UBC Theses and Dissertations

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UBC Theses and Dissertations

Political ideas of the historian Herodutus Shrimpton, Gordon Spencer 1965

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THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE HISTORIAN HERODOTUS by  Gordon Spencer Shiimpton B.A., University of British Columbia, 1965  A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS in the Department of CLASSICS We accept this thesis as conforming to the required standard  THE UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA September, 1965  In p r e s e n t i n g the  this  thesis  Columbia,  I agree that  the Library  a v a i l a b l e f o r r e f e r e n c e and study. mission  f o r extensive  representatives„  cation  of this  thesis  w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n  thesis  make  i t freely  agree that  per-  f o r scholarly  by t h e Head o f my D e p a r t m e n t o r by  I t i s understood for financial  Department The U n i v e r s i t y o f B r i t i s h V a n c o u v e r 8, C a n a d a  Columbia  1  S~  that  gain  permission.  S^^T^r<\^B-<R  shall  I further  copying o f t h i s  p u r p o s e s may be g r a n t e d  Date  fulfilment of  r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r an advanced degree a t t h e U n i v e r s i t y o f  British  his  inpartial  -> T<\^S^  copying o r p u b l i -  shall  n o t be a l l o w e d  - i i—  ABSTRACT  Herodotus of Halicarnassus was bom  into an age i n which h i s fellow  Greeks were asking themselves more p o l i t i c a l questions than they had ever done before. The reason i s that many of them were taking upon themselves greater shares i n the governments of t h e i r states, depriving absolute tyrants or oligarchic cliques of t h e i r power and assuming i t themselves. In many cases the whole citizen-body would r u l e , forming constitutions that they c a l l e d democracies. As these communities f e l t t h e i r way p o l i t i c a l l y , the people asked themselves, c o l l e c t i v e l y and i n d i v i d u a l l y , "what i s the best form of government?" I have made i t my task to f i n d out how Herodotus, the father of h i s t o r y , would have answered that question.  I n h i s work he surveyed nearly every form  of government, nearly every l e v e l of c i v i l i z a t i o n attained by the various communities of h i s time. Which of these d i d he admire, and of which d i d he disapprove?  I have studied certain instances where he records how p o l i t i c a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s motivated the people of h i s h i s t o r y , and I have observed a pattern that i s repeated at numerous times i n Herodotus' work. He believed that great deeds were more l i k e l y to come from men who believed themselves free than from men deprived of t h e i r freedom by an absolute and irresponsible r u l e r or government. In h i s t h i r d book, Herodotus studies some irresponsible rulers of the past and shows recurring patterns i n t h e i r behaviour. In the middle of the book,  - iii -  he presents a debate by seven Persians on the subject of the best government f o r P e r s i a , where, by composing the speeches of the debaters, he gives a summary of h i s own p o l i t i c a l ideas. To him tyrants are often d e c e i t f u l , and c h a r a c t e r i s t i c a l l y abuse established laws and customs; they take men's wives and daughters by force, and murder men untried.  However, i n democracy  there i s not the tyrant's abuse of law, but equality before the law, and, by governing themselves, men control t h e i r own destiny without violent i n t e r ference from a tyrant. These views are reflected i n many places throughout Herodotus' work. Different speakers make statements that seem to reveal that they shared the same opinions. Now Herodotus w i l l t e l l a story that i l l u s t r a t e s the e v i l s of tyranny, and now he w i l l pass a judgement that betrays h i s f a i t h i n f r e e dom, especially democracy. I have collected many of the above instances i n t h i s study and have d i s covered some absorbing d e t a i l s of the methods Herodotus employed to suggest p o l i t i c a l evaluations to h i s audience without any open statement.  Some  events are presented l i k e one-act plays, others l i k e f u l l - l e n g t h tragedies with character studies subtly introduced to betray the historian's sympathies. With a knowledge of these devices, the reader i s i n a position to obtain a deeper understanding of Herodotus and h i s h i s t o r y .  - iv -  TABLE OF CONTENTS  Acknowledgements  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  L i s t of Abbreviations I II III IV V VI 711 VIII  . . .  v  . . .  . vi  The Problem  1  Background f o r the War - P o l i t i c s i n Book I  . . . . . .  .  Debate and Decision i n Persia The Ionian Revolt  .22  .  The T r i a l of Athenian Democracy  8  43 . . . . . . . . . . .  Thermopylae - a Win f o r Persia, a Victory f o r Sparta  55  . . . .  69  The Epilogue of Herodotus' History  87  Herodotus' System of P o l i t i c a l Cause  96  Bibliographies Ancient Sources Modern Sources  I l l 112  A C M O W L E D G M E K T S  I would like to thank Professors H. P. McGregor and C. ¥. J. ELiot for their labours on this thesis on my behalf. To the latter particularly I owe thanks for many ideas and constructive suggestions*  - vi -  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS  AJA  American Journal of Archaeology  AJP  American Journal of Philology  BSA  Annual of the B r i t i s h School at Athens  CJ  C l a s s i c a l Journal  CP  C l a s s i c a l Philology  Cft  C l a s s i c a l Quarterly  Hermes  Hermes. Z e i t s c h r i f t f u r classische Philologie  HSCP  Harvard Studies i n C l a s s i c a l Philology  JHS  Journal of Hellenic Studies  JNES  Journal of Near Eastern Studies  TAPA  Transactions and Proceedings of the American P h i l o l o g i c a l Association  CHAPTER I ZEE PROBLEM  This study i s an attempt to establish ths political point of vis* sf the historian Herodotus* I shall examine his work in order te find those institutions hs prsfsrrsd, those he criticised, and the method he used te praise or criticise then* That he had political preferences or biases ve can safely assume, for he was, however unusual, a human being* Discussion of the political point of view of the historian must involve a consideration of political causation as i t i s found i n his work* This toe, therefore, will concern me, and I shall try to answer the question whether or not Herodotus thought that the political institutions ef his time had any effect on how his antagonists, Greece and Persia, came together for the final conflict i n the battles ef Marathon, Thermopylae, Salamis, Plataea, and Ifycale. I shall also show how Herodotus leads us to anticipate the result ef certain ef these battles and of the war itself by his c r i t i c a l analysis of the political forces that were driving the antagonists together.  By "critical analysis of  the political forces" I mean that his method ef presenting the antagonists i s such as to display the weak er strong points ef their political institutions, and to show how i t was that these institutions did or did not qualify as forces likely te produce victors i a battle. Finally, I shall make i t clear how in his ©pinion political decisions and environments, once made er foraed, led both te the clash and te i t s outcome*  So two Greek historians, Polybius and Thucydides, polities were inextricably involved i n history*  Polybius sov that the greatness of Home lay  X  i n i t s constitution, Thucydides that the reason for the failure of Athens lay  2 in i t s polities and constitution*  Did this interest of historians i n  polities begin with Thucydides? Can we go back to Herodotus and find i n him the origin of the writing of political history, history that studies political institutions and presents them as both historical cause and historical effect? Some of Herodotus' ablest critics have failed to see i n him any systematic point of view i n political matters. Indeed, he i s often regarded as rather a 3  garrulous old yarn-spinner than a historian, his work an epic as much as a 4 history, and his interest more i n the deed and i t s greatness than i n i t s cause, 5 whether political or otherwise*  while i t may seem a rare experience to the  reader to note Herodotus discovering political cause, nevertheless political opinions are present i n his work* even i f they are not always on the surface* For him, causal connections between constitutions and events do indeed exist* There are passages, however, i n which Herodotus makes explicit the existence of causal connections between political conditions and subsequent ^Polybius VI 1-6. 2  M . F* McGregor, "The Politics of the Historian Thucydides." Phoenix X (1956)  PP. 95^02* \ » F. Abbot, Thucydides. a Study i n Historical Reality (London. 1925) pp* 10-11* *J* B. Bury. The Ancient Greek Historians (London, 1909) pp* 58-60* 5  J . H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963) p* 18*  h i s t o r i c a l events*  I mention the two outstanding examples. The f i r s t i s i n  Book V, where Athens has just survived a three-pronged attack by Chalcis, Thebes, and Sparta i n glorious fashion.  The reason f o r Athens' success,  according to Herodotus, i s that she was a democracy: "So Athens grew. I t i s clear not on any one but on every consideration that democracy i s a desirable thing.  When the Athenians were under the tyrants  they were no better than their neighbours i n war; but when r i d of the tyrants, they became foremost i n battle.  This i s clear also, therefore,  that, when they were ruled, they shirked their duty since they were working for a despot; but, when free, each individual was eager to press on with the task f o r himself*"*'  Thus the success of Athens, i n this campaign at least, i s explained i n terms of her p o l i t i c a l institutions and their history.  "When the Athenians were under  the tyrants" i s a reference to the period of P i s i s t r a t i d rule already discussed by the historian.  Similarly, "when r i d of the tyrants" refers to the preced-  ing narrative, part of which Herodotus devoted to the expulsion of the Pisistratidae and the appearance of Athenian democracy. The second clear example of a h i s t o r i c a l cause i n terms of previously described p o l i t i c a l institutions i s found i n Book VII. Here, not long before the battle of Thermopylae, Xerxes reviews h i s forces, summons Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king, and asks him i f the Greeks w i l l fight so large a force. Demaratus says that he cannot answer f o r the other Greeks but he can for the  Herodotus V 78  Spartans: they will gain a victory or die to a man, but they will never abandon their post i n battle* into battle so*  Xerxes asks him what despot i s driving them  The answer comes that there i s not a human despot, only the  intangible nomos of the Spartans, which will not let them retreat. Xerxes laughs, Demaratus leaves. By the end of Book VIZ, however, the Spartan nomos has emerged as an awesome thing, for i t has caused the Spartans to do exactly as Demaratus said they would. As I shall point out later, the words of Demaratus contain allusions to previous descriptions of the Spartan constitution. Indeed, Herodotus anticipates the actions of the combatants at Thermopylae by alluding to their respective political situations*  The Spartans  have their nomos. which makes them free; the Persians have their monarch, who enslaves them. Throughout this section i n Book 711 Herodotus, sometimes using the words of Demaratus, sometimes relying upon an illustration, characterizes slaves and free men i n such a way that we know what to expect from each side before the test at Thermopylae. From this I suggest that the Herodotean method of discovering historical cause i s sometimes——indeed, i s usually—the  same as that  which Une de Bomilly has discovered i n Thucydides; the situation i s described, the actors are introduced, we are given a general remark on what men of this nature are wont to do i n these situations, and, when we are presented with the outcome, we are not at a l l surprised, because i t i s what we were deliberately  7  led to expect*  J . de Bomilly, Histoire et raison chez Thucvdide (Paris, 1956) pp* 173-179*  I f i t Is true that Herodotus anticipates the outcome of a historical event by describing i t s cause beforehand, i n preference to the technique of explaining a result i n retrospect like some modem historians, then the discussion of Athenian laxness i n battle under the tyrants and valour under democracy may not be merely an explanation i n retrospect but also a premonition of the great deeds of the future now that the Athenians are free*  Herodotus expects free people  to fight well and enslaved people to shirk their duty* These judgements prepare the reader for the outcome of the Greco-Persian war* To Herodotus, the Greeks who led the resistance were free, while the Persians were slaves of the despot Xerxes* Ve therefore can expect victory for the Greeks and for Xerxes defeat* This arrangement looks neat, but what will Herodotus do with the Persian empire itself, which, though i t s members were enslaved by a monarch, had suffered few major defeats until the invasion of Greece?  In the epilogue to  his history, he seems to find the answer to the success of the Persian empire both i n the harshness and severity of circumstances i n which i t s people lived when Cyrus took control, and i n the decision of the people to remain i n these circumstances, denying themselves the soft and easy l i f e of the plain* Herodotus, however, makes i t clear that the Persians were hardly denying themselves any longer by the time of the invasion of Greece and that i t was the Greeks Q who were now living i n harsh and severe surroundings*. For these reasons, i n  See especially Herodotus IX 82, where Pausanias compares a Greek meal with a Persian feast i n order to demonstrate this notion*  paxt at least, the Persians began as victors under Cyrus but ended as losers under Xerxes, This remark in the epilogue explaining the early greatness of Persia i s an example of the retrospective method of discovering historical cause and i t i s rare i n Herodotus. He reserves this method for re-iterating causes that interest him highly as, for example, the discussion of Athenian valour. Herodotus' usual method i s to give causes once, and then before the event.. When he repeats the cause after the event, however, we are provided with a kind of yardstick to measure the importance the historian attached to the idea. It may be argued, however, that I have gone beyond my subject. Of what interest i s i t to the student of the political ideas of Herodotus that he found the cause of the greatness of Persia in her rugged environment? To be sure, so long as there i s no connection between politics and natural environment, i t i s not of the utmost interest i n itself.  Nevertheless, Demaratus  feels that from their harsh environment the Greeks nourished their love of freedom and, i n the case of the Spartans especially, their political constitution. What about the Persians, did they gain freedom from their rugged environment? No, but Herodotus did think that the seven conspirators could deliberate seriously whether Persia should be given a democracy.  Of a l l the  arguments that Herodotus believed were brought forward in the debate, not one amounted to a charge that the Persians were not ready for, or suited to have, a democracy*  The critics of democracy argued that i t would have worked  badly, but at least i t would have worked. So Herodotus seems to have accepted  the thesis that a rugged environment helped adapt a people for a free constitution, while a luxurious one helped make them slaves. He states this i n the epilogue, where the Persians deliberate whether or not to remain i n harsh surroundings. After consideration they chose to remain. To Herodotus this meant that then and there they elected to be rulers of men rather than live  g an easy l i f e as slaves*  This was the most important decision i n the history  of Persia» indeed of the whole world of Herodotus' time* My task, then, i s to explore the mind of Herodotus through his work* This i s not a study of Herodotus, the searcher for right political views, but of the Greek who has established his political views, of a historian who loved freedom and who wrote to inspire a similar love i n his contemporaries and their succeeding generations*  I have paraphrased what he actually says i n IX 122* 4*  CHAPTER II BACKGROUND FOR THE WAR - POLITICS IN BOOK I  Herodotus begins his history by showing how the Persians put the blame on the Greeks for the Greco-Persian war* He says that certain wise men trace back to the Phoenicians a chain-reaction of abductions of women starting with Io and ending with Helen.  1  It was i n the Trojan war the Persians allege, that  one finds the f i r s t cause of the war.  As Herodotus proceeds he gradually  introduces more and more discordant voices until the Persian story fades into  2 a babble of allegations and countercharges.  Out of this confusion Herodotus  simply rises and says. "I am not come to t e l l how i t happened one way or another, but whom I myself know f i r s t to have begun injustices against the 3  Hellenes, him shall I point out . . . *"  What was this beginning of injustices  to which Herodotus refers? The answer comes almost immediately: "This Croesus was the f i r s t of the barbarians of whom we know to have reduced certain of the Greeks to the position of tributaries, and to have made friendly alliances with others. He subdued the Ionians, Aeolians, and Dorians who were i n Asia and made friends with the Lacedaemonians* Before the reign of Croesus a l l the Greeks had been free." For Herodotus, then, the condition that led to the war was the loss of autonomy by certain Hellenic states to a barbarian.  ^Herodotus I 1-4* Herodotus I 5* 1-2. ^Herodotus I 5. 3*  For the rest of the h i s t o r y Herodotus describes the struggle i n which the Greek states eventually stopped the progress of the Persian invaders and sent them home*. This done, he has finished h i s work, he has saved the great deeds of Greek and barbarian from o b l i t e r a t i o n by time, and should have indicated something of the causes of the war, h i s avowed purpose as stated at 4 the outset of h i s h i s t o r y *  He does not have to show how a l l the Greek  states, including those of A s i a Minor, were delivered from the barbarian*  To  do that would have taken him to the battle of the Eurymedon or to the Peace 5 of C a l l i a s *  Herodotus ignored these events and i n t e n t i o n a l l y closed h i s work  with the Greeks at Sestos. I t may be that there were some whom Herodotus knew who thought that the war had i t s beginnings i n the Cimmerian invasion of Asia Minor and t h e i r sacki n g of c e r t a i n Greek c i t i e s there.  At any rate Herodotus seems to be aware of 7  t h e i r theory, f o r he alludes to i t as w e l l as to that of the Persians.  I f the  Cimmerians did invade, and sack, Greek lands and c i t i e s i n force as Herodotus ^Herodotus I I . ^Giving a resume of Kirchhoff's theory about the r e l a t i v e completion of Herodotus • work How and Wells say:  "The capture of Sestus i s no r e a l end to the  Persian wars; t h i s must be found i n the b a t t l e of the Eurymedon, i f not i n the 'Peace of C a l l i a s . Kirchhoff's theory.  They go on to state, however, that they do not agree with  , n  W. W. How and J . Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus. 2 v o l s *  (Oxford, 1964) p. 15c  That he did so i n t e n t i o n a l l y I s h a l l demonstrate i n a l a t e r chapter. ^The longest treatment of the Cimmerian invasion i n Herodotus i s at IV 12*.  -  10  seems to have believed they did, why did he not go back to their invasion to find the f i r s t cause of the war? What appears to be his answer to that g question i s significant:  the Cimmerian invasion was a pillaging raid*.  Although pillagers do perform acts of injustice upon their victims and these acts may require some form of revenge. Herodotus passes by the motifs of revenge offered him by the tales of abductions and by the more tempting* 9  because i t i s more recent, Cimmerian invasion*  He has chosen instead as the  beginning of h i s history the occasion on which' an abiding state of h o s t i l i t y between Greek and barbarian was established. Indeed, as Herodotus himself must have been aware, coming from Halicarnassus, this subjugation of Greek states by the force of arms, f i r s t by Croesus and then, with no intervening period of release, by Cyrus, was an enduring one, lasting into the lifetime of the historian himself.  So the f i r s t cause of the war was not a mere  military intrusion by barbarians into certain Greek states of Asia Minor, but the f i r s t act of aggression with intent to subjugate; i t was to establish a l a s t i n g state of p o l i t i c a l tension between Greek and barbarian. Croesus wanted a powerful a l l y on the opposite shore of the Aegean. therefore made an investigation into the general state of a f f a i r s of  ^Herodotus I 6. 3,  TO  y^P  Kiu,u,epiwv  h% ix6u,evov, K p o i c o u  ebv  -npeapu-repov,  TtoXuov,  a\\'e£  en i6pou,T)G  CTp(rceuu,a T O ou  *ETI\  Ha-racrTpocpT)  tr\v  He  ma-ini an*  * Ioviqv  eyeveTo  xuiv  cipTtayTi.  Q  According to Henry B. Immerwahr, "Aspects of Historical Causation i n Herod* otus," TAPA LXXXVU (1956), pp. 241-280, revenge i s the most common form of h i s t o r i c a l motivation i n Herodotus*  -11  Greece* His investigation led him to choose the Lacedaemonians after considering the Athenians, according to Herodotus*  10  I f he did examine Athens  and Sparta i n the way that Herodotus describes, i t i s possible that he enquired about other states as well, such as Thebes, Corinth, or Argos* whatever other enquiries were made, Herodotus reports only what Croesus allegedly discovered about Athens and Sparta* puzzling*  The reason for this i s not  Herodotus i s anxious to give an account of the rise and develop-  ment of the two states that were to play so important a part in the expulsion of the Persian invader* Athens, we are told, was now under the tyrant Pisistratus. He had come to power under heavy opposition, had been expelled twice, and had finally been able to "root" his tyranny i n Athenian soil*  He was no longer a young  man, however, and Croesus had no way of telling what would happen to an alliance with him after his death, but i f he considered the unstable past of the Pisistratids, he might have easily concluded that their future was s t i l l i n some doubt*^ The affairs of Sparta, however, had settled into a much more stable condition. "The Lacedaemonians had just escaped from serious trouble and were now the victors in war over the Tegeans* For i n the kingship of Leon and Hegesides i n Sparta they had been fortunate against their other enemies  ^Herodotus I 56* 2, \ c * T o p e w v be eupiaxe Aaxeoa tjiov CouS xe x a i  'AGnvaiouG upoexovxaS.  