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An analysis and criticism of the social contract theory of political obligation Wilson, Reginald Alastair 1941

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I AN ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE SOCIAL J CONTRACT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION, j by I I Reginald A l a s t a i r Wilson A Thesis submitted i n P a r t i a l F u l f i l m e n t of The Requirements for the Degree of ; MASTER OF ARTS i i n the Department of PHILOSOPHY The U n i v e r s i t y of B r i t i s h Columbia A p r i l 1941c ACKNOWLEDGMENT I wish to express my indebtedness to Professor J .A. I r v i n g under whose supervision the following study i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy has been c a r r i e d out. That indebtedness i s not l i m i t e d to h i s encouragement and patience with t h i s t h e s i s but extends beyond to the i n s p i r a t i o n of a l e c t u r e room that has progressively pushed back the horizons of thought. What there i s of c r e d i t i s due to him; the defects and l i m i t a t i o n s of the present composition are obviously my own. Reginald A l a s t a i r Wilson. A p r i l 1941. CONTENTS. Page INTRODUCTION. GHfiPTER I . CHAPTER I I , CHAPTER I I I . CHAPTER IV. . 1. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES 3. 1. The Nature of Man. 6 . 2. The o r i g i n of the Commonwealth.»..15, S. The Nature of the Commonwealth....28 4. The R e l a t i o n of the Commonwealth to Religious Conceptions .43. AN EXPOSITION OF JOHN LOCK^S "TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT. " . . 48. 1. A c r i t i c i s m of S i r Robert Filmer's P r i n c i p l e s of Government. . . . . . . . . . 4 9 . S• Dsfini"fcioris••••« • • • • • • • • • • • © • • • • • • { 3 3 # 3. P o l i t i c a l or C i v i l Society....... . 7 9 . 4. Purposes and Forms/Of Government..84. 5. Classes of Government . , .90. AM ANALYSIS OF SPINOZA'S "TRACTATUS POLITICUS" 97 1. Human Nature and Natural Rights. . . 9 8 . 2. The Rights and Functions of Supreme A u t h o r i t i e s . . . . 107. 5• M o r i c i i * G l i y * * 6 * * » e « « « » * * e » * « « e * * e o « XX3• 4:e -A-x*xs*tocr9>cy«•«»<> • * » e « * • »X. S «3 • t5 • D 6IH0 OX* 9 . 0 ^ e«e« •*« • • • • • « « e A • • • * e a • • • X 3/3 « AN EXAMINATION OF ROUSSEAU'S "THE SOCIAL CONTRACT" 135. 1. Foundations of the State......... .136. 2. C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the State..... .148. 3. Government and i t s Form...........161. 4. Methods of Government 179. Page. CHAPTER V. T.H. GREEN'S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY. 191. 1. T.H. Green's c r i t i c i s m of Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke and RoxxsSG9-U«(D •••••••19S» 2. Psychological?- Freedom of the W i l l and Morality..............210. 3. The Grounds of P o l i t i c a l OTo 1 i ^ 9 . " f c l OXl • • ee * • • • e « * • • • • • * • » * • • S-L9 4. Sovereignty and the General W i l l S31« 5. The Basis of the State i s W i l l , not Force 838. 6. A Discussion of Rights 245. 7. Conclusion? C r i t i c i s m of Green's ]? r inc IJ)1GSO • • • * » * • » • * • * • • • • * * • » e 4» CHAPTER VI. A STUDY OF BERNARD BOSANQUET1S WORK, "THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE 5 TATE ^  • • o e * * * * * * * ' * p r p t f . r r - r C' f r r r r t v / . 1. R e l a t i o n to the S o c i a l Contract 2. The Meaning of a P h i l o s o p h i c a l Theory of the State .281, 3. P o l i t i c a l O b l i g a t i o n .....288. 4. Conception of Liberty...........303. 5. The End of the State and the Consequent L i m i t s of i t s Action.311. 6 • Tin 3 3\/iod srn S19. i3 0 •«*«»•»• •«• • •*• • 319 • 7. C r i t i c i s m s of Bosanquet's Theory334. CHAPTER V I I . L.T. HOBHOUSE'S CRITICISM OF THE '. . METAPHYSICAL THEORY OF THE. STATE.. .343. 1. S o c i a l Investigation............344. 2. Theory of the Absolute..........350. 3. Freedom and the Law. 353. 4 • TIT!© Q.1 l ^ l l l « « » t » t t e « f t t » » » t « » » t e> 5. The W i l l of the State..... 371. 6. Varying Applications of the Metaphysical Theory .380. Page CHAPTER V I I I . HAROLD J . LASKI'S, "THE STATE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE" , - 591. 1. The P h i l o s o p h i c a l Conception 2. State and Government i n the fiosil Wor Xcl«•«* & • * « • • * * • » & • • • •« • © # 4X5 © 3. The State and the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Communi 4. The Outlook for Our Generation...443. 5« Ci*i"fcIcism• «••*»•••*••••«•»•••••• • 454« CHAPTER IX. : AN EVALUATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY OF POLITICAL OBLIGATION 458. 1. The Aim of the Evaluation. .459. 2. The Concept of the I n d i v i d u a l i n The S o c i a l Contract Theory.......460. 3. The Concept "Natural" i n the S o c i a l Contract Theory . .474. 4. P o l i t i c a l Society as a Contract..485. 5. The Residence of P o l i t i c a l Authority 490. 6. C o n c l u s i o n - P o l i t i c a l Obligation..503. IHTROBUCTIOW I t was not without reason that Hothouse, who wrote h i s c r i t i c i s m , "The Metaphysical Theory of the State", during the f i r s t world war, declared that s o c i o l o g i c a l r e f l e c t i o n i s generally stimulated by an experience of some s o c i a l e v i l . Scarcely more than twenty years have passed and the nations are again at war. The following study i n p o l i t i c a l philosophy has been undertaken i n the consciousness of the present world c o n f l i c t . The external r e l a t i o n s h i p s of a nation are d i r e c t l y r e l a t e d to i t s i n t e r n a l s o c i a l l i f e , f o r , as L a s k i has observed, what the state is/In i t s i n t e r n a l r e l a t i o n s h i p s so also, i s i t i n i t s r e l a t i o n s h i p s with other states. Questions r e l a t i n g to the war, i f pursued, carry us back to an i n v e s t i g a t i o n of the nature of states themselves. Such questioning of the foundations of p o l i t i c a l society was undertaken by thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and they attempted to give an answer i n terms of the theory of the s o c i a l contract. Our i n v e s t i g a t i o n c a r r i e s us back to the o r i g i n a l works of the outstanding w r i t e r s of that period. Hobbes argued that the nature of the state could be ex-pressed "in an organic analogy, the Leviathan, whose power was the r e s u l t of a contract made by each member of society with every other. Locke i n t e r p r e t e d Hobbes' theory i n such a way that i t could be used as a bulwark of parliament-ary government. Spinoza, who considered the state to be an i n t e g r a l part of universal nature, did not make use of the notion of contract, but declared that the state was a combination of the powers of the i n d i v i d u a l s . Rousseau attempted to -use the concept of "contract" to explain away the lo s s of freedom i n p o l i t i c a l s o ciety. An examination of the p o l i t i c a l philosophies of T.H. Green and Bernard Bosanquet, two p o l i t i c a l i d e a l i s t s of the nineteenth century, presents a fre s h point of view from which to estimate the worth of the s o c i a l contract theory. The philosophies of Green and Bosanquet i n turn receive correction at the hands of two modern w r i t e r s , Hobhouse and L a s k i . Our study throughout brings us i n contact with the minds of men who have been leaders i n the p o l i t i c a l thought of t h e i r age and prepares us to evaluate i n t ne'e one luding sections of our survey, from a t r u l y p h i l o s o p h i c a l point of view, the theory that p o l i t i c a l o b l i g a t i o n i s based upon a s o c i a l contract. CHAPTER I THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES. CHAPTER I ; THE SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF THOMAS HOBBES The work of any s o c i a l Philosopher i s better understood when i t i s considered i n the l i g h t of the times i n which he l i v e d and wrote. This i s e s p e c i a l l y true of Thomas Hobbes who, although he was an o r i g i n a l thinker of the f i r s t order, was nevertheless profoundly Influenced i n h i s thought by the current p h i l o s o p h i c a l views and the p o l i t i c a l circumstances of h i s age. In order to have an understanding of hi s great t r e a t i s e the "Leviathan", which i s here our concern, i t i s necessa„ry f i r s t to take b r i e f notice of some of the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the period i n which Hobbes l i v e d . Hobbes developed his philosophy during the t h i r t y years war - a period which plunged Europe i n t o chaos and confusion. The troubled i n t e r n a t i o n a l s i t u a t i o n , moreover was r i v a l l e d i n confusion by the turbulent condition of revolutionary England. These factors were among the most important determinants of the form which Hobbes' p o l i t i c a l philosophy took, and of the point of view which he adopted. The prevalence of s t r i f e both abroad and at home impressed him with the need f o r order. His overpowering co n v i c t i o n was that some force, some device of government was required to check man's ever present tendency to war. The i n t e l l e c t u a l environment i n Hobbes' day ; was as confused as the s o c i a l scene. Just as the authority of pope and king had been undermined i n the p o l i t i c a l f sphere, the t r a d i t i o n of i n t e l l e c t u a l authority i n the Middle Ages had been undermined i n the Reformation. New ideas were i n process of development everywhere and from these new trends of thought Hobbes drew the preconceptions of h i s p o l i t i c a l philosophy. The r e v o l u t i o n i n physics, again, had given matter a new status. From the time of G a l i l e o on, Europe was to take "Matter" s e r i o u s l y . Descartes discoveries i n mathematics gave r a t i o n a l i s m and the deductive method a new i n t e r p r e t a t i o n and a new pres t i g e . The atomic theory of Democritus had been reviewed by Gassendl. The discovery of the Americas not only pushed back the horizons of geography, but revealed also p r i m i t i v e s o c i e t i e s , and suggested the conception of a state of nature, antecedent even to early c i v i l i z a t i o n . Hobbes wrote with an awareness of these advances i n human i n q u i r y * I n his own p h i l o s o p h i c a l system he b u i l t them i n t o a framework to support a new conception of man i n so c i e t y . Mobbes' ba s i c methodological p r i n c i p l e was that the p o l i t i c a l commonwealth shoul be thought of as an ^ a r t i f i c i a l animal", a great Leviathan made on the pattern of man. Sfan i s both the matter and the maker of t h i s Leviathan. To understand f u l l y Hobbes' conception of the commonwealth' we must consider with him the following four questions: (1) What i s the nature of man, the atom of the stru c t u r e . (2) How i s the o r i g i n of the commonwealth to be understood. (3) What are the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the commonwealth. (4) What i s the r e l a t i o n of h i s conception of a commonwealth to a C h r i s t i a n Commonwealth and what Hobbes c a l l s the "kingdom of darkness". The d e s c r i p t i o n of the "Leviathan" provides Hobbes' answer to these four questions. Is. THE MATURE OF .MAN. Hobbes attempts to answer the f i r s t question concerning the nature of man, by means of an introspective technique. Me.assumes a fundamental s i m i l a r i t y i n men and from t h i s assumption he concludes that, an examination of his own person w i l l provide a model of humanity i n general. This knowledge of man i s e s s e n t i a l to anyone who would r u l e and Hobbes undertakes his exposition of human psychology with the p r a t i c a l hope that h i s explanation w i l l lead to sounder and more ju s t government. Hobbes observes that A r i s t o t l e regarded the phenomenon of sensation as the r e s u l t of "species" of the thing perceived entering the mind• This view he replaced by an account of sensation i n terms of mass i n motion*Sensation, or sense to use Hobbes' term, i s caused by objects outside of us pressing on the appropriate organ of the body. This pressure which may be e i t h e r mediate or immediate, sets up a counter pressure i n the b r a i n and heart. The counter pressure i s directed outwards and seems- to r e f e r to some matter outside* This "seeming" i s c a l l e d "sense." i t i s the o r i g i n a l of a l l thoughts. Thought may further be defined as "representations" or "appearances" produced i n the mind by objects outside the body. Imagination i s decaying sense. Just as a body i n motion tends to stay i n motion, so the motions causing sense to l i n g e r on are c a l l e d imagination.The decay dccurs i n the same way as the l i g h t of the stars fades before the brighter l i g h t of the sun. Decay increases i n d i r e c t proportion to the time elapsing a f t e r the f i r s t impression. Imagination or memory furthermore, may be simple or compound, the former when i t involves a single idea, and the l a t t e r when i t concerns a number of ideas. When i t occurs i n sleep imagination takes the form, of dreams* Dreams are to be explained i n terms of ph y s i o l o g i c a l causes. , •Mental discourse Hobbes goes on, consists of a t r a i n of imaginations. This t r a i n Is not a chance impression but proceeds according to the order of the o r i g i n a l impressions. Hobbes seems to abandon his. s t r i c t determinism when he claims that imaginations, which he has declared follow one another i n the mind In the order of t h e i r f i r s t impression, may be ordered by design. This ordering of past impressions according to desigfa i s the essence of prudence, for prudence i s the process of looking back at past experience and then seeing the future i n the l i g h t fcf that experience. Because each imagination i s f i n i t e , and because these f i n i t e imaginations 8. are the "basis of a l l conceptions, there can be no conception of the i n f i n i t e . The most noble a:d usefu l of a l l man's invent-ions, Hobbes asserts i s speech. The art of speech provides signs•by which man can s i g n i f y the r e l a t i o n s of cause and e f f e c t . I t enables me to counsel and teach each other and to make others know t h e i r w i l l s and desires. I t provides, further Hobbes points;out, the most i n t e r e s t i n g form of play. But i n contrast to these legitimate uses of speech,he says, there are many common abuses* Speech i s abused when the same word i s used to s i g n i f y d i f f e r e n t things, when metaphors are used to deceive, when words are used to conceal the desire of the w i l l , or to grieve others. Much confusion arises i n thought, Hobbes goes on to say, when things are regarded as u n i v e r s a l . A c t u a l l y , only, names .ar,e; u n i v e r s a l . I t i s because words, whether univers a l names or p a r t i c u l a r terms, are so powerful, that they must be used with extreme care. A chain of reasoning that, does not.start with c l e a r d e f i n i t i o n s may be worse than useless, i t may be dangerous«> Reason, the exposition proceeds, i s the addition and subtraction of thoughts. Right reason Is addition and subtraction done c o r r e c t l y without any u n j u s t i f i e d assumptions. Errors a r i s e with mistakes i n conjecture, and absurdity comes from f a l s e inferences i n reasoning. Hobbes l i s t s seven sources of absurdity * We need not remark upon them i n d e t a i l , but may take notice of 9, his major contention that the dominant cause of a l l absurdity i n the use of words i s the misapplication of names. I f men would use t h e i r words c a r e f u l l y and pay atte n t i o n to the rules of correct speech, he says, they would.be able to reason as l o g i c a l l y on a l l subjects as they do i n geometry. .!••.• Prudence, Hobbes has already i n d i c a t e d , i s gained from experience. He further observes that i t d i f f e r s from reason or science i n i t s f a i l u r e to organize i t s materials systematically. Reason i s prudence with the ad d i t i o n of the industry required to organize experience i n such a way that the dependence of one fact upon another can be seen. When experience i s organized i n t h i s way i t Is science. The effectiveness of the s c i e n t i f i c approach •to the world, as opposed to the a u t h o r i t a r i a n approach i n v o l v i n g the acceptance of the opinions of ancient authors* can be e a s i l y demonstrated by the f a c t that mim use the s c i e n t i f i c procedure i n handling t h e i r personal a f f a i r s , while they use the a u t h o r i t a r i a n or l i t e r a r y approach i n advising others. The passions or emotions, Hobbes proceeds, continuing to elaborate on the nature of man, are the i n t e r i o r . .1. beginnings of voluntary motions. S t r i c t l y speaking these ( l ) The democratic t r a d i t i o n , of which Hobbes i s an important forerunner, has often been accused of assuming that men are more r a t i o n a l than i s a c t u a l l y the case. Hobbes was w e l l aware of the weaknesses i n men1s reasoning. While 10. i n t e r i o r beginnings or motions might be further explained i n motions outside the body, f o r Imagination Is the f i r s t beginning of voluntary motion, and, as we have observed, i t i s also the l i n g e r i n g e f f e c t of external motions. Voluntary external motions such as "to go" or "to speak" s t a r t from imaginations, and while s t i l l unexpressed o v e r t l y , are known as"endeavours". Endeavours are of two.kinds, endeavour towards something, and endeavour away from something. The f i r s t type i s c a l l e d love, desire or appetite? and the object of our love or desire is. termed "good'!. The second type, endeavour away from something i s hate or aversion; and the object of hate i s termed e v i l . The terms "love" and "hate" are names f o r the basic f a c t i n many phases of experience, such as pleasure, fear, pain and so on. The sum t o t a l of a l l d e s i r e s ? hopesf 7aversions and fears associated with a given question, i t i s further established, i s c a l l e d " d e l i b e r a t i o n " . D e l i b e r a t i o n ends when the act takes place. The l a s t act of appetite or aversion adhering to the action i s c a l l e d the w i l l . The conception of the w i l l . Hdbb-es says, has often been confused with mere i n c l i n a t i o n . On the other hand, the Schools defined w i l l as a " r a t i o n a l appetite." This d e f i n i t i o n would allow no act of w i l l to be i n c o n f l i c t with reason. According to Hobbes d e f i n i t i o n s of w i l l and reason observed above, the he held that men are a l l equally endowed with i n t e l l i g e n c e , he explained t h e i r apparent differences on the basis of the d i f f e r e n t d i r e c t i o n given to men* s i n t e r e s t s by t h e i r passions. 11. schoolmen's d e f i n i t i o n i s s e l f contradictory. Proceeding to another question, that of the ends or resolutions of discourse, Hobbes declares that four important concepts are to be defined. These are "opinion", "judgment", "doubt" and " b e l i e f " . The end or r e s o l u t i o n of a chain of discourse, i t i s f i r s t to be explained, i s the point where the discourse i s broken o f f . The a n t i c i p a t i o n of the future course of the discourse i s an "opinion", while the l a s t opinion i n a chain or argument i s a"judgment."The chain i t s e l f with i t s assertions and contradictions may be c a l l e d "doubt". A l l knowledge of f a c t except the o r i g i n a l sense experience i s open to doubt and there i s no absolute knowledge except at the time of 2 the o r i g i n a l event. Science i s simply the correct arrange-ment of a chain of c o n d i t i o n a l propositions, whereas " b e l i e f " which does not begin with facts and d e f i n i t i o n s , i s the assumption that opinions are true, ^obbes i s c a r e f u l to point out that our b e l i e f s are always directed to the opinions of someone, and thus, he says, i f we question fcivy' s saying that God made a cow speak, we are doubting L i v y not (2) From the assertion that there i s no absolute knowledge except at the time of the event, i t follows that a l l s c i e n t i f i c knowledge i s i n f e r e n t i a l * I t might be observed that, from the modern point of. view, the i s o l a t e d sense experience could not properly be c a l l e d knowledge. .X S A God. The concept of power, to a discussion of which Hobbes now turns, i s c e n t r a l i n the psychology of the "Leviathan". I t i s a concept which explains not only the petty desires of i n d i v i d u a l s , but also the great movements c f h i s t o r y , including wars and the r i s e and f a l l of kings. Power i n men may be native or acquired, but the greatest power i s that which i s acquired by the unity of men i n the commonwealth. So f a r as the i n d i v i d u a l i s concerned r i c h e s , reputation, popularity, success, a f f a b i l i t y , n o b i l i t y , eloquence, beauty and science are to be desired because they minister to man1s desire for- power. The worth or value of a man i s not to be decided on metaphysical or sentimental grounds, but on the basis of his "sale p r i c e " , the amount that w&uld be given f o r h i s poweroDigcLity i s the public, worth of a man and consists i n the respect a man i s shown by others. True worthiness, on the other hand, i s f i t n e s s for that f or which he Is said to be worthy. I t i s the overmastering desire f or power In men that makes a problem of manners, banners are not, Hobbes i n s i s t s , petty morals, but the q u a l i t i e s required by men l i v i n g with one another i n peace and concord. The happy l i f e i s one i n which the i n d i v i d u a l progressively obtains the objects of h i s desire. Although the dominant desire f o r power leads to contention and s t r i f e , other 13. human passions have a more s o c i a l r e s u l t . Love of ease, fear of death and wounds, love of the arts of peace and fear of oppression, a l l constrain men to c i v i l obedience. I t i s further to be observed that hate r i s e s from the f e e l i n g of i n f e r i o r i t y produced by receiving g i f t s one cannot repay. From t h i s observation i t might be expected, Hobbes says, that a subject would hate h i s sovereign. We s h a l l see l a t e r that he has much more to say with regard to t h i s l a s t p o s s i b i l i t y . Hobbes was c a r e f u l to note the bearing of ignorance on morality. Ignorance causes men to r e l y on the advice of others, rather than on t h e i r own good