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In search of peace and security - a study of Indian foreign policy in the cold war Kavic, Lorne John 1960

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IN SEARCH OF PEACE AND SECURITY - A STUDY OP INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE COLD WAR LORNE JOHN KAVIC A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to the standard required from candidates f o r the degree of Master of Arts Members of the Departments of THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA A p r i l , I960 In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t of the requirements f o r an advanced degree at the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree th a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood tha t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Lome J. Kavic. Department of History (international Studies) The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver 3, Canada. Date May 5 T 1960.  ABSTRACT Since India became independent i n August, 194-7, the Indian government has pursued a ' n e u t r a l i s t ' p o l i c y i n world a f f a i r s which has r a i s e d some doubts and d i f f i c u l t i e s , more p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Western non-communist camp. India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y , both generally and i n i t s various manifestations, has been frequently subject to b i t t e r c r i t i c i s m and has even been condemned as immoral and motivated by a pro-Communist bias . Such an analysis i s , of course, e n t i r e l y out of focus. I t i s hoped that t h i s t h e s i s w i l l help d i s p e l some of the doubts and c l e a r away some of the misinterpretations concerning the p o l i c i e s that the Indian government has pursued on the world stage. Various aspects of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y have been discussed by a number of w r i t e r s both i n general and i n s p e c i f i c degrees; however, to t h i s w r i t e r ' s knowledge, no one has attempted to view India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the manner treated i n t h i s t h e s i s . Within the l i m i t s placed by the proximity to the events discussed, t h i s study t r i e s to survey o b j e c t i v e l y India's foreign p o l i c y i n the cold war. Throughout t h i s study India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been discussed i n i t s various manifestations. A country's foreign p o l i c y n a t u r a l l y derives from a complex set of h i s t o r i c a l , geographic, economic and emotional f a c t o r s , and thus the context w i t h i n which Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y was formulated and the determinants upon which i t i s based are examined i n the f i r s t Chapter. Then i n Chapter Two, which describes India's approach to the problem of s e c u r i t y , are discussed the various e f f o r t s made by the Indian government to s a t i s f y , w i t h i n the bounds permitted by the country's resources, the s t r a t e g i c requirements of the State. Recog-n i z i n g that India's r e a l s e c u r i t y depends on removing tension from the world, however, India has sought the removal of Western controls over dependent Afro-Asian peoples as a concrete step towards peace. The t h i r d Chapter discusses t h i s , from India's i n i t i a l out-spoken championship of the cause of dependent peoples to a more recent moderate approach caused by a r e a l i z a t i o n that Western imperialism i s a 'dead issue' and that Communist imperialism i s the greater threat. In recognition that the d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o power blocs increases the chances of war, the Indian government has s t r i v e n to ease tension through f u r t h e r i n g the i d e a l s of the United Nations Charter, as i l l u s t r a t e d i n Chapter Four by her opposition to power blocs and to a l l i a n c e s , her advocacy of disarmament, and her championship of Red China's r i g h t to a seat at the United Nations. Aware of the d e l i c a t e peace e x i s t i n g between East and West and r e a l i z i n g that a world war could r e s u l t from any dispute i n v o l v i n g the r i v a l i n t e r e s t s of the two power blocs, India has sought to prevent such an occurrence through dealing with each issue on i t s i n t r i n s i c merits. India also understands that the only a l t e r n a t i v e to coexistence i s co-destruction, and she has sought to i n s t i l l t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n i n both the Communist and non-Communist camps. These two aspects of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y are discussed i n Chapters Five and S i x . F i n a l l y , a b r i e f attempt i s made to summarize India's foreign p o l i c y and to a r r i v e at some general conclusions. I g r a t e f u l l y acknowledge the constant advice and guidance of Dr. P. Harnetty whose constructive suggestions f a c i l i t a t e d the w r i t i n g of t h i s paper. TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter Page I Reasons, Aims, and Purposes of Indian Foreign P o l i c y 1 I I Indian Security i n the Cold "War 17 I I I India and the Dependent Peoples 34-IV India and a P o l i c y of Peace 59 V Indian Mediation i n East-West Disputes . . . 80 VI India and the P o l i c y of Panch S h i l a . . . . 106 VII Conclusion 126 Bibliography 138 ABBREVIATIONS D.S.B. Doc. Amer. For. R e l . Doc. I . A f f . G.O.I. I.C.W.A. I.P.R. R.I.I.A. S.I. A f f . Y.B.U.N. Department of State B u l l e t i n (Washington). Documents on American Foreign Relations (World Peace Foundation, Boston). Documents on Inte r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (R.I.I.A., London). Government of India. Indian Council of World A f f a i r s (New D e l h i ) . American I n s t i t u t e of P a c i f i c Relations (New York). Royal I n s t i t u t e of Inte r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (London). , Survey of In t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s (R.I.I.A.). Yearbook of the United Nations. CHAPTER I REASONS, AIMS, AND PURPOSES OF INDIAN FOREIGN POLICY A country's f o r e i g n p o l i c y u l t i m a t e l y emerges from i t s own t r a d i t i o n s , from i t s own objectives and more p a r t i c u l a r l y from i t s recent past.^ Independence f o r India unhappily coincided with one of the most troubled and menacing periods i n world h i s t o r y . The world was r a p i d l y p o l a r i z i n g i n t o the Soviet and Western blocs, and with the enunciation on 12 March 194-7 of the Truman doctrine to contain Communism, and the issuance on 5 October 1947 of a Communist Manifesto i n Moscow and Warsaw, no f u r t h e r evidence was needed to show that the s p l i t i n the two camps was sharp and world-wide. The immediate impact of t h i s h o s t i l e combination of forces was f e l t by an India which looked forward only to a period of peaceful reconstruction i n which to meet the enormous needs of her people. Instead India, at her very b i r t h , was plunged, much against her wishes, into the very centre of gigantic revolutionary forces and power r i v a l r i e s and was presented with the immediate challenge of choosing a f o r e i g n p o l i c y i n the conte;acfc of a world d i v i d i n g between Communism and anti-Communism. She was given no opportunity 1 2 to f e e l her way slowly towards a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of Indian i n t e r e s t s . At once India was c a l l e d upon to take an a t t i t u d e on such questions as Palestine and Indonesia, and soon a f t e r -wards she was faced with a decisive change i n Asian a f f a i r s when the Communist regime was established i n China. As a new nation of vast siz e and great p o s s i b i l i t i e s , India was forced by circumstances to c l a r i f y her p o s i t i o n and thereafter to assume the major r o l e accorded her i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l diplomacy. This meant formulating a foreign p o l i c y i n accordance with her n a t i o n a l b e l i e f s and i n t e r e s t s , a p o l i c y which, i n a d d i t i o n to dealing with immediate problems, would also act as a means of strengthening i n t e r n a l u n i t y . India had not only to present a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c image of her-s e l f to the world. She had also to make that image e f f e c t i v e by diplomatic action and see that the i n t e r e s t s she pursued were consonant with i t and capable of being pursued w i t h i n the context of world a f f a i r s . One has only to read Mr. Nehru's speeches between 1946 and 1949 "to see how urgent was t h i s sense of need f o r a conception of i n t e r e s t s and p o l i c y which would be both appropriate and r e a l i s t i c . Indian views on i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s may be traced to a multitude of sources, some rooted i n t r a d i t i o n and experience, others d e r i v i n g from the contemporary world. To understand India's foreign p o l i c y i t i s important to have a sound appreciation of the factors which c o l l e c t i v e l y determine 3 that p o l i c y and which have provided and are providing the motivation f o r the unequivocal execution of that p o l i c y . Only i n the context of India's needs and her i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the nature of the world c o n f l i c t can India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y he properly understood. A c a r e f u l probe i n t o these w i l l shed the outer mists and lead to a proper assessment of the aims behind Indian foreign p o l i c y . Napoleon once declared that the fore i g n p o l i c y of a state derives e s s e n t i a l l y from i t s geographic p o s i t i o n . While t h i s i s no longer e n t i r e l y accurate, because of the re v o l u t i o n i n technology during the past century, the bare f a c t s of geography do l i m i t a state's freedom of a c t i o n i n forei g n a f f a i r s . That geography i s a determinant of India's fo r e i g n r e l a t i o n s was stressed by Mr. Nehru on 23 March 194-7 i n a speech to the Asian Relations Conference i n Delh i : "Geography i s a compelling f a c t o r , and geographically she /Tndia7 i s so situated as to be the meeting point of Western p and Northern and Eastern and South East A s i a . " India's geographical c o n t i g u i t y to the two Great Powers of the Com-munist world can never be ignored by Indian statesmen, e s p e c i a l l y the simple f a c t that Communist China presses down upon a thousand miles of India's northern and eastern f r o n t i e r s . Thus i t i s a matter of v i t a l necessity f o r India to f i n d a modus vivendi with these powerful neighbours, though v i t a l i n t e r e s t s must be protected, as i n the case of the t i n y border states. 4 At the same time India cannot ignore the f a c t that she has 3500 miles of coastline and i s extremely dependent upon the sea routes f o r the flow of goods and services. The importance of t h i s f a c t o r has been acknowledged by the noted Indian p u b l i c i s t K. M. Pannikar: While to other countries the Indian Ocean i s only one of the most important Oceanic areas, to India i t i s the v i t a l sea. Her l i f e l i n e s are concentrated i n that area. Her future i s dependent on the freedom of that vast water surface. No i n d u s t r i a l development, no commercial growth, no stable p o l i t i c a l structure i s possible f o r her, unless the Indian Ocean i s free and her own shores f u l l y protected.^ Thus i t i s equally important f o r India to preserve f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with those powers ( i . e . the Western bloc) whose navies could e a s i l y t h r o t t l e India's v i t a l sea-borne l i f e i n the u n l i k e l y event of the need f o r such action a r i s i n g . Moreover, India's p o s i t i o n at the head of the Indian Ocean gives i t an important stake i n the p o w e r - p o l i t i c a l r i v a l r i e s a f f e c t i n g a l l states i n the region. Closely l i n k e d with the geographic pressure on India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y are those factors stemming from her m i l i t a r y and economic weakness — of which her leaders are 4 w e l l aware. India f e e l s that she lacks the necessary strength to choose sides i n the cold war, even i f she would otherwise be apt to do so. As a r e s u l t Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru has declared that i t i s better f o r India to stand aside from 5 i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t s f o r " i t would not be i n consonance with...dignity...to i n t e r f e r e without any e f f e c t being produced."-^ Regarding the p o s s i b i l i t y of a threat to India from the Communist bloc, p a r t i c u l a r l y China, the Indian government has h i t h e r t o expressed no f e a r s . While i t s actions, e s p e c i a l l y those concerning Pakistan and her other smaller Himalayan neighbours would seem to indicate a c l e a r awareness and concern f o r India's s e c u r i t y against Chinese actions, the Nehru government has maintained that India would not be promoting her s e c u r i t y by j o i n i n g the Western bloc. This was c l e a r l y i l l u s t r a t e d by Mr. Nehru's statement i n the Indian Parliament on 21 December 1950: India i s more secure than 90% of the countries of the world, not on the basis of her armed strength, but judging from the present world s i t u a t i o n , the danger to India i n the near future i s f a r l e s s than that threatening more powerful and advanced nations.^ India's economic weakness i s a further conditioning f a c t o r i n the general o r i e n t a t i o n of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y . Domestic economic needs govern the external p o l i c y of every 7 country and t h i s i s e s p e c i a l l y true of India.' Nehru has not hesitated to admit that h i s f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s d i r e c t e d towards meeting h i s country's pressing domestic needs both i n acquiring f i n a n c i a l and t e c h n i c a l assistance f o r her i n t e r n a l development and to gaining time i n which to achieve 6 the necessary degree of development. "The f i r s t thing we kept i n view," said Nehru i n one of h i s parliamentary speeches, "was to b u i l d our own country on s o l i d foundations and not to get entangled i n matters which did not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t us - not that we are not inte r e s t e d i n those matters, but the burden of these entanglements would be too great and the problems we had to face i n our own country were b i g Q enough f o r any country to face." Consequently, India's pressing needs of economic development have caused her to keep open the door to a l l possible sources of a i d , Western and Soviet, i f the desired economic r e v o l u t i o n i s to be achieved. The Indian Prime M i n i s t e r has stated that. India i s p e r f e c t l y prepared and happy to receive f o r e i g n a i d from any source, but at the same time he has also p l a i n l y declared that i f help from abroad at any time depended upon a v a r i a t i o n , howsoever s l i g h t , i n India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y , then India would r e l i n q u i s h that help completely and prefer s t a r v a t i o n and p r i v a t i o n to taking such h e l p I n the pursuit of economic development, then, India has considered a p o l i c y of non-alignment to be i n her best i n t e r e s t s . For i n the words of the former Secretary-General of India's External A f f a i r s M i n i s t r y , the l a t e G. S. Bajpai: I t cannot be argued that any immediate Indian i n t e r e s t s w i l l be served by t h i s country i m p l i c a t i n g h e r s e l f , by ' a r t i f i c i a l 7 t i e s ' . . . i n the ordinary combinations or c o a l i t i o n s of the friendships or enmities of the two camps i n which the major part of the world i s to-day unfortunately divided. Just as the s e c u r i t y and economic needs of India have demanded /In the opinion of the Indian government/ that India pursue a p o l i c y of non-alignment i n the cold war, so too has the temper of Indian p u b l i c opinion supported the same view. While Indian p u b l i c opinion has tended to follow rather than lead the Government i n the formulation of i t s fore i g n p o l i c y , the Nehru government has generally been c a r e f u l not to go against the sentiments of the people. The over-riding public sentiment has i n e v i t a b l y been one of a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m which was bequeathed to the Indian people as a natural by-product of c o l o n i a l subjection and the n a t i o n a l i s t r e v o l u t i o n . As one well-known Indian p u b l i c i s t has observed: The antipathy to imperialism i s deep-rooted i n the minds of everyone i n India, and that has been acquired not from books, but from nati o n a l e x p e r i e n c e . ^ Almost two centuries of foreign r u l e produced an i n s t i n c t i v e antagonism to any form of Western (white) domination over Asian and A f r i c a n (non-white) peoples. The sharp d i s t i n c t i o n which Indians make between Western European colonialism i n Asia and A f r i c a and Russian co n t r o l over eastern Europe and c e n t r a l A s ia i s due to the f a c t that India, p r i o r to the 8 recent Chinese incursions on her borders, had never exper-ienced external Communist domination of any p o r t i o n of her 12 t e r r i t o r y . On the contrary, by championing * a n t i - c o l o n i a l * movements throughout A s i a and A f r i c a , the Communists powers appeared i n a very favourable l i g h t to most Indians. I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g , then, that u n t i l quite recent years, the Indian people considered the term "imperialism" as synonymous with the nations of the West. In a d d i t i o n most of the present Indian leaders experienced the i n j u r y to pride and n a t i o n a l self-respect a r i s i n g from personal mistreatment and h u m i l i a t i o n under the c o l o n i a l regime, and thus a r e s i d u a l emotional antipathy i n e v i t a b l y clouded t h e i r assessment of the contemporary world struggle. The i n t e n s i t y of t h i s resentment and the occasions f o r i t s expression have v a r i e d , but i t has constituted a f a i r l y formidably b a r r i e r to any close alignment with the West — to which India i s p o l i t i c a l l y and economically drawn. Mr. Nehru expressed t h i s f e e l i n g i n a speech of 22 March 194-9: ...any attempt on our part...to go too f a r i n one d i r e c t i o n would create d i f f i c u l t i e s i n our own country. I t would be resented and would produce c o n f l i c t s which would not be h e l p f u l to us or to any other c o u n t r y . ^ This reluctance to associate too c l o s e l y with the West i s reinforced by the f a c t that c e r t a i n aspects of communist doctrine have considerable a t t r a c t i o n f o r Indians. 9 For on the issue of the i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t between East and West the Indian view i s that d i f f e r e n t economic and p o l i t i c a l systems are suited to d i f f e r e n t s o c i e t i e s . Nehru spoke very c l e a r l y on the subject on 22 March 194-9: We must r e a l i z e that there are d i f f e r e n t types of economic p o l i c y i n the world to-day i n d i f f e r e n t countries, and they are believed i n by t h e i r people. Well, the only thing to do i s to leave them to work out t h e i r destiny.... Any e f f o r t to change the economic p o l i c y , or any other i n t e r n a l p o l i c y f o r c i b l y , or to bring pressure to bear upon i t leads to counter-pressure and to continuous c o n f l i c t . . . . We have had a philosophy which i s a l i v e - a n d - l e t - l i v e philosophy of l i f e . We have no desire to convert other people to any view or thought.,^ India believes i n the democratic way and has fought communists at home f o r c o n s t i t u t i n g a threat to pub l i c peace and f o r actions c a l c u l a t e d to challenge the foundation of democratic government. But t h i s d i d not mean /In the view of the Nehru government/ that India should p i c k up quarrels with countries which were conducting themselves i n the communist way. She was not going to embark upon a 'moral crusade f o r the benefit 15 of mankind' on behalf of her own way of l i f e . y India holds that the problems of the East-West struggle, i f they are to be solved, should not be seen i n terms of Communism and anti-Communism, one e v i l and the other virtuous. Neither side should t r y to impose i t s own ideology on the rest of the world. This p r a c t i c a l and dispassionate approach on the issue was commented upon by Robert Trumbul, New York Times 10 correspondent i n Delhi: India as a nation hardly has such a luxurious s o c i a l structure that the mass of the people are f i e r c e l y deter-mined to defend the way of l i f e against communist e f f o r t s to make i t over... Indians generally lack that l o a t h i n g of communism that so deeply influences United States p o l i c i e s . i e -This, he explained, was the reason f o r India's separation from the fo r e f r o n t of to-day's i d e o l o g i c a l c o n f l i c t . A f i n a l f a c t o r that merits a t t e n t i o n as a deter-minant of the general course of India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y i s the strong nationalism of the Indian people. Proud of t h e i r independence, Indians have "been zealous to guard i t from any infringement. Membership of a bloc i s equated with l o s s of freedom of action i n external a f f a i r s . Mr. Nehru pointed t h i s out i n a parliamentary debate when, i n answer to a suggestion that India give up her middle p o l i c y , he declared that j o i n i n g a bloc could only mean that India give up her own view about a p a r t i c u l a r question and adopt the other party's view on that question i n order to please i t 17 and gain i t s favour. ' India considered h e r s e l f to be an important nation i n her own r i g h t , destined and determined to play an important r o l e i n world a f f a i r s . Mr. C. R. Rajagopalachari once observed i n Parliament: Our power i s very l i t t l e , but our importance i s not as l i t t l e as our power. There i s a great difference between the power that we now possess and the importance which without our seeking has been thrust upon India.-,« 11 This i s the basis of India's independent p o l i c y . She does not intend to be the playthings of others. Consequently India i s not prepared to take a d e c i s i o n because one or the other bloc wishes her t o , but only on the basis of what she considers r i g h t i n her own l i g h t and i n conformity with her own i n t e r e s t s . She w i l l judge great i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues on t h e i r merits and not as Washington or London or any other place decrees. These, then, are some of the factors that shape India's d i s t i n c t i v e view of the world. That outlook i n turn moulds the character of India's foreign p o l i c y . However, the task of discerning the basic aims of that p o l i c y presents several d i f f i c u l t i e s i n that India's p o l i c y has been i n a 19 stage of development since independence. J Often Indian foreign p o l i c y has lacked c l a r i t y and the vague terms i n which i t has been couched, l i k e 'independent p o l i c y , ' 'neutralism,' and ' p o l i c y of non-alignment' has made i t confusing and b a f f l i n g . This has l e d to widely held misconceptions concerning the general aims of India's external p o l i c y and has provoked many unfavourable reactions to i t i n 20 both the communist and non-communist worlds, and w i t h i n India i t s e l f . The p o l i c y of India i s often looked upon i n the West as simply the r e f l e c t i o n of some perverse, short-sighted or s e l f i s h code of Indian values which f a i l s to d i s t i n g u i s h between communism and the democratic t r a d i t i o n s of the West — or s t i l l worse, which favours the Marxist 12 philosophy. This explains a widespread tendency i n the West, and e s p e c i a l l y i n the United States, to condemn Indian 'neutralism, 1 or whatever i t can be c a l l e d , as some-how immoral, and even the spurious facade of an underlying pro-communist bia s . Such ill-tempered analysis i s , of course, e n t i r e l y out of focus. India's foreign p o l i c y i s based, as has been indicated above, on a number of factors and has consequently manifested i t s e l f i n various ways, a l l of which are but r e f l e c t i o n s of two basic and i n t e r r e l a t e d aims — peace and se c u r i t y . The statutory basis f o r these twin aims and, by inference, of the general o r i e n t a t i o n of Indian foreign p o l i c y i n i t s various manifestations, i s A r t i c l e 51 of the Con s t i t u t i o n of India. The state s h a l l endeavour to: (a) promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y (b) maintain ju s t and honourable r e l a t i o n s between nations (c) f o s t e r respect f o r i n t e r n a t i o n a l law and tre a t y obligations i n the dealings of organized peoples with one another, and, (d) encourage settlement of i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes by arbitration.21 In the p o l i c y of non-alignment India seeks to achieve these aims by avoiding involvement i n any t h i r d world war. Non-alignment i s not, therefore, as i s often wrongly believed, 1 3 the aim of Indian foreign p o l i c y , but the instrument through which India hopes to remain neutral i n a world c o n f l i c t i n which her t o t a l destruction i s a phys i c a l p o s s i b i l i t y . However, few Indians r e a l l y believe that i t would be possible f o r t h e i r country to remain neutral i n another major war i n view of the progressive e l i m i n a t i o n of time and space which has brought countries much nearer each other and made them more dependent on each other than ever before. In one of h i s most blunt utterances Mr. Nehru declared that India would not j o i n a war i f she could help i t but, i n view of the f a c t that i t was a d i f f i c u l t matter nowadays i n world wars to be n e u t r a l , i f the choice came India was going 22 to j o i n the side which was to her i n t e r e s t . Nehru him-s e l f has stated h i s country's p o s i t i o n i n the event of a hot war. Speaking before the Constituent Assembly on 8 March 1948 he stated that: ...we stand i n t h i s country f o r democracy, we stand f o r an Independent India. Now obviously, anything that i s opposed to the democratic concept — the r e a l , e s s e n t i a l l y democratic concept, which includes not only p o l i t i c a l but economic democracy — we ought to oppose.25 To prevent having to make such a choice, the Indian government has been determined to do a l l i n i t s power to lessen the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of a world c o n f l i c t and to promote the cause of world peace. In h i s very f i r s t 14 message to Parliament, the President of India, Dr. Rajendra Prasad r e i t e r a t e d that h i s country had i n h e r i t e d no enmities or t r a d i t i o n a l r i v a l r i e s and intended to maintain peace and friend s h i p with a l l the nations of the world and to help i n 24 every way possible i n the maintenance of world peace. Mrs. Pandit, Chairman of the Indian Delegation to the United Nations echoed t h i s aim when, i n her f i r s t speech i n the General Assembly, she declared that "We /the Indian dele-gation/ stand f o r peace and w i l l devote our resources and energy towards the a b o l i t i o n of a l l the causes which lead to war." 2 5 ; In the pursuit of peace India i s motivated not only by her s e l f - i n t e r e s t but also by the p r i n c i p l e s of non-violence of ahimsa and the di c t a t e s of love and peace expounded by Buddha some twenty-five hundred years ago. Mr. Nehru stressed t h i s point i n December 1956 while speaking on "The Indian Way i n International A f f a i r s . " ...the Indian people seemed to have developed a t r a d i t i o n to do things peacefully.... I f there was any message which India offered to other countries i t was t h i s message of doing things by peaceful methods to solve any problem.^ Although the p u r i s t Gandhian conception of ahimsa has been termed impracticable by Nehru and h i s colleagues, and though force has been resorted to — notably i n Hyderabad (1948) and Kashmir (1947-8) — the p r i n c i p l e has been accepted as 15 an i d e a l to be sought a f t e r and as a method to be pursued wherever possible. Indian leaders have endeavoured to give the s a n c t i t y and authority of r e l i g i o n to t h e i r purposes i n world a f f a i r s . The s p i r i t u a l , the non-violent, approach of India i n her r e l a t i o n to other nations i s a constant theme, and has caused at l e a s t one observer to comment that i t i s i n the l i g h t of India's moral idealism that her approach to 27 world a f f a i r s must be viewed. ' That t h i s view i s not n e c e s s a r i l y so i s indicated by the care Nehru has taken to indicate to h i s Indian audiences that h i s p o l i c y i s one which looks f i r s t to India's i n t e r e s t s . But he has also declared that the general i n t e r e s t s of India are served by the kind of p o l i c y which i s now recognizable as d i s t i n c t i v e l y Indian. In t r u t h , the p o l i c y of 'dynamic neutralism' or 'non-alignment' which India has followed — and i s f o l l o w i n g — i s a r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y c alculated to protect her national s e l f - i n t e r e s t . Mr. Nehru has himself recognized that the a r t of conducting the f o r e i g n a f f a i r s of a country l i e s i n f i n d i n g out what i s most advantageous to the country, whether a country i s 29 i m p e r i a l i s t i c or s o c i a l i s t or communist. y In the p o l i c y of non-alignment India has found the t r i p l e coincidence of serving her long- and short-term i n t e r e s t s , the i n t e r e s t s of world peace and a moral j u s t i f i c a t i o n i n a 'policy of peace' which i s not easy to f i n d i n mere neutralism. 16 Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y has been neither passive nor negative; t h i s i s evidence by the r61e India has been pla y i n g i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s since she attained independence i n 194-7. The chief features of India's foreign p o l i c y as r e f l e c t e d i n her decisions and actions may be summarized as follows: the preservation of Indian independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y by non-alignment with e i t h e r side i n the cold war, creation of a peace area and p o s i t i v e actions on the f r o n t i e r s ; removal of a root cause of tension and c o n f l i c t through championing the cause of dependent peoples i n Asia and A f r i c a ; opposition to a l l i a n c e s and the non-recognition of Communist China as steps which increase tension i n the world; a p o s i t i v e a s s e r t i o n of independent judgement on a l l cold war issues with a view to mediating between the r i v a l blocs; and furtherance of the doctrine of peaceful co-existence as the only a l t e r n a t i v e to mutual destruction. A l l other features of Indian f o r e i g n p o l i c y are but refinements of these core elements. Footnotes - Chapter I 1 Jawharlal Nehru, Speeches 194-6-194-9 (New D e l h i , P u blications D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1958), p. 264. 2 I b i d . , p. 3 0 2 . 3 P. M. Pannikar, India and the Indian Ocean (London, 1945) , p. 8 3 . 4 An example i s a statement by Mr. Nehru i n 1950 i n which he declared: "In t h i s country such army, navy and a i r f o r c e that we have i s a t i n y a f f a i r as compared to the vast armadas of other nations...judged by modern standards, we are weak, m i l i t a r i l y weak, economically weak, and so on." "Nationalism i n Asia," International Journal, Winter 1950-1951, P . 9 . 5 Speech to the Indian Constituent Assembly ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) on 8 March 1948. Independence and A f t e r , p. 215. 6 Quoted i n J . C. Kundra, Indian Foreign P o l i c y 1947-1954 (Bombay, Vora, 1955) , p. 71 . 