UBC Theses and Dissertations

UBC Theses Logo

UBC Theses and Dissertations

T.E. Hulme and the problem of unity. Sanson, Barbara Anne 1963

Your browser doesn't seem to have a PDF viewer, please download the PDF to view this item.

Item Metadata

Download

Media
831-UBC_1963_A8 S2 T4.pdf [ 4.33MB ]
Metadata
JSON: 831-1.0105772.json
JSON-LD: 831-1.0105772-ld.json
RDF/XML (Pretty): 831-1.0105772-rdf.xml
RDF/JSON: 831-1.0105772-rdf.json
Turtle: 831-1.0105772-turtle.txt
N-Triples: 831-1.0105772-rdf-ntriples.txt
Original Record: 831-1.0105772-source.json
Full Text
831-1.0105772-fulltext.txt
Citation
831-1.0105772.ris

Full Text

T. E. HULME AND THE PROBLEM OF UNITY by BARBARA ANNE SANSON B.A., The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, 1959 A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS i n the Department of E n g l i s h We accept t h i s t h e s i s as conforming to.the r e q u i r e d standard THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA j August, 1963 3 V In presenting t h i s t h e s i s i n p a r t i a l f u l f i l m e n t o f the requirements f o r an advanced degree a t the U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, I agree t h a t the L i b r a r y s h a l l make i t f r e e l y a v a i l a b l e f o r reference and study. I f u r t h e r agree that permission f o r extensive copying of t h i s t h e s i s f o r s c h o l a r l y purposes may be granted by the Head of my Department or by h i s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s . I t i s understood t h a t copying or p u b l i c a t i o n of t h i s t h e s i s f o r f i n a n c i a l g a i n s h a l l not be'allowed without my w r i t t e n permission. Department of E n g l i s h  The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia, Vancouver S, Canada. Date August l 6 , 1963 ABSTRACT T. E. Hulme i s a c o n t r o v e r s i a l .figure i n modern l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m but h i s i n f l u e n c e on the thought o f T. S. E l i o t and on the p r i n c i p l e s behind the Imagist movement i s assured. Recent c r i t i c a l examinations of him have discovered strong Romantic tendencies i n h i s thought, i n s p i t e of h i s f i r m anti-Romantic i n i t i a l stand. This Romanticism i s p a r t i c u l a r l y evident i n h i s a e s t h e t i c s , i n the d e f i n i t i o n . o f u n i t y he a p p l i e s to the image. The aim of t h i s paper i s t o t r a c e the idea of u n i t y through the whole of Hulme's w r i t i n g s , t o c l a r i f y . h i s d e f i n i t i o n s of the idea i n d i f f e r e n t contexts, and to t r y and d i s c o v e r some b a s i s f o r the p a r t i c u l a r d e f i n i t i o n of u n i t y he uses i n the case of the image Hulme's metaphysics d e l i n e a t e s the l i m i t s o f u n i t y and provides-h i s b a s i c d e f i n i t i o n s of the term. Hulme denies the p r i n c i p l e of con-t i n u i t y which he b e l i e v e s to be the b a s i s of.Humanism and'Romanticism. In p lace of one a l l - p e r v a s i v e u n i t y , he presents a t r i p l e s t r u c t u r e , i n which each realm i s d i f f e r e n t . The realm of e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s values i s u n i f i e d and unchanging The realm of the knowledge of math-ematics and the p h y s i c a l sciences i s u n i f i e d , yet subject t o change. The u n i t y of t h i s realm i s the product of the human i n t e l l e c t , of i t s tendency t o organize and manipulate the f l u x o f l i f e , reducing i t t o counter words. The ideas of t h i s realm, which Hulme b e l i e v e s t o be f i n i t e u n i t i e s , w i l l change when new f a c t s are introduced. The realm of l i f e i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d as a continuous s t a t e of f l u x o r change and i i i s not u n i f i e d . Hulme a s c r i b e s t o Bergson's theory t h a t man has two ways of o b t a i n i n g knowledge, by i n t u i t i o n and by i n t e l l e c t . I n t u i t i o n achieves a d i r e c t contact w i t h the f l u x , o b t a i n i n g an i n t e n s i v e mani-f o l d , i n which the p a r t s cannot.be separated. The i n t e l l e c t d i v i d e s t h i n g s i n t o p a r t s , o b t a i n i n g an extensive manifold. An awkwardness i n Hulme's metaphysics i s h i s b e l i e f i n O r i g i n a l S i n , which makes man a f i n i t e u n i t y . This d e f i n i t i o n o f man i s a c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f h i s b e l i e f t h a t l i f e i s f l u x and change. Whereas Hulme's metaphysics denies a s i n g l e u n i f i e d system of r e a l i t y , h i s a e s t h e t i c s p o s t u l a t e s the u n i t y . o f t h e a e s t h e t i c c r e a t i o n . Hulme begins w i t h a mechanistic conception o f a r t which he subsequently c o n t r a d i c t s completely. A r t occupies a unique p l a c e i n Hulme's thought, i n t h a t he allows i t a v i t a l u n i t y which i s i n c o n s i s t e n t w i t h any of the d e f i n i t i o n s of u n i t y brought out i n the d i s c u s s i o n of h i s metaphysics. Yet the l i f e - i n - d e a t h which Hulme allows a r t i s only temporary and w i l l decay i n t o commonplace. In the Cinders theory Hulme a s s e r t s t h a t p l u r a l i t y i s the nature of r e a l i t y and t h a t r e l a t i v i t y i s absolute. U n i t y i s impossible, an i l l u s i o n , on t h i s theory. Yet a work of a r t emerges .In t h i s d i s c u s s i o n as a u n i t y , i n which the- form contains the content completely. Hulme s t a t e s t h a t a r t creates another'"mystic" world. A r t would appear t o be the one u n i t y , b r i n g i n g t o g e t h e r ' a l l three realms, which according t o Hulme's metaphysics must be discontinuous. At the same time, the i i i e x i s t e n c e of a n . a r t i s t i c u n i t y , u n l i k e the absolute values of r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s , i s ephemeral. u The idea of u n i t y , i n the w r i t i n g s of T. E. Hulme, has d i f f e r e n t meanings i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION . 1 CHAPTER TWO: METAPHYSICS: THE LIMITS OF UNITY . . 8 CHAPTER THREE: AESTHETICS: THE VITAL" UNITY 33 CHAPTER FOUR: CINDERS: A GLIMPSE INTO ETERNITY . . 57 CONCLUSION: 79 . BIBLIOGRAPHY: 82 Because most o f the quotations i n t h i s paper are taken from the two books o f T. E. Hulme, Sp e c u l a t i o n s , and Further Specula- t i o n s , i t was considered a d v i s a b l e t o note the page references t o these books d i r e c t l y a f t e r the quotation. A l l other::references w i l l be c i t e d i n foo t n o t e s . The b i b l i o g r a p h i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n f o r Hulme 1s books i s : Hulme,, Thomas Er n e s t , Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , ed. Sam Hynes, Minneapolis, U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota P r e s s , 1955-Hulme, Thomas Er n e s t , S p e c u l a t i o n s , ed. Herbert Read, London, Kegan P a u l , Trench, Trubner and Co. L t d . , 192U-. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION The importance of Thomas Ernest Hulme t o the main stream of modern l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m i s s t i l l a matter of controversy. The s t u d i e s of him, whether exhaustive, such as Alun R. Jones' r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d The  L i f e and Opinions of T. E. Hulme, or more l i m i t e d , such as p e r i o d i c a l c o n t r i b u t i o n s , f a i l t o e s t a b l i s h any c o n s i s t e n t way of l o o k i n g at him. This i n c o n s i s t e n c y of viewpoint i s , perhaps, i n e v i t a b l e , i n view of the fragmentary nature of most of h i s notes and the l a c k of system they present t o even the most s c r u t i n i z i n g reader. Hulme emerges, i n Specu- l a t i o n s , and F u r t h e r ' S p e c u l a t i o n s, as an e n e r g e t i c p r o s e l y t i z e r , de-termined to enforce a p a r t i c u l a r world-view and w i l l i n g t o use the most aggressive methods t o do so. Even i n conversation, he was not above u s i n g knuckle-dusters to d r i v e home h i s argument (though i t must be noted t h a t even here h i s a e s t h e t i c sense p r e v a i l e d and the knuckle-dusters were carved by Gaudier-Brzeska, i n an a b s t r a c t d e s i g n ) 1 ; Jacob E p s t e i n r e p o r t s , i n his-Foreward t o S p e c u l a t i o n s , t h a t Hulme "was capable of k i c k i n g a theory as w e l l as a man downstairs when the occasion de-manded" . (S p e c u l a t i o n s , v i i . ) The f o r c e and bombast of Hulme 1 s writing,--what might be termed "The Knuckle-Duster method of C r i t i c i s m " - - c a n n o t alone account f o r the i n f l u e n c e t h a t at l e a s t c e r t a i n aspects of h i s thought have had on pro-minent modern w r i t e r s . Alun Jones' a s s e r t i o n t h a t Hulme " i s r e l a t e d Alun R. Jones, The L i f e and Opinions of T. E. Hulme, Boston, Beacon P r e s s , i960, p. 12 .^ t o the achievement of the f i r s t h a l f of the century i n much the same way as Coleridge i s r e l a t e d to the f i r s t h a l f of the nineteenth." might w e l l he taken, w i t h c e r t a i n r e s t r i c t i o n s , as the conclusion of a man who must j u s t i f y h i s own extensive endeavours on one t o p i c . On the o t h e r hand, Jones' statement contains at l e a s t p a r t of the t r u t h and h i s accuracy i s questionable mainly because of the vagueness of h i s g e n e r a l i z a t i o n . The l i s t of Hulme's pe r s o n a l contacts alone, the f a c t t h a t no l e s s a f i g u r e than Jacob E p s t e i n r e f e r s t o him as "my very great f r i e n d " (Specu- l a t i o n s , v i i . ) , and t h a t Henri Bergson can w r i t e , Ou j e me trompe beaucoup, ou i l est d e s t i n e a produire des oeuvres i n -teressantes et importantes dans l e domaine de l a p h i l o s o p h i e en g e n e r a l , et plus p a r t i c u l i e r e m e n t peut-etre dans c e l u i de l a p h i l o s o p h i e de l ' a r t . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , x.) merit a t t e n t i o n , and give an i n d i c a t i o n of Hulme's s t a t u r e . Furthermore, the i n f l u e n c e Hulme's ideas had on the thought, of T. S. E l i o t , and on the g u i d i n g p r i n c i p l e s of the Imagist movement, though at times d i s -puted, may be accepted w i t h . c e r t a i n t y . E l i o t and Hulme had no p e r s o n a l contact, but E l i o t was w e l l ac-quainted w i t h Hulme's w r i t i n g s . David Daiches w r i t e s i n The Present  Age t h a t ... i t was from Hulme t h a t E l i o t got much o f h i s c r i t i c a l and general thought. Alun R. Jones, The L i f e and Opinions of T. E. Hulme, Boston, Beacon Press, 19&0, p. 13-- 3 -We understand, t o o , the sources of E l i o t ' s c l a s s i c i s m i n l i t e r a t u r e , r o y a l i s m i n p o l i t i c s , and A n g l o - C a t h o l i c i s m i n r e l i g i o n ...when we examine the p a i r s of op-p o s i t e s which Hulme l i n e s up.3 Daiches' observation i s backed up by W. K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks who note t h a t "the p a r a l l e l s between h i s p o s i t i o n and E l i o t ' s are s t r i k i n g " ^ . Numerous other c r i t i c s p o i n t out the s i m i l a r i t i e s be-tween the two men, l a y i n g p a r t i c u l a r s t r e s s on the categories which Daiches mentioned, although i t must be pointed out t h a t Hulme never ' a f f i l i a t e d h i m s e l f w i t h an organized r e l i g i o n during h i s l i f e - t i m e . Hulme i s o f t e n considered to be "the f a t h e r of Imagism." Graham Hughes makes t h i s c l a i m f o r him i n Image and Experience. Indeed, the Imagist credo as quoted by Hughes'' i s Hulmian i n tone and content. Hughes r e p o r t s questioning " s e v e r a l " of the Imagist poets (the nucleus group c o n s i s t e d of R i c h a r d A l d i n g t o n , Amy L o w e l l , F. S. F l i n t , H i l d a D o o l i t t l e and John Gould F l e t c h e r ) as t o how much they were i n f l u e n c e d by Hulme and s t a t e s t h a t "they agree t h a t the i n f l u e n c e was considerable ..."^ The most dogmatic contradiction of Hulme's importance to the imagist movement«comes from Ezra Pound, who gives the l a u r e l t o Ford Madox Ford. o David Daiches, The Present Age, London, Cresset Press, ±95&> p. 123-k W.. K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, L i t e r a r y C r i t i c i s m A Short  H i s t o r y , New York, A. A. Knopf, 1962, p. 660. ^Glenn Hughes,. Imagism and the Imagists, Stan. U., 1931> PP- 39-^0. 6 I b i d . , p. 22. Pound w r i t e s i n This Hulme'Business: • .Without malice toward T. E. H. i t now seems advisable t o c o r r e c t a d i s t o r t i o n which can be found even i n p o r t l y works of reference. The c r i t i c a l LIGHT during the years immediately pre-war i n London shone not from Hulme, but from Ford (Madox etc.) i n so f a r as i t ' f e l l on w r i t i n g at a l l . R e cently, the South A t l a n t i c Q u a r t e r l y i n the iss u e s of Summer 1961 and Spring 1962 has c a r r i e d an argument between Alun Jones and F. MacShane, w i t h Jones a s s e r t i n g the l e a d e r s h i p o f Hulme, and MacShane g i v i n g most of the c r e d i t to Ford. I t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t the argument w i l l ever be s e t t l e d , and i t i s not of any r e a l importance t o t h i s paper. S u f f i c e i t t o say t h a t Hulme remains a f i g u r e t o contend w i t h i n any d i s c u s s i o n o f important modern l i t e r a r y movements and i s l i k e l y t o continue -to be so. His i n f l u e n c e on Wyndham Lewis i s discussed to some extent by Geoffrey Wagner, who p a r t i a l l y a t t r i b u t e s Lewis' ab-8 s t r a c t i o n i s m to h i s " i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h the teaching of T. E. Hulme." There i s , then, considerable evidence t h a t Hulme's i n f l u e n c e was exten s i v e , and, i n some cases, profound. But, o f gr e a t e r importance than the d i s c u s s i o n s on the extent o f Hulme's i n f l u e n c e , are the exam-i n a t i o n s of the ideas which c o n s t i t u t e d t h i s i n f l u e n c e . Such d i s c u s s i o n s have been most ably executed, i n the present w r i t e r ' s o p i n i o n , by Frank Quoted i n Hugh Kenner, The Poetry of E z r a Pound, London, Faber, 1951, P- 307. 8 Geoffrey Wagner, Wyndham Lewis: A P o r t r a i t of the A r t i s t as the  Enemy, London, Routledge & Kyan P a u l , 1957; P- 126. -5-Kermode i n The Romantic Image' and Murray K r i e g e r i n The Hew A p o l o g i s t s  f o r Poetry. Kermode's book i s a p r e s e n t a t i o n of the p r i n c i p l e s r e l a t i n g t o the p o e t i c image, concentrating p a r t i c u l a r l y , on the work of modern t h e o r i s t s and poets. Kermode p o i n t s out t h a t the b e l i e f i n the Image as "a r a d i a n t t r u t h out of time and.space," though b a s i c a l l y a Romantic n o t i o n , i s shared by Hulme despi t e h i s r i g o r o u s anti-Romantic a s s e r t i o n s . Murray K r i e g e r ' s work i s aimed at the d i s c o v e r y of "those c r u c i a l questions on the answers to which a systematic apology'^ f o r poetry de-pends. As an a e s t h e t i c i a n , K r i e g e r i s well-equipped;lto t a c k l e such a problem, and h i s examination of c e r t a i n major c r i t i c s and t h e i r r e l a t i o n to each ot h e r , as w e l l as h i s c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the key questions he sought t o d i s c o v e r , i s an i n v a l u a b l e guide t o any study of modern l i t e r a r y theory. His d i s c u s s i o n of Hulme i s d e t a i l e d and he i s able to d e l i n e a t e the d i s t i n c t i o n between Hulme and the Romantics, Coleridge p a r t i c u l a r l y , w h i l e at the same time p i c k i n g out t h e i r s i m i l a r i t i e s . .He i s a b l e , a l s o , t o convey an admiration f o r Hulme, while, simultaneously making c l e a r h i s inadequacies. • K r i e g e r places great importance on the r o l e Hulme gave to language i n the c r e a t i v e process, b e l i e v i n g "That the c r i t i c a l t h e o r i s t s who f o l l o w e d Hulme d i d not, i n t h e i r d i s c u s s i o n s of p o e t i c c r e a t i o n , adhere c o n s i s t e n t l y t o h i s new view does not l e s s e n the im-portance of h i s c o n t r i b u t i o n . " ^ ^Murray .Krieger, The Hew A p o l o g i s t s f o r Poetry,. Minneapolis, U n i v e r s i t y o f Minnesota P r e s s , 1956, p. 7-"^Murray K r i e g e r , The New A p o l o g i s t s f o r Poetry, Minneapolis, U n i v e r s i t y of Minnesota Press, 1956, p. 68. The view on Hulme which both Kermode and K r i e g e r share, a view which i s now w i d e l y accepted, i s t h a t , having s t a r t e d from a r i g i d l y d e f i n e d c l a s s i c a l p o s i t i o n , he e v e n t u a l l y works h i m s e l f i n t o a theory of a r t which i s romantic. In s p i t e o f the m o d i f i c a t i o n s from the o l d view which h i s theory contained, i t remains, nonetheless, romantic. This i s indeed damning c r i t i c i s m of Hulme, who objected "even t o the best of the romantics." ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 1 2 6 . ) . I t i s a l s o h i g h l y i r o n i c when one r e a l i z e s t h a t Hulme's r e b e l l i o n was d i r e c t e d against what he considered to be the romantic a t t i t u d e i n g e n e r a l , and i t s e f f e c t on l i t e r a r y out-put i n p a r t i c u l a r . I t would seem t h a t nothing f u r t h e r need be added to the a n a l y s i s of Hulme, t h a t r e - i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s unnecessary. But a more c r e a t i v e approach (and one which even Hulme would have approved o f ) i s to seek f r e s h v i e w p o i n t s , andyto recognize t h a t the subject o f Hulme i s f a r from exhausted. As the t i t l e i n d i c a t e s , t h i s p a p e r ' w i l l be devoted t o an ex-amination of Hulme's ha n d l i n g o f the concept of u n i t y . I hope t o e x p l a i n i n d e t a i l Hulme's a e s t h e t i c p r i n c i p l e s , p a r t i c u l a r l y h'isstheory of the image,' and t o show t h a t , i n g e n e r a l , these cannot be accounted f o r i n terms of h i s metaphysical statements. The problem of u n i t y i s c e n t r a l to modern thought, preoccupying the s c i e n t i s t , p s y c h o l o g i s t and l i t e r a r y c r i t i c a l i k e . A l l are searching f o r some b a s i c i r r e d u c i b l e u n i t o r u n i f i e d concept which w i l l enable them t o understand e x i s t e n c e and man's place i n i t . There are sometimes attempts made to g e n e r a l i z e , t o apply a seemingly u n i f i e d concept from one f i e l d of study t o another. In l i t e r a r y c r i t i c i s m , the b e l i e f t h a t a poem should be an organic u n i t y i s not e a s i l y given up and care i s u s u a l l y taken to account f o r i t . The idea of u n i t y was important t o Hulme and a good case can. be made f o r the f a c t that.he attempted t o organize h i s thought i n terms of the l i m i t s he allowed f o r u n i t y . I n other words, " u n i t y " may be considered .-the.'.key term i n an understanding of Hulme's thought. .Hulme's metaphysics i s the groundwork of t h i s study. There Hulme gives an i n d i c a t i o n o f what he means by u n i t y and defines the l i m i t s which he imposes on the concept. Hulme's metaphysics i s a r a t h e r i n -t r i c a t e and complex p a t t e r n of i d e a s , b u t , as i s revealed i n the f o l l o w -i n g chapter, Hulme's main concern here i s to e s t a b l i s h a framework which contains the spheres of knowledge and defines the p o s s i b i l i t i e s o f what man can know. The concept of u n i t y i s e s s e n t i a l t o the whole d i s c u s s i o n . - 8 -CHAPTER I I : METAPHYSICS: THE LIMITS OF UNITY T. E. Hulme defin e s philosophy simply: I t i s not a question of the u n i t y of the world and men afterwards put i n t o i t , but of human animals and of p h i l -osophies as an e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e i r a p p e t i t e s . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 230.) Philosophy i s an expression of what men want; i t depends more on the nature o f man, than on the e x t e r n a l world. Here i s the core of Hulme's outlook and the genesis of much of the ambiguity of h i s f u r t h e r s t a t e -ments on a r t and l i f e . Hulme's view of metaphysics i s the. i n e v i t a b l e consequence o f h i s general outlook. He recognizes two p o s s i b i l i t i e s f o r metaphysics. There are two aims t h a t metaphysics con- -c e i v a b l y might have. I t might wish t o be considered an a r t , a means of expressing c e r t a i n a t t i t u d e s to the cosmos, or i t might be taken as a science, humbly groping a f t e r the t r u t h . (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 16.) But i t i s not a science and t r u t h i s not i t s g o a l . Metaphysics i s an a r t and i t s p r a c t i t i o n e r an a r t i s t . In i t by work one can never d i s c o v e r the secret of the cosmos1, one merely f i n d s elaborate and complete ways of expressing one's pers o n a l a t t i t u d e towards i t . (Further Speculations-, l 8 . ) Again the emphasis i s on man, and not on the p o s s i b i l i t y o f u n i t y e x i s t -i n g i n the world. The p a r a l l e l o r equation t h a t Hulme draws here between metaphysics and a r t i s s i g n i f i c a n t . Much of h i s a e s t h e t i c s i s a d i r e c t d e r i v a t i v e of h i s metaphysics, and much of h i s confusion i n the l a t t e r f i e l d i s to be found i n . t h e former. The bases of both s t u d i e s are the .. • _ 9 -same, and" an understanding of Hulme's .metaphysics i s p r e r e q u i s i t e to an understanding o f . h i s a e s t h e t i c s . . To Hulme, the "base of both s t u d i e s i s the nature of man. He b e l i e v e s t h a t any philosophy, however e l a b o r a t e l y presented, i s merely a presenta-t i o n of what t h a t philosopher wants t o b e l i e v e , of what t o him i s s a t i s -f y i n g . Hulme gives an amusing metaphor f o r t h i s phenomenon by d e s c r i b i n g p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments as armour which impresses by i t s seeming omnipo-tence. I f one were t o see t h i s armour chasing a f t e r a l a d y , o r e a t i n g t a r t s i n the pantry, one would recognize a human being under i t . So i t i s w i t h philosophy; one recognizes the man i n the conclusions he draws i n the l a s t chapter of h i s book and the armour i s revealed to be but the c r e a t i o n o f h i s d e s i r e s . I f you ask what .corresponds to the pantry which betrayed the man i n • ' armour, I should ianswer t h a t i t was . the l a s t chapters of the philosophers i n which they-express t h e i r .conception of the world as i t r e a l l y i s , and so i n c i d e n t a l l y expose the t h i n g s w i t h which they are. s a t i s f i e d . How m a g n i f i c e n t l y they, may have been -c l a d b e f o r e , they come out naked here I ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 20.) What a man b e l i e v e s i s easy t o discover. The more b a s i c problem i s t o d i s c o v e r why he b e l i e v e s i t . Hulme deals w i t h t h i s problem under the heading of what he c a l l s the C r i t i q u e of S a t i s f a c t i o n . He makes h i s . C r i t i q u e serve two purposes. 'On the one hand i t exposes f a l s e h a b i t s cf thought, and on- the other, i t c l a r i f i e s what Hulme considers t o be the--10-t r u e source of s a t i s f a c t i o n . Having.asserted t h a t men employ p h i l o s o p h i c a l arguments t o j u s t i f y b e l i e f s t h a t unconsciously s a t i s f y them, Hulme goes on to analyze these b e l i e f s . They f u n c t i o n as c a t e g o r i e s , u s u a l l y unconsciously h e l d , through which man views phenomena,.and i n t o which he f i t s them. They are given by the age, and one i s aware of them only when they are denied. Other-wise, categories are h e l d as absolute; they s a t i s f y . I t should be n o t i c e d t h a t the canons of s a t i s f a c t i o n are q u i t e unconscious. The philosophers share a view of'what would be a s a t i s f y i n g d e s t i n y f o r man, which they take over from the Renais-sance. They are s a t i s f i e d w i t h c e r t a i n conceptions of the r e l a t i o n of man t o the world. These conclusions are never questioned i n t h i s respect. T h e i r t r u t h may be questioned, but never t h e i r sat-i s f a c t o r i n e s s . (Speculations, 17-) The canons of s a t i s f a c t i o n are a t t i t u d e s . The r a m i f i c a t i o n s o r exten-sions of them may be c o n t r o v e r s i a l , but never the b a s i c a t t i t u d e s them-se l v e s . His awareness of the f u n c t i o n of a t t i t u d e s leads Hulme to a s s e r t t h a t In s p i t e of i t s extreme d i v e r s i t y , a l l philosophy since the Renaissance i s at bottom the same philosophy. The f a m i l y resemblance i s much grea t e r than i s g e n e r a l l y supposed. The obvious d i v e r s i t y i s o n l y t h a t of the v a r i o u s species of the same genus. (Sp e c u l a t i o n s , 12.) Hulme' s r a t h e r vague o v e r - g e n e r a l i z a t i o n about " a l l philosophy since the Renaissance," i s brought about by h i s b e l i e f t h a t t h i s philosophy shares the same b a s i c a t t i t u d e , t h a t "the f i n a l p i c t u r e s they present of man's -11-r e l a t i o n to the world a l l conform to the same probably unconscious stan- dards or canons of what i s s a t i s f y i n g . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 16.) What pre-c i s e l y t h i s a t t i t u d e i s w i l l be discussed l a t e r . I t must be noted here, t h a t Hulme b e l i e v e d t h a t t h i s u n i t y of a t t i t u d e gave i t s c h a r a c t e r to a p e r i o d . H i s t o r y i s a study o f the changing p a t t e r n of a t t i t u d e s . (Specula- t i o n s , 36.) Through h i s t o r y /we are enabled t o glimpse the u n i t y of a t -t i t u d e which u n d e r l i e s each age. Most important, w i t h the use of the h i s t o r i c a l method, we are able to stand o u t s i d e our own age, and view i t s c a t e g o r i e s o b j e c t i v e l y . I t h i n k t h a t h i s t o r y i s necessary i n order t o emancipate the i n d i v i d u a l from the i n f l u e n c e of c e r t a i n pseudo-categories. We are a l l of, us under the i n f l u e n c e of a number c f a b s t r a c t i d e a s , of which we are as a matter of f a c t unconscious. : - • We do not see them, but see other t h i n g s through them. In order t h a t the k i n d of d i s c u s s i o n about ' s a t i s f a c t i o n ' which I want may be c a r r i e d on, i t i s f i r s t o f a l l necessary to rob c e r t a i n ideas of t h e i r s t a tus of c a t e g o r i e s . (Speculations, 37.) Whereas categ o r i e s had p r e v i o u s l y been the unquestioned b a s i s of any d i s c u s s i o n , they now become the subject discussed. Once o b j e c t i f i e d , c a t e g o r i e s l o s e t h e i r i n e v i t a b i l i t y . They cease t o be c a t e g o r i e s . • By an h i s t o r i c a l examination of d i f f e r e n t p e r i o d s , one comes to understand' t h a t the c a t e g o r i e s he holds are not n e c e s s a r i l y r i g h t , but simply a choice from a number of p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The two p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i t h which Hulme i s most concerned are the a t t i t u d e s of r e l i g i o n and humanism. . -12-Hulme's arguments thus f a r would seem to imply r e l a t i v i s m . But q u i t e the contrary i s t r u e . He a n t i c i p a t e s the charge and answers i t d i r e c t l y . ...the way i n which I have ex-plained- the a c t i o n of the c e n t r a l abs-t r a c t a t t i t u d e s and ways o f t h i n k i n g , and the use of the word pseudo-categories might suggest t h a t I h o l d r e l a t i v i s t views about t h e i r v a l i d i t y . But 1 don't. . I h o l d the - r e l i g i o u s conception of u l t i m a t e values t o be r i g h t , the humanist wrong. (Sp e c u l a t i o n s , 70.) The d i f f e r e n c e between the two a t t i t u d e s i s "simply the d i f f e r e n c e between t r u e and f a l s e . " ( S peculations, 55•) Hulme's aim i s to expose the f a l -l a c y of the humanistic p o s i t i o n and t o r e - e s t a b l i s h the r e l i g i o u s p o s i t i o n i n i t s stead; F i r s t i n the l i n e o f f i r e i s the humanist category of u n i t y . The idea of u n i t y or c o n t i n u i t y , the b e l i e f t h a t a l l aspects of r e a l i t y are continuous one from the other, r e d u c i b l e to a . u n i t y , i s inherent i n the humanistic p o s i t i o n . I t i s regarded as "an i n e v i t a b l e c o n s t i t u e n t of r e a l i t y i t s e l f . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 3«)» So s o l i d l y i s i t e s t a b l i s h e d i n "the humanistic p o s i t i o n t h a t f a c t s which tend t o deny i t . or-appear t o contra-d i c t i t are r e j e c t e d or re-examined i n the l i g h t of making them f i t . T h i s i s p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e i n what Hulme c a l l s "general t h e o r i e s about the nature-of r e a l i t y ! ' ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , h.).. The humanist wishes to encompass the whole of r e a l i t y i n a u n i f i e d scheme, wherein a known f a c t i n one area would be a p p l i c a b l e to a l l other areas. To the. humanist, r e a l i t y should be e x p l a i n a b l e on a s i n g l e ' t h e o r y ; everything should i n t e r p e n e t r a t e and synthesize. To Hulme, t h i s a t t i t u d e i s sheer nonsense.. His immediate purpose i s "...the re-establishment of the temper ©f d i s p o s i t i o n of mind -13-. which can loo k at a gap o r chasm without shuddering" (Speculations, h.). He would enforce the category of d i s c o n t i n u i t y . By denying c o n t i n u i t y , Hulme indeed denies the foundation of humanism. Without the foundation, the whole superstructure w i l l crumble. In i t s p l a c e w i l l go an e d i f i c e o f a d i f f e r e n t s o r t . As i s u s u a l i n h i s w r i t i n g , Hulme provides a v i s u a l image t o convey t o the reader h i s theory cf r e a l i t y . Let us assume t h a t r e a l i t y i s divided' i n t o three r e g i o n s , separated from one an-other by absolute d i v i s b n s , by r e a l d i s c o n t i n u i t i e s . ( l ) the i n o r g a n i c world, o f mathematical and p h y s i c a l science, (2) the organic w o r l d , d e a l t w i t h by b i o l o g y , psychology and h i s t o r y , and (3) the world o f e t h i c a l and r e l i -gious values. (Speculations, 5») These three regions are separated by absolute d i v i s i o n s ; they are absolu-t e l y d i s - u n i t e d . . The f i r s t and t h i r d regions are c h a r a c t e r i z e d by ab-s o l u t e knowledge, whereas the second r e g i o n , "the muddy mixed zone" of l i f e , w i l l y i e l d o n l y r e l a t i v e knowledge. In a s i g n i f i c a n t statement, Hulme a s s e r t s t h a t the two outer zones partake "of the p e r f e c t i o n of geometrical f i g u r e s " . The middle zone, though, i s to be h i s primary concern. I t i s e s s e n t i a l t o recognize the d i f f e r e n t types of knowledge which can be provided by these three realms. Hulme 1s scheme represents• a com-p l e t e break w i t h the humanist t r a d i t i o n and w i t h the romantic movement w i t h which he a s s o c i a t e s i t . The sacred cows of both are s l a i n together. The most c r i t i c a l . p o i n t on which he opposes them i s h i s i n s i s t e n c e on the absolute gap between r e l i g i o n and l i f e . Attempts had been made previously---; -14-by N i e t z s c h e , D i l t h e y , and Bergson (Speculations, 7-) --to separate l i f e and the p h y s i c a l s c i e n c e s , but they had not gone f a r enough f o r Hulme. They had made the f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n , but not the second, the d i s t i n c t i o n between r e l i g i o n and l i f e . The reason i s c l e a r , "For the f i r s t f a l l s e a s i l y i n t o l i n e w i t h humanism, w h i l e the second breaks the whole Renais-sance t r a d i t i o n . " ( S peculations, 8.)^, I t i s on t h i s p o i n t of the second d i s t i n c t i o n , then, t h a t Hulme takes h i s f i r m e s t stand. The method . he employs i n v o l v e s h o l d i n g "the r e a l nature of the absolute d i s c o n t i n u i t y between v i t a l and r e l i g i o u s t h i n g s c o n s t a n t l y before the mind." By means of t h i s method, Hulme hopes to 'destroy a l l "bastard pheno-mena" now e x i s t i n g and i n so doing to "re-cover the r e a l s i g n i f i c a n c e of many t h i n g s which i t seems a b s o l u t e l y impossible f o r the 'modern' mind to understand." (S p e c u l a t i o n s , 11.) To Hulme, the two most apparent "bastard phenomena," o f f s p r i n g s of the union between what t o him should be discontinuous, completely segregated realms, are the mechanistic view and the n o t i o n t h a t man can partake of p e r f e c t i o n . Heebelieves t h a t • mechanism i s the r e s u l t of the a p p l i c a t i o n of the absolute knowledge of mathematics and mathematical physics t o what he terms the " v i t a l " realm of l i f e . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 10.) In other words, the a p p l i c a t i o n o f s c i e n -t i f i c knowledge t o l i f e enables man t o describe l i f e i n terms of s c i e n -t i f i c a bsolutes, which r e s u l t s i n a complete d i s t o r t i o n of the nature of l i f e . P l a c i n g the absolute standards of r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s i n t o t h i s same " v i t a l " zone has r e s u l t e d i n the category of human p e r f e c t a b i l i t y . Hulme b e l i e v e s , t h a t r a t h e r than l e a v i n g the absolute of p e r f e c t i o n i n ' the r e l i g i o u s sphere where i t belongs, the Renaissance and post-Renais--15-sance p h i l o s o p h i e s have l e t i t penetrate the sphere o f l i f e , where i t i s made to .apply t o man. P e r s o n a l i t y and " a l l t h a t bunkum" f o l l o w . (Specu- l a t i o n s , 33.) C l e a r l y , i n s p i t e of Hulme's i n s i s t e n c e t h a t the gap between r e l i g i o n and l i f e was to be h i s more important emphasis, the t h r e a t of mechanism preoccupied him. I t i s l a r g e l y because o f Bergson's s o l u t i o n of the dilemma which mechanism posed t h a t Hulme a l i g n e d h i m s e l f so energetically .with him. Before reading Bergson, Hulme considered mechanism "the one t h i n g which overshadows everything e l s e i n an attempt t o get a s a t i s -f a c t o r y view of the cosmos!' (Sp e c u l a t i o n s , kQ.). Mechanism appears i n h i s notes as "a nightmare," "the o b s t a c l e which the s a i n t must surmount," "the awful f a c t , " and the "corpse of a 'dead world'." Bergson had given the l i f e back t o l i f e . And Hulme's r e l i e f neared ecstasy. I f e l t the e x h i l a r a t i o n t h a t comes w i t h the sudden change from a cramped •and contracted t o a f r e e and expanded s t a t e of .the same t h i n g . I t was an almost p h y s i c a l sense of e x h i l a r a t i o n , a sudden expansion, a k i n d of mental e x p l o s i o n . I t gave one the sense of giddiness t h a t comes w i t h a sudden l i f t i n g up t o a great h e i g h t . . One saw c l e a r l y i n pe r s p e c t i v e the shape of th i n g s which before had on l y been f e l t i n a muzzy k i n d of way. (Furt h e r ' S p e c u l a t i o n s , 29-30.) I t i s t o Bergson, then, t h a t Hulme gives the c r e d i t f o r • s u c c e s s f u l l y counteracting mechanism, and i t i s f o r t h i s reason, f e e l i n g t h a t one chasm has been e s t a b l i s h e d s e c u r e l y , t h a t he makes the r e c o g n i t i o n of the second chasm h i s c e n t r a l i s s u e . But Bergsonian metaphysics,, i t must -16-be remembered, i s Hulme's adopted l a n d , and he acknowledges h i s indebted-ness t o Bergson i n the f o r m u l a t i o n of h i s own metaphysics and a e s t h e t i c s . The second d i s t i n c t i o n remains c e n t r a l to Hulme's outlook. He accepts Bergson's d e f i n i t i o n o f the f i r s t d i s t i n c t i o n , the gap between l i f e and mathematical science, but i n s i s t s t h a t the second d i s t i n c t i o n be recog-n i z e d , the gap between r e l i g i o n and l i f e . Some of the p o i n t s he w i l l l a t e r make i n a e s t h e t i c s are based on h i s b e l i e f i n t h i s second gap. At the core o f the modern tendency t o r e j e c t o r be unaware of t h i s second gap, Hulme a s s e r t s , i s the complete i n a b i l i t y o f the modern mind to under-stand the nature of r e l i g i o n . So confused has the subject o f r e l i g i o n become, because of the c o n t i n u i t y t h a t has .been allowed between i t and l i f e , t h a t the essence of the subject . i s l o s t t o the modern understanding. The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of l i f e have been allowed t o f l o w i n t o r e l i g i o n and the i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n of the two realms has destroyed the r e l i g i o u s s p i r i t . Hulme maintains t h a t t h i s o verflow of l i f e i n t o r e l i g i o n began at the Renaissance. You get at t h a t time the appearance of a new a t t i t u d e which can be most br o a d l y described as an a t t i t u d e of acceptance to l i f e , as opposed to an . • a t t i t u d e o f r e n u n c i a t i o n . (Speculations , 25 •) I t i s p r e c i s e l y t h i s l i f e - a f f i r m i n g q u a l i t y which Hulme would remove from r e l i g i o n . For, to him, The d i v i n e i s not l i f e at i t s i n t e n -s e s t . I t contains i n a way an almost a n t i - v i t a l element; q u i t e d i f f e r e n t of course from the n o n - v i t a l character of the o u t s i d e p h y s i c a l r e g i o n . (Speculations, 8.) -17-By separating the v i t a l and the r e l i g i o u s , Hulme i s opposing the n o t i o n of progress which has been the consequence of t h e i r i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n . The r e l i g i o u s a t t i t u d e admits no progress. On the c o n t r a r y , i t con-centrates on the f i x i t y of man's l i m i t a t i o n s and gives him nowhere t o l o o k but t o the absolute standards of r e l i g i o n . L i f e i s a c l o s e d world. I t i s the c l o s i n g of a l l the roads, t h i s r e a l i z a t i o n of the t r a g i c s i g -n i f i c a n c e of l i f e , which .makes i t l e g i t i m a t e to c a l l a l l other a t t i t u d e s shallow...most conveniently remembered by the symbol of the wheel. (S p e c u l a t i o n s , 3^.) Humanism,,by c o n t r a s t , leaves a l l - roads open. You d i s g u i s e the wheel by making i t . run up an i n c l i n e d plane; i t then be-comes 'Progress', which i s the modern s u b s t i t u t e f o r r e l i g i o n . ( S p eculations , 35 •) ' Hulme i s l e a d i n g s t r a i g h t t o h i s c e n t r a l p o i n t about r e l i g i o n . Hulme's a n a l y s i s of the nature of r e l i g i o n p i v o t s e x a c t l y on dogma. I am not...concerned so much •with r e l i g i o n , as w i t h the a t t i t u d e , the 'way of t h i n k i n g ' , the c a t e g o r i e s , from which a r e l i g i o n s p r i n g s , and which o f t e n survive' i t . While t h i s a t t i t u d e tends t o f i n d expression i n myth, i t i s independent of myth; i t is...much more i n t i m a t e l y con-nected w i t h dogma. (Spe c u l a t i o n s , k6.) The dogmas of r e l i g i o n assume the p o s i t i o n of c a t e g o r i e s , but because they are r e l i g i o u s , t o Hulme they are t r u e . They are "the c l o s e s t expression of the c a t e g o r i e s of the r e l i g i o u s s p i r i t . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 71•) The p a r t i c u l a r dogma to which Hulme gives h i s most f e r v e n t endorsement, and -18- . w i t h which h i s name i s o f t e n connected, i s O r i g i n a l S i n . Because o f ' h i s a l l e g i a n c e t o the category of O r i g i n a l S i n , Hulme i s l e d t o h i s r i g i d de-f i n i t i o n o f the nature of man, a d e f i n i t i o n which i t i s sometimes d i f -f i c u l t t o make c o n s i s t e n t w i t h other aspects of h i s thought. To Hulme, the nature of man i s a s t a t i c u n i t y . H i s t o r y provides no evidence of human progress, "but presents i n s t e a d a kaleidoscope of a t t i -tudes which b r i n g man i n t o d i f f e r e n t p e r s p e c t i v e s . Man does not change; ca t e g o r i e s concerning man do. The absolute f i x i t y of human nature i s s i g n i f i c a n t to Hulme. I do not imagine t h a t men themselves w i l l change i n any way. Men d i f f e r very l i t t l e i n every p e r i o d . I t i s only our cat e g o r i e s t h a t change...this con-stancy of man thus provides perhaps the gre a t e s t hope of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a r a d i c a l t r a n s f o r m a t i o n of s o c i e t y . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 58.) The conclusions t o be drawn from t h i s b e l i e f of Hulme's are obvious. I f man i s a s t a t i c e n t i t y , then only one a t t i t u d e about him can be c o r r e c t . A l l other p o s s i b l e a t t i t u d e s which h i s t o r y has put f o r t h must be d i s -carded i n favour of t h i s t r u t h . W i t h i n the scheme of r e a l i t y which Hulme has drawn, the p o s s i b i l i t i e s are already l i m i t e d . - I t remains o n l y f o r Hulme t o c l a s s i f y man e x a c t l y . His c l a s s i f i c a t i o n w i l l n a t u r a l l y f a l l i n t o accord w i t h the r e l i g i o u s a t t i t u d e . Although Hulme b e l i e v e s t h a t man i s a u n i t y , he defines t h i s u n i t y as being l i m i t e d . As has already been p o i n t e d out, Hulme w i l l not a l l o w g e n e r a l i z a t i o n from the region of absolute values t o the region of l i f e . -19-The reverse process i s s i m i l a r l y impossible. Complete d i s c o n t i n u i t y must e x i s t between both realms. In the l i g h t of these absolute v a l u e s , man h i m s e l f i s judged t o be e s s e n t i a l l y l i m i t e d and imperfect. He i s endowed w i t h O r i g i n a l S i n . While he can occasion-a l l y accomplish a c t s which partake of p e r f e c t i o n , he can never h i m s e l f be p e r f e c t . C e r t a i n secondary r e s u l t s i n regard t o o r d i n a r y human a c t i o n i n s o c i e t y f o l l o w from t h i s . A man i s essen-t i a l l y bad, he can' only accomplish anything of value by d i s c i p l i n e - - e t h i c a l and p o l i t i c a l . Order i s thus not merely n e g a t i v e , but c r e a t i v e and l i b e r -a t i n g . I n s t i t u t i o n s are necessary. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , kj.) Apart from the a u t h o r i t a r i a n overtones which are inherent i n Hulme's de-f i n i t i o n o f man, there are many i m p l i c a t i o n s here which are c e n t r a l to h i s thought as a whole, and to the subject of u n i t y as an aspect of h i s thought. H i s r e c o g n i t i o n and acceptance of c e r t a i n absolute values-or standards, such as p e r f e c t i o n , which e x i s t apart from man, and h i s dogmatic i n s i s t e n c e on man's unchanging, yet u n i f i e d , nature are c o n s i s t e n t l y h e l d f e a t u r e s of h i s thought. The d i f f e r e n c e between h i s a r b i t r a r i l y d e f i n e d • h i s t o r i c a l p e r i o d s , "from Augustine, say, to the Renaissance" and "from the Renaissance to now" i s "fundamentally nothing but the d i f f e r e n c e be-tween these two conceptions of man-." (Speculations , 50.) The former p e r i o d accepted O r i g i n a l S i n ; the l a t t e r r e j e c t e d i t . The b a s i s of Romanticism i s a l s o t o be found i n the Romantics' i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n o f man. T h i s , t o Hulme, of course, i s t h e i r b a s i c mistake. -20-Here i s the root of a l l romanticism: that man, the i n d i v i d u a l , i s an i n f i n i t e r e s e r v o i r of p o s s i b i l i t i e s ; and i f you can so rearrange s o c i e t y by the d e s t r u c t i o n of oppressive order then these p o s s i b i l i t i e s w i l l have a chance and you get Progress. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , l l 6 . ) Hulme has already shown, to h i s own s a t i s f a c t i o n at l e a s t , t h a t a b e l i e f i n progress i s f a l s e , and here he. endeavours to prove t h a t i t s immediate source i s a l s o wrong. Hulme's arguments o f t e n i n v o l v e l i t t l e e l s e than negation and a f f i r m a t i o n . He o f t e n does l i t t l e e l s e than s t a t e that one a t t i t u d e i s wrong, another r i g h t . He apparently hopes to persuade by f o r c e . • So a f t e r negating the Romantic a t t i t u d e , Hulme-affirms the C l a s -s i c a l , the view that-"Man i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y f i x e d and l i m i t e d animal whose nature i s a b s o l u t e l y constant. I t i s only by t r a d i t i o n and o r g a n i -z a t i o n t h a t anything decent can be got put of him-." (Speculations, 116.) Man i s f i n i t e and f i x e d . He i s a f i n i t e u n i t y . He e x i s t s i n the "muddy .•mixed zone" of l i f e , i n complete d i s j u n c t i o n from e i t h e r realm of absolute .knowledge. Any other v i s i o n o f him, one t h a t f a i l s t o accept the gap between the v i t a l zone i n which man e x i s t s , and the outer two zones, i s wrong t o Hulme, s e r v i n g only to obscure t h e ' e s s e n t i a l nature of the -human c o n d i t i o n . The f a t a l f l a w of Romanticism as f a r as Hulme i s con-cerned i s t h a t i t ignores .the gap between r e l i g i o n and l i f e . The concepts t h a t are r i g h t and pro-per i n t h e i r ,own sphere are spread over, and so mess up, f a l s i f y and b l u r the c l e a r o u t l i n e s o f human experience. ...Romanticism then, and t h i s i s the best d e f i n i t i o n ' I can give of i t , i s s p i l t r e l i g i o n . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , l l 8 . ) Hulme would have everything w i t h i n i t s proper boundaries, a l l o w i n g no -21-t r e s p a s s i n g between realms. Hulme's f i x i n g o f the nature of man w i t h i n the boundaries of the v i t a l zone i s the key p o i n t i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of philosophy. As was noted at the beginning of t h i s chapter, t o Hulme the nature of man i s the mainspring of any philosophy. The f i x i t y of t h i s nature i s con-s t a n t l y r e i t e r a t e d i n Hulme's notes. Motives are the o n l y u n a l t e r a b l e and f i x e d t h i n g s i n the world. They extend to the animal kingdom. They are the only rock: p h y s i c a l bases change. They are more than human motives; they are the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the world. (Speculations , 233•) Motives are the . " c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the world"; they c o n s t i t u t e the way men l o o k at the world. And men l o o k at the world i n a u n i f i e d way. Philosophy i s not an expression of t r u t h ; i t i s a complete expression of a p e r s o n a l a t t i t u d e t o the world. The emphasis i s on the'word "com-p l e t e . " Completion i m p l i e s u n i t y . The b a s i c motive of man then i s t o see the world i n a u n i f i e d way. ' The apparent s c i e n t i f i c u n i t y of the world may be due t o the f a c t t h a t man i s a k i n d of s o r t i n g machine. (Speculations , 228.) I f man i s f i n i t e , then h i s expressions must a l s o be f i n i t e . I f man i s u n i f i e d , then h i s philosophy must a l s o be a u n i t y . . Philosophy, then, i s the working out of a u n i f i e d method of expression. Unity, i s the e s s e n t i a l q u a l i t y t o seek i n a philosophy. "The p r i n c i p a l c r i t e r i o n , i s then, i s i t a c o n s i s t e n t whole?" (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 20.) But a d i s t i n c t i o n must be made between the a t t i t u d e -22-expressed and the means employed t o express i t . Hulme i s l e d here t o d i s t i n g u i s h between Weltanschauung and Pure Philosophy. For Hulme WeItanschauung i s the a t t i t u d e t h a t a p h i l o s o p h e r wants to express, the category he d e s i r e s t o f i x . In Hulme's scheme t h i s must n e c e s s a r i l y be subject to l i m i t s . I t w i l l be concerned s o l e l y w i t h the v i t a l zone. I t w i l l be s u b j e c t i v e , a p e r s o n a l expression. Pure Philosophy, on the other hand,•"ought t o be, and may be, e n t i r e l y o b j e c t i v e and s c i e n t i f i c . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , l 8 . ) Or, " . . . i n the case of philosophy the s c i e n t i f i c terminology i s the means by which we c o n t r o l o u r s e l v e s , i . e . , by which we completely express ourselves." (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 19-) By equating completion w i t h c o n t r o l , Hulme i n d i c a t e s how a r b i t r a r y h i s d e f i n i t i o n of u n i t y i s . The philosopher deals w i t h f i n i t e o b j e c t s or ideas, h i s expression i s s u b l e t to the c o n t r o l s of language, and the r e s u l t a n t philosophy can only be a l i m i t e d u n i t y . But I should be the f i r s t t o a t t a c k the P h i l i s t i n e who thought he could dismiss t h i s r i t u a l terminology by saying t h a t i t corresponded t o no r e a l i t y . I t i s the f i n e s t and most d e l i c a t e l y wrought language and means of expression . of a l l the a r t s . I t s elaborate technique enables i t t o get a l e i s u r e -l y e f f e c t o f f i n a l statement where the other a r t s can only h i n t . I t i s the a r t of completion. The s e r i e s of graduated words and d e f i n i t i o n s , the elaborate • b a l a n c i n g and checking of. meanings make i t p o s s i b l e t o i s o l a t e an emotion or idea from a l l a c c i d e n t a l r e l a t i o n s , so t o study i t completely. The jargon i s a w a l l e d garden which enables mean-ings t o grow t o t h e i r f u l l e xpression, or t o use a l e s s sentimental metaphor, -23-i t i s a k i n d of experimental tank, a l a b o r a t o r y where one can p r a c t i s e ' c o n t r o l ' experiments on i d e a s . (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 19-) P h i l o s o p h i c a l language enables one to see an idea i n a l l i t s f i n i t u d e . I t provides f o r p r e c i s i o n and e x a c t i t u d e i n the d e l i n e a t i o n of a f i n i t e e n t i t y . . I t presents a p a r t i c u l a r i n a u n i f i e d way. To expect of i t t h a t i t a l s o present Truth i s absurd. I n doing so One i s e x t r a p o l a t i n g the curve of t r u t h outside i t s proper l i m i t s , ap-p l y i n g i t to f i e l d s where i t has no meaning. A l l philosophy i s bound t o be untrue, f o r i t i s the a r t of rep-r e s e n t i n g the cosmos i n words, which i s j u s t as much a necessary d i s t o r t i o n as the a r t of p a i n t i n g , which represents s o l i d i t y i n a plane of two dimensions. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 20.) Truth i s meaningless i n the v i t a l zone of l i f e . I t has s i g n i f i c a n c e o n l y i n the realm of r e l i g i o n . Truth i s contained only i n r e l i g i o u s dogma. I t i s easy to see, now, why Hulme condemns the Romantics. They search f o r t r u t h i n l i f e . In Romanticism, "You have the metaphysics which i n d e f i n i n g beauty o r the nature of a r t always drags i n the i n f i n i t e - . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 31-) But man, to Hulme, i s l i m i t e d and f i n i t e and h i s c r e a t i o n w i l l be e q u a l l y so. Yet Hulme i s w i l l i n g t o extend t o c e r t a i n r a r e i n d i v i d u a l s g r e a t e r p e r c e p t i o n than i s u s u a l . The p h i l o s o p h e r i s able to probe more deeply i n t o the chaos of our existence and t o c l a r i f y c e r t a i n aspects of i t . -2k-Or perhaps a more c o r r e c t metaphor would he t o say t h a t out of the muddy stream o f our own thoughts the p h i l o s -opher dives i n and d r i e s on the hank i n t o a d e f i n i t e and f i x e d shape the idea t h a t i n our own mind was hut muddy, t r a n s i e n t , and confused. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 37-) The philosopher c l a r i f i e s c e r t a i n f i n i t e p a r t i c l e s of r e a l i t y , b r i n g -i n g them' i n t o sharper focus. He deals d i r e c t l y w i t h the i d e a , separa-t i n g i t o f f i n i t s exactness from the surrounding•chaos. He makes an i d e a d i s t i n c t . To do so, he must circumscribe i t i n language, and "dry" i t . The philosopher's c r e a t i o n , l i k e r e l i g i o n , i s a n t i - v i t a l . I t i s a dead world, superimposed on the l i v e world. I t i s i n t h i s dead world t h a t men are conscious. Consciousness i t s e l f i s a n t i - v i t a l . . At t h i s p o i n t , Hulme's metaphysics can be f i n a l l y c l a r i f i e d . The three discontinuous realms of r e a l i t y represent the framework of h i s thought. The realm of r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s c o n s t i t u t e s absolute value: ...a s a t i s f y i n g e t h i c not only looks on values as o b j e c t i v e , but e s t a b l i s h e s an order or h i e r a r c h y among such v a l u e s , which i t a l s o re-gards as absolute and o b j e c t i v e . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 62.) T h i s realm i s independent of l i f e . I t i s s t a t i c and unchangeable. The realm of p h y s i c a l science i s a l s o c h a r a c t e r i z e d by o b j e c t i v e knowledge, but t h i s knowledge i s of a d i f f e r e n t order than t h a t of the inner realm. I t i s d e r i v e d from the study and manipulation of the f i x e d shapes and s t t i c - i d e a s which are used to describe p h y s i c a l phenomena. In a sense, -25-th. i s knowledge i s absol u t e , hut a r b i t r a r y . I t i s subject t o change when new f a c t s become f i x e d , thus destr o y i n g a p r e - e x i s t i n g , u n i t y o f per c e p t i o n . But i n the meantime, such knowledge can j u s t l y be c a l l e d absolute. The middle realm,' i n c o n t r a s t , i s i n . a c o n t i n u a l s t a t e . o f . f l u x . Hulme's conception o f the realm o f p h y s i c a l science and the realm of l i f e openly p a r a l l e l s Bergson 1s metaphysic. His d e f i n i t i o n of the nature o f r e a l i t y i s Bergsonian. (Speculations, lk-6.) I have had to suppose a r e a l i t y of i n -f i n i t e v a r i a b i l i t y , and one t h a t escapes a l l the stock perceptions-, without being able t o give any a c t u a l account of t h a t r e a l i t y . I have had t o suppose t h a t human p e r c e p t i o n gets c r y s t a l l i s e d out along c e r t a i n l i n e s , t h a t i t has c e r t a i n f i x e d h a b i t s , c e r t a i n f i x e d ways of seeing t h i n g s , and so i s unable to see th i n g s as they are. (Speculations, lk^-lk6.) The reason f o r man's " c r y s t a l l i s e d " p e r c e p t i o n and f i x e d h a b i t s i s h i s n e c e s s i t y f o r a c t i o n . Man's primary need i s not knowledge but action.' The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the i n t e l l e c t i t s e l f Bergson deduces from t h i s f a c t . The f u n c t i o n of the i n t e l l e c t i s so t o present t h i n g s not t h a t we may most thoroughly understand them, but t h a t we may s u c c e s s f u l l y act on them. Everything i n man i s dominated by h i s n e c e s s i t y of a c t i o n . (Speculations, 14-7.) Man's i n t e l l e c t i s a necessary consequence o f h i s need f o r a c t i o n . I f men were not con d i t i o n e d by t h i s need they would n o t . c o n c e p t u a l i z e , o r f i x c e r t a i n phenomena. -26-The f i x e d - shapes'or concepts w i t h which man t h i n k s , and hy which he a c t s , are d e r i v e d from e x t e r n a l phenomena, from patt e r n s o f f l u x , and from i n t e r n a l s t a t e s . Once conceptualized, they become categ o r i e s of our thought and dim our t r u e p e r c e p t i o n . - We no longer perceive t h i n g s as they are, "but only c e r t a i n conventional types." (Speculations, 1^7.) These conventional types stand i n the way not only of a d i r e c t percep-t i o n of the e x t e r n a l world, but a l s o o f a d i r e c t p e r c e p t i o n of i n t e r n a l s t a t e s . Having only c e r t a i n ways of re c o g n i z i n g our emotions, we no longer f e e l them d i s t i n c t l y . P erception i s reduced to the terms of cer-t a i n f i x e d types. We per c e i v e t h i n g s not as they are, but under the l a b e l of t h e i r type. • "As we not only express ourselves i n words, but f o r the most p a r t t h i n k a l s o i n them, i t comes about t h a t not only do we not express more than the impersonal element of an emotion, but t h a t we do not, as a matter of f a c t , p e r c e i v e more. The average person as d i s t i n c t from the a r t i s t does not even perceive the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of t h e i r [ s i c ] own emotions." (S p e c u l a t i o n s , l 6 6 . ) The d i s t i n c t i o n Hulme makes here i s between the s t a t i c c l a s s i f i c a t i o n o f the i n t e l l e c t and the t r u e nature of l i f e . The i n t e l l e c t has l i t t l e or nothing to do w i t h r e a l i t y . I t paves roads so t h a t man can make h i s way. The separation between i n t e l l e c t and r e a l i t y i s the separation be-tween what Hulme, f o l l o w i n g Bergson, c a l l s "extensive" and " i n t e n s i v e manifolds." The i n t e l l e c t s e i z e s the extensive manifold, examines and analyses i t . I t d i v i d e s t h i n g s i n t o p a r t s . I t seems then t h a t the i n t e l l e c t d i s t o r t s r e a l i t y ( i f i t does d i s t o r t i t ) because i t p e r s i s t s i n u n f o l d i n g t h i n g s out i n space. I t i s not s a t i s f i e d unless -27-i t can see every p a r t . I t wants t o form a p i c t u r e . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 178.) The i n t e l l e c t does not de a l d i r e c t l y w i t h r e a l i t y . I t deals w i t h the dead cate g o r i e s which have been set up t o cope w i t h r e a l i t y . There must, then, be another mode o f knowledge which deals d i r e c t l y w i t h the f l u x . This mode of knowledge i s i n t u i t i o n . . . . i n t u i t i o n can be def i n e d as. the method o f knowledge by which we se i z e an i n t e n s i v e m a n i f o l d , a t h i n g a b s o l u t e l y u n s e i z a b l e by the i n t e l l e c t . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , • 179•) An i n t e n s i v e manifold i s the f l u x i t s e l f . I t i s ...an absolute i n t e r p e n e t r a t i o n - -a complex t h i n g which yet cannot be s a i d to have p a r t s because the p a r t s run i n t o each ot h e r , forming a c o n t i n -uous whole, and whose p a r t s cannot even be conceived as e x i s t i n g s e p a r a t e l y . I t has d i f f e r e n c e s , but these d i f f e r -ences could not be numbered. I t could not t h e r e f o r e be called.a"' q u a n t i t a t i v e m u l t i p l i c i t y , but a q u a l i t a t i v e one. : ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , l 8 l . ) The i n t e n s i v e manifold can a l s o be equated w i t h emotional s t a t e s , where There are no c l e a r l y o u t l i n e d and separated s t a t e s ; i n f a c t there are no separate s t a t e s of mind at a l l : each s t a t e fades away i n t o and i n t e r -penetrates the next s t a t e . (Speculations , iQk.) B a s i c a l l y , Hulme b e l i e v e s t h a t the whole zone of l i f e i s i n a s t a t e of f l u x . A c t i o n depends on the i n t e l l e c t to cat e g o r i z e c e r t a i n aspects o f the f l u x . The categ o r i e s o f the i n t e l l e c t have no r e a l r e l a t i o n to the f l u x i t s e l f . They are a r b i t r a r y o u t l i n e s imposed on the f l u x , deaden--28-i n g i t i n c e r t a i n s e c t i o n s . Categories are necessary, "because man must tie able to perceive l i f e i n an organized way, so t h a t he may.act; they are the t o o l s w i t h which man manipulates the f l u x . However, categories are not true.. The gradual conclusions on the whole matter (and only as a conclusion) i s t h a t language puts t h i n g s i n a stereo-typed form. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 167.) Language then i s a r b i t r a r y . I t i s composed of the dead forms dragged up out of the f l u x of r e a l i t y . I t i s the s o l i d subject matter of the realm of p h y s i c a l science and mathematics. Language is_ the ideas i n t h i s realm. There are important p a r a l l e l s between the language-flux d i s t i n c -t i o n j u s t d escribed and. the m a t t e r - l i f e - i m p u l s e d i s t i n c t i o n which Hulme b e l i e v e s t o be the c e n t r a l p o i n t of Bergson's philosophy. Bergson countered the theory of mechanism, which--assumed, t h a t a l l n a t u r a l phenomena can be submitted to a n a l y s i s and d i s s e c t i o n , w i t h h i s theory t h a t there are two main streams of l i f e , one which can be understood by the i n t e l l e c t , the other being understood by i n t u i t i o n . ( c f : S p e c u l a t i o n s , 173-174.) I t i s u s e l e s s then to dream of one science of nature, f o r there must be two -- one d e a l i n g w i t h matter which w i l l be b u i l t up by the i n t e l l e c t , and the other d e a l i n g w i t h c e r t a i n aspects of l i f e which w i l l employ i n t u i t i o n . ( S p eculations, 174.) There w i l l be two separate s t u d i e s according t o Bergson's theory:. one of extensive manifolds, the other of i n t e n s i v e manifolds. The other aspect of Bergson's view, which i s adopted by Hulme, and has p a r t i c u l a r -29-relevance i n h i s a e s t h e t i c theory, i s the theory o f . e v o l u t i o n . Bergson b e l i e v e d t h a t the fact'"of e v o l u t i o n could only be accounted f o r by as-suming t h a t there i s an o r i g i n a l l i f e - i m p u l s e ('elan, v i t a l ) which must st r u g g l e t o work i t s e l f out through matter, u n t i l i t g r a d u a l l y becomes' embedded i n i t , thus producing the d e f i n i t e shapes which we recognize as the products of e v o l u t i o n . What matter does i s t o separate out d i s t i n c t l y i n t o separate elements the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s which i n the o r i g i n a l impulse were i n t e r p e n e t r a t e d . E v o l u t i o n then i s not a process of o r g a n i z a t i o n , of b u i l d i n g - up, but. one of d i s s o c i a t i o n . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 20k.) Matter f u n c t i o n s i n the same ca p a c i t y as language. The l i f e - i m p u l s e i s f l u x . . Or, The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of matter i s nec-e s s i t y . The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the impulse which has produced l i f e i s , on the c o n t r a r y , a f r e e c r e a t i v e a c t -i v i t y . The process of e v o l u t i o n can only be described- as the i n s e r t i o n of more and more freedom i n t o matter. (Speculations, 208.) I n view of what has already been s a i d about Hulme's d e f i n i t i o n of the r e l a t i o n o f language t o the f l u x of l i f e , i t i s r e l a t i v e l y simple to f i n d the s i m i l a r i t i e s betwean t h a t d e f i n i t i o n and h i s r e l a t i o n , here, of Bergson's theory of e v o l u t i o n . Language, l i k e matter, breaks down and c o n t r o l s the f l u x , but e x i s t s apart from i t . As was p o i n t e d out p r e v i o u s l y , language c o n s t i t u t e s the ideas of the sphere of mathematical sciences. Hulme's i n s i s t e n c e on the r e c o g n i t i o n of an absolute chasm -30-b.etween language, and l i f e must be kept i n mind, p a r t i c u l a r l y when, as w i l l become apparent i n chapter two, he ignores t h i s chasm h i m s e l f i n h i s a e s t h e t i c s . Since the Bergsonian theory of e v o l u t i o n has d e f i n i t e a p p l i c a t i o n to Hulme's thought, i t must be c l o s e l y examined. I f , t o Bergson, the l i f e - i m p u l s e i s pure f l u x and i f f l u x i s the nature of r e a l i t y , then matter must p l a y a subordinate r o l e , merely d e f i n i n g the f l u x at c e r t a i n p o i n t s . But even i n t h a t case, matter would have t o be more c l o s e l y r e -l a t e d to f l u x than Bergson would seem .to a l l o w . R. G. Collingwood t r e a t s t h i s ambiguity i n Bergson's theory s u c c i n c t l y . -T his i m p l i e s one of two t h i n g s : e i t h e r t h a t the cause of these o b s t r u c t i o n s and r a m i f i c a t i o n s i s inherent i n the l i f e - f o r c e i t s e l f , o r t h a t t h i s cause • i s something other than l i f e . The f i r s t a l t e r n a t i v e i s r u l e d out by Bergson's conception of l i f e as pure a c t i v i t y , sheer i n f i n i t e p o s i t i v e e*lan. We are t h e r e f o r e thrown back on the second, and compelled t o t h i n k of t h i s cause as something r e a l i n i t s own r i g h t , an o b s t r u c t i o n to the f l o w of l i f e ; i n s h o r t , a m a t e r i a l world i n which l i f e develops and by whose agency the work-ings of l i f e are conditioned; i n a word, we come back to the idea of matter as the stage on which l i f e p l a y s i t s p a r t . This i s . the v i c i o u s c i r c l e of Bergson's cosmology: o s t e n s i b l y he regards matter as a by-product of l i f e , but a c t u a l l y he cannot e x p l a i n how t h a t o r any other s p e c i a l by-product can a r i s e without presupposing, alongside of and indeed p r i o r t o l i f e , matter i t s e l f . •—R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of Mature, Oxford, Clarendon P r e s s , 191+5, p. ibo. -31-This i s a l s o Hulme's " v i c i o u s c i r c l e . " He a s s e r t s t h a t language i s dead, f i x e d , a n t i - v i t a l , an extensive m a n i f o l d , but he i s u l t i m a t e l y unable t o t r e a t i t as such. E v e n t u a l l y , as w i l l be revealed i n the chapter on Hulme's a e s t h e t i c s , he t r e a t s language as an i n t e n s i v e manifold. Hulme's metaphysical outlook i s based on the t o t a l d e s t r u c t i o n of the idea of c o n t i n u i t y or one a l l - p e r v a s i v e u n i t y . In place of a s i n g l e u n i f i e d system, he presents a t r i p l e s t r u c t u r e , i n which each realm i s d i f f e r e n t . The realm of e t h i c a l and r e l i g i o u s values i s u n i f i e d , a l -though Hulme i s not c l e a r i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of t h i s u n i t y , apart from s t a t i n g t h a t i t i s unchanging and absolute. The realm of mathematical knowledge i s a l s o a u n i t y , absolute, yet subject t o change. This realm i s the c r e a t i o n of man, of h i s need t o organize and manipulate l i f e . I t i s a dead world. The world of l i f e , i n which man e x i s t s , i s i n a c o n t i n u a l s t a t e of f l u x and change,- and can i n no way be s a i d to be u n i f i e d . T h e ' a d d i t i o n a l f a c t , t h a t man.also i s a u n i t y to Hulme, needs f u r t h e r examination, f o r i t represents an ambiguity i n h i s thought. Hulme's i n -t e r p r e t a t i o n of the meaning of O r i g i n a l S i n i s never c l e a r l y d e f i n e d by him, but he seems to b e l i e v e t h a t i t i m p l i e s t h a t man i s b a s i c a l l y e v i l , f i n i t e and l i m i t e d . Yet man e x i s t s i n the changing world of f l u x . Why then should he not be subject to change? Hulme had at l e a s t a momen-t a r y awareness of t h i s awkwardness i n h i s theory. In a b r i e f note i n -32- . . Cinders, he wonders why he has accepted "Person" as a unity, why the l i n e i s "drawn exactly there i n the discussion of counter worlds." (Speculations, 233 •) .This i s the only indication he has given of a recognition on his part that h is r i g i d and uncompromising d e f i n i t i o n of man was at odds with h i s equally r i g i d insistence that the realm of l i f e i s i n a constant state of movement and change. In the i n -terests of consistency, Hulme should have allowed man to he part of the f l u x which surrounds.him. As i t i s , his b e l i e f • i n ' O r i g i n a l Sin remains an awkward and unresolved problem. Hulme has, f i g u r a t i v e l y speaking, k i l l e d man, made him s t a t i c , a counter-word, • so that he could enforce h is b e l i e f i n O r i g i n a l Sin. His b e l i e f i n O r i g i n a l Sin i s i n direct contradiction of his acceptance of Bergsonian metaphysics. Man's f i n i t e and l i m i t e d nature i s of considerable importance to certain as-pects of Hulme's aesthetic theory, so t h i s p a r t i c u l a r confusion i n hi s thought needed c l a r i f y i n g here. To Hulme, there can be no one law that w i l l explain l i f e . L i f e i s a closed world of i n f i n i t e v a r i a b i l i t y i n which man acts by virtue of certain categories which enable him to conceive the f l u x i n certain s t a t i c patterns. These patterns, or philosophies, represent u n i t i e s , but they have no r e a l r e l a t i o n to l i f e . Man himself, being f i x e d , i s a unity. Unity, then, can only exist i n certain f i n i t e things, and i s r e a l l y only a function of man, who desires to see the world i n a un i f i e d way. Unity., i s a myth; there i s only f l u x i n l i f e . - 3 3 -CHAPTER I I I : AESTHETICS: THE VITAL UNITY Although Hulme opposes a l l metaphysical t h e o r i e s based on u n i t y , u n i t y , p a r a d o x i c a l l y , i s the c e n t r a l concept of h i s own a e s t h e t i c s . He a s s e r t s , t h a t w h i l e the world c o s m i c a l l y can-not be reduced to u n i t y as science pro-claims ( i n the p o s t u l a t e of u n i f o r m i t y ) , yet on the contrary poetry can. At, l e a s t i t s methods f o l l o w c e r t a i n e a s i l y d e fined routes. -(Farther S p e c u l a t i o n s , 77.) He denies the u n i t y of r e a l i t y , but a f f i r m s the u n i t y of the a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n . The nature of t h i s a e s t h e t i c u n i t y i s d e f i n e d p a r t l y by h i s metaphysical outlook, but a t r u e understanding of i t must go beyond the l i m i t a t i o n s i n t o which Hulme t r i e s t o f i t i t . Any examination of an a e s t h e t i c theory must d w e l l on c e r t a i n cen-t r a l questions. E l i s e o Vivas and Murray K r i e g e r l i s t these b r i e f l y i n The Problems of A e s t h e t i c s : What r e l a t i o n has the. o b j e c t created by the a r t i s t to the data given him by the e x t e r n a l world? Does the a r t i s t merely i m i t a t e or s e l e c t from t h i s • data and superimpose an e x t e r n a l form upon i t ? Or does h i s o b j e c t r e v e a l something which can i n no way be ac-• counted f o r i n terms of what the a r t i s t ' s w o r l d has given him? To what extent, i n other words, has the mind of the a r t i s t , i n the c r e a t i v e process, added t o the m a t e r i a l f u r n i s h e d i t by exper-ience? To what extent i s the a r t i s t l i t e r a l l y c r e a t i v e ? Or,, i f , on the other hand, the object seems t o correspond t o the e x t e r n a l world, does i t answer to the r e a l i t y given us by our senses or t o a deeper, l e s s a t t a i n a b l e r e a l i t y which a r t alone can give us? I f i t i s the l a t t e r , can a r t i n any s t r i c t sense be c a l l e d " " . i m i t a t i o n " ? Does the a r t i s t , then, r e a l l y create h i s ^ g b j e c t or does he merely d i s c o v e r i t ? A l l these;:questions are broached e i t h e r d i r e c t l y or' i n d i r e c t l y , w i t h -i n the context of Hulme's a e s t h e t i c s . Many of h i s statements w i l l be seen to be c o n t r a d i c t o r y , however,, and i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , Hulme's a e s t h e t i c s are f a r from pr e s e n t i n g a cohesive whole. There i s no doubt t h a t Huikme's metaphysics i s an indispensable guide t o a study o f h i s a e s t h e t i c s . But Hulme was concerned w i t h a r t f i r s t of a l l ; h i s metaphysics simply helped him c l a r i f y what he wanted t o say about a r t . One of the main reasons f o r the e x i s t -ence of philosophy i s not t h a t i t enables you to f i n d t r u t h ( i t can never do t h a t ) but t h a t i t does provide you a refuge f o r d e f i n i t i o n s . The u s u a l idea of the t h i n g i s t h a t • i t provides you w i t h a f i x e d b a s i s from which you can decide the t h i n g s you want i n a e s t h e t i c s . The process i s the exact contrary. You s t a r t i n the confusion of the f i g h t i n g l i n e , you r e t i r e from t h a t j u s t a l i t t l e t o the r e a r t o recover, to get your weapons, r i g h t . Quite p l a i n l y , without metaphor ; t h i s - - i t provides you w i t h an elabo-r a t e and p r e c i s e ..language i n which you r e a l l y can e x p l a i n d e f i n i t e l y what you mean, but what you want t o say i s de-cided by other t h i n g s . The u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y i s the h u r l y - b u r l y , the s t r u g g l e ; the metaphysic i s an adjunct t o c l e a r -headedness i n i t . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 130.) E l i s e o Vivas and Murray. K r i e g e r , Problems of A e s t h e t i c s , New York, R i n e h a r t , 1953, P- 117--35 His metaphysics was the weapon Hulme needed to define his position on art. The language of philosophy was his ammunition. As was shown e a r l i e r , Hulme regarded arttand philosophy as ess e n t i a l l y the same. At bottom, both express an attitude towards existence. Hulme i s de f i n i t e about what he considers should be the attitude of a r t . " I t i s essential," he writes-, "to prove that beauty may be i n small, dry things." (Speculations, 131.) "The new art i s geo-metrical i n character, while the art we are accustomed to i s v i t a l and organic." (Speculations, 76-77-) The appearance of t h i s new art i s of great importance to Hulme, f o r , ...the re-emergence of geometrical art may be the pre-cursor of the re-emergence of the corresponding attitude towards the world, and so of the break-up of the Renaissance humanistic a t t i -tude. The fact that, the change comes f i r s t i n a r t , before i t comes i n thought, i s e asily understandable f o r t h i s reason. So thoroughly are we soaked i n the s p i r i t of the period we l i v e i n , so strong i s i t s influence over-us, that we can only escape from i t i n an unexpected way, as i t were, a side dir e c t i o n l i k e a r t . , (Speculations, 78.) The new art i s a forerunner of a complete change i n the categories by which men think. I t signals a new era i n human thought, paving the way to the establishment of new categories. To Hulme, i t i s the death k n e l l of Humanism and Romanticism. Yet, because the categories which characterized a previous age tend to li n g e r i n the minds of men, -36-because they continue t o c o n s t i t u t e the way men see t h i n g s , Hulme t h i n k s " . . . t h a t i f good c l a s s i c a l verse were t o be w r i t t e n to-morrow' very few people would be able t o stand i t . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 126.) This f i n a l statement provides a new vant a g e - p o s i t i o n from which to i n t e r p r e t the importance Hulme attached t o p h i l o s o p h i c a l language, and hence, t o metaphysics. B r i e f l y , the p o i n t - i s t h i s : so i n t r a c -t a b l e are categories that,, though a new a r t may emerge, there i s no language to j u s t i f y i t ' . The c r i t i c i n e x p l a i n i n g a new d i r e c t -i o n o f t e n f a l s i f i e s i t by h i s use of a vocabulary d e r i v e d from the b i d p o s i t i o n . The thought p r vocabulary of one's p e r i o d i s an e x t r a o r d i n a r i l y d i f f i c u l t t h i n g to break away from. While an a r t i s t may have emancipated h i m s e l f from h i s own p e r i o d as f a r as h i s a r t i s concerned, w h i l e a spectator may have emancipated h i m s e l f by l o o k i n g at the a r t of other periods i n museums, yet the mental, or more a c c u r a t e l y speaking, t l i ' e . . l i n g u i s t i c emancipations of the two, may not have gone forward p a r a l l e l w i t h the a r t i s t i c one. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 76.) Hulme '.s response t o the n e c e s s i t y was the p r o v i s i o n of a framework so t h a t the new a r t could be understood. Hulme's i n s i s t e n c e on the inherent r i g h t n e s s of the r e l i g i o u s a t -t i t u d e as opposed t o the humanist a t t i t u d e c a r r i e d over to h i s i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n o f the a r t which was the product of these two a t t i t u d e s . Hulme l o o s e l y c a t e g o r i z e s the two d i s t i n c t kinds of a r t as "new" and " o l d . " He b e l i e v e d t h a t the "new" a b s t r a c t a r t was r i g h t , the " o l d " f a l s e . The new a r t , he thought, had much i n common w i t h some p r i m i t i v e -37-art and with the art of the Byzantine and Egyptian periods. Hulme terms "Greek and modern art since the Renaissance," old a r t . In these arts the l i n e s are soft and v i t a l . You have other arts l i k e Egypt-ian, Indian and Byzantine, where every-thing tends to be angular, where curves tend to be hard and geometrical, where the representation of the human body, for example, i s often e n t i r e l y non-v i t a l , and distorted to f i t into s t i f f l i n e s and cubical shapes of various kinds. (Speculations, 82.) Hulme aligns the new art with the re l i g i o u s attitude, with man's sense of his l i m i t a t i o n s amidst the incessant change of existence, and with the doctrine of Origi n a l Sin. The old a r t , on the.contrary, i s the inevitable outburst of periods dominated by. the categories of the i n t r i n s i c goodness of men and the sense of harmony between man and the external world. The two arts answer two different concep-tions of satisfactoriness. Since a l l . a r t i s created to s a t i s f y certain desires, since i t i s always the expression of a certain attitude of mind, Hulme I s able to distinguish between the two- main art types with which he deals 'on the basis of the mental tendencies of the people who produced them. The new, geometrical art i s the product of an attitude that" can be described most generally as a feel i n g of separation i n the face of outside nature."' (Speculations, 85.) The old, n a t u r a l i s t i c art " i s the result of a happy, pantheistic r e l a t i o n between man and the outside world..." (Speculations, 86.) Borrowing h i s terminology - 3 8 -from Worringer, Hulme c l a s s i f i e s these two opposing mental tendencies as the tendency to a b s t r a c t i o n and the tendency t o empathy (Abstrak- t i o n - and E i n f u h l i n g are Worringer's terms). The f e e l i n g of empathy can only e x i s t i n those people who f i n d pleasure i n the contemplation of n a t u r a l forms. A r t f o r them i s an o b j e c t i f i c a t i o n of t h e i r own v i t a l i t y . A b s t r a c t a r t represents a d i s j u n c t i o n , from nature, a shunnin of n a t u r a l , v i t a l forms, and a d e s i r e f o r f i x i t y and s t i l l n e s s . (Specu l a t i o n s , 85.) The a r t th a t r e l i e s on empathy i s v i t a l ; a b s t r a c t a r t i s a n t i - v i t a l . Hulme i n s i s t s . t h a t he accepts Worringer's a n t i t h e s i s completely. He. found i n Worringer's w r i t i n g s on a r t a c l a r i f i c a t i o n of the a t t i t u d e he h i m s e l f was t r y i n g t o formulate. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 82.) Worringer was to h i s a e s t h e t i c s what Bergson was t o h i s metaphysics. Both men had already o b j e c t i f i e d and f i x e d a t t i t u d e s t h a t he h i m s e l f was s t r u g g l i n g to express. But, h i s adoption of the t h e o r i e s of these two men i n -volv e d him i n a c o n f l i c t t h a t , although, i t i s u n l i k e l y t h a t he was aware of h i s own c o n t r a d i c t o r y p o s i t i o n s , made the f i n a l p i c t u r e o f h i s a e s t h e t i c s q u i t e d i f f e r e n t from h i s i n i t i a l statements. B a s i c a l l y , h i s a e s t h e t i c s can be seen to r e l y f a r more h e a v i l y on Bergson than on Worringer. In f a c t , h i s a e s t h e t i c s e v e n t u a l l y become an almost complet c o n t r a d i c t i o n o f Worringer's views. The p a r a l l e l Hulme drew between a r t and philosophy has already been noted. The general statements he made on both f i e l d s are s M l a r . However, since he devoted more time to a r t , he worked out h i s b a s i c -39-p o s i t i o n more f u l l y i n t h a t f i e l d . His a e s t h e t i c p o s i t i o n , then, serves t o i l l u m i n a t e h i s d e f i n i t i o n of philosophy and to.expose many of i t s f l a w s . Hulme defined the tendency t o a b s t r a c t i o n as "the d e s i r e t o t u r n the organic i n t o something hard and durable." (Speculations , 107•) In another context, he discusses "a c e r t a i n a b s t r a c t geometrical shape, which, being durable and permanent s h a l l be a refuge from the f l u x and impermanence of the outside.world." ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 8 6 . ) The new a r t i s a c r e a t i o n d i s t i n c t from : l i f e , from the f l u x of constant change*.-a b i l i t y which Bergson p o s t u l a t e s . I t shares the a n t i - v i t a l q u a l i t y w i t h p r i m i t i v e and Byzantine a r t , yet there are d i s s i m i l a r i t i e s i n the world-view which produced them. The p r i m i t i v e springs from what we have c a l l e d a k i n d of mental space-shyness, which i s r e a l l y an a t t i t u d e . o f f e a r before the, world; the Byzantine from what may be c a l l e d , i n a c c u r a t e l y , a k i n d of contempt f o r the world. (Speculations , 92•) The new a t t i t u d e Hulme f i n d s i t d i f f i c u l t t o define p r e c i s e l y , and i s reduced t o g e n e r a l i t i e s . In comparison w i t h the f l a t and i n s i p i d optimism of the b e l i e f i n progress, the new a t t i t u d e may be i n a c e r t a i n sense inhuman, p e s s i m i s t i c . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 93-) The new a r t w i l l a l s o be "new" because of i t s resemblance to machinery. Thus, ...the new "tendency towards a b s t r a c t i o n " w i l l culminate, not so much i n the. -kO-simple geometrical forms found i n a r -chaic a r t , hut i n the more complicated ones a s s o c i a t e d i n our minds w i t h ma-chinery. . . I t i s not a uuestion of d e a l i n g w i t h machinery i n the s p i r i t , and w i t h the methods of e x i s t i n g a r t , hut of the c r e a t i o n o f a new a r t hav-i n g an o r g a n i s a t i o n , and governed hy p r i n c i p l e s , which are at present ex-e m p l i f i e d u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , as i t were, i n machinery. (S p e c u l a t i o n s , 104.) Although Hulme cannot s t a t e e x a c t l y what t h i s r e l a t i o n to machinery w i l l be, i t i s reasonable t o assume, on the b a s i s o f c e r t a i n r e l a t e d statements and examples, and w i t h the background of h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f philosophy, t h a t he i s c l a s s i f y i n g a r t here as an extensive manifold. Machinery.would c e r t a i n l y be a subject f o r i n t e l l e c t u a l a n a l y s i s and d i s s e c t i o n . • Since the new a r t i s somehow r e l a t e d t o machinery, the a c t u a l o r g a n i z a t i o n o f the new a r t i s l i k e the o r g a n i z a t i o n of machinery.. Many of Picasso's p a i n t i n g s , "whatever they may be l a b e l l e d , are at bottom s t u d i e s o f a s p e c i a l k i n d of machinery." (Speculations, .105. I f t h i s a b s t r a c t a r t i s so a k i n t o machinery, being " a b s o l u t e l y d i s -t i n c t from the messiness, the confusion, and the a c c i d e n t a l d e t a i l s of e x i s t i n g t h i n g s , " i t must share the nature of matter and be ex-p l i c a b l e i n mechanical terms. Hulme hi m s e l f s t a t e s : "In the en-deavour to get away from the f l u x o f e x i s t e n c e , there i s an endeavour to create i n c o n t r a s t , an a b s o l u t e l y enclosed m a t e r i a l i n d i v i d u a l i t y . (Speculations^! &$..) The words " m a t e r i a l i n d i v i d u a l i t y " are r e v e a l i n g Hulme i s " i m p l y i n g t h a t the a r t i s t i c c r e a t i o n i s a f i n i t e and l i m i t e d -41-b i t of matter. This i s the most obvious conclusion to draw from his i n i t i a l hypothesis, the d i s t i n c t i o n between abstraction and empathy, and the sensible conclusion to make from his d e f i n i t i o n of abstraction. Abstract a r t , then, i f i t i s to be consistent with Worringer's views w i l l have the status of a Bergsonian extensive manifold and w i l l be capable of analysis by the i n t e l l e c t . Hulme defines art then as he defines philosophy. The philosopher's job, to recapitulate, was to dive into the muddy stream of our own thoughts, and dry "into a de f i n i t e and f i x e d shape the idea that i n our own mind was but muddy, transient, and confused." (Further Specu- l a t i o n s , 37-) The a r t i s t ' s function i s the same. . I t i s as i f the surface of our mind was a sea i n a continual state of motion, that there were so many waves on i t , their•existence was so trans-ien t , and they interfered so much with each other, that one was unable to perceive them. The "a r t i s t by ma-king a f i x e d model of one of the waves enables you to iso]d:e i t out and to perceive i t i n yourself. In that sense art merely reveals, i t never creates. (Speculations, 151') Hulme answers one of the central aesthetic questions i n terms of what i s , thus f a r , his mechanistic theory of a r t . By depriving the a r t i s t of c r e a t i v i t y , and denying that art can be other than revelation, Hulme would seem to be treating art much as he treated physical science and mathematics. Art, to Hulme at t h i s point, i s s t a t i c and l i f e l e s s . In order to make a "f i x e d model" of one of the waves of the f l u x , - 1 , 2 -• the a r t i s t must s t r u g g l e . He must contend w i t h the f i x e d ways men have of p e r c e i v i n g t h i n g s because of. t h e i r n e c e s s i t y f o r a c t i o n . He must a l s o contend w i t h the already f i x e d - c a t e g o r i e s by which men de-s c r i b e t h e i r p e r c e p t i o n s . He must s t r u g g l e to get the "exact curve of the t h i n g . " The great aim i s accurate, p r e c i s e and d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n . The f i r s t t h i n g i s to recognize how e x t r a o r d i n -a r i l y d i f f i c u l t t h i s i s . . I t i s no mere matter of carefulness;: you have to use language and language i s by i t s very nature a communa. t h i n g ; t h a t is., i t - expresses never the exact t h i n g but' a compromise--that which i s common to you, me and everybody. But each man sees a l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t l y , and to get out c l e a r l y and e x a c t l y what he does see, he must have a t e r r i f i c s t r u g g l e w i t h language, whether i t be w i t h words o r the technique of other, a r t s . Language has i t s own s p e c i a l nature, i t s own conventions and communal ideas. I t i s o n l y by a concentrated e f f o r t of the mind t h a t you can h o l d i t f i x e d to . your own purpose. ...You know • what I c a l l a r c h i t e c t ' s c u r v e s - - f l a t pieces of wood with, a l l d i f f e r e n t . kinds of curvature. By a s u i t a b l e s e l -e c t i o n from these you can' draw approx-imately any curve you l i k e . ' T h e . a r t i s t .. I take to be the man who simply can't bear the idea of t h a t 'approximately'. He w i l l get the exact curve of what he sees whether i t be an o b j e c t or an idea i n the mind. ...Suppose th a t i n s t e a d of your curved pieces of wood you have a springy p i e c e of s t e e l of the same types of curvature as the wood. Wow the s t a t e of t e n s i o n or c o n c e n t r a t i o n of mind, i f he i s doing anything r e a l l y • good i n t h i s s t r u g g l e against the i n -- 4 3 -grained h a b i t of the technique may be represented.by a man employing a l l h i s f i n g e r s t o bend the s t e e l out of i t s own curve and i n t o the exact curve which you want. , Something d i f f e r e n t to what i t would assume n a t u r a l l y . . • (S p e c u l a t i o n s, I32-I33.) The d i s c i p l i n e Hulme re q u i r e s of the a r t i s t , i f he i s to breakaway from the h a b i t s of p e r c e p t i o n , i s undeniably great. Even apart from t h i s d i s c i p l i n e , the a r t i s t i s a unique type, f r e e d from the r e s t r i c -t i o n s imposed on men by t h e i r compulsion f o r a c t i o n , and t h e r e f o r e more able t o get i n t o a c t u a l contact w i t h r e a l i t y . He i s , by nature, b e t t e r equipped t o see t h i n g s as they are. . Because h i s work i s a p r e s e n t a t i o n , simply, of t h i n g s as they are, he i s a r e v e a l e r , not a c r e a t o r . I f r e a l i t y as Bergson (and t h e r e f o r e Hulme) understands i t i s f l u x i n c o n t i n u a l motion, one of the most p e r t i n e n t questions to ask of Hulme's a e s t h e t i c i s "What are those things t h a t the a r t i s t gets the 'exact curve' o f ? " . An analogy Hulme uses to describe Bergson's metaphysics provides an answer to t h i s question. When I see i n the changing shape of flame something which resembles a saw edge I may s o l e l y f o r the purpose of human communication c a l l i t t h a t . But I have not by t h a t a l t e r e d the nature of the flame. So with"concepts and u n i v e r s a l s o f a l l k i n ds. We envisage the f l u x i n c e r t a i n s t a t i c geometric shapes e n t i r e l y f o r p r a c t i c a l purposes, which, have no u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y at a l l . Proteus i s god, and he cannot be s e i z e d i n any formula. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 5>) The " t h i n g s " which the a r t i s t i s able t o perceive and to convey e x a c t l y . -kh-are instantaneous o u t l i n e s on the surface of the f l u i d , ever-moving f l u x . The a r t i s t 'catches' these and ' d r i e s ' them, making them r i g i d and s t a t i c , f o r the purpose of human communication. • I f every-one could "break through the v e i l which a c t i o n i n t e r p o s e s " and a t -t a i n d i r e c t contact w i t h r e a l i t y by themselves, a r t would be u s e l e s s . Hulme defin e s a e s t h e t i c pleasure i n terms of the a r t i s t ' s a b i l i t y to transmit a sense of r e a l i t y . I t i s , then, " . . . i n t h i s r a r e f a c t of communication t h a t you get the root of a e s t h e t i c pleasure." (Specu- l a t i o n s , 136.) What s o r t o f ' a c t i v i t y must the a r t i s t undergo i n order f i n a l l y t o f i x h i s i n s i g h t ? Hulme'describes t h i s a c t i v i t y ' " a s a process of d i s c o v e r y and disentanglement." To use the metaphor which one i s by now so f a m i l i a r with--the stream of the i n n e r l i f e , and the d e f i n i t e c r y s t -a l l i s e d shapes on the surface--the b i g a r t i s t , the c r e a t i v e a r t i s t , the innovator, leaves the l e v e l where t h i n g s are c r y s t a l l i s e d out i n t o d e f i n i t e shapes, and d i v i n g down i n t o the i n n e r f l u x , comes back w i t h a new shape which he endeavours to f i x . (Speculations , 1^9-) The a r t i s t places h i m s e l f w i t h i n the f l u x , i d e n t i f i e s h i m s e l f w i t h i t and then must s t r i v e against the f i x e d forms to o b j e c t i f y h i s i n s i g h t s . The a r t i s t i c process of 'discovery' which Hulme describes i s an exact p a r a l l e l of the Bergsonian concept of e v o l u t i o n . In the a r t i s t i c pro-cess, the i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t b a t t l e s f o r expression by contending w i t h the conventions of e s t a b l i s h e d t r a d i t i o n ; i n the e v o l u t i o n a r y process - L 5 -the l i f e - i m p u l s e must s t r u g g l e w i t h matter i n order t o remain f r e e . The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of'matter i s necess-i t y . The c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f the impulse which.has produced l i f e i s , on the con-t r a r y , a f r e e c r e a t i v e a c t i v i t y . The process of e v o l u t i o n can only he des-c r i b e d as the gradual i n s e r t i o n of more and more freedom i n t o matter. ' ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 208.) S i m i l a r l y , i n the a r t i s t i c process, the i n t u i t i v e i n s i g h t must mani-pu l a t e f i x e d forms i n order t o f r e e the object e x a c t l y as i t i s . Hulme h i m s e l f was aware of the p a r a l l e l between these two processes. "Our eye," he w r i t e s , perceives the f e a t u r e s of the l i v i n g being merely as assembled, not as mut-u a l l y organised. The i n t e n t i o n of l i f e --a simple movement which runs through the l i n e s and l i n k s them together and gives them s i g n i f i c a n c e - - e s c a p e s i t . This i n t e n t i o n i s j u s t what the a r t i s t t r i e s to r e g a i n i n p l a c i n g h i m s e l f back w i t h i n the o b j e c t by a k i n d of sympathy and breaking down by an e f f o r t o f i n t u i t i o n the b a r r i e r t h a t space puts between him and h i s model. (Spe c u l a t i o n s , ikh.) I f i n t u i t i o n i s the b a s i s of the . a r t i s t i c process, then, on the grounds of Bergson's theory, the o b j e c t of t h a t i n t u i t i o n must be an i n t e n s i v e m anifold, wherein a l l the p a r t s i n t e r p e n e t r a t e and cannot be separated out by the i n t e l l e c t . The weapon which poets w i l l use to present these inte n s i v e s i n verse, Hulme b e l i e v e s , w i l l be fancy. Fancy w i l l b r i n g out the i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t i n i t s e x a c t i t u d e . When the analogy has not enough con-n e c t i o n w i t h the t h i n g described t o be -1+6-q u i t e p a r a l l e l w i t h i t , where i t . o v e r l a y s the t h i n g i t described and there i s a ; c e r t a i n excess, there,you have the p l a y of fancy--that I grant i s i n -f e r i o r t o imagination. But where analogy i s every b i t of i t . necessary f o r accurate d e s c r i p -t i o n i n the sense of the word accurate I have p r e v i o u s l y described, and your only o b j e c t i o n to t h i s k i n d of fancy i s t h a t i t i s not s e r i o u s i n the e f f e c t i t produces, then I t h i n k the o b j e c t i o n to be e n t i r e l y i n v a l i d . I f i t i s s i n c e r e i n the accurate sense, when the whole of the analogy i s necessary t o get the exact curve of the f e e l i n g o r t h i n g you want t o express--there you seem to me t o have the highest verse, even though the subject be t r i v i a l and the emotions of the i n f i n i t e f a r away. (Spe c u l a t i o n s , 137-138.) The i n t u i t i o n grasps and conveys the whole of the ' t h i n g ' . That i s , i t presents a s y n t h e t i c u n i t y . Hulme has g r a d u a l l y worked h i m s e l f i n t o a p o s i t i o n which i s a complete c o n t r a d i c t i o n of h i s o r i g i n a l stand, t h a t a r t i s . " a m a t e r i a l i n d i v i d u a l i t y " and therefore capable' of a n a l y s i s by the i n t e l l e c t . Hulme's main o b j e c t i o n t o the Romantics, then, i s n o t . t h e i r theory of organic u n i t y , but the f a c t t h a t they use t h i s theory to b r i n g together two realms which to him must r e -main separate. U n i t y f o r Hulme i s found i n f i n i t e t h i n g s , which are regarded i n themselves, "as i n d i v i d u a l not u n i v e r s a l . " (Speculations, 136.) The a r t i s t does not l o o k through the o b j e c t t o d i s c o v e r the u n i v e r s a l i n the p a r t i c u l a r , but s t r i v e s i n s t e a d t o f i n d the exact p a r t i c u l a r i t y of the p a r t i c u l a r . -kl-Hulme f e e l s no qualms, once having a s c e r t a i n e d h i s exact p o s i -t i o n , about t a k i n g over some of the terminology a s s o c i a t e d w i t h "the sloppy dregs" of Romanticism. C o l e r i d g e , he f e e l s , uses the word " v i t a l " i n "a p e r f e c t l y d e f i n i t e and what I c a l l dry sense." I t i s j u s t t h i s : A mechanical complex-i t y i s the sum of i t s p a r t s . Put them •side by side and you get the whole. Now v i t a l or organic i s merely a con-venient metaphor f o r a complexity of a d i f f e r e n t k i n d , t h a t i n which the p a r t s cannot be s a i d t o be elements as each one t o a c e r t a i n extent i s the whole. The l e g of a c h a i r by i t s e l f i s s t i l l a l e g . ' My l e g by i t s e l f wouldn't be. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , I38-I39O C l e a r l y , Hulme i s confused. On the one hand, he conceives the o b j e c t of a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n as being organic i n t h a t i t i n t e r p e n e t r a t e s w i t h the f l u x . Once removed from i t s source, once separated out by the d i s e n t a n g l i n g process of d i s c o v e r y , i t must i n e v i t a b l y be a dead form. According t o h i s metaphysical p o s i t i o n , t h i s i s the o n l y i n t e r -p r e t a t i o n t h a t Hulme w i l l a l l o w , f o r language, i n terms o f t h i s p o s i -t i o n , i_s the m a t e r i a l world. I n t h a t case, language cannot be organic o r v i t a l , because i t i s m a t e r i a l , and matter, to Hulme, i s dead. On the grounds of Bergson's m a t t e r - f l u x - d u a l i s m , a dualism t h a t Hulme i s working w i t h here i n h i s a e s t h e t i c s , a r t should be l i k e machinery, as i t i s the dead, f i x e d forms which are d e r i v e d from the f l u x . What Hulme has done i s t o p o s t u l a t e t h a t a r t i s a n t i - v i t a l , and then pro-ceed t o describe i t i n v i t a l terms. T h i s , as i t w i l l be developed - 4 8 -i n the rest of t h i s paper,-is the core of the ambiguity of Hume's aesthetics. S t i l l , i n spite of Hulme's confusion on certain major points, i t must be noted that he did not deviate from his attention to the i n -d i v i d u a l , the p a r t i c u l a r . His awareness of the hindrance which con-ventional ways of expression imposed on the exact d e f i n i t i o n of these particulars forced him to focus on the nature and function of the a r t i s t ' s medium. Language, he saw, was a b a r r i e r to precise, exact communication. The straightforward use of words a l -ways l e t s the i n d i v i d u a l i t y of things escape...If you are able to ob-serve the actual i n d i v i d u a l i t y of the emotion you experience, you become di s -s a t i s f i e d with language. You persist ' i n an endeavour to so state things , that the meaning does not escape, but i s d e f i n i t e l y forced on the attention of the reader. To do t h i s you are com-pelled to invent new metaphors and new epithets. (Speculations, 162.) The difference which Hulme i s endeavouring to make p l a i n here i s the difference hetwean the language of prose and the language of poetry. He describes prose as\he museum where the dead metaphors of the .poets are preserved." (Speculations, 152.)- What Hulme i s implying i s that prose i s dead, as d i s t i n c t from poetry, which i s a l i v e . Prose might w e l l be termed poetry's morgue. Hulme c a l l s i t a "counter" language, which permits the reader to glide through an abstract process. In another context, Hulme terms prose an "old pot" that l e t s meaning leak out. (Speculations, 135•) -k9-P o e t i c language, on the other hand, i s c o n s t i t u t e d by images. The image t r a n s m i t s the a r t i s t ' s d i r e c t contact w i t h r e a l i t y . "Crea-t i o n of imagery i s needed t o convey over t h i s freshness o f impression ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 163.) Hulme emphasizes the "freshness" o f imagery t o d i f f e r e n t i a t e i t from .prose which: i s s t a l e and dead. Freshness convinces you, you f e e l at once th a t the a r t i s t was i n an a c t u a l p h y s i c a l s t a t e . You. f e e l t h a t f o r a minute. • (Speculations, 135•) The image gives the reader the p h y s i c a l sensations experienced by the a r t i s t . This i s the core of the Hulmian a e s t h e t i c experience. The image does not i n any way appeal t o the i n t e l l e c t , but t o the f e e l i n g of the reader. I t s impact i s p h y s i c a l . The t h i n g t h a t concerns me here i s of course only the f e e l i n g which i s con-veyed over to you by the use of f r e s h metaphors. I t i s o n l y where you get these f r e s h metaphors and e p i t h e t s employed t h a t you get t h i s v i v i d con-v i c t i o n which c o n s t i t u t e s the p u r e l y . aesthetic- emotion t h a t can be got from imagery. (S p e c u l a t i o n s , 152.) In a l a t e r d i s c u s s i o n on poetry, Hulme develops t h i s p o i n t . The element i n i t which w i l l be found • i n the r e s t of a r t i s not the a c c i d e n t a l f a c t t h a t imagery conveys over an ac t -u a l l y f e l t v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n , but the a c t u a l tthar.acter of t h a t communication, the f a c t t h a t i t hands you over the sensation as d i r e c t l y as p o s s i b l e , attempts t o get i t over, b o d i l y w i t h a l l the q u a l i t i e s i t possessed f o r you when you experienced i t . . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , l6K.) -50-I n t u i t i o n then i s a p h y s i c a l r e a l i z a t i o n , and the a e s t h e t i c emotion i s f e l t as a p h y s i c a l communication. This i s t r u e of p a i n t i n g as w e l l as poetry. Hulme s t a t e s t h a t he agrees w i t h Bernard Berenson i n f i n d i n g the essence o f ; a e s t h e t i c experience i n p a i n t i n g to l i e i n d i r e c t communication, i n i t s life-communicating q u a l i t y . (Speculations, l 6 8 . ) In the l i g h t o f these statements, Hulme's poetry-prose d i s -t i n c t i o n ' s made c l e a r e r . Whereas prose i s dead, removed from l i f e , c o n s t i t u t i n g a world unto i t s e l f , poetry i s a l i v e , c o n t a i n i n g and com-municating l i f e . Hulme has come a long way from h i s Worringer-based i n i t i a l s t a t e -ments. I n f a c t , he has a r r i v e d at the opposite extreme. As was a l -ready shown, he understands a r t as being v i t a l r a t h e r than a n t i - v i t a l , and as life-communicating, r a t h e r than l i f e - n e g a t i n g . The. emphasis he places on the v i s u a l q u a l i t y of the imagery i s a l s o r e v e a l i n g . Hulme equates v i s i o n w i t h meaning. I n F u r t h e r S p e c u l a t i o n s , he s t a t e s , "We replace meaning ( i . e . v i s i o n ) by words." (Further Speculations," 77-) In other words, the meaning of the t h i n g l i e s i n what i t i s . The a r t i s t catches t h i s meaning in! aheimage .Tand l e t s the reader know what t h i s v i s u a l impression f e l t - l i k e t o him. He appeals t o the f e e l i n g s as opposed t o the i n t e l l e c t , f o r the i n t e l l e c t i s capable o n l y of a n a l y s i s and manipulation. Thus Hulme's dictum: "Each word, must be an image seen, not a counter." (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 79>) Prose l e t s meaning escape; i t no longer t r a n s m i t s a v i s u a l s e n s a t i o n to the reader. Poetry has meaning because i t i s composed of images. -51-Hulme i s led from h i s interpretation of the image as conveying physical sensations to define empathy as the basis of art. "...This p o s s i b i l i t y , " he writes, o f . l i v i n g our own emotions into out-side shapes and colours i s the b a s i c , fact on which the whole of p l a s t i c art rests. ...There i s nothing mys- • terious i n t h i s process by which form becomes the porter or c a r r i e r of i n -t e r n a l emotions. (Further Speculations, lUO.) Hulme abandons here h i s o r i g i n a l stand that abstract art denies l i f e , and embraces the opposing empathy theory, that art allows the spectator to project himself into i t s forms. Art enables the a r t i s t to express h i s i n t e r n a l states, h i s emotions, to enclose these within a form, which w i l l , i n turn, produce an emotional recognition i n the viewer. The emotional response i s dependent on the accuracy of the v i s i o n : " A l l emotion depends on r e a l s o l i d v i s i o n or sound. I t i s physical." (Further Speculations, 78.) Since form i s the " c a r r i e r " of the v i s i o n , i t merits attention. Hulme believes that a f e e l i n g f o r form of a certain kind must always be the motivation behind a new a r t . The verse form and the state of poetry i n any period are always closely related. (Further Speculations, 68.) The new poetry w i l l be characterized by free verse forms. This new verse resembles sculpture rather than music; i t appeals to the . eye rather than to the ear. I t has to mold images, a kind of s p i r i t u a l clay, into d e f i n i t e shapes. This q material ... i s image and not sound. I t builds up a p l a s t i c image -52-. which i t hands over to- the reader, whereas the o l d art endeavoured to influence him physically by the hyp-notic effect of rhythm. (Further Speculations, 75•) The "old" verse, relying on d e f i n i t e meter, had a l u l l i n g effect on the reader, allowing him to s l i d e through h i s reading of i t i n a rhythmical way, without deriving meaning from i t . You might say that such verse i s a sort of rhythmical prose. Hulme's main objection to meter i s that it'"enables people to write verse with no poetic i n -spiration..." .