Herodotus I 59-64.  12 -  but were worsted by the Tegeans alone. And i n the time before these events they had been i n a state of utter disobedience to lav worse than nearly a l l the other Greeks i n their own affairs, and with strangers inexperienced. The following i s an account of how they changed to a state of obedience to l a v . * ^ Herodotus shows that, after certain changes i n their constitution, the Spartans managed to become the masters of the Tegeans as well. Although Herodotus makes no lengthy constitutional analysis of the laws of Lycurgus, the changes he mentions are significant. "As soon as he had become his guardian, he changed a l l the laws and took precautions that no one would transgress them. In military matters Lycurgus established the enomotiae. the triecodae. and the common messes, 13  and i n addition he made the offices of ephor and elder."  The common messes and the new offices indicate that there was an increase i n participation of the individual i n the affairs of state both i n peace and war. when we consider that the context i s the change of Spartan fortunes i n war, and that before these changes the Spartans were only moderately successful i n war, at times even failures, and that after them they became successful, we are surely led to suspect that the relationship between the events  •bad luck  i n war, change to a more open constitution, good luck i n w a r — i s a causal one. The reason for the change i n fortune i s the change i n constitution.  "^Herodotus I 65. l-2» Herodotus I 65. 5»  13  We might regard the foregoing conclusion as certain but for the fact that the Spartans were defeated i n their next engagement with the Tegeans soon after 14 the change i n constitution.  This defeat prompted the Spartans to enquire of  Delphi how they might capture Tegea. The oracle told them that they must find and bring to Sparta the bones of Orestes, the son of Agamemnon. Once the Spartans succeeded in this task they managed to get the better of their enemy. 15 No doubt the critic  / who regards Herodotus as a "pious" historian (pre-  sumably meaning that he i s god-fearing or religious, always looking for the hand of god i n history) would claim that this story illustrates his conclusions. He might suggest that Herodotus mentally attached some supernatural power to the bones that made them able to give their possessor victory. He might argue, therefore, that Herodotus makes a divine power as much the cause of Spartan success over Tegea as the Lycurgan constitution* Against this i t should be said that our critic must f i r s t assume that Herodotus was "pious" i n order to see piety i n this story. It i s possible, therefore, that his piety i s as much in "the eye of the beholder" as actually there i n Herodotus* Below I shall examine the posaibilty that Herodotus i s studying human nature under the new Lycurgan constitution, when he tells the story of the bones of Orestes.  However, I shall f i r s t consider the suggestion that Herodotus i s  ^Herodotus I 65. 5* 15 For discussions of Herodotus* piety see How and Wells II p. 181, and G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War and i*« P-mUnH r a r i a a (London, 190l) p . 565*  -14 -  showing us the hand of a god at work i n this story* This raises the problem of the nature of the god or gods i n whom Herodotus believed*  We cannot  simply say that he was god-fearing, for that reveals nothing. If we are to call him "god-fearing," we must define the god or gods we think he feared* His gods were not like those of Homer or Hesiod* He thought that the characters and genealogies of these gods were the creations of the poets* According to the oracle of Dodona, which Herodotus quotes on the subject, before Homer and Hesiod the Greeks worshipped nameless, characterless gods, theol. as the thentea. or 16 arrangers of the universe*  While abandoning the Homeric and Hesiodic systems,  he refused to substitute his own on the ground that each man knew as much as any other on the questions of theology. "Now I am not eager to expound on such divine matters as I have heard from my informants, with the sole exception of divine names; for I think that everyone knows as much as the next one about them* What I shall mention about them, I shall because I am forced to by my account. As for human affairs, however, • • • •"^ Here Herodotus renounces definite knowledge of the nature of the gods* To him, theological speculation was futile* The gods, whoever they are, do intervene i n history, however* Herodotus  Herodotus II 52-53* 17 16  Herodotus II 3* 2, 4* 1* On this passage I largely accept the views of I* M. Linforth, "Herodotus' Avowal of Silence i n his Account of Egypt," University of California Publications i n Classical Philology 711 (1924) pp. 269-292*  says that the destruction of Troy vas proof that there are "great punishments IS from the gods."  Yet when we read Herodotus' version of the Trojan war* we 19  note that i t i s wanting i n divine appearances and intervention*  He asserts  that Paris was driven to Egypt by an adverse wind, where both Menelaus' money and Helen were taken from Paris by the Egyptians and held i n trust until Menelaus should come and claim them. The Greeks, he continues, came to Troy and demanded Helen. The Trojans, of course, said that she was not there* The Greeks, assuming this to be a l i e , laid siege to the city*  According to  Herodotus, however, the Trojans were telling the truth* Early i n his history he tells us that the barbarians do not regard the snatching of women as a 20 matter for fighting*  He therefore cannot believe that, i f the Trojans had had  Helen there, they would have fought i n order that Paris might keep her, i n stead of returning her to the Greeks. To Herodotus, the fact that she was not returned indicates that she was not there*  The Greeks persisted i n their  refusal to believe that she was not in Troy, and consequently, i n their b e l l i gerence* The result was the destruction of Troy, a catastrophe that could and would have been avoided had not the wind driven Helen and Paris to Egypt* "But no, they did not have Helen there to give back* Nor did the Greeks believe them though they told the truth. I shall t e l l you my opinion* It was a l l divinely arranged so that these events might make i t clear to  Herodotus II 120. 5* 19  Herodotus II 116-120*  ^Herodotus I 4*>  2  - 16  that, as great are the crimes, so great are the punishments from 21 the gods* I declare i t because I think i t true."  mawTriTHi  On the view of Herodotus, then, Troy f e l l because the wind was blowing i n the wrong direction when Paris was trying to sail home with Helen. Had i t been blowing i n the right direction, Helen would have been there and would have been returned to save the city from destruction* To us the direction of the wind i s an accident or a quirk of fortune over which we have no control, to Herodotus i t was  6aiu.wv  Ttapacxeua^v,  god..  It appears that Herodotus* "gods" i n history are the intrusions of the accidental, blind chance, or quirks of fortune. I present a few more examples* Croesus was punished by god for his hybria by the accidental murder of his son 22 Atys*  The "murderer" had no reason to try to k i l l Atys, but every reason to  protect him; and he was trying to do so conscientiously* A storm caught both Greek and Persian fleets at sea. Two hundred Persian ships were separated from the main force and exposed, when the storm struck, and were a l l destroyed as a consequence*  The Creeks, however, were well protected*. Therefore, the  storm struck at a favourable moment for the Greeks* So chance, or god, was 23 working for the Greeks against the Persians* In one place Herodotus reveals that the accident that punishes i s itself subject to chance. The Spartans were punished by god for committing a crime while the Athenians were not, though  Herodotus II 120. 5. 22  Herodotus I 34-45.  23  Herodotus 711 12-13.  - 17 -  they had committed the same crime*  So the retribution was not inevitable*  Otherwise, the Athenians would have been punished also. To Herodotus, i t seems, man was the cause of the predictable i n history, but god of the accidental or unpredictable* The story of the recovery of the bones of Orestes i s different from the above accounts of divine intervention. Far from showing how the Spartan success over Tegea was the result of an accident or a quirk of fortune, i t shows how i t 25 was the product of the wisdom and diligence of Liehes the Spartan*  He went  to Tegea, possibly on his own business, but more likely sent there by the state as one of the agathoergoi* However we may look at i t , he had taken the cares of his state with him, for, when a smith told him a marvellous tale about some huge bones he had found, Liehes began to think about the riddle from Delphi* The Delphic oracle had told the Spartans that they must recover the bones of Orestes from Tegea before they could hope for success over the Tegeans* What i s more, a second riddling oracle had more concealed than revealed the place 26 where the bones could be found*  Thereupon, Liehes puzzled out the answer to  the riddle, had himself apparently banished from his country, bought the shop from the unwilling smith who owned the plot of ground i n which the bones lay, dug up the bones and transported them back to Sparta* The reason for Liehes' diligence on behalf of the Spartan state must be that his country's success ^Herodotus VII 133. ^The words of Herodotus are; . • • xa\ O U V T U X ^ X P l T  26  Herodotus I 67.  c r  ^  e v o €  cocpir).  18 •  and his own were identified i n his mind* Herodotus makes i t clear that Liehes belonged to a class of men i n -the Spartan constitution, the agathoergoi. formed regularly and maintained from 27 those who graduated from the hippeie i n the army* Lycurgus changed a l l the 28 laws and took precautions that no one would transgress them*  This means  the establishment of sweeping changes i n the Spartan constitution affecting, presumably, the agathoergoi like a l l other institutions. Liehes, an able and diligent man, was thus given an opportunity to prove his worth and benefit his state by the provisions of the Lycurgan constitution*  The conclusion to  which we are led i s that the cause of the eventual Spartan conquest of Tegea was the euvojiia established by Lycurgus* After the account of the Spartan victory over Tegea, Herodotus returns to the f a l l of Croesus and the rise of Persia. Croesus misinterprets an ambiguous oracle and marches to the destruction of himself and his empire at the hands of Cyrus king of Persia. Perhaps Herodotus i s discovering historical cause i n divine intervention here, but there i s another cause suggested for the success of Persia over Lydia. Sandanis, the wise adviser of  ^Herodotus I 67. 5*- Their work i s thus described: TOO € bel TOUTOV t b v ,eviauTOV,  TOV av I^LOJO'L ex TUV  •6 I aire p.% ou-e vouS u-T) e X i v u e i v Herodotus I 65*. 5*  'nnteuv,  ftXXouS  IkapT iniretov  T2> XOIVQO  &\\n.  28  2  % o Herodotus, euvou-ia seemed to mean something like good order, the rule of  law, or obedience to lav* For discussions of this word and i t s meaning see Victor Shrenberg, Aspects of the Ancient World (Oxford, 1946) pp. 70-93; J . L* Myres, "•EYNCMIA .»*• CR LXI (1947) pp. 80-81; and especially A. Andreves, wEhanomia," CaXXni(l958) pp. 89-102.  - 19  Croesus, outlines this cause i n the following ways "0 king, these are the kind of men against whom you are preparing to march* They wear leather breeches, of leather too are their other clothes; they do not eat as much as they choose, but as much as they have. They occupy a rough country. In addition, they drink no wine, only water; they have no figs to eat nor any other delicacy. Look at i t this ways i f you defeat them, you will take nothing from men who have nothing; and this ways i f you are defeated, know how many fine things you will throw away.  For  once they have tasted our standard of living they will grasp i t with an unshakeable tenacity. For my part I thank the gods that they have not 3D  put i t into the minds of the Persians to attack the Lydians." That the environment has a direct bearing on the people who live i n i t and hence an indirect political significance i s guaranteed for us by the very last sentence of Herodotus' work. "So they chose to be rulers and to occupy 31  a barren country rather than to t i l l the plains and be to other men slaves." The Persians, therefore, because they have chosen to live i n rough surroundings, will be a formidable people, from whom a wise man expects to gain nothing but to whom he will lose much when i t comes to a contest of arms. In the history of Herodotus the wise man was Sandanis, the fool Croesus. When the fool turns down the wise man's advice, a l l he can expect i s the disaster ^Herodotus I 71. 2-4.  For a general discussion of the wise adviser i n  Herodotus see R. Lattimore, "The Wise Adviser i n Herodotus," CP XXXIV (1939) pp. 24-35. On Herodotus' use of the wise adviser to comment upon and explain his work see also Lieselotte Solmsen, "Speeches i n Herodotus' Account of the Battle of Plataea," CP XXXIX (1944) pp. 242-243*  20  predicted by the sage*. If we too are wise when we read the history of Herodotus we do not have to ask after the event why Cyrus defeated Croesus* Sandanis gave us the reason before the catastrophe. At the end of Book I of his history. Herodotus relates the death of Cyrus while engaged i n attacking the Massagetas. The story of this campaign contains a different picture of Persia from the one given by Sandanis* Croesus says to Cyrus: "As far as I have learned, the Hassagetae are inexperienced i n the luxuries of Persia and have no knowledge of the refinements of l i f e .  Cut up for  them, therefore, many generous portions of cattle, prepare and serve them as a feast i n your camp. Add generous bowls of neat wine and a l l kinds of food. Bo this and leave behind the weakest part of your camp as you withdraw with the rest to the river,  unless I am mistaken, when the Hassagetae  see the fine banquet, they will turn to i t . 32 display deeds of greatness*.  Thereupon i t remains to us to  The Persians, now making use of their new-found luxuries instead of trusting to their rugged environment, lost i n their struggle with the Hassagetae i n spite of their treachery. Their self-discipline was beginning to decay and failure i n battle was the result. Cyrus, the night before he died, dreamed that he saw the eldest son of Hystaspes, Darius, with wings that covered Asia and Europe. He interpreted this to mean that Darius was plotting against him* So the last thing that Cyrus  52  Herodotus I 207* 6*  - 21 -  initiated before the battle that led to his death was an investigation into a suspected plot against the throne.  The fears for the dynasty that were to  compel Xerxes to invade Greece, as I shall show in a later chapter, were already besetting the Persian king in the time of Cyrus* Thus Book I introduces the political forces, with the exception of Athenian democracy, that were to lead to the war and those that were to guide i t s outcome* The Spartans have gained their eunomia. which will make them resist and help them win.  The dynastic struggles that will give Persia her need  for military expansion are beginning, i f only i n the great king's imagination* Finally, the self-control and self-discipline that are reflected i n the Persian decision to remain i n the rugged surroundings of the hi l i s are fast vanishing. This will lead to.the incompetence and ineffectiveness of the Persian hordes in the invasion of Greece*  - 22 -  CHAPTER III DEBATE AND DECISION IN PERSIA  Anyone reading the third book of Herodotus for the f i r s t time can hardly suppress the desire to treat i t with considerable scepticism. There are sheep with l i t t l e carts supporting their very long tails, lionesses that bear only one cub i n their lives, flying snakes and gold-digging ants; there i s the fantastic story of Polyerates and his ring; and there i s the debate among seven Persians i n which they consider democracy, more, i t would seem, like fifth-century Greeks than sixth-century Persians*  1  At f i r s t glance this  material seems to mate the third book of Herodotus a l l but worthless* It i s not worthless, however. Where i t i s demonstrably accurate, i t i s of value to t e l l us something about the past, and, where wrong, to t e l l us something about Herodotus. As a general rule, I assume that Herodotus reported incidents because he believed them historical or because he believed i t his duty to repeat them i n spite of serious doubt about their historicity. Sometimes his reader may not be sure for which reason Herodotus told a story.. There i s , however, one part of Book III of which no one will be unsure: the 1  account of the debate of the seven Persian conspirators. This Herodotus  *T. A. Sinclair, A History of Greek Political Thought (London, 195l) p. 36, says, "It i s not inconceivable that such a debate should have taken place, but most of what we read in the passage cannot be a report of what Persian nobles said i n 522 B.C., but a dialogue, composed some seventy years later, after the manner of f i f t h century Greek philosophers."  related because be believed that i t happened, "When the turmoil had quieted and five days had passed, those who had rebelled against the Magians took counsel over the general situation* There were given speeches at this time, which are incredible to certain 2 of the Greeks, but they were given nevertheless." "When Mardonius had sailed from Asia and arrived i n Ionia, he then, as I shall t e l l , did something very marvellous for those of the Greeks who do not believe that Otanes advanced the opinion to the seven Persians that Persia should be ruled democratically. For Mardonius put down a l l the 3  tyrants of Ionia and established democracies i n the cities."  These two quotations, the one from the introduction to the speeches i n Book III and the other from Book 71, indicate that Herodotus encountered disbelievers of his story but, that i n spite of their disbelief he was convinced that the debate happened and he was not going to change his mind because of the criticism of others. That Herodotus felt obliged to remind us of his acceptance of his account may indicate something of the importance he attached to the event. Since this was a discussion of the various solutions to a political crisis, their merits and demerits, and since, as I shall show, Herodotus had to reconstruct most or a l l of i t s content, this debate may be a most valuable indication of the political opinions of the historian.  ^rodotus III 80. 1. ^Herodotus 71 43. 3*  - 24  Of the seven conspirators only three, Otanes, Megabyzus, and Darius, spoke. Summaries of their arguments follow*  First came Otanes, who argued  for democracy* Public affairs should be placed i n the hands of the Persians in general. The recent insolence (hybris) of Cambyses and then that of the Magian a l l go to prove that monarchy i s not good enough any more. The best of men placed i n a position of power upsets the traditional laws and customs. The unbridled insolence and envy of a king have miserable and degrading effects on his people* But the greatest evils are these: he disturbs the ancestral customs, takes women by force, and condemns men to death without trial*  The rule of the people, however, has the finest of a l l names, 4 Isonomia; offices are held by lot; an officer's accounts are scrutinized, 5 and a l l plans are referred to the public assembly* Otanes was answered by Megabyzus. Ee agreed with the words of Otanes against monarchy, or tyranny as he calls it,** but failed to concur with him on the subject of democracy. The mob i s stupid, insolent (hybristic), and worthless, an insufferable alternative to monarchy. It cannot use any knowledge i t may have i n order to rule, for i t has none* It governs like a  On the meaning of Isonomia see Victor Ehrenberg, "The Origins of Democracy,* 1  1  Historia I (1950) pp. 514-548. Herodotus III 80* 2-7.  5  ^The words for monarchy and tyranny, and monarch, tyrant, and king are interchangeable in Herodotus: see A. Andrewss, The Greek Tyrants (New York and Evanston, 1962) p. 27. For the institution Darius uses the word jioovapx IT], for the man  p-ouvap^oG; Megabyzus TopavyiG, and  p,ouvapx in , and  TupavvoG.  TupavvoG; Otanes  - 25 -  river i n flood——with no restraint*  Let us, therefore, choose the test of  men and give them the power, keeping ourselves amongst them* For the best  7  plans come from the best men*.  Darius concludes the debate i n the following fashion. The argument i s over the best of the three forms of government* On this basis, the finest government i s monarchy. The most suitable man rules i n the ablest way and keeps plans against the enemy silent. Oligarchy breeds enmities, which i n 8 turn breed strife and murder, and these disturbances give rise to monarchy* It i s thus again shown that monarchy is best* In democracy there are bad 1  practices, which lead to strong internal alliances that hold together until one man arises and stops such practices*. This man wins the admiration of the people and so becomes a monarch* Thus i t i s demonstrated yet again that monarchy i s the finest thing* "To sum up, whence came our freedom? Did i t come from a democracy, an oligarchy, or a monarch? I hold the opinion that we were freed by one man. q ancestral customs."  It i s not good to destroy the established  Such were the three arguments according to Herodotus*. Whether or not this debate i s i n any way historical, one thing i s certain. Even i f there was a debate i n Persia at this time, a l l the actual words of each speaker would not  Herodotus III 81* ^This argument i s not without obscurity, perhaps intentionally so* Herodotus seems to mean that one man murders a l l his opposition until he emerges as sole ruler* ^Herodotus III 82*  have come down to Herodotus. As the historian himself presents the debate we are not led to think that they did, for he makes the event seem like a private and informal meeting of seven conspirators, i n which i t i s hard to imagine a scribe nearby appointed to write down an account of proceedings, a sort of Hansard*. Even i f a "Hansard" were written and preserved there remains the question of translation. The Persian of the speakers has at some time become the Greek of Herodotus. Not only that, but the translation, i f i t took place, has been free. As Sinclair has s a i d , ^  the ideas, especially  about democracy—the choice by lot, the scrutiny of accounts, the referral of everything to the public assembly—, sound more like Greek ideas from the f i f t h century than Persian from the sixth* Again, i f a detailed account came down to Herodotus or his source, i t has been edited by one or the other. There were seven Persians but only three spoke, one for each form of government, and each with crisp succinctness* There are no wasted words or repetitions characteristic of informal debates among groups of men.  