i v e s (London, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 8 ) , P» 5 2 . ~~ 28 The Pact of Mutual Co-operation between I r a q and Turkey was signed on 24- February 1955i B r i t a i n j o i n e d on 5 A p r i l 1955» P a k i s t a n on 25 September 1955, and P e r s i a on 3 November 1955. For t e x t s of the agreements see Doc. I . A f f . 1955* pp. 287-289 ( I r a q i - T u r k i s h agreement); pp. 293-294- ( B r i t i s h adherence); p. 304- ( P e r s i a n adherence). 29 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 319. 30 I b i d . , pp. 319-320. 31 I b i d . , p. 3 2 0 . 32 General Assembly, O f f i c i a l Records, 6 t h Sess., Cmtte. 1, p. 28. 33 I b i d . , pp. 1 2 9 - 1 3 0 . 34 Speech t o the General Assembly's main p o l i t i c a l committee on November 18, 1959. Quoted i n Indiagram, November 19, 1959* 35 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957, p. 2 5 0 . 36 The Government of I n d i a accorded de .jure r e c o g n i t i o n to the new Government" of China on December 3 0 , 194-9• 37 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957* p. 242. 38 Quoted i n Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 244. 39 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957, p. 2 ? 1 . When the Peking government a p p l i e d f o r admission i n t o the U n i t e d Nations i n January, 1950, I n d i a , as a recent e l e c t i v e to a non-permanent C o u n c i l seat, supported the S o v i e t d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n of January 1 0 , 1950 t h a t provided f o r the e x p u l s i o n of the N a t i o n a l i s t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e from the C o u n c i l and h i s replacement by the Peking d e l e g a t e . 40 Text of the l e t t e r s i n Doc. I . A f f . 1949-1950, pp. 7 0 5 -  707.  41 I n h i s p o l i t e r e j e c t i o n of Nehru's p r o p o s a l of J u l y 18, 1950, Mr. Acheson s a i d : " I n our o p i n i o n , the d e c i s i o n between competing claimant Governments f o r China's seat i n the U n i t e d Nations i s one which must be reached by the U n i t e d Nations on i t s m e r i t s . . . I know t h a t you w i l l agree t h a t the d e c i s i o n should not be d i c t a t e d by an u n l a w f u l aggression or by any other conduct which should subject the U n i t e d Nations t o c o e r c i o n or duress." I b i d . , p. 707* iii  42 General Assembly O f f i c i a l Records, 5 t h Sess., 277th P l e n a r y Mtg., September 19, 1950, p. 2 . 43 C i t e d i n I n d i a and the U n i t e d Nations (New York, I.C.W.A., 1 9 5 7 ) , P. 70. 44 I b i d .  iv  CHAPTER V INDIAN MEDIATION IN EAST-WEST DISPUTES  We have to achieve freedom and to defend i t . We have to meet aggression and t o r e s i s t i t and the f o r c e employed must he adequate to the purpose. But even when p r e p a r i n g t o r e s i s t aggression, the u l t i m a t e o b j e c t i v e , the o b j e c t i v e of peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , must never be l o s t s i g h t of and heart and mind must be attuned to t h i s supreme aim and not swayed or clouded by h a t r e d or fear.-^  I n furtherance of her d e s i r e to create a temper of peace, and thereby l e a d the world away from a sense of p a r a l y z i n g f e a r of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war, I n d i a has  felt  t h a t she must act as a s o r t of go-between or mediator i n c o l d war d i s p u t e s i n v o l v i n g the r i v a l i n t e r e s t s of the two b l o c s . By v i r t u e of her non-alignment w i t h respect to e i t h e r power b l o c , I n d i a f e e l s t h a t she can perform the necessary  task  of b u i l d i n g a bridge which otherwise would not e x i s t between the two r i v a l b l o c s . such a r o l e —  Indeed, I n d i a i s h a p p i l y s i t u a t e d f o r  an A s i a n s t a t e , t r a d i t i o n a l l y f r i e n d l y t o  China, without any legacy of c o n f l i c t w i t h R u s s i a , yet f r i e n d l y to the West, and f o l l o w i n g a 'middle way' programme of economic and s o c i a l development.  in its  Her p o l i c y of  non-alignment and mediation has a t t r a c t e d the support of v a r i o u s A s i a n and A f r i c a n governments and the enthusiasm of 80  81 l a r g e numbers of people, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n non-Communist A s i a and i n A f r i c a .  By v i r t u e of her unique p o s i t i o n , s i z e and  i n f l u e n c e , I n d i a i s best p l a c e d t o p l a y such a r o l e .  That  she has done so w i t h not a l i t t l e success i s evidenced by her Government's a t t i t u d e s and e f f o r t s i n Korea, i n Indor  China, i n the d i s p u t e between Peking, and Washington over Formosa and the o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s , and i n the Hungarian  and  Suez c o n f l i c t s . The events of 1950  and a f t e r i n Korea were s i g n i -  f i c a n t to Indians because these events r a i s e d the spectre of a world war.  Because of i t s concern w i t h p r e v e n t i n g the  Korean war from spreading i n t o a l a r g e - s c a l e world c o n f l i c t , I n d i a c o u l d not remain a mere s p e c t a t o r t o the i n Korea.  happenings  Indeed, as the war progressed some of the key  p r i n c i p l e s of I n d i a n p o l i c y concerning the nature and f u n c t i o n of the U n i t e d Nations and of Great Power r e l a t i o n s were put to the t e s t . Before the North Korean a t t a c k i n June 1950,  the  I n d i a n government and people had h a r d l y been i n t e r e s t e d i n Korean matters.  I n d i a had not r e c o g n i z e d e i t h e r of the two  Korean governments i n the b e l i e f t h a t the a r t i f i c i a l d i v i s i o n of the country should n e i t h e r be d i g n i f i e d nor perpetuated by the act of r e c o g n i t i o n .  She would i n any case have found  i t d i f f i c u l t to decide which government t o recognize s i n c e she disapproved of the c o n d i t i o n s p r e v a i l i n g on both s i d e s of  82 the 38th P a r a l l e l .  Notwithstanding these unfortunate  circumstances, I n d i a recognized committed by North Korea.  that aggression had been  Consequently I n d i a accepted the  two S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n s  of June 25^ ( c a l l i n g on the  North Koreans t o withdraw t o the 38th p a r a l l e l and cease h o s t i l i t i e s ) and June 2 7 , 1 9 5 0  5  ( a s k i n g members of the United  Nations t o f u r n i s h such a s s i s t a n c e t o the Republic  of Korea  as might be necessary t o r e p e l the armed a t t a c k and t o r e s t o r e i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y i n the a r e a ) .  The  Indian r e p r e s e n t a t i v e , not having r e c e i v e d i n s t r u c t i o n s from h i s government, d i d n o t . vote on the l a t t e r r e s o l u t i o n . But the Government of I n d i a a f t e r c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n accepted the r e s o l u t i o n i n a s p e c i a l communication to the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l on June 2 9 , because i t was opposed t o any attempt to s e t t l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes by r e s o r t to a g g r e s s i o n .  6  At the same time, however, the Indian government made i t c l e a r that the acceptance of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n d i d not i n v o l v e any m o d i f i c a t i o n o f i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . delegate t o the United Nations  The Indian  explained:  This p o l i c y i s based on the promotion of world peace and the development o f f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h a l l c o u n t r i e s . I t remains an independent policy...determined s o l e l y by I n d i a ' s i d e a l s and o b j e c t i v e s . The Government of I n d i a e a r n e s t l y hope t h a t even a t t h i s stage i t may be p o s s i b l e t o put an end t o the f i g h t i n g and t o s e t t l e the dispute by negotiation. 9  83 L a r g e l y "because of t h i s f e r v e n t d e s i r e t o b r i n g about a quick end t o the f i g h t i n g i n Korea, r a t h e r than because of I n d i a ' s need f o r h e r f o r c e s a t home, the Government of I n d i a sent only a f i e l d ambulance and s u r g i c a l u n i t t o Korea.  Thus  while condemning the North Korean aggression, I n d i a was t h i n k i n g i n terms o f the Korean war assuming l a r g e r prop o r t i o n s and hence she wanted t o take care t h a t she d i d not get i n v o l v e d i n i t .  Although one observer has e x p l a i n e d  I n d i a ' s Korean p o l i c y as motivated by i s s u e s not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d t o the c o n f l i c t i n the p e n i n s u l a ,  i t seems c l e a r  t h a t the general outlook and a c t i o n s of the Indian government d u r i n g the Korean war can only be understood from the p o i n t of view of h e r d e s i r e t o promote peace through a l o c a l i z a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t , and t h a t i n case of e x t e n s i o n t h a t she should not be o b l i g e d t o be i n v o l v e d i n i t .  Only thus can  I n d i a ' s a b s t e n t i o n on J u l y 7, 1950 from v o t i n g on the S e c u r i t y q C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n ' s e t t i n g up a United Nations Command under the U n i t e d S t a t e s , and h e r r e f u s a l t o provide armed f o r c e s f o r s e r v i c e i n t h a t Command, be e x p l a i n e d .  In  a d d i t i o n , had the I n d i a n army p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a f u l l - s c a l e war against the North Koreans ( l a t e r j o i n e d by the Chinese Communists) i t would have been impossible f o r the I n d i a n government t o p l a y the r o l e i t d i d —  f i r s t i n the negot-  i a t i o n s and d i s c u s s i o n s on Korea h e l d under the auspices o f the United Nations and outside i t , and l a t e r i n the N e u t r a l Nations R e p a t r i a t i o n Commission i n 1953-1954.  84 I n accordance w i t h the aims of her p o l i c y , I n d i a turned her diplomacy towards mediation i n the Korean war. The very nature of t h i s p o l i c y made i t i m p r a c t i c a b l e f o r I n d i a t o w h o l l y endorse the o r i g i n a l standpoints of e i t h e r p a r t y , and consequently  India's e f f o r t s v e r y o f t e n annoyed  the United States and sometimes I n d i a was accused by l e a d i n g American p u b l i c men to the Communists.^  of f o l l o w i n g a naive p o l i c y favourable To the Government of I n d i a , however,  i t s p o l i c y looked as the best course f o r a v o i d i n g a p o s s i b l e war over Korea and other connected i s s u e s . As e a r l y as J u l y 12,  1950  the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r  took the i n i t i a t i v e t o seek a settlement of the dispute by p e a c e f u l m e a n s . I n i d e n t i c a l p e r s o n a l messages to U n i t e d States S e c r e t a r y of State Dean Acheson, and Marshal  Stalin,  Nehru d e c l a r e d : I n d i a ' s purpose i s to l o c a l i z e the c o n f l i c t and t o f a c i l i t a t e an e a r l y p e a c e f u l settlement by breaking the present deadlock i n the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , so t h a t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of the People's Government of China can take a seat i n the C o u n c i l , the Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republics can r e t u r n to i t , and whether w i t h i n or through i n f o r m a l contacts outside the C o u n c i l , the U n i t e d S t a t e s of America, the Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t R e p u b l i c s , and China, w i t h the help and cooperation of other peace-loving n a t i o n s , can f i n d a b a s i s f o r t e r m i n a t i n g the c o n f l i c t and f o r a permanent s o l u t i o n of the Korean problem. But Nehru's e n t e r p r i s e was not s u c c e s s f u l . While Marshal 13 S t a l i n welcomed Nehru's peaceable i n i t i a t i v e , Mr. Dean y  85 Acheson p o l i t e l y r e j e c t e d I n d i a ' s suggestion f o r s e a t i n g 14 Communist China at the U n i t e d N a t i o n s .  Thus nothing came  of i t save c o n s i d e r a b l e American annoyance at I n d i a f o r suggesting t h a t concessions be made to the Communist powers, -' x  This divergence of views between I n d i a and the U n i t e d S t a t e s was to cause considerable f u t u r e f r i c t i o n and mutual annoyance. I t was against t h i s background t h a t the question of the c r o s s i n g of the 38th p a r a l l e l by United Nations f o r c e s was faced by I n d i a .  As the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s , i n  September 1950* were r a c i n g towards the 38th p a r a l l e l f o l lowing the s u c c e s s f u l Inchon l a n d i n g s , Mr. Nehru p u b l i c l y s t a t e d t h a t they should not go beyond the 38th p a r a l l e l u n t i l a l l other means of settlement had been e x p l o r e d .  In  response t o a r e s o l u t i o n of the General Assembly on October 7» 1950  which, i n e f f e c t , sanctioned u n i f i c a t i o n of the country  by the f o r c e of the advancing U n i t e d Nations armies, I n d i a expressed her f e a r s t h a t the r e s u l t would be to prolong North Korean r e s i s t a n c e , and even t o extend the area of c o n f l i c t . At a press conference h e l d on October 18, Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d : We f e l t t h a t the time had come f o r an e f f o r t to be made f o r a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n . . . t o cross the 38th P a r a l l e l without making such an e f f o r t . . . a p p e a r e d to us to be wrong and t o i n v o l v e grave r i s k s of a c o n f l i c t on a much wider s c a l e . n Judging from the course of l a t e r events, i t would perhaps have  86  "been b e t t e r f o r world peace and a l l p a r t i e s concerned, i f the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s had h a l t e d and a s e r i o u s attempt at settlement had been made. on October 8 , 1950  But much to I n d i a ' s r e g r e t ,  the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s d i d cross the  3 8 t h p a r a l l e l against her strong o p p o s i t i o n and  this  c r o s s i n g c e r t a i n l y a l i e n a t e d D e l h i from Washington.  "I  Q  To the I n d i a n government t h i s c r o s s i n g and  the  subsequent r a p i d advance of the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s to the Y a l u r i v e r r a i s e d the v e r y r e a l spectre of a world war.  New  D e l h i was aware t h a t the Chinese government considered the U n i t e d Nations advance as a grave danger to t h e i r own 19 and would not t o l e r a t e i t .  When t h e i r advice was  security  dis-  regarded and Chinese Communist f o r c e s entered the war i n great force', I n d i a , r a t h e r than blame the Chinese f o r i n t e r vening, f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n p u t t i n g much of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the p r o l o n g a t i o n and e x t e n s i o n of the c o n f l i c t upon the p o l i c y of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , or more e s p e c i a l l y , of the United States.  Despite her grievance, however, the s e r i o u s -  ness of the war caused I n d i a t o continue occupying h e r s e l f w i t h the t a s k of b r i n g i n g about a settlement.  