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Representative philosophies of immanent social change from Vico to Pitrim Sorokin Garstin, Lawrence Hamilton 1946

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REPRESENTATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OP IMMANENT SOCIAL CHANGE PROM VICO TO PI TRIM SOROKIN By L. H. Garstin A Thesis Submitted i n P a r t i a l Fulfilment of the Requirements f o r the Degree of MASTER OP ARTS In'the Department of PHILOSOPHY The University of B r i t i s h Columbia, A p r i l 1946 KEPKHSEHTATITBB. PHILOSOPHIES OP IMMAHE3JT SOCIAL CHANGE FROM VIGO TO PITRHI SORGKIN M I B OP CONTENTS 1. PREFACE Al© ACKNOWIEBGM&NT* • *P1, GIOVANNI BATTI5TA VICO'S "LA. SC3ENZA MIOVA" A* Biographical Sketch B o Philosophical Scheme 1, Methods of Investigation 2* The Three Ages of Men &. She Theory of Reflux 4.. C r i t i c a l Resaxks HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OP IHSTCET" A© Biographical S&eteh B« Social Philosophy 1. Cr i t i c i sm of Hi s tor i ca l Research 2. The Concept of •'Spirit' 3 . Th® Concept of 'Freedom* 4« Th© Dialect ic in History 5. The Movement of Social Chang© 6 . Appreciation and Cr i t i c i sm E I I G B L S . 1 "MgHBACBs. THE ROOTS OF THE SOCIALIST PHILOSOPHY A« Biographical Sketch B . Philosophical Syatesa l o Cr i t i c i sm of Hegel . 2 (Table of Contents,, Continued) 2.. The Consenrative and Radical in Hegel 3« The Movement of Socia l Change 4. The Mater ia l i s t ic Conception of History .&• Cr i t i c i sm of Engels* Theories ¥lLFRi3)Q PAR£TO*S «MH9D AHD SOCIETS^ Ae Biographical Sketch B . Philosophical System 1. Theoagr of Soc ia l Equil ibrium 2. Theory of Jfon-logieal Conduct 3. Ttisozy of Residues 4» Theory of Derivations 5*: Movement of Social Change 6 . C r i t i c a l Estimate and Evaluation PITRBI SORQKIU'S "SOCIAL A33P, CULTURAL DYNAMICS" A« Biographical Sketch B o Philosophical System 1. The Meaning of Culture 2. The Ideational Culture System 3. The Sensate Culture System 4. 'The Ideal ist ic Culture System 5*-The Reality ©f Culture Systems 6 . Fluctuations of Culture Systems as Revealed in Ethics 7. The Reason of Social Cheng© 8 0 The Recurrence of Culture ^pes 9m C r i t i c a l Reiaarks SHE FDTORB OP SCO to THEORY 1 PREFACE AM) ACKCTOWLKD GMEUT I began th i s investigation with the object of formulating and defending a philosophy of s o c i a l change that had gradually taken form in my mind i n the course of a. study of the h i s t o r y of the various phases of thought and of the psychology of s o c i a l processes. However, i n the course of reading what others had said on the subject i n the past, I discovered that many of the ideas I had in mind had already been formulated in a f a r more erudite and scholarly manner than i t would have been possible for me to formulate them. Accordingly, I decided that before I could put forward any theories of my own I would have, f i r s t of a l l , to make a c r i t i c a l survey of the philosophies of s o c i a l change h i t h e r -to propounded. This work, then, f a r from i t s o r i g i n a l intent, i s the f r u i t s of that survey. In undertaking a c r i t i c i s m of thi s nature, I have had to l i m i t the f i e l d in at least four respects. I have l i m i t e d i t to philosophies of immanent(l)social change, thereby ignoring the theories of e x t e r n a l i s t i c s o c i a l change including those of the b i o l o g i c a l and geographical schools. However t h i s i s j u s t i f i a h l e on the grounds that such theories are s o c i o l o g i c a l rather than p h i l o s o p h i c a l i n (l)By "philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change" i s meant those philosophies which view s o c i a l change i n society as occurring by virtue of forces inherent in the s o c i a l system of society itself. By "philosophies of e x t e r n a l i s t i c s o c i a l change" i s meant those philosophies of s o c i a l change which v i s u a l i z e change as occurring because of forces external to the s o c i a l system undergoing change. 11 their outlook.(X) Further, the criticism is limited to "representative" philosophies, which means the omission of any evaluation of the work of such men as Tarde, Weber and Tonybee. Again the length of some of the original sources has made it difficult to outline adequately the content of some of the theories without omitting many minor yet significant details. Finally, I began the survey with Vico because he represents the first attempt to construct a comprehensive philosophy of immanent social change. Polybius, Plato. Aristotle and Machiavelli had all expounded theories of social change before Vico but their theories are indidental to other aspects of their work and do not present fully thought through systems. Nevertheless It is hoped that this critical survey does reveal the values and the shortcomings of the development of the philosophy of immanent social change since the time of tfico and as such will prove of use to those who desire an over-all view of the main currents of thought on the nature of social change since that time. V, I know of no other single adequate survey of this field and i f the survey I have here set forth helps to fulfil that purpose, I feel that my work will not have been in vain. (£L)For an excellent summary of theories of externalistic social change sees Sorokin, P. : Contemporary Sociological  Theories» New York, Harper and Bros., 1928. I would lik© t© acknowledge my great Indebtedness to professor J* A. Irving, former Head of the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of British Columbia, for the guidance and inspiration he has given in leading me to a deep appreciation ©f the values and contri-butions of social philosophy to the solution of social problems in our time, and to the desire to continue the search in this as yet relatively unexplored field of aradeavour* I would also lik© to thank Dr. T. G. Henderson, ©f the Department of Philosophy and Psychology at the University of British Columbia* for the very n&any helpful suggestions and criticisms he has offered while I was under his extremely able instruction. 3 CHAPTER Om  GIOVANNI BATTISTA VICO'S "IA SCISNZA NUOVA" A. B i o g r a p h i c a l Sketch B. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Scheme 1. Methods of I n v e s t i g a t i o n 2. The Three Ages of Men 3. The Theory of R e f l u x 4. C r i t i c a l Remarks 4 GIOVANKI BATTISTA VICO (1688-1744) Vico, an Italian b&rn in H&ples in extreme poverty from which he never entirely escaped, spent most of his life in Naples teaching in minor posts at the University there* His fame rests largely ©n th© book he published in 1725 which he entitled "I Principi Bi Una Scienza Ifuova" t In this work he set forth his philosophy of" social change* The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* in estimating his place in the history ©f thought, says of hlsa that he was bound to the philosophical traditions of humanism and the Renaissance and the historical interpretation of Roraan Law. It was these factors that determined the nature of his theories and influenced the conclusions which he reached. 5 GIOVANNI BATTISTA VICO'S "LA SCIENZA NUOVA" Vico prefaces his concepts of the nature of social change with a criticism of existing techniques of investi-gation and suggests methods that he feels might be used much better in their place. Firstly, he criticises previous research workers in the histamical field of setting forth erudite theories of social change and then seeking proof of the theories by using those aspects of the historical process which fit the theories and ignoring those facts which 'do not fit them. He claims, for instance, that METHODS OF Grotius in his desire to prove the INVESTIGATION gentleness of the ancient Germans, collec-ted a great number of "barbaric laws^ which homicide was punished by a fine of a few pence".(1) Vico believed that this was really "a proof of the cheapness of the blood of poor rustic vassals who are precisely the homines mentioned by these lawsV?II2) Vico also condemns philosophers for attributing concepts to the thinkers of the past which are actually the philosophers' own concepts, in the belief that such a procedure constitutes proof of the validity of the concepts. To d© this, according to Vico, is to change or reinterpret the meaning of these thinkers in such a manner as to suit the preconceived opinions of the philosophers. (l)Croce, Benedetto: The Philosophy of Giameatista Vico, London, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1913, pl56. (2)Ibid. 6 Lastly, Vico is vehement in his censure of the tendency of philosophers to see a continuous llSfc between the ideas of men who lived in different ages and in different geographical areas, to see* for instance Eoroaster instructing "Berosus for Chaldea, lerosus in his turn teaching Mercurius Trimegistus for Egypt, afercurius teaching Atlas, the Ethiopian Lawgiver, Atlas, Orpheus the Thraeian missionary and finally Orpheus establishing the school in Greece,"(3) For Vico, as will be seen in more detail later, there ie no necessary connection between similar doctrines discovered in different cultures or between similar periods of history in different countries* Nor <3id Vico think that the historians of antiquity knew isore about primitive times than contemporary historians* In place of what he considered these inaccurate methods, Vic© substituted others, fhe Etymology of Language, he thought, provided a fruitful source of investigation. He gives an excellent illustration of how the Etymology of Language reveals the development of history, in his dis-cussion of the Latin verb intelli.g0re» Xntelli%ere» to understand, recalls legtere« to collect the produce of the field. Now intelligere is a word of more complex connotation than legere. Yet both have the common root legere« to collect. One connotes collecting material things; the other connotes collecting mental facts and. ideas* The inference is (3)Ibid, pl5? 7 that legere was used in an agricultural society; intelligere was used in a more highly complex urban society in which the arts of speculation are developed* V/hat Vico was attempting to state was that in the etymology of words one can trace the development ©f history and hence formulate a philosophy of social change, provided that one can place the words in their correct historical sequence.. Thus legere came before intelligere indicating a development from a rural to an urban form of society, Vico, indeed, believed that "language is the best evidence for the ancient life of a people, the life lived by them while language was in the making•"(4) Vico also believed that legends and myths, i f inter-preted correctly* were useful sources of historical data concerning e^ly man. For him, they were not just imaginings and fictions but real histoid, "Reflected in mythology," Vic© found, "the institutions, inventions, social cleavages, class struggles, travels and warfare of primitive nations."(5) For example, "Venus covering her nakedness with the cestus, was a modest symbol of solemn matrimony" in the society in which Venus was Goddess. Again, the twelve great gods of Rome were symbols of twelve stages of social existence in Roman history. Another source of historical data, the "great fragments of the ancient world", thw works of the poets and historians of the classical world, the proverbs and sayings of the men (4)Ibid, pl59 (5)Ibid, pl61 8 of old, was considered by Vico to shed considerable light on former times. In this connection he stated that "th© thirty thousand names of the gods collected by Varro referrir4 to a like number of needs in natural, moral, economic and civil life of the earliest times."(6) Still another method advocated by Vico consisted in "the comparison of better known processes of development ivith those known imperfectly or in parts only, the consequent reconstruction of the latter on the basis of the former*"(6) So the "principle of heroism, revealed by evidence found in Soman History, helps^ explain the legendary history of the Greeks, to supply the deficiencies of that of Egypt and to shed light on the unknown history of all other nations of antiquity,"(8) TJhat philosophy of social change did these methods reveal to Vico? Social change operates in a three phase rhythm and history is the story of the Three Ages of Man, THE THHBE AGES OF recurring again and again in nation after nation in time and space, "W© adoptt the division of the three ages established by the Egyptians $ namely, the Age of Gods, the Age of Heroes and the Age of Man, because we find in all nations these three kinds of huBian nature. {§fi All forms of social phenomena fall into this pattern and are conditioned by its These three natures produce three kinds of mores; these, three kinds of natural law of nations which, in their turn, produce three kinds of civil law or governments, in order to communicate to them-(6)Ibid, p!63 (7)Ibid, pl63 (8)Ibid, pl63 (9)Vlco, Bs Principi di una Sclenaa Ifaova* In Sorokin, P,A,iSocial and Cultural Dynamics, Hew York, American A . . K A . . 193-7. IxV»li-. 9 selves these three species of the major things, human "beings unite into society, create three species of language and three species of written characters after which they produce three types of Jurisprudence which must* in order t© give them a sanction, be assisted by three species of authority and three kinds of reasons or rights as means of three kinds of judicial decision*!!©) In conclusions Such is the ideal history of the eternal laws that govern all nations in their birth, in their progress, in their stages* in their decadence and in their end.••He who meditates upon this law can with the help ©f this formula, of what has been, what is, and what ©hall be, recite t© himself from now on» and without our help, the ideal and eternal history*(11) The first stage of history—the Age of Gode—found men living in a state very similar to the state of nature depicted by political and social philosophers of a later day. Men, in this early period, were fierce, emotional, rude and filled with unregulated and violent passions. They possessed grefet bodily strength but were intellectually of a low order. Their morality is well summed up in the saying "snight is right". They had a strong sense of the Divine, it is true, but the Divine i •, • in their minds consisted ia gods possessed of still greater strength than they. Consequently they were struck with terror of them and jprop t^iated them with human sacrifices and other barbarous., religious rites. Their language was monosyllabic and made free use of the imperative. Their written characters wer> rude pictures. Their juris-prudence was little above ti|e Is^ f of the Jungle, (10) Ibid (ll)?bid 1 \ 1© Gne recognizee i n the sfcove description the con-ventional picture ©f the early state of roan s© ofiesa drawn by political philosophers, Vic©, however, added ens extremely important detail t* this picture, He stated that it was the age "In which the family was instituted, in which language originated, in which myths were prodmeed and in which th© chief rudiaents ©f civilization were brought to life,«{12) Vic® explained how such & bartsarous state of ex-istence could lead to aere civilised ways by saying that "men thought they were escaping- the threats of the thundering sky(13)by carrying the ir women into caves to satisfy their animal lust® cut of the gods' sights aisd by thus keeping them .safely secluded they founded the first chaste unions and the first societies? marriage and t&e family. They fortified themselves in eu&tab&e ,pla«««i with the intention of defending the»aielve«^^*4"^^^f and in reality by thme fortifying; themselves in fixed places they put an end to their neaaadic life and primitive wanderlnge, and began to le&m agriculture«"(14) Thus the first phase ©f history, violent, brutish and barbarous as it was, did see the establishment of family and coaanunity. (12) Flint, B«s Vie©., London, WilliasB Blackwood * Sons, (13) 1110 "thundering ekyM ie symbolic of the gods, (14) Croc e, Benedetto t The l%ileeor>hy of QiamTaatieta Vico, pllS. The second phase of bistory-~the Age of Heroes—arose from the faet that the "weak and <Sisorter2y* reduced to the extremity of hunger and asutual slaughter, to save their lives* teok refuge in the fortified . eaves to which th® earlier and stronger men had gene, and became servants t® the Heroes."(IS) Shis? one at onee recognizes as t&e period, of history in which the family was raised to an aristocratic and feudal basis while under the &eseen<3amts of the primitive families? who now became ssembers of a ruling class and Who had consolidated themselves in the fortified positional were the plebians and serfs* Such was the Age of Homer in Greece and the time of Servius Tullius and Junius Brutus in Berne* This second age of history was likewise a harsh period. The "Heroes"$ th© aristocrats, the feudal lords* while not so prone to lay their hands against each other, were unanimous in their oppression and e3Epl©itaM©B of tfea plebians and serfs who lived under them. They aade no attempt to alleviate the latter's suffering. Rather,, they increased their miseries by forcing them to fight in wars and by frequent resort to usury» dungeons and floggings* Even towards the members of their own families the Heroes were tvrranisal and brutal* For ®3£ampl« the Spartans 9 "in order that their sons might not fear pain, and death, beat them within an inch of their lives*.«ln Greece as in Rome it was lawful to kill innocent, new-born children. Wives.*. (is)ibid» pus* 12 were atainaained simply as a necessity of nature for tae " procreation of children and in other respeots were treated like slaves."(16) The everyday life of the period was little better. It was "innocent of all luxury, refinement and ease. Pastimes were arduous, sueh as wrestling or hunting to harden body ana mind, or else dangerous* like Jousting or big gs»e hunting, to accustom men to think lightly of wounds and death* • .Brigandage and piracy were recog-nized* "(17) In short, the Age of Heroes possessed many of the characteristics of the previous phase of history* The main difference between the two ages consisted in the fact that morality was no logger the selfish, individual morality of the first period—not a morality of individual man against individual man* Morality had become a morality of social group against social group, ©f ruling aristocracy against plebians and serfs* Vieo's chief sources for Ms description of the first two phases in the historical cycle, consisted of the works of the poet Homer and the early loasan poets* Vico was convinced, as it has already been naSe clear, that legends of the Koraerio type reflected the nature of the life ©f the early Greek people and were not Just imaginative compositions* He considered such legends as being composed (16)Ibid, p!69* (17)Ibid, pl€®. by one person but by a largo liumVer of people* Thus, in tfee ease of the Homeric poems* wtt we try to eoneelve the •••poems not as the work of an individual but as two great storehouses of the manners and eusteas of the earliest ©reeks*, containing the history of their natural law and Heroic period f i f instead of a single poet we imagine a whole nation of poets» and Instead of a single act of creationi a national poetry developing in the course of centuries, evsiytMrsg falls into its place and finds an explanation."(18) Accordingly what Vic© did was to study these poems in great detail and from them to reconstruct life as it was lived in the Heroic Age, In this connection he paid careful attention to the characters in the poeras and to their actions * their beliefs and their' language* He noted diligently the social relationships described in the poem in order to gain an idea of the nature of the political life of the period. He recognized, too, the value of observing the economic passages in the pee© for he saw therein a picture of the economic life of th© tine* Finally* he studied the ©temology of th© word® used in the poeas as a further indication of the state of the society under scrutiny* However* no nation remains at the Heroic stage of history* lach country eventually evolves into the tMrd phase of history—the Age of Men* -"S**e±a society, in the (IS)Tbia, p!88* 14 period of yewlfe&il vigor above described contains within itself, rigorousay repressed, and in fact made into a support, the element of opposition—the slaves, clients or vassals, that is to ©ay the plebians. But this element little by little succeeds in detaching itself froa ami opposing itself to the society, engaging it in a oontimal end undisguised conflict, so as by degrees to overthrew this old society and give life ami fom to a new society of which it is itself the material: a democratic society, the popular &epublio."(19) Vic© used the history of Howe to illustrate this process* He pointed out that the change from the Heroic Age to the Age of Men begins with the struggle between plebians and patricians during the reign of Junius Brutus. At first it was a struggle over land rights* Whe© the right of owning land was won by the plebians the etsmggle became one for the Modification of law in th© Twelve Tables so that law would- n© longer be the seeret- of.the patrleians but the common knowledge of all . 3£*em the struggle became one for the right of legally reeognixed aarriafes. For "without.••solemn Marriages, without the privilege of the auspices^  the plebians were, in fast, unable to enjoy the te-nvire of land and to transmit it to their families, deprived as they were of tieaeaaft* kindred and relatives. M(f30) The Canuieian Law satisfies this, dessamdw- But further IS demands were made and the plebians "gained first the Saperlum together with the Consulship and lastly the ©ffices ©f driest and Pontifex*rt(21) Later the pleMams 5 won the right of legilatiom la the form of compulsory plebiscites. The power of the patrieiaii Senate was curbed at the same time. Mow this democrat!satien process caused the "whole face of society to change, "(2&) The fasttly, property, legal processes, punishments and even war changed in character. Family solidarity increased due to emphasis on wealth and its distribution* Legal processes became simplified and rationalised* "The Intellect, the thought of the legislator was brought into play and the citizens eonfoBied to an idea of COUKOR rational utility. "(23) Milder penalties for breaking the law replaced the harsh penalties ©f former tiieea* For exa&ple, it was custoiaary, in earlier days, to burn alive a person who maliciously set fire to crops. Such a sentence was unheard of in the new Republic. Laws became more numerous and more flesdLble. Warfare beoame humane* Conquered peoples were no longer destroyed but "were left.,.in possession of the natural rights of the human raee."(S4) But this humanitarian!ens was unfortunately accompanied by the disappearance of political wisdom and the simultaneous appearance of corruption and miwiss rule. (81)Ibid, p£04, (22)Ibid9 p206. (S8)Tbid, p2©7. (24)IMd, pE©8. IS The reason for this, Vice aalataifteeV veil that the huroardtariETi ideal stressed individualism to such an extent that private interests triumphed at the expense of the greater public geod, Men became willing to undertake actions detrimental to the public good provided that their own private desires were satisfied* This state of affairs, in its turn, gave rise to a new f©MS of goverment, according to Vie©, fhi© was "monarehy", Ifoe somarehieal for© of government developed rather than any other fern because "when in a popular Bepublic every one seeks his private interest only and presses, the public forces into its services at risk of destruction of the state, t© preserve the latter from ruin a man must arise, as Augustus did In Borne, a single man who by force of arms t&te»e in hand all the affairs of the state and leaves his subjects to look after th£i>r own affairs or after any public business he way entrust to them."(25) such a fora of one nan government is welcomed by all—by the patricians who believe their subjection t© pleMan rule is over and by the pleMans whs are tired of the anarchy of inclivitalism and self-interest. this monarchical feme of government, nevertheless, remains on the side of the people. It makes or endeavours to ssake all subjects e^usl, keeps the coimons contented <£5)XMd, p209* 17 and satlsflea" and institutes a Mwell*balaac«<$ system of concessions and privileges granted sometimes to whole classes.o•semetiroes to particular groups, fey promoting into a higher ©lass saaen of unusual merit and exceptional virtues«W(S6) Vico' believed that the monarchical form of goverment was the ideal for© towards which all states inevitably tenS, For not only does it strike an equitable balance between public and private good; not only doe© it reduce class conflict to a rcinissum but it also abolishes strictions of rights to particular groups of people so that the world tends to become one unified entity under one paternal laonaroh, As Vic© stated, "under Caracella the whole Eoraan world was converted into a single Home, since great sonarchs desire the whole world to become one ."(27) However even this idyllic stage of history contained within itself the seeds of its own Ses»-bniotion. It was the ideal stage§ the perfect stage, it is true, but Vic© bought that Hie historical process contained insaanent forces which made it necessary for the process to be a process and not a static condition,, In what direction could the i€eal stage <£evelop£ Th® answer that Vic© gave was that it coula develop only in a retrograde direction. Hence he fonrulated the Law of Reflux which states that the historical cycle, navisg reached th© Age of Item? Inevitably turn® back on itself to the barbarous (265lbid, p210f (g7)Ibid, p21£. 13 state of nature with which it started* This Beflux Is well illustrated by the Dark Ages that followed the fall of Berne* In this period saen were TB8 LAW OF USTLUX forced once again to "flee into the mountain© to build themselves fortresses"^ this time because of the invasions of the German!G tribes* Once more life became uncertain and unsafe:* Ivory man's hand was against his neighbor* s in a world' that knew no security, no organized central government and no peace* For Soman law and Hoisan Justice had been for the moment forgotten and even replaced by more barbarous practices such as trial by fire or water* Warfare became equally cruel and harsh* Conditions did not remain static* Forces innsanent in society began to act and the historical rhythm soon began to repeat itself* The flight "to the mountains" was represented by the more powerful individuals of the tisse who betook themselves' to easily defended strongholds and built themselves feudal castle® wherein they were able to beat off attacks frets marauding ba&ds. Ihis stresagt&ened family solidarity which had broken down as the result of florae's fall* There was also a strong t r « ^ toward® the religious as exemplified in Ghristianityj and ©onsequesctly a deep recognition of the SSiviae Presence* One cannot fail to see in this description of Vice's a new Age of Gods* 19 What happened nesst Indicates' qwite clearly that Buropean history was on th© threshold of another Ag© of Ken. The eosasion man, weaker and powerless economically and politically again fled to thews who had "built the fortresses*'*', and sought their protection* fhls was granted In return for labor and other services to be perforEaed by these seeking protection. Tk% inevitable distinction between lords and serf®, between Heroes &w®, slaves, followed* Aristocratic forras of government arose. The early p^arliaments" became places where the feudal lords gathered to settle matters that.concerned only themselves* fh«li welfare of the serfs was entirely ignored. With the coming of this new Age of Heroes, Vico ends his attempt to trace through the historical cycle in it© constant repetition* He must have re&liseed, however, that the Age of Men was at hand for the last dsys of his life were lived In a period when the first rumblings of the desire for pofular regiaes were already to be beard. Let us now tum to a criticism of Vico* One can cowenientiy criticise his theories under three headings* raethod, philosophy of social change, and contributions to the science of social change. As has already been pointed out, Vico1 s method concerns itself largely with techniques of historical research. In fact the premises upon which he bases the validity of Me 20 t techniques determines in great measure the truth or falsity of the conclusions at which he arrives. Upon the correctness of his theory of language, for instance, lies in part the soundness or unsoundness of the proof of his cyclical theory of social change. There can he no doubt that language does reveal, in the course of its development, the development of the ideas, beliefs and ways of living of a people* In drawing at#ntlon to this fact, Vico made an original and striking contribution to fee field of historical research. It is a theory that could be investigated with profit even to-day. Too often philologists have been concerned' with the relationship among language families and with the etymology of words, fhe social aspects of language have fre<|u©ntly been neglected. Only in this oentmry has the Study of semantics become of some iinportance. But even those who have concerned themselves ? with geiaantics have shown themselves more interested in words in. relation to the modern social scene than with words as revealing the history of the past. However, i f modern philologists have neglected the relation of language in the development of culture, Vico can be accused Justly of neglecting the influence of languages upon oneanother in the course of their development. In discussing the development of Latin for example, Vic© fails to take into account the relationship of that language to the languages of the tribes surrounding the 21 original Latin settlements at the acuta of the fiber* Likewise, ho fails to acknowledge tlie contributions of other languages suGh as the Pheenician and the ©reek* Because of this* he has no justification in assuming that words of sisiple connotation and meaning are incorporated into a language prior to the incoropration of words of a mere complex meaning* Words may be borrowed from other languages in such a maimer that words 6f an extremely . compleac meaning may exist side by side with words of simple meaning* It is true* of course, that words of a complex meaning jsay not be borrowed froa another language until social development is at the stage where such words would be actively used* But no definite proof has yet been given that such Is the case* Moret. research is needed te establish the soundness of Vice's theory. Snore is another difficulty in Vice's theory of language* Modern semantics has shown that the ©ss»e word say have entirely different and even opposite meanings depending upon th« social group or the society which uses It* Kau© the word wG'©a5ssuni®Bl,l recalls to the talnd of one social group and to the people of one society an Utopia of equal opportunity and economic satisfaction for all, while in the mind of another social group or another society it recalls nothing but bloodshed* repression and tyranny* How, then, is the historian who basse his knowledge of the historical process on words, going to know just what 22 meaning a given word actually possesses? May not a word with seemingly simple meaning actually have an extremely complex meaning? Or aray not a word have both a simple and a complex meaning depe&ling on the individual who is using It? Utat right has Vico to say that le^ era meant only t© "gather material"? May it not have meant to "gather cental products" to certain social groups? Vie©, of course, was not in a position to realise the shortcomings of Ms theory. Nevertheless* it is a shortcomings which cannot b ® lightly dismissed* In his emphasis on the vjM&e of raythe and legends as a picture of the ideals and aspirations of a people prior to recorded history* Vice* helped to correct the some* what erroneous opinion of his Mme that such myths were but imaginary tales ©f a primitive people who loved nothing better than t® recount stories in poetic.fossa.: A survey of the literature of poetry and ofthe literature of ©ore recent times suggests that there is some truth in the statement that such artistic ferns do express the hopes and fears of the age in which they were written* Do not the novels of Pickens reveal, in some treasure* the life lived at the time Pickens lived? Squeers and SqueerV school give us some idea of the state of education in the early nineteenth century* Hie description of the election in the Pickwick gamers is a realistic picture of the political corruption of the day, even If couched in humorous manner* Hhe eonstamt crusade of Sickens against 23 social and political injustices does indicate the aspirations of at least ©owe of th© social groups of the tiaae. Xn a slMlsr manner the eharaoters in ©alsworthy*s novels certainly hear sosas resemblance to the »©der» capitalist and his ideals and aspirations. If such is th© ease, all the. indications are that the Iliiad and th© Odessey reveal the aspirations and ideals of the early Greeks. A study of these works is therefore of considerable value as an aid in reconstructing Greek history. On the other hand, there are arguments against using myths and legends as a basis of historical knowledge, and unless the historian end philosopher is willing to temper Ms beliefs in the value of these sources as Mstorical documents with a knowledge of these arguments, he is going to make fre«pent errors in the interpretation of Mstory. In the first place* since most of the myths were not recorded narrations of events but were oral narrations handed Sown from generation to generation, it is -eo-o KM eh to expect that changes in the content of the narratiesss did not occur and that,as each individual handed on his version, fee did not put his own interpretation into it. One cannot, therefore9 vouch for the accuracy of the narrations Or of the faithfulness of representation of the original ideals aad aspirations that were expressed* ;' Vico, in a sense, realised this and claims not that the I Iliad and 13se Odessey were the work ©f one man but that S4 they were the work of a large number of people who lived during the Heroic Age of Greece, and that consequently the works do reveal the aspirations of men in that period of history* Even if this were the ease, however* subsequent changes are bound to have taken place* Those who finally recorded $he Greek epics In written form doubtless rearranged them t© suit their own predilic|%iens« Trans-lation from osQe tongue to another must have also resulted in considerable changes* Let us turn next to Vice's theory of social change* As we have seen, Vico ba&etf his three cycle theory of history on the assumption that human nature changes and that these changes resulted in different foaass of social organisation and goveriaaent* this is implicit in his statement that he adopted the division of the three ages because he found M±» all nations these three kinds of '•. human nature*" But one may ask what are t3ae changes that occur in human mature? What is it that causes Russian nature to change? And, finally, in what directions do the changes take place? Vie© is not sufficiently clear in his analysis at this point* Apparently human nature is possessed of certain fundamental characteristics that are inherited* Furthermore these characteristics are not linaited to one nation or race but are cot&son to all humanity* For this is the only way in which Vico could account for the similarity in the history of various peoples, Vico listed certain certain inherited tendencies that 25 he considered to be a part of all humane. These Include the tendency of men who So not know the natural cause of things t o believe those things to have a nature similar to their own9 the drive to "conceive o f the remote and obscure according to the analogy of the present and familiar* and the predominance of emotion and imagination where reason is we@k.,f(g8) Again such factors as belief in soste form of Bivine Providence, a need of partnership between the sexes and the hope of a future life "have given rise to the institution of religion., to narrisge rites and funeral services.