UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

George Herbert Mead from the standpoint of Marxism Pickering, Mary G. 1945

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FROM  GEORGE ,HERBERT  MEAD  THE  OP  STA3TOPOIHT  MARXISM  by Mary  G.  P i c k e r i n g , B.A.  A  THESIS.  Submitted t o t h e Department o f P h i l o s o p h y and P s y c h o l o g y , U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h Columbia,1945.  In p a r t i a l f u l f i l l m e n t of the requirements f o r t h e degree o f Master of A r t s .  ( i )  CONTENTS  INTRODUCTION  CHAPTER ONE  _  _ _  _  MARXISM M  _  _  _  _  THE PROBLEM CF MIND  Introduction _ _ _ References  _  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  V*  _  _ _  I  _  _  _  I d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g _  *"*  — .  _ _  . -  f  materialist position _ _ _ _ consciousness as p r o d u c t _ _ consciousness as images and r e f l e c t i o n s Plekhanor's m i s t a k e _ consciousness as p r o p e r t y o r q u a l i t y . the c r i t e r i o n o f p r a c t i c e . conclusion _ _ _ _ _ _  S? q so /£ 13  _  _  BACKGROUND AND CHARAGTERI ZATI ON Qp MliAft _ Introduction  _ _ ' _ _ _  I n f l u e n c e o f Da r w i n _ I n f l u e n c e o f Cooley _  _ _  — _  _  I n f l u e n c e of Watson _  _  _  BASIC CONCEPTS T o  _  _  Social Acts _  _  _  *°  _  ^  _  _V  -  KAtuQ  _  _  _ _  f  —  _  _ _  _  / —  _  M C A t ' i TftgoKvj <P  _  _  _  .  J$  —  _  _  _  Simple consciousness _ _ _ Acts _  —  _  _ _  _  17  //  —  _  _  I n f l u e n c e of Wundt _ Conclusions  _ _  _ _  I n f l u e n c e o f Pragmatism _  CHAPTER THREE  _ _  _ _  O r i g i n and s t a t u s o f mind _  CHAPTER-TWO  _  — _  <7  _  4?  _  Jo  _ 3  7  ( i i)  CHAPTER THREE  (continued) Gestures  CHAPTER FOUR  _  _  _  .  ^7  Attitudes  _  it  Delayed response  _  i°i  MEAD S THEORY CF MIMD AMP COMSCIOUSMESS _ Ha 8  :  MB  The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol Meaning _ Ideas  -  _  _  —  _ ._  Concepts —  .  . Logic  ;  Reflective Intelligence  CHAPTER FIVE  CONCLUSION  O _ i's' _  _  .  GEORGE HERBERT MEAD FROM THE.STANDPOINT OF MARXISM  Introduction  George H e r b e r t Mead, a u t h o r of f o u r posthumously p u b l i s h e d (1) books and numerous a r t i c l e s i n contemporary p h i l o s o p h i c J o u r n a l s , a p r a g m a t i s t and a s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t *  Concluding my  was  s t u d i e s on M i n d ,  S e l f and S o c i e t y , a volume which c o n t a i n s the fundamental concepts and e l a b o r a t e s the premises o f h i s whole system, I came t o the t h a t t h e r e was  a g r e a t d e a l of v a l u a b l e m a t e r i a l i n h i s  d e s p i t e t h e obvious s u b j e c t i v i s m o f h i s c o n c l u s i o n s *  conclusion  researches,  I t seemed t o  me  t h a t Mead had done p e n e t r a t i n g a n a l y t i c work on the o r i g i n , nature f u n c t i o n of mind, and s u p p l i e d t h e most i l l u m i n a t i n g h y p o t h e s i s s u b j e c t I had y e t  and  on t h e  read*  The p e c u l i a r c h a r a c t e r of the subgect m a t t e r of Mead's work, p s y c h o l o g y , i s t h a t i t i s n o t y e t d i s e n t a n g l e d from the r e a l m of p h i l o sophic c o n t r o v e r s y * epistemology*  Most c e r t a i n l y i t i s not f r e e from problems of  As a student o f M a r x i s m , i t became a problem t o me 1  how much of Mead a system was  a c c e p t a b l e from the p o i n t of view of  d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l s m , was  just  and at what p o i n t or p o i n t s i t  t o be r e j e c t e d , as d e v i a t i n g i n t o or i m p l y i n g t h a t s u b j e c t i v i s m  w h i c h i s so n o t i c e a b l e i n Mead's w r i t i n g s , and whioh i s anathema t o Marxism* T h i s became the problem o f how  much o f t h e fundamentals of  Mead's a n a l y s i s were a c c e p t a b l e t o M a r x i s m , the problem, on the p o s i t i v e (l)  The P h i l o s o p h y o f the Present,1932; M i n d g S e l f and S o c i e t y , 1954? Movements of Thought i n the n i n e t e e n t h Century, "T^567~fhe' P h i l o s o p h y of the A c t , 1938 Mead d i e d i n 1931*  s i d e , o f the manner i n which Mead c o n t r i b u t e d t o the m a t e r i a l i s t e p i s t emology i n the way o f p o s i t i v e s c i e n t i f i c hypothesis© I t was a t f i r s t my i n t e n t i o n t o examine t h e whole b a s i s o f Mead's s o c i a l t h e o r y o f mind, i n c l u d i n g the nature o f the s e l f a n d o f t h e }  s o c i a l environment which he presupposes.  However, i t soon became e v i d e n t  t o me t h a t such an u n d e r t a k i n g would be f a r beyond t h e scope o f a thesis© Moreover, as Mead holds D a r w i n i a n views as t o the nature and o r i g i n o f s o c i e t y , and l i b e r a l views as t o i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , the d i f f e r e n c e between h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l views and those of Marxism are i m m e d i a t e l y p a t e n t t o anyone acquainted w i t h t h e s u b j e c t *  On t h e o t h e r hand, h i s v i e w s on the  n a t u r e of the s e l f , and h i s a n a l y s i s of i t s o r i g i n and development, are such as those i n t e r e s t e d i n a m a t e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f mind and consciousness i g n o r e t o t h e i r disadvantage*  self-  Marxism can f i n d l i t t l e t o 1  c r i t i c i z e i n the e s s e n t i a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f Mead s c o n c e p t i o n of t h e s e l f , marred a l t h o u g h i t i s i n i t s d e t a i l s by h i s s o c i o l o g i c a l c o n v i c t i o n s * I have t h e r e f o r e c o n c e n t r a t e d my a t t e n t i o n upon the  fundamental  concepts u t i l i z e d by Head i n h i s e x a m i n a t i o n o f mental b e h a v i o u r , i n an endeavour t o d i s c o v e r i f t h e r o o t s of h i s s u b j e c t i v i s m are h e r e , f o r i n s o f a r as t h e y a r e , h i s a n a l y s i s i s i n v a l i d f o r Marxism.  My t h e s i s i s oonp  cerned w i t h h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f mind and i t s e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s , and I i g n o r e i n s o f a r as p o s s i b l e the s o c i o l o g i c a l and s e l f a s p e c t s of h i s work. The r e v e r s e s i d e of the problem  i s t h e problem o f what i s the  a c t u a l p o s i t i o n of Marxism on t h e s u b j e c t of mind*  The g e n e r a l t e n e t s o f  of Marxism on t h e subject' a r e w e l l known, t h a t i s , t h e i r p o s i t i o n on the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problem*  Yet I experienced some c o n f u s i o n on t h e s u b j e c t  w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o t h e q u e s t i o n s , how d i d t h e y conceive o f mind, and how was t h i s c o n c e p t i o n p o s s i b l e .  Such d i f f i c u l t i e s arose out o f a c e r t a i n  amount o f a m b i g u i t y which l i n g e r s i n t h e t e r m i n o l o g y o f t h e c l a s s i c a l Marxists*  I t became n e c e s s a r y t o answer these q u e s t i o n s b e f o r e i t was  p o s s i b l e t o i n q u i r e t o what e x t e n t Mead's c o n t r i b u t i o n i s s i g n i f i c a n t , o r i n what manner he c o r r e c t e d c l a s s i c a l Marxism. My f i r s t chapter i s , a c c o r d i n g l y , an e x a m i n a t i o n o f the M a r x i s t c l a s s i c s w i t h s p e c i f i c r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s problem, i n which I a r r i v e a t my c o n c l u s i o n s a f t e r an examination o f t h e a v a i l a b l e w r i t i n g s of Marx, E n g e l s , Plekhanov and L e n i n on t h e subject® Having reached t h e s e c o n c l u s i o n s , I proceed t o a n a l y z e t h e background and g e n e r a l c h a r a c t e r o f Mead's work i n t h e second c h a p t e r s I n t h e t h i r d , _ h i c h c o n t a i n s t h e c o r r o b o r a t i o n o f t h e c r i t i c i s m s o f t h e second c h a p t e r , I proceed t o a s p e c i f i c a n a l y s i s o f h i s b a s i c c o n c e p t s , and i n the f o u r t h , t o h i s v i e w s on mind and r a t i o n a l i t y .  The f i f t h c h a p t e r i s  a summing up and g e n e r a l i z a t i o n o f t h e c o n c l u s i o n s reached* I t i n c l u d e s broader s u g g e s t i o n s c o n c e r n i n g t h e o r i g i n of t h e m i s t a k e s and o m i s s i o n s discovered* The whole t h e s i s has been w r i t t e n from t h e p o i n t o f view o f d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , and from t h i s p o i n t o f view I have presumed t o c r i t i c i z e n o t o n l y Mead but c e r t a i n statements o f t h e M a r x i s t s themselves*  The d i f f i c u l t y o f assuming such a p o i n t o f view i s  t h a t t h e g e n e r a l background o f my t h i n k i n g , those assumptions and t h e i r theorums i n terms o f which t h e s p e c i f i c problem w i l l be approached, w i l l i n a l l l i k e l i h o o d g i v e r i s e t o statements w h i c h from such a p o i n t o f view seem e v i d e n t , y e t which from any o t h e r p o i n t of v i e w may seem a r b i t r a r y and.questionable* A f u r t h e r , although r e l a t e d , complication a r i s e s  - 4 from the f a c t t h a j j l s h a l l be u s i n g terms which a r e not w i t h i n t h e scope of t h i s t h e s i s t o e x p l a i n o r d e f e n d , terms t h a t d e r i v e t h e i r meaning w i t h i n the framework of d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m . I w i s h t h e r e f o r e t o emphasize t o t h e reader t h a t f o r t h e purposes o f t h i s t h e s i s , i g i s not my premises w h i c h are under d i s c u s s i o n , except i n s o f a r as t h e y are s u b j e c t t o c r i t i c i s m from t h e p o i n t o f view of d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m itself®  f  CHAPTER MARXISM AMD  THE  OMB PROBLEM. OF MIND  The e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problem, the r o o t and s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f a l l modern p h i l o s o p h y , i s w i d e l y d e a l t w i t h i n M a r x i s t writings© I f M a r x i s t epistemology i s d e f e a t e d , i t " i s p o s s i b l e f o r t h e whole e d i f i c e of Marxism t o f a l l t o the ground*  The  f a c t t h a t M a r x i s t economics, s o c i o l o g y and  the  i m p l i c i t p s y c h o l o g i c a l premises cannot be t a k e n a p a r t from M a r x i s t p h i l o sophy, the method of d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , i s what i s meant by  the  u n i t y of Marxisms Notwithstanding,  the p h i l o s o p h y  o f Marx and Engels was  never  s t a t e d by them i n a u n i f i e d f a s h i o n , but i s t o be found s c a t t e r e d throughout such volumes as the D i a l e c t i c s of N a t u r e , The German  Ideology,  Feuerbaoh, A n t i - D u h r i n g , La Mi sere du P h i l o s o p h e , Die H e i l i g e F a m i l i e , (not y e t a v a i l a b l e i n E n g l i s h ) numerous p o l e m i c s i n contemporary j o u r n a l s not g e n e r a l l y a v a i l a b l e t o the E n g l i s h - s p e a k i n g Capital i t s e l f .  p u b l i c , as w e l l as i n  I t i s n e c e s s a r y , t h e r e f o r e , t o s e a r c h these works f o r  such s c a t t e r e d statements as t h e y c o n t a i n on the s u b j e c t i n hand, and draw d e f i n i t e c o n c l u s i o n s  to  concerning the views of Marxism, b e f o r e i t i s  p o s s i b l e t o t u r n t o a c o n s i d e r a t i o n of George H e r b e r t Mead. The p h i l o sophic w r i t i n g o f L e n i n , M a t e r i a l i s m and E m p i r i o - C r i t i c i s m , and  the  Fundamental Problems of Marxism of George Plekhanov, w i l l a l s o be examined, i n view of the f a c t t h a t b o t h are a c c r e d i t e d w r i t e r s i n the school  of  d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , and approach e p i s t e m o l o g y from the p o i n t of view of t h i s  philosophy. The p o s i t i o n a c c r e d i t e d t o e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l problems by  c l a s s i c a l M a r x i s t s i s i n d i c a t e d i n t h e statement of E n g e l s ,  that:  the  "The  g r e a t f o u n d a t i o n q u e s t i o n o f a l l , e s p e c i a l l y new, p h i l o s o p h i e s i s  connected w i t h t h e r e l a t i o n between t h i n k i n g and b e i n g * " ( 2 ) E n g e l s d i v i d e s t h e q u e s t i o n o f the r e l a t i o n o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g , consciousness  and e x i s t e n c e , i n t o two p a r t s *  The f i r s t p a r t o f  the problem has t o do w i t h t h e o r i g i n and s t a t u s o f mind* T h i s i s the q u e s t i o n o f m a t e r i a l i s m v e r s u s i d e a l i s m . "As t h i s q u e s t i o n was answered t h i s way o r t h a t , " Engels c o n t i n u e s , "She p h i l o s o p h e r s were d i v i d e d i n t o two g r e a t camps* The one p a r t y w h i c h p l a c e d the o r i g i n o f t h e s p i r i t b e f o r e t h a t o f n a t u r e , and t h e r e f o r e i n t h e l a s t i n s t a n c e accepted c r e a t i o n •*. made t h e camp o f i d e a l i s m *  (sic)  The o t h e r s , who r e c o g n i z e d  nature as t h e s o u r c e , belong t o t h e v a r i o u s s c h o o l s o f m a t e r i a l i s m . " ( 3 ) M a t e r i a l i s m i n t h i s sense i s t h e a s s e r t i o n of t h e p r i o r e x i s t ence o f n a t u r e t o mind and t h e dependency o f mind on nature f o r i t s e x i s t ence, whereas i d e a l i s m i s t h e d o c t r i n e o f t h e p r i o r e x i s t e n c e of mind, and t h e dependency o f nature upon t h e mental o r some form o f s p i r i t * " I d e a l i s m and m a t e r i a l i s m , not o r i g i n a l l y used i n any other sense, a r e not here employed, i n any o t h e r sense." (4) Marxism, o f c o u r s e , takes a m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n *  Within t h i s  g e n e r a l m a t e r i a l i s t framework, t h a t mind i s secondary t o and c o n d i t i o n e d by n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s , s p e c i f i c hypotheses c o n c e r n i n g t h e manner o f t h i s  (2)  Fmuerbach:  The Roots o f t h e S o c i a l i s t P h i l o s o p h y , Chicago, K e r r , 1903,  (3)  Feuerbaoh;  (4)  Loo* c i t .  p. 58  p . 56.  «• 7 " development, h i s t o r i c a l l y c o n s i d e r e d , are g i v e n , a l t h o u g h not i n a d e t a i l ed manner.  Among the most s t r i k i n g i s the f o l l o w i n g e x c e r p t from Tphe  German I d e o l o g y : ""Only now, a f t e r h a v i n g c o n s i d e r e d f o u r moments ( 5 ) , f o u r aspects o f the fundamental h i s t o r i c a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s , do we f i n d t h a t man a l s o possesses * consciousness:' but even s o , not i n h e r e n t , not 'pure* c o n s c i o u s n e s s . From t h e s t a r t the ' s p i r i t i s a f f l i c t e d w i t h the curse of b e i n g ^burdened w i t h m a t t e r , which here makes i t s appearance i n t h e form o f a g i t a t e d l a y e r s o f a i r , sounds, i n s h o r t , o f language. Language i s as o l d as c o n s c i o u s n e s s , language i s p r a c t i c a l consciousness as i t e x i s t s f o r other men, and f o r t h a t reason i s r e a l l y b e g i n n i n g t o e x i s t f o r me p e r s o n a l l y as w e l l ; f o r language, l i k e cons c i o u s , a r i s e s o n l y from the need, t h e n e c e s s i t y , of i n t e r course w i t h o t h e r men... Consciousness i s t h e r e f o r e from the v e r y b e g i n n i n g a s o c i a l p r o d u c t , and remains so as l o n g as men e x i s t a t a l l . (6) 9  9  J f  I t i s e v i d e n t t h a t i n The German I d e o l o g y Marx and Engels r e j e c t any d u a l i s m of the o l d s o r t and base consciousness e n t i r e l y on the s o c i a l process and s p e c i f i c a l l y upon language, i t s e l f a product o f "the n e c e s s i t y f o r i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h other men.* T h i s n e c e s s i t y a r i s e s a t a p o i n t "where t h e y had something, t o say jbo one another," (7)  and t h i s  something t o say i n v o l v e d c o - o p e r a t i o n i n l a b o r , w h i c h i s the c h a r a c t e r i z i n g form of r e l a t i o n s h i p between man and n a t u r e . M i n d t h e n , as  social,  i n v o l v e s b o t h n a t u r a l and s o c i a l processes and appears as a moment i n the p r o d u c t i o n of l i f e . The c o n t e n t o f mind a t any time would be s i m u l t a n e o u s l y n a t u r a l and s o c i a l , and would be dependent upon t h e stage o f development of m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n .  8  (5)  These ' f o u r moments are m a t e r i a l p r o d u c t i o n , p r o d u c t i o n o f new needs, r e p r o d u c t i o n o f l i f e , a n d s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s •  (6)  Marx, K, and E n g e l s , F, The German I d e o l o g y , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p. 19  (7)  E n g e l s , F.  D i a l e c t i c s o f N a t u r e , London, Lawrence & W i s h e r t , p. 283  1940,  The q u e s t i o n o f the content o f knowledge i s connected w i t h t h e second p a r t o f the problem under d i s c u s s i o n . A c c o r d i n g t o E n g e l s ^ S ) "The Q u e s t i o n o f t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h i n k i n g and being has another s i d e ; i n what r e l a t i o n do our thoughts w i t h regard t o the w o r l d surrounding us stand t o t h i s w o r l d i t s e l f ? .»• Can we, i n our i d e a s and n o t i o n o f t h e r e a l w o r l d , produce a c o r r e c t r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e r e a l i t y ? " Examination o f t h i s q u e s t i o n b r i n g s out some c o r r o l a r i e s o f t h e m a t e r i a l i s t p o s i t i o n . Engels p o i n t s o u t t h a t a p o s i t i v e answer t o h i s q u e s t i o n may be g i v e n b y o b j e c t i v e i d e a l i s m - Hegel h i m s e l f i s a n example o f such a p o s i t i o n - and t h a t s u b j e c t i v i s m b y d e f i n i t i o n doubts t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f t h e correspondence a s s e r t s such  o f i d e a s and the r e a l w o r l d .  As a m a t e r i a l i s t , Engels  correspondence.  An e x a m i n a t i o n o f the problem showsthat m a t e r i a l i s m must so a s s e r t t h e p o s s i b i l i t y and a c t u a l i t y of the i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g , f o r the r e a s o n t h a t , i f a n e g a t i v e answer i s g i v e n the  questions  immediately a r i s e , f i r s t a s t o t h e nature o f t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d """outside e x p e r i e n c e " - t h e n c e , as t o i t s e x i s t e n c e ,  outside of being peroeived;  t h e n c e , i m m e d i a t e l y t o t h e d e n i a l o f i t s p r i m a c y , and t h e undermining o f >  the premises  ofmaterialism.  T h i s process i s c l e a r l y shown i n the B r i t i s h  e m p i r i c i s t s from Locke t o Hume.  