I n company  w i t h twelve other A s i a n c o u n t r i e s I n d i a , on December 5»  1950  appealed to the advancing North Koreans and Communist Chinese to d e c l a r e immediately t h a t i t was not t h e i r i n t e n t i o n t o c r o s s south of the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , s t a t i n g t h a t "such a d e c l a r a t i o n w i l l give time f o r c o n s i d e r i n g what f u r t h e r steps are necessary t o r e s o l v e the c o n f l i c t i n the Far East  and  87 20  thus help t o avert the danger o f another world war.  However, the o p p o s i t i o n o f the S o v i e t Union and Red China on the grounds t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n f o r a c e a s e - f i r e '  would give the U n i t e d Rations f o r c e s a b r e a t h i n g space  21  caused the appeal t o go f o r naught, although Assembly approval of the r e s o l u t i o n by 52 votes t o 5 w i t h one a b s t e n t i o n cons t i t u t e d a c e a s e - f i r e group of I n d i a , Canada and I r a n . Another of I n d i a ' s mediation e f f o r t s had f a i l e d , t h i s time through what looked l i k e Chinese i n t r a n s i g e n c e , and thus caused the I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r t o d e c l a r e t o the I n d i a n Parliament: As we expected, the p a s s i n g o f t h i s r e s o l u t i o n has, f o r the time being a t l e a s t , put an end t o any attempts a t n e g o t i a t i o n o r s e t t l e m e n t . We hope s t i l l t h a t i t may be p o s s i b l e f o r events t o take a b e t t e r t u r n i n f u t u r e , but I must confess t h a t a t the moment, t h a t hope has grown v e r y dim.22 But d e s p i t e the not too o p t i m i s t i c outlook of the I n d i a n government, i t d i d not cease i t s e f f o r t s towards promoting a settlement of the Korean d i s p u t e .  J u s t as i t  25  had v i g o r o u s l y opposed a v e i l e d U n i t e d S t a t e s t h r e a t t o use the atom bomb i n Korea made by P r e s i d e n t Truman a t a y  24-  press conference  on November 3 0 , 1950  on the grounds t h a t  a general c o n f l a g r a t i o n would r e s u l t , f o r s i m i l a r reasons I n d i a a l s o opposed a U n i t e d S t a t e s r e s o l u t i o n of January 3 0 , 1951  condemning Red China as an aggressor.  S i r Benegal Rau  88 set f o r t h h i s Government's reasons f o r v o t i n g against the American r e s o l u t i o n as f o l l o w s :  i t would prolong the  war  i n d e f i n i t e l y and p o s s i b l y even l e a d u l t i m a t e l y to g l o b a l war;  i t was not f a i r i n i t s condemnation as the i s s u e of  aggression was very complex; and i t d i d not h o l d any reason25 able prospect  of success.  y  However, the Indian o b j e c t i o n s  were r e j e c t e d by the General Assembly, and Red China  was  (f©c3]aai^| an aggressor.  "This proposal," Mr. Nehru s t a t e d ,  "cannot l e a d to peace.  I t can o n l y l e a d to i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n  r  of c o n f l i c t s and might perhaps c l o s e the door to any attempt 26 at a s o l u t i o n by n e g o t i a t i o n . " The war,  indeed, d i d proceed w i t h vigorous  actions  by both s i d e s i n mounting l a r g e o f f e n s i v e s , but i t soon became evident t h a t the war had entered a m i l i t a r y deadlock. Consequently truce t a l k s began i n J u l y 1951, but were prolonged because of the i n a b i l i t y  of the opposing s i d e s to  agree on c e r t a i n p o i n t s of c o n t e n t i o n , e s p e c i a l l y the 27  question  of the p o s t - a r m i s t i c e exchange of p r i s o n e r s of war.  Once  again I n d i a stepped i n t o propose a s o l u t i o n at the s e s s i o n of the General Assembly.  On November 17,  1952  1952,  the  Indian d e l e g a t i o n made p u b l i c the t e x t of a 17-point p l a n designed to break the deadlock over the r e p a t r i a t i o n of  war  28  p r i s o n e r s and end the Korean war.  Mr. K r i s h n a Menon  emphasized t h a t the proposals were a way t o a s o l u t i o n r a t h e r than a s o l u t i o n i t s e l f .  T h e i r aim was t o b u i l d a bridge 29 between what appeared to be c o n f l i c t i n g p o i n t s of view.  89 I submit these proposals w i t h confidence and earnestness, but a l s o w i t h h u m i l i t y . I submit t h a t they are a way to a s o l u t i o n . . . . We want the v o i c e of the United Nations to be heard not through guns or bombs but through the v o i c e of peace. A f t e r some m o d i f i c a t i o n s the I n d i a n r e s o l u t i o n was by the General Assembly on December 5, 1952  adopted  and was  finally  accepted by the Chinese f o u r months l a t e r on more or l e s s the l i n e s which I n d i a had  suggested.  I n r e c o g n i t i o n of the r o l e she was p l a y i n g , I n d i a was o f f e r e d , and accepted, the chairmanship of the N e u t r a l Nations R e p a t r i a t i o n Commission which was  subsequently  e s t a b l i s h e d to implement the agreement concluded between the two s i d e s .  The Commission, and the Indian c u s t o d i a l Force  which took'charge of the p r i s o n e r s of war, played a very important p a r t i n the concluding stages of the settlement  of  the i s s u e , d e s p i t e minor i r r i t a t i o n s caused by American o p p o s i t i o n t o the i n c l u s i o n of I n d i a i n the P o l i t i c a l 50 Conference on Korea, and s e r i o u s and u n r e s t r a i n e d a t t a c k s 51 on I n d i a by South Korean government leaders.-'  I n d i a had  f i l l e d a gap, according t o Mr. Nehru, which no other  country  c o u l d have f i l l e d and had thereby brought about the c e s s a t i o n 52 of h o s t i l i t i e s . I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e on the whole Korean question s i g n i f i c a n t i n many r e s p e c t s .  While a c c e p t i n g the  was  initial  S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l r e s o l u t i o n s concerning the a t t a c k on the  90  Republic of Korea and a s s i s t a n c e t o the l a t t e r , I n d i a at the same time emphasized the importance of s e t t l i n g the dispute by p e a c e f u l means.  F e a r i n g the d i s r u p t i v e e f f e c t s  of a major war i n v o l v i n g the Great Powers on the United Nations, I n d i a opposed the r e s o l u t i o n branding the new Government of China an aggressor.  I n d i a ' s predominant aim  was t o preserve and promote the broad-based and u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r o f the United Nations.  The Government of I n d i a  never l o s t s i g h t of t h i s aim when i t was f o r m u l a t i n g i t s p o l i c y towards United Nations a c t i o n s i n Korea.  The  d i f f e r e n c e i n approach between I n d i a and those s t a t e s which sent armed f o r c e s to Korea o f t e n r e s u l t e d i n severe c r i t i c i s m of India's p o l i c y .  But i t i s necessary t o p o i n t  out that the steps I n d i a took on the Korean i s s u e , and the statements t h a t were made by her spokesmen on the s i t u a t i o n were not based on any inherent o p p o s i t i o n t o the Western b l o c or pro-Communist a t t i t u d e s .  They were based on India's  views as t o how best a general war might be avoided.  In  33  r e t r o s p e c t , as Mr. Chester Bowles has observed,  y  India's  p o s i t i o n on the t w i s t e d course of debate on Korea i n the United Nations was not pro-Communist.  On the c r u c i a l votes  I n d i a found h e r s e l f v o t i n g w i t h the American delegates f a r more f r e q u e n t l y than against them.  The Korean c o n f l i c t  showed I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y as a c t i v e and r e s o u r c e f u l i n i t s attempts t o l e a d t o a p e a c e f u l settlement conflict.  Therein l i e s i t s success.  of a major  91  Another i s s u e i n which I n d i a p l a y e d a s i g n i f i c a n t mediatory r o l e i s t h a t of Indo-China.  I n the n e g o t i a t i o n s  which brought about an a r m i s t i c e between n o r t h and south i n 1954,  I n d i a ' s i n f l u e n c e was f e l t even though Nehru had not  been o f f i c i a l l y i n v i t e d t o the conference.  India's i n t e r e s t  i n the c o n f l i c t i n Indo-China had s t e a d i l y i n c r e a s e d i n the post-war y e a r s , and I n d i a n o p i n i o n was a t a l l times h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of French government attempts to r e i n s t a t e t h e i r a u t h o r i t y over Indo-China, and t o s p l i t the ranks of the nationalists.  But though most Indians had regarded Ho  Chi-Minh as a more s i n c e r e spokesman f o r n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s than Bao Dai, the I n d i a n government had recognized n e i t h e r and had adopted a p o s i t i o n of a l o o f n e s s towards, raging struggle.  the  But from e a r l y 1953 the French p o s i t i o n was  i n constant d e t e r i o r a t i o n as the f i g h t i n g i n t e n s i f i e d .  As  i t began t o become c l e a r t h a t the French f o r c e s could not by themselves h o l d Indo-China a g a i n s t the Communist V i e t Minh, the  danger i n c r e a s e d t h a t due t o o u t s i d e i n t e r v e n t i o n  (United S t a t e s and other Western n a t i o n s on the French side and Communist China on Ho Chih Minn's s i d e ) another conf l a g r a t i o n on a major scale might take p l a c e . That Great Power i n t e n v e n t i o n i n Indo-China was becoming l i k e l y was i m p l i e d by a speech S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e D u l l e s made before the U n i t e d Nations General Assembly on September 17,  1953:  92  There ( i n Indo-China) the f i g h t i n g continues. Communist f o r c e s are seeking to gain p o l i t i c a l power "bym i l i t a r y v i o l e n c e . . . . The p r e t e x t u n t i l now has been t h a t the A s s o c i a t e d States of Indo-China were mere c o l o n i e s and t h a t the Communist war was designed to promote independence' r a t h e r than to expand by v i o l e n c e the S o v i e t Camp. I t i s no longer p o s s i b l e to support such a p r e t e x t . ^ 1  F u r t h e r proof of the growing American concern w i t h the Indo-Chinese s i t u a t i o n was evidenced by a j o i n t United S t a t e s 36 French communique of September 3 0 , 1953  which announced  t h a t the U n i t e d S t a t e s Government had agreed t o provide the French Government, p r i o r to December 31» 1954, f i n a n c i a l resources not t o exceed $385 m i l l i o n .  with additional This a i d  was i n support of French plans f o r the i n t e n s i f i e d p r o s e c u t i o n of the war against the V i e t Minh.  With the opening of a  formidable Vietminh o f f e n s i v e i n Decmeber 1953,  the concern  f o r the f u t u r e of the French m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , and f e a r of Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n , became p a r t i c u l a r l y acute i n the United States.  On December 2 9 t h Mr. D u l l e s told, a press conference  t h a t i n the event of an i n v a s i o n of Indo-China, the American r e a c t i o n "would not n e c e s s a r i l y be confined to the p a r t i c u l a r t h e a t r e chosen by the communists f o r t h e i r o p e r a t i o n s . " January 12,  1954,  On  a f t e r p r o c l a i m i n g the d o c t r i n e of i n s t a n t  r e t a l i a t i o n , Mr. D u l l e s gave warning t h a t Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n would have "grave consequences which might not be 37 confined to Indo-China." '  93  I f these admonitions s t r u c k Anthony Eden as being o f f the mark, as i n h i s view Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n was not 38 imminent,  then the i n c r e a s i n g f e a r i n I n d i a caused by  the i m p l i c a t i o n s of D u l l e s ' remarks i s understandable.  The  I n d i a n government became a c u t e l y d e s i r o u s of s t o p p i n g the f i g h t i n g and r e a c h i n g some amicable s o l u t i o n w i t h the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Communist China.  Consequently Mr. Nehru,  on February 22, 1954, made an appeal f o r a c e a s e - f i r e i n Indo-China t o be f o l l o w e d by t a l k s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t . I t seems a tremendous p i t y t h a t t h i s war should continue without any s e r i o u s attempt being made t o f i n d a way o u t . . . I am sure the House w i l l j o i n me t o request the powers concerned to s t r i v e to have a c e a s e - f i r e there and they can d i s c u s s i t i n t h e i r own way  59  40 This was p a r t i c u l a r l y d e s i r a b l e i n Nehru's view  because i n  about two months the Geneva Conference was t o be h e l d between the  Great Powers ( i n c l u d i n g Communist China) f o r t a l k s on  Indo-China and Korea.  At the same time, however, the I n d i a n  government had no d e s i r e to i n t e r f e r e  or t o shoulder any  burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s c o n n e c t i o n . But as the s i t u a t i o n i n Indo-China ( i . e . at Dien B i e n Phu) continued t o d e t e r i o r a t e , the I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r f e l t the need t o again enunciate h i s concern.  I n the Lok  Sabha on A p r i l 24, 1954- ne asked t h a t the q u e s t i o n of a c e a s e - f i r e be g i v e n urgent p r i o r i t y at the Geneva Conference  94  and he put forward a s i x - p o i n t p l a n f o r ending the IndoChina war and appealed t o the Powers t o give i t t h e i r earnest 41 c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t Geneva.  Nehru urged t h a t a c l i m a t e o f  peace and n e g o t i a t i o n should be promoted; an immediate ceasef i r e should come i n t o e f f e c t ; the Conference should o b t a i n an unequivocal undertaking by the French Government t h a t Indo-China be given complete independence; d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s between the p a r t i e s immediately and p r i n c i p a l l y concerned should be i n i t i a t e d ; and a solemn n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n agreement should be concluded and guaranteed by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , B r i t a i n , the S o v i e t Union, and China.  "The Government of  I n d i a , " Nehru concluded, "make these p r o p o s a l s . . . i n the earnest hope t h a t they w i l l engage the a t t e n t i o n of the conference and of the p a r t i e s concerned.... The a l t e r n a t i v e i s grim...peace cannot e x i s t i n an e x a s p e r a t i n g and c o s t l y r e l a t i o n s h i p of mutual t e r r o r . " While i t i s d i f f i c u l t t o a s c e r t a i n the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of I n d i a n pronouncements on the Indo-Chinese i s s u e on the Powers assembled a t Geneva, aside from the 42 apparent importance Mr. Eden a t t r i b u t e s t o them,  the  Conference d i d b r i n g a r e a l i z a t i o n o f I n d i a ' s p o l i c y r e g a r d i n g Indo-China.  I t ended a b i t t e r s t r u g g l e which i n i t s l a t e r  stages had taken on ominous p o s s i b i l i t i e s and i t brought about a n e g o t i a t e d settlement i n which French power and i n f l u e n c e were l a r g e l y removed from the scene. Thus the 43 Geneva settlement ^ was e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y welcomed by I n d i a .  95 Messages of c o n g r a t u l a t i o n on the s u c c e s s f u l outcome of the Geneva Conference were sent by Mr. Nehru on J u l y 21 to Mr. Eden, M. Mendes - France, M. Molotov, and Mr. Chou En-lai.  