These features suggest editing or that Herodotus did  not have much of the content of the speeches from his source, and had to f a l l back on his own imagination to reconstruct the essence of what was said* J. Wells has argued cogently that the Philhellene, Zopyrus, could have been the source Herodotus used for this debate. He reminds us that Zopyrus traced his descent through two generations to the Megabyzus of this incident. The genealogy of Zopyrus closes Book III, following the account of the bravery  27  and devotion of his grandfather, another Zopyrus. She many details of the heroism of the earlier Zopyrus i n the siege of Babylon and the genealogy of the later Zopyrus suggest that Herodotus talked with his contemporary, whom he declares to have deserted from Persia to Athens.  Wells argues for the  12 date 441 B.C. for this desertion.  Unfortunately he cannot be dogmatic  about any part of his argument; his conclusions are well drawn, nonetheless, and could be right. Wells' date of 441 for the desertion i s the earliest that anyone has yet 13 supported.  If Herodotus received a reliable account of the debate, which  took place i n 522, no sooner than 441, then we have a time lapse of about eighty years or more between the event and i t s coming to the ears of Herodotus. If Zopyrus was the source, i t i s unlikely that he would have brought with him to Athens any written account of what was said, even i f one existed. He would have to speak from memory either of what he had read about the debate, or, more likely, of what he had heard his family say about i t .  Probably his  family had had l i t t l e to say, for the argument of Megabyzus hardly flatters his intelligence, as I shall show, and seems more like the sort of speech Herodotus would give to a spokesman for oligarchy than the sort Zopyrus would give to his great-grandfather* ^Herodotus H I 160. 12 J. Wells, "The Persian Friends of Herodotus," JSS XKVH (1907) pp. 37*47. Zopyrus was the great-grandson of Megabyzus; see Herodotus III 153. 1, 160. 2* and Wells I, p. 302*  28  The following facts Herodotus might have ascertained from Zopyrus: Otanes was the hero of the conspiracy and out of i t gained eternal freedom from the Persian king for himself and his family; Darius was naturally the advocate of monarchy; Megabyzus also spoke. The substance of the speeches, with helpful hints from Zopyrus, was probably the work of Herodotus. Otanes, 14 who refused to be ruled by another man at the end of the debate,  was  credited with opening i t by defending freedom or (here a Greek mind i s at work) democracy.- To Darius was allotted the victorious conclusion for monarchy. But Megabyzus also spoke, so he was given a speech for oligarchy to complete the discussion. Since these speeches were composed mostly or entirely by Herodotus, we can extract from them something of his political thought, for i t i s when a historian i s constructing an otherwise lost period of history that he reveals himself and his beliefs to his reader. When Herodotus set out to give a representation of the speeches as they were given, he was obliged to f i l l i n details as he thought they happened. He would have put himself i n the place of each speaker and asked himself, "What would I have said i n order to win the argument?" ^ 1  "Berodotusm 83. 2. 15 That Herodotus does use speeches to comment upon, and explain, his work, at least i n Books V-IX, has been established by Lieselotte Solmsen, i n two articles:  "Speeches i n Herodotus' Account of the Ionic Revolt," AJP LHY  (194?) pp. 194-207; "Speeches i n Herodotus* Account of the Battle of Plataea," CP XXXIX (1944) pp. 241-253.  - 29  There i s something to be gained from considering the context of the debate*  If we reflect for a moment* we shall recall that we have just  been given four descriptions of tyrants or monarchs i n rapid succession* At the end of Book II and the beginning of Book III there i s the picture of the mad Cambyses; immediately following comes the story of Polycrates of Samoa; this introduces a brief account of some crimes of Periander of Corinth; and then we go back to Persia for Smerdis the usurper. Of these, two are murdered, one dies miserably without an heir, and the other dies suddenly and unexpectedly as the result of an accident. A l l four of them show disrespect for women in some way and a l l four either have serious trouble with some of their subjects or else are generally hated by them* Cambyses murdered his brother without justification, after banishing 17 him from Egypt out of envy,  ignored the laws and customs of Persia by  marrying two of his own sisters and then caused the death of one of them,  1  It i s stressed by Solmsen in the above articles that the speeches must always be explained i n their context.  The discussion of mine that follows  i s a short version of the thoroughly developed statement by Gertrude Mary Hirst, Collected Classical Papers (Oxford, 1938) pp*-97-110*. 17 Herodotus III 30* 1* 18  Herodotus III 31* 5*. The legal advisers  eXucav nep  be t a a v x e G  laTeXXovreG,  yap-ee i v  Kau-Boaea, I v a -rcape^eupov  abeXcpeag.  QUTU  \u\ a d x o i  ttXXov  vou-ov  oQire T O V JmoXuvxai  vop-ov TOV  VOU.OV  auu.u.a)(ov T<£> O e X o v u i  Truly the lavs were not broken, but one senses that  they were severely strained*  i  19 shot down the son of a Persian noble i n cold blood, 20 his adviser Croesus.  and would have killed  21 Ee died as the result of an accidental wound.  Polycrates treacherously sent aid to his "enemy" Cambyses who was preparing to invade the land of his "ally" Amasis. Hot only that but he sent only those subjects from whom he feared revolt, and he sent them with a message insinuating that Cambyses could keep them—in other words, he attempted to banish 22 them without t r i a l *  When they returned and fought for their native land, he  i  shut up their women and children i n the docks and would have burned them i f 23 24 need be* He was brutally and treacherously murdered by a Persian* Periander had murdered his wife Melissa, and so gained the hatred of his elder son Lycophron. Next Periander made war against his father-in-law Procles, who had told Lycophron about the murder. Later Lycophron himself was murdered i n Corcyra.  In revenge for this crime Periander took three hundred Corcyrean  25 youths of the best houses and sent them to Lydia to be made into eunuchs* As 26 for Smerdis, while he was greatly mourned by the people of the Persian realm, yet he committed the great crime against the Persians of sleeping with their 27 noble women, although he himself was of base origin.  He was murdered by the  seven conspirators* 19  Herodotus III 35. 1-3.  Herodotus III 36. Herodotus III 64-66. 22  Herodotus m  25  44. 2*  Herodotus III 45. 4.  24  But this i s not told us until after the debate, Herodotus III 126-128.  25  Herodotus III 48-53*  26  Herodotus III 62-63.  ^Herodotus III 6 9 . 2*  Thus the debate of the seven i s introduced by an account of the bloodshed and abuse characteristic of tyranny. The context after the debate i s equally relevant*  Immediately upon the establishment of Darius as king  Herodotus presents the account of his arrangements for tribute (cpopoG) throughout the Persian empire.  By virtue of i t s position, Herodotus' account  of these arrangements makes tribute appear as typical of tyrants and tyran28 nical empires.  Herodotus does not suggest that Darius' levies were oppres-  sive, but he doeB record that Darius earned the name kapelos because he i n s t i tuted them* This word, which seems to mean something like our "money-grubber, i s not without a barb. Next, almost as comic relief i n what appears to be a relentless pursuit of tyranny, Herodotus presents his entertaining "wonders of the far East." when he has finished the "wonders," he returns to his main theme, giving an account of the death of Polycrates. Again we see the rashness of the tyrant, who threatens his daughter that he will force her to remain a spinster i f she does not stop warning him about his coming death. By this time, however, we have learned from the debate to expect contempt of women from tyrants, and we are not surprised when Polycrates shuts his ears to his daughter's advice and 29 goes to his death. /  28  I shall later show that Herodotus did regard (pop oG as typical of unjust and tyrannical rule. Herodotus III 120-126.  - 32 -  On each side of his account of the rashness of Polycrates, an example 30 of pedimental structure that reminds us of the theories of J. L. Myres, Herodotus relates the murderings of two Persian nobles by Darius* The f i r s t man to die vas Intaphrenes, vho would have invaded the king's privacy while he was with a woman. When stopped by the servants of the king, Intaphrenes cut off their noses and ears. Darius, not so much troubled about the misfortune of his servants but suspecting Intaphrenes of rebellion, had him and his entire house with the exception of two males destroyed, apparently not caring that he had been one of the seven conspirators. There i s no mention 31 that he was allowed a t r i a l . Next comes Oroetes. Although he may have deserved death because of his own homicides, he was certainly granted no 32 t r i a l but killed while s t i l l occupying the seat of his satrapy.  Ironically,  Intaphrenes' wish to invade the king's privacy would never have arisen had Intaphrenes and the other conspirators opposed the establishment of a monarchy i n Persia. Moreover, Darius, acting as a typical monarch, broke the Persian law i n killing both these men* "I admire this law also (of the Persians), which forbids even the king himself to k i l l anyone* Nor can any other Persian maim one of his own  ^ J . L. Myres, Herodotus Father of History (Oxford, 1953) pp.-60-88, ^Herodotus I H 118-119. 52  Herodotus III 126-129*  - 33 -  servants. Bat, upon reckoning up, i f he finds the misdeeds more and 33 greater than the good services, then his rage takes its course." But there was no "reckoning up" i n the deaths of these two men. Otanes, the advocate of democracy, received a character-sketch from Herodotus through a speech attributed to him that vas delivered before the deposition of Smerdis. When Darius urged immediate action i n order to overthrow Smerdis, Otanes answered him thus: "Son of Hystaspes, you are of a noble father and seem yourself to be no worse than he. However, do not hasten this undertaking so rashly. Ta) 34 i t more cautiously; there must be more of us before we strike•" When Darius persisted, Otanes turned to the practical consideration of getting 35 past the palace-guards.  He was not a man of inaction, for i t was he who  obtained' the evidence that Smerdis was an illegitimate ruler and who i n i t i ated the conspiracy. He was. however, a cautious and practical man like Sandanis and Artabanus, both "wise advisers" i n Herodotus. With the above facts from Herodotus' history i n mind and remembering that Herodotus " . . .does not obtrude his own opinions but he often lets 36 his sympathies be seen." we are i n a position to see real meaning i n the 33 ^Herodotus I 137. 1.  34  ^Herodotus III 71. 3. 55  Herodotus III 72. 1.  56  S i n c l a i r , p. 39.  - 34 -  words of the wise Otanes. I f Otanes i§_wise to Herodotus, i t i s l i k e l y that h i s ideas w i l l be those Herodotus thinks are wise, indeed, the very b e l i e f s of the h i s t o r i a n himself.  To Otanes, tyranny i s unbearable.  The  best of tyrants change the ancestral customs. They are envious and "hybrist i c " i n depriving t h e i r subjects of t h e i r d i g n i t y and t h e i r r i g h t s . I n the words of Otanes, "the greatest e v i l s I am about to t e l l :  he upsets the 37  ancestral customs, he v i o l a t e s women, and he murders men without t r i a l . " These are the three major charges that Herodotus, through Otanes, brings against tyrants, and a l l three could be made against the tyrants he has discussed i n Book I I I , with the exception of Smerdis, who merely violated women. Herodotus appears to be stating here the opinion he has formed from his consideration of monarchy and tyranny i n the rest of Book I I I . The effects that tyrannical actions have upon the subjects of an irresponsible r u l e r have been recounted i n the preceding l i n e s . "Hybrls enters him because of h i s present high standard of l i v i n g , and envy was natural to man from creation. Having these two he has a l l evils.  Puffed f u l l of hybris he commits many outrages, and, f u l l of  envy, more. Although a man i n a tyrant's p o s i t i o n ought to be w i t h out envy, f o r he has everything he wants, he i s by nature the exact opposite to t h i s toward h i s c i t i z e n s .  For he i s envious of the best of  his c i t i z e n s when they survive and l i v e , and he r e j o i c e s i n t h e i r greatest calamities.  He himself i s the best of men f o r hearing calumny. Of a l l  men he i s most inconsistent, f o r , when you respect him with moderation, he i s furious because you do not worship him; and when you worship, he  Herodotus I I I 80. 5.  35 -  38  i s furious because you are a fawner."  A tyrant destroys i n i t i a t i v e and enterprise and so destroys b i s people. The  39 inescapable conclusion i s that Herodotus was a hater of tyranny. Herodotus was also a lover of freedom, especially democracy, as Otanes* tightly condensed description of the advantages of democracy shows.  " F i r s t , the rule of the people has the finest name of a l l : Isonomia. Moreover, i t performs none of the monarch's crimes; offices are gained by l o t , an o f f i c e r ' s accounts are scrutinized, and a l l plans are referred to the 40 public assembly." In short, everyone has a part i n the government and, therefore, i n working f o r the state he i s working f o r himself.  To use the words of Otanes, "the state  41 and the people are synonymous terms."  That i s how Otanes concludes, and to  Herodotus the most cogent argument has been put forward. History decreed, however, that these men were not to be swayed by the appeal f o r democracy, but by a specious argument f o r monarchy.  Herodotus III 80. 3-4. 39  A. D. Grodley does not accept this idea; A. D. Godley, Herodotus. 4 vols. (Loeb Classical Library, London, 1928) Vol. I l l , p. z v i . ^Herodotus III 80. 6. ^Herodotus I I I 80. 6, the translation i s de Selincourt's;  H e r o d o t u s , the  Histories, translated by A. de Selincourt (Edinburgh, 1959).  36  A f t e r the speech of Otanes comes that of Megabyzus, which i s a slander 42 of democracy, but hardly an argument f o r oligarchy*. "Nothing i s more stupid or •hybristie* than a useless multitude. I t i s i n sufferable f o r men who have just escaped from the hybris of a tyrant to f a l l into the hybris of an unruly people.  At least when a tyrant does  something he knows what he i s doing, but the people know nothing.  How  could an untaught man know anything, or one who knows nothing of what i s r i g h t and f i t t i n g ?  He i s accustomed to go crashing through h i s business 43 without sense l i k e a r i v e r i n flood." This heap of i n s u l t s i s not an argument. The implication of Herodotus appears to be that no convincing charge can be brought against democracy. Certainly there i s very l i t t l e that Herodotus, through Megabyzus, f i n d s to say i n favour of oligarchy. He merely employs an exhortation. "Let us choose a number of 44 the best men and turn the power over to them."  Thus a l l that has been accom-  plished by Megabyzus i s the calumniation of democracy. This violent rebuttal of democracy prepares us f o r the triumphant arguments of Darius.  Otanes, a p r a c t i c a l man, based h i s argument on observations  ^Herodotus does put bad arguments i n the mouths of h i s speakers to achieve special effects:  see Solmsen, "Ionic Revolt," pp. 198-200. That Megabyzus  o f f e r s no r e a l argument f o r oligarchy has already been observed by V i c t o r Ehrenberg, " Origins of Democracy," p. 525. ^Herodotus I I I 81. 1-2. 44 Herodotus I I I 81. 3. come from the best men"  T. A. S i n c l a i r c a l l s h i s "naturally the best plans ( H I 81. 3) an argument. Yet i t i s more of a truism  than an argument. I t leaves us with the problem of f i n d i n g the best Megabyzus assumes that the seven conspirators are among the best men.  men. This  assumption would not necessarily be convincing outside the seven conspirators.  from the common experience of a l l seven conspirators, and had discussed i n practical terms the crisis i n which the state was placed, for which situation he had offered what seemed to him a workable solution. To him kingship had proved itself to be an evil form of government, therefore i t should be abolished. The alternative to monarchy fairest to the Persian people would be a form of democracy. Such was the recommendation of Otanes. Darius' argument like Darius himself as Herodotus portrays him i s deceitful.  Before the debate, when the conspirators are discussing ways of strip-  ping the Hagian of his power, Darius urges immediate action and presses his point with these words: "You ought really to have done this on your own initiative.  Since, however,  you thought i t right to lay the matter before others and have brought i t to me as well, either we act today, or know that no one will beat me i n a 45 race to the Hagian to denounce you. I myself will t e l l him everything." "For i f a l i e must be told, let i t be told. We a l l seek the same thing telling lies or speaking the truth. One lies when he expects to gain something by deceitful persuasion, another tells the truth i n order that benefit will accrue to him for his truthfulness and that more will be entrusted to him. Thus by different actions we seek the same thing. Were there nothing to be gained, the truthful would l i e and the l i a r would 46 speak truth indifferently."  ^Herodotus III T U 5» 46  Herodotus III 72. 4*  - 38  When ve come to the debate with the throne of the "vast Persian empire at stake, we expect from Darius deceit and lies i n his bid to achieve this prize* There was deceit also i n the way Darius acted to secure the throne when the debate was finished* He made his groom prepare his horse so that i t would be the f i r s t to whinny at sunrise, the pre-arranged sign by which the 47 Persians had agreed to appoint their next monarch* Darius won the throne*  This the groom did, and  Deceit runs through the words and actions of Darius.  Now let us turn to his argument i n the debate. He begins by undermining conclusions drawn from the practical situation. "We are discussing the best form of each government, the best democracy.  48 oligarchy, monarchy."  Thus Otanes* argument from practical experience i s  made irrelevant despite i t s value. Otanes argued from facts, Darius announces - that he i s going to argue theory. Darius i s free to make any rules he chooses so long as he himself adheres to them, which he fails to do. Nevertheless', he has brushed aside the powerful arguments of Otanes. How he proceeds with an appealing truism: "What government can possibly be better than that of the very best man i n the whole state? The counsels of such a man are like himself, and so he governs the mass of the people to their heart's content; while at the  47  Herodotus I H 85-87.  Herodotus i n 82. 1.  - 39 -  same time his measures against evil-doers are kept more secret than i n 49 other states." His next postulate i s equally impressive. "In oligarchy each man wishes to be foremost i n having his opinions prevail.. This situation breeds enmities, which breed murder. From murder the state progresses to monarchy. So i t i s 50 shown how monarchy i s the best."  l e t . even i f we grant this process, i t  does not show how monarchy i s best. If we allow the contention i t shows only 51 that monarchy i s inevitable.  what i s most important here, however, i s that  Darius has departed from the principle that he laid down, namely, that the discussion was to be about the best form of each type of government. The oligarchy he used to prove his point vas an evil one, f u l l of strife.  If he  had kept to his rules and discussed the best oligarchy, presumably one composed of fair and honest men ruling the people well, the rest of his argument would have been impossible. Darius, the theorist, uses actual oligarchy to prove that theoretical monarchy i s best. This i s dishonest, but yet the very type of argument we were led by Herodotus to expect from him.  His discussion  of democracy i s exactly parallel to that of oligarchy and requires no special treatment.  His concluding statement drawn from the history of the Persians,  illustrates that Darius was not unsympathetic to the cogency of the type of practical argument used by Otanes.* Indeed, Darius makes ample use of the kind of argument he began by disqualifying. Yet i n a way this last argument i s the ^Ehe translation i s that of George Ravlinson, Herodotus; History of the Greek and Persian War (New York, 1963) p. 148. ^Herodotus III 82. 3» ^nberg,  however, "Origins of Democracy," p. 528, considers this argu-  ment of Darius a cogent one.  - 40  most ridiculous of them a l l *  "To sum i t a l l up i a a single statement, whence  came freedom to us and who gave i t ? Did i t come from a democracy, an 52 oligarchy, or a monarch?"  The answer he expects us to supply i s obvious*  If we are carried away by his rhetoric, we shall supply i t without even wondering i f i t i s correct to use the word freedom the way Darius does. But i f we have been with Herodotus until now, we shall certainly hesitate before we agree that Cyrus freed the Persians in any way.  Perhaps he spared them the  degradation of subservience to the Medea, but they were s t i l l subservient to him.  And surely the whole question that i s being debated i s whether or not  the Persians will become free i n the f u l l political sense.  Certainly Cyrus  brought them closer to freedom. But Darius i s begging the entire question when he suggests that Cyrus actually has given the Persians their freedom* This speech of Darius has been noted by T. A. Sinclair as the beginning of Greek political science. About i t he says: "(Darius) does not expressly reply to the charge of ft|3p i G made against tyranny, a charge which Megabyzus had laid against democracy, as many others did after him.  But he was clearly aware that any government might  behave i n a 'hybristic' and tyrannical manner. For he i s made to preface his statement with the proviso that i n any discussion of the three forms demos, oligarchy, and monarchy, we must consider only the best i n each case. This foreshadows the sixfold classifications of constitutions, three good of their kind and three deviations or bad forms, which i s 53 familiar to us from Plato onwards."  