Locke, a m a t e r i a l i s t i n the sense defined,  above, c a r r i e d h i s own r e f u t a t i o n w i t h him, w h i c h was drawn out and made e x p l i c i t b y B e r k e l e y and Hume. The p o i n t o f departure f o r such a t r a n s i t i o n from m a t e r i a l i s m t o i d e a l i s m i s o b v i o u s l y and i n e v i t a b l y the b i f u r c a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d i n t o  (8)  Feuerbach,  p. 59  two d i f f e r e n t forms o f b e i n g m e t a p h y s i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d , the m a t e r i a l and t h e mental. Any form of d u a l i s m admits o f t h i s d i f f i c u l t y , and t h e emergent t h e o r y of mind, h e l d by the M a r x i s t s and George H e r b e r t Mead, admits i t as u n e q u i v o c a l l y as the d u a l i s m of D e s c a r t e s ^ i f the mental i s d e f i n e d as something d i a m e t r i c a l l y opposed t o the m a t e r i a l forms o f e x i s t ence , t h a t i s , i f any t r a c e o f a s u b s t a n t i v a l c o n s c i o u s n e s s , mind or s o u l remains©  I t i s f u r t h e r e v i d e n t t h a t the s i z e o r the degree of t h e  s c i o u s n e s s does not a l t e r the d i f f i c u l t y ; s a t i o n of t h e organism  con-  whether i t i s the simple  sen-  or t h e developed m e n t a l i t y o f the s c i e n t i s t t h a t  i s under c o n s i d e r a t i o n , the problem remains* I t i s neoessary, t h e r e f o r e , t o s e a r c h f o r a d e f i n i t i o n o f con1  s c i o u s n e s s s a t i s f a c t o r y t o the d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t s p o i n t of v i e w . A l t h o u g h the answer i s c e r t a i n l y i m p l i c i t i n the above q u o t a t i o n from The German I d e o l o g y ^(see page 7) a c e r t a i n a m b i g u i t y remains i n the body of M a r x i s t works* One form o f statement common i n c l a s s i c a l Marxism concerning the nature of mental phenomena i s the d e s i g n a t i o n of these as of m a t e r i a l processes.  "products"  I n A n t i - D u h r i n g . Engels s a y s : "But i f t h e f u r t h e r  q u e s t i o n i s r a i s e d : what are thought and c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and whence t h e y come, i t becomes apparent t h a t t h e y are p r o d u c t s o f t h e human b r a i n , and t h a t man h i m s e l f i s a product o f n a t u r e , w h i c h has been developed i n and a l o n g w i t h i t s environment" (9) ;  and i n Feuerbach, 'Matter i s not a  p r o d u c t of mind, but mind i t s e l f i s o n l y the h i g h e s t product o f  matter"(10)  S i m i l a r l y L e n i n : " S e n s a t i o n , t h o u g h t , c o n s c i o u s n e s s , are t h e supreme  (9) (10)  A n t i - D u h r i n g , Hew Page 64  York I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1939, p.  42  - 10 -  •  product of m a t t e r o r g a n i z e d i n a p a r t i c u l a r way."  (11) and a g a i n , ' M a t t e r  i s p r i m a r y , and thought, c o n s c i o u s n e s s , s e n s a t i o n are products o f a v e r y h i g h developments"  (12)  Such d e f i n i t i o n s are o f h i g h i n c i d e n c e i n M a r x i s t w r i t i n g s . I t i s c l e a r t h a t the d e s i g n a t i o n of consciousness as a product i s n o t an a c c u r a t e d e f i n i t i o n , nor one t h a t can s o l v e the problem under d i s c u s s i o n * The n a t u r e of the "product" i s s t i l l l e f t i n doubt; whether i t be p u r e , i m m a t e r i a l b e i n g o f i t s own s o r t , an epiphenomenon, a p a r a l l e l dependent t h i n g , i s not i n d i c a t e d *  What s o r t o f a product c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s ,  and  what, s p e c i f i c a l l y i s i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h a t of which i t i s the product i s the d i f f i c u l t y t h a t i s not s e t t l e d .  The q u o t a t i o n s a r e , i n essence,  a re-statement of m a t e r i a l i s t p r e m i s e s , t h a t matter i s p r i m a r y and mind secondary, d e r i v a t i v e , dependent* Another c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t y p e of statement c o n c e r n i n g mental phenomena t o be found i n t h e s e works i s concerned w i t h the d e s i g n a t i o n o f t h e s e as "images" or " r e f l e c t i o n s " o f t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d • E n g e l s , "We  According to  conceived of i d e a s as m a t e r i a l i s t i c , as p i c t u r e s o f r e a l  t h i n g s , i n s t e a d of r e a l t h i n g s as p i c t u r e s o f t h i s o r t h a t stage of t h e a b s o l u t e i d e a . " (13)  A l t h o u g h the p h r a s e o l o g y here i s c o n d i t i o n e d by t h e  c o n t e x t , which i s a n t i - H e g e l i a n , t h i s c o n c e p t i o n of c o n s c i o u s n e s s as a m i r r o r i s used throughout M a r x i s t e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l w r i t i n g s • "...  sense  p e r c e p t i o n " says L e n i n , " i s not t h e r e a l i t y e x i s t i n g o u t s i d e u s , i t i s o n l y the image o f t h a t r e a l i t y . " (14) and f u r t h e r , " s e n s a t i o n i s a  (11) (12) (13) (14)  M a t e r i a l i s m and E m p i r i o - C r l t i o i s a i , New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s S e l e c t e d Works, V o l . X l 7 ~ p • 141 I b i d , p 122 Feuerbach: p. 95 Op. c i t . p. 177  - 11 -.. • • s u b j e c t i v e image o f t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d . . . " (15) Of t h e r e l a t i o n o f t h i s image t o r e a l i t y , L e n i n s t a t e s t h a t "The o b j e c t s o f our i d e a s a r e d i s t i n c t from our i d e a s , t h e t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f i s d i s t i n c t f r o m t h e t h i n g - f o r - u s , f o r the l a t t e r i s o n l y a p a r t , o r o n l y an a s p e c t , o f t h e former, j u s t as man h i m s e l f i s o n l y a fragment o f the n a t u r e r e f l e c t e d i n h i s i d e a s . " (16) I t i s c l e a r t h a t such f i g u r a t i v e modes o f e x p / r e s s i o n  do not  s o l v e t h e problem i n hand, t h a t i s , whether o r n o t a d u a l i s m i s t o be e s t a b l i s h e d ; t h a t t h e y a r e i n essence a re-statement  of the m a t e r i a l i s t  a s s e r t i o n o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g ; and t h a t , moreover, t h e y s u f f e r from a grave d e f e c t from t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f d i a l e c t i c s , i n t h a t t h e y r e g a r d s u b j e c t i v i t y o r consciousness as p a s s i v e .  Whether the sub-  j e c t i v e r e f e r s t o o r g a n i c a c t i v i t y i n t h i s w o r l d and n o t h i n g e l s e ,  or  whether i t r e f e r s t o something e n t i r e l y d i f f e r e n t , known o n l y t o i t s possessor and i n a c c e s s i b l e t o t h e methods o f s c i e n c e i s not s e t t l e d b y allusions to i t s mirror-like  qualities.  U t i l i z i n g t h e same t e r m i n o l o g y , however, Engels throws some l i g h t on t h e s u b j e c t when he s t a t e s t h a t "To t h e m e t a p h y s i c i a n , t h i n g s and t h e i r mental images, i d e a s a r e i s o l a t e d , t o be c o n s i d e r e d one a f t e r the o t h e r a p a r t from each o t h e r ... f o r him a t h i n g e i t h e r e x i s t s or i t does n o t e x i s t ; i t i s e q u a l l y i m p o s s i b l e f o r a t h i n g t o be i t s e l f and a t the same time something e l s e * " (17) The s u g g e s t i o n here i s t h a t i d e a s and t h e i r o b j e c t s a r e n o t m e t a p h y s i c a l l y separable e n t i t i e s , b u t t h a t t h e r e i s a o t u a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n o f the o b j e o t i n t h e i d e a .  I n conjunction  w i t h t h e b a s i c ooncepts o f d i a l e o t i o a l m a t e r i a l i s m ^ t h a t n a t u r e , i n c l u d i n g man and h i s i d e a ^ i s a n interdependence (15) (16) (17)  Op* c i t . p.182 Op* c i t . p. 182 A n t i - D u h r i n g i p. 27  o f m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s , i t becomes  c l e a r t h a t t h e i d e a p r o c e s s i s n o t i n e x i s t e n c e by and f o r itself„ comp l e t e l y o u t s i d e o f and e x t e r n a l t o t h e o b j e c t p r o o e s s , b u t t h a t i t p a r t i c i p a t e s i n the object process*  Engel's statement i m p l i e s t h a t t h e i d e a  i s a m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s , f o r o n l y under t h i s c o n d i t i o n c o u l d such p a r t i c i p ation exist*  I n p r e c i s e l y what manner i t e x i s t s o n l y t h e p h y s i c a l , b i o -  l o g i c a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e s c o u l d determine* On t h e same s u b j e c t , E n g e l s s a y s , "The r e a l i t i e s o f t h e outer w o r l d impress themselves upon t h e b r a i n o f man, r e f l e c t themselves t h e r e , as f e e l i n g s , t h o u g h t s , i m p u l s e s , v o l i t i o n s , i n s h o r t , as i d e a l t e n d e n c i e s , (18) and i n t h e form become i d e a l forces»" Omitting r e f e r e n c e ^ t o t h e e r r o r t h a t thought has t o do w i t h t h e b r a i n o n l y , an e r r o r d e r i v i n g from t h e r e l a t i v e l y low development o f t h e p h y s i o l o g y and p s y c h o l o g y o f t h e t i m e , one may i n f e r t h a t t h e response o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , i s i n c l u d e d i n t h e s u b j e c t - o b j e c t r e l a t i o n s h i p , and t h a t " f e e l i n g s , t h o u g h t s ,  impulses,  v o l i t i o n s " are p a r t l y the a c t i v i t y of the m a t e r i a l l y e x i s t i n g subject i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the object*  Here " r e f l e c t i o n s " i n o l u d e  subjeotive  a c t i v i t y , and t h e g e n e r a l tone of t h e passage i m p l i e s t h a t such a c t i v i t y i s i n t h e r e a l m o f m a t e r i a l o r g a n i c processes*  R e f l e c t i o n i n t h i s sense  i n c l u d e s t h e q u a l i t i e s o f t h e s u b j e c t as w e l l as those o f t h e o b j e o t * Reaching S p i n o z a t h r o u g h Peuerbaoh, P l e k h a n o v , a l t h o u g h he has much t o s a y t h a t i s i l l u m i n a t i n g , t a k e s a p o s i t i o n which somewhat confuses the conclusions  so f a r t e n t a t i v e l y reached*  Plekhanov t a k e s t h e  u n i t y o f t h i n k i n g and being t o mean t h a t t h e y a r e d i f f e r e n t appeots o f o f t h e same t h i n g * ( 1 9 )  1  He quotes w i t h a p p r o v a l F e u e r b a c h s statement,  (18)  Feuerbaoh:  p. 73  (19)  Fundamental Problems o f Marxism, Hew Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s (undated) p* 9  - 13 "That which f o r me, s u b j e c t i v e l y , i s a p u r e l y s p i r i t u a l , i m m a t e r i a l , nonsensible a c t i o n , i s , i n i t s e l f , o b j e c t i v e l y , a m a t e r i a l , sensible action!  1  I t i s not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t , a c c e p t i n g such a p o s i t i o n , Plekhanov c a n reaofe the c o n c l u s i o n t h a t t h e t h e o r y of^*animated m a t t e r ' ^ ( 2 0 ) which he f i n d s t o be spreading among Neo-Lamarkians, would be o f keen i n t e r e s t t o Marx and E n g e l s .  This "new" t h e o r y i s as a n c i e n t as Greek h y l o z o i s m , and i s  e n t i r e l y unacceptable t o d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , or c o n s i s t e n t m a t e r i a l ism o f any s o r t . A t h i r d manner o f r e f e r r i n g t o t h o u g h t , s u b j e c t i v i t y , mental phenomena, i s found i n b o t h Plekhanov and L e n i n .  "Thought" says Plekhanov  " i s not t h e cause o f b e i n g , but i t s consequence, o r t o put t h e m a t t e r more p r e c i s e l y , i t s p r o p e r t y or q u a l i t y . " (21) ( i t a l i c s n o t i n o r i g i n a l ) 1  D i s c u s s i n g D i d e r o t , L e n i n q u o t e s , " o r we must make a simple  supposition  which e x p l a i n s e v e r y t h i n g , namely, t h a t the f a o u l t y o f s e n s a t i o n i s a g e n e r a l p r o p e r t y o f m a t t e r , o r a product o f i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n * " ( 2 2 J . ( i t a l i c s n o t i n o r i g i n a l ) , and f u r t h e r , " l e t us bear i n mind t h i s t r u l y 8  v a l u a b l e a d m i s s i o n o f Mach s t h a t t h e ourrent widespread p h y s i c a l n o t i o n s regard m a t t e r as t h e immediate r e a l i t y , and t h a t o n l y one v a r i e t y / o f t h i s (23) *• r e a l i t y ( o r g a n i c m a t t e r ) possesses t h e w e l l - d e f i n e d p r o p e r t y o f s e n s a t i o n . What i s a p r o p e r t y o r a q u a l i t y t o a d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s t ? R e j e c t i n g t h e form o f a n a l y s i s w h i c h d i v i d e s q u a l i t i e s i n t o p r i m a r y and secondary, d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m regards t h e q u a l i t i e s o f a t h i n g from the p o i n t o f view o f i t s movements  (20) (21) (22) (23)  A c c o r d i n g t o t h e Textbook o f M a r x i s t  Fundamental Problems o f Marxism, New Y o r k , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , "~~ (undated) p . 30 Op. c i t , p . 11 Op. c i t . p . 105 I b i d . p. 112  P h i l o s o p h y , t h e accepted volume on t h e s u b j e c t movement o f a t h i n g —  i t s self-movement  i n t h e II.S._.R» ".. t h e >  defines i t s i n t e r n a l nature,  i s i t s uniqueness, i t s q u a l i t y . ( i t a l i c s i n o r i g i n a l ) Engels was r i g h t * The w o r l d c o n s i s t s o f p r o c e s s e s , o f q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique movements o f matter*  The q u a l i t y o f a t h i n g i s g i v e n b y the p a r t i o d a r k i n d o f move-  ment t h a t i s fundamental t o i t * " ( 2 4 )  By t h a t movement which i s funda-  mental t o i t i s meant such movement as belongs t o t h e mode o f e x i s t e n c e of t h e t h i n g , a n d f a i l i n g i n w h i c h , t h e t h i n g i t s e l f ceases t o e x i s t * F u r t h e r , " i n a c t u a l i t y , t h e r e a r e no independent  or isolated  qualities*  Q u a l i t y e x i s t s i n r e l a t i o n , and these r e l a t i o n s f l o w out o f t h e unique nature o f each t h i n g by i n t e r n a l n e c e s s i t y . . . i t s p r o p e r t i e s a r e n o t h i n g else than the manifestations o f i t s q u a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n t o other t h i n g s * " (25)  Out o f t h e unique movement o f a t h i n g a r e r e l a t i o n s h i p s formed  which e x h i b i t r e f l e x i v e l y t h e p r o p e r t i e s of t h e r e f e r e n t ^ and t h e r e l a t u m . I n t h i s sense o f t h e words q u a l i t y and p r o p e r t y , L e n i n ' s sensna t i o n o f s a l t , as pure s e n s a t i o n w i t h o u t a p p e r c e p t i o n , i s n o t a s e n s a t i o n "of s a l t " b u t p u r e l y a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f m a t e r i a l processes and t h e i r interaction.  A p p e r c e p t i o n and human thought i n g e n e r a l must be regarded  as q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique forms o f o r g a n i c movement o f whioh t h e i n t e r n a l and t h e e x t e r n a l phases a r e i n d i s o l u b l y u n i t e d , b u t not i d e n t i c a l , (fife*) The q u a l i t y o f thought e x i s t s as a c h a r a c t e r i z i n g form o f movement, n o t as " p u r e l y s p i r i t u a l , i m m a t e r i a l , n o n - s e n s i b l e a c t i o n . " I n t h i s sense o f q u a l i t y , t h e mind-body problem does n o t appear as a m e t a p h y s i c a l problem, f o r a l l t a k e s p l a c e w i t h i n t h e unique o f m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s , and no s u b s t a n t i a l , n o n - m a t e r i a l (24) (25) (26)  relationships  consciousness  L e n i n g r a d I n s t i t u t e , A Textbook o f M a r x i s t P h i l o s o p h y , London G o l l a n z , (undated)" po 246 I b i d . p. 264 O p . c i t . p* 182  can f i n d admittances  To f i x thought, s e n s a t i o n , as something s u i g e n e r i s ,  a b s o l u t e l y separate from and over a g a i n s t b e i n g , t o c r e a t e an unbridgeable g u l f between s e n s a t i o n and the sensed, i s by d e f i n i t i o n i m p o s s i b l e * T h i s p o i n t o f view i s c l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e M a r x i s t c r i t e r i o n o f p r a c t i c e , and i s t h e f e a t u r e d i s t i n g u i s h i n g t h e M a r x i s t c r i t e r i o n of p r a c t i c e from t h e p r a g m a t i c , w h i c h i s accepted by George H e r b e r t Mead. I n t h e pragmatic t h e o r y o f p r a c t i c e , t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t i s ad? vanoed t o t h e e x c l u s i o n o f t h e a c t i v i t y o f t h e environment, and t h e " p r a c t i c e " and consequent " c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s " o f t h e environment a r e d e t ermined s o l e l y by t h e s u b j e c t ;  a l l forms o f c o n t a c t w i t h t h e e x t e r n a l  w o r l d a r e viewed s u b j e c t i v e l y , as forms o f i t s a c t i v i t y , and s e n s a t i o n , thought, e x p e r i e n c e , as determined  by i t s e l f alone*  External r e a l i t y  becomes c o n t i n g e n t and r e l a t i v e • From t h e M a r x i s t p o i n t o f view o f t h e r e l a t i o n as f l o w i n g from an i n t e r n a l n e c e s s i t y , the pragmatic c o r r e c t , b u t one s i d e d *  c o n c e p t i o n i s i n a c e r t a i n sense  To Marxism t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d as known i n e x p e r -  ience i s i n c o m p l e t e , one-sided, b u t as f a r as i t goes e s s e n t i a l l y a c c u r a t e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d , t h e q u a l i t i e s o f which m a n i f e s t themselves  i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o l i v i n g b e i n g s , as w e l l as o t h e r t h i n g s , j u s t  as t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f s e n t i e n t b e i n g s are m a n i f e s t e d o n l y through i t s o t h e r , i t s own environment, t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d w i t h which i t can come i n t o i t s own k i n d s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s •  Here t h e premise i s not a s u b j e c t i v e  w o r l d , ggXEX e x p e r i e n c e , over a g a i n s t w h i c h i s put as something t o t a l l y other an o b j e c t i v e w o r l d which i s i n essence p r o b l e m a t i c * The r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e o b j e c t and the s u b j e c t r e f l e c t s t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f b o t h , i s o n l y p o s s i b l e a t a l l i n s o f a r as i t does s o * Knowledge o f mind o r t h e mental i s no l o n g e r t h e knowledge o f t h i n g s  - 16 ready made and s t a b l e , but knowledge o f interdependent p r o c e s s e s whose s p e c i f i c determination sophic  i s a matter f o r n a t u r a l s c i e n c e , not f o r p h i l o -  speculation* I t i s t h i s conception  o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s which i s embodied i n t h e  M a r x i s t c r i t e r i o n of p r a c t i c e . E n g e l s acknowledges t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f r e f u t i n g s u b j e o t i v i s t arguments,but p o i n t s out t h a t "Nature solved t h e problem b e f o r e man proposed i t . "  (27) I n other words, man was engaged  i n o b j e c t i v e m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y , f o r m i n g more and more complex r e l a t i o n ships w i t h natural processes,  l o n g before he brought up t h e q u e s t i o n as  t o whfether t h i s was p o s s i b l e .  I t i s j u s t t h i s connection with n a t u r a l  processes as p a r t o f them, a-o p a r t o f thorn, as a d i f f e r e n t form o f m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y , t h a t makes man capable o f p o s s e s s i n g The  knowledge.  i d e a t i o n a l element o f s u b j e c t i v i t y p r o p e r t o human t h o u g h t ,  the l o g i c a l and r a t i o n a l , a l s o come w i t h i n t h e m a t e r i a l i s t framework d i a l e c t i o a l l y understood.  According  t o t h e M a r x i s t s , r e a s o n and l o g i c ,  the c o n c e p t u a l w o r l d , a r i s e s out o f o b j e c t i v e m a t e r i a l p r a c t i c e as a q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique f o r m of a c t i v i t y of t h e s u b j e c t , and t h e problem o f the r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e sensed and l o g i c a l moments o f knowledge, t r a d i t i o n a l l y ruptured by t h e r a t i o n a l i s t s , r e c e i v e s i t s s o l u t i o n i n rational practice.  