judgment and prevents them from seeing the causal sequence i n events. Again i t renders them incapable of determining who are the true i n i t i a t o r s of action i n human a f f a i r s and so makes them susceptible to the sway of demagogues. Ignorance of causes and of the o r i g i n a l c o n s t i t u t i o n of r i g h t and wrong, makes men r e l y on custom - a c h i l d i s h .form of behaviour .which i s w e l l evidenced i n the recourse of lawyers to " l e g a l precedents". But custom Is challenged by the authority of reason and when t h i s occurs a clash a r i s e s i n the commonwealth, between thoughtful men and conventionalists. Hobbes* f i n a l observation with regard to the e f f e c t s of ignorance i s that ignorance i s apt to make men emphasize immediate as opposed to secondary causes - as when an i n d i v i d u a l 14 blames a t a x - c o l l e c t o r f o r the taxes made necessary by the very existence of the s o c i a l community. A l l i n a l l , Hobbes holds, ignorance presents one of the greatest problems with which the commonwealth has to - cope. Hobbes has often been accused of timldltja but h i s r e f l e c t i o n s on the subject of r e l i g i o n , to which he next turns, were daring f o r his day. The four roots of r e l i g i o n , he says, are grounded i n ignorance and fear. R e l i g i o n may a r i s e from the notion that there are ghosts, from men's ignorance of secondary causes, from devotion to the things that other men fear, and from mistaking casual events as a basis of pr e d i c t i o n f or the future e Hobbes does concede to the idea of God a somewhat l o f t i e r o r i g i n , f o r t h i s idea he admits arises from the search for a f i r s t cause. The polytheism of the heathen, he explains, i s the r e s u l t of a f a i l u r e to follow the causal s e r i e s to i t s source. There are two sorts of r e l i g i o n , says Hobbes, the r e l i g i o n of r e v e l a t i o n , and the r e l i g i o n of men. The r e l i g i o n of Abraham, Moses and C h r i s t belongs to the f i r s t c l a s s ; the r e l i g i o n of gentiles., to the second. The r e l i g i o n of men, he explains, i s an instrument of government used to make men obedient. Hobbes i s u n w i l l i n g to deviate from the t r a d i t i o n a l view i n h i s analysis of the r e l i g i o n of r e v e l a t i o n and the way i n which he harmonizes t h i s concept with the n a t u r a l i s t i c psychology and h i s 15. theory of gpvernment, i s an i n t e r e s t i n g question which w i l l receive due consideration at the end of t h i s chapter. THE ORIGIN OF THE COMMONWEALTH. The Natural Condition of Mankind. The natural condition of mankind i s savagery, a state i n which every man i s at war with every other. Hobbes does not think that any such condition ever existed u n i v e r s a l l y although he suggests that the American savages are one example of the state of nature and the kings and princess of Europe another * The condition of war of every man against every, other man a r i s e s , he explains, as a r e s u l t of nature having endowed a l l men with equal mental capacity. In support of t h i s theory e, • « & c> « o a> • 9 • * o * e © e & *e«>**»«4*«e • » © • © • • e p © • . • c f> • (S) Modgrn anthropology would not j u s t i f y his statement concerning the existence of the state among American Indians, but one i s i n c l i n e d to f e e l that his r e f l e c t i o n upon European i n t e r n a t i o n a l a f f a i r s would be as true i n the twentieth century;' as i t was i n the seventeenth. Although we must r e j e c t the notion of the state of nature as anunfounded speculation of the seventeenth century t h i s does not se r i o u s l y disturb Hobbes* argument. His point i s that without an order g i v i n g authority there would be just such a state of war. This coneeption i s a l o g i c a l develop-ment of h i s psychology, and i t i s the l o g i c a l antecedent of any conception of society which demands a .strong c e n t r a l power as the condition of order. 16 of equality .of mental endowments, Hobbes puts forward the specious argument that i n t e l l e c t u a l argument must be equal since each i n d i v i d u a l i s s a t i s f i e d with h i s own share of i t . We might c r i t i c i z e t h i s reasoning bjatb as fa r as Hobbes' subsequent considerations are concerned the important point i s not that men a c t u a l l y are equal, but that they i n v a r i a b l y think they are equal i n mental capacity. Because men think they are equal they are unrestrained i n t h e i r competition f o r objects of common desire. In such a competitive society no man fe e l s secure u n t i l he has mastered a l l h i s possible opponents. Added to t h i s prevalent Insecurity i s the ever present desire for power and glory. The r e s u l t i s actual s t r i f e or constant a n t i c i p a t i o n of s t r i f e , that:, i s , the condition of war where every man i s enemy to every man. When such a condition p r e v a i l s , there can be:no indutry, no c u l t i v a t i o n , no navigation, no b u i l d i n g ^ no knowledge, no a r t s , no l e t t e r s , no society. In such circumstances, again, there i s constant fear of danger and death, and the l i f e of man, Hobbes a f f i r m s , i s " s o l i t a r y , poor, nasty, 5. ' ' b r u t i s h , and short." From such a condition, of course, (4) Hobbes own conception of the fundamental egocen-t r l c i t y of man would be a better explanation of t h i s apparent s a t i s f a c t i o n of each with h i s own endowment than the theory of eq u a l i t y . (5) Hobbes, ^homas, "The-English Works of Thomas 17. men n a t u r a l l y turn away, for they fear death and desire to l i v e comfortably. Reason suggests to them convenient a r t i c l e s of peace, a truce i s signed and f i n a l l y the com-monwealth i s established. The fundamental r i g h t : of nature i s the l i b e r t y of s e l f preservation, or the l i b e r t y each man has to everything. In contrast to i: t h i s , the perception of a law of nature i s the discovery by reason that one ought not to perform any act contrary to 6. ' ' h i s " n a t u r a l r i g h t " • 2;, The Laws of Nature. On t h i s basis i t Is the general r u l e of reason that "Every man ought to endeavour peace as far as he has hoj>ej of obtaining i t j and when he cannot obtain i t , that he may seek,and u s e , a l l helps, and.advantages of war." This r u l e contains the f i r s t law of nature, which i s , "To 8 o seek peace and f o l l o w i t , M * and the sum of the r i g h t of $ D es * «• * «« • « © « * • * » « « « • * © » e © • » e • • * e • * • * * « • e * * • • 0 • • » * • Hobbes", V o l . I I I . "Leviathan", Ed. S i r William Malsworth, John Bahn, London, 1839, P. 113. 6. Hobbes' conceptionof a law of nature which he introduces here, d i f f e r s * both from the l e g a l and from the s c i e n t i f i c concept of law. The. l e g a l view regards the law as the f i a t of the sovereign* '^he'scientific view, on the other hand regards a law as an observed uniformity of nature. I n contrast to b t h of these, the laws of nature i n Hobbes' philosophy,have a r a t i o n a l basis which gives them nmchhthe same status as the d i c t a t e s of the hypothetical imperative i n the Kantian e t h i c a l system. 7. Hobbes. Op. c i t . p.117. 8. I b i d . p. 117 18. 9. nature, which is,,"by a l l means we can to defend ourselves." From the f i r s t law of nature i s derived the second law, "That a man be w i l l i n g when others are too, as f a r - f o r t h , as f o r peace, and defence of himself he s h a l l think i t necessary, to lay down t h i s r i g h t to a l l things, and be contented with so much l i b e r t y against other men as he w i l l 10. allow other men against himself." This law i s the basis of the s o c i a l contract. For to lay down a r i g h t i s to divest oneself of a l i b e r t y e i t h e r by renouncing i t or tr a n s f e r r i n g i t to another. No one ever lays down anything except with the hope of a t t a i n i n g some good f o r himself, and i n a contract one party promises, something to the other party with the hope of gaining something i n return. Even i n the case of a free g i f t the giver hopes to gain f r i e n d -ship or goodwill in. return. A contract may be defined, then, as the mutual t r a n s f e r r i n g of a r i g h t . Now men may contract to perform the terms of t h e i r contract at some time a f t e r the contract was made. Such a contract i s known as a covenant• In a covenant the r i g h t passes: at the time the contract i s made, regardless of the f a c t that the actual performance of the terms may not be required u n t i l some time i n the future. The signs of a contract may be words or inferences. Words are the express signs of a contract and (9) Hobbes, Op. c i t . P.117. (10) I b i d , P. 118. 19 may c a l l for, the f u l f i l l m e n t of the contract at any time. An inference may be an unexpressed or i n d i r e c t sign of a contract i f i t adequately represents the w i l l of the contractor. Covenants, hobbes goes on, are only binding when there i s a power present that i s able to overawe a l l the contracting p a r t i e s . Covenants might be made i n a state of nature, but they would be covenants of mutual t r u s t and would be void upon suspicion of a breach of t r u s t . Covenants that v i o l a t e the law of nature-, f u r t h e r , are void. The term of agreement of a covenant must be w i t h i n the power of the covenanter, for i t i s not permissible i n a covenant to promise the impossible, but i f such a covenant Is made the covenant endures at the o r i g i n a l value of the terms. Covenants i n which one agrees not to defend himself, or to confess without assurance of pardon, are void because they v i o l a t e the r i g h t of nature which j u s t i f i e s s e l f preservation. Hobbes also observes that the r i g h t to any end also includes the r i g h t to the appropriate means e For example, the sale of a water m i l l transfers also the water r i g h t s of the adjacent stream and the r i g h t to govern includes the r i g h t to levy taxes to support the administrat-i o n . There are two c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of man's nature that help to bind the p a r t i e s of a covenant. One of these, which Hobbes f e e l s i s not to be counted on, i s that men take pride i n appearing not to break t h e i r word. 20 The other bond conducive to the keeping of covenants i s a much stronger one, springing as i t does from the fear of the consequences of covenant breaking. This fear of consequences may be reinforced >y an oath sworn before God, although such an oath a c t u a l l y adds nothing to the o b l i g a t i o n , fhe sure support f o r a l l . covenants i s the existence of a power strong enough to overawe both p a r t i e s and to compel them to keep t h e i r word. From the second law of nature, urging willing n e s s to s a c r i f i c e f o r peace, Hobbes derives h i s t h i r d law, which we need only take notice of here. I t 11. demands"that men perform t h e i r covenants made". I t i s only a f t e r the covenant has been agreed upon that j u s t i c e means anything i n society. Where there i s no covenant there i s no j u s t i c e f o r , as has already been indi c a t e d , i n the absence of a covenant a state of war e x i s t s and everyone has a r i g h t to everything. In such a condi t i o n , l i k e w i s e , there i s no such thing as > i n j u s t i c e , f o r the term " j u s t i c e " i s meaningful only when covenants are drawn up and made secure, and covenants are made secure only by the i n s t i t u t i o n of sovereign power, that i s by the i n s t i t u t i o n of the commonwealth. J u s t i c e , i n the medieval sense as "the constant w i l l of giving to 1 2 . every man his own," does not e x i s t u n t i l the commonwealth & * « 9 o e o e f e « * « t o « e < » « » 0 e « f e & e o © © © • & © © © » © • © © • e « © © • © © © • © • « « « « © © 1 3 ) Hobbes, op. c i t . P. 130. 14) I b i d P. 131. SI. Is established for there i s no "own" In a state of war, In every age, Hobbes says, there have been men who have argued that j u s t i c e i s contrary to reason. This i s obviously f a l s e f o r reason i s the instrument of s e l f preservation and j u s t i c e i s the reasonable method of s e l f preservation. Even i n a condition of war a l l i e s are necessary, and to hold them i t i s necessary to keep covenant with them. Rebell i o n i s a large-scale breaking of the covenant; consequently, i t i s , against reason. The fact that r e b e l l i o n s are seldom Successful and that each r e b e l l i o n sows the seeds for further r e b e l l i o n emphasizes t h e i r unreasonableness• Some would disregard t h i s f a c t and appeal to the hope of happiness a f t e r death i n support of r e b e l l i o n . Hobbes points out that such people are acting on mere hearsay, and are not being t r u l y r a t i o n a l . A further examination of the conditions i n which men l i v e at peace with one another leads to the establishment of f u r t h e r laws of nature. Those which follow the thcee previously noted, are b r i e f l y ? 4. Gratitude. See that your benefactor has no reason to repent of h i s goodwill. 5. Complaisance. Everyone must s t r i v e to accommodate himself to the r e s t , that i s , be sociable. 6. Pardon. Pardon or peace should be granted to those who ask i t i n order that peace may be maintained i n the future. 22. 7. Revenge. Revenge i s to be taken i n the l i g h t of the future good and not of the past e v i l . Punishments are f o r the correction of the. offender and the d i r e c t i o n of others. 8. Do not declare hate of another by deed, word, countenance or gesture. 9. Acknowledge every other man as your equal by nature. The equality of men i n nature has already been demonstrated and to disregard that equality Is offensive p r i d e . 10. So not dot demand any r i g h t s f o r yourself that you would not allow,to others. 11. Deal equally with others, otherwise controversies a r i s e that, lead ...to .war. 12. What cannot be divided must'be enjoyed i n common. 13. The f i r s t possession of what cannot be divided or enjoyed i n common must be dedided by l o t . 1 4 . There are two kinds of l o t , a r b i t r a r y and nat u r a l . A r b i t r a r y l o t i s effected through the agreement of the competitors, whereas natu r a l l o t i s decided according to primogeniture or f i r s t seizure. From t h i s i t follows that what cannot be divided or enjoyed i n common should f a l l to the f i r s t possessor as i f by l o t . 1 5 . A mediator i n any dispute should have safe conduct. 16. P a r t i e s to a controversy- must submit to 23 a r b i t r a t i o n i n order that the p o s s i b i l i t y of peace may be furthered, 17. No man is : a f i t a r b i t e r of his own cause. 18. No man i s to be a judge who has In him a natural cause of p a r t i a l i t y . 19. I f there i s no evidence to the contrary the witness of one man i s equivalent to the witness of another and other witnesses should therefore be used. These laws may be summarized i n the negative statement of the golden r u l e , "Do not that to another which 15. thou wouldst not have done to t h y s e l f . " Without the assurance that others w i l l put these laws i n t o action no one Is obliged to act upon them, although everyone Is obliged to desire that they should be put i n t o action. The laws of nature are eternal because war w i l l never preserve l i f e and peace w i l l never destroy I t . Representation i n the, Commohwe alth<, Turning more s p e c i f i c a l l y to the subject of the p o l i t i c a l commonwealth^ Hobbes takes up the question of the various r o l e s of persons i n society. He observes that a person may be one whose words and actions are h i s own, or one whose words and actions represent another man-(15) Hobbes^qOp c i t . P. 144. 24. 16 • or t h i n g . A person whose words and actions are h i s own i s a "natural person" or "author". One whose words and actions are representative of the words and actions of another i s an " a r t i f i c i a l person" or "actor" Authority i s the r i g h t a man has to perform any p a r t i c u l a r act» An author i s one who has the r i g h t of a c t i n g , or authority to act on h i s own behalf. He has the r i g h t of making covenants but he must accept the ob l i g a t i o n imposed by the covenant. When he delegates his authority to an "actor" the author must accept r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f or the actor's deeds. The actor must keep h i s covenant with the author by obedience to the author's i n s t r u c t i o n s , and must show that he derives hi s authority from h i s master or author. Some things may be given the status of persons and yet not have the r i g h t of-being authors. Inanimate things and i d o l s are i n t h i s c l a s s , though they may be actors i n so f a r as they are instruments of government. Persons who are i r r a t i o n a l , a class that includes c h i l d r e n and madmen, cannot be authors except during periods when they have the use of t h e i r reason. Their "authorship" may be placed i n the hands of a guardian but t h i s transfer of power or authority necessitates a (16) The l a t i n word "persona" has always had a double meaning. I t has never been clear whether the "persona" of the drama was the actor himself or the ro l e he played. c i v i l p&wer or commonwealth to protect the ward. Even the true God may he represented or "presented" as he has been by Moses, C h r i s t and the Holy Ghost. Ar;multitude, Hobbes declares, Is o r d i n a r i l y not to be considered as one, but as many authors. With the consent of every i n d i v i d u a l In i t , however, a muljttitude may be personated or represented by one man. t h i s represen-t a t i v e has authority by v i r t u e of the fact and to the extent that each i n d i v i d u a l of the multitude as an author invests authority i n him. The actor who represents the i n d i v i d u a l s of a multitude may be one man or a number of men. When the actor i s a number of men, the voice of the majority of them rules..Because a representative assembly such as t h i s would be, might be divided equally and i t s voice therefore become mute, i t shoudl be composed of an unequal number of i n d i v i d u a l s . I f the power of veto i s placed i n the hands of one member of the assembly, the assembly's representative i s made useless and the assembly i s rendered i n e f f e c t i v e . :, The S o c i a l Contract. The p o l i t i c a l commonwealthy Hobbes proceeds, i s established by i n d i v i d u a l s f o r purposes of s e l f preservation. I t s creation i s suggested by the natural laws already o u t l i n e d . These laws are contrary to the natura l passions of mankind and are mere words u n t i l they 26. have the support of the sword. The laws of nature might be supported i n part by a few men banding together, but . a small power serves only to c a l l up a s i m i l a r power i n opposition. The only s o l u t i o n of the problem i s the union of the whole multitude under one judgement and power. Hobbes points out that the comparison of the commonwealth to the corpoTrate l i f e of the s o c i a l insects i s not sound, f o r men compete for d i g n i t y and honour i n a way that bees and ants do not. Insects are so highly s o c i a l i z e d that t h e i r private good corresponds to the common good; they are "not - c r i t i c a l , nor are they led away by the deceptions of words. The s o c i a l insect agrees n a t u r a l l y with the others i n the insect society, and i s never offended as long as i t i s comfortable. Men on the other hand are most r e b e l l i o u s when l i f e i s easy for them. Under such circumstances they are able to agree only through mutual p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n a covenant. The only possible way to end the state of war that e x i s t s n a t u r a l l y among men, Hobbes declares, i s to confer a l l power and strength on one man or assembly of men. A l l the c o n f l i c t i n g w i l l s of the multitude must be reduced to one w i l l by giving authority to the p l u r a l i t y of voices. One i n d i v i d u a l , or possibly a small group of i n d i v i d u a l s , must be appointed as "person"; the rest must regard themselves as "authors" of what he does. 27 I t i s as i f each man should say to every other mans "I authorize and give up my r i g h t of governing myself, to t h i s man, or to t h i s assembly of men, on t h i s condition that thou give up thy r i g h t to him and authorize a l l his 17. actions i n l i k e manner." When t h i s i s accomplished we have the commonwealth, " c i v i t a s " , "state" or "Leviathan", and the "person" thus endowed with authority Is"the essence of the commonwealth". &obbes further states that he i s , "one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants one with another, have made themselves every one the author to that end that he may use the strength and means of them a l l , as he s h a l l think 18 e expedient f or t h e i r peace and common defence." The i n d i v i d u a l , or assembly, appointed i n t h i s manner i s thfe sovereign and has sovereign power over i t s subjects. Such sovereign power may be attained e i t h e r by force or by mutual agreement. A commonwealth established by force i s a commonwealth "by a c q u i s i t i o n " , while a commonwealth set up by agreement i s a commonwealth "by i n s t i t u t i o n " . (17) Hobbes. Op. c i t . P..158. (18) I b i d , P. 158. 