*.They are essential to the maintenance and progress of society.They link generation to generation; they connect the present with the past an€ lead men onward step by step into the future."(29) How did Vic© demonstrate that these character!sticsare the basis of social change? As has been shown, Vico believed that men lived in a state of nature during the early beginnings of the historical e y e ! © . They were terror-struck at the gods they worshipped. They regarded the heavens as. angry and began to hide in eaves and out of the way places. "The consciousness of a Divine Presence was accompanied by a snese of shame which checked brutal lust and led to the formation of families. Society had thus for its constitutive principle, religion."(i^ ?) It would appear, then, that fear of factors over which men had no control and an accompanying sense of the Bivine were the hiM&n characteristics that led to t h e first state of the (jLi)lbid,f^- lb\eL.,Px>7. [3&) IbiJ rate §6 ' ©ycle--the Age ©f deds.* As Flint pharaphraseS Vice: "Coa* seieusness ©f the Mviae, ©nee aroused**«.continued awake and active • • ©It gradually built up a world of the gods in whioh were reflected the chief features and stages of t&© primitive history ©f human society* "(31) Ehe above explanation of the origin ©f Society is purely speculative^  ' Sven to-day' psychologists argue whether social intercourse began because ©f the instinct of sociality or because of fear of because of the daggers of solitary existence' in' &• savage and rmt&iess' age* Yet Vic© appears to-'have a strong case if the rs^ainier of his premises are correct* Periods of breaddown in a civilization do seem to iiave caused men to. fear for their lives and • their security and to have drawn them together for purposes of mutual protection thus forming the beginning of a new civilisation* Keligi©n,t©o, may have been' a factor in bringing people together but of this there is no definite proof*. If one asks what human characteristics were basic in causing the transition frem the Age of Gods to the Age of Heroes, one must recognize that the same human tendencies that produced the Age of (Sods,along with other tendencies Vie© did not mention specifically,were instrumental* Fear, again,was the activating pewer in sending the weak to shelter with tits, strong* But tfe© desire for power* for prestige and for social proisinenee siust als© have been of seme £7 iaporteaee. low-, eilaerwisef. could, the growth 'of an aristocratic society and of tae institution of serfdom and slavery be explained? Yet Vie© did not mention these* Sfor did he Mention such factors as poor economic environ-ment and the effects of conquest* b^ese latter factors mist also have had seise effect in creating the Age of Heroes-.- At aiayrate' that fear of insecurity and the desir© for protection are always the cause of the rise of a class society is ope& to question* certainly the rise of ttse proletariat and capitalists in our own time" was not due to the desire for protection on the part of the proletariat.* Vice's description of the causes of the transition tvm the Age of Heroes to the Age of Men is faaailiar to modem thinkers* ft is a ressarkable foreshadowing of what Karl Marx and his followers were later to make the foundation ©f their philosopMoal system«~tl%e class Struggle* Bf&rimg th© transition period there was* according to Vico, a bitter struggle between the lordsj nobles and patricians on the one feand and the slaves, serfs and pleMans on the other* In the emd th® latter proved triumphant and a democratic republic was established* But Vico left J»ary questions usjamswered* What were the fmndaffi®ntal causes of the struggle.,for exaiaple? To say $aat it was due.to the ' fact that the. oppressed classes established in the previai s age revolted because of their intolerable conditions is 28 a® answer. There are oppressed classes in India that have remained oppressed for hundreds of years that have not attempted to revolt* The French peasants who revolted in 1789 were far better off than the peasants of other countries on the continent of Europe at that time. Why did not the latter revolt? Vic© described a process without explaining the causes, and yet has called the process the cause» Vico stands on firmer ground la his discussion of the breakdown of the Age of Men, As has been indicated, fee attributed the ultimate collapse of a civilization to an inexorable historical law~«*the Law of Beflux,which states that a civilization having reached the perfect stage can only progress in a retrograde direction. On© may doubt Vico's confidence that any civilisation ever reaches a perfect stage, nevertheless there does appear to be a tendency for.a civilization* once having become republican and democratic, to regret the extreme fosse of individualism that often results and to support a centralised, monarchical and often dictatorial feres of government in a search for a solution to the anarchy of individualism. It is likewise frequently the case that the monarchical and dictatorial for* of government finally collapses and with its collapse the civilization dioin~ tegrates. Up to this point Vic© spoke at least partial truth* But he is not so clear as t© why the civilization need necessarily disintegrate. It Is true that Vies did state that the corruption and luxury of the rich coupled with the "en$$ and aggression of the poor" may go so far that there is no hope of stabilization and the civilisation consequently either sinks into such disorder that barbarism returns or a foreign conqueror imposes himself on the society and gradually brings it back to some semblance of order. But one might quite well asks fhy is it that the corruption of th© dominant class of the third period of history goes so far as to be incapable of correction? Why does not the dominant class adjust itself even if only in its own self -interest? Unless this basic question is answered the cause of social change resulting in the destruction of a civilisation is by no means fully explained. Another criticism that may rightly be levelled at Vie© is Ms neglect of th© influence of one culture ©n another. Greece* according to the author, went through its historical cycle untouched by Egyptian or Persian cultureo Some went through its historical cycle untouched by th© Greek oulture* Sow the problem of culture contact and culture diffusion is admittedly a difficult one but there is every indication tfe&t cultures influenee one another profoundly, even though th* manner of their influence is often obscure* Vie© had no Justification in dismissing the impact of one civilization on another as being negligible* To do this is to ignore what t©*dsy at least is considered to be an extremely important influence 30 on the processes of social change* The researches of contemporary social psychology have icade this abundantly clear* Still another question t&at Vice left unanswered is that of the direction and pifrpoee £;r*«?civ.^ n of the historical cycles* Bo the cycles march upward In a spiral towards an ever higher goal or is each cycle hut an • identical repetition of the previous cycle without any progress? Vico did not answer these <|uesti#i@ direc|||f(« However there are certain indications that he did beitoft that each cycle was a step forward and and upward'towards some ideal goal* He believed wholeheartedly in a Divine Providence which used hussan nature to Its own ends* Further he was firmly convinced of tlie sup i^Pieriiy ©f Christianity over other religions and believed that Christianity would remain a power in the future* It is hard not to believe that Vico waa*eptimistie and even idealistic in his outlook on history, in View of iaese facts* Surely, for Man each cycle of history was a step forward in which the hand of Sod was supremely manifested* In conclusion, then* we way say that Vice's coatri* bution to the philosophy of social change lay in great part in Ms method of approaching the problem* He put forward a theory of language as an aid in reconstructing past historical epochs* He affiled* at a tirae when most frequently denied* that myths and legends were valuable 31 sources of historical data. Likewise he realised the Importance of fragments of classical writings as a revelation of bygone eras. His J - emphasis on the influence o f human nature in the motivation of the historical process was also original and striking, even though it was not carried esetensively into the philosophi-cal portions of his work* In a l l these respects too Vico reveals his ability to cut ties with the scholasticism of the Middle Ages and to look with a more scientific and directive attittt&e a t the philosophical problem with which he was concerned* His willingness to examine language and to f i n d a meaning in it which lay beneath the surface 5 his desire to approach myths and legends with & realisation that there was a meaning hidden by their face value 1 and his boldness in ascribing historical changes not alone to Divine Provi-dence but also to human nature indicates that he was not bound by the narrow intellectual outlook towards the social sciences prevalent at the time he lived* Yet he did not break entirely witia the past, lather/ he acted as a bridge between the theological and scholastic ideals of the immediate past and the dawning era ©f scientific and objective experiment* He believed that the •'entire history ©f mankind is but the eternal idea ©f that history which ©Mated i n the Bivine Mind realised sad manifested in actual events*M(32) la other words be (32)Ibid, pl93* 3£J c "jrepresents the plan of history at ones' as a plan which <8©€ has ordained and whish man realises*MC33) As far as Vico's description of the actual progress of history is concerned.,, it o&nnot b© claimed that there is anything -strikingly original «$& new* Plato, .Aristotle, Sampan©!!** MaeMevalli and others have outlined histsrleal cycles that in many respects resemble the cycles of Vice. Vie©*-e contributions* therefore, lie in his spirit of research and in his insistence en the importance ©f human nature and Its changes as a causal factor in i&e pre* ' duetion of historical cycles. \ 33 CHAPTER WO HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY" A. Biographical Sketch B. S o c i a l Philosophy 1. C r i t i c i s m of H i s t o r i c a l Research 2. The Concept of ' S p i r i t 1 3» The Concept of 'Freedom1 4i The D i a l e c t i c i n History 5. The Movement of S o c i a l Change 6. Appreciation and C r i t i c i s m 3 * II©£«1 t/as its Wiwtt&tibtaegi Qe&m®&* ihe> ®m of a ei?il esapvaat. He obtained Ms tnftlii&Q$ In Shsology at the tts£*ear»11gr of S i^ngen* After, the jejbllea&ioA ©f Ma -tare vevfee* and f peat at Heidelberg Ucivereitg?* later* to Berlin vhes& be $s&gght for th* zenaindar of hi© p^afeaalonal career* " £©asel*<s* l l l t e ^ ^ - . f C M ^ ^ emmafe ths* ' su&ier's theories of' social CBcng®. Ii«®sT«r t a© thea© tfieerie* sag® based on .hi© ay stem ef dialaeti* a knowledge of his ctber philosophical vmsites is . a@$esss«y to saa 'ondersts^ ding of the theo3ri«€i,> 35 HEGEL'S "PHILOSOPHY Off HISTORY" Hegel opens h i s discussion of the nature .of s o c i a l ch'ange with a c r i t i c i s m of h i s t o r y as i t had "been written i n the past. In t h i s respect he resembles Vico and i t i s int e r e s t i n g to compare h i s c r i t i c i s m with that of the former. He divides h i s t o r i c a l investigation into three categories: the o r i g i n a l , the r e f l e c t i v e , and the philoso-p h i c a l , and he c r i t i c i s e s each i n turn. The o r i g i n a l i s defined as that type of h i s t o r y i n which "descriptions are CRITICISM Off HISTORICAL RESEARCH fo r the most part limited to deeds, events and states of society*' which the h i s t o r i a n s had ""before t h e i r eyes and whose s p i r i t they shared. "(1) Thucydides and Herodotus are claimed "by Hegel to represent h i s t o r i a n s who used t h i s method. They were reporters d i r e c t l y viewing h i s t o r i c a l events as they occurred. There i s considerahle value i n this form of h i s t o r y as i t does give a glimpse of h i s t o r y as i t was a c t u a l l y f e l t "by arct/ve. p a r t i c i p a n t s . On the other hand, the scope of such h i s t o r y i s too narrow, "being limited to "brief events and episodes observed "by the authors. Then, too, such h i s t o r y i s a l l too l i k e l y to he coloured "by the author's own mental set; h i s own perspective, h i s own prejudices, and hence i s not r e l i a b l e . As Hegel sayss "The author's aim i s to change the events the deeds and the (lYHeeel. G.W.ff.: Philosophy of History, New York, P. U ) H !? C o l l i e r & Sons, 190l(A Library of Universal L i t e r a t u r e , Ed., Angelo H e i l p r i n , Part 1, V o l . l«=J. 36 the states of see iety with which they are conversant, into an abject for the eonceptive faculty" and to preseat wt© posterity an image of events as clear as that which he himself possessed in virtue of personal observation, or lifelike description* Reflective* history, in contrast to original history, goes "beyond the limits of the time to which it relates***(3) Its spirit Hranscends the present". In other words j it covers Xeqgez* periods and is not an oy«-witness account* There are, according to lege!, at1 least types of reflective hi story t (a)u®tversal history which ajfps>at gaining a, view of th© "entire history ©f a people or a country or t&e worid*u(4) ;(b}|#a i^iaticai history which sine at using the historical past to explain, to interpret and even to predict the present $ Ce|e^ <^$siL history which is not truly history but a critioisst of historical nijprativej (d)history ®£ Ideas Which alias to presea&fc a view of special aspects of history such as the history of laws the history of art and the history of science* lach of these types of historical investigation is criticised by Hegel* Universal, history Is condemned on the grounds that trthe indivldusslity of tone which must charac-terise a writer belonging to a different culture is not modified in accordance with the period© audi a record must traverse* 1&e spirit of the writer is quite other than that of the time of which he tvtiatftV'Cft) Further, such a <02bid, p£®. (3)Ibid, p <4)IMd* p4t* (S)IMd* p47« method tend© to for© shorten histery? to omit important events aS deeds and to stress that whioh should not he stressed while ignoring that which should be stressed. Fra&s&tieal bister/ is criticised according to the classic argument that "'each period is involved in such peculiar cireiametameSj exhibits a condition ®f things so idiosyn-cratic, that its ©©ndrct must be regelated by considerations eenneeted with itself and itself alone* Amid t&© pressure ©f great events, a general principle gives us n® help. It is useless to revert to similar eirei&sstesees in" the past. !Ri© pallid shades of memory struggle in v-ain with th© life and freedom of th© present. Looked at in this light nothing can be shallower thasi the ©ft 'repeated appeal to Sreek and Boman examples diaritajg the French devolution* M<©) Critical history is subjected to the seme argtsaeiatj "Her© we have the other method ©f making tfes past a'iiviisg sealit/i putting subjective fancies in the place ©f historical data; fancies whose merit is measured by their boldness, that is, the scantiness of t&e parti cialars ©n which they are based, and the peremptoriness with which they contravene the best established facts ©f history."(?) Hegel says ©f th® history of ideas that it is characterized by a to® fragmentary and hemes ©, too inaeewate viewpoint. She implication is, of course, that one eawt isolate certain aspects of history and hope t® treat i-foea* separately. For there is an inter-action between the various parts that dare not be ignored (6)Ibid, p40. (7)Ibid, pSO-Sl. 38 if tnte causality ia to be discovered. All this may appear irrelevant t© theories of social change* Yet mi eh is not the case. For, in point of fact, these various historical methods imply some theory or theories of social eha e^ or, at least* am absence of any theories e£ social efcagge* Thus,, reporfeorial Mstorry.rl ignores both cause amd process of social change. TJaivesPsal •history s@es social change as a process involving an entire eoumtry or the -whole'world while both praissatical and critical history see social change as a repetition of cycle a of M statical events* •fen his r*r?n*~ But if Kegel s^ eetedAt2wee various types of histories with their implied t&eearies of social etaBge* «&&t could he Sgu& in tfeel? place? His answer was "phlleeephie'al history*. yfefj.'loeephleal Matoasy, Hegel easpladnedj sweat ,ftke thoughtful eoissl&ei>at£e& ef "(8) But what d©es this mean? 3be answer is to be found in Kegel** view of the nature of reasefe* Beasosj he stated, is t&e lord ef t&e world therefore the history of the world is a rational process.. »0a the one hand* Reason is the m%z%imm &€ the Universe 3 via ^ that by wkitife and in which ell reality has it© beissg and subsistence, an the other hand, it is "^ e infinite •eaeaftar of the tljaiverse? since Season is mot so powerless as to be incapable of prodaoisg but a sieve ideal, a mere iisfeCBtion—havi^ jg lis place outside reality, mofcoiy knows wter®$ something separate and abstract, (3)Xbi4, p&X.--39 i n the heads of certain human beings. I t i s the i n f i n i t e complex of things, their entire Essence and truth."(9) Thus i t would seem that Hegel ac t u a l l y meant "by p h i l o s o p h i c a l h i s t o r y , a form of h i s t o r y which traces the s o c i a l processes as a r a t i o n a l movement following recognizable laws and p r i n c i p l e s ; an orderly procession towards some r a t i o n a l end. For this i s implied i n Reason. Reason means that one thing l o g i c a l l y follows another according to knowable though perhaps not always known laws and p r i n c i p l e s . History, then, represents a r a t i o n a l and orderly process and s o c i a l change, therefore, consists i n the working out of t h i s r a t i o n a l order. Another question now a r i s e s , however. How does this r a t i o n a l , orderly and h i s t o r i c a l process work i t s e l f out? Hegel answered th i s question "by r a i s i n g f i r s t another question. May i s there t h i s r a t i o n a l , orderly process? To what end i s i t directed? What, in short, i s the ultimate design of the world? This question a,nd i t s answer "brings one immediately to another Hegelian concept, that of ' S p i r i t ' . Concerning t h i s THE CONCEPT OF SPIRIT term Hegel stated: "As the essence of matter i s gravity, so, on the other hand, we may a f f i r m , the substance, the essence of S p i r i t i s Freedom.11 (10) Just as the outstanding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of matter i s i t s g r a v i t a t i o n a l p u l l , so the outstanding c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of S p i r i t i s Freedom. Further, " S p i r i t may be defined as that which ( 9 ) l b i d , p52?53. ( l O ) l b i d , p61. 4© has its center in itself. It has not a unity outside itself, hut has already found itf i t exists &i and witfe itself* Matter has its essence outside of itself| Spirit is self*  contained existence. w(il) Ifeat is to say, where, matter' exhibits its outstanding ©harae%eristiet gravitational pull , only when approached by an external force of another bit of matter, Spirit esSsibits its outstanding ©haraeter* isl&e of Freedom in itself and without the necessity of any stimulus from without* @pir£t«thent is ©ItaraeterisBed by Freedom and this Freedom • is within Spirit*. What, now* does Hegel wean by the term Freedom? For Hegel "Freedom" is not to be understood in the ensternary sense of that, term* Freedom, as Hegel thought et it# is not neeessarily -tne condition •according to WB CONCEPT OF FfSSWSi which the individual is enabled t® act as Ms will and desire drive him* He* does it mean absence of governmental control and Intervention in the individual's life* It is not liberty*' in the sense in which John Stuart Hill , for instance* thought of it* It is not mere liberty to do what oae likes-*. Bathers* Kegel*© idea of Freedom is closely related to thought and ie concerned more with mind than with anything else* In this connection Hegel stated, 'V**If I am dependent, my being is referred to something else which 1 am not; X cannot .exist independently of something ©asternal* 1 ask free, on the contrary! when my ©aGt&tenee depends upon myself •"(IS) (IDlbldj p@2* (If)Ibid, p®2. 4 1 And the ©nly way aste can be free ultimately is ia what one thinks and believes with the inward conviction ©£ Though*. Freedom, considered 1B sueh term®-, consists essentially in the growth in the individual of a consciousness of the validity of the dictates of the inner Conseienee, or, put In more general terns, the gradual eeistsseious realisation for the need ©f and the conscious accs^ ptsoac* of moral principles because they are ceneeiously seen a® toeiztg of benefit to t&e individual and to the social group i» which the individual exists* To make these ideas clearer let us look at a concrete exsaple taken from history. Ia t&e lower stages of civilization moral principles are frequently followed i a a blind obedience without any inward and. personal conviction of their Klght. Sbis blind acceptance of moral principles aay be due to the belief that nactoare »&te©® i t necessary for obedience or they may be followed because of t&e despotic-force of On© Person9 th© Few or the Many. At anyrate they are subscribed t© in every oaee because of forces extraneous and allea to the inward eonvicftien of theiiir Mght. 'Phis is th© lack of Freedom as Hegel uaifteretood it. Om. the other hand Christianity wad© men conscious of the fact that moral laws, to have validity, must be obeyed mt of eonselous inner conviction* It is this ianer and conscious conviction in th© naimd that constitutes true Freedosw It is to be so ted, here, that this imer conviction of Freedom may, in a sense, destroy the individual,. For certain moral convictions, SUCK m the belief that death in war, for one's country is noble, certainly destroys the indi-vidual. Yet, according to Hegel's view, the individuals freedcaa attains i t s supreme farm provided that he volun-tar i ly ,and with a firm inner conviction, gives his l i f e for his country. Hegel used 'this concept of Freedom t© elucidate the relation of the individual to the State. For he claimed that true Freedom on earth l ies in the fact that an individual should, inwardly and consciously, accept the Law of the State as beneficial to himself and the social group end that he should, consequently subject himself consciously to the Will of the State as expressed in Law. Having readied this point, one might well asks But what lias a l l this to do with the idea that the history of the world i s a rational process? Hegel supplied th® answer. TBM DIALECTIC IH HISTOiar "The history of the world i s none other than th© progress of the consciousness of Freedom....The f inal cause of the world at large we allege to be the consciousness of i t s own freedom on the part ©f S p i r i t . ° ( 1 3 ) In other words, the ultimate design of the world, th® design which Season drives towards is freedom of Spir i t , and this freedom of Spirit is nothing more nor less than an inward conscious conviction of the necessity of following certain lines of action and ©f believing : \ that these l ine© of action are Eight and in accordance with (13)Ibid, p64. 43 Season* •There now arises the pj^ blea of feow the historical process realizes its aim—-tits aira ef Freedom as defined above• Tbere are two aspeets to this problem* In the first place , one mist consider the native of men* Hegsl stated, "the first glanee **• History cenvineee us that the actions of ssen proceed from their n&eds, their passions9 thesis* characters aad talents; and impresses ws with the belief that such needs) passions and interests ere the sale springs of aetion, the efficient agemts in this scene of activity."(14) Men,} in ©taer words, have natural Impulses that are selfish in essence.. They find it serenely difficult to submit t© the discipline ©f morality aad Justice, €«nse«i«ent3y History ia filled with the agony resulting from their own selfish acts. Yet, these sufferings are n&ts in vsin for they eathibit "only the means for realising what we assert to b'e the essential destiny.*-.the absolute aim, or.*»wbieh corse© to the same thing. «•• the true result of the world's history*"(15) This absolute ®im is, of course, the development into actuality of that which is potentially, of wMeh we have already spoken<*»ihe develops, ment, that is* of Spirit towards ultimate freedom. In other words, it is? only throw gh th® activity of men motivated by tfill that the potentiality ef Spirit is actualized ©Jsd this activity involves the satisfaction of selfish ends and the .•( 1ft)Ibid, p65.** (lS)IMd, p67. 44 sufferings eensequent thereto* M Hegel put i t 9 " i t i s only by this activity that that Idea as well, as abstract' characteristic® generally, are realised, aatu.alised$ for of themselves they are powerless*, fhe asetive power that puts thesa in operation and gives theia determinate existence, i s the n^ed, the instinct, inclination and passion of man*o»If I am to exert myself for any objects i t must i n som© way or other b®'S§JE object, l a the aeeom* plishment of such or such desi<£ns I must at th© seme time find satisfactions although th® purpose for which I exert myself includes a complication of results, many of which have no interest t© me* "(16) So i t i s that free the pursuit of private interest$ often attended by sorrow @nd suffering and even disaster, there arises th® accomplish-raent of ab broader purp©s©v»th© realisation ©f potential freedom for the individual* But this movement towards the actual!z-ation of potentiality i s not a 8TO©th, upward spiral•cottree* I t proceeds, rather, according to what ha© been termed the dialectic process. Sals i s essentially a clash of opposites which coalesce i n an ultimate synthesis. This synthesis, i n i t s fem, clashes with e&etker opposite and coalesces with the lat t e r to fowa yet anetber syndesis* And so the process eowtiaaea u n t i l f i n a l l y an a i l inclusive category . i s reached wherein a l l opposite® are included in a f i n a l synthesis—called alternatively by Hegel, the Absolut© (16)Ibid, p<87«*68. 45 or the Idea* An ilMstr&tiom will make tills process clearer* Hegel took ais Ms example for th® Philosophy of Mi story.v "gae building of a houa©P He pointed out that we have the means for this end: iron, wood,, s'toaaee, fire, wind, and water* Fir© ie needed ttto melt the iron? wind is needed t© Mow th© water? water to help cut th© weeeVff(l?) fhe first in the pairs of opposites are fire* wind and ' water* These art used to Mild th® heiase and in the buil-ding of th® hou#e, the second in the pairs of opposites appears* r£he wiad which helped build the hoiase is kept eat from i t | so Is the violence of "the raia(water) and •the dangers of fire* In other words, in the dialectic process* a factor gives rise' to an opposition which limits it., just as the wind and the fir© and the water gave rise to a mease which then limited the feraer* s influence; "fhe elements ©f nature are made use ©f in accordance with their nature* amd yet to co-operate for a product by which their operation ie-limited*w(3B) Another esesaBple is quoted in Stac@(19}« ThlB is the triad of not Being and Becoming and Beiag*. By Being, is meant the abstract idea ©f "beiag in general* puro being" in which all specific factors ar@ eliminated* But this pare being-is "absolutely indeterminate and featureless, completely empty and vacant*" that i s , pure being is also nethis^ ? Hence Being is the same as nothings "The pure (17)Ibid, p73* (IB)Ibid, p73. (19)Staoe, W»T.s The Philosophy of Hegel» London, Macmillan & Co«e Ltd** 1924, p92* 43 eeaeept ©f Beisag contains the idea of 11©thing*w Her© the category ©f B©ing(<$&©ei®)l® affirmative? the category @f Sot Beii^amtithesisHa negative, am ©?>iw>sit©« But, as Stase yoinrfeed out* te remain at this point is t© allow a contradiction within "the smie thiasg ai the seme time,"— Being aad 10% Being* "If we affim 'that anything 'is8 w© must at the &m® time admit that it 'is ait1*." ©its apparent ©©nt^adietion is resolved however in the th i r d eategory @f BeeeniizgCsynthesis)* One ©am readily see that Beoeming involves both Being and Sot Being and hone© is a unity of the two* One ©an readily see, t@o, that Beast©* make®*-l&is compulsory for Beasen "eaanet rest in what is self«eontradi story* *.• By rational necessity the thesis gives rise to its opposite and so t© a contradiction*,f ITow the point ©f a3.1 the above is that social change proceeds according t© the same j«*ineiples of affim&tion 5 negatlea and syathesis© A given social state gives rise to i t s opposite and there follow® a synthesis ©f the -fees© opposing conditions.*. As Hegel said, MIn this agbese are presented these momentous eolHsiens between existing^ aelaaewledged duties,, law®, rights' and those contingencies whleh are adverse to this fixed system} which assail and even destroy its foundationi} and existence? whose tenor may nevertheless seem g©©d~~on the large seal© advantageous—* yes, even indispensable and necessary* These contingencies 47 realise themselves ia History? they involve a general principle of a different order from that ea whloh depend© the B^fjeeaeaee of a people or a state* But w© must remember esse more that History is the progress of Spirit toward® the self-real! ssation it© own freedom* Hence the dialectic process is-in reality one which involve© the establishment of higher sand higher forms of freedom ustii Absolute Freedom 1© ultimately reached* Let us now look at History itself in order to see how Freedom has grown to higher end higher forms* For Hegel th® history of the world has travelled from Sast to West* Asia is the beginning of history? lurop© ie. "absolutely the @M of nistoxy*M(21) Moreover9 i f one'' looks still more closely at the historical process., Hegel claimed that one will see that as one passes from last to West* on© finds that Spirit has come more and more to realise itself, to realise the Freedom towards which it strives* fhus9 "th® East knew and to the present day only knows that Qrm ie freef th© Greek and Soman World that l©m© are free 5 the ©e&san World that Ajy, are free^gg) Corresponding to these three divisions of civil!satioa are TEE U^mmSPf m SOCIAL, three main political formss and Aristocracy im the ©reek and Soman World? and Monarchy in the German World* (2&)H®geX» Ehilosoigfty of History. p?S-76. Despotism In the last§ Desecr&ey 48 la saying that i n various c i v i l i s a t i o n s > certain grsups are "free" Hegel meant, of coupee* that th® conscious acceptance of moral principles because they are consciously seen as being of benefit to the individual and tc the social group In which the individual exists, i s limited to certain groups i n each eiv£H*mtieB<» • But i t means ©ore than that, too*' Hegel- believed that the Stat© i s the representation of the Bivine Idea en eaari&y G©ns©qp@3st3y trae freedom can only be attained throu^^: the State* 1?ut i n simple terse, this mesne that i f on© i s t© be free one wiBt inwardly and with a f u l l y c©nsei®&s conviction accept th® Law ©f the State as beneficial t© ®mmM and t© the social group i n which one exists and that one should subject oneself consciously t© the W i l l of the Stat© as expressed i n Law* Hence, when Kegel stated that wXn the East On© i s free", he meant that only the rallog despot i s in a position to consciously realise the value of laws l a i d down by th© State* A l l these under him ©bey the lawfrem blind acceptance based on external pressures* In th© case of the Roman and ©reels World more are free in this sense, but s t i l l net a l l Individuals* In the-German World, according to Hegel, everybody i s free* In the f i r s t phase of history, then., the consciousness of Freedom i s limited t© the On© individual, the despot* "•Outside the One Power*—before which nothiag can Hsai&tain asa independent existences-there i s only revolting caprice. 4 9 which "beyond t&e limits of the central power, rove© at will without purjjose or result,-"'(33) There is a despot soling his empire without any limiting control over his actions* Under him are his subjects without freed&i; not so much because they are subject to the v#&ms of a despot as because they are unconscious ©f the purpose e^ d intent of the laws promulgated by the despot* h^ey see merely such laws as edicts of the despot; imposed on thorn without their will and consent* It matters not that the laws which the despot m*tes out are bepiga laws, actually promoting the welfare of his subject®* As long as the subjects remain ujc^Bsjiouj ©f the purpose of th© laws and fail t© accept and comply with them willingly as a. social duty, they have not attained a true state of complete freedom* as Hegel himself put it,""moral distinctions and requirements are expressed as law© but so that the suMective will is governed fey these, laws as by an external force* ITotliing subjectiye, in the shape of disposition* Conscious, formal Freedom, ia recognised*. Justice i s a<&sinlstered en th® basis of external moseallty* And government s«£ate only as the prerogative of comfulsleB* * * and alta©u#t th© meral preseriptionsB • *may be perfect* what should be imterjaa^  ftuMective seatimenf is made a matter of external arrange-ment 24) And he continued* "all that we call subjectiv-ity Is concentrated in the supreme head of the State, (gS)Ibid, pl66, (S4)Ibld, p%y%^%72. m who 139 All Ms legislation has aa ©ye to the health* wealth aad benefit ©f th© whole* "(SS) Such a State feia end aueh a relatisaship between the Individual and the State leads t© am antithesisf'th© opposing principle of individuality* fS( 86) She subjects voftelt against the laws, again* est because they are necessarily unjust laws but because the subjects fall t© aeeept the* llffardly, as a necessary part ef freedom* Bttt this indlwidit«lity at. first gets nowhere* It Merely iistro» daces a new eleaiemt "which in the shape ef bravery, prowess and »agnanlt«ity, ©ccsapies the place ©f the previous despotie yeapy foes, through the same cycle ©f decllsse. *»< 2 ? ) The ancient Chinese state ie particularly illustrative of the! limited aattate ©f the consciousness of Freedom, under a despotle re$l»e» Individuals end eerporations are not thought of as having l&depeii&esfl. right®* Ifaadarine adsdnlster the country without reference to the desires ©f the individuals and eo'rperatioiss ©omasmed* and the eorfjerations and lMividwal-s ooaply with the regulations aot beeau#e ©f an lisward eenvi©ii©s of their ri$ata®s« but because of the fear ©f ©Cereal penalties* the seme 'is true of ©sines© jurisprudencet "All legal relations ' axe settled by rales 5 free •ea&laraft-~»ilw »©ral ata»dpetafc geaerallyyis thereby thoroughly obliterated^*(S8) Again, in the eorrectien ef wrongdoing 11 the detei-ri^ g principle is ©»ly the fear of puniehaent, aot any consciousness of <5»S)2bid, 1^73, (26)Ibid, p/CC (27)XMd, p!6?o <S8)Ibidt plQO* .wraag+*CS93 In family mt&t&mm "duties are absolsstely. teixtf&ag and established and vegsiated b^ !«!*»*( 30) India* another Eastern 3s»iti7e-* m e « U ma»y of tae sexse cfcarae tori e t £ ee aa China aa far as tfee develefsseaafc of tho cosjgGi«msnsi»@ of freedom IIB c'essfiersied* But India hags it* &ff«rene*e* fhay are .AM- largely to the faet that Badia is ©fss£&se$ on the basis of a e&st© system* tinder suistfc m m$ms±mii<m tfeere la a eertafe degree of tsidiv&daal iade^ adsnee from eea&nal e»ttovit;)r*. Bse freople are governed by the serial oaste to *&ich tfaty belong* this BegsX ecmsidered » nAiransv toward© the £oe&glmie&s#s of ffeeedesu For at least th«re is th* yeeegssi'&iea of diff evenena ajoeag groups of individuals wfcleh require ln&vi£wal expression in the division 1st© ame3?oas Mutually exclusive r. cjuftna* However, within ajjy given tm%9 tho e&edle&e* of the sisnfe'ern of the eaete to the established uange* of tne enste is set the oonsequenne of seeing the necessity of obeying eevtaln rales aM regulations aad of a willingness that cesses frem wltfeln the inttvidnal to ebey'tli* rules but ie, as in the ea»e of tfein&t toe te antopnally imposed pntfRweti Seeease ®f tbia* the Xndisa people have net attained a full measure e£tn« oomoieusmes of f^ eedsaa* ITevertlieiees, they are closer to the g^ el tana the Chimes** la the Fevaiaa ttapivn Spirit has aade a atill Asrthez* step towage *eaH*£ag itslef* Ifcd Foreign «»plre« <89)IMd, 0391. (SO)IMa,-|0S8. e«3£$!