Human t h e o r e t i c a l t h i n k i n g i s a new stage o f p r a c t i c a l  s o c i a l b e i n g , a p e c u l i a r form o f s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y r e p r e s e n t i n g a w o r k i n g over of t h e sensed.  I n t h i s c o n t e x t , p r a c t i c e i s opposed t o t h e o r y as  o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e forms o f developing  s o c i a l intercourse with  nature. I t i s obviously impossible,from (27)  t h i s position_,to a r r i v e a t a  I n t r o d u c t i o n t o S o c i a l i s m U t o p i a n and S c i e n t i f i c , New York, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , 1935,~ p. 11  - 17 s c e p t i c a l p o s i t i o n concerning the i d e n t i t y of t h i n k i n g and b e i n g or t o a r r i v e a t a c o n c e p t i o n o f r a t i o n a l i t y as the f u n c t i o n of a r a t i o n a l ego s e l f , oounterposed i n some way t o o r g a n i c and s o c i a l l i f e and from i t as pure  or  separable  concept*  Such are the o u t l i n e s g i v e n by d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m t o the q u e s t i o n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , thought and mind*  They are f o r the most p a r t  t h e o r e t i c a l o u t l i n e s , the " a l g e b r a " , as Plekhanov n o t e s , which must await the "mathematics" of p o s i t i v e s c i e n c e _ o r a d e t a i l e d a n a l y s i s * (28) The p h i l o s o p h i c and t h e s p e c u l a t i v e approach was the o n l y p o s s i b l e approach t o t h e problem one hundred years ago*  Since t h e n , s t r i k i n g ad-  vances have been made i n the s c i e n t i f i c - i n v e s t i g a t i o n of these I t i s p o s s i b l e now t o t u r n t o George H e r b e r t Mead, who  questions*  has had the advan-  tage o f such developmentsg t o see what c o n t r i b u t i o n he i s able t o make, t o f i n d some s o r t of s p e c i f i c answer t o problems wj^ith which the M a r x i s t s had d e a l t g e n e r a l l y , t o examine i n what reppect he d i v e r g e s from Marxism, and t o what e x t e n t p h i l o s o p h i c c o n t r o v e r s i e s ^ are s t i l l n e c e s s a r y i n the as y e t i l l - d e f i n e d f i e l d o f the p s y c h o l o g i e s *  (28)  Op.  c i t . p.  24  CHAPTER  BACKGROUND  TWO  AND  __  CHARACTERIZATIOH  l^KAt\  I n modern p h i l o s o p h y , t h e problem o f the r e l a t i o n between t h i n k :  i n g and b e i n g WEB posed b y Rene Descartes i n a unique and d i s t r a c t i n g manners  Mind and body, t h i n k i n g and b e i n g , were p o s t u l a t e d as two realms  a b s o l u t e l y d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from each o t h e r .  The problem i n the form i t has  dominated modern p h i l o p o p h y i s a by-product  of t h e C a r t e s i a n attempt t o  l i b e r a t e t h e s c i e n c e s from medieval  theology*  The m e c h a n i s t i c and u n h i s t o r i c a l b i f u r c a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d i n t o mind and body, r e s e x t e n s a and r e s c o g i t a n s  r  u n c e r t a i n l y r e l a t e d , opened  the door t o s u b j e c t i v i s m , e m p i r i c i s m , phenomenalism, and a l l forms o f idealism*  Today these p h i l o s o p h i e s predominate i n the c a p i t a l i s t w o r l d *  The C a r t e s i a n d u a l i s m , and the problems and p h i l o s o p h i e s t h a t stem from i t , no l o n g e r p l a y i n g a l i b e r a t i n g r o l e and g i v i n g d i r e c t i o n t o the  process  o f s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a c t u a l l y h i n d e r t h i s development, e s p e c i a l l y i n the f i e l d o f s o c i a l and p s y c h o l o g i c a l s c i e n c e * Changes o f the n i n e t e e n t h c e n t u r e , H e g e l i a n i s m , Marxism, and Darwinism, brought about t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a new approach t o t h e problem of c o n s c i o u s n e s s , mind and knowledge, gave new premises t o q u e s t i o n s o f epistemology.  These p r e m i s e s , i n v o l v i n g a way o f t h i n k i n g which i s t h e  l o g i c a l a l t e r n a t i v e o f t h e s t a t i c and m e c h a n i s t i c i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , were _ enunciated  as e a r l y as t h e f i f t h and s i x t h o e n t u r i e s ^ B.C. by such men  as Anaximander, H e r a c l i t u s , Pythagoras^ and wes*« n e g a t i v e l y e l a b o r a t e d by Zeno, t h e E l e a t i c *  The d i a l e c t i c a l and e v o l u t i o n a r y mode o f thought was  r e j e c t e d , however, because s o c i e t y a t t h a t stage o f development was  - 19 i n c a p a b l e of d e a l i n g -with i t , u t i l i z i n g i t , e x p l o r i n g i t s i m p l i c a t i o n s i n the i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f n a t u r a l phenomena. necessary b e f o r e men forms.  C e n t u r i e s of development were  c o u l d t u r n t o the a l t e r n a t i v e of the l o g i c o f f i x e d  Hegel e l a b o r a t e d the a l t e r n a t i v e l o g i c . Marx and E n g e l s u t i l i z e d  i t , on m a t e r i a l i s t p r e m i s e s , i n the f i e l d of s o c i a l phenomena, and D a r w i n , as a l l s c i e n t i s t s who  a r e . s t u d y i n g t h i n g s i n t h e i r o r i g i n and growth,  u t i l i z e d i t , a l b e i t u n c o n s c i o u s l y , t o handle h i s b i o l o g i c a l d a t a .  The  impact o f Darwinism on p h i l o s o p h y , s o c i o l o g y and p s y c h o l o g y has been great. George H e r b e r t Mead, s o c i a l p s y c h o l o g i s t and  philosopher,  r e c e i v e d h i s p h i l o s o p h i c and s c i e n t i f i c t r a i n i n g i n the American i n t e l l e c t u a l c i r c l e s of the l a t e n i n e t e e n t h and e a r l y t w e n t i e t h c e n t u r y . i n t e l l e c t u a l atmosphere a t t h a t t i m e was  permeated w i t h German i d e a l i s m ,  c h i e f l y H e g e l i a n , and B r i t i s h e m p i r i c i s m .  Equal and opposite arose  advancing f r o n t of m a t e r i a l i s t s c i e n c e , i n c l u d i n g s c i e n t i f i c s t i l l l a r g e l y mechanistic The  The  the  psychology,  i n i t s approach.  s p e c i f i c i n f l u e n c e s upon Mead i n h i s f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e  t h e o r y of mind were f i v e t t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e o r i e s of Darwin, the s o c i o l o g y o f C h a r l e s H o r t o n C o o l e y , t h e p s y c h o l o g i e s of John Broadus Watson and W i l h e l m Wundt, and t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f pragmatism. Basing h i s s p e c u l a t i o n s on Darwin, Mead conceives of mind and i n t e l l i g e n c e from the b i o l o g i c a l and e v o l u t i o n a r y p o i n t of v i e w . T h i n k i n g , from t h i s s t a n d p o i n t , i s i n s e p a r a b l e from b e i n g , and dependent f o r i t s e x i s t e n c e upon m a t e r i a l b e i n g .  Mind i s an emergent i n the development o f  the m a t e r i a l u n i v e r s e , and as p a r t o f the n a t u r a l p r o c e s s e s , has  "survival  v a l u e " j f t h a t i s , i t i s f u n c t i o n a l i n t h e l i f e of t h e t h i n k i n g organism. Mead r e c o g n i z e s , i n p r a c t i c e , emergents as new  types o f processes  having  •- 20 « t h e i r own c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and l a w s , t h e i r own forms of movement and p a r t icular relationships. F o r Mead, mind i s dependent upon a c e r t a i n c o m p l e x i t y o f o r g a n i c and n e u r o l o g i c a l developments  Mead's problem i n t h e s e terms i s t h e  p r e c i s e manner i n w h i c h mind arose i n t h e p r o c e s s o f m a t e r i a l e v o l u t i o n , and t h e p r e c i s e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e mental p r o c e s s *  So f a r Mead's premises  a r e , a l t h o u g h i n c o h e r e n t l y , d i a l e c t i c a l and m a t e r i a l i s t i c . The s o c i a l a s p e c t o f mind and s e l f , s t r e s s e d by Hegel who l e f t h i s i m p r e s s i o n on such p s y c h o l o g i s t s as Gaddings and C o o l e y , i s t a k e n by Mead as a major premise o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s ,  Cooley s a y s :  * And j u s t as t h e r e i s no s o c i e t y o r group which i s not a c o l l e c t i v e view o f p e r s o n s , so t h e r e i s no i n d i v i d u a l who may n o t be regarded as a p a r t i c u l a r view o f s o c i a l groups* He has no separate e x i s t e n c e ; through b o t h t h e h e r e d i t a r y and s o c i a l f a c t o r s i n h i s l i f e , a man i s bound i n t o t h e whole o f w h i c h he i s a member, and t o c o n s i d e r him a p a r t from i t i s q u i t e as a r t i f i c i a l as t o c o n s i d e r s o c i e t y a p a r t from i n d i v i d u a l s ( 2 8 ) Mead A c c e p t s t h e view t h a t i n d i v i d u a l s , minds, s e l v e s , can • /  •  e x i s t o n l y i n and through s o c i e t y , and t h a t t h e i n d i v i d u a l r e f l e c t s s o c i e t y from a p a r t i c u l a r p o i n t o f v i e w *  He i n t e n d s , however, t o go  beyond C o o l e y , t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e a c t u a l o r i g i n and development sciousness i n the s o c i a l context*  o f con-  S e l f and s o c i e t y are n o t , f o r Mead,  m e r e l y c o l l e c t i v e and d i s t r i b u t i v e a s p e c t s o f the same t h i n g . statement l e a v e s h i s problem untouched*  Such a  F o r Mead, s o c i e t y i s l o g i c a l l y  and t e m p o r a l l y p r i o r t o mind, and mind and i t s o r i g i n can o n l y be e x p l a i n ed i n terms o f a presupposed ongoing s o c i a l p r o c e s s * Mead's o b j e c t i v e i s not o n l y t o make a bare statement o f t h e u n i t y and p o l a r i t y o f s e l f and (28)  Human Mature and t h e S o c i a l Order, C h i c a g o , S c r i b n e r s , 1902, p«3  and s o c i e t y , but t o i n v e s t i g a t e t h e a c t u a l process of becoming, t h e o r i g i n and growth o f mind*  Compared t o Mead's a n a l y s i s o f the s e l f and i t s o r i g i n  Cooley's i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e development of s e l f through s o c i a l i n t e r course and t h e use of p o s s e s s i v e s , based as i t i s on a s o c i a l and s e l f f e e l i n g which a r e somehow s i m p l y assumed, i s poor and t h i n , a l t h o u g h i t d o u b t l e s s gave d i r e c t i o n t o Mead's i n q u i r i e s . A t h i r d important i n f l u e n c e on Mead was t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t i c psychology o f Watson.  Behaviourism, a r i s i n g i n o p p o s i t i o n t o i n t r o s p e c t i v e  psychology and t h e i n h e r e n t d u a l i s m o r s u b j e c t i v i s m o f . s u c h a p s y c h o l o g y , r e j e c t s a l t o g e t h e r , i n i t s pure form, t h e concept o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s * S t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , fundamental ooncepts i n t h e i n t r o s p e c t i v e and a s s o c i a t i v e p s y c h o l o g i e s , are o f no i n t e r e s t t o t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t * H i s i n t e r e s t l i e s i n t h e observable b e h a v i o u r o f t h e s u b j e c t , and t h e c o n d i t i o n s under which such behaviour a r i s e s and i s m o d i f i e d o r changed*  (__)  The b a s i c concepts o f b e h a v i o u r i s m (29) are t h e r e f l e x a r c and t h e c o n d i t i o n e d response.  Mind and t h i n k i n g are i d e n t i f i e d w i t h b e h a v i o r ,  the a c t u a l p h y s i o l o g i c a l r e s p o n s e .  The attempt i s made t o e l i m i n a t e t h e  mind-body problem by o m i t t i n g one of t h e terms and e x p l a i n i n g i t s c o n t e n t through t h e r e m a i n i n g term*  I n i m p o r t i n g i n t o t h e realm, o f p h y s i o l o g y  what had h i t h e r t o been put i n t o c o n s c i o u s n e s s , Watsonism u t i l i z e s t h e i d e a of the substitute vocal stimulus*  M e n t a l a c t i v i t y i s e x p l a i n e d as an  i m p l i c i t language h a b i t , i n which t h e i n d i v i d u a l s t i m u l a t e s h i m s e l f t o respond by means o f t h e s u b s t i t u t e s t i m u l i , o r s u b v o c a l a c t i v i t y *  The  s u b j e c t i v e i s now d e f i n e d as t h e p r i v a t e responses o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , those which do not meet t h e e y e , a l t h o u g h t h e y are i n t h e same r e i l m , t h a t o f m a t e r i a l behaviour* The agency i n v o l v e d i s language, regarded (29) Watson, J.B. People's I n s t i t u t e P u b l i s h i n g Co. Hew Y o r k , 1925  .-.22 - . as p u r e l y s u b s t i t u t e s t i m u l i *  Behaviorism a s s e r t s t h a t t h e r e i s no  due from such an e x p l a n a t i o n t o r e q u i r e a "consciousness"  i n the  resi-  intro-  s p e c t i v e sense, i n which t o r e s i d e * Watsonism was a s i g n i f i c a n t step forward i n the m a t e r i a l i s t p l a n a t i o n of the mind-body problem*  I t had n e v e r t h e l e s s s e r i o u s l i m i t a t -  i o n s a r i s i n g from i t s m e c h a n i s t i c p r e s u p p o s i t i o n s * behaviour  ex-  Behaviourism  breaks up  i n t o an atmoism as complete as t h a t t o which i n t r o s p e c t i o n had  reduced consciousness; t o physiochemical  i t regards human behaviour  as u l t i m a t e l y r e d u c i b l e  p r o c e s s e s ; regards the i n d i v i d u a l as an i s o l a t e d event  i n a physio-chemical  or i n c i d e n t a l l y s o c i a l w o r l d , and, not r e g a r d i n g  the  s u b j e c t as a q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique p r o c e s s , n e g l e c t s the a c t i v i t y of the s u b j e c t i n the process of knowledge.  Y/atson' s m a t e r i a l i s m i s s t i l l i n the  sphere of the e x t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p of i s o l a t e d t h i n g s - i n t h i s  case,  the r e f l e x a r c - a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f e a r l i e r m a t e r i a l i s m s e v e r e l y c r i t i c i z e d by Marx and  Engels.  The r e s u l t of h i s l i m i t a t i o n s i s t h a t t h e r e i s as d e f i n i t e r e s i d u e l e f t over f r o m the e x p l a n a t i o n of the mental t h a t , l a c k i n g an e x p l a n a t i o n , must go over i n t o a consciousness  o f which the r e s i d u e i s i n  some way t h e content* I d e a s , concepts or u n i v e r s a l s , a n a l y s i s , purpose, p l a n n i n g , f o r e s i g h t , almost a l l , i n s h o r t , t h a t c o n s t i t u t e s the  qualitat-  i v e uniqueness o f r a t i o n a l b e i n g s , i s l e f t unexplained by Watsonian mechanism. Thoroughly f a m i l i a r w i t h Watsonism, Mead was the shortcomings o f Watson's e x p l a n a t i o n . ( S O )  a c u t e l y aware of  H i s problem was  continue  and p e r f e c t the p h y s i o l o g i c a l e x p l a n a t i o n o f the mental from the  social  (30) M i n d , S e l f and S o c i e t y , P a r t 1, passim, U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago P r e s s , C h i c a g o , 1934-  -23and e v o l u t i o n a r y s t a n d p o i n t . The f a i l u r e o f Watsonism, common t o n o n - d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m , t o conceive o f t h e s u b j e c t as q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique and a c t i v e i s remedied by Mead t h r o u g h h i s a s s o c i a t i o n s w i t h pragmatism. Watsonism i m p l i e d a c o n c e p t i o n of t h e organism as a p a s s i v e respondent t o any and every s t i m u l u s r e a c h i n g i t from t h e environment* Mead emphasizes t h e a t t e n t i v e , s e l e c t i v e and i n t e g r a t i v e c h a r a c t e r s o f t h e s u b j e c t , t h e a c t i v e u n i t y o f t h e s u b j e c t as found i n i t s l i f e - p r o c e s s e s . The  s u b j e o t as s u b j e c t i s n o t o n l y t h e receivej^and respondent t o any and  every a c t i o n , i t i s a l s o t h e i n i t i a t o r and p r e c i p i t a t o r o f a c t i o n . The s u b j e o t i s conceived  of as a more or l e s s u n i f i e d a o t i v i t y , and knowledge,  i n s o f a r as Mead remains on m a t e r i a l i s t p r e m i s e s , as t h e i n c r e a s i n g r e l a t i o n s h i p s entered i n t o by t h e type o f a o t i v i t y p e c u l i a r t o t h e s p e c i f i c organism. Marx s a y s , "The c h i e f d e f e c t o f a l l m a t e r i a l i s m up t o now,inc l u d i n g Feuerbach's, i s t h a t t h e o b j e c t r e a l i t y ,  what we apprehend  through our senses, i s understood o n l y i n t h e form o f the o b j e c t o r cont e m p l a t i o n ; b u t n o t as sensuous human a c t i v i t y , as p r a c t i c e ; n o t subj e c t i v e l y . " (31) I t i s Mead's t a s k , as a p s y c h o l o g i s t , t o examine t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f t h i s human sensuous a c t i v i t y .  As p s y c h o l o g i s t he i s o r i e n t e d  t o t h i s , and t o t h i s end he uses as a b a s i c concept t h e a c t , a p r o c e s s w h i c h i n v o l v e s t h e unique a c t i v i t y o f t h e organism, as t h e e s s e n t i a l u n i t or l i m i t i n g area of t h e knowledge p r o c e s s *  A f u r t h e r c o r r e c t i o n o f Wat-  sonism i n Mead i s t h a t f o r human beings t h e a c t i s e s s e n t i a l l y a s o c i a l a c t , which i m p l i c a t e d t h e whole p a s t h i s t o r y and p r e s e n t r e l a t i o n s h i p s (31) F i r 3 t t h e s i s on Feuerbach, quoted i n The German I d e o l o g y , p.197  » 24 - • of t h e s o c i a l group, from a s p e c i f i c p o i n t of view* I t i s a t t h i s p o i n t , however, i n t h e r e c o g n i t i o n of the a c t i v e and  s o c i a l phases o f t h e knowledge p r o c e s s , t h a t Mead d e v i a t e s i n t o t h e  s u b j e c t i v i s m and r e l a t i v i s m common t o pragmatism. A t t e n d i n g t o an a n a l y s i s of t h e s u b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r s  o f t h e knowledge p r o c e s s , he f a i l s t o t a k e  cognizance o f t h e independent and o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y o f t h a t through which s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y proceeds, t h e a c t u a l o b j e c t i v e e x i s t e n c e  of n a t u r a l  p r o c e s s e s , o n l y i n r e l a t i o n t o which can human a c t i v i t y r e s u l t i n knowl e d g e , or i n d e e d , human or o r g a n i c a c t i v i t y e x i s t a t a l l . 5  T h i s approach b r i n g s i n t o q u e s t i o n Mead s whole c o n c e p t i o n o f p r a c t i c e , w h i c h has been b r i e f l y c r i t i c i z e d above.(See page ii" ). S t a r t i n g from t h e q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique p r o c e s s which i s o r g a n i c b e i n g , i t s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c needs, upon which a r e based i t s c h a r a c t e r s and  with  of attention  s e l e c t i o n . Mead cuts these a d r i f t more and more from t h e o n l y t h i n g  t h a t c a n g i v e them any a c t u a l i t y or 'meaning, t h e a c t u a l m a t e r i a l l y e x i s t i n g environment*  Environment comes t o be s t a t e d w h o l l y i n terms of t h e  organism, as a f u n c t i o n o f t h e c h a r a c t e r s  o f t h e organism,,  Environment  becomes s u b j e c t i v e l y c o n s t i t u t e d , no l o n g e r i n t h e o l d terms o f s u b j e c t i v e s t a t e s o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s o r contents of a s u b s t a n t i v a l mind, b u t i n b i o l o g i c a l terms as a dependent of t h e on-going organism. Here t h e whole r e l a t i o n s h i p o f b e i n g and t h i n k i n g i s r e v e r s e d . Here knowing has assumed p r i m a c y , and o b j e c t i v e b e i n g i s r e l a t i v e , cont i n g e n t , dependent upon b e i n g known.  