He welcomed the settlement as "one of the out44  standing achievements of the post-war e r a , " same time f e l t i t was  but at the  only a step t h a t had to be f o l l o w e d  by p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t s at f u r t h e r settlements t o assure peace f o r the f u t u r e . Thus the Indian government, w h i l e basing i t s p o l i c y on the agreements reached at Geneva, has devoted i t s e f f o r t s to keeping them i n e f f e c t on the assumption t h a t t h i s approach o f f e r s the best p o s s i b i l i t y of p r e s e r v i n g peace or at l e a s t p r e v e n t i n g the outbreak of renewed h o s t i l i t i e s . She has borne the heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of c h a i r i n g the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commissions f o r S u p e r v i s i o n and C o n t r o l f o r V i e t Nam,  Laos and Cambodia.  And whatever c r i t i c i s m s may  be  made of the work of the Commission, and there have been many, i t has n e v e r t h e l e s s helped keep the Indo-Chinese danger spot i n r e l a t i v e t r a n q u i l l i t y and thereby has promoted peace i n that q u a r t e r . I n the controversy over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa, I n d i a has a l s o played her p a r t of mediator i n the c o l d war with p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s .  Ever s i n c e the N a t i o n a l i s t s were  d r i v e n from the mainland, Peking has c o n s t a n t l y r e i t e r a t e d i t s s o v e r e i g n t y over the- three i s l a n d s , a c l a i m which i s e m p h a t i c a l l y r e j e c t e d by the N a t i o n a l i s t regime on Formosa.  96 From a l e g a l i s t i c s t a n d p o i n t , the h i s t o r y of Formosa, i n p a r t i c u l a r , makes p o s s i b l e c l a i m s by both the Communist and N a t i o n a l i s t governments.  The C a i r o and Potsdam conferences  both agreed t h a t Formosa was t o be r e t u r n e d t o the Republic of China i . e . Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government, f o r there i s no evidence t o assume t h a t even the S o v i e t Union foresaw the Communists assuming c o n t r o l o f China so soon a f t e r the defeat o f Japan.  But by the time of the Japanese  Peace Treaty the N a t i o n a l i s t s had been d r i v e n t o refuge on the i s l a n d and consequently the Treaty made no p r o v i s i o n s for i t s disposition.  As such the N a t i o n a l i s t government has  d i s p u t e d the c h a l l e n g e s t o i t s s o v e r e i g n t y over Formosa and the o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s made by Peking which c l a i m s the i s l a n d s belong t o i t as the successor government o f China. The value o f Formosa t o both sides i s unmistakably clear.  As the seat of the N a t i o n a l i s t government i t i s the  o n l y centre w i t h which non-Communist o r anti-Communist Chinese l i v i n g both on o r without the mainland can i d e n t i f y themselves.  But i t i s a l s o f o r t h a t reason important  s y m b o l i c a l l y and p r a c t i c a l l y t o the Communist Peking government, and h e r e i n l i e s the t h r e a t t o peace which has caused continuing anxiety i n India.  Peking has r e p e a t e d l y d e c l a r e d  i t s i n t e n t i o n of l i b e r a t i n g Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu while the N a t i o n a l i s t s , backed by e x t e n s i v e American a i d and s h i e l d e d by the U n i t e d S t a t e s Seventh F l e e t , has made every p r e p a r a t i o n t o prevent such a s e i z u r e .  97  The p o l i c y of the I n d i a n government towards t h i s i s s u e has been d i r e c t e d to. p r e v e n t i n g an outbreak o f h o s t i l i t i e s on a s c a l e which would cause American i n t e r v e n t i o n i n f o r c e i n support of Chiang Kai-shek.  I n d i a does  not recognize the Kuomintang regime on Formosa and would, indeed, probably not be too averse t o seeing i t s d o w n f a l l . S i m i l a r l y , I n d i a f e e l s t h a t the o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s of Quemoy 4-5 and Matsu r i g h t f u l l y belong t o the Peking government.  y  I n a statement t o the Lok Sabha d u r i n g the c r i s i s i n 1955 i n the Formosa s t r a i t s , Nehru made c l e a r h i s Government's support of Peking's c l a i m s : There i s h a r d l y a country which does n o t recognize t h a t the o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s , n o t a b l y Quemoy and Matsu, are o b v i o u s l y and d e f i n i t e l y p a r t s of China.... They are a few m i l e s — f i v e m i l e s o r ten m i l e s — beyond the shore. And no country can t o l e r a t e an enemy s i t t i n g ten m i l e s from t h e i r shore, bombarding them a l l the time. I t i s an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n . Therefore, i t i s almost g e n e r a l l y recognized t h a t these i s l a n d s should immediately be evacuated and taken possession o f by the Government of the mainland. However, Nehru i s aware of the American a t t i t u d e on the i s s u e and, while m a i n t a i n i n g h i s support o f Peking's c l a i m s , he has c o u n s e l l e d both Chinese regimes a g a i n s t breaking the peace over the i s s u e of ownership of Formosa and the o f f s h o r e islands.  I n the c r i s i s over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa i n  March and A p r i l , 1955, Nehru's correspondence both w i t h Eisenhower and w i t h Chou E n - l a i , which w i l l someday be p u b l i s h e d , played a s i g n i f i c a n t p a r t i n a v e r t i n g s e r i o u s  98 47 dangers. '  I t i s t o be expected t h a t the Indian government,  i n l i n e w i t h t h e i r general concept of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , of the c o m p l e x i t i e s of the Formosa s t r a i t s c o n t r o v e r s y , and of I n d i a ' s proper r o l e w i l l i n the f u t u r e , as i n the p a s t , t r y t o b r i n g the opposing p a r t i e s c l o s e r together and thereby ease the t h r e a t t o peace inherent i n the Formosa s t r a i t s i s s u e . . The p o l i c y f o l l o w e d by the Government of I n d i a w i t h r e s p e c t s to the c r i s e s over Suez and Hungary, however, i s probably the best i l l u s t r a t i o n of t h a t Government's d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o preserve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace a t almost any p r i c e .  Indeed the I n d i a n r e a c t i o n was t r u l y  remarkable.  Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d i n a speech t h a t whereas i n Egypt "every s i n g l e t h i n g t h a t had happened was as c l e a r as d a y l i g h t , " he 48 c o u l d not f o l l o w "the very c o n f u s i n g s i t u a t i o n " i n Hungary. He then proceeded t o read out the excuses which Marshal Bulganin had sent him f o r the Russian i n t e r v e n t i o n . These Mr. Nehru d e s c r i b e d as ' f a c t s ' .  He d i s p l a y e d the same  readiness t o accept Russia's e x p l a n a t i o n as he d i d t o r e j e c t those made by B r i t a i n and France. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to e x p l a i n the a t t i t u d e s expressed by the I n d i a n government i n a manner which would make the Government's stand j u s t i f i a b l e i n the circumstances.  For  the double standard which the I n d i a n l e a d e r s a p p l i e d t o both i s s u e s c e r t a i n l y j u s t i f i e d c r i t i c s i n the West who c r i t i c i z e d Nehru f o r having one scale of v a l u e s f o r the West and another  99 f o r the S o v i e t Union (which might be true i n t h a t v i o l e n c e i s more t o be expected from a regime which reposes upon i t ) . I f the use of f o r c e was wrong i n Egypt, where a t l e a s t there 49 was some s o r t of case f o r i t ,  ' i t was doubly wrong i n  Hungary, t h i s i s what many Westerners s a i d , and w i t h reason. Even i n I n d i a Nehru's p o l i c y i n the c r i s e s evoked loud and harsh condemnations.  F o r though popular  opinion  i n I n d i a was favourable t o Egypt i n every step of the c r i s i s over the c a n a l , i t was a l s o s t r o n g l y favourable t o the Hungarian n a t i o n a l i s t s who had r i s e n a g a i n s t S o v i e t r u l e . Nehru, w i t h no ambassador i n Budapest and no independent 50 sources o f information,-'  d i d not express h i s n a t u r a l  abhorrence of v i o l e n c e q u i c k l y enough t o s u i t h i s own p u b l i c o p i n i o n or t h a t of the West.  On one occasion i n the United  Nations Mr. K r i s h n a Menon a c t u a l l y voted w i t h the Soviet Union, on a Hungarian r e s o l u t i o n to h o l d e l e c t i o n s i n Hungary under United Nations auspices, because he could "not subscribe t o any phraseology or proposals before the Assembly which d i s r e g a r d the s o v e r e i g n t y o f States r e p r e 51 sented h e r e . "  x  Such t h i n g s as t h i s , and the c u r i o u s ,  unavowed connection between the events i n Egypt and Hungary, subjected Nehru t o more than the u s u a l sharp t a l k i n the West and i n intense c r i t i c i s m a t home.  A l l e g a t i o n s t h a t the  Government of I n d i a was pursuing a double standard i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , according t o whether aggression took place i n the East o r the West, were combined w i t h demands f o r the  100 r e c a l l of Mr. K r i s h n a Menon.  C r i t i c s of the Government  took p a r t i c u l a r exception to the f a c t t h a t I n d i a , alone of the non-Communist c o u n t r i e s , had voted w i t h the S o v i e t b l o c i n the U n i t e d Nations opposing f r e e e l e c t i o n s i n Hungary under U n i t e d Nations s u p e r v i s i o n . The Hindustan Times c r i t i c i z e d the Government's maladroit h a n d l i n g of the Hungarian s i t u a t i o n and i t s "curious r e l u c t a n c e , amounting almost to embarrassment" i n i t s o f f i c i a l r e a c t i o n s t o the S o v i e t behaviour;  the Statesman  c a l l e d f o r an e x p l a n a t i o n of I n d i a ' s "odd" vote at the United N a t i o n s ; w h i l e the Times of I n d i a condemned the Government's o v e r - c a u t i o u s , almost a p o l o g e t i c r e a c t i o n to S o v i e t 52 imperialism.  Mr. Narayan, the l e a d e r of the P r a j a  S o c i a l i s t P a r t y , demanded the removal of K r i s h n a Menon from the p o l i t i c a l scene and a t t a c k e d both he and Nehru f o r " j e o p a r d i z i n g I n d i a ' s moral s t a t u r e i n the world by a p p l y i n g double standards to aggression according to who and where."  commits i t  Mr. Frank Moraes, well-known Indian p u b l i c i s t ,  i n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n a f t e r h i s r e t u r n from U n i t e d Headquarters i n New  Nations  York, s a i d t h a t Mr. K r i s h n a Menon had  done nothing to enhance I n d i a ' s r e p u t a t i o n at the United N a t i o n s , and suggested t h a t h i s t a l e n t s "might more p r o f i t a b l y be u t i l i z e d elsewhere than i n the United S t a t e s , where temperatures r i s e and tempers b r i s t l e at the mere mention 53 of h i s name/  101 In r e p l y i n g t o h i s c r i t i c s , the I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r j u s t i f i e d h i s Government's a c t i o n s on both i s s u e s on both l e g a l i s t i c and p r a c t i c a l grounds.  He j u s t i f i e d  I n d i a ' s vote i n the U n i t e d Nations on the Hungarian r e s o l u t i o n on the grounds t h a t the Indian government was opposed not t o the e n t i r e r e s o l u t i o n but o n l y t o a clause recommending United Nations s u p e r v i s i o n of Hungarian elections.  He asked h i s c r i t i c s t o "see the context i n which  i t was moved and the o b j e c t i v e behind i t — because u n f o r t u n a t e l y these i n c i d e n t s t h a t have a r i s e n i n Egypt and Hungary have both been an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the c o l d war.... The Hungarian question became a pawn on the chess board o f international p o l i t i c s .  S i m i l a r l y others were t h i n k i n g of 54  the E g y p t i a n question as a pawn on the chessboard."^  As  such Nehru j u s t i f i e d h i s Government's a t t i t u d e towards the two i s s u e s as a b s o l u t e l y c o r r e c t . 55 According t o Vincent Sheean, ' Nehru was convinced t h a t R u s s i a viewed the Anglo-Prench e x p e d i t i o n to Suez as the c a l c u l a t e d prelude t o world war. Moscow found i t impossible t o b e l i e v e t h a t the e n t e r p r i s e had been undertaken without American support and a p p r o v a l , and as Nehru s a w . i t , such an attempt t o r e c l a i m the ramparts of the p a s t , i f i t had been supported by the U n i t e d S t a t e s , would indeed have brought a general catastrophe.  As the primary purpose of  Indian p o l i c y , aside from s e l f - p r e s e r v a t i o n or as a p a r t of i t , i s t o avoid t h a t catastrophe, the I n d i a n government  102 condemned the Suez a c t i o n w i t h the b i t t e r n e s s i t d i d . S i m i l a r l y , i n the I n d i a n government's view, Russia's  bloody  suppression of the Hungarian popular u p r i s i n g was an automatic r e a c t i o n t o what was  considered a s e r i o u s t h r e a t to  the f u t u r e s e c u r i t y of the S o v i e t Union.  Nehru deplored i t  as much as anybody c o u l d hut he r e l a t e d i t to the war menace the Russians were p r o t e c t i n g t h e i r f l a n k .  He must have had  some good reasons f o r t h i n k i n g so, a r i s i n g from h i s p r i v a t e correspondence.  There was one l o n g l e t t e r from Bulganin,  f o r example, at j u s t t h a t time, which set f o r t h the Kremlin' p o i n t of view.  Consequently Nehru's o v e r r i d i n g concern f o r  world peace undoubtedly caused him to view Suez as the immediate danger of war and Hungary as the deplorable  but  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c S o v i e t response t o a t h r e a t t o her s e c u r i t y . The a t t i t u d e adopted by the Indian government —  that i s ,  u n r e s t r a i n e d condemnation of the B r i t i s h and French at Suez, and apparent r e l u c t a n c e to condemn S o v i e t a c t i o n i n Hungary r e f l e c t e d New  D e l h i ' s concern to preserve peace at any p r i c e  Indeed, i f I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e i s viewed o b j e c t i v e l y , there i s c e r t a i n merit i n the b a s i c r e a l i s m of her approach even though the manner of i t s e x p r e s s i o n l e f t much to be desired.  By adamantly condemning the Suez adventure and  thereby a l i g n i n g h e r s e l f on Egypt's side i n the d i s p u t e , I n d i a prevented S o v i e t R u s s i a from c a p i t a l i z i n g on the i s s u e to present h e r s e l f as the s o l e A s i a n champion of Arab n a t i o n a l i s m and thereby g a i n a d i p l o m a t i c v i c t o r y w i t h  103  i n c a l c u l a b l e consequences f o r the West i n such a s t r a g e g i c region.  By such an a t t i t u d e and through demanding w i t h -  drawal of the Anglo-French f o r c e s , I n d i a sought to prevent the Middle-East  from e n t e r i n g i n t o a prolonged p e r i o d of  t e n s i o n t h a t could w e l l break out i n t o a general c o n f l a g ration.  The nature of the i n c i d e n t and the democratic  c h a r a c t e r of the two Western powers i n v o l v e d were probably viewed by New  D e l h i as r e n d e r i n g them amenable t o c r i t i c i s m  and d i p l o m a t i c pressure without provoking more s e r i o u s r e a c t i o n s d e t r i m e n t a l to world peace. Such was not the case, however, w i t h respect to the S o v i e t a c t i o n s i n Hungary.  