7 L. K. Eosinger has a p t l y observed what the consequences would be f o r India i n the event of war. "A t h i r d world war could bring d i s a s t e r to the country, making economic havoc, generating tremendous i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l pressures and perhaps turning her into a b a t t l e - f i e l d . The Government /of I n d i a / was aware that developments along these l i n e s would make i t s own s u r v i v a l completely uncertain." L. E. Eosinger, India and the United States (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1 9 5 0 ) , p. 3 6 . 8 JawaJiarlal Nehru, Speeches 1949-1953 (New D e l h i , P u b l i c a t i o n s D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1954), p. 141. 9 A speech during a foreign p o l i c y debate on 12 June 1952 i n the Indian Parliament, I b i d . , p. 2 2 2 . 10 G. S. Bajpai, "India and the Balance of Power," Indian Yearbook of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 1 (Madras, 1 9 5 2 ) , p. 4 . 11 A. Appadorai, "Indian Foreign P o l i c y , " I nternational  A f f a i r s (London), January 1949, p. 3 8 . 12 The Indian Communist Party, however, governed the state of Kerala f o r a short period as a r e s u l t of i t s e l e c t i o n , by democratic process, i n 1951* i 13 Speech to the Con s t i t u t i o n Club i n New D e l h i , Independence and A f t e r , p. 257. 14 A speech delivered at the Indian Council of World A f f a i r s , New D e l h i , March 2 2 , 1949, I b i d . , p. 216. 15 Chester Bowles, Ambassador's Report (London, Gollancz, 1 9 5 4 ) , p. 103. 16 The New York Times. January 28, 1951. 17 Independence and A f t e r , p. 218. 18 Quoted i n T. M. P. Mahadevan, "India's P o l i c y of Non-Alignment," The Indian Yearbook of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 (Madras, 1953) , p. 2 3 . 19 Nehru said on 22 March 1949 i n New Delhi: "Foreign p o l i c y i s something which develops gradually...in the present context of for e i g n p o l i c y we are a young country and, there-f o r e , our for e i g n p o l i c y i s gradually developing." Independence and A f t e r , p. 253* 20 See Senator Knowland's Address, November 1953 on a • P a c i f i c NATO.' Doc. Amer. For. E e l . 1953, pp. 129-130. Senator Knowland described India's n e u t r a l i s t p o l i c y as a "very.naive p o l i c y , " and warned that " i t w i l l be a f a t a l mistake i f the whole Free World s i t s t w i d d ling i t s thumbs waiting f o r India to take some e f f e c t i v e steps that would help r e s i s t Communism i n Asia." 21 The Con s t i t u t i o n of India (New D e l h i , Publications D i v i s i o n , G.O.I., 1952) , p. 2 1 . 22 Independence and A f t e r , p. 2 0 0 . 23 I b i d . , p. 217. 24 Quoted i n Mahadevan, op. c i t . , p. 2 9 . 25 The United Nations, The Second Session of the General  Assembly, v o l . 1, p. 137* 26 Indiagram, No. 851 , December 2 9 , 1955. 27 W. Norman Brown, "Indian National Ideals Today," Mary Keatings Das Memorial Lecture, Columbia U n i v e r s i t y . Cited i n T. W. Wallbank, India i n the New Era (New York, Scott, Foresman and Co., 1958) , p. 310. 28 Independence and A f t e r , p. 2 0 0 . 29 I b i d . , pp. 204-205. i i CHAPTER I I INDIAN SECURITY IN THE COLD WAR ...no government can say that i t stands f o r peace and do nothing about i t . We have to take precautions and prepare ourselves to the best of our a b i l i t y ^ The most important aim of Indian foreign p o l i c y has n a t u r a l l y been the preservation of India's independence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y . Paced with the challenging i n t e r n a l task of providing a better l i f e f o r the poverty-s t r i c k e n Indian masses, the Government of India adopted a p o l i c y of non-alignment with e i t h e r of the power blocs as being i n the country's best i n t e r e s t s . India looked at the two giant c o a l i t i o n s of h o s t i l e nations, armed to the teeth and equipped with destructive weapons of categories that India d i d not possess — could not possess f o r a long time and d i d not even want to possess — and at her own m i l i t a r y 2 strength. She calculated that to be attacked by e i t h e r of these c o a l i t i o n s would be disastrous to the nation. The Government would, therefore, not provoke e i t h e r of the two c o a l i t i o n s to attack India, i n case of war, by j o i n i n g on one side or the other. y I f the unexpected were to happen, however, and 1 7 18 India were attacked by the Soviet Union and/or Communist China, the Indian government could assume with a confidence born of s t r a i g h t l o g i c that the West would come to her a i d i n any event. Thus India saw a possible chance of remaining n e u t r a l , i f a war broke out, under the p r e v a i l i n g m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l s i t u a t i o n . She calculated that she would not be promoting her s e c u r i t y by j o i n i n g e i t h e r of the power blocs, a view c l e a r l y enunciated by the l a t e Mr. G. S. Bajpai, a former Secretary-General of India's External A f f a i r s M i n i s t r y : I t cannot be argued that any immediate Indian i n t e r e s t s w i l l be served by t h i s country i m p l i c a t i n g h e r s e l f , by a r t i f i c i a l t i e s . . . i n the ordinary combinations or c o a l i t i o n s of the friendships or enmities of the two camps i n which the major part of the world i s to-day unfortunately d i v i d e d . ^ So f a r as India's i n i t i a l external r e l a t i o n s were concerned, she had enough troubles with neighbouring Pakistan: hence r e l a t i o n s with that country were the main concern of the Indian foreign o f f i c e . The story of t h i s t r a g i c enmity between the successors to the B r i t i s h Raj i s too w e l l known to require a lengthy exposition i n t h i s paper. 5 S u f f i c e i t to note that India and Pakistan have been i n a state of undeclared war, with varying degrees of i n t e n s i t y , throughout t h e i r b r i e f h i s t o r y as, independent states. The constant threat of renewed m i l i t a r y h o s t i l i t i e s over Kashmir has compelled India to channel a large portion of her l i m i t e d 1 9 fluids i n t o defence — an annual average of 50 per cent of her budget. This, i n t u r n , has had grave economic reper-cussions, notably the slowing-down of much-needed development programmes. The s t r a t e g i c consequences have been no l e s s severe. The Indian sub-continent i s a n a t u r a l m i l i t a r y unit whose s e c u r i t y depends on j o i n t defence p o l i c i e s and co-7 ordination of t h e i r armed forces.' The h i s t o r i c threat to the area has been from the north-west, and any future invasion of that area would i n e v i t a b l y a f f e c t India. Instead of m i l i t a r y co-operation with Pakistan, however, India was forced to prepare f o r a possible war with her neighbour — a war which, i f i t occurred, could destroy the s t a b i l i t y of the sub-continent and cause i n c a l c u l a b l e harm f o r i t s 4-50 m i l l i o n inhabitants. Under these circumstances i t was not unnatural f o r the Indian leaders to i n i t i a l l y take a distant view of the cold war. Their general approach to i t can be summed up as: 'we s h a l l have nothing to do with i t . ' With the coming into power i n China of the Com-munists, however, India could no longer be a d i s t a n t on-looker. For despite persistent statements by spokesmen of the Indian government that they considered the threat from g Communism to be i n t e r n a l rather than ex t e r n a l , that Govern-ment has drawn the proper conclusions f o r India's s e c u r i t y from i t s evaluation of Communist party p o l i c i e s . India b e l i e s i n deeds what i t maintains v e r b a l l y , namely that 20 Communist governments and Communist p a r t i e s are dis t i n g u i s h a b l e . The l a t t e r pretence i t has maintained f o r p o l i t i c a l convenience, but i t has not acted accordingly. In a discreet and unosten-ta t i o u s manner India has taken the precautions available wi t h i n i t s l i m i t e d means to secure i t s f r o n t i e r s , i n i t i a l l y against Pakistan, but since 1950 p r i m a r i l y against the two neighbouring Communist giants — and e s p e c i a l l y against China. The measures that India has taken on her northern f r o n t i e r s , though obligatory f o r any Government under any conditions, indicate by t h e i r timing and nature that India has not over-looked possible aggression from e i t h e r Communist state and notably from China. The Nehru administration i s w e l l aware that the huge Chinese state has an imperial t r a d i t i o n of expansion during periods of resurgence; that at one time i t s armies and power c o n t r o l l e d much of c e n t r a l , southern, and south-eastern A s i a . I f the Indian government a c t u a l l y f e l t at the outset that the p o l i c y of a Communist Chinese government would be other than expansionist, i t was given a sharp reminder when Peking pri n t e d maps showing parts of Burma, Assam, Kashmir and Nepal under t h e i r r u l e . Some p u b l i c i s t s believe that a clash i s i n e v i t a b l e between the two giants of Asia — India and China. Even before the l a t t e r had come under Communist domination, Arnold Toynbee had w r i t t e n : In the end the current of Chinese expansion i n the t r o p i c s w i l l meet the current of Hindu expansion over the submerged heads of 21 the smaller and weaker and l e s s e f f i c i e n t peoples i n between who are already f a s t going under.^ While Nehru may or may not believe t h i s e v e ntuality to be a v a l i d one, he has taken no chances, f o r the p r a c t i c a l e f f e c t of Communist Chinese p o l i c y has been to gr e a t l y d i s t u r b I n d i a 1 s sense of s e c u r i t y . U n t i l the Tibetan invasion, most Indians f e l t safe behind the towering Himalayas 1^ and the mountains along the North-West F r o n t i e r . Security — other than against P a k i s t a n i incursions which could be momentarily embarrassing but never a di r e threat to the s e c u r i t y of the Indian Union — was one of the l e a s t discussed subjects i n Indian p o l i t i c s . Those who were concerned with i t as laymen were u s u a l l y rather speculative about i t , r a r e l y assuming that the problem might become acute i n the forseeable future. With the Chinese Communist conquest of Tibet i n the f a l l of 1950, however, and the sharp rebuff Peking gave to Indian protests, consternation was aroused i n India. The i m p l i c a t i o n s of the Chinese action f o r long-term Indian s e c u r i t y were not p a r t i -c u l a r l y consoling, as large Chinese forces were now on India's very b o r d e r s . x x Members of Parliament and the Press began to voice t h e i r concern and the Government was accused of neglecting the country's defenses. While these charges at the time may have had some basis i n t r u t h , the subsequent actions of the Nehru government have aimed at providing a d d i t i o n a l s e c u r i t y f o r India. These s e c u r i t y decisions, 22 p a r t i c u l a r l y with reference to the Himalayan areas of Bhutan, Sikkim and Nepal, deserve n o t i c e . There are f i r s t of a l l the measures taken with i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Indian government. Thus i n the northeast f r o n t i e r area w i t h i n India the Government has been b u i l d i n g roads and a i r s t r i p s . Indian army detachments are on the a l e r t at various points. In 1953 a s p e c i a l section was established i n the M i n i s t r y of External A f f a i r s to extend p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l over the w i l d border areas with the help of Indian army u n i t s , and e s p e c i a l l y vigorous action has 12 been taken against r e b e l l i o u s Naga tribesmen. In addition the Indian government has taken acti o n to guard the border between Ladakh (Kashmir) and western Tibet. Here the Government of Uttar Pradesh, with the help of the c e n t r a l government at New D e l h i , has established s p e c i a l constabulary force to p a t r o l and c o n t r o l the f r o n t i e r i n the Kumaon area. In i t s r e l a t i o n s with t i n y Bhutan which, l i k e Sikkim, i s regarded by New Delhi as being w i t h i n India's i n t e r n a t i o n a l f r o n t i e r , the Indian government showed i t s security-consciousness i n a t r e a t y concluded with that state on August 8, 1 9 4 - 9 . U n d e r the provisions of t h i s t r e a t y , the Government of India guaranteed Bhutan's i n t e r n a l autonomy and promised to give Bhutan an annual subsidy of 500,000 rupees (approximately $100,000.00) i n l i e u of commitments entered into i n the old t r e a t i e s with Great B r i t a i n i n 1865 2 5 and 1910. In return the Government of Bhutan agreed to be guided by the advice of New Delhi i n i t s external r e l a t i o n s and India was given supervisory p r i v i l e g e s over the import-a t i o n of warlike material or stores which might be required or desired f o r the strength and welfare of Bhutan. Since October 1951, when the appointment of the Dalai Lama and the Panchen Lama as members of the Consultative Conference of the Chinese People's Republic suggested that Tibet had become an i n t e g r a l part of China, Indian-sponsored defense a c t i v i t i e s i n Bhutan, such as the construction of road l i n k s and defen-14 sive f r o n t i e r posts have increased both i n number and tempo. The s i t u a t i o n i n Sikkim has been s l i g h t l y more complicated. According to t r e a t i e s signed between Great B r i t a i n and China i n 1 8 9 0 x ^ and 1 8 9 3 , 1 6 Sikkim had become a B r i t i s h protectorate. India i n h e r i t e d these t r e a t i e s and the r i g h t to send a p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r to a s s i s t the Maharaja i n the administration of the country. In 1949 considerable unrest and occasional r i o t i n g developed throughout the country as a r e s u l t of d i s s a t i s f a c t i o n with the feudal system. Acting upon the request of the Maharaja, the Indian government intervened on June 7, 1949, i n the " i n t e r e s t s of law and order," and a detachment of s o l d i e r s was sent under the general d i r e c t i o n of the p o l i t i c a l o f f i c e r who resided at Gangtok and represented India i n Bhutan as w e l l . The Indian government then nominated an o f f i c e r to serve as Dewan ( i . e . c hief administrator) of Sikkim. 24 Relations were regular i z e d by a tr e a t y signed on 17 December 5, 1950, ' and Sikkim was formally designated a "Protectorate of India." Subsequent a r t i c l e s i n the tr e a t y made India responsible f o r the defence and t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of Sikkim and gave India the r i g h t to construct and maintain communications f o r s t r a t e g i c purposes and the r i g h t to take such measures as i t considers necessary f o r the defence of Sikkim or the se c u r i t y of India, whether preparatory or otherwise, and whether w i t h i n or outside Sikkim. In p a r t i c u l a r India was to have the r i g h t to s t a t i o n troops anywhere w i t h i n the state. I t was cle a r to a l l con-cerned that India's actions had been motivated by the Tibetan a f f a i r , and consequently the Indian Parliament, with the notable exception of the Communists, approved the tr e a t y . Since the signature of the tr e a t y , the Indian m i l i t a r y establishment i n the state has been strengthened s u b s t a n t i a l l y . The s i t u a t i o n with respect to Nepal i s d i f f e r e n t from e i t h e r Bhutan or Sikkim, f o r Nepal i s an independent state. At the same time, however, i t i s , from the s t r a t e g i c standpoint, the most important f r o n t i e r s t a te. Nepal con-fronts Tibet across a common f r o n t i e r of some f i v e hundred miles. On the east the kingdom borders Sikkim and West Bengal; on the south and west, the Indian states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. As such Nepal's r e l a t i o n s with India are complicated and d e l i c a t e . 25 Since the Chinese conquest of Tibet, the Govern-ment of India has shown unusual i n t e r e s t i n Nepalese a f f a i r s As c i v i l peace i n Nepal i s a matter of na t i o n a l s e c u r i t y to India, i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that the Indian government w i l l not t o l e r a t e c i v i l disturbances i n such a v i t a l area. On numerous occasions the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r had declared that peace i n Nepal i s e s s e n t i a l to Indian independence ( i . e . s e c u r i t y ) and possible only through orderly democratic reform. The p r i n c i p a l b a r r i e r to India l i e s on the other side of Nepal. We are not going to tol e r a t e any person coming over that b a r r i e r . Therefore, much as we appreciate the inde-pendence of Nepal, we cannot r i s k our own se c u r i t y by anything not done i n Nepal which permits e i t h e r that b a r r i e r to be crossed or otherwise leads to the weakening of our f r o n t i e r s . India's keen i n t e r e s t i n the development of democratic i n s t i t u t i o n s i n Nepal was c l e a r l y shown i n 1950 by the view i t took towards the incidents that l e d to the overthrow of the feudal government c o n t r o l l e d by the Rana family. Sub r sequently the Indian government continued to t r y to strength and s t a b i l i z e the l i t t l e kingdom. In January 1952, Indian troops, under the provisions of the t r e a t y of J u l y 51, 19 1950, crossed into Nepal to help put down a Communist-in s p i r e d peasant u p r i s i n g . On January 2 5 , 1952, Nepal, reportedly on the advice of the Indian government^ banned the Communist party, and thereafter New Delhi quickly acted to . 26 step up i t s support of the Nepal administration. In 1954, alone, India spent close to eighteen m i l l i o n d o l l a r s i n Nepal f o r development purposes and these expenditures have since increased i n both value and scope. In spite of pressing needs at home, the Government of India has despatched experts to Nepal to reorganize the army and c i v i l s ervice, to b u i l d schools and h o s p i t a l s , and to b u i l d roads with the help of the Indian army. New Delhi r u e f u l l y understands that Nepal i s no longer i s o l a t e d from the tug of power p o l i t i c s . "Once a hermit, then a buffer, she has now become the meat of the sandwich." 2^ i India's,attitude towards Kashmir also r e f l e c t s the security-consciousness of the Indian government. Nehru has frequently made the claim i n defending h i s Kashmir p o l i c y , that the i n a b i l i t y of any but the Indian army to defend Kashmir s u c c e s s f u l l y against attack from across the mountains makes i t imperative f o r India to r e t a i n c o n t r o l of the area. "Kashmir, because of her geographical p o s i t i o n with her f r o n t i e r s with three countries, namely the Soviet Union, China, and Afghanistan, i s i n t i m a t e l y connected with the 21 s e c u r i t y and i n t e r n a t i o n a l contacts of India." This s t a t e -ment c l e a r l y i n d i c a t e s that a l l countries a f f e c t i n g the area are entering India's purview. S i m i l a r considerations of s e c u r i t y motivated Indian opposition to the extension of United States m i l i t a r y a i d to 27 Pakistan, and to Pakistan's membership i n Western-sponsored regional s e c u r i t y pacts. In part t h i s reaction can be a t t r i b u t e d to fear of Pakistan being strengthened to the point where she could threaten India, but l a r g e l y because of India's desire to keep the Cold War and everything associated with i t as f a r as possible from India's borders. A major aim of Indian foreign p o l i c y i s to preserve South and South-East Asia as an area of no-war, and i t was because i t was thought that m i l i t a r y pacts extending to the area would prejudice, rather than fu r t h e r , the prospect of i t s f u l f i l l -ment that there was such outspoken opposition to them from 22 the Indian government. When rumours of Anglo-American discussions con-cerning the establishment of a Middle-East Defence Organization ( i n which Pakistan was to be included) reached India i n the f a l l of 1952, her opposition was prompt and vigorous. This would br i n g the cold war too near India's borders. At the Hyderabad Session of the Indian National Congress i n January 1953, Mr* Nehru stated that Pakistan's proposed i n c l u s i o n i n the MEDO was of grave concern to India as i t would a f f e c t a l l kinds of balances and equilibrium i n India and Pakistan and South A s i a . I t would appear that India's opposition was based both on the fear of a stronger Pakistan which would r e s u l t from membership i n the regional pact and also on the fact that such a step would have f r u s t r a t e d India's aim of b u i l d i n g an area of peace. Mr. Nehru 28 emphasized the l a t t e r reason i n a speech at the Hyderabad Session of the Congress Party on January 15, 1953: Obviously, i f any such development takes place, i t means that the region of cold war comes r i g h t to our border i f Pakistan j o i n s . . . . I t i s not the p o s s i b i l i t y of war between India and Pakistan, but i t i s the p o s s i b i l i t y of world war coming right-up to our doors which i s of concern to u s ^ j Following these developments India i n c r e a s i n g l y t a l k e d of a ' t h i r d area' or 'peace area' from which war might be kept out, even i f i t were to break out elsewhere. Since the MEDO idea d i d not m a t e r i a l i z e , i t s main e f f e c t was that the Western bloc gave India a cause f o r complaint without a t t a i n i n g the aims i t wanted to achieve. The rumours of a possible United States-Pakistan m i l i t a r y pact which leaked out i n November 1953 provoked Indian reactions s i m i l a r to those shown to the MEDO, but with f a r greater i n t e n s i t y of f e e l i n g . Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru ref e r r e d to the matter i n a press conference on November 1 5 t h j and on the f o l l o w i n g day the Indian Ambassador i n Washington c a l l e d on the United States Secretary of State to seek information about the proposed pact. Despite American assurances that the proposed pact was not d i r e c t e d against India i n any way — a view since r e i t e r a t e d by P a k i s t a n i 24 leaders, the Indian press took up the issue and the whole country was emotionally charged i n i t s opposition to the American move to a i d Pakistan m i l i t a r i l y . Indians s e r i o u s l y 29 f e l t that the United States a i d would be used against her 25 i n Kashmir, y and not against any dangers of external com-munist aggression on Pakistan. Consequently t h i s would create a p o s s i b i l i t y of war between India and Pakistan. The Indian people did not view the great advantage between Indian and Pa k i s t a n i strength as a guarantee against aggression from t h e i r neighbour. They r e c a l l e d that a much weaker Pakistan had sent i t s troops into Kashmir i n 1948 to bo l s t e r the tribesmen b a t t l i n g the Indian army. That American arms ai d would not ne c e s s a r i l y be s o l e l y defensive was accepted i n India because of repeated references by Pa k i s t a n i spokesmen to a 'holy war' to l i b e r a t e Kashmir from India. But while the Government of India were c a r e f u l to c a p i t a l i z e on the anti-Pakistan mood of the Indian people i n opposing the arms a i d , t h i s was not the primary cause of o f f i c i a l Government resentment. The Government's f e e l i n g was based not p r i m a r i l y on fear of a stronger Pakistan as on the fac t that by a l l y i n g i t s e l f with the United States, Pakistan had aligned i t s e l f with one side i n the Cold War and thereby disturbed the 'area of peace* that India wanted to b u i l d i n co-operation with other Asian countries. To the Indian way of t h i n k i n g t h i s was e n t i r e l y to t h e i r country's strategic disadvantage. This same reasoning caused India to b i t t e r l y oppose the extension of regional s e c u r i t y pacts into A s i a — the C 30 Manila (SEATO) Pact and the Baghdad Pact — and p a r t i c u l a r l y 27 Pakistan's membership i n them. ' This p o l i c y of Asian regional s e c u r i t y pacts ran counter to what Mr. Nehru had e a r l i e r outlined f o r the Asian countries i n June 1950: I should l i k e the countries of Asia to make i t c l e a r to those warring f a c t i o n s , to those great countries which are so much exercised by passions against each other, that they w i l l not enter the arena of war»2g The very establishment of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s along the fringe of the Soviet Union and China, Indians argue, makes i t l i k e l y that these nations w i l l take counter-actions which would c e r t a i n l y have serious i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r India — e s p e c i a l l y i n view of her r e l a t i v e weakness v i s - a - v i s the two neigh-bouring Communist giants. Indian leaders are w e l l aware that the sub-continent i s a unit and must be defended as such, and the measures that they have taken are but a r e f l e c t i o n of t h i s basic premise. The a c t i v i t i e s of the Indian govern-ment along the whole length of i t s border, from north-west to north-east, are evidence that the nation's s e c u r i t y has not been permitted to rest upon i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of Communist theory or ^practice alone. India's f i r s t l i n e of defence may be the maintenance of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with a l l nations, and e s p e c i a l l y neighbour nations, but the Indian government, l i k e a l l responsible governments, must ne c e s s a r i l y assume that some nations i n the neighbourhood may become dangerous, 31 and i t must take measures of protection. As the timing, nature and urgency of India's s e c u r i t y measures indicate t h i s assumption has become stronger as communism has spread i n Asia. India has been r e l u c t a n t l y forced into undertaking these actions, however, and consequently they must be con-sidered a reaction and can never j u s t l y be interpreted as a provocation. In a d d i t i o n to the above-mentioned p o s i t i v e actions, India has also pursued a p o l i c y of containing the expansionist tendencies of the Communist bloc — and thereby f u r t h e r i n g her own s e c u r i t y — i n a more subtle, but nonetheless very e f f e c t i v e , manner. By d e l i b e r a t e l y adopting a neutral posture i n the face of Western warnings, and by p l a c i n g public f a i t h i n Communist i n t e n t i o n s , India has thereby constituted h e r s e l f a kind of earnest of Communist good in t e n t i o n s . In furtherance of t h i s p o l i c y the Indian govern-ment has advanced and promoted the concept of peaceful co-existence, considered the best assurance against aggression, i n f i l t r a t i o n , or subversion. Having obtained the signatures and p u b l i c adherence of both the Soviet Union and Communist China to t h i s doctrine, the motive of the Indian government has apparently been to r a i s e the spectre of the moral appro-brium that would attach to any v i o l a t i o n of the Panch S h i l a pledges. Thus, i n a v a r i e t y of ways, India has sought to secure i t s e l f from attack i n a manner consistent with her 3 2 o f f i c i a l ' n e u t r a l i t y ' i n the cold war, and at a minimum cost i n money and materials so sorely needed to fu r t h e r her i n t e r n a l economic development. Through non-alignment with the West and opposition to the establishment of regional s e c u r i t y pacts i n her neighbourhood, India has sought to keep the cold war as f a r as possible from her borders. But with the Chinese Communist triumph i n China i n 194-9 and i t s subsequent occupation of Tibet and actions elsewhere, India became aware of the greatest future threat to her s e c u r i t y . Unable and/or u n w i l l i n g to counter the Chinese threat through defence measures r e l a t i v e to the danger, the Indian government has put i t s f a i t h , and i t s s e c u r i t y , i n the p o l i c y of Panch S h i l a and has c u l t i v a t e d the friendship of Peking i n every conceivable manner. To be sure, measures have been taken to strengthen s e c u r i t y along the length of the northern f r o n t i e r s , but the very l i m i t a t i o n s of these measures would seem to indicate that they are more a natural r e f l e x to Chinese actions than a determined e f f o r t to thwart any threat that may present i t s e l f i n that quarter. Unable to a f f o r d both of the 'luxuries' of a modern, i n d u s t r i a l i z e d state — guns and butter — India has put her emphasis on the l a t t e r , the attainment of which i s a formidable task even without the added r e s t r i c t i o n s imposed by minimum defence expenditures. That i t s p o l i c y has f a i l e d to preserve the country's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y r e f l e c t s no d i s c r e d i t on the Government 33 of India. I t sought to achieve s e c u r i t y i n a manner which would not he inconsistent with the economic development of the nation; i t was the s a c r i f i c e of a short-range objective to one which would be the more s o l i d foundation upon which to b u i l d a more r e a l s e c u r i t y i n the future. As such i t was a f a r more r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y than i s generally supposed i n the West, a p o l i c y whose f a i l u r e may indeed be i t s greatest triumph. Footnotes - Chapter I I 1 Independence and A f t e r , p. 284. 2 On December 26, 1950, the Eastern Economist put India's armed strength at 2 2 0 , 0 0 0 men, ten a i r squadrons, and a very small and i n s i g n i f i c a n t navy. Mr. Chester Bowles writes: "India's army, although not large i n European terms, i s a major deterrent to any aggression against India i t s e l f . " Ambassador's Report, p. 8 7 . 3 Kundra, Indian Foreign P o l i c y 1947-1954, p. 6 9 . 4 Bajpai, Indian Yearbook of I n t e r n a t i o n a l A f f a i r s , v o l . 1, p. 4. 5 See M. Brecher, The Struggle f o r Kashmir (Toronto, Ryerson, 1953); J« Korbel, Danger i n Kashmir (Princeton, Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1954); Lord Birdwood, Two Nations  and Kashmir (London, Hale, 1956); and S i s i r Gupta, India's  Relations with Pakistan 1954-1957 (I.P.R., 1957) . 6 Brecher, op. c i t . , pp. 188-191. 7 Por a comprehensive analysis of the defence problems of the area see: Defence and Security i n the Indian Ocean Area (New D e l h i , I.C.W.A., 1 9 5 8 ) . 8 In a B.B.C. interview on June 12, 1953, Mr. Nehru said: "I see absolutely no danger — external danger — to India from communism or any other source." Cited as footnote i n Kundra, op. c i t . , p. 6 9 . 9 Quoted i n Eustace Seligman, What The United States Can  Do About India (New York, New York U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956) , p. 5 3 . 10 K. M. Pannikar, "The Himalayas and Indian Defense," India Quarterly, v o l . I l l , 2 ( 1 9 4 7 ) , p. 135. The Himalayas developed i n Indiana "a f a l s e sense of s e c u r i t y , a Maginot-l i n e mentality...India never considered her neighbours. The p o s s i b i l i t y of attack seemed d i s t a n t . . . . I t was the Himalayan Maginot-line that was responsible f o r t h i s a t t i t u d e towards India's s e c u r i t y . " 11 Tibet, however, was not considered absolutely e s s e n t i a l f o r India's s e c u r i t y by Nehru and h i s colleagues. Moreover, i n t h e i r p u b l i c view, the Chinese l e g a l claim was very strong. And i n any event, they were not prepared to go to war with China. i 12 See Nehru's speech i n the Lok Sabha, New De l h i , during debate on the Naga H i l l s s i t u a t i o n , August 2 3 , 1956. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957. pp. 490-499. 13 For the complete text of the t r e a t y , see Indian Year  Book of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , pp. 295-298. 14 The New York Times, May 9, 1952. 15 Text i n Int e r n a t i o n a l Commissions of J u r i s t s , The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, 1959, pp. 105-106. 16 I b i d . , pp. 107-109. 17 Text of the t r e a t y i n Indian Year Book of International  A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , pp. 319-322T 18 Extract from a speech i n i t i a t i n g a debate on foreign a f f a i r s , Lok Sabha, New De l h i , December 6, 1950. Nehru's  Speeches 1949-1953, p. 176. 