The c h a r a c t e r  of the objeot i s det-  ermined b y t h e r e s p o n s e , o r t h e b i o l o g i c a l and t e l e o l o g i c a l nature o f t h e knower.  The p h y s i c a l w o r l d i s c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n , beoomes r e l a t i v e t o  the responses - a c t i v i t y - o f t h e organism, and u l t i m a t e l y t o i t s needs©  - 25 As a r e s u l t of t h i s dependence of environment on the  organism,  the v a l i d i t y o f the pragmatic emphasis on p r a c t i c e and t h e e x p e r i m e n t a l method i s c a l l e d i n t o q u e s t i o n .  The complement of the organism, t h a t  through which i t expresses i t s own q u a l i t i e s - i t s a o t u a l l y e x i s t a n t environment - i s put w i t h i n the experience and c h a r a c t e r of t h e r e c e i v i n g v a l i d i t y there only.  organism,  Pragmatic p r a c t i c e becomes p r a c t i c e sub-  j e c t i v e l y c o n s t i t u t e d , t h e f i e l d of p r a c t i c e i s s u b j e c t i v e l y l i m i t e d , i t s m a t r i x tends t o f a l l w i t h i n t h e e x p e r i e n c e of t h e organism. o b j e c t i v e c h a r a c t e r s of the environment are put t o doubt• j u n c t s t o or a c c i d e n t s i n the experience of the organism*  The a c t u a l They are ad-  T h i s experience  i s i n an environment w h i c h i s i t s e l f e x p e r i e n c e , c o n s t i t u t e d i n i t s c h a r a c t e r s by the i n t e r e s t s of t h e organism viewed s u b j e c t i v e l y , as e x p e r i e n c ing  subject. From t h i s p o i n t of v i e w , o b j e c t s a t a d i s t a n o e are "promises of  c o n t a c t e x p e r i e n c e " , ( 3 2 ) , h i s t o r y i s the p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f a p a s t centered i n the needs or problem of the moment. (33) ive  Actual object-  hisbory, o f which Head h i m s e l f i s a moment, i s pure h y p o t h e s i s .  p a s t i s what we make i t .  The  The  s c i e n t i f i c w o r l d and s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s are  g i v e n v a l i d i t y o n l y through b e i n g i n common o r s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e .  Those  c h a r a c t e r s which are t h e r e f o r everyone c o n s t i t u t e the o b j e c t i v e world© I t i s t h i s phase o f Mead's t h i n k i n g which i n d i c a t e s h i s i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Wundt*  Not o n l y i n i s o l a t i n g the concept o f t h e gesture  as a s i g n i f i c a n t element w i t h i n the s o c i a l a c t d i d Wundt i n f l u e n c e Meade  (32)  The P h i l o s o p h y o f t h e A c t , Chicago U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , Chicago,1938, p. 181  (33)  P h i l o s o p h y of the P r e s e n t , Open Court P u b l i s h i n g Co., ghapter 1, passim  Chicago,1932,  - 26• « ' The much more p e r v a s i v e i n f l u e n c e of h i s m e t a p h y s i c a l c o n c e p t s , which Mead i s anxious t o eschew, but never s u c c e s s f u l l y escapes, i s e v i d e n t from amongst the e a r l i e s t of h i s w r i t i n g s and i s prominent throughout h i s work» The fundamental  concept of Wundt's psychology i s e x p e r i e n c e s  The w o r l d i s e s s e n t i a l l y s u b j e c t i v e , t h e known i s dependent f o r i t s e x i s t ence upon the knower.  Ho o b j e c t i v e and i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g r e a l i t y i s  acknowledged» E x p e r i e n c e r e q u i r e s an e x p e r i e n c i n g s u b j e c t , and i t i s here t h a t Wund't p a r a l l e l i s m e n t e r s * W i t h i n e x p e r i e n c e t h e r e are two d i f f e r e n t p o i n t s ov v i e w , which correspond t o t h e o b j e c t i v e and t h e s u b j e c t i v e , the s c i e n t i f i c and the p s y c h i c a l w o r l d s .  I n Wundt's own words:  "... every c o n c r e t e e x p e r i e n c e immediately d i v i d e s i n t o two f a c t o r s ; i n t o a content p r e s e n t e d t o us and our apprehension of t h i s c o n t e n t . We c a l l the f i r s t of these f a c t o r s o b j e c t s of e x p e r i e n c e , the second, experi e n c i n g s u b j e c t . T h i s d i v i s i o n i n d i c a t e s two d i r e c t i o n s f o r the treatment of e x p e r i e n c e . One i s t h a t o f the n a t u r a l s c i e n c e s . . . the o t h e r i s t h a t o f psychology." (34) Science and s c i e n t i f i c o b j e c t s c o n s t i t u t e mediate e x p e r i e n c e , which i s an a b s t r a c t i o n and c o n s t r u c t i o n from immediate e x p e r i e n c e . The importance  o f Wundt's i n f l u e n c e can h a r d l y be o v e r e s t i m a t e d 8  i n an a n a l y s i s of t h e b a s i s o f Mead 3 approach.  I t i s s a f e t o say t h a t  a l t h o u g h he made the a t t e m p t , he i s never a b l e i n a d e c i s i v e manner t o pass over from t h e c o n c e p t i o n of the w o r l d as e x p e r i e n c e t o t h e w o r l d as  ob-  j e c t i v e l y e x i s t e n t , although t h i s objective existence i s i m p l i e d by h i s fundamental e v o l u t i o n a r y t h e s i s t h a t mind and p e r c e p t i o n appear w i t h i n a w o r l d l o g i c a l l y and t e m p o r a l l y p r i o r .  (34)  O u t l i n e s of P s y c h o l o g y , Engelmann, L e i p z i g , 1902,  p. 3  - 27 Nevertheless,  through h i s a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h s o c i o l o g y , Mead i s  never i n a p o s i t i o n t o accept a b i o l o g i c a l s o l i p s i s m s  The experience o f  t h a t r a t i o n a l b e i n g i m p l i c a t e the whole s o c i a l groupo  I t i s the r e l a t i o n -  s h i p between s o c i e t y and nature t h a t i s c o n t i n g e n t ,  subjective;  nature  becomes a f u n c t i o n o f s o c i a l r e s p o n s e s , unable t o c l a i m independent e x i s t ence because i t i s r e c o g n i z e d idual •  o n l y as a phase o f an a c t o f a s o c i a l i n d i v -  The p o s i t i o n towards w h i c h Mead's t h i n k i n g g r a v i t a t e s i s t h a t o f  a s o c i a l s u b j e c t i v i s m . He reaches t h i s v i e w p o i n t because he i s unable t o recognize  t h e p a r t i c u l a r c h a r a c t e r of t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s , as o b j e c t i v e  productive  a c t i v i t y ^ b y v i r t u e o f which deeper and more p e n e t r a t i n g r e -  l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h n a t u r a l processes a r e formed, and i n v i r t u e o f which o n l y c a n t h e content of s o c i a l knowledge u l t i m a t e l y be e x p l a i n e d . I s Mead t h e n an i d e a l i s t ?  The q u e s t i o n cannot r e a d i l y be ans-  wered e i t h e r p o s i t i v e l y or n e g a t i v e l y .  Prom premises w h i c h are o b j e c t i v e  and m a t e r i a l i s t i c - t h e e v o l u t i o n a r y and s o c i a l p o i n t o f v i e w , he reached a p o s i t i o n which p u t s t h e organism - i n d i v i d u a l and s o c i a l - i n t o a posi t i o n o f p r i m a c y , and reduces h i s o r i g i n a l premises t o a p o s i t i o n o f dependency.  Y e t , by f o r c e of h i s o r i g i n a l p r e m i s e s , he c a n never q u i t e  complete t h e p r o c e s s , and from t h i s d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s most t h a t i s e l u s i v e , i n c o n s i s t e n t and c o n t r a d i c t o r y i n h i s h a n d l i n g o f t h e s u b j e c t matter. Such _s the background and premises from which Mead s t a r t s h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n o f t h e mind, i t s o r i g i n , i t s s t r u c t u r e , and t h e process o f cognition.  I t i s t h e t a s k o f t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n t o f i n d j u s t how much o f  h i s f i n d i n g s a r e a c c e p t a b l e from t h e d i a l e c t i c a l and m a t e r i a l i s t i c p o i n t of v i e w , i n what way h i s t h e o r y of mind i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h a t of t h e c l a s s i c a l M a r x i s t s , and i n what way he can c o n t r i b u t e t o t h e o f t e n m e r e l y  - 28 f o r m a l p r o p o s i t i o n s o f Marxism t o t h e mind - body problem, s p e c i f i c a l l y , the n a t u r e and o r i g i n o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s .  - 29 CHAPTER  BASIC  THREE  CONCEPTS  E x t e n s i v e although, t h e suggestions o f the M a r x i s t s are concerni n g consciousness and knowledge, much i s l e f t t o be d e s i r e d by them© Bare premises a r e g i v e n as t o the n a t u r e , o r i g i n and content o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , such premises as a r e i n v o l v e d i n t h e t h e o r y o f d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l materialism*  From t h i s p o i n t of v i e w , consciousness belongs t o t h e w o r l d  of s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n , i t i s i n t h i s w o r l d as p a r t o f the m a t e r i a l o r g a n i c and s o c i a l processes o f human b e i n g s .  As t o how t h i s i s p o s s i b l e ,  t o p l a c e c o n t e n t s , sensory, l o g i c a l and i d e a t i o n a l , i n t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d , only the s l i g h t e s t of outlines i s given*  How i t i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y , p h i l -  o s o p h i c a l l y p o s s i b l e , i s v e r y c a r e f u l l y worked out*  How i t i s a c t u a l l y  and p r a c t i c a l l y t h e case was a q u e s t i o n t h a t awaited f u r t h e r s c i e n t i f i c development* A t t h e same t i m e , a c e r t a i n a m b i g u i t y remains i n c e r t a i n o f t h e M a r x i s t c l a s s i c s , e s p e c i a l l y L e n i n and Plekhanov, as t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n and c o n t e n t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , a c e r t a i n c h a r a c t e r i s t i c t e r m i n o l o g y t h a t i s r e m i n i s c e n t o f t h e o l d v i e w s o f a s u b s t a n t i v a l s t u f f , a mind or s e l f which r e c e i v e d i m p r e s s i o n s from t h e o u t s i d e w o r l d .  I t i s t h i s question,  how t o p l a c e t h e contents o f consciousness i n t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d , how t o e x p l a i n consciousness and s e l f w i t h o u t r e f e r e n c e t o any m e t a p h y s i c a l d u a l i s m , t h a t occupies t h e a t t e n t i o n o f Mead. The q u e s t i o n o f t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g i n v o l v e s two d i s t i n c t problems, t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f s e n s a t i o n t o t h e sensed, o r t h e problem  o f " s i m p l e " c o n s c i o u s n e s s , which i s t h e p o i n t a t which  sub.jectiv-  isra. t r a d i t i o n a l l y arose i n t h e B r i t i s h e m p i r i c a l school^ and t h e problem  ~ 30 — of r a t i o n a l and o r g a n i z e d knowledge, t h e problem of the r e l a t i o n of t h e sensed and l o g i c a l moments of knowledge®  M a r x i s t s on the whole f o c u s  t h e i r a t t e n t i o n on human c o n s c i o u s n e s s , which i n v o l v e s b o t h t h e s e problems simultaneously*  Mead', t o a c e r t a i n e x t e n t , d i s c u s s e s them s e p a r a t e l y , as  t h e y can, i n a l o g i c a l sense, be s e p a r a t e d * Mead's i n t e n t i o n i n t h e d e f i n i t i o n of consciousness i s t o g i v e the  word a r e f e r e n c e other t h a n t h a t w h i c h i t t r a d i t i o n a l l y had i n b o t h  p s y c h o l o g y and p h i l o s o p h y .  Consciousness, f o r Mead, i n c l u d e s b o t h the  organism and i t s environment, i t cannot s i m p l y be put i n s i d e the body or the  head, i t i s not a "something" t h a t f l a s h e s f o r t h when a s t i m u l u s  reaches a c e r t a i n p o i n t i n the nervous system.  Consciousness i s a c h a r -  a c t e r the environment has i n v i r t u e o f i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the organism* The f i e l d o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s i s the organism - environment r e l a t i o n s h i p , and i t s content i s o b j e c t i v e l y t h e r e w i t h i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p * "Consciousness as such r e f e r s t o b o t h the organism and i t s e n v i r o n ment and cannot be l o c a t e d s i m p l y i n e i t h e r " , ( 3 5 ) and i t s content i n v o l v e s the  c h a r a c t e r s o f b o t h the s u b j e c t and the o b j e c t . ••*... the l o s i n g of consciousness does not mean the l o s s of a c e r t a i n e n t i t y but merely the c u t t i n g o f f of one's r e l a t i o n s w i t h e x p e r i e n c e s * Consciousness i _ t h a t sense means merely a normal r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e organism and t h e o u t s i d e o b j e c t s . And what we r e f e r t o as cons c i o u s n e s s as such i s r e a l l y the c h a r a c t e r of t h e o b j e o t ••.You may t h i n k of consciousness i n terms of i m p r e s s i o n s made upon t h i s s p i r i t u a l subgtanoe i n some u n e x p l a i n e d f a s h i o n i n the organism. Or you may t h i n k of i t merely as the r e l a t i o n between the organism and the o b j e o t itself.* (36) Consciousness i s fufcther "... a c e r t a i n environment t h a t e x i s t s  i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e organism, and i n which new c h a r a c t e r s can (35) M i n d , S e l f and S o c i e t y , p. (36)  Ibid,  p. 393  332  « 31  09  a r i s e i n v i r t u e o f the organism." (37) -  "•..  conscious s t a t e s are  recog-  n i z e d as c h a r a c t e r s of the w o r l d i n i t s r e l a t i o n t o the i n d i v i d u a l . "  (38)  "Consciousness as s t u f f , as e x p e r i e n c e , from the s t a n d p o i n t of behaviour™ i s t i o or dynamic psychology,  i s s i m p l y t h e environment of the human i n d i v -  i d u a l or s o c i a l group i n s o f a r as c o n s t i t u t e d by, or e x i s t e n t i a l l y r e l a t i v e t o t h a t of i n d i v i d u a l or s o c i a l group."  (39)  I t i s Mead's s t a t e d i n t e n t i o n i n such d e f i n i t i o n s t o extend the conoept t o i n c l u d e t h e e x t r a - o r g a n i c i n the f i e l d o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  to  take back what had gone over i n t o the s u b j e c t i n t h e h i s t o r y of p h i l o s ophy and r e t u r n the " s t o l e n goods" t o t h e i r proper l o c a t i o n .  The s t a t e -  ments are aimed e q u a l l y a t d i s p l a c i n g the s u b s t a n t i v a l view of  conscious-  ness and r e p l a c i n g i t w i t h a f u n c t i o n a l view o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  and  avoid-  i n g a p h y s i o l o g i c a l form of s o l i p s i s m , i n which the w o r l d i s p l a c e d i n s i d e the b r a i n . solipsistic  I t i s a s i n o e r e endeavour t o overcome s u b j e o t i v i s t  end  conclusions.  An e x a m i n a t i o n  of h i s p o s i t i o n r e v e a l s , however, t h a t Mead i s  c u t t i n g w i t h a two-edged k n i f e , and t h a t he t a k e s back w i t h one hand what he g i v e s w i t h the  other.  Taken a t f a c e v a l u e , c e r t a i n aspects o f the d e f i n i t i o n s appear q u i t e compatible w i t h t h e d i a l e c t i c a l and m a t e r i a l i s t i c approach. f i e l d o f consciousness  The  and i t s content i s g i v e n as a r e l a t i o n s h i p o f  prooesses between an organism and an environment t h a t are o b j e c t i v e l y there.  I t is^bhis f i e l d whioh Mead seems t o be examining w i t h a v i e w t o  d e t e r m i n i n g the s p e c i f i c form of r e l a t i o n s h i p s whioh are "conscious'^ and (37)  Mind> S e l f and S o c i e t y ,  (38)  Ibid.  (39)  I b i d . p.  p.  331 111-1®  p.  330  - 32 t h e i r manner o f movement*  R e l a t i o n s h i p s t h a t a r i s e by v i r t u e o f t h e  presences o f o r g a n i c p r o c e s s e s a r e d i f f e r e n t from o t h e r r e l a t i o n s h i p s by d e f i n i t i o n , and these s p e c i f i c r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t h e p h y s i c a l t o o r g a n i c processes do belong t o t h e f i e l d o f " c o n s c i o u s n e s s " which i s a f i e l d o f the  m a t e r i a l and r e f l e x i v e r e v e l a t i o n o f properties'.  Properties of  o b j e c t s e x h i b i t e d i n t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p o n l y a r e p r o p e r l y w i t h i n the ambit of c o n s c i o u s n e s s * But f u r t h e r s e l e c t i o n s w i l l throw t h e assumed o b j e c t i v i t y o f Mead i n t o doubt * I n p a r t i c u l a r , Mead's c o n c e p t i o n o f t h e environment, and the  c h a r a c t e r s "emergent" as t h e content o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , r e v e a l t h e  s u b j e c t i v e edge o f t h e k n i f e , and i n what manner one can move the whole i n o r g a n i c w o r l d over i n t o t h e o r g a n i c e x p e r i e n c e as a phase o f o r g a n i c a c t i v i t y , i n the p r o c e s s o f r e t u r n i n g t h e c o n t e n t o f consciousness t o i t s objective habitant * I n d e f i n i n g t h e environment i n which o r g a n i c a c t i v i t y and t h e c o g n i t i v e p r o c e s s t a k e s p l a c e , Mead's p o . s i t i o n i s t h a t the organism determines i t s environment*  This p o s i t i o n i s reiterated frequently,  t a k i n g such forms a s : There i s a d e f i n i t e a n d n e c e s s a r y g e s t a l l t o f s e n s i t i v i t y w i t h i n the organism, which determines s e l e c t i v e l y and r e l a t i v e l y the character of the external object i t perceives. What we term c o n s c i o u s n e s s needs t o be brought i n s i d e j u s t t h i s r e l a t i o n s h i p between organism and environment* Our c o n s t r u c t i v e s e l e c t i o n o f t h e environment, c o l o r , e m o t i o n a l v a l u e s , and t h e l i k e - i n terms o f our p h y s i o l o g i c a l sensi t i v i t i e s , i s e s s e n t i a l l y what we mean by c o n s c i o u s n e s s . (40) A c c o r d i n g t o Mead, t h e environment i s c o n s t i t u t e d by t h e organism i n two senses*  I n t h e f i r s t sense, i n t h e manner o f t h e q u o t a t i o n above, t h e  environment i s b y d e f i n i t i o n t h a t o n l y t o w h i c h t h e organism c a n r e a c t (40)  Mind, Self & Society,  p. 129  •-58  -  ( c a r r y on r e l a t i o n s h i p s ) by v i r t u e of i t s c a p a b i l i t i e s and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c modes of b e h a v i o u r .  A l l o u t s i d e of such r e l a t i o n s h i p s or p a r t i a l  i o n s h i p s i s not "environment".  relat-  Such a p o i n t o f view i n v o l v e s the  recog-  n i t i o n of the q u a l i t a t i v e uniqueness of the organism, and would be i n cluded i n any s c i e n t i f i c i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the l i f e - p r o c e s s e s of the organism*  The  ectical  d e f i n i t i o n i s q u i t e l e g i t i m a t e from the p o i n t of view of d i a l materialism. I n the second sense, the environment i s " c o n s t i t u t e d " by  the  organism i n t h e sense t h a t i t s c h a r a c t e r s are not p r e s e n t i n the p h y s i c a l w o r l d w i t h o u t the organism*  These c h a r a c t e r s are "emergent" and e x i s t  o n l y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the organism.  From the p o i n t of view of d i a l e c t -  i c s , i t i s q u i t e c o r r e c t t h a t upon e n t e r i n g i n t o r e l a t i o n s h i p s w i t h  org-  a n i c m a t t e r , "new"  but  p r o p e r t i e s of i n o r g a n i c processes are r e v e a l e d ;  t h e s e r e l a t i o n s h i p s are b a s i c a l l y r e l a t e d t o the s p e c i f i c q u a l i t y of the t h i n g i n v i r t u e of which i t can c a r r y on such r e l a t i o n s h i p s * Mead r e c o g n i z e s t h i s emergence, but h a v i n g o b t a i n e d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the " t h i n g - i n - i t s e l f " .  