Herodotus III 82. 5 ^ S i n c l a i r , p. 38.  - 41 -  Professor Sinclair does not say whether Darius argued well or not. hut he does point out that the charge of hybris goes unanswered. To Herodotus this i s an important charge for history itself substantiates i t .  The spokesman for democ-  racy, of course, by virtue of his position as the f i r s t speaker, could not answer the charge of hybris against democracy.  Darius, however, was i n a better  position. He spoke last and could answer any accusation previously made* Therefore, when he ignores the charge of hybris. we can only assume that Herodotus could provide him with no satisfactory answer. The result of the last two speeches i s that democracy remains slandered and the Persians allow themselves to be persuaded by deceitful, question-begging arguments that they can be free under a monarch. The vote i s cast for monarchy. A monarch, the very kind of man who, i n the belief of Herodotus, destroys the ancestral customs, was installed so as "not to destroy the good old ancestral 54 customs."  On this note ringing with irony Herodotus finishes the debate*  Now that the choice i s made, i t remains for us to observe i t s consequences* Herodotus never forgets this debate. It i s the scenic backdrop i n front of 55 which the whole of the rest of the history i s acted* If we s t i l l doubt what  Herodotus III 82. 5. 55  54  The theatrical imagery i s suitable,  what Herodotus has done i n this account  amounts to a dramatization. He began by sketching some of his characters, Otanes the wise and practical, Darius the deceitful; then he composed speeches to suit the characters. In this subtle way, Herodotus praises democracy and condemns tyranny i n an incident i n which tyranny emerged victorious. On dramatization i n Herodotus see David Grene, "Herodotus: the Historian as Dramatist," The Journal of Philosophy LVHI (l96l) pp. 477-488*  - 42  i s the best form of government, let us watch democracy versus monarchy or tyranny during the invasion of Greece*  - 43 -  CHAPTER 17 THE IONIAN REVOLT  About 500 B.C., many Creeks of Asia Minor, most of whom had been brought under the control of the barbarian by Croesus, were persuaded to throw off the foreigners' yoke. By this time, however, Persian control of their area had become considerable. Some thirteen years before this time, Darius, after securing his rear by subduing Thrace and gaining complete control of the Chersonese and the Hellespont, had invaded Scythia. Although he failed to defeat the Scythians, he gained for Persia mastery of the north coast of the Aegean sea. Persia had also taken Paeonia by the time of the revolt, thus menacing Macedonia and, potentially, mainland Greece i t s e l f . Before the Scythian invasion, the Persians had begun to interfere with the affairs of the islanders i n the Aegean when Syloson asked Darius for help in his attempt to establish himself as tyrant i n Samoa. Although the rest of the islands retained their independence, there was no doubt now that Persia was the dominant power in the Aegean. The situation was such, therefore, as to offer l i t t l e hope to the Asiatic Greeks for the success of their revolt. Their political situation promised these Greeks, mostly Ionians, l i t t l e hope also. As early as Darius' invasion of Scythia, Herodotus tells us, when the f i r s t chance for revolt had been given the Ionians, they did not accept the opportunity for fear of the political unrest that prevailed in their cities. The incident i s found in Book IV of Herodotus where Darius, after giving the Hellespont and Bosporus to the Asiatic Greeks to guard, marched into Scythia.  - 44 -  The Scythians led Darius deep into their territory, then wheeled toward the Bosporus and arrived before the Persians could double back. The Scythians at once offered the Ionians their freedom. A l l they had to do was break down the bridge over the Bosporus and revolt, thus cutting off the Persians* retreat. The Scythians would have done the rest. This i s how the Scythians ended their overtures to the Ionians. "Since formerly you remained here out of fear, now break down the bridge and be off as quickly as possible, rejoicing as free men and thanking the gods and the ScythianB."  1  Miltiades favoured the Scythian proposal; " . . . but Histiaeus opposed i t . He said that now each of them ruled his city as tyrant because of Darius. But with the power of Darius gone he himself would not be able to rule Miletus nor anybody else any other state. For each state would prefer to be ruled by a democracy rather than a tyranny. When Histiaeus had put forward this opinion, everyone changed 2 his mind and adopted i t , though he had formerly agreed with Miltiades." By reporting, or composing, this speech Herodotus makes i t clear that he believed the decision not to revolt was a political one.  It was not governed  by considerations of strategy, for, strategically, the Ionians were i n a position to give Darius serious trouble. Herodotus proves this by giving a l i s t of the tyrants present at the meeting that made this decision.  Herodotus 17 136. 4. Herodotus 17 137. 2-3.  45 -  " . . • the tyrants of the Hellespont were Daphnis of Abydos, Hippoclus of Lampsacus, Herophantus of Parium, Metrodorua of Proconesus, Aristagoras of Cyzicus, and Ariston of Byzantium, These were from the 3  Hellespont, while from Ionia were . . . ." Herodotus mentions only five others at the meeting, showing that the meeting was dominated by Hellespontine tyrants. Miltiades does not appear in this l i s t , but his name could be added, for he, like the Hellespontine tyrants, ruled an area that lay i n the path of Darius' retreat* Herodotus repeats the word Hellespont in this l i s t , reminding us of the advantage the Ionians could have gained over Darius by revolting. They could have cut off Darius* retreat completely, and, i f they were given a Scythian victory to help them, liberation from the barbarian might have been within their grasp.  They turned down  this opportunity fearing deposition because of political dissatisfaction i n their people.  They needed Darius for survival.  The political situation of Ionia was no different when the overhasty  4 Aristagoras came upon the scene*  Indeed, the Ionian revolt had i t s begin-  nings in a struggle with the rising popular party of Nazos*  "Certain men of  the rich class were exiled from Naxos by the demos, and i n exile they fled to 5 Miletus," where they sought and obtained the dubious help of the tyrant Aristagoras, who had in mind to seize power i n Naxos for himself instead of turning i t over to the exiles.  But Aristagoras realized that he would not be  Herodotus IV 158. ^Solmsen, "Ionic Revolt," p. 201. 'Herodotus V 30. 1.  - 46 -  able to take Nazos without using Persian forces* Therefore, he went to Sardis and asked for the help of Artaphrenes, rashly promising to undertake the expenses of the campaign with the help of the Naxian exiles. At the start of the siege Aristagoras had a violent disagreement with the Persian commander Hegabates who betrayed the purpose of Aristagoras to the Naxians. ConH  sequently, the siege ended unsuccessfully with Aristagoras out of money and heavily in debt to the Persians". In financial desperation and urged on by 6 Histiaeus, he decided to lead the Ionians i n their premature revolt*. In order to strengthen his cause. Aristagoras sought help from the Spartans*  He could offer them no money; so he tried to lure them with the  promise of easily obtained spoil. When they refused, he came to the Athenians* At this point Herodotus introduces a long history of the rise of Athenian democracy and i t s struggle for survival, at the end of which Aristagoras comes before the Athenian assembly and asks for help*. "when the Athenians had been persuaded they voted to send twenty ships to help the Ionians, appointing a general of theirs, Melanthius, an outstanding citizen in every respect. These ships were the beginning of  7 troubles for Greek and foreigner alike." The history of the rise of Athenian democracy and i t s desperate struggle for Herodotus V 35. 7 Herodotus V 97. 3. Twenty ships may not seem a significant contribution by Athens to a revolt against the Persian empire. It was a considerable one, however; see M. P. McGregor, "The Pro-Persian Party at Athens," Harvard Studies i n Classical Philology. Supp* I (1940) pp.. 80-83*  - 47 -  survival i a the face of intervention by Sparta adds real meaning to these few words quoted above. As Herodotus t e l l s the story, this was the f i r s t major decision that the young democracy bad to make. I t was a resolution to adopt a policy of h o s t i l i t y to the Persian empire, one that few could have believed to be without consequence. The history of Herodotus has as one of i t s tasks now to show how the Athenians faced the natural outcome of their stand against Persia and became equal partners with the Spartans i n driving out the invader.  By the careful arrangement of his material, there-  fore, Herodotus shows us that the "beginning of troubles f o r Greek and foreigner alike" was a p o l i t i c a l decision made i n f u l l democratic assembly  Q by thirty thousand Athenians* Herodotus says that Aristagoras sought to strengthen his cause i n another way,  beside getting help from the mainland*  "He began by a pretence of abdicating h i s tyranny and establishing Isonomla i n Miletus, so that the Milesians would follow him with a w i l l .  After-  wards he established the very same thing i n the rest of Ionia, driving out some of the tyrants and turning over the others each to their c i t i e s  q of origin so as to establish friendships with the c i t i e s * " The tyrants of Ionia depended upon Persia f o r support, i n return for which they generally remained l o y a l to P e r s i a * ^  In order to raise revolt i n Ionia,  1  8 The number i s Herodotus* own and comes from the context immediately preceding the above quotation. ^Herodotus V 37* •^Page 44.  2*  Herodotus V 97*  2*  48  therefore, and in order to break down the alliances with Persia and at the same time to create friendships between the cities and himself, Aristagoras had to depose the tyrants. Aristagoras also pretended to abdicate from his tyranny and to establish Isonomia in Miletus "so that the Milesians would follow him with a will."  This may or may not have been the motive of  Aristagoras. There were no means by which Herodotus could have been sure of i t , for Aristagoras died probably a decade before Herodotus was born.  11  The historian has either assumed i t or accepted i t without reserve from a source. In either case, the fact that he repeats i t without qualification indicates that he did not doubt i t s validity. To him the establishment of Isonomia i n Miletus meant that the Milesians would espouse the cause of Aristagoras and fight with a will, presumably out of gratitude. The same thing Beems to be assumed for the rest of the Ionian cities.  It appears that  the populace of the cities, once they have gained Tannnmin. can be expected to fight alongside their "liberators" for their freedom as staunch and willing allies.  It i s apparent, therefore, what faith Herodotus had i n cities  democratically governed. In the mind of Herodotus the Ionian revolt was a foolish blunder undertaken 12 by the Ionians upon the instigation of the rash tyrant, Aristagoras.  One  reason why Herodotus judged Aristagoras to be so foolish was that the tyrant failed to appreciate the significance of the prevailing political unrest i n Ionia. Aristagoras seems to have died before the battle of Lade and the end of the revolt. Herodotus V 126. 12 Solmsen, "Ionic Revolt," p. 206.  The Ionian revolt failed, and Herodotus could show two political factors that helped explain i t s failure. The f i r s t was that Histiaeus, having come back from Susa to take over the revolt and so having brought with him some hope for i t s success, was unable to recover his tyranny i n Miletus where he could have done the most damage to Persia. "The Milesians were happy to be rid of Aristagoras. and were i n no way eager to accept another tyrant into 13 their country inasmuch as they had had a taste of freedom."  So, in his  own case at least, Histiaeus was shown to be a true prophet: "He said that now each of them ruled his city because of Darius.  But, with  the power of Darius gone, he himself would not be able to rule Miletus, nor anybody else any other state. For each city would prefer to be ruled by a democracy rather than a tyranny. • Some of the cities, however, were willing to take their tyrants back after expelling them. This i s the second political cause Herodotus gives for the collapse of the Ionian revolt. "So reckoning they (the Persian commanders) called together the Ionian tyrants who had been expelled by Aristagoras of Miletus, had fled to the Medes, and happened to be there on the campaign against Miletus* Having called those of them who were present together, they spoke to them as follows:  •Ionians, now whoever of you who wishes the house of the king  well, let him show i t *  Let each of you attempt to separate his own people 15 from the rest of the alliance. ,N  ^-^Herodotus 71 5. 1. "^Herodotus 17 137. 3. ^Herodotus 71 9. 2-3«  - 50  The tyrants followed the recommendation of the Persians and made overtures to their peoples, offering to spare them from retribution i f they separated themselves from the rest of the alliance and threatening to punish them brutally i f they did not* Many Ionians obeyed the tyrants, seeing the power of Persia and the disunity i n the Ionian camp* As a consequence the revolt was crushed at Lade* Aristagoras had made a pretence of abdicating his tyranny and "he established Isonomia in Miletus* Next he established the very same thing in the rest of 16 Ionia."  Presumably, then, Herodotus saw the Ionian revolt as a group of  democracies fighting against Persia* However, at Lade the  S n n H  <ma and many of  the other Ionians did not even fight, but meekly returned home, taking back their tyrants and their Persian overlords*  So told, the revolt proves that  democracy i s by no means the type of institution likely to produce heroic deeds i n i t s participants* Herodotus, however, does not t e l l the story this way, a significant fact*  He begins by showing the folly of Aristagoras at the start  of the revolt* His mishandling of the siege of Naxos put him i n the desperate position that drove him to consider revolt* When he decided, he tried to make the Spartans his allies, but made a rash speech in which he nearly persuaded the Spartans that they could march on, and take, Susa* However, his persuasive powers were working well until he made the blunder of telling the Spartans truthfully how far away Susa was* Herodotus believed that Aristagoras might 17 have won the Spartan alliance but for this blunder* Later, when the Ionians  Herodotus V 37*  7 Herodotus V 50*  - 51 -  had suffered some defeats and their hopes were fading, Aristagoras, who was 18 "not outstanding for his courage,"  left them leaderless. Aristagoras, who  only pretended to abdicate his tyranny, was s t i l l a tyrant i n the eyes of Herodotus, and i t was he whom the historian preferred to blame rather than the democracies of Ionia. Before the battle of Lade, Dionysius, the Fhocaean admiral, tried to assume leadership, but he worked the Ionians harder than a despot would have. He soon lost control, and Ionian discipline quickly vanished. Herodotus, i t seems, seeks to excuse the Ionian democracies for their failure by blaming the tyrannical leaders of the revolt. Herodotus believed that the only hope the Greeks had i n opposing the Persians was their ability to develop free and stable constitutions. They did not have the vast steppes over which to retreat like the Scythians; nor could they hope to repeat the miracle the Massagetae had worked by defeating Cyrus, for at that time the Persian empire had not been organized on the same scale as i t was when Xerxes led i t against the Greeks, i l though the constitutions of the Ionians had been free, they had not been stable, and were easily overthrown by the influence of the absent tyrants once the revolt had begun to go badly.  Nevertheless, i t remained a tribute to democracy that a tyrant could  not get the Ionians to revolt without establishing that form of government in the cities of Ionia. Freedom with stability, however, was the antidote to the poison of Persia, a formula that had long been i n the hands of the Spartans. Nonetheless, Sparta alone could hope for l i t t l e against the whole Persian empire  Herodotus V 124.  now that Ionia was re subjugated. In the belief of Herodotus, as I shall show, i t would take another state. Athens, who, unlike her Ionian friends, by establishing for herself a stable and free form of government, would start at Marathon a chain of victories that would lead to the liberation of Hellas*  CHAPTER V THE TRIAL OP ATHENIAN DEMOCRACY  In the narrative of Herodotus, Aristagoras vent to Athens a f t e r f a i l i n g to gain the help of the Spartans. But the narrative stops with Aristagoras about to ask the Athenians to help make war on Persia (thus committing themselves to a policy of h o s t i l i t y to the Persian empire) and digresses into an account of the expulsion of the P i s i s t r a t i d a e , the r i s e of Athenian democracy.  "Driven o f f from Sparta, Aristagoras came to Athens, which had  recently become free from tyrants i n the following way."  1  This i s how Herod-  otus introduces h i s account of the f a l l of the P i s i s t r a t i d a e .  The words "free,"  2 "freed," and "free from tyrants" are found i n various places throughout i t . Herodotus could not regard a people under a tyranny as free. the  He d i d not make 3  tyrannicides Hermodius and Aristogiton the l i b e r a t o r s of Athens.  He r e -  lated the murder of Hipparchus, but f o r him freedom d i d not begin f o r the Athenians u n t i l Hippias was on h i s way to Sigeum. The tyranny of the P i s i s t r a t i d s he regarded as not much different from any other tyranny. A r i s t o t l e and Thucydides told stories of the mildness and benevolence of P i s i s t r a t u s and h i s son u n t i l the murder of Hipparchus, but Herodotus wrote 4  very l i t t l e on the subject.  Again f o r Herodotus the expulsion of the  •^Herodotus V 55 1. Herodotus 7 62. 1, 62. 2, 63. 1, 64. 2, 65. 5. Thucydides said (l,20. 2) that many Athenians d i d consider Harmodius and Aristogiton the l i b e r a t o r s of Athens. ^In I 59. 6 he simply says that they did not change the laws and ruled f a i r l y and w e l l .  - 54 -  Plsistratids was a step forward i n Athens' advance to greatness.  "Athens,  a great city before this time, when rid of the tyrants, became even great5 er." Herodotus was not sympathetic tp the Pisistratids. After Hippias was driven out of Athens, there arose faction between Isagoras and Clisthenes. In his account of this struggle for power, Herodotus may have recalled the words of Darius in the debate i n Book III. Darius had maintained that tyranny grew out of factions inherent i n democracies*^ The history of Athens as Herodotus presents i t , however, proved that the reverse could happen. In the case of Athens, democracy grew out of the factions that followed the expulsion of the -tyrants. Herodotus claimed that Athens rose to new heights as soon as the tyrants had been expelled. This was not entirely true, for Cleomenes entered Athens with a small force and a l l but established Isagoras i n power. To have Sparta meddling in her internal affairs i s hardly a sign that the city had increased in prestige. However, the greatness that came to Athens after the tyrants may be found i n her demos. It was the council and the demos that drove out Cleomenes, making clear their choice of Clisthenes i n preference to Isagoras. The Athenians chose Clisthenes because he offered them a substantial share in the government, which Herodotus recognized as democracy. Herodotus was clearly referring to the eventual emergence of democracy when he alluded to  Herodotus V 66. 1. ^Herodotus III 82. 3-4.  - 55 -  the eminence of Athens upon the expulsion of the tyrants* Herodotus describes Clisthenes' rise to political supremacy* but gives 7 scanty details of his constitutional arrangements*  This paucity of detail  may t e l l us less about the interests of Herodotus than about the type of audience for which he wrote. He believed, perhaps, that a f u l l account would have been tedious to an audience that was quite familiar with the workings of the Athenian constitution. Moreover, I shall show, i n this context Herodotus, apparently with his mind on the impending Persian invasion, i s less interested i n democracy's advantages to the citizen than i n i t s power against the alien*  To the alien the details of the constitution matter l i t t l e , i t s  establishment i s the important thing* Of the establishment of democracy by Clisthenes there i s no doubt i n the account of Herodotus* "These men (isagoras and Clisthenes) feuded over the authority. When he began to be worsted, Clisthenes made an alliance with the 8 demos*"  "As he was i n former time opposed to the demos, then, i n every re— 9  spect, he allied i t to his cause*"  These quotations strongly suggest that  Clisthenes improved the demos' position i n the reforms* Otherwise i t i s hard to see why i t remained his ally, for the friendship between the people of Athens and Clisthenes continued even while Clisthenes was i n voluntary exile Herodotus V 65-69# Herodotus 7 66* 2* ^Herodotus 7 69* 2*  56 -  during the intrusion of Cleomenes to establish Isagoras. "Nevertheless, afterwards Cleomenes came to Athens with a small force* when he arrived, he banished seven hundred families of the Athenians whom Isagoras singled out. This done, he next tried to abolish the council, and he turned over the offices to three hundred of the followers of Isagoras*"  10  It i s safe to assume that the seven hundred families expelled by Isagoras and Cleomenes, i f a true figure, represented the political allies of Clisthenes. With these gone, i f the movement of Clisthenes had received only half-hearted support from the rest of the Athenians, we might have expected to hear nothing more of Clisthenes and his reforms, "However, the council stubbornly resisted. So Cleomenes and Isagoras and his political associates seized the acropolis, while the rest of the Athenians of one accord besieged them for two days."  11  Eventually, "the Athenians recalled Clisthenes and the seven hundred families 12 expelled by Cleomenes."  The people knew who were their friends even i f the  alignment with Clisthenes had sprung from the politician*8 self-interest, as 10  Herodotus 7 72. 1.  ^Herodotus 7 72. 2* Herodotus 7 73. 1*  57  Herodotus implies i n the passages quoted above. The rest of the Athenians were w i l l i n g to work "with one accord" i n order to protect t h e i r pending constitution and to drive out the Lacedaemonian i n 14 truders.  