$£iM as it was ef a aMsltitude ©f jmtie^alities, ceuld not hoys to e*oeeiibvafce the atata' power ia a aiisgle Aaspot* Sor eould it achieve unity 1st the diversity ef a cast© aystcau It had to allow a eertaiB eenhl^ ee of freedom to survive an am Bapi*e« Een&e th* rulea? at the center of the Sspir® was swarded ."neither as the absolute director &e«? 'the arMtrary rale? bnt a& a p©w®s> whose will is regulated by the see® principle of law ae the ©bed!©see of the•sub-ject* "(31) Con»@«j-«i»nt3y th* several »®#bers of .the Em^im were allowed " a free growth' for unrestrained expansion and rsssifisatien• M(3S?) So was tmmA wim this seultit&de of nations, raving usaadsf tfces we see ia Bahylonla and Syria ®wsmym and industrial pursuits ia full vigor* *<»f»s spiritual Gad ef the Jews arrests our atteatiea«*($3) Yet the subjects did net enjoy easaplate freed<53i eiaee they wave ealled upeu im oany iaaitanse* te ©bay the Persian Satraps* As in the ease of the Chinese and th© Indians, they efeeyed net %e*»a»ee they willed ijawsr-dly to $bey hut beeiswe© external eejayalaien forced ©bediesaoe* She Persian Sasplr© th«33. M«inae it esss tolerate* * * various p*inei!g»alitl©s •aMfeita tfc* «atithe*ia(ef individually) ia a Jjteflg*. ae^vj^g^B*nC 34) . Egyptian civilisation contributed te Spirit*® realisation of that whioh it is potentially by being th© first ai'villMtlea te e&prea® the idea that Spirit is ' iawwUCU t!Tbe idea that Spirit is iaaseortal involves iala— (31)1*14* #174. (88)2fei69 pX7® <S3)lMds pnv" (34)Ibid, p!7S« m that the temum tMiviisial latttreatly f«»e®«®« infinite vain*.* "(9$) If this eenaept had been eaovie* t© its legieal ®emiusi«m fey practical Ufa, Sgypt night have reallsed th© Stat* a® the Biviae Idea tf&r«*e«©> en earth • H w w , while the Sgyi^ ien* 3r»e©g»is©d the .value ©f 13*e individual ae far ma InnertAllty was eettfteroca they aalnea henna' %y easts* and auperetltieii ia th® mortal. w©*ld and ©bayed the will a dee^ dt toeanae ©f esrfceMal pffes'Siufe assS not because they willed asud mm the value la sueh ehedleaee* fhey remained gjnajgajajjjgg ^ purpose aaa intent of the law assd ©feeyed it blindly* In Bgypt then ••the two elements of reaU-ty—^irit auuk is mature and ths impales' te llnerate lt*»-sra held • together lmhassmdemely as e«mt#3»£iss# eleeMnts*.«2h© tw© aides of this uaity are held is ai»str«9t indepa&deme© ©f eaeh etaer, ***a their veritable union pa**assarted aiaiy as a thea em turns t© th© flrsek serXd,, however*. *»u© find* at tart the true satithesie ©f th* ef the eettttieuwiieefli ©f freeema*''-& highly .©mproased fls*n ©f enmsclens individuality. Kegel painted ©at that th© geographies! cnn&vlem* ©f a^ eeae were v$ry favourable to the pwfestiem ©f individuality* Maeh mt 0rse6e eousiste of ielaads scattered thresh the Aegean $ end <SS)IMd* pSStit * Spirit* as used her* fcy Hegel apparently nmams th© soul ©f maa* (SC)Ibidt pfiPS* even the mainls&d ia nvofeen by long telets* Furth^, the nalnland is ebajmctevised "by numerous meimtatmn a»d valleys* Sach geographical condition* effectively cutt off local groups from contact with one mother sad as a consequence eomaumitieis developed ia different directions causing a diversity a»S individuality unlmowa on "the Yang-Tse, Kwang-Hoj Tigris9 Euphraeten and Kile plains. What* then* bawugnt about the taaioa of the Greeks? tnr&ef* and te coeae toougn Mlaw end cuetom l^ vj .^fcbe, H ^ g f f M - g L , « 3 ? ) Law and custom worn taa mechanisms wbercby union was achieved but law ssad custom were accepted consciously on th® part of the individuals ae neeeasaxy to the union and wore inwardly willed as desirable*- Yet» in this union were kept the "lflberent dietlnetaaea of character of individual eeamunitien* The isas^ diate cause of Greek m'saion^ ogel maintained* «as the Trejaa war nteieb united * the various Greek communities against a comasem foe* '• \ Greek individuality* then,, was due to force® inherent 1B . the mture of the various Greek communities «sd to the fact that it was necessary tm" the individual communities to be aware of the necessity of anion before union cmM t>e achieved. But because of this growing awareness or een& e^nsness, obedience of law *»is not placed in a relation t® nnivernally valid moral authorities? aeeuasing taa-'fttm of dn&iee* but the Moral mppmm m & nature (®?)lbidt p&63. 55 peculiar t© the ia&tvidaiil—aa& MVfelem ©f will,, th© result ©f dispesitiesa- and -lnttvlMl eeMU«e*len*n(38) temping t® th© Greeks,it was & t m t m that *«aeh st&is should aet acoordiag t© Ma c©avleti©si«>w(3®) Thus th© Greeh state "aot e*3jr allows ©f the display ®f their pewer® em th© .part of iadlvlAsala^ hut avians e^jMn t© . use these powers far the conan^ u weal* At th© same t i»e t a® af the ©wsuiiity ©am obtain lnfluenea unless ha has th© fever ©f satisfying th© intellect and jtid®»eHfct as well a« t h e passieas aed volatility ©f a cultivated people .•»( 40) 6n tha other hand, the eaaeeleuanssa of freedom ia th© areefe dewecraeies was net yet c«5»pl9t@? aeeerding to . Hegel.® lis the first place .the QreeSts did net vueftertajce all their acta en tha basis ©f .inney. velltien* «*tth Dereees'acy in that fern in whieh elsne it elated in Greece* ajMSSJ* are iatln&tsly ©©fm*©te€***i*fe©& a e®l©ny was to he founded*, wheis it waa pr©$©sed t© adept the •wersMp ©f foreign deities, ©r wham a general vna about t© give h&ttl© t© the enemy* the ©Faoles.ware eeneulted«*(41) In all these inataaeeg the QMekg. ©am© t© a decision not so much fro® subjective eenvietien as from ©setesaeoua suggestion. la the afteead plaee,. there was the. elessent of slavery ia Greek life whioh seriously vitiated the eenseieasaeaa of freedom* If this wiaseteu&neas war® <3S)IMd, $m» <S9)Ihid, y934* (40)Ihid, Bl}IMd, f83S* eeaplats* it would invalve alavea lieiwg ftefte- or. at least accepting their eenditloia of alavevy te&m&gh inward volition aaat with en i g i i d e a r e t a i J d i n g o f the neeeee-ity of slavery to the welfare of thm Greek social order* In the this** plase Greek dem&es'acy was possible only iia the small city state« The : Greeks had m solution to the ixyoblem of a willing and real participation in a deaeeraey that es£te»ded over a large area* fhe sere, coasting s®d ©ells&ting of votes as is doBO in our own age Is no solution sines tfee individ-ual "must be present at the eritieal stage of public business | he watt take part in decisive crises witfe Ms entire persoBality—-laot with Ms vote merely; he must. mingle in the feeat of the notion—ta« yaanlen end interest of the whole mm being absorbed in the a$fmir»uC4t) One ©ee© then that there tend arisen in gneeoe for the first tine in the history of the world-, a eem o^ioueistss o f 'Freedom for a eeiPtain mseber of individuals' and not just for tan 03*®- or f e * tne- veay On the other nana* there were certain limitations- en the eenseieneiiesj of freedca end thai* were seme sections o f tiae population tfttien did mt Isnow of t h i a ee*8«leaanaea* < Fat why did not the n&etosy of the -mwM rest with , taa establishment' of Greek eivfltaatienf fee sRswer to thla <|U66tien« Hegel stated* lies in the feet t h a t individualism* limited m it vaa» once having ti'ium i^ed. ^ egan to go to extremes since the ©reeks had not yet reached the stage (4slXbldv p387* af wnw&Uri&sm** *tunra i t wm s»eali»d 4&at the Stat® is the Blvlsa® Idea eappeseea' on eayttu laey w«r& incapable of eanmioaa ly submerging i&eir e2£tr«sie i a M v i d n a X l e a i» tae aids* of the State* fhm& sthese who had been *lenaad*p*a general*.» new aaenalnif &n in&eaea&eat appear-ance e«3 the stage of B ia tasy as M.mH carried ©is long wars with one another* M<43) Twp&»*i *±a the i n t e r n a l eaneltlaa of the a ta taa , vaie% «wn«t«6 by aelffaaaees &nd d«bisu«h«r?y*, were bsaaaa into Cnat iaaa f the point' of ia&eaant ie as lenger the fate of these *t*bea 9 but the great i*» arise nsld tfee general corrupt ttcHW«(44) Soman World in*ea*«%ed ass «atitk«*ie to tbe Greek World bat it was an esstitfeeeis of a different order from the original thesis ef the oriental wtrSdU In. the Roaan wovld ®aa acted "ne i ther in aeeevdaaee with the ©apsslee of a despot, nor in ©bedi»»oe to a graceful caprice of their ewaj but work for a general aim* one 1B efeieh Hie individual perishes end realises his own private? ©bgeet only in that ^mmmCL a t e . "(46) A genera l seta een&en to the *ihole social «r»-*p i*& eeneeived a© desirable and every i n d i v i d u a l ia the group works towards that gomeral ate, The State begins to have an abetvant exietenee *2Jd to develop i t a e l f far a definite street* in aooonpllsMnf whinn the individuals Indeed have a •(43)Ibid* 9dS*> (44)Zbid« pjc/. (4d)2bld, »168. share" but " sure sa©rifi@ed %m the severe deaauds of th© «a&amal objects, te vnieh they surrender thenselves ia ^is serviee ©f abstract generalisations-*'** She idf&lversal subjugates th© individuals; 'they have t© me$p» their own &&ea*et« i» it | but in return the abefepatetlea* mbleh they eab©$y are recognised ««(4@) B»eentiallys tb©a.f the great different©© between the Oriental werld and the lemon VerM ia that while ia the Oriental Uw*M Individuality i a im^nerged £p a blind aisd nmseaeeloue eaayifie* t© central authority, ia the ?t®sam Warld individuality ia suppressed consciously far the atta&smemt ©f a seaseieualy realised aad abstract ar#al* This Is definitely a stef %fa&mae& towards Spirit* s realisation ef itself el nee the freedom new expressed ie the seaseieus emppreamien ©f the Mividual for a goal that ia eeen aetmally t© help the individual realise his ©en aims in the Img ran* However, even th© idea ©f abstftpact tJaiversality contained within itself its own antithesis* For eventually in the a©v©l®pn«*xfc of the Reman larXd the individual began te f ee l that the abstract general aisas ae objects of the State should be mere ©losaly hie em* She nine : *• t© wai«h he was as&ed t© subscribe appeared te© abstract and remote from M s individual pHtrpeaen* C®«a«® i^e29t% there was m attempt to impose what th* individual felt should be th® abstract aims er eh jests as the aims and ©bjeete of all* (46llbi«* pl€S:B . TR tMa way ir^ivid&ality ©nee emr*-sained m&mtim&g1 and was nltiaately deeaed im tie $ee« of a. new «^th©si»~~f©und* . Hegel believedt in what be designate* tin* "Se&aian World*'* ©as above deveiepsent eeaMnPfd' ever a peri&d of time* Bssee* like. -Qreeee* evalvad thvnia^ h tfees f5«a?£e<§# ef Mstesy* "Ibe first sagged eeKypeheRded tae nri&aenAa' ef hbn\a in whieh the 'e4/em*nts which are enaantolally erased still repass in a c&Jta anitgrf until t3*e oontrarietiea have ac-quired streftg^, and t3ae unity ef the State bneooisa a peweifful *ne.»««,*{47) in the aaaaad pearled the .state "direet© ltn forees sutwarda" md n^akee its debut in the theatre ef • general blat*ryn(40)ia the ferns ef eaaqHest and *ss« panelen* In tfee third period i^mtemaal d&#tafest£«a supers vene and the ^eried eleees with Be^ petieeu w{49) In the first period ef Beaan hiatavy ©ee&rred the devel©|jesBent ©f fee state ef mind in <ealea individual believed he realised Mm»elf la the aaatoaat* general ate® ef th* State* At first the State reaebes a eeheaive fees ef political *jndes throagfe tba a&esafty ef the early leaan klnafis^of #*08« Basal*** Mm&f awvim IteXlina and the Ta^ csuirie are beet temm* fhe earliest @f thee© kings ere&ted a elasa system of Fatirleians and PleMam* by appointing senators end giving them power above ©irdinssry •p®mmm$ tliavaby making then a ns&viliged SRBtfa* L^er kings* however* •*£tern- eewted tbe support ef the people **( SO) (47)Ibid* p36@» {48)Ibid* 3&®6« (40)1*1** s@S7. (50)Ibid, p OSS* In this way the power of the Patricians was reducedf that of the Plelrians increased« This eventually led to a revolt o» the part of the Patricians and the kings were banished about Si© B.C. Because of this* Some became^  at least ia mane* a republic. Two Consuls headed this republic and governed it themselves* There followed a struggle between Patricians and flebiansft "For the abolition of royalty had taken plage exclusively t© the advantage ©f the ari3t©emGy9"(SiH® which the royal power was transferred* This straggle resulted in the Plebiane winning one eoneeaeion after another until "the Pleblana attained the r i^t of being eligible to the higher political offices* and they too managed to'obtain in the land and soil* the means of imhsiatence.uCsM 3© Hegel eoneluded that "by this union of Patrieiane and Plobiaas., loss© first attained true internal eonsieteneye.««A period of satisfied absorption in the emmm intereaCs ensues*^  S3) Stoma had by thle time reached the stage where the interests of th© individual were eoneentrated in the abetraet aM general aims of the Boman State. The complete antithesis to th© Sreek forld was finally achieved. There now followed an era of conquest and e^ paaadea lasting from the time Home extended tfee/« power through the length and breadth of Italy until the time of the close of the second Panic War* This was 1&s age in which the wmm Idea of the consciousness of freedom was actively opposed to the Idea of the consciousness of freedom iaaowa to the <5I)*bid, p807 (OB)Xbldt. p^i (SS)Ifeid, pj^. 61 Greek Torld and th© Oriental ^orld* During th© second period of lonan history, however, there areee a new contradiction t© th© Idea of th© consciousness of rreedem aa Borne understood i t * "After the feeling of patriot! am • • •had boon satisfied, destruction iiamedistely invades the state regarded en aaeset the grandeur of the individual characterC first aeon in the victories of the frest military leaders)(54)becomes stron* per in intensity***?* see the internal contradiction of "cm* now beginning to manifest itself in another fosme tfe observed thc.t contradiction previously ia th© struggle of the Patricians against the KLebianes now i t assumes the form of private interest, eofitreveTjing patriotic sentiment end respect for the ntatei 710 longer holds these oppoeites in the neeeseary equipage * Bather, we observe now side by side with wars for ccnojtest* plunder and glory, the fear-ful spectacle of civil discord in TSeta*.* .n(5S) This disruption of the Homan Ttete led to the appearance of great individuals on the stage of history, who were impelled to restore "that political, unity -sfclds was no longer to be found in men's disposition*HS6) Hence one witnesses the arrival upon the ecene of the Dictators, the Caeeare, th© Tmperors ©f Beman History* Because of the snarchy which the new individunliSK brou#it with it ••the world wide sovereignty of Ttesme became the property of a single possessor*W(S?) (Si)The bracketed ©emaient is mine* (56)Ibid* p39S* (56)Ibid, p3®8* 6 8 But the Caesars &216 Dictators no sooner had oetabliehoi ffewiteslves than they @m into ooataet with tho now anti» /gnosis that was to manlt in Spirit's ultimate and final realisation of itsolf • lender tho despotism of the ft*p*v*rst tho individual instead of soaking a new synthesis ia a aaterialistic and worldly for* of iadividualign nought canaalatian far tho lose of his fre*d©» in an issuer lifa of spiritual satisfactions* and haraio^« ffeoro, eecnxrad a "spiritual pord.,fte&tien of th* *txiiggl*.ift th* fact that tbe individual personality* instead of following Its *wn capricious ehoiee, ie purified and elevated in Oniveraality— a subjectivity that of its ©w» free will adept* principlee tending to tho good of all—reaches 9 ia fact* a Divide p*r«*nsJLlty • "( 57) la short* th* **lf~***xlfie** huallity and mmk®m& of tihrlstisn&ty Kith its ©wsx peculiar f a n of indlvldualies was the antithesis that opposed Itself to the lemen dosp©*». For the. first tine the Supreme Law of the universe wms recognised a® identical with the dictates of oemseieneee Morality was «s© longer a compulsory eisa«tneist ant was the £ree ehoiee of th* individual* Kegel bell«v«d that the Oeraan .people* «*** the "world historical peoplee* .who were destined te carry Spirit*© realiasation of itsfcif te the final conclusion* filer* ie no need, hewevere to describe in detail hew the final synthesis was achieved* Sfegei* in bis attempt te fit the modem historical period into bis pattern, beoesws CIS?)Ibid, pirn* extremely involved in the eompiieetefi movements et bietory since the fall of P©»©9 and was forced to readjust M s application of the dialectic procedure to include saner©** sub theses, antitheees and eyntheaes within the main triad he proposede Essentially* the modern era wae aaid te begin with the thesis of Christianity establishing Itself in the Vest*. Tills period covered the time to the reign #f Charles-magna* The second period of the modern era developed the "two sides of the antithesis t© a logically consequential independence and opposition—the Qmmte for itse If as a theocracy and the State for itself aa a Feudal Monarchy."(S3} In this period Osurch and State battled for the contra! of secular pewere After a long and bitter struggle the Church won and its tvlumph' led to a sooiety that was dominated by the religious ttamt* This was the ssagaifieent age of the Church Universal when the civilization of the Hiddle Agee reached its 'greatest height*. Unfort/tw t^ely th® Church beoame to aeeularis6d» tJafortssnately als©9 the Church attained to© much power over the laity~«e3gtemal power which* was not aoejaleaced to or -shared in by the laity. Because of this a soMam arose between the laity aisd the clew* "The alergy imposed certain conditions* t® which the laity must' aexrfeo* i f they would be partakers of the Holy* The satire development of doctrine? spiritual insight and the knowledge of Mvi» (S8)tbid» p*37* things, belonged exclusively to tho €bnreh; it has to order and the laity have ei&ply to believes obedience is t&eir d&ty~~tfee obedience of faith* without insight ©n their parte This position of things rendered faith a siatter of extensaX legislation and resulted in compulsion and the stabs* "(59) ^hls ©verwhetol^ g aeenlap- «ad epiritnal power of tfee Church naturally ejused a revolt against the Ctanveae Bespeet for the Papacy dwindleds Heresies against the Gh«reb developed* She iefessa&tlen began* Freedom, once again* took the form of a conscious individnal acceptance of the dictates of conscience* Luther eaqspeased the new ideas in a forcible and concrete fern* Be claimed that the Spirit of Christ really fills the hnnaa heart; that the laettvidaal knows that be is filled with the Divine Spirit; that It is Met only' the Church and the clergy who possess "the tsab*» stanee of tarntb1* but' 'the hearts of all wen wcsn and on^ ht te ©ease lata possession of the trntb*? tfoa* weacb bee te eweanpliah the work ©f reeoneiliation in bis awn jeanl"! that the "subjective feeling and tlie conviction of tha individual' i»***e<pally meee«*yywte the attaiissent of tri*th#(©@) Hegel stated that "the SeveXogaent and advances of Spirit t$m the tine of the fiefensation onward constats la this* that Spirit* having new galled th« eeaselensnea* of freedom—now takes it up and fellows it eat in building (S3)Ibid, p9?v»477« (60)Ibid* pss@»asi* up the edifice of secular relations* "(til) In ether words* the problem now became a <*uestlon of bow the idea of individual* inner conviction could be allied to the secular State* The answer to this question was the task of the third period of the modem era* It has been indicated that Christianity was the original thesis of the modem age* It hae likewise been Indicated that the aeeular power was the antithesis and opposition of the original thesis and how this opposition eventually overcame the original thesis* invadis& it to an unhealthy extent. The final syndesis is to be found* of course* in a secular State which includes in it the nature of the original thesis aa well as the nature of the antithesis. States and laws are to be nothing else than "religion manifesting itself in 'the relations of the actual world*H SI) The final synthesis was accomplished with the "struggle of the protestajset church for isolitioal emletamet% and "war was the indispensable preliminary to the security of the pretestants • *( 62) The question was not »©»e of simple conscience* but involved decisions respecting public and private property which had been taken possession of In contravention of the rights of 'the Catholic Church* and whose restitution it demanded****^ ) In amort* the pretestants in revolting against the Church had taken to themselves the Church property. The Catholic Church iasaedi-* atly attenpted to wrest the estates from the heretics* In (61)Ibid* p§S8c (62)Ibid» pSS® (€S)Ibld» pS41. <64)lbidr p©ftfc. 66 ** * \ '©eiHMKsy-.the |©&3© WES fought out la th© 3Mrty- Year©* 9tas> . Xte Saglssi the. iccue ssas settled a result ©f the Cta* , weliisn Sjejy In Holland. & similar atruggle f&e$ plsc© sai£ ' th© issue a^s agsln settled in favour of Pjpstestssats* ' - ..Finally*, the peace of tTeetphalia recognised- i^© Pr&testiPt. -; Chureh as isielepma©rit» -The sesesult was the ©rcibl^ r aeM©ve& ' aiid now ^>liti^C'll^ ratified coeisi stone® of ye^gieao ps&tie&f forcing politick er-caauDitiea «fe©$® relations ;es*-4fttesBiiM& >./V/'«5ew*d$ag; to t^ e jawacriptive principles dr. civilor -. : p^vsfc© right. "(G5) In this sassier9 th© aocular and th® religious seMwed a synthesis* Later,, th® French B®0©1sgt&«m -BJQS to breads th© eaefcetsfc ©fthe s^theeis and to create political foaasss -*&@r«is the synthesis taight op©mtOo :; -.'' * m w m n v ® m crew*** <dne-i*»st rcce£5^^e tfssediGtely t£e superiority of " '. f*e£el*8 ifeilosoghy. of social *bfy*re over that of Vico* It V- fie© obviously been mvSeedi out in for SKsra-det&iX cod th©r@* •.' 'fSKW i t posisece^ s a 'far twfoundtfr concej^al-schess©^ Furthermore* it is dependent not so ranch on hypotheses • - s&ich are bs&e? on a sti>4y of history as on hypotheses • '-goose roots-lie to tiber science of. JL©£&«s It ^ only a$fc@a? - tbs aaturb of. the !?©veRaT5t of seci&L cfcnsge has te'~m .Mused frOB5.& r&*3y of Isgte .;t$rt- !t«c©l applied1 ns® eonclupiohs. he ho& reached to, tits ectuel .©vents of Msto^ y*-' ^ esce his theorbos have not the ease- efepes&iM!e> on ta® •:' secaraey of the record of hietorlcr.1 events as hev© t&©&S;"' 67 of Vie©. Because of this, his work possesses a solid found* ation of eh extremely seminal order. There ia much evidence of the truth of the dialectical process in the world around wsv fhera i%. again, considerable troth in the idea that the world of men bee grown to knot? progressively hignea? fonae of freodoia* It is therefore only to be expected that Kegel should have brd such, a profound influence on the thoughts and acticns, of men in the last hundred years* However,, this is not to soy that Hegel's work ban no shorteomiag©*, JTatnrnlly bis work contains many points that may be ^ostl^  rriticised* One of these in the dialeetieal process itself* 7)e»pite the tact tiiat 'FAgel- painted such m lEiposing picture of the process by which t&e world move© forward towards the Absolute, s^ere are doubts as to the complete aeeurivey of t3ie description. Is fke loovereent always accomplished is a conflict of opposite©? Gertainly soeimi change appears te take, place sihen some mew idea, thought or torn of social institution arise© to confront the • 01% i?nt is the new idee, thon i^t or fore* of social institiatiem opposite in nature to that already la existence er is it a wider, a broader, a isore inclusive forsi of idea or thou^ xt or social institution? To answer this question let ua exmine certain concrete exciapies*. JTot so long ago Jlewton fonfsnl&ted ceHain lews of /mechanics*.'ffore:ree'ently Binsstein pat forward certain, lawn of relativity* According to SOSE© people* Einstein's Issa cse© a ^mtmm&Um @f Stetson's laaag of Mtatttato-Is tte>@ :fiiyste& seiesseas? B©s?fcga ssss? te ta®i&8 asi te e&Uzm goto sgrgte© as bssea a® -tut ©psmtiea e£ i s s ^ i ^ l © -.tsatSssSatieel esS |^®£^©1 lews, Stofcein's teMritt&;.«a -: te f t e » IB BS* Ss^y 'tot wrib Scne cilws • tssi© as* tet t& y^ totteSteM by w ^0«*©wg£©3 ia . s&yi&eal toQ<, Bg^L* 3©\sbtXess» ismaM to© tMs cm illwst^^i^a ®g te aieleetieel p^essg < ' ®@@ fassaimeis ST^ iase®*© meees^ iieQl lawsj easpas'©© te© uitft StaststfiaPe l&sas of ^elati^ itgr ©ESS ^jill-s@© tsMabaAcaar. tefc te ts© e@®& «£ £am es® ioitft speeSal esses es^i S*a£33i&<&&@& as©*© ©eragrsiiseS •» McfeaBfeeta 'prtnetsSM* €&B@ set of Imm* ia $3&@e «©iit*s^et&a& te ol€©3? set ©r ^ M A N the sefepo ^ aad ®s$xss& ®$ afteaMI M ftttaiMi 1am iss® ssefc . «fean«me« tegr sti l l «anftolft ©to^sst© tswtSi end m® m®?e£m?G woSmtMM « £ I B £ B ' Starts* tJaefc Sisaat©ia S&S s&s -. to sH©s? tefe te W@9t@@sd^  ssse^ies ©as develop to® - © MMteS $®ts& ®£ vlfsr teb tes® £5?8 ete& psSEt© '(OVvSwv sMl© isst e^its^ietls^ S«Ewt©Ms£s te@£&£@» include te SMatetan laws &a & b3P®aa©p g^ratest©* fte . lilKSiitv . ^ M a i M ' t t t n «tt |bt flBA.«iidttdl«i«b ; -sefeis^ ietesgr ^ feleel «©©sit©* Yefc te less ®£ ctfefttt*Usr. 6© of Einstein also apply. Th®T@fQY®9 i t would Q@@SL that 'change takes place, not by a conflict of eppositea in which- the later of the pair of opposites battle© with th© earlier unti l the latter is vanquished by the former but by a brossdesiing out ©f th© original thesis to include new theses within i t . Another instance 9 also taken from th© field ©f the • physical sciences8 w i l l isake the basis ©f the. critic!ss of Hegel still clearer. Scientists one© thought that th© ®aa21est ;particle ©f matter was the molecule | t©«day they know that tiara are s t i l l smaller particl©s™-n©utrons, protons and electrons* Yet there are molecules. discovery of neutrons and electrons does not contradict the existence of molecules, ffor ha© the discovery of noutrois end electrons created any conflict with tSie truth ©f the discovery of molecules. viiat the new discovery did was to prove that molecules are special cases of more fundamental snd more generalized characteristics of the nature of matter. So far examples have been taken from the field of the physical sciences. However, changes resulting in the development of freedom would seem to follow eueh the s®se p&ttera a© in the case of changes i a t2se nature of concepts in the physical seienee f ie ld . Th© Greeks understood freedom as a form of individualism limited to certain classes of peoplee JTodem society understands freedom as belonging to a l l classes irrespective of birth and station i a l i f e . 70 Here , again, the earl$r< Greek concept of freedom did not, as Hegel would have had it, come into conflict with the later- concept of freedcsa and then find i tself swallowed in a new synthesis. Greek freedom was a special case of a more fundamenfcal and more generalised freedom» EIb© idea of greek individually and freedc© remains to-day, extended to a l l individuals and expressed in various principles enactments of various states. In view of the above facts, it would appear that the process of social change consists in an ever more inclusive ordering of social relations as more knowledge is gained and as th® whole problem i s seen 'from continually shifting points of view. The process resemble© the picture sometimes painted of a continually expanding Universe. Social change is a. continually expisnding process embracing ever sore fuadameafefcel and more generalised forms of social organisation. Conflict between the less generalized and the more general-ized i s not inevitable as Hegel claimed. Nor i s the less generalised submerged in th© ©or© generalised. Bather, the less and th© more remain as two aspects of the same factor. This i s not to say, of course^ that tker© i s never conflict. Undoubtedly there i s e For instance, those who believe in the narrower point of view may be reluctant to admit the truth of a broader point of view and may struggle to keep what they have inviolate. Such an attitude isay lead to conflict but that does not mean that conflict is inevitable0 71 One may also question Hegel9© conviction that the TTniverse is rationally ordered and that a l l th© fundgssental processes within i t are th© result of rational necessity*' In our own time doubts have arisen as th the rationality ©f mechanical processes* AB certain physicists have attempted to show9 there are indications that th© laws thought to govern the mov€oients of electrons and protons in the atom may not always hold true. At the same time no ©or© inclusive laws have been discovered to account for the apparently erra t ic and irrational movements of certain of these bodies* Perhaps th© Universe is iundanentally irrational-~unbound by any mechanical or logical laws* This i s the view; of some physicists* But actually th© view has been neither proved nor disproved* I t may b© that in due course .of time laws w i l l be discovered to account for the apparently irrational behavior of the ,4 nf net-microscopic particles of matter, but until more evidence i s accumula&ed a state of suspended judgment is the wisest course t® follow*,. One can neither support Hegel nor disprove him* As for Eegel8 s concept of Spirit* a l l that oae can eay is that the existence of a fore® of a supersensory nature immanent in the world can no more be definitely proved nor disproved that the rationality, or irrationality of the world* Certainly i t i s one ©f these hypotheses which can not b© proved by sensory means* Hegel based his belief in the existence of such an immanent force on the fact that nine© 72 the world i s rationally, ordered i t avast have gome foree to siaks i t so* fhie force he called Spirits I t possessed within i t se l f a l l the potentialities of Absolute Freedoms These potentialities it worked out in the world,ultimately realizing a state of Absolute Freedom on earth. If, however, i t were finally proved that the world is basically irration-a l , then the entire fabric ©f the Hegelian system would crumble in ruins. The description that Kegel gave of Spirit working out that which i t is potentially, in the actual history ©f the world i s the least convincing part of his work. It. took him a good many agile gyanastics of. thought to f i t the story of history into the theoretical pattern of social change h© had propounded. Consequently this section of his work is often filled with contradictions and confusion. Certainly there would seem to be some truth in Hegel* s statement that the history of the world has travelled from th© East towards the West. When one lists the great civilizations in the • order i s which they apparently appeared on the stage of Mstory~-Chinese, Babylonian, Egyptian, Cretan, Greek, Bosian, European, U©rt& ^seriesn««one realises t^ ie truth of the statements However, when Hegel went on to claim that the West was "positively th© end of history*' he made an error that i s rapidly beecsaing apparent to-day. Asia, stirred laightely by the waves of occidental civilisation pounding at ber door, is awakening* She is taking over aasny 7 3 of the techniques and.ideas ©f th© west and reintegrating tliem to salt her own needs* There i s every evidence that one sa&y vdtsiess a. revival of the Easts, the Sewering of a new civilization as the Vfeet ossifies .in a culture pattern frcsa vittich it can not free itself o There are indications, that Hegel's contentions that th© East was doomed forever to stagnate, under th© despotism of the one i s not true*, C i v i l i z a t i o n moves to China, te India and to other parts of the Orient* Furtheraore, Hussla, usually considered an Asiatic power9 i s experiencing an awakening that i s a resounding contradiction of a l l that Hegel said,* Here w© fi a d a isovejaent ©f c i v i l i z a t i o n from the West te the East instead of from th© East to the West* Whether Russia will ever develop lag© a c i v i l i s a t i o n as great as that of th© other, c i v i l i s a t i o n s which have crossed the stag© of history remains to be seen? but n© one can deny that i n Sussia there i s a.new and v i t a l culture i n th© ©aking© On© i s s t i l l less convinced by Hegel's attempt to prove that the development of freedom, as he understood i t s has resulted in a continuously increased consciousness of the s e e d of submission to the Will of the State as the T&vlns Idea expressed ©a earth* It i s true that the East has long been known for its so-ealled oriental .despotism but Egyptian and Babylonian ci v i l i z a t i o n s did not show any development away from despotism and toward© a consciousness and willing submission to ^te W i l l pt the State 9 over that of China, Hegel was f i t t i n g the facts to his theories when 74 he claimed that the Indian caste' system involved a greater degree ©f willing submission, since individual differenti-ation was considered and allowance made for £tf l. or 3 when he stated that the Egyptian concept of immortality repre« sented a s t i l l further advance i n this direction.* In actual fact a l l these civilisations were "based on despotic that ignored the individual w i i l e Even in Hegel* s native Prussia, which he maintained represented the final attainment of Absolut® .Freedom, there was a despotic regime unsympathetic to individual volition, Again the dictatorships and tyranny of our own age are an everlasting contradiction of a l l that Hegel believed* Finally, in many of the oriental countries, there is to-day a definite movement towards a recognition of individual volition and a realization on th® part of Us© individual ©f th© necessity of submission to Law as represented by the state* The West, again, is definitely not the end of history*. The idea that the State is the nicest raanifestation^ i n the world,©f Spirit and that the individual can only develop in voluntary submission t& the Will of the Stat© because the Stats is the representative of the Divine on earth, is also open to serious ob^ ectiono The State i s an institution just as a church or a lodge or a joint-stock company is an institution,, It is formed for definite ends? i t has specific limits of control; and it can function 76 only t&reugti lusman agents* Its ends may foe more varied and more inclusive than the" ends of other institution© bat this does not l i f t i t from the realm of institutions to a supernatural, position. The State, again, i s limited l a i t s control to th© nation which i t represents just as a lodge or a church is limited in its control to it© own members* The State, at the' present time, has no control over international ©vents except through th© arbitrament of wsr». Even within its own country, a State finds i t se l f limited- in control by other institutions and associations which desaand and acquire rights and privileges at the expense of an* omnipotent government* ' • * Finally, the Stat© i s not an intangible entity ^&ove a l l and beyond all*, It find© i t s reality in human repre-sentative©, minister© of the crown, asesfoers of parliament and c i v i l servants«, why, then, should the individual be . asked to submit himself without reservation to an institu« tion which ie ojfter a l l not a l l inclusive in contra! and which can function only through individuals who, being human, are limited in knowledge, often prejudiced and frequently biased in favour of economic, politics! and social doctrines which are not those of the individuals who must live under the State* Hegel, of course, would answer that as long as a' given form of the Stat© is in existence one Esust subadt oneself to i ts control sine© 7B i t i s there because of the rational necessity of the dia l e c t i c a l process and because i t will, change it© nature as th© di a l e c t i c a l process worlsa i t s e l f out and th« essisting s t a t e form beeves i z v a t i o n a l * One must fin d ©ne'e station i n existing order of thing® and f a i t h f u l l y perfossa ©ne*s duties tbesvln* E^M5tua31y this ©a® fonn o£ the State w i l l give-way to another since everytMng* tbat . ntends s&ust w©ntual2y f a l l * . S@ stated Hegel* But one a i # J t be'Justified i n arguing that changes i n th© f o n t and nature o f the State are m t necessarily due to any rational necessity* Even i f • oan - Asppesns t&tnt there i n no rational isspalse i n the wos3.d» there i s every confidence te> believe that. til© f om and nature ©f the State ismild ciaQRCw* I t rould eJumg® because' individuals dissatisfied with the existing. "tot® bring sufficient pressure to bear i n faveur ©f cbsnge to cw&o a chaise a» actual facte Ubo deification of the Gtate i s therefore as uoneees&ftzy as i t is.htnsBfiil.to t ? * , @ healthy growth of- society* ' Hegel* s concept of Freedom i s i d e a l i s t i c i n tone* The idea that one should conscioissly obey the Will of the State as expressed i n Law because only by subordinating •one's o.vn selfish interests to the good of " a l l does one attain true frendom5 has been the aim of a l l great ethical systems. Yet,. Hegel's i d e a l i s t i c principle i s seriously mitigated by his atteapt to .peg the principle to the State. v/hat right had Kegel to claim that only i n 77 the State can one find the highest moral aim"? Is not the State often as imcsoral or as asxaoral as an individual? For i s i t not ©ad© up of individuals, as we mentioned previously? Hegel, ©f course, would answer that the indi« viduals through which the State finds expression ar® hut vehicles or instruments made use of by Spirit to work out i t s potentiality and that since the. working ©**t of this potentiality is a rational and hence sai inevitable process, on® need .not be concerned sibout individual isssorality or erawralityc Th® individuals, despite their iwffiGralityj, will be used to accomplish the greater purpose of Spirit—the workiirig out of i t s mm Freedom ©n earth. I t is clear, then, that Hegel's concept of Freedom is :-v dependent on the truth that the Uhiveysfe in action is a rational, orderly universe working out its purpose but using imperfect individuals as i ts tools* Hence, the truth of his contention that the state ie the Divine Idea as found on e«rth is dependent on the tfcuth of his con-tention that the Universe is rational in nature. And the latter contention, it has been.shewn, is open to cuestion* Thus, Hegel8 s theories possess ERS^y features that detract from their value« Nevertheless, th© general idea that charge takes place when the new arises to confront the old is an idea that Hegel did well in emphasising* It may be that the ssovea&ent of change is not a progressive movement without interruption ©r reaction. I t may be that 7B char-ge is , aot necessarily accomplished i n a clash of oppositss so trsueh ae i n a sh i f t of view-point v^ere facts pnd. cireufflstanoes sre always .relative*. It. may even be tlnat a l l that can be said about social change i s that as fsew Jsiowledg© .and a-broader outlook i s reachedchange w i l l automatically take place* But a l l th is does not refute Fegel* B contention that something now and different arises to supplement or to incorporate within i t .tho ©Id, and that such a process i s the foundation of a l l soc ia l change».. ' 79 CHAPTER THREE WS^^^SS^EBBACB.