23 e ' THE. NATURE OF THE COMMONWEALTH. . •» The Rights of the Sovereign. The commonwealth, then i s i n s t i t u t e d when all"agree and covenant that one i n d i v i d u a l or an assembly s h a l l have the r i g h t to represent the person of them a l l . Hobbes goes on to say that the covenant Involved i n t h i s agreement includes a l l who voted for i t . Further, the rig h t s which i t places i n the hands of the sovereign power are i n d i v i s i b l e , f o r to renounce any one of them Is to renounce the sovereign power. Hobbes now l i s t s t h i r t e e n " r i g h t s of the sovereign" which he considered to be the basis of the p o s s i b i l i t y of a commonwealth. .We may summarize them b r i e f l y i n the following manner. ( 1 ) While the Covenant sets aside a l l the former o b l i g a t i o n s , the authors of the covenant have not the r i g h t to set up a new covenant. Whoever attempts to depose the sovereign and i s banished i s author of his own punishment because he i s author of the sovereign^' actions. (2) There can be no breach of covenant on the part of the sovereign because he alone of a l l the members of the state was not a patic i p a n t i n i t . No one can be exempted from h i s authority on the ground that the 29 sovereign has broken covenant, for i t i s impossible for the sovereign, who i s not a party to the covenant, to transgress i t s terms. (3) No one can with j u s t i c e protest against the surrender of authority to the sovereign, for such surrender was made on a decision of the majority. Whoever does so protest may be j u s t l y destroyed because he i s attacking the common preserver of the l i f e of hi s fellow men. (4) The sovereign can do no i n j u s t i c e because each p a r t i c i p a n t of the covenant i s author of a l l that the sovereign does. He who complains of i n j u r y i s i n ef f e c t accusing himself. (5) I t follows (from observation 4) that no sovereign can j u s t l y be put to death. (6) The sovereign i s judge of what i s necessary to the peace and defence of his subjects. (7) The sovereign has the r i g h t and duty of censorship i n the commonwealth. (8) I t i s the sovereign's r i g h t to make and pu b l i c i z e rules of propriety. (9) The sovereign has the r i g h t and duty of judicature. (10) I t i s the sovereign's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to make war and peace. (11) The sovereign alone i s authorized to choose a l l counsellors, m i n i s t e r s , magistrates and o f f i c e r s . (12) I t i s the sovereign's r i g h t to reward and 30 punish according to the laws he has made. I f no law f i t t i n g the case e x i s t s , he must judge the case a r b i t r a r i l y . ( 1 3 ) The sovereign alone can create and make appoint-ments to t i t l e s of honour. The sovereign, then, i s i n a l l things supreme. Before him both d i g n i t a r i e s and humble men are both equally servants. To some, Hobbes says, i t may seem that such power i s h u r t f u l . But whoever thinks that, he points out, needs only to consider the e v i l s that r e s u l t from the absence of such power. Manifestly, the existence of a sovereign l o r d i s much the l e s s e r e v i l . : The Kinds of Commonwealth. Commonwealths may be c l a s s i f i e d , Hfebbes explains, according to the nature of the representative, as monarchies, a r i s t o c r a c i e s and democracies. I f , on the other hand, commonwealths are c l a s s i f i e d according to the nature of the dominion and power exercised i n them, they may be ei t h e r paternal or despotical commonwealths. Hobbes proceeds to evaluate the three kinds of common-wealths from the standpoint of the nature of the represent-a t i v e . I n a monarchy, of course, the representative i s a single i n d i v i d u a l . *n an a r i s t o c r a c y , a number of i n d i v i d u a l s are entrusted with the sovereign power, and they j o i n t l y constitute the representative. Hobbes declares that, since i n a democracy the representative includes 31« everyone, the improvement over the state of nature i s so'^significant that t h i s form of government does not warrant discussion. He confines h i s subsequent i n v e s t i g -ations, therefore to monarchies and sovereign assemblies* Both these forms of government, Hobbes says, invlove some inconveniences. With regard to monarchies, i t Is to be observed that a monarch i s also a man, and the passions of men are commonly more potent than r h i s reason. Consequently, a man i n power i s often i n c l i n e d to disregard the public good i n pursuit of his private i n t e r e s t . Furthermore, a monarch receives pfewer p r i v a t e l y and t h i s i s a great advantage to the smooth 5direction of the a f f a i r s of the s t a t e . A sovereign assembly, on the other hand must hear advice as a body and i t s open discussion leads to disorder. Disadvantages common to both forms of government are the c o n f l i c t s and inconsistencies that a r i s e out of human nature, but the assembly has the further complication of numbers added to i t s troubles. Again, though the power to dispose an enemy and enrich a f r i e n d at w i l l i s only found i n a monarchy, assemblies can more e a s i l y be seduced by orators. One of the chief disadvantages of a monarchy-is the f a c t that the crown may pass to an i n f a n t or upane one who cannot d i s t i n g u i s h good from e v i l . But even i n t h i s case the trouble that arises i s to be blamed upon the contention of the subjects and not upon the form of government. Contention i s npt 32. avoided by establishing a l i m i t e d monarchy, for even when a king i s elected or h i s power l i m i t e d by an assembly, disputes are l i a b l e to a r i s e . The r i g h t of succession gives an a r t i f i c i a l e t e r n i t y to the commonwealth, but i t presents a great r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to the monarch whose duty i t i s to see that the commonwealth does not revert to a condition of war through lack of provision for the succession. The succession may pass on according to custom, or according to the d i r e c t word of the monarch, or even on the basis of h i s probable wish i f he has not provided for his h e i r . .Commonwealths',. Hobbes has observed, may also be c l a s s i f i e d as paternal or despotical. These d i f f e r mainly with regard to the way i n which the e x i s t i n g form of the soverignty i s set up. The government of the commonwealth i s paternal i f i t s sovereign has acquired dominion by "generation", that i s through hereditary r i g h t . I t i s despotical on the other hand, when sovereignty has been achieved through conquest. Hobbes contends that even i n the despotical commonwealth, the comqueror may hold sway by the consent of the vanquished who covenant to obey him. I n a l l commonwealths regardless of whether they are paternal or despotical the sovereign power ought to be absolute. Where i t i s not absolute, d i v i s i o n and s t r i f e a r i s e and men are confronted again by a condition 53 of war. Now the avoidance of war i s the f i r s t duty of the s t a t e , but, as has previously been established, war can be avoided only when there existaa>-power strong enovgh to c o n t r o l the warring factions and hence i t follows that absolute authority i s Indispensible. ••;„ The Lib e r t y of Subjects. Hobbes advances from t h i s point,to a consideration of the important subject of l i b e r t y . He ca r r i e s out h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n of t h i s question i n s t r i c t l y m aterial terms. His basis statement i n t h i s regard i s simply that l i b e r t y i s the absence of external impediments to motion, fie does not take the discussion of l i b e r t y beyond the assertion that i t i s to be defined i n terms of the lack of external opposition to a* man'slwill. By tr e a t i n g the question i n t h i s way he avoids the more d i f f i c u l t question of l i b e r t y of the w i l l . He himself regards every act, including acts of w i l l , as part of a causal s e r i e s . H e points out somewhat t a u t o l o g i c a l l y , i n t h i s connection, that the causal necessity would always be apparent i f we could but see the sequence of causes and e f f e c t . But to proceed, we may observe that fiobbes uses the term"liberty" to describe only actions of desire that are unhindered by external opposition. 0n t h i s b a s i s , l i b e r t y can coexist with fear, f o r fear places no external opposition i n the way of a man's 34. actions. Consequently actions done from fear of the law are actions the doer was at l i b e r t y to omit. In the d i s -cussion of t h i s point Hobbes appears to contradict himself for he speaks of c i v i l laws as a r t i f i c i a l chains and the l i b e r t y of subjects as consiting i n freedom from covenants. Covenants, however, do not bind men by external means but simply by the fear of the consequences of breaking t r u s t . In h i s discussion of the r e l a t i o n of sovereign and subject which he next takes up, Hobbes emphasizes the absolute power of the.: s t a te. l e has already pointed out that the sovereign can do no i n j u s t i c e to anyone because every subject i s author of the sovereign's actions. From t h i s observation i t may be concluded that the l i b e r t y of the subject consists i n the unlimited power, or l i b e r t y , of the sovereign. The i n d i v i d u a l , then, finds r e a l l i b e r t y by surrendering up h i s natural freedom to the state 19. or commonwealth. Even i n Hobbes' commonwealth, however, (19) Hobbes' i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the absolute power of the sovereign may have been as welcome to the kings of the sixteenth century as i t : would be to the d i c t a t o r s of the twentieth. I t seems to me.that Hobbes.has already undermined the strength of t h i s theory by the previous d i s t i n c t i o n between author and actor. The author acts i n hi s native r i g h t , but the actor has only a derived r i g h t granted by the author. The. power of a representative i n Hobbes' e a r l i e r discussion was a derived power. Now, however, he seems to a t t r i b u t e an absolute and underived power to the representative. He j u s t i f i e s t h i s absolute power, of course, on the grounds that i t i s the means of 35. the subject has c e r t a i n l i b e r t i e s which he cannot alienate. The most important of such l i b e r t i e s i s that having to do with the defence of the body, for.no one i s bound to hurt himself or to make a confession without the assurance of a pardon. A subject i n a commonwealth i s not required to do any dangerous or dishonorable act, such as going to war, unless h i s r e f u s a l f r u s t r a t e s the w i l l of the sovereign. Hobbes would allow an.individual to refuse to serve i n war provided that the Individual substituted someone i n h i s place. In peace time a subject has no r i g h t to r e s i s t the sword of his sovereign,because such resistance robs the sovereign of h i s means of keeping order. The subject Is obliged to do the w i l l of thes o v e r e i g n as long as the sovereign's power l a s t s , that i s as long as the e x i s t i n g sovereignty endures. / ,.• The Purpose; Machinery and Preservation of the Gommbnwealth. fiobbes has emphasized.over and over again that the purpose of a commonwealth i s to maiaintain order, he © • ©©©•'•©-© * • © © © © © © « • • © «« ft • © © © ©• © a© © © © ©©&.©'©* ©© © © © © © © © © • © avoiding untold misery, ^ t might further be remembered that, while h i lias been v i n d i c a t i n g absolutism, he has at the same tifflS pointed toward the source and author of the sovereign's power and prepared the way for the l a t e r development of p o l i t i c a l theory which placed the ultimate sovereignty In the hands of the i n d i v i d u a l c i t i z e n s of the state. 36 • proceeds now to es t a b l i s h the more p o s i t i v e conception that the commonwealth i s to make provision for n u t r i t i o n . That i s to say, i t i s the task of the commonwealth to arrange for the production and d i s t r i b u t i o n of materials The'task of production i n Hobbes1 day was regarded l a r g e l y as the work of nature, hence Hobbes gives more thought to the question of d i s t r i b u t i o n . F r 0m the observation that, for the sovereign, the public good i s i d e n t i c a l with his own private i n t e r e s t i t follows that a l l the sovereign"s actions w i l l be guided by his desire for the SO. common peace and security of his subjects. The sovereign? f i r s t duty i s the d i s t r i b u t i o n of land, a task which, i n keeping with his power, he ought to perform according to h i s own and not h i s subjects idea of equity, Hobbes takes care that there w i l l be no chance for any lesser power to grow up withi n the state and overthrow i t , by a t t r i b u t i n g to the sovereign the r i g h t s of regulating foreign trade, making trade laws and c o n t r o l l i n g currency. Through the proper execution of these duties and the encouragement of industry the sovereign nourishes the l i f e of the commonwealth. The machinery of the commonwealth includes (SO) I n t h i s connection i t would be unfair to Hobbes to suggest hat he did not r e a l i z e how human weaknesses might misguide the sovereign just as they do other men. Hobbes was not planning a Utopia, and he always j u s t i f i e s hi s system on the basis of the e v i l s i t avoids rather than the good i t produces. 3 7 c the state 5s"systems", the ministers of the state, and the state's l e g a l apparatus. Hobbes'eonception of"system" i s s i m i l a r to the modern notion of an/association. A "system" i s a s o c i a l unit composed of any number of men joined together i n the pursuit of any i n t e r e s t or business Systems may be c l a s s i f i e d as regular or as i r r e g u l a r . A regular system i s one i n which one man or an assembly of men represents the members of the system. Regular systems may be absolute and independent, as i n the case of a commonwealth; or they may be dependent, as i n the case when a representative i s himself a subject of the commonwealth. Dependent regular systems may be p o l i t i c a l or p r i v a t e . A p o l i t i c a l system of t h i s kind would be one that i s made by the authority of the sovereign, f or example, a department of the state. Private dependent regular systems are either l a w f u l or unlawful. In both cases they are organized e i t h e r by the subjects of a commonwealth or by strangers. I t i s enough to say with regard to the i r r e g u l a r system that i t corresponds to the notion of the crowd or mob. The representative or executive of a system i s always l i m i t e d i n power by the absolute sovereign or absolute representative. The v i s i b l e signs of t h i s l i m i t a t i o n are the common law and the s p e c i a l l e t t e r s e s t a b l i s h i n g the system i n question, ^hus the members of the system are protected, f or in.any case where the 38 representative goes beyond the authority s i g n i f i e d i n the law and the " l e t t e r s patent", the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f a l l s on the representative,and not on the members, fiobbes i s ca r e f u l to emphasize the importance of maintaining a strong central power against the inroads of a l l powers that might divide i t . For t h i s reason a l l p rivate bodies are considered unlawful when they have not been granted public authority. Leagues of subjects within a common-wealth and factions of government within a sovereign assembly are i l l e g a l because they present a threat to the existence of the commonwealth. Hobbes describes a public minister as one who i s employed to act as a represntative of the common-wealth. His power i s derived from the commission of the sovereign. Some ministers may be general advisers of the sovereign, while others may have s p e c i f i c assignments, such as the treasury or judicature, i n t h e i r care. At t h i s point.- uobbes returns to the discussion of laws, but he considers them.now as they are found i n c i v i l society. C i v i l laws, unlike the laws of nature, are commands, and the subject Is bound to obey them. The laws of nature, as has been suggested before, are not "commands" b u t " q u a l l t i e s " that dispose a man to peace. They are, however, the basis of c i v i l law and provide that portion of common law that i s dictated by nature as w e l l as by the sovereign's command. The sovereign's 39 peculiar p o s i t i o n outside the covenant and h i s authorit-ative o f f i c e place him beyond the reach of the c i v i l law. Hobbes points out that to give a sovereign a p o s i t i o n subordinate to h i s own laws or to the dictates of custom would be to l i m i t h i s freedom and to deny h i s sovereignty. Nevertheless a true sovereign w i l l obey the laws of nature, not because of any compulsion, but out of deference to reason. The sovereign i s above the law and no other body, no assembly or p a r l i a m e n t h a s the authority to l i m i t hi s poY/er. *f . an assembly does: l i m i t the sovereign's w i l l the assembly w i l l become the true sovereign. I t i s . an ancient l e g a l p r i n c i p l e that ignorance'is no excuse for breaking the law. Hobbes disagrees with t h i s p r i n c i p l e when i t i s applied to c i v i l law, but he does agree that ignorance i s no excuse f o r breaking the laws of nature because these laws are evident.to everyone. Ignorance of the laws, he saysconstitutes a serious threat to. the safety of the commonwealth and i t i s r e q u i s i t e , therefore, that the sovereign s h a l l p u blish the laws and make t h e i r authority c l e a r . The conception of s i n must often have heen confused with the conception of crime i n Hobbes' p u r i t a n i c a l age. In h i s discussion of crime, Hobbes distinguishes between crime and s i n on the ground that the term " s i n " can properly be applied to intentions, 40. "but crimes are only concerned with overt acts. Grimes are overt actions directed to the destruction of the commonwealth. In a state of nature, therefore, there was no such thing as crime; but with the i n s t i t u t i o n of the commonwealth and the laying down of laws, crimes can be detected and punishments i n f l i c t e d . fiobbes does not base the r i g h t to punish on any covenant, for a covenant that gives another the r i g h t to i n f l i c t pain on one's own person i s against a law of nature and consequently v o i d . The r i g h t to punish, rather, i s based on the fa c t that the sovereign did not enter i n t o the covenant, and as a r e s u l t retains the r i g h t of nature to a l l things. The sovereign alone retains complete freedom and power, and upon him rests the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of maintaining order'by i n f l i c t i n g punishments upon c r i m i n a l s , fiobbes has been proceeding i n his discussion of the various c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of the commonwealth with the thought of those things that weaken the sovereign power always i n his mind. As he considers the t o p i c of the preservation of the commonwealth s p e c i f i c a l l y he deals with those i d e a l s and practiees that drain awafc. the strength of the Leviathan from w i t h i n . A commonwealth, he says, may begin i t s l i f e with feeble strength. The sovereign i n his anxiety to gain some power may be s a t i s f i e d with l e s s than absolute, power. The s i t u a t i o n 4.1. where the sovereign has less than absolute power i s the most serious threat to the state, and any doctrine or action that seems to plaint i n that d i r e c t i o n ought to be suppressed at once. Among such doctrines are f i r s t , the notion that the sovereign power may be divided; second, the b e l i e f that the sovereign i s subject to the c i v i l law, and f i n a l l y , the notion that every man has an absolute r i g h t to his own goods. The s t a b i l i t y of the commonwealth, Hobbes goes on to say, i s weakened by imported doctrines that f i l l men's minds with the desire to imitate either t h e i r neighbours, the Greeks, or the Romans i n t h e i r form of government. Among the practises that undermine a state from with i n are the c o l l e c t i o n s of power i n the hands of any person other than the sovereign. When popular leaders organize large follGwings, or monopolies c o l l e c t large sums of money, or large towns or corporations band themselves strongly together, the sovereign power i s threatened from with i n the commonwealth i t s e l f . T h i s threat from within can lead to the destruction of the state as quickly as external defeat i n war. Although Hobbes has consistently placed h i s emphasis on the order-giving function of the commonwealth, and the need for maintaining the "status q he suggests a more important rol e for the sovereign than that of being merely the policemen of the state. 42. As he proceeds to outline the duty of the sovereign's o f f i c e , he points out that the sovereign's duty includes not only the maintenance of the security of his subjects, but i n addition to t h i s a l l other legitimate a c t i v i t i e s that promote the general welfare of the commonwealth. He has already Indicated the various l e g a l and adminidtrative duties of the sovereign, and here he r e i t e r a t e s these duties and extends them to include r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r what might w e l l be c a l l e d s o c i a l service. The sovereign's educational function i s mainly confined to the propagation of views that consolidate the commonwealth. Hobbes stresses p a r t i c u l a r l y that the sovereign should.make provision for teaching the basic r i g h t s of subject and sovereign, giving information concerning the danger of popular leaders and reformers who undermine the power of the sovereign. A body of d e s t i t u t e or i d l e men constitutes a serious threat to the s t a t e , and Hobbes declares that i t i s the sovereign's duty to see that d e s t i t u t e men should be p u b l i c l y cared f o r , and i d l e men encouraged and even forced to work. He may sum up h i s conception of the functionof the sovereign by noting that, as the a f f a i r s of a l l h i s subjects are h i s own personal concern he ought to exercise the same watchful care over a l l the l i f e of the commonwealth as a wise and industrious c i t i z e n would over his own personal i n t e r e s t s . 