The Athenians had developed a sense of unity.  There i s no  suggestion that t h i s sense of unity came from the reforms of Clisthenes, nor does i t matter.  Otanes has already t o l d us that the state and people are  synonymous terms. Now t h i s i d e a l i s actually being realized i n Athens, and a p o l i t i c a l force i s a r i s i n g with which one can not t r i f l e .  Cleomenes learned  that he would no longer be able to come against Athens with a "small force." A k i n g of Sparta discovered what an emerging democracy could do, and others 1  were to be taught a s i m i l a r lesson. Cleomenes went back to Sparta i n order to c o l l e c t that large force that he would need to reduce Athens and make her conform to Spartan p o l i c y .  As he  came with h i s a l l i e s to the borders of Athens, an army from Boeotia and  The s e l f - i n t e r e s t of Clisthenes i s implied strongly i n V 66-69 also, where Herodotus alleges that Clisthenes of Athens was i m i t a t i n g h i s maternal grandfather, Clisthenes tyrant of Sicyon, i n the reforms. Herodotus believed that the actions of a tyrant were s e l f i s h .  So when he states that Clisthenes of  Athens was i m i t a t i n g a tyrant i n h i s reforms, he probably means that Clisthenes was acting from a s e l f i s h motive. Alcmeonidae i s d i f f e r e n t :  I n Book VI, however, h i s opinion of the  see C. Hignett, A History of the Athenian Constitu-  t i o n to the End of the F i f t h Century (Oxford, 1956) pp. 148-151. 14  As  C. W. J . E l i o t has shown i n h i s work, "Coastal Demes of A t t i k a , "  Phoenix. Supp. V (Toronto, 1962) pp. 145*4.47, on account of the considerable length of time needed to implement the reforms of Clisthenes, the "standing constitution" (Clisthenic democracy) existed at t h i s time only on paper*  58 -  another from Euboea simultaneously invaded Athenian territory*  With luck  and their new-found pride* the Athenians turned potential disaster into glory for themselves*  Luckily, the Spartan force disintegrated before i t  seriously penetrated Athenian territory*  Then, with this threat out of the  way, with unexpected audacity the Athenians met the armies from Euboea and 15 Boeotia i n turn and defeated them both on the same day*  After relating  these events, Herodotus makes his famous comment on democracy* "So Athens grew; and i t i s clear not on any one consideration but on every that democracy i s a desirable thing. When the Athenians were under the tyrants, they were in no wise better than their neighbours i n war; but, when rid of the tyrants, they became foremost i n battle. This too i s clear, therefore, that, when they were ruled, they shirked their duty since they were working for a despot; but, when free, each individual was eager to press on with the task for himself*"^ In this passage, the self-interest of individuals i s taken for granted* This does not mean that Herodotus was a cynic, rather, that i n his opinion a man works better and harder when he i s working for himself* We already know from Book III that i n democracy a man can at once work for himself and the 17 state*  "The state and the people are synonymous terms*"  To Herodotus  this proves that democracy i s a desirable thing. He has not finished there, 15  Herodotus V 74. 1 - 75 * 5.  1 6  H erodotus 7 78* Note the sustained interest i n the power of democracy  confronting alien peoples, i n this case Euboea and Boeotia. 17 Herodotus III 80* 5* The translation i s de Selincourt's*  59 -  however, he s t i l l has something very important to add* He seldom breaks into his narrative to pass a judgement i n his own words* Usually, when he does, i t i s i n disguised form through the speeches of the people i n his history*  No doubt he felt i t essential to add that the change i n constitution  also had a direct effect on the way the Athenians fought i n battle. With the Persian on the doorstep of Greece, we need scarcely doubt that i t i s not merely in fights with Boeotia and Euboea that he i s warning us to expect evidence of valour from the Athenians* Boeotia, wanting revenge for her humiliation at the hands of the Athenians, persuaded the Aeginetans to commence hostilities against Attica*  This they  18 did with relish, starting the much discussed "unheralded war."  In the f i r s t  attack the Athenians were badly worsted* Herodotus* narrative here appears to contradict his earlier statement that Athens was a great city now, thanks to her democracy* Surely i f Athens was able to best the Boeotians and Qhalcidians i n a single day, she could have defeated the Aeginetans as well? There are two reasons why she was unable to handle As gina. One was that the invasion was a surprise, an "unheralded attack, for which the Athenians had n  made no preparations; the other was that Aegina was an island and a sea-power against which warships were needed, and the Athenians seemed to have had only a few*- Athens did eventually undertake to build warships, but that had to be postponed at least until the new threat of Spartan intervention had passed* 1 8  J . L. Myres, "AKHPYKTCE IIQ/VEMOS," CR LVII (1943) pp. 66-67; A. Andrewes,  "Athens and Aegina," BSA XXXVTI (1936-1937) pp. 1-7.  - 60 -  For Sparta soon began to take farther interest in Athenian affairs and desired a government in Athens more amenable to Spartan policies than democracy was proving. Cleomenes, king of Sparta,summoned his allies to a conference, presented Hippias to them and announced his purpose. To him, the solution to the unmanageability of Athens was the restoration of tyranny there. Socles of Corinth opposed him, outlining the history of Corinth in such a way as to show to the assembly the evils of tyranny.  The other representatives agreed  with Socles that tyranny was an evil form of government to impose on a people, and voted against the move, thus quashing i t . Hippias closed the round of talks with a bitter speech predicting trouble for the Corinthians now that they had agreed to leave democracy in Athens. This situation i s reminiscent of the one in Book III, where the seven Persian conspirators debated the best form of government for Persia. In both cases the political future of a major power involved in the Greco-Persian  war  was at stake, the decision was between democracy and tyranny, or monarchy, (the Persians giving some consideration to oligarchy) and tyranny was attacked through references to the actions of tyrants in history. The important difference i s the point of view of the disputants.  In Book III the seven  Persians are debating their own future and that of their own people, weighing the relative advantages of the proposed constitutions for themselves as citizens; in Book VI the Lacedaemonians and their allies discuss the future  - 61 -  of another city, Athens, and the form of government most advantageous to themselves as outsiders. In these two debates, the reader of Herodotus i s allowed to see the advantages and disadvantages of democracy and tyranny both to the citizen within the city walls and to the alien without, whether friend or foe. what i s of interest i n this incident i s the importance Herodotus seems to have attached to an event out of which nothing substantial grew*' Sparta did not undertake the reform when she saw that her allies were against i t * N. G. L. Hammond sees i n this the trustworthiness of the Spartans in not acting without the f u l l consent of their allies*  Sparta, he tells us, was pre19  paring to meet the Persian by uniting her allies around her i n good faith* But i t i s possible that Herodotus saw something else i n this. He told us not long ago that Cleomenes came to Athens with a small force and tried to 20  establish Isagoras i n power*  Now, however, Sparta will not move unless her  allies are solidly behind her. Could not this be another measure of the new prestige of Athens?  It seems to add weight to Herodotus' judgement of the  increasing prestige of Athens now that she i s a democracy. This i s how Herodotus opens the debate: "when they (the Spartans) saw the Athenians growing i n power and i n no wise prepared to obey them, they perceived that while the Attic people were  G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C* (Oxford, 1963) p. 196. Herodotus V 72. 1. His words are ou ohv [leyaX^  x P e L  free they might become as powerful as themselves, but subdued under a 21 tyrant they would become weak and tractable . . » ." Here Herodotus i s probably imputing to the Spartans his own thinking. It may be doubted that he could have found out the real Spartan motive for recalling Hippias and for contemplating his restoration. Herodotus may have known that they considered intervention i n Athens, but the stated motive i s to some degree his own.  What he considered worth reporting was an intention to under-  mine the strength of democratic Athens by installing a tyranny*. In imputing this policy to the Spartans, Herodotus reveals to us his own belief, that a state under tyranny was weaker than under democracy. The content of the speeches i s of interest as well. For here, once again, Herodotus, i f he has any definite information, can report as much or as l i t t l e as he chooses, or, i f he i s improvising, he can improvise as much or as l i t t l e as he likes, and make his speakers express the opinions he wants them to*. The Spartans begin by complaining that their king has been roughly handled by the thankless Athenian demos, "which, having planted the seeds of glory, now makes them grow. So especially have learned their neighbours, the Boeotians and the Chalcidians. And soon someone else will find out for himself by 22 mistake."  The Spartans follow this with the recommendation for the rein-  statement of Hippias. ^Herodotus V 91. 1» 22  Herodotus V 91. 2. The effect of democracy on the alien i s s t i l l being  studied. This i s the kind of power that Hellas will need to oppose Persia*  - 63 -  Herodotus tells us that most of the allies were against the proposal but 23 held their peace. Only Socles the Corinthian spoke against i t .  The  tyranny of Periander has already been used i n Book III to illustrate the evils of tyranny i n general. Now Periander and Cypselus are introduced to demonstrate the evils of tyranny to the Lacedaemonians and to show us. Herodotus' audience, what a dreadful thing tyranny can be and how fortunate the Athenians are to be rid of i t . "Men will take up the habitation of fishes and fishes that of men when you, Lacedaemonians, destroy fair gover24 ments and prepare to establish tyrannies i n the cities . . . ."  Socles  tells the Spartans that, i f they think that tyranny i s so good, they should have one themselves. "At present, you yourselves, who have no knowledge of tyrants and who take fearsome precautions that such should never be in Sparta, hardly care a jot about your allies.  But i f you knew something about i t as we do, you 25  would have a better piece of advice to give than your present one." Then Socles recalls the deposition of the Bacchiadae. "And, when Cypselus became tyrant, this was the type of man he became: many of the Corinthians he banished, many he robbed of their wealth, 26 and many more by far of their lives."  23  Herodotus V 92. 1.  24  25  Herodotus V 92 6 .  Herodotus 7 92 6., 2.  ^Herodotus V 92 e.  2  1. 2.  - 64 -  Such i s the summary of the reign of Cypselus. About the reign of Periander, the son of Cypselus, Socles has more to say* "Now at the start. Periander vas milder than his father, but when he began to correspond with Thrasybulus, tyrant of Miletus, he became even far 27 more blood thirsty than Cypselus." Periander enquired of Thrasybulus by messenger how he might establish himself safely and rule his city i n the best way.  The reply of Thrasybulus was to  take the messenger out into the field and ask him questions instead of answering the question he was asked.  A l l the while he cut off the finest and t a l l -  est ears of grain until nothing was left i n the field worthy of note* "Periander saw the point and understood that Thrasybulus was advising him to murder the foremost of his citizens. So from that time he worked every evil on his citizens. What Cypselus had left undone i n murdering and banishing, Periander saw through; and in one day he stripped a l l the women of Corinth because of his own wife Melissa" [whom Periander i s alleged to have murdered i n Book III and with whose dead body he had sexual intercourse]. Periander emerges as an almost "perfect tyrant" according to the Herodotean definition of the word tyrant* "But the greatest of evils I am coming to t e l l :  he upsets the ancestral 29 customs, he forces women, and murders men without t r i a l * "  ^'Herodotus 7 92 C 28  U.  Herodotus 7 92 T). 1-4*  29  Herodotus III 80* 5*  - 65 -  It i s remarkable bow well these three charges can be levied against Periander* After Socles completes bis account of the stripping of a l l the Corinthian women and the dealings of Periander with his wife, he concludes: "There i s tyranny for you, Lacedaemonians, and that i s what i t does. And we Corinthians were stunned to hear that you were recalling Hippias, and 30  now that we have heard your speech we wonder a l l the more." So the Corinthians cast a clear vote against the recalling of Hippias and the move i s quashed* To the words of Socles, Hippias gives a strange reply. Here, had Herodotus desired to give a f a i r chance to tyranny to speak for itself, he might have permitted Hippias to seize this opportunity for an account of the mildness and benevolence of the Pisistratidae themselves, and defend the tyranny of his own family in an attempt to win the votes of the allies.  But the only  answer that he makes i s a back-handed compliment to democracy. "Surely the Corinthians more than a l l others will sorely miss the Pisistratidae when the 31 appointed days come upon them from the Athenians."  The days are "appoint-  ed" in the words of Hippias by the oracles with which he was familiar*  If  the oracles predict trouble, then trouble will come, but when i t comes, i t will make the Corinthians wish for the Pisistratidae instead of Athenian democracy* So even Hippias i s allowing that democracy i s more effective ^Herodotus 7 92  T). 4-5*.  ^Herodotus 7 93» !•  - 66 -  against the alien than tyranny. Athens remained a democracy and Hippias went back to Sigeura. At this point Herodotus comes back to the Ionian revolt and the question i s put to the Athenians i n f u l l assembly: "Will they aid the Ionians i n revolt against Persia?" The answer i s yes*. We need not wonder what the answer would have been had the proposal of the Spartans been carried out* To Herodotus* this was a turning point i n the history of the development of resistance to the oncoming Persian. Now, even though the deposition of the Athenian democracy had not been undertaken, i t had been debated and rejected, so that, for better or for worse, Athens was and would remain a democracy. As a democracy she would have to meet the Persian. The outcome would prove either the worth or the folly of her constitution. The die was cast. One of the first noteworthy decisions this newly established democracy made was to help the Ionians i n their revolt against Persia. It was a momentous decision, for i t meant that Persian reprisal had to be expected i n the event of the collapse of the revolt. The revolt collapsed. Reprisal came. It was at Marathon, as Herodotus would have i t , that democracy proved its worth forever. With the failure of the Ionian revolt, the Persians were free to move against the mainland and silence i t for the future i n case of more trouble in Ionia* They began operations by attacking Eretria and landing at  - 67 -  Marathon, where, as Miltiades informed Callimachus, there was a decision about to be made. "It i s i n your hands, Callimachus, either to enslave Athens or make her free and leave behind a memorial for a l l mankind greater 32 than that of Earmodius and Aristogiton."  The allusion to Harmodius and  Aristogiton i s fitting. They helped Athens on the road to deliverance from tyranny.  Callimachus was i n a position to put the finishing touches to what  they began. If he followed the best strategy, he could deliver Athens from 33 tyranny and "she i s able to become the foremost city of Hellas." The strategy advanced was that of Miltiades, and i t turned out to be the best, for the Persians were defeated decisively. Miltiades was one of those prominent aristocrats whom Thrasybulus would have cut down like a fine ear of grain i n a wheat field.  His father Cimon had been banished, recalled by 34  Pisistratus, and then killed probably at the order of Pisistratus' sons. Now he was i n Athens a fugitive from the Chersonese and was allowed to help in the formation of strategy. The benefit that Athens received from him was immeasurable. The idea of giving such men as Miltiades a voice i n the formation of strategy against an enemy i s i n diametric opposition to one of the ideals of Darius i n his argument for monarchy. A monarch, according to 35 Darius, keeps plans against the enemy silent. The battle of Marathon, 52  Herodotus 71 109. 3.  ^Loc. c i t . 34 Herodotus 71 103. ^The enemy (&u0u,eveaG  ttv6pas)  i s translated "evil-doers" by Rawlinson  (p. 148), whose translation I followed on pages 38-39. Powell's lexicon gives "hostile men."  - 68 -  however, i s proof that there i s an advantage in discussing plans openly in the way a democracy would do.  It makes i t possible for the best plan  to come forward. Darius stated with obvious truth that the rule of the one best man i s best.  Herodotus might have agreed. Such a statement i s not a solution to  any problem, however. Indeed, i t raises the problem how shall we be sure that the best man will come forward and take control. To Herodotus, Marathon proved that the system that enables a talented man to come forward in a crisis and guide his state through i t i s democracy, not monarchy, where the king wins his position by birth not necessarily by merit. As Herodotus presents his material he shows that the political situations of the combatants were already shaping the outcome of the struggle. Persia was a monarchy, as the seven conspirators elected to make her, Athens a democracy because of the initiative of the council and the demos and thanks to the efforts of the demagogue Clisthenes.  Sparta had her special form of  freedom, which she had gained by the wisdom of Lycurgus and preserved by her own.  Now her eunomia was to stand the test at Thermopylae.  - 69 -  C H A P T E R  71  THERMOPYLAE — A WIN FOR PERSIA A VICTORY FOR SPARTA  Just as Marathon at the end of Book 71 served as the justification of the Athenian constitution, so Thermopylae at the end of Book VII, following as i t does a discussion of Spartan politics, i s presented by Herodotus as justification of the Spartan constitution. In Book 711 the "laws'* of Lycurgus are the underlying'cause Herodotus gives for the discomfort of the mighty invader of Hellas. Book 711 begins with the dispute for the Persian throne that immediately preceded the death of Darius. Demaratus, the exiled Spartan king, i s introduced as one of those who played a major part i n the resolution of the controversy. Xerxes i s proclaimed successor and, almost immediately, Darius dies.  1  Xerxes must now choose between the two unfinished tasks inherited  from his father:  the re-subjugation of Egypt, and the invasion of Greece.  After considering various arguments for each proposition, Xerxes elects to do what he must do:  set i n order his own empire by silencing Egypt before  2 trying to add new territory. After the re-subjugation of Egypt, the question of the invasion of Greece naturally comes once again to the fore. Speeches are given i n a council of  Herodotus 711 1-3. Herodotus 711 4-8.  - 70 -  the Persian court and arguments both for and against the expedition are presented in turn by Mardonius and Artabanus. By means of the speech of Mardonius, Herodotus makes i t obvious what he thought were the Persian motives for the invasion of Greece: basically, the Persian empire must not 3  cease expanding and Athens must be punished.  Mardonius* speech i s very  similar to the speeches made by Aristagoras when he tried to persuade the Persians that they should strike at Naxos and later the Lacedaemonians that they should invade Persia. Both Mardonius and Aristagoras tried to convince their listeners that the campaigns they were advocating would be incredibly easy and that victory would be theirs by simply arriving at the enemy's door4 step with a large force.  One gathers from Herodotus that Mardonius was.  like Aristagoras, offering foolish advice, and one expects disaster for a campaign undertaken on these terms. Mardonius i s followed by Artabanus, who describes like a true prophet the strategic difficulties that were actually encountered i n the invasion of Greece and warns against taking i t too lightly. Artabanus sees many chances for defeat, the greatest of which i s the possibility of a naval reverse that 5 will result i n the cutting off of the Persian infantry.  He therefore advises  the king that, i f he should disregard his advice and insist upon undertaking ^Herodotus VII 9. 1 ~ P» Herodotus VII 9 P» 5  1.  2 - Y»  Artabanus' speeches are i n V 31. 3, 49. 3-4.  This comment reveals that Herodotus understood the over-all strategy of the invasion and the defence.  - 71 -  the invasion, he at least should stay at home and not risk his own l i f e * Xerxes, though at f i r s t angry with Artabanus, i s nevertheless put by him into a state of indecision*  7  Indeed, he seems about to renounce the i n 8 vasion. Then he has a dream. The dream visits Xerxes twice and the second time confronts him with these words: "So, son of Darius, you seem to have renounced the expedition in the council of the Persians, and have treated my words as of no account, as though you heard them from nobody* Now understand this well: unless you march straightway you can expect the following from your actions*  Just as  meteoric as has been your rise to power, so sudden will be your disappear— ance." The dream does not promise Xerxes anything i f he undertakes the campaign* It merely tells him something that he probably feared without the dream: his rise to power has been sudden because, as we have been told very recently, there are other sons of Darius older than Xerxes who thought that they should have been king before Xerxes and who may be prepared to snatch the throne from an idle monarch unless they are given something to keep their minds and hands occupied*  10  The dream alludes explicitly to the precarious state i n which  Serodotus VII 10 6.  1.  Herodotus VII 11. 1, 12. 1.  7  Herodotus VII 12. 1-2, 14.  8  Herodotus VII 14. Herodotus VII 2. 2.  