^. .pE HOOTS OF,.THE SOCIALIST PlilLGSOPIfif" A, Biographical Sketch B„. P h i l o s o p h i c a l Sj^stem > , 1. C r i t i c i s m of ilegel 2. The Conservative and Radical i n Kegel S o The Movement of S o c i a l Change .4, The M a t e r i a l i s t i c Conception of History 5 . C r i t i c i s m of Engels 5 Theories Ad 80 (18£0«1895) Ingel* was born in Sarnusi$ Serawmy aad lived there during the earlier days of his life* In he went to ftagland ta work in . a Ifanobester flzas* Sort ho not Karl lar» who besot* his lifelong friend* Between 1845 «nd 1SS0 ho' mas again hack on the Continent holing in the revolutionary novenent* of the tlate« then these failed ho ones more rol^ mod to England to eoatlna* his work and to collaborate with Mane in the production of Socialist liter-ature* Bagel** along? with Mar^ j was the chief exponent of the jMlosofhioal system of scientific Sscialiiis* He wm aarly influenced by Kegel* His simplest and best exposition of dialectical aatsrialis* 1« to he found in Feue-rha®hafhe &8teL9&JSfa, 9**iqUf.* ,M&£&aaBB* S I Kegel8* philosophy M S a profound influence en all subsequent thought of the nineteenth mS. twentieth «wnba?l««v hut it haS no sere powerful influeaae than an the philosophy of social change pit forward by PrletSerioh ^golo sni Karl far** Ihsse tw©3 rejecting Hegelian Idealism* adopted certain other aspeets of the Hegelian aystfsi and frost then constructed a igMlosoj&y of social change differlaag «5®n« sidorably fron that of earlier philosopher®* lb* new theories were stated neat auoointly by Kngels in his fou.orbaoht> ' Engol® pointed out that Hegel believed in the eaetsteiaee of an Absolute Idea or Spirit before the world and in the precox!stenoe of logical categories before the Universe <ea»s into being* (1) He said that a^ccording to (Hegel) $ nature Is the »cro outward foam of the Idea* capable of no progress as regards time* but merely of m extension of its Manifestation in space* so that i t displays all the stages ©f d«vel©in«»t comprised in it at one m>M the same ti«e togethert and is condemned to a repetition of the sane processes*"(S) ©r# put another wayB  wthe dialectic is the self^ Sevolopsent of the Idea* fhe Absolute idea Sees not only exist from eternity* but is also the astral living soul of the whole aadstiag worMU Pj*jj£3°£hy, Chico^io, Charles H rteeh (JL) Ibid., PC?-It develops fro* tteelf m itself through all ths prelim-inary stages which are treated at large la JSyUtelS, end whish are all included in it* Than it steps cmteide itself 9 changing with xtatisre itself where it , without self-eonscioue-aenst i e disguised as a necessity of nature» goes through a new development*, and? finally, in sum hi»gk«lf * "hmmm eeif-conscious * thie «&e2f-cenaei©usne«s now wos?fce itself ©tit into the higher stages fron the lowest fmm of setter until the £bselst« Idem ia again reali*ed**<3) Further, fcagela stated that Hegel believed that w all that ie real is reasonable* g&d a l l that is reaaenable ia real»"(jp) Ihin »e«nt «lsfiply that Spirit 03? Idea,in tbs. presses of its devtlesaoeat towards the /a&eeXut* d#ve2#g>ed aeeerdisBg te a rational diaX#etl*» Bests the different stages of devolepenent we^ e rstisnelSy neoeesnry end there-fore real* In thie eeannetieai 'the "attribute nf veslitgr belongs only te that whieh is at the seme time Bectsssffy* Henlitar- proves itself in the eeorse i f it® isvslepsent m . nsoe#eity*n(S') But a« Spirit ©r Idea develops «eeording to', negation and synthesis "se in th* eewroe of to p?egs*©sfc $11 earlier reality becomes unreality* loses its »eeesf$£tyy its right ef enivtssoev its mtlenalityt £n plaee es? tito • dying reality eases *, newfl vital reality* * *A11 t^ at 1© real is the "soars* ©f histoid beeonsn in the p**«*M of tine Ir^tiosBftl* * Hence as Hegel stated 'it "all 1fe«fe stand* has ultimately only nneb worCa $»*& i t anset fall*w(£f (8)tbiA9-: $04>Mia <4)Ibid9 p3S. (5)1*16, p39« (6)Xbld, p€0-41» • • • 83 Sfow fttgsls aaintained ®m% the Hegelian philosophy a* outlined in th® previous pedographs, lands Itself well tither to a eensevvntivs oatlesk or t© a ttvelntimory outlook on t&e progress of history* &© esnservativ* will point to the clewent of nteesaity horn ef tat dialectic • process and will insist that tbere is no need of change deliberately engineered by Kitten agents as the developsent of Spirit will result in change in due course m the dialectic process works itself out* Cm the' other bwd the Hegelian jsfeilosoi&y lends itself eejually well to a reve-lutiomry approach* For "reality according te Kegel, is by no means an attrilaate ntoieb belongs te a given social or political condition, under all cirew&staaeee and at all tl»es« Quite the contrary*'•*{ 7) Does" not the real eventually become the unreal as Hegel hiiaself stated? ihat at present stands-must soemer or later fall i f the Absolute is to be reached* Hsstee the revolutionary character ef too Hegelian philosophy lies in the feet t&at it •'once and for al l f gave the COUP ds •noes t@ flnlteness of resnlts ©f bt«ss thought and a«tiens"(8) It is obvious, if this conclusion i« drawn tmm Hegel * that history cannot find « eeneluslen in one completed ideal eendltloa ef biasnlty» A ©©apleted ' ssciety, a perfect state is something that ean exist only as a ^antssy in the Binds ef iaen„ On the eentrary^all successive historical conditions are only plaees ef pilgrimage in the endless evolutionary progress ef buaian (7)Ibid, ?m<~m* (S)Ibidj ptl. society from the lower to the higher* Ssrery step is 'sewmsy and useful for the tine and eireuEaetaneas to whioh it owes its origin, hut it heeomea weak and without ' justification under the newer andihighor conditions whioh develop little fey little in ite wenb* It twist give way te the higher ffenis «Moa in tem oemee to decay and defeat»M(9) • B»t» now9 what dees Bsgel* do about the obvious reply of the conservative« nanelyt that.it nay be quite true that histories! conditions are finite and subtest to ohange but Spirit develops aooording to the dialeetie pmmm end inevitably in the progress of tine Msterical conditions will ohoj^ e of their own aeeord aad of necessity? there is no need of h-mm agents to Interfere with this prooesa* It will take «ar© of itself* In the first place • angels discards "absolute truth» unattainable for the Individual;, and follows Instead the relative truths attainable by way of the positive sciences* and the Oolleotion of their results by neons of the dialectic node of, thought#**(!©) In other words, angels seaifstains that the search for absolute truth i s and that It is asora sensible to seels relative truths niiile reeegnising that sues truths are by nature temporary aisd are bound to be replaeed by new relative truths as' more knowledge i s nsqgirtd* further? tngeia rebooted the idealist!® basis of Hegelian!** and instead returned to <9)Ibid» p*SU (10) Ibid, p4$* the "materialistic standpoint» that is to say* a deter** ®i nation to eosspx^heKd the'aetual world~-aature and history-*-as i t presents itself to each ©f uas without assy preeon-eeived idealistic balderdash interfering* *(il}'Ha "conceived of idea® as materialistic, as pictures ©f real things9 instead of real things m pictures of this or that stag© of the Absolute Idea* *K 38)' Thus Engels rid fcincelf of the conservative augment hy denying th@ influence of the Idea ever matter* Xnatead matter animated-.Of e(*YtA'*-Y-Material! s» replaced Idealisau But the fiialectie node of thought was retained to explain th© progress of the material, world. He statsd that "the dial©eti& of the Idea, becsoie itself merely the s^ aseious refless of the dialeeii© evolu-tion of th© real world and therefor® the dialectic ©f . Hegel was turned upsida down, or* rather^  i t was placed upon its feet instead ©f it® head? where it had been standing befor* »."(!£) Rows thesj de®@ social change ©ceia?? Again on© must keep in mind the fast that th© world "is not to be ©on«* sidered as? a complexity ©f ready-made, things,, but as a complexity ma$« up ©f processes In which the apparently stable things.. * cause an ustoste^ chain ©f seating into being and pas slag sway, ia whieh* by means of all sorts rm VWBBBffS OF SQCXAXi Of seeming aeeidents, and in spit® £ £ o 3 9 L is carried out 1B the end a progsrame of davelrop*@nt,e 8 6 geeial e&angs seneiats In the **e®»iisg'.into being and passing away* agsay-ftntlv stable things* TMa process will' g« forward aeeerdijRg te the dialeeti* • aavenent* -' If feme leaks at the Areas' ef Meter/, erne sees 'that ' »*n *are all endowed with ee»selene»ees« S*ey are agents imbued with deliberation or -passion; mm wrteing toward* an appointed end;- mrin&agr appears witfeont' m intentional purpose* without an end desired* "(IS) But tfesae • desires and ends conflict and out ef then arise results nssferseen by those' who act*' Consequently it. is ef m val&e to eoa i^ier the motives of individuals • will m% lend na to the laws ' of history. Esther-* ©ne-amst m baele behind the motives "to establish the greet impelling foveas wbieh play npon the ... bmine ef the meting isassses and .their- lenders'" and which give rise te isetives and actions*^  IS) "• . that me the forces *&ieh -play upon the ©ensclons Mlsds of men? Ingels? answer ie the conflict ef ecenemie classes* In this connection fegels stated tSaat it is m secret that slnee tbe casing of the industrial revelntion or at.least since I B I S tbe tffeele political fight in Sngland has been a fig&t for supremacy between two classes, the middle ©lass nnfl the landed *riete<sraey* Is France a. similar political struggle has taken plaee nines, tbe return ef the Bonrbenss And since 1836 a tfeisv elites*, the proletariat, ban entered the straggle for mastery in bet* eetastries* Engels saw in thee* etrmggle«.the s^aving fereee ef wedem ; (15)Zbid«.#M*20ft* •• (16)Xblel» pl©80 ©7 Mstory* Where dees the dialectic presses .ester the ptetavt*-* even, assn&ing that social change Is a fnnetion of essnesde factors? Ifee answer is to be fennd in history itself* Hie landowners of the Bendal Age ease into conflict with the fusing bourgeoisie and later t&« bourgeoisie oane into eenfllet with the industrial proletariat* A given eeonenrie vine* is eventually eenfxwated with its opposition*- This opposition in tine displaces the original class as the dominant class in society* Bnt the elass now in control ie likewise. senfyeffifcsd with as* opposition which finally displaces it* Thas the dialectic reveals itself lia history as a progression ef eeonesic classes', one displacing the ether as the ruling class of society in the process of tine* Xn short, the socialist fbilosophy ef history is one wMeh proposes an economic Interpretation of historical events and which &afees nse ef the dlaXeetieal fomwla te explain hew history progresses« What are the eeenenio causes that give rise te the conflict ef classes? The answer Is te be fonad, ace*xading te Engels, in tfce nature ef the we^ sods of predaetien ef a seeiety* lessntla^ly, wet&eds of prodw t^len ehange because ef varlens factors that need not be mentioned here, m& m these methods ehange new classes arise out ef the new methods* lis the Middle A$e®5 for instance, sethsdo ef fretetiem were largely agi&enXtupsl and ©rganisBed ©n a feudal basis* Under such a system, the fewdal lords S3 eoatrolled tlMi iseans of produetlem m& were therefore th© dominant Glass in that seeiety* Bet •transition; first, from hand labor, controlled by the gilds, to Manufacture and thence fress »awfaot©re to tho greater industry, with -aaehine and «tss» force, had developed two. «!***«#•*( 17) f*e*e% olassos ar« the bourgeoisie and the proletariate Sngela outlined the pro seas whereby one ©las® die* places another very clearly* Be maintained that at a oert&in stage in history new forces of production which were different from those of feudal tinea earns into being* 3»«se new force* of production inelnded large-acal* KAraifaeturej the division of labor and a fsjr store eompli-eated system of exebange* Ihey were ine««patibla with the gild system and with the feudal system of seoial orgeB^  lemtiem* Consequently they were attaebed by those' earnistg' their living by the mm methods $ by the bourgeoisie* The f^eadal fetter© were ®&m®k vt£* and the bourgeoisie became the eVsmlnamt elaea* But $vt»t m ^ssassafaetAsr© came into conflict at a certain stage of progress with feudal methods of production, so has the greater industry Joined battle with the bourgeois organisation of industry, established la thsir plaees^ (18)that is te say* these Individuals whes under the system of large-seale 'smmmftarts*** felled te beoetae <®ie owners and eentrellers of the means of predaetionV soon tl7)Xbid* fl2ft« C2B)lbld,p///. -mmwmm i3m% their Imt of e*nts#«4 handicafsgp*id mm in the search for emrotadei bettement eM-they caato into .• :ertafit«t wife tao beni^is&s* Angels* tfeeory was tfefet this last eXais of ps^ letea&at aaust sve .^ial.ly supersede the bourgeoisie m the dominant class is society. Conflict between classes 'is inevitable apart tmm the faet that ebsnges in the nature of the wethede of gvoebrct&oB esnee a sMf t iii controla For the de&isient &liy§©**tb» owner* of tfee aeans of p radueti©n~»is is a position- to nanld all aocial jtitmewena in its own Imago* His eta*** imfy ffeil* • ©eo$&y» a n i l s l i ^ ^ ars all ambservieni t© 13se s^iissg gvenpv Of the Stats itegeXs stated tltst »ln »©de*R history -the will ©f the ©tats as m wbole id deelsred tbrongb the $*snging -needs of the bourgeois eecie% *^,*lnt i f in Modem ' t i a e s S t a t e in net m independent affair 'with- an independent develnpEent»e«so ntncb wore sft*st the satne thing ' be true of all. earlier tiM*v«-*Xf th® Stat© in to*day» •«• ns a whole the mm®®&%mf reflected fern ef tbe ecenossie class which controls psgodnetien it roust, therefore, have been still wre so at a perled -when % generation ©f nen sast spend- a greater portion, of tfesi? united 3igw»tS*ei • in the satisfaction «f t&etr s*ftn?£«lL aeeds, and man was, therefore* mtcb wore dependent m • 48MSM • tana tban we are t©*^**C3$) m Gf Philosophy i&sgei* said: "Still higher ideological «»ae*mtde^&**teJui the toss e^«|ii^^8^^v«^m' connection of the Idea* wllti the material conditions of easletenee become® isore and more co^ pM,e&ted and obscured by reason ef the increasing ammbss> of links between them* but it exists* As the mhefei Eenalsaance frost the HiMLe of the fifteen^'century was an actual product of the •• elty, and therefore of the bourgeois daainatienj so also was the philosophy wince that time newly wafcened*-M<ig©) Of ?.8ligion ho claimed? "Mliglvn ones arisen contains material of tradition* «&liit the ehanges whioh tahe place in tats material spring from class conditions* that la from the eeeneaiie ©irowitaneoe of the mm who take these ehanges in tam&**C$El) Bin^a, then, the State, law* mieeo^y and leligiea are' thus forces on the side of the deodnaiafc elasa* it ie ell but impossible for the. opposing elae* or -©lasses to-effect a smmaesb& chaage #sich will give them control of. the State. &mmqpm&fy the struggle between elassee tesds te take a' violent f e m end revolution is maniay the means of-ehaiaga. Hence social ehenge ie accomplished in -«M1 war between the eoeial gpeups within a eeuntry*. there, are maw,,questions that «M»e from a stau^ of mtmpa** siiilesefSsy of aoeial ehange* In the first place:, one afgttt ejadte- vigbtly jqneeti-ea IBngels8 esis&asis en (S^IMd* p!l?*X3B* csijibid, gmafe4iS» 91 eeenonie faetors m tbe basis of seeiat ebsnge* »d M l tha «6cmejBi& ©risaa^nstien of society d@es< taw' a' powarful • isflnen^ on ttev* ftsnstlcins of JNB»; ft " M e n find tbeiBseive® in a pesitfm in wbieb they aire deprived of the smenitiee of life, tbey will take acti©n**sven drastic end violent a«ti©a—t© 3 e sura t&at which th«y censMar their i?ightful dne* And likewiso there ean be no doiabt that m&m who find tSaesssselves in a etate of affluence are ex^rasely relnetsnt to forge «ngr of thelv "«enl19i or p^ivile^s®'• that etbore lean fortnn&te «tgs* improve their eeisdltlone* $&• revolutions end revolts tbat f i l l tbe pages of Matery are eenvtetng proof of the struggle of t&e classes* Bat te ooneentrate solely on- tae straggles- for economic bettemsjent is to tsJes a narrow view ef tke nature ©# soeiisl staaqga* For there in espnl^ staaAsjnt evidence ttat ot&es* tfsntm besides tfoc eeeneisie eaafes4fettt* to the process ef seeial ebsnge* Conditions in India well illustrate th» play ef forces -ether Vssm economic en the natnre and.direction of sofial ©bange* intll :reeent times* wb«n :tbe ideas ef wsetsm eivilltetion tare penetrated' tbe Indian social structure, . the great majority ©f tl&e Indira people were eontent t© exist under.a caste syntesi nteistt resalted in gmat iKpwsrlshaieKt- She alleviation ef uufferiwg fey tfee bswtidag down of tte east© system nns consistently 099**06 ©s religion®, gretnais* Hie Eindee iteligion ®mmt&hm «&• 92 casteAstern* hence it was cpiisidefea ijrreMgieus even by tbese wb©- would have benefitted most by the changes to attempt to abolish the system,Here factors related to habits, attitudes and beliefs.overrode whatever economic motives there might have bden for abolishing the system, Ihe classic example of the resistance of the Indians to social change Of a beneficial nature is, of course9 the case of the Hindoo widow who remained detemine^d to burn herself alive on the funeral pyre of her husband even after the British had made it illegal to follow this -barbarous custom. In fact the British bad to use force to prevent widows from continuing this religious custom. TkQ French Revolution provides further evidence that economic forces of themselves are not the sole basis of social change. It was not the hardships and rigors of the economic existence of the French peasants that caused the French Revolution., Actually the French peasants were immeasurably better off economically than tl^ -^ s^ant-s-of continental Europe at that time.., It was the taste of better economic conditions and the knowledge of what had been accomplished, by the English that led to revolt. In other words* it was knowledge of better conditions perhaps available that led to the Revolution and not the existing conditions in ^ emeelVesw' According tri Engels1 theories, it should have been the Other peasants of Europe who should have revolted first} not the French peasants. 93 Our own age?' again,• givis !#ei^ eTie-e.' that e%on©mie factors are not alone in causliag. aoGiai chajjge-*; Many people are puzzled by the fadto^worker who demands higher wages even though his standard of living appears to he sufficiently high. What these people do' not take into account is the pressure exerted on the worker, in the,fora of advertisements, social examplej and material-istic values, to seek a more wealthy sl^-iard even though his existing' condition is actually quite satisfactory* ; . 1 . 1 " ' ' : Advertisements and the inculcation of values are psycho-logical factors,,' Even i f changes in methods of production are con-sidered to he the Original source of social change', there is considerable room for controversy*. 3 h § Russian Revolu-tlon which resulted in the proletarian control and organization of lussian society did not ©c;cur^ i afs Engelsr theories would have iM, as the result of a @hang# f&om feudal methods of production to modem industrial •#ethods Of produiction. It occurred within a society that was at the time of the' Revolution* still largely feudal in its methods of earning an economic livelihood. In contrast, highly Industrialized western Europe and Forth America have experienced as yet ho complete transfer Of power from the bourgeois to the proletariat* In Japan*, the change -from feudal methods of production has been aeeomg|^ ed by still less of a transfer of power from one economic class to another. Here the feudal class 9 4 merely took over the new methods of r^©;dueti''oia' and abandoned the old while stil l maintaining oontrpl of their society. Moreover, tho|$h-the- outstanding forms of government, law and philosophy may appear to have 'changed considerably with the coming of industrialism yet maJy of the ideas contained in these fields remain feudal in spirit and contents Changes in methods of production did not,mean, in. this instance, changes, in the alignment of social classes nor in the con-tent of law, government and other social phenomena.1 •. The proposition, that social, change proceeds from a conflict of social classes is also" seriously Open to question. While the proposition may. contain' an element of truth, it certainly does not contain the; whole truth-. It is * true that in the English Civil. War;, for. instance^  tho • • / . . . . . . . . . ... . . . landed aristocracy was on the. whole aligned against the rising manufacturers and bourgeoisie in the towns* But any close study, of this period reveals that men were not so vividly aware of their ©lass interests as 32ngels thought. Many a landed aristocrat, fought. side by. side with Cromwell while many a bourgeois puritan fought on the side of the King. In the French Revolution nobles; like Mirabeau showed no hesitation in siding with the revolutionary forces. In our own time the so-called "white, 'collar" workers think of themselves as* members of the ruling classes' and ignore the fact' that, economically they have a lot more in common •with the workers than with, the ovmers of the means of 9 5 produc t ions The t r u t h of, the ma t t e r £s thai •education* habit's and custom^ t end t o fed the" deciding; f a c t o r s i n de&exmining t i l e © l a s s w i t h which '4 g i v e n i n d i v i d u a l w i l l i d e n t i f y h i m s | | ^ *She economic 'c^n^ i^ens- o f the individual may influence • him' airongiy • h u t ' ttotjfti i n f l u e n c e i s f a r from the most powerfu l one t h a t p i a y s up©h him .-and moves" him t o ac t ion . , Hence i t i s no t t r u e t h a t the re i s a r i g i d d i v i s i o n and a cons tan t c o n f l i c t o f c l a s s e s * Where t he re i s feoi^liGt? s i d e s are ©hoseh o f t e n on o t h e r than economic: grounds1*, BTor i s s o c i a l change ©f n e c e s s i t y aceomplished • i n violence,. E n g l i s h h i s t o r y p r o v i d e s an e x c e l l e n t i l l u s t r a t i o n o f the s low n a t u r e ' of s o c i a l change accomplished in d i s c u s s i o n and compromise.'. I t has '"been the genius o f the E n g l i s h ruling c l a s s t h a t t hey have u s u a l l y Mown'when'to g i v e i n t o the demands o f this oppos ing c l a s s e s * as when they pas sed the Reform B i l l s or when they a l l o w e d the power o f the House; o f L o r d s t o he s e r i o u s l y ^ | l r ta i ledi^thoui determihed and eveh axmed o p p o s i t i o n , © f t e n , t©©* the dominant c l a s s has n o t been, aware o f what i s i n i t s b e s t econdifi&e in te res t s ' * I t has a l l o w e d the © p i p i n g c l a s s e s assume power t o the former* s- detr iment* r e a l i z i n g - too ' l a t e t h a t i t has l o s t p r i v i l e g e s which ,had it been c o n s c i o u s l y awar&j i t would not have s a c r i f i c e d - . Y e t another • point • of c r i t i c i s m can be made o f the t h e s i s t h a t a l l social phenomena Such as law* religion* p h i l o s o p h y and government a re i n v a r i a b l y s u b s e r v i e n t t o the dominant c l a s s i n s o c i e t y . E n g l i s h l aw has i n numerous 9 6 instances r e s u l t e d i n the conv ic t ion o f memVers o f the n o b i l i t y * I n demoefatle eountries a t / l eas t , , t r i a l by 4ury insures an, i m p a r t i a l hear ing o f even the l o . v r l ^ t . The p r o v i s i o n o f f r e e counsel t© those unable to a f f o r d to hfi?e . the ir own counsel, i s • c e r t a i n l y not ca l cu la ted to s a t i s f y the i n t e r e s t s ©f the reeonomieally powerful . The permanent appointment of fudges who aro then f reed from p o l i t i c a l pressure does not appear to be; the ac t o f a c l a s s which is , determined to have j u s t i c e i n t e r * preted i n i t s own way. There may be a des i re f o r the r u l i n g group to c o n t r o l the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and: adminis trat ion of the law. There are even eases••• as; i n France p r i o r to the Revo lu t ion ? where the r u l i n g groups has succeeded i n c o n t r o l l i n g the law i n i t s own i n t e r e s t . But such a corrupt ion o f j u s t i c e i n the i n t e r e s t s o f a r u l i n g c la s s i s not u n i v e r s a l . JTor can philosophy be s a i d to r e f l e c t i n v a r i a b l y the outlook o f the r u l i n g c l a s s . V o l t a i r e • § Rousseau and Montesquieu defended the economically d isenfranchised a t a time when the r u l e r s o f French soc ie ty had almost com* p l e t e c o n t r o l o f a l l the phases o f French l i f e . Shaw,. Wells and Galsworthy have cons i s t en t ly c r i t i c i s e d tho abuses o f e x i s t i n g soc ie ty i n England. Even K a r l Marx and Engels advocated p h i l o s o p h i c a l theories i n a soc ie ty dominated by the c la s s which they attacked* I n the more abstruse f i e l d s o f philosophy the inf luence o f the dominant c l a s s i s f e l t s t i l l less* Spinoza, L e i b n i t z , 97 Leeke-i B e r k e l e y a&d Hume can- n o t 'be' s a i d t© h a v ^ framed t h e i r t h e o r i e s ©f khowledge to s u i t t h e i r eeehomie p e e r s . M o r a l p h i l o s o p h y may a l s o he i M a p e h d e n t of the mora l v a l u e s o f the e x i s t i n g r u l i n g gr©upV Thus, i n our own day* t he re i s a ' concent ra ted a t t a c k ©a the p a r t o f many m o r a l p h i l o s o p h e r s a g a i n s t the e t h i c s ©f i n d i v i d u a i i s m and c o m p e t i t i o n which i s the e t h i c s ©# contemporary r u l i n g groups as a who le . . T h i s is' not f© say*"however-! t h a t the t dominant c l a shes in-a' s o c i e t y ' do ho t encourage t h e i r own o f f i c i a l p h i l o s o p h e r s ! bes tow 'honours em them' and g i v e them favoured p o s i t i o n s i n s o c i e t y * Nor i s t h i s t© say-t h a t they would no t l i k e to * c o n t r o l the fre'edom ©f e x p r e s s i o n o f p h i l o s o p h e r s T J i i d © u b t e d i y such t endenc ies on the p a r t of the r u l i n g c a s t are present* There are i n s t ances 'where p h i l o s o p h e r s who have advocated phil©s©'«-p h i e s a t v a r i a n c e with the p h i l o s o p h y o f the ' ' r u l i n g ' class have been i m p r i s o n e d ! ban i shed o r executed f o r t h e i r v i e w s . N e v e r t h e l e s s ! ' i t is ho t innariab ' ly "tru# thafc' p h i l o s o p h y i s the ins t rument o f o l a s s i n t e r e s t s * On ly in a s o c i e t y where i n d i v i d u a l freedom i s a lmost comple t e ly unknowa does one f i n d t h a t ph i l o sophy i s the se rvan t of the masters o f s o c i e t y 9 and even here one f i n d s brave s o u l s w i l l i n g t o ' f i g h t and make ihemse lves ' h e a r d i n o p p o s i t i o n t o the eurrerrb p h i l o s © p h i c a l dogmas'. Much the same may be s a i d o f the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t the S t a t e i s the p o l i t i c a l arm ©f the• r u l i n g Class* W h i l e 9 8 it may be true that a ruling group attempts' to gain control of the State for its own ends, such is' not always the case. In England to-day, for instance* there is a labor government which certainly can not be said to'be an instrument of the English upper classes.. Mor was it revolution and violence that gave the proletariat a measure of control of government in England. On the other hand* there have been examples in the past where government was the instrument of the dominating class. Such was the case in France prior to the Revolution and such is probably tho case in present day Russia. However, despite all these shortcomings Engels has contributed to our knowledge of the nature of social change by drawing attention to the necessity of considering the economic foundations of change--an aspect that before his time had been too lightly dismissed* Moreover his theories provide an interesting background to the question of the point at which social change takes a violent form and to the problem of why social change is sometimes accomplished only in revolution and terror. The fact that he was too engrossed with social change as accomplished, through strife and that he neglected to investigate social change in its more peaceful phases undoubtedly detracts from the value of his work but when this is taken into consideration there is much of value that remains. 99 CHAPTER FOUR VILFKEDO PARETO'S "THE MXND AMD SOCIETY" A. Biographical Sketch B. Philosophical System 1. Theory of S o c i a l Equilibrium 2, Theory of Non-Logical Conduct . 3. Theory of Residues 4. Theory of Derivations 5. Movement of S o c i a l Change 6. C r i t i c a l Estimate and Evaluation 100 VI IffREDO PARETO (1848-1923) V i l f r e d o Pareto, an I t a l i a n , was trained in mathematics and engineering. This l a t t e r vocation he followed for some twenty years. But he early evinced an i n t e r e s t i n economics and published several rather o r i g i n a l a r t i c l e s applying mathematical theories to economics. These a c t i v i t i e s drew the attention of the economists and i n 1893 he l e f t the engineering profession and accepted the p o s i t i o n of professor of p o l i t i c a l economy at Lausanne University, In 1896-97 he consolidated h i s economic theories in the two volume Cours D'Economie P o l i t i q u e , However, he began to f e e l that the economic motive was not of s u f f i c i e n t l y "broad foundation to account for a philosophy of society and he turned h i s attention more and' more to the philosophy of s o c i a l change, publishing Les Systernes S o c i a l i s t e s in 1902 and the Trattato d i Sociologia  GeneraletThe Mind and S o c i e t y ) i n 1916. This l a t t e r work provides the best summary of his conclusions in s o c i a l philosophy. 1 0 1 VILFRKBO PAHSTOVS «tMIim.ATO SOCIETY" The central point of the Paretan theories of s o c i a l change i s that society i s normally i n a state of e q u i l i -brium, that i s s a l l the forces i n society are harmoniously working together to produce a stable s o c i a l structure« This constitutes a " s o c i a l system"-.' This s o c i a l 'system, however, changes with the passage of time. Such changes occur because of disturbances that temporarily displace the equilibrium. The s o c i a l system thereupon reacts i n such a way as to restore equilibrium. I f the disturbances are minor ones, the o r i g i n a l equilibrium w i l l be restored? i f the disturbances THEORY OF SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM are major ones a new equilibrium d i f f e r e n t i n character from the o r i g i n a l w i l l r e s u l t , "The equilibrium of a s o c i a l system i s l i k e the equilibrium of a l i v i n g organism and of the l a t t e r i t was noticed i n very early times that an equilibrium that has been aecidently and not severely disturbed i s soon restored" ©r i f "some modification i n i t s form i s induced a r t i f i -c i a l l y , at ©nee a reaction w i l l take place, tending to restore the changing form t© i t s o r i g i n a l state, as modified by s o c i a l change,"(1) Now, i f we examine more c l o s e l y the process of the s o c i a l system's drive towards equilibrium we w i l l f i n d , according t© Pareto? that that drive i s , despite the modifications-of s o e i a l change, o s c i l l a t o r y i n nature. (1)Pareto, The Mind and Society, New York* Harecourt Brace & Co., 1935, V o l . IV, pl435-1436. 102 F o r example, " i a h i s t o r y a p e r i o d o f f a i t h w i l l he f o l l o w e d by a p e r i o d ©f s c e p t i c i s m , which w i l l i n t u r n be f o l l o w e d by another p e r i o d o f f a i t h and so ©n."(S) "And so i t i s , c o n s i d e r i n g f o r the moment o n l y one ©r two such o s c i l l a t i o n s , t h a t i n a l i t t l e more than a hundred yea r s 5 and s p e c i f i c a l l y , from the c l o s e ©f the e igh teen th to the b e g i n n i n g ©f the t w e n t i e t h cen tu ry one wi tnesses a wave o f V o l t a i r e a n s c e p t i c i s m and theh Rousseau' s humani tar ian!sm as a s eque l t o i t j then a r e l i g i o n o f R e v o l u t i o n and then a r e t u r n to C h r i s t i a n i t y ? then s c e p t i c i s m ©nee m o r e — p © s i t i v i s m ? and f i n a l l y i n our t ime the f i r s t s tages o f a now f l u c t u a t i o n i n a m y s t i c © - n a t i © n a l i s t d i r e c t i o n . " ( 3 ) Pare to f u r t h e r p o i n t e d out t h a t "the terras 1 f a i t h 1 and 1 s c e p t i c i s m ' may be m i s l e a d i n g , i f they are thought ©f as r e f e r a b l e t o any p a r t i c u l a r r e l i g i © n ©r groups o f r e l i g i o n . . . T h e human o s c i l l a t e s between tw© extremes, and b e i n g unable t o h a l t a t e i t h e r , con t inues i n movement i n d e f i n i t e l y ; " ( 4 ) I n o ther words , there may be O s c i l l a t i o n between f a i t h and s c e p t i c i s m bu t the forms ©f f a i t h and s c e p t i c i s m are n o t the same f o r a l l p e r i o d s ©f h i s t o r y . What we a c t u a l l y have i s Change w i t h i n o s c i l l a t i o n . F u r t h e r , t h i s o s c i l l a t i o n i s a m a n i f e s t a t i o n ©f the s o c i a l system s e e k i n g i t s e q u i l i b r i u m . P a r e t © * s p h i l o s o p h y o f s o c i a l movements, t h e n , m a i n t a i n s t h a t s o c i a l change i s an (2 ) Ib id 9 p!692o (3 ) Ib id , V o l . I l l , p l l l S . (4 ) Ib id , V o l . I V , pl692=-169f. 103 oscillatory movement of the various elements of the social system in search for an equilibrium of all social forces once that system has been in, some way disturbed. Why should the social system become disturbed in its,equilibrium? Why should social change be oscillatory in nature? Pareto set forth three distinct,.theories, to account for the equilibrium movement of social cha^e. (a)the theory of non-logical conduct, (b)the theory of residues» and (c)the theory of derivations. . Firstly j let us look at the theory of non-logical conduct. Pareto stated that "every social, phenomenon may be considered under two aspects? as it is in reality, and as it presents itself to the mind of this or that human being. The first aspect we call objectives the second aspect sub.iective."