45. I4 ? THE RELATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH TO RELIGIOUS CONCEPTIONS i n h i s discussion of a "C h r i s t i a n Commonwealth" and the"Eingdom of Darkness", Hobbes attempts to correct and r e i n t e r p r e t the dominant r e l i g i o u s conceptions of his day i n such a way as to win the support of r e l i g i o n f o r h i s own p o l i t i c a l philosophy. Both on the continent and i n England he had seen how b i t t e r l y men w i l l f i g h t for t h e i r r e l i g i o u s convictions. He saw that no common-wealth could endure i f i t was divided by uncompromising r e l i g i o u s p a r t i e s . In the concluding portion of the "Leviathan" he devotes himself to the impressive task of c u l l i n g from the C h r i s t i a n t r a d i t i o n the teachings and practises that could not be harmonized with his con-ception of the absolute power of the sovereign. We need not here be concerned i n great d e t a i l with his views on these matters. I t i s s u f f i c i e n t f o r our present purposes to i n d i c a t e how he treated one or two of the major co n t r o v e r s i a l questions of r e l i g i o u s thought which have a d i r e c t bearing on h i s p o l i t i c a l philosophy. Hobbes agrees with the preponderance of r e l i g i o u s writers i n t h e i r view that man's duty to God i s to worship Him. Worship, or showing honour to God, he says, i s of two kinds, i n t e r n a l and external. I n t e r n a l worship i s . t h e inward thought of the worshipper, but 44. external-vwor ship consists of outward acts that symbolise the inward a t t i t u d e . This subjective i n t e r p r e t a t i o n made i t possible for Hobbes to r a t i o n a l i z e the absolute authority of the sovereign over a l l worshippers. He claims that there i s no inconsistency In aiisubject f u l f i l l i n g the demands of a sovereign i n h i s outward acts when these acts contradict h i s r e l i g i o u s convictions. Thus there would have been no inconsistency i n Christians s a c r i f i c i n g to the Roman emperor as long as they maintained t f i t h i h themselves trsie allegiance,to God. Man's knowledge of God? s w i l l , Hobbes says, i s from two sources, reason and r e v e l a t i o n . Hobbes i s tjuite sure that the conclusions of reason d i c t a t e to mem the w i l l of God, and that a C h r i s t i a n can f e e l confident when led by h i s reason -that he i s following the divine w i l l . On the other hand, he asks, while the assurance of r e v e l a t i o n i s not to be doubted, how i s a man to know that he i s not being deceived when a;prophet t e l l s him of a r e v e l a t i o n of God. In the days .of the Old Testament the a u t h e n t i c i t y of a prophet was tested either by his conformance to the law of Moses or by h i s e x h i b i t i o n of miracles. Hobbes i s w i l l i n g to accept the testimony of s c r i p t u r e as the word of God but points out that the argument based on miracles i s no longer v a l i d because miracles have apparently ceased. In cases where Scripture and reason seem to us to c o n f l i c t we are not to doubt 45, scripture,nor to t r y and make i t seem reasonable, but we are simply to accept the words at the command of the l a w f u l l y constituted authority. Hobbes points out that the Kingdom of God has been misinterpreted by some divines who have said i t referred to the future l i f e . This, he claims, i s not a S c r i p t u r a l i n t e r p r e t a t i o n for Scripture refers to the Kingdom of God as a c i v i l kingdom. I f the Kingdom of God had referred to eternal f e l i c i t y i n another world, why has there been so much dispute about who the representative of the kingdom i s ? Hobbes traces the notion of the Kingdom of God through the Scripture i n order to show that i t i s the equivalent to God's sovereignty over a people. Now the most reasonable form of c i v i l government has been outlined i n Hobbes' discussion of the commonwealth or i e v i a t h a n , and i n t h i s government there i s but one sovereign power.whom we ought to regard as God's representat-i v e . For any group of i n d i v i d u a l s to band themselves together i n the commonwealth and to declare themselves the sole representatives of God i s prohibited i n Hobbes' view of things. There i s i n h i s system no place for any except the authorized church, and that church i s regarded as a subordinate department under the rule of the sovereign. Hobbes expresses t h i s w e l l when he says: 'Temporal a n d ' s p i r i t u a l ' government are but two words brought i n t o the world, toemake men see-double,, and mistake t h e i r 46. 'lawful sovereign'. I t Is true that the bodies of the f a i t h f u l , a f t e r the resurrection, s h a l l be not only s p i r i t u a l , but et e r n a l ; but i n t h i s l i f e they are gross and cor r u p t i b l e . There Is therefore no other government In t h i s l i f e , neither of s t a t e , nor r e l i g i o n , but temporal; no teaching of any doctrine, lawful to any subject, which the governor both of. the state, and of the r e l i g i o n forbiddeth to be taught. And that governor must be one; or else there must needs follo w f a c t i o n and c i v i l war i n the commonwealth, between the 'church' and 'State'; between ' s p i r i t u a l i s t s ' and 'temr>oralists r;. between 'the sword of j u s t i c e ' and t h e 8 s h i e l d of f a i t h ' ; and, which i s more, In every C h r i s t i a n man'spown breast, between the 'Ch r i s t i a n ' and the 'man'. ^  9 In discussing the Kingdom of darkness fiobbes i s c h i e f l y attacking the Roman Catholic Church. He points out that we can safely assume that the authors of darkness and ignorance w i l l be those persons who receive the b e n e f i t from that darkness. The causes of darkness are four i n number, the most important .of which i s misinter-p r e t a t i o n of S c r i p t u r e . Perhaps the most serious S c r i p t u r a l m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n ^ Hobbes says, has been that the Church i s the Kingdom of God on earth. He points to the b e l i e f i n demons and ghosts as another force that has corrupted the l i g h t of r e l i g i o n . Empty and erroneous philosophy has entered the C h r i s t i a n r e l i g i o n from the Greeks, (21) Hobbes, op. c i t . P. (22) Mobbes' opposition to the homan Catholic Church as he expressed i n the Leviathan roused the anger of French Cat h o l i c s , and he was compelled to return to England from his e x i l e i n France. 4 7 and shrouded believer's minds i n darkness. F i n a l l y , he says, men have misinterpreted history and darkened our knowledge of the past. 48. CHAPTER I I . AN EXPOSITION OF JOHN LOCKE'S "TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT". %9. CHAPTER I I . AN EXPOSITION OF JOHN LOCKE'S "TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT.n . I . A CRITICISM OF SIR ROBERT FILHER'S PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT. Locke introduces his theory of c i v i l government by focussing h i s own mind upon the obscure and confused theory of absolute monarchy as i t was presented by S i r Robert Filmer i n his "Patriarcha"• Locke's c r i t i c i s m of F i l m e r 1 s exposition i s as cutting as the philosopher's keen mind could make i t . Filmer, i t appears had not only advocated i n h i s "Patriarcha" a theory that runs counter to Locke's own p o l i t i c a l view, but he has also committed.the unbearable offence of presenting a t r e a t i s e that was i n many respects vague and i r r a t i o n a l . Locke reduces Filmer's argument to i t s simplest form, which may be expressed i n the following manner; (1) No man i s born free and therefore a man never has the l i b e r t y to choose ei t h e r h i s governor or form of government. (S) Princes: hold absolute power by divine r i g h t , because slaves could never have the r i g h t to set up a government by compact or common consent. 50. (5) Because Adam was an absolute monarch,, a l l princes, since the time of Adam are also absolute. I t i s apparent that neither scripture nor reason support these arguments, and Locke proceeds i n the chapters of his f i r s t t r e a t i s e to refute t h i s spurious argument for slavery. Filmer, Locke says, has one great contention, namely, that men are not born free. Filmer based his proposition on the assertion that men are born i n subjection to t h e i r parents. Filmer i d e n t i f i e d t h i s paternal power with regal authority, claiming that both are absolute, and give t h e i r possessor, whether father or king, complete control over c h i l d or subject even to the point of death. Filmer claims to derive the absolute authority of kings and princes- Prom the proposition that Adam1s authority was absolute. Locke denounces hi s opponent for f a i l i n g to give a more s o l i d proof either of the parental authority of Adam or the connection between the parental and regal authority. F i l m e r 1 s only argument for the sovereign authority of fatherhood, that was based on anything sounder than dogmatic r e p e t i t i o n , was his quotation of the s c r i p t u r a l i n j u n c t i o n , ^ Honour thy Father." Even here Filmer was only h a l f reasonable for he omitted the other part of the quotation, which enjoins with equal weight that one should honour one's mother. Eocke declares that he has examined the "Patriarcha" thoroughly i n search of 51 a weightier argument but has found none. In his attempt to be thorough and just he has turned to Filmer' s "Observations" upon Sobbes' "Leviathan". In t h i s book Locke discovered that Filmer had urged his claim for Adam's sovereignty on the ground of God's creation of Adam and the dominion God gave Adam over Eve and his children. These claims are to be the subjects of Locke's succeeding chapters. S i r Robert Filmer attempted to derive Adam's t i t l e to the sovereignty of a l l the world from the fact of Adam's creation, but Locke i s unwilling to accept t h i s argument. Filmer held that i t i s impossible to accept the doctrine of the natural freedom of man without denying the creation of Adam. In opposition to t h i s Locke points out that there i s no apparent connection between Adam's creation and his sovereignty over anything, for his creation was only the granting of bare existence to him, whereas sovereignty involves dominion. Locke continues the discussion as he examines the meanings of the sentences Filmer has- used so c a r e l e s s l y . In i t s simplest form Filmer's argument was that as soon as Adam was creeated he was appointed monarch of the world. He recognized that at the time of Adam's creation the father of the race had no children or subjects, but he maintained that while Adam was not a monarch i n act he was a monarch " i n habit". Locke reveals the ambiguity 52« of Filmer, 1 s argument by showing that "appointment" may mean eith e r what Providence orders, or what a law of nature d i r e c t s , or a p o s i t i v e r e v e l a t i o n of God. Locke rules that "appointment" may not have the meaning of "what providence orders" i n t h i s argument because that would be the same as saying that on creation Adam was monarch i n act and Filmer had already agreed that he was not monarch " i n act" but only " i n habit". Filmer used the term "Monarch" ambiguously f o r , as he applied i t , i t might r e f e r to Adam either as proprietor of a l l the world or as sovereign r u l e r of mankind. Ruling out the p o s s i b i l i t y of "appointment" meaning "what Providence orders", Locke proceeds to examine the possible meanings of the sentence; "By appointment of God as soon as Adam was created, he was monarch of the world." ^ocke advances h i s examination by considering F i l m e r 9 s meaning when ".monarch" i s taken to mean proprietor of the world and "appoinment".. as God's revealed grant expressed i n Genesis 1:28. Taking these meanings of "monarch" and "appointment", the sentence would read:-By God's revealed grant, as soon as Adam was created^ he was proprietor of the world. But according to the text f I j "lockup Tohrt,. '".Two "Ireat'fseis'-'df Government" ,' The works of John Locke, Volume V.., Thomas Davidson's P r i n t i n g , ,3323* London, Page. 225, Locke exhausts only two,,of the four possible combinations ; o f "appointment" and "monarch". 53. of Genesis a grant could not have been made immediately on the cteavotiof Adam but only a f t e r the creation of Eve. Furthermore i t should be pointed out that Sod's revealed grant was not necessary i f God has already given the proprietorship of the world as a r i g h t of nature. On the other hand i f "monarch" i s taken to mean sovereign r u l e r of mankind and God's "appointment" to mean a law of nature, then the sentence would read: "By the law of nature as soon as Adam was ereateddhe was governor of mankind, for by r i g h t of nature i t was due to Adam to be governor of • 3 . . . . h i s p o s t e r i t y " . But t h i s means nothing more than that Adam was governor by r i g h t of nature because he was governor by r i g h t of nature..Even i f i t be granted that a man i s governor of h i s po s t e r i t y by a r i g h t of nature Adam was s t i l l not a governor u n t i l he had chi l d r e n . S i r Robert Filmer had foreseen t h i s l a t e r objection and r e p l i e d to i t i n advance by means of h i s concept of a "monarch i n habit?. Locke's reply i s to say that i n Filmer's sense "monarch i n habit" means nothing more than • e © © © « © © © « • « « c o «. » « . © • • « © © © • « © • « » « « . © o « « © • « • © « * » e » « © • « « © (2) Genesis 1:27 and 1:28(a) reads as follows: "So God created man i n h i s own image, i n the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And Sod blessed them and God said unto them " The "them" seems to Include Eve though Locke says she was created later:, no doubt r e f e r r i n g to the story i n the second chapter of Genesis. The documentary theory which separates the f i r s t two chapters of Genesis into two separate s t o r i e s had not been put forward In Locke's day. (3) Locke, Op c i t . P.224. 54. that Adam had a p o s s i b i l i t y of being a monarch and that t h i s does not support Filmer's contention that Adam was monarch of a l l the world on his creation* Locke apologizes (quite r i g h t l y , we feel) for his long and involved argument, but points out that i t was necessitated by Filmer's deceptive use of words. Turning to Filmer's claim that God made Adam lo r d of a l l things "by donation" Locke proceeds . to undermine further the p o s i t i o n taken by his monarchical opponent. Filmer concluded from Genesis 1:28-"And God Blessed them, and God said unto them, be f r u i t f u l and mul t i p l y , and replenish the earth and subdie i t , and have dominion over the f i s h of the sea; and over the fowl of the a i r , and over every l i v i n g thing that moveth upon the earth"-' that Adam had dominion over a l l creatures and was therefore monarch of a l l the world. Locke says that Filmer's saying may be interpreted i n two ways, i t may be regarded as meaning either that God's grant gave property, that i s , private dominium., and as a r e s u l t the monarchy; or that trod's. grant gave Adam power over a l l earthly creatures, including h i s c h i l d r e n , and thereby the sovereign authority of a mon&reh.. Locke proceeds i n his thoroughgoing fashion to examine the meaning of these two p o s s i b i l i t i e s . %j the ^rant suggested i n Genesis 1:28 Locke says God did not give Adam power over those of his own 55. species and, accordingly, could not have made him monarch. To support t h i s contention Locke points out that Adam was given dominion over c a t t l e , or tame creatures, beasts or w i l d creatures, and creeping things; but not over other men* God's grant both to Adam and l a t e r to $oah refers to the works of the f i f t h - d a y of creation, t t i s further to be seen that the grant expressed i n Genesis 1:28 i s either to men i n general or to ftdam and Eve. I t i s c e r t a i n l y not given to ^ dam singly and nothing but an actu a l change of the words of scripture could give that Impression. S i r £ iobert disregards Eve, assuming that she i s subject to Adam as the phrase "he s h a l l r u l e over thee" i n Genesis 3:16 might suggest-but there i s no reason to believe that Eve's dominion was l i m i t e d * If"Eve i s not referred to i n Genesis 1:28, Locke's argument i s strengthened, for then the verse obviously refers to mankind in. general Filmer apparently sought to derive support for h i s monarchical theory from God 1s grant to Noah i n Genesis 9:1 "God blessed Noah and h i s sons....etc". In * order to support h i s theory of a single authority i t was necessary to disregard Noah's sons. Locke i s quick to point out the lack of support for making a d i s t i n c t i o n between father and sons as b e n e f i c i a r i e s of God's ble s s i n g . The grant, i n tooth the cases that Filmer used to support his theory was to a number of men and not to any single 56 . man. ' Returning to the question of A clam as proprietor and monarch of the world and the I m p o s s i b i l i t y of deriving monarchical power from ownership, Locke raises a. point that he uses again i n his l a t e r discussion of power. He says that property may not be used to force another to be vassal any mote j u s t l y than a dagger. In a case where a r i c h man has authority over a poor man the authority depends on the consent of the poor man who prefers subjection to starvation, rather than on the riches of his overlord. Consequently i t would be impossible to derive Adam's authority from h i s possession of the whole world. i t i s not necessary to re l y on that argument, for Locke has already shown that private proprietorship was never given to Adam. Locke next turns to a consideration of the s c r i p t u r a l authority for monarchy that Filmer found In the saying of Senesis 3:16 "and thy desire s h a l l be to thy husband and he s h a l l r u l e over thee". From t h i s phrase S i r Robert F i l m e r succeeded i n deriving the subjection of wife to husband, the power of fatherhood, and the absolute power of the monarch. Locke makes a number of observations on h i s opponent's view, tie points out, i n the f i r s t place, that i t i s strange that God should present Adam with such a great p r i z e as the lordship of mankind at the same time as he chast ised 57 him for his disobedience and condemned him to a l i f e of ex i l e and hard labour. E x i l e and hard labour are c e r t a i n l y a strange contrast to the po s i t i o n S i r Robert hoped to win for his royal f r i e n d s . This verse, Locke thinks, i s a condemnation of Eve rather than a g i f t to Adam. Locke points out, furthermore, that the condemnation i s of Eve s p e c i f i c a l l y , and not of women i n general. The quotation from Genesis i s not a grant of p o l i t i c a l power or government, and, i f i t could i n any way be the basis of monarchy, there would be as many monarchs as there are husbands. before going on to examine Locke's c r i t i c i s m of the de r i v a t i o n of sovereign p o l i t i c a l power from fatherhood i t i s necessary to c o l l e c t some of the reasons S i r Robert Filmer and his friends gave for-basing regal authority on the power of parents over t h e i r children. S i t Robert pointed out that, as everyone i s born Subject to his father, there i s no such thing as"a natural freedom of mankind". No one since Adam has ever been born free. S i r Robert asserted that the power of parents over t h e i r c h i l d r e n i s absolute and even involves power over l i f e and death, fiocke says that his opponent gives no support f o r h i s assertion except the unreasonable argument that men i n some so c i e t i e s have had the power of k i l l i n g t h e i r c h i l d r e n . Other writ e r s of the monarchical school support S i r Robert's argument by claiming that fathers 58. derive absolute authority over t h e i r children from the fact that they gave t h e i r children l i f e . Locke r e c a l l s i n opposition to t h i s that a giver has no r i g h t to r e c a l l a g i f t he has given away. Locke further points out that these men who argue that the father gives l i f e to the c h i l d completely disregard both God and the mother. ^ e reminds them that a l l l i f e comes from u o d and that even i f the' parents alone were responsible for"making"a c h i l d the mother plays a mare important role than the father. As has been mentioned before, Sir Robert supported his argument by appealing to the f i f t h commandm-ent, "Honor thy father and thy mother". To s u i t h i s purpose he confined t h i s i n j u n c t i o n to "Honor thy father", but Locke points out his verbal treachery and appeals to s c r i p -ture to show that the power of the two parents i s always combined, here as w e l l as i n other s c r i p t u r a l commands. ^ a l f humorously he quotes the words of Jesus, forbidding anyone to separate man and wife, i n condemnation of Sir Robert* s common practise of disregarding the mother i n his s c r i p t u r a l quotations. Not only i s a ch i l d ' s l o y a l t y to i t s parents divided between father and mother, but also between parents and grandparents. S i r Robert would have i t that parental authority i s absolute, but Locke points out that i t i s Impossible for a parent, who i s himself subject to his own father, to have complete authority over his c h i l d . She d i f f i c u l t y might have been avoided had the scriptures or ^ i r Robert suggested the device 59. of delegated power, Neither suggested such a device, and i n fact i t i s impossible to have one sovereign power • r u l i n g over a number of other sovereign powers. In other words, either Adam was sovereign and his adult children subjects, or elde Adam had no sovereign power. We may well quote Locke's own statement on the subject: For i t cannot be but that paternal power does, or does not,give royal authority to them that have i t : i f i t does not, then -^dam could not be sovereign by t h i s t i t l e , nor anybody else; and then there i s an end of a l l our author s p o l i t i c s at once: i f i t does give royal authority, then everyone that has paternal power has ro y a l authority; and then, by our author 1s p a t r i a r c h a l government, there w i l l fee as many kings as there are fathers.'* Locke's destruction of §lr fiobert's systemrproceeds as he considers the contradictions involved i n deriving sovereignty from both fatherhood and property. S i r Robert might have made one sound case i f he had stayed with a single source i n his derivation of sovereignty, but h i s i n c l u s i o n of two or three contradictory cases weakened hi s p o s i t i o n . I t i s not permissible to say that Adam's power was o r i g i n a l l y based on property, and then add that i t was o r i g i n a l l y based, on Adam's fatherhood, and f i n a l l y say that i t was also o r i g i n a l l y based on God's subjecting Eve to Adam. S i r Robert, by presenting too many o r i g i n a l sources for sovereign power, cast s doubt upon a l l of them. (1) Locke 9 Op. c l t . P. S66. 60. Locke shows the Im p o s s i b i l i t y of i n h e r i t i n g paternal power by pointing out that paternal power has i t s source only i n the begetting of children,, Consequently i t i s f a l l a c i o u s to suggest a s i t u a t i o n where the paternal power passed to one of a number of brothers and gave that one brother power over a l l the r e s t . Adam's paternal power could not be inh e r i t e d by any of h i s sons, Locke points out yet another d i f f i c u l t y i n the transmission of monarch-i c a l power from Adam through the patriarchs when he notes the d i v i s i o n of power among the three sons of Noah. In which of these, he asks, would one f i n d the "establishment of r e ^ a l power"? I f regal power i s found In a l l three sons, then i t must be assumed that t h e i r power was based on t h e i r property, but i f regal power was i n the possession of only the eldest the d i v i s i o n of the world by l o t was only a waste of time. Turning to the manner i n which S i r Robert handled the transmission of Adam1s sovereign power Locke l i s t s a number of d i f f i c u l t i e s i n Filmer* s discussion. Filmer claimed that the r i g h t of Adam8 s p o s t e r i t y to possess anything was eith e r by grant or by succession from t h e i r father. He asserted that a l l kings are, or else are to be rggarded as, next heirs to those f i r s t progenitors. He contended that there never could be a multitude of men without one of them having the.