19 Text i n Indian Year Book of International A f f a i r s , v o l . 2 , pp. 316-318. 20 A. M. Rosenthal, "Grim Shadows Over The Cobra Throne," New York Times Magazine, May 2 7 , 1956, p. 47. 21 Independence and A f t e r , p. 60. 22 On t h i s point, see the discussions at the F i f t h Commonwealth Relations Conference at Lahore i n 1954, as reported i n Nicholas Mansergh, The M u l t i - R a c i a l Commonwealth (London, 1 9 5 5 ) . 23 Quoted i n Kundra, op. c i t . , p. 93* 24 Mr. Mohammed A l i , i n an address to the Foreign Press Association i n London on June 2 5 , 1956 declared: " I t has been said that American m i l i t a r y a i d to Pakistan constitutes a threat to India. Such a suggestion i s palpably absurd. The d i s p a r i t y between Indian and P a k i s t a n i human and material resources i s so great that, even a f t e r m i l i t a r y assistance from the U.S.A., there can be no question of any threat of aggression from Pakistan to India." Keesing's Contemporary  Archives (London), J u l y 7-14, 1956, p. 14962. 25 Speaking i n the Lok Sabha on November 2 0 , 1958, Mrs. Lakshmi Menon, India's Deputy M i n i s t e r f o r External A f f a i r s stated: "We have i n the past repeatedly expressed our concern at foreign m i l i t a r y a i d being given to Pakistan... i t may encourage s t i l l f u rther aggressive tendencies there. Cited i n N. D. Palmer, "India and the United States: Maturing Relations," Current History, v o l . 36 (March 1959) , No. 211, p. 132. i i 26 Nehru implied t h i s view i n the Lok Sabha on February 2 2 , 1954 when, i n reference to the United States m i l i t a r y a i d to Pakistan, he sa i d : " I t adds to the f e e l i n g of i n s e c u r i t y i n Asi a . I t i s . . . a wrong step from the point of view of peace and removal of tensions." Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957* p. 344. 27 For a more d e t a i l e d account of India's reaction to these pacts, and to regional pacts i n general, see Chapter IV. 28 The New York Times, June 13 , 1950. i i i CHAPTER I I I INDIA AND THE DEPENDENT PEOPLES . . . i t i s an astonishing t h i n g that any country should s t i l l venture to hold and to set f o r t h t h i s doctrine of c o l o n i a l i s m . . . . A f t e r a l l that has happened there i s going to he no mere objection to that, but active objection...against any and every form of c o l o n i a l i s m i n any part of the world.-, Apart from the immediate r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of looking to i t s s e c u r i t y needs, India has been motivated by a pro-Asian, a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t i c p o l i c y . As part of Asia, proud of i t s newly won freedom, India has i n s i s t e d upon recognition of the d i g n i t y and worth of the Asian people. Nehru and h i s colleagues have, on every possible occasion, stressed the proud h i s t o r i c a l legacy, the unique c u l t u r e , and the pro-mising destiny of India and A s i a . Any assumption of s u p e r i o r i t y by the West over A s i a , any s l i g h t by the former, i s deeply resented by Indian leaders. Por as Mr. Nehru declared i n h i s c l o s i n g address to the famous Asian-African p Conference held at Bandung, Indonesia i n A p r i l 1955: Asia i s no longer passive today; i t has been passive enough i n the past. I t i s no more a submissive A s i a ; i t has t o l e r a t e d submissiveness f o r so long. Asia of today i s dynamic; Asia i s f u l l of l i f e . I f there i s anything that 34 35 Asia wants to t e l l . . . i t i s t h i s . There i s going to be no d i c t a t i o n i n the future; no 'yes-men1 i n Asia, I hope, or i n A f r i c a . ^ From the day of independence, Indian leaders have been implacably a n t i - c o l o n i a l and have sought to end the p o l i t i c a l and economic domination of Europe over non-European areas. Hence the removal of the l a s t vestige of c o l o n i a l i s m i n Asia as i n A f r i c a has been a major plank of India's foreign p o l i c y . India's advocacy of the cause of the dependent peoples flows d i r e c t l y from her s o l i c i t u d e f o r the struggles f o r freedom from foreign p o l i t i c a l domination of dependent peoples a l l over the world. In every phase of i t s long h i s t o r y , the Indian National Congress has been a m i l i t a n t l y a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t organization, upholding the cause of the oppressed, the exploited and the wronged. Any oppressed or exploited nation, however small or however remotely situated i n the world, could count upon the support of the Congress h. i n i t s struggle f o r s e l f - a s s e r t i o n . Soon a f t e r the Interim National Government was formed i n 194-6, Nehru declared i n a broadcast speech: ...we believe that peace and freedom are i n d i v i s i b l e and / t h a t / the d e n i a l of freedom anywhere must endanger freedom elsewhere and lead to c o n f l i c t and war. Ve are p a r t i c u l a r l y i n t e r e s t e d i n the emancipation of c o l o n i a l and dependent countries and peoples. q India has h e r s e l f experienced fo r e i g n domination — domination 36 which, was benevolent and b e n e f i c i a l i n many respects — but which was also a negative influence i n withholding from the Indian people the opportunity to work out t h e i r own destiny by t h e i r own e f f o r t s . The Indian government and people f e e l that a people cannot progress under an a l i e n r u l e or when something i s imposed on them. They can grow only i f they develop t h e i r own strength and s e l f - r e l i a n c e and maintain 7 t h e i r own i n t e g r i t y . ' India also recognizes the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f -determination because she believes that only self-governing communities having absolute control over t h e i r own i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s , p o l i t i c a l , economic, s o c i a l and c u l t u r a l , can e f f e c t i v e l y throw t h e i r weight on the side of i n t e r n a t i o n a l co-operation f o r the establishment of world peace. E l i m i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l domination by one people over another — a f a c t o r 8 Indians believe i s a root cause of c o n f l i c t and war — and the u n i v e r s a l recognition of the p r i n c i p l e of s e l f - d e t e r -mination f o r oppressed peoples are therefore very v i t a l to India's e f f o r t s to f u r t h e r the cause of world peace. The anti-Japanese stand of the Indian people i n the Sino-Japanese c o n f l i c t , t h e i r u n q u a l i f i e d condemnation of the F a s c i s t aggression against E t h i o p i a , Czechoslovakia, Albania and Republican Spain, and t h e i r post-independence support f o r the freedom movements i n Asia and A f r i c a are h i g h l i g h t s i n the continuous and long-standing foreign r e l a t i o n s of the Indian people and t h e i r Government, pledged to the 37 e l i m i n a t i o n of p o l i t i c a l suppression of subject n a t i o n a l i t i e s wherever i t may be and i n whatever form i t may be mas-9 queradmg. y In i t s active championship of freedom f o r the dependent peoples, the Indian government has had the f u l l support of the people of India. The S o c i a l i s t s have been at one with Government on t h i s issue. The extreme l e f t - w i n g i n the country have, f o r obvious reasons, advocated even more active steps than the Government has taken i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n . The extreme right-wing of Indian p o l i t i c a l thought, however, while supporting the broad p r i n c i p l e of self-determination, have expressed the desire that India's f o r e i g n p o l i c y should be l e s s v o c a l l y i d e a l i s t i c — implying thereby that India must not court the displeasure of the Great Powers without any advantage to h e r s e l f . But even t h i s section of opinion has not been bold enough to come out openly against the over-r i d i n g sentiment of Indian p u b l i c opinion and to f r a n k l y advocate a p o l i c y of n o n - p a r t i c i p a t i o n , by India, i n the discussions connected with the freedom of the non-self-governing peoples. As Nehru stated i n the Constituent Assembly on March 8, 1948 i t would be i n j u r i o u s to India — c e r t a i n t y from an i d e a l i s t i c and high moral point of view, but equally so from the point of view of opportunism and n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t i n the narrowest sense of the word — f o r her to give up her p o l i c y of standing up f o r c e r t a i n i d e a l s i n regard to the oppressed n a t i o n s . x ^ India would a c t i v e l y 38 champion the causes of a l l those peoples a g i t a t i n g f o r p o l i t i c a l freedom from West European metropolitan powers regardless of the passive h o s t i l i t y she might have to face from the various interests.^"''" In her i n i t i a l f l u s h of independence, India generally approached the problem of r e l a t i o n s between Western and Asian states with extreme suspicion. I f there was a choice between in t e r p r e t a t i o n s of any Western p o l i c y , the i m p e r i a l i s t i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n was the one most l i k e l y to be chosen, and anything extenuating ignored. I t was a one-track p o l i c y , understand-able, but not necessarily excusable. I n d i a 1 s a t t i t u d e towards the A l l i e d treatment of Japan was motivated p r i m a r i l y by her anti-imperialism and sympathy f o r a fellow-Asian people. Owing l a r g e l y to f e e l i n g s of Asian s o l i d a r i l y , to Japan's wartime success against c o l o n i a l powers, and perhaps even to vague memories of Japan's deed i n 1905, there was i n India a considerable fund of good w i l l toward Japan upon that country's c a p i t u l a t i o n 12 i n August 194-5. India favoured a quick r e i n t e g r a t i o n of Japan into the society of free nations, with economic freedom to safeguard a decent standard of l i v i n g , and with p o l i t i c a l freedom to safeguard i n t e r n a l s t a b i l i t y . Accordingly she supported those decisions i n the Far Eastern Commission favourable to Japan. She also stimulated the renewal of contacts between India and Japan. But when the 39 West i n September 1951, decided to go ahead with a separate Peace Treaty, with Japan to prevent i t from f a l l i n g i n t o the hands of the Communist bloc e i t h e r through m i l i t a r y ag-i z 14-gression ' or i n t e r n a l r e v o l u t i o n , India declined the i n v i t a t i o n to attend the Conference at San Francisco. The Indian government also refused to sign the r e s u l t i n g Japanese Peace Treaty. 1^ The reason f o r t h i s a c t i o n , Mr. Nehru explained to the Indian Parliament on August 27 , 1951, was because none of the major suggestions put forward by India had been accepted by the United States. Consequently the Government of India would make a de c l a r a t i o n terminating the state of war and would l a t e r negotiate a simple b i l a t e r a l t r e a t y . x ^ 17 India's objections to the Treaty ' were based, i n part, on the c r i t i c i s m that i n was r e s t r i c t i v e of Japan's sovereignty i n according the United States the r i g h t to maintain bases and armed forces i n Japan. The Indian govern-ment fur t h e r viewed the Treaty as b a s i c a l l y a defence com-bin a t i o n among the s i g n a t o r i e s , e s t a b l i s h i n g a s t r a t e g i c l i n e against the Chinese and Russian mainland s t r e t c h i n g from the Aleutians through the Japanese i s l a n d chain, the the Ryukyus, Bonins, Formosa, and the P h i l i p p i n e s , t d A u s t r a l i a . In i t s view, Japan should r e t a i n a l l t e r r i t o r y whose inhabitants had an h i s t o r i c a l a f f i n i t y with the Japanese and which Japan had not acquired by aggression. The Ryukyus and Bonins f e l l i n t o these categories. Further, 40 India pointed out that the Treaty should include provisions f o r the return of Formosa to China and of the K u r i l e islands and South Sakhalin to Russia. The Indian note declared: The time and manner of such return might he the subject of separate negotiations, but to leave the future of the i s l a n d (Formosa) undermined...does not appear... to be e i t h e r just or expedient. Mutatis mutandis the same argument applies to the K u r i l e islands and to South Sakhalin. A further grievance, not mentioned i n o f f i c i a l documents, but much t a l k e d about i n a l l Indian c i r c l e s , was that Asian nations were not properly consulted or that t h e i r suggestions were not properly respected. And few things could provoke greater resentment i n modern India than s l i g h t of non-Europeans by whites. The stand taken by the Indian government found very few c r i t i c s i n the Indian Parliament and the press. In general, public opinion was wholeheartedly behind i t . The Treaty was considered an i n s u l t to a l l Asians — but another expression of the white man's haughtiness and of the Cold War, useless because of the absence of Communist China and Soviet Russia and morally u n j u s t i f i a b l e . The Indian a t t i t u d e , however, e s p e c i a l l y that of the Government, must not be viewed as simply a matter of ethi c s or idealism or opposition to Western d i c t a t i o n to a defeated Asian nation; i t was also a matter of India's n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . India could not a f f o r d to antagonize 450 m i l l i o n neighbours, 41 could not subscribe to a p o l i c y l i n i n g up the Japanese against the Chinese people, or turn a b l i n d eye to l i m i t s placed upon Japan's sovereignty. The a t t i t u d e taken by India n a t u r a l l y overjoyed the Communist powers, but i t provoked sharp c r i t i c i s m from 19 the American government J and press. The New York Times commented that "Instead of s e i z i n g the leadership of Asia f o r i t s good, Nehru turned aside from the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , " and continued on to declare that "Nehru's statesmanship i s not i n s p i r i n g people and nations to do things but only to 20 have them undone. How the mighty have f a l l e n . " While t h i s statement was unduly harsh i n i t s c r i t i c i s m , i t was nevertheless p a r t l y warranted. In the i n t e r e s t of her neutral p o s i t i o n India could have avoided launching such a noticeable public attack on the Treaty. She could, more d i p l o m a t i c a l l y , merely have refused to sign the Treaty and thereby avoided the open controversy which strained Indo-American r e l a t i o n s . But whatever the merits of India's stand, the incident d i d i l l u s t r a t e most emphatically that India championed the cause of the non-white peoples and would speak her mind on any issue with c o l o n i a l overtones regardless of who i t pleased or displeased. During t h i s f i r s t ' f l u s h of independence,' the Indian government f r e e l y expressed i t s e l f on any issue which i t regarded as i n v o l v i n g the p r i n c i p l e of 42 self-determination f o r dependent peoples.• In public statements and at the United Nations, Indian leaders and representatives of the Indian government repeatedly declared India's sympathy f o r the struggles of dependent peoples f o r freedom from foreign c o n t r o l s . France and Portugal were b i t t e r l y attacked f o r r e f u s i n g to v o l u n t a r i l y give up t h e i r small t e r r i t o r i a l holdings i n India; B r i t a i n was c r i t i c i z e d f o r her m i l i t a r y operations against the small minority of Communists i n Malaya; and Prance was castigated f o r her p o l i c i e s i n Indo-China and North A f r i c a . Indian i n i t i a t i v e helped to hasten the independence of Libya which was secured on the basis of the resolutions moved by India at the United Nations General Assembly i n 1949. The President of the National Congress of T r i p o l i t a n i a described the r o l e that India played i n the l i b e r a t i o n of Libya "as having earned the e v e r - l a s t i n g gratitude of the Libyan nation, as having confirmed India's leadership i n the struggle f o r the 21 l i b e r a t i o n of A f r i c a and Asi a . " India also played a notable part i n r e s i s t i n g the attempt of South A f r i c a to incorporate the mandated t e r r i t o r y of South-West A f r i c a and i n i n i t i a t i n g the moves f o r the granting of self-determination to Tunisia and Morocco. The p r i n c i p l e of support f o r dependent peoples, however, was most e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y r e a l i z e d i n connection with the Indonesian struggle f o r freedom from Dutch c o n t r o l . To the people of India (as indeed to the re s t of Asia) 43 Indonesia was a symbol of the aspirations of many m i l l i o n s of Asian peoples f o r freedom and of t h e i r determination to obtain recognition of the freedom already obtained. From the time when Nehru and the other n a t i o n a l i s t p o l i t i c a l leaders of India were released from j a i l on June 15, 1945, and had s h o r t l y afterwards paid v i s i t s to Indonesia and Singapore, they had been i n d i c a t i n g that they expected Indonesia to be self-governing now that the Dutch had been expelled and an Indonesian Republic had come into existence. They were disappointed when the B r i t i s h condoned, even helped, the r e s t o r a t i o n of Dutch power i n Java. Subsequently, throughout the Indonesians* b i t t e r struggle against the Netherlands from the defeat of Japan i n 1945 to the Hague Round Table Conference of 1948 that resulted i n independence f o r Indonesia, India f u l l y i d e n t i f i e d i t s e l f with the n a t i o n a l i s t movement headed by President Soekarno. In June 1947, when the Dutch f a i l e d to adhere to the terms of agreements they had made with the Indonesian r e p u b l i c , the Indian leaders expressed t h e i r keen disapproval and unsuccessfully bade the United States espouse the Indonesian cause. Thereupon India, i n company with A u s t r a l i a , c a r r i e d the case to the Security Council of the United Nations where i t vigorously advocated independence f o r Indonesia and urged others to do the same or f a i l to sense the mood of Asia and A f r i c a . India's case was that the action by the Dutch 44 against the Indonesian people endangered the maintenance 22 of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace under A r t i c l e 34 of the Charter. In answer to the claim of the Netherlands delegate that the Dutch action was a matter of domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n under A r t i c l e 2(7) of the Charter, India maintained that, according to the Charter, even matters which were e s s e n t i a l l y w i t h i n the domestic j u r i s d i c t i o n of a state should be considered to be w i t h i n the j u r i s d i c t i o n of the Security Council i f they had a bearing upon i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y . The Indian argument was accepted by the Council. Accordingly, an Indian proposal to e s t a b l i s h an i n t e r n a t i o n a l a r b i t r a t i o n commission to s e t t l e the dispute was adopted by the Council i n a r e s o l u t i o n of August 25, 1947. The truce subsequently arranged under the R e n v i l l e 23 A:g££e"efije&1; however, was not to l a s t . On December 18, 1948, the Dutch, i n a'police action,' moved by force of arms against DjakJakarta, then the c a p i t a l of the Republic of Indonesia, and put President Soekarno and other Indonesian leaders i n detention. India reacted s w i f t l y . The session of the A l l - I n d i a Congress passed a r e s o l u t i o n on December 19 , 1948 s t a t i n g that i t was a matter of utmost concern to India that Indonesia should a t t a i n her f u l l freedom and take her 24 r i g h t f u l part i n Asian and i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s . Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, addressing the meeting, declared that the people of India could not remain i d l e spectators of events i n Indonesia. He reminded the Dutch that, as the day of 45 imperialism was over, no i m p e r i a l i s t power could stay i n 25 A s i a any longer. y The Indian government then proceeded to i n s t i t u t e l i m i t e d sanctions against the Dutch, i n s t r u c t i o n s being issued to a i r p o r t a u t h o r i t i e s not to cl e a r Dutch a i r -c r a f t and not to issue f u e l to them from January 1, 1949* At the same time, India's intense i n t e r e s t i n the Indonesian question was furt h e r evidenced from the f a c t that on January 1, 1949» Nehru i n v i t e d t h i r t e e n Asian countries to consider the Indonesian s i t u a t i o n . When announcing the decision to convene such a conference, Mr. Nehru expressed the indignation of the people of As i a over the "most maked and unabashed aggression" by the Dutch i n t h e i r attempt to "revive a dying imperialism." In opening the conference he remarked: "Asia, too long submissive and dependent and a plaything of other countries, w i l l no longer brook any i n t e r -ference with her freedom...so long as any form of colonial i s m e x i s t s i n A s i a or elsewhere, there w i l l be c o n f l i c t and a 27 threat to peace." ' He proposed the creation of conditions i n which the Indonesian Republic could function f r e e l y and could negotiate as a free Government without m i l i t a r y or economic pressure. Three days a f t e r i t s organization, the Conference adopted a series of d r a s t i c resolutions which i t presented to the Security Council. Although subsequent acti o n of the Security Council was disappointing to India, the f i n a l 46 winning of Indonesian independence by negotiations between the Indonesian and Dutch a u t h o r i t i e s averted further Indian intransigence which might w e l l have had serious consequences. Since the settlement of the Indonesian question, however, and making allowance f o r i s o l a t e d instances of a n t i - i m p e r i a l i s t outbursts by Indian spokesmen, the Indian government has apparently r e a l i z e d that Asian freedoms are better served i n the long run by cautious procedures. In subsequent s i t u a t i o n s , comparable to Indonesia, Nehru has ste a d f a s t l y refused to repeat the feat f o r reasons never quite s p e c i f i e d . I t i s probable, though, that they have had to do with the r i s i n g tension i n the world and are based on the conviction that such action as that taken at the Asian Conference might lead to c o n f l i c t rather than agreement. Experience, maturity and some rude shocks to preconceived ideas, e s p e c i a l l y concerning communism, have led to a r e a l i z -a t i o n that India's past experience has not n e c e s s a r i l y been uni v e r s a l and i s not the only possible experience; that i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s absolutes do not e x i s t e i t h e r as regards the a p p l i c a b i l i t y of p r i n c i p l e s or the character of nations. I t has been a usefu l lesson to many Indians that circumstances have forced India repeatedly to compromise her high p r i n c i p l e s and to revise her estimates of other nations since 1947* Mr. Nehru implied t h i s new approach i n h i s speech to the Indian Parliament i n 1952 on "The Larger Scheme Of Things": 47 Let us "by a l l means put an end to what remains of coloni a l i s m i n Asia, i n A f r i c a and wherever i t e x i s t s hut l e t us under-stand what the r e a l c o n f l i c t i s about.... I t does not help i n the s l i g h t e s t to repeat the slogans of yesterday, t h i n k i n g that they take the place of thought and act i o n . Ours i s a complicated, d i f f i c u l t and tormented world. We must not approach our problems with any certitude of success but with a great deal of h u m i l i t y and t r y to help where we can. Our aim should be to be h e l p f u l , to do good or, at any r a t e , to avoid e v i l . - o India has not surrendered her i d e a l s , but the Sturm and Drang period of t h e i r a p p l i c a t i o n has passed. Like so many nations before her, India has learned that the p r i c e of conducting one's own f o r e i g n r e l a t i o n s i s the occasional betrayal of one's i d e a l s . Malaya was a case i n point. The r e l a t i v e quiescence of the Indian government towards the question of Malayan independence p r i o r to i t s achievement i n 1950 provoked accusations that Nehru was s o f t - p e d a l l i n g B r i t i s h c olonialism. The Nehru government, however, obviously not only appreciated the d i f f i c u l t i e s represented by the three population groups i n Malaya, none of which has a majority, but r e a l i z e d as w e l l the wonderful opportunity chaos i n Malaya would have offered the Communists a f t e r B r i t i s h withdrawal. Consequently Nehru, though he was on record as demanding freedom f o r Malaya, co-operated c l o s e l y with B r i t a i n i n her e f f o r t s towards these ends. Eventually q u a l i f y i n g h i s demand f o r B r i t i s h withdrawal from t h i s area by advocating that i t occur 48 only a f t e r peace and order had "been restored i n Ma3Jay"£? Nehru was e n t i r e l y i n accord with the developments leading to Malayan independence, and has expressed no dismay at the subsequent r e l a t i o n s h i p between B r i t a i n , the Federation of Malaya and the Crown colony of Singapore. A s i m i l a r trend away from extremist enthusiasm f o r freedom and toward a more cautious advocacy of i t i s d i s c e r n i b l e i n India's a t t i t u d e towards Indo-China. In January 1947 Nehru c a l l e d upon France to revert to peaceful methods i n Indo-China and show by i t s own example that i t stood f o r freedom everywhere. Shortly afterwards he received the Indo-Chinese delegation to the f i r s t Asian Relations Conference with the reminder that i n t h e i r country '*the b a t t l e f o r freedom has continued." By 1950, however, the Indian government had assumed a rather non-committal a t t i t u d e toward the two Indo-Chinese governments. Emperor Bao Dai of Vi e t Nam was suspected of being merely a French t o o l , while the Communist leader Ho Chih-minh, although generally credited with being a mationalist and p a t r i o t f i r s t and foremost, was too c l o s e l y t i e d to China and the Soviet Union to s u i t the taste of very many Indians. r Mr. Nehru declared on May 22 that the Government of India had decided not to accord recognition e i t h e r to the Bao Dai Government i n Viet Nam or to the Vietminh Government under Ho Chih-minh "so long as 30 i t i s not c l e a r which of the two Governments p r e v a i l there."^ India would watch developments u n t i l the people should decide. 49 "We should not jump in t o the f r a y , " he declared, and added: "After a l l , what can we do about i t , except to give moral sympathy and get involved? We do not think that i s p r a c t i c a l 31 p o l i t i c s . " ^ I t was only when the c o n f l i c t i n Indo-China appeared about to touch off a major c o n f l i c t i n 1953 that the Indian government a c t i v e l y expressed i t s concern and 52 sought to mediate the dispute.-' India's a t t i t u d e s towards the various aspects of Arab nationalism also evidence the increasing caution with which New Delhi has approached the issue of self-determination i n recent years. I n i t i a l l y India gave strong support to the Arab n a t i o n a l i s t s i n French North A f r i c a , e s p e c i a l l y the struggle, eventually won, f o r Tunisian and Moroccan independence. But even here the influence of the increasing tension i n the world has caused a noticeable i n c l i n a t i o n towards moderation i n Indian pronouncement. Thus i n i t s a t t i t u d e towards the Algerian question the Indian government has moved from great impatience and strongly-expressed a n t i -c o l o n i a l i s m to a recognition that "strong United Nations resolutions w i l l not n e c e s s a r i l y contribute to the s o l u t i o n of the complicated problems involved." Hoping to contribute to a s o l u t i o n of the problem, Mr. Nehru, i n a statement i n the Lok Sabha on May 22, 1956, put forward f i v e suggestions as a possible basis f o r a negotiated settlement: An atmosphere of peaceful approach 50 should be promoted by formal declarations by both sides i n favour of ending violence; the n a t i o n a l e n t i t y and p e r s o n a l i t y of A l g e r i a should be recognized by the French government on the basis of freedom; the e q u a l i t y of the peoples i n A l g e r i a , i r r e s p e c t i v e of race, should be recognized by a l l concerned; recognition that A l g e r i a i s the homeland of a l l the people i n A l g e r i a , i r r e s p e c t i v e of race, and that they should a l l be e n t i t l e d to the benefits and share the burdens a r i s i n g from the recognition of the national e n t i t y , p e r s o n a l i t y and freedom of A l g e r i a ; d i r e c t negotiations based on the above basic ideas, and i n accordance with the p r i n c i p l e s of the •3 3 United Nations Charter, should be inaugurated. y I t was the Prime Mi n i s t e r ' s hope that " t h i s fervent appeal w i l l reach the f r i e n d l y ears of the p a r t i e s to the present c o n f l i c t , both of whom we regard as our f r i e n d . " In l i n e with t h i s moderate approach, the Indian government has desisted from any actions which might cause an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the Algerian war. In the 1956 General Assembly the Indian delegation would commit i t s e l f no f u r t h e r on the Algerian question other than supporting a compromise r e s o l u t i o n which confined i t s e l f to expressing a hope that a peaceful, democratic, and j u s t s o l u t i o n might be found. With t h i s view i n mind Mr. Nehru declared at a press con-ference i n Delhi on October 12, 1958 that India would not f o r the moment give formal recognition to the Free Algerian government established i n Cairo on September 19. He added: 51 I t may w e l l be s a i d that at present there i s what i s c a l l e d the P r o v i s i o n a l government of A l g e r i a , representing moderates and extremists and therefore i t should be easy to deal with them as representing Algerian nationalism. I hope that the French Govern-ment w i l l negotiate with these people, because i t i s obvious that there i s no other way of s e t t l i n g the Algerian problem except by recognizing Algerian freedom.^ India's approach towards the various Middle Eastern issues i n v o l v i n g various Arab e f f o r t s to free themselves of Western controls has also been q u a l i f i e d by the requirements of the Indian n a t i o n a l i n t e r e s t . For the Middle East i s an area of great importance to India, p o s s i b l y greater even than Southeast Asia. I t i s of s t r a t e g i c importance, i t i s v i t a l as a supplier of o i l , i t enters Indo-Pakistan p o l i t i c s , and 35 i t i s a road through which communism might e n t e r . A l l these points have influenced India's p o l i c i e s i n that area, f o r obviously the rash and u n q u a l i f i e d a p p l i c a t i o n of a n t i -i m p e r i a l i s t p r i n c i p l e s would involve the greatest r i s k s . Consequently i t i s not unnatural that the Indian government has proceeded with the greatest caution i n i t s Middle Eastern p o l i c i e s , even i f t h i s has necessitated an occasional moder-ation i n the championship of great p r i n c i p l e s . P r i o r to the Anglo-French invasion of Suez i n 1956, the only instance i n which India took a more or l e s s adamant stand towards a Middle Eastern question with " i m p e r i a l i s t overtones" was over the issue of the future of the B r i t i s h mandate of P a l e s t i n e . The B r i t i s h , unable to reconcile 52 Arab-Jew differences and t i r i n g of the heavy burdens of p o l i c i n g the area, announced i n March 194-7 that they were r e f e r r i n g the matter to the United Nations. In the sub-sequent prolonged discussions on the issue the Indian delegates came out strongly on a pro-Arab l i n e , prompted l a r g e l y by the desire to avoid offending the s u s c e p t i b i l i t i e s of the Muslim world i n general, and her own t h i r t y m i l l i o n Muslim c i t i z e n s i n p a r t i c u l a r . New Delhi aimed at encouraging co-operation among Asian countries i n the i n t e r n a t i o n a l f i e l d and could not, therefore, af f o r d to antagonize the Muslim states of West Asia and Pakistan by adopting any other p o l i c y on t h i s issue. In ad d i t i o n , India could not agree with the view generally held i n the West that, because many Jews were i l l - t r e a t e d by the Europeans, Palestine should provide a home from them. The general support given to a Jewish state i n Palestine by the European powers made i t appear to Indians as yet another case of imperialism committed by Europeans against a non-European people. Consequently India adamantly opposed the p a r t i t i o n of Palestine and i n i t i a l l y withheld diplomatic recognition of I s r a e l . But i n "recognition of an established f a c t , " New Delhi announced India's recog-n i t i o n of the State of I s r a e l on September 17, 1950. The o f f i c i a l statement explained that the delay i n India's recognition has been caused by the fa c t that a l l aspects of the question had to be very c a r e f u l l y considered, i n c l u d i n g 53 the sentiments of the Arab countries. I t was now f e l t that continued mutual non-recognition was not only "inconsistent with the o v e r a l l r e l a t i o n s h i p between the two countries," but would also l i m i t the Government of India's r d l e as a possible intermediary between I s r a e l and other S t a t e s . 