(5) For instance, Greek mariners used to sacrifice to the God Poseidon in the belief that such sacrifice was an effective means to safe navigation. This is a social phenomenon. How, viewed by the Greek mind,- it was a good means of navigation—that is the subjective  aspect. Viewed according to experimental and empirical evidence, it did not aid in navigation at all—that is the objective aspect. In other words, viewed by this or that human mind th© sacrifice to Poseidon was effective whereas viewed objectively it was not effective. Putting it,another,way, "there,are actions that use means appropriate to ends, and which logically.link means (S)Ibid, Vol. 1, p76. 1 0 4 with ends," (6) such as, to give Pareto's example-, the use of oars to aid in navigation. On the other hand, there are actions "in which these traits(7)are missing*" such as sacrifice to Poseidon.(8) How, it.was Pareto's contention that "from the subjective -point of view nearly all human THEORY OF NOSOLOGICAL COTOCT actions belong to the ; • • ' • • logical class."(9) Most people-, in short, believe their' actions are logical whether they are logical in fact or not. "In the eyes of the Greek mariners sacrifice to Poseidon and rowing with oars were equally logical means of navigation, "(10) All this simply means that people exhibit two types of conduct, (a)logical conduct in which actions "logically conjoin means to ends not only from the standpoint of the subject performing them* but from the standpoint of other persons, who have a more extensive knowledge--!*! other words to actions that are logical both subjectively and objec-tively ••"•('11) .' and • (b) non-logical conduct in which the, eon-joining of means to ends is not existent from the standpoint of other persons who have a more extensive knowledge, though it may appear to be so to the subject--in other words, to actions that are logical considered subjectively but non-logical considered objectively. Furthermore, it was Pareto's belief that.a far wider area of human conduct fall under the non-logical category than has hitherto been thought to (6)Ibid* p7?. (7)"traita"--that is, traits using means appropriate to ends. (8)Ibid, p77. 0)ibid.' (10)Ibid, , (-11)Ibid. 105 be the case. It is therefore with non-flogical, conduct that we shall be chiefly concerned, since it is the type of conduct that will be most forcibly felt in. influencing social phenomena., Non-logical conduct naturally divides itself into certain classes, according to Pareto9 and this classification is extremely useful in helping us understand its nature. If we ask ourselves the.questions, (a)have the actions logi-cal ends and purposes from a subjective point, of view?, and, (b)have the actions logical ends and purposes from an objective point, of view?, we discover that we may get the following, combinations: a. actions that are non-logical both, from an objective and anysubjective point, of VieWj b. actions that are non-logical from an objective point of view but which are logical from a subjective point of. view; c. actions that are! non-logical from a subjective point of view but which are logical from an objective point of view; d. actions that are, logical both from an objective and a subjective point of view.(12) These four types of non-logical are all exhibited in human behavior, though in Pareto's view classes a and c "are of scant importance to the human race,"(13) whereas "nearly all' human actions work their Way into class b and do"(14) Thus actions performed in deference to custom may belong to class' a. They may be: logical neither from an (12)See Vol. 1, pTS, These are the classes'of non-logical eonduct only.., As such the objective end differs from the subjective in each case. This must be kept in. mind in attempting to understand the' nature of class d type of action. (13)Ibid, p79 (14)Ibido 106 objectives, experimental point of view nop from the point of view of the individual mind* Such would be the case with the custom among the English of saying "how do you do" as a salutary greeting and of deprecating the salutary expression "pleased to meet you", STo logic, either objective or subjective, is apparent in the preference--though, as Pareto noted,"human beings have a very conspic-uous tendency to paint a varnish.©f logic over their conduct."(15) The custome of preferring one phrase to the other is laid to the fact that it simply is not used by well-bred people. When the English rationalize in this way, then the non-logical conduct passes from class a to class b type and becomes logical subjectively. This is what,happens with the class a type in most cases. Hence the lack of importance of this class. For a very similar reason class C type of'conduct is rarely exhibited in human society. For Pareto, this class appears to consist in instinctive actions over which no logical varnish has been painted—"Many, many human actions, even to-day among the most civilized peoples, are performed instinctively, mechanically, in pursuance of habit; and that is more generally observable still ih the past and among less civilized peoples. There are eases in which it is apparent that the effectiveness of certain rites is believed in instinctively, and not as a logical consequence of the religion that practices them."(16) Pareto gave (15)Ibid, p79. (16)Ibid, p83. 107 perhaps a better example from the formation of language. He claimedj in this connection, that "it would he absurd to claim that the theory of grammar preceded the practice of speech. It certainly followed,, and human beings have created most subtle grammatical structures without any knowledge of it."(17) Thus, "we cannot imagine that the Greeks one day got together and decided what their conjugation was to be. Usage alone made such a 'master-piece of the Greak verb."(18) Here, then, is a perfectly logical system built up more or less instinctively and without any subjectively logical desires to create such a system. However most of these type's* of actions are, at at least among the more civilized peoples, varnished with their coat of logic and so pass from the class c type of conduct to the class d type, or to one of the other classes of conduct. Our main concern, then, is with classes b and d • These must be understood if social change in the Paretan sense of the term is to be comprehended. And as Pareto devoted almost the whole of the first volume of his work to these two types of conduct, we certainly are not at a loss to find an abundance of examples. Thus, he quoted Hesiod1'8 Opera et Bies. Hesiod affirmed that one should not, cross a river "without first washing one's hand's in it and uttering a prayer." Hesiod also maintained that "the gods punish anyone who crosses (17)Ibid, pS4'. (18)Ibid, p84. 108 i a river without so washing his hands."(19) From an objective* experimental and ©mplrleal poiht of view Hesiod's statements are false(noh-l©gieal from an# Objective point of view)but subjectively they are valid(logical" from a subjective point of view) * There is a supposed conjoining of itfeans and ends in that the hands are washed to avoid the penalties of the gods, even if the whole business is not true in fact. Again, to jump from the" ancient to the modern, Pareto quoted a court case that took place in 1913 in Milan, Iii this case three women were accused %f taking human bones from a cemetery for th© "purpose1 of compounding a philtre that would induce a man to marry a certain woman."(20) Objectively such ah action was' non-logical but subjectively means and ends'-appeared to be conjoined—the means being'the philtre of human bones and the end being the inducement, to marry. B©th the above are examples of rion-logical actions of the class b type. Offering sacrifices to Poseidon is yet another example of class b non-logical action. Bui ©he need not continue. Sufficient illustrations have been given to show the nature of non-logical actions where the action is logical subjectively but non-logical objectively. An' action of the class'd type is an action for which a subjective-logical reason is given but which leads to a different end from the purposes desired by the authors of the action. There are many examples of this sort of (i9)Ibld* ^gif IbU., R79 109 noh-logical conduct. Pareto gave aa .excellent example in the realm- of political' economy.1 "Certain measures(for ' instancei wage-cutting)of bnelnOas\'meB<.entreprenenrs)-' working under conditions of free.competition are to some extent non-logical actions of the 4B class type(20), that •ie the 'oh j active does not coincide with the subjective purpose»"(21) Pareto explained this in the following manner;. "While the business man aims at reducing costs of production, involuntarily he achieves the further effect of reducing selling prices, competition always restoring parity between the two prices...So competing enterprises get to a point where they had not the intention of going. Each of them has been looking strictly to profits and thinking of the consumer only in so far as he can be Exploited 5 but owing to the successive adjustments and readjustments required by competition their combined exertions turn out1to the advantage of the consumer."(22) Thus w© have an action which has a subjective-logical reason—to reduce production eosts,but which leads to an entirely unforeeen logical result—the reduction of selling prices and the loss of profits instead of gain. So common is this type of non-logical conduct that,we need give no further details concerning it* We are constantly doing something for ends which we have logically worked out only to discover that the objective situation (20)Pareto divided the class d type of non-logical conduct into two sub-ciasses§ actions injMch the objec-tive end would be" accepted by ithe gubj'ecr^^ i f he knew it, and actions in which the objective enW^ %uld be. rejec-ted by the subject if he knew it. The action of the business man belongs to this latter sub-class. 11® leads to an entirely different result than our expectations had warranted. Itfow Pareto noticed, in the course of his analysis of the types of non -^logical conduct that there are at least two elements in that conduct—a constant element and a variable element or*' a substantial element which we shall designate a and a contingent element^  on the whole f a i r l y variable $ which we shall designate as b."(23) "The element a directly corresponds to' non-logical conduc^ i,.The element b is the mani-festation of the need of logic that human beings feel...The element a is the^prihcipla existi&g in the mind Of the human being; the" element b is the explanatiohC or explamtions50f th t^ ~ principle, the inferencesor inferences) he draws • from•it*o» ; "There is, for example* a principley or if you prefer, a sentiment*' tm^MMue' of" (§ldch certain numbers are deemed'^ ;r%hjr of veneration; it is the chief element a...But the human being is not satisfied with merely associating senti-ments of veneration with numbers; he also wanfs to explain how that comes about* to'''demo'nstrai^ :.^  that in doing what he does he is prompted by the force of logic. So the element b inters in and we' get various explanations, variousi demonstrations as, to why certain numbers are gacredW There is in the human being that which restrains him from discarding ©Id beliefs all at once. That is the element as But he feels called upon to justify, explain,""demonstrate his attitude, and element b enters in, which in one way ©r another saves the letter of his beliefs while altering them in substance."(24) What are the elements a and b? Of element a Pareto stated that "the element a corresponds t© certain instincts ©f man or, more exactly men, because a has no objective existence and differs in differentindividuals*..And it is* . (23)Ibid, Vol. 1, p481. (24)Ibid. I l l probably because of i t s correspondence to i n s t i n c t that i t i s v i r t u a l l y constant i n s o c i a l phenomena."(25) In other words, Pareto's theories so f a r lead at least to the following conclusions: 1. Human actions are largely non-logical i n that ends and means are not, in a multitude of cases, objec-t i v e l y conjoined; 2. An examination of non-logical behavior reveals two elements in that behavior--(a) a constant element i n which there i s a "non-l o g i c a l nucleus issuing in certain acts that have speci-f i e d results,"(26)and, (b) a variable element which consists in a drive to f i n d l o g i c a l explanations for behavior which i s non-l o g i c a l ; 3. The constant element in conduct--the non-logical nucleus--is i n s t i n c t , sentiinent or tendency. The constant element i n non-logical conduct Pareto c a l l e d Residues* Residues are, then, the sentiments, the THEORY OP RESIDUES i n s t i n c t s , the tendencies that cause humans to behave non-logically. Here we enter the realm of psychology rather than philosophy, nevertheless, at least an elementary understanding of the theory of Residues is necessary to a f u l l comprehension of Pareto's philosophy of s o c i a l change. Just as i n the case of non-logical conduct so in the (25)lbid, Vol. 2, p501. (26)lbid, 112 case of residues Pareto presented an elaborate c l a s s i f i -c ation of the main types*, This c l a s s i f i c a t i o n i s given bel©ws(27) 1. i n s t i n c t f o r combinations, 2. i n d t i n e t of group-»persistance} 3. i n s t i n c t to express sentiments "by external acts, 4. i n s t i n c t o f s o c i a l i t y . So i n s t i n c t to protect the i n t e g r i t y of the i n d i v i d u a l and h i s appurtenances, 6, i n s t i n c t of sex. , Not a l l of these so - c a l l e d instincts(28)are equally important i n determining the nature of s o c i a l change. Pareto himself considered the f i r s t and second major groups to be most important i n encouraging or retarding s o c i a l change. In the fourth major divi^i*©!? the two sub-classes of voluntary conformity on the part of the indivS'r'i dual and of the i n s t i n c t to enforce <a;nif©rmity upon others are important. In the f i f t h major group the i n s t i n c t o f resistance to a l t e r a t i o n s i n the s o c i a l equilibrium, the f i r s t o f the l i s t e d sub-classes, i s also important. The other major groups and sub-classes we may, f o r our purposes, disregard. $2W£he term " i n s t i n c t s " at ©nee r a i s e s the question of the^npaber of i n s t i n c t s which humans possess. Modern psychology has' rejected i n s t i n c t s as being as numerous as Pareto apparently deemed them. But l e t us not quarrel over terms. The important point i s that, whether these charac-t e r i s t i c s of humans are i n s t i n c t i v e or not, they are ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s recognised as r e a l by most psychologists. -Modern psychologists would, of courge, maintain that such • ch a r a c t e r i s t i c s are s o c i a l l y inducii'. ThiSj, boweyer, does not a l t e r the f a c t that* one©' p r e s e t * they e x | i | a power*-f u l influence on behavior. See my c r i t i c a l rimalpis dt the end of t h i s chapter. (27)These are the major classes only. fs0;'^o l i s t e d - -a number of sub-classes f o r each main type. Some ©f these l a t t e r we s h a l l have occassion to r e f e r to frt>mtime to time but there i s no need to l i s t them here. See,lbid»>Vol. 2, p516-519. 113 By the i n s t i n c t f o r combinations' ;Pareto meant'^e'' tendency f o r humans to want to handle objects and to discuss thoughts and ideas; t o ' ^ J n l n e them, to combine them i n d i f f e r e n t ways, to play with them.. I t i s a tendency of c u r i o s i t y , of invent!veriess, o f OMginality@ Of imagination. As one can r e a d i l y see, whether t h i s tendency i s i n s t i n c t i v e or c u l t u r a l l y induced, i t i s a tendency which i s the progressive element i n society. Pareto defined i t as that "which impels the human being to put things, and acts to-gether without pre-established design, without knowing what he i s d r i v i n g at—much as a person rambles about i n the f o r e s t f o r the mere pleasure of rambling about."(29) Where design does e x i s t , as i t sometimes does, " i t oftentimes, has nothing to do with the r e s u l t a c t u a l l y achieved."(30) As i n the case of previous concepts, an example or two w i l l make the idea ©f an i n s t i n c t of combinations c l e a r e r . One good example i s that of t o r t u r i n g a wax f i g u r i n e made i n the image of a person one wishes to harm. Here we have a combination o f likenesses^-the use of an image of an enemy to harm the enemy himself. Again, rare, things are connected with rare happenings and so* talismans and r e l i e s are c a r r i e d i n the f a i t h that they w i l l b r i n g good fortune, or, again, "human beings have often believed that by eating c e r t a i n substances one may come to partake of those substances."(31) For instance jcertain cannibals eat the bodies of t h e i r foes i n the hope that by so doing they w i l l become strong l i k e t h e i r enemies. I n t h i s way, (29)Ibid, V o l 11, p524. (3©)Ibid,; p56I. ,(31)0p.Git., pS24. 114 humans try all manner of weird and wonderful combinations and associations in order to get what they desire. They examine, play with,, combine,, and associate, and have done so down to the present when they carry a rabbit's foot for good fortune or. burn the effigy of Hitler to 'symbolize the wish for his actual death. The instinct of group-persistance or,"persistance of aggregates" as Pareto. sometimes called it, is the opposite of the instinct of.combinations* It is the conservative element in society. According to Pareto, "certain combin-ations constitute a group of elements closely united as in one body, so that the compound ends by acquiring a person-ality such as other entities have."(32) And after the group "has been constituted, an instinct very often comes into play that tends with varying energy to prevent the things so combined from being disjoined and which, if disintegration cannot be avoided, strives to dissemble it by preserving the outer physiognomy of the aggregate*"(33) Gnce again an. example or two will serve to illustrate Pareto's meaning. Pareto quoted Monsignor. DuchesneXj^ ejs, Origines du eulte Chretien)on litanies in the Catholic Church. These, Monsignor Duchesne indicated, were sung in spring time in the period of the late frosts as "solemn supplications instituted to invoke heavenly protection upon earthly possessions." (34) Now, it had been the pagan custom to sing pagan litanies at the.same time of the year. Why was there this similarity .between Christianity and Paganism? (32)Ibid, p597, (33)Ibid, pS98. (34)Ibid, p604. 3.3.5 Pareto stated that it was due to the fact that Christianity could not taproot an old custom and had to accept'it in its ritual to please those who were accustomed to it . Here, then, is' a group-persistance* a persistance of a custom in which was preserved "the outer physiognomy" . though it had boen "disjoined" fr©m its original context. Another examples is that of a feast day set aside "by the church and which was held on the twenty-sec©hd ©f February. The twenty-second of February had been set aside by "She-pagans for the festival of the family, dead* (35) Pareto commented that "the observance of that festival arid the rites which accompanied it were considered incompatible with the Christian faith. But it was too difficult to uproot habits so particularly dear and deep-rooted. "(36) We have experience of the same sort of thing in our time. The combination ©# group of aggregates which constitutes Poland has preserved its wj^ siegnjamy"'' despite the pressure ©f "disintegrative forces"". The drive to remain a separate political entity persists on'through-ccuntless vicissitudes. l|b&! jtflf also seen in the persistance of the ee©n©mic philosophy of laissez-faire int© an era that i s rapidly becoming one of economic control and interference. Group persistance, indeed, takes many ##&aa. It may be.a persistance "df relations between a:5p^sM;and other persons and places » n ( | j^ In the animal world* '<$a. dog (35) Ibid j. p6©4. (36) Ibid, p6 l^. (37) Ibid,, p©li* 116 kennelied in a garden will not haam oats and poultry that belongs there, ©nee Mtside the gate he chases all the oats and doge he -a&t+HINb 'likewise ''Sie human < sentiments "of family, of property* patriotism, love for motber*»tongue, for the ancestral religion, for friends" (39) are of the same order* ©r it may be persis-tance in the relationship ©f social classes. "Living in a given group impresses the minT* with certain concepts* • certain ways of thinking and doing, certain prejudices, certain beliefs which, as in the case of so many other entities of the kind, endure in time and acquire a pseudo-objective validity* "(40) Or finally, it may be a persistance of "abstract!©ne"~-a persistance of forms of thought, of metaphysical systems^  of theologies. In this way Buddhism, Hinduism, Christianity, Confucianism and Marxism have '•-<• persisted through generations. Closely allied with the sentiment or instinct of persistance are certain aspects of Pareto1s instinct of soeiality--the need of uniformity, whether voluntary uniformity of the individual or group, or the uniformity enforced by the group ©a -^individuals* People tend to resent those who differ from- them and they attempt to enforce uniformity on the erring individual* Thus those of an 3M-%fc faith are tortured by th^ inquisition and burned at the stake or given over to the is^rd i n the name of Allah. Thus mobs in fiance' stoned women who (38)Ibid, pSll. '(39):lbld;*. p611. '(4©)Ibid^ p62g--623o 117 who defied the traditional foxm.of dress by wearing •bloomers. Moreover, there i s a tendency for mankind to t ry to keep himself uniform with others-. He wants to he l ike others. He follows the fashion.. He desires t© he part of the "in-group" and conforms to things done hy his group. Very rare i s the rebel . One can readi ly see how a l l th is i s bound up with group persistance. A l l the above tendencies encourage group-persistance. They reinforce the tendency ©f conservatism, the tendency to- res i s t change. Equally related t© group-persisiance i s the defence of the integri ty and the appurtenances ©f the indiv idual . This i s part icular ly true i n the case of those sentiments or inst incts of resistance to alterations in the soc ia l equilibrium. "If an existing state of soc ia l equilibrium i s altered," stated Paret©, "forces tending t© re -establish i t come into play. . .Such forces a r e , i n chief, senti&ients that f ind their expression in residues ©f the variety we are here examining. On the passive side, they make us aware ©f the alteration i n the equilibrium. On the active side, they prompt us t© remove, repel , counteract the causes of the alteration."(41) So men not only desire uniformity; they tend to res i s t changes that might upset the social equilibrium. This tendency i s t® be observed over and over again i i i the resistance (41)Ibid, p727*.728. 13B u s u a l l y accorded 'a t tempts t o r e f o m t h e s o c i a l ' s y s t e m . . The h a b i t - b e l i e f p a t t e r n s o f people become so f i x e d t h a t they f i n d themselves i n c a p a b l e o f a d j u s t i n g themselves t e hew s o c i a l c o n t e x t s . ©nly the ^ .jaaladjueted r e b e l and the p l a s t i c young f i n d themselves f e r v i d suppor te r s o f change. And t h e y , more o f t e n than n o t , f i n d themselves thwar ted by th© i n e r t i a -o f the system t a k e n u i n i t s e n t i r e t y . Hav ing d i s c u s s e d the na ture ©f r e s i d u e s , we are now i n a p o s i t i o n t o se.e how they are l i n k e d t© n o n - l o g i c a l behavior-.. People behave i n such and such a manner because t hey are d r i v e n t o do so by c e r t a i n sent iments ©r i n -s t i n c t s . (42) They possess the i<£-ntiH**t- u r g i n g them t o innova te o r change. T h i s l e a d s them t o a c t etiad i t l e a d s them t o a c t i n such a way as t o i n s t i t u t e i n n o v a t i o n s o r changes-.- Bu t the sent iment i s s© power fu l t h a t i t d r i v e s them i n t o a c t i o n even i f the a c t i o n i s o b j e c t i v e l y 'nam-l o g i c a l or . i f the ob j ec t i ve - end i s d i f f e r e n t fr©m ;-'the s u b j e c t i v e purpose . Hence the a c t i o n w i l l . a p p e a r t o the ' on looke r as n o n - l o g i c a l . L i k e w i s e some people are u r g e n t l y d r i v e n to r e s i s t any i n n o v a t i o n s * And s o , again-, they a c t and a c t i n such a way as t o r e s i s t change. B u t ©nee a g a i n the sent iment i s s© power fu l t h a t they are d r i v e n i n t o a c t i o n a t the expense ©f o b j e c t i v e l o g i c and as a conse-quence t h e i r a c t i o n appears t© the on looke r as h o n - l © g i c a l . ( 4 3 ) A g a i n i t must be emphasized W a t we have ia©t d e s c r i b e d i n d e t a i l a l l ©f t he r e s i d u e ^ . We have chMfeu o n l y , those which are necessa%" t© an unders tanding ©1* P a r e t o 1 s t heo ry o f s o c i a l change. Pare to has a c t u a l l y (Bat fo rward a d e t a i l e d t hao ry ©f "human m o t i v a t i o n b u t ©nly , t h a t p a r t ©f i t r e l a t i n g to the p h i l o s o p h y o f s o c i a l ehif#<~» need concern us h e r e . H9 The explanation of the Engl ish' d i s l i k e 'of the "pleased to meet you" s a l u t a t i o n and t h e i r preference for the "how do you do?" s a l u t a t i o n i s thus the r e a l i z a t i o n that fee preference i s a function;, o f the E n g l i s h sentiment against innovat ion . On the other b'©nd* 't&e'Ameiri-can- di's-*-l i k e o f a planned. and c o n t r o l l e d economy-^whieh represents a s t a t i c form of society-*-and t h e i r preference f o r a h i g h l y mobile* constant ly changing eompetetive system i s a func t ion of the American sentiment i n favour of combin-a t i o n and innovation* But a t the same t ime, t h e i r r e s i s -tance to changing this - mobile • system i s a funct ion o f t h e i r sentiment against innovat ion . In»'n©ne of tfo'ege eases has e m p i r i c a l l o g i c anything to do with the conduct revealed*' This conduct i s a funct ion of sentiments and not ©f object ive l o g i c But—and her© we' come to the theory o f derivation's--as we prev ious ly mentioned* there i s f o r Pareto a tendency f o r people to des ire a l o g i c a l l y constructed system to account f o r behavior which may be n o n - l o g i c a l o b j e c t i v e l y . There i s a tendency f o r people to •'rationalize;"V to speak i n the parlance of modem psychology* Threy want t© account l o g i c a l l y f o r the residues* dr ives ©r sentiments that are w i t h i n them.. These l o g i c a l l y constructed systems of r a t i o n a l i z a t i o n are deFivationsv(43) And* as one can see,, '•'(43) As these der ivat ions a f ^ . n © t heeessary to the foxsnulation o f Pare*©:'1'.«'•. theory - ;©My§©eial * 'cbange they are here discussed but b M e f i s k Hdwlyer^-' as >§fie : 'has- to d i g below the der ivat ions t o ^ p t a t the residues* a knowledge of t h e i r p r i n c i p l e s i s o f va lue . 12© they are "but ''raaMf estations"1**• '"indi«ati0nsw of "other fOro0s(residues)that are the forces which 'really determine the1 social e q u i i i h r i m . "(44) According to Pareto* the process of constructing derivations may occur i n a number ij£ different ways .(45) Below are some of the main classifications given "by Pareto t 1. "by the dogmatic assertion ©f facts, 2. by appeal to authorityr, . 3* by appeal to sentiments|. 4. by verbal proofs--alleg6;;r|.e0,;anasLogie logical systems and thelL like;. Let us take a bri e f glance at the meaning of these classifications.. People w i l l sometimes act i n certain THEORY OF PEHVATlONg non-logical ways and then, i f asked why they acted i n these ways, w i l l reply that i t i s the correct manner i n wbi.eb to act. This, they consider, i s a l l that need be said. There i s considered to be sufficient reason i n the foaMulation ©f suck an assertion. Such i s an essample of the f i r s t class of derivations. Pareto gave another- i l l u s t r a t i o n of this form ©f rationalization when he stated' "t&at "frequent i n our time are assertions to the effect 'that this or that measure means 'progress' or ''deiaoeraey' or that i t i s 'broadly humane' or 'makes for a better Jhumanity 1...By being repeated" over and'over again, it(the' assertion) (44) Ibid*rVol. . i l l * . pSQl. ' (4^me- e i a s a i f i c a t i . e ^ ' £ £ ^ ' a j $ ^ie..main- oaes only.. Sub-e!aWe:s; have been' ©mi-tied, lowlyer* some' of the latter are mentioned i n Ifee ensuing discussion.For * the f u l l oM#sl##eaiion see i b i d , Vol-, i l l * p89© passim. 121 eventually - acquire© a f©rce of s i t s own* 'becomes a motive of conduct and i s t© a l l intents and purposes a d©ri"? v a t i © R i r i ( 4 6 ) Kitlea? bad.the same idea in mind when he stated in-Mein, "Kssmf that,the biggea? the l i e and the mere often i t i s 'repeated the •greater, the l ikel ihood that i t . w i l l be believed by the masses as gospel trutho Aa' for the appeal to auth©rity--ev©2^©lae i s famil iar with this rat ional izat ion. Individuals,' divine beings* tradit ions , are, a l l sai led on as proof of the log ica l necessity of an act which i n • r e a l i t y i s a c©nsequehce o f human sentiments or ins t inc t s . Mow a u t h © r i t y may give an objectively v a l i d proof i f i t i s an expert i n the f i e l d with, which the proof i s concerned* But th is i s often net the case* Pareto gave an example of what often ©ecursi.. "ieeaus'e he i s a . f i r s t -c lass p o l i t i c i a n Theodore Roosevelt i s sure that he also "kmews Metery^|> and'he makes bold, t© del iver a: lecture i n Ber l in i n which he makes a brillijbhfc display of h i s profound ignorance of Greek and Roman history.; .*Now.. •.Roosevelt i s a past master i n the art of manipulating e lect ions. . .But how can a l l that make hfm: competent to advise the English on how t© govern Egypt, or the French on the aumbor ©f children they should have?. . . /• i But. . . there was plenty of admiration for Roosevelt* s fatuous chatter. The feeling wae: that there was a man who was man enough t© get himself elected to the presidency of the United States...and"that therefore he must surely • (A©)Ib id , p©©2. 122" be competent in--any matter r e l a t e d to* the h i s t o r i c a l ' and s o c i a l sciences*"(47)" Here i s an i l l u s t r a t i o n o f an , ' appeal"to- ;the' aiatha^fer' o f • an i n d i v i d u a l and one can. r e a d i l y see how i t a f o m o f l i i l j ^ t l ^ l e g i C e In a s i m i l a r manner t r a d i t i o n s asid' "#s'ages are • appealed t© as proof ©f the wisdom-of aniftictien that i s i n r e a l i t y n © n - l o g i e a i * Appeals are made t© ;th© ?twisdisia o f the forefathers" or to " trad i t ions ©f the pa^iy-* l 8 (^) The reasoning i s that because an act ion; was undertaken i n the pas t 'by supposedly wise i n d i v i d u a l s i t remailis e q u a l l y ' v a l i d i n the s i i u a t i o h under d i s c u s s i o n . This type o f d e r i v a t i o n usually•'•arises from residues o f group-pers i stance*. In a s i m i l a r fash ion act ions o f d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s are upheld by appeal to the t r a d i t i o n of the B i b l e * • Often appeal "is.made te• a div$n%:ifttilMg*- .Sometimes ' the appeal i s made ©n the" • grounds' • IMjfti a d iv ine be ing ought te be obeyed "out 'of simple reve'ie^e'© f o r the d e i t y , • without . spl i t t ing- h a i r s very f i f thly as to the reasons for* . .eonduet o r , at the most,, adding some few words on one's duty .'In respect of i t •" . Sometimes, aga in , ac t ions are undertaken ©n the grounds tha t a d iv ine be ing w i l l punish the i n d i v i d u a l i f he f a i l s to accomplish the given actions:. - F i n a l l y "a person may accomodate h i s conduct to the d iv ine w i l l out o.M. love f o r the d e i t y . "(49) The r e a l motivat ion f o r the individm-al^S ac t iona are., o f (47 ) Ib id , p906, (48 ) Ib id , p § l & , (49 ; )Ibid ? p91©.* 123: course t ;fiet the reasons given at a l l but are the residues or .sentiments that l i e beneath these rationalizations. The third method, of eonst'ruG'ting a logi c a l frsae-werk to explain n©n-l®gieal actions--that ©f appealing to sentiments-nnay also take many forms. Thus* i n the past* proof "of God' B existence has been • in part based on that of "universal G6nsensus"( 50) So many people believe i n God that there must be a Sod. This is. proof by appeal to the sentiments of others. Actually b e l i e f i n God i s probably due to one of the residues previously mentioned and hsis nothing to do with the derivation given her®,. Or, again, the reason for undertaking an act may be given by stating that it i s in accord with "collective interest"* For example, "a certain number of politicians want some- . thing for themselves. But they ask for i t i n the name of party, city , country. "(51) • However,* we need not contin^i 'i&e-. dese^ 'ptien of derivations. I t i s clear now 'what f are^' meant. when h® said that people "varnish their behavior with a coat of logic". Let us, then, return to the original Paretan proposition, namely, that society exists i n a state of . equilibrium; that a disturbance of the equilib2?igp leads either to a reaction back to the original e%uilibrium or a movement forward t© a new equilibrium; and that what social change there i s , i s accomplished within an o s c l l i a - ' tory framework. <5©-)Ibid, p92g.« (Si)Ibid, f@48.. 124 E a r l i e r we raised the question of why the socia.1 equilibrium "becomes disturbed and why s o c i a l change i s o s c i l l a t o r y i n nature. The clue to the answers l i e s in Pareto's theory of residues, which i s , in i t s turn, an account of the reasons f o r non-logical behavior. In thi s connection i t was noticed in the course of the discussion of residues, that what was most s t r i k i n g was the antagon-i s t i c p a i r of sentiments or i n s t i n c t s existant in humanity: the sentiment of combinations or innovation and the sentiment of group-persistance or group of aggregates, Now,Pareto was convinced that, in a s o c i a l system, f i r s t one sentiment i s dominant and then the other. At one time the socie,l system w i l l be dominated by the sentiment MOVEMENT OP SOCIAL CHANGE of innovation, at another by the sentiment of group-persistance. Then,again, the sentiment of innovation w i l l come to the fore, and so on. Accordingly, the s o c i a l system w i l l change rapid l y or remain r e l a t i v e l y s t a t i c : "Societies i n general subsist because a l i v e and vigorous i n the majority of th e i r Cov)S~fcituentr.. members are sentiments corresponding to residues of sociality(group-persistanceJ, But there are also individuals in human so c i e t i e s in whom some at least of those sentiments are weak or indeed actually missing. That f a c t has two inter e s t i n g consequences which stand in apparent contradiction, one of them threatening the d i s s o l u t i o n of society, the other making for i t s progress i n c i v i l i z a t i o n . . , " I t i s evident that i f the requirements of uniformity were so strongly active in a l l individuals i n a given society, as to prevent 1 even one' of them breaking free i n any p a r t i c u l a r from the uniformities prevalent in i t , such a society would have no i n t e r n a l cause f o r 125 6^ss©liati©B,j Wt' meAtfeti* would i t . have aia|r cause f©r chs$g©/**,.Gh the ©thea? naiad j. i f the /'pe'qrair'ememi-©f' imifomity' Were, to. fail-, society' would net hold ^gether, and each inddviduial would go his ©wn. way* as liens and tigers,-* • birds of prey and ©iher animals d©» Societies that endure 'aad ehahge are therefore s i t - 1 uated in s.