•right derived from Adam, 61. to be king of a l l the r e s t . Filmer held that a l l power on earth was. derived or usurped -from f a t h e r l y Jpower. Locke returns to a discussion of these generalizations i n l a t e r paragraphs but pauses here to marvel at the inconsistency of Filmer's l a t e s t statement which i s to the effect that i t does not matter how kings got t h e i r power because i t i s the manner and not the o r i g i n of t h e i r rule that makes them king fit discussion of inheritance, Locke implies, i s useless with a man who reasons l i k e this,- for what Filmer i s arguing here i s that regal power belongs to the man who can seize i t . Disregarding t h i s l a s t question, Socke con-tinues the discussion of monarchical power from Adam. The question he asks I s , how s h a l l we know the person who has a r i g h t to govern, if Filmer's argiaments are to be of any use i n answering t h i s question,he must show that Adam's power did not end at h i s death, and that the present princes of the world have derived t h e i r present power from him. I f he should f a i l to make the demonstration i n either case, says Locke, we must search for anotherv bases of government. The p l a i n case i s , fiocke states, that God created man with a desire for s e l f preservation. Man's r i g h t to the rest of creation i s manifestly based on the r i g h t to s e l f preservation. Furthermore, Locke continues God gave t h i s same t i t l e to a l l men, not just to one 68. i n d i v i d u a l . A second deep rooted, d i v i n e l y given, desire, i s the desire to poopogate thesspeeies. From t h i s l a t t e r " r i g h t " i t can c l e a r l y be seen that men are bound to care for t h e i r children and consequently children have the r i g h t to i n h e r i t property from t h e i r parents. But t h i s r i g h t of inheritance does not include the father's p o l i t i c a l power. The inheritance of kingly power and the r i g h t of primogen-i t u r e may be common practice but they cannot be established on the same authority as the inheritance of property. Locke continues his discussion by declaring that the same power that set up the f i r s t r u l e r and gave him power must determine and e s t a b l i s h the second r u l e r . That i s , i f God gave the f i r s t grant of sovereignty i n i n s t i t u t i n g a government, He i s the only authority able to e s t a b l i s h the second r u l e r . I f on the other hand the consent of men established the f i r s t r u l e r , nothing but the consent of men can e s t a b l i s h the r u l e r ' s successor. F i n a l l y , i t may be noted again that, i f the r i g h t of fatherhood established the f i r s t r u l e r , that same r i g h t could not est a b l i s h the second r u l e r f o r the paternal r i g h t inherent i n procreation - applied to the f i r s t r u l e r only and can never be i n h e r i t e d . Referring to the previously mentioned statement of S i r Robert, that there i s a king and heir of Adam i n every multitude, Locke makes several penetrating remarks before he advances to the discussion of who i s h e i r . 63. Locke suggests that Sir Robert's suggestion be taken seriously and that we consider a "multitude" composed of a l l the kings of the earth. Now, according to S i r Robert, one, and only one,of that number, i s the legitimate heir of Adam and king of a l l the r e s t . From t h i s observation he re a d i l y concludes either that i t i s unnecessary to regard the kingsasthe heir of Adam, or that a l l the kings of the earth are unlawful. Both these p o s s i b i l i t i e s would be d i s t a s t e f u l to the monarchists, and Locke proceeds to a lengthy discussion of the whole question of inheritance i n the closing chapters of his f i r s t t r e a t i s e . Locke* s f i n a l attack on Filmer's Monarchical theory consists i n an examination of the important question: Who i s the he i r to power? There has never been, he says, any question about e i t h e r the o r i g i n or the existence of power; the question that has produced endless s t r i f i e i s , who s h a l l have i t . Filmer,who attempted to derive a l l p o l i t i c a l power from Adam, ought to have treated t h i s question s e r i o u s l y , and given conclusive proof of the manner i n which Adam's sovereign power has been conveyed from one possessor of i t to the next. He did not make t h i s c l e a r , and Locke undertakes to expose hi s conclusions to the clear l i g h t of reason. Filmer sets f o r t h h i s view of Inheritance i n the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y vague statement that c i v i l 64. power was assigned by. the divine w i l l to the "eldest parents". Who are the "eldest parents" asks Locke. Are they the eldest offspring of the family who have children of t h e i r own, or are they offs p r i n g who have had children longest? Whichever group f i l m e r regards as h e i r , i t i s c e r t a i n that neither i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of "eldest parents" would include an unmarried person as h e i r . Another equally i n t e r e s t i n g suggestion of Filmer's l i m i t e d the f i e l d of possible heirs to Adam's l i n e and p o s t e r i t y . Locke points out that t h i s i s equivalent to saying merely that the heir i s to be found somewhere within the human race and not i n the animal world. From Locke's comment we gather that i t must have been a common practice of Pilmer to assume as true the thing he was attempting to prove even before he had established h i s proof. As an example of t h i s , approaching the question of prtomogenltureFilmer referred to heirs as lords both of t h e i r own chi l d r e n and of t h e i r brothers. In t h i s statement, Locke points out, Filmer insinuated, but did not prove that the elder brother was h e i r . Filmer attempted to support the r i g h t of one brother to rul e over the otherby again appealing to s c r i p t u r e , fie gave two au t h o r i t i e s i n declaring that God promised C a i n that Abel should be subject to him, and that Isaac blessed Jacob and t o l d him to be lord of his brethren. Locke claims that i n the case of God's promise to Cain, i t i s to be noted that the promise was c o n d i t i o n a l , depending on c a i n l i v i n g righteously, that i t was personal and referred to C a i n alone, and that the promise of subjection did not mention any other brothers but Abel. I n regard to Jacob's par chit s<* of Esau's b i r t h r i g h t and the subsequent blessing of Jacob by IsaacLocke claims that no support i s given to Filmer's contention that one brother has the r i g h t to be lord over the other, ^n r e a l i t y , says Locke, t h i s case runs counter to Filmer's general theory, for i t i s an example of the attainment of power by compact. Furthermore, isaac's blessing which gave tfacob the lordship over his brethren, was quite d i s t i n c t from Jacob's purchase of the b i r t h r i g h t . Cocke contends that i t would be wrong to assume that, among the p a t r i a r c h s , the inheritance of the b i r t h r i g h t included any r i g h t of power and dominion. He points out that a f t e r Isaac's death Jacob was not l o r d over Esau but both l i v e d as independent lords. Even I f Filmer's assumption that the eldest son i s heir i s accepted he has s t i l l made no provision for inheritance when there i s no son i n the immediate l i n e of succession. Filmer had attempted to show that the patriarchs had Adam's absolute power by claiming that they had the r i g h t both of sentencing to death and making war. The cases he gives i n proof of t h i s are Judah sentencing h i s daughter ^homar to death, and Abraham commanding 518 66. soldiers of his own family, i n connection with the f i r s t instance, Locke observes that many judges have the r i g h t to pronounce the death sentence and s t i l l are not kings, and, as regards, the second, he points out that many plant-ers' i n the A m e r i c a s have waged war s i m i l a r to t h i s "war" of Abraham. Locke asserts i n t h i s regard that the death sentence and power to make war may be the rights of kings but that s t i l l does not prove that everyone who has these ri g h t s i s a king. F i n a l l y , he says, even i f we grant that Abraham had these marks of sovereignty, Filmer has not shown how they descended from Adam. In discussing the l i g h t that i s thrown on tire question, of the inheritance of monarchy by Noah's d i v i s i of the world among his three sons, Locke states that such a d i v i s i o n would be the end of a div i n e l y i n s t i t u t e d l o r d -ship. Locke expresses t h i s w e l l when he says: For i f the r i g h t of the heir be the ordinance of ^od, a divine r i g h t ; no man, father or not father, can a l t e r i t : i f i t be not a divine r i g h t , i t i s only human depending on the w i l l of man: and so where human i n s t i t u t i o n gives i t not, the f i r s t - b o r n has no r i g h t at a l l above hi s brethren; and men may put government Into what hands, and under what form they please. Filmer had. hoped to finds c r i p t u r a l support fo r the monarchical form of government by turning to (5) Locke. Op. c i t . P. 517. the dispersion of B a b e l and finding there the i n s t i t u t i o n of r o y a l power. A t Babel, he s a i d , the nations were divided i n t o d i s t i n c t f a m ilies with fathers r u l i n g over each family, Locke, in-replying to t h i s says that he finds no such support f or any form of government i n the account of the Babel incident. The s e r i f t u r e discusse only how the d i v i s i o n occurred, and i f i t makes any reference to government i t does not point toward the monarchical form because the command to b i l d the tower was referred to a p l u r a l authority, "they" not to a singular,"he". ^n examining ^ilmer' s assertion that he could trace the paternal government to the time of the Egyptian bondage where i t was interrupted, Locke contends that his opponent did not trace the des.-cent of paternal power. Filmer consistently equated paternal and regal power, and Locke asks how the transfer of power into the hands t of an Egyptian monarchwas an i n t e r r u p t i o n of royal power as such. * % a t , Locke asks, does "returning out of bondage mean? Does i t not mean that, contrary to Filmer's usual contention, there i s some d i s t i n c t i o n i n the le v e l s of subjection of a son, a subject and a slave? Considering the status of Moses and Joshua, Locke claims that the rule of these men marks a d i s t i n c t break i n any imaginabl hereditary l i n e , f o r neither had the t i t l e either of father or of prince. 68. Locke proceeds to review the evidence for anything l i k e the hereditary transmission of power among the Jews, and observes that i t was Interrupted so frequen-t l y that, during the id-hol*history of 1750 years, they had hereditary kingly government over them for not more than one t h i r d of the time. *n t h i s period of kingly r u l e , ^ocke concludes, there was neither paternal govern-ment nor l i n e a l succession to i t . 2. DEFINITIONS. Locke observes that, S i r Robert f i l m e r ' s f a l s e p r i n c i p l e s of government now being overthrown, there are two attitudes we can take toward p o l i t i c a l power. We can, he says,regard the government of p o l i t i c a l s o c ieties as nothing more than the rul e of the stronger, or we can attempt to discover a firmer foundation of government. In embarking irpon t h i s i n v e s t i g a t i o n with Locke we may advisedly quote his own d e f i n i t i o n of p o l i t i c a l power. I t Is as follows? P o l i t i c a l power,then, I take to be a r i g h t of making laws with penalties of death, and consequently a l l Jess p e n a l t i e s , for the regulating and preserving of property, and of employing the force of the community, i n executing such laws, and i n the defence of the common-wealth from foreign i n j u r y ; and a l l t h i s only for the public good. 6. (6) Locke. Op. c i t . B. 339. 69. The State of ftature Before we can understand p o l i t i c a l power, fiocke goes on, we must understand the "natural state" of mankind, This natural state i s a state of freedom of action and natural power. In i t men are f r e e , he says, to order t h e i r actions and dispose of t h e i r possessions with no other l i m i t a t i o n than the l i m i t a t i o n imposed by the "law of nature". A man i n the natural state i s subject to no other earthly w i l l . °nly Divine W i l l may constrain him. Lest anyone should think that t h i s natural state i s a state of l i c e n s e , L 0cke points out there i s a law of nature which rules i n the natural state of man-kind. The basis of the o b l i g a t i o n which t h i s law imposes i s to be found i n the fact that a l l men are the workmanship, subject and property of God. This law of nature, Locke says, "Obliges everyone: and reason, which i s the law, teaches a l l mankind, who w i l l but consult i t , that being a l l equal and independent, no one ought to harm another i n his l i f e , health, l i b e r t y , or possession." From t h i s law, Cocke concludes, i t i s the p o s i t i v e duty of everyone to preserve the l i f e of mankind• (7) Locke. Op. c i t . P. 341. 70. He asserts that an offender against the law of nature declares by his offence that he i s beyond the rule of reason and common equity, and makes himself a danger to mankind. As a r e s u l t of his own act, Locke goes on, the offender gives a l l mankind, i n the person of any of i t s members the r i g h t to punish t h i s transgressor of the law of nature. Everyone, he says, has the r i g h t to punish the c r i m i n a l according to calm reason and conscience. The punishment i n f l i c t e d has a double purpose, to serve both as a reparation and as a r e s t r a i n t . Conscious that t h i s doctrine would surprise some, Locke asks what other power than the one he has outlined has a prince or state which punishes an a^.ien c r i m i n a l . The prince or o f f i c e r s of the state were never given, and could never be given, any authority over an a l i e n by t h e i r own l e g i s l a t u r e . xhe powers these administrators assume i n such'a case, Eocke concludes, i s none other than that possessed by every man i n a st ate of nature. Locke points out that, while everyone i n a state of nature has the r i g h t to punish a c r i m i n a l , only the person against whom a crime i s committed has the r i g h t of taking or remitting reparations. The general r i g h t of mankind to punish offenders against law of nature includes the r i g h t to k i l l a murderer and to punish lesser offences. In the case of a murderer, ^ocke goes on, the criminal i n his war upon mankind has 71, placed himself i n the same class as a wild beast, and mankind has the r i g h t to defend i t s e l f by exacting the murderer's l i f e . The general rule as to the severity of a l l punishments i n a l l offences, he says, i s to punish with the degree of severity which i s necessary to make the crime an " i l l " bargain for the offender, •kocke observes that i t may be quite properly pointed out that the type of punishment he has outlined i s unreasonable in making a man a judge In his own case, and i s , therefore no substitute f o r c i v i l government. But, he continues, the rule and execution of j u s t i c e i n absolute monarchies i s not much b e t t e r , f o r , here again, the monarch i s judge i n his own case. Locke foresees the question as to whether there ever was a st ate of nature.•'Replying i n advance, he asserts on the one hand that i l l the princes and ru l e r s are now In a state of nature u n t i l by t h e i r own consent they have made themselves members of a p o l i t i c a l society. The State of War. Locke points out that, whereas some men have confused the "state of nature" and the E s t a t e of war"; the two are markedly d i f f e r e n t , fie has already pointed out that the state of nature i s a state where men l i v e as,;>eq.uals-; together according to reason. (The state of 72. war, on the other hand, Is a state of enmity and destruction where one has declared a s e t t l e d design upon another's l i f e . This state l a s t s only as long as the actual force endures. In that time one has the r i g h t to defend oneself against attack, for the law of nature dictates that a l l l i f e i s to be preserved as f a r as p o s s i b l e . Jn cases where a l l l i f e cannot be preserved Locke claims that those who are innocent are to be saved f i r s t . Locke declares that one who attempts to get another i n his absolute power should be regarded as placing himself i n a state of war. Anyone, he says, who attempts to gain power over another i s attacking the natural freedom and security of the other man. Such a state of war e x i s t s , Locke says, when a judge perverts war and i n t e r p r e t s the laws i n a manner that favors one party to a controversy. £he sufferer of such i n j u s t i c e has no appeal to any power on earth and can only appeal to leaven. By "appealing to Heaven" Locke means that a man, having found appeals to earthly courtsf: - of j u s t i c e useless, appeals toG&od. This means, i n e f f e c t , that a man appeals to his own conscience, b e l i e v i n g that some day he w i l l have to answer for his action to the "supreme Judge of a l l men". 73. Slavery. ^ocke introduces what seems to him the only reasonable conception of slavery by considering the mean-ing of freedom. He has already pointed out that the natural freedom of mankind consists of freedom from a l l earthly powers and from a l l rules except the law of nature. Freedom i n society i s not, he says, the unrestrained li c e n s e to do whatever one wishes, as S i r Robert Filmer said i t was; i t i s the l i b e r t y found i n obeying one constituted^ia-uthority"; i:iiocke declares further that l i b e r t y i s found i n l i v i n g under one common standing r i l e established by the l e g i s l a t u r e . Liberty consists i n following ones own w i l l where no rule forbids^ and i n being free from"the inconstant,,! uncertain, unknown, 8. a r b i t r a r y rule of another man". Freedom from absolute a r b i t r a r y power, Locke goes on, i s so c l o s e l y connected with s e l f preservation that a man has no more r i g h t to part with i t than he has to part with h i s own l i f e . lie has no r i g h t to place himself under the a r b i t r a r y power of another man by compact, f o r t h i s i s equivalent to destroying his own l i f e , fhe only way a man may lose h i s freedom i s by committing some act deserving death, fhen, (1) Locke. Op. c i t . P.351. 