5 6 In other Middle Eastern issues i n v o l v i n g the d i r e c t i n t e r e s t s of Great B r i t a i n , however, the Indian government proceeded with more caution. Thus while India did not hesitate to declare i t s sympathy with Iran i n that country's dispute with Great B r i t a i n over the n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of o i l resources i n 1951> New D e l h i , t r y i n g to combine the p r i n c i p l e s of peace, anti-imperialism, and s e c u r i t y , coun-s e l l e d a peaceful settlement of the c o n f l i c t through b i l a t e r a l 37 negotiations between the two disputants. ' India depended upon Iran f o r o i l , upon B r i t a i n f o r tankers and upon the friendship of both to safeguard her v i t a l s e c u r i t y i n t e r e s t s i n the area. In a d d i t i o n , the p o s s i b i l i t y of Communist subversion or Russian intervention anywhere i n the Middle East has been an ever present thought i n Indian minds. Thus a peaceful settlement of the c o n f l i c t so that nobody would have a pretext to intervene was of the greatest concern to India and an a d d i t i o n a l incentive f o r her to remain neut r a l i n the dispute. For s i m i l a r reasons India, i n the Anglo-Egyptian 54 dispute over the Suez Canal and B r i t a i n ' s r i g h t to maintain m i l i t a r y forces there, would only go so f a r i n support of the Egyptian cause. Here again the m i l i t a r y consideration was the cause of the dilemma. Egypt's demands were recog-nized as the "legitimate" claims of nationalism on the one hand, hut on the other hand, the need f o r s t a b i l i t y i n an area of such s t r a t e g i c importance was also r e a l i z e d . Thus the Indian government only committed i t s e l f as i n favour of Egypt eventually obtaining f u l l sovereignty over the Suez Canal and of making i t afterward an i n t e r n a t i o n a l highway by 38 special,treaties.-^ The announcement from Cairo on J u l y 27 , 1954 of the agreement between B r i t a i n and Egypt on the evacuation of B r i t i s h troops from the Suez Canal Zone, however, was welcomed by Nehru as having removed another cause of tension, and of having thereby helped to turn people's minds 39 toward peaceful p r o g r e s s . ^ The most extraordinary example of r e s t r a i n t , however, and an example, i t might be added, that from the standpoint of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s i s most admirable, has been shown by India i n regard to the small number of enclaves belonging to France and Portugal which survived India's independence as the remnants of the o l d days of European expansion. The p o l i c y of the Indian government toward these fo r e i g n footholds was c l e a r l y stated by Nehru i n 1949. India wanted a peaceful s o l u t i o n i n regard to these f o r e i g n pos-sessions but the only future f o r these possessions was 55 complete i n t e g r a t i o n with India. "We are prepared to wait a l i t t l e f o r i t , to avoid c o n f l i c t , " Mr. Nehru declared, "hut i t i s an inconceivable that i n t h i s new,, resurgent India, 40 b i t s of t e r r i t o r y should belong to Powers f a r away." Since independence, the Indian government has sought to bring about the peaceful i n t e g r a t i o n of these for e i g n footholds with the Republic of India, but only with p a r t i a l success. In the case of Prance, India has been successful thanks to the generally c o n c i l i a t o r y a t t i t u d e of French governments towards the d i s p o s i t i o n of the French settlements of Pondicherry, Chandernagore, Yanam, K a r i k a l , and Make — together t o t a l l i n g 196 square miles. A j o i n t d e c laration by the Governments of France and India made i n 1948 declared t h e i r j o i n t decision to study, i n common, ways and means of a f r i e n d l y regulation of the problems of the French establishments i n India, with due regard to the i n t e r e s t s and aspirations of the population of these t e r -r i t o r i e s , to the h i s t o r i c a l and c u l t u r a l l i n k s of these 41 people with France, and to the evolution of India. Protracted and oftentimes b i t t e r negotiations ensued but eventually Pondicherry and the other holdings were ceded to India a f t e r 240 years of French r u l e . A formal t r e a t y to t h i s e f f e c t was signed i n November 1954. In the case of Portugal, however, no progress has been made i n face of Lisbon's uncompromising stand against 56 cession of Goa, Damao and Diu — an area of some 1,496 square miles embracing some 600 ,000 people. To most Indians, Goa i s a symbol of imperialism, an i r r i t a t i n g reminder of Western e x p l o i t a t i o n i n an almost completely free motherland. Nehru has c a l l e d the Portuguese possessions "a continuing 42 interference with India's p o l i t i c a l system." Since 1947, the Indian government has made repeated requests to Lisbon to open negotiations f o r cession, negotiations being formally i n i t i a t e d by the Indian M i n i s t e r at Lisbon by presenting an Aide Memoire, dated February 27 , 1950, on behalf of the Government of India to the Portuguese government. But Lisbon refused to discuss the question of t h e i r sovereignty over t h e i r Indian possessions with New D e l h i , and has maintained the a t t i t u d e ever since that these possessions are an i n t e g r a l part of the homeland, a claim Nehru has emphatically rejected. Frequent clashes have taken place on the Goanese border as passive r e s i s t o r s , non-violent a g i t a t o r s , have sought to cross the f r o n t i e r of Goa to further a l i b e r a t i o n movement. These clashes have provoked a rousing cry i n India f o r armed i n t e r v e n t i o n , but Nehru has remained i n s i s t e n t that the problem can only be solved by peaceful negotiations. Indeed, any other p o l i c y would contradict h i s oft-repeated adherence to Pancha S h i l a . "The high reputation that we enjoy i n the world today and the weight that our words carry." Mr. Nehru admitted i n 1955, "are due to the fa c t that we 57 adhere to and honour our p r i n c i p l e s . I f we suddenly reverse our p o l i c y , the world w i l l get an opportunity to say that we 44 are d e c e i t f u l . " Thus the Indian government remains deter-mined to employ negotiations, not force, to r i d India of these l a s t vestiges of European co l o n i a l i s m . In a consideration of India's p o l i c y towards the issue of dependent peoples, then, several f a c t o r s stand out. The i n i t i a l a p r i o r i assumption that p r a c t i c a l l y a l l Western diplomacy was motivated by imperialism and the resultant one-track approach of extreme suspicion to the problem of i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e l a t i o n s has given way to a more discriminatory evaluation of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . The genuine fear of renewed Western influence i n Asia remains, as i s amply i l l u s t r a t e d by c e r t a i n events of recent years. Thus the extreme s e n s i t i v i t y of Nehru and others to Western-sponsored a l l i a n c e s such as SEATO (1954) and the Baghdad Pact (1955) may be p a r t i a l l y explained by the b e l i e f that these m i l i t a r y pacts .represented an i n d i r e c t return of Western power to an 45 area from which i t had recently retreated. y S i m i l a r l y , the sharp Indian condemnation of the Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and i n i t i a l r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n of Russia's actions i n Hungary i l l u s t r a t e d three f a c t s : f i r s t , a continuing mistrust of Western actions because of the lengthy h i s t o r y of Anglo-French colonia l i s m i n Asia and A f r i c a ; secondly, a w i l l i n g n e s s to give the Russian case a f a i r hearing because of the absence of d i r e c t penetration into South and Southeast 58 Asia; t h i r d , an unstated b e l i e f that violence i s bad but white violence against non-whites i s worse. In recent years, however, there has been an increasing r e a l i z a t i o n i n India that the more immediate and greater " i m p e r i a l i s t threat" i s now presented by the two Communist giants, and e s p e c i a l l y Communist China. Hence there has been a s i g n i f i c a n t softening i n the former a l l - o u t support of Asian freedom movements when these threatened to provide openings f o r Communist advances as i n Malaya and Indo-China. S i m i l a r l y , where outspoken a n t i - c o l o n i a l i s m served only to further embarrass a c o l o n i a l power's e f f o r t s to prepare dependent peoples f o r independence by gradual processes, as i n B r i t a i n ' s A f r i c a n colonies, the Indian government has become prudently s i l e n t . India has also considerably 'mellowed her tune' i n areas where the t r a n s f e r of power to resident peoples i s complicated by large opposing groups, as i s the case i n A l g e r i a where there i s a large French minority, or on Cyprus where Greek-Turkish animosities could have serious consequences should B r i t a i n t r a n s f e r power to the Greek majority. India's desire now appears to be to prevent Asian, A f r i c a n , (or European nationalism) from d i s -rupting world peace. The conclusion may therefore be per-mitted that i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c s , and notably the aggressiveness of communism i n Asia, have.caused India to considerably, mellow her championship of dependent peoples. Footnotes - Chapter I I I 1 Jawaharlal Nehru: an address to the United Nations General Assembly i n P a r i s , November 3, 1948. Speeches  1946-1949, pp. 319-320. 2 For a d e t a i l e d account of the conference, see George McTurnan Kahin, The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, Cornell U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1956). 3 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 289. 4 B. S. N. Murti, Nehru 1s Foreign P o l i c y (New D e l h i , Beacon Information and P u b l i c a t i o n s , 1953)» pp. 24 - 2 5 . 5 Broadcast from New D e l h i , September 7, 1946. Nehru's  Speeches 1946-1949, p. 2. 6 The Indian experience has been w e l l summed up by Professor Toynbee: "India i s . . . t h e /onlj7 great non-Western society that has been...overrun and conquered by Western arms and ruled a f t e r that by Western administrators... India's experience of the West has thus been p a i n f u l and... hu m i l i a t i n g . " Arnold Toynbee, The World and The West (Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1953)* p. 34. 7 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 302. 8 Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 266. 9 Robert A. Scalpino i n an a r t i c l e "Neutralism i n Asia" published i n American P o l i t i c a l Science Review, v o l . XLYIII, 1 (March 1954), pp. 49-62, observes that "an examination of the numerous fore i g n p o l i c y statements of the Indian National Congress i n the past ( B r i t i s h r u l e period) reveals a strong element of c o n t i n u i t y i n the present Indian foreign p o l i c y . " 10 Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 215. 11 I b i d . , p. 216. 12 Werner L e v i , Free India i n A s i a (Minneapolis, U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota Press, 1953)» p. 119. 13 S. I . A f f . 1949-1950, p. 462. 14 Doc. Amer. For. R e l . 1951, pp. 462-466. 15 See the Indian note to the United States government on August 2 3 , 1951. I b i d . , pp. 606-608. i 16 The Hew York Times, August 28, 1951. India signed a separate Peace Treaty with Japan at Tokyo on June 9, 1952, which ended the state of war with Japan; i t waived a l l Indian claims to reparations. India agreed to return Japanese property, etc., but the Treaty d i d not mention anything about the c o n t r o v e r s i a l subjects referred to i n the Indian note of August 2 3 , 1951. Text i n Doc. I .  A f f . (E.I.I.A., 1952) , pp. 483-4-87. 17 Indian note of August 2 3 , 1951. 18 Since the Pormosan trouble arose i n January 1955» there has been much l e g a l controversy regarding the status of Formosa. Some claim that Formosa i s not Chinese t e r r i t o r y . Had such a p r o v i s i o n been made i n the Japanese Peace Treaty, there would have been no room f o r such controversies. 19 In United States i n World A f f a i r s ( 1951) , p. 192 i s the comment that the Indian objections were " f l a t l y rejected" by the United States "with signs of i r r i t a t i o n that were unusual i n i t s diplomatic exchanges with n o n - S t a l i n i s t countries." 20 The New York Times, August 28, 1951. 21 Quoted i n M u r t i , op. c i t . , pp. 74-75* 22 Text of the Indian note i n Doc. I . A f f . , 194-7-194-8, p. 74-8. 23 See U. N. Document S/649. 24 K. P. Karunakarn, India i n World A f f a i r s 1947-1950 (London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952) , p. 229. 25 I b i d . 26 He also expressed the hope that A u s t r a l i a and New Zealand would attend, and h i s i n v i t a t i o n was accepted. 27 P r e s i d e n t i a l speech delivered i n New Delhi inaugurating the eighteen-nation Conference on Indonesia, January 2 0 , 1949. The, Governments of Afghanistan, A u s t r a l i a , Burma, Ceylon, Egypt, E t h i o p i a , India, Iran, the Lebanon, Pakistan, the P h i l i p p i n e s , Saudi Arabia, S y r i a and Yemen were repre-sented at t h i s Conference by delegates at m i n i s t e r i a l l e v e l , while China, Nepal, New Zealand and Siam sent observers. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, pp. 327-329. 28 Text 6f the Eesolution i n Doc. I . A f f . 1949-1950, pp. 567-569. i i 29 Speech, i n r e p l y to the two-day debate on Foreign P o l i c y , Parliament, New De l h i , June 12, 1952. Nehru 1s  Speeches 194-9-1955. p. 215. 30 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, June 10-17, 1950, p. 10754-. 31 The New York Times, June 17, 1950. 32 India's diplomatic i n t e r v e n t i o n i s discussed i n Chapter V. 33 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, J u l y 7-14-, 1956, p. 14-^ 65^  34- I b i d . , October 25 - November 1, 1958, p. 16468. 35 Defence and Security i n the Indian Ocean Area (New De l h i , I.C.W.A., 1958), p. 11. 36 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, September 23-30, 1950, p. 10974. 37 The New York Times, June 29, 1951. 38 L e v i , Free India i n Asia, p. 128. 39 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, J u l y 31 - August 7, 1954, p. 13704. 40 Speech i n the Constituent Assembly ( L e g i s l a t i v e ) , New D e l h i , March 8, 1949. Nehru's Speeches 1946-1949, p. 241. 41 M u r t i , op. c i t . , p. 5 2 . 42 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957. p. 380. 43 In a repl y to debate on Goa i n the Lok Sabha on Ju l y 26, 1955, Nehru declared that: "To say that Goa i s a part of Portugal i s something i n the nature of a f a i r y t a l e or nursery rhyme...it has no r e l a t i o n s h i p to f a c t s , and any kind of w i l l , decree or law passed i n Portugal i s not going to make Goa a part of Portugal." I b i d . , pp. 377-378. 44 Extract from Nehru's r e p l y to the debate on the i n t e r -national s i t u a t i o n , Lok Sabha, September 17, 1955* I b i d . , p. 390. 45 Nehru has described the Manila Treaty as " i n c l i n e d dangerously i n the d i r e c t i o n of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries." I b i d . , p. 267. i i i CHAPTER IV INDIA AND A POLICY OP PEACE ...the approach of m i l i t a r y p a c t s . . . i s a wrong approach, a dangerous approach and a harmful approach. I t sets i n motion a l l the wrong tendencies and prevents the r i g h t tendencies from developing.^ The fundamental problem f a c i n g India since independence has been i n t e r n a l rather than external. I t i s the gigantic problem of providing a vast population with the nec e s s i t i e s of l i f e — food, c l o t h i n g and housing. The Government of India i s f u l l y conscious of these d i f f i c u l t i e s and also of the economic and m i l i t a r y weakness of the country. Indian leaders c l e a r l y r e a l i z e that whether India i s involved i n a war or not, the mere f a c t of a world conflagration breaking out would s e r i o u s l y hamper the country's i n d u s t r i a l and economic development. I t would generate tremendous i n t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l and s o c i a l pressures, and perhaps turn India into a b a t t l e - f i e l d . Such developments along these l i n e s would make the s u r v i v a l of the Government i t s e l f com-p p l e t e l y uncertain. Therefore the Indian government, to gain time i n which to make economic progress, has given the highest p r i o r i t y to the pursuit of i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace. 59 60 The Indian government i s convinced that, unless member-states owe u n q u a l i f i e d allegiance to the United Nations, i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace w i l l be endangered. As the d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o power blocs i s not i n the i n t e r e s t s of the world organization, India has refused to be a party to any such development e i t h e r by helping i n the formation of new 'blocs' or by j o i n i n g any of the e x i s t i n g ones. The p o s i t i o n of dynamic neutralism or non-alignment which India has adopted i n the East-Vest struggle i s thus represented by the Indian government as a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to the avoidance of war. Indian leaders f e e l that by j o i n i n g one of the two power blocs, India would be l e s s i n a p o s i t i o n to work e f f e c t i v e l y f o r the prevention of war. Mr. Nehru has declared that India would lose the advantage of great influence by a l i g n i n g h e r s e l f with one group of nations, an influence he described as growing and i n the favour of world 4-peace• India b e l i e v e s , therefore, that by r e f u s i n g to take sides i n the world power struggle she i s f o l l o w i n g a p o s i t i v e p o l i c y . 5 Such a p o l i c y w i l l , i n the view of many Indians, slow down the d r i f t toward a b i p o l a r world i n which i n t e r -n a t i o n a l tensions would be r a i s e d to an i n t o l e r a b l e p i t c h and armed c o n f l i c t become i n e v i t a b l e . I t i s often asserted by Indians that t h e i r country, by v i r t u e of i t s unique p o s i t i o n , affords the best remaining hope f o r u l t i m a t e l y bridging the ever-widening gap between the Communist nations 61 and the West. Indeed, India's 'middle' p o s i t i o n does enable her to maintain amicable r e l a t i o n s with both sides and to provide an acceptable channel of communication i n a world where normal channels are i n c r e a s i n g l y breaking down. This has caused Lord Birdwood to remark that India's p o l i c y of dynamic n e u t r a l i t y i n the c o l d war i s a matter, not f o r f a c i l e regret, but perhaps f o r hope, because of the possible advantage of having one power i n the world with access to leadership on both sides. Many people i n the West have charged non-alignment to be immoral, but India r e j e c t s the premises and, therefore, the p o l i c y implications of t h i s argument. To divide the world i n t o r i g i d moral categories, Indians r e p l y , i s to indulge i n f a n c i f u l self-righteousness. No state or way of l i f e has a monopoly of t r u t h or v i r t u e , though one may be admired more than another. None i s an absolute threat to peace and freedom. On the contrary, Indians argue, both East and West share the blame f o r the i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension which hangs l i k e a shadow of impending death over the e n t i r e planet. Both sides are g u i l t y of provocative deeds and words, but both are f i r m l y established i n the present world and can only be eradicated by a contest on the b a t t l e f i e l d . The Indian for e i g n policy-makers argue that the moral imperative i s to rul e out war and to concentrate on the d i f f i c u l t but e s s e n t i a l task of r e l a x i n g tensions, to recognize the harsh r e a l i t i e s of i n t e r n a t i o n a l l i f e , and to 62 search unceasingly f o r a negotiated settlement between the opposing power blocs. Mr. Nehru has repeatedly held that the major f a c t o r 7 that might lead to war i s the psychosis of fear' p r e v a i l i n g among the two blocs of nations who are often f e a r i n g aggression from each other. I f e i t h e r of the two groups or both proceed from the premise that sooner or l a t e r an armed c o n f l i c t i s i n e v i t a b l e , then there i s l i t t l e chance, eventually, of world peace. India's p o s i t i o n has been that such a war i s not i n e v i t a b l e . The Government of India, therefore, has t r i e d i n the i n t e r e s t s of India and of world peace to impress upon the world that view through openly v o i c i n g opinions against steps which, according to i t s c a l c u l a t i o n s , might lead to war. Among the steps which augur d i s a s t e r i n the future are the t r a d i t i o n a l attempts to secure peace and se c u r i t y by means of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s — steps which are rejected by the Indian government because they jeopardize the e f f o r t s to tr e a t i n t e r n a t i o n a l problems i n a c o n c i l i a t o r y environment free of fe a r . During h i s v i s i t to America i n 1950, the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r emphasized t h i s view: The very process of a marshalling of the world i n t o two h o s t i l e camps p r e c i p i t a t e s the c o n f l i c t which i t i s sought to avoid. I t produces a sense of t e r r i b l e fear and that fear darkens men's minds and leads them into wrong courses. There i s perhaps nothing so bad and so dangerous i n l i f e as fear.... 63 Our problem, therefore, becomes one of lessening and u l t i m a t e l y putting an end to t h i s f e a r . That w i l l not happen i f a l l the world takes sides and t a l k s of war. War becomes almost c e r t a i n then.g India i s not convinced that the actions of one of the power blocs constitute the exclusive threat to the peace of the world and i t i s not, therefore, eager to p a r t i c i p a t e i n any scheme of c o l l e c t i v e s e c u r i t y , e i t h e r outside or wi t h i n the United Nations framework, that would involve f o r c e f u l action by one of the power blocs against the other. In her att i t u d e towards the Western system of a l l i a n c e s aimed against Communism, India's opposition i s l a r g e l y conditioned by her own i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of the nature of the Communist threat. Indian leaders have declined to accept a black and white picture of postwar developments that asserts the presence of r i g h t on one side e x c l u s i v e l y . Most leaders of Indian thought also conclude that the Soviet Union and Communist China fear Western intentions at le a s t as much as the West fears Russian and Chinese aims. In support of t h i s conclusion they have pointed to the Soviet emphasis on Western intervention a f t e r the Bolshevik r e v o l u t i o n . They point also to the postwar Soviet fears of American atomic weapons and to the complaints of Russian leaders a f t e r the Second World War concerning Western aggressive designs. Thus, a f t e r the Western nations had organized themselves into the North A t l a n t i c Treaty 64 Organization, i t appeared to many Indians to be a barren controversy whether the Soviet Union was driven by ambition or fear or both: fear was evident on both sides as Europe was divided between competing and h o s t i l e a l l i a n c e s . Looking to A s i a , Indian leaders have interpreted the Communist threat as coming from w i t h i n Asian s o c i e t i e s rather than from Soviet or Chinese m i l i t a r y aggression. They can see no advantage accruing to Communist power through f o r c i b l e occupation of the under-developed Asian countries as such an occupation would hardly add to Communist m i l i t a r y strength. The p r e v a i l i n g Indian a t t i t u d e i s that the Communist programme f o r Asia r e s t s on p o l i t i c a l , c u l t u r a l and economic penetration rather than on m i l i t a r y conquest. Thus, they argue, any attempt to t a l k of the Communist danger to the free world — of which the ordinary people of Asia have l i t t l e , i f any, conception — or to stress the importance of m i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s and under-emphasize s o c i a l and economic measures i s an extremely short-sighted and erroneous p o l i c y . Such a p o l i c y leaves the s o c i a l and economic back door wide open to subversion while guarding the m i l i t a r y front against an u n l i k e l y overt Soviet and/or Chinese aggression. The Indian government f e e l s , therefore, that the 9 best way to f i g h t Communism i s not m i l i t a r y containment, but through b u i l d i n g economic s t a b i l i t y and helping to f u l f i l l l e gitimate n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r a t i o n s . ^ One foreign observer 65 has confirmed t h i s view: There i s ample evidence to show that f o r most Asians the main issue i s not Moscow versus Washington, or c a p i t a l i s m versus communism, but rather nationalism, a r e a l voice f o r the people i n government and economic progress, versus c o l o n i a l i s m , despotic government and economic back-wardness.^ Consequently India has deprecated m i l i t a r y alignments of nations because such steps l e d to the creation of a 'war psychosis,* increasing fear and a race of armaments — a l l these f a c t o r s working together i n the d i r e c t i o n of war. While not denying the r i g h t of nations to take legitimate precautions f o r self-defence, Mr. Nehru has declared that defensive a l l i a n c e s openly d i r e c t e d against some other country or countries defeat t h e i r own purpose of t r y i n g to 12 maintain peace through strength. That t h i s view i s not wholly groundless i s confirmed by Lester B. Pearson, the former Canadian Secretary of State f o r External A f f a i r s , who stated that " i n a l l the long story of mankind, arms alone, however powerful, have never been s u f f i c i e n t to guarantee s e c u r i t y f o r any length of time." ' One side's s e c u r i t y becomes the other's i n s e c u r i t y with the r e s u l t that an arms race develops, a v i c i o u s c i r c l e which i n the past has caused untold misery and destruction and at the present time could cause mankind's e x t i n c t i o n . Therefore i t i s a l l the more necessary to reduce tension i n order to avoid a war caused by accident or m i s c a l c u l a t i o n . 66 Thus India's opposition to a l l i a n c e s stems both from her non-agreement with the Western bloc as to the nature of the Communist threat and, of course, from her main objective of not getting involved i n a world war, f o r which end she wanted to minimize i n t e r n a t i o n a l tensions. However, while opposing m i l i t a r y pacts i n general, India's a t t i t u d e to them has been of more or l e s s concern depending on whether the area involved was d i s t a n t or close to her own t e r r i t o r y geographically. 14 15 Towards the Rio Pact and the Brussels Treaty, y India has never expressed opposition as she has recognized them as legitimate measures of self-defence. The Rio Pact covered an area which d i d not a f f e c t India very much, whereas the Brussels Treaty was viewed by India as the r e s u l t of a fear on the part of c e r t a i n nations of Western Europe of the Soviet Union whose expansion into Eastern Europe was not regarded with favour even by India. 16 On the North A t l a n t i c Treaty Organization, India has often expressed her views. She has never implied that the Western powers were motivated by any other considerations than t h e i r fear of the Communist bloc, although i n her view 17 that very fear created counter-fear and a war psychology. ' But the Indian government has expressed concern over the geographical development of NATO to embrace countries which have nothing to do with the A t l a n t i c community, and e s p e c i a l l y over the i m p l i c a t i o n s of statements by Portuguese o f f i c i a l s 67 that NATO was committed to a i d Portugal to maintain i t s Indian settlements. Mr. Nehru gave expression to t h i s Indian concern i n a speech to the Indian Parliament on June 12, 1952: I t / N A T 0 7 began as a pact f o r defence against aggression, but i t has apparently widened i t s scope and taken upon i t s e l f the defence of the c o l o n i a l possessions of the nations concerned. That, so f a r as we are concerned, i s a very serious matter. I t means that c e r t a i n countries must give assurances whether formal or informal that they w i l l protect and maintain c o l o n i a l r u l e wherever i t e x i s t s . India's concern would be understandable — i f her fears were v a l i d . For thereby the movements f o r freedom of dependent peoples would come in t o c o n f l i c t with the organized and coordinated might of a l l the NATO powers. But the NATO tre a t y , though i t permits a member to bring any question before i t f o r discussion, does not provide f o r the support of member-states i n t h e i r c o l o n i a l possessions. The com-p l i c a t i o n s which were inherent i n any such commitment were c e r t a i n l y appreciated by the d r a f t e r s of the Treaty and pointedly avoided. For Portugal to imply that her NATO partners were bound to help her maintain possession of Goa must c e r t a i n l y have been embarrassing to the A l l i a n c e . 