©m.e intermediate ©©ndition between those two extremes* "•••Human societies are essentially, heterogenous 9 and the Intermediate state i s attained" because the requirements ©f uniformity Sire, very strong in. ;s©ine individ-uals* moderately strong in Mhers,- very feeble iii still." others and Iptnost entirely absent xn a few.... "In view of the effects ©f this * greater ©r lesser potency ©f the,; sentiments ©/ N unif©rmity, one may foresee ©lit ©f hand* th&two theologies.' wi l l ju$ in an appearance9 dn'e of which wi l l glerify' iiMioM'lity real . t©p imaginary9 the ©ther ©f .which wi l l glorify movement5 progress in one di'r'eetion ©r'another. "(52) "Thus Paret© saw the sentiments" ©f innovation and gr©up-persistenc©*in "undulatory movement" between the extremes of each-* giving rise t© ah undulatory movement in social phemnemena^-partieularly to the phenomenon of social change. The question ©f why one group ©f sentiments should be dominant in society at one time and another group of sentiments at. another time now arises., Paret© believed that i t depended on'- the nature of the puling class,* the elite,and on the nature of the masses. The domination of one or. the ©ther groups of sentiments in a social system is dependent on the proportion of group*-persi stance (@g)Ibld, V©1'.1V, pS10*51§.. 126 and combination residues as between the puling group and the common man,. I f the ru l ing e las i £s loya l t© group-persistance residues, then soc ia l ©hang© w i l l be sl©w§ if the class i s loya l to combination residues s then soc ia l change w i l l be rapid,. But i f the masses ©f men are l ^ a l to gr©up-persistance residues while ,the ru l ing class is loya l to combination residues, the masses w i l l gradually change the character ©f the residues of the ru l ing class t© those comprising group-persistance residues and the rate of social change w i l l pass fr©m rapid t© s l©w ? and the opposite will happen i f the masses are loya l t© combination or innovation residues while the ru l ing group is loya l t© persistance residues. I t i s interesting to note, in - th i s connection, that Pareto believed that "variations in intensit ies of class one and class two residues seem to be i n n© Way correlated with the democratic or aristocratic ehagaefcer ©f the system of government" and that the variations i n -question do not seem "t© be i n any way correlated with the state of. wealth^ S3) New i t i s clear why there i s a domination of one type ©f sentiment ©r the other i n a given soc ia l system. One of th© principle factors i s the relat ive proportion of the two main classes of residues i n individuals , classes and nations. Upon this proportion depends the rate of s © c i a l change. (S3)Ibid, p-1701. 3,27 But at this point the question of why the changes i n the proportion of the two main © l a s s e s of residues among individuals and classes should occur, presents i t s e l f . The answer appears t© l i e i n the fact that the predominance of innovation sentiments i n a soc ia l system may lead to such a weakening of g r © u p r p e r s i s t a n c e residues that the individuals and classes concerned react against continued innovations and i n the direction ©f uniformities and group^persistances. Concerning this Pareto stated that "When a society i s weakening'...through lack of class two r e s i d u e s . » , . a reaction often ©eeurs i n a p a r t - - i t may he a small part-—©f that soceity."(54) And so the pendulum of soc ia l change swings "back t© a slower rate . However, i t i s often the case that, "Instead of tending to stimulate residues that would contribute to reinvig©3^ti*iag the 'society. • .the reaction i s chiefly manifest i n an intensi f icat ion ©f residues that :h||r© n© bearing, or very l i t t l e , ©n the presentation of the society. "Governing elasses:that are r i ch i n class two residues but short i n class one" residues need new elements i n which -those proportions, 'are rever-sed. Such elements would Ordinari ly be supplied by normal e i r © u l a t i © n ( 5 5 ) . But i f , instead, the governing class ©pens i t s doors ©nly to individuals , who consent t© be l ike i t , and are indeed driven by their ardorv.,.to exaggerate "In that direct ion, the already harmful predominance of eeJ?tain residues i s carried further s t i l l and the road t© ruin i s thrown ©pen. Conversely, a c lass . • • that i s woefully lacking i n class two residues would need • to" acquire new elements that are weak i n class one and strong i n class two residues. Instead., by opening 'only- to these individuals who devote themselves to i t s service., i t acquires elements that i n n© way serve to supply i t with the things i t m©st^ needs..."(56) (54)Ibid, pl823. (55)"normal circulation"—this point ' '• . i s discussed l a t e r . (56)Ibid, p l7©7. 128 I f this occurs, as i t often does, the reaction will then proceed eventually to take a violent form— revolution and the forcible displacement of the entire ruling group wi l l become the order of -the day,. Normally, however, the ruling class allows into i t s folds "any individual potentially dangerous to i t , provided he  consents to serve it."(57) In this way the residue composition ©f the class i s slowly and gradually changed and the social equilibrium is not to© drastically disturbed. Phrasing this point in another way, social equilibrium wi l l result when ability to innovate is combined with abil ity to make the proper use ©f inno-vations. Concerning this, i t is natural to'suppose that the leaders should predominate in innovation sentiments , since, as leaders, they must lead the way, and that the masses should predominate in group-persistance sentiments in order t© stabilize the innovation1 sentiments of the leaders. So one recognizes how history is the story of the equilibrium of a social system? disturbed by various phenomena and oscillating between the static ©n the one band and the dynamic on the- other, and with a'noABal'-equilibrium in an intermediate position. So one recognizes how there is: an oscillation in residues—an © s e i l l a t i o n between residues ©f innovation and group persistance and vice versa. S© one sees h©w the social stricture swings ; (S7)XMd, pl796* 129 between the poles of a f l u i d "individualism" i n a period ©f AniOyV^t? /PiTv^u and a r i g i d "collectivism" i n a period ©f |^©%p'#i^'sistameee •' One oan visual ise bow tne class structure consists "in a c irculat ion ©f El i tes whose difference i n characteristics' i s a difference i n residues. One can see* also,' how © s e i l l a t i e m f i n derivations would ©ceur , corresponding with soc ia l osc i i ia t ions . Derivations change i n accordance with the predemiiSpaee ©f group-persistences or sentiments of iiai©vati©a« Certain d e r i -vations come into vogue in a period of greup^persistanoej other derivations i n periods of innovation. And they w i l l recur fram century t© century as the predominance of i residues changes. In this way systems of 'theology aad metaphysics osc i l la te between the same two poles. In short, "rhythmical movements i n ©me group of elements have their repercussions upon movements i n ©ther elements, the resultant being the movement that i s observable i n the 'complex unit formed by th© sum ©f the groups. "(SS) CRITICAL ESTIMATE AND EVALUATION The foregoing aceoumt of Pare t© 1 s theories has been abstracted from a f©ur-v©lume work, each volume averaging some six or seven hundred pages. As ©aae might judge from-this fact, P a r e t © 1 a writing i s , to say the least , rathe r diffuse and undisciplined. Paret© commences t© discuss a topic but before long i s drawn away by some related tepie and i t i s ©nly after a lend digression that he (58)Ibid, pl624. 130 r e t u r n s t o the o r i g i n a l t o p i c . Bu t i t i s no t v e r y l o n g be fo re he i s ©|f a ga in on some o t h e r s i d e t r a i l . Thus the work l a c k s u n i t y and coherence, two o f the elementary ' mechanics o f c o m p o s i t i o n . And mat te r s are f u r t h e r com-p l i c a t e d by the i n t r o d u c t i o n o f cop^us foo tno tes some o f which are more impor tan t than the o r i g i n a l t e x t . Many o f these notes a re th ree o r f o u r pages i n l e n g ^ and must be read c a r e f u l l y b y those who would unders tand the d i r e c t i o n o f argument. One i s somewhat reminded of H i t l e r ' s r a m b l i n g s t y l e i n Mein KamTafi There Is the sfene l a c k o f o r g a n i z a t i o n and o r d e r l y p j h ^ e n t a t i o n . Another c r i t i c i s m t h a t might W e l l be made of P a r e t o ' s methods i s h i s f a i l u r e - tne same examples i n h i s t reatment o f the v a r i o u s t h e o r i e s he pu ts f o r w a r d . F o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n s , r e s i d u e s and d e r i v a t i o n s a re each r e l a t e d t o the others"; y e t he g i v e s one s e t o f examples t o e x p l a i n n o n - l o g i c a l a c t i o n s ; a d i f f e r e n t s e t t o e x p l a i n r e s i d u e s ; and a t h i r d s e t to i l l u s t r a t e d e r i v a t i o n s . I t i s c e r t a i n t h a t i t would have been much b e t t e r t o have used the same se t o f examples t o i l l u s t r a t e a l l thpee t h e o r i e s , f o r i f he had done t h i s h i s arguments would undoubtedly have bben more cogent . As ma t t e r s s t a n d , one c o u l d l e g i t i m a t e l y r a i s e the q u e s t i o n o f whether what i s t r u e f o r one s e t o f i l l u s t r a t i o n s would be t r u e for another s e t . Thus,, what he uses t o prove the presence and na tu re ©f r e s i d u e s might no t suppor t what he l a t e r t r i e s t© prove 131 of derivations. To use a fixed set of facts throughout would have been closer to the s c i e n t i f i c method of reducing variable factors to a minimum* ¥ow that we have completed this preliminary and somewhat necessary criticism of methods, we may turn to the main substance of the work with a view to estimating the soundness of the theories proposed and to analyse what has been added to social theory that has not been discussed by Vico, Hegel or Engels. Let us look f i r s t at his theory of non-logical conduct. Pareto has performed a valuable task in inves-tigating at great length the supposed rationality of man i n the performance of the great majority of his actions. Pareto, i n a systematic manner, endeavoured to shov/ that , man i s not the reasonable and rational creature he^so often considered to be. This i n i t s e l f i s a great step forward to the understanding of the problem of social change. Once the essential non-logical character of man has been grasped, s. there i s no longer need to despair because man does not conform to an objectively logical pattern. I t i s merely a confirmation of the results of experience and should be taken as a datum of fact In dealing with social change. And i t might be added that contemporary psychology "bears out Pareto 1s conclusions i n i t s detailed study of institutions and their work. Symbols, ri t u a l s , ceremonies, slogans, emotions, beliefs and habits play a far greater r&le i n the production of human action than a l l the logic i n the world. 132 Here i s one portion of Hegel* s Universe that i s not ra t iona l . However, when Pareto went on to account for non-log ica l behavior he was not quite so successful. In the f i r s t place Pareto d id not define the nature of residues with sufficient clearness. They are spoken of sometimes as "instincts", sometimes as"sentiments", and sometimes as "tendencies". But there i s a great difference i n the meaning of each of these terms. I f residues are inst incts , they are more or less permanent i n humanity and cannot be eradicated. This i s important to any philosophy of social change since the l imits of change w i l l be determined by these inst incts . On the other hand, i f the residues are sentiments or tendencies, there i s the poss ib i l i ty ., that they may be due to cul tural heredity and not bio* log i ca l heredity. I f the l a t t er i s the case, social change w i l l be much more f lexible i n i t s range since i t i s possible to change a culture where i t i s not possible to change a given b io log ica l ly constituted organism. Possibly the answer to the problem l i e s somewhere between the two extremes. This would seem to be the implication of modern psychology. Thus, there may be an inherited tendency of such a nature that the young are p l iant and given to innovation while the old are characterized by group-peri instance residues. One has also to consider the fact that adjustment to the whole 133 environment and social system' i n which the individual exists has an important bearing on the drive for social change. I t i s the maladjusted individual who i s the radical and the innovator? i t i s the well adjusted and satisfied-who is'the conservative. On the other hand, that there are residues of the types Pareto emphasized—whether inherited or learned— cannot be denied.' Empirical evidence provides positive proof of their existence. In every violent revolution , •which i s a form of social change, there are found those' • people-1-generally belonging to the older age groups— who are characterized by possessing sentiments of group-, persistance. They r e s i s t change even to the point of being exiled or massacred. On the other hand, there are found those—usually belonging to the younger age groups— who are characterized by possessing sentiment's of innova-tion. Even i n a f a i r l y stable social milieu there are found individuals possessing one or other of the two main types of residues. There are those in,Canada to-day, for instance, who, on the whole, reveal group-persistance characteristics in their desire to continue the so-called free enterprise system of economic production. But there are also those who reveal innovation eh acteristics i n their desire for economic planning and control and a new social system i n which .the state owns the means of production. Let us pass on now to "th«. next Important aspect of Pareto's work—the theory of social equilibrium* In a sense Pareto gave the world no new and startling theory. The situation in which a given set of circumstances leads eventually to i ts opposite was a part of Vico* s theory, accounting for the transition through the three stages of history. This element is again apparent in Hegel8 s dialectical process and in Engels1 materialistic concep-tion of history. What Pareto did was to give the process an explanation that, from the point of view of social control, was perhaps more valuable than previous explana-, tions. To say that social change proceeds according to a . clash of opposite© i s Valuable in that so fsar as one can deduce opposites from existing social conditions, one i s enabled to predict the future course of social change, but to ascribe the dialectical process to a "Spirit" working out that which I t is potentially as Hegel did, does not give one much hope in the task of controlling social change since i t i s obvious that one cannot control a process that i s acting through an agent that i s super-sensory., parti cularly when the workings of the agent go forward because of a rational necessity permeating the Universe. The Engelian formula i s better in that i t ascribes social change, not to supersensory guided, rationally organised and therefore necessary motion, but 135 V to the material forces of economies* The material forces of economics are at least within the orbit of human direction. But even Engels offers no full explanation as to why there whould arise a elash "between economic classes or why the ruling group should choose to continue the control of economic forces and the exploitation of the submerged class even when such action leads inevitably to self-destruction. Pareto, on the other hand, gave an explanation of the nature of social change;? that, while' being as material-istic in its nature as is the Engelian theory, pushed the process one step farther back to its source. Actually what Pareto did was to transfer the cause of the clash of opposites from economics to psychology. He attempted to show that this clash arises from the psychological nature of man. Pisychologieally man either resists change or favours it. That is his nature. And it is because of this nature that clashes arise—clashes between those supporting sentiments of group-persistance and those supporting sentiments of combination or innovation. If this is true* then the problem of social control becomes th© problem of influencing the psychological nature of man* However, concerning this, one must point out that Pareto was weak in his discussion of the concept of the "normal circulation?; of ruling groups. If the ruling class normally takes members of the non-ruling group into its 136 f o l d on the condition that those members serve the former, then i t seems log ica l to suppose that the l a t t er v / i l l have to change, among other things, the sentiments they formerly held* In that case the poss ib i l i t i e s Of a change i n the nature of. the predominating sentiments of the rul ing e l i t e would be considerably reduced and the l i k e -lihood of revolution increased instead of decreased. The truth i s that the ru l ing group does change i t s sentiments .without introducing "new blood", provided that the change i s not too extreme. I f the change required i s extreme they usually do balk and do throw the soc ia l system so drast ical ly out of equilibrium by running counter to the needs of equilibrium that revolution does break out. Another point of cr i t i c i sm that i s worth mentioning i s that there i s an absence of any f u l l y rounded and closed conceptual scheme i n Pareto 1s system* Hegel's scheme ca l l s for a f i n a l synthesis i n which a l l contra-dictions are included <md the d ia l ec t i ca l process com-pleted 9 or i n which S p i r i t has realized i t s e l f completely i n i t s ultimate Freedom, or i n which the S&ate becomes the Divine Idea- as i t i s real ized on earth. Marx sees h i s scheme of h i s t o r i c a l materialism rounded off i n a classless society i n which the State has f i n a l l y withered away. Pareto, on the other hand, somewhat resembled Vico i n that his theory of the movement of soc ia l change presents no f i n a l synthesis and apparently has no goal . 137 Social change is just oscillation and ther© is no in-dication of its getting anywhere. Because of this, Pareto's philosophy lacks the appeal of a more speculative philosophy and leaves on© with the feeling that it is perhaps rather shallow and ineffective. What place, then, does Pareto occupy in the history of th© philosophy of social change? In th© first place, he continued the materialistic and mechanistic tradition introduced by Engels and the Marxians in contrast to the idealistic tradition of Vico and Hegel, In the second place, Pareto shifted the emphasis from economics as the main motive force of th© historical process to the psychological nature of man. In this respect there can be no doubt "that he did a great service to the cause of social theory. In the third place, he called attention to the fact that it is sentiments, feelings and emotions that predominate as the source of human actions, and not objective logic. He brought to the fore th© essentially irrational bias of man's nature. Again, in his theory of derivations, he undoubtedly gave a new insight into the why and how of the logical constructs that make up so much of the history of human thought. Finally, he gave some idea, although the idea was by no means new, of the reasons for the waxing and waning of ruling groups. 138 PI TRIM SOROKnr'S "SiOClAL-.ASI) CULTURAL DYNAMICS" A. Biographical Sketch B. Philosophy of S o c i a l Change 1. The meaning of culture 2. The Ideational Culture System 3. The Sensate Culture System 4. The I d e a l i s t i c Culture System 5. The R e a l i t y of Culture Systems 6. Fluctuations in Culture Systems as Revealed i n E t h i c s 7. The Reason of S o c i a l Change 8. The Recurrence of Culture Types 9. C r i t i c a l Remarks 139 PI TRIM SOROKIN (1899- ) Sorokin, now a naturalized American, was "born i n Russia and led a d i v e r s i f i e d l i f e there "before coming to America. He was, among' other things, a member of the Russian psycho-neurological I n s t i t u t e , a magistrate of criminal law, a member of the Council of the Russian Republic, secretary to Kerensky and a member of the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1918. In 1922 he obtained h i s Doctorate in Sociology i n Russia. In 1923 he came to the United States as he had "been condemned to death and "banished "by the Communist government. In 1930 he "became a member of Harvard University. His main works include Sociology of Revolution, 1925. S o c i a l Mobility, 1927, Contemporary Sociological Theories, 1928, S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l Dynamics, 1937 and Time Budgets of Human Behavior,1959. 140 PITRIM SOBOKBT'S ffilLTHRAL AtTP SOCIAL TWNAUICS S o r o k i n ' s t heo ry of social change i s woven about what he termed a culture unit, Sorokin defined culture as the "sum total of everything which i s created o r m o d i f i e d by the conscious o r unconscious activity of two or more individuals interacting with one another o r conditioning one another's b e h a v i o r , "(1) T h i s "sum t o t a l has a u n i t y , b u t t h i s u n i t y i s n o t t h a t o f a m y s t i c a l " s o u l " o r " s p i r i t " o r f o r c e exp re s s ing i t s e l f i n space and time and i m p r e s s i n g i t s e l f on the na ture of the minutiae of social phenomena, Nor i s i t u n i t y ach ieved b y " s p a t i a l and mechan ica l adjacency o f phenomena." Nor y e t i s i t u n i t y b o m o f the " i n d i r e c t a s s o c i a t i o n through a common e x t e r n a l f a c t o r " a s , f o r example, would be the case where the use o f skiis? f u r c o a t s , f u e l , and so on formed a u n i t y of s o c i a l phenomena through the e x t e r n a l f a c t o r o f c l i m a t e . And i t i s no t the u n i t y o f " f u n c t i o n a l i n t e g r a t i o n " , as, f or example, i n a garage where a l l the t o o l s and appar-atus form a u n i t y f o r the f u n c t i o n o f s e r v i c i n g and r e p a i r i n g c a r s . Ra the r , i t i s what S o r o k i n c a l l e d a "logico-meaningful i n t e g r a t i o n " o r u n i t y . I n o rde r to unders tand this concept of u n i t y a l i t t l e more c l e a r l y one must have a c l e a r i d e a of the meaning o f culture. In any g i v e n society a t any g i v e n p e r i o d o f time, men carry on a c t i v i t i e s o f a r t , s c u l p t u r e , drawing, painting and l i t e r a t u r e . T h i s i s a part o f c u l t u r e . A g a i n , under 141 the same conditions} men carry on act iv i t i e s i n the inte l l ec tua l f i e l d , constructing systems of truth, of ethics and of law. This , too, i s a part of culture. Or men order their relationships with one another--creating type s of states, evolving soc ia l systems, making xmr and, starting revolutions. This i s also a, part of culture. In a l l these . spheres of ac t iv i ty things are "being "created and modified "by the conscious or unconscious activity" of individuals . , And i n a l l this ac t iv i ty there i s a unity of a "logico-meaningful" nature. , IVhat i s this "logieo-meaningful" integrative factor? Sorokin, defined i t as "the identi ty or similarity.of central meaning, idea or mental M a s that permeates a l l the log ic -a l l y related fragments"(2)of a culture. This , as i t stands, may not appear to he a very comprehendable statement. But Sorokin went on to point out that there are two aspects to any culture system, which he. termed the internal and ex-ternal aspects of culture respectively. The internal aspect THE M E A T O G OF CULTURE of culture he. defined as "the realm of mind, value, meaning."(2) I t "belongs to the realm of inner experience" and i s revealed i n "ideas, vo l i t ions , feelings and emotions."(2)or i n "systems of thought woven of these elements of inner experience."(2) The external aspect "is composed of inorganic and organic phenomena? objects, events and processes, which incarnate, or incorporate, or rea l ize , or externalize the internal experiences."(2) (2)Ibid, p55, V o l . 1. 143 In short, the internal aspect of culture i s the realm of values and value complexes, whereas the external aspect i s the realm of ac t iv i t i e s and inst i tut ions and processes which are the vehicles which are used to.express overtly the internal aspects of culture. How, i t was Sorokin* s contention that the internal aspects of culture determine the nature of the external aspects* that the realm of values and value complexes i s , i n other words, paramount i n the culture, that a l l the soc ia l phenomena are permeated by this value system and are log i ca l ly related through i t into one unif ied and integrated whole. "In this sense," he stated, "identity of central pr inc ip le , idea or norm plays i n the cul tural world a role analogous to that of the atom, proton, electron or other ultimate unit universally common to a l l the material systems."(3) ..'.'This gives i t ( the culture) i t s sociocultural and logico-meaningful ind iv idual i ty , i t s specif ic s ty le , i t s physiognomy and personality. "(4) Sorokin continued his description of the internal aspects of culture. Since i t consists i n a system of value complexes i t i s obvious that i t w i l l have certain premises, "majter premises" as Sorokin cal led them, on the basis of which the value systems are constructed. One can not think of any' system of values that, does not go back to some premise or premises which form the basis of the whole system. (3)Ibid, p £ 5 , V o l . 1. (4)Ibid, p28, V o l . 1. 144 S o r o k i n y i s i o n e d these premises a r i s i n g i n f o u r main areas(5) .11.(1) the na ture o f r e a l i t y , (2) the na tu re o f needs and ends to he s a t i s f i e d , (3 ) the ex ten t t o which these needs and ends are to be s a t i s f i e d , and (4) the methods o f s a t i s f a c t i o n . . L e t us examine the na ture o f r e a l i t y . S o r o k i n ' s argument wast t h a t "the h e t e r o g e n e i t y o f i n d i v i d u a l e x p e r i e n c e s , t oge the r w i t h - o t h e r f a c t o r s , l eads to a m u l t i p l i c i t y o f the modes o f p e r c e p t i o n o f the same phenomenon by d i f f e r e n t „ p e r s o n s . " ( 6 ) Such i s the case i n the p e r c e p t i o n o f the na tu re o f r e a l i t y . Some people p e r c e i v e r e a l i t y "as t h a t which can be p e r c e i v e d by the organs o f the sense . " Others; b e l i e v e t h a t t h i s i s no t r e a l i t y a t a l l . To them i t i s a mere i l l u s i o n . True r e a l i t y f o r these i n d i v i d u a l s i s "beyond appearances"! i t i s "supersensate , i m m a t e r i a i , s p i r i t u a l " and.may be " s t y l e d God, nirvana., , Brahma—external s p i r i t , I ' e l a n v i t a l . D ing f u r und an s i c h . " ( 7 ) Here , t h e n , are two major premises d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed t o each o t h e r . I n l i k e f a s h i o n , some people b e l i e v e t h a t needs are " p u r e l y c a r n a l o r s e n s u a l , l i k e hunger and t h i r s t and s ex , s h e l t e r and the comforts o f the body g e n e r a l l y . "(8) Others l o o k upon needs as e s s e n t i a l l y s p i r i t u a l " l i k e s a l v a t i o n o f o n e ' s s o u l , the performance o f sac red du ty , s e r v i c e to God, c a t e g o r i c mora l o b l i g a t i o n s . " ( 9 ) The same h o l d s t r u e o f the ex ten t to which needs and ends are t o be s a t i s f i e d . Some people g i v e themselves up ( 5 ) T b i d , p70, V o l . 1. ( 6 ) I b i d . ( 7 ) , I b i d , ( 8 ) I b i d , p 7 1 , V o l . 1. ( 9 ) I b i d . 145 entirely to purely s p i r i t u a l purposes. Others give themselves up almost entirely to purely carnal purposes. Some consecrate themselves to either one or other of these purposes i n moderate degree only. Finally, some people believe that they should satisfy their needs by modification of the external-environment. Yet others believe that "modification of self, one's body and mind and their parts i n such a way as to be v i r t u a l l y free from a given need"(ld)is the ideal method of attending to needs. How, Sorqtn argued that the "logi co-meaningful indi«? viduaiity" of a culture, " i t s s;ityle, i t s physiognomy" i s a function of a value system composed of l o g i c a l l y related values from each of the four areas of values outlined above. Art, intellectual activity, the ordering of social relation-ships, a l l f i t into and subserve this value system. Thus one might fin d a culture whose value system includes a b e l i e f i n r e a l i t y as "immaterial and s p i r i t u a l " , which considers s p i r i t u a l needs of soul salvation and service to God as the proper needs of men, which,insists on wholehearted conse-cration to the s p i r i t u a l as desirable and vs/hich i s convinced that the method of attaining these ends is, to r i g i d l y discipline body and mirid so that physieal needs are minimized or viewed as unnecessary i n order that a l l may be concentrated on the s p i r i t u a l and immaterial. Or con-versely, one,might find a culture whose value system i s the (165ibid,. pjto,v?i'£;\ : , 146 opposite---which views reality as material, wh&chconsiders physical and material needs as the sumuta bontamu which believes that such needs should he wholeheartedly satisfied and which relies on the manipulation of th© external environment as the best method of realizing such needs* . This value system—whatever i t may he—Sorokin desig-nated the super-system of the; culture. Integrated with i t are the sub-systems of art, intellectual life and the ordering of social relationships. Art in the immaterial value system just described will logically deal with the spiritual and the spiritual atmosphere will characterize i t through and through. Intellectual l ife will concern itself with a system of truth, ethics and law which support the spiritual outlook and reflect its dominance in the culture. Social relationships, too,, will be ordered so that they may realize the spiritual ends of life* Conversely, again, in the materialistic, sensual or carnal value system, art will reflect an atmosphere that is this-worldly and characterized by the physical and sensory. Intellectual life will busy itself with the construction of a system of truth, ethics and law that supports the materialistic conception of reality. Social relationships will stress the purely physical, utilitarian and hedonistic relationships of individuals. Sorokin did not, of course, state that there are in real l ife such pure systems as those just described. But he did believe that there are cultures in which value systems 147 of th i s or that kind predominate and give a meaningful unity to. the majority of soc ia l phenomena. And he drew on the history of the Beet* of Egypt, of China, of India for confirmation of h is theory. More spec i f i ca l ly , Sorokin saw social change as a variant recurrent cycle of three main culture systems2 the Ideational system, the Ideal i s t ic system and the Sen-sate system, as he termed them. According to him, soc ia l change proceeds through three systems of value complexes, three different super-systems with their a l l i e d sub-systmes. Let us look for a moment at each of these three systems. The f i r s t , the Ideational system, corresponds largely to the non-material, sp i r i tua l system already outlined. However, i t may be divided into two main sub-classes, the' Ascetic Ideational and the Active Ideational. Of these two THE TDEATI01TAL CULTURE SYSTEM classes the Ascetic "Ide-ational i s the extreme form. I t "seeks the consumation of the needs and ends through an excessive elimination and minimization of the carnal needs, supplemented by a complete detachment from the sensate world and even from oneself, viewing both as mere i l l u s i o n , non-real, non-existing* The \#ole sensate mi l ieu , and even the individual self , i s dissolved i n the supersensate, ultimate reality."(11) I t has also a number of other characterist ics . Because i t strives towards the "ultimate, supersensory r e a l i t y , las t ing , eternal , unchangeable, and not towards the everchanging y (11)Ibid, p 73 5 Vol* 1. 148 and ephemeral , i t a s s o c i a t e s i t s e l f e i t h e r w i t h i n d i f f e r e n c e t o , and detachment from the p h y s i c a l environment o r a r e l u c t a n c e t o change i t o r w i t h a contempt o f i t . "(12) : Hence i t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by " i m p e r t u r b a b i l i t y and i n d i f -f e rence" i n the face of• temporal pa ins and p l e a s u r e s . A g a i n , i t s t r e s s e s B e i n g r a t h e r than Becoming. F o r i t , r e a l i t y ' "remains e t e r n a l l y the? same, unchangeable ."(13) Consequent-l y s i t p r e f e r s "va lues which are e v e r l a s t i n g and d u a a b l e . . • Time l a c k s p e r s p e c t i v e o f the p a s t , p resent and the f u t u r e " and i t s t r e s s e s s t o o , "man's c o n t r o l o f h i m s e l f , e s p e c i a l l y o f h i s b o d i l y senses , o f h i s emotions , f e e l i n g s , w i s h e s , l u s t s . " ( 1 4 ) I t encourages an i n t r o v e r t : p e r s o n a l i t y . M e n t a l p rocesses are d i r e c t e d "upon s e l f and i t s a n a l y s i s and m o d i f i c a t i o n * " ( 1 5 ) " I t i m p l i e s a c l o s e a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h the phenomenon o f the i n n e r menta l exper ience . .*accompanied by detachment from and r e l a t i v e i n d i f f e r e n c e t o the e x t e r n a l w o r l d i n the p h y s i c a l sense.."(16) I n t h i s connect ions i t i s more concerned w i t h the problems o f " s o u l , mind u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y , God, the D e v i l , Good, E v i l , s a l v a t i o n , E t e r n a l V a l u e , Consc ience , J u s t i c e and so on ."(17) The concept o f the Ego c o n s i s t s i n d i s s o l v i n g ; the s e l f " i n the U n i v e r s e o f impersona l and i m m a t e r i a l r e a l i t y . The supreme t a s k o f the i n d i v i d u a l s e l f i s a u n i o n w i t h u l t i m a t e r e a l i t y , from w h i c h , l i k e water i n a c u p , separa ted from the ocean, i t i s t e m p o r a r i l y i s o l a t e d by the frame o f m a t e r i a l ex i s t ence . " (18 ) ; : ( 1 2 ) I b i d , p79 , V o l . 1 . ( 1 3 ) I b i d , p80* ( 1 4 ) T b i d , p83 . ( 1 5 ) i b i d 9 - p 8 4 . • ( 1 6 ) I b i d , p85* ( 1 7 ) I b i d , p86 . ( 1 8 ) I b i d , p88 . 149 I t w i l l "require and stimulate cognition of inner psychical and mental processes from the most elementary psychological processes of sensation, perception...to the most sublime and subtle experiences of ecstasy, trance, mysticism, suggestion...and others like...reunion with the absolute... revelation...divine inspiration."(19) It w i l l therefore accept the v a l i d i t y of divine i n s p i r a t i o n and revelation as means of acquiring truth. Such, b r i e f l y , are the major premises, the culture mentality, mental bias of the Ascetic Ideational culture. The Active Ideational culture, i t was said, i s a more moderate form of the same mentality. As such, i t w i l l con-ta i n elements of the next major culture mentality to be discussed--the Sensate men t a l i t y — b u t the s p i r i t u a l and immaterial w i l l s t i l l predominate. The Sensate culture system may also be divided into various sub-classes; the Active Sensate, the Passive Sen-sate and the Cynical Sensate. The Active Sensate culture corresponds lar g e l y with. the second i l l u s t r a t i o n of the meaning of the i n t e r n a l THE SENSATE CULTURE SYSTEM aspects of culture given ear lie:, and as such i t i s the opposite of the Ideational culture mentality just described. "The Sensate mentality views r e a l i t y as only that which i s presented to the sense organs. It does not seek or believe in any supersensory r e a l i t y ; at most, in i t s d i l u t e d form ( I 9 ) l b i d , p89. 