72  Xerxes was placed upon his accession. After his dream Xerxes i s persuaded to invade Greece. But let us be on guard against merely seeing divine intervention as cause i n history once more. The dream makes i t clear that there i s political or dynastic pressure compelling Xerxes to invade Greece. We are reminded of the statement of the wise Artabanus: dreams "are not of god * but are "the cares of the 1  day"  12  11  intruding into one's sleep. Whether this was equally the view of 13  Herodotus concerning dreams, we cannot say.  Herodotus may have argued  that, i f the dream was from a god, then the god was merely telling Xerxes that his precarious position was forcing him to undertake the invasion. But he may also have believed that Xerxes could have realized, and probably did realize, this fact without the god. To Herodotus, therefore, the deciding factor that made Persia move against Greece was Xerxes' fear for the throne.  The reasoned arguments for  and against the invasion were balanced and resulted i n indecision on the part of the king. But, as soon as he realized his precarious dynastic position, he acted.  It i s almost tautological that one has such dynastic problems  "Herodotus VII 16. (3.  2. bXk' oube TauTa e a t i . . . 9 e X a .  "Herodotus VII 16. (3. 13  2. TCC X I S r\\i£pr)Q  cppovTiCei.  Artabanus seemed to be sincere i n his desire to disprove that Xerxes had seen anything real (VII 17. l ) . Yet, despite his scepticism, Artabanus did see a dream.  73 -  only where one has a monarchic form of government. Thus the decision to invade Greece, in the eyes of Herodotus, was made by a monarch, not because he was a man. a husband, or a warrior, but solely because he vas a monarch. In Book I we discovered that Sparta came to a state of eunomia through the wisdom of Lycurgus, i n Book V, that Athens became a democracy by a form of political evolution, and in Book HI, that Persia, after debating certain other forms of government, elected to remain a monarchy. Fittingly, i t i s in terms of this last decision that Herodotus chooses to find the cause of subsequent Persian actions. The die was cast i n Book III, not by the gods, but by men i n cool debate. Persian monarchy i s now to be pitted against Spartan eunomia and Athenian democracy. Xerxes decides to invade Greece, and so advances toward his f i r s t test, Thermopylae. At Sardis the land forces muster, whence they advance tp the Hellespont and cross i t , proceeding along the coast with the fleet offshore advancing in conjunction. Then Herodotus presents a description of the 14 nature and magnitude of the forces by land and sea.  Finally, after we have  been over-awed by the scale of this huge force and have had sufficient time to wonder how i t was that the Hellenes ever managed to pluck up enough courage to face a l l these Persians, let alone defeat them, Herodotus raises that very question himself.. Herodotus 711 61-100,  - 74 -  "When he had reviewed the fleet and disembarked from the vessel, he sent for Demaratus the son of Ariston, who was marching with him on the expedition to Hellas, and calling him i n he asked him this:  'Demaratus,  i t i s my pleasure to ask you something that occurs to me. Tell me now, i f the Greeks will stand their ground and raise their hands against me. I do not think they w i l l .  Even i f the Greeks and a l l the other men to  the West were gathered together, they would not be able to endure my 15 advance, being so heavily out-numbered.'" This question i s one thing i n the mind of Xerxes, but i n the mind of Herodotus i t becomes another: how was i t that Sparta (the question i s addressed to a Spartan) had the courage not to capitulate, but to lead Hellas against a l l of Asia and win? The words used by Demaratus i n reply have a familiar ring: "Poverty i s Hellas' old bed-fellow, but valour i s her new-found friend, which she has got by work, wisdom, and strict law. Using valour, Hellas wards off poverty and despotism." ^ 1  In these words of Demaratus, we are strongly reminded of the very words Herodotus used to describe the reforms of Lycurgus and their effect on the Spartan people. "Work and wisdom" remind us of old Liehes, who showed Sparta the way to leadership i n the Peloponnesus, while "strict law" reminds us of the transition the Spartans made from kakonomia to eunomia through the  Herodotus VII 101. ^Herodotus VII 102. 1.  - 75  reforms of Lycurgus. We are now told that these conditions specifically lead to greatness and freedom from despotism. But i n this context "freedom from despotism" does not mean just freedom from some local Greek tyrant. With the potential enslaver of Greece actually present to hear these words the statement i s akin to a prophecy that Hellas will meet and ward off the threat of slavery from the Persian invader. Here we have the discovery of historical cause in the political institutions of the Spartan people. Demaratus continues and tells Xerxes bluntly that the Spartans will fight 17 him even i f a l l the rest of Greece capitulates.  Xerxes laughs and returns  to his old arguments about the vastness of his own forces compared to the smallness of those of the Greeks. He suggests to Demaratus that, i f the situation (TO i t o \ IT IHOV) i s such as he has described i n Sparta, and i f one Spartan i s a match for ten of his men, then he, as a king, entitled to double portions of everything else, ought to be willing to fight against about 18 twenty of his Persians.. "Come now and look at i t reasonably. How could a thousand, even ten thousand, even f i f t y thousand men, a l l being equally free and not ruled by any one man, oppose such a great army? For, i f they were ruled by a single man after our fashion, they might become braver than i s their usual habit out of fear of him, and might advance, driven by the whip, against greater numbers than their own. like that."  19  'Herodotus VII 102. 2-3. Herodotus VII 103. 1-2. 19  Herodotus VII 103. 3-4.  But, abandoned to freedom, they would do nothing  Demaratus answers the f i r s t part of Xerxes* argument by saying that he would 20 rather not have to fight anybody* "But i f there were need or some great cause driving me, I should gladly fight with any one of those men who claim to be a match for three Greeks* So also with the Lacedaemonians, they are inferior to none i n single combat,  but together they are the best i n the world* Yes, they are free,  but not entirely free*  For over them there i s a despot, nomos* This  they fear far more than your men do you. What this master commands, they do*  And his command never varies, he allows them to flee from no number  of men i n battle, but orders them to stay i n their ranks and conquer or die*"  21  Unless the Spartans had obedience to law, eunomia. this argument of Demaratus would be meaningless, an impossible claim*  The assertions of Demaratus are  intelligible because the reader understands them i n the light of the discussion of Spartan reforms i n Book I* Xerxes advances from Doriscus, and sends messengers to parts of Greece demanding the tokens of submission, earth and water. No messengers are sent to Athens and Sparta, however, because of the way these two cities treated the earlier messengers of Darius: the Athenians threw theirs into a pit, the Spartans theirs down a well. The Spartan people had acted tyrannically, condemning two men to death without t r i a l , and violating the established  Herodotus VII 104. 3* 21  Herodotus VII 104. 3-5  - 77 -  customs vita regard to the sanctity of ambassadors from another country* Things began to go badly for Sparta thereafter, which would have been no surprise to Herodotus. So the Spartans, recognizing their guilt, called for two volunteers to come forward and die for their state*  It vas to restore  the fortunes, and save the freedom, of Sparta that two nobles, Spercbias and 22 Bulis, offered themselves to go and die at the hands of the great king* The proud words of these two Spartans, placed out of chronological order and with the Persians advancing towards Thermopylae as an unnatural background, provide further comment on the difference between the relative positions of a private Persian citizen and two private Spartan citizens* Hydarnes, the Persian, who became the commander of the "immortals" at Thermopylae, asks the Spartans why they do not reject their unhappy mission 23 and simply make friends with the king and enjoy l i f e i n Persia*  The answer  he i s given i s not only an answer to his question but also a reflection on the nature of the conflict at Thermopylae, an assertion of the willingness of free people to die for their freedom* "Hydarnes, the advice that you give us i s unbalanced. You advise us out of knowledge of one half, and from ignorance of the other. You know what i t i s to be a slave but you have had no experience of freedom, whether i t i s or i s not a sweet thing. If you knew what i t was, you would not advise us 24 to fight for i t with spears alone, but with axes as well."  22  Herodotus 711 131-136.  Herodotus 711 135. 1-2. 24  Herodotus 711 135. 3.  - 78 -  These may or may not have been the words of two Spartans addressed to Hydarnes i n Persia, probably they were not, but they are certainly the words of Herodotus explaining why the Spartans will fight Hydarnes and the Persians at Thermopylae, at Plataea, and will eventually lead Greece to victory over superior numbers* Here Xerxes i s answered. It i s not a human despot who will lead the Greeks to success, i t i s freedom. People stand their ground in battle when they are free not because they fear the whips behind them but because they have before them an idea of the sweetness of freedom* In Book V Herodotus has already told us that he thinks people under a tyrant shirk their 25 duty i n battle*  Ve therefore now know what to expect from both sides at  Thermopylae. From the Greeks we shall expect outstanding courage even to the death, from the Persians reluctance and cowardice* There i s a discordant note, however, i n the remarks of Demaratus. Herodotus has made Demaratus show how the Spartans are ruled by their nemos* But 26 this nomos has also been called a despotes* this?  What does Herodotus mean by  T. A. Sinclair notes the introduction of this word and places beside  i t a similar point made in Book III: "Perhaps Nomos was really now becoming a despotic ruler with a l l the uncertainty and fickleness of the traditional  T u p a v v o G • At any rate  Herodotus has another tale to t e l l which, like the story of Demaratus, ends with the emphasis on  v o u o S , but the point of the story i s quite  different. The following i s a translation of most of the passage: i t  'Herodotus  78«  'See page 76*  - 79 -  keeps the word vo\ioQ where i t occurs and makes no attempt to reproduce in English the interplay of VOJIOG  and vou-iCe tv  .  'If one were to  offer to a l l men the choice of the best nomoi i n the world, they would a l l , after a good look around, choose their own . . . • There are i n dications that men do i n fact adopt this attitude towards nomoi* This story will serve for one:  King Darius during his reign summoned Greeks  who were present at his court and asked them for what sum of money they would agree to eat their fathers at death* They replied that they would not do so on any account. Darius after that summoned members of a tribe of Indians who do eat their parents and asked them i n the presence of the Greeks, who followed what was said through an interpreter, what sum of money they would take to consume their fathers with f i r e .  They cried out  in horror at the very mention of such a thing. Both these are practices established by Nomos (vevojj, iana i)  and I think Pindar was quite right 27  in that poem i n which he said that Nomos was king of a l l . "* Thus, according to the observations of Herodotus, nomos could be, and usually was, a basileus or a desnotes of a people, and we have been told that the Spartans themselves were under this despot, nomos. In spite of this, Herodotus has shown us quite clearly that he regards the Spartans as a free people* The story of Sperchias and Bulis has shown this. to some sort of paradox*  So i t seems that we are led  How can the Spartans be under a form of despotism  and yet be free at the same time? The solution to the paradox was given to us i n Book 71 i n a typical Herodotean 'digression' on the history of: the Spartan kingship. We are f i r s t told there that the Spartans have two kings, and various accounts of how this  Sinclair, p* 40  - 80 -  came about are presented*  Next comes a l i s t of the prerogatives of the  Spartan kings: they have certain priesthoods and absolute power i n declaring war; they are allowed a body-guard and positions of honour at feasts, where they are served f i r s t and are given double portions; they have other incidental duties and privileges. Theirs are the oracles to keep, a duty they share with the "Pythians," theirs are certain c i v i l disputes to judge; 28 they each have one vote i n the council of thirty elders,  which vote can  be recorded i n absentia through a near relative; and, finally, a special 29 state of mourning i s declared at their death* Herodotus then turns to some past Spartan kings and their doings.  One  king, Ariston, had married twice without issue and suddenly began to cast lustful eyes on the wife of his best friend, Agetus. So he tricked Agetus by means of an oath into parting with his wife; and taking her he divorced his own.  From his second wife there was issue, Demaratus, but because of  the confused marital circumstances there seemed to be some doubt over whose son Demaratus really was.  Later, when Demaratus became king of Sparta, he  f e l l out with Cleomenes, who then raked up the question of the birth of Demaratus and with the help of Leotychides hailed the king into court. At length he managed to get him deposed* Demaratus had already incurred the  On this and Thucydides I 20* 3 see How and Wells II p. 87* 29  Herodotus VII 51-60*  ^°Herodotus VII 63. 1*  The word i s arcone|i^a'(j.evo€. Compare this action  with that of Periander, who, as some believed, murdered his wife*  - 81 -  hatred of Leotychidea by carrying off the letter's bride-to-be and marrying her himself*  After asking the truth about his birth from his mother and get-  ting either a skilfully non-committal answer or else what amounted to an 31 admission of genuine ignorance on her part, Demaratus left Sparta for good* Leotychide8, however, was not to have everything his own way.  He too had  to face judgement in court, after he was discovered sitting on a glove f u l l of money that he had received as a bribe* He was found guilty and deposed* Like Leotychidea, Cleomenes also had his share of trouble because of his conspiring with the priestess of the Delphic oracle in order to depose Demaratus, for, when the Spartans asked the oracle i f Demaratus should be deposed, Cleomenes intrigued with the Delphic priestess to insure that she would condemn Demaratus. For this, Cleomenes was found guilty and exiled. So he went 32 into Arcadia  and began to stir up the Arcadians against his ex-countrymen.  In fear of these actions the Spartans recalled and re-established him as king in f u l l standing.  Having returned home, Cleomenes went and was finally put 33  in the stocks, where he died.  There had been one t r i a l , however, that  Cleomenes won. when he invaded the Argolid and brought Argos to her knees but came back without actually taking the city, he was tried on the accusation that 34 he had taken a bribe to spare the city. This charge he escaped. Herodotus VII 62-70. Herodotus (VI 74. l ) says that he first went to Thessaly. likely*  Bat this i s un-  An emendation of the text i s suggested by Daphne Hereward, "Herodotus  vi.74," CP XLVI (1951) p. 146. 35  Herodotus VII 71-75. 1.  34  Herodotus VII 76-82.  - 82 -  Absolute tyrants, ve have been told by Herodotus, change the ancestral customs, take women by force, and condemn men to death without t r i a l * The history of Spartan kingship, however, shows only a few examples of questionable dealings with women, quite modest acts beside those of Periander, who murdered his wife and stripped a l l the women of Corinth naked i n one day; the ancestral customs were never changed after Lycurgus, indeed, they were rigidly kept, so much so that a number of kings lost their positions because they had either broken the law or, as i n the case of Demaratus, did not f u l f i l l a l l the legal requirements to be king. The kings, therefore, were as much under the law as any other Spartan citizen, the only difference between them and ordinary Spartans being their special privileges, which, were clearly defined* Finally, of course, they did not condemn men to death without t r i a l .  This means that the "despot, or "king," of Sparta was not the 11  man who bore the t i t l e , but law, nomos* Nomos ruled the king as well as the Spartans. This i s what Demaratus meant when he said that nomos was despotes of Sparta* He was warning us not to assume that the "constitutional mon— archs" of Sparta were i n any way tyrants like Xerxes* The rule of nomos could, and should, be tempered* Ve have seen i n many places throughout the history of Herodotus that nomoi are very easily changed. Usually, Herodotus leaves us with the impression that such impermanence i s one of the evils of tyranny. But what would he have said about free people changing their laws?  It i s worthy of note that there are only two peoples  spoken of as free i n the history of Herodotus, the Spartans and the Athenians*  - 83 -  It i s also worthy of note that Herodotus shows how both these peoples made changes i n their nomoi* This i s significant. Herodotus i s the relentless critic of tyranny* He seems to search for i t everywhere and to warn his contemporaries about the pitfalls of the institutions of his time. I have already argued that for him freedom entails the absence of tyranny; now i t i s possible to go further. Freedom i s a kind of balance between the people's control over their nomoi and their nomoi's control over them, for i t i s when the people have demonstrated their ultimate superiority over their nomoi that the absolute nature of the nomoi's control i s broken*  Only  then, although the people may s t i l l be entirely submissive to their nomoi. can they be called free. Nomos i s and must be master.  But the people must  show that they are the ultimate masters of their master.  Thus Spartan free-  dom and the will to resist Persia a l l began with wise Lycurgus, who, we may remember, when he was considering the changes i n Spartan law, was addressed in this way by the Delphic oracle:  "I do not know i f I am prophesying to a 35  god or a man, more likely, I think, to a god, Lycurgus*"  Herodotus must  have concurred i n this tribute to the greatness of the father of Spartan ennomia* Demaratus saw the source of Spartan valour i n their political institutions*  Xerxes, on the other hand, suggested that the Greeks might derive  valour from being flogged into battle by a master, but he could not see how  Herodotus I 65* 3  their being free would help them i n standing their ground before him.  The  reader of Herodotus will recall a story that disproves Xerxes' contention about the value of whips to inspire courage i n fighting men.  Perhaps Herod-  otus recorded this story i n Book IV because, i n proving that whips actually destroy courage i n battle, i t anticipated the futile policies of the great king i n the battle of Thermopylae. "(The Scythians) entered the country i n pursuit of the Cimmerians, and. on their return home after the long gap of twenty-eight years, found trouble waiting for them hardly less serious than their struggle with the Medes. This was i n the shape of a large hostile army, which opposed their entrance for the Scythian women, wearied with their menfolk's protracted absence, had intermarried with the slaves.. *  «  *  "From the union of these slaves with the women of Scythia a new generation had grown to manhood, and when they learned the circumstances of their birth they resolved.to oppose the return of the army from Media. As a preliminary measure of defence they dug a broad trench from the Tauric mountains to the widest part of lake Maeotis; then, taking up defensive positions along i t , resisted a l l efforts to force an entrance. Many engage ments were fought, but the invading army could make no headway until one of their number thought of a new plan of attack. 'My friends,' he said, 'what we are doing i s absurd. In this war with our own slaves we stand to lose both ways, by the casualties we i n f l i c t no less than by the casualties we suffer; for the more we k i l l of them, the fewer we shall have, when we are once again their masters.  I propose, therefore, that we should stop using  spears and bows and go for them each one of us with a horsewhip.  When they  saw us armed, they naturally thought that they were as good men as we are, and were meeting us on equal terms; but when they see us coming with whips instead, they will never try to stand up to us.'  "The Scythians put the plan into action with immediate success; the opposing army was dumbfounded; every man forgot he was a soldier and fled." Ve need not ask i f this story contains any historical truth. The people of Herodotus' time who kept this story alive, even i f they did not believe in i t s historical truth, at least preserved i t because they believed i n the potential truth of i t s lesson. A slave i s no match for a free man in battle. But treat him as a free man and fight with him on equal terms and he i s as good as any. Herodotus makes one general remark about the value of Xerxes' men at Thermopylae: "They made i t clear to anyone and especially to the vjng himself that i n his army were many bodies (SvGpumoi)  but few men  ('av&pee). " '  7  Xerxes also discovered the value of whips at Thermopylae. He found that free men would stand their ground without being flogged into battle, for on the third day, when his own men were reluctant to face the fierce-fighting Greeks, 38 he resorted to driving his army into combat with whips.  So much for his  suggestion that beating men like animals or slaves could make them any more manly in battle. The last scene on the field' of Thermopylae i s simply sketched in these words:  Herodotus I? 1. 2-3, 3-4. 1. 37  Herodotus VII 210. 2.  ^Herodotus VII 223. 3.  The translation i s de Selincourt's.  - 86 -  "So saying Xerxes vent touring amongst the bodies. And, having heard that Leonidas was basileus and general of the Lacedaemonians, he gave 39 orders to cut off his head and fix i t on a stake." This i s a scene of poignant contrast. The victorious king in the battle of Thermopylae was not Xerxes but Leonidas. The humiliation that the body of Leonidas had to suffer only adds to his stature as a great man; at the same time i t detracts from the "winner," Xerxes. The contrast between these two men i s heightened by the fact that both carried the same t i t l e , basileus. Yet one was king of an enslaved people while the other's people were free.  59  Herodotus VII 283. 