i t , i s at a l o s s to e x p l a i n i t s  He t h e r e f o r e p l a c e s the emergent  c h a r a c t e r s as dependent upon the organism, and d e f i n e s them as o f t e n as not as c o n s t i t u t e d by the organism*  The  environment becomes a s e t of  emergent c h a r a c t e r s h a v i n g a v e r y u n s e t t l e d r e l a t i o n s h i p t o any w o r l d o u t s i d e experience*  By t e r m i n o l o g i c a l s l e i g h t of hand, Mead reaches  a p o s i t i o n i n w h i c h "environment" i s e q u i v a l e n t t o "experience." t h e r e f o r e not s u r p r i s i n g t h a t he d i s c o v e r s t h a t he can put over i n t o the  objective  It is  "consciousness"  " o b j e o t i v e w o r l d " - i n s h o r t , t h a t t h e terms consciousness  and e x p e r i e n c e are interchangeable« The acceptance of a complete s u b j e c t i v i s m t  end-produot of t h i s p r o c e s s i s the  • - 34 * I t i s my o p i n i o n t h a t y o u have t o r e c o g n i z e n o t o n l y t h e organism but a l s o t h e w o r l d as having i t s r e a l i t y i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e organism* The w o r l d i s organized i n r e l a t i o n t o each organism* T h i s i s i t s p e r s p e c t i v e from t h a t p o i n t o f view* R e a l i t y i s t h e t o t a l i t y o f such p e r s p e c t i v e s ^ * (41) ( i t a l i c s n o t i n o r i g i n a l ) Such a statement  e x h i b i t s Mead's a f f i l i a t i o n s w i t h Wundt* W i t h -  i n t h i s t o t a l i t y o f p e r s p e c t i v e s t h e r e are c e r t a i n common elements " s o c i a l o b j e c t s " - a c c o r d i n g t o Mead©  T h i s common element i n t h e t o t a l i t y  of p e r s p e c t i v e s c o n s t i t u t e s f o r him t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d * The i n d i v i d u a l p a r t s o f experience' a r e t h e s u b j e c t i v e * The analogy here between Mead's o b j e c t i v e and s u b j e c t i v e worlds and Wundt * s mediate and immediate experience i s c l e a r * N e v e r t h e l e s s , an e x a m i n a t i o n of c e r t a i n q u o t a t i o n s above w i l l r e v e a l those i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s mentioned i n chapter two o f t h i s work* Cons c i o u s n e s s as ''a normal r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e organism and o u t s i d e o b j e c t s " i s n o t a s u b j e c t i v i s t statement* "Conscious  Nor i s t h e statement t h a t  s t a t e s a r e •»• c h a r a c t e r s o f t h e w o r l d i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o  the i n d i v i d u a l . "  The r o o t o f t h e i n c o n s i s t e n c y , i n c l u d i n g t h e d i f f i c u l t y  Mead f i n d s w i t h h i s emergent c h a r a c t e r s , seems t o l i e i n t h e s h i f t o f p o i n t o f v i e w which accomplishes w i t h g r e a t f a c i l i t y n o t alone f o u r volumes b u t w i t h i n a s i n g l e paragraph.  throughout  I n t h e above q u o t a t i o n ,  "*.. t h e l o s i n g o f consciousness does n o t mean t h e l o s s o f a c e r t a i n e n t i t y b u t merely t h e c u t t i n g o f f o f one's r e l a t i o n s w i t h experiencese Consciousness  i n t h a t sense means m e r e l y a normal r e l a t i o n s h i p between  the organism and t h e o u t s i d e o b j e c t s , " t h e s h i f t i s q u i t e apparent*  In  the f i r s t sentence, "environment" means " e x p e r i e n c e s " , and i n t h e second, i t i s "outside objects".  F a r from b e i n g i d e n t i c a l , t h e w o r l d as e x p e r i e n c e  (41) Movements o f Thought i n t h e N i n e t e e n t h Century, p* 315  - 35 © and t h e w o r l d as o u t s i d e o b j e c t s have a n t i t h e t i c a l p h i l o s o p h i c i m p l i c a t ions*  Such i n c o n s i s t e n c i e s a r e t o be found everywhere i n Mead's works  True t o pragmatic d o c t r i n e , he uses whichever s u i t s h i s purpose i n a given point of discussion* I n g e n e r a l , Mead accomplishes t h e s h i f t i n t h i s mannert i n examining t h e organism, he adheres, on t h e whole t o an o b j e c t i v e and mat™ e r i a l i s t p o i n t o f view*  The organism i s r e g a r d e d , as a m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s  g o i n g on, and i s s u b j e c t e d t o e x a m i n a t i o n as such*  The- environment,  however, i s regarded w h o l l y from t h e p o i n t o f v i e w o f t h e organism* W i t h the  s u b j e c t as f i r s t t e r m , Mead f i n d s i t i m p o s s i b l e t o g e t beyond e x p e r -  i e n c e as t h e counter t e r m .  M a t e r i a l i s m must s t a r t from t h e m a t e r i a l  w o r l d as f i r s t term and a r r i v e a t t h e s u b j e c t and s u b j e c t i v e as c o u n t e r term* Such i s t h e r e s u l t o f a m a t e r i a l i s t a n a l y s i s of c o n s c i o u s n e s s i n i t s s i m p l e s t sense as d e f i n e d by Mead®  I t i s found t h a t Mead has n o t  overcome t h e f i r s t d i f f i c u l t y o f m a t e r i a l i s m , t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p between p e r c e p t i o n and t h e w o r l d t h a t i s p e r c e i v e d , t h e c o n t e n t o f c o n s c i o u s n e s s , and t h e w o r l d which t h a t content i n c l u d e s and presupposes. The second meaning which t h e term / c o n s c i o u s n e s s " has f o r Mead i s i n t h e sense o f r a t i o n a l t h i n k i n g o r r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e * I t i s t h i s t y p e o f s p e c i f i c a l l y human c o n s c i o u s n e s s which Mead s u b j e c t s t o a most p e n e t r a t i n g a n a l y s i s *  I n t h i s a n a l y s i s , i t i s Mead's i n t e n t i o n t o  i n t e r p r e t mental phenomena, i d e a s , meaning, l o g i c , a l l t h a t i t had been n e c e s s a r y t o p l a c e i n a mind somehow d i f f e r e n t from and o t h e r t h a n t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d , i n terms o f o r g a n i c p r o c e s s e s o f a p a r t i c u l a r s o r t q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique t y p e s o f p r o c e s s i n t h e w o r l d o f m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s * The s t a n d p o i n t from which Mead conducts h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s i s  —36 the  —  s t a n d p o i n t o f s o c i a l b e h a v i o u r i s m . The o r i g i n of mind a c c o r d i n g t o  Mead, presupposes an ongoing s o c i a l p r o c e s s , and mind can be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f s t i m u l u s and response w i t h i n t h i s p r o c e s s . Response, f o r Mead, i s a much broader term t h a n the simple r e f l e x a r c u t i l i z e d by Watson. F o r Mead, response i n c l u d e s the whole response t o the environment or a p a r t i c u l a r phase o f i t i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c t . As s u c h , i t i n c l u d e s many s t i m u l i and responses i n Watson's sense, and i n d e f i n i t e c o m p l i c a t i o n s of t h e s e . Mead f o l l o w s up the b e h w v i o u r i s t i c a n a l y s i s of Watson but from t h i s new approach, t h a t man's l i f e , development, a t t i t u d e s , t h o u g h t , a l l a s p e c t s , are shaped and d i r e c t e d by the s o c i a l p r o c e s s o f w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l i s an i n t e r a c t i n g element.  W i t h i n t h i s framework the b e h a v i o u r -  i s t i o concepts of s t i m u l i and response are u t i l i z e d by Mead w i t h t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t i t i s a s o c i a l s t i m u l u s and a s o c i a l response w h i c h i s i n v o l v e d , and t h a t a c c o r d i n g l y , the sensory-motor a r c and i t s c o m p l e x i t i e s t a k e on new _a£ forms p e c u l i a r t o the s o c i a l and human s i t u a t i o n . The o r i g i n a t i o n o f mind w i t h i n t h i s s o c i a l process i s dependent upon a degree of nervous and g e n e r a l p h y s i o l o g i c a l development common o n l y t o human b e i n g s , a c o n d i t i o n which i n i t s t u r n presupposes the whole o f o r g a n i c evolution.  • The b a s i c ooncepts u t i l i z e d by Mead i n h i s a n a l y s i s , g i v e n such  p r e s u p p o s i t i o n , are the s o o i a l a c t , the g e s t u r e , a t t i t u d e s and t h e d e l a y e d response. The a o t , f o r Mead, i n c l u d e s the n a t u r a l t e l e o l o g y o f the organism,  i t s tendency t o m a i n t a i n i t s l i f e processes i n v i r t u e of which i t  s e l e c t s the s t i m u l i t o w h i c h i t w i l l respond.  The a c t , w i t h t h e p r e -  s u p p o s i t i o n of such ( n a t u r a l ) s e l e c t i o n , would t h e n i n c l u d e t h e r e c e / p t i o n of t h e s t i m u l u s and the response t o i t , c a r r i e d on u n t i l t h e impulse from  from w h i c h t h e r e c e p t i o n , o f t h e s t i m u l u s o r i g i n a t e d was s a t i s f i e d .  It is  t o be n o t i c e d here t h a t t h e a c t as used b y Mead d i f f e r s from Watson's simple s t i m u l u s - r e s p o n s e formula i n t h a t i t o r i g i n a t e s i n t h e l i f e p r o c e s s o f t h e organism, i t s mode o f e x i s t e n c e , and consequently i t s needs and c a p a c i t i e s . ism  Such a c o n c e p t i o n i s a fundamental c o r r e c t i o n o f Watson-  o f which d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m would approve.  Here t h e r e i s a n  i n t e g r a l r e l a t i o n s h i p between t h e s t i m u l u s and t h e response which f i n d common ground i n t h e m a t e r i a l mode o f l i f e o f t h e organism. The s o c i a l a c t belongs t o " . . . t h e c l a s s o f a c t s which i n v o l v e t h e c o - o p e r a t i o n o f more t h a n one i n d i v i d u a l , and whose o b j e c t as d e f i n e d by the a c t . . . i s a s o c i a l o b j e c t . I mean b y a s o c i a l o b j e c t one t h a t answers t o a l l p a r t s o f t h e complex a c t , though these p a r t s be found i n t h e conduct o f d i f f e r e n t i n d i v i d u a l s . The o b j e c t i v e o f t h e a c t s i s t h e n found i n the l i f e - p r o c e s s of t h e group, n o t i n those o f t h e separate i n d i v i d u a l a l o n e . " (42) For  Mead, i n d i v i d u a l experience cannot be t a k e n by i t s e l f , n o r  can s o c i a l a c t s be b u i l t up o u t o f i n d i v i d u a l s t i m u l i and responses. The p s y c h i c a l f a l l s w i t h i n t h e s o c i a l a c t and presupposes i t .  I t i s a part-  i c u l a r phase o f t h e a c t , t h a t phase which i s i n t e r n a l t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l , not i n t h e sense o f b e i n g i n another w o r l d , m e t a p h y s i c a l l y d i s t i n g u i s h e d , but i n t h e sense o f b e i n g w i t h i n h i s organism.  I n the d e f i n i t i o n of t h e  s o c i a l o b j e c t , r e c o g n i t i o n i s given t o the s o c i a l character of apperception The i n d i v i d u a l o r p r i v a t e c h a r a c t e r o f a p p e r c e p t i o n i s n o t denied b u t brought i n t o i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h the l i f e - p r o c e s s e s o f t h e group. The g e s t u r e , a concept borrowed w i t h m o d i f i c a t i o n s from Wundt, i s " t h a t p a r t o f t h e s o c i a l a c t w h i c h serves as a s t i m u l u s t o other forms i n v o l v e d i n t h e same s o c i a l a c t . " (43) The response o f t h e form t o which (42) M i n d , S e l f and S o c i e t y , p. 7, f o o t n o t e (43) I b i d ,  p. 42  — 38 — the g e s t u r e / i s a s t i m u l u s i s i n t u r n a s t i m u l u s t o the f i r s t form, and the r e s u l t i s a- c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s which t e r m i n a t e s i n t h e completion of t h e a c t .  The g e s t u r e and t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n o f gestures a s a whole f a l l  w i t h i n t h e conoept o f t h e s o c i a l a c t .  I t i s t h i s s i t u a t i o n , given the  p h y s i o l o g i c a l and n e u r a l development common t o human b e i n g s , out o f which mind and r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e a r i s e .  I n the conversation of gestures,  however, no mind o r i n t e l l i g e n c e , no " i d e a s " o r r a t i o n a l i t y i s i m p l i e d . The c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s can be e x p l a i n e d i n terras o f t h e c o n d i t i o n i n g of responses i n a s t r i c t l y Watsonian f a s h i o n , w i t h these m o d i f i c a t i o n s noted abcte^ namely, t h a t i t i s s o c i a l , and t h a t t h e r e c e p t i o n o f t h e s t i m u l u s , i n t h i s case t h e gesture ,bearsjan i n t i m a t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e l i f e processes o f t h e form. A t t i t u d e s belong t o t h e i n t e r n a l phases o f t h e a c t . The a t t i t u d e i s an i m p l i c i t r e a d i n e s s t o respond i n a c e r t a i n manner t o a s p e c i f i c stimulus or a s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n a l f e a t u r e .  I t i s b u i l t up through t h e  l i f e h i s t o r y o f t h e form through m a n i f o l d i n t e r a c t i o n s w i t h f n a t u r a l and s o c i a l p r o c e s s e s , and i t s presence i s e x p l i c a b l e i n terms o f t h e c o n d i t i o n ed response.  The a t t i t u d e determined what t h e response t o the s t i m u l u s  w i l l be. I t b e a r s , i n t h e human i n d i v i d u a l , a d e f i n i t e r e l a t i o n s h i p t o t h e a t t i t u d e s o f t h e group i n terms o f which t h e i n d i v i d u a l has h i s e x i s t e n c e . Mead p l a c e s t h e a t t i t u d e a t t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e a c t by analogy w i t h t h e s e l e c t i o n o f s t i m u l i by t h e form as e x p l a i n e d above.  This p l a c e -  ment o f t h e a t t i t u d e as t h e b e g i n n i n g o f t h e a c t i g o f d o u b t f u l v a l i d i t y . I t i m p l i e s t h a t a c t s o r i g i n a t e out o f a t t i t u d e s , i n s t e a d o f a t t i t u d e s out of a c t s .  A t t i t u d e s areresponses  t o s t i m u l i , and t h e s t i m u l u s i s l o g i c a l l y  p r i o r t o t h e a t t i t u d e b o t h h i s t o r i c a l l y , i n i t s o r i g i n , and^ l o g i c a l l y , i n the a c t i t s e l f .  - 39 The analogy between t h e n a t u r a l s e l e c t i v i t y of o r g a n i c l i f e and the s e l e c t i o n of s t i m u l i by a t t i t u d e s i s f a l s e j i n one case we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h c a p a b i l i t y o f r e s p o n s e , and i n t h e other we a r e d e a l i n g w i t h t h e cond i t i o n e d response i t s e l f , which presupposes a s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n , e i t h e r i n t e r n a l or e x t e r n a l ; i n one case we are d e a l i n g w i t h the o v e r t processes esses.  life  o f a form^and i n t h e other an i n t e r n a l p a r t of these l i f e  Mead d e f i n e s a t t i t u d e s as an i n t e r n a l p a r t of t h e s o c i a l  proc-  process,  and t h e b e a v i o u r i s t i c t h e o r y i m p l i e s t h a t t h e y are b u i l t up out o f i t and presuppose i t .  Such an analogy between t h e m a t e r i a l l i f e - p r o c e s s e s o f  organisms and psychology, which i s i n v o l v e d i n but not i d e n t i c a l t o t h e l i f e processes  o f t h e group i s i m p o s s i b l e .  I t i n v o l v e s an i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f t h e s u b j e c t i v e p a r t o f these p r o c e s s e s , o r e x p e r i e n c e , w i t h these processes  themselves.  Materialism  t a k e s t h e p o s i t i o n t h a t t h e m a t e r i a l l i f e processes  o f the group a r e  p r i m a r y and a t t i t u d e s a r e secondary and dependent.  The complex f u n c t i o n s  of a t t e n t i o n , which Mead i s i n t e r e s t e d i n a n a l y z i n g , are n o t e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f a t t e n t i o n b u t i n terms o f something e l s e . Here Mead's s u b j e o t i v i s t p h i l o s o p h y i n f l u e n c e s the v e r y seat o f h i s s c i e n t i f i c a n a l y s i s . The f o u r t h concept u t i l i z e d by Mead i s t h e delayed  response.  T h i s concept i s n o t necessary t o t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n of gestures as such, but i t s p o s s i b i l i t y i s a p r e r e q u i s i t e t o r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e .  The  d e l a y a l o f t h e response enables t h e b r e a k i n g up o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l phase o f t h e s o c i a l a c t , t h e s e p a r a t i o n o f t h e i n i t i a t i o n s and consummation o f the a c t .  The d e l a y e d response enables t h a t i n t e r n a l phase of t h e a c t t o  take p l a c e which i s t h e b a s i s o f i d e a t i o n a l and i n t e l l i g e n t  behaviour.  CHAPTER  FOUR  MEAD'S THEORY OF MIND AMD CONSCIOUSNESS:  W i t h i n t h e context o f these concepts, t h e s o c i a l a c t , t h e gestures', a t t i t u d e s and t h e delayed response. Mead e l a b o r a t e s h i s t h e o r y o f m e n t a l i t y and r e f l e c t i o n i n t e l l i g e n c e .  The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i s t h e  key mechanism i n Mead's e x p l a n a t i o n o f mindo A s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i s a g e s t u r e , u s u a l l y v e r b a l , which c a l l s out t h e same response i n t h e form whose gesture i t i s and i n t h e o t h e r forms i n v o l v e d i n t h e s o c i a l a c t , w i t h t h i s d i f f e r e n c e , t h a t t h e response i n the f i r s t form i s i m p l i c i t , i t does n o t achieve i t s o v e r t c o m p l e t i o n . T h i s i m p l i c i t response i s , f u r t h e r , s i m u l t a n e o u s l y a s t i m u l u s t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l making t h e g e s t u r e . The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol a r i s e s w i t h i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s , b u t i t i s d i f f e r e n t i a t e d from t h e gesture i n t h a t i t c a l l s out the same response i n b o t h forms i n v o l v e d i n t h e s o c i a l a c t .  I n t h e con-  v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s , an a c t o f one s o r t c a l l s out an a c t o f another s o r t i n the form t o which t h e gesture i s a s t i m u l u s . F o r a g e s t u r e t o be a s i g n i f i c a n t symbol, f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o have i n h i s own experience the meaning o f h i s g e s t u r e s , i t must c a l l f o r t h t h e same a t t i t u d e i n a l l those i n v o l v e d i n t h e a c t .  I t i s because t h e v o c a l guesture i s one t h a t  i s capable o f a f f e c t i n g i t s author i n t h e same manner t h a t i t a f f e c t s o t h e r forms, because he i s g i v i n g h i m s e l f t h e same s t i m u l u s he i s g i v i n g o t h e r s , t h a t t h i s type o f gesture i s t h e most common i n communication. Through t h i s type o f g e s t u r e , t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s capable o f s e l f s t i m u l a t i o n i n t h e same f a s h i o n as he i s oapable o f s t i m u l a t i o n from others.  