150 i t assumes an agnostic attitude towards the entire world "beyond the senses. The Sensate reality is thought of as a Becoming, process. Change, Flux, Evolution, Progress, Transformation. Its needs and aims are mainly physical, and maximum satisfaction is sought in these needs."(20) Again:, i t sees "only • empirical reality," and i t desires ";to change the surrounding sensate environment to meet its needs," but as "empirical reality is ever changing...one must be ready to meet the change in environment by a necessary change in one's transforming activity.•"(21) Consequently, "this mentality is inseparable from a dynamic, evolutionary, progressive principle ."(22) Adjustment and , readjustment , therefore, are necessary in individuals and social institutions generally. And values become short term values limited to the present, the here and now. Likewise, i t seeks the control of the external world and not control of man* s self. It therefore exhibits an extroversion "pointed towards the transformation of the sensate milieu."(23) It tends "to be scientific and physically causative and, in this sense, rational and calculated."(24) Again, and follow-ing from the above, i t views the "whole of inner l i fe , its processes, and a l l spiritual and immaterial phenomena, as either ignorant delusion or aberration or a peculiar by-product of, purely physiological processes in the nervous system or in any other part of the"body."(25) Its conception (20)Ibid, p73. (21)Ibid,, p80. (22)Ibid, p 81. (23)Ibid, pS3. (24)Ibid, p84. (25)Ibid, p86. 151 of the self fa l l into a similar pattern, being but "one of the foci or knots" of material forces "which make up the external world...It is a kind of dynamo which do.es not need help from any mysterious supernatural forces or immaterial agencieso.olt implies a corporeal conception of self' which' makes i t inseparable from the body, a skeptical or irre- " ligious or disrespectful attitude towards non-material forces and agencieso..egotism, readiness to fight for physical integrity. "(26) Such a mentality naturally stim-ulates man to seek knowledge of the external i^orld. It will . cause "a successful development of natural sciences and a blossoming of man* s knowledge of the material, external world and of the technical inventions for its control."(27) The Sensate mentality, again, implies "the validity of perception through man's external sense organs as the basis of truth."US) It was stated before that there i?ere not usually pure forms of the two main and opposing types of mentality described and i t was pointed out tliat Sorokin mentioned one "sub-class of culture mentalities—the Active Ideational, combrining the Sons ate and Ideational elements with the latter elements dominating. Likewise two other sub-classes© of Sensate mentality—the Passive Sensate and the Cynical Sensate—were mentioned. The Passive Sensate Sorokin defined as being "charac-terized by the attempt to f u l f i l l physical needs and aims (26)Ibid, p88..' (27)Ibid, ! p®G. (28)Ibid, p92." 152 neither through the inner modification, of self, nor through efficient reconstruction of the external world, hut through a parasitic exploitation and utilization of external reality as it is, viewed as the mere means of enjoying sensual pleasures."(29) The Cynical Sensate is defined as "seeking to achieve the satisfaction of its needs" by using " a specific technique of donning and doffing those Ideational masks which promise the greatest returns in physical comfort It is an opportunistic mentality in which individuals readjust their values to run along with the stream. However, one need not concern oneself with these categories as they do not figure prominently in the Sorokian scheme. But there is a third main class—the. Idealistic—which is important. "Quantitatively i t represents a more or less THE IDEALISTIC CULTURE SYSTEM balanced unification of Ideational elements and Sensate elements...Qualitatively it synthesizes the premises of both types into one inwardly-consistent and harmonious unity. For it , reality is many sided, with the aspects of everlasting Being and ever changing Becoming of the spiritual and material...The. methods of their realization involves both-the modification of self and the transformation of the external, world...Its face is simultaneously other-worldly and of this world."(31) (29)lbid, p74. (30)lhid, p74. (3l)lbid, p74. 153 What evidence, i n the h i s t o r i c a l process, i s there that there are in f a c t such d i f f e r e n t culture mentalities as those Sorokin mentioned? Sorokin was convinced that "Hinduism Buddhism, Taoism, Sufism and early C h r i s t i a n i t y , mystical sects, groups and movements, .such as the Cynics, Stoics, THE REALITY OP CULTURE SYSTEMS Gnostics and the devotees of Orphism,"(32)are examples of the Ideational type of mentality-Uascetic Ideational at the highest l e v e l , Active i d e a t i o n a l on a lower, and I d e a l i s t i c and mixed on the loweBt1.'(33) And, he continued, " a l l these systems set f o r t h Ascetic Ideationalism as the i r sublime and supreme form, but r e a l i z i n g that that i s attainable only by the few, they admit f o r the mass of adherents eit h e r the Active Ideational or the I d e a l i s t i c or a mixed mentality of a less Sensate sort."(33) Nevertheless, the Ideational remains "the c r i t e r i o n of excellence."(34) This shapes the greater l & r t of t h e i r culture mentalities and determines the nature of thei r cultures. Sorokin attempted to prove h i s contention by quoting from the source books of the philosophies and r e l i g i o n s j u s t mentioned. Thus he quoted several passages from the Hindu cl a s s i c s - - t h e Ring Veda, Chandogva Upanishad and the Upanishads—to i l l u s t r a t e t h e i r view of ultimate r e a l i t y . "Beyond the senses there are objects, beyond the objects there i s the mind, .beyond the mind there i s the i n t e l l e c t . The S e l f i s hidden i n a l l beings and does not shine f o r t h , but i t i s seen by subtle seers...It i s not born. I t dies (32)lbid, p l l 2 . (33)lbid. (34)lbid, p l l 3 . not;. I t .sprang from nothing; Nothing sprang from i t . The Ancient is .unborn s eternal , everlasting. I t i s without sound, iwthout touch, without form.,, without d.ec.ay,,:' without taste,> eternal. . .without smell, beyong the great,and unchangeable."(35) Here the implication i s that the Hindu view of ultimate • rea l i ty is immaterial. and hidden beyond the reach of the, sen-ses . In a l ike manner Sorokin,revealed the Hindu,contempt for the world of external sense perception. "He whom no desire with i t s snares and poisons :: can lead astray i s the awakened, the Omniscient; even the Gods envy him...He delights only in the destruction of a l l desires. . .Destroy contact, then w i l l end sensation; destroy the six entrances (s ix organs of sense), then w i l l contact cease."(36) Such statements indicate that, the methods of attaining complete consecration to the s p i r i t u a l i s for "Hinduism, the complete mastery of a l l Sensate needs. But one need not continue. The same device is .'.followed by Sorokin i n regard to Buddhism, E Taoism and, early and Ascetic Chris t iani ty . What i s there to be said for the Sensate Mentality? Sorokin dismissed the necessity of proof of the existence, of such a mentality with the comment that "this type of mentality i s quite famil iar to-us-.... . I t pervades our contemporary culture . . . I t i s very widely spread now among business men, energetic professionals, scientests, s c h o l a r s . « This type of mentality and examples of i t i n history are so well-known., i t / i s so common i n this age, that ho further (35)Ibid, pl!4. (36)Ibid, p l l 4 . 155 commentary i s necessary."(37) • Confucianism, Sorokin considered an exce l l ent example : o f the I d e a l i s t i c cu l ture m e n t a l i t y . He descr ibed i t fey -s t a t i n g that "this system represents a remarkable combih- ' a t i o n o f the i d e a t i o n a l and the Sensate; I t s main purpose be ing to ind i ca te the Srapir ical mean,-to keep the balance , or,* i n i t s own language, to preserve * the s tate o f e q u i -l i b r i u m and harmony*, meaning by t h i s the 'state * when f ee l ings o f p leasure , anger, sorrow or joy have been s t i r r e d and a l l i n t h e i r due measure and degree'v . .This harmony i s the u n i v e r s a l path i n which a l l human' ac t ions should proceed. When i t ex i s t s a l l things are nourished and f lour i sh ." (38) T h i s , Sorokin argued, shows "the unwilling*' ness o f Confuscitfc5~ to go beyong the E m p i r i c a l world and i t s phenomena, o.On the other hand he often mentioned heaven, thus i n d i c a t i n g an in troduct ion o f I d e a t i o n a l premises,' n o t i n any profound way, perhaps, but h a r d l y as a mere fac.onr de n a r l e r . "(39) The Confuciusian means o f a t t a i n i n g these goals i s p a r t l y empirical- , p a r t l y I d e a t i o n a l , such as the doctr ine of f i l i a l p i e t y , the system of the f i v e fundamental s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , and so on. F o r Confucius, the main p r i n c i p l e of s o c i a l conduct i s reasonable, p r a c t i c a l , w e l l -b lanaced, but ma in ly e a r t h l y . Such a system has been f o r ages the bas i s o f the Chinese s p i r i t . - , ' Sorokin c i t e d other s i m i l a r I d e a l i s t i c cu l tures from, Egypt and from the per iod fo l lowing the c lose of the Middle (33>Ibid;, p!49. (39)ibid", ©149. . ( 3 7 ) I b i d , p!40. 156 Ages«. But one need not discuss them in detail as sufficient examples of Sorokin1s proof of the existence of the ®ajor types of culture mentality have been given. Let us, then, . pass on -to the next problem or set of problems. I t has been shown how social change/was conceived by Sorokin in terms of culture systems, culture mentalities, super-systems and sub-systems. I t has also been shown that there are certain ©ajor types of culture mentality. The question now arises of the nature of the fluctuations of culture mentalities in the course of history and the relation of the sub-systems, the external aspects of culture,to the super-systems, the internal aspects of culture. I t cannot be hoped to trace through the solution to these problems in a l l the detail Sorokin gave. He traced the fluctuations in three large volumes, each of about seven-hundred pages in lenght. In the f irst volume of his work he dealt at great length, with fluctuations in Art forms and their relation to the culture mentalities in which they were created. Painting and sculpture, architecture, music and literature are a l l investigated in relation to this problem. In the second volume he dealt with fluctuations in systems of truth and knowledge, idealism and materialism, eternalism and teraporalism, realism, conceptualism and nominalism, universal!sm, and singular! sm, determinism and indeterminism, causality, time 9 space and number, scientific theories, ethics, absolutism and relativism and ethico-juridical mentality in criminal law. In volume three he dealt with 157 fluctuations in social relationships, in theocratic and secular forms of government, in Ideational and. Sensate , liberty, in economic conditions, in ivar;,' in disturbances in intra-groiip relationships and in personality and conducto In view of a l l this wealth of detail and the impos-s ibi l i ty of attempting to summarize i t in the space that is available, i t is proposed/to take one topic discussed by Sorokin and to use i t as an illustration of how Sorokin worked out his theories in regard to the two problems stated above. In this connection the topic of ethics is ehosen,not so much because Sorokin*s description of the fluctuation of ethical systems and of the relation of these systems to culture mentalities i s better than Ms descrip-tion of fluctuations in other fields, as because i t i s a topic about which there is much dispute at the present tirae« Sorokin*s theories may shed some light ©n an objective solution to :the ethical problem« . , . Sorokin pointed out, f irst of a l l , that i f his theories are correct there ought to be three major ethical systems corresponding with the three-major types of culture mental-i t ies or super^systems—Ideational ethics, Idealistic ethics and Sensate ethics«-as well as types of ethical systems corresponding to to the sub-types of culture mentality* Tims the Ideational ethics should reveal a conviction that ethical conduct is not just conduct most 168 conducive to increasing sensate or material happiness | i t i s conduct most conducive to increasi ng s p i r i t u a l health and well-being. Again, the ethical norms of such a system should appear as" absolute and supreme, unchanging and unchangeable, eternally v a l i d "since i t i s intended to bring i t s followers into unity with the supreme and absolute."(40) Furthermore, the ethical principles should emanate not from the empirical, sensory world, but from the s p i r i t u a l , from God or the gods. The Sensate system of ethics should present a contrast to the Ideational system.-It should reveal a conviction that FLUCTUATIONS IH CULTURE SYSTEMS ethical conduct i s that AS HSvBALBD IN ETHICS conduct most conducive to the increase of the sum of "sensate happiness, comfort, u t i l i t y and pleasure. "(41) Eth ica l values should be re lat ive "because with the changing sensate conditions the ethical rules 1 must also change."(41) And sensate ethical principles should emanate from pure sense perception; from "man made rules , having no other authority behind them."(41) Between the Ideational and the 5 e ^ 5 ^ t e i e thical systems should l i e the Ideal i s t ic system. I t should aim simultaneously at the transcendental and the earthly. Its principles should be partly absolute, partly re la t ive . The authority of i t s commands should be i n part God; i n part reason, sensory perception, man. Sorokin believed that there were and are such ethical (40)Ibid, p482, V o l . l l . (41)Ibid, p48S. 159 systems and he c l a s s i f i e d them as the ethics of absolute p r i n c i p l e s , the ethics of love, and the eth i c s o f happiness corresponding with the Ideational, I d e a l i s t i c and Sensate culture mentalities respectively« Sensate ethi c s , the ethics of happiness, he further divided i n t o three sub- ! classes, eudaemonistic ethics which considers l i f e ' s main objective "happiness of the whole system of l i f e , i n which pleasure and joy s h a l l outweigh pain, s u f f e r i n g and g r i e f " ; hedonistic ethics which considers l i f e * s main o b j e c t i v e "separate o r singular pleasures", the short term view of happiness, the i d e a l o f carpe diemg u t i l i t a r i a n i s m which i s s i m i l a r to eudaemonism but which emphasizes "the means of obtaining happiness rather than on what happiness i t s e l f it."(42) Do these systems o f ethics e x i s t in various s o c i e t i e s and do they hold the allegiance o f men i n the correct periods--Ideational ethics i n an Ideational culture mentality, Sensate ethics i n a Sensate culture mentality, and I d e a l i s t i c ethics i n an I d e a l i s t i c culture mentality? And how do they f l u c t u a t e i n the h i s t o r i c a l ' process? Sorokin answered the f i r s t question i n the affirmative when he sai d , "these three systems*„.have fluctuated in t h e i r domination throughout th© h i s t o r y of Graeco-Roman and Western cultures „ Each of them has prevailed i n iabout the same periods during which the Ideati o n a l , I d e a l i s t i c and Sensate systems o f a r t and tr u t h have been i n the (42)Ibid 5 p484* 160 ascendancy."(43) He then went on to trace through these fluctuations i n history. : In Greece, "between the eighth and f i f th, centuries before Christ,, ethics was largely Ideational i n Its content. This i s clear from the works of such men as Hesiod, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Herodotus and Pindar*, Thus Hesiod considered moral commands as given "by .Zeus*. The Oracles and the l i terature of the time are f u l l of references to the wrath of the Gods at the breaking of moral commands* Writers of the time revealed a contempt of the physical , sensory world and a profound be l i e f i n the immaterial and absolute values. Hence Pindar could say that "human happiness does not las t long".and Sophocles could say that "as long as we l i ve we are but f leet ing shades."(44) Then as one follows the course of h is tory , one finds changes In the ethical outlook. "This system of ethics "began to decline i n the f i f t h century before Chris t , and was replaced by the Ideal i s t ic ethics of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle."(45) Thus Plsto i n his Ehaedo c r i t i c i s e d the Sensate system of ethics. Yet, elsewhere, he combined Ideational and Sensate moral values,.. Euripides, Ar i s to -phanes, and Thucydides carried on a s imi lar t rad i t ion . Men such as these advocated an eudaemonistie happiness "whose one foot i s i n the super-sensory world of Absolute values, the other i n the noblest f i e l d of the sensory world. "(45) (43) Sorokin, P.AVf The Cr i s i s of Our Age.» P. Button & C o . , 1941, pl39. • (44) Op.Cit., p490-91. (45)Ibid, p492. 1 6 1 From the th ird century before Christ to about the f o i f r t h century A.D. the Sensate system of ethics "in i t s nobler Stoic and Epicurean forms 9 as well as i n the c r u d e forms of naked' hedonism and of the code of carp© diem.»"(46) predominated. In th is period Epicurus described the' ethical man as one who has friends, marries', uses the goods o f th is v/orld i n moderation and who l i s tens t o "nature" and "reason" i n the dearch for ethical principles and Ep/' .Gtetus advised that the good l i f e could only b e • attained by doing what i s i n accordance with nature and • b y refraining from doing that which i s inconsistent with nature. Sen© likewise maintained that the end o f l i f e i s to protect and I O Q K after oneself and that this c o u l d be done only by l i v i n g according to nature. Lucretiub 1 believed that the object of l i f e i s to secure absence from pain and that one could only do' this b y understanding t h e laws of nature. In nearly every case the appeal i s made to the sensate world as interpreted b y reason. "After the fourth century A.D*, the Ideational ethics of Christ ianity achieved supremacy, remaining:' unchallanged to t h e thirteenth century*"(47) The ethics of pr inc iples , In other words, once more b e c a m e the dominant form. Once more moral commands were given of God. They were absolute and of supreme value. They did not have any regard for the value of sensate happiness. Sorokin, again, attempted t o prove that such a change i n ethical values occurred b y (46) Sorokin, P .A. , The.Cris is of Our Age*. pl39. ( 4 7 ) Ib id , pl39. - -162 reference to various Christ ian ethical theorists . For instance s he claimed that St. Bernard, one of the early Christ ian Saints,, once said, "fear not them that k i l l the "body"?that Dante stated the supreme end of l i f e i s "glory to God i n the heaven and peace be unto earth"? that St . Augustine remarked that "the perfect happiness of man • cannot be other than the Vis ion of the Divine Essence5 that the Bible warned that one should "take. • .not, thought f o r . . . l i f e , what ye sha l l eat, or what ye shal l drink? nor yet f o r . , .body, what ye shal l put on. But seek ye f i r s t the Kingdom of God..."(48) Then, once again, there was a change. "This uncom-promisingly Ideational system of ethics began to give way to the less rigorous, Idea l i s t i c ethics of the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries,"(49) "Hew notes begin to sound—a note of sublime eudaemonism ? a note somewhat reluctant to adopt the previous monastic asceticism and torture of body; a note of admissibi l i ty and jus t i f i ca t ion of the supreme eudaemonistic happiness i n so far as i t does not contradict the commands of God."(50) Peter Aberlard, Hugo de St . V ic tor , Albertus Magnus, Walter of Brugges, Alexander of Halle and others were quoted by Sorokin as examples of the Ideal i s t ic tendencies of the period. But "the growth of sensate elements continues within the absolute system of ethics of the next centuries, and (48) :op.c/r.p/s3 (49) Sorokln, P.A.sThe C r i s i s of Our Age, pl40. (50) Sorokin, P .A.sCultural and Social Dynamics, p496, . ' V o l . 11. 163 culminates in an emergence of Sensate systems of ethics at the end of the fifteenth? and the ir enormous increase in the si#.t;eenth century. Sensate eudaemonism9 then hedonism and uti l i tarianisms re-emerge on the highway of ethical thought of Western Society, and after that, with temporary fluctuations,, continue to grow. "(51) And so to-day the ethics of hedonist and ut i l i tar ianism are predominant. "Prom science to re l ig ion we demand that everything be useful."(52) Thus the pragmatists can say that " i f be l i e f i n God i s useful , God exists; i f not, He does not" and William James can ask, "what i s the truth* s cash value in experiential terms?" and the modern advertisement can question and answers "Unhappy? Buy a new cart" or "Want to be happy? Buy a brand new ham or refrigerator*" At this point l e t us pause a moment to summarize the main points so far discussed by Sorokin. Essent ia l ly , he proposed the following propositionss— (1) There are culture mentalities or super-systems in history which may be termed Ideational, Idea l i s t i c or Sensate, and which have certain sub-classes| (2) There are sub-systems i n various f i e l d s , such as ethics, which partake of the same Ideational, Ideal i s t ic and Sensate characteristics as the super-systems in which they occurf (3) There are fluctuations i n the predominance of the types of super-systems and corresponding sub-systems; (51) Ib id , p496. (52) I b i d , pso^ 164 (4)These fluctuations', appear to follow the order of Ideat iona l Idea l i s t i c , Sensate, Ideational, Idea l i s t i c , Sensate, and so on, A number of questions arise from these propositions. Why i s there a rhythm of Ideational, Ideal i s t ic and Sensate culture mentalities? Why are 'these phases of the h i s t o r i c a l process recurrent? V/hy do the three phases follow the sequence noticed? To these problems we w i l l now turn. Why do a l l sociocultural phenomena change incessantly? Why i s there this relentless becoming instead of ever-last ing permanency? Sorokin rejected the theories that account for such changes as being due to factors external to the phenomena—such as geographical conditions, b io -log ica l factors and so on—operating as the sole factors. In place of them, he favoured the "principle of immanent change of each sociocultural system supported by the externalist ic pr inc ip le , within certain conditions and limits."(53) By the principle of immanent change Sorokin THE REASOB OF SOCIAL CHAHGB meant that "any system which i s , during i t s existence, a going concern, which works and acts and does not remain i n a state of rest , i n the l i t erary sense of the word, cannot help ehangingjust because i t performs some a c t i v i t y , some work, as long as i t exists."(54) Is other words,"the change i s an immanent ( 53)Ib id , p592, Vol., IV, ( 54)Ibid. 165 consequence of 'the system's being a going concern. "(55) In this respect9 a culture system's movement is somewhat like the growth of an individual. An individual cannot help growing from childhood to youth, from youth to maturity, from maturity to old age,and from old age to death. The process is inherent or immanent within him. So a culture system has the process of change inherent within i t by i ts .;'-• very nature. A' number of corollaries follow from this principle. In the first place, because i t changes immahently, the process of culture change generates certain consequences, among which i s "an incessant change of the system itself^" that i s , the system changes but these changes in themselves set in motion s t i l l other changes in the system. Or the " process may result in changes in the environment which in x ' turn react upon the system, thereby changing i t s t i l l further. Sorokin gave a concrete example of the sort of thing that happens when he explained that "a given state declares war against another state. The act of warfare changes not only the first state, but introduces a series of important consequences in the world external to it...The other state is forced to enter the warfare...The second state becomes victorious...and subjugates the first....The act of the f irs t state immanently generated a series of changes in i tself , a series of changes in the external world; internal and external changes in their turn have reacted forcibly (55) Ibid, p593. 166 upon the state and, have led to i t s profound transformation, up to the loss of i t s sovereignty and independence. "(5?) In.the second,place, "as soon as a sociocultural movement emerges, with a l l i t s properties and modus vivendi and modus ajgendi, i t contains i n i t s e l f i t s normal future."( 58) In other words, v > i t sets i t s own Destiny immanently. True, external agencies may crush and destroy i t , hut as long as i t i s allowed to pursue i t s course i t w i l l pursue i t i n a way determined by i t s own immanent nature just as an acorn hears i t s own destiny, namely, the unfolding Destiny of an oak and of nothing else."(59) But the course a culture system follows i s not entirely r i g i d and set. External conditions at the moment of the culture's emer-gence may have an effect. "The immanent potent ia l i t ies of the system can actualize i n somewhat different l i f e careers i f the external conditions are different or when they change differently during the l i f e career of,the system."(60) Tie rs i s therefore some variat ion of potent ia l i ty . Again, the process may he compared with the growth of an acorn. I7e know an acorn must become an oak, but "how, long actually the oak w i l l be, what w i l l be i t s shape, strength, size--we cannot forsee."(61) Another l imitat ion on the Destiny of a culture i s the fact that the "margin of self-determination of the future career of a system" i s not "the same for a l l (57)Xbid, p602. (58)Xbid, p603. (59)Ibid, p603. (60)Ibid, p606, (61)Ib id , p606. 167 sociocultural systems."(62) This i s due to a number of , factors including the kind of system—some systems are more dependent on external conditions than others—and the kind of environment i n which the system exists—some environments are more oppressive than others. .Why do these factors have an influence on the Destiny of cultures? Sorokin believed that i t i s because some, cultures are better integrated than others. But, then, one may ask v/hy this should be so. The answer to this 1 l a t t er problem i s to be found i n the fact that a number o f factors promote or hinder the integration of a culture. These factors include the quantity of membership(a system with a large membership, according to Sorokin, i s l i k e l y to be more integrated than one with a smaller membership) ; the b io log ica l , mental and social qual i t ies of the mem-bers! the quantity and quality of knowledge, experience and wisdom of the members | the quality of organization of the culture? the means of control of human behavior and Of natural forces at i-fcs disposal; the degree of contiguity of the system; and the extent to which i t i s independent of environment, and so on. Another reason for social change i s the p a r t i a l truth of each of the culture mentalities. Each of the major mentalities contains either the entire truth or entire falsehood or i s part ly tune and partly fa lse . But i f a system contained the entire truth there would be no (62)Ibid, p603. 168 reason for change. On the other hand, i f a system were entirely false i t could not exist for any great length of time. Nobody could l ive i n complete error f o r they would very soon perish. So a culture system must be part ly t*i«e, partly false* Thus i t would seem to be safe to assume that "because each of the systems has an inva l id part , each of these systems leads i t s human bearers away from r e a l i t y , gives them pseudo-knowledge instead of rea l knowledge and hinders their adaptation and the satisfaction o f . . . t h e i r needs. When such a system of truth grows. . . i ts false part tends to grow, while i t s v a l i d part tends to * decrease. . .It tends to drive out a l l other systems of truth and the v a l i d parts they contain.. .The r e s u l t . . . o f such a trend i s t h a t . . . the system becomes more and "more inadequate...The society and culture...become more and more empty. . .d isorderly , . .base . . . The moment eomes when the false part outweighs i t s v a l i d part. Under such conditions the society and i t s bearers i s doomed either to perish o r . . . t o change i t s Major premises. . .In th i s way the dominant system prepares i t s own downfall and paves tiie way for the ascendance and domination of one of the r i v a l systems of truth and real i ty . . ."(63) So much for the "why" of soc ia l change. V/hat reasons can be given, now, for the recurrence of the three phase system? Sorokin 1s answer to this i s what he termed the (63)Ibid, p743. 169 principle of l imits and tho'-.'.partial truth o f each of the culture mentalities just mentioned. He maintained that i n soc ia l processes there i s a l imi t to causal relationships, l imits i n the direction of social change and l imits to the poss ib i l i t i e s of change. As regards the l imits of causal THE RECURRENCE OF CULTURE relationships he argued that TypB'S not only the l og i ca l reason of mathematics but also the "testimony of empirical facts" indicted a "basis for contending that causality between phenomena exists only within certain l imits and that" outside these bounds the, relationship either disappears , or becomes radica l ly altered i n nature."(64) He pointed to the fact that the harder one strikes a piano key the louder the sound is ( indicat ing a causal relationship)but that there >is a stage at which increased hardness of stroke w i l l not increase the sound( indicating the causal re lat ion-ship no longer exists) . Again, i n the natural sciences there are "stabi l i ty l imits", " c r i t i c a l temperatures" and " c r i t i c a l pressures", indicating points at which causal relationships cease to exist . So i n the soc ia l f i e l d , there are l imits to such causal relationships as poverty and f e r t i l i t y , urbanization and mental disease and so on. This means, of course, l imits to social change since causal relationships may result i n social change and where the relationships cease to exist , social change w i l l also cease, other things being Squal. (64)Ibid, p695., 170 Sorokin considered that the, l imits to the direction of social change set;by -the. fact that external forces and the pressure of soc ia l forces "permanently and cease-less ly interfere i n social change preventing them from proceeding "forever continuously and uniformly along the same trend. "(65) Furthermore, there i s the fact that i f the direction of social change were to have no l imi ts i t "would retain i t s nature and characteristics unchanged forever."(66) But such i s not the ease. According to the theory of immanent change "any social system i n process, just' because i t i s i n process, t r i l l inevitably be worn out, modified or transformed. "(67) I t has now been shorn, according to> Sorokin, that social changes "cannot move forever i n the same direction having reached this l i m i t , they turn i n a new direction^ along this new direction they also cannot move forever* arid sooner or la ter have to turn again,: and so on. "(68) Sorokin stated that there are l imits to the poss ib i l i t i e s of such turns and they f a l l into the Ideationals! deali-ati Sensate phases and the ir sub-classes. In this connection he saids • . "If a given system has unlimited poss ib i l i t i e s of'change, under such conditions, the system/can .change so radica l ly that i t w i l l lose a l l i t s essential characteristics and become unidentif iable. Such a change means the cessation of the existence of the system; when a system becomes unidentifiable and loses i t s sameness,; i t disappears. Hence so long as a system lives? i t has l imits i n i t s change. (65)Ibid, p700-701* (66)Ibid, p700. (67)Ibid, p700< (68)Ibid, p701. 171 The se lect iv i ty of a system leads to the same resu l t . An unlimited poss ib i l i ty of change for " a given system means i t can become anything 9 can injegt everything, therefore can become rad ica l ly different from.what.it was and unidentifiable.. '.,. - Such change i s equivalent to the cessation ©f the existence of the system and to i t s replacement . by another--»-quite different--system. For these reasons, pract ica l ly any. system. must.have and does have l i m i t © to the range of Its changes."(69) Again, Sorokin attempted t© prove the l imits of poss ib i l i t i e s of soc ia l change empirically. In chemistry, water can only change through the three forms of so l id , l i q u i d and vapour. In biology, organisms have l imits of l i f e duration and si*e of'growth-. .Economic organization i s l imited to five or six types such as the nomadic, the pastoral , the agricultural and the indus tr ia l . The same l imits are probably true of-other soc ia l phenomena. The'question of why there should be a sequence of I deational-Idoalist i e-Sensate-Ideatioaal. . . . .culture mentalities remains to be answered. Sorokin admitted that while the pattern of soc ia l change seems to have followed this road i n Greco-Roman and Western cultures, there appears to be no logieal reason why there should not be variations i n the observed sequence. However, on an empirical'basis, i t would appear that "in the overripe stage of Sensate culture, man become© so wild that he cannot tame himself and. . .can be brought to h i s senses only by catastrophic tragedy and punishment....These c a l l for the policeman of history,-who Imposes...#a hard and •(69)Ibid,, p702. i B ts© .sts*a&t Jriel^t e e t h © t f e & t e a l mMMmm**^ Bs- © t o r . ^jess^s* .'Si© % 5 o3.1@ fJ^saf&Q'QQ?? i« l e e s *#X©.t© t?EK§ ] CRITICAL REMARKS Anyone who reads Sorokin w i l l have to admit that th is b r i l l i a n t sociologist has given the world what Is probably the soundest description of the course of soc ia l change yet attempted, Vico's description of the three ages of men, Hegel's outline of the development of freedom towards the Absolute ? Engels' picture of history as the conflict of soc ia l classes and Pareto's concept of history as a pendulum of soc ia l o sc i l l a t ion ever seeking soc ia l equilibrium 9 while they a l l contain v i t a l elements of • truth, appear to f a l l short of the interpretation given by Sorokin• On the other hand, Sorokin* s explanation of the why of social change is obviously neither as profound nor as convincing^the explanations given by the other philoso-. phers. Evidence i n favour of the proeess of social change as being a process of which the dominant ehaBteristic i s change i n culture mentalities or value systems i s very extensive. Certainly the period following the f a l l of the Roman Empire, the period of the Middle Ages, was dominated 173 by an Ideational value system i n xriiich materialism was disdained and s p i r i t u a l values placed at the apex of the goal of l i f e , Jesus, St, Augustine and S i r Thomas Aquinas, the greatest philosophers of the period, approached philosophical problems from a sp i r i tua l and rel igious point of view, and other^worldliness permeates the ir work through and through. Thus Jesus could say, "lay not up for your-selves treasures upon earth,- where moth and rust doth corrupt. But lay up for yourselves treasures i n Heaven,' where neither moth nor rust doth corrupt," St . Augustine could ask,' "what i s i t we' wish-to do when we seek to attain the supreme good, unless that the flesh should cease to lust against the S p i r i t ? . . . A n d as we cannot attain to this i n the presentl l i f e , however ardently we desire i t , lerfe us by God's help accomplish this? to preserve the soul from succumbing and yielding to the f lesh that lusts against it."