There the a c t i o n s of the  Russians were o b v i o u s l y not pursued without due  consideration  to the e f f e c t s such a c t i o n would have on S o v i e t p r e s t i g e throughout the world.  Indeed, i n view of the common view  being expressed i n the West at the time of the Hungarian u p r i s i n g t h a t i t was the beginning of the end f o r the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n i n E a s t e r n Europe, the S o v i e t suppression of the u p r i s i n g i s understandable.  For Moscow to have withdrawn  from Hungary under such c o n d i t i o n s would have i n i t i a t e d s i m i l a r occurrences throughout the S o v i e t s a t e l l i t e s w i t h s e r i o u s consequences f o r the S o v i e t p o s i t i o n —  a position  R u s s i a had given some 20 m i l l i o n l i v e s to secure.  That the  Kremlin chose not to r e t r e a t was undoubtedly i n t e r p r e t e d , c o r r e c t l y so, by Nehru to i n d i c a t e the uselessness purposely b r i n g i n g pressure to bear upon t h a t  of  country.  104 Nehru probably f e l t t h a t such c r i t i c i s m , i f taken too f a r , might provoke more s e r i o u s S o v i e t r e a c t i o n s and might even l e a d to a world war.  Thus the I n d i a n government opposed  censure of the S o v i e t a c t i o n s , and demands f o r t h e i r w i t h drawal from Hungary, at the U n i t e d Nations on the c o r r e c t premise t h a t such a c t i o n c o u l d do no good but,to the c o n t r a r y , might do i n c a l c u l a b l e harm.  Nehru could see no use i n  p r o v o c a t i v e t a l k where no t a n g i b l e r e s u l t s c o u l d be expected. The I n d i a n government pursued a p o l i c y t h a t , though i t appeared two-faced and immoral t o most observers, was,  i n the  view of t h a t Government, c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e i r promotion of peace through c o n s i d e r i n g each case s t r i c t l y on i t s m e r i t s . I n consonance w i t h her p o l i c y of non-alignment, then, I n d i a has maintained  a s p i r i t of o b j e c t i v i t y i n d e a l i n g  w i t h i n t e r n a t i o n a l i s s u e s , examining and judging each i s s u e , as i t a r i s e s , on i t s i n t r i n s i c merit and expressing views openly and f r e e l y without f e a r or favour.  her  The f a c t  t h a t her a t t i t u d e on a p a r t i c u l a r i s s u e pleases t h i s power or d i s p l e a s e s t h a t does not weigh w i t h I n d i a i n a r r i v i n g at a d e c i s i o n and standing by i t .  Thus, throughout the Korean  war the Indian government d i r e c t e d i t s e f f o r t s t o ending the c o n f l i c t .  I n d i a apprehended t h a t the c r o s s i n g of the  3 8 t h P a r a l l e l by the U n i t e d Nations f o r c e s would widen the area of c o n f l i c t and thus she opposed such a c t i o n being taken.  For the same reason Indian opposed the United  R e s o l u t i o n of February 1,  1951,  branding the People's  Nations  105  R e p u b l i c of China as an aggressor i n Korea on the grounds t h a t the r e s o l u t i o n would p r o l o n g h o s t i l i t i e s and might extend the area of c o n f l i c t .  I n d i a ' s p r o p o s a l s on the  r e p a t r i a t i o n of p r i s o n e r s broke the deadlock i n the t r u c e t a l k s , and I n d i a n t r o o p s s u p e r v i s e d the e x e c u t i o n of the armistice.  I n the n e g o t i a t i o n s which brought about an  a r m i s t i c e between n o r t h and south i n Indo-China (1954), I n d i a ' s i n f l u e n c e was f e l t even though Nehru had not been o f f i c i a l l y i n v i t e d t o the conference.  I n the c r i s i s over  Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa i n March and A p r i l , 1955» Nehru's correspondence both w i t h Eisenhower and w i t h Chou E n - l a i undoubtedly p l a y e d not a minor p a r t i n a v e r t i n g s e r i o u s dangers.  And i n the Hungarian and Suez c r i s e s , the aim of  the I n d i a n government was t o prevent the i s s u e s from causing g r e a t e r c o n f l i c t s , even though t h i s meant h a r s h c r i t i c i s m of France and B r i t a i n and an embarrassing r e l u c t a n c e t o c h a s t i z e the S o v i e t Union.  The I n d i a n government has been determined  t o preserve the peace even though her e f f o r t s i n so doing are not always a p p r e c i a t e d . Through an independent  approach  to each i s s u e , I n d i a has s t r i v e n t o c o n c i l i a t e the opposing p o i n t s of view and to thereby prevent the world from r u s h i n g headlong i n t o a c o n f l i c t , the o n l y r e s u l t of which would not o n l y be d e s t r u c t i o n of the combatants, but of c i v i l i z a t i o n itself.  Footnote's - Chapter V  1 Nehru's Speeches 194-9-1955, p.  125.  2 M i c h a e l Brecher, Nehru: A P o l i t i c a l Biography Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1 9 5 9 ) , p. 559.  (Toronto,  5 I n d i a was one of the members on the U n i t e d Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) which r e p o r t e d on June 2 5 , 1950 t h a t aggression had taken p l a c e . U.N. Doc. S/1946, June 2 5 , 1950.  4- S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n , S / l 5 0 1 , June 25, 5 I b i d . , S/1511, June 27,  1950.  1950.  6 U.N. Doc. S/1520, June 2 9 , 194-9-1950, pp. 635-636.  1950.  Text Doc.  I. Aff.  7 S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l , O f f i c i a l Records, 5 t h Y r . , No. 17, 475th Mtg., 30 June 1950, pp. 2 - 5 . The I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r c l a r i f i e d the I n d i a n p o s i t i o n at a press conference i n New D e l h i ' o n J u l y 7, 1950: " I n d i a supported the r e s o l u t i o n s of the S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l because they l o g i c a l l y f o l l o w e d the context of events and the U. N. C h a r t e r , and because t h a t seemed the only course to avoid the e x t e n s i o n of c o n f l i c t and l a r g e - s c a l e warfare. In doing so I n d i a ' s primary c o n s i d e r a t i o n was to serve the cause of peace." Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , J u l y 15-22, 1950, p. 10847. 8 L e v i , Free I n d i a i n A s i a , pp. 90-92. Mr. L e v i d e s c r i b e s these'as annoyance t h a t the U. N. acted so promptly on Korea while i t had r e f u s e d to act on I n d i a ' s p r o t e s t against P a k i s t a n i aggression i n Kashmir; d i s g u s t w i t h the world s i t u a t i o n c r e a t e d by the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., resentment at Western use of f o r c e a g a i n s t an A s i a n people; Indian r e l u c t a n c e to f i g h t a f e l l o w A s i a n n a t i o n . 9 S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l R e s o l u t i o n , S/1588, J u l y 7, 1950. I n d i a ' s reasoning, as e x p l a i n e d by C. A. R a j a g o p a l a c h a r i -that " I f country a f t e r country rushes t o Korea, a world c o n f l a g r a t i o n w i l l s u r e l y f o l l o w . " C i t e d i n Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 8 9 . 10 Senator Knowland's Address, November 1953 NATO. Doc. Amer. For. R e l . 1953, pp. 129-130.  was  on a P a c i f i c  11 Mr. Nehru has d e s c r i b e d these notes as "not an attempt at mediation, f o r we have never thought i n those terms. I made the appeal i n the vague hope t h a t , perhaps, i t might r e s u l t i n something p o s i t i v e . " Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953% p. 168. i  12 U n i t e d States D.S.B., v o l . X X I I I , No. 578 (31 J u l y 1 9 5 0 ) , p. 1 7 0 . 13 Doc. I . A f f . 194-9-1950* p. 7 0 7 . 14  Ibid.  15 U n i t e d States i n World A f f a i r s . 1950, p. 2 2 7 . 16 C i t e d i n Kundra, I n d i a n F o r e i g n P o l i c y 1947-1954. p. 1 3 3 . 17 I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , A Summary of Recent Statements by the Prime M i n i s t e r of I n d i a , E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , A p r i l 1951, p. 1 2 2 . 18 S. I . A f f . 1949-1950, p. 514. 19 Nehru s t a t e d t h i s i n the I n d i a n Parliament on December 6 , 1 9 5 0 . Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 169-170. 20 The New York Times, December 6 , 1 9 5 0 . 21 Year Book of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 1950, p. 248. 22 E x t e r n a l A f f a i r s , p. 1 2 2 . 23 S. I . A f f . 1949-1950, p. 3 5 3 . I n New D e l h i , Nehru, speaking t o the I n d i a n Parliament on December 6 , 1950, made an earnest appeal t o the "Great Powers" t o make every endeavour t o f i n d a p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n t o the present c r i s i s , because the consewuences o f t h e i r f a i l u r e t o do so are too t e r r i b l e t o contemplate. E x p r e s s i n g abhorrence of the atomic bomb, he d e c l a r e d : " I f the f o r c e of circumstances compels the world t o use the bomb, i t w i l l mean t h a t the world has surrendered t o e v i l . I e a r n e s t l y hope there w i l l be no q u e s t i o n , now o r h e r e a f t e r , o f the use o f the atomic bomb." Speeches 1949-1955, pp. 106-173. 24 The New York Times, December 1, 1 9 5 0 . 25 Keesing's p. 11246.  Contemporary A r c h i v e s , February 3 - 1 0 , 1951,  26 I b i d . , p. 11248. 27 The U n i t e d Nations Command r e f u s e d t o r e p a t r i a t e a n t i Communist North Korean and Chinese p r i s o n e r s who d i d n o t wish t o r e t u r n t o t h e i r Communist-ruled c o u n t r i e s . 28 Text i n Doc. I . A f f . 1952, pp. 446-449. 29 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , January 31 - February  1953,  P. 12720.  ii  7,  30 Robert Trumbull s a i d i n a despatch: "Washington's o p p o s i t i o n t o the i n c l u s i o n of I n d i a i n the Korean conference brought Indo-American r e l a t i o n s t o a low p o i n t , i f n o t the lowest i n recent y e a r s . " The New York Times, September 27, 1953. 31 Dr. Pyun, a member of the South Korean- government, on August 24-, used the s t r o n g e s t language a g a i n s t I n d i a , saying t h a t South Korea d i d not want "a scheming and b e t r a y i n g I n d i a on our s i d e , " and accused I n d i a of " t r a f f i c k i n g w i t h the Communists." The New York Times, August 30, 1953* 32 Mr. Nehru i n the Lok Sabha, December 24, Speeches 1953-1957, p. 244. 33 Bowles, op. c i t . , p.  1953.  243.  34 J . L e y s e r , "Aspects of I n d i a ' s F o r e i g n P o l i c y , " A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, v o l . V, 1 (March 1951). 35 Doc. Amer. For. R e l . 1953,  p. 38.  36 I b i d . , pp. 3 5 0 - 3 5 1 . 37 C i t e d i n S i r Anthony Eden, F u l l C i r c l e (Toronto, C a s s e l l ,  I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 8 6 - 8 7 .  38 I b i d . , p. 87. 39 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 245-246. 40 Such was not the view of S i r Anthony. I n h i s Memoirs, pp. 9 0 - 9 1 , be w r i t e s t h a t he "was not v e r y happy" about the Nehru p r o p o s a l , as a c e a s e - f i r e without p o l i t i c a l backing of r e a l a u t h o r i t y would leave the peoples of the A s s o c i a t e d S t a t e s a t the mercy of the Vietminh. 41 Text i n Doc. I . A f f . 1954,  pp. 123-124.  42 Mr. Eden, p r i o r t o the Conference, d e c l a r e s t h a t : "In measuring our chances of success at Geneva, I f e l t s t r o n g l y t h a t the outcome would depend t o a c o n s i d e r a b l e extent upon the p o s i t i o n taken up by I n d i a . . . i t was e s s e n t i a l not t o a l i e n a t e I n d i a by our a c t i o n s i n a p a r t of the world which concerned her c l o s e l y . " F u l l C i r c l e , p. 9 4 . 43 Agreement was reached i n Geneva on J u l y 2 0 , Text i n New York Times, J u l y 2 1 , 1954. 44 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , J u l y 24-31,  p. 13694.  iii  1954. 1954,  45 Even S i r Anthony Eden has commented t h a t the presence of Chiang's f o r c e s on the o f f - s h o r e i s l a n d s " c o n s t i t u t e d a constant grievance w i t h which most of world o p i n i o n would sympathize." F u l l C i r c l e , p. 309. 46 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , March 26 - A p r i l 2, 1955* p. 14118. 47 Vincent Sheean, Nehru: The Years of Power (New York, Random House, I 9 6 0 ) , p. 153. 48 C i t e d i n Eden, op. c i t . , p. 545* 49 For a g e n e r a l l y sound defence of the Anglo-French a c t i o n s at Suez, see I b i d . , pp. 454-584. 50 I n a speech i n the Lok Sabha on November 19, 1956, Mr. Nehru emphasized t h i s aspect of h i s Government not p o s s e s s i n g the broad c l e a r f a c t s . He admitted r e c e i v i n g f a i r l y f u l l accounts from I n d i a n Embassies and M i s s i o n s abroad and from other Governments, but d e c l a r e d t h a t t h i s "has r e s u l t e d i n an abundance which i s o f t e n c o n t r a d i c t o r y . . . /and.7 gives a v e r y confused p i c t u r e . " Nehru' s Spe e che s 1955-1957, p. 323. 51 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , November 24 December 1, 1956, p. 15223. 52 I b i d . , January 5-12, 1957,  p. 15308.  53 I b i d . 54 I b i d . , p. 15309. 55 Sheean, op. c i t . , pp. 160-162.  iv  CHAPTER VI INDIA AND THE POLICY OP PANCH SHILA  ...peace can only come i f we endeavour t o e s t a b l i s h a c l i m a t e of peace. I t i s not by condemnation or mutual r e c r i m i n a t i o n t h a t we s h a l l achieve t h i s g o a l . We must f o r g e t past c o n f l i c t s and past grievances and decide t o make a new approach t o each other i n a s p i r i t of t o l e r a n c e and f o r bearance w i t h c h a r i t y towards a l l and malice towards none....-^  When I n d i a became independent i n a world which was r a p i d l y p o l a r i z i n g i n t o two r i v a l b l o c s of n a t i o n s ,  p her major aims, as enjoined i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n , were t o promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y by s t r i v i n g t o prevent any outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s among the major powers. A c u t e l y conscious of I n d i a ' s slender i n d u s t r i a l base and p o v e r t y - s t r i c k e n masses, the Indian government f e l t t h a t i t could best c o n t r i b u t e t o the f u l f i l l m e n t of i t s f o r e i g n aims by s t e a d i l y p r e s s i n g n o n - v i o l e n t and c o n c i l i a t o r y proposals aimed at b r i d g i n g the chasm between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. became I n d i a ' s p o l i c y :  Thus the way o f the Panch S h i l a  f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of s t a t e conduct  which Mr. Nehru b e l i e v e d "would go a l o n g way t o put an end t o the f e a r s and apprehensions which cast dark shadows 106  107  over the world," i f accepted and acted upon by a l l c o u n t r i e s of the world.-' The p o l i c y o f p e a c e f u l coexistence was g e n e r a l l y motivated by the communist v i c t o r y i n China i n l a t e 194-9 which f o r the f i r s t time p r o v i d e d a s t r o n g c e n t r a l base i n A s i a f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l Communism.  As I n d i a shared e x t e n s i v e  borders w i t h China, h e r a n x i e t y t o prevent China from h e l p i n g communist p a r t i e s i n South-East A s i a and South A s i a l e d t o the gradual emergence o f h e r p o l i c y o f coexistence which began t o take concrete shape i n 1953•  The i n i t i a l  mention and promulgation o f t h i s p o l i c y , however, came as the aftermath of S i n o - I n d i a n d i f f e r e n c e s over T i b e t .  The  Chinese Communist i n v a s i o n of T i b e t i n October - November 1950 presented I n d i a w i t h a c r i s i s i n h e r immediate area and a t h r e a t o f some magnitude t o the continuance of h e r p o l i c y of peace.  