1*  <•» 87 *»  CHAPTER VII THE EPILOGUE OP HERODOTUS' HISTORY  After Thermopylae, Herodotus takes us through Salamis, Plataea, and Mycale, showing us how the slave army of the great self-indulgent king of Persia was defeated by a few determined, proud, and "free" Greeks. He concludes his account of the war at the Hellespont, where the invader first crossed into Europe and so beyond what was his due, only to meet defeat for his insolence. As Herodotus approaches his conclusion, the Greeks win at Mycale, press on to the Hellespont, only to be left there by Herodotus, who turns to what seems to be another digression into the sometimes rather morbid private l i f e of the great king. Finally, when he has described some of the gory details of the aftermath of one of the king's love affairs, he remembers his narrative for a moment and tells us how the Greeks regained the Hellespont.  Its capture, however, reminds him of another depressing  story about the violent Persian satrap Artayctes. Artayctes plundered the shrine of Protesilaus and then added insult to injury by taking certain women within the temple and having intercourse with them. But Artayctes had an ancestor—-end this prompts Herodotus to t e l l another story, which presumably happened i n the reign of Cyrus. Herodotus i s spending more time in recounting illustrative material than in pressing his narrative directly to a specific goal. Is there a reason for this? Immediately after the Persian defeat at Salamis, Mardonius urged Xerxes  - 88 -  not to give up but e i t h e r to undertake an assault on the Peloponnese or else to leave him (Mardonius) behind with some picked troops, who would r e duce the stubborn Greeks to s l a v e r y *  1  Xerxes then turned to one of h i s  proven wise advisers, Artemisia, and asked her what she thought of these two suggestions of Mardonius*  She recommended the second proposal on the ground  that Mardonius was merely a slave of the great king and he would be leading a slave army. The king's slaves are h i s property, her argument goes.  So  whatever they possess already, or win i n the future, be i t money, s p o i l , 2 or glory, i t i s not r e a l l y t h e i r s but the king's.  Whether or not we believe  that Artemisia of Halicarnassus said t h i s , we need scarcely doubt that i t i s what Herodotus of Halicarnassus believed.  At Plataea, Mardonius and  h i s men would be slaves f i g h t i n g f o r nothing, they would shirk t h e i r duty i n the f i e l d , and they would lose. From t h i s general description of the s i t u a t i o n of Mardonius and h i s rank and f i l e before Plataea, the h i s t o r i a n advanced to a description of the state of mind of Mardonius' o f f i c e r s not long before the b a t t l e .  Herodotus had  heard a story from Thersanderof Orchomenus, who received from the h i s t o r i a n a character-reference that i s probably included i n order to r e f l e c t the truth of the story. Not long before Plataea, Mardonius and f i f t y of h i s o f f i c e r s were i n v i t e d to a banquet at the home of Attaginus, the Theban. During the banquet, a Persian o f f i c e r confided i n Thersander i n the following manner.  Herodotus T i l l 100*  4-5 •  Herodotus VIII 102.  2-5*  89 *  "Bo you see these Persians dining here and the army that we left encamped on the river?  3.  In a l i t t l e while you will see hut a few of this host  surviving."  The Persian was asked by the Greek why he did nothing to avert the disaster that he foresaw. Here i s the answer: "Friend, what has to happen from god man i s incapable of averting. For who wants to listen, when a l l you t e l l i s the truth? Many Persians are aware of these facts, but they follow along because they are bound by compulsion. The height of bitterness for a man i s to be a thinker i n much 4 but a master i n nothing." The pessimism of the man resulting from his position as a "slave" i n spite of his high rank, i s obvious and needs no further comment., Herodotus i s analysing where the blame lay for the Persian defeat. Having started with a general statement about the whole of Mardonius * force he has now narrowed his attention to the officers of the Persian army. The time came soon enough for the Persians to fight and lose at Plataea. In addition, according to Herodotus, they fought and lost Mycale on the same 5 day.  It i s the sequel to the battle of Mycale that interests us for the  moment. During the march back to Sardis, Masistes, the son of Darius, accused the general in charge of the Persians at Mycale, Artayntes, of being "worse ^Herodotus II16. 3. ^Herodotus IX 4-5. 5 Herodotus IX 100.  - 90 -  than a woman for such generalship."  We do not know i f Herodotus endorsed  this charge, but he certainly made no attempt to gainsay i t *  Whether the  charge was valid or not, Herodotus has now passed from the rank and f i l e of the Persian army to an officer and now to the generals, casting aspersions on their competence* From the supreme commanders the next step i s obvious. While the soldiers were going out to fight at Plataea without any hope of gaining anything for themselves, while the Persian officers were contemplating the battle i n pessimism and downright despair, and while the Persians were being led by generals whose leadership could not escape serious (even i f unjustified) reproach, where was the king of Persia? The usual place for the Persian monarch was Susa, his capital*  In fact, however, he was much closer to  7 Greece than Susa, i n Sardis to be exact, while his army's morale was thus deteriorating.  But what was he doing, i f anything, to alleviate these  problems? No one who has read the history carefully can escape the meaning of the following words: "He (Xerxes) being i n Sardis at that time f e l l i n love with the wife of Masistes" [the son of Darius and half brother of Xerxes]*  The story i s not told just because i t i s interesting, but because  i t i s a comment both on Xerxes i n particular and on tyranny in general* The details of the ensuing story need not concern us. ^Herodotus IX 107* 1* Herodotus IX 107. 3.  7  Herodotus IX 108. 1*  But, we may add, the end  - 91 -  vas disaster for Masistes and his entire house, who were, as we might 9 conjecture, put to death without t r i a l . From this Herodotus digresses back, we might say, to his narrative, which i n itself i s of only secondary interest to him now.  10  The capture of  the Hellespont brings Herodotus to Artayctes, the Persian governor (presumably the satrap) of the area.  11  Here i s another example of the tyranny  and misrule likely to ensue from Persian domination. Artayctes had robbed 12 the shrine of Protesilaus of its treasure and regularly had intercourse 13 with women inside i t . The rapacity and self-indulgence of the Persian king could be a model for his satraps. Herodotus, however, knows a story about an ancestor of Artayctes, which shows that i t was not ever thus with the Persian empire. For when the Persians wanted to go down to the plains and take the fields of their now subjugated peoples who dwelt there, and to t i l l the meadows i n ease instead of trying to eke out an existence from the harsh and rugged h i l l country, they were dissuaded by Cyrus on the ground 14 that the action would lead to softness and ultimate slavery. That those  Herodotus IX 113. 2. 1 0  I n a manner of speaking the narrative was never of primary concern to  Herodotus, who did not revel i n merely telling stories as some believe. Herodotus was keenly aware of the "lessons of history," which were always of prime importance to him. "^Herodotus (IX 116. l ) says: exupdweue 6 e T O U T O U T O U VOJXOU Hep^ew unapxoG 'Apxa u X T T ) G . 12  15  Herodotus IX 116. 1.  Herodotus IX 116. 3..  14  Herodotus IX 122.  - 92 -  days were gone now the two preceding anecdotes, i f not the whole preceding history, has shown. And, apparently, this self-denial on the part of the Persians i s , to Herodotus, one of the reasons for their past successes. As we have already seen from the speech of Sandanis i n Book I, the harshness of the Persian surroundings was one of the great causes of Cyrus* victory over.Croesus. Thus Herodotus has brought us to what he considers to be one of the great underlying reasons for the expansion of Persia, and hence for the war between the Persians and the Creeks. Myres has argued that Herodotus finds the underlying cause of the GrecoPersian war i n this passage.. He states confidently i n his last paragraph that the choice made by the Persians and revealed i n the very last few lines in the history of Herodotus i s a direct fulfilment of the promise he made at the start:  that the cause or reason, why they fought with one another will  be discovered. "* 1  Myres* belief that Herodotus wrote his last paragraph with his f i r s t one in mind i s largely based on his theory of pedimental composition. In fact, however, we do not need Myres* theory to assume that Herodotus made this connection deliberately. In the epilogue Herodotus returns to the time of Cyrus and Croesus and, in the reference to Protesilaus, to the time of the Trojan war as well;  ' j . L. Myres, Herodotus: Father of History (Oxford, 1953) p. 300.  the history began with Croesus and Cyrus after a brief discussion of the Trojan war and certain other details that preceded that event* The theme of the abuse of women i s concluded i n the story of the amorous adventures of Xerxes with the wife of Masistes. This theme, beginning i n the introduction, where Herodotus says that certain Persian logioi blamed the Greeks for the war because i n the field of woman-snatching the Greeks were far more guilty than the barbarians—even starting the Trojan war over a woman—, spans the whole work of Herodotus.  Not long after these stories  of woman-snatching, the abuse of women and their rights began to be a special characteristic of kings and tyrants from the time of Gyges and his adventures with the wife of Candaules down to Xerxes. Moreover, i n the epilogue Herodotus returns specifically to the threadbare contention of the Persians that the Greeks had incurred guilt when they invaded Troy and thus were to blame for the war.  Herodotus re-introduces i t and discards i t a  second time i n order to pave the way for his final pronouncement on the subject. Artayctes wanted to take possession of the treasure i n the shrine of Protesilaus, who led the Greeks ashore at Troy and died in the process. "Speaking i n the following way he persuaded Xerxes:  'My lord, i n these  parts there i s the house of a Greek man who invaded your land and died justly as a consequence.  Give me his house, so that people may learn  never to invade your land.' He said this because he could easily persuade Xerxes, who suspected nothing of what he really intended, to give him a man's house. And this i s how he reasoned that Protesilaus had invaded the  - 94 -  king's lands  the Persians consider that a l l Asia belongs to them and  to whichever of their kings i s reigning."^ The last sentence shows how thin the argument i s that the Persians had suffered injustice at the hands of the Greeks i n the Trojan war.  To Herod-  otus, Art ayetes was using a lying and deceitful argument to persuade Xerxes to grant what was neither Artayctes' due nor Xerxes' possession. In the introduction the argument that the Greco-Persian war began at Troy i s merely brought forward and discarded. Now i t i s put into the mouth of a treacherous man and thus branded as worthless. Herodotus i s s t i l l satisfied that the injustices began with Croesus. The theme of the abuse of women i s re-introduced to illustrate finally the misrule and tyranny of Persia. The tendency of the tyranny of Xerxes 17 to degrade bis subordinates i s proved i n the cowardice of Oeobazus  and the  rapacity of Artayctes. The theme of the effects of environment upon a people i s at the last specifically related to the Persians and their role i n history. The closing scene of the work i s i n Persia, the enslaver of the large part of the ancient world i n Herodotus' eyes. The presence of the enslaver probably evokes the very last word of the history, &ou\eoetv, to serve another man as a slave, a suitable word for the "historian of Greek 18 freedom," as Herbert J . Muller has called Herodotus, to place at the end l6  Herodotus IX 116. 3.  17  Herodotus IX 118. 1.  •I  p  Herbert J. Muller, Freedom i n the Ancient World (New York, 1964) p. 223.  - 95 -  of his history. Herodotus concluded his study of the Greco-Persian war i n this way to show the Greeks the value of freedom and the horrors of tyranny and enslavement.  - 96 CHAPTER VIII HERODOTUS' SYSTEM OP POLITICAL CAUSE  The purposes of Herodotus stated at the outset of his story were to save the great deeds of Greek and barbarian from obliteration by time," and especially to show for what O\T in they fought with one another."  1  f i r s t of these has been amply f u l f i l l e d .  The  He has shown how the Persians  grew i n a few generations from an insignificant tribe of unorganized people in the Median empire into the rulers of a l l but the entire civilized world. He has described many of the legal, political, artistic, and architectural achievements of both Greek and barbarian, and he has shown both how these civilizations came into conflict, and how the Greeks won their stunning victory. But what of his promise to give the aitie of the war? Here we must establish the meaning of the word aitie before making assessment. 2 and most obvious meaning in Herodotus i s "blame."  The f i r s t  In this sense i t i s used  over and over again, and in the introduction "blame" i s at least part of the connotation, for Herodotus immediately takes up the Persian conviction that the Greeks are to blame for the war.  The latter he discards i n order to  ^Herodotus I 1. 2 See A. E. Wardman, "Herodotus on the Cause of the Greco-Persian Wars," AJP LXXII (l96l) pp. 134-138, and Henry R. Immerwahr, "Historical Causation in Herodotus," TAPA LXXX7II (1956) pp.  - 97 -  substitute his own theory, namely, that Croesus began the real injustices by reducing some Creeks to the status of tax-payers within his empire. Thus the blame, i n the view of Herodotus, i s to be given to Croesus. In most cases, however, Herodotus seems to use the word i n an ambiguous context, where i t i s hard to t e l l exactly what he means. Indeed, there are passages where i t i s impossible, or at least difficult, to insist upon anything like blame, or guilt, or charge, and we are forced to seek a more neutral translation such as cause. The cognate adjective of aitie i s used in Book II (12.. 2-4), where Herodotus explains why the Persian skulls on a battlefield were thin and the Egyptian skulls thick. The people told him that the reason (aition) was that the Egyptians shaved their heads. This shaving of heads, he continues, i s the reason (aition) why the Egyptians do not become bald.. In the same passage the word i s used similarly twice more. Again, i n Book II (26. l ) the sun i s aitioa for the sinking of the Nile's level i n winter. It i s futile to argue that the sun i s "to blame" here. Later i n Book H  (108. 3) Herodotus tells us that Egypt was no longer f i t  for horses and wheeled traffic after the reign of Sesostris. For this situation the many canals that Sesostris dug are a i t i a i .  In Book VU  (125)  the adjective i s used as a neuter noun, with the article. After Herodotus has told us that some lions had attacked the camels alone of a l l the packanimals i n the baggage train of the Persians, he wonders at the reason (to aition) for this strange selectiveness of the lions. As for the word aitie itself, there are examples i n which i t seems to  - 98 -  nave a meaning similar to the substantival adjective. Powell i n his Lexicon to Herodotus declares that the word means "reason why" twentytwo times i n Herodotus, but there i s a suggestion of "charge, fault, or blame" i n most of these. Nevertheless, there are some exceptions i n Book III.  The first i s to be found in III 118. 2. Here Intaphrenes has just  brutally mistreated the guards of the royal palace because they tried to keep him out on the perfectly true and justifiable ground that the king was 3 with a woman. Intaphrenes replies with swift savageness.  The guards then  show themselves to Darius and t e l l him the aitie of their sufferings. Immediately Darius begins to fear another rebellion against the throne of Persia. Surely the point of the narrative i s that no blame i s to be attached to the guards for what they have done? If the guards were i n any way to blame for what happened, presumably Darius would simply have told them that they had got what they deserved, and he may have thought nothing more about the matter. According to the story, however, Darius became anxious because his palace guards had been attacked suddenly and without provocation. Furthermore, i f the guards had been i n any way to blame for what happened, we should not expect them to go straight to the king. What then i s the aitie responsible for their sufferings? It i s simply that in the course of doing their duty they had stopped a quick-tempered Persian nobleman from entering to see the king at a moment when he had no right to do so. And Intaphrenes was one of the seven conspirators. They had agreed that any one of them could see the king at any time he chose except when the king was with a woman ( i l l 84. 2).  - 99 -  this i s the cause, or reason, for their mutilation; i t i s not the charge for which they were mutilated.  The word i s used in the same way again  only a few paragraphs later (120. l ) . Here a man who has never had the slightest thing to do with Polycrates of Samoa resolves to k i l l him "for the following aitie."  The man has no charge or grudge to bring against  Polycrates. As the story goes, he decided to k i l l him because of a quarrel with another Persian noble.  So, we might say, the cause of, or the reason  for, the death of Polycrates was the quarrel between two Persian nobles. It i s true that at the end of the chapter we are told that the murderer of Polycrates wanted revenge, but not on Polycrates directly, only indirectly, because he was the source of the man's reproach.  Perhaps our best example,  however, i 3 to be found in Book VI (3. 3). When Histiaeus i s asked by the Ionians why he has urged Aristagoras to revolt, Histiaeus makes up a ridiculous story to satisfy their curiosity but suppresses the real aitie. Now i t happens that Herodotus has already told us why Histiaeus wanted Aristagoras to revolt:  he believed that, i f there was a revolt, he,  Histiaeus, would be sent to the coast of Asia Minor to deal with i t . He wanted Aristagoras to revolt because he did not like Susa, where the king 4 had taken him, and wanted to get home to Miletus.  The aitie. or reason,  was that Histiaeus wished to return to his Milesian tyranny. of grudge, charge, or blame i s totally absent. Herodotus V 35. 4»  Here the idea  — 100 **  Thus Herodotus can mean simply "cause" by the word aitie.  In addition,  the word, even though i t be restricted i n other contexts, should have the widest meaning i n the introduction, where the historian i s speaking i n broad and general terms about the plan and purpose of his work as a whole. When Herodotus says that he i s going to find the aitie that caused them to fight with one another, we must assume that he i s going to find out both who was to blame for the war and the reason why they fought with one another. Has he done both these things? Certainly he has shown us quite directly that he blames Croesus, the beginner of injustices against the Greeks, for the war; but what about the reason for their fighting one another? Throughout this study I have suggested how Herodotus has done this. Through the words of Demaratus and through his own praises of democracy he has shown us why the Greeks, especially the Spartans and Athenians, were willing to fight, even against apparently hopeless odds. But why did the Persians fight with the Greeks?  It i s not enough  to say that i t was because Athens sent twenty ships to help in the Ionian revolt, although i t i s certain that Herodotus did think of the twenty ships as one of the major aitiai of the war.  We could, perhaps, find many other  such incidents, small and great, that would have collectively given Persia a hearty grudge against the Greeks. But grudges are only pretexts. We have seen i n the early part of Book VII that Xerxes could s t i l l be persuaded by Artabanus not to invade Greece i n spite of the many "injustices" that Persia had to avenge. We have also noted, however, that within the Persian monarchic  - 101 -  system there were forces driving the king to a policy of foreign conquest. Here we are much nearer to the idea of an underlying cause. There was the problem of securing one's succession to the throne by keeping pretenders too busy to think of plot and intrigue. Earlier than Xerxes, Darius' wife was aware of this need for conquest. She i t was who urged Darius to under5 take a campaign, preferably the invasion of Greece.  Nevertheless, the  Persian drive to expand, for which the doctrine of revenge was merely a justifying pretext, was even older than Darius. Herodotus does not t e l l us that Cambyses was aware of i t , but he does say that Cambyses invaded Egypt because he was displeased with the wife that Pharaoh had sent him.  Tet,  as Herodotus may well have recognized, this i s hardly a reason for a foreign  7 conquest and barely qualifies as a good pretext.  We need not doubt that  Herodotus was aware that this sort of "pretext-making'' was characteristic of empires. He himself knew that Croesus had done this very thing when taking over the Greek states of Asia Minor. "Croesus," he says, "laid hands on a l l the Greek states one at a time . . . bringing one charge against one state, another against another. Against some he could find serious charges Herodotus III 134. ^Herodotus III 1. 7 How and Wells I p. 256, "The personal motive i s characteristic of Herodotus; the alliance of Egypt with Lydia ( i 77) and mere lust for conquest ( i 153« 4) were fully sufficient causes for the attack on Egypt." But surely the incident shows how hard pressed the Persians were at times to justify their "lust for conquest," their doctrine of expansion.  - 102 -  and he acted accordingly; but against others he only brought trifles." Where did the Persian doctrine of expansion begin? Perhaps, i n the eyes of Herodotus, the Persians learned i t from the Lydians or the Babylonians  9 along with the drinking of wine.  