19 C e r t a i n l y i t was not considered relevant by Nehru, y and thus India, despite c e r t a i n public statements by government o f f i c i a l s to the contrary, does not consider NATO as too d i r e c t l y a f f e c t i n g her. 68 But while India has acquiesced i n European and American a l l i a n c e s , her reaction to the extension of these arrangements i n t o areas nearer home has been one of strenuous objection. The Indian government openly opposed 20 the formation of a P a c i f i c Pact. Concern was shown by-some members i n the Indian Parliament about the possible formation of a P a c i f i c Pact as e a r l y as A p r i l , 194-9. Mr. Nehru r e l i e v e d that concern by informing the House that there was no discussion going on f o r such a pact at the 21 time. At the Colombo meeting of the Commonwealth on Foreign A f f a i r s i n 1950, India declared that she had no 22 i n t e n t i o n to j o i n such a pact, apparently opposing i t f o r the reason that the time was not ripe f o r such a step because of the unsettled state of South-East A s i a , the s i t u a t i o n s i n Indonesia and Indo-China being s t i l l unresolved. Here again i t seems that India's primary fear was that such a pact might be used to b o l s t e r up the shrinking strength of the c o l o n i a l powers i n those areas. Later, however, when the Chinese Communists came i n t o power, and the United States began to i n s t i t u t e a change i n her Asian p o l i c y , India opposed the P a c i f i c Pact f o r the reason that i t would create tensions i n the area. When her disapproval f a i l e d to h a l t the signature of the Pact, however, India d i d not show active h o s t i l i t y to i t , nor has she subsequently done so. She apparently recog-nizes that the Pact i s a defensive arrangement which, by reason of the area of i t s a p p l i c a t i o n , cannot be considered 69 an overt provocation by Peking and therefore w i l l not, i n i t s e l f , increase tension i n As i a . Towards the Manila Pact (SEATO), 2 5 however, India has been adamantly opposed from the outset, and i n t h i s opposition she has been able to take Burma and Indonesia with her and exercised enough influence to keep a wavering Ceylon away from the Pact. The Geneva settlement had ju s t brought about a cease-fire inlndo-China, and India had as recently as A p r i l 28, 1954, signed with China the Sino-Indian Agreement on Tibet to which was attached a general statement containing the f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of peaceful co-existence to which India apparently attached the highest importance. Consequently the Indian government reacted extremely unfavourably to the Western bloc's desire to go ahead with a South-East Asia Defence Treaty. Mr. Nehru made h i s views known i n the Indian 24 Parliament on September 29, 1954. His c r i t i c i s m s were more or l e s s based on the grounds that SEATO was not, as i t s signatories claimed, a bulwark f o r peace and sec u r i t y i n South-East A s i a , but rather that i t would d e f i n i t e l y add to the tensions and fears of the s i t u a t i o n . He declared: ...the approach of t h i s Treaty i s wrong and may antagonize a great part of As i a . Are you going to have peace and s e c u r i t y by creating more c o n f l i c t s and antagonisms and by making people think that instead of bringing s e c u r i t y you bring insecurity....pc India could not accept the contention that the South-East 70 A s i a Defence Organization was a regional body as defined i n the United Nations Charter, because some of the signatory states were not geographically s i t u a t e d i n that region — a point which i n c l i n e d the Treaty "dangerously i n the d i r e c t i o n of spheres of influence to be exercised by powerful countries. The f a c t that the Pact was signed despite India's very vocal objections only served to further alarm Indian opinion as to the actual motives of the West. Why, Nehru enquired, should the Western powers seek to set up m i l i t a r y bases i n parts of the world where the chief desire was to keep out of war, to protect countries which f o r the most part have not asked f o r t h e i r p r o t e c t i o n , or to elaborate m i l i t a r y plans with l e s s e r Asian nations when the stronger and often more democratic Asian governments were outspokenly opposed to them? M i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s were f a m i l i a r but here Nehru detected something new and rather extraordinary — i n t e r l o c k i n g a l l i a n c e s which, i n h i s opinion, increased the prospect of war on a world scale and was something, therefore, undesirable i n p r i n c i p l e . 28 The negotiation and signing of the Baghdad Pact provoked equally strong opposition from India, f o r i t embraced Middle Eastern states and thereby an area of great stragegic importance t o l n d i a . Nehru c r i t i c i z e d the Pact f o r creating i n Western Asia f a r greater tension and c o n f l i c t 29 than ever before, J and was p a r t i c u l a r l y c r i t i c a l , however, of Pakistan's membership i n the Pact — membership which the Indian government f e l t was not provoked by fear of some 71 imminent or dist a n t invasion or aggression from the Soviet 30 Union, but because of Pakistan's h o s t i l i t y to India. But undoubtedly the major opposition from India was due neither to fear of Pakistan's motives nor to those of the Western signatories of the defence pacts i n As i a . I t can be traced to the Indian r e a l i z a t i o n that her peace area was no more. As a r e s u l t of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact India was e n c i r c l e d by anti-Communist a l l i a n c e s . This f a c t rendered India's p o l i c y of non-involvement through non-alignment of l i t t l e consequence i n the event of war. The danger, i n Nehru's view, was that any odd member of one of the pacts could set i n motion something which would gradually p u l l i n not only the members of that pact, but some other i n t e r r e l a t e d pact of which they were common members. That i s why, both f o r l a r g e r reasons and f o r the narrow reason of s e l f - i n t e r e s t , 31 India took exception to the SEATO and Baghdad P a c t s . y These pacts d i d not recognize the new factors that were at work. Instead of taking advantage of these new factors which aimed at peace, disarmament and the lessening of tension, these pacts d e l i b e r a t e l y checked them and encouraged other tendencies which increased hatred and fear and apprehension and came i n the way fo disarmament. I t i s f o r t h i s basic reason, the b e l i e f that m i l i t a r y pacts constitute a dangerous and harmful approach to world peace, that India has maintained her unequivocal disapproval of, and opposition to, the very establishment of such arrangements. 72 Closely bound up with. India's opposition to the enti r e concept of m i l i t a r y pacts has been her advocacy of disarmament and the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c ontrol of atomic energy. The r e l e n t l e s s Indian d i a l e c t i c on the f a t a l c o r r e l a t i o n between Great Power armaments races and war leaves l i t t l e room f o r a cautious t e s t i n g of formulas and proposals f o r t h e i r water-tight guarantees. There was great — and to some, app a l l i n g — meaning to the announcement of the Indian delegate i n the 1951 General Assembly that India was i n t e r -ested not i n the adoption of any p a r t i c u l a r r e s o l u t i o n on 52 disarmament, but i n the actual beginning of disarmament. "Pear of aggression i s the root of a l l c o n f l i c t s , " argued the Indian delegate i n 1951 i n recommending to the major powers that they subscribe to a 'No-War Declaration.' He added by way of explanation: Por once war as a possible s o l u t i o n to any question, i s f i n a l l y ruled out — and t h i s i s what i s implied by a j o i n t no-war declaration — that minds of those involved must i n e v i t a b l y turn to peaceful s o l u t i o n s . ^ Although S i r Benegal Rau's attempt at t h i s time to get the major powers to subscribe to a blanket renunciation of war as a matter of p r i n c i p l e proved abortive, three years l a t e r Mrs. Pandit returned to the suggestion of a 'No-War Declaration' i n the i n t e r e s t of producing a climate of peace i n the world, but i t was not formally offered as an Indian proposal i n the United Nations* The Indian government f e l t , 73 and continues to f e e l , that the s o l u t i o n i n the f i e l d of armaments depends e s s e n t i a l l y on agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union by v i r t u e of t h e i r m i l i t a r y preponderance over a l l other states. But India i s determined to do a l l i n her power to bring the opposing sides i n the cold war together, and to somehow save mankind from the horrors of an arms race which can only end i n mutual destruction by nuclear arms. Consequently the Indian government has continued to maintain that nuclear, chemical, and b i o l o g i c a l knowledge and power should not be used to forge weapons of mass destruction. They advocate the pro-h i b i t i o n of such weapons by common consent, and immediately be agreement amongst those concerned, which l a t t e r i s , of course, at present the only e f f e c t i v e way to bring about t h e i r abandonment. Mr. C. S. Jha has described India's views on nuclear disarmament (i n c l u d i n g t e s t i n g ) as i n v o l v i n g nothing l e s s than the s u r v i v a l of the human race: This i s the greatest challenge of our time, the supreme challenge of the s p i r i t . S h a l l Man have the wisdom to use the tremendous power placed i n h i s hands by the discovery of atomic power to make t h i s planet a world of happiness and plenty, or w i l l he i n u t t e r f o l l y use nuclear power f o r committing mass suicide and the destruction of the human r a c e . ^ I t i s India's p o l i c y to endeavour with f a i t h and hope to promote a l l e f f o r t s that seek to bring to a h a l t t h i s d r i f t 35 to what appears to be the menace of t o t a l destruction. ^ 74 Just as India's opposition to a l l i a n c e s and advocacy of disarmament are attempts to ease tension i n the world, so too i s her championship of Communist China's recognition and admittance to the United Nations an attempt to lead the world away from the brink of the abyss. Despite Red China's aggressiveness, many people i n India maintain that the lessening of tension i n the Far East depends to a great extent on giving the Peking government diplomatic recognition and according i t i t s proper place i n the i n t e r -n a t i o n a l community. These are separate but c l o s e l y i n t e r -r e l a t e d issues leaning as they do on the same arguments and bringing i n t o play the same emotions. Both issues r e s t on a combination of formal agreements and p o l i t i c a l considerations. In extending immediate recognition to the Communist 56 Peking government, India d i d so on the basis that de facto c o n t r o l of t e r r i t o r y and administration e n t i t l e s a government *° <ie .jure status. Recognition was not, therefore, to mean that the Indian government approved of the character of the new regime, f o r the Nehru administration r u t h l e s s l y sup-pressed Communists at home; i t was rather a recognition of p o l i t i c a l r e a l i t y . India dealt with the case on i t s merits although t h i s caused serious resentment i n the United States — a f a c t o r which was to become a serious d i f f i c u l t y i n Indo-American r e l a t i o n s i n view of what happened l a t e r . And although the Indian government explained that no moral judgement was involved, i t undoubtedly had few qualms about 75 the downfall of the corrupt Kuomintang oligarchy. For the same reason of recognizing r e a l i t i e s , India supports the entry of Red China into the United Nations. " I t becomes completely unreal and a r t i f i c i a l , " Mr. Nehru,has declared, "to t a l k about China being repre-sented i n the United Nations or i n the Security Council by 37 someone who cannot speak f o r China." ' To Indian government leaders, the i n t e r n a t i o n a l recognition of Communist China would also have symbolic importance as a recognition of the new status of Asian peoples i n world a f f a i r s . Thus, while as an Indian Nehru may sometimes have moments of disquietude about the might of the New China, nevertheless as an Asian he has shared what he has considered a Western s l i g h t to a great power. In 1953 be observed: " I f China i s not there /xn the United Nations/> then from the point of view of population, from the point of view of world importance, 38 nearly a quarter of the world i s not the r e . " y More urgently, however, the Indian government holds the view that there can be no peace i n Asia u n t i l the Govern-ment of the Chinese People's Republic i s u n i v e r s a l l y recog-nized and accepted as the bona f i d e government of the Chinese people. Mr. Nehru has stated quite b l u n t l y that "one of the biggest f a c t o r s towards ensuring s e c u r i t y i n South-East Asia and i n the Par East i s the recognition of China...and China 39 coming i n t o the United N a t i o n s . W i t h the outbreak of the 76 Korean war India, i n accord with that view, championed more vigorously than ever the r i g h t of Communist China to be represented. On J u l y 13 , 1950, Mr. Nehru sent i d e n t i c a l l e t t e r s to Marshal S t a l i n and the United States Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, i n which he suggested the seating of 4-0 Communist China at the United Nations. This proposal was 41 welcomed by the Soviet leader but rejected by the Americans and so came to naught. Nothing daunted, India, at the opening of the f i f t h session of the United Nations General Assembly i n September 1950, introduced a d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n which stated that "the Central Government of the People's Republic of China i s the only...government functioning i n the Republic of China, as now constituted." The Assembly was asked to decide that t h i s government should be e n t i t l e d to represent the Republic of China i n the General Assembly and to recommend that the other organs of the United Nations adopt 4-2 s i m i l a r r e s o l u t i o n s . Faced by the adamant opposition of the United States, opposition which grew stronger as the Korean war progressed, the Indian proposal was defeated and subsequent suggestions towards the same end have achieved no success. Red China continues to be excluded from the United Nations, a s i t u a t i o n Mr. Nehru has deplored on many occasions and which prompted even the Statesman ( D e l h i ) , which i s considered a pro-Western and conservative newspaper, to write on September 16, 1950: 77 ...the u n r e a l i s t i c obstinacy of the U. S. on the China question i s pre-j u d i c i n g her r e l a t i o n s , not with China only, but with other Asian countries and lessening the authority of the U. N. The Security Council as at present constituted represents neither the f a c t s of world power, as was intended, nor ( i t now seems cle a r ) the wishes of the majority of members. How i t can suc c e s s f u l l y champion democratic causes, as i t i s not i t s e l f democratically constituted i s a question which i s l i k e l y to be asked as time goes on.;,. The National Standard even questioned the claims of the United Nations to be considered as an organization with world-wide r e s p o n s i b i l i t y . I t wrote on January 16, 1951: "America deprived the U. N. of i t s moral claims to enforce i t s d i r e c t i v e by her obstinate r e f u s a l to buy peace through the concession of Red China's claims on Formosa and f o r the 44 seat i n the Security Council." The continued r e f u s a l by the United States and i t s supporters to permit Red China's seating i n the United Nations i s viewed by Indians as a development i n the context of which the United Nations i s being converted from the status of a world organization to the executive agent of an anti-Communist bloc. Such a development w i l l , i n the Indian view, weaken not strengthen the world body and so make i t l e s s e f f e c t i v e as an agency of peace. In recent years, however, there has been a noticeable d i s i n c l i n a t i o n on the part of India to adamantly 78 demand the admission of Communist China into the United Nations. In part t h i s may he a t t r i b u t e d to New Delhi's awareness that American non-recognition of the Peking regime at the present time i s based on a complex set of factors — emotional, p o l i t i c a l , and s t r a t e g i c — that only time and a favorable series of events can a l t e r . And p a r t l y i t i s due to the suspicion aroused i n India by China's actions i n Tibet, South-East A s i a , and on India's borders, as to the responsible nature of the Chinese Communist government. Even Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, with a l l h i s prestige and eloquence, dares not support Red China's claims to a seat at the United Nations too v o c i f e r o u s l y at a time when that country i s s e i z i n g Indian t e r r i t o r y without regard to Indian protests and i n d i r e c t v i o l a t i o n of i t s w r i t t e n and spoken adherence to Panch S h i l a . The Indian government apparently recognizes that the issues of recognition and United Nations membership fo r her Chinese neighbour are part of a l a r g e r problem which must i t s e l f change before any r e a l new developments can be expected. Thus India's approach to the cold war i s based on the view that world peace can only be secured i f a l l nations owe u n q u a l i f i e d allegiance to the United Nations. In furtherance of her own cherished i d e a l s and n a t i o n a l i n t e r -e s t s , no l e s s than those of the other progressive nations of the world, India plays her r o l e i n the United Nations Organization. She recognizes i n i t the Supreme Parliament 79 of the nations of the world, where the voice of any nation, regardless of size or p o l i t i c a l ideology, subscribing to the fundamental p r i n c i p l e s guiding the great organization i s heard with due regard. She recognizes i n i t the symbol of the gigantic e f f o r t humanity i s prepared to make i n order to stave o f f war. As such India has sought to gain the admittance of Red China i n t o the United Nations, thereby hoping to give the world organization a more representative character and to strengthen i t s promotion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l cooperation. For the West ( i n general) to disregard the existence of a quarter of the human race i n the throes of readjustment i s viewed by New Delhi as a p o t e n t i a l and very r e a l threat to world peace. India opposes the d i v i s i o n of the world i n t o r i v a l power blocs as representing a s p i r i t of animosity, hatred and suspicion which i s contrary to the basic p r i n c i p l e s underlying the United Nations Organization. She considers that such a d i v i s i o n as represented by regional s e c u r i t y pacts, leads only to imaginary s e c u r i t y , but thereby creates a war psychology and a race i n armaments which can only lead, as i n the past, to di s a s t e r f o r a l l concerned. Through non-alignment and continuous enunciation of her views, India hopes to lead the world away from t h i s dangerous p o l a r i z a t i o n of power and fear psychosis and to further the cause of peace. Footnotes - Chapter IV 1 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957* p. 319. 2 Eosinger, India and the United States, p. 36• 3 On March 22, 194-9, Mr. Nehru, speaking on 'Our Foreign P o l i c y , ' s a i d : "We want at l e a s t ten or f i f t e e n years of peace i n order to he able to develop our resources." Independence and A f t e r , p. 258. 4- I b i d . , p. 24-2. 5 Nehru said on March 22, 1949: " I t i s not a middle-of-the-road p o l i c y . I t i s a p o s i t i v e , constructive p o l i c y d e l i b e r a t e l y aiming at something and d e l i b e r a t e l y t r y i n g to avoid h o s t i l i t y to other countries, to any country as f a r as p o s s i b l e . " I b i d . , p. 254. 6 Lord Birdwood, A Continent Decides, p. 198. 7 Mr. Nehru's speech i n the Indian Parliament on February 18, 1953 mainly revolved around t h i s theme 'Psychosis of Fear.' Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 243-258. 8 Jawaharlal Nehru, V i s i t to America (New York, John Day, 1 9 5 0 ) , pp. 30-31. 9 This was one of the reasons given by Mr. Nehru f o r h i s opposition to the P a c i f i c Pact i n 1949. 10 In an interview with Robert Trumbull i n March 1951, Mr. Nehru suggested two ways to f i g h t communism i n Asia: by encouragement of nationalism; and by helping economic progress. He pointed out: "That i s to say the people should not be made by circumstances to think of communism as a l i b e r a t i n g force, which they sometimes do." The New  York Times, A p r i l 1, 1951. 11 Eosinger, op. c i t . , p. 146. 12 Nehru's Press Conferences 1953, p. 7. 13 L. B. Pearson, "After Geneva: A Greater Task For NATO," Foreign A f f a i r s , v o l . 34 (1955-56), pp. 15-16. 14 The Inter-American Treaty of Eeciprocal Assistance (Eio Pact) signed on September 2, 1947 at Eio de Janeiro between the United States and a l l twenty L a t i n American states. Text i n Doc. I . A f f . 1947-1948, pp. 773-778. i 15 The Brussels Treaty, signed on March 17, 194-8 at Brussels between Belgium, Prance, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, znd the United Kingdom. Text i n Doc. I . Aff7 194-7-194-8, pp. 225-229. 16 The North A t l a n t i c Treaty, signed A p r i l 4-, 194-9 at Washington between twelve powers, namely: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, I t a l y , Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States. Greece and Turkey joined l a t e r on February 20, 1952, under a separate Protocol of February 15, 1952. Text i n Doc. I . A f f .  194-9-1950, pp. 257-260. 17 In a speech i n the Lok Sabha during debate on Foreign A f f a i r s , November 19, 1956, Mr. Nehru declared: "The fear of Western countries regarding the armed might of the Soviet Union brought into existence pacts and a l l i a n c e s l i k e the NATO, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. Then came i n t o existence, as a counterblast, the Warsaw Treaty. Each of these systems of a l l i a n c e s pretends to be an association f o r peace and defence against attack, but each has the e f f e c t r e a l l y of fr i g h t e n i n g the other party and making i t more apprehensive of danger and, therefore, quickening the race of armaments." Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 328. 18 Nehru's Speeches 194-9-1953, p. 2 2 3 . 19 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 378. 20 The Security Treaty between the Governments of A u s t r a l i a , New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS Pact) signed at San Francisco on September 1, 1951. Text i n Doc. Amer. For. E e l . 1951, PP. 263-265. 21 Kundra, Indian Foreign P o l i c y 194-7-1954-, p. 91. 22 L e v i , Free India i n A s i a , p. 57* 23 The South-East Asia C o l l e c t i v e Defence Treaty signed at Manila on September 8, 1954- by eight powers, namely: A u s t r a l i a , France, New Zealand, Pakistan, the P h i l i p p i n e s , Thailand, the United Kingdom and the United States. Text i n D.S.B. XXI (795), September 20, 1954-, pp. 393-396. 24- "The South-East A s i a Treaty Organization," Nehru's  Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 265-273. 25 I b i d . , p. 268. 26 I b i d . , p. 267. i i 27 Nicholas Mansergh, "Commonwealth Foreign P o l i c i e s 194-5-56: A Perspective View," Commonwealth Perspectives (London, Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 5 8 ) , P» 5 2 . ~~ 28 The Pact of Mutual Co-operation between Iraq and Turkey was signed on 24- February 1955i B r i t a i n joined on 5 A p r i l 1955» Pakistan on 25 September 1955, and P e r s i a on 3 November 1955. For texts of the agreements see Doc. I . A f f . 1955* pp. 287-289 (Iraqi-Turkish agreement); pp. 293-294- ( B r i t i s h adherence); p. 304- (Persian adherence). 29 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 319. 30 I b i d . , pp. 319-320. 31 I b i d . , p. 320. 32 General Assembly, O f f i c i a l Records, 6 t h Sess., Cmtte. 1, p. 28. 33 I b i d . , pp. 129-130. 34 Speech to the General Assembly's main p o l i t i c a l committee on November 18, 1959. Quoted i n Indiagram, November 19, 1959* 35 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957, p. 2 5 0 . 36 The Government of India accorded de .jure recognition to the new Government" of China on December 3 0 , 194-9• 37 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957* p. 242. 38 Quoted i n Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 244. 39 Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957, p. 2 ? 1 . When the Peking government applied f o r admission i n t o the United Nations i n January, 1950, India, as a recent e l e c t i v e to a non-permanent Council seat, supported the Soviet d r a f t r e s o l u t i o n of January 10, 1950 that provided f o r the expul-sion of the N a t i o n a l i s t representative from the Council and h i s replacement by the Peking delegate. 40 Text of the l e t t e r s i n Doc. I. A f f . 1949-1950, pp. 705-707. 41 In h i s p o l i t e r e j e c t i o n of Nehru's proposal of J u l y 18, 1950, Mr. Acheson said: "In our opinion, the decision between competing claimant Governments f o r China's seat i n the United Nations i s one which must be reached by the United Nations on i t s merits...I know that you w i l l agree that the decision should not be d i c t a t e d by an unlawful aggression or by any other conduct which should subject the United Nations to coercion or duress." I b i d . , p. 707* i i i 42 General Assembly O f f i c i a l Records, 5 t h Sess., 277th Plenary Mtg., September 19 , 1950, p. 2 . 43 Cited i n India and the United Nations (New York, I.C.W.A., 1957) , P. 70 . 44 I b i d . i v CHAPTER V INDIAN MEDIATION IN EAST-WEST DISPUTES We have to achieve freedom and to defend i t . We have to meet aggression and to r e s i s t i t and the force employed must he adequate to the purpose. But even when preparing to r e s i s t aggression, the ultimate objective, the objective of peace and r e c o n c i l i a t i o n , must never be l o s t sight of and heart and mind must be attuned to t h i s supreme aim and not swayed or clouded by hatred or fear.-^ In furtherance of her desire to create a temper of peace, and thereby lead the world away from a sense of paralyzing fear of the i n e v i t a b i l i t y of war, India has f e l t that she must act as a sort of go-between or mediator i n cold war disputes i n v o l v i n g the r i v a l i n t e r e s t s of the two blocs. By v i r t u e of her non-alignment with respect to e i t h e r power bloc, India f e e l s that she can perform the necessary task of b u i l d i n g a bridge which otherwise would not e x i s t between the two r i v a l blocs. Indeed, India i s happily situated f o r such a r o l e — an Asian s t a t e , t r a d i t i o n a l l y f r i e n d l y to China, without any legacy of c o n f l i c t with Russia, yet f r i e n d l y to the West, and f o l l o w i n g a 'middle way' i n i t s programme of economic and s o c i a l development. Her p o l i c y of non-alignment and mediation has a t t r a c t e d the support of various Asian and A f r i c a n governments and the enthusiasm of 80 81 large numbers of people, p a r t i c u l a r l y i n non-Communist Asia and i n A f r i c a . By v i r t u e of her unique p o s i t i o n , size and influence, India i s best placed to play such a r o l e . That she has done so with not a l i t t l e success i s evidenced by her Government's at t i t u d e s and e f f o r t s i n Korea, i n Indo-r China, i n the dispute between Peking, and Washington over Formosa and the offshore i s l a n d s , and i n the Hungarian and Suez c o n f l i c t s . The events of 1950 and a f t e r i n Korea were s i g n i -f i c a n t to Indians because these events r a i s e d the spectre of a world war. Because of i t s concern with preventing the Korean war from spreading i n t o a large-scale world c o n f l i c t , India could not remain a mere spectator to the happenings i n Korea. Indeed, as the war progressed some of the key p r i n c i p l e s of Indian p o l i c y concerning the nature and function of the United Nations and of Great Power r e l a t i o n s were put to the t e s t . Before the North Korean attack i n June 1950, the Indian government and people had hardly been interested i n Korean matters. India had not recognized e i t h e r of the two Korean governments i n the b e l i e f that the a r t i f i c i a l d i v i s i o n of the country should neither be d i g n i f i e d nor perpetuated by the act of recognition. She would i n any case have found i t d i f f i c u l t to decide which government to recognize since she disapproved of the conditions p r e v a i l i n g on both sides of 82 the 38th P a r a l l e l . Notwithstanding these unfortunate circumstances, India recognized that aggression had been committed by North Korea. Consequently India accepted the two Security Council Resolutions of June 25^ ( c a l l i n g on the North Koreans to withdraw to the 38th p a r a l l e l and cease h o s t i l i t i e s ) and June 27 , 1 9 5 0 5 (asking members of the United Nations to f u r n i s h such assistance to the Republic of Korea as might be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y i n the area). The Indian representative, not having received i n s t r u c t i o n s from h i s government, did not. vote on the l a t t e r r e s o l u t i o n . But the Government of India a f t e r c a r e f u l consideration accepted the r e s o l u t i o n i n a sp e c i a l communication to the Security Council on June 2 9 , because i t was opposed to any attempt to s e t t l e i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes by resort to aggression. 6 At the same time, however, the Indian government made i t c l e a r that the acceptance of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n d i d not involve any modification of i t s f o r e i g n p o l i c y . The Indian delegate to the United Nations explained: This p o l i c y i s based on the promotion of world peace and the development of f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with a l l countries. I t remains an independent policy...determined s o l e l y by India's i d e a l s and objectives. The Government of India earnestly hope that even at t h i s stage i t may be possible to put an end to the f i g h t i n g and to s e t t l e the dispute by n e g o t i a t i o n . 9 83 Largely "because of t h i s fervent desire to bring about a quick end to the f i g h t i n g i n Korea, rather than because of India's need f o r her forces at home, the Government of India sent only a f i e l d ambulance and s u r g i c a l unit to Korea. Thus while condemning the North Korean aggression, India was think i n g i n terms of the Korean war assuming l a r g e r pro-portions and hence she wanted to take care that she did not get involved i n i t . Although one observer has explained India's Korean p o l i c y as motivated by issues not d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to the c o n f l i c t i n the peninsula, i t seems cl e a r that the general outlook and actions of the Indian government during the Korean war can only be understood from the point of view of her desire to promote peace through a l o c a l i z a t i o n of the c o n f l i c t , and that i n case of extension that she should not be obliged to be involved i n i t . Only thus can India's abstention on Ju l y 7, 1950 from voting on the Security q Council Resolution' s e t t i n g up a United Nations Command under the United States, and her r e f u s a l to provide armed forces f o r service i n that Command, be explained. In addi t i o n , had the Indian army p a r t i c i p a t e d i n a f u l l - s c a l e war against the North Koreans ( l a t e r joined by the Chinese Communists) i t would have been impossible f o r the Indian government to play the r o l e i t did — f i r s t i n the negot-i a t i o n s and discussions on Korea held under the auspices of the United Nations and outside i t , and l a t e r i n the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission i n 1953-1954. 84 In accordance with the aims of her p o l i c y , India turned her diplomacy towards mediation i n the Korean war. The very nature of t h i s p o l i c y made i t impracticable f o r India to wholly endorse the o r i g i n a l standpoints of e i t h e r party, and consequently India's e f f o r t s very often annoyed the United States and sometimes India was accused by leading American public men of f o l l o w i n g a naive p o l i c y favourable to the Communists.