I n I n d i a , T i b e t was t r a d i t i o n a l l y considered a  b u f f e r s t a t e guaranteeing the s e c u r i t y of I n d i a and f a c i l i t a t i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and China along a mountainous, u n f o r t i f i e d , and l o o s e l y watched border o f some 1800 m i l e s .  To many I n d i a n s , China's behaviour i n  T i b e t was t h e r e f o r e a t e s t o f the s i n c e r i t y of h e r o f t repeated assurances of f r i e n d s h i p f o r I n d i a .  The Government  of I n d i a at no time c h a l l e n g e d o r denied the s u z e r a i n t y of China over T i b e t , but i t was always anxious t h a t T i b e t should m a i n t a i n the autonomy i t had enjoyed d u r i n g the 4.  present century.  The Chinese  ' l i b e r a t i o n ' of T i b e t i n the  108 f a l l of 1950 thus came as a great shock t o the I n d i a n government and people. The I n d i a n a t t i t u d e towards the Chinese a c t i o n c r y s t a l l i z e d quickly.  Those Indians who had been s t r o n g l y  anti-Communist, l i k e M. R. M a s a n i  5  and the S o c i a l i s t s ,  considered the Chinese a c t i o n as f u r t h e r proof of t h e i r worst f e a r s .  They expressed the hope t h a t many Indians  would f o r g e t t h e i r w i s h f u l t h i n k i n g and l o s e t h e i r i l l u s i o n s about the nature of Chinese Communism.  6  Those  newspapers  and s e c t i o n s o f the p u b l i c which had h i t h e r t o been f r i e n d l y t o China, though not n e c e s s a r i l y t o communism, s u f f e r e d a c o n s i d e r a b l e shock.  There were second thoughts about the  a d v i s a b i l i t y of I n d i a championing the admittance of Red China i n t o the U n i t e d Nations O r g a n i z a t i o n .  The r e a c t i o n i n  I n d i a provoked the F o r e i g n P o l i c y B u l l e t i n (New York) t o declare: Whatever the motive t h a t i n s p i r e d the Chinese Communists, t h e r e can be no doubt that t h i s step w i l l f u r t h e r the expansion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism and may w e l l d e l a y P e i p i n g ' s admission t o the U. N. p a r t i c u l a r l y because of p o s s i b l e changes i n I n d i a ' s f o r e i g n policy. 7  That the I n d i a n government was extremely concerned was apparent from the sharp p r o t e s t s sent t o P e k i n g . F o r example, on October 26th, the I n d i a n government expressed " s u r p r i s e and r e g r e t " at the Chinese a c t i o n s , and a t the f a c t t h a t the Chinese government should have sought a s o l u t i o n  109  of her problems w i t h T i b e t by f o r c e i n s t e a d of by the slower and more enduring methods of p e a c e f u l approach.  8  The Chinese r e p l y of October 30th, however, was a complete r e b u f f to the Indian p r o t e s t and a s s e r t e d t h a t "the problem of T i b e t i s e n t i r e l y a domestic problem of China" and t h a t Q  no f o r e i g n i n f l u e n c e w i l l be t o l e r a t e d . ' This provoked a f u r t h e r I n d i a n note on October 31st  i n which the Indian  government c a t e g o r i c a l l y r e j e c t e d the Chinese i n s i n u a t i o n t h a t I n d i a was being prompted by outside i n f l u e n c e s to i n t e r f e r e i n China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s .  At the same time  I n d i a r e i t e r a t e d i t s s t r o n g d i s a p p r o v a l of China's a c t i o n s as having g r e a t l y added to the t e n s i o n s of the world and to the d r i f t towards general war, and as having a f f e c t e d f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between I n d i a and C h i n a . V a r i o u s  Indian  l e a d e r s , i n p u b l i c statements, r e v e a l e d t h e i r acute concern w i t h the s i t u a t i o n .  The Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Sardar P a t e l ,  f o r example, c a l l e d upon the I n d i a n people to be ready to meet the danger along the northern f r o n t i e r l i k e brave  men  and warned t h a t "Communist China's i n v a s i o n of T i b e t might be s u f f i c i e n t , i n view of i n t e r n a t i o n a l t e n s i o n , to s t a r t a new world w a r . "  x±  The sharp Indian notes to Peking and such p u b l i c u t t e r a n c e s of Indian leaders as the one quoted above caused much s p e c u l a t i o n i n both the I n d i a n and the f o r e i g n press a p o s s i b l e re-examination to Communist China.  on  of I n d i a ' s e n t i r e p o l i c y i n regard  The Hindu, a l e a d i n g  English-language  110 newspaper p u b l i s h e d i n Madras, wrote t h a t the i m p o s i t i o n of a Communist regime over T i b e t by f o r c e would m a t e r i a l l y e f f e c t I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e toward Communist China and c a l l f o r 12 a r e t h i n k i n g of her f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n g e n e r a l .  But the  Indian government was not prepared t o l e t the i n c i d e n t i n t e r f e r e w i t h i t s p u r s u i t of peace. Thus when T i b e t appealed t o the United Nations f o r p r o t e c t i o n on November 7» 13 1950, ^ the I n d i a n delegate opposed the r e s o l u t i o n by E l Salvador t h a t the appeal be put on the agenda of the Assembly. I n d i a considered t h a t the question was an i n t e r n a l 14 matter  t h a t could s t i l l be s e t t l e d by p e a c e f u l means, and  t h a t such a settlement would safeguard the autonomy which T i b e t had h i t h e r t o enjoyed while m a i n t a i n i n g i t s h i s t o r i c a l 15 a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h China.  A c c o r d i n g l y , the S t e e r i n g Com-  mittee of the General Assembly decided unanimously on November 24th that c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the appeal should be postponed. The  s t r a i n which the Tibetan a f f a i r brought about  i n S i n o - I n d i a n f r i e n d s h i p remained f o r some time, but the c o n c l u s i o n of a Sino-Indian trade agreement on A p r i l 1954  29,  appeared t o i n i t i a t e a new e r a i n r e l a t i o n s between  the two s i g n a t o r y s t a t e s .  For i n the preamble to the agree-  ment there was a d e c l a r a t i o n of p r i n c i p l e s and c o n s i d e r a t i o n s which was to t h e n c e f o r t h govern Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s . These were:  mutual respect f o r each other's  territorial  i n t e g r i t y and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression;  mutual  Ill n o n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n each other's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s ; e q u a l i t y 16 and mutual b e n e f i t ; and p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e .  By t h i s  agreement, Mr. Nehru hoped t o "ensure peace t o a v e r y l a r g e extent i n a c e r t a i n area of A s i a , " and e v e n t u a l l y win i t s 17 acceptance a l l over the world. ' Since the e n u n c i a t i o n of t h i s Panch S h i l a d o c t r i n e , the Government of I n d i a has devoted much o f i t s a t t e n t i o n t o f u r t h e r i n g these b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s .  I n d i a already had deep-rooted i d e o l o g i c a l ,  i n s t i t u t i o n a l , and economic l i n k s w i t h the Western democ r a c i e s and she has since s t r i v e n t o b u i l d up f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h the Communist c o u n t r i e s as w e l l by d e l i b e r a t e l y r e f r a i n i n g from c r i t i c i z i n g those c o u n t r i e s ' systems of a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o r domestic development.  A considerable  p o r t i o n of Indian o p i n i o n has f o l l o w e d the Government's l e a d , l a r g e l y on the premise t h a t c r i t i c i s m of the S o v i e t Union and i t s p a r t n e r s i s u n l i k e l y t o do any good, while i t would i n t e r f e r e w i t h I n d i a ' s e f f o r t s t o p l a y the uncommitted middleman of g o o d w i l l toward both b l o c s . I n l i n e w i t h t h i s r61e of an 'emmissary of peace' the Indian government has sought t o engender i n the West the same optimism which she p u r p o r t e d l y holds towards the Communist n a t i o n s .  I n a general way, Nehru has been  c o n t i n u o u s l y working since the death of S t a l i n and h i s dethronement from the i n n e r c i r c l e of S o v i e t greats t o s e l l  112 the i d e a t h a t R u s s i a i s changing i n the d i r e c t i o n of reasonableness.  Statements made by S o v i e t spokesmen at the  Twentieth P a r t y Congress were welcomed by the Indian government as i n d i c a t i n g a new look i n S o v i e t p o l i c y .  "This new  l i n e , " Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d i n the I n d i a n Parliament,  "both  i n p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g and i n p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y , appears t o be based upon a more r e a l i s t i c a p p r e c i a t i o n o f the present world s i t u a t i o n and represents a s i g n i f i c a n t process of •J Q  adaption and adjustment."  He b e l i e v e d i t was a step towards  the c r e a t i o n o f c o n d i t i o n s f a v o u r a b l y t o the p u r s u i t of a p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l c o e x i s t e n c e , a development which would l e a d t o a f u r t h e r r e l a x a t i o n of t e n s i o n i n the world. S i m i l a r l y , I n d i a has sought t o make Red China appear more r e s p e c t a b l e by r a t i o n a l i s i n g that  country's  a c t i o n s as the outcome of a b a s i c response t o outside prov o c a t i o n and t h e r e f o r e not as d e l i b e r a t e aggression on Peking's p a r t .  This view has permeated the pronouncements 19 of the Indian government on Korea, T i b e t and the Formosa 20 straits  controversy.  I n the same manner Nehru welcomed  the pronouncements made by the Chinese Red l e a d e r s a t Bandung —  i n which they d e c l a r e d t h e i r readiness t o enter  i n t o d i r e c t n e g o t i a t i o n s w i t h the United S t a t e s t o r e l a x t e n s i o n i n the Par East and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Formosa area —  as r e p r e s e n t i n g "a f u r t h e r and wholesome develop-  ment .../which/ i f . . . a v a i l e d o f by a l l concerned...can l e a d 21 to an approach towards p e a c e f u l settlement."  113  I n seeking to give the widest currency to h i s i d e a s , N h r u became one of the most w i d e l y t r a v e l l e d heads e  I n 1954  of s t a t e .  he made a s t a t e v i s i t t o Communist China,  stopping o f f at most of the c a p i t a l s of South-East A s i a . 1955  ne p a i d o f f i c i a l v i s i t s to R u s s i a —  an e s p e c i a l l y tumultuous welcome — European c o u n t r i e s .  I n 1956  In  where he r e c e i v e d  and to a number of east  be set o f f on h i s t r a v e l s again,  a t t e n d i n g the Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Conference, and v i s i t i n g West Germany, France and Y u g o s l a v i a .  I n the l a t t e r  country he conferred w i t h Marshal T i t o and w i t h Colonel Nasser of Egypt.  I n a d d i t i o n to the t r a v e l s of i t s Prime  M i n i s t e r , I n d i a has been the host of a l a r g e number of d i s t i n g u i s h e d v i s i t o r s from both b l o c s .  Among these can be  mentioned John F o s t e r D u l l e s ; Selwyn L l o y d ; L e s t e r Pearson; K i n g Ibn Saud; the Shah of I r a n ; Chinese Communist and S o v i e t l e a d e r s ; and most r e c e n t l y the h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l v i s i t of P r e s i d e n t Eisenhower of the U n i t e d States i n November 1959.  During a l l these v i s i t s the c o n s i s t e n t theme  has been one of aiming at the r e d u c t i o n of world t e n s i o n and the promotion of world peace and cooperation.  The  S o v i e t l e a d e r s , e s p e c i a l l y , have s e i z e d upon the o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f f e r e d d u r i n g t h e i r v i s i t s t o I n d i a to enunciate  w i t h much  flamboyance t h e i r d e d i c a t i o n to peace. However, while the Communist b l o c has expressed i t s d e d i c a t i o n to the p r i n c i p l e s of Panch S h i l a on many occasions —  pronouncements that would seem t o have been  Un-  accepted by the Indian government w i t h an a i r of u n r e a l 22  optimism — the a c t i o n s of the Communist g i a n t s have i n d i c a t e d otherwise. The a c t i o n s of the S o v i e t Union i n 25  c r u s h i n g the Hungarian r e v o l u t i o n i n 1956  y  and the pressure  brought t o bear by Moscow on Poland e a r l i e r i n the same year; the severe c r i t i c i s m s of Yugoslav d e v i a t i o n i s m by Peking; and most important —  the Red Chinese suppression of the  T i b e t a n r e v o l t i n 1959 and i t s subsequent s e i z u r e of s i z a b l e chunks o f Indian t e r r i t o r y i n the north-east and north-west, have c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d t o the I n d i a n government t h a t t h e i r p o l i c y of p e a c e f u l coexistence i s s t i l l f a r from a c h i e v i n g i t s objectives.  But as t h e i r r e a c t i o n s t o these events have  i n d i c a t e d , the l e a d e r s of I n d i a are determined t o continue t h e i r p o l i c y of patience and c o n c i l i a t i o n . The Tibetan r e v o l t of May 9 , 1959 put a great s t r a i n on the Pive P r i n c i p l e s to which Peking and New D e l h i had r e p e a t e d l y r e a f f i r m e d t h e i r adherence.  The s w i f t and  b r u t a l Chinese suppression of the r e v o l t , and the f l i g h t of the D a l a i Lama t o I n d i a aroused deep concern i n I n d i a , where sympathy f o r T i b e t ' s s t r u g g l e f o r independence was w i d e l y expressed  i n the Press and by members of a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s  save the Communists. a c u t e l y uncomfortable,  The c r i s i s undoubtedly made Nehru but the Prime M i n i s t e r , while  e x p r e s s i n g h i s d e s i r e t o see the people of T i b e t  progress  i n freedom, r e i t e r a t e d h i s d e s i r e f o r m a i n t a i n i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s w i t h "the great country of China" and c o u n s e l l e d  115  r e s t r a i n t i n the present d i f f i c u l t  circumstances.  Oil  H i s statement, however, was c r i t i c i z e d by wide c i r c l e s of Indian o p i n i o n as being too moderate.  Public  demonstrations and newspaper e d i t o r i a l s emphasized t h i s ,  and  stormy scenes occurred i n the I n d i a n Parliament where China's a c t i o n s were roundly condemned.  Por t h e i r p a r t , the Chinese  Communists r e a c t e d to the outburst of I n d i a n o p i n i o n w i t h a sharp a n t i - I n d i a n press and r a d i o campaign which charged I n d i a w i t h e x p a n s i o n i s t plans f o r i n t e r f e r i n g i n China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and of being i m p e r i a l i s t t o o l s .  The  People's D a i l y d e c l a r e d t h a t "the z e a l shown by c e r t a i n Indian p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s i n i n t e r f e r i n g i n China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s i n T i b e t has gone f a r beyond the endurance of a 25 p a t i e n t f r i e n d l y neighbour."  