Certainly, as Sandanis told Croesus long  ago, i t had i t s roots i n the rugged conditions that surrounded the Persians in the time of Cyrus. Because of their environment, they were able to defeat the Lydians and thus make the f i r s t substantial addition to their empire (of which Herodotus had knowledge) after they had supplanted the Medes. From this time on Cyrus was a conqueror. First he took Babylon and later he died fighting the Massagetae. Thus Herodotus thought that the doctrine of expansion was a heritage from the age of Cyrus, springing from the superiority the Persians had gained from being tough farmers of the h i l l country. When Herodotus comes to the end of his work he associates this toughness with the Persian belief i n their right to rule other men. Cyrus tells the Persians that, i f they keep their environment, they will rule other men; i f they renounce i t , they will become slaves. Herodotus concludes with the comment: "So the Persians agreed and went off home, acknowledging that Cyrus' opinion was better; and they chose to inhabit an infertile country and to rule rather than to t i l l the plains and be to other men slaves." ^ When confronted with the advice of 1  TSerodotus I 26. 3. ^When Sandanis spoke to Croesus, the Persians drank only water ( i 71. 2-3), but at the end of Book I (207. 6-7) they knew about drinking wine.. 10  Herodotus IX 122. 4.  - 103 -  Cyrus, the Persians chose to take the course that would make them rulers of men.  From this choice would have grown their belief that they had a right  to rule other men, a belief that would have easily led to the growth of their doctrine of expansion. However, there i s more we could and should notice about this decision, which as I shall show, was made upon the suggestion of an untyrannical king. Once i t was endorsed by the Persians i t became, in the eyes of Herodotus, an untyrannical move, in that the subject peoples of the Persian empire would be able to see that their rulers did not think excessively of themselves and of their own indulgence.  Instead of plundering temples, as Artayctes was to do,  or snatching men's wives, like Xerxes, they agreed not to seize farms and rule in comfort, but to leave others with their possessions and rule amid the hardships of the h i l l country.  Herodotus apparently believed that the Persian  empire, when i t began, lacked a l l the outward signs of harsh tyranny. Yet to Herodotus the great king and his subordinates were tyrants to the fullest extent of his definition by the time of the Persian invasion of Greece. How was the transition made from mild monarchic rule to unbridled tyranny? Surely i t came after the seven Persian conspirators debated and agreed to retain the monarchy, even when Otanes had warned them like a true prophet that evil would come of i t . And evil did come of i t . . Darius immediately set about ordering the assessment and collection of tribute, a symptom of the presence of a form of tyranny. the transition:  This i s how Herodotus outlines  - 104 -  "Under Gyrus and even under Cambyses there was nothing laid down concerning the payment of tribute; instead the people brought gifts.  Ind on  account of this establishment of tribute and for many other similar arrangements the Persians say that Darius was a money-grubber, Cambyses a despot, and Cyrus a father. For Darius turned everything into money, Cambyses was harsh and tyrannical, while Cyrus arranged everything for their benefit."  11  Thus the rule of the empire descended from the paternal, or providing, rule of Cyrus through the harsh reign of Cambyses to the money-making tyranny of Darius, and was itself proof of the general principle that Otanes had put forward, that even the best of men placed i n a position of absolute power cannot help becoming tyrants sooner or later.  To be sure, the decline was  gradual i n the case of Persia; i t happened nonetheless. I have suggested that tribute (phoros) was a symptom of tyranny to Herodotus. He seems to betray the same attitude to i t i n two other places. In the first instance Herodotus speaks of the way i n which the Scythians ruled Asia "hybristically and tyrannically." One of the marks of this kind of mis12 rule was the random exaction of •phoros.  but here, i t might be argued,  Herodotus may not have been objecting to the exaction of tribute so much as i t s haphazard manner. A more convincing example i s to be found i n the opening pages of the history. In I 5, Herodotus announces that he i s going to t e l l us who i t was who began the injustices against the Greeks. Immediately Herodotus III 89. 5. 12  Herodotus I 106. 1.  - 105  thereafter, he tells us that Croesus "vas the f i r s t of the barbarians of whom we have knowledge to reduce certain of the Greeks to the payment of phoros." Thus the exaction of tribute by Croesus was one of the injustices that started the war.  In the case of Persia the assessment of phoros i s  typical of the change from the mildness of Cyrus, who refused to take away the rich fields of Persia's subjects, to the harshness of Xerxes, who took everything he could, their money, the prime of their man-power for slaves, even their due glory for heroic deeds in battle. In the introduction to this study I wondered how Herodotus would have explained the military success of Persia, since the empire was a form of tyranny; why did he not see that the success of Persia over her enemies was disproof of his theory that freedom, not tyranny, was the cause of military prowess i n a state? I have shown that the rugged environment of the Persians vas one explanation. Now, however, we are introduced to another consideration* Under Cyrus, when Persia expanded more than at any later time, Persian control over her subjects was not described by the historian as harshly tyrannical, but noticeably mild. Cyrus and Cambyses received gifts, but Darius and his successors collected phoros. Cyrus emerges as a mild despot i n the description of his dealings with some of his subjects i n the closing scene of the history. The Persians went to Cyrus on the suggestion of Artembares and proposed removing to better and more congenial surroundings. Cyrus granted the request i n spite of the fact  106  that he believed i t to be the wrong thing to do.  Only after granting the  13 request did he try to argue with the Persians.  It seems from this i n -  cident that Cyrus was not the typical tyrant at a l l . Had he been, he would have either laid down the law as he saw f i t , or, more likely, leapt at the opportunity for a l i f e of ease and luxury*  Again, Herodotus made Darius  conclude his argument for tyranny by suggesting that the Persians owed their "freedom" to Cyrus. Herodotus would never have accepted this statement as true; nevertheless, he could believe that some Persians, who had "no knowledge of freedom, how sweet a thing i t i s , " to use the words of Sperchias and Bulis speaking to Hydames, would accept the assertion of Darius. Herodotus clearly believed that the Persians looked back to a golden age of mild monarchy in the age of Cyrus. It was in the reign of Cyrus also that the Persian empire was founded. The Persians defeated the Medes and took over the rule of their empire, next f e l l the Lydian empire, followed by the Babylonian.  Soon after these  events, in the reign of Cambyses, Egypt capitulated to Persia, and the task of conquering the civilised world looked a l l but complete. But in the reign of Darius things did not go so well. Darius invaded Scythia without conquering i t , and was even defeated in an exploratory expedition to Marathon. The real shock, however, was yet to come. Xerxes mobilized vast forces from the whole Persian empire for an invasion against a few city-states in Greece.  Herodotus IX 122  - 107 -  The city-states won decisively*  It will be noted I have omitted the Persian  defeat at the hands of the Massagetae. This too i s interesting. Before the battle with the Massagetae, Cyrus announced to Eystaspes that he, Cyrus, was favoured by the gods. Again, we remember the trick the Persians set for the Massagetae by preparing a sumptuous feast for them complete with neat wine to overpower them. Signs of tyranny, Cyrus unjustified self-importance 1  (he was not favoured by the gods for he f e l l the next day i n the fighting), and the self-indulgence of the Persians, are present, contributing to the Persian disaster. Again, however, there i s an illustrative contrast. The picture of Cyrus dying in battle against the Massagetae may evoke a picture of Xerxes sitting on a specially prepared seat and watching the battle of Sal amis. Perhaps the Persians could have felt themselves near-equals to their warrior king in the days of Cyrus, but Xerxes left no doubt about bis assumed superiority. An obvious pattern emerges from Herodotus' study of the Persian empire. The more tyranny i t had, the less success i t had i n war.  The reverse had  been the case i n Herodotus' account of Athens' history. To him, while the Athenians were under the tyrants they were not much more successful i n war than their neighbours, but, after Athens won democracy, she became a major power i n Hellas*  The same pattern i s found i n his account of Sparta;  Lycurgus gave the Spartans their eunomia. by which word he probably, meant the rule of law or obedience to law as opposed to the rule of kings or obedience to them. From the time of the establishment of this eunomia Sparta  - 108 -  began to increase in power. Both Athenian democracy and Spartan eunomia were free constitutions as opposed to tyrannies. So to Herodotus there was a direct relationship between the amount of freedom enjoyed by the citizens and the amount of power enjoyed by the city. As tyranny grew, the power waned; as freedom grew, the power increased.  The reason for this i s that  men are self-interested. Their self-interest both helps corrupt the tyrant, as Otanes said, and enhances a free state, for in freedom the individual i s part of the state, and thus, as he prospers, so does his state. Under tyranny, however, individuals have nothing of their own and no hope of gaining anything, for they are slaves. So to Herodotus the political situations of combatants i n an engagement were not only important factors to consider, they were decisive. As Herodotus' contemporary, Hippocrates of Cos, put i t : "We have now discussed the organic and structural differences between the populations of Asia and Europe, but we have s t i l l to consider the problem why the Asiatics are of a less war-like and a more tame disposition than the Europeans. The deficiency of spirit and courage observable in the human inhabitants of Asia has for i t s principal cause the low margin of seasonal variability i n the temperature of that continent, which i s approximately stable throughout the year. Such a climate does not produce those mental shocks and violent bodily dislocations which would naturally render the temperament ferocious and introduce a stronger current of irrationality and passion than would be the case under stable conditions*. It i s invariably changes that stimulate the human mind and that prevent i t from remaining passive.  These, in my view, are the reasons why the  Asiatic race i s unmilitary, but I must not omit the factor of institutions. The greater part of Asia i s under monarchical government; and wherever men are not their own masters and not free agents, but are under despotic rule,  - 109 -  they are not concerned to make themselves militarily efficient but, on the contrary, to avoid being regarded as good military material—the reason being that they are not playing for equal stakes.  It i s theirs,  presumably, to serve and struggle and die under compulsion from their masters and far from the sight of their wives and children and friends. Whenever they acquit themselves like men, i t i s their masters who are exalted and aggrandized by their achievements, while their own share of the profits i s the risking and the losing of their lives.  And not only  this, but, in the case of people so circumstanced, i t i s also inevitable that the inactivity consequent upon the absence of war should have a taming effect upon the temperament, so that even a naturally courageous and spirited individual would be inhibited on the intellectual side by the prevailing institutions. A strong argument in favor of my contention i s furnished by the fact that a l l the Hellenes and non-Hellenes i n Asia who are not under despotic rule, but are free agents and struggle for their own benefit, are as warlike as any populations in the world—the reason being that they stake their lives in their own cause and reap the rewards of their own valor (and the penalties of their own cowardice, into the bargain)*. You will also find that the Asiatics differ among one another, some being finer and others poorer in quality, and these differences also have their cause in the seasonal climatic variations, as I JL4 have stated above." To Hippocrates, the father of medicine, the role of the various constitutions in shaping the nature of men was one to be studied in cold clinical detachment as a static condition. To Hippocrates, i t did not matter i f i t was a political institution or a nearby bog, for both affected men i n predictable , On Airs. Waters, and Places. 16; the translation i s that of Arnold J . Toynbee, Greek Historical Thought (New York, 1962) pp. 143-144*  -llO-  ways, But the father of history went further in his appreciation of this principle*. He studied the Greco-Persian war not as a series of battles the way a military historian might do, but as a psychological struggle on the part of the Greeks to overcome their fear of the Persians and to oppose them with fierce determination.  They did so and won.  To him, there-  fore, i t remained to find the cause of their bravery. Political freedom, for Herodotus, was what made the Greeks fight*  So a political institution  affected more than the nature of men, i t reached as far as their very destiny*  Ken, he believed, shaped their institutions by their own actions  or decisions. It was, therefore, in man's hands to control his own destiny, barring accident  (6eu>v xa l a a  veu-ovtuv),  by making wise political de-  cisions*. Herodotus has taken i t as part of his task to show what "wise political decisions" were and what were foolish ones. Now he leaves i t to his fellow man to learn or to ignore the lessons of history and to choose between deliberately shaping or leaving to chance the future of himself and his descendants*.  - Ill -  BIBLIOGRAPHY (Works c i t e d arc marked*) ANCIENT SOURCES Aeschylus  The Peraae of Aeschylus, H, T. Broadhead, Ed. (Cambridge, I960).  Herodotus 1. Editions  ^Hlstoriao  t  2 v o l s . (Oxford, I960).  He*rodote 10 v o l s . , Ph. E. Legraned, Ed. (Bude B  Series, P a r i s , 1955). Herodotus» the Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Books. 2 v o l s . , I Parts I and I I , R. W. Macan, Ed, (London, 1908). 2.  Translations  *A. D. Godloy, Herodotus 4 v o l s . (Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library, London, 1928). P. R. B. Godolphin, The Greek Historians I (Nov; York, 1942). *Georg® Rawlinson, Herodotus* end Persian Wars  History of the Greek  (New York, 1965).  *A. de Selincourt, Herodotus, the Histories (Edinburgh, 1959). Hippocrates  t r a n s l a t e d i n part by Arnold J. Toynbse, Greek H i s t o r i c a l Thought (New York, 1962).  Plutarch  Translated by Bernadotte P e r r i n , Plutarch's Lives, 11 v o l s . (Loeb C l a s s i c a l Library, London, 1926).  Polybius  QHlBtoriao. 4 v o l s . (Oxford, 1823).  Thucydides  ftHistoriae,  2 v o l s . (Oxford, I960).  i  i  112 -  Bibliography (continued)  MODERN SOURCES Abbot, G. F.,  Thucydides. a Study i n Historical Reality (London, 1925).  Agard, Walter R., Andrewss, A.,  What Democracy Meant to the Greeks (Madison, I960), •"Athens and Aegina," BSA XXXVII (1936-1937) pp. 1-7. •"Eunomia," C& XXXII (l938) pp. 89-102. The Greek Tyrants (New York and Evanston, 1962).  Baldwin, B.,  "How Credulous was Herodotus?, ' Greece and Rome XI 1  (1964) pp. 167-177. Blake, Warren E.,  "Cicero's Greek Text of Herodotus I. 31,* J£P LXV (1944) pp. 167-169.  Brown, Truesdell S.,  "Herodotus and-his Profession," American Historical Review LIX (1954) pp. 829-843. "Herodotus Speculates about Egypt," AJP LXXXVI (1965) pp. 60-76..  Browning, Robert,  "Herodotus V. 4 and Euripides Cresphontes f r . 449 N.," CR LXXV, N.S. XI (1961) pp. 201-202.  Bury, 2T» B., Calder, W. M.,  The Ancient Greek Historians (London, 1909). "The Royal Road i n Herodotus," CR XXXIX (1925) pp. 7-11.  Campbell, A. I.,  "Herodotus I. 47 and Theocritus Id. XVI. 60," CR XLV (1931) pp. 117-118.  Cary, M.,  "Note on Herodotus IV. 108-109," CR XLIII (1929) p. 214.  Chrimes, M. T.,  "Herodotus and the Reconstruction of History," JHS L (1930) pp. 89-98.  - 113 Clark, R. T.,  "The Campaign of Plataia," CP XII (1917) p. 30.  Cohoon, J. W.,  "A Textual Item i n Herodotus," AJP LXIV (1943) pp. 439-440.  Cook, R. M.,  "Amasis and the Greeks i n Egypt," JHS LVII (1937) pp. 227-237.  Ehrenberg, Victor,  •Aspects of the Ancient World (Oxford. 1946). Society and Civilization i n Greece and Rome. Martin Classical Lectures XVIII (Harvard, 1964). *"The Origins of Democracy," Historia I (1950) pp. 515-548.  Eliot, C. W. J.,  "Coastal Hemes of Attika, a Study of the Policy of KLeisthenes," Phoenix. Supp. V (Toronto, 1962).  Finiey, J. H., Jr., Forrest, W. G.,  Thucydides (Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1963). "Oracles i n Herodotus," CR LXXII, N.S. VIII (1958) pp. 122-124.  Foster, E. S.,  "Trees and Plants i n Herodotus," C& LVI (1942) pp. 57-63.  von Fritz, K.,  "Herodotus and the Growth of Greek Historiography," TAPALXVII (1936) pp. 315-340.  Glover, T. R.,  Herodotus (Berkeley, 1924). The Greek Attitude to Poetry and History (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1954). "Two Notes on Herodotus," CO. XX (1926) pp. 97-98.  Gow, A. S. F., Grene, David,  "Mexpa 9 a X d a a r ] G , " CR XLV (1931) p. 172. •"Herodotus, the Historian as Dramatist," The Journal of Philosophy LVIII (l96l) pp. 477-488.  Griffiths, J. Gwyn,  "Herodotus and Aristotle on Egyptian Geometry," CR LXVI, N.S. II (1952) p. 10.  - 114 -  Grundy, G. B.,  •The Great Persian War and i t s Preliminaries (London, 1901).  Hadas, Moses,  "On the Golden Vine of the Persian Throne," CJ XXIII (1928) pp. 702-703. "Utopian Sources i n Herodotus," CP XXX (1935) pp. 113-121.  Halliday, W. R.,  "Orthagoriscus," CR XXXVII (1924) p. 15  Hammond, N. G. L.,  *A History of Greece to 322 B.C. (Oxford, 1963).  Hereward, Daphne,  •"Herodotus v i . 74," CR LXV, N.S. I (l95l) p. 146.  Hignett, C ,  •A History of the Athenian Constitution to tha End; .<vf FifthICenWv B. C. (Oxford, 1956).  Hirst, Gertrude Mary, Holland, Louise Adams,  •Collected Classical Papers (Oxford, 1938). "Herodotus I, 94: A Phocaean Version of an Etruscan Tale," AJA XLI (1937) pp. 377-382.  How, W. ¥., and  •A Commentary on Herodotus. 2 vols. (Oxford, 196l).  J. Wells, Immerwahr, Henry R.,  •"Aspects of Historical Causation i n Herodotus," TAPA LXXXVII (1956) pp. 241-280. ""Epyov : History as a Monument i n Herodotus and Thucydides," AJP LXXXE (i960) pp. 261-290. •"Historical Action i n Herodotus," TAPA LXXXV (1954) pp. 16-45.  Jacoby, F., see Wissowa, G. "The Campaign between Athens and Aigina," AJP LXXXIII Jeffery, L. H.,  (1962) pp. 44-54. Prosopographia Attica (Berlin. 190l).  Kirchner, Iohannes  - 115 -  Laird, A. G.,  "Herodotus on the Pelasgians in Attica," AJP LIV (1935) PP. 97-119. "The Persian Army and Tribute Lists in Herodotus," CP XVI (1921) pp. 505-526.  Last, Hugh,  "Thermopylae," CR LVH (1945) pp. 65-66.  Lattimore, Richmond,  "Herodotus and the Names of Egyptian Gods," CP XXXIV (1959) pp. 557-565. "The Composition of the History of Herodotus," CP LIII (1958) pp. 9-21. •"The Wise Adviser in Herodotus," CP XXXIV (1959) .pp. 24-55.  Lazenby, J. F.,  "The Strategy of the Greeks i n the Opening Campaign of the Persian War,"  Legrand, Ph. E.,  Hermes XCII (1964) pp. 264-284.  "Herodotea," Revue des etudes anciennes XL (1958) pp. 225-254.  Linforth, I. M.,  "Greek and Egyptian Gods," CP XXXV (l940) pp. 500501. •"Herodotus* Avowal of Silence i n his Account on Egypt," University of California Publications i n Classical Philology. VII (1924) pp. 269-292.  McCartney, E. S.,  "Engineering Superstitions Comparable to that Recorded by Herodotus I. 74," CP XXXV (1940) pp. 416-420.  MacDonald, C ,  "Herodotus and Aristotle on Egyptian Geometry," CR LXTV (1950) p. 12.  McGregor, M. F., (See also under Meritt, B.D.)  •"The Politics of the Historian Thucydides," Phoenix X (1956) pp. 93-102. •"The Pro-Persian Party at Athens," HSCP Supp. I (l940) pp. 71-95.  - 116 -  Mande, A., and J. L. Myres,  "The Desert Pipeline in Herodotus III. 9," CR LX (1946) p. 19.  Meiggs, Russel,  "Herodotus," History Today VII (1957) pp. 729-738.  Meritt, B.. D., H. T.  The Athenian Tribute Lists III (Princeton, 1950).  Wade-Gery, and M. P. McGregor, Meyernoff, Hans,  The Philosophy of History in Our Time (New York, 1959). "Herodotus as a Short Story Writer," CJ XVIII (1922-  Milden, A. W.,  Milne, J. G.,  1923) PP. 208-219. "Herodotus I.. 94 NOMIZMA " CR LXIII (1949) pp. 8587. "Sea Power i n Greek Thought," CR LVIII (1944) pp. 1-7.  Momigliano, A.,  "The Place of Herodotus i n the History of Historiography," History XLIII (1958) pp. 1-13.  Muller, Herbert J.,  •Freedom i n the Ancient World (New York, 1965).  Myres, J . L.,  •"AKHPYKT02  (See also under Mande, A.)  IIOAEMCE  (Herodotus V. 8l)," CR LVII  (1943) PP. 66-67. "Dryoscephalae (Hdt. IX. 39. Thuc. III. 24.)," CR LXIV (1950) p. 11. •"'EUNOMIA'" CRLXI (1947) pp. 80-81. •Herodotus: Father of History (Oxford. 1953). The Political Ideas of the Greeks (London, 1927).  Nazaroff, P. S.,  "The Scythians Past and Present," Edinburgh Review CCL (1929) pp. 108-122, translated by Malcolm Burr.  Nissen, H.,  "Der Ausbruch des Peloponnesischen Krieges," Historische Zeitschrift LXIII (1889) pp. 385-427.  - 117 -  Pearson. L.,  "Propaganda i n the Archidamian War," CP XXXI (1936)  PP. 33-52. Pearson, L. I. C,  "On Herodotus I. 33," CR XLV (l93l) p. 14. "The Ingots of Croesus (Hdt. I. 50)," CR XLV (l93l) pp. 118-119.  Pearson, Lionel,  Early Ionian Historians (Oxford. 1939). "Herodotus on the Source of the Danube," CP XXIX .(1934) pp. 328-337.  Pease, A. S.,  "The Son of Croesus," Cg XVI (1920) p. 201.  Platnau, Maurice,  "Herodotus 6. 72," CR LXXIV, N.S. X (i960) p. 102.  Powell, J . Enoch,  A Lexicon to Herodotus (Hildesheim. I960). "Herodotus III. 99? A Modern Parallel," CR XLVI (1932) p. 11. "Notes on Herodotus Books I and II," CO. XXIX (1935) pp. 72-82. "Notes on Herodotus Books III-IX," CO. XXIX (1935) pp. 150-163. "Notes on Herodotus," GO.XXXII (1938) pp. 211-219. "Puns In Herodotus," CR LI (1937) pp. 103-105. "Scaliger on Herodotus," CR LII (1938) pp. 58-59. "The Manuscript S of Herodotus," CR LI 91937) pp. 118-119.  Pritchett, W. Kendrick, Marathon (Berkeley and Los Angeles, I960)., "Xerxes* Route over Mount Olympos," AJA LXV (l96l) pp. 369-376. Quincey, J. H.,  "The Nile in Flood, Herodotus II, 19, 2." CR LXXIX, N.S. XV (1965) p. 10.  118 -  Raubitschek, A.,  "Treaties between Persia and Athens," Greek. Roman, and Byzantine Studies V (1964) pp. 151-160,  Richards, John Francis Chatterton, Robinson, P. M.,  "Final Nu i n Herodotus and Ionic Inscriptions," HSCP XLVI (1935) pp. 37-41. 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