74. i f i t should happen that t h i s power to which a man has f o r f e i t e d h i s l i f e spares h i s l i f e , and exacts work instead, the man i s a slave. In other words the perfect condition of slavery i s a state of war between a law f u l conqueror and captive. Property. I t i s apparent, Locke says, both from the working of natural reason and divine r e v e l a t i o n , that uod has given the earth to mankind i n general. The question he now considers i s how private property arose. He shows In his discussion of mankind that private property arose without a s p e c i f i c compact of mankind i n general, and that the invention of money made the accumulation of property possible. God gave to man not only the world's natural rdsources^but also the reason by which man might make the best possible use of t h i s world. Locke continues the discussion by pointing out that while i t i s evident that the f r u i t s the earth brings f o r t h of I t s own accordsare to be enjoyed by a l l mankind there must be some way i n which i n d i v i d u a l s may l a w f u l l y appropriate these resources for t h e i r own p a r t i c u l a r use. At what point, he asks, does the common produce of the world become the private possession of an ind i v i d u a l ? He answers that the i n d i v i d u a l gains 7 5 . r i g h t f u l possession of the common f r u i t of the earth when he expends his own labor upon i t . Thus, he says, the North American Indian owns the acorns he gathers when he expends labor on picking them up. S i m i l a r l y the deer i s the property of the man who k i l l s i t . This same p r i n c i p l e may be applied, Locke argues, to a l l other forms of property, land included. The l i m i t to a man's possession, he asserts, i s that quantity of the f r u i t of the earth he can use with none of i t s p o i l i n g . In a l i k e manner the amount of ground a man may r i g h t -f u l l y possess i s that amount he can c u l t i v a t e without producing an unusable surplus. Locke considers that t h i s conception works no hardship an anyone, because, the amount of goods or land that a man may accumulate w i l l depend only on h i s own reason"and industry, and, as each man i s able to accumulate only as much as he can use, there w i l l be plenty of land for everyone. Locke observes that t h i s a c q u i s i t i v e manner of l i f e might have been the happy condition of mankind had not man invented money. The invention of money complicated the p i c t u r e , for as i-ocke affirms, money, unlike foodstufifs, does not s p o i l and can be hoarded, ^ocke remarks that money has no r e a l value but only derives i t s value from the consent of men that so mueh gold s h a l l have the same value as so much of.some usable product, such as grain. From t h i s consent 76. ^ocke concludes: " I t i s plain,that men have agreed to a disproportionate and unequal possession of the earth; they having by a t a c i t and voluntary consent, found out a way how a man may f a i r l y possess more land 9. than he himself can use the product of". I n spite of t h i s f a c t , says Locke, i t i s easy to see how the f i r s t t i t l e of property developed from no other o r i g i n than human labour. Paternal Power. I t may possibly have been with r e c o l l e c t i o n s of his encounter with the p o l i t i c a l p r i n c i p l e s of S i r Robert Filmer that L O C k e returns to the consideration of paternal power. The term "paternal" Locke says, i s i t s e l f responsible for a great deal of the misunderstan-ding that surrounds the discussion of "paternal power". i f men had seen that "paternal power"Inelides the mother and might better be c a l l e d "parental power", they would have recognized that the basis of t h i s power l i e s i n the unprotected condition of childhood and the parental (9) Locke. Op. c i t . P. 366. The type of consent that Locke here refers to i s l i a b l e to be l i t t l e d i f f e r e n t froml,the "consent" a man gives to being a slave when the al t e r n a t i v e i s death. The propriety of the term "consent" with such a s p e c i f i c a t i o n i s open to questiGm'u 7 7 . duty to d i r e c t and support chi l d r e n . Adam, Locke points out, entered the world as a mature and r a t i o n a l man, but a l l h i s p o s t e r i t y have come into l i f e as unreasoning i n f a n t s . I t i s only as the c h i l d matures and attains the use of reason, Locke says, that he i s able to order his l i f e by reason's law. In t h i s p r erational period of a child's minority i t i s the duty of the parent to assume the d i r e c t i n g function that reason l a t e r performs. Locke adds that i n the case of i d i o t s or others who do not achieve the use of reason i t i s necessary for the parents or guardians to continue t h e i r d i r e c t i v e function beyond the usual period of twenty-one years. Locke contends that "paternal power" i s a temporary measure necessary i n that period of a man's l i f e when he i s unable to assume the use of reason or the freedom of action that are his by nature. iocke obser. ves that the children 1 s duty of honoring t h e i r parents has often been confused with the parent's o b l i g a t i o n to d i r e c t the immature l i v e s of t h e i r c h i l d r e n . I t w i l l not, he thinks, require much r e f l e c t i o n to see that the children's duty of honoring t h e i r parents r i s e s from gratitude which they ought to f e e l towards those who have lavished so much care upon them, l o give the parents a p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n over t h e i r c h i l d r e n i s , Locke suggests, an i n v a l i d deduction from the c h i l d * s duty of honoring h i s parents Any ordinary 78. father, he observes, enjoys as much power over his children as a prince enjoj&s over h i s . There i s , Locke notes, another source of "parental power" and t h i s i s derived from property. This power based on property arises from the father's r i g h t to bestow his estate upon h i s children* fhe fact that a c h i l d hopes to receive such a g i f t from his father w i l l dispose the c'hild to follow his father's wishes. This type of parental influence Locke distinguishes from absolute dominion on the ground that i t i s conditional. The c h i l d , he points out, always has the r i g h t to disobey his parent even though the disobedience may cost him the parental estate. In concluding his discussion of paternal power Locke observes how easy i t *as for the paternal power of early fathers to pass over into p o l i t i c a l power. f!e points out that the habit of obedience i n a mature offspr i n g l e d to the p o l i t i c a l supremacy of the father of a family. Some r u l e , he suggests, was necessary; the father of a family had assumed that r o l e i n the period of his children's infancy; and i t was an easy step to carry that rule beyond the family into the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . From t h i s early type of government, £ocke points out, there was an easy t r a n s i t i o n from hereditary and e l e c t i v e kings. He comments that early fathers were also p r i e s t s , and he observes that there i s ho more 79. more necessary connection between father and king than than there i s between father and p r i e s t . Parental power he concludes i s no argument for monarchy* J . POLITICAL OR CIVIL SOCIETY. Society,. kocke says, i s a divine creation, obligations of necessity, convenience and i n c l i n a t i o n compel men to l i v e i n society. Locke reviews the various types of society that centre i n the family. He begins with the simple conjugal r e l a t i o n of man and wife, refers to the r e l a t i o n s h i p of children and parents, and f i n a l l y examines the relationships e x i s t i n g i n a household of the p a t r i a r c h a l type that includes both family and servants. In none of these s o c i e t i e s , Cocke asserts, i s the prototype of p o l i t i c a l or c i v i l society found. The d i s t i n c t i o n , between kinship and p o l i t i c a l organizations he regards as important i f his conception of p o l i t i c a l society i s to be seen i n i t s contrast to monarchical theories. I t becomes more apparent l a t e r when he considers p o l i t i c a l society. fontinuing the development of his theory, •^ocke states that i n p o l i t i c a l society the perfect freedom and r i g h t of s e l f defence which men enjoy i n the state of nature are surrendered to the community i t s e l f . The community, he says, becomes the "umpire" and men i n t h e i r controversies have the r i g h t to appeal 80. to the community's established law and judicature. In p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s , he claims, men give up th e i r natural r i g h t to punish offences against the law of nature, and the community receives the power of making laws and of making war and peace, ^ ocke declares that i t i s evident that monarchical power i s inconsistent with the power of t h i s c i v i l society. C i v i l society, he declares, includes everyone, and brings every member under the j u r i s d i c t i o n of a common judge. Absolute monarchy, he says, i s inconsistent with c i v i l society, because the monarch's power i s placed above the power of the society i t s e l f , -kocke grants that the monarch may protect his subjects and introduces a measure of order among them, but he claims the cost of the bargain Is too high, for the subject has no appeal against the power of the monarch. What difference i s there, Bocke queries, between a state of nature and a monarchy where the subject has no appeal against the monarch's w i l l ? I f there i s no difference, he asks, how s h a l l an absolute monarchy be c a l l e d a c i v i l society? The beginning of p o l i t i c a l society, Locke argues, i s to be found i n the common agreement of a number of i n d i v i d u a l s who decide to divest themselves of t h e i r natural l i b e r t i e s and unite into a community. This action may be taken, he says, by any number of in d i v i d u a l s when they agree to quit the state of nature. 81 e The creation of t h i s p o l i t i c a l body does not injure those who do not j o i n i n the community, because the l a t t e r are at l i b e r t y to remain i n a state of natriire. the ind i v i d u a l s who consent to form one body, Eocke t e l l s us, are bound to obey the w i l l of the majority. This agreement i s contained i n t h e i r o r i g i n a l consent to unite, f o r , i f they do not agree to be governed by the majority voice, the union would soon be unable to act as one body and i t s members would have returned to the state of nature. Eocke adds, furthermore, that the o r i g i n a l agreement to unite implies the agreement to give up a l l power necessary to the attainment of the ends for which the union took place. A h i s , he concludes, i s the only method by which a lawful government could come into being. There are,.Locke observes, two possible objections that some may be i n c l i n e d to raise against t h i s view, fhe f i r s t of these i s that there i s no h i s t o r i c a l support to indicate that any such compact ever took place. The second possible objection, he considers, i s the assertion that as a l l men are born under some government, they can never have the freedom to unite i n forming another p o l i t i c a l society. In considering the question of h i s t o r i c a l support for the s o c i a l compact, L Qcke suggests that one reason there i s l i t t l e mention of such a compact i n hi s t o r y i s the antiqui t y of the union. The state of 82. nature, he says, i s so inconvenient that men-soon learned the simple device of uniting into .societies by consent. There are some things, he points out humorously, that are so e a s i l y taken for granted that no mention need be made of them. Consider, for example, he suggests, the childhood of the men of the Xerces army; no one mentions i t , but who doubts that they were once children? 'then, of course, he asserts, indignantly, - there are-'-many h i s t o r i c a l examples. Who would forget, he asks, the o r i g i n or ^ ome, of Venice, or the societies of Peru, of F l o r i d a , of Cheriquenas and of B r a z i l , or the men J u s t i n mentioned who l e f t Sparta to found a new society with Palatanus? I t i s true, he admits, that the most common form of government i s the monarchy, but t h i s may be accounted for when we observe the easy t r a n s i t i o n of the r u l e of a father to the rule of a king, when we consider the s i m p l i c i t y of that form of government, and when we reeognize the appropriateness of monarchy i n a society that i s constantly at war. These observations do not, he asserts, i n any way weaken the argument that the peaceful beginnings of governmentare to be found i n the consent of the people. To the objection that men are always subjects of some government and never free to unite i n a new government, £-ocke r e p l i e s that on the basis of t h i s argument there could never be any more than a single 83. legitimate monarchy i n the world. w h i l e he regards t h i s answer as conclusive, he goes on to reply i n more d e t a i l . It i s not true, he declares, that men are subjects whenn. they never had any opportunity to recognize or own t h e i r subjection. Ahus, he claims, while a c h i l d may be under the care of h i s father, the c h i l d i s not a subject of any country or government u n t i l he has agreed to be a member of that country. Agreement, Bocke adds, may be of two kinds, express or t a c i t , fhere i s no question about express agreement, but i n defining t a c i t agreement he claims that a man may be regarded as giving t a c i t consent to a government when he accepts property i n i t s t e r r i t o r y . In t h i s connection he notes that the submission of a person includes the submission of h i s property, but that the government's control of a man's property involves c o n t r o l over the man only as leng as he i s the owner, ^n the case of a man who has given h i s express consent to a government, Locke contends that nothing but a public act or the collapse of a government can restore to him his natural freedom. I n conclusion, contrary to the opinion of the monarchists, Locke asserts that nothing but a man's p o s i t i v e consent can ever make him a subject of a p o l i t i c a l society. 84. 4. PURPOSES AND FORMS OF GOVERNMENT. Locke remarks that some may ask, why, i f men enjoyed so much freedom and equality i n the state of nature, they ever formed p o l i t i c a l s o c i e t i e s . He asserts that In spite of the benefits of freedom and equality i n the state of nature, there are some obvious inconveniences about i t which drive men into p o l i t i c a l society. I n i t , he says, men are constantly exposed to invasion by others, and, as a r e s u l t , t h e i r condition i s one of constant fear and danger. In order to escape the in s e c u r i t y of the state of nature, feocke goes on, men j o i n with others for the preservation of t h e i r property, that i s , t h e i r l i v e s , l i b e r t i e s , 10. and estates. The chief purpose of p o l i t i c a l society, ^ocke says, i s the preservation of property. Property i s always insecure In a state of nature because, i n that state,there i s no"established, s e t t l e d and known law" there i s no "known and i n d i f f e r e n t judge"; and no power to back the sentence of j u s t i c e , fhe natural r i g h t to The concept of property i s so important i n Locke's p o l i t i c a l philosophythat i t i s w e l l to note the terms generality. Property includes l i f e , l i b e r t y and possessions. 85. preserve oneself and others i s given up i n p o l i t i c a l s ociety, and protection becomes the work of the law. The natural r i g h t to punish crimes against the law, furthermore, i s given up to the executive power and Is then only used with the consent and at the command of the executive, -^hese powers, he goes on, which men once exercised of t h e i r own free w i l l , become the r i g h t of the executive power, with the one great l i m i t a t i o n that they must never he used except for the public good. Proceeding to the discussion of the forms of commonwealths, Locke observes that "commonwealth" refers to any independent community, and not alone to democracy. There are three major forms of commonwealth, he contends, democracy, oligarchy and monarchy. A democracy i s a common-wealth w i t h i n which the people have united i n t o one society f o r the making and executing of laws. An oligarchy places the power i n the hands of a few select men and t h e i r h e i r s . A monarchy, d i f f e r i n g from both of the other forms, places the power i n the hand s of a single authority which may be eit h e r hereditary or e l e c t i v e . The purpose of society, Locke contends, i s the enjoyment of property i n peace. The means to that end are the laws, and the body which makes the laws i s the l e g i s l a t u r e . Of course, Locke declares, behind the laff-making function of the l e g i s l a t i v e body there i s the consent of t h society which i s necessary for the 86. sanction Of any law. The community Locke claims, places supreme power i n the l e g i s l a t i v e authority, and a l l the obedience of the community i s owed to that authority. The great l i m i t i n g p r i n c i p l e that restrains the exercise of l e g i s l a t i v e power i s the geheral demand that the l e g i s l a t i v e authority must s t r i v e f o r the preservation of society. Locke claims that i t can have no absolute and a r b i t r a r y authority over the l i v e s afld forttines.of the people because i t can have no greater power than any of the covenanting parties had i n the state of nature. No power, he reminds us, has the r i g h t to destroy l i f e or property. The l e g i s l a t u r e , he contends, can never assume power to rule by extemporaneous or a r b i t r a r y decrees. Ittwas to avoid that sort of power, Locke declares, that men united i n the commonwealth. For the l e g i s l a t i v e power to assume an a r b i t r a r y authority i s as much worse than the offensive power of a single i n d i v i d u a l i n a state of nature as the l e g i s l a t i v e power i s greater than the i n d i v i d u a l ' s power. The l e g i s l a t i v e power, he goes on, cannot take any man's property without h i s consent. Locke recognizes however, that there are necessary expenses connected with government, and interprets t h i s consent of the i n d i v i d u a l as the consent of the majority of the people to enactments establishing taxation. F i n a l l y , he concludes, the l e g i s l a t i v e body has no authority to 87. transfer i t s law-making function to any other power, because the people gave i t authority to make laws not to make l e g i s l a t o r s . Because of t h i s l e g i s l a t i v e body's supreme di r e c t i n g power, Locke continues, a l l other powers are subordinate to i t . The executive power should be appointed by the l e g i s l a t i v e body, fhe function of the l e g i s l a t i v e power does not demand the continuous a c t i v i t y of that body, and i t Is not necessary that the l e g i s l a t u r e should be permanently convened. On the other hand, the l e g i s l a t i v e function i s so continuous that the power must always be ac t i v e . One other major power of the commonwealth, the federative power, Locke claims, i s also of such a nature that i t s authority should be exercised continuously. &e observes that, because the commonwealth i s i n a state of nature with respect to other common-wealths, i t must have the strength of united action gained from ordering t h i s aspect of i t s existence through a c e n t r a l i z e d power. ^his power, which he c a l l s federative, has an executive r e s p o n s i b i l i t y In war and over the external a f f a i r s of the commonwealth. Because of t h e i r s i m i l a r i t y of function, L Qcke contends , the executive and federative powers should not be separated. Locke asserts that there can be only one supreme power i n the commonwealth, ^he l e g i s l a t i v e body holds i t s power by v i r t u e of i t s subject's t r u s t that 88. i t w i l l act for certain ends. The authority to move or alter the legislative power remains with the people them-selves, for they retain v i r t u a l l y the power of "saving themselves." While the government exists, however, the legislative body i s supreme and i t only loses i t s supremacy when the government i s dissolved. When the executive i s a single individual aftd also part of the legislature, Locke declares that he is supreme i n a special sense and that his supremacy is derived not from his function as a lawmaker but from his function as an executor.. When oaths of allegiance to such an executive are taken, the allegiance expressed is owed to him as supreme executive and not as legislator. In Locke's words he i s an "image, phantom or representative of the commonwealth", and has "no w i l l no power, but that of the law". t o eke suggests that the legislature may be convened or adjourned either according to the constitution or i t s own wish. The duty of convocation i s often placed i n the hands of the executive body. Sometimes a definite time may be established by the constitution and i n such a case the executive's function in calling the legislature together i s purely ministerial, (11) Locke. Op. c i t . P. 428o ^ocke i s preparing the way for the symbolic conception of klrafifMP* 89. When the c o n s t i t u t i o n does not set a s p e c i f i c time for the convocation of the l e g i s l a t u r e , t h i s power of convocation may be l e f t to the d i s c r e t i o n of the executive. Such executive power of convocation, however, does not e s t a b l i s h the supremacy of the executive over the l e g i s l a t u r e . Should the executive seize unlawful power, Locke proceeds, a state of war i s created, and the people may govern t h e i r actions by the p r i n c i p l e s that hold sway i n a state of war. The executive that seizes power by unlawful force i s to be opposed with force, for force i s the only method applicable i n a state of war. ^n such a s i t u a t i o n , Locke declares, the people are to r e i n s t a t e the l e g i s l a t i v e power. i n considering the s i t u a t i o n that arises when a changing population has l e f t a deserted town with a number of representatives and a f l o u r i s h i n g c i t y with none, Locke contends that there i s no c o n f l i c t of power between the executive and the people. In order to insure the safety of the people, the executive's duty i s to arrange a just d i s t r i b u t i o n of representative In changing the allotment of representatives to the l e g i s l a t u r e the exedutive powerr i s not setting up a new l e g i s l a t u r e , but restoring a true one. Locke observes that, as i t i s impossible fo r the l e g i s l a t i v e authority to foresee a l l the 90. situations that might confront the executive, some provision must be made for such emergencies. H e suggests the prerogative of the executive which gives i t the right to act without the guidance of the positive law and even i n opposition to the law. '^ he legitimacy of any particular use of this perogative w i l l be indicated by the e f f e c t i t has on the well being of the people. ihe rule of early government was nearly a l l by perogative and very l i t t l e by law. The extension of the law and the limitation of the prince's prerogative does not harm the prince because i t does not remove from him anyhliing r i g h t f u l l y his. the perogative of the executive, Locke contends, i s nothing but the power of doing the public good without the sanction of the law. Should this privelege be misused the people are the only judge. I f , as a result, a controversy arises between the executive and the people, the people can only appeal to heaven, and lay upon their conscience the judgment they make and the action they are compelled to take. 5. CLASSES OF GOVERNMENT. In his discussion of the three types of power, paternal, p o l i t i c a l and despotical, fiocke reviews a number of propositions he has previously advanced. He observes that the purposes of paternal power i s the 91. nourishing of the c h i l d during that period of l i f e when the c h i l d i s incapable of managing his own property. P o l i t i c a l power has no other end than the preservation of the property of the subject. D e s p o t l c a l pdwer, on the other hand, i s the absolute, a r b i t r a r y power a conqueror has over his captives i n a lawful war. This absolute a r b i t r a r y power can never be obtained by nature or by compact. I t i s obtained only when a warring aggressor i s defeated and taken captive. Proceeding to the subject of conquest, Locke asserts that, contrary to one body of opinion, conquest i s as f a r removed from setting ap a government as demolishing a house i s from I t s construction. W'hen a man plunges society i n t o a state of war, and conquers, his t i t l e to obedieace i s as unjust and i l l e g a l as the t i t l e a robber might gain to a c i t i z e n ' s estate at the point of a sword. In such a case, Locke declares, the conquered have no court of appeal on earth and can only appeal to heaven and seek freedom by r e v o l t . Even when the conqueror i s i n the r i g h t , toeke asserts, his power i s d e f i n i t e l y l i m i t e d . In the f i r s t place, conquest can give no power over those who assisted i n gaining the v i c t o r y . Secondly, the power gained i n the conquest i s only held over those who actually assisted or concurred i n making the unjust war. T h i r d l y , he contends that the power of the conqueror i s only over the l i v e s of those 9S e who concurred, and t h i s does not include t h e i r possessions. The reason Locke gives for t h i s assertion i s that a father has no r i g h t to involve the possession of hi s innocent children,. Nature has destined the father's goods for the chi l d r e n , and as aresult conquest cannot l e g a l l y include the estates of the conquered. "Usurpation" i s the name Locke gives to domestic conquest. While a man may seize power i n the commonwealth, he can never a t t a i n the right to be obeyed u n t i l h i s power i s sanctioned by the free consent of the people. Usurpation he defines as an unlawful change of the persons i n power. When t h i s change i s accompanied by changes i n the form of government, the r e s u l t i s tyranny. Tyranny, Locke goes on, Is the governor's exercise of power beyond h i s r i g h t . When the end of the government i s not the public good and the governor makes hi s own w i l l and not the law the -rule, then the government i s a tyranny. Locke supports his contention that the law must r u l e by quotations from the speeches of no less a fig u r e than King James I . When the government has f a l l e n into the hands of a tyrant what J ought the people to do? Locke's reply to t h i s assertion / i s that force may l e g i t i m a t e l y be used by the people i n t h e i r own defence, ^ t may be used, of course, only i n j opposition to unjust and unlawful force. When the 95 people are forced to r i s e against tyranny, Locke contends that the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the outbreak of c i v i l war c l e a r l y l i e s with the tyrant. To those who oppose Locke's argument through fear that i t makes the government the prey of constant unrest and r e v o l t , he makes three r e p l i e s . F i r s t , i n some countries the prince's person i s sacred and i n such countries no one w i l l destroy t h i s important person. Second, where an injured party i s rel i e v e d by law there i s no cause for r e v o l t . Third, he claims that where there are only a few i n opposition l i t t l e more harm w i l l be done than can be done by a single madman i n a whole society, bnly when the force of the tyranny f a l l s on the majority of the people w i l l there be a general uprising, f i n a l l y , Locke points out, a l l t h i s trouble may ea s i l y be avoided by the government i f i t w i l l but rule within the law. Locke introduces h i s discussion of the disso-l u t i o n of government by distinguishing between p o l i t i c a l society and government. "The commonwealth or p o l i t i c a l society has i t s o r i g i n i n the union men form when they emerge from a state of nature. | h i s union i s most commonly dissolved by foreign attack and when i t i s the government i s also dissolved. Government on the other hand,may be overthrown by a number of causes less drastic than invasion. The government i s dissolved when the l e g i s l a t u r e i s altered by other than popular power.