y  And i n a speech t o the  N a t i o n a l People's Congress on A p r i l 22nd, the Panchen Lama s a i d t h a t "the r e a c t i o n a r i e s i n I n d i a f o l l o w i n g i n the f o o t s t e p s of the B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t s , have always harboured e x p a n s i o n i s t ambitions i n T i b e t and have c a r r i e d out v a r i o u s sabotage a c t i v i t i e s . . . u n f a v o u r a b l e to the f r i e n d s h i p between China and T i b e t . "  2 6  But Nehru, though he d e s c r i b e d the Chinese charges as both unbecoming and e n t i r e l y devoid of substance,  and  accused the Chinese government of u s i n g "the language of the 27 c o l d war r e g a r d l e s s of t r u t h and p r o p r i e t y , " ' was  deter-  mined to t r e a t the i s s u e on i t s m e r i t s and not l e t i t become a c o l d war i s s u e .  Consequently, the Indian government,  116 d e s p i t e I n d i a n p u b l i c f e e l i n g , opposed as they had done i n 1950, any United Nations debate on T i b e t on the grounds t h a t T i b e t was a p a r t of China and thus a domestic concern.  28  This was i n s t r i c t accordance w i t h the F i v e P r i n c i p l e s and was a l s o undoubtedly motivated by I n d i a s d e s i r e not to 1  give offence to China.  I t must also be recognized t h a t while  the Indian argument has been d e s c r i b e d as specious by  those  who favour U n i t e d Nations debate of the Tibetan tragedy, i t a l s o has a great d e a l of m e r i t .  For such a d i s c u s s i o n by  the O r g a n i z a t i o n would n e c e s s a r i l y become a c o l d war debate aimed more at damaging the Chinese Communists than a i d i n g the T i b e t a n s .  Such a debate might do the Tibetans more harm  than good by provoking f u r t h e r Chinese r e p r i s a l s or encouraging the Tibetans to hopeless r e s i s t a n c e . Hungary had c l e a r l y shown t h a t whatever the West might say, sympathy was the sum t o t a l of the support i t would g i v e .  I f the West  was not prepared to chance i g n i t i n g a t h i r d world war  over  a c r i t i c a l i s s u e i n Europe, i t would most c e r t a i n l y not do so over a minor issue i n the H i m i l a y a s .  Thus the p o s i t i o n  taken by the I n d i a n government was both r e a l i s t i c and sound. But d e s p i t e the o f f i c i a l o b j e c t i v i t y of the I n d i a n government concerning the r e v o l t , the Tibetan c r i s i s s e v e r e l y s t r a i n e d Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s , and subsequent Chinese a c t i o n s have put I n d i a ' s p o l i c y of peace, as based on the Panch S h i l a d o c t r i n e , t o i t s severest t e s t .  The new  point  of c o n t e n t i o n concerns the d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e i r borders w i t h  117  one another, borders which — Line —  aside from the vague MacMahon  have never been c l e a r l y demarcated.  As has since  been r e v e a l e d by the Indian government, the border c o n t r o v e r s y w i t h China has s t e a d i l y developed since J u l y 1954, when Peking f i r s t began t o probe I n d i a ' s borders.  On every  occasion the Indian government p r o t e s t e d but w i t h h e l d the events from p u b l i c knowledge " i n the hope t h a t p e a c e f u l s o l u t i o n s t o the d i s p u t e s could be found by agreement by the 29 two c o u n t r i e s without p u b l i c excitement  on both s i d e s . "  y  But as the Chinese expanded t h e i r border c r o s s i n g s i n the summer and f a l l of 1959, r i s i n g concern was v o i c e d i n the Indian Parliament.  The Prime M i n i s t e r was queried by  o p p o s i t i o n members i n the Lok Sabha on August 13 about the Communist propaganda f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of S i k k i m , Ladakh, and Bhutan, and about the a l l e g e d massing of Chinese troops on I n d i a ' s northern f r o n t i e r s .  I n answer, Nehru, while s t a t i n g  t h a t h i s Government had no knowledge of any Chinese troop c o n c e n t r a t i o n s near Indian borders, gave h i s assurances t h a t e v e r y t h i n g would be done t o safeguard the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of I n d i a and d e c l a r e d t h a t "so f a r as we are concerned the MacMahon Line i s the f r o n t i e r — f i r m by usage and r i g h t , and f i r m by  f i r m by t r e a t y , 30  geography.Similar  assurances were given by the Prime M i n i s t e r d u r i n g subsequent weeks as concern rose i n I n d i a over China's a c t i o n s . The growing concern of the I n d i a n government was evidenced by the f a c t t h a t on September 7, 1959, a White Paper  118 c o n t a i n i n g Notes, memoranda and l e t t e r s exchanged between the Governments of I n d i a and China from 1954 t o 1959 51 presented t o the I n d i a n Parliament by Mr. Nehru.  was The  y  correspondence showed i n t e r a l i a t h a t Mr. Chou E n - l a i had accepted the MacMahon as the north-east border between I n d i a and China i n 1957, tout had subsequently r e t r a c t e d from t h i s commitment.  The numerous i n c i d e n t s , charges, and counter-  charges i n c l u d e d Chinese a l l e g a t i o n s of "brazen i n t r u s i o n s " by I n d i a n troops on T i b e t a n t e r r i t o r y , coupled w i t h a l l e gations of "unscrupulous c o l l u s i o n " between I n d i a n f o r c e s and " t r a i t e r o u s T i b e t a n r e b e l s ; " reference to border t e n s i o n between the two c o u n t r i e s i n the Bara H o t i area of U t t a r Pradesh; the d i s c l o s u r e t h a t as f a r back as 1956  I n d i a had  warned China t h a t v i o l a t i o n s of I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y might l e a d to a " c l a s h of arms;" and the I n d i a n r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s on the b u i l d i n g of a Chinese road across Ladakh, r e f e r r e d to by Mr. Nehru i n h i s statement to the Rajya Sabha on August 1959*  31,  I n the l a t t e r connection the Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s had  made counter-charges of armed I n d i a n " i n t r u s i o n s " i n the Ladakh a r e a , which was claimed as Chinese t e r r i t o r y . r e p l y the I n d i a n Prime M i n i s t e r d e s c r i b e d China's  In  territorial  claims as "absurd," " f a n t a s t i c , " and completely i n a d m i s s i b l e , s t a t i n g t h a t they c o u l d not be the s u b j e c t of any m e d i a t i o n , a r b i t r a t i o n or c o n c i l i a t i o n . change i n geography — them as a g i f t . ends."52 y  " I t i n v o l v e s a fundamental  the Himalayas being handed over to  That cannot be accepted, there the matter  119  But the Government of the Chinese People's Republic was apparently not of the same view, and w i t h the Chinese ambush of an I n d i a n p a t r o l l a t e one October afternoon at spot 45 m i l e s from the T i b e t a n f r o n t i e r i n the windswept 0  wastes of Ladakh, the long-simmering became an open i s s u e .  border  controversy  This c r u e l b e t r a y a l of Nehru's  innocent t r u s t and of I n d i a ' s n a t i o n a l s e l f - r e s p e c t brought a s w i f t and vehement outburst of anti-Chinese f e e l i n g out I n d i a .  In New  through-  D e l h i over 3,000 I n d i a n students demon-  s t r a t e d outside the Chinese Embassy, shouting "Death to Chou" and other anti-Chinese slogans; the  demonstrators  burned copies of Chinese maps which showed 40,000 square m i l e s of I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y as belonging to China. Jubbulpore, some 1,000  In  students signed a blood oath, d e c l a r i n g  t h e i r readiness to l a y down t h e i r l i v e s to defend I n d i a against Chinese aggression. demonstrations 33 where.  S i m i l a r anti-Chinese student  took p l a c e at Allahabad, B a r e r l l y , and e l s e -  y  The v a r i o u s Indian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and newspapers were no l e s s emphatic i n u r g i n g Nehru to take s t r o n g and immediate a c t i o n .  The A l l - I n d i a Congress Committee condemned  the Chinese i n t r u s i o n s i n t o I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y . , expressed  full  support f o r the Government, and d e c l a r e d t h a t "the i n t e g r i t y of I n d i a must be respected."  The P r a j a S o c i a l i s t P a r t y  demanded t h a t the Government take such measures, m i l i t a r y and d i p l o m a t i c , as to compel China to q u i t Indian t e r r i t o r y ,  120 warning t h a t :  "On the way we meet the Chinese t h r e a t  depends not o n l y the i n t e g r i t y of I n d i a , hut a l s o the freedom, s e c u r i t y and peace of the whole of A s i a . "  Even the Indian  Communists d e c l a r e d ' they" - stood w i t h the r e s t of the people f o r the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of I n d i a .  The Hindustan Times  ( D e l h i ) d e c l a r e d t h a t some form of l i m i t e d r e p r i s a l  was  "imperative f o r the sake as much of our s e l f - r e s p e c t as of the l a r g e r peace"; the Times of I n d i a (Bombay) warned t h a t i t might be necessary  "to consider the p o s s i b i l i t y of s e v e r i n g  d i p l o m a t i c r e l a t i o n s w i t h Communist China i f Peking p e r s i s t s i n d e l i b e r a t e acts of p r o v o c a t i o n and i n s u l t against t h i s country"; w h i l e the Indian Express ( D e l h i ) c a l l e d f o r " f i r m p u n i t i v e a c t i o n against the v i o l a t o r s of our f r o n t i e r s , " 54urged an Indo-Pakistan defence arrangement. I n d i a f e l t both angry and alone.  The  and  ruthlessness  of Red China's behaviour made a wreckage of some cherished convictions.  There was no longer confidence t h a t A s i a n  s o l i d a r i t y , c r e a t e d at the Bandung Conference, would outlaw the use of f o r c e ; t h a t Indian n e u t r a l i t y and non-alignment w i t h m i l i t a r y b l o c s would g r a d u a l l y l e a d the Communist and non-Communist worlds to mutual understanding;  or that the  repeated pledges of p e a c e f u l coexistence by Peking meant t h a t Red China was worthy of j o i n i n g the U n i t e d Organization.  Nations  The n a t i o n a l d i s i l l u s i o n m e n t was so great  t h a t even Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru took o f f h i s rose-coloured g l a s s e s , looked hard at h i s g i a n t neighbour to the n o r t h ,  121  and t o l d the Indian Parliament:  " I doubt i f there i s any  country i n the world t h a t cares l e s s f o r peace than China today."  5 5  But aside from s t a t i n g h i s b e l i e f t h a t "China has 36 not got over the f i r s t f l u s h of i t s r e v o l u t i o n a r y mentality,"-^ Nehru's i n i t i a l response t o China's c a l c u l a t e d aggression was h e s i t a n t —  and w e l l i t might be, f o r h i s p o l i c y of  p e a c e f u l coexistence was going up i n flames.  China appar-  e n t l y had nothing but contempt f o r Panch S h i l a and was showing t h a t contempt by throwing i t r i g h t back i n t o the face of her best f r i e n d outside the Communist b l o c .  The Prime  M i n i s t e r w e l l knew the consequences f o r h i s country's economic development i f she took a f i r m m i l i t a r y stand a g a i n s t the Chinese encroachments.  I n face o f the s t r o n g f e e l i n g of  Indian o p i n i o n , he d i d declare t o a mass meeting of 200,000 i n New D e l h i on November 1, 1959 t h a t I n d i a would not w i l t before the Chinese challenge: I want t o disabuse any s u s p i c i o n t h a t might l u r k i n some peoples minds that we w i l l not be able to defend our i n t e g r i t y i f the Chinese invade us. We have confidence i n our s t r e n g t h and determination t o meet t h i s c h a l l e n g e , and we w i l l meet i t w i t h our f u l l s t r e n g t h . We w i l l defend our country w i t h a l l our might. But Mr. Nehru i s a l s o determined t o seek a p e a c e f u l  settlement.  As he t o l d the Indian Parliament on December 2 1 , 1959 i n r e p l y to a demand by S o c i a l i s t l e a d e r J . P. K r i p a l a n i and other  122 o p p o s i t i o n members who demanded a f i r m stand a g a i n s t Communist China: As f a r as I am concerned, as f a r as my Government i s concerned, we s h a l l n e g o t i a t e and n e g o t i a t e and n e g o t i a t e to the b i t t e r end. Any other approach i s anti-Gandhian and against our fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . I want members • to r e a l i z e the only a l t e r n a t i v e to n e g o t i a t i o n i s war.^g In face of Chou E n - l a i ' s apparent determination not t o r e l i n q u i s h any of the t e r r i t o r y s e i z e d by h i s f o r c e s , however, the p e a c e f u l settlement d e s i r e d by Mr. Nehru w i l l not be e a s i l y achieved.  Mr. Chou E n - l a i wants Prime M i n i s t e r  Nehru, i n e f f e c t , to enter i n t o t a l k s w i t h the  territorial  outcome prejudged a g a i n s t him, and i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t Nehru has r e j e c t e d such a peremptory c a l l i n g of I n d i a to China's h e e l .  H i s d e s i r e f o r a n e g o t i a t e d settlement, how-  ever, i s evidenced by the f a c t t h a t he has agreed t o meet w i t h the Chinese l e a d e r i n A p r i l /I"9607.  I f Mr. Nehru f e e l s  t h a t a l o n g stalemate now would work more to China's advantage than t o I n d i a ' s , he may be disposed t o make the best of t a l k s without f u r t h e r p r e p a r a t i o n , i n the hope t h a t something be accomplished  i n t h a t way.  may  Indeed, a long stalemate would  q u i t e l i k e l y r e s u l t i n l e a v i n g Indians much l e s s b i t t e r towards China than the f i r s t f l a r e u p of i n d i g n a t i o n seemed to imply.  Indians w i l l remain s u s p i c i o u s of China i n the  f u t u r e , but the suspension of aggression and the s u b s t i t u t i o n  123  of f r i e n d l y a c t s by China would undoubtedly b r i n g a f r i e n d l y response from I n d i a .  But should the forthcoming t a l k s be  i n c o n c l u s i v e , there i s always the r i s k t h a t s p r i n g i n the Himalayas w i l l unfreeze more than the g l a c i e r s . Whatever I n d i a ' s short-range Chinese encroachments may be — China's aggressiveness  r e a c t i o n t o these  and hypotheses are many, —  has c e r t a i n l y caused the Indian  government t o reappraise the f u t u r e value of Panch S h i l a , and t o make f i r m adherence t o , and f a i t h i n t h a t d o c t r i n e very difficult  and dangerous.  I t i s q u i t e l i k e l y t h a t the  pressure of Chinese expansion w i l l continue, and while t h i s w i l l pose a problem f o r every A s i a n n a t i o n and n a t i o n s w i t h Asians i n t e r e s t s —  even S o v i e t R u s s i a , which has much the  l o n g e s t , most v u l n e r a b l e and most c o n t r o v e r s i a l f r o n t i e r w i t h China —  i t w i l l be an e s p e c i a l l y acute one f o r I n d i a .  Paced w i t h the o v e r r i d i n g n e c e s s i t y of c o n c e n t r a t i n g her main a t t e n t i o n and energy on her i n t e r n a l problems i f she i s ever t o withstand Chinese pressure, I n d i a must, i n the near f u t u r e , defend h e r i n t e r e s t s on the f r o n t i e r s l a r g e l y 39 by diplomacy.  This w i l l r e q u i r e great t a c t and much  patience on the p a r t of the Indian government f o r the Chinese —  and t h a t i n c l u d e s the N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese on  Formosa q u i t e as much as the Chinese Communists on the mainland —  do not recognize the l e g a l i t y of the MacMahon Line  as a f r o n t i e r .  