He i s a b l e t o i n f l u e n c e h i m s e l f a s o t h e r s i n f l u e n c e him©  - 41 - • C o n v e r s e l y , he c a n i n f l u e n c e o t h e r s as he i n f l u e n c e s h i m s e l f . the  Tfafeough  medium o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol, he c a n c a l l out i n h i m s e l f t h e same  a t t i t u d e o f response which h i s g e s t u r e c a l l s out i n t h e o t h e r . the  He has  response o f t h e o t h e r i n h i s organism as a f u r t h e r stimulBS t o h i s own  a c t i v i t y o r c o n v e r s a t i o n s The rolejaf t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i n t h e s o c i a l act  i s t h a t o f a f u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t i o n o f t h e i n t e r n a l phases o f t h e a c t  which enables c o n t r o l b y t h e i n d i v i d u a l o f h i s p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n the a c t , by v i r t u e o f h i s knowledge o f t h e manner i n which o t h e r s w i l l , p a r t i c i p a t e * The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol mediates i n t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s i n such a manner as to  bring c o n t r o l o f the a c t i n t o i m p l i c i t i n d i v i d u a l behaviour.  The whole  s o c i a l a c t i s brought i n t o t h e e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l . The problem o f t h e p r i g i n a t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol out o f such a s i t u a t i o n as t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s i s one which Mead s o l v e s i n a v e r y u n s a t i s f a c t o r y manner. (44-) The d i f f i c u l t y o f g e t t i n g over from a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h a g e s t u r e which may o r may not be common t o two forms and which c a l l s out a d i f f e r e n t response^.in each form t o a s i t u a t i o n i n w h i c h forms use t h e same g e s t u r e ancjhave t o i t t h e same response i s one w h i c h o c c u p i e s an i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  He c o r r e c t l y  f e a l i z e s t h a t b o t h t h e s t i m u l u s and t h e response must l i e w i t h i n t h e l i f e p r o c e s s e s o f b o t h forms, and on t h i s b a s i s conducts a p a i n f u l i n v e s t i g a t i o n i n t o i m i t a t i o n i n birds©  T h i s he e x p l a i n s as t h e p i c k i n g out and s t r e n g t h -  e n i n g o f t h o s e responses which are common i n t h e songs o f b o t h b i r d s , a p r o c e s s which r e s u l t s i n a marked s i m i l a r i t y o f t h e i r song. ognizes t h a t t h e b i r d n o t e s a r e n o t s i g n i f i c a n t symbols*  Y e t he r e c -  Indeed, t h e  analogy o f t h e b i r d s has no r i g h t f u l p l a c e w i t h i n h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , f o r  (44)  See: M i n d , S e l f & S o c i e t y ,  P a r t . 1 1 , Chapters 8 & 9  - 42 •» the b i r d s are n o t i n v o l v e d i n a s o c i a l a c t , a c c o r d i n g t o h i s own d e f i n i t ion. G r a n t i n g t h a t something of the o r i g i n a t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i s d i s c o v e r e d  i n h i s e x a m i n a t i o n of the b i r d s , ( w h i c h i s n o t granted)  such a n e x a m i n a t i o n d i s p l a y s a fundamental weakness i n Mead's whole conc e p t i o n o f t h e o r i g i n a t i o n o f t h e symbol.  F o r , granted t h a t the b i r d s i t -  u a t i o n i s a s o c i a l a c t by Mead's d e f i n i t i o n , which i t i s n o t , the s o l e s t i m u l i i n t h e s i t u a t i o n are those provided by the s o c i a l process i t s e l f , the a c t u a l a c t i v i t i e s o f other forms or t h e i n t e r n a l s t i m u l i o f t h e form itself«  The problem o f t h e common s t i m u l u s which c a l l s f o r t h a common  response, t h e problem o f the symbol which has i d e n t i c a l meaning f o r both forms i s s o l v e d by Mead w h o l l y i n s u b j e c t i v e o r s o c i a l terms - t h e o b j e c t i v e w o r l d and t h e problem o f t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f s t i m u l i i s l e f t o u t . The problem o f a v e r b a l s t i m u l u s which i s a s i g n i f i c a n t symbol and a t the same time a s u b s t i t u t e s t i m u l u s f o r a p h y s i c a l o b j e c t cannot be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f t h e p i c k i n g out and s t r e n g t h e n i n g v o c a l responses i n a v o c a l situation  alone• I n s o f a r as Mead does c o n s i d e r the problem o f t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n  of s t i m u l i , he f i n d s no p r o p e r s o l u t i o n f o r i t . Mead c o r r e c t l y r e a l i z e s , i n h i s c r i t i c i s m o f Watson's e x p l a n a t i o n o f language as the c o n d i t i o n i n g of r e f l e x e s and t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n of s t i m u l i j t h a t such an e x p l a n a t i o n begs the q u e s t i o n .  The problem i s e x a c t l y analogous t o t h a t o u t l i n e d by Marx ,f  i n t h e t h i r d t h e s i s on Feuerbaek: ?l:e ^rUri.-?.:l3« ^The M a t e r i a l i s t d o c t r i n e c o n c e r n i n g t h e changing o f c i r c u m s t a n c e s and e d u c a t i o n f o r g e t s t h a t circumstances are changed by men and t h a t t h e educator h i m s e l f must be educated. T h i s d o c t r i n e has t h e r e f o r e t o d i v i d e s o c i e t y i n t o two parts_,__one_ of. w h i c h i s s u p e r i o r t o s o c i e t y . ^ ( 4 5 ) (45)  Appendix t o The German I d e o l o g y ,  p. 197-198  . • - • 43 Mead says i * You c a n e x p l a i n the c h i l d ' s f e a r o f the w h i t e r a t by c o n d i t i o n i n g i t s r e f l e x e s , but y o u cannot e x p l a i n t h e conduct o f Mr. "Watson i n c o n d i t i o n i n g t h a t s t a t e d r e f l e x by means o f a s e t o f c o n d i t i o n e d r e f l e x e s , u n l e s s you s e t up a super-Watson t o c o n d i t i o n h i s r e f l e x e s . * (46) Mead's answer t o t h e problem i s t o take c o n d i t i o n i n g i n t o t h e s e l f - a c t i v i t y o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , i n such a manner t h a t t h r o u g h the s i g n i f i c a n t symbol he c o n d i t i o n s h i s own r e f l e x e s . -  The c r i t i c i s m here i s  obvious. The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol, i n terms o f w h i c h t h i s s e l f - c o n d i t i o n i n g goes on, i n s o f a r , a s i t i m p l i e s r e f e r e n c e as w e l l as commonality presupposes j u s t t h o s e d i f f i c u l t i e s which i t i s now used t o e x p l a i n . Mead's r e a l problem i s t o f i n d a s i t u a t i o n i n which organisms are i n v o l v e d i n t h e same a c t i v i t y w i t h the same o b j e c t s and hence  already  have a common element o f response t o an i d e n t i c a l p h y s i c a l s t i m u l u s . The a c t i v i t y c a r r i e d on must be one t h a t i n v o l v e s t h e l i f e - p r o c e s s e s of b o t h forms and which c a n be p a r t i c i p a t e d i n c o - o p e r a t i v e l y by each i n v i r t u e of t h e i r common o b j e c t i v e and common a t t i t u d e s .  T h i s much i s r e c o g n i z e d  by Mead i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l act© But Mead f a i l s t o r e a l i z e t h a t a s i t u a t i o n of - t h i s s o r t e x i s t s i n cooperative  a c t i v i t y i n l a b o r , i n t h e p r o d u c t i o n o f t h e means o f l i f e ,  so t h a t he d e s c r i b e s t h e p s y c h i c s i d e o f t h i s p r o c e s s but does n o t understand i t s b a s i s and i s hence l e d j i n t o absurd c o n t r a d i c t i o n s . The l a b o r process i s t h e o n l y e x p l a n a t i o n o f t h e common response t o an i d e n t i c a l o b j e c t i n v i r t u e o f w h i c h t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f s t i m u l i , and t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol/whioljfpre supposes t h e common response, c a n be e x p l a i n e d .  Mead app-  roaches t h e problem from t h e p o i n t o f view o f g e t t i n g from the same  (46); M i n d , S e l f & S o c i e t y , p . 106  gesture  ea  t o t h e same response*  44  '  '  I n s o f a r as he l o o k s f o r t h i s s i t u a t i o n i n t h e sub-  human c o n v e r s a t i o n of g e s t u r e s , i n s o f a r as he i s i g n o r a n t o f t h e s p e c i f i c determining  c h a r a c t e r o f human s o c i e t y and f a i l s t o r e a l i z e t h a t s o c i e t y  cannot be compared t o subhuman l i f e i n any manner, he cannot f i n d t h a t s i t u a t i o n which he seeks. I n r e a l i t y , Mead has approached t h e problem not o n l y from t h e wrong p r e m i s e s ,  but upside down.  Theproblera i s n o t t o get from t h e gesture  t o s i m i l a r responses, but t o get from s i m i l a r responses and s t i m u l i alreadye x p l a i n e d by t h e p r i m i t i v e l a b o r process t o t h e s u b s t i t u t i o n o f t h e same v o c a l stimulus f o r the o r i g i n a l object. vocal a b i l i t y ,  This i s a problem t h a t , assuming  should n o t be d i f f i c u l t t o s o l v e . The meaning o f such a  s u b s t i t u t e s t i m u l u s i s a l r e a d y i n t h e experience  of t h e i n d i v i d u a l s i n -  volved. Mead's d i f f i c u l t y  i n accounting f o r t h e reference character of  symbols i s d i r e c t l y connected w i t h h i s s u b j e c t i v i s t p h i l o s o p h y , and t h e r e finds a quasi-solution. y S y m b o l i z a t i o n c o n s t i t u t e s new o b j e c t s n o t c o n s t i t u t e d b e f o r e , o b j e c t s which would n o t e x i s t except f o r t h e context of s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s wherein symbolization o c c u r s . Language does not simply symbolize a s i t u a t i o n or o b j e c t which i s a l r e a d y t h e r e i n advance; i t makes p o s s i b l e t h e e x i s t e n c e or appearance o f t h a t s i t u a t i o n or o b j e c t , f o r i t i s a p a r t o f t h e mechanism whereby that s i t u a t i o n or object i s created... f o r t o repeat, o b j e c t s are i n a genuine sense c o n s t i t u t e d w i t h i n t h e s o c i a l process o f e x p e r i e n c e , by communication and mutual adjustment o f behaviour among t h e i n d i v i d u a l organisms w h i c h are i n v o l v e d i n t h a t p r o c e s s and w h i c h c a r r y i t on. (47) * ( i t a l i c s not i n o r i g i n a l ) Objects are dependent upon t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s i t s e l f , and hence t h e r e i s no need t o e x p l a i n t h e r e f e r e n c e c h a r a c t e r o f t h e symbolI  (47)  Mind, S e l f , & Society,  p. 78  => §5 Language makes i t s own o b j e c t s , so t h a t symbolic r e f e r e n c e i s e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f t h e symbol i t s e l f I  Such are t h e s c i e n t i f i c  conclus-  i o n s reached by pragmatic p h i l o s o p h y . To r e i t e r a t e , n e i t h e r the r e f e r e n c e n o r the common c h a r a c t e r s o f the symbol c a n be e x p l a i n e d b y t h e symbol i t s e l f , n o r b y s o c i a l i n t e r a c t i o n i t s e l f j . Without both c h a r a c t e r s t h e gesture i s n o t a symbol, and t h i s f a c t i s t h e one t h a t e x p l a i n s why the i m i t i a t i o n of b i r d s i s n o t s y m b o l i z a t i o n . S y m b o l i z a t i o n i s a d i a l e c t i c o f r e f e r e n c e and commonality. A b s t r a c t e i t h e r and t h e r e i s no symbolI  I n c r i t i c i z i n g Wundt, Mead o b j e c t s t o h i s assump-  t i o n t h a t common ideas and o b j e c t s e x i s t p r i o r t o s y m b o l i z a t i o n , and. comp l a i n s t h a t no such s i t u a t i o n c a n be found i n the c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s * I t i s q u i t e c o r r e c t t h a t no such s i t u a t i o n e x i s t s w i t h i n the subhuman conv e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s , but such a s i t u a t i o n i s found w i t h i n the human labor process.  I n Mead's terms, t h e problem i s t h r e e f o l d , t o f i n d a common  gesture h a v i n g a common response and a common r e f e r e n c e *  He cannot s o l v e  t h i s problem, so he t u r n s the whole problem on i t s head/ and f a l l s  into  l o g i c a l f a l l a c y , e x p l a i n i n g t h a t which i s t o be e x p l a i n e d i n terms o f itself.  I t i s c l e a r t h a t t h e o n l y answer t o t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n o f the  gest-  ure t o b o t h forms and t h e o b j e o t can o n l y be e x p l a i n e d by the d i a l e c t i c o f man i n h i s n a t u r a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s , o f which the d i a l e o t i c o f t h e r e f e r e n c e and common c h a r a c t e r s o f the symbol i s a moment* F a i l i n g t o understand t h e double aspects o f man's mode o f e x i s t e n c e , t h e n a t u r a l and the s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s as a u n i t y o f o p p o s i t e s w i t h i n the l a b o r p r o c e s s , Mead cannot understand t h e o r i g i n a t i o n o f the d u a l c h a r a c t e r o f the symbol which a r i s e s out o f t h e needs o f such a s i t u a t i o n . I t i s n o t denied t h a t i n a v e r y r e a l sense t h i s s o c i a l  process  and t h e symbol make p o s s i b l e t h e appestsance and (not o r I ) e x i s t e n c e o f  - 46 *? new o b j e c t s * The symbol and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s themselves are new o b j e c t s , as w e l l as t h e m a t e r i a l produce which cooperative  l a b o r makes p o s s i b l e *  As t o t h e power and c o n t r o l which s y m b o l i z a t i o n g i v e s over s o c i a l and n a t u r a l a c t i v i t y , Mead's a n a l y s i s i s v e r y good*  I t i s i n terms o f t h e s o c i a l p r o c e s s fend w i t h i n t h e framework o f the s o c i a l a c t t h a t Mead a l s o develops h i s t h e o r y o f meaning*  This  theory  i s a development and e l a b o r a t i o n of t h e b e h a v i o u r i s t i o t h e o r y o f meaning* "Meaning", says Watson, " i s j u s t a way of saying t h a t out o f a l l t h e ways an i n d i v i d u a l has of r e a c t i n g t o t h i s o b j e c t , a t any one time he r e a c t s i n o n l y one o f these ways ..." (48) For Mead t o o , meaning l i e s i n the r e s p o n s e , but i t i s a s o c i a l response and a s o c i a l stimulus t h a t a r e i n volved*  "Meaning" says Mead, " a r i s e s and l i e s w i t h i n t h e f i e l d of t h e  r e l a t i o n between t h e gesture  o f a g i v e n human organism and t h e subsequent  b e h a v i o u r o f t h i s organism as i n d i c a t e d t o another human organism by t h a t gesture*"  (49) The meaning i s g i v e n i n .the response o f t h e o t h e r organism  to t h i s gesture.  T h i s response has r e f e r e n c e t o t h i s gesture  completion of the a c t .  The meaning o f t h e gesture  adjustment t o t h e gesture  on the p a r t of t h e other*  and t o t h e  i s made e x p l i c i t i n t h e Meaning i n v o l v e s t h i s  t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p between g e s t u r e , response and t h e f u t u r e phases o f the a c t i m p l i e d by t h e g e s t u r e * Before t h e appearance o f mind and t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol, t h e n , meaning i s p r e s e n t i n t h e f i e l d o f o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s .  Mead says  ' l e a n i n g i s t h u s a development of something o b j e c t i v e l y t h e r e as a r e l a t e i o n between c e r t a i n phases of t h e s o c i a l a c t * (48)  Behaviourism,  p. 201  (49)  Mind, Self & Society,  p . 75  I t i s not a psychical  •» 47 -> 5  a d d i t i o n t o t h a t a c t , and i t i s not an ' i d e a as t r a d i t i o n a l l y conceived'.' (50)  F u r t h e r , "the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of gestures i s n o t " b a s i c a l l y a process  g o i n g on i n a mind as such, o r one n e c e s s a r i l y i n v o l v i n g a mind: i t i s an e x t e r n a l , o v e r t , p h y s i c a l or p h y s i o l o g i c a l process going on i n the a c t u a l f i e l d o f s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e . " (51) Meaning, o b j e c t i v e l y t h e r e i n t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p s o f t h e convers a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s , becomes a p s y c h i c a l content w i t h t h e appearance o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol.  With t h e mechanism o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t  symbol,  which a l l o w s f o r t h e i n t e r n a l i z y c t i o n o f t h e o b j e c t i v e r e l a t i o n s o f t h e act  i n t o the experience o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l , t h e i n d i v i d u a l has t h e meaning  of h i s g e s t u r e , i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p t o the response o f t h e other which has t h i s r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f u t u r e phases o f t h e ongoing a o t i v i t y .  The r o l e o f  t h e symbol i n r e l a t i o n s h i p t o meaning i s t h a t o f i n t e r n a l i z i n g a r e l a t i o n ship o b j e c t i v e l y there, of bringing the r e l a t i o n s h i p into the i m p l i c i t conduct o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l and i n t h i s sense i n t o s e l f - c o n s c i o u s e x p e r i e n c e . T h i s p r o c e s s o f i n t e r n a l i z i n g t h e a c t by means o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i s apprehension o f meaning, although Mead f r e q u e n t l y confuses i t , once o b t a i n e d , w i t h meaning i t s e l f . "What does i t mean" i n t h i s sense means "how does t h e organism respond". I t i s obvious t h a t such response i m p l i e s the past c o n d i t i o n i n g and e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e organism.  An i n e x p e r i e n c e d organism cannot g i v e an  adequate response t o t h e f u t u r e r e f e r e n c e which t h e gesture has*  Even i n  the c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s t h e r e i s p r e s e n t an i n n e r phase o f t h e a c t which Mead i n t h i s c o n t e x t o v e r l o o k s .  (50)  Mind, S e l f & S o c i e t y , p. 76  (51)  Ibidi  p. 79  What Mead does emphasize i s t h a t  .  « 48 -  i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s , organisms respond t o each other as o b j e c t s t o w h i c h t h e y have been c o n d i t i o n e d * They do n o t respond t o each other as s u b j e c t s , which i s o n l y p o s s i b l e when t h e i n d i v i d u a l has t h e response o f the o t h e r i n h i s own experience t h r o u g h t h e mechanism o f t h e symbol* The c r i t i c i s m t h a t t h e r e i s an i d e a t i o n a l element even i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s does n o t o f c o u r s e , i n v a l i d a t e Mead's a n a l y s i s ?  of t h e r o l e o f the symbol i n t h e having of meaning o f h i s gesture by t h e individual himself*  What t h e o b j e c t i o n i s , i s t h a t the respondent has  the meaning o f t h e gesture i n h i s experience not be capable of an adequate response*  a l r e a d y , otherwise he would  Mead's p o i n t t h a t t h e author o f  the gesture does not have t h e meaning o f h i s gesture i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n of g e s t u r e s i s q u i t e c o r r e c t o An o v e r s i g h t on Mead's p a r t even more s e r i o u s b u t c l o s e l y a l l i e d , i s t h a t o b j e p t s i n t h e p h y s i c a l w o r l d have no meaning, i f Mead i s t o s t a y s t r i c t l y w i t h i n h i s premises o f t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n of g e s t u r e s *  Mead over-  l o o k s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e r e are two s o r t s of o b j e c t s t o which we respond: s o c i a l o b j e c t s , which are t h e gestures and responses of other organisms, and p h y s i c a l o b j e c t s *  When Mead does concede r e c o g n i t i o n t o t h e p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t , he does one o f two t h i n g s •  E i t h e r he p o i n t s out t h a t i t s meaning  i s g i v e n i n our response t o i t , and t h i s sense of t h e word f a l l s his definition.  