^ To the Government of India, however, i t s p o l i c y looked as the best course f o r avoiding a possible war over Korea and other connected issues. As e a r l y as J u l y 12, 1950 the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r took the i n i t i a t i v e to seek a settlement of the dispute by peaceful m e a n s . I n i d e n t i c a l personal messages to United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson, and Marshal S t a l i n , Nehru declared: India's purpose i s to l o c a l i z e the c o n f l i c t and to f a c i l i t a t e an e a r l y peaceful settlement by breaking the present deadlock i n the Security Council, so that representatives of the People's Government of China can take a seat i n the Council, the Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republics can return to i t , and whether with i n or through informal contacts outside the Council, the United States of America, the Union of Soviet S o c i a l i s t Republics, and China, with the help and cooperation of other peace-loving nations, can f i n d a basis f o r terminating the c o n f l i c t and f o r a permanent s o l u t i o n of the Korean problem. But Nehru's enterprise was not successful. While Marshal 13 S t a l i n welcomed Nehru's peaceable i n i t i a t i v e , y Mr. Dean 85 Acheson p o l i t e l y r ejected India's suggestion f o r seating 14 Communist China at the United Nations. Thus nothing came of i t save considerable American annoyance at India f o r suggesting that concessions be made to the Communist powers,x-' This divergence of views between India and the United States was to cause considerable future f r i c t i o n and mutual annoyance. I t was against t h i s background that the question of the crossing of the 38th p a r a l l e l by United Nations forces was faced by India. As the United Nations forces, i n September 1950* were racing towards the 38th p a r a l l e l f o l -lowing the successful Inchon landings, Mr. Nehru p u b l i c l y stated that they should not go beyond the 38th p a r a l l e l u n t i l a l l other means of settlement had been explored. In response to a r e s o l u t i o n of the General Assembly on October 7» 1950 which, i n e f f e c t , sanctioned u n i f i c a t i o n of the country by the force of the advancing United Nations armies, India expressed her fears that the r e s u l t would be to prolong North Korean resistance, and even to extend the area of c o n f l i c t . At a press conference held on October 18, Mr. Nehru declared: We f e l t that the time had come f o r an e f f o r t to be made f o r a peaceful solution...to cross the 38th P a r a l l e l without making such an effort...appeared to us to be wrong and to involve grave r i s k s of a c o n f l i c t on a much wider s c a l e . n Judging from the course of l a t e r events, i t would perhaps have 86 "been better f o r world peace and a l l p a r t i e s concerned, i f the United Nations forces had halted and a serious attempt at settlement had been made. But much to India's regret, on October 8 , 1950 the United Nations forces d i d cross the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l against her strong opposition and t h i s "I Q crossing c e r t a i n l y alienated Delhi from Washington. To the Indian government t h i s crossing and the subsequent r a p i d advance of the United Nations forces to the Yalu r i v e r r a i s e d the very r e a l spectre of a world war. New Delhi was aware that the Chinese government considered the United Nations advance as a grave danger to t h e i r own s e c u r i t y 19 and would not t o l e r a t e i t . When t h e i r advice was d i s -regarded and Chinese Communist forces entered the war i n great force', India, rather than blame the Chinese f o r i n t e r -vening, f e l t j u s t i f i e d i n p u t t i n g much of the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r the prolongation and extension of the c o n f l i c t upon the p o l i c y of the United Nations, or more e s p e c i a l l y , of the United States. Despite her grievance, however, the serious-ness of the war caused India to continue occupying h e r s e l f with the task of bringing about a settlement. In company with twelve other Asian countries India, on December 5» 1950 appealed to the advancing North Koreans and Communist Chinese to declare immediately that i t was not t h e i r i n t e n t i o n to cross south of the 3 8 t h p a r a l l e l , s t a t i n g that "such a de c l a r a t i o n w i l l give time f o r considering what further steps are necessary to resolve the c o n f l i c t i n the Far East and 87 20 thus help to avert the danger of another world war. However, the opposition of the Soviet Union and Red China on the grounds that the r e s o l u t i o n f o r a cease-fire ' 21 would give the United Rations forces a breathing space caused the appeal to go f o r naught, although Assembly approval of the r e s o l u t i o n by 52 votes to 5 with one abstention con-s t i t u t e d a cease-fire group of India, Canada and Iran. Another of India's mediation e f f o r t s had f a i l e d , t h i s time through what looked l i k e Chinese intransigence, and thus caused the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r to declare to the Indian Parliament: As we expected, the passing of t h i s r e s o l u t i o n has, f o r the time being at l e a s t , put an end to any attempts at negotiation or settlement. We hope s t i l l that i t may be possible f o r events to take a better turn i n future, but I must confess that at the moment, that hope has grown very dim.22 But despite the not too o p t i m i s t i c outlook of the Indian government, i t did not cease i t s e f f o r t s towards promoting a settlement of the Korean dispute. Just as i t 25 had vigorously opposed y a v e i l e d United States threat to use the atom bomb i n Korea made by President Truman at a 24-press conference on November 3 0 , 1950 on the grounds that a general conflagration would r e s u l t , f o r s i m i l a r reasons India also opposed a United States r e s o l u t i o n of January 3 0 , 1951 condemning Red China as an aggressor. S i r Benegal Rau 88 set f o r t h h i s Government's reasons f o r voting against the American r e s o l u t i o n as follows: i t would prolong the war i n d e f i n i t e l y and possibly even lead u l t i m a t e l y to global war; i t was not f a i r i n i t s condemnation as the issue of aggression was very complex; and i t did not hold any reason-25 able prospect of success. y However, the Indian objections were rejected by the General Assembly, and Red China was (f©c3]aai^ |r an aggressor. "This proposal," Mr. Nehru stated, "cannot lead to peace. I t can only lead to i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of c o n f l i c t s and might perhaps close the door to any attempt 26 at a s o l u t i o n by negotiation." The war, indeed, d i d proceed with vigorous actions by both sides i n mounting large offensives, but i t soon became evident that the war had entered a m i l i t a r y deadlock. Consequently truce t a l k s began i n Ju l y 1951, but were pro-longed because of the i n a b i l i t y of the opposing sides to agree on c e r t a i n points of contention, e s p e c i a l l y the question 27 of the post-armistice exchange of prisoners of war. Once again India stepped i n to propose a s o l u t i o n at the 1952 session of the General Assembly. On November 17, 1952, the Indian delegation made pub l i c the text of a 17-point plan designed to break the deadlock over the r e p a t r i a t i o n of war 28 prisoners and end the Korean war. Mr. Krishna Menon emphasized that the proposals were a way to a s o l u t i o n rather than a s o l u t i o n i t s e l f . Their aim was to b u i l d a bridge 29 between what appeared to be c o n f l i c t i n g points of view. 89 I submit these proposals with confidence and earnestness, but also with h u m i l i t y . I submit that they are a way to a solu-t i o n . . . . We want the voice of the United Nations to be heard not through guns or bombs but through the voice of peace. A f t e r some modifications the Indian r e s o l u t i o n was adopted by the General Assembly on December 5, 1952 and was f i n a l l y accepted by the Chinese four months l a t e r on more or l e s s the l i n e s which India had suggested. In recognition of the r o l e she was p l a y i n g , India was offered, and accepted, the chairmanship of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission which was subsequently established to implement the agreement concluded between the two sides. The Commission, and the Indian c u s t o d i a l Force which took'charge of the prisoners of war, played a very important part i n the concluding stages of the settlement of the issue, despite minor i r r i t a t i o n s caused by American opposition to the i n c l u s i o n of India i n the P o l i t i c a l 50 Conference on Korea, and serious and unrestrained attacks 51 on India by South Korean government leaders.-' India had f i l l e d a gap, according to Mr. Nehru, which no other country could have f i l l e d and had thereby brought about the cessation 52 of h o s t i l i t i e s . India's a t t i t u d e on the whole Korean question was s i g n i f i c a n t i n many respects. While accepting the i n i t i a l S ecurity Council resolutions concerning the attack on the 90 Republic of Korea and assistance to the l a t t e r , India at the same time emphasized the importance of s e t t l i n g the dispute by peaceful means. Fearing the disrup t i v e e f f e c t s of a major war i n v o l v i n g the Great Powers on the United Nations, India opposed the r e s o l u t i o n branding the new Government of China an aggressor. India's predominant aim was to preserve and promote the broad-based and un i v e r s a l character of the United Nations. The Government of India never l o s t sight of t h i s aim when i t was formulating i t s p o l i c y towards United Nations actions i n Korea. The difference i n approach between India and those states which sent armed forces to Korea often resulted i n severe c r i t i c i s m of India's p o l i c y . But i t i s necessary to point out that the steps India took on the Korean issue, and the statements that were made by her spokesmen on the s i t u a t i o n were not based on any inherent opposition to the Western bloc or pro-Communist a t t i t u d e s . They were based on India's views as to how best a general war might be avoided. In 33 retrospect, as Mr. Chester Bowles has observed, y India's p o s i t i o n on the twisted course of debate on Korea i n the United Nations was not pro-Communist. On the c r u c i a l votes India found h e r s e l f voting with the American delegates f a r more frequently than against them. The Korean c o n f l i c t showed Indian foreign p o l i c y as active and resourceful i n i t s attempts to lead to a peaceful settlement of a major c o n f l i c t . Therein l i e s i t s success. 91 Another issue i n which India played a s i g n i f i c a n t mediatory r o l e i s that of Indo-China. In the negotiations which brought about an armistice between north and south i n 1954, India's influence was f e l t even though Nehru had not been o f f i c i a l l y i n v i t e d to the conference. India's i n t e r e s t i n the c o n f l i c t i n Indo-China had s t e a d i l y increased i n the post-war years, and Indian opinion was at a l l times h i g h l y c r i t i c a l of French government attempts to r e i n s t a t e t h e i r authority over Indo-China, and to s p l i t the ranks of the n a t i o n a l i s t s . But though most Indians had regarded Ho Chi-Minh as a more sincere spokesman f o r n a t i o n a l i s t a s p i r -ations than Bao Dai, the Indian government had recognized neither and had adopted a p o s i t i o n of aloofness towards, the raging struggle. But from ea r l y 1953 the French p o s i t i o n was i n constant d e t e r i o r a t i o n as the f i g h t i n g i n t e n s i f i e d . As i t began to become cle a r that the French forces could not by themselves hold Indo-China against the Communist Vi e t Minh, the danger increased that due to outside i n t e r v e n t i o n (United States and other Western nations on the French side and Communist China on Ho Chih Minn's side) another con-f l a g r a t i o n on a major scale might take place. That Great Power intenvention i n Indo-China was becoming l i k e l y was implied by a speech Secretary of State Dulles made before the United Nations General Assembly on September 17, 1953: 92 There ( i n Indo-China) the f i g h t i n g continues. Communist forces are seeking to gain p o l i t i c a l power "by-m i l i t a r y violence.... The pretext u n t i l now has been that the Associated States of Indo-China were mere colonies and that the Communist war was designed to promote 1 independence' rather than to expand by violence the Soviet Camp. I t i s no longer possible to support such a p r e t e x t . ^ Further proof of the growing American concern with the Indo-Chinese s i t u a t i o n was evidenced by a j o i n t United States -36 French communique of September 3 0 , 1953 which announced that the United States Government had agreed to provide the French Government, p r i o r to December 31» 1954, with a d d i t i o n a l f i n a n c i a l resources not to exceed $385 m i l l i o n . This a i d was i n support of French plans f o r the i n t e n s i f i e d prosecution of the war against the V i e t Minh. With the opening of a formidable Vietminh offensive i n Decmeber 1953, the concern f o r the future of the French m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , and fear of Chinese i n t e r v e n t i o n , became p a r t i c u l a r l y acute i n the United States. On December 2 9 t h Mr. Dulles told, a press conference that i n the event of an invasion of Indo-China, the American reaction "would not ne c e s s a r i l y be confined to the p a r t i c u l a r theatre chosen by the communists f o r t h e i r operations." On January 12, 1954, a f t e r proclaiming the doctrine of instant r e t a l i a t i o n , Mr. Dulles gave warning that Chinese i n t e r -vention would have "grave consequences which might not be 37 confined to Indo-China." ' 93 I f these admonitions struck Anthony Eden as being of f the mark, as i n h i s view Chinese intervention was not 38 imminent, then the increasing fear i n India caused by the i mplications of Dulles' remarks i s understandable. The Indian government became acutely desirous of stopping the f i g h t i n g and reaching some amicable s o l u t i o n with the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of Communist China. Consequently Mr. Nehru, on February 22, 1954, made an appeal f o r a cease-fire i n Indo-China to be followed by t a l k s f o r a settlement. I t seems a tremendous p i t y that t h i s war should continue without any serious attempt being made to f i n d a way out...I am sure the House w i l l j o i n me to request the powers concerned to s t r i v e to have a cease-fire there and they can discuss i t i n t h e i r own way 59 40 This was p a r t i c u l a r l y desirable i n Nehru's view because i n about two months the Geneva Conference was to be held between the Great Powers (in c l u d i n g Communist China) f o r t a l k s on Indo-China and Korea. At the same time, however, the Indian government had no desire to i n t e r f e r e or to shoulder any burden of r e s p o n s i b i l i t y i n t h i s connection. But as the s i t u a t i o n i n Indo-China ( i . e . at Dien Bien Phu) continued to d e t e r i o r a t e , the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r f e l t the need to again enunciate h i s concern. In the Lok Sabha on A p r i l 24, 1954- ne asked that the question of a cease-fire be given urgent p r i o r i t y at the Geneva Conference 94 and he put forward a six-point plan f o r ending the Indo-China war and appealed to the Powers to give i t t h e i r earnest 41 consideration at Geneva. Nehru urged that a climate of peace and negotiation should be promoted; an immediate cease-f i r e should come into e f f e c t ; the Conference should obtain an unequivocal undertaking by the French Government that Indo-China be given complete independence; d i r e c t negotiations between the p a r t i e s immediately and p r i n c i p a l l y concerned should be i n i t i a t e d ; and a solemn non-intervention agreement should be concluded and guaranteed by the United States, B r i t a i n , the Soviet Union, and China. "The Government of India," Nehru concluded, "make these proposals...in the earnest hope that they w i l l engage the atten t i o n of the conference and of the p a r t i e s concerned.... The a l t e r n a t i v e i s grim...peace cannot e x i s t i n an exasperating and c o s t l y r e l a t i o n s h i p of mutual t e r r o r . " While i t i s d i f f i c u l t to asce r t a i n the r e l a t i v e s i g n i f i c a n c e of Indian pronouncements on the Indo-Chinese issue on the Powers assembled at Geneva, aside from the 42 apparent importance Mr. Eden a t t r i b u t e s to them, the Conference d i d bring a r e a l i z a t i o n of India's p o l i c y regarding Indo-China. I t ended a b i t t e r struggle which i n i t s l a t e r stages had taken on ominous p o s s i b i l i t i e s and i t brought about a negotiated settlement i n which French power and influence were l a r g e l y removed from the scene. Thus the 43 Geneva settlement ^  was e n t h u s i a s t i c a l l y welcomed by India. 95 Messages of congratulation on the successful outcome of the Geneva Conference were sent by Mr. Nehru on J u l y 21 to Mr. Eden, M. Mendes - France, M. Molotov, and Mr. Chou E n - l a i . He welcomed the settlement as "one of the out-44 standing achievements of the post-war era," but at the same time f e l t i t was only a step that had to be followed by p e r s i s t e n t e f f o r t s at further settlements to assure peace f o r the future. Thus the Indian government, while basing i t s p o l i c y on the agreements reached at Geneva, has devoted i t s e f f o r t s to keeping them i n e f f e c t on the assumption that t h i s approach o f f e r s the best p o s s i b i l i t y of preserving peace or at l e a s t preventing the outbreak of renewed h o s t i l i t i e s . She has borne the heavy r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of c h a i r i n g the International Commissions f o r Supervision and Control f o r Viet Nam, Laos and Cambodia. And whatever c r i t i c i s m s may be made of the work of the Commission, and there have been many, i t has nevertheless helped keep the Indo-Chinese danger spot i n r e l a t i v e t r a n q u i l l i t y and thereby has promoted peace i n that quarter. In the controversy over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa, India has also played her part of mediator i n the cold war with p o s i t i v e r e s u l t s . Ever since the N a t i o n a l i s t s were driven from the mainland, Peking has constantly r e i t e r a t e d i t s sovereignty over the- three i s l a n d s , a claim which i s emphatically rejected by the N a t i o n a l i s t regime on Formosa. 96 From a l e g a l i s t i c standpoint, the h i s t o r y of Formosa, i n p a r t i c u l a r , makes possible claims by both the Communist and Na t i o n a l i s t governments. The Cairo and Potsdam conferences both agreed that Formosa was to be returned to the Republic of China i . e . Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang government, f o r there i s no evidence to assume that even the Soviet Union foresaw the Communists assuming c o n t r o l of China so soon a f t e r the defeat of Japan. But by the time of the Japanese Peace Treaty the N a t i o n a l i s t s had been driven to refuge on the i s l a n d and consequently the Treaty made no provisions f o r i t s d i s p o s i t i o n . As such the N a t i o n a l i s t government has disputed the challenges to i t s sovereignty over Formosa and the offshore islands made by Peking which claims the islands belong to i t as the successor government of China. The value of Formosa to both sides i s unmistakably c l e a r . As the seat of the N a t i o n a l i s t government i t i s the only centre with which non-Communist or anti-Communist Chinese l i v i n g both on or without the mainland can i d e n t i f y themselves. But i t i s also f o r that reason important symbolically and p r a c t i c a l l y to the Communist Peking govern-ment, and herein l i e s the threat to peace which has caused continuing anxiety i n India. Peking has repeatedly declared i t s i n t e n t i o n of l i b e r a t i n g Formosa, Quemoy and Matsu while the N a t i o n a l i s t s , backed by extensive American a i d and shielded by the United States Seventh F l e e t , has made every preparation to prevent such a seizure. 97 The p o l i c y of the Indian government towards t h i s issue has been direct e d to. preventing an outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s on a scale which would cause American i n t e r -vention i n force i n support of Chiang Kai-shek. India does not recognize the Kuomintang regime on Formosa and would, indeed, probably not be too averse to seeing i t s downfall. S i m i l a r l y , India feels that the offshore islands of Quemoy 4-5 and Matsu r i g h t f u l l y belong to the Peking government. y In a statement to the Lok Sabha during the c r i s i s i n 1955 i n the Formosa s t r a i t s , Nehru made cle a r h i s Government's support of Peking's claims: There i s hardly a country which does not recognize that the offshore i s l a n d s , notably Quemoy and Matsu, are obviously and d e f i n i t e l y parts of China.... They are a few miles — f i v e miles or ten miles — beyond the shore. And no country can to l e r a t e an enemy s i t t i n g ten miles from t h e i r shore, bombarding them a l l the time. I t i s an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n . Therefore, i t i s almost generally recognized that these islands should immediately be evacuated and taken possession of by the Government of the mainland. However, Nehru i s aware of the American attitud e on the issue and, while maintaining h i s support of Peking's claims, he has counselled both Chinese regimes against breaking the peace over the issue of ownership of Formosa and the offshore i s l a n d s . In the c r i s i s over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa i n March and A p r i l , 1955, Nehru's correspondence both with Eisenhower and with Chou E n - l a i , which w i l l someday be published, played a s i g n i f i c a n t part i n averting serious 98 47 dangers. ' I t i s to be expected that the Indian government, i n l i n e with t h e i r general concept of the i n t e r n a t i o n a l c o n f l i c t , of the complexities of the Formosa s t r a i t s controversy, and of India's proper ro l e w i l l i n the future, as i n the past, t r y to bring the opposing p a r t i e s c l o s e r together and thereby ease the threat to peace inherent i n the Formosa s t r a i t s issue. . The p o l i c y followed by the Government of India with respects to the c r i s e s over Suez and Hungary, however, i s probably the best i l l u s t r a t i o n of that Government's determination to preserve the i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace at almost any p r i c e . Indeed the Indian r e a c t i o n was t r u l y remarkable. Mr. Nehru declared i n a speech that whereas i n Egypt "every single t h i n g that had happened was as cl e a r as dayligh t , " he 48 could not f o l l o w "the very confusing s i t u a t i o n " i n Hungary. He then proceeded to read out the excuses which Marshal Bulganin had sent him f o r the Russian intervention. These Mr. Nehru described as ' f a c t s ' . He displayed the same readiness to accept Russia's explanation as he d i d to r e j e c t those made by B r i t a i n and France. I t i s d i f f i c u l t to explain the a t t i t u d e s expressed by the Indian government i n a manner which would make the Government's stand j u s t i f i a b l e i n the circumstances. For the double standard which the Indian leaders applied to both issues c e r t a i n l y j u s t i f i e d c r i t i c s i n the West who c r i t i c i z e d Nehru f o r having one scale of values f o r the West and another 99 f o r the Soviet Union (which might be true i n that violence i s more to be expected from a regime which reposes upon i t ) . I f the use of force was wrong i n Egypt, where at least there 49 was some sort of case f o r i t , ' i t was doubly wrong i n Hungary, t h i s i s what many Westerners s a i d , and with reason. Even i n India Nehru's p o l i c y i n the c r i s e s evoked loud and harsh condemnations. For though popular opinion i n India was favourable to Egypt i n every step of the c r i s i s over the canal, i t was also strongly favourable to the Hungarian n a t i o n a l i s t s who had r i s e n against Soviet r u l e . Nehru, with no ambassador i n Budapest and no independent 50 sources of information,-' d id not express h i s natural abhorrence of violence quickly enough to s u i t h i s own public opinion or that of the West. On one occasion i n the United Nations Mr. Krishna Menon a c t u a l l y voted with the Soviet Union, on a Hungarian r e s o l u t i o n to hold e l e c t i o n s i n Hungary under United Nations auspices, because he could "not subscribe to any phraseology or proposals before the Assembly which disregard the sovereignty of States repre-51 sented here." x Such things as t h i s , and the curious, unavowed connection between the events i n Egypt and Hungary, subjected Nehru to more than the usual sharp t a l k i n the West and i n intense c r i t i c i s m at home. Allegations that the Government of India was pursuing a double standard i n i n t e r -n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , according to whether aggression took place i n the East or the West, were combined with demands f o r the 100 r e c a l l of Mr. Krishna Menon. C r i t i c s of the Government took p a r t i c u l a r exception to the f a c t that India, alone of the non-Communist countries, had voted with the Soviet bloc i n the United Nations opposing free elections i n Hungary under United Nations supervision. The Hindustan Times c r i t i c i z e d the Government's maladroit handling of the Hungarian s i t u a t i o n and i t s "curious reluctance, amounting almost to embarrassment" i n i t s o f f i c i a l reactions to the Soviet behaviour; the Statesman c a l l e d f o r an explanation of India's "odd" vote at the United Nations; while the Times of India condemned the Government's over-cautious, almost apologetic reaction to Soviet 52 imperialism. Mr. Narayan, the leader of the Praja S o c i a l i s t Party, demanded the removal of Krishna Menon from the p o l i t i c a l scene and attacked both he and Nehru f o r "jeopardizing India's moral stature i n the world by applying double standards to aggression according to who commits i t and where." Mr. Frank Moraes, well-known Indian p u b l i c i s t , i n an a r t i c l e w r i t t e n a f t e r h i s return from United Nations Headquarters i n New York, said that Mr. Krishna Menon had done nothing to enhance India's reputation at the United Nations, and suggested that h i s t a l e n t s "might more p r o f i t a b l y be u t i l i z e d elsewhere than i n the United States, where temperatures r i s e and tempers b r i s t l e at the mere mention 53 of h i s name/ 101 In r e p l y i n g to h i s c r i t i c s , the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r j u s t i f i e d h i s Government's actions on both issues on both l e g a l i s t i c and p r a c t i c a l grounds. He j u s t i f i e d India's vote i n the United Nations on the Hungarian r e s o l u t i o n on the grounds that the Indian government was opposed not to the entire r e s o l u t i o n but only to a clause recommending United Nations supervision of Hungarian e l e c t i o n s . He asked h i s c r i t i c s to "see the context i n which i t was moved and the objective behind i t — because unfort-unately these incidents that have ar i s e n i n Egypt and Hungary have both been an i n t e n s i f i c a t i o n of the cold war.... The Hungarian question became a pawn on the chess board of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s . S i m i l a r l y others were thinking of 54 the Egyptian question as a pawn on the chessboard."^ As such Nehru j u s t i f i e d h i s Government's at t i t u d e towards the two issues as absolutely correct. 55 According to Vincent Sheean, ' Nehru was convinced that Russia viewed the Anglo-Prench expedition to Suez as the calculated prelude to world war. Moscow found i t impossible to believe that the enterprise had been undertaken without American support and approval, and as Nehru saw.it, such an attempt to reclaim the ramparts of the past, i f i t had been supported by the United States, would indeed have brought a general catastrophe. As the primary purpose of Indian p o l i c y , aside from self-preservation or as a part of i t , i s to avoid that catastrophe, the Indian government 102 condemned the Suez action with the b i t t e r n e s s i t d i d . S i m i l a r l y , i n the Indian government's view, Russia's bloody suppression of the Hungarian popular u p r i s i n g was an auto-matic r e a c t i o n to what was considered a serious threat to the future s e c u r i t y of the Soviet Union. Nehru deplored i t as much as anybody could hut he r e l a t e d i t to the war menace the Russians were protecting t h e i r f l a n k . He must have had some good reasons f o r t h i n k i n g so, a r i s i n g from h i s private correspondence. There was one long l e t t e r from Bulganin, f o r example, at j u s t that time, which set f o r t h the Kremlin' point of view. Consequently Nehru's overriding concern f o r world peace undoubtedly caused him to view Suez as the immediate danger of war and Hungary as the deplorable but c h a r a c t e r i s t i c Soviet response to a threat to her s e c u r i t y . The a t t i t u d e adopted by the Indian government — that i s , unrestrained condemnation of the B r i t i s h and French at Suez, and apparent reluctance to condemn Soviet action i n Hungary r e f l e c t e d New Delhi's concern to preserve peace at any p r i c e Indeed, i f India's a t t i t u d e i s viewed o b j e c t i v e l y , there i s c e r t a i n merit i n the basic realism of her approach even though the manner of i t s expression l e f t much to be desired. By adamantly condemning the Suez adventure and thereby a l i g n i n g h e r s e l f on Egypt's side i n the dispute, India prevented Soviet Russia from c a p i t a l i z i n g on the issue to present h e r s e l f as the sole Asian champion of Arab nationalism and thereby gain a diplomatic v i c t o r y with 103 i n c a l c u l a b l e consequences f o r the West i n such a stragegic region. By such an atti t u d e and through demanding with-drawal of the Anglo-French forces, India sought to prevent the Middle-East from entering into a prolonged period of tension that could w e l l break out into a general conflag-r a t i o n . The nature of the incident and the democratic character of the two Western powers involved were probably viewed by New Delhi as rendering them amenable to c r i t i c i s m and diplomatic pressure without provoking more serious reactions detrimental to world peace. Such was not the case, however, with respect to the Soviet actions i n Hungary. There the actions of the Russians were obviously not pursued without due consideration to the e f f e c t s such action would have on Soviet prestige throughout the world. Indeed, i n view of the common view being expressed i n the West at the time of the Hungarian u p r i s i n g that i t was the beginning of the end f o r the Soviet p o s i t i o n i n Eastern Europe, the Soviet suppression of the u p r i s i n g i s understandable. For Moscow to have withdrawn from Hungary under such conditions would have i n i t i a t e d s i m i l a r occurrences throughout the Soviet s a t e l l i t e s with serious consequences f o r the Soviet p o s i t i o n — a p o s i t i o n Russia had given some 20 m i l l i o n l i v e s to secure. That the Kremlin chose not to r e t r e a t was undoubtedly interpreted, c o r r e c t l y so, by Nehru to indicate the uselessness of purposely bringing pressure to bear upon that country. 