-r 94. The l e g i s l a t i v e power unites the commonwealth into a single body giving i t form, l i f e and unity. When a prince opposes his w i l l to the laws that express the w i l l of society by making new laws or subverting old ones, the government i s overthrown. When he hinders the assembling or the functioning of the l e g i s l a t u r e , or, In opposition to the common good, makes a change i n the electorate or methods of e l e c t i o n , the government i s destroyed. I f , f i n a l l y , the l e g i s l a t u r e or the prince denies i t s t r u s t either by d e l i v e r i n g the commonwealth into foreign subjection or by invading the subjects, the government i s overthrown. This places the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for the maintainance of government i n the hands of the prince or other executive. When the authority abandons i t s duty or subverts the good of society, the responsible power and not society i t s e l f i s responsible for the d i s s o l u t i o n . I t i s c l e a r , -^ocke continues, that, when the governmnet d i s s o l v e s , the people have the ri g h t to provide for themselves. But to say t h i s , he observes, i s l i k e t e l l i n g people to take care of t h e i r l i b e r t y when t h e i r chains are on. fhey are not alone able to care for themselves when the d i s s o l u t i o n occurs; they can also take steps to prevent the government from f a l l i n g To those who say that the people are always discontented and w i l l r e a d i l y r i s e i n r e v o l t with the excuse that 95. the i n s u r r e c t i o n i s the prince's f a u l t , Locke answers that people do not r e a d i l y r e v o l t , and are unwilling to change t h e i r old habits and forms for new ones. Then,he goes on, the theory i s not the most important factor for when, people are miserable, i t i s not t h e i r misery that i s provocative of r e v o l t . Furthermore, revolutions do not occur on every l i t t l e mismanagement of public a f f a i r s but only a f t e r a long t r a i n of abuses His theory, Locke claims, i s a hindrance rather than an aid to r e v o l u t i o n , because i t indicates who the r e a l rebel i s and should stop the trouble at i t s source. I t is* the prince or governor who determines the nature of the government and, to avoid revolutions, a l l i t h a t Is necessary Is just government within the framework of the law. Locke observes that even Barclay, the great advocate of monarchy, allows for resistance when the king endeavours to overturn the commonwealth or when he makes himself subject to another. As long as the l e g i s l a t u r e continues to function j u s t l y , Locke concludes, i t i s the supreme power and the people have no r i g h t to resume the power they have delegated u n t i l that power reverts to j them again through an i l l e g a l act of the l e g i s l a t u r e or through the conclusion of the l e g i s l a t u r e ' s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l term. When a controversy arises between the people and the prince the prince ought to refer the 96. debated question to the w i l l of the people. I f he refuses to consult t h e i r wish or to follow the manifest w i l l of the people, they have a Judge who i s always just and they may appeal to heaven and follow the dictates of t h e i r own consciences. CHAPTER I I I M-AMLISIS, OF SPINOZA'S "TRtCTATUS POLTTTHTTS" 98. CHAPTER I I I . AM ANALYSIS OF SPINOZA'S nTRACTATUS POLITICUS". 1 . HUMAN NATURE AND NATURAL RIGHTS. Spinoza's p o l i t i c a l philosophy i s a s t r i k i n g i l l u s t r a t i o n of the deductive method applied i n the p o l i t i c a l f i e l d . Having once established the c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of human nature he proceeds to deduce, by "an undoubted course of argument", his theory of p o l i t i c s . I t should not be assumed that Spinoza turns his back on experience and prac t i s e f o r his introduction to "A p o l i t i c a l Treatise" denounces the t h e o r e t i c a l appwoach to p o l i t i c s that i s so often taken by philosophers.'Philosophers writing! In the f i e l d of p o l i t i c s have tended to praise a type of human nature that does not actually e x i s t and td condemn what a c t u a l l y does e x i s t . This has been the r e s u l t of thinking of human passions as vices rather than as human facts of which the p o l i t i c a l philosophers should take account. Statesmen, he asser ts have written more i n t e l l i g e n t -l y than philosophers upon t h i s subject for they have been guided by experience. When the mental acuteness Kof those who have guided the l i f e of nations i s considered i t become clear that a philosopher i s wast ing his time in i h o p i n g to discover something new i n the f i e l d of p o l i t i c s 99 c that has-not already been t r i e d out i n the practise of some state. Statesmen are frequently regarded as more cr a f t y than learned and are distrusted on that account. I f one would understand the working of the passions and mindsoof -.men>.-..-he-Infers, he should study under these men who have come i n contact with human l i f e as i t actually I s . His method, then, i s to consider f i r s t , what experience teaches concerning human nature and then to determine the most appropriate constitutions for the three h i s t o r i c a l forms of government; monarchy, aristocracy .1.® and democracy. I t has been a weakness of p o l i t i c a l theory, Spinoza declares, to regard human passions as vices that must be condemned rather than as facts that a sound philosophy must accept and take into account, '^he proposition that a l l men are susceptible to passions has been adequately supported, he says, i n his " E t h i c s " , Ahe nature of men i s such that they tend, on the one hand to f e e l p i t y for those who are i n trouble and, on the other, to f e e l enfry f o r those who are happily situated. On the whole men are more susceptible to taking revenge than they are to showing mercy. Another (1) Death prevented Spinoza from complet-ing h i s discussion of democracy. 100. c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of human d i s p o s i t i o n i s to want everyone to l i v e according to one's own mind, ^he desire to have f i r s t place leads to r i v a l r y and s t r i f e , and, while men are generally agreed that r e l i g i o n teaches every man to love his nature as himself, most men show the impotence of r e l i g i o n i n t h e i r jealous s t r i f e . His "Ethics", Spinoza-says,also estsblished the facts that reason could do much to moderate the passions, and that the way which l e d to t h i s moderation was so steep that i t was beyond the reach of men distracted by the p r a t i c a l exigencies of p o l i t i c s . Men's good f a i t h and honesty, Spinoza declares, i s not to be truated i n establishing a dominion t A permanent and stable government ft an be ensured only by establishing a dominion of such a nature that important a f f a i r s are not l e f t to men's honesty* The system must be such that acts which are b e n e f i c i a l to the state w i l l be executed regardless of whether men are l e d ' by reason or by passion. The s p i r i t from which an act i s done i s of no i n t e r e s t to the state so long as men administer a f f a i r s i n the i n t e r e s t of the dominion's s e c u r i t y . "For l i b e r a l i t y of s p i r i t , o r courage, a private S. v i r t u e ; but the v i r t u e of the state i s i t s security". .*..«.........«.....**...• .»».»•• •••»»»•»»••»»•»»••»» ( (g) "Tract" at us Politicus"-Benedict 13e i p i n o z a . "The chief works of Benedict De Spinoza". 101. Spinoza's conception of natural r i g h t lis derived from h i s conception of power. He observes that the d e f i n i t i o n of any object -does not'give us any grounds for b e l i e v i n g that i t exists now or w i l l continue to e x i s t . Of things that do e x i s t , he says, that only the power that caused them to ex i s t i s able to maintain t h e i r existence. From t h i s he concludes that the power by which things e x i s t and operate i s the external power of ^ od. I f things were maintained by any other created power, that power would need the same power by which i t was Page 290. Translated and edited by R.H.M. &lwes. George B e l l and Sons - London - 1891. Spinoza seems to assume here that the s p i r i t from which an act i s done i s of no importance, f h i s seems strange i n the l i g h t of a l l that he has said about the paramount importance of the human passions and the p o s s i b i l i t y of reason modifying those passions. I f i t were possible to e s t a b l i s h a system of government which gave no place to the attitudes and character of men i t would prove to be an unchanging system of mechanically operating laws. Such .an i d e a l i s inconsistent with his defInitionof the best type of dominion as one where human blood i s not merely a matter of c i r c u l a t i o n of the blood but d i r e c t i o n by reason. (Cf. P.314) (3) Spinoza's conception of power i s similar i n some respects to the pr i m i t i v e notion of "mana". Spinoza uses "God" i n the s p e c i a l sense defined elsewher e i n his philosophy as that which i s , and i s of i t s own causation. H-ig doctrine that uod's power was constantly required to sustain the universe was l a t e r replaced by the notion of the deists that God's power was only necess ary to set the universe i n motion. 10S. created for i t s own preservation. From the proposition that the power which sustains a l l natural power i s the eternal power of God, Spinoza derives h i s d e f i n i t i o n of natural r i g h t . As God has a r i g h t to everything]* and as his r i g h t i s none other than his power, i t may be concluded that every natural thing has as much r i g h t as i t has power. Natural r i g h t then, he continues, i s the power of nature i t s e l f . "And so the natural r i g h t of universal nature and consequently 4. of every i n d i v i d u a l thing, extends as far as i t s power." This proposition applies to man as well as to inanimate objects for man too i s a part of nature. Man's t i g h t or power i s not determined by reason alone but also by the b l i n d desires which d i r e c t h i s a c t i v i t y . &is t o t a l power i s the sum of reason and appetite, both of which are part of nature and operate according to nature's laws. In c o n t r a d i s t i n c t i o n to the popular view that ignorant work against nature, Spinoza maintains that whatever man does, whether he i s ledv by reason or b l i n d desire, he does i n accord with the laws and rules of nature. In support of t h i s , he contends that (4) Spinoza. Op. c i t . P. 292. Spinoza's assertion that power equals r i g h t i s merely a m u l t i p l i c a t i o n of terms. He complicates his theory by using the word " r i g h t " which has a moral connotation. 103. i f men were so constituted that they l i v e according to reason only t h e i r natural r i g h t would be sol e l y determined by the power of reason. But i n r e a l i t y men are also led'' by b l i n d desire;;;and. as a r e s u l t t h e i r natural r i g h t i s not l i m i t e d to reason but includes appetite as w e l l . The popular view of man* s r e l a t i o n to the natural world considers the world of men ex i s t i n g within and yet separated from nature as one dominion ex i s t i n g w i t h i n another. This view, Spinoza says, considers the human mind as a d i r e c t and independent creation of ftod, and Spinoza regards the dichotomy implied between the mind and nature as f a l s e . there i s no d i v i s i o n , he says, the human mind i s as much a part of nature as the human body i s . I t i s no more i n our power to have a sound mind than i t i s to have a sound body. I t i s not to be denied, Spinoza asserts, that a man strives as f a r as he i s able to preserve hi s own existence. A ny disagreement that might arise over t h i s point would arise over the question of free w i l l . The fr e e r a man i s , however, the more he necessarily seeks his own preservation. Nothing that convicts a/man of weakness can be ascribed to hi s l i b e r t y . * t i s only as a man l i v e s according to the laws of nature that he i s t r u l y f r e e , fhis implies, Spinoza claims, that man i n so f a r as he i s free l i v e s i n accordance with the dictates of hi s reason and chooses good i n preference 104 e to e v i l . * , I t i s not always i n the power of man to use h i s reason, or i n other words, a man cannot always be free. In spite of that, Spinoza says, everyone tries' to preserve himself and as everything done i s done by natural law i t follows that natural law forbids nothing but what i s impossible. Natural law, he continues, i s not opposed to s t r i f e or hatred, for the bounds of nature are not the bounds of human reason but the i n f i n i t e laws which regard the eternal order ••of the universe. "What our reason pronounces bad, i s not bad as regards the order and laws of universal nature, but only as regards the laws of our own nature taken separately." Continuing his discussion, Spinoza considers the question as to the dependence of one man on another. The authority of one man over another i s psy-chological as we l l as p h y s i c a l , for example, a person i s bound to h i s benefactor as long as his gratitude?? for the benefactor's kindness and hope of further kindness l a s t . One's judgements, too, are dependent on pther's i n so f a r as others deceive one's mind, that i s he claims, a person i s independent and free i n so far as he uses his reason c o r r e c t l y . Even when one's actions (5) Spinoza. Op. c i t . p. 295. 105. are determined by necessity, they are free i f the nature of the necessity i s understood, f o r , says Spinoza, l i b e r t y presupposes necessity. Just as the ri g h t of any i n d i v i d u a l Is i n proportion to his power, Spinoza contends that the more there are who group themselves Into an a l l i a n c e , the greater i s t h e i r r i g h t . But as men are naturally enemies and are only Independent i n a state of nature as long as they guard themselves against others, the t o t a l r i g h t and power of mankind as a whole Is nonexistent. Moreover, Spinoza goes on, without the help of others men are not able to support }.ife or c u l t i v a t e the mind. ^en emerge from t h i s condition of fear and insecurity when they bind themselves i n t o a group and develop s p e c i f i c a l l y human r i g h t s . fhus Spinoza sayss End so our conclusion i s , that natural r i g h t , which i s sp e c i a l to the human race, can hardly be conceived, except where men hJave general r i g h t s , and combine to defend the possession of the land they inhabit and c u l t i v a t e , to protect themselves, to repel a l l v i o l e n c e and to l i v e according to the general judgment of a l l . For the more they combine together, the gore r i g h t they c o l l e c t i v e l y possess. " When men, i n t h i s manner, have general r i g h t s and are guided as i f by a single mind they lose a l l t h e i r i n d i v i d u a l rights except those that the common law allows them. Spinoza c a l l s t h i s r i g h t which i s determined by the power of (6) Spinoza. Op. c i t . P. 296. 106. a Multitude, dominion. The one kho has been entrusted with a f f a i r s of state i s said to hold dominion. According to t h i s authority i s the whole multitude, a cftosen group, or a single i n d i v i d u a l ; the dominion i s c a l l e d a democracy, an aristocracy, or a monarchy. As Spinoza observes e a r l i e r i n h i s discussion, there i s no such thing as wrong doing i n a state of nature. I t i s only under dominion, he now continues, that there can be any d i s t i n c t i o n between good and e v i l for the d i s t i n c t i o n must be made by the dominion and i t s laws. ^ h i s conception of e v i l i s contrary to the popular conception which regards those actions as wrong which are done contrary to sound reason. I t is not a sound inference, Spinoza contends, which suggests that' the r a t i o n a l l i f e i s synonymous with obedience. I t would be more correct to equate the guidance of reason with the freedom a man has to preserve himself. However, he continues, there i s a sense i n which i t i s not improper to speak of wrongdoing as contrary to reason, for the laws of the best dominion are i n harmony with reason and i n such a dominion actions contrary to reason are properly considered as wrong. 107. 2. THE RIGHTS AMD FUNCTIONS OF SUPREME AUTHORITIES. Spinoza opens h i s discussion of the r i g h t s of supreme au t h o r i t i e s by establishing a number of d e f i n i t i o n s . In a dominion, he says, the entire body of subjects i s c a l l e d a commonwealth. When men l i v e under dominion t h e i r state i s said to be c i v i l . The general business of a dominion i s designated by the name a f f a i r s of state. A o c i t i z e n , he continues, i s one who enjoys by law a l l the advantages of a commonwealth, but subject i s bound to obey the laws without receiving the benefits they accrue to a c i t i z e n . With t h i s introduc-t i o n he proceeds to deduce a l l the- properties of a c i v i l state i n general. The r i g h t of supreme authority i s equivalent to the simple natural power of the multitude i n so far as the natural power of the multitude i s guided as i f by one mind. The supreme authority of a commonwealth, Spinoza continues, maintains the authority of the commonwealth i n so f a r as i t preserves i t s unity. I f one man i s given the r i g h t to disregard the law and l i v e a f t e r his own mind the commonwealth loses that much r i g h t . I f th i s power i s given to two men the power i s divided, and i f to every ©He •••the commonwealth i s completely :.U :••:••.•>>:? 