They a s s e r t that t h i s l i n e , which the Indian  government claims i s the l e g a l one, was imposed on T i b e t by  124 the B r i t i s h who dominated T i b e t when China was h e l p l e s s and i n the throes of a r e v o l u t i o n . With h e r present  strength  i t i s o n l y n a t u r a l t o expect China t o a s s e r t her claims t o t e r r i t o r y which a t one time was p a r t of the Chinese Empire. Due t o I n d i a ' s i n a b i l i t y t o a s s e r t h e r claims t o the d i s p u t e d areas by reason of the i n a c c e s s a b i l i t y of the regions from the Indian s i d e , the Government's p o l i c y w i l l be to argue i t s case w i t h China, t o propose reasonable  com-  promises and t o f i g h t back where i t can i f there are f u r t h e r incursions.  The true l i n e of p o l i c y f o r I n d i a i s thus t o  conduct a h o l d i n g o p e r a t i o n as long as t h a t i s p o s s i b l e , and i n the meantime t o promote i n d i r e c t l y and w i t h d e l i c a c y a p o l i c y of containment.  Mr. Nehru has found t h a t by being a  f r i e n d t o the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n i s not n e c e s s a r i l y t o enable him t o l i v e i n peace w i t h i t , and i n f u t u r e h i s p o l i c y towards Red China w i l l be v o i d of some of h i s past  illusions.  But while Indians w i l l take a r e a l i s t i c view of China i n f u t u r e , the aggressiveness  of t h a t country has not  appeared t o have a l t e r e d Nehru's f a i t h i n a p o l i c y of non-alignment i n the context of the c o l d war. At the same D e l h i speech where he d e c l a r e d t h a t I n d i a would r e s i s t oppression on her f r o n t i e r s w i t h f o r c e , Mr. Nehru s t a t e d e m p h a t i c a l l y t h a t " t a l k of abandoning the p o l i c y of nonalignment i s u t t e r l y wrong and u s e l e s s . a more f o o l i s h t h i n g .  There c o u l d not be  As f a r as I am concerned, I w i l l  125 oppose i t w i t h a l l my s t r e n g t h . "  40  Even Chinese i n t r a n -  sigeance over n e g o t i a t i n g a settlement has not shaken Nehru's r e s o l v e .  This was evidenced by h i s f i r m o p p o s i t i o n  to suggestions made at the annual Congress P a r t y meeting at Bangalore i n mid-January I960 t h a t I n d i a drop i t s p o l i c y of non-alignment and o p p o s i t i o n to m i l i t a r y p a c t s .  The  Prime M i n i s t e r s a i d that India's p o l i c y had been proved 4-1 r i g h t and t h a t such proposals were a s i g n of weakness. He even welcomed the Chinese challenge "shake the people up,"  on the borders to  and heatedly declared t h a t whatever  the consequences, I n d i a would never a l l o w f o r e i g n armies on her s o i l , even to a i d defence.  His stand was  affirmed  by Mr. S a n j i v a Eeddy i n h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l address t o the Congress P a r t y the f o l l o w i n g day i n which he s t a t e d t h a t while I n d i a would r e s i s t any aggression  "we have to adhere  to our p o l i c y . . . / w h i c h / n e c e s s a r i l y . . . h a s to be adapted to 42 new  conditions."  For any one to challenge or doubt the  p o l i c y of I n d i a based on Panch S h i l a and non-alignment w i t h power b l o c s was  showing a remarkable l a c k of understanding  of what had happened or was happening i n the present-day world.  Footnotes - Chapter VI  1 J a w a h a r l a l Nehru, Broadcast from Colombo, May 2 , 1954. Speeches 1955-1957* p. 2 5 2 . 2 The C o n s t i t u t i o n o f I n d i a (New D e l h i , Government of I n d i a , 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 2 1 . 3 Statement made at the Dynamo Stadium, Moscow, June 2 2 , 1955. Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957, p. 3 0 3 . 4- Nehru's Speeches 194-9-1953, p. 174-. 5 A prominent member of the Indian C o u n c i l of World Affairs. 6 L e v i , Free I n d i a i n A s i a , p. 97• 7 F o r e i g n P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , New York, November 1 0 , 1 9 5 0 . 8 C i t e d i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s , The Question o f Tibet and the Rule o f Law, 1959, pp. 132-133. 9 I b i d . , p. 1 3 3 . 10 I b i d . , pp. 133-135. 11 Quoted i n the New York Times, November 1 0 , 1950. 12 I b i d . , November 5 , 1 9 5 0 . 13 U n i t e d N a t i o n s , Document A/154-9. Text i n I b i d . , January 2 1 , 1959. 14 F o r a l e g a l i s t i c viewpoint on T i b e t ' s s t a t u s , see "The P o s i t i o n of T i b e t i n I n t e r n a t i o n a l Law," i n The Question of T i b e t and the Rule of Law, pp. 7 5 - 9 9 . 15 U n i t e d Nations General Assembly, November 24, 1950. U. N. Document A/1543. 16 C i t e d i n Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 262. 17 I b i d . , p. 263. 18 From a statement i n Lok Sabha, March 2 0 , 1956.  p. 3 1 8 .  i  Ibid.,  19 On December 5, 1950, the I n d i a n delegate t o the U. N. s a i d : "Since China has been ravaged by wars, i t was understandable t h a t . . . t h e o r d e a l s through which they had passed had made them unduly s u s p i c i o u s and apprehensive. Year Book of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , 1950, p. 24-5. 20 R e f e r r i n g t o the N a t i o n a l i s t - h e l d o f f s h o r e i s l a n d s of Matsu and Quemoy d u r i n g the 1955 c r i s i s i n the Formosa s t r a i t s , Mr. Nehru d e c l a r e d t h a t "no country can t o l e r a t e an enemy s i t t i n g ten m i l e s from t h e i r shore, bombarding them a l l the time. I t i s an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n . " Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , March 26 - A p r i l 2, 1955, P.. 14-118. 21 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 299. 22 The Times of I n d i a , however, has i s s u e d a word of c a u t i o n as- regards the pronouncements of Premier Khrushchev. Commenting on statements made by him d u r i n g h i s v i s i t t o I n d i a 1957, the Times s t a t e d : "The v i s i t of our Russian guests, while i t has helped t o heighten the permutations and combinations of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , c a r r i e d i t s own warnings t o us.... By a l l means l e t us r e t u r n c o u r t e s y w i t h courtesy but not t o the p o i n t of l e t t i n g the guest edge the host out of h i s own mansion.... There can be no doubt t h a t what Moscow i s now engaged i n i s a maneuvre t o undermine, i s o l a t e and o u t f l a n k Western i n f l u e n c e i n A s i a . " K e e s i n g s Contemporary A r c h i v e s , December 31, 1955 - January 7, 1956, p. 14-614-. 1  23 See Chapter V. 24- Keesing's Contemporary  A r c h i v e s , May 9-16, 1959, p. 16799.  25 I b i d . , p. 16801. 26 I b i d . 27 I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s , The Question of T i b e t and the Rule of Law, p. 1 7 3 . 28 I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t t o note t h a t out of 82 members of the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , o n l y 4-3 supported the move t o debate the T i b e t q u e s t i o n . Among these 43 members o n l y 7 were A s i a n c o u n t r i e s , while 20 were from South and North America. 29 Quoted i n Werner L e v i , "Chinese-Indian Competition i n A s i a , Current H i s t o r y , v o l . 38 (February I960), p. 66. 1  30 Keesing's Contemporary p. 1 7 H 5 .  A r c h i v e s , November 21-28, 1959, ii  31 The correspondence i s summarized i n Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , November 21-28, 1959, pp. 1711617119.  32 I b i d . , p. 17119. 33 See Time, December 14, 1 9 5 9 . 34 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , November 21-28, 1 9 5 9 , p. 17122. 35 C i t e d i n Time, December 14, 1959. 36 Indiagxam, October 22, 1 9 5 9 . 37 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , November 21-28, 1959, p. 17120. 38 C i t e d i n The Japan Times, December 22, 1959. 39 Vincent Sheean has observed: "whatever the p r o v o c a t i o n , India's a t t i t u d e toward China must conform t o i t s own p r i n c i p l e s as taught by Gandhi and as r e i t e r a t e d i n v a r i o u s agreements, t r e a t i e s and formulae by Nehru. The e n t i r e s t r u c t u r e would be wrecked, t h e o r e t i c a l l y o r p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , by any q u a r r e l w i t h China...over the Himalayan r e g i o n s . " Nehru: The Years o f Power, p. 156. p.  40 Keesing's Contemporary A r c h i v e s , November 21-28, 1959, 17120.  41 C i t e d i n The Japan Times, January 16, I960. 42 Indiagram, January 1 7 , I960.  iii  CHAPTER V I I CONCLUSION  I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the e r a of 'cold war' d e r i v e s from a v a r i e t y of sources.  At the time o f  independence Indian l e a d e r s were faced w i t h i n t e r n a l problems of such an overwhelming nature t h a t e x t e r n a l p o l i c y , save f o r r e l a t i o n s w i t h P a k i s t a n , was of l i t t l e  concern.  As the 'cold war' was mainly r e s t r i c t e d t o the European scene a t t h i s time, Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s d i d not touch the d i r e c t l i n e of East-West d i s p u t e .  Under these circum-  stances Indian l e a d e r s took a d i s t a n t look a t the 'cold war'.  T h e i r general approach to i t can be summed up as:  'we s h a l l have nothing t o do w i t h i t ' . But I n d i a could not m a i n t a i n t h i s aloofness from world a f f a i r s f o r l o n g .  With the coming i n t o power i n China  of the communists and I n d i a ' s r e c o g n i t i o n of the Peking regime, I n d i a could no longer be a d i s t a n t onlooker.  The  aggressive a t t i t u d e and a c t i o n s of the Chinese Communists provoked the United S t a t e s t o e s t a b l i s h s e c u r i t y pacts along the p e r i p h e r i e s of the resurgent Chinese s t a t e and thereby brought the i m p l i c a t i o n s of the 'cold war' i n t o I n d i a ' s immediate neighbourhood. 126  As a consequence of h e r  127  s i z e , l o c a t i o n and f u t u r e p o s s i b i l i t i e s , I n d i a was  forced  to r a p i d l y assume an important r o l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy.  This meant f o r m u l a t i n g  a foreign policy i n  accordance w i t h her n a t i o n a l b e l i e f s and i n t e r e s t s , a p o l i c y which, i n a d d i t i o n to d e a l i n g w i t h immediate problems, would a l s o act as a means of strengthening i n t e r n a l u n i t y . The  immediate s i t u a t i o n tended to reduce pos-  s i b i l i t i e s i n the f i e l d of f o r e i g n p o l i c y to two broad alternatives.  One  was  a c t i v e p a r t i s a n s h i p i n world a f f a i r s  combined w i t h extensive f o r e i g n sources.  The  m i l i t a r y and economic support from  other was  a p o l i c y of p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s s t r o n g l y conditioned  by  the  p o s s i b l e i n f l u e n c e of such a p o l i c y upon the domestic scene and by the p o l i c y ' s impact upon the f o r e i g n powers. p o l i c i e s involved substantial r i s k s .  Any  Both  success w i t h  the  f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e depended upon such f a c t o r s as the cons i s t e n c y of a c t i o n by the major powers; the m i l i t a r y f e a s i b i l i t y of f o r e i g n p r o t e c t i o n ; and, perhaps most important of a l l , the i n t e r n a l repercussions of dependency and a c e r t a i n amount of f o r e i g n s u p e r v i s i o n and c o n t r o l . A l l of these r i s k s , and e s p e c i a l l y the l a s t , m i l i t a t e d s t r o n g l y against i t s adoption by the Indian government. The  second a l t e r n a t i v e , despite  became the most n a t u r a l choice and, and h i s c o l l e a g u e s ,  i t s obvious r i s k s ,  i n the eyes of Nehru  the most reasonable.  I t s d i c t a t e s were  128 simple "but compelling.  I t must take account of geography,  of i n t e r n a l weakness and the urgent nature o f domestic problems,,of the c u l t u r e and r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n of I n d i a , and o f the n a t i o n a l i s m of the I n d i a n people.  Foreign  p a r t i s a n s h i p , a t e i t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l o r the n a t i o n a l l e v e l , was regarded as a development l i k e l y t o produce f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t i o n s i n an a l r e a d y confused Under the circumstances  situation.  f o r e i g n p o l i c y had t o be a p i l l a r  of s t r e n g t h , capable of being sustained on the b a s i s of i t s own emotional and p o l i t i c a l appeal, and founded upon a r e a l i s t i c a p p r a i s a l o f power abroad, both a c t u a l and p o t e n t i a l . I n d i a ' s c o n t i g u i t y t o the great l a n d powers of Communist China and the S o v i e t Union made i t a matter of v i t a l n e c e s s i t y f o r her Government t o do nothing t o antagonize bours.  these g i a n t neigh-  An a t t a c k by e i t h e r or both of these c o u n t r i e s on  I n d i a c o u l d never be withstood and would have d i s a s t r o u s consequences f o r the n a t i o n , i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y d e s t r o y i n g i t s very foundations. n i z e d the probable  The Indian l e a d e r s undoubtedly recog-  i n a b i l i t y of Western power t o defend I n d i a  from Communist a t t a c k , even i f events caused o r f o r c e d them to c o n s i d e r i t d e s i r a b l e .  The l e s s o n of Korea has undoubtedly  been an impressive one t o many Indians; the power of Communist China was recognized and f e a r e d .  Thus the Indian  government f e l t i t would not be t o I n d i a ' s i n t e r e s t s , from e i t h e r the emotional o r the p r a c t i c a l standpoint, t o a l i g n h e r s e l f w i t h the West.  129  Consequently,  the I n d i a n government enunciated  what was, i n i t s view, the wise and n a t u r a l p o l i c y of ' n e u t r a l i s m ' , 'non-alignment',  or whatever i t may he c a l l e d .  I n d i a n l e a d e r s sought to b u i l d t h e i r country on s o l i d foundations and not to get entangled i n matters which d i d not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t them, not because they were d i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the c u r r e n t of world events, but because they f e l t t h a t the burden of these entanglements would be too great f o r I n d i a ' s weak economy to support.  But though I n d i a has  remained f o r m a l l y n e u t r a l i n the East-West power s t r u g g l e , her f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been n e i t h e r p a s s i v e nor n e g a t i v e . This has been evidenced by the a c t i o n s of the I n d i a n government on the world stage, a c t i o n s designed to promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y and t o create thereby an atmosphere conducive t o I n d i a ' s economic development and  social  progress. I n the f i r s t instance i t has been seen t h a t the I n d i a n government has pursued a p o l i c y designed to achieve the maximum s e c u r i t y at a minimum c o s t i n scarce money and materials.  Indian l e a d e r s recognize t h a t i f I n d i a i s ever  t o achieve a reasonable l e v e l of s e c u r i t y , the country must be put on a sound economic b a s i s as i n modern warfare only a country w i t h a sound economic s t r u c t u r e can hope t o w i t h stand the ravages of war.  For I n d i a to arm h e r s e l f t o a  degree where she c o u l d thwart Communist ( i . e . Chinese)  130 expansion by f o r c e of arms alone would n e c e s s i t a t e defence expenditures  on a s c a l e which would have d i s a s t r o u s con-  sequences f o r the country's economic development.  