(Further Speculations, 75-) In other words, i t makes use of counter-words rather than new images. The new verse w i l l ar-rest the reader physically by means of the images. The image, to Hulme, then, i s not just the f a b r i c from which poetry i s woven; the image i s •-•poetry just as certainly as prose, the counter-language, i s the material world. The image and the free verse form are closely related.' The image, a physical sensation produced by an object i n r e a l i t y , re-produced for i t s own sake alone, can never be more than a very small thing. To put t h i s modern conception of the poetic s p i r i t , t h i s tentative and h a l f -shy manner of looking at things, 'into regular metre i s l i k e putting a c h i l d into armour. (Further. Speculations, 72-73-) The new attitude demands a new form, and at the same time i t must have maximum self-expression. Free verse, to Hulme, i s the only answer f o r these requirements. -53-Free verse s t i l l r e q u i r e s d i s c i p l i n e of the poet, "Continual ef-f o r t necessary to t h i n k of t h i n g s as they are, the c o n s t r a i n t neces-sary to a v o i d great tendencies to use b i g words and common phrases without meaning." (Further.'Speculations, 98•) In submitting h i m s e l f to t h i s d i s c i p l i n e , i n s t r i v i n g t o capture "the exact curve of the t h i n g , " the poet f i n d s new images. The attempt to work out the o r i -g i n a l impression b r i n g s about a new impression. The s t r u g g l e w i t h language'"forces the idea...back on i t s e l f and b r i n g s out the o r i -g i n a l idea i n a c l e a r e r shape. ...The id e a has grown and developed because of the o b s t a c l e s i t had to meet." (Sp e c u l a t i o n s , 211.) "In-a sense the poetry w r i t e s i t s e l f . " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 95•) The f i n a l image i s new and f r e s h , even to. the poet. J u s t as p h i l o s o p h i c a l language c o n s t i t u t e s p h i l o s o p h i c a l i d e a s , the image c o n s t i t u t e s the p h y s i c a l sensations of .poetry. What r e l a t i o n do these l a t e r developments i n Hulme's thought have on h i s ideas about a b s t r a c t i o n ? Hulme r e i t e r a t e s , i n s e v e r a l d i f f e r e n t contexts, t h a t the e x t e r n a l world of l i f e i s always the source of. any a r t . The "Object must cause the emotion.before the poem can be w r i t t e n . " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 97•) He a l s o empha-s i z e s t h a t the a r t i s t s e l e c t s from the data provided by r e a l i t y , t h a t he " p i c k s out" something. . (Speculations, 15&.) " L i t e r a t u r e , l i k e memory, s e l e c t s only the v i v i d patches of l i f e . The a r t of a b s t r a c t i o n . " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 99-) A b s t r a c t i o n i s f i n a l l y d e f i n e d then as a s e l e c t i o n from r e a l i t y . -3k-There must be j u s t as much contact w i t h nature i n an a b s t r a c t a r t as i n a r e a l i s t i c one; without t h a t stimulus the a r t i s t c ould produce nothing... A l l a r t may be s a i d t o ; b e r e a l i s m , then, i n t h a t i t e x t r a c t s from nature f a c t s which have not been observed be-f o r e . But i n as f a r as the a r t i s t i s c r e a t i v e , he i s not bound down by the a c c i d e n t a l ..relations of the elements a c t u a l l y found i n nature,, but .extracts, d i s t o r t s , and u t i l i z e s them as a means of expression, and not as a means of ' i n t e r p r e t i n g nature. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 128'.) N a t u r e , i s the source of a l l a b s t r a c t a r t , but to Hulme, u n l i k e the n a t u r a l i s t , i t i s not reproduced f o r the sake of the pleasure which may be found i n n a t u r a l t h i n g s , but as a means of s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n f o r the a r t i s t . Hulme places the emphasis on the a r t i s t , on h i s need f o r s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n , j u s t as he had p l a c e d emphasis on the philosopher's need t o express h i s a t t i t u d e . The c o n c l u s i o n of t h i s matter i s t h a t " . . . a l l our analogies s p i r i t u a l and i n t e l l e c t u a l . a r e d e r i v e d from p u r e l y p h y s i c a l a c t s . Nay, more, a l l a t t r i b u t e s of the absolute and a b s t r a c t are r e a l l y nothing more ( i n so f a r as they mean anything) but e l a b o r a t i o n s of simple passions-." ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 2k2.) B a s i c a l l y , Hulme defin e s poetry i n the same way as he defined philosophy. Both the poet and the philosopher d e s i r e t o f i x an im-p r e s s i o n o r an a t t i t u d e , and they must achieve t h e i r aim through the medium of language. The achievement i n both cases i s the c r e a t i o n of another w o r l d / a world apart from l i f e . The worlds o f poetry and philosophy are u n i f i e d , because they are shaped by language, but the • -55-u n i t y they possess i s not the same. The world of p h i l o s o p h i c a l language i s a mechanical u n i t y , dead and s t a t i c ; the world of the p o e t i c image i s a v i t a l u n i t y , f i x e d , yet a l i v e . In so f a r as Hulme f i n d s u n i t y o n l y i n language (apart, of course, from the absolutes of r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s ) , u n i t y , t o him, i m p l i e s death. Yet he a l l o w s poetry a l i f e - i n - d e a t h e x i s t e n c e . However, i t i s necessary to define the nature of t h i s l i f e - i n -death e x i s t e n c e . I t must he remembered t h a t poetry i s the product of man, who, by Hulme's d e f i n i t i o n , i s f i n i t e and l i m i t e d . H is c r e a t i o n , t h e r e f o r e , w i l l alsoVbe f i n i t e and l i m i t e d . Furthermore, h i s c r e a t i o n i s impermanent. Hulme's r e a l i z a t i o n o f the imminent decay of a l l a r t leads him.to conclusions t h a t would j a r most a r t - l o v e r s . At one p o i n t , he s t i e s , " P e r s o n a l l y I am of course i n favour of the complete de-s t r u c t i o n of a l l verse more than twenty years o l d . " (Further Specu- l a t i o n s , 69.) Odd-sounding as i t i s , such a statement i s the i n e v i t a b l e extension of Hulme's t h e o r i e s . P o e t i c imagery i s merely the language which l a t e r w i l l degenerate i n t o prose c a t e g o r i e s . I t w i l l grow o l d and l o s e i t s newness. This i s why the c r i t e r i o n Hulme e s t a b l i s h e s for-good poetry are "freshness" and " z e s t . " The poet i s able to ex-perience new sensations i n t e n s e l y , and t o transmit these sensations . t o o t h e r s . In t h i s sense, "Great p a i n t e r s are men i n whom has o r i -g i n a t e d a c e r t a i n v i s i o n of t h i n g s which has become or w i l l become the v i s i o n of everybody." (Sp e c u l a t i o n s , 14-9-150.) The same t h i n g may be s a i d of poets, who b r i n g f o r t h new images which u l t i m a t e l y -56- , become p a r t o f common thought. Hulme's metaphysics can be seen t o i n f l u e n c e h i s a e s t h e t i c s at c e r t a i n p o i n t s . He r i g i d l y adheres t o the view t h a t the object o f a e s t h e t i c p e r c e p t i o n must be a small t h i n g , and condemns any attempt to l e t i t s sphere of relevance spread beyond i t s e l f . I n t h i s sense, h i s theory i s c o n s i s t e n t i n i t s attempt t o e l i m i n a t e a l l poetry t h a t t r i e s t o "drag i n the i n f i n i t e . " On.the other hand, Hulme has ob-v i o u s l y t r i e d . t o avoid a mechanistic theory of a r t . In so doing, he has created a 'niche' f o r a r t which cannot be accounted f o r - w i t h i n the framework o f h i s metaphysics. The language of proseiji merely the -decayed language o f poetry, can be accounted f o r m e c h a n i s t i c a l l y . Poetry, however, i s e x p l a i n a b l e i n terms of v i t a l and organic u n i t y . I t partakes-of the charac t e r of the f l u x , yet i t i s apart from the f l u x , d e r i v i n g from the e l a n v i t a l , y e t a l i e n t o i t . Hulme would o b v i o u s l y need t o p o s i t a f o u r t h realm i n h i s meta-physi c s i n order t o make h i s theory o f a r t v a l i d . As i t i s , the v i t a l u n i t y he allows a r t i s not c o n s i s t e n t w i t h any of h i s general assumptions. A r t i s unique i n t h a t Hulme allows i t a u n i t y which he denies t o anything e l s e . A r t , t o Hulme, i s a paradox; i t i s dead, yet a l i v e - - a s o r t o f l i f e - i n - d e a t h . I t i s not, however, an absol u t e , f o r i t w i l l d i e completely e v e n t u a l l y . I t achieves a momentary uniqueness. -57-CHAPTER IV: CINDERS: A GLIMPSE INTO ETERNITY Had Hulme l i v e d longer he would undoubtedly have made some attempts t o give h i s philosophy g r e a t e r consistency. At h i s death he was s t i l l p l a nning an e x p o s i t i o n of h i s p e r s o n a l philosophy which, according t o S i r Herbert Read, e d i t o r of S p e c u l a t i o n s , would have been cast i n an a l l e g o r i c a l form, much l i k e Nietzsche's Z a r a t h u s t r a . The hero of t h i s work, Aphra, appears r a r e l y i n Hulme's notes, but he was o b v i o u s l y as v i s u a l l y - o r i e n t e d as h i s .creator, and experiencedthe world i n images. Most of the fragments f o r t h i s work, on the whole j o t t i n g s and .aphorisms, w e r e . c o l l e c t e d by Read under Hulme's own t i t l e , Cinders. The main pur-pose of t h i s .work i s t o destroy the n o t i o n of u n i t y and to e s t a b l i s h p l u r a l i t y in' i t s stead. Furthermore, Hulme refuses to accept t h a t t h i s p l u r a l i t y can be d e s c r i b e d i n words; language, he maintains, i n Cinders, i s merely i l l u s i o n . In the o p i n i o n of the present w r i t e r , the e a s i e s t approach t o the Cinders theory i s through Bergson's theory of time, a theory which sub * Hulme ^ s c r i b e s t o . (Speculations, 212-214.) The d i s t i n c t i o n Bergson drew between r e a l time and mechanical time i s e s s e n t i a l l y the same d i s -t i n c t i o n he drew between the f l u x of the r e a l world and the s t a t i s of the dead world d e a l t w i t h by the p h y s i c a l sciences and mathematics. • The-d i f f e r e n c e between the two i s the d i f f e r e n c e between what i s happening, and what.men must "think i s happening i n order t h a t they may act. Berg-son described r e a l time.as meaning r e a l d u r a t i o n . "Duration i s the continuous progress of the past which gnaws i n t o the f u t u r e and which - 5 8 -13 s w e l l s as i t advances." . This r e a l d u r a t i o n which c h a r a c t e r i z e s the f l u x , and i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h i t , i s c o n t i n u a l l y growing. New th i n g s are c o n s t a n t l y appearing and disappearing. Bergson w r i t e s , "The more we study the nature of time, the more we s h a l l comprehend t h a t d u r a t i o n means i n v e n t i o n , the c r e a t i o n of forms, the c o n t i n u a l e l a b o r a t i o n of Ik the a b s o l u t e l y new." On the continuous process of change which i s r e a l d u r a t i o n , c r e a t i o n i s c o n s t a n t l y o c c u r r i n g . I n r e a l time the past j o i n s w i t h the f u t u r e t o continue i n t o the present. Bergson c a l l s such d u r a t i o n "a hyphen, a connecting l i n k . " " ^ R e a l i t y , then, the f l u x which Bergson p o s t u l a t e s , e x i s t s i n r e a l time, and i s inex-t r i c a b l y l i n k e d w i t h i t . I n t e r p r e t i n g Bergson's theory o f time, Hulme wri t e s , -Real change does e x i s t but we s h a l l ' always f i n d i t incon c e i v a b l e i f we t r y to form a p i c t u r e of what we mean. When we t h i n k i n t h a t way we s h a l l always reduce r e a l change t o the k i n d of.change t h a t you get i n any mechanical system. (Sp e c u l a t i o n s , 197-) Mechanical time, i n con t r a s t w i t h r e a l time, i s connected w i t h space, w i t h the tendency of the i n t e l l e c t to analyse t h i n g s out i n s p a t i a l terms, t o see the world as c o n s i s t i n g i n c e r t a i n ordered pat-t e r n s . Mechanical time i s a f u n c t i o n of the i n t e l l e c t which,'by nature, •^Henri Bergson, C r e a t i v e -Evolution, London, Macmillan and Co., 1911, P- 5-l l j T b i d . , p. 11. 15 I b i d . , p. 2k. -59-according t o Bergson, i s opposed t o c r e a t i o n and change.' ...against t h i s idea o f the absolute o r i g i n a l i t y and u n f o r e s e e a b i l i t y of forms our whole i n t e l l e c t r i s e s i n "revolt.. The e s s e n t i a l f u n c t i o n of our i n t e l l e c t . . . i s t o be a l i g h t f o r our conduct, to make ready f o r our a c t i o n on t h i n g s , to foresee, f o r a given s i t u a t i o n , the events, favourable or unfavourable, which may f o l l o w thereupon. I n -t e l l e c t t h e r e f o r e i n s t i n c t i v e l y s e l e c t s i n a given situatioijgwhatever i s l i k e something, a l -ready known. In other words, the i n t e l l e c t opposes r e a l change and t r i e s t o f i t new f a c t s i n t o pre-determined p a t t e r n s o r systems. I t cannot a l l o w f o r completely new t h i n g s except by d i s t o r t i n g them t o f i t o l d pat-t e r n s . Mechanical time, then,, might be s a i d to be "out of time" be-cause i t contains only dead elements. Since there i s no change there i s no time, so i r r e v o c a b l y are time and change connected. Mechanical time i s time standing s t i l l , o r measured out, and i s t h e r e f o r e com-p l e t e l y a l i e n t o the nature of r e a l i t y . I t i s i n e v i t a b l y a r t i f i c i a l and opposed t o c r e a t i o n , i n complete c o n t r a s t t o r e a l time which J L S c r e a t i o n . ( Speculations , 197-) Mechanical time i s cl o c k - t i m e , by which men r e g u l a t e , p l a n and understand t h e i r l i v e s . , In co n t r a s t w i t h r e a l time which, i n l i n k i n g the p a s t , the present, and the f u t u r e , " s w e l l s as i t advances," o r b r i n g s new t h i n g s i n t o e x i s t e n c e , mechanical time f i t s p a s t , present and f u t u r e i n t o one p a t t e r n . The dichotomy e s t a b l i s h e d here between r e a l time and mechanical Henri Bergson, C r e a t i v e -Evolution, London, Macmillan and Co., 1911, P. 5 '-- 6 0 -time i s the dichotomy between chaos and u n i t y . Chaos, t o Hulme, i s the nature o f l i f e ; u n i t y i s unnatural t o l i f e , is.imposed upon i t by the minds of men by manipulating dead counters. Language gives a sense of u n i t y , and t h i s u n i t y i s f a l s e , an i l l u s i o n . .Language connects t h i n g s , v e l d s them together, u n i f i e s them. E v e n t u a l l y , t h i s language i t s e l f becomes considered an ab s o l u t e , and people b e l i e v e t h a t words are the c o n s t i t u t i o n o f the world. Symbols are p i c k e d out and b e l i e v e d to be r e a l i t i e s . People imagine t h a t a l l the complicated s t r u c t u r e of the world can be woven out of "good" and "beauty". These words are merely counters r e p r e s e n t i n g vague groups of t h i n g s , to. be 'moved about on a board f o r the convenience of the p l a y e r s . (Speculations, 2l8.) When language i s allowed to usurp and replace r e a l i t y , you f i n d people e x p l a i n i n g themselves by means of words, which, at b e s t , should only be a medium of communication. The philosopher Haldane, f o r example, admiring o r g a n i z a t i o n a b o v e . a l l , i s c r i t i c i z e d by Hulme f o r h i s com-p l e t e r e l i a n c e on language, f o r h i s absurd b e l i e f t h a t language i s the u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y . S u r e l y t h i s i s the gr e a t e s t comedy i n human h i s t o r y , t h a t men should come to • think, themselves as made up of one of t h e i r own t o o l s . (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , Ik.) There are echoes here o f the Weltanschauung-Pure Philosophy d i s -t i n c t i o n made e a r l i e r . Haldane i s " d i s t i n c t l y a 'counter' as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from a ' v i s u a l ' philosopher." (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 9-) Language i s - 6 l -h i s s o l e reference. What he i s . d o i n g i n h i s philosophy i s d e s c r i b i n g language i n terms of language. This i s a completely u n r e a l a c t i v i t y . The v i s u a l p h i l o s o p h e r , on the other hand, r e f e r s to the f l u x , and language t o him i s hut a hardening of h i s impressions of a d i r e c t con-t a c t w i t h r e a l i t y . The f l u x , the source of h i s philosophy, must he c l o s e l y adhered to and o f t e n returned t o . Such a philosopher must beware of going.too f a r i n t o the a b s t r a c t realm f o r f e a r of l o s i n g s i g h t of h i s o r i g i n a l p h y s i c a l i n t u i t i o n . This p h y s i c a l b a s i s of knowledge, b e l i e v e s Hulme, i s a l l t h a t i s r e a l l y e s s e n t i a l t o meta-ph y s i c s ; l o g i c i s only an e l a b o r a t i o n , a drawing out, and b u i l d i n g upon, o f the o r i g i n a l p h y s i c a l p e r c e p t i o n . He a s s e r t s , " I t h i n k t h a t what we r e q u i r e now i s a race of naked p h i l o s o p h e r s , f r e e from the i n h e r i t e d embellishments o f l o g i c . " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 12.) I t i s i n t e r e s t i n g t o t r a c e the use of "naked" i n Hulme's w r i t -ings and t o di s c o v e r j u s t how c o n s i s t e n t l y , and a p p r o p r i a t e l y , he ap-p l i e s the word'. In p i n p o i n t i n g the s u p e r i o r i t y of h i s philosopher-hero's c o n t r i b u t i o n t o a e s t h e t i c s , he states,, "The great advantage of Bergson's theory i s t h a t i t s t a t e s the t h i n g most nakedly, w i t h the l e a s t amount of metaphysical baggage." .(Speculations, 1^9 •) Con-v e r s e l y , the l a s t chapters of most books of philosophy expose the "armour" as having been nothing but the cover-up t o an a t t i t u d e t o l i f e . "How m a g n i f i c e n t l y they may have been c l a d b e f o r e , they come out. naked here!" (Speculations, 20.) "Nakedness," then, becomes the -62-c r i t e r i o n by -which Hulme judges a philosophy. This i s the key to h i s making a r t and philosophy synonymous. Both the a r t i s t and the p h i l o s -opher are "naked" i n r e a l i t y , completely exposed t o p h y s i c a l sensations, open t o new impressions, and unhindered by the weight of l o g i c or' "meta-p h y s i c a l baggage." What Hulme expects from philosophy i s a Weltanschauung, and t h i s i s what he attempts t o give.- The s u b - t i t l e of Cinders i s A Sketch of a New Weltanschauung. Hulme can never be c r i t i c i z e d f o r c a r r y i n g any excess metaphysical baggage i n t o h i s Cinders theory. His expression here i s o r i g i n a l , o f t e n f i n d i n g i t s e l f i n an image." Moreover, i t has the v i s u a l q u a l i t y which Hulme /required of the image. The c e n t r a l theme i s the Bergsonian n o t i o n of r e a l i t y being f l u x and change i t s a t t r i b u t e , but i t i s ex-'amined here i n g r e a t e r d e t a i l and i n many more of i t s r a m i f i c a t i o n s . The i m p o s s i b i l i t y of d i s c o v e r i n g an absolute Truth i s i t s constant message. A l l i s f l u x . The m o r a l i s t s , the c a p i t a l l e t t e r i s t s , attempt t o f i n d a framework ou t s i d e the f l u x , a s o l i d bank f o r the r i v e r , a p i e r r a t h e r than a r a f t . Truth i s what helps a p a r t i c u l a r sect i n the general flow. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 222.) Truth i s .a r e l a t i v e term, r e l a t i v e not o n l y t o the f l u x of r e a l i t y , but a l s o t o other t r u t h s . R e l a t i v i t y i s then, the norm not only of the flux,- but a l s o of the mechanical world of matter. P l u r a l i t y , not. u n i t y , i s the constant i n both. Language i s a f a l s e refuge, an escape from p l u r a l i t y t o p l u r a l i t y . - 6 3 -This p l u r a l i t y c o n s i s t s i n the nature of an ash-heap. In t h i s a s h - p i t of c i n d e r s , c e r t a i n ordered routes have been made, thus c o n s t i t u t i n g whatever u n i t y there may be--a k i n d of-manu-f a c t u r e d chess-board l a i d on a cind e r heap. Not a r e a l chess-board impressed on the c i n d e r s , but the gossamer world of symbolic communication already spoken o f . (Speculatbns, 219.) The image of the-chess-board i s . u s e d o f t e n by Hulme to make concrete h i s theory o f the o r g a n i z i n g q u a l i t y of language, the way i t o u t l i n e s and d i v i d e s o f f p h y s i c a l impressions, p r o v i d i n g tenuous l i n e s o f com-munication around and over-the cinder-heap of r e a l i t y . The organiza-t i o n given by language i s a r t i f i c i a l , but i t provides a means of get-t i n g from one pla c e t o another, w i t h a f e e l i n g of c e r t a i n t y and s e c u r i t y . But the squares of t h i s chess-board always c o n t a i n cinders and are bounded by c i n d e r s , and are i n e v i t a b l y incomplete. A l l the sudden i n s i g h t s (e.g. the great analogy .of a woman compared t o the world i n B r u s s e l s ) - - a l l of these s t a r t a l i n e , which seems about t o u n i t e the whole world l d g i c a l l y . But-the l i n e stops. There i s no u n i t y . A l l l o g i c and l i f e are made up of tangled ends l i k e t h a t . . Always t h i n k of the f r i n g e and of the c o l d walks, of the l i n e s t h a t l e a d "nowhere.' ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 235-236.) There i s always a " f r i n g e " of cinders which i s l o s t o r l e f t out i n the g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s achieved by language. Even language i t s e l f cannot work out a complete synthesis by manipulating a l l i t s elements, because there w i l l always be a c o n f l i c t i n terms, an o p p o s i t i o n o f purposes. -6k-Truth, t o Hulme, i m p l i e s c o n f l i c t and o p p o s i t i o n . I t i s - r e l a t i v e and r e l a t i v i t y i s the only absolute. The absolute i s invented t o r e c o n c i l e c o n f l i c t i n g purposes. But these pur-poses are n e c e s s a r i l y c o n f l i c t i n g , even i n the nature of Truth i t s e l f . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 228.) P l u r a l i t y , the nature of r e a l i t y , i s . synonymous w i t h Truth. This i s simply saying t h a t everything is. i n i t s own r i g h t , i n no way u n i t e d to anything e l s e . Hulme . f i n d s . p l u r a l i t y i n many d i f f e r e n t manifesta-t i o n s . The s i g h t of s o U e r s i n Bologna'excites him as a v i s u a l r e-p r e s e n t a t i o n of h i s philosophy. I am a p l u r a l i s t , and to see s o l d i e r s . f o r a p l u r a l i s t should be a symbolic . philosophic'drama. There i s no U n i t y , no T r u t h , but f o r c e s which have d i f -f e r e n t aims, and whose sole r e a l i t y c o n s i s t s i n these, d i f f e r e n c e s . (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 26.) Hulme's p o s i t i o n i n the Cinders theory i s ^ ' s t r i k i n g l y analogous t o the f i n d i n g s i n contemporary p h y s i c s . He i s at pains t o p o i n t out t h a t there i s no u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y which, when found, w i l l be the b a s i s of a general law subsuming everything i n a u n i f i e d way. As he admits h i m s e l f , the use of the word " c i n d e r s " i s an awkward attempt t o convey an impression t h a t by i t s very nature cannot be given i n words. The absolute i s not t o be described as p e r f e c t , but i f e x i s t e n t as e s s e n t i a l -l y i m perfect, c h a o t i c and c i n d e r - l i k e . (Even t h i s view i s not u l t i m a t e , but merely designed t o s a t i s f y temporary human analogies and wants.) (Speculations , 221.) -65-Hulme i s not advancing an atomistic outlook to r e a l i t y . He i s not im-plying that there i s a single irreducible u n i t , the cinder, hut that a l l i s necessarily i n a continual state of f l u x and change and that the "cinder" i s just a convenient f i c t i o n . Dr.. Marcus Fiery substan-t i a t e s t h i s view on the basis of modern experimentation. He writes, Atoms, as we know them today, have hardly anything more i n common with the notion that was intended by the inventors of the atomic concept. In p a r t i c u l a r , atoms are not the ultimate irreducible e n t i t i e s •which one might take as a basis f o r explaining Nature. In f a c t , • 'i i t i s doubtful whether any such 'ultimate' unit-rexists at a l l . ' The conclusion to be drawn from Hulme's theory thus f a r , apart from i t s prophetic role i n r e l a t i o n to modem s c i e n t i f i c discoveries, i s that language i s completely f i c t i t i o u s by i t s very nature, and at i t s very best can only be "behind the times" i n i t s description of.a con-t i n u a l l y changing instant of time. Or, to co-ordinate Cinders once more with the Bergsonian time-concept given at the beginning of t h i s chapter, language i s out of time, and can never refer to r e a l i t y . Hulme has succeeded i n presenting'a Weltanschauung which, i n virt u e of i t s basic premises, i s the broad framework f o r a l l other Weltanschauungs. I f r e a l i t y i s defined as chaotic, confused and con-1'Quoted, i n "The End of Atomism," i n The Sciences, New York, New York Academy of Sciences, volume 3> number 3> July 1, 196>3> P* -66-t r a d i c t o r y , then a l l expressions may he e q u a l l y v a l i d , i n that a l l are eq u a l l y i n v a l i d . J u s t as the r e a l world i s capable of an i n f i n i t e number of p o s s i b i l i t i e s , so language expression i s u n l i m i t e d i n i t s s c o p e . Hulme a s s e r t s "That the world i s f i n i t e . . . a n d t h a t i t i s yet an i n f i n i t u d e of cinders (there i s no f i n i t e law encompassing a l l . ) " ( S peculations, 222.) Since the world e x i s t s , i n r e a l time, r e a l dura-t i o n , and change i s the o n l y constant, i t i s not subject to the l i m i -t a t i o n s of space and w i l l t h e r e f o r e never exhaust the p o s s i b i l i t i e s of d i f f e r e n c e s . Man, on the other hand, l i v e s i n the world of space and must f e e l secure i n an i n h e r e n t l y insecure world. He has an i n -f i n i t e scope f o r n o v e l t y of s e l f - e x p r e s s i o n . Hulme b e l i e v e s t h a t , The t r u t h i s t h a t there are no u l t i -mate p r i n c i p l e s , upon which the whole of knowledge can be b u i l t once and f o r -ever as upon a rock. But there are an i n f i n i t y of analogues, which help us along, and give us a f e e l i n g of power over the chaos when we perceive them. The f i e l d i s i n f i n i t e and h e K i n l i e s the chance f o r o r i g i n a l i t y . Here there are some new th i n g s under the sun. (Perhaps i t would be b e t t e r to say t h a t there are some new th i n g s under the moon, f o r here i s the l a n d pre-eminently of'shadows, f a n c i e s and analogies.) ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 233-234.) Hulme's d e s c r i p t i o n of 'language as forming a moon-world as op-posed to the r e a l world "under the sun" leads s t r a i g h t t o the core of h i s b e l i e f s about language, a r t and u n i t y . I t i s quite obvious already t h a t language i s separate from r e a l i t y , t h a t i t i s o n l y t h e -67-instrument of communication. Yet when Hulme allows f o r the i n t r o d u c -t i o n of new elements i n t o language he would seem t o be c o n t r a d i c t i n g the whole n o t i o n o f mechanical time as'being fixed,and s t a t i c . T his seeming c o n t r a d i c t i o n can be explained away by Hulme's p o s t u l a t i o n of p l u r a l i t y as being the norm of the mechanical world combined w i t h h i s conception o f man as a k i n d of "sorting-machine." In other words, there are ah i n f i n i t e number of p o s s i b l e p a t t e r n s i n t o which man can arrange h i s experience, which he does, i n s t i n c t i v e l y . Once the e l e -ments of experience have been named, or given counters, t h i s order-ing i s accomplished by s e l e c t i o n o r abstraction from among them. B r i e f l y , order i m p l i e s choice, (and on Hulme's theory, the choices could, o f course, be, i n f i n i t e i n number) and i t i s by t h i s f a c i l i t y f o r making a choice t h a t man i s able to develop a s a t i s f a c t o r y out-l o o k t o ex i s t e n c e . A j u d i c i o u s choice o f i l l u s i o n s , l e a d i n g t o a c t i v i t i e s planned and c a r r i e d out, i s the only means of happiness, e.g., the e x h i l a r a t i o n o f regarding l i f e as a proce s s i o n o r a war. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 232.) What Hulme i s saying, v i r t u a l l y , i s t h a t all.words are i l l u s i o n s which men use as b u i l d i n g b l o c k s i n order to b u i l d t h e i r f u t u r e i n terms of the present. With regard to choice, i t must always be remembered th a t i t i s a r t i f i c i a l and a r b i t r a r y , t h a t there w i l l be countless elements i t has not i n c l u d e d o r accounted f o r . Choice i m p l i e s the l e a v i n g out of other t h i n g s o f equal v a l i d i t y , but j u s t not of equal relevance to - 6 8 -the d e s i r e s of a human being. 'Thus Hulme can define " A l l t h e o r i e s as t o y s " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 100.) which men can p l a y w i t h and which s a t i s f y t h e i r d e s i r e f o r s e c u r i t y i n a strange and inconstant world. In making language synonymous w i t h i l l u s i o n , Hulme i s saying, i n e f f e c t , t h a t man l i v e s i n a world of dreams. The m o t i v a t i o n behind the dreams i s the s a t i s f a c t i o n o f human d e s i r e s , s p e c i f i c a l l y , the d e s i r e t o perceive the world i n a u n i f i e d way, which i s contrary to the nature of r e a l i t y . The aim Of science and of a l l thought i s to reduce the complex and i n e v i t a b l y disconnected world of g r i t and cinders to a few i d e a l counters, which we can move about and so form an u n g r i t l i k e p i c t u r e of r e a l i t y - - o n e f l a t t e r i n g to our.sense of power over the world. . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 22k.) Man l i v e s i n a. world apart from r e a l i t y , i n h i s own a r t i f i c i a l l y con-t r i v e d u n i t y , w h i l e a l l around him i s chaos. Hulme sees " C e r t a i n groups of ideas as huts f o r men to l i v e i n . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 225.) In another context, he s t a t e s , "The, t r u t h remains t h a t the world i s not any u n i t y , but a house i n the cinders (outside 'in the c o l d , p r i -meval)." (S p e c u l a t i o n s , 223•) The image of the "house" can only have been c a r e f u l l y chosen by Hulme,-for i t conveys so s u c c i n t l y what he i s saying. The house, a r t i f i c i a l , b u i l t " up from the c i n d e r s , provides p r o t e c t i o n and i s o l a t i o n from the chaos under i t . . I t enables man t o l i v e i n s e c u r i t y . Probably because i t so serves as an image f o r h i s theory, Hulme says, "there i s only one a r t t h a t moves me: a r c h i t e c --69-t u r e . " (Speculations, 238.) But the s e c u r i t y i s ephemeral and Hulme o f t e n p o i n t s out the p r o c l i v i t y of a l l . m a t t e r t o r e v e r t t o chaos. He draws his.examples from i l l n e s s , d i s g u s t , death. Man has b u i l t h i s house on the sand. Man h i m s e l f i s but a cindery t h i n g , p a r t a k i n g of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the f l u x . I f such i s the case, then man can i n no way c o n s t i t u t e a u n i t y , except i n so f a r as he i s manipulated i n terms of counters. Hulme's b e l i e f i n O r i g i n a l S i n should have been shaken at t h i s p o i n t , but he gives no i n d i c a t i o n - t h a t he was aware of t h i s c o n t r a d i c t i o n . Man i s the chaos h i g h l y organized, but l i a b l e t o r e v e r t t o chaos at any moment. Happiness and ecstasy at present unstable. Walking.in the s t r e e t , seeing p r e t t y g i r l s ( a l l chaos put i n t o the d r a i n s : not seen) and wondering what they would l o o k l i k e i l l . Men laughing at a bar --but w a i t t i l l the fundamental chaos r e v e a l s i t s e l f . ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 227.) Hulme i s c o n s t a n t l y reminded of t h e . c o n t r a s t between man-made or g a n i -z a t i o n and the f l o w of c i n d e r s . I t i s h i s awareness of t h i s c o n t r a s t t h a t makes Hulme contemptuous of a l l t h e o r i e s t h a t push '.counters i n t o a s y n t h e s i s . He i s always aware of the tag-ends, of cinders which they d i d not i n c l u d e , and of t h e i r - remoteness from r e a l i t y . He f r e q u e n t l y juxtaposes the dream and the r e a l i t y , t o p o i n t but the a b s u r d i t y of the former. •. . 1 P h i l o s o p h i c a l syntheses and e t h i c a l systems are o n l y p o s s i b l e i n arm-c h a i r moments. They are seen t o be meaningless as soon as we get i n t o a bus w i t h a d i r t y baby and a crowd. (Spe c u l a t i o n s , 228-229.) -70--Reality c o n s t a n t l y p o i n t s out the senselessness o f man's i n t e l l e c -t u a l endeavours. I t shows the a b s u r d i t y of t r y i n g to. f i t chaos i n t o a system. Despite the f r a g i l i t y of a l l attempts at s y n t h e s i s , man must have h i s house i n the c i n d e r s , and a r t t o Hulme i s another s h e l t e r outside r e a l i t y . He harbours no i l l u s i o n s t h a t poetry can be m o r a l l y u p l i f t i n g or d i d a c t i c i n any way. For him i t i s only " f o r the amuse-ments of bankers and other sedentary arm-chair people i n a f t e r dinner moods." (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 92.) A l l a r t achieves i s t o provide man w i t h the t o o l s t o organize h i s l i f e . There must be something on "which we can hang up our hat. B e t t e r some-t h i n g to which, when f o r a surging moment we,have a f e e l i n g ( r e a l l y the cinders drunk f o r a minute) .we can r e f e r i t . L i t e r a t u r e as a b u i l d i n g up of t h i s s t a t e of reference. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 89-90.) A r t i s the conveyor of r a r e moments of s y n t h e s i s ; i t s e l e c t s , b u i l d s up and makes concrete what are otherwise o n l y vague passing sensa-t i o n s i n the. mind. By so doing i t provides a u n i f i e d f i c t i o n which men can r e f e r to as a f a c t and use as anEans of communication. These p a r t i c u l a r f i c t i o n s are then sometimes prolonged, made to apply t o a g r e a t e r range of experience. Thus Hulme st a t e s t h a t the l i t e r a r y man i s always s t r i v i n g ' f o r "the c r e a t i o n of h i s own chessboard." (Further  S p e c u l a t i o n s , 9k.) •-71-The chess-board v o r i d provided by the a r t i s t , .the " s t a t e of re-ference" • a r t b u i l d s up, i s nothing more than an escape from r e a l i t y , "an escape t o the i n f i n i t e . " Because of the s c a t t e r e d nature of the Cinders notes, Hulme never r e a l l y d e f i n e s vhat he means b y ' " i n -f i n i t e , " but i n view o f the other statements he makes about a r t i n somevhat the same context, i t i s much c l o s e r to the realm of r e l i g -ious values than t o the realm of s c i e n t i f i c and mathematical knov-ledge, and. comes near t o the Romantic stand v h i c h he condemned f o r "dragging i n the i n f i n i t e . " A r t c o n t r i b u t e s to the c r e a t i o n of another world, v h i c h nourishes man's sense of the i n f i n i t e . The u n i v e r s a l conspiracy:, other people unconsciously provide the sentimental s p e c t a c l e i n v h i c h you l u x u r i a t e . The . world ±s_ nothing- more or less, than a stage. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 232.) The a c t i v i t i e s o f the stage are a b s o l u t e l y a l i e n t o r e a l i t y , i n no way bearing-reminders of t h e i r source. In a sense a l l i d e a l s must be d i v o r c e d , t o r n away from the r e a l i t y where we found them and put on a stage. They must appear separate and f a r from a l l d i r t and l a u g h t e r at t h e i r low and common r e l a t i o n s . They must be posed and moved d r a m a t i c a l l y , and above a l l , t h e i r gestures must express t h e i r emotions. This i s the a r t of l i t e r a t u r e , the making of t h i s other world. . They must wear high-heeled shoes which make them appear f r e e movers, and not sprung from t h a t low t h i n g E a r t h . The separation of • the h i g h h e e l and the powdered face i s e s s e n t i a l t o a l l emotions, i n order t o make a work of a r t . (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 90-) Hulme f i n d s many examples o f t h i s s e paration from r e a l i t y which i s the character o f a r t . A g i r l ' s " h a l l - d r e s s and shoes are symbolic o f the world organized ( i n counters) from the mud. Separate from contact." ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 227.) But the most important f e a t u r e of t h i s ' o t h e r world i s u n i t y , wherein the form contains the .content. In order t o achieve t h i s u n i t y , the a r t i s t must work w i t h the c i n d e r s , p l y i n g them, u n t i l they a l l add.up to .the v i s i o n of a new world. Not s u f f i c i e n t to f i n d a nalogies. I t i s necessary t o f i n d those t h a t add something t o each, and give a sense 'of wonder, a sense o f being u n i t e d i n another mystic world... (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 88.) This other mystic world i s v a r i o u s l y r e f e r r e d to by Hulme as " l i f e seen i n a m i r r o r " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 8 8 . ) , and "other-world-through the g l a s s . " (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 87.) The q u a l i t y of t h i s o t h e r world o b v i o u s l y c o n s i s t s i n a paradox; i t must be a l i v e , and yet not subject t o death. I n t h i s , i t i s i n f i n i t e . The image t h a t most impressed Hulme as conveying e x a c t l y t h i s i n f i n i t e q u a l i t y was the dancer, who represented a p e r f e c t s y n t h e s i s of form and content, who expressed "the o r g a n i s a t i o n of c i n d e r s , f i n a l l y emancipated!' (S p e c u l a t i o n s , 235-) Each dancer on the stage w i t h her e f f e c t s and her suggestions of i n t e n s i t y of meaning which are not p o s s i b l e , i s not h e r s e l f (that i s a very cindery t h i n g ) but a., synthesized s t a t e of mind i n me. The red moving -73-f i g u r e i s a way of grouping some ideas together, j u s t as powerful as .the one c a l l e d l o g i c which i s only an analogy to counter-pushing. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 89.) The dancer i s not a "cindery t h i n g , " subject t o the l i m i t a t i o n s of time, but e x i s t s i n the mystic world, t i m e l e s s and i n f i n i t e . Her gestures express her emotions w i t h no v e r b a l i n t e r f e r e n c e . Her being i s i d e n t i f i e d w i t h what she does. . Hulme wanted the l i t e r a r y image to possess the same q u a l i t y as the dancer. Whereas "...reader take's words as x without the meaning attached. Aphra sees each word w i t h an.image s t i c k i n g on t o i t , never a f l a t word passed over a board l i k e a counter." (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 78.) He described h i s own f e e l i n g s about words i n the same way (Further  S p e c u l a t i o n s , 8 2 . ) , keeping always w i t h i n h i m s e l f ' t h e v i s i o n , the syn-t h e s i s , which, was l o s t i n a counter. A word must be a l i v e t h i n g , yet contained i n i t s form. I t means what i t i s . I t stands up. ( c f . Further  S p e c u l a t i o n s , 86.) The c r e a t i o n of the mystic world where t h i n g s l i v e and yet are dead i s Hulme's d e f i n i t i o n of the f u n c t i o n of a r t . The conclusion cf the Cinders theory i s th a t there i s No Geist without ghost This i s the o n l y t r u t h i n the subject. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 24-3.) In other words, there i s no s p i r i t without death, no meaning without form. What Hulme i s saying, as. was mentioned i n the chapter on aes-t h e t i c s , i s t h a t u n i t y i m p l i e s death. U n i t y i s a complete removal -Ik-from the v o r l d of r e a l . t i m e i n vhich- a l l i s f l u x and change. Yet i t i s s t i l l not i n the dead v o r l d of matter vhere time i s made to stand s t i l l . - I t i s found i n a magic, mystic w o r l d v h i c h a r t creates. The u n i t y of a r t cannot he compared t o consciousness i n the u s u a l sense i n v h i c h Hulme uses the vord. This consciousness i s always ex-tremely ephemeral, tenuous and incomplete. At one p o i n t he s t a t e s , Only i n the f a c t of consciousness i s <• there any u n i t y i n the world. Cf. Ox-f o r d S t r e e t at 2 A.M. A l l the mud, • endless, except where bound together by the s p e c t a t o r . (Speculations, 222-223-) Consciousness can only u n i f y a p a r t of r e a l i t y and the u n i t y i t e f f e c t s i s always f r i n g e d w i t h c i n d e r s . ' S i m i l a r l y , o n ly when the mind takes i n impressions i s there any u n i t y i n i t , but t h i s i s j u s t f o r - a par-t i c u l a r moment, which w i l l be r e l a t i v e t o a l l other p a r t i c u l a r moments. A melancholy s p i r i t , the mind l i k e a great desert l i f e l e s s , and the sound of march music i n the s t r e e t , passes l i k e a wave over t h a t d e s e r t , u n i f i e s i t , but then goes. ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , 2^5-) Consciousness i s o n l y o c c a s i o n a l and even then f l e e t i n g , always flow-i n g on w i t h the f l u x . The a r t i s t , however, holds "on through waves" (Fu r t h e r . S p e c u l a t i o n s , 8 0 . ) , ' and h i s work has a. u n i t y made concrete, cut o f f from the tag-ends of c i n d e r s . A r t sets the cinders f r e e from t h e i r s e r v i t u d e t o the f l u x . A s u i t a b l e analogy t o Hulme's d e f i n i t i o n o f a r t would be a shadow, cut o f f from the o b j e c t which i t r e f l e c t e d , yet keeping the a t t r i b u t e s of l i f e . A r t i s a moving shadow. -75-A r t may be a moving shadow, e x i s t i n g i n a mystic world, but Hulme makes no p r o v i s i o n f o r i t on the grounds of h i s Cinders theory. , His conception of the world t h a t a r t creates d e f i e s e x p l a n a t i o n i n terms of h i s b a s i c statements. The f a c t t h a t Hulme a t t r i b u t e s magical q u a l i -t i e s t o a r t does not a s s i s t i n any way, except perhaps t o make h i s ideas more confusing t o i n t e r p r e t . The f a c t t h a t he enters the camp of h i s enemies, the Romantics, as soon as he defines a r t has been, ex-c e l l e n t l y handled by many w r i t e r s , p a r t i c u l a r l y " F r a n k Kermode i n h i s Romantic Image. Kermode places Hulme i n the Romantic t r a d i i o n l a r g e l y because Hulme allows the a r t i s t "access t o realms of t r u t h h a b i t u a l l y 1 Pi ' i n a c c e s s i b l e . . . " x The i n t u i t i o n w i t h which Hulme c r e d i t s the poet, i s almost i d e n t i c a l w i t h the Romantic imagination, Kermode b e l i e v e s , except in, so f a r as Hulme i n s i s t s on the f i n i t e nature of the object of i n t u i t i o n . Murray K r i e g e r ' s examination of Hulmian a e s t h e t i c s . i n The Hew A p o l o g i s t s f o r Poetry reaches the same co n c l u s i o n . The b a s i c , (and perhaps only) d i s t i n c t i o n between Hulme.'s i n t u i t i o n and,the Ro-mantic imagination i s the d i f f e r e n c e i n the d e f i n i t i o n s of r e a l i t y given by the'two views. In the case of Coleridge's concept of the imagination f o r example, "The poet's imagination, i n d e a l i n g w i t h the p a r t i c u l a r , can, through i t s c r e a t i v i t y and i t s organic powers of u n i f i c a t i o n , harmonize the concrete and the f i n i t e w i t h the u n i v e r s a l , the i n f i n i t e , the r e a l . But f o r Hulme, f o l l o w i n g Bergson, u n i v e r s a l s are not r e a l i t y but are a r i d superimpositions upon r e a l i t y which are 1 ^ F r a n k Kermode, The Romantic'Image, London, Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1957. - 7 6 - . demanded by our p r a c t i c a l p r o p e n s i t i e s . " " ^ Both w r i t e r s emphasize Hulme's i n s i s t e n c e on the f i n i t e nature of the image and the u n i t y o f y i t a l i t y he a t t r i b u t e d t o i t . Yet n e i t h e r man t r a c e d the p o s s i -b i l i t i e s f o r t h i s u n i t y i n terms of the t o t a l p i c t u r e of'Hulme's thought. The present work has attempted t o conduct such a search i n the b e l i e f • t h a t i t was worthwhile t o f o l l o w the concept:of u n i t y throughout Hulme's w r i t i n g s , and t r y t o di s c o v e r some b a s i s f o r the p a r t i c u l a r u n i t y he.allows the image. The Cinders theory provides no b a s i s f o r u n i t y . In f a c t , i t ' r e s t s on a complete d e n i a l . o f absolute u n i t y and i n the acceptance of the r e l a t i v i t y of a l l knowledge. The b a s i c f l u x , the general " l a v a f l o w of c i n d e r s " i s a l l , i n which t h i n g s come f o r t h , change, d i e . "The world l i v e s i n order to develop the l i n e s on ±s fa c e . " (Specu- l a t i o n s , 229>) Opposed t o t h i s are the f e e b l e attempts of man t o or-ganize the. chaos and reduce a l l cinders t o counters, then move the counters around the organized chess-board u n t i l everything i s ac-counted f o r and reduced t o a single., all-encompassing unity.. But the cinders always defy counters and l i f e can never be completely organized i n s p a t i a l terms, f o r the reason t h a t the cinders are . a l -ways changing. Y et, a r t on the Cinders theory i s l i f e without change, l i f e t h a t i s form. A r t i s a s o r t of v i t a l chess-board. There can be no doubt t h a t the world of a r t as Hulme describes ^Murray K r i e g e r , The Mew A p o l o g i s t s f o r Poetry, Minneapolis, The U n i v e r s i t y of-'Minnesota Press, 1956, p. 3^-fr. - T T - ; i t i s an i d e a l w o r l d , f r e e from the l i m i t a t i o n s o f f l u x and the con-d i t i o n s of change and death which i t imposes. Yet i t i s not, i n the f i n a l estimate, m a t e r i a l , because, u n l i k e the language which i s the m a t e r i a l world, i t leaves no f r i n g e of cinders'unaccounted f o r . Furthermore, a r t i s a l i v e , whereas matter i s dead. Yet both partake of u n i t y . This i s the crux o f the ambiguity of the concept of u n i t y i n Hulme's thought. U n i t y i m p l i e s death, t o Hulme, because i t i s r e -mote from, unattached t o , the f l u x o f l i f e . At the same time; u n i t y i m p l i e s l i f e , l i f e at i t s most p e r f e c t . I t i m p l i e s l i f e w i t h i n -herent organization.. • . .:Hulme's d e f i n i t i o n of a r t seems t o resemble, most.closely h i s d e f i n i t i o n of the e t e r n a l values o f ' r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s . L i k e those v a l u e s , a r t i s beyond l i f e , yet has s i m i l a r i t i e s w i t h the mechanis-t i c realm. Hulme's p a u c i t y of comments on the character of the r e -l i g i o u s and e t h i c a l values i s f r u s t r a t i n g here, but i t i s reasonable to assume th a t the terms i n which he defined a r t are very near t o h i s conception of those v a l u e s . At t h s p o i n t , the l i m i t s of u n i t y which ' Hulme e s t a b l i s h e d i n h i s metaphysics are broken down. A l l three' of the realms which he so dogmatically a s s e r t e d were independent and dis c o n t i n u o u s , coalesce i n h i s theory o f a r t . A r t , t o Hulme, appears' to have the st a t u s o f a continuous u n i t y , encompassing a l l spheres wfchin i t s form. A r t would seem t o provide a glimpse i n t o e t e r n i t y . Yet there i s one important q u a l i f i c a t i o n . . A r t can never pro-v i d e more than a glimpse i n t o e t e r n i t y . U n l i k e the values of r e l i g i o n • -78-and e t h i c s , v h i c h are e t e r n a l , a r t i s ephemeral, t r a n s i e n t . I t i s the r e s u l t o f a new sensation, a new discovery'and i t w i l l e v e n t u a l l y become commonplace. "Wonder can o n l y be the a t t i t u d e o f a man pas-s i n g from one stage t o another; i t can never be a permanently f i x e d t h i n g . " ( S p e c u l a t i o n s , IkO.) A r t presents a novel p e r c e p t i o n , which at f i r s t might seem strange, but. On more f a m i l i a r grounds, l o s e s i t s appeal. I t i s the stranger t h a t sees the romantic and the b e a u t i f u l i n the commonplace, c f . i n New York, or i n strange c i t y , detached and there-f o r e able t o see beauty and romance. (Further S p e c u l a t i o n s , 99 •) The "other world" which a r t conveys i s , fundamentally, o n l y a hew set of c a t e g o r i e s , enabling man to per c e i v e the f l u x i n a d i f f e r e n t way. A work of a r t can f i n d i t s p l a c e , i n p a r t , on the Cinders theory. L i k e a p h i l o s o p h i c a l theory, a r t i s a f i n i t e u n i t y among an i n f i n i t e number o f - p o s s i b l e f i n i t e u n i t i e s . The u n i t y o f a r t , however, i s unique, and cannot be explained i n terms of any other aspect of Hulme's thought. -79-CONCLUSiON In h i s metaphysics, Hulme d e l i n e a t e s the l i m i t s of u n i t y and gives h i s d e f i n i t i o n s of u n i t y . He allows 'unity to c h a r a c t e r i z e only the realm of absolute r e l i g i o u s and e t h i c a l v a l u e s , and the realm which c o n s i s t s of the knowledge of mathematics and the phy-s i c a l s c iences. Hulme describes the kinds of u n i t y of these two realms as being s i m i l a r t o one another i n some respects and d i s -s i m i l a r i n others. Both realms are s i m i l a r i n t h a t they are a n t i -v i t a l , completely d i s j o i n e d from the t h i r d realm of l i f e . The values of r e l i g i o n and e t h i c s , however, are e t e r n a l and changeless, e x i s t i n g o u t side space and time. The u n i t y o f . t h i s realm i s absolute, unknowable by man. The u n i t y which c h a r a c t e r i z e s the realm' of mathe-matics and p h y s i c s , on the other hand, i s the product of the human i n t e l l e c t which conceptualizes the continuous f l u x o f l i f e , per-c e i v i n g i t i n u n i f i e d terms. The u n i t y of t h i s realm c o n s i s t s i n language, which f i x e s , or makes s t a t i c , passing waves of the f l u x , ~by.c a p p l y i n g words to them. As Hulme p o i n t s out, the language of the m a t e r i a l realm always leaves something out; i n . o t h e r words, i t c o n s i s t s i n an a r b i t r a r y u n i t y . Change can occur i n t h i s realm when new f a c t s are introduced, but the tendency of man t o t r y t o organize new f a c t s i n t o a system i s i n e v i t a b l e . These u n i f i e d sys-tems of the m a t e r i a l world, are, h o w e v e r , . f i n i t e , and r e l a t i v e t o other f i n i t e systems. The t h i r d realm which Hulme p o s t u l a t e s , the -80-realm of l i f e , i s continuous f l u x , wherein change i s the constant and u n i t y i s impossible. B a s i c a l l y , then, i n terms of Hulme's metaphysics, u n i t y can ex-i s t o n l y i n the realms of r e l i g i o u s and e t h i c a l values o r i n the m a t e r i a l world of p h y s i c a l science and mathematics, wherein the u n r i s s u p p l i e d by language. Furthermore, Hulme i s emphatic t h a t no communion or c o n t i n u i t y can e x i s t among the three realms he defines There i s no one b a s i c u n i t y , which, i f discovered, would e x p l a i n e verything. Yet Hulme's theory of a r t , e s s e n t i a l l y h i s theory of the image seems t o represent a cohesion of a l l three' of the realms which he p o s t u l a t e s i n h i s metaphysics, s i g n i f y i n g a complete c o n t r a d i c t i o n of h i s b a s i c b e l i e f i n d i s c o n t i n u i t y . The a e s t h e t i c image, l i k e re l i g i o u s and e t h i c a l v a l u e s , i s remote from time and space, yet un-l i k e those values i t i s not e t e r n a l . At the same time, the image partakes of the v i t a l i t y of l i f e , yet i t i s l i f e organized-, l i f e completed. In i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , i t i s a k i n t o the m a t e r i a l realm, yet i n i t s v i t a l i t y i t i s d i s s i m i l a r t o i t . The image partakes of a l l three realms and would seem t o represent the one b a s i c u n i t y which Hulme's metaphysics s t a t e s i s an i m p o s s i b i l i t y . But Hulme allows f o r t h i s i m p o s s i b i l i t y , probably unknowingly, i n a r t . The u n i t y of the image i s a t o t a l c o n t r a d i c t i o n of Hulme's metaphysics. However, Hulme allows i t only an ephemeral e x i s t e n c e , before i t de-generates i n t o the a r b i t r a r y u n i t y of the m a t e r i a l realm. The imag -81-of a r t i s a p e r f e c t e d f i n i t e , which momentarily permits a glimpse of e t e r n i t y . Hulme's idea of u n i t y cannot he g e n e r a l i z e d . He circumscribes u n i t y w i t h i n c e r t a i n realms, d e f i n i n g i t d i f f e r e n t l y i n each case, and then allows the boundaries to f a l l when he1 defines a r t . U n i t y , to Hulme, then, has many meanings, t a k i n g on d i f f e r e n t meanings i n d i f f e r e n t contexts. -82-BIBLIOGRAPHY I. B i b l i o g r a p h i e s Consulted A b s t r a c t s of E n g l i s h Studies. Boulder, Colorado: N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l of Teachers of E n g l i s h , 1959-1962. Essay and General L i t e r a t u r e Index. New York: H. W. Wilson Com-pany, I90O-I961. Index t o . L i t t l e Magazines. Denver, Colorado: A l a n Swallow, 19^9-1959-K u n i t z , Stanley J . and Ha y c r a f t , Howard. Twentieth Century Authors. New York: . H. W. Wilson Company,- 1942. Modern Humanities Research A s s o c i a t i o n . Annual B i b l i o g r a p h y o f  E n g l i s h Language and Li t e r a t u r e . / ' Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1921-1960. Modern Language A s s o c i a t i o n of America. American B i b l i o g r a p h y ( i n PMLA), I9V7-I962. ' Watson, George. Concise Cambridge B i b l i o g r a p h y of E n g l i s h L i t e r a - t u r e , 600-1950- Cambridge: Cambridge U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1958. Year's Work i n ' E n g l i s h Studies. E d i t e d f o r the E n g l i s h A s s o c i a t i o n . Oxford: Oxford U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1919-1960. I I . . Books Consulted Bayley, John. The Romantic S u r v i v a l : A Study i n P o e t i c E v o l u t i o n . London: Constable, 1957-Bentley, E r i c , e d i t o r . The Importance o f S c r u t i n y . New York: Geor W. Stewart, 1948. Bergson, H e n r i . An I n t r o d u c t i o n t o Metaphysics. Translat ed by ,T. E Hulme. London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1912. . C r e a t i v e E v o l u t i o n . T r a n s l a t e d by Arthur M i t c h e l l . London: MacMillan and Company L t d . , 1911. Brooks, Cleanth and W i l l i a m K. Wims.ath, J r . L i t e r a r y C r i t i c i s m : A  Short H i s t o r y . New York: A l f r e d A. Knopf, 1962. — -83-Collingwood, R.'.G. The Idea of Mature. Oxford: Clarendon P r e s s , 1945. Daiches, David. Poetry and the Modern World. Chicago: U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago Press, 19^0. . The Present- Age. London:- Cresset Press, 1958-E p s t e i n , Jacob. Let There Be Sculpture.• London: Readers Union L t d . , 19^2. • f Ford, Boris,- e d i t o r . The Modern Age. Volume 7> New York: Penguin Books, 1961. " ' -Hough, Graham. Image and Experience: Studies i n a L i t e r a r y Revolu- t i o n . • London:Duckworth, i 9 6 0 . ' The Last Romantics. London: Methuen, 1961. Hughes, Glenn. Imagism and the Imagists. Stanford, C a l i f o r n i a : S t anford U n i v e r s i t y P ress, 1931-Hulme, Thomas Ernest. F u r t h e r Speculations. E d i t e d by Sam Hynes. Minneapolis: U n i v e r s i t y of. Minnesota P r e s s , 1955-• Speculations. E d i t e d by Herbert Read. London: Kegan, P a u l , Trench, Trubner and Company, L t d . , 192k. Jones, Alun R. L i f e and Opinions of T. E. Hulme. Boston: Beacon Pr e s s , i960. . Kermode, Frank. Romantic Image. London: Routledge and Kegan P a u l , 1961. K r i e g e r , Murray. The New A p o l o g i s t s f o r Poetry. Minneapolis: Uni-v e r s i t y of Minnesota P r e s s , 1956. Noi'fc, Kathleen. The Emperor's Clothes. London: W i l l i a m Heinemann L t d . , 1953-Read, S i r Herbert. The- True Voice of F e e l i n g . London: Faber' and • Faber, 1953-Richards, I . A. The Philosophy of R h e t o r i c . New York: Oxford U n i -v e r s i t y P r ess, 1936. - 8 4 -Roberts, M i c h a e l . T. E• Hulme. London: Faber and Faber, 1938. Schorer, M., J . M i l e s and G. McKenzie. C r i t i c i s m : The Foundations  of Modern L i t e r a r y Judgment. ' New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1948. Squire, J . C' • The Honeysuckle and the Bee. • New York: E. P. Dutton and Company, -Inc., 1938-V i v a s , E l i s e o and Murray K r i e g e r , e d i t o r s . The Problems of Aes- t h e t i c s . New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc., 1958. West, R. B. Essays i n Modern L i t e r a r y C r i t i c i s m . New York: Rine-h a r t and Company, Inc., 1952. I I I . A r t i c l e s Consulted Anonymous. "The End of Atomism," The Sciences, I I I ( J u l y 1, 1963), 4S7. .Anonymous. " I n t e l l e c t u a l Policeman," Times L i t e r a r y Supplement, No.-30^3 (June 2k, i 9 6 0 ) , 400. B e l g i o n , Montgomery. "In Memory of T. E. Hulme-," Saturday Review  of L i t e r a t u r e , IV (October 1, 1927), 154-5. Coffman, Stanley K. , J r . "Imagism: The C o n t r i b u t i o n of T. E. Hulme and E z r a Pound t o E n g l i s h Poetry, 1908-17," Ohio State  U n i v e r s i t y A b s t r a c t s of D o c t o r a l D i s s e r t a t i o n s , #57, 3 9 - 4 5 -D a n i e l l s , J . R. "T. S.. E l i o t and His R e l a t i o n t o T. E. Hulme," U n i v e r s i t y of Toronto Q u a r t e r l y , I I ( A p r i l , 1933), 38O-396. F l e t c h e r , Edward G. "Imagism--Some Notes and Documents," Texas  University Department of English.. Studies i n E n g l i s h , XXVI (1947), 184-208. Jones, Alun R. "Notes Toward a H i s t o r y of Imagism," South A t l a n t i c .. Q u a r t e r l y , LX (Summer, 1961), 262-285. . "T. E. Hulme, Wilhelm Worringer and the Urge t o A b s t r a c t i o n , " B r i t i s h J o u r n a l of A e s t h e t i c s , I (L960), 1-7. Josephson, C l i f f o r d Anthan. "An Image of T. E. Hulme," D i s s e r - t a t i o n A b s t r a c t s , XVII (1957), IO85. - 8 5 -MacShane, F. "To E s t a b l i s h the Facts: A Communication on Mr. A. R. Jones and F. Madox Ford," S o u t h ' A t l a n t i c Q u a r t e r l y , LXI . (Spring, 1962), 200-265. Martin., W. "T. E. Hulme: A B i b l i o g r a p h i c a l Note," Notes and Queries, IX (August, 1962), 8. Roberts, Michael. "Reviev of L i f e , " Times L i t e r a r y Supplement, No. 1583 (June h, 1932), 38U. . "The Categories o f T . E. Hulme," C r i t e r i o n , X I I ( A p r i l , 1932), 375-385. Stone, Edward. "Further Speculations o f T. E. Hulme. (Review)," South A t l a n t i c Q u a r t e r l y , LV ( A p r i l , 1956), 256-257-) Waggoner, H. H. "T. S. E l i o t and the Hollow Men," American  L i t e r a t u r e , XV (May 19^3), 101-126. Ward, A. "Speculations on E l i o t ' s Time-World: An A n a l y s i s of the Family Reunion i n R e l a t i o n t o Hulme.and Bergson," American  L i t e r a t u r e , XXI (March, 19^9), 18-3I+. 

Cite

Citation Scheme:

        

Citations by CSL (citeproc-js)

Usage Statistics

Share

Embed

Customize your widget with the following options, then copy and paste the code below into the HTML of your page to embed this item in your website.
                        
                            <div id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidgetDisplay">
                            <script id="ubcOpenCollectionsWidget"
                            src="{[{embed.src}]}"
                            data-item="{[{embed.item}]}"
                            data-collection="{[{embed.collection}]}"
                            data-metadata="{[{embed.showMetadata}]}"
                            data-width="{[{embed.width}]}"
                            async >
                            </script>
                            </div>
                        
                    
IIIF logo Our image viewer uses the IIIF 2.0 standard. To load this item in other compatible viewers, use this url:
http://iiif.library.ubc.ca/presentation/dsp.831.1-0105772/manifest

Comment

Related Items