outside  Gr he regards t h e p h y s i c a l o b j e c t as being s o c i a l l y con-  s t i t u t e d w i t h i n t h e s o c i a l c o n t e x t oi e x p e r i e n c e , i n e f f e c t , denies i t s e x i s t e n c e as an i n d e p e n d e n t l y e x i s t i n g p h y s i c a l o b j e c t . M a t e r i a l i s m would i n s i s t on t h e f i r s t o f these a l t e r n a n t s * I t i s t o be noted t h a t t h e response t o the p h y s i c a l o b j e c t i n v o l v e s p r e c i s e l y the same t r i a d i c r e l a t i o n s h i p as t h e response w i t h i n t h e c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s w h i c h , as i s p o i n t e d out above, i s response t o t h e other as a n  o b j e c t , and n o t as s u b j e c t s  The response t o t h e " g e s t u r e " o f the p h y s i c a l  o b j e c t , t h e f a l l i n g o f a t r e e o r the dropping o f t h e stone, bears the same r e f e r e n c e t o t h e f u t u r e a c t i v i t y of t h e o b j e c t as response t o o r g a n i c g e s t u r e s , assuming t h a t the organism i s i n b o t h cases capable o f an adequate response.  W i t h t h i s e x t e n s i o n , -which i s suggested by Mead h i m s e l f  but i s not l o g i c a l l y i n c l u d e d i n h i s t h e o r y , t h e t h e o r y o f meaning i s acceptable  t o m a t e r i a l i s m , p r o v i d i n g t h a t meaning and e x i s t e n c e are n o t  identified.  I t -would seem more a c c u r a t e , however, t o denote meaning as  the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t y o f an o b j e c t , and knowledge o f t h i s  character-  i s t i c as r e f l e c t e d i n t h e response o f an organism as apprehension o f t h i s mode o f a o t i v i t y .  The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i s t h e n a q u a l i t i v e l y new stage  i n t h e apprehension o f meaning a r i s i n g w i t h i n t h e l a b o r processo Symboli z a t i o n does c o n s t i t u t e new o b j e c t s , f o r i t has as i t s consequence t h e i n t e r n a l i z g r t i o n o f s t i l l f u r t h e r phases of the a c t and t h e response t o the other as s u b j e c t .  The s i g n i f i c a n t symbol a l l o w s us t o c a l l out i n  o u r s e l v e s and others t h e response which t h e o b j e c t s which i t means c a l l s out. I n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of Mead * s t h e o r y o f meaning, i t i s not necessa r y t o e q u i v o c a t e about t h e use o f words. Head i s q u i t e c o r r e c t , however, i n p o i n t i n g out t h a t language i s not a r b i t r a r y , t h a t i t i n v o l v e s t h e whole s o c i a l a c t and i n v o l v e s a c o m p l i c a t i o n o f responses. (52) Nor i s Mead's usage o f t h e term meaning a r b i t r a r y , i n t h e sense o f a nominal d e f i n i t i o n b u t grows out o f t h e s u b j e c t i v i s m o f h i s p o i n t o f v i e w .  One o f t h e c h i e f c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f Mead t o t h e m a t e r i a l i s t t h e o r y of mind i s h i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of ideas and concepts i n b e h a v i o u r i s t i o (52)  M i n d , S e l f & S o c i e t y , p. 74  - 50 - • terms  3  i n terms t h a t a r e dynamic and physiological©  Ideas, f o r Mead, are  i m p l i c i t r e s p o n s e s , o r g a n i z a t i o n s o f a t t i t u d e s corresponding "A b e h a v i o u r i s t i c t r e a t m e n t ,  to stimuli.  i f i t i s made broad enough, i f i t makes use  of t h e almost i n d e f i n i t e c o m p l e x i t i e s e x i s t i n g i n t h e nervous system, can a d j u s t i t s e l f t o many f i e l d s which were supposed t o be c o n f i n e d t o an i n t r o s p e c t i v e a t t a c k s " (53) Ideas a r e i m p l i c i t a c t i v i t y and t h e s k e l e t o n of t h e i r s t r u c t u r e i s found i n the c e n t r a l nervous system,,  Ideas, i n  s h o r t , a r e p a t t e r n s o f a c t i o n i n t h e c e n t r a l nervous system which a r e initiated  b u t not o v e r t l y expressed*  As suoh t h e y f a l l w i t h i n the  field  of s o c i a l andjaatural i n t e r a c t i o n . "Ideas, as d i s t i n c t from a c t s , or as f a i l i n g t o issue i n overt behaviour,  a r e s i m p l y what we do n o t do; t h e y  are p o s s i b i l i t i e s of o v e r t responses v/hich we t e s t out i m p l i c i t y i n t h e c e n t r a l nervous system and t h e n r e j e c t i n f a v o r o f those w h i c h we do n o t i n f a c t actupon." (54) Ideas as i n v o l v i n g meaning i m p l y s i g n i f i c a n t symbols. i d e a s a r e i d e a s we can i n d i c a t e t o o u r s e l v e s and t o o t h e r s ;  Conscious  a pattern of  r e s p o n s e s , i n other words, t h a t we a r e able t o i n i t i a t e i n o u r s e l v e s and i n others»  Conscious i d e a s a r e a p a r t o f t h e s o c i a l a c t , ax s u b j e c t i v e  phase o f t h e a c t i n t h e sense t h a t tfefy are i n t e r n a l t o t h e i n d i v i d u a l organism.  I n t h e conscious  idea there i s that s e l f - a c t i v i t y , that s e l f -  a s t i m a t i o n o f t h e organism through the medium o f s y m b o l i z a t i o n by v i r t u e of which t h e i n d i v i d u a l has h i s r e a c t i o n under h i s own c o n t r o l . When t h e i n d i v i d u a l i s able t o c o n d i t i o n h i s own responses through a process o f s e l f - s t i m u l a t i o n i n t h e same manner t h a t o t h e r s s t i m u l a t e h i m , he has a conscious  i d e a , s t i l l e x p l i c a b l e i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l terras. The s i g n i f i c a n t  (53) M i n d , S e l ffe_S o c i e t y , (54)  Ibid,  p. 99  p. 12  *• 51 •=» symbol i s t h e mechanism fundamental t o such s e l f - c o n s c i o u s i d e a s . Mead i s here e x p l a i n i n g away the l a s t refuge of i d e a l i s m i n m a t e r i a l i s t terms» An important c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of the i d e a s x as an i m p l i c i t organized  and  r e a d i n e s s t o a c t i s what Mead c a l l s i t s temporal d i m e n s i o n . As  the e x t e r n a l a c t , t h e process of i n t e r a c t i o n w i t h i n the sphere of e x t e r n a l a o t i v i t y , has a temporal span and a manner of o r g a n i z a t i o n i n t i m e ;  so,  i n t e r n a l i z e d through experience or c o n d i t i o n i n g t h i s temporal phase i s p r e s e n t i n the a c t as the i n f l u e n c e of the l a t e r stages of the a c t on the earlier  stages: "There i s , " s t a t e s Mead, " i t i s t o be n o t e d , an i n f l u e n c e of the l a t e r a c t on t h e e a r l i e r a c t . The l a t e r process which i s t o go on has a l r e a d y been i n i t i a t e d , and t h a t l a t e r p r o c e s s has i t s i n f l u e n c e s on the e a r l i e r p r o c e s s . Now, such an o r g a n i z a t i o n of a group of nervous elements as w i l l l e a d t o conduct w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o the o b j e c t s about us i s what one would f i n d i n the c e n t r a l nervous system answering t o what we c a l the o b j e c t . " (55) The  s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h i s c o n c e p t i o n  of the i d e a , as a v a l i d a t i n g  case f o r the m a t e r i a l i s t e p i s t e m o l o g y , a n d j i i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m i n p a r t icular, i s fourfold•  F i r s t , the whole i n t e r p r e t a t i o n i s w i t h i n the frame-  work of m a t e r i a l p r o c e s s e s .  Ideas themselves are not t h i n g s , but  material  p r o c e s s e s ^ as such} and as an i n t e r n a l i z a t i o n of e x t e r n a l temporal a c t i v i t y , t h e y have a temporal d i m e n s i o n , t h e y are not s t a t i c but f l v i i d . the a n a l y s i s i m p l i e s an answer t o the e p i s t e m o l o g i o a l i d e n t i t y of t h i n k i n g and b e i n g , the q u e s t i o n of how w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o the w o r l d around us.  Second,  q u e s t i o n of the  our thoughts stand  As d e r i v e d from the a c t u a l o v e r t  i n t e r a c t i v i t y of p r o c e s s e s , the i d e a r e f l e c t s the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t y < of the e x t e r n a l p r o c e s s :  The  i d e a , a l t h o u g h removed from the  "external  w o r l d " , o r i g i n a t e s i n t h i s world and r e f l e c t s i t i n the form of temporal (55)  Mind, S e l f , & S o c i e t y ,  p.  70  - 52 «= and s p a t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of n e u r a l p a t t e r n s * T h i n k i n g i s a mode of beh a v i o u r of human b e i n g *  T h i r d , i f the i d e a i s erroneous, of  something  goes wrong w i t h the i n t e r n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , t h e proof of t h i s i s o v e r t material practice*  Something w i l l go wrong w i t h the a c t , which the i d e a  no l o n g e r p r o p e r l y r e f l e c t s .  F i n a l l y , ideas i n t h i s sense out across the  o l d t e r m i n o l o g y and forms of t h i n k i n g which gave r i s e t o the of p r i m a r y and secondary q u a l i t i e s *  conceptions  Ideas r e f l e c t the q u a l i t i e s of  o b j e c t s as t h e i r c h a r a c t e r i s t i c modes of a c t i o n . A l l of these i m p l i c a t i o n s of h i s t h e o r y of i d e a s are not e x p l i c i t l y drawn out by Mead.  I n p a r t i c u l a r , Mead o v e r l o o k s t h e f a c t t h a t t h e  a n a l y s i s i m p l i e s the i d e n t i t y of t h i n k i n g and  being.  A b s t r a c t i o n , and the u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r o f concepts has  long  been a p o i n t of d i f f i c u l t y i n the m a t e r i a l i s t e x p l a n a t i o n of mind*  I t has  seemed i m p o s s i b l e f o r a b s t r a c t ideas t o be s t a t e d i n p h y s i o l o g i c a l t e r m s , and t h e r e f o r e necessary t o p l a c e them over i n t o "pure consciousness"* we pass from sense p e r c e p t i o n t o concepts, how  How  we a b s t r a c t and g e n e r a l i z e  are key q u e s t i o n s , f o r t h e y are ooncern the p o i n t of t r a n s i t i o n from the sensed t o the l o g i c a l forms of knowledge, and as t h e y are answered, so i s answered the e p i s t e m o l o g i c a l q u e s t i o n ,  what correspondence has the con-  c e p t u a l w o r l d w i t h t h e world o f nature*  I n psychology,  the problem o f  concepts t a k e s the form of the problem of r e c o g n i t i o n . Mead a s k s , "Can we f i n d a s t r u o t u r e t h e r e i n the c e n t r a l nervous system t h a t would answer t o a c e r t a i n type o f response whioh r e p r e s e n t s f o r us t h e c h a r a c t e r of the o b j e c t w h i c h we r e c o g n i z e , as d i s t i n c t from mere (56) sensations?" 5 6  ( )  W i t h i n the i n t e r a c t i v i t y o f t h e form and the o b j e c t , which Mind, S e l f & Society,  p*  84  proceeds a c c o r d i n g t o the l i f e processes and needs o f t h e form and t h e c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a c t i v i t y of the o b j e c t , u n i v e r s a l i t y i s found i n a c e r t a i n type o f response.  Mead answers, "There i s a u n i v e r s a l i n t h e form o f t h e  response t h a t answers t o a whole s e t o f p a r t i c u l a r s , and t h e p a r t i c u l a r s may be i n d e f i n i t e i n number, p r o v i d e d  o n l y t h a t t h e y have c e r t a i n char™  a c t e r s i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e response." (57) The u n i v e r s a l as c o n c e p t u a l , f o r Mead, i s t h e r e l a t i o n s h i p o f a s i n g l e form of response over a g a i n s t an i n d e f i n i t e number of s p e c i f i c objects.  The response i s u n i v e r s a l , and t h e s t i m u l u s p a r t i c u l a r .  This  i s the manner i n which a b s t r a c t i o n t a k e s p l a c e , and the -fhole f a l l s w i t h i n t h e complex b e h a v i o u r o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l and the group. I n c o n s i d e r i n g t h e u n i v e r s a l as conceptual Mead t o a c e r t a i n extent i g n o r e s the u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r s o f t h e o b j e c t s t h e m s e l v e s , w h i c h are i m p l i e d by t h e a n a l y s i s . M a t e r i a l i s m would p o i n t out t h a t i n order f o r t h e u n i v e r s a l response t o be p o s s i b l e , i n t h e sense e i t h e r o f o r i g i n a t i o n o r o f adequacy, i t must r e f l e c t p r o p e r t i e s which t h e i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s have i n common, t h e u n i v e r s a l c h a r a c t e r of the o b j e c t . The a n a l y s i s i m p l i e s and c o r r o b o r a t e s  the d i a l e c t i c a l conception  o f t h i n g s as a  u n i t y o f t h e p a r t i c u l a r and t h e u n i v e r s a l * Implying but not emphasizing t h e o b j e c t i v e as w e l l as t h e s u b j e c t i v e nature o f u n i v e r s a l i t y , Mead c o n t r i b u t e s t o t h e M a r x i s t t h e s i s on t h e problems of conceptual  knowledge by a s c i e n t i f i c h y p o t h e s i s  as t o  how t h i s i s p o s s i b l e , t h a t a b s t r a c t i o n i s a s u b j e c t i v e phase o f o b j e c t i v e p r a c t i c e , and how i t i s p o s s i b l e t h a t conceptual  knowledge a r i s e s o u t o f  and corresponds t o forms of a c t i v i t y of t h e m a t e r i a l w o r l d .  (57)  Mind, S e l f , & Society,  §. 84  loc.cit  Mental  - 54 o b j e c t s , concepts, a r e forms o f i m p l i c i t nesponse, t e m p o r a l l y  organized,  t h a t are b u i l t up out o f e x p e r i e n c e . As p h y s i o l o g i c a l l y i m p l i c i t , t h e y are i n d e f i n i t e l y complex p a t t e r n s i n t h e c e n t r a l nervous system. Another phase o f u n i v e r s a l i t y considered by Mead i s i t s s o c i a l dimension i n human e x p e r i e n c e , which i n v o l v e s t h e mechanism o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol.  I n t h i s sense pf£ u n i v e r s a l i t y ^ i s a common response on  the p a r t o f a s o c i a l group. The u n i v e r s a l i t y o f t h e symbol l i e s i n t h e f a c t t h a t everyone i n t h e group can take a s i m i l a r a t t i t u d e t o i t . T h i s form o f u n i v e r s a l i t y i n t r o d u c e s two q u e s t i o n s , one o f which aire  d e a l t w i t h i n d e t a i l by Mead i n h i s t h e o r y o f t h e s e l f , and one of  which i s i n essence i g n o r e d .  I n c l u d i n g t h i s r e l a t i o n t o t h e responses  of o t h e r s , t h e response o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l has i t s e l f an i n d i v i d u a l and a common c h a r a c t e r j  t h e concept f o r t h e i n d i v i d u a l d i f f e r s w i t h i n t h e  common l i m i t s a c c o r d i n g t o h i s p o i n t o f v i e w , h i s past experience as a member o f t h a t s o c i e t y .  U n i v e r s a l i t y and p a r t i c u l a r i t y f o r t h e human i n -  d i v i d u a l have two d i m e n s i o n s , a r i s i n g o u t of d i f f e r e n t bjrt i n s e p a r a b l e s e t s o f r e l a t i o n s h i p s , t h e n a t u r a l and the s o c i a l . The  other q u e s t i o n which a r i s e s w i t h t h e i n c l u s i o n o f t h e s o c i a l  aspect i s t h e r e l a t i o n s o f t h e s o c i a l o r common response t o t h e o b j e c t i v e world.  W i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l d i m e n s i o n , Mead seems t o l o s e  s i g h t a l t o g h e r o f t h e f a c t t h a t even as t h e i n d i v i d u a l so t h e common r e s ponse cannot do otherwise t h a n r e f l e c t t h e c h a r a c t e r s o f t h e o b j e c t .  By  v i r t u e o f t h i s n e g l e c t , Mead r e t u r n s t o h i s p o s i t i o n o f s o c i a l s u b j e c t i v ism i n which t h e e x t e r n a l w o r l d i s regarded  as the t o t a l i t y of p e r s p e c t i v e s ,  and t h e o b j e c t as i n a r e a l sense dependent upon s o c i a l p e r c e p t i o n . the o b j e c t i v i t y of t h e conceptual l i e s o n l y i n t h e f a c t t h a t i t i s a common, as opposed t o a p r i v a t e , response t h a t i s i n v o l v e d .  Here -  •"» 55  Here a g a i n Mead r u p t u r e s the u n i t y o f m a n ' ^ i a t u r a l and h i s s o c i a l relations*  U n i v e r s a l s "are meaningless a p a r t from t h e s o c i a l a c t s i n which  t h e y a r e i m p l i c a t e d and from which t h e y d e r i v e t h e i r s i g n i f i c a n c e . "  Mead  has e x p l a i n e d t h e mechanisms o f both n a t u r a l and s o c i a l u n i v e r s a l i t y , b u t he f a i l s t o e x p l a i n t h a t t h e y f i n d common ground i n t h e u n i t y o f t h e n a t u r a l and s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s o f man, which has as i t s e x p l a n a t i o n t h e l a b o r process© Mead's t h e o r y o f concepts i n d i c a t e s t h e p o s s i b i l i t y o f a mate r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f l o g i c w h i c h , i n d e e d , has been announced and outl i n e d by M a r x i s t p h i l o s o p h y .  L o g i c j£or t h e M a r x i s t s , i s a q u a l i t a t i v e l y  unique form o f s u b j e c t i v e a c t i v i t y a r i s i n g out o f sense p e r c e p t i o n .  The  laws o f f o r m a l l o g i c a r e u l t i m a t e l y d e r i v e d from m a t e r i a l i n t e r c o u r s e w i t h n a t u r e , r e f l e c t nature i n such a way t h a t i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r l o g i c a l ded u c t i o n s tojbe v a l i d a t e d i n m a t e r i a l p r a c t i c e .  "The p r a c t i c e o f men,"  says L e n i n , "by r e p e a t i n g i t s e l f m i l l i o n s o f t i m e s , i s f o r t i f i e d i n cons c i o u s n e s s by t h e f i g u r e s o f l o g i c . "  (58)  Mead's t h e o r y o f l o g i c i s t h a t i t bears an i n t r i n s i c  relation-  s h i p t o t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a t t i t u d e s and i n v o l v e s h i s whole t h e o r y o f ideation: '  -. .  .  "Our s o - c a l l e d laws o f thought a r e t h e a b s t r a c t i o n s o f s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e . . . a l l t h e e n d u r i n g r e l a t i o n s have been s u b j e c t t o r e v i s i o n . There remains t h e l o g i c a l c o n s t a n t s , and t h e d e d u c t i o n s from l o g i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . To t h e same category b e l o n g t h e s o - c a l l e d m n i v e r s a l s i n concepts. They a r e t h e elements and s t r u c t u r e o f a u n i v e r s e o f discourse® Insofar as i n s o c i a l conduct w i t h others and w i t h o u r s e l v e s we i n d i c a t e t h e c h a r a c t e r s t h a t endure i n t h e p e r s p e c t i v e o f t h e group t o w h i c h we belong and out o f which we a r i s e , we are i n d i c a t i n g t h a t which r e l a t i v e t o our conduct i s unchanged, t o w h i c h , i n other words, passage i s i r r e l e v a n t ( 5 9 ) (58)  Quoted i n A Textbook o f M a r x i s t P h i l o s o p h y ,  (59)  M i n d , S e l f & S o c i e t y , p. 90, f o o t n o t e  p. 10$.  •  - 56 T h i s s t r i k i n g passage r e v e a l s the manner i n -which Mead would have approach ed the q u e s t i o n of l o g i c , had he ever undertaken a thorough i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the s u b j e c t . U n f o r t u n a t e l y , Mead's c h a r a c t e r i s t i c f a u l t mars these suggestive remarks.  He  extremely  f a i l s t o note the source of the " c h a r a c t e r s t h a t  endure i n the p e r s p e c t i v e o f the group."  The  i m p l i c a t i o n s of t h i s  pass-  age are t h a t such c h a r a c t e r s and r e l a t i o n s are d e r i v e d from s o c i a l i n t e r activity i n itself.  B e a r i n g i n mind t h a t s o c i a l i n t e r c o u r s e does i m p l y  n a t u r a l i n t e r c o u r s e , and i s a r e f l e c t i o n o f the stage of development o f n a t u r a l i n t e r c o u r s e , i t becomes e v i d e n t how  i t i s p o s s i b l e f o r the  order  and c o n n e c t i o n o f i d e a s t o correspond w i t h the order and c o n n e c t i o n events.  