The  Government's r e l u c t a n c e to take such steps has caused i t to place i t s s e c u r i t y p r i m a r i l y upon diplomacy.  Limited e f f o r t s ,  to be sure, have been taken to secure the northern  frontiers,  but these represent automatic r e f l e x e s more than concrete defensive p l a n n i n g . Westopposition  I t i s through non-alignment w i t h the  to r e g i o n a l s e c u r i t y pacts i n her neighbour-  hood, f r i e n d s h i p w i t h her Communist neighbours, and  furtherance  of the Panch S h i l a d o c t r i n e , t h a t I n d i a has sought to secure h e r s e l f from a t t a c k . I t has a l s o been shown t h a t i n the world at l a r g e I n d i a ' s p o l i c y has d i r e c t e d - i t s e l f to c o n s c i o u s l y  and  d e l i b e r a t e l y working f o r peace through mediation, moral pressure, and through openly v o i c i n g opinions against  steps  or on i s s u e s which, according t o Indian c a l c u l a t i o n s , might l e a d to war.  India believes that i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes  can  be amicably and p e a c e f u l l y s e t t l e d by d i s c u s s i o n , n e g o t i a t i o n , and a r b i t r a t i o n .  She has f a i t h i n the i n t r i n s i c need and  d e s i r e of a l a r g e m a j o r i t y of the nations of the world to maintain peace and to ensure s e c u r i t y t o the war-weary peoples of the  world.  I n d i a ' s championship of the cause of dependent peoples i s based on the premise t h a t p.eace" and freedom are  131 i n d i v i s i b l e ; t h a t the absolute freedom of a l l n a t i o n s of the world i s conducive  t o contentment and peace of the  world; and t h a t enslavement of any people, however s m a l l n u m e r i c a l l y , i s d e t r i m e n t a l t o peace.  Consequently,  since  independence i n 194-7, the I n d i a n government has sought t o remove what i t considers t o be a r o o t cause o f war. I n 194-9 i t convened an A s i a n conference of Indonesian independence.  to c o n s i d e r the problem  I n the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , I n d i a n  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s have given strong support t o Arab n a t i o n a l i s m , e s p e c i a l l y the s t r u g g l e f o r T u n i s i a n and Moroccan independence, and B r i t i s h , French, B e l g i a n and Portuguese c o l o n i a l i s m were f r e q u e n t l y c r i t i c i z e d by I n d i a i n t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l body. I n more recent years, however, I n d i a has been much l e s s v o c a l on t h i s i s s u e than before and t h i s has probably been due t o a r e a l i z a t i o n i n New D e l h i t h a t , i n view of East-West t e n s i o n , i t i s b e t t e r t o give one's advice w i t h g r e a t e r prudence.  I n d i a ' s d e s i r e now appears t o be t o prevent  or A f r i c a n n a t i o n a l i s m from d i s r u p t i n g world peace.  Asian  Maturity  i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s has caused the I n d i a n government t o recognize the dangers inherent i n a blanket and unequivocal a p p l i c a t i o n of a p u r e l y i d e a l i s t i c approach. I n d i a ' s a t t i t u d e towards the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , towards a l l i a n c e s and disarmament, and towards Red China's admittance  i n t o the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , demonstrate h e r con-  v i c t i o n t h a t ' t e n s i o n and eventual armed c o n f l i c t are l a t e n t  132  i n each, i s s u e .  Through a p o l i c y of non-alignment  India  considers h e r s e l f t o be making a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o peace.  She has c o n s c i o u s l y sought t o impress upon the  world her c o n v i c t i o n t h a t war i s not i n e v i t a b l e and t h a t i f i s s u e s are approached i n the proper mood then t e n s i o n can be a l l e v i a t e d .  M i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s are opposed on the  grounds t h a t s e c u r i t y can never be achieved by such means which a c t u a l l y l e a d t o war. S i m i l a r l y , the r e f u s a l of the West t o recognize Red China and t o deny her admittance t o the U n i t e d Nations i s considered by Indians t o be unnecessary p r o v o c a t i o n of a powerful country.  Through c o n t i n u a l  e n u n c i a t i o n of these views I n d i a hopes t o a l l e v i a t e t e n s i o n s i n the world and c r e a t e an atmosphere i n which n a t i o n s of the w o r l d , r e g a r d l e s s of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l i d e o l o g y , can work i n f r i e n d l y c o o p e r a t i o n f o r the mutual b e n e f i t o f mankind. I n d i a ' s mediatory r o l e i n East-West d i s p u t e s i s f u r t h e r evidence of t h i s a t t i t u d e .  By r e t a i n i n g her  detached o b j e c t i v i t y and her i n d i v i d u a l i t y , I n d i a has sought to r e s t o r e equanimity over a world r i v e n by f e e l i n g s of h a t r e d and v i o l e n c e .  F r e q u e n t l y I n d i a ' s 'independent'  approach t o i s s u e s i n v o l v i n g i n t e r e s t s of the r i v a l b l o c s has caused h e r t o be viewed w i t h v a r y i n g degrees of s u s p i c i o n and resentment and has f o r c e d h e r 'to plough a l o n e l y furrow', but I n d i a remained c o n s i s t e n t i n h e r e f f o r t s t o prevent the outbreak o f a general c o n f l i c t .  Her e f f o r t s  i n r e s p e c t t o Korea, Indo-China, the Formosa s t r a i t s , and  133  i n Hungary and Egypt are evidence of I n d i a ' s mediatory r o l e . Through an independent approach t o each i s s u e , I n d i a has s t r i v e n to c o n c i l i a t e the opposing p o i n t s of view and  thereby  prevent the outbreak of a general c o n f l a g r a t i o n . F e a r f u l of f u t u r e Chinese a c t i o n s a f t e r the Tibetan episode i n 1950,  however, I n d i a advanced the F i v e  P r i n c i p l e s of Panch S h i l a as the b a s i s f o r Sino-Indian relations.  Thereby I n d i a sought to secure her f r o n t i e r s  from any f u t u r e Chinese ' n i b b l i n g ' i n c u r s i o n s t h a t could be expected along the i l l - d e f i n e d Himalayan f r o n t i e r s .  At the  same time I n d i a sought to f u r t h e r these p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i n the world at l a r g e .  She has  to engender i n the West the same optimism which she  striven pur-  p o r t e d l y holds towards the Communist n a t i o n s , and to b r i n g the r i v a l b l o c s together i n f r i e n d l y c o o p e r a t i o n . a l t e r n a t i v e to coexistence i s c o - d e s t r u c t i o n .  The  only  But while  Panch S h i l a has apparently eased t e n s i o n somewhat i n the world due to the general r e a l i z a t i o n t h a t the Indian premise i s a c o r r e c t one, the events i n Hungary i n 1956 i n 1959  and i n T i b e t  c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e d that the p r i n c i p l e s of Panch S h i l a  are s t i l l f a r from acceptance as the only b a s i s f o r r e l a t i o n s among s t a t e s .  China's s e i z u r e of I n d i a n t e r r i t o r y made t h i s  e m p h a t i c a l l y c l e a r to I n d i a n s , and while the outcome of t h i s dispute remains a matter of c o n j e c t u r e , i t has  certainly  i n j e c t e d a new note of admitted r e a l i t y i n t o I n d i a n p o l i c y . A rapprochement between East and West w i l l , i n the f u t u r e ,  134  not be advanced by I n d i a with, the same optimism as i n the p a s t , and China w i l l be viewed w i t h more jaundiced eyes than h i t h e r t o . I t can t h e r e f o r e be concluded t h a t although the term 'neutralism' i s sometimes a p p l i e d t o Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y , t h i s i s h a r d l y an accurate d e s c r i p t i o n .  I n d i a has  been n e u t r a l only i n her r e f u s a l t o j o i n m i l i t a r y p a c t s : she has c e r t a i n l y a l i g n e d h e r s e l f i n many d i s p u t e s .  She has  a l i g n e d h e r s e l f w i t h A f r o - A s i a n n a t i o n s i n the p u r s u i t of c e r t a i n economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l aims.  She has  exerted h e r i n f l u e n c e i n many t r o u b l e d areas —  Korea,  Indo-China, Indonesia, North A f r i c a , t o name but a few. I n the United Nations she has p l a c e d h e r s e l f c l o s e l y by the side of the Arab b l o c . In t r u t h I n d i a has f o l l o w e d a r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , c a l c u l a t e d t o p r o t e c t her n a t i o n a l self-interest.  This b a s i c m o t i v a t i o n of n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t  has o f t e n been obscured by a camouflage of p h i l o s o p h i c a l and moral p l a t i t u d e s .  But India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y has  elements of opportunism, i n c o n s i s t e n c y , and expedience as does t h a t of any world power.  —  This i s seen i n the f a c t  t h a t she has not h e s i t a t e d t o use force when her u n i t y or s e c u r i t y has been threatened, Junagadh, Kashmir, and Nepal.  as i n the case of Hyderabad, While c o n t i n u a l l y advocating  disarmament i n the United Nations, I n d i a has turned down a  135  number of reasonable proposals f o r d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n i n Kashmir.  On t h i s i s s u e of Kashmir, the general p r i n c i p l e  of s e l f - d e t e r m i n a t i o n f o r a l l peoples h a r d l y squares w i t h the o b s t a c l e s Nehru has p l a c e d i n i t s path i n Kashmir. I n d i a has c a s t i g a t e d Western r u l e i n A s i a and A f r i c a , yet Indian l e a d e r s have never c r i t i c i z e d Communist t o t a l i t a r i a n r u l e i n E a s t e r n Europe.  The Indian government has too o f t e n  seemed to go out of i t s way to be accommodating to the Communist powers while s p a r i n g n o t h i n g i n i t s c r i t i c i s m of Western p o l i c i e s . Yet even i f the message of non-violence,  Gandhian  e t h i c s , and s p i r i t u a l i t y i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s have been unduly s t r e s s e d i n supporting I n d i a ' s a c t i o n s on the world  stage,  i t must be recognized that I n d i a has acted as mediator and honest broker i n East-Vest d i s p u t e s and has i n a general way t r i e d to i n f u s e the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene w i t h ness and c o n c i l i a t i o n .  reasonable-  Thereby I n d i a has made a p o s i t i v e  c o n t r i b u t i o n to world peace although her a c t i o n s and expressed  opinions have f r e q u e n t l y brought down upon her  the harsh c r i t i c i s m s of both East and Vest, depending as her views favoured one side or the other. The r e l a t i v e success which I n d i a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y has enjoyed i s l a r g e l y due t o one man,  Jawaharlal Nehru.  For I n d i a ' s amazing prominence i n world a f f a i r s has  largely  grew from the s t a t u r e of Nehru as. a n a t i o n a l i s t l e a d e r ,  136 statesman, w r i t e r , and dynamic p e r s o n a l i t y .  But Nehru w i l l  soon pass from the scene, and what the p o l i c y of h i s successors w i l l be i s a matter of great debate even i n I n d i a . C e r t a i n l y whoever emerges to l e a d I n d i a w i l l l a c k the tremendous p r e s t i g e which has enabled Nehru to a v o i d meeting the demands of the e x t r e m i s t s e c t i o n s of Indian o p i n i o n f o r abandonment of non-alignment i n favour of c l o s e r a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h e i t h e r East or West.  In view of recent  Chinese a c t i o n s and the s t r e n g t h of pro-Western elements i n Indian p o l i t i c a l  l i f e any f o r s e e a b l e t r e n d i n Indian f o r e i g n  p o l i c y would undoubtedly be to more i n t i m a t e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the Western camp.  Such a t r e n d , while c e r t a i n l y  a t t r a c t i v e to the West, would, however, c e r t a i n l y be c o n t r a r y to the i n t e r e s t s of world peace.  The d r i f t towards war  can  only be checked by the most p e r s i s t e n t and p a t i e n t e f f o r t s to b r i n g and h o l d a l l s i d e s t o g e t h e r .  They cannot be  checked by h e l p i n g to b u i l d up the preponderance of one s i d e , which i n i t s e l f , and through i t s example upon o t h e r s , can have no r e s u l t other than t h a t of widening the  cleavage,  p u l l i n g down the b r i d g e s , and pushing the world a l i t t l e nearer to the b r i n k .  This c o n v i c t i o n i s the mainspring  India's foreign p o l i c y .  of  I t impels her, not towards  i s o l a t i o n i s m or any f i c t i t i o u s  n e u t r a l i t y , but to extend the  hand of f r i e n d s h i p to a l l , provided only t h a t the p r i c e of f r i e n d s h i p i s not conformity or subservience.  I t causes  her t o r e t a i n and develop a l l e x i s t i n g f r i e n d l y contacts as  137 w e l l as to e s t a b l i s h new ones.  For I n d i a t o abandon i t i n  favour of short-term p o l i t i c a l and economic advantages a c c r u i n g from alignment w i t h the West would not only be t o I n d i a ' s long-term disadvantage, but might w e l l hasten the approach of a world c o n f l i c t which I n d i a has s t r i v e n t o prevent.  Through a continuance of non-alignment, mediation  and the promotion of peace, I n d i a can best serve the cause of world peace.  BIBLIOGRAPHY  A.  Primary Sources  1. General Sources Department of State B u l l e t i n (Washington). Proceedings of the U. N. S e c u r i t y C o u n c i l and General Assembly. Year Book of the U n i t e d Nations. 2. C o l l e c t e d Documents Documents on American F o r e i g n R e l a t i o n s (New York, C o u n c i l on F o r e i g n A f f a i r s ) . Documents on I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (London, Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s ) . Documents and Speeches on B r i t i s h Commonwealth A f f a i r s 1931-1952. 2 v o l s (Royal I n s t i t u t e of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , 1953). 3. B i o g r a p h i e s , Autobiographies and C o l l e c t e d Speeches Bowles, Chester. Ambassador's Report (London, G o l l a n c z , 1954).  Cousins, N. Talks With Nehru (New York, John Day, 1 9 5 1 ) . Eden, The R t . Hon. S i r Anthony. F u l l C i r c l e C a s s e l l , I960).  (London,  I n t e r n a t i o n a l Commission of J u r i s t s . The Question of T i b e t and the Rule of Law (Geneva, 1959X» L i e , Trygve. I n The Cause of Peace (New York, M a c m i l l a n , 1954). N a r a i n , S. K. (ed.). Jawaharlal Nehru: S e l e c t i o n s (London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1956). Nehru, J a w a h a r l a l . An Autobiography (London, Bodley Head, 1942). 138  139  Nehru, J a w a h a r l a l . Before and A f t e r Independence: A C o l l e c t i o n of Speeches 1922-1950 (New D e l h i , I n d i a n P r i n t i n g Works, 1951). ; . Independence and A f t e r : A C o l l e c t i o n of Speeches 1946-194-9 (New York, John Day, 1950). . I n d i a and The World (London, A l l e n and Unwin, 193617 ; . S o v i e t R u s s i a : Some Random Sketches and Impressions (Bombay. Chetana. 194-9). .. . Speeches 194-6-1949 (New D e l h i , P u b l i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1958). Speeches 1949-1953 (New D e l h i , P u b l i c a t x o n s D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1 9 5 4 ) . . 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