108 c destroyed. As a r e s u l t , asserts Spinoza, the i n d i v i d u a l i n a commonwealth loses certai n priveleges. He can no longer act as his own judge, and has not the r i g h t to int e r p r e t the laws. As every c i t i z e n i s dependent on the commonwealth he i s bound to execute i t s laws. In order to preserve the necessary unity the w i l l of the common-wealth "must be taken" to be the w i l l of a}.l, and, what the state decides i s j u s t , must be taken as the decision of each i n d i v i d u a l . To the objection that the state i s repugnant to reason because i t i s against reason to subject oneself to another, Spinoza r e p l i e s that i n r e a l i t y sound reason pronounces against the independence of passionate men and teaches a l l to :&s$k>;.peacee Because the c i v i l state ensures peace and security against those who are led by t h e i r passions, i t i s true to assert that the more a man i s guided by reason the more he w i l l keep the laws of the commonwealth. Furthermore, Spinoza claims, the c i v i l state i s ordained for the very purpose of removing fear and s u f f e r i n g , and, as these are the ends, every i n d i v i d u a l s t r i v e s , i t i s r a t i o n a l to follow p a r t i c u l a r orders of the commonwealth which seem contrary to reason f or by so doing the greater good found i n the st ate i t s e l f i s maintained. Just as i n the case of an I n d i v i d u a l , when he follows reason he i s most powerful so i n the case of a commonwealth, when i t follows reason 109. I t i s most power f u l . The necessary r e s u l t , Spinoza points out, of a •commonwealth following the dictates^ of reason i s to have a greater measure of popular support, that i s greater unity and power. Only the impossible Is beyond the power of the cominonvveaith, and, of course, t h i s would include what no one can be induced to flo by reward or by threat, t h i s l i m i t a t i o n on the power of the commonwealth, Spinoza asserts, does not mean that i t should not coerce those who declare themselves beyond the c i v i l law, but i t does mean that actions which cause indignation to the majority of the c i t i z e n s are beyond the r i g h t of the commonwealth. Spinoza claims that his conception of the subjects obedience to the state does not rule out obedience to ^ od, for both the rule of the state and the rul e of God are expressions of the rule of reason. The mind, i n so faras i t makes use of reason, i s dependent only on i t s e l f and, as a re s u l t the knowledge and love of uod or of one's neighbour cannot properly be cal l e d subjection to anyone. Furthermore, the h i g h e s t expression of c h a r i t y for others i s obedience to the commonwealth's law. External r i t e s and ceremonies are of no consequence as do not touch the knowledge and love of God. From t h i s , Spinoza assumes that everyone i s free to worship as he chooses but, he adds, the propogation of a r e l i g i o n 110. ought to be l e f t only i n the hands of God himself or of the supreme authorities of the state. Spinoza develops h i s theory of the rig h t s supreme authorities have against other commonwea11hstby comparing i n t e r n a t i o n a l relationships to the relationships of one man to another man, i n a state of nature. The only flaw he finds i n the p a r a l l e l i s the commonwealth1s superior power of defence. Like the condition of men i n a state of nature any two commonwealths are naturally enemies, and one may at any time decide by i t s own w i l l to make war upon the other. I n order to establi s h peace i t i s necessary for the two powers to make a pact, but a pact, Spinoza concludes, endures only as long as the motives for entering i n t o i t endure. Once the fear or Mpe that produced i t i s removed either of the contracting powers may break the pact at w i l l . The more commonwealths thatc, j o i n i n contracting a treaty, the greater i s the fear any of them w i l l have In breaking i t , and the greater i s the dependence of one commonwealth on the others. Further discussion of t h i s topic i s unnecessary, Spinoza claims, because every p a r t i c u l a r proposition may be deduced from the general statement that a l l men seek to preserve t h e i r own existence. The most important of the rights of supreme aut h o r i t i e s i s the r i g h t of acting as the mind of a dominion. From t h i s r i g h t , Spinoza contends that 111. the more ..important functions of supreme authorities are evident, they alone have the right of deciding what i s good and e v i l i n the commonwealth and i t i s t h e i r duty to lay down and interpr e t the laws, and to wage war and make peace..A number of other duties are included i n these functions. Spinoza l i s $ s the rig h t s of the supreme authority,* they are to judge, to punish, to appoint j u r i s t s , to order war and peace and to levy taxes-for war, A n order to preserve the unity of the commonwealth these functions must be performed by the supreme authority alone. Anyone else who in t e r f e r e s i n a public matter i s to be regarded as a pretender. Spinoza proceeds to a discussion of the way i n which the law binds the commonwealth. Host important of a l l such laws, he reasons, i s the law of self-preservation and the commonwealth does wrong when i t acts against t h i s dictatesof reason and allows i t s e l f to be destroyd either from within the state ot from without. As wrong i s only that which i s forbidden by the c i v i l law, i t cannot be said that the commonwealth, which made the laws, i s bound by them or i s able to do wrong. Rather the reverse i s true for contracts and laws should be broken when i t i s expedient for the general welfare. In such a case, Spinoza argues, the question as to what i s expedient for the general welfare rests with him who holds dominion and not with any private 112. person. As no private person has the r i g h t to vindicate the laws, the laws do not bind him who holds dominion. I f the law cannot be broken, however, without weakening the strength of the commonwealth, the commonwealth i s l i a b l e to be dissolved and a l l contracts brought to an end. What w i l l vindicate contracts then w i l l be the law of war. From t h i s , Spinoza concludes, supreme author-i t i e s are bound to preserve the commonwealth by the same compulsion as that which keeps any i n d i v i d u a l from destroying himself. Just as i n the case of a single i n d i v i d u a l Spinoza continues, the best condition i s that which preserves his l i f e ; so i n the commonwealth, the best condition i s that which maiatains the commonwealth's independence. I t i s one thing, he declared, to t i l l a f i e l d by r i g h t and quite another to t i l l i t i n the best possible way. In a s i m i l a r way the thing to be aimed at i n any commonwealth i s i t s best state. Now the end of al}. dominion i s the peace and security of l i f e , the best state of c i v i l society i s consequently that state where these ends are attained. Men are not born f i t f or c i t i a e n s h i p , Spinoza claims, they must be made so. they can only become good c i t i z e n s i n a stable and w e l l ordered commonwealth. Sedition and c i v i l war, he says, are not to be attributed to the wickedness of i n d i v i d u a l s , f o r the passions of a l l men are the 113. same; but rather they are to be recognized as the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y of the commonwealth and I t s laws. The c i t i z e n s i n the best condition of a commonwealth l i v e l i v e s of unity and peace. A t i s not a condition of peace, Spinoza contends, where subjects are only hindered from taking up arms against t h e i r r u l e r s by fear. That condition might better be c a l l e d the absence of war. t h i s difference i s well i l l u s t r a t e d by the differences i n a dominion held by consent and one held by conquest. L i f e , Spinoza goes on, i s more than the c i r c u l a t i o n of the blood: i t involves the use of ihanv s most valuable possession, his reason. The best condition of a dominion i s not one where peace i s maintained at the point of a sword for that i s slavery; the best condition i s that which i s e s t a b l i s h e d i by common consent and maintained by popular approval. S. MONARCHY. Spinoza introduces his exposition of the best c o n s t i t u t i o n for the monarchical form of government by reviewing some of the points he has already noted. The problem would be simple, he observes, i f human nature were so constituted that men desired what i s most useful, f o r them no art would be needed to produce unity and confidence among men. As i t i s , however, men's passions lead them to disunion and s t r i f e and the form of a 114. commonwealth to be permanent must be so arranged that men's passions w i l l compel them to l i v e according to reason. The an t i t h e s i s of t h i s form of government i s that form which entrusts the general welfare to the good f a i t h of a single man. Spinoza objects to the notion that peace and concord are attained by placing the supreme power of the commonwealth i n the hands of one man, for one man's watchfulness i s inadequate i n supervising his own a f f a i r s and i s proportionately worse i n supervising the a f f a i r s of others. Furthermore, Spinoza continues, while the absolute dominion of one man may prevent i n t e r n a l war the r e s u l t i s as far removed from peace as slavery i s from the concord of family l i f e . The power of a single man i s i n s u f f i c i e n t * of i t s e l f to hold the supreme r i g h t and, Spinoza continues, the king must have his own personal power augmented by the power of others. In harmony with t h i s i n e v i t a b l e weakness of the monarch Spinoza presents a theory of monarchical government which gives the king a position of comparatively monor importance. As he has pointed out, the w i l l and power of one man i s n e g l i g i b l e i n comparison with the power of the multitude unless that i n d i v i d u a l w i l l and power act i n accordance with the popular w i l l . The exercise of the king's power i s accordingly to be so l i m i t e d that he can do nothing that w i l l destroy 115. the unity and security of the dominion. The king, Spinoza asserts, must have no dir e c t contact with his subjects but must l i v e i n solitude. He may have courtiers but a l l who attend h i s court and have personal contact with him are to be excluded from holdinfe o f f i c e . The only d i r e c t connection that the king i s to have with the guidance of the a f f a i r s of the dominion i s to choose from the various dominions that the ministers of the supreme council set before him. This would make i t impossible for him to i n i t i a t e action on his own behalf and i n that way gather power in t o h i s own hands. His family l i f e , Spinoza declares, should be c a r e f u l l y regulated. The king may not have a foreign wife, f o r , as history has shown, the intermarriage of kings with foreigns leads to disputes and war. He must choose his wife from among the c i t i z e n s , and, l e s t the king should increase his p r i v ate power, his hear re l a t i o n s should be debarred from holding o f f i c e . Kings fear the popularity and a b i l i t y of t h e i r sons and for t h i s reason the education of the king's c h i l d r e n should be taken out of the king's hands and placed i n the hands of the supreme council. ( 2 ) Spinoza was apparently cognizant of the abuses connected with the court l i f e of his day. 116. The n o b i l i t y of the monarchy, Spinoza argues must be l i m i t e d to the d i r e c t descendants of the king. P r o v i s i o n must be made i n order to prevent the growth of a large group of descendants of the king, for such a powerful group presents a threat to the t r a n q u i l l i t y of the state. This group should not be confused with the supreme council which i s the governmental body, Marriages of the king's male r e l a t i v e s of the t h i r d and foutth degrees of consanguinity should be made i l l e g a l , That i s , the king's uncles and cousins are forbidden to marry and i f they should be married t h e i r children are not to be l e g a l l y recognized. By these regul-ations Spinoza proposes to prevent the i n t e r n a l s t r i f e that frequently r e s u l t s from a quarrelsome n o b i l i t y . Spinoza had, no doubt, observed the frequent disturbances that arise within the commonwealth from the presence of a disorderly soldiery. In his discus-sion of monarchy he urges that only c i t i z e n s are to be included i n the m i l t i a . In t h i s way the threat of faetions can be avoided. A l l c i t i z e n s are to be compelled to spend some part of every year i n t r a i n i n g . fhey are to receive no pay i n war or i n peace because they ought to value t h e i r l i b e r t y and be w i l l i n g to f i g h t f or i t . Although the minor o f f i c e r s of the m i l i t i a may hold t h e i r positions for l i f e , those In supreme command are to be appointed i n war time for only one year, and reappointments 117. 8. are forbidden.. These commanders are to be chosen from the cou n c i l l o r s so that they w i l l be old experienced and conservative. In t h i s manner Spinoza hoped to remove from the commonwealth the danger of unbridled m i l i t a r y power. The population of the monarchy, Spinoza contends, sould be divided into clans which not only act as the basis of representation but also maintain the equality of the c i t i z e n s . Each clan i s to be distinguished by sfeme badge or sign i n order that c i t i z e n s may r-eCognizeeand take pride i n t h e i r own group. In a state of nature, Spinoza points out, nothing i s held so much i n common as the s o i l . In the monarchy also he urges a l l the non-iaoveable property should be held i n common by the public and rented out to the c i t i z e n s at a yearly rate. In peace time t h i s annual rent i s to be the only tax, but i n time of war i t may be increased by a war tax to meet the expenses of defence. One of the most important resul t s (8) Spinoza may possibly have hoped that a dom-in i o n as soundly constructed as the one he proposed would be too powerful to be attacked and too benevolent to enter a foregin war. The imposition of a l i m i t a t i o n of one year upon the tenure of o f f i c e of the supreme command would c e r t a i n l y lead to confusion and i n e f f i c i e n c y In the event of a war. 118. of t h i s method of holding property, Spinoza stresses, i s the fact that i n time of war i t gives an equal r i s k to a l l c i t i z e n s and i n peace time increases;- t h e i r interdependence. The most important governing group i n Spinoza's outline of monarchy i s the king's council. The functions he outlines for t h i s group include defend-ing the c o n s t i t u t i o n , advising the king and publishing and executing the king's orders. Ihe members of t h i s body must have reached t h e i r f i f t i e t h year and must understand the commonwealth's system of government. As Spinoza's chief device for avoiding corruption i n any governing body i s to keep i t as large as possible, the c o u n c i l l o r s f or s i x hundred elaws^ would number around two thousand men. The supreme council would include three or four members from each clan, and, of these, one would be a j u r i s t . Each co u n c i l l o r holds o f f i c e for three or four years without the p o s s i b i l i t y of reappointment before the expiration of the f i v e year period out of o f f i c e . The terms of o f f i c e of the co u n c i l l o r s from each clan are arranged i n such a way that they do not a l l r e t i r e i n the same year. I t i s one of the duties of the king, Spinoza continues, to choose the c o u n c i l l o r s from a l i s t of a l l c i t i z e n s over f i f t y . • In h i s consideration of the rules of order f o r t h i s supreme council Spinoza requires that In a:-discussion'- of vthe a f f a i r s of the dominion as a whole a i l the council must be present. Councillors who are s i c k must send a deputy ex-councillor to s i t i n t h e i r place or else submit to a f i n e . In the discussion of~ i n t e r n a l a f f a i r s the majority constitute a quorum. The c o u n c i l , he asserts, should s i t at least four times a year at regular I n t e r v a l s . Every clan i s to hold the presidency i n turn, and at the time of holding the presidency, i t i s known as the leading clan. The privelege of being president i n the case of each clan f a l l s to i t s senior c o u n c i l l o r . Before the s i t t i n g of the council f i v e or s i x j u r i s t s wait upon the clan to hear h i s wishes i n order that they may submit these for discussion by the c o u n c i l . The regular business of the council includes hearing the reports of the ministers and ascertaining and discussing the state of a f f a i r s . Opinions expressed i n the council that are supported by over one hundred co u n c i l l o r s are submitted to the king for h i s decision. Between the sessions of the council i t s decisions are put into effect by f i f t y or more ministers who, however, have no authority to i n i t i a t e new business. Spinoza stresses that t h i s type of ISO. council affords many advantages both to the king and to the people. I t has already been pointed out that some add i t i o n a l power i s needed-.to reinforce the power of the king and i t can be seen that-the supreme council performs that function. The large number of c i t i z e n s included i n the council insures that a l l w i l l be well represented, f o r , says Spinoza, i t i s inconceivable that i n so large a number there should be any popular opinion unknown. Another advantage of the size of the council i s that i t would be impossible for anyone to bribe so large a number. Because no one i s admitted under the age of f i f t y , every olfl man has a reasonable hope that he w i l l some day s i t on the c o u n c i l . There could be no greater inducement to v i r t u e , s p i n 0 z a points out, than t h i s hope of public honour. Then again t h i s type of organization w i l l prevent many unnecessary wars because i t i s highly improbable that a s e l f interested party could persuade so large a number to embark upon a war that was • 9. contrary to the general welfare. This supreme council, Sftinoza further contends, w i l l be a great advantage to the king because i t w i l l enable him to know the most • (9) Spinoza, l i k e other writers of his day, tended to regard wars as a r e s u l t of d i r e c t planning. Although some wars have been deliberately planned and executed t h i s explanation errs i n disregarding other highly complex causal f a c t o r s . 121 most popular opinion and also protect him from the concentration of power that occurs when hi s councillors are few. One c o u n c i l l o r from every clan i s chosen as a j u r i s t . A j u r i s t , l i k e the other c o u n c i l l o r s , must know the c o n s t i t u t i o n and foundation of his own p a r t i c u l a r government but i n addition he must know the c o n s t i t u t i o n of other governments. From the whole body of j u r i s t s a council of judges, numbering approximately forty-one or s i x t y -one should be formed, whose duty i s to judge a l l suits and punish criminals. O nly j u r i s t s over fo r t y years of age are to be selected to act on t h i s council. Contrary to the popular p r a c t i c e , Spinoza continues, judges are not to be appointed for l i f e but only for a few jaears, so that every year a c e r t a i n portion of the council w i l l r e t i r e and be replaced by other clans. No judgement i s to be made without the presence of a l l the judges. Any substitutes who replace sick members, he proposes, should be paid from fines and confiscated goods. A proportion of the b e n e f i t from every c i v i l s u i t i s to be paid to the members of both councils. This, Spinoza argues, w i l l stimulate the administration of j u s t i c e by giving both councils a personal interest i n i t s execution. °n the other hand, the judges w i l l be re-•1. SS o strained by the fear of t h e i r successors and the right of a l l subjects have of appealing to the supreme council. Organized r e l i g i o n , Spinoza contends, should be separated form the state i n monarchy. No temples are to be b u i l t at the public expense. No laws are to be passed forbidding r e l i g i o u s opinion unless these opinions are seditious and aim at the overthrow of the commonwealth. A l l groups which are permitted the public exercise of t h e i r r e l i g i o n , he concludes, are to be allowed to b u i l d temples at t h e i r own expense. Spinoza i s w i l l i n g to admit that there never has been a kingdom that exactly p a r r a l l e l e d the monarchy he has outlined, but he asserts that the i l l u s t r a t i o n s that may be drawn from history on any p a r t i c u l a r feature of i t gives p r a t i c a l evidence that a system such as he proposes would be the happiest and most secure form of monarchy. In p a r t i a l support of t h i s he refers to the monarchy i n Aragon as i t existed i n one period of the Middle Ages. By putting forward a c o n s t i t u t i o n that provides for i n t e r n a l security and (9) The use of r e l i g i o n as a support for the state was highly developed i n the Roman Empire. There was tolerance of every r e l i g i o u s opinion except the i n t o l e r a n t opinion of monotheistic Christians who attacked the r e l i g i o u s sanctions of the empire by refusing to worship pagan |ods. 123. freedom from internecine s t r i f e Spinoza fe e l s confident that he has armed his monarchy against i t s two worst enemies, those who jhrey upon i t from within and those who attack i t from without. AM, ARISTOCRACY. Spinoza continues the exposition of his p o l i t i c a l philosophy by setting f o r t h his plan for a l a s t i n g a r istocracy. An aristocracy, he asserts, i s a type of commonwealth i n which the supreme power i s held by c e r t a i n persons chosen from the general population. Aristocracy d i f f e r s from democracy, Spinoza says, i n that an a r i s t o c r a t i c government depends on e l e c t i o n and not on b i r t h or fortune. In a democracy,on the other hand, government depends for the most part, •"on some r i g h t 10. either congenital or required by fortune". The number of men who are to be included i n t h i s r u l i n g group, may be determined Spinoza declares, i f we r e f l e c t that "in- any society there are approximately two or three f i r s t (10) Spinoza's d e f i n i t i o n of r i g h t as equivalent to power would conffcse t h i s statement. A congenital power would c e r t a i n l y seem to be a power such as the excellence of an a r i s t o c r a t possesses. Spinoza must have believed there was some connection between adult character and b i r t h or he would not have distinguished democracy i n t h i s way. His d i s t i n c t i o n seems more applicable to aristocracy than to democracy. 184. class men i n a hundred. I f the safety of the state demands one hundred f i r s t class men to r u l e , then on the above b a s i s , the p a t r i c i a n class should contain f i v e thousand. Several features of i t s constitution d i s t i n g u i s h t h i s form of government from the monarchical. In a monarchy, Spinoza continues, the power of one man was inadequate and had to be supplemented by the power of the supreme council, but i n the government which rests with a large council no such d i f f i c u l t y a r i s e s . While kings are mortal and t h e i r power passes away when they die, councils are everlasting and t h e i r power never reverts to the multitude, ^he w i l l of one man fluctuates but the w i l l and power of a large council approaches absolute perf e c t i o n . While there are some s i m i l a r i t i e s between the two types of government the form suited to monarchy must be changed i n order to provide for a sure foundation for i n t e r n a l peace i n an aristocracy. In an aristocracy, Spinoza goes on, equality only e x i s t s among the patricians themselves and, as a r e s u l t , the m i l i t i a may include both subjects and non-(11) One wonders how Spinoza determined that three i n a hundred was the incidence of superior individuals In the population, or why he decided that the government required a hundred f i r s t class men. 125. subjects. While i t would weaken the ranks to exclude s subjects, the.supreme command i s only open to p a t r i c i a n s . As subjects have the same status as foreigners^they should be rewarded for army service on the same, basis as mercen-a r i e s . A s i m i l a r inequality i n the population, he declare