of  A c o r r o l l a r y o f t h i s t h e s i s o f h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m would be  t h a t the type of l o g i c u t i l i z e d by a s o c i a l group r e f l e c t s the stage  of  m a t e r i a l development of t h a t group, the s t a t e of i t s n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n s w h i c h are one and the same t h i n g as i t s mode of p r o d u c t i o n . R e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e , i n c l u d i n g f o r e s i g h t , purpose and p l a n n i n g i s a l s o brought by Mead w i t h i n the c o n t e x t of the s o c i a l a c t , as an i n t e r n a l phase o f the act i n which f u t u r e phases of the o v e r t a c t i v i t y a r e brought w i t h i n the c o n t r o l of the i n d i v i d u a l i n terms of i m p l i c i t haviour.  I n r e f l e c t i v e i n t e l l i g e n c e an important r o l e i s played by  be-  ideas  or concepts as p r e v i o u s l y d e f i n e d , and t h e i r temporal o r g a n i z a t i o n i n the : sense t h a t the l a t e r stages o f the a c t s t h e y imply bear upon the stages o f the i d e a .  present  Based on the d e l a y a l of o v e r t response, whihh occurs  upon the appearance of a problem, or the b l o c k i n g o f the ongoing a c t , mental behaviour r e q u i r e s the s i g n i f i c a n t symbol as i t s p r i m a r y mechanism. R e f l e c t i o n , or f e f l e o t i v e behaviour a r i s e s o n l y under c o n d i t i o n s of s e l f - c o n s c i o u s n e s s (the use of the s y & b o l — M.P.) and makes p o s s i b l e the purposive c o n t r o l and w i t h  - 57 o r g a n i z a t i o n "by the i n d i v i d u a l organism of i t s conduct •with r e f e r e n c e t o the s o c i a l and p h y s i c a l environments i . e . w i t h r e f e r e n c e t o the v a r i o u s s o c i a l and p h y s i c a l s i t u a t i o n s i n which i t becomes i n v o l v e d and t o which i t reacts. (60) The  r o l e o f the s i g n i f i c a n t symbol i n i n t e l l i g e n t behaviour  be c o n s i d e r e d i n these two r e l a t i o n s , t h e n a t u r a l and the s o c i a l *  can  I n the  s o c i a l r e l a t i o n , the i n d i v i d u a l i s able by i t s use t o i n d i c a t e t o h i m s e l f the a t t i t u d e s of others towards h i s own a c t i o n s . As he has the s t i m u l u s t o h i s own a t t i t u d e s and those o f others i n h i s own c o n t r o l , he i s capable of s e l f - s t i m u l a t i o n by which he can become an o b j e c t t o h i m s e l f . He  can  i n d i c a t e t o h i m s e l f what the s o c i a l s i t u a t i o n w i l l be before hand, how others w i l l tend t o respond and he w i l l answer such responses* t o t e s t out i m p l i c i t y - i n thought - the i m p l i c a t i o n s o f h i s own i n the s o c i a l  He i s a b l e actions  field*  I n t h e n a t u r a l r e l a t i o n , the symbol i s e s p e c i a l l y important analysis.  A n a l y s i s r e q u i r e s the p i c k i n g out and h o l d i n g on t o t h e  in  char-  a c t e r s of the s t i m u l u s s i t u a t i o n which c a l l out a c e r t a i n response*  The  symbol enables t h e i n d i v i d u a l t o h o l d on t o the c h a r a c t e r , as the symbol i s under h i s own  control*  o b j e c t s t i m u l a t e s him.  Through the symbol he s t i m u l a t e s h i m s e l f as the  I t i s i n t h i s manner i n r e l a t i o n t o a n a l y s i s t h a t  v o l u n t a r y a t t e n t i o n can a l s o be e x p l a i n e d *  Conscious a t t e n t i o n i s the  a b i l i t y t o h o l d on t o c h a r a c t e r s and the responses r e l a t e d t o them*  An-  a l y s i s and conscious a t t e n t i o n are an i n t e r n a l d i a l e c t i c of s t i m u l u s  and  response, i n which the s t i m u l u s and consequently i n d i v i d u a l s own  the response i s under the  control*  F o r each s i t u a t i o n or o b j e c t , the organism has a number of a l t e r n a t i v e responses dependent upon h i s past e x p e r i e n c e .  The d e l a y a l o f the  r e s p o n s e , a n a l y s i s , and a t t e n t i o n , enable the s e l e c t i o n o f responses w i t h •(60J M i n d , S e l f F S o c i e t y , p* 91' ~ ' '  - 58 reference t o the f u t u r e , t h e i r i s o l a t i o n , i m p l i c i t r e s t i n g , and recombina t i o n . •Thinking i s an i m p l i c i t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e a c t i n v o l v i n g a t t e n t i o n , a n a l y s i s , choice and purpose.  I t i s an i n t e r n a l s e l f - a c t i v i t y made  p o s s i b l e by t h e symbol. I t i s t o be n o t i c e d t h a t i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n of r e f l e c t i v e  intell-  i g e n c e , Mead p r e s e r v e s a p u r e l j / j m a t e r i a l i s t approach throughout. One d i f f i c u l t y which presents  i t s e l f i s t h a t Mead a s s i g n s a n a l y s i s a l t e r n a t i v e l y  t o t h e symbol and t o t h e hand. the  I n one case the symbol p i c k s out t h e  o b j e c t , and fiiB t h e o t h e r / h a n d  I t seems p o s s i b l e t h a t t h e hand may be  assigned  8  t h i s a b i l i t y of p i c k i n g out t h e o b j e c t i n t h e f i r s t  instance,  a l t h o u g h t h e use of t h e hand and t h e symbol are c l o s e l y interwoven; and t h a t t h e p r i m a r y c h a r a c t e r o f t h e symbol i s t h a t i t h o l d s on t o t h e chara c t e r o f t h e o b j e c t i n t h e absence o f t h e o b j e c t ;  i t enables t h e i n d i v -  i d u a l t o t h i n k about a s i t u a t i o n which i s not m a t e r i a l l y p r e s e n t .  -• 59 CHAPTER  FIVE  CONCLUSIONS  I t i s now p o s s i b l e t o draw more coherent c o n c l u s i o n s the problem posed i n t h i s workf  concerning  namely; o f what v a l u e are the conceptions  of Mead t o the t h e o r y o f d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l materialism® I t has been observed t h a t d i a l e c t i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m regards subj e c t i v e a c t i v i t y as a q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique form of m a t e r i a l process; "simple" c o n s c i o u s n e s s ,  that  s e n s a t i o n , i s p u r e l y a m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n which r e -  f l e c t s t h e c h a r a c t e r s of t h e s u b j e c t and t h e o b j e c t ; t h a t language and con* c e p t u a l knowledge i s a form o f a c t i v i t y which r e f l e c t s t h a t a c t i v i t y o f the e x t e r n a l w o r l d , i s d e r i v e d from i t through p r a c t i c e and r e c e i v e s i t s v a l i d a t i o n i n p r a c t i c e , i n overt material a c t i v i t y *  As t o o r i g i n , mind  a r i s e s out o f m a t e r i a l processes as a new form o f t h e s e , and i s e s p e c i a l l y dependent, c o i n c i d e n t a l , a c c o r d i n g t o Marx and E n g e l s i n The German Ideffo l o g y , w i t h t h e growth of language,  (See page  7 ).  Language i t s e l f arose i n t h e p r i m i t i v e l a b o r p r o c e s s out of t h e n e c e s s i t i e s of the l a b o r p r o c e s s , when, as E n g e l s remarks, men had somep t h i n g t o s a y toone a n o t h e r .  H i s t o r i c a l materialism i s the p o s i t i o n that  the q u a l i t a t i v e l y unique f e a t u r e of t h e human group 3s t h e l a b o r which i s t h e mode of e x i s t e n c e o f thagj group. n a t u r a l and a s o c i a l a s p e c t .  process,  The l a b o r p r o c e s s has a  Human development i s a r e s u l t o f t h e u n i t y  and c o n f l i c t o f these two r e l a t i o n s .  I n t h e s e terms, t h e s o c i a l a c t i s ,  i n t h e f i r s t i n s t a n c e , d i r e c t l y , a n d subsequently d i r e c t l y o r i n d i r e c t l y , r e l a t e d t o the l a b o r process.  Ideas, concepts,  a t t i t u d e s , are a s u b j e c t -  i v e moment of t h i s o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l and m a t e r i a l p r a c t i c e , d e r i v e d from i t and v a l i d a t e d by i t .  - 60 .-  •  How does Mead stand on these two g r e a t q u e s t i o n s , t h e o r i g i n and nature o f thought, and t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and being? I t i s seen t h a t t o t h e former q u e s t i o n , Mead t o o answers t h a t thought i s a new form o f m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y developed  i n and along w i t h  n a t u r a l processes and c o n t i n g e n t upon the development of language. He does n o t , however, conceive o f language as developed  i n and along w i t h the  l a b o r p r o c e s s j consequently, although he analyses i n a m a s t e r l y way some of t h e e f f e c t s o f having language, he cannot e x p l a i n t h e process of g e t t i n g ito I t i s seen t h a t t o t h e second q u e s t i o n , Mead has a g a i n , although u n i n t e n t i o n a l l y , made a v e r y p o s i t i v e c o n t r i b u t i o n t o m a t e r i a l i s i n g  His  t h e o r y of i d e a s and concepts, l o g i c and i n t e l l i g e n c e , i f made c o n s i s t e n t , l o g i c a l l y i m p l y t h i s i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g .  Of c o u r s e , i t i s im-  p o s s i b l e f o r pure p h i l o s o p h y t o say t h a t h i s a n a l y s i s i s the c o r r e c t one in a l l i t s details.  But i t i s c l e a r l y p o s s i b l e from t h e p o i n t o f view o f  m a t e r i a l i s m , and i s a v a l i d a t i n g form o f jbhe a s s e r t i o n of t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g * I t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s t r u e t h a t , although such c o n c l u s i o n s may be l e g i t i m a t e l y reached from an e x a m i n a t i o n o f h i s work, Mead i s capable o f denying t h e i d e n t i t y o f t h i n k i n g and b e i n g and consequently denying  those  premisestijemselves which h i s a n a l y s i s and h i s s c i e n t i f i c statements  pre-  suppose.  T h i s p o s i t i o n stems from h i s a f f i l i a t i o n s w i t h t h e psychology of  Wundt and t h e p h i l o s o p h y o f pragmatism.  These a f f i l i a t i o n s i n f l u e n c e h i s  work i n a v e r y c o n c r e t e and s p e c i f i c way, which has been s p e c i f i c a l l y p o i n t e d out i n h i s a n a l y s i s of t h e o r i g i n a t i o n o f t h e s i g n i f i c a n t symbol, h i s t h e o r y o f meaning, and h i s treatment of t h e concept or u n i v e r s a l . The concrete s t a r t i n g p o i n t of many o f h i s d i f f i c u l t i e s i s  obviously h i s conception of the s o c i a l act.  This b a s i c concept i s t h e  f o c u s o f a l l t h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n s which his-mixed p h i l o s o p h i c approach, t h e c o m b i n a t i o n o f e v o l u t i o n a r y m a t e r i a l i s m and pragmatic s u b j e c t i v i s m , would presage. I n the f i r s t p l a c e , t h e s o c i a l a c t , e s p e c i a l l y as u t i l i z e d i n the c o n v e r s a t i o n o f g e s t u r e s , takes i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n man"s s o c i a l r e l a t i o n s o n l y , not the fundamental u n i t y o f h i s s o c i a l and m a t e r i a l r e l a t i o n s . T h i s o m i s s i o n expresses i t s e l f i n the f a c t t h a t althoughfee-r e c o g n i z e s She s o c i a l a c t and t h e responses i n v o l v e d as r e l a t e d t o t h e l i f e - p r o c e s s e s o f the group, he has no c o n c e p t i o n productive  o f these l i f e - p r o c e s s e s themselves as  a c t i v i t y , objective material practice.  Secondly, t h e i m p l i c a t -  i o n i s a l r e a d y there i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n o f t h e s o c i a l a c t , (see page "5V), otherwise one o f h i s b e s t statements, t h a t t h e o b j e c t i v e world i s c o n s t i t uted by s o c i a l e x p e r i e n c e ,  by h i s s u b s t i t u t i o n , f o r t h e term " s o c i a l  o b j e c t " whioh may mean m a t e r i a l l y e x i s t e n t independent o b j e c t s , t h e s u b j e c t i v e term " o b j e c t i v e s " o f t h e act... T h i s a b i l i t y t o confuse t h e obj e c t i v e w o r l d w i t h t h e s u b j e c t i v e w o r l d i s adequately demonstrated, o f c o u r s e , i n h i s e x p l a n a t i o n o f simple  consciousness.  Such an approach i s c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e f a c t t h a t Mead p l a c e s the a t t i t u d e a t t h e beginning  o f t h e a c t , i n some sense t h e r e b y i d e n t i f y -  i n g a t t i t u d e s and t h e i r r e s u l t a n t s o c i a l a o t i v i t y as c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e l i f e - p r i o e s s e s o f t h e group, whereas the t r u t h o f t h e matter i s t h a t a t t i t u d e s a r e b u i l t up out o f o b j e c t i v e s o c i a l and m a t e r i a l a c t i v i t y and presupposes t h i s a c t i v i t y .  With the a t t i t u d e at the beginning  of the  a c t , t h e r e a l w o r l d becomesan appenda^ge t o these a t t i t u d e s , as d e t e r mined i n a r e a l sense by them, and t h e whole r e l a t i o n o f t h i n k i n g and being i s reversed.  - 62. — I t i s n o t d e n i e d , of course, t h a t , an a c t once i n i t i a t e d , the a t t i t u d e s i n v o l v e d may n o t and do n o t e x e r t an i n f l u e n c e on i t s course. As E n g e l s has p o i n t e d out, i f i d e a l f o r c e s i n t h i s sense c o n s t i t u t e i d e a l i s m , t h e n no m a t e r i a l i s t s can e x i s t . ( 6 1 ) t h a t w i t h a t t i t u d e s a t the beginning  The p o i n t a t i s s u e i s ,  of t h e a c t , as d e f i n i n g the w o r l d  i n a r e a l sense, w i t h o u t c o n s i d e r a t i o n of t h e d e r i v a t i o n o f t h e a t t i t u d e s themselves and t h e f a c t t h a t t h e y e x i s t through o v e r t m a t e r i a l p r a c t i c e . , Mead has made t h e step of t r a n s i t i o n t o s u b j e c t i v i s m i n which o b j e c t s are d e f i n e d as e x p e r i e n c e .  I t has been p o i n t e d out t h a t Mead i s n o t con-  s i s t e n t i n h i s d e f i n i t i o n of o b j e c t s as e x p e r i e n c e , as indeed i t i s imp o s s i b l e f o r him t o be i f he once takes i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n t h e o r i g i n a t i o n o f t h e a t t i t u d e s themselves*.  N e v e r t h e l e s s , w i t h a t t i t u d e s as t h e  s t a r t i n g p o i n t o f t h e a c t as t h a t i n terms o f which o b j e c t s have t h e i r d e f i n i t i o n , Meadis not i n a p o s i t i o n t o recognize as an acute problem the d i f f i c u l t y of a c c o u n t i n g f o r t h e o r i g i n a t i o n o f t h e symbol i n i t s reference  character. I t i s seen, t h e n , i n what manner Mead's p h i l o s o p h i c p r e d i l e c t -  i o n s i n f l u e n c e h i s b a s i c concepts themselves, which i m p l y those c o n t r a d i c t i o n s w h i c h become e x p l i c i t i n h i s consequent analyses haviour.  o f mental be-  I t i s a l s o seen t h a t , from a c o n s i s t e n t l y m a t e r i a l i s t i c p o i n t  of v i e w , Mead's d i f f i c u l t i e s can be e a s i l y r e s o l v e d , and t h e r e s u l t s t e n t a t i v e l y i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a m a t e r i a l i s t i n t e r p r e a t i o n of mind. I t i s n e v e r t h e l e s s c l e a r t h a t , unable t o understand i n a s e l f conscious  f a s h i o n t h e t e n e t s o f d i a l e c t i c a l and h i s t o r i c a l m a t e r i a l i s m ,  i n f l u e n c e d by p h i l o s o p h i e s which a r e a n t i - s c i e n t i f i c and which o c c a s i o n a b s u r d i t i e s i n t h e m i d s t o f s c i e n t i f i c phypotheses, Mead e x h i b i t s the (61)  Feuerbach,  p. 73  a b s o l u t e n e c e s s i t y o f a c o n s i s t e n t l y s c i e n t i f i c p h i l o s o p h y t o t h e psychologist. The e r r o r which Meadmakes i n h i s s o c i a l t h e o r y o f mind, t h e one fundamental e r r o r which subsumes a l l o t h e r s , i s t h e b i f u r c a t i o n o f t h e w o r l d i n t o s o c i e t y and n a t u r e , and t h e assumption, P h i l o s o p h i c a l l y , and c o n t r a r y t o h i s own premisas, of t h e primacy o f s o c i e t y , t h e primacy, i n s h o r t , o f oxpanoion t o reality©  The r e l a t i o n s h i p o f t h i s p o s i t i o n t o t h e  C a r t e s i a n s p l i t t i n g asunder o f t h e mental and t h e p h y s i c a l i s c l e a r *  The  e x t e n t t o which C a r t e s i a n i s m and i t s p h i l o s o p h i c a l o f f s p r i n g , w i t h t h e s c i e n t i f i c content o f f o u r hundred years development, have been transformed from a mode o f thought l i b e r a t i n g s c i e n t i f i c i n q u i r y t o one which h i n d e r s and comes i n t o open c o n t r a d i c t i o n w i t h i t ^  t h e e x t e n t t o which Darwinism  as a s o c i o l o g i c a l b a s i s i m p a i r s t h e u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f h i s s u b j e c t m a t t e r by t h e s o c i a l psychologist??; the  t h e e x t e n t t o which pragmatism  encourages  vague and i n d e f i n i t e use o f terms, which i s t h e key-note o f r e a c t i o n ;  t o t h i s e x t e n t does modem p s y c h o l o g y stand i n need o f a p h i l o s o p h y cons i s t e n t w i t h s c i e n c e itself©  - 64 -  BIBLIOGRAPHY  Cooley, C.H.,  Human Mature and the S o c i a l Order, S c r i b n e r s , New  E n g e l s , F«,  York,  1902.  A n t i - D u h r i n g ; Herr Eugene Duhring's R e v o l u t i o n i n Science, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , New York, 1939. D i a l e c t i c s of Nature, 1940. "Feuerbach:  Lawrence and W i s h a r t , London,  The r o o t s of t h e s o c i a l i s t p h i l o s o p h y ,  K e r r , Chicago,  1903  Socialism, S c i e n t i f i c & Utopian, P u b l i s h e r s , N.Y. (1935) J a c k s o n , T'H. Lenin, V.I.  Dialectics,  International  F r a n c i s White, Toronto,  (undated)  M a t e r i a l i s m and E m p i r i o C r i t i c i s m , S e l e c t e d Works. •s  V o l . X I , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , New  York,  (undated)  Leningrad I n s t i t u t e (undated) of P h i l o s o p h y . A Textbook of M a r x i s t P h i l o s o p h y , G o l l a n c z , London Marx, K.  C a p i t a l , V o l . 1, Random House, New The P o v e r t y of F h i l o s o p h y ,  Marx, K.  (undated)  K e r r , Chicago,  1920  and  E n g e l s , F.  The German I d e o l o g y , I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , New York,  Mead, G.H.  York,  1939.  Books ; The P h i l o s o p h y of the P r e s e n t , Open Court P u b l i s h e r s Chicago, 1932 M i n d , S e l f and S o c i e t y , U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , Chicago, 1934 Movements of Thought i n the N i n e t e e n t h C n t u r y , U n i v e r s i t y of Chicago P r e s s , Chicago, 1936 e  The P h i l o s o p h y of the A c t , U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago Chicago, 1938  Press,  — 65 •»  Mead, G.H.  Articles "The D e f i n i t i o n o f t h e P s y c h i c a l , " D e c e n n i a l P u b l i c a t i o n s , , U n i v e r s i t y o f Chicago, Vol.111, Chicago U n i v e r s i t y P r e s s , 1903, p.77 - 112. "The Mechanism o f S o c i a l Consciousness," J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y , V o l , I X , 1912, p.401-406 "The S o c i a l S e l f , " 1913, p. 374-380.  Journal of Philosophy, ~  Vol.X,  ,!  "A B e h a v i o u r i s t i c Account of t h e S i g n i f i c a n t Symbol," J o u r n a l of P h i l o s o p h y , V o l . X I X , 1922 p» 157-153 2?lekhanov, G«  Fundamental Problems of Marxism, I n t e r n a t i o n a l P u b l i s h e r s , New York (undated)  P r e n a n t , M«  B i o l o g y and Marxism, New York, 1938  Watson, J.B.  Behaviourism,  International  Publishers,  People's I n s t i t u t e P u b l i s h i n g  Co.,  New Y o i r , 1925 Wundt,  W.,  Outlines of Psychology,  Engelmann, L e i p z i g , 1902  

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