104 Nehru probably f e l t that such c r i t i c i s m , i f taken too f a r , might provoke more serious Soviet reactions and might even lead to a world war. Thus the Indian government opposed censure of the Soviet actions, and demands f o r t h e i r with-drawal from Hungary, at the United Nations on the correct premise that such action could do no good but,to the contrary, might do i n c a l c u l a b l e harm. Nehru could see no use i n provocative t a l k where no tangible r e s u l t s could be expected. The Indian government pursued a p o l i c y that, though i t appeared two-faced and immoral to most observers, was, i n the view of that Government, consistent with t h e i r promotion of peace through considering each case s t r i c t l y on i t s merits. In consonance with her p o l i c y of non-alignment, then, India has maintained a s p i r i t of o b j e c t i v i t y i n dealing with i n t e r n a t i o n a l issues, examining and judging each issue, as i t a r i s e s , on i t s i n t r i n s i c merit and expressing her views openly and f r e e l y without fear or favour. The f a c t that her a t t i t u d e on a p a r t i c u l a r issue pleases t h i s power or displeases that does not weigh with India i n a r r i v i n g at a decision and standing by i t . Thus, throughout the Korean war the Indian government direct e d i t s e f f o r t s to ending the c o n f l i c t . India apprehended that the crossing of the 3 8 t h P a r a l l e l by the United Nations forces would widen the area of c o n f l i c t and thus she opposed such a c t i o n being taken. For the same reason Indian opposed the United Nations Resolution of February 1, 1951, branding the People's 105 Republic of China as an aggressor i n Korea on the grounds that the r e s o l u t i o n would prolong h o s t i l i t i e s and might extend the area of c o n f l i c t . India's proposals on the r e p a t r i a t i o n of prisoners broke the deadlock i n the truce t a l k s , and Indian troops supervised the execution of the armistice. In the negotiations which brought about an armistice between north and south i n Indo-China (1954), India's influence was f e l t even though Nehru had not been o f f i c i a l l y i n v i t e d to the conference. In the c r i s i s over Quemoy, Matsu and Formosa i n March and A p r i l , 1955» Nehru's correspondence both with Eisenhower and with Chou E n - l a i undoubtedly played not a minor part i n averting serious dangers. And i n the Hungarian and Suez c r i s e s , the aim of the Indian government was to prevent the issues from causing greater c o n f l i c t s , even though t h i s meant harsh c r i t i c i s m of France and B r i t a i n and an embarrassing reluctance to chastize the Soviet Union. The Indian government has been determined to preserve the peace even though her e f f o r t s i n so doing are not always appreciated. Through an independent approach to each issue, India has s t r i v e n to c o n c i l i a t e the opposing points of view and to thereby prevent the world from rushing headlong i n t o a c o n f l i c t , the only r e s u l t of which would not only be destruction of the combatants, but of c i v i l i z a t i o n i t s e l f . Footnote's - Chapter V 1 Nehru's Speeches 194-9-1955, p. 125. 2 Michael Brecher, Nehru: A P o l i t i c a l Biography (Toronto, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1959) , p. 559. 5 India was one of the members on the United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK) which reported on June 2 5 , 1950 that aggression had taken place. U.N. Doc. S/1946, June 2 5 , 1950. 4- Security Council Resolution, S/l5 0 1 , June 2 5 , 1950. 5 I b i d . , S/1511, June 27 , 1950. 6 U.N. Doc. S/1520, June 2 9 , 1950. Text Doc. I. A f f .  194-9-1950, pp. 635-636. 7 Security Council, O f f i c i a l Records, 5 t h Yr., No. 17, 475th Mtg., 30 June 1950, pp. 2 - 5 . The Indian Prime M i n i s t e r c l a r i f i e d the Indian p o s i t i o n at a press conference i n New Delhi'on J u l y 7, 1950: "India supported the resolutions of the Security Council because they l o g i c a l l y followed the context of events and the U. N. Charter, and because that seemed the only course to avoid the extension of c o n f l i c t and large-scale warfare. In doing so India's primary consideration was to serve the cause of peace." Keesing's  Contemporary Archives, J u l y 15-22, 1950, p. 10847. 8 L e v i , Free India i n A s i a , pp. 90-92. Mr. Levi describes these'as annoyance that the U. N. acted so promptly on Korea while i t had refused to act on India's protest against P a k i s t a n i aggression i n Kashmir; disgust with the world s i t u a t i o n created by the U. S. and the U.S.S.R., resentment at Western use of force against an Asian people; Indian reluctance to f i g h t a fellow Asian nation. 9 Security Council Resolution, S/1588, J u l y 7, 1950. India's reasoning, as explained by C. A. Rajagopalachari was -that " I f country a f t e r country rushes to Korea, a world conflagration w i l l surely f o l l o w . " Cited i n Bowles, Ambassador's Report, p. 8 9 . 10 Senator Knowland's Address, November 1953 on a P a c i f i c NATO. Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1953, pp. 129-130. 11 Mr. Nehru has described these notes as "not an attempt at mediation, f o r we have never thought i n those terms. I made the appeal i n the vague hope that, perhaps, i t might r e s u l t i n something p o s i t i v e . " Nehru's Speeches 1949-1953% p. 168. i 12 United States D.S.B., v o l . XXIII, No. 578 (31 J u l y 1950) , p. 170. 13 Doc. I . A f f . 194-9-1950* p. 707. 14 I b i d . 15 United States i n World A f f a i r s . 1950, p. 227. 16 Cited i n Kundra, Indian Foreign P o l i c y 1947-1954. p. 133. 17 India's Foreign P o l i c y , A Summary of Recent Statements by the Prime M i n i s t e r of India, External A f f a i r s , A p r i l 1951, p. 122. 18 S. I . A f f . 1949-1950, p. 514. 19 Nehru stated t h i s i n the Indian Parliament on December 6 , 1950. Speeches 1949-1953, pp. 169-170. 20 The New York Times, December 6 , 1950. 21 Year Book of the United Nations, 1950, p. 248. 22 External A f f a i r s , p. 122. 23 S. I. A f f . 1949-1950, p. 353. In New De l h i , Nehru, speaking to the Indian Parliament on December 6 , 1950, made an earnest appeal to the "Great Powers" to make every endeavour to f i n d a peaceful s o l u t i o n to the present c r i s i s , because the consewuences of t h e i r f a i l u r e to do so are too t e r r i b l e to contemplate. Expressing abhorrence of the atomic bomb, he declared: " I f the force of circumstances compels the world to use the bomb, i t w i l l mean that the world has surrendered to e v i l . I earnestly hope there w i l l be no question, now or hereafter, of the use of the atomic bomb." Speeches 1949-1955, pp. 106-173. 24 The New York Times, December 1, 1950. 25 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, February 3 -10, 1951, p. 11246. 26 I b i d . , p. 11248. 27 The United Nations Command refused to re p a t r i a t e a n t i -Communist North Korean and Chinese prisoners who di d not wish to return to t h e i r Communist-ruled countries. 28 Text i n Doc. I. A f f . 1952, pp. 446-449. 29 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, January 31 - February 7, 1953, P. 12720. i i 30 Robert Trumbull said i n a despatch: "Washington's opposition to the i n c l u s i o n of India i n the Korean conference brought Indo-American r e l a t i o n s to a low point, i f not the lowest i n recent years." The New York Times, September 27, 1953. 31 Dr. Pyun, a member of the South Korean- government, on August 24-, used the strongest language against India, saying that South Korea d i d not want "a scheming and betraying India on our side," and accused India of " t r a f f i c k i n g with the Communists." The New York Times, August 30, 1953* 32 Mr. Nehru i n the Lok Sabha, December 24, 1953. Speeches 1953-1957, p. 244. 33 Bowles, op. c i t . , p. 243. 34 J . Leyser, "Aspects of India's Foreign P o l i c y , " A u s t r a l i a n Outlook, v o l . V, 1 (March 1951). 35 Doc. Amer. For. Rel. 1953, p. 38. 36 I b i d . , pp. 350-351 . 37 Cited i n S i r Anthony Eden, F u l l C i r c l e (Toronto, C a s s e l l , I 9 6 0 ) , pp. 8 6 - 8 7 . 38 I b i d . , p. 87. 39 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, pp. 245-246. 40 Such was not the view of S i r Anthony. In h i s Memoirs, pp. 9 0 - 9 1 , be writes that he "was not very happy" about the Nehru proposal, as a cease-fire without p o l i t i c a l backing of r e a l authority would leave the peoples of the Associated States at the mercy of the Vietminh. 41 Text i n Doc. I. A f f . 1954, pp. 123-124. 42 Mr. Eden, p r i o r to the Conference, declares that: "In measuring our chances of success at Geneva, I f e l t strongly that the outcome would depend to a considerable extent upon the p o s i t i o n taken up by I n d i a . . . i t was e s s e n t i a l not to alienate India by our actions i n a part of the world which concerned her c l o s e l y . " F u l l C i r c l e , p. 9 4 . 43 Agreement was reached i n Geneva on July 2 0 , 1954. Text i n New York Times, J u l y 2 1 , 1954. 44 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, J u l y 24-31, 1954, p. 13694. i i i 45 Even S i r Anthony Eden has commented that the presence of Chiang's forces on the off-shore islands "constituted a constant grievance with which most of world opinion would sympathize." F u l l C i r c l e , p. 309. 46 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, March 26 - A p r i l 2 , 1955* p. 14118. 47 Vincent Sheean, Nehru: The Years of Power (New York, Random House, I960), p. 153. 48 Cited i n Eden, op. c i t . , p. 545* 49 For a generally sound defence of the Anglo-French actions at Suez, see I b i d . , pp. 454-584. 50 In a speech i n the Lok Sabha on November 19, 1956, Mr. Nehru emphasized t h i s aspect of h i s Government not possessing the broad c l e a r f a c t s . He admitted r e c e i v i n g f a i r l y f u l l accounts from Indian Embassies and Missions abroad and from other Governments, but declared that t h i s "has r e s u l t e d i n an abundance which i s often contradictory... /and.7 gives a very confused p i c t u r e . " Nehru' s Spe e che s  1955-1957, p. 323. 51 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 24 -December 1, 1956, p. 15223. 52 I b i d . , January 5-12, 1957, p. 15308. 53 I b i d . 54 I b i d . , p. 15309. 55 Sheean, op. c i t . , pp. 160-162. i v CHAPTER VI INDIA AND THE POLICY OP PANCH SHILA ...peace can only come i f we endeavour to e s t a b l i s h a climate of peace. I t i s not by condemnation or mutual recrimination that we s h a l l achieve t h i s goal. We must forget past c o n f l i c t s and past grievances and decide to make a new approach to each other i n a s p i r i t of tolerance and f o r -bearance with c h a r i t y towards a l l and malice towards none....-^ When India became independent i n a world which was r a p i d l y p o l a r i z i n g i n t o two r i v a l blocs of nations, p her major aims, as enjoined i n the Co n s t i t u t i o n , were to promote i n t e r n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y by s t r i v i n g to prevent any outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s among the major powers. Acutely conscious of India's slender i n d u s t r i a l base and poverty-stricken masses, the Indian government f e l t that i t could best contribute to the f u l f i l l m e n t of i t s foreign aims by s t e a d i l y pressing non-violent and c o n c i l i a t o r y proposals aimed at bridging the chasm between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. Thus the way of the Panch S h i l a became India's p o l i c y : f i v e p r i n c i p l e s of state conduct which Mr. Nehru believed "would go a long way to put an end to the fears and apprehensions which cast dark shadows 106 107 over the world," i f accepted and acted upon by a l l countries of the world.-' The p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence was generally motivated by the communist v i c t o r y i n China i n l a t e 194-9 which f o r the f i r s t time provided a strong c e n t r a l base i n Asia f o r International Communism. As India shared extensive borders with China, her anxiety to prevent China from helping communist p a r t i e s i n South-East Asia and South Asia led to the gradual emergence of her p o l i c y of coexistence which began to take concrete shape i n 1953• The i n i t i a l mention and promulgation of t h i s p o l i c y , however, came as the aftermath of Sino-Indian differences over Tibet. The Chinese Communist invasion of Tibet i n October - November 1950 presented India with a c r i s i s i n her immediate area and a threat of some magnitude to the continuance of her p o l i c y of peace. In India, Tibet was t r a d i t i o n a l l y considered a buffer state guaranteeing the s e c u r i t y of India and f a c i l i t a t i n g f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between India and China along a mountainous, u n f o r t i f i e d , and loo s e l y watched border of some 1800 miles. To many Indians, China's behaviour i n Tibet was therefore a te s t of the s i n c e r i t y of her o f t -repeated assurances of friendship f o r India. The Government of India at no time challenged or denied the suzerainty of China over Tibet, but i t was always anxious that Tibet should maintain the autonomy i t had enjoyed during the 4. present century. The Chinese ' l i b e r a t i o n ' of Tibet i n the 108 f a l l of 1950 thus came as a great shock to the Indian government and people. The Indian attitude towards the Chinese acti o n c r y s t a l l i z e d quickly. Those Indians who had been strongly anti-Communist, l i k e M. R. Masani 5 and the S o c i a l i s t s , considered the Chinese action as further proof of t h e i r worst f e a r s . They expressed the hope that many Indians would forget t h e i r wishful t h i n k i n g and lose t h e i r i l l u s i o n s about the nature of Chinese Communism.6 Those newspapers and sections of the public which had hit h e r t o been f r i e n d l y to China, though not nec e s s a r i l y to communism, suffered a considerable shock. There were second thoughts about the a d v i s a b i l i t y of India championing the admittance of Red China i n t o the United Nations Organization. The rea c t i o n i n India provoked the Foreign P o l i c y B u l l e t i n (New York) to declare: Whatever the motive that i n s p i r e d the Chinese Communists, there can be no doubt that t h i s step w i l l further the expansion of i n t e r n a t i o n a l communism and may we l l delay Peiping's admission to the U. N. p a r t i c u l a r l y because of possible changes i n India's foreign p o l i c y . 7 That the Indian government was extremely concerned was apparent from the sharp protests sent to Peking. For example, on October 26th, the Indian government expressed "surprise and regret" at the Chinese actions, and at the fac t that the Chinese government should have sought a s o l u t i o n 109 of her problems with Tibet by force instead of by the 8 slower and more enduring methods of peaceful approach. The Chinese r e p l y of October 30th, however, was a complete rebuff to the Indian protest and asserted that "the problem of Tibet i s e n t i r e l y a domestic problem of China" and that Q no foreign influence w i l l be t o l e r a t e d . ' This provoked a fu r t h e r Indian note on October 31st i n which the Indian government c a t e g o r i c a l l y rejected the Chinese i n s i n u a t i o n that India was being prompted by outside influences to i n t e r f e r e i n China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s . At the same time India r e i t e r a t e d i t s strong disapproval of China's actions as having greatly added to the tensions of the world and to the d r i f t towards general war, and as having affected f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s between India and C h i n a . V a r i o u s Indian leaders, i n public statements, revealed t h e i r acute concern with the s i t u a t i o n . The Deputy Prime M i n i s t e r Sardar P a t e l , f o r example, c a l l e d upon the Indian people to be ready to meet the danger along the northern f r o n t i e r l i k e brave men and warned that "Communist China's invasion of Tibet might be s u f f i c i e n t , i n view of i n t e r n a t i o n a l tension, to s t a r t a new world war." x ± The sharp Indian notes to Peking and such public utterances of Indian leaders as the one quoted above caused much speculation i n both the Indian and the foreign press on a possible re-examination of India's entire p o l i c y i n regard to Communist China. The Hindu, a leading English-language 110 newspaper published i n Madras, wrote that the imposition of a Communist regime over Tibet by force would m a t e r i a l l y e f f e c t India's a t t i t u d e toward Communist China and c a l l f o r 12 a r e t h i n k i n g of her foreign p o l i c y i n general. But the Indian government was not prepared to l e t the incident i n t e r f e r e with i t s pursuit of peace. Thus when Tibet appealed to the United Nations f o r protection on November 7» 13 1950, ^ the Indian delegate opposed the r e s o l u t i o n by E l Salvador that the appeal be put on the agenda of the Assembly. India considered that the question was an i n t e r n a l 14 matter that could s t i l l be s e t t l e d by peaceful means, and that such a settlement would safeguard the autonomy which Tibet had h i t h e r t o enjoyed while maintaining i t s h i s t o r i c a l 15 association with China. Accordingly, the Steering Com-mittee of the General Assembly decided unanimously on November 24th that consideration of the appeal should be postponed. The s t r a i n which the Tibetan a f f a i r brought about i n Sino-Indian friendship remained f o r some time, but the conclusion of a Sino-Indian trade agreement on A p r i l 2 9 , 1954 appeared to i n i t i a t e a new era i n r e l a t i o n s between the two signatory states. For i n the preamble to the agree-ment there was a declaration of p r i n c i p l e s and consider-ations which was to thenceforth govern Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s . These were: mutual respect f o r each other's t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual I l l non-interference i n each other's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s ; e q u a l i t y 16 and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence. By t h i s agreement, Mr. Nehru hoped to "ensure peace to a very large extent i n a c e r t a i n area of Asia," and eventually win i t s 17 acceptance a l l over the world. ' Since the enunciation of t h i s Panch S h i l a doctrine, the Government of India has devoted much of i t s at t e n t i o n to f u r t h e r i n g these basic p r i n c i p l e s of r e l a t i o n s among states. India already had deep-rooted i d e o l o g i c a l , i n s t i t u t i o n a l , and economic l i n k s with the Western demo-cracies and she has since s t r i v e n to b u i l d up f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with the Communist countries as w e l l by d e l i b e r -a t e l y r e f r a i n i n g from c r i t i c i z i n g those countries' systems of administration or domestic development. A considerable porti o n of Indian opinion has followed the Government's lead, l a r g e l y on the premise that c r i t i c i s m of the Soviet Union and i t s partners i s u n l i k e l y to do any good, while i t would i n t e r f e r e with India's e f f o r t s to play the uncommitted middleman of goodwill toward both blocs. In l i n e with t h i s r61e of an 'emmissary of peace' the Indian government has sought to engender i n the West the same optimism which she purportedly holds towards the Communist nations. In a general way, Nehru has been continuously working since the death of S t a l i n and h i s dethronement from the inner c i r c l e of Soviet greats to s e l l 112 the idea that Russia i s changing i n the d i r e c t i o n of reasonableness. Statements made by Soviet spokesmen at the Twentieth Party Congress were welcomed by the Indian govern-ment as i n d i c a t i n g a new look i n Soviet p o l i c y . "This new l i n e , " Mr. Nehru declared i n the Indian Parliament, "both i n p o l i t i c a l t h i n k i n g and i n p r a c t i c a l p o l i c y , appears to be based upon a more r e a l i s t i c appreciation of the present world s i t u a t i o n and represents a s i g n i f i c a n t process of •J Q adaption and adjustment." He believed i t was a step towards the creation of conditions favourably to the pursuit of a p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence, a development which would lead to a further r e l a x a t i o n of tension i n the world. S i m i l a r l y , India has sought to make Red China appear more respectable by r a t i o n a l i s i n g that country's actions as the outcome of a basic response to outside pro-vocation and therefore not as deliberate aggression on Peking's part. This view has permeated the pronouncements 19 of the Indian government on Korea, Tibet and the Formosa 20 s t r a i t s controversy. In the same manner Nehru welcomed the pronouncements made by the Chinese Red leaders at Bandung — i n which they declared t h e i r readiness to enter i n t o d i r e c t negotiations with the United States to r e l a x tension i n the Par East and p a r t i c u l a r l y i n the Formosa area — as representing "a further and wholesome develop-ment .../which/ i f . . . a v a i l e d of by a l l concerned...can lead 21 to an approach towards peaceful settlement." 113 In seeking to give the widest currency to h i s ideas, N ehru became one of the most widely t r a v e l l e d heads of state. In 1954 he made a state v i s i t to Communist China, stopping o f f at most of the c a p i t a l s of South-East Asia. In 1955 ne paid o f f i c i a l v i s i t s to Russia — where he received an e s p e c i a l l y tumultuous welcome — and to a number of east European countries. In 1956 be set o f f on h i s t r a v e l s again, attending the Commonwealth Prime M i n i s t e r s ' Conference, and v i s i t i n g West Germany, France and Yugoslavia. In the l a t t e r country he conferred with Marshal Tito and with Colonel Nasser of Egypt. In addition to the t r a v e l s of i t s Prime M i n i s t e r , India has been the host of a large number of distinguished v i s i t o r s from both blocs. Among these can be mentioned John Foster Dulles; Selwyn Lloyd; Lester Pearson; King Ibn Saud; the Shah of Iran; Chinese Communist and Soviet leaders; and most recently the h i g h l y successful v i s i t of President Eisenhower of the United States i n November 1959. During a l l these v i s i t s the consistent theme has been one of aiming at the reduction of world tension and the promotion of world peace and cooperation. The Soviet leaders, e s p e c i a l l y , have seized upon the opportunities offered during t h e i r v i s i t s to India to enunciate with much flamboyance t h e i r dedication to peace. However, while the Communist bloc has expressed i t s dedication to the p r i n c i p l e s of Panch S h i l a on many occasions — pronouncements that would seem to have been U n -accepted by the Indian government with an a i r of unreal 22 optimism — the actions of the Communist giants have indicated otherwise. The actions of the Soviet Union i n 25 crushing the Hungarian r e v o l u t i o n i n 1956 y and the pressure brought to bear by Moscow on Poland e a r l i e r i n the same year; the severe c r i t i c i s m s of Yugoslav deviationism by Peking; and most important — the Red Chinese suppression of the Tibetan r e v o l t i n 1959 and i t s subsequent seizure of sizable chunks of Indian t e r r i t o r y i n the north-east and north-west, have c l e a r l y indicated to the Indian government that t h e i r p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence i s s t i l l f a r from achieving i t s objectives. But as t h e i r reactions to these events have indicated, the leaders of India are determined to continue t h e i r p o l i c y of patience and c o n c i l i a t i o n . The Tibetan r e v o l t of May 9 , 1959 put a great s t r a i n on the Pive P r i n c i p l e s to which Peking and New Delhi had repeatedly reaffirmed t h e i r adherence. The swift and b r u t a l Chinese suppression of the r e v o l t , and the f l i g h t of the Dalai Lama to India aroused deep concern i n India, where sympathy f o r Tibet's struggle f o r independence was widely expressed i n the Press and by members of a l l p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s save the Communists. The c r i s i s undoubtedly made Nehru acutely uncomfortable, but the Prime M i n i s t e r , while expressing h i s desire to see the people of Tibet progress i n freedom, r e i t e r a t e d h i s desire f o r maintaining f r i e n d l y r e l a t i o n s with "the great country of China" and counselled 115 Oil r e s t r a i n t i n the present d i f f i c u l t circumstances. His statement, however, was c r i t i c i z e d by wide c i r c l e s of Indian opinion as being too moderate. Public demonstrations and newspaper e d i t o r i a l s emphasized t h i s , and stormy scenes occurred i n the Indian Parliament where China's actions were roundly condemned. Por t h e i r part, the Chinese Communists reacted to the outburst of Indian opinion with a sharp anti-Indian press and radio campaign which charged India with expansionist plans f o r i n t e r f e r i n g i n China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s and of being i m p e r i a l i s t t o o l s . The People's D a i l y declared that "the zeal shown by c e r t a i n Indian p o l i t i c a l c i r c l e s i n i n t e r f e r i n g i n China's i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s i n Tibet has gone f a r beyond the endurance of a 25 patient f r i e n d l y neighbour." y And i n a speech to the National People's Congress on A p r i l 22nd, the Panchen Lama said that "the reactionaries i n India following i n the footsteps of the B r i t i s h i m p e r i a l i s t s , have always harboured expansionist ambitions i n Tibet and have c a r r i e d out various sabotage activities...unfavourable to the friendship between China and T i b e t . " 2 6 But Nehru, though he described the Chinese charges as both unbecoming and e n t i r e l y devoid of substance, and accused the Chinese government of using "the language of the 27 cold war regardless of t r u t h and propriety," ' was deter-mined to treat the issue on i t s merits and not l e t i t become a cold war issue. Consequently, the Indian government, 116 despite Indian public f e e l i n g , opposed as they had done i n 1950, any United Nations debate on Tibet on the grounds 28 that Tibet was a part of China and thus a domestic concern. This was i n s t r i c t accordance with the Five P r i n c i p l e s and was also undoubtedly motivated by I n d i a 1 s desire not to give offence to China. I t must also be recognized that while the Indian argument has been described as specious by those who favour United Nations debate of the Tibetan tragedy, i t also has a great deal of merit. For such a discussion by the Organization would n e c e s s a r i l y become a cold war debate aimed more at damaging the Chinese Communists than aiding the Tibetans. Such a debate might do the Tibetans more harm than good by provoking further Chinese r e p r i s a l s or encour-aging the Tibetans to hopeless resistance. Hungary had c l e a r l y shown that whatever the West might say, sympathy was the sum t o t a l of the support i t would give. I f the West was not prepared to chance i g n i t i n g a t h i r d world war over a c r i t i c a l issue i n Europe, i t would most c e r t a i n l y not do so over a minor issue i n the Himilayas. Thus the p o s i t i o n taken by the Indian government was both r e a l i s t i c and sound. But despite the o f f i c i a l o b j e c t i v i t y of the Indian government concerning the r e v o l t , the Tibetan c r i s i s severely strained Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s , and subsequent Chinese actions have put India's p o l i c y of peace, as based on the Panch S h i l a doctrine, to i t s severest t e s t . The new point of contention concerns the d e l i n e a t i o n of t h e i r borders with 117 one another, borders which — aside from the vague MacMahon Line — have never been c l e a r l y demarcated. As has since been revealed by the Indian government, the border contro-versy with China has s t e a d i l y developed since J u l y 1954, when Peking f i r s t began to probe India's borders. On every occasion the Indian government protested but withheld the events from p u b l i c knowledge " i n the hope that peaceful solutions to the disputes could be found by agreement by the 29 two countries without public excitement on both sides." y But as the Chinese expanded t h e i r border crossings i n the summer and f a l l of 1959, r i s i n g concern was voiced i n the Indian Parliament. The Prime M i n i s t e r was queried by opposition members i n the Lok Sabha on August 13 about the Communist propaganda f o r the l i b e r a t i o n of Sikkim, Ladakh, and Bhutan, and about the alleged massing of Chinese troops on India's northern f r o n t i e r s . In answer, Nehru, while s t a t i n g that h i s Government had no knowledge of any Chinese troop concentrations near Indian borders, gave h i s assurances that everything would be done to safeguard the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of India and declared that "so f a r as we are con-cerned the MacMahon Line i s the f r o n t i e r — f i r m by tr e a t y , 30 f i r m by usage and r i g h t , and f i r m by g e o g r a p h y . S i m i l a r assurances were given by the Prime M i n i s t e r during subse-quent weeks as concern rose i n India over China's actions. The growing concern of the Indian government was evidenced by the fact that on September 7, 1959, a White Paper 118 containing Notes, memoranda and l e t t e r s exchanged between the Governments of India and China from 1954 to 1959 was 51 presented to the Indian Parliament by Mr. Nehru. y The correspondence showed i n t e r a l i a that Mr. Chou E n - l a i had accepted the MacMahon as the north-east border between India and China i n 1957, tout had subsequently retracted from t h i s commitment. The numerous in c i d e n t s , charges, and counter-charges included Chinese a l l e g a t i o n s of "brazen i n t r u s i o n s " by Indian troops on Tibetan t e r r i t o r y , coupled with a l l e -gations of "unscrupulous c o l l u s i o n " between Indian forces and "t r a i t e r o u s Tibetan rebels;" reference to border tension between the two countries i n the Bara Hoti area of Uttar Pradesh; the disclosure that as f a r back as 1956 India had warned China that v i o l a t i o n s of Indian t e r r i t o r y might lead to a "clash of arms;" and the Indian representations on the b u i l d i n g of a Chinese road across Ladakh, r e f e r r e d to by Mr. Nehru i n h i s statement to the Rajya Sabha on August 31 , 1959* In the l a t t e r connection the Chinese a u t h o r i t i e s had made counter-charges of armed Indian " i n t r u s i o n s " i n the Ladakh area, which was claimed as Chinese t e r r i t o r y . In rep l y the Indian Prime M i n i s t e r described China's t e r r i t o r i a l claims as "absurd," " f a n t a s t i c , " and completely inadmissible, s t a t i n g that they could not be the subject of any mediation, a r b i t r a t i o n or c o n c i l i a t i o n . " I t involves a fundamental change i n geography — the Himalayas being handed over to them as a g i f t . That cannot be accepted, there the matter "52 ends. y 119 But the Government of the Chinese People's Republic was apparently not of the same view, and with the Chinese ambush of an Indian p a t r o l l a t e one October afternoon at spot 45 miles from the T i b e t a n 0 f r o n t i e r i n the windswept wastes of Ladakh, the long-simmering border controversy became an open issue. This cruel betrayal of Nehru's innocent t r u s t and of India's n a t i o n a l self-respect brought a swift and vehement outburst of anti-Chinese f e e l i n g through-out India. In New Delhi over 3,000 Indian students demon-strated outside the Chinese Embassy, shouting "Death to Chou" and other anti-Chinese slogans; the demonstrators burned copies of Chinese maps which showed 40,000 square miles of Indian t e r r i t o r y as belonging to China. In Jubbulpore, some 1,000 students signed a blood oath, declaring t h e i r readiness to l a y down t h e i r l i v e s to defend India against Chinese aggression. S i m i l a r anti-Chinese student demonstrations took place at Allahabad, B a r e r l l y , and e l s e -33 where. y The various Indian p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s and newspapers were no l e s s emphatic i n urging Nehru to take strong and immediate action. The A l l - I n d i a Congress Committee condemned the Chinese i n t r u s i o n s into Indian territ o r y . , expressed f u l l support f o r the Government, and declared that "the i n t e g r i t y of India must be respected." The Praja S o c i a l i s t Party demanded that the Government take such measures, m i l i t a r y and diplomatic, as to compel China to quit Indian t e r r i t o r y , 120 warning that: "On the way we meet the Chinese threat depends not only the i n t e g r i t y of India, hut also the freedom, se c u r i t y and peace of the whole of Asia." Even the Indian Communists declared ' they" - stood with the rest of the people fo r the t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y of India. The Hindustan Times (Delhi) declared that some form of l i m i t e d r e p r i s a l was "imperative f o r the sake as much of our self-respect as of the larger peace"; the Times of India (Bombay) warned that i t might be necessary "to consider the p o s s i b i l i t y of severing diplomatic r e l a t i o n s with Communist China i f Peking p e r s i s t s i n deliberate acts of provocation and i n s u l t against t h i s country"; while the Indian Express (Delhi) c a l l e d f o r "firm punitive action against the v i o l a t o r s of our f r o n t i e r s , " and 54-urged an Indo-Pakistan defence arrangement. India f e l t both angry and alone. The ruthlessness of Red China's behaviour made a wreckage of some cherished convictions. There was no longer confidence that Asian s o l i d a r i t y , created at the Bandung Conference, would outlaw the use of force; that Indian n e u t r a l i t y and non-alignment with m i l i t a r y blocs would gradually lead the Communist and non-Communist worlds to mutual understanding; or that the repeated pledges of peaceful coexistence by Peking meant that Red China was worthy of j o i n i n g the United Nations Organization. The n a t i o n a l disillusionment was so great that even Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru took o f f h i s rose-coloured glasses, looked hard at h i s giant neighbour to the north, 121 and t o l d the Indian Parliament: "I doubt i f there i s any country i n the world that cares l e s s f o r peace than China today." 