(71), And Sic--Thomas Aquinas could conclude that the "perfect happiness of man cannot be other than the v i s ion of the Divine Essence."(72) Dante, the most famous of the. Medieval poets took as his theme for the Divine Comedy the problems of the s p i r i t u a l l i f e . The great ar t i s t s of the time, Michael Angel© and Leonard© da .Vinci, , wove into the ir work the same other-worldly theme. Even the ©v©ry day (TDEand.a-s The Class ica l Moral ists . Houghton M i f f l i n Co . , Cambridge University Press, 1937, pl81. (72)SorokinQ P.A.g The Cr i s i s of Our Age, P137» 174 l i f e of the.'people of this age, while i t was; much takes up with the struggle for mere existence, was concerned i n i t s i d l e r moments with the problem of attaining the l i f e eternal-.* (73) . The history of the change i n the system of values . since the time of the Middle Ages indicates emphatically . that,there has been a transit ion from an Ideational value system to a Sensate value system. The history of western c i v i l i z a t i o n from the time of the Reformation and the Renaissance to the present i s the history of raan*s preoccupation with the control of the material environment. I t i s revealed i n the growth of so-called sc i ent i f i c attitudes and methods of investigation and proof and i n , the decreasing emphasis on af fa irs of a s p i r i t u a l and other-worldly nature. I t i s s t i l l more v i v i d l y revealed i n our contemporary c i v i l i z a t i o n with i t s vast indus tr ia l machine and i t s stress on the material comforts of l i f e . Philosophy, a r t , poetry, l i terature and drama, too, re f lec t the change i n values*, Of the philosophers,, Jeremy Benthara could state that "nature has placed mankind under the governmnet of two sovere ign© masters, pain and pleasure. I t i s for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we sha l l do.. .The standard of r ight and wrong i s fastened to this throne..*Pleasures.. .and the avoidance, of pain, are the ends of the legislator*"(74) (73) For an excellent account of this period to ld from the point of view of i t s value system sses Randall, J .H.s The Making of the Modern Mind, Book 1, Houghton M i f f l i n , Cambridge, Mass•, 1926• (74) 8 ^ ^ ^ / ^ ^ ^ / ^ rhiloAMt^ fnt-n, 175 James M i l l could say thaf "we may assume i t as another principle" that the business of government "is to increase to the utmost the pleasures, and diminish to the utmost : the pains, which men derive from one a n o t h e r » " ( 7 5 ) John Stuart M i l l could claim that "the ultimate end. with reference to and for the sake of which a l l other things are desirable i s an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as r i c h as possible i n enjoyments, both i n quantity and i n quality."(76) Kar l Marx, or more spec i f ica l ly l&igels, as has already been shown, argued that a mater ia l i s t ic in ter -pretation, of history i s the sole basis o f any understanding of soc ia l change. Mow, these men just mentioned are out-standing philosophers of the las t hundred or so odd years, notice that there i s no reference to the supersensory i n them. Their entire philosophy i s based on a hedonistic or Sensate approach. Other philosophers could just as well have been quoted. For example, the entire pragmatie philosophy of our own day i s grounded i n a materia l i s t ic and sensory outlook. The trend i s unmistakeable. A survey of a r t , moreover, indicates a s imilar trend. No longer do art i s t s take as the ir subject the glory and worship of the supersensory world. The painting of Madonnas, angels and b i b l i c a l scenes i s a tMng of the past. Again the great buildings erected to-day are not made for the worship of the supersensory world as were the magnificent (75)Ibid, p $ X £ . (76)Ibid, p904. . 176 cathedrals of Medieval times, but for the increase of physical comfort and the better control of the sensory worldo The comic s tr ips , advertisements and picture books are the source of modern art and their themes are invariably sensory i n nature, intending to appeal to sensory pleasures. Those ar t i s t s who persist i n "doing art for art ' s sake" complain of the indifference of men to their work and even they condescend to stoop to the Sensate i n the form of landscape painting, portraiture and cartoons with p o l i t i c a l implications. Poetry, likewise, seldom finds i t s theme i n the subjects with which men l ike Dante and Torquato Tasso were concerned. Poetry, i n the las t hundred years i n part icular , either, l ike the translation of Omar IChayyaxa, stresses the value of physical pleasures or l ike the work . of Cec i l Day Lewis, 17. H a Auden and Stephen Spender, deals with p o l i t i c a l puoblemsyor l i k e the works of Hardy, House-man and T.So E l i o t repeats incessantly a doubt of the existence of any supernatural power, or l ike the hosts of love l y r i c s and songs, praises the sensory beauty of members of the opposite sex. Literature and drama are almost wholly concerned with the betterment of material conditions. One has only to think of Dickens, Wells, Shaw, Galsworthy, Ibsen, Eugene O' t i e i l l , Dreiser and hundreds of others to real ize the truth of the stameraent. 17? In view of a l l this evidence one would seem to be justified in coming to the conclusion that at least the the history of the West since th® f a l l of the Roman Empire has passed through thfree phases—the Ideational phase of the Middle Ages, in, which, an other-worldly system of values and truths dominated western culture? the Idealistic phase of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, in which other-worldly and this-worldly systems of values and truths predominated! the Sensate phase lasting from the eighteenth century to the present, in which a this-worldly system of values and truths has taken the place of the previous value systems. Howeverone is justified in . raising the question as to whether the same changes in value systems have occurred in other civilizations. Let us take a look at the history of Greece and Rome. Do these civilizations reveal similar rhythms of Ideational, Idealistic, and Sensate systems of values? I do not pretend to be as familiar with Greek and Roman civilizations as ifith the modem period. Nevertheless, there do appear to be certain indications that the former civilizations did experience such rhythmical movements. In the early days of Greek history—the Homeric Age--th©re was undoubtedly a good deal of preoccupation with the lives of the gods and the goddesses, that i s , with.the supersensory and extraordinary. Ulysses, for instance meets and mingles with many a god and goddess ITS ^ . . . . . . and the l a t t er serve to represent ideals that the average Greek of the time strove towards. Later there arose a movement which sought to f ind f i r s t principles which would reduce to law and order the apparently chaotic nature of the Universe. One ca l l s to mind, i n this connection, the work of Thales,: Anaximander, Anaximenes, Pythargoras and Demoeritus, a l l of whom sought to reduce the Universe to one fundamental form from which a l l things arise and into which they a l l pass away. Thaiss declared the f i r s t principle to he water; Amaximander cal led i t the eternal movement of a "boundless "body or force; Anaximenes believed i t was a i r ; Pythargoras regarded the principles of number to constitute the f i r s t pr inc iple; and Demoeritus thought of the f i r s t principle as atoms i n continual motion. Here, then, one finds a tendency to depart from Ideational pr inc ip les , a tendency to seek for the truth not In super-sensory realms but i n the realms of the sensory and the mathematical. How similar this movement Is to the movement that began i n Europe towards the close of the Middle Ages i s revealed i n the work of such men as Bacon, Copernicus, Ga l i l eo , Hewton, Le ibni tz , Spinoza and Descartes. These men, l i k e their Greek counterparts,sought to interpret the Universe i n terms of mathematical and physical pr inc ip les . Greece, too, passed through a period of Idea l i s t i c values. Again, there i s every evidence that Greece underwent a transit ion from an Ideal i s t ic system of values to a 179 Sensate., system of values. Socrates, who lived, in the Sensate period of Greek history? thought the study of human nature and human life the most necessary and the most fruitful of studies. Hot the gods hut pen? not the supersensory hut the materialistic, were the proper sub-jects of study. The, Stoics and the Epicureans sought the good life in this world and not in the world of the spirit. Epicurus, for; example, believed that the highest good ie pleasure and the avoidance of pain. Once more the, parallel between thia third phase of Greek value systems and the third phase of the value systems of European culture—the Sensate periods-is striking. The utilitarians and the pragmatists of western civilization are the prototypes of the Stoics and,Epicureans of the Greek period. Roman, civilization reveals a similar rhythm in value systems. As in the case of the Greeks, one finds that the values of the early Roman peoples were woven around the gods. They, looked largely to these gods to keep them in good, fortune—to Janus to protect the home, to,Penates to look after the storehouses, to Saturnus to look after the sowing of the seed,and to Faunus to watch over the success-ful increase,of livestock. Furthermore, the head of the family considered it his duty to secure and to keep the favour of these supernatural powers. Religion, in those days, was very much a family,affair close to the every day life of the people. 3B© Again, one finds considerable evidence,in the legends of in©: early Soman period,that there were many Ideational elements in the character arid moral ideals of the f i rs t generations of Romans. Objects of the materialistic and Sensate world did not appeal to than. They lived a simple l i f e as farmers and husbandmen. The values they applauded did not consist in wealth, prestige and power. Rather, such non-material values as a strong sens© of justice, faithfulness to the pledged word, resoluteness and deter-mination in the face of the greatest odds, and devotion to the welfare of the cammunity no matter what the cost, were considered the noble st virtues in early Roman society. The heroic resistanceof Horatious to the Etruscans j the fearlessness ©f Mueius Scaevola in the face of torture and the decision of the Consul Brutus t© condemn his two traitor sons to death because i t was his duty as a Consul to put the claims of the State before the claims of flesh and blood, are a l l evidence that the Ideational moral values were accepted by the early Romans., The change from Ideational to Idealistic and Sensate values began with the expansion of Rome overseas and with the struggle with Carthagec A commercial and capitalist class began to arise and to set i t s values in control over wealthier civilizations. Selfish commercialism and ua« * scrupulous imperialism and exploitation for profit began to replace the values of the simple and frugal l i fe Of ear l i er times. Large estates owned by the few for the ir own sola benefit replaced the .small holding system, Luxury and ostentation increased as foreign imports were '-brought to the r i ch i n Rome. From the time of the defeat of Carthage, through the period of soc ia l s t r i f e and reform arid during the period of the Empire, Idea l i s t i c and Sensate values became more and more predominmi%with th© '.sensategradually coming to; outweigh the I d e a l i s t i c . And so one witnesses the growth of the Epicurean and Stoic schools of philosophical thought represented by such mean as Lucretius, Verg i l and Marcus Aurel ius. The goals of Roman l i f e beeam© material-i s t i c . -B igger buildings, more luxurious baths,, bread and circuses became the means ©f attaining the good life:. But inevitably the reaction against Sensate values set i n during the decline and f a l l ©f Rome. The Ideational doctrine of Christ ianity began t© spread. Piotinus, one of the ear l i er Roman philosophers of the Christian era, set forth the idea that matter, that the f l e sh , i s e v i l \ that one should exterminate bodily desires? that one should outgrow the l i f e of the senses and seek the pure l i f e of the s p i r i t by finding a mystical identity of feel ing with Godo Piotinus was to be f oilo\i?ed by St . Augustine and'Sir.' Thomas Aquinas and other philosophers whose emphasis was other-worldly and Ideational. The great Ideational c i v i l i s a t i o n of the Middle Ages^  rose from the feains of Sensate Rome. , . • I f Sorokin'',s .arg^aoept. that the M s t o r y of the world ie the history of changes i n culture mentality contains much that i s true* there 'are other aspects of his doctrines that are less, convincing* .His explanation o f th© why of the Ideational-Idealistlc-Sensate nature of soc ia l change, for instance, i s "built largely on anajogy. An ac©rn,: h© "Observed, must grow into an oak because of forces inherent i n the nature Of the acorn. So a culture mentality, once brought into being must, follow a '.predestined course because of I t s inherent nature. In each case, forces within are at work driving the process towards i t s predistened end* Wiat the forces -are/SforoldLn did not explain. This -is a serious shortcoming since i t l imi ts the knowledge of soc ia l causa-t ion and hence the, understanding .of the nature of soc ia l processes. Moreover, there appears to be no convincing reason why one should hope to be able to diagnose the nature of the growth of a culture mentality from the, analogy of the growth ©f an, acorn. Perhaps analogy aids i n c l a r i f y ^ the nature of a concept but i t certainly does not prove that because processes i n two f ie lds appear to be s imilar that therefore the same or s imilar forces are at work, i n them. The eternal rhythm ©f day and night is.analagGUs,t© the eternal rhythm of i i f e and. death but no one would suggest that the same forces cause both rhythms.,It may be that the growth of a. culture, mentality i s due to forces inherent i n the culture but Sorokin did not pros/e i t . 183 To "be.fair to Sor*>kiri, however, i t i s necessary to point out 'that he did not believe that forces' 'inherent i n a culture system were the sole forces influencing the direction'of the system's growth. He was careful to point out that such factors as external environmrart, the number of members constituting the system, b i o l o g i c a l 8 mental and social qualities of the members, and so on, seriously * affect ^he direction of growth © f a culture system, limiting i t s "margin of self-determination", suppressing i t , driving i t to express i t s e l f i n a different manner than other similar eulture systems. However, Sorokin did not investigate this aspect of the problem i n any det a i l . This i s a pity sine©: y lawi of interaction between the external and internal aspects of a culture system ftight have been deduced from a thorough research bf a l l the pertinent facte. The third reason to which Sorokin attributed changes i n culture systems«»-the pa r t i a l truth of each system-«appears to be sounder than the other two* A l l experieh© indicates that no truth that one can know i s ultimate and f i n a l . As new viewpoints are reached,what ©nee appeared to be the truth turns out to be only part of the truth. This was made clear* i n the discussion of Hegel* On the other hand, whether Sorokin i s correct i n stating that the invalid part of a culture mentality tends'to grow u n t i l i t outweighs the v a l i d part, thus making the culture system more and more inadequate as a means of satisfactory adaptation and adjustment for the • 185.' individuals of the culture* i s a matter of doubt. Why. should the inva l id part © f a culture mentality; increase and the v a l i d -part decrease? Sorokin off ©red no reasons for t h i s . A most l ikely' reason for the change of a culture mentality i s that put forward by Pareto, namely<, that In ,: a given culture mentality individuals charaeterisied by sentiments of group persistance react against any form of . change while the external aspects of the culture system change for various.reasons I n such a way that the or ig ina l culture mentality i s ©tit of harmony with, the.changes i n the external aspects of the, culture;. - Ibis leads those who are characterised by sentiments,of Imiovation to displace those who are characterised'by sentiments ©f group persis-tanee and then to inject into the culture system the ir own system of" values, thereby changing the, culture, mentality. The principle ©f l imi t s by which Sorokin explained the recurrence of the three types o f culture mentality i s open to the same cr i t i c i sm as, that given of the necessity of a culture system to evolve i n given directions because of forces inherent In the system. His appeal, once more, was to analogy. Just as there are l imits' to,..causal re la t ion-ships i n the f i e l d of the natural and physical sciences, so' must;'there- be-''limits, to'causal relationships i n the-' • f i e l d of the soeial sciences:. Hence there w i l l be l imi t s t© the types of culture •"'mentalities possible since-when .. causal relationships cease to exist? soeial change of a 186 given kind w i l l no longer take place. Sorokin ha3%d sound grounds for coming to such a conclusion* The operation of the principle ©f limits in the natural and physical sciences i s no proof that the principle operates in the social sciences. I t may be that there is a possibility or even a probability of such being the ease..-- but the hypothesis:must remain only a hypothesis based on analogy and is not < sufficient proof of the existence of such a principle i n the processes of social change. There i s probably more certainty in Sorokin*s conten-tion that the limits to the direction of social change are set by external forces, Observation te l ls ©ne that social phenomena are limited in the direction of their changes by such factor© as climate, the impact of alien cultures, biological change and so on. For example, the culture mentality of the Ebrth American Indian has been entirely changed by the impact of the European culture mentality upon i t o The third argument advanced by sbrokin to account for the limits of the direction of change of a culture system, namely* that so long as a system lives it"must have limits to i t s changes because i f i t did not i t could alter so • radically that i t would become unidentifiable and disappear, i s undoubtedly true. But as an aid in understanding the why and how of social change i t i s of l i t t l e value since i t does not enable us to get at factors which w i l l result in control of change. 187 The empirical proof of the limits to the possibilities of change can be criticised:, n & i g & ^ a f r grounds to the criticism of the principle of limits. Just because in chemistry there are limits to the changes which water can undergo or because in biology organisms are limited in the, length of life duration and in size of growth , there is no . reason to believe that the same forms of limits are characteristic of the possibilities of soeial. change. Once again Sorokin was arguing by. analogy. There is a possibility or even a probability that Sorokin's contention is true, but it remains a possibility or probability and not proved fact*. ' . However, despite all the shortcomings of the Sorokian system, there remains much that is of value. The concept of the culture mentality, .with its system of values, an the dominant fact of the soeial process is. .something new in social theory which has considerable evidence to support its reality. The principle of limits, i f not entirely convincing, is provocative of further speculation and investigation. Sorokin, indeed, pushed forward the frontier &? social theory to a new milestone when he set down the results of so many years of study. 188 THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL THEORY ' Tne foregoing chapters attempted ;ta survey.in a critical manner the development of representative philoso-phies of Immanent social change from the .first systematic : treatment of the subject hy Vico to its contemporary t^ eat*-ment hy Pi trim SorokinIt is now time to look forward and to suggest the possibilities of further development,' , Certaini trends -iii the development of philosophies of, I/;-..immanent''social' -change are readily observable,. Both Hegel and Vico appealed in the final analysis to the Supersensory and Divine Power as the essential final cause in the production of social change. 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Metoa^ - i® t©o t a ^ e e e m t f -dad- - - i s e ^ F p i e t © t* b e w l as a. «a®ats i {3©t i«® a sati©i-a®t©i^ tt*e©f>y ©£ • e se ia l t i£ES<e»- 3&a£t s^«as». 2fi9»at$6afti«i08 th<§ • mm mmmmmmm . ^ ^ ^ M M ^ ^ M ^ ^ ® mm i n --the- ffe#F^^tsi"-© %i§€ia if&elmm to .£&e3$& tabes-. • p&$&&,m& m.i&m saaspfiner &m:ssiisfiis ©f wew © s i t e s @ a § ^^ "'M#%" ec6gs$iK: -©ses&te m ©sate* -SMOBB 'at ©tei^fig #ssn§® :etj cegtyaliig •1ft&;'£B&&e$ -if, -serial:nbaa®©-^ ., \ ; . • «ftag^-iia$$ %&».3s^  ism „$6«w£e© 193 philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change w i l l "be supplanted by "biological, psychological, geographical and other e x t e r n a l i s t i c theories, or w i l l the two main types of theory continue to contribute to a solution of the whole problem? These question immediately r a i s e yet another question. Has the philosophical approach to the problem of s o c i a l change contributed anything of Talue to the l a t t e r ' s solution? C e r t a i n l y , no person would argue that the work of the philosophers has not at least helped c l a r i f y the nature of the problem. By tracing the h i s t o r i e s of c i v i l i z a t i o n s and comparing their s i m i l a r i t i e s and differences, the philosophers have brought emphasis to bear on the complex nature of s o c i a l causation. They have shown that there i s no simple answer to the problem of what causes s o c i a l change. This i s indicated i n the vari e t y of theories of an immanent nature that have been proposed. Vico stressed the force of D i v i n i t y and of human nature; Hegel emphasized the importance of r a t i o n a l necessity; Engels proclaimed the doctrine of economic determinism; Pareto put forward the theory of o s c i l l a t i o n and s o c i a l equilibrium; and Sorokin propounded a major cycle of value systems. One can see from th i s that the. problem of s o c i a l causation as investigated by the philosophers contains many facets, the recognition of which help to throw l i g h t on a solution to the problem. There i s no v a l i d reason to suppose, unless one accepts unreservedly Sorokin's p r i n c i p l e of l i m i t s , that further p h i l o s o p h i c a l speculation w i l l f a i l to bring to our attention other 194 viewpoints equally valuable. Therefore one may expect a continuance of philosophical theory i n the future. However, there i s l i t t l e l i k e l i h o o d that new p h i l o s o p h i c a l systems w i l l appeal to the supersensory as an ultimate causal f a c t o r . Speculation w i l l no doubt be "based largely on empirical observation and on the science of l o g i c . One cannot escape being influenced by the major f a i t h of our times--the s c i e n t i f i c method. There i s another point to be considered. Even a cursory glance at the philosophers of immanent s o c i a l change reveals that there are certain conclusions which, while they have been arrived at independently and with often r a d i c a l l y d i f f e r e n t hypotheses and sets of data, indicate that there are causal factors that have been i n operation i n a l l c i v i l i z a t i o n s studied by the various philosophers. In other words, indications are that there are c e r t a i n constant factors causing the growth and decay of c i v i l i z a t i o n s . V i c o described an unreconciled opposition as the cause of the t r a n s i t i o n from the Age of Heroes to the Age of Men—an opposition which led to a long struggle between s o c i a l classes. Hegel, too, based h i s theory of s o c i a l change almost e n t i r e l y on the idea of a c o n f l i c t of opposites, though, f o r him, the c o n f l i c t was not necessarily a c o n f l i c t between s o c i a l classes so much as a c o n f l i c t between Ideas of the nature of Freedom. Engels, again, saw s o c i a l change as a c o n f l i c t between economic classes. Pareto's theory of s o c i a l equilibrium is based on 195 a struggle of the opposites of group-persistance sentiments and sentiments of innovation. Sorokin stressed as the foundation of h i s s o c i a l theory a c o n f l i c t "between value systems. In a l l these theories, then, there i s the constant element of c o n f l i c t as the foundation ef s o c i a l change. Furthermore, the c o n f l i c t i n a l l cases is "between that which i.s which r e s i s t s change and that which i s not which desires to "be. In short, at the root of the processes of s o c i a l change there appears to l i e the fac t o r of struggle "between the s t a t i c and the dynamic. A l l the philosophers whose ideas have "been outlined agree on t h i s . They d i f f e r in their interpretation of the nature of the dynamic and the s t a t i c , Vico, f o r instance, maintained that the s t a t i c i s found variously i n the r u l i n g group, i n the anarchy of individualism, or i n the anarchy of a despotism which attempts to reduce the anarchy of individualism to manageable proportions; the dynamic, i n the oppressed classes or in the benevolence of monarchy. Hegel claimed that the s t a t i c i s an Idea of Freedom limited i n time and non-inclusive of a l l the categories contained in the Absolute Idea of Freedom, and that the dynamic i s the opposition of contin-u a l l y broadening and more inclusive Ideas of Freedom as the world progresses towards the Absolute and f i n a l category of Freedom. Pareto argued that the s t a t i c consisted i n a condition of society in which the majority of the people are characterized by sentiments of group-persistance while 196 the dynamic consisted in a condition of society i n which the i majority of the people are characterized "by sentiments of innovation. Engels found.the s t a t i c i n a s o c i a l class who owned and controlled the means of production and the dynamic i n the economically disenfranchised. Sorokin argued that the. s t a t i c i s a value system that has outlived i t s usefulness in a culture and that the dynamic consists i n the new value system—Ideational, I d e a l i s t i c or Sensate—which w i l l take the plade oft the outworn system. Nevertheless, the opposition, whether "between classes, between individualism and c o l l e c t i v i s m ; between authoritarianism and democracy; between degrees of freedom or between idealism and material-ism, is d e f i n i t e l y present i n a l l c i v i l i z a t i o n s . The above conclusions are likewise an extremely impor-tant contribution of philosophical theory to the question of s o c i a l causation. For not only do they reveal some of the fundamental and constant bases of s o c i a l change but they also indicate that philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change are largely concerned with the problem of ultimate and f i n a l causes of" the progress of hist o r y rather than with the more lim i t e d question of the r i s e and f a l l of th i s or that c i v i l i z a t i o n . A study which attempts to attack the problem with the former goals i n view i s f a r more s a t i s f y i n g than a study which l i m i t s i t s e l f to one ephemeral epoch i n the endless reaches ofl time. But the richness of the re s u l t s of philosophical speculation on the analysis of the nature of s o c i a l change 197 and the emphasis of such speculation on the constants of s o c i a l change are not the only values in i t . Philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change provide a massive conceptual scheme accounting f o r the "beginning, progress and ending of c i v i l i z a t i o n s . Because of. this they form a f a i t h and a frame of reference whereby.men may order their l i v e s . For i t is certain that men, i f they are to l i v e and act with purpose, must have some b e l i e f s to l i v e by; some goals to reach. Men without some view of the world and the d i r e c t i o n of i t s progress f a i l to s t r i v e or to lead a l i f e of s a t i s f a c t i o n . They merely exist in vegetative i n a n i t i o n , not knowing whence they came or where they w i l l go. Faith in some form of conceptual scheme men must have and the philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change f i l l this basic want. The contributions of philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change, then, have been many--the bringing to l i g h t of a multitude of valuable theories regarding s o c i a l causation; an emphasis on f i n a l causes; and the construction of conceptual schemes of considerable s i g n i f i c a n c e . Because of these contributtions they w i l l continue to have a place in any future investigations of the problem of s o c i a l change. However, a l l indications point to the f a c t previously' mentioned, namely, that the methods used to deduce theories w i l l be those of experimental science rather than pure speculation based on l o g i c a l l y deduced hypotheses such as 198 the hypothesis that men got together to form a s o c i a l contract as an alternative to the state of na,ture. At the same time, philosophies of e x t e r n a l i s t i c s o c i a l change are "bound to increase in importance. They represent a "breaking down of theories of s o c i a l causation into specialized f i e l d s . This s p e c i a l i z a t i o n and concentration on s p e c i f i c aspects of the problem—psychological, b i o l o g i c a l , s o c i o l o g i c a l , geographical and cultural--has enabled the investigator to l i m i t the f i e l d of study to a single f a c t o r of s o c i a l causation and hence to coyer a f a r greater range of d e t a i l than would otherwise be the case. It i s largely because of such s p e c i a l i z a t i o n that the natural sciences have made such progress in recent years. Similar progress has undoubtedly already been achieved in the p a r t i c u l a r branch of the s o c i a l sciences under discussion and, consider-ing the f a c t that the application of s c i e n t i f i c methods to the s o c i a l sciences i s comparatively recent, there is every evidence that a great mass of f a c t u a l data and v a l i d l y reasoned conclusions w i l l be forthcoming i n the future. The decision of many investigators to l i m i t t h e i r f i e l d of study to contempoEary c i v i l i z a t i o n s and cultures w i l l also continue to increase i n importance as a method of solving the problems of the nature and causes of s o c i a l change. There i s a great deal of truth in the argument that to seek to f i n d : the bases of s o c i a l causation in the records of h i s t o r y i s to r e l y on data that i s often incomplete and inaccurate. There is greater l i k e l i h o o d that an accurate description 199 of the nature of s o c i a l causation can he attained from the observation and analysis of c i v i l i z a t i o n s and cultures which are at the time of investigation a c t i v e l y undergoing change. Here, there i s an extensive and as yet untapped f i e l d of study. One thinks, f o r instance, of India where scarcely any work of t h i s nature has "been done, or the tribes, and commun-i t i e s where Western c i v i l i z t i o n has not yet penetrated. It i s true that the methods used i n t h i s type of work remain somewhat crude and unreliable but investigations along these li n e s have only just begun i n the l a s t twenty or t h i r t y years. Certainly Margaret Mead and Robert and Mary Lynd are outstanding pioneers i n the f i e l d , and t h e i r work shows every indication of having extremely valuable r e s u l t s for the entire problem of s o c i a l causation, Nevertheless s p e c i a l i z a t i o n , whether i t i s limited to an investigation of one single f i e l d of s o c i a l causation or to e x i s t i n g cultures and c i v i l i z a t i o n s , cannot produce a synthesis or a systematic philosophy of s o c i a l change. S p e c i a l i z a t i o n fji by i t s vary nature atomistic i n outlook. Only philosophic speculation, even though based on techniques of observation and experiment* i s in a p o s i t i o n to draw the confusing threads of thought together and to weave from them a u n i f i e d pattern of s o c i a l causation. Therefore one may expect that, as more and more data is gathered in each of the specialized f i e l d s and as more and more conclusions are reached in each of these f i e l d s , the j>hi loiophid?approach «- ie* piy^rJ- *JV>**0 / K u f t t t t — 200 to the problem w i l l gain increasing importance. Leaders of thought on the subject w i l l not be content to allow each of the atomistic theories to remain separate and compartmen-t a l i z e d . The interaction of forces w i l l become increasingly apparent and with the r e a l i z a t i o n of t h i s the attempts of the pKji»i4r / »A^e i»to l i n k together the data and hypotheses of the atomists w i l l assume a more prominent place in the development of thought concerning s o c i a l change. And f i n a l l y of course, i t w i l l be the philosophers developing a systema-t i c synthesis and conceptual scheme who w i l l set f o r t h a d e f i n i t i v e philosophy of s o c i a l change. One may conclude, then, that,for a time at l e a s t , philosophies of immanent s o c i a l change w i l l continue to to e x i s t side by side with various philosophies of external-i s t i c s o c i a l change and with the l i m i t e d observational study of e x i s t i n g cultures and c i v i l i z a t i o n s . One may further conclude that the atxm/stxc, theories based on s c i e n t i f i c observation and experiment w i l l dominate thought on s o c i a l change in the near future and that even the t r u l y speculative type of investigation w i l l be effected by the major f a i t h of the present day. However, one may be confident that there w i l l arise a reaction against atomism and an intense desire for some form of synthesis based on purely speculative inquiry. The present phase is but a prelude to the u n i f i c a t i o n that w i l l surely come. 201 B I B L I O G R A P H Y Croce, Benedetto: The Philosophy of Giambatista Vico, • London, George A l l e n & Unwin, Ltd., 1915. Engels, Frederick: Feuerbach: The Roots of the S o c i a l i s t Philosophy , Chica.ge, Charles H. Keer & Co., 1903. F l i n t , Robert: Vico, London, William Blackwood & Sons,1884 Hegel, G.W.F.: Philosophy of History. New York, P.F. C o l l i e r & Sons,1901(A Library of Universal Knowledge , Ed. Angelo H e i l p r i n , Part 1, Vol. 12. Pareto, V i l f r e d o : The Mind and Society. London, Jonathan Cape, 1935, 4 Vols. Rand,. B.: Modern C l a s s i c a l Philosophers, Cambridge Mass., Houghton M i f f l i n Co., 1936. Sorokin, P. A.: The C r i s i s of Our Age. The S o c i a l and ' C u l t u r a l Outlook, New York, E. P. Button, & Co,, Inc., 1941, Sorokin, P. A.: S o c i a l and C u l t u r a l Dynamics, New York, American Book Company, 1937, 4 Vols. Stace, W. T.: The Philosophy of Hegel, London, Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1924. 

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