5 5 But aside from s t a t i n g h i s b e l i e f that "China has 36 not got over the f i r s t f l u s h of i t s revolutionary mentality,"-^ Nehru's i n i t i a l response to China's calculated aggression was hesitant — and w e l l i t might be, f o r h i s p o l i c y of peaceful coexistence was going up i n flames. China appar-e n t l y had nothing but contempt f o r Panch S h i l a and was showing that contempt by throwing i t r i g h t back i n t o the face of her best f r i e n d outside the Communist bloc. The Prime M i n i s t e r w e l l knew the consequences f o r h i s country's economic development i f she took a f i r m m i l i t a r y stand against the Chinese encroachments. In face of the strong f e e l i n g of Indian opinion, he d i d declare to a mass meeting of 200,000 i n New Delhi on November 1, 1959 that India would not w i l t before the Chinese challenge: I want to disabuse any suspicion that might l u r k i n some peoples minds that we w i l l not be able to defend our i n t e g r i t y i f the Chinese invade us. We have confidence i n our strength and determination to meet t h i s challenge, and we w i l l meet i t with our f u l l strength. We w i l l defend our country with a l l our might. But Mr. Nehru i s also determined to seek a peaceful settlement. As he t o l d the Indian Parliament on December 2 1 , 1959 i n r e p l y to a demand by S o c i a l i s t leader J . P. K r i p a l a n i and other 122 opposition members who demanded a f i r m stand against Communist China: As f a r as I am concerned, as f a r as my Government i s concerned, we s h a l l negotiate and negotiate and negotiate to the b i t t e r end. Any other approach i s anti-Gandhian and against our fundamental p r i n c i p l e s . I want members • to r e a l i z e the only a l t e r n a t i v e to negotiation i s war.^g In face of Chou E n - l a i ' s apparent determination not to r e l i n q u i s h any of the t e r r i t o r y seized by h i s forces, however, the peaceful settlement desired by Mr. Nehru w i l l not be e a s i l y achieved. Mr. Chou E n - l a i wants Prime M i n i s t e r Nehru, i n e f f e c t , to enter into t a l k s with the t e r r i t o r i a l outcome prejudged against him, and i t i s not s u r p r i s i n g that Nehru has rejected such a peremptory c a l l i n g of India to China's heel. His desire f o r a negotiated settlement, how-ever, i s evidenced by the f a c t that he has agreed to meet with the Chinese leader i n A p r i l /I"9607. I f Mr. Nehru f e e l s that a long stalemate now would work more to China's advantage than to India's, he may be disposed to make the best of t a l k s without f u r t h e r preparation,in the hope that something may be accomplished i n that way. Indeed, a long stalemate would quite l i k e l y r e s u l t i n leaving Indians much less b i t t e r towards China than the f i r s t flareup of indignation seemed to imply. Indians w i l l remain suspicious of China i n the future, but the suspension of aggression and the s u b s t i t u t i o n 123 of f r i e n d l y acts by China would undoubtedly bring a f r i e n d l y response from India. But should the forthcoming t a l k s be inconclusive, there i s always the r i s k that spring i n the Himalayas w i l l unfreeze more than the g l a c i e r s . Whatever India's short-range reaction to these Chinese encroachments may be — and hypotheses are many, — China's aggressiveness has c e r t a i n l y caused the Indian government to reappraise the future value of Panch S h i l a , and to make f i r m adherence t o , and f a i t h i n t h a t doctrine very d i f f i c u l t and dangerous. I t i s quite l i k e l y that the pressure of Chinese expansion w i l l continue, and while t h i s w i l l pose a problem f o r every Asian nation and nations with Asians i n t e r e s t s — even Soviet Russia, which has much the longest, most vulnerable and most co n t r o v e r s i a l f r o n t i e r with China — i t w i l l be an e s p e c i a l l y acute one f o r India. Paced with the overriding necessity of concentrating her main at t e n t i o n and energy on her i n t e r n a l problems i f she i s ever to withstand Chinese pressure, India must, i n the near future, defend her i n t e r e s t s on the f r o n t i e r s l a r g e l y 39 by diplomacy. This w i l l require great t a c t and much patience on the part of the Indian government f o r the Chinese — and that includes the N a t i o n a l i s t Chinese on Formosa quite as much as the Chinese Communists on the main-land — do not recognize the l e g a l i t y of the MacMahon Line as a f r o n t i e r . They assert that t h i s l i n e , which the Indian government claims i s the l e g a l one, was imposed on Tibet by 124 the B r i t i s h who dominated Tibet when China was helpless and i n the throes of a re v o l u t i o n . With her present strength i t i s only natural to expect China to assert her claims to t e r r i t o r y which at one time was part of the Chinese Empire. Due to India's i n a b i l i t y to assert her claims to the disputed areas by reason of the i n a c c e s s a b i l i t y of the regions from the Indian side, the Government's p o l i c y w i l l be to argue i t s case with China, to propose reasonable com-promises and to f i g h t back where i t can i f there are further incursions. The true l i n e of p o l i c y f o r India i s thus to conduct a holding operation as long as that i s possible, and i n the meantime to promote i n d i r e c t l y and with d e l i c a c y a p o l i c y of containment. Mr. Nehru has found that by being a f r i e n d to the Chinese r e v o l u t i o n i s not necessarily to enable him to l i v e i n peace with i t , and i n future h i s p o l i c y towards Red China w i l l be void of some of h i s past i l l u s i o n s . But while Indians w i l l take a r e a l i s t i c view of China i n future, the aggressiveness of that country has not appeared to have a l t e r e d Nehru's f a i t h i n a p o l i c y of non-alignment i n the context of the cold war. At the same Delhi speech where he declared that India would r e s i s t oppression on her f r o n t i e r s with force, Mr. Nehru stated emphatically that " t a l k of abandoning the p o l i c y of non-alignment i s u t t e r l y wrong and useless. There could not be a more f o o l i s h thing. As f a r as I am concerned, I w i l l 125 40 oppose i t with a l l my strength." Even Chinese i n t r a n -sigeance over negotiating a settlement has not shaken Nehru's resolve. This was evidenced by h i s f i r m opposition to suggestions made at the annual Congress Party meeting at Bangalore i n mid-January I960 that India drop i t s p o l i c y of non-alignment and opposition to m i l i t a r y pacts. The Prime M i n i s t e r said that India's p o l i c y had been proved 4-1 r i g h t and that such proposals were a sign of weakness. He even welcomed the Chinese challenge on the borders to "shake the people up," and heatedly declared that whatever the consequences, India would never allow f o r e i g n armies on her s o i l , even to a i d defence. His stand was affirmed by Mr. Sanjiva Eeddy i n h i s P r e s i d e n t i a l address to the Congress Party the f o l l o w i n g day i n which he stated that while India would r e s i s t any aggression "we have to adhere to our policy.../which/ necessarily...has to be adapted to 42 new conditions." For any one to challenge or doubt the p o l i c y of India based on Panch S h i l a and non-alignment with power blocs was showing a remarkable lack of understanding of what had happened or was happening i n the present-day world. Footnotes - Chapter VI 1 Jawaharlal Nehru, Broadcast from Colombo, May 2 , 1954. Speeches 1955-1957* p. 252. 2 The Constitution of India (New Delh i , Government of India, 1952) , p. 2 1 . 3 Statement made at the Dynamo Stadium, Moscow, June 2 2 , 1955. Nehru's Speeches 1955-1957, p. 3 0 3 . 4- Nehru's Speeches 194-9-1953, p. 174-. 5 A prominent member of the Indian Council of World A f f a i r s . 6 L e v i , Free India i n Asia, p. 97• 7 Foreign P o l i c y B u l l e t i n , New York, November 10 , 1950. 8 Cited i n International Commission of J u r i s t s , The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law, 1959, pp. 132-133. 9 I b i d . , p. 133. 10 I b i d . , pp. 133-135. 11 Quoted i n the New York Times, November 10, 1950. 12 I b i d . , November 5 , 1950. 13 United Nations, Document A/154-9. Text i n I b i d . , January 2 1 , 1959. 14 For a l e g a l i s t i c viewpoint on Tibet's status, see "The P o s i t i o n of Tibet i n International Law," i n The Question  of Tibet and the Rule of Law, pp. 7 5 - 9 9 . 15 United Nations General Assembly, November 24, 1950. U. N. Document A/1543. 16 Cited i n Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 262. 17 I b i d . , p. 263. 18 From a statement i n Lok Sabha, March 2 0 , 1956. I b i d . , p. 318. i 19 On December 5, 1950, the Indian delegate to the U. N. said: "Since China has been ravaged by wars, i t was under-standable that...the ordeals through which they had passed had made them unduly suspicious and apprehensive. Year Book  of the United Nations, 1950, p. 24-5. 20 Referring to the N a t i o n a l i s t - h e l d offshore islands of Matsu and Quemoy during the 1955 c r i s i s i n the Formosa s t r a i t s , Mr. Nehru declared that "no country can to l e r a t e an enemy s i t t i n g ten miles from t h e i r shore, bombarding them a l l the time. I t i s an i n t o l e r a b l e s i t u a t i o n . " Keesing's  Contemporary Archives, March 26 - A p r i l 2, 1955, P.. 14-118. 21 Nehru's Speeches 1953-1957, p. 299. 22 The Times of India, however, has issued a word of caution as- regards the pronouncements of Premier Khrushchev. Commenting on statements made by him during h i s v i s i t to India 1957, the Times stated: "The v i s i t of our Russian guests, while i t has helped to heighten the permutations and combinations of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c s , c a r r i e d i t s own warnings to us.... By a l l means l e t us return courtesy with courtesy but not to the point of l e t t i n g the guest edge the host out of h i s own mansion.... There can be no doubt that what Moscow i s now engaged i n i s a maneuvre to undermine, i s o l a t e and outflank Western influence i n Asia." Keesing 1s  Contemporary Archives, December 31, 1955 - January 7, 1956, p. 14-614-. 23 See Chapter V. 24- Keesing's Contemporary Archives, May 9-16, 1959, p. 16799. 25 I b i d . , p. 16801. 26 I b i d . 27 International Commission of J u r i s t s , The Question of  Tibet and the Rule of Law, p. 173. 28 I t i s s i g n i f i c a n t to note that out of 82 members of the United Nations, only 4-3 supported the move to debate the Tibet question. Among these 43 members only 7 were Asian countries, while 20 were from South and North America. 29 Quoted i n Werner L e v i , "Chinese-Indian Competition i n As i a , 1 Current History, v o l . 38 (February I960), p. 66. 30 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17H5. i i 31 The correspondence i s summarized i n Keesing's  Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, pp. 17116-17119. 32 I b i d . , p. 17119. 33 See Time, December 14, 1959. 34 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17122. 35 Cited i n Time, December 14, 1959. 36 Indiagxam, October 22, 1959. 37 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17120. 38 Cited i n The Japan Times, December 22, 1959. 39 Vincent Sheean has observed: "whatever the provocation, India's a t t i t u d e toward China must conform to i t s own p r i n -c i p l e s as taught by Gandhi and as r e i t e r a t e d i n various agreements, t r e a t i e s and formulae by Nehru. The entire structure would be wrecked, t h e o r e t i c a l l y or p h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , by any quarrel with China...over the Himalayan regions." Nehru: The Years of Power, p. 156. 40 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, November 21-28, 1959, p. 17120. 41 Cited i n The Japan Times, January 16, I960. 42 Indiagram, January 17, I960. i i i CHAPTER VII CONCLUSION Indian foreign p o l i c y i n the era of 'cold war' derives from a v a r i e t y of sources. At the time of independence Indian leaders were faced with i n t e r n a l pro-blems of such an overwhelming nature that external p o l i c y , save f o r r e l a t i o n s with Pakistan, was of l i t t l e concern. As the 'cold war' was mainly r e s t r i c t e d to the European scene at t h i s time, Indo-Pakistan r e l a t i o n s did not touch the d i r e c t l i n e of East-West dispute. Under these circum-stances Indian leaders took a distant look at the 'cold war'. Their general approach to i t can be summed up as: 'we s h a l l have nothing to do with i t ' . But India could not maintain t h i s aloofness from world a f f a i r s f o r long. With the coming into power i n China of the communists and India's recognition of the Peking regime, India could no longer be a distant onlooker. The aggressive attitu d e and actions of the Chinese Communists provoked the United States to e s t a b l i s h s e c u r i t y pacts along the peripheries of the resurgent Chinese state and thereby brought the implications of the 'cold war' into India's immediate neighbourhood. As a consequence of her 126 127 s i z e , l o c a t i o n and future p o s s i b i l i t i e s , India was forced to r a p i d l y assume an important ro l e i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l diplomacy. This meant formulating a foreign p o l i c y i n accordance with her n a t i o n a l b e l i e f s and i n t e r e s t s , a p o l i c y which, i n addition to dealing with immediate problems, would also act as a means of strengthening i n t e r n a l u n i t y . The immediate s i t u a t i o n tended to reduce pos-s i b i l i t i e s i n the f i e l d of foreign p o l i c y to two broad a l t e r n a t i v e s . One was active partisanship i n world a f f a i r s combined with extensive m i l i t a r y and economic support from fore i g n sources. The other was a p o l i c y of p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s strongly conditioned by the possible influence of such a p o l i c y upon the domestic scene and by the p o l i c y ' s impact upon the foreign powers. Both p o l i c i e s involved s u b s t a n t i a l r i s k s . Any success with the f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e depended upon such fa c t o r s as the con-sistency of a c t i o n by the major powers; the m i l i t a r y f e a s i b i l i t y of f o r e i g n protection; and, perhaps most important of a l l , the i n t e r n a l repercussions of dependency and a c e r t a i n amount of foreign supervision and c o n t r o l . A l l of these r i s k s , and e s p e c i a l l y the l a s t , m i l i t a t e d strongly against i t s adoption by the Indian government. The second a l t e r n a t i v e , despite i t s obvious r i s k s , became the most natural choice and, i n the eyes of Nehru and h i s colleagues, the most reasonable. I t s d i c t a t e s were 128 simple "but compelling. I t must take account of geography, of i n t e r n a l weakness and the urgent nature of domestic problems,,of the culture and r e l i g i o u s t r a d i t i o n of India, and of the nationalism of the Indian people. Foreign partisanship, at ei t h e r the i n d i v i d u a l or the nat i o n a l l e v e l , was regarded as a development l i k e l y to produce furt h e r complications i n an already confused s i t u a t i o n . Under the circumstances foreign p o l i c y had to be a p i l l a r of strength, capable of being sustained on the basis of i t s own emotional and p o l i t i c a l appeal, and founded upon a r e a l i s t i c appraisal of power abroad, both actual and p o t e n t i a l . India's c o n t i g u i t y to the great land powers of Communist China and the Soviet Union made i t a matter of v i t a l necessity f o r her Government to do nothing to antagonize these giant neigh-bours. An attack by ei t h e r or both of these countries on India could never be withstood and would have disastrous consequences f o r the nation, i n a l l p r o b a b i l i t y destroying i t s very foundations. The Indian leaders undoubtedly recog-nized the probable i n a b i l i t y of Western power to defend India from Communist attack, even i f events caused or forced them to consider i t d e s i r a b l e . The lesson of Korea has undoubtedly been an impressive one to many Indians; the power of Com-munist China was recognized and feared. Thus the Indian government f e l t i t would not be to India's i n t e r e s t s , from e i t h e r the emotional or the p r a c t i c a l standpoint, to a l i g n h e r s e l f with the West. 129 Consequently, the Indian government enunciated what was, i n i t s view, the wise and natural p o l i c y of 'neutralism', 'non-alignment', or whatever i t may he c a l l e d . Indian leaders sought to b u i l d t h e i r country on s o l i d foundations and not to get entangled i n matters which d i d not d i r e c t l y a f f e c t them, not because they were d i s i n t e r e s t e d i n the current of world events, but because they f e l t that the burden of these entanglements would be too great f o r India's weak economy to support. But though India has remained formally neutral i n the East-West power struggle, her foreign p o l i c y has been neither passive nor negative. This has been evidenced by the actions of the Indian govern-ment on the world stage, actions designed to promote i n t e r -n a t i o n a l peace and s e c u r i t y and to create thereby an atmo-sphere conducive to India's economic development and s o c i a l progress. In the f i r s t instance i t has been seen that the Indian government has pursued a p o l i c y designed to achieve the maximum s e c u r i t y at a minimum cost i n scarce money and materials. Indian leaders recognize that i f India i s ever to achieve a reasonable l e v e l of s e c u r i t y , the country must be put on a sound economic basis as i n modern warfare only a country with a sound economic structure can hope to with-stand the ravages of war. For India to arm h e r s e l f to a degree where she could thwart Communist ( i . e . Chinese) 130 expansion by force of arms alone would necessitate defence expenditures on a scale which would have disastrous con-sequences f o r the country's economic development. The Government's reluctance to take such steps has caused i t to place i t s s e c u r i t y p r i m a r i l y upon diplomacy. Limited e f f o r t s , to be sure, have been taken to secure the northern f r o n t i e r s , but these represent automatic r e f l e x e s more than concrete defensive planning. I t i s through non-alignment with the W e s t o p p o s i t i o n to regional s e c u r i t y pacts i n her neighbour-hood, fr i e n d s h i p with her Communist neighbours, and furtherance of the Panch S h i l a doctrine, that India has sought to secure h e r s e l f from attack. I t has also been shown that i n the world at large India's p o l i c y has d i r e c t e d - i t s e l f to consciously and d e l i b e r a t e l y working f o r peace through mediation, moral pressure, and through openly v o i c i n g opinions against steps or on issues which, according to Indian c a l c u l a t i o n s , might lead to war. India believes that i n t e r n a t i o n a l disputes can be amicably and peacefully s e t t l e d by discussion, negotiation, and a r b i t r a t i o n . She has f a i t h i n the i n t r i n s i c need and desire of a large majority of the nations of the world to maintain peace and to ensure s e c u r i t y to the war-weary peoples of the world. India's championship of the cause of dependent peoples i s based on the premise that p.eace" and freedom are 131 i n d i v i s i b l e ; that the absolute freedom of a l l nations of the world i s conducive to contentment and peace of the world; and that enslavement of any people, however small numerically, i s detrimental to peace. Consequently, since independence i n 194-7, the Indian government has sought to remove what i t considers to be a root cause of war. In 194-9 i t convened an Asian conference to consider the problem of Indonesian independence. In the United Nations, Indian representatives have given strong support to Arab nationalism, e s p e c i a l l y the struggle f o r Tunisian and Moroccan independence, and B r i t i s h , French, Belgian and Portuguese c o l o n i a l i s m were frequently c r i t i c i z e d by India i n t h i s i n t e r n a t i o n a l body. In more recent years, however, India has been much less vocal on t h i s issue than before and t h i s has probably been due to a r e a l i z a t i o n i n New Delhi that, i n view of East-West tension, i t i s better to give one's advice with greater prudence. India's desire now appears to be to prevent Asian or A f r i c a n nationalism from d i s r u p t i n g world peace. Maturity i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s has caused the Indian government to recognize the dangers inherent i n a blanket and unequivocal a p p l i c a t i o n of a purely i d e a l i s t i c approach. India's attitu d e towards the United Nations, towards a l l i a n c e s and disarmament, and towards Red China's admittance i n t o the United Nations, demonstrate her con-v i c t i o n that' tension and eventual armed c o n f l i c t are latent 132 i n each, issue. Through a p o l i c y of non-alignment India considers h e r s e l f to be making a p o s i t i v e contribution to peace. She has consciously sought to impress upon the world her conviction that war i s not i n e v i t a b l e and that i f issues are approached i n the proper mood then tension can be a l l e v i a t e d . M i l i t a r y a l l i a n c e s are opposed on the grounds that s e c u r i t y can never be achieved by such means which a c t u a l l y lead to war. S i m i l a r l y , the r e f u s a l of the West to recognize Red China and to deny her admittance to the United Nations i s considered by Indians to be unnecessary provocation of a powerful country. Through continual enunciation of these views India hopes to a l l e v i a t e tensions i n the world and create an atmosphere i n which nations of the world, regardless of t h e i r p o l i t i c a l ideology, can work i n f r i e n d l y cooperation f o r the mutual benefit of mankind. India's mediatory role i n East-West disputes i s further evidence of t h i s a t t i t u d e . By r e t a i n i n g her detached o b j e c t i v i t y and her i n d i v i d u a l i t y , India has sought to restore equanimity over a world r i v e n by fe e l i n g s of hatred and violence. Frequently India's 'independent' approach to issues i n v o l v i n g i n t e r e s t s of the r i v a l blocs has caused her to be viewed with varying degrees of suspicion and resentment and has forced her 'to plough a lonely furrow', but India remained consistent i n her e f f o r t s to prevent the outbreak of a general c o n f l i c t . Her e f f o r t s i n respect to Korea, Indo-China, the Formosa s t r a i t s , and 133 i n Hungary and Egypt are evidence of India's mediatory r o l e . Through an independent approach to each issue, India has s t r i v e n to c o n c i l i a t e the opposing points of view and thereby prevent the outbreak of a general conflagration. Fearful of future Chinese actions a f t e r the Tibetan episode i n 1950, however, India advanced the Five P r i n c i p l e s of Panch S h i l a as the basis f o r Sino-Indian r e l a t i o n s . Thereby India sought to secure her f r o n t i e r s from any future Chinese 'nibbling' incursions that could be expected along the i l l - d e f i n e d Himalayan f r o n t i e r s . At the same time India sought to further these p r i n c i p l e s of i n t e r -n ational r e l a t i o n s i n the world at large. She has s t r i v e n to engender i n the West the same optimism which she pur-portedly holds towards the Communist nations, and to bring the r i v a l blocs together i n f r i e n d l y cooperation. The only a l t e r n a t i v e to coexistence i s co-destruction. But while Panch S h i l a has apparently eased tension somewhat i n the world due to the general r e a l i z a t i o n that the Indian premise i s a correct one, the events i n Hungary i n 1956 and i n Tibet i n 1959 c l e a r l y indicated that the p r i n c i p l e s of Panch S h i l a are s t i l l f a r from acceptance as the only basis f o r r e l a t i o n s among states. China's seizure of Indian t e r r i t o r y made t h i s emphatically c l e a r to Indians, and while the outcome of t h i s dispute remains a matter of conjecture, i t has c e r t a i n l y i n j e c t e d a new note of admitted r e a l i t y i n t o Indian p o l i c y . A rapprochement between East and West w i l l , i n the future, 134 not be advanced by India with, the same optimism as i n the past, and China w i l l be viewed with more jaundiced eyes than h i t h e r t o . I t can therefore be concluded that although the term 'neutralism' i s sometimes applied to Indian foreign p o l i c y , t h i s i s hardly an accurate d e s c r i p t i o n . India has been neutral only i n her r e f u s a l to j o i n m i l i t a r y pacts: she has c e r t a i n l y aligned h e r s e l f i n many disputes. She has aligned h e r s e l f with Afro-Asian nations i n the pursuit of c e r t a i n economic, p o l i t i c a l and c u l t u r a l aims. She has exerted her influence i n many troubled areas — Korea, Indo-China, Indonesia, North A f r i c a , to name but a few. In the United Nations she has placed h e r s e l f c l o s e l y by the side of the Arab bloc. In t r u t h India has followed a r e a l i s t i c p o l i c y i n i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s , c a lculated to protect her national s e l f - i n t e r e s t . This basic motivation of natio n a l i n t e r e s t has often been obscured by a camouflage of phi l o s o p h i c a l and moral p l a t i t u d e s . But India's foreign p o l i c y has elements of opportunism, inconsistency, and expedience — as does that of any world power. This i s seen i n the fact that she has not hesitated to use force when her unity or se c u r i t y has been threatened, as i n the case of Hyderabad, Junagadh, Kashmir, and Nepal. While c o n t i n u a l l y advocating disarmament i n the United Nations, India has turned down a 135 number of reasonable proposals f o r d e m i l i t a r i z a t i o n i n Kashmir. On t h i s issue of Kashmir, the general p r i n c i p l e of self-determination f o r a l l peoples hardly squares with the obstacles Nehru has placed i n i t s path i n Kashmir. India has castigated Western r u l e i n Asia and A f r i c a , yet Indian leaders have never c r i t i c i z e d Communist t o t a l i t a r i a n r u l e i n Eastern Europe. The Indian government has too often seemed to go out of i t s way to be accommodating to the Communist powers while sparing nothing i n i t s c r i t i c i s m of Western p o l i c i e s . Yet even i f the message of non-violence, Gandhian e t h i c s , and s p i r i t u a l i t y i n f o r e i g n a f f a i r s have been unduly stressed i n supporting India's actions on the world stage, i t must be recognized that India has acted as mediator and honest broker i n East-Vest disputes and has i n a general way t r i e d to infuse the i n t e r n a t i o n a l scene with reasonable-ness and c o n c i l i a t i o n . Thereby India has made a p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n to world peace although her actions and expressed opinions have frequently brought down upon her the harsh c r i t i c i s m s of both East and Vest, depending as her views favoured one side or the other. The r e l a t i v e success which Indian foreign p o l i c y has enjoyed i s l a r g e l y due to one man, Jawaharlal Nehru. For India's amazing prominence i n world a f f a i r s has l a r g e l y grew from the stature of Nehru as. a n a t i o n a l i s t leader, 136 statesman, w r i t e r , and dynamic p e r s o n a l i t y . But Nehru w i l l soon pass from the scene, and what the p o l i c y of h i s suc-cessors w i l l be i s a matter of great debate even i n India. C e r t a i n l y whoever emerges to lead India w i l l lack the tremendous prestige which has enabled Nehru to avoid meeting the demands of the extremist sections of Indian opinion f o r abandonment of non-alignment i n favour of c l o s e r association with e i t h e r East or West. In view of recent Chinese actions and the strength of pro-Western elements i n Indian p o l i t i c a l l i f e any forseeable trend i n Indian foreign p o l i c y would undoubtedly be to more intimate association with the Western camp. Such a trend, while c e r t a i n l y a t t r a c t i v e to the West, would, however, c e r t a i n l y be contrary to the i n t e r e s t s of world peace. The d r i f t towards war can only be checked by the most pe r s i s t e n t and patient e f f o r t s to bring and hold a l l sides together. They cannot be checked by helping to b u i l d up the preponderance of one side, which i n i t s e l f , and through i t s example upon others, can have no r e s u l t other than that of widening the cleavage, p u l l i n g down the bridges, and pushing the world a l i t t l e nearer to the brink. This conviction i s the mainspring of India's foreign p o l i c y . I t impels her, not towards i s o l a t i o n i s m or any f i c t i t i o u s n e u t r a l i t y , but to extend the hand of friendship to a l l , provided only that the p r i c e of fri e n d s h i p i s not conformity or subservience. I t causes her to r e t a i n and develop a l l e x i s t i n g f r i e n d l y contacts as 137 w e l l as to e s t a b l i s h new ones. For India to abandon i t i n favour of short-term p o l i t i c a l and economic advantages accruing from alignment with the West would not only be to India's long-term disadvantage, but might w e l l hasten the approach of a world c o n f l i c t which India has s t r i v e n to prevent. Through a continuance of non-alignment, mediation and the promotion of peace, India can best serve the cause of world peace. BIBLIOGRAPHY A. Primary Sources 1. General Sources Department of State B u l l e t i n (Washington). Proceedings of the U. N. Security Council and General  Assembly. Year Book of the United Nations. 2. Collected Documents Documents on American Foreign Relations (New York, Council on Foreign A f f a i r s ) . Documents on International A f f a i r s (London, Royal I n s t i t u t e of International A f f a i r s ) . 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Dutt, R. Palme. India Today (Bombay, People's Publishing House, 1949) . Gaitonde, Pundlik. The Goa Problem (New Delh i , I.C.W.A., 1956. Gupta, S i s i r . India's Relations with Pakistan 1954-1957 (New D e l h i , I.C.W.A., 1 9 5 6 ) . Haines, C. G. (ed.). The Threat of Soviet Imperialism (Baltimore, John Hopkins, 1 9 5 4 ) . Indian Council of World A f f a i r s . Defence and Security i n  the Indian Ocean Area (New York, Asia Publishing House, 1 9 5 8 ) . . India and the United  Nations (New York. Manhattan Publishing Co., 1 9 5 8 ) . Kahin, G. M. The Asian-African Conference (Ithaca, Cornell U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 5 6 ) . Karuna&aran, K. P. India i n World A f f a i r s 1947-1950 (London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1952) . 141 Karunakaran, K. P. India i n World A f f a i r s 1950-1955 (London, Oxford U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 5 8 ) . Kautsky, John H. Moscow and the Communist Party of India (New York, Wiley, 1955) . Kundra, J . C. 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